Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, Volume 1 9781400887620

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

N

TRIBES, MINORITIES AND NATION

S

,

PUBLISHE D FO R TH E PRINCETO N CENTE R O F INTERNATIONA L STUDIE S A LIS T O F OTHE R CENTE R PUBLICATION APPEAR S A T TH E BAC K O F VOLUM E I I

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VOLUM EI

SOUTHEAS T ASIA T

R

I

B

E

S

N

,

M I N O R I T I E S , AN

D

NATION S

EDITE D B

Y

PETER KUNSTADTE R P R I N C E T O N NE

W JERSE

PRINCETO N UNIVERSIT I 9 6 7

Y

Y PRES

S

Copyright © 196 7 by Princeto n Universit y Pres s AL L MGHT S BESERVE D

Library o f Congres s Car d No . 66-1770 3 Printed i n th e Unite d State s o f Americ a by Th e Mapl e Pres s Compan y

Princeton Legacy Library edition 2017 Paperback ISBN: 978-0-691-62316-0 Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-691-62851-6

PREFACE in thi s volume ar e from severa l distinc t sources . Mos t of the m gre w ou t o f a conferenc e hel d i n Princeton i n Ma y 1965 ; other contribution s wer e solicite d afte r thi s conference , an d stil l others cam e ou t o f a sessio n a t th e annua l conventio n o f th e American Anthropologica l Associatio n i n Denve r i n Novembe r 1965. The conference , o n th e subjec t o f tribes , minorities, an d centra l governments i n Southeas t Asia , was held a t Princeto n University , under th e auspice s o f th e Cente r o f Internationa l Studies , be tween Ma y 1 0 and Ma y 15 , 1965. The conferenc e wa s conducte d under a contrac t fro m th e Advance d Researc h Project s Agenc y of th e Departmen t o f Defense . Peopl e wer e brough t togethe r at thi s conferenc e wh o ha d ha d extensiv e direc t experienc e wit h tribal o r rura l minorit y people s o r wh o ha d bee n engage d i n projects sponsore d b y centra l government s whic h deal t wit h those people. Papers were prepared i n advanc e of th e conference , and thes e forme d th e basi s fo r discussion . Th e papers , a s the y appear i n thi s volume , hav e bee n modifie d a s a resul t o f thes e discussions, an d som e o f th e conclusion s o f th e discussion s ar e also contained i n the introductory chapter . Participants i n th e conferenc e a t Princeto n include d Dr . Wil liam R . Geddes , SEAT O Advise r t o th e Triba l Researc h Centr e in Chiengmai , Thailand , an d Departmen t o f Anthropology , Uni versity o f Sydney ; Mr . To m Harrisson , Curato r an d Governmen t Ethnologist, Sarawa k Museum ; Dr . Le e W . Huff , Directo r fo r Behavioral Sciences , Advance d Researc h Project s Agenc y o f th e U.S. Departmen t o f Defense ; Mr . Pete r Kandre , doctora l candi date, Universit y o f Goteborg ; Dr . Pete r Kunstadter , Departmen t of Sociolog y an d Anthropology , Princeto n University ; Mr . Charles Henr y Ley , Saba h Borde r Scouts , and Assistan t Protecto r of Aborigines , Departmen t o f Aborigin e Affairs , Malaysia ; Dr . Hans Manndorff , Anthropologica l Advise r t o the Hill Tribe s Divi T H E PAPER S

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PBEFAC E

sion o f th e Departmen t o f Publi c Welfare , Governmen t o f Thailand, an d Museu m fii r Volkerkunde , Vienna ; Mr . Mara n L a Raw, Anthropologica l Researc h Officer , Governmen t o f Burma , and doctora l candidate , Universit y o f Illinois ; Dr. Michae l Moer man, Departmen t o f Anthropology , Universit y o f California , Lo s Angeles; Mr . Joh n B . O'Donnell , U.S . Agenc y fo r Internationa l Development, formerl y Provinc e Representative , Kie n Ho a an d Long A n Provinces , Republi c o f Vietnam ; Mr . Myle s Osborn , Colombo Pla n Hil l Tribe s Advise r t o th e Roya l Laotia n Govern ment; Mr . Jame s Thoma s Ward , U.S . Agenc y fo r Internationa l Development, formerly Rural Development Advisor, Refugee Re lief Program , Laos . Mr. Harr y Pierson , o f th e Asi a Foundation, 1 Mr . Richar d Diao , of th e Unio n Researc h Institut e (Hon g Kong) , Dr . Frederic k K. Lehman o f th e Universit y o f Illinois , and Dr. Gerald C . Hicke y of Th e RAN D Corporatio n submitte d papers , bu t wer e unabl e to atten d th e conference . A t th e reques t o f th e editor , Professo r F. W . Mot e an d Dr . Joh n T . McAIiste r o f Princeto n Universit y prepared paper s after th e conference wa s held . Other paper s gre w ou t o f a pane l sessio n o n th e futur e o f upland triba l people s i n Southeas t Asi a a t th e 196 5 meeting s of th e America n Anthropologica l Associatio n i n Denver . Thi s panel, whic h wa s no t connecte d wit h th e conferenc e hel d earlie r at Princeton , wa s organize d b y Professo r Lucie n Hank s (o f Ben nington College ) an d Professo r Lauristo n Shar p (o f Cornel l Uni versity). Th e contribution s o f Dr . Robbin s Burlin g (Departmen t of Anthropology , Universit y o f Michigan ) an d Dr . Joe l M . Hal pern (Russia n Researc h Center , Harvar d University ) wer e a re sult o f thi s session . Dr . Lehman , wh o als o participated, expande d and elaborate d hi s origina l pape r a s a resul t o f thi s session . Th e paper b y Mr . G . Linwoo d Barne y (Nyac k Missionar y College , and doctora l candidate , Departmen t o f Anthropology , Universit y of Minnesota ) wa s solicite d b y th e edito r a s a result o f Halpern' s suggestion following th e Denver meetings . All book s growin g ou t o f conferences , especiall y thos e whic h have no t lai d dow n rigi d outlines , ma y lac k consistency . Thi s book suffer s fro m a n inevitabl e lac k o f uniformity , give n th e * Mr. Pierso n an d th e Asi a Foundatio n wer e represente d a t th e conferenc e b y Mr. Jame s Basche .

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PREFAC E

diverse training , experience , an d interest s o f ou r authors . Also , since man y o f th e author s hol d officia l positions , thei r remark s have sometime s bee n limite d b y consideration s o f securit y an d diplomacy. Th e view s o f th e author s shoul d no t b e take n a s offi cial representation s o f th e organization s whic h emplo y them , no r do the y necessaril y represen t view s o f Princeto n University , th e American Anthropologica l Association , o r th e Departmen t o f Defense. This boo k i s no t s o complet e a s i t migh t hav e been . I t woul d have been desirabl e t o cover Cambodi a an d th e Mala y Peninsula , not t o mentio n Indonesi a an d th e Philippines. 2 N o excus e i s offered fo r thes e omissions , sav e tha t i t i s impossibl e t o cove r everything. Mainlan d Chin a ha s bee n included , no t becaus e i t is a par t o f Southeas t Asia , bu t becaus e man y o f th e minoritie s in Southeas t Asi a ar e als o t o b e foun d i n China , becaus e China' s policies o f establishin g autonomou s minorit y region s ar e bein g copied i n Southeas t Asia , an d becaus e Chin a ha s openl y avowe d her intention s o f influencin g Southeas t Asia n minorities . Easter n India wa s include d becaus e o f th e example s o f ethnicall y South east Asia n triba l people s bein g integrate d int o a centra l govern ment quit e differen t fro m thos e foun d i n Southeas t Asia . Th e greatest concentratio n i n th e boo k (perhap s to o great ) i s o n Thailand. Th e reaso n fo r thi s i s simpl y tha t informatio n i s mor e readily availabl e from Thailan d a t the present time , and i t prove d possible t o cove r a fairl y complet e rang e o f topic s there . The conferenc e i n Princeton , th e sessio n i n Denver , an d th e papers i n thi s boo k wer e limite d t o rura l minoritie s rathe r tha n urban ones ; and i n general th e emphasi s was on cultural o r ethni c minorities, rathe r tha n religiou s o r racia l ones . O'Donnell' s pape r on th e Sout h Vietnames e Strategi c Hamle t Progra m deal s wit h people wh o ar e ethnicall y a par t o f th e nationa l majority , bu t their socia l distanc e fro m th e centra l governmen t make s the m resemble a minorit y i n man y ways . Th e Chinese , wh o ar e th e primary urba n minorit y i n Southeas t Asia , ar e wel l covere d i n a larg e bod y o f specialize d literatur e o f thei r own . Therefor e we hav e include d reference s t o th e Chines e minorit y onl y whe n they wer e appropriat e t o th e mai n subjec t unde r discussion , or , as in Mote's paper, when the y were a rural minority . a

See Appendix for Cambodia n populatio n figures.

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PREFAC E

Events hav e move d rapidl y i n Southeas t Asi a (particularl y i n Vietnam, Thailand , an d Malaysia ) sinc e thes e paper s wer e pre pared fo r publicatio n i n 1965 . Man y change s i n th e positio n o f minorities i n Vietna m hav e resulte d fro m th e grea t expansio n o f American militar y effort s there , th e accelerate d fighting i n th e highlands, an d th e election s hel d i n Sout h Vietna m earl y i n Sep tember 196 6 (i n whic h minoritie s includin g montagnards , Catho lics, an d sect s lik e th e Ho a Ha o receive d abou t twic e a s man y seats a s woul d hav e bee n prescribe d b y thei r proportion s i n th e population). Th e America n presenc e i n Thailan d ha s increased , and ha s bee n accompanie d b y greatl y expande d Tha i an d U.S . programs fo r minorities , particularl y i n th e Northeas t an d amon g the norther n hil l tribes . Th e whol e matte r o f "Confrontation " of Malaysi a b y Indonesi a ha s bee n droppe d a s a result o f politica l changes i n Indonesia , bu t th e problem s o f integratin g th e larg e non-Islamic populatio n o f Sarawa k wit h th e res t o f Malaysi a con tinue t o b e amon g th e mos t vexin g difficultie s facin g tha t nation . Thus, althoug h som e o f th e condition s describe d i n thes e paper s have bee n outdated , th e backgroun d settin g o f minoritie s an d tribes remain s importan t i n nationa l an d internationa l develop ments o f th e region . Peter Kunstadte r Chiengmai, Thailan d October 1 , 196 6

[ vii i ]

ACKNOWLEDGMENT S I GRATEFULL Y acknowledg e th e assistanc e o f th e man y peopl e wh o aided i n th e preparatio n o f thi s boo k fo r publication . I o f cours e thank th e author s fo r th e spee d o f th e preparatio n o f thei r papers , and fo r thei r patienc e i n makin g numerou s editoria l changes . I par ticularly wan t t o than k Dr . Joh n T . McAliste r an d Dr . Joe l Halper n for thei r numerou s an d valuabl e bibliographi c suggestions , an d Profes sor Lucie n Hank s an d Professo r Lauristo n Shar p fo r organizin g a panel fro m whic h severa l o f th e paper s i n thi s volum e came , an d for assistin g me in obtaining these papers for publication . Dr. Robbin s Burling , Dr . Willia m J . Gedney , Dr . Willia m A . Smalley, Dr . G . Willia m Skinner , an d Mr . Davi d D . Thoma s kindl y provided m e wit h unpublishe d material s o n linguisti c classificatio n and populations , an d trie d t o straighte n ou t fo r m e th e ver y confuse d systems o f linguisti c classificatio n whic h exis t i n th e literature . The y are i n n o wa y t o b e blame d fo r th e inadequacie s o f th e linguisti c classifications presente d i n th e book . The larg e an d burdensom e secretaria l jo b o f preparin g thi s boo k for publicatio n wa s share d b y a numbe r o f persons , includin g espe cially Mrs . Dian e Appelbaum , Mrs . Ann e Birrell , Mrs . Ev a Critz , Miss Ris a Rosloff , Mrs . Barbar a Salmone , an d Mrs . Jud y Winkler , who typed , researched , an d arranged ; Mrs . Charlott e Carlson , Mrs . Judy Getis , an d Mr . E d Lippitt , wh o assiste d i n preparatio n o f th e maps; and Mrs . Jean Lilly , who assiste d with cop y editing . I wis h t o than k th e Nationa l Geographi c Societ y fo r cameras , film , and othe r suppor t whic h helpe d m e t o take mos t o f m y picture s whic h appear i n thi s volume. Finally, I wis h t o acknowledg e th e assistanc e o f th e Cente r o f Inter national Studies , especiall y Professo r Klau s Knorr , Director , fo r assis tance wit h th e man y bureaucrati c detail s involve d i n completin g thi s task, an d th e Offic e fo r Surve y Researc h an d Statistica l Studie s o f Princeton Universit y for spac e in which to work .

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CONTENT S

Prefac e ν Acknowledgment s i

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Illustratio n sectio n follows page 1

6

Ma p section follows pag e 90

0

PART I : INTRODUCTIO

Chapte r 1 Introduction,

N

by Pete r Kunstadte r 3

PART I I : B U R M

A

Burma : Introduction, by Pete r Kunstadte r 7 Chapte r 2 Ethni c Categorie s i n Burm a an d th e Theor y o f Social Systems , by F . K. Lehma n 9 Chapte r 3 Towar d a Basi s fo r Understanding th e Minori ties i n Burma : Th e Kachi n Example , b y Mara n La Ra w 12

PART II

I : CHIN

3 5

A

China : Introductio n by Pete r Kunstadte r 14 Chapte r 4 Th e Nationa l Minoritie s o f Chin a an d Thei r Relation s wit h th e Chines e Communis t Regime , by Richar d K . Dia o 16

PART IV : INDI

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India : Introduction, by Pete r Kunstadte r 20 Chapte r 5 Tribesme n an d Lowlander s o f Assam , b y Rob bins Burlin g 21

5 5

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CONTENT S PAR T V

: LAO S

Laos: Introduction , b y Joel Halper n an d Peter Kunstadter 23 Chapter 6 Governmen t an d th e Hil l Tribe s o f Laos , b y G.M.T. Osborn 25 Chapter 7 Th e Meo of Xieng Khouan g Province , Laos , by G. Linwood Barney 27 Chapter 8 U.S . Aid t o Hil l Trib e Refugee s i n Laos , b y J. Thomas Ward 29 PAR T V l : MALAYSI

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7 7 3

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Thailand: Introduction , by Peter Kunstadter 36 Chapter 1 1 A Minority an d Its Government: Th e Thai-Lue of Northern Thailand, by Michael Moerman 40 Chapter 1 2 Th e Thai Mobile Development Unit Program, by Lee W. Huff 42

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Malaysia: Introduction, by Peter Kunstadter 30 Chapter 9 Tribes , Minorities , an d the Central Governmen t Sarawak, Malaysia, by Tom Harrisson 31 Chapter 1 0 Th e Murut s o f Saba h (Nort h Borneo) , b y C. H. Ley 35 PAR T V I I : T H A I L A N

3

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C O N T E N T S VOLUM E I I P A R T v i i : T H A I L A N D (continued)

Chapter 1 3 Th e Rura l "Haw " (Yunnanes e Chinese ) o f Northern Thailand , b y F . W. Mot e 48 Chapter 1 4 Th e Hil l Trib e Progra m o f th e Publi c Welfar e Department, Ministr y o f Interior , Thailand : Re search an d Socio-Economi c Development , b y Hans Manndorf f 52 Chapter 1 5 Th e Triba l Researc h Centre , Thailand : A n Account o f Plan s an d Activities , b y Willia m R . Geddes 55 Chapter 1 6 Autonom y an d Integratio n o f Socia l Systems : The I u Mie n ("Yao " o r "Man" ) Mountai n Population an d Thei r Neighbors , b y Pete r Kandre 58 Chapter 1 7 Th e Lua ? (Lawa ) an d Ska w Kare n o f Mae hongson Province , Northwester n Thailand , b y Peter Kunstadte r 63 PART V I I l : VIETNA

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Vitenam: Introduction , b y Pete r Kunstadte r 67 Chapter 1 8 Th e Strategi c Hamle t Progres s i n Kie n Ho a Province, Sout h Vietnam : A Cas e Stud y o f Counter-Insurgency, b y Joh n O'Donnel l 70 Chapter 1 9 Som e Aspect s o f Hil l Trib e Lif e i n Sout h Viet nam, b y Gerald C . Hickey 74 Chapter 2 0 Mountai n Minoritie s an d the Viet Minh : A Key to th e Indochin a War , by J . T. McAlister , Jr . 77 PART I X THE ROL E O F PRIVAT E F O U N D A T I O N

7

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Chapter 2 1 Th e Asi a Foundation' s Programmin g fo r Triba l and Minorit y People s i n Southeas t Asia , b y Harry H . Pierso n 84

7

Appendix Populatio n an d Linguisti c Applica tion o f Ethni c Group s o f Cambodi a 86

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Index 86

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PART I . I N T R O D U C T I O

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CHAPTE R 1

Introduction PETE K K U N S T A D T E R

THE PROBLE M

This boo k i s addresse d t o problem s o f relationship s betwee n tribal an d rura l minorit y people s an d centra l government s o f Southeast Asia . Th e question s wit h whic h thi s volum e deal s ar e many an d varied . Firs t ar e th e question s o f wha t i s a tribe , a minority, a dominan t majority ? Ho w ar e thes e people distributed , and ho w d o the y com e t o b e wher e the y are ? Second , wha t is th e natur e o f th e relationship s betwee n thes e sort s o f groups ? Third, ho w ar e thes e relationship s affecte d b y th e genera l pro cesses o f modernization , b y curren t politica l situation s withi n the nations , an d b y internationa l disputes ? Fourth , i n thei r attempts t o promot e nationa l solidarit y an d t o buil d moder n na tions, ho w hav e th e centra l government s an d othe r organization s proceeded wit h regar d t o th e minorit y an d triba l populations ? What program s hav e bee n directe d towar d thes e people , an d how hav e thes e program s succeeded ? Finally , what recommenda tions ca n b e mad e fo r developin g program s an d fo r doin g re search o n the problems uncovered ? GENERAL BACKGROUN D

These ar e problem s o f nation-buildin g i n a modernizing world , made mor e urgen t an d mor e complicate d toda y b y warfar e o r the threa t o f warfare . Bu t th e pres s o f present-da y event s shoul d not blin d u s t o th e fac t tha t th e existin g pattern s o f relationshi p are th e result s o f man y centurie s o f development . Th e group s

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TABLE 1 POPULATION, DENSITY , AN D E T H N I C M I N O R I T I E S I N S O U T H E A S T ASI A A N D CHINA » Country ( & Nationa l Majority) Burma (Burman) b Cambodia (Khmer) 0 Laos (Lao) d Malaysia (Malay) 8 Thailand (Centra l Thai)' Vietnam, Nort h (Vietnamese)* Vietnam, Sout h (Vietnamese)11 China, mainlan d (Han Chinese, ' all dialects )

Total 1963 Estimate d Population

1963 Estimated Approx . Per Persons pe r cen t Minor Square Mil e it y & Triba l

23,664,000 5,740,000 1,882,000 8,200,000

90.3 86.1 20.6 64.0

44 14 47 60

28,835,000

145.3

30

15,917,000

254.6

15

14,900,000

225.9

13

700,000,000

189.6

6

"Source: UNESC O (1964 : Tabl e 9) ; Information Please Almanac, 1965 ; individual tables in this book. For details on composition of tribal an d minorit y populations se e chapter s o n th e variou s countries . Becaus e o f th e ver y ques tionable censu s figures an d classification s o f minorities , this table should be used with extreme caution. b Figure fo r nationa l majorit y (Burman ) als o include s Araka n an d Tenas serim dialect speakers and is therefore a n overestimate of the nationa l majorit y population (LeBa r et al. 1964:38) . 0 Figure fo r nationa l majorit y (Khmer ) i s estimate d b y subtractin g known minority population s fro m th e 196 2 censu s total . Therefore , percentag e o f minority populatio n i s underestimated . d Estimate o f nationa l majorit y (Lao ) i s from LeBa r et al. (1964:215) . e Estimate o f tota l an d minorit y population s fo r Federatio n o f Malay a ar e based o n 195 7 census; for Saba h an d Sarawa k the y ar e base d o n 196 0 census . f Estimate fo r tota l minorit y populatio n i s base d o n subtractio n o f th e figure fo r "Siames e Thai " (LeBa r et al. 1964:197 ) fro m th e 196 0 censu s total . "Siamese Thai " doe s no t distinguis h amon g th e variou s Tha i dialec t group s and i s therefor e a gros s overestimat e fo r th e nationa l majorit y population . I f "Central Thai " i s taken t o mea n "Buddhis t Thai s livin g i n the Centra l regio n of Thailand, " th e minorit y populatio n give n b y th e censu s woul d b e approxi mately 7 1 percent . s Minority an d majorit y figures fro m 196 0 census . h Estimat e fo r tota l minorit y populatio n include s onl y known population s and i s therefore a n underestimate . » Estimate o f minorit y percentag e fro m Bru k (1959:15) .

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INTRODUCTIO N

in questio n hav e neve r bee n completel y isolate d no r hav e the y been entirel y independen t o f th e dominan t politica l an d economic structure s o f thei r regions . Man y o f thei r cultura l fea tures reflec t long-ter m contac t wit h th e grea t civilization s o f China an d Indi a an d wit h th e developin g nation-state s o f South east Asia . The y ar e no t isolate d today , thoug h the y liv e i n rela tively remot e regions ; an d the y ar e changin g today , a s the y hav e for centuries , i n respons e t o outsid e contacts . I n spit e o f th e relative isolatio n o f thes e people , thei r mind s ar e no t close d t o the introductio n o f ne w idea s o r ne w materia l items . Man y o f the so-calle d tribe s o r minoritie s i n an y on e countr y actuall y turn ou t t o b e representative s o f culture s whic h have bee n highl y developed i n thei r ow n righ t i n som e othe r localit y o r a t som e other time , an d man y o f the m ar e highl y sophisticate d i n thei r dealings with central authority . Although, a s w e shal l see , i t i s difficul t t o generaliz e abou t the tribe s an d minorities, 1 ther e ar e feature s whic h allo w u s t o distinguish the m fro m th e dominan t majorities . I n eac h o f th e countries wit h whic h w e dea l ther e i s on e dominan t grou p fro m which tha t countr y derive s it s nam e and , a t leas t nominally , th e leaders o f it s centra l government , i n spit e o f th e fac t tha t i n some o f thes e countrie s th e dominan t grou p i s no t actuall y a numerical majority . I n Burm a w e have th e Burmans , in Thailand , the Centra l Thais , i n Laos , th e Lao , i n Cambodia , th e Khmers , in Vietnam , th e Vietnamese , an d i n Malaysia , th e Malays . The civilization s o f thes e state s ar e al l base d i n lowlan d plain s areas, broa d rive r valleys , deltas , o r coasta l regions , wher e th e people mak e thei r livelihoo d primaril y fro m irrigated-ric e agri culture;2 an d ther e the y hav e bee n accessibl e t o outsid e influenc e from th e predominantl y seaborn e contac t wit h th e Chines e an d Indian trader s an d missionarie s an d late r wit h th e Ara b an d 1 Contrast, fo r example , th e individualistic , money-oriente d I u Mie n (Yao) , who hav e littl e village organization , n o communa l attachmen t t o th e land , bu t an extremel y wide-rangin g concep t o f th e identit y o f th e I u Mie n socio-religio political syste m (Kandre' s paper) , wit h th e communall y oriented , subsistenc e farming Lua? , wh o hav e a strongl y develope d village structure , elaborat e rule s of village lan d ownership , an d grea t variet y o f cultur e pattern s betwee n village s (Kunstadter's paper) . ' Th e Malay s ar e somewha t o f a n exceptio n t o thi s i n tha t the y hav e depende d on fishing an d tradin g an d a coasta l econom y muc h mor e tha n th e othe r group s mentioned. Th e Ha n Chinese , a t leas t i n souther n China , ar e als o a river-valle y people, though livin g a t a fairly hig h altitud e in som e places.

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European ones . Overlan d trad e wit h th e Chines e ha s als o bee n important fo r severa l centurie s i n som e areas , especially i n north em Rurma , Laos, and Thailand . In spit e of it s obvious cultura l debt s t o Chin a an d India , South east Asi a ha s develope d rathe r independentl y o f th e res t o f Asia . With th e exceptio n o f Vietnam , whic h wa s occupie d an d rule d by th e Chines e fro m abou t 10 0 B.C . t o abou t A.D . 940 , th e are a was no t subjec t t o large-scal e militar y invasion s an d contro l b y "outsiders" unti l th e colonia l perio d o f th e nineteent h century . Even then , althoug h militar y forc e wa s sometime s use d t o con quer an d pacify , larg e number s o f foreigner s wer e no t involve d until th e Secon d Worl d War . As alread y mentioned , cultura l influence s di d com e int o th e area, largel y b y sea . Th e earlies t influence s cam e fro m India n and Chines e source s and , afte r th e fifteenth century , Europea n ones. I f w e trac e bac k th e histor y o f th e regio n tw o thousan d years o r so , w e ca n se e tha t ther e hav e bee n gradua l overlan d migrations o f people s movin g generall y southwar d fro m th e hill y regions o f China' s souther n an d southwester n frontiers . Usuall y these invader s di d no t com e i n large , well-organize d groups , bu t moved gradually , absorbin g th e culture s an d som e o f th e popula tions o f th e peopl e wh o wer e alread y i n Southeas t Asia . Th e Vietnamese ar e agai n a major exception , a s the y expande d south ward fro m th e Re d Rive r Delt a region . R y militar y forc e the y conquered th e Malayo-Polynesia n speakin g peopl e o f th e Cha m Kingdom, an d threatene d th e Khme r Kingdom . Onc e th e popula tions becam e establishe d i n th e area , ther e wa s considerabl e war fare a s th e newcomer s se t u p kingdom s i n imitatio n o f thos e which wer e alread y there—thi s wa s tru e especiall y o f th e Ta i peoples.* The lowland-base d civilization s hav e sporadicall y attempte d to exten d thei r contro l over , an d sometime s expan d thei r popula tion into , th e hil l areas . Thi s proces s ha s generall y accelerate d in recen t years , a s th e pres s o f populatio n an d improvement s in technolog y hav e force d an d allowe d the m t o mov e ou t o f * As use d i n thi s book , th e ter m Tai refer s t o a grou p o f language s an d th e tribal an d minorit y peopl e wh o spea k them , suc h a s th e Blac k Tai , Whit e Tai , Tho, etc. , an d Thai refer s t o th e peopl e o f Thailan d an d th e varietie s o f Ta i languages whic h the y speak .

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their usua l ecologica l setting . Th e reason s fo r thes e movement s are obviou s whe n populatio n figures ar e examined . Th e countrie s in questio n hav e al l ha d tremendou s increase s i n thei r popula tions, especiall y i n th e nineteent h an d twentiet h centuries , mainly i n th e region s o f mos t intens e cultivation . Meanwhile , the minorit y an d triba l area s hav e bee n relativel y underpopu lated, an d thei r resource s underexploited . I n China , fo r example , the "Nationa l Minorities " (no t includin g Tibet ) compris e onl y 6 percen t o f th e tota l population , bu t occup y 6 0 percen t o f th e territory (Bru k 1959:15) , mostly i n the border area s o f th e south west, west , an d north . Th e figure s fo r Sout h Vietna m ar e roughl y the same . Th e overpopulatio n o f Jav a an d relativ e underpopula tion o f mos t o f th e othe r island s o f Indonesi a ar e well-know n facts. Thu s w e find i n Kalimanta n (Indonesia n Borneo) , China , Vietnam, an d eve n i n Cambodia , Burma , an d Thailand , govern ment-sponsored program s t o resettl e majorit y people s (member s of th e dominan t group ) i n th e hill s an d previousl y remot e borde r regions whic h wer e onc e th e mor e o r les s exclusiv e domai n o f tribal an d minorit y peoples. 3 It i s onl y i n recen t year s tha t contro l o f th e hil l area s ha s been technicall y possibl e an d tha t th e lowland-base d state s hav e seriously attempte d t o exten d thei r contro l t o thes e areas . I n the past , thoug h tribut e ma y hav e bee n collected , thes e wer e a Diao i n thi s volum e discusse s som e o f th e aspects o f thes e program s i n China an d th e gerrymanderin g o f nationa l minorit y zone s s o a s t o includ e ma jorities o f th e dominan t Ha n population . Se e als o Bru k (1959:17) . Som e o f the backgroun d fo r th e Indonesia n resettlemen t program s i s discusse d i n Pelze r (1948:Chs. 6 , 7) . Th e Vietnames e resettlemen t progra m i s discusse d briefl y by Henderso n (1961 ) an d Ladejinsk y (1961) . Th e rathe r unsuccessfu l progra m here was clearl y base d o n strategi c consideration s (especiall y contro l o f th e mountain minorities ) an d faile d t o tak e int o accoun t th e difference s betwee n lowland an d uplan d environment s (Henderso n 1961:123 , 12 5 ff.) . Th e Cam bodian projec t involve s resettlemen t o f arm y veteran s i n sparsel y settle d areas , apparently fo r th e dua l purpose s o f economi c developmen t an d contro l (Smit h 1965:169-170). Th e Burmes e arm y ha s a simila r projec t fo r resettlemen t o f army veteran s i n th e Sha n an d Kachi n state s (se e Pierson' s paper) . Thailan d has no t embarke d o n deliberat e polic y o f resettlemen t o f th e populatio n i n minority area s fo r purpose s o f control , bu t som e o f th e resettlemen t an d develop ment project s (nikhom), especiall y thos e associate d wit h relocatio n o f population s in area s affecte d b y dams , hav e ha d thi s effect . Se e Kaufma n (1963 ) fo r a discussion o f resettlemen t o f triba l an d minorit y refugee s fro m th e civi l wa r i n Laos, an d Pelze r (1963 ) fo r a brie f descriptio n o f th e resettlemen t o f Chines e during the Malaya n Emergency .

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areas whic h wer e no t reall y a par t o f an y natio n (Leac h 1960) . Only within th e pas t half-century , or , more accurately , onl y sinc e the beginnin g o f th e 1950's , hav e th e hil l an d borde r minoritie s become a matte r o f direc t concer n t o th e centra l governments. 4 They hav e als o becom e source s o f increasin g conflic t between central governments. 5 In general , then , unti l quit e recentl y th e lowlan d civilization s did no t exten d thei r contro l ver y hig h u p int o th e hills . Ecologi cally an d culturall y th e mountai n an d hil l region s o f Southeas t Asia, includin g th e grea t mas s o f tangle d territor y separatin g valley an d lowlan d Chin a fro m lowlan d Burma , Laos , an d Viet nam, an d th e ridge s extendin g fro m thi s mas s whic h separat e the majo r rive r system s fro m on e another , ca n al l b e considere d as a singl e unit. The peoples i n this are a represent severa l distinc t major languag e groups , bu t thes e linguisti c division s correspon d neither t o present-da y politica l boundarie s no r t o th e basi c pat terns o f life , whic h i n thes e hill s ar e everywher e rathe r similar . In contras t t o th e patter n o f lowlan d civilizations , th e patter n in th e hill s i s on e of swidden * (slash-and-burn , shifting ) cultiva tion an d generall y independen t villages. 8 'Certainly, i n th e cas e o f China , attempt s hav e bee n mad e fo r centurie s to contro l th e souther n an d southwester n hil l areas , but thes e area s hav e remaine d a refug e fo r "wil d barbarians. " Onl y wit h moder n transportatio n an d communica tion technolog y ha s th e governmen t bee n abl e t o establis h rea l contro l ove r much o f th e country' s souther n borde r highlands . Takin g a clu e fro m Sovie t policies, th e Chines e Communist s hav e bee n muc h mor e consciou s tha n mos t Southeast Asia n government s o f potentia l problem s an d politica l possibilitie s of minorit y groups . (Fo r a n exampl e o f Sovie t policie s i n actio n se e Armstron g 1965.) Thi s concer n ha s als o bee n take n u p b y th e Vietnames e Communist s (including th e Sout h Vietna m Liberatio n Front ) an d th e Pathe t Lao , wh o hav e been fa r mor e sensitiv e t o minorit y an d triba l people s tha n ha s th e governmen t of Sout h Vietnam o r the Roya l Lao Government . 5 Minorities an d tribe s hav e becom e importan t internationall y o n th e Thailand Burma borde r (Sha n an d Kare n rebels) ; o n th e Thailand-Malay a borde r (prob lems o f Tha i Malay s an d Communis t Chines e terrorists) ; o n th e Thailand-Cam bodia borde r (Cambodia n minorit y i n Thailan d an d th e Khme r Sere i movement) ; on th e Thailand-Lao s borde r (Pathe t La o influenc e amon g Northeaster n Thais , movement o f Me o an d Ya o tribesme n acros s th e border ; th e Cambodia-Sout h Vietnam borde r (Khme r minorit y i n Vietnam , Vietnames e minorit y i n Cambodia) ; North Vietnam-Sout h Vietna m borde r (variou s triba l groups) ; an d th e Sarawak Sabah-Kalimantan borde r (variou s triba l groups) . Se e th e relate d paper s i n thi s volume for detail s o f some of thes e conflicts . * Swidden agricultur e (als o calle d b y th e ter m "slas h an d bur n agriculture, " and a variet y o f othe r loca l names ) i s a syste m whereb y field s ar e cleare d b y cutting, drying , an d burnin g th e vegetatio n an d ar e cultivate d fo r onl y a shor t period befor e allowin g the fields t o return t o fallow . " The independenc e o f thes e village s shoul d no t b e overemphasized . Som e

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The fac t tha t thes e peopl e ar e relatively remot e fro m th e pres ent-day seat s o f governmen t doe s no t mea n tha t the y ar e neces sarily downtrodde n o r unsophisticated : Harrisso n ha s indicate d the relativel y hig h standar d o f livin g enjoye d b y som e o f th e inland group s i n Sarawak ; som e of th e Yao and Me o opium-grow ing hil l tribesme n i n Thailan d an d Lao s evidentl y enjo y a higher incom e tha n d o som e o f th e rura l Tha i an d La o i n th e valleys belo w the m (se e Barney's , Kandre's , an d Geddes ' papers); som e o f th e minorit y group s i n Burma , suc h a s th e Shan, ar e quit e sophisticate d politicall y (se e Maran' s paper) ; the rura l Chines e ("Haw" ) peopl e i n th e Nort h Thailan d hill s serve a s a mode l fo r th e diffusio n o f technologica l innovation s to bot h lowlan d an d triba l people s (se e Mote' s paper) . Althoug h it i s tru e tha t i n som e countrie s (e.g . Lao s an d Vietnam ) triba l people hav e bee n subjec t t o informa l pattern s o f discriminatio n and ar e know n b y name s whic h mea n "slave, " i n othe r area s they hav e no t bee n i n direc t enoug h contac t wit h th e "majority " populations t o hav e bee n effectivel y dominated . I n area s suc h as Thailand, Sabah , an d Sarawak , many o f the tribal and minorit y peoples ar e quit e prou d o f thei r cultures , includin g th e feature s which mak e the m differen t fro m th e politicall y dominan t populations. Although th e territor y look s rugge d t o Westerner s use d t o th e comforts o f automobil e an d ai r travel , i t i s b y n o mean s impas sable t o me n an d wome n o n foot—especiall y t o me n an d wome n accustomed t o makin g thei r livin g b y cultivatin g th e mountain sides. Fo r thousand s o f year s ther e hav e bee n movement s o f these peopl e alon g th e fe w narro w valley s whic h transec t thi s mass an d throug h an d acros s th e mountain s themselves . Occa sionally, th e mountai n people s hav e reache d th e lowland s an d have becom e transforme d ther e int o lowland-typ e people . Bu t for th e lowlanders , onc e establishe d i n th e valleys, th e mountain s have prove d t o b e effectiv e barrier s t o large-scal e movement s of population s excep t durin g shor t period s whe n th e are a ha s groups, lik e th e Ya o an d Meo , hav e extensiv e inter-villag e politica l structures . Other groups , lik e th e Rhad £ an d Jara i o f Indochin a an d th e Kare n an d Lah u of Burma an d Thailand , hav e ha d extensiv e inter-village religio-politica l structures , usually centere d aroun d a charismati c religious leade r o r spiri t doctor . Th e ques tion o f feuda l connection s betwee n triba l village s an d lowlan d government s i s discussed o n pp. 29 ff., an d i n Lehman's an d Kunstadter' s papers .

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been unde r th e pressure s o f warfare ; an d invasion s rarely, if ever , have le d t o large-scal e resettlemen t fro m on e major lowlan d are a to th e next. 7 Political control , however , wa s extende d fro m tim e t o tim e from th e centra l area s t o mor e remot e region s bot h b y th e ex pansion o f nativ e politica l system s an d b y colonia l regimes . A s the hegemon y o f th e centra l government s expanded , thre e choices wer e availabl e t o th e vanquished : fleeing t o th e hills , becoming absorbe d int o th e newl y dominan t group , o r establish ing, an d i n som e way maintaining , boundarie s aroun d themselve s so tha t thei r identit y coul d b e preserve d i n spit e o f thei r los s of politica l independence . Th e first choice , fleeing t o th e hills , seems t o have bee n characteristi c o f many o f th e Khmer-speakin g peoples i n Vietnam , Laos , an d Thailan d an d man y o f th e Malayo-Polynesian speaker s i n Vietnam ; th e secon d choice , ab sorption, ha s been th e lo t of man y o f th e Mon - an d Khmer-speak ing people s o f wha t i s no w Norther n Thailand ; erectio n o f cul tural boundarie s fo r th e preservatio n o f identit y ha s bee n th e way fo r man y o f th e group s whic h w e hav e calle d minorities . This brie f an d overgeneralize d accoun t wil l a t leas t allo w u s to characteriz e th e people s wit h who m thi s boo k deals . DISTRIBUTION O F PEOPLE S AN D CULTURE S I N SOUTHEAS T ASI A

The presen t distributio n o f people s an d culture s i n Southeas t Asia ca n b e accounte d fo r i n term s o f severa l processes . I n th e plains, coasts , deltas , an d broa d rive r valley s w e find th e basi s for centralize d governments : Burm a prope r i s essentiall y th e lower an d middl e Irrawadd y Valle y an d Delta ; Thailan d i s base d on th e Maena m Valle y an d Delta ; Laos , which , excep t fo r it s international complications , i s hardl y mor e tha n a principality , is reall y onl y th e plain s alon g th e middl e Mekon g Valley ; Cam bodia's bas e i s th e lowe r Mekon g Valle y aroun d th e grea t lak e of Tonl e Sap ; Nort h an d Sout h Vietna m ar e base d o n th e Re d River Delt a an d th e Mekon g Delta , respectively ; th e coas t o f the Mala y Peninsul a an d th e lowe r reache s o f th e river s drainin g 7 The Thais , fo r example , invade d an d sacke d th e ancien t Khme r kingdo m and it s capita l a t Angkor , bu t the y di d no t sta y ther e t o settle , no r di d th e Burmese, wh o repeatedl y invade d th e centra l plain s an d norther n valley s o f Thailand, eve r sta y ther e i n larg e number s onc e th e battle s wer e over . Again , excepting th e Vietnamese , th e objective s o f thes e war s wer e usuall y loo t an d captives, no t territory .

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what wa s onc e th e Britis h portio n o f Borne o for m th e basi s fo r Malaysia . Th e interior s o f thes e countrie s an d th e borderland s between the m ar e th e home s o f th e minorit y an d triba l peoples . Several differen t kind s o f movement s o f people s an d culture s are represente d i n th e presen t arrangement . Ther e hav e bee n direc t invasions , wher e territor y ha s bee n take n an d nativ e popu lation s displaced , destroyed , absorbed , o r encapsulated . On e ex ampl e o f thi s proces s ha s bee n th e southwar d movemen t o f th e Vietnames e alon g th e Annames e coast , i n whic h th e kingdo m of th e Malayo-Polynesian-speakin g Cham s wa s destroye d an d thos e Cham s wh o wer e no t kille d o r absorbe d wer e reduce d t o an unimportan t minority . Th e norther n Mon-Khme r speaker s were force d int o th e inlan d hill s wher e the y ar e toda y referre d to a s mot (slave ) o r montagnard (mountaineer) . Th e southwar d expansio n o f th e Vietnames e continue d into Khme r (Cambodian ) territor y i n th e Mekon g Delt a region , a proces s whic h continue s to th e presen t day . But b y fa r th e mos t commo n patter n ha s bee n a mor e gradua l movement , no t highl y organized , includin g a t an y on e tim e onl y a smal l numbe r o f people . Th e bes t exampl e o f thi s i s tha t o f th e Tai-speakin g people s wh o hav e bee n spreadin g ou t fro m th e borde r region s o f souther n an d southwester n Chin a an d norther n Burma , Laos , an d Vietnam . Wher e thes e Ta i speaker s reache d large rive r valleys , a s i n Assam , Thailand , an d Laos , an d eve n in th e uplan d valley s o f th e Sha n State s i n Burma , the y forme d kingdom s o r principalities . Wher e the y hav e remaine d i n th e hills, the y hav e com e t o b e considere d a s minorit y o r triba l peo ple, lik e th e Lue , th e Re d Tai , Whit e Tai , an d Blac k Tai , an d so forth . A simila r situatio n i s see n wit h th e Viet-Muong , uplan d group s o f Vietnames e wh o escape d th e sinicizatio n whic h affected thei r lowlan d cousin s i n th e Re d Rive r Delt a i n Nort h Vietnam . Th e proces s o f gradua l movemen t continue s wit h th e present-da y movement s o f Me o an d Yao int o Thailan d fro m Lao s (see Kandre' s an d Barney' s papers ) an d movement s o f Lah u from Burm a int o Thailand . Likewise , som e o f th e Ta i speaker s are stil l movin g southwar d i n Lao s an d Vietnam . Settlement s of thes e people s ar e scattere d throug h th e hill s a s villag e com munitie s whic h shif t thei r locatio n i n respons e t o th e need s o f swidden agricultur e o r t o escap e oppressiv e government s o r in [Π ]

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surgents. Simila r movement s hav e take n plac e fro m Kalimanta n (Indonesian Borneo ) int o Sarawa k an d Saba h unti l recently . A thir d proces s ha s bee n th e deliberat e relocatio n o f popula tions, ofte n throug h captur e i n warfar e o r a s tribut e fro m on e prince t o hi s superior . Thu s th e Mo n ar e scattere d remnant s o f an earl y kingdo m i n souther n Burm a an d Thailand , an d variou s fragments o f Tai-speakin g group s hav e bee n move d fro m plac e to plac e withi n Thailan d a s th e resul t o f a series of conquests . A fourt h process , simila r i n som e way s t o th e third , ha s bee n the deliberat e encouragemen t o f migratio n o f certai n people s for specia l purposes : Chines e migratio n int o Thailan d wa s en couraged fo r buildin g irrigatio n canals ; int o Borne o fo r wor k in gol d mine s an d o n peppe r plantations ; an d th e Chines e an d Indian migratio n wa s encourage d o n th e Mala y Peninsul a fo r work o n rubbe r plantation s an d i n tin mines. At a rather differen t level, th e Britis h encourage d Indian s i n th e Civi l Servic e t o mi grate int o Burm a a t th e tim e whe n Burm a wa s administere d as a par t o f India . Suc h migrant s hav e forme d th e base s fo r very larg e population s o f oversea s Chines e wh o hav e becom e integrated i n differen t way s i n th e countrie s i n whic h the y no w find themselves . Ofte n the y hav e becom e urban minorities , an d we hav e no t concerne d ourselve s wit h the m t o an y grea t exten t in thi s book . Th e Chines e i n Southeas t Asi a ar e treate d i n a n extensive literatur e o f thei r ow n (se e bibliograph y i n Purcel l 1965). Still anothe r typ e o f movemen t ha s involve d relativel y fe w people, bu t ha s ha d grea t cultura l impact—th e movemen t o f traders an d missionarie s includin g Chines e trader s bearin g a variety o f cultura l traits , cro p plants , an d idea s abou t socia l structur e and religion ; India n missionarie s bringin g Buddhis m an d idea s about th e organizatio n o f states ; late r trader s bringin g Isla m as wel l a s commerce ; an d finally , Europea n an d America n mis sionaries an d trader s bringin g Christianity , colonialism , cro p plants, an d worl d commerce . Again , thes e people , whe n the y settled i n Southeas t Asia , wer e predominantl y urba n dwellers , but thei r cultura l influenc e penetrate d fa r inlan d an d ha s ha d profound effect s o n peopl e the y hav e neve r see n (fo r example , tobacco an d maize , originall y Ne w Worl d cro p plants , hav e be come ubiquitous i n th e farthes t an d mos t isolate d hil l regions) . [ 12 ]

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The resul t o f thes e processe s i s no t jus t on e bu t a serie s o f patchworks o f language , race , ethni c identification , religion , an d distribution o f cultura l traits . I n general , however , th e patche s on th e quilt s ar e large r i n th e valley-coast-delta-plain s areas , re flecting th e multi-dimensiona l dominanc e o f th e centra l govern ments. Th e patche s ar e smalle r (an d sometimes , a s i n th e north ern Thailan d hills , reduce d t o th e siz e o f singl e villages ) i n th e folds an d crease s o f th e mor e remot e o r isolate d refug e area s of triba l group s (Bennington-Cornel l 1964) . One resul t o f th e grea t diversit y i n historica l background s o f the triba l an d minorit y people s i s tha t th e name s whic h ar e ap plied t o the m ma y no t b e accurate , i n tha t the y lum p togethe r a numbe r o f peopl e wit h ver y differen t characteristics . Th e so called Kh a o f Laos , fo r example , ar e actuall y compose d o f a number o f distinc t cultura l groups . Difference s amon g Lua ? an d Karen group s ma y als o be strikin g (se e Kunstadter's paper) . Thi s means tha t triba l name s shoul d no t b e accepte d uncriticall y a s implying cultura l uniformit y (se e Lehman' s paper) . Such confusion s ma y hav e importan t politica l consequence s in area s wher e th e triba l o r minorit y people s ar e representative s of differen t nationa l majorities . On e exampl e o f thi s i s th e so called KM T (Kuomintang , Nationalis t Chinese ) i n Burm a an d Thailand.8 It shoul d no t com e as a surprise tha t traditiona l alliance s base d on famil y o r extende d kinshi p tie s continu e t o functio n amon g the triba l an d minorit y people s i n th e moder n world . W e hav e evidence i n thi s book fro m Burm a (Lehman' s paper) , Lao s (Bar ney's paper) , an d Vietna m (McAlister' s paper ) o f th e persisten t importance i n moder n politic s o f thes e traditiona l patterns . W e see repeatedl y th e importanc e o f knowledg e o f loca l histor y fo r an understandin g o f contemporar y alignments , an d w e lear n tha t not al l Karen, o r Meo , or Tai tribe s ar e th e sam e in thei r politica l relationships, despit e th e fac t tha t the y ma y shar e languag e an d many othe r cultura l feature s wit h peopl e wh o ar e calle d b y th e same name . Despite th e diversit y o f origins , there ar e many genera l charac teristics o f th e peopl e whic h ca n b e liste d t o sho w a consisten t 8 See Mote' s pape r fo r a discussio n o f th e variou s distinc t group s t o whic h this singl e label has been applie d indiscriminately .

