The Age of Asian Migration: Continuity, Diversity, and Susceptibility Volume 2 1443878219, 9781443878210

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The Age of Asian Migration

The Age of Asian Migration: Continuity, Diversity, and Susceptibility Volume 2 Edited by

Yuk Wah Chan, Heidi Fung and Grażyna Szymańska-Matusiewicz

The Age of Asian Migration: Continuity, Diversity, and Susceptibility Volume 2 Edited by Yuk Wah Chan, Heidi Fung and Grażyna Szymańska-Matusiewicz This book first published 2015 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2015 by Yuk Wah Chan, Heidi Fung, Grażyna SzymańskaMatusiewicz and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-7821-9 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7821-0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Yuk Wah Chan, GraĪyna SzymaĔska-Matusiewicz and Heidi Fung Part 1: Women and Migration Chapter One ............................................................................................... 20 Asian Women and Asian Migration: A Review and Prospective Research Agenda Yuk Wah Chan Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 44 Sunday Catwalk: The Self-Making of Filipino Migrant Women in Hong Kong Ju-chen Chen Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 67 “Towards a Shared Future?” Transnational Identity and Belonging of Japanese-Filipino Families in Japan Jocelyn O. Celero Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 93 Emotional Ransom: Exploring Envy and Resentment among Filipino “Hero-migrants” and their “Left-behind” Families Evangeline O. Katigbak Part 2: Refugee and Borderland Migration Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 108 Military Sanctuary: Migration in the India-Burma-Bangladesh Borderland Willem van Schendel

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Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 131 Black Territory to Land of “Paradise”: The Changing Political and Social Landscape of Mongla Tharaphi Than Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 157 From Transient Migration to Homemaking: Filipino Immigrants in Guam Valerie Yap Part 3: Remittances and Migration Economics Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 176 The Regime of Remittances and Asian Migration Yuko Hamada Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 192 When New Migrants Meet Old Migrants: Indonesian Ethnic Economy in Hong Kong Kim Kwok and Diana K. Kwok Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 211 International Remittances and Household Wellbeing in Tamil Nadu C. Valatheeswaran Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 235 Financial Literacy among Foreign Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore Nguyen Nhu Ha Contributors ............................................................................................. 252

INTRODUCTION YUK WAH CHAN, GRAĩYNA SZYMAēSKA-MATUSIEWICZ AND HEIDI FUNG

Introduction This volume, together with the first, previously published, volume (Chan, Haines and Lee 2014), is an outcome of the Asian Migration conference held in Hong Kong in September 2013, co-hosted by the City University of Hong Kong and the International Organization for Migration. The first volume covers the six sub-regional areas through focused themes: Northeast Asia: Coping with Diversity in Japan and Korea; East Asian Chinese Migration: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China; Vietnamese Migration and Diaspora; Cambodian, Lao, and Hmong Diaspora and Settlement; Singapore: New Immigrants and Return Migration; and South Asian Migration and Diaspora. This book consists of eleven chapters arranged under three migration themes: women and migration, borderland and refugee migration, and migration economics. We believe these are among the most important themes in migration studies that are particularly relevant to Asia. The chapters included here provide new case studies, offering fresh perceptions and nuanced analyses regarding the life experiences and wellbeing of migrants. In the sections below, we discuss how migration is related to world politics and global shifts in the economy. While wars and political struggles led to massive human movements in the second half of the last century, neoliberalist capitalism has predominately boosted migration as a livelihood strategy for many from the South. We hope to suggest pointers that will arouse deeper understandings of migration as a world phenomenon and we also believe Asian migration will provide useful anecdotes for the further development of migration theories and conceptual frameworks.

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Introduction: The Characteristics of Asian Migration

Migration as international politics Political instability and economic turbulence often induce rigorous human movement. Asian out-migration occurred throughout the colonisation period from the nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century. However, the most substantial out-migration waves occurred in the second half of the twentieth century. Decolonisation, shifts in political regimes and Cold War politics brought about sea changes in Asia. Three immense waves of post-World War II migration in Asia included massive population shuffles due to the partition of India into India and Pakistan, the Chinese refugee and migrant movements at the establishment of communist China, and the Indo-Chinese refugee outflows from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam at the end of the Vietnam War. Economic reforms in socialist Vietnam, mass killings in Cambodia, and the political fall-out between Vietnam and China in the second half of the 1970s also led to mass migrations. With this backdrop, migration in Asia has often been linked to the shifting political economic landscapes across the region and has commanded eminent concern in international political circles and academia. Hong Kong, today an advanced city-state in Asia, was largely constituted of refugees and migrants from China at the time when China turned communist (Hambro 1955). With the arrival of hundreds of thousands of poor migrants and the availability of large sums of refugee capital, Hong Kong’s economy was rapidly industrialised in the 1960s, and took off during the second half of the 1970s. Taiwan, at the point of decolonisation, was taken over by a “migrant” political regime, which had attempted to establish its legitimacy over Taiwan through repressive rule from the 1940s through to the 1980s. This migrant regime has since the 1990s been making adaptations to local democratic movements in Taiwan. International migration immediately entails acts and policies of more than one country. Reactions to inflows and outflows of migrants involve different political decisions. For the receiving countries, this involves all kinds of (long-term or short-term) immigration schemes, border controls, and regulations to deal with large quantities of immigration applications and illegal entries. On the part of the source countries, deliberate polices on border control (either to allow or stop outflows), national economic planning, and labour export policies may bring about very different results of migration. The Indochinese saga in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in a number of political debates among the Asian transient centres such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand, all of which had to make their own policies to

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deal with the hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees reaching their shores in large and small boats (Grant 1979). These governments had to face international criticism for their lack of, or insufficient, humanitarian support for the boat people. Due to Cold War politics, many Western countries showed a political will to bring remedies to these human tragedies and thus joined the resettlement schemes. However, the seemingly endless influx of Indochinese led to the slackening of such admission schemes (Haines 2011; Lee 2014). The re-appearance of waves of Vietnamese boat people into Hong Kong in the late 1980s resulted in many rounds of political debate between the U.K. government and Hong Kong’s legislators. A political decision made in 1988 to repatriate economic Vietnamese refugees gave Hong Kong a poor reputation in the international political arena (Chan 2011a). Since the 1980s, despite the fact that the region has enjoyed relative political stability, economic deprivation and sporadic political struggles have continued to draw people out of their home countries; disparity between advanced and rising Asian economies and other less developed regions has also induced many intra-regional migratory movements. Thus, intra-regional migration, especially migration between neighbouring countries, often constitutes part of the specific population dynamics and migration politics in the region. Many of these migrations were originally intended to be short-term, but instead became “permanent sojourns”; this was especially the case where the source countries continued to fail to bring improvements to local livelihoods. With the existence of the overland routes that extend through the many miles of borders separating Asian countries, refugee migration across borders has been commonplace. Refugee migration is often born out of local, regional, and global political dynamics. While most Western countries are seen as possible destinations for refugee settlement, most Asian countries do not play this role. Instead, they have acted as transient centres where refugee migrants file their claims for resettlement. However, the lengthy manner in which the claims are processed means that many refugees are stuck in Asian places for significant periods of time, with no possibility of planning for their own and their families’ futures. Asian countries often face international criticism in terms of their treatment of refugees and human trafficking (such as the “Trafficking in Persons Report” from the United States). As such, migration has often involved much negotiation of powers and intergovernmental politics. The treatment of migrant workers also exposes governments to national and international criticism in terms of whether

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Introduction: The Characteristics of Asian Migration

measures are in place for protecting migrants’ welfare and rights, and various relevant entry and exit regulations. On the other hand, international politics and displays of intergovernmental power sometimes draw countries into whirlpools of tension and make migration a point of concern. One recent case relates to territorial disputes regarding the oil-rich islands in the South China Sea. In May 2013, Philippine coastguards fired at a Taiwanese fishing boat, killing one crewman. The incident triggered an angry outcry in Taiwan and the government demanded an immediate apology. With no favourable reply from the Philippine authorities, some Taiwanese lawmakers urged the Ma Ying-jeou government to file a protest with the Philippines by freezing the importation of Filipino workers (AFP 2013a; AFP 2013b). A similar case occurred in Hong Kong. In 2010, a tour bus full of Hong Kong tourists was taken hostage by a retired Filipino policeman in Manila. Gunfire between the hostage-taker and the police took the life of eight Hong Kong tourists. The incident sparked off social uproar in Hong Kong and a divisive diplomatic row between Hong Kong and the Philippines. Demands for an official apology and the suggestion of a sanction on importing workers from the Philippines generated much tension between the migrant-hosting city (Hong Kong) and the source country (the Philippines). Although the Hong Kong government did not implement sanctions against the entry of Filipino domestic workers, in early 2014, it barred visa-free access to Philippine diplomatic and official passport holders in order to press for an apology. It was only after three years of negotiations that the Philippine government apologised, and compensation was paid to the victims’ families in April 2014 (SCMP 2014).

Migration and neoliberalism Migration and neoliberalism have grown together. As mentioned above, most mass migration movements that have taken place during the last century have been partly the result of global politics in the region. Migration since the 1980s has been boosted by the ending of the Cold War, and the opening up of once-closed countries such as socialist China and Vietnam. Neoliberalism supports the free flow of material goods as well as labour. Expanding economies have made it necessary for countries such as Thailand and Malaysia to recruit an increasing number of legal and illegal workers from neighbouring countries. Advanced economies—including Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong—on the other hand, need large numbers of care workers (such as domestic workers) from poorer countries (such as the Philippines and Indonesia) to release middle-class women

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from home duties. South Korea and Japan are also advanced economies and yet, unlike the above, they are not particularly open to labour imports. Instead of importing workers, they import a number of foreign wives from developing Asian countries. To the source countries, exporting human resources is one way to reduce local discontent. For example, exporting workers for overseas work helped the Marcos government to solve the problem of internal unemployment. However, after many years of implementing such a policy, the lack of economic improvement within the country and continuous outflows of human resources have also brought local criticism against the government (Oishi 2005; Parreñas 2008). Indeed, neoliberalism and the commodification of the care/domestic sector have together crafted a specific global job market for women from poorer countries, and this has also to do with the deliberate neoliberal policy of reducing social welfare (such as subsidising childcare centres) within many developed countries (Parreñas 2000, 2001; Oishi 2005; Farris 2014). Chang (2000) has fiercely critiqued such neoliberal development of the global economy. She argues that: …the simultaneous dismantling of social service systems in the Third World and the First World is no coincidence…facilitates the commodification of women for labor export as it becomes impossible for women to sustain their families at home…are forced to migrate, often to work as domestic servants in the First World…(t)heir role as commodities (or, at best, mercenaries) in this global exchange is explicit, as they are both prodded to migrate and lauded for doing so by statesmen calling them the new “heroes” of their countries.

Such neoliberal policy coincides with the global patriarchal ideology of the gendered division of domestic labour, making women work in the kitchen and responsible for childcare and home-based chores (Huang et al. 2005). Neoliberalism thus thrives, alongside a resurgence of patriarchy. Such neoliberal patriarchy has not only reinforced the unequal treatment of men and women and sustained the gendered division of household labour, but has also allowed the state to evade its responsibility to provide sufficient social welfare in terms of childcare and other familial support. Parreñas (2008, 53) has stated clearly: State welfare support for the family has not just responded inadequately to the changes brought by the entrance of women, particularly mothers, to the labor force in many industrialized countries; it has ignored the needs created by women’s labor market participation. Welfare support in many countries does not meet the new familial needs of single parents or of dual-

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Introduction: The Characteristics of Asian Migration earning or dual-career couples…government assistance keeps child care a private and not a public responsibility.

On the other hand, in providing people with the possibility of seeking employment through migration, governments of the sending countries may face decreased domestic pressure and demands for economic improvement. As stated above, migration has become an outlet for job searching. This is another dimension of neoliberalism. Oishi (2005, 58) has analysed why so many developing countries favour international migration as a development strategy. Firstly, out-migration means increased remittances flowing into the country. Secondly, the problem of domestic unemployment is somewhat alleviated. For a number of sending countries, these remittances already form part of the most dominant components of the national economy; for instance, the annual flow of remittances to the Philippines has increased from $US2 million in 1970 to $US25.1 billion in 2013, which constituted 8.4 percent of the country’s annual GDP (Philippine Star 2014). The top three remittance recipient countries are all in Asia: India ($US70 billion), China ($US60 billion), and the Philippines ($US25 billion) (World Bank 2014). In an age of the feminisation of migration, women of the South are prone to migrate for overseas employment. Besides taking up productive (manufacturing) and reproductive work in foreign countries, many women also engage in cross-border marriage in the global marriage market (Piper and Roces 2003; Constable 2007; Thai 2008; Wang and Hsiao 2009). For example, many Filipinas have married Japanese men (Nakamatsu 2003); Vietnamese brides have become the second largest group of foreign spouses in Taiwan (Fung and Wang 2014); and mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Chinese marriage has become a social trend (Chan and Ko 2014). Filipino and Thai women setting up families in Europe are also commonplace (Pe-Pua 2003; Mix and Piper 2003). Such international marriages within and beyond Asia thrive because of the abundant supply of Asian brides as well as the operation of many matchmaking agencies (Wang and Chang 2002; Thai 2008; Yang and Lu 2010; Chan 2011b, 173). The opening of “borders” for border-crossing labour and marriage migrants has become part and parcel of neoliberal capitalism—this not only entails a hegemonic command of human resources (which transfers people from low-income groups to more affluent parts of the world), but also reveals the elasticity of patriarchy, which has been resuscitated and strengthened by the transnational linkages of the neoliberalist systems. The easy transfer of workers and wives has helped shape the particular form of development seen in Asia, leading to the formation of labour export economies such as those of the Philippines, Nepal, and Indonesia, and the

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depletion of young marriageable females from a number of villages and towns in China, India, and Vietnam (Chu 2010; Belanger and Tran 2011). The import and export of low-skilled labour is an extended phenomenon of the unequal development among different countries in the region. Receiving countries either make policies for overseas recruitment or deliberately “allow” irregular entry in order to make available large pools of cheap human resources from nearby countries. Both receiving and sending countries benefit from such an arrangement. However, these migrants are vulnerable due to the lack of legal measures protecting their rights. Despite legislation of individual nations guaranteeing workers’ salaries and wellbeing, a general lack of political will in Asia to carry out more progressive practices to ensure migrants’ welfare and human rights often renders overseas employment a “black box” within which the global exploitation of migrant workers is generated. Thus, an increasing number of labour and migrant groups have described overseas-based low-skilled employees, such as domestic helpers, as modern slaves. This lack of robust protective measures is also an outcome of the development of the global neoliberal economic mechanism and political mentality. Bacon (2013) makes a radical critique against the tide of international migration. He has studied the U.S.-Mexican migration relations and asserts that neoliberal policies have driven millions of Mexicans to leave home. The collaborative forces between global corporations and governments of receiving and sending countries have made it inevitable that millions of individuals will move elsewhere to seek better opportunities to survive. Otero (2011) further argues that poor policies in Mexico and the government’s gamble with neoliberalism and integration with North American economies have lost Mexico both its labour sovereignty and its food self-sufficiency, and thus have produced ever-increasing outmigration rates. Both Bacon and Otero reinforce the right of individuals to “stay home”, and the need for the governments of developing countries to support people’s survival at home and local employment, rather than unconditionally depend on migration. Migration has often been considered a livelihood strategy and “a vote with one’s feet” for those who are not satisfied with the conditions at home. Without the determination to improve the national economy, poor countries have been gradually emptying their pools of human resources to rich countries. Thus, scholars such as those cited above believe that “staying home” is a resistance against global neoliberalism and a route to regaining self-autonomy and dignity.

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Asian characteristics of migration As a politically diverse and economically active region, Asia has become a central concern for world politics and global economic development. Asia has continued to take the lead in human movements, in terms of both producing the greatest volume of international migrants and receiving the second greatest volume of them (bearing in mind also that China and India—the two most populous countries in the world—also have hundreds of millions of internal migrants). As mobile as this region is, Asia is a focal point for both policy-makers and researchers regarding different forms of voluntary and involuntary human movements, as well as regulation of these movements. The migration flows of Asian women in the domestic-care work sector and the global marriage market, and the governing of these flows, have also drawn much attention (Piper 2008; Momsen 1999). With the experiences of massive refugee movements (in the wake of World War II and the Cold War) and the recycled migrations of the Asian diasporas, Asia can contribute many interesting anecdotes to the discussion of migration impacts on development and migration politics. It is a region carrying specific characteristics of return migration due to the existence of various advanced, expanding, and vibrant transitional economies. While Asian political systems may not often guarantee the best practices of democracies, Asian economies encourage many of those holding foreign passports to continue to work and live in places they had once left. Asians are particular migrant groups; they tend to revive or sustain home connections and undertake return migration. Regardless of whether or not these Asians finally return home, many seem to hold in their imagination the ideal of their return as a life goal. Many Asians offer intriguing stories of recycled and multiple migrations—continuously moving between their home countries and countries of settlement, as well as other transient locations. Among other reasons, such as root-searching and familial reunion, these returns are largely related to global economic shifts; global economic recession in general and sub-regional economic growth in Asia. Around 800,000 emigrants from Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s returned to Hong Kong for work and other reasons in the 1990s and 2000s (Sussman 2011). Large numbers of overseas Vietnamese, overseas Chinese Vietnamese, and overseas Chinese have also returned to Vietnam or China to explore the golden work and investment opportunities on offer in these transitional economies (Chan 2013; Chan and Tran 2011). Many second-generation Japanese Brazilians also returned to Japan due to the lack of job opportunities in Brazil (Tsuda 2003).

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Indeed, return migration in Asia is salient. Return migration has also made many sending countries draw up particular policies and re-entry schemes to cater for their overseas nationals, for short-term visits and long-term stays. The increasing numbers of returnees and their exploitation of local economic opportunities in their countries of origin will inevitably lead to increased social debates on the issues of citizenship, national identity, multiculturalism, and the political-legal hierarchies of weighting entrants of different nationalities, classes, cultures (religions), and sexes. The particular concern of Asian states with population quality and dynamics has led to the promulgation of migration policies that trap migrants in semi-legal or illegal work environments, limiting their human rights (such as marrying locals and getting pregnant) and submitting them to the mercy of their employers and local police (MMN and AMC 2013). To take Asian migration and its governance as a typology, we do not aim to depict Asia as a region unique and different to anywhere else. On the contrary, we would like to see the promotion of a comparative approach to studying migration in various political and economic contexts. Kritz, Lim, and Zlotnik (1992) provide a systems approach for migration research. To them, migration has increasingly rendered inevitable transnational exchanges and interactions between political systems. International migration has brought us to see “disharmonious levels, rates, and strategies of economic and demographic growth that encourage people to migrate” (1992, 1). The migration systems approach provides a comprehensive framework within which to study international migration through a system that is “constituted by a group of countries that exchange relatively large numbers of migrants with each other…include in a system all countries linked by large migration flows” (1992, 2-3). To understand the systems, one has to pay attention to the national contexts of making economic, technological, and social policies that continuously respond to the flows of migrants. In such a diverse region as Asia, migration (a kind of social behaviour governed by national and international regulatory regimes) that takes place in a transnational social system has constituted part and parcel of the political landscape of the region. It has to do with individual as well as familial decisions, social trends (such as migration culture), and entry and exit controls at various checkpoints. It also involves international politics. Migration has often necessitated complex inter-governmental synergy in crafting sending and admitting schemes and in facilitating cross-border movements. While receiving governments have to provide infrastructural

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services for the integration of migrants, sending countries also need to assist return migrants in re-adaptation. As Castles, de Haas, and Miller (2014) have pointed out, migration develops networks between the areas of origin and destination, bringing about changes in both, including changes in demographic, economic and social structures. Not only does this result in a new cultural diversity in the destination country, it also generates challenges to the question of national identity (2014, 7). All in all, we need to consider migration from the perspective of a complex global system that involves political, economic, and cultural decisions at individual, social (familial), and political levels.

Organisation of the book In this volume, we address three eminent themes in migration studies. The first theme is the feminisation of migration. Ever since the early 1990s, with the large number of women migrating to become low-skilled workers within the region, the plight of women migrants has captured much academic attention. Some countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, have become major sources of low-skilled women workers for other countries. Although there has been much discussion surrounding this feminised phenomenon, we believe there are still a number of issues that require further study, which should concern both academic researchers and the migrants themselves. In the first chapter of this section, Yuk Wah Chan provides an overview of the various scholarly discourses on the benefits and problems of female migration. The chapter seeks to suggest a few less studied but important aspects regarding labour and female migration (including the roles of the intermediary employment agencies and migrants’ families in the suffering of the migrants). The chapter also continues with the unfinished debate on the feminist trajectory against the gendered division of household labour and provides new research agenda. In the chapter that follows, Ju-chen Chen offers a fascinating story of the self-enterprising Filipino domestic workers who do not rest on their rest days, but instead engage in all sorts of event-making activities. By participating in and organising beauty pageants, contests and performances, the migrant women un-mistakenly construct a new group identity for themselves which is not a replica of the national (home) discourse, but is a more regional or home-town based folk network. Through their busy schedules and flamboyant “catwalking” on Sundays, Filipino women reassert their desire to create a better self during their overseas stays as domestic workers in Hong Kong.

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In Chapter 3, Jocelyn O. Celero examines the transnational identity of Filipino mothers and their Japanese Filipino children. While a hyphenated identity is often considered halfway and thus belonging nowhere, Celero finds that both the mothers and the children are adept at making use of their bicultural assets to benefit their own lives, and both are able to engage in a rewarding transnational lifestyle between the Philippines and Japan. In Chapter 4, Evangeline O. Katigbak writes about the heavy material demands that Filipino migrants receive from home. The author argues that migration has created a special culture back in the home villages of migrants which makes non-migrants jealous of families who have someone working overseas. While relatives and neighbours often approach migrant families for material help, there has been a sentiment of resentment among the migrants who try to resist such unending demands. The chapter analyses how migration has brought about tension between migrant and non-migrant families, and the social space in which a kind of “emotional ransom” has been developed. Part 2 of the book speaks to those who are concerned about refugee migration in the region, and cross-border movements between neighbouring countries. One of the essential forms of migration actually occurs between neighbouring countries. In the West, human flows across the U.S.-Mexico border have been the most discussed and prominent borderland migrations. In Asia, many borderlands have served as temporary or permanent “sanctuaries” for people who could no longer stay in their homeland. Refugee families who are subject to either political purges or economic deprivation often take with them all their belongings to launch their long march across borders, and many of these refugeseeking journeys have turned into “permanent” settlements. In Chapter 5, Willem van Schendel examines the form of border migration that is least studied by scholars. With a series of visual images from photographs collected in Mizoram (northeast India), he attempts to capture the everyday life experiences of a special migrant group—military insurgents and their families—who have moved along the India-BurmaBangladesh borderland to find a place to settle. Such an intersected borderland has provided a temporary sanctuary for this military group. Tharaphi Than examines the increasingly vibrant economic development of the borderland between China and northern Myanmar. Mongla, a border town that has thrived on what Than calls vices (gambling dens, prostitution, the exotic meat trade, and human trafficking), is the second most prosperous border town of Myanmar. The outgrowth of this kind of “vice economy” has been accompanied by intense border-crossing

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movements conducted by people from both sides. While many Chinese have moved to Mongla to pursue business opportunities and to purchase property, many individuals from Myanmar have also crossed the border to search for jobs. Such a thriving border town has also drawn people from other areas within Myanmar. The author urges that attention be paid to the intriguing sinicised borderland development in this part of Southeast Asia and the various types of border-crossing movements and activities. Valerie C. Yap explores the home-making experiences of Filipino migrants in Guam, a maritime island lying opposite the Philippines in the Pacific Ocean. Although Guam is part of the United States, it is not entirely treated as “American land” in the eyes of Filipino migrants and the local indigenous groups. Guam is also often considered a stepping stone or transient place for Filipinos’ final entry into “America”. However, with long living experiences and the growth of the Filipino migrant population in Guam, Filipinos are gradually removing this “transiency”. Their home-making trajectories and shifting sense of belonging have given rise to new complexities in the construction of identity and inter-racial relations on this western Pacific island. Part 3 of the book is dedicated to the issues of migration economy and remittances. Economics is often perceived as the most important factor causing international migration. It is well recognised that remittances sent back home by migrants have constituted a major part of the national economy of many developing countries. Yuko Hamada examines the “regime of remittances” which acts as a conceptual framework for the various flows and scales of remittances, and points out that remittance flows are dominant in a number of regions in Asia, and significant factors for economic growth. However, overdependence on remittances has posed a major challenge to the development of these countries. It is found that most of the remittances are spent on household consumption, and not on boosting the country’s investment and manufacturing sectors. The author then brings our attention to some good practices in the deployment of remittances. In Chapter 9, Kim Kwok and Diana K. Kwok present a thoughtful analysis of an interesting case of migrant economy: the Indonesian ethnic economy in Hong Kong. What is most captivating is the juxtaposing of two groups of Indonesian migrants: the Indonesian Chinese (who settled in the city in the 1970s and 1980s) and Indonesian domestic helpers. Such an ethnic economy has been made possible through the investment of the well-off group (the Chinese from Indonesia who possess economic and cultural capitals in accessing the market) and the large consumption market formed by the masses of Indonesian domestic workers. The chapter

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analyses various structural factors that have deprived the domestic helpers of business and work opportunities in this economic niche, and how such a problem has led to the formation of an informal sector within this ethnic economy. C. Valatheeswaran studies the various impacts of remittances on the wellbeing of migrant households in Tamil Nadu, a state receiving the second highest remittances in India. The author uses congregate data from a survey by the National Sample Survey Organisation and analyses how recipient households have used international remittances. The results indicate that remittances are mainly spent on food, healthcare, and education, which directly enhance the wellbeing of the families, and also secure a better future for the young generations (in terms of children’s education). However, there are also data showing that a significant portion of the money received has been used for debt repayment. This shows that many migrant households actually suffer from the high costs of migration (charges by middlemen or overseas employment agencies). In the final chapter, Nguyen Nhu Ha examines financial literacy among foreign domestic workers (FDWs) in Hong Kong and Singapore. Labour migration has been problematised by many who query whether overseas employment can help alleviate poverty if migrants and their families are not able to put remittances to good use and invest in the long term betterment of their home families. Through evaluating the responses of FDWs towards financial literacy programmes, Nguyen attempts to delineate the advantages and disadvantages of such training and urges increased research into this area. Overall, we have found that Asian migration has been carried out by different categories of people through different pathways (North-South, South-North and South-South). There is much more to explore as various places within the region are undertaking rapid economic and social changes, and people have been increasingly susceptible to the temptation of migration in the face of various political, socio-economic and cultural challenges at home. As migration scholars from Asia and beyond, we are still in search of more powerful conceptual frameworks through which to unpack the various packages of “knowledge” so far provided by the existing literature on Asian migration.

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Chu, J. 2010. Cosmologies of Credit: Transnational Mobility and the Politics of Destination in China. Durham: Duke University Press. Constable, N. 2007. Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Migrant Workers. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Farris, S. R. 2014. “Neoliberalism, Migrant Women, and the Commodification of Care.” http://sfonline.barnard.edu/gender-justice-and-neoliberaltransformations/neoliberalism-migrant-women-and-thecommodification-of-care/#sthash.arANChyx.dpuf. Fung, H., and T. P. Wang. 2014. “Vietnamese Marriage Migrants and the Changing Public Discourse.” In The Age of Asian Migration, edited by Y. W. Chan, D. Haines, and J. Lee, 213-245. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Grant, B. 1979. The Boat People: An Age Investigation with Bruce Grant. New York: Penguin Books. Haines, D. 2011. “Rethinking the Vietnamese Exodus: Hong Kong in Comparative Perspectives.” In The Chinese / Vietnamese Diaspora – Revisiting the Boat People, edited by Y. W. Chan, 20-35. London: Routledge. Hambro, E. 1955. The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong: Report Submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff. Huang, S., B. S.A. Yeoh, and Noor Abdul Rahman, eds. 2005. Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Kritz, M. M., L. L. Lim, and H. Zlotnik, eds. 1992. International Migration Systems: A Global Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Lee, J. H. X. 2014. “Introduction: Cambodian, Lao, and Hmong Diaspora in the United States.” In The Age of Asian Migration, edited by Y. W. Chan, D. Haines, and J. H. X. Lee, 250-261. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Mix, P. R., and N. Piper. 2003. “Does Marriage ‘Liberate’ Women from Sex Work? Thai Women in Germany.” In Wife or Worker: Asian Women in Migration, edited by N. Piper and M. Roces, 53-72. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. MMN and AMC. 2013. Migration in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Chiang Mai: Mekong Migration Network and Asian Migrant Centre. Momsen, J. H., ed. 1999. Gender, Migration, and Domestic Service. London; New York: Routledge.

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Nakamatsu, T. 2003. “International Marriage through Introduction Agencies: Social and Legal Realities of ‘Asian’ Wives of Japanese Men.” In Wife or Worker: Asian Women in Migration, edited by N. Piper and M. Roces, 181-202. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Oishi, N. 2005. Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies, and Labor Migration in Asia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Otero, G. 2011. “Neoliberal Globalization, NAFTA, and Migration: Mexico’s Loss of Food and Labor Sovereignty.” Journal of Poverty, 15: 384-402. Parreñas, R. S. 2008. The Force of Domesticity: Filipina Migrants and Globalization. New York: New York University Press. —. 2001. Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work. Stanford: Stanford University Press. —. 2000. “Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers and the International Division of Reproductive Labor.” Gender & Society 14: 560-580. Pe-Pua, R. 2003. “Wife, Mother, and Maid: The Triple Role of Filipino Domestic Workers in Spain and Italy.” In Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration, edited by N. Piper and M. Roces, 157-180. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Piper, N., ed. 2008. New Perspectives on Gender and Migration: Livelihood, Rights and Entitlements. New York: Routledge. Piper, N. and M. Roces, eds. 2003. Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Philippine Star. 2014. “Remittances hit record high of $25.1 B in 2013.” The Philippine Star, 17 February. http://www.philstar.com/business/2014/02/17/1291769/remittances-hitrecord-high-25.1-b-2013. SCMP. 2014. “Hong Kong, Philippines Resolve Bus Hostage Crisis As Families Accept Payout.” South China Morning Post, 24 April. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1495132/hong-kongand-philippines-finally-resolve-manila-bus-hostage-crisis. Sussman, N. M. 2011. Return Migration and Identity: A Global Phenomenon, A Hong Kong Case. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Thai, H. C. 2008. For Better or for Worse: Vietnamese International Marriages in the New Global Economy. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Tsuda, T. 2003. Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in Transnational Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press.

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Wang, H. Z., and S. M. Chang. 2002. “The Commodification of International Marriages: Cross-border Marriages Business in Taiwan and Viet Nam.” International Migration 40 (6): 93-116. Wang, H. Z., and M. Hsiao, eds. 2009. Cross-border Marriages with Asian Characteristics. Taipei: Academia Sinica, Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies. World Bank. 2014. “Remittances to Developing Countries to Stay Robust This Year, Despite Increased Deportations of Migrant Workers, Says WB.” 11 April. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/04/11/remittancesdeveloping-countries-deportations-migrant-workers-wb. Yang, W. S., and M. C. W. Lu, eds. 2010. Asian Cross-border Marriage Migration: Demographic Patterns and Social Issues. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

PART 1: WOMEN AND MIGRATION

CHAPTER ONE ASIAN WOMEN AND ASIAN MIGRATION: A REVIEW AND PROSPECTIVE RESEARCH AGENDA YUK WAH CHAN

Introduction The feminisation of migration in Asia has drawn much scholarly as well as public attention since the 1980s. As Zlotnik (2003) has pointed out, compared to migration prior to 1980, a major development of international migration since then has been the increasing visibility of women migrating as international workers. There is no doubt that more women are moving across borders in their own right, rather than being male migrants’ affiliates, but this does not mean that women are gaining an equal footing with their male counterparts. Many women who migrate for work are engaged in low-skilled labour; especially prominent is their engagement in the reproductive or care-work sectors, which reinforces women’s traditional role as household caretaker on a global scale. Many Asian women from less-developed countries have also become cross-border brides for economic reasons, and are considered to have preserved women’s traditional feminine qualities (submissiveness, obedience, filialness and willingness to attend to household chores). While the feminisation of migration points to the fact that more women are migrating, what does this (the abundance in quantity) mean in terms of women’s lives, status, empowerment, femininity, and gender equality? Before answering the above, there are many more questions to be asked. What has made women in the region move so rigorously in recent decades? Are the reasons that make them move today the same as those of 30 years ago? What sustains the push factors? Has “physical” movement really facilitated women’s (social) mobility?

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Women migrants often land in an alien territory to become hardworking workers or wives, with little support. While fulfilling their new roles and duties in an estranged (geographical and cultural) landscape, they also have to shoulder many obligations from home. Being “far” from home does not mean they have shredded “home obligations”. On the contrary, they are still “closely” connected with home through all kinds of cheap and easily available communication technologies (Vertovec 2004). Transnational connections between home (of origin) and the new home are often said to provide emotional support for homesick migrants and help compensate for their absentee roles as wife, daughter, and mother. Yet, few have discussed how such increasingly easy communication has also made it increasingly difficult for migrant women. High demands (for money and material items) from home have become sources of stress on female migrants, whether such demands are made by parents, siblings, children, relatives, or neighbours. What does migration mean to Asian women as individuals and as a social category? How have migration and the traditional gender roles of women (as mother, wife and daughter) continued to shape women’s (physical and social) mobility and immobility? What effects has migration had on women’s bodies and minds? This chapter seeks to firstly provide an overview of scholarly discourses regarding women’s migration and how they have discussed issues related to the above questions. Secondly, it will suggest several important aspects that together will constitute a nuanced research agenda for investigating the phenomenon of the feminisation of migration. After three decades of vigorous research and debates on women’s issues in relation to migration, there seems to be a loss of interest in further researching “women and migration”. We believe further research is necessary to elicit a deeper understanding of the whole issue of female migration and the political economy of such migration that has crosscut important gender, social, economic, and cultural issues.

Feminisation of migration: How? How many? There has been much discussion surrounding the general trend of the feminisation of migration. Around 49 percent of all international migrants (232 million in 2013) are women. However, the situation varies across different regions. The highest proportion of female migrant stock is in Europe (51.9%), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (51.6%), Northern America (51.2%), Oceania (50.2%), and Africa (45.9%). Asia (41.6%) actually hosts the smallest proportion of female migrants (OECDUNDESA 2013), and this rate of female migrants in Asia has declined

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since 1960, which at that time was at 46 percent (Zlotnik 2003). Such a decline in the proportion of female migrants has to do with the great increase in the outflows of male migrants from Asia to the oil-producing countries of West Asia (OECD-UNDESA 2013). Considering Asia as a region producing the second most international migrants, Asian women as a whole are actively on the move. The “taking-off” of female migration in Asia began in the 1980s. As stressed by Hania Zlotnik (2003), the last two decades before the turn of the millennium witnessed the most dynamic movements of women across borders. The growth of female migration has to do with the increasing availability of low-skilled jobs for women, especially in the field of domestic work. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated the number of domestic workers around the globe to be close to 100 million; 83% of those are women (ILO 2013, 19). Asia is now hosting the largest proportion (at 41%) of domestic workers. Many of these domestic workers find their jobs across national borders, within as well as beyond home regions (ILO 2013, 19-24). Female migration is particularly prominent in a number of Asian countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. United Nations’ statistics show that women constitute two thirds of the migrant workers from Indonesia, while half of those from the Philippines and Sri Lanka are women (UNESCAP 2013). There are also large numbers of irregular women migrants from Myanmar to Thailand and from Indonesia to Malaysia. Without regular status, it is difficult to estimate the actual number of women migrants in these sub-regions. South Asian women are increasingly active in crossing national borders to work in the Middle East as well as Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia (ILO 2006). Let us also take a look at the different situations of individual countries and places where large numbers of female migrants reside. In 2011, 57 percent of Hong Kong’s migrants were female, whereas female migrants in Singapore occupied 56 percent of its intake. Japan and South Korea had the same proportion of female migrants at 55 percent, while Macau, a small place but actively drawing migrant workers, had more than 51.4 percent female migrants (World Bank 2011). These female migration trends are connected with the two predominant modes of migration in Asia. As mentioned above, low-skilled labour migration has been one major mode of female migration. Another popular female migration pattern is marriage migration. If we take Hong Kong as an example, the city now hosts over 300,000 foreign domestic workers; over 90 percent of these are

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Southeast Asian females, mostly from Indonesia and the Philippines. Among the marriage migrants in Hong Kong, the predominant group is that of cross-border brides from mainland China. In 2013, 45 percent of all marriages in Hong Kong were Hong Kong-China marriages, 78 percent of which were with a bride from mainland China (see Table 1-1). A comparable situation can be found in Taiwan. Among all foreign spouses in Taiwan, 65 percent are from mainland China, the majority being Chinese women who have married Taiwanese men (Table 1-2). Capturing the trends and patterns of female migration will help us to better understand what exactly is meant by “the feminisation of migration” in Asia. After two decades (the 1990s and 2000s) of vibrant female migration in the region, what effects have such movements had on women’s lives, livelihoods, bodies, and minds? The following sections will review different analytical discourses on the phenomenon of female labour and marriage migration that have been provided by previous scholarly studies. Table 1-1: Hong Kong-China cross-border marriages (1986-2011) Year

HK-China HK-China Total marriages marriages cross-border (with mainland (with mainland marriages (between brides) bridegrooms) China and HK) 2013 19,166 7,444 26,610 2012 20,621 6,917 27,538 2011 20,312 5,867 26,179 2010 19,191 4,836 24,027 2009 18,145 4,194 22,339 2006 28,145 6,483 34,628 2001 18,380 2,359 20,739 1996 24,564 1,821 26,385 1991 21,220 1,390 22,610 1986 15,776 675 16,451 Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Hong Kong.

Total marriage registrations 55,274 60,459 58,369 52,558 51,175 50,328 32,825 37,045 42,568 43,280

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Table 1-2: Number of foreign spouses in Taiwan (1987-2013) Country of origin

Number of spouses

China 315,905 Vietnam 89,042 Indonesia 27,943 HK and Macau 13,168 Thailand 8,375 The Philippines 7,707 Cambodia 4,282 Japan 4,197 South Korea 1,238 Others 14,846 Total 486,703 Source: National Immigration Agency of Taiwan.

Percentages (of all foreign spouses) 64.91 18.29 5.74 2.71 1.72 1.58 0.88 0.86 0.25 3.05 100%

Analytical discourses of feminised migration Although it is not only females from poor countries who migrate, a major focus in academic discussions of the phenomenon of the feminisation of migration has been on women migrants from the developing world. Much interest has been concentrated on those who migrate to find low-skilled jobs or who aspire to marry up and thus achieve a better life. Female migrants from developing countries have therefore become a particular transnational social group under the research spotlights. These two categories of Asian female migrants (low-skilled labour migrants and marriage migrants) have, since the 1990s, drawn immense scholarly attention. Many who examine gender issues in relation to migration have been concerned about the relationship between migration and the enhancement of female power and status. Are women empowered or disempowered in the process of migration and settlement? In what ways are they constructing a new self and new subjectivity? Popular understanding tends to believe that, with the betterment of their economic status, migrant women tend to enjoy greater say and power back in their homeland. However, many have also found that female migration has perpetuated the reproduction of exploited female bodies. Thus, while some may argue that migration can be a form of empowerment and liberation through which women can untie traditional patriarchal bondage, others stress that women are still subjected to subordinating roles and to new forms of exploitation and discrimination in host societies after their migration (Jongwilaiwan and Thompson 2013; Wang and Tien 2009;

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Wang and Belanger 2008; Huang, Yeoh and Rahman 2005; Piper and Roces 2003a; Constable 2005, 2007; Lan 2003; Wang and Chang 2002). Longterm engagement in low-skilled work has led to a de-skilling of migrant women (McKay 2003). Moreover, under the global regime of the sexualised and racialised division of labour, international migration has strengthened the global patriarchal structure (Hu-DeHart 2002; Parrenas 2001). The above questions are still subject to ongoing debates. Before accepting any ready answers, one must be reminded of a more macro perspective of the phenomenon of female migration—how the international labour market today has largely relied on a massive scale of global search for cheap low-skilled labour through placement agencies. ParreĖas (2000), for example, has revealed that a hierarchical division of household labour has emerged through the migration of low-skilled women workers. While First World women rely on Third World women to take up the burdens of their household chores, women migrants of the Third World in turn rely on their even poorer female relatives to take care of their own children and housework. Chang (2000) also stresses that First World countries have often formulated deliberate economic policies and interventions to facilitate their “continued extraction” of Third World resources, including human resources (2000, 3). Thus, international migration can be considered a continuous trajectory of Third World exploitation. One situation has been quite clear to us—the conventional gendered division of sex roles for home-based work and responsibilities has boosted the international market for female “care” labour, and facilitated female migration across national boundaries. These job types are supposed to be taken up by women due to their motherly and wifely sex roles. Such a situation has, on the one hand, provided myriad trans-border job opportunities for women. On the other hand, however, it continues to resuscitate a gendered division of labour and recast conventional gender boundaries on to women from less-developed countries, rendering a worldwide perpetuation of unequal gender development crosscutting race, class, and inter-state relations. In the following subsections, we attempt to delineate the major analytical discourses on the various issues regarding gender and migration.

Overseas migration, economic heroes, and reversed gender order Many low-skilled women migrants have been described as “economic heroes” who work abroad for higher incomes and send their earnings back home to advance their families’ economic livelihoods. They are also

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applauded by the state for their contribution to the country’s economic development. However, some have highlighted the problem of “moral hazard” (Ebeke 2012) and the negative consequences that such continuous labour export policies have brought to the sending countries. Remittances are often spent on household consumptions and seldom result in long-term investment or societal development, while the sending countries have also lacked the strong will and appropriate policies necessary to boost long-term development and create jobs and general economic prosperity. After almost four decades of massive labour exportation in the Philippines, the country’s economy seems to have made no significant progress and many in the country still have to rely on overseas job opportunities to make decent earnings. College-trained Filipinos find it more financially rewarding to work as low-skilled workers abroad. Hailed as economic heroes by their families and countries, overseas contract workers, such as Indonesian and Filipino domestic workers, have acknowledged the economic incentives of their migration. By leaving home to take up higher-paid jobs elsewhere, women have gained greater economic independence and obtained opportunities to negotiate with the patriarchal structures at home. Becoming the “breadwinners” for their families, they may improve their home status and have more “say” in family matters (Hoang and Yeoh 2011). Yet, with higher earnings and the ability to support their siblings’ and / or children’s education and family livelihood in general, women migrants (have to) carry on their unending journey to retain their “empowered status as the relative who helps the family, and the resultant respect” (Madianou 2012, 285). Often, the decision to go overseas for work has turned many of these women into the breadwinners not only of their own families but of the families of others back in their hometowns. Such obligations to send remittances home have created extra stress on the bodies and minds of migrants, a consequence that accompanies the enhancement of their status. Further discussion will be provided in later sections. Some migrant women see migration and overseas work as an escape from unhappy marriages and abusive husbands, and leaving home also helps to reduce the impact of a broken marriage on one’s own reputation and suffering (Lan 2006). Young, single Asian women see going abroad as a chance of avoiding arranged marriages and a personal trajectory to seek modern life experiences not available in their home villages. Thus, migrations for work to more advanced economies are seen as “modern pilgrimages” (Lan 2006). Further developing such discourses of how migration may facilitate women’s resistance against traditional female role bondages and general patriarchal pressures, Huang and Yeoh (2011) have

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also found a reversed gender order in the migrant-sending countries, where husbands become the carers of children, while their wives become the family’s breadwinner through transnational labour migration.

Caring bodies, estranged souls Accompanying the “empowerment” and “resistance” discourses are analyses concerning migrant women’s poor plight including issues of discrimination, marginalisation, general exploitation, and physical and sexual abuse (Huang, Yeoh, and Rahman 2005). Many case studies of migrant workers from different countries have provided evidence for such problematic situations [examples can be found in Huang, Yeoh, and Rahman (2005): Hugo (2005)—Indonesian domestic workers; Gamburd (2005)—Sri Lankan domestic workers in the Middle East; Lan (2005)— domestic workers in Taiwan; Wee and Sim (2005)—Indonesian workers in Hong Kong; Rahman et al. (2005)—domestic workers in Singapore; and Chin (2005)—domestic workers in Malaysia]. A large number of migrant worker groups have also been established locally and regionally to help promote the human rights and welfare of migrant workers. As the majority of female migrant workers are engaging in domestic and care work, a series of care or reproductive work literature has come of age. The emergence of “care” literature has helped deepen our understanding of migrants’ work experiences and has provided further macro analyses of the shifting political economy for reproductive work. This global “care” chain industry has transformed many of the conventional practices of home-based care and household labour (Parrenas 2001; Hochschild 2000). Overseas domestic workers who enter the care sector have helped take care of families worldwide. However, they have left their own families behind. The experience of separation from home and from children has often been devastating to migrant women. Ironically enough, while taking care of other people’s children and family life, the migrants experience a disrupted family life, motherhood, and wifehood (Hochschild 2000). To compensate for their absence at home, many have to practice an “alternative kind of motherhood” from a distance, often with the assistance of ICT (information and communication technologies) (Madianau 2012). As a result of spending years looking after other people’s children and families, migrant women suffer from estranged relationships with their own children due to their “absentee motherhood”. In a recent special issue on transnational practices of social care, Huang, Thang and Toyota (2012) analyse how care work in Asia has been feminised as a result of the exodus of female migrants, often through the

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form of marriage and labour migration. Included in the issue are a number of cases examining the rights and wellbeing of care-work migrants. In general, care literature has pointed out how the internationalisation and commercialisation of reproductive and care work has helped liberate a large number of First World women from their home duties. Yet, this can only be accomplished through recruiting poorer women from developing countries to perform cleaning, cooking, and other caring labour. As a result of their leaving home, the poorer women in the hometowns of the migrants will then become the carers of their children and families. Thus, there emerge three classes of women in the global domestic work arena: (1) those in the First World who cast off their home duties to women from the Third world; (2) those who can afford to migrate and work for the first category of women; and (3) the poorest women in poor countries who do not migrate but take up care work for the families whose “madams” have migrated abroad to work as maids (Parrenas 2000). In the United States, baby-sitting and nanny work has been taken up by both documented and undocumented migrants from the Third World, or by college students of colour. Julia Wrigley (1996) studied how American parents and immigrant caregivers (for children) have both tried to adapt to each other’s expectations. However, they have encountered all sorts of difficulties and conflicts regarding “quality” of care, style of child-rearing, and employer-employee relationships. Wrigley has also reflected on the question of the gendered division of household labour: As middle-class mothers have gone to work, many have fought gender inequality. They would like to restructure both their households and their workplaces. Most have run up against a wall on both fronts. Men have proved resistant to taking on household tasks and child care. Many husbands point to their careers as reason for not doing more. Men’s careers are still often accorded priority in two-career families…By hiring caregivers, these women avoided the tensions and conflicts that can arise when women really push men toward more equal participation. They basically turned gender inequalities into class inequalities. (1996, 141-142)

While white middle-class women have long struggled for an equal share of household responsibilities between husband and wife (Hochschild 1989), the appearance of a large number of cross-border women as domestic workers around the globe has basically silenced feminists’ advocacy for eliminating sexual inequality in the realm of housework; it seems no longer relevant to ask men to share household chores when nannies and maids are readily available at a cheap price. The commercialisation of reproductive labour on a global scale has succinctly entrenched women back to the

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conventional sex roles. Lan (2006, 126) has argued that the “feminisation of domestic labour enables women’s emancipation and concomitantly sustains gender subordination in the context of global migration”. Globalisation and the opening up of First World kitchens to Third World women have thus worked to the effect of “nullifying” a core issue in gender debates.

Asian brides and docile bodies Closely related to labour migration is the issue of cross-border Asian brides. Literature examining the various consequences of international marriages in Asia has been on the rise (Heikkilä and Yeoh 2011; Yang and Lu 2010; Wang and Hsiao 2009; Kim 2008; Palriwala and Uberoi 2008; Thai 2008; Toyota 2008; Constable 2005). Yet, one particularly interesting discussion about cross-border marriages concerns the fine line between migrating to become a wife and migrating to be a (domestic) worker; as Piper and Roces (2003b) argue, such a boundary is often blurred. Andrea Lauser (2008) also makes a parallel comparison between Philippine female migrant labourers and marriage migrants, and considers the former as paid workers and the latter as unpaid housewives who engage in household work. “The structural affinity between a paid worker and an unpaid housewife, both socially defined as appropriate women’s positions, can blur the boundaries between these two different migration patterns” (Lauser 2008, 101-102). A large number of Asian women from poorer countries are imported either as domestic helpers or wives because of their supposed feminine qualities and submissive (Asian) femininity. A general perception of Asian brides is their docility and ability to take care of the young and the old in the family. Such feminine qualities are believed to have been lost among Western women as well as “liberated” Asian middle-class women. Thus, Asian women from less-developed places are taken and “promoted” as ideal marriage choices and docile bodies, who are more qualified carers since they have retained traditional femininity. Lauser (2008) has stressed that, while women from a more conservative and traditional society might find new life chances through the global marriage-scape, men in more modernised regions have turned to less developed societies to look for “traditional” wives who can perform traditional caring roles. Women from the Philippines are considered to be able to endure hardship and take good care of their husbands and motherin-laws. They sacrifice their own wellbeing and get married abroad to men they hardly know. Thai women who have married German men to upgrade

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their families’ economies offer another example of docile female bodies and souls who aspire to go abroad to perform the roles of submissive wives. Some of them have ended up in brothels or have become sex workers to support their German husbands (Mix and Piper 2003). Thus, a large number of Asian women migrants through marriage are taken as docile Asian females whose roles other well-off Asian women or Western women have refused to play. Because of these supposed Asian female characteristics, there has been a “continuum” of women’s migration experiences from wife to worker, or vice versa. Some who migrate as workers (either for domestic work or sex work) may make use of international marriage as a strategy to escape from low-status jobs and to obtain long-term citizenship in the hosting country. Pe-Pua (2003) finds that migrant women from developing countries often shift their roles between low-skilled factory worker, maid, and wife, all of which are conventional feminine roles. Whether as worker or as wife, women migrants have been continuously marginalised in the host societies, and are subject to discriminative gazes. Indeed, marriage migrants originating from poorer places are often stereotyped as marrying for money (not for love) and have encountered social exclusion and legal discrimination. They face discrimination and new forms of disciplining in the husbands’ families and communities (Chan and Shum 2011; Tang and Wang 2011). They are also targets of discriminatory immigration policies and requirements (Mix and Piper 2003), and have been subjected to both societal and state powers for assimilation (Cheng 2010; Wang and Bélanger 2008). In a recent article by Belanger and Tran (2011), the authors report on a systematic study of the impacts of marriage migration in the home village in the south of Vietnam. The site is a rural community in Can Tho province, where around half of the young women had married abroad either in Taiwan or South Korea. The availability of such a transnational marriage market and the “going overseas” aspirations of young village women have left four immediate impacts: young women continue to aspire for overseas marriage; a significant shortage of single women available for marriage in the local community; increasing bride prices in the village; and a higher value of daughters in the eyes of parents. With an ample supply of aspiring wives from less-developed Asian countries, such as Vietnam, the booming global marriage market has facilitated one of the key movements of Asian migration, which has become a source of the expanding Asian migrant communities and diaspora closely linked to previously formed refugee migrant settlements (Chan 2011; Thai 2008).

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Women’s agency and new subjectivities There is no doubt that women in the age of migration have exercised their agency through going abroad to grasp better opportunities for making money, obtaining better-paid jobs, or marriage. These are all strategies for bringing about better economies for their families and themselves. Once abroad, they are also able to put into practice different strategies that strengthen the co-ethnic diasporic groups, often built up with exclusively female communities, and which work together for mutual support and solidarity (Roces 2003; Nakamatsu 2005). Filipino workers in Hong Kong and Singapore often “occupy” and congregate in public areas during their days off—a high concentration of Asian female workers congregate in public spaces with country-specific food and drink, dancing and singing, and religious rituals. Their prominent presence in open spaces is seen as resistance against their unfulfilling work life, exploitative job nature, discriminative gazes, and general marginalisation (Liebelt 2011; Huang and Yeoh 2000;). Marriage migrants have also experienced hardship in adapting to cross-cultural marriage, new familial relationships, and estranged cultural environment. Such hardships have sometimes “trained” migrant women to be even more independent and “tough”; and the commercial relationships between marriage agents and migrants (some are active participants in the marriage market) are often more complex than the stereotypical discourses have depicted (Nakamatsu 2005). Even in such an extremely exploitive environment as the sex industry around a certain military base in South Korea, women are still “agentive” rather than passive, and the global sexual labour market is a space where one can find the negotiative subjectivities and agencies of the Filipino migrant entertainers and sex workers (Cheng 2010). All these descriptions become evidence for the discourses that stress women migrants’ agency manifested in a variety of adverse social contexts as a result of migration.

