Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, Volume 2 9781400887637

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SOUTHEAS

T ASIA

TRIBES , MINORITIES AN D NATION

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N ,

P U B L I S H E D FO R T H E P R I N C E T O N CENTE R O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L STUDIE S A LIS T O F OTHE R CENTE R P U B L I C A T I O N S A P P E A R S A T T H E BAC K O F V O L U M E I I

VOLUM E I

SOUTHEAS

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T ASIA

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TRIBES , MINORITIES

, AN

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NATION S

EDITE D B

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PETE R K U N S T A D T E PRINCETO PRINCETO

N NE

W JERSE

N UNIVERSIT

I 9 6 7

R Y

Y PRES

S

Copyright © 196 6 by Princeto n Universit y Pres s AL L MGHT S RESERVE

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Library o f Congres s Car d No . 66-1770 3 Printed i n th e Unite d State s o f Americ a by Th e Mapl e Pres s Compan y

Princeton Legacy Library edition 2017 Paperback ISBN: 978-0-691-62826-4 Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-691-62852-3

C O N T E N T S VOLUM E I I P A R T V I i : T H A I L A N D (continued)

Chapter 1 3 Th e Rura l "HaW " (Yunnanes e Chinese ) o f Northern Thailand , by F. W. Mote 48 Chapter 1 4 Th e Hil l Trib e Progra m o f th e Publi c Welfar e Department, Ministr y o f Interior , Thailand : Re search an d Socio-Economi c Development , b y Hans Manndorf f 52 Chapter 1 5 Th e Tribal Researc h Centre , Thailand : A n Account o f Plan s an d Activities , b y Willia m R . Geddes 55 Chapter 1 6 Autonom y an d Integratio n o f Socia l Systems : The I u Mie n ("Yao " o r "Man" ) Mountai n Population an d Thei r Neighbors , b y Pete r Kandre 58 Chapter 1 7 Th e Lua ? (Lawa ) an d Ska w Kare n o f Mae hongson Province , Northwester n Thailand , b y Peter Kunstadte r 63 PART V I I l : VIETNA

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Vietnam: Introduction , by Peter Kunstadte r 67 Chapter 1 8 Th e Strategi c Hamle t Progres s i n Kie n Ho a Province, Sout h Vietnam : A Cas e Stud y o f Counter-Insurgency, b y John O'Donnel l 70 Chapter 1 9 Som e Aspect s o f Hil l Trib e Lif e i n Sout h Viet nam, by Gerald C . Hickey 74 Chapter 2 0 Mountai n Minoritie s an d the Viet Minh : A Key to the Indochina War , by J. T. McAlister, Jr . 77 PART ix

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THE ROL E O F P R I V A T E F O U N D A T I O N

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Chapter 2 1 Th e Asia Foundation' s Programmin g fo r Triba l and Minorit y People s i n Southeas t Asia , b y Harry H . Pierson 84

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Appendix Populatio n an d Linguisti c Applica tion of Ethnic Group s of Cambodia 86

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Index 86

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TRIBES , MINORITIES AN D NATION P A R T VII

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, CONTINUE

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CHAPTE R 1 3

The Rural "Haw" (Yunnanes e Chinese ) of Norther n Thailan d F . W . MOTE

1

INTRODUCTION

The peopl e describe d i n thi s paper , th e rura l "Haw " or, more properly, recen t migran t Yunnanes e Chines e o f Norther n Thai land (wit h a tota l populatio n o f abou t 6,700 ) ar e numericall y unimportant a s a minorit y grou p i n Thailand . Nonetheles s the y are illustrativ e o f a numbe r o f significan t points . First , the y ar e representatives i n th e hil l area s o f a "Hig h Culture," an d i n spite o f numerous physica l disadvantages ar e managing to retain and transmi t tha t attachmen t t o thei r younge r generation . Sec ond, i n spit e o f (or , mor e accurately , becaus e o f environmenta l advantages of ) thei r transitiona l ecologica l location , the y hav e become relativel y prosperou s i n a shor t time , i n compariso n t o their hil l trib e an d rura l Tha i neighbors , withou t a primary de pendence o n opiu m cultivation . Third , a s a migran t populatio n from a natio n involve d i n internationa l struggle s an d th e rem 1 Professor Mote , wit h hi s wife , spen t approximatel y eigh t day s i n th e tw o Haw village s describe d herein . Becaus e o f thei r abilit y t o spea k th e dialec t of Chines e i n us e i n thes e village s an d thei r previou s acquaintanc e wit h th e general patter n o f lif e i n Yunnanes e villages , th e Mote s wer e abl e t o establis h rapport ver y rapidl y an d t o gathe r fa r mor e informatio n i n a shor t tim e tha n would th e averag e visitor . Th e importanc e o f thes e material s i s increase d b y the fac t tha t ther e ar e onl y brief , scattere d journalisti c account s o f th e Ha w in print . The occasio n o f Professo r Mote' s visi t t o th e Ha w wa s a reques t fro m th e Hill Tribe s Divisio n o f th e Tha i Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare . Th e Hil l Tribe s Division was familia r wit h som e o f th e genera l feature s o f th e agricultura l tech niques o f thes e peopl e an d thei r relationship s wit h othe r ethni c group s i n th e same area , an d wit h th e fac t tha t "Haw " trader s travele d t o man y o r th e hil l tribe villages. Th e specifi c purpose s o f Professo r Mote' s tri p wer e t o determine , if possible , th e origin s o f thi s population ; t o describ e briefl y thei r wa y o f life ; to sugges t way s i n whic h furthe r researc h migh t be usefu l t o th e Tha i government ; and t o gathe r informatio n o n way s i n whic h th e "Haw " migh t contribut e t o the modernization o f othe r hill peoples. (Ed. )

[487 ]

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nants o f a civi l war , thei r situatio n indicate s th e sort s o f interna tional pressure s t o whic h suc h minorit y group s ma y b e exposed . Fourth, thei r relationship s wit h rura l Tha i an d triba l people s exemplify th e sor t o f acculturativ e influenc e tha t ca n exis t i n rural area s fro m settle d communities , i n spit e o f th e fac t tha t they ar e no t deliberatel y establishe d a s "mode l communities. " In al l o f thes e variable s th e contrast s o f th e tw o communitie s which wer e studie d sho w th e difficultie s o f makin g vali d generalizations. W H O AR E TH E H A W ? — S O M E DEFINITION S

The Amphur Fang Haw District. Thi s i s a n internall y cohesiv e zone, bu t i t i s no t administrativel y define d a s a "district " (amphur, tambon, o r muban) b y th e Tha i government . I t i s th e area comprisin g th e mountai n borde r are a plu s th e foothil l vil lages o f Ban-yang , Ban-mai , an d Mae-nom , plu s th e planne d vil lage (a t presen t onl y an empt y site ) o f Kuang-w u (Chines e nam e only) an d th e sub-villag e o f Hui-tsung-p' o (Chines e name) . A U of thes e li e withi n twenty-fiv e kilometer s o f th e southwest , west , and nort h o f Fang . Th e resident s recogniz e tw o suc h separat e and internall y cohesiv e districts , thi s on e o n th e Burmes e borde r and th e other near Chiengra i on the Laotian border . Refugees. Thi s ter m i s use d her e i n th e sens e i n whic h i t i s used b y th e villag e "Haw " themselves , althoug h officiall y thei r status i s tha t o f irregula r immigrant s lik e man y o f th e hil l tribe s of th e regio n an d no t tha t o f "refugees. " The y ar e Chines e (Yun nanese, wit h som e admixtur e o f minoritie s races ) wh o fled fro m Yunnan Provinc e int o Burma , mostl y i n 1951-1952 , an d afte r tw o or thre e year s ther e starte d migratin g i n a diffus e movemen t infiltrating portion s o f th e borde r zon e i n Thailan d i n 1954 . Th e vast majorit y ar e native s o f Yunna n Province ; exception s ar e a few fro m othe r southwester n Chines e provinces , wive s marrie d in Burm a o r Thailand , an d childre n bor n i n th e las t fourtee n years. Three-fourth s o f th e Yunnanes e com e fro m thos e fe w pre fectures lyin g closes t t o th e Burmes e border . A muc h smalle r proportion com e fro m th e establishe d Yunnanes e communit y i n northern Burma , an d some , bot h directl y fro m Yunna n an d fro m established residence s i n Burma , hav e entere d Thailan d onl y within th e pas t year . Thes e recen t arrivals , however , represen t [ 48 8 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E CHINESE ) O F NOHTHEB N THAILAN D

TABLE 2 1 POPULATION O F R E C E N T YUNNANES E REFUGEE S I N N O R T H E R N T H A I L A N D , 196 5 Location an d Villag e Names " Tota

l Populatio n

Changwad Chiengmai—Amphu r Fan g Wan-yang (Ba n Yang), b Lower Leve l 1,83 P'an-lung (Mae-Nom) , Mid-leve l 15 Huo-fei (Ba n Mai), b Lowe r Leve l 68 Hui-tsung-p'o, Mid-leve l ? Changwad Chiengrai—Amphu r Chieng-sae n Man-t'ang 2,25 Amphur Chiengra i Lao-chia-t'ang 1,15 Amphur Thoen g (? ) Ch'ang-k'ung 54 Total 6,617 a b

0 2 0 100+ 7 1 7 +

Tha i name s ar e i n parentheses , followin g th e Chines e names . Only Ban-yan g an d Ban-ma i wer e visite d b y th e writer .

a ver y smal l fractio n o f th e total . Ther e i s littl e o r n o movemen t at present , an d condition s makin g possibl e suc h movemen t o f "refugees" d o no t see m likel y t o exis t agai n i n th e foreseeabl e future. The Haw {Also Written "Hor," "Ho," or "Chin-haw") in Thailand. Yunnanes e hav e bee n comin g int o Burma , Laos , an d Northern Thailan d fo r a hundre d year s o r more , thoug h i n Thai land thei r number s hav e bee n small . Her e the y cam e mostl y as singl e peddlers , drivin g a pack-hors e o r two , comin g i n th e winter an d dr y season s (Octobe r t o May ) an d returnin g befor e the rain y season. 2 Th e majorit y wer e Chines e Moslem s fro m th e 2

For a n earlie r referenc e t o th e "Haw " se e Hallet t (1890:210) , wh o quote s the 188 7 journa l o f Mr . Archer , th e Britis h Consu l a t Chiengmai , describin g caravans fro m Yunna n t o Utaradit , th e hea d o f barg e navigatio n o n th e Menam : The rout e followe d b y thi s carava n was fro m Yunna n (Fu ) t o Puerh , Ssumao, Kian g Hung , Muan g Long , Muan g Lim , Kia n Hsen , Kian g Hai , Peh, an d Utaradi t o r Tha-It . Thes e caravan s com e dow n t o Tha-It , bu t the greate r par t g o eastwar d towar d Chiengma i (Zimme) , an d som e a s far a s Britis h Burmah . ["Eastward " i n thi s sentenc e mus t b e a misprin t for westward. ] Thes e trader s ar e pur e Yunnanese , an d ar e calle d H o b y the Siamese . There ar e interestin g earl y reference s t o th e Ha w (spelle d "Ho" ) an d muc h valuable informatio n o n presen t circumstance s i n th e articl e b y Halper n (1961:22 , 24, 26-7 , 32, tables).

[ 48 9 ]

THAILAND : F . W . MOT E

heavily Mosle m southwester n par t o f Yunnan . The y trade d mostly i n th e villages , bot h uplan d an d lowland . Th e wor d "Haw" i s somethin g o f a mystery ; i t i s neithe r a Yunnanes e nor a Tha i word . Thais , includin g officials , hav e questione d th e meaning o f th e word , an d hil l tribe s "experts " thin k tha t i t i s the wor d b y whic h th e peopl e o f thi s "hil l tribe " call themselves ; they d o no t realiz e tha t th e so-calle d Ha w ar e simpl y ordinar y Chinese o f Yunnan . Thai s hav e observe d tha t th e majorit y o f overseas Chines e i n Thailan d canno t communicat e wit h th e "Haw," an d mak e th e mistak e o f thinkin g tha t thei r Teochi u language is th e standar d fo r China , henc e th e "Haw " mus t b e something othe r tha n Chinese , tha t is , anothe r minorit y peopl e like th e Yao , th e Meo , etc . Mos t o f th e "Haw " wh o hav e com e within th e las t te n year s an d d o no t kno w Tha i ar e no t eve n aware tha t suc h a nam e exists . Thos e wh o d o kno w th e word , as wel l a s othe r Chines e an d Sino-Thai s i n th e region , accep t the wor d "Haw " simpl y a s a curiou s an d somewha t insultin g Thai ter m fo r Yunnanes e Chinese , a ter m havin g bot h officia l and popula r currency . Fro m thi s poin t onwar d thi s repor t wil l adopt th e wor d "Yunnanese. " Questione d abou t th e meanin g of th e word , th e peopl e i n Norther n Thailan d giv e a variet y of answer s (fiv e differen t explanation s hav e bee n collected) , none of which makes much sense. 3 "Among th e explanation s fo r th e wor d "Haw " th e followin g ar e cite d a s typical attempt s t o rationaliz e th e explanation , rathe r tha n a s approve d o r ac ceptable explanations : (a) "Haw " i s th e Tha i equivalen t o f th e southwester n Chines e soun d o f the wor d ho o f th e expressio n ho /en , meanin g "wha t people? " I t i s sai d tha t when aske d wh o the y were , th e Chines e woul d repl y somewha t rhetorically : "Ho jenP!" ("What people , indeed?!" ) Thi s explanatio n cam e fro m a Yunnanes e gentleman i n Chiengmai . I t sound s mos t improbable . (b) "Haw " i s th e Tha i equivalen t o f th e southwester n Chines e soun d o f the wor d ho, meanin g "peaceful , friendly. " Th e earl y Yunnanes e wer e so desig nated becaus e the y wer e peaceful , friendl y traders , an d thei r designatio n o f themselves a s suc h was accepte d a s th e ethni c nam e fo r them . Thi s cam e fro m a Yunnanes e leade r o f th e Mosle m communit y i n Norther n Thailan d an d i s also improbable . (c) "Haw " i s th e Tha i equivalen t o f th e southwester n Chines e soun d o f the wor d huo, whic h i s th e nam e o f th e semi-historica l triba l chieftai n Men g Huo (i n Tha i usuall y calle d Ben g Haw) , a characte r i n th e Chines e nove l The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, wel l know n amon g Thai s i n th e translatio n made ove r a hundre d year s ag o calle d Sam-kok. Meng-Hu o was suppose d t o have bee n a fierce loca l chieftai n wh o was seve n time s capture d an d seve n times release d b y th e Chines e genera l Chu-k o Lian g (K'un g Beng ) i n th e effor t to pacif y hi m an d brin g th e southwes t o f Yunna n unde r Chines e control . Th e

[ 49 0 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

The earl y Yunnanes e occasionall y becam e permanen t immigrants; the y settle d i n smal l numbers , alway s i n towns , never formin g mountain villages of thei r own, and never practicing agriculture in Thailand. Chiengmai, Lamphun, and Chiengrai have bee n thei r majo r centers . I t i s sai d b y th e Chines e school principal i n Chiengma i tha t ther e ar e no w seve n hundre d t o eight hundre d Chines e o r Sino-Tha i households i n tha t city , o f which abou t one-third are Yunnanese, though in the smaller communities o f th e Nort h th e proportio n runs higher . Linguistically distinct, the y ten d t o remai n a communit y apar t fro m th e Teochiu-speaking oversea s Chinese ; we migh t als o cal l th e Yun nanese the "overland" Chinese. Of th e tw o mosque s in Chiengmai , the smalle r and newe r on e (fifteen years ) i s exclusivel y Chinese ; it s leade r report s tha t about tw o hundre d t o thre e hundre d me n an d sixt y t o eight y women atten d th e majo r servic e eac h week . Th e othe r mosqu e has a large r congregatio n and a considerabl y longer history , bu t is n o longe r exclusivel y Chinese , having Tha i an d India n mem bers a s well . I t wa s founde d fifty year s ag o b y a n immigran t from Yunna n surnamed Cheng, who became a leading Chiengmai citizen. H e donate d th e lan d fo r th e city' s airport , fo r whic h he wa s knighted . H e die d las t yea r i n Mecc a a t th e ag e o f ninety-three. Anothe r leadin g Yunnanes e Mosle m wa s Mr . L u modern "Haw " ar e regarde d a s thi s general' s descendants , henc e the y ar e calle d by hi s name . Thi s explanatio n seem s improbabl e since , i f th e analog y ha s an y meaning, "Haw " shoul d the n b e th e nam e b y whic h Yunnanes e cal l th e Thais . (d) "Haw " i s th e Chiengma i (Norther n Thai ) wor d fo r walnut s (man haw means "nu t oil") . Th e Yunnanes e trader s use d t o arriv e i n Chiengma i eac h fall wit h walnut s t o sell , an d the y wer e identifie d b y thei r associatio n wit h this produc t abov e al l else . Th e Chines e wor d fo r walnu t i s ho t'ao, th e first syllable o f which , i n southwester n Chinese , sound s somethin g lik e "haw. " Thi s explanation, minu s th e Chines e wor d fo r walnut , cam e fro m a n elderl y Tha i agricultural exper t wh o gre w u p i n Chiengma i fifty year s ag o an d wh o remember s the annua l arriva l o f "haw " trader s i n th e cit y afte r th e en d o f th e rain s i n November. (e) "Haw " i s a varian t pronunciatio n o f th e Chines e wor d hao, meanin g "good," an d show s eithe r bilingua l triba l peoples ' appreciatio n o f th e Yunnanes e traders o r Chines e self-estee m i n havin g labele d themselve s thi s way . Thi s stor y is current amon g th e Chines e i n Norther n Thailand . (f) I t i s assume d b y som e amateu r anthropologist s tha t "Haw " ma y b e som e tribal nam e fo r th e Chinese , unrelate d t o an y Chines e o r Tha i word . Bu t n o such tribal word ha s been foun d tha t correspond s phonologicall y t o this. The origi n o f th e ter m "Haw " a s applie d t o th e Yunnanes e i n Thailan d remain s an unsolve d mystery .

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of Lamphun , knighte d fo r hi s contribution s t o th e buildin g o f the rail line between Lamphu n an d Chiengmai . Such Yunnanes e hav e settle d i n th e are a an d hav e becom e familiar a s "Haw " peddler s o r eve n a s leadin g citizen s withou t the Thai s havin g com e generall y t o realiz e tha t the y ar e no t analogous t o th e othe r minorit y group s classe d a s hil l tribes . Were i t no t fo r th e attentio n no w bein g focused o n th e "refugee " Yunnanese wh o hav e arrive d sinc e Worl d Wa r II , th e ol d "Haw " of Thailand' s norther n town s woul d probabl y g o unnoticed toda y except a s on e furthe r constituen t o f th e ubiquitou s Chines e shop keeping population . The ne w arrivals , i n Thailan d a t leas t an d i n thei r presen t circumstances, ar e properl y classe d a s "borde r regio n minorit y people." Althoug h a n analog y t o th e hil l tribe s i s misleadin g i n terms o f understandin g thei r culture , i t i s realisti c i n term s o f the Tha i government' s administrativ e task s i n th e borde r regions . For th e Yunnanes e ar e no t immigrant s t o Thailan d i n th e usua l sense, an d thei r activitie s pla y a centra l rol e i n th e live s o f th e hill tribes . Since simila r "overseas " Chines e groups , especiall y thos e fro m Yunnan an d neighborin g province s wher e hil l trib e minoritie s are mos t numerous , appea r t o hav e a n analogou s positio n i n th e present-day lif e o f Burma , Laos , an d eve n i n Vietnam , som e as pects o f th e mor e readil y studie d situatio n i n Norther n Thailan d may hav e significan t implication s fo r thes e area s a s well . Th e pattern o f Ha n relation s wit h non-Ha n people s i s itsel f a majo r domestic Chines e proble m o f th e whol e Chines e borde r zone , as Mr. Diao's paper i n this volume attests . Some Misleading Political Identifications. Severa l group s tha t should b e carefull y distinguishe d fro m eac h othe r ar e b y cus tomary usag e rathe r indiscriminatel y labele d i n way s tha t iden tify the m wit h th e Chines e Nationalis t government . Suc h usag e is not analogou s t o th e usage curren t amon g the Yunnanese them selves, an d indee d i s no t eve n comprehensibl e t o them . Bu t th e historical reason s fo r th e confusio n ar e eas y enoug h t o understand. In th e large-scal e movemen t o f refugee s fro m Yunna n int o Burma i n 1951-1952 , th e mos t importan t grou p politicall y (though no t th e largest ) wa s tha t consistin g o f militar y unit s [ 49 2 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NORTHEH N THAILAN D

loyal t o th e Republi c o f China . Suc h militar y unit s wer e calle d Kuomintang (Chines e Nationalist ) forces , an d wer e give n som e protection a s politica l refugee s i n Burma . Late r thes e unit s be came guerrill a irregulars ; thei r activitie s create d a n internationa l crisis, an d unde r outsid e pressure s the y wer e withdraw n t o Taiwan (althoug h i t i s a n ope n secre t tha t som e smal l number s of the m remained) . Thos e remainin g element s ar e often confuse d with th e Yunnanes e villagers . The y occupy , i n part , adjacen t areas; moreover , som e o f th e villager s wer e formerl y militar y personnel o f on e kin d o r another . Bu t th e villager s toda y ar e living a s civilians . Moreover , the y hav e n o direc t organizationa l links wit h th e governmen t i n Taiwa n an d i n fac t fee l themselve s very luck y t o b e i n Thailan d an d no t i n Taiwan . The y ar e no t happy t o find themselve s politicall y identifie d i n an y way . I t is prope r t o distinguis h the m fro m th e "ol d Haws, " i.e. , Yun nanese wh o hav e bee n i n Thailan d sinc e befor e Worl d Wa r II , some o f who m als o stil l wor k a s pett y trader s i n th e hills , al though n o politica l labe l seem s t o mak e thi s distinction . The Chines e Nationalis t labe l i s equall y misleadin g whe n ap plied t o tw o othe r group s i n th e hills . On e i s mad e u p o f th e bandits wh o wer e als o force d ou t o f Chin a b y th e Communis t take-over. Th e Yunnanes e villagers sa y that al l the scu m o f south west Chin a fled ahea d o f th e Communis t armie s an d forme d bandit band s tha t preye d especiall y o n th e Chines e refugee s themselves a s the y trie d t o flee wit h a fe w possession s int o Burma. The y recal l als o tha t suc h bandi t gang s whe n confronte d by Burmes e militar y force s woul d pos e a s fleeing Chines e arm y regulars, thereb y receivin g protection . Findin g i t a t time s usefu l to continu e t o clai m tha t labe l for themselves , thes e bandit s hav e continued t o b e th e scourg e o f th e Yunnanes e villager s a s wel l as o f th e hil l tribe s an d othe r peopl e the y encounte r i n Burma , Thailand, an d Laos . At on e tim e severa l year s ag o th e Yunnanes e villagers, with th e suppor t o f th e origina l guerrill a forces , create d an exterminatio n forc e t o trac k dow n an d annihilat e on e bandi t group operatin g i n thei r area , an d thoug h thei r are a i s now clear , they kno w tha t othe r suc h bandi t element s ar e stil l operatin g in som e places . Another grou p popularl y labele d a s belongin g t o th e forme r Chinese regula r armies , whos e behavio r als o threaten s th e repu [ 49 3 ]

THAILAND : F . W . MOT E

tation o f th e "Haw " i n general , i s tha t relativel y smal l grou p (three hundre d t o fou r hundred ) o f overage d an d useles s ex soldiers wh o refuse d t o b e evacuate d t o Taiwa n becaus e the y were i n a n advance d stag e o f opiu m addictio n an d kne w tha t they coul d no t ge t opiu m i n Taiwan . The y ar e discusse d belo w (pp. 506, 514). To summarize , i t i s inappropriat e t o appl y an y politica l label s to th e village s unde r discussion , an d i t i s especiall y inaccurat e to refe r t o al l o f th e disparat e group s mentione d abov e b y an y general an d inclusiv e labe l an d t o impl y tha t the y constitut e one coheren t group . (Chines e nam e "Wan-yang, " alternat e Chinese nam e "Yang-tzu-chai" )

THE VILLAG E O F BAN-YAN G

Wan-yang i s simpl y th e Chines e transliteratio n o f th e Tha i name; "ban " mean s "village " an d "yang " mean s "Karen. " Th e alternate Chines e nam e mean s "Kare n people' s stockade. " Bot h Thais an d Chines e stat e tha t a smal l Kare n villag e occupie d th e location a t th e tim e th e Yunnanes e move d in , afte r whic h th e Karen al l left . History. Yunnanes e first move d i n t o th e sit e fro m th e highe r hills abov e an d fro m th e Burmes e sid e o f th e borde r exactl y ten year s ag o (th e winte r o f 1954-1955) . The y cam e a s civilia n refugees fleeing Yunnan , an d mos t ha d spen t tw o o r thre e year s in Burm a o n th e way . Afte r th e firs t majo r evacuatio n o f Chines e Nationalist troop s i n Burm a (b y ai r t o Taiwan ) i n 1954 , thes e peasant familie s ha d t o mov e dow n ou t o f th e hill s an d establis h settlements wher e the y coul d liv e by farming . Al l of th e so-calle d Haw village s cam e int o bein g a t tha t time , som e a s earl y a s late 1953 , and some a year or two later. At th e tim e th e Yunnanes e arrived , th e Kare n villag e o f a few house s stoo d i n a n isolate d smal l clearin g i n th e mids t o f a forest , jus t a t th e lowes t edg e o f th e foothill s an d abov e th e paddy fields cultivate d by Thais in the valley bottom . The Yunnanes e cleare d th e jungle , lai d ou t street s followin g the curv e o f th e hill , an d cleare d extensiv e fields no w totalin g (with th e villag e area ) abou t 150 0 rai, extendin g principall y t o the sout h o f th e settlemen t an d u p a dra w t o th e west . Tw o streams ru n ou t o f th e hill s a t thi s point ; the y ar e reliabl e year [ 49 4 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

round source s o f wate r an d power , an d th e resident s hav e de vised a n elaborat e syste m o f ope n ditche s an d split-bambo o ele vated culvert s t o diver t runnin g wate r t o mos t home s an d house hold gardens . I n thi s wa y the y hav e als o provide d a strea m o f water t o powe r th e machiner y o f a home-buil t rice-polishin g plant; the y hav e als o considere d usin g i t t o produc e electricity , but haven' t th e capita l t o purchas e equipmen t neede d fo r instal lation. Formerl y the y als o supplie d wate r an d powe r fo r a bam boo-paper factory , n o longer in production . Some scattere d tree s hav e bee n lef t fo r shade ; thei r grea t siz e gives evidenc e o f th e magnitud e o f th e tas k of clearin g the site . Appearance of the Village. Th e villag e ha s muc h o f th e ap pearance o f a typica l peasan t villag e o f th e interio r o f China , except tha t th e house s ar e mostl y buil t o f bambo o an d othe r flimsy materials, wherea s i n Yunna n the y woul d b e buil t o f bric k and tile , with som e ston e i n lintels an d doorways . Eac h residenc e consists o f thre e o r fou r separat e one-stor y building s buil t o n the ground , havin g raise d (t o a heigh t o f on e foo t o r more ) tamped-earth floors an d consistin g o f a centra l roo m throug h which th e mai n doo r enter s an d tw o sid e room s entere d b y in terior doors . Thes e thre e o r fou r building s for m th e side s o f a courtyard comprisin g usuall y hal f o r les s o f th e househol d area , the res t bein g vegetabl e garden . On e o r tw o o f th e building s will b e livin g o r sleepin g rooms , on e a detache d kitche n an d storage room , anothe r a bat h hous e o r furthe r storag e area . Onl y two houses , on e th e villag e headman's (th e chairman's) , ar e buil t on piling s raisin g the m wel l abov e th e groun d i n th e Tha i man ner. Eac h residenc e ha s a n outsid e privy , a dee p pi t boarde d over an d enclose d i n a smal l hu t fo r privacy , containin g als o a wate r ur n fo r washing . Beyond o r adjoining th e courtyar d there " usually ar e foun d a stal l fo r horse s an d oxen , a pe n fo r pig s (pigs ar e no t allowe d t o roa m fre e a t an y time) , chicke n roosts , duck pens , etc. , an d a plac e fo r tools , grain , storage , etc . Eac h yard i s enclose d i n a fenc e o f bambo o o r a livin g hedge , an d many ar e planted wit h frui t tree s o r decorativ e flowers. Th e larg e vegetable garden s ar e intensivel y worke d an d neatl y maintained , with a constan t rotatio n o f crop s providin g a stead y supply . There i s n o electricit y i n th e village . Road s ar e dee p i n dus t that mus t becom e mir e in th e rain y season . A wide bridge crosse s [ 49 5 ]

T H A I L A N D : F . W. MOT E

th e strea m a t th e entranc e t o th e village, an d man y narro w one s cross i t a t othe r point s a s i t wind s throug h th e place . Th e mai n stree t ha s a numbe r o f shop s occupyin g th e front s o f houses , th e courtyard s o f whic h the n li e behind . Doorway s ar e decorate d with las t year' s Ne w Yea r couplets , fade d an d tattered . Imme diatel y o n enterin g th e village , on e realize s tha t i t i s a Chines e village fro m th e layout , styl e o f houses , an d evidenc e o f charac teristi c Chines e activities , ye t i t doe s no t see m lik e a villag e in Chin a becaus e i t i s s o flims y an d new . Th e street s ar e unim proved , ther e ar e n o decorativ e ston e gateways , pavilions , ston e inscriptions , imposin g doorway s o f mor e substantia l homes—non e of th e thing s reflectin g lon g establishment , gentr y pride , an d wealth . Population. Th e officia l registere d populatio n o f Ban-yan g i s 1,830, o f who m 8 8 ar e ver y recen t arrival s fro m Burma . Te n years ago , a t th e tim e o f founding , th e populatio n i s sai d t o have numbere d abou t a thousand . Ther e ar e somethin g ove r 20 0 "households, " o f whic h 12 0 includ e a ma n an d hi s wif e (th e large numbe r o f incomplet e household s reflectin g th e refuge e characte r o f th e population) . Of th e 12 0 couples , 9 0 o f th e wives are Chines e fro m Yunna n an d 3 0 ar e non-Chines e wives marrie d in Burm a o r Thailand , amon g who m th e larges t numbe r ar e Pai-y i (Thai-Lue) . I n th e te n year s sinc e th e villag e wa s founded , 55 0 babie s hav e bee n bor n (no t countin g stillbirth s an d infan t mortalitie s withi n th e first month) . Ther e ar e local Tha i husband s i n thre e o r fou r household s a t th e edg e o f th e village , whose Pai-Y i wive s ar e connecte d in som e wa y t o th e Yunnanes e villagers. Ther e ar e n o Teochiu-speakin g o r othe r oversea s type s of Chines e i n th e village , bu t ther e ar e a fe w who , thoug h the y ha d bee n residen t i n Yunnan , clai m a "nativ e place " (usuall y ancestral , no t personal ) i n som e othe r provinc e i n th e southwest ern par t o f China . Religions. Abou t one-thir d o f th e populatio n ar e Chines e Mos lems (Hui) . The y maintai n a mosqu e (on e o f th e larges t an d best building s i n th e village) wit h attache d schoo l an d residenc e for thei r Α-Hung o r religiou s teacher . Abou t fort y ver y youn g boys stud y Arabi c i n thi s schoo l lat e eac h afternoon ; thei r tw o or thre e year s o f suc h stud y i s adequat e onl y t o teac h the m ho w t o recit e th e Kora n withou t reall y understandin g Arabi c [ 49 6 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

syntax o r vocabulary . A n itineran t Pakistan i Ima m als o had bee n invited t o spen d th e mont h o f Ramada n an d hel p wit h th e extr a services. Bot h o f th e town' s tw o noodle-shop s (th e onl y restau rants i n th e town ) ar e Moslem . A s th e non-Moslem s sai d o n several occasions , "W e ca n easil y observ e thei r foo d practices , but the y canno t observ e ours , s o their s ten d t o prevail. " I t appears tha t th e Moslem s observ e thei r religiou s practice s meticulously. Two-thirds o f th e populatio n ar e non-Moslems , identifyin g themselves a s Han-chiao ( a ter m no t generall y use d i n China , but curren t wher e th e distinctio n fro m Islam , o r Hui-chiao, be comes important ; Han-chiao literall y mean s "Chines e teach ings"). Thes e household s rais e pigs , mak e liquors , han g their sausage s an d ham s u p t o cur e in the public gaze , and other wise g o abou t thei r infide l way s wit h n o sig n o f frictio n o r com munal il l wil l o f an y kind . Al l person s questione d abou t thi s denied an y frictio n o r sens e o f communa l oppositio n o r separa tion o f an y kind . Moslem s ofte n marr y non-Mosle m wives ; Mos lems wil l b e invite d t o ea t i n non-Mosle m homes , bu t normall y will decline ; non-Moslem s d o no t declin e Mosle m invitations . Each war d (tsu) o f th e villag e contain s bot h Mosle m an d non Moslem households , an d abou t hal f o f th e war d captain s ar e Moslems. Thes e condition s an d proportion s prevai l i n bot h o f the village s visited : on e (Ban-yang ) ha s a Mosle m chairman , and on e ha s a non-Moslem . A first impressio n tha t shoul d b e studied howeve r i s tha t th e Moslem s ten d t o includ e relativel y fewer o f th e poores t familie s an d exercis e a stron g leadershi p role. The non-Mosle m peopl e hav e buil t a smal l an d pitifull y poor looking templ e t o the spirit s o f th e locality. This is not specificall y sectarian i n an y sense , bu t display s th e characte r o f popula r o r vulgar Taoism . I t ha s n o pries t o r attendant . I t consist s o f thre e mud-plastered buildings , earth-floore d an d leaf-thatched , o n a commanding hilltop . The centra l hal l contain s a n altar-tabl e wit h three spiri t tablets , th e centra l on e dedicate d t o "th e efficaciou s spirit o f thi s plac e imperially-enfieffe d t o receiv e an d respon d to offerings, " an d th e sid e one s t o th e spirit s o f crop s an d fields and domesti c animals . Candle s an d incens e ar e burne d befor e these, especiall y o n th e first an d fifteenth day s o f th e luna r [497]

THAILAND: F . W . MOT E

month, b y individual s singl y an d no t i n an y forma l ceremony . Banners attestin g t o petition s mad e o r answered , crudel y lettere d in blac k o n chea p re d cotto n cloth , han g befor e th e alta r an d form th e onl y decoratio n i n th e place . The sid e building s contai n one roo m each , an d ar e use d fo r cookin g an d servin g congrega tional meal s a fe w time s a yea r a t celebration s tha t mar k th e limited communit y lif e o f th e believers. There i s n o Buddhis t templ e no r shrin e i n th e village , an d no villager s ar e identifie d a s activ e Buddhists , thoug h tha t doe s not mea n tha t som e d o no t practic e privat e Buddhis t devotion s in thei r homes . Th e villag e o r som e person s i n i t hav e mad e donations to th e Tha i Buddhis t wat five kilometer s dow n th e road i n th e large r Tha i villag e nea r th e highway . However , i t is no t know n whethe r thes e wer e act s o f piet y o r diplomacy . There ar e seve n o r eigh t Christian s i n th e village , al l thos e noted bein g younge r singl e men . A Canadia n missionar y an d his America n wif e fro m Chiengra i (Pasto r Carlso n o f th e Chin a Inland Mission ) occasionall y visi t th e village . Pasto r Carlso n ha s spent som e year s i n Yunna n i n th e past , speak s th e languag e well, an d i s respecte d fo r hi s learnin g an d hi s abilit y t o hik e the hills alone carrying a heavy pack . The Mosle m mosqu e i s decorate d wit h Chines e saying s an d couplets, on e o f whic h reads : "Trac e Islam , Christianity , Con fucianism an d Buddhis m t o th e on e root with its many branches. " This notabl y ignore s "superstitious " Taoism , bu t suggest s a n atmosphere o f mutua l respec t an d goodwil l tha t i n trut h seem s to prevail , a s fa r a s religio n i s concerned , i n thes e villages . Occupations. Man y o f th e adult s ar e illiterat e o r barely-literat e peasants wh o practice d farmin g i n Yunna n an d wh o liv e prin cipally b y farmin g now . (Th e characte r o f thei r agricultur e i s discussed below. ) Man y o f thes e a t on e tim e serve d a s conscripted soldier s o r wer e attache d t o household s o f better-of f refugee families , som e o f who m hav e sinc e lef t th e villages . A numbe r practic e subsidiar y occupation s suc h a s carpentry , smithing an d horse-shoeing , carting , cookin g an d food-proces sing, sewin g an d tailoring , etc . Ther e ar e tw o barbe r shops , tw o noodle-shop restaurants , tw o rice-millin g plant s (on e water-pow ered; on e wit h gasoline-powere d machinery) , tw o o r thre e full time tailors , an d severa l full-tim e shopkeepers . Ther e ar e seve n [ 498 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NORTHEH N THAILAN D

teachers, an d ther e i s on e "doctor, " perhap s th e onl y regula r college graduat e residen t i n th e village ; h e studie d electrica l en gineering a t Southwes t Unio n Universit y i n Kunmin g an d received som e kin d o f medica l trainin g i n th e arm y afte r that , but canno t b e considere d a rea l doctor . However , h e give s shot s and dispense s medicine s o n dail y round s an d stil l i s addresse d by hi s forme r title , "Medical-Officer Wu. " Th e teacher s hav e had mostl y th e old-styl e Chines e privat e education , excep t th e younger one s wh o attende d modem-typ e countr y hig h school s in Yunnan . Commerc e a s a n occupatio n i s discussed elsewhere . Government. Eac h o f th e Yunnanes e villages , being i n th e bor der zon e beyon d norma l Tha i habitation , i s require d b y Tha i regulations governin g th e hil l tribe s t o hav e a villag e chie f o r headman, i n Tha i th e puyaiban. O n analog y t o this , th e "Haws " too ar e require d t o confor m t o th e triba l convention . Th e Yun nanese hav e me t thi s incongruit y b y organizin g "self-governin g committees" (Tzu-chih-hui) whos e chairma n (hui-chang) func tions a s th e puyaiban vis-a-vi s th e Tha i governmen t an d a s hea d of governmen t internally . Th e relationshi p t o th e Tha i govern ment i s ver y important ; h e receive s instruction s fro m th e loca l officials, i s require d t o kee p a registr y o f al l th e villag e inhabi tants, an d i s responsibl e fo r them . An d h e ca n dea l directl y wit h Thai official s a t th e amphur (district ) level . (N o inquir y wa s made abou t taxation. ) But primaril y th e chairma n i s important a s the actua l governo r and leade r o f hi s village . Th e Ban-yan g chairma n ha s hel d offic e since th e foundin g o f th e village . H e i s no t regarde d a s a highl y effective villag e hea d a s fa r a s th e village' s interna l affair s ar e concerned, bu t h e i s respected a s a competen t an d vigorou s man , especially successfu l i n dealing s wit h th e Thais. He speak s North ern Tha i readily ; hi s wif e i s a Pai-y i (Thai-Lue ) fro m a villag e near Fang , wit h who m h e communicate s i n Thai . H e spend s much o f hi s time attendin g to personal business ou t o f th e village, and because responsibilitie s ar e not effectivel y delegated , nothin g can b e decide d i n hi s absence , an d governmen t tend s t o lag . Thus th e spiri t an d qualit y o f governmen t i n Ban-yan g i s quit e different fro m tha t i n Ban-ma i (se e below) , a fac t remarke d by resident s o f bot h villages . Nonetheless , th e essentia l task s o f community governmen t ar e accomplished . [499]

T H A I L A N D : F . W . MOT E

The self-governin g committe e i s mad e u p o f th e eleve n o r twelve war d chief s (tsu-chang). Th e ward s ar e area s o f th e vil lage, divide d of f s o a s t o provid e convenien t group s o f eightee n or twent y contiguou s household s withou t respec t t o religion , oc cupation, o r statu s o f th e householders . Withi n eac h war d on e household hea d i s "advanced " b y th e other s t o b e thei r war d chief, t o serv e indefinitel y unti l h e get s tire d o f th e offic e an d wants t o ge t ou t o f it . Th e committe e "elects " its chairma n an d vice-chairman b y procedure s know n t o it , no t state d i n an y con stitution, an d fo r indefinit e periods . The y hol d meeting s fro m time t o time , bu t accomplis h mos t o f thei r busines s i n ad hoc meetings singl y o r i n smal l group s wit h th e chairma n a s nee d arises. Th e villag e busines s keep s hi m quit e bus y wheneve r h e is at home or walking about in the village. There i s littl e o r n o crim e i n th e village . Th e street s ar e safe , and home s ar e lef t unlocked . Ther e hav e bee n tw o murder s o f villagers b y othe r Yunnanes e i n te n years , bu t bot h ar e declare d to hav e bee n th e wor k o f Communis t provocateurs . A constan t vigilance i s maintaine d t o ferre t ou t an y Communis t activity , but ther e i s a genera l feelin g o f securit y abou t thi s an d confi dence tha t everythin g whic h goe s o n i n th e villag e i s know n to th e prope r authorities . I n fact , thoug h th e onl y policeme n are th e tw o BP P teachers , ther e i s a n effectiv e informa l syste m of surveillanc e o f th e kin d tha t naturall y develop s i n a smal l rural villag e wher e everyon e know s everyon e else . Som e opium smoking an d pett y gamin g g o on , bu t probabl y les s tha n i n a rural villag e i n Yunna n befor e 1949 . N o prostitutio n i s allowe d within th e villag e limits , an d prostitute s wh o pl y thei r professio n beyond th e limit s ar e fro m Tha i village s farthe r away . Ther e seem t o b e n o secre t societies , protectio n rackets , extortion , o r other suc h practices ; a t least , n o on e coul d b e foun d t o complai n of such , an d th e villag e i s probabl y to o poo r t o suppor t man y parasites. The Village Primary School. Th e Yunnanes e ha d organize d schools fo r thei r childre n fro m th e beginnin g o f thei r refuge e existence i n Burma , an d a s th e presen t village s wer e bein g built , sites wer e se t asid e o n whic h th e school s wer e to b e erected . The suppor t o f elementar y educatio n ha s th e automati c accep tance o f th e citizenr y an d i s a virtu e professe d b y al l leaders . [ 50 0 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NOBTHER N THAILAN D

The difference s amon g th e school s i n th e variou s communitie s derive fro m th e varyin g degree s o f effectivenes s wit h whic h th e village leader s hav e bee n abl e t o organiz e an d utiliz e th e re sources availabl e t o them . But it must be pointed out that these are poor villages, and the best schools , reflectin g th e bes t organizatio n an d th e greates t sacrifices, stil l ar e skin-and-bone s operations . Ai d t o educatio n is on e o f th e greates t need s o f th e villages . The onl y ai d t o th e schools from th e Tha i governmen t i s represented b y the service s of tw o BP P teacher s i n eac h villag e and , a t Ban-yang , a smal l contribution toward th e roofin g o f on e o f th e schoo l building s now unde r construction . Th e school s nee d suppor t fo r childre n who cannot pay the tiny tuition fee, textbooks, equipment, bette r pay fo r teachers , an d man y othe r kind s o f ai d i n orde r bette r to accomplis h thei r educationa l goals . Ye t thei r ver y existenc e indicates th e importance which thes e people attach t o education, and the y stan d a s monument s t o a significan t achievemen t i n community action . The schoo l a t Ban-yan g consist s o f tw o shed-lik e building s and a thir d unde r constructio n (thoug h wor k i s not a t th e moment i n progres s becaus e o f a lac k o f funds) ; thes e building s stand o n thre e side s o f a spaciou s courtyar d an d playground . The mai n buildin g ha s a n offic e an d tw o larg e classrooms . Th e second buildin g ha s thre e classrooms . Th e thir d buildin g wil l be on e ver y larg e roo m tha t ca n b e use d a s classroo m spac e or a s a meetin g hall . Thes e building s ar e i n ba d repair . Thei r only furnishing s ar e battere d desk s an d chair s o f roug h make , many fallin g apart . Ther e ar e fe w decorations , pictures , maps , or teachin g aids . Th e wall s ar e papere d wit h newspapers , tat tered an d dirty . Everythin g look s dust y an d i n bad repair . Rec reation facilitie s consis t of a few swings and a slide; the students themselves collecte d contribution s t o bu y on e basketbal l an d a pair o f badminto n rackets . Adjoining th e schoolyar d i s a compoun d i n whic h th e tw o Thai teacher s (on e wit h wif e an d child ) live , an d wher e on e bachelor Yunnanes e teache r als o lives. This housing i s provide d by th e villag e fo r th e Tha i teachers , who als o receive a regular gift o f vegetables , wine , an d foods,—e.g . ther e i s a conventio n that ever y tim e anyon e i n th e villag e slaughter s a n o x or a pig, [501]

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each Tha i teache r receive s on e kil o o f th e fres h meat . Th e Chi nese teacher s nominall y receiv e five hundre d bah t pe r mont h and n o regularize d gifts , an d sometime s g o withou t salary . Thai i s taugh t durin g th e regula r schoo l hour s fro m 9:3 0 t o 3:00 t o childre n wh o (b y regulation ) hav e no t passe d th e ag e of fourteen , bu t attendanc e i s no t compulsory , an d onl y a littl e over hal f o f th e student s i n th e Ban-yan g schoo l atten d th e Tha i classes. On e o f th e tw o Tha i teacher s i s a lively , friendl y ma n much like d b y th e villager s an d students ; observatio n o f hi s classes ha s show n tha t h e i s a n excellen t teacher . Th e othe r i s notably les s effective. Parent s ar e gla d t o hav e thei r childre n learn som e Thai , fo r convenience , bu t man y o f the m hav e no t yet learne d t o valu e i t a s education . I t i s doubtfu l tha t an y stu dent, unde r presen t conditions , woul d lear n enoug h Tha i t o g o on t o regula r Tha i middle-school . Th e Tha i education , however , is take n muc h mor e seriousl y b y communit y leader s a t Ban-ma i and appear s t o accomplis h mor e there . Th e contras t betwee n the Ban-yan g schoo l an d tha t a t Ban-ma i point s u p th e impossi bility o f generalizin g abou t th e qualit y o f educatio n i n th e vil lages. A t Ban-yan g th e schoo l ha s ha d a histor y o f start s an d failures, o f inadequat e organization , wea k leaders , an d repeate d financial crises . A t presen t onl y one-hal f o r slightl y mor e o f th e children o f schoo l ag e ar e enrolle d (tota l enrollmen t i s 122) , while a t Ban-ma i al l o f th e childre n o f schoo l ag e ar e i n school . Fortunately, tw o o r thre e o f th e Ban-yan g teacher s ar e now quit e concerned abou t th e conditio n o f thei r schoo l an d ar e strivin g to brin g abou t a reorganizatio n o f it . Th e visi t o f th e write r was opportun e fro m thei r poin t o f vie w a s i t helpe d focu s atten tion on th e school' s need . Chinese educatio n i s conducte d i n of f hours , befor e an d afte r the regula r schoo l hour s devote d t o Thai . I t i s fai r t o sa y tha t the communit y (understandably ) regard s th e Chines e educatio n as somethin g ver y important , ha s sacrifice d t o creat e th e school s for tha t purpose , an d wil l striv e t o maintai n an d improv e the m for th e sam e reason . Bu t a fairl y effectiv e teachin g progra m i n Thai i s als o launched , an d i t wil l inevitabl y gro w i n importanc e as th e communit y become s mor e adjuste d t o it s ne w lif e i n Thai land. I n an y event , th e school s ar e th e sensitiv e spo t i n th e com munity a t whic h influenc e ca n b e brough t t o bear , wher e th e [502]

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community ca n b e mad e t o wor k togethe r now , an d wher e th e character o f th e communit y i n th e futur e i s no w bein g molded . Agriculture. Despit e som e small-scal e commerc e withi n an d emanating fro m them , th e Yunnanese village s ar e essentiall y agri cultural. Th e villagers , thoug h the y arrive d a shor t te n year s ago destitut e an d empty-hande d afte r havin g fle d repeatedly , are rathe r prou d tha t wit h thei r bar e hand s the y hav e succeede d in creatin g viabl e communities . Moreover , the y fee l tha t thei r trial perio d wa s passe d tw o o r thre e year s ag o an d tha t no w their economi c foundation s ar e establishe d an d thei r futur e se curity assured . Wit h thei r growin g awarenes s tha t the y wil l b e here awhil e an d tha t the y ca n remai n i n thei r presen t locations , they ar e beginnin g t o tak e a longer-rang e vie w o f thei r agricul tural planning . Alread y thei r impac t o n th e wet-rice-growin g Thai an d Thai-Lu e village s belo w the m an d o n th e hil l tribe s above the m i s evident , an d i t i s sur e t o becom e stronger . When the y first arrived , th e villager s ha d t o clea r fields wher e neither habitatio n (beyon d th e temporar y Kare n villag e o f a fe w houses) no r permanen t cultivatio n ha d existe d before . The y lo cated thei r villag e a t th e botto m edg e o f th e slopes , abov e exist ing padd y fields , an d constructe d som e ne w padd y fields t o gro w wet ric e i n th e manne r t o whic h the y wer e accustome d fro m their Yunnanes e experience , bu t thei r wet-ric e fields wer e con fiscated b y neighborin g Tha i farmers , apparentl y wit h loca l gov ernment approval . S o th e villager s too k t o makin g ne w fields just abov e them , i n whic h the y coul d gro w dr y ric e a s a stapl e crop i n th e mai n growin g seaso n an d a second cro p o f vegetable s or othe r produc e durin g th e winte r growin g season . Th e bound ary betwee n paddy-ric e land s ha s remaine d th e boundar y between Yunnanes e an d Thai (an d Pai-yi ) a t Ban-yang, althoug h at Ban-ma i the y hav e foun d way s o f leasin g som e padd y fields for three - t o five-year period s i n orde r t o gro w som e we t ric e also. A t Ban-yan g the y hesitat e t o conver t dr y fields t o we t one s even wher e i t coul d b e done , for fea r o f losin g them , an d thoug h they tal k abou t eventuall y bein g abl e t o leas e som e padd y lands , they stil l hav e no t don e s o excep t fo r a singl e winte r seaso n at a time , t o gro w dr y o r irrigate d crop s durin g th e seaso n tha t the Thais normally let the fields lie fallow . Almost al l th e regula r resident s o f th e villag e wor k i n thes e [ 50 3 ]

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fields lyin g nea r th e village , bot h th e 1,50 0 rai of field s tha t the y consider t o b e thei r ow n an d th e fields rente d i n th e winte r from thei r Tha i neighbors . Eve n th e schoo l principal, a man fro m a scholarl y famil y wh o ha d neve r use d hi s hand s before , tell s with self-deprecatio n mixe d wit h humo r ho w h e ha d t o lear n to di g th e soi l an d d o peasan t labor . Mos t o f th e leadin g peopl e in th e villag e wer e classe d a s "ric h peasants " o r 'landlords " by th e Chines e Communists , wer e mad e th e objec t o f clas s war , and henc e wer e force d t o flee . Thi s mean s tha t agricultura l man agement skill s an d experienc e ten d t o b e hig h amon g them , an d the agricultur e o f th e villag e i s consequentl y quit e progressive . This ha s helpe d the m t o rais e thei r statu s sinc e thei r arrival . They not e tha t whe n the y arrive d the y ha d t o hir e themselve s out t o th e Tha i farmer s a s da y laborer s a t th e rat e o f thre e bah t per da y (collecte d i n unhuske d rice) . No w the y hav e becom e employers o f larg e number s o f Thai s t o hel p the m wor k thei r fields, a t wage s o f seve n o r eigh t bah t pe r day , pai d i n eac h case da y b y day . Thi s chang e fro m hire d laborer s t o employer s of labo r is symboli c o f th e rapi d advanc e tha t thei r superio r agriculture plu s thei r hard-workin g habit s hav e mad e possible . Farmers wit h a littl e capita l ar e beginnin g t o develo p frui t orchards. Tangerine s d o well, but on e must wai t thre e year s afte r planting smal l grafte d tree s befor e a crop ca n b e harvested . Som e poorer villager s spok e wit h env y o f thos e wh o coul d affor d thi s kind o f development . Th e bes t orchar d i n th e villag e ha s bee n producing tangerine s fo r tw o seasons , an d th e owne r i s no w transforming i t graduall y t o Iamyai , whic h bea r fo r a longe r lif e after th e tree s ge t starte d (tangerine s bea r fo r a tota l o f onl y about seve n years) , an d whic h ear n bigge r profit s pe r man-year per-acre. Thi s orchardis t i s als o experimentin g wit h othe r fruits , grows commercia l vegetabl e crops , raise s larg e number s o f chickens an d ducks , an d ha s experimente d wit h raisin g fish. H e uses chemica l fertilizer s applie d accordin g t o soi l tests , insecti cides, scientifi c procedures . Hi s furthe r developmen t i s no t lim ited by lack of water o r land, but by lack of labor . Most farmer s gro w thei r wet-seaso n cro p o f dr y hill-lan d rice , then plan t a winter cas h cro p o f garlic , onions, ginger, so y beans, etc. Marke t condition s hav e fluctuated, an d som e hav e suffere d losses. Thre e year s ag o ther e wa s overproductio n o f potatoes , [ 50 4 ]

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and las t year overproductio n o f garlic , the latte r becaus e s o many neighboring Thai s bega n t o gro w garli c i n imitatio n o f th e Yun nanese. Bu t graduall y the y ar e learnin g ho w t o pla n fo r th e mar ket an d ho w t o enlarg e thei r marketin g area . I n additio n t o th e field crops , eac h househol d maintain s fin e vegetabl e garden s fo r table use , raise s pig s an d poultry , an d produce s it s ow n eggs . Moslems, bein g unabl e eithe r t o rais e o r t o ea t pork , ten d t o raise mor e poultry . The village s a t th e lowe r leve l (jus t a t th e edg e o f th e paddy rice zone ) hav e counterpar t village s a t mid-leve l betwee n them selves an d th e highes t mountai n elevations . A t th e mid-level s there ar e som e fine plateau s o f extensiv e area , easil y worked , where som e crop s gro w particularl y well . Th e exac t relationshi p between th e lower-leve l village s an d th e mid-leve l i s not entirel y clear t o th e presen t write r (wh o ha s no t observe d th e mid-leve l agriculture), bu t i n par t i t i s a matte r o f cro p diversification , made possibl e b y th e varyin g climat e o f th e tw o levels . Fo r ex ample, goo d potatoe s canno t b e grow n a t th e lowe r level , henc e the Thai s canno t seriousl y compet e i n th e potat o market . Th e crop comin g i n fro m hig h Burmes e growin g area s formerl y con trolled th e marke t i n Norther n Thailand , bu t i n th e las t tw o seasons Burmes e potatoe s hav e no t bee n abl e t o enter , s o loca l prices hav e risen , makin g potato-growin g i n Thailan d a ver y profitable activity . See d potatoes ar e grown a t th e lower elevatio n in th e winte r season , the n th e smal l an d unmarketabl e see d po tatoes ar e take n t o th e highe r fields an d plante d durin g th e mai n growing season . Thi s cro p need s littl e attentio n afte r bein g planted, s o th e farme r ca n retur n t o th e lowe r fields (fou r o r five hours ' walk ) afte r a fe w day s o f labo r i n th e potat o fields and devot e mos t o f hi s tim e t o th e lowlan d dry-ric e crop . Th e upland fields ca n als o produc e certai n othe r crop s o f vegetable s and grain s (especiall y maize ) bette r tha n th e lowe r fields, s o there seem s t o b e reaso n enoug h t o hav e som e smal l par t o f the farmin g populatio n permanentl y statione d there . The popula tion figures sho w somethin g o f th e relationship : Ban-yan g wit h 1,830 peopl e an d Ban-ma i wit h 68 0 ar e relate d t o th e mid-leve l villages of Maeno m (Chinesenam e P'an-lung ) an d Hui-tsung-p'o , of whic h th e forme r ha s 15 2 peopl e an d th e latte r a similarl y small populatio n (exac t figures no t ascertained) . [ 50 5 ]

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Another facto r i n th e relationshi p betwee n th e level s i s th e production o f opium . I t seem s apparen t fro m th e report s o f vil lagers (corroborate d b y Manndorff s observations ) tha t ther e ar e a numbe r o f derelicts , overage d soldier s i n advance d stage s o f addiction, wh o canno t b e productiv e farmer s bu t wh o ca n pro duce enoug h opiu m fo r thei r ow n need s an d wh o therefor e mus t stay a t th e highe r elevation s a t whic h opiu m grows . Thei r number i s smal l an d i s decreasing , fo r th e profit s fro m opiu m ar e not enoug h t o attrac t th e norma l hard-workin g Yunnanes e farmer. Bu t a smal l amoun t o f suc h opiu m productio n probabl y will continu e unti l th e har d cor e o f otherwis e useles s derelict s liquidates itself . (Se e belo w unde r "Aspect s o f th e Opiu m Problem.") The villager s spea k o f themselve s diffidentl y a s backwar d peo ple fro m a remote borde r are a o f Yunnan , not worth y representa tives o f China' s mor e advance d regions . T o som e exten t thei r agriculture reflect s th e partia l trut h o f this , thoug h thei r ow n awareness o f th e fac t show s thei r susceptibilit y t o innovatio n and improvement . A n agricultura l exper t currentl y workin g among the m state s the m t o b e "fift y year s behin d th e mos t ad vanced agricultur e i n Japa n o r Taiwan , bu t t o a simila r degre e in advanc e o f th e agricultur e a t presen t practice d al l abou t them," an d h e note s thei r keennes s t o lear n ne w methods . Thi s same exper t state s tha t th e method s o f th e Yunnanes e a s no w practiced i n th e villages , particularl y i n winte r cropping , i n th e use of fertilizers , i n th e introduction o f new crops , in th e improve ment o f varietie s throug h selectiv e breeding , an d i n thei r approach t o agricultur e a s a commercialize d activity , ar e alread y being widel y copie d an d ar e bringin g abou t a transformatio n of th e agricultur e o f th e region . Thi s i s said wit h particula r refer ence t o th e lowlan d farmers—Thai s an d Pai-y i especially—bu t it coul d als o b e applie d t o th e hil l tribes . Althoug h th e impac t among th e hil l tribe s i s les s evident , th e Yunnanes e villager s have starte d givin g vegetabl e seed s t o tribesme n i n neighborin g villages, hav e taugh t the m ho w t o plan t vegetabl e crops , an d have provide d the m wit h a marke t fo r thei r production . Lah u women wer e note d sellin g Chinese-typ e vegetable s i n Ban-yang , and the Yao villagers were reported t o do the same. A responsibl e officia l i n Ban-yan g sai d tha t i n a goo d yea r [ 50 6 ]

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like th e curren t on e an d th e previou s year , th e tota l sal e o f agri cultural produc e ou t o f th e village s o f Ban-yan g an d Ban-ma i reaches a gros s i n exces s o f on e millio n baht , an d tha t i t i s stead ily increasing . Potatoe s ar e th e bes t singl e cas h crop , bu t frui t may displace them in first place in a few years. Because o f th e importanc e tha t th e Tha i governmen t attache s to experiment s wit h whea t productio n i n Norther n Thailand , some question s abou t i t wer e pu t t o a numbe r o f farmer s an d village leaders . The y ar e experience d whea t growers , whea t hav ing bee n a stapl e cro p i n Yunna n an d durin g thei r year s i n Burma. The y ar e als o familiar wit h buckwheat , barley , an d othe r grain crop s tha t gro w a t hig h elevations . The y insis t tha t whea t will no t produc e th e yiel d o r th e quality , i n thes e lowland s o f Northern Thailan d o r i n th e adjoinin g hil l location s lik e thos e of Ban-yan g an d Ban-mai , t o justif y th e Tha i government' s present effort s t o introduc e i t there . The y als o repor t tha t see d wheat brough t i n fro m Burm a an d plante d som e year s ag o b y themselves eve n a t th e middl e an d hig h elevation s abov e th e present village s produce d excellen t yiel d o f hig h qualit y i n th e first season , bu t s o exhauste d th e soi l tha t the y coul d no t ge t a secon d cro p despit e attempt s t o rotat e an d fertilize . Th e tech nical problem s o f growin g whea t i n thes e soil s a t presen t remai n unsolved. Bu t thes e farmer s shoul d b e usefu l participant s i n an y joint experiment s wit h Tha i agricultura l experts , especiall y i f their presen t leve l of knowledg e an d experienc e i s not overlooke d by suc h expert s who , i t wa s suggested , occasionall y ten d t o b e somewhat bureaucrati c an d arbitrar y i n dealin g wit h thei r "poo r ignorant cousins " of th e hills. Animal Husbandry. Cattl e fo r slaughterin g ar e purchased fro m the Thais . On e mai n reaso n fo r thi s i s tha t a t Ban-yan g animal s cannot b e herde d an d protecte d fro m thiever y b y resident s o f neighboring village s (Ban-ma i report s muc h les s difficult y o f thi s kind). Draf t animals , mainl y humped-oxe n an d mule s (ther e ar e no wate r buffal o i n eithe r village ) ar e importan t fo r cartin g an d for packin g produce , an d man y household s hav e suc h animals . Since we t ric e i s no t grown , an d als o partly becaus e o f th e pov erty o f man y o f th e villagers , field s ar e tille d b y ho e an d no t plowed b y anima l labor ; thi s remain s tru e eve n a s condition s im prove, despit e th e fac t tha t thes e peopl e ar e accustome d t o th e [ 50 7 ]

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use o f th e plo w i n Yunna n an d hav e experimente d wit h dee p cultivation a t hig h elevation s i n Burm a an d eve n i n Thailand. 4 The failur e t o us e plow s a t presen t probabl y i s t o b e explaine d as a temporar y adjustmen t t o change d environmenta l condition s and economi c circumstances . Som e o f th e villager s tal k abou t using ligh t power-cultivator s i n th e future , whe n the y ca n affor d to bu y them , an d som e firs t experiment s wit h suc h equipmen t are reporte d t o hav e commence d i n th e summe r o f 1965 , afte r this writer's visi t to the villages. Horses ar e a statu s symbol , an d the y ar e necessar y fo r trave l in an d ou t o f th e hill s i n th e we t season . Th e better-of f familie s often hav e on e o r tw o horse s o f th e smal l Yunna n bree d (mis takenly calle d b y man y outsider s th e "Mongolia n pony") ; thes e are strictl y use d a s saddl e an d pac k horses , an d customaril y ar e not gelded . Donkey s ar e use d chiefl y fo r breedin g mule s whic h carry th e bulk y agricultura l produc e dow n th e mountai n trail s to th e level s wher e the y ca n b e shifte d t o ox-carts . Horse s ca n pack fifty kilos , mules eighty . Non-Moslem household s usuall y kee p a pi g o r two , alway s tightly penne d an d unde r a shed roof, an d neve r allowe d t o roa m freely; pigpen s usuall y adjoi n th e househol d garde n patches , bu t are kept a s far fro m livin g quarters a s possible. No coun t o f animal s wa s made , bu t ther e appea r t o b e fewe r than would be normal for a village in Yunnan. Commerce. Th e si x o r eigh t commercia l establishment s i n th e village ar e al l of ver y smal l size, and mos t villager s make periodi c visits t o Fan g t o purchas e supplies . Bu t cloth , foods , soap , no tions, candies , trinkets , simpl e medicines , cosmetics , batteries fo r transistor radios , kerosen e fo r lamps , etc. , ca n b e bough t i n th e village. A numbe r o f peddler s wh o trave l amon g th e hil l tribe s ar e based i n th e village ; the y usuall y far m i n th e we t seaso n an d peddle thei r good s i n th e winte r an d dr y seasons . The local shop s supply mos t o f thei r stock , probabl y o n a partnershi p basis . Thi s trade appear s t o b e ver y small , involving littl e capita l investmen t 4

Cf. Gordo n Young' s brie f repor t o f a village i n Amphu r Fan g calle d Ph a Luang, where , a t a n elevatio n o f 6,00 0 feet , Yunnanes e wer e usin g oxe n t o plow fields for th e stapl e cro p o f buckwhea t (Youn g 1962:83) . The exac t locatio n of thi s village , it s populatio n size , an d it s Chines e nam e ar e unknow n t o thi s author, an d th e villager s ma y hav e move d sinc e Young' s descriptio n wa s writte n in 1961 .

[ 50 8 ]

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and smal l profits . Althoug h a littl e opiu m get s int o thi s trade , these mountai n peddler s ar e no t primaril y opiu m traders , an d all person s questione d sai d tha t t o brea k int o th e opiu m trad e in a wa y t o mak e i t worthwhil e require d larg e capita l an d in volved grea t risks . There i s als o som e peddlin g o f simpl e ware s t o Tha i an d othe r lowland villages , bu t i t i s les s extensiv e tha n th e trad e amon g the hill tribes and is not expected to increase. The marketin g o f agricultura l produc e i s th e majo r busines s activity o f th e village. The villag e production i s in part markete d in Fang , thoug h increasingl y i t reache s market s a s fa r awa y a s Chiengmai (15 0 km.). The sam e buyers wh o specializ e i n buyin g up villag e productio n fo r sal e i n larg e lot s elsewher e als o bu y up produc e fro m Tha i an d Thai-Lu e village s nearby , arrang e transport, an d dea l wit h th e bi g buyers . I n this , connections wit h merchants i n th e town s ar e important , an d thes e ar e no t exclu sively with fello w Yunnanese . The commercia l lif e o f th e village s wa s onl y casuall y observed ; it was not possible to study it carefully . Contacts with the Outside World. I n term s o f th e movemen t of persons , contact s wit h th e outsid e worl d (farthe r tha n Fan g or Chiengmai ) ar e extremel y limited . Though som e leaders trave l several time s a yea r t o Chiengmai , an d eve n occasionall y t o Bangkok, most o f th e population hav e not gon e farther tha n Fan g (23 km. ) i n th e directio n o f Thailand . Person s comin g int o th e village ar e note d an d recorded . Tribesme n com e t o sel l thing s and t o buy , t o borrow , an d t o see k advice . Thai s an d othe r low landers com e occasionally ; youn g monk s o f th e Tha i templ e fiv e kilometers awa y ar e frequentl y t o b e see n i n th e village . Tha i officials, mostl y Borde r Patro l Policemen , com e regularly , an d local civi l official s com e occasionally . Non-Yunnanes e Chines e merchants fro m th e outsid e ar e sai d no t t o com e int o th e village s and no t t o b e welcom e there , althoug h th e villager s bu y fro m them i n the Thai towns nearby. There is no regular transportatio n in an d ou t o f Ban-yang ; good s mus t b e move d b y ox-car t a t twenty bah t pe r cart-loa d pe r tri p ( 7 kilometers) , an d person s usually g o o n foo t i n th e dr y weather , an d b y horsebac k whe n the roa d become s nearl y impassabl e t o al l vehicles an d t o pedes trians in the wet season . USIS an d Britis h Informatio n film truck s hav e com e int o th e [509]

THAILAND : F . W . MOT E

village o n tw o o r thre e occasions ; thei r visit s wer e highl y appre ciated. Durin g th e pas t fiv e year s malaria-contro l worker s hav e come onc e a year t o spray insecticides , but n o othe r publi c healt h or other service s have eve r come . ( A TB surve y is badly needed. ) The missionar y Pasto r Carlso n fro m Chiengra i walk s ove r tw o or thre e time s a yea r an d onc e cam e wit h hi s wife . A travelin g Pathan Ima m wa s i n th e villag e t o help wit h th e specia l activitie s of th e mont h o f Ramadan , 1965 . The Chines e Embass y i n Bang kok, afte r severa l year s o f littl e o r n o direc t contact , i n 196 4 sent som e official s i n fo r a brie f visit . Fou r technica l adviser s from Taiwan , i n th e field s o f medicine , foo d processing , agricul ture, an d anima l husbandr y wer e i n th e village s i n 196 5 fo r a period o f si x to twelv e months . Th e Princes s Mothe r o f Thailan d visited th e villag e briefl y b y helicopte r i n 1964 , o n he r wa y t o visit a ne w schoo l sh e ha d sponsore d i n th e Ya o villag e abov e Ban-yang. He r visi t mad e a dee p impression , an d photograph s of he r take n i n th e villag e han g i n severa l places . Th e Governo r of Chiengma i wit h a n entourag e o f mor e tha n a hundred person s made a n inspection o f the village in the fall of 1964 . An America n anthropologis t spen t a fe w month s i n th e villag e some tw o o r thre e year s ago , usin g i t a s a bas e fro m whic h t o study th e Ya o peopl e nearby . Othe r tha n thi s limite d movemen t of persons, the villagers see no outside faces . But th e isolatio n ha s bee n greatl y ameliorate d i n th e pas t tw o or thre e year s b y th e widesprea d us e o f inexpensiv e transisto r radios. Almos t ever y househol d ha s one , an d som e ar e well-in stalled wit h goo d aerials . However , radi o receptio n leave s some thing t o b e desired . Th e Communis t Chines e statio n i n Kunming, a 700-K W transmitter , come s i n lou d an d clea r a t all time s an d carrie s specia l broadcast s t o th e region , bu t th e hatred fo r thing s Communis t Chines e i s s o grea t that , withou t any outsid e effor t bein g mad e t o preven t peopl e fro m listening , these broadcast s receiv e very littl e an d alway s scornfu l attention . The onl y Mandari n broadcast s tha t ar e reliabl y lou d an d clea r are thos e fro m Radi o Australia , twic e a day ; thes e ar e th e chie f source o f new s fo r th e villagers , an d the y ar e avidl y followed . The Tha i radi o station s ar e listene d t o fo r music , but knowledg e of Tha i i s no t widesprea d enoug h t o mak e th e Tha i new s an d commentary broadcast s effective . Thai-languag e broadcast s o f [510]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NOBTHER N THAILAN D

educational o r instructiona l natur e coul d b e effectiv e wit h th e school children . Voic e o f Americ a ca n b e locate d o n th e radio s but canno t b e receive d clearl y enoug h s o tha t anyon e trie s t o listen t o them . Radi o Taiwa n canno t b e received . Th e villager s are inten t radi o listener s an d tr y doggedl y t o find broadcast s to listen to . A few copie s o f som e Bangko k Chines e dailie s reac h th e vil lages, man y day s late . The y ar e not widel y circulate d an d seem to b e littl e read . Ther e i s a n interes t i n magazines , pictures , audiovisual educatio n materials , books , an d th e lik e tha t far ex ceeds th e meage r supply ; whe n questione d abou t th e nee d fo r a bookstore , however , everyon e replie d tha t ther e wa s no t enough mone y i n th e villag e fo r book s t o hav e an y sale . A fre e lending or reading library in each village, directed towar d recreational an d self-stud y need s o f children , youth , an d villag e leaders undoubtedly would be very popular. Relations with the Thai. Whe n aske d ho w the y fee l abou t Thailand, al l villagers , fro m headme n t o commo n villager s i n the privacy o f thei r ow n homes, express gratitude t o the countr y for th e opportunit y i t ha s give n the m t o star t lif e ove r again . This seem s t o b e a genera l an d a sincer e sentiment . Moreover , they lov e th e lan d the y no w liv e o n an d remar k o n it s beaut y and fertility. Thei r attitud e towar d th e Thai king and royal fam ily is one of respect, and towar d th e central government o f Thailand one of confidence . But thei r attitude towar d local petty official s i s one of distrust , partly a carry-ove r fro m th e usua l Chines e peasan t distrus t of government a t th e lowe r levels , an d partl y a consequenc e o f the insecurit y o f thei r refuge e status . The y hav e learne d tha t small official s expec t t o b e bribed ; thi s neithe r surprise s the m nor arouses resentment as long as the amounts remain reasonable. But the y tr y t o avoi d al l contac t wit h officials , feelin g the y wil l be found vulnerable to larger-scale extortion, and all having some distant example s t o point to . It i s unlikely tha t the y woul d eve r willingly g o to th e Thai court s to seek justice o r to Thai law-enforcement officer s t o seek protection. Most important i n their lives is the character o f th e local Thai farmers, thei r neighbor s i n th e village s jus t belo w the m o n th e wet-rice land . The y cal l Centra l Thai s "T'ai-tzu, " an d cal l th e [511]

THAILAND : F . W . MOT E

local Norther n Thai s "Kuo-lo, " distinguishing the m a s tw o differ ent races . "Kuo-lo " i s no t a Yunnanes e word ; i t appear s t o b e one the y learne d fro m on e o f th e hil l tribes . Th e relation s be tween Ban-yan g an d th e near-b y Kuo-l o village s i n th e pas t hav e been marke d b y violence ; mor e tha n twent y o f the villager s hav e been murdere d b y th e Kuo-l o i n te n years , mostl y i n connectio n with arme d robbery . Ban-mai , b y contrast , report s ver y goo d relations wit h it s neighboring village s (althoug h th e neares t one s are Thai-Lue , no t Kuo-lo) ; althoug h th e villager s i n Ban-ma i share th e unflatterin g cliche s abou t Kuo-l o character , the y repor t a lac k o f violenc e an d muc h bette r relations . An d eve n a t Ban yang th e relation s betwee n th e tw o kind s o f village s ar e mor e constructive tha n destructive . Th e proble m o f orde r an d safet y on th e roa d leadin g int o th e villag e ha s greatl y improved , an d although considerabl e los s i s regularl y sustaine d (particularl y theft o f poultr y an d animals , uprootin g o f frui t tree s i n newl y planted orchards , theft o f tools, plundering o f crops, and the like), the Yunnanes e o n th e on e han d constantl y devis e bette r mean s of guardin g agains t thi s an d o n th e othe r ten d t o shru g i t of f as par t o f th e pric e the y mus t pa y fo r bein g allowe d t o liv e here. And, i n an y event, i t i s a controllable an d diminishin g prob lem whic h doe s not seriousl y affec t th e future o f th e villages. As th e youn g Yunnanes e childre n lear n Tha i i n school , an d as marriag e an d othe r relationship s wit h th e Thai s increase , understanding betwee n th e tw o communitie s wil l improve . A t present i t ca n b e note d tha t th e Kuo-l o ar e anxiou s t o wor k fo r the Yunnanes e a s winter-seaso n laborer s i n thei r farms , depen d on th e Yunnanes e t o bu y thei r agricultura l products , an d imitat e the Yunnanes e i n pattern s o f livelihood , especiall y i n agricultura l technology an d i n diet . Th e neare r village s hav e notabl y increased i n prosperit y i n recen t years—evidence d i n th e build ing o f man y ne w an d bette r houses—an d th e departur e o f th e Yunnanese would have a serious adverse affect o n the region . Belations wit h th e Borde r Patro l Policemen-teacher s ar e rathe r good. Th e Yunnanes e regar d the m a s policeme n primaril y an d feel tha t som e o f the m ar e no t highl y qualifie d t o teach , bu t nonetheless gran t the m th e respec t tha t teacher s shoul d b e ac corded. N o doub t thes e teacher s ar e makin g a n impac t o n th e minds o f th e childre n i n thei r classes . Th e childre n gathe r i n [ 512 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NOKTHEB N THAILAN D

the schoo l yar d ever y mornin g a t 9:3 0 t o recit e th e oat h o f al legiance, salut e th e flag, an d sin g th e nationa l anthe m (al l i n Bangkok Thai) , an d proudl y clai m tha t the y sin g th e anthe m better tha n th e childre n i n th e nearb y Kuo-l o village . I f ther e were som e bilingua l teachin g o f th e Thai , th e languag e instruc tion coul d b e mad e mor e effective ; man y o f th e childre n sa y that the y ca n pronounc e t o th e teacher' s satisfaction , bu t canno t explain. N o doub t th e Yunnanes e villager s ar e bot h bette r abl e to profi t fro m th e presenc e o f th e BP P i n thei r village s an d t o defend themselve s agains t abus e tha n ar e th e hil l tribes , amon g whom complaint s agains t BP P encroachment s ar e sometime s much mor e serious . Realisti c cooperatio n betwee n th e Yunnanes e and th e BP P i n an y enlightene d progra m coul d b e expected . On th e leve l o f contac t betwee n villag e leader s an d mid-to high-level Tha i officials , th e Yunnanes e sa y tha t quit e satisfactor y understandings hav e bee n achieve d i n recen t years . Th e villag e leaders themselve s profes s t o fee l tha t n o seriou s problem s be tween themselve s an d th e Thai governmen t exis t or are in dange r of erupting . Relations with the Chinese Government in Taiwan. Th e scop e of persona l contact s wit h Taiwa n an d wit h th e Chines e Embass y in Bangko k (a s note d above , p . 510 ) ha s bee n ver y limited . The presen t write r ha s n o basi s fo r discussin g th e rea l natur e of an y organizationa l contacts , bu t th e attitud e o f th e villager s toward Taiwa n ca n b e know n wit h som e certainty . Th e calenda r system o f th e Republi c o f China , outlawe d b y th e Chines e Com munists, i s retaine d b y th e villagers , an d thi s i s sometime s take n to impl y allegianc e t o th e governmen t o n Taiwan . A negativ e and perhap s mor e accurat e explanatio n i s tha t ther e i s n o othe r modern calendar , excludin g th e on e th e Communist s hav e prom ulgated, fo r Chines e t o adopt . Nominall y th e villag e authoritie s profess allegianc e t o th e Republic , an d Chian g Kai-shek' s pictur e is hun g alongsid e tha t o f th e Tha i kin g i n thei r officia l rooms , but her e agai n a negativ e o r passiv e explanatio n probabl y come s closer t o th e truth . Fo r th e on e definit e politica l attitud e tha t all of thes e peopl e shar e in unshakable convictio n i s that Chines e Communism i s evil . Beyon d that , the y ar e politicall y passive . They ar e wel l informe d o n th e tru e natur e o f Chines e Commu nism, havin g live d unde r i t an d havin g bee n force d t o flee i n [513]

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order t o preserv e thei r lives . Th e Moslem s amon g the m ad d t o that a deep-seate d resentmen t o f th e Chines e Communis t treat ment o f thei r religion . Bu t i t woul d b e incorrec t t o sa y tha t th e Yunnanese villager s fee l a positiv e loyalt y t o th e governmen t in Taiwan . Moreover , the y hav e n o interes t i n Taiwan a s a place ; they fee l luck y no t t o hav e bee n evacuate d t o Taiwa n an d sa y that the y woul d refus e t o g o ther e i n th e future . The y explai n this b y sayin g tha t Taiwa n i s s o poo r an d overcrowde d tha t un skilled an d destitut e peasant s lik e themselve s woul d hav e n o way o f supportin g themselve s there . Thi s lac k o f enthusias m to ward Taiwa n i s simila r t o th e attitude s note d amon g th e mor e recent refugee s i n Hon g Kon g an d elsewhere , an d i s perhap s not surprising . Aspects of the Opium Problem. Opiu m affect s th e dail y live s of a numbe r o f th e inhabitant s o f th e villages , a s i t doe s th e daily live s o f mos t o f th e peopl e i n Norther n Thailand . Althoug h outlawed i n Thailan d i n 1958 , it wa s stil l smoke d openl y i n Fan g City a s lat e a s 196 1 o r 196 2 (accordin g t o villag e gossip ) an d can stil l b e procure d ther e withou t to o muc h trouble . However , the genera l tren d towar d suppressio n pushe d vigorousl y b y th e Thai governmen t ha s had th e effec t o f inducin g th e use of heroin , which th e Yunnanes e villager s greatl y fea r an d whic h the y clai m is not used by any of themselves . The traditiona l attitud e towar d opium , a s contraste d t o heroi n and th e othe r mor e powerfu l derivatives , i s tha t opiu m i s no t a ba d o r dangerou s thin g i f use d i n moderation , an d tha t i t ca n be use d i n moderatio n indefinitel y withou t addiction . Mil d us e of opiu m wa s particularl y prevalen t i n periphera l area s o f Chin a like Yunnan . Thu s i t i s no t surprisin g tha t a numbe r o f olde r villagers hav e bee n mil d user s o f opiu m a t on e tim e o r another , and tha t mos t peopl e thin k first o f a pip e whe n the y fee l an y illness o r discomfort . Seriou s discussio n o f th e proble m wit h som e younger schoolteacher s an d othe r mor e modern-minde d person s in th e village s lead s t o th e conclusio n tha t th e numbe r o f stead y users i s smal l an d tha t ther e i s a stron g feelin g agains t eve n the mil d us e o f opiu m amon g th e young . Strengthenin g th e schools an d th e yout h club s an d providin g recreationa l an d edu cational materia l t o sustai n th e modern-minde d resistanc e t o i t should b e adequat e mean s fo r controllin g th e opium-smokin g [514]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

problem. Althoug h i t i s importan t tha t th e school s an d othe r progressive force s i n th e village s b e aide d i n thei r wor k o f keep ing u p th e communit y morale , th e opiu m consumptio n proble m at presen t mus t be regarded a s a minor issue , not greatl y differen t from th e proble m a s i t ha s existe d i n Yunna n fo r a century , an d in no dange r o f gettin g ou t of hand unde r presen t an d foreseeabl e conditions. Another aspec t o f th e opiu m proble m concern s it s productio n and th e economic s o f productio n vis-a-vi s othe r kind s o f agricul tural production . Th e 196 1 repor t o f th e Hil l Tribe s Divisio n on triba l people s an d th e opiu m proble m present s a roug h formula: on e man s labo r fo r on e growin g season , workin g on e rai o f land , produce s on e kilogra m o f ra w opium , wort h abou t 1,000 bah t a t th e price s pai d t o th e produce r i n th e hills . Discus sion wit h th e Yunnanes e villagers , without suggestin g knowledg e of thi s formula , tende d to corroborat e it s validity . Bu t the y als o added th e opinio n tha t opiu m productio n require d intensiv e labor an d tha t th e productio n ca n b e cu t i n hal f b y a sudde n change i n th e weathe r durin g th e fe w day s o f collectin g th e sap. Thus the y claim tha t sinc e they now have other good agricul tural opportunities , amon g th e Yunnanes e o f al l kind s onl y a derelict unfi t fo r productiv e labor , i.e. , a n addic t willin g t o liv e a minima l existenc e fo r th e sak e o f smokin g opium , woul d wast e his tim e growin g opium . Accordin g t o th e villagers , potatoe s which gro w bes t a t th e sam e elevatio n a s opium ca n i n one grow ing seaso n gros s on e ma n 4,000-5,00 0 baht ; moreover , th e labo r is fa r les s intensiv e (enoug h s o tha t th e farme r ca n liv e a t th e lower elevation , simultaneousl y growin g anothe r winte r cro p o f some othe r cas h produc t there) , an d th e yiel d is certain. I n addi tion, other winte r crop s grow n a t lowe r elevations , suc h a s garlic , ginger, etc. , ca n gros s a ma n 3,00 0 bah t i n on e season . Althoug h market variabilit y ca n (an d ha s a t times ) upse t thes e figures, in genera l th e hard-workin g Yunnanes e farme r alway s ha s a choice o f severa l othe r crop s i n th e winte r (opium ) growin g season tha t ca n guarante e hi m greate r incom e wit h les s labo r and risk . Thes e figures wer e checke d ou t wit h man y person s in al l kind s o f conversationa l situations , an d ther e seem s t o b e no reason to doubt their basic validity. Attitudes toward the Various Hill Tribes. Yunna n i s ethnicall y [ 51 5 ]

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the mos t comple x regio n o f China . Th e Yunnanes e villager s i n Thailand hav e live d al l thei r live s wit h minorit y group s o f th e same ethnic identifications a s most of thos e now present i n North ern Thailan d an d classe d b y th e Tha i governmen t a s hil l tribes ; they kno w the m well , an d hav e generall y goo d relation s wit h them, especiall y thos e the y kno w bes t fro m Yunnan . Chinese-influenced Hill Tribes. The y clas s thre e triba l group s as being most influence d b y Chines e cultur e an d most susceptibl e to thei r leadershi p an d influenc e now . Thes e ar e th e Lisu , th e Yao, an d th e Meo , i n tha t order . The y stat e tha t usuall y 70-8 5 percent o f th e Lis u an d Ya o peopl e o f bot h sexe s an d al l age s are abl e t o spea k fluen t Chines e o f th e Yunnanes e dialect , hono r Chinese writing , an d occasionall y ar e eve n literat e i n Chinese . The Me o ar e les s reverentia l towar d thing s Chinese , bu t amon g most group s know n t o th e Yunnanes e a t leas t 5 0 percen t o f th e total, includin g almos t al l o f th e adul t males , ar e abl e t o spea k Chinese. The y particularl y lik e th e harmoniou s characte r o f th e Lisu an d Yao , thoug h the y objec t t o thei r loos e sexua l morals . They stat e tha t al l thre e group s com e t o the m fo r guidanc e i n religious matters , fo r seed s an d growin g instructions , fo r loan s and other aid , and to conduct business. The relationshi p describe d b y th e villager s between themselve s and thes e hil l tribe s wa s particularl y eviden t i n th e Ya o villag e near Ban-yang , visite d on e da y i n th e compan y o f som e o f th e villagers. Th e Ya o villag e headman' s wife , whe n aske d ho w i t happened tha t sh e spoke such perfect Yunnanes e (an d he r villag e has bee n mor e o r les s i n it s presen t are a o f Thailan d fo r fort y years), replied : "Wh y not ? W e com e fro m th e 'Grea t Dynasty ' [ta-ch'ao] an d w e spea k th e languag e o f th e 'Grea t Court.' " The Yunnanes e find th e Yaos ' conservativ e attachmen t t o thing s Chinese somewha t touchin g an d slightl y amusing . The y sa y th e Yaos al l wan t a pai r o f moc k copie s o f oldfashione d clot h shoe s to b e burie d in , s o tha t thei r spirit s ca n presen t themselve s a t the cour t o f th e Chines e emperors . And , i t i s said , th e Yao s wil l pay highe r price s fo r oldfashione d stapl e commoditie s fro m China tha n fo r ne w superio r good s fro m elsewhere . Thei r shamans recit e incantation s fro m Chines e texts , an d thi s make s some knowledg e o f Chines e essentia l t o them . I n th e villag e visited everyon e encountered , fro m ver y youn g childre n t o ol d [ 51 6 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

grandmothers, spok e quit e passabl e Yunnanes e an d wa s prou d to d o so . Th e form s o f courtes y extende d t o th e visitor s wer e all consistent with Chines e models. The Thai-Lue (Pai-yi). Th e Yunnanes e kno w th e Thai-Lu e (Pai-yi) fro m Yunnan , fro m Burma , an d a s residents i n Norther n Thailand. The y lik e the m an d find the m ver y tractabl e an d pleasant people . Thai-Lu e outnumbe r al l othe r non-Ha n wive s among them . A t Ban-ma i ther e ar e tw o neighborin g village s o f Thai-Lue wh o cam e ou t fro m Burm a wit h th e Yunnanese . A t Ban-yang th e headma n (puyaiban), thoug h a Moslem , ha s mar ried a Thai-Lue gir l from a village near Fang. Asked wha t "Pai-yi " mean s i n thei r usag e o f th e word , th e best informe d o f th e Yunnanes e agree d i n explainin g tha t i t means an y o f th e people s know n t o the m wh o spea k th e Tai related languages , excludin g Centra l an d Norther n Tha i and Lao . These language s ar e sai d t o var y onl y slightl y fro m Chin a t o Burma t o Thailand , an d fro m "dr y Pai-yi " t o "wate r Pai-yi, " so tha t al l th e Pai-y i ar e on e grea t community . Whe n aske d spe cifically wha t th e Shan s o f Burm a ar e i n relatio n t o th e Pai-yi , the answe r give n i s tha t "Shan " i s simpl y a loca l Burmes e nam e for Pai-yi . Th e differenc e betwee n "dry " an d "water " Pai-yi , as thes e peopl e understan d it , i s not tha t betwee n dry-ric e farm ing a s oppose d t o wet-ric e farming . Rathe r i t ha s t o d o wit h other economi c an d cultura l distinctions . Th e "dry " Pai-y i ar e described a s more backwar d an d poorer , riving in low hill region s where ther e ar e n o larg e streams . Th e "wet " Pai-y i ar e valley bottom peopl e livin g i n conjunctio n wit h majo r streams , an d water ha s ritua l significanc e fo r them . Fo r example , they defecat e only whe n standin g i n water , an d conside r th e sign s o f huma n defecation i n thei r field s t o defil e them . (Ban-mai , incidentally , is locate d upstrea m fro m thei r villages. ) Eve n th e "dry " Pai-y i are merel y foothill s people , an d non e o f th e Pai-y i shoul d b e classified a s tru e "hil l tribes " since the y neve r occup y th e highe r elevations.5 Other Tribes. Man y o f th e Yunnanes e ca n spea k a t leas t a 6 This "fol k ethnology " i s no t completel y accurate , bu t doe s reflec t th e attitude s of thes e Yunnanes e towar d th e Thai-Lue . "Pai-yi " i s a nam e fo r som e Ta i speakers i n China , notabl y thos e i n Yunnnan , bu t i s not use d fo r th e Ta i speaker s in, fo r example , Kwangsi , suc h a s th e Chuan g an d Chung-chia , wh o cal l Yun nanese Ta i speaker s "Pai-yi, " but woul d no t refe r t o themselve s i n thi s way .

[517]

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smattering o f man y o f th e hil l trib e languages , especiall y Lah u and Karen , whic h the y ha d t o lear n whil e i n Burma . Loca l Lah u women com e frequentl y t o Ban-yan g t o sel l vegetables ; a s the y walk throug h th e villag e (thei r costume , exposin g thei r bar e breasts, i s bizarr e t o th e Yunnanes e eye) , youn g me n idlin g i n doorsteps mak e jokin g bante r wit h them , t o everyone' s amuse ment. Bu t fe w Karen s o r Lahu s kno w much Yunnanese , an d rela tions wit h thes e othe r tribe s clearl y ar e no t lik e th e relation s with th e Lisu , th e Yao , an d th e Meo . And , althoug h the y d o not le t i t affec t thei r relation s wit h th e loca l Lahu, th e Yunnanes e much resen t th e fact tha t th e Burmes e i n recent year s hav e hire d some Lah u group s t o figh t the m a s infiltrators , sniper s hidde n along jungle paths, and a s guerrillas . Among al l o f th e hil l tribe s o f th e region , th e Yunnanes e exer cise considerabl e authority ; thei r prestig e an d thei r obviousl y superior wa y o f lif e giv e the m muc h leadershi p potential . Th e Yunnanese kno w thi s an d unde r prope r condition s woul d b e will ing t o cooperat e wit h Tha i authoritie s i n usin g thei r influenc e to brin g abou t th e guide d transformatio n o f th e hil l tribes , par ticularly i n matter s o f agricultura l technology . An d amon g thos e tribes whic h us e th e Yunnanes e languag e an d hono r th e Chines e script a s th e languag e o f thei r religiou s texts , th e prestig e o f the Yunnanes e villagers ' exampl e i n sendin g thei r childre n t o schools t o lear n Tha i migh t b e particularl y helpfu l i n persuadin g tribesmen t o tak e th e stud y o f Tha i mor e seriously . I n matter s of medicin e an d publi c healt h (i n whic h the y ar e accustome d to loo k t o Chines e fo r advice ) th e leadershi p o f th e Yunnanes e villagers migh t als o b e important . I n short , th e Yunnanes e vil lagers represen t a n asse t tha t migh t b e exploite d i n man y way s to improve the conditions of the hill tribes. THE VILLAG E O F BAN-MAI : COMPAEISON S AN D CONTRAST S

The villag e ha s tw o Tha i names , "Ban-mai " meanin g "ne w village," an d "Vieng-wai, " th e meanin g o f whic h i s unknow n to thi s writer . Th e Yunnanes e villager s cal l i t b y a thir d name , "Huo-fei," whic h ha s n o meanin g i n Chinese , bu t i s simpl y th e Yunnanese transliteratio n o f anothe r Tha i nam e fo r th e place , meaning "th e chie f dam" ; th e Tha i equivalen t doe s no t see m to be current an y more. [518]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

Ban-mai i s locate d thre e kilometer s sout h an d fiv e kilometer s west o f Fan g City , of f th e roa d leadin g t o th e ho t spring s an d the provincia l agricultura l experimentatio n station . Lik e Ban-yang, Ban-ma i i s located jus t abov e th e borde r o f th e padd y fields, i n th e lowes t foothills , o n a fin e river , an d o n a mai n trai l leading u p int o th e hills . Ban-ma i i s closel y linke d t o th e mid level villag e o f Mae-no m (Chines e name , "P'an-lung") , fro m which man y o f it s resident s hav e come ; i t i s als o closel y linke d to a mid-leve l sub-villag e know n t o th e write r onl y b y th e Yun nanese nam e o f "Hui-tsung-p'o, " locate d nort h o f Ban-ma i an d Fang a t th e mid-elevation . Ban-mai wa s founde d on e yea r earlie r tha n Ban-yang , bu t i n the sam e movemen t o f peopl e an d unde r th e sam e conditions . Its presen t populatio n i s 680, among who m 7 5 are recen t arrival s from Burma , an d 10 8 ar e babie s bor n i n th e villag e i n th e las t eleven years . A ne w stree t i s no w unde r constructio n t o accom modate ne w arrival s fro m Mae-nom . Th e proportio n o f Yunnan ese t o non-Ha n wive s i s abou t th e sam e a s a t Ban-yang . On first glance , Ban-ma i seem s t o b e jus t a smalle r an d mor e compact cop y o f Ban-yang , bu t o n a secon d glanc e i t reveal s some interestin g differences . It s street s ar e neate r an d bette r kept; it s garden s ar e smaller , permitting les s space for vegetables , but the y ar e muc h neate r an d mor e attractivel y planted . Ther e is n o ope n wate r runnin g throug h th e villag e t o eac h house ; instead, man y house s hav e goo d well s (averag e 4 0 fee t deep , reaching gravel-roc k stratum , costin g 1,00 0 bah t t o di g an d im prove ), cemente d an d enclose d i n protectiv e walls . Man y house s have cemen t floors an d terrac e area s i n front . Th e villag e man ages t o look more prosperous simpl y by being more orderly . Eac h of thes e village s insist s tha t th e othe r ha s th e mor e well-of f in habitants, bu t th e trut h i s tha t bot h hav e ver y fe w wh o ar e no t quite poor . The religiou s situatio n i s comparabl e t o tha t a t Ban-yang . A new modest-size d mosqu e i s bein g built . A templ e t o th e loca l spirits i s sai d t o exist , bu t wa s no t see n b y th e writer . Ther e are sai d t o b e n o Christian s i n th e village , an d n o activ e Bud dhists, bu t th e villag e headma n welcome s t o hi s villag e Pasto r Carlson of Chiengra i on his infrequent rounds . The villag e ha s on e noodle-sho p (Moslem , a s a t Ban-yang ) [519]

THAILAND : F . W . MOT E

and anothe r sho p tha t sell s pastries , an d a numbe r o f smal l gen eral stores . However , i t i s close r t o Fan g an d o n a bette r roa d (served b y tw o dail y roun d trip s o f th e loca l bus) , s o i t i s mor e dependent o n shopping facilities i n Fang. The patter n o f governmenta l organizatio n i s identical wit h tha t at Ban-yang , bu t th e conduc t o f governmen t i s strikingl y differ ent, an d mos t o f th e contrast s betwee n th e tw o village s see m to deriv e fro m thi s fact . Th e chairma n i s a n extremel y vigorou s man i n hi s fortie s wh o spend s al l his tim e i n th e village , workin g his ow n far m an d tendin g t o th e affair s o f hi s people . H e say s that th e Tha i official s hav e learne d tha t t o find hi m the y mus t go t o hi s field s an d no t t o hi s house , a s h e work s o n th e lan d every day . H e ha s thre e childre n o f schoo l ag e an d anothe r wh o soon wil l be , an d h e work s intimatel y wit h th e schoo l authoritie s to kee p th e schoo l wel l finance d (relativel y speaking) , wel l or ganized, an d runnin g properly . On e gain s th e impressio n tha t this villag e chief walk s th e streets o f his village ever y day, talkin g with th e peopl e i n a friendl y an d egalitaria n manner , impartin g a moral e an d a cohesivenes s t o th e socia l grou p tha t keep s every one performin g a t a hig h level . An d th e villag e chie f ha s abl e aids. Ban-ma i appear s t o be ru n b y a triumvirate o f th e chairma n or villag e head , th e schoo l principal , an d a n elderl y ma n calle d the guidanc e office r (chih-tao-yuan, a positio n nominall y highe r than tha t o f th e chairman , bu t mor e o r les s honorary) . The y are a n effectiv e trio . The schoo l a t Ban-ma i ha s les s tha n on e hundre d students . Its building s an d schoo l ground s ar e roughly comparabl e t o thos e at Ban-yang , excep t tha t the y ar e i n excellen t repair , clean , an d better equipped . I t ha s th e reputatio n o f bein g th e bes t schoo l in th e severa l Yunnanes e villages , an d parent s wh o ca n affor d to d o so ar e beginnin g t o sen d thei r childre n t o liv e wit h friend s at Ban-ma i s o tha t the y ca n atten d thi s school . I t i s reporte d that ther e ar e n o childre n o f schoo l ag e i n thi s villag e wh o ar e not enrolle d i n th e school . Th e teacher s receiv e onl y thre e hun dred bah t pe r month . Tuition , a s a t Ban-yang , varie s fro m te n to fort y bah t pe r semester . Lik e th e schoo l a t Ban-yang , th e Ban-mai schoo l lack s book s an d teachin g aid s a s wel l a s recre ation equipment . [ 52 0 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

The schoo l a t Ban-ma i i s serve d b y a boar d o f trustee s an d by a n activ e "yout h club, " occupying schoo l premises . The yout h club, ru n b y villag e teen-ager s wit h th e directio n o f tw o o r thre e young teachers , give s man y recreatio n program s fo r schoo l an d village. A performance fo r th e visitors ' benefit wa s quit e remark able. I n a serie s o f vaudevill e act s youn g childre n i n improvise d costumes sang , danced , an d acte d ou t pantomime s wit h grea t cleverness, whil e th e official s an d citizen s o f th e tow n watched . The sho w wa s pur e entertainment , fre e o f an y politica l meanin g or propaganda . The schoo l need s mor e building s an d need s book s an d othe r materials, bu t i t i s functionin g admirabl y an d coul d wel l serv e as a mode l fo r th e reorganizatio n o f th e schoo l a t Ban-yang ; its leader s discusse d th e Ban-yan g situatio n wit h concer n an d intelligence an d indicate d tha t the y woul d b e willin g t o help . The Ban-ma i schoo l ha s a mor e positiv e attitud e towar d learnin g Thai. Th e tw o BP P teacher s ar e muc h appreciated , an d i n orde r to kee p the m i n th e villag e an d o n th e jo b more fully , th e village , at it s expense , ha s buil t the m home s an d give n the m som e cas h for movin g expense s s o tha t the y wil l bring thei r wive s an d fam ilies t o liv e i n th e village . I n thi s a s i n man y othe r thing s th e leadership o f Ban-ma i display s positive an d constructiv e attitude s toward th e Thais , an d th e villag e follow s tha t leadership . A s the villag e schoo l become s a n enlarge d boardin g school , i t migh t be use d t o ai d th e cultura l assimilatio n o f Lisu , Yao , Meo , an d other triba l people s fo r who m th e Chines e mode l ha s grea t prestige. The agricultura l situatio n a t Ban-ma i show s som e mino r devia tions fro m tha t a t Ban-yang , bu t the y migh t becom e important . Relations wit h th e Tha i (Kuo-lo ) neighbor s i s muc h better , an d losses du e t o thef t an d plunderin g ar e sai d t o b e insignificant . In addition , th e resident s o f thi s villag e ar e presse d fo r spac e (they clai m abou t 57 0 rai o f field s a s "theirs" ) an d hav e littl e area fo r eas y expansio n int o th e stee p hill s behin d them , s o the y have t o kee p thei r residenc e are a a s smal l a s possible , meanin g that hom e garden s ar e smaller , an d mor e vegetable s ar e grow n in th e fields , i n th e winte r seaso n only , an d a large r proportio n of vegetable s i s purchased . Bu t mos t important , a t Ban-ma i the y [521 ]

THAILAND : F . W . MOT E

have foun d way s o f leasin g o r rentin g nearb y padd y field s o n three-to-five-year contracts ; thu s the y ca n rais e som e we t ric e in th e rain y seaso n an d enlarg e thei r productio n o f cas h crop s and vegetabl e crop s i n th e winte r season . And , unde r th e stimu lus o f th e guidanc e office r (formerl y a larg e landlor d wit h grea t interest i n agricultura l managemen t i n Yunnan) , the y ar e experi menting activel y wit h cro p improvement . Si x improve d strain s of Taiwa n an d Japanes e we t ric e wer e bein g grow n experimen tally alongsid e th e bes t tw o strain s i n th e villag e a s a demonstra tion t o th e village . Thes e effort s t o improv e agricultura l technol ogy ar e bein g followe d wit h interes t i n th e villag e an d ar e re ported t o b e havin g a n impac t o n th e Thai-Lu e an d Tha i village s nearby a s well . Potatoes an d othe r uplan d crop s ar e importan t cas h crop s grown a t higher elevation s by Ban-ma i farmers, a s at Ban-yang . The shorte r tim e spen t a t Ban-ma i mad e i t impossibl e t o tal k to a s man y o f th e villager s an d t o verif y al l o f th e first impres sions. I n retrospect , th e mai n poin t o f contras t seems t o b e at mosphere o r morale , rathe r tha n an y materia l difference . CONCLUSION

The presenc e o f th e Yunnanes e rural minorit y pose s som e diffi cult problem s fo r th e Tha i administration . Fro m th e standpoin t of th e Tha i government , ther e ar e severa l disadvantage s i n thes e people: on e i s th e fac t tha t thei r genera l cultural orientatio n is, withou t question , Chinese . Th e othe r ite m whic h mus t b e of grea t concer n i s th e militar y organizatio n an d involvemen t in large-scal e opiu m trad e o f Yunnanes e Chines e i n th e mor e remote an d highe r terrai n o f th e borde r regions , reports o f whic h have reache d th e publi c press. 6 I wa s unabl e t o observ e directl y "Dennis Bloodworth , fo r example , states , "I n Nort h Thailan d th e (opium ) commerce i s ru n b y remnant s o f th e 93r d Nationalis t Chines e Infantr y Division , which was force d ou t o f Yunna n whe n th e Communist s overra n Chin a 1 5 year s ago" (1965) . On Ma y 18 , 1965 , th e New York Times carrie d th e followin g story , unde r the byline o f Seymou r Topping , dateline d Bangkok : A Chines e Nationalis t militar y forc e base d i n Northeas t Burma i s reported to b e carryin g ou t raid s i n Yunna n Provinc e o f Communis t China . Troop s commanded b y Gen . M a Chuan-ku o operat e fro m th e mountainou s area s of Hs i Meng , 17 0 mile s northwes t o f th e junctio n o f th e border s o f Burma ,

[ 52 2 ]

" H A W " (YUNNANES E C H I N E S E ) O F NORTHEK N THAILAN D

the relationship s betwee n thos e Chines e an d th e peaceful-appear ing, non-opium-growing villager s in the Fang area . This n o doub t bring s int o questio n th e man y advantage s whic h the existenc e o f th e Yunnanes e brings , o r coul d bring . Bu t ther e are som e ver y rea l advantages . Thei r politica l loyaltie s ar e strongly anti-Communist , an d a s refugee s fro m th e Communis t Chinese regime , the y hav e a more realisti c view o f Chines e Com munism, it s method s an d it s dangers , tha n an y othe r minorit y population. Thei r influenc e o n th e hil l tribe s i s widesprea d i n Thailand, Burma , an d Laos , becaus e o f trad e connection s whic h have bee n establishe d ove r hundred s o f years . Thes e trad e con nections als o mak e th e Yunnanes e potentiall y grea t source s o f information o n activitie s i n th e hil l area s whic h Thai s d o no t frequent. Thei r permanen t settlemen t i n area s th e Thai s hav e considered t o b e onl y margina l o r unproductiv e mean s tha t thes e areas ar e blocke d of f t o othe r immigrants , an d thi s effectivel y controls migratio n o f hil l tribe s i n area s whic h Thai s hav e other wise bee n unabl e t o consolidate . Thei r potentia l influenc e a s in novators an d introducer s o f ne w agricultural , economic , educa tional, an d socia l organizationa l technique s i s particularl y grea t because o f th e traditionall y hig h estee m wit h whic h Chines e culture i s viewed amon g suc h people s a s th e Meo , Yao, and Lis u (see Kandre' s pape r i n thi s volum e fo r furthe r example s o f thi s among th e Yao) . Bu t thi s latte r conditio n i s precisel y th e hear t of th e proble m whic h face s th e Thai s i n buildin g a culturall y Thai (rathe r tha n Chinese ) natio n within th e boundaries o f Thai land. Th e questio n remain s whethe r a sufficientl y flexible an d imaginative administrativ e devic e ca n b e develope d t o assur e the integratio n o f thes e Yunnanese int o th e Thai nation an d mak e possible thei r us e a s a lin k betwee n th e Tha i administration , Thai culture, and th e hill tribes . Thailand an d Laos . Th e raider s ar e sai d t o b e abl e t o cros s easil y int o Yunnan an d sometime s escor t ou t dissiden t element s an d refugees . The articl e als o reporte d tha t ther e wer e 10,00 0 Chines e forme r Nationalist s i eight settlement s i n th e Nort h Thailan d frontie r areas , whic h wer e independen of Pekin g an d Taiwan . I t i s no t know n wha t source s o f informatio n ma y hav been availabl e t o th e New York Times writer , bu t hi s repor t clearl y contain s som inaccuracies o f detail . Young (1962:83 ) assert s tha t th e Ha w "ow e a degre e o f loyalt y t o th Kuomintang guerrillas. "

n t e e e

[ 52 3 ]

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BIBLIOGRAPHY BLOODWORTH, DENNI S

1965 Chasin g th e dragon . Th e Observer, Januar y 24 , 1965. London. HALLETT, H O L T S .

1890 A

thousan d mile s o n a n elephan t i n th e Sha n States , Edinburg h and London , Willia m Blackwoo d an d Sons.

HALPERN, JOE L

1961 Th e rol e o f th e Chines e i n La o society . Journa l o f th e Sia m Society 4 9 ( 1 ) : 2 1 - 4 6 . TOPPING, SEYMOU R

1965 Ne w Chian g raid s i n Chin a reported . Th e Ne w Yor k Times , May 18 , 1965. YOUNG, GORDO N

1962 Th e hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailand . Bangkok , th e Sia m So ciety, 2 d edn .

[524]

CHAPTE R 1 4

The Hil l Trib e Progra m o f Th e Publi c Welfar e Department, Ministr y o f Interior , Thailand : Research and Socio-economic Developmen t HAN S M A N N D O R F F

PREFACE

This pape r i s intende d t o presen t a concis e revie w o f th e Hil l Tribe Projec t i n Norther n Thailand , a s conducted b y the Ministr y of Interior , Publi c Welfar e Department , Hil l Trib e Division . I t gives a brie f descriptio n o f th e histor y an d presen t stat e o f th e Hill Trib e Project , includin g research , planning , an d develop ment activities . Referenc e i s mad e t o a numbe r o f reports , ar ticles, an d governmen t paper s o n thi s subject , fro m whic h mor e detailed informatio n ma y be obtained . HILL TRIBE S AN D CENTRA L GOVERNMEN T BEFOR E 195 9

There ha s bee n a continuou s historica l proces s i n Southeas t Asia by whic h people s an d tribes , suc h a s speaker s o f th e Tibeto Burman an d Thai-Shan-La o languages , hav e graduall y move d toward th e south . Repeate d southwar d migration s o f population s and sprea d o f cultura l trait s ca n b e detecte d sinc e th e Bronz e Age, an d eve n neolithi c times . Thi s i s reflecte d no t onl y i n th e linguistic an d racia l affiliations , bu t ca n als o b e inferre d fro m archeological evidenc e an d historica l recor d (Manndorf f 1965B) . At th e sam e tim e a s th e extensio n o f population s an d civiliza tions from th e nort h was taking place, there was also a continuou s seaborne cultura l impac t int o Southeas t Asi a fro m Indi a an d In donesia, startin g wit h th e beginnin g o f th e Christia n era . Thi s southern impac t i s reflected , fo r example , i n th e earl y Indochin a civilizations o f Funan , Angkor , an d Srivijaya , an d late r influence s repeatedly extende d inlan d fro m th e coasts , spreadin g upstrea m along th e grea t river s o f th e subcontinent . I n recen t centurie s [ 52 S ]

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overseas influenc e ha s bee n represente d increasingl y b y Euro pean an d America n civilizations . In th e hill s o f th e entir e region , stretchin g fro m Burm a an d Thailand t o Lao s an d Vietnam , th e southward movemen t o f vari ous triba l group s continues . I n Norther n Thailand , a numbe r o f hill tribe s lea d a semi-nomadi c or migratory wa y o f life , a t eleva tions rangin g fro m 80 0 t o 2,00 0 meter s (2,50 0 t o 6,10 0 feet) , often crossin g th e border s t o an d fro m Burm a an d Laos . Th e general directio n o f thi s movemen t i s fro m nort h t o south . Esti mates o f th e numbe r o f tribesme n involve d rang e fro m 50,00 0 to 400,000 . On e repor t estimate s tha t a s o f Novembe r 196 0 th e total Thailan d hil l trib e populatio n wa s 217,00 0 (Youn g 1962:85). However , al l thes e figures ar e onl y estimate s an d should b e use d wit h considerabl e caution . Unlik e th e tribe s o f such nearb y countrie s a s India , Burma , Frenc h Indochina , an d Malaya, th e Thailan d hil l tribe s hav e neve r bee n include d i n any censu s report s o r distric t gazetteer s compile d b y th e govern ment. Unti l recently , man y o f th e remot e hil l tract s o f th e four teen norther n province s wer e virtuall y non-administere d areas , and, unti l th e Borde r Patro l Police wa s se t u p i n 1955 , the moun tainous frontie r region s wer e neve r effectivel y controlled . Besides th e hil l tribes, a n a s yet undetermine d numbe r o f Chi nese an d Sha n peopl e hav e move d int o th e hill s o f Norther n Thailand i n recen t times . Thes e dwel l primaril y i n th e frontie r regions nea r th e three-countr y corne r o f Burma , Thailand , an d Laos. Man y o f them ar e th e remnant s o f retreatin g militar y units , such a s th e forme r Kuomintan g (KMT , Nationalis t Chinese ) an d Free Sha n Armie s fro m Burma . Other s ar e straggler s o r refugee s from politica l an d militar y disturbance s i n th e neighborin g coun tries. Thu s th e majorit y o f the m ar e male . Onl y a fractio n o f these recen t immigrant s hav e brough t thei r familie s wit h them . Those o f Chines e origi n ar e generall y labele d "Haw " i n North ern Thailand. 1 I t i s quit e interestin g tha t n o on e i s abl e t o giv e 1

These ar e onl y th e mos t recen t movement s o f Sha n an d Chines e int o Northern Thailand . Mos t Chines e i n urba n area s hav e move d b y se a t o central Thailan d an d thenc e hav e move d t o othe r part s o f Thailand . Man y of th e Shan s i n th e Nort h remai n fro m invasion s a s recen t a s th e tur n of th e century . Ther e ar e record s o f "Haw " (Yunnanes e Chinese ) i n th e mid-nineteenth centur y (se e e.g . Hallet t 1890) . Se e als o Mote' s pape r i n this volum e fo r a mor e complet e descriptio n o f th e "Haw. " (Ed. )

[ 52 6 ]

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a satisfactor y explanatio n o f th e derivatio n o f thi s name . How ever, i t shoul d b e clearl y state d tha t th e so-calle d Haw , wh o have recentl y settle d i n th e mountain s o f Chiengma i an d Chiengrai provinces , ca n no t b e regarde d a s a "hil l tribe " i n the sam e sens e a s th e othe r group s treate d i n thi s paper . Man y of thes e Ha w hav e sprea d int o hil l trib e villages , without, how ever, losin g thei r identit y a s Chinese . W e wil l hav e t o dea l wit h these peopl e repeatedl y i n thi s repor t becaus e the y liv e i n a remarkable symbiosi s wit h th e hil l tribes . A s trader s i n th e hill s and ke y me n i n th e opiu m traffic , the y no t onl y exer t contro l over financial transactions , bu t als o manage t o hav e considerabl e influence upo n th e headme n an d othe r member s o f triba l communities. Anthropologists wh o ar e concerne d wit h th e ethnograph y o f Southeast Asi a have traditionall y distinguishe d betwee n lowlan d and uplan d groups . Th e difference s betwee n th e culturall y di versified triba l groups , dwellin g i n th e mountai n ranges , an d th e developed civilization s o f th e rive r valley s hav e bee n referre d to frequentl y i n th e anthropologica l literature . Thu s th e ter m "hill tribes " ha s bee n created . W e shal l no t argu e abou t th e validity o f thi s term , bu t sinc e i t ha s bee n created , w e shal l use it when needed . Nonetheless, i t shoul d b e mentione d tha t thes e hil l tribe s hav e never live d i n a stat e o f complet e isolation , an d tha t cultura l traits o f th e surroundin g grea t civilization s hav e bee n adopte d by the m an d assimilate d t o variou s degrees . Fo r example , a n analysis o f th e religiou s belief s an d ritual s o f man y hil l tribe s leads t o th e impressio n tha t the y hav e preserve d (an d possibl y reinterpreted) som e o f th e concept s an d teaching s prevailin g in ancien t Chin a an d Tibet . Thi s i s especiall y tru e fo r th e Me o and Yao , an d als o a lesse r degre e fo r suc h tribe s a s th e Lis u and Lahu . O n th e othe r hand , i f som e popula r magico-religiou s practices o f remot e lowlan d Tha i village s ar e observed , i t becomes eviden t tha t a numbe r o f the m bea r strikin g resem blance t o thos e o f certai n hil l tribes , a phenomeno n whic h might b e trace d t o forme r historica l relationships , o r eve n t o a commo n cultura l stratu m fro m whic h thes e seemingl y distinc t populations derived . Many o f th e hill tribe s tha t ca n be foun d i n the fourteen north [527]

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F

ern province s see m t o b e rathe r recen t immigrants . Specificall y thos e o f th e Tibeto-Burma n stoc k (lik e Lisu , Lahu , an d Akha) , as wel l a s thos e Chinese-affiliate d tribe s (lik e Me o an d Yao) , probabl y di d no t ente r th e countr y mor e tha n 10 0 t o 15 0 year s ago. Others , suc h a s th e Law a an d othe r Mon-Khmer-relate d tribe s o f Austroasiati c linguisti c stock , a s wel l a s som e earl y group s o f Karen , have ha d thei r homestead s i n th e are a betwee n th e Salwee n an d Mekon g river s fo r a ver y lon g time . Som e hav e even bee n ther e sinc e befor e th e emergenc e o f th e earl y Tha i city-state s i n th e norther n province s i n th e tent h t o twelft h cen turies . Howeve r thi s ma y be , ther e ha s evidentl y bee n a tremen dou s influ x o f hil l tribesme n i n th e las t eight y o r on e hundre d years. I n som e province s th e hill s ar e clos e t o bein g overpopulated , a situatio n tha t threaten s t o becom e wors e du e t o tw o factors . Firs t i s th e constan t flow o f newcomer s i n recen t years, an d th e secon d i s th e absenc e o f an y inclinatio n o n th e par t o f mos t hill me n t o mov e dow n t o th e lowlands . Eve n i f the y shoul d move, th e demographi c expansio n o f th e rura l Tha i peopl e livin g in th e lowland s wil l probabl y lea d t o a saturatio n o f thes e land s within th e nea r future . Som e section s o f th e lowlan d populatio n are alread y pressin g int o th e uppe r part s o f th e valley s an d u p th e hil l slopes . Traditionally , th e relationshi p betwee n th e lowlan d populatio n an d th e hil l peopl e i n Thailan d ha s bee n on e o f mutua l toleranc e an d non-interference . Ther e ha s bee n littl e ope n antipathy , bu t rathe r ther e ha s bee n apath y betwee n them . U p t o now , th e average khon muang ("Norther n Thai, " literall y "ma n o f th e principality" ) consider s th e khon dot ("mountai n man" ) t o b e a rathe r strange-lookin g bu t n o les s respecte d countryman . I n some neighborin g countries , variou s disdainfu l denotation s ar e given t o hil l tribesme n (e.g . kha, "slave, " i n Laos ; moi, "sav age," i n Vietnam) . Th e nam e "Kha " i s als o applie d b y th e Tha i to som e tribe s livin g nea r th e Laotia n border , e.g . th e Kham u (o r Kh a Khmu? ) an d Khatin . These , however , ar e exceptions , an d concer n onl y smal l group s whic h hav e migrate d int o Thai lan d fro m Laos , wher e thi s derogator y nam e wa s alread y attache d t o thos e tribes . Th e Tha i ter m khon γα ("fores t man" ) or khon dot ("mountai n man" ) i s withou t pejorativ e meaning . [ 52 8 ]

H I L L TBIB E PBOGBA M

It i s true, however, tha t tribesme n ar e sometime s discriminate d against i n busines s dealings . Thi s i s especiall y tru e o f th e non opium-growers, e.g . th e Kare n an d Lua? , wh o d o no t hav e th e benefit o f possessin g cas h crops , an d whos e economi c relation s with the lowlanders are on a less advantageous basis. Among th e opium-growin g tribes , trad e relation s betwee n low lands an d upland s ar e largel y determine d b y th e opiu m produc tion o f th e hil l peopl e an d b y thei r demand s fo r certai n com modities whic h ca n b e obtaine d onl y fro m th e lowlands . Thes e trade relation s ar e carrie d o n eithe r b y Tha i pett y trader s o r by Chines e (Haw ) merchants . Thes e intermediarie s brin g new s from th e outsid e worl d an d stimulat e ne w demand s an d desire s by exhibitin g merchandis e previousl y unknow n o r unobtainabl e by th e hil l people . Th e opium , a s a marketabl e cas h produc t of hig h value , encourage s th e trader s t o penetrat e eve n int o th e most remot e part s o f th e hill s an d guarantee s a relative economi c security an d eve n wealt h t o th e hill tribesmen . B y mean s o f thi s cash produc t the y ca n bu y luxur y o r fanc y good s an d ca n eve n occasionally hire lowland peopl e a s laborers . Until abou t te n year s ag o th e Tha i governmen t di d no t car e much abou t th e tribesme n i n th e hills . Establishmen t o f contact s with the m wa s largel y lef t t o th e discretio n o f th e provinc e (changwad) an d distric t (amphur) authorities . Usuall y th e loca l officers maintaine d tha t the y ha d enoug h problem s wit h thei r own peopl e (i n th e lowlands ) an d di d no t fee l compelle d t o bother about the people in the inaccessible hills. With fe w exception s ther e wa s n o taxation , n o conscription , no education , an d n o lega l registratio n o f hil l tribesmen . Th e population censu s di d no t includ e them . Thei r lega l positio n a s residents o r citizen s o f th e countr y wa s neve r clearl y defined , and virtuall y n o governmenta l administratio n wa s extende d int o the remote mountai n areas . Even durin g ou r hil l trib e surve y i n 1961-196 2 w e fel t tha t many loca l authoritie s appeare d t o lac k a clea r understandin g of, an d concer n for , th e hil l tribe s an d wer e uncertai n abou t the Tha i government' s polic y towar d them . Som e responsibl e persons though t tha t i t wa s governmen t polic y t o brin g th e hil l tribes dow n t o th e lowlands. Other s admitte d tha t the y ha d littl e or n o contac t wit h th e hil l populations an d ha d littl e informatio n [ 52 9 ]

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concerning thei r numbe r an d whereabouts . A s a n example , w e were tol d severa l time s tha t sinc e ther e wa s no w a law prohibit ing opiu m production , ther e wa s n o mor e popp y cultivatio n b y hill people . Som e explaine d tha t thei r curren t activitie s gav e them littl e o r n o tim e t o lear n muc h abou t th e hil l people . Th e prevailing ambiguitie s o f governmen t polic y resulte d i n a lac k of coordinatio n i n th e approac h o f responsibl e authoritie s towar d the hil l tribes . On th e othe r hand , th e recentl y arrive d hil l tribesme n see m to have bee n quite conten t wit h thi s stat e o f affairs . A s tradition ally self-relian t an d independen t mountai n peoples , the y hav e always bee n abl e t o tak e car e o f themselves . Ther e i s reaso n to believe tha t thei r prevailin g attitud e i s to hail an y governmen t that leave s the m alone . W e ma y no t b e mistake n i n assumin g that man y migration s o f hil l trib e communitie s ar e cause d b y government action s whic h th e tribesme n fee l t o b e oppressive . These triba l communitie s are , i n general , no t aggressiv e o r war like. The y ten d instea d t o disappear , t o retrea t deepe r int o th e jungle i f the y fea r an y undue interferenc e i n thei r internal affairs . For the m i t doe s no t mak e an y differenc e i f th e hil l trac t i n which the y dwel l i s i n Burma , Laos , o r Thailand , a s lon g a s they ar e allowe d t o practic e thei r customar y social , economic , and ritua l lif e i n peace . I t ma y wel l b e tha t th e expectatio n of bein g left alon e has guided man y tribal communitie s int o Thai land in the past, and in recent years. Of course , i t i s n o longe r possibl e fo r th e governmen t t o leav e these ethni c minoritie s entirel y alon e today . I t i s th e inevitabl e logic o f event s i n ou r time s tha t administratio n an d moderniza tion ar e extende d eve n int o thos e remot e part s o f th e countr y which were traditionall y self-sufficient . The deliberat e proces s o f governmen t involvemen t wit h th e northern hil l tribe s wa s starte d i n 1955 , wit h th e progra m o f the Borde r Patro l Police , an d wa s intensifie d i n 1959 , whe n th e Ministry o f Interio r assigne d th e Publi c Welfar e Departmen t t o carry ou t certai n researc h an d developmen t activitie s i n th e re mote mountain regions . INTENSIFICATION O F RELATIONSHI P SINC E 195 9

In th e las t te n year s th e governmen t o f Thailan d ha s increas ingly becom e awar e o f it s responsibilit y fo r includin g th e hil l r ?tt n 1

HIL L TBIB E PBOGBA M

people o f th e Nort h i n it s publi c polic y an d fo r providin g ad ministrative services . These step s wer e take n t o show , in a practi cal way , that th e welfare an d problem s o f th e hil l tribes i n North ern Thailan d ar e a concer n o f th e government . I t wa s implie d that i f th e governmen t woul d no t car e fo r them , someon e els e might attemp t t o do so. When th e lat e Prim e Minister , Marshal l Sarit , banned th e pro duction o f opiu m i n Decembe r 195 8 (250 1 Buddhis t Era) , th e Ministry o f Interio r wa s give n th e responsibilit y o f abolishin g opium cultivation . Thi s adde d urgency t o th e proble m o f dealin g with th e hil l tribes , sinc e severa l o f thes e mountai n peopl e wer e opium producers . Thu s th e opiu m proble m becam e th e reaso n for intensifyin g relation s o f th e centra l governmen t wit h hil l trib e societies. The majo r problem s whic h th e governmen t face d a t thi s tim e were a s follows : (1 ) t o replac e opiu m cultivatio n withou t strik ing a deathblow t o the econom y of th e hill people; (2 ) t o preven t further fores t destructio n b y assistin g th e hil l peopl e t o develo p a mor e conservativ e syste m o f shiftin g cultivatio n or , i f possible , to promot e stabilize d farmin g i n th e hills ; (3 ) t o rende r health , educational, an d othe r welfar e service s t o th e mountai n popula tion; an d (4 ) t o exten d administratio n an d contro l t o remot e hill an d frontie r regions . Since 195 5 the Borde r Patro l Polic e ha d bee n operatin g wit h regard t o th e fourt h point , a s the y wer e assigne d t o provid e for "contro l an d publi c safet y i n th e remot e hill s an d frontie r regions." Besides , o r fo r thi s purpose , the y als o establishe d schools an d distribute d some medica l an d agricultura l equipmen t to hil l tribesmen . However , i t wa s fel t i n severa l quarter s tha t education, vocationa l training , agricultura l assistance , etc . shoul d be i n th e hand s o f a civi l agenc y wit h a n adequatel y qualifie d staff. In a decisio n o f Jun e 3 , 1959 , th e Counci l o f Minister s approved a Ministr y o f Interio r pla n fo r th e establishmen t o f Land Settlemen t Project s fo r hil l tribes i n various Nort h Thailan d provinces. Th e Publi c Welfar e Departmen t wa s entruste d wit h the implementatio n o f thi s project . Th e primar y purpos e wa s to settl e hil l tribe s i n location s suite d fo r them , b y mean s o f establishing "settlemen t areas " (nikhom) o n th e ridge s an d hig h plateaus whic h ar e th e mos t favore d site s o f th e hil l peoples , [531 ]

THAILAND : HAN S MANNDORF F

and b y encouragin g th e tribe s t o migrat e t o thes e settlemen t areas. Four lan d settlemen t pilo t project s wer e establishe d fo r hil l peoples i n 1960-1963 : i n Ta k Provinc e (Do i Musser) ; i n Chiengmai Provinc e (Do i Chiengdao) ; i n Chiengra i Provinc e (Maechan); an d i n Loe i Provinc e (Bh u Lor n Low) . Th e hil l projects wer e administere d b y a superintenden t an d wer e usuall y staffed wit h agricultura l workers , healt h workers , tractor - an d truck-drivers, etc . The y wer e als o equippe d wit h som e moder n agricultural machiner y an d road-constructio n an d transpor t equipment. The first fe w year s wer e occupie d wit h th e mer e establishmen t of thes e projects . Th e Tha i officer s wer e feelin g thei r way , sinc e they wer e face d wit h a n entirel y ne w situation , sociall y an d cul turally, a s well a s economically . Th e Tha i wer e no t a t al l experi enced i n hil l agriculture . I n th e nin e hundre d year s o f thei r history i n Thailan d the y ha d neve r take n grea t interes t i n th e mountains. I t too k som e tim e t o realiz e tha t th e concept s an d experience derive d fro m lowlan d settlement s coul d no t easil y b e transplanted int o the hills. So it was not at all surprising tha t thes e hill project s suffere d som e setback s durin g thei r initia l perio d of operation . On th e othe r hand , th e hil l tribe s wer e rathe r reserve d an d restrained, thoug h neve r hostil e o r rejectin g i n thei r respons e to th e projects . The y too k a "wait an d see " attitude, occasionall y passing b y o r stoppin g a t th e offic e bungalow , acceptin g invita tions for socia l gathering s o r fo r triba l danc e performances , with out makin g a final commitmen t t o resettle . W e shoul d not e a t this poin t tha t triba l leader s ar e usuall y quit e shrew d an d abl e politicians, an d eve n diplomats . I n th e end , the y di d no t volun tarily migrat e int o th e settlemen t areas , an d i t woul d hav e bee n unrealistic t o thin k tha t the y coul d easil y b e ordere d t o leav e their villages an d joi n the projects . The administrativ e an d plannin g official s o f th e Hil l Trib e Project wer e probabl y quit e righ t i n followin g a polic y o f mod eration, sinc e prematur e activitie s coul d possibl y hav e aggravated th e alread y delicat e situatio n i n th e hills . The y di d not tak e an y drasti c measure s t o transplan t triba l population s or t o resettl e the m in th e projec t areas , an d the y refraine d fro m [532]

H I L L TBlB E fHOGEA M

enforcing th e law s prohibitin g slash-and-bur n agricultur e an d opium cultivation . Confronted wit h s o man y pressin g problems , th e Publi c Wel fare Department , le d b y it s Directo r General , Khu n Pakor n Angsusingha, reacte d i n thre e ways . Carefull y selecte d officer s were sent t o neighboring countrie s t o stud y comparabl e problem s in othe r ethni c minorit y programs , internationa l technica l assis tance agencie s wer e invite d t o rende r aid , an d a socio-economi c survey o f th e Norther n Thailan d hil l tribe s wa s inaugurated . Th e Hill Trib e Projec t proceede d slowl y a s th e mai n effor t wa s di rected towar d gatherin g mor e experience . THE SOCIO-ECONOMI C SURVE Y O F SELECTE D HIL L TRIBE S IN NORTHER N THAILAN D 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 6 2

Soon afte r establishin g th e Do i Musse r (Ta k Province ) an d Doi Chiengda o (Chiengma i Province ) settlemen t projects , th e government fel t th e nee d fo r reliabl e informatio n abou t hil l tribes, t o b e use d a s a basi s fo r effectiv e plannin g o f th e hil l tribe welfar e an d developmen t projects . Fo r thi s purpose , th e Department o f Publi c Welfar e initiate d a socio-economi c surve y of selecte d hil l tribes . This researc h projec t wa s th e first government-sponsore d sur vey o f th e mountai n people s o f Norther n Thailand . I t wa s con ducted b y th e Ministr y o f Interior , wit h assistanc e an d coopera tion fro m severa l organizations . Th e Asi a Foundatio n gav e finan cial assistanc e fo r trainin g th e governmen t official s an d fo r th e field surve y an d final surve y report ; th e Unite d Nation s provide d a socia l anthropologis t (th e autho r o f thi s paper ) a s a technica l assistance expert ; ECAF E Divisio n o f Socia l Affair s drafte d a n observation schedul e an d intervie w guid e whic h wa s pre-teste d and refine d afte r field experience ; th e Ministr y o f Agricultur e and th e Borde r Patro l Polic e participated i n th e projec t b y sec onding thei r official s t o joi n i n th e field work ; th e Ministr y o f Public Healt h provide d medica l supplies ; th e Sia m Societ y fur nished informatio n b y makin g availabl e it s rich librar y resources ; and advisor y service s wer e als o receive d fro m Chulalongkor n University durin g th e trainin g period , a s wel l a s durin g th e late r stages o f th e study . The field survey , whic h covere d th e Meo , Yao , Lisu , Lahu , [533 ]

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and Akha , al l o f who m ar e opiu m growers , wa s carrie d ou t be tween Octobe r 196 1 an d Ma y 1962 . Th e tribe s covere d wer e selected i n accordanc e wit h th e wishe s o f th e governmen t an d were thos e wit h whic h th e land settlemen t project s wer e primar ily concerned. Th e Karen , anothe r populou s hil l trib e i n Norther n Thailand, wer e onl y include d i n th e Hil l Trib e Projec t a t a late r date. Specia l emphasi s wa s give n i n th e surve y t o th e rol e o f hill traders, i.e., Thai peddlers an d the "Haw. " The field-survey personne l wa s groupe d int o fiv e teams , eac h consisting o f on e officia l fro m th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare , one officia l fro m th e Ministr y o f Agriculture , an d a n associat e from th e Borde r Patro l Police , wh o gav e medica l assistanc e an d was dresse d i n civilia n clothes . Th e surve y team s wer e statione d in sampl e villages , usuall y fo r a perio d o f fro m on e t o thre e months, an d wer e constantl y advise d an d guide d b y th e social anthropologist. Grea t pain s wer e take n i n th e beginnin g t o estab lish a friendl y relationshi p wit h th e tribesme n an d t o gathe r in formation i n a casua l wa y throug h "participan t observation. " More systemati c interview s wer e starte d onl y afte r a goo d amount o f mutua l confidenc e an d amicabilit y ha d bee n devel oped. I n severa l case s i t wa s thre e week s o r more unti l thi s coul d be accomplished . Eightee n sampl e village s o f th e above mentioned tribe s wer e studie d rathe r intensively , an d som e twenty t o thirt y mor e village s wer e visite d mor e briefly . Following th e fiel d surve y o f th e five research teams , a smalle r group mad e month-lon g visit s t o chec k th e dat a whic h ha d bee n obtained an d t o supplemen t it , particularl y throug h studie s o f attitudes an d opinions . The Final Report of the Socio-Economic Survey of Hill Tribes in Northern ThaUand wa s prepared i n Bangkok durin g June 1962 , and wa s presente d t o th e Ministr y o f Interio r an d t o UNESCO . With thei r approva l i t wa s publishe d i n a preliminar y mimeo graphed for m i n August 196 2 (Thailan d 1962). 2 Thi s repor t ha s become a n authoritativ e sourc e o f information , an d it s recom mendations ar e use d a s a basi s o f th e presen t Hil l Tribe s Devel opment an d Welfar e Progra m o f th e Ministr y o f Interior . It i s not possibl e t o g o int o al l th e detail s o f th e surve y report . But i t ma y b e mentione d tha t i t attempte d t o giv e a comprehen 2

A revised an d illustrate d editio n i s now in print.