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PETE R KUNSTADTE K

pattern o f differenc e betwee n wha t w e hav e calle d dominan t majorities, urba n minorities , rural minorities, and tribes , as show n in Tabl e 2 . A tabl e suc h a s thi s emphasize s th e difference s be tween thes e kind s o f groups , bu t i t shoul d no t b e use d uncriti cally. Th e ecologica l distinctio n betwee n th e uplan d an d remot e areas o n th e on e han d an d th e lowland-plains-valley-coast-delt a areas o n th e othe r ha s alread y bee n mentioned , bu t i t shoul d be pointe d ou t tha t ecolog y alon e i s no t a sufficien t explanatio n for th e distributio n o f type s o f socia l organization s o r type s o f groups. Fo r example , th e Thai-Lue , o f who m Moerma n writes , live i n a valle y are a onc e th e sea t o f th e Princ e o f Chiengkham , a ver y importan t cultura l an d politica l cente r i n th e earl y histor y of Thailand , bu t no w a backwate r region . Change s i n technolog y can rapidl y an d radicall y alte r th e pattern s o f ecologica l adapta tion an d ca n mak e otherwis e useles s area s availabl e fo r intensiv e exploitation (e.g . th e vas t water-contro l project s i n th e Centra l Thai plain s whic h mad e wet-ric e cultivatio n possibl e ther e o n a larg e scale) . In fact , th e boxe s int o whic h Tabl e 2 i s divide d shoul d no t be take n to o literally . A s Lehma n an d Mara n hav e pointe d out , it i s extremel y difficul t t o us e an y se t o f attribute s a s definin g characteristics fo r a tribe-minority-majorit y classification . Th e lines betwee n th e differen t type s ar e no t sharp , an d ther e ar e numerous exception s t o thi s summar y classificatio n whic h ar e discussed in the papers which follow . Even mor e important , fro m a theoretica l poin t o f view , i s th e caveat tha t a tabl e o f thi s typ e shoul d no t obscur e th e connec tions betwee n group s a t th e variou s level s represente d i n th e table. W e mus t no t vie w tribes , minorities , an d centra l govern ments a s discret e entities—the y ar e no t now , an d neve r hav e been, separat e an d distinct . I n fact , w e find fo r man y purpose s that th e importan t thin g abou t tribe s an d minoritie s i s the natur e of thei r relationship s wit h th e centra l government s o r wit h th e dominant majorities . Th e group s wit h whic h w e ar e concerne d very ofte n defin e themselve s not onl y in term s of thei r uniquenes s and isolatio n (whic h i s on e o f th e traditiona l anthropologica l approaches) bu t i n term s o f thei r relationship s t o othe r groups . The situatio n whic h Leac h first (1954 ) describe d s o wel l fo r highland Burma , i n whic h Kachins , fo r example , defin e [ 14 ]

INTBODUCTIO N TABL E 2 T R I B E S , M I N O R I T I E S , AN D C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T I N SOUTHEAS T ASI A

S

Percentag e o f Populatio n i n Eac h Categor y Grou p Dominan t nationa l majorit y

Burm a

Cambodi a

Lao s

Malaysi a Sabah Sarawak

Thailan d

Nort h Vietnam

Sout h Vietnam

China , Mainland 1·

Vietnames e 85

Vietnames e 88

Ha n Chines e Nort h dialect s 67 Othe r dialect s (26.5)

Chines e 1.1

Chines e 5.7

Hui

Khme r 85

Lao 50

Mala y O.S

Mala y 19

Urba n India n minoritie s 0.8 Chines e 1.7

Chines e 7 Vietnames e 7 Frenc h 0.1

Chines e 2 Vietnames e ? Tha i

Chines e 23 British 0.2

Chines e Chines e 31 10 British 0.1

Rura l Sha n minoritie s 6 Mo n 1.7 Arakanes e

Cha m

Black Ta i ρ Re d Ta i

Kadaza n (Dusun ) 82 Bajau 12 Other s

Daya k 40

Minorit y Muon g Tha i 2.6 50 ? Ta y (Tho ) Mala y 3.2 S.9 Tha i Ku i 2.4 0.4

Khme r 2.6 Cha m 0.8

Chuan g 1.1 Uighu r 0.6

"Tribes"

Stien g Rhad e Tota l tribe s 1

Kenya h Kelabi t Other s Tota l 11

Kare n Me o Akha Hti n Other s Tota l tribe s 0.8

Jara i 1.1 Rhad i 0.8 Hr e 0.7 Bahna r 0.6 Sedan g 0.4 Tota l "tribe " 6.5

Yi 0.6 Me o 0.4 Puy i 0.2 Tun g •0. 1 Yao 0.1 Pa i 0.1

Burma n 55

ρ

3

S

Kare n 7 Kachi n 7 Chi n 2 Other s

"Kha " Muru t Me o 4 Ma n (Yao ) Other s Tota l tribe s 16+

Centra l Tha i 30

Nun g 1.9 Me o 1.4 Yao 1.1 Other s

0.6 Tibeta n 0.5 Manchuria n 0.4 Mongolia n Korea n 0.2

{continued)

a Figure s ar e estimate s fro m source s cite d in table s fo r individua l countries . Wher e basi s for classificatio n i s unknown , proportion s ma y no t equa l 10 0 percent . b Thi s classificatio n i s no t particularl y appropriat e for China . Th e Hui , for example , ar e a religious , no t a n ethnic , minority , althoug h the y ar e classifie d b y th e Chines e a s a "minorit y nationality, " an d th e Tibetan s hav e claime d t o a n independen t nation . Man y of th e minorit y nationalit y population s i n Chin a hav e a mor e diversifie d populatio n tha n is characteristi c o f man y o f th e group s i n Southeas t Asia .

[ 15 ]

[1 6 ]

i

Terrain, Ecology

Writing, "Great Tradition" Different from standard di - 1 No t organized politically, participate religion, bu t usuall y no t alect, mos t peopl e bilin - overtly o r covertly in central govthat of the dominant gual; ofte n hav e specia l ernment; loyalties t o nation and to group, traditions conschools ethnic group often in conflict; loyalsciously related to another ties cross national borders country, area , o r time , cities, specialists

"Tribes"

(continued)

Hills, jungle, inte- Literacy nil or archaic vari- Usually a different language Contact with lowest bureaucratic lev- Predominantly subsistence dr y rice , rior awa y fro m ety, o r missionary-sup - family from dominant els, i f any; little o r no communica- shifting cultivation (opiu m growers major rivers plied for religious purgroup, ofte n stron g emo- tion t o centra l government , onl y produce fo r sale; small-scale terracposes; religion i s usually tional attachment t o lan- ritual participation i n central gov - ing o r irrigation, i f any; trade with animism, sometimes guage,people often multi- ernment, i f any; local political or - local marke t tow n o r itineran t "Little Tradition, " reli - lingual in tribal and dom- ganization a t villag e level , ver y traders, purchas e som e manufac gious leader s rarel y hav e inant languages, littl e o r rarely higher; vague loyalties to fel- tured goods , n o industrialization ; more tha n local following, no schooling 1 lo w tribesmen; little i f an y loyalty little o r no t wage work but occasional charismatic 1 t o nation , loyalties ma y cros s na cults develop: few special1 tiona l borders i i ists, except religious

Subsistence agriculturists, wet and dry rice, some production for sale, smalltime trade , no . industrialization ; little wage work, if an y

Often i n specialize d position s i n economy, i n commercial and bank ing enterprises, often restricted from some occupations b y law o r custom

1 Languag e and Education Political Structure Economy 1. i i Writing, "Great Tradition " Standardized dialect, mos t Kingdoms, nation-states; borders set Wet ric e fo r consumption an d com people monolingual; public or stabilize d b y colonia l powers ; religion, (Buddhism or mercial sale ; seaborn e trad e wit h schools Islam), cities cultivated bureaucracies nominally in bands o f world market , moder n money, an d arts and crafts, specialists, dominant population, bu t fremarket exchange system; large irriusually nationa l religiou s quently with foreign minority "ad - gation an d drainage projects; com hierarchy vice"; loyalties to nation mercial agricultura l development ; i industrial developmen t

Degree of Cultural Development

i Remote or isolated Marginal literacy, usuall y Usually dialect of same lan- Contact with lowest bureaucratic lev- , Rural only fo r religio n usuall y gauge family a s majorit y els; little communication to central minorities lowland areas not th e moder n form , group, but may not be mu- government; local political organi-j poor communi- ' "Little Tradition" religion, tually intelligible ; edu - zation a t village level, positio n by cation and much animism ; villages , cated people know "stand- personal qualities; loyalties primatransportation few specialists, specialities ard" form; perpetuation of rily t o village and t o holder o f real to dominant dialects not encouraged in power areas, lo w hills, imported schools b y central governrain, shadow , o r ment poor soil areas

Lowland cities, Urban minorities market towns

Dominant Lowland, plains, broad valleys, national coasts majority

Group

(continued )

TABLE 2

PETE R KUNSTADTE R

INTRODUCTION TABLE 2 (continued) Population Group Dominant national majority

Distribution

Dynamics

Dominant ethni c grou p con - Rapid populatio n growt h du e centrated mainl y i n on e to recen t publi c healt h meas country ures an d moder n medicine ; rapid growt h o f cities , espe cially growt h o f "primate " cities

In larg e citie s an d marke t Shares rapid populatio n growt h Urban minorities towns, sometime s itineran t of dominan t majority , bu t traders, majo r concentratio n immigration controlle d o r shu t in som e othe r countr y off i n mos t countries , out migration sometime s encour aged; degre e o f intermarriag e varies In remot e o r isolate d rura l Rapid populatio n growt h a s Rural minorities areas, population distributio n public healt h measure s ar e often doe s no t correspon d t o extended t o rura l regions ; national border s temporary o r permanen t mi gration t o urba n center s a s rural economi c opportunitie s diminish o r fo r accumulatio n of bride-price , generall y endogamous "Tribes"

Often distribute d withou t re - Population growt h jus t begin ning t o accelerat e a s publi c gard t o moder n politica l boundaries, usuall y discon - health service s an d moder n tinuous distributio n mixe d medicine becom e available ; with othe r group s very littl e urba n migration , generally endogamou s

themselves vis-a-vi s Shans , an d i n whic h the y mak e rathe r con scious decision s t o becom e Sha n o r remai n Kachin , i s apparentl y quite widesprea d i n Southeas t Asi a (se e below , pp . 34 ; 42 ff . fo r further discussio n o f thi s point) . Thi s i s no t merel y a matte r of "passing, " b y whic h a n individua l decide s tha t hi s socia l posi tion shoul d b e judge d b y other s i n term s o f hi s physica l appear ance: th e proces s ha s involve d whol e village s o r communitie s and thei r socia l structure s a s well a s their physical appearance . Finally, i t shoul d b e remarke d tha t ther e i s frequentl y littl e difference betwee n th e way s o f lif e o f triba l o r rura l minorit y people an d tha t o f th e rura l part o f th e nationa l majority , despit e superficial cultura l difference s tha t ar e ofte n striking . Ther e i s usually a fairl y substantia l socia l an d cultura l ga p betwee n th e urban center s an d al l rura l villages ; muc h o f th e productio n o f [ 17 ]

PETE H KUNSTADTE H

all rura l people s i s fo r subsistenc e rathe r tha n cash ; mos t o f th e rural peopl e hav e fairl y limite d participatio n i n markets , thoug h they depen d o n the m fo r essentia l tool s an d prestig e goods ; and , until recently , th e governmenta l service s hav e no t penetrate d very fa r int o an y rura l areas . Lik e th e rura l member s o f th e national majority , mos t o f th e minorit y an d triba l peopl e recog nize th e existenc e an d powe r o f th e centra l governments , an d many hav e bee n subjec t fo r corvee labor . Rura l peopl e an d tribesmen bas e mos t o f thei r cooperativ e actio n o n tie s o f famil y and kinship , an d rura l majority , minority , an d triba l village s ar e bound togethe r a s religiou s communities . Thu s i t i s prope r t o speak o f man y o f th e triba l peopl e a s "hil l peasants " (Izikowit z 1951).9 CHARACTERISTICS O F SOUTHEAS T ASIA N NATION S

Boundaries. Lik e th e distributio n o f peoples , the presen t politi cal border s i n Southeas t Asi a represen t a serie s o f events . Although th e regio n i s ol d i n history , th e nations , excep t fo r Thailand, whic h retaine d it s independenc e throughou t th e colo nial period , ar e new . The y wer e create d mainl y durin g th e colo nial er a b y power s quit e remot e fro m th e scene , primaril y a s the resul t of competitio n amon g th e British , Dutch , an d French , and wit h littl e referenc e t o th e realitie s o f ethni c distribution s or th e realitie s o f existin g politica l relationship s o n th e ground . The event s o f th e Secon d Worl d Wa r an d th e en d o f th e colonia l period, wit h th e consequen t withdrawa l o f th e Europea n colonia l powers, le d t o som e mino r realignment s (e.g . th e Burma-Chin a border); consolidation , o r attempte d consolidatio n o f nation s ou t of colonia l administrativ e unit s (Indonesia , Burma , Malaysia ) which ha d no t enjoye d politica l solidarit y prio r t o th e colonia l "The distinctio n mad e b y Sahlin s (1960:408 ) an d Wol f (1966:2-1 ) betwee n peasants an d primitive s doe s no t hol d i n mos t o f Southeas t Asia . The y argu e that peasants , unlik e primitives , d o no t contro l thei r ow n mean s o f productio n (land an d labor) . Thoug h sometime s subjec t t o corvoe labor, mos t o f th e peopl e in th e greate r par t o f Southeas t Asi a ow n thei r ow n lan d (Lowe r Burma , th e large Malaya n plantation s an d muc h o f lowlan d Vietnam—th e area s o f mos t intensive Wester n colonialism—ar e exception s t o thi s generalization) . Otherwis e the condition s o f lif e o f th e triba l an d rura l minoritie s an d th e majorit y rura l population resembl e quit e closel y those described by Wolf (1966) .

[ 18 ]

Lower right : Highwa y constructio n de veloped mos t rapidl y betwee n 195 8 an d 1961. "Th e Mia o peopl e o f th e Miao Tung Autonomou s Chou i n southeas t Kweichow welcomin g th e firs t lorrie s t o arrive afte r th e openin g o f a ne w high way i n thei r area. " C R Octobe r 1962 .

Lower left : "Telephon e line s bein g in stalled i n a nationa l minorit y are a i n Yun nan Province . . . Telephon e service s ar e now availabl e i n mor e tha n nine-tenth s of th e communes . . . I n remot e marke t towns wher e regula r pos t an d telegrap h offices hav e no t ye t bee n established , travelling posta l worker s appea r o n day s when fair s ar e held. " C R Februar y 1964 . Chou Tzu-y u photo .

Upper right : "Member s o f th e Kunmin g Botan y Researc h In stitute o f th e Chines e Academ y o f Science s investigatin g frui t tree resource s i n th e Hsishuangpann a Ta i Autonomou s Chou." The tea m gathere d informatio n o n al l varietie s o f fruit s t o pro vide a "scientifi c foundatio n fo r th e ful l utilizatio n o f China' s fruit tre e resources. " C R Octobe r 1963 . Ho u Chung-hsie n photo .

Upper left : Traditiona l us e o f fores t products—Ya o wome n gather bambo o shoot s o n Taya o Mountain , Kwangs i Chuan g Aut. Region . "Th e Ya o peopl e us e bamboo , abundan t i n thei r mountains, t o buil d house s an d t o mak e tables , chairs , bed s and othe r article s fo r dail y use . Th e shoot s ar e a prize d food. " China Reconstruct s [CR ] Jul y 1964 .

C H I N E S E P E N E T R A T I O N O F M I N O I U T Y AREA S

MODERNIZATION O F NATIONA L M I N O R I T I E S I N CHIN A

Upper an d middl e left : Rura l fair s persist unde r socialism . Communiza tion o f th e triba l economie s i s sai d t o have reduce d price s an d increase d in comes an d demand s fo r loca l product s at thi s traditiona l sprin g fai r i n th e Tali Pa i Autonomou s Chou. C R Au gust 1963 . Ch u Yu-h u photo . Lower left : Minorit y peopl e ar e bein g trained i n modern medicine . " A Ching po woma n healt h worke r give s a pa tient a n injection, " Tehun g Thai Ching-po Autonomou s Chou, Yunnan . CR Septembe r 1959 . Chen g Kuang hua photo . Lower right : "Typica l Ta i house s . . . half-hidden i n grove s o f plantain . Everything i s mad e o f Bamboo. " Pic ture probabl y take n i n Chinghung , Hsi-shuang P a n - n a Tha i Autonomou s Chou. C R Jul y 1962 . Opposite page Upper left : Traditiona l farmin g prac tices remai n i n part s o f the Hsi-shuan g Pan-na Tha i Autonomou s Chou. "Girls o f th e Ain i nationalit y pickin g tea o n Nannu o Mountain , 1,40 0 metre s above se a level. " C R Jul y 1962 . Upper right : Elsewher e i n Yunna n "modern method s hav e replace d th e most primitiv e farmin g technique — Pai wome n ge t read y t o spra y insecti cide." C R Decembe r 1961 . Ch i Kuan shan photo .

MP H

MODERNIZATIO N O F NATIONA L MINORITIES , CONT . v

Middl e left : Minorit y people s hav e traditionall y ha d contact s wit h Chi nes e markets . Visitor s fro m th e sur roundin g highland s com e t o th e Kun min g market . Marti n Hurliman n phot o in Burma, Ceylon, Indo-China . . . Landscape, Architecture, Inhabitants. Ne w York , B . Westerman n Co. , Inc. , 1930, p . 281 . Middl e right : " N e w housin g i n Ching hun g i s designe d t o fit Ta i customs. " CR Apri l 1959 . Y i Tieh-shi h photo . Lowe r right : Heavie r industrie s ar also bein g introduced . "Yan g Kuei fen (left ) o f th e Mia o nationalit y an Chi n Tsu-hua n o f th e Tun g nation ality ar e bot h lath e operator s a t th ne w Genera l Machin e Faotor y buil in th e Puyi-Mia o Autonomou s Chou in souther n Kweichow. " C R Octobe 1959. Wan g Fu-tsu n photo .

e d e t r

*•·. *"".-

. -τ- . *

Λ

;;

·Λ'*' ' %• ' '''' V"is* " S

MODERNEZATION O F T R A D I T I O N A L CRAFTS I N CHIN A

Upper left : Ta i woma n spinnin g cotton o n th e porc h o f he r hom e in Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a Tha i Auton omous Chou. C R Jul y 1962 . Upper right: "Mia o girl s [fro m Kweichow] workin g a t thei r em broidery." Mia o clothin g i s dec orated wit h wax-resis t dye d pat terns a s well . "Fin e example s o f designs an d handwor k ar e bein g collected, studied , exhibite d an d published i n albums . Som e o f them, adapte d fo r rugs , tablecloth s and cushio n covers , ar e greatl y ap preciated i n othe r part s o f China. " CR Augus t 1963 . Ho Shi-ya o photo . Middle left : "Th e silk-scree n print ing worksho p a t th e Yunna n Print ing an d Dyein g works , wher e ga y cotton print s ar e mad e fo r minor ity peoples. " Thes e ar e sol d a t th e Kunming Nationalities ' Departmen t Store, wher e traditiona l costume s and ornament s ar e stocked . Com mercial productio n o f clothin g ha s freed minorit y nationalit y wome n for othe r tasks . C R Marc h 1960 . Lower left : "Woolle n an d cotto n textiles fo r th e minorit y nationali ties mad e i n a co-o p i n Yunna n Province." Handicraft s hav e be come a par t o f th e socialis t econ omy. C R Octobe r 1962 .

T H E CHINES E P R O G R A M F O R LITERAC Y

Upper left : Literac y an d modern ization program s star t a s team s o f linguists, anthropologist s an d his torians fro m th e Centra l Academ y of Nationalitie s an d th e Academ y of Science s visi t minorit y areas . "An ol d ma n o f th e Mia o nation ality relate s a legen d t o member s of a minorit y language s investiga tion tea m tourin g th e Mia o dis tricts i n Sout h Chin a t o stud y th e sounds o f th e language. " C R Au gust 1962 . H o Shih-ya o photo . Center left : Afte r th e language s have bee n analyse d a standar d dia lect i s picked , an d instructio n i s given i n th e ne w script . "Member s of th e Tun g nationalit y i n Kwei chow stud y thei r ne w alphabe t during a res t break. " C R Augus t 1962. Ye n Mao-je n photo . Lower left : Th e skill s o f literac y are passe d o n t o th e younge r gen eration. "I n th e Y i Autonomou s Chou i n th e Liangsha n Mountains , Szechuan province , a woma n teaches he r daughte r th e scrip t de vised fo r he r people. " C R Jun e 1964. Hs u Hsin-ya o photo . Lower right: "Chan g Pa o o f th e Lahu nationalit y i n Yunna n prov ince note s dow n th e wor k h e ha s just don e i n th e Lah u script. " R y 1962 twelv e minorit y nationalit y publishing house s ha d bee n se t u p and wer e publishin g book s an d newspapers. C R Augus t 1962 . Wang Chuan-ku o photo .

M O B I L I Z A T I O N O F MINOMTTE S I N C H I N A

Upper left : Minorit y literatur e i s compile d an d use d fo r politica l purposes . "Delegates fro m Yunna n holdin g a grou p discussio n durin g th e sessio n o f the Nationa l Conferenc e o f Outstandin g Group s an d Individual s i n Educa tion an d Cultur e i n Pekin g i n Jun e 1960 . Hana n Zuai , famou s Ta i bard , i s seated secon d fro m right. " C R Decembe r 1960 . Huan g Chan g photo . Upper right : Th e student s ar e mobilize d fo r politioa l action . Unde r thei r banner "student s o f man y nationalitie s marc h i n Peking' s annua l Ma y Da y Parade." C R Octobe r 1959 . T u Hsiu-hsie n photo . Lower left : "Peopl e o f China' s nationa l minoritie s demand : 'U.S . imperial ists, ge t ou t o f Panama!' " C R Marc h 1964 . Huan g Ching-t a photo . Lower right: Th e Centra l Academ y o f Nationalitie s wa s establishe d i Peking i n 1951 , an d withi n te n year s ba d mor e tha n 3,00 0 student s an faculty member s belongin g t o 5 0 nationalities . Her e the y stud y thei r ow cultural historie s befor e bein g sen t bac k hom e a s leaders . "Student s . . get togethe r o n th e campu s t o danc e an d sing. " C R Novembe r 1961 . F Chun photo .

n d n . u

C O M M E R C E I N T H E GAR O H I L L S , INDIA

Upper left : Bambo o fro m th e hill s finds a read y marke t i n th e plains . Rafts o f bambo o bundle s ar e pole d down strea m an d sol d b y tribes men wh o the n wal k home . Center left : Tribesme n carr y hug e bundles o f cotto n t o market . Lower left : Drie d fish o n displa y at th e Naka m market . Upper right : A s h e weigh s por tions fo r sal e i n hi s India n typ e balance, a Gar o man hope s t o mak e a profi t fro m hi s investmen t i n a bag o f salt . Bobbin s Burlin g pho -

COMMERC E I N TH E GAR O HILLS , INDIA , CONT .

Upper lef t an d middl e left : Garo s displaying fruit s an d vegetable s fo r sale. Mos t purchase s ar e betwee n plainsmen an d Garos—eithe r cas h crops tha t ar e exporte d t o th e plains, o r importe d manufacture d goods. Th e latte r wil l probabl y b e purchased b y othe r Garos , bring ing a cas h econom y int o relation s among tribesmen . Lower left : A trade r fro m th e plains display s good s h e offer s fo r sale t o tribesme n i n th e Gar o Hills : soap, thread , combs , etc . H e car ries hi s good s fro m on e marke t t o the nex t i n th e woode n chest . Mar kets ar e hel d onc e ever y seve n days i n eac h locality . Lower right: Permanen t sho p i n Tura, th e administrativ e cente r an d largest tow n i n th e Gar o Hills . Pots, pans , an d lamp s o n displa y are o f India n manufactur e an d ar e widely use d b y Garos . Robbin s Burling photo s 1954-1955 .

MEO SETTLEMEN T I N LAO S

Upper left : Ai r vie w o f a Me o village i n th e Luan g Praban g dis trict. Upper right : Me o youths , Ke o Katchoum village . Middle left : Ke o Katchoum , a Me o village. Middle right : Youn g Me o man wit h homemade rifle , i n La o tradin g village. Lower right : Me o opiu m fiel d about 10 0 km . sout h o f Luan g Pra bang o n th e roa d t o Vientiane , nea r Keo Katchoum . Tre e stump s re maining afte r slas h an d bur n clear ing ar e visibl e i n th e field. Joe l Halpern photo s 1957-1959 .

M E O S E T T L E M E N T I N L A O S , CONT .

Upper left : Me o weighing opiu m i n a La o trading village. Upper right : Ancesto r spirit s ar e invoke d during a Me o curin g ceremony , Ke o Kat choum village. Middle right : Youn g Me o women , Ke o Kat choum village. Middle left : Me o gir l carryin g wate r i n bamboo tubes , Ke o Katchou m village .

Lower right: Th e Lao Inspecto r o f Education fo r Luan g Praban g Province show s Me o villager s i n Keo Katchoum th e first school ma p of Lao s i n th e La o language. Thi s map was produced b y th e U.S. In formation Service . Joe l Halper n photos 1957-1959.

MINORITY-LOWLAN D CONTACT

SI

N LAO

S

Upper left : Thi s La o tradin g village , near Sal a Po u Khou n o n th e Vientiane Luang Praban g road , i s a cente r fo r trad e wit h uplan d villages . Middle left : Khmu ? wome n sellin g pack ets o f banan a leave s t o La o wome n i n Luang Praban g town . Lower left : La o woma n peddlin g cotto n in prosperou s Khmu ? village , Luan g Pra ban g district . Lowest left : Blac k Ta i mothe r an d chil dren i n Na m Th a town . Joe l Halper n photo s 1957-1959 . Lower right : Khmu ? bo y wit h basket s o f charcoa l fo r th e Luan g Praban g powe r plan t await s truc k transport .

M I N O B I T Y - L O W L A N D CONTACT

S I N LAOS ,

CONT.

Upper left : Ya o wome n an d girl s wait ing a t th e Na m Th a clini c operate d b y Dr. To m Dooley . Woma n i n foregroun d has infeote d goiter , a diseas e commo n among Ya o an d Meo . Lower left : Thai-Lu e wome n wh o hav e come t o trad e i n Muon g Sai , Luan g Pra bang Province . Lower right : Blac k Ta i refugee s i n Vien tiane. Tal l haird o o n woma n a t right sig nifies tha t sh e i s married . Joe l Halper n photos 1957-1959 .

A typica l Northeas t Thailan d village — wate r shortag e contribute s t o economic prob lems o f thi s area .

Nikho m Chiengpin , a lan d settlemen t com munit y i n th e Northeast . Not e widel y dis persed houses .

Middle left : Prosperit y o f thi s Northeas t village i s show n b y extensiv e us e o f woo d in houses .

Lower left : A poore r house .

Middle right : A nea t hous e mad e o f inex pensive materials—thatche d roo f an d wove n bambo o walls .

Lower right : A ver y poo r house . Le e W . Huff photos , Marc h 1963 .

N O R T H E A ST T H A I L A N D

N O R T H E A S T THAILAN D M D U P R O G R A M

Upper left : Villager s gathe r t o se e helicopte r whic h ha s brough t par t o f th e MDU team . Upper right : Afte r speakin g wit h villag e official s MD U worker s mak e spo t checks o f economi c conditions . Middle lef t an d right : MD U tea m helpe d Ba n Klan g villager s cu t u p tree s t o straighten an d wide n thei r street . Th e wor k wa s complete d afte r th e tea m left, an d som e tea m member s returne d t o inspec t cleare d an d straightene d street. Lower right : Alta r fo r ceremon y t o b e conducte d b y MD U tea m leade r a t village assembly . Th e Tha i flag, imag e o f Buddha , an d pictur e o f Tha i Kin g and Quee n symboliz e country , religion , an d royalty , th e thre e source s o f Thai nationa l unity . Le e W . Huf f photos , Marc h 1963 . Lower left : MD U clinic , unde r a n improvise d shelter , i s a popula r attraction .

31¾¾¾!

NORTHEAS T THAILAN D MD U PROGRAM , CONT .

Uppe r lef t an d right : Wate r use d t o b e drawn b y han d fro m a shallo w wel l i n Ku t Rua Kham . A well drillin g cre w wa s brough t in b y th e MD U tea m t o improv e th e well . Middl e left : Newl y installe d han d pum p i n Kut Ru a Kham . Lower right: Th e MD U tea m ha s se t u p it s motio n pictur e scree n i n th e ground s o f a temple . Lower left : Tea m leade r speak s wit h schoo l childre n wh o wil l b e give n schoo l uniforms , notebooks , an d pencils . Le e W . Huf f photos , Marc h 19Θ3 .

ECOLOGY O F T H A I , " H A W " AN D TRIBA L S E T T L E M E N T , N O R T H E R N T H A I L A N D

Upper left : Fifty-yea r ol d Ya o villag e i n th e mid-level hills , thre e mile s wes t o f Wa n Yang. Ya o resident s stan d i n fron t o f typica l house. Center: Mai n stree t o f Wa n Yang , a Yun nanese "Haw " refuge e villag e o n th e lowe r margin o f th e hills , southwes t o f Fang . Lower left : Th e closes t Norther n Tha i vil lage lie s i n th e valle y abou t fou r mile s eas t of W a n Yang . Lower right : W a n Yan g resident s hav e rented field s belongin g t o Thais , an d hav e hired th e owner s a s laborer s t o gro w winte r crops (garlic) . Wa n Yan g lie s a t th e foo t o f the hill s i n cente r o f picture . F . W . Mot e photos, Januar y 1965 .

YUNNANESE REFUGE E ("HAW" ) SETTLEMEN T I N NORTHER N THAILAN D

Upper: Student s assembl e a t 9:3 0 fo r flag-raising at th e Borde r Patro l schoo l i n Ba n Yang , wher e policemen-teachers instruc t i n Thai . Chines e in structors us e th e sam e schoo l fo r classe s beginnin g at 8:00 . Middle: Th e Chines e templ e lie s o n th e highes t land i n W a n Yang . Th e Ya o headma n fro m a neighboring villag e ha s contribute d t o it s con struction, an d ha s erecte d a spiri t table t alongsid e three Chines e tablet s within . Religio n her e i s a Taoist-Buddhist Chines e fol k religio n fro m whic h the Ya o religio n ha s bee n derived . Ther e i s als o a mosque i n thi s village . Lower: W a n Yan g village , lookin g northeas t to ward Thai-settle d lowlands . Bambo o pip e carrie irrigation wate r fo r gardens , an d supplie s kitchen and bat h houses . Mea t i s dryin g o n rac k i n cente of picture . F . W . Mot e photos , Januar y 1965

s s r .

ME O SETTLEMEN

T I N THAILAN D

Uppe r left : Me o headma n o f villag e nea r Do i Suthep , Chiengma i Province . Silve r necklac e an d gol d teet h indicat e hi s wealth . August 1963 . Middl e left : Me o villag e nea r Meto , Am phu r Hot , Chiengma i Province , surrounde d by cor n field s i n whic h opiu m ha s als o bee n planted . Septembe r 1Θ63 . Middl e right : Me o villag e i n Thailand , ca . 1900. Fro m Surveying and Exploring in Siam, b y Jame s McCarthy . London , Joh n Murray , 1900 , p . 183 . Lowe r left : Me o woma n an d chil d i n vil lage nea r Meto , Septembe r 1963 . Lowe r right : Me o headma n o f villag e nea Met o wear s Tha i styl e clothe s an d a Me sash; o n hi s righ t hi s so n wear s Me o cloth ing, hi s othe r so n i s dresse d i n Chines fashion . Septembe r 1963 . P . Kunstadte photo s excep t a s noted .

r o e r

KAHE N M O U N T A I N - L O W L A N

D DIFFERENCES

,

THAILAN D

Uppe r left : Ba n Hua j Pyng , a Ska w Kare n mountai n village . Ma y 19Θ4 . Uppe r right : Summonin g soul s t o Ska w Karen mountai n home , Ban Ha k Maj . Marc h 1964. Middl e left : Mountai n Ska w Kare n woman . Marc h 1964 . Middl e right : Pw o Kare n hous e i n valle y near Tha i tow n o f Wan g Lung , Amphu r Hot , Chiengma i Province . Augus t 1963 . Lower right: Kare n wome n (second , third , and fourt h fro m right participat e i n crema tion ceremon y fo r Tha i Buddhis t abbo t o f Maesarian g temple . Januar y 1964 . P . Kun -

L U A? M O U N T A I N - L O W L A N D DIFFERENCES , T H A I L A ND

Upper left : P a Pae , a traditiona l moun tain village. Borde r Patro l schoo l i s a t left. Jun e 196 4 Upper right : Me n o f P a Pa e hel p t o re pair Borde r Patro l school . Writin g o n blackboard i s in Tha i an d phoneti c Lua? script. Apri l 1964 . Middle left : A Chines e store-keepe r ha s erected a flag besid e a ne w bridg e i n Kawng Loi , a Thai-ized Lua ? mountai n village. Septembe r 1963 . Middle right : Ba n Tun' s headman wear s his badg e o f office. H e receives a smal l monthly salary fo r keeping village record s and reportin g t o th e distric t office r i n Amphur Hot . Septembe r 1963 . Lower right : Thai-styl e hous e an d ric e barn i n Thai-ize d Lua ? valle y tow n o f Ban Hu a Lin . Novembe r 1963 . P . Kun-stadter photos.

LUA·1 MOUNTAIN-LOWLAN

D DIFFEBENCES

, CONT .

Above: Ba n Tun , a traditiona l mountai n village. Woma n an d gir l carr y firewood pas t porc h o n whic h ric e i s sprea d t o dry . Cotto n yarn hang s fro m anothe r porc h o n whic h firewood i s drying . Septembe r 1Θ63 . Middl e right : Recen P h a e ? , jus t outsid e o his hous e o f material th e jungle . Septembe

t Lua ? migran t t o Ba n f Maesariang , ha s buil t s h e coul d gathe r fro m r 1963 .

Lowe r left : Recen t Lua ? migran t t o valle y wears Tha i clothin g an d weave s Karen style carryin g ba g whic h finds a readie r marke t i n Maesarian g tha n d o Lua ? bags . Ban PhaeP , Septembe r 1963 . Lowe r right : Relativel y prosperou s Lua ? i n Ban To n Phrao , nea r Maesariang , ha s woode n hous e i n traditiona l Lua ? style . Jan -

LUAP UPLAND AGRICULTURE, THAILAND

Upper left : Clearin g th e uplan d fields wit h a machet e afte r abou t nin e year s o f fallow . February 1964 . Upper center : Large r tree s ar e no t felled , but thei r branche s ar e loppe d s o su n wil l reach th e crops . Februar y 1964 . Upper right : Girl s an d wome n hel p i n th e clearing. Februar y 1964 . Middle right : Firebrea k i s mad e t o preven t the fir e fro m burnin g ou t o f control . Kare n fields adjoi n thos e o f th e L u a ? here , an d Karens (background ) hel p i n th e work . March 1964 .

Lower left : Olde r wome n summo n th e ancestors t o th e edg e o f P a Pa e t o mak e a n offering t o the m befor e th e field s ar e burned . Older me n sacrific e a pi g o r buffal o o n th e trail leadin g t o th e fields t o assur e a suc cessful fire. Marc h 1964 . Lower right : Youn g me n carr y torche s alon g the botto m o f field s t o ignit e them . Field s near P a Pae , lat e Marc h 1964 . P . Kunstadte r

photos.

LUA1^ UPLAND AGRICULTURE, CONT.

Upper left : Whil e fields stil l smolder , Lua ? man plant s wove n bambo o talia t o tel l th e forest spirit s tha t th e fiel d belong s t o him . Upper right : Roo t crop s ar e plante d befor e any furthe r clearin g an d burnin g i s done . Middle right : Youn g me n us e lon g iron tipped diggin g stick s t o mak e hole s fo r th e rice seed . Lower left : Girl s an d wome n follo w an d throw see d int o th e holes . Lower right : A buffal o i s sacrifice d t o hel p the ric e midwa y throug h th e growin g season. Lowest right : Ric e growin g i n uplan d field near Lua ? villag e o f Ba n Dong , Septembe r 1963. Othe r picture s nea r P a Pae , March June 1964 . P . Kunstadte r photos .

LUA P IRRIGATE D AGRICULTURE , T H A I L A N D

Upper left : Be d i s prepare d carefull y fo r rice seedling s whic h wil l late r b e trans planted. Middle left : See d i s broadcas t sow n i n bed. Lower left : Hire d Kare n labore r lead s buffalo whil e Lua ? field-owner plows . Middle right : Hoein g th e terrace s befor e harrowing. Lower right : Th e final harrowing . P a Pae , lat e Ma y t o earl y July , 1964 . P . Kunstadte r photos .

LUAP IBHIGATE D AGRICULTURE , CONT .

Upper left : Libatio n o f ric e liquo r i s poure d on sacrific e t o ancesto r spirit s o f fiel d owner , of collatera l relatives , an d o f th e previou s owners o f th e field. Simila r ceremon y i s hel d at eac h uplan d fiel d prio r t o planting . Upper right : Transplantin g th e fields. Middle left : Youn g childre n hel p b y twist ing top s of f ric e seedling s befor e the y ar e transplanted. Middle right : Afte r th e transplantin g i s com pleted, a ceremon y i s hel d t o preven t th e buffaloes fro m losin g thei r souls . I f thi s ceremony wer e no t held , th e buffaloe s would weake n an d di e afte r th e strenuou s work o f plowin g an d harrowing . P a Pae , July 1964 . Lower right : Irrigate d fields nea r Liia ? vil lage o f Ba n Tun , Septembe r 1963 . P . Kun stadter ohotos .

LUA? SUBSISTENC E ACTIVITrES , THAILAN D

Upper left : Wate r i s carrie d fro m sprin g o r stream an d store d i n bambo o tubes . Marc h 1964. Middle an d lowe r left : Ric e i s mille d dail y in a foot-powere d mill . Th e bra n an d chaff are fe d t o pig s an d chickens . Chicken s an d pigs ar e fe d an d penne d unde r th e hous e every night . Wate r buffaloe s ar e turne d ou t to graze , an d ma y b e tie d u p a t nigh t o r left ou t i n th e fields. Marc h 1964 . Middle right : Almos t ever y hous e i n P a Pa e has a simpl e stil l t o mak e th e ric e liquo r which i s require d fo r ever y socia l an d ritua l occasion. Jul y 1964 . Lower right : Fis h trap s ar e baite d wit h in sects an d place d i n irrigatio n ditches . Jun e 1964. P . Kunstadte r photos .

L, ..;¾;..;,:¾ .

L U A? SUBSISTENC E ACTIVITIES , CONT .

Upper lef t an d right , middl e right: Fish supplemen t th e diet , an d fishing is a n enjoyabl e grou p activit y o n a hot day . Marc h 1964 . Lower lef t an d right : Childre n quick ly lear n adul t roles—splittin g firewood and tendin g younge r children . F a Pae , Decembe r 1964 . P . Kunstadte r photos .

LTJA-

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Z

c:

!:D PI

I:'J >-i I:'J

'd

~

1-1

H

d These figures are taken from official Chinese Communist statistics, based on the 1958 census, publisbed in Shih-shih Shou-ts'e (Handbook on Current Events), Peking, September 10, 1956, and Jen-min Shou-ts'e (People's llandbook), 1951. • These figures are taken from Chinese Communist statistics, published in People'. Handbook, 1957. f These minorities have been recently officially recognized. Detailed data are not available. • These figures are taken from Bruk (1959: 22). h The figure given for the total mainland China population is the total of the 1958 figures listed in tbis table. This total does not equal the various totals given by Bruk in different places within his paper: 590 195,000 (Bruk 1959:4), or the census count-574,206,OOO (ibid.). His totals aho included 7,591,000 people on the island of Taiwan, who were not counted in this table. Bruk's figures on Han Chinese are not consistent. We have used the breakdown given on p. 22. • Sources for linguistic identification: LeBar et al. (1964); Chan et al. (1956A, B, C, D); Wilhelm (l956A, B, C), except as noted. Linguistic classification has heen changed to conform with that in the other parts of this book. See notes accompanying "Populatiou and Linguistic Af!iliation of Ethnic Groups of Burma" in Introduction to Part II above for details. I Source: Ma (1962), k Source: Bruk (1959:18-21). I Source: China News Analysis (573:6, July ~3, 1965). .. China News Analysis (578:5, July ~3, 1965) states tbat the Maonan speak "a Chinese-Tibetan language of the Tung-SllUi group." Bruk (1959:26) states, "The Molao and Maonan are two small nationalities, the basic area of which is located to tbe northwest of the city of Lu-chou in the Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Ch'u. Being located in the center of Chuang population, tbey Were subjecled to the linguistic and cultural infiuence of the latter, hut the ethnic group to which they belong has never been definitively determined. n Linguistic classification from Atla. oj the Peoples oj the World (Anon. 1964).