Emerging research agendas of Asian female migration Migrant recruitment agencies An emerging research agenda on women migrant workers is the focus on recruitment agencies, both in the sending and receiving countries. Early scholarship on gender and migration has been focused on migrants’ rights and welfare, working conditions, and employers’ treatment of the workers. An increasing number of researchers and workers’ organisations have found that recruitment agencies are crucial parts of the exploitative

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systems of labour migration. These intermediaries, who link the workers from the sending countries to the employers of the receiving countries, have become dominant in the process of worker placements. They are structurally allowed to make a financial gain from every successful placement they make. However, after years of governmental regulation of the operations of the placement agencies, malpractice and illegal operations are still prevalent in places like Hong Kong and Singapore. Besides overcharging, many exercise draconian practices, including confiscating workers’ identity documents, forcing workers into debt contracts, taking fees from workers that are not allowed by law, and exercising illegal custody of workers. In sum, many of these intermediaries are part of the exploitative systems of international labour migration. A number of abuse cases that have occurred in the region have been, directly or indirectly, induced by the intermediaries. They either “collaborate” with employers’ abusive treatment by discouraging workers from complaining about the depressing situation, or make workers feel obliged to continue working, regardless of the circumstances, as they are highly indebted. Biao Xiang (2012) has examined the “black box” operation of the recruitment agencies, and has found that many of them have their own “operation logics”. Not only have these private recruitment agencies challenged the regulatory authorities of the state, they also often operate in ways that undermine migrants’ rights. Using cases from China, Xiang argues that, even though the Chinese government has tried to impose more regulation at different times, such attempts to enhance control and monitoring have not helped reduce the role of agencies in abusing workers. On the contrary, the measures have made the placement process ever more complicated and the agencies ever more powerful. Xiang believes that, rather than being independent private agencies, the very nature of these intermediaries is actually an integral part of the whole system of labour migration governance. An increasing number of migrant groups and unions have also turned their attention to the operation of the intermediaries. Despite some improvement in the regulatory framework of agencies, it has been found that such agencies are solely profit-oriented, attempt to evade their responsibilities in taking care of the welfare of migrants, and break rules and laws to maximise their profits. For example, IMWU, one of the largest Indonesian workers organisations in Hong Kong, together with other migrant groups, has conducted a survey among migrant workers in that city and discovered different kinds of malpractices of the recruitment agencies (cited in Amnesty International 2013; also see Caritas 2009; Chan

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2006). Amnesty International (2013) has also launched research both in Hong Kong and Indonesia to trace the work experiences of Indonesian domestic workers. Its report reveals that, even before the migrant workers arrive at the placement countries, they had already been exploited by the agencies. This happened during the “training period”, in which the female trainees were forced to work for the staff of the training centres without payment—a situation often disguised as part of the training. Some training centres also keep workers in custody, forbid them to leave the centre for the whole period of training, and take away personal documents of the workers. Following the workers’ arrival in the placement countries, the agencies continue to keep their identity documents and passports and force them to sign debt agreements which often take away an amount equal to seven-months of their salary.

Home duties, home burdens, and emotional stress Migration has often been taken as a disrupted and displaced experience for those who have left home, and homesickness is often a stressful experience, but few have discussed how continued home connections and communication can also be a source of stress. The self-imposed obligatory role of providing economic benefits for the native family has continuously impacted on the migrated lives, bodies, and emotions of female migrants. As shown above, migration is a life choice and can be a livelihood strategy that helps liberate women from the constraints of the home environment and at the same time bring economic benefits. The fact is though that, despite being abroad, women migrants are still very much attached to home and connected to home through all sorts of ICT including telephone, messages, and other mobile social media devices. These communicative means have helped many women to handle homesickness as well as to fulfil their “absentee” roles as daughter, wife, and mother. Yet, while ICT assists them in “making up” for their unfulfilled roles at home, these communications also consistently add mental stress to the migrants. Financial and material demands from home often constitute, amidst their estranged experiences (of marginalisation) in the host country, extra emotional burdens to the migrants. As analysed by Katigbak in this volume, there is envy and resentment between these “economic heroes” and their left-behind families, relatives and neighbours. Katigbak calls this state “emotional ransom”. Those having the “privilege” of working abroad are often envied by their relatives and neighbours at home. With increasingly easy communication and the “closed-up” distance, relatives in home villages will easily convey demands for material needs to the

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migrant workers. Migrant women have continued to play the role of “dutiful daughters and sisters”, as well as “caring mothers” and “responsible neighbours”, through the electronically wired transnational social spaces, through which they transmit money, love, care, and emotion. However, such “primordial” connections and attachments have also been amongst the most fundamental sources of stress to many migrants, who feel obliged to fulfil all the material demands of people from home. One Vietnamese informant in Hong Kong had to stop taking her mother’s phone calls from Vietnam due to the mother’s excessive demand for money. Over the past ten years, during which she has lived in Hong Kong (as a marriage migrant), she had donated most of her income to her natal family in Haiphong, and contracted another loan of H.K.$120,000 (around U.S.$ 15,000) from the bank to satisfy her mother. Yet, the money demands did not end. The young woman stated that the most heart-breaking moment was when she heard from a relative that her mother had told others that she was not a filial daughter. With such a loan and its interest hanging over her head, she found life miserable and stressful. She could hardly bear any further demands from Vietnam, and thus decided to “distance” herself from home by not taking the calls from Vietnam. In order to save money for home, some Filipino domestic workers in Hong Kong explicitly expressed that they had taken drastic measures in terms of their eating patterns. These included trying to eat less, and only eating at relatives’ or friends’ places during their days off (when they could not eat at the employers’ homes). Some said that they were constantly nervous about the money demands from their families. One migrant worker from the Philippines described her story of working as a domestic helper in Hong Kong as “a sacrifice” for the family. She had worked in Hong Kong for seven years and felt proud to be able to feed the family in the Philippines and support her younger sister’s education as a nurse. However, she also felt the great pressure that the familial obligations had exerted on her body and mind. She complained that people in the hometown often failed to understand that they could afford their material demands only because she had worked extremely hard and cut back on her own expenses in order to save money. Narrating some of the bad experiences she had in her seven-year long overseas sojourn, the young migrant could not hold back her tears. Yet, neither could she refuse the demands from home. “People there always thought once we are abroad, we must be rich, they can’t understand.” The worker also mentioned that now her younger sister had graduated and had migrated to Saudi Arabia to work as a nurse. “It is now her turn to take care of the family; I feel relieved.”

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The stories of “dutiful daughters” seem to have no end. Migration does not seem to change the traditional role played by Asian women of pious daughters and faithful wives. Neither does migration alter their ties to home. Whether at home or abroad, they are consciously and subconsciously fulfilling their “obligations” for the family, and continuing with the ongoing female trajectory of “self-sacrifice” and endurance.

When Asian women meet Asian women Another issue that we would like to put on the research agenda is the relationship between the Asian female employer and the employee. One area which is highly relevant to the plight of migrated women and the consequences of migration on gender relations in Asia is the womenwomen relationships between middle-class female employers and hired female workers. In terms of the vast phenomenon of hiring overseas domestic helpers, one issue that fascinates us relates to the fact that the global search for cheap female labour entails a gender struggle in both the sending and receiving countries. Both sets of women (employer and employee) have attempted to negotiate with the home patriarchal structure and powers, and have acted to make their own way out (from the structural constraints on women). Middle-class women in the hosting countries find it worthwhile to spend a little money to hire overseas helpers to take up the housework that is supposed to be their duty. On the other side, provided with such overseas work opportunities and “good money” incentives, women from developing countries are eager to take the golden opportunity to make a good income to support the family, which in turn makes them the “breadwinner” of the family and “economic heroes” of the nation. The plentiful supply of cheap domestic helpers has freed middle-class women in the developed world from their home-based duties, who in turn are then better positioned in the competitive men’s world – the job arena. This carries the presupposition that such women are assisted by another (type of) woman who takes up their home-based duties as a paid job. Yeoh and Huang (1999) provide an early discussion of this dual situation, whereby both the maid and her mistress have taken up paid jobs and yet neither of them has escaped the “bind of domesticity”. While the maid has re-entrenched herself in the domestic space in a foreign country, the employer “continues to fulfil a supervisory role over the domestic arena, as well as the moral and emotional weight of reproducing the family (1999, 278). They see the private home/work place for the domestic worker as the “contact zone” where two strangers come into contact and

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negotiate their respective motherly roles in different ways. ParreĖas (2008) also provides interesting discussions of the “force of domesticity”. The whole trend of sending females from the Philippines to other countries to work in the care-domestic sector “ironically retains the notion of women’s domesticity, (and)…pushes the reconstitution of the gender division of labour in the family but maintains the notion of women’s responsibility for care work in the family” (2008: 18). She argues that the ideology of women’s domesticity is actually reinforced by worldwide patriarchy. Furthermore, the globalisation and marketisation of domestic duties have both connected and divided women, as they act to increase tensions among women by raising “the resentment of overworked female extended kin and daughters against migrant mothers”(2008: 19). Instead of seeing maids and home-based workers as their “allies” who help them to negotiate with the patriarchal social order, many First World “madams” perform a “patriarchal” role of controlling and mastering the domestic helper “subjects”. Lan Pei-chia (2006) in her award-winning book, Global Cinderellas, has examined how middle-class women in Taiwan have tended to draw a demarcation line between “maids and madams”, with which the former are regarded as waged domestic helpers, rather than part of the private home-making. The madams can sometimes be jealous of the role of the workers who take care of their children, who may be mistaken for the “madam” (2006, 158). The female employers also set their own boundaries and territory, and have the upper hand in shaping “the interactive scripts of an employment relationship” (2006, 201). Some craft a “distant hierarchy” (2006, 204) to distance the worker from them and to stress the insurmountable employer-employee relationship; they simultaneously place themselves in the role of custodian or guardian of the domestic helper, in order to “protect” the employee from the bad influence of her peer country fellows. The overt patronage offered by the employers, or control over the employee, is part of the package of First World dominance over Third World subjects, downgrading women workers from the developing South as second-rate submissive subjects. Even when there is a chance of developing a kind of sisterhood, it turns out to be “instrumental personalism” (Lan 2006, 213-216). Women-women relationships within employer-employee relationships in private homes provide an intriguing empirical and analytical space in which we can understand the plights of women in an age of globalisation. Women from different parts of the world come face-to-face with each other in an extremely micro social space (such as the kitchen). We would like to investigate this issue from the perspective of women (the employer, First World women, as well as the employee, Third World women) and

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discuss what effects the “globalisation of the kitchen” has on both women and on familial relationships. Without each other, neither would be able to attain “emancipation”. Yet, seldom is it the case that they will develop sisterhood and ideological solidarity, and treat each other as allies. Migrant labour unionists and researchers have spoken out for the need to redefine domestic labour as formal labour (with protection of workers’ payments and working hours) rather than as a special, ambiguous category of homecarers or “family members” (Cox 2012; Pratt 2004). From a feminist perspective, one important dimension to explore is under what circumstances a stable alliance can be built between women employers and women employees in the domestic field. In the United States, middle-class Caucasian women often rely on “nannies of colour” from among immigrants from the South (many of them are from Latin America) to take up housework and childcare. In Asia, middle-class women in developed economies shift their household burden to women from poorer countries. Although they might feel sorry for their own maids, who have to leave their own home and children to take care of other people’s children, the “employment” relationship has somehow overridden the “sisterhood” empathy for the maids, and made the employer women rationalise a more “detached” relationship with their helpers. For the women from the South, the extended sojourning experiences may add to their life experiences, and allow them to avoid patriarchal pressures on early marriage and reproduction, and to escape from the control of parents and husbands. Yet, arriving at the work place abroad, they are immediately locked into a situation which positions them back into the restrictive space of a kitchen in a foreign place. The employment relationship inside the household of a foreign culture can also be particularly difficult for workers to handle. While it may be easier to expect “codes of behaviour” in a “normal” workplace in a city, domestic workers are open to all sorts of unexpected demands, rules and regulations in the setting of a private home. In today’s age of migration, how should feminist researchers understand the different plights and positions of women who are involved in a migration relationship? It will be of imminent interest to feminist researchers to examine the micro politics of the intimate space between an employer woman and an employee woman regarding the arrangement and negotiation of domestic work and childcare. A few decades ago, the first wave of feminism encountered a backlash from black women in the United States who argued that the vast differences between women of different races and from different class backgrounds would make an

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overarching feminist theory unintelligible. The interrogation of the women-women relationship within domestic work space may raise a new platform for understanding the slogan, if not the jargon, that “the personal is the political”, and how and why (more) women are still tied (down) to the “domestics”. We believe these discussions will contribute to nuanced research agendas and new dimensions for the development of feminist studies.

Conclusion In the above, we have put forward a few areas requiring increased research efforts, so as to obtain a better understanding of the plight of women in relation to migration. These include migrant recruitment agencies, migrant-home relationships, and the relationships between women employers and women employees. By exploring further the powerful institutional and commercial sectors, the transnational social space of female migration, “globalised” kitchen space, and intercultural/inter-class contacts among Asian females, we will be able to gain enhanced insights into the shifting gender relations and migration politics at work in this age of globalisation. We set out below some prospective research questions: 1. What has differentiated the experiences of the “employer” and “employee” women in the particular context of overseas domestic work employment? 2. What kind of (Asian) femininity has the globalisation of domestic work and popularisation of cross-border Asian marriages suggested and constructed, and what are the general impacts on women? 3. How has the vast phenomenon of the exportation of female domestic workers in the global domestic work market impacted on the feminist pursuits of gender equality? 4. How has the international division of domestic labour shifted the “battle ground” from between women and men to between (First World) women and (Third World) women? 5. What are the general impacts of female migration on hometown women-men and women-women relationships?

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6. What changes has migration brought to the relationships between hometown families and migrants in terms of material connections and relational attachment, and what consequences have such changing relationships had on the migrant women? We believe that tapping further into these questions will bring us to a new level of understanding of the micro politics of gender relations, migration dynamics, and power relations with regard to international migration.

References Amnesty International. 2013. China – Exploited for Profit, Failed by Governments: Indonesian Migration Domestic Workers Trafficked to Hong Kong. https://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA17/029/2013/en Caritas. 2009. Study on the Real Working Situation of Foreign Domestic Workers in HK. Hong Kong: Caritas Community Development Service. Chan, Y. W. 2006. A Survey of the Social Integration of Indonesian in Wan Chai District. Hong Kong: ISSHK. —. 2011. “The Repatriated – From Refugee Migration to Marriage Migration.” In The Chinese/Vietnamese Diaspora – Revisiting the Boat People, edited by Y. W. Chan, 161-71. New York: Routledge. Chan, Y. W., and T. Shum. 2011. “Refugee Migration and Settlement: Vietnamese Boat People Migrants in Hong Kong.” In The Chinese / Vietnamese Diaspora - Revisiting the Boat People, edited by Y. W. Chan, 65-75. New York: Routledge. Chang, G. 2000. Disposable Domestics: Immigrant Women Workers in the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Cheng, S. 2010. On the Move for Love: Migrant Entertainers and the U.S. Military in South Korea. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Chin, C. B. N. 2005. “Neither at Work Nor at Home: Asian Transnational Domestic Workers in Malaysia.” In Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, edited by S. Huang, B. S. A. Yeoh, and N. A. Rahman, 262-287. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Constable, N., ed. 2005. Cross-border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. —. 2007. Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Migrant Workers. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Cox, R. 2012. “Gendered Work and Migration Regime.” In Transnational Migration, Gender and Rights, edited by R. A. Sollund, 33-52. Bingley, U.K.: Emerald. Ebeke, C. H. 2012. “Do Remittances Lead to a Public Moral Hazard in Developing Countries? An Empirical Investigation.” The Journal of Development Studies 48 (8): 1009-1027. Gamburd, M. R. 2005. “‘Lentils There, Lentils Here!’: Sri Lankan Domestic Labour in the Middle East.” In Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, edited by S. Huang, B. S. A. Yeoh, and N. Abdul Rahman, 92-114. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Heikkilä, E. K., and B. S. A. Yeoh, eds. 2011. International Marriages in the Time of Globalization. New York: Nova Science Publishers. Hochschild, A. 2000. “Global Care Chains and Emotional Surplus Value.” In On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism, edited by W. Hutton and A. Giddens, 130-146. London: Jonathan Cape. Hugo, G. 2005. “Indonesian International Domestic Workers: Contemporary Developments and Issues.” In Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, edited by S. Huang, B. Yeoh, and N. A. Rahman, 54-91. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar. Hu-Dehart, E. 2002. “Asian Women Immigrants in the US Fashion Garment Industry.” In Women and Work in Globalising Asia, edited by D-S. S. Gills and N. Piper, 209-210. New York: Routledge. Hoang, L. A., and B. S. A. Yeoh. 2011. “Breadwinning Wives and ‘LeftBehind’ Husbands: Men and Masculinities in the Vietnamese Transnational Family.” Gender & Society 25 (6): 717-739. Huang, S., B. S. A. Yeoh, and N. A. Rahman, eds. 2005. Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Huang, S., L. L. Thang and M. Toyota. 2012. “Transnational Mobilities for Care: Rethinking the Dynamics of Care in Asia.” Global Networks 12 (2): 129-134. Huang, S., and B. S. A. Yeoh. 2000. “Negotiating Public Space: Strategies and Styles of Migrant Female Domestic Workers in Singapore.” In Gender and Migration, edited by K. Willis and B. S. A. Yeoh, 251-271. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar. ILO (International Labour Office). 2006. Feminization of Asian Labour Migration. Bangkok: ILO. ILO. 2013. Domestic Workers Across the World: Global and Regional Statistics and the Extent of Legal Protection. Geneva: ILO.

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Jongwilaiwan, R., and E. C. Thompson. 2013. “Thai Wives in Singapore and Transnational Patriarchy”. Gender, Place and Culture 20 (3): 363-381. Kim, D-S, ed. 2008. Cross-border Marriage: Process and Dynamics. Seoul: Institute of Population and Aging Research, Hanyang University. Lan, P. C. 2006. Global Cinderellas: Migrant Domestics and Newly Rich Employers in Taiwan. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. —. 2005. “Surrogate Family, Disposable Labour and Stratified Others: Transnational Domestic Workers in Taiwan.” In Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, edited by S. Huang, B. Yeoh, and N. A. Rahman, 210-32. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar. —. 2003. “Maid Or Madam? Filipina Migrant Workers and the Continuity of Domestic Labor.” Gender & Society 17 (2): 187-208. Lauser, A. 2008. “Philippine Women on the Move: Marriage Across Borders.” International Migration 46 (4): 85-110. Liebelt, C. 2011. Caring for the ‘Holy Land’: Filipina Domestic Workers in Israel. New York: Berghahn Books. McKay, D. 2003. “Filipinas in Canada: De-skilling as a Push toward Marriage.” In Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration, edited by N. Piper and M. Roces, 23-52. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Mix, P. R., and N. Piper. 2003. “Does Marriage ‘Liberate’ Women from Sex Work? Thai Women in Germany. In Wife or Worker: Asian Women in Migration, edited by N. Piper and M. Roces, 53-72. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Madianou, M. 2012. “Migration and the Accentuated Ambivalence of Motherhood: The Role of ICTs in Filipino Transnational Families.” Global Networks 12 (3): 277-295. Nakamatsu, T. 2005. “Complex Power and Diverse Response: Transnational Migration and Women’s Agency.” In The Agency of Women in Asia, edited by Lyn Parker, 158-181. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. OECD-UNDESA. 2013. World Migration in Figures: A Joint Contribution by UN-DESA and the OECD to the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development. 3-4 October. Palriwala, R., and P. Uberoi, eds. 2008. Marriage, Migration and Gender. New Delhi: SAGE Publications. ParreĖas, R. 2001. Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work. Stanford: Stanford University Press. —. 2000. “Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers and the International Division of Reproductive Labor.” Gender & Society 14: (4): 560-80.

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Pe-Pua, R. 2003. “Wife, Mother, and Maid: The Triple Role of Filipino Domestic Workers in Spain and Italy.” In Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration, edited by N. Piper and M. Roces, 157-180. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Piper, N., and M. Roces, eds. 2003a. Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. —. 2003b. “Introduction: Marriage and Migration in an Age of Globalization.” In Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration, edited by N. Piper and M. Roces, 1-22. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Pratt, G. 2004. Working Feminism. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Roces, M. 2003. “Sisterhood Is Local: Filipino Women in Mount Isa.” In Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration, edited by N. Piper and M. Roces, 73-100. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Rahman, N. A., B. S. A. Yeoh, and S. Huang. 2005. “‘Dignity Overdue’: Transnational Domestic Workers in Singapore.” In Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, edited by S. Huang, B. S. A. Yeoh, and N. A. Rahman, 233-61. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Tang, A. and H. Z. Wang. 2011. “From Victims of Domestic Violence to Determined Independent Women: How Vietnamese Immigrant Spouses Negotiate Taiwan’s Patriarchy Family System.” Women’s Studies International Forum 34: 430-440. Thai, H. C. 2008. For Better or for Worse: Vietnamese International Marriages in the New Global Economy. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Toyota, M. 2008. “Editorial Introduction: International Marriage, Rights and the State in East and Southeast Asia.” Citizenship Studies 12 (1): 1-7. UNESCAP (UN Economic and Social Comission for Asia and the Pacific). 2013. Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2013. Geneva: UNESCAP. Vertovec, S. 2004. “Cheap Calls: The Social Glue of Migrant Transnationalism.” Global Networks 4 (2): 219-24. Wang, H. Z., and D. Bélanger. 2008. “Taiwanizing Female Immigrant Spouses and Materializing Differential Citizenship.” Citizenship Studies 12 (1): 91-106. Wang, H. Z., and S. M. Chang. 2002. “The Commodification of International Marriages: Cross-border Marriages Business in Taiwan and Viet Nam.” International Migration 40 (6): 93-116.

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Wang H. Z., and H. M. Hsiao, eds. 2009. Cross-border Marriages with Asian Characteristics. Taipei: Academia Sinica, Center for AsiaPacific Area Studies. Wang, H. Z., and C. Y. Tien 2009. “Who Marries Vietnamese Brides? Masculinities and Cross-border Marriages.” In Cross-border Marriages with Asian Characteristics, edited by H. Z. Wang and H. M. Hsiao, 13-38. Taipei: Academia Sinica, Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies. Wee, V., and A. Sim. 2005. “Hong Kong as a Destination for Migrant Domestic Workers.” In Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, edited by S. Huang, B. S. A. Yeoh, and N. A. Rahman, 175-209. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Willis, K. and B. S. A. Yeoh, eds. 2000. Gender and Migration. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar. World Bank. 2011. Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. http://www.econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EX TDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21352016~pagePK:64165401~pi PK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html. Wrigley, J. 1995. Other People’s Children. New York: Basic Books. Xiang, B. 2012. “Predatory Princes and Princely Peddlers: The State and International Labor Migration Intermediaries in China.” Pacific Affairs 85 (1): 47-68. Yang, W. S., and M. C. W. Lu, eds. 2010. Asian Cross-border Marriage Migration: Demographic Patterns and Social Issues. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Yeoh, B., and S. Huang. 1999. “Singapore Women and Domestic Workers: Negotiating Domestic Work and Motherhood.” In Gender, Migration, and Domestic Service, edited by J. Henshall Momsen, 277-300. New York: Routledge. Zlotnik, H. 2003. Global Dimensions of Female Migration. Washington, DC: Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/global-dimensions-femalemigration.

CHAPTER TWO SUNDAY CATWALK: THE SELF-MAKING OF FILIPINO MIGRANT WOMEN IN HONG KONG JU-CHEN CHEN

Opening the scene… On a Sunday afternoon in April 2013, for the first time I acted as a judge for the Miss Pinoyshots Princess, a beauty pageant held in a bar and restaurant in a landmark office building in Central, Hong Kong. The venue looked like a wine cellar with a stage at the centre for live performances, a ring of wooden tables and seats, and a rise-up area with cocktail tables. Event organisers and supporting teams rustled around in tense excitement. Friends of the competing beauties rejoiced in greeting each other and taking selfies. All the candidates, their make-over artists and assistants feverishly spun around at one semi-open corner of the restaurant to do final touch-ups. When the master of ceremonies announced the beginning of the show, the music stopped, and the spotlight on the stage made everyone wink, the lady in a bright red bikini costume with red feather wings like the “Victoria Secret’s Angel” appeared on the stage. She wore a gorgeous smile. When she confidently moved around the catwalk and introduced herself with an air of elegance, I almost forgot that she was also a Filipino domestic helper in the city… (Figure 2-1)

Introduction Hong Kong, a largely Chinese metropolis with a population of seven million, currently has over 300,000 foreign domestic helpers. Among them, the majority (over 90 percent) are women from the Philippines and Indonesia. The law of Hong Kong requires all foreign domestic helpers to live-in with their employers and grants them “not less than 1 rest day in every period of 7 days”.1 This means that every week foreign domestic

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helpers have one free day for themselves. In almost all cases, the rest-day for the 300,000 domestic helpers is Sunday. Due to this arrangement, most people living in Hong Kong are familiar with scenes that feature foreign domestic helpers crowding certain public spaces. Among them, the most well-known are Victoria Park in Causeway Bay for the Indonesian workers and Statue Square, Chater Garden, and the ground level of HSBC headquarters in Central for the Filipino workers. Less known to the general public is that not every domestic helper spends her Sundays sitting in a park or on a footbridge to rest. Instead, many have busy schedules joining religious gatherings, attending friends’ birthday or farewell parties, running errands in Worldwide House,2 holding general meetings of various associations, or participating in sport competitions or beauty pageants. This chapter examines various beauty pageants and talent performances of Filipino domestic helpers in Hong Kong, which require enormous investments of time, work, and money from the participants. Based on interviews of a number of domestic workers and participatory observation of the processes of “event-making”, this chapter will analyse the Filipinas’ motivations for joining such activities and their experiences of self-making and community building in such processes.

No rest on rest-days? There are different types of festive events and contests going on regularly among the Filipinas. On Sundays (and public holidays), in the open space of the pedestrianised Chater Road3 in Central district, one may come across colourful and cheerful events: for example, the Sinulog Festival in January, Philippines Tourism Day in May, Philippine Independence Day in June, and Kalilang Festival in September. Most of these events include stage performances and parades that demonstrate Filipino cultural and ethnic diversity, as well as beauty and talent competitions that give fame to the winners and honour to the related supporting societies. In addition, different beauty or modelling competitions are also from time to time held indoors, such as in bars and restaurants in Central and elsewhere. The most celebrated indoor event is arguably the annual Ms. Barkadahan contest at the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre. In less prominent places, such as district community halls and the Bayanihan Centre4 in Kennedy Town, Filipino events regularly take place on Sundays. Most of the organisers and participants are overseas Filipinos – domestic helpers and Filipino expatriates in Hong Kong. Occasionally, celebrities from the Philippines are invited to participate. Sponsorships from travel agents, wireless

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communication carriers, and banking service providers that target business with Filipinos are common; official support from the Philippine Consulate General is sometimes available also. All these events require Filipino domestic workers to spend their Sundays (“rest-days”) in tightly scheduled activities. In addition to Sundays, event organisers and their team members also need to prepare for different things during the week—getting the costumes, props, trophies, banners, agendas, sponsors, guest lists, and judges ready before show time. This is significant, since on weekdays most domestic workers have to work laboriously to take care of their employers’ families. “Why don’t they rest on their ‘rest-days’?” was my earliest question regarding this perplexing phenomenon. Why are they willing to spend Sundays—their only rest-days—and much of their very limited free time during weekdays on these events? Additionally, these activities are costly. For example, it costs as much as one- to two-thirds of a foreign domestic helper’s monthly income5 to participate as a candidate in the contests (more details about “communal sponsorship” for a beauty pageant candidate will be discussed in a later section). Considering the amount of time, money, and emotional investments that the Filipino women put into these events, I wonder what the motivations and gains are. Previous studies have provided some explanations for this phenomenon. Whilst Oracion (2012) claims that festive events help migrant workers fulfil their ethnic and national identity as Filipinos, Constable (1997) argues that these activities offer them a chance to escape from their reality as maids. Based on my participatory observation of these Sunday events and my interviews with those actively participating in competitive performances, I would argue that neither national pride nor the motivation of “escape” sufficiently explain their participation. “National pride” sees these Filipinas as “patriotic subjects” who defend and embody the interests of the Philippine state, whilst “escaping” overlooks the differences among these migrant workers, fixes them into the subject positions as “maids”, and assumes that such an identity is “undesirable”. In reality, the “maid” identity may not be especially critical to them. In this chapter, I look at migrant Filipinas as active “desiring subjects” (Cheng 2010, 9-10), who have different reasons for leaving home, make different choices in terms of both host city and particular employer family, and decide their own schedules on Sundays. The chapter argues that Filipinas in Hong Kong devote themselves to these time-consuming Sunday festivals for the following reasons. First, no matter how slim the chances are, they see beauty queen titles as pathways

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for them to build promising careers, change their life, and obtain economic success and enhanced social status. In other words, beauty pageants are a critical means of self-enterprising. Second, by supporting a candidate, usually a member of a social group, all participants (typically women who have left their parents, friends and sometimes husbands and children in the Philippines and live alone in their employers’ homes) form an intimate community and foster a valuable group identity and community for themselves in Hong Kong. Participating in these Sunday competitions is not the only way, but rather is one of the many ways in which to garner a supporting community. Whilst others may link up with church groups or sports competitions for rapport and support, beauty pageant organisers and participants craft intimacy and community through exciting beautymaking events, which are often infused with emotion and corporeal experiences. Through this ethnographic study of their dreams and efforts in participating in beauty pageants, I hope to relate to readers these Filipino women’s subjective understanding of their migrant identity and post-migration self-making.

Beauty pageants and stage performances Event making On Sundays, my Filipino informants were often busy jumping between schedules—sending remittances home at Worldwide House, meeting friends and families around the IFC mall6 or at HSBC headquarters, attending churches in the Admiralty district or running errands in Causeway Bay.7 In addition, for those who actively participated in various “shows”, a substantial chunk of time was taken up preparing and rehearsing for these festivals and contests. Prior to a show, the organisers and their supporting teams would have to create an event page on social media (Facebook is certainly the most popular) in order to advertise it and communicate with potential candidates and performers, arrange a time and place to take portrait photos of all candidates for event posters and online promotions, attract and settle sponsorship, book venues, make ready the stage and audio and visual equipment, and order trophies, sashes, tiaras, capes, sceptres, bouquets, and other award items. In some cases, the organisers also had to mobilise their networks in order to recruit strong candidates. On the other hand, the contest candidates, supported by various home-town or interest group societies, were responsible for attending rehearsals, practicing for talent shows, catwalks, speeches, and answering pageant questions, and preparing their costumes, hairstyles, and

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makeup. In addition to these preparations, money was a major concern as well as an attraction in many contest events. A typical beauty pageant candidate may be required to pay a “quota” (registration fee) of HKD 1000 to HKD 3000 in advance in order to receive entrance tickets that she can then give or sell to her supporters. In most cases, the candidate sold these tickets to members of her support group(s). I call this “communal sponsorship”, and this is literally how a candidate can scrape together sufficient money to pay the quota. In return, if the candidate wins, she will receive a prize in the form of a cash award and/or a valuable but practical gift (such as a laptop computer, mobile phone, mini TV set, water boiler, cosmetics, etc.) for herself and for sharing among her support group. Participating in a contest, therefore, offers migrant workers the opportunity to foster moral, emotional and material linkages with each other, and to build up intimate relationships with members of their community, many of whom are people from nearby towns or villages.

Highlighted cases: The Independence Day celebration, Miss Pinoyshots Princess, and Ms. Barkadahan In this section, I will elaborate upon three annual activities in an effort to illustrate the nature of these Sunday events: the Kapangyawan Festival (i.e., the Philippine Independence Day Celebration), Miss Pinoyshots Princess, and Ms. Barkadahan. The Kapangyawan Festival forms part of a (usually) month-long festival in June celebrating the independence of the Philippines.8 The Kapangyawan Festival is held in Chater Road and Chater Garden on the Sunday closest to 12 June, the Philippine Independence Day. It is organised by the Philippine Consulate General, sponsored by various Filipino-targeted businesses, and supported by interest group associations and regional societies. The day-long festival usually commences with an interfaith prayer and a Catholic Mass, followed by singing the national anthem, and some speeches by state officials. Thereafter, there is a parade and different performances by various regional and community groups. These groups walk slowly along Chater Road, from Ice House Street towards Chater Garden. They showcase the rich ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of the Philippines by dressing up in ethnic costumes and walking with props that represent regional features. When they reach the main stage, each group then takes turns to give a stage performance, which is also a competition. Typical performances might include folk dancing, singing, and drumming, which again aims to highlight local cultural differences (Figure 2-2).

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Prior to the day of the Kapangyawan Festival, participating societies spend many Sundays on meetings, planning, rehearsals, taking portrait photos, and preparing costumes. On those Sunday afternoons, they meet in an open public area—for example, the footbridge near Central Ferry Pier —which allows them not only to chat, share food and information, run errands, and take photos, but also to closely work together to prepare for the parade and performances. Therefore, as soon as they complete their stage performance at Chater Garden, they immediately relax and spread out to find friends representing other societies on the day. They look for food, take many selfies, and crowd towards the main stage when celebrities from the Philippines begin to perform. Some retreat to a quieter corner to rest and await the announcement of the winners of the competitions. Often, even at ten or eleven o’clock that same evening, one can still find groups of exhausted but happy women laughing, joking, and taking group photos on a dark Chater Road. The Kapangyawan Festival is a month-long event of intensive collaboration, a day of chaos and excitement, and repeated chances to laugh and spend time together. On a quite different scale, both the Miss Pinoyshots Princess and Ms. Barkadahan are indoor beauty pageant competitions sponsored by a Filipino interest group and a Filipino-targeted businesses respectively. In contrast to the Kapangyawan Festival, an outdoor event, Ms. Barkadahan and Miss Pinoyshots Princess express no obvious patriotic sentiment, nor do the participants emphasise national pride. Although official representatives from the Philippine Consulate General usually attend both events, rarely will one find nationalistic sentiment expressly displayed.9 Instead, indoor beauty contests are often an integrated part of the operation of the so-called “ethnic economy” of the Filipino communities. These events promote the commercial interests of Filipino-targeted businesses and provide Filipina participants with a platform from which to achieve individual “success”. This can be achieved not only by winning valuable prizes, including monetary rewards, but, more importantly, also by gaining opportunities to develop their social connections within the Filipino communities in Hong Kong and to build a career with Filipino-related businesses. The Miss Pinoyshots Princess event introduced at the opening of this chapter is organised annually by a Filipino photography group. Daniella, the organiser, explained that she organises this pageant “just to have fun”; creating a fun occasion for people joining as competitors, their personal supporting teams, the organising committee, photographers, and the audience. “Different from most pageants, I am not aiming at making a profit”, she emphasised repeatedly. The registration fee (or “quota” as the

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participants call it) paid by the candidates is the main funding source used to pay for the venue, audio-visual equipment and services, banners, cash awards, trophies, sashes, tiaras and other essential expenses. For Miss Pinoyshots Princess, each candidate pays a quota of HKD 1,000 and the committee aims to recruit 20 candidates annually. All of the organising committee members are volunteers. Material awards are donated by sponsoring businesses. The three parties involved in the events the organising society and event committee, the sponsors, and the candidates as well as their friends and supporting societies each benefit differently. The photography group builds up its reputation as a respected organisation and establishes connections with potential models, photographers and sponsors. The sponsors gain a platform for business promotions, find possible sales representatives, and deepen their links with various Filipino communities. The candidates and their supporting societies, besides having fun and garnering social and economic relationships with each other and with other groups (more detailed analysis below), have the chance to share in valuable cash awards and useful gifts. Winners also earn a respected reputation among OFW (overseas Filipino workers) circles in Hong Kong. The cash award is a handsome amount in addition to their regular income, and the “material” potential the pageant titles offer the winner is promising too (Figure 2-3). Organising a pageant is certainly not straightforward. Daniella explained that she had to mobilise her networks and spent approximately one whole month encouraging “girls” (especially strong candidates) to participate. Thereafter, she spent every Sunday for the following two months preparing the candidates to perform their production number,10 and on improving their catwalks and public speech skills (Figure 2-4). Pageant organisers, like Daniella, are often pageant titleholders themselves before taking on the challenges of organising competitions, and are frequently referred to as “mam (madam)” by those who have previously participated in their shows. Daniella laughed at my question of “no rest on rest-days” and explained: “I want to be a role model and I want people to copy me. I want to use my talent to be successful. I am successful [emphasis mine]”. This supports well my argument that pageant participants are “desiring subjects”.

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Ms. Barkadahan is one of the largest annual pageants for the OFW community in Hong Kong. It differs from other pageants like Miss Pinoyshots Princess in its funding sources and purpose. Ms. Barkadahan is mainly sponsored by SmarTone, one of Hong Kong’s major wireless communication carriers, and is a major marketing event for the company. Barkadahan, literally meaning “joining a friendly group” in Tagalog, refers to a successful branding of the company: the Barkadahan sa SmarTone sim card and recharge vouchers that offer international and roaming calls. The card is widely used by OFWs in Hong Kong. The annual event is held in Hong Kong’s largest convention centre, the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre (Figure 2-5). The award value for the winner – including the award shared by her supporting group and “partner” – is 500,000 Philippine pesos (roughly HKD 88,000, or more than 21 months of a foreign domestic worker’s salary). The prestige and award are certainly a huge attraction for Filipinas. In 2013, the show attracted more than 300 applicants and had 12 finalists. Different from most of the pageants, candidates interested in participating in Ms. Barkadahan do not have to pay any quota. However, it is a requirement that all participants must be holders of a Hong Kong Filipino domestic helper visa and registered users of SmarTone’s Barkadahan mobile. From there, every facet of the event is carefully organised to promote the business of SmarTone within the OFW community. For example, the finalists are involved in various print media and online promotions of the company’s telecommunication services, tickets for the show include coupons for sim cards, and temporary employees who work for the event organisation committee are sometimes rewarded with recharge vouchers which they can then resell. In 2014, the event organiser created a “partner” category for the competition. In other words, each competitor had to bring a partner to the pageant show, thereby doubling the pageant competitors – promoters of the business – instantly. Despite the business nature of Ms. Barkadahan, the event is very popular among Filipinos. In short, the candidates invest time and a very limited amount of money (in the phone cards), but earn opportunities to make a significant amount of money from the competition, which may immediately enable the winner’s family to buy a piece of farmland at home or enable her to start a small business either in Hong Kong or the Philippines. All of this means a more promising life.

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Figure 2-1: O One of the coompetitors of Miss M Pinoyshoots Princess 20 013 in her colourful costtume (all photoos in the chapterr were taken byy the author).

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Figure 2-2: One shot of the Kalilang Festival celebration on Chater Road. The Philippine national flag is often eye-catchingly displayed at these events.

Figure 2-3: The crowned winners of Miss Pinoyshots Princess 2014

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Figure 2-4: The candidates for Miss Pinoyshots Princess 2014 conducted a rehearsal at Central Ferry Pier.

Figure 2-5: Ms. Barkadahan 2013 at the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre.

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Analysis Pastime or self-enterprising? I watched my Filipino informants rushing to event venues carrying costumes, makeup, and other accessories in awkwardly large plastic bags and having their friends help them transform from a domestic helper to a beauty queen, fashion show model or master of ceremonies right on a corner of Chater Road or in the ladies’ room of a community centre. It prompted me to ask myself what these embarrassing and daring acts were really all about. At show times, when I looked at them both as a spectator and a judge, in their bikinis or evening gowns, wearing gorgeous smiles, trying their best on the catwalk, and introducing themselves (over)confidently to the audience, I could not help wondering whether they seriously believe in the possibility of becoming a professional model or a crowned beauty queen in a famous pageant. Is this a pastime or a self-enterprising endeavour (Anagnost, Arai and Ren 2013)? Interviews with some of the frequent participants demonstrated that they did not participate in these events merely for fun and nor was it just out of obligation to their home country or fellow Filipinos. Rather, most believed in their talents and had striven to see how they might “use (not waste) their talents to have a more successful life”. When I asked my informants why they were willing to spend so much time, money, and energy on preparing and participating in these shows, to my surprise most of them actually seemed confused by my question. They smiled shyly, giggled nervously, and hesitated: “Yes, yes, mam” or “Yes, mam, we like it”. Then they simply returned to whatever they were busy doing or chatting with friends in Tagalog. Either my question made no sense to them or they were unsure, or unwilling, to reveal the reasons for their participation. At one of the modelling contests, a male Filipino engineer, an ordinary foreign resident11 of Hong Kong, confidently explained: Ok. Doing these shows gives them a different life, a different role. They need it. They need to feel that they are not only cleaning and taking care of kids and the elderly.

This perspective is consistent with Constable who explains: “Such activities provide important occasions for women to dress up, enjoy themselves, show off artistic or musical talents, and become someone other than ‘Mrs. Liu’s maid’” (1997, 169). Such a view, however, implies that these Filipinas desire a superior identity to that of a domestic helper. This is an oversimplification and does not reflect appropriately many

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Filipinas’ reasoning and emphasis on their “professionalism”. Many Filipino domestic helpers stressed in the interviews that they worked hard and professionally as home-workers to pursue their dreams for life: “just like any other professionals who may or may not travel abroad”, Dia, one of my key informants, explained. Dia once jokingly said that she would “hire” me as her next employer. When I protested and said that I could not ask her to perform household chores for me, she snapped, with an unmistakable teasing tone: Ju-chen, mam, do you think we need you to tell us to bring you your coffee? Do you think you need to ask us to bring your newspapers? Of course not! We know our jobs [emphasis mine].

Another time, when I asked Dia and Angeles if they preferred to work in large or small flats, Angeles winked and said wittily: Big flats, of course. It is easier to do storage and easier to play “hide-andseek” (i.e., hiding themselves somewhere in the flat, so they would not be sighted by their employers in order to offer their employers a sense of privacy). We are very good at playing hide-and-seek, you know, we are professional!

Moments like these often showed me that these women were active agents in doing their jobs. They do not always want to escape or deny this identity. They see their work as something that needs “professional” skills and attitudes, as well as emotional intelligence. One thing to note is that not every Filipino domestic helper in Hong Kong actively participates in such events.12 Many such women never participate in any contest or festival. On the other hand, the busy eventgoers claim that they almost never take time to rest in Statue Square, on the ground floor of the HSBC headquarter or on the footbridge in Central. “We are not like them. We are different”, they state with careful politeness and subtle contempt. Obviously, there are different preferences and life pattern choices among different groups of Filipina migrant workers. Further research is needed to see how different ways of spending “restdays” or leisure hours relate to age, marital status, education, and other background differences among the Filipinas. I believe it is fair to say that any of the possible life aspirations the beauty contest participants try to fulfil through attending these shows is one of those “self-making” processes that Filipino domestic helpers have carried out in Hong Kong. Migrant women who spend time and money on these events have

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attempted to re-assert their own “enterprising selves” and to attain some personal achievements.

Talent and career Daniella was the first informant I met who clearly explained to me why she enjoyed beauty pageants. “Talent. Because I have talent. I want to show my talent”, she claimed instantly in the most assertive voice. “Talent is what you have that helps you build up your confidence and that helps other people to see you”, she further explained. I was surprised by how clear she was, regarding both her motivation to participate in a pageant and the dream she strived to fulfil through competing in and organising beauty contests. This attitude was different from that of some other informants I met. After meeting more beauty queens, I found that “talent” and “confidence” were two keywords repeatedly evoked when Filipinas talked about entering into a competition. In the various experiences of preparing for and competing in pageants, most candidates adopted the discourse that they “have talent” and had become “more confident” after participating in pageants. Daniella was unique in that she seemed to know what her choices were and was determined from the moment she left the Philippines that she would find “a better wage for her family, a better future for her son, and to prove that she is a better person”. Indeed, joining and organising beauty pageants has become the path for many such women to enhance their social and cultural capitals and to carve out a different and brighter career.

Friendship and community On Sundays, I met with my informants in Statue Square, the covered footbridge leading from Exchange Square and the IFC mall to the Central Ferry Pier, at their gatherings and group activities. Rita, Dia, and their friends from Mindanao kindly allowed me to sit with them and join their casual chats and food sharing. They patiently answered my questions whilst busily preparing for an event – perhaps fixing a costume, practicing a dance, arranging a photo shoot – or catching up with friends after a week’s hard work. Rita was usually in charge of organising an event: communicating with potential participants on Sundays in meetings and via Facebook, applying for venues, fixing the schedule with the various parties involved, and distributing the preparation work to different members. As a group leader, her most important role was to foster and maintain the bonding of her group by making herself available whenever members

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needed emotional support or advice on how to live a better life in Hong Kong as an overseas worker, or simply needed companionship. Dia, the best friend and most reliable partner of Rita, always willingly volunteered herself when Rita needed someone to step in and efficiently accomplish any tasks left by Rita. Together they were like Frodo Baggins and Samwise Gamgee in The Lord of the Rings series: one leads and the other assists; without the second “man”, the leader would have difficulty fulfilling her pursuits. Gradually, I had increasing opportunities to observe these women’s diverse routines. I met with them at MTR exits in Wan Chai and Central early on Sunday mornings and shopped with them for materials needed for costumes, name badges, or boutonnieres for honourable guests. We sat together in the lobby of karaoke bars to collect money and small gifts for exchange from participants of a birthday party, a Mother’s Day celebration, or a Christmas party. We sang, danced, and took many photos together that highlight Hong Kong’s urban landscape and wealth. I joined in with their discussions on Facebook concerning the planning of events beforehand; we “liked” and commented on each other’s photos afterwards. During the long hours of event rehearsals at a pier in Central, we stood behind large columns to avoid the chilly breezes of Victoria Harbour. We ate snacks, took more photos, looked at fashion catalogues (targeted at the overseas Filipino communities) from the Philippines, or simply sat in boredom awaiting our turn to act on different tasks. From time to time, we watched and excitedly commented on how Rebecca, the “fashion designer” and “makeup artist” as she was known to many groups of Filipinas, improvised with her limited resources to transform a candidate who represented her group in a completion into a beauty queen. When we were hungry or tired of sitting, we walked to the IFC mall to use the toilets or to Worldwide House to buy Filipino snacks and run a few errands (buying phone cards, passing a gift to a friend, etc.) on the way. Whilst walking and sitting together or waiting for a show to begin, we would chat about our families, jobs, and responsibilities – theirs as domestic helpers and mine as a teacher – and about our shared experience as women, mothers, and foreign workers in Hong Kong. On the “event days”, not being very helpful for last minute preparations of the props and finishing touches of the performers’ costumes and accessories, I usually just stood by in case they needed someone to watch their belongings, take pre-show portrait photos, go grab some food, pass hair pins or sprays, or embark on another round of pageant question practice (Figure 2-6). When I arrived late (the event on Chater Road ran for a whole day and was comprised of performances by many different groups) and missed their

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performance, I would then find them at their “old spot of retreat” on a sidewalk near the Mandarin Oriental Hotel. Even though the event was still on, they were no longer among the spectators. My exhausted friends sat casually on the sidewalk, laughed their “Filipino carefree laughs” and told sexy jokes with friends, including a few of the Filipino men who usually showed up. Together, we sighed, relaxed, and enjoyed watching these guys’ funny Gangnam style dance.13

Figure 2-6: Last minute preparations for a beauty and talent competition at the back of the main stage on Chater Road.

It was only after two years of participating at every stage of an event organisation and its final delivery that I gradually came to fully comprehend my Filipino informants’ specific desire to be a part of these events. Through earnestly working and organising events together, migrant Filipinas build immense solidarity with their own group and cultivate intimacy and friendships that have gone through ups and downs during the various competitive events. They sweat, laugh, feel nervous, and handle stress together in the process. This might explain why they could not answer my question as to why they were willing to spend so much time, energy, and money on these events. Participating in these events is not about either fully relaxing or fully enjoying. Participation brings with it tension, heavy workloads and exhaustion. However, these positive and

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negative emotions and experiences are critical steps towards their realisation of who they and in terms of maintaining their community and identity. Commitment to a beauty pageant is not merely about supporting friends but has provided the social space they have needed to realise and confirm who they are.

Personal, not national Participating in these Sunday events, as my research has shown, is, first of all, a way for the Filipinas, who spend most of their time living alone in their employers’ homes, to build up a meaningful social world, a humane and corporeal community, that is not far away and not digitalised (unlike the long distance call communications with their own families). It is the desire to re-establish an identity and to find one’s value that they passionately commit to one show after another. I also once thought that they so actively participated in these events out of pride in their home country and region and that it was patriotic pride – which could be enhanced by their marginalised (if not stigmatised) life as foreign maids – that motivated them to devote themselves to pageants and talent shows (to prove their power and beauty as Filipinos). Yet, careful observation proves this argument questionable. The first major event in which I participated was the celebration of the Philippines Independence Day (the Kapangyawan Festival) in June 2011. Observing the many Filipinas dressed up in the traditional Filipiniana dress with the striking butterfly sleeves that represent the elegance of the Philippines, cheerfully chatting with friends in Tagalog, giving loud applause for the speeches of officials from the Philippine Consulate, one may easily be (mis)led to the belief that living abroad (as domestic workers) enhances the Filipinos’ bonding with home and their national pride. However, I soon realised from the various celebrations that members of different groups did not express a common interest or a sense of a comradeship and loyalty to one single “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983) of the Philippine nation. Rather, they joined an event to show their support for the particular group they identified with. Their comradeship and loyalty was towards the associations they chose to join. Rita and Dia, as well as most of the frequent participants in the performances, parties, and contests were members of one of the many Filipino associations in Hong Kong. Theirs was an association based on their region of origin in the Philippines. Whilst Rita and Dia were two of the co-founders, many of the members were acquaintances, relatives or neighbours before they arrived in Hong Kong. These connections provided

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them with the opportunity to make initial contacts or “comradeship” claims. However, it was only through their devotion of time, money, mutual emotional support and collaboration, week after week, project after project, and event after event, that they fashioned an identity and community for themselves. Such an identity is not built upon patriotism, but by actively working and organising activities together. Once an association’s group finished their performance, they often retreated to their “usual corner” to relax, hang out, laugh, and eat rather than continuing to participate in and support the events as an audience with other spectators (these “other spectators” could be other Filipinas who arrive late and have only recently joined the event, Hong Kong Chinese who pass by or tourists from around the world who stop to find out what is going on). One incident in 2013 also led me to recognise this “personal”, rather than “national”, dimension of the Sunday events. Rita fell out with the male president of her group over disputes regarding the budget and finances of their group; he was an ordinary resident and had significant connections with Philippine officials and businessmen in Hong Kong. The situation culminated in Rita and Dia retreating from active participation in this association they had cofounded, and they soon endeavoured to start up a new group with a few of their most faithful friends. With Independence Day approaching in June, I asked Rita and Dia where to meet them on that Sunday, and they responded matter-of-factly that they were not going because they no longer participated in the parade or any other organisational duties. The Independence Day celebration is an event open to the interested public, and is supposed to be the annual celebration for the Philippine community in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, its attraction to Rita and Dia ceased once it failed to provide a platform from which to foster group intimacy and conduct their self-aspired roles as event-organisers. Far from a national identity, what my informants have cultivated is a community that is personal and corporeal. It is built on and tailored to meet personal needs, and shine on personal achievements, history, connections, and experiences.