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sive accoun t o f th e ethni c an d socio-economi c situatio n i n th e hills, stressin g th e contemporar y pattern s o f acculturatio n an d basic fact s o f economi c activitie s an d socia l structure s o f th e tribes concerned . I t discusse d th e majo r problems , including : (1) promotin g a mor e stabilize d economy ; (2 ) replacin g opium growing b y developin g ne w cas h crops ; (3 ) administratio n an d control in the remote hills and frontier regions . The author s o f th e repor t di d no t assum e tha t thi s surve y would giv e th e final answe r t o th e man y question s whic h wer e covered. Instead , i t was stresse d tha t thi s survey pointe d t o problems whic h deserve d intensiv e stud y b y qualifie d experts . Thes e were problem s relate d t o suc h thing s a s soi l conservation , lan d use, hil l agricultura l techniques , preventiv e veterinar y methods , development o f effectiv e transpor t an d marketin g mechanisms , livestock-raising an d pastur e improvement , etc . Ther e were , i n addition, problem s i n whic h huma n factor s playe d a n importan t role, fo r whic h mor e intensiv e anthropologica l an d sociologica l research woul d b e required . Recommendations fo r furthe r research , experimentation , an d continuous evaluatio n wer e mad e throughou t th e surve y report . RECOMMENDATIONS O F TH E 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 6 2 SXJRVE Y

On th e basi s o f th e surve y a number o f recommendation s wer e submitted t o th e Tha i government . Thes e include d polic y mea sures, administrativ e measures , an d developmen t activities . A n action progra m wa s suggested , wit h thre e majo r projects : (1 ) intensification an d broadenin g o f settlemen t projec t activities ; (2) mobil e developmen t worker s t o approac h th e hil l people s outside th e settlemen t projec t areas ; (3 ) establishmen t o f a Tribal Research Centr e t o serv e a s a permanen t advisor y institutio n (see Geddes' paper i n this volume). Devehpment Activities. Th e implementatio n o f thes e majo r projects wil l b e deal t wit h below. Her e we ca n discus s onl y som e of th e mai n principle s whic h wer e recommende d o n th e basi s of th e surve y findings . 1. In regar d t o th e Lan d Settlemen t Projects , i t wa s suggeste d that, fo r th e tim e being , the y shoul d not b e regarde d a s resettle ment area s int o whic h th e triba l group s shoul d b e relocated , but tha t the y shoul d become hill bases in which intensiv e agricul [ 53 5 J

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rural (an d other ) experiment s shoul d b e carrie d out , an d fro m which, a t a late r stage , usefu l innovation s shoul d b e sprea d int o the surroundin g hil l trib e villages . Thus these hil l station s shoul d be looke d o n a s pilo t developmen t block s incorporating suc h ac tivities as : (a) cultivatio n o f experimenta l cas h crops , which migh t ulti mately replac e opium-popp y cultivatio n an d developmen t o f im proved an d modernized method s o f hil l farming ; (b) trainin g an d demonstratio n center s fo r hil l farmer s wh o may b e encourage d t o com e i n fro m th e nearb y village s outsid e the projec t sites ; (c) marketin g an d trans-shipmen t center s fo r th e promotio n of trad e envisage d i n the program ; (d) health , education , an d welfar e center s fo r th e hill peopl e living i n or near th e project sites . Through th e intensifie d experimenta l developmen t proces s i t is hope d tha t th e settlemen t projec t area s ca n graduall y becom e regions o f mor e stabilize d agricultur e i n whic h the opiu m popp y will b e completel y replace d b y economicall y valuabl e crop s which ar e i n shor t suppl y i n th e country , fro m whic h th e hil l people ca n deriv e a n adequat e income . The developmen t o f live stock-raising, an d possibl y som e handicraf t activitie s coul d pla y an importan t rol e i n thi s context , a t leas t i n som e areas . Within th e settlemen t projec t areas , prope r road s shoul d b e built t o lin k th e triba l village s together , an d t o connec t the m with th e nationa l highwa y syste m i n orde r t o facilitate th e trans port o f hil l farmers ' product s int o lowland markets . Othe r facili ties, suc h a s schools , dispensaries , publi c meetin g places , etc. , should als o be set up in the hill stations. 2. Secondly , th e hil l station s shoul d b e considere d as : (a) trainin g center s for developmen t worker s wh o wil l wor k among th e hil l peopl e i n severa l field s o f economi c an d socia l activities; (b) hil l base s fro m whic h mobil e developmen t wor k shoul d be launched , i n orde r t o introduc e usefu l innovation s t o th e hil l tribesmen in the remote areas. The settlemen t project s a t Ta k an d Chiengda o hav e onl y tw o and thre e triba l village s respectivel y withi n thei r prescribe d project areas . Suitabl e provision s shoul d b e mad e fo r th e larg e [ 53 6 ]

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number o f village s outsid e th e projec t areas . Sinc e i t woul d b e unrealistic t o expec t tha t thos e tribesme n scattere d ove r th e hill s would migrat e int o th e spher e o f th e settlement s (o r eve n visi t and stud y thei r demonstratio n plots) , th e hil l tribe s shoul d b e approached i n thei r ow n villages . The y shoul d b e me t i n thei r own world , i n thei r ow n physica l an d social environment . Every thing possibl e shoul d b e don e t o prevent th e settlemen t center s from becomin g "ivor y towers " wit h th e official s livin g inside , while the hil l tribes remai n outside . Of course , suc h a mobile extensio n schem e ca n b e successfu l only i f i t i s conducte d b y adequatel y traine d personnel , wh o are experience d an d dedicated , wh o i n fac t hav e somethin g val uable t o exten d t o th e tribesmen . Th e trainin g o f suc h personne l is, therefore , a prerequisit e fo r a successfu l mobil e developmen t scheme. Tw o proposal s wer e mad e t o rende r thi s kin d o f tho rough training . Th e first channe l fo r trainin g shoul d b e th e hil l stations, o r settlemen t projects , throug h whic h valuabl e practica l experience i n wor k wit h hil l people coul d b e obtained . Th e sec ond channe l shoul d b e th e Triba l Researc h Centre , which , a t the sam e time, should serv e a s a permanent advisor y an d trainin g institution. It i s quit e clea r tha t thi s actio n progra m i s a long-term project , the implementatio n o f whic h wil l nee d muc h time . I t ma y tak e several year s befor e th e experiment s i n th e hil l station s yiel d the first usefu l results . An d onl y afte r thes e hav e bee n achieve d can prope r trainin g b e give n t o th e mobile developmen t workers . Several year s ma y b e require d befor e th e Triba l Researc h Centr e will b e i n a position t o render substantia l advic e an d training . 3. Th e establishmen t o f a Tribal Researc h Centre fo r Norther n Thailand wa s anothe r majo r projec t recommende d o n th e basi s of th e surve y findings. 3 Th e objective s o f this projec t ar e covere d in Professor Geddes ' paper i n this volume . 3 The tex t o f th e recommendation s wit h regar d t o th e Triba l Researc h Centre was a s follows :

In orde r t o facilitat e effectiv e wor k i n connectio n wit h th e triba l minorities i n thi s country , anthropologica l researc h an d a variet y o f socio economic studie s shoul d serv e th e practica l purpos e o f preparin g a basi s for formulatin g realisti c plan s directe d towar d th e improvemen t o f socia l and economi c conditions . Apar t fro m thi s the y shoul d contribut e t o ou r

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These wer e th e thre e majo r project s o f th e actio n progra m recommended i n 1962 . I t i s mos t gratifyin g t o repor t tha t thei r implementation wa s prepare d an d starte d i n 196 3 an d 1964 . Administrative Measures. Anothe r sectio n o f recommendation s dealt wit h administrativ e measures . Thes e ar e liste d unde r thei r major heading s i n orde r t o giv e a n ide a o f th e issue s whic h wer e dealt with . It was recommended that : 1. Actio n regardin g th e hil l tribe s shoul d b e give n priorit y consideration, an d a n appropriat e administrativ e machiner y should be establishe d t o thi s end . 2. Consideratio n shoul d b e give n t o mean s whic h woul d in crease th e effectivenes s o f communication s betwee n th e Centra l Tribal Welfar e Committe e an d th e administrativ e authoritie s o f the provincial an d district levels. Action o n thes e tw o issue s ha s no t bee n completel y satisfac tory. Th e administrativ e machiner y ha s bee n create d b y estab lishing a Hil l Trib e Divisio n i n th e Publi c Welfar e Department . But thi s Divisio n rank s to o low i n th e bureaucrati c hierarchy , and th e highe r echelon s o f th e Publi c Welfar e Departmen t ar e too occupie d wit h othe r responsibilitie s t o produc e effectiv e re sults. Operationa l communicatio n betwee n thos e person s i n th e field an d thos e i n position s of higher authorit y i n th e governmen t is lacking . Th e Centra l Triba l Welfar e Committe e ha s se t u p knowledge o f th e tribe s an d people s concerned , thei r culture , thei r way s of life , an d thei r history . Th e on e canno t easil y b e separate d fro m th e other . We recommen d tha t a Triba l Researc h Centr e b e se t u p i n Norther n Thailand, preferabl y i n th e tow n o f Chien g Ma i o n accoun t o f it s centra l location. I t could , perhaps , b e associate d wit h th e Universit y o f Chien g Mai, whic h i s abou t t o b e inaugurated , bu t shoul d cooperat e als o wit h other nationa l universitie s a s wel l a s wit h th e Sia m Societ y i n Bangkok . The Triba l Researc h Centr e shoul d serv e as : (a) a cente r for studie s in applied anthropology ; (b) a documentatio n cente r fo r anthropologica l (an d othe r socio economic ) studie s carrie d ou t i n the region , (c) a briefin g an d trainin g cente r fo r triba l officers , extensio n workers , administrators, educators , specialist s i n agriculture , live-stock , trans port an d marketing , bein g concerne d wit h developmen t activitie s among hil l tribes ; (d) a burea u providin g advisor y service s t o th e governmen t o f th e problems o f th e hil l tribes . It i s plausibl e t o conceiv e tha t thi s Centr e migh t wel l b e utilize d fo r coordinating regiona l effort s i n regar d t o th e hil l tribes . (Thailan d 1962 )

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six subordinat e subcommittees , bu t i t i s fel t tha t thi s committe e organization i s no t to o effective. Th e feelin g i s growin g tha t th e status o f th e Hil l Trib e Divisio n shoul d b e raise d t o tha t o f a separate Department o f Hil l Tribe Affairs . 3. Consideratio n shoul d b e give n t o method s o f bringin g hil l people int o participatio n i n th e Tha i loca l an d centra l government. So far , thi s ver y importan t issu e o f organizin g effectiv e loca l government i n hil l trib e area s ha s bee n entirel y neglected . 4. Establishmen t o f "triba l officers " attache d t o distric t officer s of provincia l governors . It wa s recommende d tha t a specia l administrativ e pos t o f "tribal officer " shoul d b e establishe d i n area s wit h larg e triba l minority populations . Thi s positio n shoul d b e hel d b y a full y authorized governmen t official , wh o a t first migh t b e a Thai , but i n futur e migh t b e recruite d fro m th e triba l minorit y con cerned. H e migh t b e attached t o th e distric t office r (nai amphur) and ac t a s a liaiso n a t th e administrativ e level . Nothing ha s bee n done in this regard . 5. Creatio n o f a cadre o f worker s i n a wide variet y of technica l fields includin g communit y development , wh o wil l b e dedicate d to the hill people and will live and work with them . 6. Trainin g programs fo r thes e workers . 7. Provisio n o f incentive s fo r youn g Tha i official s t o wor k among hil l tribes . The Tha i authoritie s gav e grea t attentio n t o thes e recommen dations, sinc e the y hav e a direc t bearin g o n the implementatio n of tw o o f th e majo r project s mentione d above , th e settlemen t projects an d th e mobil e developmen t project . However , th e qual ity o f th e trainin g program s an d th e provisio n o f incentive s ar e still unsatisfactory . Policy Measures. A final sectio n o f th e recommendation s deal t with polic y measures . Th e Tha i governmen t ha s assume d respon sibility fo r th e administration , welfare , an d developmen t o f th e hill people. Consequently, i t seeme d appropriat e to clarif y certai n basic issue s i n orde r t o fulfil l thes e aims , an d i t appeare d impor tant tha t rapi d actio n b e take n i n vie w o f th e growin g uncer tainties i n th e hil l region . [ 53 9 ]

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The sectio n o n polic y include d consideration s suc h a s th e following: 1. Th e government' s relation s t o th e hil l tribe s shoul d b e clarified. It wa s mentione d tha t th e competen t governmen t authoritie s should decid e th e lega l positio n o f person s i n triba l communities , including question s o f citizenship , registration, taxation , conscrip tion, compulsor y schoo l education , th e righ t t o hol d officia l posi tions, etc . I t wa s suggeste d tha t th e competen t governmen t au thorities shoul d giv e du e consideratio n t o th e nee d fo r specia l laws whic h allo w for th e specia l cultura l an d linguisti c character istics o f thes e ethni c minorities . Fo r example , th e questio n o f bilingual schoo l education , schoo l curricula, marriag e an d inheri tance laws , villag e administratio n systems , etc . shoul d b e con sidered. Finally , i t wa s mentione d tha t th e governmen t shoul d consider way s an d mean s o f creatin g loyalty t o th e Tha i nation , so a s t o facilitat e th e integratio n o f thes e ethni c minoritie s int o the social, economic, and political life of the country . 2. Th e questio n o f lega l lan d ownershi p i n th e hill s shoul d be examined . The existin g Lan d Cod e o f Thailan d doe s no t allo w privat e ownership o f th e highlands . I f thi s cod e i s take n literally , th e hill peopl e ma y b e declare d outlaw s a t an y moment . I n vie w of th e seriou s problem s whic h coul d resul t fro m suc h a measure , ways an d mean s shoul d b e develope d t o provid e lega l securit y for th e peopl e i n th e hills . Th e questio n o f lan d ownershi p fo r hill farmer s wil l becom e imminen t whe n th e semi-nomadi c shift ing cultivator s adop t stabilize d farming . An y discriminatio n against th e hil l dweller s i n favo r o f th e lowlan d dweller s shoul d be avoided . Therefore , th e competen t governmen t authoritie s should eithe r decid e upo n a modificatio n o f existin g lan d codes , or shoul d see k a n alternativ e solutio n favorabl e t o the hill popula tions. The authoritie s shoul d stud y th e possibilitie s i n thi s regard , keeping i n min d th e followin g factors : (a ) th e productio n uni t of al l th e hill tribe s concerne d i s th e family , eithe r i n it s nuclea r or extende d form ; (b ) triba l peopl e hav e a concep t o f privat e property an d rea l property , an d ther e i s a preemptiv e privileg e of th e famil y unit , recognize d b y al l others , t o retur n t o it s ol d clearings a s lon g a s th e villag e remain s i n th e sam e vicinity ; [ 54 0 ]

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and (c ) triba l people do not like forced relocatio n t o area s wher e there i s a ris k that the y wil l becom e merel y hire d labor , withou t land o f thei r ow n t o live o n an d cultivate. 4 I n it s relation s wit h the hil l peoples , th e governmen t shoul d accep t thei r existin g so cial structure , withou t attemptin g t o brin g abou t immediat e changes whic h woul d unnecessaril y distur b thei r socia l equilib rium. I f i t shoul d appea r tha t th e formatio n o f ne w type s o f associations o r corporation s woul d b e desirable , thei r implemen tation shoul d b e discusse d wit h th e forma l an d informa l leader s of th e tribes , an d thei r advic e shoul d b e give n seriou s considera tion. 3. Th e questio n o f usin g som e o f th e hil l fores t area s fo r agri culture shoul d b e examined . The presen t fores t reservatio n policie s declar e tha t th e practic e of slash-and-bur n agricultur e i n th e hill s i s unlawful . Tw o con siderations wer e brough t t o th e attentio n o f th e governmen t i n this context : (a ) Th e settlemen t o f semi-nomadi c population s can onl y b e achieve d gradually . A long-ter m projec t require s a continuous , patien t approach . I n th e initia l stages , sever e penalties fo r cuttin g tree s i n protecte d area s ma y no t yiel d th e desired result , becaus e th e hil l me n d o no t ye t full y understan d the natur e o f thei r offenses . W e hav e alread y observe d grav e reactions i n case s wher e tribesme n wer e arrested . I n th e lon g run i t woul d b e mor e profitabl e i f a mor e lenien t approac h wer e used durin g th e first phas e o f la w enforcement . Th e relevan t authorities shoul d stres s th e positiv e aspect s o f teachin g th e hil l people ho w t o stabiliz e thei r agriculture , rathe r tha n usin g a punitive approach , (b ) Th e stabilizatio n o f hil l tribe s wil l hav e to b e don e in variou s part s o f th e hil l areas . I t i s impossibl e to grou p the m al l together i n tw o o r thre e o r even five settlemen t project areas . Thoug h som e regroupin g ma y b e considered , mos t of th e hil l people ma y remai n i n th e are a an d th e village s the y now occupy . Thi s mean s tha t severa l part s o f th e highland s no w reserved fo r fores t migh t hav e t o b e legall y allotte d fo r cultiva tion. Th e allege d negativ e result s o f deforestatio n cause d b y hil l agriculture see m t o hav e bee n greatl y exaggerated . Th e com *See paper s b y Kandr e an d Kunstadte r i n thi s volum e fo r a n indicatio n o f some o f th e variabilit y amon g som e o f thes e tribe s i n concept s o f property , land allocation , an d productio n units . (Ed. )

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petent governmen t department s shoul d cooperat e i n reachin g the decisions on this subject . 4. Th e policy towar d opium-popp y cultivatio n shoul d tak e int o consideration th e condition s prevailin g i n th e hil l an d frontie r regions. In additio n t o thei r presentl y illega l us e o f reserve d fores t lands, th e hil l people s ma y b e declare d outlaw s a t an y tim e be cause o f thei r age-ol d economi c traditio n o f popp y cultivatio n and sal e o f ra w opiu m t o traders . Th e tribesme n themselve s can not b e blame d fo r thi s stat e o f affairs . Th e policie s o f variou s governments towar d opiu m productio n an d consumptio n hav e frequently change d durin g th e las t century . Sudde n enforcemen t of th e prohibitio n o n th e mai n cas h crop , opium , i s liabl e t o lead t o mor e dangerou s situation s tha n exis t a t present . There fore, th e following suggestion s wer e made : (a ) A t presen t ther e should b e a sympatheti c polic y towar d th e hil l peopl e wh o pro duce opium , (b ) Stron g measure s shoul d b e take n i n th e low lands agains t th e trad e i n opiu m an d opiates , (c ) Governmen t authorities shoul d pu t primar y stres s o n th e positiv e objective s of enablin g hil l peopl e t o develo p a ne w cas h economy , b y ren dering technica l assistanc e throug h experience d hil l agricultural ists. Onl y i n thi s contex t shoul d the y b e graduall y encourage d to give up opium cultivation . 5. Th e final polic y suggestio n wa s tha t consideratio n b e give n to th e us e o f hil l tribesme n a s members o r associate s o f securit y forces o r Border Patrol . The hil l tribesme n ar e th e onl y one s wh o really kno w th e hill s and jungles . The y kno w ho w t o find thei r wa y an d als o t o mov e and surviv e i n thi s environment . The y ar e fa r superio r t o anyon e else i n thi s environment . The y als o kno w wha t i s goin g o n i n the hills . I n fact , the y hav e amazin g communication s amon g th e various groups . It woul d therefor e see m o f grea t benefit t o ensur e their cooperatio n i n matters concernin g contro l an d intelligence . Selected member s o f hil l tribes ma y b e use d a s loca l informants , local guides , an d a s associate s attache d t o th e Borde r Patro l Police. The y shoul d b e speciall y briefe d fo r thes e tasks . A pro gram o f thi s kin d i s alread y bein g carrie d ou t b y th e Borde r Patrol, an d ther e i s n o reaso n wh y i t shoul d no t b e accelerated . But howeve r i t i s done , i t shoul d b e base d o n voluntary , no t [542]

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compulsory, conscriptio n o f hil l tribesme n int o th e Tha i militar y services i n th e nea r future . The y d o no t see m prepare d fo r thi s type o f functio n fo r som e tim e yet . Abrup t confrontatio n wit h a worl d differen t i n society , technology , an d climat e would prob ably lea d t o a disruptio n o f thei r socia l systems , values , an d ethics, withou t allowin g the m t o establis h root s i n thei r ne w environment. O n thei r retur n t o th e triba l village s afte r th e ser vice, the y woul d no t hav e an y prospect s o f becomin g leaders , since th e traditiona l socia l system s woul d no t recogniz e thei r new knowledg e a s qualifyin g the m fo r triba l leadership. 5 This i s th e outlin e o f recommendation s submitte d t o th e Tha i government i n 196 2 o n th e basi s o f th e surve y findings . I n th e following yea r a number o f thes e recommendation s wer e imple mented, primaril y through th e newl y establishe d Hil l Trib e Divi sion o f th e Publi c Welfar e Department , Ministr y o f Interior . THE IMPLEMENTATIO N O F ACTIO N PROGRAMS , 1963-1965, AN D SOM E REMARK S ON THEI R EVALUATIO N

There ar e thre e majo r project s i n th e actio n program , dealin g with th e expansio n o f the function s o f th e hill settlemen t stations , the developmen t o f mobil e extensio n services , an d th e establish ment o f a Triba l Researc h Centre , respectively . Expense s fo r the implementatio n o f thes e program s wer e me t b y th e Tha i government. Technica l assistanc e wa s rendere d b y th e Asi a Foundation an d b y th e Australia n government . The Asi a Founda tion provide d a n anthropologis t (th e autho r o f thi s paper ) t o serve a s advise r t o th e Hil l Trib e Divisio n fo r tw o year s (1963-1965) an d grante d financial ai d fo r trainin g governmen t officials an d conductin g a n experimenta l mobil e extensio n scheme. The Australia n government , throug h SEATO , provide d an anthropologis t (Professo r Geddes ) t o serv e a s a specia l ad viser t o th e Triba l Researc h Centr e fo r on e yea r (1964^1965 ) and presente d fourtee n jeep s t o th e hil l tribe s projec t o f th e Public Welfar e Department . Th e followin g paragraph s discus s the progress made from 196 3 to 1965. 5

See papers b y Huf f an d Moerma n i n thi s volum e fo r suggested us e o f returnin g veterans i n minorit y Tha i villages , an d paper s b y Kandr e an d Kunstadte r fo r the function s i n triba l village s o f individual s wh o hav e ha d experienc e i n th e outside world . (Ed. )

[543 ]

T H A I L A N D : HAN S MANNDORF F

1. Intensificatio n an d expansio n o f th e activitie s o f th e settle ment project s i n th e hill s has include d developmen t o f (a ) agri cultural experimen t stations , (b ) demonstratio n center s fo r hil l farmers, (c ) marketin g an d tradin g center s fo r cas h crops , (d ) training center s fo r developmen t workers , an d (e ) hil l base s fo r mobile demonstratio n an d developmen t work . N o spectacula r progress ha s bee n achieve d i n thes e regard s i n existin g stations . Some modes t experiment s hav e bee n conducte d a t Ta k (Do i Musser) an d Chiengra i (Maechan ) i n th e cours e of th e last year . They hav e no t serve d a s demonstratio n center s becaus e th e ex periments wer e limite d i n scop e an d success . Th e ide a o f estab lishing tradin g store s ha s bee n discusse d a t variou s levels , bu t none ar e operatin g s o far . Du e t o th e fac t tha t th e hil l station s have no t ye t mad e th e desire d progres s i n thes e fields, the y can not ye t serv e a s trainin g center s fo r developmen t workers . Th e station a t Ta k wa s use d a s a bas e fo r a n experimenta l mobil e scheme i n 196 3 an d 1964 . It s impac t an d succes s wer e rathe r limited du e t o lac k o f knowledg e an d traine d personnel . A forma l reques t ha s bee n mad e t o foreig n ai d agencie s t o obtain th e service s o f thre e qualifie d me n wit h experienc e i n tropical hil l agriculture , livestock-raisin g an d pastur e improve ment, an d plan t ecology . Thes e expert s ar e suppose d t o assis t and advis e th e researc h an d experimentatio n o n modernize d hil l agriculture. Thi s woul d includ e th e promotio n o f mor e rational ized system s o f shiftin g cultivation , wit h shor t croppin g period s and adequat e fallo w times , cove r crops , an d growt h o f shad e trees i n abandone d clearings , experimentatio n wit h suitabl e an nual an d perennia l cas h crops , continuatio n o f wor k o n th e ex perimental cattl e far m a t Tak , an d researc h o n th e reactio n o f natural vegetatio n t o variou s kind s o f agricultura l activities . In 196 3 a soil specialist (provide d b y th e Foo d an d Agricultur e Organization) an d a plan t ecologis t (provide d b y th e Colomb o Plan) wer e brough t u p t o th e Ta k hil l tract s t o stud y soi l type s and plan t association s an d t o determine prospect s fo r agricultura l development. Th e preliminar y repor t o n thei r activitie s (Kee n 1964; Moorma n et al. 1964 ) is ver y valuable . I n 196 4 a Ne w Zealand cattl e specialis t worke d a t th e Ta k hil l statio n fo r five months. H e establishe d a n experimenta l cattl e far m i n coopera tion wit h th e projec t officials . Pastur e lan d wa s cleared , a wid e [ 54 4 ]

HIL L TBIB E PBOGBA M

variety o f ne w gras s specie s wa s introduce d experimentall y fo r improving grazing , an d eleve n cattl e wer e brough t t o thi s live stock farm. Th e project seem s quit e promising, and hill tribesme n of surroundin g villages tak e a n interes t i n it. However , i t i s absolutely necessar y t o hav e continuou s exper t advic e fo r i t t o be come a success . It i s hope d tha t th e expert s mentione d abov e wil l giv e a ne w stimulus t o th e activitie s o f th e settlemen t projects , but on e wil l have t o wai t fo r a t leas t tw o t o fou r year s fo r th e firs t valuabl e results t o appear . Besides th e activitie s mentione d above , th e hil l station s ar e engaged i n (f ) establishin g educationa l institution s suc h a s pri mary schools , (g ) renderin g medica l services , and (h ) promotin g good relation s betwee n governmen t an d th e hil l people . Th e Hil l Tribe Divisio n cooperate s wit h th e Ministr y o f Educatio n t o es tablish school s i n relativel y accessibl e tribal villages . The proces s is slow, du e t o lac k o f fund s an d t o th e difficult y o f finding dedi cated teacher s willin g t o devot e themselve s t o wor k i n thes e remote areas . Moreover , curricul a an d teachin g methods properl y adjusted t o th e aspiration s an d expectation s o f th e hil l peopl e are stil l lacking . A s i n othe r matters , basi c researc h int o thes e aspects o f triba l lif e i s required . I t ma y b e mentione d her e tha t schools run by th e Border Patrol Police have not been too successful either . Thi s i s probabl y no t du e t o lo w intelligenc e o f triba l children, fo r thei r alertnes s an d intellectua l abilit y hav e bee n noted b y severa l previou s observer s wh o hav e studie d the m closely (Finla y 1962) , bu t i t ma y b e attribute d t o a variet y o f other reasons . I n man y hil l trib e village s growin g interes t i n learning an d writin g i s clearl y evident . I t appear s tha t man y tribesmen woul d prefe r t o hav e teacher s fro m thei r ow n tribe , but ther e hav e bee n ver y fe w tribesme n i n Thailan d wh o woul d be qualifie d fo r a jo b a s primar y schoo l teacher . Muc h attentio n is bein g give n t o thes e questions , bu t n o satisfactor y answe r ha s been foun d s o far . Medical service s ar e usuall y accepte d gratefull y b y hil l tribes men, but , a s i n educatio n an d agriculture , thei r extensio n is ham pered b y th e lac k o f trained , experienced , an d dedicate d person nel, a s wel l a s b y th e physica l factor s o f inaccessibilit y o f th e widely disperse d villages . [545]

THAILAND : HAN S MANNDOHF F

As far as the relationship betwee n th e field officer s o f th e Hil l Tribe Divisio n an d th e tribesme n i s concerned , a sympatheti c and friendl y approac h prevail s i n th e entir e projec t area . Ther e has neve r been an y forced labor , fo r example , i n road construc tion o r field-clearing. If th e hil l peopl e wor k i n group s nea r th e hill stations , it is commonly don e on a voluntary basi s of mutua l aid—they wil l receiv e anothe r benefi t i n retur n fo r thei r assistance, either in cash or in kind. 2. Th e secon d majo r projec t i s th e mobil e extensio n scheme . An experimental mobil e development project wa s launched fro m Tak (Do i Musser ) hil l base in 196 3 and 1964 . Four teams , each composed o f a n agricultura l extensio n worker , a healt h worker , and a socia l worker , were sen t t o remot e village s o f Me o an d Karen tribesmen . Som e o f thes e village s wer e relativel y wel l known from previou s contact and study. Others had never befor e been visited by local government official s o r even Border Patrols. Their relation s wit h lowlanders ha d bee n confine d t o the barter ing o f opiu m durin g occasiona l contact s wit h traders , "Haw " merchants, and Tha i peddlers. The mobile extensio n wor k starte d wit h a reconnaissanc e sur vey of twenty-si x Meo villages in the Tak and Mae Sod hill tracts and fourtee n Kare n village s i n Amphu r Ma e Sod . O n th e basi s of thes e surveys , strategicall y locate d village s wer e selecte d i n which th e four mobil e teams settle d down . Temporary huts were built with the assistance of the villagers. A more intensive survey was carrie d out i n th e ke y villages , an d operation s wer e some times extende d t o neighboring villages. One of the valuable lessons learned was that much more preparation an d trainin g o f field worker s i s require d i f th e schem e is t o become successful . Mor e emphasis i s now give n to trainin g in th e relevan t skills . I t wa s als o learne d tha t i t woul d b e o f great value to introduce some kind of government administratio n into thes e villages . Fo r example , officia l recognitio n coul d b e given t o a headma n wh o migh t b e chose n b y the tribesme n i n accordance wit h thei r ow n traditions . The n communication s could b e establishe d betwee n th e officiall y recognize d villag e government an d th e authoritie s o f th e neares t Tha i lowlan d administration. Throughou t thei r history , u p unti l today , thes e tribal communitie s hav e bee n largel y self-governin g an d hav e [ 54 6 ]

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received few , i f any , service s fro m th e centra l government , s o it is no t surprisin g i f the y hav e n o understandin g o f th e purpos e and intention s o f th e mobile extensio n worker s wh o visi t o r settl e down in their villages . Of course , the introductio n o f a n appropriat e syste m o f govern ment administration , adequatel y adjuste d fo r triba l cultur e an d conditions woul d nee d active cooperatio n betwee n th e Hil l Trib e Division an d th e Departmen t o f Administration , a s wel l a s th e district an d provinc e authorities . Thu s th e politica l integratio n could b e promote d throug h a moderat e regiona l autonomy , b y which triba l chieftains , villag e headmen , forma l an d informa l leaders ar e recognize d a s official s o f th e village s an d eve n o f the tambon ("commune " o r grou p o f villages) . Thi s ha s alread y been don e i n a fe w areas , a s in the cas e o f th e Ya o of Ph u Lang a (Nan Province ) an d i n som e o f th e Kare n district s o f Maehong son Province. 6 The ide a o f havin g mobil e extensio n worker s wh o g o t o th e hill tribesmen , meetin g the m i n thei r ow n settin g an d extendin g their usefu l skill s i n agriculture , health , education , marketing , etc., seem s excellen t t o th e tribesmen . However , severa l danger s are involved . I f i t i s don e wit h a lac k o f basi c understandin g and knowledg e o n th e sid e o f th e mobil e workers , i t ma y resul t in a loss of confidenc e b y th e hill people. First o f all , thes e mobil e worker s nee d t o hav e a prope r atti tude towar d th e tribesme n an d appreciatio n fo r thei r mod e o f life. Second , the y mus t b e dedicate d t o thei r work , sinc e thei r job i s no t easy . An d las t bu t no t least , the y hav e t o b e traine d in such fields a s community developmen t amon g tribal minorities , and hil l agriculture , a s wel l a s suc h subject s a s anthropolog y and sociology , i n orde r t o develo p a n adequat e understandin g of ho w triba l societie s operate . As mentioned above , th e hill stations an d Tribal Researc h Cen tre coul d serv e as training channel s an d permanent advisor y insti tutions. However , i t ma y requir e tw o t o fou r year s unti l the y can reall y d o so . I n th e meantime , trainin g an d advic e i s ren dered, a s th e nee d occurs , b y th e staf f o f th e Hil l Trib e Divisio n and b y th e tw o anthropologist s attache d t o th e hill tribe projects . "This patter n i s alread y wel l establishe d i n othe r area s a s well . See , fo r example, Kandre' s an d Kunstadte r s paper s i n thi s volume . (Ed. )

[ 54 7 ]

THAILAND : HAN S MANNDOBF F

Some preliminar y trainin g course s hav e bee n held , an d thre e manuals fo r field workers hav e bee n produce d o n initial develop ment activities , reconnaissanc e survey , an d villag e communit y survey (Thailan d 196 4 A, B, C ). Finally, an d equally important , the fiel d staf f i s continuousl y learnin g b y doing , followin g th e trial and error approach . In th e officia l polic y o f th e hil l trib e project , mor e an d mor e importance i s attache d t o the use of mobil e work, i.e. , approach ing th e hil l peopl e i n thei r ow n villages . Th e resettlemen t idea , on th e othe r hand , i s slowl y fading , o r a t leas t ha s bee n post poned, becaus e i t was learne d tha t th e hil l tribesme n wer e no t inclined t o b e relocate d an d resettle d i n th e prescribe d projec t areas. Thes e area s wer e no t properl y selecte d i n al l cases . W e do no t thin k i t a wis e polic y t o impos e an y forc e o n th e hil l people, sinc e thi s coul d wel l result i n annoyance an d even hostil e feelings amon g th e hill tribesme n an d might finall y lea d t o obstinate fights in the jungles. Another basi c proble m i s to provide incentive s o r inducement s to th e field staff , bot h mobil e worker s an d hil l statio n staff . I t has bee n realize d tha t no t al l o f the m ar e full y dedicate d t o the wor k t o whic h the y ar e assigned . The y complai n abou t th e hard livin g conditions , lo w salary, isolatio n i n remot e areas , and small opportunit y fo r promotio n i n a physica l an d cultura l environment whic h i s quit e strang e t o them . Suc h complaint s are quit e understandable . Ye t a s a consequence , i n man y case s the worker s d o onl y jus t enoug h wor k a s is absolutel y necessar y to avoi d troubl e wit h thei r superiors . Withou t persona l motiva tion n o progres s ca n be achieved , a s thi s i s th e kin d o f wor k which require s a s much individua l initiativ e an d sincer e dedica tion as skill and experience. A remed y fo r thi s proble m migh t b e t o recrui t hil l peopl e into th e hill tribe projec t field staf f a s soon a s possible. However , in th e beginning , a smal l cadr e o f Tha i officer s i s needed. More over, ther e ar e administrativ e an d bureaucrati c difficultie s i n recruiting triba l people , since , accordin g t o present govenmen t reg ulations, certai n qualification s an d examination s ar e require d i n order t o become a Thai official . A t present discussion s ar e bein g held o n these problems. Two furthe r experimenta l mobil e project s wer e carrie d ou t in 1965 . In th e first, eight studen t volunteer s from Chulalongkor n [ 54 8 ]

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University wer e sen t t o som e hil l village s t o mak e friend s wit h tribesmen an d t o exchang e opinions . Thes e student s wer e prop erly selecte d an d thoroughl y briefed . The y staye d fo r on e mont h and reporte d t o th e Hil l Trib e Divisio n o n thei r return . Thi s project seem s t o hav e succeede d becaus e o f th e excellen t quali fications o f th e person s concerned . I n th e secon d case , a selecte d group o f Buddhis t monk s volunteere d t o contac t triba l peopl e in thei r mountai n villages , perhap s fo r th e firs t tim e i n history . This experiment , whic h i s no w goin g on , i s bein g closel y observed. Bot h project s wer e sponsore d wit h financial ai d fro m the Asia Foundation . 3. Th e Triba l Researc h Centr e i s th e thir d majo r projec t i n the actio n program . Th e Centr e wa s establishe d durin g th e fiscal year 1964-196 5 throug h th e Publi c Welfar e Departmen t an d i n association wit h th e Universit y o f Chiengmai . Professo r Geddes , the anthropologica l advise r attache d t o th e Centre , has submitte d several substantia l recommendation s fo r it s futur e administrativ e setup, staffing , organization , an d field research , an d hi s pape r on thes e subject s i s include d i n thi s volume . Therefore , onl y th e most essentia l facts wil l b e discusse d her e i n orde r t o summariz e the present state of th e project . Staff i s bein g recruite d an d traine d i n th e cours e o f thi s yea r (1965). Th e curren t budge t allow s for on e senior researc h officer , two junio r researc h officers , on e librarian , an d maintenanc e per sonnel. A gran t ha s bee n receive d fro m th e Britis h Embass y t o purchase book s fo r th e library . Thi s i s i n additio n t o th e gran t of th e Australia n government , previousl y referre d to , which con sisted o f fourtee n jeep s presented t o the hill trib e projec t throug h SEATO. Th e Centr e wa s inaugurate d i n Jun e 196 5 with a train ing course for government officials . A numbe r o f researc h project s ar e envisage d fo r th e comin g years, includin g (a ) comprehensiv e studie s o f selecte d tribes , giving primar y importanc e t o Meo , Yao , Lahu , Lisu , Akha , an d Karen; (b ) communit y studies ; (c ) studie s o n trad e system s in th e hill s an d marke t condition s i n selecte d areas , specificall y near th e existin g hil l station s i n Tak , Chiengdao , Maechan , Lo m Sak, an d Maesariang ; (d ) linguisti c studies , particularly o n Meo , Lahu, an d Karen ; (e ) agricultura l an d anima l husbandr y studies , with attentio n t o th e socia l factor s involved ; (f ) populatio n studies, wit h emphasi s o n a n accurat e hil l trib e census ; (g ) edu [ 54 9 1

T H A I L A N D : HAN S MANNDOHF

F

cationa l research , wit h a n examinatio n o f suc h question s a s ad justmen t o f curricul a t o hil l trib e societies , languag e instruction , use o f audiovisua l aids , etc. ; (h ) healt h studies ; (i ) stud y o f th e rol e o f th e Chines e "Haw " i n relatio n t o th e hil l tribes ; (j) studie s o f administrativ e system s whic h woul d b e acceptabl e to th e triba l peopl e an d woul d facilitat e thei r integratio n int o th e life o f th e Tha i nation . I n additio n t o thes e activities , th e Triba l Researc h Centr e i s bein g develope d t o serv e a s a documentatio n center , includin g a library , museum , an d archives . I t i s als o use d a s a briefin g an d trainin g cente r fo r officer s an d worker s amon g hil l tribes , as wel l a s fo r member s o f th e hil l trib e societies . Finally , i t i s to becom e a coordinatio n cente r fo r foreig n an d domesti c researcher s wh o wor k o n variou s aspect s o f hil l trib e life . Th e foundation s ar e bein g lai d s o tha t th e Triba l Researc h Centr e will carr y ou t a s well a s stimulat e an d coordinat e researc h work i n th e hill s o f Norther n Thailand , wit h a vie w t o assistin g th e hil l trib e projects . I t shoul d b e stresse d her e tha t applie d researc h canno t b e easily separate d fro m pur e scientifi c research . Somethin g mus t be know n befor e i t ca n b e applied . Thi s mean s tha t thoroug h researc h o n severa l aspect s o f triba l lif e i s a prerequisit e t o suc cessful action . Any attemp t t o launc h large developmen t project s withou t th e necessar y knowledg e woul d b e wors e tha n useless . I t i s eas y t o cit e numerou s instance s fro m variou s part s o f th e world i n whic h well-intentione d measure s wer e nullifie d b y th e lack o f knowledge . I t wa s no t know n i n advanc e tha t thes e ac tion s wer e incompatibl e wit h socia l institution s o r deepl y roote d sentiment s o f th e peopl e concerned . Suc h lac k o f knowledg e ha s often le d t o rea l catastrophes , socia l o r economi c disintegration , an d eve n los s o f life . Ther e hav e bee n example s i n whic h ill-con sidered agricultura l innovations , undertake n precipitately , hav e led t o remarkabl e damag e t o soi l an d vegetation . A s a resul t of suc h action , th e populatio n los t confidence , an d furthe r ad ministrativ e actio n becam e mor e difficult . I t i s t o th e credi t o f th e authoritie s o f th e hil l trib e projec t in Thailan d tha t the y hav e alway s bee n prepare d t o facilitat e researc h i n connectio n wit h th e plannin g an d implementatio n of th e program , an d the y hav e contacte d variou s foreig n an d domesti c agencie s t o assis t i n th e conduc t o f specifi c researc h Γ 550 1

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programs. Th e establishmen t o f th e Triba l Researc h Centr e i n Chiengmai i s a n outstandin g achievemen t i n thi s regard . Since thi s projec t i s of worldwide interest , ther e i s good hop e of continuin g suppor t fro m internationa l organization s an d foundations concerne d wit h th e promotio n o f huma n welfare . It ca n be hoped tha t it s organization wil l advanc e independen t and concentrated scientifi c work and that it will facilitate cooper ation amon g th e relevan t nationa l an d internationa l researc h institutions. BIBLIOGRAPHY The followin g i s a lis t o f scientifi c articles , surve y reports , an d govern ment paper s whic h hav e a direc t bearin g o n problem s deal t wit h i n thi s paper. BENNINGTON-CORNELL ANTHROPOLOGICA L SURVE Y

1964 A

repor t o f triba l people s i n Chiengra i Provinc e nort h o f th e Mae Ko k river. Bangkok , Sia m Society , Dat a Pape r 1 .

BERNATZIK, HUG O ADOL F

1947 Akh a un d Meau : problem e de r angewandte n Volkerkund e i n Hinterindien. Innsbruck , Wagnerisch e Universitat s Buch druckerei. Tw o vols. Althoug h thi s boo k i s a n accoun t o f fiel d research don e i n 1936-1937 , i t i s stil l th e onl y anthropologica l monograph o n hil l tribe s o f Thailand . Severa l section s o f th e book dea l wit h problem s relevan t t o topic s unde r discussio n in th e presen t volume . CAMPBELL, P . D . J .

1963 Repor t o n surve y o f tea-growin g area s o f Thailand . Colomb o Plan. FINLAY, DOUGLA S

1962 Repor t o n visi t t o Chien g Da o to stud y chil d an d family need s of hil l tribe s community . Bangkok . HEINE-GELDERN, ROBER T

1962 A

proposa l fo r th e establishmen t o f a triba l researc h cente r in Thailand . Bulleti n o f the International Committe e o n Urgen t Anthropological an d Ethnological Researc h 5:21-22 .

KEEN, F . G . B .

1964 Prospect s fo r lan d developmen t an d settlemen t o f hil l tribe s in th e upland s o f Ta k Province. Bangkok , Ministr y o f Interior , Department o f Publi c Welfare . KUNSTADTER, PETE R

1964 Researc h o n th e Lua P an d S^ka w Kare n hil l peopl e o f North ern Thailand , wit h som e practica l implications . Bangkok , mimeographed.

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T H A I L A N D : HAN S M A N N D O R F F MANNDORFF, H A N S

1965A Socio-economi c researc h i n suppor t o f socio-economi c develop ment i n th e hil l trib e project . Journa l o f th e Publi c Welfar e Department 5:30-36 . Bangkok , Ministr y o f Interior . 1965B Som e observation s o n th e southwar d migratio n o f hil l tribe s in Thailand . Mitteilunge n de r Anthropologische n Gesellschaf t in Wien . (Publishe d i n German , wit h a n Englis h summary. ) MOERMAN, MICHAE L

1964 A

diar y o f activitie s i n Thailand . Bangkok . Contain s a revie w of triba l programmin g unde r Para . IV .

MOORMAN, F . R. , K . R . M . ANTHONY , an d SAMAR N PANICHAPON G

1964 Not e o n th e soil s an d lan d us e i n th e hill s o f Ta k Province . Bangkok, Ministr y o f Nationa l Development , Lan d Develop ment Department . PATYA SATHO O

1962A Th e hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailan d an d th e opiu m problem . United Nation s Bulleti n o n Narcotic s 15(2 ) :35-45 . 1962B Repor t o n th e hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailand . Bangkok , mim eographed. Contain s a bibliography an d revie w o f anthropolog ical studie s o f hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailand , includin g a number o f recommendation s o n possibl e area s o f researc h per taining t o th e socio-economi c developmen t o f hil l people s i n the North . THAILAND, D E P A R T M E N T O F PUBLI C W E L F A R E

1959 Lan d settlemen t projec t fo r hil l trib e peopl e i n Thailan d a s of 196 0 (B.E . 2503) . Bangkok , Ministr y o f Interior , Depart ment o f Publi c Welfare . 1962 Repor t o n th e socio-economi c surve y o f th e hil l tribes i n North ern Thailand . Bangkok , Ministr y o f Interior , Departmen t o f Public Welfare . 1964A A manua l fo r field worker s amon g hil l tribes : initia l develop ment activities . Bangkok , Ministr y o f Interior , Departmen t o f Public Welfare . 1964B A manua l fo r field worker s amon g hil l tribes : reconnaissanc e survey. Bangkok , Ministr y o f Interior , Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare. 1964C A manua l fo r fiel d worker s amon g hil l tribes : villag e com munity survey . Bangkok , Ministr y o f Interior , Departmen t o f Public Welfare . UNTTED NATION S ECONOMI C COMMISSIO N FO R ASI A AN D TH E F A R EAS T ( E C A F E ) , DIVISIO N O F SOCIA L AFFAIR S

1961 Repor t o f a field tri p undertake n i n connectio n wit h th e projec t on a socio-economi c surve y o f th e hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailand. YOUNG, GORDO N

1962 Th e hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailand : a socio-ethnologica l re port. Bangkok , Sia m Society , 2 d edn .

[ 55 2 ]

CHAPTER 1 5

The Tribal Research Centre, Thailand: An Account of Plans and Activitie s WILLIAM R . GEDDE S

INTRODUCTION

This pape r deal s wit h th e subjec t o f th e Triba l Researc h Centre whic h th e Thailan d governmen t establishe d i n 1964 . Th e creation o f th e Centr e wa s recommende d i n th e report , prepare d by Dr . Han s Manndorff , o f th e socio-economi c surve y o f th e hill tribe s i n Norther n Thailan d carrie d ou t b y th e officer s o f the Departmen t o f Public Welfare i n 1961-196 2 (Thailan d 1962) . On Apri l 21 , 1964 , th e Cabine t o f th e Governmen t o f Thailan d decided tha t th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare , workin g i n co operation wit h th e Universit y o f Chiengmai , shoul d establis h a "Tribal Researc h Centre " with th e followin g activitie s (Thailan d 1964): (1) T o conduc t researc h project s i n th e fields o f education , health , economics, sociolog y an d anthropolog y o f th e hil l tribe s i n northern Thailand . Th e outcom e o f suc h project s wil l b e use d a s as basi s t o reformulat e a bette r pla n fo r hil l trib e work . (2) T o procure books, films, journals, etc. in the fields of socia l science and othe r studie s relatin g t o th e hil l tribes . Thes e book s wil l b e for library which will be part of the Centre. (3) T o procur e artifact s o f th e tribe s an d films o f the m t o b e kep t in the museum which is also to be part of the Centre. (4) T o evaluat e continuousl y th e hil l trib e project s conducte d b y both the Government and private organizations. (5) T o participat e i n th e trainin g o f official s wh o wil l b e workin g with the hill tribes. (6) T o giv e advisor y service s an d cooperatio n t o institutions , bot h domestic an d foreign , intereste d i n conductin g studie s amon g th e hill tribes .

Prior t o thi s final Cabine t decisio n th e governmen t ha d approached th e Southeas t Asi a Treat y Organizatio n (SEATO ) [ 55 3 ]

THAILAND : WILLIA M K . GEDDE S

with a reques t fo r assistanc e i n plannin g an d equippin g th e Centre. Th e Australia n governmen t undertoo k t o suppl y trans port an d th e service s o f a n anthropologica l advise r i n th e initia l year, a positio n whic h I assume d i n Jul y 1964 . Late r th e Britis h government undertoo k t o provid e book s fo r th e librar y u p t o a valu e o f £60 0 sterling , an d i n Jul y 1965 , the U.S . governmen t announced a gif t throug h SEAT O o f $12,00 0 wort h o f photo graphic an d recordin g equipment . In translatin g th e Cabine t decisio n int o action , a numbe r o f problems hav e bee n encountered . Thes e ar e th e norma l birth pangs o f a ne w institution . Som e o f th e problem s ar e financial and organizational , suc h a s th e smal l siz e o f th e presen t budge t and th e comparativel y lo w statu s o f th e Centr e i n th e institu tional structur e o f th e Thailan d civi l service . Thes e problem s I shal l discus s towar d th e en d o f thi s paper . A n immediat e prob lem wa s t o formulat e a researc h program . Althoug h b y n o mean s unconscious o f th e academi c value o f researc h o n th e hil l tribes , the governmen t wa s mos t intereste d i n it s practica l us e i n th e service o f policy . Therefore, i n formulatin g th e plan , on e ha d first t o understan d the polic y toward s th e hil l tribes . In fact , i n th e opinio n situatio n of 196 4 one coul d d o somethin g mor e tha n merel y see k t o under stand. Seriou s though t o n th e natur e o f a n activ e polic y toward s the hil l tribe s wa s fairl y new , an d althoug h ther e wa s genera l agreement o n th e basi c line s o f polic y amon g th e person s mos t intimately connecte d wit h th e hil l trib e program , man y othe r persons wer e uncertai n a s t o wha t th e polic y wa s o r wha t i t should be . Thu s her e wa s opportunit y fo r on e t o us e one' s judg ment o f th e alread y know n fact s an d comparativ e knowledg e of simila r situation s elsewher e i n th e worl d i n suppor t o f th e agreed policy , an d s o help t o promot e a greater , an d henc e mor e effective, consensus . It i s agree d tha t th e tribe s ca n n o longe r b e lef t isolate d fro m the Tha i people . Ther e ha s t o be a greate r relationship . Shoul d this tak e th e for m o f complet e absorptio n o f th e tribe s int o th e general Tha i community—tha t i s t o sa y "assimilation"—o r should i t tak e th e for m no w generall y know n i n Englis h as "inte gration," i n whic h th e tribe s woul d remai n mor e o r les s separat e social entitie s wit h cultura l distinctiveness , bu t participat e i n [554]

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the overal l economi c an d politica l structur e o f Thailand ? Deci sion o n thi s questio n wil l affec t th e natur e o f th e developmen t program. If th e polic y wer e t o b e assimilationist , the n effor t woul d b e directed towar d educatin g th e peopl e i n Tha i languag e an d cul ture an d encouragin g th e interchang e o f person s betwee n Tha i and triba l areas . Ther e woul d b e les s nee d fo r th e stud y o f triba l languages an d cultures . If , o n th e othe r hand , th e polic y wer e to b e th e milde r on e o f integration , the n th e aim s woul d b e to promot e economic , social , an d politica l developmen t throug h existing triba l institutions . It i s unrealisti c t o vie w th e tw o policie s o f assimilatio n an d integration a s extrem e alternatives . Complet e assimilatio n o f th e tribes withi n th e foreseeabl e futur e i s not a possibility. Especiall y in som e o f th e tribe s th e sens e o f triba l integrit y is very strong . The Meo , fo r instance , almos t neve r intermarr y eve n wit h other tribe s whos e territorie s intersec t thei r own . Attachment s to languages , customs , religions , an d famil y an d grou p system s cannot b e broke n o n a mas s scal e withi n th e spac e o f on e o r two generations , excep t perhap s b y th e us e o f force , whic h i s interdicted in a free country . Attempts t o haste n assimilatio n usuall y produc e socia l disrup tion an d eventuall y hostil e reaction . Th e resource s o f personne l and wealt h whic h woul d b e require d fo r economi c assimilatio n of th e tribe s ar e beyon d th e mean s o f th e Tha i government . Finally, ther e i s th e specificall y nationa l reaso n fo r keepin g the tribe s i n th e hills . I f the y mov e awa y fro m th e hill s othe r groups wil l manag e t o com e in , thu s creatin g a neve r endin g task o f assimilatio n an d pressur e o n th e lowland s whic h wil l b e needed fo r th e constantl y increasin g Tha i population . A s lon g as th e tribe s d o remai n i n th e hills , however , thei r relativel y isolated existenc e wil l ten d t o uphol d thei r distinctiv e socia l structures an d cultures . But jus t a s complet e assimilatio n i s no t a practica l possibilit y in th e foreseeabl e future , neithe r i s a for m o f integratio n whic h would no t resul t i n som e los s o f triba l cultur e o r som e los s o f the identit y o f triba l peopl e wit h thei r origina l groups . A degre e o f assimilatio n i s a n inevitabl e consequenc e o f a n integration policy . Th e peopl e wil l lear n economi c technique s [ 55 5 ]

THAILAND: W I L L I A M R . GEDDE S

common t o th e Tha i bu t foreig n t o thei r traditiona l ways . The y will g o more t o th e market place , and som e of the m wil l probabl y stay there . Although th e integratio n polic y woul d foste r respec t fo r triba l languages, politica l an d economi c integratio n an d educationa l development wil l deman d increase d knowledg e o f Tha i language , and som e persons, havin g acquire d th e necessar y languag e abil ity, wil l fin d greate r opportunitie s o f advancement b y identifyin g themselves mor e o r les s completel y wit h th e Thai . Pressur e o n the lan d ma y i n tim e expe l som e tribesme n fro m th e hills . The mos t realisti c policy, therefore , appear s t o be on e o f open ended integration . I t woul d no t b e anti-assimilationist . I t coul d recognize th e righ t o f tribesme n t o assimilat e th e Tha i cultur e and blen d wit h Tha i societ y i f the y wished an d would als o recognize th e pressures whic h woul d induc e many o f the m t o do so. It woul d facilitat e th e proces s fo r them , bu t th e policy' s pri mary ai m woul d no t b e assimilation . I t woul d b e t o promot e the welfar e o f th e triba l people s an d th e developmen t o f thei r economics within their present hill environments. It woul d no t see k t o brea k u p thei r socia l institution s bu t would instea d see k t o make the m more effective. I t woul d respec t tribal religions , s o lon g a s th e peopl e wishe d t o hol d them , an d utilize tribal languages . It woul d allo w th e triba l peopl e maximu m contro l ove r thei r local government , althoug h i t woul d require loyalt y t o th e crow n and subservienc e t o th e centra l politica l institution s o f th e coun try. Thi s i s th e polic y upo n whic h a consensu s appear s t o hav e been reached . It , o r a polic y ver y lik e it , guide s th e program s of hil l trib e developmen t whic h ar e currentl y bein g pursued . It als o guide s th e practica l researc h progra m o f th e Triba l Re search Centre . Let m e no w spea k o f th e progra m i n som e detail . I t i s no t yet approve d b y th e Thailan d government . Bu t I hav e submitte d it t o th e governmen t an d i t i s currentl y unde r consideration . SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDIE S

Basic studie s ar e require d o f th e si x mai n triba l groups—Meo , Yao, Karen , Lahu , Akha , an d Lisu . Th e studie s shoul d b e o f [ 55 6 ]

TH E TRIBA L RESEARC H CENTR E

two types : socio-economi c communit y studie s an d studie s o f lan guages. Th e firs t requirement , then , i s for si x socia l anthropolo gists an d si x linguist s t o mak e th e studies . I f fund s o r availabl e personnel ar e limited, I shoul d giv e priority t o the socio-economi c studies. W e nee d the m fo r basi c knowledg e o f triba l culture s and fo r th e interpretatio n o f late r researc h findings. Therefore , I shal l speak of these studies first. Ideally, th e person s t o carr y ou t th e studie s shoul d b e Thai . This is because ther e i s a need t o build u p a corps o f Thai expert s on th e tribe s wh o wil l remai n i n th e country , constantly increas ing th e informatio n o n th e tribe s an d keepin g i t u p t o date , an d who will act as advisers on development projects . But ther e ar e ver y fe w Tha i a t presen t qualifie d i n socia l an thropology, an d non e wh o see m likel y t o b e abl e t o serv e th e Centre permanently . Therefore , I hav e suggeste d th e appoint ment o f si x junio r researc h officer s wh o would , unti l suc h tim e as graduate s i n anthropolog y becam e available , b e recen t uni versity graduate s i n an y subject . Eac h on e o f the m shoul d b e assigned t o specializ e o n a particula r tribe . Eac h shoul d lear n to spea k th e languag e o f th e trib e o n whic h h e i s specializin g and shoul d b e responsibl e fo r keepin g a n up-to-dat e recor d o f all availabl e fact s o n th e tribe . I n selectin g th e junio r researc h officers, a n attemp t shoul d b e mad e t o ge t a grou p wit h divers e initial training—som e i n economics , som e i n politics , som e i n agriculture, fo r example—an d the y shoul d b e encourage d t o de velop thei r specia l interest s alon g with thei r genera l anthropolog ical interest s i n th e tribe s o f thei r choic e i n orde r t o increas e their valu e i n join t discussion s o n problem s affectin g an y o r al l of th e hil l tribes . A s earl y a s possibl e i n thei r career s th e junio r research officer s shoul d b e give n a chanc e t o stud y fo r a perio d in a university anthropolog y departmen t i n Thailan d o r overseas . The junio r researc h officer s wil l no t b e capabl e o f carryin g out th e basi c socio-economi c studie s o n thei r own . Therefore , i t will b e necessar y t o hav e outsid e expert s conduc t th e studies . The junio r researc h officer s shoul d then be assigne d t o the expert s as assistant s i n orde r tha t the y b e traine d t o carr y ou t late r re search projects o n their own . For th e outsid e expert s t o b e engaged , financial grant s wil l be necessary . Fund s ar e bein g sough t fo r thi s purpose , an d I [557]

THAILAND : WILLIA M R . GEDDE S

hope a sufficien t amoun t t o finance th e socio-economi c studie s will become availabl e in the near future . The socio-economi c studie s shoul d b e planne d t o occup y tw o years. A perio d o f a t leas t si x month s wil l b e require d t o allo w the anthropologis t t o gai n a genera l familiarit y wit h th e triba l area an d th e peopl e an d t o acquir e a workin g knowledg e o f th e language. Thereafte r ther e shoul d b e detaile d observatio n an d collection o f quantitativ e dat a o n a whol e year' s cycl e o f socia l and economi c activities . I f ther e i s an y tim e lef t afte r th e obser vational yea r i s completed , i t ca n b e occupie d b y checkin g data , by brie f comparativ e studie s i n neighborin g communities , o r b y a preliminary write-up of field results. To som e person s th e perio d o f tw o year s ma y see m to o long . But th e whol e raison d'Stre o f th e Researc h Centr e i s t o suppl y information i n dept h a s distinc t fro m th e mor e superficia l typ e of informatio n whic h i s al l tha t ca n b e hope d fo r fro m quic k surveys. Th e triba l culture s ar e unfamiliar . I t i s a difficul t tas k to gai n tru e rappor t wit h th e peopl e an d a greate r tas k stil l t o appreciate al l their cultura l differences . The researc h wor k o f th e Centr e ha s a practica l intent . Ther e is, o f course , grea t scop e i n the hil l trib e area s fo r researc h wor k of a more purel y academi c kind. I hope tha t th e Thailand govern ment, i n th e interest s o f internationa l scholarship , wil l alway s remain friendl y t o suc h wor k an d th e Centr e wil l giv e i t ever y facility i n its power. Indirectly , i t will profit by th e improvement s to anthropologica l theor y whic h th e wor k shoul d provide . Bu t the project s whic h th e Centr e itsel f adopt s a s part s o f it s ow n program mus t b e s o governe d a s to yiel d th e typ e o f knowledg e it want s an d t o ensur e tha t th e result s o f th e studie s becom e known withi n a reasonabl e lengt h o f time . Therefore , i t i s pro posed tha t th e followin g condition s b e attache d t o grant s mad e to foreig n expert s fo r th e purpose s o f th e socio-economi c studies : (1) Th e projec t mus t b e subjec t t o th e genera l supervisio n of th e Director of th e Tribal Researc h Centre . (2) Th e anthropologis t shoul d have on e o f th e junio r researc h workers o f th e Centr e attache d t o him—tha t is , th e researc h worker wh o i s t o becom e th e permanen t specialis t o n tha t tribe . The anthropologis t shoul d allo w thi s researc h worke r t o partici pate i n th e researc h activities , acquain t hi m wit h th e fact s dis [ 55 8 ]

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covered i n th e researc h work , an d giv e hi m trainin g i n researc h techniques. (3) Th e researc h pla n shoul d embrac e a complet e socio-eco nomic stud y o f a singl e community , analyzin g it s demography , ecology, kinship system , genera l socia l structure, politics, religion, and subsistenc e an d tradin g economy . (4) Withi n si x month s o f th e complete d field researc h a ful l report shoul d b e give n t o th e Centr e wit h th e righ t t o publis h it (althoug h specia l circumstances—suc h a s universit y require * ments fo r advance d degre e theses—ma y b e take n int o considera tion i n decidin g th e dat e o f publication) . Th e final paymen t under th e contrac t shoul d b e deferre d unti l the report i s received . Direct financial aid , a s distinc t fro m hel p wit h transport , ac commodation, an d othe r facilitie s whic h th e Centr e ma y b e abl e to render , shoul d b e confined , i n th e initia l stag e o f th e Centre' s activities, t o researc h worker s wh o ar e willin g t o accep t th e con ditions given above . I d o no t mysel f fee l tha t thes e condition s woul d infring e th e independence o f th e anthropologis t o r imped e hi s work . Bu t i n the Unite d State s som e o f th e anthropologist s wit h who m I hav e discussed th e proposal—althoug h b y n o mean s al l o f them—ex pressed concer n a t th e conditions . Therefore , i t i s desirabl e t o explain the m i n mor e detai l an d t o stat e th e reason s fo r them . Let i t b e understood , first o f all , tha t th e condition s appl y only t o project s whic h ar e par t o f th e Centre' s researc h scheme . The Centr e doe s no t wis h t o monopoliz e al l scientifi c wor k i n the hills , an d scholar s whose project s ar e no t par t o f th e Centre' s scheme wil l be fre e t o mak e an y arrangement s the y can , o r thei r consciences wil l allow , wit h thei r ow n sponsorin g agencie s an d with other sections of the Thailand government . In th e cas e o f it s ow n sponsore d project s th e Centr e commit s its resource s t o them . I t als o obtain s th e cooperatio n o f othe r government agencies , particularl y th e provincia l an d distric t ad ministrations an d th e police , t o protec t th e researc h worker s an d facilitate thei r work . I n retur n fo r thi s governmen t effor t i t i s fair tha t th e researc h worker s shoul d suppl y th e informatio n re sulting fro m thei r studie s an d assis t th e developmen t o f furthe r research work . A t leas t i t seem s t o m e so . Th e secon d require ment—the assistanc e wit h furthe r development—ma y b e debat [ 55 9 ]

THAILAND : WILLIA M H . GEDBE S

able, an d I shal l discus s i t i n a moment . Bu t ther e ca n scarcel y be an y debat e abou t th e fairnes s o f supplyin g a ful l repor t o n the researc h work . Ther e i s n o restrictio n o n freedo m o f speec h in this . The anthropologis t i s being invite d t o widen his audience . He i s no t bein g aske d t o giv e th e informatio n confidentially . He can also publish i t wherever els e he likes. Although thi s developmen t ma y b e regrettable , th e triba l re gion o f Thailan d ha s becom e o f grea t strategi c importance . A n anthropologist can , i n fact , n o longer wor k ther e withou t govern ment support . Th e supplyin g o f a repor t i s th e minimu m condi tion unde r whic h fre e anthropologica l researc h i s likel y t o b e permitted t o continu e i n th e area . Severe r condition s impose d by th e Nationa l Researc h Counci l o f Thailan d alread y exis t o n paper governin g al l foreig n researc h i n th e country , bu t I hop e that th e Triba l Researc h Centr e wil l b e permitte d t o operat e on th e line s outline d above . Undoubtedly a mai n reaso n fo r th e decisio n o f th e Tha i au thorities t o reques t report s fro m foreig n scholar s wa s tha t certai n foreign governmen t agencie s wer e sendin g int o th e field person s who reporte d directl y t o the m an d whos e report s could , a t th e wish o f th e agencies , b e kep t confidential . I t doe s no t see m t o me t o b e excessivel y nationalisti c o f th e Tha i governmen t t o wish t o hav e th e sam e informatio n a s wa s sen t abroad . I t doe s not as k tha t th e scholar s giv e thei r result s t o i t alone . I t doe s not wis h t o dictat e th e wa y i n whic h th e studie s ar e carrie d out, althoug h i t provide s facilitie s fo r them . I t i s a curiou s fac t that som e o f th e scholar s wh o hav e criticize d th e condition s se t out abov e hav e themselve s accepte d fa r mor e restrictiv e condi tions impose d b y thei r ow n fund-supplyin g agencies . I n suc h cases i t i s th e foreig n scholar s an d no t th e Tha i wh o ar e bein g the mor e nationalistic . The abov e discussio n ha s bee n concerne d primaril y wit h th e fourth, genera l condition—th e supplyin g o f a termina l repor t on th e research . I shoul d lik e no w t o spea k briefl y o f th e othe r conditions. Th e first an d thir d condition s ar e necessar y part s o f the Centre' s specifi c schem e fo r a systemati c coordinate d stud y of triba l socio-economi c structures . Scholar s wh o d o no t wis h to tak e par t i n thi s schem e ca n pursu e thei r ow n independen t lines. Bu t thos e wh o d o elec t t o participat e i n i t ca n justifiabl y [ 56 0 ]

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be aske d t o adop t a stud y pla n whic h wil l allo w thei r wor k t o fit int o th e tota l scheme . Th e Director' s "supervision " woul d in fac t b e o f a ver y genera l nature . H e woul d no t attemp t t o impose particula r researc h procedures , bu t h e shoul d b e con sulted a s to field locations and be able to suggest modes of coordi nation between th e various research workers. The secon d condition—tha t o f acceptin g a junio r researc h worker o f th e Centr e a s a n associate—require s mor e explanation . As mentione d earlier , th e Centre , fo r th e continuanc e o f it s wor k after th e initia l studie s ar e completed , need s th e service s o f Tha i workers wh o wil l remai n i n it s service . Hel p wit h th e trainin g of thes e officer s i s a retur n whic h th e foreig n scholar s coul d giv e for th e hel p whic h the y themselve s receive . Advantag e t o th e anthropologist an d no t disadvantag e shoul d b e th e resul t o f th e arrangement. Th e junio r worker s wil l probabl y prov e highl y val uable assistants . The y wil l al l b e universit y graduate s selecte d for thei r intelligenc e an d keennes s t o wor k i n th e triba l areas . Naturally the y wil l b e fluen t i n Thai . The y wil l wis h t o perfor m well becaus e i t i s upo n th e qualit y o f thei r performanc e tha t their futur e opportunitie s wil l depend . Thes e opportunitie s wil l include, i t i s hoped , a period a t a university i n Thailan d o r over seas t o enabl e the m t o gai n highe r qualification s i n anthropology . Difficulties o f cooperatio n wit h th e junio r researc h workers , therefore, nee d no t b e expected . Bu t shoul d the y arise , ther e are severa l way s i n whic h the y coul d b e overcome . Th e junio r research worker , wh o woul d b e unde r th e field directio n o f th e anthropologist, coul d b e give n supplementar y task s whic h woul d not involv e a clos e dail y associatio n betwee n hi m an d th e anthro pologist. I n extrem e case s whe n cooperatio n becam e impossible , the Directo r o f th e Centr e coul d b e aske d t o withdraw th e junio r research worker . Finally, i t might b e sai d tha t neithe r th e Directo r o f th e Centr e nor th e foreig n anthropologist s ar e expecte d t o be imbeciles . Th e imagined problem s discusse d abov e will probably hav e littl e real ity. Th e schem e an d its associate d condition s ar e simila r i n man y ways t o th e Colonia l Developmen t an d Welfar e Fun d schem e under whic h a goo d dea l o f th e bes t recen t Britis h socia l anthro pology ha s bee n carrie d out . I t wa s o n th e Britis h schem e tha t the proposa l wa s modeled , althoug h wit h som e necessary adapta [561 ]

THAILAND : WILLIA M R . GEDDE S

tion t o th e Tha i politica l reality . I t ma y b e eve n mor e productiv e because i t offer s a uniqu e opportunit y fo r a numbe r o f anthro pologists i n neighborin g fiel d area s t o wor k coincidentall y an d in a coordinated manner . LANGUAGE STUDIE S

There ar e a number o f linguist s fro m oversea s alread y a t wor k on hil l trib e languages . Other s hav e displaye d a n interes t i n com ing an d ma y ge t suppor t fro m source s othe r tha n th e Centre . It may , therefore , b e possibl e t o ge t th e basi c languag e studie s done withou t th e nee d t o make maintenanc e grant s t o th e field workers. Th e Centr e should , however , provid e subsidie s fo r th e publication o f dictionarie s an d grammars . I f enoug h finance ca n be found , th e Centr e shoul d als o offe r grant s alon g th e sam e lines a s thos e propose d fo r th e socio-economi c studie s i n orde r to ge t a complete coverag e o f triba l language s a s soon as possible. Ideally, th e Centr e shoul d hav e o n it s staf f a traine d linguis t to supervis e languag e researc h an d publication. H e o r she should , if possible , b e Thai . I f n o suitabl y traine d perso n ca n b e foun d in Thailand , encouragemen t shoul d b e give n t o a n intereste d graduate t o ge t hi s o r he r linguisti c trainin g i n a n oversea s uni versity wit h a vie w t o a n appointmen t a s a linguistic s researc h officer o f the Centre . OTHER RESEARC H PROJECT S

The socio-economi c studie s ar e basic becaus e the y wil l provid e fundamental informatio n usefu l t o practicall y al l othe r studie s in th e triba l field. Bu t ther e ar e a number o f othe r urgen t studie s required t o supplemen t them , o r t o provid e informatio n o n spe cific issues . Th e mos t importan t o f thes e studie s see m t o m e t o be a s follows : 1. An Agricultural Study of Shifting Cultivation. a. A detaile d stud y o f th e effect s o f shiftin g cultivatio n o n soi l fertility i s required . Th e complet e stud y shoul d cover : (1) A full descriptio n o f th e presen t method s o f shiftin g culti vation practice d by th e si x main tribe s i n respec t t o paddy , corn , opium, and any other crops of significance . (2) A stud y o f a selecte d are a o f lan d withi n whic h shiftin g cultivation i s bein g practiced , thi s stud y t o compris e accurat e [ 56 2 ]

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land-use maps , th e determinatio n o f vegetatio n an d soi l charac teristics a t th e outse t o f th e study , an d a recording o f th e change s in these characteristics a s the cultivation proceeds . (3) Experimentatio n i n a n are a (perhap s adjoinin g tha t i n "2" above ) wit h differen t method s o f lan d us e unde r shiftin g cultivation, suc h as , fo r example , fallo w period s o f differen t length, leavin g fores t strip s betwee n fields, o r deliberat e plantin g of trees , such as casuarinas, during fallow periods . Let m e spea k briefl y o f th e importanc e o f thi s stud y i n genera l and o f eac h o f it s part s i n particular . Al l th e group s livin g i n the hill area s of Nort h Thailan d practic e shifting cultivation , eve n those who , lik e th e Kare n an d Lua? , als o hav e som e terraced , irrigated fields or , lik e th e Yunnanes e nea r Fang , wh o hav e larg e permanent foothil l vegetabl e gardens . Shiftin g cultivatio n i s th e only method for most tribes. It is also practiced by millions of people elsewhere in the world and is the predominant metho d ove r all of uplan d Southeas t Asia . I t i s unlikely , therefore , tha t th e method wil l b e abandone d i n th e foreseeabl e future , althoug h some modification s ma y b e introduced . Section s o f th e presen t population o f shiftin g cultivator s i n Thailan d ma y b e resettle d in th e lowlands , o r th e are a o f permanen t cultivatio n ma y b e extended int o th e hill s b y furthe r terracin g o r b y th e sprea d of tre e crops . Bu t unde r presen t condition s i t i s likel y tha t i f sections o f th e presen t hil l populatio n d o leav e th e hills , then place wil l b e take n b y ne w immigrant s fro m Burm a an d Laos . The lan d formatio n an d drainag e patter n wil l mak e a n extensiv e spread o f terracin g difficult . Th e introductio n o f tre e crop s wil l depend upo n th e developmen t o f a market fo r the m an d a mar keting organization , an d upo n th e trainin g o f th e hil l tribesme n in method s o f tree-cro p cultivation . Probabl y als o th e exten t t o which suc h crop s ca n b e introduce d wil l be limited b y th e demo graphic situation , tha t i s t o say , b y th e amoun t o f labo r whic h can b e absorbe d b y them . Som e tre e crop s requir e a large r are a of lan d tha n i s availabl e t o certai n groups . Others , suc h a s tea , have onl y a limite d market . A s pointe d ou t b y Dr . Campbel l in hi s report , te a productio n accordin g t o th e presen t rate s o f consumption i n Thailan d coul d a t th e mos t absor b th e labo r of six thousand hil l tribesme n (Campbel l 1963) . It seem s quit e clear , therefore , tha t shiftin g cultivatio n i s goin g [ 56 3 ]

THAILAND : WILLIA M R . GEDBE S

to remai n th e majo r metho d o f agricultur e i n Thailand' s hill s for a ver y lon g tim e t o come . Acceptanc e o f thi s fac t b y th e planners o f hil l trib e developmen t scheme s an d b y agriculturist s concerned wit h th e hil l tribes i s highl y important . Fa r to o ofte n is th e vie w take n tha t shiftin g cultivatio n i s bad , tha t i t mus t be abandoned , an d tha t therefor e i t i s not a fit subjec t fo r agricul tural study . Ther e i s erro r on al l these points . Properly practiced , shifting cultivatio n i s no t ba d and , i n fact , i s probabl y th e onl y method b y whic h man y o f th e hill s ca n b e farme d a t all . Th e only alternativ e t o i t i s t o abando n th e hill s t o fores t o r allo w their exploitatio n onl y fo r lumbering , which , a s practice d some times, doe s a s muc h permanen t damag e t o th e fores t cove r a s does shiftin g cultivation . Nor , fo r th e reason s alread y stated , wil l shifting cultivatio n b e abandoned . Finally , i t i s a fi t subjec t fo r study becaus e i t i s th e mos t importan t par t o f th e hil l trib e eco nomic reality . The opprobriu m wit h whic h agricultura l scientist s hav e s o often viewe d shiftin g cultivatio n ha s bee n a seriou s handica p to economi c improvemen t i n al l th e hill s o f Southeas t Asia . Pro fessor Harol d Conklin , i n a wor k publishe d first i n Current Anthropology an d late r a s a monograp h issue d b y th e Organizatio n of American State s (Conkli n 1963) , has reviewed al l the literatur e to dat e i n th e worl d o n shiftin g cultivation . Th e numbe r o f ade quate studie s i s ver y small , an d nearl y al l o f th e studie s ar e purely descriptive . Ther e ar e non e involvin g controlle d experi mentation. Thailand , throug h th e Triba l Researc h Centr e an d the Hil l Trib e Division , ha s a chanc e t o redres s thi s situation , thereby makin g a n importan t contributio n t o knowledge valuabl e to all Southeast Asia . Let m e conside r no w th e thre e part s o f th e propose d stud y in mor e detail . Th e first par t i s to b e a descriptio n o f th e existin g methods o f shiftin g cultivatio n practice d b y th e variou s hil l tribes. Suc h a descriptio n i s a norma l par t o f a n anthropologica l socio-economic survey , an d therefor e th e dat a woul d be supplie d by th e anthropologist s workin g o n th e communit y studie s pro posed earlier . Bu t the y shoul d b e especiall y requeste d t o col lect th e informatio n i n detail , briefe d a s t o wha t t o loo k for, an d aske d t o repor t thei r finding s i n al l th e relevan t socia l context. [ 564 ]

TH E TRIBA L RESEARC H CENTR E

The hil l tribe s apparentl y practic e differen t method s o f shiftin g cultivation. Th e Kare n i n th e Maesarian g District , fo r instance , appear t o rotat e thei r field s accordin g t o a syste m whic h place s a fiel d i n fallo w afte r onl y on e year' s croppin g fo r paddy . Prob ably becaus e o f thi s system , thei r residenc e patter n i s stable , some village s havin g bee n o n thei r presen t site s a t leas t durin g the lifetim e o f th e oldes t inhabitants . Fo r a syste m o f thi s kin d to work , ther e i s a n uppe r limi t t o th e populatio n siz e relativ e to th e lan d are a available . I n othe r words, the populations remai n sufficiently smal l t o allo w th e fallowin g field s t o sta y ou t o f use lon g enoug h fo r ne w fores t growt h t o regenerat e the m completely. I t i s importan t t o determin e wha t th e uppe r limi t of populatio n is . I t wil l vary , o f course , accordin g t o th e soi l characteristics o f a n area . Therefore , th e anthropologis t wh o makes th e stud y o f th e Kare n shoul d repor t no t onl y o n th e modes o f lan d use , bu t als o o n th e size s o f population s usin g defined areas . He shoul d pay attentio n t o division s of lan d owner ship withi n th e communit y becaus e populatio n pressur e o n th e land ma y var y throughou t th e communit y territor y an d a stud y of th e variation s an d thei r effect s ma y hel p t o indicat e wha t the upper limi t o f desirabl e population is. The Meo , on th e othe r hand , d o not practic e a rotation syste m of th e kin d describe d above . The y normall y divid e th e lan d int o paddy lan d an d corn-popp y land . T o som e degre e the y see k different type s o f soi l fo r th e tw o purposes , becaus e th e soi l typ e which favors padd y i s no t th e mos t favorabl e fo r poppies . Th e extent t o whic h the y ca n find th e tw o type s o f soi l i n th e sam e general localit y i s limited , especiall y a s eac h househol d want s its padd y an d it s popp y cultivation s t o b e fairl y clos e togethe r in orde r t o sav e th e labo r o f buildin g tw o farmhouses . Therefore , in practice , a communit y ha s t o choos e t o som e exten t whic h crop t o favo r i n it s selectio n o f land , th e favoritis m a t presen t generally bein g give n t o poppies . Sometime s a communit y ha s no scop e fo r choice . I t mus t tak e th e lan d whic h happen s t o be available . Even so , ther e ar e limitin g factor s affectin g th e site s o f Me o cultivation, th e stronges t influenc e bein g th e predilectio n fo r growing poppies . I t i s extremel y rar e t o fin d Me o communitie s living a t a height o f les s than 3,00 0 feet. I n th e Thailan d environ [ 56 5 ]

THAILAND : WILLIA M B . GEDDE S

ment th e greate r th e heigh t th e bette r th e poppie s grow , an d this i s a t leas t th e rationalizatio n th e Me o giv e fo r livin g s o high. Ther e ma y b e othe r factors , o f course , accountin g fo r th e height. I t i s th e traditio n o f th e Me o t o liv e high . The y ar e adapted t o th e climat e a t thi s level . Als o th e facto r favorin g the growt h o f poppie s ma y no t b e simpl y th e heigh t bu t th e drainage patter n o f th e soi l an d it s chemica l characteristic s du e to thi s o r othe r causes . Th e Me o d o no t appea r merel y t o see k height. The y see k th e source s o f stream s an d the n settl e nea r these sources . All the factor s whic h possibly determin e settlemen t require stud y t o determine thei r role . The Me o farmin g pattern s o n lan d chose n fo r padd y an d o n that chose n fo r poppie s ar e different , bu t i n neithe r cas e d o the y resemble th e Kare n patter n o f regula r fallo w afte r a shor t perio d of use . Padd y lan d i s neve r use d fo r poppie s (althoug h th e re verse i s occasionall y true ) becaus e poppie s wil l no t gro w wel l after paddy . A padd y field i s normall y use d fo r tw o year s i n succession. I t woul d be use d i n subsequen t years , too , if i t woul d yield enoug h crop , bu t i t canno t d o so , an d therefor e th e padd y fields ar e abandone d afte r tw o years . Popp y fields hav e i n eac h year a successio n o f tw o crops—cor n an d poppies . I n th e cas e of ne w fields th e cor n i s plante d afte r th e fields ar e cleare d b y burning i n lat e Apri l o r earl y May . I n July , befor e th e cor n i s harvested, th e poppie s ar e plante d betwee n th e cor n s o tha t th e corn leave s wil l shelte r th e youn g plant s fro m th e heav y rain . (This i s the commo n practice . Sometimes th e poppies ar e plante d in fields whic h d o no t hav e corn , bu t thi s i s considere d a risk y procedure.) Whe n th e cor n i s harvested , attentio n i s devote d to th e poppie s unti l th e harvestin g o f th e opiu m i n January . Thereafter cor n an d poppie s ar e grow n o n th e field fo r u p t o five year s i n succession , unti l th e productivit y o f th e field ha s become s o lo w tha t furthe r cultivatio n i s no t worthwhile . A villag e are a farme d unde r thi s patter n soo n become s exhausted. Althoug h th e Me o ofte n clai m tha t popp y lan d farmed fo r severa l year s wil l regro w scru b an d tree s an d thu s be refertilized , th e conditio n o f area s the y hav e onc e use d an d their ow n frequen t migration s sugges t tha t thi s i s no t so , o r a t least tha t th e perio d require d fo r jungl e regeneration i s extremel y long. Th e padd y land , bein g farme d fo r onl y tw o years , ma y [ 56 6 ]

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be refertilize d faster , bu t thi s i s th e smalle r proportio n o f th e land bein g brough t unde r cultivation , s o tha t eve n i f i t doe s regenerate, th e are a s o mad e fit fo r farmin g agai n i s ofte n to o small to support th e population an y longer. Therefore, a frequen t patter n appear s t o b e a s follows . Th e Meo mov e int o a ne w area . The y brea k i n lan d fo r padd y an d poppies, feedin g thei r animal s o n th e co m raise d i n th e popp y fields. The y exten d th e area s use d fo r padd y i n th e followin g years an d far m thei r initia l popp y field s fo r five years . Afte r fiv e years ther e i s usuall y enoug h lan d lef t fo r anothe r se t o f popp y fields t o b e made . Therefore , the y ca n remai n i n th e are a fo r a furthe r fiv e years , makin g te n year s i n all . (Fiv e year s appear s to b e th e maximu m perio d t o us e fo r a popp y fiel d unde r opti mum conditions . I f soi l condition s ar e no t perfect , th e perio d may b e fou r year s o r less . Thu s th e tota l perio d o f residenc e possible i n a n are a show s variation. ) Frequently , afte r te n year s there i s n o mor e suitabl e lan d left , an d th e grou p mus t migrate . In man y part s o f Thailan d te n year s i s th e averag e perio d o f settlement o f Me o communities , althoug h th e commo n rang e is from si x to fifteen years. When th e Me o d o move , they ofte n mov e i n leaps . Thi s mean s that the y d o no t g o to a n are a adjacen t t o th e ol d one , but mov e to a n are a perhap s twent y o r eve n ove r a hundre d kilometer s away, sometime s eve n muc h further . Grea t significanc e lie s i n the las t tw o fact s whic h hav e bee n given—tha t th e migration s come ever y te n year s o r s o an d tha t th e mov e i s ofte n t o a com pletely ne w area . Thes e fact s sugges t tha t th e Me o patter n o f farming i s dictate d no t simpl y b y tradition , lac k o f knowledg e of th e exhaustin g effect s o n th e soi l o f repeate d cropping , an d by th e eas e o f no t havin g t o clea r jungl e ever y year , bu t als o by necessity . Th e lan d availabl e t o the m i n an y on e plac e ma y not b e sufficien t fo r the m t o far m accordin g t o th e rotatio n sys tem practice d b y th e Kare n eve n i f the y kne w i t an d wishe d to follo w it . I f th e lan d wer e enough , thei r perio d o f residenc e under thei r presen t syste m woul d no t hav e t o b e a s shor t a s ten years . I f ther e wer e sufficien t lan d nearby , the y woul d no t have t o migrat e b y leap s bu t coul d mov e t o area s adjoinin g thei r old farms . An importan t fac t appear s t o b e tha t th e Me o ar e latecomer s [567]

THAILAND : WILLIA M K . GEDDE S

to Thailand . I n som e areas , a t least , the y wer e probabl y th e las t of al l th e tribe s t o come , som e o f thei r majo r migration s bein g as recen t a s sixt y t o eight y year s ago . The y ofte n hav e ha d t o fit themselve s int o area s alread y occupie d b y othe r tribes . Thu s they frequentl y populat e smal l enclave s o f uncut fores t betwee n the territorie s of , fo r example , Lah u o r Kare n groups ; o r the y may no t b e abl e t o fin d an y area s o f virgi n jungl e bu t b e force d to mak e d o wit h a n are a previousl y use d b y anothe r trib e bu t abandoned fo r man y years . Area s whic h hav e bee n abandone d in thi s wa y ar e usuall y th e margina l region s o f othe r tribes ' territories o f use . Th e condition s whic h mak e the m margina l ar e tha t the lan d i s a t hig h altitude s an d ofte n steepl y sloped . Therefore , the necessit y t o locat e themselve s o n area s o f lan d unuse d b y other tribe s o r o n th e margina l area s o f othe r tribes ' lan d rein forces th e Me o custo m o f living high up . It ma y b e tha t i n othe r province s th e Me o d o hav e large r areas o f virgi n lan d availabl e to the m an d tha t th e situatio n sug gested here , whic h i s derive d fro m stud y i n Chiengma i Province , does no t appl y (Anthon y an d Moorma n 1964) . Bu t thi s doe s not mea n tha t th e descriptio n o f th e situatio n i s withou t impor tance. I f i t i s atypica l now , i t i s likely t o become typica l in futur e years becaus e th e Me o mus t soo n begi n t o ru n ou t o f hill s i n Thailand. Thei r souther n migratio n fro m Yunna n ha s no w extended wel l int o Ta k Province . Th e remainin g hil l area s t o the sout h ar e quit e densel y occupie d b y Karen . S o wher e ca n the Meo go next? It shou d b e note d i n passin g tha t th e fac t tha t th e Me o mus t often tak e secon d plac e i n th e competitio n fo r lan d doe s no t mean tha t the y ar e inferio r t o othe r tribe s i n wealth , status , o r self-estimation. Du e t o thei r superio r skil l i n popp y cultivation , they ar e ofte n riche r tha n neighborin g tribes ; they emplo y Lah u and Kare n i n a syste m whic h coul d perhap s b e terme d "opiu m slavery"; the y ar e jealou s o f thei r independenc e (althoug h co operative wit h governmen t officials ) an d ar e prou d o f thei r cul ture, thi s prid e bein g indicate d no t onl y b y thei r word s bu t b y the fac t that , unlik e mos t o f th e othe r tribes , the y rarely , i f ever , intermarry wit h othe r tribes . The abov e consideration s mak e i t clea r tha t a n understandin g of th e Me o system o f shiftin g cultivatio n require s ful l study , [ 568 ]

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not onl y o f thei r type s o f crop s an d condition s unde r whic h the y grow best, bu t als o o f th e exten t o f lan d area s availabl e t o the m and the population size s of their groups . As wit h th e anthropologis t studyin g th e Karen , s o to o th e per son studyin g th e Me o mus t watc h fo r al l th e relevan t facts . One tas k o f th e Researc h Centr e wil l b e t o prepar e a surve y guide fo r hi m an d t o ensur e tha t i t i s revised an d refine d throug h periodic join t meetings , arrange d b y th e Centre , o f al l anthro pologists workin g o n th e communit y studies . At thes e meetings , the anthropologist s wil l giv e on e anothe r th e benefi t o f thei r ex periences, thei r insights , an d thei r criticism s o f on e another' s procedures. A featur e o f th e shiftin g cultivatio n practice d b y many o f th e tribes i n Thailan d i s th e clearin g b y number s o f household s o f very larg e block s o f lan d withou t leavin g an y strip s o f jungl e between th e househol d clearings . Thi s probabl y ha s a n advers e effect o n fores t regeneratio n becaus e i t leave s n o see d reservoirs , and i t ma y als o increas e erosion . Ho w extensiv e i s thi s block clearing? Wha t ar e th e inducement s t o it ? Th e inducement s ma y be social , i n tha t th e peopl e prefe r t o wor k togethe r o r exchang e labor; the y ma y b e religious , i n tha t th e peopl e fea r spirit s i n isolated areas ; the y ma y b e political , i n that villag e leader s selec t the mai n plantin g area s eac h yea r an d th e res t o f th e peopl e abide b y thei r decisions ; o r the y ma y b e purel y economic , i n that lan d i s i n to o shor t suppl y t o allo w th e leavin g o f unculti vated strips , o r tha t bette r track s ca n b e mad e t o a combine d planting are a an d thu s th e tota l amoun t o f labo r nee d fo r cro p production i s reduced . O r i s i t tha t non e o f th e abov e factor s are compulsive , bu t simpl y tha t th e bloc k clearanc e system , ad mittedly mor e sociabl e an d generall y mor e convenient , i s prac ticed becaus e th e peopl e ar e ignoran t o f it s deleteriou s effect s on soi l fertility ? I f th e las t explanatio n i s true , the n grea t im provement migh t b e effecte d b y simpl e educatio n i n stri p farm ing an d i n th e advantage s o f it . Th e answe r t o th e situatio n cannot b e found , however , unti l ful l investigation s ar e carrie d out i n eac h tribal area . Th e situatio n ma y var y i n differen t tribes . As th e discussio n ha s bee n long , le t m e summariz e it s mai n theme. W e ar e discussin g th e proposa l fo r a detaile d stud y o f the effect s o f shiftin g cultivatio n o n soi l fertility , th e ai m bein g [ 56 9 ]

THAILAND : WILLIA M R . GEDDE S

twofold: firstly , t o determin e ho w urgen t i s th e nee d fo r alterna tives t o th e syste m an d secondly , t o discove r ho w th e syste m itself ma y b e improved . W e sai d tha t th e first par t o f suc h a study shoul d b e a ful l descriptio n o f th e existin g method s o f shifting cultivatio n a s practice d b y th e si x main tribe s i n respec t to all their mai n crops . To fulfill thi s part o f the study, th e anthro pologists makin g th e triba l communit y studie s shoul d b e full y briefed o n wha t t o loo k for , shoul d collec t informatio n o n al l agricultural practice s i n detail , an d shoul d presen t thi s informa tion i n al l it s relevan t socia l context . Ther e i s on e othe r wa y in which th e anthropologist s migh t help . They migh t pu t marker s in th e fields the y stud y (mappin g thei r location s accurately ) to not e i n cod e for m th e date , th e siz e o f th e field, an d th e crop grow n there . Th e Researc h Centr e i s t o b e a permanen t organization. I t shoul d b e possibl e fo r it s officer s t o chec k u p in subsequen t year s o n th e us e o r non-us e o f a t leas t a selectio n of thes e fields an d thu s ge t quantitativ e dat a o n shiftin g cultiva tion practice s whic h wil l hav e a highe r degre e o f scientifi c validity than has been recorded o n this topic. The secon d par t o f th e propose d stud y wa s sai d t o b e a de tailed investigatio n o f a particula r are a i n whic h shiftin g cultiva tion is bein g practice d t o determin e th e vegetatio n an d soi l char acteristics o f particula r part s o f i t bot h befor e an d afte r use . This par t o f th e stud y i s t o b e o f a differen t orde r fro m th e first. Th e first par t wil l b e descriptiv e o f existin g method s an d can b e carrie d ou t b y th e anthropologists . Th e secon d par t i s intended t o b e a purel y agricultura l stud y an d wil l requir e th e services o f a traine d agricultura l scientist . A convenien t are a t o investigate woul d b e tha t embrace d b y th e Chien g Da o Nikhom. 1 Shifting cultivatio n i s spreadin g i n thi s are a t o part s whic h ar e still unde r primar y jungle . Th e stud y would ai d nikhom plannin g as wel l a s provid e th e scientifi c informatio n neede d fo r genera l use. Cultivatio n i s proceedin g i n th e are a o f al l th e recognize d hill trib e crop s a s wel l a s o f te a an d coffee . Th e stud y woul d give adde d valu e t o th e nikhom becaus e o f al l th e nikhoms thi s one has th e lowes t population , whic h probabl y number s no t mor e 1

A nikhom i s a governmen t lan d settlemen t area . I n th e cas e o f th e hil l tribe areas , th e nikhoms no w operat e a s governmen t welfar e station s fo r th e tribes.

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than 45 0 people, an d therefor e it is less suited t o the developmen t of th e socia l welfar e progra m whic h th e nikhoms wer e intende d to promote . A t th e sam e time , th e populatio n relativ e t o th e land are a i s dens e enoug h t o provid e th e righ t condition s fo r the stud y now proposed . The first tas k woul d b e t o prepar e a detaile d land-us e ma p of th e area . Thi s woul d requir e aeria l photograph y fro m a lo w level. Thereafte r th e agriculturalis t woul d stud y th e characteris tics o f th e part s o f th e are a unde r use , i n fallow , o r no t ye t used, an d progressivel y recor d th e change s an d thei r effect s o n the map. The informatio n s o derived woul d permi t th e interpreta tion i n agricultura l term s o f th e informatio n o n variou s triba l practices supplie d b y th e anthropologists . The thir d par t o f th e proposed stud y is controlled experimenta tion wit h differen t method s o f shiftin g cultivation . Thi s experi mentation coul d als o b e carrie d ou t i n th e are a o f th e Chien g Dao Nikhom, utilizin g th e area s o f primar y jungl e whic h wil l otherwise soo n succum b t o th e presen t largel y uncontrolle d shift ing cultivation . On th e basi s o f th e informatio n derive d fro m th e whol e study , a trul y scientificall y base d agricultura l educatio n progra m coul d be prepared fo r the hill tribes. Ideally, a full y traine d agricultura l scientis t shoul d b e appointed t o th e researc h staf f o f th e Triba l Researc h Centre . The projec t i s a long-ter m one . T o yiel d significan t results , th e experimentation woul d hav e t o b e carrie d o n fo r a t leas t five or si x year s an d preferabl y muc h longer . Th e project , therefore , requires a perso n wh o i s prepare d t o devot e hi s whol e attentio n to hil l agriculture , whic h differ s greatl y i n natur e fro m th e agri culture o f th e lowlands . Althoug h th e first an d mai n tas k o f suc h an agricultura l researc h office r woul d b e t o carr y out th e researc h project propose d above , he woul d advis e th e anthropologist s an d assist the m i n thei r descriptiv e studie s i n suc h way s a s classifyin g vegetation an d soil s for them . H e migh t als o supervise experimen tation i n the nikhoms an d villages . To carr y ou t th e project , th e Centr e wil l nee d additiona l finance. I t ma y als o b e difficul t t o find i n Thailan d a perso n with sufficien t qualification s wh o i s abl e t o fre e himsel f fro m prior commitments . I t ma y b e necessary , therefore , t o see k a [571 ]

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foreign exper t t o initiat e th e project . I t i s doubtfu l i f a foreig n agriculturalist woul d b e abl e t o sta y i n Thailan d lon g enoug h to d o mor e tha n jus t initiat e it . Fo r thi s reason , i f suc h a perso n is brough t in , the n a junio r researc h office r wit h a degre e i n agriculture shoul d b e appointe d to be traine d b y hi m t o continu e the stud y o n a long-ter m basis . Ever y effort , however , mus t b e made t o find a qualifie d Tha i senio r agriculturalis t willin g t o devote himself t o problems o f hill agriculture . 2. A Study of Pastoral Possibilities. Th e Hil l Tribe s Divisio n of th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfar e i s hopin g t o engag e th e services o f oversea s expert s t o stud y th e possibilitie s o f usin g the uplan d grassland s fo r cattle-raising . Althoug h thes e expert s would probabl y no t b e workin g directl y fro m th e Centre , the y would receiv e ever y possibl e assistanc e fro m th e Centre . Th e Centre shoul d als o b e abl e t o help i n th e interpretatio n o f thei r results i n term s o f practica l developmen t scheme s b y investigat ing suc h socio-economi c factor s a s th e densit y o f th e populatio n which coul d b e supporte d b y cattle-raisin g (an d relatin g i t t o the existin g populatio n densitie s i n th e areas) , th e lan d tenur e system whic h woul d b e mos t practica l i n th e cattle-raisin g areas , and th e marketin g syste m whic h woul d b e mos t suitable . Ther e are othe r consideration s too , whic h migh t affec t th e succes s o f a cattle-raisin g scheme . Fo r instance , i f th e cattle-raisin g i s in tended t o provid e onl y a par t o f th e people' s income , leavin g them dependen t o n agricultur e fo r th e rest , ther e wil l b e th e problem o f keepin g th e cattl e fro m th e cultivate d areas . All suc h matters will require investigation . We ar e arguin g tha t th e purel y pastora l stud y mus t b e bu t a par t o f a wide r investigation . W e certainl y d o no t inten d t o imply tha t i t i s not highl y important , bu t i t i s tru e tha t pastoral ism, lik e te a cultivation , ca n probabl y a t bes t provid e employ ment fo r onl y a small proportion o f th e tota l hill tribe population . But thi s wil l be the situatio n wit h man y form s o f hill trib e devel opment. Ther e ca n b e n o panace a fo r al l th e problems . Th e an swers mus t b e piecemeal . S. Population Studies. A t presen t n o on e i s certain o f th e num ber o f tribes-peopl e i n Thailand . Generall y th e numbe r i s assessed a t aroun d 200,000 , bu t estimate s hav e range d a s hig h [572]

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as half a million. There i s no certainty a s to the population size s of any of the tribes (Bennington-Cornel l 1964) The Nationa l Statistica l Offic e i s no w plannin g a census , an d the Centr e ha s bee n cooperatin g i n drawin g u p plan s fo r it . I t is hoped to collect information not only on the numbers of people in the various tribes, but als o on family siz e and type, clan membership (wher e ther e i s a cla n system) , lan d holdings , type s of cro p an d annua l yields o f each type , holdings of anima l stock , and, i f possible , cas h incomes. It wil l be possible to collect some of this data only according to a sample system. When th e censu s i s completed, i t wil l b e necessar y t o kee p the informatio n u p t o date , especiall y tha t relatin g t o villag e locations an d th e movement s o f triba l group s bot h withi n th e country an d int o th e countr y fro m Burm a and Laos . It i s hoped that a statistica l office r fo r thi s purpos e ca n b e permanentl y lo cated at the Tribal Research Centre. 4. Education Studies. A number o f school s have alread y bee n established i n triba l areas , some by th e Borde r Patro l Police an d a fe w i n th e nikhoms by th e Departmen t o f Education . Th e demand for schools , although stil l slight , i s bound t o increase , an d the rat e o f economi c an d socia l developmen t ca n b e speede d by a well-adapted educationa l system. In orde r fo r th e schem e t o b e wel l adapted , investigatio n i s needed o f th e relativ e place s to b e assigne d t o triba l language s and to Thai as media of instruction; of the curriculums of schools; of th e timetable s o f schools ; an d o f possibl e form s o f adul t education. When resource s permit , i t i s hope d tha t a n educationa l research office r ca n b e appointe d t o th e staf f o f th e Triba l Re search Centr e t o devot e hi s whol e attentio n t o thes e an d othe r related problems . Usin g th e informatio n o n triba l culture s sup plied by the anthropological research officers , h e would supervise or advis e experimenta l school s a s the y wer e establishe d an d as sess the results of their programs. 5. Other Research Projects. There ar e many other matters into which th e Triba l Researc h Centr e coul d carry out investigations, such a s the relationships between th e several differen t categorie s of Chines e immigrant s an d th e tribes-people , th e problem s in [573 ]

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volved i n givin g th e tribes-peopl e citizenshi p an d lan d rights , and th e developmen t o f informatio n service s fo r th e tribes . Bu t adequate consideratio n o f thes e matter s seem s t o m e t o requir e the informatio n fro m th e socio-economi c an d statistica l studie s outlined above . I t i s hoped , therefore , tha t thes e studie s ca n be carrie d ou t first. Th e lis t i s lon g enoug h t o occup y th e prob able resource s o f th e Centr e fo r a t leas t th e first tw o years . I f other matter s shoul d becom e s o urgent a s t o deman d action , th e persons workin g a t th e Centr e would , o f course , tr y t o giv e such informatio n o n the m a s the y coul d accumulat e fro m th e investigations alread y carried out . THE ACTIVITIE S O F TH E TRIBA L RESEARC H CENTR E TO TH E PRESEN T DAT E

The discussio n s o far ha s bee n futuristic . Thi s i s becaus e th e Tribal Researc h Centr e i s a ne w thin g bor n a bar e yea r ag o on pape r only . Bu t it s materia l existenc e ha s no w begun , an d I shal l briefl y revie w it s infan t progres s t o date . The n I shal l discuss th e obstacle s i t mus t overcome . The constructio n o f a buildin g t o hous e th e Centr e ha s almos t been complete d o n th e campu s o f th e Universit y o f Chiengmai . The buildin g incorporates a lecture hall, a library, a central office , five office s fo r researc h staff , a roo m (t o b e air-conditioned ) fo r the storag e o f tape s an d films, an d a photographi c darkroom . Possibly b y 196 7 an extensio n t o th e buildin g wil l b e constructe d comprising a n auditoriu m an d mor e offic e space , whereupo n th e present lectur e roo m woul d becom e par t o f a museu m fo r whic h collections are already being made . It i s hoped t o provid e th e librar y wit h a s complet e a collectio n as possibl e o f book s an d article s o n hil l tribe s i n al l area s o f Southeast Asia . A n excellen t beginnin g ha s bee n mad e throug h the generou s donatio n fro m th e Britis h government , an d i t i s expected tha t fund s wil l b e provide d b y th e Thailan d govern ment fo r furthe r acquisition s eac h year. Th e librar y als o include s a numbe r o f genera l work s o n socia l anthropology , linguistics , and tropica l agriculture . The governmen t ha s alread y approve d i n principl e a pla n fo r a museum . Accordin g t o thi s pla n th e museu m wil l hav e tw o sections. I n th e mai n Centr e buildin g ther e wil l b e a n exhibitio n [574]

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of perishabl e an d valuabl e objects , suc h a s triba l costume s an d jewelry. I n addition , o n a n are a o f lan d whic h i t i s hope d th e University o f Chiengma i ca n mak e available , ther e wil l b e erected actua l house s o f th e si x mai n hil l tribes . Thes e house s will either , be bough t i n the hills an d reassemble d o n th e museu m site, o r the y wil l b e erecte d fro m ne w ne w material s b y triba l craftsmen. Eac h hous e wil l b e furnishe d i n typica l triba l fashio n and wil l contai n exhibit s o f agricultura l implement s an d othe r items o f triba l materia l culture . Togethe r thes e house s wil l for m a smal l composit e triba l villag e i n natura l surroundings . Th e houses ma y als o b e use d o n occasio n t o accommodat e tribes people visitin g the Centre . At presen t (Ma y 1965 ) th e researc h staf f o f th e Centr e com prises onl y tw o persons . Khu n Wana t Bhruksasr i i s actin g a s Senior Researc h Officer . Becaus e o f hi s outstandin g talent , i t i s hoped tha t h e wil l remai n wit h th e Centr e i n a senio r capacity . The othe r membe r o f th e researc h staf f i s a junio r researc h worker wh o a t presen t i s o n secondmen t fro m anothe r sectio n of th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare . H e i s a mos t abl e an d enthusiastic worker , wh o w e hop e wil l occup y a permanent posi tion o n th e staff . Provisio n exist s fo r th e appointmen t o f anothe r junior researc h officer , an d th e establishmen t i s t o b e increase d in th e nex t financial year , whic h begin s i n October . Bu t th e Centre face s a proble m i n recruitmen t whic h wil l b e discusse d later. Arrangements hav e bee n complete d fo r th e holding a t th e Cen tre o f a trainin g cours e fo r officer s fro m al l agencie s concerne d with hil l trib e developmen t work . Th e cours e wil l compris e in struction i n elementar y anthropology , languag e study , polic y to wards th e hil l tribes , an d developmen t programs . Th e ai m o f the cours e i s t o stimulat e a scientifi c attitud e i n th e officer s an d to promote coordinatio n betwee n th e agencies . It i s also intende d to familiariz e th e officer s wit h th e objective s o f th e Centr e an d to encourag e the m t o cooperat e wit h it. Because th e establishmen t o f th e Centr e ha s require d a goo d deal o f offic e wor k an d consultation s wit h governmen t officials , and becaus e o f shortag e o f staf f an d th e recentnes s o f th e ap pointments o f th e tw o person s wh o d o constitut e it , w e hav e been abl e t o mak e onl y a smal l beginnin g wit h ou r researc h [575]

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work. I t seeme d wises t t o appl y ou r ver y limite d resource s an d time t o th e stud y o f a singl e community . Ther e wer e tw o mai n reasons fo r this . 1. Seriou s researc h o n th e hil l tribe s ha s s o far take n th e form , in mos t cases , o f wide-rangin g comparativ e survey s utilizin g a questionnaire prepare d i n advance. 2 Usefu l a s thes e studie s ar e for providin g a genera l conspectu s o f th e situatio n i n th e hills , full understandin g o f th e structure s an d economie s o f th e hil l tribe societie s demand s mor e intensiv e investigations . Thi s i s es pecially so i n th e cas e o f thos e hil l tribe s whos e mai n sourc e of incom e i s a n illega l crop . Becaus e i t i s a governmen t agency , the Triba l Researc h Centr e i s boun d t o b e calle d upo n ofte n to conduc t quic k survey s t o gai n informatio n whic h i s sai d t o be urgentl y require d fo r thi s o r tha t purpose . Th e mor e depen dent th e Centr e i s o n governmen t funds , th e lowe r it s statu s in th e governmen t institutiona l hierarchy , th e greate r th e pres sure fo r thi s kin d o f researc h wil l be . Sometimes , n o doubt , th e Centre mus t conced e t o th e demands . Bu t th e chie f valu e whic h it ha s a s a permanen t researc h organization , a s distinc t fro m ad hoc researc h terms , i s tha t i t i s i n a positio n t o carr y ou t longer-term investigation s whic h wil l yiel d mor e substantial , more accurate , an d ultimatel y mor e valuabl e information . There fore, I wishe d t o mak e ou r earliest researc h ventur e a demonstra tion o f th e typ e o f stud y whic h I fel t th e Centr e shoul d hav e as its main interest . 2. The secon d reaso n fo r concentratin g o n a single communit y was t o provid e trainin g method s o f field wor k fo r th e tw o mem bers o f th e staff , neithe r o f who m i s a traine d anthropologist . We selecte d th e Me o villag e o f Meto , whic h i s a t a heigh t of 3,70 0 fee t i n th e Amphu r Ho d Distric t o f Chiengma i Province . For severa l month s w e visite d th e villag e fo r abou t a wee k a t a time , wheneve r opportunit y permitted . W e hav e no w ha d a house buil t i n th e village , an d w e hop e tha t on e membe r o f the staf f wil l b e abl e t o carr y o n th e stud y mor e continuously . For myself , th e stud y i s a continuatio n o f on e I bega n i n 1958 , 8 I a m referrin g her e t o th e si x mai n hil l tribes . I a m therefor e no t takin g into accoun t th e excellen t stud y o f th e Law a b y Dr . Kunstadter , whic h woul d serve a s a n exampl e fo r studie s o f th e hil l tribe s proper . A field stud y o f th e hill Karen s ha s als o jus t bee n complete d b y Shiger u Iijim a o f Kyot o University , but onl y preliminary result s have been publishe d s o far .