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P E T E B KUNSTADTE

R

TABLE 6 AUTONOMOU S NATIONALITIE S GOVERNMENT S OF MAINLAN D CHIN A

Locatio n (Province )

Nam e

A. AUTONOMOU S B E G I O N Inne r Inne r Mongoli a Mongoli a A u t . Regio n

Uighu r A u t . Regio n

Chuan g A u t . Regio n

Ningsi a H u i A u t . Regio n Tibeta n Aut . Regio n

Ad ministrativ e Divisions *

Tota l Populatio n (1,00O 1S)

11

11,700

IS

4,87 0

3,600 Oct . 1 1955

11

19,50 0

7,28 0 M a r . 5 1958

4

1,820

600

Oct . 2 5 1958

4

1,270

1,200

Apr. 2 2 1956

1,019

578

Sept . 3 1952

Populatio n o f Majo r Tribe s D a t e o f (1,000's ) Foundin g

S

7 league s 9 municipalitie s 22 countie s 50 b a n n e r s 3 a u t o n o m o u s countie s β specia l district s Sinkian g 5 a u t o n o m o u s cho u 4 municipalitie s 74 countie s 6 a u t o n o m o u s countie s Kwangs i 6 specia l district s 5 municipalitie s 68 countie s 7 a u t o n o m o u s countie s Ningsi a 1 specia l distric t 2 municipalitie s 16 countie s Tibe t Prope r 5 specia l district s a n d C h a m d o 1 municipalit y 68 countie s

B. A U T O N O M O U

Numbe r of Nation alitie s

S C H O U (EQUIVALEN

T T O SPECIA L DISTRICT ) β

1,213

Ma y 1 1947

Yen-pie n Korea n A u t . Chou Kan-na n Tibeta n Aut . Chou JJn-hsi a H u i A u t . Chou

Kiri n

1 municipalit y 6 countie s

Kansi i

7 countie s

β

340

166

Oct . I 1953

Kans u

7

810

312

Nov . 1 5 1956

Hai-pe i Tibeta n A u t . Chou Hai-na n Tibeta n A u t . Chou Huang-na n Tibeta n A u t . Chou Yu-sh u Tibeta n A u t . Chou Kuo-l o Tibeta n A u t . Chou Hai-hs i Mongolian , Tibetan , an d K a z a k h Aut . Chou l-\l K a z a k h A u t . Chou

Tsingha i

I municipalit y 5 countie s 1 autonomou s count y S countie s I autonomou s count y

6

130

26 D e c . 3 1 1953

Tsingha i

5 countie s

6

200

60 D e c . 1 5 1953

Tsingha i

3 countie s

4

77

46 D e c . 2 2 1953

Tsingha i

6 countie s

4

100

85

Feb.1 2 1952

Tsingha i

6 countie s

2

65

60

Jan . 1 1954

Tsingha i

1 municipalit y 8 countie s

7

100

—

Jan . 2 5 1954

13

1,000

500

Nov . 2 » 1954

11

180

54

Sinkian g

K'o-tzu-lo-a u Sinkian g (Kizilsu ) Kirghi z A u t . Chou

2 specia l district s 1 municipalit y 21 countie s 2 a u t o n o m o u s countie s 4 countie s

Jul . 1 4 1954

(continued)

[ 16 2 ]

CHINA:INTHODUCTIO

N

TABLE 6 (continued)

Nam e B . AUTONOMOU

Ch'ang-ch i Hu i Aut . Chou Pa-vin-kuo leng (Baya n GoI ) Mongo l Aut. Chou Po-er-t'a-l a (Boro TaIa ) Mongo l Aut . Chou Hsiang-hs i T'u-chi a an d Mia o Aut . Chou Hai-na n L i and Mia o Aut. Chou Kan-tz u Tibeta n Aut. Chou Α-pa Tibeta n Aut. Chou Liang-sha n I Aut. Chou Ch'ien-tung na n Mia o and T'un g Aut. Chou Ch'ien-na n Pu- i an d Mia o Aut . Chou Te-hun g Tha i an d Ching-p o Aut. Chou Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a Aut . Chou Hung-h o Ha-n i an d I Aut. Chou Nu-chian g Li-su Aut . Chou Ti-ch'in g Tibeta n Aut. Chou Ta-I i Pa i Aut . Chou Wen-sha n Chuan g an d Mia o Aut . Chou Ch'u-hsun g I Aut. Chou

Locatio n (Province )

Administrativ e Divisions»

Number of Tota l Populatio n o f Nation- Populatio n Majo r Tribe s Dat e o f alities (1,000's) (1,000's) Foundin g

S CHO U

Sinkian g

7 countie s 1 autonomou s count y

13

98

39 Jul . 1 5 1954

Sinkian g

7 countie s 1 autonomou s count y

12

57

20 Jun e 2 3 1954

Sinkian g

8 countie s

13

41

10 July 1 5 1954

10 countie s

β

8 countie s

4

691

Szechwan

21 countie s

4

540

440 Dec . 2 5 1950

Szechwan

1¾ counties 1 autonomou s count y 11 counties

5

«20

Szechwan

8

860

Kweicho w

16 counties

7

1,960

210 Jan . 1 1953 700 Oct . 1 1952 Miao : 78 0 July 2 3 1956 T'ung : 47 0

Kweicho w

16 counties 1 autonomou s count y

8

1,949

Pu-i : 81 8 Aug. 8 Miao : 28 3 1956

Huna n

Xwangtun g

1,800

Tuchia : 89 6 Sept . 1 6 1957 Miao : 34 2 Li: 38 9 J u I y I 1952 Miao : 1 4

Yunna n

5 counties 1 che n

9

400

Thai : 17 8 July 2 4 1953 Ching-po : 9 7

Yunna n

8 countie s

14

320

160 Jan . 2 3 1953

12

1,880

1:340 Nov . 1 8 Ha-ni : 28 0 1957

17

220

110 Aug. 2 3 1954

7

170

90 Sept . 1 8 1954

9

1,600

670 Nov . 2 2 1956

7

1,400

10

1,670

Yunna n Yunna n Yunna n Yunna n

1 municipalit y 10 countie s 2 autonomous counties 4 countie s 1 autonomou s count y 3 countie s

Yunna n

1 municipalit y 10 counties 2 autonomous counties 8 countie s

Yunna n

11 counties

Chuang : 44 9 Apr. 1 Miao : 15 3 1958 390 Apr. 1 5 1958 (continued)

I 16 3 ]

PETER KUNSTADTE R

TABLE 6 (Continued) Province o r Regio n

Name o f Autonomou s Count y o r Banne r

C. AUTONOMOU S C O UNTY (EQUIVALEN

Hopeh Provinc e

Inner Mongolia n Autonomous Regio n Liaoning Provinc e Kirin Provinc e Heilungkiang Provinc e Kansu Provinc e

Tsinghai Provinc e

Uighur Autonomou s Region, Sinkian g

Hunan Provinc e

Kwangtung Provinc e

Kwangsi Chuan g Autonomous Regio n

Szechwan Provinc e Kweichow Provinc e

T T O COUNTY )

Date of Pounding

Ta-ch'ang Hu i Autonomou s Count y 195 Meng-ts'un Hu i Autonomou s Count y 195 0-lun-ch*un (Oronchon ) Autonomou s Banne r 195 Mo-Ii-ta-wa Ta-hu-er h (Daghor ) Autonomou s Banne r 195 O-wen-k'o (Evenki ) Autonomou s Banne r 195 Fou-hsin Hu i Autonomou s Count y 195 K'o-Ia-ch'in Tso- i Mongo l Autonomou s Count y 195 Ch'ang-pai Korea n Autonomou s Count y 195 Ch'ien-kuo-erh-Io-ssu Mongo l Autonomou s Count y 195 Tu-erh-po-t'e Mongo l Autonomou s Count y 195 Chang-chia-ch'uan Hu i Autonomou s Count y 195 T'ien-chu Tibeta n Autonomou s Count y 195 Su-nan Yfi-k u Autonomou s Count y 195 Su-pei Mongo l Autonomou s Count y 195 A-k'o-sai Kazak h Autonomou s Count y 195 Tung-hsiang Autonomou s Count y 195 Hu-chu T' u Autonomou s Count y 195 Hua-Iung Hu i Autonomou s Count y 195 Men-yuan Hu i Autonomou s Count y 195 Hsun-hua Sala r Autonomou s Count y 195 Ho-nan Mongo l Autonomou s Count y 195 Pa-H-k'un (Bar KoI ) Kazak h Autonomou s Count y 195 T'a-shih-k'u-erh-kan (Tas h Kurghan) Tadzhi k Autonomous Count y 195 Mu-lei-Kazakh Autonomou s Count y 195 Yen-ch'i Hu i Autonomou s Count y 195 Ho-pu-k'o-sai-erh (Kobuk-Saur ) Mongo l Autonomou s Count y 195 Ch'a-pu-ch'a-erh (Chapchal ) Sib o Autonomous Count y 195 Chiang-hua Ya o Autonomou s Count y 195 Ch'eng-pu-Miao Autonomou s Count y 195 Hsin-huang T'un g Autonomou s Count y 195 T'ung-tao T'un g Autonomou s Count y Lien-shan Chuan g an d Ya o Autonomous Count y 195 Lien-nan Ya o Autonomous Count y 195 Ju-yuan Ya o Autonomous Count y 1956 Tung-hsing Multinationa l Autonomou s Count y 195 Ch'in-chow Chuan g Autonomou s Count y 1957 Tu-an Ya o Autonomou s Count y 195 Pa-ma Ya o Autonomous Count y 195 Lung-lin Multinationa l Autonomou s Count y 195 Ta-miao-shan Mia o Autonomous Count y 195 Ta-yao-shan Ya o Autonomous Count y 195 San-chiang T'un g Autonomou s Count y 195 Lung-sheng Multinationa l Autonomou s Count y 195 Mu-Ii Tibetan Autonomou s Count y 195 Mao-wen Ch'ian g Autonomou s Count y 195 Yen-yuan I Autonomou s Count y 1964 Sung-t'ao Mia o Autonomou s Count y 195 Chen-ning Pu- i and Mia o Autonomous Count y 1963 Wei-ning I , Hui , and Mia o Autonomous Count y 195 San-tu Shu i Autonomous Count y 195

4 4 1 8 8 7 7 8 6 6 5 5 4 0 4 0 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 6 8 3 » 7 b

5 5 3 5 2 2 1 3 8 ° 6 d

4 6

(continued)

[ 164 ]

CHINA:INTRODUCTIO

N

TABL E 6 (Continued)

Provinc e o r Regio n Nam

C. AUTONOMOU

B COUNT

Yunna n Province * O-sha

e of Autonomou s Count y o r Banne r Foundin

T (EQUIVALEN

Dat e o f

g

T T O COUNTY )

n I Autonomou s Count y 195 Ts'ang-yua n K'a-w a Autonomou s Count y 195 Keng-m a Tha i an d K'a-w a Autonomou s Count y 195 Li-ehiang Na-hs i Autonomou s Count y 195 Ning-lan g I Autonomou s Count y 195 Ho-k*o u Yao Autonomou s Count y 196 P'ing-pie n Mia o Autonomou s Count y 195 Chiang-ch'en g Ha-n i and I Autonomou s Count y 195 Lan-ts'an g La-h u Autonomou s Count y 195 Meng-Iie n Thai , La-hu , an d K'a-w a Autonomou s Count y 195 Kung-sha n Tu-lun g an d N u Autonomou s Count y 195 Wei-shan I an d Hu i Autonomou s Count y I960 Nan-chie n I Autonomou s Count y 1963 Hsi-men g K'a-w a (Wa ) Autonomou s Count y 1965 Lu-na n I Autonomou s Count y 195

1 8 5 8 6 8 8 4 8 4 6

' « h

7

a Th e Ju-yua n Ya o Autonomou s Count y wa s reorganize d unde r th e jurisdictio n o f Shao-kua n Specia l Distric t i n Octobe r 196 3 b y mergin g th e forme r Shao-pie n Yao Autonomou s Count y an d Ju-Yua n Count y (Nan-fang Jik Pa, Canton , Octobe r 5, 1963, p. 1; Nationalities Solidarity, Peking , Januar y 1964 , No . 68:30). b Th e Ch'in-cho w Chuan g Autonomou s Count y was rename d in Septembe r 1968 , I t was formerl y know n as CVin-pe i Chuan g Autonomou s County , an d i s unde r th e jurisdictio n o f Chan-chian g Specia l Distric t (Yang-cheng Wen-pao> Canton , Septembe r 29 , 1963) . 0 Yen-yua n 1(Yi ) Autonomou s Count y wa s converte d fro m Yen-yua n ordinar y count y o f Hsi-ch'an g Specia l Distric t i n 1964 . d Th e Chen-nin g Pu- i and Mia o Autonomou s County , under th e jurisdictio n o f An-shu n Specia l District , was founde d i n 196 3 (Nationalities Solidarity, Peking , Januar y 1964 , No . 68:30) . • Hsiin-tie n Hu i Autonomou s County , founde d i n 1957 , wa s converte d int o an ordinar y count y i n 196 0 (People's Daily, Octobe r 30 , 1960 , p . 4) . t Th e Wei-sha n I (Yi ) an d Hu i Autonomou s Count y was forme d i n 196 0 ou t o f th e Wei-sha n I (Yi ) an d th e Yung-chie n Hu i Autonomou s Counties . Th e ne w uni t remaine d unde r th e jurisdictio n o f Ta-I i Pa i Autonomou s Chou . β The Nan-chie n I (Yi ) Autonomou s Count y is unde r th e jurisdictio n o f Ta-I i Pa i Autonomou s Chou . h Hsi-men g K'a-w a (Wa ) Autonomou s Count y is unde r th e jurisdictio n o f th e Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a Tha i Autonomou s Chou , and wa s founde d Marc h 1 , 196 5 (Neic China News Service, Marc h 10 , 1965) . 1 Informatio n o n nationalit y autonomou s area s o f variou s level s revise d i n accordanc e wit h China , Ministr y o f Interio r (1965). (Ed. )

REFERENCE S CITE D ANON .

1964 Atla s o f th e people s o f th e world . Moscow , Institut e o f Ethnography , an d Academ y o f Sciences , U.S.S.R . BRUK , SOLOMO N I F I C H

1959 Naseleniy e Kitaya , MN R i Kore i [People s o f China , Mongolia n People' s Republic , an d Korea] . Moscow , Publishin g Hous e o f

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Academy o f Sciences , U.S.S.R . (Translate d b y U.S. Join t Pub lications Researc h Service , New York, 1960. ) CHAN SHAU-WIN G et al.

1956A Nort h China . Ne w Haven , Huma n Relation s Are a File s Press . Subcontractor's Monograp h HRAF-27 , Stanford-1 , Vol . 1. 1956B Centra l Sout h China . Ne w Haven, Huma n Relation s Are a File s Press. Subcontractor' s Monograp h HRAF-28 , Stanford-2 , Vol . 1. 1956C Eas t China . Ne w Haven, Huma n Relation s Are a File s Press . Subcontractor's Monograp h HRAF-29 , Stanford-3 , Vol . 1. 1956D Southwes t China . Ne w Haven, Huma n Relation s Are a File s Press. Subcontractor' s Monograp h HRAF-30 , Stanford-4 , Vol . 1. CHINA, PEOPLE' S REPUBLIC , MINISTR Y O F INTERIOR

1965 Chung-hu a Jen-mi n Kung-ho-ku o Hsing-cheng . Ch'u-hu a Shou-ts'e [Handboo k o n administrativ e division s o f th e People's Republi c o f China , 1965] . Pekin g (Englis h translatio n by Join t Publication s Researc h Servic e JPR S :32,223, Octobe r 1, 1965 . Washington , D.C. , U.S. Departmen t o f Commerce , Clearinghouse fo r Federal Scientifi c and Technical Information. ) LEBAR, FRAN K M., GERAL D C. HICKEY , and JOH N K. MUSGRAVE

1964 Ethni c group s o f mainland Southeas t Asia . New Haven, Huma n Relations Are a File s Press . M A HSUEH-LIAN G

1962 Ne w scripts fo r China' s minorities . Chin a Reconstructs , August: 24-27. [Peking. ] U.S. CENTRA L INTELLIGENC E AGENCY (CIA )

1959 China : Provisiona l atla s o f communis t administrativ e unit s (CIA/RR G R 59-20). Washington , D.C. , U.S. Department of Commerce, Offic e o f Technical Services . VVEDENSKH, B . A., et al. (eds. )

1949- Bol'shai a sovetskai a entsiclopediia . Moscow , Governmen t Pub 1958 lishin g House . W I L H E L M , H E L L M U T , et al.

1956A Genera l handboo k o f China . Ne w Haven, Huma n Relation s Area File s Press . Subcontractor' s Monograp h HRAF-55 , Wash ington-4, Vol . 1. 1956B Northwes t China . Ne w Haven, Huma n Relation s Are a File s Press. Subcontractor' s Monograp h HRAF-59 , Washington-5 , Vol. 1 . 1956C Northeas t China . Ne w Haven, Huma n Relation s Are a File s Press. Subcontractor' s Monograp h HRAF-61 , Washington-9. Periodicals CHINA NEW S ANALYSIS . Weekl y newsletter . Hon g Kong . JEN-MIN JIH-PA O (PEOPLE' S D A I L Y ) . Peking . JEN-MIN SHOU-TS' E (PEOPLE' S HANDBOOK) . Peking .

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N

NAN-FANG JIH-PAO . Canton . NATIONALITIES SOLIDARITY . Peking . N E W CHIN A N E W S SERVICE . Peking . SHIH-SHIH SHOU-TS' E (HANDBOO K O N CURREN T E V E N T S ) . Peking .

WEN-WEI-PAO. Hon g Kong . YANG-CHENG WEN-PAO . Canton .

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The Nationa l Minoritie s of China and Their Relation s With th e Chines e Communis t Regim e RICHAR D K . DIA O

INTRODUCTION

China i s a multi-nationalit y state. 1 Beside s th e Ha n Chines e who constitut e th e majorit y o f th e population , ther e ar e ove r fifty nationa l minorities . Accordin g t o officia l statistic s o f 1953 , the tota l minorit y populatio n amounte d t o more tha n 35,500,000 ; the tota l increase d t o 38,900,00 0 b y 1957 , representin g roughl y 6 percen t o f th e entir e populatio n o f China . Thos e minoritie s which numbe r ove r on e millio n includ e th e Chuang , Uighur , Hui (Chines e Muslims) , Y i (I , o r LoIo) , Tibetan , Miao , Man 1 I n th e curren t Chines e Communis t terminology , minoritie s (religious , ethnic , tribal) ar e referre d t o a s "minorit y nationalities. " The Communis t vie w o f minorit y nationalities i s tha t th e problem s involve d ar e thos e o f class struggle. Thu s Liu Ch'un , deput y chairma n o f th e Chines e Cabinet' s commissio n o f nationalitie s and deput y hea d o f th e Chines e Communis t Party' s united-fron t departmen t of th e Centra l Committee , i s quote d a s saying , "Th e questio n o f nationalit y is connecte d wit h th e questio n o f classes , i n fac t th e questio n o f nationalit y is th e questio n o f classes . Ma o Tse-tun g ha s pointe d ou t tha t 'nationa l struggl e fundamentally i s a questio n o f clas s struggle' " ( China News Analysis [CNA] 563:2, Ma y 7 , 1965 , citing Nationalities Solidarity). What i s t o becom e o f cultura l difference s an d age-ol d antagonism s betwee n the variou s minoritie s i n China ? Li u Ch'u n continue s i n anothe r article : "W e must conside r th e nationa l peculiaritie s an d difference s betwee n nationalitie s since thi s i s advantageou s fo r implementin g th e democrati c reform , socialis t revo lution an d socialis t constructio n amon g th e nationalities . Frictio n betwee n na tionalities shoul d no t b e take n to o seriously . I t ca n b e correcte d b y education . . . . Thi s doe s no t mea n tha t w e wan t t o foste r nationa l privileges ; for tha t woul d b e a fundamenta l error " (CN A 563:3 , Ma y 7 , 1965 , quotin g from a n articl e b y Li u Ch'u n i n Red Fiog , fortnightly , Peking , No . 12 , Jun e 30, 1964 , pp. 16-25 , reprinted i n Nationalities Solidarity 6, 1964) . Since minorit y problem s ar e clas s struggles , th e fina l solutio n i s obvious : 'T t is onl y wit h th e comin g o f communis m an d th e gradua l extinctio n o f classe s that b y th e mergin g o f nationalities , nationa l peculiaritie s an d difference s wil l disappear" (ibid.). Althoug h "mergin g o f nationalities " i s evidentl y th e ultimat e objective, th e Communists , a s Mr . Dia o shows , ar e willin g t o allo w th e minoritie s at least a temporar y period o f autonomy . (Ed. )

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churian, Mongolian , Puy i (Pu-i) , an d Korean ; thos e numberin g 500,000 t o on e millio n includ e th e Tung , Yao , Pai , T uchia, an d Kazakh; thos e numberin g betwee n 100,00 0 an d 500,00 0 includ e the Hani , Thai , Li , Lisu , Kaw a (Wa) , She , Tunghsiang , Nasi , Laku (Lahu) , Shui , an d Ching-p o (Jinghpaw) ; th e populatio n of th e remainin g minoritie s number s betwee n severa l ten s o f thousands, severa l thousands , o r severa l hundreds . I n addition , there ar e stil l a fe w tribe s whic h hav e no t ye t receive d officia l recognition a s minorit y nationalitie s (se e Introduction : China , Table 5 , n. a). Although rathe r limite d i n number , th e minoritie s ar e ver y widely dispersed . I n terms o f area , the y ar e scattere d ove r almos t 60 percen t o f China' s 9,600,00 0 squar e kilometers . Amon g th e national minorities , roughl y eigh t million , o r 2 0 percent , hav e taken permanen t residenc e i n th e cities , towns , an d village s al l over th e country . I n fact , man y member s o f th e minoritie s reside togethe r wit h othe r groups . Th e Hui , fo r example , liv e in mor e tha n 1,60 0 hsien (counties) , whic h constitut e 7 0 percen t of al l hsien i n th e country . Th e Manchurian s ar e locate d i n 86 0 hsien; mos t o f th e Korean s ar e concentrate d i n th e Yen-pie n Au tonomous Chou ("prefecture") , bu t a smal l numbe r o f the m have take n u p residenc e i n many hsien an d shih (municipalities ) in th e northeas t province s an d Inne r Mongolia . Th e Uzbeks , wit h a populatio n o f onl y 13,000 , ar e scattere d ove r 6 9 hsien an d shih in th e Uighu r Autonomou s Regio n i n Sinkian g (Kuang Ming Daily [KMD], Peking , February 22,1957) . The area s wit h th e heavies t concentratio n o f nationa l minori ties ar e near o r i n the frontie r regions—Inne r Mongolia , Sinkiang , Tibet, Yunnan—whic h ar e ric h i n natura l resource s a s wel l a s strategically important . Each minorit y ha s it s ow n tradition s an d customs , which diffe r largely fro m thos e o f th e Hans . Furthermore , ther e exis t amon g some minorities considerabl e difference s i n economi c an d cultura l development, an d mutua l suspicio n an d racia l hatre d resultin g from dispute s ar e additiona l factors tha t aggravat e th e difficultie s in exercisin g contro l over them . The problem o f handlin g nationa l minorities ha s therefor e becom e a vita l questio n i n th e formula tion o f Chines e Communis t domesti c an d united-fron t policies . In fact, th e consolidation an d further developmen t o f the Commu [ 17 0 ]

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nist regim e depend s ver y muc h o n whethe r th e nationa l minori ties can be effectively ruled . REGIONA L AUTONOM Y A S TH E BASI S O F TH E NATTONALITIE S POLIC Y

The fundamenta l polic y o f th e Chines e Communis t authoritie s in relatio n t o th e nationa l minoritie s i s phrase d i n term s o f re gional autonomy . Thi s polic y i s largel y base d o n experienc e learned fro m th e Sovie t Union , bu t modifie d accordin g t o condi tions i n China . Th e ter m "regiona l autonomy " woul d see m t o indicate tha t nationa l minoritie s ar e permitte d t o se t u p thei r own government s an d exercis e norma l governmenta l power s an d functions i n conjunctio n wit h th e leadershi p o f th e Chines e Com munist Part y an d o f th e Communis t government . Bu t unlik e th e Soviet system , whic h nominall y recognize s th e righ t o f self-de termination an d th e righ t o f secession , th e Chines e Communis t policy continue s t o stres s tha t al l territorie s o f th e nationa l mi norities are integral parts of the land o f China. Types of Autonomous Regions. Accordin g t o th e "Outlin e o f the Principle s o f Autonom y i n th e Nationalitie s Areas " promul gated in 1952 , autonomous region s ar e divide d int o thre e types : 1. A region inhabited by one national minority . 2. A regio n consistin g o f on e majo r nationalit y an d severa l minor nationalities . 3. A regio n consistin g o f tw o o r mor e larg e nationalities . In th e earl y year s o f th e Chines e Communis t regime , al l area s of minorit y concentrations , regardles s o f thei r size , wer e calle d "autonomous regions. " Afte r th e promulgatio n o f th e Constitu tion i n 1954 , the nationalit y area s were, according to their respec tive administrativ e sizes , officiall y divide d int o autonomou s re gions, autonomous chou, an d autonomou s hsien. Th e designation s "region," "chou'' an d "hsien' ar e equivalen t t o province , spe cial district, an d count y respectively . A t present, fiv e autonomou s regions, twenty-nin e autonomou s chou, an d sixty-fiv e autono mous hsien hav e bee n se t u p o n th e Chin a mainlan d (Tabl e 6) . While outwardl y th e Chines e Communis t authoritie s appea r to sho w seriou s interes t i n th e politica l an d socia l equalit y o f national minoritie s an d i n makin g the m "pla y th e rol e o f [ 17 1 ]

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master," the y d o not , however , observ e th e tru e spiri t o f th e policy. This is illustrated by the following four points : (1) Thos e minoritie s residin g i n th e town s an d rura l district s do no t enjo y th e righ t o f autonomy , althoug h suc h communitie s are calle d "nationalit y hsiang." (2) Th e Han Chines e (nationa l majority) ar e constantly urge d to settl e dow n i n th e autonomou s area s wit h th e ultimat e objec tive o f securin g a Chines e majority . Th e migratio n o f Ha n Chi nese int o th e minorit y areas , accordin g t o officia l explanation , "is beneficia l bot h t o nationalitie s solidarit y an d t o th e construc tion o f th e autonomou s regions." 2 (Quotatio n fro m a repor t b y Li Wei-ha n t o th e secon d enlarge d conferenc e o f th e Centra l Nationalities Affair s Commission , hel d o n Decembe r 21 , 1951.) But th e tru e motiv e o f th e migratio n polic y obviousl y i s t o bring greate r Chines e contro l ove r th e minorit y people s and , in th e lon g run , t o assimilat e them . Fo r instance , i n Inne r Mon golia th e Mongolian s compris e abou t one-eight h o f th e region' s population, whil e th e Ha n Chines e hav e grow n t o ove r 8 0 per cent an d th e othe r minoritie s numbe r jus t ove r 1 percent o f th e total (se e Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily:PD], Peking , Januar y 31, 1963) . I n th e Ha-n i an d Y i (I ) Autonomou s Chou i n Yunna n Province, th e Ha-n i nationalit y constitute s 1 4 percent ; th e Y i 18 percent ; eac h o f th e othe r eleve n minoritie s les s tha n 1 o r 2 percent , whil e th e Chines e mak e u p nearl y 5 0 percen t o f th e total (se e PD, May 7,1959) . (3) Th e populatio n o f th e Manchurian s total s ove r on e mil lion, bu t the y ar e th e onl y on e o f th e large r minoritie s wh o d o not hav e a n autonomou s governmen t o f thei r ow n a t an y level . The Communis t authoritie s d o not forge t tha t th e Manchu s rule d China fo r a lon g time , tha t the y hav e a clos e associatio n wit h the Hans , an d tha t the y ar e comparativel y bette r educated . T o prevent the m fro m achievin g politica l independence , i t is neces sary, fro m th e Chines e Communis t poin t o f view , t o den y the m the righ t o f autonomy . (4) I n orde r t o achiev e th e objectiv e o f "divid e an d rule, " 2 The succes s o f th e polic y o f encouragin g Ha n migratio n t o minorit y region s and als o th e gerrymanderin g o f th e border s o f thes e region s i s show n b y the fac t tha t b y I96 0 th e tota l populatio n i n autonomou s area s wa s sixty-thre e million, o f whic h th e majority , thirty-si x million , was Chines e (CNA 563:1) . (Ed.)

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th e Chines e Communis t authoritie s hav e deliberatel y place d peo ple o f th e sam e nationalit y unde r th e jurisdictio n o f differen t autonomou s governments . On e notabl e cas e i s tha t o f th e Tibetans . Ther e ar e altogethe r mor e tha n 2,700,00 0 Tibetan s i n th e country , bu t the y ar e scattere d ove r larg e part s o f Kansu , Tsinghai , Szechwan , Yunnan , an d Tibet . Instea d o f permittin g the m t o concentrat e in on e are a an d settin g u p a n autonomou s region fo r al l Tibetans , th e Communis t authoritie s hav e settle d the m i n nin e neighborin g autonomou s chou, i.e. , Kan-na n o f Kansu , Hai-pei , Hai-nan , Haung-nan , Yu-shu , an d Kuo-l o o f Tsinghai , Kan-tz u an d Α-p a o f Szechwan , an d Ti-ch'in g o f Yun nan , an d in th e Tibeta n Autonomou s Region . AutonomousGovernments and Their Rights of Autonomy. Like an y othe r loca l governmen t i n th e hinterlan d o f China , th e autonomou s governmen t i s forme d o n th e basi s o f "democrati c centralism " an d th e "people' s congress. " Nominally , a n autono mou s governmen t ha s greate r authorit y tha n a rulin g bod y o f a simila r leve l i n a non-minorit y area . Accordin g t o th e stipula tion o f Articl e 7 0 o f th e Chines e Communis t Constitution , th e organ s o f self-governmen t a t al l thre e level s (region , chou, an d hsien), apar t fro m enjoyin g th e righ t o f exercisin g autonomy , ma y also : (a ) administe r th e finances o f thei r area s withi n th e limit s o f thei r authority ; (b ) organiz e th e publi c securit y force s of thei r area s i n accordanc e with th e militar y syste m o f th e state ; an d (c ) i n th e ligh t o f th e political , economic , and cultura l char acteristic s o f th e nationalit y o r nationalitie s i n th e give n area , mak e regulation s o n th e exercis e o f autonom y a s wel l a s specifi c regulations , an d submi t the m t o th e Standin g Committe e o f th e Nationa l People' s Congres s (NPC ) for approval . I n actua l prac tice , suc h self-governmen t organ s ofte n find thei r hand s boun d by variou s restriction s impose d throug h th e Party' s manipulatio n of th e NP C an d democrati c centralis m system , th e latte r provid ing a read y excus e fo r placin g al l governmen t affair s unde r th e unified leadershi p o f th e Party . Le t u s examin e closel y ho w th e restriction s ar e impose d o n th e organ s o f self-government : (1) Accordin g t o th e Communis t Electora l Law , th e people' s congresse s a t al l level s ar e forme d throug h elections , bu t th e allocatio n o f deputie s mus t b e base d o n population . Thu s th e [ 17 3 ]

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number o f deputie s representin g th e main nationalit y i s relativel y smaller i n a n are a wher e it s populatio n i s i n th e minority , suc h as i n th e cas e o f Inne r Mongolia . Th e Mongolia n deputies , unde r such circumstances , naturall y canno t d o muc h t o mak e thei r voices hear d a t th e Congress . Th e officia l promis e t o le t the m "play th e rol e o f master " i s consequentl y a n empt y slogan . (2) Deputie s o f th e nationa l minoritie s ar e confronte d wit h similar trouble s a t th e loca l people' s councils . I n man y o f th e minority communitie s an d areas , many nationalitie s liv e together , so tha t th e counci l usuall y i s compose d o f member s o f al l nation alities concerned . Whil e th e pos t o f regiona l governmen t chie f is take n b y a leade r o f th e mai n minorit y nationalit y o f th e area , most othe r posts—suc h a s vice-chairman , vice-governor , vice county magistrate , an d departmen t heads—ar e take n b y th e Chi nese o r member s o f othe r nationalities . Th e chairma n o f th e first people's counci l i n Inne r Mongolia , fo r example , i s a Mongolian , but o f th e seve n vice-chairme n o f th e council , onl y thre e ar e Mongolian, th e remainin g fou r bein g Ha n Chinese . Amon g th e thirty-seven counci l members , sixtee n ar e Mongolian , on e Hui , one Manchurian , an d ninetee n Chines e (se e PD, Ma y 6 , 1955). 3 The people' s council , unde r suc h circumstances , ca n hardl y exer cise it s function s an d power s t o promot e th e interes t o f th e na tional minorities . I t i s no t surprisin g tha t th e Mongolian s trie d in th e pas t t o regrou p th e communitie s i n Inne r Mongoli a int o Mongolian districts , Ha n Chinese-Mongolia n districts , an d Chi nese districts , hopin g eventuall y t o eliminat e o r t o detac h them selves fro m th e Ha n Chines e districts , becaus e "th e Mongolian s have becom e head s o f th e household , bu t canno t ru n th e house hold a s master " (se e Inner Mongolia Daily [IMD], Novembe r 14, 1957) . (3) Accordin g t o th e principl e o f "democrati c centralism, " the individua l obey s th e collective , th e loca l orga n obey s th e central, an d al l loca l organ s mus t b e place d unde r th e unifie d leadership o f th e centra l governmen t an d perfor m thei r function s 3 Mere number s o f representative s d o no t giv e th e whol e picture . Mos t o f the representative s wh o ar e supposed t o be ethni c Mongol s in th e Inne r Mongolia n government hav e "becom e Chinese" ; the y n o longe r spea k Mongolian , an d the y dress an d ac t lik e Chines e (Rupe n 1964:3) . Nonetheless , eve n th e concessio n of havin g som e nomina l Mongol s represente d i n th e governmen t i s mor e tha n the Kuomintan g allowed . (Ed. )

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and power s unde r th e directio n an d supervisio n o f th e nex t higher level . Thi s principl e als o applie s t o th e organizatio n o f the nationa l minorit y autonomou s governments . When a decisio n concerning th e interes t o f a nationalit y i s mad e b y th e appro priate leve l o f a n autonomou s government , i t ma y b e vetoe d or disapprove d a t th e nex t highe r level . Fo r example , whe n th e people's congres s o f th e Mo-li-ta-w a Banne r (equivalen t t o a county) i n Inne r Mongoli a passe d a resolution , requestin g th e establishment o f a Dagho r (Ta-hu-erh ) nationalit y autonomou s chou t o b e compose d o f thre e banner s (Mo-li-ta-wa , A-jung , and Pu-t'e-h a i n Inne r Mongolia , an d part s o f Tsi-tsi-har , Lung chiang an d Fu-ch'i u i n Heilungkiang ) i t was rejected b y th e nex t higher level (se e PD, Februar y 26,1958) . (4) Wit h th e Part y remainin g i n th e suprem e rulin g position , all actua l powe r o f th e loca l government , whic h i s nominall y run b y th e people' s congres s an d th e people' s council , i s kep t in th e hand s o f th e loca l Part y committees . Thes e committee s are a t al l time s unde r th e soli d contro l o f th e Politica l Burea u and th e Centra l Committe e o f th e Chines e Communis t Party . Any loca l governmen t decisio n o f importanc e must , therefore , first b e approve d b y th e loca l Part y committee . N o decisio n whatsoever ca n b e mad e withou t full y complyin g wit h th e inter est an d desir e o f th e Communis t Party , especiall y o n matter s concerning finance an d th e arme d forces . I n othe r words , th e local autonomou s governmen t ma y exercis e it s function s an d power onl y withi n limit s prescribe d b y th e Politica l Burea u an d the Centra l Committe e o f th e Party , an d no t by th e Constitution . The autonomou s governmen t may , o n th e othe r hand , exercis e its function s an d power s wit h a comparativel y greate r freedo m in suc h matter s a s custom s an d habits , marriage , an d religiou s beliefs; i t ma y wor k ou t specifi c regulation s i n th e ligh t o f con crete loca l condition s an d submi t the m t o th e Standin g Commit tee o f th e NP C fo r approval . Eve n thi s concessio n i s grante d in th e interes t o f consolidatin g th e Party' s united-fron t operatio n for th e stabilization of th e regime. The Question of Minority Nationalization of the Autonomous Governments. Th e questio n o f minorit y nationalizatio n o f th e autonomous government s ha s alway s bee n regarde d a s a n impor tant lin k i n strengthenin g relation s betwee n th e autonomou s gov [175]

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eminent an d th e nationa l minorities , i n bringin g abou t th e soli darity o f th e nationalities , an d i n consolidatin g th e Communis t regime a s a whole . I t embodie s thre e majo r aspects : th e cadre , written an d spoke n language , an d th e for m o f loca l government . The Minority Cadres. A s early as 1950 , the Chines e Communis t authorities promulgate d "Th e Tria l Proposa l fo r th e Cultivatio n of Nationa l Minorit y Cadres, " stipulatin g tha t larg e number s o f minority cadre s woul d b e traine d b y establishin g nationa l minor ity colleges , cadr e schools , an d trainin g classes , a s wel l a s b y urging th e youn g peopl e o f th e minoritie s t o stud y i n al l type s of senio r an d junio r secondar y schools . With governmen t suppor t and promotion , educatio n o f th e nationa l minoritie s ha s bee n making rapi d progress , a s evidence d b y th e steadil y increasin g number o f traine d cadre s o f th e minorities . Accordin g t o officia l statistics i n 1949 , minority student s attendin g college s numbere d only approximatel y 600 . By 1963 , at th e Centra l Nationalit y Col lege alone , full-tim e student s ha d increase d t o 1,08 6 (se e China News Service [CNS] , Hon g Kong , Januar y 29 , 1964) . B y Ma y 1961, th e eigh t nationalit y college s i n th e mainlan d ha d alread y graduated 41,97 3 full - an d part-tim e students , representin g fifty nationalities, whil e thos e stil l i n schoo l totale d 12,71 6 (se e Nationalities Solidarity [NS], monthly , Septembe r 6 , 1961) . Minority nationalit y cadre s i n 194 9 numbere d approximatel y 10,000, whic h i n 195 2 increase d t o 100,000 , t o 480,00 0 i n 1959 , and t o 500,00 0 i n 1963 . This growt h represente d roughl y a fiftyfold increas e compare d wit h th e tota l o f 194 9 (se e NS, No . 10 , 1959, an d CNS, Septembe r 4 , 1963) . O f th e total , ove r 100,00 0 were junior - an d middle-grad e technica l cadres , primary an d sec ondary schoo l teachers , medica l an d publi c healt h personnel , lit erary an d artisti c workers , an d translators ; th e grea t majorit y of the m wer e engage d i n governmen t wor k i n th e loca l autono mous organs (se e KMD, Septembe r 28,1963) . The abov e figure s sho w tha t th e numbe r o f nationalit y cadre s increased b y 90,00 0 between 195 0 and 1952 ; by 300,00 0 betwee n 1953 an d 1957 ; an d b y 80,00 0 i n jus t on e yea r betwee n 195 7 and 1958 . Th e spee d o f increas e slowe d afte r 1958 , averagin g only a fe w thousan d annually . Th e slowdow n afte r 195 8 coul d have bee n cause d partl y b y th e economi c crisi s resultin g fro m the failur e o f th e "Grea t Lea p Forward, " bu t i t i s als o possibl e [ 17 6 ]

MINOHITIE S & TH E CHINES E COMMUNIS T REGIM E

that th e Communis t authorities , wh o ha d becom e mor e cautiou s in expandin g th e forc e o f th e minorit y cadres , wer e compelle d to cu t dow n th e numbe r o f trainees . A t presen t th e percentag e of minorit y cadre s i n som e minorit y area s i s alread y greate r tha n that o f th e Ha n Chines e cadre s i n th e sam e areas . Thu s th e training o f minorit y cadre s ma y hav e reache d saturatio n point. 4 In futur e th e trainin g progra m possibl y wil l switc h emphasi s to qualit y instea d o f quantity . Mor e effort s ar e likely t o be mad e to tur n ou t "revolutionar y successors " amon g th e minorit y nationalities. Years o f racia l discrimination , goin g bac k t o Kuomintan g day s and earlier , hav e turne d th e nationa l minoritie s int o emotionall y explosive an d sensitiv e groups . T o them , "Onl y whe n a govern ment i s ru n b y th e cadre s o f it s ow n peopl e ca n i t b e calle d a governmen t o f it s own ; otherwise , th e governmen t ma y b e good, but it is not its own" (se e PD, June 14,1951) . For th e convenienc e o f rulin g th e minorit y areas , certai n num bers o f minorit y cadre s ha d t o b e traine d t o replac e th e Ha n Chinese. Th e trainin g program , however , alway s emphasize d th e importance o f "th e huma n factor " an d "th e clas s standpoint. " In th e selectio n o f trainees , th e majo r consideratio n wa s "moral ity," whil e "abilit y an d qualification " wer e o f secondar y impor tance. Th e ter m "morality " refers t o th e individual' s famil y back ground, his revolutionary awareness , and th e degree o f hi s loyalty to th e Party . A t present , childre n o f th e so-calle d five elements — landlords, ric h peasants , counter-revolutionaries , ba d characters , and rightists—stan d ver y littl e chanc e o f bein g admitte d int o schools o f highe r learning ; th e sam e i s tru e fo r childre n o f bour geois families . The first regulatio n i n th e admissio n polic y o f th e nationa l minority college s stipulate s tha t candidate s "mus t b e thos e wh o have joine d th e revolutionar y struggl e an d worke d fo r mor e tha n two years. " A repor t carrie d i n Nationalities Solidarity, No . 10 , 1959, disclose d tha t "A t present , ther e ar e ove r 500,00 0 nationa l 'For example , i n Tibet , followin g th e rebellio n o f th e lat e 1950' s an d earl y 1960's, th e forme r Tibeta n loca l governmen t was dissolved , an d th e ne w polic y was t o b e carrie d ou t b y th e Preparator y Committe e fo r th e Autonomou s Regio n of Tibet , wit h th e ai d o f " a certai n numbe r o f cadre s o f Ha n an d othe r na tionalties" (Patterso n 1962:192 , quotin g Chan g Ching-wu , Secretar y o f th e Chi nese Communis t Part y i n Tibet , an d representativ e o f th e Pekin g governmen t in Tibet) . (Ed. )

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minority Communis t Part y member s an d ove r 900,00 0 Youn g Communist Leagu e members. " Thes e figures wer e almos t thre e times mor e tha n th e tota l o f th e minorit y cadres . Thi s migh t suggest tha t mos t o f th e minorit y cadre s wer e no t chose n fro m among th e ordinar y people , bu t wer e carefull y selecte d fro m among th e Part y an d Leagu e member s o r fro m thos e havin g good qualifications fo r Party or League membership . In Sinkiang , man y o f th e minorit y peopl e considere d cadre s of thei r ow n nationalitie s a s "running-dog s o f th e Chinese " (PD, December 26 , 1957) . Th e Mongolian s calle d th e Mongolia n cadres "racia l renegades, " an d eve n viewe d th e vetera n Mon golian cadre s a s "actuall y Chines e wh o hav e disguise d themselves a s Mongolian s t o exercis e contro l ove r th e Mongo lians" (IMD, Novembe r 14 , 1957) . I n Kansu , th e Hui s calle d the Hu i cadre s "traitors " wh o "sel l thei r religio n fo r persona l glory" (KMD, Januar y 17,1958) . Although th e Communis t authoritie s declare d tha t minorit y nationalization o f th e autonomou s government s mus t emphasiz e the us e o f minorit y cadres , the y als o stresse d tha t " . . . th e number o f minorit y cadre s an d worker s i n relatio n t o tha t o f the loca l cadre s an d worker s shoul d roughl y b e i n th e righ t pro portion t o tha t betwee n th e populatio n o f th e particula r minorit y nationality an d th e tota l populatio n o f th e area " (KMD, Marc h 29, 1957) . In vie w o f th e fact s tha t mos t o f th e minorit y area s ar e com posed o f severa l nationalitie s an d tha t th e Ha n Chines e ofte n constitute th e majority , th e proportio n o f th e Chines e an d th e minority cadre s naturall y gav e advantag e t o th e Chinese . Th e minority cadre s i n suc h circumstance s wer e give n mino r post s in th e government . Take , fo r example , th e organizatio n o f th e Inner Mongolia n Autonomou s Government . Mongolia n cadre s assigned t o th e variou s regiona l organ s an d enterprise s unde r the People' s Counci l comprise d onl y 9. 9 percent , th e Chines e cadres, 90 percent. I n th e more importan t organs , the proportion s of th e Mongolia n cadre s wa s eve n smaller . I n th e Publi c Securit y Department, fo r instance , th e percentag e o f Mongolia n cadre s stood a t 5. 2 percent ; i n th e People' s Bank , 5. 9 percent ; an d the Trad e Department , 4. 3 percent . I n th e les s importan t organs minorit y cadre s too k up a higher percentage : 50. 5 percen t [ 178 ]

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in th e Physica l Cultur e an d Sport s Commission ; 4 7 percen t i n the Nationalitie s Affair s Commission ; an d 33. 3 percen t i n th e Bureau of Religious Affairs (IMD, June 24,1957). The minorit y cadre s wer e no t onl y smalle r i n numbe r an d given onl y mino r post s i n th e les s importan t organs , the y als o were ignore d b y th e Chines e cadres , who too k them t o be noth ing mor e tha n decoration s o n th e facad e o f "minorit y nationali zation." Th e Ha n Chines e cadre s thin k tha t thei r minorit y col leagues ow e thei r position s t o th e trainin g an d car e give n the m by th e Chinese . N o seriou s proble m arise s i f al l wor k a t th e same level . Bu t i f on e of th e minority cadre s get s a higher position, the n thos e Ha n Chines e unde r hi m assum e a n ai r o f su periority an d eve n def y th e authorit y o f th e highe r minorit y cadre. Thi s situatio n develope d i n virtuall y al l minorit y autono mous areas . Th e KMD reporte d o n Decembe r 14 , 1956 : At th e T'ien-ch u Tibeta n Autonomou s Hsien governmen t [i n Kans u Province], ther e ar e a count y chie f an d thre e deput y chiefs . On e of th e deput y chiefs , a Chinese , monopolize s everything . A U cadre s under th e governmen t mus t see k instructio n fro m him , so tha t h e keeps bus y al l da y long . Th e count y chie f an d othe r deput y chiefs , all bein g Tibetan , ar e regarde d a s inefficien t an d incapabl e o f solvin g problems. H e neve r ask s fo r instructio n fro m th e chief , s o tha t al l of them remain idle all day long.

The same report went on to cite another example: Ma Kuo-han , chie f o f th e Tung-hsian g Autonomou s Hsien [i n Kans u Province], i s a Tung-hsian g ma n an d quit e abl e i n his work ; h e enjoy s great respec t amon g hi s ow n people . Bu t Hsue h Chen-wu , a Chinese , the deput y chief , doe s no t trus t him , an d think s tha t th e chie f ca n draw hi s salar y an d enjo y hi s meals , bu t i f h e work s ther e i s boun d to b e trouble . Although M a Kuo-han i s the chie f o f th e count y govern ment, he is seldom informed o f what is going on in the government .

Language. Th e us e o f popula r languag e o r language s i n th e minority are a i s anothe r importan t polic y o f th e Chines e Com munists. According t o Article 3 of th e Constitution , th e nationa l minorities ar e entitled, without discrimination, to use their native languages, bot h i n writin g an d speaking . Popula r minorit y lan guages ar e not onl y taugh t i n minority are a school s for trainin g in literacy , bu t als o used i n conjunctio n wit h Chines e in officia l communications by the autonomous governments. [ 179 ]

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Prior t o 194 9 there wer e seventee n writte n minorit y languages , among whic h onl y Mongolian , Tibetan , Manchurian , an d Korea n were widel y used . A s th e populatio n o f th e othe r minoritie s wa s small, th e us e o f thei r language s wa s restricted . A s a first ste p in promotin g th e nationalitie s policy , th e Communis t authoritie s made persisten t effort s t o inven t an d refor m minorit y scripts . They decide d earl y i n 195 1 t o for m script s fo r thos e language s which ha d non e an d t o refor m thos e whic h wer e incomplet e or unsystematic . Du e t o a lac k o f traine d personnel , however , the progra m mad e littl e headwa y unti l 1956 , when th e necessar y investigation an d preparatio n ha d bee n mad e an d a sufficien t number o f traine d cadre s wer e available . A t presen t thos e i n charge hav e invente d ne w phoneti c scripts , resemblin g Chines e Romanization, fo r th e Chuang , Puy i (Pu-i) , Li , Tun g (Kam) , Miao, Yi (LoIo) , Lisu , Hani , Kaw a (Wa) , an d Nas i nationalities ; and reforme d th e writte n languages , using phonetics, o f th e Thai , Laku, Ching-po , Uighur , an d Kazakh . B y usin g a phoneti c sys tem whic h resemble s Chines e Romanization , i t i s hope d th e minority people s ca n mor e easil y lear n th e Chines e languag e someday i n the future. 5 The Communis t authoritie s als o pai d considerabl e attentio n to th e popularizatio n o f minorit y languages , includin g th e ne w and reforme d phoneti c scripts . Fro m 195 2 t o 1958 , 9,05 0 books , totaling 97,353,00 0 copies , wer e publishe d i n suc h language s a s Mongolian, Tibetan , Uighur , Chuang , Puyi , Miao , Korean , Y i (LoIo), Li , Thai , Kazakh , Kirghiz , Sibo , Lisu , Ching-po , Laku , Kawa (Wa) , an d Hani . I n addition , abou t sevent y newspaper s and magazine s wer e publishe d i n th e sam e perio d i n Mongolian , Tibetan, Uighur , Kazakh , Chuang , Korean , Kirghiz , Thai , Ching-po, Lisu and Sibo (NS , July 6,1959) . 8 For furthe r detail s o n Communis t Chines e languag e policies , se e Rupen' s discussion (1964:4-5 ) o f th e polic y a s applie d t o Inne r Mongolia . A Cyrilli c script ha s bee n standar d i n th e Mongolia n People' s Republi c sinc e 194 5 (a n evidence o f Russia n influence) , bu t th e traditiona l Mongo l scrip t i s stil l use d in Inne r Mongolia , wher e i t serve s a s a symbo l o f grou p identification . I n 195 8 Peking announce d tha t minorit y language s woul d b e transcribe d wit h a Roman ized alphabet , bu t a s o f 196 4 thi s directiv e ha d no t bee n applie d t o Mongolian . The retentio n o f th e traditiona l scrip t i n Inne r Mongoli a wa s a sympto m o f the confrontatio n o f Chines e an d Russia n interest s i n th e Mongols . Thi s conflic t also include d a vilificatio n o f Genghi s Kha n b y th e Russians , whil e th e Chines e praised hi s accomplishment s i n bringin g a highe r cultur e t o th e Russians . For informatio n o n th e languag e progra m a s applie d t o othe r group s se e F Ma (1962) . (Ed. ) * * ** *

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Apart fro m th e above , many minority-languag e program s wer e broadcast b y centra l an d loca l radi o stations , man y films wer e dubbed i n minorit y languages , an d man y play s wer e writte n i n minority language s b y th e minorit y scriptwriter s an d artists . Contrary t o the spiri t o f thi s policy, th e Hui s an d Manchurians , who ar e mor e numerou s i n population , wer e no t encourage d t o publicize th e us e o f thei r ow n script s o r languages , o r th e stud y of thei r cultura l heritage . The y wer e encourage d t o lear n an d use th e Chines e language, thu s speedin g th e Communis t progra m of assimilation . Thi s differen t attitud e seem s t o sho w tha t th e Communist authoritie s ar e afrai d tha t wit h stronge r grou p identi fication, th e Hui s an d Manchurian s migh t becom e politicall y am bitious and fight for independence . While outwardl y th e popularizatio n o f th e minorit y language s fits wel l int o th e nationalizatio n program , th e Communist s ap pear, however , t o hav e bee n mor e intereste d i n publicizin g th e thinking o f Ma o Tse-tun g a s th e chie f mean s fo r ideologica l indoctrination. In orde r t o reduc e loca l resistanc e t o Communis t contro l an d to smoot h th e wa y fo r gradua l infiltratio n o f Part y influence , the Communis t authoritie s allowe d th e loca l autonomou s govern ments t o b e se t u p generall y i n form s commo n t o th e custom s and habit s o f thei r respectiv e localities . Nevertheless , i n al l loca l autonomous governments , th e people' s congres s an d th e people' s council wer e force d t o perfor m thei r dutie s unde r th e syste m of democrati c centralism . Thus , wit h th e exceptio n o f th e title s such a s ch'i ("banner" ) an d meng ("league" ) i n lone r Mon golia, an d pan-na ("valle y plain" ) i n Yunna n stil l bearin g toke n semblance o f th e ol d days , ther e wa s practicall y n o differenc e in substanc e a s compare d wit h othe r loca l Chines e government s in an y par t o f th e country . Al l election s o f th e people' s congress , and compositio n o f th e people' s council , an d th e term s o f thei r service were exactly like those in non-minority areas . MINORITY REPRESENTATIVE S I N TH E CENTRA L GOVERNMEN T AN D UNITED-FRONT ORGANIZATION S

As a supplementar y measur e t o wi n ove r th e suppor t an d loyalty o f th e nationa l minorities , th e Communis t authoritie s re cruited certai n pro-Communis t minorit y personage s t o tak e par t [ 18 1 ]

iUCHAB D K . DIA O

in th e centra l governmen t organ s an d th e united-fron t bodies . The National Peoples Congress. Th e Nationa l People' s Con gress (NPC ) i s th e highes t orga n o f stat e power . Th e allocatio n of th e NP C deputie s i s decide d accordin g t o Chapte r Thre e o f the Electora l Law : The deputie s t o th e NP C ar e t o b e electe d b y th e province s o n th e basis o f on e deputy fo r ever y 800,00 0 persons. The number o f deputie s should no t b e les s tha n thre e i n a provinc e wit h a n exceptionall y small population . I n municipalitie s unde r th e direc t contro l o f th e central governmen t an d i n industria l citie s o f ove r 500,00 0 i n popula tion unde r th e provincia l government , on e deput y i s t o b e electe d from ever y 100,00 0 resident s [Articl e 20] ; al l minorit y nationalitie s should elect 15 0 deputies to the NPC [Articl e 21].