Cinderella is never “just a maid” I agree with Nicole Constable and the male Filipino informant who told me that it is important for Filipinas to have an alternative identity, to not be “just a maid”. Participating in these festivals and shows – no matter whether as event organisers, judges, performers, masters of ceremony,

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receptionists, photographers, or assistants – makes these women feel valuable and fulfilled. However, this is not because they consider these roles to be more respectable than the role of domestic helper. Rather, active participation in beauty pageants is a process of life- and selfmaking: by the act of joining a group, sacrificing one’s time, and making contributions of one’s talent and money, a Filipino migrant woman defines who she is as a desiring agent in migration (Cheng 2010). This is also applicable to those who choose to devote their time to, for example, church activities, sport games or simply chatting, playing cards and resting on the footbridges or the grounds of the HSBC headquarters. The theory of the increasing importance of leisure life and consumptions for identity making in an industrialised and capitalised society is useful here (Rojek 1985, 1995). When individuals attend at similar factories or offices and do similar jobs, leisure life and consumption patterns become “personal” and more and more important in defining who a person is. Gradually I understood that my initial question, “Why not rest on your rest-day”, is an egocentric, if not ethnocentric, one. It is akin to asking Cinderella, the fairy tale character and metaphor used by Pei-Chia Lan (2006) to mean Indonesian domestic helpers in Taiwan, why she wishes to join the royal ball rather than stay home and rest. Cinderella knows during every moment of her life – Mondays to Fridays included – that she is not “just a maid” and she does not have to attend the ball in order to prove this. It is the same for my informants. Such a question is uttered from the perspectives of employers and other parties (such as employment agencies and the government), who have been so used to the discipline and management of the labour and time of these foreign workers that Sundays have become the “rest” day – the day designated to “restore” their energy for the following week’s labour. From the Filipinas’ perspective, Sundays are free time and family time. Sundays are time to take care of oneself and fulfil other responsibilities as friends, sisters, girlfriends, wives, daughters, mothers, and breadwinners, as well as self-enterprising subjects. The “Cinderella” metaphor helps to illustrate their self-image and subjective choices: they are not just maids, whether it is Monday or Sunday. That said, domestic work is a profession they are proud of, and being maids, therefore, is an identity they confidently own. This recognition is important for my argument that participating in Sunday events can be about “taking a break”, but it is certainly not about escaping. Different from the ball-attending gay men featured in the documentary Paris is Burning (Livingston 1991), being a beauty queen, singer, dancer, costume designer, hairdresser, accountant, or photographer is not a transient identity or an illusion for the event-participating Filipinas.

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Rather, these “assigned roles” in their group projects do, on the one hand, give them opportunities to show their femininity, beauty, talents, and educational qualifications (which are, in most cases, neither needed nor encouraged on their work days as maids) and, on the other hand, provide them with actual opportunities for self-enterprising. Thus, event-making and participating has become a space in which Filipino migrants have attempted to build their more complete and expressive self. It is a selfreassuring and actualising process that brings migrant workers multiple identities.

Conclusion The research on which this chapter is based arose out of my curiosity about why Filipino domestic workers in Hong Kong tirelessly participate in Sunday pageants. The research result argues that both “patriotism” and “identity avoidance” (escaping or forgetting their identity as maids) arguments cannot explain fully the consistent and long-term investment of time and money in these events; nor could both existing explanations illustrate the actual social practices and processes of resource organisation and circulation related to these Sunday catwalks. In her ethnography On the Move for Love, in which she writes about Filipino migrant entertainers in South Korea’s U.S. military camp town, Sealing Cheng (2010) examines the partial conceptual framework of seeing migrant entertainers as victims of sex trafficking and argues that it would be more productive to recognise them as both migrant subjects and desiring subjects: Thus, migrant Filipina entertainers are global actors who pursue desires and dreams shaped by the globalization of modernity and struggle for redistribution and recognition along their own paths, simultaneously reconstituting meanings and flows in the transnational field (2010, 10).

Seeing migrant entertainers as agents, not merely passive victims, Cheng’s elaboration on their dreams as a pursuit shaped by modernity and global culture is also critical. In his book about Tonga and the anxiety of Tongan people about modernity, Niko Besnier (2011) examines the popularity of beauty pageants in the small Pacific Island nation. Enveloped by the anxiety of being on the edge of global modernity, Tongans find that beauty pageants offer them platforms from which to actualise multiple aspects of modernity: objectified gendered bodies, prioritised professionalism, internationalised (pageant) rules and formats, and the possibility for the winner to become a confident cosmopolitan actor (2011, 158).

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This chapter argues that Filipina Sunday pageant participants and attendees in Hong Kong are desiring subjects. They left home in the first place to find a second chance in their lives, whether this was to improve the life of their families, leave an unhappy marriage, pursue a metropolitan life, or something else. They know (better than me) that what is most precious in their lives in Hong Kong is not just leisure time and money. Rather, in migration – living alone with a new family and discovering new communities in this so-called metropolitan city – they find chances to redefine who they are, and to desire and realise new subjectivities. Sunday catwalks give them chances at self-enterprise that could lead to promising economic results. The event-making processes help consolidate their newly found self-images as talented and confident women, and enable them to build an affectionate and proximate community that gives them solid social identities.

Notes 1. This clause can be found in the Guidebook for the Employment of Domestic Helpers from Abroad (ID969) of the Immigration Department of Hong Kong. Http://www.immd.gov.hk/en/forms/forms/id-e-969.html. 2. Worldwide House is a commercial building in Central that is frequently visited by Filipinos due to the presence of telecommunication shops, banks, and grocery stores catering to Filipino customers. 3. Chater Road is a short street in the heart of Central district that is flanked by luxurious shops, a five-star hotel, public parks (Statue Square and Chater Garden) and the old Legislative Council of Hong Kong. The road was turned into a pedestrian zone on Sundays in the 1980s to encourage shopping and gradually became one of the main venues for hosting outdoor events by Filipinos and others. Indeed, Chater Road, Chater Garden, and Statue Square have combined to become a symbolic centre of the Hong Kong Filipino community. Bearing no less blame from local businesses and other Chinese residents regarding their “intrusion” and “occupation” of this area, Filipinas have continued to gather in this neighbourhood one Sunday after another for the past 30 years or so. Events that celebrate (Filipino) national, religious, and cultural holidays and promote the interests of the Philippines (for example, the Philippine Tourism Festival) are often held on Chater Road (see also Nicole Constable [1997, 3-7] for more details). 4. The Bayanihan Centre is a building designated for the use of foreign domestic helpers (not limited to Filipinas) in Hong Kong and is located in Kennedy Town in the west of Hong Kong Island. Since 1993, a group of Filipino businessmen have funded the Hong Kong Bayanihan Trust, a non-government organisation that aims to promote the wellbeing of foreign domestic helpers in Hong Kong (see for more details). Working with the Hong Kong government, they began establishing overseas domestic helper centres in several locations across Hong Kong for two purposes: to provide sheltered facilities for foreign

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domestic helpers on their rest days and to ease crowdedness and tensions in popular gathering places such as those in Central. Among these centres, the Bayanihan Centre is the largest, having the capacity to host 2,500 people, and comes equipped with an auditorium, a library, a canteen, a beauty salon, and a remittance counter. Bayanihan is a Tagalog word that refers to the spirit of collaboration and community work, such as clearing a piece of farmland or moving a village house together. However, I would argue that, without understanding the perspectives and desires of foreign domestic helpers, centres such as these are not particularly successful. For example, the Bayanihan Centre, because of its location and not-quite-metropolitan features, is considered a second rank venue for beauty pageants. 5. The minimum allowable wage was raised to HKD 4,110 in 1 October 2014, which is approximately USD 530. 6. The IFC (International Finance Centre) is an architecture compound that includes the IFC mall, two landmark office towers, the Four Season Hotel and the serviced residence Four Season Place in the Central district of Hong Kong. The outdoor podium at the IFC mall is a popular meeting place for foreign domestic helpers. 7. My informants are almost all based on Hong Kong Island, rather than in Kowloon, the New Territories or Outlying Islands. In other words, they work for families living on Hong Kong Island. This is why they mostly hang out with friends on Hong Kong Island, in the Central District, Admiralty, and Causeway Bay. However, these are certainly only some of the popular gathering places for Filipinas in Hong Kong and other popular gathering places exist in Kowloon and the New Territories. 8. In addition to the Kapangyawan Festival, events celebrating Philippine Independence usually include a charity ball sponsored by the Philippine Association of Hong Kong (PAHK), a flag ceremony on Independence Day (12 June) at the Philippine Consulate General (PCG), and an official reception held by the PCG. 9. That said, every single event I participated in began with singing the Philippine national anthem. Whether this was just a formality, or carried moral or emotional power is uncertain. 10. The group dance that usually involves all candidates at the beginning of the pageant. 11. An ordinary foreign resident is one who has a normal working visa rather than the discriminating “domestic helper” visa. An ordinary resident will have the right to become a permanent resident in Hong Kong after they consecutively live in the city for seven years, while overseas domestic workers are prohibited from obtaining permanent residence in Hong Kong. In addition, foreign domestic worker visa holders are also subjected to other restrictions such as the infamous “2-Week Rule”—having to leave Hong Kong within two weeks from the termination of employment. 12. According to the estimation of experienced Filipino pageant goers, about 60 percent of all Filipino domestic workers in Hong Kong participate in various forms of talent and beauty competitions as candidates, supporters, or audience.

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13. “Gangnam style” dance here refers to the signature dance performed by Korean pop singer, Psy, in his single “Gangnam Style”. The dance imitates horse trots and, as the song became a global hit, so the dance has also been attempted by celebrities worldwide and has become a source of parody. When the Filipino men performed it, they exaggerated the horse-step moves, which were meant to be both funny and sexy.

References Anagnost, A., A. Arai, and H. Ren, eds. 2013. Global Futures in East Asia: Youth, Nation, and the New Economy in Uncertain Times. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Cheng, S. 2010. On the Move for Love: Migrant Entertainers and the U.S. Military in South Korea. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Constable, N. 1997. Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Filipina Workers. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Lan, P-C. 2006. Global Cinderellas: Migrant Domestics and Newly Rich Employers in Taiwan. Durham/NC: Duke University Press. Livingston, J. 1991. Paris is Burning [VHS]. U.S.: Academic Entertainment Off White Productions. Oracion, E. G. 2012. “The Sinulog Festival of Overseas Filipino Workers in Hong Kong: Meanings and Contexts.” Asian Anthropology 11: 107-127. Rojek, C. 1985. Capitalism and Leisure Theory. London: Tavistock. —. 1995. Decentring Leisure: Rethinking Leisure Theory. London: Thousand Oaks.

CHAPTER THREE “TOWARDS A SHARED FUTURE?” TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITY AND BELONGING OF JAPANESE-FILIPINO FAMILIES IN JAPAN JOCELYN O. CELERO

Introduction The present wave of globalisation has challenged the state to reframe nationhood, citizenship, race, ethnicity, and other forms of belonging with the prevalence of multicultural families (with foreign spouses and bicultural children) which pluralise a society’s ethno-cultural landscape. The emergence of such families in Japan, including those formed between Filipinos and Japanese, undermines the long-held mythical assumption that Japan is an ethnically homogeneous nation-state fortified through generations of historic isolation and ethnic purity. Born to cross-ethnic, cross-national Japanese-Filipino unions, many Japanese-Filipino children (hereafter JFC) currently reside either in the Philippines or in Japan.1 Unlike migrant workers and their families, most of these families have settled permanently in Japan and have gradually assimilated into Japanese society. The fact is that JFC born or raised in Japan are presumed to be well-integrated into Japanese society. However, such an assumption overlooks the enduring and shifting functions of migration, in both its narrow and broad sense (Itzigsohn et al. 1999), in their lives. By examining Filipino mothers and their Japanese-Filipino children’s socio-economic integration and transnational living spaces, this chapter seeks to analyse the discursive term “Japanese-Filipino” as a concept of identity and belonging. Suzuki (2010) explains that “JFC” is a more neutral term when compared to the IOM’s (International Organization for Migration) shin nikkeijin, which means “contemporary generation of people of Japanese descent”, or the term Japino (a combination of Japanese and Filipino),

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which sprang up in the 1990s as a result of the soaring number of JFC births. Japino has a rather negative connotation as it pertains to fatherless children of Filipino entertainers. While some Filipino mothers are single mothers, the majority are not. Most Filipino mothers in this study are not unfamiliar with the label JFC but they prefer to call their children haafu (the Japanese word for half), based on their awareness of the dual cultural orientation of their children. “Hyphenated identities” is a concept that Rumbaut (1994, 789) develops through his research on immigrant children in the United States. It highlights the middle position between the American nationality of such children and the ethnic identity of their parents. Similarly, JapaneseFilipino or the haafu identity may be understood as JFC’s loyalty to the Japanese citizenship on the one hand, and the continuous connection to the Filipino mother’s ethnicity and culture on the other. Recent scholarship has looked into the lives of Filipino women and JFC separately through the lenses of gender, class, and ethnicity, and has emphasised their vulnerabilities in terms of social integration (Suzuki 2010; Hara 2011; Tsuda 2011; Takahata 2012; Uchio 2012). In this chapter, I would like to argue that both the mothers and their children have acculturated to the hyphenated identity, Japanese-Filipino, as a result of their mobile and transnational lifestyle. Both mothers and children possess various forms of capital and perform different social and economic roles in Japan and the Philippines. They are actively engaging themselves in activities that utilise their bi-cultural endowments, their multiple language skills, and their transnational connections, which have provided them with employment opportunities and economic benefits. This chapter will illustrate how Japanese-Filipino mothers and children shape their transmigrant identity by nourishing their dual sense of belonging and building transnational livelihood strategies. By making sense of being and becoming “Japanese-Filipino”, both mothers and children have attempted to strive for “inclusion” in both societies.

Japanese-Filipino families in “multicultural” Japan The prominence of multiculturalism as a discourse has further demystified Japan as a mono-ethnic state, and has brought tremendous pressure on the government to make legal, social, and structural changes to accommodate wider familial or national membership (Chung and Kim 2012, 202). The social discourse of multiculturalism also promotes social equality and inclusion of immigrants (Befu 2006, 7). At present, Japan lacks concrete multicultural policies for integrating ethnic minorities.

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Children born to Japanese and non-Japanese unions have challenged Japan’s nationality law, which emphasises blood-based citizenship. Since the law does not recognise dual nationality, a child must decide, before reaching the age of 22, to choose one over the other. In 2008, Japan began to grant citizenship to children born out of wedlock to a Japanese father and migrant mother. This legal reform nevertheless has signalled the gradual accommodation of multicultural families and children (Women’s Asia 2008, cited in Chung and Kim 2012, 199) in Japan. Local government units (LGUs) have the burden of delivering “basic sociocultural rights and services to immigrants” who are regarded as community members (Tsuda 2006, 4-7). Supplementing official initiatives are the efforts of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in providing programmes that help immigrants integrate and identify themselves as local citizens (Tsuda 2006, 23-25). Yet, despite minimal attention being given to ethnic diversity, evidence shows that the social integration of immigrants is taking place at the local level through the combined efforts of LGUs and NGOs. With such assistance, immigrants are more able to obtain social citizenship, although without any guarantee for gaining legal citizenship. Indeed, the number of Filipino applications for naturalisation has been low, showing the lack of interest in obtaining legal citizenship. Filipino mothers and their Japanese-Filipino children provide an interesting case from which to understand how a minority group interprets their Japanese membership and belonging vis-à-vis Japan’s shifting ideologies, laws, and social conditions for defining its members (and nonmembers). It also helps indicate the process of the building up of a transmigrant identity through first-generation migration, and migration and re-migration of the second generation. Early Filipino migration to Japan and the formation of JapaneseFilipino families occurred in the 1970s, reaching its height in the mid1980s. Most of these Japanese-Filipino families were formed by Filipino women2 and Japanese men. Several channels had facilitated such transnational marriages.3 Early unions occurred after Filipinas met Japanese men while the latter were conducting business in the Philippines. After a period of time, the Filipina wife (sometimes with a JFC) would move to Japan to reunite with the husband. Another predominant pattern was the marriage of rural Japanese men and Filipinas from villages. Such marriages were arranged via Philippine (local) government-mediated labour and marriage migration systems (Suzuki 2002, 101; 2003, 399; Satake 2004, 453). Filipino women were sought as hanayome (brides) to Japanese farmers, who could struggle to find Japanese spouses. In the 1980s, the Japanese government encouraged

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the recruitment of Filipino entertainers, which also resulted in a soaring number of Japanese-Filipino marriages. Many former Filipino entertainers overstayed and resorted to marriage with a Japanese national in order to obtain legal status in Japan, a trend that abruptly increased following the government’s later restrictions on the entry of entertainers4 (see Table 3-1 below). In 2012, Filipinos were ranked as the fourth largest migrant group, while Japanese-Filipino marriages were the second highest of intermarriages (next to Japanese-Chinese) in Japan. In terms of legal status, these children are entitled to Japanese citizenship which is based on the principle of jus sanguinis (citizenship by parentage or blood), or categorised under various types of visa in Japan, as well as their Filipino mothers (see Table 3-1).Consequently, JapaneseFilipino families live with multiple forms of settlement, patterns of migration, and levels of adaptation in Japan. Even though the divorce rate of Japanese-Filipino intermarriages declined from 70 percent in 1995 to 40 percent in 2012 (Japan Ministry of Justice 2012), failed unions have inevitably resulted in the prominent presence of Filipino single-mother households in Japan. Of the total 16, 288 divorces filed, 3,920 were between Japanese and Filipinos (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare 2012). Naoto Higuchi (2011) identifies Filipino migrant women in Japan either as unmarried or single mothers, with broad socio-economic statuses, ranging from business owners to government subsidy programme beneficiaries. Moreover, the return of a number of Japanese-Filipino families (mothers and their children) from the Philippines, attempting to seek long-term or permanent settlement has also brought forth a more complex picture of the life patterns and integration of this group of immigrants and their second generation.

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

18,246

32,796

45,510

496

1234

Permanent Residents 26,967

46,233

432

1094

Child or Spouse of Japanese National Child or Spouse of Permanent Resident Dependent

Source: Ministry of Justice, Japan

46,547

44,784

Entertainers

Long-term Residents 15,530

1251

696

44,366

39,733

21,117

50,539

1334

903

43,817

47,407

23,756

50,691

1426

1,238

45,148

53,430

26,811

23,643

1590

1,570

49,195

60,225

29,907

14,149

Total Foreign 2,084,919 Population (Registered) Total Filipino 155,672 169,359 185,237 199,394 187,261 193,488 Population Temporary 6,987 8,452 10,115 13,267 14,527 12,732 Visitors/Tourists Trainees 2,356 2,329 2,689 2,888 2,906 3,738 Designated Activities 2,778 3,121 3,454 3,706 5,361 6,052 8,698 4,938 7,660

10,856 4,919 6,363

1801

2,032

51,076

67,131

33,332

2047

2,472

49,980

75,806

35,717

9,199

210,617

202,592

11,065

2,217,426

2008

2,152,973

2007

Table 3-1: Statistics of foreigners and Filipinos in Japan, 2001-2012

“Towards a Shared Future?”

2009 2134

2,765

46,027

84,407

37,131

7,465

3,970 8,608

6,705

211,716

2,186,121

2010 2197

2,899

41,255

92,754

37,870

6,319

730 5,291

6,756

210,181

2,134,151

2011 2,226

3,347

38,249

99,604

39,331

4,188

308 2,372

4,290

209,376

2,078,508

71

2,253

3,647

33,122

106,397

40,707

344

137 1,863

n. d.

202,974

2,033,656

2012

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Theoretical framework and research methodology I drew my data from semi-structured interviews with 20 Filipino mothers and 20 JFC residing in Tokyo and its surrounding areas,6 which I conducted from March to August 2013. I found my respondents through personal connections. Interviews were carried out in the Filipino, English, and Japanese languages in order to accommodate the linguistic abilities of mother and child participants. I recorded, fully transcribed, and translated my interviews into English. All grammatical and logical errors are my own. I categorised the data by coding emerging themes that highlight the migration, educational and occupational experiences, and life aspirations of my interviewees. For the purpose of coherence, pseudonyms were assigned to Filipino mothers, while Japanese names were given to JFC respondents. Table 3-2 shows the profile of mother and children respondents, with their age, education level, and work experience. To analyse the inter-linkage between socio-economic adaptation and migration experiences among Japanese-Filipino families within the framework of transnationalism, I refer to Glick-Schiller, Basch, and Szanton-Blanc’s (1992, 1) definition of transnationalism: “the processes by which transmigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement”. They conceptualise transmigrants as active decision makers and identity constructors who concurrently maintain ties with two or more societies (also see Guarnizo and Smith 1998). The pluralised relations that transmigrants build—familial, economic, social, and organisational—span borders and enable them to engender multiple forms of being and belonging. Mahler (1999, 289), on the other hand, points out that the term “transnational” stresses how people’s activities are integrated beyond borders and nation-states, and that “national identities” still exist as a form of resistance to the hegemonic power of the state to control and regulate the laws and norms of belonging. Hence, the use of the term “transmigrant” stresses individuals’ selfdefining practices, while the term “transnational” highlights the relevance of space and action within and beyond the boundary of one society. In this study, I focus on the patterns of transnational migration, education and language skills, and the work practices of Filipino mothers and JapaneseFilipino children which act to create a transnational social field between Japan and the Philippines. This chapter will examine how such practices shape their Japanese-Filipino identity, a kind of “transmigrant sense of being”, as well as their dual sense of belonging to two societies.

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Language and education Filipino mothers Whilst there is a common notion that most Filipino migrant workers in Japan have low educational attainment, 14 out of 20 respondents7 in this research were former entertainers who either received some college education or a full college degree, indicating their relatively high educational achievement. In addition, my respondents came from diverse socio-economic backgrounds even though the majority had previously worked as entertainers. Many have the ability to communicate in English, an Americanised cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986), which Japanese men find desirable (Ballescas 2003, 567; Suzuki 2003). Whilst this cultural asset has encouraged Japanese-Filipino marriages to take place, most Filipino mothers in this study revealed that this capital was underutilised in rearing Japanese-Filipino children in Japan. Melissa, an assistant language teacher, confessed: I only speak with them in English. They do not ask me so they do not want to be taught, especially my eldest child. She would rather go to juku (cram school 8)…Maybe, they will be pressured if I teach them.

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Nenita

Melania

Luisa

Felice

3

4

5

6

2

44

45

38

40

42

44

Age

College grad.

College undergrad.

College undergrad.

HS undergrad.

HS grad.

College grad.

Education

Mayumi

ALT trainee/owns piggery and farm in the Philippines

ALT

Kota

Emiko

Kei

Living subsidy recipient/Parttime factory

Caregiver

Hiro

Kenjie

Child2

Bar owner

Businesswoman (phone cards)

Employment

23

18

17

20

17

15

Age

These typical Filipina names are pseudonyms assigned to mother respondents. These Japanese names are likewise pseudonyms given to children respondents.

Vilma

2

1

May

1

Mother1

Part-time office staff

Studied elementary in the Phils.; currently 2nd year university in Japan

Part-time store crew

Part-time store crew

Studied elementary in the Phils.; Currently Senior HS (Jap)

College student (Japan)

Construction worker

Senior HS grad. (stopped schooling)

Part-time carpenter

Part-time restaurant crew

Junior HS (Jap) (stopped schooling)

Senior HS (Jap)

Current employment

Education

Table 3-2: Profile of Filipino mother and Japanese-Filipino children respondents

74

Melissa

Wella

Gina

Emma

Nadia

Guada

Celia

Cherry

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

44

49

44

47

57

52

44

44

College undergrad.

PEPT (HS grad.)

College undergrad.

College grad.

College grad.

College undergrad.

College grad.

College grad.

Miko

Living subsidy recipient/Parttime factory worker

Housekeeper

Akina

Aya

Junpei

Businesswoman (partly owns a restaurant)

Living subsidy recipient

Ayane

Kimi

Ayami

Ryosuke

ALT

Housekeeper

Bank manager

ALT

18

21

16

23

27

20

18

17

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Company employee

None

Part-time store crew

Part-time coffee shop crew

1st senior HS (after moving to Japan but finished HS in the Phils.) Vocational undergrad. Nail Art School (Jap); to go to the Phils. for English language training course 1st year university in Japan (finished grade school and HS in the Phils.)

Nurse

Part-time cram school teacher

None

None

Reached HS in Japan but finished university in the Phils.

Nursing college grad. in Japan

Currently 2nd year university in Japan but went on exchange programme in the Phils.

Senior HS (Japan)

Senior HS (Japan)

75

Yolly

Janet

Mila

Sara

Delia

Nelda

15

16

17

18

19

20

76

50

45

52

56

50

55

College undergrad.

HS grad.

College grad.

College undergrad.

College undergrad.

College grad.

Factory worker

Housekeeper

Caregiver

Housekeeper

Beauty clinic owner

Businesswoman (owns a travel agency in the Philippines)

Reiko

Yuri

Mai

Shin

Chizuko

Rina

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21

24

18

29

16

25

Part-time tutor

Manager, advertising agency (from the Phils. to Jap) Part-time restaurant crew

Employee (Japanese company in the Phils.)

Part-time store crew

Reached HS in Japan; University graduate (Phils.)

Reached HS in the Phils.; 1st year university (Japan)

Reached 3rd year HS in the Phils.; moved to Japan for senior HS and university Currently 4th year university (Japan)

Full-time company employee (Jap)

HS grad. in the Phils. (to enter university in Japan next year)

University grad. (Phils)

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Her children’s refusal to learn English indicates how language capital does not always work to the advantage of Filipino mothers in directing parent-child relations when their children place more value on the Japanese language. The Japanese language is an important criterion for measuring immigrants’ cultural adaptation and belonging to the Japanese society. Many Filipino women after residing in Japan for many years have acquired Japanese language skills through formal and informal employment and education. Most of my respondents, who learned Japanese whilst working as entertainers, have used this to communicate with their children. However, this type of Japanese is “impolite” and is “men’s language”. Delia remarked, “I cannot use it to teach my children because they might not respect me”. Mothers like Delia place more emphasis on using the Filipino language to communicate with their children at home, both to command respect and authority, and to nurture parent-child ties. There are others who studied Japanese on their own. Yolly, for example, learned Japanese through watching NHK language programmes. She also read her children’s Japanese textbooks. Her motivation to be “Japanised” in terms of language is to support her children’s studies and participate in their school activities. Some Filipinas come to Japan as educational migrants and obtain Japanese proficiency through formal schooling even prior to marriage. May came to Japan in 1994 on a student visa to study at a Japanese language school. Wella also entered as a migrant student in 1987 to learn Japanese in order to fulfil her desire to work in a Japanese company. Nadia received a vocational training scholarship in 1990, which supported her to study fashion and cosmetology and which required Japanese language training in Tokyo. Janet, Wella, and Nadia later married Japanese men and are now permanent residents in Japan. These women stressed the importance of learning Japanese which helped them tremendously in rearing their children. For marriage migrants like Gina, government-sponsored Japanese language classes offered by the nearby ward office helped her a great deal. She learned about these classes through her Japanese neighbours whom she had befriended. She recounted: I did my best to mingle with other Japanese mothers in the neighbourhood. Luckily, there was a Japanese mother who could speak English. She helped me read flyers. Then, there were also free Japanese language lessons at the ward office. Because I am a Filipina, I adapted easily; I conversed with everyone until I gained their trust and acceptance. Like me, I did not want

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Gina’s Japanese language skills have enabled her to make Japanese friends and have given her a sense of belonging to the community. Anticipating the difficulty in raising a child in Japan as a foreign mother, Japanese networks and access to government language programmes can ensure protection from discrimination at school and, furthermore, alienation from the immediate community. Filipino mothers tend to place great importance on Japanese language skills and increasing their social connections. These strategies reinforce Filipinas’ view that gaining the “right” social and cultural capital is essential for them and their children to cultivate a sense of membership in the Japanese society. In his study of immigrant spouses in Yamagata, Burgess (2008) emphasises that their growing awareness of “Japanese” and “foreigner” as demarcated identities prompts them to reassess their self-representation and invest in society through acculturation and building social ties. Thus, while immigrant Filipino mothers strategically assimilate to gain access to resources for social integration, their “self-making” practices entail reordering of the importance of Japanese and Filipino cultures, by giving primacy to the Japanese language whilst keeping the Filipino language within the private sphere.

Japanese-Filipino children Whilst most Japanese-Filipino children in this study were born in Japan, their educational experiences were shaped by frequent moves between the Philippines and Japan. Eleven out of the 20 respondents acquired their primary education in Japan, and the remaining nine studied in an elementary school in the Philippines. Seven entered Japanese junior and senior high schools, while four studied at a Philippine high school. One went to a university in the Philippines, while seven graduated from a university in Japan. Two took a vocational or an English language training course in the Philippines and six pursued vocational and technical courses in Japan (see Table 3-2). It is crucial to underscore at this point the differences between the Japanese and Philippine educational systems. Japan follows the French education system which promotes individual rights and entails learning the national language and culture as preconditions for integration (Castles 2004, 35). It consists of elementary, junior high school, senior high school, and university levels, totalling 16 (6-3-3-4) years of schooling. The Philippines, on the other hand, has been greatly influenced by the

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79

American education system with its ten mandated years of basic education (primary and secondary school) and four years of tertiary education, adding up to a total of 14 (6-4-4) years9 of schooling (Mariñas and Ditapat 2000). School subjects are taught in both English and Filipino. The disjuncture between the two systems has definitely produced uneven educational experiences among JFC, who stayed in different countries at different times. This also has consequences for their patterns of socialisation within and between societies. Most JFC born in the Philippines started either grade school or senior high school in Japan. Studying in Japan widened their exposure to the Japanese culture and language, which is integral to Japanese citizenship (Murphy-Shigematsu 2004, 320). Some Japanese-Filipino children were taken to the Philippines for reasons such as parental divorce, relocation of business/work of parents, poor academic performance, misbehaviour, or extreme peer pressure to belong to a group in Japan. In these circumstances, migration and remigration proved to be a working mother’s way of dealing with her child’s schooling. The extended family as a source of providing care for JFC in the Philippines has been beneficial for Filipino mothers working in Japan, and such affective bonds have also helped children cope with temporary separation from their own mother and adjust to a new social environment. Yuki, once a left-behind child, said: My aunts raised me while my mother was away. I got close to my cousins and relatives a lot. I learned to practice “po and opo” and “mano po”.10 In the Philippines, people value respect for the elders regardless of your group. I am glad to be connected to my Filipino side.

Some Japanese-Filipino children, who were born, raised, and studied in the Philippines, adopted the Filipino culture and values, which instilled in them a strong Filipino ethnic identity. Chizuko, who was born and finished secondary education in the Philippines, recalled the advantage of having a Japanese name and appearance in school: Being Japanese in the Philippines gives you an extra benefit. They smile and get friendly with you. Being Japanese seems easy for them to remember my name. They get surprised when they hear me speak Filipino. They seem confused and amazed at the same time that I look Japanese and can speak the native language.

In the Philippines, where diversity is rather celebrated, Chizuko’s combined sense of Japanese-ness and Filipino-ness ensured her group

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belonging. Her Japanese identity, marked by her name and her typical Japanese physical features, distinguished her from the rest and, yet, these markers did not hinder her ability to make friends. Moreover, her ability to speak the Filipino language also helped her to blend in. Hage (2000, cited in Jo 2003, 39) defines these bodily characteristics and dispositions as national capital, which denotes one’s membership in a dominant culture. By identifying oneself as a Japanese in the Philippines, Chizuko had attempted to utilise her national capital to define a superior position over her Filipino classmates. On the contrary, when moving to Japan in 2010 to study Japanese in preparation for university, Akina experienced the opposite of Chizuko: “Foreigners do not get any special treatment in Japan. We are Japanese who are just like everybody else.” In Japan, JFC like her were expected to pass for Japanese, and their foreign-ness obstructed their ability to fit in. Emiko and Mayumi, who were both brought back to Japan by their respective mothers and consequently transferred to a high school in Tokyo, had difficulty fitting in: Emiko: I felt out of place because my gestures and speech are not Japanese. They did not talk to me because I was different. It took some time to be accepted. Mayumi: I was bullied because my mother is a gaijin (foreigner). I did not tell mum about this because I did not want her to come to school. I managed to overcome this though because I was good at English in class.

My JFC respondents who grew up in the Philippines came to notice that in Japan, bullying in schools was a display of power through “othering” those who look, behave and act differently. The above cases show two typical ways of coping used by JFC: making oneself fluent in Japanese in order to gain group inclusion and “acting out foreign-ness” by using English to assert a higher status. Akina also benefitted from an English education in the Philippines (not from being a Japanese national), which gained her admission to a Japanese university. Reiko took English as a course in a Japanese university since her parents did not send her to the Philippines for schooling. To supplement her English education, she joined exchange programmes in Australia and the United Kingdom two years ago. She was aware that many other Japanese youths also went abroad to learn English and, yet, their goal was to become a global jinzai (human resource). On the other hand, she realised that she had become more of a “mixed child”, a

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81

Japanese-Filipino with dual cultural frames of reference. Unlike other JFC who went to the Philippines for English education, Reiko’s English skill has been enhanced through international cultural exposure. With regards to the Filipino language, most JFC who were born and grew up in Japan have minimal-to-almost-zero Filipino language-speaking ability. Ayami pointed out that learning Filipino “is rare in Japan and there is no necessity to be fluent in it”. She and other JFC who never learned Filipino could only manage to understand it through their mother who spoke the language at home. Kimi, on the other hand, presented a unique case. She chose to major in Filipino at a university in Tokyo. She reasoned as follows: “My friends are mostly Japanese and I don’t have a problem with that, but since I am half-Filipino because of my mother, I feel the need to study the language.” Through her determination to specialise in Filipino whilst maintaining her friendship with other Japanese, Kimi recognised her bilingual orientation through using Filipino with her mother at home and using Japanese with her friends. For Ryosuke, switching languages could be confusing and, thus, he chose to stick with Japanese to protect himself from alienation by his Japanese peers. In Japan, peer pressure and potential group exclusion prevent JFC from using the Filipino language outside the home. Both JFC and their Filipino mothers are aware of the prevailing discrimination and marginalisation, and they respond to these barriers by striving for Japanese linguistic competence. The Japanese language is the nation’s symbol of power and the criterion for societal membership; immigrant groups have no choice but to acquire such language fluency to cope with Japan’s nativist and assimilationist education system. Fluency in Japanese not only permits Filipino mothers to foster mother-child relations at home, but also helps them to immerse themselves in Japanese social circles. In the same vein, JFC have paid attention to acquiring appropriate national and cultural capital when dealing with family, peers, and kin. Furthermore, some JFC have benefitted from the English education acquired in the Philippines and other countries, and have attempted to use it to claim higher status vis-à-vis their Japanese classmates and resist exclusion. JFC’s transnational education has also nurtured in them a bicultural self. Overall, both JFC and Filipino mothers have striven towards integration by ‘displaying’ Japanese language and culture in the public social sphere, whilst keeping their Filipino cultural expressions mainly in the home space.

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Economic participation Filipino mothers Most Filipino mothers in this study have experienced economic transformation in Japan following the decline of the entertainment business. The visibility of Filipino women in daytime work is a major shift in their economic lives. For instance, by becoming caregivers and language teachers (San Jose and Ballescas 2011), they are simultaneously reforming their social position in the Japanese society. These two major areas of work have been increasingly in demand as a result of Japan’s rapidly aging society (Repeta and Roberts 2010; Takenaka 2012; Uchio 2010), and the growing pressure on the country to pursue internationalisation through advancing English education, in addition to reconsider the utilisation of its previously “untapped” human capital (Hayashi 2012).11 Using local readily available human resources is deemed less costintensive than bringing in caregivers from the Philippines via bilateral mechanisms, such as the rather restrictive (on the selection of migrant workers) Japanese-Philippine Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).12 Felice, who is now an assistant language teacher, decided to quit night work to regain self-esteem and for the benefit of her child. I have a Japanese child. It would not do her good if I continued working at night. Now that I have become a teacher, I have finally fulfilled my dream as a professional and a better Filipino in Japan.

On the other hand, Melania was determined to rebuild her family’s farming businesses (rice production, livestock, and poultry) in Nueva Ecija, Philippines. After her marriage failed in 2005, she took her daughter, Mayumi, then 11 years old, to the Philippines. Managing the business enabled her to feel that she had “regained (my) being a resilient and strong Filipina”. Now back in Japan with Mayumi, she still frequents her hometown to oversee her businesses. Divorce, poverty, and discrimination are the foremost social challenges impeding the integration of many Filipino migrant mothers in Japan. Moreover, their status and citizenship are often dependent on their capacity to fulfil their family roles (Chung and Kim 2012, 217). A number of Filipino women resorted to migration as a strategy to rearrange their economic activities. This was necessary in order to provide stable financial support to the natal family, including the needs of their children left behind in the Philippines.

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Janet, a former entertainer, regarded owning a beauty clinic in Tokyo as a fulfilment of her long-time dream of becoming an entrepreneur in Japan. In 2013, 8.5 percent of Filipinos working in Japan were engaged in the wholesale and retail trade, making them the third largest group of immigrants contributing to this economic sector (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare 2013); this clearly shows that the economic position of Filipinos has shifted from night work to other industries. To Janet, economic success represents a deeper meaning. She explained: My family is here; my daughter and husband are Japanese. I would like to prove to them (my family) that we (Filipinos) can make it in Japan. We can change our image.

Beyond their individualistic approach to success, a motivating factor for Filipino women to achieve a change in their socio-economic status is “rearing a family” in Japan, as in Janet’s case. Through a combination of business ownership, economic success and upholding of Filipino values (such as family-orientedness and filial piety) (Aguilar 1995, as cited in Satake 2008, 124), Filipino mothers convey their desire for acceptance within their own family in Japan, which runs parallel to their greater goal of inclusion into the host society.

Japanese-Filipino children A number of my JFC respondents have undertaken part-time work while studying in Japan, which is a phase they believe all Japanese youth should pass through when they reach 16 years of age. Hiro, a senior high school student who had just started working in a carpenter’s shop, said, “It is a Japanese practice. It trains us to become more independent and prepare for our future. I am Japanese so I must experience it.” Akina, who started working in a nearby coffee shop, confessed that she was pushed by her Japanese father to do it so that she “could learn the value of hard work, a salient outlook among Japanese”. Some JFC believe that they have become more Japanese with their internalisation of the values of hard work and independence. However, some also found it hard to work out those “values”, as part-time jobs were difficult to secure in Japan’s declining economy. Aya quitted nail art school some years ago and, since 2011, she had been employed in five part-time jobs. She decided to go to the Philippines to learn English and hoped to become a translator. Like Aya, many JFC have contributed to the growing number of Japanese freeters (freelancers) and NEETs (not in education, employment, or training), which has increasingly become an economic

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concern for Japan and other developed countries (Kosugi 2006). Going to the Philippines for English training has provided an alternative to JFC to grapple with their difficult situation. Bicultural capacity has actually worked to benefit a number of JFC. Shin developed cross-cultural sensitivity and was able to distinguish between the Japanese and Filipino working environment: The Philippine workplace is a very relaxed one. Filipinos are very positive, lively, and fun to work with. In Japan, Japanese can be very protective, reserved, and focused. They don’t talk much, so you have to read between the lines. It can be hard when you are not Japanese and you deal with them.

The contrasting features of Filipino and Japanese work cultures gave Shin dual training experience and shaped his bicultural work style, which he then capitalised on when he worked for a multinational media company in the Philippines before he was transferred to its headquarters in Japan in 2009. Yuri, a 24 year old informant, also experienced the positive impacts of her bicultural training. She grew up in the Philippines but pursued higher education in Japan. After graduating from university, she worked in an international IT company in Tokyo before moving to a Japanese-owned outsourcing company based in Manila. She expressed her enthusiasm for this new workplace: They hired me because I can speak English and Japanese, which is needed for the job, and I know a lot about Filipino culture since I am also Filipino which is useful for understanding the market. Most of all, I am happy because I am able to live with my Filipino family again.

Becoming a part of an extended family in the Philippines involves a process of redefining the family which, to JFC like Yuri, can further boost their Filipino social and cultural capital. In reality, not all JFC have attained enough confidence to work either in Japan or the Philippines. Emiko, for instance, focused on attaining an opportunity to migrate to another country as her frustration with the Japanese work culture accumulated: The workplace can be very stressful. The Japanese are workaholics. You can’t use school or church as an excuse...I may be Japanese physically but I do not belong here…so I want to move elsewhere. In Asia, definitely. I aim to go to Singapore since it is near the Philippines. My heart is Filipino.

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She is one of the three JFC in this study to have struggled with Japanese work habits and felt ill-suited to Japan. Emiko looked forward to working in a third country where she could maximise her bicultural capital. Emiko’s case illustrates both JFC’s resistance to the hegemonic power of Japanese assimilative culture, and a growing aspiration to pursue her future outside the two societies of orientation. Pursuing greater socio-economic mobility means that Filipinas and their Japanese-Filipino children have to find various interconnected ways of “becoming” Japanese-Filipino and of belonging to both Japan and the Philippines. For those Filipino mothers who have quite successfully acculturated into the Japanese society, they have improved their social and economic status and achieved a “Japanised” household. They see these changes as further opportunities to reconfigure the use of Filipino and Japanese cultures in their transnational connections and business. Most Japanese-Filipino children have defined themselves as Japanese nationals on the basis of their birth, growth, education, and work experiences; yet, they continue to re-appropriate Filipino social and cultural capital to contend with various structural and socio-cultural barriers.

Conclusion: Japanese-Filipino as a transmigrant identity In this conclusion, I will sum up my findings and analyses. To provide a brief summary, a comparison of different aspects of Filipino mothers and JFC is shown in Figure 3-1. As indicated, the patterns of their education and economic lives are structured and constructed through processes of assimilation and transnationalism. Assimilation (Gordon 1964) is a process in which migrants are, in the long run, able to gradually abandon their homeland culture to fully adopt the culture and language of the host society. Building on Gordon’s concept of assimilation, Constant and Zimmermann (2009) reinterpreted assimilation, based on their study of immigrants in Germany, as having a stronger identification with the host society and culture, which results in a weaker connection to the home society and culture (ethnicity). As shown above, some Filipino immigrant mothers have striven hard to acquire a Japanese cultural fluency within which to raise their family and engage with the Japanese community and workplace and, therefore, have become “Japanese”. Some have changed their work from night time entertainers to teachers or caregivers. Yet, despite their efforts to integrate into the host society, they retain all possible connections with their natal families in the Philippines, from which they seek help in order to overcome family challenges.

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Filipino Mothers Acquired cultural capital (Japanese) Assimilating Japanese language and culture Shifting economic roles Economic integration

Transnational Japanese-Filipinos Highly-educated Bicultural capital Multilingual Transnational business, career options, family relations

JFC Accumulated/ national capital Acquired cultural capital (Japanese and Filipino) Part-time, full-time work Third country economic migration

Figure 3-1: Comparison of educational, economic and migration experiences of Filipino mothers and JFC

Most JFC born in Japan are entitled to the Japanese nationality. Compared to their Filipino mothers, JFC may identify more strongly with the Japanese society. However, like their mothers, they may still experience discrimination and marginalisation as their amount and type of capital may not match their aspirations in Japan. Accordingly, JFC will endeavour to engage in dual/multiple identifications and cherish a multiple sense of belonging by building up transnational networking, and thus possibilities, for themselves. This paper has examined the salience of the term “Japanese-Filipino” in denoting the transmigrant lives of Filipino mothers and JapaneseFilipino children who desire to be included and accepted in Japan, while retaining their connections with the Philippines, and aspiring to belong elsewhere. The cases in this study provide evidence to support a reconsideration of the term “Japanese-Filipino” beyond its use as a social category or in the primordial sense of being haafu children; it is in fact a “practice” of self-making and seeking belonging. The cases have revealed how Filipino mothers and JFC both engage in remaking the self and redefining sources of social affiliation, both locally and transnationally. The evolving socio-economic conditions of the Philippines and Japan will also continue to redirect Filipino mothers’ and their children’s bicultural and transmigrant way of life. Japan has begun to tap its internal human resource (its migrant population) for elderly care and English education, which generates new work opportunities for Filipinas. Whereas some (Burgess 2008) have observed a slight social change, particularly

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regarding Japan’s attitude towards its immigrants, it remains to be seen whether these changes will eventually give rise to a more accommodating culture for immigrants in the near future. The Philippines, on the other hand, has been one of the leading labourexporting countries in the world and has recently become a hub for the global IT outsourcing industry (Tyner 2000; Rodriguez 2010; Patalinghug 2012; Riego 2013). Those JFC who possess selective bicultural capital have leveraged above the Philippines’ improved economy to create increased possibilities for their careers. Indeed, compared to ordinary young Japanese, they may even be better positioned (with bi-cultural endowments) when responding to Japan’s changing demand for labour, should they aspire to lead a transnational future. Transnationalism, as a process that produces a transmigrant identity, has become the tool with which many Filipino parents and JFC negotiate for loyalty and membership. This current way of life is a desirable pattern for both the transmigrant mothers and their children.

Notes 1. This figure is based on the JFC Joint Statement released at the 2009 Conference for JFC held in Saitama City, Japan. The International Organisation for Migration’s (IOM) approximation is 100,000 to 200,000. Please refer to: http://jfcmultisectoralnetworkingproject.org/index.php/en/joint-statement-jfcs, accessed 10 December 2011. The former Center for Japanese-Filipino Families (CJFF) held that there are around 340,000 children and youth of Filipino ancestry. Please refer to http://home.att.ne.jp/banana/cjff/homepage.htm, accessed 10 August 2013. Whereas statistics from the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (2013) show a significant decline in the number of JFC born in Japan over the last decade, from 4,856 in 2000 to 2,643 in 2012, there are no accurate data on the number of Japanese-Filipino children living in the Philippines, which reflects the complexity of the citizenship issue. 2. The highest recorded number of Japanese men-Filipino women intermarriages in Japan was 12,150 (together with 195 Japanese women-Filipino men intermarriages) in 2006. In 2012, there were 3,517 Japanese men-Filipino women intermarriages, and 139 Japanese women-Filipino men intermarriages in Japan, which were the lowest figures recorded over the last two decades (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2012a). 3. There are existing studies (e.g. Bauzon 1999, Satake 2004, Nuqui 2009) which lengthily discuss the distinct features of Filipino-Japanese or Japanese-Filipino intermarriages and the historical-cultural specificity of these intermarriages. Such marriages are not necessarily between a Filipino entertainer and a Japanese man. Also, see Piper’s (2003) analysis on the shifting rather than static roles of migrant women as workers and wives.

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4. In Japan, this so-called instrumental marriage, that is, using marriage to acquire legal status, is also found among other migrant women, as is the case of the Chinese (Liu-Farrer 2010). 5. There are now approximately 5,488 JFC, or identified statistically as children born to a Filipino mother, compared to only 83 births in Filipino father-Japanese mother families in 1995. In 2012, the number of births in Japanese father-Filipino mother families was down to 2,474, whilst Filipino father-Japanese mother families saw 169 births (Japan Ministry of Labour, Health and Welfare 2012b). 6. Interviewees are residents within the greater Tokyo area (Tokyo, Chiba, Kanagawa, and Saitama), where an estimated 39 percent of the total number of registered foreign nationals in Japan are currently residing (Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 2012). 7. In my interviews with over 60 Filipino women in Tokyo, I found a similar trend in which more than 70 percent of my respondents obtained some college education or a full college degree in the Philippines. 8. Cram schools are private tutorial schools for specific educational needs, such as improving in academic subjects, or passing a university examination (Lewis 1995, 6). 9. Until 2011, this was the period of education according to the old Philippine curriculum. On 15 May 2013, Republic Act No. 10533 (also known as the Basic Education Act of 2013 (see http://www.gov.ph/k-12/#about)) was signed and began implementing the K-12 basic education system, which now follows a 1-6-4-2-4 pattern, although my respondents (children of Filipino mothers) went to the Philippines to study prior to this curriculum restructuring. 10. Po and opo are polite words used by Filipinos when talking to the elderly. Meanwhile, mano po is a polite expression and gesture by a younger person to show their respect to older people, and with which he/she asks permission from seniors to place their right hand on his/her forehead to receive blessings from them. 11. In her talk at Waseda University, Professor Hiroko Hayashi of Fukuoka University referred to women in Japan as “untapped potential” and called upon a widening of their labour participation in order to address Japan’s labour market demands. 12. JPEPA is the first bilateral agreement between the Philippines and Japan, which was ratified in 2006, granting permission to Filipino professionals such as nurses and caregivers to work in Japan. Due to Japan’s language examination and other strict requirements, flows of Filipino professionals to Japan remain minimal. Refer to http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/PB%202007-01%20-%20JapanPhilippines%20Economic%20Partnership%20Agreement%20(JPEPA),%20An%2 0assesment.pdf.

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edited by Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, 690-719. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Mariñas, B. O., and M. P. Ditapat. 1999. “Philippines, Curriculum Development.” In Globalization and Living Together: The Challenges for Educational Content in Asia, 112-119. UNESCO-IBE and Central Board of Secondary Education (India), Final Report on the Subregional Curriculum Development, New Delhi, March 9-17. Morawska, E. T. 2009. A Sociology of Immigration: (Re)making Multifaceted America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Murphy-Shigematsu, S. 2004. “Expanding the Borders of the Nation: Ethnic Diversity and Citizenship Education in Japan.” In Diversity and Citizenship Education, edited by J. Banks, 303-332. California: JosseyBass. Nuqui, C. G. 2009. “International Migration, Citizenship, Identities and Cultures: Japanese-Filipino Children (JFC) in the Philippines.” Gender, Technology and Development, 12 (3): 483-507. Patalinhug, J. 2012. “The Right to Organize in the Philippine Business Process Outsourcing Industry.” Journal of Social Economics 42 (2-3): 248-256. Piper, N. 2003. “Wife or Worker? Worker or Wife? Marriage and Crossborder Migration in Contemporary Japan.” International Journal of Population Geography, 9 (6): 457-469. Repeta, L., and G. Roberts. 2010. “Immigrants or Temporary Workers? A Visionary Call for a ‘Japanese-style Immigration Nation’.” The AsiaPacific Journal: Japan Focus, 48-3-10, November 29. http://japanfocus.org/-Glenda_S_-Roberts/3450. Riego, J. M. 2013. “Pioneer BPO Firm Shines Bright in its Sector through ICT Partner’s Excellent Connectivity.” Business Mirror. http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/index.php/en/features/marketing/19 424-pioneer-bpo-firm-shines-bright-in-its-sector-through-ict-partner-sexcellent-connectivity. Rodriguez, R. M. 2010. Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Rumbaut, R. G. 1994. “The Crucible Within: Ethnic Identity, Self-Esteem, and Segmented Assimilation among Children of Immigrants.” International Migration Review 28 (4): 748-794. San Jose, B., and M. R. Ballescas. 2011. “Engaging Multiculturalism from Below: The Case of Filipino Assistant Language Teachers in Japan.” A paper presented at the First Vulnerable Filipino Migrants Conference, Osaka University, Japan, March 19-21.

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Satake, M. 2004. “Filipina-Japanese Intermarriages: A Pathway to New Gender and Cross-Cultural Relations.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 13 (4): 445-473. Satake, S. 2008. “At the Core of Filipina-Japanese Intercultural Marriages: Family, Gender, Love, and Cross-Cultural Understanding.” In The Past, Love, Money, and Much More: Philippines-Japan Relations Since the End of the Second World War, edited by L. Yu-Jose, 111-137. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Suzuki, N. 2010. “Outlawed Children: Japanese-Filipino Children, Legal Defiance, and Ambivalent Citizenships.” Asia Affairs 83 (1): 31-51. —. 2003. “Transgressing Victims: Reading Narratives of ‘Filipina Brides’ in Japan.” Critical Asian Studies 35 (3): 399-420. —. 2002. “Gendered Surveillance and Sexual Violence in Filipina PreMigration Experiences to Japan.” In Gender Politics in the AsiaPacific Region, edited by B. S. A. Yeoh et al., 99-119. London/New York: Routledge. Takahata, S. 2012. “The 1.5-Generation Filipinos in Japan: Youths Straddling between Education and Employment.” Journal of International Relations and Comparative Culture 11 (1): 291-302. Takenaka, A. 2012. “Demographic Challenges for the 21st Century: Population Ageing and the Immigration ‘Problem’ in Japan.” Anthropology and Aging Quarterly 33 (2): 38- 43. Tsuda, T. 2006. “Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration.” In Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration, edited by T. Tsuda, 3-36. Landham, M.D.: Lexington Books. Tsuda, Y. 2011. “Caught between Two Walls? Cultural Identity of Japanese-Filipino Youth.” A paper presented at the First Vulnerable Filipino Migrants Conference, 19-21 March. Tyner, J. A. 2000. “Global Cities and Circuits of Global Labor: The Case of Manila, Philippines.” The Professional Geographer, 52 (1): 61-74. Uchio, T. 2012. “The Micropolitics of Representation of Japanese-Filipino Children in Japan.” A paper presented at the Japanese Studies Association in Southeast Asia, hotel Armada, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, 22-23 February. —. 2013. “Groups Vulnerability and Individual Dignity: The Case of Japanese-Filipino Youth.” http://globalstudies.doshisha.ac.jp/english/i18n/images/theme4/Taichi_ Uchio_presentation.pdf.