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the mai n grou p i n th e communit y a t Met o bein g th e sam e grou p I live d wit h the n a t Pasamlie m i n Amphu r Chien g Dao . I n th e intervening si x years th e grou p move d mor e tha n 12 0 miles, having reside d e n rout e fo r tw o year s i n Amphu r Ma e Cham . We ar e carryin g ou t a socio-economi c analysi s o f th e commu nity. I t i s certainl y no t a mode l study , becaus e o f th e constan t interference o f othe r duties . Bu t we hav e alread y gaine d a grea t deal o f usefu l information . W e hav e learne d muc h abou t th e Meo system s o f kinshi p an d clanshi p an d abou t Me o religion . We hav e discovere d man y interestin g fact s abou t th e economy , of whic h I ma y quot e jus t a fe w a s examples . Havin g witnesse d the opiu m harvest , w e kno w tha t th e averag e productivit y o f a househol d i s abou t five t o si x kilogram s o f ra w opium , whic h yields a cas h incom e o f five t o seve n thousan d bah t (approxi mately $250-$350). 3 A fe w o f th e large r household s ma y hav e an incom e o f te n thousan d baht . Th e peopl e liv e i n a symbioti c relationship wit h Yunnanes e Ha w trader s (immigrant s fro m Yun nan no w residen t i n Thailand ) o f whom , a t th e heigh t o f th e opium season , ther e ar e seventee n familie s i n a villag e o f sixty two households . Th e Me o emplo y neighborin g Kare n t o wor k in thei r fields, payin g the m a very lo w wag e bu t rewardin g the m also wit h opiu m fo r smoking . O n th e average , abou t hal f th e opium incom e o f th e Me o i s use d t o bu y necessar y foodstuffs . There i s a n interrelationshi p o f crops , especiall y paddy-maize opium-stockraising, whic h i s basi c t o th e presen t Me o economy . Many Me o woul d b e willin g t o foreg o opiu m productio n i f suit able cro p alternative s coul d b e found . Me o communitie s hav e wide-ranging connection s throug h marriag e wit h othe r Me o groups, whic h influenc e thei r migratio n patterns . Th e stud y o f the Met o communit y i s s o fascinatin g tha t i t i s difficul t t o resis t the temptatio n t o spen d al l ou r tim e u p there . I n th e hea t o f the Chiengma i Plai n ou r nose s twitc h fo r th e mountai n air , an d we kno w wh y th e Me o wan t t o sta y wher e the y are , o r a t leas t in som e lik e plac e wher e th e ai r i s coo l an d th e flower s bloom . Perforce, however , th e Centr e i s ou r mai n concern . It s hear t must alway s b e i n th e mountain s i f i t i s t o hav e an y lif e a t all , but fo r i t t o functio n properl y a s a researc h institutio n certai n 3

One U.S . dollar equal s approximatel y 2 1 baht .

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problems mus t b e overcome , an d thes e for m th e subjec t o f th e concluding par t o f th e paper . THE STATU S O F TH E TRIBA L RESEARC H CENTR E

The Triba l Researc h Centr e wa s establishe d o n a recommenda tion emanatin g fro m th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare . Th e Department gav e i t birt h an d ha s mothere d i t solicitously . I f it i s t o remai n a sectio n o f an y singl e governmen t department , it coul d hav e n o bette r hom e tha n i n th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare, becaus e th e Directo r Genera l an d hi s deputie s an d th e senior officer s o f th e Hil l Tribe s Divisio n ar e all keenly intereste d in it s welfar e an d d o thei r bes t t o promot e it s interests . But th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfar e i s onl y on e o f severa l government agencie s engagin g i n wor k wit h th e hil l tribes . A most importan t agenc y i s th e Borde r Patro l Police , whic h ha s extensive program s t o improv e condition s i n th e hil l trib e areas . If th e Triba l Researc h Centr e i s t o hav e maximu m utility , i t should suppl y informatio n t o al l agencie s an d als o receiv e ai d from the m i n th e gatherin g o f information . Whil e i t remain s under th e administrativ e contro l o f a singl e department , workin g cooperation, althoug h no t impossible , i s rendere d mor e difficult . The governmen t i s awar e o f th e nee d fo r close r coordinatio n of hil l trib e programs , an d measure s t o effec t thi s coordinatio n are unde r consideration . Th e positio n an d rol e o f th e Triba l Re search Centr e shoul d for m a n importan t par t o f thi s consideration. Another proble m arise s fro m th e locatio n o f th e Centr e withi n the Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare . Ever y departmen t ha s a n order o f subdivision , an d th e statu s o f officer s depend s o n thei r relative position s withi n thi s order . A t presen t th e Triba l Research Centr e i s a sectio n o f th e Hil l Tribe s Division , whic h itself i s subsidiar y t o th e Burea u o f Lan d Settlement . Althoug h the Centr e doe s receiv e specia l consideratio n fro m th e Depart ment, i t mus t operat e throug h th e existin g rankin g order , an d its staf f ha s t o b e grade d accordin g t o it . Th e positio n o f th e Director i s stil l undetermined , bu t i n th e case s o f al l othe r posi tions th e presen t situatio n mean s tha t the y ar e al l o f relativel y low grade . Thu s the y canno t attrac t person s o f sufficien t quali fications t o carr y ou t independentl y th e skille d work o f anthropo [ 57 8 ]

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logical research . I n th e cas e o f junio r person s wit h th e talen t to b e traine d a s efficien t researc h workers , th e presen t situatio n does no t offe r the m opportunitie s fo r caree r advancemen t whic h would encourag e mos t o f the m t o regar d wor k wit h th e Centr e as a permanent occupation . The proble m ma y b e overcom e i n tim e b y a departmenta l reorganization whic h woul d giv e th e Centr e a highe r status . O r a solutio n ma y emerg e fro m th e consideratio n no w bein g give n to th e coordinatio n o f th e hil l trib e program s o f differen t departments. A solutio n alon g th e secon d line s woul d hav e on e advantage . The fourt h functio n o f th e Centr e a s set out i n a Cabinet decisio n quoted earlie r (p . 553 ) wa s "t o evaluat e continuousl y th e hil l tribe project s conducte d b y bot h th e Governmen t an d privat e organizations." I t woul d no t b e eas y fo r th e Centr e t o carr y ou t this functio n whil e i t remain s a sectio n o f th e Departmen t o f Public Welfare . I t woul d b e difficul t enoug h fo r i t t o evaluat e the project s o f it s own department. I t woul d requir e considerabl e temerity t o offe r evaluation s o f project s o f othe r departments . Both th e abov e solution s woul d leav e th e Triba l Researc h Cen tre a s a par t o f th e ordinar y civi l servic e organization . A differen t way o f overcomin g th e proble m woul d b e t o giv e th e Centr e independence i n som e form . Ther e ar e tw o possibilitie s here . One i s t o attac h th e Centr e t o a university, probabl y th e Univer sity o f Chiengmai . There is , it seem s t o me , considerabl e meri t i n th e suggestio n of a universit y attachment , provide d th e positio n accorde d th e Centre i n th e universit y structur e i s sufficientl y hig h fo r i t no t to hav e t o fac e th e sam e problem s o f contro l an d statu s whic h it no w ha s i n th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare . Thi s affiliatio n would allo w th e Centr e t o carr y ou t it s evaluativ e function . An d it woul d reliev e th e Centr e o f som e o f th e pressur e fo r quic k results whic h tend s t o inhibi t th e intensiv e wor k whic h I fee l should be its main task . But a universit y attachmen t woul d hav e its ow n problems , chief o f whic h woul d b e th e recruitmen t o f staff . I n Thailan d at th e presen t tim e th e universitie s d o no t hav e th e sam e degre e of prestig e a s i s often accorde d t o the m i n the Wester n countries . University leader s do , o f course , ofte n exercis e considerabl e in [579]

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fluence o n governmen t activities , bu t frequentl y the y d o s o through holdin g dua l positions , on e i n thei r universit y capacit y and on e i n the government . Th e junio r perso n canno t se e himself, at leas t fo r ver y man y years , th e holde r o f dua l positions . There fore, i f h e i s ambitious , a s th e ables t youn g Thai s concerne d to ai d thei r country' s developmen t naturall y are , he usually elect s for governmen t servic e becaus e tha t seem s t o offe r hi m th e greater opportunit y for influenc e an d authority . This i s a mor e seriou s proble m tha n i t ma y see m t o thos e outside th e Tha i scene . In th e cas e o f th e Triba l Researc h Centr e it ma y b e overcom e b y tw o mean s operatin g conjointly . First , in drawin g u p condition s fo r a universit y attachment , provisio n could b e mad e fo r a definit e relationshi p o f th e Centr e t o govern ment agencie s workin g wit h th e hil l tribes . Th e Centr e shoul d have a n advisor y an d a n evaluativ e role , an d i t shoul d b e abl e to cal l o n th e resource s o f th e agencie s i n collectin g information . Second, i t shoul d hav e source s o f fund s whic h woul d allo w i t to offe r specia l inducement s t o staf f an d carr y ou t extensiv e fieldresearch programs , produc e publications , an d emplo y foreig n ex perts, when needed, for specia l projects . For thi s t o occur , a source , o r sources , o f fund s mus t b e foun d outside regula r governmen t funds . On e suc h sourc e i s th e South east Asi a Treat y Organization , whic h ha s alread y bee n generou s to th e Centr e an d ma y b e incline d t o furthe r generosity . How ever, th e Centr e wil l nee d fund s whic h ar e assigne d o n mor e than a yearl y basis , an d i t remain s t o b e see n whethe r thi s ca n be s o in the case of the Treaty Organization . An alternativ e woul d b e suppor t fro m on e o r mor e o f th e larg e overseas foundations . Her e one' s thought s naturall y tur n towar d American magnanimity . Th e suppor t give n woul d hav e t o b e large, because a condition which the Centre would probably hav e to accep t in order t o secure it would b e a relinquishing o f SEAT O assistance. The cas e for foundatio n assistanc e i s very strong . I n th e Triba l Research Centr e th e Thailan d governmen t ha s create d a n institu tion which coul d be o f major importanc e t o Southeast Asia. Ther e is n o simila r institution , a s fa r a s I know , i n an y o f th e othe r countries o f th e region . A t th e tim e o f th e Centre' s creatio n i t [ 58 0 ]

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was envisage d tha t ultimatel y i t migh t becom e a Regiona l Centre. This is a bright vision which could be made a reality. BIBLIOGRAPHY ANTHONY, K . R . M . an d MOORMAN , F . R .

1964 Agricultura l problem s an d potentialitie s o f a hil l trib e are a in Thailand . Bangkok . Thi s pape r survey s condition s i n Ta k Province. BENNINGTON-CORNELL ANTHROPOLOGICA L SURVE Y

1964 A

repor t o n triba l people s i n Chiengra i Provinc e nort h o f th e Mae Ko k river . Bangkok , Sia m Society , Dat a Pape r 1 .

CAMPBELL, P . D . J .

1963 Repor t o n th e surve y o f tea-growin g area s o f Thailand . Bang kok, Colomb o Plan . CONKLIN, HAROL D C .

1963 Th e stud y o f shiftin g cultivation , Washington , Pan-America n Union. Studie s an d Monographs VI. THAILAND, D E P A R T M E N T O F PUBLI C W E L F A R E

1962 Repor t o f th e socio-economi c surve y o f th e hil l tribe s i n North ern Thailand . Bangkok , Ministr y o f th e Interior , Departmen t of Publi c Welfare . 1964 A brie f o n th e hil l trib e developmen t an d welfar e progra m in Norther n Thailand . Bangkok , Ministr y o f th e Interior , De partment o f Publi c Welfare .

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Autonomy and Integratio n o f Social Systems: The Iu Mien ("Yao " or "Man") Mountai n Population an d Thei r Neighbor s PETE R KANDR

E

INTRODUCTIO N

This pape r doe s no t dea l directl y wit h a n actio n program , no r does i t propos e an y definit e cours e o f action ; however , som e of th e topic s discusse d ma y b e relevan t fo r th e planning o f actio n programs. O n th e basi s o f m y researc h experienc e wit h on e mi nority group , th e I u Mie n (o r "Yao " o r "Man" ) i n Thailan d and Laos , I discus s som e interna l an d externa l adaptation s o f a population , b y whic h a characteristi c organizationa l framewor k and concomitan t value s ar e maintaine d unde r th e impac t o f changing politica l an d economi c conditions . Som e understandin g of th e adaptiv e mechanism s o f thi s societ y ma y b e useful , a t least fo r thos e administrator s i n contac t wit h thi s people . The Research Project. Th e researc h o n whic h thi s pape r i s based ha s bee n carrie d ou t amon g th e I u Mie n o f Chiengra i Province, Thailand , an d i n Houe i Sa i Province , Laos . Th e mai n part o f th e dat a wa s collecte d amon g th e I u Mie n no w livin g in Maecha n District , Chiengra i Province . Th e greates t par t o f this populatio n ha s immigrate d t o Thailan d fro m th e Houe i Sa i region sinc e 1945 . Th e mos t detaile d informatio n come s fro m Ban La o Tsi i Khue n (Tha i nam e Ba n Phalae ) i n th e are a o f the Maecha n Hil l Trib e Welfar e Cente r (nikhom) o f th e Publi c Welfare Department , Thailan d Ministr y o f Interior . I currentl y reside i n thi s village . Informatio n concernin g th e I u Mie n o f Yunnan, China , an d Mun g Sin g an d Na m Th a area s i n Lao s has bee n collecte d i n the Na m Khyn g settlement, Houe i Sai Province, Laos . Th e village s tha t constitut e th e settlemen t com e fro m [ 58 3 ]

THAILAND : PETE K KANDR E

Mun g Sin g an d Na m Tha . On e o f thes e village s move d fro m Yunna n t o Lao s afte r 1950. * Two kind s o f dat a hav e bee n collected : informatio n o f a gen eral nature , gaine d throug h interview s wit h well-informe d per sons ove r a perio d o f abou t on e year ; an d informatio n obtaine d throug h systemati c investigatio n o f selecte d household s an d vil lages wit h regar d t o factor s whic h I hav e judged , o n th e basi s of mor e genera l information , t o b e o f strategi c importanc e i n shapin g socia l processes . Th e questionnaire s hav e bee n revise d continuousl y a s a resul t o f progres s mad e i n th e analysis. 1 The Categories of Iu Mien, and Ύαο or Man. Population s com monl y calle d Ya o o r Ma n ar e foun d i n portion s o f souther n Chin a (part s o f Kwangtung , Kwangsi , an d Yunna n provinces) , Nort h Vietnam (Tonkin) , norther n Laos , Norther n Thailand , an d northeaster n Burma . Th e tota l numbe r o f Yao speaker s ha s bee n estimate d t o li e somewher e betwee n hal f a millio n an d on e mil lion , wit h th e mai n par t o f the m livin g i n China , fro m wher e the y hav e graduall y move d t o th e othe r region s (LeBa r et al. 1964:64). 2 Th e presen t pape r i s no t concerne d wit h th e Yao a s define d by linguisti c classification , bu t onl y wit h population s havin g a certai n socio-economic-ritua l syste m an d which , o n th e basi s o f * Geographica l name s hav e bee n spelle d phonetically , excep t wher e usag e is wel l establishe d o n map s o r i n publishe d literature . Som e confusio n i s inevitabl e because o f th e differen t standard s o f transcriptio n employed i n differen t places . Fo r example , th e Ta i wor d huaj ("smal l mountai n valley") ha s ordinaril y bee n transcribe d b y th e Frenc h as houei; th e Ta i wor d myang ("city " o r "principality" ) is ordinaril y transcribe d tnuong b y th e French , bu t sometime s appear s i n Indo china , Thailand , an d Burma a s mung, an d sometime s i s rendere d muang i n Thailand . 1 M y curren t researc h ha s bee n finance d b y UNESC O ( a Fellowshi p unde r th e Majo r Projec t fo r Mutua l Appreciatio n o f Easter n an d Wester n Cultura l Values, 1964 ) an d grant s fro m th e followin g Swedis h researc h institutions : th e Universit y o f Goteborg ; th e Swedis h Stat e Council fo r Socia l Scienc e Research ; th e Swedis h Stat e Counci l fo r Researc h i n th e Fiel d o f Humanities . Valuabl e administrativ e suppor t ha s bee n give n m e b y th e Nationa l Researc h Council of Thailan d an d th e Publi c Welfar e Departmen t o f th e Ministr y o f Interio r of Thailand . T o al l thes e an d othe r agencies , an d t o al l th e privat e person s who hav e assiste d m e i n variou s situations , I offe r m y sincer e gratitude . I a m particularl y indebte d t o Professo r K . G . Izikowit z o f Gotebor g Universit y fo r help an d encouragement , an d t o Mr . Le j Tsa n Kuej , o f Ba n Phalae , Maechan , Thailand , wh o ha s bee n a tru e frien d an d a patien t tutor . Part s o f th e section s of thi s pape r o n politica l structur e ar e modifie d fro m Kandr e (1964) . 2 Unfortunately , i t i s no t possibl e t o dra w fro m thi s condense d compilation of dat a fro m variou s publishe d source s an y usabl e informatio n concernin g I u Mie n socia l organization .

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thi s association , distinguis h themselve s fro m othe r population s an d refe r t o themselve s a s Iu Mien. Althoug h I u Mie n ar e speak ers o f variou s dialect s o f th e Ya o language , the y d o no t us e th e Yao languag e a s a basi c criterio n fo r self-identification , bu t in stead refe r t o variou s tradition s whic h ar e discusse d a t lengt h 3 below. I n Thailan d ther e ar e abou t 10,00 0 I u Mien , settled i n approxi matel y sevent y village s o r hamlets , mostl y i n th e mountai n re gions nea r th e norther n border s wit h Lao s an d Burma . Ther e are tw o mai n concentrations , on e i n th e amphur (districts ) o f Chiengkha m an d Mun g Pon g an d anothe r i n Amphu r Maechan , Chiengra i Province . Mos t o f thos e livin g i n th e Maecha n are a have migrate d fro m Lao s sinc e 1945 . Th e settlemen t i n th e Chiengkham-Mun g Pon g are a i s older . Apparentl y ther e hav e been I u Mie n livin g i n thi s region , an d als o i n adjacen t Na n Province , fo r th e las t hundre d years . Recentl y a numbe r o f the m have move d int o Thailan d fro m Chiengtun g (Kengtung ) Province , Burma . Th e I u Mie n populatio n i n Lao s seem s t o b e muc h mor e nu merou s tha n i n Thailand , bu t I d o no t hav e reliabl e informatio n abou t thei r tota l numbers . Informatio n o n thei r populatio n i n Burm a i s als o lacking , bu t m y informant s believ e the m t o b e less numerou s i n Burm a tha n i n Thailand . Ecology of the Iu Mien. Th e I u Mie n socio-economic-ritua l system operates , wit h fe w exceptions , i n a mountainou s natura l environment , wher e th e peopl e practic e swidde n (slash-and burn ) agriculture . Th e mai n subsistenc e cro p i s dry , glutinou s rice. Fo r a t leas t th e pas t fifty year s opiu m cultivatio n ha s bee n th e mai n sourc e o f cash . A t presen t i n Thailand , a s a resul t o f th e gradua l suppressio n o f popp y cultivatio n an d th e opiu m trad e an d a s a resul t o f improve d communications , th e raisin g o f pig s an d pepper s fo r sal e i s becomin g increasingl y important . Mor e *I shoul d mak e i t clea r tha t I a m speakin g o f a socio-economic-ritua l system whose participant s cal l themselve s I u Mien . Th e member s ar e recruite d primaril y by sexua l reproduction , bu t approximatel y I O percen t o f th e populatio n calle d I u Mie n hav e bee n incorporate d b y purchas e o r marriag e an d ritual adoptio n throug h introductio n t o th e prope r spirits . Strictl y speaking , I u Mie n wh o becom e Christian s ar e n o longe r I u Mien—the y hav e "throw n awa y th e ancesto r spirits " and n o longe r participat e i n th e I u Mie n ritua l system . The y may , however , continu e t o participat e i n th e I u Mie n socia l syste m (throug h exchang e o f wives) and economi c system (throug h economi c alliances) . (Se e belo w for furthe r discus sion o f method s o f incorporatio n of ne w populatio n elements. )

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than mos t othe r mountai n population s i n thi s area , th e I u Mie n have excelled in trade. None o f m y informant s remember s ancestor s wh o hav e live d on th e plains . Amon g th e term s the y us e fo r self-identificatio n there ar e som e whic h refe r t o th e ecologica l settin g o f th e I u Mien, fo r instanc e "me n o f th e hig h mountains, " an d "son s o f the mountai n rice." 4 Nonetheless , a fe w village s hav e moved , or ar e plannin g t o move , dow n t o th e plain s i n orde r t o practic e wet-rice cultivation . Fo r thes e communitie s soy a bean s an d pea nuts, i n additio n t o pigs , ar e th e mai n source s o f income. 5 Som e villagers located i n the mountains als o plan t o star t wet-rice culti vation. I n on e suc h village , Phalae , wher e I live , som e padd y fields hav e alread y bee n prepared . Th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare i s carryin g ou t systemati c experiment s a t th e Maecha n nikhom fo r th e introductio n o f ne w crop s an d agricultura l techniques. TH E SYSTE M MAINTAINE

D A S A N INTEGRATE

D WHOL E THROUG

H

CONSCIOU S APPLICATIO N O F DIFFEREN T TECHNIQUE S O F ADAPTATIO N TO ACTIV E FORCE S O F TH E TOTA L ENVIRONMEN T

At a n earl y stag e of m y researc h amon g th e I u Mien , I foun d that m y informant s use d tw o differen t term s whe n referrin g t o formal rule s governin g thei r socia l an d ritua l practices : lej njej and lej ftng. Le j ca n b e translate d a s "custom " o r "tradition. " No direc t translatio n i s possibl e fo r th e word s njej an d fing. 6 When I followe d thi s lead , I foun d tha t the y ar e clearl y awar e of, an d als o sa y tha t the y ac t on , th e premis e tha t thei r welfar e depends o n successfu l adaptatio n to th e demand s o f tw o distinc t power structure s whic h belon g t o tw o different , thoug h no t strictly separated , sphere s o f existence : (1 ) th e powe r structur e of th e spiri t world , whic h ha s specia l relevanc e to long-ter m ac tion-orientation; an d (2 ) th e politica l system s affectin g short term action-orientation . Th e powe r structure s belongin g t o th e latter categor y ar e usuall y referre d t o a s "governments, " an d * The existenc e o f thes e tw o term s was pointe d ou t t o me b y Dr . Gordo n Downer, Schoo l o f Orienta l an d Africa n Studies , Universit y o f London . 5 For a brie f bu t accurat e descriptio n o f I u Mie n econom y an d contact s wit h other group s i n Thailan d se e Young 1962:47-48 . 'The wor d -fing i n thi s contex t i s no t th e sam e a s it s homonym , whic h mean s "clan."

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particula r importanc e is attache d by th e I u Mie n t o relationship s with centra l governments , hung gjaa ("th e king' s government") . I t i s considere d essentia l t o kno w an d appl y a distinc t se t o f rules o f conduc t for eac h o f thes e categorie s o f power . M y infor mant s als o stres s th e importanc e of flexible adaptatio n to othe r individuals—the "polit e approach " i n day-to-da y interactions—i n orde r t o avoi d ope n conflicts . Thi s consciou s an d systemati c ap proac h t o problem s o f adaptatio n betwee n individual s i s impor tan t i n determinin g th e genera l characte r o f socia l lif e amon g th e I u Mie n an d i n th e relationship s betwee n the m an d othe r populations . Becaus e thi s i s a for m o f institutionalize d behavio r which i s no t define d b y th e I u Mie n a s traditio n (Ie]), I cal l it institutionalized politeness. Anothe r clas s o f behavio r frequentl y referre d t o i s phou tung ("ordinary") . Thi s ter m refer s t o fields o f actio n i n whic h indi vidual choic e o r judgmen t i s considere d t o b e th e prope r cri terio n fo r determinin g action . Lej Njej. Thi s ter m refer s t o a bod y o f knowledg e abou t th e natur e o f th e univers e an d th e plac e o f th e I u Mie n i n it . Lej njej als o refer s t o rule s o f conduc t whic h defin e th e long-ter m action-orientatio n tha t will resul t i n th e bes t possibl e adaptatio n of a particula r individua l t o condition s affectin g hi s ultimat e welfare. Becaus e thes e rule s ar e believed t o correspon d to th e perma nen t orde r o f th e universe , th e ide a tha t the y coul d chang e i s considere d t o b e absurd . Thu s lej njej i s bot h a worl d vie w an d a theor y o f actio n (i t is not , however , th e complet e theor y o f actio n o f th e I u Mien) . I t prescribe s stabl e form s o f cooperatio n betwee n individual s an d group s i n th e population s define d a s descendant s o f I u Mien . I t give s t o thi s populatio n wha t socia l scientist s cal l "socia l struc ture. " I t als o prescribe s th e us e o f a n instrumen t t o facilitat e cooperativ e actio n and , finally, i t serve s a s a boundary-maintain ing mechanis m wit h regar d t o interaction s betwee n differen t so cial systems . Becaus e lej njej refer s onl y t o th e inevitabl e condi tion s affectin g person s wit h a particula r associatio n wit h th e past , it counteract s linkag e o f tha t populatio n wit h othe r socia l systems. A World View and a Theory of Action. T o th e I u Mie n th e universe i s th e habita t o f a multiplicit y o f actors , th e tw o mai n [ 587 ]

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categories o f whic h ar e referred t o a s men an d spirits. Th e spirits (mien)7 hav e th e capacit y fo r enjoymen t an d suffering . Lik e men, th e spirit s nee d foo d (rituall y transforme d int o "spiri t food"), an d the y valu e securit y an d socia l recognitio n o f thei r intrinsic worth . The y want t o b e respected . Spirit s hav e a socia l organization i n whic h th e observanc e o f contractua l obligation s is supervise d an d enforce d b y th e coercio n o f "th e grea t grou p of spirits " (turn toong mien). Thi s grou p o f eightee n specialize d functionaries, wit h a hos t o f assistants , form s a veritabl e centra l government. Protecte d b y thi s government , eac h spiri t enjoy s existence i n absolut e securit y accordin g t o hi s intrinsi c valu e or merit . Thi s valu e o r meri t i s gaine d b y investment s i n th e world o f men , eithe r mad e b y th e individua l himsel f (befor e he die s an d become s a spirit ) or , h e ha s alread y passe d t o th e spirit level of existence, made for him by living men. These investment s mus t b e mad e i n th e worl d o f me n i n th e form o f merit-makin g ceremonies , in whic h th e individual' s spiri t receives a status i n the spiri t world from th e spiri t centra l govern ment. Merit-makin g (fiu too) i s carrie d ou t unde r strictl y con trolled condition s an d require s expenditure s o f variou s amount s of wealth, 8 particularl y silver. Th e spiri t governmen t ha s stron g likes an d dislike s i n tw o respects : I t like s silve r an d dislike s sex ual intercourse . While accumulatin g wealth , particularl y money, durin g hi s ex istence i n th e worl d o f men , a perso n s physica l welfar e depend s largely o n correctl y fulfillin g dutie s towar d ancesto r spirit s (ung thai mien). A livin g person' s safet y als o depend s o n protectio n received fro m tempora l politica l powers . However , hi s ultimat e security depend s o n hi s relation s wit h th e centra l governmen t of the spirit world . The spirits ' govermen t doe s not regularl y interfer e wit h rela tions betwee n men , bu t the y hav e th e powe r t o d o s o i f desired . Ancestor spirit s caus e illnes s i f th e obligatio n t o fee d the m ha s not bee n fulfilled . I n addition , ma n i s expose d t o aggressio n fro m a multiplicit y o f evi l spirit s (tsung mien), on e fo r eac h ailmen t 'The wor d mien i n th e middl e ton e mean s "man, " an d i n th e hig h ton e means "spirit. " Th e correc t ton e indicatio n fo r Ya o words i s given i n th e glossary . 8 There ar e thre e mai n grade s o f merit-making , eac h associate d wit h it s own ceremony: kwaa tang, tou saj, and th e highest , gjaa tse. Al l ceremonies ar e carrie d out accordin g t o th e sam e basi c principles , bu t the y requir e differen t amount s of wealth .

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or categor y o f accident , al l properl y catalogue d b y th e ritua l experts. Ma n i s als o protecte d b y certai n loca l spirit s towar d whom h e ha s contractua l obligations . Me n ma y propos e cooperatio n on a contractua l basis t o spirits , asking the m fo r hel p t o becom e ric h i n th e world o f men . Suc h proposition s ar e ofte n mad e b y th e I u Mien , but , becaus e i t i s no t certai n tha t th e spirit s wil l cooperat e i n th e worl d o f men , the y ar e neve r pai d i n advanc e fo r thei r assistance . Whe n i t is a questio n o f obtainin g statu s i n th e spirit world , th e procedur e is th e othe r way around . A ma n rituall y contact s th e grea t spirit s and , afte r feastin g the m an d payin g the m respect , h e expect s to receive , afte r hi s death , a particula r positio n i n th e spiri t world. I n th e worl d o f th e I u Mie n ther e i s a define d networ k o f relationship s betwee n livin g men , which motivate s variou s stabl e forms o f cooperatio n with regar d t o commo n obligation s towar d ancesto r spirit s an d variou s othe r spirit s (bu t no t wit h regar d to th e governmen t o f th e spiri t world , whic h i s a matte r fo r individua l action) . Th e competitiv e effort s o f individual s ar e based o n processe s o f wealt h accumulatio n an d o n notion s o f th e univers e a s a n organize d whol e wher e th e advancemen t o f th e individua l i s inconceivabl e withou t flexible adaptatio n t o certai n powe r relationships . I t i s onl y possibl e t o mak e thi s adap tatio n b y acceptin g th e responsibilitie s o f a loya l membe r o f I u Mie n society . The Notion of the Unified Iu Mien Community and of Stable Social Relationships. Th e spirit s o f th e descendant s o f th e I u Mie n ar e subject s o f th e spiri t government—th e eightee n digni tarie s wh o administe r th e communit y o f spirits . Ultimat e securit y an d socia l recognitio n ar e enjoye d a s a membe r o f thi s hierarch y unde r th e protectio n o f th e spiri t government . A perso n ma y qualify himsel f fo r futur e position s i n th e hierarch y o f spirit s by carryin g ou t a serie s o f merit-makin g ceremonie s durin g hi s lifetime o r b y havin g the m carrie d ou t o n hi s behal f afte r hi s death . Bu t a person' s abilit y t o advanc e i s dependen t i n par t also o n cooperation . Ther e ar e rule s whic h bin d th e individual , in a networ k o f ritua l obligations , t o variou s categorie s o f progen itors, an d thes e obligation s lin k th e individua l t o other s wit h similar obligations . Th e notio n o f a unifie d I u Mie n communit y an d th e characte r [ 58 9 ]

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of stabl e relationship s implie d b y suc h a n ide a ar e founde d o n the belie f tha t th e descendants 9 o f I u Mie n hav e al l contracte d ritual obligation s t o ancestor s an d creator-gods . The livin g popu lation i s divide d b y patrilinea l descen t int o subdivisions , eac h of whic h i s charge d wit h ritua l responsibilitie s fo r a correspond ing grou p o f ancesto r spirits . Thes e ar e ritua l cooperativ e units , and commo n ritua l obligation s sometime s impos e economi c co operation i n th e poolin g o f resource s for individua l merit-makin g ceremonies. Fo r example , whe n th e parent s hel p son s t o mak e merit befor e th e son s hav e accumulate d sufficien t capital , th e sons hav e th e obligatio n t o compensat e th e parents , afte r then death, by carrying out expensive death ceremonies . The hous e (peo) i s lej njej becaus e i t i s th e plac e wher e th e ancestor spirit s ar e fe d an d th e spiri t governmen t i s honored . The hous e i s alway s associate d wit h a descen t group , whic h i s obligated t o a correspondin g grou p o f ancesto r spirits , tha t o f the "owne r o f th e house " (peo tsiu) an d hi s descendants. 10 There ma y b e person s livin g i n th e hous e wh o d o no t belon g to th e descen t grou p o f th e houseowner , bu t th e in-marrie d women ar e integrated int o thi s group . Therefore , th e household 11 is distinc t fro m th e ritua l group , an d it s operatio n i s regulate d primarily b y a concer n fo r productiv e efficiency . Th e ritua l leader, wh o i s the houseowner, i s not necessarily th e actual leade r of th e househol d productio n team . However , thes e tw o roles ten d to coincid e i n on e person . Becaus e o f th e usua l orientatio n to ' "Descendants " includ e al l thos e fro m othe r ethni c group s wh o hav e bee n ritually integrate d int o th e I u Mie n community , a s wel l a s th e biologica l descen dants o f th e I u Mien . I u Mie n rule s o f descen t d o no t refe r t o biologica l descent , as understoo d b y moder n science , bu t t o ritually establishe d connection s wit h the ancesto r spirits . Th e chil d i s believe d t o b e th e produc t o f cooperatio n between a mal e an d a femal e ancesto r spiri t (bot h o f th e father' s group) , who giv e th e youn g lif e spiri t t o th e huma n parents , wh o the n giv e i t a body , feed it , and mak e i t grow . An individua l i s no t reall y a membe r o f th e I u Mie n unti l h e ha s undergon e initiation, tha t is , a n introductio n t o th e ancesto r spirit s afte r h e ha s reache d twelve year s o f age . Becaus e th e I u Mie n believ e i n a cycl e o f rebirth , ther e is n o forma l objectio n t o th e initiatio n o f a chil d fro m anothe r ethni c group . After all , th e chil d o f one' s ow n flesh an d bloo d ma y b e th e reincarnatio n of a perso n wh o formerl y belonge d t o anothe r ethni c group . (Fo r further informa tion o n this topi c see Kandre an d Le j Tsan Kuej 1965) . 10 This ritual grou p i s calle d chuang ung thaaj ("thos e wh o cooperat e wit h regard t o ancesto r spirits") . "The househol d i s calle d jet peo mien hoo khii haj ("on e hous e peopl e that cooperat e withou t quarreling") .

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ward individua l wealt h accumulation , me n foun d thei r ow n house s a s soo n a s the y ar e abl e t o recrui t an d manag e successfull y an efficien t productio n team . Th e cla n (fing) i s th e larges t o f th e ritua l descen t groups . Cla n membershi p i s inherite d patrilineally , fo r life , unles s th e perso n i s transferre d t o th e cla n o f hi s adoptiv e fathe r befor e th e ritua l initiation . Member s o f eac h fing ar e suppose d t o hav e descende d fro m a commo n ancestor , wh o wa s a membe r o f th e group tha t "cam e ove r th e sea " (se e below) . Clan s an d then larger subdivision s d o no t kee p genealogie s an d hav e n o interna l organization . Individual s kee p th e nam e of thei r father' s cla n an d ad d i t t o thei r officia l nam e (turn mien bua), whic h i s use d i n contact s wit h person s outsid e o f th e circl e o f clos e relative s an d friends, an d als o ad d i t t o thei r spiri t nam e (fa bua), whic h is used i n ritua l contexts . Fing cu t throug h differen t village s (hang) an d household s which ar e associate d wit h particula r place s an d particula r men . The y cu t throug h household s becaus e wome n d o no t chang e thei r cla n membershi p a t marriage . When definin g th e I u Mie n a s distinc t fro m othe r populations , th e cla n syste m a s a whol e i s referre d t o i n th e contex t o f a n origin myt h know n a s "crossin g th e sea " (phiu fiu gja koe). Thi s myth , whic h i s par t o f a longe r cycl e o f stories , tell s ho w th e ancestor s o f th e I u Mie n se t of f t o cros s th e se a i n boat s becaus e o f a sever e drough t i n thei r ow n country , "Nanking. " Som e o f th e boat s wer e lost , an d th e crew s o f th e othe r boat s were save d b y on e o f th e creator-gods . Pie n Hun g thereupo n pledged alway s t o hono r an d rewar d thi s god . Th e twelv e I u Mie n fing (clans ) wer e founde d afte r thi s voyage , an d thence forth th e I u Mie n hav e calle d themselve s Pien Hung fun fa ("th e childre n an d granchildre n o f Pie n Hung") . Becaus e al l o f th e I u Mie n respec t "ancestors " wh o cooperate d when crossin g th e sea , the y al l mus t hono r th e obligation s thos e ancestor s contracted . The y mus t brin g u p thei r childre n t o tak e car e o f th e ancestors ' rights , an d the y mus t al l cooperat e in teach ing an d remindin g eac h othe r o f th e respec t the y ow e t o Pie n Hung . Th e I u Mie n stres s tha t Pie n Hun g i s know n t o al l I u Mien . The y sa y tha t Pie n Hun g i s on e o f th e first thing s thei r childre n [591]

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are tol d about , togethe r wit h knowledge o f respect due t o parent s and ancestors . It i s significan t tha t Pie n Hun g i s no t explicitl y referre d t o as th e biologica l progenito r o f th e I u Mien , bu t a s a benefacto r who remain s a n outsider . Th e ultimat e unit y o f th e I u Mie n population i s thu s define d i n term s o f commo n ritua l obligation s contracted b y th e ancestor s wit h regar d t o a n outsider . Thes e obligations refe r bot h t o th e livin g an d t o th e dea d generations , who continu e t o hono r Pie n Hun g afte r the y hav e passe d t o the spirit level of existence . Clan membershi p amon g th e I u Mie n i s no t associate d wit h positions o f powe r an d prestige . Statement s referrin g t o a fixed rank orderin g o f th e clan s ar e phrased i n terms of th e relationshi p between elde r an d younge r brother . I n general , I hav e foun d such statement s o f rankin g t o b e inconsisten t wit h on e another , because ther e i s no notio n of a commo n progenito r fo r th e whol e population. T o a n outsider , suc h statement s see m t o be lik e occa sional squabble s betwee n peopl e who, in fact, ar e used t o treatin g each othe r a s equals. The elde r brother-younge r brothe r relationshi p i s ofte n referred t o when describin g th e connection s betwee n th e I u Mie n and th e Lanten . Linguisticall y thes e tw o population s ar e bot h Yao, an d eve n wit h regar d t o socia l organizatio n ther e see m t o be man y similarities . However , fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f th e Iu Mien , th e difference s ar e importan t enoug h t o mak e the m maintain tha t thes e tw o hav e differen t lej njej traditions . All I u Mie n wh o belon g t o th e sam e cla n ar e suppose d t o be "almos t lik e relatives " (tsien tse —the ter m refer s t o patri lineal relatives) . Whe n person s mee t fo r th e first time , th e tw o first question s are : "Wher e d o yo u live? " an d "Wha t i s you r fing?" Afte r thi s basi c informatio n i s given , a mor e precis e patri lineal kinshi p relationship , base d o n a commo n know n ancestor , may b e establishe d b y comparin g genealogies . Membershi p i n the sam e cla n establishe s pattern s o f long-ter m cooperatio n i n neither th e real m o f economi c productio n no r i n th e politica l sphere. Economically an d politicall y th e fing provide s a basi s fo r in formal person-oriente d (i.e. , non-spirit-worl d oriented ) relation ships, whic h ma y becom e th e nucleu s o f economi c an d politica l [ 59 2 ]

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cooperation , bu t whic h ar e no t bindin g i n advanc e t o fixed pat tern s o f cooperation . Onl y i n case s wher e relationshi p ca n b e define d i n term s o f exac t kinshi p terminolog y ar e ther e certai n restriction s an d rights . Th e restriction s appl y onl y t o formatio n of marriag e alliances . Th e right s giv e acces s t o a hous e whe n certai n ritua l activitie s ar e bein g carrie d out , fo r instanc e a t th e birt h o f a child . Th e restriction s governin g marriag e ar e neve r formulate d a s categorica l prohibition s t o b e enforce d b y politica l institutions . Paymen t o f adequat e compensatio n i n silve r ("washin g th e face") seem s t o b e th e solutio n t o mos t suc h problems . I t ma y happe n tha t biologica l descendant s o f th e sam e fathe r an d mothe r fal l i n lov e an d wan t t o marry , an d b y movin g fa r awa y the y ar e abl e t o establis h thei r ow n household . I t i s admitte d tha t the y canno t possibl y sta y an d cooperat e wit h peopl e wh o kno w abou t thei r kinshi p relationship , becaus e "the y ar e to o ashamed. " However , th e ide a o f persecutin g suc h deviatio n fro m th e approve d patter n b y followin g th e coupl e an d puttin g pres sure o n the m i s quit e contrar y t o I u Mie n ideas o f ultimat e indi vidual responsibility . I t i s no t th e busines s o f anyon e t o interfer e in th e private life of othe r people. Accordin g t o m y experience , th e commo n reactio n in suc h an d similar case s is , "The y d o wrong , bu t wha t ca n yo u do ? Thi s is love , an d i t i s bette r tha t the y ru n awa y an d marr y tha n tha t the y commi t suicide. " Severa l case s o f marriag e betwee n biologica l brothe r an d siste r hav e bee n reporte d t o me , a s hav e man y case s o f passio n drama s endin g i n suicid e o r murder . I believ e tha t thi s intensit y i n relationship s betwee n th e sexe s ha s somethin g t o d o wit h th e codificatio n o f eroti c behavio r which ha s resulte d fro m th e readin g o f literatur e glorifyin g love , an d als o ma y b e a resul t o f th e ver y rea l difficultie s me n hav e in gettin g married . Marriag e amon g th e I u Mie n i s a busines s transactio n involvin g th e transfe r o f importan t amount s o f wealth , an d i t i s fundamenta l t o th e individual' s succes s i n life . Lej njej i s neve r categorica l wit h respec t t o obligations . Me n canno t forc e a n individua l t o fulfil l hi s ritua l obligations . H e can onl y b e taugh t wh y i t i s i n hi s ow n interes t t o d o so . Ulti matel y th e spirit s themselve s ar e suppose d t o b e abl e t o enforc e respec t fo r thei r rights . [593]

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Relationships to Other Populations. Othe r ethni c group s ar e also sometime s referre d t o a s fing (clan) , an d the y ar e suppose d to hav e obligations , prescribe d b y thei r ow n lej njej traditions . Therefore, th e ide a that , fo r instance , a n Akh a woul d lik e t o become I u Mie n doe s not mak e muc h sens e t o many o f th e latte r because o f th e dominan t belie f tha t on e canno t ge t awa y fro m one's obligation s t o ancesto r spirit s withou t givin g the m substan tial compensation . Th e perso n wh o doe s no t follo w hi s lej njej rules risks serious troubl e soone r o r later . Despite this , th e I u Mie n populatio n i n Laos , Thailand , an d Burma contain s a hig h proportio n fro m othe r ethni c groups . A t least 1 0 percen t o f th e presen t I u Mie n populatio n ha s bee n purchased directl y fro m suc h group s a s Meo , Akha , Lahu , Shan , Lamet, Khamu , Lao , an d Thai . Thes e peopl e hav e bee n rituall y incorporated int o th e I u Mie n community . Almos t al l wer e ver y young childre n whe n the y wer e purchased , but , particularl y i n the past , grow n marrie d couple s hav e bee n bough t an d rituall y incorporated. One cas e ma y b e cite d o f a Me o marrie d coupl e wh o wer e sold t o th e I u Mie n b y th e husband' s fathe r i n abou t 1860 . A daughter o f thi s couple , no w age d eighty-seven , i s stil l alive . She marrie d a high-leve l I u Mie n headma n i n Laos , an d on e of he r sons , Lej Tsa n Kuej , i s my tutor . Anothe r o f th e grandson s is Le j Tsa n Fi n (La o Tsii) , th e headma n o f th e villag e wher e I live . Bot h kee p i n touc h wit h thei r Me o relatives , wh o liv e in Ta k Province , Thailand . Because o f th e ritua l integration , th e 1 0 percen t wh o hav e been adopte d ar e considere d a s I u Mie n i n ever y respect . I hav e discovered n o sig n o f a feelin g o f sham e o r oddit y o r inferiorit y attached t o bein g a "bough t child, " o r bein g bor n t o parent s from anothe r ethni c group . These person s readil y admi t th e fac t and jok e abou t bein g Akha , Lahu , o r som e othe r tribe . Bu t "bought children " ar e no t alway s treate d wit h th e sam e affectio n as th e others . The reaso n fo r buyin g childre n i s almos t alway s th e desir e to buil d quickl y a n efficien t workin g household , whic h i s th e main instrumen t fo r th e enrichmen t o f th e "houseowner. " I f th e household ha s no t ye t reache d th e limi t for profitabl e expansion , the hea d ofte n invest s som e of hi s surplus i n expandin g his futur e [ 59 4 ]

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productiv e capacity . Ther e i s n o evidenc e tha t thi s i s a recen t phenomenon , no r i s i t associate d specificall y wit h th e cas h in com e fro m opiu m cultivation . Th e caus e lie s muc h deeper , i n th e desir e t o maximiz e househol d production . Th e importanc e o f th e I u Mie n institutio n o f buyin g childre n is illustrate d b y th e followin g example . Abou t thre e hundre d to fou r hundre d I u Mie n hav e bee n converte d t o Christia n ritua l in th e pas t te n years . Thes e margina l I u Mie n hav e no t give n u p th e practic e o f buyin g childre n and , indeed , oppos e th e mis sionarie s i n this . The y stres s tha t "thi s i s suc h a n ol d custo m tha t w e canno t give i t up. " Furthermore , these margina l I u Mie n have no t given u p th e ide a o f marriag e a s a busines s transactio n betwee n tw o persons , on e o f who m i s goin g t o los e manpowe r while th e othe r gain s it . Thu s the y hav e agreed , onl y unde r mis sionar y pressure , t o abstai n fro m takin g bride-pric e i f th e mar riage i s betwee n Christians . Bu t i f th e gir l i s a "bough t child, " compensatio n is demande d for th e origina l outlay . Ther e ar e als o person s belongin g t o I u Mie n household s wh o have no t rituall y becom e I u Mien . I t i s no t necessar y tha t ever y membe r o f th e househol d b e integrate d wit h th e houseowner' s group o f ancesto r spirits . I t i s sufficien t i f th e spirit s ar e informe d abou t th e ne w househol d membe r an d aske d no t t o har m th e person . Several wome n i n m y village o f residenc e wh o belon g t o differ en t ethni c group s hav e bee n member s o f I u Mie n household s for shorte r o r longe r periods . On e i s a n Akh a woman , divorce d by he r husband , wh o ha d previousl y sol d thei r daughte r t o I u Mien . Th e mother , wh o wante d t o liv e wit h he r child , wa s ac cepte d a s a permanen t membe r o f th e household . He r daughte r ha s becom e a n I u Mien , bu t th e mothe r maintain s he r Akh a dress. A n Akh a mal e lives i n th e village unde r simila r conditions . Th e attitud e o f I u Mie n towar d othe r ethni c group s seem s to b e on e o f grea t toleranc e a s lon g a s it i s a questio n o f produc tive cooperation . Meanwhile , th e ritua l distinction s ar e maintaine d with grea t care . Thu s lej njej rule s affec t th e interna l operatio n o f th e socia l system, bu t d o no t delimi t th e demographi c expansio n o f th e population . Money: The Instrument of Action. Th e rule s o f lej njej ar e [ 59 5 ]

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associated wit h a vie w o f th e univers e a s a n organize d whole , in whic h th e I u Mie n operat e o n tw o level s o f existence : th e world o f me n (jaang keen) an d th e worl d o f spirit s (jom keen). On bot h level s goal s ca n b e reache d b y individual s usin g silve r as a n instrumen t calle d th e "bridg e o f spiri t silver " (gjaa jom kiu, lit . "makin g th e bridg e o f th e spirits") . Th e spirit s bridg e can b e use d fo r man y purposes , includin g strengthenin g healt h and predicting a person's life span. 12 The premis e o f th e ritua l i s tha t a perso n i s abl e t o ac t an d attain variou s goal s b y knowin g ho w t o us e silve r (money) . H e will liv e a s lon g a s h e ca n accumulat e silver . Lej njej offer s a method o f actio n an d a n instrumen t fo r evaluatin g progres s o f the individual' s life . B y makin g th e individual' s ultimat e succes s require th e financing o f a numbe r o f expensiv e merit-makin g ceremonies, lej njej make s accumulatio n o f liqui d wealt h th e main goa l for th e individual . In th e I u Mie n worl d view , th e individual' s lif e i s goal-ori ented. Hi s progres s ca n b e evaluate d i n term s o f merit-makin g ceremonies tha t hav e bee n carrie d ou t an d i n term s o f hi s poten 12 The followin g i s a brie f descriptio n o f thes e techniques . Th e basi c assumptio n is tha t genera l vigo r i s a matte r o f th e proximit y o f th e "lif e spirit " («an ) to th e body . Th e ritua l exper t use s technique s prescribe d b y lej njej fo r finding the lif e spiri t an d inducin g i t t o sta y wit h th e body . H e order s a numbe r of specia l spiri t assistant s (spirits , no t men ) t o visi t al l quarter s o f th e univers e in searc h o f th e lif e spirit , an d h e instruct s the m ho w t o d o it . Layin g ou t pieces o f ritua l pape r mone y acros s th e floor of th e hous e towar d th e ceremonia l door, he tells the spirit assistants :

This i s the bridge that leads into the sky ; This i s the bridge that leads to the earth ; This i s the bridge fo r spirit s an d fo r men ; This is the bridge t o the spiri t world ; This i s the bridge through th e forest ; This is the bridge acros s the waters ; This i s th e bridg e tha t lead s throug h al l countries ; This is the bridge tha t leads in all directions . He show s th e spiri t assistant s ho w t o follo w th e bridg e b y jumpin g fro m on e piece o f mone y t o th e next . Then , fallin g int o a (simulated ) trance , h e depart s for th e spiri t world . When th e lif e spiri t ha s returne d (i n th e for m o f a n insec t foun d i n fron t of th e ceremonia l doo r o f th e house) , i t i s offere d food . Uncooke d rice i s place d in a bambo o tub e i n th e middl e o f a tra y covere d wit h ritua l money . Usin g a stick y string , th e ritual exper t trie s t o catc h a s man y piece s o f th e pape r money a s possible . Th e numbe r o f piece s caugh t indicate s ho w man y mor e tens of years the subjec t wil l live.

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tial t o accumulat e furthe r liqui d wealt h fo r merit-making , he] njej define s silve r a s th e idea l mediu m o f exchang e an d th e fixed standar d o f value . Th e preoccupatio n wit h th e accumulatio n o f wealth , particu larly i n th e for m o f silve r (whic h i s rituall y define d b y Ie] n]e] as th e universa l "Ope n Sesame") , ha s undoubtedl y bee n a mai n determinan t o f th e action-orientatio n o f th e I u Mie n fo r a lon g time . Th e whol e syste m o f merit-makin g ceremonie s directe d towar d th e "centra l governmen t o f th e spiri t world " use s silve r as th e bridg e betwee n th e worl d o f me n an d th e worl d o f spirits . Paymen t o f silver , a t leas t a smal l quantity , i s a basi c Ie] njej requiremen t fo r al l importan t ritua l transactions , includin g marriage . Becaus e mone y i s th e ke y t o succes s (bu t b y differen t paths ) bot h i n th e worl d o f me n an d i n th e worl d o f spirits , th e indi vidual ha s t o choos e betwee n th e bridge s tha t ca n b e buil t wit h money . I f a perso n decide s t o inves t i n hi s futur e existenc e i n th e spiri t world , h e spend s hi s mone y fo r merit-makin g ceremonies . Thu s h e purchase s i n advanc e a respecte d positio n in th e spiri t world , an d afte r h e i s dea d thi s ma y affec t th e suc cess o f hi s livin g descendants . However , I hav e bee n tol d repeat edly tha t a perso n i s no t particularl y respecte d amon g livin g me n becaus e o f hi s spiri t rank . Thi s ran k i s indicate d b y hi s spirit name , whic h i s neve r use d i n relationship s wit h men . Hi s relatio n t o th e spirit s i s hi s ow n business . Onl y a person' s abilit y to ac t i n thi s worl d count s wit h hi s fellowmen . Th e sayin g is , "On e i s respecte d fo r thre e things : money , intelligence , an d good heart—an d mone y i s th e grea t thing. " I f a ma n ha s al l thes e qualities , i t i s largel y attribute d t o hel p fro m ancesto r spirits—if th e ancesto r spirit s ar e clever , the y wil l no t lea d a life-sou l o f ba d qualit y t o thei r descendants . A ma n wh o i s simpl y rich , withou t bein g cleve r o r generous , is stil l respected , but abov e al l h e i s feared , becaus e i t i s though t tha t a ric h ma n i s fre e t o d o mor e o r les s wha t h e wants . Ther e is als o th e ide a tha t virtu e i s attache d t o silver . I t i s believe d tha t spirits , particularl y thos e o f th e centra l government , valu e silver just a s muc h a s the y dislik e sexua l intercourse . The heaven s where th e to p eightee n spirit s liv e ar e calle d "th e pur e land. " Onl y b y offerin g enormou s amount s o f spiri t mone y ca n th e indi [ 59 7 ]

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vidual gai n th e necessar y meri t an d increas e hi s intrinsi c valu e so as to attain his heavenly goal . Money, i n particula r silver , has specia l symboli c connotations . Fifty o r sixt y year s ago , when m y oldes t informant s wer e young , "silver wa s s o rar e tha t i t wa s cu t int o tin y pieces . The y use d to sa y abou t a perso n wh o ha d muc h silver , 'Thi s perso n ha s much silver . Hi s lif e i s good . H e i s ver y good.' " I hav e als o been tol d tha t i n th e ol d time s onl y wealt h wa s respected , an d it i s onl y recentl y tha t th e "clever " persons , fo r instanc e ritua l experts, have gained respect . I kno w o f poore r me n wh o hav e withdraw n fro m competitio n for th e pos t o f villag e headme n afte r learnin g o f th e ambition s of ric h men . Th e ide a tha t a ric h ma n ca n d o whateve r h e like s has bee n pointe d ou t t o m e frequently , a s i n th e followin g exam ple. I onc e commente d o n th e peculia r an d ungentlemanl y be havior o f a ma n wh o wa s a n alcoholic . Whe n I suggeste d tha t his ver y unhapp y childhoo d migh t hav e somethin g t o d o wit h his presen t behavior , I wa s firmly corrected . "Tha t ha s nothin g to d o wit h hi s childhood. H e i s s o ric h tha t h e think s h e doesn' t need to bother abou t othe r people , but ca n d o whatever he likes." In spit e o f thei r genera l preoccupatio n wit h money , th e I u Mien hav e no t become corrupted . The y ar e friendl y an d reliabl e people, wit h ver y grea t respec t fo r th e right s o f thei r fellowmen . Money, i n thei r society , i s associate d wit h positiv e values : th e good life , respec t an d car e for parent s an d children , an d respec t for th e traditiona l wa y o f life . I t woul d b e misleadin g an d unfair , on th e basi s o f thei r emphasi s o n money , t o visualiz e th e I u Mien as a mercenary an d cold-blooded lot . Ritual Techniques. Spirit s ar e though t t o b e powerfu l bu t rather stupid . "The y believ e everythin g th e ritua l exper t says . When h e give s the m piece s o f pape r sayin g i t i s silver , the y believe i t i s real . Whe n h e give s the m ba d alcohol , the y enjo y it becaus e h e say s i t i s good. " Ceremonie s ar e ofte n occasion s for hilariou s jokin g a t th e expens e o f eve n th e mos t powerfu l o f spirits. The I u Mie n lack a concept o f a n omniscient , omnipresen t god. Thei r spirits , bi g an d small , ar e power s wit h who m ma n can cooperat e o n a contractua l basis . Althoug h the y ca n trave l fast, the y ar e no t alway s presen t an d d o no t kno w wha t i s goin g on i n the worl d o f me n unles s the y ar e properl y told . Th e spirits , [ 59 8 ]

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particularl y thos e o f th e centra l government , d o no t easily under stan d th e Ya o language , s o thes e spirit s mus t b e addresse d i n ritua l Chinese . Thu s th e spectator s a t th e ceremon y ca n mak e thei r comment s i f the y d o no t interfer e i n th e activitie s o f th e ritua l expert . Lej njej prescribe s th e technique s o f communicatio n wit h th e spirits, th e offic e o f "ritua l expert," 13 an d a n educationa l an d examinatio n syste m fo r recruitmen t o f specialists , i n whic h th e teacher-pupi l relationshi p i s essential . Thi s relationshi p i s though t to b e a continuou s proces s o f cooperatio n whic h i s no t ende d by th e deat h o f th e teacher . Teache r an d pupi l cooperat e acros s th e border s dividin g th e worl d o f me n fro m th e worl d o f spirit s in th e sam e wa y a s ancesto r spirit s an d thei r descendant s ar e suppose d t o cooperate . Technique s o f communicatio n wit h spirit s ar e strictl y regulate d b y lej njej prescriptions , largel y i n writte n manual s (saj zung sdu o r tsm mien szu). Th e text s ar e writte n i n Chi nese o r us e Chines e characters , ofte n copie d fro m Chines e origi nals. A n archai c for m o f literar y Chines e (sometime s calle d "Cantonese, " sometime s "Nankin g dialect" ) i s prescribe d be cause th e spirit s hav e difficult y understandin g othe r languages . Usuall y th e ritua l expert s hav e a ver y imperfec t knowledg e o f thi s for m o f Chinese , an d th e spiri t o f th e teache r o f th e exper t is alway s calle d upo n t o lea d hi s pupil . A priori , th e teache r is suppose d t o be mor e competen t tha n th e pupil . Lej njej doe s no t refe r t o th e us e o f an y othe r language . Al l othe r languages , includin g Yao , belon g t o th e categor y o f non ritua l technique s an d ar e classe d a s phou tung, whic h mean s "ordinary " (se e below) . Lej Fing. Th e lej jing traditio n define s a n approac h t o th e proble m o f adaptatio n t o politica l powe r i n th e worl d o f men . Thes e ar e rule s aime d a t th e protectio n o f lif e an d propert y o f th e I u Mie n populatio n i n interaction s betwee n member s o f th e I u Mie n communit y an d i n relation s wit h th e externa l politica l powers dominatin g th e region s wher e th e I u Mie n live . While lej njej affect s long-ter m planning , lej jing i s concerne d "Turn saf kung ("th e grea t teacher") , th e high-leve l exper t wh o take s car e of relationship s wit h th e spiri t government , an d mien sib mien, th e ma n wh o takes car e o f smalle r spirits .

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with th e shor t term—wit h adaptatio n t o a changing tota l environ ment. Lej fing is a genera l principl e fo r adaptiv e behavio r an d is a n essentia l elemen t i n th e I u Mie n theor y o f action , a s indi cated by their use of the term lej ("tradition") . In earlie r days th e need wa s for adaptation , primarily t o loosel y organized (ofte n "inter-tribal" ) politica l system s o f a feuda l type, controlle d b y high-leve l headme n exercisin g a characteristi cally charismati c for m o f leadership . No w th e lej fing refer s pri marily t o th e administratio n carrie d ou t b y centra l governments . "When yo u liv e i n Thailand , yo u hav e t o follo w th e lej fing of Thailand . I f yo u liv e i n Laos , yo u follo w th e lej fing o f Laos , and i n Burma , yo u follo w th e lej fing o f Burm a . . . . " The siz e o f fines an d th e metho d o f recruitin g th e village head man an d counci l ar e lej fing matters . A s units o f productio n an d elements i n a politica l system , th e constituen t household s o f th e village ar e no t covere d b y consciou s applicatio n o f lej njej rules . But lej njej affect s househol d routin e mor e tha n i t doe s th e com munal lif e o f th e villag e (laang), sinc e th e nucleu s o f th e house hold i s alway s a ritua l descen t grou p associate d wit h a particula r group o f spirits , whil e th e villag e i s merel y a n aggregat e o f households. Actually, lej fing an d lej njej ar e mutuall y reinforcing , an d when describin g th e impac t o f on e o n th e behavio r o f th e I u Mien, i t i s impossibl e t o disregar d th e other . Th e distinctio n is a conceptua l on e an d refer s strictl y t o th e I u Mie n mode l of th e universe , a worl d vie w i n whic h a basi c distinctio n i s made betwee n stable an d unstable powe r relationships . Th e tw o sets o f rule s wil l b e treate d simultaneousl y i n th e remainde r o f this paper . Phou Tung. Al l practice s no t affectin g th e right s o f th e spirit s or no t stemmin g fro m th e nee d t o protec t me n fro m me n o r to confor m t o demand s o f politica l power s ar e calle d phou tung ("ordinary"). Thi s ter m refer s t o fields o f actio n lef t t o b e gov erned b y individua l judgment . Importan t example s includ e agri cultural techniques , th e decisio n t o liv e i n th e hill s o r o n th e plains, an d eve n th e Ya o languag e an d traditiona l dres s use d in everyda y lif e (thi s doe s no t refer t o th e dres s o f ritua l experts , which i s lej njej). Th e spirit s ar e suppose d t o b e intereste d onl y in gettin g thei r jus t compensatio n fo r cooperation , fo r instanc e [600 ]

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for "helpin g th e ric e grow. " Fo r thi s the y ar e offere d ritua l "spirit money. " Institutionalized Politeness. Thi s i s a techniqu e fo r facilitatin g daily persona l interactions , particularl y i n competitiv e situations . I t i s applie d systematicall y t o avoi d gettin g int o ope n conflicts . "You canno t spea k i n a n unfriendl y manne r t o eac h other . I f you ar e impolite , the n somebod y wil l los e face , an d thi s wil l cause a quarrel . The n yo u canno t cooperat e an y longer . Tha t make s yo u weake r an d yo u mak e les s money. " Ideally , th e polit e approac h shoul d appl y i n al l situations . "Fo r instance , i f tw o childre n fight, the n yo u hav e t o separat e them . Bu t yo u shoul d no t bea t them , onl y teac h the m nicely. " Th e I u Mie n tr y a s muc h a s possibl e t o kee p socia l interaction s free fro m over t friction . Undoubtedl y thi s preoccupatio n i s con necte d with othe r element s i n thei r theor y o f action . Forming Household Units with Strong Internal Discipline. In stitutionalize d politeness , applie d t o interactio n betwee n mem bers o f a househol d unit , contribute s t o stron g interna l discipline . Struggles fo r leadershi p ar e stoppe d a t a n earl y stage , becaus e quarrel s ar e no t tolerated . I f tw o grow n member s canno t ge t along, th e "houseowner " (peo tsiu) wil l as k on e o f the m t o leave, o r someon e will move ou t o n his own initiative . Th e househol d unit s usuall y spli t afte r th e deat h o f th e house owner , whe n marrie d son s establis h thei r ow n households . I f brother s continu e t o liv e unde r th e sam e roof , wit h a commo n househol d (eatin g together , makin g fields together , etc.) , bot h of the m ma y b e calle d peo tsiu. Sometime s the y ma y hav e sepa rat e household s bu t car e fo r thei r ancesto r spirit s togethe r a t a commo n spirit platform . I inquire d systematicall y i n fort y households , no t limitin g m y interviews t o househol d heads , regardin g th e optimu m siz e o f th e household . Th e desire d numbe r o f grow n person s (ove r fifteen years o f age ) varie d betwee n five an d twelve . Th e reason s given for limitatio n o f househol d siz e wer e invariabl y tha t ba d tal k an d quarrel s woul d star t i f to o man y live d together , an d tha t thi s mad e cooperatio n difficult . Th e houseowner s alway s refe r to disciplinar y problems . A frequen t opinio n i s tha t i f i t wer e no t s o difficult , the y woul d lik e t o hav e a s man y workin g hand s as possible , "t o mak e i t big , hav e larg e fields, an d b e strong. " [60 1 ]

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Some Techniques of Social Control and Boundary Maintenance: Security of Life and Property. Devian t behavio r in I u Mie n societ y i s counteracte d an d correcte d b y variou s formal an d informa l procedures . Non-observanc e o f contractua l obligations i s checke d mainl y b y exclusio n o f th e offende r fro m benefits o f cooperativ e activities . The fac t o f a breach o f contrac t is communicate d t o th e community , an d th e offende r i s alway s excommunicated t o som e extent . H e lose s fac e an d wil l find i t difficult t o secur e profitabl e cooperatio n unti l h e ha s "washe d his face " b y honorin g hi s obligations . Becaus e contract s ar e s o important, th e presenc e o f witnesse s i s stresse d bot h i n ritua l contexts (cooperatio n betwee n me n an d spirits ) an d i n economi c cooperation betwee n men . The lac k o f forma l socia l contro l ove r contractua l relationship s accounts i n par t fo r a marke d distrus t o f long-ter m contract s and th e preferenc e fo r exchange s o f good s an d service s o n a cash basis . O n th e othe r hand , extensio n o f credi t improve s a man's reputation an d attract s partner s fo r cooperativ e enterprises . There ar e forma l procedure s fo r repai r o f damag e t o physica l well-being o r propert y cause d b y direc t action . I n thi s situatio n communal organ s ge t involve d an d appl y correctiv e measure s in accor d wit h lej fing tradition . Th e judicia l proces s aim s a t establishing a contrac t e x pos t fact o an d a t th e transformatio n of a conflic t int o a relationshi p o f cooperatio n an d exchange . The victi m an d th e offender , unde r pressur e fro m mediator s (fo r example, th e headma n an d th e villag e council) , agre e upo n rea sonable compensatio n fo r th e damage s an d th e service s o f th e mediators. Th e decisio n i s made easie r b y establishe d precedent s for amount s t o b e pai d an d procedure s t o b e followed . A s lon g as th e offende r show s readines s t o cooperate , h e i s give n th e opportunity t o negotiat e an d bargain . Th e mai n principl e o f th e Iu Mie n judicia l syste m i s no t revenge , bu t repai r o f damag e to individuals . I t i s founde d o n th e ide a o f th e communit y a s a cooperativ e goin g concern . This ide a i s frequentl y expresse d i n th e statemen t tha t "I u Mien d o no t kil l I u Mien. " Fo r example , whe n informant s hav e reported robber y combine d wit h murder , the y hav e stresse d tha t these ar e reall y peculia r times—i n th e pas t "suc h a thin g wa s unheard of. " Whe n olde r case s o f killin g hav e bee n reported , [ 60 2 ]

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the y hav e bee n presente d a s accidents , wit h on e exception . I n thi s cas e (se e below ) th e kille r wa s a perso n wh o ha d bee n adopte d recentl y fro m a differen t ethni c group . After investigat ing thes e case s i n mor e detail , th e circumstance s o f th e accident s sometime s see m rathe r strange . Bu t i t i s quit e characteristi c o f th e I u Mie n processe s o f conflic t resolutio n tha t thei r explici t interpretation s avoi d th e admissio n o f aggression , eve n a s a fait accompli. Th e forma l procedure s fo r conflic t resolutio n (fo r instance , in th e cas e o f theft ) ar e carrie d ou t i n a n atmospher e whic h is mad e a s pleasan t a s possibl e fo r everyone . Th e plaintiff , th e accused , th e headman , an d th e spectator s si t togethe r an d discus s th e matte r politely , drinkin g an d eatin g th e foo d brough t b y th e accuse d i f h e ha s alread y admitte d hi s guilt , o r tha t brough t by th e plaintiff. 14 Th e purpos e o f th e meetin g i s clearl y understoo d t o be repara tion fo r damag e an d restoratio n o f th e smoot h functionin g o f social interaction s onc e th e offens e ha s becom e known . Th e motiv e i s no t revenge , an d th e bloo d feu d i s no t a n I u Mie n institution . Th e victim , th e accused , an d th e communit y a s a whole ac t a s i f the y wer e equall y intereste d i n removin g th e conflict . Everyon e cooperate s i n solvin g th e unpleasan t matte r as smoothl y an d wit h a s littl e offens e t o th e involve d partie s as possible . O f course , th e I u Mie n ar e n o mor e saint s tha n an y othe r people , bu t eve n i f ther e i s desir e fo r pur e revenge , publi c expression s o f i t ar e no t ordinaril y tolerated . Th e ide a tha t anythin g ca n b e repaire d wit h adequat e com pensation , whic h make s aggressio n agains t th e culpri t meaning less (i f h e cooperates) , i s founde d o n th e principl e tha t asset s of variou s person s ar e commensurable . Eve n i n th e cas e men tione d below , whe n a perso n wa s actuall y executed , i t wa s stressed b y m y informant s tha t th e ac t for whic h h e was punishe d coul d hav e bee n neutralize d b y th e paymen t o f a certai n amoun t of money . I n th e ol d days , i n fact, ther e was a fixed blood-price . Th e logi c o f thi s attitud e i s explaine d a s follows . T o kil l a ma n i s t o depriv e hi m o f money-makin g capacit y an d t o depriv e thos e wh o hav e bee n i n contractua l relation s wit h hi m o f th e mone y h e coul d hel p the m make . Consequently , everythin g ca n 14

Thi s an d th e following paragrap h ar e take n fro m Kandr e (1964:30-31) .

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be pu t right b y payin g compensatio n i n silver , an d i t i s i n th e interests o f man y peopl e i n additio n t o th e accuse d t o se e tha t this i s done. The metho d fo r conflic t resolutio n i s not permissiv e o r lenient . Money mean s th e capacit y t o ac t an d survive . The perso n wh o has cause d th e deat h o f anothe r mus t mak e u p t o th e dea d per son's spiri t b y financing merit-makin g ceremonie s an d als o b y honoring th e obligation s whic h th e dea d perso n ha d contracte d with othe r men . Thi s normall y mean s tha t th e kille r mus t foreg o his own possibilities for advancement . According t o I u Mie n standards , on e ha s t o b e ric h t o ge t away wit h murde r withou t extremel y seriou s consequence s fo r oneself. This is one reason why rich men are feared . If th e kille r i s a youn g unmarrie d man , i t i s probabl e tha t his parent s an d othe r clos e relative s wil l poo l thei r resource s to pa y compensatio n rathe r tha n lettin g hi m b e executed . Bu t this mean s tha t th e youn g man' s lif e chance s ar e spoiled . H e will no t b e abl e t o buil d a n efficient , independen t household . Unless hi s parent s ar e ver y rich, the y probabl y wil l not financ e his marriage , an d i t wil l b e difficul t fo r hi m t o find anyon e wh o wants t o marr y him . H e is tie d b y too man y obligation s t o hi s creditors. About twent y year s ag o i n Laos a n adoptiv e so n shot his fathe r in circumstance s tha t wer e considere d ver y extenuating . Th e fourteen-year-old bo y an d hi s twelve-year-ol d brothe r ha d bee n bought onl y a fe w year s befor e fro m th e Re d Lahu . The y wer e very badl y treate d b y thei r adoptiv e father , wh o bea t the m an d made thei r live s miserabl e i n ever y way . On e da y th e fathe r came t o th e fiel d wher e th e tw o boy s wer e workin g an d scolde d them fo r no t workin g fas t enough . Befor e h e left , h e tol d the m he wa s goin g t o kil l them . Th e boy s panicked , an d whe n the y found th e rifl e th e fathe r ha d forgotten , th e olde r bo y sho t him . In thi s cas e th e kille r wa s shot , muc h t o th e regret , i t seems , of everyon e i n th e village . Th e younge r bo y wa s no t touched . The executio n wa s motivate d b y th e fac t tha t th e kille r ha d n o relatives wh o coul d hav e pai d th e compensation , an d i t wa s as sumed tha t i f h e wer e lef t aliv e h e woul d ru n awa y (th e onl y logical thin g fo r th e bo y t o d o i f h e wishe d t o avoi d virtua l slavery). [ 60 4 ]

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I n anothe r case, als o i n Laos , a ma n is sai d t o have sho t anothe r ma n b y acciden t wit h a crossbo w durin g a tiger-hunt . Th e cir cumstance s wer e considere d ver y incriminating . Th e kille r hi d th e body , whic h wa s no t discovere d fo r quit e a while . Compensa tion wa s agree d upon , amountin g t o ove r U.S . $1,00 0 (calculate d in term s o f th e presen t exchang e rat e betwee n dollar s an d silver in Thailand). 1 5 Th e kille r belonge d t o a wealth y famil y an d thu s h e survived . Thes e ar e illustration s o f th e traditiona l method s b y whic h th e I u Mie n provid e securit y fo r lif e an d property . Prosecutio n of th e kille r traditionall y depende d o n th e actio n o f th e victim' s relatives. Wit h th e expansio n o f centra l governmenta l jurisdictio n int o hil l region s o f Lao s an d Thailand , case s o f thef t an d murde r are sometime s brough t t o governmen t courts . Bu t th e prevailin g opinio n amon g th e I u Mie n seem s t o b e tha t thei r ow n wa y of handlin g suc h problem s i s mor e satisfactory , a t leas t fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f th e victims . "Wha t i s th e us e o f puttin g a ma n int o priso n o r executin g hi m i f h e ca n b e mad e t o wor k an d repai r th e damag e h e ha s done ? Late r o n h e ma y leav e prison an d star t th e same thin g again. " We ca n conclud e tha t th e ide a o f th e "bridg e o f silver " pro vides a n efficien t metho d fo r socia l contro l o f th e individual . Becaus e th e individua l i s abl e t o operat e successfull y onl y b y using thi s instrument , th e possibilit y tha t h e ma y b e deprive d of it s us e i s indee d a meaningfu l threat . Informal Cooperation in Village Communities: Maintenance of Village Solidarity. Bot h th e village counci l o r grou p o f assistan t headme n an d th e headma n ar e involve d i n th e proces s o f conflic t resolutio n insid e th e villag e community . Th e headma n an d hi s assistant s rel y primaril y o n th e agreement . A househol d hea d who doe s no t wan t t o confor m i s alway s fre e t o leave th e village communit y an d g o somewher e els e wher e th e socia l climat e i s mor e congenial . Semi-informa l contro l i s exercise d b y th e villag e headma n i n th e followin g situations . Uncooperativ e behavio r suc h a s refusa l to hel p i n defens e o f anothe r hous e i f i t ha s bee n attacke d doe s 35 Th e averag e lifetim e earnin g capacit y o f a n I u Mie n at tha t tim e is estimate d by m y informant s t o hav e bee n U.S . $100 , calculate d o n th e sam e basis . Th e standar d compensatio n fo r a ma n a t tha t tim e wa s $150 , fo r a woma n $40 .

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not caus e immediat e punishmen t o r reprisal . Instead , gradua l pressure i s pu t o n th e recalcitran t part y t o repai r th e spli t i n village solidarity . Repeate d failur e t o shoulde r responsibilitie s for commo n securit y wil l ultimatel y resul t i n expulsio n fro m th e village. Bu t befor e thi s poin t i s reache d th e offende r wil l b e "taught th e righ t ways " b y th e headma n an d eventuall y fine d if the offense i s repeated. An informan t ha s give n a hypothetica l exampl e o f th e round about wa y i n whic h communa l disciplin e i s imposed . I f ther e is a goo d field nea r th e village , bu t i t i s to o smal l fo r everyon e to ge t a portio n o f it, it ma y b e agree d tha t n o on e wil l us e the field . I f someon e the n start s t o use i t i n spit e o f th e agree ment, h e wil l not b e force d of f it , but th e headma n wil l probabl y come aroun d an d tel l hi m politely , "G o on—i t reall y doesn' t matter. Bu t don' t com e an d complai n i f th e pigs fro m th e villag e come int o th e field. " It i s characteristi c o f th e "loos e structure " o f I u Mie n village s that a socia l behavio r o f th e kin d describe d abov e i s no t consid ered t o b e criminal . I t i s disapproved , however , an d th e perso n or househol d tha t goe s agains t th e cooperativ e practice s wil l eventually com e into difficulties . Techniques of Communication: Authority and Ideological Control. I t ha s alread y bee n stresse d tha t th e cooperatio n be tween individual s i n processe s o f productio n i s regulate d largel y through contract s betwee n individuals , and tha t som e of th e mos t important form s o f contrac t involv e obligation s t o b e honore d after th e deat h o f on e o f th e partie s t o th e agreement . Bu t wha t is th e guarantee , fo r instance , tha t th e descendant s wil l i n fac t honor thei r ritual obligation s onc e thei r parent s ar e dea d an d cannot appl y economi c sanctions ? Ther e i s no politica l authorit y to enforc e thes e obligations . Enforcemen t depend s o n lej njej tradition. Knowledge o f lej njej i s communicate d i n writing , orally , an d by participan t observation . Th e I u Mie n ar e literat e (i n a Chi nese script ) an d hav e a variet y o f books , mostl y concerne d wit h ritual an d myth . Ther e ar e als o collection s o f lov e song s and , finally, circula r letter s usuall y comin g fro m person s wit h suc h firm reputation an d high prestige tha t they have reason t o believ e their opinion s will have strong impact . [ 60 6 ]

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S

Messages fro m thes e opinio n leaders is on e of th e characteristi c ways i n whic h knowledg e abou t th e syste m i s comunicated . Ther e i s grea t genera l interes t i n thes e letters ; youn g an d ol d sit for hour s singin g thei r texts, which always contai n some moral lesson. Befor e th e presen t politica l situatio n blocke d communica tions, thes e circula r letter s travele d quickl y al l ove r th e vast are a inhabite d b y I u Mien . Th e possibilit y o f writte n communicatio n has n o doub t bee n importan t in maintainin g th e integrit y o f I u Mien culture . Person s wh o hav e neve r bee n i n Yunna n tak e i t for grante d tha t th e I u Mie n ther e kee p aliv e th e sam e lej njef tradition s becaus e "if ther e ha d bee n an y chang e [a t least befor e th e presen t regim e i n China ] we woul d hav e hear d or read abou t it." Th e tw o followin g example s ar e summarie s o f letter s o f a typ e called "son g fo r makin g good. " Th e autho r o f both , F u Oo n Uang , i s a sixty-six-year-ol d ritua l exper t o f highes t distinctio n and i s a high-leve l headma n o f a numbe r o f I u Mie n an d Me o villages i n th e Chiengkha m District , Chiengra i Province , Thai land . Hi s Thai governmen t title is Phya Kha m Daeng . Song No. 1 Everybody must respect his father and mother When yo u wer e stil l a child , you r mothe r carrie d yo u o n he r back , and yo u at e he r milk . Fathe r i s lik e th e sky , an d mothe r i s lik e th e earth . Therefor e yo u shoul d respec t them . Marriage Everbod y shoul d cooperat e i n harmony . On e mus t no t fight o r mak e trouble . Husban d an d wif e mus t lov e eac h other , an d no t d o wha t is wrong . Relations to spirits and to the governments You hav e t o d o goo d an d no t d o wron g agains t th e spirit s an d th e goverment . I t i s mor e seriou s t o d o wron g agains t th e spirit s tha n against th e goverment . Wit h governmen t yo u ca n usuall y com e t o an agreement . I f yo u d o wron g agains t th e spirits , yo u wil l die .

The actua l letter , whic h i s mor e tha n a thousan d word s long , begins b y tellin g th e origin myt h o f th e Iu Mien . It was probabl y written i n 196 2 an d i s no w sai d t o be widesprea d amon g th e Iu Mie n of Thailand . [ 60 7 ]

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Song No. 2 Marriage It i s important to see in the hooks whethe r th e two people who are goin g t o marr y ar e a goo d combinatio n [referenc e i s t o horoscope s of dat e o f birth , etc.] . I f thi s i s no t done , th e marriag e ma y fai l because perhap s th e tw o wil l no t cooperate . Opium Opium i s no t good . Som e peopl e becom e ric h b y tradin g wit h it , but other s los e thei r wealt h smokin g it . Becaus e o f opiu m on e ofte n comes int o oppositio n wit h th e government , an d th e resul t i s suffering . [The autho r o f thi s lette r neithe r smoke s no r drinks. ]

This lette r wa s writte n aroun d 194 7 an d i s wel l know n an d widely circulated both in Thailand and Laos . The followin g i s a circula r lette r fro m th e high-leve l headma n I Kie n (La o governmen t title , Chao La), on e o f th e tw o mai n political leader s o f I u Mie n i n norther n Laos. 16 H e no w live s in th e Na m Khyn g settlemen t i n th e Houe i Sa i Provinc e an d has a positio n i n th e Roya l La o Governmen t administration . Th e letter, writte n i n Chinese , set s dow n regulation s fo r th e siz e o f the bride-pric e an d i s addresse d t o bot h I u Mie n an d Me o i n Laos. Chines e i s th e lingu a franc a i n thi s case . I n translation , the letter reads as follows: Talking openl y t o al l I u Mie n an d Meo , t o al l headmen , t o al l house holds. Fro m no w o n ther e wil l b e fou r differen t level s o f bride-price . In al l case s th e "mothe r s mil k money, " an d th e "grandparent' s money " will b e counte d a s one , an d fo r th e bes t qualit y [bride ] i t i s fixed at 6 6 lung; fo r th e secon d quality , 5 6 lung; fo r th e thir d quality , 46 lung; an d fo r th e fourt h quality , 3 6 lung. Th e "gol d custo m money " is counte d int o th e "mother s mil k money-grandparent' s money. " I n addition t o wha t ha s alread y bee n counte d yo u hav e th e mui mien money [mone y fo r th e organize r o f th e marriag e ceremony , wh o i s the leade r an d go-between]. " Yo u hav e t o pa y tha t separately . Fo r this, tw o lung i s th e correc t amount . Furthermore , ther e i s th e "por k custom" [th e foo d consume d durin g th e marriag e ceremony] . Fo r 16 The othe r i s I Fu , olde r brothe r o f I Kien . Hi s governmen t titl e i s Chao Mai. " I t i s significan t tha t th e mui mien mone y ha s t o b e counte d separately . The mui mien belong s t o lef nfef traditio n an d is describe d i n th e creatio n myth. Th e sayin g i s 'withou t cloud s n o rai n wil l fall , an d withou t mui mien there wil l be n o marriages. "

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this you will use not mor e tha n thre e pigs, and the middl e way custo m is t o hav e tw o pigs . The way U has been up to now, it has been difficult for poor people to do it [emphasi s added] . Th e duratio n of th e great variet y o f marriag e [ceremony ] is on e da y and two nights. Th e middl e variet y i s finishe d i n on e day, with tw o pigs. Th e poo r people , wh o mak e i t small , finish i t afte r a singl e meal . Th e custo m tha t guest s receiv e por k t o tak e wit h the m whe n the y leav e i s t o be discontinued . Th e goodnes s o f th e parent s mus t b e remembere d later o n by givin g the m on e pig. It has been decide d tha t thi s custo m must b e followe d exactly . Everyon e mus t follo w it , an d the y mus t not tak e more . Th e thir d mont h o f th e year 196 5 (Signed ) Chao La Tsa n Ngi n Thes e letter s ar e example s o f th e kin d o f socia l contro l exer cised b y leader s whos e position s ar e founde d mainl y o n persona l prestige an d furthe r cemente d throug h connection s with th e cen tra l governments . Th e relationshi p betwee n thes e opinio n leader s an d th e othe r I u Mie n i s analogou s t o tha t betwee n a ritua l exper t an d hi s teacher . Th e latte r act s a s a go-betwee n an d leade r i n th e pupil' s relation s wit h th e spiri t government . Likewise , th e ritua l exper t who conduct s th e merit-makin g ceremonie s fo r a n individua l i s called th e teache r o f thi s perso n becaus e h e explain s th e signifi canc e o f th e ceremony . Thi s teacher-pupi l relationshi p clearl y reflects th e centra l rol e o f communicatio n o f knowledg e i n I u Mie n society . But ho w efficien t i s thi s communication , fo r instance , i n th e economi c spher e o f life ? I Kien' s lette r i s clearl y directe d towar d regulatio n o f economi c activities , becaus e th e siz e o f bride-pric e is no t fixe d b y le\ njef, but belong s t o th e phou tung ("ordi nary") category . M y informant s believ e tha t th e I u Mie n i n Lao s will follo w th e directives . Perhap s thi s wil l no t happe n a t once , bu t afte r a fe w year s everyon e wil l confor m "becaus e everybod y ther e ha s trouble s wit h mone y now , an d also , earlie r [thirt y t o forty year s ago] , th e price s o f wome n i n silve r weigh t wer e jus t abou t wha t I Kie n ordered . Bu t o f cours e silve r ha d mor e valu e then. " Compare d with th e curren t (1965 ) pric e level, th e ordere d reductio n i s mor e tha n 7 0 percent , i f al l cost s o f th e ceremon y are adde d together . The Theory of Action and the Potential for Adaptation. Succes s [ 60 9 ]

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(meeng nuung haj) i s believe d t o resul t fro m intelligen t adjust ments wit h regar d t o the powe r relationship s dominatin g particu lar situations . Th e genera l ide a i s on e o f flexible adaptatio n t o the demand s o f th e powers (liing), whil e safeguardin g one' s ow n vital interests . Th e principle s fo r action-orientatio n ar e forme d in term s o f th e advancemen t o f th e individua l o n th e tw o level s of existence : th e worl d o f me n an d th e worl d o f spirits , fro m which th e sou l o f th e individua l come s an d wher e i t return s at hi s death . I n theory , everythin g els e i s eithe r instrumenta l or an obstruction t o the individual's advance . This individual-centere d approac h i s clearl y expresse d i n th e idea tha t i n th e afterlif e i n th e spiri t worl d everyone—ma n an d woman alike—ha s a n individua l hous e an d i s unaffected b y senti mental attachments . With thes e notion s i n min d i t ma y b e easie r t o understan d why th e I u Mie n ar e s o articulat e i n thei r approac h t o problem s of adaptation . Th e individua l i s left t o car e fo r himsel f i n a com petitive, production-oriente d socia l environment . I f disruptiv e conflicts ar e t o b e avoided , ther e mus t b e communication o f gen eral bu t efficien t principle s o f adaptation . Thi s i n tur n mean s that th e rational , empirica l elemen t ca n be expecte d t o be prominent i n representation s o f th e natur e o f th e universe . Thus , a s has alread y bee n pointe d out , th e idea l state—th e successfu l achievement o f adaptatio n t o fundamenta l powe r relationships — is conceived a s one wher e sentimenta l attachment s ar e lacking . Like al l model s o f comple x systems , th e worl d vie w o f th e Iu Mie n i s a simplificatio n an d doe s no t accoun t fo r al l th e ob servable processe s takin g plac e i n a give n socia l an d ecologica l situation. Th e principle s o f actio n referre d t o a s "institutional ized politeness, " phou tung, an d lej fing ar e thu s complementar y to th e genera l long-ter m principle s o f action , lej njej. Th e lej njej traditio n i s considere d invariant , becaus e i t i s assume d t o correspond t o th e tru e natur e o f th e situatio n o f ma n i n th e universe, see n fro m long-ter m perspective . A t th e sam e time , lej fing traditio n i s considere d t o b e th e intelligen t approac h to problem s o f adaptatio n i n a changin g politica l environment . Lej njej refer s t o stabl e powe r relationships , and , ultimately , i t is a n elaboratio n o f empirica l knowledg e abou t death , disease , and loss as inevitable element s o f human existence . [610]

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I believ e tha t i n it s presen t formulatio n th e Ze / njef o f th e I u Mie n ma y b e a n elaboratio n o f a n earlie r experienc e o f drasti c change s i n politica l powe r relationship s tha t occurre d i n th e pas t as a resul t o f confrontatio n wit h th e Chines e imperia l politica l system. Th e I u Mie n socio-economic-ritua l system , whic h oper ates o n th e premis e tha t a n intelligen t adaptatio n t o changin g power condition s i s possibl e an d necessary , i s wel l arme d t o dea l with mor e powerful political-socia l systems . Accordin g t o I u Mie n beliefs , spirit s d o everythin g backwar d compare d wit h men . The y ea t foo d raw , instea d o f cooked ; the y are stupid , whil e me n ar e clever ; the y ar e strong , whil e me n are weak ; an d finall y the y ar e fre e o f sentimenta l attachments , while me n ar e not . Bu t th e appreciatio n o f mone y i s a commo n denominato r betwee n me n an d spirits . Th e worl d vie w o f th e I u Mie n i s a n explanatio n o f th e processe s o f lif e i n term s o f complementar y oppositions . Thi s i s a dialectica l metho d o f rea soning, i n whic h th e contradiction s ar e resolve d i n th e notio n of huma n actio n directe d towar d it s ow n advancement , achieve d throug h th e us e o f a generall y approve d standar d o f value . Thu s th e notion s o f power , security , an d valu e canno t be applie d sepa ratel y whe n describin g th e behavio r o f th e I u Mie n becaus e ulti matel y the y refe r t o th e sam e thing , survival. POLITICA L BEHAVIO R

Village and Household in Iu Mien Society. Ther e i s n o forma l rule tha t ever y I u Mie n settlemen t mus t hav e a headman . I t is a matte r o f convenienc e whethe r a grou p o f household s choose s its ow n headma n o r prefer s t o as k a headma n fro m som e othe r village t o tak e car e o f th e lef fing sid e o f communa l life . Th e I u Mie n hav e a tendenc y t o sprea d ou t int o smal l hamlets , some time s comprisin g onl y a fe w households . Thi s i s t o som e exten t symptomati c o f th e concep t o f individua l enterpris e whic h i s favored i n thei r society . Individual s ar e alway s o n th e mov e searchin g fo r bette r opportunities , bette r soils , o r a mor e con venien t socia l climate . Ther e is nothin g specia l abou t th e I u Mie n in thi s regar d a s compare d wit h othe r ethni c group s livin g i n th e sam e hil l regions ; th e patter n o f settlemen t i s i n par t condi tione d b y th e ecologica l patter n o f swidde n agriculture . I n thi s settin g i t i s commo n for resident s o f ver y smal l o r poo r [61 1 ]

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settlements to ask the headma n o f a bigger , wealthie r village to b e thei r headma n too . Thi s i s especiall y tru e i f th e headme n has a reputation o f "good heart. " Because th e matte r o f villag e politica l structur e i s a matte r of lej fing, practica l convenienc e i n suc h factors a s size of village , relative siz e an d wealt h o f neighborin g villages , reputatio n o f headmen o f neighborin g villages , natur e an d exten t o f contro l exercised b y stat e authorities , an d th e genera l socia l climat e (fo r instance, whethe r ther e i s a wa r goin g on ) mea n tha t decision making i n variou s village s ma y operat e unde r radicall y differen t conditions. A smal l settlemen t i n th e war-ravage d regio n aroun d Mung Sin g i n Lao s canno t b e expecte d t o follo w th e sam e prac tices i n selectin g a headma n a s a larg e wealth y villag e i n th e region o f Chiengkham , Thailand . By sayin g tha t th e villag e governmen t i s lej fing, th e I u Mie n state explicitl y tha t i t doe s no t matte r ho w th e collectivit y o f the household s i s managed a s long a s the operation s o f th e households ar e no t impeded . Th e villag e governmen t i s though t o f as instrumenta l fo r th e protectio n an d preservatio n o f th e house holds, which are the basic production an d ritual units. There ar e som e lej njej rule s whic h affec t th e cohabitatio n of constituen t household s o f a village . Nonconformanc e t o thes e rules b y a househol d o r sectio n o f th e village—fo r example , non observance o f th e closin g o f th e villag e t o communication s wit h the outsid e worl d a s prescribe d b y th e ceremonia l calendar—i s incompatible wit h co-residence . Thu s i n Thailan d ther e hav e been instance s wher e conversio n t o Christianit y ha s resulte d i n the splittin g o f village s whe n th e rituall y oppose d halve s move d to a saf e distanc e fro m on e another . Th e lej njej rule s appl y to th e village , not a s a politically organize d unit , but a s an aggre gate o f household s i n commo n residence , whic h implie s certai n common ritua l obligations . Becaus e o f commo n residenc e o n th e same mountai n slope , al l th e household s ar e subjec t t o th e sam e geomantic rule s wit h regar d t o obligation s towar d a bod y o f local spirit s o f eart h an d water , an d thes e obligation s mus t b e fulfilled i n accordanc e wit h th e sam e ceremonia l calendar . M y informants stres s tha t th e constituen t household s cooperat e i n these ritua l activities , bu t th e politica l organizatio n ha s n o rele vance t o thi s cooperation . Th e household s ac t a s i f the y wer e [ 61 2 ]

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free an d independen t of on e anothe r an d onl y unit e in a commo n desire t o fulfil l obligation s t o th e spirit s tha t hav e bee n contracte d independently . Thes e spirit s ar e no t connecte d wit h th e ancestors , s o cla n membershi p o r kinshi p relation s d o no t affect thes e activities . Th e onl y exceptio n i s tha t sometime s th e spirit leader s o f th e group s o f ancesto r spirit s associate d wit h particula r household s ar e suppose d t o ac t a s intermediarie s an d witnesses whe n transaction s ar e carrie d ou t wit h th e loca l spirits . I n fact , lej njej ignore s th e village a s a distinc t category . Fo r instance , ther e i s n o ritua l villag e gate , no r a commo n playin g ground , no r a communa l house . Villagewid e publi c work s ar e no t a n institutio n of th e I u Mien . Economi c cooperatio n is carrie d ou t b y group s o f cooperatin g households ; i t i s no t dependen t on ritua l o r politica l cooperation . Ther e i s n o clea r notio n o f a commo n villag e territory . Distributio n o f fields i s decide d o n th e basi s o f informa l negotiation s betwee n leader s o f th e house hold s eac h year , an d a genera l directio n i s agree d upo n i n whic h th e fields ar e to be prepared . With regar d t o th e notio n o f villag e territory , th e prevailin g idea seem s t o b e tha t i f som e household s o f a differen t ethni c group wan t t o settl e nea r th e village , ther e ar e n o forma l ob stacles (ther e ar e man y informa l ones ) excep t tha t the y ar e no t allowed t o occup y a plac e abov e th e I u Mie n o n th e sam e moun tain slope . Thi s rul e i s strictl y enforce d an d i s founde d o n th e same geomanti c consideration s a s th e rule s regulatin g th e relativ e locatio n o f th e household s o f a n I u Mie n settlement : n o hous e is allowe d t o obstruc t a clea r lin e betwee n an y othe r hous e an d th e loca l spiri t shrine s whic h ar e locate d abov e th e village. Th e ide a tha t th e hous e (peo ) i s primar y a s compare d wit h th e villag e (laang) appear s clearl y i n th e I u Mie n idea s o f th e afterlife. Th e sam e geomanti c principle s a s thos e followe d fo r hom e site s ar e followed , an d muc h mor e carefully , fo r grav e sites (th e spiri t home s o f th e dead) . Ofte n larg e amount s o f mone y ar e pai d t o Chines e geomancer s fo r thei r services . I t i s believed tha t i f th e grav e i s favorabl y located , th e ancestor' s spirit wil l b e respecte d b y al l othe r spirits , regardles s o f rank . Thu s descendant s bor n afte r th e ancestor' s deat h wil l b e protecte d agains t attack s o f ba d spirit s an d wil l b e helpe d b y friendl y spirits . The y will be cleve r an d rich . [613]

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The geomancy , i n it s presen t form , i s clearl y Chinese . Severa l well-informed Yunnanes e stat e tha t I u Mie n geomanc y i s identi cal wit h tha t practice d i n Yunna n befor e th e presen t regime . Freedman (1958:7 7 ff.) , o n th e basi s o f severa l literar y sources , stresses th e grea t importanc e attache d t o geomanti c correctnes s of grav e site s i n southeaster n China , motivate d i n exactl y th e same wa y a s describe d t o m e b y Yunnanes e an d I u Mie n informants. In th e spiri t world , th e I u Mie n believe , ever y individua l ha s his o r her ow n house . Husband s an d wive s hav e separat e houses , although "a t night , whe n nobod y sees , the y visi t eac h other." 18 This ide a o f a n individua l spiri t hous e reflect s th e importanc e attached t o th e positio n o f "houseowner " (peo tsiu). Th e house hold i s th e mai n institutio n fo r th e attainmen t o f th e dominan t goal o f individua l action : wealth , particularl y i n th e for m o f money. I n thi s context , th e villag e ha s n o meaningfu l functio n except th e short-ter m on e o f providin g securit y agains t attac k from othe r men . Resolution of Conflicts Caused by Political Rivalry. Conflict s of politica l rivalr y ar e usuall y solve d i n th e followin g way . I f a ma n strongl y aspire s t o th e offic e o f headman , bu t fail s t o be chosen , h e ma y star t t o brea k awa y fro m th e village , alon e or with a group o f followers . But this process o f fission is carefull y restrained i n orde r t o minimiz e th e risk s o f "throwin g awa y face" an d thu s losin g th e possibilit y o f returnin g i f thing s d o not tur n out a s hoped. The spli t work s a s follows . Th e ma n wh o plan s t o foun d a new villag e an d ha s selecte d a suitabl e plac e fo r i t wil l no t abruptly declar e tha t h e i s movin g awa y an d invit e other s t o come wit h him . Instead , h e start s cautiously , buildin g a smal l hut a t th e chose n place , callin g i t " a shelte r tha t i t ha s bee n necessary t o erec t a t th e distan t field. " Graduall y h e move s mos t of th e thing s belongin g t o hi s househol d an d i s seldo m see n i n the ol d village . H e ha s no t ye t mad e a forma l move . I f th e sit e proves good , i t ma y attrac t othe r household s fro m hi s ol d villag e and perhap s fro m othe r villages . Thus , gradually , a ne w villag e community ha s com e int o existence , "an d nobod y know s whe n "According t o lej njej, sexua l intercours e i s incompatibl e wit h lif e i n heaven , "th e clea n land. "

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the y reall y moved. " I f calculation s prov e wrong , the y slowl y move thei r thing s bac k t o th e ol d village . "Thi s the y ca n d o because the y hav e not lost face b y tellin g other s tha t the y wer e going t o move away." Of course , sometime s thing s d o no t wor k s o smoothly . Ope n dispute s ma y occu r i n a village, an d a whol e sectio n ma y leav e together , bu t manifes t conflic t seem s exceptiona l amon g th e I u Mien . The Iu Mien and Inter-Tribal Political Systems. I u Mie n governmenta l structure s have graduall y becom e part s o f th e adminis trative system s o f Thailan d an d Laos . I hav e n o informatio n abou t th e continue d existenc e o f th e traditiona l systems i n Yun nan , bu t i t i s probabl e tha t unde r th e presen t regim e thes e semi feudal politica l structure s buil t aroun d loca l charismati c leader s no longer exist there. The terminolog y give n i n thi s discussio n i s fro m I u Mie n sources an d refers t o principle s o f politica l organizatio n tha t are, or hav e been , practice d b y them . Th e existenc e o f a commo n approac h t o politica l organizatio n amon g th e large r communit y of hil l population s i n thi s are a i s indicate d b y th e existenc e o f inter-triba l politica l structures . However , thi s pape r i s concerne d primaril y wit h th e adaptatio n of on e population , the I u Mien . Whatever similaritie s ma y exis t betwee n th e socio-economic ritua l system s o f th e variou s "tribes, " ther e i s n o commo n ideology o r institutio n for th e enforcemen t of a permanen t supra-triba l politica l organization . Thu s th e alignment s o n thi s leve l ar e unstable an d conditione d b y changin g realitie s o f powe r politic s in which th e main contestant s are individual s o f establishe d repu tation . Thes e realitie s ar e ultimatel y conditione d b y pressure s comin g fro m mor e powerfu l an d expansiv e powe r structure s of th e valley regions . In thi s situatio n individual s ma y gai n powe r an d influenc e by cooperatin g wit h th e externa l powers , wh o nee d agent s fo r the contro l o f th e mountai n regions . Thi s i s th e secre t o f th e career s o f man y I u Mie n politica l leader s wh o starte d as wealth y and respecte d village headme n and graduall y secure d thei r reputation s b y skillfu l mediatio n o f conflict s i n th e mountains . I n some case s the y finally establishe d themselve s a s semi-feuda l prince s ove r hug e collection s o f village s wit h a wid e rang e o f [615 ]

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distinct socio-economic-ritua l system s whic h wer e veritabl e mul tiple societies . Before th e extensio n o f centra l governmenta l administratio n to mountai n regions , governmenta l function s abov e th e villag e level wer e carrie d ou t b y person s wh o hel d offic e a s high-leve l peacemakers an d mediators . I t wa s commo n fo r suc h a politica l system t o b e create d an d maintaine d b y suc h a peacemake r an d to include elements from differen t ethni c groups. The turn tao mien ("bi g headman" ) carrie d ou t hi s function s as mediato r an d peacemake r (hoo si mien) withi n a grou p o f villages (tsaang hang haa laang, "uppe r villages , lowe r villages"). Severa l suc h group s coul d b e combine d int o large r units unde r top-leve l chief s (tsuang tsi, lit . "owne r o f th e whole"). The constituen t villag e (laang) headme n (fiu too mien, "smal l headmen") wer e ofte n chose n an d appointe d b y th e high-leve l headman. The turn too mien wa s assiste d b y th e "helpin g man, " usuall y a brothe r o r so n wh o wa s no t a headma n i n hi s ow n right , bu t who ofte n becam e hi s successor . Th e syste m wa s broke n u p i f some o f th e constituen t village s preferre d anothe r turn tao mien after hi s death . Thus th e combination s o f villages were no t stable , but varie d wit h th e attractio n o f individual s o f greate r o r smalle r reputation an d wit h th e powe r delegate d b y the m b y th e domi nant political powers o f th e valleys. The institutio n o f turn tao mien wa s no t limite d t o th e I u Mie n population. High-leve l I u Mie n headme n hav e bee n recognized , and i n som e case s ar e stil l recognized , b y population s wit h different socio-economic-ritua l systems . Th e terminolog y use d i n such case s i s different , bu t th e leadershi p exercise d b y th e I u Mien headmen i s th e same . Some I u Mie n chief s hav e exercise d authorit y ove r wid e area s and receive d title s indicatin g thei r relation s t o externa l govern mental structures . Ue n Tsoe , a turn tao mien whos e governmen t title wa s Phy a Luang , wa s a notabl e case . Whe n h e die d abou t twenty year s ago , hi s authorit y wa s recognize d b y mor e tha n a hundre d village s associate d wit h seve n differen t socio-economi c systems (I u Mien , Lanten , Akha , Khamu , Meo , Lahu, an d Kato ) located i n th e Mun g Phon-Mun g Man g are a o f Yunna n an d th e [616]

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Mun g Sing-Na m Th a are a o f Laos . H e gaine d hi s positio n o n th e basi s o f hi s persona l qualities , th e prestig e o f hi s ancestor s (several o f who m ha d bee n distinguishe d high-leve l headmen) , an d throug h hi s competenc e a s a skillfu l mediato r wit h th e Frenc h colonia l regime . Tw o o f hi s sons , Tseu I F u (governmen t titl e Chao Mai) an d Tse u I Kie n (governmen t titl e Chao La), are no w importan t high-leve l headme n in norther n Laos, holdin g position s i n th e administratio n o f th e Roya l La o Government . Likewise i n Thailan d I u Mie n me n hav e bee n kamnan (head man ) o f a tambon o r "commune " includin g I u Mie n village s an d Me o village s i n Amphu r Pong , Chiengra i Province . Thi s i s an ol d pattern , a s on e o f th e headme n i s sai d t o hav e hel d th e same position , wit h a governmen t titl e o f Phya, fo r fort y years . I n turn , hi s father , Tan g Tsa n Khuen , is sai d t o hav e bee n a turn too mien i n th e Luan g Praban g regio n o f Lao s fo r abou t fifty years. Th e I u Mie n i n Lao s di d no t alway s belon g t o system s wher e th e high-leve l headma n was I u Mien . Sometime s I u Mie n villages ha d Me o o r Lah u chiefs . Thi s illustrate s th e I u Mie n attitud e with regar d t o politica l power , expresse d i n Ze / fing tradition . Villages o r villag e segment s tha t mov e i n searc h o f bette r soil s or mor e congenia l socia l climate s confor m t o th e prevailin g power structur e of th e are a int o which the y enter . I hav e investigate d th e question s o f qualification s o f high-leve l headme n an d th e processe s b y whic h the y attai n office , relyin g on informatio n fro m I Fu , I Kien , Ue n Lin , an d others . Whe n a ma n i s i n trouble , h e will consul t a ritua l exper t i f th e proble m is believe d t o originat e i n a conflic t i n relation s wit h th e spirits . But i f th e difficultie s ar e cause d b y disturbe d relation s wit h men , a ma n wit h a reputatio n fo r knowledg e an d abilit y wil l b e con sulted . Th e person , o r persons , i n troubl e wil l giv e a su m o f mone y t o th e peacemake r (hoo si mien) an d as k fo r hi s service s as mediator . I f th e mediato r i s successful , mor e peopl e wil l re quest hi s help , an d hi s reputatio n wil l grow . B y travelin g o n business o r pleasur e trip s an d talkin g wit h man y people , by dis playin g hi s intelligenc e an d knowledge , hi s reputatio n will sprea d even more . I n du e time , a s a resul t o f hi s reputation , h e wil l be appointe d headma n b y som e high-leve l chief . Eventually , when hi s reputatio n ha s becom e ver y great , a grou p o f "smal l [617]

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headmen" wil l invit e hi m t o b e thei r turn too mien. Whereve r such a ma n goes , hi s reputatio n wil l preced e him , an d h e wil l always have a position o f authority . Competence i n solvin g inter-persona l conflicts , whic h i s th e starting poin t fo r a politica l career , i s demonstrate d onl y i n par t by actua l deeds . Actua l accomplishment s ar e essential , bu t th e reputation o f a person' s ancestor s i s als o importan t fo r buildin g the confidenc e s o essentia l t o a headman' s career . Descen t doe s not giv e an y particula r righ t t o a n office , bu t i s i s commonl y believed tha t i f th e ancestor s wer e "good " the n thei r descen dants wil l probabl y b e "good " a s well . Th e basi s fo r thi s belie f is th e notio n tha t th e sou l o f th e chil d i s le d t o it s parent s b y the ancesto r spirits . I f th e ancesto r spirit s ar e goo d an d intelligent, the y wil l no t recrui t spirit s o f ba d quality , becaus e if the y do , the y themselve s wil l suffe r a s th e chil d grow s u p to neglect hi s duties t o his ancestors . A man wh o doe s not respec t his obligation s t o th e spirit s i s necessaril y a n unreliabl e man . The right s o f spirit s an d th e right s o f ma n ar e blende d i n th e sense tha t th e mos t imperativ e obligation s betwee n livin g me n have ritua l motivations . A ma n whos e spiri t ha s bee n selecte d by th e spirit s o f person s wh o prove d themselve s reliabl e durin g their lifetim e seem s therefor e a goo d choice . Th e pas t deed s of th e individual reinforce thi s judgment. In thi s contex t th e qualit y o f th e ancestor s i s no t judge d o n the basi s o f thei r presume d statu s i n th e spiri t worl d (achieve d by merit-making ) bu t o n th e basi s o f wha t the y accomplishe d during thei r lif e i n th e worl d o f men . Becaus e th e merit-makin g system i s a standar d ope n t o all , the tru e qualit y o f a man canno t be determine d o n th e basi s o f hi s ancestors ' merit . I t i s thu s not surprisin g tha t descen t line s whos e ancestor s include d man y high-level officeholder s sometime s kee p specia l record s o f th e political position s o f th e ancestors . Suc h record s ar e distinc t fro m the genealogies used i n ritual. In al l maneuverin g fo r position s o f powe r an d influence , wealth, particularl y money , i s essential . Th e offic e o f a high-leve l headman i s n o exception . Hi s positio n is , to a n importan t extent , the combine d resul t o f hi s ow n an d hi s ancestors ' capacit y t o spend. Ther e i s a definit e tendenc y amon g th e Iu Mie n fo r politi cal office s t o b e allocate d t o peopl e o f lineage s whos e member s [ 61 8 ]

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have previousl y hel d simila r offices . I n par t thi s happen s becaus e me n wh o ar e i n offic e ofte n us e thei r son s o r brother s a s assis tants , an d thu s th e latte r ar e i n a goo d positio n t o buil d th e necessar y reputation . Also , th e brothe r o r so n wil l capitaliz e heavily o n th e prestig e o f hi s relative . Amon g th e I u Mien , a s amon g mor e highl y organize d states , th e incumben t administra tion i s usuall y i n a favorabl e positio n a t th e tim e o f succession . Ther e i s als o th e reinforcin g facto r o f accumulate d capita l o f silver o r money , a s wel l a s th e fea r tha t thi s inspires . Thus , i n spite o f th e absenc e o f forma l rule s fo r th e recruitmen t o f high level headmen , th e office s ten d t o b e occupie d b y person s fro m certai n lineage s becaus e o f thei r privilege d positions , accumu late d capital , an d favorable ancestors . Thi s tendenc y i s furthe r reinforce d b y th e rol e o f high-leve l chiefs a s mediator s fo r th e centra l government . Throug h alloca tion o f governmen t title s whic h ar e sometime s hereditary , an d throug h th e additiona l prestig e gaine d b y delegatin g t o relative s th e power s o f comman d o f th e governmen t office , som e line s of descen t attai n position s tha t ar e doubl y supported . The y ar e reinforce d o n th e on e han d throug h factor s whic h ar e effectiv e in th e valu e structur e o f th e hil l societ y (o r societies ) an d o n th e othe r han d throug h th e policie s o f th e politica l structure s of th e valle y societie s whic h ten d t o continue , wit h son s o r brothers , th e form s o f cooperatio n tha t hav e alread y prove d use ful. On e reaso n fo r thi s polic y i s simpl y th e lac k o f alternatives ; ther e i s als o th e fac t tha t son s an d brother s o f a "governmen t man " get introduce d to th e relevan t authorities . Th e monopolizatio n o f th e channel s o f communicatio n wit h th e valle y government s i s furthe r reinforce d b y th e seemingl y commo n attitud e amon g hil l peopl e o f fea r an d frustratio n dic tate d b y thei r ignoranc e o f th e way s o f th e valle y people . Th e hill people , wh o thin k o f themselve s a s simpl e an d honest , thin k of valle y peopl e a s bein g clever . I n suc h situation s a ma n wh o can communicat e wit h th e governmen t agencie s i s relie d upo n heavily. Phy a Luan g Ue n Tso e i s a goo d exampl e o f thi s process . Hi s father , an d man y ancestors , ha d bee n importan t turn tao mien. H e wa s intelligen t an d rich , ha d a "goo d heart, " an d helpe d th e hil l peopl e an d th e Frenc h government . A t tha t tim e th e [ 61 9 ]

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hill peopl e wer e scare d o f governmen t official s an d wer e ofte n in difficultie s whe n the y ha d t o dea l wit h them . Ue n Tso e spok e for th e hil l people , an d h e als o helpe d th e Frenc h defea t th e Akha, who did not obey the government . Relations wit h valle y governmen t authoritie s hav e bee n con tinued b y hi s tw o sons . Thei r titles , Chao Mai an d Chao La, are sai d b y m y informant s t o b e hereditar y an d t o belon g t o the olde r an d younge r so n o f a Phya Luang. Ther e ar e simila r examples i n Thailand . The Compatibility of Various Hill Societies and the Terms "Hill People" and "Valley People" as Meaningful Categories. We shal l no w conside r som e o f th e non-politica l aspect s o f rela tionships amon g th e variou s hil l populations , an d betwee n the m and th e valle y peoples . Durin g m y researc h I hav e hear d state ments concernin g th e relativ e eas e wit h whic h differen t kind s of communitie s ar e able t o co-exis t i n clos e proximity . Th e state ments ofte n refe r t o th e relativ e permissivenes s o f th e variou s social systems . Fo r instance , i t ha s bee n commonl y agree d tha t "the Akh a forbi d much , th e I u Mie n less , an d th e Lah u ver y little." This statemen t wa s mad e i n Ba n Chaguoo , a Re d Lah u villag e in Amphu r Maechan , Chiengra i Province , durin g a discussio n among nin e Re d Lah u men, m y I u Mie n interpreter , an d myself . The startin g poin t o f th e discussio n wa s th e followin g event , told t o m e b y th e headman , Chaguoo , i n th e cours e o f hi s lif e story. In Hue j Mukhan g I becam e headma n an d staye d te n years . I wa s nominated whe n ther e wer e twenty-fou r house s i n th e village . Befor e that ther e wa s no headman . I first lived ther e alone with my household for on e year . The n m y relative s arrived , an d thereafter , th e others . In th e en d tw o Akh a village s (Ba n Adj u an d Ba n Sae n Chaj ) cam e and settle d dow n quit e near . Fo r tw o year s the y live d clos e together , but i t becam e ver y difficul t i n th e lon g ru n becaus e th e Akh a forbi d all kind s o f things . Th e custom s d o no t fit together . An d als o ther e were no t enoug h fields. Therefor e th e whol e villag e move d t o Hue j Chaj . . . .

Similar statement s hav e bee n mad e b y severa l I u Mie n an d Akha informants , an d a simila r orde r o f cultura l incompatibilit y is suggeste d b y othe r researc h worker s (e.g . Bennington-Cornel l [ 62 0 ]

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Survey 1964 ; Ministr y o f Interio r 1962) . I t i s a n importan t subject fo r systemati c researc h t o investigat e th e interna l consistenc y of th e variou s tradition s o f wha t migh t b e calle d "th e greate r hill society, " an d t o se e whethe r ther e i s a commo n attitud e amon g th e hil l population s towar d th e valle y populations . Fo r example , th e genera l categorie s "hil l people " (jam bung mien) an d "plain s people " (jam peeng mien o r jam mung mien) occu r i n the I u Mie n creatio n myth. . . . The n th e ma n cu t th e frui t int o smal l piece s a s h e ha d bee n told. Bu t h e go t mixe d up , an d threw th e seed s o n th e plain , an d th e piece s o f th e fruit o n th e mountains . Therefore , ther e ar e man y peopl e o n th e plain , an d very fe w i n th e mountain s . . . . But , as th e sayin g goes , "th e hil l peopl e ar e better " [referrin g t o the m a s the mea t o f th e fruit] . On e commo n distinctio n between mountai n and valley i s base d on literacy . Books , i n thi s context , ar e symbol s o f prestig e an d power . M y Akh a an d Re d Lah u informant s say tha t both of thes e group s use d t o hav e books . Book s mad e o f ric e wer e give n t o th e Lah u b y th e creator-god , bu t th e peopl e at e the m becaus e the y wer e to o heav y t o carr y around . Th e Akh a sa y tha t th e dogs at e thei r books . Amon g th e Akh a o f th e Maecha n are a i t seems tha t literac y i s associate d wit h idea s o f economi c an d po litica l domination , a s indicate d i n th e followin g paragraph . About te n year s ag o th e well-know n Akh a chief , Sae n Chaj , ha d a reputatio n a s a "stron g man. " Fo r variou s reason s man y Akha, Lahu , an d I u Mie n villages sough t hi s protection . Muc h to thei r surprise , h e di d no t wan t t o b e connecte d with an y o f th e I u Mien . H e i s sai d to hav e remarked : " I don' t wan t t o have th e Yao . The y hav e books , an d soone r o r later , the y wil l give trouble . You canno t contro l them. " Th e progressive-minde d I u Mie n ar e wel l aware , an d proud , of th e fac t tha t the y diffe r fro m th e othe r hil l peopl e (excep t thei r "younge r brothers, " th e Lanten ) becaus e the y hav e books . But the y stil l conside r themselve s inferio r t o th e lowlander s an d to som e othe r hil l peoples , fo r exampl e th e Me o i n Laos . "Th e Yao hav e thei r ow n books , bu t fe w rea d them . Th e Me o in Lao s have n o book s o f thei r own , bu t stil l the y sen d thei r childre n to school s wher e the y lear n t o rea d an d writ e an d spea k a n im portan t foreig n language. " [ 62 1 ]

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A COMPARISO N O F I U MIE N AN D LAME T

One o f th e basi c assumption s whic h th e I u Mie n hol d abou t social relationship s i s th e notio n o f reciproca l right s an d obliga tions, create d o n a contractua l basis . Th e ide a o f th e I u Mie n community, a s a unite d whole , i s phrase d i n term s o f commo n obligations contracte d b y commo n ancestor s t o on e o f th e cre ator-gods, Pie n Hung . Th e ide a o f correc t fulfillmen t o f mutua l obligations permeate s I u Mie n socia l relations an d ha s it s ritua l counterpart i n the regular feeding o f ancestor spirits. The ide a o f th e spiri t governmen t i s associate d wit h th e ide a of a n objectiv e meri t syste m fo r advancemen t i n th e spiri t leve l of existence . Position s i n th e hierarch y ar e reache d throug h merit-making ceremonie s fo r individuals , carrie d ou t unde r strictly controlle d circumstances . Given th e historica l backgroun d o f th e I u Mien , ther e i s littl e doubt tha t th e ide a o f a centra l governmen t o f th e spiri t world , which offer s complet e security , i s th e projectio n o f a n idealize d view o f th e traditiona l imperia l administratio n o f Chin a (cf , for example , th e descriptio n o f Yan g 1961) . Eve n th e painte d images o f th e eightee n grea t spirit s depic t thes e dignitarie s i n traditional Chines e dress . Because o f th e lac k o f relevan t documentation , i t i s not possi ble t o stat e th e histor y o f lej njej an d lej fing traditions . Bu t if w e conside r th e preoccupatio n o f th e I u Mie n wit h th e indi vidual accumulatio n o f wealth , an d particularl y th e importanc e placed b y lej njej o n money , i t i s obviou s tha t th e I u Mie n s ecological positio n make s th e achievemen t o f th e necessar y sur plus a matter o f strenuou s effort s b y a well-disciplined productio n team. Persona l initiativ e an d mobilit y ar e o f utmos t importanc e in thi s context . Ofte n thi s mean s tha t individua l households , o r small aggregate s o f households , ente r int o th e sphere s o f variou s previously establishe d powe r structures , an d the y mus t eithe r adapt themselve s t o th e demand s o f thes e powe r structure s o r leave. The stres s o n individua l accumulatio n o f wealt h i s clearl y an obstacl e to th e formatio n o f large r an d mor e politicall y poten t production units . Th e frequentl y expresse d desir e t o "mak e i t [ 62 2 ]

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big, t o b e strong " i s usuall y frustrate d b y th e difficult y a leade r ha s i n imposin g disciplin e an d keepin g a large slic e o f th e profit s in a situatio n wher e everyon e want s t o hav e a s muc h a s possibl e for himself . As soo n a s a n individua l think s h e ca n enric h himsel f faster o n hi s own , h e wil l eithe r tr y t o impos e himsel f a s th e leade r (i n orde r t o ge t contro l of th e purse-strings) , o r h e wil l qui t th e household . Hi s ritua l obligation s t o hi s parent s d o no t necessaril y oblig e hi m to stay i n thei r house . I n thi s kin d o f a social settin g th e rationa l approach , expresse d in th e lej fing tradition , seem s t o b e th e on e use d i n mos t situa tion s affecte d b y powe r relationships . Th e Lamet , describe d b y K . G . Izikowit z (1951:85-142 , 294-355) , hav e a n ecolog y an d socia l syste m simila r t o thos e of th e I u Mie n i n man y ways . On e strikin g similarit y i s foun d in th e rol e o f certai n categorie s o f wealt h a s a dominan t goa l for individuals—an d th e associatio n o f thes e form s o f wealt h with position s o f powe r an d influenc e i n th e community . Wit h th e I u Mie n th e goa l i s silver ; wit h th e Lame t i t i s buffaloe s an d bronz e drums . I n both societie s th e househol d is instrumenta l in achievin g th e necessar y surplus , an d i n bot h case s individual s mus t b e highl y mobil e i n searc h o f profitabl e opportunitie s fo r th e acquisitio n o f wealth . Th e I u Mie n engage i n extensiv e trade , an d th e Lame t (a s describe d befor e Worl d Wa r I I ) ear n salarie s by workin g i n distan t place s lik e th e Siames e tea k forests . I n bot h system s powe r an d influenc e ar e i n th e hand s o f th e rich . However , thes e peopl e d o no t constitut e a distinc t clas s in th e societ y amon g th e I u Mie n a s the y d o amon g th e Lamet , where the y ar e rituall y initiate d int o a clas s calle d lem. I n bot h societie s th e preferre d for m o f wealt h ha s ritua l functions . Ther e ar e als o importan t differences : th e preferre d for m o f wealth o f th e Lame t ha s les s universa l applicatio n a s a mediu m of exchang e i n relationship s betwee n me n tha n doe s th e preferre d for m o f wealt h amon g th e I u Mien . I t i s no t quit e clear fro m Izikowitz ' descriptio n whethe r th e preferre d wealt h of th e Lame t i s explicitl y though t o f a s a mediu m o f exchang e with th e spirit s o r whethe r it s efficienc y lie s i n th e fac t tha t th e spirit s lik e them . I t i s rathe r eviden t tha t som e sor t o f ex chang e i s involve d wit h regar d t o buffaloes , bu t ther e is n o clea r explanatio n o f th e rol e o f th e bronz e drums . Th e circumstance s

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in whic h th e drum s ar e use d suggest s tha t the y ar e employe d as instrument s fo r th e propitiatio n o f spirit s i n th e sam e wa y as th e I u Mie n us e music , dancing , an d recital . Amon g th e I u Mien th e spirits , particularl y th e eightee n member s o f th e spiri t government, ar e supposed t o like silver . Izikowitz stresse s tha t th e lent hav e n o forma l prerogative s in dail y life—the y ar e jus t generall y respected , an d thei r influ ence i s base d o n respect . Thu s thei r situatio n i s simila r t o tha t of th e ric h me n amon g th e I u Mie n wh o ar e feare d an d als o respected becaus e the y hav e silver . Th e I u Mie n spirit s lik e silver, an d therefor e silve r i s associate d wit h th e ide a o f virtu e or cleanliness . "Silve r make s thing s clean, " the y say , an d the y pay fines wit h silve r "t o was h th e fac e o f someone. " Becaus e silver give s capacit y t o act , ric h me n ar e feared , an d thi s give s them a position of power and importance. The importan t thin g abou t th e I u Mie n for m o f preferre d wealth i s tha t i t give s the m possibilitie s o f operatin g i n othe r social contexts : silve r i s use d an d accepte d b y everyone . Th e preferred wealt h o f th e Lame t ha s a mor e limite d fiel d o f application. There i s a n importan t differenc e betwee n I u Mie n an d Lame t world views . Th e mos t importan t spirit s o f th e Lame t ar e thei r ancestor spirits , whil e th e governor s o f th e I u Mie n spiri t worl d are th e non-ancestra l dignitarie s o f th e spiri t government . Th e merit-making ceremonie s o f th e Lame t ar e directe d towar d thei r ancestor spirits , whil e amon g th e I u Mie n the y ar e oriente d to ward th e spiri t government . Amon g th e I u Mie n th e feedin g of th e ancesto r spirit s i s a ver y importan t ritual , bu t i t i s don e to fulfil l a n obligation , whil e th e merit-makin g ceremonie s ar e held t o insur e certai n right s fo r th e individua l i n hi s futur e life . According t o th e I u Mien , th e ancesto r spirit s ar e no t stron g enough t o provid e securit y i n th e spiri t world , wher e ultimat e power is in the hands of th e spirit government . Perhaps befor e th e Chines e conques t th e I u Mie n ha d a socio economic-ritual syste m simila r t o tha t o f th e Lamet . Becaus e of th e prestig e o f Chines e politica l powe r an d culture , silve r was substitute d fo r buffaloes , bronz e drums , o r simila r object s vested wit h symboli c value . A t th e sam e time , th e merit-makin g ceremonies wer e re-directe d fro m th e relativel y impoten t ances [ 62 4 ]

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tor s t o a governmen t o f th e spiri t worl d whic h ha d brough t th e ancesto r spirit s unde r contro l i n th e sam e wa y a s th e Chines e imperia l governmen t ha d brough t th e livin g generation s o f I u Mie n unde r control . Althoug h thi s i s a purel y theoretica l reconstruction , i t seem s plausible enoug h t o for m a basi s fo r researc h i n th e historica l sources . I n an y case , i t woul d b e difficul t t o explai n ho w th e Chines e scrip t an d ritua l languag e woul d hav e becom e a n ele men t o f th e lej njej traditio n withou t assumin g a perio d o f stric t Chines e politica l contro l an d clos e contac t with Chines e culture . Chines e influenc e o n th e I u Mie n socio-economic-ritua l syste m ha s bee n o f grea t importance . Bu t thi s doe s no t mea n tha t th e I u Mie n are Chines e o r tha t the y hav e an y particula r attachmen t to moder n Chines e culture. 19 Archai c literar y Chinese , mixe d with Ya o i n ritual , an d th e writin g syste m belon g t o th e lej njej traditio n an d ar e considere d t o b e centra l t o th e I u Mie n socia l scheme . Bu t thi s situatio n i s roughl y comparabl e t o th e us e o f Churc h Lati n o r Pal i in th e moder n world. Spoke n Chines e (Yun nanese ) i s stil l widel y use d a s a trad e language , bu t i s maintaine d onl y fo r commercia l reasons . Th e mos t significan t contribution s from Chines e traditiona l cultur e see m t o b e th e ide a o f a centra l governmen t o f th e spiri t worl d an d th e mone y economy . DEVELOPMEN T PROJECT S AN D SOCIA L SCIENC E RESEARC H

Th e practica l us e o f informatio n furnishe d b y sociologica l re search require s tha t i t refe r t o reality , an d no t just t o a construc tion tha t ma y b e o f interes t fo r pur e researc h bu t useles s a s a workin g too l fo r th e formulatio n o f concret e administrativ e policies. Ther e i s als o th e questio n o f th e relevanc e o f th e infor matio n t o th e problem s tha t th e developmen t agencie s ar e work ing wit h a t a give n moment . Som e problem s coul d b e overcom e if th e researc h worker s wer e informe d abou t curren t develop men t policie s an d i f th e technica l languag e use d i n researc h re port s wer e translate d int o terminolog y mor e familia r t o non-spe cialists. Th e par t tha t get s los t i n translatio n (i f th e translatio n "Ther e i s littl e hop e o f rediscoverin g ancien t Chines e socia l pattern s i n th e contemporar y I u Mie n system . Th e ecologica l condition s o f I u Mie n lif e impos e definit e limitation s o n th e possibilit y o f conformin g t o "traditional " Chines e practices .