At th e fourt h sessio n o f th e Secon d NP C hel d i n Novembe r 1963, a resolutio n o n increasin g th e numbe r o f deputie s t o th e Third NP C was passed. The resolution reads : Deputies t o th e NP C t o b e electe d i n th e province s an d autonomou s regions should b e o n the basis of one deputy for ever y 400,000 persons. The numbe r o f deputie s shoul d no t b e ies s tha n 1 0 i n a provinc e or autonomou s regio n wit h a n exceptionall y smal l number o f residents . In th e municipalitie s unde r th e direc t authorit y o f th e centra l govern ment o r provincia l government , i n industria l citie s o f ove r 300,00 0 in population , an d i n industrial , minin g an d lumberin g citie s o f belo w 300,000 i n population , bu t wit h worker s an d thei r dependent s exceed ing 200,000 , th e allocatio n shoul d b e on e deput y fo r ever y 50,00 0 persons; th e minorit y nationalitie s shoul d elec t 30 0 deputie s t o th e NPC.

Consequently, th e tota l numbe r o f deputie s t o th e Thir d NP C held i n Decembe r 1964 , was increase d fro m 1,22 6 a t th e previou s Congress t o 3,040 , whil e th e percentag e o f nationa l minorit y deputies droppe d fro m 12.2 3 percen t t o 9.8 7 percent . O f th e twenty-eight provinces , municipalities , an d autonomou s regions , eleven province s an d municipalitie s ha d n o deputie s representin g the nationa l minorities . I n th e othe r seventee n provinces , munici palities, an d autonomou s regions , nationa l minorit y deputie s ranged fro m on e t o fifty. Individua l allocation s o f th e seventee n provinces, municipalities , an d autonomou s region s ar e liste d i n Table 7 . The allocatio n o f th e minorit y deputie s i s no t necessaril y i n correct proportio n t o th e population ; bu t nearl y al l minorit y na [ 182 ]

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TABLE 7 PERCENTAGE O F MINORIT Y NATIONALIT Y DELEGATE S TO TH E THIR D NATIONA L PEOPLE' S CONGRESS , 196 4 Area Tibet Sinkiang Tsinghai Kwangsi Yunnan Ningsia Kweichow Inner Mongoli a Kansu Kirin Szechwan Heilungkiang Peking Kwangtung Fukien Hupeh Shensi

Deputy Tota l

Number o f Minorit y Nationality Deputie s

Percentage

24 53 18 87 93 IS 67 55 52 76 240 132 101 160 54 126 70

21 40 12 47 50 7 27 21 12 9 27 12 4 6 2 2 1

87.5 75.45 66.66 54.02 53.76 46.66 40.29 38.18 23.07 11.84 11.25 9.09 3.85 3.75 3.70 1.58 1.42

tionalities hav e deputie s t o the NPC . Such a method o f allocatio n speaks wel l o f th e car e an d cautio n th e Chines e Communis t au thorities hav e use d t o wi n ove r th e loyalt y o f th e minorit y peo ples. Th e Chuan g an d th e Tibetans , eac h wit h forty-thre e dep uties, hav e th e mos t minorit y allocations ; nex t com e th e Uighu r with twenty-seve n deputies , th e Hu i wit h twenty-five , th e Y i with twenty-three , th e Mongolian s wit h twenty-one , th e Mia o with seventeen , th e Korean s wit h ten , th e Manchurian s wit h nine, th e Puy i wit h eight , th e Tha i wit h six , th e Kazak h an d Yao wit h five each , th e Tun g an d Han i wit h fou r each , th e Ta-hu-erh an d Kaw a wit h thre e each , th e Tung-hsiang , Li , Lisu , Laku, an d Chila o wit h tw o each , an d th e Ahchang , Pulang , an d twenty-seven other s with one each . The tota l numbe r o f vice-chairme n o f th e Thir d NP C Standin g Committee wa s increase d fro m sixtee n t o eighteen , bu t th e num ber o f minorit y vice-chairme n droppe d fro m thre e t o two. Besides Saifudin bein g reelected , Ngap o Ngawan g Jigm e wa s newl y elected; an d th e Dala i Lam a an d Panche n Erden i wer e dropped . The numbe r o f Standin g Committe e member s o f th e Thir d NP C [ 183 ]

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was increase d fro m th e previou s sixty-tw o t o ninety-six . Th e tw o minority members , L u Ha n (o f th e Y i nationality ) an d Hsie h Fu-min (o f th e Chuan g nationality ) wer e reelected . I n term s of percentages , th e nationa l minorit y membershi p i n th e NP C Standing Committee was also lowered . The Central Government and State Organs. Accordin g t o th e official announcemen t i n th e People's Daily, Januar y 5 , 1965 , Ulanfu, Vice-Premie r an d concurrentl y Chairma n o f th e Nation alities Affair s Commission , i s th e onl y representativ e o f minorit y people i n mor e tha n fift y hig h governmen t posts . A Mongolian , Ulanfu i s a membe r o f th e Chines e Communis t Part y Centra l Committee an d Alternat e Membe r o f th e Politica l Bureau . A man wit h suc h a politicall y stron g backgroun d ca n hardl y b e taken a s a tru e representativ e o f th e nationa l minorities. 6 Fo r all intent s an d purposes , th e minoritie s hav e n o representative s in th e higher organ s of th e central government . The National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Th e Nationa l Committe e o f th e Chines e People's Politica l Consultativ e Conferenc e (CPPCC ) i s the nerv e center o f th e Chines e Communis t united-fron t activities . Befor e the promulgatio n o f th e Constitution , i t actuall y acte d a s th e NPC. Toda y i t exist s onl y a s a n advisor y orga n o f th e centra l government. The numbe r o f delegate s t o th e presen t CPPC C ha s bee n in creased fro m th e previou s tota l o f 1,07 1 t o 1,119 . Yet th e numbe r of delegate s representin g th e minorit y peopl e remaine d a t thirty six. Th e percentag e o f thei r representatio n thu s droppe d fro m 3.36 percen t t o 3 percent , o r roughl y one-hal f o f wha t i t shoul d be sinc e th e minorit y people s compris e 6 percen t o f th e tota l national population . Th e numbe r o f vice-chairme n o f th e presen t CPPCC ter m o f offic e ha s bee n increase d fro m fiftee n t o twenty two, bu t th e numbe r o f th e minority vice-chairmen droppe d fro m three to only one, Pebala Golieh-namje, a Tibetan. Judging fro m th e figures give n above , th e influenc e o f th e minority peopl e i n th e NPC , th e centra l government , an d th e CPPCC i s graduall y bein g weakened . Thu s th e tru e natur e o f 6 Cf. Rupen' s remark s (1964:6) : "Th e tw o highes t Part y leader s i n IMA R [Inner Mongolia n Autonomou s Regional ] (Ulanf u an d K'ue i Pi) , an d on e o f th e leaders, Ch i Ya-t'ai , al l thre e Mongols , attende d th e Kuomintang' s Mongol-Tibeta n School i n Pekin g i n 1923 , suggestin g tha t the y wer e highl y Sinifie d Mongol s even then. " (Ed. )

[ 184 ]

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the Chines e Communis t polic y towar d th e nationa l minoritie s shows tha t i t doe s no t li e i n accordin g du e respec t t o them , bu t in further tightenin g governmen t contro l over them . THE NATIONALITIE S POLIC Y I N TH E THA I AUTONOMOU S ARE A

Local Governments in the Thai Autonomous Region. Th e Tha i population total s abou t 500,000 , slightl y ove r 8 percen t o f Yun nan's minoritie s populatio n o f si x million. 7 Th e Tha i peopl e ar e scattered i n th e Te-hun g regio n i n wester n Yunna n an d Hsi-shuang Pan-n a i n souther n Yunnan . Ove r 300,00 0 Tha i peo ple ar e concentrate d i n thes e tw o areas , an d th e remainin g num bers ca n b e foun d i n al l part s o f Yunna n Province . A t presen t the Tha i peopl e hav e se t u p tw o autonomou s chou, namely , th e Hsi-shuang Pan-n a Tha i Autonomou s Chou an d th e Te-hun g Thai-Ching-po Autonomou s Chou; an d tw o autonomou s counties , the Meng-lie n Thai , Laku , an d K'a-w a Autonomou s Hsien an d the Keng-ma Thai and K'a-wa Autonomous Hsien. The Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a Tha i Autonomou s Chou wa s th e firs t multi-nationality autonomou s governmen t wit h a fairly larg e population tha t th e Chines e Communis t authoritie s se t up . Situate d to th e sout h o f latitud e 2 2 degrees, it cover s al l of Ch'e-li , Fo-hai, Nan-ch'iao, an d Chen-yue h hsien, wit h a tota l are a o f 25,00 0 square kilometers . Th e Tha i people compris e one-hal f o f th e tota l population o f 320,000 . Th e Ha n Chines e als o tak e u p a larg e percentage o f th e population . I n addition , mor e tha n te n nation alities liv e there , includin g th e Hani , Pulang , Laku , Yao , Miao , Hui, Kawa , an d Ching-po . In 195 0 a preparator y orga n fo r settin g u p th e autonomou s government wa s pu t int o operation , an d ove r tw o hundre d mem bers o f a nationalit y wor k tea m wer e sen t ou t t o se t u p thre e autonomous hsiang, on e eac h locate d i n Ch'e-li , Fo-hai, and Nan ch'iao hsien. O n Ne w Year' s Day , 1953 , a n enlarge d meetin g of th e autonomou s chou preparator y committe e wa s hel d wit h over 43 0 delegate s attending . Topic s o n th e agend a include d determining th e numbe r o f member s t o serve o n th e autonomou s council, boundar y demarcation , officia l titl e o f th e autonomou s chou, an d administrativ e policies . Th e autonomou s governmen t 7 This discussio n o f "Thai " refer s onl y t o thos e Tai-speakin g people s i n Yunna n who ar e calle d "T'ai " b y th e Chines e Communis t authorities . Othe r Tai-speakers , including th e Chuang , Chung-chia , Shan , Nung , an d stil l others , numbe r mor e than te n millio n within th e boundaries o f China . (Ed. )

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was formall y inaugurate d o n Januar y 23 , 1953 . A t first i t wa s called th e autonomou s regio n government . O n Jun e 8 , 1955 , i t was rename d autonomou s chou, accordin g t o th e newl y promul gated Constitution . The Tehun g Thai-Ching-p o Autonomou s Chou, i n Yunna n Province, situate d o n th e Sino-Burmes e border , wa s se t u p o n July 24 , 1953 . With ove r 400,00 0 i n population , thi s governmen t had withi n it s jurisdictio n five hsien: Lu-hsi , Jui-li , Lun g chuan , Ying-chiang, an d Liang-ho . Th e Tha i an d th e Ching-po , bot h being th e mai n nationalitie s o f th e area , ha d population s o f 175,000 and 97,00 0 respectively . After bein g rename d o n Ma y 1 , 1956 , a s a n autonomou s chou, the chou s territory wa s considerabl y expande d wit h th e additio n of T'eng-chung , Pao-shan , Lung-ling , an d Ch'ang-ning , al l o f which ha d bee n unde r th e jurisdictio n o f th e Pao-sha n Specia l District government . Th e populatio n wa s thu s increase d t o mor e than 1. 6 million , wit h a tota l are a amountin g t o 37,00 0 squar e kilometers. A t presen t ther e ar e ove r te n differen t nationalitie s living i n th e area , includin g th e Ha n Chinese , wh o compris e 70 percen t o f th e population , th e Tha i an d Ching-po , amountin g to 1 0 percen t an d 6 percen t o f th e tota l respectively , an d th e rest bein g Ah-chang , Peng-lung , Lisu , Hui , Yi , Miao , Kawa , an d Pai. Th e native s o f th e are a ha d show n visibl e resistanc e t o th e expansion o f th e chou's territory . The y fel t tha t "Onc e th e terri tory i s expande d an d mor e Ha n Chines e take n in , ou r 'kingdom ' will b e eliminated " an d tha t "Regiona l autonom y i s onl y nomi nal, wit h n o positio n an d n o authority , an d th e Part y take s ove r the plac e o f th e government " (Yunnan Daily [YD], Decembe r 29, 1957) . The Meng-lie n Tha' i Laku , an d K'a-w a Autonomou s Hsien an d the Keng-m a Tha i an d K'a-w a Autonomou s Hsien wer e respec tively se t u p o n Octobe r 16 , 1954 , an d Octobe r 15 , 1955. Land Reform and the Agricultural Cooperative Movement. The territor y o f th e Tha i autonomou s are a spread s acros s tropi cal, sub-tropica l an d temperat e zones , wit h plentifu l rainfal l an d fertile soil . Th e are a produce s i n quantit y padd y rice , banana , pineapple, an d coconut ; othe r product s includ e tea , cotton , cam phor, rubber , quinine , an d coffee . China' s well-know n "P u Er h Tea" grow s i n th e mountainou s regio n i n th e vicinit y o f Me n Hai in Hsi-shuan g Pan-na . [ 18 6 ]

MINORITIE S & TH E CHINES E COMMUNIS T BEGIM E

The Tha i ar e mostl y fanners . A s earl y a s th e twelft h century , what th e Chines e Communist s hav e com e t o ter m th e "feuda l system" wa s alread y dominan t i n th e area . Th e "feudal " eco nomic syste m remained , wit h th e exceptio n o f som e area s wher e the native s had bee n thoroughl y assimilate d b y th e Chinese , until the establishmen t o f th e autonomou s government . Fo r instance , all land s i n Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a wer e owne d b y th e Hsuang Wei Szu, (o r Chao-pien-lin —"lord o f vas t tracts") . Th e Hsuang Wei Szu allotte d hi s lan d t o th e Tu Szu (sectio n chief ) i n th e pan-nas, an d th e Tu Szu i n tur n subdivide d thei r shar e t o th e village heads , an d th e villag e head s share d thei r portio n wit h the villagers . Th e tenan t farmers , beside s surrenderin g par t o f their crop s t o th e Tu Szu an d th e villag e head s a s officia l rent , had t o undertak e ove r on e hundre d differen t kind s o f unpai d physical labor . Accordin g t o Communis t sources , i n norma l case s the farmer s ha d t o surrende r 3 0 percent , an d i n specia l case s up t o 7 0 percent , o f thei r earning s t o th e loca l overlord s (PD, June 6 , 1957) . Privat e armie s an d prison s wer e maintaine d t o suppress an y resistance . Th e serf s coul d eve n b e pu t t o deat h at the will of their lord. 8 Shortly afte r th e autonomou s governmen t wa s se t up , th e Communist authoritie s bega n t o carr y ou t socia l reforms , espe cially lan d reform . I n practice , th e lan d refor m polic y i n th e minority area s differe d fro m tha t i n othe r part s o f th e country . Instead o f instigatin g th e peasant s fro m th e lowes t leve l t o carr y out struggle s agains t th e landlords , a s happened i n mos t part s o f China, th e mor e moderat e metho d o f friendl y negotiatio n wit h the landlor d wa s adopted . Th e authorities , b y usin g th e mixe d tactics o f persuasio n an d intimidation , mad e th e landlord s giv e up thei r land s fo r th e benefi t o f al l peasants. 9 Thu s th e so-calle d peaceful lan d refor m wa s smoothl y carrie d ou t i n 195 5 and 1956 . 8

See als o Li n (1961:28) . Fo r furthe r informatio n o n Ta i socia l structur e and relation s wit h th e Chines e i n Yunna n see , fo r example , Chian g (1950 ) an d Wiens (1954) . (Ed. ) "According t o Li n (1961:29) , "Afte r th e oppresse d masse s wer e full y awakene d to th e necessit y fo r suc h reforms , th e governmen t hel d consultatio n wit h th e landlords an d slaveowner s . . . urgin g the m t o giv e u p thei r oppressio n an d exploitation an d promisin g that , i f the y did , the y woul d b e accorde d appropriat e political position s an d a livin g standar d no t lowe r tha n before . Land wa s divide d up. Then , later , whe n th e individua l peasant s understoo d th e nee d fo r collectiv e farming, th e plot s wer e poole d i n agricultura l producers ' cooperatives. " Th e planned cooperativizatio n o f farmin g evidentl y me t wit h som e resistanc e (se e below, pp . 188-189) . (Ed. )

[ 18 7 1

RICHAR D K . DIA O

Mos t o f th e Tha i peasant s receive d o n th e averag e tw o mow ( 1 mot u = .16 7 acre ) o f lan d tha t coul d produc e fro m 46 0 chin ( 1 chin = 1. 1 lbs. ) t o 1,20 0 chin o f foo d grai n annuall y (NS, Jul y 6, 1959) . Sinc e th e Communis t revolutio n an d lan d reform , th e "feuda l system" ha s bee n broken , an d th e serf s hav e becom e master s of thei r ow n land , a t least briefly . Today , th e Tha i people , guide d by th e Communists , hav e a t leas t nomina l self-governmen t throug h elections . Accordin g t o th e Electora l Law , the y elec t thei r representative s t o for m a loca l people' s congress , an d th e latte r elect s member s fo r th e loca l council . Thi s procedur e i s identica l wit h tha t fo r th e res t o f th e country , excep t som e o f th e administrativ e unit s stil l retai n thei r ol d names , whic h ar e familiar t o th e loca l peopl e throug h lon g usage . I n th e Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a Tha i Autonomou s Chou, fo r instance , the y stil l us e pan-na instea d o f hsien i n th e name s o f th e countie s unde r th e chous jurisdiction . Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a i s th e Chines e transliteratio n o f th e Tha i ter m sipsong ("twelve" ) pan ("thou sand") na ("irrigate d fields"), o r pan-η α ("irrigate d valle y plain") . Eac h valle y plai n (pan-na) i s equivalen t to , or a t th e sam e leve l with, a hsien ("county" ) i n th e ordinar y Chines e regions . Th e same thin g i s tru e i n Inne r Mongolia , wher e the y stil l us e th e Mongolia n term s men g an d chi instea d o f th e Chines e chuan-sh'u an d hsien t o refe r t o som e specia l district s an d counties . N o mat ter wha t nam e o r titl e is used , however , al l levels o f loca l minorit y governmen t i n minorit y area s ar e lik e thos e i n othe r part s o f th e countr y an d ar e unde r stric t Communis t contro l throug h th e people' s congres s an d th e syste m o f democrati c centralism . Th e lan d refor m perio d coincide d wit h th e gradua l penetratio n of Part y influence . Th e People's Daily reporte d o n Januar y 14 , 1957, tha t 8,50 0 rura l activist s wer e recruite d an d traine d durin g th e lan d refor m period , 58 2 native s wer e admitte d int o th e Party , an d 1,93 8 youn g peopl e int o th e Youn g Communis t League . Part y organ s wer e establishe d i n mos t o f th e hsiang o f th e area . Consequently , th e Tha i lord s ar e hardl y i n a positio n t o dominat e as before , althoug h som e continu e t o hol d nomina l office s i n th e organ s o f self-government . Man y no w wor k i n th e field s wit h th e peasants . Shortl y afte r th e lan d refor m wa s completed , th e authoritie s [ 18 8 ]

MINORITIE S & TH E CHINES E COMMUNIS T REGIM E

urged th e peasant s t o tak e par t i n mutual-ai d team s an d starte d a numbe r o f agricultura l cooperative s t o persuad e th e peopl e to joi n th e collectivization . Bu t th e peasants , wh o wer e satisfie d with farmin g th e smal l lot s o f thei r own , showe d no interes t in th e governmen t program . Mos t o f the m remaine d cautious , and fe w decide d t o joi n th e cooperatives . Th e Yunnan Daily published o n Octobe r 19 , 1957 , a n editoria l entitle d "Observa tions an d Suggestion s Concernin g th e Basi c Condition s i n th e Thai are a o f th e Tehun g Thai-Ching-p o Autonomou s Chou," which said : During th e cours e o f th e developmen t o f agricultura l cooperatives , it ca n b e expecte d tha t 4 t o 5 percen t o f th e rura l populatio n wil l join i n th e first year , abou t 1 0 percen t i n th e second , an d 3 0 percen t in th e thir d year . Whe n th e tota l o f participatin g household s ha s reached abou t 3 0 percent , i t mean s tha t al l th e poo r an d lower-mid dle-class peasant s i n th e are a wh o urgentl y nee d t o tak e par t wil l have t o b e absorbe d int o th e cooperatives . B y then, th e cooperativiza tion movemen t wil l hav e t o fac e a n importan t turnin g point .

The Nationalities Solidarity als o reporte d o n Jul y 6 , 1958 : "On e of th e tw o ver y firs t cooperative s i n Hsishuangpanna , th e Su sheng Agricultura l Cooperativ e o f Ching-hun g County , whic h was first forme d i n Ma y 1956 , had t o fac e mas s withdrawa l fro m the cooperativ e i n April an d Ma y 1957 . Twelve o f th e 30 member households firmly wanted t o withdraw. " This appeare d t o show tha t th e developmen t o f th e agricultura l cooperativization movemen t ha d ru n int o considerabl e resistance . Even th e Communis t authoritie s ha d t o admi t tha t "Despit e the grea t effor t w e mad e i n publicizin g th e cooperativ e system , the understandin g o f th e peasan t masse s wa s stil l ver y poor. " The cooperativizatio n movemen t wa s no t eve n basicall y com pleted unti l th e latte r par t o f 1958 , when th e "Grea t Lea p For ward" movemen t wa s ragin g al l ove r th e country . Durin g tha t period th e Communis t authoritie s als o manage d t o ope n u p a few people' s commune s an d som e stat e farm s specializin g i n planting economi c crops . Bu t th e percentag e o f participatin g households remaine d ver y lo w compare d wit h othe r part s o f th e country. I n Hsi-shuan g Pan-na , onl y 70.4 6 percen t o f th e rura l households joine d th e agricultura l cooperative s (KMD , Novem ber 12 , 1958) . [ 18 9 ]

MOllAftD K . DIA O

At presen t agricultur e remain s th e majo r occupatio n i n Hsi shuang Pan-na . Som e production progres s ha s bee n mad e a s a result o f expande d acreage , improved farmin g methods , and a com pletion o f wate r conservatio n projects . Fo r example , rice , corn , sweet potato, groundnut , so y bean, an d cotton crop s all have bee n increased fro m on e cro p a yea r t o tw o crops , wit h som e area s claiming thre e crop s o f padd y rice . Th e Kuang-ming Daily re ported o n February 23,1964 : In th e Tha i are a o f th e Te-hun g Tha i an d Ching-p' o Autonomou s Chou, th e tota l o f foo d grai n i n 196 2 gaine d 4 9 percen t a s agains t that o f 1952 . I n abou t one-hal f o f th e households , eac h membe r o f the famil y ha d ove r 700 chin o f foo d grain , compare d wit h 81 7 chin in th e Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a Tha i Autonomous Chou. In 1963 , production of foo d grai n gaine d a furthe r 3. 6 percen t ove r tha t o f th e precedin g year.

Economic crop s an d cattl e als o gaine d t o a varyin g degree . The People's Daily reporte d o n Ma y 6 , 1963 : "I n comparin g the productio n o f 196 2 wit h tha t o f 1952 , cotto n show s a n in crease o f 8 0 percent ; suga r cane , 14 1 percent ; tea , 6 3 percent ; large cattle , 3 9 percent ; liv e hogs , 14 0 percen t an d sheep , 10 0 percent." One importan t aspec t o f th e Chines e Communis t nationa l mi norities progra m i s aime d a t helpin g th e minoritie s t o achiev e economic development , especiall y i n agriculture , whic h is , o f course, stil l th e mai n occupatio n i n mos t minorit y areas . Gen erally speaking , th e traditiona l farmin g method s o f th e minorit y peoples wer e extremel y backward . T o hel p moderniz e them , th e Communists hav e don e muc h wor k i n th e field , cultivatin g ex perimental plot s an d helpin g t o collect an d distribut e informatio n from loca l experienc e i n raising cro p yields. The minorit y farmer s have graduall y introduce d mor e scientifi c farmin g practices , in cluding spreadin g manure , weeding , top-dressing , an d th e us e of insecticide . Toda y nearl y al l th e minorit y population s ar e farming i n the agricultura l cooperative s o r commune s which hav e been organize d i n many minority areas . In addition , th e Communis t authoritie s hav e financed variou s projects fo r th e minorities , suc h a s wate r conservation , industry , and transportation , a s wel l a s educationa l an d medica l services , which ha d al l bee n badl y neglecte d i n thei r areas . I n doin g this , [ 19 0 ]

MINORITIES &

f r i g C l i l N E § E COMMUNIS T REGIM E

the Communis t authoritie s usuall y leav e t o th e autonomou s gov ernments, fo r thei r ow n use , a large r tha n norma l shar e o f th d state's revenu e whic h i s collecte d b y loca l government s throug h taxation. Also , accordin g t o th e compilatio n o f Stat e Plans , th e state give s additiona l fund s fro m th e centra l governmen t a s sub sidies t o hel p th e minorities . Thi s policy , o f course , i s integrate d with th e Marxist-Leninis t politica l doctrin e tha t i n orde r t o wi n over th e suppor t o f th e minoritie s an d gai n thei r trus t i t i s first necessary t o help the m i n economic development . Thus economi c development i s used t o supplemen t an d smoot h ove r th e exercis e of political control by the central government . It woul d seem , therefore , tha t th e livin g condition s o f th e Tha i people, especiall y th e poo r an d lower-middl e peasants , hav e im proved fro m th e pre-liberatio n days . A n exac t measur e o f th e improvement, however , canno t b e made from th e availabl e data . Industry, Commerce, Communication, Transportation, and Post and Telecommunications. Fairl y goo d progres s ha s bee n reported i n th e developmen t o f th e area' s industry , commerce , communications, transportation , an d pos t an d telecommunica tions. I n th e pas t onl y handicraf t industr y existe d i n thi s area . In recen t years , som e locall y ru n stat e minin g an d factor y enter prises hav e bee n se t up , includin g machine-making , electricit y production, tea-processing , farm-implemen t manufacturing , paper-making, an d sugar-refinin g factories . Accordin g t o officia l reports, th e tota l industria l productio n i n 196 2 i n th e Te-hun g Thai an d Ching-p o Autonomou s Chou wa s 8. 4 time s mor e tha n that o f 1952 , an d industria l outpu t advance d fro m 4. 1 percen t to 21. 9 percent . In th e pas t moto r road s wer e practicall y nonexisten t i n th e area. I t woul d tak e a travele r mor e tha n on e mont h t o reac h Kunming, th e capita l o f Yunna n Province . A t presen t ove r 1,00 0 kilometers o f roa d hav e bee n buil t i n both th e Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a and Te-hun g Tha i autonomou s areas , an d a tri p t o Kunmin g takes abou t thre e t o fou r days . I n addition , a n airlin e ha s bee n opened betwee n Pao-sha n an d Kunming . A t th e sam e time , mos t communes, hsiang, an d tow n office s hav e telephones . Pos t an d telecommunications no w cove r fou r time s mor e are a tha n i n th e past (NS, No . 5, May 1963) . Progress i n th e field o f communication s an d transportatio n ha s [ 19 1 ]

RICHARD K . DIA O

considerably increase d deliver y o f produc e t o othe r part s o f th e country, an d mor e commoditie s ca n no w b e brough t i n fro m the citie s in other provinces . Taxation. Th e taxatio n syste m fo r minorit y area s i s th e sam e as tha t fo r Han-dominate d regions . Taxe s ar e generall y divide d into tw o categories : th e rura l o r agricultura l tax , an d th e indus trial an d commercia l taxes . From th e standpoin t o f stat e revenue , industrial an d commercia l taxe s ar e mor e importan t tha n agricul tural tax . However , i n th e Tha i area , a s well a s in othe r minorit y areas, agricultur e stil l remain s th e dominan t occupation . Agricul tural ta x serves , therefore , a s th e mai n sourc e o f revenu e whic h Communist authoritie s ca n collec t fro m th e minorit y areas . The levyin g o f agricultura l ta x i s fixe d i n term s o f a certai n percentage o f th e so-calle d norma l year-yiel d (no t actua l year yield) an d i s pai d primaril y i n grain . Th e averag e ta x rat e fo r the countr y a s a whol e ha s sinc e 195 8 been fixed a t 15. 5 percen t by th e Communis t authorities . Eac h loca l governmen t withi n its jurisdictio n ma y var y th e rat e prescribe d b y th e centra l gov ernment fro m 6 percen t t o 2 5 percen t a s lon g a s i t meet s th e requisition quota . Th e rat e effecte d i n minorit y area s i s usuall y slightly lowe r tha n average , excep t i n area s wher e th e year-yiel d is hig h an d bumpe r crop s ar e expected . Th e rat e i n Hsi-shuan g Pan-na Tha i Autonomou s Chou an d Te-hun g Tha i an d Ching-p o Autonomous Chou, bot h producin g larg e quantitie s o f padd y rice, i s abou t 1 4 percen t instea d o f 1 2 percent , th e averag e rat e fixed for Yunnan Province by the central government . In spit e o f th e Communis t authorities ' clai m tha t agricultura l tax no w comprise s onl y 6 t o 7 percen t o f th e tota l revenu e i n the stat e budget , th e ta x ha s alway s bee n a heav y burde n o n the peasant s o f China . Thi s i s largel y becaus e th e levyin g o f agricultural ta x i s supplemente d wit h th e stat e purchas e o f grai n and par t o f th e peasants ' burde n i s actuall y turne d int o profit s for th e foodstuf f an d commercia l department s o f th e government . Furthermore, agricultura l surtaxe s levie d b y loca l government s are als o exclude d fro m bot h loca l an d centra l budgets . Actually , of th e tota l stat e revenue , abou t one-hal f come s directl y o r in directly from agricultura l production . Commencing i n 196 4 wit h th e initiatio n o f th e nation-wid e "Socialist Educatio n Movement, " th e Communist s hav e persis [ 19 2 ]

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tenth/ urge d th e peasant s t o sel l "surplu s grain " t o th e stat e in additio n t o th e officia l quot a a s fixed fo r th e agricultura l ta x and stat e purchas e o f grains . Consequently , th e peasant s hav e actually gaine d ver y littl e fo r persona l us e eve n i n area s wher e grain productio n wa s reporte d t o hav e increase d sinc e 1964 . According t o informatio n gathere d fro m interview s wit h recen t ar rivals fro m Yunna n Province , th e peasant s i n Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a Thai Autonomou s Chou i n 196 4 ha d t o surrende r mor e tha n 2 0 percent o f thei r earning s t o th e Communis t governmen t an d about 1 5 percen t t o th e cooperative s o r commune . Thes e tw o figures togethe r ma y actuall y excee d tha t whic h th e Tha i peopl e normally use d t o surrende r t o thei r overlord s i n pre-liberatio n days. In th e categor y o f industria l an d commercia l taxes , th e mos t important on e i s th e Consolidate d Industria l an d Commercia l Tax, whic h cover s nearl y al l busines s an d transportatio n activi ties, suc h a s th e manufactur e o f industria l products , th e purchas e of agricultura l produce , import s an d commodit y sales , an d busi ness sale s o f state-owne d an d collectiv e enterprises , bu t i t ha s rather littl e significanc e i n th e Tha i area . I n addition , ther e ar e several loca l taxes , suc h a s thos e o n slaughtering , th e sellin g o f livestock, ownershi p o f urba n properties , licensin g o f vehicle s and boats , an d th e like . Thes e taxes , use d primaril y fo r loca l budgetary purposes , var y i n kin d an d rat e i n eac h area . Language Reform, Education, and Public Health. Th e Tha i system o f writing , base d o n a n India n script , i s partially , bu t not completely , phonetic . Th e histor y o f th e Tha i peopl e show s that legend s an d poem s wer e discovere d t o hav e bee n writte n on tre e leaves . In 195 7 th e Communis t languag e reformer s worke d out , o n the basi s o f th e origina l Tha i spelling , a ne w phoneti c system , and systemati c effort s wer e mad e t o publicize it. 10 B y first takin g 10

In discussin g refor m o f nationa l minorit y writin g system s M a (1962:26 ) states: "Th e Tai s hav e tw o dialect s bu t five scripts . Tw o o f th e scripts , th e Tai Le h an d Ta i Na , were chose n fo r reform , becaus e the y ar e the mos t widel y used i n bot h dialec t area s an d posses s muc h writte n literature . Thes e tw o script s have thei r origi n i n a n India n scrip t bu t the y develope d i n differen t ways , th e Tai Le h remainin g close r t o th e origina l India n whil e th e Ta i N a ha d bee n much simplifie d b y discardin g man y useles s letters . Thei r alphabe t ha s ha d a lon g history and , a s a for m o f nationa l culture , i t i s muc h love d b y th e Tais. Th e basi c for m wa s therefor e retaine d an d onl y a fe w letter s whic h ha d become phoneticall y obsolet e wer e discarded. " (Ed. )

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the poo r an d lower-middl e peasants , wh o wer e mostl y illiterate , into part-tim e classes , th e Communis t authoritie s attempte d t o eliminate th e illiterac y i n th e are a an d a t th e sam e tim e t o dis seminate th e Communis t revolutionar y thought . Startin g i n 195 8 textbooks wer e writte n an d printe d i n th e ne w Tha i script , an d these wer e followe d b y th e publicatio n o f Thai-languag e news papers an d magazines . A t presen t abou t 7 0 percent o f th e youn g people hav e learne d t o rea d an d write . U p t o 196 0 ther e wer e five secondar y school s an d 25 0 primary schools , with ove r 20,00 0 students i n th e Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a Autonomou s Chou (PD, No vember 27 , 1960) . In th e Te-hun g Tha i an d Ching-p o Autonomou s Chou, a n article i n th e Ma y 196 3 issue o f Nationalities Solidarity reported : Up t o th e en d o f 1962 , primar y school s increase d b y 7 9 percen t over th e tota l o f 1952 , an d student s 3 9 percent b y th e sam e compari son; amon g them , th e numbe r o f frontie r school s gaine d 17 8 percent , and student s 26 9 percen t a s agains t th e correspondin g figures of 1952 . Ordinary an d specialize d secondar y school s mor e tha n double d an d students increase d b y 4 7 percent ; amon g them , thos e school s i n th e frontier region s increase d thre e time s ove r th e 195 2 total an d student s increased 2,26 0 percent .

In th e are a o f publi c healt h suc h epidemic s a s bubonic plague , malaria, smallpox , an d choler a hav e bee n basicall y controlled , and th e preventio n an d treatmen t o f malari a ha s bee n particu larly successful . Accordin g t o officia l reports , th e percentag e o f malaria case s i n th e populatio n droppe d fro m 7. 9 percent i n 195 3 to 1. 5 percen t i n 1962 . The Meng-ha i P a area , whic h wa s hardes t hit b y malari a i n th e past , ha d b y 196 2 cu t th e incidenc e from 5 0 percen t i n 195 3 t o 0.0 3 percen t (KMD, Januar y 24 , 1963). Again accordin g t o officia l statistics , publi c healt h organiza tions i n Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a wer e increase d fro m eigh t t o thirty three i n te n years . I n th e Te-hun g Tha i an d Ching-p o Autono mous Chou, fourtee n publi c healt h station s wer e se t u p b y 1962 , an increas e o f 24 5 percen t ove r th e 195 2 figure. Th e numbe r of hospita l bed s increase d 82 1 percen t ove r th e 195 2 total ; full time medica l worker s increase d 30 0 percent , an d amon g the m the numbe r o f minorit y medica l worker s gaine d a s many a s four teen time s over the 195 2 total (NS, Ma y 1963) . Religious Belief and Marriage. Nearl y al l villager s i n th e Tha i [ 194 ]

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autonomous are a ar e follower s o f th e Souther n o r Theravad a form o f Buddhism . Ther e i s a Buddhis t templ e i n nearl y ever y village, an d th e peopl e spen d fro m 1 0 t o 2 0 percen t o f thei r income i n observing Buddhis t ritual . According t o loca l custom , a bo y shoul d ente r a templ e a t the ag e o f seve n o r eigh t t o prepar e himsel f fo r becomin g a monk. H e stay s i n th e templ e unti l h e i s twenty . Whil e livin g in th e temple , th e bo y doe s no t spen d al l o f hi s tim e recitin g the Scriptures ; h e learn s t o rea d an d writ e too . I n th e pas t th e monks wer e highl y respecte d b y th e loca l people . Thei r foo d was sen t t o the m b y th e villagers , an d the y neve r too k par t i n physical labor . Eve n whe n a mon k walke d i n th e sun , i t wa s customary fo r th e villager s t o hol d a n umbrell a ove r hi s head . The Chines e Communis t authoritie s i n thei r dealing s wit h thi s group o f Buddhis t nationalitie s wer e cleve r enoug h t o sho w out ward respec t fo r th e freedo m o f religiou s belief , bu t the y als o were cleve r enoug h t o promot e th e ide a o f "freedo m no t t o believe." I t i s no w forbidde n fo r an y village r t o "urge " o r "per suade" anyon e t o becom e a believer . A t th e sam e tim e th e au thorities mak e seriou s effort s t o destro y superstition s i n th e mind s of th e youn g an d t o instigat e the m t o discriminat e agains t th e monks wh o refus e t o wor k i n th e fields . I n th e Tha i village s the followin g sarcasti c doggere l ha s bee n widel y circulated : Humming th e Scriptures , yo u don' t work ; You enjo y circlin g o n horsebac k wit h a n umbrell a over you r head ; While other s perspir e profusel y i n th e fields ; You ea t u p al l th e foo d yo u exploit ; But yo u neithe r labo r no r produce ; We'll see what you're up t o when you return t o your normal life . (New Observation [NO], Gen . No . 197 , Nov. 16 , 1958 ) Unable t o continu e facin g suc h taunt s fro m th e masses , th e monks finall y ar e bein g force d t o tak e of f thei r Buddhis t cloak s and join the peasant ranks in the fields. 11 11

Buddhism ha s als o bee n th e targe t fo r refor m i n Inne r Mongolia . Th e lama s there ar e suppose d t o joi n cooperatives , an d hav e bee n require d t o wor k 26 0 days pe r year , afte r whic h the y ma y dispos e o f th e remainde r o f thei r tim e in religiou s activitie s i f the y wis h (Rupe n 1964:4 , citin g Ulanfu' s speec h t o the Siliiigol League lamas , July 10 , 1958). (Ed. )

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Furthermore, long-establishe d custo m formerl y prevente d th e monks fro m socia l contac t wit h wome n unti l the y returne d t o normal life . Bu t th e Communis t authorities , unde r th e pretex t of publicizin g th e ne w for m o f marriage , openl y ordere d th e villagers no t t o interfer e wit h monk s wh o wante d t o find girl friends, and , moreover , th e girl s were encourage d t o make friend s with th e monks . Th e catch , o f course , wa s tha t befor e a mon k could approac h th e girls , h e ha d t o becom e som e sor t o f labo r activist. Th e teasin g was strong , an d s o was th e desire . And sinc e the huma n desir e prevailed , eve n th e monk s bega n t o wor k har d in th e fields t o acquir e th e necessar y qualifications . Graduall y religious influenc e ha s bee n weakene d amon g th e Tha i people , and i t i s possible tha t someda y soo n religiou s belie f ma y b e com pletely eliminated . The Tha i marriag e syste m ha s alway s allowe d fre e courting , and i t i s strictl y a monogamou s system . Matchmaker s ar e onl y required t o sho w respec t t o th e parents , a mer e formality . I n general, suc h a syste m conforme d wit h th e Communis t ide a o f marriage, s o tha t ther e wa s n o majo r refor m i n thi s particula r area. Bu t politica l indoctrinatio n ha s taugh t th e youn g t o b e careful i n choosin g thei r life-lon g partners . Beside s findin g love , the couple s mus t b e sur e thei r clas s standing s matc h an d tha t neither sid e i s politicall y backward . Therefore , a monk wh o doe s not work hard i n the fields can hardly find an ideal partner. 12 In th e pas t th e wome n wer e confine d t o th e hous e an d takin g care o f domesti c chores . Th e villager s superstitiousl y believe d that "Whe n a woma n plow s th e fields, a three-year-lon g drough t will occur ; whe n a woma n dig s a n irrigatio n ditch , n o wate r will eve r com e through ; an d whe n a woma n help s buil d a dike , it will never be full o f water" ( KMD, Ma y 18,1961) . At presen t th e Tha i wome n no t onl y tak e car e o f th e hous e and teac h thei r children , bu t the y als o tak e par t i n farmin g an d freely mov e abou t a t rural affairs . I n man y case s the y ar e provin g to be more capable than their men . 12 The Communist s hav e interfere d wit h marriag e custom s i n area s wher e th e customs d o no t confor m t o Communis t ideals . Fo r example , the y hav e attempte d to discourag e th e Ching-p o custo m o f arrange d marriage , t o reduc e th e amoun t of bride-pric e (whic h ofte n customaril y involve s a perio d o f servic e b y th e groom t o hi s father-in-law) , an d t o restric t th e weddin g (whic h use d t o involv e lengthy feasting ) t o a simpl e ceremon y (CNA 563:6 , Ma y 7 , 1965) . (Ed. )

[ 19 6 ]

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Training of Minority Cadres. Trainin g larg e number s o f mi nority cadre s ha s bee n on e o f th e fundamenta l policie s o f th e Chinese Communis t regime . I n th e las t te n year s the y hav e trained ove r 1,30 0 minorit y cadre s amon g th e fourtee n nationali ties i n th e Hsi-shuan g Pan-n a area , gainin g twent y time s ove r the earl y year s o f th e regime . Impressiv e progres s als o ha s bee n reported i n th e Te-hun g Tha i an d Ching-p o Autonomou s Chou. At presen t full-tim e minorit y cadre s (excludin g thos e a t th e hsiang offices ) compris e 14. 1 percen t o f al l cadre s i n th e area ; in th e frontie r region s th e number o f minorit y cadre s ha s reache d 26.8 percent o f th e total , an d th e figure reache s nearl y 3 0 percen t if th e hsiang an d tow n cadres ar e added (NS, May , 1963) . CONCLUSIONS

Theoretically, th e Chines e an d th e Russia n Communist s tak e the Marxist-Leninis t ide a a s the foundation o f th e policies towar d the nationa l minorities . Tha t ide a i s summe d u p i n th e expres sion: "Nationa l i n form , Socialis t i n content. " I n othe r words , in orde r t o place th e minoritie s politicall y unde r th e stric t contro l of th e Communis t Party , i t is permissible t o accord the m a degre e of freedo m i n suc h matter s a s economy , culture , language , cus toms an d habits , an d religiou s creeds , a s thes e ar e mino r bu t psychologically importan t concession s fo r winnin g ove r th e loyalty o f th e minorit y people . Suc h a n ide a ca n bes t b e described b y a n ol d Chines e saying : "Sellin g dog-mea t behin d the trademar k o f a sheep' s head. " I n th e cas e o f th e nationa l minorities, th e "dog-meat " i s th e conten t o f th e Chines e Com munist minorit y policy , whil e th e "sheep' s hea d trademark"—re gional autonomy—i s th e cleve r rus e fo r achievin g th e objective . In practic e th e Chines e Communist s diffe r i n method s fro m the Russia n Communists . Th e Sovie t syste m take s th e for m o f a unio n which , nominall y a t least , recognize s th e independen t status o f th e participatin g membe r unit s an d eve n accord s the m the righ t o f self-determinatio n an d th e righ t o f secession . Th e Chinese Communists , o n th e othe r hand , stres s th e sovereignt y of on e government , als o tha t al l minorit y autonomou s region s within th e nationa l boundarie s ar e componen t member s o f th e great nationa l family , an d tha t al l suc h region s ar e inseparabl e parts o f th e country . Thi s differenc e i n th e wa y o f handlin g mi [ 19 7 ]