CHAPTER FOUR EMOTIONAL RANSOM: EXPLORING ENVY AND RESENTMENT AMONG FILIPINO “HERO-MIGRANTS” AND THEIR “LEFT-BEHIND” FAMILIES EVANGELINE O. KATIGBAK

Introduction In June 2012, “Little Italy”, an upland rural village in Batangas province, southeast of Manila, the Philippines’ capital city, celebrated its annual fiesta1, la dolce vita2 style. The two-day celebration included a village-wide singing contest and a variety show staged by prominent show business personalities, and was attended by both provincial and municipal officials. Owing to their relatively superior financial status, villagers who worked in Italy as domestic workers were assigned the task of shouldering the cost of the celebration, of approximately one million pesos. Nonmigrants’ expectations of migrants’ financial provision of such ostentatious festivities has often generated various conflicting emotions which capitalise on their being members of an extended family.3 Using the case of Little Italy, this chapter explains how translocal subjectivities—the “multiply located senses of self among those who inhabit transnational social fields” (Conradson and McKay 2007, 169)— are constituted through emotions. It questions the economically inflected hero subjectivities of migrants, which basically revolves around their financial ability to provide for their family. I will draw readers’ attention to the frequent emphasis on positive emotions (e.g., sacrificial love) and stories of success that permeate the current scholarship on translocal subjectivities. I would suggest that such narratives are problematic on two accounts. First, the blanket category of “hero-migrants” summarily deems all migrants and migration trajectories as successful, hiding the complexities

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of the individual experience. Second, the logic of the hero-migrant discourse is mounted on the over-valorised, economically inflected subjectivities of migrants, despite various emotions underpinning such subjectivities (Ho 2009). I thus consider emotions and economies to be intertwined features of migration. I suggest that this intertwining produces various representations of hero-migrant subjectivities and would question the frequent association of positive emotional constructs and hero-migrants. Indeed, the emotional economies of migration are also characterised by negative emotions such as envy and resentment. I suggest the use of emotional ransom—the price of redemption from unfavourable social positions brought about by transmigration—to theorise about the negative emotions that reconfigure translocal subjectivities. Emotional ransom emphasises the various ways by which emotions are leveraged to coerce economic remittances. It also underlines the ways through which translocal subjects employ emotions to blur social categories and positions in situated localities. In what follows, I first demonstrate the significance of studying emotions in understanding translocal subjectivities. I pay particular attention to the intertwining of emotions and economies, and argue that emotions are not merely ancillary to economic life (Coe 2011; Conradson and McKay 2007). I will provide an overview of the sociocultural contexts of my study, particularly the Filipino cultural notion of bayanihan (communal unity). Through an investigation of fiesta spaces in the barangay (barrio / village) of Little Italy based on fieldwork that I conducted in 2011 and 2012, I analyse how the multi-graded emotions of envy and resentment reshape translocal subjectivities, which also results in tainted versions of hero-migrants. I will analyse the important roles played by emotions in building migrants’ subjectivities through the use of the concept of “emotional ransom”. In this chapter, the administrative name of the village and the names of the research participants are withheld to protect the identities of the respondents.

Theorising emotions: emotional ransom and translocal subjectivities Translocal subjectivities are formed through the continuous reworking of identities in multiple and overlapping localities as a result of migration. This recognises that migrants’ selfhood is an amalgamation of various spatiotemporal experiences, established as their senses of self-transmutation through reconfigurations of social relations in movements and emplacements (Collins 2012; McKay 2006; Silvey 2006, 2007). This forging of multiple

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attachments contributes to the production of new sociocultural spaces where culture and social relations are not lost but are rather transformed and intensified (Ehrkamp 2005; Levitt 2001; McKay 2006). Conradson and McKay’s (2007) conception of translocal subjectivities replaces economic-centric discussions of migrant subjectivities (e.g., migrants as remittance-senders) with the emotional (and affective) states that colour transmigrants’ lives. In a similar vein, Ho (2009, 789) stresses the importance of emotion in constituting subjectivities and contends that emotional attributes (re)shape subjectivities, producing “emotional subjectivities”. Indeed, emotions (re)structure translocal subjectivities and influence the behaviour and attitudes of translocal subjects towards transnational family-hood, specifically with respect to monetary remittances and social standing. This is manifested by the different emotional and socioeconomic dislocations that translocal subjects experience through their own movements or the movements of others. Migrants frequently reap economic benefits from working abroad. Whilst they may be economically disadvantaged in host areas, their migration usually allows them to move upward in the socioeconomic ladder in the country of origin (e.g., Aguilar 2009; Carling and Åkesson 2009; Levitt 2001). The economic advantage of migrants, however, is not always shared equally among members of their transnational families or other members within these translocal social relations (e.g., extended family relations that constitute a translocal village). Non-migrant family members often solicit economic assistance from the migrants by leveraging emotions. In the same way, emotions may be capitalised upon by migrants for personal purposes. Negotiations for economic help through the manipulation of emotions (re)produce the notion of “emotional ransom”. As migrants and non-migrants are differently positioned in the translocal social field (McKay 2012), emotions are often leveraged in order to re-position oneself in the constellation of translocal social relations. These emotions may be employed to recast hero subjectivities by projecting a favourable image of one’s self, or by dislocating others in order to satisfy a particular purpose. Emotional ransom invokes the sacrificial love that is expected from hero-migrants, and those who fall short of such love are sometimes compelled to “display” such selfless emotion at different costs. In contrast to the discursive singular characterisation of hero subjectivities, the notion of emotional ransom thus reveals that the translocal social field is a landscape of emotional “tugs-ofwar” marked by tension and ambivalence, which is similar to Carling’s (2008, 1453) conceptualisation of “asymmetries” in transnational

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relations. Carling (2008) advances the notion of asymmetries as a means of analysing transnationalism at the micro-level. According to him, asymmetries inherent in transnational relations produce frustrations among migrants and non-migrants in the area of origin. Moreover, Carling (2008, 1453) notes that power relations between migrants and non-migrants are not always in favour of the migrants, as “transnational practices are shaped by the multi-faceted nature of the relationship, with migrants and nonmigrants experiencing vulnerability and ascendancy at different times and in different contexts”. Drawing on Carling’s analysis, I suggest that these asymmetrical transnational relations function as the breeding ground that legitimises the negotiations for emotional ransom. Emotional ransom is multifaceted. In this chapter, I explore the negotiations for emotional ransom through two ends—the migrants and the non-migrants, with such negative emotions as envy and resentment. On the one hand, non-migrants envy the ability of migrants to negotiate a new social position through their migration. The upward mobility of migrants and their families in the socioeconomic strata, for example, widens the income gap between those who (are able to) move and those who cannot. Such a condition necessitates the “rescue” of the disadvantaged by their migrant relatives on account of their familial connections. Migrants, on the other hand, often resent this version of migrant-heroes that is constructed by non-migrants. Consequently, the payment of emotional ransom contradicts the more usual characterisation of migrants as embodying sacrificial love towards their (extended) family. In both of these configurations, emotions are employed to trouble the conventional notions of hero subjectivities. Envy and resentment come about as a result of the asymmetries that, as Carling (2008) persuasively argues, are ingrained in transmigration. Building on Carling’s work, I examine the envy and resentment that result from, and bring about, other forms of asymmetrical relations—including the demands for, and appropriation of, emotional ransom—between migrants and non-migrants in Little Italy. Before discussing the different emotions that create tensions, I will first narrate on the construction of the migrants’ subjectivities that stress self-sacrifice and familial love.

The construction of hero subjectivities Across many different labour-sending countries in the global South, migrants are generally viewed in a positive light owing to their significant contributions in salvaging the languishing macroeconomies of the nation

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and the microeconomies of the family through the massive and unabated flows of monetary remittances from abroad (Basch et al. 1994; Carling 2008; Levitt 2001; Tyner 2004). The constructions of hero subjectivities are varied, constituting a kaleidoscope of different shapes and patterns, but they come together to form a positive feeling that is fuelled into societal consciousness (Carling and Åkesson 2009; Riccio 2001). Migrants are therefore deemed to embody the values of, inter alia, courage, selflessness, endurance and hard work—laudable qualities that constitute important aspects in the production of hero subjectivities (Carling and Åkesson 2009; Osella and Osella 2000; Riccio 2001). These embodied heroic attributes are considered to contribute to the material success of the migration journey. In other words, positive heroic qualities are convertible to the visible and tangible evidence of economic gains through migration. The production of hero subjectivities therefore creates an undifferentiated migration track that assumes stories of triumphs and flows of positive emotions not only for their families but also for the wider community. In the following section, I will probe deeper into this issue through the cultural notion of bayanihan (spirit of community) in the Philippines.

Foregrounding Bayanihan Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) have long been ascribed the title bagong bayani (modern-day heroes), owing to their monetary remittances which help keep the national economy afloat (Gibson and Graham 2002; Gonzales 1998). The notion of the hero-migrant, although extolled for the accompanying self-sacrifice, is primarily economic in orientation (Aguilar 2003; Asis 2005; McKay 2003). That is, the discursive heroism of migrants is based chiefly on their faithful sending of remittances from abroad with concomitant assumptions of altruism and sacrificial love. It has long been acknowledged that the bagong bayani title of OFWs is primarily a political construct aimed at incorporating the OFWs within the Filipino nation (Asis 2005; Basch et al. 1994). Primarily, it is the championing of the wellbeing of the family; more generally, it is the upholding of the national economy above one’s own comfort and convenience that (re)produces the imagery of hero-migrants in the national and societal imaginations (POEA 2009; see also Aguilar 2003; Asis 2005; Parreñas 2006). The valiant endurance by migrants of the hardships associated with migration further underlines the hero-migrant imagery. Hence, the bagong bayani political construct evokes, and simultaneously

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sustains and (re)shapes, the sociocultural constructions of hero subjectivities through bayanihan. Representing an imagery of shared progress, the notion of bayanihan is the cultural underpinning of the Filipino notions of bayan (nation) and bayani (hero). Bayanihan refers to the spirit of community seen in the old tradition of moving nipa huts from one place to another by able-bodied men, who carry an entire house on their shoulders using bamboo poles. In sociocultural imagery, the hero is the ideal member of the family or community on whose physical strength and character the family and community are founded (Ang 1979, 92). To participate in bayanihan, therefore, is to display a spirit of comradeship or unity and, in the nationalistic rhetoric, to be a bayani. As a sociocultural notion and praxis of shared communal progress, bayanihan therefore undergirds the production of hero imageries and governs the expectations of economic assistance from the OFWs. The bayanihan spirit is evident in the reproduction of translocal subjectivities in Little Italy, where the majority of migrants work as domestics in different parts of Italy. Like other rural villages in the Philippines, Little Italy exercises bayanihan by pooling resources. Those who can afford it are expected to offer help to others so that none of their relatives are left behind on the ladder of socioeconomic success. Thus, the “Little Italy” tag is viewed as testifying to the spirit of bayanihan. The village is deemed to have established a model for others, whereby migrant domestic workers in Italy (the village’s “economic pilgrims”) have remained loyal to their identified “mission with an explicit purpose of securing the family’s [and the wider community’s] reproduction and strengthening its future” (Yeoh and Huang 2000, 419). The material success of migration in Little Italy was the map that led to the “discovery” of the migration-to-Italia-route to socio-economic progress that began in the late 1970s. Pioneering migrants helped family members and other relatives to go to Italy because the collective experience of poverty in earlier times made the dream for progress a shared endeavour among all the villagers. Later on, the practice of bayanihan involved community projects, such as the building of a barangay hall and the renovation of the village chapel. The translocal projects of migrants resulted in the transformation not only of the material landscape of the village, but also of the social and emotional relations. Some villagers lament on how, along with the economic benefits of transmigration, their relations with each other have been loaded with envy and resentment.

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Emotional ransom: envy and material demands among non-migrants Envy has been a mainstay in the examination of migrant lives and experiences; yet, it has frequently been glossed over in the migration literature. Nominal mention of envy appears in discussions of the negative impacts of monetary remittances (Aguilar 2009; McKay 2003; McKay and Brady 2005). Envy incites the “evil eye” (Osella and Osella 2000, 127) that threatens ill feelings towards its subjects. Tapias and Escandell’s (2011) work on envy among Bolivian migrants in Spain is instructive as they shed light on how envy travels and instigates mistrust and competition in previously close-knit transnational social relations (in both blood or fictive kin relations). Following Tapias and Escandell (2011, 77), I look at how envy is a negative outcome of social capital and can act as a subtle mechanism of social control among members of the same family and community. Accordingly, envy lusts for the same social position and material possessions that others have but the envious lack. The manipulative work of envy is evident in the 2012 fiesta celebrations in Little Italy, which I will use to illuminate how envy exacts emotional ransom. As discussed previously, the lavish village fiesta involved the participation of show business personalities, and local politicians as guests of honour. The exorbitant spending for the festivities shows how the migrant bayani of the village “remits and reshapes” (Walton-Roberts 2004, 78) village projects and occasions whether at home or away. The ability of transmigrants to sustain the Little Italy imagery of shared progress elevates them to an entitled position in the village where their opinions on particular matters are given prime consideration. The village head (male, 64 years old), for instance, admitted: We cannot celebrate our fiesta here if those who are abroad won’t approve of it, mainly because they are the source of funding. The reason we are able to prepare for our fiesta next year (2012) is because they gave it a go signal.

Migrants gave the 2012 festivities a “go signal”, five years after the much lauded and well-remembered week-long fiesta in 2007, which was a source of pride in the village. The upholding of the Little Italy imagery and its accompanying la dolce vita lifestyle has bred feelings of envy that have legitimised emotional ransom by the non-migrants. Non-migrants often described the five-year interlude between the ostentatious celebrations in 2007 and 2012 with a mix of nostalgia and disapproval.

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Such feelings were aggravated by the fact that, during the five-year gap, nearby villages had had their own lavish fiesta celebrations. Dante (a 65 year old non-migrant) said, “I often tell my kumpare4 here (village): ‘Why did we allow ourselves to lag behind other barangays?’”. Tanya (a 19 year old non-migrant) echoed the views of her fellow villagers: “Other barangays have been holding concerts of famous rock bands and artists… It’s time for [Little Italy] to shine [again] (laughs)… the SK (Sangguniaang Kabataan)5 is planning a fiesta next year (2012).” Envy pushes subjects to play a game that is of its own creation. Nonmigrants conceptualise a race-to-the-top “competition” among villages, in which the most materially progressive wins, while those who “lag behind” have to be ransomed from the consequent (imagined) shame of being outdone. The narratives of non-migrants reveal that hero-migrants are tasked to pay an emotional ransom by financing lavish festivities that pit the village against other translocal villages. This can be seen in the ways in which non-migrant villagers pressure their migrant counterparts for emotional ransom because, in the imagined game, Little Italy has lagged behind its “competitors”. The desire to maintain the social status of Little Italy in the municipality justifies the coercion for emotional ransom. Expressions of envy are tacit because to envy is to admit “social and/or economic inferiority and unsocial behavior” (Tapias and Escandell 2011, 79). Thus, familial and community solidarity has been employed to mask envy. Whilst re-articulations of the Little Italy imagery through constant mentioning of the 2007 fiesta have brought about feelings of envy among the non-migrants, they cannot finance grandiose celebrations on their own. Hence, non-migrants place the responsibility of sustaining the imagery of progress on the migrants, and employ family-hood as the fundamental logic to exact emotional ransom. A major fundraising strategy of nonmigrants was a quota system of monetary contributions from each household. This was in addition to the money that the committee hoped their migrant relatives would be able to raise for the fiesta. The monetary contribution of each household in the barangay and among migrants was pre-determined by the village committee, and the village head reasoned: Some are tight-fisted, and there are also some [who are] spendthrift. Some would only be willing to give 5 or 10 Euros; what would you be able to do with that? But if each of them would contribute at least 50 Euros, then that would be very good.

Such demands for emotional ransom are fuelled by the imagination of “easy money” (Osella and Osella 2000, 127) from migrants. In reality, and as many of the villagers have likewise acknowledged, the money of

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migrants is hard earned. According to Paolo (a 61 year old non-migrant), it was earned by their “sweat and blood”. Yet, as the narratives show, the non-migrants’ demands for an emotional ransom are buttressed by unashamed “logics of excess”, a kind of promiscuous spending that the performance of particular subjectivities demands (Osella and Osella 2000, 123). For this reason, non-migrants concoct a variety of strategies to elicit an emotional ransom. For instance, the village council planned to have the list of per household monetary contributions for the 2012 fiesta posted in the village chapel for several months following their celebration, just as they had done in 2007. According to the village head, this was “to honour them (the contributors)”. In doing so, however, those who gave less, or none at all, were subjected to public shame. While the emotional ransom-paying hero-migrants were crowned with honour, those who fell short of embodying “heroism” were subject to a position of lesser social standing. In most cases, migrants performed their normative hero subjectivities by acceding to the demands for emotional ransom and abetting the village social drama but there were a number who refused to perform the script of the ideal hero-migrant. Even among those who conformed to the heromigrant model, not all did so without resentment. In reality, migrants often resent the unending demands for emotional ransom, and all sorts of other material demands. They respond to non-migrants’ “extortion” tactics in a variety of ways. I will expound on this in the next section.

Emotional ransom: resentment and resistance among migrants Like envy, resentment has not been given due attention in scholarly analyses. Although it has frequently been mentioned in academic discussions and popular discourses as inherent to migration, little has been done to make such emotion an analytical category. Resentment is an emotion that sits between pride and anger. It is a feeling of indignation or bitterness over unfair treatment, whether real or perceived. Multi-graded and without definite shape, resentment contains different shades of frustration and/or bitterness. This section explores the tensions and ambivalence that result from resentment over the non-migrants’ expectations and demands for material support, which forms part of the emotional ransom. Sociality in extended families has its own contradictions (McKay 2012; Olwig 2002) and family members are susceptible to such inconsistencies (of relations), especially when emotions are deliberately

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employed to benefit a particular group of people at the expense of another. For instance, left-behind family members are often compelled—despite their annoyance—to conform and assume their own (perceived) subjectivities, not only as dependents but also as extensions of the hero subjectivities of migrants. Mary (a 76 year old non-migrant), whose four children are in Italy,6 spoke about her dismay when she was called upon to support the needs of the less fortunate in the village and in the wider municipality: Whenever there would be problems in the municipality, they would hastily rush up here for help. They probably think that people here are rich because many are in Italy. Ay, wrong! … We don’t have money... We are poor… If this village is called Little Italy because every need of all people can be supported, by all means then, call it Little Italy! But we can’t.

Mary lamented the general assumption that migration immediately led to the improved economic capacity of migrants and their families, and therefore their ability to support “every need” of the larger community. Such a compulsion to perform hero subjectivities is produced through various forms of social regulations and coercion, and plays on emotions (Silvey 2006; Velayutham and Wise 2005). Consequently, it results in feelings of exasperation that are especially strong among those who feel the unfairness of having to shoulder much of the weight of the financial burden of the poorer villagers. Whilst migrants may likewise feel irritated by the burdensome demands for emotional ransom, resistance to paying is not always successfully demonstrated because the fame and status of the family is frequently taken into consideration. Thus, while migrants may be vocal about their annoyance towards their left-behind relatives, the flows of economic assistance from abroad continue. Gerald (a 31 year old migrant) echoed the feelings of his fellow migrants towards sending money to the village: Others say, ‘what the heck! They’re asking for money again!’ It’s like [migrants] will show annoyance at first but they’d eventually give in… It’s a normal feeling, right?

Gerald further revealed that collecting the emotional ransom for the 2012 fiesta necessitated greater effort, in terms of persuading people to finance what his fellow migrants described as an “extravagance”. Such “normal feeling[s]” of discomfort and unhappiness about having to finance the “extravagance” of non-migrants indicate resistance against the

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coercive (heroic) role imposed on the migrants and the economically framed hero subjectivity. In other words, migrants pay the necessary emotional ransom but not without opposition and resentment. Pinky (a 43 year old migrant) shared this with me: “I am not at ease here (village); when they see us, they see Euros”. I observed the same retort from a balikbayan7 when I attended the initial meeting for the 2012 fiesta preparations, which was spearheaded by the SK (see note 5). Amidst the jovial mood of the youth discussing various activities for the festivities, a female balikbayan (in her 40s) spoke without hiding her irritation and said, “Maybe you should ask those who are in Italy first if they would be willing to finance such extravagance.” The consequential shift in social position brought about by migration results in varying forms of emotionally underpinned translocal subjectivities. Specifically for the migrants, the pressure to conform and give in to emotional ransoms demanded by non-migrants redefines the meaning of what it is to be a “hero”. Contrary to its positive imagery, the notion of hero has been calculatingly reconfigured to one that fuels and sustains the envy-infused, materialistic, and imagined rat race among translocal villages in the municipality. Migrant-heroes are in a double bind of redeeming the honour of their families by giving monetary contributions, and nursing the pride of the entire village. The burden of emotional ransom thus challenges the prevalent image of the “sacrificial and dutiful” migrants in migration literature. Indeed, emotional ransom peels off the positive discourses of sacrificial love and transnational family relations, and reveals the constant tension and (material and emotional) negotiations between migrants and the left-behind.

Conclusion This chapter has underscored the reality that goes beyond the usual positive discourses (both on economic results and relations) that are deemed to justify migration and separation (of families); negative emotions likewise feature in the (re)configurations of translocal subjectivities. The situations examined in the above show that hero subjectivities are not always buttressed by sacrificial love, but are also characterised by resentment that disrupts the imagined heroism of migrants. The literature on migrant remittances has mainly focused on money flows and the accompanying “progress” of transnational families and the local and national economies. Digging below the layers of economic provision uncovers the idea that economic remittances have led to an emotional ransom that troubles translocal subjectivities as well as

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positions in a social collective. Looking further into the negative emotions generated in the transnational social space is particularly important for gaining a greater understanding of migrant life and transnational family relations. We need to understand how negative emotions are felt, negotiated, embodied, and performed alongside the esteemed positive emotions and relations that surround translocalities. Finally, the findings of this study invite further extrapolations on the emotional geographies of migration.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank A/P Shirlena Huang for her valuable comments on the larger research project from which I draw this chapter. I am also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback and suggestions. Additionally, I thank Dr. Yuk Wah Chan for all her help and understanding regarding this project.

Notes 1. A Catholic religious festivity held in honour of the patron saint of a particular village or town. 2. Imagining migrants’ lives in Italy as a “sweet life” is pervasive among the “leftbehind” villagers. 3. The entire village is considered isang pisa (hatched from the same brood), a type of social relationship where both blood and fictive kin are considered part of the extended family. 4. Kumpare refers to male fictive kin, usually the godfather of one’s child. 5. The Sangguniaang Kabataan (SK), or Youth Council, is a political body composed of youths aged 13-21. 6. Only one of Mary’s five children lives in the village. 7. A balikbayan is a migrant who is in the sending locality for a vacation, or one who has returned permanently.

References Aguilar, F. 2009. Maalwang Buhay: Family, Overseas Migration, and Cultures of Relatedness. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press. —. 2003. “Global Migrations, Old Forms of Labor and New Transborder Class Relations.” Southeast Asian Studies 41 (2): 137-161. Ang, G. 1979. “The Bayanihan Spirit: Dead or Alive?” Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society 7 (1/2): 91-93.

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Asis, M. 2005. “Caring for the World: Filipino Domestic Workers Gone Global.” In Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, edited by S. Huang, B. Yeoh, and N. Abdul Rahman, 21-53. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International. Basch, L., N. Glick Schiller, and C. Szanton Blanc. 1994. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States. Pennsylvania, USA: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers. Carling, J. 2008. “The Human Dynamics of Migrant Transnationalism.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31 (8): 1452-1477. Carling, J., and L. Åkesson. 2009. “Mobility at the Heart of a Nation: Patterns and Meanings of Cape Verdean Migration.” International Migration 47 (3): 123-155. Coe, C. 2011. “What is Love? The Materiality of Care in Ghanaian Transnational Families.” International Migration 49 (6): 7-24. Collins, F. L. 2012. “Researching Mobility and Emplacement: Examining Transience and Transnationality in International Student Lives.” Area 44 (3): 296-304. Conradson, D., and D. McKay. 2007. “Translocal Subjectivities: Mobility, Connection, Emotion.” Mobilities 2 (2): 167-174. Ehrkamp, P. 2005. “Placing Identities: Transnational Practices and Local Attachments of Turkish Immigrants in Germany.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31 (2): 345-364. Gibson, K., and J. Graham. 2002. “Situating Migrants in Theory: The Case of Filipino Migrant Contract Workers.” In Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? Edited by F. Aguilar Jr, 39-59. Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Migration Research Network and the Philippine Social Science Council. Gonzales, J. III. 1998. Philippine Labor Migration: Critical Dimensions of Public Policy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Ho, E. L. E. 2009. “Constituting Citizenship through Emotions: Singaporean Transmigrants in London.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99 (4): 788-804. Levitt, P. 2001. The Transnational Villagers. Oakland, CA: University of California Press. McKay, D. 2012. Global Filipinos: Migrants’ Lives in the Virtual Village. Bloomington/Indianapolis, USA: Indiana University Press. —. 2007. “‘Sending Dollars Shows Feeling’: Emotions and Economies in Filipino Migration.” Mobilities 2 (2): 175-194.

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—. 2006. “Translocal Circulation: Place and Subjectivity in an Extended Filipino Community.” The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 7 (3): 265-278. —. 2003. “Cultivating New Local Futures: Remittance Economies and Land-use Patterns in Ifugao.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 43 (2): 285-306. McKay, D., and C. Brady. 2005. “Practices of Place-making: Globalisation and Locality in the Philippines.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 46 (2): 89-103. Olwig, K. 2002. “A Wedding in the Family: Home Making in a Global Kin Network.” Global Networks 2 (3): 205-218. Osella, F., and C. Osella. 2000. “Migration, Money and Masculinity in Kerala.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 6: 117-133. Parreñas, R. S. 2006. Children of Global Migration: Transnational Families and Gendered Woes. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). 2009. Annual Report. Pasig City, Philippines: POEA. Riccio, B. 2001. “From ‘Ethnic Group’ to ‘Transnational Community’? Senegalese Migrants’ Ambivalent Experiences and Multiple Trajectories.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 27 (4): 583-599. Silvey, R. 2007. “Mobilizing Piety: Gendered Morality and IndonesianSaudi Transnational Migration.” Mobilities 2 (2): 219-229. —. 2006. “Consuming the Transnational Family: Indonesian Migrant Domestic Workers to Saudi Arabia.” Global Networks 23 (40): 23-40. Tapias, M. and Escandell, X. 2011 “Not in the Eyes of Beholder: Envy among Bolivian Migrants in Spain.” International Migration 49 (6): 76-94. Tyner, J. 2004. Made in the Philippines: Gendered Discourses and the Making of Migrants. London/ New York: Routledge Curzon. Velayutham, S., and A. Wise. 2005. “Moral Economies of a Translocal Village: Obligation and Shame among South Indian Transnational Migrants.” Global Networks 5 (1): 27-47. Walton-Roberts, M. 2004. “Returning, Remitting and Reshaping.” In Transnational Spaces, edited by P. Jackson, P. Crang, and C. Dwyer, 78-101. London/New York: Routledge. Yeoh, B. S. A., and S. Huang. 2000. “‘Home’ and ‘Away’: Foreign Domestic Workers and Negotiations of Diasporic Identity in Singapore.” Women’s International Forum 23 (4): 413-429.

PART 2: REFUGEE AND BORDERLAND MIGRATION

CHAPTER FIVE MILITARY SANCTUARY: MIGRATION IN THE INDIA-BURMABANGLADESH BORDERLAND WILLEM VAN SCHENDEL1

Borderland migration takes on many shapes. Scholars have reflected on the cross-border mobility of peasant settlers, nomads, traders, job seekers, marriage partners, criminals, and refugees. In this chapter, we look at a form of migration that has received far less attention from scholars than from security agents and policy makers—armed rebels seeking safety behind an international border. It is a common phenomenon in many of the world’s borderlands. For contemporary examples, think of rebels in the borderlands of Syria/Turkey, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Uganda/Congo, and Somalia/Ethiopia. This form of strategic mobility is often thought to be a short-term dodge but it can extend to many years and, as a result, rebels can turn into long-term residents. It is not difficult to locate Asian examples: after 1949, tens of thousands of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) troops settled in Northern Burma and Thailand and, after 1960, members of the insurgent Malayan Communist Party put down roots in southern Thailand. In this chapter, we consider the case of a 20-year insurrection against the Indian state—the Mizoram War of Independence (1966-86)2, and the military sanctuary that cross-border migration provided these insurgents. Mizoram is a geographical cul-de-sac in the extreme northeast of India, surrounded on three sides by foreign territory. To the east and south is Burma/Myanmar and to the west Bangladesh. Only a small strip in the north links Mizoram to India (see Maps 5-1a and 5-1b).

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Maps 5-1a and 5-1b: Location of Mizoram.

The Mizoram War began with a rebel attack on the region’s main towns and fierce retaliation by the Indian armed forces. The Indian Air Force bombed Mizoram’s main town and the entire region became militarised. The rebel Mizo National Army went underground and embarked upon a guerrilla war that would last for two decades. In order to isolate the guerrilla fighters from the general population, the Indian authorities forcibly uprooted over 80 percent of the inhabitants of Mizoram and resettled them in so-called “protected and progressive villages” along the main roads.3 As pressure on the guerrilla army increased (and non-government organisations began to publish a slew of reports on human rights violations4), life in Mizoram became riskier for the combatants. Soon military migrants from Mizoram and their families were crossing the border to seek refuge from the Indian armed forces and to prepare counterattacks. They were not seeking to set up a state of their own in the territorial periphery of another state. On the contrary, their eyes remained trained upon their home territory; they were merely seeking temporary breathing space across the border. These migrants were not very welcome in Burma but they fared better in East Pakistan (as Bangladesh was known before it achieved statehood in 1971). Here they received support from the Pakistan army and from borderland people and they set up settlements, training camps, and a government in exile. From guerrillas seeking refuge they turned into settlers. Out of reach of the Indian authorities, a cross-border existence took shape. This chapter uses photographs to explore the everyday existence of these military migrants. We have collected thousands of photographs from over a hundred private collections in Mizoram as part of a larger research project (carried out jointly with Joy Pachuau) on the usefulness of visual

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sources for developing new understandings of social change in Mizoram between the 1860s and the 2000s. We have reported our findings in a recently published book.5 There are hundreds of these photographs depicting the Mizoram War of Independence, most of which have not been in the public sphere before. We have had to make a very small selection and focus on only a few themes since the format of this chapter does not allow for a more extensive presentation. The photographs used in this chapter are from the collections of Lalthangsangi, R. Zamawia, Lalsangliana Sailo, and the Mizo National Front.

Migration before the 1960s Spatial mobility had long been the norm in the mountainous region that we now call Mizoram. Mountain agriculture was mostly slash-and-burn, and this required regular rotation of cultivation on dispersed plots around mountaintop settlements. In addition, these settlements would often move as a result of local strife, splitting of chiefly domains, fire, or epidemic disease. Prior to colonial annexation (which occurred here as late as the 1890s), the population had never been under a state and therefore had not been subject to state policies to make them sedentary and restrict their mobility. Instead, men aspiring to be village chiefs encouraged migration to new settlements and thus people moved into, across, and out of what is now Mizoram in accordance with micro-political developments. Another form of spatial mobility was caused by considerable net immigration from the Chin Hills in Burma (to the east of Mizoram) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for reasons that are still poorly understood. The result was that previous settlers either resisted the newcomers, or moved into areas to the north and west of Mizoram. A pattern of inter-village conflicts led to a heightened demand for labour (both productive and military), which was acquired by means of raids on the plains population of Bengal and Assam who had been under British rule since the mid-eighteenth century. It was these raids that prompted British expeditionary forces to enter the Mizoram hills and, after failed attempts, conquer them in the 1890s. For the first time, clear administrative boundaries were established to delineate the territory of Mizoram.6 These boundaries gradually took on social reality and only then did it begin to make sense to speak of crossborder migration in this region. Even though the colonial administration established boundaries, crossborder migration in Mizoram was a matter of little concern because it merely meant traversing district and provincial borders within British India.7 All this changed radically with the demise of British colonial rule.

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In 1947, Mizoram became part of independent India, a country to which it was connected only by its short northern border. Foreign territory surrounded it on all other sides (see Maps 5-1a and 5-1b): Burma was to the east and south, and (East) Pakistan to the west.8 Suddenly, cross-border movements became international journeys that three competing states intended to regulate. Soon, passports and visas were introduced and crossborder travellers began to be forced back. The spatial equation had changed entirely and Mizoram had become a segment of a complex international borderland. Many people in Mizoram resented the region’s inclusion into India and there were powerful lobbies to remain independent, or to join Burma instead. Dissatisfaction with Indian rule further increased sharply following ecological disaster in 1959-60. It was this that led to the rebellion in 1966 and the following events that prompted the insurgents to seek military sanctuary across the border.9

Images of military sanctuary When states provide a safe haven to rebels from across the border, secrecy is at a premium. This was no different for Pakistan when it took in the Mizo insurgents. Pakistan denied immediate Indian accusations that it was aiding and abetting an outlawed organisation. For both states, this was routine business: ever since independence, they had been on bad terms with each other, had supported each other’s rebel groups, and had repudiated each other’s allegations. The Mizos’ welcome was part of Pakistan’s broader strategy to destabilise India in its northeastern corner. The secrecy involved in military sanctuary usually translates into a dearth of public information. The rebels and the host state have a shared interest in imposing an information blackout lest their arrangement is put in jeopardy. Whatever information does become available tends to be ex post facto, for example in the form of memoirs. By contrast, the Mizo military migrants in East Pakistan documented their cross-border life in considerable detail by taking numerous photographs, and many of these photographs survive. A few photographs have been shown in the public sphere for many years but now we have hundreds more.10 The importance of this visual record is manifold. It provides a uniquely contemporaneous entry point into the life of Mizo migrants in East Pakistan, it complements and complicates the available written sources, it challenges the distinction between professional and vernacular photography, and it poses numerous questions about the relationship between image, memory, and history. Visual sources can help us to appreciate how military migrants maintain cross-border relationships. The Mizo images served to document

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life in exile, not just for the migrants themselves but equally for their relatives, friends, and supporters back home in Mizoram. They form a record of extraordinary times in alien surroundings and they range from the intensely personal to political propaganda. Many of these photographs, but not all, reveal awareness on the part of those depicted that they were posing for a larger audience. Some photographs appear to be performances that were staged with propaganda purposes in mind. The problematic veracity of photographic images is the subject of important debates among historians, anthropologists and scholars of cultural studies, but these are beyond the scope of this chapter.11 What sets military migrants apart from many other migrants is their high level of organisation and collective purpose. The Mizo National Front (MNF) and its armed wing (the Mizo National Army or MNA) had initiated the rebellion. The leadership of these twin organisations moved to East Pakistan and was clearly in charge of the migrant community there. Their publicity policy included creating a visual record: at least two photographers were involved in documenting important occasions. One of these photographers was K. T. Zama, a professional with a well-known photographic studio in Aizawl, the capital of Mizoram. The other was Lalsangliana, a junior leader. In addition, they used photographic studios in East Pakistan to create images of themselves. Several amateur photographers were also active, who would not necessarily have been interested in the topics that the leadership wanted to foreground. Despite our efforts, the identity of most of these amateurs remains unknown to us. We use a small selection of these images to illustrate how photographs can elucidate even the most secret and hidden migration processes. We explore three themes: how they depict border-crossing, the creation of a national identity in exile, and everyday life abroad.

Crossing the border Unauthorised cross-border mobility is rarely documented visually and our collection does not contain a single image of the Mizos as they actually step across the border into East Pakistan. Nevertheless, four images do give a sense of the process. Figure 5-1 shows two Mizo fighters in a border village during their flight to East Pakistan.

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Figure 5-1: Seeking military sanctuary in East Pakistan, 1969.12

Two other images give us a perspective from the Pakistan side of the border. Figure 5-2 depicts guerrilla troops at the Mizo National Army headquarters in East Pakistan listening to a leader’s speech just before they leave for a cross-border attack on Indian armed forces. Figure 5-3 shows us Mizo fighters looking wistfully at Mizoram from a mountaintop.

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Figure 5-2: Mizo fighters in East Pakistan readying themselves for a cross-border attack in India, 1970.13

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Figure 5-3: Looking at the homeland (Mizoram, India) from a mountaintop in East Pakistan, 1970.14

Figure 5-4, on the other hand, is a true border-crossing image. It shows the return of the Mizo rebels after 20 years in exile. In 1986 they signed a peace agreement with the Indian government. By then Pakistan had disintegrated and the territory they returned from was now known as Bangladesh.15 Here we see rebels just after traversing the river separating Bangladesh (in the background) from Mizoram (India).

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Figure 5-4: Mizo rebels crossing the border on their return to Mizoram, 1986.16

National identity The Mizo rebellion sought to establish the independent country of Mizoram. Cross-border migration was necessary to find a safe place from which to stage attacks on the enemy (the Indian troops that had been deployed to thwart Mizo secession), but it also created a space to elaborate upon the notion of the Mizo nation and to work out the trappings of state power. These included the installation of a government in exile, parliamentary elections, state ceremonies, a national flag, and the appointment of ambassadors. In this way, independent Mizoram took on more substance across the border than back home. In other words, migration helped build a nation-state. The safety of military sanctuary provided an opportunity to foster a sense of Mizo-ness expressed in the idiom of the modern state. Thus in Figure 5-5 we see a classic state trope that has become a universal practice: the head of state inspecting a guard of honour. Nothing indicates that this is, in fact, an exiled organisation unrecognised and shunned by more established states.

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Figure 5-5: The President of Mizoram, Laldenga, inspects the national guard of honour on the occasion of Mizoram Independence Day in Mahmuam (East Pakistan), 1 March 1969.17

Figure 5-6 presents the Mizoram state as a democratic one. The parliamentarians posing for this photograph symbolise the will of the people, presumably expressed through democratic elections. In Figure 5-7, we see the newly designed emblem of Mizo nationhood: a national flag prominently featuring the cross of the Christian faith. The cross was (and is) a highly emotive symbol for the Mizos and provides a strong link between national and religious identities.

Figure 5-6: Members and senators of the Mizoram parliament in old Chhantlang (East Pakistan), 1970.18

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Figure 5-7: Raising the Mizoram national flag in Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), c. 1980.19

Everyday migrant lives People seeking military sanctuary never know if their stay will be brief or not. It can be a question of days, weeks, or decades, depending on the course of military and political events. In the case of the Mizos, it turned out to be decades. They quickly established the routines that any migrant community needs to build a life in new surroundings, and the visual record illustrates this. Among the most common images were those documenting lifecycle events such as weddings and births (Figures 5-8 and 5-9).

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Figure 5-8: A Mizo wedding in Mahmuam, East Pakistan, 1970.20

Figure 5-9: Celebrating the birth of baby David Lalramchhana, East Pakistan, 1970.21

It was also important to record devout sociability, especially since the Mizos found themselves in a country where few shared their faith. Almost all Mizos are Christians. They were in a part of East Pakistan that was predominantly Buddhist and therefore had to build their own churches (Figure 5-10). They also formed church choirs, as had been the custom back home (Figure 5-11).

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Figure 5-10: Constructing the church in the Mizo “capital headquarters” in East Pakistan, 1970.22

Figure 5-11: The Mizo Evangelical Choir poses at the Baptist Union Assembly in East Pakistan, 1971.23

Other forms of sociability were equally important. Sports took on a prominent role, both as entertainment and as physical exercise for fighters (Figure 5-12). The meshing of civil and military roles was a key aspect of everyday migrant life in many other respects also. For example, Figure 513 shows female fighters posing proudly with their guns in a photograph celebrating their involvement in the national struggle. In Figure 5-14, we see a male fighter in casual wear.

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Figure 5-12: A Mizo tug-of-war competition in their capital headquarters in East Pakistan, 1970.2

Figure 5-13: Two women fighters, Lalthansangi and Chalmawii, showing their weapons at the Lion Brigade headquarters, East Pakistan, 1969.25

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Figure 5-14: A Mizo fighter in denims poses with his gun and backpack in Bangladesh, c. 1980.

A Burmese intermezzo Everyday life in the Mizo settlements in East Pakistan was suddenly upset in 1971. Earlier that year, the Bangladesh Liberation War had erupted, pitching the Pakistan armed forces against guerrilla forces intent on establishing the independent state of Bangladesh. By the end of 1971, pro-Bangladesh guerrilla fighters and invading Indian armed forces compelled the Pakistan army to surrender and East Pakistan became Bangladesh. The Mizos lost their sanctuary and had to fear for their lives as both Indian and Bangladeshi troops were looking for them.26 They made a mad dash for safety to the south, across the Burmese border. Here they found new protectors, but these protectors were not state officials. The Mizos fell in with the insurgent fighters of the Communist Party of Burma who controlled the territory of northern Arakan, just across

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the border. They established camps here and attacked Indian forces from Burma (Figure 5-15).

Figure 5-15: Two officers of the Mizo National Army in Burma, c.1974.27

The Mizo insurgents survived in the Burma-Bangladesh borderland until coups d’état in Bangladesh in 1975 brought an anti-Indian military government to power which welcomed them back. Protected by Bangladesh state agents, they returned to their old stamping grounds and resumed their lives, until the Mizo Independence War finally came to an end in 1986.

Military sanctuary and other forms of borderland migration The study of military sanctuary can be an important addition to studies of human mobility in border regions. When peasants, nomads, job seekers, or marriage partners cross an international border, they usually experience the border as a hindrance to their freedom of movement. The border is largely incidental to their pursuit of economic and social wellbeing, although it does inflect their livelihood strategies. This is not true for those seeking military sanctuary, as in the case of the Mizo migrants. To them, the international border is a godsend ȹ it is the reason they migrate.

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Crossing the border is crucial to their livelihood because they are fleeing from a state. In this respect, military migrants are similar to borderland refugees and criminals who also use the border to hide from a state in order to ensure their freedom and survival. However, refugees and criminals differ from military migrants because they do not migrate as an organisation, take large numbers of arms with them, or actively oppose the state they have just left behind. They also differ from military migrants in another way. Many refugees and criminals manage to melt into the borderland population but military migrants stand out and always need the protection of the power controlling the cross-border territory. As a result, military migrants using a borderland as a hideout have to deal with two territorial powers at the same time. They are not alone in this. Another mobile group that uses the international border to play two territorial systems simultaneously are smugglersȹborderland traders who challenge the import-export restrictions imposed by states. Smuggling exists because borders exist. It prospers when it can exploit the disparities between two neighbouring systems of economic regulation. Like military migrants, smugglers need state agents’ protection or connivance to survive but they are unlike military migrants in most other respects. For example, smugglers do not create formal organisations but depend on flexible crossborder networks, they set store by invisibility, they do not seek confrontation, and they are motivated by profit rather than politicomilitary power. The distinction between military migrants and other borderland migrants can be sharp. In the case of the Mizos in East Pakistan and Burma, it was clear that they were quite different from peasant settlers, traders and civilian refugees. Their initial purposeȹto seek shelter behind the border in order to return victoriouslyȹremained unchanged from the 1960s to the 1980s when they did, in a manner of speaking, return victoriously. Sometimes military migrants are far more difficult to distinguish from other borderland migrants. If they do not have sufficient financial support, they may turn into smugglers and settlers. Examples include the Chinese Nationalist Party troops, who became internationally prominent drug lords, or settlers, and the Malayan communist insurgents, who set up houses in Thailand.28 In other cases, military migrants ensconce themselves amongst borderland refugees.29

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Military sanctuary as illegal but authorised migration The migration of rebel militias has been of interest to students of security and counter-insurgency. As Jeffrey Treistman argues: [Even the counterinsurgency literature] on the role of external sanctuaries is incomplete. Many scholars make the mistake of combining it with other forms of foreign assistance...It is therefore necessary to disaggregate sanctuaries from other forms of external assistance. I define safe havens as the availability of an external territory which insurgents utilize to conduct operations. I impose the additional criteri[on] that a sanctuary must also be of sufficient quality. The utility of a sanctuary is negated if it is located far from its intended target, the safety of insurgents is threatened, or it impedes insurrectionary activities. External sanctuaries must provide a secure location to plan and coordinate attacks, house the organization’s leadership, and be a conduit for the transport of military hardware and supplies.30

By contrast, scholars of migration rarely focus on the cross-border migration of rebel militias, even though there are clear links with key themes in migration research, notably forced relocation and refugee migration. Even a currently popular topic, cross-border marriage migration, could well embrace the marriages of Mizo combatants. What makes military migration an important topic for migration studies is that it foregrounds the distinction between “illegal” immigration and “unauthorised” or “undocumented” immigration, terms that are often used interchangeably. Militias crossing an international border do so illegally and therefore are always deportable.31 However, across the border the powers that be cannot ignore a foreign militiaȹthey have to either beat it back or grant it sanctuary. If they take the latter course, they permit the foreign fighters to remain in their territory. The U.S. State Department has a definition of sanctuaries (although since 2006 it has preferred to designate these as “terrorist ‘safe havens’”) but this definition is insufficient. It states: Terrorist safe havens are defined … as ungoverned, under-governed, or illgoverned areas of a country and non-physical areas where terrorists … are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.32

Mizo rebels in East Pakistan, and later in Bangladesh, were there not despite the government but because of it: the Mizo migrants were used as an instrument of Pakistani and Bangladeshi policy towards India. The

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definition holds only for Mizo sanctuary in Burmaȹhere they benefitted from unsettled power relations and protection by fellow rebels. In the case of Pakistan, it was state officials who allowed the military migrants to stay and who supported them, even though this meant flouting Pakistani state law regarding the entry of foreign nationals. These officials acted unlawfully out of political expediencyȹreasons of state trumping the rule of law. The Mizos’ long sojourn in East Pakistan—without Indian passports or Pakistani visas—was both illegal and authorised. Their presence in East Pakistan was permitted for political reasons but this did not mean that they had a right to be in the country. Pakistani officials could deport them at any moment by invoking national law.33 In other words, military sanctuary normalises illegal immigration at the expense of state law.

Conclusion Human mobility across state-imposed borders can include forms that scholars of migration usually overlook. Borders provide self-rescue to military organisations that are unable to hold out in a territory. Such mobility may take the form of swift dashes across an international border or may turn into long-term settlement. In this chapter, we have looked at the latter and we have used visual sources to explore some dimensions of military migration. Long-term settlement is only possible if the authorities across the border provide military sanctuary by ignoring their own immigration laws, turning military migration into authorised, but still illegal, cross-border mobility. Cases of military sanctuary are challenging because they qualify migration theories that equate illegal immigration with unauthorised or undocumented immigration. These three terms do not necessarily overlap: migration can be illegal yet authorised, and authorisation can take different forms. In the case of Mizo military sanctuary, the migrants’ illegal presence in East Pakistan was sanctioned by the Pakistan armed forces (which controlled the Pakistan state under military rule at the time) but this authorisation was always conditional on Pakistani reasons of state. A change in the political relationship with India could have led to the withdrawal of that authorisation at any moment. Throughout their sojourn in East Pakistan, the Mizos were undocumented migrantsȹthe Pakistan state did not register them and they were free to come and go across the border. In other words, they provide an example of a group of illegal, undocumented, yet authorised migrants.

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Notes 1. The author thanks Joy Pachuau, two anonymous reviewers, and participants of the Conference on Asian Migration and the Global Asian Diasporas, City University of Hong Kong, 6-7 September 2013 for their comments. He also thanks Lalthangsangi, R. Zamawia, Lalsangliana Sailo, and the Mizo National Front (all in Mizoram) for their permission to reproduce images from their collections. This chapter is part of a research project (jointly carried out by Joy Pachuau and Willem van Schendel, with assistance from Mimi Lalhlimpuii Pachuau) focused on photographic images as sources for new understandings of social change in Mizoram between the 1860s and the 2000s. The main research findings are reported in Joy Pachuau and Willem van Schendel, The Camera as Witness: A Social History of Mizoram, Northeast India (Cambridge and Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 2. For introductions to this conflict, see Nirmal Nibedon, Mizoram: The Dagger Brigade (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1980); Vumson, Zo History: With an Introduction to Zo Culture, Economy, Religion and Their Status as an Ethnic Minority in India, Burma, and Bangladesh (Aizawl: Vumson, 1993); C. G. Verghese and R. L. Thanzawna, A History of the Mizos (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1997), Vol. 2; H. M. Bareh, Encyclopaedia of North-East India: Volume 5 – Mizoram (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2001); and R. Zamawia, Zofate Zinkawngah (Zalenna Mei a Mit Tur a Ni Lo) (Aizawl: R. Zamawia, 2007). 3. C. Nunthara, Impact of the Introduction of Grouping of Villages in Mizoram (Delhi: Omsons Publications, 1989). 4. The Brigadier T. Sailo Foundation. 2014. Human Rights Committee of Mizoram – 1974. Aizawl: Hnamte Press. 5. See Note 1. 6. The British named the region “Lushai Hills” because they knew the largest ethnic group by the name of Lushai or Lushei. The Lushai preferred to be called Mizo and the name of the area was changed to Mizoram (Mizo-land) soon after the British left. During the colonial period, the Lushai Hills were a district of the province of Assam but were ruled under a special dispensation. 7. Mizoram’s northern border was a district border (Assam); its eastern and southern borders were provincial (Burma), and so was its western border (Bengal). 8. Across Mizoram’s border with Burma lay the Chin and Arakan Hills and across its border with East Pakistan were the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In 1971, East Pakistan became Bangladesh. 9. In 1959-60 one of Mizoram’s rare “bamboo famines” occurred and, despite previous warnings, government officials failed to prepare relief. For introductions, see Sajal Nag, “Tribals, Famine, Rats, State and the Nation,” Economic and Political Weekly (24 March 2011), 1029-33; and Ken P. Aplin and James Lalsiamliana, “Chronicle and Impacts of the 2005-09 Mautam in Mizoram,” in: Grant Singleton et al. (eds.), Rodent Outbreaks: Ecology and Impacts (Los Baños: International Rice Research Institute, 2010). 10. See Note 1.

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11. For introductions, see Peter Burke, Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence (London: Reaktion Books, 2001); Elizabeth Edwards, “Objects of Affect: Photography Beyond the Image,” Annual Review of Anthropology 41 (2012), 221-34; and Christopher Pinney, “Seven Theses on Photography,” Thesis Eleven 113: 1 (2012), 141-56. 12. MNF leader V. L. T. Muana and his assistant Lalnghinglova passing through the abandoned village of Sialhau (Mizoram, India) on their way to East Pakistan, 1969. Source: Mizo National Front (MNF) collection. 13. Original caption: “Tripura Operation by Mizo Army Hqrs., Lawmna. Speech by Pu. L. Malsawma Colney, Senator, at Army Hqrs, Chhantlang [Mahmuam], CHT East Pakistan, 9th July 1970.” Source: MNF collection. 14. Sajek region, Chittagong Hill Tracts, East Pakistan. Source: Lalsangliana Sailo collection. 15. In 1971, Pakistan broke into two parts and its eastern half (where the Mizo settlements were located) became Bangladesh. 16. The man holding the walking stick is Zoramthanga, one of the rebels’ most prominent leaders. Source: MNF collection. 17. Source: MNF collection. 18. Source: MNF collection. 19. Source: MNF collection. 20. Source: K. Lalthangsangi collection. 21. Source: MNF collection. 22. Source: MNF collection. 23. Source: MNF collection. 24. Source: Lalsangliana Sailo collection. 25. Source: K. Lalthangsangi collection. 26. For similar confusion among Malaysian guerrilla fighters in north Kalimantan (Indonesia) after sudden regime change in Indonesia in 1965, see Michael Eilenberg, “Straddling the Border: A Marginal History of Guerrilla Warfare and ‘Counter-Insurgency’ in the Indonesian Borderlands, 1960s-1970s,” Modern Asian Studies 45: 6 (2011), 1447-450. 27. They are Major Ngursailova Sailo (right) and (Major?) Ngurliana Sailo. The picture was taken in northern Arakan (today, Rakhine State), in the BurmaBangladesh borderland. Source: R. Zamawia collection. 28. Guerrilla forces remained active in the Thai/Malaysian borderland after the Malaysian government declared the “Emergency” over in 1960. By 1989, they laid down their arms and were settled as stateless persons in “peace villages” in southern Thailand. 29. For an example of a Mauretanian force acting from Mauretanian refugee camps in Senegal and Mali, see Lance Kinne, “The Benefits of Exile: the Case of FLAM,” Journal of Modern African Studies 39: 4 (2001), 597-621. The Mozambican insurgent organisation FRELIMO similarly embedded itself in refugee communities in Tanzania. Michael G. Panzer, “Building a Revolutionary Constituency: Mozambican Refugees and the Development of the FRELIMO Proto-State, 1964-1968,” Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies 39: 1 (2013), 5-23.