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is don e competently ) wil l no t b e importan t compare d wit h wha t is gaine d i n increase d efficienc y o f planning . Nonetheless , variou s difficulties see m t o b e almos t endemi c i n th e relationship s be tween socia l scienc e researc h an d program s directe d towar d th e rapid solutio n o f concret e problems . Relevance of Social-Anthropological Research to Directed Social Change. Th e motivatio n fo r far-reachin g interventio n i n th e so cial, economic , an d cultura l lif e o f variou s minoritie s come s bot h from a nee d to promot e nationa l securit y an d fro m a concer n for refor m an d improvemen t o f livin g conditions . I n som e case s these intervention s hav e produce d disastrou s result s an d hav e created mor e problem s tha n the y wer e mean t t o solve . Perhaps mor e efficien t approache s coul d hav e bee n foun d i f the policie s wer e based o n relevan t informatio n abou t th e social , economic, an d cultura l realitie s o f th e situation . Bu t th e usua l anthropological monograph s an d doctora l dissertation s ar e no t much hel p i n constructin g policies . Ho w ca n thes e fault s b e remedied? It seems reasonabl e t o assum e tha t thos e wh o make integratio n policies ar e intereste d i n attainin g thei r goal s wit h minimu m time, effort , an d expense . I t als o seem s reasonabl e tha t the y would tr y t o use t o thei r ow n advantag e th e condition s prevailing in th e minorit y groups . I f the y ar e no t intereste d i n smashin g doors tha t ar e alread y ope n (althoug h thi s sometime s happens) , then the y shoul d b e intereste d i n th e adaptiv e mechanism s o f the community whic h the y wish to integrate. Crash program s ar e rarel y successful . The y usuall y see m t o result fro m thre e factors : urgen t need , lac k o f time , an d deficien t information, whic h exclude s th e possibilit y o f a mor e differen tiated an d les s destructiv e approach . Eve n i f th e ultimat e goa l is a sociall y an d culturall y homogeneou s societ y rathe r tha n a multiple societ y (thoug h thi s goa l i n itsel f ma y b e unrealistic) , the policy-maker s canno t b e expecte d t o welcom e a n elemen t of th e populatio n consistin g o f sociall y badl y adapte d person s who may become a serious burden . The notion o f balanced growt h whic h is , to some extent, alway s present i n plannin g fo r economi c development , i s certainl y rele vant i n th e contex t o f nation-building. I t i s just here that intimat e knowledge o f th e adaptiv e mechanism s o f th e variou s socio-eco [ 62 6 ]

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nomic-ritua l system s whic h ar e t o b e combine d t o for m a n inte grate d whol e i s o f greates t importance . Unfortunately , a s Fredri k Bart h ha s recentl y pointe d out , th e problem s o f adaptatio n hav e bee n treate d rathe r one-sidedl y i n th e anthropologica l literature . To o frequentl y thes e thing s hav e been forgotten : "Firstly , tha t a n adaptatio n involve s peopl e no t onl y i n a relationshi p wit h th e natura l environment , bu t als o in relation s o f competition , cooperation , an d symbiosi s wit h eac h othe r whic h ma y profoundl y influenc e th e structur e an d distribu tion o f groups . Secondly , tha t i n huma n adaptatio n cultura l fac tor s suc h a s system s o f politic s an d property , an d demographi c factors , ar e a s vitall y involve d a s ar e th e mor e commonl y consid ered technologica l factors " (Bart h 1964:15-22) . Th e problem s discusse d i n th e presen t volum e ar e mainl y problem s o f mutua l adaptatio n o f differen t social , economic , and ritua l systems . O n th e basi s o f dat a tha t ar e no w availabl e con cernin g th e othe r socia l system s o f th e region wher e I a m carry ing ou t research , th e I u Mie n see m quit e exceptiona l fo r then differentiate d an d explicitl y formulate d approac h t o variou s cate gories o f problem s o f adaptation . However , I doub t tha t ther e is reall y a basi c contrast . I t ma y wel l b e tha t w e ar e simpl y shor t o f relevan t information , fo r reason s indicate d b y Barth . Amon g th e I u Mien , I hav e investigate d th e rang e an d charac ter o f adaptiv e technique s b y systemati c questioning . I woul d have remaine d relativel y ignoran t o f th e existenc e o f thes e the ories o f actio n ha d I relie d onl y o n th e technique s o f participan t observatio n an d th e recollection s o f informant s concernin g pas t events. Perhap s it i s no t surprisin g tha t onc e I ha d bee n informe d abou t th e adaptiv e technique s o f th e I u Mien , I quickl y discov ered a simila r differentiate d approac h (thoug h no t s o systemati cally verbalized ) amon g th e populatio n associate d wit h th e Akh a socio-economic-ritua l system . Th e Akh a hav e a bod y o f forma l rules , analogou s t o th e lej njej o f th e I u Mien , pertainin g t o genera l ritua l activity , calle d tie tu thuu ("feedin g th e spirits") . Thes e rule s ar e considere d invariable , an d th e socia l organizatio n owe s it s stabilit y t o thei r enforcement . Whil e th e I u Mie n hav e a verball y articulate d tra ditio n o f adaptiv e technique s to be use d i n relation s with politica l powers (lej fing), suc h a verba l traditio n seem s t o b e absen t

[ 62 7 ]

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among th e Akha . However , i n thei r villag e communitie s the y have a politica l institution , a n offic e charge d wit h externa l politi cal relations , calle d nangee. I hav e bee n tol d tha t thi s institutio n can b e foun d i n ever y Akh a village . There i s in additio n anothe r functionary calle d djuma?, wh o i s th e founder , o r clos e patri lineal relativ e o f th e founder , o f th e village . H e i s th e leade r of th e rituall y determine d villag e activitie s involvin g economi c cooperation. Beside s thes e tw o office s ther e ar e th e separat e func tions o f ritua l exper t an d smith . A U four o f thes e functions ma y be carrie d ou t by th e sam e person, bu t th e method o f recruitmen t is different fo r eac h office . Knowledge o f th e existenc e o f thes e office s wil l undoubtedl y help thos e wh o nee d t o approac h Akh a communitie s i n orde r to secur e economi c o r politica l cooperation . Cooperatio n shoul d be sough t fro m all ke y persons , no t onl y fro m th e nangee. H e is th e officia l contac t ma n wit h regar d t o outsiders , bu t i n thi s capacity h e i s no t i n a positio n t o impos e hi s persona l polic y on th e populatio n o f th e villag e excep t b y method s o f force . Unfortunately, confuse d idea s abou t th e leadershi p pattern s i n Akha communitie s hav e le d t o th e failur e o f man y actio n pro grams an d hav e resulte d i n som e unnecessar y frustration s an d bad feelings . But th e leadershi p patter n onl y make s sens e i f i t i s see n a s the applicatio n o f a theor y o f actio n o r adaptation . Therefor e it seems to me tha t th e principle s of plannin g for th e future , upon whic h th e variou s group s bas e thei r activities , ar e prope r subjects fo r stud y an d hav e practica l valu e i n socia l scienc e re search for directe d socia l change . Anthropologists sometime s ten d t o loo k a t th e communitie s they stud y a s i f the y wer e close d systems , an d therefor e the y rely to o muc h o n th e techniqu e o f participan t observation . I f applied to o one-sidedly , thi s techniqu e i s boun d t o b e self-de feating becaus e th e processe s o f rapi d chang e hav e alread y started t o mak e a n impac t o n people' s knowledg e concernin g the tota l environment . Thes e processe s o f chang e hav e altere d the previousl y stabl e base s o n whic h member s o f communitie s used t o b e abl e t o pla n thei r live s an d activitie s i n consisten t patterns. Unde r thes e change d condition s i t woul d see m mor e realistic t o inquir e int o ambition s an d plan s fo r futur e activitie s [ 62 8 ]

I U MIE N ( Υ Α θ ) AN

D THEI B NEIGHBOR

S

rathe r tha n t o rel y o n a one - or two-yea r perio d o f jus t observin g what th e peopl e do . Becaus e o f th e rapi d developmen t o f com munication s whic h fee d i n ne w information , traditiona l frame works als o sometime s appea r mor e clearly i n th e conflict s create d in th e thinkin g an d plannin g o f th e individua l tha n the y woul d appea r i n externall y observabl e actions . I t seem s commonl y agree d tha t on e o f th e mai n object s o f social scienc e i s t o produc e predictiv e model s o f socia l systems . I n orde r t o d o this , th e researc h worke r mus t pa y particula r atten tion t o th e view s tha t th e member s o f th e communit y unde r stud y hav e o f th e future . Th e accurac y o f thes e expectation s shoul d b e compare d wit h th e better-informe d guesse s o f th e ob server abou t change s whic h ca n b e expecte d i n th e tota l environ ment . Thi s ha s no t bee n th e orthodo x approac h i n socia l o r cul tura l anthropology , althoug h i t i s mor e commo n i n economic s an d sociology . I t ca n b e hope d tha t th e integratio n o f th e socia l science s wil l occu r faste r tha n th e growt h o f th e problem s o f integratio n o f minorit y groups . A Short Iu Mien Social Grammar for Practical Use. A s I pointe d ou t i n th e beginnin g o f thi s paper , I hav e no t propose d concret e actio n programs . Bu t I ca n offe r a fe w genera l "rule s of thumb " tha t migh t b e usefu l fo r thos e wh o pla n o r carr y ou t actio n program s amon g th e Iu Mie n or "Yao." 1. Change s tha t increas e money-makin g capacit y ar e welcomed . 2. Change s tha t decreas e money-makin g capacit y ar e strongl y resisted becaus e th e I u Mie n measur e th e individual' s chance s to surviv e an d succee d i n term s o f hi s money-makin g ability . Thi s concep t belong s t o thei r religiou s tradition , lej njej. 3. Chang e i n religiou s practice s prescribe d b y th e Ie] njej tradi tion wil l affec t th e socia l organizatio n an d th e motivation s tha t have mad e th e I u Mie n i n thei r presen t environmen t a disciplined , hardworkin g people , mainl y intereste d i n th e peace ful accumulatio n o f wealth , particularl y i n th e form o f money . 4. Politica l governmen t i s a matte r o f practica l adaptatio n o f th e basi c productiv e an d ritua l unit , th e household , t o th e de mand s o f externa l politica l powers . I n th e presen t situation , thi s mean s adaptatio n t o centra l governmen t agencies . Th e wor d lef mean s "custom " o r "tradition, " an d th e ter m fing i s use d b y [ 62 9 ]

THAILAND : PETE R KANDB E

the I u Mie n t o indicat e tha t the y consciousl y an d systematicall y seek good relationships wit h governments . 5. I n al l inter-persona l an d inter-grou p relations , th e I u Mie n consciously an d systematicall y tr y t o avoi d involvemen t i n ope n conflicts. I f the y d o ge t involve d i n conflct , i t mean s tha t th e matter i s o f vita l interes t t o them . The y attac h extrem e impor tance t o th e correc t fulfillmen t o f mutua l right s an d obligations . 6. Productio n technique s ar e governe d onl y b y consideration s of efficiency . Thu s th e I u Mie n can b e expecte d t o b e intereste d in al l technica l innovation s tha t promis e t o increas e thei r produc tion an d thereb y thei r income . 7. Th e locatio n o f settlement s i n th e hill s i s governe d b y stric t religious rules . N o othe r settlement s shoul d b e establishe d o n the sam e mountai n slop e abov e a n I u Mie n settlemen t withou t careful consultatio n wit h th e I u Mie n villagers , especiall y thei r religious experts . Th e rule s governin g th e locatio n o f settlement s do no t prescrib e tha t th e I u Mie n mus t necessaril y liv e i n th e mountains. Whe n the y mov e dow n o n th e plains , th e geomanti c rules n o longe r appl y becaus e ther e ar e n o mountains . Th e rule s are no t replace d wit h othe r ritua l regulation s concernin g th e location of settlements on the plains. 8. Whil e Christianit y i s incompatibl e wit h th e I u Mie n religi ous tradition , i n th e sens e tha t a person canno t subscrib e t o bot h these religion s a t th e sam e time , ther e i s n o suc h opposition , at present , betwee n I u Mie n religiou s belief s an d th e teaching s of Gautam a Buddha . Suggestions for Improving the Yield of Field-Work Projects. It ma y b e eviden t fro m wha t I hav e alread y sai d tha t I d o no t consider th e surve y metho d a s a ver y usefu l devic e t o advanc e our knowledg e o f th e adaptiv e technique s o f variou s populations . Neither d o I believ e tha t th e tim e i s rip e t o organiz e social-an thropological field wor k o n a tea m basis , though th e ide a o f larg e laboratory-like setting s fo r socia l scienc e i s ver y attractiv e t o me. Unfortunately , a t presen t mos t researc h worker s see m t o guard thei r ow n smal l fields o f stud y jealously , an d i t i s no t easy t o se e ho w thi s situatio n coul d b e change d rapidly . The basi c problem is , of course , that everyon e wants t o develo p his ow n dat a an d th e implication s o f thes e dat a t o th e fulles t extent possible . Whil e nobod y i s unhapp y t o ge t informatio n which help s the m alon g i n thei r ow n research , fe w ar e read y [ 63 0 ]

I U MIE N ( Υ Α θ ) AN

D THEI H NEIGHBOR

S

to furnis h other s wit h unpublishe d dat a o r ideas . Thi s mean s tha t th e exchang e o f reall y stimulatin g idea s i s indee d a slo w process . Whateve r ma y b e th e tru e interest s o f science , thes e are th e rule s o f th e merit-makin g syste m i n th e worl d o f th e anthropologists , an d the y mus t b e reckone d wit h whe n plannin g reform o f th e workin g condition s o f th e researc h workers . Unde r th e circumstances , th e mos t efficien t researc h organiza tion fo r anthropolog y stil l seem s t o be th e individua l field worke r with hi s nativ e tutors . However , hi s efficienc y woul d b e improve d if h e ha d th e opportunit y fo r rapi d publicatio n an d thu s coul d establish a clai m o n hi s findings. A s i t i s now , i t ma y b e year s before th e informatio n i s published : th e advanc e o f th e scienc e is retarded , an d th e practica l usefulnes s o f researc h i s diminished . If a researc h worke r b y hi s ow n choic e wait s fo r year s befor e publishin g th e result s o f field work , the n th e expense s o f hi s activitie s ma y no t be justified . Bu t I believ e i f facilitie s fo r publi catio n (includin g adequat e researc h libraries ) wer e availabl e i n th e countrie s wher e muc h researc h i s done , the n th e rati o o f th e inpu t o f tim e an d mone y fo r field project s t o th e outpu t of valuabl e dat a woul d b e mor e reasonable . Becaus e I a m workin g i n Thailan d an d particularl y concerne d with problem s o f researc h there , I woul d sugges t tha t hig h pri orit y b e give n t o th e establishmen t o f a reasonabl y complet e researc h librar y a t th e Hil l Trib e Researc h Centr e in Chiengmai . Thi s librar y shoul d includ e first o f al l th e mos t importan t periodi cals o f socia l science , particularl y thos e oriente d towar d th e inte gratio n o f variou s branche s o f th e socia l sciences , a s wel l a s th e classics o f socia l anthropology . Th e informatio n service s o f vari ous countries , th e Unite d Nation s agencie s lik e UNESC O an d ECAFE , shoul d b e intereste d i n extendin g thei r activitie s i n thi s direction . I t no w seem s commonl y agree d tha t socia l scienc e researc h can giv e valuabl e assistanc e t o th e developin g countries . I f thi s is so , th e researc h worker s shoul d b e give n th e practica l facilitie s to formulat e an d disseminat e thei r findings. APPENDI X O N TH E MOBILIT Y O F I N D I V I D U A L S AN D S E T T L E M E N T S Thre e kind s o f dat a ar e illustrate d her e i n orde r t o sho w th e exten t o f geographica l an d genealogica l knowledg e o f th e I u [63 1 ]

THAILAND : PETE R KANDB E

Mien an d th e degre e t o whic h thei r connection s wit h other area s remain importan t t o them . 1. Genealogy from Ban Lao T siiKhuen (Phalae), Maechan, Thailand. Th e followin g patrilinea l genealog y give s th e spiri t names o f th e ancestors , thei r title s (achieve d i n feast s o f merit) , and locatio n o f buria l place . Th e genealog y indicate s th e move ment o f thi s lineag e fro m Kwangtun g (southeaster n China ) t o Northeastern Thailand . Th e first nam e i n eac h grou p i s the spiri t name o f a mal e ancestor ; th e name(s ) o f wif e (wives ) follow . The first nam e give s th e fing (clan ) o f th e ancestor , hel d o n the individual' s behal f wit h respec t t o th e spiri t government . Thus ancesto r No . 1 (th e oldest ) belong s t o th e Tan g fing, an d TABLE 2 2 THE GENEALOG Y O F TAN G F U HI N Gener- Nam ation Name

e (Clan , Spiri t , Meri t Title )

1. Tang Tsen g Je t Loon g Pung Si i Je t Njaan g 2. Tang Tsi n Je t Loon g Tseu Si i Nje j Njaan g 3. Tang Tso e Je t Loon g Tseu Si i Je t Njaan g Tang Si i Fa m Njaan g 4. Tang Lian g Fe j Loon g Tang Si i Je t Njaan g 5. Tang Sen g Je t Loon g Tang Si i Fe j Njaan g 6. Tang Hjaan g Nje j Loon g Tseu Si i Fa m Njaan g 7. Tang Men g Fe j Loon g Pung S i Nje j Njaan g 8. Tang Kie m Fe j Loon g Tang Si i Nje j Njaan g Lej Si i Nje j Njaan g 9. Tang F a Lie m Tseu Si i Tsi e Jang Si i Tsi e 10. Tang F a Ton g Tang Si i Tsi e 11. Tang F a Tsin g Wife (stil l alive ) 12. Tang F u Hi n

[ 63 2 ]

Location o f Ancestor' s Grav e China: Kwangtun g k

Location (i n Orde r of Siz e o f Population )

5,486 5,259 (904)

[not available ] North Vietna m

[not available ] Mon-Khmer: PKatuic {continued)

[ 69 3 ]

P E T E B KUNSTADTE H

TABLE 2 4 {continued) Est. Popula Group tion i n Nort h (Synonyms Vietnam1· in Parentheses ) Laqua k

(200)

Rue (Roc)*· *

(189)

Kelao*

[not available ]

Lati'

(a small group )

Nungs·1·1

(a large group )

Sachs·"

[not available ]

Total (196 0 census)

Location (i n Orde r of Siz e o f Population ) North Vietnam , Yunnan North Vietna m

Language Kadai: Mon-Khmer: ?Katuic Kadai:

Kweichow, Hunan , Yunnan, Kwangsi , North Vietna m North Vietnam , Kadai: Yunnan Southern China , Chinese: Nun g North Vietnam , dialect South Vietna m Mon-Khmer: ?N . North Vietna m Laos

15,916,955"

* Sources: Population figures primaril y from UNESC O (1964:315 , Table 9 ) citing Nhan Dan {The People), Novembe r 2 , 1960 , Nort h Vietnam , quotin g 1960 censu s figures. Informatio n o n distributio n fro m LeBa r et al. (1964 ) an d other source s as noted . Populatio n figures i n parenthese s ar e fro m LeBa r et al. (1964) an d ar e no t include d i n th e 196 0 censu s total . Fo r informatio n o n methods o f linguisti c classificatio n se e note s accompanyin g th e tabl e o f popu lation an d linguisti c affiliatio n fo r Burm a i n th e presen t volume . b Group s whos e population s ar e unknow n ar e liste d alphabetically . 0 According t o Gedne y (1965) , i n Nort h Vietnam , "th e ter m Th o . . . is applied to man y dialect s of th e Ta i group, and ther e i t is said to be a Vietna mese term . . . . Som e o f th e dialect s o n th e Kwangs i sid e o f th e borde r that I studie d ar e [also ] calle d Th o b y thei r speakers. " I n som e place s th e term Th o is considered t o b e derogatory, s o the Nort h Vietnames e have begu n using th e ter m " T a y " i n officia l reference s t o thes e people . Thoma s (1965 ) adds tha t ther e i s muc h confusio n i n classificatio n betwee n Th o an d Nung , some dialect s o f whic h ar e apparentl y mutuall y intelligible . d Th e Ta i populatio n probabl y include s mos t o r al l o f th e followin g popu lations liste d separatel y b y LeBa r et al. (1964) : L U (1,000+) , Neu a (?) , Pa-y (533) , Blac k Ta i (344,191) , Phuta i (?) , T'o u La o (528) , Trung-ch a (180), Re d Ta i (?) , Whit e Ta i (?) . • There i s als o a Chinese-speakin g grou p know n a s Nun g (se e n. k below) . ' T h e Ho a ar e groupe d b y LeBa r et al. (1964:72 ) wit h th e Meo , bu t ar e considered b y Skinne r (1965 ) an d Thoma s (1965 ) t o b e ethni c Chinese . Skin ner's estimat e fo r 196 5 populatio n o f ethni c Chines e i n Nort h Vietna m i s 190,000. {continued)

[ 69 4 ]

VIETNAM : INTRODUCTIO

N

TABLE 2 4 (continued) * This grou p i s no t liste d b y LeBa r et al. (1964) . Th e Ca o La n ar e groupe d b y LeBa r et al. (1964:88 ) wit h th e Indochin a Man (Yao) , bu t the y cit e Arutiuno v an d Mukhlino v (1961) , wh o conside r the Ca o La n t o b e a separat e Tai-speakin g group . Populatio n figure i s fro m UNESCO (1964) . 1 The X a ar e groupe d wit h th e Indochin a LoIo , b y LeBa r et al. (1964:26) , but the y ar e liste d a s a separat e grou p b y UNESC O (1964) . ' Identificatio n an d linguisti c classificatio n fro m Thoma s (1965) . k Thi s grou p i s no t liste d i n UNESC O (1964) . 1 Thomas (1965 ) state s tha t ther e i s a Chinese-speakin g grou p know n a s Nung i n Nort h Vietnam . A larg e numbe r o f refugee s fro m thi s grou p hav e gone t o Sout h Vietnam . m Censu s tota l include s 36,72 8 "other " triba l people . h

REFERENCE S CITE

D

ARUTIUNOV, S . A . an d A . I . MUKHLINO V

1961 Material y po etno-lingvisticheskoi klassifikatsii narodo v Vetnam a [Materials fo r th e ethnolinguisti c classificatio n o f th e people s o f Vietnam]. Sovetskai a Etnografii a 1:72-82 . GEDNEY, W I L L I A M J .

1965 Persona l communication . LEBAR, FRAN K M. , GERAL D C . HICKEY , an d JOH N K . MUSGRAV E

1964 Ethni c group s o f mainlan d Southeas t Asia . Ne w Haven , Huma n Relations Are a File s Press . OVERSEAS CHINES E YEARBOO K

1964 Oversea s Chines e yearbook . Taipei . SKINNER, G . W I L L I A M

1965 Persona l communication . THOMAS, DAVI D D .

1965 Persona l communication . UNESCO 1964 Demographi c yearbook , 1963 . Ne w York , Unite d Nations .

[ 69 5 ]

P E T E B KUNSTADTE H

TABLE 2 5 POPULATION AN D LINGUISTI C AFFILIATIO N O F ETHNI C GROUPS O F SOUT H VIETNAM Group [Sub-group s (Synonyms in Parentheses) ]

Estimated Population in Sout h Vietnam b

Location (i n Orde r of Siz e of Population )

Language

Vietnamese (Anna - • 12,900,000" mese, Kinh ) Chinese Cambodian (Khmer ) Jarai [(Djarais) , Puan, Hodrung , Hrue] Rhade f [(Raday , Rdg , EdS, Rad£ f) Adham, Bih , BIo , Kodrao, Krung , Mdhur, Rd e Kpa ] Hre [(Davak , Davach), Raba h (Tava), Cre q (Kare), Hre , Taliang] Koho [CiI * (Chil, KiI1), La t (Lach) , Tring, Sre , Ma a (Chau-Ma), Kalop , Laya, Pru , Rion , Nop, TaIa, Codon ] Bahnar [ToIo, Golar, Alaking, Jolong , Bahnar Bonom , Bahnar Rengao , Kontum, Krem ] Br6u [(Bru, f Baroo , Muong Leong , Leung, KaIo , Leu , Quang Tr i Va n Kieu)] Cham [Cham , Cam bodian Cham ]

Viet-Muong: Viet South Vietnam , namese North Vietnam , Cambodia, Laos , Thailand, Chin a 860,000^ China, Southeas t Chinese Asia 300,000 t o Cambodia, Sout h Mon-Khmer: 500,000= Vietnam, Thailan dI Khmeri c 150,000 t o South Vietnam , Malayo-Polynesian: 160,000 Chamic, Platea u Cambodia 100,000 t o Sout h Vietnam , 120,000 Cambodia

Malayo-Polynesian: Chamic, Platea u

100,000

South Vietna m

Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, N. Bahnaric

100,000

South Vietna m

Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, S . Bahnari c

75,000 t o Sout h Vietna m 80,000

Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, N. Bahnaric

50,000

South Vietnam.Laos, Mon-Khmer: North Vietna m Katuic

45,000 t o Sout h Vietnam , 50,000+ Cambodia

Malayo-Polynesian: Chamic, Coasta l (continued)

[ 69 6 ]

VIETNAM : INTRODUCTIO

N

TABLE 2 5 (continued)

Group [Sub-group s (Synonyms in Parentheses) ] Nung h Sedang [(Hadang , Hotea, Hoteang , Rotea) possibl e sub-group: Sedang Todrah] Katu [(Teu , Attouat , Kao, Khat , Thap , NguonTa, T a River Va n Ki^u , Phuong Katu) ] Stieng [Bulach , Budip, BuIo ] Mnong, Centra l [(Pnong) Nong , Bu Rung , B u Prang, B u Non g Dih Bri , Bunor , Rohong, Preh, Cil « (Chil, KiI) ] Roglai, Norther n [(Radlai, Raglai f , Adlai)]i Cua [(Kor , Traw , Bong Mieu) , mountain grou p (KoI, Dot , Yot) , foothills grou p (Traw, Dong) ] Roglai, Souther n [(RaglaiO]1 Chru [(Cado, Chrau , Churu')] 1

Estimated Population in Sout h Vietnam b

Location (i n Orde r of Siz e of Population )

Language

50,000' Souther n China , Chinese : Nun g dia North Vietnam , lec t South Vietna m 40,000 t o Sout h Vietna m Mon-Khmer : Bah , N. Bahnaric 80,000 naric

20,000 t o Sout h Vietnam, Laos Mon-Khmer : 40,000 Katuic , very close to Phuon g 30,000 Cambodia , Sout h Vietnam 20,000 t o Sout h Vietna m 40,000

Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, S . Bahnaric Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, S. Bahnaric close t o Koho >

20,000 t o Sout h Vietna m 25,000

Malayo-Polynesian: Chamic, Coasta l

20,000 Sout

h Vietna m

Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, N. Bahnaric

15,000 t o Sout h Vietna m 20,000

Malayo-Polynesian: Chamic, Coastal , very clos e t o N . Roglai Malayo-Polynesian: Chamic, Coastal , close t o Cha m

15,000 Sout

h Vietna m

{continued)

[ 69 7 ]

PETE R KUNSTADTE R

TABLE 2 5 (continued) Group [Sub-group s (Synonyms in Parentheses) ! Chrau [(Chra u Jro , Ro) Jro , Mro , Voqtwaq, Vajieng , Chalah, Via , Prang, etc. ] Pacoh [(B o Rive r Van KiSu) , Pahi , ?Ta-6ih] Mnong Ga r [(Gar , Mnong, f Pno m Gar)] Jeh [(Die , Yeh ) Je h Perak, Je h Brilar , Dram, Langya ] Rengao

Tai [Blac k Tai , White Tai , Red Tai ] Halang [(Koyong) ] Nung [(Nong) ] Hroy [(Bahna r Cham)] Kwanh [(Mnon g Kwanh, Kuen) ] Bih'

Bout m Rai [(Seyu) ]

Estimated Population in Sout h Vietnam b

Location (i n Orde r of Siz e of Population )

Language

15,000 Sout

h Vietna m

Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, S. Bahnari c

15,000 Sout

h Vietna m

Mon-Khmer: Katuic

10,000 t o Sout h Vietna m 15,876

Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, S. Bahnarici

10,000

Laos, South Vietna m Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, N. Bahnaric, close t o Halan g 10,000 t o Sout h Vietna m Mon-Khmer: Bah 15,000 naric, N. Bahnaric, between Sedan g and Babna r 10,000 t o Nort h Vietnam , Tai: Southwester n 15,000' Laos , Sout h Vietna m 10,000 Sout h Vietnam , Laos Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, N. Bahnaric, close t o Je h 10,000' North Vietnam , Tai: Centra l Kwangsi, Sout h Vietnam 6,000 t o South Vietna m Malayo-Polynesian: 10,000 PChamic, Coasta l 5,000 t o South Vietna m Mon-Khmer: Bah 10,000 naric, S . Bahnari c 5,000 to Sout h Vietna m Malayo-Polynesian: 10,000 Chamic Platea u (dialect of Rhad6 ) 5,000 to Sout h Vietna m Mon-Khmer: Bah 10,000 naric, N. Bahnari c 5,000 t o South Vietna m Malayo-Polynesian: 10,000 Chamic, Coastal , close t o Souther n Roglai (continued)

[ 69 8 ]

VIETNAM : INTBODUCTIO

N

TABLE 2 5 (continued) Group [Sub-group s (Synonyms in Parentheses) ]

Estimated Population in Sout h Vietnam*

Location (i n Orde r of Siz e of Population )

Language

B,olomn

5,000 to Sout h Vietna m Mon-Khmer: Bah 10,000 naric, S . Bahnari c Ta-oih [(Kantua , 6,000 Laos, South Vietnam Mon-Khmer : Katuic, clos e t o Tau-Oi')] Pacoh (ma y no t be a distinc t group) South Vietna m 5,677 Malayo-Polynesian: Krung m ·0 Chamic Platea u 5,000' Yao [(I u Mien , Kwangsi, Kwang Miao-Yao: Ya o Man)] tung, Hainan , North Vietnam , Laos, Thailand , South Vietna m 5,000 Monom [(Bonom , South Vietnam , Laos Mon-Khmer : Bah naric, N. Bahnari c Menam f )] Muong 5,000 North Vietnam , Viet-Muong: South Vietna m Muong 5,000' North Vietnam , Tho [(Tay) ] Tai: Central , sev Southern China , eral dialect s South Vietna m 2,000 Cac Gi a Roglai 1 South Vietna m Malayo-Polynesian: Chamic, Coasta l dialect differ s from othe r Rogla i Strieng» 2,000? South Vietnam , Laos Mon-Khmer : Bah naric, N. Bahnaric, possibly a Je h dialect 100' Kweichow, Hunan , Miao-Yao: Mia o Meo [(Miao) ] Szechwan, Kwang;si, Yunnan, Nort h Vietnam, Laos , Thailand, Sout h Vietnam Mon-Khmer: Bah Brao [(Lave , Love ) [unavailable ] Laos, Thailand , Cambodia, Sout h Krung] naric, N. Bahnaric Vietnam™ Mon-Khmer: Cao [(probabl y a [unavailable] Laos, Sout h Viet nam™ Katuic Katu group) ] (continued)

[ 69 9 ]

P E T E R KUNSTADTE H

TABLE 2 5 (continued) Group [Sub-group s (Synonyms in Parentheses) ] Duan [(Duane, f same a s Taku a or Kayong?) ] Halang Doan k

Estimated Population in Sout h Vietnam b

Location (i n Orde r of Siz e of Population )

[unavailable] South Vietna m

[unavailable] Laos, Sout h Viet nam'11 Kayong [(Kagiuong , [unavailable] South Vietna m Ca Giong , Katang)] Langya [(Lan g Ya , [unavailable] Laos, Sout h Viet nam™ ?Strieng)]« [unavailable] Laos, Sout h Viet Loven nam10 [unavailable] Laos, Sout h Viet Ngeh nam™ North Vietnam , Nhang [(Yay , Giai , [a few ] Nyang, Giang) ] Yunnan, Sout h Vietnam 111 Noang [(sub-grou p [unavailable] South Vietnam of Chru?)] » Noar

[unavailable] Laos, Sout h Viet nam™

Phuong [(Huu Rive r [small group ] South Vietna m Van KiSu) ] [unavailable] South Vietnam ™ Pru [classe d b y Thomas (1965B ) as a Koh o sub group]) Sayan [( ? a varian t [unavailable] South Vietnam ™ of Sedang) ] Sedang Todra h [(Didrah)]

[unavailable] South Vietna m

Takua*

[a smal l group]

Total Sout h Viet 14,900,000 nam (1960 )

South Vietna m —

Language Mon-Khmer: PBahnaric Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, N.Bahnaric Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, ?N . Bah naric, close to Cu a Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, N. Bahnari c Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, N. Bahnaric Mon-Khmer: Katuic Tai: Norther n Malayo-Polynesian: Chamic, Coasta l very close to Chr u Mon-Khmer: PBahnaric, N . Bahnaric Mon-Khmer: Katuic, clos e t o Katu an d Ta-oi h Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, S . Bahnari c Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, ?N . Bah naric Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, ?N . Bah naric, apparentl y distinct fro m Se dang languag e Mon-Khmer: Bah naric, N. Bahnaric? — (continued)

[ 70 0 ]

V I E T N A M : INTRODUCTIO N

TABLE 2 5 (continued) a Source : Name s o f group s ar e thos e accepte d a s standar d b y Thoma s (1965A), excep t a s indicated . Followin g Thomas , th e grouping s ar e o n a linguistic, no t necessaril y cultura l basis . Underline d populatio n figures ar e from Thoma s (1965A) . Thos e no t underline d (unles s otherwis e specified ) ar e from LeBa r et al. (1964 ) an d deriv e ultimatel y fro m a 196 0 census reporte d i n Tong-So Ca c Sa c Da n Thuon g [th e total highlan d populatio n figures] b y N h a Cong-Tac Xa-Ho i Mie n Thuon g [Burea u o f Socia l Actio n fo r th e Highlan d Area], Saigon , I960 . Linguistic affiliatio n i s fro m Thoma s (1965A ) fo r al l thos e Mon-Khmer speaking group s h e ha s listed . Group s identifie d b y LeBa r et al., bu t no t b y Thomas, ar e classified followin g LeBa r et al., accordin g t o thei r scheme , whic h is primarily geographical. These classifications ar e in parentheses. Tai-speakin g groups ar e classified accordin g t o Li (1959 , 1960) . See notes accompanyin g th e Burma populatio n an d linguisti c affiliatio n tabl e fo r furthe r detail s o n prob lems o f classification . Distribution o f group s i s fro m LeBa r et al. (1964) , Thoma s (1965A) , an d other sources , a s noted . Countrie s ar e liste d i n orde r o f concentratio n o f th e group. b Group s whos e population s ar e unknow n ar e liste d alphabetically . 0 Estimate fo r ethni c Vietnames e wa s calculate d b y subtractin g minorit y and triba l population s fro m censu s total . d Figure fo r Chines e i s from Skinne r (1965) . e Figure fo r Cambodia n i s fro m Buttinge r (1961:120) , apparentl y base d on Sout h Vietnames e governmen t sources . £ Name use d b y LeBar et al. (1964) . * Thomas (1965B ) state s that thes e Koh o sub-tribe s have somewha t differ ent cultures , an d spea k dialect s o f th e sam e languag e wit h varyin g degree s of mutual intelligibility . LeBar et al. (1964 ) hav e considere d the m t o b e distinct , and giv e th e followin g figure s fo r population : Koh o (10,000) ; M a (30,000) ; Sre (30,000) . h Identification b y Thoma s (1965A , 1965B) . No t mentione d b y LeBa r et al. (1964) . The Chinese-speakin g Nun g ar e renowne d fighters . Yao (Man , I u Mien) , Me o (Miao) , Muong , Tai-speakin g Nung , Chinese speaking Nung, Black, White, and Red Thai, Tho, and Nhang have come fro m the Nort h t o Sout h Vietna m a s refugee s (Thoma s 1965A , 1965B ; Kandr e 1965). ' Thoma s (1965B) , quotin g George s Condominas , consider s Ga r t o b e a Mnong language , possibl y mutuall y intelligibl e wit h som e dialect s o f Mnong . k Thoma s (1965B ) suggest s combining Halan g an d Halan g Doan , althoug h LeBar et al. (1964:139 ) hav e liste d the m a s separate . 1 Bih, Chr u (Churu) , Noang , an d Rogla i (Raglai) , al l apparentl y Malayo Polynesian speakers , ar e groupe d togethe r i n th e 196 0 censu s figures, wit h a total populatio n o f 40,000 . m Identification b y LeBa r et al. (1964) , no t liste d a s separat e grou p b y Thomas (1965A) , wh o say s he ha s hear d o f n o Brao , Loven, Cao , Ngeh , Pru , or Saya n language s i n Sout h Vietna m (1965B) .

(continued)

[701 ]

PETE R KUNSTADTE B

TABLE 2 5 (continued) n

Identificatio n an d populatio n estimat e fro m Thoma s (1965A) , lumpe d with Mnon g b y LeBa r et al. (1964:154) . ° Th e Krun g ar e classed a s a sub-grou p o f th e Rhad e by'Thoma s (1965A) . ρ Identificatio n an d populatio n estimat e o f Strien g ar e fro m Thoma s (1965A, 1965B) . The y ar e not mentione d by LeBa r et al. (1964) . « The Langy a ar e classed a s a sub-grou p o f th e Jeh by Thoma s (1965A) . r Identificatio n b y Thoma s (1965A) , no t liste d a s a separat e grou p b y LeBa r et al. (1964) .

REFERENCE S CITE

D

BuTTINGER , J .

1961 Th e ethni c minoritie s i n th e Republi c o f Vietnam . In Problem s of freedom : Sout h Vietna m sinc e independence , W. R . Fischel , ed . Ne w York , Th e Fre e Pres s o f Glencoe , Inc. , Ch. 6. KANDRE , PETE R

1965 Persona

l communication .

L E B A R , F . M. , G . C . HICKEY , an d J . K . MUSGRAV E

1964 Ethni c group s o f mainlan d Southeas t Asia . Ne w Haven , Huma n Relation s Are a File s Press . Li , FANG-KUE

I

1959 Classificatio n b y vocabulary : Ta i dialects. Anthropologica l Lin guistics 1 ( 2 ) : 1 5 - 2 1 . 1960 A tentativ e classificatio n o f Ta i dialects . In Cultur e in history : essays i n hono r o f Pau l Radin , Stanle y Diamond , ed . Ne w York, Columbi a Universit y Press , fo r Brandei s University . SKINNER , G . W I L L I A M

1965 Persona

l communication .

THOMAS , DAVI D D .

1965A Vietna m minorit y language s (Jul Summe r Institut e of Linguistics . 1965B Persona l communications .

[ 70 2 ]

y 196 5 revision) . Saigon ,

CHAPTE R 1 8

The Strategi c Hamlet Program in Kien Hoa Province , South Vietnam: A Case Study of Counter-Insurgency JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L

L

INTRODUCTION

This pape r wil l conside r som e aspect s o f th e counter-insur gency progra m conducte d i n th e province o f Kie n Ho a in the Mekong Delt a are a o f Sout h Vietnam. * Th e physical, cultural , and historica l settin g an d a brie f descriptio n o f th e insurgents will be presented first, followed by a short analysis of the origins and aim s o f th e Strategi c Hamle t Program , discussio n o f the methods use d an d results obtaine d i n Kie n Ho a Province, and then som e conclusion s an d recommendation s whic h ma y be drawn fro m thi s experience . Setting. Kie n Ho a is one of the forty-five province s o f Sout h Vietnam an d is locate d fift y mile s sout h o f Saigon , wher e the Mekong Rive r meet s th e South Chin a Sea . On a map and from the air, the province looks like a giant green and brown paw—the elements of the paw composed o f three large , long islands sepa rated b y the major channel s o f th e Mekong. The edges o f the islands ar e dense wit h coconu t grove s an d swamp palms , the ends ar e larg e sal t fields an d mud flats covere d wit h tangle d mangrove and swampbrush, the interiors of the islands are made up o f ric e paddie s crisscrosse d b y levees an d canals. Th e total area o f th e provinc e i s 215,52 0 hectare s (83 2 sq. mi.) , with a population of approximately 550,000. Although adjacent t o the area where Khmer (th e ancient Cambodian empire ) influenc e ha s been greates t i n Sout h Vietnam , the peopl e o f Kie n Ho a are almost entirel y ethni c Vietnamese . "John B . O'Donnel l wa s th e U.S . Operation s Missio n (AID ) Provincia l Representative in Kien Hoa from Decembe r 196 2 to August 1964.

[ 70 3 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . o'DONNEL L

Because o f th e relativ e wealt h o f th e provinc e an d th e emphasi s placed o n education , the y ar e bette r educate d tha n thei r neigh bors t o th e north an d south . Many o f th e grea t heroe s o f th e Vietnames e pas t eithe r cam e from o r wer e associate d wit h Be n Tre , whic h wa s th e nam e o f the provinc e befor e i t wa s change d t o Kie n Ho a b y Presiden t Diem i n 1957 . Phan Than h Glan , a leade r i n th e earl y resistanc e against th e French , ca. 1880 , wa s bor n i n Kie n Ho a and , afte r attempting valiantl y t o dete r th e Frenc h fro m takin g ove r Cochi n China, committe d suicid e in protest agains t th e Frenc h encroach ment o n Vietnames e sovereignty . Earlier , whe n Nguye n Anh , later proclaime d Empero r Gi a Long , sough t refug e i n Kie n Ho a after bein g drive n fro m centra l Vietna m b y th e Tay-Son , h e en listed th e suppor t o f Genera l Truon g Ta n Buu , a nativ e o f Be n Tre, wh o becam e a ke y figur e i n Gi a Long' s long , difficult , bu t eventually successful , campaig n t o driv e th e Tay-So n fro m cen tral Vietnam . Th e farmer s an d fishermen o f Kie n Ho a hav e per petuated th e legend s o f Pha n Than h Gia n an d Truon g Ta n Bu u and ar e prou d o f bein g fro m th e sam e are a whic h produce d these an d man y othe r nationa l heroes . Kien Ho a i s a n extremel y ric h province . Th e coconu t grove s of Kie n Ho a provid e ove r hal f o f th e fres h coconu t an d copr a production fo r th e entir e country . Th e 196 2 harves t o f 196,00 0 metric ton s o f unprocesse d ric e ranke d elevent h i n th e country , with a n average yield o f 1. 8 ton s per hectare, which ranke d twen tieth i n th e country . Th e othe r majo r incom e source s i n Kie n Hoa ar e fish, fruit, duc k feathers, an d tobacco . Because o f th e superio r education , ric h tradition , an d extrem e pride o f th e peopl e i n Kie n Hoa , whic h mad e the m natura l lead ers i n othe r revolutionar y struggles , th e agricultura l wealt h o f the province , whic h provide s mone y t o suppor t th e guerrill a effort i n Kie n Ho a an d othe r province s a s well , plu s th e difficul t terrain a t th e edge s an d tip s o f th e islands, which provide s excel lent concealmen t fo r trainin g camps , hospitals , suppl y depots , munitions factories , res t an d recreatio n areas , the Vie t Cong hav e placed th e "liberation " o f Kie n Ho a hig h o n thei r priorit y list . In fact , capture d document s hav e indicate d tha t th e Vie t Con g attempted t o mak e thei r effor t i n Kie n Ho a thei r mode l fo r "liberation" programs throughou t th e Mekon g Delta . [ 70 4 ]

STRATEGI C HAMLE T PBOGRAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

When th e Genev a Accord s wer e signe d i n 1954 , Bin h Dai , B a Tri, an d Than h Ph u a t th e tip s o f th e thre e island s o f Kie n Ho a were designate d regroupin g area s fo r th e Vie t Min h wh o wishe d to g o t o Nort h Vietnam . Accordin g t o report s fro m peopl e wh o lived i n Kie n Ho a a t th e time , man y o f th e Vie t Min h wh o wer e regrouped i n Kie n Ho a fo r transportatio n t o th e Nort h di d no t leave, eithe r decidin g o f thei r ow n fre e wil l t o remai n i n th e province, or , a s wit h some , receivin g order s t o sta y behind . A token amoun t o f Vie t Min h arm s wa s turne d i n t o th e Interna tional Contro l Commission , an d th e res t wer e cache d wher e the y could b e brough t ou t agai n i f an d whe n th e nee d arose . Man y of thos e wh o di d g o nort h lef t behin d member s o f thei r fam ilies—wives, children, parents, or brothers an d sisters. Following th e exodu s t o th e North , thing s settle d dow n i n Kien Ho a a s th e ex-Vie t Min h wen t bac k t o thei r ric e field s an d coconut grove s t o awai t th e reunificatio n o f th e tw o halve s o f Vietnam. However , th e election s t o reunif y th e countr y wer e never held . Som e accus e Die m o f refusin g t o hol d th e elections , others blam e th e Russian s wh o wer e worrie d abou t th e uprising s against th e Communis t agraria n refor m progra m i n th e North . The trut h probabl y lie s somewher e i n between , wit h bot h side s unwilling to take the chance of losing the election . By lat e 1957 , i t becam e increasingl y apparen t tha t Presiden t Diem, havin g neutralize d o r virtuall y eliminate d th e threa t fro m the Bin h Xuyen , Ca o Dai , and Ho a Hao , and havin g consolidate d his powe r i n Saigo n an d th e othe r majo r populatio n centers , wa s gradually extendin g hi s contro l t o th e countryside , employin g many o f th e technique s o f propagand a an d politica l actio n use d formerly b y th e Vie t Minh . Thes e development s alarme d th e Hanoi regim e an d th e forme r Vie t Min h stil l livin g i n th e South , and i t wa s evidentl y decide d b y th e Nort h Vietnames e govern ment tha t th e political , psychological , an d militar y struggl e which ha d brough t th e Vie t Min h succes s agains t th e Frenc h should b e resumed . Accordingly , i n earl y 195 8 som e o f thos e who ha d gon e nort h i n 195 4 bega n t o reappea r i n thei r nativ e villages i n th e South . Forme r Vie t Min h wh o ha d remaine d be hind i n 195 4 began t o make the long trek north fo r indoctrinatio n and training . Those who had returne d fro m th e Nort h establishe d themselves i n th e village s wher e governmen t presenc e wa s lim [705]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

ited o r wher e th e governmen t ha d neve r completel y succeede d in reestablishing it s presence followin g th e Vie t Min h struggle . The firs t ste p i n resumin g th e struggl e wa s t o establis h th e security o f wha t the y designate d thei r "bas e area. " Smal l cell s were se t u p i n th e remot e villages , an d intelligenc e an d propa ganda operation s wer e begun . A dossier o f th e misdeed s o f loca l officials an d other s loya l t o th e governmen t wa s compiled , an d a rumo r campaig n wa s mounte d agains t thes e persons . Whe n the prope r climat e o f oppositio n t o supporter s o f th e My-Die m (U.S.-Diem) regim e ha d bee n created , a campaig n wa s starte d to wi n over , neutralize , driv e away , or , i f necessary , assassinat e these officials , landowners , wealth y merchants , an d othe r "My Diem puppets. " As th e pro-governmen t presenc e wa s graduall y eliminated , a shadow Vie t Con g politica l apparatu s wa s forme d t o replac e it . As bas e area s wer e secured , intelligenc e agent s an d the n propa ganda an d political-actio n specialist s utilizin g th e intelligenc e gathered bega n t o fa n ou t int o adjacen t areas . Th e propagand a themes wer e simple—socia l justice , a n en d t o corrup t an d crue l government, lan d t o th e tiller , dow n wit h th e Americans ' puppe t Diem, a n independen t prosperou s Vietna m fo r th e Vietnamese. 1 Young me n wer e take n int o th e rank s o f th e Nationa l Libera tion Army . Men , women , an d childre n wer e urge d t o contribut e money an d energ y t o th e effort s o f th e Nationa l Liberatio n Front . Small raids , carefull y planne d an d executed , wer e carrie d ou t against remot e governmen t outpost s t o captur e weapon s an d am munition fo r th e Nationa l Liberatio n Army . Road s wer e mine d and ambushe s sprun g t o creat e a n ai r o f fea r whic h woul d dis courage th e governmen t troop s an d official s fro m visitin g th e rural area s excep t wit h stron g militar y escort . Governmen t at tempts a t suppressio n o f th e insurgenc y an d retaliatio n agains t the Vie t Con g tactic s serve d onl y t o ad d recruit s t o th e growin g National Liberatio n Army . In additio n t o receivin g report s o f assassination s an d attack s on outposts, President Die m learne d o f th e deterioratin g situatio n in othe r ways : farmer s wer e draggin g thei r fee t o n repaymen t of Governmen t Agricultura l Credi t loans , land-servic e personne l l See "Progra m o f th e Nationa l Liberatio n Fron t o f Sout h Vietnam, " reprinte d in Fal l (1963 : Appendi x 4 ) .

[ 70 6 ]

STRATEGI C HAMLE T PBOGRAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

were having a n increasingl y difficul t tim e collecting annual payments fo r lan d distribute d unde r th e lan d refor m progra m o f 1957, rura l cooperative s wer e failing , landowner s wer e unabl e to collec t ren t fro m tenan t farmers , an d troop s wer e becomin g increasingly hesitan t t o ente r area s o f th e provinc e wher e th e guerrillas were operating . Alarmed b y thes e report s fro m Kie n Hoa , Presiden t Die m i n early 196 0 appointe d Lieutenan t Colone l Pha m Ngo c Tha o t o be Provinc e Chief . Lieutenan t Colone l Tha o wa s a forme r regi mental commande r an d late r chie f o f counter-intelligenc e fo r the Viet Minh forces in Cochin China. Unlike most of his present fellow officers , h e ha d no t rallie d t o th e French-sponsore d Viet namese governmen t establishe d i n 1949 , but ha d continue d wit h the resistanc e force s unti l th e en d o f arme d hostilitie s i n 1954 . Upon arriva l i n Kie n Ho a i n 1960 , Tha o bega n t o enlarg e an d improve th e loca l militar y forces . H e importe d a larg e numbe r of former Ho a Hao soldiers. The Hoa Hao are a militant religious sect who had set up their own, virtually autonomous, government in th e lowe r Mekon g Delt a durin g th e Vie t Min h struggle . Following th e war , the y ha d bee n cleverl y assimilate d int o th e national politica l structur e and , fo r al l purposes , eliminate d a s a powerful politica l and military force. The Ho a Ha o brough t int o Kie n Ho a wer e assigne d specifi c areas o f responsibilit y b y Tha o an d throug h a combinatio n o f ruthless militar y tactic s an d a crud e bu t effectiv e campaig n o f psychological warfar e an d terroris m wer e abl e t o driv e th e Vie t Cong back from th e edges of the main towns and villages. When Thao firs t arrive d i n Kie n Hoa , hi s provincial headquarter s wa s often fired upo n fro m a smal l rive r b y Vie t Con g forces . Afte r a fe w month s th e firing ceased completely , an d th e road whic h connected th e provincial capital with Saigon was once again saf e for traffic. 2 Bu t th e strong-ar m tactic s of Thao' s Ho a Hao irregu lars, althoug h apparentl y initiall y effective , bega n t o generat e complaints fro m individual s loya l t o th e governmen t ove r an d above th e constan t complaint s o f Vie t Con g sympathizer s an d 2

0'DonnelTs evaluatio n o f Lieutenan t Colone l Thao' s effectivenes s i n thi s op eration i s confirme d independentl y b y Joh n McAliste r (persona l communicatio n 1965, base d o n field trip s i n Kie n Ho a Province , 1961) . Tha o ha d als o bee n active in th e development o f the agroville program (Zasloff , N . D.). (Ed. )

[ 70 7 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

became a n increasin g sourc e o f embarrassmen t fo r Presiden t Diem. The Presiden t decide d tha t Tha o migh t b e bette r use d else where an d sen t hi m of f t o Comman d an d Genera l Staf f Schoo l at For t Leavenworth , Kansas , and appointe d i n his place a youn g major, Tra n Ngo c Chau , wh o wa s servin g o n th e plannin g staf f of th e presidency . Cha u wa s bor n an d raise d i n Hue , th e forme r capital o f Annam . H e wa s th e so n o f a n importan t mandari n who wa s a n ol d frien d o f Presiden t Diem . Cha u droppe d ou t of schoo l a t th e en d o f Worl d Wa r I I an d joine d th e nationalis t forces wh o wer e preparin g thei r campaig n agains t th e returnin g French. H e wa s sen t t o Tonki n fo r training , wher e h e ha d a n opportunity t o se e an d liste n t o H o Ch i Min h an d V o Nguye n Giap tal k o f th e people' s wa r an d people' s army . Cha u wa s the n assigned t o th e highland s o f centra l Vietnam , wher e h e ros e i n the ranks o f the Viet Minh . When th e semi-independen t Vietnames e governmen t wa s se t up b y th e Frenc h i n 1949 , h e lef t th e Vie t Min h an d returne d to Hue . Subsequentl y h e entere d th e Vietnamese Militar y Acad emy a t Dala t an d upo n graduatio n wa s assigne d t o a Vietnames e battalion o f th e Frenc h Expeditionar y Forc e an d fough t agains t the Viet Minh . After th e Indochin a War , Cha u continue d i n th e arm y a s a troop commander , inspecto r o f Civi l Guar d an d Sel f Defens e Forces i n th e are a immediatel y sout h o f Saigon , an d finally a s a membe r o f Presiden t Diem' s plannin g staff , befor e bein g ap pointed Provinc e Chie f o f Kie n Hoa i n May 1962 . With thi s introduction w e ca n tur n t o a discussio n o f th e Stra tegic Hemle t Program , it s origi n an d aims , and th e method s use d and results obtained i n Kien Hoa Province . THE STRATEGI C HAMLE T PROGRAM : ORIGINS

3

The Strategi c Hamle t Progra m o f th e governmen t of Presiden t Ngo Din h Die m wa s officiall y adopte d o n Apri l 17 , 1962 , a s th e "The Strategi c Hamle t Progra m wa s precede d i n Vietna m b y a numbe r o f different resettlemen t an d rura l developmen t programs . Th e Lan d Developmen t Program ha s bee n outline d b y Henderso n (1961) . I n thi s program , whic h starte d in 1957 , loya l Vietnames e peasant s wer e t o b e resettle d i n area s suc h a s th e highlands aroun d PIeik u an d th e Mekon g Delta , whic h ha d serve d a s base s for Vie t Con g an d othe r dissiden t groups . Th e ai m o f th e progra m wa s t o

[ 70 8 ]

STRATEGI C HAMLE T PROGRAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

vehicle fo r meetin g th e growin g Vie t Con g threat. Man y indi viduals—Vietnamese, Americans , British , an d French—hav e claimed credi t fo r it s development . I t i s probably mos t accurat e develop o r reclai m lan d whic h ha d bee n abandone d a s a resul t o f th e wa r or whic h ha d neve r bee n subjecte d t o advance d agricultura l techniques . Equall y important (o r perhap s mor e important ) wa s th e ide a tha t thes e resettlemen t areas wer e t o b e o f assistanc e i n th e politica l an d militar y contro l o f insecur e areas an d wer e t o serv e a s center s fro m whic h minorit y population s (e.g . th e montagnards) coul d b e influenced . The plannin g fo r th e Lan d Developmen t Progra m wa s base d o n earlie r experi ence wit h resettlemen t program s fo r th e 850,00 0 refugee s wh o ha d com e fro m th e North followin g th e Genev a Conferenc e i n 1954 . Th e progra m ha d t o b e aban doned i n th e delt a regio n becaus e th e strengt h o f th e Vie t Con g ther e mad e it impossibl e t o carr y ou t th e engineerin g task s (ditching , damming , draining ) before th e resettlemen t coul d actuall y tak e place . Resettlemen t i n th e highland s encountered a numbe r o f technologica l an d economi c problems , an d U.S . ai d was withdraw n fro m th e projec t befor e i t wa s implemented . Nonetheless , i t was pursued b y th e Vietnamese . In 195 9 a rura l regroupmen t progra m was undertake n i n whic h tw o kind s of center s wer e t o b e se t up : center s calle d qui khu fo r peopl e believe d t o be sympathetic , o r potentiall y sympathetic , t o th e Vie t Cong ; an d center s calle d qui ap fo r familie s wh o wer e believe d t o b e loya l t o th e Sout h Vietnames e government, bu t wh o wer e livin g i n remot e area s wher e the y coul d no t b e protected fro m th e Vie t Cong . Th e progra m was graduall y abandone d whe n it prove d difficul t o r impossibl e t o differentiat e amon g th e populatio n accordin g to potentia l sympath y t o th e Vie t Con g (eve n man y governmen t official s ha d relatives i n th e North ) an d whe n th e loya l familie s coul d no t b e convince d that movin g t o th e agglomeratio n center s was fo r thei r ow n goo d (se e Zasloff , N. D.: 6-8 , fo r a brief revie w of th e program). The "Agrovill e Program " (Zasloff , N . D.:9-32 ; 1962-1963 ; Nguye n 1961) , which wa s begu n late r i n 1959 , was designe d t o concentrat e rura l populatio n for purpose s o f economi c developmen t an d t o preven t the m fro m givin g ai d to th e Vie t Cong . I t di d not , however , incorporat e th e self-defens e feature s of th e strategi c hamlets . I t wa s hope d tha t th e regroupe d population s coul d be linke d u p b y a ne w strategi c roa d system , tha t th e progra m woul d stimulat e the developmen t o f mor e an d mor e competen t villag e administrators , tha t eco nomic developmen t woul d lea d t o bette r loca l finances fo r th e villages , an d that a yout h movemen t coul d b e develope d i n th e ne w settin g t o provid e future rura l leadership . As fa r a s th e peasant s wer e concerned , th e majo r disadvantage s o f th e agrovill e program wer e th e force d abandonmen t o f thei r homes, ancestra l shrines , frui t and shad e trees , an d familia r surroundings , force d indebtednes s fo r ne w lan d which the y ha d not chosen , an d unpai d corvee labo r i n th e constructio n o f the ne w settlements . Sinc e no t al l o f th e fields coul d b e relocated , th e peasant s were force d t o wal k severa l kilometer s fro m th e ne w settlement s an d coul d not giv e thei r field s th e continua l attentio n the y required . Loca l leader s i n th e agroville project s wer e subjec t t o grea t pressure s fro m th e Vie t Cong , wh o used peasan t disconten t wit h th e progra m t o grea t advantage . Th e agrovill e program was graduall y abandone d i n 196 1 an d replace d b y th e Strategi c Hamle t Program. Fo r furthe r discussio n o f th e Strategi c Hamlet s se e Smit h (1964) , and fo r a journalisti c accoun t o f th e backgroun d t o th e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m see Warne r (1963) . Fo r a detaile d compariso n o f th e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m with simila r program s i n othe r countrie s se e Osborn e (1965) . (Ed. )

[ 70 9 ]

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L

to sa y tha t Councilo r Ng o Dinh Nhu , brothe r an d closes t advise r to th e President , wa s th e prim e move r i n th e developmen t an d execution o f th e program . Th e detail s o f th e progra m wer e worked ou t b y a smal l grou p o f Vietnames e official s (man y o f them forme r Vie t Minh , includin g youn g Majo r Tra n Ngo c Chau), assigne d t o th e presidentia l plannin g staff . They include d in th e final progra m proposa l th e best element s of idea s presente d from man y sources—th e Britis h experienc e i n Malay a wit h th e "new villages, " th e experienc e o f Vietnames e civilia n an d mili tary official s wh o ha d alread y starte d securit y an d political-so cial-economic program s i n variou s part s o f th e country , th e ex perience gaine d i n th e campaig n agains t th e Huk s i n th e Philip pines, th e America n frontie r fort , th e lan d developmen t center s and agroville s use d b y th e Governmen t o f Vietna m (GVN ) a s resettlement center s fo r refugee s fro m Nort h Vietna m an d coloni zation project s i n undevelope d area s o f th e country , man y o f the element s o f th e strateg y an d tactic s use d b y th e Vie t Min h in thei r campaig n agains t th e French , th e counter-insurgenc y tactics develope d b y th e Frenc h i n Indochin a an d Algeria , an d many othe r experience s an d counter-insurgenc y theories . Aims. Th e ai m o f th e Strategi c Hamle t Program , a s state d by Presiden t Diem , wa s t o creat e a "stat e o f mind" : th e com mitment o f th e peasant s t o th e suppor t o f thei r governmen t an d resistance t o th e Vie t Cong . I t i s essentia l tha t on e remember s that th e Sout h Vietnames e governmen t an d th e Vie t Con g wer e in fact , competing i n al l fields fo r th e loyalt y an d th e suppor t of th e majorit y o f th e people, bot h believin g tha t whicheve r sid e gained thi s loyalt y an d suppor t woul d b e th e eventua l winne r in th e comple x struggle . Th e Vie t Con g wer e attemptin g t o forc e the governmen t t o withdra w fro m th e rura l area s t o th e larg e towns an d citie s wher e politica l subversion , economi c strangula tion, an d increasin g militar y pressur e woul d resul t i n a tota l col lapse. Thi s coul d b e don e onl y wit h th e suppor t o f th e rura l population, t o provid e th e manpowe r an d mone y fo r th e effort . The governmen t wa s attemptin g t o reverse th e proces s by forc ing th e Vie t Con g bac k t o thei r bas e areas , wher e the y coul d be destroyed . Onc e again , th e suppor t o f th e rura l populatio n was essential . Th e Vie t Con g believe d tha t tim e wa s o n thei r [710]

STRATEGI C HAMLE T PROGRAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

side; th e GV N fel t tha t thei r positio n o f responsibilit y dictate d a majo r accelerate d effort . To brin g abou t commitment s t o th e government , i t wa s neces sary t o convinc e th e peasan t tha t h e should, an d could, success fully oppos e th e Vie t Cong . Translate d int o mor e explici t terms , the Strategi c Hamle t Progra m wa s intende d t o provid e th e aver age peasant an d his family wit h th e following things : (a) a (b) a (c) a (d) a (e) a (f) a

reasonable degree of safety ; reasonable livelihood ; reasonable amount of elementary justice; reasonable chance for his children; reasonable degree of status in his community; reasonable degree of opportunity .

In additio n t o th e majo r tas k outline d above , a secon d tas k and a n overal l objectiv e wer e writte n int o th e program . Th e second tas k wa s t o "teac h throug h experience , th e practice s an d processes, th e requirement s an d rewards , o f self-government. " When bot h task s ha d bee n accomplished , th e fina l objectiv e o f "a stable , prosperous , self-governin g natio n offerin g adequat e and equa l opportunit y an d protection , unde r law , t o al l it s loya l citizens, coul d b e attained " (fo r mor e detail s o n th e aim s o f the Strategi c Hamle t Program , se e Bohannon 1963) . Methods Used. Th e task s an d objective , a s stated , wer e (an d are) basicall y soun d an d admirabl e goal s fo r an y government . The proble m wa s t o carr y thes e goal s fro m th e poin t o f talkin g about the m t o developin g an d executin g program s whic h woul d bring abou t th e desire d results . A s a resul t o f th e trip s o f Vice President Lyndo n Johnso n an d Genera l Maxwel l Taylo r t o Viet nam i n 1961 , th e Unite d State s decide d t o increas e it s suppor t to th e governmen t o f Vietna m i n it s struggl e agains t th e Vie t Cong insurgents . Mor e U.S . militar y adviser s wer e sen t t o Viet nam, an d th e militar y assistanc e progra m wa s increased . Realizing tha t th e political-economic-social-psychologica l aspects o f th e struggl e wer e equally , o r more , importan t tha n the militar y aspects , th e Agenc y fo r Internationa l Developmen t began t o searc h fo r way s t o intensif y an d accelerat e non-militar y support. Accordingly , i n earl y 196 2 a specia l tas k forc e wa s se t [711 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

up i n th e U.S . Operation s Missio n (USOM)/Saigo n t o refocu s ongoing ai d program s an d coordinat e activitie s whic h contrib uted t o th e Strategi c Hamle t Nationa l Pla n wit h th e Vietnames e government an d U.S . military . I n addition , a two-ma n tea m wa s sent t o Saigo n i n Ma y 196 2 t o surve y th e situatio n an d prepar e recommendations fo r increase d AI D support . Rufu s Phillips , th e leader o f th e team , ha d bee n a n advise r t o th e Vietnames e arm y units involve d i n th e reestablishmen t o f GV N contro l i n th e Camau Peninsul a an d Interzon e V (Bin h Din h an d Quan g Nga i provinces i n centra l Vietnam ) followin g th e en d o f hostilitie s in 1954 . He ha d late r serve d a s advise r t o th e Roya l La o Govern ment durin g th e establishmen t o f th e Actio n Civi c progra m i n that country . Ber t Fraleigh , th e othe r membe r o f th e team , ha d been wit h AI D an d it s predecessor agencie s sinc e 1947, primarily in mainlan d China , Taiwan , an d Laos , mos t recentl y servin g a s Operations Office r wit h USOM/Taiwan . Phillips an d Fraleigh , afte r severa l weeks o f trave l an d discus sion wit h GV N an d U.S . officials i n Vietnam , recommende d tha t a specia l offic e fo r Rura l Affair s (Counter-Insurgency ) b e estab lished withi n th e AI D mission . Thi s offic e woul d serv e a s th e action uni t fo r administerin g a decentralize d progra m t o suppor t the GV N Strategi c Hamle t Plan . Th e pla n contemplate d th e as signment o f a USO M representativ e t o eac h o f th e province s of Vietna m wh o woul d b e responsibl e fo r administerin g a greatl y increased non-militar y assistanc e program . It wa s estimate d tha t U.S . $10,000,00 0 i n loca l currency woul d be require d t o ge t th e progra m moving . Thi s mone y woul d b e used t o hel p defra y th e cost s incurre d b y rura l familie s wh o would b e require d t o mov e fro m th e insecur e area s int o strategi c hamlets, t o suppor t th e reeuiting , training , an d deploymen t o f government personne l wh o woul d wor k i n th e countryside , t o support th e trainin g o f loca l militi a an d hamle t officials , t o cove r a portio n o f th e cost s o f self-hel p project s selecte d b y hamle t residents, t o support , a s needed , psychologica l warfar e an d othe r complementary activities . I t wa s als o recommende d tha t "Foo d for Peace " (Publi c La w 480 , Titl e II ) commoditie s an d U.S . excess propert y item s whic h woul d contribut e t o th e counter insurgency effor t b e imported . AID/Washington accepte d th e recommendations , an d Rufu s [712]

STRATEGI C HAMLK T PROGRAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

Phillips wa s selecte d t o hea d th e Offic e o f Rura l Affairs ; Ber t Fraleigh wa s transferre d fro m Taiwa n t o b e hi s deputy . Th e special purchas e o f U.S . $10,000,000 of local currency was author ized, an d procuremen t o f P.L . 48 0 an d exces s propert y require ments wa s started . Recruitmen t o f provincia l representative s wa s initiated b y AID/Washington . Phillips an d Fraleig h starte d wor k wit h th e GV N o n develop ing mor e specifi c administrativ e procedures . A s a first step , in structions wer e sen t fro m Saigo n t o th e provinc e chief s request ing th e preparatio n o f comprehensiv e provincia l rehabilitatio n (strategic hamle t establishment ) plan s an d detaile d estimate s of th e funds , materials , an d personne l require d t o can y ou t th e plans. When thi s write r arrive d i n Vietna m i n Octobe r 1962 , a fe w provincial rehabilitatio n plan s ha d alread y bee n receive d i n Sai gon, an d mor e wer e arrivin g daily . Thes e plan s wer e reviewe d briefly b y th e Offic e o f th e Executiv e Secretary o f th e Interminis terial Council , th e Offic e o f Rura l Affair s o f th e U.S . Operation s Mission, an d th e Strategi c Hamlet s Divisio n o f th e U.S . Militar y Assistance Advisor y Grou p (MAAG) . A join t U.S./GV N tea m composed o f th e director s o f thes e thre e organization s the n mad e a field tri p t o th e provinc e concerne d t o wor k ou t an y problem s and t o prepare a budget fo r USO M financial an d material suppor t and a calculatio n o f MA P (Militar y Assistanc e Program ) mate rials require d whic h woul d b e supplie d throug h MAAG . Thes e two document s wer e the n presente d t o th e U.S . Committe e o n Provincial Rehabilitation 4 an d th e GV N Interministeria l Commit tee fo r Strategi c Hamlets , where the y wer e discusse d an d give n official approval . Th e budget s wer e the n cleare d b y th e variou s GVN an d U.S . official s concerned , an d a chec k fo r a portio n of th e fund s allocate d (usuall y thre e months ' operatin g costs ) was draw n o n th e GV N treasur y an d delivere d t o th e provinc e chief b y a representativ e fro m th e Offic e o f Rura l Affairs . The scop e an d dept h o f th e provincia l rehabilitatio n plan s varied accordin g t o th e imaginatio n o f th e provinc e chie f con cerned. I n th e cas e o f Kie n Ho a Province , Lieutenan t Colone l 'This committe e wa s als o know n a s th e "Truehear t Committee, " a U.S . co ordinating committe e fo r provincia l operation s consistin g o f working-leve l repre sentatives o f al l U.S . agencie s i n Vietnam , chaire d b y Mr . Willia m Trueheart , the Deput y Chie f o f Mission .

[713 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N B . o'DONNEL

L

Chau approache d th e preparatio n o f hi s pla n i n a sensibl e way . Upon hi s arriva l i n Kie n Ho a i n Ma y 1962 , Cha u immediatel y began a n intensiv e stud y o f th e situatio n i n th e province . H e visited ever y distric t an d mos t o f th e accessibl e villages , talkin g to governmen t officials , para-militar y commander s an d thei r troops, businessmen , moneylenders , farmers , bus-drivers , cap tured Vie t Cong, women, and children . He rea d bac k i n th e history o f Kie n Ho a and it s heroes, studie d the flow of products an d money between th e town s an d th e coun tryside, reviewe d th e pas t productio n figure s fo r copra , rice , to bacco, an d fish, discusse d th e lan d refor m progra m wit h land owners an d tenan t farmers , discusse d th e educationa l syste m with teachers , students , an d parents , an d analyze d th e report s o f enemy activities , bot h militar y an d th e comple x political-psycho logical-economic combination . During th e si x month s fro m Ma y t o October , Cha u studie d the provinc e fro m ever y angle. At th e sam e tim e h e strengthene d his intelligenc e syste m t o gathe r mor e informatio n an d als o ac complished th e ver y importan t tas k o f instillin g ne w hop e an d enthusiasm i n everyon e he contacted . I n earl y Novembe r Cha u presented hi s provincia l rehabilitatio n pla n t o a join t GVN/U.S . committee i n Saigon . This write r wa s presen t a t thi s meetin g an d wa s impresse d by Chau' s imaginatio n an d ability . Hi s pla n wa s wel l though t out, darin g i n som e respects , an d include d detail s whic h con veyed hi s dee p understandin g o f th e strateg y an d tactic s o f th e enemy an d th e measure s tha t woul d hav e t o b e undertake n t o cope wit h them . Chau' s reques t fo r money , materials , an d per sonnel wa s considere d excessiv e b y som e member s o f th e com mittee, s o th e whol e grou p mad e a tri p t o Kie n Ho a t o discus s the matte r further . The y cam e awa y impresse d b y wha t h e ha d already bee n abl e t o d o wit h th e limite d mean s a t hi s disposa l and subsequentl y authorize d a majo r portio n o f hi s request . The USO M suppor t budge t wa s prepare d an d approve d an d a USO M provincia l representativ e (th e writer ) wa s appointe d to assis t an d advis e Cha u i n th e implementatio n o f hi s plan . Under th e term s of th e piaste r releas e agreement , a committe e was establishe d a t th e provincia l leve l compose d o f th e Chie f of Provinc e a s Chairman , an d th e USO M Provincia l Representa [714]

STRATEGI C HAMLE T PROGRAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

tive an d th e U.S . MAA G Sector Adviso r a s members . Th e latte r officer wa s involve d becaus e eac h provinc e wa s als o considere d a militar y sector , wit h th e provinc e chie f a s commande r o f loca l military force s an d a s civi l administrator . Al l expenditure s o f provincial rehabilitatio n fund s ha d t o b e discusse d an d approve d by al l thre e member s o f th e Provincia l Rehabilitatio n Committee . All question s wer e suppose d t o b e resolve d b y th e provincia l committee wit h minimu m relianc e o n th e Vietnames e o r Ameri can official s i n Saigon . The decentralizatio n o f responsibilit y and authorit y wa s on e of th e fundamenta l tenet s o f th e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m an d a ke y elemen t i n it s earl y success . Th e flexibility thu s provide d allowed th e progra m t o mov e ahea d rapidl y an d t o adjus t fairl y well t o th e constantl y changin g situation . Th e degre e o f inde pendence an d responsibilit y whic h th e provincia l committe e as sumed varie d accordin g t o th e confidenc e an d aggressivenes s of th e province chief. Decentralization to this extent was a radical departure fro m pas t practice , an d man y Vietnames e a t bot h pro vincial an d centra l governmen t level s foun d i t difficul t t o adjus t and di d not us e t o th e ful l advantag e th e responsibilit y an d au thority entruste d t o them . The struggl e wa s a t th e gras s root s level , an d i t wa s sine qua non o f th e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m tha t th e administratio n of th e mean s t o carr y ou t th e progra m b e place d a t th e lowes t practicable level . Th e risk s inheren t i n decentralizatio n o f fiscal responsibility i n a cultur e wher e th e peopl e ofte n kno w an d loo k the othe r wa y i n case s o f graf t an d corruptio n wer e t o som e extent compensate d fo r b y th e presenc e o f foreig n observer s i n the perso n o f th e America n member s o f th e committee . Ther e were case s o f imprope r usag e o f fund s whic h wer e uncovere d by th e America n adviser s an d brough t t o th e attentio n o f th e province chie f and , i n th e cas e o f Kie n Hoa , man y other s whic h were uncovere d b y th e province chief an d passe d o n t o the Amer icans. There wer e certainl y case s of imprope r use s of fund s whic h were no t caught . I t i s difficul t t o generaliz e on , o r eve n estimate , the degre e o f misus e o f funds ; bu t i t i s fai r t o stat e tha t thi s problem wa s o f majo r concer n t o th e America n representative s in th e field wh o attempte d t o assur e prope r us e o f fund s an d fiscal responsibility t o the best of thei r ability . [715]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

It shoul d b e note d a t thi s poin t tha t ther e wer e n o know n precedents fo r man y aspect s o f th e Strategi c Hamle t Program , and ne w procedure s o f al l sort s ha d t o b e establishe d o n a n ad hoc basis . Fortunately , som e o f th e personne l i n th e Offic e of Rura l Affair s ha d had previou s experienc e i n Asi a an d assiste d in th e developmen t o f logistica l an d accountin g procedure s which wer e late r combine d an d generalize d fo r th e whol e country. With th e strategi c hamle t suppor t fund s deposite d i n th e pro vincial treasur y an d th e military an d civilia n suppor t item s begin ning t o arriv e i n th e province , th e progra m bega n t o mov e for ward. Th e first ste p take n b y th e provinc e chie f wa s t o initiat e recruitment o f personne l wh o woul d b e responsibl e fo r guidin g the rura l populatio n i n the establishmen t o f strategi c hamlets . Chau hel d a meetin g o f hi s distric t chief s an d instructe d the m to star t recruitin g candidate s fo r th e hamle t constructio n cadr e positions. Ther e wer e eigh t district s i n Kie n Ho a a t tha t time ; a nint h wa s create d i n earl y 1963 . A quot a wa s establishe d fo r each distric t dependin g o n th e numbe r an d phasin g o f hamle t construction. Whil e th e distric t chief s wer e recruitin g men , th e Chief o f Provinc e reorganize d hi s provincia l administratio n t o deal better with the accelerated program . The Specia l Assistan t t o th e Provinc e Chie f fo r hamle t estab lishment (wh o ranke d a s a Deput y Provinc e Chie f alon g wit h the Deput y fo r Militar y Affair s an d th e Deput y fo r Administra tion) wa s a youn g major name d Ca o Min h Quan , wh o wa s bor n and raise d i n Kie n Ho a an d kne w th e provinc e well . H e wa s charged wit h th e responsibilit y fo r settin g u p site s fo r trainin g and developin g program s o f instructio n fo r th e hamle t construc tion cadre , villag e an d hamle t official s an d th e hamle t militia . The centra l governmen t ha d sen t ou t sketch y instruction s o n training whic h wer e improve d b y th e provincia l staff; Cha u con tributed many idea s which were expande d by Quan . Within a few week s th e constructio n an d equippin g o f trainin g sites was well underway an d th e recruit s fo r th e hamle t construc tion cadr e ha d arrive d i n th e provincia l capital . Th e provinc e chief droppe d hi s othe r dutie s fo r tw o day s an d personall y inter viewed al l th e candidates . He the n mad e th e first o f man y deci sions whic h wer e t o ad d greatl y t o th e effectivenes s o f hi s pro [ 71 6 ]

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gram bu t whic h eventuall y ra n head-o n int o th e oppositio n o f the Saigo n bureaucracy . Realizin g tha t th e succes s o r failur e o f the progra m depende d t o a ver y grea t exten t o n th e attitud e or abilit y o f th e hamle t constructio n cadre , wh o woul d hav e di rect contac t wit h th e villager s th e governmen t wa s tryin g s o hard t o influence , Cha u decide d tha t 90 0 piaster s (U.S . $12.37 ) per mont h wa s no t sufficien t compensatio n fo r th e wor k tha t he expecte d fro m thes e youn g me n an d women . H e suggeste d that th e provincia l committe e agre e t o th e reductio n o f th e num ber o f personnel use d i n the program an d t o the use of the surplu s funds thu s create d t o pa y thos e selecte d a highe r salary . Afte r consultation wit h th e Assistan t Directo r fo r Rura l Affairs , thi s move wa s approve d b y th e provincia l committee . Thi s i s a goo d example o f th e flexibility buil t int o th e genera l program , whic h was an essential ingredient o f its early success. The person s selecte d the n underwen t a n intensiv e trainin g pro gram conducte d b y th e chie f o f th e province, his specia l assistan t for hamle t establishment , an d variou s othe r provincia l officials . The trainee s wer e intelligen t an d appeare d sincer e i n thei r desir e to sav e thei r country . Chau' s clos e persona l attentio n t o th e re cruitment an d trainin g wa s i n goo d par t responsibl e fo r thei r success i n the field. Upo n graduatio n fro m thei r training program , the candidate s wer e organize d int o eleven-ma n teams . Th e tea m leaders wer e generall y youn g me n fro m th e Provincia l Offic e of th e Ministr y o f Civi c Action . Thi s ha d bee n establishe d abou t 1957 a s th e agenc y responsibl e fo r extendin g an d strengthenin g government contro l i n th e countryside . Th e Civi c Actio n me n were usuall y capabl e individual s wh o ha d bee n fairl y wel l trained i n political/propagand a activities . Man y o f the m ha d already ha d tw o o r thre e year s experienc e i n Kie n Hoa , workin g with th e rura l population . Mos t o f th e othe r tea m member s ha d never worked for th e governmen t before . The eleven-ma n team s wer e broke n dow n int o thre e sections , which wer e charge d wit h differen t responsibilites . Thre e mem bers o f th e tea m wer e responsibl e fo r gatherin g detaile d informa tion o n al l aspect s o f hamle t life , e.g . breakdown b y population , by se x an d ag e group , agricultura l an d livestoc k production , names an d attitude s o f familie s wit h member s i n th e Vie t Con g (we shal l retur n t o thi s later) , agricultura l credi t loan s grante d [717]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

and repaymen t experience , existenc e an d conditio n o f schools , dispensaries, temples , churches , etc . Thes e dat a wer e t o prov e invaluable fo r plannin g realisti c socia l an d economi c improve ment programs i n the individual hamlets. Three member s o f th e tea m wer e responsibl e fo r organizin g the hamle t resident s int o wor k group s an d directin g th e construc tion o f th e hamle t defenses . Th e hamle t defense s usuall y con sisted o f a wid e moa t an d a mu d wal l toppe d b y a barbe d wir e fence whic h followe d th e perimete r o f th e populatio n grouping . This typ e o f defens e work s wa s bette r suite d t o condition s found i n th e highlan d area s o f centra l Vietnam , wher e the peopl e tend to liv e i n closel y groupe d clusters . I n Kie n Hoa , an d fo r that matte r i n mos t o f th e Mekon g Delt a area , th e peopl e liv e in loos e populatio n grouping s strun g ou t alon g a road , canal , or river . Th e hamle t perimeter s wer e i n man y case s fou r t o fiv e kilometers long , to o lon g t o b e effectivel y guarde d b y th e tw o squads o f militi a authorize d fo r eac h hamlet. 5 Th e remainin g fou r members o f th e tea m wer e responsible fo r explainin g th e philoso phy an d objective s o f th e strategi c hamle t programs , organizin g the hamle t resident s int o socia l an d economi c actio n group s ac cording t o se x an d age , developin g a hamle t charter , an d arrang ing fo r th e electio n o f hamle t official s b y secre t ballot . Thes e activities o f th e political/propagand a componen t o f th e tea m were th e mos t importan t and , unfortunately , th e leas t clearl y defined an d understoo d element s o f th e entir e strategi c hamle t process. I n area s wher e th e hamle t constructio n team s under stood thes e element s an d thei r importanc e an d als o pos sessed th e personalit y trait s whic h enable d the m t o convinc e th e villagers o f thei r integrit y an d sincerit y an d o f th e genuin e con cern o f th e governmen t fo r thei r securit y an d welfare , th e peopl e responded an d starte d takin g th e firs t step s towar d committin g themselves t o th e government. 6 I t wa s a t thi s crucia l poin t tha t the importanc e o f carefu l selection , thoroug h training , adequat e 5

Unlike th e older , compact , walle d o r hedge d village s o f norther n an d centra l Vietnam, th e settlement s i n th e delt a ar e newer , mor e dispersed , an d ofte n strung ou t alon g wate r course s o r road s (Hicke y 1963:213) . Thes e delt a village s are generall y characterize d b y les s cooperativ e action , fo r exampl e i n religiou s celebrations, tha n th e village s furthe r north . (Ed. ) "For a n interestin g discussio n o f th e Communis t approac h t o thi s problem , see 'Topulatio n Contro l Technique s o f Communis t insurgents , a Sociologica l Analysis," Osank a (1964) .

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and continuin g guidance , an d constan t attentio n t o problem s which affecte d th e moral e o f th e cadr e becam e clearl y evident . When th e critica l element s o f understandin g th e progra m an d establishing rappor t wer e missing , th e hamle t establishmen t phase ofte n becam e a perio d o f unpleasant , meaningles s force d labor fo r th e villagers . Although al l o f th e physica l step s migh t have bee n carrie d out , th e hamle t wa s reall y nothin g mor e tha n the populatio n groupin g no w surrounde d b y a worthles s mu d wall, wit h a grou p o f me n wh o ha d bee n traine d i n militar y tactics an d provide d weapons , bu t ha d n o desir e t o us e them , a hamle t charte r whic h wa s tor n u p b y th e Vie t Con g agent s who returned t o th e hamle t onc e th e governmen t cadr e ha d left , and wit h "electe d officials " wh o eithe r fled th e hamle t o r agree d to cooperat e wit h th e Vie t Cong . A hamlet establishmen t tea m woul d generall y sta y i n a hamlet from thre e t o eigh t weeks , dependin g o n th e attitud e o f th e population, degre e o f Vie t Con g subversion , an d othe r factors . When al l th e basi c step s ha d bee n accomplishe d t o th e satisfac tion o f th e cadre , th e villag e officials , an d distric t chief , a cere mony wa s held , usuall y preside d ove r b y th e provinc e chie f o r one o f hi s deputies , t o "inaugurate " the ne w "strategic " hamlet . The step s outline d abov e wer e th e basi c procedure s fo r imple menting th e Strategi c Hamle t Program . Ther e wer e man y othe r elements tha t wil l b e discusse d late r i n thi s paper . A t thi s point , however, tw o important points should be made : (1) Th e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m wa s no t intende d t o b e a rigi d program . A s more experienc e wa s develope d an d the situ ation changed , ol d program s wer e refine d o r discarded , an d ne w programs wer e initiated . Th e overal l objectiv e an d th e tw o task s outlined earlie r plu s th e basi c procedura l forma t remaine d th e same, bu t th e tactic s use d withi n thi s framewor k varie d fro m area t o are a an d fro m wee k t o week . Ther e ar e forty-fiv e prov inces i n Sout h Vietnam , an d i t ha s ofte n bee n sai d tha t ther e are forty-fiv e differen t war s goin g on . Th e Strategi c Hamle t Pro gram i n eac h province , althoug h applyin g th e sam e basi c pro cedural format , develope d it s individua l character . Thi s ha s bee n cited b y som e authoritie s a s on e o f th e basi c weaknesse s o f th e program. I n th e opinio n o f thi s write r i t wa s th e mos t realistic , if no t th e only , wa y t o proceed . Ther e wer e n o standar d prece [719]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . o'uONNEL L

dents fo r th e program , an d th e tactic s develope d locall y wer e often incorporate d i n the nationa l pla n a s the y wer e prove n suc cessful. Ther e wer e man y way s t o brin g abou t th e commitmen t of th e rura l people . Th e tactic s develope d depende d t o a grea t extent upo n th e attitude , experience , ability , an d initiativ e o f the loca l leaders . (2) Th e intangible s involve d i n changin g a person' s mind , which wa s th e primar y ai m o f th e Strategi c Hamle t Program , were ofte n sidetracke d o r los t i n th e rus h t o get things done. Many officials , bot h Vietnames e an d American , fel l victi m t o a hypnotic preoccupation 7 wit h identifiabl e physica l accomplish ments, numbers o f hamlet s completed , numbers o f "elections " held, numbers o f militi a "trained, " an d o n an d on . Th e urgenc y to mov e forwar d wa s great , th e pressur e fro m th e enem y wa s always present , an d ver y ofte n th e fundamenta l goa l o f th e pro gram wa s los t i n number s an d th e mechanics o f everyda y activi ties. I t wa s extremel y importan t t o paus e a t frequen t interval s to rethin k th e reasons fo r buildin g hamle t defenses , th e reasons for holdin g elections , th e reasons fo r buildin g school s an d dis pensaries, etc . Unfortunately , thi s wa s no t don e ofte n enough , and th e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m i n man y areas , althoug h ap parently successfull y completed , ha d no t resulte d i n th e commit ment o f peopl e t o th e sid e o f th e government . Thi s i s no t t o say tha t physica l accomplishments , speed , an d urgenc y ar e no t vital t o th e succes s o f th e program . The y ar e al l essential , bu t can becom e virtuall y meaningless , a t time s counter-productive , unless the y ar e undertake n wit h th e understandin g continuall y re-thought an d reinforced , tha t th e fundamenta l goa l i s th e at tainment o f a n intangible—th e creatio n o f a stat e o f mind , th e commitment o f men to a cause. The conflic t betwee n physica l an d tangibl e accomplishment s * The insidiousnes s o f numerica l self-delusio n ca n b e illustrate d b y a n encounte r the write r ha d wit h on e U.S . officia l i n Saigon , who , whe n tol d tha t th e Strategi c Hamlet Progra m i n th e Mekon g Delt a was beginnin g t o disintegrate , turne d to a larg e char t behin d hi m whic h showe d number o f hamlet s completed , number of militi a trained , number o f roll s o f barbe d wir e issued , etc. , an d i n a n outrage d voice demande d a n explanation , vigorousl y pointin g ou t tha t i t couldn't b e dis integrating, tha t th e figures indicate d tha t i t was movin g ahea d remarkabl y well, an d tha t mor e figures wer e arrivin g daily ! Unfortunately , thi s self-delusio n had t o b e shattere d b y har d facts , an d th e emphasi s o n reportin g wa s change d from quantitativ e t o qualitativ e analysis .

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and betwee n quantit y an d quality , wa s th e sourc e o f muc h discussion an d friction . I n Kie n Hoa , Lieutenan t Colone l Cha u ha d worked ou t a n ambitiou s timetabl e fo r hamle t completion . A s the team s move d int o area s whic h ha d bee n subjecte d t o a lon g period o f Vie t Con g subversio n an d indoctrination , the y foun d their tas k increasingl y difficult . Accordingly , Cha u modifie d hi s timetable an d advise d th e team s t o tak e mor e tim e i n these ham lets. Th e slowdow n o f th e progra m i n Kie n Ho a bega n t o brin g criticism fro m highe r headquarters . Cha u stoo d firm an d refuse d to b e pushe d int o a rac e wit h othe r province s t o se e whic h on e could repor t mor e numerica l progres s eac h month . Durin g th e same perio d thi s write r wa s als o servin g a s USO M Provincia l Representative i n Lon g A n Province , wher e th e provinc e chie f was unde r eve n greate r pressur e t o accelerat e establishmen t o f strategic hamlets . The provinc e chief , Majo r Nguye n Vie t Thanh , was a dedicate d individua l an d responde d t o th e pressur e fro m Saigon b y workin g da y an d nigh t an d urgin g hi s provincia l an d district staff s t o mov e ahea d faster . Standard s wer e no t observe d as th e team s move d rapidl y fro m hamle t t o hamlet . Masse s o f people wer e relocated , resultin g i n seriou s problem s fo r th e pro vincial government , an d i t soo n becam e apparen t tha t th e pro gram ha d bee n extende d fa r beyon d th e capabilitie s o f th e prov ince. Th e Vie t Cong , wh o ha d bee n carefull y plottin g thei r re sponse t o th e Strategi c Hamle t Program , too k advantag e o f thi s overextension an d bega n a n intensiv e militar y an d psychologica l campaign agains t the government-"controlled " zones . Included her e i s th e Genera l Narrativ e o n progres s fro m th e Long A n Provincia l Representative s Repor t fo r June , July, 1963 : The Provincia l Rehabilitatio n progra m i n Long An Provinc e suffere d some sever e setback s durin g th e pas t tw o months . Viet Con g activit y has picke d u p considerably—concentratin g o n attackin g strategi c ham lets, tearin g dow n wall s an d fences , kidnapin g youn g men , assassinat ing hamle t official s an d i n genera l destroyin g th e moral e an d wil l to resist of th e rura l population . Th e hamlet militi a have not performe d well; th e Vie t Con g hav e entere d complete d strategi c hamlet s wit h trained an d arme d militi a squad s an d hav e encountere d n o resistance . Why aren' t th e hamle t militi a standin g u p t o th e Vie t Cong ? Ther e appear t o b e a numbe r o f reasons—1 ) Th e militi a d o no t see m t o have confidenc e i n thei r abilit y t o resis t th e VC—rathe r tha n tes t their abilit y the y ar e avoidin g th e enemy . 2 ) I n man y hamlet s th e

[ 72 1 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

militia d o patro l th e defensiv e perimeter , la y ambushe s an d stan d guard—but onl y unti l 230 0 o r 240 0 a t whic h tim e the y al l g o to sleep, enablin g th e VC to penetrate wit h eas e during the early mornin g hours. Th e situation ma y be correcte d b y the recruitment an d trainin g of additiona l militi a wh o ca n the n shar e th e defensiv e assignments , allowing a res t perio d betwee n patrols , guar d duty , etc . (Thi s proble m has bee n discusse d wit h th e ne w provinc e chief , Majo r Xinh , wh o plans t o se t u p additiona l militi a trainin g center s whic h wil l doubl e the presen t provincia l trainin g capacity. ) 3 ) Lon g A n Provinc e i s suffering fro m a critica l shortag e o f troops—th e limite d numbe r o f troops ar e committe d i n grea t par t t o stati c defens e (distric t towns , bridges, post s an d securit y fo r hamlet s unde r construction) . Offensiv e operations agains t V C saf e area s hav e bee n curtaile d thu s allowin g the enem y a breathin g spel l to regrou p an d the n strik e a t know n government wea k points . Becaus e o f th e shortag e o f troops , fe w ar e available fo r reactio n agains t V C attack s a t night . Th e militi a hav e come t o realiz e tha t the y wil l hav e t o stan d o r fal l alone , whic h has don e nothin g t o improv e thei r morale . Th e assignmen t o f addi tional troop s t o Lon g A n (a t leas t on e battalion ) woul d d o a grea t deal t o improv e th e militar y situatio n an d laterall y th e moral e o f the militia . Another importan t facto r i n th e present situatio n i n Lon g A n Prov ince i s th e accelerate d rat e a t whic h th e establishmen t o f strategi c hamlets i s bein g carrie d out . I t appear s tha t th e massiv e relocatio n effort i n Marc h an d April an d Ma y and the surg e i n hamle t construc tion durin g thi s perio d hav e overextende d th e provincia l capabilities . There i s a grea t nee d fo r consolidatio n activitie s in hamlet s reporte d as completed . I t ha s been strongl y recommende d t o th e new province chief tha t h e recruit an d trai n hig h calibr e cadr e t o operat e i n smal l teams i n complete d hamlet s t o 1) examin e hamle t defense s an d de fense plans ; recommen d improvement s i n curren t operatin g proce dures; 2 ) examin e hamle t developmen t prospect s an d advis e hamle t residents o n self-hel p projects , NAC O loans , collectiv e developmen t projects, etc. ; 3 ) serv e a s persona l representative s o f th e provinc e chief t o study the morale of hamlet resident s and their attitudes towar d the loca l an d provincia l administration—t o repor t directl y t o the province chie f a n an y case s o f corruptio n o r misconduc t o n th e par t o f Government officials , t o advise hamlet committe e members on improvement o f hamle t administration , etc . Th e provinc e chie f agree d wit h the nee d fo r thi s typ e o f activit y an d i s presentl y drawin g u p a pla n for recruiting , training and deployment of such teams. Early i n Jul y Majo r Nguye n Vie t Thanh , provinc e chief , wa s reassigned t o Ca n Th o a s I V Corps , G- 3 [staf f operation s officer] . Majo r Nguyen Ngo c Xinh , forme r distric t chie f o f Sade c Distric t i n Vin h Long provinc e wa s name d a s hi s replacement . Majo r Xin h doe s no t possess th e militar y abilitie s o f Majo r Thanh , bu t i s muc h mor e civi c

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action oriented . H e i s ver y concerne d wit h th e peopl e an d intend s to introduc e program s whic h ai m directl y a t winnin g thei r loyalty . Essentially, th e sam e sequenc e o f event s wa s repeate d throug h most o f th e delta , resultin g i n th e virtua l collaps e o f man y o f the supposedl y "completed " strategi c hamlet s durin g th e sum mer an d fal l o f 1963 . Chau' s approac h wa s t o b e prove n vali d in late r month s whe n th e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m wa s disinte grating throughou t th e delt a bu t th e hamlet s o f Kie n Ho a con tinued t o resist bravel y i n th e face o f greatl y increase d Vie t Con g military an d psychologica l pressure . Before movin g o n t o som e o f th e specifi c complementar y pro grams develope d an d employe d i n Kie n Hoa , w e shoul d tak e a momen t t o analyz e wha t mad e Lieutenan t Colone l Cha u a n effective counter-insurgent . First , h e thoroughl y understoo d an d believed i n th e task s an d objectiv e o f th e Strategi c Hamle t Pro gram. Second , h e ha d th e abilit y t o translat e hi s understandin g of th e strateg y an d tactic s o f th e enem y an d hi s idea s o n ho w to mee t the m int o actio n program s whic h coul d b e carrie d ou t by others . Third , h e possesse d th e initiativ e an d self-confidenc e to us e t o ful l advantag e th e authorit y an d flexibility allowe d him unde r th e decentralize d concep t o f operations . Fourth , h e had th e courag e an d perseveranc e t o mov e ahea d despit e th e Viet Con g resistanc e an d pressur e an d disagreement s wit h th e officials o f hi s ow n government . Fifth , h e ha d th e administrativ e ability an d insigh t t o direc t th e complicate d military-political economic-social-psychological campaig n agains t a ruthless , well trained enemy . Thi s pape r i s no t intende d t o b e a n expositio n of th e virtues o f Lieutenan t Colone l Chau . However , an y analysi s of th e progra m i n Kie n Ho a mus t tak e int o consideratio n hi s unusual abilit y an d hi s contributio n t o whateve r succes s wa s achieved. The complementar y program s wer e man y an d varied . Becaus e of tim e an d securit y limitations , onl y a fe w o f the m wil l b e dis cussed i n detail . I n meeting s Lieutenan t Colone l Cha u woul d often sa y tha t hi s approac h wa s ver y simple , compose d o f tw o basic elements : first, publi c relations ; second , economi c develop ment. In th e "publi c relations " field , on e progra m develope d b y [ 72 3 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

Lieutenant Colone l Cha u wa s t o prov e extremel y valuabl e i n a numbe r o f ways . Thi s wa s hi s versio n o f a combine d complaints-and-actions intelligenc e system . T o carr y ou t th e pro gram, th e provinc e chie f instructe d eac h hamle t deput y chie f for securit y t o se t u p a n intervie w schedul e whic h woul d includ e all member s o f al l familie s o f th e villag e ove r a perio d o f time . The interview , onc e th e necessar y rappor t wa s established , woul d consist o f thre e basi c questions : (1 ) D o yo u hav e an y com plaints agains t anyon e wh o work s fo r th e government , o r for tha t matter , ha s anyon e bee n givin g yo u a ba d time ? (2 ) You know , th e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m i s reall y intende d t o make thing s bette r fo r al l o f us—wha t d o yo u thin k th e govern ment shoul d d o t o mak e ou r live s better ? (3 ) Th e Vie t Con g don't bothe r u s to o muc h anymore—hav e yo u hear d wha t they'r e up to ? (Wha t abou t Buu' s brothe r wh o i s wit h th e Vie t Cong — has Bu u hear d fro m hi m lately ? Ho w ar e thing s goin g fo r him ? Do yo u thin k h e migh t be intereste d i n comin g bac k t o ou r ham let an d forge t abou t carryin g a rifl e i n th e swamp ? No w tha t the ol d villag e chie f wh o use d t o giv e hi m suc h a har d tim e has bee n pu t i n jai l b y th e provincia l officials , h e reall y doesn' t have muc h reaso n t o sta y away . Also , isn' t h e stil l prett y inter ested i n Thanh's sister? ) Reports o f thes e interview s wer e the n sen t t o th e provincia l Complaints Burea u wher e the y wer e condense d an d passe d o n to th e provinc e chie f daily . Th e peopl e wh o wer e interviewe d were als o suppose d t o b e informe d tha t the y coul d communicat e directly wit h th e provinc e chie f i f the y fel t tha t th e intervie w form migh t b e to o publi c a mean s t o expres s thei r grievances . Lieutenant Colone l Cha u rea d thes e report s faithfull y ever y day, takin g actio n a s required. I f ther e was a report o f corruptio n on the part o f a village official o r Self-Defense Corp s (SDC ) com mander, h e woul d orde r th e nex t highes t commande r t o mak e an investigatio n an d repor t bac k t o hi m wit h ful l details . I f th e charge wa s substantiated , appropriat e disciplinar y actio n wa s taken. Lieutenan t Colone l Cha u use d member s o f hi s staf f t o make discree t investigation s whe n h e though t tha t th e superior s of th e accuse d migh t cove r up for him . The informatio n o n th e Vie t Con g activity , i f tactical , wa s passed o n t o th e distric t chie f fo r follow-up . Genera l informatio n [ 72 4 ]

STRATEGI C HAMLE T PROGRAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

of strategi c value, suc h a s Vie t Con g ta x collectio n rate , curren t Viet Con g propaganda , potentia l defectors , wa s passe d o n t o the Special Coordinator fo r Intelligence-Psychologica l Wa r activi ties fo r inclusio n i n backgroun d document s o r direc t propagand a exploitation. The informatio n o n th e thing s th e peopl e though t th e govern ment shoul d b e doin g i n thei r hamle t o r elsewher e wer e use d as th e basi s fo r preparin g meaningful action program s fo r eco nomic an d socia l development . Th e intervie w syste m wa s a con tinuing one . As the progra m developed , Lieutenan t Colone l Cha u noticed tha t som e o f th e hamle t deputie s wer e no t sufficientl y educated t o d o a decen t jo b wit h th e interviews , an d tha t i t was creatin g to o muc h additiona l wor k fo r them . S o he recruite d several brigh t youn g people , traine d the m i n th e procedures , an d sent the m t o villag e headquarter s t o d o th e sam e thing . I t wa s much easie r fo r the m becaus e the y wer e abl e t o rea d an d writ e with facilit y an d ha d n o direc t involvemen t wit h th e grievance s of th e people . Thi s wa s no t a cover t operation , an d th e peopl e were encourage d t o expres s themselve s freely . Th e informatio n gained fro m thi s activit y contribute d immeasurabl y t o whateve r success was achieved i n the province . It shoul d b e note d a t thi s poin t tha t on e decisio n tha t ha d been mad e durin g th e formativ e stage s o f th e Strategi c Hamle t Program enable d th e provincia l committe e t o engag e i n activitie s which woul d otherwis e hav e bee n impossible . When th e budge t categories wer e establishe d fo r Strategi c Hamle t Progra m sup port funds , i t wa s realize d tha t ther e woul d b e man y unforesee n expenses. Accordingly , 1 0 percent o f th e tota l provincia l suppor t budget wa s place d i n a "miscellaneous " fun d whic h coul d b e used fo r project s no t otherwis e funde d tha t wer e judge d neces sary b y th e provincia l suppor t committee . Th e Kie n Ho a pro vincial committe e mad e goo d us e o f th e miscellaneou s fun d pro vided fo r man y programs—probabl y th e mos t significan t amon g these wer e wha t Lieutenan t Colone l Cha u calle d hi s "publi c relations" programs . In additio n t o providin g limite d suppor t fo r th e complaint s and action s bureau , th e provincia l committe e als o authorize d the publicatio n o f a bimonthly newspape r t o acquain t th e peopl e of th e provinc e wit h th e thing s th e governmen t wa s doin g t o [725]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

improve th e condition s i n th e provinc e an d als o t o repor t o n the "actions " take n b y th e Vie t Cong . Almos t al l o f th e new s was local , an d man y picture s wer e included . Th e Vie t Con g ha d been publishin g a newspape r i n th e provinc e fo r severa l years , distorting fact s an d pushin g thei r ow n propagand a line . The gov ernment newspaper provide d a much neede d an d effectiv e devic e for gettin g th e governmen t stor y t o th e rura l population . Th e provincial committe e als o authorize d th e formatio n an d equip ping o f a provincia l theatrica l tea m compose d o f abou t thirt y young me n an d women . Th e grou p wa s a grea t success , judgin g from th e siz e an d th e respons e o f th e crowd s the y dre w i n vil lages throughou t th e province . The GV N propagand a capabilitie s whic h ha d previousl y bee n judged adequat e were , i n fact , woefull y inadequat e whe n observed a t a provincia l level . Suggestion s fo r improvement s an d lists o f requirement s bega n t o com e i n fro m th e provinces , an d the GV N an d U.S . staff s i n Saigo n bega n t o respond . U.S . Infor mation Servic e (USIS ) jumpe d int o th e ga p o n man y occasions , and USO M Communication s Medi a Divisio n starte d procuremen t of transisto r radios , additiona l simpl e printin g equipmen t (t o augment th e existin g villag e newspaper kits) , loudspeake r equip ment, an d other necessary hardware. Lieutenant Colone l Cha u wa s alway s lookin g fo r way s t o im prove hi s informatio n programs , an d so , whe n i n earl y 196 4 plans wer e worke d ou t fo r importin g severa l smal l (500-watt ) radio transmitter s fo r us e i n selecte d provinces , h e becam e quit e enthusiastic, remarkin g a t on e poin t tha t suc h a radio transmitte r would b e a s valuabl e t o th e provincia l rehabilitatio n progra m as one division o f troops . The provincia l committe e decide d t o embar k o n a join t cam paign t o get a radio statio n for Kie n Hoa. Requests wer e prepare d and submitte d throug h Vietnames e governmen t channels . Ever y visitor t o Kie n Ho a wa s aske d to hel p ge t a radi o transmitter . When provincia l official s o r U.S . provincia l personne l wen t t o Saigon, the y repeate d th e request . Th e join t effor t pai d off , an d the first o f th e ne w transmitter s wa s installe d i n Kie n Ho a i n July 1964 . Thi s episod e i s include d t o illustrat e anothe r advan tage o f th e presenc e o f American s i n th e decentralize d system . [ 72 6 ]

STHATEGI C HAMLE T PROGRAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

The reques t fo r th e transmitte r an d man y othe r provincia l re quests wer e give n adde d emphasi s b y submissio n o f a n identica l request throug h U.S . channels . America n follow-u p a t al l levels , up t o an d includin g direc t conversatio n wit h Presiden t Die m and hi s successors , brok e man y bottleneck s an d wa s on e o f th e most importan t factor s contributin g t o th e effectivenes s o f th e decentralized system . In thes e an d othe r propagand a program s (e.g . leaflets , posters , and direc t persona l contac t wit h familie s wit h member s i n th e Viet Con g t o tr y t o convinc e the m tha t thei r son s o r brother s or nephew s shoul d retur n t o th e governmen t caus e [se e activitie s of hamle t team , above] , helicopter - o r aircraft-mounte d loud speaker broadcasts , etc.) , Lieutenan t Colone l Cha u alway s em phasized th e importanc e o f basin g th e all-importan t loca l propa ganda theme s o n loca l intelligence . I n man y case s th e hardwar e for disseminatin g th e messag e wa s available , bu t th e individual s charged wit h th e responsibilit y fo r preparin g th e messag e di d not understan d wha t the y wer e doin g an d wer e mor e ofte n tha n not poo r writers . T o coordinat e thes e tw o importan t field s better , a specia l positio n was created on th e provincial staf f fo r a directo r of intelligence an d psychologica l warfare activities . Besides th e "publi c relations " elemen t o f Lieutenan t Colone l Chau's program , ther e wer e th e ver y importan t "economi c de velopment" aspect s whic h provide d th e basi s fo r an d follow through o n th e publi c relation s programs . Ther e wer e fa r to o many program s t o g o int o them i n an y detail . Amon g the m wer e the self-hel p progra m whic h wa s supported b y release-agreemen t funds, Foo d fo r Peac e (P.L . 480 , Title II ) supplies , exces s prop erty, an d importe d commoditie s suc h a s cement , shee t roofing , reinforcing rods . I n addition , program s wer e undertake n t o im prove th e rura l healt h program . Fo r example , many o f th e villag e and hamle t healt h worker s wh o ha d bee n traine d i n previou s years ha d no t bee n pai d fo r quit e som e time . Thi s proble m wa s eventually solve d throug h th e effort s o f th e provincia l committee , and th e worker s wer e brough t i n fo r bac k pay , trainin g sessions , and pe p talks . In education, a hamlet schoo l constructio n progra m wa s under taken i n 196 3 wit h fund s fro m th e Asi a Foundatio n an d cemen t [ 72 7 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

and roofin g fro m Rura l Affair s stocks . Whe n thi s progra m wa s underway, a detaile d surve y o f existin g school s i n th e provinc e was mad e b y th e IVS—Internationa l Voluntar y Servic e ( a fore runner o f th e Peac e Corps)—voluntee r assigne d t o th e province , which serve d a s th e basi s fo r a large-scal e schoo l improvemen t and constructio n progra m i n 1964 . The existin g provincia l voca tional schoo l wa s moved t o a larger building , an d additiona l tool s were supplie d fro m USOM/Rura l Affair s exces s propert y stocks . When thi s write r lef t th e province , USOM/Educatio n ha d shipped th e stee l fram e fo r a hug e ne w vocationa l schoo l t o b e built on the outskirts of th e provincial capital . In agriculture , improve d ric e see d wa s distribute d t o abou t 15,000 farmer s i n 14 0 hamlets . Th e wate r problem , whic h wa s severe durin g th e dr y season , gav e ris e t o a progra m fo r diggin g shallow concrete-line d well s an d buildin g concrete-bloc k cistern s for catchin g rai n water . (Fo r a descriptio n o f thes e an d othe r projects, se e USO M Activitie s Plan , Kie n Ho a Province. ) The USO M Provincia l Representativ e serve d ver y ofte n a s th e catalyst fo r startin g a ne w program , improvin g a n existin g pro gram, o r revivin g a defunc t program . Th e technica l division s of USO M provide d invaluabl e guidanc e an d assistanc e i n thes e efforts. When th e Offic e o f Rura l Affair s wa s created , th e technica l divisions o f USO M wer e no t sure wha t rol e th e ne w offic e woul d assume o r wha t workin g relationship s would be . As a result, ther e was som e frictio n betwee n Rura l Affair s an d technica l divisio n personnel a t th e beginnin g o f th e program . Whe n i t becam e apparent tha t th e Provincia l Representativ e coul d assis t th e tech nical division s o f USO M i n spreadin g thei r program s throughou t the country , somethin g the y ha d wante d t o do year s befor e bu t had bee n unabl e t o d o becaus e o f tim e an d distanc e limitations , they pitche d i n an d gav e generousl y o f thei r tim e and specialize d talents t o help the generalis t a t the provincial level . These, then , wer e th e basi c element s o f th e Strategi c Hamle t Program, whic h ha d bee n designe d t o achiev e a n intangibl e goal . Did th e progra m achiev e th e hoped-fo r results ? Ha d th e state of mind bee n created ? Ha d th e peopl e committe d themselve s to th e governmen t becaus e the y fel t the y should an d could successfully resis t the Viet Cong ? [ 72 8 ]

STHATEGI C HAMLE T PROGRAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E RESULTS OBTAINE D

By mid-summe r 1963 , ther e wer e man y indication s tha t thi s "state o f mind " wa s graduall y bein g achieve d i n Kie n Hoa . In cluded her e i s th e "Genera l Narrativ e o n Progress " from th e Pro vincial Representativ e fo r th e month s o f Jun e an d July , 1963 : The Provincia l Rehabilitatio n Progra m i n Kie n Ho a ha s reache d a poin t durin g th e pas t tw o month s wher e encouragin g indication s of th e progres s o f th e progra m ar e reporte d daily . Hamle t militi a and S.D.C . ar e workin g togethe r t o fight of f Vie t Con g attack s o n strategic hamlets , increase d intelligenc e fro m hamle t resident s an d defectors fro m th e Viet Cong have resulted in inflicting damag e agains t the Vie t Cong , information o n Vie t Con g unit s have allowe d provincia l authorities t o trac k an d locat e thes e unit s an d launc h successfu l opera tions agains t thei r bases , hamlet citizen s are responding t o ever-increas ing securit y b y buildin g ne w homes , schools , hamle t offices , dispen saries, etc . I hav e bee n abl e t o mak e severa l field trip s throug h th e provinc e and hav e bee n impresse d b y th e progress whic h I hav e seen . Damage d roads ar e bein g repaire d an d ne w road s ar e bein g built ; area s whic h were inaccessibl e excep t b y helicopte r si x month s ag o ca n no w b e reached by jeep with relatively light escort. In man y hamlets , hamle t offices , informatio n halls , dispensarie s an d schools hav e bee n buil t o r are unde r construction . A U of thi s construc tion ha s bee n accomplishe d b y th e hamle t citizen s themselves throug h voluntary contribution s an d donate d labor , wit h ver y little , i f any , assistance fro m th e government . ( I a m sur e tha t th e prodding s o f the villag e an d distric t official s hav e played a majo r rol e i n thi s burs t of self-help ; nonetheless , it is impressive to observe. ) The hamle t resident s appea r to be optimisti c an d anxiou s t o improv e their communities . Existin g market s ar e bus y an d well-stocked ; ne w market place s are being built . The Vie t Con g stil l contro l o r dominat e larg e area s o f th e province , and th e threa t o f Vie t Con g attack i s stil l ever-present , ye t i t appear s that th e Strategi c Hamle t resident s ar e gainin g confidenc e i n thei r ability t o resis t th e V.C . Th e effectiv e us e o f artiller y an d mortar s at nigh t in support o f hamle t defenses , increasin g number s o f militi a t o supplement th e S.D.C . an d Civi l Guar d (S.G. ) troop s i n th e area , provincial operation s agains t Vie t Con g safe areas—al l o f thes e factor s ar e contributing t o a growin g willingnes s o f th e peopl e t o commi t them selves to the Government and against the Viet Cong. Relocation: Al l district s ar e relocatin g familie s a s Strategi c Hamlet s are constructed . Th e relocatio n appear s t o b e well-planne d an d ex -

[ 72 9 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

ecuted. Foo d an d mone y are provided t o families whe n the y ar e moved to thei r hom e sites. Hamlet Militia: S o far , th e performanc e o f th e hamle t militi a ha s been impressive . T o date , 454 1 militi a hav e bee n trained . Thi s i s more tha n th e numbe r (2 0 pe r hamle t accordin g t o Provincia l Releas e Agreement) authorized pe r hamlet . Col . Cha u pursue d a polic y o f training thre e me n fo r eac h weapo n an d i n som e hamlet s ther e ar e 30 or 40 trained militi a with 1 0 or 15 weapons. This polic y ha s worke d well—wit h mor e militi a t o shar e th e respon sibility o f hamle t defense , ther e i s les s pressur e o n individua l militia , who hav e a n opportunit y t o res t betwee n assignments . Also , th e in creased numbe r o f militi a give s th e hamlet resident s a sens e o f securit y in numbers , a confidenc e i n thei r abilit y t o repel attack , an d a willingness to stand up to attacking Viet Cong forces. One hamle t I visite d ha d thirt y traine d militi a an d te n weapons . When questione d o n th e valu e an d effectivenes s o f th e militia , th e village chie f responded , "W e hav e on e platoo n no w t o figh t agains t the Vie t Cong—w e woul d lik e on e company. " Thi s sam e hamle t ha d been attacke d on e hou r earlie r b y a V.C . grou p whic h ha d bee n driven of f b y th e hamle t militia . I n othe r hamlets , th e hamle t militi a are goin g ou t o n nigh t patrol s an d ambushe s wit h th e S.D.C . Th e large numbe r o f traine d militi a i n thi s hamle t allow s thi s typ e o f activity whic h ha s prove n beneficia l t o both th e militi a an d th e S.D.C . Self-Help Projects: Self-help project s hav e bee n slo w i n gettin g under way. This is du e in part t o th e fact tha t Col . Chau revise d th e orienta tion o f th e progra m i n Kie n Ho a an d ha d t o get th e wor d t o th e people. Specia l five-da y trainin g course s wer e hel d i n Apri l an d Ma y to acquain t th e hamle t chief s wit h th e ne w self-hel p concept , an d applications ar e no w beginnin g t o flo w in . Si x project s hav e bee n approved an d mone y wa s presente d t o th e hamlet s o n 3 1 July . Fort y applications ar e presentl y unde r study . Example s o f propose d projects : 1) Hamle t purchase s piglet s whic h ar e distribute d t o individua l farmers fo r raising—whe n pi g i s sol d afte r on e year , farme r keep s 60 percen t o f profi t an d hamle t receive s 4 0 percent ; 2 ) Hamle t use s 20,000 piastre s provide d b y governmen t plu s 20,00 0 collecte d fro m hamlet resident s t o purchas e copr a fro m loca l residents , the n arrange s for transportatio n t o marke t i n provinc e capita l an d keep s profi t fo r improvement o f hamle t facilities . Health Programs: Provinc e ha s difficult y retainin g traine d healt h workers. Althoug h som e 50 0 hav e bee n traine d onl y 8 2 ar e workin g full time . Often thes e health worker s are drafted b y ARVN or recruited by C G o r SDC . I n othe r case s the y receiv e n o pa y s o ar e force d to find wor k whic h wil l provid e the m a livelihood . Thi s proble m i s [ 73 0 ]

STRATEGI C HAMLE T PROGBAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

presently bein g studie d b y th e provinc e medicin e chie f an d USO M representative to arrive at some practical solution. Education Programs: Two building s a t Su n Don g Trainin g Cente r have bee n renovate d t o provid e tw o workshop s fo r provincia l voca tional school . Wor k benche s hav e bee n buil t an d effort s ar e currentl y underway t o obtai n a generator , machin e tool s an d mor e han d tools . The vocationa l schoo l wil l concentrat e o n wood-workin g an d forgin g and weldin g classe s fo r th e present . Dr . High , USO M Education , has assure d u s tha t Kie n Ho a wil l b e include d i n th e 196 4 Actio n Plan fo r Rura l Trad e School s a t whic h tim e th e presen t wor k shop s will b e converte d t o dormitorie s fo r student s fro m outlyin g districts . I inten d t o contac t Vaugha n Stapleto n o f IV S t o fin d ou t whethe r we migh t b e abl e t o borrow a n IV S vocationa l schoo l adviso r fo r two week s o r a mont h t o hel p u s finalize plan s fo r th e school . Information Programs: Kien Hoa Today newspape r discontinue d afte r issue 1 2 (Jun e 15)—Provinc e plan s monthl y magazin e typ e publica tion wit h mor e photo s an d instruction s t o cadre s an d hamle t com mittees an d militia . Other-Youth Center: Plan s no w bein g develope d b y Reconstructio n Chief fo r renovatio n o f a larg e buildin g i n tow n t o serv e a s Provincial Youth Center . Permissio n ha s bee n requeste d fro m Ministr y o f Interio r for contac t wit h Sacrament o hig h school s t o reques t assistanc e wit h equipping center . I a m workin g o n preparatio n o f slid e an d tap e presentation t o send to Sacramento . Coordination and Cooperation with Other Agencies (MAAG, etc.): Coordination wit h MAA G continue s t o b e good , Secto r Adviso r an d Intelligence Adviso r kee p USO M representativ e wel l posted o n curren t military situation and Viet Cong activities. Administrative: I pla n t o ren t a hous e i n Kie n Ho a whic h will serv e as an office an d are a to entertain Vietnamese officials . Other Comments: O n Jun e 6 , Lt . Col . Tra n Ngo c Chau , provinc e chief, wa s reassigne d t o Danan g a s mayo r o f tha t city . Majo r L e Huu Due , deput y provinc e chie f fo r security , wa s designate d Actin g Province Chief . Majo r Du e i s mor e militaril y oriente d tha n Col . Cha u but assure d m e tha t h e intende d t o follo w closel y th e program s estab lished b y Col . Chau . Majo r Du e ha s bee n extremel y cooperativ e an d has demonstrate d a n understandin g o f th e importanc e o f civi c action/people-oriented programs .