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nority problem s i s largel y du e t o th e fac t tha t th e populatio n of th e minorit y people s o f Chin a i s ver y small , an d historicall y many o f the m hav e ha d clos e association s wit h Ha n Chinese . In addition , th e interest s o f th e Chines e Communis t Part y dictat e a polic y o f denyin g th e autonomou s government s th e righ t o f self-determination an d th e right o f secession . The Chines e Communis t nationalitie s polic y als o differ s fro m the polic y o f th e Nationalis t Chines e government . Althoug h Dr . Sun Yat-se n lon g expounde d th e ide a o f "racia l equality, " th e Nationalist governmen t ignore d it s importanc e an d eve n delib erately playe d dow n th e difference s betwee n th e governmen t and nationa l minorities . B y simplifyin g th e complicate d condi tions i n th e minorit y areas , th e Nationalis t governmen t adopte d the sam e method o f administratio n tha t prevaile d i n non-minorit y areas. Consequently , racia l dispute s wer e aggravate d instea d o f alleviated. Th e Chines e Communist s worke d ou t thei r polic y b y adopting th e dialectica l poin t o f view : "T o solv e contradiction s on th e basi s o f recognizin g them. " A s a result , th e first thin g they di d wa s t o recogniz e an d accep t th e difference s betwee n nationalities, an d the y the n accorde d th e minoritie s nomina l re spect. Fro m tha t poin t o n the y trie d t o mak e us e o f acceptabl e forms o f self-governmen t throug h whic h t o pus h forward , ste p by step , th e socia l refor m progra m i n thos e areas . I n practic e they di d no t impos e pressur e fro m outside , bu t steppe d u p th e training o f minorit y cadre s wh o coul d b e use d a s th e mediu m for disseminatin g revolutionary ideas . Results hav e prove d tha t th e Communis t wa y wa s mor e cleve r and practicabl e tha n th e fact-ignorin g approac h o f th e National ist government . At presen t racia l discriminatio n an d oppressio n hav e been , os tensibly a t least , reduce d o r eliminated . I n th e Communis t Con stitution i t i s clearl y stipulate d tha t "al l th e nationalitie s ar e equal" an d tha t "racia l friendship , mutua l help , an d solidarity " should prevail . Ther e hav e bee n visibl e change s i n th e relation s between th e minorit y nationalitie s an d th e Ha n Chinese ; an d disputes amon g th e minoritie s themselve s hav e bee n relativel y reduced. Fairl y goo d progres s i n th e economic , cultural , educa tional, and health fields has been achieved . But th e roa d t o socialis t progres s i s no t entirel y line d wit h [ 19 8 ]

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roses. Durin g th e perio d o f socia l reform , i n th e minorit y areas , the Communis t authoritie s sowe d man y seed s o f dissensio n among th e variou s clas s element s o f th e minorit y communities . From thi s groun d o f dissensio n ther e ha s grow n a ne w for m of discriminatio n an d oppression . An d i t i s becomin g s o intol erable tha t mor e an d mor e minorit y people s ar e growin g appre hensive an d cautious , an d i n som e case s fea r o f th e ne w ruler s has bee n expresse d i n ope n resistance . I n Yunna n Province , fo r example, th e minorit y peopl e ofte n openl y criticize d th e Com munist socia l refor m program . Amon g th e criticism s frequentl y heard were : "Clas s an d clas s struggl e i n th e minorit y are a ar e created b y th e Communis t Party" ; "Democrati c refor m i s t o create a racia l split" ; "Th e livelihoo d o f th e minorit y peopl e is no t a s goo d a s i n th e pre-liberatio n days " (YD, Augus t 22 , 1957). Official Chines e Communis t report s naturall y hav e give n ver y little informatio n o n th e activitie s o f resistance , excep t i n th e case o f th e rebellion s o n a large r scal e tha t brok e ou t i n Tibe t and Sinkiang . Ther e is , however, on e highl y revealin g paragrap h in a n articl e entitle d "Th e Presen t Nationalitie s Proble m i n Ou r Country an d Clas s Struggle, " b y Li u Chun , Vice-Chairma n o f the Nationalitie s Affair s Commission , publishe d i n th e Jun e 3 , 1964, issu e o f Hung Ch'i (Red Flag). I t says : "I n recen t years , the activitie s o f th e loca l nationalist element s hav e bee n rampan t in man y minorit y nationalit y areas. " I n othe r words , i t mean s that resistanc e an d revol t hav e no t onl y been prevalent , bu t per haps violent also . In thei r executio n o f th e nationalitie s policy , th e Chines e Com munist authoritie s hav e i n recen t year s repeatedl y warne d th e Han Chines e cadre s t o overcom e th e undesirabl e influenc e o f "Great Hanism " a s a majo r ste p i n improvin g relation s wit h the minorit y peoples . They have, o n th e othe r hand , show n equa l attention t o th e activitie s o f "loca l nationalis t elements " wh o may hav e bee n tryin g t o see k politica l independenc e an d t o fre e themselves fro m Communis t rule . Th e Communis t authoritie s have fo r th e pas t fe w year s neve r relaxe d thei r effort s i n carryin g out ideologica l struggl e an d criticis m agains t suc h elements . Harsh criticis m an d denunciatio n wer e widel y practice d durin g the perio d o f "bloomin g an d contending " an d th e subsequen t [ 199 ]

RICHAR D K . DIA O

"anti-rightist" campaig n betwee n 195 7 an d 1958 . I n tha t perio d a numbe r o f minorit y intellectual s launche d ope n attack s agains t the Communis t polic y towar d th e nationalities . Som e sai d th e Communists ha d foule d u p socialis t reform ; stil l other s sai d the y had ruine d th e cooperativizatio n movement ; an d ther e wer e others wh o complaine d tha t foodstuff s ha d becom e mor e an d more scarc e an d dail y commoditie s ha d bee n steadil y decreasin g (PD, Decembe r 26 , 1957) . Consequently, som e minorit y intellectual s wer e purged . Bu t the suppressiv e measure s wer e no t stron g enoug h t o eliminat e the lingerin g influenc e o f loca l nationalism . I n recen t year s loca l disturbances hav e demande d Communis t attentio n t o suc h a n extent tha t th e authoritie s have , sinc e 1963 , taken remedia l step s to ensur e thei r contro l ove r th e nationalities . On e suc h ste p wa s the initiatio n i n 196 3 o f th e socialis t educatio n movemen t cen tered o n clas s struggle . T o carr y ou t th e struggl e i n a thoroug h manner, th e Communist s purposel y create d clas s antagonis m an d racial discriminatio n amon g th e nationalities . A t th e sam e tim e they ar e s o determined t o eliminat e th e influenc e o f loca l nation alism tha t the y hav e linke d i t u p wit h th e vita l questio n o f na tional defense . A n editoria l entitle d "T o Develo p Ail-Ou t Clas s Education amon g th e Nationa l Minorities, " published i n th e Au gust 196 3 issue of Nationalities Solidarity, said : In orde r t o materializ e thei r drea m fo r a restoratio n o f th e ol d orde r and t o cove r u p th e tru e natur e o f thei r anti-Part y an d anti-Socialis t activities, th e reactionar y clas s element s o f th e nationa l minoritie s will continue , b y makin g us e o f th e racia l an d religiou s cloak , t o deceive th e masses and t o benumb an d paralyz e the class-consciousnes s of th e masses . Meanwhile , du e t o th e fac t tha t mos t area s o f th e national minoritie s ar e situate d o n th e frontie r region s o f th e mother land, th e imperalists , reactionarie s o f al l countrie s an d moder n revi sionists wil l i n thei r plo t t o overthro w ou r countr y exhaus t thei r wit s in conspirin g wit h suc h reactionar y element s o f th e nationa l minoritie s to kindle th e racia l emotion s and spli t th e racial relation s in a n attemp t to destro y th e unit y o f th e motherlan d an d solidarit y o f th e nationali ties i n orde r t o temp t th e minorit y peopl e t o detac h themselve s fro m the socialis t road .

In fact , th e Communis t instigatio n o f clas s hatre d an d clas s struggle ha s backfired . Sinc e a n advers e situatio n ha s developed , the Communis t authoritie s hav e trie d t o direc t th e attentio n o f [ 20 0 ]

MINORITIES &

TH E CHINES E COMMUNIS T REGIM E

the masse s agains t th e activities o f the "reactionary an d exploit ing class " an d "foreig n imperalists. " I n th e process , the y certainly hop e t o ge t rid of the incorrigible element s o f "loca l nationalism," t o furthe r tighte n thei r contro l ove r th e national minorities, and to consolidate th e political power of the regime. REFERENCES CITE

D

CHIANG YING-LIAN G

1950 Pai- i t e Sheng-huo Wen-hu a [Th e life an d cultur e o f the Pai-i]. Shanghai, Chunghu a Boo k Co . (Huma n Relation s Are a File s translation.) L I N YUEH-HU A

1961 Th e minorit y people December: 26-29.

s o f Yunnan . Chin

a Reconstructs

,

M A HSUEH-LIAN G

1962 Ne w script s for China's minorities . Chin a Reconstructs , August : 24-27. PATTERSON, GEORG E N .

1962 Recen t Chines e policie s i n Tibe t an d towards th e Himalaya n border states . Th e Chin a Quarterly , December : 191-202 RUPEN, ROBER T A .

1964 Th e MP R and Inne r Mongolia , 1964 . China New s Analysi s 540:1-7 (Novembe r 13) . W I E N S , HEROL D J .

1954 China' s marc h towar d th e tropics. Hamden , Conn. , Sho e Strin g Press. Periodicals CHINA NEW S ANALYSI S ( C N A ) . Hon g Kong . CHINA NEW S SERVIC E ( C N S ) . Hon g Kong . HUNG C H ' I [Red Flag] . Pekin g INNER MONGOLI A DAILY ( I M D ) . JEN-MIN JIH-PA O [People' s Daily ] ( P D ) . Peking . KuANG MIN G DAIL Y ( K M D ) . Peking . NATIONALITIES SOLIDARIT Y ( N S ) . Peking . N E W OBSERVATIO N ( N O ) . YUNNAN DAIL Y ( Y D ) .

[201 ]

PART IV : INDI

A

I N D I A : INTRODUCTIO

N

portio n o f Indi a i s included i n a book o n Southeas t Asia for severa l reasons . The populatio n o f easter n Indi a (includ ing Assam , Nagaland , Manipur , Tripura , an d th e Nort h Eas t Frontier Agenc y [NEFA] ) include s a larg e proportio n o f triba l and minorit y peopl e wh o spea k language s closel y relate d t o languages o f Southeas t Asi a rathe r tha n t o th e language s o f India proper , an d thei r culture s i n man y way s resembl e th e cultures o f neighborin g Southeas t Asia n peoples . Jus t a s th e southern boundar y o f Chin a doe s no t mar k a cultura l o r lin guistic division , th e easter n borde r o f Indi a doe s no t mar k of f a cultural o r linguisti c area . Easter n Indi a thu s i s a n are a wher e Southeast Asia n highlander s com e i n contac t wit h a highl y stratified lowlan d societ y base d o n caste . I t i s interesting t o com pare th e reactio n o f th e highlander s o f easter n Indi a wit h th e reactions o f highlander s elsewher e i n Southeas t Asi a wh o ar e in contac t wit h relativel y unstratifie d lowlan d societies . T H E EASTER N

The India n example s indicat e a variety o f politica l solution s t o the problem s o f larg e concentration s o f minorit y an d triba l peoples withi n a n alread y heterogeneou s population . A s Burlin g points out , hil l tribesme n i n easter n Indi a hav e lon g bee n in volved i n th e econom y o f th e lowlands . Bu t i n genera l th e hil l people o f easter n Indi a hav e refuse d t o ente r int o th e cast e system. The y hav e bee n unwillin g t o accep t th e religiou s an d symbolic assumptions , a s wel l a s th e socia l stigm a o f bein g inte grated int o th e lowe r level s o f th e cast e system . Thi s i s appar ently i n contras t t o th e fat e o f tribesme n elsewher e i n Indi a who , for centuries , hav e bee n incorporate d a s individual s an d a s groups a t th e lowes t cast e levels . Th e conversio n o f larg e num bers o f easter n Indi a tribesme n t o Christianit y ma y b e inter preted i n par t a s th e ritua l symbolizatio n o f thi s attemp t t o sta y out of th e caste system. Burling point s ou t i n th e pape r whic h follow s tha t i t i s i n th e east tha t Indi a ha s bee n face d wit h som e o f it s mos t seriou s political problem s i n attemptin g t o for m a unifie d nation . Th e national governmen t ha s bee n force d t o recogniz e th e cultura l distinctness o f Nagalan d an d t o giv e i t statu s a s a stat e fo r a variety o f geographica l an d politico-militar y reasons , a s wel l a s [ 20 5 ]

PETE R KUNSTADTE H

for reason s o f cultura l difference . An d Burlin g indicate s tha t other cultura l group s hav e bee n quic k t o seiz e o n th e Nagalan d precedent i n requestin g stat e recognition. 1 In a brie f surve y suc h a s thi s i t ha s no t bee n possibl e t o spel l out th e processe s b y whic h th e Naga s hav e manage d t o buil d sufficient politica l unit y t o achiev e statehoo d throug h fairl y well-coordinated politica l an d militar y action . Thi s i s a ver y real problem , sinc e th e Naga s ar e actuall y quit e divers e cul turally an d linguistically , traditionall y the y hav e rarel y bee n organized abov e th e villag e level , an d the y hav e traditionall y been headhunter s fightin g amon g themselve s jus t a s bitterl y a s they hav e fough t agains t th e Indians . N o doub t i n Indi a a s i n Burma (Lehman' s paper) , th e recognitio n o f th e Naga s a s some thing separat e an d apar t bot h b y Britis h an d India n administra tions, combine d wit h attempt s t o forc e the m int o th e standar d Indian social-politica l model , helpe d t o creat e politica l unit y where none existed before . Burling give s an optimisti c picture o f th e succes s of representa tive democrac y withi n th e stat e o f Assam , wher e hil l tribe s an d lowlanders ar e bot h represente d i n stat e government . I n area s such a s th e Gar o Hills , wher e tribesme n hav e bee n allowe d t o participate i n governmen t o n a n equa l basi s wit h th e lowlanders , where th e centra l governmen t ha s no t bee n stric t i n attemptin g to enforc e cultura l uniformity , wher e long-tim e missionar y activ ity ha s le d t o th e developmen t o f a literat e an d educate d grou p of people , an d wher e th e border s hav e no t bee n th e scen e o f 1 There ha s bee n renewe d fighting b y Nag a an d Miz o tribesme n i n Nagaland , Manipur, an d th e Miz o Hill s Distric t o f Assa m sinc e thes e paper s wer e written . The Nagas , som e o f who m continu e t o pres s fo r complet e independenc e fro m India, attacke d India n troops , claimin g tha t aggressio n agains t th e Naga s con tinued eve n afte r a cease-fir e conferenc e betwee n Prim e Ministe r Indir a Gandh i and Nag a leaders . Th e Miz o (o r Lushai ) revol t wa s evidentl y organize d b y th e Mizo Nationa l Front , on e o f severa l Miz o politica l organization s whic h i s strivin g for Miz o nationa l independenc e (New York Times, 1 8 Februar y 1966 , "Bomb s kill 3 6 o n trai n i n India' s Nag a area" ; 1 9 Februar y 1966 , "Mrs . Gandh i meet s with Nag a leaders" ; 2 0 Februar y 1966 , 'Indi a an d Nag a insurgent s agre e t o expand observer s team" ; 2 1 Februar y 1966 , "Angr y Naga s cance l meetin g wit h Indian leaders" ; 3 Marc h 1966 , "India n outpost s ar e attacke d b y nationalis t Mizo tribesmen" ; 5 Marc h 1966 , "Rebe l trib e widen s Indi a hil l attacks" ; 6 Marc h 1966 'India n Arm y recapture s outpost s fro m Miz o rebels" ; 7 Marc h 1966 , "India ban s grou p seekin g secessio n i n a triba l revolt" ; 9 Marc h 1966 , "Mizo s hold 6 Indian outposts" ; 1 0 March 1966 , "Mizos ambus h India n patrol") .

[ 20 6 ]

INDIA : INTRODUCTIO

N

serious internationa l disputes , thi s approac h seem s t o hav e worked quit e well . I t i s no t a t al l clea r tha t th e sam e solutio n can wor k i n NEFA , wher e th e peopl e ar e muc h les s sophisti cated (the y ar e muc h les s likel y t o b e literat e i n a n India n lan guage o r English , an d hav e bee n kep t isolate d deliberatel y b y both Britis h an d India n administrations ) an d wher e th e borde r has bee n subjec t t o a n importan t serie s o f recen t internationa l battles. TABLE 8 SCHEDULED TKIBE S AN D SCHEDULE D CASTE S I N INDIA , 1961 CENSUS * Scheduled Tribes Schedule Total Percen n Numbe Area Populatio India Assam Manipur Nagaland NEFA Tripura

439,234,771 11,872,272 780,037 369,200 336,558 1,142,005

r Tota

30,130,184 2,064,816 249,049 343,697 298,167 360,070

t o f Percen l Numbe 6.86 17.39 31.93 93.09 88.59 31.53

d Caste s t of l

r Tota

64,449,275 732,756 13,376 126

14.67 6.17 1.71 0.03

119,725

10.48

—

—

* Source: Census of India, 1961 , Vol. I, Par t II- A (ii) .

[ 20 7 ]

P E T E H KUNSTADTE H

TABLE 9 POPULATION AN D LINGUISTI C AFFILIATIO N O F E T H N I C G R O U P S O F E A S T E R N INDIA » (ASSAM , M A N I P U R , NAGALAND, T H E N O R T H EAS T F R O N T I E R AGENCY , AND TRIPURA ) A. ASSA M

Group

Estimated Locatio n o f Greates t Population Concentratio n in Assa m i n Assa m

Assam—N on- Tribal Assamese 6,780,00

0

Throughout Assa m

Bengali 2,089,00

0

Throughout Assa m

Hindi 524,00

0

Throughout Assa m

Nepali 215,00

0

Throughout Assa m

Oriya Santali

146,000 69,000

Assam—Scheduled Tribes 363,000 Khasi 345,000 Bodo (Boro , Plains Kachari ) Garo 301,000 Mizo (Lushai )

216,000

Mikir

154,000

Miri

136,000

Rabha

38,000

Dimasa (Hill s Kachari) Lalung

32,000

Hmar

10,000

Lakher

9,500

10,600

Darrang, Lakhimpur , and scattere d Throughout Assa m United Khas i an d Jaintia Hill s Goalpara, an d scat tered Garo Hill s

Language

Indo-European: Indo Aryan, Assames e Indo-European: Indo Aryan, Bengal i Indo-European: Indo Aryan, Hind i Indo-European: Indo Aryan, Nepal i Indo-European: Indo Aryan, Oriy a Munda (prob . related t o Mon-Khmer) Mon-Khmer: Khas i

Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto Burman, Bod o Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto Burman, Bod o Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto Mizo Hill s Burman, Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto Mikir Hill s Burman, Naga-Kuki b Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto Lakhimpur Burman, Nort h Assam Goalpara, Gar o Hill s Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto Burman, Bod o North Cacha r Hill s Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto Burman, Bod o Nowgong, Khasi Hills , Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto Mikir, an d Nort h Burman, Bod o Cachar Hill s Cachar, Mikir , an d Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto Burman, Kuki-Chi n North Cacha r Hill s Mizo Hill s Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto Burman, Kuki-Chi n {continued)

[ 20 8 ]

INDIA: INTRODUCTIO N

TABLE 9 {continued) A. ASSAM , cont.

Group i

Estimated Locatio n o f Greates t Population Concentratio n n Assa m i n Assa m Languag

Deori (Chutiya ) 9,10

e

0 Lakhimpu r Sino-Tibetan

: Tibeto Burman, Bod o Koch 8,00 0 Gar o Hill s Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto Burman, Bod o Pawi 6,90 0 Miz o Hill s Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto Burman, Kuki-Chi n Assam total " 11,872,77 2

B . MANIPU H

Group i

Estimated Population n Manipu r Languag

Manipur—N on- Tribal Manipuri-Meithei 502,000 Nepali 13,500 10,000 Bengali Manipur—Scheduled Tribes 44,000 Tangkhul Thado 30,000 29,000 Kabui Mao 29,000 Paite 17,000 Hmar 15,000 Kacha Nag a (Empeo ) 9,700 Simte 9,500 Vaipei (Vaiphui ) 8,000 Maring 7,700 Anal 5,500 Kom 5,500 Gangte 4,900 Maram 4,900 2,300 Chiru 1,900 Lamgang Khoirao 400 780,037 Manipur tota l

e

Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Indo-European: Indo-Aryan , Nepal i Indo-European: Indo-Aryan , Bengal i Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Naga-Kuk i Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman, Naga-Bod o Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman, Naga-Kuk i Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman, Naga-Bod o Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman, Naga-Kuk i Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman, Naga-Kuk i Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman , Kuki-Chi n Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman, Naga-Bod o

(continued)

[ 20 9 ]

P E T E R KUNSTADTE R

TABLE 9 {continued) C. NAGALAN D

Group

Estimated Location o f PopulaGreatest tion i n Concentration Nagaland in Nagalan d

Nagaland —N on- Tribal 10,000 Nepali

Scattered (? )

Hindi

4,500

Scattered (? )

Bengali

3,800

Scattered (? )

Assamese

3,600

Scattered (? )

Nagaland —Scheduled Tribes Konyak 57,000

Tuensang

Ao

56,000

Mokokchung

Sema

47,000

Mokokchung

Angami

34,000

Kohima

Lotha (Lhota )

26,000

Mokokchung

Pochuri (includ ing Sangtam ) Phom-Sha

18,000 13,000

Tuensang an d Kohima Tuensang

Yimchunger

13,000

Tuensang

Khiemnungan

12,000

Tuensang

Chang

11,000

Tuensang

Chakesang

10,000

Kohima

Zemi-Zeliang

9,400

Kohima

Zheza

8,800

Kohima

Chakru

8,000

Kohima

Rengma

5,800

Kohima

Makware Nagaland tota l

769 369,200

Tuensang

Language Indo-European: Indo-Aryan , Nepali Indo-European: Indo-Aryan , Hindi Indo-European: Indo-Aryan , Bengali Indo-European: Indo-Aryan , Assamese Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Eastern Naga d Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Central Naga e Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Western Naga ' Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Western Naga f Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Central Naga » Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Western Naga ' Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman ? Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman ? Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman ? Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Eastern Naga d Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Western Naga f Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Naga-Bodo Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Western Naga f Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Western Naga ' Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman Western Naga f Sino-Tibetan: Tibeto-Burman ?

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

{continued)

INDIA·. INTRODUCTIO

N

TABLE 9 (continued) D. ΝΕΓ Α

Locatio n of Greates t Estimate d Concen Grou p (Sub-group s '. Populatio n tratio n or Synonym ) in NEF A. i n N E F A

Languag e

NEFA—Scheduled Tribes Abor-Ad i (Abor Adi, Ashing , Bokar , Bori , Gallong , Milang , Minyang , Padam , Pailib o Pangi , Pasi , Ramo , Shimong , Tagin ) Aka (Hrusso )

?

Siangs

Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman , Nort h Assam , Abor-Ad i

?

Kamen g

Bangr u

?

Dafl a (Apatani , Bangni , Dafla ) Kark o Khampt i (Hkampti ) Lodun g Memb a

?

Kameng , Subansir i Subansiri h

Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman , Nort h Assam , Ak a ?

? ? ? ?

Sian g Lohi t Sian g Sian g

Miji Mir i

? ?

Kamen g Subansir i

Mishm i (Digaru , Idu-Mishmi , Miju )I Monp a

?

Lohi t

?

Kamen g

Nag a (Nocte , Tangsa , Wanehou ) Singph o (Jinghpaw )

?

Tira p

?

Lohit , Tira p

Solun g

?

Kameng , Subansir i

N E F A tota l (1961 census )

Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman Nort h Assam , Dafl a ? Tai : Southwestern , Sha n ? Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman Tibeta n ? Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman Nort h Assam , Mir i Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman Nort h Assam , Mishm i Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman Tibeta n Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman Nag a Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman Singpho 1 ?

,

, , , , , ,

336,558i (.continued)

[21 1 ]

PETE R KUNSTADTE R

TABL E 9 (continued) E . TRIPUR A

Grou p

Estimate d Populatio n in Tripur a

Tripura —Non-Tribal Bengali 772,00 0 Manipuri-Meithe i 28,00 0 Chakm a 22,00 0 Arakanese-Mog h 10,00 0 0 Nepal i 1,70 Tripura —Scheduled Tribes Tripur i 284,000 Hala m 16,000 Garo o (Garo ) 5,000 Kuk i 3,000 3,000 Lusha i (Mizo ) Tripur a tota l 1,142,00 5

Languag e Indo-European : Indo-Aryan , Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman Indo-European : Indo-Aryan , Sino-Tibetan : Tibeto-Burman Indo-European : Indo-Aryan ,

Bengal i , Kuki-Chi n Bengal i , Burmese-Lol o Nepal i

Sino-Tibetan Sino-Tibetan Sino-Tibetan Sino-Tibetan Sino-Tibetan

, , , , ,

: Tibeto-Burman : Tibeto-Burman : Tibeto-Burman : Tibeto-Burman : Tibeto-Burman

Bod o Kuki-Chi n Bod o Kuki-Chi n Kuki-Chi n

» The materia l i n thi s tabl e wa s assemble d fro m Census of India, 1961 , Vol. I , India , Par t H- C (ii) , Languag e Tables . Grou p name s ar e thos e give n in th e census . Informatio n o n locatio n o f group s i n Assa m wa s modifie d b y referenc e t o th e 195 1 censu s i n th e case s wher e th e 195 1 censu s ha d a mor e complet e breakdown . Linguisti c classification s hav e bee n modifie d i n a fe w instance s t o correspon d wit h usag e elsewher e i n thi s boo k (se e note s accom panyin g th e Burm a populatio n an d linguisti c affiliatio n tabl e fo r furthe r detail s o n problem s o f linguisti c classification) . Th e designatio n "Schedule d Tribes " i s from th e Census , Vol. I , Par t II- A (ii) . Populatio n figures hav e bee n rounde d t o th e neares t thousan d (fo r larg e groups ) o r th e neares t hundre d (for smal l groups) . b Th e Miki r languag e i s classifie d a s a membe r o f th e Kuki-Chi n grou p o f th e Tibeto-Burma n famil y elsewher e i n thi s book . 0 A numbe r o f smal l group s o f immigrant s fro m othe r part s o f Indi a hav e no t bee n include d i n thi s breakdown , bu t ar e include d i n th e Assam total . d Th e Easter n Nag a language s ar e probabl y closel y relate d t o wha t i s called th e Bod o Grou p o f Tibeto-Burma n elsewher e i n thi s volume . β Th e Centra l Nag a language s ar e probabl y closel y relate d t o wha t i s called th e Kuki-Chi n Grou p o f Tibeto-Burma n elsewher e i n thi s volume . f Th e Wester n Nag a language s probabl y fal l unde r wha t i s calle d th e Nag a Grou p o f Tibeto-Burma n elsewher e i n thi s volume . β The Gallon g an d Tagi n group s ar e foun d primaril y i n Subansir i Frontie r District , a s wel l a s i n Siang ; th e Pada m grou p i s foun d i n Lohi t Frontie r Distric t a s wel l a s i n Siang . h Th e Bangn i grou p i s foun d i n Kamen g Frontie r District . i Th e Singhp o languag e i s tentativel y classifie d a s distantl y relate d t o th e Bod o grou p o f Tibeto-Burma n elsewher e i n thi s volume . 3 Censu s dat a fo r N E F A ar e s o incomplet e tha t ther e i s littl e poin t i n giving populatio n figures fo r th e variou s tribes . Elwi n (1960 ) ha s estimate d tha t th e tota l N E F A populatio n i s about . 500,000 .

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BIBLIOGRAPH Y

Bibliographic reference s t o easter n Indi a ma y b e foun d i n Furer-Haimen dorf (1958 , 1964 ) an d Patterso n an d Inde n (1962) . Th e genera l situatio n of triba l people s in Indi a an d governmen t program s fo r the m i s summarize d periodically i n governmen t report s (e.g . Indi a 1960 ; 1961) . Elwin , wh o was influentia l i n establishin g governmen t polic y wit h respec t t o tribe s throughout Indi a ha s describe d hi s philosoph y specificall y wit h respec t to th e peopl e o f th e Nort h Eas t Frontie r Agenc y (1960) . Som e o f th e British administrativ e histor y o f th e easter n Indi a frontie r area s i s sum marized i n Rei d (1942 ) an d Elwi n (1959) . Classic ethnographi c monograph s o n th e people s o f thi s regio n includ e Furer-Haimendorf (1962) , Gurdo n (1914) , Hodso n (1908 ; 1911) , Hutto n (1921A; 1921B) , Mill s (1922 ; 1926 ; 1937) , Parr y (1932) , Playfai r (1909), an d Shakespea r (1912) . Valuabl e ethnographi c note s ar e als o contained i n th e variou s censuse s o f India , especiall y th e censu s o f 1931 . Recent ethnographi c studie s includ e Barua h (1960) , Dutt a (1960) , Ro y (1960), Sharm a (1961) , Shukl a (1960) , Sinh a (1962) , Srivastav a (1962) , and Burlin g (1963) . Fo r a stud y o f th e integratio n o f triba l peopl e else where i n Indi a se e Baile y (1960) . BAILEY, F . G .

1960 Tribe , caste , an d nation : a stud y o f politica l activit y an d political chang e i n Orissa . Manchester , Mancheste r Universit y Press. BARUAH, T A P AN KUMA R M .

1960 Th e Id u Mishmis . Shillong , Shr i P . C . Dutta , o n behal f o f the Advise r t o th e Governo r o f Assam . BURLING, ROBBIN S

1963 Rengsanggri : famil y an d kinshi p i n a Gar o village . Phila delphia, Universit y o f Pennsylvani a Press . DUTTA, P . C .

1960 Th e Tangsas . Shillong , P . C . Dutta , o n behal f o f th e Advise r to th e Governo r o f Assam . E L W I N , VERRIE R

1959 India' s Northeas t Frontie r i n th e 19t h century . London , Oxfor d University Press . 1960 A philosoph y fo r NEFA . Shillong , Shr i J . N . Chowdhury , o n behalf o f th e Advise r t o th e Governo r o f Assam , 2 d revise d edn . FURER-HAIMENDORF, CHRISTOP H VON

1962 Th e nake d Nagas . Calcutta . Thacke r Spin k & Co. , 2 d revise d Indian edn . FURER-HAIMENDORF, ELIZABET H VO N

1958 A n anthropologica l bibliograph y o f Sout h Asia . Pari s an d L a Haye, Mouto n an d Co . 1964 A n anthropologica l bibliograph y o f Sout h Asia , Vol . II , 1955 1959. Pari s an d L a Haye , Mouto n an d Co .

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1914 Th e Khasis . London , Macmillan , 2 d edn . HODSON, THOMA S CALLA N

1908 Th e Meitheis . London , Davi d Nutt . 1911 Th e Nag a tribe s o f Manipur . London , Macmillan . HUTTON, JOH N HENR Y

1921A Th e Angam i Nagas . London , Macmillan . 1921B Th e Sem a Nagas . London , Macmillan . INDIA, CENSU S COMMISSIONE R

1961 Censu s o f India , 1931 . 1932 Censu s o f India , 1961 . INDIA, MINISTR Y O F H O M E AFFAIR S

1960 Repor t o f th e Committe e o n Specia l Multipurpos e Triba l Blocks. Ne w Delhi , Governmen t o f Indi a Press . INDIA, SCHEDULE D AREA S AN D SCHEDULE D TRIBE S COMMISSIO N

1961 Repor t o f th e Schedule d Area s an d Schedule d Tribe s Com mission, 1960-61 . Simla , Governmen t o f Indi a Press , 2 vols . MDLLS, JAME S P H I L L I P

1922 Th e Lhot a Nagas . London , Macmillan . 1926 Th e A o Nagas . London , Macmillan . 1937 Th e Rengm a Nagas . London , Macmillan . PARRY, N . E

.

1932 Th e Lakhers . London , Macmillan . PATTERSON, MAUREE N L . P . an d RONAL D B . INDE N

1962 Sout h Asia : a n introductor y bibliography . Chicago , Syllabu s Division, Universit y of Chicag o Press . PLAYFAIR, ALA N

1909 Th e Garos . London, Davi d Nutt . REED, SI R ROBER T

1942 Histor y o f th e frontie r area s borderin g o n Assam , fro m 1883-1941. Shillong , Assa m Governmen t Press . ROY, SACHT N

1960 Aspect s o f Padam-Minyon g culture . Shillong , Sr i Sachi n Roy , on behal f o f th e North-Eas t Frontie r Agency . SHAKESPEAR, J .

1912 Th e Lushe i Kuk i clans . London, Macmillan . SHARMA, R . R . P .

1961 Th e Sherdukpens . Shillong , P . C . Dutta , fo r th e Researc h De partment, Adviser' s Secretariat . SHUKLA, B . K .

1960 Th e Daflas . Shillong , P . C . Dutta , o n behal f o f th e Advise r to th e Governo r o f Assam . SrNHA, RAGHUVT R

1962 Th e Akas . Shillong , P . C . Dutta , fo r th e Researc h Department , Advisers Secretariat . SRIVASTAVA, L . R . N

.

1962 Th e Gallongs . Shillong , P . Dutt a fo r th e Researc h Department , Advisers Secretariat .

CHAPTE R 5

Tribesmen and Lowlanders of Assam 1 BOBBIN S BURLIN G

ASSAM ANDSOUTHEAS T ASI A

As a n integra l par t o f th e Republi c o f India , Assa m i s no t conventionally though t o f a s a par t o f Southeas t Asia , ye t i t shares man y characteristic s wit h th e nations t o the eas t an d ther e is Justification fo r includin g i t with Southeas t Asi a when consider ing th e rol e o f triba l peoples . Lik e th e nation s o f Southeas t Asia , Assam ha s a minorit y o f triba l mountaineer s wh o diffe r i n man y ways fro m th e lowlan d majority . A s i n muc h o f Southeas t Asi a proper, th e hil l me n liv e largel y b y swidde n agriculture ; the y are fragmente d int o dozen s o f linguisti c groups , an d unti l th e colonial perio d n o politica l syste m base d i n th e plain s wa s abl e to extend it s contro l consistentl y int o th e hills . Except fo r recen t converts t o Christianity , th e hil l me n (lik e mos t o f thei r cousin s to th e east ) fal l unde r tha t vagu e rubri c o f "animism " an d ar e thus se t of f fro m thei r Hind u neighbor s i n th e valley . And , a s in othe r part s o f Southeas t Asia , lowlander s ten d t o loo k upo n the hil l peopl e a s naiv e an d primitiv e rustics , whil e the y ar e often see n in return a s wily, sophisticated scoundrels . This muc h follow s th e familia r Southeas t Asia n contras t be tween lowlande r an d mountaineer , bu t i n tw o respect s th e con trast i n Assa m seem s even sharpe r tha n elsewhere . Only i n Assa m is th e racia l difference betwee n th e peopl e o f th e mountain s an d those o f th e valle y grea t enoug h t o preven t a hil l ma n fro m losing himsel f amon g th e plain s population , o r t o preven t a low lander fro m becomin g los t i n th e hills . Mor e important , I think , 1 My first acquaintanc e wit h Assa m was mad e possibl e b y a generou s gran t from th e For d Foundatio n fro m 195 4 t o 1956 . Th e presen t pape r wa s originall y prepared fo r a symposiu m o n "Th e Futur e Rol e o f Triba l People s in th e Nation s of Southeas t Asia, " hel d i n Denve r a t th e 196 5 meetin g o f th e America n Anthro pological Association .

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the lowlan d Assamese , as participants i n the civilization o f Hind u India, hav e cultura l pattern s quit e differen t fro m thos e o f th e lowland Burmes e o r Tha i o r Vietnamese , an d thes e characteris tics alte r th e manne r i n whic h hil l ma n an d plain s ma n ca n dea l with on e another . Although th e burden s o f cast e ar e sai d t o res t more lightl y upo n th e Assames e tha n upo n mos t Hindus , cast e still create s a barrie r o f a sor t unknown i n Southeas t Asi a proper . The roya l Burmes e coul d solidif y hi s positio n b y strategi c mar riages wit h chiefl y hil l families , an d a t th e uppermos t level s o f Southeast Asia n societ y i t seem s tha t ethni c difference s ten d t o dissolve. T o th e higher-cast e Assamese , however , intermarriag e with a tribesma n i s unthinkable . Elsewher e i n Southeas t Asia , a mountainee r wit h sufficien t wealt h an d a sufficientl y chiefl y pedigree ca n occasionall y dea l wit h upperclas s plain s me n o n reasonably equa l terms . Th e tribesma n i n Assam , whateve r hi s status a t home , ca n ente r Hind u societ y onl y a t th e bottom . These specia l characteristic s o f Assa m see m t o m e t o b e rela tively minor , however , an d fo r presen t purpose s a t least , th e more interestin g contrast s betwee n Assa m an d th e res t o f South east Asi a aris e fro m th e differin g politica l histor y o f th e tw o areas sinc e th e Secon d Worl d War . Th e fac t tha t Assa m ha s not bee n par t o f politica l Southeas t Asia , bu t ha s instea d bee n attached t o India , ha s give n th e tribesme n a uniqu e experienc e which ma y possibl y hav e implication s fo r th e tribesme n i n th e smaller nations. In compariso n wit h mos t o f Southeas t Asia , independent Indi a ha s ha d a n orderl y political life, an d th e apparatu s of electiv e parliamentar y democrac y has , so far , worke d wit h relative success . Indi a ha s operate d unde r it s independen t consti tution fo r fiftee n years , an d wit h th e death s o f Nehr u an d Shastri i t successfull y achieve d tw o orderl y transition s o f power . The natio n has , moreover , hel d thre e genera l elections , i n which mos t o f th e triba l peopl e o f Assa m hav e participated . To characteriz e India n politica l lif e a s tranquil , however , would b e goin g to o far , an d th e integratio n o f Assam' s triba l minority ha s no t bee n th e leas t o f th e manifol d problem s besetting th e ne w government . Thoug h the y numbe r les s tha n 1 percen t o f India' s population , th e triba l peopl e hav e pose d a seriou s national problem , an d withi n th e stat e o f Assam , wher e they constitut e somethin g close r t o 1 5 percent, th e relation s be [ 21 6 ]

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tween triba l an d lowlan d peopl e hav e bee n marke d b y almos t unceasing friction . Th e relation s hav e bee n governe d b y thre e varying politica l experiments , eac h o f whic h I wil l describ e briefly i n th e following pages : 1 ) th e so-called autonomou s hil l districts withi n th e stat e o f Assam ; 2 ) th e separat e stat e o f Nagaland; an d 3) th e centrally administere d Nort h Eas t Frontie r Agency. TRIBESMEN I N A CONSTITUTIONA L GOVERNMEN T

As befit s a n intricat e nation , th e Constitutio n o f Indi a i s an intricate document . I n th e editio n I hav e use d i t run s t o 273 pages eve n without its amendments. 2 Thi s great (t o an American) bulk result s fro m man y factors , bu t amon g othe r thing s th e Constitution provide s no t only for the organization o f the central government, bu t fo r th e stat e government s a s well , an d in the case o f Assam , it make s explici t an d detailed provision s fo r the tribal areas . Thes e provision s ar e foun d i n wha t i s know n a s the "Sixt h Schedule, " a sixteen-pag e appendi x whic h wit h th e various othe r "schedules " follow s th e mai n bod y o f th e Constitution. The Sixt h Schedul e divide s th e mountainous region s o f Assa m into two classes. The wilder area s (know n a t the time the Constitution wa s frame d a s Balipar a Frontie r Tract , Tira p Frontie r Tract, Abo r Hill s District , Mishim i Hill s District , an d Nag a Tribal Area , whic h constitute s th e inner , o r wilde r par t o f the Naga Hills ) wer e t o be centrally administere d a s the North Eas t Frontier Agenc y o r NEFA (se e below). Th e less wil d hil l tract s were apportione d amon g si x districts: th e Unite d Khasi-Jainti a Hills, th e Garo Hills , the Mizo Distric t (formerl y Lusha i Hills) , the Nag a Hill s (i.e. , th e more settle d portio n o f the Naga Hills , which wa s to be distinc t fro m th e wilder Nag a Triba l Are a included a s part o f NEFA), th e North Cacha r Hills , and the Mikir Hills. Eac h o f thes e si x district s wa s to hav e a distric t counci l whose member s woul d b e electe d b y adul t suffrag e fro m terri torial constituencie s int o whic h th e distric t woul d b e apportioned. Thes e distric t council s wer e new , unlike an y gov ernment bodie s tha t ha d existed earlier , an d they wer e grante d broad loca l power s an d duties, includin g th e right t o build roads , ' T h e Constitutio n o f Indi a (a s modifie d u p t o Novembe r 1 , 1956) .

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set u p schools , administe r markets , regulat e lan d an d agriculture , an d th e righ t t o collec t th e mos t importan t loca l taxes . Th e coun cils wer e give n jurisdictio n ove r "customar y law " (pertainin g to marriage , inheritance , th e appointmen t an d successio n o f chiefs o r headmen , an d wha t th e Constitutio n call s "socia l cus toms") , an d the y wer e expecte d t o establis h th e court s tha t would decid e dispute s arisin g unde r thes e headings . Thes e forma l provision s o f th e Constitution , thoug h possibl y somewha t cumbersome , explicitl y attempte d t o reconcil e th e hil l people' s desir e fo r autonom y wit h th e requirement s o f nationa l unity . Th e uniqu e ethni c positio n o f th e triba l peopl e wa s recog nized . The y wer e give n th e majo r responsibilit y fo r thei r ow n customar y law , an d th e hil l district s wer e explicitl y exempte d from certai n nationa l legislatio n tha t migh t infring e upo n thei r traditions . Th e onl y provision s tha t migh t strik e a n outside r a s superficially unreasonabl e ar e thos e whic h gran t ver y broa d powers t o th e governo r o f th e stat e o f Assam . Legislatio n passe d by th e distric t council s mus t b e signe d b y th e governo r befor e it become s law . H e ca n chang e th e boundarie s o f th e districts , an d h e ca n eve n dissolv e th e distric t council s an d assum e thei r powers. I t mus t b e remembered , however , tha t unde r th e spiri t in whic h th e Constitutio n wa s written , th e offic e o f governo r of th e stat e i s analogou s t o tha t o f th e India n president , an d th e presidenc y i n tur n i s modele d upo n th e offic e o f th e Britis h monarch . I t wa s clearl y th e expectatio n o f th e writer s o f th e Constitutio n tha t shor t o f extraordinar y circumstance s th e action s of th e distric t council s woul d b e approve d b y th e governor . Of course , writin g a forma l constitutio n an d puttin g it s provi sions int o smoot h operatio n ar e quit e differen t things . Politica l experienc e wa s rar e amon g hil l men , an d th e peopl e ha d ha d no experienc e wit h direc t suffrage . Nevertheless , th e distric t council s wer e organized , member s o f th e council s wer e electe d in th e first genera l electio n i n 1952 , an d wit h varyin g degree s of efficiency , th e council s hav e grapple d wit h th e problem s o f local governmen t eve r since . Becaus e the y wer e electe d fro m triba l constituencies , i t wa s probabl y inevitabl e tha t th e council s woul d becom e th e foca l point s o f triba l nationalism . Th e stat e legislature , whos e Γ 218 ]

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electorate i s largel y plain s Assamese , ha s tende d itsel f t o b e re sponsive t o it s ow n variet y o f nationalism . Triba l leader s hav e issued periodi c call s fo r triba l loyalty , s o a s t o rall y resistanc e against th e rea l o r imagine d encroachmen t o f th e ambitiou s Assamese. Plain s leader s hav e answere d b y insistin g tha t hil l man an d plain s ma n i n Assa m ar e indissolubl y boun d b y histor y and sentiment , an d the y hav e periodicall y suggeste d tha t onl y outside agitator s coul d possibl y hav e stirre d u p th e tribesme n to such a point of self-assertion . The over t disagreement s betwee n hil l an d plain s leader s hav e been cause d mor e b y emotiona l issue s tha n immediatel y practica l issues. There hav e bee n occasiona l disagreement s abou t th e jurisdiction o f variou s governmenta l bodies , competitio n fo r th e in evitably limite d governmen t funds , an d rarel y someon e ha s be come concerne d abou t th e futur e allocatio n o f profi t fro m th e potential minera l an d hydroelectri c wealt h o f th e hills. But issue s of language , religion, an d cultura l traditio n hav e cause d fa r mor e bitterness. N o educate d hil l ma n ca n calml y accep t th e conde scending wa y i n whic h plain s me n sometime s refe r to th e hill s as backward , a s primitive , an d a s lagging man y centurie s behin d the mor e progressive an d civilize d plains . Th e hil l leade r doubt s that th e averag e hil l farme r i s economicall y wors e of f tha n th e average lowlan d farmer , an d h e know s tha t som e o f th e hil l dis tricts are , b y India n standards , wel l educated . B y on e count , in fact , th e Miz o Hill s turne d ou t t o hav e th e highes t percentag e of literac y o f an y comparabl e distric t i n India . Why , then , won ders th e hil l man , mus t other s persis t i n describin g th e tribe s as "backward" ? SYMBOLIC MFFEKENCE S BETWEE N HILL S AN D PLAIN S

Plains Assames e lik e t o sugges t tha t i t i s th e conjunctio n o f mountains an d lowlands , wit h th e minglin g o f thei r contrastin g peoples, tha t give s thei r stat e it s uniqu e characte r an d set s i t off from th e res t o f India . Convince d tha t th e Britis h deliberatel y kept th e hill s isolate d fro m th e plain s an d deliberatel y fostere d naive separatis t ambition s amon g th e hil l people , th e plain s As samese ofte n fee l tha t i f onl y the y wer e give n th e chance , the y could cooperat e i n buildin g a unite d an d vigorou s Assa m unde r [219 ]

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the leadershi p o f Assamese . The y coul d the n graduall y dra w th e hill peopl e withi n th e embrac e o f thei r civilization . Bu t th e hil l people, b y an d large , ac t a s i f the y wan t n o par t o f wha t th e plains me n offer . Khasi s becam e annoye d whe n stree t marker s written i n Assamese scrip t appeare d i n thei r district , an d n o issu e has mor e infuriate d th e triba l peopl e tha n periodi c suggestion s by plain s me n tha t th e Assames e languag e b e use d i n hil l schools.3 Standard s o f Englis h hav e bee n relativel y hig h i n th e hills, an d th e tribal s drea d havin g t o lear n no t onl y English , and perhap s Hind i a s a ne w nationa l language , bu t th e stat e language o f Assames e a s well . Phizo , th e Nag a leader , mad e po litical capita l ou t o f th e refusa l o f a distinguishe d Hind u visito r to shar e a feas t o f por k an d ric e beer . "Here, " sai d Phizo , "i s a symbo l o f th e unbridgeabl e ga p betwee n th e Nagalan d an d India."4 Over th e pas t centur y man y tribesme n hav e becom e Christian s (the larges t numbe r ar e Baptists) , an d virtuall y ever y triba l leader i s a Christian . The difference s betwee n hil l men and plain s men ar e fa r olde r tha n th e comin g o f Christianit y t o Assam , but bot h tribal s an d Hindu s hav e ofte n com e t o loo k upo n Chris tianity a s th e chie f symbo l o f thei r separation . Indeed , som e hil l men ma y becom e Christian s precisel y becaus e the y fee l the y need a symbo l tha t wil l emphasiz e th e feeling s o f separatis m they alread y hav e an d which , a t th e sam e time , wil l giv e the m a clai m t o b e "civilized. " Bu t t o th e Hind u lowlander , Christi anity i s ofte n see n a s a legac y o f th e colonia l West , a foreig n doctrine implante d i n thei r midst. 5 In spit e o f emotiona l issues , i n spit e o f unclea r jurisdictiona l boundaries betwee n variou s governmen t bodies , an d i n spit e o f the occasiona l inefficiencie s o f inexperience d officials , th e distric t councils hav e functioned , an d wit h on e tragi c exceptio n reason 3 Report o f a debat e i n th e Assa m Legislativ e Assembly , Assam Tribune, De cember 24 , 1963 . 4 Quoted b y Verrier Elwi n (1960:244) . 5 In lat e 1963 , whe n thousand s o f triba l refugee s poure d int o Assa m fro m East Pakista n however , th e governmen t o f Indi a suddenl y foun d i t worthwhil e to poin t ou t tha t man y o f th e refugee s wer e Christians . I n thi s wa y Indi a asserted t o th e worl d tha t Indi a i s a secula r stat e whic h discriminate s agains t no religion , an d tha t th e issu e between Indi a an d Pakista n i s no t tha t of Hinduis m vs. Islam , bu t rathe r th e India n acceptanc e o f th e idea l o f a secula r stat e vs . Pakistani communalism .