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30. Jeffrey Treistman, “Home Away From Home: Dynamics of Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Comparative Strategy 31: 3 (2012), 240-41. 31. Nicholas P. De Genova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life,” Annual Review of Anthropology 31 (2002), 419-47. 32. Marc Jamison, Sanctuaries: A Strategic Reality, an Operational Challenge (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 4. See also Idean Salehyan, “Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups,” World Politics 59: 2 (2007), 217-42. 33. The Burmese episode shows that the authorities granting sanctuary need not be state agents. In Burma, it was insurgents who allowed the Mizos to settle. After 1975, the “Pakistan scenario” resumed, although this time the authorising officials represented a new state, Bangladesh.

References Aplin, K. P., and J. Lalsiamliana. 2010. “Chronicle and Impacts of the 2005-09 Mautam in Mizoram.” In Rodent Outbreaks: Ecology and Impacts, edited by G. Singleton et al. Los Baños: International Rice Research Institute. Bareh, H. M. 2001. Encyclopaedia of North-East India: Volume 5 – Mizoram. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Burke, P. 2010. Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence. London: Reaktion Books. De Genova, N. P. 2002. “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life.” Annual Review of Anthropology 31: 419-447. Edwards, E. 2012. “Objects of Affect: Photography Beyond the Image.” Annual Review of Anthropology 41: 221-234. Eilenberg, M. 2011. “Straddling the Border: A Marginal History of Guerrilla Warfare and ‘Counter-Insurgency’ in the Indonesian Borderlands, 1960s–1970s.” Modern Asian Studies 45 (6): 1423-1463. Jamison, M. 2008. Sanctuaries: A Strategic Reality, an Operational Challenge. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College. Kinne, L. 2001. “The Benefits of Exile: the Case of FLAM.” Journal of Modern African Studies 39 (4): 597-621. Nag, S. 2011. “Tribals, Famine, Rats, State and the Nation.” Economic and Political Weekly, 24 March, 1029-1033. Nibedon, N. 1980. Mizoram: The Dagger Brigade. New Delhi: Lancers Publishers. Nunthara, C. 1989. Impact of the Introduction of Grouping of Villages in Mizoram. Delhi: Omsons Publications. Panzer, M. G. 2013. “Building a Revolutionary Constituency: Mozambican Refugees and the Development of the FRELIMO Proto-

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State, 1964–1968.” Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies 39 (1): 5-23. Pinney, C. 2012. “Seven Theses on Photography.” Thesis Eleven 113 (1): 141-156. Salehyan, I. 2007. “Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups.” World Politics 59 (2): 217-242. The Brigadier T. Sailo Foundation. 2014. Human Rights Committee of Mizoram – 1974. Aizawl: Hnamte Press. Treistman, J. 2012. “Home Away From Home: Dynamics of Counterinsurgency Warfare.” Comparative Strategy 31 (3): 235-252. Verghese, C. G., and R. L. Thanzawna. 1997. A History of the Mizos, Vol. 2. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. Vumson. 1993. Zo History: With an Introduction to Zo Culture, Economy, Religion and Their Status as an Ethnic Minority in India, Burma, and Bangladesh. Aizawl: Vumson. Zamawia, R. 2007. Zofate Zinkawngah (Zalenna Mei a Mit Tur a Ni Lo) Aizawl: the Author.

CHAPTER SIX BLACK TERRITORY TO LAND OF “PARADISE”: THE CHANGING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LANDSCAPE OF MONGLA THARAPHI THAN

Introduction Migration in Burma or Myanmar is often a result of poverty, humanrights violations, civil war, decline of the rural economy, and urban development. This chapter focuses on the particular development at the Burma-China borderlands in a post-conflict era and its relationship to the movements of people in the region. It will highlight the changing political and social landscape of one particular border town, Mongla, located in Eastern Shan State on the Burma-China border. Previously known as a “black territory” because of the armed conflicts in the area, Mongla has undergone enormous changes since the 1990s. Because of the presence of many ethnic armies along the Burma border and the ongoing war between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Burmese army,1 people living outside Mongla, including Burmese nationals, need special permission from both the Burmese government and the armed groups in the Special Regions2 to enter this border area. Access to this region is extremely restricted and, as a consequence, there has been limited scholarship on the socio-economic transformation and human flows to and from Mongla, or along the country’s borders in general. Drawing on data from the Ministry of Immigration, and the National Archives Department of Burma, as well as interviews with borderland people and authorities, this chapter attempts to examine the different categories of people actively engaging in the booming economy at this border region from 19893 to the present, and will argue that both the local

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authorities and people are facing many challenges posed by the dominating influences of migrants and border-crossers from China.

A brief history of Burma’s civil wars and ceasefire agreements March 1989 could be considered a turning point in Burma’s civil wars. During that month, the Kokang group, a minority faction within the army of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), staged a mutiny against the CPB. This mutiny was broadcast on BBC Burmese radio from London, from which many other rebel groups learned about the incident, and had attempted further mutinies and breakaways. The Kokang’s mutiny indicated the waning power of the CPB leadership and sent a strong message to other ethnic groups that they could also split from the party and establish their own armies. A month later, on 17 April, the Burmese New Year Day, the largest unit in the CPB army, the Wa division, with its tens of thousands of soldiers, followed the Kokang’s example and ended their relationship with CPB.4 With the collapse of the CPB and, perhaps more importantly, the collapse of what was known as the North-East Command previously controlled by the CPB, new autonomous states emerged. The political and social landscape of what were locally known as “black territories” where the government and rebel groups waged wars on and off for 23 years was to change permanently. With the downfall of the North-East CPB command, new special regions emerged with their territories demarcated not only along physical boundaries but also along ethnic lines. The following table outlines the different ceasefire agreements between the Burmese government and different ethnic groups.5

Northern Shan State Special Region (4) Kachin State Special Region (1)

Northern Shan State Special Region (5) Southern Shan State Special Region (6) Northern Shan State Special Region (6) Kayah Special Region (1)

Kachin State Special Region

4

6

10

9

8

7

5

3

2

Northern Shan State Special Region (1)7 Northern Shan State Special Region (2) Eastern Shan State Special Region (4)

1

Name of the new region assigned by the government

Table 7-1: Ceasefire agreements

Zaw Mai

Gabriel

Aung Ma Hkam Hti Ai Mong

Ma Htu Naw

Zahkung Ting Ying

Peng Jiasheng, Peng Jiaphu Chao Ngi Lai, Bao Youxiang Sai Lin (aka) Ling Min Xing, U Kyi Myint Say Htin9

Leader of the ethnic group or the new region

6,050

80

1,404

1,400

2,000

1,286

2,130

5,600

80

1,257

1,320

2,009

1,150

1,340

2,650

7,564

9,9948 3,300

1,345

Number of soldiers at the time of ceasefire 2,706

Number of arms

Black Territory to Land of “Paradise”

24/2/92

27/2/92

21/4/91

18/2/91

11/11/91

15/12/89

24/9/89

30/6/89

9/5/89

31/03/89

Ceasefire date6

Moe Byeh/Phae Khon Lai Sin

Kyauk Ta Lone Namtu

Kaung Hka

Pang Wa

Sein Kyawt

Mongla

Pang Sang

Louk Kaing

Location of the headquarters

KIO

KNG

Pa-O Phyu (White Pa-O) Palaung

New Democratic Army (NDA) NDA

Shan/Akha

Wa

Ethnicity (or popular name) of the group Kokang

133

Kayah State Special Region (3)

All ethnic groups of Shan State Freedom Group Kareni National Progressive Party

12

13

New Mon State Party

Shan State Army

Communist Party Burma (Arakan) Shan State National Army

KNDP (Naga)

15

16

17

18

19

14

(2) Kayah State Special Region (2)

11

134

Lee Yeh

Kan Yawk

Saw Tun Oo

Khun Sa

Naing Shwe Gyin

Aung Than Lay, Khoo Hta Bu Phe

Saw Kaleh

U Sanda, U Tun Kyaw U Shaw Aye, U Than Soe Naing

182

3,589

298

14,000

7,860

7,790

3,148

1,496

1,619

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50

2,347

61

9,000

8,346

8,936

752

801

1,236

5/11/96

11/6/95

6/4/97

5/1/96

29/5/95

21/3/95

9/10/96

26/7/94

9/5/94

Daw Ta Ma Gyi, Hti Pone Ka Lo Yay Chaung Pha Ho Meim/Loi Lan/Loi Um/Mong Maw Buthitaung/S ittwe Sipaw Township, Loi Khae mountain ranges Loikaw

Naung Htaw

Pyin Saung

Hoya/Biya

KNPA

CPB (Arakan) SSNA

New Mon State Party MTA

Kayan Pyi Thit Party (New Kayan State Party) Pa-O Ni (Red Pa-O) Karreni

Ka-la-la-ta

KNO division 6, battalion 16

Mon armed-group (Myeik/Dawei division)

KNU (Than-daung region)

Pha-do Aung San and his group

KNPP (break-away) Hoya region KNU division 2, Special region

21

22

23

24

25

26

SSNA (break-away group)

20

U Ko Gyi

Go Yi

Pha-do Aung San

Saw Peri Ohn

AungTheik Hin, Sein Ba Than

Saw Tha Mu He

U Kanna

70

113

127

118

270

551

411

24

56

51

33

486

83

155

Black Territory to Land of “Paradise”

10/11/99

23/7/99

17/4/98

8/11/97

31/5/97

24/2/97

27/9/96

Than-daung north region

Mai Yawn, Mai Kaing Azin/Kyaik Don Chaung Chi (Myeik division) Than-daung Region Phaya Kone village Hoya region KNU

KNPP

KNU

Mon State Army (breakaway) KNU

SSNA (breakaway) KNU

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Border crossings in Burma Burma is surrounded by China, Thailand, Laos, Bangladesh and India, sharing the longest border with China to the northeast and east.10 Seven states and divisions inside Burma, namely Kachin, Kayin (Karen), Chin, Sagaing, Tanintharyi (Tennasarim), Rakhine (Arakan), and Shan share boundaries with these neighbouring countries. There are in total 17 official border crossings (see details in Table 7-2 and Map 7-1). Table 7-2: Locations of the 17 border crossings in Burma Name of border crossing 1. 2. 3. 4.

Panwah (Panwar) Kampikete11 Laiza12 Lweje (Lwegel)

Location in Burma Kachin State

5. Myawaddy

Karen (Kayin) State

6. Reed (Rih Khaw da) 7. Tamu13 8. Kawthaung

Chin State Sagaing Division Tanintharyi (Tennasarim) Division Rakhine (Arakan) State Northern Shan State

9. Maungdaw 10. Sittwe 11. Muse (more commonly known as 105mile gate) 12. Namkham 13. Chinshwehaw or Kunlon 14. Mengla

Chittagong in Bangladesh Ruili in Yunnan, China

Mangai in Yunnan, China

15. Mongkoh 16. Kyukote (Jingu) 17. Tachileik

Bordering Foreign Province/Country Nujiang, Nongdao, and Zhangfeng in Longchuan County, Dehong Prefecture in Yunnan Province Mae Sot in Western Thailand Mizoram in India Moreh in Manipur, India Ranong in Southern Thailand

Eastern Shan State

Tengchong in Yunnan, China Nanpenghe, in Yunnan, China Wanding in Yunnan, China Mae Sai in northern Thailand

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Map 7-1: Locations of the 17 border crossings in Burma

Source: This map was produced by the author based on a map retrieved from http://www.mapsopensource.com/burma-map-black-and-white.html, accessed 02/07/2015.

Out of all these border crossings, Muse (or the 105-mile gate) remains the most important crossing to China, whilst Myawaddy, Kawthaung, and Tachileik are the most important to Thailand, and Tamu is the most important to India. Besides formal border crossings, there are illegal or jungle routes through which local people cross to the other side of the border. These jungle routes are preferred by businesspeople for reasons of tax evasion and illegal trading. Indeed, the jungle routes have supported

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the black market economy for many decades, especially during the Burma Socialist Programme Party period from 1962 to 1988 when all international trade relations were ceased. The social conditions of the border towns depend on the economy of the two neighbouring countries and the diplomatic relations between Burma and its neighbours. For example, Thailand used to be Burma’s largest trading partner, but China replaced Thailand as its top trading partner in 2011 as the Chinese economy has expanded enormously in the past two decades (Myanmar Times 2011a). The networks of hmaung kho (literally meaning “take advantage of the dark trading”) or underground trade networks14, which boomed during the heyday of Burma’s socialist era, were replaced by the jade trade with China.15 In 2011 alone, 4,000 tonnes of jade were exported to China, mainly through the border crossings, and this trade alone made up 80 percent of all border trade (Myanmar Times 2011b). Besides jade, a number of other rare and “exotic” commodities, including culturally and environmentally sensitive items such as women’s hair,16 tree iguanas, rare snake species, and trees with their roots attached, were also traded at the border. Attempts to procure such rare goods often led to the deaths of locals; for example, a worker once fell from a tree while trying to catch the rare animals (Narinjara News 2011). One of the most popular items traded from Burma to China was black coral, worth up to U.S. $45 per pound (WEJ 2011). In the early 1990s, animal tendons and ligaments, possibly for use in Chinese medicine to cure rheumatism, were popular too (Myanma Dana 1993). Local merchants and companies preferred to trade with China, since they considered that the “Chinese are not fussy” (ibid.) (which implies that there will always be a market in China for Myanmar products). In the early 1990s, approximately 300 border companies, mainly owned by individuals with strong ties with the ceasefire groups (“NyeinChan-Yay”, meaning peace groups in Burmese), dominated the border trade. They were regarded as “super merchants” with a special license to plant teak and other hardwood items, which were mostly located in the forests in the previous “black” regions (ibid.). Many petty traders and labourers also depended on the border trade for their livelihood. Local people in the remote areas hunted rare animals and sold them alive in border towns such as Mongla. Some would preserve the carcasses and bones of animals and exchange them with the Chinese for salt (Win Naing Tun 2009). Some Chinese companies hired local people as procurers and provided them with cash and food rations in advance. In the 1990s, a profitable business at the Burma-China border, especially at Muse, was the export of Japanese second-hand cars to China.

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In 1992, Mercedes and Toyota cars were driven across the border, and the sale of each car could make up to a 100 percent profit margin. Rich Chinese from Ruili, Wanding, and other districts in Yunnan Province preferred to buy cars from Burma as they were available right on their “door-step”, whereas the purchase of Chinese-made cars was more difficult due to the longer distance of transportation (Myanma Dana 1993). This may remind us of a historical record of the human migration route from Heshun village (situated in Tengchong of Yunnan, China), via Burma, to Shanghai. When Heshun villagers wanted to go to Shanghai, they often went to south Burma first and then reached Shanghai via sea. Chinese newspapers from Beijing and Shanghai arrived in Heshun via Rangoon, Bamo, or Myitgyina.17 Table 7-3 below is a glimpse of the annual numbers of entry and exit of the above-mentioned border crossings in seven states and divisions during 2010. The Tamu border crossing in Sagaing division was closed to Burmese citizens while Manipuri were allowed to cross the border and enter Burma. The table shows the numbers of Burmese people crossing the border to India, Bangladesh, China or Thailand with temporary border passes. The pass was valid for six months and cost 3,000 kyats or U.S. $3 in 2011.18 Among all the border crossings, Muse (Table 7-2) in Northern Shan State is the busiest exit to China. Out of the 3.3 million legal border crossers (i.e., temporary border-pass holders) from Northern and Eastern Shan state in 2011, 54 percent exited from Muse to China whereas 46 percent travelled to Thailand through the Tachileik crossing. There are no data available for the number of Indians, Bangladeshis, Laotians, or Thais entering Burma via the Tamu, Reed, Myawaddy or Tachileik border checkpoints.21 However, specific data monitoring the number of Burmese leaving Burma for China, and Chinese travelling to Burma via Kachin and Northern Shan State border gates are available. According to Table 7-4, for every 8.5 Burmese leaving the country for China, there is only one Chinese entering the country. The figures highlight the importance of Chinese border towns as lands of opportunity for many Burmese. This situation could be contrasted with that in the mid1950s when many Chinese labourers and mule traders applied for a threemonth visa from the Burmese government to work and trade in Burma (Ministry of Immigration 1954, 1956).

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Table 7-3: Number of entries and exits at eight border crossings19 Burmese leaving20

Foreigners entering

Kachin

93,497

35,420

Kayin

744,066

38,942

Chin

7,878

7,982

Sagaing

0

33,969

Tanintharyi

250,306

129,959

Rakhine

48,009

11,457

Shan East

1,509,886

1,491,374

Shan North

1,794,828

257,511

Total

4,448,470

1,749,103

Checkpoint

Source: Ministry of Immigration and Population Department of Population, August 2011.

The Burmese Immigration Department was opened in June 1957 to regulate border-crossing movements, especially following the final demarcation of the China-Burma border was drawn up in 1955. The 1947 Emergency Immigration Act was also amended after 1955, which stated that trespassers could be deported without a trial (ibid.). In that period, all the border towns (except for Muse) were listed as “black” areas, as they were controlled by armed groups, and local government officials had to submit reports to the government in Rangoon about the movements of Chinese and Shan-Chinese in the border towns. Some of the reports included how many Chinese schools a town had and how many students attended them (Military Intelligence 1982). This episode indicated the “sensitive” Burmese-Chinese relationship at border regions.

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Table 7-4: Number of Chinese and Burmese border crossers at Kachin and Northern Shan State border checkpoints Checkpoint

2009

2010

2011 (up to July)

Burmese leaving

Chinese entering

Kachin

93,515

32,397

Northern Shan

1,806,660

238,381

Kachin

100,573

36,589

Northern Shan

1,954,355

186,514

Kachin

56,498

18,764

Northern Shan

1,199,712

102,339

Total

5,211,313

614,984

Source: Ministry of Immigration and Population Department of Population, August 2011

There was also an official investigation into the Shan-Chinese in Kachin to see whether they could be counted as an indigenous race (Myitgyina District Office 1955). A Sein Lon township official argued with the Ministry of Home Affairs that unlike Burmese-Muslims, who were counted as an indigenous race according to the Citizenship Act Section 3 (1), Shan-Chinese could not be included as an indigenous race as they entered Burma from China later than 1932. The Minister of Myitgyina, capital of Kachin State, settled the case by stating that the Shan-Chinese was one of the indigenous races according to Sections 3 and 4 of the Union Citizenship Act 1948 (Myitgyina District Office 1955).

Mongla: a town with two tales Despite their historical “fear” of the Chinese, Burmese in the BurmaChina border towns are increasingly intermingling with Chinese. Mongla is presented here as an example of the changing political and social landscape of Burmese border towns with rigorous interactions with the

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Chinese. Furthermore, the town has a tendency to fall under the cultural, linguistic, and arguably political hegemony of China. Mongla, locally known as Mai La or La village/region, is located in Eastern Shan State. It is divided into three townships, Mongla, Hsaleu, and Nampan, with around 80,000 people made up of 13 different ethnic groups; the majority of these are Akha, Palaung, Lwe, and Shan. Mongla is more commonly known in Burma as Special Region 4 (SR4). Mongla attracted the world’s attention when exile media such as Irrawaddy started reporting on its casinos, transvestite shows, and brothels in 2003 (Williams 2003). When I asked in August 2013 what the leaders think of the Western perceptions of the town and its notoriety as the “Las Vegas of the East”, one SR4 administrator replied, “Our leader, i.e., Ling Ming Xian, is aware of that, but he asks those who use that term to come and visit Mong La to really see if the town is comparable to Las Vegas.”22 Local people, especially those in the administration, were clearly aware of the great attention that the town’s casinos and brothels had drawn from outsiders, but were quick to point out that these activities were only present on a small scale. They were also quick to distance themselves and the administration from the casinos. One SR4 clerk said she had only been to the casino area, Wang Hsieo (a 30-minute drive from downtown Mongla), once. She emphasised that “we keep our lives separate”. What she meant was that the life of local Burmese was separated from that of the Chinese who came to engage in “entertainment” activities. These new comers mainly interacted with and were served by the temporary Chinese residents, who provided various services (such as selling exotic meat and offering taxi services) to the incoming Chinese. In Mongla, in-migration (from China) has exceeded out-migration, with many Chinese having moved across the border and settled in the border areas. Besides this, there are also large numbers of Chinese who are day travellers. Although there are no official records of these daily commuters, it is safe to assume that they are mostly Chinese visiting the Burmese town. Local Shans from Keng Tong consider the casinos in Mongla the major attraction for the “others”, i.e. the Chinese. Contrary to this, the only reason for the Shans to visit Mongla is pilgrimage, and they do not stay overnight. Most of the new pagodas are situated inside the town, but one traditional village on the outskirts of the town also serves as a main tourist attraction for the Shans from nearby towns such as Keng Town and Tachileik. Like the Burmese residents of Mongla, the Shans from Keng Tong were also quick to point out that they were not like the Chinese visitors, and stressed that they were not interested in the casinos. One Shan visitor even suggested that casinos were just a façade for a more

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lucrative business—the drug trade—in the area. One Shan businessman quipped, “It’s a town where people get rich through short-cuts.” The term short-cut is a euphemism for the drug trade and gambling. These “short-cuts” have aroused uneasiness among the locals. While the Shans from Keng Tong and the Akhas from Mongla have distanced themselves from the Chinese visitors, they believe that the town has been intentionally developed in such a pattern as to welcome the Chinese. Despite this, the SR4 authorities have attempted to retain the Burmese “character” of the town by imposing the Burmese language. A local law requires all businesses and shops to use the Burmese language (before they use any Chinese characters) on their storefronts. Yet, Chinese is still dominating the economic life of the town as it is the language in trade and business. In the lobbies of the hotels jointly owned by the SR4 administration and the Chinese, both Burmese and Chinese newspapers and magazines are on display. However, inside the hotel rooms, all instructions and information are in Chinese (see Figures 7-1a to 7-1c). 23

Figure 7-1a: A hotel façade

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Figure 7-1b: Chicken and fish section: inside the central market

Figure 7-1c: The front of an SR4 soldier’s cap

The currency used in Mongla is Chinese Renminbi and not Burmese Kyat. Almost all the premises in the downtown area are owned or rented by Chinese. When asked how many Chinese have applied for permanent residency in SR4, one official estimated around 100. The Chinese have to apply for a temporary permit in order to stay in Mongla and the permit can be renewed every year. Mongla is at present economically, culturally, and linguistically under the strong influence of the Chinese. As mentioned above, however, the SR4 authorities have made some effort to maintain its Burmese “appearance” by requiring businesses to use Burmese as the main language on signs and advertisements. The Burmese government has also attempted to stress a “Burmese identity” at the town’s iconic landmarks. For example, at the first of the three border gates entering Mongla from Keng Tong, all signs written on a well-known historical pagoda and the Drugs Eradication Museum are written in Burmese. Inside the museum, a picture of the retired Senior General Than Shwe is displayed as the champion of the drug eradication campaign. Yet, apart from these signs, there seem to be few traces that manifest Burmese sovereign power and Burmese or Shan cultural influences. There are also few visible signs and state mechanisms connecting Mongla to any other towns in Burma. On the streets, Japanese cars, imported via Thailand, carry license plates with distinctive SR4 numbers. Local businesses pay tax to the SR4 administration rather than to the Burmese government. Since the local people voted in 2008 against accepting the Burmese government,24 the town has not been constitutionally governed by the State of the Union of Myanmar. After rejecting the Burmese government, which government would the local people really like? This is a difficult question to answer since Mongla, a border town much neglected by both its ethnic leaders and the Burmese government, had long been in wars throughout the past decades

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and had not experienced any governance from a “normally” functioning state. On the one hand, locals do not want to be governed by the Burmese central government. On the other hand, neither are they satisfied with the governance of the present SR4 administration. Many people doubt whether this administration will provide good governance and leadership. According to one staff member of an international NGO, Mongla’s SR4 administration has yet to make a strong commitment to the development of health services and education. The political turmoil between SR4 and the central government in January 2010 (during which the General Secretary of the SR4 administration was gunned down near his house in downtown Mongla) made it difficult for both sides to initiate necessary social investments that would help usher in development and long-lasting peace. Such a lack of commitment to development and stability may explain the lack of trust on the part of the locals in the local (SR4) as well as the central governments. Political instability and the transitory nature of local sovereign powers in this “black territory” have sensitised locals to not trust power. People from neighbouring towns such as Keng Tong also stress that “short-cuts” or a get-rich-quick mentality revolving around the drug trade has overshadowed the “character” of local authorities.

Opium and ATS From the time of the ceasefire in 1989 to August 2009, Mongla enjoyed a relatively long period of stability and prosperity; it was only the health hazard that arose with SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2003 that adversely affected the local economy. However, the Kokang incident in August 2009 sent shockwaves across all special regions.25 Kokang fell on 29 August 2009, and this incident demonstrated the fact that, even after a decade of complete control over the economy and the border territories, the SR4 administration would not disarm itself. Disarming would severely undermine their political and economic positions in the region. To this border regime, an independent army not only guaranteed their own security, but was also important for safeguarding economic prosperity. One SR4 administrator mentioned that, after the Kokang incident, over 200 new concrete watch-posts were built between Mongla and Wang Tar Ping, the first immigration check point from Keng Tong into the Mongla area. This was the first major preparation for war in the SR4 region following the 1989 ceasefire. The Burmese government then withdrew their health, education, and other officers from Mongla, and some NGOs also sent their staff members back home. After Kokang, Mongla was

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generally regarded as the government’s second target because it was relatively more vulnerable when compared to other neighbouring regions. For example, the Wa region, with a 30,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), would not easily invite an attack. All such development has underpinned the specific border economic strategies of the ceasefire groups—to follow “short-cuts” or engage in lucrative drug trades, which would guarantee huge profits and help strengthen their army and hence their political position vis-à-vis the Burmese army. In public, Mongla’s leaders portrayed themselves as taking pride in being able to eradicate drug trade in their regions. They even invited representatives from the United Nations and the central government to visit their territories and to carry out inspections (Lintner and Black 2009). One NGO chief commented, “During the three years I worked in the area, I have yet to see a single poppy plant.” All the administrative staff I talked to confirmed that opium production was declining and SR4’s law enforcement and education programmes on drug eradication were effective. The Ministry of Home Affairs on its website boasted that Mongla had been an opium-free zone since 1997 (Po Khaw 2013). The Netherlands’ Transnational Institute (TNI) also considered that in 2003, Mongla was poppy free (Kramer 2008).26 However, recent development has shown that Mongla has shifted from being a major opium production hub to a transit point for drug trafficking, especially for ATS (Amphetamine-type stimulants). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2013, 71), ATS were trafficked into Mongla from Lashio, Tangyang, Hopan, and Pansang and then from Mongla to Keng Tong, Taunggyi, Mandalay, Mongphyat, and to Laos and Thailand (UNODC 2013, 71). The NGO worker who said he had not seen a single opium plant during his service in Mongla had voiced his concerns over ATS. A wall near his office was spray-painted by local drug dealers, sketching a map of drug stores in Mongla. Drug dealers targeted local village headmen, convincing them to use ATS to boost their stamina. Through the headmen, drug dealers hoped to promote sales of the pills among villagers. The availability of simple portable machines that produce synthetic drugs has boosted the home production of ATS. Some local taxidrivers and truck-drivers said that they had seen people transporting such machines in their vehicles in Keng Tong and surrounding areas. Amidst the unstable political situation in which armed border groups are under imminent pressure from the government to form Border Guard Forces (BGF), the SR4 leaders have been particularly concerned about amassing wealth not only for personal gain and family security, but also

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for buying advanced weaponry for their armies. The drug trade is thus important to them in this regard.

Casinos, rubber plantations, brothels, and exotic meat Casinos By July 2013, Mongla had a greater number of hotel beds than the capital of Burma, Naypyidaw. None of the hotels have internet access; although Mongla uses telecommunication services provided by Chinese companies, Internet access at the hotels is subject to the restriction imposed by the Chinese authorities. Mongla relies completely on Chinese telecommunications infrastructure, and local businesses do not have the technology to overcome this ban. Besides, the only telephone station where locals can arrange their calls to other parts of Burma,27 the only post office in Mongla that provides a service to and from China, and mobile phone communications and landlines are all controlled by the Chinese. Such dependency on Chinese telecommunication networks and Internet services means that a large part of Mongla’s communication with the outside world is at the mercy of Chinese technology and the Chinese government’s policies. The SR4 authorities want its border crossings to be freely accessible for Chinese visitors. However, in 2005, the Beijing government sent a small troop to enforce a travel ban on Chinese citizens frequenting the casinos (the Chinese government had discovered that some Yunnan officials had pilfered money at Mongla casinos) (Black and Fields 2006). The formal border crossings have remained closed to visitors and gamblers but what is locally known as a “thief’s hole” or an illegal crossing, located just a few metres from the official checkpoint, is open. Bike-taxis are available outside the informal crossing to take people to the casino (see Figures 7-2a and 2b). One SR4 official pointed out that casinos are the business interest of Peng Xin Chun, wife of Lin Ming Xian and daughter of Peng Jiasheng, one of the leaders of the UWSA or the Northern Shan State Special Region 1. Local people speculated that the casinos were funded and owned by Chinese bosses from Xiamen, Macao and Malaysia. All the casinos are open 24 hours per day and the hotels provide a free shuttle service to and from the casinos; yet, cars with Chinese car plates are banned from entering the Wang Hsieo area where the casinos are located. During its heyday, i.e. before SARS, it was reported that as many as 500,000 Chinese visited the Mongla casinos every year. In August 2013, the construction

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business in the town was still booming and almost every new building being built was a hotel. SR4 officials stressed that they would like to see the Chinese side lift the travel ban as early as possible.

Figure 7-2a: Thief’s hole

Figure 7-2b: Taxi-stand outside the thief’s hole

Staff in the casinos are mainly local young men and women. Many employees are teenagers who have only a primary school education. Some had learned to read and write Chinese at private schools. While some SR4 officials sent their children to Taunggyi, Mandalay, and Yangon of Burma for education, many also sent their children to schools in Dalou, Jinhong, or Kunming in China to receive a Chinese education. One official said that, since young people could easily secure jobs at the casinos, they were not interested in education. Parents also had little incentive to send their children to school beyond the primary level. New employees at the casinos may expect to earn at least 1,800 Yuan or U.S. $294 a month, which is equivalent to the salary of a university professor in Yangon. The gambling business mainly targets Chinese gamblers and is one of the quickest means to generate revenue for the SR4 authorities. What long-term impacts it will have on the younger generations of the locality remains to be seen.

Rubber plantations While casinos remain a major employer for local young people in the town, the Chinese rubber companies provide jobs and business for landowners and farmers in the villages. It is estimated that approximately 110,000 acres of rubber trees have been planted in the Mongla area since the 1989 ceasefire, which has effectively changed the local topography. Chinese companies not only provided rubber saplings and technology, they also brought in their own workers from China. Although the SR4

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administration often claimed that, under their reign, local people enjoyed economic prosperity, it has not yet made any long-term investment in the region. The decision of many SR4 officials to send their children away for education and to buy property in other places in Burma and China reflects their sense of insecurity in their own position and in their control of the area. Ceasefire agreements may be violated at any time; for example, the first ceasefire group, the Kokang, has lost its power and businesses in the special region since the 2009 incident. With no incentive to invest in the region, the SR4 administration has relied on investments from China. The rubber plantations established by Chinese companies have now become another integral part of the prospering economy in the border area.

The sex trade Alongside casinos, brothels also operate “freely” in downtown Mongla. Prior to 2004, it was reported that women from different parts of China came to work as sex workers in Mongla, and after they had saved enough money they would return to their hometowns. After the closing of the official border-crossings, the number of women arriving from northern China reduced. One health worker estimated that there were around two hundred prostitutes in the town; they were mostly from Yunnan and southern China. These prostitutes were checked regularly by the SR4 health department. The actual number not working at the “registered” brothels could be higher (see Figures 7-3a,b). Before visiting the area, I had assumed that Mongla would be a popular destination for trafficking in women. However, local people as well as NGO staff informed me that Burmese women working in the town migrated to work there voluntarily. Because of the lack of jobs, other border towns in Northern Shan State such as Muse actually faced a more significant problem with human trafficking. Casinos and brothels therefore seem to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they are associated with vice and remain a major impediment deterring young people from continuing their education. On the other hand, because of the good pay and steady supply of jobs, these businesses help reduce the number of local women trying to migrate to other places to find jobs; hence they prevent human trafficking. Since almost all casinos and brothels are run by Chinese and cater to Chinese visitors, local people can avoid feeling morally bereft. Some officers working for the SR4 administration have bluntly stated that they had nothing to do with these businesses. These entertainment businesses are deemed to be essential for maintaining the border economy, and the tax

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revenues that the SR4 authorities receive from these businesses are vital for maintaining and strengthening their army. Only with a strong army would they be able to maintain the status quo in the border regions.

Figure 7-3a: Market by day, red light district by night

Figure 7-3b: Sex in the city: business cards are freely distributed by call girls

The exotic meat trade When talking about “exotic” meat, one official said that rich Chinese liked to eat “good” food, and Mongla could provide all sorts of exotic meat, ranging from black bear to owl, sourced from villages and the jungles around the town, as well as from other parts of Burma. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the trading of forest products, including endangered animals, is a common feature of border trade in many ChinaBurma border towns due to the lack of law enforcement in the region and Mongla is no exception. There is an open market for snakes, pangolins, birds, and deer in downtown Mongla. Most animals are sold alive for meat while some animal products (such as gallbladders of bears) are sold for medicinal purposes (see Figures 7-4a to 7-4c). The same SR4 officer emphasised that there was little political will to tackle the exotic meat trade. Casinos and exotic meat are twin factors that attract rich Chinese visitors to cross the border to visit the town. As long as there are casinos, there will be exotic meat to cater to their rich visitors. In the downtown market, one shop owner displayed the license issued by the SR4 administration, which allowed him to sell rare animal meat. The ‘meat’ market is an important way for the local authorities to maintain a prosperous border economy.

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Figure 7-4a: A Barn Owl on sale

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Figure 7-4b: Preparing meat in an open market

Figure 7-4c: Porcupine quills for toothpicks, to leopard skins

Conclusion Mongla provides an interesting example of Asian borderland economy and migration. Its booming economy relies heavily on the influxes of Chinese investors and an infiltration of Chinese influences. Bordercrossing activities and the incoming and outgoing of migrants (both shortand long-term migrants) are not induced by poverty and unemployment (most well-quoted pushing factors), but rather by the particular development pattern in the border region. Human movements in the northern borderlands of Burma in the past were mostly induced by ongoing regional conflicts and power struggles. In a post-conflict era, the political and economic landscapes of the borderlands continue to be shaped by many domestic and international forces. Booming border towns,

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such as Mongla, not only draw rich Chinese visitors from across the border, they also keep locals from migrating out of the town and attract domestic migrants from other regions of Burma. Thus, Mongla remains the only place in Burma where there is a net migration, i.e. more people entering the area than leaving it. Casinos, brothels and the exotic meat market have characterised the border economy; the construction industry and rubber plantations have also helped move the region into a new development stage. Illicit trades such as arm-dealings and drug trafficking may be developing in the area, and this requires further study. Human mobility, migration, and settlement patterns, especially those of the Chinese from across the border, in Mongla require long-term research. Yet, very few outsiders are able to gain access to the area, let alone conduct research. Official government statistics often ignore Mongla, which itself becomes a reminder to observers that the town barely exists in Burma’s records and remains elusive of state control. With the sort of development mentioned above, the socio-cultural landscape of Mongla is changing fast. Chinese dominance is salient. The local SR4 administration has the great ambition of building a 60-megawatt hydropower dam to wean itself off its current Chinese electrical supply. Yet the town’s internet and other telecommunication services are provided and supported by Chinese infrastructure. The leaders of SR4 have ordered Burmese to be the first or official language for trade, and yet few shopkeepers speak Burmese and the currency used in the town is Chinese Renminbi. Casinos, SUVs (Special Utility Vehicles), karaoke bars, and the Chinese language might be the agents of modernity that connect the people of Mongla to “civilization”, but the question of how locals should react to “vice” businesses has created another paradox for the locals, who are already facing many challenges in terms of the town’s political, economic and cultural development. Such a paradoxical trend is bound to affect the identity of the locality in the coming decades.

Notes 1. The ceasefire agreement signed in 1994 by many ethnic armies came to be nullified after the government launched an attack on the Kokang army in August 2009. Since then, tensions have been rising steadily between the government army and the armed ethnic groups, most notably the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the east and northeast, and the Karen National Union (KNU), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and New Mon State Party in the south and southeast. In 2011, the government launched an offensive against the KIA and, as of April 2014, both sides were still fighting amidst an ongoing peace process.

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2. Eight Special Regions or autonomous regions were granted to the ceasefire groups after a series of agreements between the government and different armed groups after 1990. However, the ceasefire agreements collapsed after the 2009 attack on the Kokang Army and also due to the government’s failed attempts to persuade these groups to transform their armed forces into Border Guard Forces (BGF). In October 2010, for the first time in 20 years, the government called the KIA “insurgents”. 3. In 1989, the government established the Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs. In the same year a “market economy” was adopted to replace the socialist economy. 4. It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many Wa soldiers served under the CPB but, according to one ex-CPB cadre who worked alongside Wa leaders, there could be 15,000 to 20,000 Wa soldiers, including both permanent military personnel and civilian-cum-conscripts. During the war-weary days when civilians refused to return to the frontlines, Wa army leaders had to visit one house after another carrying gold coins. Only when the family was guaranteed food for the next few weeks, did young male Was agree to follow their leaders to war. 5. This summary is a copy of the large exhibition panel located on the second floor of the Drugs Eradication Museum in Rangoon, reproduced by the author in August 2013. 6. On the exhibition panel, it is stated “the date on which [the group] entered the realm of law”, which implies ceasefire. 7. According to the 2008 constitution, this Special Region (1) of Northern Shan State became the “Kokang Self-administered Zone”. After the government’s offensive on Kokang in August 2009, both the area and the Kokang Army dissolved, and it is believed that most of the members of the group migrated to either Wa or Mongla areas, which were previously known as Special Region (2) of Northern Shan State and Special Region (4) of Eastern Shan State under Chao Ngi Lai, Bao Youxiang and Sai Lin (also known as Lin Mingxing) respectively. 8. An estimate by one ex-CPB member was much higher than this. 9. There could be other variations in the spelling of the name. 10. Burma shares a 2,192 km border with China, a 2,096 km border with Thailand, a 1,331 km border with India, a 256 km border with Bangladesh, and a 224km border with Laos. Information obtained from the official Burmese government website, http://www.myanmar-information.net/political/english.pdf. 11. The crossing at Kampikete (also spelt Kam bai ti) was closed in 2006. The Kokang Army used to operate around this area until August 2009 when the government army launched an attack on it. One reason for the attack is they refused to transform themselves into the Border Guard Force (BGF), which effectively would have meant relinquishing their autonomy to the government’s army. For more information on China-Myanmar borders, see Toshihiro Kudo, “Myanmar’s Border Trade with China: Situation, Challenge and Prospects”, in Economic Relations of China, Japan and Korea with the Mekong River Basin Countries (MRBCs), edited by Kagami Mitsuhiro, IDE-JETRO, 2010, http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Brc/pdf/03_chapter8.pdf.

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12. The Laiza crossing was closed in 2006. The headquarters of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), one of the ethnic armed groups still fighting against the Burmese army, is located near Laiza on the way to Yingjiang in China. Both locations are on the historic migration route of Bamo-Yingjiang-Tengchong used by many locals in Tengchong, most notably from Heshun village, which established relations with Burma in the fourteenth century. See He Lin, “Reserving Ideality Home, Going Down to Burma: A Present-time view of the Heshunnese Family before 1950s”, unpublished article. 13. This border checkpoint is subject to closures due to explosions, fights, and protests by Naga fighters. 14. For more mhaung kho trading and business, see Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2000. 15. In the early 2000s, the Hong Kong jade market influenced the jade economy inside Burma, particularly in Pha-Kant and Mandalay as well as Chinese border towns such as Teng Chong and Ruili alongside Mae Sai and Mae Sot on the Thailand side. The outbreak of SARS in 2002-2003 saw the complete halt of the trade, causing a plunge in the price of jade. See Myanma Dana 159, 2003, pp. 3745. 16. There is a tradition of women donating their hair to pagodas since, according to the Burmese and many other Asians as well, hair and the head is considered one of the most noble and precious parts of the body. Chinese buy human hair by weight, then dye it and make wigs or extensions, and then export it to other countries. 17. Interview with Yang Faxi, Heshun, 13 July 2011. 18. Since 1 July 2011, the validity of the temporary passes was increased from three years to six years. In the early 1990s, those crossing the border did not need to apply for a border pass. 19. No dates were mentioned in the table, but the numbers suggest that they are the accumulated total for all persons leaving and entering the country in 2010 up to July 2011. Since many migrants hold temporary permits only, it is highly likely that the same person is counted multiple times in the data over a one-year period. The number of people who left using “jungle” routes or via un-official crossings could be much higher than the official figures of exit and entry. 20. These numbers represent the people who crossed the border with temporary border passes. 21. The question of why the Population Department closely scrutinises the number of Chinese entering the country as opposed to Indians, Thais, or Bangladeshis calls for further investigation; this indicates the government’s different attitude and policies towards different nationalities. 22. Very few people agreed to be interviewed; those who did refused to be recorded, even though they shared with me their experiences of living in the town rather openly. In this chapter, I removed the names of my informants in order to protect their identity and safety. For more on Ling Ming Xian, one can read Bertil Lintner and Michael Black, 2009, Merchants of Madness: The Methamphetamine Explosion in the Golden Triangle (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books), especially pp. 77-85. 23. Pictures were taken by the author unless otherwise specified.

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24. The overwhelming “No” vote of local people in the 2008 constitutional referendum clearly signalled to the government that they did not want the Burmese central authority. One of the officials involved in vote counting stated that he and other officials had to tweak the numbers of the votes so that the result would not embarrass the Burmese government. He said the percentage that voted “No” was close to 100, but they changed it to around 90 to “soften” the blow. 25. In August 2009, the government launched offensives against the Kokang Army, also known as the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), after the latter refused to form a Border Guard Force (BGF) as required by the 2008 constitution. 26. For more information on politics of drugs in Southeast Asia, see A. McCoy, 2009. The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic (revised), New York: Lawrence Hill Books. 27. The SR4 region has initiated talks with the Burmese government on the selling of extra electricity supplies to three towns under the government’s control—Mai Yu, Mai Yong, and Tachileik—following the completion of its 60 megawatt hydroelectric power dam construction in Maiyang over the Nam Lwe River.

References Black, M., and R. Fields. 2006. “Virtual Gambling in Myanmar’s Drug Country.” Asia Times, 26 August. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HH26Ae01.html. He, L. No date. “Reserving Ideality Home, Going Down to Burma: A Present-time view of the Heshunnese Family before 1950s.” Unpublished article. Kramer, T. 2008. “Burmese Daze.” Irrawaddy, November 16: 11. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=14533. Kudo, T. 2010. “Myanmar’s Border Trade with China: Situation, Challenge and Prospects.” In Economic Relations of China, Japan and Korea with the Mekong River Basin Countries (MRBCs), edited by Kagami Mitsuhiro, 266-94. Bangkok: Bangkok Research Centre, IDEJETRO. Kyaw Yin Hlaing. 2000. “The Political Economy of Hmaung-kho in Socialist Myanmar.” Kasarinlan 1 (15): 65-114. Lintner, B., and M. Black. 2009. Merchants of Madness: The Methamphetamine Explosion in the Golden Triangle. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Military Intelligence. 1982. “Saung Oo Report.” Number 3, Document Number 001, 17 September. National Archives Department, Accession Number 39009. Ministry of Immigration. 1954/1956. Annual Report by the Ministry of Immigration. Rangoon: Government Publishing House. Myanma Dana. 1993. 8 (3): 28-43.

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Myanma Dana. 2003. 159: 37-45. Myanmar Times. 2011a. Various Articles, 27 June-3 July. http://www.mmtimes.com/2011/news/581/news58107.html. —. 2011b. Various Articles, 28 March-3 April. http://www.mmtimes.com/2011/business/568/biz56803.html. Myitgyina District Office. 1955. “Letter to the Ministry of Kachin.” Number 12793, 4E-1m, 11 July. National Archives Department, Accession Number 351, AG 3/1. Narinjara News. 2011. 26 August. http://ww.narinjara.com/detailsbur.asp?id=3424. Po Khaw. “National Task.” The Central Committee for Drug Use Control, Ministry of Home Affairs. http://www.ccdac.gov.mm/articles/article.cfm?id=420. UNODC. 2013. Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment. Vienna: United Nations Organizations on Drugs and Crime. WENJ. 2011. Weekly Eleven News Journal, 4 September. http://www.weeklyeleven.com/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=10060:black-coral----&catid=45:2009-11-10-07-4541&Itemid=113. —. 2011. “Growing Interest of Thai Merchants on the Border Gates.” Weekly Eleven News Journal (WENJ). Weekly Eleven News Journal, 27 July. http://www.news-eleven.com/index.php?option=com_content&view =article&id=9554:2011-07-27-19-05-36&catid=45:2009-11-10-07-4541&Itemid=113. Williams, J. 2003. “Mong La: Burma’s City of Lights.” Irrawaddy, January 11: 1. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=2806. Win Naing Tun. 2011. “Crimes Behind the Relaxed Border Regulations.” Weekly Eleven News Journal http://www.news-eleven.com/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=8069:2011-04-21-06-10-20&catid=78:2009-11-13-06-2517&Itemid=135 accessed 26 August 2011.

CHAPTER SEVEN FROM TRANSIENT MIGRATION TO HOMEMAKING: FILIPINO IMMIGRANTS IN GUAM VALERIE YAP

The Filipino immediately felt at home in Guam…It was not, however the mere fact that he worked in climes similar to that of the Philippines that made the Filipino feel at home. Here in the island bastion, he was with people whose culture is like his, hammered out of the anvil of Castillan rule for over three centuries. (Abcede 1955, 6-8)

Introduction Guam, an outpost that carries military and strategic importance, sits on the fringe of the United States acting as its western Pacific border. The slogan “where America’s day begins” captures Guam’s position as a transit point of entry to the U.S. mainland by immigrant labourers from the Philippines, who obtained legal permanent residency but departed after short employment stints on the island. Thus, Filipino immigrants in Guam were often labelled as “transient aliens”, a label constructed in the 1970s, which portrayed them as merely economic migrants seeking the American dream. In 2008, Filipinos in Guam were still described by Chamorros, the indigenous people of Guam, as just “passers through” because Guam was seen as the “escape route from poverty for the Filipino” (Kal-el 2008). Guam, a maritime borderland to the Philippines, is geographically closer to the Philippine islands than to the U.S. mainland. It takes Filipinos only a few hours of flight time to reach Guam. Filipino immigrants have long considered Guam as a stepping-stone to “U.S. citizenship and financial aggrandizement, not willing to invest in an island community which can be fragile” (Monnig 2007, 361). This chapter challenges this assumption. Instead of being a “transient” community, this research finds

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that Filipino immigrants, after a long period of immigration and development, have settled and developed their own communities in Guam. It examines how the Filipino community has transformed social spaces and made their home on this Pacific island. It will first provide a background of Filipino migration to Guam, and then examine the various “home-making” processes of Filipino immigrants. In addition to the existing literature, this research has benefitted from my fieldwork in Guam between 2011 and 2012. Interviews were also conducted with Filipino community leaders as well as old and new immigrants.

Filipino and other migrants in Guam Prior to World War II, in-migration did not significantly alter Guam’s ethnic configuration (Bettis 1993, 268). Throughout the Spanish era and the American pre-World War II years, the Chamorros remained predominately the largest ethnic group, composing over 90 percent of the population. The few immigrant groups mainly included Filipinos, Micronesians and Whites, occupying less than ten percent of the total population. Most early immigrants had arrived for military, administrative and religious positions, and were largely integrated into the native society through intermarriages and resettlements. Yet, colonisation and in-coming immigrants had also led to the rise of a “neo-Chamorro” culture featuring cultural influences taken from Spain, Mexico, and the Philippines (Underwood 1985). The latter in particular brought with them traditions that helped paint the cultural tapestry of the Guam Chamorro society: Filipino food traditions such as lechon (roasted suckling pig), paksiw (meat or fish stewed in vinegar), and tuba, or coconut sap liquor, had settled well into the local palate. Cockfighting and the mestizo style of female dress had also become a part of the local traditions. The Americans had significantly altered Guam’s lifestyle. As stated by Rogers (1995), the native inhabitants underwent an intense process of “American” acculturation that ran “deeper than their absorption into the Spanish culture in all social aspects except religion” (1995, 157). Despite the fact that the indigenous culture still maintains elements of strong family ties and deep attachment to the ancestral land, many indigenous people have lost the use of the Chamorro language that was previously the prevalent language in homes and other social settings during the pre-World War II years. English has become the national language while American ideals and democratic aspirations have been inculcated into the indigenous “imagination” through an American-centred education system. Teachers from the U.S. mainland and Hawaii have greatly assisted in the teaching of

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American history and culture, while the teaching of Guam history and knowledge is downplayed. American Federal holidays have been made mandatory public holidays, and have gradually weakened the observance of local customs and traditions (Perez 2002, 459). A more significant change brought about by American policies, which had a huge impact on the demographic composition of Guam, occurred after World War II (Bettis 1993). Following World War II, American military policies initiated a massive recruitment of Filipino workers for rehabilitation and reconstruction projects, which contributed greatly to the prominent presence of Filipino migrant workers on the island. This influx of Filipinos had the direct effect of “minoritising” the Chamorro population, shrinking their numbers from over 90 percent prior to the 1940s to less than 50 percent of the total population in the 1980s. 1 With the signing of the U.S.-Philippine labour agreement,2 large numbers of Filipino men arrived in Guam to work as labourers, carpenters, electricians, masons, and engineers. Predominately male labour migration was then followed by Filipino female migration; many Filipino women were later employed either in health services or other professional and semi-professional fields. Furthermore, early “single male migration” had given way to family migration in later periods. By 1950, Filipino workers made up 65 percent of the workforce in Guam. A steady flow of foreign workers continued through the 1960s and 1970s following the adoption of the 1965 Immigration Act that established more comprehensive worker categories and strengthened the provisions on family reunification. This Act significantly paved the way for the immediate family members of Filipino migrant workers to migrate from the Philippines to Guam and apply for permanent residency and U.S. citizenship. The large number of Filipino immigrants had fostered the flourishing of a highly visible Philippine community in Guam and the subsequent building of a Filipino-Guaminian identity. Inflows of Filipino migrants brought great relief to labour shortages that had plagued Guam for years. They worked in Guam’s various sectors, such as tourism, housing projects, and the rebuilding of typhoon-ravaged homes. The Filipino population is now the second largest group in Guam. Of the Filipino population (41,944) in 2010, 12,916 were Guam-born while the remaining 29,028 indicated their place of birth as the Philippines (Bureau of Statistics and Plans 2012). Micronesian immigrants such as Chuukese, Pohnpeneians, and Palauans also arrived in Guam in increasing numbers in pursuit of education and gainful employment in the post-war period. Prior to 1950, migration from the Northern Marianas was mostly for family reunification.

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Migration from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) was insignificant and only increased in the period from 1975 to 1980 (ICP 1988). Migration from the other islands of Micronesia increased substantially in the late 1980s after the signing of the Compact of Free Association Acts that established the relationship between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)3 and the Republic of Palau, also collectively known as the Freely Associated States (FAS). Under one of the provisions, Micronesians were permitted to freely enter, reside, and engage in occupations within the United States, its territories and possessions, thus leading to the increase in the migrant population from FSM and RMI. Immigration stood at 1,000 persons per year from these Asia-Pacific islands and an estimated 8,000 immigrants and their children had entered Guam by 1995 (Office of the Governor 1996). The majority of the Micronesian migrants engaged in labour-intensive sectors such as hotels and restaurants, landscaping, and construction.