Other indicator s o f progres s wer e capture d Vie t Con g docu ments whic h reporte d tha t th e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m wa s hurting the m badl y i n man y ways—youn g me n wer e defectin g [731]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

to thei r nativ e villages , intelligenc e agent s wer e bein g arrested , tax collection s wer e fallin g off , trave l fro m bas e are a t o bas e area wa s becomin g mor e difficul t an d mor e dangerous . O n th e other side , governmen t ta x collection s an d th e Nationa l Agricul tural Credi t Organizatio n loa n repayment s wer e increasing . The progra m wa s apparentl y beginnin g t o succeed , an d no t because a massiv e amoun t o f financial an d materia l ai d had bee n provided t o th e province. The total value o f the funds an d USO M and MA P materials allocate d t o Kie n Ho a durin g th e six-month s period fro m Decembe r 196 2 t o Ma y 196 3 was approximatel y on e million dollar s o r th e equivalen t o f tw o dollar s pe r person . (A t that, onl y approximatel y hal f th e tota l allocatio n wa s used. ) There i s n o doub t tha t th e "hardware " helpe d a grea t deal , but mor e important , th e peopl e wer e beginnin g t o believe i n the sincerit y an d honest y o f thei r ow n governmen t an d thei r own abilit y t o resis t th e Vie t Cong . I n othe r province s whic h had a s muc h o r mor e financial an d materia l suppor t an d whic h had bee n initiall y les s critica l tha n Kie n Hoa , th e situatio n wa s much worse, e.g. Long An Province. Although progres s wa s bein g mad e throughou t th e province , the degre e o f progres s i n an y give n are a depende d t o a grea t extent o n th e ability , honesty , an d sincerit y o f th e loca l officials , e.g. th e distric t chie f and , i n eve n mor e direc t contac t wit h th e rural population , th e villag e chie f an d th e commande r o f th e local securit y force s an d th e catalys t hamle t establishmen t cadre . If thes e official s wer e responsiv e an d fair , th e progra m move d forward—even i n th e area s mos t heavil y infeste d wit h Vie t Con g political personnel, soldiers, and supporters . An outstandin g exampl e o f a successfu l leade r o f thi s typ e was Captai n Huyn h An h Ho a wh o wa s th e distric t chie f i n Bin h Dai, a t on e tim e th e wors t distric t i n th e province . Captai n Ho a was a nativ e o f Kie n Ho a an d ha d bee n involve d i n th e struggl e against th e Japanese , French , an d Vie t Minh . H e wa s a short , slightly chubby , happy-lookin g man , wh o showe d severa l teet h missing whe n h e smiled . Riding with hi m i n his battere d jee p wa s a n instructiv e experi ence i n applie d counter-insurgenc y techniques. Men, women, an d children woul d wav e a s h e drov e by . H e woul d sto p occasionall y to chat respectfull y wit h a n ol d man o r woman, t o speak seriousl y [ 73 2 ]

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with a shabbil y dresse d hamle t militi a man , o r t o fire a few ques tions a t a passin g bus-driver . A s w e drov e away , th e peopl e h e had talke d wit h woul d b e smilin g an d woul d wav e unti l w e were ou t o f sight . Captai n Ho a wa s a dedicated , capable , an d brave man , bu t abov e all , he understoo d th e peopl e o f Bin h Dai , their needs an d aspirations, and how to lead them . One da y i n Marc h 196 4 whe n h e wa s returnin g fro m a tri p to resuppl y th e me n i n a pos t tha t ha d bee n attacke d th e nigh t before b y a ban d o f Vie t Con g soldiers , th e roa d erupte d i n back, under , an d i n fron t o f th e bu s i n whic h h e an d hi s me n were riding . A murderou s cros s fir e fro m th e side s o f th e roa d poured int o th e bus . Ho a jumpe d ou t an d bega n t o rall y hi s men fo r a counter-attac k whe n h e wa s droppe d b y a bulle t through th e forehead . B y tha t tim e mos t o f th e soldier s wer e dead o r badl y wounded ; th e Vie t Con g move d u p t o th e bu s and aske d on e o f th e wounde d me n t o poin t ou t Hoa . The y gave th e dea d bod y a kick , talke d briefl y amon g themselves , and the n move d bac k int o th e coconu t groves , thei r missio n accomplished. A ne w distric t chie f wa s appointe d immediately , bu t th e pro gram i n Bin h Da i bega n t o sag . Th e ne w ma n wa s considere d by th e American s i n th e provinc e t o b e th e bes t militar y planne r on th e provincia l staff . H e had als o proved hi s courage an d abilit y in severa l battles . Whe n h e arrive d i n Bin h Dai , th e Vie t Con g followed u p Hoa' s murder wit h a vicious military campaign . The y hit hamle t afte r hamlet , pos t afte r post , an d th e roa d wa s mine d more an d mor e frequently . Th e ne w distric t chie f trie d hi s ver y best, bu t h e di d no t hav e Hoa' s abilit y t o motivat e an d lea d people. Moral e dropped , intelligenc e decreased , an d defection s from th e Viet Con g decreased . Whe n thi s writer lef t th e provinc e in Augus t 1964 , Bin h Da i wa s stil l considere d on e o f th e mor e secure area s i n th e province , bu t thing s wer e definitel y no t goin g well. There ar e other s like Captai n Ho a i n Vietnam , bu t thei r num ber i s decreasin g wit h eac h passin g month . A goo d distric t chie f who doe s hi s jo b wel l become s a marked man . H e ca n anticipat e death b y a lan d mine , a sniper' s bullet . H e become s a numbe r one targe t fo r th e Vie t Cong , fo r h e i s thei r numbe r on e enemy . Other distric t chief s wh o d o no t d o thei r job s o r wh o us e thei r t 73 3 ]

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positions a s a mean s t o lin e thei r ow n pocket s survive , an d the y aid th e insurgents' cause. The rea l hop e fo r defeatin g th e Vie t Con g rest s wit h th e Cap tain Hoa s o f Vietnam , not , wit h al l due respect , wit h th e militar y experts, nor wit h th e roa d an d da m builders , no r eve n wit h eco nomic specialists . The y ar e ver y importan t extension s o f th e pro gram, bu t th e Captai n Hoa s ar e th e hear t o f th e program . Th e military experts an d others can become Hoas, not by simpl y goin g through th e motion s o f wearin g a constan t vacuou s smile , bu t by developin g a dee p appreciatio n o f th e need s an d aspiration s of thei r people . Wit h thi s appreciation , a rappor t ca n b e estab lished whic h wil l allo w the m t o lea d th e Vietnames e peopl e i n a struggl e fo r th e attainmen t o f thos e ideal s whic h motivat e th e Chaus an d Hoa s of Vietna m a s i t di d ou r ow n (U.S. ) revolution ary leaders a little less than tw o hundred years ago. The deterioratio n o f th e situatio n i n Bin h Da i wa s actuall y slower i n comin g tha n i n the res t o f th e province , wher e a down ward tren d ha d starte d severa l month s earlier . I n Jun e o f 196 3 Lieutenant Colone l Tra n Ngo c Cha u wa s summone d b y Presi dent Die m an d sen t a s mayo r t o Danan g i n centra l Vietnam , to quie t th e Buddhist s wh o ha d begu n t o agitat e agains t th e government. I t wa s suppose d t o b e a temporar y assignment , an d his military deputy was named acting province chief. Major Du e wa s pleasan t an d wel l liked . H e too k ove r Chau' s office an d bega n t o mee t wit h th e tw o U.S . member s o f th e provincial rehabilitatio n committee . Cha u ha d outline d thos e things he wante d don e during hi s absence , an d Majo r Du e bega n to carr y the m out . A s tim e passe d an d Cha u di d no t return , Due becam e mor e an d mor e unhapp y wit h hi s difficul t assign ment an d wante d t o retur n t o somethin g h e kne w well—leadin g troops int o battle . Decision s o n ne w problem s wer e needed , an d he hesitate d t o mak e them . Th e progra m bega n t o slo w down . The repercussion s fro m th e suppressio n o f th e Buddhist s i n Sai gon an d centra l Vietna m wer e beginnin g t o b e fel t i n subtl e ways. Th e civi l servant s a t provincia l leve l wer e disturbe d b y what wa s happening , thei r wor k wa s affected , an d th e progra m slowed down . The n cam e th e Novembe r coup d'etat whic h over threw Diem . Wit h th e chang e i n governmen t thing s stil l di d not improve . Th e centra l governmen t wa s i n complet e confusion , [ 73 4 ]

STBATEGI C HAMLE T PROGRAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

and th e general s wer e attemptin g t o consolidat e thei r power . The Vie t Con g too k advantage o f th e confusio n an d greatl y bene fited b y intensifyin g th e pressure . I t becam e increasingl y appar ent tha t somethin g woul d hav e t o b e don e o r al l o f th e progres s achieved durin g th e first par t o f th e yea r woul d b e totall y lost . Some program s staggere d along , primaril y becaus e o f th e exis tence o f a decision-makin g bod y a t th e provincia l leve l (th e pro vincial committee ) wit h th e authorit y an d mean s t o act . The governmen t calle d fo r submissio n o f ne w "pacification " programs fo r establishmen t o f "ne w life " hamlets . Som e o f th e wrongs o f th e Die m program , suc h a s force d relocation , force d labor, an d force d contributions , wer e no w outlawed . Th e pro grams submitte d were , i n mos t cases , technica l improvement s over th e origina l plans . Th e Vietnames e an d American s ha d learned a grea t dea l abou t th e mechanic s o f th e progra m durin g the pas t year . However , ther e wa s a disturbin g emphasi s o n "control" o f territory an d "control " o f movement an d provisio n of mor e "hardware, " whic h seeme d t o los e sigh t o f th e origina l concept o f influencing people an d bringin g abou t a commitment to a cause. Rumors o f coup s an d counter-coup s persisted , an d moral e began t o falter—th e Vie t Con g continue d t o tak e advantag e o f the situatio n t o intensif y thei r activities . O n Januar y 30 , 1964 , the da y Genera l Khan h carrie d ou t hi s cou p agains t th e othe r generals, a reinforce d Vie t Con g compan y brok e throug h th e weakened defense s acros s th e smal l rive r fro m th e provincia l capital a t 6:3 0 i n th e evenin g an d fired mortar s an d automati c weapons int o th e tow n an d the n withdrew . Thi s wa s th e first time tha t thi s had happene d sinc e th e day s o f Lieutenant Colone l Thao (se e p . 707) . Exactl y on e wee k later , bu t thi s tim e a t 6:0 0 in the evening, the Viet Con g attacke d again , now wit h a heavie r mortar barrage . Moral e spirale d downward—official s move d thei r families t o Saigon , wealth y businessme n an d landowner s move d into th e provincia l capita l fro m th e distric t town s which ha d als o been hi t b y morta r attacks . Loca l securit y force s wer e defectin g to th e Vie t Con g a t a n alarmin g rate . And then i n Februar y 196 4 a very unusual thin g (fo r Vietnam ) happened. Lieutenan t Colone l Cha u wa s reassigne d t o Kie n Hoa . When h e returned , h e wa s shocke d t o find ho w badl y th e situa [735]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

tion ha d deteriorated . H e immediatel y too k of f o n a n inspectio n trip o f ever y district—repeatin g th e sam e evaluatio n stud y tha t he ha d mad e whe n h e first assume d directio n o f th e province . What h e foun d wa s ver y discouraging . H e determine d tha t h e would hav e t o pul l bac k man y post s an d withdra w fro m severa l strategic hamlet s t o regrou p hi s forc e t o reinforc e thos e villages , hamlets, an d post s whic h wer e still viable . H e the n pu t togethe r another excellen t program , whic h wa s a n improvemen t ove r th e original on e becaus e h e ha d ha d tim e t o evaluat e hi s previou s efforts durin g his absence fro m th e province . The downwar d spira l slowed , an d the n graduall y th e progra m began t o mov e forwar d again , bu t thi s tim e i t wa s muc h slowe r and mor e difficult . Th e centra l governmen t wa s stil l i n a stat e of complet e confusion . Supplie s wer e no t movin g ou t o f Saigon . Many o f Chau' s bes t me n ha d bee n killed . Ther e wa s wranglin g over th e allocatio n o f fund s t o th e provinces . Bu t despit e al l these obstacle s thing s bega n t o move . B y Augus t 196 4 moral e had picke d up , intelligenc e wa s onc e agai n comin g in , an d th e Viet Con g wer e agai n condemnin g publicl y an d complainin g privately abou t th e "America n puppet " Chau . The Vietnames e an d American s i n th e field hav e learne d a little bi t abou t insurgency—wha t cause s it , ho w thes e cause s are exploite d b y th e Communists , ho w t o comba t it , and , hope fully, ho w t o preven t i t fro m developin g i n othe r countries. 8 CONCLUSION

The Strategi c Hamle t Program , a s conceive d b y th e centra l government an d carrie d ou t i n Kie n Ho a Province , cam e clos e to meetin g th e requirement s fo r defeatin g a Communis t wa r o f national liberatio n an d achievin g th e politica l stabilizatio n whic h would allo w economi c an d socia l developmen t t o procee d i n a well-ordered manner . However , ther e wer e severa l weaknesse s which limite d th e effectivenes s o f th e program . A fe w o f th e 'Additional informatio n o n th e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m i s availabl e fro m AID i n Washington , including : "Note s o n Strategi c Hamlets, " prepare d b y C . T. R . Bohannan , Offic e o f Rura l Affairs , USOM/Saigon , Augus t 15 , 1963 ; "U.S . Owned Loca l Currenc y Releas e Agreemen t betwee n th e Agenc y fo r Internationa l Development (AID) , a n Agenc y o f th e Unite d State s o f America , an d th e Government o f Viet-Nam , Kie n Ho a Provinc e Rehabilitation, " Saigon , Decembe r 3, 1962 ; "Provinc e Rehabilitatio n Plan : Kie n Ho a Province, " Saigon , Marc h 6, 1964 .

[ 73 6 ]

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more important weaknesses and suggestions for improvement ar e listed below : I. Weakness in the Program. A. The progress of the program depended too heavily on the attitude and ability of a few individuals. If thes e wer e remove d from th e scene , th e progra m di d not mov e forwar d an d ofte n moved backward . Thi s suggest s thre e possibl e improvements : (1) Th e entir e program shoul d have been spelle d ou t much more precisely , i n simpl e language , s o tha t individual s a t al l levels woul d hav e com e t o understan d an d believ e i n th e pro gram. Onc e equippe d with thi s understandin g an d belief , a con stant flow o f encouragement , reaffirmatio n o f purpose , simpl e guide lines, and instruction s shoul d have been passed on to them to help them keep their eye on the objectives of the program. (2) Continuin g attentio n shoul d hav e bee n pai d t o careful selection, thoroug h indoctrination, and maintenance o f morale and motivation o f al l individual s involve d i n carryin g out th e program. (3) Th e developmen t o f mean s b y whic h th e governe d could pro d th e governmen t int o responsiv e actio n shoul d hav e been encouraged . Further , thi s basic concep t shoul d hav e bee n translated into realistic action programs. B. A s more experienc e wa s gained , i t became increasingl y ap parent that there was too much emphasis on physical accomplishments. Hamlet residents wer e provided with social and economi c facilities, e.g . schools , healt h centers , newspapers , whic h ar e found i n successful rura l communities in other areas of the world, and the n th e peopl e wer e expecte d t o commi t themselve s t o the government . Too little emphasis was placed on solving those problems which were really bothering the rural population, such as mistreatmen t b y governmen t officials , th e lac k o f a simpl e system o f justice , insufficien t land , hig h lan d rentals , an d hig h interest rate charged by money-lenders. The Vietnames e governmen t ha d attempte d t o mee t som e of these problem s throug h law s and program s whic h limite d lan d rentals, guarantee d th e right s o f tenanc y fo r thre e t o five years, provided agricultura l credi t a t reasonabl e rates , etc . Thes e pro grams, althoug h quit e goo d i n theory , wer e no t translate d int o [ 73 7 ]

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realistic actio n programs . Thi s failur e ca n b e trace d t o th e poo r caliber an d lo w motivatio n o f thos e charge d wit h th e responsibil ity fo r administratin g th e progra m a t th e province , district , vil lage, an d hamle t levels . Also , th e mechanica l procedure s wer e too cumbersom e t o provid e meaningfu l respons e t o th e need s of th e people . I n area s wher e th e basi c problem s o f land , justice , an d trul y responsive governmen t wer e handle d wel l b y th e loca l officials , th e peopl e wer e willin g t o commi t themselve s t o th e government . I n thes e area s hamle t resident s demonstrate d thei r confidenc e in th e governmen t b y providin g th e social an d economi c facilitie s the y neede d throug h thei r ow n effort s wit h a minimu m o f outsid e assistance . II. Suggested Improvements. Th e shortcoming s o f th e Vietnames e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m migh t hav e bee n overcom e b y carefull y applyin g th e followin g broa d concep t o f developmen t whic h i s base d o n ou r ow n (U.S.A. ) successfu l experience. 9 A. Th e preparatio n an d continua l proclamatio n o f a statemen t of th e aim s an d ideal s o f th e governmen t coul d provid e some thin g t o whic h al l citizen s coul d rall y an d fo r whos e preservatio n the y woul d willingl y ris k thei r lives . W e hav e suc h a statemen t in ou r Declaratio n o f Independenc e an d Constitution , strength ene d an d reaffirme d b y th e word s o f Patric k Henry , Thoma s Jefferson, Abraha m Lincoln , an d others . Th e Vietnames e peopl e have a goo d constitutio n (Fal l 1963 : Appendi x 2 ) an d a ric h traditio n o f herois m an d sacrific e fo r countr y whic h coul d serv e as th e basi s fo r a declaratio n o f aim s an d ideals . I f properl y presente d an d faithfull y observed , thi s coul d becom e th e rallyin g poin t fo r al l th e divergen t interes t groups , includin g man y o f 10 th e presen t Viet Con g supporters. B. Th e designer s o f th e U.S . constitutio n an d governmen t wer e well awar e o f th e necessit y t o creat e a n atmospher e i n whic h struggle (betwee n have s an d have-nots , managemen t an d unions , black an d white , etc. ) coul d tak e plac e wit h a minimu m o f vio * Fo r a n interestin g discussio n o f thi s though t se e "Ideolog y an d Organizatio n in Counterinsurgency, " by Methvi n (1964) . ω Th e hard-cor e Communist s could probabl y no t be converted .

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lence. Suc h a n atmospher e allow s an d encourage s citizen s t o present thei r aspiration s an d grievance s wit h th e knowledg e tha t they ca n b e satisfie d unde r a syste m o f la w an d withou t resor t to violence. The Vietnames e governmen t attempte d t o implemen t this concep t whe n i t include d provision s fo r fre e election s o f local officials , formatio n o f socia l an d economi c actio n group s within th e hamlets , an d majorit y selectio n o f self-hel p project s in th e Strategi c Hamle t Program . Thes e measure s wer e carrie d out fairl y wel l i n som e areas , suc h a s Kie n Ho a Province , bu t much mor e emphasi s shoul d hav e bee n place d o n translatin g thi s concept int o practical, effective actio n programs. The Vie t Con g i n Kie n Ho a Province , an d i n Sout h Vietna m in general , wer e fa r ahea d o f thei r opponent s i n understandin g the politica l and psychologica l natur e o f th e struggl e an d exploit ing th e grievance s an d aspiration s o f th e peasants . Th e image s they presente d t o th e peopl e wer e no t thos e o f a theoretica l Marx, a dictatoria l Stalin , o r a power-hungr y Mao , bu t mor e those o f a n inspirin g Patric k Henry , a brav e Robi n Hood , o r a jus t Abraha m Lincoln . Thes e statement s o f ideal s an d aim s which the y ha d prepare d ha d grea t popula r appea l amon g th e rural population (se e Fall 1963 : Appendix 4) . Once the y ha d seduce d th e peopl e wit h inspirin g slogans , the y then maintaine d an d strengthene d thei r hol d b y continuou s in doctrination, firm discipline , an d th e applicatio n o f terro r a s needed. Discussions wit h forme r Vie t Con g leader s (Communis t part y members) reveale d tha t the y kne w ver y wel l tha t the y woul d have t o seduc e th e peopl e b y presentin g themselve s a s the cham pions o f thei r aspiration s an d grievances . Bu t onc e the y gaine d complete control , the y full y intende d t o tur n Sout h Vietnam int o a Communis t state . This deception , carrie d ou t s o wel l b y th e Vie t Con g leaders , has resulte d i n th e rea l commitmen t o f a substantia l percentag e of th e rura l population . Thi s belie f an d spiri t canno t b e defeate d by militar y measure s alone . Th e Vie t Con g ca n b e kille d indi vidually b y bombs , machin e guns , an d artillery , bu t mor e wil l come forwar d t o replac e the m a s lon g a s th e peopl e ca n b e seduced or coerced to support th e Viet Cong. The peopl e o f Kie n Ho a wh o ha d neve r live d unde r Commu [ 73 9 ]

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L

nism wer e vulnerabl e target s fo r Vie t Con g propaganda ; thos e who ha d experience d Communis t control , suc h a s th e resettle d Catholic refugee s fro m Nort h Vietnam , resiste d th e Vie t Con g fiercely. Mor e emphasi s shoul d b e placed o n explainin g th e work ings of , an d condition s in , a Communist stat e suc h a s North Viet nam, i n term s tha t ca n b e understoo d an d believe d b y the peas ants o f Kie n Hoa . III. Effects of American Participation. U.S. participation i n the Strategi c Hamle t Progra m was a majo r departure fro m conventiona l AID , MAAG , an d USI S program s and shoul d provid e valuabl e lesson s fo r futur e developmen t programs. The majo r feature s o f th e program were : A. Decentralizatio n o f responsibility an d authority . B. Clos e coordinatio n betwee n U.S . governmen t agencie s and th e Vietnames e governmen t a t central , regiona l (ARV N Corps—the countr y i s divide d int o fou r corp s areas) , sub-re gional (ARV N division— a tactica l are a compose d o f severa l provinces), provincia l (ARV N secto r comparabl e t o U.S . state) , and, i n som e cases , distric t (ARV N subsector—comparabl e t o U.S. county ) levels. " C. America n follow-u p o f downwar d an d upwar d governmen tal communicatio n whic h resulte d i n the breaking o f many bottle necks an d th e expeditin g o f al l aspect s o f th e program . D. Th e immediat e an d continuin g availabilit y o f substantia l amounts o f money , P.L . 48 0 foodstuffs , an d material s wit h suffi cient U.S . participation i n administratio n to : (1) serv e a s a chec k o n misus e o f th e suppor t provided ; (2) provid e a legitimat e reaso n fo r offerin g advic e o n th e use o f th e suppor t provided . The presenc e o f American s a t th e lowe r level s was a n essentia l ingredient i n an y succes s th e progra m achieved . Fightin g a cen turies-old traditio n o f tigh t centra l control , the y gav e confidenc e to loca l leader s an d encourage d th e centra l governmen t t o pro 11 This extensio n o f coordinate d U.S . activitie s t o th e lowes t level s helpe d to assur e tha t th e policie s an d plan s develope d jointl y i n Saigo n wer e translate d into action programs a t the gras s roots level.

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STBATEGI C HAMLE T PHOGKAM , KIE N HO A PROVINC E

ceed wit h a decentralize d program . Th e Americans , both militar y and civilian , played many roles in the provinces : (1) The y wer e observer s an d students—takin g a graduat e course i n a people' s wa r an d i n broade r term s i n political/eco nomic/social developmen t i n general . (2) The y wer e friend s an d supporters—encouragin g thei r Vietnamese allies . (3) The y were reporters—helping t o shape U.S. understanding of th e comple x struggle . (4) The y wer e watchdog s (a s muc h a s a foreigne r ca n b e in a n alie n culture)—a s muc h fo r th e GV N a s fo r th e U.S . (5) The y wer e advisers , occasionall y i n guerrill a warfar e an d the politica l an d psychologica l struggle , bu t mor e ofte n i n thos e things tha t American s kno w best—hardware , procedures , book keeping, etc . The American s were al l of thes e thing s an d mor e and , a s such , served a s th e catalyst whic h starte d an d maintaine d th e momen tum o f th e program. 12 A people' s wa r an d a people' s arm y canno t b e fough t fro m the capita l o f th e countr y alone . Responsibilit y and authorit y must b e decentralized . Sufficien t flexibility mus t b e allowe d a t the lowe r level s o f governmen t t o provid e rapi d an d adequat e response t o loca l needs . Trus t mus t b e place d i n carefull y se lected leaders . Mistake s wil l frequentl y b e made , bu t th e struc ture o f governmen t wil l b e strengthene d rathe r tha n weakene d through thi s process . RECOMMENDATIONS FO R RESEARC H

Mao Tse-tun g ha s pointe d ou t tw o obviou s area s fo r researc h in th e political/social/economi c field : "Kno w you r enemy . Kno w yourself." Free worl d researc h i n thi s fiel d migh t b e improve d b y ap proaching th e problem s i n a n underdevelope d are a i n th e sam e way: 12 When th e majorit y o f th e U.S.-purchase d loca l currenc y ha d bee n spen t and ha d bee n replace d b y GV N controlle d currency , th e practic e o f a three-ma n sign-off fo r expenditure s wa s continue d becaus e th e GV N official s kne w tha t the U.S . personne l wer e honest , an d wer e no t convince d tha t thei r ow n me n were. A sid e effec t o f th e three-ma n sign-of f was tha t th e provinc e chie f fel t that h e coul d g o ahea d wit h th e progra m becaus e h e ha d tw o peopl e t o shar e the blam e o r back hi m u p i f h e got in hot wate r wit h th e Saigo n bureaucracy .

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V I E T N A M : JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L

A. Know your enemy: (1) Obtai n al l availabl e anti-governmen t propagand a an d arrange t o receiv e a continua l flow o f newl y develope d propa ganda. Analyze the propaganda an d identif y thos e aspiration s an d grievances whic h th e anti-governmen t force s inten d t o exploit . (2) Mak e a stud y o f th e political , psychological , an d mili tary tactic s o f th e anti-governmen t grou p t o determin e thei r strengths an d vulnerabilities . (3) Mak e a n attemp t t o determine whethe r th e anti-govern ment group s ar e foreign-dominated . I f the y ar e not , determin e the chance s o f th e movement's succumbin g t o foreign dominatio n and wha t polic y o r program s migh t b e develope d t o preven t this take-over . B. Know yourself: (1) Undertak e a n in-dept h stud y o f th e problem s whic h the anti-governmen t group s ar e exploitin g i n thei r attemp t t o win th e suppor t o f th e people . Prepar e recommendation s fo r cor rective government actio n which may be required . (2) Analyz e th e governmen t civi l servic e structur e t o deter mine method s fo r improvin g th e calibe r an d motivatio n o f gov ernmental employees a t all levels. (3) Analyz e th e presen t statu s o f upwar d communicatio n to determin e improve d method s fo r allowin g th e peopl e t o ex press an d satisf y thei r grievance s withou t resor t t o violence . RECOMMENDATIONS FO R ACTIO N

The Strategi c Hamle t Progra m a s applie d i n Kie n Ho a Prov ince suggest s severa l actio n possibilitie s whic h migh t b e appli cable i n othe r underdevelope d area s subjec t t o Communist-in spired insurgency . A fe w o f thes e actio n possibilitie s ar e liste d below: (1) Encourag e thoroug h decentralizatio n o f responsibility , authority, an d resources . America n o r othe r Fre e Worl d adviser s assigned a t lowe r echelon s o f government coul d serv e a s catalyst s in a decentralizatio n process . Th e rol e o f th e Peac e Corp s i n such an undertaking require s carefu l consideration . (2) Identify , train , an d motivat e responsibl e loca l leader ship, bot h governmen t official s an d non-governmenta l leaders . Training shoul d includ e thoroug h ye t simpl e explanatio n o f th e [ 74 2 ]

STRATEGIC H A M L E T PEOGHAM , KIE N HO A PBOVINC E

interrelationship o f governmen t an d th e governed—showin g con trast betwee n wester n democrac y an d Communis t exploitatio n of legitimat e grievances . (3) Encourag e nationa l leadershi p t o wor k o n improvin g attitudes an d administrativ e procedure s o f governmenta l bureau cracy t o provid e trul y responsiv e government . Th e complaint s and actio n techniqu e use d b y Provinc e Chie f Cha u i n Kie n Ho a and earlie r b y Presiden t Magsaysa y i n th e Philippine s coul d b e adapted t o condition s i n othe r countries . Rewardin g o f capable , honest civi l servant s an d punishmen t o f corrup t official s woul d greatly strengthe n th e nationa l civi l service . (4) Stres s immediat e grass-root s program s a s wel l a s long range nationa l development . Th e avowe d ai m o f th e Communis t world—China an d Cub a i n particular—i s t o us e th e techniqu e of exploitin g local grievance s t o creat e nationa l war s o f liberatio n which wil l bring t o powe r group s whic h woul d b e subservien t t o their plan s fo r worl d domination . Th e U.S . an d th e Fre e Worl d in genera l canno t affor d t o devot e year s t o gradua l nationa l de velopment whil e a clever, ambitiou s enem y i s steadil y subvertin g the rura l an d urba n population .

REFERENCES CITE D BOHANNON, C . T . R .

1963 Note s o n strategi c hamlets . USOM , Offic e o f Rura l Affairs , August 15 . Saigon . F A L L , BERNAR D B .

1963 Th

e tw o Viet Nams . Ne w York , Frederic k A . Praeger .

HiCKEY, G E R A L D C .

1963 Problem s o f socia l chang e i n Vietnam . In Proceeding s o f th e Ninth Pacifi c Scienc e Congres s o f th e Pacifi c Scienc e Associ ation, 1957 . Vol . 3 , Anthropolog y an d Socia l Sciences , p p . 209-216. Bangkok , Sacretariat , Nint h Pacifi c Scienc e Congress . HENDERSON, W I L L I A M

1961 Openin g o f ne w land s an d villages : Th e Republi c o f Vietnam' s land developmen t program . In Problem s o f freedom : Sout h Vietnam sinc e independence , Wesle y R . Fishel , ed . Ne w York , The Fre e Pres s o f Glencoe , Inc. , 123-138 . METHVTN, EUGEN E

1964 Ideolog y an d organizatio n i n counterinsurgency . Orbis , Spring , Vol. 8 .

[743 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N B . O ' D O N N E L L NGUYEN KHA C N H A N

1961 Polic y o f ke y rura l agrovilles . Asia n Cultur e 3 ( 3 - 4 ) : 2 9 - 4 9 (July-December). OSANKA, FRANKLI N MAB K

1964 Populatio n contro l technique s o f Communis t insurgents , a sociological analysis . Australia n Arm y Journal , January , No . 17. OSBOHNE, MILTO N E .

1965 Strategi c Hamlet s i n Sout h Vietnam : a surve y an d a compari son. Ithaca , Cornel l University , Southeas t Asi a Program , De partment o f Asian Studies , Data Pape r 55. SMITH, Majo r W I L L I A M , J R .

1964 Th

e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m i n Vietnam . Militar y Revie w 44(5) (May) .

UNITED STATE S OPERATION S MISSIO N

1962 U.S . owne d loca l currenc y releas e agreemen t betwee n th e Agency fo r Internationa l Developmen t (AID) , a n agenc y of th e Unite d State s o f America , an d th e governmen t o f Viet Nam, Kie n Ho a Provinc e rehabilitation . USOM , Decembe r 3. Saigon . 1963 Provincia l representative' s genera l narrativ e o n progress , Kie n Hoa Province . USOM , Jun e an d July. Saigon . 1964 Provinc e rehabilitatio n plan : Kie n Ho a Province . USOM , March 6 . Saigon . WARNER, DENI S

1963 Th

e last Confucian . Ne w York, Macmillan .

ZASLOFF, JOSEP H J .

N.D. Rura l resettlemen t i n Vietnam : a n agrovill e i n development . Michigan Stat e Universit y Vietna m Advisor y Group . Agenc y for Internationa l Developmen t Contrac t IC A c l l 2 6 . 1962- Rura l resettlemen t i n Sout h Vietnam : th e agrovill e program . 1963 Pacifi c Affair s 35(4):327-34 0 (Winter) .

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CHAPTE R 1 9

Some Aspects of Hill Tribe Life in Vietnam GERAL D C . HICKEY "

HISTORICAL AN D CULTURA L BACKGROUN D

Introduction. Fro m a n ethnolinguisti c poin t o f view , th e Indo chinese peninsul a i s on e o f th e mos t comple x area s o f th e world. Generall y speaking , however , th e ethni c group s tha t occupy th e are a ca n b e place d i n on e o f tw o categories : those tha t liv e i n th e lowland s (th e plains , valleys , an d deltas ) and thos e tha t occup y th e highlands . Mor e tha n a geographica l distinction, th e highland-lowlan d dichotom y play s a n importan t part i n contemporar y problem s o f th e area. Historically , th e loca tion o f a give n ethni c grou p ha s ha d significanc e fo r it s develop ment, fo r th e advance s o f civilizatio n i n th e Indochines e penin sula have been restricted t o the lowlands. The primar y source s o f hig h cultur e i n th e Indochines e penin sula hav e been Indi a an d China . A s it sprea d eastward , th e grea t tradition o f Indi a molde d th e civilization s o f th e Thai , Lao , an d Khmer (th e predominan t ethni c group s o f present-da y Thailand , Laos, an d Cambodia ) a s wel l a s o f th e Cham . (Althoug h onl y an estimate d 45,00 0 Cha m surviv e toda y i n centra l Vietnam , thi s once-populous grou p a t on e tim e dominate d th e kingdo m o f Champa, whic h decline d a s a resul t o f war s wit h th e Vietnames e that culminate d i n it s defea t i n 1471. ) Th e grea t traditio n o f China i s represente d b y th e Vietnamese , wh e wer e sinicize d during th e thousand-yea r perio d o f Chines e rul e an d who , sinc e the tent h century , hav e carrie d thi s traditio n southwar d i n thei r expansion alon g th e coasta l plai n t o th e delt a o f th e Mekon g River. * Portions o f thi s pape r appea r i n a somewha t differen t for m i n Th e Majo r Ethnic Group s o f th e Sout h Vietnames e Highland s RM-4041-ARPA , b y G . C . Hickey, publishe d b y th e RAN D Corporation , Apri l 1964 , reproduce d her e b y permission. Material s o n th e contemporar y situatio n i n Vietna m refe r t o mid-1965 .

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VIETNAM : GEHAL D C . HICKE T

The highlan d group s o f th e Indochines e peninsula , o n th e other hand , hav e remaine d relativel y aloo f fro m thes e grea t cur rents o f history . This i s not t o say that the y have been completel y isolated fro m outsid e contac t o r tha t thei r societie s hav e remained unchanged . Man y group s hav e lon g ha d contac t wit h their civilize d lowlan d neighbors , wh o i n man y instance s ar e re lated linguistically . Sometime s th e contac t ha s bee n marke d b y conflict, an d sometime s i t ha s bee n largel y symbiotic , resultin g in th e borrowin g o f cultur e traits . Also , sinc e th e mid-nineteent h century, a numbe r o f groups , particularl y thos e i n th e souther n Vietnamese highlands , hav e ha d contac t wit h th e French . Essen tially, however , th e highlan d peopl e (montagnard) hav e no t be come par t o f an y o f th e grea t tradition s tha t hav e touche d them ; they hav e no t bee n "civilized. " Linguistically, however , ther e i s considerabl e variatio n amon g the hil l tribes . Th e Rhad e an d Jara i spea k closel y relate d lan guages tha t belon g t o th e Malayo-Polynesia n stock , whic h includes Cham ; th e Mnong , Stieng , Bahnar , an d Sedan g lan guages belon g t o th e Mon-Khme r stock , whic h include s Cambo dian. Thi s doe s no t impl y formidable linguisti c barriers, however , as group s speakin g differen t language s (whethe r o f th e sam e stock o r not ) bu t locate d i n contiguou s area s ar e sufficientl y fa miliar wit h on e another' s language s t o communicat e wit h relativ e ease. A Brief Historical Sketch. 1 Betwee n th e nint h an d th e twelft h centuries, th e highlan d are a o f souther n Lao s an d Vietna m i s mentioned severa l time s i n account s o f th e intermitten t strug gles betwee n th e kingdo m o f Champ a (whos e capita l cit y o f Vijaya wa s o n th e coasta l plai n o f wha t i s now centra l Vietnam ) and th e Khme r empir e (whos e capita l wa s a t Angkor , nea r th e Tonle Sa p i n present-da y Cambodia) . I n those struggle s th e are a was a buffe r zone , whic h ofte n passe d fro m th e contro l o f on e side t o tha t o f th e other . I n time s o f peac e trad e betwee n th e two kingdoms wa s carrie d on over a highland route . Occasionally , highlanders participate d i n event s o f th e period ; i n 1149 , fo r example, a n arm y compose d o f Cham , Vietnamese , an d member s 1 ExCePt a s noted , historica l materia l o n th e highlander s come s fro m Bourott e (1955:1-133). Thi s i s th e majo r historica l sourc e fo r th e highland s o f souther n Vietnam.

[ 74 6 ]

ASPECT S O F HIL L THIB E LIF E

of severa l highlan d group s fough t a n unsuccessfu l battl e agains t an army o f invadin g Khmer . The yea r 115 0 marked th e beginnin g o f a long perio d o f Cha m hegemony ove r mos t o f th e hig h plateau . Thi s ende d i n 147 1 with th e defea t o f th e Cha m b y th e Vietnamese , wh o the n ex tended thei r authorit y t o includ e som e o f th e area s inlan d fro m the coasta l plain . Th e greate r par t o f th e hig h plateau , however , remained ungoverne d for severa l hundre d years . By th e beginnin g o f th e seventeent h centur y La o influenc e in th e highland s a s far sout h a s th e Bolove n Platea u wa s increas ing, and Khme r contro l extended ove r most of th e Darla c Plateau . Accounts o f thi s perio d mentio n th e existenc e o f th e powerfu l Jarai sorcere r know n a s th e Sade t o f Fire , who m legen d claim s to b e th e guardia n o f th e sacre d Pra h Kha n sabe r o f th e ancien t Khmer (se e "Th e Sadets, " below) . I n 160 1 th e Kin g o f Cam bodia, th e Sade t o f Fire , an d anothe r Jara i sorcerer , th e Sade t of Water , forme d a n allianc e o f friendshi p i n which the y pledge d themselves t o exchang e gift s ever y thre e years . Th e exchange s continued unti l 1890 , when Norodo m becam e Kin g of Cambodia , and hav e becom e th e basi s fo r a clai m fo r "reunification " o f the highlands wit h Cambodi a (se e below) . The seventeent h an d eighteent h centurie s wer e a perio d o f considerable inter-grou p warfar e i n th e highlands , an d ne w con tenders fo r contro l o f th e are a appeared . Th e Vietnamese , i n continuing thei r southwar d expansion , reache d th e delt a o f th e Mekong River , an d th e Nguye n emperor s followe d th e patter n of extendin g thei r contro l t o highlan d area s adjacen t t o th e coastal plain . Th e Siames e wer e expandin g eastwar d and , afte r struggling wit h th e Lao , assume d contro l ove r th e Bolove n Pla teau. Accordin g t o on e eighteenth-centur y account , man y o f th e inter-group war s wer e concentrate d i n th e Darla c Plateau . Ther e the Jara i wer e sai d t o b e raidin g village s o f neighborin g groups , notably th e Bahnar , an d carryin g of f slave s whic h the y sol d t o the Lao , an d th e Sedan g als o wer e reporte d a s fightin g wit h their neighbors . The firs t Westerner s reache d th e highland s i n 1843 , whe n Catholic missionarie s o f th e Societ e d e l a Missio n Etranger e d e Paris travele d int o th e interio r fro m th e coasta l tow n o f Touran e (now Danang) . I n 184 9 th e first missio n wa s establishe d nea r [747 ]

VIETNAM : GEEAL D C . HICKE Y

present-day Kontum , an d b y 185 1 ther e wer e fou r missionarie s (three Frenc h an d on e Vietnamese ) workin g i n Bahna r villages . Because o f th e inter-grou p warfare o f th e period , th e missionarie s encountered grea t difficulties . Th e existenc e o f th e missio n wa s temporarily threatene d i n 1862 , whe n a n epidemi c struc k dow n many o f th e Bahnar , whos e sorcerer s blame d th e diseas e o n th e presence o f th e foreigners . Th e Sedan g aggravate d th e situatio n by attacking Bahnar villages at that moment . When th e Frenc h occupie d th e delt a o f th e Mekon g Rive r in 1859 , agitatio n sprea d t o th e group s i n th e adjacen t souther n highlands. (Som e source s conten d tha t muc h o f i t wa s stirre d up b y th e Vietnamese. ) Th e Stien g i n th e vicinit y o f Th u Da u Mot revolte d agains t th e French , a s di d th e Chra u i n th e are a east o f Bari a (no w calle d Phuo c Le). I n th e period tha t followed , the Siamese , French , English , an d German s wer e biddin g fo r control o f th e Mekon g River , an d th e souther n Laotia n an d Viet namese highland s assume d ne w importance . T o secur e thei r claim o n th e area , th e Frenc h organize d severa l explorator y mis sions, th e first o f whic h wa s th e Gautie r Missio n o f 1881 . Th e aim o f th e exploratio n wa s t o reac h Hu e i n central Vietna m fro m the Mekon g Delt a b y followin g th e Donna i River , continuin g northward, contactin g th e Stieng , Mnong , an d Bahnar , an d ultimately crossin g th e Cordiller a t o Hue . Th e missio n faile d t o achieve thi s end , however , when , upo n reachin g th e confluenc e of th e Donna i an d th e D a Hou e rivers , th e guide s refuse d t o continue northward . I n hi s accoun t o f th e expeditio n Gautie r mentions a "kin g o f th e mois, " Tong Hen , a ma n o f seventy-fiv e who trafficke d i n slave s an d wa s recognize d a s a leade r b y som e of th e smalle r groups . During th e secon d hal f o f th e nineteent h centur y th e Nguye n emperors bega n sponsorin g don dien, o r militar y colonies , i n th e upland area s adjacen t t o th e coasta l plain , wher e member s o f the arm y wer e give n lan d so tha t the y migh t settl e thes e ne w territories. I n additio n t o forcin g man y highlanders t o mov e fur ther inland , th e Vietnames e settler s exploite d thos e wit h who m they cam e i n contact . Th e quan truong, o r leade r o f th e settlers , often demande d rhinocero s horn s o r slave s o f th e loca l highland ers, an d i n 188 3 severa l seriou s incident s prompte d restrainin g action b y th e Frenc h administrators . (I n on e instance, a highlan d [ 74 8 ]

ASPECT S O F HIL L TRIB E LIF E

village headma n wa s burne d alive , an d hi s wif e slain , whe n h e failed t o suppl y th e amoun t o f corvee labo r demande d b y Viet namese settlers.) 2 The importanc e o f th e Darla c Platea u i n th e bi d fo r contro l of th e Mekon g ros e wit h report s i n 188 5 tha t th e stream s i n the Sedan g countr y containe d gol d an d wit h persisten t rumor s of othe r minera l riche s i n th e area . I n 188 8 th e Frenc h adminis tration organize d a n expeditio n t o investigat e th e Sedan g are a and place d i t unde r th e leadershi p o f Mayrena , a Belgia n ad venturer. O n hi s arriva l i n th e Sedan g country , Mayren a mad e contact wit h Pirn , a Sedan g chie f wh o ha d gaine d th e suppor t of man y village s amon g th e Sedan g an d Bahnar . Becaus e o f Mayrena's impressiv e appearanc e an d hi s unusua l physica l feats , the Sedan g leade r conclude d tha t h e wa s a ma n o f grea t ae ("mana" o r "sou l force" ; se e below , p . 758 ) an d forme d a n al liance wit h him . Encourage d b y th e Frenc h missionaries , Mayrena attempted , throug h th e leadershi p o f Pirn , t o for m a federation o f ethni c group s i n th e area . Th e Jara i trie d t o resis t Sedang hegemony , bu t withou t success , and , whe n severa l o f th e groups ha d bowe d t o Sedan g leadership , Mayren a declare d th e area t o b e autonomou s an d name d himsel f it s ruler , "Mari e I , King o f th e Sedang. " H e the n sen t notic e o f thi s ne w develop ment t o th e Frenc h authoritie s an d als o aske d thei r permissio n to transpor t mineral s an d othe r produc e t o th e coasta l town s for shipping . Shoul d th e Frenc h refuse , h e added , h e wa s willin g to negotiat e wit h th e English , Germans , o r Siamese . Th e affai r was short-lived , however . Whe n Mayren a wen t t o Belgiu m i n 1889, th e Frenc h denie d hi m permissio n t o retur n t o Indochin a (Bourotte 1955 ; Dossier Mayrena) . In 1890-1891 , a Frenc h explorator y expeditio n know n a s th e Pavie Missio n secure d th e right s o f th e Frenc h i n Laos , expellin g the Siames e fro m th e highlan d area s the y occupie d eas t o f th e Mekong River . Accompanie d b y a ban d o f Cambodians , Captai n Cupet, a membe r o f th e Pavi e Mission , travele d fro m Krati e i n Cambodia t o th e highlan d town s o f Ba n Do n an d Kontum . Th e group encountere d grea t difficulties , som e o f whic h ha d bee n provoked b y a rumor amon g th e Jarai that Cupe t wa s responsibl e 2 Vietnamese attempt s t o settl e i n th e highland s an d consequen t problem s for th e hill tribes have continue d u p to the present day .

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VIETNAM : GEHAL D C . HICKE Y

for suppressin g th e Cambodia n king' s gift s t o th e Sade t o f Fire . Cupet, however , succeede d i n impressin g th e Jara i (hi s compas s was o f particula r interes t t o them) , an d the y agree d t o tak e him t o th e Sade t o f Fire , wh o welcome d hi m cordially . Cupe t noted i n his accoun t o f th e visi t tha t the Sadet' s follower s seeme d to pay hi m littl e deference . H e als o met th e Sade t o f Wate r and , although h e ha d n o gift s t o offe r th e sorcerer , wa s abl e t o for m an alliance with him . In 190 0 ther e emerge d anothe r "kin g o f th e mois, " L e V o Tru. (Althoug h th e reports are not specific o n this point, th e nam e would indicat e tha t h e wa s eithe r a Vietnames e o r a n accultur ated highlander. ) Wit h a following o f aroun d nin e hundred high landers, L e V o Tr u raide d th e centra l coasta l tow n o f Son g Cau , killing th e Frenc h resident , hi s wife , an d thei r guards . H e an d his ban d the n assume d contro l o f th e area , until th e Gard e Indo chinoise Provincial e arrived , capture d th e leader , an d thu s ende d the venture . During th e first year s o f th e twentiet h centur y ther e wa s a marked increas e i n attack s o n Frenc h militar y an d missionarie s throughout th e highlands . I n a n attemp t t o restor e orde r an d gain th e highlanders ' suppor t o f th e French , Odend'hal , a hig h French administrator , accompanie d b y a smal l unarme d ban d of Vietnames e (Odend'ha l explicitl y refuse d a n arme d escort) , journeyed int o th e Jara i area . Ther e h e wa s welcome d b y th e Sadet o f Fire , an d th e tw o me n agree d t o for m a n alliance . Afte r they ha d share d a chicken , th e Sade t prepare d a specia l ja r con taining prescribe d ingredient s fo r a bloo d oath , an d th e Sade t drank fro m th e jar . Bu t OdendTia l refused , sayin g tha t h e onl y drank water , apparentl y unawar e o f th e impor t o f such a refusal . The Sade t becam e angr y an d suspicious , an d Odend'ha l aggra vated thi s b y askin g t o b e show n th e sacre d saber . Severa l day s later a ban d o f Jara i warrior s sle w th e Frenchma n an d hi s assis tants an d burned thei r bodies . In 190 5 Darla c Provinc e wa s shifte d fro m Lao s t o Vietna m and a Frenc h Residen t appointed . Thi s increase d Frenc h contro l and, accordin g t o Bourotte , diminishe d th e powe r o f th e Sadet s of Fire . Anothe r "kin g o f th e mois " appeared durin g tha t year . He wa s M e Sao , of a poo r Rhad e famil y tha t ha d know n slavery . Me Sa o an d a smal l ban d o f follower s establishe d themselve s [750]

ASPECT S O F HIL L TRIB E LIF E

in the heights between M'drac and Ban Me Thuot and conducte d raids o n village s o f th e are a t o captur e slave s who m the y the n sold. Th e mandarins o f Ph u Ye n and Khan h Ho a wer e reporte d to hav e aide d M e Sa o in hi s activities an d share d i n th e profits . As more and more villages fell under his control, Me Sao became bolder, unti l finally th e Residen t o f Darla c dispatche d troop s to th e area . M e Sa o wa s turne d ove r t o th e troop s b y hi s ow n followers, and he later died in prison. The situation in Darlac Province improved considerably during the tenur e o f Sabatier , who was the Residen t in th e first quarter of th e twentieth century . Thi s energeti c an d intelligen t adminis trator launche d publi c work s projects , improve d th e administra tive services , an d conducte d systemati c researc h o n th e ethni c groups o f th e province . Assiste d b y th e abl e administrato r Antomarchi, Sabatie r founde d a schoo l syste m fo r highlander s as wel l a s a medica l service . Th e growin g reputatio n o f Darla c as an are a o f ric h an d fertil e soi l cause d a lan d rus h i n 1925 , and, withi n a perio d o f a fe w months , ove r on e hundre d bid s for lan d totalin g 92,00 0 hectare s wer e filed wit h th e colonia l administration i n Saigon . Bidders were eithe r individua l planter s or representative s o f larg e Frenc h corporation s intereste d i n es tablishing extensiv e tea , coffee , o r rubbe r estate s i n th e area. 3 To mee t th e demand s o f thi s ne w situation , th e Frenc h ad ministration undertoo k a study o f th e lan d questio n i n th e high lands, an d i n 192 7 Sabatie r issue d tw o comprehensiv e reports , the first concerne d largel y wit h th e land-tenur e questio n an d the secon d wit h recommendation s fo r copin g with th e problem s involved in developing the area. The first repor t pointe d out that , whil e som e lan d wa s unclaimed, there wer e larg e area s carefull y apportione d b y individuals, families, clans , or villages. It emphasize d als o that land tenure system s varied from on e ethnic grou p t o another. Specifi c information wa s given on the land system of th e Rhade, wherein, by th e matrilinea l rule s o f succession , right s t o a give n territor y were veste d i n po Mn (femal e proprietors) , wh o hel d titl e fo r * See "Document s d e Colonisatio n Fran?ais e e n Territorei s No n Soumi s a l a Jurisdiction e t a !'Administratio n Annamites, " Ecol e Francais e d'Extrem e Orient , 1927 (manuscrip t i n tw o parts) . Thes e ar e th e report s prepare d b y Sabatie r concerning th e land-tenur e situatio n i n th e souther n highlands . The y als o contai n recommendations fo r grantin g tide s o r leases to colonists .

[751]

V I E T N A M : GERAL D C . HICKE Y

their ki n group . Th e limit s o f th e territor y wer e clearl y defined , and th e po Ian wa s oblige d b y traditio n t o wal k it s boundarie s periodically. Sh e als o wa s responsibl e fo r regulatin g swidde n agriculture i n th e territor y an d prescribin g punishment s fo r offenses (includin g incest ) committe d withi n it s limit s (se e Sabatier 1940) . The secon d repor t containe d extensiv e recommendation s fo r land settlemen t procedure . I n essence , lan d unclaime d (res nullius) woul d b e immediatel y availabl e fo r colonizatio n wit h th e approval o f th e colonia l administration , an d titl e t o th e lan d could b e granted . Wit h lan d claime d b y th e highlanders , how ever, a colonis t coul d onl y receiv e a bail emphytheotique, o r ninety-nine yea r lease . In additio n t o th e approva l o f th e colonia l administration, th e bidde r fo r a give n piec e o f lan d woul d als o need th e approva l o f th e highlande r (o r grou p o f highlanders ) claiming titl e t o th e land . Fo r example , i n part s o f th e Rhad e country i t woul d b e essentia l t o hav e th e accor d o f th e po Ian and headme n o f village s withi n th e territor y concerned . In addition , th e repor t covere d suc h topic s a s labo r fo r th e proposed estates . It strongl y suggeste d keepin g Vietnames e labo r out o f th e highlands , pointin g ou t tha t contac t wit h th e Vietnam ese an d Cha m ha d alway s bee n deleteriou s fo r th e highlan d people. In additio n t o formulatin g th e lan d polic y i n th e highlands , the Frenc h extende d t o th e entir e are a th e administrativ e syste m established a t th e en d o f th e nineteent h centur y fo r thos e por tions the n unde r thei r control . Th e larges t administrativ e unit s were th e provinces , an d thes e wer e divide d int o districts , som e of whic h wer e furthe r divide d int o cantons . Th e village s wer e the smalles t administrativ e units , an d the y retaine d thei r tradi tional leadership . Eventually , th e whol e highlan d area , desig nated a s th e Pay s Montagnar d d u Su d (an d usuall y referre d to a s th e PMS) , becam e a Crow n Domain e (Domaine de la Couronne) directl y under th e control of the emperor . Although th e Rhad e cooperate d substantiall y wit h th e Frenc h administrators, othe r highlan d group s continue d t o resis t thei r authority. I n 193 1 Gatille , chie f o f Snou l District , wa s kille d b y a grou p o f Mnon g whil e inspectin g th e constructio n o f a ne w road designe d t o travers e th e souther n portio n o f th e highlands . [ 75 2 ]

ASPECT S O F HIL L TBIB E LIF E

Two year s late r Morere , th e marsha l o f th e loca l gendarmerie , was slai n i n th e vicinit y o f Nu i Bara . I n 193 4 and agai n i n 193 5 Camp Rolland , on e o f th e mos t importan t militar y post s i n th e southern highlan d area , wa s attacke d b y a combine d forc e o f Mnong an d Stieng . Between 193 5 an d 193 8 ther e wa s als o considerabl e agitatio n among highlan d group s furthe r north , i n th e Pleik u an d Kontu m areas. Amon g th e Bahna r an d Sedan g ther e i s belie f i n ya —the incarnations o f powerfu l spirit s i n huma n form—an d i n 193 5 a rumor sprea d tha t a ya ha d appeare d i n Ph u Yen . I t wa s sai d to b e th e chil d o f a ma n name d M a Wi h an d a python , an d was believe d t o b e th e incarnatio n o f Set , bearde d so n o f Ko k Glaih, th e Spiri t o f Thunder . Amon g th e Bahnar , Sedang , an d Jarai th e new s cause d a grea t stir ; i t wa s interprete d a s a sig n that th e promise d "ag e o f gold " ha d come . Pilgrim s began flock ing t o th e hous e o f M a Wi h bearin g offerings , fo r whic h M a Wih gav e the m smal l bottle s o f "magic " wate r a s a powerfu l talisman. Th e Sedan g openl y expresse d thei r oppositio n t o th e French administratio n an d attacke d Frenc h outposts . Th e Jara i abandoned thei r fields , i n th e belie f tha t i n thi s ne w ag e the y would b e provide d fo r withou t havin g t o work . Th e administra tion finall y steppe d i n an d arreste d M a Wih . Befor e th e tribuna l Ma Wi h argue d tha t h e ha d committe d n o crime ; h e simpl y had give n wate r t o th e curiosity-seeker s t o satisf y the m s o tha t they woul d leav e hi m alone . Th e trouble , h e contended , wa s caused b y th e Spiri t o f th e Forest . M a Wi h wa s released , an d the agitatio n subsided . The take-ove r b y th e Japanes e o n Marc h 9 , 1945 , ushere d i n a ne w perio d o f troubl e for th e highlanders and o f loss of prestig e for th e French . Som e highlander s aide d th e Japanese , whil e others fough t them . Whe n th e Frenc h regaine d contro l a t th e end o f 1945 , the Vie t Min h wer e operatin g i n th e Darla c Platea u and encouragin g th e highlander s t o "fight th e colonialis t oppres sors." I n th e year s following , highlander s fough t bot h o n th e side o f th e Vie t Min h an d o n tha t o f th e French . Wit h th e Ge neva Agreement s o f 195 4 mos t o f th e souther n highland s cam e under th e contro l o f th e governmen t o f Sout h Vietnam . A larg e number (th e exac t figur e neve r wa s reported ) o f highlander s who ha d fough t wit h th e Vie t Min h wen t t o Nort h Vietnam . [ 75 3 ]

V I E T N A M : GEHAL

D C . HICKE

Y

With th e passin g o f th e souther n highland s t o th e Vietnamese , the PM S a s a n administrativ e uni t wa s abolished , an d th e provin cial administration s becam e directl y responsibl e t o th e govern ment i n Saigon . Triba l hamlet s wer e arbitrarily consolidate d int o villages fo r administrativ e purposes . Villag e chief s wer e ap pointed b y th e distric t chiefs , subjec t t o approval by th e provinc e chief. Highland agent s traine d i n Nort h Vietna m manifestl y bega n infiltrating th e are a i n 1957 , a t a tim e whe n thousand s o f Viet namese refugee s fro m Nort h Vietna m wer e bein g resettle d i n the highlands . B y 196 0 ther e wer e reporte d t o b e 51,69 5 Viet namese settle d o n 21,18 6 hectare s o f land , mos t o f i t i n th e vi cinity o f Ba n M e Thuo t an d Pleiku . Th e highlander s hav e als o been subjec t t o force d resettlemen t programs . B y 196 3 thre e large regroupmen t center s wer e functionin g fo r th e highlanders . Since 196 0 th e highland s hav e agai n becom e a buffe r zone , thi s time i n th e struggl e betwee n th e Vie t Con g an d th e governmen t of th e Republi c o f Sout h Vietna m (Biro u (1963:1-12 ; Hicke y 1956-1958). Cultural Background: Economic Activities. Althoug h ther e ar e many detail s o f difference s betwee n th e variou s highlan d groups , a numbe r o f similaritie s betwee n the m ca n b e mentioned. Amon g the highlanders , the villag e i s th e mos t importan t economi c unit . Whatever i s neede d b y th e peopl e i s produce d i n th e village , and whateve r i s produce d i s consume d b y villag e residents . A U highland group s practic e swidde n agricultur e (se e below , pp . 765 ff.) .4 Upland o r dr y ric e i s the stapl e crop , but al l th e group s cultivate numerou s secondar y crop s i n th e swidde n afte r th e har vest and in kitchen garden s within th e village. 5 They als o rais e chickens , pigs , buffaloes , an d goats , an d bot h hunting an d fishing ar e activitie s essentia l t o th e sustenanc e o f the group . * Swidden agricultur e ofte n i s referre d t o a s "slash-and-bum " o r "shifting " agriculture. I n bot h Frenc h an d Vietnames e literatur e i t i s calle d ray. s More recently , som e groups , notabl y th e Rhad e an d Sedang , hav e begu n cultivating coffe e plant s i n smal l estates , sometime s a n individua l effort , sometime s a grou p effort . Se e Da m B o (Jacque s Dournes ) (1950:931-1208) , th e genera l source fo r mos t o f th e highlan d group s o f Sout h Vietnam . Feelin g tha t th e highland group s ar e to o simila r i n thei r wa y o f lif e t o b e separated , Dourne s refers t o the m genericall y a s "Pemsiens " (take n fro m th e initial s PMS , fo r Pay s Montagnard d u Sud) .

[754]

ASPECT S O F HIL L TRIB E LIF E

Socio-Political Organizations. Politically , too , th e villag e i s th e most importan t unit . Althoug h th e highlan d group s ofte n ar e referred t o a s tribes , the y hav e n o triba l organization . Indeed , prior t o th e establishmen t o f th e Frenc h administratio n a t th e end o f th e nineteent h century , ther e wa s n o political superstruc ture o r recognize d permanen t leadershi p beyon d th e village . Th e present Vietnames e administrativ e system , simila r i n structur e to th e French , provide s th e onl y large-scal e politica l organizatio n in th e highlands . Amon g th e Bahnar , ther e ar e toring, o r define d territories, collectivel y claime d b y th e village s withi n them , bu t these association s ar e designe d t o safeguar d th e villages ' hunting , fishing, an d farmin g rights , rathe r tha n t o provid e a politica l bond (Guillemine t 1949:383-384) . In th e pas t ther e hav e bee n individua l leader s wh o for a tim e gained politica l ascendanc y ove r group s o f villages , whole ethni c groups, an d i n som e case s severa l groups , bu t th e union s the y achieved wer e short-lived . Notabl e amon g thes e leader s wer e some o f th e Sadet s o f Fire , powerful sorcerer s who exercise d con siderable politica l influenc e amon g th e Jara i an d neighborin g groups (se e "A Brief Historica l Sketch," above). Normally, however , th e highlanders ' politica l activitie s ar e re stricted t o th e village . Th e villag e politica l organization s o f th e various group s ar e quit e similar , wit h politica l authorit y i n th e hands o f th e males . Thi s authorit y i s no t diminishe d b y th e fac t that th e Rhade , Jarai , an d Mnon g hav e matrilinea l kinshi p sys tems, i n whic h descen t i s i n th e femal e line , an d th e wome n own th e houses , domesti c animals , produc e fro m farming , an d gongs an d jar s (bot h prestig e items ) an d als o hol d titl e t o lan d (Hickey 1956-1958) . Ever y villag e ha s a counci l o f elde r males , usually draw n fro m th e househol d heads , an d fro m amon g thes e elders th e villag e headma n i s selecte d eithe r b y th e counci l o r by a consensu s o f adul t villagers . Administratio n o f th e village , protection o f th e inhabitants , an d organizatio n o f villag e ritual s are th e traditiona l responsibilitie s o f th e headman , assiste d an d counseled by th e elders . After th e arriva l o f th e Frenc h th e head man als o provide d liaiso n betwee n th e villager s an d th e distric t authorities. Justice ha s traditionall y bee n largel y i n th e hand s o f th e vil lage headma n an d th e council . Althoug h famil y problem s ar e [ 75 5 ]

V I E T N A M : GERAL D C . HICKE Y

supposed t o be resolve d b y th e head o f th e family , othe r conflicts , including violation s o f villag e customs , ar e deal t wit h b y th e village leaders . I n th e village-centere d societ y o f th e highlands , customs an d mora l code s ar e deepl y internalized . Village s hav e a stron g collectiv e spirit , an d everyon e i n the m share s i n th e same styl e o f lif e an d subscribe s t o th e sam e se t o f values . Be cause th e villag e societ y i s small , breache s o f custo m d o no t go unnoticed , an d th e sanctio n o f th e communit y i s brough t t o bear o n offenders . Wit h th e exceptio n o f th e Stieng , wh o hol d the entir e famil y responsibl e fo r th e wrong s o f on e o f it s mem bers, guil t usuall y i s treate d a s a n individua l matter , an d th e guilty part y mus t mak e hi s reparation s t o th e communit y accord ing t o custom . Th e Frenc h organize d tribunal s fo r mos t o f th e larger ethni c groups , usin g codifie d nativ e custom s an d appoint ing indigenou s judges , but thes e tribunal s wer e onl y fo r th e prob lems tha t coul d no t b e resolved a t th e village level . The Vietnam ese governmen t abolishe d the m an d trie d to replac e nativ e wit h Vietnamese law . Thi s decisio n ha s sinc e bee n reverse d (se e below, "Recen t Governmen t o f Vietna m Legislatio n fo r Montag nard Tribunals") . The on e outstandin g variatio n o n thi s patter n o f village-cen tered justic e i s foun d amon g th e Rhade , wher e a certai n jura l authority rest s wit h th e po Ian, o r "proprietor s o f th e land, " senior female s wh o hol d titl e t o cla n lan d b y righ t o f inheritanc e (see pp . 751-52) . A s guardian s o f thes e strictl y define d terri tories (an y on e o f whic h ma y encompas s severa l villages) , th e po Ian grant permissio n t o farm withi n th e territory , and , i n addi tion, perfor m ritual s honorin g th e soul s o f th e cla n ancestor s who resid e i n th e territory . Shoul d th e territor y b e violate d i n any way , a s b y th e occurrenc e o f inces t withi n it , i t i s th e po Ian who demands th e penalty (Sabatie r 1940) . In th e past , inter-villag e warfar e ha s bee n commo n amon g the highlanders . Th e Frenc h abolishe d i t i n area s wher e thei r control wa s wel l established , bu t i t continue s t o occu r amon g some groups . Othe r kind s o f inter-villag e conflict , shor t o f war , remain widespread . Institution s suc h a s th e aforementione d faring o f th e Bahnar , o r clan s amon g th e Rhad e an d Jara i whic h create inter-villag e kinshi p ties , serv e t o diminish war s an d con flicts betwee n villages . Bu t amon g al l th e group s th e favore d [ 75 6 ]

ASPECT S O F HIL L TRIB E LIF E

means fo r avoidin g conflic t ar e th e alliances . Through th e father son allianc e o r th e "grea t xep" bloo d oath , fo r example , village s can preven t o r en d war s an d othe r conflict s an d ca n forc e bond s of cooperation . B y th e sam e token , o f course , suc h alliance s ca n be a mean s o f gainin g allie s wit h who m t o carr y o n a wa r mor e effectively. An d familie s o r clan s ca n all y themselve s s o a s t o be abl e t o carr y ou t vendettas . On e suc h instanc e occurre d among th e Mnon g Ga r a s recentl y a s 194 9 (Condomina s 1957) . There i s som e similarit y i n th e socia l stratificatio n o f highlan d groups. Mos t village s hav e severa l wealth y families , wh o consti tute a socio-politica l elite . Amon g som e groups , suc h a s th e Rhade an d th e Mnong , thes e families ten d t o intermarry , thereb y perpetuating thei r elit e roles . Sorcerer s hav e hig h statu s i n th e highlands, an d i n som e villag e societie s the y exercis e politica l as well a s religious influence . Althoug h th e Frenc h administratio n officially di d awa y wit h slavery , ther e continu e t o b e instance s of it , particularl y amon g th e Stieng , Mnong , an d Sedang . Religion. Th e differen t highlan d group s shar e a grea t man y religious belief s an d practices . Al l hav e origi n myth s concernin g the beginnin g o f thei r "race, " b y whic h the y mea n thei r ow n ethnic group . Usuall y th e myt h ha s a n ethnocentri c touc h i n that i t present s th e group' s ancestor s a s th e first human s t o ap pear o n earth . ( A numbe r o f th e highlan d group s refe r t o them selves a s "th e people." ) Th e pantheo n o f spirit s (calle d yang by al l groups , regardles s o f languag e variations ) i s extremel y large; ther e ar e spirit s associate d wit h th e elements , wit h inani mate objects , wit h th e dead , an d wit h animal s an d plants . Though som e o f th e spirit s ar e good , mos t ar e malevolent . Th e Rhade hav e a hierarch y o f deities , th e highes t o f whic h i s th e Lord o f Heave n (Ae Die); th e Sedan g believ e i n a pantheo n of god s who die as men do . AU th e highlander s liv e i n th e shado w o f th e spirits , whic h are believe d t o affec t huma n destiny . Illnes s an d misfortun e ar e attributed t o th e spirits , an d onl y th e sorcere r ca n trea t them . The usua l metho d o f propitiatio n i s th e ritua l sacrific e o f a n animal. First , th e victi m wil l sacrific e a chicken , then , i f tha t has n o effect , a goat , an d finally a buffalo . B y suc h mean s o f curing illness, more than on e highlander ha s depleted his livestock. The lif e o f th e highlande r i s accompanie d b y man y divers e [757]

V I E T N A M : GEKAL

D C . HICKE

Y

rituals an d governe d b y a myria d o f taboos . Th e rice-plantin g cycle include s a syste m o f rite s designe d t o guarante e a goo d crop, an d suc h thing s a s house constructio n hav e thei r ow n serie s of fixed rituals . Familie s an d clan s abid e b y foo d taboo s an d obey interdiction s agains t huntin g certai n animal s o r consumin g certain plants . Village s sometime s ar e tabo o t o non-residents , as ar e house s o n certai n occasions . Anothe r concep t share d b y all highlander s i s ae ("mana " o r "sou l force") , whic h everyon e is though t t o have , bu t i n varyin g degrees . Thoug h th e amoun t of ae tha t a n individua l ha s i s intrinsic , i t ma y b e enhance d by th e favo r o f th e spirits . Th e degre e o f ae i s manifeste d i n a variet y o f ways . Unusual physical characteristic s suc h a s a powerful physiqu e o r a ful l beard , a s wel l a s suc h attribute s a s a n extraordinary abilit y i n huntin g o r i n war , ar e regarde d a s sign s of suc h ae. A perso n s o endowe d enjoy s grea t prestig e amon g the highlanders , an d a manifestl y larg e degre e o f ae i s essentia l for anyon e who aspires to be a leader. There ar e sorcerer s amon g al l highlan d groups , an d a t leas t one i s foun d i n mos t villages . Becaus e the y ar e believe d t o b e capable o f contactin g th e spirits , thei r service s ar e muc h i n de mand, an d i n som e village s th e sorcerer s exercis e a s muc h influ ence i n villag e affair s a s th e headma n an d council . Thei r abilit y to determin e th e sourc e o f witchcraf t make s the m personage s to b e feared . I n 194 9 the vendett a amon g th e Mnon g Ga r allude d to earlie r involve d a sorcere r wh o ha d informe d on e famil y tha t it wa s bein g bewitche d b y another . Simila r incident s i n Jara i villages i n 195 7 prompte d th e distric t chie f t o collec t al l th e sorcerers int o on e villag e s o a s t o b e abl e t o contro l thei r activities. The Sadets. Recen t work s b y Frenc h ethnologist s agre e tha t there ar e a t presen t a Sade t o f Fire , a Sade t o f Water , an d a Sadet o f th e Wind . A s alread y mentioned , earl y account s abou t the highland s tel l o f a powerful Jara i sorcere r know n a s the Sade t of Fire . In the seventeent h century , thi s sorcerer an d his confrere , the Sade t o f Wate r (th e tw o ar e neve r suppose d t o meet , fo r a meetin g woul d brin g grea t calamities) , entere d int o a n agree ment wit h th e Kin g o f Cambodi a t o exchang e gift s ever y thre e years. Legen d ha s i t that , a t som e unspecifie d tim e lon g ago , a bon d wa s establishe d betwee n th e Sade t o f Fir e an d th e Khme r [ 75 8 ]

ASPECT S O F HIL L THIB E LIF E

rulers. Whe n a Cha m kin g recovere d a glimmerin g objec t fro m beneath th e water s o f a river , i t turne d ou t t o be th e Pra h Khan , a sacre d sabe r o f Khme r royalty . Whil e th e Khme r cam e to pos sess the scabbard , fo r which King Jayavarman I I (A.D . 802 to 854) is sai d t o hav e constructe d a magnificen t reliquary , th e Jara i ob tained th e sabe r itself , an d i t wa s entruste d t o a sorcere r o f Ple i M'tao village, who became known a s Master o f the Saber o r Sade t of Fir e (Bourott e 1955) . According t o Jara i tradition , th e Sade t o f Fir e a s keepe r o f the sacre d sabe r derive s hi s unusua l power s fro m th e hos t o f spirits associate d wit h th e saber , whic h ar e believe d t o liv e i n the Sadet . I n additio n t o givin g the Sade t unconquerable strengt h in battle , thes e spirit s endo w hi m wit h specia l powe r t o dispe l epidemics throug h ritua l sacrifices . Student s o f highlan d ethnol ogy var y somewha t i n thei r account s o f th e Sadet s an d i n thei r views o n th e influenc e o f thes e sorcerer s o n th e Jara i an d neigh boring groups . Joui n (1951:73-84 ) contend s tha t th e las t power ful Sade t o f Fir e wa s a Jara i name d Y Thih , wh o live d i n th e village of Ple i M'tao durin g th e last half o f the nineteenth centur y and tha t hi s successor s ar e incorrectl y referre d t o a s "Master s of th e Saber, " wherea s the y shoul d b e calle d "Guardian s o f th e House o f th e Saber " (Ae Buom) becaus e the y ar e no t tru e Sadets. Othe r scholar s maintai n tha t Sadet s suc h a s th e on e re sponsible fo r th e deat h o f Odend'hal , an d als o th e curren t Sadet , are tru e successor s t o th e guardianshi p an d consequentl y t o th e title (Ezzaou i 1940:169-174 ; Lafont 1963) . All ethnologist s agre e tha t i t i s traditiona l fo r kinsme n o f th e Sadet o f Fir e t o sla y hi m whe n h e ha s grow n old , bu t ther e are tw o versions of th e method b y which th e new Sade t i s chosen. According t o one , th e Sadet , prio r t o his death , throw s hi s coppe r bracelet int o th e poo l wher e th e resident s o f Ple i M'ta o bathe , and whicheve r mal e emerge s wit h th e bracele t o n hi s ar m wil l be th e ne w Sadet . Anothe r versio n i s that , afte r th e deat h o f the Sadet , youn g warrior s o f th e Si u cla n (fro m whic h th e Sade t traditionally i s selected ) gathe r t o slee p i n th e sam e communa l house. Whil e the y ar e asleep , on e o f th e elder s demands , "Wh o will b e Bo k Redau? " an d whe n on e o f th e warrior s answer s i n his sleep , "I t i s I, " a cotto n bracele t i s place d o n hi s wris t a s a symbo l o f hi s ne w rol e (Bourott e 1955 ; Ezzaou i 1940) . [759]

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D C . HICKE

Y

The Sade t o f Water , accordin g t o al l accounts , function s mor e as a sorcere r tha n a s a leader . H e reside s i n th e villag e o f Ple i M'tao E a i n Darla c Province , wher e h e receive s visitor s wh o bring prescribe d gifts, an d h e frequentl y travel s abou t th e are a visiting village s t o perfor m ritual s tha t ar e intende d t o preven t or dispe l epidemic s du e t o droughts . Elderl y Rhad e recal l tha t on severa l occasion s a Sade t o f Wate r cam e t o th e tow n o f Ba n Me Thuot , remainin g o n th e outskirt s o f th e settlemen t a s i s the custom , an d throughou t th e Jara i area s olde r villager s recal l having see n him . Severa l recen t source s repor t tha t ther e als o is a Sade t o f th e Wind , who, althoug h h e play s n o politica l role , has considerabl e mystica l powe r (Condomina s 1959 ; Lafon t 1963). Of th e three , however , th e Sade t o f Fir e appear s t o b e th e only on e ever t o hav e wielde d politica l power . Althoug h Captai n Cupet o n hi s 1890-189 1 expeditio n recorde d (a s mentione d above) tha t th e the n Sadet' s follower s pai d hi m littl e deference , various historica l account s credi t othe r Sadet s o f Fir e wit h con siderable politica l influenc e o n th e Jara i an d neighborin g groups , and th e Odend'ha l affai r i n 190 5 woul d indicat e tha t th e Sade t of Fir e o f tha t tim e wa s a leade r t o b e reckone d with . Recen t French ethnologist s disagre e o n th e rol e o f th e curren t Sade t of Fire . Fathe r Dournes , a membe r o f th e Sociot e d e l a Missio n Etrangere d e Pari s wh o ha s spen t a numbe r o f year s amon g th e Jarai i n th e Che o Re o area , believe s tha t th e Sade t o f Fir e con tinues t o have considerabl e influence ; Lafon t (1963 ) denie s tha t the thre e Sadet s enjo y th e prominen t role s toda y tha t the y ha d at the time the French explorers visited th e highlands. THE PRESEN T SITUATIO N O F TH E VIETNAMES E HIGHLANDER S

Introduction. Th e situatio n amon g th e highlander s i s i n a stat e of basi c chang e no w (Ma y 1965) . Sinc e th e rebellio n i n Septem ber 196 4 th e governmen t ha s attempte d t o satisf y som e o f th e desires o f th e highlander s i n th e hop e o f gettin g the m t o rall y behind th e government . Firs t the y hel d a conferenc e a t Pleik u in October , an d th e highlander s presen t represente d mos t tribes , although a s delegate s som e wer e simpl y civi l servant s fro m province an d distric t offices , whil e som e wer e rea l leaders—peo ple wh o ha d bee n jaile d afte r thei r uprisin g i n 1958 . Mos t o f [ 76 0 ]

ASPECT S O F HIL L TRIB E LIF E

these wer e Rhade , Jarai , an d Bahnar . Missin g wa s Y Bham, th e Rhade leade r wh o spurre d th e 195 8 revolt , wa s jailed , an d ha d been release d i n Februar y 1964 . He wa s involve d i n th e Septem ber rebellion , bu t eithe r wen t voluntaril y o r wa s force d t o g o to Cambodi a wher e h e no w appear s t o b e a captiv e o f a move ment tha t call s itsel f Th e Fron t fo r th e Protectio n o f th e Op pressed Races . Thi s movemen t doe s no t pu t ou t th e Vie t Con g line, but rathe r somethin g tha t sound s lik e th e Cambodian s bein g excessively nationalisti c (se e below) . The leader s o f th e highlan d grou p (Rhade , Jarai , an d Bahna r for th e mos t part ) compile d th e "aspirations " o f al l th e group s represented an d presente d the m t o th e Vietnames e authorities . These concerne d givin g th e highlander s mor e (an d stronger ) representation i n th e centra l government , mor e role in th e admin istration o f thei r ow n areas , lan d title s ( a ver y sor e poin t wit h those whos e lan d ha d bee n take n b y th e lan d developmen t schemes initiate d i n 195 7 whe n th e Die m governmen t bega n resettling norther n refugee s an d centra l Vietnames e i n th e high lands—the government' s attitud e the n wa s tha t th e governmen t owned al l th e lan d i n th e highlands) , acceptanc e o f mor e high landers i n secondar y schools , universities , an d th e Schoo l o f Ad ministration. The y als o wante d thei r ow n army , direc t America n aid (i.e. , not t o g o throug h Saigon) , mor e schools , an d medica l facilities, an d the y wante d reinstitute d thei r nativ e tribunals , which ha d bee n suppresse d b y th e Die m regim e (se e below) . They als o wante d thei r ow n language s taugh t i n th e primar y schools along with Vietnamese . The Vietnames e discusse d thes e thing s wit h them , the n Gen eral Khan h cam e t o mee t them . Th e Vietnamese woul d no t agre e to th e arm y o r direc t America n aid . Ther e ha d bee n a rathe r vaguely organize d Burea u fo r Montagnar d Affair s organize d i n March 1964 , an d Genera l Khan h announce d tha t i t woul d be come a directorat e an d appointe d Colone l Y a B a a s director . He agree d t o mos t o f th e othe r thing s an d bega n turnin g th e wheels t o ge t somethin g don e abou t it , bu t lef t offic e lat e i n October. Mr . Huon g wa s sincere , but wa s to o beset an d besiege d by th e Buddhist s an d student s t o d o anything . Ther e wer e rum blings o f anothe r revol t i n th e highlands , an d th e Vietnames e quickly appointe d a numbe r o f highlander s t o th e Non-Commis [ 76 1 ]

V I E T N A M : GERAL D C . HICKE Y

sioned Officers ' Schoo l a t Nhatran g an d fifteen to th e Officers ' Training Schoo l a t Th u Doc . Th e Ministr y o f Educatio n announced a plan fo r expande d educatio n i n th e highland s an d a schem e whereb y highlander s woul d ge t specia l consideratio n for thei r applicatio n t o school s o f highe r educatio n (th e accep tance grad e woul d b e lowere d 1 0 percen t fo r them) . I n Marc h 1965 a grou p o f twenty-tw o highlan d leader s me t wit h variou s ministers i n Saigon . Th e tribunal s wer e reinstated , th e intentio n of granting lan d title s was made known , an d a scheme for survey ing lan d announced . S o i t ca n b e see n tha t th e situatio n i s i n a stat e o f flux . The Viet Cong and the Highlanders. Vis-a-vi s th e Vie t Cong , there ha s bee n a marke d change . Wherea s i n 195 8 the Vie t Con g propaganda wa s wel l don e (thing s lik e hammerin g awa y a t th e mountaineers' fea r tha t th e Die m governmen t wa s goin g t o de pose the m o f al l land) , i n th e pas t severa l year s th e Vie t Con g have use d terrorism , force d recruitmen t an d labo r i n hil l trib e villages, demand fo r ric e and food , an d direc t attack s o n resettle d hill trib e village s resultin g i n considerabl e deat h an d destruction . The highlander s no w almos t invariabl y describ e themselve s a s "in-between." The y d o no t wan t t o suppor t th e Vie t Con g (an d are afrai d o f them) , bu t the y stil l ar e no t lure d b y th e government. Hill Tribe Nationalism: Y Bham and the Front for the Protection of Oppressed Races. Y Bham , a leade r o f th e Rhad e trib e from Sout h Vietnam , ha s gon e t o Cambodia, wher e h e i s workin g for th e formatio n o f a Unite d Fron t fo r th e Protectio n o f Op pressed Race s (Frenc h abbreviation : FULRO ) t o b e compose d of th e people s o f th e Sout h Vietnames e an d Cambodia n high lands. Thoug h thi s movemen t ha s bee n widel y reporte d i n th e public press , i t i s to o earl y t o judge th e effectivenes s o f Y Bham's attempt t o buil d a nationalis t movemen t amon g th e highlanders , who ar e now , a s ha s bee n th e cas e fo r centuries , caugh t i n a struggle between thei r more powerfu l neighbors . Legal Status of the Highlanders: History. Traditionall y amon g the highlander s reconciliatio n o f dispute s an d punishment s fo r violations o f custom s wer e th e affair s o f famil y an d village . Prio r to th e arriva l of th e French , th e triba l law s wer e unwritten ; the y were expresse d i n term s o f taboo s an d sanction s whic h al l mem [ 76 2 ]

ASPECT S O F HIL L TKIB E LIF E

bers o f th e societie s kne w an d respected . Ther e wa s a well-de fined mora l order , wit h well-define d retribution s an d punish ments for those who breached it. The Frenc h administratio n allowe d th e traditiona l jura l sys tems to continue, and some administrators began recording tribal laws wit h a view t o organizin g nativ e tribunal s (hil l trib e cus toms are codified i n Gerber 1951 ; Guilleminet 1952 ; Lafont 1963; Sabatier 1940) . Tribunals wer e establishe d i n th e provinc e capi tals o f th e hig h plateau . Hil l trib e judge s wer e appointed , an d the coutumiers (codified customs ) serve d as a basis for adjudica tion. Case s brough t t o th e tribunal s wer e thos e which coul d no t be resolved o n th e villag e level . The procedure s o f thes e court s were relatively simple . At Ban Me Thuot, for example , the judge, an elderl y respecte d ma n fro m Ba n Don , woul d hol d session s for th e firs t five day s o f ever y month . Th e session s wer e hel d in a smal l roo m simpl y furnished , wit h a tabl e behin d whic h the judg e sat , an d a fe w benches . Th e plaintif f an d hi s part y sat o n on e sid e whil e th e defendan t an d hi s grou p wer e o n th e other. Afte r eac h sid e ha d presente d hi s case , witnesse s wer e heard, an d th e judg e would refe r t o th e pertinent law . The cas e usually was resolved through discussion. Recent Government of Vietnam Legislation for Montagnard Tribunals. In response to the highlander reques t for the organization of "Customs Law Courts in the highlands and a Law Protection regime" (formall y submitte d a t the Convention for Administrative an d Militar y Affair s hel d in Saigo n i n Marc h 1965) , th e Government o f Vietna m ha s promulgated a decree aime d a t "reorganizing Montagnar d Commo n La w Court s i n th e Centra l Vietnam Highlands. " The new courts are to deal with civil affairs , "montagnard affairs, " an d pena l offense s whe n bot h partie s ar e highlanders. Crime s and offense s committe d b y hill tribe servicemen, crime s agains t th e nation , o r thos e involvin g lowlander s (ethnic Vietnamese) wil l be brought before th e National Courts. The la w provide s fo r court s a t th e village , district , an d prov ince levels . The Villag e Custom s La w Cour t i s preside d ove r by th e Villag e Administrativ e Committe e Chief , assiste d b y tw o highlander assessors . Early in December eac h year, the chairme n of villag e administrativ e committee s an d resident s o f the villages prepare a list of twelve notables electe d by the population. From [ 76 3 ]

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D C . HICKE

Y

each lis t th e distric t chie f concurrentl y actin g a s Justic e o f th e Peace wil l selec t tw o regula r assessor s an d tw o deput y assessor s for ever y villag e court . A t leas t on e weekl y sessio n i s hel d i f necessary. Whe n a cas e i s resolved , th e decisio n i s recorde d an d signed b y th e contestin g parties, thus negating the right to appea l to anothe r court . Righ t o f appea l t o a highe r cour t i s possibl e when the case remains unreconciled . At th e distric t level , th e court s wil l b e preside d ove r b y a President o f th e Court , wh o wil l b e th e distric t chief , an d h e will b e assiste d b y tw o hil l trib e assessors . Ther e wil l als o b e a clerk-interpreter . Th e assessor s wil l b e selecte d fro m list s o f hill trib e notable s electe d b y th e distric t residents . Session s o f the cour t wil l b e hel d a t leas t twic e a mont h a t distric t head quarters. Case s withi n th e jurisdictio n o f th e distric t cour t in clude thos e appeale d fro m th e villag e courts , lawsuit s o n civi l and commercia l matter s involvin g mor e tha n 500$V N an d les s than 1,500$VN , al l kind s o f mino r offenses , "an d case s consid ered traditionall y a s seriou s ones , suc h a s offense s agains t reli gions an d creeds , viz . desecratio n o f graves , insult s uttere d dur ing a ritua l ceremony , disturbanc e o f a n oath-takin g ceremon y and offense s agains t deities. " A Montagnar d Affair s Sectio n o f th e cour t wil l b e organize d at th e provincia l level . Thi s section wil l b e unde r a Montagnar d Presiding Judge , assiste d b y tw o hil l trib e assessors , a nationa l clerk wh o keep s th e records , an d a n interpreter . Th e assessors , like thos e of th e othe r courts , will be draw n fro m a list o f electe d notables. Th e Montagnar d Affair s Sectio n wil l si t onc e o r twic e a month , dependin g o n demands . Thi s cour t i s competen t t o pass judgmen t o n appeal s fro m th e montagnar d distric t court s and action s whic h d o no t fal l int o th e real m o f th e villag e o r district courts . This legislatio n restore s th e lega l statu s o f th e nativ e law s an d tribunals whic h ha d bee n los t by th e highlander s unde r th e Die m regime a s a part o f th e polic y o f total assimilatio n whic h resulte d in a n attemp t t o replac e hil l trib e socia l institution s wit h Viet namese ones . Thi s polic y cause d considerabl e resentmen t amon g the highlanders , wh o fel t tha t thei r wa y o f lif e wa s threatened , and thi s fea r wa s seize d upo n b y th e Vie t Con g i n thei r propa ganda. Thi s wa s on e o f th e base s o f a stron g appea l b y th e Vie t [ 76 4 ]

ASPECT S O F HIL L TRIB E LIF E

Cong, wh o coul d cit e favorably th e exampl e o f th e autonomou s zones i n Nort h Vietnam . Although th e new law s see m t o be a step in th e right direction , the overal l effec t ma y hav e bee n t o structur e hil l trib e la w i n terms o f th e Vietnames e system . Th e highlan d villagers , lik e th e Vietnamese villagers , wil l probabl y prefe r t o settl e thei r ow n difficulties withou t recourse to outside authority . AGRICULTURE AND LAND TENURE

The governmen t o f th e Republi c o f Vietna m i s currentl y pre paring a progra m o f distributio n o f lan d title s t o th e mountain eers. Othe r tha n problem s associate d wit h shiftin g o f village s due t o th e wa r (non e o f th e highlander s normall y coul d b e con sidered nomadi c people—the y ma y shif t thei r fields bu t prefe r to kee p thei r village s i n th e sam e location) , ther e ar e matter s concerning highlan d agricultura l technique s an d land-tenur e sys tems whic h I believ e woul d b e wel l t o conside r i n formulatin g such a program . Highland Agriculture. Swidde n agricultur e (als o sometime s referred t o as shifting o r slash-and-burn agriculture ) i s traditiona l among th e highlander s an d continue s t o b e practice d b y mos t groups. Where ther e i s available botto m lan d wit h wate r sources , the hil l tribe s usuall y practic e padd y wet-ric e agriculture , usin g techniques simila r t o thos e o f th e Vietnames e (an d probabl y learned fro m them) . Suc h fields ca n b e see n alon g rive r bank s throughout th e highlands , i n volcani c depression s suc h a s thos e in th e vicinit y o f Pleiku , an d i n leve l area s aroun d Konru m town . In th e are a o f Ph u Bo n ther e ar e als o som e extensiv e padd y fields belongin g t o th e Jarai , an d th e Chur u i n th e valle y o f Dran cultivat e padd y usin g th e Cha m plo w an d wate r buffal o (they ar e suppose d t o hav e learne d th e technique s fro m th e Cham centurie s ago) . Finally , i n th e Valle y o f th e Wind s inlan d from Quan g Ngai , th e Hr e hav e terrace d padd y fields simila r to the terraces of the Vietnamese alon g the coast . Generally speaking , ther e ar e basi c similaritie s i n th e swidde n technique employe d b y mountaineers . Amon g mos t (i f no t all ) groups i t i s a syste m o f rotatin g agricultur e wherei n a plo t i s farmed fo r a give n period—usuall y betwee n on e an d thre e [765]

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D C . HICKE

Y

years—and the n i s lef t t o li e fallo w whil e th e cultivator s mov e to a serie s o f othe r fields, returnin g t o th e overgrow n plo t i n due time . The cycl e seem s t o b e fairl y consisten t wit h al l groups . The fallowin g perio d usuall y depend s o n th e typ e o f flora tha t predominates th e area ; i f ther e i s a n abundanc e o f fast-growin g bamboo, fo r example , th e fallo w perio d probabl y wil l onl y b e three o r fou r years , whil e i n area s wher e th e growt h i s slowe r it may be eight t o fifteen years. To prepar e th e fields, first vegetatio n i s cut , an d usuall y al l but th e larg e tree s ar e felled . Afte r th e brus h an d woo d hav e dried sufficiently , fire s ar e se t an d controlle d a s much a s possible. The rubbl e i s cleared , an d th e soi l is raked. Th e me n mak e hole s with dibbl e sticks , and wome n follow , plantin g th e seeds . Durin g the growin g perio d som e weeding i s done . Both me n an d wome n assist with th e harvest , an d th e yield is stored i n individual famil y granaries. Variou s secondar y crop s ar e plante d i n th e swiddens , sometimes i n alternatin g row s wit h th e uplan d ric e an d some times afte r th e harvest . Kitche n garden s an d frui t grove s usuall y are cultivated i n the village near the house. The Brou , a grou p locate d i n th e vicinit y o f K e Sanh , nea r the La o borde r inlan d fro m Quan g Tri , usuall y far m thei r fields one yea r (thre e year s i f ther e ar e larg e trees , whic h ar e though t to indicat e goo d soil) . Whe n ther e i s ne w matur e vegetatio n on th e field lyin g fallow—fro m five t o eigh t years—th e plo t ca n be recultivated . On e yea r i s th e norma l plantin g fo r swidden s used b y th e Jeh , a grou p foun d nea r th e Da k Pe k area , northwes t of Kontum. Their fallowing perio d is ten years. In th e vicinit y o f Ph u Bo n (Che o Reo) , th e Jara i wh o practic e swidden agricultur e cultivat e thei r fields fo r thre e years , an d the Jara i t o th e east , i n th e Ple i Mron g area , far m thei r swidden s for a s lon g a s five years , leavin g th e field fo r fiv e t o eigh t year s before clearin g and burning them again . Selecting th e sit e fo r a ne w swidde n field usuall y involve s in specting th e vegetatio n t o determin e whethe r th e kind s o f plant s supported b y goo d soi l abound . Thi s als o ma y b e accompanie d by som e typ e o f divination ; th e Rhade , fo r example , loo k fo r certain bird s i n th e fores t becaus e the y ar e a n ome n o f fertility , while th e Che o Re o Jara i construc t a shelte r o n th e propose d site, an d i f th e occupant s drea m o f fish o r decease d ki n o r ac [766]

ASPECT S O F HIL L TRIB E LIF E

quaintances, i t i s a sig n o f fertil e soil , whil e dream s o f goat s or dog s indicat e th e reverse . It i s ofte n assume d tha t swidde n agricultur e i s destructive . In hi s detaile d stud y o f swidde n agricultur e amon g th e Hanuno o of Mindor o Islan d i n th e Philippines , Conkli n (1957:154^155 ) warns agains t makin g negative judgments o n thi s form o f agricul ture withou t realizin g th e variation s tha t exis t i n it an d withou t examining i t objectively . Othe r anthropologist s an d agricultura l economists suc h a s Pendleto n (fo r example , N.D.:33-52 ; 1962 ) have bee n doin g research o n th e efficienc y o f usin g swidde n agri culture i n certai n physica l ecologies . I n area s lik e th e upland s of Thailan d (simila r i n man y respect s t o th e highland s o f Sout h Vietnam) mos t farmin g i s don e o n slopes , an d th e rain s ar e tor rential. Usin g th e swidde n metho d ha s th e advantag e o f leavin g the tre e root s i n th e soil , whic h help s t o retai n th e structure , and th e dibbl e stic k doe s minima l har m t o th e structure . I f a plow wer e use d i n thes e circumstances , ther e woul d b e grav e danger o f having th e top soil wash away . Land Tenure. Whe n highlander s cultivat e we t ric e i n paddys , ownership i s wel l defined , a s th e limit s o f th e lan d usuall y cor respond t o th e exten t o f cultivatio n Amon g the Hre, fo r example , everyone know s whic h famil y own s particula r terraces , an d thes e are passed from generatio n t o generation . The traditiona l land-tenur e system s o f group s practicin g swid den agricultur e var y somewha t betwee n th e differen t groups . The mos t complicate d appear s t o b e th e po Ian syste m o f th e Rhade (describe d above , pp . 75 2 ff.) . I t i s relate d to th e matri lineal cla n syste m wherei n cla n name , mobil e goods , an d lan d are passe d dow n throug h th e femal e line . The sub-cla n ha s clai m to a give n territory , an d titl e i s veste d i n th e po Ian (literall y "proprietor o f th e land") , usuall y a n elderl y femal e o f th e senio r line. Accordin g t o recen t Rhad e sources , thi s syste m ha s bee n changing, particularl y i n th e vicinit y o f Ba n M e Thuot . Among th e Bahna r ther e i s th e toring, a territor y i n whic h several village s collectivel y contro l hunting , fishing, an d farmin g rights. Outsiders , whethe r Bahna r o r not, mus t hav e th e approva l of th e villages ' elder s (kra) i n orde r t o ente r an d carr y ou t an y of th e abov e activities . Research thu s fa r indicate s tha t mos t o f th e othe r hil l trib e [ 76 7 ]

V I E T N A M : GEBAL D C . HICKE

Y

groups hav e villag e territorie s i n whic h th e resident s farm . I n some instance s i t i s a ver y well-define d area ; amon g th e Jeh , for example , th e sal ja i s a villag e territory , an d whil e outsider s are fre e t o hun t o r fish i n th e sal ja, the y canno t da m a strea m or far m withou t permissio n o f th e villag e leaders . Wit h othe r groups th e territor y i s les s wel l defined ; i t simpl y i s a n are a sur rounding th e village , wher e th e resident s farm , hunt , fish, an d cut wood . I t i s i n th e orde r o f thing s tha t village s respec t on e another's rights . Among al l hil l tribes , eac h famil y cultivatin g a cycl e o f swid dens i s recognize d a s owne r o f thes e fields. Villager s al l kno w which fields lyin g fallo w belon g t o fello w villagers , an d thei r rights ar e respected . Th e rul e seem s t o b e tha t th e first occupie r of the soil has unwritten titl e to it. Finally, ther e i s a n erroneou s notio n tha t th e hil l tribe s clai m all o f th e lan d i n th e highlands . Th e land-tenur e system s note d above embrac e onl y a portio n o f th e area . Th e remainde r i s lan d res nullius, unclaime d by anyone . REFERENCES CITE D BIROU, A . (O.P. )

1963 Le

s societe s coutumiere s fac e a leu r developpment : le s montagnards d u Vietna m Sud . Epiphanie , January/Febru ary: 1-12 .

BOUROTTE, B .

1955 Essa i d'histoir e de s population s montagnarde s d u Sud-Indo chinois jusqu' a 1945 . Bulleti n d e l a Societ e de s Etude s Indo chinoises 30:1-133 . CONDOMINAS , G .

1957 Nou 1959 Che

s avon s mango l a forot . Paris , Mercur e d e France . z le s roi s d e l'ea u e t d u feu . Marc o Pol o 24:47-60 .

CONKLIN, H .

1957 Hanuno o agriculture . Rome , Foo d an d Agricultur e Organiza tion o f th e Unite d Nations . F.A.O . Forestr y Developmen t Paper 12 . D A M B O (JACQUE S DOUENES )

1950 Le

s population s montagnarde s d u Su d Indochine . France-Asie , Numero Speciale , 5:931-1208 .

DOSSIER MAYREN A

N.D. Dossie r Mayrena mimeographed.

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. Ecol

e Frangais

e d'Extrem

e Orient

,

ASPECT S O F HIL L TBIB E LIF E EZZAOUI, J .

1940 Un

e versio n d e l a Iegend e de s deu x Sadets . Institu t Indo chinois pou r l'Etud e d e 1'Homm e 3:169-174 .

FALL, B . B .

1963 Th

e tw o Viet-Nams : a politica l an d militar y analysis . Ne w York, Frederic k A . Praeger, Inc .

GERBEH, T .

1951 Coutumie r Stieng . Bulleti n d e 1'Ecol e Francais e d'Extrein e Orient 45:228-269 . GUILLEMINET , P .

1949 L

a trib u Bahna r d u Kontum . Paris , Imprimeri e Nationale Societe Asiatiqu e d e Paris . Acte s d u XXI e Congre s de Orientalistes. 1952 Coutumie r d e l a trib u Bahna r de s Sedan g e t de s Jara i d la provinc e d e Kontum . Paris , E . d e Boccard , Publication de 1'Ecol e Francais e d'Extrem e Orient .

, s e s

HiCKEY, G . C .

1956- Unpublishe d note s o n th e majo r ethni c group s i n th e souther n 1958 Vietnames e highland s collecte d durin g field trip s betwee n 1956 an d 1958 . JOUIN, B .

1951 Histoir e legendair e d u Sade t d u Feu . Bulleti n d e l a Societ e des Etude s Indochinoise s 26:73-84 . LAFONT, P.-B

.

1963 Tolo i Djuat : coutumie r d e l a trib u Jarai . Paris , Publication s de 1'Ecol e Francais e d'Extrem e Orient . MAITRE, H

.

1912 Le

s jungle s moi . Paris , Larose .

PENDLETON, R . L

.

N.D. Som e interrelation s betwee n agricultur e an d forestry , particu larly i n Thailand . Journa l o f th e Thailan d Researc h Society , Natural Histor y Supplemen t 12:33-52 . 1962 Thailand . Ne w York , Duell , Sloa n an d Pearce . SABATIER, L .

1940 Recuei l de s coutume s Rhadee s d u Darlac . Hanoi , Imprimeri e d'Extreme Orient .

[ 76 9 ]

CHAPTE R 2 0

Mountain Minorities and The Viet Minh: A Key to The Indochina War 1 JOH N T

. MCALISTER

5

JR

.

DIE N BIE N PHU : A PBISMATI C VIE W O F TH E FIRS T INDOCHIN A WA R

During th e first wee k o f Ma y 195 4 newspape r headline s th e world ove r tol d o f French-le d soldiers , abou t a n infantr y divisio n in strength , wh o wer e surrounde d i n a mountain valle y i n north ern Indochina . The y wer e fightin g fo r thei r live s agains t a n ad versary mor e tha n twic e thei r size . Th e enem y commande d th e encircling mountai n heights , an d fro m thes e position s the y main tained a witherin g artiller y fire whic h serve d t o cove r th e ad vance o f thei r battalions . Relie f force s coul d no t b e marche d 1 The stud y o f whic h thi s pape r i s a par t i s based largel y o n researc h conducte d in th e Frenc h Arm y Archive s o n th e Indochin a Wa r a t th e Service Historique de YArmde i n th e Chatea u d e Vincenne s o n th e edg e o f Paris . I a m mos t grateful t o th e Ministr y o f Defens e o f th e Republi c o f Franc e fo r havin g grante d me permissio n t o consul t thes e archives . I a m equall y appreciativ e t o th e person nel o f th e Service Historique de VArmee, wh o aide d m e i n innumerabl e ways . I wis h especiall y t o mentio n th e assistanc e o f th e Director , Genera l Cosso-Brissac , the Chie f o f th e Oversea s Section , Lieutenan t Colone l Jouin , an d th e hea d of th e Indochin a Archive , Majo r Miche l Desiree , a courageou s survivo r o f th e Battle o f Die n Bie n Phu , wit h who m I worke d mos t directly . Accordin g t o the regulation s governin g m y us e o f thes e archives , I a m no t permitte d t o make direc t citatio n t o th e informatio n I collecte d there . Simila r condition s hav e been observe d i n th e publicatio n o f tw o othe r work s (Fal l 1961 ; Tanham 1961 ) based o n researc h a t th e Service Historique de VArmoe. The researc h a t th e Service Historique de VArmee was made possibl e by a gran t from th e Foreig n Are a Fellowshi p Program , a joint committe e of th e Socia l Scienc e Research Counci l an d th e America n Council o f Learne d Societies , whic h I acknowledge gratefully . The preparatio n o f thi s pape r wa s supporte d i n par t b y th e Specia l Operation s Research office , th e America n University , unde r Departmen t o f th e Arm y Contrac t DA 49-09 2 ARO-7 , throug h fund s mad e availabl e t o th e Cente r o f Internationa l Studies, Princeto n University . Neithe r th e Foreig n Are a Fellowshi p Program , the Specia l Operation s Researc h Office , th e Departmen t o f th e Army , no r th e Center o f Internationa l Studie s i s responsibl e i n an y wa y fo r th e content s o f this paper, no r for th e views expressed herein .

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overland becaus e th e battl e sit e la y o n th e opposit e sid e o f a wide stretc h o f enemy-controlle d mountainou s terrain , difficul t to travers e unde r th e bes t o f circumstances . Parachute d rein forcements, a possibilit y earlier , woul d no w b e droppe d t o a n almost certai n death . I f thei r transport s were no t knocked down , their bodie s woul d b e riddle d i n th e slo w descen t t o th e ground . An ai r o f desperatio n an d helplessnes s becam e widespread . Th e defenders o f Die n Bie n Ph u seeme d beyon d redemption. 2 For distan t observer s throughou t th e world , th e battl e bein g waged i n th e beautifu l an d remot e uplan d valle y o n th e borde r between Lao s an d Vietna m wa s symbolic . I t wa s a microcos m of th e confrontatio n o f th e Wes t wit h th e Communis t strateg y of expansio n int o th e underdevelope d area s o f th e world . Fo r closer observer s thi s globa l symbolis m wa s overshadowe d b y th e specific issue s whic h th e comba t posed . Th e Frenc h comman d was attemptin g t o hal t th e take-ove r o f th e mountai n homelan d of th e Tai 3 minorit y peopl e i n northwester n Vietnam . Prio r t o Dien Bie n Ph u th e Frenc h ha d bee n unabl e t o sto p th e wide ranging operationa l maneuver s int o unprotecte d section s o f th e Tai highland s an d adjacen t area s o f Lao s b y th e militar y force s of th e Communist-le d Vietnames e independenc e movement , th e Viet Minh . I t wa s fo r thi s reaso n tha t th e Frenc h hope d t o main tain thei r influenc e i n th e Ta i countr y b y drawin g th e Vie t Min h into a fixed-position battle . The issue s represente d b y th e Die n Bie n Ph u encounte r als o had a n underlyin g significanc e fo r th e Vie t Minh . Th e battl e was th e culminatio n o f thei r progres s throug h th e stage s o f mili tary developmen t prescribe d b y Ma o Tse-tun g i n hi s writing s on th e strateg y o f revolutionar y warfare. 4 Afte r a meage r begin 2 The literatur e o n th e battl e o f Die n Bie n Ph u i s larg e an d growing . I t includes Catrou x (1959) , Deviller s an d Lacoutur e (1960) , El y (1964) , Fal l (1961:Ch. 12 ; 1964 ; forthcoming) , Grauwi n (1954) , Langlai s (1963) , Lanie l (1957), Navarr e (1956) , Tanha m (196I:Ch . 4) , PaiIIa t (1964:Ch . 33) , Pouge t (1964), Ro y (1963;1965) , V o (1964) . 3 The wor d Ta i i s spelle d thu s throughou t thi s pape r i n orde r t o differentiat e the Ta i language , tribes , highlands , an d federatio n o f Indochin a fro m th e Tha i people o f Thailan d (wh o ar e also speakers of a Tai language) . 4 Mao's importan t writing s o n revolutio n hav e bee n collecte d i n Ma o (1963) . This volum e include s "Problem s o f Strateg y i n China' s Revolutionar y War " (De cember 1936) , "Problem s o f Strateg y i n Guerrill a Wa r agains t Japan " (Ma y 1938), "O n Protracte d War " (Ma y 1938) , an d "Problem s o f Wa r an d Strategy " (November 6 , 1938) .

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S & TH E VIE T MIN H

ning i n Decembe r 1944 , with a guerrill a ban d o f onl y thirty-fou r men, th e Vie t Min h had , b y th e autum n o f 1950 , achieve d a capacity fo r flexible big-scal e encounter s know n a s mobil e war fare.5 I n les s tha n thre e year s o f earnes t combat , fro m 194 7 t o 1950, the y ha d progresse d fro m guerrill a warfar e t o th e secon d stage o f Mao' s strategy , mobil e warfare . The y ha d demonstrate d this capacit y b y decimatin g a Frenc h forc e o f 10,00 0 me n i n a runnin g battl e alon g Vietnam' s mountainou s northeaster n fron tier i n Octobe r o f 1950 . Fro m thi s turning-poin t th e Vie t Min h waged thre e and one-hal f mor e year s o f mobil e warfar e i n whic h they refuse d t o accep t a define d battl e front . Suc h a war withou t fronts wa s als o a wa r withou t territoria l objectives . Thi s wa s the cas e becaus e th e Vie t Min h kne w tha t contro l o f territor y was meaningles s s o lon g a s Frenc h force s remaine d stronge r an d could reoccup y an y los t ground . Becaus e th e Communist s bega n with relativel y weake r arme d strength , the y ha d t o haras s an d wear dow n th e French , buil d u p thei r ow n forces , an d kee p o n the mov e s o tha t the y coul d no t b e trappe d an d annihilated . The Vie t Minh' s revolutionar y wa r strateg y wa s designe d t o force th e Frenc h int o a territoria l defense . Wit h thei r adversary' s troops sprea d ou t an d tie d down , th e Communist s coul d concen trate a loca l forc e superio r i n number s an d firepowe r t o wip e out th e scattere d an d expose d Frenc h units . I f a stronge r Frenc h relief forc e approache d t o ai d it s beleaguere d comrades , th e Vie t Minh woul d merel y mel t int o th e countryside , refusin g combat . After seve n year s (1947-1954 ) o f thi s harassmen t th e Frenc h were anxious t o ge t th e Vie t Min h t o joi n i n a fixed battle. Ironi cally, thi s desir e playe d int o th e Communists ' hands . Th e battl e of Die n Bie n Ph u represente d th e Vie t Minh' s arriva l a t Mao' s final stag e o f militar y development, tha t o f fixed-position warfare . After th e line s o f battl e ha d bee n draw n a t Die n Bie n Ph u in lat e 1953 , th e fat e o f thos e defendin g th e isolate d outpos t in th e highland s o f northwester n Vietna m wa s hardl y i n doubt . The certaint y o f thi s outcom e becam e apparen t whe n element s of fou r Vie t Min h division s wer e concentrate d aroun d th e Franco-Vietnamese positions . Th e Frenc h commande r i n Indo china, Genera l Henr i Navarre , believe d tha t th e Communists ' 5 The beginning s an d growt h o f th e Vie t Min h arme d forc e ar e documente d in Anon . (1955A) . Details o n the December 194 4 origins ar e found o n p. 12.

[ 77 3 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTEB , JR .

strategic mobilit y an d logistic s wer e modes t an d tha t thei r forc e in th e Ta i highland s woul d b e n o large r tha n on e divisio n (Sheehan i n Ro y 1965 : XVII). I t wa s expecte d tha t thi s divisio n would batte r itsel f agains t th e superio r powe r th e Genera l ha d amassed a t Die n Bie n Phu . Th e traged y o f thi s miscalculatio n was tha t th e Frenc h comman d was attempting t o fight a fixed-position battl e mor e tha n 18 0 ai r mile s fro m it s neares t bas e o f support wit h onl y meager ai r transport capability , no real alterna tive mean s o f surfac e reinforcement , n o avenu e fo r withdrawal , and withou t comman d o f th e surroundin g heights . T o th e sur prise o f th e Frenc h military leadershi p th e Viet Min h had devise d an ingeniou s logisti c syste m whic h replenishe d th e Communist led force acros s the most rugged terrai n i n Indochina . By th e en d o f th e first wee k i n Ma y 195 4 France ha d suffere d its wors t defea t i n nearl y fou r centurie s o f colonia l politic s an d warfare. A French-le d forc e o f seventee n battalion s numberin g more tha n 10,000 men surrendere d t o th e Vie t Min h afte r fifty-six days o f bitte r conflict . Althoug h thi s los s represented onl y a small portion o f th e approximatel y 450,00 0 Frenchmen , Vietnamese , and me n o f othe r ethni c identitie s fighting agains t th e Commu nists throughou t Indochina , i t finished almos t seve n year s o f French comba t agains t revolutionar y warfare. 6 Sinc e th e over whelming majority o f French-le d force s remaine d intact , i t seem s clear tha t th e battl e o f Die n Bie n Ph u wa s decisiv e fo r reason s other tha n militar y capacity . Th e Franco-Vietnames e force s stil l had th e mean s bu t n o longe r ha d th e wil l t o continue . The reason s fo r th e decisivenes s o f th e battl e o f Die n Bie n Phu i n endin g th e Indochin a Wa r ar e complex . Withou t a ful l exploration o f thi s complexity , on e sequenc e o f explanatio n ap pears conspicuous . Tha t Franc e n o longe r wishe d t o pres s th e combat agains t th e Vie t Min h wa s primarily , i f no t exclusively , a politica l decision . Bu t th e domesti c politica l pressure s whic h caused suc h a decisio n wer e a respons e t o th e lac k o f Frenc h military an d politica l succes s i n Vietnam . Th e defea t a t Die n Bien Ph u wa s dramati c an d overwhelmin g evidenc e o f thi s un successful pattern . Althoug h th e Vie t Min h di d no t hav e a pre " Figures fro m Ro y (1963:558-559) . Th e tota l include d approximatel y 300,00 0 Vietnamese, 54,00 0 French , 30,00 0 Nort h Africans , 18,00 0 Africans , 20,00 0 Le gionnaires, 15,00 0 Laotians , an d 10,00 0 Cambodians .

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S & TH E VIE T MIN H

dominant militar y or political position i n northern Vietnam , muc h less th e whol e o f Indochina , i t was deeme d wise r b y th e Frenc h to en d th e comba t an d ge t th e bes t condition s obtainabl e b y negotiations. A further investmen t o f me n an d materie l appeare d unwarranted sinc e th e Vie t Min h ha d perfecte d a strateg y whic h the French-led force s ha d been unable to master. THE ETHNOGRAPHIC BACKGROUN D T O TH E INDOCHINA WAR

The succes s o f Vie t Min h strateg y wa s du e no t onl y t o thei r use o f th e concept s o f Ma o Tse-tun g bu t also , an d mor e impor tantly, th e adaptatio n o f thei r strategi c thinkin g t o th e uniqu e geographic an d ethni c feature s o f Vietnam . Th e developmen t of a modes t guerrill a forc e int o a six-divisio n arm y wit h mobil e striking powe r wa s greatl y facilitate d b y th e characte r o f Viet nam's geography , especiall y tha t o f th e norther n portio n o f th e country.7 Thes e advantage s aros e becaus e Vietna m i s no t geo graphically unifie d wit h convenien t natura l avenue s o f communi cation. Isolate d area s aboun d an d offe r refug e fo r guerrilla s o r ambush site s for mobil e forces . Overall, Vietna m i s a n hourglass-shape d countr y fragmente d with mountai n chain s an d hel d togethe r b y a thi n coasta l plai n uniting tw o delta s a t extrem e end s o f th e territory . Th e dimen sions o f Vietnam' s geograph y ar e it s lengt h o f approximatel y 1,000 mile s an d it s widt h o f 30 0 mile s a t it s wides t an d 4 5 miles at it s narrowes t point . Mor e strikin g i s th e patter n o f th e coun try's populatio n distribution . Roughl y thirt y millio n Vietnames e are crowde d ont o less than 20,00 0 of th e country' s 128,00 0 squar e miles o f territory . The y liv e o n fertil e delta s an d coasta l plains , while th e remainin g 100,000-plu s squar e miles , mostl y platea u and mountains , ar e sparsel y populate d (Condomina s 1951:77) . This vas t mountai n are a mark s a shar p cultura l dichotomy . It contain s les s tha n tw o millio n person s of variou s non-Vietnam ese ethni c identitie s havin g a much lowe r leve l o f cultura l attain ment tha n th e lowlanders . Whil e th e Vietnames e wh o ar e crowded alon g nearl y a thousan d mile s o f narro w lowland s hav e a genera l ethni c an d cultura l homogeneity , th e mountain s ar e inhabited b y a confusin g ethni c mosaic o f widely divers e peoples. 'The bes t genera l geograph y o f th e are a i s Grea t Britain (1943) . Anothe r geography i s Canad a (1953) , an d Dobby' s boo k (1956 : Ch. 20) i s als o useful .

[775]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTER , JR .

Enough i s know n abou t th e mountai n minorit y peoples t o mak e valid generalization s abou t thei r diversity , bu t informatio n abou t them i s s o scarc e tha t ther e i s no t eve n a precis e numbe r fo r the variou s ethni c groupings . With th e informatio n availabl e th e non-urba n ethni c minoritie s in Vietna m ca n b e classifie d int o thre e convenien t categories . These genera l distinction s relat e primaril y t o th e locatio n o f th e minority people , althoug h thi s characteristi c tend s t o reflec t con gruent pattern s i n socia l organization , relatio n t o th e land , an d linguistic classification . B y employin g thes e criteria , i t i s possibl e to distinguis h first , th e minoritie s o f th e souther n delta s wh o have inherite d th e decayin g traditio n o f antiqu e kingdoms ; sec ond, thos e primitiv e inhabitant s o f th e platea u countr y o f sout h central Vietnam; an d finally, th e occupant s o f th e northern moun tains whos e ethni c an d cultura l tie s spa n th e adjacen t frontier s with Lao s an d China . Th e first o f thes e categorie s include s th e lowland minorities , th e Cambodian s an d Chams , whos e histor y shows tha t the y ha d th e highes t cultura l developmen t o f th e non-Vietnamese rura l peoples . Whil e the y hav e no t bee n totall y assimilated, the y d o liv e intersperse d amon g th e lowlan d Viet namese population , who m the y resembl e i n basi c characteristic s such a s wet-rice agriculture . At th e othe r en d o f th e cultura l spectru m ar e th e approxi mately 800,00 0 inhabitant s o f th e platea u are a o f sout h centra l Vietnam.8 In contras t t o the other minorit y peoples o f th e countr y as wel l a s t o th e Vietnamese , thes e platea u inhabitant s practic e agriculture primaril y fo r thei r ow n subsistence . Thei r lac k o f a highl y value d cas h cro p ha s tende d t o reinforc e th e distinctiveness an d cultura l isolation o f th e plateau peopl e from th e lowlan d Vietnamese, especiall y wit h th e declin e o f th e latter' s deman d from th e highland s fo r suc h item s a s elephant s an d medicina l plants. Anothe r reflectio n o f thei r distinctivenes s a s wel l a s thei r culturally les s advance d statu s amon g th e people s o f Vietna m is tha t thos e o n th e platea u generall y d o no t us e irrigatio n an d are force d t o shif t thei r cultivatio n t o differen t plot s periodicall y when th e fertilit y o f th e soi l i s depleted . A furthe r aspec t o f the distinctivenes s o f th e platea u peopl e is thei r lac k o f coheren t 'The populatio n figures fo r th e sout h centra l platea u ar e a matte r o f dispute . The figure of 800,00 0 used her e is from Condomina s (1951) .