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ably orderl y governmen t ha s bee n carrie d on . Thi s bring s m e to th e event s whic h le d u p t o th e mos t recen t politica l experi ment i n India' s fa r northeast , th e establishmen t o f Nagaland . THE FORMATIO N O F NAGALAND— A TRTBA L STAT E

It i s difficult t o kno w exactl y wh y th e grievance s o f th e Naga s had s o muc h mor e violen t consequence s tha n thos e o f th e othe r tribes. Perhap s th e Naga s ha d a slightl y mor e fierce traditio n of warfar e tha n others , tradition s whic h dat e bac k t o pre-Britis h times. Perhap s the y happene d t o hav e som e unusuall y abl e o r belligerent leadership . Perhap s too , th e fac t tha t th e Nag a Hill s were th e onl y par t o f Indi a t o b e occupie d b y th e Japanes e dur ing the Secon d Worl d Wa r mean t tha t th e genera l turmoi l cause d by passin g armies , an d th e availabilit y o f weapon s whic h the y abandoned, helpe d t o fomen t unres t an d encourag e rebellion . In an y event , a s early as 1947 Angami Zapu Phiz o was demandin g complete independenc e fo r th e Nag a Hills , an d b y th e earl y 1950's Naga s wer e i n ope n rebellion . Th e India n arm y struggle d to asser t control , an d i n a pattern o f guerrill a warfare, wit h whic h Americans hav e becom e al l to o familiar , governmen t troop s burned Nag a village s suspecte d o f harborin g rebels , an d whe n rebels coul d no t kil l India n trooops , the y turne d upo n "loyal " Nagas instead . A s i s als o no t entirel y unprecedente d i n othe r guerrilla wars , neithe r sid e seeme d abl e t o achiev e rea l victory . The Naga s stage d periodi c raid s o n governmen t posts . They use d captured weapon s o r arm s whic h the y smuggle d fro m Pakistan , a hundre d mile s away. 6 At leas t on e repor t o f Chines e arm s ap peared i n th e press , bu t n o substantia l tie s betwee n Naga s an d Chinese hav e bee n documented. ' I n fact , whe n th e Chines e in vaded India , Phizo , b y the n livin g i n exil e i n London , offere d to en d th e rebellio n an d t o organiz e resistanc e agains t th e Chi nese i f Nehr u woul d agre e t o hol d a plebiscit e o n Nag a indepen dence.8 Foreig n missionarie s wer e accuse d o f encouragin g th e rebellion, bu t n o rea l evidenc e fo r thi s ha s eve r bee n given . O f course, th e rebe l leaders , lik e al l triba l leaders , ar e Christians . It wa s reporte d tha t Nag a delegate s brough t thei r Bible s t o a 'New York Times, Ma y 4 , 1962 . Assam Tribune, Decembe r 16 , 1963 . ' New York Times, Septembe r 21 , 1957. 8 New York Times, Novembe r 16 , 1962.

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INDIA : ROBBIN S BURLIN G

peace conferenc e an d knel t i n praye r befor e conferring. 9 T o In dians thi s ma y smac k o f Wester n colonia l influence , bu t t o a Naga i t ma y simpl y b e a n adde d ritualizatio n o f hi s deepl y fel t independence. Naga s trie d a t on e tim e t o brin g thei r cas e befor e the Unite d Nations , an d the y hav e insiste d tha t thei r countr y never was a part o f India . The respons e o f th e India n governmen t wa s slo w an d b y n o means consistent : sometime s i t wa s politica l an d conciliatory , sometimes militar y an d harsh . Bu t a s year s passe d withou t a military solution , Nehr u an d th e India n governmen t cam e slowl y to agre e t o establishing a state o f Nagaland , separat e fro m Assam , but stil l withi n th e India n Union . Thoug h th e rebe l leader s di d not agree , othe r "loyal " Naga s did , an d i t wa s hope d tha t thi s compromise whic h grante d mor e autonom y tha n a hil l distric t but less tha n complet e independenc e woul d undermin e suppor t for th e rebe l cause . Bills creatin g Nagalan d passe d i n Parliamen t i n 1962 , an d i n December 196 3 Nagaland , embracin g bot h th e olde r Nag a Hill s District an d th e "Naga " area s o f NEFA , becam e th e sixteent h and smalles t stat e o f th e Republi c o f India . Wit h 370,00 0 people , Nagaland i s suppose d t o b e o n a pa r governmentall y wit h th e nine millio n o f Assam , no t t o mentio n th e sixt y millio n o f Utta r Pradesh.10 Whe n th e firs t stat e election s wer e hel d i n Januar y 1964, supporter s o f th e "loyalist " Nag a Shil u A o wo n th e ma jority o f seat s i n th e ne w forty-six-sea t stat e legislativ e assembly , and A o became the chie f minister. 11 Even thi s di d no t en d th e rebellion . Raid s continue d throug h March o f 1964 , bu t beginnin g i n Septembe r negotiation s wit h the rebel s brough t th e first rea l hop e fo r genuin e peace. 12 A truc e was arranged , bu t a s lat e a s Novembe r 1965 , whe n th e truc e was du e t o expire , rebel s threatene d t o rene w hostilitie s unles s the governmen t droppe d it s premis e tha t negotiation s b e restricted t o solution s requirin g th e Naga s t o remai n withi n th e Indian Union. 13 Until recently , n o othe r trib e ha d take n u p arm s o r seriousl y • New York Times, Septembe r 7 , 1964 . 10 Nagaland ha s its ow n capita l a t Kohima , it s own legislature an d chie f minister , and it s own representatives in the national parliament . a New York Times, Decembe r 2,1963 ; January 18,1964 . 12 New York Times, Septembe r 6 , 1964 . a India Briefing, Decembe r 1965 .

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TRIBESME N & LOWLANDER S O F ASSA M

demanded complet e independence , bu t man y demand s hav e been mad e fo r separat e hil l state s an d th e succes s o f th e Naga s could only encourage separatist ambitions. In 196 5 a party called the Miz o Nationa l Fron t wa s callin g fo r a n independen t Miz o land an d i t score d som e electora l successes. 14 B y 196 6 violenc e had broke n out i n th e Miz o hills an d th e threa t o f a repetitio n of the Naga conflict hung over that district. NEFA—TRIBES UNDE R DrREC T ADMINISTRATIO N

The thir d politica l experimen t fo r th e hill areas i s represented by th e Nort h Eas t Frontie r Agency , o r NEFA , a s it i s generall y known. Thi s i s th e regio n designate d a s "Par t B Triba l Area " by th e Sixt h Schedul e o f th e Constitution , an d i t i s th e are a which was most lightly administere d during British times. NEFA constitutes th e north an d northeastern mountai n tracts, the area s which border Bhutan, China, and northern Burma. Its population has bee n variousl y estimate d at tw o hundred thousan d t o a million, Verrie r Elwin' s (1960 ) estimat e o f a half-millio n bein g a s reasonable a s any . Th e me n wh o frame d th e Constitutio n felt , quite rightl y n o doubt , tha t i t woul d b e impossibl e t o se t u p elective government ther e immediately. NEFA i s constititutionall y designate d a s a part o f Assam , an d it i s suppose d t o b e unite d wit h th e res t o f th e stat e whe n i t has reache d a "sufficient " stag e o f development . I n th e mean time, it is administered by a separate agency, responsible through the Governo r o f Assa m (wh o i s himself a centra l appointee , no t a locall y electe d officer ) t o th e centra l government . I n effect , therefore, NEF A has been ruled as a centrally administered territory, an d a presidential appointe e has sat in Parliament t o represent it s people. Since th e Britis h perio d trave l int o NEF A ha s bee n strictl y controlled. Thi s ha s bee n partl y t o protec t th e travele r agains t possible dange r in unadministere d territory , bu t th e rul e i s now also quit e explicitl y designe d t o protec t th e triba l peopl e fro m the encroachmen t an d exploitatio n the y might suffe r i f outsider s had unlimite d acces s t o thei r hills. 15 S o long a s it i s difficul t fo r anyone not directl y connecte d wit h th e NEF A administratio n 14

India Briefing, Decembe r 1965 . Statement b y Prim e Ministe r Nehru reporte d i n th e Assam Tribune, Decembe r 18, 1963 . 15

[ 22 3 ]

INDIA : ROBBIN S BURLIN G

to gai n admission , an d i n th e absenc e o f articulat e loca l leader ship, i t i s difficul t t o kno w jus t wha t th e presen t situatio n is . Certainly loca l violenc e i s being controlled , road s ar e bein g buil t at an acceleratin g rate , an d th e governmen t ha s launche d variou s ambitious scheme s fo r agricultura l an d educationa l development . The strategi c importanc e o f th e region , particularl y sinc e th e Chinese invasio n (th e mai n thrus t o f whic h wa s int o NEFA) , will surel y stimulat e th e governmen t t o pus h it s developmen t schemes a s rapidl y a s possible , thoug h i t ma y discourag e elec tions an d th e ris k o f independen t politica l movement s suc h a s have characterized th e other hill regions . TRIBESMEN I N A REPRESENTATIV E DEMOCRAC Y

As citizens o f India , th e triba l people s o f Assa m hav e no t onl y been subjec t t o loca l government , bu t (excep t fo r th e peopl e of NEFA ) the y hav e als o participate d i n th e nation' s thre e gen eral elections , an d thei r representative s si t i n bot h th e Assa m State Legislativ e Assembl y an d i n th e nationa l parliament . Som e idea o f th e ethni c divisio n withi n th e stat e ca n b e see n i n th e results o f th e 196 2 elections. 16 I n tha t year , 10 5 members o f th e legislative assembl y wer e electe d fro m a s man y constituencie s of th e state . B y th e tim e o f th e election s th e Nag a Hill s ha d been separate d fro m Assa m an d di d no t sen d representative s to th e assembly , bu t th e remainin g hill districts comprise d fifteen of th e 10 5 assembl y constituencies . O f these , eleve n wer e wo n by th e "A U Part y Hil l Leader s Conference " (APHLC) , a coali tion o f hil l partie s fro m th e variou s districts , an d mos t o f thes e seats wer e wo n decisively . Th e Congres s Party , whic h generall y offered th e onl y seriou s opposition , wa s soundl y defeated , a s i t had bee n i n earlie r elections . O f th e fou r seat s whic h Congress s did wi n i n th e hills , thre e wer e i n th e Nort h Cacha r an d Miki r Hills, district s whic h I judg e t o b e mor e lik e th e plain s i n thei r general ethni c characte r an d politica l attitude s tha n othe r hil l districts. Th e wea k positio n o f th e Congres s Part y i n th e Assa m Hills i s show n dramaticall y b y th e fac t tha t o f th e 2,83 3 legisla tive assembl y seat s whic h wer e conteste d i n th e variou s state s of Indi a i n 1962 , th e onl y tw o seat s fo r whic h Congres s di d no t 10 The election s i n Assa m wer e reporte d i n detai l i n th e Assam Tribune betwee n February 2 5 an d Marc h 4 , 1962 .

[ 22 4 ]

THIBESME N & LOWLANDEH S O F ASSA M

offer a candidat e wer e i n th e Assa m Hills. 17 I n thos e constituen cies alon e Congres s admitte d i t ha d n o chance . Th e Congres s Party ha s clearl y becom e identifie d wit h clos e tie s t o othe r part s of India , an d a vot e agains t Congres s ha s com e t o mea n a vot e for triba l autonomy . By contrast , o f th e remainin g ninet y seat s o f th e Assa m Legis lative Assembly , n o les s tha n seventy-fiv e wer e won b y Congress , leaving a scan t fifteen seat s t o b e distribute d amon g indepen dents an d th e variou s othe r parties . (Th e Communis t Part y o f India, incidentally , wo n n o seat s a t al l i n th e Assa m Legislativ e Assembly i n 1962 , makin g Assa m on e o f th e tw o state s i n Indi a without CP I representation . Th e developin g borde r disput e wit h nearby Chin a apparentl y squelche d th e alread y wea k followin g of th e Communis t Part y there. ) As th e larges t singl e oppositio n block , th e APHL C ha d th e right t o become th e formal oppositio n i n th e Assembly , an d ther e were speculation s tha t the y migh t becom e allie d wit h certai n independents wh o dre w thei r suppor t fro m th e Bengal i minorit y in Assam. 18 Apparently th e APHL C leader s declined t o tak e thes e opportunities. Havin g bee n electe d o n a platfor m whic h demanded a separat e stat e a s it s majo r plank , the y wer e appar ently unwillin g t o participat e i n assembl y affair s t o th e poin t of formin g a "loya l opposition. " Fo r a tim e the y eve n threatene d to resign in a block from th e Assembly . Two APHL C candidate s als o ran fo r seat s i n th e nationa l par liament i n 1962 , on e o f the m successfully . (Th e tota l Assames e delegation t o th e Lo k Sabha , th e lowe r an d mor e powerfu l hous e of Parliament , i s twelve. ) A fe w othe r tribesme n hav e bee n elected t o earlie r parliaments , an d others hav e sa t a s presidentia l nominees t o represen t NEFA . On e Khas i lady , a membe r o f a n earlier parliament , eve n cam e t o th e Unite d Nation s som e year s ago a s a membe r o f th e India n delegation , bu t th e numbe r of tribespeopl e i n th e nationa l parliamen t wil l inevitabl y remai n miniscule. Even i n Assa m th e APHL C wa s outnumbere d eleve n t o sev enty-nine b y Congress . Preoccupie d wit h th e issu e o f a separat e hill state , th e APHL C representative s d o no t see m t o hav e exer " Assam Tribune, Januar y 14 , 1962. M The Statesman, Calcutta , Marc h 1 , 1962.

[ 22 5 ]

INDIA : BOBBIN S BUBLIN G

cised eve n a s muc h weigh t a s thei r smal l number s migh t hav e permitted wit h respec t t o othe r issue s facin g Assam . Neverthe less, i f i n n o othe r wa y than b y continua l agitation , the y hav e kept th e tribe s fro m bein g a forgotte n corne r o f a larg e nation , and b y creatin g liv e electora l issues , the y hav e stimulate d new and expande d politica l horizon s fo r thei r people . Th e issue s reached th e to p i n lat e 196 3 when APHL C leader s conferre d with Nehru . H e offere d the m som e hop e for a greate r measur e of loca l autonomy, thoug h h e rejected thei r demand s fo r a sepa rate hil l state. 16 Though th e hill people ar e badly outnumbered, thei r represen tation i s not negligible. It may someda y be increased by representatives fro m NEFA , an d the y migh t receiv e suppor t fro m th e leaders o f Nagaland . I n a natio n wher e everybod y belong s t o a minorit y o f some sort , ther e i s always th e possibility tha t stra tegic alliance s wil l allo w th e tribal vote s t o decide issue s wher e other vote s ar e divided—an d enhanc e th e powe r o f th e tribe s in th e process . S o long a s th e electora l machiner y continue s t o operate, th e hil l peopl e do , at least , hav e a n institutionalize d way o f airin g thei r grievances , an d the y hav e som e mean s t o guide the decisions which affec t thei r territories . THE INDIREC T EFFECT S O F ECONOMI C CHANG E

Most o f this paper ha s dealt wit h forma l politica l relationship s because I fee l i t i s i n thes e tha t Assam' s experienc e ha s bee n least lik e th e nations t o the east. I n conclusion, however , a wor d about economi c prospect s ma y not b e ou t of place . A s in the rest o f India , th e governmen t ha s bee n increasingl y concerne d with communit y developmen t projects . Governmen t officer s hav e encouraged improve d agricultura l practices , du g wells , opene d schools an d dispensaries , an d taugh t elementar y technique s o f sanitation an d public health . I a m not sure tha t India n agrono mists kno w muc h mor e abou t th e problems o f swidde n agricul ture tha n d o Americans. As in the nations furthe r east , on e hears occasional desperat e statement s abou t th e wastefulness o f swid den, bu t there ha s been virtuall y n o officia l attemp t t o prohibi t burning i n th e area s wher e tha t ha s bee n traditional ; indeed , official polic y seem s t o hav e bee n t o tr y t o improv e swidde n 18

Assam Tribune, Decembe r 24 , 1964 .

[ 22 6 ]

TRIBESME N & LOWLANDEH S O F ASSA M

agriculture rathe r tha n t o replac e i t (e.g . Elwi n 1960:8 2 ff.) . However, man y o f th e hil l tract s o f Assa m ar e relativel y densely settle d b y compariso n wit h othe r swidde n regions , an d population seem s t o b e expandin g a s rapidl y a s i n othe r part s of India . Soone r o r late r th e limit s o f swidde n agricultur e mus t be reached . Perhaps systemati c farmin g encourage d b y sophisticate d experimentation an d governmen t encouragemen t ca n keep swid den productio n ahea d o f th e population , thoug h I a m no t a t all certain . Bu t th e stead y extensio n o f road s throughou t th e hill area s ma y provid e a rea l alternative . I t ma y b e tha t th e economic salvatio n o f th e hill s lie s no t i n subsistenc e grains , th e crops th e governmen t i s ofte n mos t concerne d with , bu t i n spe cialized cas h crop s tha t gro w bette r a t highe r altitude s tha n i n the lowlands . Alread y Khasi s expor t grea t quantitie s o f potatoes , and Gar o orange s hav e bee n s o successfu l tha t i t has bee n profit able t o shi p the m b y truc k ou t o f th e hill s an d the n airfreigh t them t o Calcutta . Man y othe r perennia l o r orchar d crops—arec a nuts, bete l leaf , tea , pineapples , cashe w nuts , pepper—ma y ulti mately mak e fa r mor e valuabl e crop s tha n hil l ric e o r millet . Of course , t o plac e relianc e upo n cas h crop s require s a n assure d system o f distributio n an d carrie s wit h i t th e dange r o f complet e dependence upo n th e plain s for subsistenc e grains , but tha t ma y be a less frightful alternativ e tha n immediate hunger . A n increas ing shif t t o perennia l crop s woul d als o inevitabl y brin g abou t changes i n lan d tenur e practices , and , i n al l likelihood , a shif t in th e directio n o f individua l contro l o f land . Thi s coul d intro duce a n imbalanc e i n th e distributio n o f wealth , suc h a s I thin k I wa s abl e t o observ e i n thos e Gar o village s wher e perennia l crops o r permanen t wet-ric e fields ha d begu n t o riva l swidden s in importanc e (Burlin g 1963:311-312) . In spit e o f thes e dangers , I thin k tha t i f I wer e responsibl e for th e agricultura l developmen t o f th e Assa m Hills , I woul d be tempte d t o encourag e cas h crops , particularly perennials , bu t I strongl y suspec t tha t th e wa y i n whic h suc h crop s ar e goin g to sprea d mos t effectivel y i s no t throug h th e exhortatio n o f agri cultural extensio n workers , bu t throug h th e invisibl e pressure s of th e market . Hil l farmer s i n Assa m ar e quit e astut e enoug h to decid e whethe r the y ca n ge t mor e ric e b y growin g i t them [ 22 7 ]

INDIA : ROBBIN S BURLIN G

selves o r b y growin g orange s an d the n tradin g the m fo r rice . My gues s i s tha t th e extensio n o f road s coul d quit e rapidl y ti p the balanc e i n favo r o f th e cas h crops . I t ma y eve n b e tha t th e recent concer n fo r th e improvemen t o f swidde n agricultur e comes a t th e tim e whe n swidde n i s becomin g obsolete , no t be cause i t i s inherentl y deleteriou s t o th e soi l bu t becaus e othe r forms o f agricultur e wil l becom e mor e profitabl e wit h th e bette r transportation tha t i s increasingly available . No hil l ma n want s t o brin g a hal t t o continuin g economi c development, bu t t o becom e economicall y mor e integrate d wit h other part s o f th e natio n implie s som e sor t o f continuin g politica l relationship. I n spit e o f m y grea t sympath y fo r th e triba l minor ity, th e Nag a notio n o f complet e independenc e ha s neve r seeme d realistic t o me . I a m eve n doubtfu l whethe r i t make s a grea t deal o f differenc e whethe r a hill regio n i s organize d int o a sepa rate stat e o r int o a semi-autonomou s par t o f anothe r state . Some where i n th e politica l proces s compromise s hav e t o b e made . The mai n feature s o f th e neede d compromise s see m t o m e t o be obvious . Th e plains peopl e coul d gran t cultura l independenc e to th e hills : le t the m spea k thei r ow n languages , ea t thei r ow n food, bre w thei r ow n beer , an d worshi p a s animist s o r a s Chris tians, whicheve r the y prefer . I f th e plain s peopl e woul d sto p insisting tha t the y liv e o n a higher leve l o f civilizatio n tha n thei r tribal brethren , hal f th e proble m woul d b e solved . O n th e othe r hand, th e hil l peopl e mus t soone r o r late r admi t thei r geographi cal proximit y t o th e plain s an d agre e t o whateve r politica l an d economic compromise s ar e needed to keep th e countr y from com ing apar t a t th e seams . Th e proble m lie s i n persuadin g peopl e to mak e thes e compromises . I a m ethnocentri c enoug h t o believ e that i n th e lon g run , th e slo w an d nois y working s o f electiv e parliamentary politic s i s th e bes t hope , an d i n it s willingnes s t o let peopl e elec t thei r ow n leaders , I thin k Indi a deserve s ou r profound admiration . REFERENCES CITE D BURLING, ROBBIN S

1963 Rengsanggri : famil y an d kinshi p i n a Gar o village . Philadelphia , University o f Pennsylvani a Press .

[ 22 8 ]

TRIBESMEN &

L O W L A N D E R S O F ASSA M

E L W I N , VEBRIE H

1960 A philosoph y fo r NEFA . Shillong , Advise r t o th e Governo r of Assam , 2 d revised edn . INDIA

1956 Th e Constitutio n o f India . Delhi , Manage r o f Publications .

Periodicals ASSAM TRIBUNE . Gauhati .

INDIA BRIEFING . Ne w York , Indi a Counci l of the Asi a Society . N E W YOR K T I M E S . Ne w York .

T H E STATESMAN . Calcutta .

[ 22 9 ]

PART V : LAO

S

Laos: Introductio n JOEL HALPERN AN D PETE R KUNSTADTER a lan d i n th e middle . He r heterogeneou s populatio n re flects he r positio n o n a n ethni c watershed , an d he r histor y tell s repeatedly o f struggle s t o contro l th e lan d whic h lie s sout h o f China, northeas t o f Burma , eas t o f Thailand , an d wes t o f Annam . The struggl e continue s today , mor e o r les s openly , despit e th e "neutralization" o f Lao s followin g th e 196 2 Genev a agreements . On th e on e sid e Thailan d give s ai d t o he r allie s i n th e Roya l Lao Governmen t (Chalermni t 1961 ; Murphy 1965:12 2 ff.), wit h considerable assistanc e fro m th e Unite d States . An d o n th e othe r side, beginning as early as 195 1 (Burchet t 1959:89-91) , th e Com munists o f Nort h Vietnam , th e Chinese , an d fo r a tim e th e Rus sians have give n ai d t o their allies , the Pathe t La o (e.g . Le Kha m 1961; Sheeha n 1965 ; broadcas t o f Radi o Pathe t Lao , Jul y 26 , 1965, Octobe r 26 , 1965 ; Radio Peking , Decembe r 22 , 1965) . Th e Chinese hav e als o had a lon g interes t i n Laos . Chines e H o (Yun nanese) invader s o r raider s repeatedl y sacke d th e nort h o f Laos . The successor s t o th e Nationalis t Chines e ar e reporte d t o hav e troops i n th e are a nea r Luan g Praban g (Radi o Pathe t Lao , Jul y 26, 1965) . Communis t Chines e ar e reporte d t o hav e supplie d advisers t o th e Pathe t La o an d t o hav e sen t constructio n crew s to buil d a roa d fro m Chin a t o Phon g SaI y an d t o Ba n Houe i Sai on th e border wit h Thailan d (Sutherlan d 1963 ; Fall 1965:193; Radio Pathe t La o broadcast , Augus t 5 , 1965 ; New York Times, December 17 , 1965) . Fal l eve n claim s tha t Lao s no w ha s bette r road communication s wit h Chin a an d Nort h Vietna m tha n wit h its non-Communis t neighbor s (1965:193) . Th e Chines e hav e als o supplied economi c an d cultura l mission s i n Xieng Khouan g Prov ince (repor t o f Radio Pathet Lao , July 27,1965). LAOS I S

Likewise, thoug h the y hav e bee n require d b y th e Genev a agreements o f 196 2 t o withdraw thei r troops , th e American s ar e involved i n backin g thei r Tha i allie s an d i n providin g continue d support t o th e Roya l La o Governmen t i n th e for m o f economi c aid an d refuge e ai d program s (Ward' s paper ) whic h hav e al lowed th e Roya l governmen t t o retai n som e contro l ove r th e mountainous area s wher e th e Pathe t La o hav e ha d som e o f thei r [ 23 3 ]

JOE L HALPER

N&

P E T E R KTJNSTADTE

R

greatest militar y an d politica l successe s (cf . Fal l 1965) . Lao s also figures importantl y i n th e Vietnames e war , sinc e th e H o Chi Min h trai l fro m Nort h Vietnam passe s through Pathe t Lao controlled southeastern Laos, through an area populated predominantly b y "Kha " tribesme n (New York Times, Decembe r 17 , 1965, p. 2; January 9,1966, pp. 1-3) . The present boundarie s o f th e Kingdom o f Lao s are the result of th e Frenc h colonia l period ; i n particula r thei r for m wa s se t as th e resul t o f contest s betwee n France , Britain , an d Thailan d for th e territor y which lay between Burma an d th e French inter ests o n th e Indochin a coast , a s wel l a s conflict s ove r acces s t o China. Laos was not a unified stat e when Franc e intervene d i n 1893. A Laotia n kingdom , La n Xang , wit h its sea t at Luan g Prabang , had once ruled over much of the lowlands of what was to become Laos, an d als o ove r muc h o f Norther n Thailand . Th e powe r o f Lan Xan g ha d lon g sinc e declined , a s th e countr y wa s caugh t in a series o f war s an d was invaded repeatedl y b y Burma , Thailand an d Annam . Ther e wer e als o wars amon g thre e principali ties int o whic h La n Xan g ha d split: Luan g Prabang , Vientiane , and Champassak . Xieng Khouang, which was annexed by Annam in 183 2 (Mathie u 1959:40 ; Domme n 1965:8) , ha s ha d a some what differen t history . The Frenc h wer e see n a s protector s fro m di e incursion s o f the Siamese , a t leas t initially , whe n the y establishe d thei r Protectorate o f Luan g Praban g i n 1893. 1 The princel y famil y o f ' T h e Chines e H o ha d recentl y burne d Luan g Prabang , whic h ha d als o bee n threatened by th e Blac k Flags of the tribal Ta i irom northwestern Vietnam, when th e Frenc h establishe d th e Protectorate . Th e Siamese , wh o ha d earlie r promised protection , ha d take n hostage s t o Bangko k an d ha d faile d t o giv e the Laotian s relie f fro m th e raider s (Domme n 1964:9-10 ; a detaile d accoun t of thi s perio d i s foun d i n Pavie' s journal) . Thu s i t i s understandabl e wh y th e elite amon g th e valle y La o considere d themselve s "Childre n o f th e Frenc h Peace. " In vie w o f th e past relationship s an d presen t military realitie s it is not surprisin g that th e Vietnames e o n on e sid e an d th e Siames e Tha i o n th e othe r hol d Lao s in rathe r low estee m a s an underdevelope d rura l hinterlan d whic h need s assistanc e in throwin g of f th e yok e o f it s self-appointe d protectors . Example s o f thes e attitudes ar e foun d i n th e writin g o f th e Nort h Vietnames e correspondent , L e Kham (1961: 2 ff.) , wh o speak s o f th e "simple " Pathet La o i n th e Xien g Khouan g "cow country " whic h lack s pave d roads . Th e edito r o f th e Tha i Chalermni t Press i n introducin g a boo k b y hi s Lao s corresponden t (1961 ) write s o f th e humble food, poo r accommodations , an d poo r road s wit h whic h th e corresponden t must cope . Late r i n th e boo k th e corresponden t goe s o n t o describ e ho w easil y the Tha i coul d mak e mone y i n Laos . Th e Tha i peopl e . . . crosse d ove r i n

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Champassak, i n souther n Laos , wa s unde r Siames e influenc e a t this time . Thes e ol d principalitie s hav e retaine d politica l sig nificance: Princ e Bou n Ou m o f Champassa k wa s Prim e Ministe r at th e tim e o f th e ascendanc y o f th e Rightis t Genera l Phoum i Nosavan betwee n 196 0 an d 196 2 (se e Domme n 1965:2 9 et seq. for informatio n o n Bou n Oum' s career) . I n Xien g Khouan g the descendan t o f th e princel y famil y serve s a s governo r unde r the Roya l La o Government . Evidentl y h e stil l retain s som e thoughts o f autonomy , an d hi s relation s t o triba l minoritie s (specifically Meo ) reflec t thi s positio n (se e Barney' s paper) . Nominal independenc e fro m Franc e wa s regaine d afte r th e Second Worl d War , an d th e condition s o f foreig n interventio n were se t a t th e Genev a Conventio n whic h ende d th e French Indochina Wa r in 1954 , and i n the Genev a Agreement s o f 1962 . The problem s o f buildin g a moder n natio n i n Lao s ar e com plicated no t onl y historically an d politically, a s already indicated , but als o b y feature s o f economy , geography , an d demography . Laos i s landlocked . He r rout e t o th e se a vi a th e Mekon g Rive r must pas s throug h bot h Cambodi a an d Sout h Vietnam , an d th e way i s blocked b y th e Khon e Fall s o n th e borde r wit h Cambodia . Goods shippe d throug h Thailand , b y rail fro m th e por t o f Bang kok, mus t b e ferrie d acros s th e river , sinc e n o bridge s cros s th e Mekong int o Laos . Al l othe r route s t o th e sout h ar e overlan d across roug h countr y an d poo r roads . Thu s Lao s i s entirely de pendent upon he r neighbor s fo r contac t wit h th e outsid e world . Since Lao s ha s n o major industries , she is dependent o n foreig n sources fo r almos t al l manufacture d goods , an d depend s o n for eign ai d fo r mos t o f th e mone y wit h whic h t o purchas e them . Laos i s eve n dependen t o n Thailan d fo r muc h o f th e foo d t o supply he r capital , Vientiane , whic h i s th e larges t tow n i n th e country. Thi s i s no t t o sa y tha t Lao s ha s n o potentia l fo r eco nomic growth . Wit h prope r developmen t o f transportation , fo r example, som e area s coul d becom e ric e exporters , an d forest s could b e exploited . (Th e prospec t o f a da m t o b e constructe d big number s . . . t o Vientian e . . . wher e the y foun d n o competition sinc e th e Lao wer e no t commercial-minde d an d Lao s stil l lacke d technica l men . I t wa s easy therefor e fo r Tha i national s t o com e an d ear n a muc h highe r incom e i n Laos . . . . Th e La o di d no t eve n kno w ho w t o gro w rice an d vegetable s or raise stock properly . . . " (Chalermni t 1961:71) .

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near Vientiane , whic h woul d suppl y hydroelectri c powe r unde r the Mekon g Rive r Developmen t Schem e hold s promis e fo r Vientiane and other area s of Laos. ) Added to thes e problem s i s a grea t ethni c diversity . Th e ethni c Lao ma y wel l b e a minorit y i n thei r ow n country , an d mos t of th e majo r ethni c groups , includin g th e La o themselves , ar e but part s o f muc h large r population s foun d acros s th e border s in Thailand, China , an d Vietnam . Although n o goo d censu s material s ar e availabl e (se e popula tion tabl e below , an d Halper n 196 1 A; 1964B , tabl e 9) , abou t half th e populatio n o f Lao s ca n b e considere d "minority " o r "tribal." Th e La o official s lik e t o spea k o f fou r differen t groups , the Lao , th e triba l Tai , th e La o Theng , an d th e La o Xung. 2 The La o ar e th e politicall y dominan t group , an d ar e foun d primarily i n th e valle y o f th e Mekon g an d it s majo r tributaries , and i n Northeastern Thailand . Mos t La o ar e subsistenc e grower s of we t rice . The y ar e Buddhists , and , thoug h princel y familie s exist, th e rura l village s d o no t contai n hereditar y classes . Thei r social structur e i s generall y bilateral , an d thu s the y characteris tically hav e n o widesprea d lineage s no r clans , nor an y large-scal e social organizations based o n kinship. The triba l Tai , includin g th e Neua , Lue , Red , Black , an d Ph u Tai ar e generall y found i n th e higher valleys, and als o in adjacen t parts o f northwester n Vietnam , southwester n China , an d North ern Thailand . Th e Blac k Tai ar e generall y considere d to b e "typ ical" i n tha t the y hav e preserve d muc h o f wha t wa s apparentl y the traditiona l Ta i wa y o f lif e prio r t o th e expansio n o f th e Tai speaking people s i n Indochina . The y liv e i n narrow uplan d val leys, wher e the y cultivat e rice , makin g us e o f irrigatio n an d ter races. The y als o d o som e swidde n farmin g o n mountainsides , and gro w som e opiu m a s a cas h crop . I n Laos , a s i n norther n Vietnam (se e McAIister' s paper) , th e Blac k Ta i hav e organize d themselves int o muongs o r principalities . Thes e principalitie s ar e generally limite d t o a singl e valley , an d thoug h som e o f th e Ta i groups i n Lao s wer e nominall y involve d i n th e Si p Son g Cha o 2 As use d i n thi s paper , th e ter m La o refer s t o th e valle y Lao , wh o ar e also calle d La o Lum . Th e triba l Ta i ar e sometime s calle d th e La o Tai . Th e Lao Then g (o r Thenh , o r Theung) , o r "mountainsid e people, " ar e sometime s referred t o b y th e pejorative ter m "Kha, " meanin g "slave. ' La o Xung (o r Sung) , the "mountainto p people, " include the Me o and Ya o (o r Man) .

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Tai (Twelv e Ta i Principalities ) o f northwester n Vietnam , thi s loose federatio n ha d littl e effec t o n th e group s i n Laos . The Blac k Ta i socia l syste m ha s thre e hereditar y classes . Th e princely clas s i s forme d o f th e member s o f tw o larg e families , the L o an d th e Cam , wh o apparentl y retai n titl e t o al l th e irri gated lan d withi n th e muong. Use-right s t o swidden s ar e owne d by th e peopl e wh o clea r th e land . Th e princel y familie s hav e ritual function s a t th e commencemen t o f th e plantin g season , and i n worshiping th e chie f go d o f th e muong . Member s o f th e Luong an d K a familie s compris e th e priestl y class , whic h enjoy s high prestige . Priests , o f who m ther e ar e thre e ranks , ar e i n charge o f othe r communa l rite s an d individua l ceremonies . Th e other Blac k Ta i familie s for m th e commone r class , from whic h are draw n th e farmers , artisans , an d soldiers . Commoner s wh o use irrigate d lan d mus t pa y a tax , i n labor, t o villag e o r muon g officials. Mos t o f th e Blac k Ta i populatio n liv e i n smal l village s which ar e unde r th e contro l o f th e chao muong, o r prince . The Blac k Ta i ar e largel y self-sufficient , makin g fo r themselve s most o f wha t the y consume . Ther e ar e Chines e shop s i n marke t towns an d itineran t Chines e merchant s wh o visi t th e villages , but th e Blac k Tai hav e ha d littl e cas h t o spen d o n manufacture d goods. Hickey (1958 ) argue s tha t th e locatio n o f th e Blac k Ta i i n upland valleys , awa y fro m th e Vietnames e an d lowlan d Lao , has allowe d the m t o preserv e muc h o f thei r traditiona l Ta i cul ture an d t o develop th e fragmente d principalitie s which ar e thei r characteristic socio-politica l structur e (1958:206 , 210) . Th e iso lation o f th e Blac k Ta i fro m th e center s o f civilizatio n shoul d not b e overemphasized ; i n spit e o f th e fac t tha t the y ar e no t Buddhist, the y d o hav e thei r ow n Indian-derive d scrip t (se e Hickey 1958 , Izikowitz 196 2 for furthe r informatio n o n th e Blac k Tai). Although i n man y respect s th e Blac k Ta i ma y b e typica l o f the triba l Tai , ther e ar e a number o f importan t exceptions . Th e Lue, fo r example , ar e Buddhist s i n additio n t o worshipin g a numbe r o f typica l Ta i spirit s (se e Moerman' s pape r an d th e summary o f Lu e cultur e i n LeBa r et al. 1964:206-213) . Th e Lu e in Lao s ar e descendant s o f wha t wa s onc e a fairl y highl y orga nized Chinese-influence d stat e i n th e Si p Son g Pa n N a o f south [ 23 7 ]

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western Yunnan , an d thi s ancien t political structur e stil l has rele vance fo r relation s betwee n th e Lu e an d othe r group s (se e Moer man 1965) . Thoug h mos t o f th e triba l Ta i ar e predominantl y subsistence agriculturalists , som e hav e specialize d i n othe r occu pations. Whole village s o f Ta i P'oue n (Phuan ) i n th e Tra n Nin h Plateau (Xien g Khouan g Province ) hav e specialize d i n black smithing. Thei r village s ar e locate d o n mai n trad e routes , an d they trave l widel y t o sel l thei r ware s (Izikowit z 1962:83) . The La o Then g labe l i s applie d t o a divers e grou p o f peopl e who ar e descendant s o f th e indigenou s proto-Indochinese . The y are Mon-Khme r speaker s an d includ e th e Khmu? , T?in , Lamet , and Loven . Th e majorit y o f the m ar e animists , an d the y ar e predominantly dependen t o n swidde n ric e agriculture , but som e practice irrigate d agricultur e (e.g . Smalle y 1961:8) . Thoug h or dinarily the y ar e no t organize d politicall y abov e th e villag e level , some groups , especiall y i n th e south , wer e abl e t o moun t large scale resistance against the French colonia l forces . The La o Xun g includ e th e Me o an d Yao . The y ar e generall y mountaintop dwellers , dependen t o n swidde n ric e agricultur e for subsistence , an d o n opiu m fo r cas h income , an d livestoc k production fo r sal e a s wel l a s fo r prestig e an d sacrifice . The y are recen t migrant s fro m th e north . Th e Me o who hav e remaine d in Chin a hav e evidentl y becom e quit e acculturate d t o Ha n Chi nese cultur e (se e Rue y 196 0 fo r a brie f accoun t o f th e Me o i n China an d Rue y 196 2 fo r a discussio n o f thei r southwar d migra tion). Thos e wh o hav e move d t o Southeas t Asi a reflec t Chines e influence i n man y aspect s o f thei r culture . The y ma y eve n hir e Chinese tutor s t o liv e i n thei r villages . Th e patrilinea l socia l system o f th e Meo , wit h it s supra-villag e proliferation , i s describe d in Barney' s paper , an d th e somewha t simila r syste m o f th e Ya o (Iu Mien ) i s describe d b y Kandr e i n th e Thailan d sectio n o f the book (se e als o Iwat a 1960) . The line s betwee n th e culture s o f th e variou s group s ar e no t always sharpl y drawn . Th e La o Then g hav e frequentl y "becom e Lao" i n differen t degrees . Fo r example , Izikowit z (1951:24 ) refers t o peopl e wh o ar e "identica l wit h th e Khmu ? [but ] hav e adopted Buddhism, " an d Smalle y (1961:4,8 ) refer s t o Khmu ? who hav e becom e Buddhist s an d adopte d th e La o language . Smalley als o believe s tha t thousand s o f full y assimilate d La o ar e [ 23 8 ]

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of Khani ? descent . Th e Laotia n socia l syste m i s no t closed , an d official polic y encourage s al l inhabitant s t o conside r themselve s to b e Laotian . A s Barne y suggests , man y Me o see m t o prefe r t o maintain thei r distinc t identity , thoug h som e individua l Me o have als o becom e culturall y Lao . Thoug h Lao s doe s no t hav e a unified an d cohesiv e nationa l society , th e ethni c group s ar e b y no mean s independen t entities . Historically , the y hav e bee n re lated economicall y an d politicall y wit h lowlan d market s an d political-administrative systems , an d ar e boun d b y ritua l tie s t o the lowlands ; an d the y ar e increasingl y involve d i n th e inter national an d interna l struggle s withi n Laos . The La o populatio n i s no t evenl y distribute d throughou t th e country. The elit e La o ar e concentrated i n the civi l capital (Vien tiane), i n th e roya l capita l (Luan g Prabang) , an d i n a fe w ol d towns alon g th e Mekong . I n additio n t o th e ubiquitou s urba n Chinese shopkeeper s (se e Halpe m 1961) , ther e ar e man y Sia mese Tha i o r Vietnames e merchant s an d businessmen . Th e Sia mese Tha i ar e relativ e newcomer s i n thi s rol e an d hav e take n advantage o f th e departur e o f som e of th e Vietnames e since 1954, plus th e intensificatio n o f trad e whic h ha s com e wit h increase d foreign ai d (se e Chalermni t 1961:55) . Th e fac t tha t th e urba n population i s smal l indicate s th e limite d economi c developmen t of Laos ; th e fac t tha t th e urba n populatio n i s largel y non-La o is a furthe r indicatio n tha t th e fat e o f th e La o i s no t completel y in thei r ow n hand s (se e Halper n 1964B:15-1 9 fo r a discussio n of urba n patterns) . There i s a grea t ga p i n Lao s betwee n th e fe w wealth y urban ized French-educate d elit e an d th e mas s o f th e peopl e wh o ar e subsistence agriculturalist s (se e Halper n 1964B : Tabl e 2 9 fo r an expositio n o f rural-urba n differences) . Th e separatio n i s rein forced b y poo r communicatio n systems , lack o f educatio n i n rura l areas,3 an d lac k o f economi c development. 4 Buddhis m an d th e 3 Until recentl y secula r publi c an d privat e schoo l educatio n abov e th e primar y level ha s bee n confine d t o urba n areas , an d ha s bee n availabl e t o onl y a smal l portion o f th e population . U.S . ai d program s hav e brough t school s t o som e rural, tribal , an d refuge e areas . Se e Halper n (1964A:Tabl e 8 ) fo r a n indicatio n of th e geographi c limitation s o f th e schoo l system . Se e Schanch e (1962 ) fo r a popula r accoun t o f on e o f th e America n ai d program s t o triba l schools . Se e Barney's pape r fo r a discussio n o f Me o schools . Th e Communist s hav e als o been activ e i n promotin g educatio n i n thei r 'liberated " areas , an d hav e pai d special attentio n t o Me o school s an d th e schoolin g o f othe r minorities . A recen t

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symbolic presence o f royalty have helped giv e a feeling o f nation hood t o th e Laotians, 5 bu t obviousl y th e countr y i s no t a well integrated unit . Despit e a degre e o f ritua l interactio n wit h th e lowland Lao , commo n religio n doe s no t serv e a s a bon d fo r th e tribal people , mos t o f who m ar e animist s (se e Barney' s pape r for th e rol e o f religio n a s a symbo l o f ethni c difference) . Th e Luang Praban g prince s fight amon g themselves , an d th e rulin g family o f Champassa k contest s wit h the m fo r th e allegianc e o f at least th e southern Laotians . The distributio n o f ethni c group s o f Lao s doe s no t correspon d to internationa l boundaries . Th e Laos-Thailan d borde r ha s bee n subject t o chang e fo r centuries , reflectin g th e relativ e strength s of th e Laotia n an d Tha i princes. Th e La o an d Northeaster n Tha i dialects ar e indistinguishabl e acros s th e borde r (i n fac t ther e are nin e time s a s man y La o speaker s i n Thailan d a s ther e ar e in Laos) ; trad e an d kinshi p connection s ar e maintaine d excep t as interna l an d internationa l condition s prohibi t the m (se e Chalermnit 1961:44-45) . Indeed , i n th e last thre e o r four genera tions peopl e hav e foun d themselve s livin g i n Lao s o r Thailan d depending o n internationa l event s o f n o immediat e concer n t o themselves (i.e. , modifications o f th e borde r a s a resul t o f agree ments betwee n th e Britis h an d Frenc h i n th e 1880's , th e subse quent readjustmen t wit h th e ai d o f th e Japanes e i n Worl d Wa r II, an d a retur n t o th e earlie r borde r a t th e en d o f th e war) . As i s demonstrate d elsewher e i n thi s volum e (Kandre' s paper) , until recentl y th e border s hav e no t prove d an y barrie r t o th e North Vietnames e publicatio n claim s tha t i n 196 4 ther e wer e 36,20 0 childre n enrolled i n school s i n 'liberate d areas, " wit h a n additiona l 25 0 i n secondar y schools. Presumabl y mos t o f thes e ar e triba l people . Secula r school s hav e bee n scarce i n thi s area , an d thes e ar e impressiv e figures eve n i f exaggerate d (Fal l 1965:183; Vietnam Courier 37:6, October 7 , 1965) . 4 The elit e o f Lao s i s b y n o mean s a completel y close d kinshi p group , bu t kinship connection s ma y b e use d t o cemen t othe r socia l ties . Positio n i n th e elite ma y b e achieve d wit h money , education , an d goo d fortun e o r powe r (o n structure o f th e elit e se e Halper n 1964A:5-7 , 2 8 ft.) . Socia l mobilit y throug h the militar y ha s becom e increasingl y important . Kon g Le , a "Kha " b y birth , achieved hi s meteori c ris e throug h th e army . A t first h e was traine d b y th e French an d fough t agains t th e Vie t Minh . Late r h e receive d trainin g fro m th e Americans. H e reinforce d hi s socia l positio n i n 195 9 b y hi s thir d marriage , t o the niec e o f sociall y prominen t Laotia n Genera l Oua n Ratikon . Kon g Le' s bas e of influenc e i s i n th e army , no t particularl y amon g th e souther n triba l peopl e (see Domme n 1964:14 3 ff. fo r th e stor y of Kon g Le's career) . 8 Even th e Pathe t La o continu e t o appea l t o th e Kin g a s a symbo l o f nationa l unity (e.g . broadcas t o f Radi o Hano i reportin g Pathe t La o manifesto , Octobe r 28, 1965) .