Filipino home-making in Guam Under the American colonial rule, Filipinos were more active in conducting community activities. They were permitted to celebrate Philippine festivals and memorial days during the American period prior to World War II. One example highlighted by Abcede (1955, 35) is the celebration of Rizal Day on 30 December. The Filipino community would commemorate that day by carrying the Philippine flag along Agana’s prewar roads. The Philippine community also built a monument to pay tribute to Apolinario Mabini, one of the revolutionary heroes, interned in Guam after the Philippine-American war. His statue was located in the village of Anigua in the late 1930s, which was then destroyed during World War II (Abcede 1955, 36). Filipino community life became more pronounced after the Second World War. As mentioned above, the first post-World War II wave of Filipino migrants was predominantly male; they worked mostly as labourers in the construction industry. Like Filipino migrant workers in California and in Hawaii (see Alegado 1991; Okamura 1998; Pido 1997), the Filipino contract workers in Guam lived in labour camps and were separated from the local communities. These camps were situated within the vicinity of the U.S. military bases, and Filipino workers, like military personnel, had to obtain permission from village officials to enter Chamorro municipalities (Bettis 1993). Workers’ physical encampment had reinforced their status as temporary residents and limited their

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interactions with the local people. Yet, this physical isolation had also helped foster close ties between the migrant workers, and the labour camps became a base for the establishment of thriving Filipino communities. Many contract workers had arrived knowing very little of Guam. They were assisted by previous groups of contract workers to adapt to the new environment. Fictive kinship ties were developed among the workers, who came to regard each other as family, and these close relationships remained even after the labour camps were closed in the late 1950s. The father of Melissa Sevares, the current mayor of Dededo, was among the many contract workers recruited from Iloilo in 1950. He lived in Camp Roxas and, after the camp was closed, chose to settle down in Guam. Melissa Sevares, who arrived in Agat in the 1960s to stay with her father, recounted in an interview her experience of growing up in the camps. She was often busy visiting adopted uncles and their families and most camp residents actively engaged in a wide variety of activities, including religious processions, sports festivals, barrack clean-up contests, and many fund-raising activities for civic purposes (Palacol 1955, 57-59). While all Filipinos participated in the commemoration of Philippine national holidays, different Philippine dialects flourished along with the reproduction of regional traditions and ways of life in Guam.

Filipino associations and organisations Following the closure of the camps in the 1950s, a large number of the workers settled in Guam and continued the activities and social club gatherings originally established inside the camps. With the growth of the Filipino immigrant population, an increasing number of Filipino clubs and associations were established, including business and alumni associations, sports clubs, and many region- or town-based social organisations. Currently, there are around 50 Filipino associations of different sizes and natures on the island. For larger, long-established organisations, memberships usually consist of a majority of Philippine-born migrants as well as a number of Guam-born Filipinos. A few selected Chamorro community leaders act as their honorary members, and there are also some Micronesian members. Below, I will elaborate upon a few Filipino associations of different natures. The Filipino Community of Guam (FCG), established in 1954, is the oldest Filipino organisation. The organisation had roughly 500 representatives from the three major labour camps when it was originally set up (FCG 1955, 38-39, 96-97) and acted as an umbrella organisation for other small Filipino associations. During the days in the labour camps,

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FCG handled many employment disputes and improved the poor sanitary conditions of the camps. The main purposes of its establishment were to unify all Filipinos on the island and promote their welfare. It served as a common platform for organising social projects and cultural events. One of the largest projects was the “Know the Philippines” exposition, which exhibited information about Philippine history and traditions. It was hoped that this would “make Americans understand the Filipino way of life more” (FCG 1955, 96). This event became an important space for Filipino immigrants to express collectively their identity as Filipinos and later evolved into a month-long celebration held in June. It is now known as “Philippine Independence and Heritage Month”; activities include a food festival, cultural showcases, flag-raising, and an Independence Ball. In 2009, FCG, in partnership with the Philippine Consulate-General of Guam, established the Eskwelahang Munti ng Guam (small school of Guam), a learning centre focusing on Filipino heritage. The centre offers a variety of language and cultural classes, including Tagalog (the Philippine national language), Philippine history, and folk dancing, to children between six and 16 years old (Thompson 2012). The Filipino Ladies Association of Guam (FLAG) is a women’s club that was founded in 1962. It aims to promote Filipiniana clothing through the Santacruzan procession, a flower-filled parade that marks the discovery of the Holy Cross by Saint Helena. This procession is considered one of the most elaborate and important Filipino cultural events in Guam. The Guam Filipino Artists (GFA) is an association that promotes interest in the Philippine arts. It showcases different cultures and traditions of the Philippines through its exhibitions of paintings, photographs, sculptures and mixed media arts. The Apalit Association of Guam is an organisation that promotes religious tradition and heritage. Its name comes from the town of Apalit located in the southern area of Pampanga in the Philippines. Every year, the association celebrates the Apalit fiesta (festival), which is reminiscent of the celebration in the Philippines, with a traditional fluvial parade of Saint Peter, the patron saint of the people of Pampanga. The association has permission to hold this religious procession on Guam’s public beaches. The president of the Apalit Association has clearly stated that continuing with the fiesta is a way of asserting Filipinos’ religious devotion. The fluvial parade also aims to promote awareness of the patron saint beyond the Filipino community. This event is not only attended by Filipinos in Guam, but also attracts tourists from around the world as well as Chamorros from the island.

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While promoting their Philippine traditions and customs, Filipino organisations are also aware of expressing their concern over local issues. Thus, there are also activities demonstrating their civic engagements and contributions, such as donating medical equipment to Guam’s Memorial Hospital, undertaking local medical missions to different villages on the island, and awarding scholarships to students of the University of Guam (UOG). Expressions of local commitment have often marked FCG’s official statements, showing their intention “to pursue that noble task of helping make Guam progressive and offering gratitude to an island that has been generous to its members” (Barro 1997, 17). Here, home-making is not only about retaining their homeland’s culture, traditions and practices, but is also about building and maintaining various proactive relationships with the host society and constructing local “belongingness”. In an article published in the Pacific Daily News in 2013, Roy Adonay, the FCG president, remarked that the organisation would continue to dedicate and commit their time to the community (Palanca 2013): [We] harness the energy and enthusiasm of this group into something very good. A majority of us over here are not from here. We’re immigrants. These activities are our way of giving back to the community that has welcomed us and adopted us.

In the interview, the FCG president, representing a large number of Filipinos, clearly stated that the Filipino immigrant community has endeavoured to “pay back” and contribute to Guam’s development. It is a way to show how Filipinos have fulfilled their civic duties to the local community. This is a sentiment generally shared by other Filipino organisations that look upon their work and activities as not just a matter of showing (off) Philippine cultures and doing good merely for Filipinos, but also as acts of giving back to the Guam society.

The Filipino community space Besides organising themselves into groups and associations, Filipinos in Guam have also constructed a “Philippine landscape” on the island that mirrors different aspects of home. Geographical concentrations of migrants often leads to “spatial” representations of migrant communities in different destination countries. These kinds of “ethno-hubs” mark the presence of migrant groups with a variety of food stalls and restaurants, cultural centres, all types of shops, and residences and squatters. The concentration of migrant minorities in both urban neighbourhoods and suburban areas has been well studied (Li 2009; Zhou 2009, 1992).

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Filipinos have also expanded and strengthened their presence in Guam through food markets, restaurants, cultural centres, and churches. Some of the more prominent manifestations of these spatial identifiers include the SM Department Store, “Bench/”, and Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ). These are premises “transplanted” from the Philippines. Around these Filipino “landmarks” are a large number of stores, banks, and restaurants catering to the needs of Filipinos. Furthermore, the Dededo district has a concentration of restaurants that serve various Philippine cuisines. The district is certainly a culinary ethno-hub for Filipinos to meet and enjoy food traditions. Ethnic food consumption is an expression and embodied experience of ethnic identities, acting as a continual reminder of one’s ethnicity (Alba 1990). In Guam, Filipino ingredients and canned goods are not only sold in the specialty stores, but are also widely available in major supermarkets like Pay-Less Supermarket and Walmart, highlighting in every sense the prominent presence of a strong migrant community. The prevalence of traditional dishes and delicate snacks and cakes in all festive celebrations, parades and events has definitely helped demonstrate the survival and thriving of a community through food.

The Filipino mediascape in Guam Ethnic media plays an important role in circulating information that is essential for migrants to live a smooth life. This information may include news about the migrant communities and the country of origin, as well as the advertisement of cultural events, entertainment programmes and job information. On the other hand, by disseminating relevant and up to date information, the ethnic media of migrant communities also helps newly arrived immigrants to understand and adapt to the host society. Filipinos in Guam enjoy wide access to Philippine print media, television and radio programmes, which together form a “mediascape” (Appadurai 1990) that transcends territorial boundaries and has catered to the special needs of the Filipino migrants in Guam. Guam is home to two cable channels that provide all-Filipino programming worldwide, namely the Filipino Channel (TFC) and GMA Pinoy TV. There are also two Philippine-format FM radio stations, namely KTKB Megamixx 101.9 and Fun 101.1 KNUT. The former, commencing in 2003, was the first of its kind in Guam while the latter relocated its broadcasting from Saipan (in the Northern Mariana Islands) to Guam in 2012. These radio stations play contemporary Filipino music and provide news about the root country. They also announce community activities,

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broadcast advertisements for local businesses, and host interviews with visiting celebrities from the Philippines. Print media is another popular source of information. In the early years after the Second World War, newsletters published inside the labour camps in the 1950s were important sources of information and fitted the camp residents’ interests. Such print media also contained information on the social and cultural activities provided by different organisations, which served to boost the morale of its residents. An example can be found in one of the newsletters of Camp Roxas, “Barangay: The Voice of Roxas Villagers”. In the 1950s, there were few sources of information that the Filipinos could resort to. Barangay was thus a much read newsletter by the camp residents. Selected workers would occasionally receive either a cash reward or letter of commendation for the contributions they made to their respective job areas. Some columns in the newsletters particularly served as “advisors” for workers who felt nostalgic about the homeland and provided suggestions for overcoming homesickness. The newsletter also featured cultural stories that soothed the emotions of the migrant workers. A number of Filipino newspapers and magazines are now available and widely circulated among the Filipino communities, some of which are distributed for free. For example, Island Tribune was published in 2010 with the purpose of advocating Filipino culture and identity, and is freely distributed. This magazine mostly provides feature stories on Filipino cuisine, tourist destinations, pop culture, and traditional events. Others, such as the Bayanihan Weekly and the Pacific Daily News, cover local affairs and social activities hosted by a myriad of Filipino organisations and associations. News pieces of these printed media regularly report on meetings and fundraising activities, such as donations to disaster victims in the Philippines, scholarships to those in need in both Guam and the Philippines, and financial assistance to local community projects. There are also feature stories of individual Filipinos, highlighting achievements in terms of attaining self-sufficiency or having successful careers. These “success” stories often stress upward mobility and show how individuals can become successful through hard work and their own merits. The titles of these stories—“hard work equals success”, “breaking new ground”, “reconnecting with their roots” —capture the transformation of migrants with modest backgrounds who are nevertheless capable of embarking upon successful careers after migrating and attaining their aspirations. Stories like these function to encourage other immigrants to work to the best of their ability so as to grasp the economic opportunities in the host society.

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In general, community newspapers advertise Filipino businesses and services, and make frequent references to Philippine-related events and news. At the time I was conducting my fieldwork in Guam, it was the news of the Corona trial4 that occupied the front pages alongside local news concerning local political campaigns and community activities. The broadcasting of news related to the Philippines as well as Guam reveals the dual realities of Filipino migrants’ lives, and through such ethnic media, myriad virtual spaces spanning national borders have been created (Bonus 2000). The selection of news relating to the Philippines also shows that many Filipino migrants in Guam are concerned about the affairs of their root country, and their sense of belonging will not be complete without making reference to the Philippines, despite the fact that they have settled permanently in Guam.

Community lives of different generations of Filipinos Within the Filipino community, there is great awareness of the presence of ethnic associations as their activities are often advertised in the local newspaper. Devotees to hometown associations mainly derive from the older generation who wish to stay connected to their homeland roots. Yet, not every Filipino or Guamanian of Philippine descent commands the same degree of attachment to the root identity or the same amount of devotion to Filipino communal activities. A general divide can be made between the older generation of Filipino immigrants and the younger generations who were born in Guam or who grew up there. A 37-year-old Philippine-born respondent, who grew up in Guam, remarked that his parents’ devotion towards the FCG was a way for them to feel less “…homesick…they pretty much want to keep in touch with each other with what’s going on”. Their involvement with the FCG reveals how they perceive such migrant institutions as sources for instilling a sense of kinship. Similarly, a 66-year-old male government employee joined his first organisation, the Visayan Association, in 1972 when he was still new to Guam, and has since become actively involved in other Filipino associations. The informant commented that joining such organisations has had many positive effects on him including remedying his loneliness and introducing him to new acquaintances. It has also become a way for him to practice the traditions and values of being Filipino. For the respondents who actively participate in communal activities, migrant organisations serve as spaces in which to showcase their ties to homeland, via cultural events, food, ritual practices and the commemoration

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of national holidays and events. Their activities are ways of “making place” in the receiving society (Zelinsky and Lee 1998). Another participant, a 52-year-old female accountant, pointed out that her involvement with Filipino associations began in the mid-1990s with her joining the Guam Accountant Association, a professional group that had a predominantly Filipino membership. Through the organisation, she met and gained many co-ethnic friends who helped her adjust to life in Guam. She encouraged newcomers to seek out and participate in ethnic associations because “these things help you out in reaching out and not getting bored”. Besides Filipinos from the older generations, newly arrived immigrants also show strong interest in the ethnic activities. For example, a 39-yearold teacher, who arrived in 2005, attributed her quick adjustment to the new environment to her involvement in her parish in Mong-mong. She joined the local choir and was subsequently adopted by a Bicolano5 family, whereupon she had lunch with the family almost every Sunday. Her foster family helped her adapt to life in Guam and gain a sense of belonging. With her involvement in communal activities, she was able to establish different relationships with her co-ethnics and gain a foothold in the coethnic community, and thus feel less displaced and more “secure”. More importantly, she found that she could maintain linkages to the homeland, the Philippines. On the other hand, Filipinos, like other ethnic communities, are not homogenous. As stressed above, not every Filipino is interested in ethnic cultural events. The reasons given by some for their disinterest include lack of time, busy work life, a preference to devote time to family and work (rather than to the ethnic community), and not being knowledgeable about Filipino cultural traditions. Generally speaking, there was a lower rate of participation among the younger generations. Many of the older generation immigrants have hoped to expose their children to the homeland culture by urging them to become involved in ethnic community life. However, in some instances, this has brought about the opposite outcome. A third-generation Filipino Guaminian in an interview in a local radio programme described her disassociation with all things Filipino. She recounted winning the Miss Teen Philippines-Guam pageant but stated, “Up until that pageant, I had never participated in Santacruzan. I only sang for Philippine independence but I never really stayed for the event. I only saw things when participating in it because I am Filipino, but as for appreciating it or understanding it, I did not.” Her remarks demonstrate how participation in a mainstream cultural pageant does not necessarily translate to a deep engagement in homeland cultural

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practices. Many young Filipinos, similar to this young Miss Teen Philippines-Guam, see such participation as an act of keeping up appearances and fulfilling a duty chained to ethnicity; her act was devoid of the importance and meanings associated with cultural traditions.

Chamorro-Filipino relations Activities of the Filipino organisations are still largely limited to members of the Filipino community. There is little participation from other ethnic groups. A 62-year-old female Filipino professor observed that life in the associations is largely patronised by Filipinos. Philippine cultural events often take place in “Filipino community space” where other groups may not feel welcome to participate. For example, one of the important Filipino festivals is the Santacruzan procession, for which Filipino associations sponsor all the flower arches that grace the parade. Most participants are active members of the organisation, and relatives or friends of these members. A few important “others” may be invited as honorary guests and observers by the organisers. Their presence is a “diplomatic display” of the linkages and friendships between Filipino associations and the centres of power and influence in Guam. At the celebrations, as a matter of formality, these honoured guests praise the organisations for their continued efforts and contributions to Guam. The use of ethnic space for hosting cultural events illuminates the spatial presence of the Filipino community and its contribution to the island’s cultural diversity, but this, on the other hand, does not “give space” for the participation of other ethnic groups who would like to take part in the Filipino community activities. Indeed, “placing” Philippine cultural events in “Filipino space” has marked the geo-cultural divide between Filipinos and other groups. The changing demographic and ethnic composition in Guam in the post-World War II period had pushed Chamorro leaders to become more aware and protective of their indigenous culture (Leibowitz 1989). Chamorro leaders had attempted to guard their dominant position by demanding a curb on the inflow of immigrants. There was fear that the continuous importation of foreign labour to fill jobs would undermine local efforts to develop and train a Guamanian labour force (Vialet 1979). Tensions were especially heightened during periods of economic decline. Immigrants in vast numbers were viewed as a socio-cultural and political threat. Chamorro leaders seemed to fear the possible emergence of strong resident “alien” groups who, by virtue of their citizenship, could vote for

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their own ethnic leaders and gain political influence on island matters. As the largest minority, Filipinos have distinctive advantages in asserting their group’s interests. Some Filipinos have attained prominent positions through appointment as well as through election. Their participation in local affairs and their positions may be seen as a threat to the political power of the Chamorro leadership. One case that illustrated this tension was the nomination of Leah Beth Naholowaa, of Philippine descent, as the Director of the Department of Labour (DOL) in 2011. Several Chamorro activists opposed her appointment because of comments she reportedly made regarding the recruitment of foreign workers. Naholowaa promised to provide employment to foreign H-26 workers immediately after the completion of the building of the military base, which implied the increased presence of Filipino workers in Guam. She also expressed her desire to have a Filipino governor in Guam one day (Buhain 2011). Her statements were construed as displaying favouritism for Filipinos as the majority of H-2 workers employed in Guam were Filipinos and a Filipino governor would mean the end of the political dominance of the Chamorros. Chamorro rights activist, Trini Torres, feared that Naholowaa would let “the Filipinos (to) replace our Chamorros from our island (…)” (Buhain 2011). In my interview with Ron Laguana, a Chamorro activist and Director of Chamorro Studies, he expressed explicitly his opposition to Naholowaa’s nomination and how he was stunned by her insensitive public declaration. Amidst opposition, Naholowaa was appointed for a year. Laguana criticised Naholowaa for making priorities that benefitted foreigners rather than protecting the welfare of the existing population, such as the unemployed and the youth. Her open claim of her desire to have a Filipino governor also demonstrated “a lack of respect towards the Chamorro community here on the island (…)”. Her statements squarely positioned the Filipinos (as the “Other”) against the indigenous Chamorros and reflected a “local versus foreigner” attitude. Her claims unwisely demonstrated a view that positioned Filipinos as a foreign group, potentially hampering opportunities and benefits that should go to the local population. The relationship between Chamorros and Filipinos is a complex one, often intertwined with a shared colonial legacy loaded with experiences and memories of over-dominance by White colonial rulers, and intermarriages and cross-ethnic familial ties between the two groups. In a recent article in the Marianas Variety, Davis (2013) wrote, “[M]ost Filipinos have married into Chamorro families at some point or are related to those who have. They fear family conflict, exclusion, and isolation.”

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This highlights how the Chamorro-Filipino relationship is fraught with long-standing familial and cultural connections dating back to the Spanish period together with some tension over power struggles. Both groups are aware of this subtle relationship, and in general are careful to monitor “situations” to ensure things do not spiral out of control. In my discussion with Laguana, he explained that his opposition to Naholowaa was not meant to be racist and that Chamorros “are not the oppressors”. He stressed: We are the oppressed. I cannot be a racist in my own homeland. I am just protecting the interest of my people.

His views reflected the fear of most Chamorros that they would soon be replaced and displaced by other groups as the “political leaders and social movers” of Guam (Underwood 1987, 60). The Americans often see little difference between Filipinos and Guamanians (Maga 1988, 19). The above incident illustrates well the divide that still exists between the two groups. As mentioned above, despite many Chamorros and Filipinos already being tied in terms of familial connections, the two groups are still ethnically and culturally distinctive. When someone like Naholowaa begins to stress the difference and to slide towards one group, the other group is ready to react and retaliate for the interests of their own. After all, the Chamorro, being the indigenous group on the island, will be ready to act to preserve their position and dominion over Guam. Another case in point is the complaint made about an advertisement that had the tagline, “Pinoy Power”. In 2011, a telecommunications company designed a marketing campaign intended to capture the Filipino market in Guam. They wanted to sell different mobile services directed at Filipino consumers, such as inexpensive per minute calls to the Philippines, unlimited prepaid call cards, and the send-a-load or mobile recharge load service. Accompanying this campaign was a poster showing a superhero holding a mobile phone. Instead of having an “S” on his chest, this superhero was flaunting a “P” and underneath that “P” was the tagline, “Pinoy Power” (Filipino Power). The poster could be found in Filipino shops and grocery stores. The poster was eventually withdrawn due to a series of complaints that started with an email from a Caucasian who questioned the appropriateness of the tagline by commenting, “such a slogan has no place in Guam”. The comments triggered reactions from the Chamorros as well as other groups. Some demanded a similar advertisement tagline (for example, Chamorro Power) and called for more localised products. Much of the strain resided in how the word “power” was understood. To the non-Filipinos, the

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wordplay came across as a proclamation of Filipino dominance. The combination of words generated uneasiness as the poster symbolised a power struggle in Guam. The tagline could be interpreted as marginalising the Chamorros, the indigenous population, and the rise (to power) of the Filipinos. The discontinuation of the poster did not arouse discussion from the Filipino community; most of its members were aware of the difficulty of debating such issues. The poster should be considered as yet another incident touching upon the sensitive ethnic relations in Guam. Many Filipinos would rather focus on maintaining the status quo and quietly making Guam their home than drawing attention to themselves. In everyday life, many Chamorros have forged close relationships with Filipinos, seeing them among their families and friends. Yet, conflicts such as that described above can result when issues touch upon political power and economic dominance.

Conclusion Filipino migration to Guam came about as a result of colonial rule. Many migrant families in early times had not expected to stay in Guam all their lives and yet many ended up staying in Guam for generations. Filipino migration to Guam has been considered or labelled as “transient” —a stepping stone for further migration to the U.S. mainland—but many Filipino migrants have striven to make Guam their home. This chapter has provided data showing how different generations of Filipino immigrants have established their “homeland” in Guam and at the same time maintained close ties to their root country, the Philippines, across the sea border. Despite the subtle tensions that can be observed between Chamorros and Filipinos, the relationship continues to evolve, especially due to the many inter-marriages between the two groups. By reliving their cultural traditions through cultural events and possessions in Guam, Filipinos have weaved the cultural tapestry of the island and also created a strong sense of community tied to their traditional values and organisational affiliations. Yet, the Filipino community spirit does not hamper their commitment to the building of a prosperous and lively Guam. Filipinos have asserted their presence on the island through matters (such as their skills, professional knowledge, and charitable activities) that draw attention to their contribution to the island’s development. It is indeed within various social and cultural spaces that Filipinos have negotiated for full membership in the ever evolving Guamanian society.

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Notes 1. The Chamorro population accounted for 45 percent of the total population in the 1980s. By 1990, their numbers had decreased to 37 percent and have remained within this figure to the present. On the other hand, the Filipino population in the 1950s only accounted for 12 percent of the total population, but by the 1980s it had increased to 21 percent and is still steadily increasing. In 2010, Chamorros only comprised 37 percent (59,381 people) of the total population (159,358). The number of people of Philippine origin was at 41,944, 26 percent of the total population, while Whites only accounted for 7 percent (11,321) (see ICP 1988; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992; Bureau of Statistics and Plans 2012). 2. It was an agreement between the U.S. Embassy in Manila and the Philippine government in May 1947 that paved the way for the “recruitment and employment of Philippine citizens by the US military forces and its contractors in the Pacific, including Guam” (Rogers 1995, 217). 3. The Federated States of Micronesia comprised the four island states of Chuuk, Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Yap. These islands were formerly part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). 4. News media covered the impeachment proceedings of the Philippine Chief Justice Renato Corona in mid-2012. Corona was accused and found guilty of failing to publicly disclose his assets, liabilities, and net worth. 5. An ethno-linguistic group in the Philippines who came from the south-eastern region of Luzon. 6. H-2 workers are temporarily admitted under the H visa worker programme to perform labour that cannot be filled by workers in the U.S. and its territories.

References Abcede, J. C. 1955. “By Way of Introduction ….” In Know the Philippines Carnival & Exposition, 6-8. Guam: The Filipino Community of Guam. Alba, R. D. 1990. Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Alegado, D. T. 1991. “The Filipino Community in Hawaii: Development and Change.” Social Process in Hawaii 33: 12-38. Appadurai, A. 1990. “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy.” Theory, Culture & Society 7 (2): 295-310. Barro, C. L. 1997. “The Filipino Community of Guam.” Island Life Magazine, 16-18. Bettis, L. 1993. “Colonial Immigration on Guam: Displacement of the Chamorro People under U.S. Governance.” In A World Perspective on Pacific Islander Migration: Australia, New Zealand and the USA, edited by G. McCall and J. Connell, 265-296. Kensington, Australia: Centre for South Pacific Studies.

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Bonus, R. 2000. Locating Filipino Americans: Ethnicity and the Cultural Politics of Space. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Buhain, J. 2011. “Confirmation Hearing Turns into Race Issue.” Marianas Variety, 2 February. http://mvguam.com/subscribenow/16459-confirmation-hearing-turnsinto-race-issue.html. Bureau of Statistics and Plans. 2012. 2010 Guam Demographic Profile Summary File. http://bsp.guam.gov/images/stories/census/2010guamprofile.pdf. Davis, D. 2013. “Filipino Politics on Guam.” Marianas Variety, 13 June. http://www.mvariety.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=56611:filipino-politics-on-guam&catid=13:letter-to-theeditor&Itemid=112. FCG (Filipino Community of Guam). 1955. “FCG: History and Accomplishment.” In Know the Philippines Carnival & Exposition, 38-39. Guam: The Filipino Community of Guam. Interagency Committee on Population (ICP). 1988. Guam’s People: A Continuing Heritage (A Statistical Profile of the Territory of Guam 1920-1980). Guam: Government of Guam. Kal-el. 2008. “Filipino Week” [Msg 28]. SYRGUFORUMS, 10 January. http://www.syrgu.com/index.php?topic=19872.0;all. Leibowitz, A. H. 1989. Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations. The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Li, W. 2009. Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Maga, T. P. 1988. Defending Paradise: the United States and Guam 1898-1950. New York/London: Garland Publishing, Inc. Monnig, L. A. 2007. Proving Chamorro: Indigenous Narratives of Race, Identity and Decolonization on Guam. Ph.D. Thesis, UrbanaChampaign: University of Illinois. Office of the Governor, Government of Guam. 1996. Pacific Immigration Impact: Effects of P.L. 99-239 on the Island of Guam FY 1989 to FY 1995. http://www.pacificweb.org/PDF/MICRO_MIGRANTS/FY1995%20C ompact%20Report.pd. Okamura, J. 1998. Imagining the Filipino American Diaspora: Transnational Relations, Identities and Communities. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. Palacol, E. L. 1955. “The Marbo Story.” Know the Philippines Carnival & Exposition. Guam: The Filipino Community of Guam.

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Palanca, K. 2013. “Filipino Community of Guam elects new officers.” Guam Pacific Daily News, 27 January. http://www.guampdn.com/article/20130127/COMMUNITIES/3012703 01/Filipino-Community-Guam-elects-newofficers?odyssey=mod|newswell|text|Frontpage|s. Perez, M. P. 2002. “Pacific Identities beyond US Racial Formations: the Case of Chamorro Ambivalence and Flux.” Social Identities 8 (3): 457-479. Pido, A. 1997. “Macro/Micro Dimensions of Filipino Immigration to the United States.” In Filipino Americans: Transformation and Identity, edited by M. Root, 21-38. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications Inc. Rogers, R. F. 1995. Destiny’s Landfall: A history of Guam. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Thompson, E. 2012. “Little School Aims to Have a Big Influence: Eskwelahang Munti ng Guam Teaches Kids about their Filipino Heritage.” Guam Pacific Daily News, 5 February. http://www.guampdn.com/article/20120205/COMMUNITIES/2020503 05/Little-school-aims-big-influence-Eskwelahang-Munti-ng-Guamteaches-kids-about-their-Filipinoheritage?odyssey=mod|newswell|text|Frontpage|p. Underwood, R. A. 1985. “Excursions into Inauthenticity: The Chamorros of Guam.” Pacific Viewpoint 26 (1): 160-184. —. 1987. “Immigration and Guam’s Future.” In Chamorro SelfDetermination: The Right of a People I Derechon I Taotao, edited by L. Souder-Jaffrey and R.A. Underwood, 59-65. Mangilao, Guam: Chamorro Studies Association and Micronesian Area Research Centre, University of Guam. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1992. 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Social, Economic and Housing Characteristics: Guam. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Vialet, J. C. 1979. The Use of Temporary Alien Labor on Guam: A Special Study. Washington: US Government Printing Office. Zelinsky, W., and B. Lee. 1998. “Heterolocalism: An Alternative Model of the Sociospatial Behaviour of Immigrant Ethnic Communities.” International Journal of Population Geography 4: 281-298. Zhou, M. 1992. Chinatown: The Socioeconomic Potential of an Urban Enclave. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. —. 2009. Contemporary Chinese America: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Community Transformation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

PART 3: REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION ECONOMICS

CHAPTER EIGHT THE REGIME OF REMITTANCES AND ASIAN MIGRATION YUKO HAMADA1

Introduction The importance of remittances to national economic development and household income is a major motivating factor in the continued growth of international labour migration. Many developing countries consider remittances a critical contributor to their economic development, and hence encourage their labour force to seek employment abroad. This is becoming increasingly common despite some negative impacts such as the “brain drain” and the social costs associated with international labour migration. Remittances stand as one of the clearest examples of how international labour migration can contribute to the development of migrant-sending countries. Although remittances can be affected by changes in labour market demand, economic volatility, and tighter immigration control, they are still more resilient than private capital flows and have become more important as a source of foreign currency in many developing countries (Chami et al. 2008). In 2009, for example, remittance flows were the second largest source of external funding for developing countries after foreign direct investment (FDI) (Ratha et al. 2009). The value of remittances to developing countries is more than three times that of official development assistance (ODA) (World Bank 2012). From 1995 to 2003, migrant remittances to developing countries tripled, from U.S. $58 billion to U.S. $160 billion, while FDI grew only by half from U.S. $107 billion to U.S. $166 billion, and ODA only marginally increased, from U.S. $59 billion to U.S. $79 billion (Ahortor and Adenutsi 2009; also see Figure 1). Although there is growing recognition that dependence on migration to solely generate remittances is not a progressive solution for development,

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a number of countries have strategically developed migration policies to maximise economic benefits. These include reducing the costs of transferring remittances to countries of origin and motivating migrants to remit through formal banking systems that allow deposits to be available for private sector development. All such measures are taken with a view to ensure the effective and efficient transfer and utilisation of remittances. Use of a formal banking system is also important for taxation, statistics, and national security.

160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Remittance

FDI 1995

ODA

2003

Figure 8-1: Global growth of remittances, FDI, and ODA in USD billion in 1995 and 2003 Source: Ahortor and Adenutsi (2009, 3275).

The global financial crisis of 2008 affected large sections of the population of both developed and developing nations as well as many international migrants (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2009). However, the resilience of remittances during the financial crisis was well proven, as they fell by only 5.5 percent in 2009 and recovered fast in 2010 (World Bank 2011). On the other hand, FDI flows and private debt and portfolio equity flows fell by 40 and 46 percent in 2009 respectively. Compared to private debt and portfolio equity flows, ODA and FDI, remittances are a more stable source of income for developing countries, and thus have yielded even greater macroeconomic benefits in terms of reduced fluctuations to economic outputs and consumption (Chami et al. 2008, 12). Remittances are now being factored into sovereign ratings in middleincome countries and debt sustainability analysis in low-income countries

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(Ratha et al. 2010). In light of the growth in remittances being received by developing countries, more attention should be paid to its effective use and management. It is also important to enhance the attractiveness and efficiency of formal banking structures, at both national and transnational levels, in managing remittance flows. For many Asian countries of origin, building good governance for successful labour migration is crucial. Indeed, if migrants are successfully employed overseas, they are supposed to produce a greater income for their families back home, which is also important for solving the problem of insufficiently paid jobs in the local economy. Yet, without good practices in maximising the effective use of remittances, both migrants and their families, and the sending countries, may not be able to enjoy long term benefits of the remittance economy. This chapter will first provide an overview of remittances in Asia by highlighting some of the major characteristics of the remittance economy, including overdependence on remittances, transfer of remittances through informal channels, and remittances being used for primary consumption. It will then discuss good practices addressing the above challenges. The chapter will sum up by examining short and long term consequences of remittances and how sending countries might develop strategies to manage remittance flows in a more efficient manner.

Remittances in Asia: facts and trends The Asian continent is the source of nearly 60 million migrant workers who sent almost US$260 billion home to their families in 2012, an amount representing 63 percent of such global finance flows to developing countries (IFAD 2013, 6). In 2012, the World Bank named six countries from Asia within the top ten global recipients of officially recorded remittances. These included India, China, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Vietnam (World Bank 2012). As a percentage of GDP in 2012, remittances of five countries from Asia were recorded in the top ten: Tajikistan (47 percent), Kyrgyz Republic (29 percent), Moldova (23 percent), Nepal (22 percent), and Samoa (21 percent) (World Bank 2012). Officially recorded remittance flows to developing countries reached U.S. $401 billion in 2012 (World Bank 2013a). These flows were expected to rise by 8 percent in 2013 and by 10 percent in 2014, ultimately reaching U.S. $534 billion in 2015 (World Bank 2012). The enormity of these figures calls for a deeper analysis of the future trends of flows of remittances. In the following, I will elaborate on three different problems related to remittances: overdependence on remittances,

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informal remittance-sending channels, and the use of remittances for family consumption.

Overdependence on remittances Many developing countries in Asia are highly dependent on remittances. Remittances are often used to finance consumption and investment, plug trade gaps, and service debt in these countries. Typical examples of such countries include Nepal and the Philippines. Nepal is considered to be the most migrant-dependent country in South Asia. Political instability due to long-running conflict accompanied by high unemployment levels, poverty, and depletion of natural resources has resulted in a large number of Nepalese seeking overseas employment on a regular basis (Gartaula 2009). The money they send back home has become a critical tool in sustaining the country’s social and economic structures. According to the World Bank, in the fiscal year 2009 officially recorded remittances to Nepal rose to U.S. $2.99 billion, representing 23 percent of the GDP (World Bank 2011). This was a significant increase from U.S. $900 million in the 2005 fiscal year, which was 11 percent of the GDP (Shishiso and Bajracharya 2010, 15). The number of recipient households increased from around 23 percent in 1995/96 to around 55.8 percent in 2010/11, with each household receiving an average of NPR 80,436 per year (Government of Nepal 2011). Considering the remittances sent through informal channels (hence they are unrecorded), the actual amount of remittance recipients is likely to be higher. The Nepal Migration Survey (2009) revealed that the largest proportion of these remittances (27.4%) came from Qatar, followed by Saudi Arabia (13.4%), India (13.4%), Malaysia (12.1%), and the United Arab Emirates (10.8%). Significant amounts of remittances also came from Israel (4.6%), the United Kingdom (2.7%), and Japan (2%) (Government of Nepal 2011; IOM 2011).

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25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011 Figure 8-2: Remittance inflows (in percentage of GDP) in Nepal Source: Remittance Inflows to GDP for Nepal (Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis 2014).

The Philippines has also enjoyed consistently high remittance inflows in recent years. The growth in remittances has resulted from the large number of overseas Filipino workers in more than 224 destinations, employment in the high wage-earning seafaring sector, and wage escalation among those on extended contracts and with long term employment experiences (IOM 2013, 6). In 2013, the Philippines was one of the top recipients of officially recorded remittances, having received a total of U.S. $26 billion from its overseas workers (World Bank 2013b). According to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the United States remained the top source of remittances in 2012, accounting for 42.6 percent of the total (Magtulis 2013). This was followed by Canada (9.2%), Saudi Arabia (8.1%), the United Kingdom (5%), Japan, (4.7%), United Arab Emirates (4.5%), and Singapore (4.1%) (Magtulis 2013). Remittances are estimated to contribute towards 8 to 10 percent of the GDP of the Philippines, making overseas employment one of the most important sources of external earnings in the Philippines (Magtulis 2013, 7).

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25000

181

23068

20000 15251 15000 8769

10000 5130 5000 0 1998

2001

2006

2011

Figure 8-3: Migrant remittance inflows to the Philippines (US$ mil) Source: World Bank Annual Remittance Data (World Bank 2013).

Such reliance on remittances may lead to the following negative impacts: x Reduced fiscal discipline: Remittances may decrease governments’ incentive to maintain fiscal balance. Empirical evidence indicates that governments misuse the fiscal space provided by remittances and consume and borrow more (Chami et al. 2008, 1; ESCAP 2010). x Dutch-disease effects: Although remittances constitute a source of financing in the balance of payments, there is evidence suggesting that remittances are positively correlated with real exchange rate appreciation. Some traces of the Dutch-disease-effects, such as increase in the prices of non-tradable goods in remittance-receiving countries, have been shown. It has also been shown that Dutchdisease effects are stronger in fixed exchange rate regimes (Acosta et al. 2009; ESCAP 2010). x Reduced political will for policy reform: Remittances can pose a moral hazard problem by reducing the political will to enact policy reform. Remittances that insure the public against adverse economic shocks may reduce the incentive of households to impress upon the government the need for the implementation of

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reforms for pro-poor economic growth (Chami et al. 2008; ESCAP 2010). x Weak institutions: Remittances are also associated with weaker institutional environments—lower control of corruption, lower quality of government, and retarded rule of law. This represents a significant lack of political will to enact governance reforms (Abdih et al. 2008; ESCAP 2010). It is difficult to verify exactly how problems associated with overdependence on remittances affect economic development; however, a significant drop in remittances would severely impact upon countries that are highly dependent on these inflows to sustain their economies (ESCAP 2010).

Informal money transfer A second issue regarding remittances in Asia is that many migrant workers still use informal channels to remit their money back home. This is because transferring money through informal channels is considered to be easier, cheaper, and faster than through formal channels. This makes it difficult for countries of origin to know exactly the value of remittances they receive each year and to maximise the benefits from such remittance, for example in investment initiatives. There are insufficient incentives for migrants to utilise the formal banking system as opposed to the traditional hundi or hawala system. The hundi system is preferred because formal remittance channels are not attractive in terms of speed, accessibility, and cost. Additionally, transfers of money can take place through friends, family, brokers and agents (Balaji and Priego 2005). The use of informal remittance channels is popular in countries such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, where a large proportion of the population works abroad. According to Myanmar’s Department of Labour, in 2012, 132,619 people were registered as working abroad. Additionally, approximately 1.2 million undocumented Myanmar workers in Thailand were issued with temporary passports (Department of Labour, Myanmar 2012). Despite having these “remedy” policies towards registering migrant workers, the government of Myanmar still has difficulty ascertaining the value of remittance flows, as most of its migrant workers prefer to send their money through the hundi system (ibid.). These unregistered transactions involve dealers in Thailand relaying messages to members of their

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network in Myanmar who then deliver the necessary amount to the family (Russeau 2013). According to research conducted by the Asian Development Bank, 56 percent of all Bangladeshi migrants in Malaysia use the informal hundi system (ADB 2006). While all respondents said that they preferred using hundi because it was cheaper and had a good reputation, 84 percent said that hundi was faster and more convenient (ADB 2006). Moreover, according to the official “Household Survey on Overseas Migrants and Remittances”, 40 percent of all remittances were received by households through formal banking channels, 29 percent were transferred through the hundi system, and one-third were either transferred through friends or relatives or were brought to Pakistan by the migrants themselves during their home visits (cited in Arif 2009, 24-52.). Both migrants and their families consider the bank procedure for transferring money difficult. The procedure and paperwork involved seem to be the main obstacles to using banking services to transfer remittances (Arif 2009, 24-52). Arif’s research also compares two aspects – the time involved in the transfer of money and the cost of each transaction – of the banking and hundi system. Families receive money through banks within four to five days, whilst the hundi system can send money in less than two days. While the transaction costs vary markedly across regions, the overall costs for using the banks or hundi are similar at approximately PKR 700 for each transaction (see Table 8-1). Table 8-1: Time and costs for remittances transactions in Pakistan: bank vs hundi Channels ˜‡”ƒ‰‡–‹‡‹˜‘Ž˜‡†‹ ‡ƒ…Š–”ƒ•ƒ…–‹‘ȋ†ƒ›•Ȍ ˜‡”ƒ‰‡…‘•–‘ˆ‡ƒ…Š –”ƒ•ƒ…–‹‘ȋƒ‹•–ƒ‹ ”—’‡‡•ȗȌ ‘–‡ǣȗͳα͹ͻǤͺͺ

Bank ͶǤͶ͵

Hundi ͳǤ͹ͷ

͸ͺ͸ǤͲ͹

͸ͻ͸Ǥ͵ͳ

‘—”…‡ǣ”‹ˆȋʹͲͲͻǡͷ͹ȌǤ

Labour-sending countries like the ones mentioned above recognise the importance of reducing remittance transfer costs and motivating migrants to remit through a formal banking system that will allow those deposits to be available for private sector development. The use of a formal banking system is also important for taxation, statistical and national security

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purposes. For countries of both origin and destination, unrecorded remittances have become a security concern, particularly since the September 11 attacks in the United States, as part of the financing for the attacks was derived through informal money transfer channels (Qorchi et al. 2003). However, it is unlikely that a significant shift to formal banking will occur since banks in both labour-sending and receiving countries often charge commissions at rates higher than those charged by informal channels. As a result, there is little incentive for migrant workers to use formal channels to send remittances.

Remittances for family consumption Chami et al. (2008) have argued in their study of remittances and growth that the economic impact of remittances depends greatly on how they are used. They came across various anecdotal reports suggesting that recipients used remittances to increase family consumption rather than to invest in businesses or other productive assets. This tends to limit the positive impacts of remittances in Asia (ESCAP 2010). According to Chami et al. (2008), there are three emerging trends: 1. A significant (and often largest) portion of remittances is spent on consumption (e.g., Oberai and Singh 1980, and Durand et al. 1996). Gilani, Khan, and Iqbal (1981) found that most remittances in their household survey in Pakistan were spent on consumption, followed by residential investment. 2. A significant, although smaller, portion of remittances goes into savings or investments. Alderman (1996) and Adams (1998), using survey data from Pakistan, found that remittances tend to be invested in land and buildings. 3. The savings and investments funded by remittances do not necessarily imply a corresponding rise in the overall productive capacity in the countries of origin. Empirical evidence suggests that in most migrant-sending countries in Asia, recipient families do tend to rely on remittances to cover daily expenses, healthcare costs, education, and the purchase of basic household appliances (IFAD 2013). However, while this consumption improves the basic wellbeing of households, the high level of dependence on remittances exposes families to a number of “risks”.

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First, dependence on remittances may give rise to moral hazard problems (OECD 2005)—recipient households may put in little or no effort at work, resulting in no insurance against a decline or stoppage of remittance inflows and an overall lower work force participation in the local economy. Second, frequency, and continuity of remittances relies greatly on the continuance of the motivations behind sending remittances—altruism or self-interested exchange (Chami et al. 2008). Consumption patterns may be adversely affected if such motivations are no longer strong enough to secure continuity of timely and adequate amounts of remittances. Third, the inflow of remittances depends on the availability and retention of foreign employment. This is vulnerable to shocks resulting from shifting global economic conditions. If remittances are used mainly to fuel consumption, a sudden decrease in remittance inflows due to loss of overseas jobs (for example, as a result of a global financial crisis) can be highly damaging to the wellbeing of recipient households. Thus, it is important to channel remittances towards productive investments. However, recipients often lack sufficient financial skills and knowledge to effectively invest and save the funds they receive. In Pakistan, Arif’s (2009) study has discovered that approximately 46 percent of recipient households are unable to make investments or to save even after remittance senders have worked abroad for more than three years. Because of limited financial literacy and poor knowledge of the practices of savings, migrants (who have invested significant amounts to cover the cost of migration) also find it difficult to break free from poverty and the migration cycle, despite being employed abroad for considerable periods of time (IOM 2012). There is an urgent need to encourage remittance-receiving households and countries to harness additional benefits of labour migration through “remittance management”. It is important for migrant families to realise that their interests rest on how they can effectively utilise remittance to secure longer term economic improvements. Governments should work on “remittance management” so that policies are put in place to promote local industry and entrepreneurial ventures. For example, preference schemes in cooperation with the private sector may help facilitate the establishment of medium and small-sized companies.

Remittance management: sharing good practices Having examined the drawbacks of remittances in the previous sections, I will now elaborate upon innovative policies and efforts that attempt to

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improve the use of remittances. These schemes and programmes are either centrally organised by the governments or provided by international or non-governmental organisations. Most of these schemes involve enhancing financial literacy, providing counselling services for investment and entrepreneurship, tax reduction incentives, and finance skills-oriented training. India and Pakistan provide preferential access to start-up investments for returnees from overseas employment (IOM 2011, 66). The Indian Investment Centre (IIC) specifically targets migrants as potential investors and supports them via joint ventures and technical assistance (IOM 2011, 67). Pakistan has a similar scheme in which the government provides advisory services and non-repatriable investment schemes (IOM 2011, 67). The government of Nepal has devised a strategic plan under which the Foreign Employment Promotion Board provides micro-credits to returning migrant workers who have received skills and entrepreneurial training. The Philippines has institutionalised incentive-based programmes designed to encourage migrant workers to invest their overseas earnings in the domestic economy (Calzado 2007). Unlad Kabayan, an NGO in the Philippines, conducts a Savings and Investment Mobilisation (SIM) programme (Unlad Kabayan 2013a) and a Credit Assistance Programme (CAP) (Unlad Kabayan 2013b) to ensure remittance-sending migrants and their receiving households have access to sufficient financial planning training and assistance. The goals of the programmes are to secure longer-term benefits from remittances and to utilise remittance beyond subsistence. In addition, the Philippine government has institutionalised a financial literacy programme through the Central Bank of the Philippines, other banks and their associates, and private companies (including insurance companies). There are also numerous civil society organisations working on similar programmes. Some countries carry out financial literacy programmes for households and migrants at the pre-departure phase. For example, in Nepal, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has implemented a financial literacy programme in which household members learn about savings, investments, household budgeting, and other financial management skills (IOM 2012). It also facilitates coordination among financial institutions to extend their outreach to rural communities in Nepal, where labour migration is high. These communities are linked to the services of financial institutions and encouraged to participate in establishing enterprises and cooperatives. Public-private partnerships can help improve the developmental effect of remittances. Hatton National Bank’s “Adhishtana” savings account is a

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unique savings scheme for remittance senders and receivers in Sri Lanka. It links migrant workers and their dependents with micro-entrepreneur programmes (Hatton National Bank n.d.). The programme has made financial services more accessible and affordable to migrant workers and their dependents across Sri Lanka. It received the “Best Practice Award” for enhancing the positive impacts of remittances through cross-sector partnerships (The Island 2013). Indeed, more public-private partnerships as such will certainly enhance the utility of remittances.

Conclusion International labour migration is a driver of socio-economic development in many migrant-sending countries in Asia. It is a means of revenuegeneration through remittances, and a temporary solution to the problems of unemployment and trade deficits. This chapter highlights the fact that, as remittances are mainly used for household consumption, the contribution of migration to longer term social and economic development in the regions of origin has been limited. Migration also incurs social costs including the brain drain and moral hazards regarding disincentives for local employment and economic improvement. Without good financial planning, migrant families may be unable to harness income and potential savings from remittances effectively into productive investments. Thus, migrants are less able to break away from the migration cycle. On the national level, without appropriate investment plans and infrastructural build-up in the sending countries, these countries will not enjoy long term benefits from international labour migration and from the returning workforce that has acquired many different skills while working abroad. The strengths and weaknesses of international labour migration must be examined more closely and the dependence on migration to support subsistence must be reduced. Below, I suggest three policy initiatives: Firstly, countries of origin should more effectively evaluate the impacts of remittance flows and play a more robust role in monitoring such flows. Only by crafting appropriate policies to facilitate the reinvestment of such external earnings into productive enterprises and constructing infrastructure that will in turn enhance the investment environment will the country as a whole enjoy increased long term benefits from international labour migration. Secondly, although most Asian countries of origin of labour migrants have strategic plans for sustainable development, which require the

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support of the international community, including the United Nations and affiliated organisations such as the IOM, few explicitly include international labour migration in those plans. Indeed, labour migration should be appropriately embedded in such plans in order to reveal the strategic importance of international labour migration and to better manage remittance flows. Thirdly, it is important for labour-sending countries to provide supportive measures for their workers at different stages of migration. These measures include the provision of pre-departure skills and financial training, pre-departure consultations to raise awareness of rights and the development of migration goals, streamlined remittance-sending procedures, skills-development during overseas postings, employment opportunities and re-integration programmes for returning workers, and contingency planning for unexpected returns of migrants (e.g., in cases of political conflict or natural disaster). These policies should be regularly updated to make adjustments for the shifting dynamics of international migration. Finally, governments of sending countries have to take the greatest responsibility in developing their national economy to enable sustainable development, which is the most important incentive for migrants to return home. With no guarantee of a sustainable livelihood, migrants have no choice but to continue to search for overseas employment. After all, both the governments and migrant workers should realise that labour migration is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. In the long term, it is critical that sending countries devise ways to apply remittances to more productive use, to benefit the overall development of the country. International labour migration could be a strong driver for sustainable development if good governance and appropriate policies are built into an effective and transparent system that has the capacity to address every stage of the migration cycle and maximise gains for the migrants and their families as well as the country of origin.

Notes 1. The analysis presented in this chapter represents the view of the author and does not reflect the views of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The author would like to thank Sanam Rahman and Chris Foulkes (IOM Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific) for editing this paper. The author would also like to acknowledge Tauhid Pasha, Frank Laczko, Andrew Bruce, and Rabab Fatima (IOM HQ and Regional office for Asia and the Pacific) for their support. 2. Hundi refers to the traditional financial instruments used on the Indian subcontinent for trade and credit transactions. They are used as remittance instruments

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(to transfer funds from one place to another), credit instruments (to borrow money [IOUs]), and for trade transactions (as bills of exchange). (Reserve Bank of India, n.d.) 3. Hawala is “money transfer without money movement”. Transactions between hawala brokers are conducted without promissory notes because the system is heavily based on trust (Investopedia LLC, 2014).

References Acosta, P. A., E. K. K. Lartey, and F. S. Mandelman. 2009. “Remittances and the Dutch Disease.” Journal of International Economics 79: 102-116. Ahortor, C. R. K., and D. E. Adenutsi. 2009. “The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth in Small-Open Developing Economies.” Journal of Applied Sciences 9 (18): 3275-3286. ADB. 2006. Workers’ Remittance Flows in Southeast Asia. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Alderman, H. 1996. “Saving and Economic Shocks in Rural Pakistan.” Journal of Development Economics 51: 343-365. Arif, G. M. 2009. Economic and Social Impacts of Remittances on Households: The Case of Pakistani Migrants Working in Saudi Arabia. Islamabad: IOM. Balaji, A. and D. Priego. 2005. “International Remittances”. Harvard Business School. http://people.hbs.edu/mdesai/IFM05/BalajiPriego.pdf Calzado, R. J. 2007. “Labour Migration and Development Goals: The Philippine Experience.” A paper presented at the International Dialogue on Migration Workshop on “Making Global Labour Mobility A Catalyst For Development”. October 8, WMO Conference Center, Geneva. Chami, R., A. Barajas, T. Cosimano, C. Fullenkamp, M. Gapen, and P. Montiel. 2008. “Macroeconomic Consequences of Remittances.” IMF Occasional Paper 259. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. Department of Labour, Myanmar. 2012. Labour Migration Management in Naypyidaw. Durand, J., W. Kandel, E. A. Parrado, and D. S. Massey. 1996. “International Migration and Development in Mexican Communities.” Demography 33: 249-264. ESCAP. 2010. Situation Report on International Migration in South and South-West Asia. Bangkok: The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

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Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. 2014. Remittance Inflows to GDP for Nepal. http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DDOI11NPA156NWDB#. Gartaula, H. N. 2009. “International Migration and Local Development in Nepal.” Contributions to Nepalese Studies 36 (1): 37-65. Kathmandu: Research Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies. Gilani, I., F. Khan, and M. Iqbal. 1981. “Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Middle East and Its Impact on the Domestic Economy, Part 1.” PIDE Research Report No. 126. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. Government of Nepal. 2011. Nepal Living Standards Survey 2010/11. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. Gubert, F. 2005. “Migrant Remittances and their Impact on Development in the Home Economies: The Case of Africa.” In Migration, Remittances and Development, 41-67. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Hatton National Bank. N.d. HNB Adhishtana. http://www.hnb.net/data/for_individuals/hnb_adhishtana.php. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 2013. Sending Money Home to Asia. Rome: IFAD. Investopedia LLC. 2014. Hawala. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hawala.asp. IOM. 2013. Country Migration Report The Philippines 2013. Manila: IOM and Scalabrini Migration Centre. —. 2011. Labour Migration from Colombo Process Countries: Good Practices, Challenges and Way Forward. Geneva: IOM. —. 2012. Private Sector Participation in Labour Migration Management in Nepal. Kathmandu: IOM. Mgtulis, P. 2013. 2012 Remittances Hit Record High. http://www.philstar.com/business/2013/02/15/909187/2012remittances-hit-record-high. Nepal Institute of Development Studies. 2009. Nepal Migrants’ Survey. Kathmandu: Nepal Institute of Development Studies. Oberai, A. S., and H. K. Manmohan Singh. 1980. “Migration, Remittances and Rural Development: Findings of a Case Study in the Indian Punjab.” International Labour Review 119: 229-241. Qorchi, M. E., S. M. Maimbo, and J. F. Wilson. 2003. “Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System.” A Joint IMF - World Bank Paper. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/op/222/.