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social organization s beyon d th e leve l o f th e village , excep t fo r occasional coalition s forme d unde r th e auspice s o f charismati c leaders, usuall y o n th e basi s o f magi c o r religio n (se e Hickey' s paper). Rather tha n a homogeneit y arisin g ou t o f thei r cultura l dis tinctiveness fro m th e lowlanders , th e peopl e o f th e sout h centra l plateau hav e suc h a diversit y amon g themselve s a s t o constitut e one o f th e most comple x ethni c mosaic s i n th e world . Som e orde r can b e introduce d i n th e pictur e becaus e mos t o f th e platea u people fal l withi n tw o linguisti c classifications . Bu t th e predomi nance o f group s belongin g t o th e Mon-Khme r an d Malayo-Poly nesian languag e familie s doe s no t mea n tha t a nea t patter n o f cultural congruit y ha s emerged . Eve n thoug h ther e ma y b e a close similarit y i n languag e amon g th e inhabitant s o f distan t villages o n th e plateau , cultura l similaritie s d o not necessarily follo w linguistic lines . Th e language s themselve s ar e ver y divers e (se e table o f linguisti c affiliatio n an d population) , an d uniformit y o f language doe s no t mea n politica l coherence . Therefore , th e wid e disparity i n populatio n amon g th e languag e sub-group s i s no t so meaningfu l a s i t migh t see m upo n initia l investigation . Whil e population figures ar e alway s o f questionabl e accurac y i n Viet nam, i t appear s tha t fou r linguisti c sub-groups , th e Jarai , th e Hre, th e Koho , and th e Rhade , compos e more tha n half th e popu lation o f th e centra l plateau . Th e remainde r o f the peopl e belon g to a grea t arra y o f linguisti c sub-group s (se e U.S . Arm y 1964:1-10; LeBar et al. 1964) . Since thes e grouping s base d o n languag e classificatio n repre sent neithe r cultura l entitie s no r coheren t socia l organizations , they d o no t represen t institution s o f potentia l usefulnes s fo r com mon action . I t i s th e village (o r hamlet ) whic h remain s th e basi c unit fo r huma n activit y o n th e plateau , an d thi s characteristi c has carrie d wit h i t consequence s fo r th e perpetuatio n o f existin g patterns o f cultura l diversit y an d backwardness . Th e confusio n which an y descriptio n o f th e wid e cultura l variation s inevitabl y produces underscore s th e difficultie s involve d i n promotin g an y more coheren t socia l organizatio n amon g th e platea u people s themselves o r i n developin g an y assimilatio n wit h th e lowlan d Vietnamese. The ar c o f mountain s surroundin g th e Re d Rive r Delt a i n [ 77 7 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N T . MCALISTER , J K .

northern Vietna m an d formin g a buffe r wit h sout h Chin a i s th e homeland o f a thir d general categor y o f non-Vietnames e minorit y people. Containin g peopl e culturall y mor e advance d tha n thos e of th e sout h centra l plateau , thi s norther n uplan d territor y in cludes people s o f fou r majo r languag e groups . Despit e th e num ber o f differen t languag e families , th e degre e o f dialec t differ entiation i s not nearl y s o great i n the nort h a s in the sout h centra l plateau. Fo r example , man y o f th e Ta i dialect s ar e t o som e de gree mutuall y intelligible . Principa l amon g th e norther n uplan d minorities ar e th e populou s Ta i an d Viet-Muon g wh o shar e th e agricultural practic e o f cultivatin g rice unde r irrigatio n i n th e mountain valleys . The approximatel y 300,00 0 Viet-Muong appea r to b e relativel y homogeneous , an d ar e concentrate d i n th e regio n to th e wes t an d th e sout h o f th e Re d Rive r Delta . Th e approxi mately 800,00 0 speaker s o f Ta i language s ar e mor e disperse d and culturall y heterogeneous. 9 The majo r Ta i group s of Vietna m ar e th e Whit e an d th e Blac k Tai (name d fo r th e colo r o f th e uppe r garmen t thei r wome n wear), th e Tho , th e Tai-speakin g Nung , an d th e Nyan g (se e LeBar et al. 196 4 fo r summar y description s o f thes e groups) . Not onl y ar e the y scattere d throughou t th e ar c o f mountain s of norther n Vietnam , bu t the y als o hav e clos e cultura l tie s t o similarly labele d Ta i group s in adjacen t area s o f Lao s an d China . Along th e northeaster n frontie r o f Vietna m th e settlement s o f Tho, Nung , an d Nyan g hav e bee n mad e withou t respec t t o th e international boundary . The y exten d int o Kwangs i an d Kwang tung province s i n sout h China . I n th e othe r directio n acros s th e northwestern frontie r ther e ar e substantia l group s o f Blac k Ta i in Phon g SaI y Provinc e of norther n Lao s a s wel l a s furthe r sout h around th e Plain e de s Jarre s i n th e vicinit y o f th e Laotia n tow n of Xien g Khouang ; Sa m Neu a Provinc e i n easter n Lao s is inhab ited b y a grou p know n a s th e Ta i Neua , whic h i s anothe r sub group o f th e Tai-speakin g people s wh o ar e foun d i n th e interio r of southeas t Asi a fro m northeas t Burm a an d Norther n Thailan d into south Chin a (se e map 15) . In shar p contras t t o th e peopl e o f th e sout h centra l platea u "The mos t appropriat e estimat e o f th e Tai-speakin g populatio n fo r th e perio d under discussio n i s th e figure o f 830,000 , give n i n Morechan d (1952) . Con dominas (1953:642 ) estimate d th e Viet-Muon g a t approximatel y 250,000 . Thi s latter sourc e contain s a n excellen t bibliograph y o n th e ethnograph y o f Indochina .

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the Ta i hav e traditionall y ha d a sophisticate d socia l an d politica l organization beyon d th e village . The Ta i village has had it s iden tity an d importanc e subordinate d t o a large r groupin g generall y known a s the muong, whic h i s traditionally a valley-bound princi pality. Especiall y i n Blac k Ta i societ y th e highl y stratifie d clas s structure ha s alway s functione d i n term s o f th e muong, an d within thi s framewor k th e villag e ha s bee n relegate d t o a ver y minor position. 10 Accordin g t o traditio n al l lan d i n a muong be longed t o th e Chau Muong, th e hereditar y politica l an d socia l leader wh o wa s almos t alway s a membe r o f on e o f th e nobl e families whic h mak e u p th e L o Ca m clas s (Hicke y 1958:14 0 ff.) . As i n th e feuda l syste m o f th e Europea n Middl e Age s th e indi vidual farmer , a commoner , ha d n o titl e t o th e lan d h e worked . The Ta i farme r wa s no t boun d t o th e lan d i n serfdom , bu t i f he chos e t o depart , th e lan d h e worke d reverte d t o th e muong for redistribution . Beside s controllin g th e land , th e nobilit y (which i s compose d o f th e L o Ca m families ) ha s successfull y nurtured th e belie f tha t the y hav e bee n divinel y authorize d t o be th e traditiona l leader s o f th e Blac k Tai . Throughou t norther n Vietnam an d part s o f norther n Lao s th e L o Ca m hav e bee n rec ognized a s th e socia l an d politica l elite . Moreover , the y hav e buttressed thi s prestig e b y maintainin g a monopol y ove r th e wealth o f th e region . Fo r thes e reason s th e influenc e o f th e L o Cam persiste d despit e sustaine d Frenc h effort s t o brea k thei r hereditary prerogatives . Although th e L o Cam hav e ha d a positio n o f influenc e extend ing ove r a wid e region , n o politica l o r socia l entit y beyon d th e muong ha s emerge d fro m Ta i society . However , ther e i s th e be lief amon g th e Ta i i n th e are a northwes t o f th e Re d Rive r Delt a that th e regio n wa s onc e organize d int o a politica l uni t know n as th e Si p Son g Cha u Tai , meanin g th e federatio n o f twelv e Tai states . Ther e neve r appear s t o hav e bee n suc h a centralize d political organization . Instead , th e Si p Son g Cha u Ta i seem s t o have bee n mor e o f a ritualistic entit y withi n whic h th e De o fam ily o f La i Cha u wer e beginnin g t o wel d a centralize d politica l structure a t th e tim e th e Frenc h asserte d themselve s i n th e Ta i highlands. 10 The bes t singl e sourc e o f in f ormation o n th e Tai-speakin g people s o f Vietna m is Hickey (1958) . Information o n the muong i s found o n pp. 194-195.

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V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTEH , J B .

In general , i t wa s th e muong aroun d whic h Blac k Ta i politic s and societ y wa s organized , an d thi s patter n o f autonomou s up land-valley principalitie s ha s seeme d t o b e prevalen t amon g Tai speaking minoritie s throughou t norther n Lao s an d Thailand . Thi s decentralized configuratio n o f powe r ha s bee n a consequenc e of th e influentia l positio n o f th e chau muong a s hereditary chief s of thes e principalities . Unchecke d internall y i n thei r authority , the autonomou s chau muong hav e bee n barrier s t o th e forma tion o f an y mor e coheren t organizatio n fo r commo n actio n i n the Ta i highland s o f northwester n Vietnam . O n th e othe r hand , they hav e als o bee n th e obstacle s t o th e externa l dominatio n of th e Ta i country . Both th e Vietnames e i n earlie r centurie s an d more recentl y th e Frenc h wer e unabl e t o brea k th e ritua l o r temporal powe r o f th e chau muong, thoug h th e Chines e ma y have bee n abl e t o d o s o i n recen t year s i n th e Si p Son g Pa n Na o f Yunna n (se e Diao' s paper) , an d th e Siames e hav e don e so in Norther n Thailand . The Th o ar e th e larges t minorit y i n norther n Vietnam . Whil e they to o hav e ha d a hereditar y elite , thei r socia l an d politica l structure i s quit e unlik e tha t o f th e Blac k Tai . Thi s i s i n part a result o f th e Th o having modifie d thei r cultur e i n respons e to th e Vietnames e effort s t o assimilat e the m int o th e lowlan d tradition i n th e perio d followin g th e sixteent h century . Thi s pol icy o f Vietnamizatio n wa s carrie d ou t b y mandarin s sen t int o the Th o are a northeast o f th e Re d Rive r Delta . Their mixed-bloo d descendants, know n a s th e Tho-ti , becam e a hereditar y aristoc racy. Tho-t i wer e accorde d th e politica l prerogative s o f a man darinate, whic h amon g th e Vietnames e wa s chose n o n th e basi s of examination s an d merit . Among th e Tho , the Tho-t i functione d in a political syste m whic h conforme d t o the administrativ e struc ture utilize d b y th e Vietnames e i n th e lowland s (Hicke y 1958 ; 33 ff.) . Rather tha n leadin g t o a hierarchica l politica l o r socia l struc ture amon g th e Tho , thi s administrativ e syste m ha s merel y al lowed th e Vietnames e t o exer t thei r influenc e ove r the m mor e easily. Th e Tho-t i di d no t hav e autonomou s base s o f powe r ex cept a s a resul t o f thei r socia l prestige . The y acquire d prestig e by a hereditar y monopol y ove r th e alie n Vietnames e cultur e an d their ritualisti c rol e i n th e religio n o f thei r people . Amon g th e [ 78 0 ]

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Tho, unlik e th e Blac k Tai , th e ric e field s wer e privatel y owned , and th e grea t majorit y o f th e Th o settlement s consiste d o f dis persed homestead s forme d int o loose-kni t agglomerations . Thu s the powerfu l positio n o f th e chau muong, base d o n th e feuda l land syste m an d th e highl y stratifie d societ y o f th e muong, ha s no analo g wit h th e Tho . If ther e i s a genera l patter n o f uplan d socia l structur e (t o which th e Th o ar e a n exceptio n becaus e o f thei r Vietnames e acculturation), i t i s th e syste m o f th e Blac k Tai . I n additio n to it s presenc e amon g th e Whit e Tai , a smal l grou p o f Ta i lan guage speaker s closel y relate d t o thei r Blac k Ta i neighbors , thi s cultural patter n als o seem s t o b e characteristi c o f th e populou s Viet-Muong people , who ar e quit e differen t i n language bu t simi lar i n agricultura l practice s t o th e Tai . Althoug h les s recen t data i s availabl e o n th e Viet-Muong , i t appear s tha t the y to o have a stron g traditio n o f a hereditar y aristocrac y whic h enjoy s political prerogative s stemmin g fro m feuda l contro l ove r th e lan d as wel l a s fro m ritualisti c prestig e (Condomina s 1953:645) . The people s sharin g characteristic s i n socia l an d politica l or ganization wit h th e Blac k Ta i ar e found , wit h fe w i f an y excep tions, t o th e wes t o f th e Re d River . Thu s amon g th e inhabitant s of uplan d valley s wh o practic e irrigated-ric e agriculture , ther e are people s o n eithe r sid e o f th e Re d Rive r wh o have contrastin g social systems . To th e eas t ther e ar e th e Tho, whose Vietnamize d hereditary elit e ha s mad e the m subjec t t o lowlan d control . Fiercely independen t valley-boun d principalitie s scattere d throughout th e highland s o f th e are a t o th e wes t o f th e Re d River an d extendin g o n int o norther n Lao s hav e traditionall y resisted lowlan d control . Two smalle r groups , th e Me o an d th e Ma n (calle d Ya o o r Iu Mie n elsewhere) , complet e th e ethni c landscap e i n th e moun tains o f norther n Vietnam . Simila r i n cultura l characteristics , these tw o peoples ar e juxtaposed a s a minor ethni c them e agains t the majo r pattern s i n social an d politica l organizatio n o f the mor e populous Tai, Tho, and Muong. In the juxtaposition many aspects of the situatio n o f th e mountai n minoritie s i n Vietna m an d thei r relations t o eac h othe r becom e clearer . On e importan t distinctio n of th e Me o an d th e Ma n i s found i n thei r habitat an d agricultura l practices. Unlik e the Tai and Muon g linguistic groups i n norther n [781]

VIETNAM: JOH N T . MCAHSTER , J R .

Vietnam th e Ma n an d th e Meo d o not inhabi t th e uplan d valley s and rive r bottoms , bu t liv e o n th e peak s an d slope s abov e them . There the y gro w ric e i n dry-lan d shiftin g cultivatio n fo r then own subsistence . Bu t i n contras t t o th e dry-lan d cultivator s o f the sout h centra l platea u th e Ma n an d th e Me o als o hav e a n important cas h crop , th e opiu m popp y (se e Condomina s 1953 : 644-649). The existenc e o f a cas h cro p mean s tha t thes e mountainto p dwellers hav e bee n closel y tie d t o th e market s i n th e uplan d valleys wher e thei r opiu m i s trade d fo r good s produce d i n th e lowlands o r importe d fro m abroad . Th e opiu m trad e ha s tradi tionally involve d a substantia l numbe r o f intermediarie s i n th e marketing o f th e crop . Instead o f bein g a harmonious commercia l relationship, th e trad e betwee n th e Ma n an d Me o cultivator s and th e valle y trader s ha s ofte n resulte d i n substantia l tensions . These difficultie s ove r price s an d exchang e hav e serve d t o rein force th e independen t spiri t o f th e mountainee r cultivator s an d have strengthene d thei r apprehension s towar d mos t aliens . An other facto r complicatin g thes e highland relationship s i s tha t th e valley principalities , th e muong, hav e frequentl y attempte d t o bring th e Ma n an d th e Me o unde r thei r authorit y an d t o requir e tax o r tribut e fro m them . Thu s th e characte r o f th e relation s between th e valle y ruler s i n th e highland s an d th e opium-grow ing mountaineer s ha s somewha t resemble d tha t betwee n th e low landers an d th e highland valle y muong themselves . In thei r socia l an d politica l organizatio n th e Ma n an d th e Me o are muc h mor e sophisticate d tha n th e dry-lan d cultivator s o f the centra l plateau . A s migh t b e expected , thei r societ y i s als o quite differen t fro m tha t o f thei r norther n neighbors , th e high land valley-dwellin g Ta i an d Viet-Muong . Althoug h th e extende d families ar e muc h mor e importan t group s amon g th e Ma n an d the Me o tha n ar e th e village s thi s ha s no t bee n a barrie r t o political structure s emergin g beyon d th e village level . Thu s rela tively larg e Ma n an d Me o socia l cluster s hav e developed . Bu t rarely, i f a t all , have the y bee n o n th e institutionalize d o r rigidl y structured basi s o f th e muong o f th e Blac k Tai . Instea d the y have bee n forme d aroun d th e capacitie s fo r mediation , o r per sonal prestig e o f individua l Ma n o r Me o leaders , usuall y i n local ized situation s (se e Kandre' s an d Barney' s papers) . Broade r [ 78 2 ]

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grouping s hav e bee n limite d i n par t becaus e settlement s o f thes e two people s hav e generall y bee n smal l an d restricte d t o altitude s above 3,00 0 feet , wher e th e opiu m popp y grow s best . A t thes e height s thei r settlement s hav e bee n disperse d throughou t south ern China , norther n Vietnam , Laos , an d Thailand . Despit e th e absenc e o f an y large r uni t o f politica l centralizatio n beyon d th e local cluster s o f influence , eve n o n a ritualisti c o r mythologica l basis suc h a s th e Si p Son g Cha u Tai , ther e appear s t o hav e bee n considerabl e communicatio n betwee n thes e distan t Ma n an d Me o setdements . I t ha s bee n thes e broa d network s o f communicatio n an d socia l organizatio n tha t hav e mad e th e mountai n minoritie s o f norther n Vietnam a s a whol e culturall y distinc t fro m thos e o f th e centra l plateau . As thi s surve y o f th e ethni c landscap e o f th e Vietnames e highland s indicates , th e geographi c locatio n o f thes e minoritie s offers a convenien t mean s fo r categorizin g group s havin g funda menta l difference s i n culture . Th e classificatio n base d o n locatio n demonstrate s tha t th e separatenes s an d minorit y positio n o f th e mountai n people s wit h respec t t o th e lowlan d majorit y doe s no t necessaril y impl y grea t differenc e i n leve l o f cultura l develop men t wit h respec t t o th e Vietnamese . Whil e suc h a disparit y does exis t wit h th e peopl e o f th e sout h centra l platea u i t i s ob viously no t th e cas e wit h th e valley-dwellin g Ta i o f th e north , who hav e a writte n languag e an d supra-villag e politica l structures , as well a s irrigated-ric e agriculture . Sinc e thes e cultura l variation s ar e associate d wit h distinc t geographica l areas , the y allo w fo r certai n limite d generalization s abou t th e consequence s o f thi s diversit y fo r relation s wit h th e Vietnamese . Th e lo w leve l o f politica l organizatio n o f th e sout h centra l platea u people s ha s mean t tha t the y hav e no t ha d th e organizationa l capacit y t o resist lowlan d domination . Yet th e cul tura l disparit y whic h result s fro m thei r lac k o f a n organizatio n for commo n actio n ha s als o bee n a barrie r t o th e Vietnames e in controllin g th e platea u peopl e throug h a simpl e patter n o f administrativ e contro l an d acculturatio n a s wa s th e cas e wit h th e Th o i n th e north . Whil e thes e Th o ar e par t o f th e sam e language famil y a s th e Blac k an d Whit e Tai , th e Vietnames e were unabl e t o brea k th e autonom y o f th e Ta i people s t o th e west o f th e Re d River . Although , afte r th e Tho , thes e upland -

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valley Ta i were probabl y th e closes t culturall y t o th e lowlanders , it di d no t prov e possibl e t o overcom e th e independen t spiri t an d power o f th e chau muong o r t o chang e th e structure d societ y on whic h his influenc e wa s based . Th e sam e fiercely autonomou s attitude o f th e uplan d Ta i ha s als o bee n share d b y th e Ma n and th e Me o wh o liv e o n th e slope s an d peak s abov e thei r up land-valley principalities . Th e chau muongs hav e attempte d t o extend thei r authorit y ove r thes e mountainee r opiu m cultivator s with th e resul t tha t tension s simila r to thos e betwee n th e Ta i and th e Vietnames e hav e frequentl y developed . Thes e an d vari ous othe r kind s o f tension s hav e emerge d t o affec t Vietnames e relations wit h th e mountai n minoritie s a s a consequenc e o f th e broad spectru m o f cultura l diversit y amon g th e people s o f Vietnam. GEOGRAPHIC AN D ETHNI C LIMIT S T O VIETAMES E POLITICA L UNIT Y

In thei r wide diversit y thes e geographic an d cultura l character istics hav e limite d th e unit y o f Vietna m an d it s developmen t as a nation . Wit h thes e limit s i n min d i t i s hardl y necessar y to emphasize , fro m th e perspectiv e o f contemporar y events , th e potentially disastrou s consequence s fo r th e Vietnames e peopl e of the disunity of their country . The patter n o f it s historica l developmen t ha s als o affecte d th e unity o f Vietnam . Th e histor y o f th e Vietnames e ha s bee n a story o f thei r stead y expansio n southwar d fro m th e delt a o f th e Red Rive r alon g th e narro w coasta l plai n o f wha t i s no w centra l Vietnam int o th e delt a o f th e Mekon g River. 11 Thi s advanc e wa s not complete d unti l th e late eighteent h centur y and wa s achieve d only throug h th e militar y conques t o f tw o kingdom s whic h stoo d in th e pat h o f th e Vietnamese . On e wa s Champa , a kingdo m of Malayo-Polynesia n peopl e locate d i n wha t i s now centra l Viet nam. I t finall y succumbe d t o th e Vietnames e i n th e lat e seven teenth centur y afte r almos t nin e hundre d year s o f conflic t an d two centurie s o f retreat . Sout h o f Champ a th e Khme r (o r Cam bodian) Kingdo m controlle d th e are a aroun d th e presen t cit y 11 The mos t authoritativ e sourc e o n th e historica l developmen t o f th e Vietnames e is L e Than h Kho i ( 1 9 5 5 ) . Masso n (1960 ) i s a usefu l shor t account . Buttinge r (1958) i s th e standar d Englis h languag e history . Th e historiograph y o f Vietna m is discusse d i n article s b y Honey , Chesneaux , an d Malleret , i n Hal l (1961:Ch . 9; 17 ; 2 3 ) .

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of Saigo n an d th e delt a t o th e southwes t o f it . Durin g th e cours e of th e eighteent h centur y thi s fertil e territor y wa s conquere d by th e Vietnamese . Bu t unlik e Champa , whic h cease d t o exist , Cambodia continue d t o prospe r i n th e uppe r par t o f th e Mekon g Delta aroun d it s capital o f Phno m Penh . The presence o f approxi mately 45,00 0 Cha m peopl e i n th e vicinit y o f th e coasta l town s of Pha n Thie t an d Pha n Ran g an d abou t 400,00 0 Khme r peopl e in th e Mekon g Delt a ar e vestige s o f thes e onc e prominen t king doms i n wha t i s no w Sout h Vietna m (se e populatio n table) . Although livin g i n strategi c locations , the Cham s an d th e Khmer s have no t create d majo r problem s fo r th e unit y o f Vietna m sinc e their conques t becaus e o f th e smallnes s o f thei r numbe r an d the lack of their political consciousness and activity . This centuries-lon g southwar d expansio n wa s no t wholl y bene ficial fo r th e Vietnamese . Disadvantage s hav e arise n becaus e thi s geographic advanc e wen t beyon d thei r capacit y t o consolidat e these gain s throug h politica l centralization . Regionalis m devel oped a s th e expansio n straine d th e tenuou s monarchica l structur e of politics . Thi s tren d wa s confirme d i n a divisio n o f th e countr y at approximatel y th e eighteent h parallel , a conditio n whic h en dured fo r almos t tw o centurie s fro m 162 0 until 1802 . Two claim ants t o centra l powe r i n Vietna m fough t eac h othe r fro m base s in th e souther n an d norther n region s o f th e country . I n a patter n reminiscent o f th e presen t fragmentatio n o f Vietna m th e Portu guese an d the n th e French aide d th e south , while th e Dutc h sup ported th e north . The reunification o f th e country i n 1802 , by Em peror Gi a Lon g o f th e souther n faction , wa s attributabl e i n larg e part t o Frenc h ai d i n th e for m o f ship s an d nava l gun s whic h gave th e southerner s superiorit y i n mobility an d firepower. It wa s onl y sixt y years late r tha t Franc e bega n it s unsystemati c and opportunisti c effort s t o acquir e politica l control over territor y in Vietna m an d it s tw o neighbors , Lao s an d Cambodia . I n th e brief perio d o f unit y ther e wa s n o tim e t o la y th e foundation s of a durabl e nationa l stat e i n Vietnam . Neithe r wa s ther e th e political capacit y fo r suc h a n undertaking . I t wa s thi s absenc e of politica l talen t amon g Gi a Long' s successors , manifesting itsel f in provocation s towar d th e French , tha t prompte d th e latte r t o seize territor y a s a n informa l compensatio n fo r thei r declinin g influence wit h thei r forme r clients . [785]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTEB , JR .

In th e uneve n patter n o f Frenc h occupatio n Vietna m wa s di vided int o thre e territories (Tonkin , Annam , an d Cochi n China) , with differen t lega l statuse s an d forms o f administration . Throug h colonial policie s o f thi s kin d Franc e reinforce d regiona l tenden cies i n Vietnames e politics , makin g the m eve n sharpe r b y creat ing ne w base s fo r division . I t wa s fo r comple x reason s growin g out o f thes e divisiv e colonia l policie s tha t roughl y equa l number s of Vietnames e fough t o n bot h th e Communis t an d Frenc h side s in th e wa r betwee n 194 7 an d 1954. 12 This colonia l divisivenes s also contribute d t o th e settlemen t tha t partitione d th e countr y after th e Genev a conferenc e o f 195 4 o n almos t exactl y th e same line s a s i n th e earl y eighteent h centur y whe n Franc e had begu n he r politica l adventure s i n Vietnam . Thi s continuin g fragmentation serve s t o underscor e th e historica l lac k o f experi ence wit h th e centra l institution s i n Vietnam . I t als o put s int o perspective th e presen t conflict , whic h involve s a contes t t o im pose centra l contro l b y th e Communist s an d relativel y unstruc tured attempt s t o resis t thi s challeng e b y othe r Vietnamese . A s the contemporar y situatio n indicates , th e uniqu e geographica l features an d historica l experienc e o f Vietna m ha s mean t tha t political centralizatio n o f eve n th e lowland s ha s bee n a n unre solved proble m i n Vietna m ove r th e pas t thre e an d a hal f centuries. Besides thes e historica l problem s o f politica l centralization , the Vietnames e southwar d expansio n alon g th e narro w coasta l plain an d int o th e Mekon g Delt a create d anothe r proble m fo r the unification o f Vietna m a s a nation . Thei r expansio n wa s con fined t o th e coasta l plai n an d deltas , s o th e platea u regio n o f south centra l Vietna m a s wel l a s th e mountain s o f th e nort h were lef t untouche d b y Vietnames e settlements . A s th e foregoin g survey ha s shown , thes e tw o highlan d area s contai n people s wit h very basi c cultura l differences , an d thei r continue d existenc e a s unassimilated minoritie s withi n th e territoria l boundarie s o f Viet nam has posed problems of control for th e Vietnamese . Unlike th e consequence s o f regionalis m whic h develope d a s the Vietnames e becam e stretche d ou t alon g th e coasta l plai n 12

Approximately 300,00 0 Vietnames e wer e fighting wit h th e Frenc h b y 1954 , and the y wer e oppose d b y 350,000-400,00 0 i n th e Vie t Min h rank s (Ro y 1963:558).

t 78 6 ]

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in thei r southwar d advance , the presenc e o f th e highlan d people s did no t caus e a n immediat e challeng e t o politica l centralization . Because the y wer e smal l i n number , no t usuall y expansive , an d inferior i n technica l capacit y an d socia l organization , th e moun tain minoritie s onl y infrequentl y pose d a threa t t o th e securit y and well-bein g o f th e lowland Vietnamese . Suc h challenge s wer e easily deal t wit h b y network s o f militar y post s commo n t o th e frontier area s o f advancin g civilization s fro m th e America n Wes t in th e nineteent h centur y t o th e northwes t Chin a campaign s against th e Nien s an d othe r minorities . Continuou s effort s wer e made t o normaliz e relation s wit h th e mountai n minoritie s b y recognizing thei r autonom y i n retur n fo r thei r acceptin g ritua l investiture fro m th e Vietnames e monarch y an d renderin g tribut e to i t a s sovereign . Wit h mino r exceptions , thi s actio n tende d to stabiliz e th e mountainou s interio r frontie r o f th e coastal-ori ented lowlan d Vietnamese . A majo r variatio n fro m thi s patter n o f leavin g undisturbe d the cultura l autonom y an d politica l separatenes s o f th e mountai n minorities occurre d i n th e Vietnames e relation s wit h th e Tho . This grou p inhabit s a territor y tha t ha s bee n strategi c throughou t Vietnam's history . I t lie s acros s th e majo r route s o f communica tion fro m sout h Chin a int o Vietnam . Thi s mountainou s are a ha s been a traditiona l invasio n rout e fo r Chines e force s whic h re peatedly attempte d t o restor e th e dominatio n tha t Chin a exer cised ove r Vietna m befor e 939 . Th e Th o homeland , lyin g between th e delt a o f th e Re d Rive r an d th e Chin a frontie r i n the northeas t portio n o f norther n Vietnam , i s als o clos e t o th e main concentratio n o f th e Vietnames e population . Fo r thi s reaso n its mountain s wer e a usefu l refug e fo r th e Ma c family , wh o re treated ther e afte r thei r unsuccessfu l attemp t t o usurp th e thron e of Vietna m i n th e lat e sixteent h century . Fro m th e regio n aroun d the tow n o f Ca o Ban g th e Ma c wer e abl e t o continu e thei r bi d for politica l power b y winning th e support o f th e loca l Tho popu lation an d b y receiving th e ai d o f th e cour t a t Peking . For almos t a centur y th e Ma c maintaine d thei r aspiration s fo r legitimac y until th e oppositio n Trin h famil y invade d thei r mountai n redoub t and crushe d the m (L e Than h Kho i 1955:250-251) . Afte r havin g overcome th e Mac , the y mad e effort s t o den y th e us e o f th e Tho territor y t o futur e dissidents . Thes e effort s include d a con [ 78 7 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTEB , JR .

certed progra m o f cultura l assimilatio n carrie d ou t b y Vietnames e mandarins. Th e resul t wa s th e emergenc e o f th e Vietnamize d elite, th e Tho-ti . Throug h the m acculturatio n too k for m i n th e adoption o f a Vietnames e styl e i n lan d regulation s an d religiou s practices, amon g man y simila r change s i n Th o society . Becaus e of th e rol e thei r territor y playe d i n Vietnames e politics , th e Th o were mor e influence d b y Vietnames e cultur e tha n an y othe r eth nic minority i n Vietnam . Because thei r locatio n wa s mor e periphera l t o th e aren a o f Vietnamese politics , thi s typ e o f beginnin g towar d assimilatio n into Vietnames e cultur e di d no t occu r wit h th e othe r mountai n minorities. Suc h isolatio n coul d no t lon g remai n th e cas e onc e fresh move s wer e mad e towar d politica l centralizatio n i n Viet nam. Afte r th e unificatio n unde r Gi a Lon g i n 180 2 much interes t was show n i n th e territor y o f th e tw o state s developin g i n th e lowlands o f th e Mekon g Rive r Basin : Cambodi a an d th e thre e kingdoms o f wha t late r wa s t o becom e Laos . I f th e competitio n for influenc e ove r these countrie s beyon d Vietnam' s interio r fron tier durin g th e earl y nineteent h centur y ha d continued , i t seem s reasonable t o assum e tha t th e cultura l contac t wit h th e mountai n minorities locate d betwee n th e Vietnames e coasta l plai n an d th e Mekong Valle y woul d hav e starte d a tren d towar d assimilation . But thes e incipien t development s cam e t o a n en d wit h th e im position o f Frenc h power . Instea d o f indigenou s state s finding a definitio n throug h loca l processes of politics, th e French create d out o f thei r technique s o f colonia l engineerin g a territor y know n as Indochina . French Indochin a becam e an amalga m o f colon y an d protecto rates, joinin g togethe r territorie s wit h extremel y divers e an d con trasting cultures , an d wit h grea t disparitie s i n thei r level s o f so cial an d politica l development . Thi s politica l potpourr i wa s a consequence o f Frenc h ambition s i n Eas t Asi a an d Vietnames e ambitions alon g th e Mekong . Th e prince s i n th e Cambodia n an d Laotian area s accepte d Frenc h protectio n willingl y rathe r tha n have thei r rol e a s pawn s i n a Siames e an d Vietnames e rivalr y for territoria l influenc e continued . Perhap s a s a n outgrowt h o f their attitud e o f protecting th e Cambodian s an d Laotian s agains t Vietnamese encroachment , th e Frenc h als o sough t t o preserv e the autonom y an d th e cultura l distinctivenes s o f th e mountai n [ 78 8 ]

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minorities. Th e mos t extrem e exampl e o f thi s polic y occurre d in th e centra l Vietna m platea u wher e th e Frenc h prohibite d th e immigration o f Vietnames e int o certai n area s (Condomina s 1951:80). At th e sam e tim e the y wer e guardin g th e autonom y o f th e upland peoples , th e Frenc h wer e als o attemptin g t o establis h direct rul e amon g them . Inevitably , thi s effor t involve d circum scribing th e establishe d pattern s o f rule , and resulte d i n consid erable tension s betwee n thos e wit h traditiona l influenc e an d those wit h position s create d b y th e French . Thes e tension s di d not caus e endurin g problem s amon g th e uplan d Ta i t o th e wes t of th e Re d Rive r i n norther n Vietna m becaus e thei r indigenou s elite's influenc e wa s onl y slightl y affecte d b y Frenc h programs . This wa s no t th e cas e amon g th e Tho , whos e elite , a s ha s bee n seen, di d no t hav e autonomou s base s o f influence . No t onl y di d the positio n o f th e Tho-t i declin e unde r Frenc h rule , bu t thei r misfortune als o represented a check o n Vietnames e cultura l influ ence sinc e thi s Vietnamize d elit e wa s th e principa l agen t o f as similation amon g th e Tho . A s i s indicate d b y thi s situatio n among th e Tho , on e o f th e importan t effect s o f th e progra m of direc t rul e wa s t o strengthe n th e barrier s t o assimilatio n wit h the lowlanders , which wer e being erecte d aroun d al l th e minorit y people. Excep t i n th e cas e o f th e Tho , thes e barrier s coincide d with th e interest s o f th e minorit y people s o r a t least wit h desire s of thei r leaders . The uplan d people s responde d t o thi s protectio n o f thei r au tonomy b y a loyalt y towar d th e Frenc h whic h wa s demonstrate d dramatically durin g wartime . On e suc h sequenc e o f event s too k place i n Marc h 1945 , whe n th e Japanes e attempte d t o arres t all Frenc h militar y an d administrativ e personne l i n Indochina . Some element s o f th e Frenc h Colonia l Arm y manage d t o escap e into sout h China . Thi s exodu s include d a detachmen t o f Rhad e tribesmen, probabl y belongin g t o th e Bataillon de Tirailleurs Montagnards du Sud Annam, wh o wer e le d b y Lieutenan t Colonel LePage , th e commande r o f th e Fourt h Batallio n o f th e Sixteenth Colonia l Infantr y Regiment . Unde r extremel y sever e circumstances the y mad e thei r wa y throug h mor e tha n eigh t hun dred mile s o f jungl e fro m th e centra l platea u o f Vietna m al l the way to Yunnan Province . [ 78 9 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTER , J B .

During 1946 , whe n thes e Colonia l Arm y unit s returne d fro m China, al l o f Vietna m seeme d t o b e i n revol t agains t th e French . But th e peopl e o f th e Ta i highland s welcome d thes e Frenc h troops a s liberators , particularl y becaus e the y pu t t o flight Vie t Minh cadre s wh o wer e attemptin g t o ge t a foothol d there . A similar situatio n occurre d th e sam e yea r i n th e centra l Vietna m plateau wher e th e returnin g Europea n detachment s o f th e French arm y wer e enthusiasticall y received . Thi s attitud e con trasted wit h th e aggressiv e resistanc e show n i n th e lowland s o f central Vietnam , whic h th e Frenc h neve r reoccupie d durin g th e seven years o f th e Indochin a War . Such loyaltie s a s thes e wer e th e resul t o f colonia l policie s which reinforce d th e cultura l dichotom y betwee n mountai n an d lowland people s i n Vietnam. They were a corollary to the divisiv e policies followe d b y th e Frenc h amon g th e Vietnamese , whic h had facilitate d colonia l rul e ove r th e thre e administrativel y dis tinct area s o f th e country . Throug h thei r colonia l rul e th e Frenc h had give n greate r definitio n an d structur e t o th e centrifuga l forces whic h ha d develope d throughou t Vietnam' s history . A s a resul t o f th e Frenc h apprehensio n towar d institution s fo r cul tural assimilatio n an d politica l integration , a heterogeneou s pat tern o f conflictin g loyaltie s too k form i n Vietnam . Thos e highlan d as wel l a s lowlan d group s loya l t o th e Frenc h di d no t hav e com mon interest s o r mutua l trust . I t remaine d fo r th e seve n year s of wa r t o brin g ou t thes e laten t antipathie s an d cas t the m i n bold relief . Durin g thi s prolonge d conflict , th e absenc e o f coher ent politica l suppor t fro m thei r variou s clien t group s i n Vietna m proved a severe limitation t o the French . Face d wit h th e sophisti cated military-politica l strateg y o f th e tightl y structure d Vie t Minh, th e politica l divisivenes s whic h ha d onc e facilitate d French rul e no w prove d t o b e a grea t liability . I t mean t tha t France wa s force d t o surrende r t o th e Communist s despit e th e fact tha t th e bul k o f it s arme d force s i n Indochin a remaine d intact. THE NORTHER N INDOCHIN A MOUNTAIN S I N VIE T M I N H STRATEG Y

When th e Indochin a Wa r bega n i n 1947 , it wa s no t surprisin g that th e Vie t Min h fled th e lowlan d citie s o f norther n Vietna m for th e surroundin g mountains . Th e Frenc h militar y forc e wa s [ 79 0 ]

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concentrated i n th e citie s suc h a s Hano i an d Haiphong , bu t i t was to o smal l t o hav e grea t effec t i n th e extensiv e highlands , where i t foun d mobilit y difficul t an d it s enemie s coul d easil y hide. I n thi s earl y period th e Viet Minh forces wer e tightly organ ized an d wel l adapte d t o th e mountainou s terrain , thoug h muc h smaller tha n th e French . Beside s siz e ther e wa s als o a grea t dis parity i n equipmen t an d i n th e qualit y o f training . Becaus e o f their inferio r position , th e immediat e tas k o f th e Vie t Min h wa s to preserv e thei r ow n forc e whil e wearin g dow n tha t o f th e French. A t th e sam e tim e the y ha d t o develo p thei r capacitie s beyond th e scal e o f guerrill a warfar e i f thei r aspiration s fo r inde pendence throug h militar y operation s wer e t o b e fulfilled . Thu s it wa s inevitabl e tha t th e Vie t Min h woul d adop t unconventiona l forms o f warfare , fo r an y conventiona l approac h towar d th e French militar y contingent s whic h stoo d betwee n the m an d thei r political objectives would surely have failed. 13 The Communist s too k advantag e o f th e mos t conspicuou s fea tures o f Vietnames e geograph y an d societ y i n orde r t o maximiz e their meage r militar y capacities . I n exploitin g th e mountain-low land dichotom y i n norther n Vietnam , th e Vie t Min h expose d the vulnerabilitie s o f th e large r an d better-equippe d Frenc h ex peditionary corps . The tellin g advantag e th e Frenc h ha d enjoye d in th e lowlan d citie s wa s th e capacit y t o concentrat e superio r troop strengt h an d firepowe r i n tactica l situations . Th e dictate s of unconventiona l warfar e require d tha t th e Vie t Min h den y thi s convenience t o thei r enem y b y dispersin g thei r ow n force s i n terrain wher e th e concentratio n o f superio r force s agains t the m was mor e difficult . Eve n i n th e lowlands , wher e th e terrai n fa vored th e French , th e Vie t Min h successfull y cause d th e Frenc h to exten d thei r force s t o perilousl y thi n limits . Th e harassmen t of guerrilla s hidde n amon g a lowlan d peasantr y whos e loyalt y the colonia l regim e coul d no t comman d wa s simila r i n effec t to th e action s o f th e Vie t Min h disperse d i n th e mountains . Wit h their adversaries ' forces sprea d ou t an d tie d down , th e Vie t Min h could the n concentrat e locall y superio r strengt h t o wea r dow n the French , a proces s whic h cam e t o be know n a s pourrissement, or "rottin g away. " 13

This conditio n i s simila r t o tha t discusse d b y Jano s (1963) . Als o usefu l in understandin g thi s situatio n i s Zawodny , ed . (1962) , especiall y th e articl e by Knor r (pp . 53-64) .

[791 ]

V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTER , J R .

While ther e wa s extensiv e comba t i n man y region s o f Indo china, i t wa s i n th e norther n mountain s o f Vietnam , wher e the y had fle d initially , a s wel l a s i n th e adjacen t area s o f Lao s tha t the Vie t Min h wer e bes t abl e t o implemen t thei r strategy . Thei r success als o depende d o n th e capacit y o f th e Vie t Min h simul taneously t o undercu t Frenc h position s i n th e Re d Rive r Delt a by a clandestin e politica l organizatio n whic h gav e increasin g safety t o lowlan d guerrillas , a s wel l a s providin g recruit s fo r th e mountain trainin g areas . Ye t i n thes e enemy-controlle d lowlands , as severa l dramati c instance s o f Communis t defea t indicated , it wa s difficul t i f no t impossibl e fo r th e Vie t Min h t o develo p beyond th e scal e o f guerrill a harassment . Eve n wit h th e Frenc h forces sprea d thin , th e delt a terrai n allowe d reinforcement s to b e concentrate d quickly . Bu t th e simultaneou s gnawin g awa y at th e defens e position s an d communication s route s i n th e low lands hel d dow n troop s tha t wer e potentia l reinforcement s fo r engagements i n the mountains . By contrast , th e terrai n i n th e uplan d region s facilitate d th e Viet Minh' s achievemen t o f loca l superiorit y i n troop s an d firepower becaus e o f th e isolatio n o f certai n ke y area s fro m th e centers o f Frenc h strength . Havin g th e enem y cu t of f fro m rein forcements wa s no t s o muc h a facto r o f th e distanc e fro m base s of th e expeditionar y corp s a s it was th e geographi c fragmentatio n of Vietnam , wher e uplan d valle y area s ar e reache d onl y b y lon g narrow defiles . Defens e post s se t u p i n thes e mountai n valley s by th e Frenc h wer e perfec t objective s fo r th e Vie t Min h guer rillas sinc e reinforcements , whe n the y di d come , coul d usuall y reach thei r besiege d comrade s onl y throug h easil y ambushe d corridors. Weapon s take n fro m thes e overru n position s allowe d the Communist s t o develo p thei r capacitie s beyon d th e guerrill a level an d t o repea t thei r patter n o f achievin g tactica l superiorit y in mountain isolatio n on an increasingly larger scale. This exploitatio n o f th e mountain-lowlan d dichotom y i n north ern Vietna m fo r militar y succes s depende d o n a n abilit y t o creat e bases i n th e highland s an d t o maneuver fro m the m withou t bein g tied dow n t o a defens e o f territory. 14 I n developin g thi s capacity , the Vie t Min h ha d capitalize d upo n a revol t launche d amon g "The histor y o f Vie t Min h technique s fo r creatin g political-militar y base s is discusse d i n detai l b y Lancaste r (1961 : Appendi x II , pp . 418^428) .

[ 79 2 ]

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the Th o i n 194 0 aroun d th e tow n o f Ba c Son . A t tha t tim e th e entry o f th e Japanes e occupatio n troop s int o Indochin a diverte d the attentio n o f th e Frenc h an d presente d th e opportunit y fo r an expressio n o f pent-u p frustrations . B y providin g a n organiza tional structur e fo r thes e smolderin g passions , th e Communist s were abl e t o establis h a guerrill a bas e i n th e mountain s o f Viet nam durin g th e Japanes e occupation . Creatin g thi s guerrill a zon e behind Japanes e line s secure d fo r th e Vie t Min h bot h legitimac y as a "resistanc e movement, " an d weapon s fro m th e Allies , wh o were the n eage r t o ti e down th e Japanes e b y loca l harassment. 15 As th e Pacifi c wa r cam e t o a close , these achievement s yielde d other importan t benefits . Wit h th e unexpected Japanes e capitula tion i n Augus t 1945 , the existenc e o f a discipline d an d equippe d armed forc e i n clos e proximit y t o th e citie s o f th e Re d Rive r Delta wa s a vita l asse t t o th e Communists . I t allowe d the m t o get contro l ove r th e capita l o f Hano i an d proclai m th e indepen dence o f Vietnam . Despit e thi s advantage , ther e followe d almos t a yea r o f unsuccessfu l negotiation s wit h th e French . B y th e en d of 194 6 i t ha d becom e apparen t tha t i f th e Vie t Min h wante d independent politica l powe r the y woul d hav e t o fight fo r i t (se e Modelski 1964) . At thi s point th e guerrill a bas e i n the Tho homeland (know n administrativel y t o th e Communist s a s th e Vie t Bac Zone) wa s onc e agai n invaluable , for i t afforde d a safe have n upon which th e Viet Minh could fall back . The Th o revol t o f 194 0 wa s understandabl e i n vie w o f thei r historical experience . Thi s militan t protes t wa s sparke d b y th e Japanese invasio n tha t wa s directe d alon g a traditiona l rout e leading fro m Chin a acros s th e Th o homeland . Takin g advantag e of a n ol d patter n i n which the y were pawns betwee n th e invader s and th e invaded , th e Th o sough t a n outle t fo r thei r antagonis m toward th e French . Eve n thoug h th e Japanes e appea r t o hav e supplied arm s indirectl y t o th e Th o an d give n qualifie d encour agement t o them , th e motivatio n fo r th e uprisin g seem s certai n to hav e sprun g fro m thes e mountai n people s themselves . Signifi cantly, th e 194 0 revol t occurre d i n area s wher e th e influenc e of th e Tho-ti , thoug h stymie d b y th e French , wa s stil l strong . 15 The Communists ' rol e i n th e Ba c So n uprisin g i s documente d i n Centra l Committee (1960:66-69) . Th e circumstance s o f th e revol t i n relatio n t o th e Japanese occupatio n ar e discusse d i n Marchand (1950:11) .

[ 79 3 ]

V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTER , J R .

Whether thi s facto r mean s tha t th e Ba c So n rebellion wa s wholl y attributable t o th e laten t oppositio n o f th e Tho-t i i s no t clear . However, th e Tho-t i see m t o hav e bee n unabl e t o provid e th e leadership fo r th e rebellio n b y themselves , especiall y afte r th e Japanese permitte d th e Frenc h t o crus h it s mai n thrust . Ye t th e uprising wa s neve r completel y stampe d out . Becaus e th e Com munist Part y provide d a n organizationa l structure , th e resistanc e was abl e t o persist i n th e for m o f isolate d pocket s o f terrorists . The rol e o f th e Communis t Part y i n th e Ba c So n revol t an d in th e organizatio n o f endurin g guerrill a unit s amon g th e Th o is illuminatin g i n severa l respects . Th e tenuousnes s o f th e posi tion o f th e Tho-t i a s a n elit e withi n Th o societ y i s suggeste d by thei r inabilit y t o provid e th e organizationa l structur e fo r a continuation o f th e resistance . Bu t th e apparen t widesprea d sup port amon g th e Th o fo r th e Communist-le d guerrill a movemen t indicates tha t hostilit y towar d th e Frenc h wa s no t restricte d to thei r Vietnamize d elite , whic h ha d bee n dispossesse d by th e colonia l regime . Despit e th e organizationa l limitation s of th e Tho-ti , thei r Vietnames e cultura l backgroun d enable d them t o pla y a vita l par t i n th e formatio n o f th e guerrill a zone . Since the y wer e th e onl y Vietnamese-speakin g elit e of an y moun tain minority , the y wer e i n a n unparallele d positio n t o work wit h the Vie t Min h t o organiz e a highlan d guerrill a bas e withi n thei r traditionally define d territory . Moreover , becaus e th e Tho-t i ha d suffered a t th e hand s o f th e colonia l regimes , thei r interest s tended t o coincid e wit h thos e o f th e Communists . Thi s attitud e was i n shar p contras t t o th e elite s o f othe r mountai n group s wh o looked upo n th e Frenc h a s protectors fro m Vietnames e encroach ment. These an d othe r specia l characteristic s whic h se t th e Th o apar t from thei r mountai n neighbor s presente d th e Vie t Min h wit h a rar e opportunit y fo r gettin g a politica l foothol d i n Vietna m during th e Japanes e occupation . Ye t thi s developmen t containe d an importan t elemen t o f chance . Althoug h th e Ba c So n uprisin g was a n expressio n o f deep-roote d attitudes , i t wa s th e Japanes e invasion throug h Th o territor y tha t provide d th e vehicl e fo r th e protest. Whethe r th e Vie t Min h migh t hav e achieve d simila r political tie s amon g th e Th o withou t th e spar k o f th e Ba c So n rebellion i s a n ope n question . However , th e uniquenes s o f th e [794]

MOUNTAI N MINORITIE

S & TH E VIE T MIN H

Tho amon g th e highlan d minoritie s mad e the m th e mos t likel y mountain all y o f a Vietnames e politica l group . Without th e com bination o f th e Th o cultura l distinctivenes s an d chanc e historica l developments, i t seem s unlikel y tha t th e Vie t Min h woul d hav e been abl e t o establis h suc h a n effectiv e guerrill a zone . This limi tation woul d hav e ha d importan t consequence s fo r th e Indochin a War. If a mountai n bas e are a wa s a s indispensabl e a s i t appear s to hav e bee n t o th e Vie t Min h i n gainin g contro l ove r Hano i after th e Japanes e capitulation , an d i n affordin g a sanctuar y fo r the protracte d seven-yea r conflict , the n th e Communis t relation ship wit h th e Th o wa s seminal . Attempt s b y th e Communist s to establis h bas e area s i n th e Vietnames e lowland s ha d faile d before th e Japanes e war. 16 I n th e aftermat h o f th e Japanese capit ulation th e limite d cadr e o f th e Vie t Min h ha d tim e t o organiz e only th e citie s o f norther n Vietna m int o a Communis t politica l structure. Withou t th e Vie t Ba c Zon e prepare d durin g th e Japa nese occupation , th e Vie t Min h migh t hav e bee n expose d t o th e military superiorit y o f th e Frenc h an d annihilate d befor e anothe r suitable bas e coul d hav e bee n established . I n additio n t o th e security whic h i t afforded , th e Th o homelan d occupie s on e o f the mos t strategi c location s i n Indochina . I t i s clos e t o th e citie s of th e Re d Rive r Delta , bu t it s advantag e ove r othe r mountai n redoubts wa s it s contiguit y wit h th e Kwangsi-Kwangtun g prov inces o f souther n China , whic h mad e convenien t a livel y con traband trad e i n arm s an d ammunition . I n thei r exploitatio n o f the mountain-lowlan d dichotom y fo r militar y advantage , th e Vie t Minh coul d hardl y hav e bee n mor e favorabl y situate d tha n i n the Th o territory . The commitmen t o f th e Th o peopl e t o th e Communists ' mili tary effor t wa s als o a n impressiv e asset . Whil e th e Whit e an d Black Ta i wer e welcomin g th e Frenc h Colonia l Arm y o n it s re turn fro m Chines e exil e i n 1945-1946 , Th o guerrill a unit s wer e 19 The mos t spectacula r attemp t t o creat e a lowland bas e occurre d i n 1930-193 1 in th e nort h centra l Vietna m province s o f Ngh e A n an d H a Tinh . I t was crushe d by th e French , bu t i t gav e th e Communist s a n opportunit y fo r invaluabl e revolu tionary experience . Th e stor y o f thi s uprisin g i s tol d b y Tra n Hu y Lie u (1960) . Another importan t attemp t t o creat e a lowlan d bas e occurre d simultaneousl y with th e Japanes e interventio n an d th e Ba c So n revolt . Thi s precipitou s uprisin g was launche d i n th e Mekon g Delt a i n th e autum n o f 194 0 an d was quickl y crushed b y th e French . Se e Mu s (N.D.:12 ) fo r detail s o f thi s revolt .

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helping th e Vie t Minh t o tak e over Hanoi . After th e proclamatio n of independenc e i n Augus t 194 5 th e Ministe r o f Defens e i n th e first governmen t organize d b y H o Ch i Min h wa s a Th o name d Chu Va n Tan . H e becam e on e o f th e thre e Th o general s i n th e Viet Min h arme d force s an d serve d a s th e commande r o f th e Viet Ba c bas e are a fo r mos t o f th e war . Th e othe r Th o general s eventually commande d tw o o f th e si x division s mobilize d durin g the Indochin a Wa r b y th e Vie t Minh . Thes e tw o divisions , th e 312th an d th e 316th , wer e compose d primaril y o f Th o numberin g roughly 20,00 0 me n i n all . Thi s wa s approximatel y 2 0 percen t of th e Vie t Min h regular s a s o f 195 4 an d abou t 5 percen t o f the tota l estimate d Th o populatio n i n th e earl y 1950's . A s thes e figures demonstrate , th e Vie t Min h wer e acceleratin g th e socia l and politica l integratio n o f th e Th o with lowlan d cultur e throug h the proces s o f revolutionar y war . Fro m modes t guerrill a begin nings, a smal l Communis t cadr e becam e th e catalyti c agen t i n this integration . A t th e sam e tim e the y helpe d t o transfor m th e most loosel y structure d o f th e norther n mountai n minoritie s int o hierarchical political-militar y formation s o f grea t dedicatio n an d determination. In term s o f th e utilit y o f thei r territor y an d th e commitmen t of thei r population , th e contributio n o f th e Th o t o th e militar y success o f th e Vie t Min h wa s vital , i f no t absolutel y decisive . While i t is imprudent t o anticipate th e results of thoroug h histori cal evaluation , fou r turning-point s i n th e militar y spher e o f th e Indochina Wa r appea r conspicuou s a s antecedent s t o Die n Bie n Phu. Al l o f the m occurre d i n th e norther n Vietna m mountain s or wer e intimatel y relate d t o th e lowland-mountai n dichotomy . The first wa s th e serie s o f battle s fough t alon g th e northwes t border wit h Chin a durin g th e autum n o f 1950 . This engagemen t gave dramati c evidenc e tha t th e Vie t Min h ha d achieve d mobil e warfare capability . Known a s th e battl e fo r R.C . (Rout e Coloniale ) 4 , thi s en counter wa s fough t alon g th e sixt y mile s o f roadwa y runnin g southeastward fro m th e tow n o f Ca o Ban g t o Lan g Son . I n thi s vicinity th e roa d follow s mountai n defile s paralle l t o th e Chin a border a t distance s neve r mor e tha n thirt y mile s an d usuall y about twelv e mile s fro m th e frontier . Frenc h troop s had occupie d these frontie r position s i n 1947 , when th e bul k o f th e expedition [ 79 6 ]

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S & TH E VIE T MIN H

ary corp s ha d bee n hurle d agains t th e Communists ' Vie t Ba c redoubt. Althoug h thi s attac k faile d t o eliminat e th e Vie t Min h base area , i t di d permi t th e Frenc h t o statio n force s betwee n the guerrill a zon e an d th e mos t convenien t route s int o souther n China. However , thi s defensiv e postur e di d no t preven t th e Vie t Minh fro m obtainin g militar y supplie s an d trainin g fro m China , particularly afte r th e Chines e Communis t victor y i n 194 9 ha d brought thei r regular formations t o the Vietnamese frontier. Thus , contrary t o their expectations , this frontier guar d dut y ha d place d a substantia ] portio n o f th e Frenc h arm y i n a n extremel y expose d position—a situatio n the y realized onl y belatedly . Exploratory attack s b y th e Vie t Min h i n mid-Septembe r 1950 , on borde r post s betwee n th e tw o garriso n town s o f Ca o Ban g and Lan g So n force d th e executio n o f th e previousl y determine d French polic y o f abandonin g thes e frontie r positions . I n orde r to facilitat e th e withdrawa l o f th e detachment s a t Ca o Ban g southeastward alon g R.C . 4 , reinforcement s wer e dispatche d northwestward fro m Lan g So n t o lin k u p wit h th e retreatin g units. Thi s maneuve r b y approximatel y 6,00 0 French-le d troop s was throug h mountainou s terrai n i n whic h th e Vie t Min h ha d massed mor e tha n twent y batallion s o f infantr y an d artillery — much mor e tha n doubl e th e siz e o f th e expeditionar y corp s units . The annihilatio n o f thi s frontie r forc e wa s almos t inevitable . Ye t R.C. 4 wa s th e onl y feasibl e escap e rout e fro m thes e forwar d posts dee p i n Communist-controlle d territory . Instea d o f blockin g Chinese materie l fro m enterin g th e guerrill a zon e i n th e Th o homeland, th e Frenc h frontie r forc e ha d becom e encircled . Th e troops wh o surrounde d the m wer e th e ver y one s wh o ha d re ceived weapon s an d trainin g fro m th e Chines e despit e th e de fensive presenc e of th e French army. 17 With virtuall y thei r entir e 6,000-ma n contingen t eithe r killed , captured, o r wounded , th e Frenc h suffere d i n th e battl e fo r R.C . 4 thei r greates t defea t i n colonia l warfare sinc e th e Battl e o f Que bec. Naturally , th e engagemen t wa s historicall y importan t fo r the Vie t Min h too . I t no t onl y heralde d thei r achievemen t o f a mobil e warfar e capability , i t als o gav e the m unchallenge d con " Th e mos t thoroug h accoun t o f th e R.C . 4 battl e i s containe d i n Bodar d (1965:395-603). Importan t informatio n i s als o foun d i n Fal l (1961:27-28 ) an d Marchand (1953:127-142) .

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trol ove r a n are a northeas t o f th e Re d Rive r Delt a extendin g all th e wa y t o th e Chin a border . Beside s acquirin g enoug h mate riel t o re-equi p a ful l divisio n fro m stock s th e Frenc h hastil y abandoned a t Lan g Son , thi s Vie t Min h succes s enable d the m to obtai n supplie s fro m Chin a o n a mor e regula r basis . Suc h material advantage s wer e extremel y importan t t o th e Commu nists i n buildin g a regula r forc e fro m thei r guerrill a foundations . Yet certai n factor s underlyin g th e Vie t Min h victor y o n R . C. 4 wer e o f mor e lastin g importanc e tha n it s materia l rewards . The Communist s ha d no w demonstrate d tactica l an d organiza tional achievement s withou t whic h th e additiona l quantitie s o f materiel might have been meaningless . The battl e o f R . C. 4 wa s th e firs t operatio n i n whic h th e Vie t Minh wer e capabl e o f employin g a divisio n havin g bot h infantr y and artiller y unit s a s a tactica l unit . I t wa s als o th e first engage ment i n whic h Th o fough t i n regula r formations . Th e Th o com prised a t leas t a thir d o f th e force s committe d t o th e comba t on R.C . 4 . The y wer e organize d int o tw o regiments , th e 174t h and th e 209th—nucle i aroun d whic h th e 316t h an d th e 312t h Divisions wer e late r formed—an d the y playe d importan t role s in th e Vie t Min h victory . I n additio n t o reinforcin g th e predomi nantly Vietnames e 308t h Division , thes e regiment s distinguishe d themselves o n severa l occasions , especiall y whe n th e Frenc h col umns lef t th e roadbe d o f R.C . 4 and attempte d t o escape throug h the mountains . Th e 209t h Regimen t wa s credite d wit h annihilat ing th e Frenc h arm y troop s i n th e vicinit y o f Don g Kh e eve n though it s ow n effectivenes s wa s impaire d b y sever e casualties . Further sout h aroun d Tha t Kh e th e 174t h Regimen t wa s respon sible fo r neutralizin g Frenc h reinforcement s parachute d i n t o facilitate th e retreat of the Cao Ban garrison . While i t migh t hav e bee n expecte d tha t th e Th o wh o wer e fighting o n thei r hom e territor y woul d b e wel l adapte d t o moun tain combat , th e Vietnames e wer e traditionall y unuse d t o activi ties—military o r otherwise—i n th e highlands . Moreover , th e Vietnamese personne l o f th e 308t h Divisio n wer e primaril y vol unteers fro m th e lowlan d town s o f Hanoi , Phu c Yen , an d Vin h Yen. Thei r capacit y fo r mountai n operation s ha d develope d a s a resul t o f experienc e i n progressivel y large r encounter s beyon d [ 79 8 ]

MOUNTAI N MINOHITIE

S & TH E VIE T MIN H

the guerrill a scal e a s well as from thre e months o f intensiv e train ing a t th e Ye n Sha n bas e i n souther n China' s Yunna n Province . Of course , thi s wa s no t th e first tim e tha t Vietnames e troop s had fough t i n th e mountains . Guerrill a remnant s o f th e tradi tionalist monarch y ha d mad e a las t stan d agains t Frenc h con quest i n th e lat e nineteent h centur y i n almos t th e sam e locatio n as th e Vie t Ba c Zone . Effort s t o repe l Chines e invasion s ove r previous centurie s ha d als o take n plac e there . Bu t th e event s of th e Indochin a Wa r appea r t o represen t th e firs t tim e tha t the Vietnames e consciousl y utilize d thei r mountainou s territor y in a strateg y t o wi n politica l an d militar y power , an d the n adapted larg e number s o f lowlander s t o th e task . Whil e i t i s true tha t Vietnames e ha d bee n engage d a s worker s i n mine s throughout th e mountains , an d tha t Vietnames e shop s ha d pre dominated i n th e mountai n towns , thes e activitie s involve d a small numbe r o f persons . Therefore , tha t eventuall y 100,00 0 t o 150,000 Vietnames e coul d achiev e an y corporat e undertakin g i n the highland s b y adaptin g themselve s t o mountai n livin g wa s an important departur e in their cultural history . Equally a s significan t a s th e Vietnamese' s newl y develope d capacity t o fight i n th e mountain s wa s thei r abilit y t o coordinat e their operation s wit h a larg e numbe r o f Tho . Th e tightnes s o f their coordinatio n i n th e R . C. 4 encounte r indicate d tha t th e Tho ha d bee n wel l integrate d politicall y an d militaril y int o th e Viet Min h structure . Thi s to o wa s a ne w departure . Previou s lowland experienc e wit h th e Th o ha d onl y th e purpos e o f creat ing a Vietnamize d elit e a s a n instrumen t o f pacificatio n an d con trol. No w th e Vie t Min h wer e assimilatin g th e Th o an d offerin g them th e possibilit y fo r socia l mobilit y base d o n militar y an d po litical talents . Whil e th e Tho-t i wer e probabl y i n a favorabl e position intially , opportunitie s fo r mobilit y wer e no t restricte d to them . Throug h thi s socia l an d politica l mobilization , th e Th o became suc h cohesiv e an d effectiv e fighter s tha t the y wer e abl e to sustai n wid e geographi c mobility . No t onl y di d the y partici pate i n operation s o n th e edg e o f th e delta , bu t the y wer e als o dispatched int o th e Ta i highland s hundred s o f mile s t o th e wes t of thei r homeland . Besides thi s capacit y t o maneuve r widely , ther e wer e othe r [ 79 9 ]

V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTEH , J B .

advantages t o th e Vie t Min h fro m thei r progra m o f geographi c adaptation an d politica l mobilizatio n fo r revolutionar y war . On e of thes e benefit s wa s th e abilit y o f th e Vie t Min h adherent s t o acquire militar y effectivenes s rapidly . Eve n thoug h th e Vietnam ese an d th e Th o ha d receive d littl e o r n o militar y instructio n during th e colonia l era , the y learne d th e demandin g skill s o f artillery an d infantr y tactic s i n th e shor t spac e o f less tha n thre e years. Moreover , the y devise d way s o f employin g thes e skill s to wip e ou t Frenc h force s havin g mor e length y militar y experi ence. Becaus e o f thei r skillfulnes s i n th e fundamental s o f militar y tactics, th e Vie t Min h wer e abl e t o adop t th e revolutionar y wa r strategy of Mao Tse-tung with grea t success. Yet Mao' s stres s o n mobil e warfare—hi s intermediat e stag e i n the pat h t o victory—seems t o have meant comba t b y large armie s on grea t plain s suc h a s tha t o f northeas t Chin a wher e ther e wa s ample are a t o maneuver. 18 However , th e differenc e i n scal e an d location betwee n thes e classi c engagements i n Chin a an d th e bat tle o f R . C. 4 di d no t mea n tha t th e comba t i n th e Vietnames e highlands wa s a departur e fro m mobil e warfare . Th e Vie t Min h had adapte d Mao' s theorie s t o thei r ow n particula r situation . This wa s perhap s mos t eviden t i n mobil e warfar e where , a s Ma o says, "i n orde r t o dra w th e enem y int o a figh t unfavourabl e to hi m bu t favourabl e t o us , ofte n w e shoul d engag e hi m whe n he i s o n th e mov e an d shoul d loo k fo r condition s favourabl e to ourselve s a s th e advantageousnes s o f th e terrain , th e vulner ability o f th e enemy , th e presenc e o f inhabitant s wh o ca n block ade information , an d th e fatigu e an d inadvertenc e o n th e par t of th e enemy " (Ma o 1963:246) . Th e Vietnames e Communist s had a t th e battl e o f R.C . 4 , th e firs t majo r turning-poin t o f th e Indochina War , use d terrai n t o compensat e fo r thei r stil l smal l armed forces . The y ha d show n themselve s capabl e o f rapi d re positioning i n thei r maneuver s agains t th e French , usin g th e mountains t o thei r advantag e rathe r tha n allowin g the m t o b e an obstacle . Acros s th e pat h o f th e fleeing Frenc h arm y the y had execute d thei r quic k pince r attack s wit h th e precisio n o f a basketbal l play . Because o f thi s brillian t success , achieve d throug h th e shrew d "The stor y o f th e implementatio n o f Mao' s strateg y i n th e Chines e revolution ary wa r i s contained i n Li u (1956:243-270) .

t 80 0 ]

MOUNTAI N MINOBITIE S & TH E VIE T MIN H

use o f mountainou s terrain , th e nex t turning-poin t i n th e Indo china Wa r i s a startlin g contrast . Th e Vie t Min h seeme d t o aban don al l th e shrewdnes s the y ha d previousl y displaye d whe n the y boldly launche d a serie s o f fronta l attack s o n Frenc h position s in th e Re d Rive r Delt a durin g th e first si x month s o f 1951 . I n what ma y hav e bee n a desperat e effor t t o gai n a quic k victory , the Communists , i n th e first o f thes e lowlan d attack s i n Januar y 1951, swep t dow n fro m th e mountains , penetrate d t o th e edg e of th e delta , an d attempte d t o driv e i n th e directio n o f Hanoi . Having concentrate d clos e t o 30,00 0 troop s i n th e vicinit y o f Vinh Yen , abou t thirt y mile s northwes t o f Hanoi , th e Vie t Min h forces mad e a convenien t an d attractiv e target . I n thei r hast e the Communis t leader s see m t o hav e forgotte n th e asymmetr y of militar y advantage s betwee n th e mountain s an d th e lowlands . With roadway s crisscrossin g th e leve l delt a expans e i n th e battl e area, rive r transport , an d nearb y airfield, th e Frenc h ha d littl e problem i n assemblin g superio r force s quickly . Whil e groun d detachments fixed th e Vie t Min h location , Frenc h ai r an d artil lery bombardment s raine d tremendou s quantitie s o f shell s an d bombs on the massed units of their enemy. 19 The los s a t Vin h Ye n o f 6,00 0 me n ( a fifth o f th e forc e the y had committe d there ) wa s th e pric e fo r thi s Vie t Min h gamble . Although th e Vie t Min h seeme d temporaril y t o regai n thei r cau tion fro m th e soberin g effect s o f th e Vin h Ye n debacle , the y soon indulge d themselve s i n anothe r adventurou s campaign . After attemptin g unsuccessfull y t o lure Frenc h unit s int o isolate d defiles amon g th e foothill s o n th e norther n edg e o f th e delt a during Marc h an d Apri l 1951 , the Vie t Min h thrus t throug h th e western flank o f Frenc h delt a position s i n lat e May . Unlik e thei r plan i n th e comba t a t Vin h Yen , th e strateg y o f th e Vie t Min h was t o coordinat e thei r fronta l attac k o n th e Da y Rive r line alon g the southwester n ri m o f th e delta , wit h a n attac k insid e th e delt a itself. The infiltratio n behin d Frenc h line s o f tw o crac k regiment s of th e 320t h Vie t Min h Divisio n wa s mad e possibl e b y th e cre ation o f bas e area s i n th e populou s delt a throug h clandestin e political operations . Eve n thi s subtlet y coul d no t compensat e fo r their militar y inferiority , a s th e fragmente d mountai n terrai n ha d "Details o f th e battl e o f Vin h Yen , includin g a map , ar e foun d i n Fal l (1961:30-35) an d i n Marchan d (1953:143-150) .

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V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTER , J R .

done earlier . Again , becaus e o f th e eas e wit h whic h the y coul d concentrate superio r force s i n th e delta , th e Frenc h wer e abl e to preven t th e Vie t Min h fro m achievin g mobil e warfar e i n th e lowlands.20 These stubbor n fronta l attack s o n Frenc h delt a position s ha d cost th e Vie t Min h dearl y i n personne l an d materie l losses . Ye t as their subsequen t move s indicated, the y had learne d thei r bitte r lessons durin g th e firs t si x month s o f 1951 . In th e thir d turning point o f th e Indochin a War , th e Communist s dre w ou t o f thei r successful an d unsuccessfu l experience s a more effectiv e exploita tion o f th e mountain-lowlan d dichotomy . A s a resul t o f thi s ne w approach th e Vie t Min h wer e abl e t o attai n a n equilibriu m i n strategic forc e wit h th e Frenc h a t th e battl e o f Ho a Binh , whic h raged fo r fou r month s betwee n Novembe r 195 1 an d Februar y 1952. Thi s midpoin t alon g th e pat h t o a Maois t revolutionar y war victor y wa s achieve d throug h a flexible respons e t o a Frenc h initiative tha t ha d attempte d t o brea k th e Communists ' hol d o n the mountain s surroundin g th e delta . I n th e hop e o f disruptin g the Vie t Min h suppl y lin e leadin g fro m th e centra l coasta l plai n to th e Vie t Ba c Zone , th e expeditionar y corp s ha d occupie d th e town o f Ho a Binh . Locate d o n th e Blac k Rive r onl y fort y mile s from Hanoi , thi s tow n wa s i n th e mountain s wel l beyon d th e periphery o f th e delta , an d fa r enoug h fro m lowlan d base s so that it s occupatio n require d a vulnerabl e extensio n o f Frenc h forces (Fal l 1961:41-55 ; Marchand 1953 : Ch. 8). In thi s offensiv e th e Frenc h see m no t t o hav e bee n wholl y attentive t o th e disadvantage s o f thei r decision . B y seizin g a point isolate d b y mountainou s terrai n an d connecte d t o th e low lands b y a singl e roa d runnin g throug h narro w defiles , the y ex posed themselve s dangerousl y t o th e Vie t Minh . A s position war fare develope d fo r th e tow n o f Ho a Bin h an d it s adjacen t airstrip , mobile warfar e wa s launche d b y th e Vie t Min h agains t reinforce ments o n th e route s leadin g fro m th e delta . Durin g thi s fightin g the Vie t Min h displaye d th e sam e tenaciou s qualitie s tha t ha d characterized thei r earlie r combat . Whil e whittlin g awa y a t thes e offensive unit s alon g th e Blac k River , th e Vie t Min h demon strated a ne w dimensio n i n flexibility. Regula r unit s wer e onc e 20

The Da y Rive r battl e i s covere d i n Fal l (1961:38-41 , Ma p p . 40 ) an d in Marchan d (1953:156-162) .

[ 80 2 ]

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again infiltrate d int o th e Re d Rive r Delta , thoug h no t wit h th e purpose o f attackin g fixed Frenc h positions . Thei r harassmen t served t o expan d th e delt a bas e areas , increas e th e pressur e o n the securit y force s there , an d eventuall y forc e th e redeploymen t of Frenc h unit s from th e Ho a Bin h salient (Marchan d 1953:184) . The Vie t Min h victor y a t th e battl e o f Ho a Bin h pointe d t o a ne w departur e i n Vie t Min h strategy . Previousl y th e Vie t Min h had bee n conspicuousl y incapabl e o f sustainin g mobil e o r posi tion warfar e i n th e delta . No w the y ha d show n themselve s abl e to us e wha t capabilitie s the y possesse d i n th e lowland s i n con junction wit h thei r mai n forc e i n th e highlands . Thi s strateg y held ou t th e potentia l o f undercuttin g th e whol e Frenc h positio n in norther n Vietnam . Instea d o f fronta l attack s o n th e delta , th e Viet Min h woul d no w graduall y expan d thei r base s i n th e low lands. Thi s woul d ti e dow n increasingl y larg e number s o f Frenc h troops t o stati c securit y dut y an d preven t thei r us e i n mountai n offensives. Whe n remainin g Frenc h position s i n th e highland s were attacked , a simultaneou s initiativ e b y Vei t Min h force s i n the delt a woul d creat e a n insolubl e tactica l dilemma . Caugh t in thi s strategi c vise , th e militar y resource s o f th e Frenc h com mand coul d be slowly filed away . Strengthened b y th e achievement s o f thei r ne w approac h t o revolutionary wa r startegy , th e Vie t Min h launche d a n offensiv e into th e northwes t highlands , th e hom e o f th e Whit e an d th e Black Tai , i n th e autum n o f 1952 . Th e Communist s ha d neve r before bee n abl e t o moun t large-scal e militar y operation s i n thi s region becaus e o f it s distanc e fro m thei r principa l bas e are a an d the hostilit y o f th e Ta i towar d them . Formin g a n operation s are a known a s ZAN O (Zone Autonome Nord-Ouest), th e Ta i high lands wer e th e las t significan t norther n Vietna m mountai n are a under Frenc h control . Th e area' s importanc e stemme d no t jus t from th e Ta i population who m th e Frenc h ha d pledge d t o defen d but als o fro m it s positio n a s th e gatewa y t o Laos . I f th e Frenc h could no t sto p th e Vie t Min h fro m gainin g contro l ove r ZANO , then al l o f norther n Lao s woul d b e threatened . As th e Communis t troop s move d towar d th e Ta i highlands , the Frenc h attempte d t o exploi t thei r enemy' s extende d position . They drov e int o th e rea r o f th e Vie t Minn' s suppl y lin e i n th e vicinity o f th e uppe r Re d Rive r abou t midwa y betwee n th e Vie t [ 80 3 ]

V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTEK , J R .

Bac bas e are a an d ZANO . I n thi s maneuver , terme d Operation Lorraine, th e Frenc h assemble d th e larges t forc e the y wer e eve r to amas s fo r a singl e operatio n i n th e Indochin a War , 30,00 0 men. Shrewdly , th e Vie t Min h allowe d th e Frenc h t o penetrat e deeply int o th e rea r o f thei r lines . Th e deepe r the y wen t int o the Communists ' rea r area , th e mor e expose d th e Frenc h unit s became. Tie d t o th e road s becaus e o f thei r tank s an d vehicles , the Expeditionar y Forc e wa s a convenien t targe t whe n i t aban doned th e hop e o f deterrin g th e Vie t Min h advanc e an d bega n to withdraw (Fal l 1961:72-100) . Unchecked, th e Vie t Min h no w rolle d int o th e Ta i highlands . After skirmishe s aroun d th e importan t Frenc h airfield-outpos t at N a San , whic h coul d hav e bee n a battl e lik e Die n Bie n Phu , the Vie t Min h brok e of f th e engagement . A s i f b y impuls e the y then sen t thei r mai n unit s careenin g throug h th e mountain s int o northern Laos. 21 Caugh t of f guard , th e Frenc h hastil y dispatche d reinforcements int o Lao s b y ai r fro m th e Re d Rive r Delta . Th e Viet Minh' s mobilit y ha d no w reache d th e poin t wher e the y could thro w th e Frenc h greatl y of f balanc e an d thereb y gain tre mendous strategi c advantage . Thei r adaptatio n t o mountain com bat an d thei r manipulatio n o f th e mountain-lowlan d dichotom y to compensat e fo r materia l an d numerica l inferiorit y ha d yielde d great benefits . THE TA I HIGHLAND S I N TH E MOUNTAI N POLITIC S O F INDOCHIN A

The Frenc h militar y operation s are a i n th e northwes t know n as ZAN O ha d a s it s primar y missio n th e protectio n o f th e Ta i Federation. Originall y thi s tas k wa s essentiall y a politica l func tion. I t wa s t o b e achieve d b y supportin g th e Presiden t o f th e Tai Federation , De o Va n Long , b y defendin g th e capita l locate d at La i Cha u nea r th e Chin a border , an d b y maintainin g Frenc h influence amon g th e Ta i populatio n an d othe r minoritie s livin g within thei r territory . I f thes e condition s wer e t o b e realized , it woul d b e throug h th e militar y strengt h o f France . Ye t thi s strength wa s becomin g increasingl y circumscribe d b y th e Vie t Minh's exploitatio n o f th e mountain-lowlan d dichotomy . Th e po 21 These Vie t Min h thrust s int o Lao s ar e illustrate d i n Navarr e (1956 : Map p. 165) .

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sition o f th e Ta i highlands becam e progressivel y mor e vulnerabl e with th e immobilizatio n o f Frenc h power , an d becaus e o f funda mental political shortcomings o f th e Tai Federation . Sharp interna l dissension s mad e th e politica l uni t a federatio n in nam e only . I n realit y i t wa s use d a s a n instrumen t b y it s president i n a n attemp t t o restor e th e prestig e an d authorit y his famil y ha d enjoye d befor e th e Frenc h colonizatio n o f Indo china. S o bitte r wer e th e antagonism s withi n th e Ta i populatio n as a resul t o f De o Va n Long' s bi d t o restor e familia l powe r tha t they cause d th e virtua l paralysi s o f commo n actio n b y Ta i no t linked t o hi m b y kinship . Moreover , i n particula r instance s th e bitterness o f som e o f hi s relative s outdi d tha t o f othe r uplan d Tai. Ironically , th e tas k o f maintainin g th e allegianc e o f th e Tai (whic h wa s intende d a s a politica l mission ) wa s sough t b y military mean s tha t wer e eventuall y undermine d b y politica l fac tors for which th e French ha d n o effective response . The Ta i Federatio n cam e int o bein g o n Jul y 15 , 1948 , whe n the Provisiona l Statut e wa s signe d a t La i Chau . I t i s especiall y significant tha t th e Federatio n wa s formall y attache d t o th e French Unio n i n thi s gran t o f autonom y an d ha d n o lega l rela tionship t o Vietnam . Thi s situatio n wa s altere d i n Apri l 1950 , after Vietna m ha d ostensibl y becom e independent , whe n th e Ta i Federation wa s include d i n th e domai n o f th e Vietnames e Em peror, bu t it s autonom y wa s no t substantiall y diminished . Thi s autonomous statu s depende d no t onl y upo n th e Frenc h protec tion fro m th e Vietnamese—Communist s o r not—bu t als o upo n the characte r o f thei r ow n politics , whic h mad e th e Ta i difficul t to contro l b y an y outsiders . A s a furthe r complicatio n t o thei r politics variou s group s amon g th e Ta i ha d traditionall y bee n eager an d adep t i n usin g outsider s i n attempt s t o establis h hegemony ove r thei r rival s i n th e Ta i highlands . Suc h a competi tion wa s i n progres s whe n th e Frenc h penetrate d durin g th e 1880's int o wha t late r becam e Lao s unde r th e pretex t o f stoppin g Siamese pressur e o n th e "kingdom " o f Luan g Prabang . (Th e Siamese ha d ostensibl y gon e t o th e ai d o f Luan g Prabang , whic h was under attac k from th e Ho Chinese. ) The Frenc h wante d t o confin e th e Siames e t o a positio n wes t of th e Mekon g Rive r b y diplomati c an d militar y pressur e an d in th e proces s establis h a protectorat e ove r Luan g Prabang . A n [ 80 5 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTEH , JR .

important limitatio n t o thi s approac h wa s th e turbulenc e emanat ing fro m th e mountainou s interio r betwee n th e Mekon g an d th e Red rivers . Thi s politica l no-man's-land , unassimilate d b y an y lowland principalit y an d havin g littl e coherenc e o f it s own , ha d become a n uplan d sanctuar y fo r disparat e maraudin g band s fleeing sout h fro m Chin a followin g th e T'a i p'in g Rebellion . I n re sponse t o th e anguishe d plea s o f neighborin g principalities , th e Siamese ha d attempte d t o pacif y thi s terrorize d mountai n area . But i n th e proces s th e Siames e ha d antagonize d th e uplan d Ta i of th e Si p Son g Cha u Ta i alon g th e Blac k River . A s a reprisa l these Ta i ha d attacke d Luan g Praban g i n 188 7 with si x hundre d mercenaries o f th e infamou s Blac k Flag s le d b y th e eldes t so n of th e Chau Muong o f La i Cha u (Muon g Lai) , know n b y hi s Vietnamized nam e a s De o Va n Tri . Eve n th e principa l figur e of France' s imperia l expansio n i n Laos , August e Pavie , the n i n Luang Prabang , wa s force d t o fle e temporaril y wit h th e King . Although i t ha d bee n unintende d b y th e Tai , thi s inciden t con vinced th e Frenc h tha t the y mus t secur e thei r positio n a t Luan g Prabang b y occupyin g th e mountainou s hinterland . Withou t thi s control o f th e interio r the y coul d hardl y expec t t o checkmat e the Siames e (Hal l 1955:597) . During th e sprin g o f 188 9 French militar y units operatin g fro m the Re d Rive r Valle y reache d th e highland s o f th e Si p Son g Chau Tai . Afte r protracte d engagement s wit h De o Va n Tri' s Black Flags , a settlemen t wa s achieve d whic h calle d fo r th e an nexation o f th e Ta i highland s t o th e Frenc h Empir e (Hal l 1955:598). Wit h th e reductio n o f thi s mountai n turmoi l th e French wer e abl e t o proceed wit h th e consolidatio n o f thei r posi tion alon g th e Mekong . Bu t sixt y years later , wit h th e crumblin g of th e Frenc h positio n throughou t Indochina , th e Ta i highland s were onc e agai n th e linchpi n betwee n th e Re d Rive r Delt a an d the Mekon g Valley . Th e us e o f th e Ta i Federatio n a s a natura l avenue b y th e Vie t Min h fo r a thrus t int o norther n Laos , aime d at th e symboli c roya l sea t a t Luan g Prabang , i s more comprehen sible i n th e ligh t o f thes e earlie r events . Th e Frenc h concep t of usin g th e Ta i Federatio n a s a buffe r t o suc h a thrus t is , how ever, muc h les s understandable . Divisiv e tendencie s amon g th e Tai ha d aide d th e Frenc h i n occupyin g th e Si p Son g Cha u Tai , and durin g sixt y year s littl e wa s don e t o encourag e cohesion , [ 80 6 ]

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since thi s woul d hav e mad e th e proble m o f colonia l contro l mor e difficult. B y 195 4 thi s polic y prove d t o b e shortsighted . Throughout th e nineteent h centur y ther e had bee n fierc e inter necine struggle s betwee n th e relate d rulin g familie s o f th e Muongs o f La i Cha u an d Phon g Tho . Know n b y thei r Vietnam ized name s a s Deo , thes e ruler s wer e actuall y member s o f th e Lo Ca m familie s wh o traditionall y dominate d th e ke y post s o f the chau muong i n th e Ta i highlands. The Ta i name o f th e leade r of th e Blac k Fla g contingen t wa s Ca m Ou m (instea d o f De o Van Tri) . Hi s father , wh o wa s th e Chau Muong o f Muon g La i (Lai Chau) , wa s Ca m Sinh . B y th e tim e th e Frenc h ha d reache d the Si p Son g Cha u Tai , thi s fathe r an d so n combinatio n emerge d as th e mos t influentia l famil y grou p i n th e Blac k Rive r area . This advantag e ha d bee n achieve d ove r th e De o famil y o f Phong Tho , wh o ha d predominate d fo r mos t o f th e century . Th e Lai Cha u rulers ' achievemen t ca n b e attribute d t o a serie s o f judicious alliance s wit h outsider s tha t ha d vaulte d the m ahea d of thei r Phon g Th o rivals . Thes e profitabl e externa l compact s had include d one s wit h th e Vicero y o f Yunnan , th e chief s o f th e various Blac k Fla g pirat e gangs , an d eve n th e Empero r o f Viet nam. Afte r th e Frenc h occupatio n ende d th e possibilitie s o f suc h outside alliances , th e La i Cha u ruler s nevertheles s perpetuate d their predominan t positio n amon g th e uplan d Tai . Despit e th e attempts o f th e Frenc h t o brea k thei r influence , th e La i Cha u faction preserve d thei r prestig e b y carefull y planne d marriages , maintaining clos e contac t wit h famil y branche s a t P a Ta n an d Chieng Chan , an d b y keepin g i n touc h wit h th e ruler s o f Phon g SaIy and Luan g Prabang in Laos. The Whit e Tai , amon g who m th e De o o f La i Cha u an d Phon g Tho wer e predominan t families , ar e a numerica l minorit y i n th e northwest highlands , bu t the y hav e historicall y enjoye d a com manding positio n o f influenc e ove r th e Blac k Tai . Thi s seem s to hav e bee n tru e n o matte r whic h famil y (La i Cha u o r Phon g Tho) wa s i n ascendency . Th e maintenanc e o f thi s advantag e has require d a n extensiv e syste m o f politica l operation s an d com munications, sinc e th e Blac k Ta i ar e foun d i n scattere d location s often a t substantia l distance s fro m La i Chau . Thos e familia r wit h these relationship s hav e customaril y talke d o f th e "natura l su periority" o f th e Whit e Tai . They hav e been observe d t o be cold [ 80 7 ]

V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTER , J R .

blooded an d t o hav e easil y dominate d th e submissiv e Blac k Tai. Whether thi s ha s bee n a resul t o f deep-seate d psychologica l factors o r a consequenc e o f Whit e Ta i skillfulnes s i n playin g off Blac k Ta i jealousies , th e dominanc e of th e De o o f La i Cha u and thei r ki n wa s clea r whe n th e Frenc h arrived . Moreover , i n Pavie's 188 9 treat y wit h De o Va n Tri , Franc e confirme d thi s hegemony by recognizing their hereditary right over the Sip Song Chau Ta i exclusiv e o f Phon g Tho . Specificall y mentione d a s being withi n thei r patrimon y wer e th e muongs o f La i Chau , Quinh Nhai , Ph u Yen , Tuan Giao , an d Die n Bie n Phu . Yet thi s must have seemed like an empty gesture to the Deo of Lai Chau. Perhaps i t was only intended a s a salve to the damage d prestig e of the defeated lords of the Sip Song Chau Tai. Whatever thi s recognitio n mean t a t th e time , it di d no t mea n that th e Frenc h wer e goin g t o permi t th e De o o f La i Cha u t o continue unchecke d thei r influenc e ove r th e Ta i highlands . A s will b e recalled , th e Frenc h launche d a progra m t o brea k th e traditional patterns o f power i n the Tai highlands. This include d the organizatio n o f th e Si p Son g Chau Ta i int o province s alon g the lines o f Vietnamese tradition s i n administration. Lowlan d influence was als o apparen t i n th e name s o f th e ne w provinces , Lai Chau , So n La , an d Phon g Tho , which wer e take n fro m th e Vietnamese appellation s o f th e tradin g center s tha t becam e th e capitals o f thes e administrativ e units . Withi n eac h provinc e th e first subordinat e echelo n o f administration wa s the district which contained severa l canton s know n a s Phu . Th e Ph u wer e i n fac t the Muong—th e traditiona l valle y principalitie s o f th e uplan d Tai. Th e chau muong, whic h no w becam e th e offic e o f th e Tri Phu in the Vietnamized system, was made elective by the French. In spite of this maneuver members of the Lo Cam families tende d to remai n a s chau muong (o r Tri Phu) sinc e thei r traditiona l prestige served to guarantee their election. Above this level, however, virtuall y al l uplan d Tai , whethe r L o Ca m o r not , wer e blocked fro m upwar d mobilit y i n th e administrativ e hierarchy . The distric t chief s wer e i n genera l Vietnamese , an d abov e the m was a Frenc h superstructur e compose d o f bot h civilia n an d military officials . Commander s o f militar y unit s statione d ther e [ 80 8 ]

MOUNTAI N MINOBITIE S & TH E VIE T MIN H

tended als o t o exercis e administrativ e authorit y sinc e the locatio n of th e Ta i highlands mad e the m a part o f th e IV Militar y Region . While thi s Frenc h colonia l er a di d no t destro y th e basi s fo r the influenc e o f th e L o Ca m familie s withi n thei r individua l muongs, i t obviousl y di d eliminat e th e tenuou s hierarch y o f power tha t th e De o o f La i Cha u ha d erecte d ove r th e Si p Son g Chau Tai . Afte r fift y year s o f consolidatin g thes e instrument s of colonia l control , th e Japanes e occupatio n o f Indochin a i n 1940 disrupte d France' s relationship s amon g th e uplan d Tai . Be fore th e en d o f th e occupatio n th e Franco-Vietnames e superstruc ture i n th e Ta i highland s wa s abandone d whe n it s personne l fled t o th e safet y o f souther n China . I n th e absenc e o f thes e colonial restraint s th e underlyin g characte r o f th e divers e Ta i factions wa s agai n expressed . No t unexpectedl y th e De o famil y of La i Cha u showe d itsel f strongl y oppose d t o th e reinterventio n of outsiders . Thi s wa s bu t a natura l corollar y o f thei r determina tion to regain th e family's previou s position of influence . By contrast , th e diffus e an d compartmentalize d famil y group s of th e Blac k Ta i aroun d So n L a wer e eage r fo r externa l ai d i n order t o preven t th e reestablishmen t o f th e La i Cha u hegemony . To thes e apprehensiv e Blac k Ta i i t wa s th e arme d forc e an d not th e ideolog y o f th e Vie t Min h tha t prove d s o appealing . Paradoxically, i t wa s thi s flirtation b y th e Blac k Ta i wit h th e Viet Min h tha t enable d th e De o o f La i Cha u t o regai n thei r preeminent positio n throug h Frenc h auspices . Alarme d b y th e threat o f Communis t influenc e i n th e strategi c northwes t high lands, th e French , upo n thei r reoccupatio n i n 1945-1946 , seeme d willing t o us e th e La i Cha u family' s aspiration s a s a mean s o f control rather tha n tr y t o reestablish thei r pre-war superstructure . The readines s o f th e Frenc h t o entrus t th e De o o f La i Cha u with th e leadershi p o f thei r progra m fo r a Ta i Federatio n wa s based o n severa l contrastin g factors . Wit h mos t o f th e Vietnam ese lowland s i n ope n revol t agains t Frenc h rul e i t wa s n o longe r feasible t o pla n fo r a Vietnames e cadr e i n th e uppe r echelon s of administratio n i n th e highlands. Moreover, man y o f thes e Viet namese official s ha d alread y fled t o th e Re d Rive r Delt a t o joi n the Vie t Minh . Sinc e an y hop e fo r continuit y wit h th e pre-wa r administrative structur e wa s ou t o f th e questio n i n th e turbulen t [ 80 9 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N T . MCALISTEB , J R .

year o f 1946 , th e Frenc h wer e castin g abou t fo r alternatives . The De o o f La i Cha u were , i n thi s situation , thei r natura l allies . During th e hiatu s o f authorit y followin g th e Japanese capitula tion, th e De o ha d mad e strenuou s effort s t o cur b th e expansive ness o f th e Vie t Min h i n th e Ta i highlands . Whil e th e interest s of th e De o an d th e Frenc h wer e simila r i n opposing the Vietnam ese Communists , the y wer e no t congruen t i n al l respects . A s will b y no w b e wel l understood , th e Whit e Ta i enthusias m against th e Vie t Min h stemme d fro m thei r desir e t o preven t th e Black Ta i fro m developin g outsid e alliances . Bu t th e pressur e by th e De o upo n th e Blac k Ta i merel y increase d th e alienatio n of th e larges t grou p o f th e Ta i Federation . Eventuall y thi s vul nerability mad e th e Federatio n a gatewa y rathe r tha n a barrie r to the Viet Minh conquest o f th e northwest highlands . AUTONOMY AN D INTEKNA L DISSENSIO N I N TH E TA I FEDERATION : AN UNSTEAD Y BULWAR K AGAINS T TH E VIE T M I N H

When th e Frenc h colonia l restraint s wer e remove d b y th e Japanese occupation , th e De o of La i Cha u coul d no t immediatel y extend thei r authorit y ove r al l o f th e Si p Son g Cha u Tai . A s a consequenc e o f Frenc h policie s th e De o did no t a t tha t momen t have eve n a firm gras p ove r al l o f La i Cha u Province . Obviously , their firs t objectiv e wa s to consolidat e thei r positio n withi n th e White Ta i area . Thi s wa s accomplishe d b y makin g member s o f their famil y th e chau muong fo r al l o f th e neighborin g muongs, even t o th e exten t o f breakin g th e prestig e o f othe r De o families . With thi s don e thei r nex t ste p involve d th e annexatio n o f distan t muongs t o La i Cha u Province . A s a capston e o f thi s maneuver , Deo Va n Lon g wa s mad e chie f o f th e province . Havin g thi s foundation o f loca l power , h e easil y accede d t o th e presidenc y of th e Ta i Federatio n whe n i t wa s create d i n provisiona l for m in 1946 . Despite Frenc h backing , however, De o Van Long' s mov e into th e presidenc y di d no t giv e hi m complet e contro l ove r th e Tai Federation . I n orde r t o exten d hi s influenc e ove r al l th e up land Tai , De o Va n Lon g ha d someho w t o dea l wit h th e othe r two provinces in the Federation, Phong Tho and Son La. Phong Tho was ruled b y a rival Deo family o f White Tai whose competitiveness di d no t g o t o th e exten t o f seekin g powe r through disruptiv e outsid e alliances . De o Va n An , th e leade r [ 81 0 ]

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of th e riva l family , wa s persuade d no t t o b e destructiv e t o th e Federation a s a whol e b y hi s appointmen t a s Chie f o f Phon g Tho Province . Although De o Va n A n wa s a manageabl e politica l rival , hi s prerogatives a s provinc e chie f wer e no t adequat e t o hol d hi s allegiance indefinitely . However , hi s varyin g demand s a s premiums fo r hi s loyalt y wer e withi n th e capacit y o f De o Va n Long t o accommodate . Moreover , th e locatio n o f Phon g Th o Province mean t tha t i t wa s th e firs t t o encounte r Vie t Min h regu lars whe n the y bega n t o direc t thei r attentio n t o th e northwes t highlands. Thi s challeng e mad e Phon g Th o mor e dependen t upon bot h th e Frenc h an d th e Ta i Federatio n fo r militar y assis tance. Whil e ther e wer e frequen t disagreement s o n th e amoun t and qualit y o f militar y support , De o Va n An' s Whit e Ta i none theless fough t tenaciousl y fo r thei r hom e provinc e agains t th e invading Vie t Minh . Deo Va n Lon g di d no t find So n L a Provinc e no r an y o f th e Black Ta i area s easil y manageable . Durin g th e unsettle d perio d at th e en d o f th e Japanes e occupatio n ther e wa s a Vie t Minh sponsored uprisin g i n So n L a agains t bot h th e De o o f La i Cha u and th e French . Ca m Va n Zung, a Black Ta i who led thi s protest , was i n clos e allianc e wit h th e Vie t Min h Interprovincia l Com mittee, whic h ha d provide d hi m wit h th e weapon s t o initiat e the rebellion . Naturally , th e neutralizatio n o f thi s uprisin g wa s a key objective o f De o Van Long. After thi s wa s achieve d i n earl y 1947 , Ba c Ca m Qui , hea d of th e Blac k Ta i famil y o f Thua n Chau , wa s installe d a s Chie f of So n La Province . Ca m Va n Zung fled in defeat int o th e hinter land, seeking what safet y an d suppor t th e Viet Minh coul d afford . He an d othe r Blac k Ta i leader s wer e t o b e hear d fro m again . Meanwhile, th e Ta i Federation' s authorit y i n So n L a wa s base d on Ba c Ca m Qui , whos e loyalt y stemme d fro m hi s persona l hat e toward th e Vie t Minh , wh o ha d kille d hi s brothe r i n 1946 . Ye t his reliabilit y di d no t giv e De o Va n Lon g contro l ove r So n L a Province. Indeed , i t wasn' t unde r th e contro l o f an y group , bu t hotly conteste d b y several . Unlik e th e situatio n i n La i Cha u an d even i n Phon g Th o ther e ha d bee n n o patter n o f centralizatio n or emergenc e o f a rulin g famil y i n So n La . Perhap s thi s wa s attributable t o som e Blac k Ta i tradition s i n marriage , lineag e [811]

V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTEK , J H .

designation, o r othe r aspect s o f socia l structure . Mayb e i t wa s a consequenc e o f th e siz e o f th e Blac k Ta i population , estimate d at 100,000— a figure thre e time s large r tha n th e estimat e fo r th e White Tai . Possibl y it s caus e wa s th e scattere d natur e o f thei r settlements. Whateve r it s origi n ther e wa s a strikin g absenc e of politica l cohesio n amon g th e Blac k Tai—eve n o n th e poten tially unifying them e of opposition to Lai Chau dominance . Military forc e eventuall y becam e th e primar y metho d fo r cop ing wit h th e dissensio n insid e th e Ta i Federatio n cause d b y th e antipathies t o th e De o o f La i Chau . I n th e particula r situatio n at So n L a ther e seeme d t o b e n o politica l formul a whic h coul d hold th e allegiance s o f al l th e inhabitant s o f th e province . A s the uprisin g o f 194 5 ha d shown , th e disaffectio n o f th e Blac k Tai wa s certai n t o b e expresse d militantly . Th e proble m wa s complicated b y th e fac t tha t politica l influenc e amon g th e Blac k Tai wa s fragmente d betwee n five families . The y include d th e Xa o f Mo c Cha u i n th e southernmos t portio n o f th e province , the Hoan g o f Ye n Chau , th e Ca m o f Ma i Son, the Ca m o f Muon g La, an d th e Ba c o f Thua n Chau . Lackin g a convenien t respons e to th e politica l expectation s o f thes e families , an d apprehensiv e of thei r tie s wit h th e Vie t Minh , De o Va n Lon g appointe d Ba c Cam Qu i th e Chie f o f So n L a Province . Sinc e th e Ba c famil y of Thua n Cha u comprise d almos t a quarte r o f th e populatio n of So n La , i t wa s probabl y decide d tha t the y woul d b e th e bes t clients amon g th e Blac k Tai . Moreover , thei r muong wa s locate d in th e nort h o f So n La , makin g the m th e neares t grou p t o La i Chau. Beyond siz e it seem s tha t th e Ba c family ha d fe w purel y politi cal attribute s o f benefi t t o De o Va n Long . Th e appointmen t o f Bac Ca m Qu i seem s t o hav e galvanize d th e oppositio n o f th e Cam an d X a families . Th e Vie t Min h gav e the m guarantee s which th e Ta i Federation , becaus e o f it s hope s fo r politica l cen tralization, coul d no t make . I n allyin g with th e Vietnames e Com munists, th e dissiden t Blac k Ta i familie s di d no t hav e t o giv e up thei r ow n loca l autonomy . Th e Vie t Min h wer e carefu l t o preserve th e traditiona l socia l hierarch y o f th e Blac k Tai , espe cially afte r earl y attempt s a t lan d refor m ha d taugh t the m bitte r lessons. Thi s capacit y t o capitaliz e upo n antagonism s withi n tra ditional structure s o f loca l influenc e emerge d a s on e o f th e ke y [ 81 2 J

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hallmarks i n Communis t politica l operation s i n both the lowland s and th e highlands . B y providin g th e resource s an d directio n t o these loca l clusters , th e Vie t Min h wa s abl e t o aggregat e politica l power withou t havin g t o organiz e completel y ne w structure s a t the loca l level . The cas e o f th e Blac k Tai , a s wel l a s tha t o f th e Tho , demon strates tha t th e abilit y o f th e Vie t Min h t o exploi t thes e tradi tional antagonism s first pai d of f i n th e availabilit y t o th e Com munists o f highl y motivate d fighters. Beside s suc h a fighting spirit th e dissiden t Ca m an d X a familie s provide d th e Viet Min h with othe r advantages . On e i n particula r derive d fro m th e fac t that thei r traditiona l lands wer e concentrated i n the southern por tion o f So n L a Province . Th e natura l defens e o f thei r homelan d served t o protec t importan t Vie t Min h communicatio n route s into norther n Laos , especiall y int o Sa m Neu a Provinc e adjoinin g Son La . I n addition , th e dissiden t familie s wer e abl e t o assis t the Vie t Min h o n th e easter n ban k o f th e Blac k River . Ther e they forme d a buffe r betwee n La i Cha u an d th e Whit e Ta i area s around Nghi a Lo , T u Le , an d Tha n Uye n whic h wer e hel d i n 1947 by Viet Minh of Tho origin . Because o f thi s arme d dissidenc e b y Blac k Ta i familie s backe d by th e Vie t Minh , th e consolidatio n o f th e Ta i Federatio n wa s blocked t o th e sout h an d th e eas t o f La i Chau . Lackin g th e political attitud e o r acume n t o end th e dissidence , De o Van Lon g and hi s Frenc h adviser s organize d a Ta i militar y force . B y Jul y 1947 there wer e two Ta i battalions , eac h wit h 85 0 men includin g 150 Frenc h o r Vietnames e cadres . Togethe r wit h severa l com panies o f irregulars , thi s forme d th e Ta i arme d force . Th e Firs t Battalion wa s considere d th e mos t effectiv e o f th e tw o becaus e it wa s compose d o f Blac k Ta i fro m Die n Bie n Ph u an d Thua n Chau. The y showe d themselve s toughe r an d mor e courageou s than th e Secon d Ta i Battalion , whic h wa s mad e u p o f Whit e Tai from La i Cha u (Lhermit e 1949:27) . During thei r formativ e perio d thes e unit s wer e employe d i n clearing th e wes t ban k o f th e Blac k Rive r country . Thi s tas k was complete d b y Jun e o f 1947 , with th e occupation b y th e Firs t Tai Battalio n o f th e rive r tow n o f Suyut , locate d sout h o f Mo c Chau. This gav e clear evidenc e o f th e dissensio n amon g the Blac k Tai. Th e dissiden t Blac k Ta i familie s an d th e Firs t Battalio n [ 81 3 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTER , JR .

were fighting agains t eac h othe r o n behal f o f outsider s becaus e they coul d no t unit e t o oppos e o r bargai n wit h th e De o o f La i Chau. Despit e th e effort s o f th e Firs t Battalion , th e dissiden t famlies wer e no t defeate d bu t too k t o th e bush . Fro m mountai n sanctuaries the y continue d thei r guerrill a harassmen t agains t th e representatives o f th e Federation . I t wa s no t unti l th e formatio n of th e Thir d Ta i Battalio n i n 194 9 that thi s harassment wa s give n a comprehensiv e response . Eve n thi s di d no t eliminat e th e guer rilla challeng e but only held it to a limited scale . As par t o f France' s overal l strateg y i n norther n Vietna m a high priorit y wa s assigne d t o th e occupatio n o f th e mountainou s area lyin g betwee n th e Blac k an d Re d rivers . Althoug h thi s are a was separate d fro m La i Cha u b y th e Blac k Rive r Valle y an d two o f th e mos t rugge d mountai n cluster s i n al l o f mainlan d Southeast Asia , th e Fa n S i Pa n (10,30 8 feet ) an d Po u Luon g (9,793 feet) , th e populatio n characteristic s wer e th e sam e a s those wes t o f th e Blac k River . Becaus e ther e wer e importan t concentrations o f th e uplan d Ta i i n thi s vicinity , De o Va n Lon g was anxiou s t o exten d hi s contro l ove r them . Fortunatel y fo r the La i Cha u family , hi s ambitio n coincide d wit h th e Frenc h military requiremen t fo r securin g thi s importan t flank o n thei r Red Rive r Delt a positions . Once th e regio n o f th e Ta i Federatio n t o th e wes t o f th e Blac k River ha d bee n reasonabl y wel l consolidate d i n th e summe r o f 1947, De o Va n Lon g an d hi s Frenc h adviser s turne d thei r atten tion t o th e east . Th e operationa l plan s the y wer e developin g specified tw o offensiv e thrusts . On e i n th e nort h alon g th e Chin a border woul d b e launche d fro m Phon g Th o wit h th e objectiv e of capturin g th e Re d Rive r por t o f La o Ka y an d pacifyin g th e upper valle y area . Th e othe r calle d fo r a driv e fro m th e lowe r Black Rive r tow n o f Va n Ye n int o th e mountain s t o occup y th e upland valle y o f Nghi a L o an d the n dow n th e wester n slope s to tak e Ye n Bay , a n importan t Vie t Min h logistic s cente r o n the Re d River . Bot h o f thes e offensive s illustrate d throug h th e action the y initiate d man y o f th e particula r characteristic s o f the Tai highlands (Lhermit e 1948:27-32) . Known a s Operation Benedictine, th e souther n offensiv e wa s a fight fo r communication s route s an d uplan d valleys . Th e latte r were a major sourc e o f ric e s o precious t o th e Vie t Min h becaus e [814]

MOUNTAIN MINORITIE S & TH E VIE T M I N H

the Frenc h strengt h denie d the m th e delt a harvest . Thes e valley s would continu e t o b e specia l objective s o f th e Communist s throughout th e Indochin a Wa r sinc e ric e wa s use d t o pa y fo r their militar y supplie s fro m China . O f cours e thi s mean t tha t the uplan d Ta i wh o gre w th e ric e woul d b e target s fo r th e Vie t Minh too . A s a corollar y ther e wa s th e possibilit y tha t th e Ta i Federation coul d los e b y insensitivit y t o loca l issue s wha t the y had gaine d throug h militar y operations . Operation Benedictine, however, assure d the m fo r mor e tha n thre e year s a contro l ove r the mountain populatio n west of the Red River . This offensiv e an d it s norther n counterpar t wer e abl e t o brea k the bac k o f th e Vie t Min h resistanc e becaus e thei r adversarie s did no t consis t o f regula r troops . Althoug h the y wer e organize d into regula r formation s u p t o th e regimenta l level , thes e Vie t Minh unit s consiste d o f unseasone d an d untraine d guerrillas . Bu t they wer e no t defeate d b y th e French-le d Tai . Whe n thei r resis tance prove d ineffective , the y fled t o sanctuarie s i n th e hinter land, leavin g th e town s an d route s o f communicatio n i n Frenc h hands. Unti l th e Vie t Min h victorie s alon g R.C . 4 i n th e autum n of 195 0 shifte d th e balanc e o f strategi c force s i n norther n Viet nam, thi s militar y forc e wa s sufficien t t o kee p th e Ta i highland s relatively cal m an d unde r Frenc h control . Bu t a s event s le d u p to th e invasio n o f th e northeas t b y Communis t regular s i n th e autumn o f 1952 , politica l issue s mad e militar y contro l increas ingly difficult . The norther n thrus t t o th e Re d Rive r i n 1947 , called Operation Genvieve, illustrate d som e othe r characteristic s abou t th e north west highlands . Thi s offensive , le d b y th e French-commande d White Ta i o f th e Secon d Battalion , was launched throug h rugge d mountain terrai n whic h containe d fe w passages . Ke y t o thei r success wa s th e capacit y t o encircl e th e mai n Vie t Min h defen sive positio n a t th e tow n o f Co c Le u jus t acros s th e Re d Rive r from La o Kay . Thi s envelopin g advanc e o f th e Secon d Battalio n was aide d significantl y b y Me o partisans . Afte r mor e tha n a month o f patien t effor t thes e Me o wer e successfu l i n gettin g into position s o n th e flank s an d i n th e rea r o f th e Vie t Minh . Their pressur e exerte d simultaneousl y wit h th e mai n attac k served t o diver t th e Vie t Min h an d mak e a victor y easie r t o attain. [815]

V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTER , J R .

These maneuver s i n Operation Genmeve wer e excellen t exam ples o f th e possibilitie s o f employin g partisan s o f th e variou s mountain minoritie s t o fight o n groun d familia r t o them . B y thei r agility, endurance , an d knowledg e o f th e terrain , th e mountain eers possesse d mobilit y an d surpris e i n attac k whic h wa s ofte n decisive. A s a n extensio n o f thei r arme d forc e th e mountai n par tisans gav e a flexibility t o Frenc h militar y operation s whic h would hav e bee n difficul t t o attai n otherwise . The y serve d a s guides, porters , an d source s o f information , an d the y wer e tena cious fighters, usefu l i n mountai n ambushes . Obviously , militar y qualities varie d amon g th e minoritie s a s wel l a s betwee n group s within th e sam e minorit y group . The y playe d a majo r rol e i n the wa r a s lon g a s th e fightin g i n th e northwes t highland s con tinued it s guerrill a patter n an d comba t wa s o n a smal l scale . Once regimental-strengt h contingent s o f bot h th e Frenc h an d the Vie t Min h becam e engage d i n th e highlands , th e rol e o f the minorit y people s decline d quantitatively . Ye t i n man y way s they becam e mor e valuable . Wit h large r unit s fighting eac h othe r in th e mountains , logistic s an d intelligenc e function s too k o n a ne w dimension . Mountai n partisan s frequentl y coul d provid e the margi n fo r victor y throug h extende d reconnaissanc e patrol s or b y finding little-know n trail s t o improv e mobilit y o r reduc e supply problems . Unde r larger-scal e conflict , mountai n minoritie s which wer e los t t o th e enem y a s a resul t o f politica l antagonism s could substantiall y reduc e thes e advantage s t o on e o f th e com peting commands . The performanc e i n Operation Genvidve di d no t mea n tha t the Frenc h gaine d a clear-cu t o r permanen t advantag e fro m th e highland minorities . Conflictin g an d easil y change d loyaltie s complicated th e tas k o f recruitin g dependabl e mountai n parti sans. Instea d o f becomin g par t o f a sociall y mobilize d militar y organization, thes e partisa n group s tende d t o rel y o n thei r tradi tional socia l structur e fo r comba t organization . Thei r motivatio n to fight wa s stimulate d b y traditiona l attitude s an d antipathies , including a combativ e spiri t betwee n neighborin g people . Thes e latent antipathie s amon g th e people s livin g northwes t o f th e Re d River Delt a wer e extremel y intricat e becaus e o f th e complexit y of th e ethni c mosai c there . Sinc e fe w institution s fo r peacefu l resolution o f difference s amon g thes e group s ha s emerged , th e area ha s experience d a lon g an d blood y histor y o f warfare . [816]

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By compariso n th e situatio n i n th e northeas t wa s muc h mor e straightforward. Th e Th o wer e th e predominan t grou p numeri cally an d inhabite d th e mos t strategi c are a i n th e region . Wit h the exceptio n o f th e Ma n (o r Yao) , th e othe r smalle r ethni c minorities live d i n location s o n th e peripher y o f th e Th o home land. Becaus e th e Ma n ha d generall y stabilize d thei r relation s with th e Tho , th e mai n sourc e o f tensio n i n th e mountai n societ y of th e northeast wa s with people coming from outside . The northwest highland s to o ha d thei r concer n wit h th e outside , bu t a s an adde d dimensio n i t containe d sever e interna l antipathies . These interna l factor s whic h mad e th e northwes t a politicall y and culturall y diffus e socia l networ k als o mean t tha t i t wa s a difficult are a t o defend . Outsid e pressur e di d not produc e a unit y against th e intruder . Rathe r i t wa s looke d upo n b y som e ethni c groups a s an opportunit y t o gain a n advantag e ove r some interna l adversary. Therefore , De o Va n Long' s polic y o f minimizin g th e dissension withi n th e Ta i highland s b y forc e wa s effectiv e onl y so lon g a s ther e wa s n o stron g militar y alternative . I n thi s in terim, befor e th e Vie t Min h regular s invade d th e northwes t high lands, th e hea d o f th e Ta i Federatio n mad e littl e effor t t o resolv e some o f th e disunifyin g factor s amon g hi s people . Whe n th e Viet Min h pressur e wa s applied , thes e interna l fissure s bega n to sho w themselves . A MINORIT Y WITHI N A MINORITY : THE M E O AN D TH E POLITIC S O F OPIU M

One o f th e mos t importan t politica l problem s tha t De o Va n Long trie d t o manag e b y militar y forc e wa s hi s relation s wit h the Meo . The inappropriatenes s an d inadequac y o f militar y mea sures o f th e Ta i Federatio n i n dealin g wit h thes e peopl e ca n be quickl y graspe d fro m informatio n o n thei r populatio n an d ecology. Withi n th e Ta i Federatio n ther e wer e almos t 5 0 percen t more Me o tha n ther e wer e Whit e Tai . A s wil l b e recalled , th e Meo generall y liv e o n mountai n slope s abov e 3,00 0 feet , wher e they ar e dry-lan d cultivators . Sinc e thei r habitatio n follow s th e terrain s o closely , th e Me o ar e usuall y foun d i n clusters , bu t a t widely scattere d locations . Probably becaus e o f thei r settlemen t patter n a s wel l a s thei r social structure , permanen t politica l centralizatio n ha s rarel y oc curred amon g th e Meo . However , thi s ha s no t mean t tha t th e [ 81 7 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTER , JR .

Meo hav e lacke d regula r communication s wit h othe r member s of thei r grou p a t distan t locations . I n contras t t o th e imag e tha t might b e suggeste d b y informatio n o n thei r ecology , th e Me o are a dynami c an d sophisticate d people . Thi s characterizatio n is partiall y validate d b y th e fact s tha t the y hav e bee n migratin g into Indochin a sinc e th e earl y nineteent h centur y an d tha t the y are stil l o n th e move . Thi s migratio n too k Me o peopl e int o Lao s in th e mid-nineteent h century , an d somewha t late r the y bega n to ente r Thailand . Thei r histor y an d kinshi p connection s ar e wel l known eve n amon g th e mos t far-rangin g migrants . Commo n cla n membership ca n serv e a s a bon d betwee n me n fro m distan t villages. Although th e settlement s o f th e Me o hav e bee n scattered , the y do follow a geographi c pattern . This patter n reveal s th e directio n of thei r migration , followin g a relativel y well-define d cours e southward fro m China . O n a n ethni c map o f Southeas t Asi a thes e Meo settlement s appea r lik e counterpoin t t o th e mai n them e of Ta i settlements . Their principa l concentratio n outsid e of Chin a is stil l t o b e foun d i n th e norther n Indochin a area . Wit h fe w exceptions th e Me o i n Indochin a ar e locate d betwee n paralle l lines runnin g north-sout h fro m Muon g Sin g alon g th e wester n edge o f Sayabour y Provinc e i n Laos , a s th e wester n limit , an d on th e eas t fro m H a Gian g i n Vietna m t o th e easter n edg e o f Sam Neu a Province , Laos . Withi n thi s rectangle , 35 0 mile s fro m east t o west, an d 40 0 miles from nort h t o south, ther e i s a distinc tive ethni c patter n which , however , ha s littl e coherenc e o f it s own. Perhap s i t ha s bee n th e tensio n arisin g ou t o f th e struggl e between th e multiplicit y o f ethni c group s (includin g larg e popu lations o f uplan d Tai , H o Chinese , Man , Meo , an d Khmu? ) tha t has given this region special political definition . Historically, thi s southwar d migratio n o f th e Me o ha s bee n a sourc e o f grea t unrest . I t wa s turmoi l i n souther n Chin a tha t prompted th e Me o exodus . I n thei r determinatio n t o secur e a new homeland , the y clashe d wit h th e uplan d Ta i an d Man , lai d waste muc h o f th e mountai n area , an d drov e t o th e peripher y of th e delt a befor e bein g checke d b y th e Vietnames e (Hicke y 1958:33-34). Despit e th e lingerin g antagonis m thei r devastatio n had caused , th e Me o wer e abl e t o locat e themselve s i n th e north west highland s o f Vietnam . Thei r choic e o f high-altitud e livin g [ 81 8 ]

MOUNTAIN MINOKITIE S &

TH E VIE T M I N H

sites no t onl y mean t a scattere d settlemen t pattern , i t als o brought the m int o greate r contac t wit h th e uplan d Ta i tha n i f they ha d bee n concentrate d i n on e location , a s wer e th e Tho . Obviously, thi s increase d th e potentia l fo r frictio n sinc e th e val ley-dwelling Ta i wishe d t o insur e thei r securit y b y controllin g the Meo who lived on the heights above them . In th e earl y 1950' s approximatel y 50,00 0 Me o live d i n th e northwest highlands . Anothe r 30,00 0 wer e t o b e foun d eas t o f the Re d Rive r i n location s alon g th e Chin a borde r fro m P a Kh a to Ca o Bang . A s th e wa r progressed , thes e Me o i n th e eas t be came isolate d a t th e rear o f Vie t Minh position s in the Tho homeland. Becaus e o f thei r traditiona l antagonis m towar d th e Tho , the Me o east o f th e Re d Rive r fough t tenaciousl y agains t th e Viet Minh . Th e larges t an d mos t importan t o f th e easter n Me o clusters wa s i n th e vicinit y o f th e Son g Cha y Rive r northeas t of th e frontie r tow n o f P a Kha . Fro m thi s mountai n redoub t Meo under th e comman d o f Cha u Qua n L o persisted i n harassin g the Viet Minh . In contras t t o thi s situatio n eas t o f th e Re d River , th e Vie t Minh i n th e northwes t wer e no t allie d wit h th e traditiona l enemies o f th e Me o bu t wer e fightin g agains t them . Thi s wa s an initia l advantag e t o Vie t Min h ambition s fo r receivin g Me o support, but i t had t o be cultivated . Unlike thei r easter n counterpart s th e Me o i n th e northwes t did no t inhabi t periphera l location s bu t live d i n area s withi n the hear t o f th e Ta i Federation . Thei r settlement s wer e i n fiv e separate locations , th e larges t o f whic h wa s i n th e mountain s surrounding Die n Bie n Phu . Her e som e 12,00 0 Me o wer e engaged i n traditiona l agriculture . Du e north , i n th e mountain s between La i Cha u an d Phon g Tho , ther e wer e anothe r 10,00 0 Meo. I n th e are a betwee n th e Blac k an d Re d river s ther e wer e two prominen t Me o settlements . Eac h o f the m wa s groupe d around th e tw o towerin g peak s o f th e area , the Fan S i Pan, wher e there wer e abou t 10,00 0 Meo , an d Po u Luong , havin g abou t 5,000 Me o inhabitants . Completin g thi s patter n wer e approxi mately 10,00 0 Me o locate d o n th e mountai n height s aroun d Mo c Chau an d Ph u Ye n i n th e lowe r Blac k Rive r Valley . Th e patter n thus forme d become s mor e distinc t an d comprehensibl e upo n consulting a n ethnolinguisti c map . I t i s n o exaggeratio n tha t th e [ 81 9 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTER , JR .