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movement o f triba l an d minorit y peopl e (suc h a s Yao , Meo , Khmui3, an d variou s Ta i groups) , an d the y to o maintai n kinshi p and othe r connection s acros s th e boundaries . The sam e situatio n has existe d alon g th e Chines e an d Vietnames e borders , whic h everywhere cu t acros s ethni c distributions . Thi s i s significan t when on e consider s Nort h Vietnamese presence in Laos an d influ ence amon g th e Pathe t Lao . Historically , ther e appear s t o hav e been a consisten t tren d o f migratio n b y bot h La o an d triba l groups southward , particularl y t o th e southeast , a s a resul t o f recurrent war s a s wel l a s populatio n pressure s emanatin g fro m Yunnan. Th e Ya o an d Me o provid e perhap s th e mos t dramati c example o f thi s movement , a tren d tha t continue s wit h curren t warfare. The connectio n betwee n trib e an d natio n i n Lao s ha s varie d considerably betwee n differen t tribes . Th e prio r ownershi p o f the lan d b y th e "Kha " tribe s i s stil l clearl y recognize d an d sym bolized i n roya l ceremonies , a s i s th e stor y o f th e subjectio n o f these autochthon s b y th e La o (Smalle y 1961:6 ; Archaimbaul t 1964). "Kha " mean s "slave " i n th e La o language , an d "Kha " people, suc h a s th e Khmui 3, hav e bee n liabl e fo r corvee labor . But othe r tha n ritual recognitio n ther e i s little o r no participatio n by th e unassimilate d "Kha " i n th e Roya l La o Governmen t abov e the leve l o f distric t chie f (tasseng), th e nex t t o lowes t leve l o f rural administration . B y contrast , th e Me o o f Xien g Khouan g have ha d representative s an d eve n ministers i n th e Roya l govern ment (Barney' s paper) . The Frenc h di d no t g o ou t o f their wa y t o develo p o r reinforc e tribal unit s b y settin g u p separat e administrativ e device s fo r them a s the y di d i n th e Vietnames e Centra l Platea u (wher e th e French attempte d direc t administratio n o f th e triba l people ) o r in Tonki n (wher e the y encountere d strongl y organize d Ta i minorities an d preserve d traditiona l politica l appearance s whil e trying t o manipulat e electe d o r appointe d leaders) . Becaus e o f their opiu m production , tribesme n (i n distinctio n t o th e La o lowlanders) wer e offere d som e concessions—bu t thes e wer e i n th e form o f relief fro m taxes , not recognitio n o f tribal sovereignty. 6 'See Halper n (1964B:115-118 ) regardin g curren t feature s o f th e opiu m trad e and Reinac h (1901:310 ) fo r a n exampl e o f earl y Frenc h interest s i n expandin g opium production . Se e Barney' s pape r regardin g influenc e o f opiu m o n Meo-La o relations in Xieng Khouang Province .

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The reaction s o f variou s group s t o th e problem s o f assimilatio n have ofte n bee n quit e different . Typicall y th e Khmu ? hav e bee n rather passiv e an d submissive , wherea s th e Me o hav e bee n ag gressive i n thei r relation s wit h th e Lao . Difference s i n Khmu ? and Me o reaction s ar e reflecte d i n thei r recen t messiani c cults , which ar e suppose d t o lea d the m t o a bette r life . Amon g th e Khmu? th e messia h i s depicte d a s a n omnipoten t kin g fo r who m they shoul d sho w respec t b y stoppin g al l wor k an d consumin g all thei r resource s i n feasts . Th e messia h wil l the n appea r amon g them, o r the y wil l visi t hi m i n hi s cave , an d h e wil l mak e avail able t o the m al l th e materia l trapping s o f Wester n civilizatio n which ar e presentl y denie d them . B y contrast, th e Me o messiani c myth foresee s Jesu s Chris t a s the messiah, appearin g amon g the m in a jeep , givin g the m arm s an d summonin g the m t o action . According t o thi s myth , th e Me o wil l depos e th e loca l La o officials, an d the n wil l tak e ove r th e nationa l capita l (Halper n 1960:63; se e als o Smalle y 1965). 7 We ca n als o compar e Khmu ? an d Me o economi c an d politica l integration. Th e Khmu ? apparentl y hav e ha d n o politica l partici pation i n th e La o administrativ e syste m abov e th e leve l o f th e tasseng. Thoug h th e Khmu ? occasionall y produc e agricultura l surpluses fo r sale , the y ar e primaril y subsistenc e farmers . Thei r economic relation s wit h th e La o ar e a s subject s fo r corvee labor , sometimes a s hire d agricultura l worker s o r servants , an d a s par ticipants i n market s fo r basi c commoditie s an d tool s (Izikowit z 1951; Smalle y 1961) . Apparently som e of thei r economi c relation s have bee n mediate d throug h th e institutio n o f th e lam, a La o middleman (Halper n 1964B:94-95) . B y contrast , th e Me o ar e producers o f a n importan t cas h crop , opium , an d ar e relativel y prosperous. On e ma y gues s tha t th e origina l basi s o f th e specia l Meo relationshi p wit h th e La o Governo r o f Xien g Khouan g ma y have bee n contro l o f opiu m productio n an d trade , sinc e Xien g Khouang wa s th e onl y provinc e i n Lao s wher e productio n o f opium wa s legalize d b y th e French . The minorit y an d triba l group s d o no t appea r t o b e unifie d political entitie s i n Laos , a s som e group s i n Burm a an d Anna m ' The Me o messianic myt h ma y als o be a reflectio n o f thei r instrumenta l attitud e toward th e Christia n religio n an d thei r identificatio n o f Christianit y wit h moder n Western technolog y an d power .

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have been . Ther e i s evidentl y som e supra-villag e organizatio n amon g some of th e groups suc h as the Me o and Yao (se e Barney' s and Kandre' s papers) , who ar e relativ e newcomer s t o Laos , bu t nothin g o n th e leve l o f th e Sha n principalitie s seem s t o hav e existed t o riva l eve n th e limite d powe r o f al l th e La o princes . The minorit y Tai in Lao s seem no t to have been as well organize d as wer e th e Si p Son g Cha o Ta i o f norther n Vietna m (se e McAlister' s pape r an d Hicke y 1958) . Nonetheless , some o f th e tribal people s wer e abl e t o resis t Frenc h contro l fiercely durin g th e colonia l period (se e Halper n 1964:80 ff.). Th e triba l people s of Lao s historicall y appea r t o hav e bee n involve d i n a shiftin g series o f extra-villag e alliance s dependen t i n larg e measur e o n the waxin g an d wanin g o f loca l pett y states . I t i s onl y i n thi s centur y tha t unitar y stat e contro l has begu n to be imposed . (Th e same typ e o f situatio n ha s existe d i n ethnicall y simila r Norther n Thailand , wher e onl y i n th e las t fift y year s ha s th e Bangkok based Tha i governmen t attempte d t o regulat e comprehensivel y th e lives o f th e tribal peoples. ) Th e precedin g perio d was hardl y one o f autonom y of individua l triba l units , however ; suc h inter pretation s ar e founde d o n lac k o f historica l knowledge , whic h was admittedl y difficult t o obtai n when document s were lacking , fragmentary , o r har d to com e by (fo r historica l dat a on a specifi c group see e.g. Kunstadte r 1965:1-7) . Tribesme n ar e considere d t o b e citizen s o f Laos , bu t mos t of the m hav e n o specia l representatio n i n th e government . A few Me o (fo r example , Toub y Lyfon g an d Genera l Vang Pao ) have reache d hig h offic e unde r th e Roya l La o Government , but it is unclea r whethe r the y have don e so a s individual s o r becaus e the y wer e selecte d a s representative s o f minorit y interest s (se e Barney' s paper) . I t is clear, however, tha t th e Royal La o Govern men t ha s no t attempte d to organiz e minorit y interests ; it appear s tha t the y d o not wan t th e minoritie s t o becom e organize d a s such. Tribesme n were no t systematicall y recrutie d int o th e Roya l Lao Arm y unti l 1961 , whe n Unite d State s Arm y Specia l Force s detachment s arrive d i n Laos ; simultaneousl y th e Unite d State s was supportin g a nationa l arm y compose d largely o f ethni c Lao (Domme n 1964:272) . Likewise , i n th e pas t th e governmen t ha s ruled agains t th e publicatio n o f triba l languages , apparentl y ou t of fea r tha t thi s woul d reduc e th e possibilit y o f assimilatio n o f Γ 243 ]

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tribal populations. Recendy, however, a Meo language newspape r has bee n publishe d (se e Barney' s paper) , an d broadcast s ar e being made in Meo (se e Osborn's paper) . Fall (1965:17 3 ff.) ha s pointe d ou t tha t th e spli t betwee n th e Pathet La o an d th e Rightist s follow s line s o f ver y ol d ethnicall y based antagonisms . Mos t o f th e Pathe t Lao-controlle d area s (generally area s awa y fro m th e Mekon g Valley ) hav e tradition ally bee n inhabite d b y minorit y Ta i an d triba l people s (Fal l 1965:191). Th e Pathe t La o contro l Phon g SaI y an d Sa m Neua Provinces . I n par t thi s i s du e t o geography—thes e provinces adjoi n Chin a an d Nort h Vietnam . I n par t th e Pathe t Lao contro l i s du e t o politics—the y wer e force d t o withdra w from othe r province s bu t wer e allowe d t o sta y i n Phon g SaI y and Sa m Neu a a s a resul t o f th e 195 4 Genev a Accord s (Fal l 1965:179-180). Bu t thei r strengt h als o lies in th e ethni c composi tion o f th e tw o provinces—abou t two-third s o f th e populatio n of Sa m Neu a i s minority Tai , an d ove r one-hal f o f th e populatio n of Phon g SaI y i s "Kha " (se e Halper n 1964B:11 , an d source s listed fo r Tabl e 9) . I n fact , th e La o appea r t o b e i n th e majorit y only i n Vientiane , Khammouane , Savannakhet , an d Champassa k provinces ( ibid.) .8 It i s i n th e area s wher e th e ethni c La o ar e i n the minorit y tha t th e Pathe t La o hav e bee n mos t successfu l i n creating a Communis t administrativ e structur e paralle l t o tha t of th e Roya l La o Government ; th e Pathe t La o claime d i n 196 5 to contro l two-third s o f th e territor y o f Lao s an d nearl y hal f th e population (Fal l 1965:183) . As in Nort h Vietna m (se e McAlister' s paper) , th e Communist s have generall y bee n quit e successfu l i n thei r appeal s t o th e mi nority an d triba l peoples , wh o hav e bee n mobilize d i n aidin g the revolutionar y struggle . Wher e th e Pathe t La o hav e faile d to gai n th e suppor t o f triba l peopl e (e.g . amon g th e follower s of Toub y Lyfong) , i t apparentl y ha s bee n du e t o preexistin g alliances an d antagonism s amon g th e Me o themselve s (se e Barney's paper) . By contras t wit h th e Roya l La o Government , th e Pathe t Lao , from th e tim e o f thei r founding , consciousl y incorporate d minor 8 Vientiane Provinc e ha s bee n divide d int o Vientian e an d Borikhan e provinces , and Champassa k int o Champassak , Sedone , an d Sithdon e province s sinc e thes e statistics wer e compiled .

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ity interests , an d hav e continue d t o emphasiz e appeal s t o ethni c groups.9 Wherea s th e Roya l La o Governmen t officiall y doe s no t recognize triba l languages , th e Pathe t La o hav e develope d a Me o script presumabl y closel y relate d t o tha t develope d fo r th e Me o in adjacen t area s o f Nort h Vietna m (Vietnam Courier 37:6 , Oc tober 7 , 1965) . Th e Pathe t La o hav e sen t specialist s fro m th e Meo an d othe r triba l group s t o schoo l i n Nort h Vietnam , Peking , and Moscow , a s wel l a s t o thei r ow n school s i n the Communist controlled province s o f Lao s (Fal l 1965:183) . Faydang, a Me o leade r wh o wa s on e o f th e origina l founder s of th e Pathe t La o movemen t alon g wit h Princ e Souvannavong , seems t o hav e bee n use d precisel y fo r th e purpos e o f winnin g Meo suppor t an d organizin g Me o militar y unit s (Burchet t 1959:216 ff.). 10 Althoug h th e difference s betwee n Faydang' s an d Touby's follower s ar e ofte n referre d t o i n term s o f ideolog y an d morality (Burchet t describe s Faydang' s burnin g commitmen t t o the Communis t cause ; L e Kha m [1961 ] characterize s Touby' s "The followin g i s a sectio n o f th e Actio n Progra m adopte d a t th e Secon d National Congres s o f th e Ne o La o Ha k Sat (th e politica l branc h o f th e Pathe t Lao) i n Sa m Neu a Province , Apri l 6-11 , 1964 , a s reporte d b y th e Vietna m News Agency , Hanoi , Apri l 13 , 196 4 (cite d i n Domme n 1964:319) : 1. T o unit e al l th e people , unit e variou s nationalitie s (triba l groups) , strata , religious communities , politica l parties , patrioti c personalities , an d in tellectuals, includin g individual s i n th e Roya l Famil y an d Buddhis t monk s and nun s wh o favo r peac e an d neutrality , regardles s o f thei r politica l tendencies, belief s an d religio n . . . . The closes t analogou s appea l o f th e Roya l governmen t seem s t o b e th e follow ing statemen t b y Prim e Ministe r Princ e Souvann a Phoum a o n Januar y 1 , 1965 , published i n a news releas e o f th e Roya l Embass y o f Laos , Washington , Februar y 8, 1965 : We mus t remembe r als o tha t a larg e segmen t o f ou r rura l populatio n lack s many commodities , relief , socia l securit y services , tha t man y wh o liv e i n towns find quit e natura l t o receiv e fro m th e State . Thin k o f ou r countryme n in th e mountains , th e countrysid e an d th e plateau s o f th e interior , wh o enjoy non e o f thes e benefits . W e ma y gues s wha t kin d o f hostil e propagand a can b e mad e o f this . I t certainl y ha s othe r objectives , bu t i t vividl y expose s all thes e inequalitie s . . . w e shoul d striv e t o reduc e o r eliminat e them . "Other tribesme n hav e als o bee n recruite d i n larg e number s b y th e Pathe t Lao (Fal l 1965:187) . Pathe t La o Radi o (Jul y 26 , 1965 ) acknowledge s th e effectiveness o f Me o fighting o n th e sid e o f th e Roya l La o Government : ". . . Me o bandit s ar e unde r th e direc t comman d o f U.S . officer s wh o hav e trained the m wit h weapons . Th e U.S . imperialist s hav e use d thes e Me o bandit s to carr y ou t destructiv e acts agains t th e Laotia n natio n . . . . Th e U.S . imperialists ar e no w plannin g t o se t u p a Me o forc e wit h a vie w t o partitionin g th e country an d separatin g th e Me o people , who hav e live d i n Lao s fo r generations , from th e Laotia n people. "

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followers a s "pirates") , Barne y inform s u s tha t th e split betwee n Faydan g an d Toub y i s o f lon g standing . Touby' s cla n ha d tradi tionall y bee n allie d wit h th e princel y famil y o f Xien g Khouang , an d Faydang' s cla n (whic h i s generall y locate d furthe r t o th e north ) ha d bee n left ou t of thi s arrangement . Sithon e Komada m i s anothe r triba l leade r i n th e Pathe t Lao , whose influenc e i s largel y wit h th e "Kha " people s i n souther n Laos. H e i s th e so n o f a "Kha " chie f wh o le d a revol t agains t th e Frenc h in th e earl y 1900's . Lik e Faydang , h e i s a vice-chair ma n o f th e Centra l Committe e o f th e Ne o La o Ha k Sa t (se e Burchet t 1959:20 8 ff.) . I t i s interestin g t o not e tha t Princ e Bou n Ou m o f Champassak , th e Rightis t leader , allegedl y aide d th e Frenc h i n suppressin g th e rebellio n o f Sithone' s fathe r (Fal l 1965:174). Becaus e mos t o f th e recen t fightin g i n Lao s ha s occurre d i n th e hil l areas , th e minorit y an d triba l peopl e wh o live ther e hav e been deepl y affected . Som e o f th e problem s o f th e triba l peopl e in th e norther n par t o f Lao s ar e deal t wit h i n th e paper s tha t follow. Th e peopl e i n th e southeaster n par t o f Lao s throug h which supplie s pas s fro m Nort h int o Sout h Vietna m mus t als o have bee n affected . On e ca n easil y imagin e th e massiv e recruit men t o f loca l (tribal ) labo r require d b y th e H o Ch i Min h Trail . Long-ter m effect s o f th e buildin g o f road s i n triba l area s wil l almos t certainl y reorien t trad e patterns , mak e governmen t ser vices mor e accessibl e an d contro l mor e effective , an d will doubt less involv e th e permanen t relocatio n o f man y triba l villages. 11 Such effect s hav e alread y bee n note d i n pas t year s alon g th e Vientiane-Luan g Praban g Road . Road s wil l com e t o serv e th e same need s a s th e Mekon g an d it s tributarie s hav e don e fo r th e ethni c Lao . Thes e effect s wil l surel y endur e afte r peac e ha s returned . Th e magnitud e o f th e dislocatio n o f peopl e a s a resul t o f th e warfare i n Lao s ca n b e judge d fro m recen t estimate s tha t "abou t 250,000 people , mostl y Me o an d Yao hil l tribesmen , ar e partiall y or full y supporte d b y U.S . aid " (U.S . Senate , Committe e o n th e Judiciar y 1965:16 , statemen t o f R . M . Poats , Assistan t Adminis trato r fo r th e Fa r East , Agenc y fo r Internationa l Development) . 11 Japanese films show n recentl y o n America n televisio n depic t classroom s an d workshop s locate d i n cave s i n southeaster n Laos, wher e triba l peopl e ar e traine d and work . Thi s i s cite d a s th e Pathe t La o respons e t o America n bombings .

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This total amounts t o an increase of abou t 110,00 0 refugees sinc e the Genev a agreements were signed in 1962 (ibid. pp. 6-7, statement o f Leonar d Unger , Deput y Assistan t Secretar y fo r Fa r Eastern Affairs) , an d represent s a t leas t 1 0 percent o f th e tota l population o f Laos . Some aspect s o f th e massiv e U.S . assistance programs fo r thes e refugees ar e discussed b y Osbor n an d Ward , whose estimate s o f th e numbe r o f refugee s ar e considerabl y lower tha n thos e cited above. Paradoxically, i t may be in Laos, the least developed o f Southeast Asia n countries , wher e th e problem s o f tribal-minority-low land relation s wil l hav e t o b e worke d out mos t rapidly . I n th e past, minorit y an d triba l population s coul d solv e th e problem s of pressur e fro m lowlan d force s simpl y b y fleeing highe r int o the mountain s o r furthe r int o th e jungle . Bu t moder n militar y technology means that today there is nowhere to hide, and recent political developments mean that wherever they go the tribesmen and minoritie s wil l be th e targe t fo r political influenc e fro m on e or th e othe r sid e o f th e Laotia n struggle . Thu s th e triba l an d minority peopl e wil l have to develo p som e sort of lastin g adjust ment t o mor e continuou s contac t wit h th e Iowlander s o f Lao s and their outside allies. Simultaneously, th e Iowlanders will have to take a more realistic approach than simpl y denying the existence of minority problems o r conceiving o f a slowly an d informall y evolvin g Laotianization throug h adoptio n o f Buddhis m an d increase d education . The refuge e relie f program s ar e a t bes t a temporar y solutio n to the problems of th e displaced minority an d triba l populations. Though Osbor n an d War d spea k optimisticall y abou t th e ac complishments o f th e refuge e relie f programs , thes e program s are obviousl y dependen t o n foreig n ai d no t onl y fo r materia l and financial support, bu t als o for th e formatio n o f thei r under lying policies . Similarly th e Pathe t La o hav e calle d fo r outsid e help: "W e hai l an d stan d read y t o receiv e specialist s an d tech nicians o f al l countrie s who , fo r th e sak e o f justic e an d peace , would voluntee r t o help u s buil d an d develo p ou r econom y an d culture i n th e liberated areas " (Pathe t La o Radio , Octobe r 28 , 1965). Meanwhil e the y boas t o f thei r ne w irrigatio n project s and schools , an d denounc e Unite d States-supporte d program s of th e Roya l La o Governmen t a s ruse s t o foo l th e people . The recognition now being given to tribal and minority peoples [247 ]

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in thes e programs—for th e first tim e man y ar e receivin g govern ment-sponsored health , education , an d welfar e services—th e in corporation o f som e o f thes e peopl e int o militar y an d politica l organizations, an d th e deliberat e cultivatio n o f minoritie s b y th e Pathet La o an d Nort h Vietnames e mean s tha t forma l relation s between centra l governmen t an d minoritie s ca n neve r agai n b e simply ignored . Th e tribe s an d minoritie s ar e increasingl y liter ate, increasingl y awar e o f th e outsid e world , an d (wit h moder n military trainin g an d weapons ) increasingl y abl e t o exer t rea l influence.12 Laotia n attitude s an d policie s towar d tribesme n d o seem t o b e changing , a t leas t wit h respec t t o th e Meo . Toub y Lyfong an d Genera l Van g Pa o hol d importan t positions ; i n spit e of a la w agains t th e printin g o f triba l languages , a Me o news paper i s bein g distributed , an d broadcast s ar e bein g mad e i n tribal language s ove r governmen t radios . We canno t stres s to o strongl y tha t a s far bac k a s record s exis t the triba l peopl e o f Lao s hav e neve r live d i n isolate d stati c com munities. Village s move d ever y fe w decades , an d longer-ter m stability wa s th e exception . But , althoug h the y wer e no t isolate d in th e past , th e contact s wer e largel y limite d t o th e border s o f the triba l communities . Muc h o f th e trad e too k plac e outsid e o f the community , an d wa s eithe r mediate d throug h a n agen t suc h as th e lam (i n th e cas e o f th e Khmu? ) o r wa s carrie d ou t b y Chinese trader s wh o brought thei r goods to the mountain villages . Tribesmen suc h a s th e Khmu? o r Lamet worke d fo r wage s amon g the lowlan d Lao , o r eve n crosse d int o Thailan d fo r work—th e locus o f thi s wor k wa s outsid e th e triba l communities , an d th e wages wer e use d fo r traditiona l purchase s o f prestig e good s o r tools whic h di d no t disrup t triba l communit y patterns . Rituall y the Khmu ? playe d a n importan t par t i n lowlan d La o stat e cere 12 Despite thes e change s Barne y report s tha t th e traditiona l Me o socia l structur e has survive d th e rigors o f continuou s warfar e an d flourishes eve n i n th e refuge e camps. Thi s ma y wel l mea n tha t th e Me o wil l emerg e wit h a n eve n stronge r sense o f identit y an d bette r mean s fo r inter-villag e socia l organizatio n tha n the y had befor e th e war . Fo r hundred s o f years , startin g i n China , th e Me o hav e had t o cop e wit h centralize d governments . Apparentl y the y gav e u p lowlan d plow agricultur e a s the y fled Chines e persecution . I n th e mountainou s area s of norther n Indochin a the y hav e adapte d themselve s t o contac t wit h centra l governments b y livin g i n th e mountain s an d relyin g o n a valuabl e cas h crop , opium, t o giv e the m a hig h standar d o f living . No w tha t som e o f the m hav e been force d b y th e wa r int o th e lowlands , wil l the y b e willin g t o retur n t o th e mountains whe n th e wa r is over ?

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monies, bu t agai n thi s wa s outsid e o f th e spher e o f Khmu ? com munal religion . I f missionarie s cam e t o th e tribes , the y wer e a s representatives o f completel y alie n (Western ) societies . Politi cally th e villag e headme n o f th e Ya o an d Me o functione d a s in termediaries betwee n th e lowlan d governmen t an d th e villagers , most o f whom had littl e or no direct contact with the government . Such assimilatio n a s too k plac e (an d muc h di d tak e plac e bot h on a n individua l an d a communit y level ) wa s no t th e resul t o f deliberate polic y o n th e par t o f th e lowlanders . The situatio n ha s change d radicall y sinc e th e Secon d Worl d War. Triba l communitie s ar e muc h mor e directl y penetrate d b y lowlanders, an d tribesme n hav e begu n t o pla y a mor e direc t role in lowland society . The tribesme n hav e been deepl y involve d in th e civi l war s o f Laos . Thei r economies , especially i n the ref ugee areas , hav e bee n extensivel y modified—many hav e becom e completely dependen t o n airlift s fo r subsistence . Politicall y the y have becom e involve d a t th e to p level s o f th e Pathe t Lao , an d at leas t a fe w Me o hav e reache d hig h position s i n th e Roya l Lao Government . Eve n smal l rura l communitie s hav e becom e the particula r target s fo r direc t attempt s a t politica l influenc e by bot h sides . Apparently th e Me o will play a key role i n an y future develop ments. I t seem s t o hav e bee n recognize d b y al l side s tha t th e Meo ar e th e triba l peopl e mos t suitabl e fo r organizatio n int o military an d politica l units , and the y have received ai d an d atten tion t o a much greate r exten t tha n hav e othe r minorit y and triba l peoples. In thi s respec t th e Pathe t La o have a built-in advantag e in thei r clos e alliance wit h Nort h Vietnam , wher e ther e ar e som e 220,000 Meo , severa l time s th e numbe r i n Laos , concentrate d in th e formall y recognize d Me o district s o f Thua-Chu a an d M u Cang Cha i i n th e Ta y Ba c Autonomou s Zon e which border s o n the Pathe t Lao-controlle d part s o f Lao s (Fal l 1963:150-151) . The questio n remain s how muc h eithe r th e Roya l La o Govern ment o r th e Pathe t La o will be willin g t o accommodat e th e tribe s and minoritie s i n attemptin g t o buil d nationa l unit y whe n th e immediate political-militar y problem s ar e resolve d an d massiv e foreign ai d i s withdrawn . If th e tw o opposin g government s continu e t o contro l thei r re spective territories , contrastin g socia l system s ma y develop , a s [ 24 9 ]

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has happene d fo r exampl e i n Nort h an d Sout h Kore a o r Nort h and Sout h Vietnam . On e major contras t which migh t b e expecte d to develo p woul d b e i n loca l governmenta l institutions , whic h would deepl y affec t triba l an d minorit y peoples . If , afte r th e present struggle , on e sid e attain s a monopol y o f powe r i n Laos , that sid e wil l hav e secure d fo r itsel f th e majo r right s t o grappl e with th e problem s o f stat e formation . I n thi s the y wil l b e influ enced i n larg e measur e b y th e evolvin g pattern s o f thei r patrons . If Lao s manages t o avoid incorporation b y Nort h Vietnam and/o r Thailand, neithe r th e pattern o f autonomou s zone s o f th e former , nor th e basicall y traditiona l structure s o f th e latte r wil l suffic e as a mode l fo r nationa l unit y i n Laos . Thi s i s tru e becaus e o f the preponderanc e i n th e populatio n o f Lao s o f ethni c group s without tradition s o f centralize d administration . Lookin g beyon d the contemporar y dee p involvemen t in Southeast Asi a of Wester n powers (no w mainl y th e Unite d States) , hopefully , som e lastin g form o f regiona l integratio n ma y develop , perhap s base d o n th e most positiv e progra m i n th e are a t o date , th e Lowe r Mekon g development schem e (Schaa f an d Fifield 1963) . BIBLIOGRAPHY There i s a n extensiv e bod y o f Frenc h literatur e o n th e people s o f Indo china, bu t muc h o f i t i s devote d t o languag e an d religion . Informatio n o n economy, social , an d politica l structur e o f triba l an d minorit y group s i n Laos gathere d b y professiona l socia l scientist s i s scarce . Unfortunately , n o economic stud y exist s for th e hil l area s comparabl e t o that o f Gaudillo t an d Condominas (1959) . Izikowitz ' landmark monograp h o n th e Lame t (1951 ) shows wha t a n anthropologis t ca n d o whe n h e consider s problem s o f inter relations betwee n trib e an d lowland , rathe r tha n thinkin g o f tribe s a s isolates. Th e lac k o f publication s specificall y o n Lao s i s partiall y compen sated fo r b y studie s o f overlappin g populations i n neighborin g countrie s (e.g., Abadie 1924 , Bernatzik 1946) . Works o f specia l relevanc e t o th e subject s covere d i n thi s boo k ar e listed below . ABADIE, MAURIC E

1924 Le

s race s d u Haut-Tonki n d e Phong-Th o a Lan g Son . Paris , Societe d'Edition s Geographiques , Maritime s e t Coloniales .

ARCHAIMBAULT, CHARLE S

1964 Religiou s structure s i n Laos . Journa l o f th e Sia m Societ y 52(1) :57-74. Gives information o n the ritual relations between "Kha" groups and th e Royal government .

[ 25 0 ]

LAOS : INTRODUCTIO

N

AYME, G .

1931 Monographi e d u V ° Territoir e Militaire . Paris , Expositio n Coloniale Internationale . BARNEY, GEORG E LINWOO D

1957 Th e Meo : a n incipien t church . Practica l Anthropolog y 4 . BERNATZIK, HUG O ADOL F

1947 Akh a un d Meau : Problem e de r angewante n Volkerkund e i n Hinterindien. Innsbruck , Wagnerisch e Universitat s Buch * druckerei. BOCK, CAR L

1884 Temple s an d elephants . London . BURCHETT, W . G

.

1959 Mekon g upstream : a visi t t o Lao s an d Cambodia . Berlin , Seve n Seas Publishers . (Present s th e Communis t vie w o f th e Laotia n situation wit h backgroun d informatio n o n th e rol e o f triba l people i n th e Pathe t Lao. ) CHALERMNIT PRES S CORRESPONDEN T

1961 Battl e o f Vientian e 196 0 (wit h historica l backgroun d leadin g to battle) . Bangkok , Chalermni t Press . COLONNA, M .

1938 Monographi e d e l a provinc e d e Saravane . Bulleti n de s Ami s du Laos , 2 . D O M M E N , ARTHU R J .

1965 Conflic t i n Laos : th e politic s o f neutralization . Ne w York , Praeger. ( A synopti c accoun t o f th e politica l event s i n Lao s since th e Secon d Worl d War , wit h a n extensiv e bibliography. ) F A L L , BERNAR D

1963 Th e tw o Viet-Nams : a politica l an d militar y analysis . Londo n and Dunmow , Pal l Mal l Press . 1965 Th e Pathe t Lao : a "liberatio n party. " In Th e Communis t revo lution i n Asia : Tactics , goals , an d achievements , Rober t A . Scalapino, ed . Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J. , Prentice-Hall , Inc . FRAISSE, ANDR E

1951 Le s village s d u platea u d e Bolovens . Bulleti n d e l a Societ o des Etude s Indochinoises . GAUDILLOT, CLAUD E an d GEORGE S CONDOMINA S

1959 L

a Plain e d e Vientiane : rappor t d'otude , Tome s I—III , Royaume d u Laos , Commissaria t a u Plan , Octobr e 1959 . Paris , Bureau pou r I e Developemen t d e l a Productio n Agricole .

HALPERN, BARBAR A an d JOE L M . HALPER N

1964 Lao s an d America— a retrospectiv e view . Sout h Atlanti c Quarterly LXIII(2 ) :175-187 . HALPERN, JOE L M .

1960 Lao s an d he r triba l problems . Michiga n Alumnu s Quarterl y Review, 67:59-67 .

[ 25 1 ]

JOE L HALPEHN & PETE R KUNSTADTEB 1961A Populatio n statistic s an d associate d data . Lao s Projec t Pape r No . 3 . Lo s Angeles , Universit y o f California , mimeographed . 1961B Th e rol e o f th e Chines e i n La o society . Journa l o f th e Sia m Societ y 49(1):21-46 . 1964A Government , politics , an d socia l structur e i n Laos : a stud y of traditio n an d innovation . Ne w Haven , Yal e University , Southeas t Asia Studies . Monograp h Serie s 4 . 1964B Econom y an d societ y o f Laos : a brie f survey . Ne w Haven , Yale University , Southeas t Asi a Studies . Monograp h Serie s 5 . (Thes e tw o monograph s contai n muc h basi c data , th e secon d include s a n extensiv e genera l bibliography. ) 1965 Laos , futur e prospect s an d thei r limitations . Asia n Surve y V I ( I ) :59-65 . HiCKEY , G E H A L D C .

1958 Socia l system s o f norther n Vietnam . Chicago , Universit y o f Chicago , Departmen t of Anthropology , Ph.D . dissertation . (Con tain s a descriptio n o f severa l norther n Vietna m ethni c group s an d include s materia l o n th e Blac k Ta i o f Na m Tha , Laos. ) IWATA, K E I J

I

1959 Ethni c group s i n th e valle y o f th e Na m Son g an d Na m Lik : thei r geographi c distributio n an d som e aspect s o f socia l change . Japanes e Journa l o f Ethnology . Als o publishe d i n English , i n mimeographe d for m a s Lao s Projec t Pape r No . 15 , Joe l M . Halpern , ed . Lo s Angeles , Universit y o f California , 1961 . 1960 Kokub u Lao s n o Shos u Minzoku . Shillin , 1 . Als o publishe d i n English , i n mimeographe d for m a s Minorit y group s i n norther n Laos, especiall y th e Yao , Lao s Projec t Pape r No . 16 , Joe l M . ed. Lo s Angeles , Universit y o f California , 1961 . IzrxowiTZ , KAR L GUSTA V

1951 Lamet : hil l peasant s i n Frenc h Indochina . Goteborg , Etno grafiska Museet , Etnologisk a Studie r 17 . (Th e bes t genera l eth nograph y o n a Laotia n triba l group , givin g a n extensiv e ac coun t o f th e relationshi p betwee n th e Lame t hil l peopl e an d th e lowlan d peopl e o f Lao s an d Thailand. ) 1962 Note s abou t th e Tai . Th e Museu m o f Fa r Easter n Antiquitie s [Stockholm] , Bulleti n 34:73-91 . KAUFMAN , HOWAR D K .

1963 Nationalis m an d problem s o f refuge e an d ethni c minorit y reset tlement . In Proceeding s o f th e Nint h Pacifi c Scienc e Congress , 1957, 3:170-174 . K E N E , THA O

1958 Bibliographi

e d u Laos . Vientiane , Editio n d u Comit e Littiraire .

KUNSTADTEH , PETE R ?

1965 Th e L u a (Lawa ) o f Norther n Thailand : aspect s o f socia l structure , agriculture , an d religion . Princeton , N.J. , Princeto n University , Cente r o f Internationa l Studies , Researc h Mono graph 2 1 .

Γ 25 2 1

LAOS : INTHODUCTIO

N

LAFONT, PIERR E BERNAR D

1964 Bibliographi e d u Laos . Publication s d e I'Ecol e Francais e d'Extreme Orient , Vol . 1. Paris , Ecol e Francais e d'Extrem e Orient. (A n extensiv e critica l bibliography , especiall y fo r French sources. ) LEBAR, F . M. , G . C . HICKE Y an d J . K . MUSGRAV E

1964 Ethni c group s o f mainland Southeas t Asia . Ne w Haven , HRA F Press. LEBAR, FRAN K M . an d ADRIENN E SUDDAR D (eds. )

1960 Laos : it s people, it s society, it s culture. Ne w Haven , HRA F Press. A genera l summar y o f socia l scienc e dat a o n Laos . L E KHA M

1961 Fro m th e Plaine de s Jarres t o Ban Ba n [an article appearin g in Va n Hock (Th e Letters), No . 135, Februar y 24 , 1961, pp. 1 , 6 , 7 , 14 , and No. 136, Marc h 3 , 1961 , p p . 14-18] . Translation b y U.S . Join t Publication s Researc h Service , Wash ington, D.C . JPRS : 9307 . MATHIEU, A . R .

1959 Chronologica l tabl e o f th e histor y o f Laos . In Kingdo m o f Laos. France-Asie , Englis h edition , pp . 32-49 . MOERMAN, MICHAE L

1965 Ethni c identificatio n i n a comple x civilization : wh o are th e Lue? America n Anthropologis t 6 7 (5 , i) :1215-1230 . MURPHY, CHARLE S J . V .

1965 Thailand' s fight t o the finish. Fortun e 7 2 (4):122-127 ; 266, 270, 272 , 274 , 276 (October) . PAVIE, AUGUST E

1898- Missio n Pavi e e n Indochine. 1879-1895 , 1 0 vols. Paris, Leroux . 1919 REINACH, LUCIE N D E

1901 L e Laos. Paris , A . Charles, Librairie-Editeur , 2 vols . (Trans lated b y the Human Relation s Are a Files , Indochin a sourc e no. 149 ) ( A basi c sourc e fo r th e colonia l period. ) RUEY Y I H - F U

1960 Th e Magpie Mia o o f souther n Szechuan . In Socia l structur e in Southeas t Asia , G . P . Murdock, ed . Ne w York , Wenner-Gre n Foundation fo r Anthropological Research , Vikin g Fun d Pub lications i n Anthropology, 29:143-155 . 1962 Th e Miao : thei r origi n an d southwar d migration . Taipei , Inter national Associatio n o f Historian s o f Asia . Secon d Biennia l Conference Proceedings , pp . 179-190 . SAVINA, F . M .

1930 Histoir e de s Miao. Hongkong , Imprimeri e d e la Societ e des Missions-etrangeres d e Paris. ScHAAF, C . H A R T an d RUSSEL L H . F I F I E L D

1963 Th e Lower Mekong : challeng e t o cooperatio n i n Southeas t Asia. Princeton, N.J., Van Nostrand .

[ 25 3 ]

JOE L HALPER N & PETE R KUNSTADTER SCHANCHE, DO N A .

1962 A n America n hero : th e exclusiv e stor y o f ho w a n America n farmer ha s devote d hi s lif e t o a on e man crusad e fo r freedo m and democrac y i n war-tom , Communist-infiltrate d Laos . Satur day Evenin g Pos t 235:15-21 ; 91-9 5 (Jun e 2 , Jun e 9) . ( A journalistic accoun t o f th e wor k o f Edga r "Pop " Buel l amon g the Meo. ) SHEEHAN, NEI L

1965 Nort h Vietnames e fea r B-52's , a deserte r report s i n Saigon . New York Times, December 21 , 1965. SMALLEY, WILLIA M A .

1956 Th e Gospe l an d th e culture s o f Laos . Practica l Anthropolog y 3:47-57. Contain s a descriptio n o f th e relationshi p betwee n some tribal groups and the Lao. 1961 Ethnographi c notes o n the Khmu ? o f th e Norther n Laos . Manuscript note s prepare d fo r th e Huma n Relation s Are a Files , December 15 . (Thes e note s ar e incorporate d i n part i n Ethni c Groups o f Mainlan d Southeas t Asia , F . LeBa r et al., eds. , 1964.) 1965 Ciarj : Khmu ? cultur e hero . In Felicitatio n Volume s o f South east-Asian Studies , vol . 1 , pp . 41-54 . Bangkok , Th e Sia m Society. SUTHERLAND, HENR Y

1963 Dr . Dooley' s ex-pilo t see s divisio n o f Laos ; US C graduat e student, back from 10-mont h visit, says nation is lost as neutral. Los Angele s Times , Sunday , Ma y 12 , Sec . B , p . 2 . (Repor t of a n intervie w wit h Te d Werne r wh o give s a n accoun t o f Chinese penetratio n int o norther n Laos. ) U. S . SENATE , COMMITTE E O N TH E JUDICIAR Y

1965 Refuge e problem s in Sout h Vietna m an d Laos , hearings befor e the Subcommitte e t o Investigat e Problem s Connecte d wit h Refugees an d Escapees , o f th e Committe e o n th e Judiciary , United State s Senate , 89t h Congress , Firs t Session . Washing ton, D.C. , U.S . Government Printin g Office . Periodicals NEW YOR K TIMES . Ne w York . VIETNAM COURIER . Hanoi .

[ 25 4 ]

LAOS : INTRODUCTIO

N

TABLE 1 0 POPULATION AN D LINGUISTI C AFFILIATIO N OF ETHNI C GROUP S O F LAOS » Group [Sub-group s (Synonyms i n Parentheses)] Laotian Ta i [(Lao) ] Khmu' [(Kh a Khmu , Khamu, Mou) ] Meo [(Miao) , Stripe d Meo, Whit e Meo ]

Estimated Population in Laos b 1,000,000 100,000 50,000'1-1

Chinese"

45,000

Neua

38,500

Loven [(Boloven) ]

18,000

Lu [(Lu e Thai) ]

16,000

Red Ta i [(Ta i Daeng) ]

15,000

P'u No i

10,000

Brao [(Lave , Love) ]

9,000

Souei

8,600

Black Ta i [(Ta i Dam , Tai Noir) ] T?in [(Kh a Phai , Kh a T?in, "Lawa") ]

8,500+

Lamet

5,800

Yao [(calle d Ma n i n Laos, I u Mien) ]

5,000

6,000

Location (i n Order o f Population Size ) Laos, Thailan d

Language Tai: Southwester n

Mon-Khmer: 0 Laos, Thailan d Kweichow, Miao-Yao: Mia o Hunan, Sze chwan, Kwangs ii. Yunnan, Nort h Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, South Vietna m China, Southeas t Chinese Asia Laos, North Viet - Tai: Southwester n nam Mon-Khmer: CenLaosf tral Uplan d Yunnan, Burma , Tai: Southwester n Thailand, Laos, North Vietna m Tai: Southwester n North Vietnam , Laos Mon-Khmer? Laos TibetoBurman? Mon-Khmer: Laos, Thailand , Central Uplan d Cambodia Laos Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d Tai: Southwester n North Vietnam , Laos Mon-Khmer: Thailand, Lao s Northern Upland Laos Mon-Khmer: Palaung-Wa Kwangsi, Kwang - Miao-Yao: Ya o tung, Hainan , North Vietnam , Laos, Thailand , South Vietna m {continued)

[ 25 5 ]

JOE L HALPEHN & PETE R KUNSTADTER

TABLE 1 0 (continued) Group [Sub-group s (Synonyms i n Parentheses)]

Estimated Population in Laos b

Yuan [(Kho n Myang , Northern Thai) ] Oy [(Oi) ]

5,000 4,500

Akha [(Ikaw) , Hani , Woni]

4,500

Kasseng

4,000

Nha Heu n [(Hoen , Ni a 3,00 0 Hoen)] 2,000 Lahu [(Mussuh) ] Alak

1,750

The

1,500

Ngeh [(Nghe) , Kieng ]

1,000 +

Halang Doa n [(Duan) ]8 1,00 Sou [(Souk) ]

0 1,000

Sapuan

900

Sork

600

Ataouat [(Attaouat , Katu)] Cao

[not available ]

Cheng

[not available ]

Halang

[not available ]

Haw [(Ho , Yunnan ese)]

[not available ]

Katang

[not available ]

[not available ]

Location (i n Order o f Population Size )

Language

Thailand, Lao s Laos

Tai: Southwester n Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d Yunnan, Burma , Tibeto-Burman: Thailand, Lao s Burmese-Lolo, LoIo grou p Laos Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d Laos Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d Yunnan, Burma , Tibeto-Burman: Thailand, Lao s Burmese-Lolo, LoIo grou p Mon-Khmer: Laos Central Uplan d Mon-Khmer: Laos Central Uplan d Laos' Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d (Bahnaric ?) Laos, Sout h Viet - Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d nam Mon-Khmer: Laos Central Uplan d Mon-Khmer: Laos Central Uplan d Laos Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d Mon-Khmer: Laos Katuic Laos' Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d Laos Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d Mon-Khmer: South Vietnam , Laos Bahnaric Yunnan, Thai Chinese: Yunnan ese land, Burma , Laos Mon-Khmer: Laos Central Uplan d (continued)

[ 25 6 ]

LAOS: INTBODUCTIO N

Group [Sub-group s (Synonyms i n Parentheses)] Langya [( a sub-grou p of Jeh , se e unde r South Vietnam ] Monom [(Bonom , Menam)] Noar

Estimated Population in Laos b

[not available ]

Mon-Khmer: Bahnaric Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d Mon-Khmer: Laos Central Uplan d Mon-Khmer: South Vietnam , Katuic Laos Tai: Southwester n Laos Laos, North Viet - Tai: Southwester n nam, Thailan d Mon-Khmer: Laos' Central Uplan d Tai: Northern 11 Laos, Thailan d Mon-Khmer: Laos, Thailan d Central Uplan d South Vietnam , Mon-Khmer: Laos Katuic

South Vietnam , Laos [not available ] Laos'

Pacoh [(B o Rive r Van Kieu) ] Phuan Phuthai

[not available ] [not available ] [not available ]

Sayan

[not available ]

Saek [(Sek) ] So

[not available ] [not available ]

Ta-oih [(Kantua , Tau-Oi, T a Hoi) ] Thailand Tha i [(Sia mese)] Thap

[not available ]

Laos tota l (196 2 estimate) 1

Mon-Khmer: Bahnaric

South Vietnam , Laos

[not available ]

Ven [(Veh) ]

Language

[not available ]

Ngung B o

Vietnamese

Location (i n Order o f Population Size )

[not available ] Thailand [not available ] Laos

Tai: Southwester n Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d [not available ] South Vietnam , Viet-Muong: North Vietna m Vietnamese [not available ] Laos Mon-Khmer: Central Uplan d 1,882,000 (continued)

"· See notes accompanyin g th e Burm a populatio n figures i n thi s volum e fo r a discussio n o f th e problem s o f linguisti c classification . Th e primar y sourc e used fo r locatio n an d populatio n figures i n Lao s i s LeBar et al. (1964) , excep t as noted. W e have use d mor e recent source s where they contradic t LeBar et al. The following figure s ar e listed b y Halpern (1964 , Table 9 ) for Laos in 1955: Ethnic Compositio n o f th e Populatio n o f Laos, 195 5 Lao an d Ta i Kha Meo-Yao Vietnamese Chinese European Indian an d Pakistan i Total

856,000-865,000 210,000-258,000 52,300- 52,90 0 8,000 32,350 8,000 500 1,167,150-1,223,850

[ 25 7 ]

JOE L HALPER N & PETE R KUNSTADTER TABLE 1 0 (continued) Halpern base s hi s figures o n official Lao s sources . H e notes tha t thes e figures do no t include Phon g SaI y an d Sa m Neua provinces , tha t the y ar e based o n projections o f availabl e figures, an d that th e figure fo r th e Kha (La o Theng ) group appears to be seriously underestimated. O n the basis of comparison wit h earlier figures, th e Lao and Tai figure appear s t o be an overestimate . b Group s ar e liste d i n orde r o f siz e o f population . Wher e populatio n o f groups i s unknown, th e groups ar e listed alphabetically . 0 The Khmu? have usually bee n classified a s one of the Wa-Palaung branc h of Mon-Khmer, bu t Smalley (i n LeBar et al. 1964:113), who has done the most extensive wor k wit h th e Khmu?, consider s tha t thei r languag e i s closer t o the Mon-Khmer language s o f Sout h Vietnam . d Estimat e o f Me o populatio n fro m Barney , persona l communication , figure fo r earl y 1950's . This figur e i s roughly equivalen t t o combined figure o f 52,300-52,900 fo r Me o and Yao, given b y Halper n (1964:Tabl e 9) . • Figures fo r Chines e i n Laos ar e from Skinne r (1965) . ' Thes e group s ar e reporte d b y LeBa r et al. als o t o b e foun d i n Sout h Vietnam, bu t are not included i n Thomas ' lis t (1965) . « From th e point o f view of language, Thomas (1965B ) suggest s combinin g Halang an d Halang Doan . h Linguistic classificatio n o f the Sae k (Sek ) is from Gedne y (1965) , whos e recent wor k indicate s tha t i t i s definitely no t a Mon-Khme r language . •Personal communicatio n fro m U . S. Agency fo r Internationa l Develop ment indicate s tha t i n 196 6 they us e muc h highe r figures fo r Me o in Lao s (88,000), an d for tota l Lao s populatio n (2,600,000) . REFERENCE S CITE

D

BARNEY, G . L .