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Ratha, D., S. Mohapatra, and A. Silwal. 2009. Migration and Remittance Trends 2009: A Better-Than-Expected Outcome So Far, But Significant Risks Ahead. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/10958 Reserve Bank of India. N.d. Museum. http://rbi.org.in/Scripts/ms_hundies.aspx. Ruiz, I., and C. Vargas-Silva. 2009. “Another Consequence of the Economic Crisis: A Decrease in Migrants’ Remittances.” Working Paper 0907, Department of Economics and International Business, Sam Houston State University. Russeau, S. S. K. 2013. “Remittances Buoy Up Myanmar’s Economy.” IPS Inter Press Service, 23 May. http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/remittances-buoy-up-myanmarseconomy/. Shishiso, H. and R. Bajracharya. 2010. Nepal Economic Update. World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEPALEXTN/Resources/2235541273777738652/Nepal_Economic_Update_Final_April_2010_v1.pdf The Island. 2013. HNB Bags IFAD Award at Global Forum on Remittances 2013, 13 June. Unlad Kabayan. 2013a. Migrant Services & Social Entrepreneurship. http://www.unladkabayan.org/migrant-workers-programs.html. —. 2013b. Micro-credit. http://www.unladkabayan.org/micro-credit.html. World Bank. 2011. World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. http://go.worldbank.org/QGUCPJTOR0 —. 2012. “Remittances to Developing Countries will Surpass $400 Billion in 2012.” Migration and Development Brief 19, 20 November. —. 2013a. Migration, Remittances, and Diaspora. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/0,,contentM DK:21924020~pagePK:5105988~piPK:360975~theSitePK:214971,00. html. —. 2013b. “Developing Countries to Receive Over $410 Billion in Remittances in 2013, Says World Bank.” http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/10/02/ developing-countries-remittances-2013-world-bank.

CHAPTER NINE WHEN NEW MIGRANTS MEET OLD MIGRANTS: INDONESIAN ETHNIC ECONOMY IN HONG KONG KIM KWOK AND DIANA K. KWOK

Introduction Indonesians constitute one of the largest non-Chinese population groups in Hong Kong, peaking at 133,337 in 2011. The majority work as foreign domestic workers (hereafter FDWs)1 in the territory. FDWs have attracted much attention, both in academic writing and the mass media. Many have studied the global inequality of gendered labour migration, and have approached the theme from the migrants’ daily life experiences and various power relations (Constable 2007; Law 2001). Others have explored the migrants’ organisations and social activism (Sim 2003; Ford 2004; Constable 2009; Hsia 2009), the violation of their human rights (Piper 2005; Mok 2008), and sexuality issues (Chang and Groves 2000; Sim 2010). Yet, in Hong Kong and other places in Asia, little attention has been paid to the ethnic economy born of the increasing migration of FDWs or of immigrants in general in the region. Studies of fast food shops and restaurants operated by Vietnamese wives in Taiwan (Huang, Tsay, and Hsiao 2012), and the self-employment experiences and socio-political embeddedness of the South Asian minorities’ economy in Hong Kong (Law and Lee 2013; Erni and Leung 2014) are some exceptions. Despite being low-paid migrant workers, Indonesian FDWs have in one way or another contributed significantly to the prospering Indonesian ethnic economy in Hong Kong. Not only does this ethnic economy carry economic value for Hong Kong, but it has also turned out to be an integral part of the Hong Kong ethnoscape, enriching the economic and cultural diversity of the local society.

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Based on ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews conducted in 2012 and 2013, this chapter offers some preliminary analyses regarding the emergence and flourishing development of the Indonesian ethnic economy in Hong Kong, brought about by the encounter of two groups of migrants from Indonesia—migrant domestic workers and Chinese Indonesian immigrants. Its aim is twofold. Firstly, it examines how the interplay of an economic niche and individual and group resources shapes the present form of the ethnic economy. Secondly, it investigates the relationship between the formal and informal sectors of this ethnic economy. This chapter will discuss the notions of mixed embeddedness (Kloosterman, Van der Leun, and Rath 1999) and capital (Putnam 2000; Portes 1998; Bourdieu 1986), from which it conceptually departs. It will then go on to examine the migration and socio-economic backgrounds of the new and old groups of Indonesian migrants, followed by an exploration of their varied roles within the Indonesian ethnic economy.

Ethnic economy of migrants The authors of the seminal work Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Business in Industrial Societies define ethnic economy as “a set of connections and regular patterns of interaction among people sharing common national background or migration experiences” (Waldinger et al. 1990, 3). This general definition has been further clarified, enriched, and even contested by others. For example, while Ivan Light highlights two main aspects, namely ethnic ownership and ethnic employment network (Light 2005), Zhou Min understands the term more broadly as denoting “every enterprise that is either owned, or supervised, or staffed by racial/ethnic minority group members regardless of size, type, and locational clustering” (Zhou 2004, 1043). Making reference to these authors, this chapter understands the term “ethnic economy” as a set of economic activities surrounding and connecting a group of migrants not necessarily sharing a common national / ethnic background (as in the definition of Waldinger et al. 1990), but rather a common cultural heritage and inter-related migration experiences. In explaining immigrant economic activities, scholars suggest the concept of mixed embeddedness (Kloosterman, Van der Leun, and Rath 1999; Kloosterman and Rath 2001). This highlights the interplay of structural and ethno-cultural factors: the ethnic economy is shaped by the structural environment of the country of settlement including business regulations, immigration policies, and market conditions on the one hand, and on the other, the internal individual and group resources of co-ethnics.

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One common and long-standing feature of an ethnic economy is informal activities. Broadly defined, the informal sector in an advanced economy can be seen as involving “actions of economic agents that fail to adhere to the established institutional rules or are denied their protection” (Feige 1990, 990). Specifically, it includes self-employment in small-unregistered enterprises and wage employment without labour or social protection. In a case study of ethnic economy, Kloosterman, Van der Leun, and Rath (1999) show that, upon facing demanding business regulations (institutional environment) and lacking financial and human capital (individual resources), many Islamic butchers from Turkey and Morocco engaged themselves in off-the-book selling of meat and employing relatives who were partly or not paid at all. This informal production was made possible based on trust and support (group resources) generated by social networks among kinship and co-ethnics. Social capital has been a much discussed notion for explaining the success of certain immigrant entrepreneurship (Zhou 1992; Portes 1998; Light 2004). It denotes advantages such as price discounting, free labour, and information about business conditions stemming from social networks in economic settings. However, although social capital plays an undisputable role, research is often over-preoccupied with its “ethnic” character; that is, this capital is presumed to be vested in the co-ethnic migrant group (Pieterse 2003; Jones and Ram 2007). This has not only shadowed cross-ethnic social connectedness and the bridging of the social capital (Putnam 2000) of migrants deriving from such connections, but has also obscured the role of other resources, such as cultural and economic capital, as suggested by Bourdieu (1986).

Two groups of migrants from Indonesia Generally speaking, two groups of migrants connected to Indonesia can be identified in Hong Kong. The first is Indonesian FDWs, who have been entering Hong Kong since the 1990s. The second group is the Indonesian Chinese “returnees”; the majority of this group settled in Hong Kong during an earlier period—the 1970s and 1980s. Indonesian FDWs started to trickle into Hong Kong when the colonial government allowed expatriates to bring their domestic workers with them to Hong Kong in the 1970s (Asian Migrant Center et al. 2001). Initially, Hong Kong recruited mostly Filipinas as domestic helpers. Only in the 1990s did Indonesian domestic workers begin to land in Hong Kong in greater numbers. In 2001, there were 142,556 Filipinos and 50,494 Indonesians in Hong Kong (Census and Statistics Department 2002).

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However, developments in the last decade have radically changed the make-up of the FDW population. In 2011, while the number of Indonesians rapidly increased to 133,337, the number of Filipinos slightly decreased to 133,018. Indonesians and Filipinos together make up approximately 60 percent of the total nonChinese population in Hong Kong (Census and Statistics Department 2013). The employment of FDWs is regulated through two-year employment contracts stipulated by the Department of Immigration. This contract sets a minimum wage (presently set at HK$4,110), food and board, and number of rest days. Most Indonesian workers in Hong Kong originate from rural areas. Compared to their Filipino counterparts, Indonesian FDWs are on average younger, less educated, and more likely to be underpaid and exploited (Asian Migrant Center et al. 2001; Asian Development Bank 2006; Sim 2007). Some recent cases of abuse of Indonesian FDWs (Chiu 2014; BBC 2014) have again vividly exposed the deprivations of this migrant group in Hong Kong to an international audience. The demand for and recruitment of FDWs are closely related to the socio-economic conditions of Hong Kong. In the 1970s and 1980s, Hong Kong emerged as one of Asia’s “newly industrialising economies” (NIEs), and transitioned from a manufacturing economy to a commercial centre focusing on tertiary industries such as marketing and finance (Chiu 1999). With the growth of the economy, an increasing number of local women joined the labour force, subsequently creating a need for middle-class families to outsource their domestic duties. At present, FDWs are indispensable to middle and upper-class families not only in terms of the “emotional and physical labour in the work of social reproduction” (Sim 2007, 4), but also for their value as a symbol of status (Constable 2007; Sim 2007). Even during the difficult years following the Asian financial crisis in 1998, and SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2003, demand for FDWs continued to rise. This implies that Hong Kong has become dependent on external sources of low-waged labour (Sim 2007, 95-96). Earlier migrants from Indonesia were Indonesian Chinese “returnees”, known as guiqiao or huaqiao. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a significant number, estimated to be over 200,000 in total, came to settle in Hong Kong.2 These were Indonesia-born ethnic Chinese, who could be roughly divided into two subgroups according to their time of migration. The first subgroup left Indonesia for China in the 1950s, shortly after the People’s Republic of China was founded and upon the patriotic call of Mao Zedong to contribute to a socialist China. The second subgroup left for China in

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the mass repatriation and amidst the anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia in the 1960s. However, these Indonesian Chinese “returnees” did not fit into the socialist system in a myriad of ways. Some suffered greatly during the Cultural Revolution because of their “overseas relations”; they were removed from their professional posts and sent to the countryside to be “re-educated”, or imprisoned (Godley 1989, 348). Many left China for Hong Kong when the exit option was made available from the early 1970s. Despite living in a free and cosmopolitan city, the Indonesian Chinese “returnees” were not free from discrimination and suffered from exclusion and marginalisation, particularly during the early days of their time in Hong Kong. As most of their professional qualifications were acquired in China and were not recognised in Hong Kong, they could only find lowskilled jobs to secure a precarious living. They were perceived as “secondclass citizens” and thus were liable to be exploited (Horizon 1983; Zheng Ming 1978). Nevertheless, some of these Indonesian Chinese succeeded in accumulating wealth by running their own businesses, mostly Indonesian restaurants and grocery stores. Many of these families have raised themselves from the lowest end of the social hierarchy and have obtained financial security over the past 30 years. Carrying with them multiple “experiences of displacement” (Clifford 1997), their “Chineseness”, multiple identities and sense of belonging have become the focus of several studies (Wang 2006; Chin 2003; Tan 2011). In daily life, their distinct and multiple identities are articulated through daily cultural practices, including their mixed spoken languages (Bahasa Indonesian, Mandarin, and Cantonese) and cuisine (Indonesian and Chinese).

Ethnic economy created by Indonesian Chinese “returnees” Indonesian restaurants and grocery stores first appeared in Hong Kong in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They were operated by Indonesian Chinese “returnees” to serve the distinct cultural needs of their fellow huaqiaos. Among those early businesses, some have survived until today by offering upmarket cuisine.3 Others, such as grocery stores located largely in Kwun Tong, Tsuen Wan, and Quarry Bay, where many Indonesian Chinese “returnees” lived, have been gradually transformed to serve the needs of Indonesian migrant workers over the last decade. The large numbers of Indonesian labour migrants have actually led to the blossoming of Indonesian grocery stores all over Hong Kong. Ms Tang4 and her family have been running an Indonesian grocery store in an old residential block in Quarry Bay since the early 1980s. The

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store was very popular among Indonesian huaqiaos in the 1980s and 1990s. People came not only for the Indonesian dried food and spices, but also for cooked Indonesian food. She said: Back in the old days, people queued up for half an hour, or more, just to buy our food for taking away… Later the business became worse, many Indonesian huaqiaos moved away from the district, some old customers have not come back.

When asked how they have maintained their business, Ms Tang stressed that the increased numbers of Indonesian migrant workers have helped significantly: Indonesian sisters,5 now there are more and more Indonesian sisters…they come on Sunday, we are full here.

During my visit on a Friday afternoon, I was amazed at the leisurely atmosphere created by the dancing, jokes, and conversations of a group of elderly people (mostly Indonesian huaqiaos in their seventies) gathered in front of the 15-square metre shop. While these elderly individuals were chatting cheerfully, two Indonesian sisters, who were employed as FDWs, were preparing food at the back of the store. Work such as making food for the store should not be part of the domestic duties of the FDWs but in Hong Kong this is quite common. The Chinese Indonesian boss in this case makes use of the Indonesian workers to work for the business. Mr and Mrs Lam, who arrived in Hong Kong from China in 1974, were engaged in a watch-making and export business for about 20 years before turning their attention to the business opportunities offered by the Indonesian market. After closing the watch business due to fierce competition from China and other Asian countries, they opened an Indonesian grocery shop in Ma On Shan in 2002, a time when the number of Indonesian FDWs was rapidly rising. The shop sold daily groceries, cooked food, telephone cards, and Indonesian garments. It also offered a remittance service. The business in the first five years was better than expected, as competition was rare. After the grocery shop closed in 2012 because of the termination of the rental contract, Mr and Mrs Lam opened a clothing shop in Causeway Bay where Indonesian FWDs congregate during weekends. “Customers become friends…sometimes they come and chat, they just need someone to talk to in their own language…I fill out some forms for them as I speak Indonesian and read Chinese”, explained Mrs Lam on her role as a shop-owner as well as a cultural mediator.

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It is difficult to estimate the exact number of shops, restaurants, and finance companies in the Indonesian ethnic economy. In 2011, there were at least 136 remittance agencies serving Indonesian migrant workers in Hong Kong (JFIU 2011). Indonesian grocery shops and restaurants often appear next to these remittance agencies or serve as remittance agencies at the same time. It is also common to find one or more Indonesian grocery shops near the 160 wet markets throughout Hong Kong. Most of these shops are run by Indonesian Chinese “returnees” who are well-established in the business. Some of these returnees operate more than one shop while others run their business through franchising. One example is Surya, who owns a remittance service, a jewellery business, a hair salon as well as an Indonesian supermarket.

Tapping into the ethnic niche market Indonesian grocery stores together with remittance services and banks pioneered by the Indonesian Chinese “returnees” are the first two business sectors. Other business activities have gradually emerged: travel agencies, the selling of mobile phones and services, telephone cards, furniture and electrical appliances, clothes, Muslim-specific garments and accessories, health products, hair and beauty salons, internet cafés, and photo shops. In contrast to the Indonesian food and grocery stores scattered around residential areas and wet markets, the new businesses are mainly found in certain areas such as Causeway Bay, Tsuen Wan, Yuen Long and Sham Shui Po where there is a high concentration of ethnic minority residents or visitors. A number of these new businesses are located in shopping malls such as the Causeway Bay Shopping Centre in Causeway Bay, and Hop Yik Plaza in Yuen Long. These are second-rate or even down-market shopping malls which offer comparatively affordable rents. They are less popular among local Hong Kong Chinese. Owners of these new businesses are diverse, ranging from local Hong Kong Chinese to Pakistanis, former Indonesian FDWs, and the younger generation of Indonesian Chinese. The young Indonesian Chinese are also ethnic Chinese who were born and grew up in Indonesia. They migrated to Hong Kong directly from Indonesia, mostly in the aftermath of the 1998 anti-Chinese riots. Most are fluent in Bahasa Indonesian (the official language of Indonesia). While some can speak Mandarin or Cantonese, few can read and write Chinese. They are either married to local Chinese or/and have kinship networks in Hong Kong. To a certain extent, they can be seen as an extended stream of the earlier migration of Indonesian Chinese “returnees”.

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Jenny, for example, who comes from a Chinese merchandising family in Surabaya, moved to Hong Kong with her husband in 2009. Her husband comes from a huaqiao family that has been in Hong Kong for over 30 years. After working for several months in a remittance shop in a Causeway Bay shopping mall, Jenny saw a new business opportunity. Indonesian FDWs are eager to buy wooden furniture and electronic appliances from colourful catalogues for their families living in remote areas in Indonesia. The order of the furniture is made in Hong Kong and the customers can pay their monthly instalments with part of their monthly wages. Jenny opened her furniture shop in 2013 in the same shopping mall where she used to work. Although her business has not been as successful as her competitors, she believes that there are large profit margins in the huge Indonesian market. Ahmed, a Hong Kong resident of Pakistani origin, has been living in Hong Kong for over 20 years. For the last ten years, he has been engaged in the textile-trading business. Now in his 50s, he owns a textile company in cooperation with some Chinese partners. The company has its own factory in Guangdong province. Having closed down his textile outlet in Tsim Sha Tsui, Ahmed opened a new one in Sham Shui Po, where branded products, including ladies’ T-shirts and dresses from his own company, are sold at relatively low prices. On a Sunday afternoon, one can hardly squeeze through the excited crowds of Indonesian FDWs to reach the counter, at which either Ahmed or his wife sit and work as the cashier. Hanna, who works as an “illegal” distributor for Ahmed, introduced me to Ahmed’s outlet. Hanna, a FDW, always carries with her a catalogue of Ahmed’s products and tries to sell them to her fellow FDWs. Once a week, she goes to Ahmed’s shop and collects the products her friends or acquaintances have ordered. For this part-time business, Hanna can easily earn HK$1,500 to 2,000 a month in addition to what she earns as a FDW. Local Hong Kong Chinese have also long been aware of the business opportunities arising out of this group. In addition to big market players such as multinational telecommunication enterprises SmarTone and China Mobile, which have aggressively tapped into the FDW ethnic market, there are also small entrepreneurs who are making a modest income out of this market. One interesting example is the emergence of photo-taking businesses, which appeal to many Indonesian FDWs who feel delighted to send interesting photographs to their families back home. They may dress up in pretty dresses, sometimes even in Western-styled wedding gowns, and then send their photographs back home. One local Chinese retiree runs his photo-taking stall in Victoria Park (Causeway Bay) every Sunday; he

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said, “I am retired and have nothing to do at home; why not come here and earn some money?”

FWDs who become permanent residents In order to be a legitimate employee of the above businesses, one has to be an “ordinary resident” in Hong Kong. Under the Immigration Ordinance, FDWs, among some other groups, are excluded from being “treated as ordinarily residents” (Immigration Department n.d.) in Hong Kong. It is clearly stipulated that FDWs are not allowed to perform nondomestic work outside their employers’ household and other part-time work (Immigration Department 2008). As such, the status of FDWs restricts them to working merely as household helpers and to living with their employer. They are prohibited from having other forms of paid work, self-employment, and any right of abode (right of permanent residence) in Hong Kong. Therefore, employees of the above businesses are either young Indonesian Chinese or former FDWs who have already changed their status. The young Indonesian Chinese, as mentioned above, have recently immigrated for family reunions or for employment other than domestic work. For them, working for someone else is often seen as a transitional stage, as their ultimate goal is to be their own boss. Bonnie, a Chinese from Jakarta and a friend of Jenny, is married to a Hong Kong Chinese. She works in the most prosperous ethnic business segment, mobile phone services, in a CityLink shop located in the same shopping mall where Jenny works. Her job is to sell phones and services to Indonesian FDWs in Bahasa Indonesian. “Now many Indonesian sisters speak Cantonese…but if you can speak in their own language, it is easier for them, and it is warm”, Bonnie stated, by way of explanation of why people like her are needed in the business. Like her friend Jenny, she aspires to have her own business one day. Most of the former FDWs who have obtained the right to stay permanently (right of abode) in Hong Kong have achieved such status (Immigration Department 2014) through marrying a Hong Kong citizen. It is estimated that approximately 10,000 former Indonesian FDWs have obtained such residence status.6 I met Atin in Yuen Long on a Sunday afternoon. She approached Indonesian FDWs gathering around a football pitch near Long Ping Station, and tried to sell them prepaid sim cards. Atin was employed by the Hong Kong subsidiary (Telin Hong Kong) of an Indonesian telecommunication and network provider, and was responsible for the Yuen Long area. She was happy with her present job as she earned

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slightly over HK $10,000 a month, which was much higher than the salary of a FDW. She left her job as a domestic worker four years ago when she married her Hong Kong husband.

Indonesian FDWs in the informal economy The main pillar of the Indonesian ethnic economy is constituted of FDWs and, without them as customers, it would not have existed and flourished as it has. Consumption by Indonesian FDWs ranges from having a bowl of home-cooked soto ayam (chicken soup) to buying telephone cards (for calling back home) and spending conspicuously for fashionable smartphones. Although this consumption may seem paltry, in aggregate, it adds up to a significant amount. I was informed by an Indonesian Chinese “returnee”, who works for his friend’s tiny remittance shop located in Causeway Bay, that the monthly turnover of the shop accruing from remittances always exceeds HK$ 10 million. A number of studies (Asian Migrant Centre 2004; APMM and MFMW 2013) indicate that, after sending remittances back home, the disposable income of FDWs for consumption in Hong Kong ranges from 40 to 54 percent of their monthly wages. Taking these figures as a reference, we can come to a conservative estimate of the consumption power of all Indonesian migrants in Hong Kong, which amounts to a total of HK$ 2.5 billion, equal to about 0.1 percent of Hong Kong’s annual GNP in 2011.7 Despite their considerable contribution to the local economy (Asian Migrant Centre 2004), Indonesian migrants are denied the economic opportunity of setting up businesses to serve their own community or of being a proper employee in the ethnic economy. In other words, they are deprived of their economic rights, which are widely recognised and advocated by international human rights bodies.8 As a result, the involvement of Indonesian FDWs in the ethnic economy has been restricted to the role of consumers. Nevertheless, in order to supplement their income or to make up for their underpayment in terms of wages, many have found a way to engage themselves in the ethnic economy’s informal sector. Hanna, for example, has always had a side “business” besides her work as an FDW. As mentioned above, Hanna is an independent distributor of Ahmed’s garment products. Prior to that, she distributed telephone cards for over three years. She bought the cards from suppliers in Causeway Bay and sold them to people through her own networks during the week. She even crossed over the ethnic boundary and connected with Filipina FDWs. Her “business” was good but unstable as many people failed to pay her. All of these

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businesses were conducted without the knowledge of her employer. Unlike Hanna, Fiti’s petty “business” was carried out in cooperation with her employer. Fiti was invited by owners of Indonesian grocery shops in Tuen Mun (mostly Indonesian Chinese “returnees”) to supply ready-to-eat freshly cooked Indonesian food. She did this for several years. Money earned was shared with her elderly employer, who provided her with the place and time to cook. The role of Indonesian FDWs as customers in the ethnic economy is indispensable. However, their role as informal actors is not acknowledged and thus is devalued. Certain scenes taking place on Sundays where FDWs congregate best illustrate the contradictory nature of the situation of Indonesian FDWs. In Causeway Bay, for instance, while thousands of Indonesian FDWs are served warmly as “formal” customers in shopping malls and stores, others gather in small clusters in various places nearby and engage in “illegal” hawking. They carry suitcases full of food and goods to be sold at prices lower than those found in the shopping malls. These hawkers have to look out for park patrols and government hawker-control teams. Depending on what they sell, they can usually earn HK$ 100-200 extra for the week if they are lucky enough not to be caught. Interestingly, a similar scene took place in Yuen Long where I met Atin. Everybody, including Indonesian FDWs and the park patrols, was more relaxed there. Street businesses seemed to be tolerated and the boundary between the “formal” and “informal” sector was blurred.

Discussion The illustrations in the above have revealed that the flourishing Indonesian ethnic economy has offered new economic opportunities for various groups of migrants, including such marginalised groups as the Indonesian Chinese “returnees” and long-settled Pakistani migrants. However, Indonesian FDWs, the most significant group of people keeping the ethnic economy alive, are mostly barred from profiting from this market due to their status as FDWs. In the following, we will use the concepts of “mixed embeddedness” and “capital” to make further analyses of the various factors contributing to the present form of the Indonesian ethnic economy in Hong Kong.

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Structural opportunities and constraints According to the notion of mixed embeddedness, structural circumstances play a significant role in the ethnic economy, either as opportunities or constraints. Along with globalisation and increased regional labour migration, the mass arrival of Indonesian FDWs has shaped the structural condition for the emergence of the Indonesian ethnic economy. Early Indonesian Chinese “returnees” are able to grasp this excellent opportunity to secure economic gains by engaging in businesses catering to Indonesian FDWs. Although Indonesian Chinese “returnees” have relevant language skills and knowledge, as well as social connections in Indonesia, these resources were of little use before the 1990s when there were few Indonesians in the city. Once the boom-time of the earlier Indonesian restaurants and grocery stores was over, few of these huaqiaos had thought there would arise another prime time for their business. Only with the arrival of Indonesian workers in larger volumes were they given the chance to re-activate their dormant resources—their economic, cultural and social capital—and to make use of them proactively for business purposes. Structural circumstances can also serve as constraints. As mentioned above, Indonesian FDWs are subject to the regulations of the Hong Kong migration regime, which denies their rights to perform non-domestic work and become permanent residents. It is exactly this institutional constraint (on the Indonesian FWDs) that offers the chance for both the earlier and later Indonesian Chinese migrants to fill the market gap, because they have the legal right to do so. However, it deprives the FDWs of a chance to legitimately take advantage of the prospering Indonesian ethnic economy and, at the same time, inevitably forces some into the informal sector.

Cultural and social capital It is the common cultural background that connects new and old migrants from Indonesia, without which the Indonesian ethnic economy would not have developed so smoothly. This common cultural background encompasses the Bahasa Indonesia language, migrants’ living experiences in Indonesia and their desire for Indonesian food. Mrs Lam, the Indonesian Chinese “returnee” who owned a garment shop, expressed that “at the beginning [of her stay in Hong Kong], I could not imagine that I could use Indonesian to earn a living here…” All the Indonesian Chinese “returnee” informants believed that they would not have entered the business if they had not been equipped with the language skills and knowledge of

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Indonesian culture. Yet, these are insufficient for business success. Their bi-cultural background supplements their ability to start and sustain these economic activities. Being ethnic Chinese and being able to read, write, and speak Chinese enables them to process official paperwork, to connect with local Chinese customers and to import goods from China and Indonesia more easily.9 As such, their multiple migratory and cultural backgrounds, which were sources of discrimination in earlier years (Horizon 1983; Zheng Ming 1978; Godley 1989), conversely became useful “capital” for business once the aforementioned opportunity structure emerged in the market. While this reactivated cultural capital has stemmed from their culturalethnic endowments as well as acquired knowledge in Indonesia, the Chinese Indonesians also possess specific social capital through their social networks in Indonesia, China, and Hong Kong. For example, Mr and Mrs Lam remarked that they were actually informed by a huaqiao friend in Hong Kong (who ran a FDW agency) of such a market opportunity. Their present garment shop has been largely supported by Indonesian Chinese suppliers who are their old friends back in Indonesia. Apart from this social capital, cross-ethnic bridging also plays a role in expanding the clientele or obtaining useful skills and resources not available within one’s own co-ethnic group. As explained in the above cases, some Indonesian Chinese bosses depend on a network of Indonesian domestic workers who either supply their shops with goods (such as ready-to-eat cooked Indonesian food) or help to expand their clientele. Some also reach out to customers from other migrant worker groups. Hanna, for instance, has tried to earn more from her telephone card selling business through her connection to Filipina FDWs.

Symbiotic interconnectedness of the formal and the informal Due to the restrictions stipulated by the Hong Kong government, the involvement of Indonesian FDWs in the ethnic economy is illegitimate. Yet, being “hidden” workers in grocery stores, self-employed telephone card distributors, or petty hawkers has rendered them active players in the informal ethnic economy which includes legal goods that bypass the usual costs and are excluded from the protection of laws and administrative rules (Feige 1990). In general, two kinds of informal activities can be identified. The first consists of those attached to the formal sector, such as Indonesian FDWs being hired to work in grocery shops or as informal salespersons for telephone cards or textile items. In such cases, while the grocery shop or

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textile outlet is licensed and pays tax, the Indonesian workers are not officially reported and their activities are off the books. The second kind comprises activities carried out by individual Indonesian migrants who have no direct linkage to the formal sector, which means they carry out non-registered self-employment. Examples are the Sunday FWD “businesswomen’ who sell home-cooked food and handicrafts to their coethnics on the street. Despite their being outside the law, the carrying on of such informal economic activities appears to be an integral, even indispensable, part of the Indonesian ethnic economy in Hong Kong. Indonesian FDWs serve as a large cohort of convenient and cheap informal labour for the formal ethnic economy. Without the Indonesian FDWs who help behind the scenes of the grocery stores or act as invisible textile distributors, such businesses would not operate smoothly and at relatively low running costs. Without the informal telephone card distributors and the Sunday “businesswomen”, obtaining daily necessary items would become more expensive for FDWs. In this sense, the informal sector does not exist in isolation. It is, on the one hand, an integral part of the formal economy and, on the other, constantly conditioned by the existing opportunity structure. The informal and formal sectors have developed a symbiotic relationship in which both benefit and depend on each other.

Concluding remarks The emergence and development of the Indonesian ethnic economy in Hong Kong can be seen as being initially induced by the encounter of two groups of migrants—Indonesian FDWs and Indonesian Chinese “returnees”. Both groups are embedded within their own ethno-cultural milieu as well as in the socio-economic and politico-institutional environments in Hong Kong. This chapter has shown that, firstly, the existing form of the Indonesian ethnic economy has emerged out of the complementation of the advantages and disadvantages of the situations of two migrant groups from Indonesia. Secondly, it is particularly shaped by the interplay of both groups’ socio-cultural resources as well as the structural constraints exerted on the Indonesian FWDs in particular. This chapter has also argued that the informal sector of the ethnic economy, mostly consisting of Indonesian FDWs, has become an integral part of the prospering Indonesian ethnic economy in Hong Kong. Unlike typical ethnic entrepreneurship in advanced economies, this case study demonstrates at least two different features. Firstly, most businesses are neither owned nor operated by the majority Indonesian migrants themselves, which is usually

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the case in other ethnic economies. Due to their contract terms, Indonesian FDWs, who aspire to earn extra money, can only “work” informally, such as being a helper at the back of a fast-food restaurant, or a street hawker on Sundays. They are always aware that they may be caught, in which case they would be expelled from Hong Kong. Secondly, the petty and fragile nature of these informal economic activities has prevented Indonesian FDWs from enjoying long-term and steady earnings, and subsequent upward social mobility in prospering ethnic economies, an outcome much celebrated in the discussions of ethnic economy literature (Waldinger 1986; Zhou 2004; Portes 2010). Further exploration should be undertaken into the deprived situation of migrant workers within the context of Asian FDW migration.

Notes 1. The Hong Kong Government uses the term “foreign domestic helpers” (FDHs). However, most migrant-related NGOs use the term “foreign domestic workers” (FDWs), which sounds less suggestive of menial maid’s work. This chapter uses the latter term due to the author’s similar opinion to the migrant NGOs. 2. There is no consensus on the accurate number of Indonesian Chinese resettled in Hong Kong. While some authors put the figure at 100,000 (Godley and Coppel 1990; also see Peterson 2012), others put it between 300,000 and 500,000 (Chin 2003; Wang 2006). 3. Two examples are the Padang Indonesian Restaurant and the Indonesian Restaurant 1968. 4. All names used in this chapter are pseudonyms. 5. “Sister” is the term used to address FDWs in daily life, which carries a soft tone and suggests a close employer-employee relationship. 6. Information obtained in a conversation with an informant at the Indonesian Consulate in June 2013, Hong Kong. 7. Our own calculations based on the FDW standard wage (HK$3920) in 2011: HK$1568 (40% of HK$3920) x 12 (months) x 133,337 (the number of Indonesian nationals in Hong Kong) = HK$2,508 million; Hong Kong’s GNP in 2011 was HK$1,897,755 million. 8. Two relevant international agreements: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

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Jones, T., and M. Ram. 2007. “Re-embedding the ethnic business agenda.” Work, Employment and Society 21 (3): 439-457. Kloosterman, R, J. Van der Leun, and J. Rath. 1999. “Mixed Embeddedness, Migrant Entrepreneurship and Informal Economic Activities.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23 (2): 253-267. Kloosterman, R., and J. Rath. 2001. “Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Advanced Economies: Mixed Embeddedness Further Explored.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 27: 189-201. Law, L. 2001. “Home Cooking: Filipino Women and Geographies of the Senses in Hong Kong.” Cultural Geographies 8 (3): 264-283. Law, K. Y., and K. M. Lee. 2013. “Socio-political Embeddings of South Asian Ethnic Minorities’ Economic Situations in Hong Kong.” Journal of Contemporary China 22 (84): 984-1005. Light, I. 2004. “Social Capital’s Unique Accessibility.” Journal of American Planning Association 70 (2): 145-151. —. 2005. “The Ethnic Economy”. In The Handbook of Economic Sociology, edited by N. Smelser and R. Swedberg, 650-677. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Peterson, G. 2012. “The Uneven Development of the International Refugee Regime in Postwar Asia: Evidence from China, Hong Kong and Indonesia”, Journal of Refugee Studies 25 (3): 326-343. Pieterse, J. N. 2003. “Social Capital and Migration: Beyond Ethnic Economies.” Ethnicities 3(1): 29-58. Piper, N. 2005. “Rights of Foreign Domestic Workers – Emergence of Transnational and Transregional Solidarity?” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 14 (1/2): 97-119. Portes, A. 1998. “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology.” Annual Review of Sociology 24: 1-24. —. 2010, Economic Sociology: A Systematic Inquiry. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Sim, A. 2003. “Organising Discontent: NGOs for Southeast Asian Migrant Workers in Hong Kong.” Asian Journal of Social Sciences 31 (3): 478-510. Sim, A. 2007. Women in Transition: Indonesian Domestic Workers in Hong Kong. PhD thesis, University of Hong Kong. —. 2010. “Lesbianism among Indonesian Women Migrants in Hong Kong.” In As Normal as Possible: Negotiating Sexuality and Gender in

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Mainland China and Hong Kong, edited by C. Yau, 37-50. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Tan, C. B. 2011. “Indonesian Chinese in Hong Kong: Re-migration, Reestablishment of Livelihood and Belonging.” Asian Ethnicities 12 (1): 101-119. Waldinger, R. 1986. “Immigrant Enterprise: A Critique and Reformulation.” Theory and Society 15: 249-285. Waldinger, R. et al. 1990. Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Business in Industrial Societies. California: Sage. Wang, C. B. 2006. Huo zai biechu: Xianggang yinni huaren koushu lishi [Life is elsewhere: stories of the Indonesian Chinese in Hong Kong]. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. Zheng Ming. 1978. “Chonggong yao huanying chuguo huaqiao fugui” [Communist China should welcome the return of the overseas Chinese]. Zheng Ming, December, 55-56. Zhou, M. 1992. Chinatown: The Socioeconomic Potential of an Urban Enclave. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. —. 2004. “Revisiting Ethnic Entrepreneurship: Convergencies, Controversies, and Conceptual Advancements.” International Migration Review 38 (3): 1040-1074.

CHAPTER TEN INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES AND HOUSEHOLD WELLBEING IN TAMIL NADU C. VALATHEESWARAN*

Introduction International remittances have become important income sources in the developing world, reaching a magnitude of US$ 401 billion in 2012 and a growth rate of nearly 5.3 percent over the previous year (World Bank 2013). It is now more than three times the amount of official development assistance (ODA) and almost as large as foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries. In particular, it constitutes more than 15 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of many developing countries. India is the largest remittance recipient country in the world, receiving almost U.S.$ 69 billion in 2012, followed by China which received US$ 60 billion. Other important remittance recipient countries include the Philippines (U.S.$ 24 billion) and Mexico (U.S.$ 23 billion). Remittances accounted for 4.5 percent of India’s GDP (World Bank 2013). The Reserve Bank of India (RBI bulletin 2010) indicated that 65 percent of foreign remittances came from unskilled and semi-skilled labourers working in the Gulf countries and skilled labourers working in the software and other information and communication technologies (ICT) related areas in North America during 2008-09. There was a significant increase in remittance inflows from the Gulf countries, while the remittances from North America declined during 2008-09 (when compared to those received in 2006-07). International remittances have reduced India’s reliance on external aid and have provided considerable support to India’s balance of payments (BoP). It has also offset India’s merchandise trade deficit to a large extent, thereby keeping the current account deficit at modest levels since the 1990s (RBI 2006). The state of Kerala receives the highest amount of international

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remittances in India, followed by Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh (Zachariah and Rajan 2010). Among the states of India, Tamil Nadu remains a concern because the state has a long history of international migration and continues to send large numbers of migrants even after the positive transformation of its economy from an agriculture-based economy to an industrial economy over the course of the twentieth century. In the last two decades, there has been a decline in agricultural activities due to a lack of irrigation facilities and monsoon-induced crop failures. Many from rural families have been deprived of income stability and had no choice but to migrate, either to urban areas within the state or abroad, for employment. With the high outflow of labourers, the state received a total of INR 44,416 crore from abroad in 2011, which accounted for nearly 17.3 percent of the total remittances received by the country and 9 percent of the net state domestic product (NSDP). Moreover, the proportion of households receiving international remittances in Tamil Nadu has rapidly increased from 1.1 percent in 1993 to 4.2 percent in 2007-08. The main purpose of this chapter is to explore how international remittances are spent or used by recipient households and their impacts on household expenditure patterns. This study applies the propensity score matching method, which constructs a statistical comparison group based on a model of the probability of remittance receipt (among households with observed characteristics). Remittance receiving households are then matched with non-recipient households on the basis of their probability or propensity score. The average treatment effect of remittance receipt is then calculated as the mean differences in outcomes across these groups. It shows how remittances affect household expenditure patterns. Remittances allow households to overcome the type of liquidity constraints that prevent investment in human and physical capital (Taylor 1999). As a result, households spend remittances on investment goods such as education, healthcare, housing, agriculture, and enterprise (Adams 1998, 2006; de Haas 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006, 2010; Yang 2008; Vogel and Korinek 2012; De and Ratha 2012). This pattern of expenditure can help build human and physical capital in the sending countries which will allow people to break the cycle of poverty and improve the countries’ development prospects. In this regard, remittances can help raise a country’s long-term economic growth potential through higher rates of human capital accumulation.

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Various studies on remittances in India There are a number of studies in India that focus on the macroeconomic determinants of remittances and their effects on the country’s savings, investment, balance of payments, and economic growth (Nayyar 1994; Gupta 2006; Mallick 2010). At the micro level, most studies on remittances in India mainly focus on Kerala. In particular, there have been several studies on the impact of labour flows to Middle East countries and of financial flows (remittances) on the socio-economic and demographic features of the origin households in Kerala (Mathew and Nair 1978; Prakash 1978, 1998; Kurian 1979). In recent years, the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) in Trivandrum has conducted six major migration surveys (1998, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010) in Kerala in order to understand the patterns and magnitude of labour migration from Kerala, the impact of migration on demographic changes, the social cost of migration, remittance inflows, use of remittances, and their impacts on Kerala’s economy and society (Zachariah, Kannan and Rajan 2002; Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan 2001a, 2001b; Zachariah and Rajan 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Pelletier 2011). These studies have found that the major share of the remittances is used for basic subsistence needs. Apart from this, remittance income is also used for constructing new houses, purchasing land or durable goods, and meeting marriage-related expenses. On the other hand, remittance inflows have pushed up the prices of land, construction materials, and consumer goods, as well as the costs of healthcare and education. Overall, remittances play a major role in enhancing quality of life, and reducing poverty and unemployment, and contribute significantly to human development in terms of education and healthcare. Scholars have also attempted to measure total household remittances against the macroeconomic indicators of Kerala’s economy (Kannan and Hari 2002; Zachariah and Rajan 2011; Pushpangadan 2012). Rajan and Zachariah (2011) made a similar observation in the case of Goa. Like Kerala, Goa’s remittances were found to be spent mainly on basic household expenses, with a smaller share used for education, paying back debts, building houses and savings. Using a similar methodology, the Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development (CRRID) in Chandigarh conducted a migration survey in Punjab in 2010 to understand the patterns, processes, and magnitudes of emigration from Punjab, the flows of remittances, and their impacts on the origin households and the Punjabi economy. The results have not yet been published.

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Although Tamil Nadu has been receiving a large amount of remittances from abroad for more than two decades, there is a lack of studies on this state in terms of the uses of remittances and on remittance-receiving households’ expenditure patterns. As such patterns may differ across regions in India (RBI 2010; Tumbe 2011), it should be of scholarly interest to provide more cases for comparison. It is also important to know how household expenditure patterns are affected by the receipt of remittances by comparing international remittance-receiving households and households that do not receive remittances. No systematic study has yet attempted to assesses the impacts of remittances on household expenditure patterns in Tamil Nadu by using the data drawn from India’s National Sample Survey (NSS).1 This study thus tries to fill the research gaps in the existing literature.

Data and methodology The data used in this chapter is drawn from the National Sample Survey Organisation’s (NSSO) 64th round survey on employment, unemployment and migration particulars in 2007-08 (NSSO 2010). This survey collected detailed information on household characteristics, employment status, household monthly consumption expenditure, and migration particulars of household members, as well as on remittances and how this money was used. Remittances are defined as “transfers, either in cash or in kind, during the last 365 days to the households by their former members who had migrated out”.2 Both formal and informal transfers of remittances were considered. This survey remains the most reliable source for migration and remittances data, at state as well as district level, in India. In Tamil Nadu, the survey covered around 7,089 households, of which 5,330 households (75.2%) received no remittances, 1,391 households (19.6%) received internal remittances, and 368 households (5.2%) received international remittances. The survey adopted stratified multi-stage sampling for the selection of the sample units from both rural and urban areas of all districts in Tamil Nadu. To assess the impacts of remittances on household expenditure patterns, I first applied a t-test to the differences in unconditional means on the outcome measures (i.e., five expenditure categories) for remittancereceiving and non-remittance-receiving households. This provides an initial sense of the magnitude of the raw group differences between the two groups of households. However, an unconditional comparison does not indicate whether remittances have a causal impact because differences in the group may reflect group differences in variables that jointly affect

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the receipt of remittances and the outcomes. This is possible because having an out-migrant in a family is strongly associated with remittance receipt and is likely associated with household expenditure. The selection of remittance-receiving households poses challenges for identifying the economic effects of remittance receipt if remittancereceiving households differ systematically from non-remittance-receiving households regarding observable and unobservable aspects. For instance, households receiving remittances may be wealthier, have more human capital, or have more working-age members than those who do not receive remittances. These variables, in turn, probably affect expenditure and receipt of remittances. Therefore, they cannot be treated as a random sample. The non-random selection of households may lead to biased estimates of the economic effect of remittance receipt. There are multiple ways to correct this non-random selection, including difference-indifference (DID) estimation, an instrumental variable (IV) approach, or propensity score matching (PSM). A series of instrumental variables has been used in previous studies on migration and remittances, including distance to railroad lines, historical migration rates, changes in rainfall patterns, employment creation rates in labour-receiving countries, financial crises, average income of the remitter’s place of residence, and access to financial institutions through which remittances are transferred (Woodruff and Zenteno 2007; Mckenzie and Rapoport 2007; Yang 2008; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010). The NSS 64th survey has not included any strong instrumental variables and using a poor instrumental approach would generate substantially more biased results (Mckenzie et al. 2006). A better way is to use difference-indifference (DID) estimation to analyse the impact of remittances on a household’s expenditure patterns. This compares the changes in outcomes over time between remittance-receiving households (the treatment group) and non-recipient households (the comparison group). Yet, due to the absence of panel data, this approach is not possible. As a result, this study uses the PSM approach, first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), to account for non-randomness in remittance receipt. The main purpose of using PSM is to quantify the average effect of remittances by matching remittance-receiving households (treatment group) with households with similar characteristics that do not receive remittances (comparison group). In this study, the remittance receipt indicator D holds the value one for households receiving remittances, and zero otherwise. Y1 and Y0 are the outcome variables of the remittance-receiving households and nonrecipient households. The average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) can be estimated as follows:

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ATT = E [Y1 / D = 1, P (X)] – E [Y0 / D = 0, P (X)]

(1)

X is a vector of variables that characterise differences between the two groups of households and explains variation in economic outcomes. The PSM approach first involves estimating a probit regression, explaining the receipt of remittances by observed socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. The propensity scores (defined as the probability of remittance receipt for each household conditional to the characteristics included in the model) are deduced from this model. These probabilities, or propensity scores, are used to match remittance-receiving households with non-recipient households sharing similar propensity scores. Calculating this effect is not straightforward since the propensity score is a continuous variable. To overcome this problem, four different matching methods have been proposed by Becker and Ichino (2002). This study uses Kernel matching. In this matching, all remittance-receiving households are matched with a weighted average of all non-recipient households with a weight inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of the remittance-recipient and non-recipient households. Compared with other matching procedures, Kernel matching makes maximum use of the information in the survey. Analytical standard errors cannot be computed with Kernel matching. Therefore, I have calculated bootstrapped standard errors.

The use of remittances The issue of how remittances are utilised by the receiving households is a widely debated topic. On the one hand, empirical evidence from developing countries shows that remittance-receiving households spend a higher share of remittance earnings on basic consumption needs, with little positive impact on the local economies (Durand et al. 1996; Koc and Onan 2004). On the other hand, people spend a significant amount of remittances on education, healthcare, housing, agriculture and private enterprise (Taylor et al. 2003; de Haas 2006; De and Ratha 2012; Zachariah and Rajan 2012). This pattern of expenditure may help to build human capital in developing countries. Generally, a household may use the remittances for several purposes. Table 12.1 below provides information on households’ three most common uses of remittances according to the amount spent. Six major uses were identified. When the pattern of use of remittances in Tamil Nadu was considered, in line with the existing literature, it was found that households primarily spent remittances on food (45.4%) and debt

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repayment (30.7%). In particular, rural households (44.3%) were found to be much more likely to use remittances for debt repayment than urban households (7.3%). The debt could be incurred as a result of the high transaction cost of international migration, due to the involvement of unregistered recruitment agents in the migration process. After this, households had mainly used the remittances on developing human capital (20.5 percent for education and 14.4 percent for healthcare). Of these, female-headed households (30%) spend a higher share of their remittances on education than male-headed households (10.5%). However, both male- and female-headed households spend more on boys’ than girls’ education.3 Girls marry at an early age, and then move to their husband’s home. After that, she can no longer provide financial support to her natal family as her income will be controlled by her husband. Households choose to invest in boys’ education as boys are expected to financially support the family after finishing their education and acquire better remunerated jobs owing to such education. Overall, the investment in human capital will improve the development prospects of the country. The next important use of remittances was savings and investment (25%). As expected, more urban households (43%) used remittances mainly for savings and investment purposes than rural households (13%). This finding differs from other states such as Kerala where a large proportion of remittances were used for buying land and in the construction of buildings (Zachariah and Rajan 2011; Reshmi and Unisa 2013). In Orissa state, there was a greater use of remittances for marriage and ceremonial expenses as well as towards improving housing conditions. Remittances were mostly used on education in most of the north-eastern states, while they were mainly used for savings and investment in Goa and most of the Union Territories (UTs) (Tumbe 2011; Rajan and Zachariah 2011). The pattern of remittance utilisation varies along with the economic status of the remittance-receiving households. Richer households are expected to invest the remittance income in various forms of enterprise, while poorer households are expected to give priority to satisfying their basic consumption needs (Koc and Onan 2004). By using the quintiles method,4 it was found that poor households primarily used remittances for debt repayment (54.6%), which was the cost of migration. Middle-income households used remittances for food consumption. After this, a significant proportion of households in both the poor (37%) and middle-income (35%) sectors used remittances for education and healthcare. In contrast, rich households reported a higher utilisation of remittances for savings and investment purposes, i.e. they diversified their remittance income to

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acquire various physical assets. This finding indicated that remittances helped finance education and health expenditure of low- and middleincome households to a greater extent than those of the high-income group. Table 12-1: Uses of international remittances In percentage

Uses of remittances First use 45.4

Second use 20.0

Third use 8.5

Education Healthcare Debt repayment

0.3 4.6 30.7

20.5 14.4 4.8

14.0 16.3 8.8

Savings/Investment Other items of household expenditure Total Source: Compiled from NSSO (2010).

10.5

20.6

25.0

8.5

19.7

27.4

100.0

100.0

100.0

Food items

The pattern of remittance utilisation across social groups revealed a higher reported use of remittances towards debt repayment and food consumption by the Scheduled Caste (SC) group,5 while the “backward” classes (OBC) and other social groups showed a diversified pattern of spending their remittance earnings on education, healthcare, and household durable goods. Apart from this, the use of remittances differed across regions.6 Households receiving remittances in the south primarily spent more remittances on debt repayment (45.8%) than those in other regions in the state. In the southern and coastal regions, there was higher reportage of the use of remittances towards education. The north coastal region showed a high proportion of remittances used for savings and investment, while the inland region used a high amount of remittances for healthcare expenses. The length of stay abroad has also had a positive effect on the amount and frequency of remittances to origin countries. However, studies have argued that remittances decline along with the length of stay abroad as a result of greater social distance between migrants and the home country; such a distance leads to a decline in altruistic concern (Dustmann and Metres 2010; Collier et al. 2011). This argument can be further supported by cases of “permanent migration”, in which a migrant’s social ties with the country of origin tend to decline. Furthermore, permanent migrants

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may receive less family pressure as they are better educated and more likely to come from wealthy households. Therefore, permanent migrants tend to remit less after the repayment of the loan supporting the migration cost and education. On the other hand, the remittance inflow is more likely to increase when the temporary migrant is staying abroad for a longer time (Stark 1991; Mahuteau et al. 2010). This study supports these arguments. It has found that migrants send remittances home less frequently during the first three years. However, they send a greater amount of remittances to their family once they have stayed abroad for a longer duration. The experience and skills gained overseas allowed migrants to earn more and remit more frequently. Furthermore, temporary migrants maintained stronger ties with the family left behind; this also increased the likelihood of sending remittances more frequently. This study has also analysed the remittance-use pattern against the duration of staying abroad. Remittance-use patterns significantly differ according to duration of stay. Remittances were predominantly utilised to repay debt and for food consumption during the first three years. Thereafter, the remittance-use patterns gradually changed. Remittances were spent on education and healthcare when the migrant had stayed abroad for a longer period. In urban areas, a greater share of remittances was used for savings and investment purposes. To sum up, remittances have contributed significantly to investment in human capital, which can in turn have a substantial impact on economic development.

Recipient and non-recipient households This section compares the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of households receiving remittances and households not receiving remittances (see Appendix Table A-1). Remittance-receiving households are much less likely to have a male household head and adult male members at home because most migrants are males. Remittance-receiving households are also typically smaller in household size and are less likely to have young children. At the same time, compared with households not receiving remittances, remittance-receiving households have more female-headed households, household heads that are older, and more elderly members. This shows that there is high dependency on the income from remittances in the receiving households. The educational status of the heads of remittance-receiving households tends to be higher than that of non-recipient household heads. While household heads in non-recipient households are more likely to be employed in agricultural and fishery-related sectors, remittance-

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recipient household heads are most likely to work in home gardening and growing crops, and the difference is statistically significant. Households receiving remittances tend to receive less locally earned wages than nonrecipient households, showing the shortage of working-age males in those households. Remittance-receiving households received an average of INR 62,554 in the 12 months prior to the survey. They are wealthier in terms of consumption quintiles and have mostly settled in urban areas. Comparing remittance-recipient households across regions in the state, this study also finds that a greater number of remittance-receiving households live in the coastal region (which has a higher migration incidence rate; 34 percent of households have an emigrant member).

Household expenditure patterns Table 12-2: Average budget shares of sample households Expenditure Category

International RRH Mean

SD

Non RRH Mean

diff.