Meo commande d th e rampart s o f th e Ta i Federation . Acces s to th e northwes t highland s fro m th e eas t was virtuall y impossibl e except b y traversin g area s inhabite d b y th e Meo . Ke y town s of th e Federatio n wer e encircle d b y mountain s containin g Me o settlements. Th e Me o wer e a ready-mad e Troja n horse . The antagonisti c attitud e o f th e Me o whic h th e Vie t Min h were t o exploi t wa s no t merel y a persistenc e o f historica l jeal ousies. B y thei r continuin g southwar d movement , thei r fierce independence, an d thei r willingnes s t o fight fo r autonomou s settlements, th e Me o perpetuate d a spiri t o f distrus t betwee n themselves an d th e valley-dwellin g Tai . Ye t mor e fundamenta l than thes e antipathie s wa s th e frictio n tha t develope d ove r th e potential profi t fro m th e Meo' s cas h crop : opium . Becaus e ther e were tremendou s profit s t o b e mad e i n th e marketin g o f th e opium, th e Ta i an d th e othe r valle y people , particularl y Chines e and Vietnames e merchants , wer e eage r t o ge t th e cro p fro m th e Meo. Unhappil y fo r th e northwes t highlands , thi s di d no t lea d to a harmoniou s commercia l relationshi p betwee n th e producer s and th e merchants . I t i s no t clea r whethe r thi s wa s du e t o th e absence o f bargainin g capacitie s amon g th e Meo or an intractabl e conspiracy b y th e merchants . Nonetheless , th e Me o fel t tha t th e merchants wer e takin g advantag e o f the m an d deprivin g the m of the fruits o f their labor . The antagonis m ove r opiu m wa s relate d t o tha t attributabl e to th e Me o settlemen t patterns . Sinc e th e opiu m popp y grow s best a t altitude s o f fro m 3,00 0 t o 4,50 0 feet , th e Me o settle d in suc h location s eve n thoug h thei r presenc e produce d frictio n with th e valle y dweller s below . A s ca n b e easil y see n fro m thi s precondition fo r cultivation , th e production o f opiu m ha d a shar p effect o n th e topographicall y stratifie d settlemen t patter n an d complex ethni c mosai c o f th e mountain s o f norther n Vietna m and norther n Laos . S o importan t a facto r wa s thi s opiu m tha t it cam e t o be one of th e principal issues aroun d whic h th e politic s of the Tai highlands was focused . Under Frenc h colonia l administratio n th e cultivatio n o f opiu m had bee n controlle d o n th e basi s o f internationa l agreements . This place d shar p limit s o n th e Me o a s wel l a s o n th e Ma n an d the Blac k Tai , wh o wer e als o importan t cultivator s o f opium . The wer e allowe d t o gro w th e plan t onl y o n th e condition s tha t [ 82 0 ]

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they declar e thei r produc t an d sel l it directl y t o th e Frenc h pub lic monopoly . I n practic e th e mountai n peopl e neve r declare d more tha n a thir d o f thei r production . Th e remainde r the y sol d as contraban d i n a trad e tha t wa s establishe d betwee n th e moun tains of northern Vietna m and southern China . The existenc e o f suc h a trad e wa s a grea t advantag e onc e the Vie t Min h go t a foothol d i n th e mountain s durin g th e Japa nese occupation . I t facilitate d thei r gettin g weapon s an d ammu nition i n retur n fo r th e opiu m cro p o f th e highlands . Becaus e other barte r item s wer e paltr y whe n compare d wit h th e riche s of opium , th e Me o cultivator s becam e specia l object s o f militar y and politica l pressure . The mountin g exigencie s o f th e wa r mean t that i n additio n t o th e traditiona l source s o f frictio n ove r th e marketing o f th e opiu m th e Me o no w becam e linke d a s neve r before t o th e issue s o f lowlan d politics . I n thi s wa y the y becam e involved i n a n unorthodo x for m o f politica l integration . The significanc e o f thi s politic s o f opiu m ca n b e see n b y eval uating th e magnitud e o f th e crop . I n th e lat e 1940' s an d earl y 1950's th e annua l productio n o f ra w opiu m i n norther n Vietna m was estimate d a t sevent y tons . Discountin g th e amoun t tha t wa s consumed b y th e Me o an d othe r producers , i t wa s estimate d that i n th e yea r 194 7 ther e wer e thirty-eigh t ton s availabl e fo r marketing. Whil e ther e i s n o indicatio n whethe r thi s wa s a typi cal amount , it s valu e wa s pu t a t approximatel y 40 0 millio n pias ters o r abou t sixtee n millio n U.S . 195 7 dollars. 22 Thi s provide s an interestin g compariso n wit h anothe r majo r cas h crop—th e rice exporte d fro m al l o f Indochina , whic h jumpe d fro m 91,00 0 tons i n 194 7 t o 233,00 0 i n 194 8 an d i n tha t yea r ha d a valu e of 45 2 million piasters. 23 Rice, unlike opium, was more completel y controlled b y th e Frenc h an d represente d nearl y 4 0 percen t o f the valu e o f export s fro m Indochina . Potentially , then , th e Vie t Minh coul d hav e approache d th e incom e o f th e Frenc h fro m exports by gaining control over the opium of northern Vietnam . The importanc e o f thi s sourc e o f wealt h t o th e Communis t military machin e i s eviden t fro m th e barte r relationship s tha t !2 The estimat e i n U.S . dollai s wa s calculate d a t a rat e o f 23. 5 Indochines e piasters t o 40 0 francs , t o on e U.S . dolla r i n th e perio d prio r t o 1952. Thi s exchange rat e is documented i n McCaI l (1961:93-94) . 23 Information o n ric e cro p i s fro m Haut-Commissaria t d e Franc e e n Indochin e (1949:221-222).

[821 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTER , JR .

developed durin g th e yea r 194 9 i n th e vicinit y o f Ca o Bang . With si x kilogram s o f opiu m i t wa s possibl e t o obtai n throug h the contraban d trad e wit h souther n Chin a a ligh t machin e gu n and 50 0 rounds o f ammunition . A n automatic rifl e an d 50 0 rounds of ammunitio n coul d b e gotte n fo r 4 kilogram s o f opium , an d a rifl e an d 50 0 round s o f ammunitio n fo r 2. 5 kilograms . O n thi s basis th e Vie t Min h coul d hav e acquire d 12,80 0 rifle s an d 6,400,000 round s o f ammunitio n i f the y ha d controlle d al l 3 8 tons o f opiu m tha t wa s estimate d a s marketabl e i n 1947 . This quantit y o f supplie s woul d hav e bee n sufficien t t o equi p an entir e infantr y division , a n objectiv e o f utmos t priorit y t o the Vie t Minh . Carryin g th e analog y further , i t woul d hav e bee n possible t o hav e equippe d th e si x division s o f th e Vie t Min h regular arm y b y 195 2 throug h th e barte r o f opiu m alone ! Whil e the Vie t Min h neve r achieve d thi s degre e o f barter , i t i s surpris ing tha t th e annua l labo r o f approximatel y 80,00 0 Meo an d othe r mountain cultivator s o f opiu m could , eve n i n theory , equi p a n infantry division . Ye t suc h a relationshi p serve s t o underscor e why th e opiu m cro p i n general , an d th e Me o i n particular , wer e of suc h concer n t o th e participant s i n th e Indochin a War . Although ther e is n o informatio n o n th e portio n o f th e opiu m crop tha t th e Vie t Min h controlled , i t i s certai n tha t the y di d not contro l i t all , a t leas t unti l thei r invasio n o f th e Ta i highland s in 1952 . I n fac t th e onl y rea l sourc e o f ta x receipt s fo r th e Ta i Federation wa s fro m th e sal e o f opium . A t it s heigh t i n 1948 , this amounte d t o 1. 2 millio n piaster s o r abou t $52,00 0 i n U.S . 1957 dollars . Afte r 195 1 thi s cease d t o b e a sourc e o f revenu e for th e Federation , a developmen t whic h probabl y reflecte d th e consequences o f th e Tai policies toward th e Meo . As a roug h approximatio n i t appear s tha t ther e wer e betwee n eight an d nin e ton s o f opiu m availabl e annuall y fo r marketin g in th e Ta i Federation . A littl e les s tha n hal f o f thi s amount , between thre e an d fou r tons , wa s obtainabl e fro m th e Me o wh o inhabited th e height s aroun d Die n Bie n Phu , an d anothe r to n was usuall y availabl e fro m th e Me o o f th e Po u Luon g mountai n area nea r Nghi a Lo . I f thes e ar e accurat e approximations , the y indicate tha t abou t 2 0 percent o f th e marketabl e opiu m o f north ern Vietna m cam e fro m th e territor y o f th e Federatio n an d tha t almost 1 0 percen t o f th e tota l wa s produce d aroun d Die n Bie n [ 82 2 ]

MOUNTAI N MINOBITIE S & TH E VIE T MIN H

Phu itself . Whil e precis e documentatio n i s unavailable , i t woul d appear fro m wha t informatio n i s accessibl e tha t th e Die n Bie n Phu are a wa s th e mos t concentrate d produce r o f opiu m i n Vietnam. The antagonis m betwee n th e Tai an d Me o had com e t o a hea d in 194 5 an d wa s heightene d wit h th e formatio n o f th e Ta i Fed eration. Prio r t o th e Japanes e occupatio n th e Me o wer e responsi ble onl y t o th e Frenc h administratio n i n th e highlands . The y were groupe d togethe r unde r th e authorit y o f Me o chief s i n th e various provinces , but , a s i n th e cas e o f th e Blac k Tai , i t wa s hard t o impos e unit y upo n them . Effort s b y th e Frenc h i n th e 1930's t o organize paramilitar y unit s amon g the Meo and t o nam e a Me o commande r fo r al l th e unit s o f So n L a Provinc e wer e a complet e failure . Th e Me o treasure d thei r autonom y eve n t o the poin t o f bein g unintereste d i n th e unificatio n o f thei r ow n people. Supra-loca l politica l organizatio n amon g th e Me o i n northern Vietna m ha s bee n o n a purel y ad hoc basis , an d ha s not ha d th e traditiona l legitimac y tha t th e muong o f th e Ta i has enjoyed . There ar e tw o example s o f Me o politica l centralization : th e clusters aroun d th e leader s Cha u Qua n L o i n th e Son g Cha y River Valle y northeas t o f La o Kay , an d aroun d Toub y Lyfon g in th e mountain s surroundin g th e Plain e de s Jarre s i n nort h cen tral Laos . Thes e Me o unit s wer e a t tw o geographi c extreme s of Indochina , and no prominent Me o leaders emerged i n between. Social an d politica l actio n amon g thes e Me o i n betwee n wa s probably o n th e basi s o f hamle t o r loca l ki n grouping . Thes e smaller unit s appea r t o have bee n muc h mor e easil y manipulate d by th e competitor s i n th e Indochin a War . Ofte n thi s wa s no t an advantage , sinc e th e Meo , lik e othe r mountai n minorities , found i t eas y t o switc h sides . B y comparison , th e large r grou p (under Touby) , probabl y becaus e i t i s mor e resilien t an d ha s developed mor e specifi c interests , ha s bee n mor e consisten t i n its alignment . I t als o continue s t o pla y a n exceedingl y importan t role i n Laotia n politics , a s i t ha s ove r th e pas t tw o decade s (se e Barney's paper) . Bu t thes e difference s amon g th e Meo , rathe r than explainin g th e basi s fo r thei r behavior , merel y rais e mor e questions. Wh y suc h cluster s o f politica l organizatio n a s tha t of Touby' s hav e appeare d i n som e Me o area s an d no t i n other s [823 ]

V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTEH , J R .

is a t presen t a n unanswerabl e question , bu t it s effect s ca n b e examined. In 194 5 th e Me o becam e alarme d a t wha t the y sa w t o b e a resurgenc e o f Whit e Ta i hegemon y i n th e northwes t highlands . Those Me o i n th e vicinit y o f Die n Bie n Ph u reacte d similarl y to th e Blac k Tai . The y joine d th e Vie t Min h rathe r tha n acqui esce t o th e curtailmen t o f thei r autonomy . I n retur n fo r pledge s of ful l autonom y the y rendere d grea t servic e t o th e Vie t Min h through thei r extensiv e knowledg e o f th e mountains . Becaus e of th e socia l an d politica l fragmentatio n o f th e Me o livin g i n the Federation , th e Ta i wer e abl e t o maintai n a t leas t som e influ ence amon g the m b y arbitrar y arrangements , bu t thi s wane d as the Viet Minh pressure on the highlands increased . From th e beginnin g o f thei r involvemen t i n th e northwest , the Vie t Min h ha d bee n abl e t o us e th e Me o withou t forcin g them int o an y mor e rigorous organizationa l structure . Throug h a coordinatio n o f Me o activitie s i n thi s loos e arrangement , th e Viet Min h benefite d fro m th e pressur e exerte d b y th e Whit e Tai t o absor b th e Me o int o a mor e centralize d organization . I n contrast t o thei r operation s i n th e Vietnames e lowlands , wher e they wer e establishin g rigi d superstructure s fo r political mobiliza tion, th e Communist s wer e abl e i n th e highland s t o manipulat e traditional structure s withou t reorganizing them . If persistin g pattern s o f antagonis m ha d no t bee n presen t an d the highlander s ha d bee n resilien t an d oppose d t o outsiders , th e story o f th e Indochin a Wa r migh t wel l hav e bee n a differen t one. Sinc e i t ha s bee n customar y t o thin k o f lowland-highlan d antipathies i n Southeas t Asia , thi s intra-highlan d patter n o f an tagonism i s especiall y significant . Thus , b y hi s precipitou s actio n in tryin g t o asser t hi s authorit y ove r th e Ta i highlands , De o Va n Long ha d a s earl y a s 1945-194 6 actuall y give n th e Vie t Min h at leas t nomina l contro l ove r th e riches t opium-growin g are a in th e northwes t an d acces s t o th e heartland o f th e Federation . DIEN BIE N P H U : THE PBIZ E O F TH E TA I FEDERATIO N AN D TH E GATEWA Y T O LAO S

Besides it s opiu m productio n ther e were othe r reason s for Die n Bien Ph u bein g th e riches t locatio n i n th e Ta i Federation . I t is th e larges t uplan d valle y i n th e northwes t highland s an d vir [ 824 ]

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tually th e onl y plac e tha t we t ric e ca n b e cultivate d o n a scal e approaching tha t o f th e Vietnames e lowlands . Consequentl y i t had th e highes t ric e yiel d o f an y muong unde r th e contro l o f Deo Va n Long . I n 195 3 thi s productio n amounte d t o 4,00 0 tons , which wa s approximatel y 3 0 percen t o f th e harves t availabl e to th e Federatio n i n tha t year . Moreover , i t was , with th e excep tion o f Ho a Binh , th e larges t populatio n cente r northwes t o f the Re d Rive r Delta . It s 15,00 0 person s constitute d 1 5 percen t of th e Blac k Ta i peopl e i n Vietna m an d abou t 5 percen t o f th e total population of th e Tai Federation . Another aspec t o f Die n Bie n Phu' s importanc e wa s a s a ke y avenue o f communication s fro m th e northwes t highland s int o upper Laos . I t wa s th e closes t poin t o f significanc e i n Vietna m to th e Roya l Laotia n capita l o f Luan g Praban g o n th e Mekon g River. Vi a th e Na m O u Valley , th e La o roya l capita l wa s a straight sho t t o th e southwes t les s tha n 15 0 mile s away . Sinc e the Mekon g ha d bee n th e directio n o f th e Vietnames e expansio n when th e Frenc h ha d intervened , i t seeme d natura l tha t i t woul d again b e a prim e objectiv e a s France' s powe r crumbled . Die n Bien Ph u wa s no t onl y th e linchpi n o f th e Ta i Federatio n bu t also th e gatewa y fo r Vietnames e expansionis m t o th e west . The importanc e o f Die n Bie n Ph u t o th e northwes t highland s was recognize d b y De o Va n Long . Th e impotenc e o f th e Ta i Federation withou t Die n Bie n Ph u wa s i n a sens e a n establishe d historical fact . De o Van Long probably looke d upon th e extensiv e upland valle y a s a par t o f hi s patrimon y sinc e th e Pavi e Treat y had specificall y recognize d th e hereditar y righ t o f th e De o o f Lai Cha u ove r Die n Bie n Phu a s well a s other highland locations . However, th e Frenc h ha d no t permitte d th e exercis e o f thi s righ t during thei r colonia l administration . Unde r thei r auspice s a Blac k Tai chau muong ha d governe d Die n Bie n Ph u an d ha d bee n responsible t o th e Vietnames e administrativ e superstructur e i n the highlands . Ami d th e confusio n o f 194 5 a majo r chang e i n this patter n occurre d whic h ha d importan t implication s fo r th e Indochina War . In th e aftermat h o f th e Japanes e capitulatio n i n 1945 , De o Van Lon g returne d fro m voluntar y exil e t o wha t ha d onc e bee n the Si p Son g Cha u Tai , th e mountai n kingdo m o f hi s ancestors . One o f hi s first act s wa s t o replac e th e chau muong o f Die n [ 82 5 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTER , JR .

Bien Phu , L o Va n Hac , wit h hi s ow n so n De o Va n Un . L o Va n Hac ha d serve d a s chau muong o f Die n Bie n Ph u fro m 194 1 to 194 5 an d ha d wo n th e respec t o f bot h th e Frenc h an d hi s own Blac k Ta i people . Ou t o f a n awarenes s o f thi s prestige De o Van Lon g attempte d t o persuad e L o Va n Ha c t o accep t a mino r administrative post . Bu t th e forme r chau muong fled Die n Bie n Phu i n ange r an d disgust , finding refug e amon g th e Vie t Minh . Deo Va n Lon g kep t th e Blac k Ta i leader' s wif e a prisone r i n the hope tha t thi s would induc e Ha c t o return, bu t i t merely rein forced hi s determinatio n agains t th e Whit e Tai . Within th e Com munist organizatio n h e foun d a n outle t fo r hi s hostility , an d ros e to a position o f authority . French official s wh o kne w L o Va n Ha c fro m previou s experi ence wer e convince d tha t onl y hi s hat e o f De o Va n Long , an d not hi s regar d fo r th e Vie t Minh , mad e hi m thei r adversary . In th e year s 1951-1952 , the y attempte d t o mak e contac t wit h the Blac k Ta i leade r i n orde r t o induc e hi m t o defec t fro m th e Communists. Thi s effor t wa s blocke d personall y b y De o Va n Long, wh o labele d th e forme r chau muong a traito r t o th e Ta i Federation. Ye t littl e doub t o f L o Va n Hac' s importanc e an d awareness o f trend s withi n th e Vie t Min h cam p remaine d b y the autum n o f 1952 . Upo n th e initia l Frenc h evacuatio n o f Die n Bien Phu , h e returne d t o rescu e hi s wif e fro m he r imprisonment . For almos t a year thereafter , unti l Novembe r 20 , 1953 , Dien Bie n Phu wa s i n Communis t hands . Undoubtedl y L o Va n Ha c playe d an importan t politica l an d militar y rol e i n th e Communis t prepa rations o f thi s period . Afte r th e Frenc h reoccupie d th e valle y in orde r t o mak e thei r dramati c stan d i n th e Ta i highlands , th e chau muong o f th e spo t the y ha d chose n a s th e symbo l o f thei r resistance i n Indochin a wa s firmly amon g th e rank s o f th e Vie t Minh. Once th e Frenc h decide d t o engag e th e Communist s i n posi tion warfar e i n th e Ta i highlands, Die n Bie n Phu wa s th e obviou s choice a s th e ke y battl e area . Althoug h La i Cha u wa s roughl y equidistant b y ai r fro m resuppl y base s a t Hanoi , i t di d no t li e astride an y o f th e majo r invasio n route s int o uppe r Laos . Neithe r did th e othe r importan t center s i n th e northwes t highland s offe r locations appropriat e t o th e achievemen t o f Frenc h objective s in defendin g norther n Indochina . Th e Frenc h Commande r i n [ 82 6 ]

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Chief, Genera l Navarre , mad e i t clea r tha t th e creatio n o f a "hedgehog" o r a land-ai r bas e a t Die n Bie n Ph u t o suppor t mo bile operation s wa s a compensator y actio n (Navarr e 1956:218) . It wa s intende d t o mak e u p fo r th e Frenc h incapacit y i n mobil e warfare especiall y i n th e mountain s o f uppe r Lao s an d norther n Vietnam. Th e existenc e o f a fortifie d cam p dee p i n enemy-con trolled territor y would , i t wa s hoped , offe r a n attractiv e enoug h target t o mak e th e elusiv e Vie t Min h stan d an d fight. I n suc h an encounte r i t wa s expecte d tha t th e Frenc h woul d b e stron g enough t o wip e ou t th e Vie t Min h a s the y thre w themselve s against fixed positions . By establishin g a "hedgehog " base athwar t th e principa l rout e into th e uppe r Mekon g Valley , Genera l Navarr e hope d t o bloc k the anticipate d Vie t Min h invasio n o f norther n Laos . Ha d th e Indochina Wa r bee n a motorize d conflic t wit h dependenc y o n roads, Navarre' s purpose s migh t hav e bee n achieved . Bu t i n th e northwest highland s ther e wer e n o "blockin g positions " lik e those tha t ha d bee n s o familia r t o th e Frenc h Commande r a s an armo r office r i n Europ e (Catrou x 1959:171-172) . Th e Vie t Minh travele d b y foo t acros s difficul t mountai n terrain , an d de pended o n huma n chain s o f cooli e porter s fo r thei r supplie s an d on loca l mountaineer s fo r thei r guides . Agains t thi s typ e o f mo bility th e stronghol d a t Die n Bie n Ph u wa s ineffectiv e an d vul nerable. I t coul d no t bloc k th e Communis t advance , bu t i t coul d be blocke d fro m sendin g ou t mobil e strik e forces . I n earl y De cember 195 3 tw o Vie t Min h division s pinne d dow n th e Frenc h garrison, whil e a thir d struc k int o Lao s an d dow n th e Na m O u Valley towar d Luan g Prabang . Th e uselessnes s o f Die n Bie n Ph u in protectin g norther n Lao s wa s no w apparent . It s vulnerabilit y to annihilation wa s becoming evident (Fal l 1964) . The defens e o f Laos , a s symbolize d b y protectin g th e sea t of th e ol d kingdo m o f Luan g Prabang , wa s hardl y a goa l t o inspire De o Va n Long . Th e subordinatio n o f th e Ta i Federatio n to suc h a tas k wa s a blo w t o th e prestig e o f it s president . More over, th e choic e o f Die n Bie n Phu, a Black Tai area , a s the princi pal Frenc h bas e i n th e highland s wa s a sever e reductio n o f th e White Ta i leader' s influence . Reinforcin g thi s "hedgehog " required th e evacuatio n o f La i Cha u an d mos t othe r center s hel d by th e Frenc h i n th e northwest . I n thi s retrea t an d regroupin g [ 82 7 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTEH , J B .

at Die n Bie n Ph u ther e wa s a certai n bitte r irony . Th e locatio n dictated b y geographi c consideration s t o b e th e noda l poin t fo r their confrontatio n wit h th e Vie t Min h wa s th e localit y th e French ha d allowe d thei r Ta i clien t t o abus e politically . Rathe r than plannin g thei r operation s s o that militar y strateg y wa s rein forced b y politica l preparations , th e situatio n wa s reversed . Ulti mately, French-sanctione d politica l program s amon g th e Ta i proved t o have great military liabilities. With th e abandonmen t o f La i Chau , Phon g Tho, and th e Blac k Tai area s o f So n L a Province , th e Frenc h politica l influenc e i n the northwes t highland s wa s virtuall y ended . Thi s wa s no t a sudden event . Th e prestig e o f th e Frenc h ha d decline d a s th e Viet Min h threa t mounted . Lon g befor e th e withdrawa l fro m these center s th e thre e Ta i provinc e chief s ha d bee n adaman t in thei r deman d tha t paramilitary units raised amon g thei r peopl e not b e use d i n othe r area s o f th e Federation . Unde r Vie t Min h pressure th e tenuou s spiri t o f mutua l assistanc e brok e down com pletely. Ba c Ca m Qu i o f So n L a an d De o Va n A n o f Phon g Tho woul d no t permi t th e assignmen t o f thei r militi a unit s t o Deo Va n Lon g i n La i Chau . Whe n the y wer e dispatche d b y French command , th e troop s defecte d an d returne d t o thei r homes. Thes e wer e occasion s fo r expressio n o f pent-u p antago nism agains t De o Va n Lon g a s wel l a s fea r o f th e Vie t Minh . Yet th e sam e effec t resulte d whe n Whit e Ta i unit s wer e use d outside o f La i Chau . By regroupin g thei r force s a t Die n Bie n Phu , th e Frenc h los t most o f th e Ta i paramilitar y unit s the y ha d helpe d organize . The partisa n fighters wer e concerne d abou t protectin g thei r fam ilies an d reluctan t t o leav e thei r homes . Fo r thei r par t th e thre e Tai leader s coul d no t believ e tha t th e battl e fo r Die n Bie n Phu , even i f a victory , coul d restor e t o the m th e influenc e the y ha d known sinc e 1945 . Such cooperatio n a s the y gav e t o th e Frenc h was passiv e an d diffident . However , th e los s o f thes e leaders ' militia unit s wa s no t a substantia l quantitativ e setbac k fo r th e French. There were onl y about 1,10 0 i n all, or roughly a battalio n in strength . The y ha d no t bee n traine d t o fight togethe r a s a unit bu t wer e use d i n compan y strengt h o f abou t 15 0 men each . In orde r t o appeas e th e French , De o Va n Lon g a t leas t gav e assurances tha t hi s troop s woul d figh t a s guerrilla s behin d th e [ 82 8 ]

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oncoming Viet Minh. Despite his feelings o f humiliation o n leaving La i Chau , th e Presiden t o f th e Ta i Federatio n followe d th e French t o Die n Bie n Phu , an d afte r th e battl e wa s evacuate d to France, where he continues to reside in retirement. One majo r consequenc e o f th e Frenc h withdrawa l t o Die n Bien Ph u wa s th e los s o f contac t an d communication s wit h th e peoples o f th e Tai highlands. They coul d no longer expec t intelligence o r othe r tactica l assistanc e fro m th e Ta i whom the y ha d abandoned t o th e Vie t Minh . Neithe r coul d the y hope for muc h cooperation fro m th e Black Tai living in the valley o f Die n Bien Phu o r th e Me o inhabitin g th e height s above . I n a sens e th e loyalties of th e people livin g within the French "hedgehog" were still commanded by their traditional leaders, who were absent but were attemptin g t o exercis e thei r authorit y fro m th e rank s o f the Viet Minh. As a practica l matte r mos t o f th e Ta i populatio n i n o r ou t of Die n Bie n Ph u wer e weighin g thei r chance s agains t th e possible outcome s o f th e loomin g battle . Thei r optin g fo r th e Vie t Minh in large numbers was based on an important factor beside s a belie f i n a Communis t victory . B y contras t wit h th e tactica l immobility o f th e French , th e Vie t Min h wer e maneuverin g with grea t flexibility throughou t th e northwes t highland s an d into upper Laos . This mobility depende d vitall y on contact wit h the loca l populatio n fo r supplementar y food , intelligenc e an d guides, and, most important o f all, porters. The feat tha t Genera l Navarre ha d believe d logisticall y impossible—th e massin g o f four Vie t Min h division s i n th e Ta i highlands—wa s achieve d only wit h th e ai d o f a n estimate d 80,00 0 porters . Th e flexible tactics of the Viet Minh gave the mountain people an opportunity to participate which the French self-imposed immobilit y did not. Because th e Communis t mobilit y depende d o n thi s popular par ticipation, thei r politica l actio n wa s geare d t o stimulat e it . With th e Frenc h immobilize d i n th e valley a t Die n Bie n Phu, the Vie t Min h ha d th e opportunit y t o establis h thei r offensiv e positions unhurriedly . Th e battl e di d no t begi n i n earnes t unti l March 13 , 1954, nearly four month s after th e French had reoccupied th e spot . Becaus e o f Frenc h fixed-positio n defense , th e en gagement quickl y establishe d it s characte r a s a n artiller y duel . General Navarr e ha d anticipate d thi s development an d expecte d [ 82 9 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N T . MCALlSTER , J R .

to us e his twenty-fou r 105-mm . howitzers an d fou r 155-mm . howitzers t o devastat e th e Vie t Min h force s a s the y swoope d dow n from th e surroundin g height s (Fal l 1964) . An y rea l possibilit y of effectiv e Vie t Min h artiller y fire o n Frenc h position s wa s dis counted. Th e Communist s woul d hav e t o locat e thei r weapon s in vie w o f Frenc h observers , wh o woul d the n orde r counter-bat tery fir e o r a n ai r attac k t o silenc e them . Anyway , Navarr e be lieved tha t potentia l Vie t Min h artiller y position s woul d hav e to b e behin d hills , six t o eigh t mile s fro m th e airfiel d an d th e center o f th e fortifie d camp . Thi s wa s considere d b y th e Frenc h commander t o b e wel l beyon d th e rang e o f an y possibl e enem y artillery (Navarr e 1956:195-196) . However , th e Vie t Min h ac tually hel d a n almos t continuou s hil l lin e wit h a n averag e eleva tion i n exces s o f 3,00 0 fee t a t a distanc e o f onl y 5,50 0 yard s from th e cente r o f th e Frenc h camp . I n fron t o f thi s ther e wa s a secondar y hil l lin e wit h height s i n exces s o f 1,50 0 fee t tha t was onl y 2,50 0 yard s fro m th e mai n defensiv e positions , whos e elevation wa s 1,00 0 feet . Th e result s o f th e battl e attes t t o th e effectiveness o f th e Communis t artiller y fro m thes e range s (Fal l 1961:285). The Vie t Minn' s artiller y wa s th e principa l surpris e i n th e bat tle o f Die n Bie n Phu . Th e Frenc h wer e hopelessl y outnumbere d by thei r enem y i n heav y weapons . Th e Communist s ha d twent y 105-mm. howitzers , twent y 75-mm . howitzers , a n importan t bu t undetermined numbe r o f heav y mortars , sixtee n 37-mm . antiair craft guns , on e hundre d 50-calibe r antiaircraf t guns , and , durin g the battle , sixty-fou r ne w Russia n 37-mm . antiaircraf t gun s ar e supposed t o have arrived ; i n al l they ha d mor e tha n tw o hundre d heavy weapon s (Navarr e 1956:218) . Th e Frenc h ha d t o matc h this strengt h wit h thei r twenty-eigh t artiller y pieces , fo r whic h they ha d insufficien t ammunition . Bu t quantit y wa s fa r fro m being th e sol e o r eve n th e principa l advantag e t o th e Vie t Minh . The effectivenes s o f th e Communis t artiller y la y i n positionin g and i n protectio n fro m counter-fire . Genera l Navarr e ha s described th e procedure s whic h achieve d thes e advantages : The artiller y ha d bee n du g i n b y singl e pieces . Th e gun s ha d bee n brought forwar d dismantled , carrie d b y men , t o emplacement s wher e they ha d direc t observatio n o f thei r targets . The y wer e installe d i n shell-proof dugouts , an d fire d poin t blan k fro m porthole s o r wer e

[ 83 0 ]

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pulled ou t by thei r crew s an d pulle d bac k i n a s soo n a s ou r counter battery fire began . Eac h piec e o r grou p o f piece s wa s covere d b y massed antiaircraf t artiller y pu t int o positio n an d camouflage d i n th e same manne r a s th e guns . Thi s wa y o f usin g th e artiller y an d A A guns wa s possibl e onl y wit h th e "huma n anthill " a t th e disposa l o f the Vie t Min h an d wa s t o mak e a shamble s o f al l th e estimate s o f our ow n artillerymen . (Navarr e 1956:218-219 , a s translate d b y Fal l 1961:289-290)

The three-thousand-foo t ridg e lin e alon g whic h th e Vie t Min h positioned thei r artiller y wa s th e hom e o f th e Me o o f Die n Bie n Phu. Precis e informatio n o n th e rol e o f th e Me o i n establishin g these gu n implacement s i s lacking . However , evidenc e o f wide spread Me o participatio n wit h th e Vie t Min h i n So n L a an d Lai Cha u province s i s plentiful . Fo r example , amon g th e 3,20 0 coolies a t wor k o n suppl y route s fo r th e Vie t Min h i n So n L a Province durin g th e summe r o f 1953 , th e Me o wer e th e mos t enthusiastic. Moreover , thei r involvemen t wit h th e Communist s was not limite d t o labor brigades; Meo guerrill a unit s were activ e for th e Vie t Min h caus e i n th e are a betwee n So n L a an d Die n Bien Ph u i n th e perio d leadin g u p t o th e battle . I n vie w o f thi s participation, an d becaus e o f thei r alienatio n fro m bot h th e French an d th e Ta i Federation , i t seem s certai n tha t th e Me o also playe d a n importan t par t i n th e militar y preparation s a t Dien Bie n Phu . Seen fro m anothe r poin t o f view , th e rol e o f th e Me o gain s in perspective . I f th e Frenc h ha d bee n abl e t o maintai n th e loyalty o f th e Me o o f Die n Bie n Ph u i n th e sam e manne r a s the fidelit y o f th e Me o northwes t o f La o Kay , th e militar y situa tion migh t hav e bee n substantiall y different . Cha u Qua n L o o f the Son g Cha y Rive r are a wit h 2,00 0 Me o partisans , wa s abl e in 1953-195 4 t o ti e dow n a significan t bod y o f Vie t Min h troop s through relentles s guerrill a harassmen t behin d Communis t lines . A simila r sor t o f respons e b y th e Me o o f Die n Bie n Phu , perhap s based o n a sens e o f defendin g thei r home s agains t Vietnames e encroachment, woul d hav e bee n a n invaluabl e asse t t o th e French. No t onl y woul d thi s hav e denie d t o th e Vie t Min h assis tance fro m th e Me o i n locatin g an d camouflagin g bunkers , bu t it als o migh t hav e enable d th e Frenc h t o fight fo r th e hig h ground an d possibl y destro y som e o f th e enemy' s artiller y pieces . [831 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTER , JH .

Given al l th e othe r shortcoming s i n Navarre' s planning , i t seem s unlikely tha t loya l Me o harassmen t coul d hav e turne d th e tid e of battl e i n France' s favor . Ye t th e decisivenes s o f th e Commu nists' artillery fire suggests that th e absenc e of Me o support migh t have altered th e pattern of the battle. As th e battl e evolved , witherin g artiller y fir e wa s turne d o n the Frenc h an d thei r Ta i allies . I n th e valle y o f Die n Bie n Ph u were thre e Ta i battalion s comprisin g one-quarte r o f th e force s under Frenc h comman d whe n th e battl e began . Th e Anne-Mari e outpost locate d northwes t o f th e Die n Bie n Ph u airfiel d wa s held b y th e Thir d Ta i Battalion . Muc h depende d o n them , sinc e the cam p ha d n o mean s o f re-suppl y excep t b y air . Whe n thei r position cam e unde r attac k an d wa s isolate d fro m th e mai n French bas e o n Marc h 18 , 1954 , th e whol e battalio n defecte d with thei r weapons . Th e othe r tw o battalion s wer e als o unabl e to adjus t t o th e necessitie s o f fixed-position comba t i n ope n ter rain. Unde r th e pressur e o f th e unceasin g artiller y barrage s the y too fled the field. This confrontatio n o f traditiona l mountai n enemie s wa s a sig nificant them e i n th e battl e o f Die n Bie n Phu . Th e engagemen t illustrated, a s perhap s n o othe r even t i n th e histor y o f th e north west highland s coul d have , th e opposin g interest s o f th e people s in th e mountai n area . See n agains t th e backgroun d o f mor e tha n two centurie s o f conflict , th e battl e o f Die n Bie n Ph u coul d b e regarded a s a fight fo r th e Si p Son g Cha u Tai , i n whic h th e antagonists agai n enliste d externa l ai d a s the y ha d i n th e past . Certainly thi s wa s a n importan t facto r i n understandin g th e bat tle. Ye t clearl y ther e wa s muc h mor e t o th e encounte r tha n this . Never befor e ha d s o many o f th e ethni c group s o f th e Indochin a area face d eac h othe r i n comba t a s a t Die n Bie n Phu . Tw o ou t of th e fou r division s th e Vie t Min h ha d committe d a t Die n Bie n Phu, th e 312t h an d th e 316th , wer e commande d b y Th o general s and ha d a larg e percentag e o f Th o i n thei r ranks. If th e Tho ha d never befor e fough t wes t o f th e Re d River , fa r fro m thei r home land, i t wa s equall y tru e tha t th e Me o an d th e Blac k Ta i ha d never had suc h potent allies . It wa s characteristic s suc h a s thes e tha t distinguishe d th e bat tle o f Die n Bie n Ph u fro m th e previou s patter n o f conflic t i n the Ta i highlands . Unlik e thei r lowlan d predecessors , th e Vie t [ 83 2 ]

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Minh wer e attemptin g t o incorporat e th e minorit y peopl e throughout th e mountains o f Indochin a int o th e political syste m they were building . Exacting tribut e o r placing a puppet regim e in powe r wer e t o the m anachronisti c mode s o f operating . Thei r interests were best served by creating an organization for military participation which gave the minorities opportunities for mobility and status , bu t whic h sough t t o preven t intra-minorit y antipa thies fro m bein g expressed . Sinc e politica l integratio n i n South east Asi a i s s o ofte n though t o f a s dependin g o n economi c an d social prerequisites , i t i s instructiv e t o not e th e Vie t Minh' s effectiveness i n usin g militar y organizatio n t o achiev e thes e purposes. Moreover, th e Vie t Min h consolidate d thes e politica l gain s a t the en d o f th e Indochin a Wa r b y th e creatio n o f th e Tai-Me o Autonomous Zone— a Communis t versio n o f th e Si p Son g Cha u Tai. Th e interna l autonom y o f th e minoritie s o f thi s zon e wa s provided b y a proportiona l representatio n o n a n Administrativ e Committee i n whic h th e Ta i ha d te n seats , th e Me o five , Viet Muong two , Ma n one , Vietnamese two , while fiv e wer e distrib uted t o lesse r minoritie s (Ano n 1955B-.17) . Whethe r th e Com munists hav e attempte d t o brea k th e traditiona l patter n o f loca l political an d socia l structure amon g th e peoples o f th e Ta i highlands i s unknown. Sinc e their grea t succes s militarily cam e fro m manipulating thes e traditiona l structures , i t woul d see m risk y for the m t o attemp t policie s i n whic h th e Vietnames e an d th e French befor e the m ha d failed . Ye t until the y alte r thes e struc tures to assimilate the minorities more closely to Vietnamese culture, ther e wil l continu e t o b e th e possibilit y o f assertion s o f autonomy beyond Communist control. In retrospect , i t i s clea r Die n Bie n Ph u wa s no t a victory fo r Communist orthodox y bu t fo r Vie t Min h shrewdness . It wa s not doctrine tha t outsmarte d th e Frenc h bu t a precis e knowledg e of th e mountain s an d people s o f norther n Vietnam . Ye t i n th e newspaper headline s throughou t th e worl d th e battl e wa s pic tured a s a triump h fo r th e brut e strengt h o f Communis m mad e possible b y th e illici t an d unstoppabl e ai d o f th e Chinese . Thi s was bu t anothe r exampl e o f th e difficultie s o f communicatin g subtleties o f internationa l event s t o newspape r audiences . Perhaps mor e o f th e meanin g o f th e battl e coul d hav e bee n [ 83 3 ]

V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTEH , J B .

conveyed b y a traditiona l Laotia n legen d abou t Muon g Theng , the origina l Ta i nam e fo r Die n Bie n Phu . I t wa s i n thi s uplan d valley a t th e daw n o f creatio n tha t Pray a Then , th e Kin g o f the Sky , sen t hi s so n Khu n Boro m t o earth . B y th e tw o wive s he brough t wit h hi m Khu n Boro m sire d seve n sons , an d t o eac h of the m h e assigne d a specifi c territory . Thes e seve n Ta i King doms were : Th e Lan d o f th e Millio n Elephant s (La n Xang ) or th e Kingdo m o f Luan g Prabang , th e Lan d o f Poue n o r th e Kingdom o f Xien g Khouan g i n Laos , th e Lan d o f th e H o o r the Si p Son g Pa n N a i n Yunna n Provinc e o f southwes t China , the Si p Son g Cha u Ta i i n Vietnam , th e Lan d o f th e You n o r the Kingdo m o f Chiengma i i n Norther n Thailand , th e Kingdo m of Ayuthy a i n present-day centra l Thailand , an d finall y th e King dom o f Peg u i n Lowe r Burma . Accordin g t o thi s legend , Muon g Theng (o r Die n Bie n Phu ) wa s th e cente r o f dispersio n o f th e Tai people s throughou t Southeas t Asi a an d migh t a s a conse quence b e considere d th e ethni c origin-point o f th e are a (Coede s 1954:13-15). This legen d i s o f cours e a gros s simplification . I f i t wer e true , it woul d hel p t o resolv e man y o f th e mysterie s i n th e comple x ethnography o f mainlan d Southeas t Asia . Ye t th e legen d i s no t completely mythological . I t seem s probabl e tha t a t leas t th e Laotians o f th e Mekon g Valle y an d th e Blac k Ta i o f th e Plain e des Jarre s aroun d Xien g Khouan g di d originat e a t Die n Bie n Phu o r passe d throug h ther e fro m som e norther n poin t o f origin . However, wha t i s inaccurate ethnographicall y ma y b e suggestiv e and instructiv e politically . Becaus e o f it s locatio n Die n Bie n Ph u is th e gatewa y t o th e land s o f th e Tai-speakin g people s i n South east Asia , whic h stretc h acros s th e state s o f Burma , Thailand , and Laos, as well as southern China . The victor y a t Die n Bie n Ph u wa s not , a s preceding Vie t Min h campaigns i n Lao s clearl y showed , t o fulfil l onl y Viet Min h goal s of incorporatin g al l o f th e people s withi n th e coloniall y estab lished boundarie s o f Vietna m int o a nation-state . A s subsequen t events have confirmed , thi s triump h a t Die n Bie n Phu establishe d the Vietnames e Communist s a s a powe r amon g th e Tai-speakin g peoples. It als o identifie d the m wit h traditiona l Vietnames e goal s of drivin g t o th e Mekon g an d acquirin g a hegemon y ove r th e peoples t o th e west . Sinc e th e Chines e themselve s ar e no t [834 ]

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without designs ove r th e strategicall y locate d Ta i peoples , thi s victory woul d hav e brough t Vietnames e an d Chines e goal s int o conflict. Future historian s ma y wel l recor d tha t th e cessatio n o f th e Indochina Wa r wa s cause d a s muc h b y Chines e concer n ove r Vietnamese expansio n a s b y Frenc h defeat . I f successio n t o French sovereignt y i n al l o f Indochin a i s th e fundamenta l goa l of th e Vietnames e Communists , a s thei r extensiv e activitie s i n Laos ten d t o indicate , the n thi s canno t bu t threate n al l o f th e mainland o f Southeas t Asi a a s wel l a s China . Whateve r th e un derlying design s o f th e Chines e an d Vietnames e Communists , their interest s i n th e unassimilate d Tai-speakin g minoritie s o f the mountainou s interio r o f Southeas t Asi a make s the m on e o f the importan t focuse s o f politica l concern . Attentio n t o thei r par ticular ethni c an d geographi c characteristics , rathe r tha n t o ab stract Communis t theory , ma y offe r th e bes t insuranc e agains t their manipulation fo r Communis t purposes . MOXINTAI N MINORITIE S AN D TH E VIETNAMES E COMMUNISTS : TH E CONTINUIN G CONFLIC T

The Communis t victor y a t Die n Bie n Ph u i n th e sprin g o f 1954 brough t a hal t t o wha t i s no w calle d th e Firs t Indochin a War. Bu t i t di d no t brin g a n en d t o th e Vie t Min h activitie s among th e mountai n minorities . Thi s ha s continue d wit h grea t intensity amon g th e Tai-speakin g mountai n peopl e o f norther n Laos an d th e fragmente d group s o f th e tw o major languag e fam ilies livin g o n th e sout h centra l plateau . Thes e operation s i n Lao s have been a natural extensio n o f th e earlie r invasion s of the coun try i n 1953-195 4 b y th e Vie t Minh' s crac k divisions . Followin g the Genev a Conferenc e o f 1954 , however , i t wa s risk y fo r th e Vietnamese Communist s t o launc h suc h over t operation s int o upper Laos . I n orde r t o avoi d potentia l internationa l sanctions , the Vie t Min h undertoo k politica l an d paramilitar y organizationa l activities amon g th e minorities o f northern Lao s in an unobtrusiv e manner. These preparation s cam e t o ligh t i n th e summe r o f 1959 , whe n the Laotian governmen t charge d tha t th e Communis t Vietnames e had invade d th e tw o norther n province s o f thei r country , Phon g [ 83 5 ]

VIETNAM : JOH N T . MCALISTEH , J B .

SaIy an d Sa m Neua. 24 Investigation s b y Unite d Nation s observer s failed t o prov e an y invasio n b y ethni c Vietnamese . Sinc e Sa m Neua an d Phon g SaI y hav e congruen t ethni c characteristics—i n concentrations o f Whit e an d Blac k Ta i peoples—wit h th e neigh boring province s o f norther n Vietnam , La i Cha u an d So n La , it woul d no t hav e bee n difficul t t o us e non-Vietnames e troop s from Vietnam . Such a possibilit y underscore s th e eas e wit h whic h Vie t Min h influence coul d b e extende d int o Lao s b y employin g technique s that wer e s o successfu l i n th e Ta i highland s o f Vietnam . A ne w Geneva agreement , tha t o f 1962 , wa s expecte d t o brin g a cessa tion t o th e Vietnamese-supporte d hostilitie s tha t erupte d i n 1959 . Yet th e bes t guarante e ha s appeare d t o b e a traditiona l one . The fiercely independen t Me o livin g o n th e height s aroun d th e Plaine de s Jarre s i n centra l Lao s hav e prove n th e mos t tenaciou s combatants agains t th e Pathe t Lao—th e Laotia n Communis t movement. Lik e th e Me o i n Vietna m aroun d Die n Bie n Phu , the Me o of th e Plaine de s Jarres seem to have made thei r decisio n on non-ideologica l grounds . Thos e Me o o f Lao s wh o ar e fighting against th e Communist s d o s o no t fo r ideologica l reasons , bu t because th e Communist s hav e trie d t o restric t thei r autonom y and depriv e the m o f th e benefit s fro m thei r opiu m crop. 25 Having obtaine d thei r succes s throug h th e manipulatio n o f traditional structure s an d antipathies , th e Vie t Min h hav e now , ironically, ha d thes e characteristic s turne d agains t the m politi cally. Th e continuin g conflic t aroun d th e Plain e de s Jarre s pro vides fres h evidenc e o f th e persistenc e o f th e underlyin g politica l characteristics o f the Tai highlands from th e Red River in Vietna m to th e Mekon g i n Laos . Now , jus t th e revers e fro m Die n Bie n "Halpern an d Fredma n (1960 ) an d Domme n (1965:119-125) . Domme n (1965:124) state s tha t th e Unite d Nation s " . . . subcommitte e too k a plan e t o Sam Neu a Province , wher e the y interrogate d a numbe r o f prisoner s an d refugees , several of who m wer e Black Thai. " 25 There ar e als o Me o fighting wit h th e Communist s i n Laos , le d b y Faydang , who continue s t o b e a n activ e participan t i n th e Pathe t Lao . Se e Fal l (1965A) . The them e o f Fall' s articl e i s state d i n hi s openin g sentence : "I n larg e measur e the Laotia n Communis t movemen t appear s t o b e base d no t o n th e ethni c Laotia n lowlanders bu t o n man y o f th e minoritie s o f Laos—Thai , Meo , an d Malayo Indonesian (i.e . Kha, La o fo r slave ) peoples. " Fo r additiona l informatio n o n Faydang an d th e pro-Communis t Me o se e Domme n (1965:72-76) , th e introduc tion to the Laos sectio n of thi s book, an d Barney' s paper .

[ 83 6 ]

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Phu, i t i s th e anti-Communis t Me o wh o contro l th e hill s an d the strategi c passe s leading sout h an d westward fro m th e Plain e des Jarres. The Pathe t La o have taken th e valley itself, but the y have bee n unabl e t o tak e th e surroundin g height s (Domme n 1965:242-250). Th e outcom e remain s i n doubt , bu t th e event s do illustrate tha t th e influence o f th e Viet Minh and thei r client s can be checked by political shrewdness in the ways of th e mountain people or by unanticipated consequences of traditional alignments, a s appear s t o be th e cas e with th e Me o o f Laos . A longterm resolutio n o f th e problem s o f Lao s o r an y o f th e state s of Southeas t Asi a would probably requir e furthe r assimilatio n of the mountain peoples to the lowland culture. Yet the Meo would probably resis t an y over t mov e toward force d cultur e chang e and los s o f politica l autonom y jus t a s tenaciousl y a s the y ar e now opposin g th e Communists . The Vie t Minh' s interes t i n Lao s ha s no t bee n confine d t o the norther n par t o f th e countr y wher e th e Ta i highland s are . Because Laos shares a border more than tw o hundred miles long with Vietna m sout h o f th e seventeent h parallel , i t ha s offere d a more convenient avenu e for infiltratio n tha n th e narrow, forty mile wid e demilitarize d zon e tha t separate s th e tw o halve s o f the Vietnames e territory . Vie t Min h position s i n southeaster n Laos suppor t a n infiltratio n rout e (th e "H o Ch i Min h Trail" ) which lead s int o th e sout h centra l platea u o f Vietna m (Warne r 1965). Thi s platea u i s th e homelan d o f approximatel y 800,00 0 people speakin g language s o f th e Mon-Khme r an d Malayo-Poly nesian families . Durin g th e Indochin a Wa r th e Vie t Min h di d not have notable success in winning the loyalties of these minorities o r employin g the m i n militar y operations. 28 Thi s contras t to th e situatio n i n norther n Vietna m wa s attributabl e i n par t to th e absenc e o f centralize d socia l o r politica l institution s suc h as th e Si p So n Cha u Ta i o r eve n th e muong. I t wa s als o du e to th e paternalistic attitud e o f th e Frenc h administration , whic h gave a hig h priorit y t o th e protectio n o f th e montagnards from the lowlan d Vietnames e an d th e preservatio n o f thei r custom s and traditions . Before th e en d o f th e Indochin a Wa r th e onl y organizationa l 28

This conclusion i s drawn from Marchan d (1952:169-176) .

[ 83 7 ]

V I E T N A M : J O H N T . MCALISTKH , J H .

structures t o exis t beyon d th e loca l leve l i n th e souther n high lands wer e French-sponsore d paramilitar y units . The y wer e di vided int o unit s speakin g th e sam e minorit y language , an d usu ally commande d b y a Frenc h cadre . Demonstration s o f loyalt y to th e Frenc h b y thes e unit s wer e frequent , an d ther e i s littl e to sugges t tha t the y eve r defecte d t o th e Vie t Minh . Thi s doe s not mea n tha t th e Communis t Vietnames e wer e no t effectiv e in exploitin g th e highland s o f sout h centra l Vietna m fo r militar y advantage. Th e tragi c stor y o f th e annihilatio n o f th e Frenc h regimental comba t team , Groupement Mobile, o n R.C . 1 9 a t A n Khe in June 1954 , attests t o their effectiveness. 27 Bu t their adapta tion o f guerrill a an d mobil e warfar e t o th e souther n highland s was almos t exclusivel y wit h Vietnamese , no t triba l troops . B y the en d o f th e wa r i n 195 4 th e Vie t Min h ha d a ful l division , the 305th , i n thei r Interzon e V (sout h centra l Vietnam ) an d a tota l o f 25,000-30,00 0 regula r troops . Thu s th e situatio n i n this are a wa s jus t th e revers e o f tha t i n norther n Vietnam . Th e Viet Min h controlle d th e Vietnames e lowlands , an d th e Frenc h controlled most of the highlands where the minority peoples lived . With th e implementatio n o f th e Genev a agreement , th e Vie t Minh evacuate d thi s are a sout h o f th e seventeent h paralle l an d brought most of its regular troop s to the north. The relativ e absenc e o f intra-minorit y antagonism s i n th e sout h central platea u an d th e Frenc h protectio n o f thes e minoritie s from th e lowlander s ha d give n th e Viet Min h few politica l oppor tunities t o exploit . Bu t thes e opportunitie s increase d wit h th e advent o f th e Republi c o f Vietnam . Ou t o f a concer n ove r th e potential fo r infiltratio n int o th e souther n highland s th e govern ment o f Ng o Din h Die m sough t protectio n b y movin g approxi mately 100,00 0 ethnic Vietnames e int o th e area . By placing thes e Vietnamese i n strategi c locations , Presiden t Die m expecte d t o increase th e securit y o f th e highland s agains t Vie t Min h exploita tion. A t th e sam e tim e abou t 25,00 0 mountai n peopl e wer e re grouped a t si x sites a s a n adde d precautio n (Gittinge r 1959:27) . Rather tha n enhancin g th e securit y o f th e region, thes e program s antagonized th e mountai n minoritie s t o a n exten t tha t ha d no t ST

The fact s o f thi s mos t importan t operatio n o n th e sout h centra l platea u during the Indochina Wa r ar e related b y Fall (1961:Ch . 9) .

[ 83 8 ]

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S & TH E VIE T MIN H

previously existed . A t th e sam e tim e th e Vie t Min h launche d a progra m o f propagand a an d indoctrinatio n o f th e platea u peo ple tha t include d radi o broadcast s i n thei r language s an d th e training o f cadre s amon g th e variou s minorities . Throug h thes e techniques th e Vietnames e Communist s hope d t o capitaliz e upo n the disconten t o f th e souther n highlander s an d establis h th e po litical base s fo r guerrill a an d mobil e warfar e operation s (But tinger 1961:109 ; Hicke y 1957:26-27) . Despite th e shortcoming s o f th e policie s o f th e Republi c o f Vietnam, th e Communists ' politica l experienc e ha s no t bee n s o successful i n th e souther n highland s a s i t wa s i n earlie r year s in northern Vietnam . Instead, anothe r political trend has emerged . This ha s bee n th e gradua l developmen t o f a movemen t fo r au tonomy o f th e highlands . I t ha s bee n bot h anti-Communis t an d anti-Republic o f Vietnam . Th e tren d gaine d momentu m throug h programs t o trai n th e mountai n minoritie s a s paramilitar y an d "special forces " i n th e fight agains t th e Communists . Thi s gav e the highlander s a n opportunit y fo r militar y training , organiza tional experience , an d comba t equipmen t mor e widesprea d tha n anything previousl y known . B y th e autum n o f 196 5 approxi mately 18,00 0 me n ha d bee n organize d int o formation s know n as civilia n irregula r defens e unit s (Keatle y 1965) . Wit h thes e assets th e souther n highlander s ha d a vehicl e fo r th e expressio n of thei r discontent . Thei r smolderin g antipathie s erupte d o n September 19 , 1964 , whe n 3,00 0 heavil y arme d mountaineer s revolted i n five United State s Army Specia l Forces Camps , killing twenty-nine Vietnamese , capturin g a hundre d mor e an d seizin g twenty American s a s hostages . Th e conciliator y effort s o f th e Americans an d th e responsivenes s o f th e Vietnames e succeede d in quelling th e revolt an d restoring order (Sochure k 1965:38) . The leader s o f th e uprisin g proclaime d thei r movemen t th e Forces Unifiees de Lutfe pour la Race Opprimee (tha t is , united forces fo r th e struggl e fo r th e oppresse d races , o r FULRO) , which ha s it s ow n flag an d a se t o f politica l aim s tha t ar e ad dressed t o th e American s an d th e Republi c o f Vietna m (Fal l 1965:70). Mos t o f th e member s o f th e movemen t see m t o b e from on e minorit y group , th e Rhade , whic h i s generall y consid ered th e mos t culturall y advance d o f th e souther n highlan d peo [ 83 9 ]

VIETNAM: JOH N T . MCALISTEH , J R .

pies. A s par t o f th e reconciliatio n i n Septembe r 1964 , the y wer e given certai n specifi c promise s b y th e representative s o f th e Re public o f Vietnam . Thes e include d a variet y o f politica l reform s which woul d ameliorat e th e conditio n o f th e highlander s an d resolve man y area s o f friction betwee n the m an d th e Vietnamese . The Republi c o f Vietna m ha s no t bee n quic k t o hono r thes e promises, an d th e uprisin g o f 196 4 was threatene d i n Septembe r and repeate d i n Decembe r 196 5 (Sheeha n 1965A ; 1965B) . Ther e is concern tha t FULR O wil l be drive n int o the Communis t camp . Since a centralize d organizatio n amon g th e highlander s ha s emerged i n FULRO , i t woul d no w b e mor e convenien t fo r th e Communists t o dea l wit h th e souther n minoritie s accordin g t o their establishe d patter n o f operations . B y holdin g ou t promise s of a n autonomou s zon e simila r t o tha t o f th e Tai-Me o are a i n the northwest , th e Communist s migh t capitaliz e o n th e goal s of th e souther n highlander s an d tur n the m activel y agains t th e Republic o f Vietna m an d th e allie d force s assistin g them. 28 Since th e ethni c compositio n o f Indochin a i s on e o f th e mos t complex i n th e world , i t i s t o b e expecte d tha t th e politica l an d social problem s arisin g fro m thi s characteristi c wil l als o b e com plicated an d protracted . Howeve r complex , thes e problem s hav e not prove n t o b e insoluble . The y hav e bee n amenabl e t o thos e who hav e show n themselve s mos t knowledgeabl e concernin g th e particular characteristic s an d goal s o f th e variou s mountai n peo ples an d capabl e o f responding t o them. In al l but a few instance s this typ e o f understandin g ha s bee n b y th e Vietnames e Communists. REFERENCES CITE D ANON.

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[ 84 0 ]

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BUTTINGER, JOSEP H

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1957 Preliminar y researc h repor t o n the High Plateau . Saigon . Michigan Stat e University , Vietna m Advisor y Group , mimeographed. 1958 Socia l system s o f norther n Vietnam . Chicago , Universit y of Chicago , Departmen t o f Anthropology , doctora l dis sertation. JANOS, ANDRE W

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military histor y o f modern China , 1924-1949 . Prince ton, N.J. , Princeton Universit y Press .

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1963 Selecte d militar y writing s o f Mao Tse-tung. Peking , For eign Language s Press . MARCHAND, Colone l JEA N

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[ 84 4 ]

PART IX . T H E ROL E O F PRIVATE FOUNDATION S

CHAPTE R 2 1

The Asia Foundation's Programming fo r Triba l an d Minority People s in Southeas t Asi a HARR Y H . P I E R S O

N

INTRODUCTION

Guide Lines of Foundation Activities. Th e program s under taken b y th e Asi a Foundatio n wit h respec t t o triba l an d minorit y peoples i n Southeas t Asi a ar e carrie d ou t i n accordanc e wit h guide lines of tw o kinds: First, th e Foundation' s Article s o f Incorporation , whic h reflec t three purposes , tw o o f whic h ar e pertinen t t o th e subjec t o f th e paper: (1) T o suppor t individuals , voluntar y groups , an d private , quasi-governmental an d governmenta l institution s whos e aims ar e th e modernizatio n an d developmen t o f thei r ow n societies; (2) T o encourag e cooperatio n amon g Asian , American , an d international organization s tha t ar e workin g towar d thes e same goals . Second, countr y guid e line s whic h ar e develope d fro m th e needs o f th e countr y concerne d a s viewe d b y th e Foundation' s resident representativ e withi n th e limit s impose d b y (1 ) th e Foundation's genera l purpose s (above) , (2 ) th e Foundation' s capabilities a s a n America n organizatio n workin g i n Asia , an d (3) th e availabl e funding . In broa d terms , thos e guid e line s whic h ar e german e t o projects relatin g t o triba l an d minorit y people s reflec t expresse d national need s i n regar d t o th e integratio n o f minorities , th e achievement o f developmen t goal s withi n a changin g bu t reason ably stabl e an d peacefu l socia l environment , th e developmen t of huma n resources , th e developmen t o f researc h an d stud y o f social problem s (especiall y b y national s o f th e countrie s them [ 847 ]

PBIVATE F O U N D A T I O N S : HAKR Y H . PIERSO N

selves), an d th e rol e o f minorit y people s i n th e tota l socia l an d economic developmen t process . Thes e objective s are , o f course , to a consideabl e degre e interlinke d an d mutuall y supporting . Basic Operating Principles. Operatin g principles , whic h ar e fundamental t o th e Foundation' s approac h i n th e variou s coun tries o f Southeas t Asia , determine th e individuals , groups, institu tions, o r governmen t agencie s whic h wil l b e assiste d an d th e types o f program s undertaken . Th e mos t importan t o f thes e prin ciples are : 1. Asia n initiativ e an d suppor t ar e essentia l t o an y constructiv e measures o f lastin g benefit . Therefore , mos t o f th e Foundation' s assistance i s i n th e for m o f grant s t o project s designe d an d ad ministered b y Asian s themselves . Th e Foundatio n i s firmly o f the belie f tha t suc h project s ar e mos t likel y t o b e pertinen t t o local needs , t o induc e loca l support , an d t o becom e endurin g assets in the countries concerned . 2. Residen t representative s ar e essentia l t o soun d progra m de velopment. A safeguar d i s thu s provide d agains t th e uninten tional impositio n o f preconceive d America n solution s tha t ma y be inapplicabl e o r inappropriat e t o th e Asia n problem unde r con sideration. Furthermore , th e Foundatio n i s enable d t o exten d assistance i n whateve r for m ma y bes t encourag e an d supple ment loca l effort, an d therefor e increas e th e probability o f succes s of th e project . 3. Sinc e it s limite d resource s d o no t permi t th e Foundatio n to undertak e project s requirin g large-scal e financing , assistanc e is predominantl y i n th e smal l gran t field fo r project s whic h sho w promise o f leadin g to greate r an d mor e sustained activit y unde r local or other sponsorship . In th e ligh t o f th e abov e guid e line s an d operatin g principles , it i s no t surprisin g tha t th e Foundatio n ha s occasionall y bee n asked t o assist local projects havin g t o do with triba l an d minorit y peoples. Fo r instance , a basi c nee d t o whic h th e Foundatio n has responde d i n man y Asia n countrie s (an d no t onl y i n relatio n to triba l an d minorit y peoples ) i s fo r researc h t o develo p dat a with whic h adequat e developmen t progra m plannin g ca n b e un dertaken b y Asia n governments . I t ha s bee n foun d tha t althoug h the Southeas t Asia n countrie s b y an d larg e hav e bee n th e subjec t of researc h an d stud y b y outsiders , the y hav e seldo m bee n th e [ 84 8 ]

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subject o f researc h b y thei r ow n people . Thi s phenomeno n ha s deep roots , o f course , an d ther e i s no intentio n her e t o deprecat e the tremendou s contribution s mad e t o ou r knowledg e o f Asia n countries by outside researchers . Since Worl d Wa r II , however , man y Asian s hav e bee n traine d in researc h method s an d hav e returne d t o thei r ow n countries , where the y hav e identifie d importan t area s o f research . Thu s local peopl e ar e rapidl y movin g fro m position s o f bystander s an d informants t o becom e activ e participant s an d planners . Unde r these conditions , researc h i s becomin g a par t o f th e plannin g habits o f governmen t an d privat e institution s an d agencies , an d its result s ar e bein g fe d bac k promptl y int o th e system . With particula r referenc e t o program s fo r triba l an d minorit y peoples, th e Foundatio n ha s o n occasio n bee n abl e t o respon d to request s fo r assistanc e i n researc h whic h gre w ou t o f loca l concern fo r th e integratio n o f suc h people s int o nationa l affairs . This concer n underla y th e Hil l Tribe s Researc h Projec t initiate d in Thailan d i n 196 1 by th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfar e wit h a gran t fro m th e Foundation . Thi s wa s th e initia l phas e o f a program whic h i s reporte d o n i n thi s boo k b y Dr . Han s Mann dorff. Positively , th e Tha i governmen t desire d t o find way s t o incorporate th e hil l tribe s more closel y into th e body politic with out destroyin g thei r culture . Negatively , th e threa t o f Communis t subversion an d th e consequen t threa t t o th e integrit y o f Norther n and Northwester n Thailan d wer e als o factor s t o b e take n int o consideration, althoug h thes e factor s see m t o hav e becom e ex plicit onl y som e tim e afte r th e movemen t t o find way s o f inte grating the hill tribes into the Thai nation began . The origin s o f th e Hil l Tribe s Researc h Projec t illustrat e ho w a numbe r o f independen t stream s o f though t an d organizationa l interests ca n sometime s coincid e a t a poin t i n tim e an d resul t in th e creatio n o f a new activit y possessing considerabl e potentia l for furthe r development . I n earl y 195 9 th e Publi c Welfar e De partment wa s alread y involve d i n a pilo t resettlemen t program . Mr. E . J . Tavanlar , a Filipin o specialis t o n lan d settlemen t wa s attached t o th e Departmen t unde r arrangement s wit h th e Foo d and Agricultur e Organizatio n (FAO ) i n order to act a s an advise r on th e resettlemen t project . Bot h Mr . Tavanla r an d th e Directo r General o f th e Publi c Welfar e Departmen t wer e awar e o f th e [ 84 9 ]

PRIVAT E FOUNDATIONS : HARH Y H . PIERSO N

need fo r researc h prio r t o undertakin g an y majo r resettlemen t efforts. Th e Socia l Affair s Divisio n o f ECAF E (Economi c Coop eration i n Asi a an d th e Fa r East ) wa s intereste d i n researc h because o f it s concer n wit h th e narcotics problem . Th e Southeas t Asia Treat y Organizatio n (SEATO ) ha d becom e intereste d an d had mad e a direc t gran t t o th e Sia m Societ y t o help collec t triba l artifacts. Th e Directo r o f th e Borde r Patro l Police , alread y activ e in educationa l an d socia l servic e program s fo r th e triba l group s at tha t time , wa s als o intereste d i n researc h a s a necessar y pre lude t o improve d work . Thi s atmospher e le d t o a series o f discus sions i n 195 9 among personne l o f th e Departmen t o f Publi c Wel fare wit h members o f th e Asi a Foundatio n an d th e Socia l Affair s Division o f ECAF E i n 195 9 lookin g towar d th e creatio n o f a research projec t (se e Manndorff s discussion , i n thi s volume , o f the Socio-Economi c Surve y of Hill Tribes). By contrast , experience s i n Burm a an d Lao s hav e als o taugh t the Foundatio n tha t i t i s no t alway s s o eas y t o discer n a con sensus withi n som e Asia n government s abou t possibl e way s o f assisting i n th e solutio n o f triba l minorit y problems . Fo r thi s reason, i t i s a matte r o f polic y tha t th e possibilit y o f workin g on triba l an d minorit y problem s b e thoroughl y discusse d wit h the appropriat e agencie s o f a centra l government , an d a rea l effort exerte d t o b e certai n tha t th e programmin g envisage d meets wit h th e approva l o f ever y interested loca l center o f power . Thus, durin g th e lat e 1950' s i n Burma , bot h th e centra l civilia n government an d th e senio r leader s o f th e Burmes e arm y wer e very muc h concerne d abou t th e possibility o f subversio n o f triba l groups b y Chines e Communists , th e Americans, Sha n nationalist s based i n Thailand , etc . Thi s unanimit y o f attitude , however , di d not encourag e foreig n ai d program s addresse d t o th e problem s of minorit y groups . Wit h th e formatio n o f th e Frontie r Adminis tration i n 1960-1961 , the Burmes e arm y (a s th e primar y agenc y in th e wor k o f definin g th e ne w frontie r wit h China ) too k a much greate r interes t i n socia l an d educationa l wor k amon g th e tribal groups . Thoug h thi s heightene d interes t brough t som e measure o f improvemen t i n th e treatmen t o f triba l groups , i t did no t affec t th e long-standin g inhibition s place d upo n foreig n aid agencie s t o d o anythin g abou t promotin g appropriat e re search an d socia l improvement measure s amon g th e tribal people . t 85 0 ]

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The Burmes e arm y create d interna l program s fo r dealin g wit h some of th e problems o f th e tribal minorities; the national policie s of Burm a neve r encourage d foreig n programmin g addresse d t o such groups . The foregoin g remark s onl y serv e t o poin t up , o f course , th e reasons fo r th e Foundation' s insistenc e o n respondin g t o loca l initiative an d allowin g project s t o b e carrie d ou t i n th e manne r and throug h mean s considere d b y thei r loca l sponsor s t o be mos t appropriate fo r th e circumstances . I t migh t b e note d her e tha t this approac h permit s th e Foundatio n t o b e represente d b y pro gram administrator s wh o ar e no t necessaril y highl y traine d spe cialists i n particula r aspect s o f th e loca l culture , mores , etc . The practica l applicatio n o f th e Foundation' s guid e line s an d operating principle s i s illustrated i n th e followin g section , whic h deals wit h programmin g fo r triba l an d minorit y people s i n Burma, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, an d Vietnam . FOUNDATION PROGRAMMIN G FO R HIL L TRIB E AN D MINORITY PROJECT S I N SOUTHEAS T ASI A

Burma1. Becaus e o f th e policie s o f th e governmen t o f Burm a during th e perio d fro m 195 2 throug h 195 9 wit h regar d t o assist ing th e educational , economic , an d socia l developmen t o f th e individual state s o f th e Unio n o f Burma , th e Asi a Foundatio n never sough t direc t an d activ e programmin g wit h hil l tribe s o r state government s i n tha t country . Th e Unio n Governmen t a t Rangoon di d permi t progra m exploratio n b y th e Foundatio n i n the states ; but , fo r th e mos t part , suc h exploration s wer e t o b e confined t o program s o f centra l governmen t agencie s operatin g in th e states . A notabl e exampl e o f thi s kin d o f programmin g wa s th e 1958-1961 project , wit h th e Nationa l Registra r o f Co-operatives 2 1 The sectio n o n Burma was prepare d b y Mr . Jame s J . Dalton , Director , Revie w and Developmen t Department , an d forme r Asi a Foundatio n Representativ e i n Burma. 2 Prior t o Marc h 2 , 1962 , whe n th e presen t Revolutionar y Council Governmen t of Burma seize d contro l o f th e government , th e cooperativ e movemen t i n Burma was a state-supporte d ventur e designe d t o " . . . refor m th e socia l syste m b y means o f a ne w economi c syste m whic h woul d no t favou r privat e enterprise . . . " (Dr. My a Maung , i n a n unpublishe d researc h pape r o n agricultura l cooperatio n in Burma , Jun e 1962 , p . 28) . Th e cooperativ e movemen t include d Primar y So -

[ 85 1 ]

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covering cost s o f experimenta l trainin g classe s fo r leader s o f co operative societie s i n various stat e centers . The classe s were orga nized an d manage d b y th e Nationa l Registra r o f Co-operativ e Societies (NRCS ) wit h headquarter s i n Rangoon . Th e classe s were attende d b y a n averag e o f forty-fiv e individuals , an d stu dents include d th e presidents , secretaries , committe e members , and member s o f loca l "co-op " societies i n eac h area . The instruc tors wer e qualifie d personne l employe d b y th e NRCS . Course s taught included : Co-operativ e Principles , Accounting , an d Ad ministration. Amon g noteworth y feature s contributin g t o th e ex perimental characte r o f th e classes , th e followin g ar e representative: (1) Th e classe s wer e residential , an d ther e wa s alway s uncer tainty a s t o ho w man y officer s o f loca l co-o p societie s coul d at tend extende d courses . (2) Th e interva l o f trainin g was varied, fo r purpose s o f experi mentation, t o rang e betwee n on e wee k an d fou r month s i n orde r to lear n abou t th e optimu m tim e tha t coul d b e give n t o certai n courses o f training . (3) Th e location s fo r th e trainin g wer e varie d accordin g t o plan. Problem s o f transport , style , an d siz e o f th e surroundin g co-op societies , languag e o f instruction , etc. , al l wer e factor s i n determining location . Classes wer e hel d i n Tiddim , Falam , an d Paletwa , Chi n Hills ; Myitkyina an d Bhamo , Kachi n State ; Sandowa y an d Kinmaw , Arakan; Kyaukme , Taunggyi , Kengtung , Loilem , an d Lashio , Shan State ; an d Pa-an , Kare n State . Du e t o th e terminatio n of Asi a Foundatio n assistanc e t o Burm a i n Decembe r 1962 , a planned, full-scal e evaluatio n o f the experimenta l work was neve r completed. However , preliminar y observation s a t tha t tim e indi cated tha t suc h field-training effort s migh t b e uneconomi c an d diffuse whe n compare d t o th e creatio n an d managemen t o f a centrally locate d cooperativ e educatio n trainin g center . Plan s fo r cieties, Townshi p o r Distric t Wholesal e Societies , an d Nationa l Wholesal e Co operative Societies . Th e sector s o f th e econom y i n whic h thes e societie s wer e to operat e include d agricultura l produce , fisheries , cottag e industries , production , internal marketing , an d foreig n export . Th e majo r stres s o n th e developmen t of th e societie s b y th e governmen t durin g th e perio d fro m 194 7 t o 196 2 was in interna l marketin g o r consume r cooperatives , an d i n agricultura l "co-ops, " or Agricultura l Proco s (Producers ' Multipurpose Co-operatives) .

[ 85 2 ]

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the creatio n o f th e latte r trainin g entit y have,no t bee n imple mented sinc e th e curren t Revolutionar y Counci l Governmen t o f Burma came to power in 1962. Another exampl e o f programmin g wit h centra l governmen t agencies operatin g i n th e state s i s th e projec t o f th e Arme d Forces Rehabilitatio n Boar d i n bot h th e Sha n an d Kachi n states . This Board' s multi-facete d progra m i s a deliberat e attemp t b y the Burmes e arm y t o develo p a 100,000-acr e farmin g trac t i n the Sha n Stat e an d anothe r 10,000-acr e trac t i n th e Kachi n State . It i s als o designe d t o mee t certai n sociologically-oriente d need s within th e arm y cadres . Thes e need s concern , i n part , th e fac t that a portio n o f th e regula r arm y i s no w nearin g retiremen t age afte r twent y year s o f service . Facilitie s ar e alread y bein g developed withi n th e army for retrainin g men i n vocational trade s for retur n t o civilia n life . Arrangement s hav e als o bee n mad e to provide employmen t opportunitie s t o such traine d me n i n gov ernment-owned enterprises . Sinc e thi s ha d no t bee n don e t o an y large exten t i n th e past , i n matter s concernin g retur n t o th e lan d by retire d arm y personnel , th e presen t projec t wa s develope d for suc h a purpose . Me n optin g fo r suc h a form o f pre-retiremen t training activit y ar e assigne d t o th e Board' s far m projec t thre e years prio r t o retirement . The y thu s ge t essentia l trainin g an d form a technicall y qualifie d labo r corp s capabl e o f handlin g mechanized farmin g equipment . The y ar e give n individua l houses an d smal l garden plots; but th e major area s farmed remai n the propert y o f th e Board , an d an y profit s derive d ar e divide d on th e basi s o f scale s fo r skills , hour s o f wor k invested , etc . Aside fro m thes e variou s goals , th e effor t als o represent s a n attempt b y th e arm y t o exten d it s influenc e int o non-Burma n areas o f Burm a (thos e area s no t inhabite d primaril y b y ethni c Burmans) throug h th e introductio n o f productive , socialist-ori ented far m settlement s i n th e Sha n an d Kachi n uplands . Th e aim, particularl y i n th e cas e o f th e Sha n State , i s t o sho w th e people o f tha t stat e how th e so-calle d feudal system s o f authority , tradition, lan d use , etc. , t o whic h the y clin g ar e no t suite d t o modern (Socialis t and Burman ) way s of doing things. The are a involve d fo r th e Sha n projec t i s 100,00 0 acre s whic h formerly belonge d t o severa l feudal chieftain s (sawbwas ) i n th e Loilem area . Th e populatio n i n the are a i s small, an d th e village s [ 85 3 ]

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tend t o cluste r o n th e highe r hills . Th e area s develope d b y th e Board a s extensiv e farmin g land s ar e i n th e broa d lo w valleys . Limited wate r supply , a s wel l a s a small , impoverishe d popula tion, ha s alway s retarde d th e agricultura l developmen t o f th e region. B y introducin g mechanize d farmin g o n a larg e scal e an d installing deep-wel l mechanica l pumping , th e arm y Board' s project ha s injecte d a muc h highe r leve l o f technolog y an d far m investment tha n eve r witnesse d befor e i n th e area . Non e o f th e local farmer s ca n imitat e i t withou t th e kin d o f hel p no w bein g extended t o the m b y th e Boar d i n periphera l trainin g projects , because the y lac k th e capita l an d know-how . Th e principa l crop s in th e projec t ar e uplan d wheat , corn , barley , an d rye . Sinc e Burma ha s t o impor t a larg e amoun t o f whea t pe r yea r th e mai n emphasis i n thi s larg e projec t i s o n th e productio n o f high-yield , healthy, drought-resistan t varietie s o f wheat . The Asi a Foundation' s rol e i n thi s effor t wa s merel y tha t o f supplying som e experimenta l see d grain s fo r test . A t on e time , also, th e Foundatio n arrange d to suppl y a n Israel i grai n produc tion exper t a s a n adviser ; bu t th e developmen t o f direc t contrac tual relationship s betwee n th e government s o f Israe l an d Burm a for supplyin g a number o f Israel i technica l adviser s t o this projec t superseded suc h a n arrangement . T o date , th e activitie s o f th e Board stil l flourish, an d i n recen t year s effort s hav e bee n addressed t o supplyin g som e technica l advice , seeds , fertilizers , etc., t o surroundin g smal l farmer s suc h a s thos e o f th e P a O tribal groups in the Central Sha n region. In 195 9 an d 196 0 th e attitud e o f th e centra l governmen t to ward th e stat e government s bega n t o chang e wit h regar d t o eco nomic an d othe r form s o f assistance . I t wa s finally recognize d that a n expande d effor t woul d hav e t o b e mad e t o foste r th e growth o f severa l states , an d increase d allocation s o f centra l gov ernment fund s a s wel l a s foreig n ai d wer e directe d towar d thi s problem. Thus , startin g i n 1959 , the Asi a Foundation—maintain ing constan t consultatio n wit h th e centra l government—bega n to explor e variou s possibilitie s wit h stat e governments . Thi s le d to the following representativ e projects : 1. A ta x surve y o f th e Sha n Stat e b y a tea m o f economist s from th e Universit y o f Rangoon . Th e purpos e wa s t o provid e the stat e an d centra l government s wit h factua l dat a abou t th e [854]

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deficiencies o f th e existin g land , sales , vehicle, an d othe r ta x sys tems, i n orde r t o la y th e basi s fo r mor e efficien t ta x assessmen t and collectio n practices . 2. A syste m o f agricultura l trainin g awards , administere d b y the Kachi n Stat e government , fo r youn g Kachi n student s grad uating fro m th e Kachi n Schoo l o f Agricultur e i n Myitkyina . 3. A syste m o f supplyin g agricultura l equipmen t t o residen t middle school s i n th e outlyin g area s o f th e Kachi n State . Th e equipment wa s use d b y th e students , unde r th e directio n o f com petent agricultura l technician s employe d b y th e Kachi n State , for trainin g purpose s an d t o augmen t th e incom e o f th e middl e schools. 4. Assistanc e t o a social servic e organization o f Buddhis t clerg y interested i n establishin g th e beginning s o f a socia l servic e sys tem i n th e Kachin , Shan , an d Kaya h states . Th e organization , known a s th e Socia l Servic e Sangha , worke d wit h stat e govern ments an d th e centra l governmen t i n creatin g smal l health-car e clinics, orphanages, and schools for handicappe d children . Since th e assumptio n o f powe r b y th e Revolutionar y Counci l Government o f Burm a i n Marc h 1962 , the Socia l Servic e Sangh a has no t bee n ver y activ e i n th e constituen t state s o f Burma . In stead i t continue s t o wor k i n centra l Burma , wher e amon g th e Buddhist monasterie s an d orphanage s associate d wit h thi s orga nization, ove r a thousan d orphan s an d handicappe d childre n ar e given lodgin g an d som e forms o f vocationa l trainin g by intereste d lay Buddhists . In n o cas e di d th e foundatio n eve r carr y ou t direc t program s with triba l groups , eve n thoug h i n som e instance s th e centra l government di d no t appea r t o oppos e suc h work . Example s ar e the P a O i n centra l Sha n Stat e an d th e Lis u i n Kachi n an d Sha n states. Th e reason, i n thes e an d othe r cases , was tha t th e Founda tion sa w th e importanc e o f a n organize d progra m supporte d an d guided b y th e centra l government . A t tha t time , an d unti l th e creation o f th e Frontie r Administratio n i n 1960-1961 , n o well planned an d organize d centra l governmen t progra m existe d fo r the hil l trib e peoples . Wit h th e creatio n o f th e Frontie r Adminis tration, th e Burm a arm y assume d a larg e measur e o f responsibil ity fo r suc h work , an d thereafte r securit y problem s tende d t o override developmen t considerations , wit h th e resul t tha t n o fur [ 85 5 ]

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ther effort s wer e mad e b y th e Foundatio n t o develo p program s in th e states . I n 196 2 American foundation s i n Burm a (includin g the Asi a Foundation ) wer e aske d b y th e governmen t o f Burm a to terminat e thei r operations . Looking bac k o n programmin g i n th e triba l minoritie s area s in Burma , i t i s clea r tha t th e Foundatio n di d no t consciousl y undertake t o stud y th e processe s o f modernizatio n a s the y occu r among triba l people s an d th e effec t thes e processes have o n triba l society. Fo r thi s reason , it s assistanc e wen t t o wha t coul d b e considered periphera l project s (i n triba l o r ethni c minorit y pro gramming) suc h a s forma l educatio n an d technica l schooling . Such project s wer e importan t becaus e the y underscore d th e Foundation's desir e t o hel p th e centra l governmen t foste r national integratio n an d a n increase d measur e o f economi c an d social developmen t i n th e constituen t state s o f Burma . O n th e other han d th e effectivenes s o f suc h project s i s questionabl e be cause o f inabilit y t o moun t essentia l preliminar y research . A program o n agricultura l scholarships , fo r instance , wa s no t relate d to th e realitie s o f swidde n agriculture : wha t problem s ar e bot h solved an d create d b y trainin g someon e fro m th e triba l group s or a citizen of a constituent stat e to run a tractor? I t is understood that th e governmen t o f Burm a no w give s increase d priorit y t o research int o th e custom s o f triba l people s befor e attemptin g to develo p economi c an d socia l program s i n th e hil l areas . Two researc h project s representativ e o f thi s interes t ar e thos e undertaken recentl y b y th e Rangoo n Institut e o f Economic s (for merly th e Universit y o f Rangoo n Economic s Department ) an d the Anthropolog y Departmen t o f th e Rangoo n Art s an d Scienc e University. I n th e latte r cas e th e researc h concern s som e o f th e Padaung peopl e i n th e Kaya h Stat e an d involve s languag e study . The ultimat e purpos e i s t o develo p mean s b y whic h severa l se lected Burmes e arm y officer s an d civilian s ma y b e instructe d in th e language , s o tha t the y ma y bette r perfor m a numbe r o f agricultural trainin g an d communit y developmen t function s among th e Padaun g people . I n th e forme r instance , th e researc h concerns th e land-us e practice s o f th e P a O peopl e i n th e centra l Shan Stat e an d ho w thos e practice s hav e bee n affecte d b y th e various form s o f taxatio n an d administrativ e contro l b y th e Sha n State and central government . [ 85 6 ]

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Laos. Foundatio n programmin g amon g triba l group s i n Lao s has bee n o f a ver y limite d nature . Som e project s whic h wer e undertaken o n behalf o f th e Me o tribal people were largely concerned with th e welfare an d well-being of persons who had been displaced fro m thei r home s t o th e Vientian e are a b y Pathet La o military action . One project wa s of special interest, however, because it helped to elucidat e a governmenta l polic y with regard t o the hil l tribes. This projec t ha d t o d o wit h th e printin g o f a Me o prime r s o that th e Me o childre n coul d becom e literat e i n thei r ow n lan guage in addition to the Lao language. Despite close coordination between th e Foundatio n an d interested governmen t officials , thi s undertaking incurre d th e oppositio n o f Princ e Souvanna Phoum a and reflecte d hi s polic y o f equatin g La o acculturatio n wit h La o nationhood. Generall y speaking , amon g th e governmen t official s in Laos , th e attitud e i s tha t ther e i s n o triba l problem , eve n though ther e ar e mor e triba l people s tha n ther e ar e Lao . Some friends o f Lao s conside r thi s officia l disregar d o f th e cultura l differences an d specia l need s o f th e triba l group s a s on e o f th e important reason s fo r th e disaffectio n o f man y triba l people s i n the country . O n th e othe r hand, thi s policy does make it a t least theoretically possibl e fo r triba l peopl e t o becom e sufficientl y as similated to be eligible for appointments to government positions, because if th e tribal s obtain an d accep t Laotia n education , the y acquire th e sam e qualification s fo r governmen t servic e a s th e Laotians themselves . Research o n the pros and con s of thi s problem would be most welcome. Malaysia. Becaus e of th e multi-ethni c communa l nature o f th e Malaysian population , th e Foundation' s programmin g i n Malay sia wa s a n attemp t t o respond t o th e stron g drive o f th e centra l government fo r nationa l unity . Prio r t o th e establishmen t o f Malaysia, project s i n th e Federatio n o f Malay a an d Singapor e took accoun t o f th e importanc e o f inter-communa l cooperatio n and harmony . Becaus e the y dealt with Mala y and Chines e (ma jority) populations , suc h project s ar e probabl y no t withi n th e purview o f thi s book , excep t fo r one s which provide d radi o set s for the aboriginal settlements through the Protector of Aborigines, in orde r t o help giv e the aborigine s a greate r sens e o f participa tion i n th e lif e o f th e Malaya n natio n an d acces s t o broade r [857]

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educational opportunities . Anothe r assiste d th e Borne o Literatur e Bureau i n Sarawa k t o develo p publication s designe d t o hel p in crease literac y an d buil d a democrati c citizenry . Thes e publica tions includ e writing s i n th e indigenou s language s o f Iba n an d Kadazan. Th e Borne o Literatur e Bureau , th e publishin g agency , also publishes in English, Chinese , and Malay . Since Malaysi a Da y an d th e establishmen t o f a Foundatio n office i n Jesselton , Saba h (Nort h Borneo) , programmin g wit h respect t o Bornea n triba l group s ha s increased . Th e genera l pur pose o f suc h wor k has , however , remaine d th e same . A corollar y of thi s wor k i s th e identificatio n an d developmen t o f moder n leadership amon g the tribal groups . Projects undertake n i n th e foregoin g connectio n includ e schol arships fo r Dayaks , Kayans , an d othe r indigenou s people s t o en able the m t o finish hig h school ; fo r th e trainin g o f nativ e people s in Saba h i n busines s methods ; assistanc e i n th e contrastiv e analy sis o f th e Kadaza n (o r Dusun ) languag e wit h Englis h t o hel p improve Englis h teaching ; th e provisio n o f tutor-teacher s t o hel p qualify fifty nativ e junio r members o f th e Sabah stat e civi l servic e for senio r job s o r universit y entrance ; an d furnishin g a linguist educator t o supervis e th e introductio n o f ne w Englis h teachin g methods i n th e primar y school s o f Sarawak , whic h enrol l pupil s of divers e languag e backgrounds . Thailand. I n Thailan d th e Foundatio n ha s carrie d ou t mor e systematic an d comprehensiv e programmin g wit h respec t t o tribal an d minorit y people s tha n i n an y othe r countr y o f South east Asia . Ove r th e pas t te n year s ministeria l policie s hav e begu n to develop , an d th e approache s t o th e problem s o f th e hil l tribe s and minorit y people s hav e varie d accordin g t o th e ministry' s view o f it s missio n an d th e degre e o f enlightenmen t o f hig h officials. For instance , th e Borde r Patro l Police— a branc h o f th e Minis try o f Interior—hav e a s thei r principa l missio n th e maintenanc e of la w an d orde r i n th e borde r areas . Th e exac t origin s o f a n interest, o n th e par t o f th e Borde r Patro l Police , i n providin g educational trainin g an d othe r socia l service s t o triba l group s is unknow n t o us . Tha t thi s kin d o f wor k ha s bee n i n existenc e for som e year s i s atteste d b y th e followin g excerp t fro m a draf t [ 85 8 ]

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article writte n i n Februar y 196 0 b y a n America n ethnologis t working i n Thailand : The Tha i Borde r Patro l Polic e (BPP ) no w constitut e a consciou s instrument o f gradua l assimilation . Thi s organization , apparentl y out o f shee r propinquit y t o th e ethni c minoritie s livin g i n remot e border area s an d th e necessit y o f dealin g wit h them , ha s take n i t upon itself , o r ha d thrus t upo n it , cultura l responsibilitie s whic h ar e not normall y withi n th e domai n o f th e simpl e guardian s o f la w an d order. Th e BP P ha s establishe d throughou t muc h o f th e hil l area , where ethni c minoritie s ar e mos t numerous , a serie s o f school s i n which th e instructor s ar e policemen . Th e primar y objectiv e o f in struction i n thes e school s i s t o brin g a knowledg e o f th e Tha i lan guage t o th e childre n o f group s fo r who m tha t languag e i s no t th e native form o f speech . . . .

Health an d sanitatio n measure s ar e als o taught . However , thes e activities ar e clearl y secondar y t o th e majo r dutie s o f th e BPP , which ar e i n intelligence-gathering , polic e work , an d simila r fields. Consequently , th e instructio n o f hil l trib e childre n ha s to be suspende d when police duties intervene . More o r les s concurren t wit h th e foregoin g developments , th e Department o f Publi c Welfare—als o a branc h o f th e Ministr y of Interior—bega n a progra m t o resettl e som e o f th e hil l tribe s in th e Northeas t i n permanen t villages . Thi s activit y apparentl y grew ou t o f a slowl y developin g awarenes s o n th e par t o f severa l high governmen t official s tha t th e hil l tribe s presente d actua l and potentia l problem s fo r th e governmen t wit h respec t t o for eign subversion . The y wer e als o concerne d abou t th e (reported ) deleterious effect s o n th e watershed s o f deforestatio n cause d b y swidden agricultur e an d th e raisin g and/o r transportatio n o f opium. Crudel y stated , th e respons e seem s t o hav e bee n a deci sion t o tr y ou t a resettlemen t progra m whic h woul d brin g th e hill trib e people s int o controlle d areas , wher e the y coul d b e watched an d a t th e sam e tim e encourage d t o tak e u p mor e per manent an d legitimat e agricultura l pursuits . However , th e De partment o f Publi c Welfar e wa s le d b y a n enlightene d perso n and staffe d b y a growin g numbe r o f person s wh o wer e traine d in researc h an d appreciate d th e importanc e o f research-base d action. Clos e acquaintanc e o f th e Department' s personne l wit h [ 85 9 ]

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personnel o f th e Asi a Foundatio n le d t o th e discover y o f a n inter est i n hil l tribe s researc h an d th e beginnin g o f conversation s in 196 0 whic h resulte d i n th e Foundation' s extendin g financial assistance t o th e Departmen t t o enabl e i t t o carr y ou t a progra m of field researc h befor e th e resettlemen t progra m wa s implemented o n a large scale. So fa r a s th e Foundatio n knows , th e Hil l Tribe s Researc h Project represente d th e first tim e a Tha i governmen t agenc y ha d made a researc h surve y befor e makin g a pla n fo r socio-economi c development. Th e importanc e o f thi s ste p nee d no t b e labored . The detail s o f thi s projec t an d relate d grant s b y th e Foundatio n are pursue d furthe r i n th e separat e pape r b y Dr . Han s Mann dorff, wh o ha s bee n intimatel y involve d wit h hil l tribe s problem s in Thailand for a number o f years. In makin g thes e grants , th e Foundatio n ha s attempte d t o mee t national need s fo r socia l integratio n o f minorit y peoples , th e de velopment o f researc h an d stud y o f socia l problems , an d socio economic development , an d indirectl y th e developmen t o f trained leadershi p throug h th e tea m researc h syste m whic h wa s adopted. However , i t canno t ye t b e sai d tha t th e progra m ha s been successful , a s i t i s no t clea r tha t ther e i s an y rea l commit ment o n th e par t o f th e Tha i governmen t t o se e th e hil l tribe s problem a s a national on e requiring basicall y civil administration . Until recently , responsibilit y fo r th e are a ha s bee n left , mor e by defaul t tha n b y intention , t o th e Border Patro l Police , perhap s because o f th e belie f tha t onl y a smal l numbe r o f persons , rela tively speaking , wer e involve d an d th e feelin g tha t th e budge t was to o limite d t o cove r suc h a larg e geographica l area . On e of th e advantage s o f th e researc h projec t was , therefore , tha t it woul d provid e a n opportunit y fo r wor k wit h th e triba l people s in a wa y tha t woul d nicel y complemen t th e polic e an d militar y sphere o f concern . It ha s bee n possibl e t o se e som e progress . Th e Departmen t of Publi c Welfar e ha s becom e deepl y involve d an d ha s estab lished a specia l divisio n t o wor k o n hil l tribe s problems . Signifi cantly, th e Ministr y o f Educatio n ha s als o becom e involve d re cently an d ha s se t u p a specia l uni t t o dea l wit h educatio n i n the triba l villages , an d th e Asi a Foundatio n ha s finance d som e of thi s work . Th e missin g elemen t i s a sens e o f an y fundamenta l [ 86 0 ]

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commitment b y th e Tha i governmen t as a whole t o th e promp t and effectiv e integratio n o f th e triba l people s int o th e nation . The Foundatio n believe s tha t it s assistanc e ha s bee n a n impor tant facto r i n encouragin g th e civilia n element s o f governmen t to becom e intereste d i n puttin g larg e fund s int o hil l tribe s pro gramming. Th e cooperatio n o f severa l Unite d Nation s agencies , SEATO, an d th e Sia m Societ y o f Thailan d ha s alread y bee n en listed, an d personne l ha s begu n t o arriv e t o undertak e advisor y tasks i n specialize d area s fo r whic h th e Thai s d o no t ye t hav e the necessar y traine d people . Another salutar y resul t o f th e programmin g carrie d ou t t o dat e is th e chang e fro m th e origina l attitud e o f solvin g hil l tribe s problems b y resettlemen t t o on e whic h recognize s tha t civi l gov ernment actio n an d service s mus t tak e plac e in situ —in othe r words, service s mus t b e take n t o th e tribe s rathe r tha n bringin g the tribes to the services. The Departmen t o f Publi c Welfar e project s involvin g th e re search program , th e provisio n o f a n advise r (Dr . Manndorff) , the trainin g o f mobil e extensio n teams , an d th e printin g o f th e report o f th e socio-economi c surve y i n English , compris e th e Foundation's majo r respons e t o th e need s o f Thailan d i n thi s particular area . Th e Foundatio n i s no w reducin g it s hil l tribe s projects becaus e man y othe r agencie s an d organization s wit h larger funds a t their disposa l ar e entering th e field. In additio n t o th e abov e program , th e Foundatio n has , ove r the pas t fe w years , supporte d a numbe r o f smal l project s fo r research, publishing , an d collectio n o f artifact s o f triba l peoples , assistance t o school s enrollin g hil l tribe s pupil s an d t o th e pupil s themselves, an d o n on e occasio n ha s encourage d colleg e student s to d o elementar y socia l researc h amon g th e hil l tribes . I n tha t instance a gran t o f Apri l 196 4 provide d a month' s pe r die m fo r eight member s o f th e Voluntar y Studen t Grou p fo r Hil l Trib e Development, o f th e Facult y o f Arts , Chulalongko m University , who spen t on e month o f thei r vacatio n perio d studyin g th e social , cultural, an d economi c environmen t o f hil l trib e peopl e an d i n carrying out research o n local tribal languages . Finally, i t shoul d b e mentione d tha t th e Foundatio n ha s re sponded t o request s fo r assistanc e i n respec t t o th e Malay-speak ing Musli m populatio n o f souther n Thailand , whic h ha s ha d na [ 86 1 ]

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tional integratio n a s it s goal . A numbe r o f relativel y smal l projects, undertake n fo r th e mos t par t i n answe r t o requests fro m the Tha i government' s Ministr y o f Educatio n o r regiona l an d provincial educatio n officers , bu t als o from th e Tha i Librar y Association an d th e Educatio n Societ y o f Thailand, have been assiste d in providin g incentive s t o schoolchildre n an d adult s t o lear n th e Central Tha i dialect , enablin g specialist s i n language-teachin g to introduc e improve d method s o f teachin g Tha i t o children , and providin g readin g material s i n th e Mala y languag e fo r smal l village an d mosqu e libraries . I t is hope d tha t thes e effort s wil l help brea k th e viciou s circl e o f inabilit y t o spea k an d rea d Tha i language an d lac k o f educatio n i n general , whic h ha s kep t th e Thai Muslim s i n thre e o f th e four souther n province s o f th e coun try fro m enterin g governmen t servic e an d nationa l life . A projec t has recentl y bee n starte d t o teac h th e Mala y languag e t o Tha i officers, whos e first languag e i s Thai, an d wh o ar e posted i n area s inhabited mainl y b y Thai-Malays . Vietnam. Ove r th e pas t five years , intermitten t grant s hav e been mad e b y th e Foundatio n t o suppor t Vietnames e effort s t o create a greate r nationa l consciousnes s amon g th e hil l trib e (montagnard) people s o f Sout h Vietnam . Th e Foundatio n doe s not vie w thes e grant s a s formin g a n integrate d program . Rather , for th e mos t part , the y hav e supporte d a serie s o f Vietnames e efforts durin g th e perio d 1960-196 3 to improve educationa l facili ties fo r certai n triba l peoples . Fo r example , th e Koh o trib e ha s received ai d fo r a primar y schoo l buildin g an d schoo l book s a s well as agricultural trainin g course s throug h privat e organization s such a s th e Associatio n o f Parent s o f Student s o f th e Hig h Pla teau Are a a t Chron g Tambor , th e Missio n Evangeliqu e a t Dalat , and th e Internationa l Voluntar y Service . Rhad e triba l villager s in Banmethuo t Provinc e hav e receive d trainin g i n agricultura l techniques, an d th e Jara i an d Bahna r mountai n tribe s hav e bee n provided wit h specia l educationa l course s fo r youn g peopl e through th e Missio n Etranger e a t Che o Reo , Kontu m Province . School building s fo r childre n o f undesignate d tribes , a s wel l a s agricultural demonstratio n course s fo r resettlemen t villages , hav e been provide d throug h hil l trib e center s an d th e Internationa l Voluntary Service . Work ha s als o been don e wit h th e Buddhists , wh o ar e a minor [ 86 2 ]

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ity i n Vietnam . Mos t o f th e project s ar e smal l an d hav e provide d books, equipment, teachin g aids , and travel . The mos t substantia l assistance ha s gon e t o th e Institut e fo r th e Executio n o f th e Dharma, fo r variou s purpose s connecte d wit h thei r socia l wor k program. Th e ide a ha s bee n t o hel p identif y an d suppor t leader ship capabl e o f constructiv e socia l action , an d t o encourag e con structive communit y action . CONCLUSIONS

Among th e conclusion s whic h migh t b e draw n fro m th e fore going exposition ar e the following : A. I n th e countrie s o f Southeas t Asia , governmen t awarenes s of th e actua l an d potentia l problem s whic h aris e fro m domesti c efforts t o integrat e minorit y peopl e into th e nationa l bod y politic , and fro m externa l effort s t o us e th e dissatisfaction s o f minorit y peoples fo r subversiv e purpose s is , relativel y speaking , jus t be ginning t o crystallize . B. Governmen t attitude s towar d researc h b y outsid e scholar s on al l aspect s o f hil l trib e lif e ar e quit e closel y correlate d wit h the positio n o f th e natio n i n respec t t o alignmen t o r non-align ment with th e major contendin g international forces . C. Externa l organization s wishin g t o foste r researc h o r programs i n respec t t o hil l tribe s an d minorit y group s woul d be wel l advise d t o mak e sur e tha t project s fo r thos e purpose s are understoo d an d accepte d b y th e centra l governmen t o f th e country concerned . D. Externa l organization s intereste d i n assistin g program s which involv e hil l tribe s an d minorit y group s shoul d mak e ever y effort t o us e thei r fund s t o encourag e loca l governmen t agencie s to bas e thei r plannin g o n thoroug h researc h int o socio-cultura l factors o f such groups . E. Commitmen t b y centra l governmen t authoritie s t o soun d programs manage d b y th e non-disciplinar y o r non-securit y agen cies o f th e governmen t shoul d preced e th e financing o f projects , or shoul d b e a majo r goa l o f project s assiste d b y externa l organizations. F. Hil l tribe s programmin g i s closely relate d t o wor k i n stimu lating th e improvemen t o f socia l scienc e researc h an d teachin g in indigenous institutions of higher learning . [ 86 3 ]

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G. The Asia Foundation's programmin g in respect t o hill trib e and minorit y people s i n Southeas t Asi a is, by an d large , not fa r enough advance d a t thi s tim e t o permi t usefu l evaluatio n o f it s effects. Furthermore , ther e i s a grea t nee d fo r mor e researc h by loca l scholars , backstoppe d b y foreig n scholars ; thi s i n tur n emphasizes th e nee d fo r mor e trainin g o f loca l peopl e i n th e theory and techniques of social science research.

[ 86 4 ]

PART X . A P P E N D I

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APPENDI X

TABLE 2 6 POPULATION AN D LINGUISTI C AFFILIATIO N O F E T H N I C G R O U P S O F CAMBODIA » Group Estimate d (Synonyms Populatio n Locatio n (i n Orde r o f in Parentheses ) i n Cambodia b Siz e o f Population )

Language

, Sout h Viet - Mon-Khmer: Khmeri c Khmer (Cam - 3,500,000 Cambodia bodian nam, Thailan d Chinese 435,000° China , Southeas t Asi a Chinese 400,000 d Sout h Vietnam , Nort h Viet-Muong : Viet Vietnamese namese Vietnam, Cambodi a Stieng 30,000+" Cambodia , Sout h Viet - Mon-Khmer: Bah nam naric, S . Bahnari c 6,000d — Indo-European: French French Brao 3,000+ Laos , Thailand , Cam - Mon-Khmer: Bah bodia naric, N . Bahnari c Saoch 172 Cambodi a Mon-Khmer: PKhmeric Cham [unavailable] Sout h Vietnam , Cam - Malayo-Polynesian: bodia Chamic Chong [unavailable] Cambodia , Thailan d Mon-Khmer: Khmeri c Jarai [unavailable] Sout h Vietnam , Cam - Malayo-Polynesian: Chamic bodia Kui [unavailable] Thailand , Cambodi a Mon-Khmer: Khmeri c Pear [unavailable] Cambodi a Mon-Khmer: Khmeri c Rhade, (RadS ) [unavailable] Sout h Vietnam , Cam - Malayo-Polynesian: bodia Indochina Platea u Thai (Siamese ) [unavailable] Thailan d Tai: Southwester n Cambodia Tota l (1962 census) ' t5,740,115 B Source: Informatio n o n distributio n an d populatio n fro m LeBa r el al. (1964), excep t wher e noted . Linguisti c classificatio n primaril y fro m Thoma s (1965A, 1965B) . See notes accompanying Burm a populatio n figures fo r furthe r details o n method s o f linguisti c classification . Estimat e fo r Khme r populatio n is fo r 1959 . b Group s whos e populatio n i s unknow n ar e liste d alphabetically . "Estimate o f Chines e populatio n i s fro m Skinne r (1965) ; a t a pres s con ference i n Phno m Pen h i n Marc h 196 5 Princ e Norodo m Sihanou k gav e a n estimate o f 300,00 0 Chines e i n Cambodia . d Figure s release d a t a pres s conferenc e o f Princ e Norodo m Sihanou k i n Phnom Penh , Marc h 1965 . 8 Figure fo r Stien g i s derive d fro m dat a cite d i n LeBar et al. (1964:157) . 'Figure fo r tota l Cambodia n populatio n fro m Realite s Cambodgiennes , 19 Marc h 1965 , Supplemen t A .

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APPENDI X

REFERENCES CITE D LEBAR, FRAN K M. , GERAL D C . HICKEY , an d JOH N K . MUSGRAV E

1964 Ethni c group s o f mainlan d Southeas t Asia . Ne w Haven , Human Relation s Are a File s Press . SKINNER, G . W I L L I A M

1965 Persona l communication . THOMAS, DAVI D D .

1965A Vietna m minorit y language s (Jul y 196 5 revision) . Saigon , Summer Institut e o f Linguistics . 1965B Persona l communications . Periodicals REALITES CAMBODGIENNES , Phno m Penh .

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INDEX

Inde x Th e lette r "m " precedin g a numbe r refer s t o the ma p o f tha t number . Abell, Si r C . A., 34 7 Abor Hill s District , Assam, 217 "aborigines, " i n Malaya , 34 2 Academ y fo r th e Developmen t o f Nationa l Group s Sagaing, 98 f actio n programs : ai m of, 57-58 ; coordinatio n of, 59 , 60; directe d a t tribes an d minorities , 54-56 ; foreig n experts in , 62; internationalizatio n of, 65 , 365, 670; an d loca l communities , 61; loca l expert s in , 62; motivatio n for , 54 , 59; an d populatio n growth, 60 ; an d privat e foundations , 64, 847-64 ; an d research , 59, 61, 64; and universities , 63 , 6 4 in India : 59, 213, 226-28 ; i n Laos , 246n, 266-70 , 295 , 299, 301, 303; in Malaysia: 333 ; in Sabah : 36Of , 363; in Sarawak : 64 , 345; i n Thailand , 60, 61, 64, 379-94 , 381 , 384-86, 392f, 420, 422, 445, 450f, 479, 510 , 521-32 , 662-74 ; i n Vietnam : 60 , 703, 706-44 , 742f . See also specific programs : Borde r Patro l Police ; Community Development ; Mobil e Developmen t Units ; resettlement ; Triba l Researc h Centre ; U.N. ; USO M adoptio n o f children , 36 . See also Yao , child-buyin g agriculture , 8 , 139 , 454-56 , 498 , 571 . See also dry-ric e cultivation ; irrigate d agriculture ; shiftin g cultivation ; swidden agriculture ; wet-ric e cultivatio n "agroville program, " in Sout h Vietnam , 709n Ahchan g (Ah-Chang) , in China , 183,186 Ahom Shan , in Burma , 79 Ahwenke, see Tungu s AID , see USAI D Akha: adaptatio n to politica l powers , 627f; becomin g Yao, 594 ; i n China , 149; i n Laos , 296; i n Thailand , 374 , 528, 534, 549, 619; lac k o f literacy , 621; leadership , 628; relation s wit h

Yao, 616 ; socio-economic-ritua l system, 62 7 Albuquerque , Duk e of, 38 8 All Part y Hil l Leader s Conference , see Assam America n Baptists : i n Thailand , 392n , 650, 655, 666f; amon g Karen , 666f America n Bibl e Society , in Thailand , 390 America n Churche s of Chris t (Christia n Churches) , in Thailand , 390 America n Indians , 41; an d India n Reorganizatio n Act , 51n ; reservatio n system among , 59, 67 2 America n Nationa l War College , 43 3 America n policie s fo r minoritie s in Sout h Vietnam , 681 f America n Tradin g Company , 35 5 Amir, Sulta n of SuIu , 355 Amyot, J. , 432n, 443, 445, 448n, 457 n Andrianoff , T. , 271n Angkor, 10η , 525, 74 6 animism , 22; i n Assam, 215; in Borneo , 330; i n Laos , 237, 240, 272, 287; i n Malaysia, 307 , 330, 339; i n Thailand , 369; i n Vietna m highlands , 75 7 animists : ethni c identit y of , 7 6 Annam , 678; invasion s o f Laos , 23 4 Annames e coast , 1 1 Anthony , K . R . M. , 568 anthropologica l advisers: i n Sabah , 361; in Thailand , 383, 543, 547f, 549 anthropologica l research : problem s o f field work, 63Of; 556-62 , 626-31 . See also Asia Foundation ; Thailand ; Triba l Researc h Centr e anthropologists : rol e in isolate d communities , 411-13 Antomarchi , 75 1 Ao, Shilu , 22 2 Apple, R . W., Jr. , 683n Arakan dialect , 4n, 89n Arakan State , Burma , 38 Arakanese, i n Burma , 93f, 114 , 13 0 Archaimbault , C , 24, 241, 262

[ 87 1 ]

INDE X

Armed Forces Rehabilitation Boar d of Burma, 853 Armstrong, T., 8n, 685 ARPA (Advance d Researc h Project s Agency), 745n Arsa Meksawan, 475 Arutiunov, S. A., and A. I. Mukhlinov, 695n Asia Foundation, 392 , 533, 543, 549; aims of, 847f; in Burma, 851-56; in Laos, 857; in Malaysia, 857f; operating principles, 848; programs, evaluation of, 863f; relations wit h Asian governments, 85On; research, 848f, 854f; in Sabah, 858; in Thailand, 383f , 849, 858-62; in Vietnam, 727f, 861ff. See also action programs, private foundations i n Assam, 11 , 45, 75, 135, 215-29; population in, 205; position of minorities in, 36; tribesmen in, 224 Assamese, in Burma, 117 assimilation, 38 , 42, 51, 59; hypotheses concerning, 46f; "passing, " 17; i n Thailand, 391 , 394, 554f. See aho Burmanization; integration of minorities; Vietnamizatio n Attopeu Province, Laos, 297 Australian government: ai d to Thailand, 543 , 554f Auvade, R., 677n AVS (America n Volunteer Service) , 55 Ba Mali, in Sarawak, 331 Bac Cam Qui, Black Tai leader, 811f Bac family of Black Tai, 812 Bahnar, in Vietnam, 677, 683n, 686, 747, 761; land tenur e system of, 767; missionaries among , 748; political structure of, 755 Bailey, F. G., 36 Bajau, i n Sabah, 354 Balembangan Island, Sabah, 355 Balipara Frontier Tract , Assam, 217 Ban Akas, Thailand, 464 Ban Don Luang, Thailand, 464 Ban Fa Huan, Thailand, 429 Ban Houei Sai, Laos, 233 Ban Hua Lin, Thailand, 647 Ban Kut Rua Kham, Thailand , 461n, 464 Ban Lao, Thailand, 464 Ban-Mai, Thailand, 518-2 2 Ban Myt Lawng, Thailand, 647 Ban Na Khu, Thailand, 461n

[ 87 2 ]

Ban Nong On, Thailand, 43On Ban Oj, Thailand, 406 Ban Pa Pae, Thailand, 479n, 643, 652f Ban Phae?, Thailand, 647 Ban Phalae, Thailand, 583 Ban Phon Thum, Thailand, 461n Ban Ping, Thailand, 401n, 402-2 4 Ban Ton Phrao, Thailand, 647 Ban Yan (Wan-Yang), Thailand , 494-518 Bang Chan, Thailand, 419 Bangkok, Thailand, 235 Bao Dai, Emperor o f Vietnam, 679, 683n Baptists: in Burma, 97. See aho American Baptists; Karen; missionaries Barth, F., 627 Battle of Day River, 802 n Battle of Insein, 98 Battle of Vinh Yen, 801n Baw Luang, Thailand, 646 Bawlahke, Kayah State, Burma, 77, 99f Belaga, Sarawak , 329 Benedict, P., 85 Bengali minority, in Assam, 225 Bennington-Cornell Anthropologica l Survey, 13 , 573, 62Of Berelson, B., and G. A. Steiner, 470 Bernatzik, H. , 271n, 278, 288 Bhamo District, Burma, 75, 120, 135 , 141 Bhu Lom Low nikhom, Thailand , 532 Bible Societies of Southeast Asia, in Thailand, 390 bilingualism, 22, 133, 135, 669; in India, 220; in Malaysia, 338; in Thailand, 513 , 518. See also specific languages, countries, peoples; multilingualism Binh Xuyen sect, in South Vietnam, 705 Birou, A., 754 Bisaya, in Sarawak, 321 Black Flags of the Tribal Tai: in Thailand, 234 n Black Tai: an d French administration , 825f; internal dissension among, 814; lack of political cohesion, 812; in Laos, 236-38; Lo and Cam families, 236, 237, 779, 812; in North Vietnam, 678n, 683, 649n; relations with Vie t Minh, 809f, 811-13; in Southeast Asia, 11; in Vietnam, 778, 807-10, 82Of Black, White, and Red Tai (Thai), 296. See aho upland Thai , in Laos

INDE X

Blakeslee, D . J. et al, 465 , 474 Blanchard , W., 372η, 373 Bloodworth , D. , 522η Bodard , L., 797η Boeles, J. , 399nf Bohannon , C . T. R., 711, 736η Boloven Plateau , 747 borde r areas , 19 . See also borderlands ; borders ; boundaries ; individua l countrie s Borde r Patro l Polic e (BPP) , Thailand , 61, 375f, 378, 380-83 , 386 , 393f, 478f, 5l2f, 526 , 53Of, 533f, 545f, 573, 578, 643 , 65Of , 662-64 , 67Of , 850 ; actio n programs , recommendation s for, 67Of ; aid programs, 501-503 ; as bridge t o Tha i society , 664 ; function s of, 381f; role in assimilation , 858f; and triba l relationships , 382f , 542f, 671; i n Yunnanes e villages , 500 borderlands : Burma-Thailand , 29n, 8On; China , 7, 8n, 75; China , Burma , Bhutan , 223, 85Of; China-India , 205, 225; contro l of, 7n, 8n; an d ethni c distribution , 135 , 329f; Laos-Thailand , 41n ; Thailand , 374 borders : China , minoritie s on , 170 ; Laos-China-Vietnam , 241 ; Sarawak , 350 Borikhan e Province , Laos, 244n Borneo , 32, 65, 86, 307, 317f, 354; aborigine s in , 310n ; archaeology , 323f; censu s of , 330; contac t wit h China , 319; geograph y o f sultanates , 335; hil l tribes , econom y of, 332, 333 ; Literatur e Burea u Sarawak , 858; militar y operation s in , 333; populatio n distributio n in , 328f; religions in , 324; sultanates , 30. See also Sabah , Sarawak , Malaysi a Boun Oum , Princ e of Champassak , Laos, 235, 246 boundaries : betwee n states i n Southeas t Asia, 19; colonia l backgroun d of , 19; effects o n populatio n movement , 19; genera l histor y of , 18 Bourotte , B., 746n , 759 Brandt , J., 374n, 399 n Brao languages , Sout h Vietnam , 701 n Brecher , M. , 126 Britain : ai d to Thailand , 549, 554; colonialism , 75 British Nort h Borneo , 353 Brooke rajah s (i n Borneo, Sabah an d Sarawak) , 329f , 334-37, 34Of, 344-46 , 348 ; administration : in

Borneo , 351f; in Sabah, 355f; in Sarawak, 356 Brown, J. M. , 22, 398n , 399n , 40On Brown, M. , 86 Bru in Vietnam: agricultur e of , 766 Bruk, S. I., 4n, 7, 7n, 23n, 86, 16On Brunei , 309, 317f; religion s in , 330; Sulta n of, 309, 335, 355 Brune i Bay , Borneo , 339, 356 buboni c plague : i n China , 194 Buddhism , 50 ; in Borneo , 324; in Inne r Mongolia , 195n ; in Laos, 236-38 , 247, 292; in Malaysia, 338f; an d nationa l majority , 21 , 114 ; suppression o f in Sout h Vietnam , 734; i n Thailand , 195n , 369, 400n , 435, 446, 498, 641; an d violence , 472; an d Yao religion, 630 Buddhists : agitatio n in Danang , 734; minorit y in China , 195f; monarch y in Burma , 77, 117; philosophy, an d materialism , 471f; politica l action s in Burma an d Vietnam , 472 ; priests , 402, 404, 420f, 469, 549; socia l work in Sout h Vietnam , 863 Buell, E . (Pop) , 299f Bukit Tru s Madi , Sabah , 356 Bukitan , Sarawak , 331 Bunchan a Arthakorn , 429 n Burchett , W. C, 233, 245, 246, 681 Burling, R. , 79, 88n , 227 Burma , 7,12, 65 , 75-91,127 , 507; army, 94, 855; Baptis t Convention , in Thailand , 392n; boundaries , 75; colonia l period , 75; constitution , 93f, 103; definitio n of , 93n; federa l governmen t of , 95; "federalists " in , 38; highland s of , 420; Hil l People' s Regulatio n Act of 1889, 75; independence , 93; invasion s o f Laos , 234; kin g of, 30, 46, 117 , 119f, 129, 142; lowlan d societ y of , 450; and minorities , 75, 76f, 101 , 143; politica l structur e of, 75; radi o broadcast s to Thailand , 441; raids in Thailand , 640; researc h o n tribes, 856; subversion amon g minoritie s in , 85Of; Unio n of, 46, 93, 373 Burman , definitio n of , 93n, 121n ; language of , 23n ; minority , in Burma , 136 Burmanization , 51,119,130,14 2 Burmese , in Thailand , 640, 641 Buttinger , J. , 24n, 677n , 678, 701n , 784n, 839 Butwell, R. , 130

I 87 3 ]

INDE X

cac-lai traders, 678f Cady, J. F., 22n, 25, 26, 11 5 Cam families, see Black Tai Cam Sinh , Prince of Lai Chau, 807 Cam Van Zung, Black Tai leader, 811 Cambodia, 7, 53, 65, 66, 77, 235, 677n; assimilation of minorities in, 54; radio broadcasts to Thailand, 441 Cambodian (Khmer ) minority : in Thailand, 372 , 38On, 668; in Vietnam, 683n, 776 Cambodian Thai, in Thailand, 431 Campbell, P. D. J., 563 Cao Dai sect, in Vietnam, 21, 683n , 688, 705 Cao languages, in South Vietnam, 701n Carlson, Pastor, 498, 510 cash cropping, 35, 139; in Assam, 227; in Thailand, 536, 570-72. See abo agriculture caste, in Assam, 216 caste system, 205f Catholic: minority, 21; missionaries, in China, 391; missionaries, in Thailand, 391; refugees fro m Nort h Vietnam , 740 Catholics, in Thailand, 391n , 433, 665f Catroux, Gen., 772n, 827 cattle: researc h on in Thailand, 572; thefts, i n Thailand, 417, 418, 457, 474, 507; in Thailand hills, 544f Celebes, 354 census: of India (1961) , 84n; of Laos (1376), 431; of Thailand, 374f Central Intelligence Agency, U.S., see CIA Central Nationality College, China, 176 Central Thai, in Thailand, 4n Central Thai Plains, Thailand, 14 Ceylonese minority, in Malaysia, 308, 310 Chalermnit Press, 233,234n, 239, 240 Cham: kingdom , 11 , 677; minority, in Vietnam, 683n, 686, 745, 776, 787 Cham Tewi , Queen of Lamphun, 640 Champa, Kingdom of, 745f, 784f Champassak, Laos , Prince of, 234f, 240 Champassak Province , Laos, 244n Chan, C. J., 150 Chan Shau-wing , et al., 161n Chang Ching-wu, 177n charismatic leaders, 19, 110, 11 5 chau tnuong (Ta i hereditary chiefs) , 779-84 Chau, Lt. Col., 708, 710, 713-17, 721, 723-28, 730, 731, 734, 735f, 743n

[874 ]

Chi Ya-t'ai, 184n Chiang Kai-shek, 513 Chiang Ying-ling, 187n Chiapas, Mexico, action programs in, 423 Chieng Dao District, Thailand, 386 , 577 Chieng Dao nikhom, Thailand , 570 Chieng Khawng, Thailand, 402f Chiengkham, Thailand, 402f, 408, 417; prince of, 14 , 406 Chiengmai, Thailand, 374, 382, 538n; Lua? kin g of, 640 ; prince of, 30, 52n, 640, 642 Chiengmai Province, Thailand, 479, 491, 568, 576 Chiengmai University, Thailand, 549, 553 Chiengrai, Thailand, 382, 407n, 488, 498 Chiengrai Province, Thailand, 42On, 491, 583 Ch'ilao, in China, representation, 183 children, purchase of, 36. see also Yao, child-buying Chin: in Burma, 26, 45, 46, 50, 75, 94-124, 131 ; and Burman society, 45, 51, 97, 98; religion of, 97f; and World War II, 143 Chin Hills, Burma, 114 , 12 0 China, People's Republic of, 7,144 , 298; administrative divisions of, m3; agricultural cooperative s in, 187-91; borderlands of, 6, 7, 75, 205; and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conferenc e (CPPCC) , 184; class struggle in, 177, 199-201; class struggle and minorities, 169n; Communist Constitution of, 171,173 ; Communist Party of, 175 , 177f, 188-97; democratic centralism in, 174f, 188; gerrymandering of minority areas in, 150, 172n, 186; "Great Leap Forward," 176, 189 ; Han migration to minority areas, 172n; invasion of India, 221, 224; Marxist-Leninist doctrin e in, 191 , 197-201; Nationa l People's Congress, 173; nationalist attitudes in, 177 ; radio broadcasts to Thailand, 441; relations with USSR, 180n ; social reforms in , 187; "Thousand Flowers, " 199; Young Communist League , 178, 188 China (People' s Republic of), languages in: Chuang, Ching-po, Hani (Ha-ni).Kaw a (Wa) , Kazakh,

INDE X

Kirghiz, Korean , Laku, Li , Lisu, Meo (Miao) , Mongolian , Nasi , Puy i Pu-i) , Sibo , Thai , Tibetan , Tung , Uighur , Yi (see also LoIo) , 180. See also separate heading s unde r languages Chin a (People' s Republi c of) , minoritie s in : agricultura l developmen t of , 19Of ; attitude s toward , 179 ; autonomou s areas, 171, 186, m4 ; autonomou s government s of, 173,174f , 181-84 ; cadres , 175f , 197; an d class 177 ; collectivizatio n of, 189; cooperative s among , 187n ; discriminatio n against , 177Ϊ , 198 ; distributio n of , 170 ; educatio n of , 176; election s among , 173f ; governmen t policie s on , 28, 169-201 ; and industrialization , 191 ; kinshi p and marriag e among , 195f; lan d reform , 186-91 ; language , policy , 32 , 179-81 ; publications , 180 ; researc h on; 18Of , 193 ; scripts , 179ff, 193n ; literac y of , 193f ; modernizatio n of , 186-91 ; nationalis m among , 20Of; "nationality, " definitio n of , 169n ; non-Han , 492; politica l contro l of , 178; population , 149, 169-201 ; an d public health , 194; radi o broadcast s to, 181; reform s an d socia l structure , 196n; religion s of, 194-96 ; Tai-speaking , 185-197 ; taxatio n of , 192f; triba l feudalis m among , 187 f Chin a Inlan d Mission , see Oversea s Missionar y Fellowshi p China , Nationalis t (Nationalis t China , Republi c o f Taiwan) : 198 , 492f, 510; minorit y policie s in , 174n . See also Nationalis t Chines e Chinese : becomin g Thai , 492; bandit s in Burma , Laos, an d Thailand , 493f; economi c role in Southeas t Asia, 36 Chines e Churc h of Indonesia , in Thailand , 392n Chines e Communists , 150; i n Sarawak , 319-20 ; organization , in Sarawak , 320 Chines e empire , 30,117 Chines e influence : i n Sabah , 354; in Vietnam , 787 . See also influenc e o f civilizations : Chines e Chines e interest s in Ta i peoples , 834f Chines e jars, trad e amon g Muru t of Sabah , 35 8 Chines e Moslem s (i n Chin a see Hui) ,

in Thailand , see Haw ; Yunnanes e Chines e Chines e overseas minority : 12 , 35; in Burma , 114 , 492; i n Cambodia , 24n ; in Laos , 239, 272, 492; i n Malaysia , 264f, 307, 309f; in Sabah , 354, 355 ; in Sarawak , 311n, 318-20 , 329, 344 , 346, 349; i n Singapore , 309 ; i n Thailan d ( see also Haw; Yunnanes e Chinese) , 3Θ9, 373, 375, 390, 392n , 401, 487-524 , 526n , 573; in Vietnam , 492, 678 n Chines e traders : 117f , 489f ; in Borneo , 359; i n Laos , 261, 281, 284n Ching-po , 149,170 , 185f, 196n . See also Jinghpaw o r Kachi n Chomsky , N. , 106 Christia n Brethre n Mission , in Thailand , 39 0 Christia n Mission , in Sarawak , 35 0 Christianity : amon g Yao, 585n , 595 , 630; an d politica l identity , 120 ; in Assam, 215; in Borneo , 324, 330; i n Burma , 96; in India , 205, 220 ; in Laos , 242, 288, 289, 290, 292; in Malaysia, 330 , 338f; in Sarawak , 321; in Thailand , 388-91 , 498. See also missionarie s Chu-K o Lian g (K'un g Beng) , 49On , 491n Ch u Van Tan , Gen. , 79 6 Chuang , in China , 23n, 169 , 183 , 185n , 517n. See also China : language s Chulalongkom , Kin g o f Thailand , 389, 64 0 Chulalongko m University , Thailand , 533, 548f, 861 Chung-chia , in China , 185n, 517 n Churc h o f Chris t in Japan , in Thailand , 392n Churc h o f Chris t in Thailand , 391, 392n Churc h of Sout h India , in Thailand , 392n CI A (U.S . Centra l Intelligenc e Agency), 55, 56, 64On , 681f , m3, m4 Civilian Irregula r Defens e units , Sout h Vietnam , 56 , 83 9 Clarke , Sir C , 336 , 34 7 "closed, corporat e community, " definitio n of , 3 9 Cochi n China , 678 Coedes , G. , 834 cognitive models , 10 5 Colomb o Plan , 301, 345, 54 4

[875]

INDE X colonial administration , 206 , 241 colonialism, 18 , 37-39; i n Borneo, 341; in Burma , 77 , 120; in India, 206, 219f; an d land tenure , 20 ; in Laos , 234, 241 , 243, 246, 278f, 295 ; in Malaysia, 307f ; i n Sarawak , 343 f Colson, E., 59 Communist activities : i n Laos, 233 ; in Malaysia, 310f ; i n Thailand , 388 , 4 4 1, 473f, 50 0 Communist Part y o f India , 22 5 Community Developmen t ( C D ) i n Thailand: 420 , 448n, 465-67 , 49 1 Condominas, G. , 52, 678, 678n, 679, 682, 701n , 757, 775, 776n, 778n , 781f, 78 9 "Confrontation," Indonesi a an d Malaysia, 57 , 310, 339f; i n Borneo , 322, 329 , 332; economic effect s of , in Kalimanta n an d Sabah , 359; effect o n tribal economy , 333; geography of , 318 ; in Sabah , 355f , 362-64; i n Sarawak, 318 , 322, 334 Confucianism, i n Thailand , 37 3 Congress o f Indochines e Peoples , Phnom Penh , 24n , 683 n Congress Party , i n Assam, 224 , 225 Conklin, H . C, 102 , 564, 767 cooperative movemen t i n Burma, 851n f corvee labor , 18 , 241; and actio n programs, 670 ; in Sarawak , 351 ; in Thailand, 6 7 1 ; in Vietnam , 67 8 Cosse-Brissac, Gen. , 77 In counter-insurgency, i n Thailand , 425 f cultivation, see agricultur e cultural boundaries , 10 , 31-35; an d caste, 216 . See also demographi c boundaries cultural background : i n Laos, 261-6 3 cultural conversion , 34f . Se e also assimilation, integratio n cultural development : o f populatio n groups, 16 f cultural identity , see cultura l boundaries cultural discontinuities , 10 9 cultural group , 4 0 cultural-social change , 105 , 139 culture: definitio n of , 4On ; change, i n Sarawak, 326f ; idea l vs. real , 106; symbolic aspect s in , 139. See also assimilation, integratio n Cupet, Capt. , 749f , 76 0 Curtis, L . J., 405 customary law : among Lua ? o f Thailand, 657f ; i n Burma , 28n ; in

[ 87 6 ]

India, 218 ; in Sabah , 359f ; i n Sarawak, 345-47 ; i n Thailand , 377f , 378n; i n Vietnam, 28n , 678 D a Hou e River , Vietnam , 74 8 Daghor, i n China , 17 5 Dalai Lama , 18 3 Dalton, J . J. , 851n Dam B o (Jacque s D o u m e s ) , 764 n Dambro language , 399 n Darlac Plateau , Vietnam , 747 ; and control o f Mekon g River , 749; Khmer contro l of , 747 ; lowland an d French settlemen t in , 751. See aho Vietnam highland s Darlac Province , Sout h Vietnam , 5 5 Dayaks, in Sabah , 354 , 858. See also Land Dayak s ( D u s u n ) , Se a Dayak s (Iban) De Young , J . E., 61 Democratic Republi c o f Vietna m ( D R V ) , 684 . See aho Nort h Vietnam demographic boundaries , 32 . See also boundaries Dent, A. , 355 Deo famil y o f Tai, 779 Deo Va n An, chief o f Phong Tho , 810f Deo Va n Long, presiden t o f Ta i Federation, 804f , 810 , 825, 825f Deo Va n Tri (Ca m O u m ), chief o f Black Flag s o f th e Tribal Tai , 806, 807-808 Desiree, Maj . M., 771n Deutsch, K . W., 38, 39, 4On, 4 1, 42, 46, 47 , 52 Devillers, P., and Lacouture , J. , 772 n Diem, Ng o Dinh, 55f , 681 , 705, 706f, 708, 734 , 761 , 764, 838 Dien Bie n Phu , 679, 771; artillery battl e of, 829-32 ; bibliography , 772n ; economic importanc e of , 824f ; ethni c antagonisms in , 832; ethni c composition in , 825ff; Frenc h military strateg y in , 827; geographi c importance of , 825 ; significance t o Tai, 834 ; strategic importanc e of , 826f Dobby, E . H . G., 775 n Doe Va n Un, Prince o f Die n Bie n Phu, 826 Doi Chiengda o nikhom, Thailand , 53 2 Doi Musse r nikhom, Thailand , 53 2 Dommen, A . J., 234n , 24On , 243, 836n, 837 Donnai River , Vietnam , 74 8

INDE X

Donnell , J. C , 688 η Dorsey , J. T. , Jr., 68 9 Doumes , Fr. , 760 Downer , G. , 84, 586 n dry-ric e cultivation , 76. See also agricultur e Due , Maj. , 73 4 East Bengal , 11 6 East Indi a Company , 354 East Pakistan , 4 5 Easte r Islands , 8 6 ECAF E (Economi c Cooperation , Asia and Fa r East) , 533, 631, 670, 85 0 ecology, 8 , 14 ; o f hil l tribes , in Thailand , 526-30 ; an d lan d laws, in Sarawak, 349 ; o f states , 10 7 economi c development : effect s i n Thailand , 653f economi c power, 2 0 economi c structur e o f Southeas t Asia, 16 f economie s o f Southeas t Asia n nations , 1 9 education : i n Laos , 857; i n Sabah , 365, 858; i n Sarawak , 34 5 educationa l research : i n Thailand , 57 3 electrificatio n i n rura l areas : Thailand , 463f Elwin, V., 59 , 212n , 223 , 22 7 Ely, Gen . P., 772n Embree , J. F. , 61, 284, 41 9 Emeral d Buddh a o f Thailand , 382 Emerson , R., 125f, 12 8 endogamy , 3 2 ethni c balance , 24 f ethni c categories , 93-124 ; a s ethni c groups, 109 ; "hil l people, " 62Of; "valley people, " 62 0 ethni c distribution , in Sabah , 35 4 ethni c homogeneity , i n Thailand , 369-7 8 ethni c identity , 107 ; symbol s o f in Thailand , 44 2 ethni c labels, 13 , 102ff, 111, 121, 132 ; "Austrienn e race, " 683n; Han-Chiao , 497; "Haw " (Yunnanes e Chinese) , 489f; Hui-Chiao , 497; Kuo-lo , 512; Pai-yi , 517n ; i n Thailand , 406, 431; Shan , 517; T'ai-tzu , 511; Tay, 649n ; Thai-Lue , 517n ; Tho , 694 exogamy, 3 2 Ezzaoui , J., 759 Fall , B., 64n, 233, 234, 244, 677n , 678n, 684, 685n , 686 , 688, 688n ,

689, 706n , 738, 739, 771n , 772n , 797n, 801n , 802, 802n , 804, 827 , 830, 836n , 838n , 83 9 family planning , need for i n Thailand , 671. See also action programs , an d populatio n growth ; overpopulatio n i n Thailand ; malari a contro l in Thailan d Fang , Thailand , 488, 499, 56 3 FAO (Foo d an d Agricultur e Organization) , 544f, 84 9 fatalism, amon g peasants , 47O f Faydang , Me o Communis t leader , 245f, 274n, 275, 303, 836n ; an d Toub y Lyfong , 27 5 federalist movement , in Burma , 93-9 6 Fell , H. , 316n feudalism , 29f , 43 , 45, 52n , 139 ; in Thailand , 30, 36, 600, 640-4 2 Fifleld, R . H. , 250 Finlay , D. , 545 French : administratio n of Ta i Highlands , 808f; administratio n of Vietnam , 678-80 ; annexatio n o f Ta i Highlands , 806; i n Cambodia , 24n ; in Cochi n China , 704; colonia l attempt s t o break Ta i politica l structure , 780; colonia l policie s o n Indochin a minorities , 790; contro l of opium , 82Of; defeat a t Die n Bien Phu , 773; in Indochina , 677-79 , 785-90 ; relation s with minoritie s in Sout h Vietnam , 838 ; relation s wit h Siamese, 805 ; relation s wit h Vietnam minorities , 678-80; an d triba l autonom y in Vietnam , 788-90 ; use o f minoritie s i n paramilitar y units , 837f Frenc h Indochina , 19 Frenc h Indochin a army, ethni c compositio n of, 773n , 813-1 7 Frenc h Indochin a War, 274n , 430, 679 , 684; battl e a t An Khe , 838; battl e o f Die n Bie n Phu , 824-35 ; battl e fo r Ho a Binh , 802f; battl e for R . C . 4, 796-800 ; battl e fo r Vin h Yen , 801; battl e for ZANO , 803; Operation Benedictine, 814f; Operation Genvieve, 815-17 ; Operation Lorraine, 803 f Fron t for th e Relie f o f Oppresse d Races, see FULR O frontie r areas : administration , in British Burma , 75; Enquir y Commission , Burma , 93, 14 1 FULR O (Fron t for th e Relie f o f

[ 87 7 ]

INDE X

Oppresse d Races) , 25, 53f, 66, 682f, 761f, 839f Funan , 525 Furnivall , J. S., 14 0 Gandhi , Indira , 206n Garo , in India , 227 Gar o Hills , Assam, 206, 217 Gautie r Missio n of 1881, Vietnam , 748 Geba , of Burma , 111. See also languages Geddes , W., 549 Gedney , W., 85, 88η, 258n, 40On , 694n Gekhu , of Burma , 112. Se e also languages Genev a Agreement s o f 1954, 244, 705, 75 3 Genev a Agreement s o f 1962, 233, 235, 247, 295, 836 Genev a conventio n of 1954, 235, 295, 683n, 709fn, 786 , 835 Genghi s Khan , 180 n geography, 8 , 9, 1 0 Gerber , T. , 763 Germa n Romanticis t thought , and socia l science theories , 103 Ghurkas , in Sarawak, 327 Gi a Long , emperor , 704, 787, 788 Ginsburgs , G. , 685 Gittinger , J. P., 838 Goffman , I. , 107 Governmen t Allianc e Part y (Malaysia) , 337 Governor , powers of , in Assam, 218 Graham , D . C. , 271n, 287 Graham , W. A., 405 Grauwin , Med.-Com. , 772n "Grea t Hanism, " in China , 19 9 "great tradition " religions, 21 "Greate r Thai " ethnolinguisti c classification , 431 Grierson , G . Α., 84n guerrillas, Chinese : in Burma , 493; in Republi c of Taiwan , 493 Guilleminet , P. , 755, 763 Gullick , J. M., 307 gumchying gumsa, 138,13 9 gumlao, 43,13 8 gumrawng gumsa, 139 gumsa, 43,135,138 f Haina n Island , 85 Haka-Chin , in Burma, 108. Se e also languages Hallett , H. , 489f, 526n, 639

[ 87 8 ]

Hall , D. G . E., 748n, 806 Halpern , A. M., and Fredman , H . B., 836n Halpern , J. M., 21, 236, 239, 239n , 242, 244, 257nf, 261, 271n Hamilton , J. W., 115, 652 Ha n Chinese : in China , 5, 150, 185 Han i (Ha-ni) : in China , 170, 172, 183, 18 5 Hanuno o of Mindoro Island , 767 Harrisson , T. , 343 Harris , M. , 14 4 Harvey, G . E., 118 Haw , 32, 487-524; contac t with British Informatio n Service , 510; definition s o f name , 488, 49Of; dialect , 490; ecologica l positio n of, 487; econom y of, 487; histor y of , 489f; internationa l implication s of, 487f; loyaltie s of , 523n ; migration s of , 488; an d opium , 35; origin of, 488f; and politica l unrest , 818; population , 487-92 ; refugees , 488-92 ; refugee s in Burma , 488; refugee s i n China , 488; refugee s i n Laos, 233, 805; refugees i n Thailand , 234n, 376, 404, 487n, 526n , 546 , 555; role i n cultur e change , 529; rol e in Thailand , 526f. See also Hui, Yunnanese Chines e Hawaii , 86 headhunting , 45n; amon g Nagas , 206; in Borneo , 339, 356f; in Burma , 118; in Sarawak , 346 f Heine-Geldern , R. , 19 Henderson , W., 7n, 60η, 708n Hendry , J. B., 688n Hickey , G. C, 237 , 453n , 677n , 678n , 679 , 682 , 685 , 687 , 688n , 718n , 754 , ^ 779 , 780, 818 , 839 "High Platea u Autonom y Movemen t Committee " (NLF) , 25 "hill peasants, " 18 Hill Trib e Developmen t an d Welfar e Program , Thailand , 267, 564, 376 hill tribe s i n Thailand : characteristics , 527; economy , 668; education , 382; effects o f economi c change , 673 ; effects o f road-building , 673; employmen t restrictions , 548; lan d ownership , 642; languages , 669 ; lega l status, 668, 672f; protectio n of lan d base, 672f; researc h o n (se e also Triba l Researc h Centre , Thailand) , 549, 553-81 , 667-69 ; strategi c significance of , 56 Hinduism , 115; in Assam, 215; in

INDE X

Borneo, 324; in India, 220; in Thailand, 37 3 Hkamti Shan , in Burma, 79 Ho, see Haw Ho Chi Minh , 430, 708, 796; in Thailand, 430 n Ho Chi Min h Trail, 234, 246, 837 Hoa, Capt. Huynh Anh , 732 Hoa Ha o sect, Vietnam, 21, 683n, 705, 707 Hoang family o f Black Tai, 812 Hod District , Thailand, 57 6 homogenization o f triba l peoples, 51-53. See also assimilation, integration, cultural chang e Honey, P. J., 685n Hoselitz, B., 27 Hot District, Thailand, 38 6 Houei Sa i Province, Laos, 583 Hre, in Vietnam, 677, 683, 767 Hsi-Shuang Pan-n a Tha i Autonomous Chou, China, 185-9 7 Hsieh Fu-min, 18 4 Hue, Vietnam, 678 Huff, L . W., 437n, 440, 444n, 452, 455, 457, 469, 477, 482f Hui, 89n; in China, 15n , 152, 169, 170, 174, 178 , 181, 183, 185, 186. See also Haw; Yunnanese Chines e Hui-tsung-p'o, Thailand, 50 5 Huks, in Philippine Islands, 710 Huong, 761 I (see also Yi), in China, 152 Iban, in Borneo, 318. See also Dayaks Iijimi, S., 115 , 576n Ilanun, i n Sabah, 354 independence of Nort h Borneo (Sabah), 355 India, 59; boundaries of, 75 ; caste system in, 205f; civil service, 75; contrasts with Southeas t Asia, 215-17; Constitutio n of , 217f ; district council s in, 217f ; ethnographies of , 213n ; integratio n of tribal peoples, 213n; majorit y attitude toward minority, 215; minority attitude toward majority , 215; population of , 205 ; social stratincation an d tribes in, 36; unassimilated minoritie s in, 41 Indian civilization: influenc e of , i n Vietnam, 745 Indian minority, 12 ; in Burma, 89n; in Laos, 272; in Malaysia, 307, 309f;

in Sarawak, 320; in Thailand, 373, 401f "indigenous population": i n Malaysia , 308, 315n; in Sabah, 354; in Sarawak , 320 indirect rule , in Sarawak, 345-4 7 Indochina War , see French Indochin a War Indochina LoIo , in North Vietnam , 695n. See also I and Yi Indochina Ma n (Yao) , in North Vietnam, 695n. See also Yao Indonesia, 65, 127, 324; Communists in, 31 In industrialization, 20, 49. See also modernization influence o f civilizations : Arab, 325; Burman, 113 , 114, 120, 121, 132, 137; Chinese, 5-6, 12 , 117, 119f , 135f, 149-51 , 325, 354, 487, 516, 521, 525 , 527, 622-25, 677, 745, 787; European, 6, 12; Indian, 6, 12, 115, 325, 525, 745; Indonesian, 525; Islamic, 12 ; Northern Thai , 117n; Shan, 137; Thai, 652f; Western, 325 influence o f missionaries, 1 2 Inner Mongolia , 170 , 172, 174, 195n Institute for th e Execution o f th e Dharma, Sout h Vietnam, 863 Instituto Nacional Indigenista, Mexico , 423 insurgency: i n Burma, 93; in Malaya , 426; i n Philippine Islands, 426 Intanon, Prince of Chiengmai , Thailand, 38 9 integration o f minorities: in Cambodia , 24n; in China, 28n; by Pathet Lao , 25n; in Singapore, 24n; in South Vietnam, 24n, 28n; in Thailand , 554-56, 849. See also assimilation intermarriage, 32, 33, 34; across Borneo borders, 341; and maintenance o f cultural patterns, 33f ; in India, 216. See also cultural boundaries; exogamy international cooperatio n in action programs, 670 International Control Commission, 705 International Voluntary Servic e (IVS) , in Sout h Vietnam, 728, 862 intra-minority problems, in Burma, 98-101 Irrawaddy Rive r Valley and Delta , 10, 75,116 irredentism, 9n, 47, 53, 135 irrigated agriculture, 5, 19, 114, 139,

[ 87 9 ]

INDE. X

238, 350 , 369 , 586 . See also agricultur e Islam , 21 , 32; i n Borneo , 324, 330 , 342 ; in Malaya , 341 ; i n Malaysia , 307 , 309, 338f , 341f; i n Sarawak , 319 , 321; i n Thailand , 428 , 491 . See also Muslim ; Hu i i n Thailan d I u Mien , see Ya o Iwata , K. , 23 8 Izikowitz , K . G. , 18 , 237, 238 , 262 , 584n , 623 f Jacob , P . E. , an d J . V. Tc-scano , 4 1 Janos , Α., 791 n Japanese : i n Borneo , 339; i n Burma , 143; i n India , 221; i n Indochina , 684, 789; i n Laos , 240 , 274n , 278 , 281 , 289; i n Malaysia , 310 ; i n Sarawak , 348; i n Thailand , 664; rol e i n Indochin a War , 79 3 Jarai , i n Vietnam , 54 , 356 , 683n , 686 ; agricultur e of , 766 ; histor y of , 747 ; kinshi p syste m of , 755 ; politica l structur e of , 9n , 755f; relation s wit h French , 749f; slave trade , Vietnam-Laos , 747 ; sorcerers , 758-60 ; i n Vietna m revolts , 761 . See also sadet s Java, 7 , 39 , 319 ; peasant s in , 3 9 Javanese : i n Borneo , 32 9 Jayavarma n II , Kin g o f Khmer , 75 9 j e h (i n Vietnam) : agricultur e of , 766 ; lan d tenur e of , 76 8 Jesuits : i n Thailand , 38 8 jinghpaw : i n India , see Singhpo ; i n China , see Ching-p o Johnson , L . B. , 71 1 Joiner , C . Α., 24n , 55 , 679 , 680 , 685n , 686n , 687 , 84O n Join t U.S . Militar y Advisor y Grou p (JUSMAG) , i n Thailand , 43 4 Jones , L . W. , 315 n Jouin , B. , 759 , 771 n Judd , L. , 369 , 390 , 392 n Jumper , R. , 68 8 Jumper , R. , an d Normand , M. W., 55 , 677n , 684 , 685n , 68 6 "Kachin" : a s label , 10 2 Kachin : becomin g Burman , 5 1 , 141 , 143; becomin g Shan , 17 , 34 , 44 ; an d British , 143 ; i n Burma , 14 , 44 , 46 , 50, 75-77 , 93-146 ; an d Chinese , 135f; ecolog y of , 140 ; an d Japanese , 143; an d Sha n cultura l influence ,

[ 880 ]

135-38 , 140-42 ; an d Sino-Burmes e border , 144 ; an d Worl d Wa r I I , 14 3 Kachi n politica l system , 138 . See also gumsa an d gumfoo Kachi n socia l system , 43f, 112 , 14 0 Kachi n State , Burma , 7n , 24f, 38 , ^ 43 , 13 2 "Kachi n tribes, " definition , 89 n Kachi n tribes : i n Burma , 30 , 79 , 134 ; in China , 149 , 196 n Kadaza n ( D u s u n ) , in Sabah , 35 4 Kalada n River , i n Burma , 9 7 Kalasi n Province , Thailand , 452 , 461n , 46 7 Kalimanta n (Indonesia n Borneo) , 7, 12 , 328, 340 f Kam , see Tun g Kanchanabur i Province , Thailand , 36 9 Kandre , P. , 584n , 603n , 701 n Kandre , P. , an d Le j Tsa n Kuej , 590 n Kans u Province , China , 17 3 Kantarawadi , Kaya h State , Burma , 9 9 Kapua s River , Kalimantan , 32 8 Karen : agriculture , i n Thailand , 565 ; becomin g Thai , 651f ; i n Burma , 75 , 76, 94-124 ; communit y structure , 660; economi c relation s wit h L u a ? , 36; entrepreneurs , in Thailand , 643-49 ; a s ethni c category , 111 ; intermarriag e among , 661 ; languages , 22nf, 89n , 666 ; literacy , 376 ; Nationa l Defens e Organizatio n ( K N D O ) , i n Burma , 2Θ, 93, 99 ; Nationa l Union , in Burma , 26 ; nationalists , i n Thailand , 387 ; politica l structure s of , 9n ; population , in Thailand , 642f; rebellion , i n Burma , 26 , 46 ; rebels , i n borde r areas , 8n ; refugees , i n Burma , 663n ; refugees, i n Thailand , 13 , 30, 44 , 51 , 114, 360 , 374 , 380 , 389-92 , 480 , 528, 529 , 534 , 546 , 547 , 549f, 563 , 576n , 668 ; tribes , i n Burma , 30 . See also Pw o Karen ; Ska w Kare n Kare n State , Burma , 24f, 3 8 Karenni , i n Burma , see Kaya h Karen-n i (Re d Karen ) State , Burma , 9 9 Kato , relation s wit h Yao , 616 f Kaufman , H . K. , 7n , 6 1 Kawa ( W a ) : i n China , 170 , 183 , 185, 18 6 Kawilorot , Princ e o f Chiengmai , 38 9 Kawn g Loi , Thailand , 64 6 "Kayah" : i n Burma , 38 , 44 , 50 , 7 1 , 77f , 78n , 94-124 ; a s ethni c label , 111 ; Kaya h State , Burma , 38 , 44 , 94ff ,

INPE X 99f, 109 ; synonym s for , 75 , 99 ; i n Thailand , 11 1 Kayan : i n Borneo , 318 , 319 , 331 , 342 ; in Sabah , 858 ; i n Sarawak , 321 , 337 , 346 Kayan-Kenyah : i n Sarawak , 34 7 Kazakh , i n China , 170,18 3 Keatley , R. , 83 9 Keen , F.G.B. , 54 4 Kelabit : i n Borneo , 318 , 319 , 322f , 331 , 342, 356 ; i n Sabah , 340 ; i n Sarawak , 321, 327 , 337 , 346 , 35 6 Kelao , i n China , 156 . See also Ch'ila o Keningau , Sabah , 36 1 Kennedy , R. , 315 n Kenyah : i n Boreno , 318, 319 , 331 ; i n Sarawak , 321 , 337 , 344 , 34 6 Keyes, C . F. , 432, 433 , 438n , 441n , 442n , 64 8 "Kha, " 528 ; definitio n of , 236n ; i n Laos , 13 , 24 , 234 , 246 , 258n , 261 ; in Thailand , 433 , 46 4 "Kha, " meanin g i n La o language , 24 1 Khammouan e Province , Laos , 244 , 29 7 Kham u ( K h m u ? ) , 528 ; becomin g Yao , 594; relation s wit h Yao , 616 . See also Khm u Khanh , Gen. , 56, 761 , 73 5 Khan h Hau , Vietnam , 688 n Khasi : i n India , 220, 225 , 22 7 Khe t Phatanakane , 301. See also villag e cluster s i n Lao s Khmer : an d F U L R O , 54 ; histor y i n Indochina , 677n ; histor y i n Vietnam , 677, 703 , 74 6 Khme r kingdom , 10η , 11 , 784 f Khme r minority : i n Vietnam , 8n , 54 , 787 Khme r Sere i movement , 8 n Khmer-speakin g peoples , 1 0 Khmu ? i n Laos : 238 , 241 , 269 , 296 , 389; agriculture , 272 ; cultur e chang e among , 238f ; econom y of , 242 , 248f ; politica l structur e of , 24 2 Khmu ? i n Thailand : 374 , 390 , 392n , 643, 668 ; minorities , an d politica l unrest , 818 . See also Kham u khon dot, 52 8 Kho n Kaen , Thailand , 44 1 khon muang (Yuan) , i n Thailand , 406 , 528 khon pa, 52 8 Khon e FaUs , Mekon g River , 23 5 Khon g Khai , Laos , 27 3 Khu n Luan g Wilanka , kin g o f Chiengmai , 64 0

Khu n Yua m Valley , Thailand , 374 , 63 9 Khu n Yua m Valley : connection s wit h Burma , 63 9 Khwa e No i River , wester n Thailand , 4 4 Khyn , i n Thailand , 40 6 Kie n Ho a Province , Sout h Vietnam , 703 , 706-44 ; econom y of , 704 ; geograph y of, 703 ; histor y of , 704f ; Viet Con g in , 70 4 Kimanis , Sabah , 35 5 Kin g o f Burma , 3 0 king, a s symbo l o f nationa l unity , i n Laos , 240 n kin g o f Siam , 3 0 kin g o f Thailand , 382 , 51 3 Kingshill , K. , 40 5 kinship , 11 5 kinshi p systems , 114 f kinshi p ties , 1 3 KM T (Kuomintang) , see Nationalis t Chines e Knorr , K. , 791 n Koho , i n Vietnam , 677 , 638n , 701n , 86 2 Kon g Le , 24On , 275n f Korea n Presbyteria n Church , i n Thailand , 392 n Koreans , i n China , 170 , 18 3 Krati e Province , Cambodia , 24 n Kual a Lumpur , Malaysia , 33 6 Kuchinera i District , Thailand , 46 7 Kuching , Sabah , 35 5 Kuching , Sarawak , 35 5 K'ue i Pi , 184 n Kui , i n Thailand , 373 , 380n , 66 8 Kun-min g (Kunming) , China , 191 , 499, 51 0 Kunstadter , P. , 33, 34 , 125 , 243 , 479n , 480, 576n , 65 2 Kuomintan g ( K M T ) , see Nationalis t Chines e Kutsung , i n China , 159 . See also Won i or Han i trib e Kwangsi Province , China , 149 , 517n , 778 Kwangtun g Province , China , 77 8 Kweicho u Province , China , 11 8 Kyaw Thet , 127 , 129 , 132 , 14 5 Kyebogyi, Kaya h State , Burma , 77 , 9 9

Labua n Island , Sabah , 35 5 Ladejinsky , W. , 7n , 5 5 Lafont , P.-B. , 759 , 760 , 76 3 Lahaha n Kayan , i n Sarawak , 34 7 Lahu : becomin g Yao , 594 ; guerrilla s i n Burma , 518 ; lac k o f literac y among ,

[ 88 1 ]

IKDE X

621; in Laos, 269, 296, 634; migration of, 11 ; political structures of, 9n; relations with Yao, 616f; in Thailand, 374, 390, 506, 518, 527f, 533f, 549f, 620, 643 hissez-faire policie s and political development, 58 Lakua, in China, 170,183,18 5 Lamet: becomin g Yao, 594; compared with Yao, 623f; economy of, 623f; in Laos, 238, 248, 389; in Thailand, 623; world view of, 624 Lampang, Thailand , 479 n Lamphun, Thailand, Mon Queen of , 640 Lamphun, Prince of, 30, 5 2 Lamphun Province , Thailand, 491 Lan Chang, Laos, king of, 431 Lan Xang, Laos , 234 Lancaster, D., 792n Land Dayak: i n Borneo, 318; in Kalimantan, 329; in Sarawak, 321, 329, 331, 344, 346, 349 land law, in Thailand, 377 land ownership, in Thailand, 376, 54Of, 642n Landon, K. P., 688 Langlais, Col. P., 772n LANGUAGES (general) : as basis for minority groupings , 132 ; in Burma, census of, 79; classification of , 78-89; classification, i n China, 23n; classification i n Thailand, 374n; and cultural homogeneity, 133 ; dialect boundaries, 78; dialect differences , 86; and education, Southeas t Asia, 16; glotto-chronology of , 86; historical relationships, 78f; mutua l intelligibility of, 86; official policie s on, 22f; policies: in Burma, 128 ; and education, 669; in Laos, 243f, 266f, 292f, 857; in Malaysia, 308f, 858; in Thailand, 375, 382; reform, i n North Vietnam, 686; romanization of scripts, in China, 18Of; use in national integration, 23 LANGUACES: Akha, 374n, ml5; Arakanese, 116 ; Atzi, 116, 132 ; Austroasiatic, 114 , 116; Bahnar , 746; Bahnaric, 85; Bih, 86; Black Tai, ml5; Blac k Tai, script for, 237; Bodo group, 212; Bre, 109, 111; Burman, 116, 119; Cambodia n (Khmer) , 746; Central Karen, of Burma, 111 ; Central Naga, 212; Central Thai, 23n, 382; Cham, 86, 746; Chin, 116;

[ 88 2 ]

Chinese, 23n, 85, 119, ml5; Chinese-related, 79 ; Chuang, ml5; Chuang-Tung, 86; Dravidian, 89n; Eastern Naga , 212n; Gauri, 116; Geba, 109; Gehku , 109 ; Haka, 108; Hani, ml5; Haw (Ho, Yunnanese Chinese), ml5; Hre, in Vietnam, 777; Iban, 858; Jarai, 86, 746; Jari in Vietnam, 777; Jinghpaw (Ching-po) , 76, 116 , 119, 132f; Kachin, 78, 116, 132f; Kadai, 85, ml5; Kadazan, 858; Kam-Sui, 85f; Karen , 109 , 116 , 374n, 651; Katuic, 86, Kayah, 78, 109, 111; Kelao, 86; Khasi, 85; Khmeric, 85; Khmu', ml5; Khun, ml5; Koho, in Vietnam, 777; Korean, 180; Kuki-Chin group , 212n; Lahu, 374n, ml5; Lamet, ml5; Lao, 238, ml5; La o Thai, 78; Laqua, ml5; Lashi, 116, 132; Lati, ml5; Li of China, 180 ; Lisu, 374n; LoIo, ml5; Lue, ml5; Malacca , 85; Malay in Thailand, 307, 321, 862; Malayo-Polynesian, 677, 683n, 777; Manchurian, 180 ; Manumanaw (Miinu), 109, 111; Maru, 132; Miao-Yao, 84, 374n, 375, ml5; Miao (Meo), ml5, 85; Mikir, 212n; Minchia (Pa-i) , ml5; Mongolian, 180; Mon-Khmer, 290f, 296, 677, 683n, 777, ml5; Mnong, 746; Mon, 85; Munda, 85; Muong, ml5; Northeast Thailand, 22nf, 431; Northeastern Thai , 22nf, 78; Nung (Tai-speaking), ml5; Nung-Rawang , 116; Nyang (Nhang) , ml5; Pa-y, ml5; Padaung , 109 ; Palaung, 85; Pali, 625; Phuthai, ml5; Red Tai, ml5; Rhad6 , 86, 746; Rhade, in Vietnam, 777; Saek, ml5; in Sarawak, 321; Sedang , 746; Shan-Tai, 132; Singhpo (Jinghpaw , Ching-po) , 212n; Sino-Tibetan, 79, 374n, ml5; Skaw Karen, ml5; Standar d Burmese , 116,- Stieng, 746; T'in, ml5; Tai, 84-86, 683f, 778, ml5; Tai and Kam-Sui-Mak, 85 ; Tai, in China, 185n; Tai Dai, 132 ; Tai Dau, 132; Tai Leh in China, 193n; Tai Leng, 132; Tai Lung, 132 ; Ta i Na, in China, 193n; Tai Neua, ml5; Tai Nui, 132 ; Taungyo, 116; Tavoyan, 116; Tenasserim dialect , 89n; Tho (Tay), ml5; Tibetan , 180 ; Tibeto-Burman, 79, 374n; Tibeto-Burman , Burmese-Lolo, ml5; Viet Muong, ml5; Vietnamese , ml5; Wa, ml5;

INDE X

Western Naga , 212n; Whit e Tai , ml5 ; Woni , ml5 ; Yao (Man) , ml5 ; Yaw, 116 ; Yeinbaw, 109 ; Yuan (Kho n Muang) , ml5 ; Yunnanes e dialect , 625; in Norther n Laos, 88; in Southeas t Asia, 22. See also individua l language names ; minorit y languages ; scripts; triba l language s Laniel , J., 772n Lann a Thai , of Norther n Thailand , 117 n Lante n Tribe , in Thailand , 592, 616f , 621 Lao : becomin g Yao, 594 ; definitio n of , 236n; elite , 239, 24On , 274f, 296; i n Laos, 236, 272, 282; peopl e an d language, distributio n of , 240 ; refugees, i n Laos , 303; socia l structure , 236, 239f; in Thailand , 387, 390, 393, 406, 43 1 lao lum, definitio n of , 236 n Lao Then g (Kha) , in Laos , 236, 238 , 296. See also Lao Theun g Lao Theung , in Laos , 297, 30 3 Lao Xung: definitio n of , 236n ; i n Laos , 236, 238. See also Meo and Ya o Laos, 11 , 37, 65, 77: borders , 75, 234, 240; censu s of , 236 ; change s i n politica l structure , 243; civil war , effect o n tribes, 302f; econom y of , 235; ethni c compositio n of, 236-43 , 296; governmen t coalitio n in , 295; histor y of , 233-35 ; kin g o f (see also Royal La o Government) , 302; Ministr y o f Religiou s Affairs, 21 ; minoritie s policies , 857 ; movemen t of people s in , 241; populatio n (1966) , 258n; radi o broadcast s t o Thailand , 441; relation s with China , Nort h Vietnam , Thailand , an d Unite d States , 233; researc h o n tribes, 259 ; rural-urba n ga p in , 239f; school s in , 239n; socia l systems , 249f; terroris m in, 264-66 ; transportatio n in, 235; urbanization , 239; village cluster s in , 301 ? Lawa, see Lua o f Thailan d Lawai Jau , T., 33 7 Le Khac , 686n Le Kham , 233, 234n, 245f Le Page , Lt . Col. , 789 Le Than h Khoi , 677n, 784n , 78 9 Le Vo Tru , "Kin g o f th e Mots," 75 0 Leach , E. R. , 8,14,19 , 34, 42, 44, 45, 103, 105f, 107 , 112 , 114,116 , 117 , 121, 135 , 138 , 140 , 47 2 leadership , charismatic , 9n LeBar, F. , et al., 4n, ml5, 85, 88n, 102 ,

161n, 237, 257η , 258n, 316n , 398n , 432, 584 , 678n, 682, 694n , 695n , 701n, 702n , 777, 778 , 867 n legal statu s o f tribes , Thailand , 529, 540 . See aho lan d law; lan d ownershi p Lehman , F . K., 45, 88nf, 107, 110,115 , 118, 120,121,125,13 7 lej fing, 586-638 . See aho Ya o socia l system lej njej, 586-638. See aho Ya o socia l system Lej Tsa n Kuej , 584 n Levi-Strauss , C , 10 3 Levy, M . J., Jr. , 49 Lewis, A. , 31 In Lhermite , Lt . CoL , 813f Li, Fang-kuei , 85f, 88n , 701n Li, in China , 170, 183 ; in Hainan , 85 Li Wei-han , 17 2 Lin Yueh-hua , 23n , 187n , 68 6 liquor brewing , contro l of i n Thailand , 380 Lisu: i n Burma , 112 ; i n China , 170, 183, 186 ; i n Kachi n State , Burma , 855; i n Sha n State , Burma , 855; in Thailand , 374, 390, 516, 523, 527f, 533f, 549f literary : amon g Karen , Yao, an d Me o in Thailand , 369; amon g India n minorities , 206f; as ethni c attribute , 621 Liu Chun , 169n , 19 9 Liu, F . F. , 800n Lo ( see aho Blac k Tai) , in Laos , 23 6 Lo Ca m families o f Blac k Tai , 80 7 Lo Van Hac , princ e o f Die n Bien Phu , 826 local administration , in Thailand , 379f, 474, 67 0 Lofang, 274 n LoI o (see aho Yi an d I ) , in China , 150; in Nort h Vietnam , 695 n Long, M . F. , 433n, 454n , 455, 45 6 Lon g Nawang , Kalimantan , 341 Lon g Pasi a (P a Sia) , Sabah , 328, 340 , 363 longhouses : i n Kalimantan , 341; in Sarawak, 325 , 346, 349, 35 1 "loose structure " of Tha i society , 41 9 Loven, in Laos , 23 8 Loven languages , Sout h Vietnam , 7 0 In lowland Thai , in Thailand , 36 loyalty o f hil l tribes , Thailand , 672 Lu, in Nort h Vietnam , 694 n Lu Han , 18 4 LUA ? O F THAILAND : 5n , 13 , 30n , 47 , 51 ,

[ 88 3 ]

INDE X 369, 374 , 390, 528, 563, 639-40 acculturation, 649 ; administrativ e connection wit h Tha i government , 49 , 657-60; agriculture , 652-53 , 658f (see also swidde n agriculture , dry-ric e cultivation, irrigate d agriculture , wet-rice cultivation) ; ancien t Buddhis m among, 641 , 643-49, 666 ; and BPP (Border Patro l Police) , 662-6 4 (see also Borde r Patro l Police) ; animis m among, 641 , 643-49; attitud e towar d central government , 47n , 48; attitude s toward Communism , 663 ; attitudes toward missionaries , 66 6 becoming Karen , 34 ; becoming Thai , 48, 640 , 38On, 651f ; an d BPP (Borde r Patrol Police) , 662-6 4 (see also Borde r Patrol Police) ; bilingualism , 643-4 9 cash crop s (se e also agricultura l change, irrigate d agriculture) , 648 , 653 ; in Chiengmai , 3 1 ; Christianity among , 664-67; communicatio n among , 643-49 ; community structur e of , 656-60 ; contacts wit h Chinese , 646 ; contact s with Thai , 646 ; control o f villag e resources, 659 economic relation s wit h Karen , 36, 641, 661 ; economy of , 643-49 , 652f ; education of , 662f ; effect s o f literac y on , 664f household structure , 66 0 influence o f Tha i civilizatio n on , 652f; intermarriage , 643-49 ; irrigate d agriculture {see also agriculture) , 652 , 659; isolatio n of , 644 f land ownershi p (se e also hil l tribes , land ownership , lega l statu s o f tribes) , 642, 651 , 656 ; language (Mon-Khme r group), 47 , 643-49, 664f ; leadershi p among, 656f ; lega l status , 375; lineages, 656-60; literac y among , 643-49 ; i n lowlands, 668 markets, 646 ; material cultur e of , 643-49; an d medica l care , 661; migration t o lowlands, 647-48 ; missionaries among , 643-49 , 664-67 ; multih'ngualism, 22n f "nationalism," 649 opium addiction , 654 f payment o f tribute , 640 , 642; population i n Thailand , 64 2 relations t o centra l government , 644f , 646; relation s wit h Karen , 641 , 647f, 660-62; relation s wit h Norther n Thai , 647f; relation s wit h othe r groups , 641; relations wit h Princ e o f Chiengmai ,

[ 88 4 ]

641; religion , 479 , 480, 644f, 659f , 66 5 (see also animism , Buddhism , Christianity); respons e t o "Communist ' threat, 662f ; romanize d scrip t fo r language, 66 4 schools for , 646 ; settlement pattern s of, 641 , 644f; a s slaves (Kh a L u a ? ) , 640; standar d o f living, 661 ; swidde n agriculture, 65 8 and taxation , 642 , 657f; Tha i influence among , 646 ; trade, 643-49 ; traditional history , 640 ; types of villages, 643-4 9 use o f missionary script , 377 ; use of Thai script , 66 5 village administration , 657-6 0 wage wor k by, 648, 653 Luang Prabang , Laos , 234, 239, 269, 29 7 Luang Prabang , Laos , princes of , 234f, 24 0 Luce, G . H., 108 Lue, see Thai-Lu e Lushai Hills , Assam, 21 7 Lushai o f Assam , see Miz o Lux, T . E., 438n, 444n , 46O n Ma, i n Sout h Vietnam , 701 n Ma Chuan-kuo , Gen. , 522n f Ma Hsueh-liang , 23n , 161n, 18On, 193n, 68 6 Ma Wih , Vietnam highland s religiou s leader, 75 3 MAAG (U.S . Military Assistanc e Advisory Group) , i n Sout h Vietnam , 713, 73 1 Mac famil y o f Vietnamese, 787 Macartney, C . A., 126 Madagascar, 8 6 Madoc, G . C, 31On Mae Cha m District , Thailand , 57 7 Mae So d District, Thailand , 54 6 Maechan nikhom, Thailand , 532 , 583 Maehongson Province , Thailand , 109 , 374, 383 , 479n, 547 , 639-7 4 Maenam Rive r Valle y an d delta , 1 0 Maenom (P'anlung) , Thailand , 50 5 Maeping Valley , Thailand , 63 9 Maesariang, Thailand , 383 , 639, 647 Magsaysay, presiden t o f Philippines , 743n majority-minority: i n Borneo , 33O f malaria, 301 ; in China, 194 ; in Thailand, 384f , 438 , 510. See also public healt h unde r countr y headings

INDE X

Mala y language , see languages , Mala y Mala y minority : 5 ; in actio n programs , 62; i n Sabah , 354 ; i n Sarawak , 329 , 346, 349; i n Thailan d {see also Thai-Malay) , 372n , 373 , 390, 402, 428, 480f, 668 Mala y Peninsula , 10 , 12, 86, 31On , 322, 35 4 Malaya , 66; aborigine s in , 24n; Departmen t o f Aborigines , 265 ; Federatio n of, 317 , 324, 34 1 Malaya n Communis t Terroris t movement , in Thailand , 42 8 "Malayan Emergency, " 60η , 31On , 710 Malayo-Polynesia n languages , 10 , 54, 86, 307, 677, 683n ; i n Vietnam , 701n, 74 6 Malaysia, 65 , 307-16 ; Constitutio n of , 309; econom y of, 309f; Federatio n of , 317; histor y of , 307-309 , 317 ; language policie s in , 338; minoritie s policies in , 308; museum s in , 345; nationa l unity , 321, 857f; religion s in , 307, 309. Se e also Sabah; Sarawa k Malaysian Borneo , 28. See also Borneo ; British Borne o Man , 48, 583. See also Yao Ma n (I u Mien ) i n Vietnam , 781 ; relation s wit h Tho , 817; minorities , and politica l unrest , 818. Se e also Yao Manchurians : in China , 169f, 181 ; in governmen t o f Inne r Mongolia , 174 ; representatio n of, 18 3 Manchus , of China , 172 Mandalay , 12 0 Mandala y Empire , 12 9 Manila , Philippin e Islands , 35 3 Manipur , 75; populatio n of, 20 5 Manipuri , in Burma , 11 7 Manndorff , H. , 525, 553, 861 Ma o Tse-tung , 169n , 181 , 741, 772nf, 80 0 Mara n L a Raw , 88n , 400n Marburge r mission , i n Thailand , 392 n Marchand , Col . J., 793n , 797n , 801n , 802nf, 837n "margina l men, " 33 mass media , effects i n rura l villages, 441n. Se e also radio Masson , Α., 784 n Mathieu , A. R. , 235, 27 2 Mayrena , "King o f th e Sedang, " 74 9 McCaIl , D . H. , 821n McDonald , Rev. N . A., 38 9 McGilvary , Rev . D. , 389, 40 5

MD U (Mobil e Developmen t Units) , Thailand : 61 , 384, 406n , 425 ; agitator s against , 444 ; agricultur e program s of , 453-56 ; annua l Yout h Camps , 468; attitude s o f tea m members , 441f; an d coordinatio n of governmen t agencies , 456 , 458 ; coordinatio n with politica l development , 426; educatio n program s of , 453 ; effect s of , 464 , 470-83 ; an d ethni c minorities , 464 ; follow-u p program s of , 448-70 ; an d foreign aid , 434nf ; foreig n observer s in, 437n; i n Souther n Thailand , 480; initia l phas e programs , 437-48 ; leadershi p in , 434; loca l modification s of programs , 441; an d loca l officials , 449; an d loca l security , 474f; measuremen t o f effects , 473 ; mediatin g controvers y i n villages, 445f; medica l car e programs , 438 , 451-53 ; mode l villages, 450, 458-70 ; and nation-building , 435; need s fo r researc h an d evaluation , 482; an d opiu m addicts , 452; organizatio n of , 434; origi n of , 433-35 ; personne l selection , 436f, 458, 481f; plannin g for, 436 ; an d politica l development , 477f; problem-oriente d approac h in actio n programs , 446f; radi o program s by , 44Of; road buildin g programs , 449ff; rol e o f militar y men , 436, 481f; self-hel p concept , 443f; strengthenin g distric t government , 474-78 ; an d triba l groups , 478f; use of films, 439f; use o f fol k music , 44Of; use o f loca l dialect , 442 {see also minorit y languag e policies , Thailand) ; an d village cooperation , 444-47 ; wate r developmen t programs , 457; welfare assistanc e programs , 43 9 Me Sao , "king of th e mots," 75Of Mead , G . H., 107 medica l aid , in Sarawak , see actio n programs , Sarawa k medica l car e for minorities , Thailand , see actio n programs , Thailan d Mekon g River , 10 , 325, 528, 748f; in Laos, 273 , 296 ; i n Thailand , 430 ; i n Vietnam , 67 7 Mekon g Rive r Delta , Vietnam, 10 , 703, 747f, 787. See also Kien Ho a Province , Sout h Vietna m Mekon g Rive r Developmen t Scheme , 65, 236, 25 0

[ 88 5 ]

INDE X

Melanau, in Sarawak, 349 Melanesia, 86 Mendelson, E. M., 96,114 Meng-Huo (Ben g Haw), 49On MEO (Miao) , 36; agriculture, 568f; becoming Yao, 594; bilingualism, 621; competition for land, 568f; economy, 577; elite, 274f; history, 274n, 278f, 286; income, 577; migration of, 11 , 271, 577, 818; minorities, and political unrest, 818; and opium , 35, 568, 577; political organization of , 9n, 278-82, 823f; population distribution , 271; relations with Haw , 577; relations with Karen, 577; relations with Yao, 616f; use of tribal labor, 568; in China, 149 , 169, 185, 186, 238; in Kwangsi Province, China, 298; in Kweichow Province, China, 298; in China, representation of, 183; in Yunnan Province, China, 298 MEO, I N LAOS: 9 , 235 , 238 , 241 , 244 ,

248f, 269, 274, 296, 298, 405, 621, 634; administration, 280; administration i n Xieng Khouan g Province, 273; agriculture, 283-85; and Buddhism , 292; and Christianity, 288, 292; anti-Communism among , 836f; authority structur e of, 276; citizenship, 282; culture change, 289-93; clans, 275f; Communists, 409; division of labor, 285; economy, 282-85, 289f, 298f; education, 29Of, 857; folklore, 286-89; history, 27lf , 274f; in Laos civil war, 279; in Xieng Khouang Province, 272; inheritance, 286; intermarriage, 291; "invasion" of Thailand, 402f; kinship, 275-78; land ownership, 285; radio broadcasts to, 269f; newspaper for, 292n; livestock, 284f; loyalties, 292; marriage, 277f; material culture, 285f; military organization , 245, 275f, 281; nationalism of , 282 ; political change , 290; political organization, 281f; polygyny, 278f; refugees, 275 , 293, 303; relations with Lao, 273f; religion, 285-89; residence pattern , 276f; role of in Laos, 36f; separat e state for, 25n; settlement o f disputes, 280; social structure, 248n, 275f; opium i n Laos, strategic importanc e of, 836 (see aho under opium) ; village composition, 277ff

[ 88 6 ]

MEO, I N THAILAND: 9, 298 , 369 , 374 ,

390, 479n, 516, 523, 527f, 533f, 546, 549f, 555, 576f, 654; agriculture, 565-67; ecology, 565-69; language of, 516; legal status, 375; radio broadcasts, 386; migration, 567-69; missionary activity among, 390; on Thailand border, 8n

MEO, I N VIETNAM: 249, 287 , 298 , 677 ,

683, 694n, 781-84; conflict wit h Tai and Yao, 818; ecology, 817f; economy, 782; motives for joining Viet Minh, 824; and opium, 817-24; population, 819 ; relations wit h lowlanders, 782; relations with Tho and Viet Minh, 819; role in Battle of Dien Bien Phu, 831-35; social organization of , 782f; and the Tai Federation, 817 , 819f; in war against Viet Minh , 815f Meo-French paramilitar y units in Indochina War, 823 Mesoamerica, 39 messianic movements: among Jarai in Vietnam, 679; among Jarai and Sedang in Vietnam, 753; among Khmu ? i n Laos, 242; among Meo in Laos, 242 Methvin, E. H., 433n, 437n, 738n Miao, see Meo Micronesia, 86 migration, 6, 9, 11, 33, 34, 525-30 Mikir Hills, Assam, 217 Military Advisory Command, Sout h Vietnam, 56 military caretake r regime of 1958-1961, Burma, 94 military training in Vietnam Highlands , 839 military, role in development programs, 482. See also, MDU, Thailand millenary cults, 110. See also messianic movements MINORITIES AND TRIBES: an d actio n

programs, 56; adaptation t o central governments, 10; attributes of, 4n, 15-17, 42; autonomous areas for (see also Assam, China, India, Nort h Vietnam), 149 ; a s buffers, 108 , 118 ; cultural change among, 9; definitio n of ( see also ethnic labels, cultural boundaries), 134, 369; derogatory terms for (see abo "kha"), 9, 108 , 490, 528; discrimination against, 9; and ecologica l distinctions, 113 , 136 ;

INDE X

economic distinctions of, 113f ; government policies on, 23-29, 171 ; integration of (see also assimilation), 143,145; international implication s of, 8n, 45, 53, 65f; languag e distinctions among, 115f; and majorities, 134 ; markets and trade, 110, 117f, 135 ; migrations of, 12 ; an d missionaries, 130; and nationalism, 129; political development of, 116f , 119; pluralism of, 145 ; relations with central governments , 29—54 ; religious distinctions among, 114f; resistance to change, 32; and secession, 171 ; self-identification of , 76; social science theories concerning, 10If ; social structural distinction s among , 114f; sophisticatio n of , 9; as source of instability, 126f; standard of living, 9; symbolic interaction of , 138; symbols of distinctness, 110 . See also tribes, in Assam: 216f, 224-25; population, 216f in Burma: Britis h policy on, 129 ; international implications of, 29; government policies on, 98f, 145; national representation, 50; political rights of, 95 in Cambodia: 53 ; international implications of, 24n in China: on borderlands, 149 ; in Chinese revolution, 150 ; "divide and rule," 127; government policies on, 25, 149-51; rebellions of, 199-201 ; and self-determination, 19 7 in India: administratio n of, 217; attitudes towar d majority, 219; attributes of, 215; autonomous area s for, 220-23; conflict with majority, 219; cultural integration of, 228; economic development, 227f; economi c integration, 228; economic relations with majority, 205 ; government of, 217; government policies on, 213n; international implication s of (India-Pakistan), 221; international implications of (India-China) , 221; relations with majority, 205; representation of , 206, 216f, 222, 225; symbolic distinctions, 219f in Indonesian-Malaysia n "Confrontation," 6 6 in Kalimantan, 348 in Laos: assimilation, 242, 247; and Laos civil war, 246, 262-66; derogator y term for, 241; education, 300;

language policy , 300; medical care, 30Of; modernization of , 246 ; relations with majority, 239 , 241, 248, 261, 302; representation, 241 , 243-46, 608, 616f in Malaysia: administratio n of, 308; British colonial policies on, 309 in New World, 144 in Sabah : 62 ; language policies on 365; legal status of, 360 in Sarawak: administratio n of , 345-47; attitudes toward, 336, 342; conflict resolution, 346; land laws concerning, 348f; legal relations with majority, 344f ; and natural resources, 35Of; population, 331 ; representation of, 336 , 347, 348n; self-rule, 346f ; taxation, 351f in Thailand: attitude s toward centra l government, 401-24; communication with centra l government, 393f, 401-24; economic relations with Thai, 393; education, 376f, 382; government policies on, 539-43, 554-56; languag e policies on, 376f, 385f, 479, 502, 513; language research on, 573; legal status of, 375-77 , 529, 540; loyalties, 416; nationalism of, 387f; ownership of resources (see also land ownership ; land laws), 376n, 392f; population, 369-78, relations with other minorities, 528; representation of, 5Of, 380, 430, 539, 607; symbolic importance of food, 442 in Vietnam: 53; an d national unity , 786-90. See also Vietnam highlander s in North Vietnam: autonom y of, 151 , 249; government policies on, 25 in South Vietnam: internationa l implications of, 53 ; and National Liberation Front (NLF) , 25; representation of, 683 n minority group: definition, 131-3 5 minority problems, social science approaches to, 125-31 minority relations (intra-minorit y relations): an d cultural exclusivity , 104; effects o f colonialism on, 127 ; historical background of, 127f ; religion and, 96; and social philosophy, 102 Mishimi Hills District, Assam, 217 Mission Etrangere, in South Vietnam, 862 Mission Evangelique, in South Vietnam, 862 missionaries: in Borneo, 356; in Burma, 96f, 389; conflicts among , 391; in Laos, 291-92; and literacy, 46f; and

INDE X

modernization, 46f, 141 ; relations with minorities and centra l governments, 667; role in annexatio n of Chiengmai, Thailand, 389 ; in Thailand, 388-9 2 Mizo, in Nagaland, 20 6 Mizo Hills District , Assam, 206, 217, 219 Mizo National Front, in India, 223 Mizo National Front, in Nagaland, 206n Mnong (Viet-Muong) , in Vietnam, 757, 778; elite, 757; kinship system of 755; relations with French, 752f; slavery among, 757; sorcerers among, 758 Mnong Gar, 757 Mobile Development Unit Program, Thailand, see MDU mobile extension scheme, Thailand , 536f, 546, 548 Mobile Information Teams , Thailand, 433f mobilization, 39 , 42; and social disorganization, 53 ; of unmobilize d peasants, 39. See also action programs Modelski, G., 793 modernization, 3-66; attitude s of minorities toward, 58; desire fo r among tribes, 26; effects o n rural-urban gap , 673; effects o n tribal economy, 52; in India, 226-28; and MDU model villages program , Thailand, 458-70; role of political agencies in, 49. See also action programs Moerman, M., 32,112, 406, 420, 421, 423, 430, 432f, 440, 442, 444 Mohr, C., 53,68 6 tnoi, see minorities, derogatory term s for Mon, in Burma, 50 , 75, 94, 114, 116, 130; migrations of, 12 ; in Thailand , 373, 390, 640 Mon-Khmer languages, see languages Mon-Khmer languages , Northern Lao s group, ml 5 Mon-Khmer languages , Palaungic group, ml 5 Mon-speaking peoples, 10 Mon National Defense Organization , i n Burma, 26, 93 Mon in Burma, nationalism among , 11 6 Mon refugees, i n Thailand, 37 3 Mondulkiri Province, Cambodia, 24 Mongolians, in China, 170 , 172;

[ 88 8 ]

attitudes toward Chinese , 178; in government of Inner Mongolia , 174; representation of , 18 3 montagnards of Sout h Vietnam, 55 , 66, 745-69. See also minorities in Vietnam; Vietna m highlander s Moorman, F. R., 544, 568 Morechand, G. , 271n, 287, 778n Moseley, G., 15 0 Mosel, J. N., 435n Moslem, see Muslim Mount Kinabalu, Sabah, 353 , 363 Mrabri, in Thailand, 374 multilingualism, 22fn. See also bilingualism muong (Ta i principality), 779-8 4 Muong, in North Vietnam , 683 Murchie, G., 448n Murphy, C. J. V., 233 Murut, in Borneo, 331 Murut, i n Sabah, 340, 353, 354, 356; agriculture, 357f; economy, 356, 358, 359; loyalties, 363; material culture, 356, 358; military actions , 363; relations with British, 363; subtribes, 356 Murut, in Sarawak, 321, 333, 337, 347 Muslim, 21f; counci l of Thailand , 480; minority i n Thailand, 372n, 401, 48Of, 491f, 497f , 861f; i n Malaysia, 330 Mussuh, see Lahu Mus, P., 688n, 795n Mya Maung, Dr., 851 n Nadel, S . F., 107 Naga Hills, Assam, 217 Nagas, 205, 206n, 220-2 3 nai amphur, importanc e of in Thailand, 475-7 8 Nakhon Panom Province, Thailand, 432, 454, 457n, 461n, 464 Nam Khyng, Laos, 583 Nam Tha Province, Laos, 296f Nan, Thailand, 369 , 409, 547; Thailand, Princ e of, 405 , 408 Narai, King of Ayuthaya, 388 Nash, M., 77n, 114 Nasi, in China, 170 "nation," concept of , 103 ; definitio n of, 4 0 nation-building, 3-66, 119 ; among Thai-Lue in Thailand, 419 ; and Buddhism, 469; in Burma, 24f; an d the colonial legacy, 129;

INDE X

communication in , 38; and ethnic heterogeneity, 128 ; in Europe, 41; and individual identification, 76 ; in Laos, 235; in Malaysia, 310; mobilization in, 39; role of schools, 433; and social theories, 103ff; in Thailand, 393f, 435; theoretical considerations on, 37-54; values in, 38. See also national integration national cohesion, 28 national consciousness, among rural Thai minorities, 401-86 national integration: i n Burma, use of common religion, 77; and cultural orientation, 45f; structure d relationships in, 43, 47; values and attitudes in, 43, 57. See also minorities; symbolic values national language, 130, 14 1 National Liberation Front (NLF) , South Vietnam, 25, 706. See also Viet Cong National Registrar of Co-operatives, Burma, 851f National Research Council of Thailand , 64n, 560, 584n national solidarity, see nation-building national unity, in India, 218; in Malaysia, 309, 338; in Thailand, 382, 406, 427, 435; in Vietnam, 784-90. See also nation-building, cultura l boundaries nationalism, effects o f language on, 130 Nationalist China, see China, Nationalis t Nationalist Chinese, 13, 174n, 177 , 184n; in Burma, 493f; in Laos, 233; in Thailand, 387 , 493f, 522nf, 526 "nationality," definition of , 40 native law, see customary law native tribunals, in Vietnam highlands , 761-65. See also Vietnam highlands Navarre, Gen. H., 772n, 773, 804n, 827, 829, 83 0 NEFA (Nort h East Frontier Agency , Assam), 205, 217, 223-36; history of , 223-26; isolation of, 223f; political backwardness of, 207; population of, 223; strategic importance of , 224 Negritos, in Thailand, 374 n Nehru, J., 127 , 216, 221, 226 Neo Lao Hak Sat, 245n, 246 Neua, in North Vietnam, 694n New Guinea, 322, 325, 343 New Tribes Mission, among Lua ? of Thailand, 390, 664 Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, 183

Ngeh languages, South Vietnam, 701n. See also languages Nguyen, K. N., 709n Nguyen, K. T., 686 Nguyen emperors, Vietnam, 747 Nhang (Nyang) , in Vietnam, 778 Nhu, Ng o Dinh, 710 Niah Cave, Sarawak, 323f nikhom ( see also action programs, Thailand), 7n, 467, 531f, 570-72 Nishida, T., 86 Norodom, King of Cambodia, 747 North Borneo Charter Company , 355f North Cachar Hills, Assam, 217 North East Frontie r Agency, see NEFA North Korea, 250 North Vietnam, 24n, 149, 284n, 298, 771-884; characteristics of minorities in, 683f; constitution of, 684f ; influence i n Laos, 240n; languag e research in, 686; minority policies of, 684-87; radio broadcasts to South Vietnam minorities, 687; role in Laos civil war, 296 North Vietnamese, in Laos, 241 North Vietnam-South Vietna m border , 8n North Vietnamese refugees: i n South Vietnam, 701n; in Thailand, 43Of Northeast Tha i minority, in Thailand, 373; attitude s toward othe r minorities, 432. See also Thai minority Northeast Thailand: 427 ; cash crops in, 455; communicatio n and transportation in , 474f; culture of , 432; diet in, 429; economy of, 429, 433, 442n (see also Chinese traders, Haw (Ho ) traders); education in, 429; environment, 428f; ethni c composition, 431; ethnic identity in, 432; health problems, 452f; links with Laos, 431; politics in, 430; population, 428f; relations with central government, 429f; security from theft , 47 4 (see also cattle theft); actio n programs; spirit doctors in, 438n; wants and needs of , 457; water problems, 429 Northern Chin , in Burma, 137 Northern Thai princes, 48, 52 Northern Thailand , 404, 526, 539. See also Northeast Thailan d Northwestern Thailand , 639-7 4 Nung: i n Burma, 79, 155; in China,

[ 88 9

INDE X

185n; Chinese-speaking , i n Vietnam , 155, 694n, 695n ; Tai-speaking , i n Chin a an d Vietnam , 155 , 778; Tibeto-Burman-speaking , Odend'hal , 75 0 Office o f th e Prim e Minister , Thailand , 434 Oka, T. , 682 opium (se e also under specifi c country) : 9 , 35,138f; addictio n amon g Meo , in Laos , 236, 238, 248n ; addictio n amon g non-opiu m growers in Thailand , 654-56 ; addictio n amon g tribe s i n Thailand , 315, 389f; and BP P in Thailand , 381; contro l of in Thailand , 378-80 , 542 ; economi c effects i n Thailand , 654-56 ; economi c influenc e of , 529 ; economic s in Thailand , 515; effect s o f ba n on Thailan d tribes , 531; Frenc h contro l of, i n Laos , 284; an d Ha w in Thailand , 487; i n Laos , 241, 261, 387; Laos-Burm a trade , 387; Laos-Thailan d trade , 284; Me o in Laos, cultivation , 283, 299; Me o sale of, i n Laos , 284; problem s of , i n Laos, 269; in Sarawak , 350 ; significance i n Indochin a War, 822 ; in Thailand , 387, 393, 522n , 527 , 529, 534, 536, 565-6 7 (se e also Ha w [Ho ] in Thailand ; Yunnanes e Chines e in Thailand) ; and triba l relations , Laos, 242f; an d triba l relations , Thailand , 529, 655; value in Thailand , 402; i n Vietnam , 782ff , 821; an d weapon s exchange , in Vietnam , 820f f opium addiction , social repercussions , 655n opiu m addicts , Chinese , 494 (see also Ha w [Ho] ; Yunnanes e Chines e refugees); treatmen t in Thailand , 386, 65 5 opium-growin g tribes , 3 5 Osanka , F . M. , 718n Osborne , M . E., 680, 687, 709 n Oua n Ratikon , Gen. , 24On Outwar d Boun d Schools , Sabah , 36 5 over-urbanization , 2 7 Overbeck, Baron , 35 5 overpopulation , in Thailan d hills, 528 . See also action program s an d populatio n growth ; famil y planning , nee d in Thailand ; malari a contro l

[ 89 0 ]

Overseas Missionar y Fellowshi p (OMF) , in Thailand , 390, 49 8 Pa O : i n Sha n State , Burma , 855 ; researc h o n land use , 85 6 Pacific Scienc e Congress , 65 , 67 0 Pada s River , Sabah , 32 8 Padaung , in Burma , 111, 85 6 Pa i (Pa-y) , in China , 170, 186 ; in Nort h Vietnam , 694 n Pai-yi , in Thailand , 496, 499, 50 6 Paillat , C , 77 2 "Pak Tai, " 399n Pakistan , 7 5 Pakor n Angsusingha , 53 3 Palaung , of Burma , 11 4 Palawan , Philippin e Islands , 32 3 pan-Mala y movements , Malaysia , 31 1 pan-triba l solidarity , Thailand , 661 f pan-tribalism , 25 ; in India , 226; lac k o f in Burma , 26. See also FULR O Panche n Erdeni , 18 3 Panglon g Conference , Burma , 9 3 para-Malay , in Sabah , 35 4 part y politics , in Sarawak , 348 n part y system , i n Malaysia , 336 f Pasamliem , Thailand , 57 7 Pasternak , B., 14 9 Pathe t Lao , 8n, 233, 234, 241, 244, 249 , 263, 289, 295, 296, 297, 302f, 387, 681, 836n; actio n program s of , 245n, 247f; conflic t wit h Meo , 836f; and ethni c conflict , 244-48 ; i n Xieng Khouang , Laos, 273; minoritie s in , 244f, 302f, 836n ; schools, 239nf , 294; i n warfare, 29 6 Patterson , G . N. , 177 Paty a Saihoo , 378, 38 7 Pauker , G. , 426 Pavie, Α., 234n , 80 6 Pavie missio n i n Laos , 749f Pavie treaty , 808, 82 5 Pays Montagnar d du Su d (PMS) , in Vietnam highlands , 752-54 ; 764 n Peac e Corps , U.S. , in Sout h Vietnam , 742f peasan t communit y structure , 39 peasants , 18n ; cooperatio n among , 444n Pebal a Golieh-namje , 18 4 Peking , China , 24n Pelzer , K. , 7n Pendleton , R . L. , 76 7 Peng-lung , i n China , 18 6 Pensiangan , Sabah , 357, 35 9 "a people, " 46; concep t of, 101f ; definition , 3 9

INDE X

Phannanikom District, Thailand, 465 Phi Thong Luang, in Thailand, 374 Philippine Islands, 324, 441 Phizo, Angami Zapu, 22Of Phong SaIy, Laos, 233, 244, 258n, 778 Phoumi Nosavan , Prince, 235, 275 Phrae, Thailand, 405f Phu Langa, Thailand, 547 Phu Tai, in Laos, 236; in Nort h Vietnam, 694n; in Thailand, 374, 433 Phumibol Dam, Thailand, 393 Pien Hung, Yao deity, 591f Piker, S., 454n, 471n Pinnow, H.-J., 85 PL 480 ("Foo d for Peace") program , in Vietnam, 712, 727 Plaine des Jarres, Laos, 273, 299 Plains Chin, in Burma, 11 3 Platenius, H., 433n, 457 Pleiku, 56 pluralism, 28, 51 po Ian, 751f, 756 . See also Rhade Poats, R. M., 246 Pocock, D., 103 Polynesia, 86 Ponnyadaung Range, Burma, 114 population: concentratio n i n central regions, 7; control of mortality in Thailand, 384f; estimates of, 271, 526; growth of, 6f , 60 , 227f, 348; minorities of Sarawak, 331; movements, in Burma, Laos, Thailand, 372 ; research in Thailand , 572f; in Southeast Asia, 16f , 20 ; statistics on, 20f; o f tribes in Thailand, 374f Pouget, J., 772n Prachin Province, Thailand, 431 Prachinburi Province, Thailand, 474n Presbyterians, in Thailand, 392n , 664. See ako Christianity ; missionarie s "primate city," 27 Protector of Aborigines, Malaysia, 308 Protectorate o f Luang Prabang, Laos, 234f Provincial Police, Thailand, 378, 380-83 Pru languages, in South Vietnam, 70 In public health, in Northeast Thailand , 438 Public Relations Department, Thailand , 437 Public Welfare Department, Thailand , see Thailand, Department o f Publi c Welfare Pulang, in China, 183 , 185

Punan: in Borneo, 331; in Sarawak , 321, 325,345, 351 Purcell, V., 12 Puyi (Pu-i) , in China, 153,170,18 3 Pwo Karen: i n Burma, 110 , 113, 115; in Thailand, 113 , 390 Pye, L., 37 Quan, Maj. Cao Mmh, 716 Quan Lo, Meo leader, 819, 823 radio broadcasts: Chinese , received by Thai-Lue in Thailand, 510 ; fro m China t o Thailand, 388 ; in minorit y dialects, Thailand, 385f , 479; to Murut in Sabah, 365; Philippine Islands to Thailand, 441; Radio Australia to Thailand, 510; range of Voice of America, 51 1 Radio Hanoi, 240 Radio Pathet Lao, 25n, 233, 245, 247 Radio Peking, 270, 386 Radio Sabah, 365 radios: for Malayan aborigines , 857; in Thailand, 386 , 441. See also action programs; BPP; mass media; minority languages; MD U Rajang River , Sarawak , 321, 325, 329 RAND Corporation, 745n Ratanakkiri Province, Cambodia, 24n Ratburi Province, Thailand, 37 3 Rawang, in Burma, 79 ray agriculture, 764n. See oho swidde n agriculture Red Karen, see Kayah Red Lahu, in Thailand, 620 . See also Lahu Red River, Vietnam, 10 , 677, 778, 780 Red Tai: in Laos, 236; in Nort h Vietnam, 683, 694n; in Southeast Asia, 11 reference group , 45f. See also cultural boundaries reference systems , 105 refugees: Chines e in Burma, 492f; Haw in Thailand, 488-92; in Laos, 246-47, 262-66, 270, 293, 295-303; Murut in Sabah, 363. See also individual countr y and triba l names regional integration, 250 regionalism in Vietnam, 787 regroupment program in South Vietna m highlands, 838f Rehabilitation Village s and New Lif e Foundation, Thailand, 38 6 religion: an d national identity, 97; and

[891 ]

INDE X

nationa l unity , 21, 50; an d nationa l unit y in Malaysia , 33 0 religions: i n Laos , 240; i n Southeas t Asia, general , 21f. See also under name s o f individua l religion s an d sects religious syncretism , 2 2 research : o n hill agriculture , in Thailand , 544-46 ; o n hill tribes , Thailand , 549, 553-81 ; on modernizatio n of tribes , in Burma , 856; needs , Thailand , 535; relatio n to government , 472; o n triba l languages, Sabah , 858; o n tribes, in Laos, 25 9 researc h programs , Thailand , see Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare , Triba l Researc h Centr e reservatio n system , Unite d States , 59. See also American Indians , India n Reorganizatio n Act resettlement , 7n , 12, 60; in Burma , 7n, 144; in Cambodia , 7n, 24n; in China , 7n ; in Indonesia , 7n; in Laos , 7n; in Malaya n Emergency , 264f; an d modernization , 264-66 ; o f refugee s in Laos , 264-66 ; i n Sabah , 361f; i n Sarawak, 32On ; in Sha n an d Kachi n States, Burma , 853f; in Sout h Vietnam highlands , 838f; in Thailan d ( see also nikhom), 7n , 467, 535, 544-46 , 859f; in Vietnam , 7n , 708nf revitalizatio n movement , amon g Meo in Laos , 292. See also messianic movement s "revolutio n fro m above, " in Thailand , 483 Rhade , an d FULRO , 682f; customar y law, 756 ; elite , 757; "kin g of th e tnois," 75Of; kinship system , 755 ; lan d ownershi p (see also po Ian), 751f , 767; i n Nort h Vietnam , 686n ; politica l structure s of, 9n ; relation s with French , 752f; role in Vietna m highlands , 682, 839f; in Sout h Vietnam , 54 , 55, 683; in Sout h Vietnam , agricultur e of, 766 ; in Sout h Vietnam , cas h crop s of, 764n ; in Vietnam , 678, 681, 686; in Vietnam triba l rebellions , 761; in World War II , 789f rightists, in Laos, 244 Roi-e t Province , Thailand , 431 role complementation , 108 roles, 106 f

[ 89 2 ]

Roma n Catholics , in Burma , 97 Roux, H. and Tra n Van Chu , 271n Roy, J. , 772n, 773, 786n Royal La o Government , 8n, 273; minoritie s polic y of , 24 5 Rue y Yih-fu , 23 8 Rupen , R. Α., 174η , 18On , 184n, 195 n rura l Chines e ("Haw") , in Norther n Thailand , see Yunnanes e Chines e rura l minority , see minoritie s rural-urba n gap , 17, 27; in Thailand , 423, 425, 432n ; in Vietnam , 68 8 Rusk, Dean , 443 Russian Communists , 197 Russians, in Kalimantan , 350 Sabah (Britis h Nort h Borneo) , 12, 307, 317f, 340 ; administratio n of , 340; administratio n of minoritie s in, 360; agricultura l change , 361f ; American s in , 355; educatio n in, 361; ethni c distribution s in , 340; Europea n influenc e in , 354; geograph y of , 353 ; history, 354f; land law in , 361f; medica l car e in, 361; militar y operation s in , 353; natura l resources , 358; populatio n of , 353f; researc h o n triba l languages , 858; religion s in , 330; taxation , 361-62 ; transportatio n in, 353; hill tribes in , see hil l tribes ; minoritie s Sabah Borde r Scouts , 356, 359, 36 3 Sabatier , L. , 682, 751nf, 756, 76 3 sacred kingdoms , 19 . See also Buddhis t monarch y Sadet s (Jara i sorcerers) , 747, 750, 755, 758-60 ; curren t role of, 760 ; function s of , 759 ; relation s with Cambodia , 747, 758f; successio n of , 759. See also Jara i Sahlins , M . D. , 18n Sai Kham , Chao , 273ff Saifudin , 18 3 Saigon, Sout h Vietnam , 291, 353 Sak-Kadu , in Burma , 10 8 Sakai, in Sarawak , 34 2 Sakonnakhor n Province , Thailand , 432, 445, 461n, 462, 46 4 Salween River , 52 8 Sam Neu a Province , Laos, 244, 245n, 258n, 269, 296, 297, 78 0 Sam Thon g Refugee Center , Laos, 273, 299f Sama Duw a o f th e Kachin , in Burma , 95 Sangha , see Sha n Buddhis t organizatio n in Burma

INDE X Sao Wunna , 9 4 Sapulut , Sabah , 35 9 Sarabur i Province , Thailand , 45 2 Sarawak , 9,12 , 307 ; administratio n of , 334; archaeolog y of , 324 ; citizenshi p in , 344 ; cultura l histor y of , 317f , 321 ; epidemic s in , 343 ; geograph y of , 317f, 322f , 328f; an d Indonesia , 317f ; loyalt y in , 321 ; natura l resources , 349 ; an d th e Philippines , 317; politica l structure , 336 ; populatio n movements , 318, 328 , 331 ; relation s wit h Malaysia , 344 ; religion s in , 330 . See ako actio n program s an d research ; minoritie s Sarawa k Museum , 323 f Sarawa k Unite d People' s Part y ( S U P P ) , 337 Sarawak-Sabah-Kalimanta n border , 8 . See also borderland s Sarit , Fiel d Marshall , Prim e Ministe r o f Thailand , 384 , 425 , 469 , 53 1 Savannakhet , Laos , 244 , 275 f Savina , F . M. , 271n , 28 7 Saw Shwe , 9 9 Sawbwa system , see Sha n politica l system Sayan languages , Sout h Vietnam , 701 n Schaaf , C . H. , 25 0 Schanche , D . Α., 239 n Schlatter , D. , 377, 39 0 Schramm , W., 435n , 441 n Scigliano , R. , 64 n Scott , J. G. , 11 2 scripts , 193 , 376 ; i n India , 220; Ta i languages , i n China , 193n ; Teochi n dialect , 490 ; Ya o languages , 516 , 636-38 . See also languages ; minorit y language s Sea Daya k ( I b a n ) , i n Borneo , 318 , 323 ; in Kalimantan , 328 ; i n Sarawak , 320 , 321, 328 , 331 , 346 , 34 9 SEAT O (Southeas t Asia Treat y Organization) , 543 , 670 , 850 , 861 ; aid t o research , 580 ; ai d t o Thailand , 387, 549 , 553 f Sedang , i n Vietnam , 686 , 747f ; cas h crops , 764n ; religio n of , 757 ; slaver y among , 75 7 Sedon e Province , Laos , 244n , 29 7 Seidenfaden , E. , 29n , 399n , 43 1 Self-Hel p Lan d Resettlemen t Centers , Thailand , see nikhom Sema i Senoi , of Melay , 35 6 Semang , i n Thailand , 399 n Sen i Pramoj , 42 7

Seno i Semang , i n Malaysia , 30 7 Service Geographiqu e d e l'lndochine , m l 5 , 67 7 settlement : o f hil l tribe s o f Thailand , 531-3 3 Sgaw Karen , see Ska w Kare n Shafer , R. , 8 4 Shan : becomin g Yao , 594 ; i n borde r areas , 8n ; Buddhis t organization , i n Burma , 46 , 95f , 114 ; i n Burm a (see also Hkamt i Shan) , 26 , 4 1 , 46, 47 , 50, 75 , 76 , 79 , 93-124 , 131 ; i n China , 185n ; language , 23n ; marke t system , 117; politica l system s of , 30 , 99-101 , 116f; Sawbwa s [see also Sha n politica l system) , 30 ; Shan-Chines e tradin g complex , 117 ; socia l system , 43f; i n Thailand , 373f, 387 , 393 , 405f, 409 , 526 , 64 1 Sha n State , Burma , 7n , 11 , 24f, 38 , 75 , 132 Shaplen , R. , 68 9 Sharp , L. , 41 9 Shar p L. , et al., 52n , 6 1 Shastri , L. , 21 6 She , i n China , 17 0 Sheehan , N. , 233, 773, 84 0 shiftin g cultivation : i n Laos , 262 , 298f ; legal statu s of , i n Thiland , 541 ; i n Malaysia , 307 ; researc h o n i n Thailand , 562-72 ; i n Sabah , 356 , 362 ; in Sarawak , 349 ; i n Vietna m highlands , 776 . See ako agriculture ; swidden agricultur e Shorto , H . L. , et al, 8 5 Shui , i n China , 17 0 Siam , kin g of , 3 0 Siam Society , 533 , 538n , 850 , 86 1 Siamese : definitio n of , 404n ; histor y i n Laos , 805f; minorit y i n Laos , 239 ; relation s wit h Si p Son g Cha u Tai , t

80 6

"Siames e Thai, " 4n , 48 . See also Ta i an d Thai , distinguishe d Sihanouk , N. , Princ e o f Cambodia , 24n , 25, 54 , 683n , 867 n Silingol League , Inne r Mongolia , 195 n Silverstein , J. , 130 , 14 3 Singapore , 353 ; an d Malaysia , 307 , 309 , 317 Singhpo , 21 0 Sinkiang , rebellio n in , 19 9 Sinkian g Province , China , 17 8 Sino-Burmes e border , 144 . See also China , borderland s Sino-Tibeta n languages , m l 5

[893]

INDE X

Sip Son g Cha o Tai (Twelv e Ta i Principalities) , Northwes t Vietnam , 236f, 243, 779, 783, 807, 83 3 Sip Son g Pa n Na , Yunnan Province , China , 237, 780 (see also Hsi-Shuan g Pan-Na ) Sithdon e Province , Laos, 244n Sithon e Komadam , 246 Skaw (Sgaw ) Karen , in Burma , 110-1 5 Skaw (Sgaw ) Karen , in Thailand : 113 , 390, 639-74 ; acculturatio n of, 651f ; animis m among , 650; an d Buddhism , 650; Christianit y among , 650; distric t differentiatio n among , 650; economy , 644f; education , 650; history , 641 ; intermarriage , 644f; isolatio n of , 650 ; language, 644 ; loca l administration , 650; materia l cultur e of, 644f, 650-5 1 migration , 641, 651f ; multilingualism , 650-61 ; opiu m addiction , 654f; relation s with centra l government , 651 ; religions, 644f, 650, 651; settlemen t patterns , 641, 644f; village organization , 649-5 2 Skinner , G . W., 89n , 258n , 373, 375 , 399η, 694n, 701n , 867 n Slimming , J. , 310n Smalley, W. Α. , 23n , 238, 242, 258n , 272, 373, 377, 380n , 383 , 390, 399n , 669 Smith , D . E., 77n Smith , Maj . W., Jr. , 709 n Smith , R. M. , 7n So, in Thailand , 433, 46 4 Soai, in Thailand , 37 3 Sochurek , H. , 55, 56, 686, 83 9 social stratification , 20 5 social systems, theor y of , 93-12 4 "Socialist Educatio n Movement, " in China , 19 2 Societ e de la Missio n Etranger e d e Paris, 760, 86 2 "a society, " concep t of, 10 1 socio-cultura l integration , 40 Son La uprising , 81 1 sorcerers , see Sadet s Souphanavong , Prince , 303 Sout h Korea , 25 0 Sout h Vietnam , 57 , 235; administrativ e divisions of, ml3 ; Communis t appeal s to, 739f; Constituen t Assembly of , 683n; Constitutio n of, 684 , 738 ; contro l of minoritie s in , 709n ; decentralizatio n o f administration , 742f; declin e o f administration , 706f; delta villages in , 718n; election s in ,

[ 89 4 ]

705; governmen t of , 8n ; governmen t relation s wit h hil l tribes , 53 ; Nationa l Liberatio n Fron t (NLF ) in , 8n, 24n ; language policie s in , 680; minorit y legal status , 684; minoritie s policies , 680-83 , 687 , 763-65 , 840 ; recommendation s fo r research , 741f ; refugees in , 709n; resettlemen t program s in , 68 0 Sout h Vietnamese , relation s wit h minorities , 680-8 3 Southeas t Asia Treat y Organization , see SEATO Southwes t Unio n University , China , 499 Souvann a Phouma , Prince , 245, 302, 857 Spanish Americans , 4 1 Specia l Divisio n o f th e Chins , Burma , 38 special forces , see XS. S . Army Specia l Force s specialized organizations , 4 9 Sre, in Sout h Vietnam , 701 n Srivijaya, 52 5 Stacey, T. , 310n Stat e Religio n Act , Burma , 96-98 , 12 0 Stern, T. , 44, 52, 110, 115 , 369, 373f, 378, 38On , 384n Steward , J. , 40 Stieng, in Vietnam , slaver y among , 757 Stun g Tren g Province , Cambodia , 24n strategic hamlets : America n rol e in , 740; decentralize d administration , 740 ; defense of , 718f; deterioratio n of , 734; educatio n program s in , 731; intelligenc e system s in , 724-27; loca l newspaper s in , 725f; local radi o in , 726; medica l car e in , 730; rol e o f militia in , 731; trainin g personne l in , 717-19 ; U.S . aid to , 74Of. See also actio n program s i n Vietna m strategic hamle t program : 57 , 59, 703, 706-44 ; aims , 71f; costs , 732 ; decentralize d administratio n in , 715, 740; educatio n program , 727 ; evaluatio n of , 72Of , 736-41; origins , 707-28 ; methods , 711-28 ; propagand a program , 727; publi c healt h measures , 727; results , 721-41 ; Viet Con g reactio n to, 719, 721, 733, 739f subsistenc e agriculture , 20, 35, 139. Se e also agricultur e SuIu , in Sabah , 35 4 Sun Yat-sen , 19 8 Sutherland , H. , 233

INDE X

Sutton , J. L. , 47 4 swidden agriculture , 11,114 , 139 ; amon g Yao, 585 ; defined , 8n ; in Assam, 215; i n India , 226-28; i n Laos, 236, 238; legal restrictions , in Thailand , 378; in Thailand , 369, 652f, 658f; in Vietna m highlands , 754 , 765-68 . See also subsistenc e agricultur e symbolic values , an d cultura l identity , 32 Szechwan Province , China , 173 Ta-hu-erh , in China , representation , 18 3 T'ai, in China , see Tha i Tai : administratio n by French , 779f; in China , 155,170,183 , 185 , 778; cultur e change , in Thailand , 594 ; definition , 772n ; distinguishe d fro m Thai , 6n ; distributio n i n Southeas t Asia, 778; ecolog y of , i n Burm a an d Thailand , 517; i n Laos , 236, 296, 778 ; and politica l unrest , 818; relation s with French , 795, 828; rol e in Frenc h Indochin a War, 772; socia l organizatio n of , 779-84 ; i n Vietnam , 41, 677, 772£F , 789, 778n , 790. See also minoritie s Tai Ba c (Ta y Bac ) Autonomou s Zone , Nort h Vietnam , 151 , 249 Tai Blanc , see Whit e Ta i Tai Dai , in Burma , 7 9 Tai Federation , Θ79, 685; antagonism s within , 805; leadershi p dispute s within , 806-10 ; relation s wit h Meo , 823f; role in Indochin a highlands , 804-17 ; rol e in Indochin a War , 804-17 ; structur e of, 80 5 Tai feudalism , 779-8 4 Tai highlands , en d of Frenc h influenc e in, 82 8 Tai languages , 23n ; in China , 149, 517n; central , northern , and southwester n groups , ml 5 Tai Lue : i n Laos , 236; i n Thailand , see Thai-Lu e Tai Neua , in Laos , 236, 77 8 T'ai P'in g rebellion , China , 806 Tai P'oue n (Phuan) , in Laos , 23 8 Tai politica l structure , see Si p Son g Cha u Tai ; Ta i Federatio n Tai-Frenc h militar y force , see Frenc h Indochin a Wa r Tai-Me o Autonomou s Zone , Nort h Vietnam , 679 , 83 3

Tai-speakin g peoples , 11 . See also languages, Tai ; minoritie s Taiwan , Republi c of, 494 , 510. Se e also China , Nationalis t Tak Province , Thailand , 56 8 tambon councils , in Thailand , 41 9 Tanham , C , 771n , 772 n Taoism , amon g Yunnanes e i n Thailand , 497f Tarekan , Kalimantan , 341 Tavanlar , E . J., 849 Tawan , Sabah , 353, 36 3 Tay, see Th o Tay Ba c Autonomou s Zone , Nort h Vietnam , see Ta i Ba c Taylor, Gen . M., 711 teak industry , i n Thailand , 63 9 Tedong , in Sabah , 34 0 Tehun g Thai-Chingp o Autonomou s Chou , Yunnan , 186-9 7 television, i n Northeas t Thailand , 465. See also mass media , radio s Tenasseri m dialect , speaker s of , 4n . See also languages, Tenasseri m Tenasseri m State , Burma , 3 8 Teochi u dialect , 490. See also languages, Chines e terrai n an d ecology , Southeas t Asia, 16f Thai , see Ta i Thai-America n Audiovisua l Service , m 9 Thai-Frenc h militar y force , see Frenc h Indochin a Wa r Thai-Lao : i n Thailand , 402, 425-86 . Se e also minoritie s Tha i Autonomou s Region , China , 185 Tha i Buddhis m (Theravad a Buddhism , 435, 47 2 Tha i Isa n (Northeas t Thai) , in Thailand , 43 1 Thai-Lu e ( L u ) : 11 , 47; refugees, i n Laos, 296f Thai-Lu e in Thailand : 14 , 58, 372f, 390, 496, 509 ; attitud e toward : centra l government , 48f, 404-406 ; Communists , 409; education , 407n; hil l tribes , 237f, 392n , 402, 406, 409; Tha i army , 411, 415; written messages, 41On communicatio n among , 412f ; communit y structure , 403f; conques t b y Siamese, 404-406 ; cooperativ e actio n among , 411, 415; cultura l distinction , 407; dialect , 48 ; ecolog y an d economy , 404; educatio n among , 403n; effect o f governmen t regulations , 416-19 ; gamblin g among , 417; generationa l

[ 89 5 ]

INDE X

differences, 409 ; history , 403; importanc e of literacy , 407n ; leadershi p among , 422-24 ; literac y among , 403n, 410; loyalties , 403 , 408f; missionar y activity among , 390; nationalis m among , 406; paymen t of tribut e by, 406; relation s with Yunnanese , 517; self-sufficiency of , 407; sentr y force , 410-12; symboli c importanc e of food , 406f; Tha i provincia l polic e among , 417; value s of, 409; village: leadership , 41Of, 421f; veteran s in , 413 Thai-Malays , 8n , 372n , 816f. See also Mala y minority , in Thailan d Thai-Me o Autonomou s Zone , Nort h Vietnam , 685 Tha i minority , in Thailand , 401-86 , 668 Tha i Nationa l Defense College , 433 Tha i nationals , in Laos, 234n Tha i peddlers , in Thailand , 534, 546 Thai-Yawng , i n Thailand , 31, 372, 406 Thai-Yua n (Norther n Thai) , in Thailand , 390, 409 Thailand , 7, 10η , 11, 12, 65, 77, 248, 298; abolitio n of slavery in , 640; actio n program s (see also Border Patro l Police ; MDU) , 7n , 425-86 ; administrativ e divisions , m9 ; administrativ e overcentralization , 476f; administrativ e structure , 51 , 379n; administrativ e units , 420; agricultura l change , 454-56 ; attitude s toward tribe s in , 529f; boundaries , 75; characteristic s of, 427; communit y structur e in , 52n; compulsor y educatio n in , 432; Departmen t of Administration , 547; Departmen t of Forestry , 385; Departmen t of Mines , 457; Departmen t of Publi c Welfare , 61, 64, 437, 522-25 , 530 , 578 , 583f, 667, 849, 859; discriminatio n agains t tribes people , 529; foreign researcher s in, 557-62 ; governmen t authorit y in remot e areas, 426; Hil l Tribe s Division , Departmen t of Publi c Welfare, 267 , 383, 487n, 538n , 543 ; influenc e o f hill tribe s o n lowlan d civilization , 527 ; invasion s o f Laos , 234; legislation an d assimilation , 375; Ministr y o f Agriculture , 533 ; Ministr y of Cooperatives, 437, 443; Ministr y of Defense , 384 ; Ministr y o f Education , 383, 545, 860; Ministr y o f Interior , 474, 544; Ministr y o f Publi c Health , 384, 437, 451, 533; minoritie s legislation, 375 ; nationa l

[ 89 6 ]

homogeneity , 427; Northeast , see Northeas t Thailand ; Populatio n Census , 372n , 399n ; Quee n Mother , 510; regiona l difference s in , 428f; researc h o n hill tribes , 387; researc h needs , 535; revolutio n o f 1932, 642; rura l communit y organization , 419; rura l delegation s t o Bangkok , 474n ; social chang e in , 483; socio-economi c survey o f hill tribes , 533-43 ; socia l structure , 50, 61; standar d o f living, 427; taxation , effects o n minorities , 418f; teachers , rol e of , 467f; Triba l Researc h Centr e in, see Triba l Researc h Centre ; tribe s in , histor y of , 528; tribes , reactio n to settlemen t programs , 532 (see also hil l tribes ) Thanh , Maj . Nguye n Viet, 721 Thano m Kittikachorn , Prim e Ministe r of Thailand , 436, 441 n Thao , Lt . Col . Pha m Ngoc , 706n, 707f The h Chongkhadikij , 431 n Theravad a Buddhism , see Tha i Buddhis m Thibaw, Kin g of Burma , 142 Tho (Tay ) i n Vietnam: 678n , 683, 778, 780, 788; attitude s towar d French , 794; elit e (Tho-ti ) among , 780f, 789; revolt o f 1940 (Ba c Son) , 792-96 ; role in battl e o f Die n Bien Phu , 832; role in Frenc h Indochin a War, 798f; Viet Minh , 794-96 ; Vietnames e history, 787f Tho-ti , see Th o elit e Thomas , D. D. , 85 , 86 , 258n , 399n , 400η , 694η , 695η , 701n , 702n , 867 n Thomas , M. L. , 27 , 430 , 477 , 48 3 Thompson , V., and Adloff, R . Α., 316n , 668 Tibet , 173 ; rebellio n in , 150, 19 9 Tibetans , in China , 15, 169 , 173 , 183 Tibeto-Burma n language , in China , 14 9 Tibeto-Burma n languages , i n Thailand , 374, 528 Tidong , in Sabah, 354 timbe r use disputes, in Sarawak, 349 T?in : i n Laos, 238; in Thailand , 374, 392 Tinker , H. , 127, 13 0 Tira p Frontie r Tract , Assam, 217 Titaya Suvanajata , 466 ilan (Me o spirits), 285f. See also Me o religion; animis m Ton g Hen , "king o f th e mots," 748 Tongas , C, 686 Tonkin , 678

INDE X Tonkin, Laos , 24 1 Tonle Sap , Cambodia, 10 , 746 Topping, S. , 311n, 522nf Torrey, J. , 355 T'ou Lao , in Nort h Vietnam , 694 n Touby Lyfong , 243 , 244, 248, 271n , 273, 274n , 275f , 280 , 282, 290, 291 , 292n, 302f , 82 3 Tougou Lyfong , 274 n Toulya Lyfong , 274n , 28 2 Toungoo, Burma , 11 2 Tran Hu y Lieu, 795 n Tran Nin h Plateau , Laos , 23 8 tribal autonomy : i n India, 218 ; in Laos , 243 tribal characteristics , 14 , 527; concept s of identity , 5n ; conservatism, 112 ; self-sufficiency o f community , 546 f tribal economy , i n Laos, 248f , 2 6 If; an d relations amon g tribes , 36 ; and relations wit h nationa l society , 35f ; in Thailand , 652ff , 66 8 tribal education : i n Thailand, 382 , 545 , 86Of tribal independence , 5 , 25f tribal inter-villag e politica l structures , 9n tribal isolation , 5 , 14 , 58, 62, 322f tribal languages : newspaper s in , 248; radio broadcasts in , 248 267, 269f; research on , 390. See aho languages ; minority language s tribal rebellions , 22n , 25f, 53n , 795n ; and colonialism , 77 ; in Laos, 269; in Nagaland, 206n ; i n Vietnam , 678f , 682f, 685f , 689 , 752-54, 76Of , 839, 840, 795 n Tribal Researc h Centre , Thailand , 6 1, 64, 268 , 535, 539, 543, 547-51, 553-S1, 564 , 631, 667, 669; activities, 553; administration , 578; administrative problems , 554; establishment i n Thailand, 573nf ; facilities, 574-78 ; staffin g problems , 578f tribal society , theoretica l model s of , 4 3 tribal Tai , in Laos , 236 . See aho Tai , Black Tai , Red Tai, White Tai , in Laos tribal villag e organization , 5 n tribal wars , 14 0 tribes, administratio n of : i n Laos , 261-70; i n Thailand , 529 , 538 tribes, homogeneity of , 42-44 , 13 2 tribes, isolatio n of , 42-44 ; i n Laos , 248f ; in Thailand , 55 4

tribes, materialism of , 3 2 tribes, an d nationa l integration , 43f tribes, separatis m of , 6 2 tribes, stabilit y of , 42 , 44 tribes, strategi c importanc e of , 2 9 tribes an d minorities , see minoritie s tribes people , see minoritie s Trinh famil y o f Vietnamese , 78 7 Tripura, population , 20 5 truck gardening , 36 . See also cas h crops ; agriculture Trueheart Committee , 713n Trung-cha, i n Nort h Vietnam , 694 n Trusan River , Sarawak , 32 8 Truxton, A . S., 389, 390 Tsinghai Province , China , 17 3 Tu Due , emperor o f Vietnam , 67 8 T'uchia, i n China , 17 0 Tung ( T u n g ) , i n China, 154 , 170, 183 Tung-Hsiang (Tunghsiang) , i n China , 170, 18 3 Tungus, i n China, 15 9 Tylor, E . B., 4O n U Nu , 96 Ubol Province , Thailand , 42 9 Ubon Province , Thailand , 44 1 Udon Province , Thailand , 43O n Udorn Province , Thailand , 431 , 432, 441, 46 5 Uighur, i n China, 169 , 183 Ukit, i n Sarawak , 33 1 Ulanfu, 184 , 195n "UIu dresse r system, " medica l services , in Sarawak , 34 5 UNESCO, 4n , 534, 631, 694n UNESCO Divisio n o f Narcoti c Drugs , in Thailand , 38 7 Unger, L. , 247 Union o f Burma , see Burm a United Christia n Missionar y Society , i n Thailand, 39 0 United Churc h o f Chris t i n the Philippines, i n Thailand , 392 n United Hil l People's Congress , Burma , 26 United Khasi-Jainti a Hills , Assam, 217 United Nations , 222 , 533, 861; actio n programs i n Laos , 30If; India n representation, 225 ; survey of refugees, Laos , 26 3 United Popula r Front , Pathe t Lao , 302f United States , a s "meltin g pot, " 59 USAID (Unite d State s Agenc y fo r International Development) , 63 ; in Laos, 239n , 246 , 258n, 262, 295,

[ 89 7 ]

INDE X

299f, 302; in Thailand , 42On ; in Vietnam , 7 1 If. See also action program s U.S . Army Ma p Service , m l3 U.S . Army Specia l Forces , 53, 55f, 243, 681f, 839 U.S . Congress , Committe e on Foreig n Affairs, 443 n U.S . Departmen t of Defense , in Thailand , 386f U.S . government , ai d to Thailand , 554 USI S (Unite d State s Informatio n Service) , in Thailand , 385, 433f, 441n; i n Sout h Vietnam , 726 U.S . miliar y aid , in South Vietnam , 711 U.S . Militar y Assistanc e Advisor y Grou p (MAAG) , in South Vietnam , 713 , 731 U.S . Operation s Missio n (USOM) , in Thailand , 381, 384, 386f, 42On , 478, 703n; in Vietnam, 712-14 , 726 , 728f, 731, 73 2 U.S . Senate , Judiciar y Committee , 246 Universit y o f Chiengmai , Thailand , 538n, 579 uplan d Thai , See Tai upland-lowlan d contacts , in Sarawak , 325 Uppe r Burma , 129 Uppe r Chindwin , Burma , 108 Uzbeks , in China , 170 Vang Pao , Gen. , 243, 248, 273n , 275f, 302f Vella, W. F. , 430, 435 veterans : i n Thai-Lu e villages, 422n; in Thailan d actio n programs , 422-2 4 Vientiane , Laos , 235, 239, 291; prince s of, 234f; Province , 244n Viet Ba c Autonomou s Zone , Nort h Vietnam , 151 , 680, 793, 799 Viet Cong , 53, 55, 56, 387; ai d program s for minorities , Θ81 ; establishmen t of , 706; in guerrilla warfare , 706; language policie s of , 32, 681; minorit y policies of , 28, 681. See also Nationa l Liberatio n Fron t Viet Minh , 55, 24On , 679f; in Cambodia , 24n; in cities, 795 ; conflic t wit h Chinese , 834f; developmen t of , 772; evacuatio n t o North , 705; in guerrill a warfare, 791 ; interest s in Laos, 837; interest s in Tai peoples , 835; in Laos, 281, 289; an d Laotia n minorities , 835f; militar y organization , use for nation-building , 833; minorit y

[ 89 8 ]

policies, 684, 771-884 ; mobilit y in Tai highlands , 829; negotiation s wit h French , 793; propaganda , 706; relation s with China , 797; relation s with minorities , 679f; resumptio n of actio n in South Vietnam , 705 ; strategic us e of mountains , 791-804 ; strategy of , 773, 79Of; in Ta i highlands , 803 , 813; in Viet-Ba c Zone , 795; warfar e i n foothills, 802; warfare i n lowlands, 792 , 801f; warfare i n mountains , 792, 798f Viet-Muong , i n Southeas t Asia, 11 ; social structure , 781 Vietnam ( see also South Vietnam , Nort h Vietnam) , 7, 53, 65; actio n program s in , 55; borders , 677f; Buddhis m in , 688; Catholicis m in, 688; ethni c distributio n in , 677, 745-60 , 775-84 ; an d Frenc h colonialism , 786-90 ; geography , 775 ; hill tribe s an d vocationa l training , 453n; interna l division s of , 687f; nationa l unity , 688f; norther n minoritie s in , 777f; population , 677; relation s with Cambodi a an d Laos , 788; religion s in , 688; ric e productio n in, 821; triba l revol t in , 56 (se e also triba l rebellions ) Vietnam highland s (see also Darlac Plateau) : 751 : abolitio n o f slavery in, 757; autonom y movemen t in , 839; basis of leadershi p in , 758; Cambodia n influenc e in , 747 ; Catholi c missionarie s in , 747f; Cha m contro l of, 747; contact s with lowlanders , 746 ; court s in {see also native tribunals) , 763-65 ; customar y la w in, 755f, 762-65 ; don dien {military colonies ) in , 748; economy , 754; elite s in , 757; Frenc h administratio n of, 748f, 750-52 , 763; Frenc h influence , 748-53 ; histor y of , 746-60 ; inter-villag e alliances , 757 ; inter-villag e warfare , 756f; irrigate d agriculture , 765 ; Japanes e in , 753; lan d dispute s in, 761; lan d laws, 765; lan d ownershi p in, 751f; language s of , 746, 777f; militar y trainin g in , 839; Nort h Vietnames e refugee s in , 754; politica l organizatio n of , 755-60 ; population , 777; regroupmen t centers , 754; religion s in , 757-60 ; Sedan g influenc e in , 749; settlemen t of Vietnames e arm y in , 748;

INDE X

sorcerers in (see also Jarai sorcerers), 758-60; Sout h Vietnames e administration of , 754 ; South Vietnamese legislation on , 763-65; taboos in, 758; tribal revolts against French, 748-53; Viet Cong action in, 762; Viet Minh in, 753f; Vietnames e control of, 747 f Vietnam highlanders: 241 , 745-769; aspirations of, 761 ; characteristics of , 776; land tenur e among, 767f; legal status of, 762f ; nationalis m among, 762; in North Vietnam, 753 Vietnam hill tribes, see Vietnam highlanders Vietnam minorities, role in Frenc h Indochina War, 771-884; geographical classification , 78 3 Vietnamese: expansion of, 6 , 677n, 784-90; i n Cambodia, 8n, 24, 54, 677n; in China (Ching) , 159 ; in Laos, 237, 272; of Nort h Vietnam , 678n; in Thailand, 430n ; relations with Vietnam highlanders, 678; in South Vietnam, 56; southward expansion of, 1 1 Vietnamization o f Tho, 780ff, 788. See also Tho in Vietna m Vijaya, 74 6 village cooperation, in Thailand, 444-47 village headmen, role in Thailan d action programs, 422-24 Vo Nguyen Giap, 708, 772n Wa (Kawa ) i n Burma: 45 , 75, 118; and Chinese , 14 9 Wa State, Burma, 1 9 Wachirawut, King of Thailand , 43 5 Wagley, C, 14 4 Wallace, A. F. C, 29 2 Walterhouse, H. F., 443 Wanat Bhruksasri , 57 5 Warner, D., 273, 709n, 837 Wars of national liberation, 743n Weiner, M., 43 WeUs, K. E., 389, 390f westernization, 97 Westwood, T., 31On wet-rice cultivation, 76; in Thailand, 14 . See also agriculture, irrigated agriculture White Tai (Ta i Blanc), in Vietnam , 683, 694n, 778; relations with Black Tai, 807-11; relation s with Viet Minh, 811f. See also Tai

Whyte, W. F., and Williams, L. K., 471 Wiens, H.,187 n "wild Wa," in Burma, see Wa Wilhelm, H., 161 n Williams-Hunt, P . D. R., 6On Wilson, D. A., 27, 39, 430 "winning hearts and minds," 56. See also action program s Wolf, E., 18n , 39, 40 Woodman, D., 129, 142 Woodruff, L . W., 688n World Ban k Advisory Group, Thailand, 433 n World Health Organizatio n (WHO) , in Sarawak , 334, 346; in Thailand , 384 World War II, 18, 75, 126, 141-43, 216, 221,235, 240, 249, 278, 281, 292n, 375, 392n, 492f, 664, 708, 753, 789f; in Indochina, 684 ; in Malaysia, 310 Worldwide Evangelization Crusade , in Thailand, 390 writing systems, see languages Wulff, R. , 386 Xa, in North Vietnam, 695n Xa family o f Black Tai, 812 Xieng Khouang, Laos, 272, 778; prince of, an d Meo, 246; princes of , 234f, 273 Province: 233, 295; administration of , 273; civi l war in, 272f; ethni c distribution in, 271f; governo r of , 235 , 242; transportation in , 272f; relations with Annam, 273; relations with rest of Laos, 273 Y Bham Enoul, Rhade leader, 682, 683n, 761f Y Binh Aleo, 681 Y Thih, Jarai sadet, 759 ya, spirits of Bahnar and Sedang , 753 Ya Ba, CoL, 761 Yang, C. K., 622 YAO (I n Mien , Man): 5n ; adaptatio n to administrative change , 622; adaptation t o central governments, 586f; adaptation t o economic change, 609; adoption, 36, 585n, 594, 634; afterlife, 614n ; ancestor worship, 590nf; and Chinese , 149; attitude toward centra l governments , 48; attitudes toward lowlanders, 621; attitude s toward other hill tribes, 621; bilingualism, 625;

[ 89 9 ]

INDE X

ceremonies of, 598f; child-buying, 36, 594, 634; Christianity among , 595, 612; clans among, 591-93; communications among, 48, 606-609; conflict resolution, 602-605; conquest by Chinese, 624; culture, and literacy, 607; deviant behavior among, 602-606; ecology of, 585f ; economic cooperation among, 613; economy, 605n, 782; ethnic categorie s of, 584; genealogy of, 59On, 631-34; history of, 583, 632-36; household composition , 509f , 601, 613-15, 634 in Burma, 634f; in China, 31, 149 , 170, 183,185, 584, 607, 632; in Laos, 31, 238, 241, 269, 296, 303, 634-36; in North Vietnam, 683, 695n; in Southeast Asia , 48; in Thailand, 31 , 47, 292n, 369, 374, 390, 479n, 506, 516, 523, 527f, 533f, 547, 549f, 583, 634-36, 654; in Vietnam, 31, 633, 677, 781-84 income of, 605n; influence of Chinese civilization among , 625n; initiation, 59On ; and intermarriage, 59On, 594, 634; kin relationships, 592f, 607; language (glossary) , 636-38; leadership, 616-18; literacy among, 606, 621; location in Thailand and Laos, 583f; maintenance of cultural boundaries, 48; an d marriage, 593, 607, 608, 633; "materialism" ( see also Yao merit-making), 597; merit-making, 588-638; migration, 11 , 583-638; missionary activity among, in Thailand, 390 ; murder among , 602-605; on Thailand border, 8n; and opium, 35, 514f, 585, 608, 820f; origin myth, 591f; political structures, 9n, 611-622, 634; population in Laos, 585; population in Thailand, 585; property ownership, 613; refugees, in Laos, 297, 303 relations with: Akha , 594, 619, 620; central governments, 600, 607, 616f, 619-21; lowlanders in Vietnam, 782; Meo, 594; other groups, 594, 615-17; spirits, 586-638; Yunnanese, 516 ritual among, 596n; settlemen t pattern, 61 If; socia l control, 602-606; social structure, 585n, 590-93, 629f, 782f; use of Chinese language,

[900]

599, 625; use of Chinese geomancers, 613f; use of Chinese script, 377; value of silver, 588, 595-98; village cooperation, 605f; village fission, 614f; world view, 624. See also Man Yatsushiro, T., 457n Yaw, in Burma, 114 Yawng, in Thailand, see Thai-Yawng Yeinbaw, in Burma, 111 Yi ( I ), in China, 169,172 , 183 , 18 6 Ying Sida, 26 Young, G., ml5, 382, 399n, 42On, 508n, 523n, 526, 586n, 642 Young, H. M., 89n Yuan, in Thailand, see Thai-Yuan Yunnan Province, China, 118 , 135, 149 , 173,191f, 199 , 241, 488, 507, 5l7n, 584 Yunnanese, 488. See also Haw (Ho) Yunnanese: in Burma, 496; relations with minorities, 491; relations wit h other Chinese, 491, 513f, 523; religion of, 491 Yunnanese, in Thailand: 9 , 376; action programs among , 510; agriculture, 498f, 502-509, 521; agricultural change, role in, 522; and BPP, 509; and Buddhism, 509; cash crops, 504-509, 515, 522; Chinese education among, 501-503; commerce among, 508f, 577; contact with Chines e Embassy, 510; contacts with outside world, 509-13; cultural orientation, 522f; ecology of, 494f, 503-505; economy, 494, 498f, 503-509, 521f; education , 496f, 500-503, 520f; effect o n Thai and Thai-Lue , 503, 522; government of, 499f, 520; health program s among, 499, 510; history of, 491, 519; income of, 515 ; influence of , 418; integration with Thailand, 523; intermarriage, 496, 512, 519 ; languages, 496f; leadership, 499f; location, 488-92, 519; loyalties of , 523; material culture, 495f, 519; missionaries among, 510, 519; newspapers, 511; and opium, 506, 509, 514f; peddlers, 508f, 577; plow cultivation, 507f; politics, 493, 513; population, 496, 519; radio broadcasts to, 511 relations with: BPP , 512f, 521; hill tribes, 515f; Karen, 518; Lahu, 518; Lisu, Yao, and Meo, 516; neighbors,

INDE X

511-13; officiak, 511-13 ; Thai, 49 499f, 511-1 3 religions of, 496-98 , 519; traders, 577; and USIS , 509; and Yao, 634

ZANO (Zon e Autonome Nord-Ouest) , 803 Zasloff, J. J., 707n, 709n Zawodny, J. K., 791n

[901]

Other books published fo r The Center of International Studies Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affair s Gabriel A . Almond, The Appeals of Communism Gabriel A . Almond an d Jame s S. Coleman , editors , The Politics of the Developing Areas Gabriel A . Almon d an d Sidne y Verba , The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations Richard J . Barne t an d Richar d A . FaIk , Security in Disarmament Cyril E . Blac k an d Thoma s P . Thornton , editors , Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence Robert J . C . Butow , Top and the Coming of the War Miriam Camps , Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963 Bernard C . Cohen , The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement Bernard C . Cohen , The Press and Foreign Policy Charles D e Visscher , Theory and Reality in Public International Law, translate d by P . E . Corbet t Frederick S . Dunn, Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan Harry Eckstein , Division and Cohesion in Democracy: a Study of Norway Richard F . Hamilton , Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic Herman Kahn , On Thermonuclear War W. W . Kaufmann , editor , Military Policy and National Security Klaus Knorr , On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations Klaus Knorr , editor , NATO and American Security Klaus Knor r an d Sidne y Verba , editors , The International System: Theoretical Essays Peter Kunstadter , editor , Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations Sidney J . Ploss , Conflict and Decision-making in Soviet Russia Lucian W . Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya James N . Rosenau , editor , International Aspects of Civil Strife James N . Rosenau , National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support Rolf Sannwald an d Jacques Stohler , Economic Integration: Theoretical Assumptions and Consequences of European Unification. Translate d b y Herma n F . Karreman Richard L . Sklar , Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation Glenn H . Snyder , Deterrence and Defense Harold an d Margare t Sprout , The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, With Special Reference to International Politics Thomas P . Thornton , The Third World in Soviet Perspective: Studies by Soviet Writers on the Developing Areas Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership Karl vo n Vorys , Political Development in Pakistan Myron Weiner , Party Politics in India E. Victo r Wolfenstein , The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Ghandi Oran R . Young , The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises

[902]

Map Sectio n

Redrawn Map 3. CHINA —Administrative Divisions. from China: Provisional Atlas of Communist Administrative Units (CIA/R R G R 59-20) . Washington, D.C., U.S . Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Service, 1959, and modified with more recent information. Map 4. CHINA —Minority Autonomous Administrative Divisions of the Southwest. Redrawn from China: Provisional Atlas of Communist Administrative Units (CIA/ RR GR 59-20). Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Service, 1959, and modified with more recent information. ReMap 9. THAILAND —Administrative Divisions. drawn from map of Thailand prepared by Thai-American Audiovisual Service, July, 1962. Map 13. SOUTH VIETNAM—Administrative Divisions. Redrawn from Population Density Map of South Vietnam, Scale 1:500,000, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Army Map Service, Edition 1-AMS, 6-64. Map 15. NORTHERN INDOCHINA—Distribution of Languages. Sources : LeBar, Fran k M . et al. Ethnolinguisti c group s o f Main land Southeas t Asia , ma p accompanyin g Ethni c Group s of Mainlan d Southeas t Asia , Ne w Haven , Conn. , Huma n Relations Are a File s Press , 1964 . Service Geographiqu e d e l'lndochine , Cart e Ethnolin guistique prepare d unde r th e directio n o f l'Ecol e Fran gaise d'Extrem e Orient , 194 9 edition . Young, Gordon . Th e hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailand . Bangkok, Sia m Society , secon d edition .

1. BURM A AN D EASTER N INDI A

2. CAMBODI A

3. CHINA—ADMINISTRATIV

E DIVISION

S

4. CHINA—MINORIT Y AUTONOMOU S ADMINISTRATIV E DIVISION S O F TH E SOUTHWES T

5. LAOS—ADMINISTRATIV E DIVISION S

6. MALAYSIA—SABA H AN D SARAWA K

7. MALAYSIA—SA B AH

8. THAILAN D

9. THAILAND—ADMINISTRATIV E DIVISION S

10 . THAILAND—DETAI

L

11 . NORT H VIETNAM—ADMINISTRATIV

E DIVISION

S

12 . SOUT H VIETNA M

106»

104 °

108 °

Militar y Lin e o r Demarcatio n

ADMINISTRATIVE

DIVISIONS

1 A N GIAN S

2 3 LA M DON G

2 A N XUYE N

2 4 LON G A N

3 B A XUYE N

2 5 LON G KHAN H

4 BIE N HO A

2 6 NIN H THUA N

5 BIN H DIN H

2 7 PHON

6 BIN H DUON G

2 8 PH

U BO N

G DIN H

7 BIN H LON G

2 9 PH

U YE N

8 BIN H THUA N

3 0 PHUO

C LON G

9 BIN H TU Y

3 I PHUO

C THAN H

3 2 PHUO

C TU Y

IO CHUON I I CO

G THIE N

3 3 PLEIK

N SO N

3 4 QUAN

I 2 DARLA C 1 3 DIN H TUON

G

U G DU C

3 5 OUAN G NA M 3 6 QUAN

1 4 GI A DIN H

G NGA I

I 5 G O CON G

QUANG TI N

1 6 HA U NGHI A 17 KHAN H HO A

QUANG TR I TAY NIN H

18 KIE N GIAN G

THUA THIE N

19 KIE N HO A

TUYEN DU

C

2 0 KIE

N PHON

G

VINH BIN

H

2 1 KIE N TUON

G

VINH LON

G

2 2 KONTU

LAOS

M

CAMBODIA

25 5

07

5 10

108 °

13. SOUT H VIETNAM—ADMINISTRATIV E DIVISION S

0

14. NORTHER N INDOCHIN

A

Key: * Se e materia l accompany ing Burm a Populatio n Tabl e for furthe r informatio n o n linguistic classification . VIET-MUONG 1. Vietnames e 2. Muon g MIAO-YAO 3. Mia o (Meo ) 4. Ya o (Man ) MON-KHMER N. Lao s Grou p 5. Khmu' ' 6. Lame t 7. T i n Palaungic Grou p 8. W a TAI Southwestern Grou p A. Blac k Ta i B. Khii n C. La o D. Lu e E. Pa- y F. Phutha i G. Re d Ta i H. TaiNeu a I. Yua n (Kho n Myang ) J. Whit e Ta i Central Grou p K. Nun g L. Th o (Tay ) Northern Grou p M. Chuan g N. Nyan g (Nhang ) O. Sae k SINO-TIBETAN Chinese Q. Chines e (severa l dialects) R. Ha w (Ho , Yunnanes e Chinese) Tibeto-Burman Burmese LoIo S. Akh a T. Lah u U. LoI o V. -Han i W. -Won i X. Minchi a (Pai ) Karen Y. Ska w Kare n KADAI a. Laqu a b. Lati '

15. NORTHER N INDOCHINA—DISTRIBUTIO N O F LANGUAGE S