SD

Consumption

0.745

0.153

0.785

0.149

-0.040***

Healthcare

0.075

0.093

0.051

0.084

0.024***

Education

0.079

0.097

0.071

0.098

0.007

House rent

0.058

0.102

0.070

0.108

-0.012**

Durables

0.042

0.055

0.028

0.045

0.013***

*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% Source: Compiled from NSSO (2010).

Table 12-2 presents the share of household budget of five expenditure categories for households receiving international remittances and households that do not receive remittances. The major component of the mean budget is consumption of goods: remittance-receiving households (74%) tend to spend less than non-recipient households (78%). International remittance-receiving households, on the other hand, spend relatively more on the education of household members, healthcare, and durable household goods. Thus, we can see that expenditure on healthcare and durable household goods tends to increase significantly with the receipt of remittances. This result may suggest that migration and remittances act as coping strategies to mitigate health risks and to develop

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physical capital in the state. Overall, the data has provided support for the optimistic view that remittances are spent on investment goods rather than merely on basic consumption.

Determinants of receipt of remittances The study estimates a probit model to evaluate the determinants of remittance receipt. The model includes the following variables: household composition (household size, number of children less than six years of age, number of boys between 7-18 years old, number of girls between 7-18 years old, number of adult males between 19-59 years old, number of adult females between 19-59 years old and number of elderly persons 60 years old or above); socioeconomic characteristics (age of household head, whether household head is currently married, female household head, occupation of household head, educational status of household head, dummy variable omitting illiterate household head, land ownership of household, and whether the household head is of the OBC or SC caste group); and regional dummy variable (households are in urban areas and regional dummy variables omitting the north coastal region dummy variable). The regional variables facilitate a within-state comparison of the probability of receiving remittances. Table 12-3 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors from the probit model. The results support the insurance and self-interest motives to remit. If the number of children less than six years old, number of adult females, married household head, and female headed households are considered liability factors, then a positive coefficient on these variables and a negative coefficient on adult males in the regression are consistent with the insurance motive to remit. However, the number of boys and number of elderly persons do not significantly influence the receipt of remittances. By observing household-owned land, the data show that households owning more land tend to receive more remittances than households with less land. This provides evidence for the self-interest or bequest motives to remit (Hoddinott 1994). Household members may be more inclined to send remittances to wealthier households as a form of investment in their future, such as receiving an inheritance. Comparing educated household heads with illiterate household heads, the educated household head has a significant impact on the receipt of remittances. Geographic location is also an important factor determining the receipt of remittances. Urban households receive proportionally more remittances than rural households. Furthermore, households living in coastal regions tend to receive more remittances than households in other regions. Coastal

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regions have experienced high out-migration for the past two decades; one pushing factor for migration was agricultural failure resulting from insufficient irrigation facilities. The out-migrants send remittances back to their families to relieve their financial constraints. Table 12-3: Determinants of remittances receipt (household level)

Constant

Coefficient -4.935***

Std. Err. 0.333

Household size

0.033

0.030

Number of children less than 6 years

0.230**

0.091

Number of boys 7-18 years

-0.101

0.083

Number of girls 7-18 years

-0.172**

0.087

Adult males 19-59 years

-0.662***

0.096

Adult females 19-59 years

0.427***

0.120

Elderly persons greater than 60 years

-0.124

0.087

Characteristics of household head Age

0.025***

0.004

Married

1.592***

0.128

Female household head

1.731***

0.127

Occupation Agricultural, fishery and related labourers

-0.088

0.107

Market gardeners and crop growers

0.125

0.123

Primary

0.297***

0.092

Secondary

0.283***

0.099

Higher secondary

0.323**

0.157

Graduate

0.567***

0.128

Diploma

0.482**

0.193

Educational status

Land possessed 0.005-0.01 hectare

0.306***

0.087

0.02-0.20 hectare

0.378***

0.103

Greater than 0.21 hectare

0.573***

0.118

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223

Regions Coastal

0.223***

0.084

Southern

0.044

0.081

Inland

-0.204

0.099

Urban areas

0.261***

0.075

OBC

-0.224**

0.107

SC

-0.642***

0.144

Number of observations

5698

LR chi2(26)

732.15

Prob > chi2

0.000

Pseudo R2 0.268 *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1% Source: NSSO (2010).

Impacts of remittances on household expenditure patterns The impact of remittances on household expenditure patterns in Tamil Nadu is evident from the unconditional differences in mean outcomes across remittance-receiving households and non-recipient households, and from the estimated average treatment effect for the treated group based on the Kernel matching method. Table 12-4 shows that remittances tend to increase total household expenditure on consumption, education, healthcare, and durable goods. The ATTs are statistically significant at 1 percent. At the same time, remittances do not affect spending on house rent. This study has observed similar findings among urban households, while remittances only have a significant impact on consumption and durable goods in rural households. When differentiating the impact of remittances on household expenditure patterns by gender of the household head, this study found that remittances are more likely to increase educational expenditure in female-headed households (at 5 percent significance level) than male-headed households (at 10 percent significance level) (Table 12-5). On the other hand, remittances tend to increase spending on durable household goods more significantly in maleheaded households than female-headed households. Concerning the average effect of remittance receipt on household expenditure patterns by regions in the state, this study found that remittances tend to increase the share of household expenditure devoted to house rent in the north coastal region and to durable goods in the coastal

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Table 12-4: Effects of remittance receipt on household expenditure patterns of rural and urban households Expenditure category Consumption Healthcare Education House rent Durables Total

Total

Rural

ATT

SE

0.315*** (5512) 0.425*** (5512) 0.411*** (5512) 0.041 (5512) 0.547*** (5512) 0.339*** (5512)

0.036 0.069 0.101 0.152 0.087 0.037

ATT 0.179*** (2759) 0.286 (2759) 0.090 (2759) 0.011 (2759) 0.420*** (2759) 0.195*** (2759)

Urban SE

0.054 0.181 0.233 0.155 0.152 0.053

ATT

SE

0.334*** (2333) 0.460*** (2333) 0.450*** (2333) -0.127 (2333) 0.489*** (2333) 0.344*** (2333)

0.038 0.135 0.143 0.154 0.162 0.052

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors reported with 50 replications. Number of observations is reported in parentheses below the ATT. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Source: NSSO (2010).

Table 12-5: Effect of remittance receipt on household expenditure patterns with male and female household heads FHH Expenditure category Consumption Healthcare Education House rent Durables Total

ATT 0.288*** (789) 0.460*** (789) 0.471** (789) 0.352 (789) 0.393* (789) 0.341*** (789)

SE 0.069 0.147 0.232 0.348 0.226 0.085

MHH ATT 0.300*** (4482) 0.443*** (4482) 0.230* (4482) 0.027 (4482) 0.643*** (4482) 0.302*** (4482)

SE 0.033 0.102 0.140 0.127 0.121 0.036

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors reported with 50 replications. Number of observations is reported in parentheses below the ATT. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% Source: NSSO (2010).

region, whereas remittance receipt has a statistically significant impact on expenditure on healthcare in the southern and inland regions (see

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Appendix Table A-2). Overall, remittances help to improve infrastructure and standard of living by increasing household expenditure. In particular, it improves human capital through more spending on education and healthcare, and diminishes the probability of poor health among household members.

Robustness check of ATT There are several ways to check the robustness of the findings. One such way is to apply direct nearest-neighbour matching (nnmatch) (instead of estimating the propensity score equation). The findings are assumed to be more reliable if both methods provide similar results. Using the nnmatch method, this study found that the results of ATT were the same in terms of significance for all the total expenditure categories as the results of the Kernel matching estimate. This suggests that the ATT results based on the Kernel matching method are consistent. Table 12-6: Robustness check International RRH

nnmatch Std. Err. 0.033

Kernel Matching Coeff. SE 0.315*** 0.036

Consumption

Coeff. 0.270***

Healthcare

0.477***

0.101

0.425***

0.069

Education

0.421***

0.145

0.411***

0.101

House rent

0.010

0.130

0.041

0.152

Durables

0.508***

0.122

0.547***

0.087

Total

0.272***

0.038

0.339***

0.037

*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1% Source: NSSO (2010).

Conclusion This study has made use of nationally representative household survey data from Tamil Nadu to analyse the uses of remittances by receiving households and how remittances have affected household expenditure patterns by comparing households receiving international remittances and those not receiving remittances. The chapter has explained that migrant households in Tamil Nadu primarily used remittances for food consumption and debt repayment. Thereafter, they spent on matters that

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contributed to human development (i.e., education and healthcare), and savings and investment. However, the high utilisation of remittances on debt repayment by receiving households is indicative of the high cost of migration (such as payments to middlemen). The fact that remittance-receiving households are not likely to invest overseas earnings into entrepreneurial activities is an issue of concern, since this typically leads to circular or repeated migration – returnmigrants migrating (both locally or internationally) again for employment. On a more positive note, this study has found that remittance receipt tends to increase the share of household expenditure on healthcare, education and durable goods. Such results lend support to views linking migration to development and agree with the growing literature that sees remittance receipt as useful for improving physical and human capital accumulation in developing countries (Adams 1998; Edwards and Ureta 2003; Yang 2008; Quisumbing and McNiven 2010). Having said that, the author should stress that it is still necessary to further investigate both the positive and negative impacts of remittances, especially concerning the extent to which remittances have contributed to educational attainment and the acquisition of healthcare, and how these will affect migrant migration patterns in the long term.

Notes * This chapter is based on the author’s ongoing PhD research entitled, “International Migration, Remittances and Human Development: An Empirical Study from the Indian State of Tamil Nadu” under the guidance of Prof. S. Irudaya Rajan at Centre for Development Studies (CDS) in Trivandrum. 1. Prior to this survey, there was no data available on the amount of remittances received and used across the states of India. The NSS included details on remittances for the first time in the 64th survey on employment, unemployment, and migration particulars in 2007-08. 2. An “out-migrant” is defined as any member of a household who has left the household at any time in the past to stay outside the village/town, provided he/she is alive at the time of the survey. 3. In female-headed households, nearly 50 percent and 42 percent of households used remittances for boys’ and girls’ education respectively. On the other hand, among the female-headed households, nearly 36.5 percent of households used remittances for boys’ education and 11.2 percent of households used them for girls’ education. 4. This is a useful method for analysing the use of remittances by different income groups. To derive the quintiles, households were sorted by expenditures from the lowest to the highest. The study uses household expenditure data as a proxy for household income data, because the NSS 64th round survey does not provide

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monthly household income data. Households are then divided into five equal groups referred to as quintiles. Each of the quintiles represents 20 percent of households. The lowest group in the ranking is the first quintile (the first 20 percent), the second group is referred to the second quintile (the second 20 percent) and so forth. The highest group in the ranking is the fifth quintile (the final 20 percent). The first and fifth quintiles could be used as proxies for the “poor” and the “rich” respectively. 5. The SC group is a disadvantaged people who are given special recognition in the Constitution of India. They comprised 19 percent of the state’s population in 2001. 6. The survey has classified the states into four major regions: (1) the north coastal region, which has the highest poverty level in the state, comprising Thiruvallur, Chennai, Kancheepuram, Vellore, Tiruvannamalai, Villupuram, and Cuddalore districts; (2) the coastal region, the rice bowl of the state, comprising Karur, Tiruchirappalli, Perambalur, Ariyalur, Thiruvarur, Thanjavur, Nagapattinam, and Pudukkottai districts; (3) the southern region, which is a region with low rainfall, consisting of Madurai, Dindigul, Virudhunagar, Tirunelveli, Kanniyakumari, Thoothukudi, Ramanathapuram, Theni, and Sivagangai districts; and (4) the inland region, which includes Coimbatore, Erode, The Nilgiris, Salem, Dharmapuri, and Namakkal districts.

References Adams, R. H. 1998. “Remittances, Investment, and Rural Asset Accumulation in Pakistan.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 47 (1): 155-173. —. 2006. “Remittances and Poverty in Ghana.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3838. Washington, DC: World Bank. Adams, R. H. Jr, and A. Cuecuecha. 2010. “Remittances, Household Expenditure and Investment in Guatemala.” World Development 20 (10): 1-16. Amuedo-Dorantes, C., and S. Pozo. 2006. “Remittance Receipt and Business Ownership in the Dominican Republic.” The World Economy 29 (7): 939-956. Amuedo-Dorantes, C., and S. Pozo. 2010. “Accounting for Remittance and Migration Eơects on Children’s Schooling.” World Development 38(12): 1747-759. Becker, S. O., and A. Ichino. 2002. “Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Based on Propensity Score.” The State Journal 2 (4): 358-377. Collier, W., M. Piracha, and T. Randazzo. 2011. “Remittances and Return Migration.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 6091. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.

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de Haas, H. 2006. “Migration, Remittances and Regional Development in Southern Morocco.” Geoforum 37: 565-580. De, P. K., and D. Ratha. 2012. “Impact of Remittances on Household Income, Asset and Human Capital: Evidence from Sri Lanka.” Migration and Development 1 (1): 163-179. Durand, J., W. Kandel, E. A. Parrado, and D. S. Massey. 1996. “International Migration and Development in Mexican Communities.” Demography 33 (2): 249-264. Dustmann, C., and J. Metres. 2010. “Remittances and Temporary Migration.” Journal of Development Economics 92: 62-70. Edwards, C. A., and M. Ureta. 2003. “International Migration, Remittances, and Schooling: Evidence from El Salvador.” Journal of Development Economics 72: 429-461. Gupta, P. 2006. “Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances: Evidence from India.” Economic and Political Weekly 41 (26): 2769-2775. Hoddinott, J. 1994. “A Model of Migration and Remittances Applied to Western Kenya.” Oxford Economic Papers 46: 459-476. Kannan, K. P., and K. S. Hari. 2002. “Kerala’s Gulf Connection: Emigration, Remittances and their Macroeconomic Impact 19722000.” Working Paper No. 328. Thiruvananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies. Koc, I., and I. Onan. 2004. “International Migrants Remittances and Welfare Status of the Left-Behind Families in Turkey.” International Migration Review 38 (1): 78-112. Kurian, R. 1979. “Patterns of Emigration from Kerala.” Social Scientist 7 (6): 32-53. Mahuteau S., M. Piracha, and M. Tani. 2010. “Selection Policy and Immigrants’ Remittance Behaviour.” IZA Discussion Papers No. 4874. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. Mallick, H. 2010. “Remittances, Consumption, Investment and Economic Growth.” In India Migration Report 2010: Governance and Labour Migration, edited by S. I. Rajan. New Delhi: Routledge. Mathew, E. T., and P. R. G. Nair. 1978. “Socioeconomic Characteristics of Emigrants and Emigrant Households: A Case Study of Two Villages in Kerala.” Economic and Political Weekly 13 (28): 1141-1153. Mckenzie, D., and H. Rapoport. 2007. “Network Effects and the Dynamics of Migration and Inequality: Theory and Evidence from Mexico.” Journal of Development Economics 84: 1-24. McKenzie, D., J. Gibson, and S. Stillman. 2006. “How Important Is Selection? Experimental Versus Non-experimental Measures of the

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Income Gains from Migration.” Policy Research Working Paper 3906. Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group. Nayyar, D. 1994. Migration, Remittances and Capital Flows: The Indian Experience. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. NSSO. 2010. Unit level data of the 64th Round (2007-08) NSS survey on Employment, Unemployment and Migration Particulars. New Delhi: India National Sample Survey Organisation. Pelletier, A. 2011. “Household Remittances, Inequality and Poverty: Evidence from the State of Kerala.” In Dynamics of Indian Migration: Historical and Cultural Perspectives, edited by S. I. Rajan and M. Percot. New Delhi: Routledge. Prakash, B. A. 1978. “Impact of Foreign Remittances: A Case Study of Chavakkad Village in Kerala.” Economic and Political Weekly 13 (27): 1107-1111. Prakash, B. A. 1998. “Gulf Migration and its Economic Impact: The Kerala Experience.” Economic and Political Weekly 33 (50): 3209-3213. Pushpangadan, K. 2012. “Analytics of Migration and Growth: Exploring Kerala’s Economic Performance.” In Growth, Development and Diversity, edited by K. Pushpangadan and V. N. Balasubramanyam. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Quisumbing, A., and S. McNiven. 2010. “Moving Forward, Looking Back: The Impact of Migration and Remittances on Assets, Consumption, and Credit Constraints in the Rural Philippines.” The Journal of Development Studies 46 (1): 91-113. Rajan, S. I., and K. C. Zachariah. 2011. “Impact of Emigration and Remittances on the Goan Economy.” In India Migration Report 2011: Migration, Identity and Conflict, edited by S. I. Rajan. New Delhi: Routledge. Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 2010. “Remittances from Overseas Indians: Modes of Transfer, Transaction Cost and Time Taken.” Mumbai: RBI. —. 2006. “Invisibles in India’s Balance of Payments.” Monthly Bulletin, November. Mumbai: RBI. Reshmi, R. S., and S. Unisa. 2013. “Economic Impact of Migration on the Family: The Case of International Female Labour Migration.” In India Migration Report 2013: Social cost of migration, edited by S. I. Rajan. New Delhi: Routledge. Rosenbaum, P. R., and D. B. Rubin. 1983. “The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects.” Biometrika 70 (1): 41-55.

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Stark, O. 1991. “Migration in LDCs: Risk, Remittances, and the Family.” Finance and Development 28 (4): 39-41. Taylor, J. E. 1999. “The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the Migration Process.” International Migration 37 (1): 63-88. Taylor, J. E., S. Rozelle, and A. de Brauw. 2003. “Migration and Incomes in Source Communities: A New Economics of Migration Perspective from China.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 52 (1): 75-101. Tumbe, C. 2011. “Remittances in India: Facts and Issues.” The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 54 (2): 479-501. Vogel, A., and K. Korinek. 2012. “Passing by the Girls? Remittance Allocation for Educational Expenditures and Social Inequality in Nepal’s Households 2003-2004.” International Migration Review 46 (1): 61-100. Woodruff, C., and R. Zenteno. 2007. “Migration Networks and Microenterprises in Mexico.” Journal of Development Economics 82 (2): 509-528. World Bank. 2013. Migration and Development Brief 20. Washington, DC: World Bank. Yang, D. 2008. “International Migration, Remittances and Household Investment: Evidence from Philippine Migrant’s Exchange Rate Shocks.” The Economic Journal 118 (528): 591-630. Zachariah, K. C., K. P. Kannan, and S. I. Rajan. 2002. Kerala’s Gulf Connection: CDS Studies on International Labour Migration from Kerala State in India. Trivandrum: Centre for Development Studies. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew, and S. I. Rajan. 2001a. “Impact of Migration on Kerala’s Economy and Society.” International Migration 39 (1): 63-87. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew, and S. I. Rajan. 2001b. “Social, Economic and Demographic consequences of Migration on Kerala.” International Migration 39 (2): 43-71. Zachariah, K. C., and S. I. Rajan. 2007. “Migration, Remittances and Employment: Short Term Trends and Long Term Implications.” Working Paper No. 395. Trivandrum: Centre for Development Studies. Zachariah, K. C., and S. I. Rajan. 2009. Migration and Development: The Kerala Experience. New Delhi: Daanish Books. Zachariah, K. C., and S. I. Rajan. 2010. “Migration Monitoring Study, 2008 Emigration and Remittances in the Context of Surge in Oil Prices.” Working Paper No. 424. Thiruvananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies.

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Zachariah, K. C., and S. I. Rajan. 2011. “Impact of Remittances of Nonresident Keralites on Kerala’s Economy and Society.” The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 54 (3): 503-526. Zachariah, K. C., and S. I. Rajan. 2012. Kerala’s Gulf Connection, 1998-2011: Economic and Social Impact of Migration. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

Appendix

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Household size  Number of children < 6 yrs old  Number of boys 7-18 yrs old Number of girls 7-18 yrs old Adult males 19-59 yrs old Adult females 19-59 yrs old Elderly population > 60 yrs old Age of household head Male headed households Female headed households Household head married  Educational status of household head  Illiterate Primary Secondary Higher secondary Graduate Diploma Occupational status of household head  Market gardeners and crop growers

Main variables

0.352

0.144

0.082

0.253 0.307 0.285 0.047 0.079 0.025

0.382 0.457 0.455 0.232 0.352 0.178

0.177 0.296 0.291 0.057 0.144 0.033

0.275

0.435 0.461 0.451 0.212 0.269 0.155

Non recipient Mean SD 3.626 1.694 0.250 0.433 0.289 0.453 0.268 0.443 0.828 0.377 0.862 0.345 0.296 0.457 46.625 13.442 0.848 0.359 0.152 0.359 0.790 0.407

International RRH Mean SD 3.543 1.662 0.321 0.467 0.242 0.429 0.226 0.419 0.476 0.500 0.899 0.301 0.438 0.497 50.856 13.764 0.584 0.494 0.416 0.494 0.851 0.357

Table A-1 Descriptive statistics by remittance recipient and non-recipient households

232

0.062***

-0.077*** -0.011 0.006 0.010 0.065*** 0.008

-0.082 0.071*** -0.047* -0.043* -0.353*** 0.038** 0.141*** 4.231*** -0.082*** -0.054*** 0.061***

Diff.

Agricultural and fishery related labourers 0.087 Sector Rural 0.427 Urban 0.573 Land possessed (in hectares) Less than 0.005 0.182 0.005-0.01 0.361 0.02-0.20 0.198 Greater than 0.21 0.258 Social group ST 0.000 SC 0.068 OBC 0.813 Others 0.120 Regions Coastal Northern 0.280 Coastal 0.315 Southern 0.283 Inland 0.122 Monthly remittances income 5008.7 Monthly wage/salary income 2884.7 Monthly household expenditure 5272.6 MPCE 1742.1 Household receive wage/salary income 0.334 *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1% Source: Compiled from NSSO (2010). 0.461 0.399 0.435 0.427 5698.8 2663.6 876.2 0.463

0.370 0.341 0.136 0.154 0.008 0.215 0.722 0.063 0.307 0.199 0.254 0.240 3752.1 3479.3 1078.2 0.689

0.386 0.481 0.399 0.438 0.000 0.252 0.391 0.325 0.450 0.465 0.451 0.328 6162.3 7726.2 3880.2 1714.3 0.472

0.089 0.411 0.448 0.244

0.483 0.474 0.342 0.361

0.500 0.500

0.499 0.501

0.495 0.495

0.391

0.188

0.282

International Remittances and Household Wellbeing in Tamil Nadu

-867.4*** 1793.3*** 663.9*** -0.355***

-0.027 0.116*** 0.029 -0.118***

-0.008* -0.147*** 0.091*** 0.056***

-0.188 *** 0.021 0.063*** 0.104***

-0.073*** 0.073***

-0.101***

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Coastal Northern

Coastal

Southern

Inland

Consumption

ATT SE ATT SE ATT SE ATT SE 0.316*** 0.076 0.184*** 0.062 0.262** 0.110 0.255 0.160 (1588) (1018) (1442) (525) Healthcare 0.176 0.215 0.411** 0.180 0.540** 0.235 0.584** 0.283 (1588) (1018) (1442) (525) Education 0.326 0.216 0.306 0.213 0.391 0.283 0.436 0.463 (1588) (1018) (1442) (525) House rent 0.487** 0.248 -0.008 0.310 -0.498 0.386 -0.478 0.409 (1588) (1018) (1442) (525) Durables 0.383* 0.196 0.447** 0.175 0.409 0.313 0.283 0.373 (1588) (1018) (1442) (525) Total 0.315*** 0.091 0.218** 0.085 0.264*** 0.084 0.283 0.183 (1588) (1018) (1442) (525) Note: Bootstrapped standard errors reported with 50 replications. Number of observations is reported in parentheses below the ATT. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1% Source: NSSO (2010).

Expenditure category

Table A-2 Effect of remittance receipt on household expenditure patterns by regions

234

CHAPTER ELEVEN FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG FOREIGN DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG AND SINGAPORE NGUYEN NHU HA

Introduction Labour migration has been a livelihood strategy for many people from developing countries. The number of women workers leaving their homes to look for improved job opportunities has been on the rise since the 1980s, leading to a phenomenon referred to by many as the “feminisation of migration” (Chang and Ling 2000; Pettman 2003; Sassen 2000). In Asia, this phenomenon is predominantly represented by the large number of female migrants who work primarily in low-skilled and low-paid job sectors, such as domestic workers and entertainers. Asia now has the highest total number of domestic workers in the world (UN Women 2013). Among countries receiving foreign domestic workers, Singapore and Hong Kong are the main destinations, while the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka are the principal sending countries (Kaur 2007). Among all possible reasons, earning higher wages is the basic factor that pushes millions of women to leave home to find work. With the enhanced income available from overseas work, many migrant women have contributed to the remittance economy of their home countries, representing a significant source of income for both their families and the national economy. While both male and female migrants remit part of their earnings back home, female migrants tend to send a higher proportion of their income than men (Osaki 1999; World Bank 2010). In many migrant-sending countries, female migration is considered “a short-term means of generating foreign funds for the country” as well as a solution to underemployment and unemployment in the home countries (Huang et al. 2004: 336-339). Yet, in reality, female migration has become

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a long-term livelihood strategy enabling many poor households to secure income security, and to transit from “subsistence” and agriculture production to more sophisticated business production. Migration for work is also making it possible for many poor households to invest in developing human capital (Huguet 2003). However, there are growing concerns about the misuse of remittances and problematic financial management among female labour migrants and their families. Some attribute such problems to barriers in accessing formal remittance channels (such as banks) due to the migrants’ limited rest-days (usually Sundays), lack of valid documents, and the disincentive for commercial banks to attract foreign domestic worker (FDW) clients (Ramírez et al. 2005). Some, on the other hand, argue that many migrant workers lack the basic literacy necessary to manage their own finances. They are thus incapable of making informed choices concerning the financing of migration costs and savings. Moreover, being women, they are often marginalised in family decision-making processes relating to the use of remittances (ILO 2011). Financial literacy refers to “the ability to read, analyse, manage, and communicate about the personal financial conditions that affect material wellbeing” (Mavrinac and Chin 2004: 11). Without a greater understanding of the actual conditions and ways in which they manage their hard-earned money, it is difficult to assess whether migration can really offer a sustainable livelihood for migrant women and their families, and enhance their economic status in the long term. This chapter seeks to examine this phenomenon through cases from Hong Kong and Singapore, both of which are major destinations of FDW migrants in Asia. In both places, there are different organisations offering a wide range of finance-training programmes and workshops for FDWs from different countries. Based on data obtained from a five-month fieldwork exercise at an NGO offering financial literacy programmes in Singapore, and research on Indonesian FDWs in Hong Kong,1 this chapter will examine how FDWs respond to financial literacy education, and different perspectives on the actual effects of such training. It also calls for increased research into this emerging area of “migration economics”.

Remittance economy and female migration in Asia Globally, around 105 million migrants are women, which is about half of the total number of migrants (WIDE 2010). In the East Asia and Pacific region, an increasing number of international migrants are females, outnumbering male migrants by one million in 2013 (World Bank 2014:

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12). Many studies have also showed that female migrant workers are major remittance senders to their home country. They earn less than men but save more and send more frequently (World Bank 2010, Ramírez et al. 2005). Remittances to developing countries reached US$435 billion in 2014 and a further rise to US$454 billion is projected for 2015. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines (US$28 billion) is the top recipient of officially recorded remittances, followed by Vietnam (US$11.4 billion), and Indonesia (US$8.4 billion) (World Bank 2014). Yet, the actual amount of remittances is probably higher than official records show because a large unknown proportion of remittance monies are transmitted through private, unrecorded channels (Adam et al. 2005; Huguet 2003). As previously stated, female migrant workers remit a large portion of their income back home and their contribution plays an important role in the economy of the home country. International remittances were three times larger than Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2013 and significantly exceeded Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows to developing countries (World Bank 2014). Despite the increasing discussions about the relationship between migrant remittances and economic growth, there is no fixed view on whether remittances bring positive results in the home country. What is even less certain is whether the remittances economy is sustainable. Ebeke (2012) has suggested the problem of “moral hazard” and the negative consequences of remittance flows in reducing public spending on education and health. On the other hand, sending countries have lacked the strong will and appropriate policies necessary to boost long-term development and to create jobs for general economic prosperity. For example, after almost four decades of massive labour exportation in the Philippines, the country’s economy seems to have made no significant progress and many in the country must still rely on overseas job opportunities to make decent earnings. College-trained Filipinos find it more financially rewarding to work as low-skilled workers abroad. The literature on remittances shows that remittances have mixed results. Among those who look more positively at remittances, some find that migrant remittances generally have a positive impact on reducing poverty and enhancing health in the developing world, and can generate economic growth in places where a minimal level of institutional protection has been established (Driffield and Jones 2013; Richard and Adam 2011). Richard et al. (2013) have examined the situation in Ghana, and have found that households with remittance receipts have spent more on education, housing, and health, and less on food. Their study actually

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supports the view that remittances can reduce poverty as people invest in human capital rather than just spend for short-term survival. Chakraborty et al. (2014) have examined the use of remittances in migrant-sending countries and found that remittances help insure migrant households’ social networks against emergencies and increase cash flows to poor households. Another study into the use of remittances was conducted in Lemery, one of the fastest growing municipalities in Batangas in the Philippines. In this area, 77 percent of remittance senders were found to be women and 90 percent of these women senders worked as domestic helpers. The study indicates that approximately 65 percent of the senders prefer women in the family to be their remittance managers (UN-INSTRAW and UNDP 2010). Overall, migration and remittances have various impacts on women and their families. While migration has separated women from their families, it has “the potential to improve the status and autonomy of women” (Huguet 2003: 128). Yet, Cohen (2011) finds that traditional relationships between movers and non-movers and social practices may affect the handling of remittances and complicate the reorganisation of the household income structure and financial management. Indeed, female migrant workers face many challenges regarding the control of their money. Those coming from rural and poor households with limited access to education and financial services may become trapped in different cycles of bad management of remittances and debt repayment, which will then lengthen their migration period. A number of migrants also face significant financial problems at the end of their contract work, including debt repayment and scant savings (Omelainuk 2005).

Financial literacy and migration Problematic financial management and misuse of remittances by migrants and their families are not the unique experiences of one specific migrant group; neither are the experiences limited to low-skilled migrant workers. Yet, among low-skilled female migrant workers, such as FDWs, this problem is more difficult to handle due to their marginalised gendered role in the family and their relatively low income. A growing body of literature has discussed the role of financial education interventions to improve migrant workers’ knowledge and skills in managing finance (Bruhn et al. 2014; Carpena et al. 2011; Doi et al. 2014; Gibson et al. 2012; Karunarathne and Gibson 2014; Seshan and Yang 2014). However, specific studies on this issue of FDWs remain few.

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Miller et al. (2014) have provided a systematic analysis of the literature on financial education interventions. Their study examines 188 articles that discuss the results of financial education designed to increase consumers’ financial knowledge (financial literacy), skills, attitudes, and behaviours (financial capability). A majority of the cases (140 out of the 188) indicate that financial education has positive impacts on people’s financial management, such as increasing savings and skills in managing savings (Miller et al. 2014: 3). Out of the 188 cases, seven have studied the role of financial education interventions on migrants in various places. However, since these cases vary greatly geographically and concern various migrant types, it is hard to draw any clear relationship between financial literacy training and the wellbeing of migrant workers. One interesting fact provided by Gibson et al. (2012) is that financial literacy training in Australia and New Zealand enhances migrants’ information-seeking behaviour, which helps to reduce the risk of using more costly remittance products. Information-seeking behaviour in this study refers to the use of different sources of information, such as those from the Internet or banks, and the ability to compare the costs for sending remittances. Mavrinac et al. (2008) are concerned about the relationship between female migrant workers’ level of savings and their reintegration after returning home. They have found that migrants with financial and entrepreneurial education are more likely to have amassed a greater level of savings at the time of their return. With more savings, migrants are less likely to feel stressful during the final stage of their migrated life; this also acts to ensure the smoother reintegration of returning migrants. Seshan and Yang (2014) have carried out a study on Indian male migrant workers in Qatar by inviting them to attend a motivational workshop on financial habits, with a particular focus on savings and fostering joint decision-making with their wives back home. At the end of the workshop, they found that financial literacy interventions led to substantial changes in the management of finance of both the migrants and their wives. There was an increase in joint financial decision-making and incentives for saving when both parties—migrants and family members at home—received training. Doi et al. (2014) provide another study concerning training for both migrants and their family members. They undertook a pilot programme providing financial literacy training to female migrant workers and their families in the Greater Malang area and Blitar District of East Java Province in Indonesia. In evaluating the effects of the programme, they found that it was only by training both migrant women and their family members together that significant positive results

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would ensue in relation to spending behaviour and savings. The programme also stressed the importance of “teachable moments” —a time when the family experiences a large increase in family income. It is in such situations that people have a greater incentive to learn about money management and the opportunity to put what they have learned into practice (Doi et al. 2014: 51). To sum up, studies on financial literacy intervention have shown mixed results on the effects of such training. Whilst, in general, there are more positive than negative results, studies also stress that both the migrants and their family members need to attend to the issue together in order to make wiser use of remittances.

Foreign domestic workers in Singapore and Hong Kong Asia has the highest number of domestic workers in the world. Women comprised 83 percent of the domestic worker workforce in 2012, and that constituted 7.5 percent of female employment worldwide (UN Women 2013). The strong economies of Singapore and Hong Kong have encouraged many from their female population to enter the workforce; this is made possible by the employment of a large number of domestic helpers from poorer countries. Singapore is the Asian country with the highest proportion of foreign workers in its labour force (Piper 2005). Its changing economic strategies—from intensive export-oriented manufacturing in the early 1970s to financial and business services in the last two decades—have led to a rearrangement of occupational structure and demands in the job market. Foreign skilled and unskilled labourers are recruited into Singapore’s job market. In 2014, low-paid workers accounted for approximately 40 percent of the foreign workforce (MOM 2015). By December 2014, according to the Singapore Ministry of Manpower, there were approximately 223,500 FDWs, mainly from the Philippines and Indonesia, together with a significant minority from Sri Lanka (Lyons 2007). In Singapore, labour policies towards domestic workers aim at providing short-term domestic services. FDWs are excluded from the protection of the Employment Act, which offers some measure of legal protection to workers. In March 2012, the Ministry of Manpower Singapore announced a weekly rest day for FDWs whose work permits were issued or renewed after 1 January 2013 (MOM 2012). With this new regulation, Singapore aims to enhance its attraction as a destination for quality and experienced FDWs and yet its lack of basic rights protection

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for low-skilled labour migrants is still largely questioned by migrant groups. Hong Kong began to recruit FDWs in the 1970s to allow families to hire full-time live-in domestic helpers. In 1986, the Hong Kong government adopted a minimum wage policy for FDWs, subject to adjustment from time to time. Since October 2014, the minimum wage of FDWs has been increased to HK$4,110 (Hong Kong Labour Department 2014). Foreign domestic workers, estimated at slightly over 300,000, are mainly comprised of Indonesians (47%) and Filipinos (50%), making up around 3 percent of Hong Kong’s population (Amnesty International 2013: 5). According to a survey by Amnesty International, FDWs in Hong Kong have been subjected to serious human rights violations, such as physical or verbal abuse, limitation of freedom of movement, prohibition of faith practices, violation of minimum wage, arbitrary contract termination, and illegal treatment by placement agencies (Amnesty International 2013: 6). In the face of such violations, both the Hong Kong government and sending countries have failed to apply effective monitoring, investigations, and sanctions against individuals and organisations that violate the legislations related to domestic workers’ rights. Whilst FDWs may not be able to organise workers’ organisations in Singapore, FDWs in Hong Kong have been highly active in organising and participating in union organisations and rights avocation (Constable 2009). These actions contribute significantly to FDW activism in Hong Kong in three respects—community building and collective identity, making visible agency and capabilities, and visualising diversity and differences in unity (Lai 2010).

Financial literacy programmes in Hong Kong and Singapore Various non-governmental organisations have offered financial literacy training for FDWs in Hong Kong and Singapore. These programmes vary greatly in their objectives, approaches, duration, and tuition fees. Tables 11-1 and 11-2 are selected lists of organisations in both places providing financial literacy training programmes for FDWs. Besides NGOs, the Indonesian Consulate in Hong Kong, commercial companies and some religious groups also offer similar programmes as part of their initiatives to enhance the welfare of FDWs. For example, a number of finance-related programmes have been offered by QM Financial, Mandiri Sahabatku, Halaqah Jumat, and Dompet Dhuafa in Hong Kong. Most of these programmes are free of charge. Below, I will focus on the programmes of two organisations, Aidha

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in Singapore and Enrich in Hong Kong. Both organisations are open to female domestic workers from different countries. Aidha is a not-for-profit organisation established in 2006 in Singapore. Its main goal is to equip migrant women with saving skills and to end the cycle of poverty for FDWs by enhancing their financial literacy and entrepreneurial knowledge. Students who register at Aidha will take two core modules, namely “Finance and Technology” and “Entrepreneurship and Business Management”. “Finance and Technology” is the foundationbuilding module, which includes three courses designed to develop essential skills in financial management (Compass Club), computer literacy (Computer Workshop), and effective communication (Leadership Club). Students must complete these courses before continuing on to the advanced module on “Entrepreneurship and Business Management”. The advanced module is comprised of two part—“Venture Club” and “Advanced Leadership Club”. These advanced courses teach students more sophisticated business concepts and instruct them how to start a business back home. Students will develop a business plan under a trained mentor’s guidance. Students will also learn skills to effectively communicate with their future customers, suppliers and other stakeholders. All courses are nine months in duration and are offered twice monthly on Sundays. The course fee for each module is S$350 and can be paid by six instalments (S$75 monthly). This amount is approximately equivalent to one month’s salary of FDWs without experience in Singapore. Students who register for both modules can get a discounted price of S$550 in total. Yet, such a fee should be considered a high cost to FDWs. Enrich was founded in 2007 in Hong Kong as a formally registered charity organisation. According to its manager, Ms Lenlen, the founders of Aidha and Enrich actually met in a regional conference on financial literacy training for FDWs, where the found that they shared many common goals. Following this brief encounter, the founder of Aidha decided to establish the organisation in Singapore, while the founder of Enrich did likewise in Hong Kong. Enrich runs four core courses, namely “Money Wise Migrants”, “Investments for Migrants”, “Speak Up”, and “Setting up my Business”. These courses take approximately four hours in total to complete. Each session costs HK$20. This is relatively low when compared to the fees collected by Aidha. After taking basic training classes, students are encouraged to attend free mentoring sessions within two to three months. Enrich’s classes are held at different locations in Hong Kong in order to reach a wider FDW community. Classes in different languages (such as English, Tagalog, Bahasa Indonesian, and Thai) are available.

Filipino FDWs

Indonesian FDWs, return FDWs and their families

All marginalised women

All FDWs

Filipino FDWs

All FDWs

Target Group

Financial literacy

Banking education

Financial literacy product

Financial literacy

IT, English

Communication

Entrepreneurship

Financial literacy

Entrepreneurship

Financial literacy

Computer literacy

Entrepreneurship

Financial literacy

Course

Source: Compiled by the author from field data.

[Hong Kong]

CARD MRI

[Hong Kong]

Mandiri Bank of Indonesia

[Hong Kong]

Christian Action

[Hong Kong]

Enrich

[Singapore]

ASKI Global Ltd

[Singapore]

Aidha

Organisation

273

No information

No information

4,000

750

2,500

Students trained

By module (four modules, two months)

One day

One day

One day

By module (three months, every Sunday)

By module (nine months, alternate Sundays, twice a month)

Duration

Table 11-1: Selected financial literacy training programmes in Singapore and Hong Kong

Financial Literacy among Foreign Domestic Workers

Free

Free

Free

HK$20 plus free “one by one financial coaching”

Free

S$350/module

Cost

243

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Impacts of financial literacy training A strong desire to learn The data I obtained from my interviews and survey with FDWs (including those who had or had not attended financial literacy classes) both in Singapore and Hong Kong show that there is a strong desire among FDWs to learn more about financial management. After working for a number of years overseas, many FDWs showed that they could upgrade their own self-image and capabilities through attending classes and continuous learning. In a focus group interview with three middleaged Filipino FDW students at Aidha, one of them stressed: Our motivation is to upgrade our knowledge. We are college graduates; I worked in an office before. These classes are like a continuation (of my education) or an upgrade of my knowledge. I do learn a lot from this.

This kind of thinking was commonly found among FDWs who showed special interest in learning more about savings and managing small business ventures back home. Before taking classes at Aidha, a number of the Filipino workers had attended other classes at training centres or embassies that provide “home economics” education, which include cooking, dressmaking, hair dressing, sewing or other general training related to housework. While interviewees said that they valued those skills, they also opined that those skills would not help them to sustain their livelihood after they returned home. They would treasure any training that enhanced their chances of opening a business at home and that helped them with savings. One Filipino domestic worker shared this with me: At Pajar Nehan, they offer cosmetology or dress making. But Aidha is different. Aidha teaches you how to make money, how to do business...So one can go to Aidha, and bring a cosmetology proposal to get comments… Aidha wants you to have your own business plan. This is an advantage.

A common reason behind this tendency to receive financial training is workers’ desire to acquire skills in increasing their savings and in making money. Students at Aidha are reminded that they need savings in order to start a business. The problem for many FDWs is the fact that they remit most of their income back to their families and, without good financial planning, they often spend the remaining of their income on consumption,

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such as phone cards and shopping, rather than on “productive” uses (Mavrinac et al. 2008; also see Taylor 2006). Compared to the class fees of other financial training programmes I have studied, Aidha’s course fees are the highest. As mentioned above, their fees amount to around one month’s salary for a domestic worker. Yet, from the interviews, I found that workers seemed to agree that the training was “value-for-money”. One participant of Aidha’s courses said, “I can’t say I waste money in doing it. Even though I pay quite a lot, I learn something important. The return is more”. A number of interviewees agree that financial literacy training is a valuable investment for their future. The knowledge and skills they obtained from it would help them use money more effectively and make wiser financial decisions. More importantly, they acquired practical skills for implementing business plans. After taking classes, workers also became more aware of applying learned business skills to help with their everyday spending and saving. One Aidha student shared this with me: “I really apply what I learn from Aidha (to my daily life)…how to manage your money, how to spend wisely. Now, I have started saving and I am building my own house.” A number of Enrich’s students in Hong Kong responded similarly to the training they received at the organisation. One respondent stressed that “financial literacy training” equipped her with different practical knowledge and skills and had become embedded in her daily life practices: I can arrange my money better than before. I know how to arrange my budget…write down every dollar that I have used…so I can see clearly where all my money has gone.

Critiques on financial literacy training Platt et al. (2013) have conducted a survey among Indonesian FDWs in Singapore, which indicates that about 54 percent of the women in the survey have a savings account either in Singapore or Indonesia. For women who do save, they save around 54 percent of their salary (Platt et al. 2013: 33). Yet, almost half of the respondents do not have a savings habit. Among those who would like to make better use of their savings, their concern is focused on “acquiring capital to fund future business ventures back home” (Platt et al. 2013: 9). Some of the participants in the survey had received financial literacy training from Aidha. However, the level of correlation between financial literacy training and financial behavioural change is unclear. No data in the survey shows how many of the students from Aidha have saving habits.

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While it is still unclear whether financial literacy training definitely produces a positive result in developing a savings habit, my survey of the 48 Indonesian FDWs in Hong Kong shows that, even without such training, the incentive to save is strong. In the survey, 37 FDWs did not receive formal financial literacy training. The average saving of the respondents each month is HK$1,904, with the lowest amount at HK$500 and the highest at HK$3,000. This saving does not include the money they remit back home. Considering that in general they send half of their income (i.e. HK$2,055) back home, this is quite a high amount of savings. A number of respondents also developed specific strategies to manage money. A gay couple explained how they kept their money: “We keep onethird of the money for sending to Indonesia, one-third as savings for building a house (in Indonesia) and one-third for spending on cooking food for holidays and other needs in Hong Kong”. Another informant managed her income like this: “Each month, I send HK$2,000 home, and keep HK$1,000 to HK$1,500 for saving, and spend HK$500 for living costs. Because the Indonesian currency fluctuates, I wait until the exchange rate is good to send money home.” This informant has found a good strategy to optimise the value of her money for home. One significant issue in money management among FDWs is whether they can control the way remittances are spent back home. While FDWs can join programmes of financial literacy in Hong Kong, few such opportunities are available in their home villages in Indonesia. To reduce overspending and misuse of remittances, many informants stressed that it was better to keep the money in their own hands than in the hands of their families. One informant sent more money home a few years ago when her husband started up a small business in the village. Once the business became more stable, she reduced the amount of remittances, only remitting HK$1,000 for her daughter’s education. “If I send all money, all will be spent”, she said. Out of the 48 respondents, 20 have a bank account in Indonesia, 26 keep a bank account in Hong Kong, while two have bank accounts in both locations. The decision of where to set up a bank account will also affect money management. For those with less “self-control” on expenditure, they stressed that it was better for them to set up a bank account in Indonesia, as it would be less easy for them to withdraw money. This is one way to avoid overspending.

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More savings or more income? While financial literacy training stresses the value of saving for a future business, some FDWs find it even more desirable if they can increase their income immediately. The more enterprising FDWs have actually either self-taught or been influenced by peers to start up informal businesses in Hong Kong to add to their meagre domestic work salaries. These include selling clothes, snacks, and phone cards to other FDWs in Sundays at FDW-concentrated areas (see Chapter 9 in this volume). Some informants have online businesses: “We sell online tee-shirts to customers in Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Indonesia, and we have both retail and wholesale orders. We order stocks from China and make payment to the sellers’ Bank of China account. We also have bank accounts in Indonesia to receive payment from Indonesian customers.” A number of informants in Hong Kong opined that financial literacy training was not particularly important to them. Instead, volunteering at workers’ unions or organisations provided them with more valuable experience in organisational work and exposure to Hong Kong culture, which in turn nurtured in them financial and other management skills. One worker said: “I like to work with social organisations and educate people. I have not received financial literacy education, but my experiences working with organisations like Oi Merah Putih,2 and joining its capacity building courses helped me manage things better.” Another informant found that the living environment of Hong Kong itself had already helped her to gain a business mind-set. Through interactions with local people and selflearning on the Internet, she has improved her business skills. “Before coming to Hong Kong, my catering business in Indonesia did not have good financial management…now I know how to fix a failed business.”

Conclusion In spite of the growing concern about migrant workers’ financial literacy and the availability of relevant training programmes, only a very small portion of FDWs in Hong Kong and Singapore have ever received such education. Moreover, there is a lack of systematic evaluation of the quality of the various programmes provided by a wide spectrum of organisations of very different natures. While in general it should do no harm to raise the “financial skills and knowledge” of FDWs, it must also be stressed that such training will not help the overall situation of the remittance finances of the migrants and their families if the migrant women do not have sufficient control over the household expenditure

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structure. It would be misleading to reduce the complicated relationships between remittance uses, poverty, and sustainable livelihoods to merely a matter of financial skills. There is indeed an urgent need for more research into the social and cultural aspects of remittances economy and migration.

Notes 1. This research contains two parts. In Singapore, I volunteered and conducted my research at Aidha for five months (from August 2009 to January 2010). I participated in a number of its classes and group activities, and conducted in-depth interviews with Aidha’s staff members, volunteers and FDWs who signed up for classes. In Hong Kong, I approached Indonesian FDWs in public places where FDWs congregate and meet with friends on Sundays. I conducted a survey with 48 Indonesian FDWs, to collect their views on and/or experiences with financial literacy training programmes. I also conducted in-depth interviews with a number of them and visited Enrich, an organisation providing FDWs with financial literacy training. 2. Oi Merah Putih is an organisation that promotes the wellbeing of Indonesian FDWs in Hong Kong. It aims to empower Indonesian domestic workers through classes and activities.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Jocelyn O. Celero is currently a student on the Ph.D. Program of International Studies in Waseda University’s Graduate School of AsiaPacific Studies in Japan. She is a recipient of a Monbukagakusho scholarship offered by Japan’s Ministry of Education. The subject of her dissertation is the transnational social mobility of Japanese-Filipino children. She graduated from Sophia University with a Master’s Degree in Global Studies in 2012. She also holds a Master’s Degree in Asian Studies which she earned from the University of the Philippines-Asian Center in 2008. Prior to studying in Japan, she taught History and Social Studies for more than six years in the Philippines. Yuk Wah Chan is an Associate Professor in the Department of Asian and International Studies at the City University of Hong Kong. Her recent publications include The Age of Asian Migration (Volume 1), VietnameseChinese Relationships at the Borderlands: Trade, Tourism and Cultural Politics, and The Chinese / Vietnamese Diaspora – Revisiting the Boat People. Her research covers Asian borderlands, Asian migration and diaspora, Vietnamese-Chinese relations, gender and identity. Ju-chen Chen is a lecturer in the Department of Anthropology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Her research covers migrant workers (mingong) in China and foreign domestic helpers in Hong Kong. She is particularly interested in exploring relationships between the experiences of migration and the realisation of motherhood and womanhood. Heidi Fung is a Research Fellow/Professor at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. She undertook interdisciplinary doctoral training at the University of Chicago. Her research involves the socialisation of emotion, daily disciplinary and moral training practices, and child-rearing beliefs across cultures. Currently, she studies how socialisation and family ties are practiced across borders and across generations by Vietnamese marriage migrants in Taiwan.

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Yuko Hamada works for the International Organization for Migration Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific as a senior regional labour migration, migration and development specialist. Her recent publications include: “Global Governance and International Migration: A Bridge Too Far?” (in Limits of Good Governance in Developing Countries, Gadjah Mada University Press, 2011); “National Governance International Labour Migration” (in Migration and Development, 2012); and “International Migration from Nepal” (in Situation Report for South and South West Asia, United Nations, 2012). Hamada also co-authored the publication Facilitating Safe Labor Migration in the Greater Mekong Subregion (ADB, 2013). Evangeline O. Katigbak received her Ph.D. in Geography from the National University of Singapore and a Master degree in Geography from the University of the Philippines. She was an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of the Philippines before she left for Singapore to pursue her doctoral studies. Her research interests include transnational labour migration, translocalities, translocal emotional geographies and transnational families. Diana K. Kwok, Ed.D., MSW, RSW, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Special Education and Counselling at the Hong Kong Institute of Education. She has previously been employed as a mental health social worker, working with diverse cultural groups. She is currently teaching and conducting research on the cultural sensitivity of educators and assisting professionals with their work with minority students in Chinese cultural contexts. Kim Kwok is an Assistant Professor at the Caritas Institute of Higher Education in Hong Kong. She has previously been employed as a social worker, working with people with diverse migration and cultural backgrounds. She holds an M.A. in Migration Studies and a Ph.D. in China Studies. Her research interests cover Chinese migration, ethnic economy, and gender and sexuality issues. GraĪyna SzymaĔska-Matusiewicz is an Assistant Professor in the Institute of Sociology at the University of Warsaw. Her areas of research include Vietnamese diaspora and identity, and family and relationships. She is also an advisor on Vietnamese diaspora at the Poland-Asia Research Center. She has published academic work in both English and Polish.

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Nguyen Nhu Ha is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Asian and International Studies at the City University of Hong Kong. Prior to her study in Hong Kong, she completed an M.A. in Development and Governance in Germany and obtained her Bachelor degree in Sociology from Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Her research interests include the politics of accountability, civil society, female migration and empowerment in Asian countries. Willem van Schendel (University of Amsterdam) is a historian and anthropologist. His research deals with borderlands and the social consequences of the mobility of people and goods. His recent publications include A History of Bangladesh (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and The Camera in Mizoram: Capturing History in Northeast India (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Further information on him can be found at www.willemvanschendel.com. Tharaphi Than is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures at Northern Illinois University. Her research focuses on women, modernity, and the print media of Burma. Her recent works include Women in Modern Burma (Routledge, 2014) and “Understanding the Languages of Pyidawtha: Burmese Approaches to Development”, published in Journal of South East Asia Research in 2013. C. Valatheeswaran is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in Economics at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) (affiliated to Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) in Trivandrum, Kerala, India. He is completing his Ph.D. thesis (“International Migration, Remittances and Human Development: An Empirical Study from Tamil Nadu State of India”) under the guidance of Professor S. Irudaya Rajan at the CDS. He has published a research article titled “Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in India: Rehabilitation Mechanism, Livelihood Strategies, and Lasting Solutions” in Refugee Survey Quarterly. He also works as a co-researcher on research projects funded by the International Organisation for Migration and the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs of the Government of India. His research interests include international migration, development economics, refugees and forced migration, climate change, impact evaluation and Tamil diaspora.

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Valerie C. Yap is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Asian and International Studies at the City University of Hong Kong. She holds a Master of Social Sciences in Development Studies from the same university. She obtained her Bachelor’s degree from Ateneo de Manila University in the Philippines. Her research interests include transnationalism, diaspora, and tourism.