1965 Persona l communication . GEDNEY, W I L L I A M J .

1965 Persona l communication , Septembe r 2 1 , 1965 . HALPERN, J . M .

1964 Econom y an d societ y o f Laos : a brie f survey . Ne w Haven , Yale University , Southeas t Asi a Studies . Monograp h Serie s 5 . LEBAR, FRAN K M. , GERAL D C . HICKEY , an d JOH N K . MUSGRAV E

1964 Ethni c group s o f mainlan d Southeas t Asia . Ne w Haven , Human Relation s Are a File s Press . SKINNER, G . W I L L I A

M

1965 Persona l communication . THOMAS, DAVI D

1965 Vietna m minorit y languages—(Jul y 196 5 revision) . Saigon , Summer Institut e o f Linguistics . 1965B Persona l communications , Jul y 2 1 an d Septembe r 22 , 1965 .

[ 25 8 ]

CHAPTE R 6

Government and the Hill Tribes of Laos G. M . T . OSBOR N

INTRODUCTION

The intentio n o f thi s pape r i s t o provid e a condense d pictur e of th e triba l people s o f Laos—o f th e condition s the y live in toda y and wha t i s bein g don e t o alleviat e thei r hardship s resultin g from isolation , war , an d a traditiona l lac k o f interes t i n thei r welfare an d development . T o giv e th e pictur e it s proper perspec tive, i t shoul d b e mentione d tha t th e write r has , t o date , serve d twenty month s i n Lao s a s a n advise r t o th e Roya l Governmen t on th e administratio n o f hil l tribes . H e has , therefore , no t bee n specifically concerne d wit h researc h an d stud y o f triba l groups , but mor e wit h thei r genera l administratio n an d wit h bringin g them practica l help . I t shoul d no t b e inferre d fro m thi s tha t the importanc e o f researc h ha s bee n overlooked ; o n th e contrary , the write r i s fully awar e tha t ideall y an d give n normal conditions , research an d stud y ar e necessar y precursor s t o formulatin g ad ministrative polic y fo r triba l people s an d that , followin g this , research shoul d continu e t o ru n parallel t o developmen t plannin g and it s implementation . Regrettably , th e situatio n i n Lao s ha s for man y year s preclude d th e launchin g o f a balance d researc h program, an d henc e th e informatio n tha t i s availabl e fro m pas t anthropological an d socia l studie s devote d specificall y t o thes e problems i s scarce . For th e purpose s of thi s paper th e writer has made th e assump tion tha t th e reader s hav e a fai r understandin g o f th e politica l vicissitudes o f Lao s ove r th e pas t twent y year s an d hav e som e knowledge o f th e curren t situation , whic h ha s inevitabl y affecte d the triba l peoples . Although th e content s o f thi s pape r ar e largel y base d o n th e writer's persona l experienc e an d observations , informatio n fro m other source s ha s bee n include d (e.g . statistical) . I n suc h case s [ 25 9 ]

LAOS: G . MYLE S T . OSBOB N

checks fo r accurac y hav e bee n mad e whereve r possible . Th e opinions expressed , excep t wher e otherwis e indicated , ar e per sonal t o th e writer . I n th e tex t th e ter m "tribal " refer s t o hil l tribes a s distinct from th e Lao . POPULATION, ETHNI C DISTRIBUTION , AN D LANGUAGE S

The populatio n o f Lao s (al l races ) i s variousl y estimate d i n the absenc e o f an y formal censu s a t between 1.7 5 an d 2. 3 million, of whic h approximatel y hal f ar e triba l peoples . Th e latte r liv e at altitude s frequentl y i n exces s o f 3,00 0 feet , i n contras t t o th e Lao, wh o ar e lowlanders ; hence, throughou t th e regio n th e settlements o f hil l tribe s an d th e La o ar e i n general clearl y separated , with th e La o inhabitin g th e flat alluvia l lan d adjacen t t o th e Mekong an d it s tributarie s an d th e triba l people s livin g i n o r above th e high valleys an d on the high plateau . The ethni c distributio n o f th e hil l tribe s doe s no t brea k dow n conveniently int o regions, a s many o f the m ar e scattere d through out th e country . A n exampl e i s th e "Kha " (Laotia n wor d fo r "slave") grou p o f tribe s (som e fifty differen t triba l peoples) . They for m abou t 2 5 percent o f th e tota l population , an d althoug h the larges t concentration s ar e i n th e northwes t an d south , smal l pockets ar e als o foun d i n centra l Laos . Th e Me o (Miao ) an d Yao (Man ) tribes , o n th e othe r hand , whic h ma y tota l a s muc h as 100,00 0 o r 5 percen t o f th e population , hav e t o dat e confine d themselves exclusivel y t o th e portio n o f Lao s nort h o f Vientiane . The so-calle d Ta i tribe s compris e abou t 1 6 percent , o r 320,00 0 people, an d liv e i n widel y scattere d settlement s chiefl y i n th e mountain valley s o f norther n Laos . Th e thre e mai n tribe s ar e Tai Da m (Blac k Tai) , Ta i Daen g (Re d Tai) , an d Ta i Kha o (White Tai) , bu t ther e ar e als o Ta i Phuan , Ta i Neua , an d Pho u Tai (Phuthai) . (Thes e designation s ar e made b y th e La o accord ing t o th e colo r o f traditiona l costumes , location , o r som e othe r characteristics, rea l or imagined. ) The numbe r o f distinc t language s an d dialect s spoke n i n Lao s would b e difficul t t o estimate , bu t th e majo r divisio n i s betwee n those wh o spea k Ta i language s an d thos e wh o spea k th e Mon Khmer languages . I n th e forme r grou p ar e include d th e La o and th e Ta i tribes , an d i n th e latte r ar e th e so-calle d Kh a tribe s or La o Theung . Th e Me o an d Ya o spea k language s o f anothe r [ 26 0 I

GOVEHNMEN T & HIL L TRIBE S

unrelated family . Ther e i s n o lingu a franc a fo r al l thes e group s other tha n Lao , whic h i s know n onl y t o a relativel y smal l per centage o f th e "Kha, " Meo , an d Ya o triba l peoples . Th e Ta i tribes, whos e dialect s ma y b e aki n t o Lao , ma y find i t easie r to understan d spoke n Lao . HISTORICAL AN D CULTURA L BACKGROUN D

The oldes t group s i n the area , the so-calle d Kha, are considere d by th e La o t o b e th e origina l inhabitant s an d owner s o f th e land. Thei r primar y clai m t o th e lan d i s symbolicall y recognize d in ceremonies , lik e thos e hel d a t Luan g Prabang , i n whic h th e Kha ar e defeate d i n a gam e whic h represent s th e ancien t contes t between thei r ancestor s an d th e Tai-speakin g invaders . Othe r tribal groups , suc h a s the Me o an d Ya o (o r Man) , are compara tive newcomer s t o Laos , havin g arrive d fro m th e north , wher e the bul k o f thei r populatio n stil l remains, starting i n about 1850 . Relationships between the Tribes and with the Government. The considerabl e difference s i n backgroun d o f th e multi-ethni c population o f Laos , lac k o f a commo n cultur e and language , an d economic inequalitie s inheren t i n th e difference s i n habitat s ar e not conduciv e t o eas y assimilation . Fo r centurie s th e La o hav e provided th e governin g class ; and, althoug h the y hav e develope d a degre e o f cultural , economic , an d politica l unit y amon g them selves (disregardin g dynasti c rivalries ) the y hav e ha d littl e inter est i n assimilatin g th e non-La o groups . Still , th e tribe s an d mi norities hav e no t bee n isolated . Administrativ e relation s wit h non-Lao peopl e hav e bee n create d throug h officia l recognitio n of loca l villag e headme n (nai ban) an d distric t chief s (tasseng) (see Barney' s pape r o n politica l connection s betwee n Me o an d Lao an d Kandre' s pape r o n connection s betwee n Ya o and Lao) . There hav e als o bee n extensiv e economi c relationship s between tribesme n an d lowlanders . Th e rol e o f th e lam (wh o is a n ethni c La o middleman ) develope d t o regulat e trad e be tween Khmu ? an d lowlan d La o market s (Halper n 1964:9 4 ff.) . The Me o engage d directl y i n th e opiu m trad e wit h Chines e traders an d apparentl y als o wit h th e La o (se e Barney' s paper) . For year s Khmu ? an d Lame t hav e worke d i n th e Laotia n low lands an d eve n i n Thailand t o ear n mone y t o buy prestig e good s (drums an d buffaloes ) an d othe r necessitie s (iro n tools ) (se e [ 26 1 ]

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Izikowitz 1951) . Ther e ar e als o ritua l an d symboli c interdepen dencies betweee n hil l peopl e an d lowlander s (Archaimbaul t 1964). Bu t despit e thes e man y interconnections , th e ethni c groups have tende d to remain distinct . Paradoxically, ther e i s on e facto r arisin g fro m th e civi l wa r which ma y i n tim e lea d t o a gradua l breakin g dow n o f thes e inter-group barriers—th e refuge e proble m an d it s solution . Fo r the pas t twent y year s o r mor e Lao s ha s bee n face d wit h th e recurring influ x o f refugee s fro m withi n it s ow n borders . Mor e recently thi s ha s becom e seasonal , fo r i t result s fro m Pathe t Lao encroachment s durin g th e dr y seaso n (Januar y t o May) . Thus i n th e majorit y o f case s th e refugee s ar e triba l peopl e wh o are ill-equipped t o cope with th e calamit y o f loss of home, possessions, an d mean s o f livelihood . Th e hil l people , o f course , ar e primarily shiftin g cultivators , bu t i n th e pas t thei r move s hav e been planne d an d orderly . Th e dr y seaso n i s th e tim e whe n the y prepare thei r fields fo r plantin g afte r th e harvest. I f the y canno t prepare thei r fields, the y canno t plan t a cro p fo r th e followin g year. Th e triba l peopl e no w fin d the y have nowhere i n the jungl e to which the y can retreat . Thei r fields an d their homes ar e alway s subject t o destruction . In th e pas t th e degre e o f hel p the y coul d expec t depende d largely o n th e regio n the y happene d t o b e in ; i f i t wa s a n are a where a foreign agenc y o r mission o r it s equivalent wa s operatin g in conjunctio n wit h La o authorities , the y woul d receiv e al l th e assistance availabl e fo r immediat e relie f an d long-ter m resettle ment. I n genera l thi s stil l applies. The U.S . AID refuge e program , without whic h th e situatio n woul d b e disastrous , no w support s some 150,00 0 refugee s throughou t th e country . Thes e ar e peopl e who woul d b e unabl e t o subsis t withou t periodi c supplie s o f rice, clothing , medica l supplies , etc . The majorit y o f th e refugee s live i n isolate d area s tha t ca n b e supplie d onl y b y air . U.S . AI D and th e Roya l La o Governmen t activitie s ar e coordinate d b y the Socia l Welfar e Adviser , U.S . AID , an d th e Directo r o f th e Social Welfar e Department , Ministr y o f Socia l Welfare . Outside thes e area s th e circumstance s were , an d stil l ar e t o some extent , different . Fo r example , where tribal refugees happe n to com e t o th e attentio n o f th e loca l authorite s (throug h fear , [ 26 2 ]

GOVERNMEN T & HIL L TRIBE S

ignorance, o r pride, many triba l headmen d o not tak e the initiative i n reportin g thei r predicament) , the y receiv e i n theor y a n initial issu e o f foo d an d welfar e commoditie s suc h a s rice, blankets, etc. ; bu t afte r thi s the y ar e lef t t o fen d fo r themselves . Small wonder the n tha t on e finds scattered throughou t th e country group s o f triba l refugee s wh o throug h Pathe t La o pressur e have a t som e stag e bee n force d t o leav e thei r norma l habita t and seek refug e i n o r nea r th e mai n center s o f population . Th e more develope d an d industriou s tribe s endeavo r t o adap t them selves t o thei r ne w environment . A few succeed, wherea s other s who lac k stron g leadershi p an d assistanc e ar e unabl e t o over come their bewildermen t an d ek e out a miserable existence . In summary , until quit e recentl y th e Laotia n governmen t ha s largely ignore d th e problem s o f refugee relief , particularly thos e involving resettlement an d rehabilitation. When it has dealt with them, it has don e so on a purely ad hoc and regional basis without attemptin g t o coordinat e resource s o r formulat e a n overal l policy. O f cours e i t coul d b e argued , an d n o doub t ha s been , that wit h a n acut e shortag e o f funds , ba d communications , an d many othe r fundamenta l deficiencies , refuge e relie f coul d not be accorde d an y priority. Besides, it clearly suited som e political factions t o discourag e th e introductio n o f a prope r relie f an d resettlement program—starvin g refugee s mak e a goo d talkin g point and a soft target for subversion. However, lat e i n 196 2 th e Roya l La o Governmen t requeste d the United Nations to arrange for a survey to be made of refugee s and demobilize d soldiers ; th e latte r wer e include d becaus e a t that tim e i t wa s hope d t o reduc e graduall y th e strengt h o f th e armed force s o f th e countr y a s unification progresse d unde r th e Government o f Nationa l Union . Th e surve y wa s conducte d i n early 1963 , and som e of th e recommendation s i n th e subsequen t report for m th e basis of a new national program for resettlemen t of refugee s no w bein g develope d by th e Ministr y o f Socia l Welfare unde r th e guidanc e o f a Unite d Nation s Resettlemen t Adviser. A modest star t ha s no w been mad e withi n th e limitations im posed by financial support for the program and trained personnel; but mor e significan t i s th e fac t tha t th e importanc e o f resettle [ 26 3 ]

LAOS: G . MYLE S T . OSBOR N

ment properl y planne d an d executed , an d irrespectiv e o f th e ethnic group s concerned , ha s a t las t bee n recognize d b y man y in authorit y whe n hithert o i t wa s understoo d onl y b y a few . Generally speaking , th e resettlemen t an d agricultura l develop ment program s i n Lao s ar e primaril y fo r subsistenc e agriculture , owing t o th e poo r communicatio n system . Ther e are , however , instances wher e a resettlemen t i s locate d clos e enoug h t o a tow n to mak e transportatio n economicall y feasible . I n suc h case s th e goal o f agricultura l developmen t i s a combinatio n o f productio n for bot h subsistenc e an d fo r th e loca l market . Virtuall y nothin g has bee n don e t o develo p market s eithe r fo r th e hil l tribesme n or fo r th e Lao , no r ha s ther e bee n an y developmen t o f agricul tural credit . This particular face t o f triba l administration , which i s commo n to al l countrie s o f Southeas t Asi a t o a greate r o r lesse r degree , is bein g dwel t o n a t som e length , sinc e it s satisfactor y solution , in additio n t o improvin g th e economy , health , an d welfar e o f the triba l communit y concerned , ca n als o g o som e wa y towar d providing th e answe r t o th e mai n proble m o f bridgin g th e ga p between centra l government s an d thei r triba l peoples . I n othe r words, throug h th e mediu m o f resettlemen t an d it s accompany ing benefits , th e administrativ e machin e become s directl y involved o n a persona l leve l wit h triba l people , possibl y fo r th e first time ; an d i f this contac t i s made an d develope d wit h under standing an d respec t fo r triba l custom , beliefs , an d tradition , it can hardly fail t o improve relations. At thi s poin t i t seem s appropriat e t o conside r briefl y wha t resettlement reall y means , a s it s connotatio n i s evidentl y no t al ways clearl y understood . Resettlemen t i s th e planne d proces s of bringin g th e huma n an d lan d resource s o f a country togethe r for socia l economi c ends . Th e socia l objectiv e i s primaril y th e development o f viabl e communities , an d th e economi c objectiv e is normall y agricultura l production . Ther e ar e othe r temporar y objectives i n certai n circumstances , suc h a s providin g securit y and insulatio n agains t militan t Communis m an d subversion . Per haps th e bes t exampl e o f thi s wa s th e vast resettlemen t progra m launched b y th e Malaya n governmen t durin g th e Emergenc y in 1952 : ove r a perio d o f a fe w year s on e millio n o f th e rura l population (mostl y Chines e farmers ) wer e move d fro m th e jun [ 26 4 ]

GOVERNMEN T & HIL L TBIBE S

gle fringes , wher e the y wer e sof t target s fo r Communis t terroris t subversion, t o properl y planne d Ne w Villages . Thi s no t onl y afforded a reasonable degree o f protection (Police , Home Guards , illuminated perimeters , etc.) , but , mor e important , i t enable d the civi l authoritie s t o introduc e t o thes e illiterat e peopl e a ne w way o f lif e i n th e for m o f education , medical , an d healt h service s and improve d agricultura l methods . Th e peopl e hav e ofte n proved eage r t o learn . Ther e wer e difficulties , o f course , durin g the transitiona l period ; bu t th e viabilit y o f th e concep t ha s bee n proved an d thi s progra m wa s th e greates t singl e facto r i n th e defeat, whic h too k twelve years t o accomplish, of th e Communist inspired insurrection . Included i n this mas s resettlemen t wer e triba l group s (aborigi nes) livin g i n dee p jungle , who m th e Communis t terrorist s wer e using a s screens, source s o f intelligence , an d foo d suppliers . Thei r resettlement pose d additiona l problems , an d experienc e showe d that i f i t wa s t o b e a success , ver y specia l car e an d unlimite d patience wer e required . Initially , som e smal l group s wer e air lifted ou t of dee p jungle ; bu t n o on e ha d give n sufficien t though t to th e group' s wishes , sinc e th e militar y requiremen t wa s con sidered t o b e paramount . I n som e case s thi s actio n prove d t o be a fata l mistake , an d th e group s wer e take n back . Th e lesso n was learned , an d from the n o n a techniqu e was evolve d whereb y small militar y unit s wit h a n interprete r wer e deploye d i n dee p jungle fo r lon g period s wit h th e sol e tas k o f winnin g ove r th e aborigines t o th e poin t wher e the y woul d com e ou t voluntarily . The tim e involve d varie d fro m a fe w week s t o man y months , depending o n th e degre e o f contac t th e grou p ha d previousl y had with th e Communis t terrorists . It i s relevan t her e t o quot e th e view s o f th e the n Advise r to th e Departmen t o f Aborigine s o n wha t h e considere d afte r long experienc e t o b e fundamenta l t o th e succes s o f resettlin g tribal peoples : (a) Prope r planning . Co-operatio n o f th e grou p concerne d an d thei r voluntary (no t forced) agreemen t t o the scheme. (b) Availabilit y o f suitabl e lan d voluntaril y acceptabl e t o th e group ; and assurance of Governmen t approva l to occupy the land. (c) Governmen t assistanc e in the form of : (i) Rationin g until new cultivations are productive;

[ 26 5 ]

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(ii) Welfar e good s (clothing , tobacc o etc.) ; (iii) Too k an d implements necessar y fo r hous e buildin g an d agriculture; (iv) Medica l attention ; (v) Prope r administratio n an d protection onc e they have moved; (vi) Assistanc e to obtain employmen t i f necessary ; (vii) Educatio n fo r th e children , (d) Unlimite d patience ; tim e fo r th e communit y t o adjus t itsel f t o its ne w circumstance s an d mod e o f life . Bes t achieve d b y arrang ing for a n advanc e party fro m th e grou p t o move to the new are a and prepar e th e wa y fo r th e remainder . Ma y tak e betwee n si x and twelv e month s t o complet e a move . I f a chang e i n agricul tural methods is involved, it will take longer.

In concludin g thi s section , i t ca n b e sai d categoricall y tha t a goo d rapport betwee n governmen t an d triba l people s ca n onl y be achieve d throug h genuin e mutua l confidence , whic h ma y tak e many months , i f no t years , o f patien t effor t t o establish . Deep seated prejudice s mus t b e overcome . The n an d the n onl y ca n a sens e o f belongin g star t t o tak e root . I f thi s sens e i s carefull y fostered b y al l mean s available , i t shoul d lea d ultimatel y t o a closer identificatio n with , an d participatio n in , th e lif e an d econ omy of th e nation . GENERAL PLA N O F TH E ACTIO N PROGBAM

Unlike othe r countrie s i n Southeas t Asi a wit h simila r triba l problems, ther e i s n o ministry , department , o r divisio n o f th e Laotian governmen t specificall y responsibl e fo r th e administra tion o f th e hil l tribes . Thi s probabl y arise s fro m th e fac t tha t the constitutio n accord s Laotia n citizenshi p t o al l permanent resi dents o f Laos , regardles s o f race , wh o ar e no t alread y citizen s of anothe r country ; i t als o guarantee s al l citizen s th e sam e right s and privilege s unde r th e law , a s wel l a s th e sam e typ e o f ad ministration. I n practice , thes e constitutiona l provision s d o no t generally appl y t o th e triba l peoples , wh o i n man y case s stil l retain thei r autonomy . On e exampl e o f th e wa y th e syste m ma y operate shoul d b e illustrative . The officia l language s o f th e court s are La o and French . Triba l languages ar e barre d fro m th e courts , although triba l interpreter s ar e suppose d t o b e admitted . Th e point a t questio n her e i s somewha t irrelevant , sinc e unde r th e [ 26 6 ]

GOVERNMEN T & HIL L TRIBE S

military condition s whic h have prevailed i n Laos for man y years, the norma l cour t procedure s hav e ofte n bee n suspended . The mai n goa l o f th e actio n progra m wa s t o forg e ne w an d effective administrativ e link s betwee n governmen t an d th e hil l peoples bot h a t centra l an d provincial levels. At the centra l level it would be done by establishing, initially, the nucleus of a special department fo r th e administratio n o f th e hil l people; an d a t th e provincial an d distric t level s by closely involvin g th e administrations i n specifi c capita l ai d an d welfar e project s fo r th e benefi t and development of the tribes. In additio n t o thes e relie f an d developmen t program s fo r bringing governmen t t o th e tribes , th e intentio n i s to introduc e a radio program devise d specificall y fo r th e tribal people of Laos and t o broadcas t i n selecte d triba l languages . Th e precep t her e is tha t t o achiev e th e ultimat e goa l o f gradua l assimilatio n o f the triba l people s int o th e nationa l lif e an d economy , th e first and foremos t essentia l i s t o b e abl e t o communicat e wit h them . If thi s canno t b e don e initiall y throug h th e medium o f th e na tional languag e (Lao ) alone , the n triba l language s mus t b e utilized in addition . PROGRESS OF TH E ACTIO N PROGRAM

The concep t o f a specia l departmen t fo r th e administratio n of th e tribal peoples i n Laos has been generall y accepted in principle, togethe r wit h th e polic y ai m tha t triba l peopl e shoul d b e recruited to posts in the department when this step is found practical. A t th e presen t time , th e staffin g o f suc h a departmen t presents certai n fundamenta l difficulties , th e majo r one s bein g those o f finance an d personnel . Without th e former , i t i s obvi ously no t possibl e eve n t o contemplat e recruitin g th e latter . I t would not answe r th e problem t o secon d o r borro w staf f fro m other governmen t department s o n eithe r a long-ter m o r tempo rary basis. The secondment of staff wa s tried and proved a failure in th e Tha i government' s Hil l Trib e Developmen t an d Welfar e Program, whic h inter alia calls fo r mobil e extensio n teams . Secondment t o th e team s was unsatisfactory, an d direc t recruitmen t and trainin g ha d t o b e use d b y th e Hil l Tribe s Divisio n of th e Department o f Publi c Welfare. Personne l seconded from on e de[ 26 7 ]

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partment t o anothe r feel , with goo d reason , tha t thei r promotio n prospects withi n thei r hom e departmen t suffe r (ou t o f sight, ou t of mind) . I n addition , ther e ar e th e usua l problem s o f workin g in th e field i n area s wher e communication s ar e poor , suc h a s long delays in the payment o f already low salaries. Ideally, a departmen t administerin g hil l tribe s shoul d b e largely self-contained , certainl y wit h respec t to th e everyda y needs o f th e tribe s i n th e field s o f agriculture , medicin e an d health, basi c education , welfare , etc . Th e departmen t shoul d b e able t o develo p an d implemen t it s project s independentl y wit h the assistanc e an d advic e provide d b y triba l research . Ther e ar e many reason s fo r this—th e fundamenta l on e i s th e absolut e necessity fo r th e righ t approach . Th e wron g on e ca n d o irrepara ble damage . Th e ke y executiv e staf f o f th e departmen t shoul d not onl y be qualifie d i n their respective fields, but , equall y impor tant, shoul d hav e experienc e wit h hil l people ; an d th e extensio n workers who , afte r training , wil l ofte n b e operatin g withou t supervision i n remot e triba l areas , shoul d b e ver y carefull y se lected. A sens e o f dedication , understanding , an d har d wor k i s essential fo r th e effectiv e functionin g o f a departmen t adminis tering tribal peoples. Within th e limitation s impose d b y finance, th e intentio n woul d be t o establis h th e nucleu s o f thi s departmen t i n Lao s wit h a balanced field tea m o f specialist s i n agricultur e (includin g live stock), medicin e an d health , communit y development , an d wel fare. Sinc e suc h specialist s ar e no t presentl y availabl e i n th e country, the y woul d hav e t o b e recruite d fo r a limite d perio d from outside ; the n Laotia n counterpart s woul d understud y the m in thei r fiel d work . Afte r acquirin g fiel d experience , th e Laotian s would nee d furthe r trainin g t o fit the m fo r administrativ e o r semi-technical post s i n th e department . Onc e th e proces s o f es tablishing th e nucleu s wa s wel l unde r way , th e creatio n o f a cadre o f extensio n worker s an d researc h facilitie s coul d b e con sidered. Regardin g th e latter , th e Laotia n governmen t migh t well profit fro m th e Tha i government' s Triba l Researc h Centr e i n Chiengmai, wher e researc h an d studie s wil l cove r a t leas t som e of th e triba l groups commo n t o both territories . Specifi c problem s in whic h experience migh t b e share d coul d includ e method s use d to solv e suc h problem s a s providin g alternativ e cas h crop s t o [ 26 8 ]

GOVERNMENT &

H I L L TRIBE S

replace opium , an d th e developmen t o f method s fo r trainin g field staff. Th e Meo , Yao , Mussu h (Lahu) , an d Khmu ? ar e th e chie f opium cultivator s i n Laos—al l bu t th e latte r ar e large-scal e opium producer s i n Thailan d a s well . Opiu m i s th e mainsta y of thei r economy . A s in Thailand, thi s is very muc h o f a potentia l problem in Laos , an d on e o f grea t complexity. O f the man y triba l revolts agains t th e Frenc h regim e i n Laos , a t leas t one , tha t o f the Me o i n Sa m Neu a Provinc e i n 1918 , wa s cause d i n par t b y attempts o f th e Frenc h t o collec t a ta x in th e for m o f opium . The difficultie s o f lac k o f finance an d expertis e hav e bee n touched on , bu t i t woul d b e mor e tha n unrealisti c t o overloo k or attemp t t o minimiz e th e curren t problem s arisin g fro m th e confused interna l politica l situatio n i n Laos . Thi s ha s tende d to paralyz e th e administrativ e machin e an d den y t o th e govern ment acces s t o larg e area s populate d b y th e tribes . A furthe r aggravation i s th e woefull y lo w salar y scal e o f governmen t em ployees. Hig h wartim e prices , coupled wit h fixed salaries , mean s that ther e i s littl e inducemen t t o har d wor k an d integrit y o n the par t o f governmen t workers , an d governmen t servic e n o longer attract s th e best candidates . In th e ligh t o f thi s sombe r pictur e on e canno t hel p bu t reflec t on th e advisabilit y o f eve n attemptin g t o creat e thi s ne w depart ment a t th e presen t tim e wit h s o many factor s conspirin g agains t its viability . Thi s i s no t a polic y o f despair ; i t i s a n hones t ap praisal o f th e relevan t facts , an d i t represent s a n equall y genuin e desire t o ensure , a s fa r a s possible , tha t whe n governmen t i s properly introduce d t o th e hil l tribe s i n Laos , i t has , a t least , a reasonable chanc e o f attaining it s aims. In th e meantime , a modes t star t ha s bee n mad e t o generat e government interes t i n triba l matter s a t th e provincia l an d dis trict levels , b y th e launchin g o f project s (schools , welfare , an d wet-rice cultivation ) exclusivel y benefitin g certai n triba l groups . Results s o fa r ar e encouraging . A fe w radi o set s hav e bee n dis tributed t o selecte d triba l village s wher e La o i s understood , an d undoubtedly muc h enjoymen t i s derive d fro m th e programs . There i s a n arm y transmitte r a t Luan g Prabang , no t a par t o f the nationa l network , whic h broadcast s new s i n th e Me o language fo r fifteen minute s ever y weekday , an d Me o musi c fo r thirty minutes o n Sundays . I t i s too earl y t o evaluat e thi s particu [ 26 9 ]

LAOS : G . MYLE S T . OSBOE N

lar medium , pendin g th e introductio n o f a specia l triba l radi o program and a larger distribution of receiving sets. CONCLUSIONS

(a) Ther e ar e no w indication s tha t a s a resul t o f th e eve r present refugee proble m i n Laos (th e majorit y o f refugee s bein g tribal) ther e i s developin g awarenes s i n th e governmen t o f it s responsibilities toward th e hill people. (b) I f thi s consciousness can be translated into impartial assistance i n th e righ t manner , a bi g ste p forwar d wil l hav e bee n taken in the relations between the government and the hill tribes. (c) Wherea s th e importanc e o f establishin g a specia l depart ment fo r administerin g th e hil l people s is recognized , th e con tinuing politica l instabilit y an d interna l strif e togethe r wit h lac k of finance, ar e cogen t reason s agains t creatin g th e departmen t at the present time. The risks of it being stillborn are too great. (d) Plan s for establishin g the department should proceed with the fir m objectiv e o f implementatio n whe n circumstance s ar e more propitious. (e) I n th e meantime , effort s shoul d b e concentrate d o n developing communication s wit h th e hil l peoples . Radi o seem s t o be th e mos t practica l method. O f course , thi s developmen t mus t be carefull y synchronized , wit h increase d programmin g coordi nated wit h th e distributio n o f mor e radi o sets , sinc e a t presen t Radio Peking i s alread y broadcastin g extensivel y i n som e of th e tribal languages . (f) Wher e government service s (e.g . medical, educational and administrative) exis t i n predominantl y triba l areas , muc h mor e could be don e t o promot e a bette r understandin g wit h th e hil l people through the medium of these services. REFERENCES CITE D ARCHAIMBAULT, CHABLE S

1964 Religiou s structure s i n Laos . Journa l o f th e Sia m Societ y 52(1):57-74. HALPEBN, JOE L M .

1964 Econom y an d societ y o f Laos : a brie f survey . Ne w Haven , Yale University , Southeas t Asi a Studies . Monograph Serie s 5. IziKowrrz, KAB L GUSTA V 1951 Lamet : hil l peasant s i n Frenc h Indochina . Goteborg , Etno grafiska Museet , Etnologiska Studie r 17.

[ 27 0 ]

CHAPTE R 7

The Meo of Xieng Khouang Province, Laos G. L I N W O O D BARNEY

1

THE ME O

The Me o and Lao s are representatives o f a large group spread over souther n Chin a an d northeaster n Southeas t Asia. 2 The y number abou t tw o an d a hal f millio n i n China , tw o hundre d and twent y thousan d i n Nort h Vietnam , almos t fifty thousan d in Thailand , an d wer e estimate d a t about fifty thousand i n Lao s over a decad e ago. 3 They hav e graduall y move d southward an d westward out o f Chin a i n th e pas t 15 0 year s an d generall y occupy highland s whe n the y mov e int o Southeas t Asia . XTENG KHOUAN G PROVINCE—ETHNI C DISTRIBUTIO N

Xieng Khouang Province in northern Lao s is largely a plateau, with a broad plain , th e Plain e de s Jarre s (als o know n a s th e Tran Nin h Plateau) , a t a n elevatio n o f abou t 4,00 0 feet , an d surrounding mountain s risin g anothe r 1,00 0 t o 5,00 0 feet . A n estimate, perhaps exaggerated , i n 1959 indicated that ther e wer e forty-five thousan d Me o i n thi s provinc e alone . Villag e elder s state tha t Me o hav e bee n settlin g i n th e provinc e fo r abou t a 1 The field wor k o n whic h mos t o f thi s pape r i s base d wa s don e betwee n 1950 an d 1954 , whe n th e autho r wa s engage d i n linguisti c an d missionar y wor k in Laos . Thi s i s a modificatio n an d expansio n o f a pape r entitle d "Th e Me o of Xien g Khouan g Province, " whic h was Lao s Projec t Pape r 13 , Joe l Halpern , ed., Universit y o f California , Lo s Angeles , mimeographed . Informatio n was sup plemented b y Theodor e Andrianoff , wh o ha s bee n a missionar y i n Lao s sinc e 1948, an d b y conversation s wit h Toub y Lyfong , Me o leader , whe n h e visite d the Unite d State s during th e spring of 1965 . 2 See Bernatzi k (1947) , Graha m (1954) , Morechan d (1955) , Rou x an d Tra n (1954), an d Savin a (1930 ) fo r description s o f Me o elsewher e i n Southeas t Asia . 8 For source s o f populatio n estimate s o f Me o outsid e o f Lao s se e th e table s of populatio n accompanyin g th e othe r part s o f thi s book . N o accurat e coun t of Me o i n Lao s ha s bee n made , bu t th e estimat e o f a t leas t fifty thousan d seems reasonable , give n th e observe d larg e number s o f Me o i n refuge e camp s at th e presen t time .

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Y

hundred year s (Mathieu , 1959:45 , states tha t th e Me o cam e int o Laos i n 1840) . In Xien g Khouang , a s i n muc h o f Southeas t Asia , ther e i s a fairly orderl y topographica l distributio n o f ethni c groups . Th e Lao, wh o ar e Buddhist s an d wet-ric e growers , liv e primaril y i n the rive r valleys . They maintai n onl y a slight margi n o f authorit y in Xien g Khouang , althoug h the y ar e th e dominan t ethni c grou p of Laos . Mino r ethni c groups—Vietnames e artisans , Chines e traders, India n clot h merchants , Wester n missionaries , airlin e personnel, an d Europea n colonists—were , befor e th e Communis t invasion, concentrated i n or near th e town of Xieng Khouang . The Khrnu? , wh o liv e mainl y i n th e foothills , ar e primaril y dry-rice agriculturalists . Politicall y the y ar e submissiv e t o th e Lao; the y giv e littl e indicatio n o f attemptin g o r desirin g t o attai n political autonom y o r recognition . The y hav e lon g bee n i n con tact wit h th e Lao , fro m who m the y hav e learne d man y materia l culture traits , but the y hav e retaine d thei r animisti c religio n (se e Smalley 1956) . The Me o ar e usuall y locate d hig h o n th e flank s o f th e moun tains, wher e the y ar e primaril y slash-and-burn , dry-ric e cultiva tors. The y als o gro w cor n an d vegetables , an d ear n cas h throug h production an d sal e o f opium , livestock , an d surplu s agricultura l goods. Unlik e th e Khmu? , th e Me o hav e maintaine d a hig h de gree o f socia l an d political solidarit y an d hav e retaine d a distinc tive materia l culture , especiall y i n thei r dress . The y self-con sciously perpetuat e thei r cultura l distinctivenes s fro m th e Lao , though the y ar e quic k t o accep t man y item s o f Laotia n culture , including literacy . The Town of Xieng Khouang. Th e tow n o f Xien g Khouan g was a colonia l administrativ e cente r fo r th e Frenc h an d wa s th e seat o f th e Laotia n governo r (Chao Khoueng). Xien g Khouan g has been th e locatio n o f a dail y marke t (whic h attracte d peopl e from a s fa r a s fiv e days ' wal k away ) an d th e sit e o f a larg e festival i n th e twelft h (lunar ) month . Th e tow n (an d th e prov ince) wer e connecte d b y highwa y wit h Vin h o n th e Vietnames e coast t o th e east , Vientian e o n th e Mekon g borde r wit h Thailan d to th e southwest , an d Luan g Prabang , th e roya l Laotia n capita l to th e west . Th e road s hav e bee n close d becaus e o f Communis t activities mos t o f th e tim e sinc e th e earl y 1950's . Th e provinc e has bee n th e scen e o f repeate d bitte r battles , sinc e i t lie s i n [ 27 2 ]

ME O O F XIEN G KHOUAN G PBOVINC

E

th e middl e o f th e invasio n rout e fro m Nort h Vietna m t o th e norther n Lao s lowland s alon g th e Mekong . Thoug h th e hill-base d Me o hav e repeatedl y prevente d th e Communist s fro m securin g thei r hol d o n th e Plain e de s Jarre s (e.g . Warne r 1965:35-36) , most o f th e communicatio n with th e res t o f Lao s i n recen t year s ha s bee n b y air . The Government of Xieng Khouang. Th e Governo r o f Xien g Khouan g wh o i s recognize d b y th e Roya l La o Governmen t fled to Vientian e a t th e tim e o f th e first Communis t invasion . A pro vincial governmen t i n exil e wa s maintaine d i n Vientian e fo r a numbe r o f years , bu t administrativ e office s ar e no w bein g buil t in Sa m Thong , a refuge e cente r wes t o f Xien g Khouan g i n a par t o f th e provinc e controlle d b y th e Roya l La o Governmen t (see Ward' s paper) . Th e Communist s contro l th e tow n o f Xien g Khouan g an d hav e installe d thei r ow n provincia l governmen t forty kilometer s fro m ther e a t Khon g Khai , i n th e cente r o f th e Plain e de s Jarres . Xieng Khouan g wa s on e o f fou r principalitie s which , a t th e tim e th e Frenc h too k control , existe d i n th e are a whic h ha s no w becom e Laos . I t ha d manage d t o maintai n it s independenc e b y payin g tribut e bot h t o th e stronge r Laotia n principalit y an d t o Anna m (Nort h Vietnam) . Unde r th e Frenc h the Luan g Praban g "kingdom " wa s recognize d a s paramount . However , fo r purpose s of convenience , administrativ e affair s wer e se t u p i n Vientiane , an d th e powe r o f th e othe r thre e principalitie s wa s curtailed . But i n Xien g Khouang , unlik e othe r area s o f Laos , th e traditiona l pattern s o f leadershi p wer e no t drasticall y altered : th e presen t governor , Cha o Sa i Kham , i s th e descendan t o f th e ol d Princ e of Xien g Khouang . Eac h provinc e i n Lao s i s normall y divide d int o severa l tnuong (administrativ e territoria l unit s roughl y equivalen t t o a county) , eac h o f whic h ha s a n appointe d chao muong, o r count y officer . Xien g Khouan g i s divide d int o fou r tnuong territories , bu t ther e ar e five chao muong. Fou r ar e Lao , on e fo r eac h territoria l muong. Th e fifth, Toub y Lyfong , i s th e "chief" o f th e Me o populatio n whic h i s scattere d i n th e hill s o f th e entir e provinc e (se e below) . Relations of Meo to Lao. Th e Me o ar e no t a politicall y o r culturall y unifie d group , eve n i n Xien g Khouan g Province . A t least tw o Me o leader s hav e a followin g there: 4 Toub y Lyfon g 4 Genera l Vang Pao , anothe r Xieng Khouan g Meo , is als o becomin g recognize d as a Me o leader becaus e o f hi s successfu l militar y caree r (se e below) .

Γ OT O Λ

LAOS : G . LINWOO D BAKNE Y

(presentl y allie d wit h th e Roya l La o Government ) an d Faydan g (allied wit h th e Pathe t Lao) . Th e alignmen t o f thei r follower s in thei r competitio n fo r leadershi p seem s based o n traditiona l clan alignment s a s well a s o n th e genera l politica l situatio n i n Laos. Bot h of thes e me n belon g t o th e White Me o (o r mon tleu) group. Th e Stripe d Me o (mon len), who ar e muc h les s activ e politically, spea k a differen t dialect . A t leas t on e Stripe d Me o clan claim s relationshi p with th e White Meo , but th e exact natur e of thi s relationshi p i s not know n t o th e author . Th e Stripe d Me o are not favored i n receipt of politica l plums. Although th e detail s o f th e historica l relationship s betwee n the Me o an d th e La o o f Xien g Khouan g ar e no t know n t o thi s author , th e followin g seem s t o b e a reasonabl e reconstruction . An allianc e o r workin g agreemen t seem s t o hav e bee n worke d out betwee n th e leade r o f on e grou p (evidentl y a larg e an d importan t cla n o r grou p o f clans ) o f Whit e Me o an d th e Governo r of Xien g Khouan g (thi s agreemen t ma y hav e bee n worke d out even prio r t o th e Frenc h colonia l period) . Toub y Lyfon g an d Chao Khoueng (Governor ) Sa i Kha m are heir s t o thi s arrange ment . I n additio n t o thi s alliance , th e tw o ar e clos e persona l friends. Touby' s fathe r wa s know n a s th e riches t Me o i n Xien g Khouang . Durin g hi s lifetim e h e hel d a positio n vis-a-vi s th e Lao simila r t o Touby's . H e sen t a t leas t thre e o f hi s son s t o school, an d Toub y wa s a schoolmat e o f Cha o Sa i Kha m whe n the y went t o schoo l in Hanoi. 5 Bot h persona l friendshi p an d historica l allianc e see m importan t i n thei r presen t relationship. 8 5 Toub y i s th e oldes t o f thre e survivin g educate d brothers . Hi s younge r brother , Tougou , i s on e o f th e leadin g lawyer s i n Lao s an d was educate d i n France . Toulya , anothe r brother , onc e serve d a s a deput y fro m Xien g Khouan g Province . Anothe r versio n o f thi s stor y states tha t Touby' s fathe r cam e fro m Chin a as a poo r youn g man , an d wa s take n int o th e househol d o f Faydang' s fathe r as a servant . Unde r Faydang' s father' s tutelage , Touby' s fathe r prospered . Touby' s father' s childre n wen t furthe r i n schoo l tha n di d Faydang' s father' s children . Faydang' s brother , Lofang , wen t t o schoo l i n Xien g Khouang , wher e h e finished elementar y school . H e di d no t g o o n t o hig h schoo l i n Vinh , a s di d Touby , but returne d t o hi s ow n village , Non g Het , wher e h e becam e a schoo l master . Durin g th e Japanes e occupatio n th e Frenc h appointe d Toub y a s a distric t chie f (tasseng). Faydang' s famil y resente d th e prominenc e give n t o thei r forme r ser vant' s son . The y identifie d themselve s wit h th e Communists , an d allie d themselve s temporaril y wit h th e Japanese , agains t th e French . Toub y remaine d loya l t o th e Frenc h durin g th e occupation , an d throughou t th e Indochin a Wa r whic h followed. I n 1956 , whe n election s wer e hel d fo r th e Nationa l Assembly , Toub y ran agains t Lofan g an d defeate d him . Thu s th e spli t betwee n Touby' s an d Faydang' s familie s ha s continued . (Ed. ) • Followin g Kon g Le' s 196 0 coup , an attemp t was mad e t o ensur e th e continue d loyalty o f th e Xien g Khouan g Me o (on e o f th e best-organize d fighting force s

Γ 274 1

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E

Faydang wa s a t on e tim e a Meo chie f (recognize d a s a distric t chief) fro m th e northeaster n par t o f Xien g Khouang . H e i s no w the leadin g Me o membe r o f th e Pathe t Lao . I t i s sai d o f hi s followers tha t "whateve r Touby' s peopl e do , Faydang' s peopl e will d o th e opposite. " Thi s divisio n i s o f lon g standing , thoug h Touby an d Faydan g ar e relate d (Touby' s mothe r i s sai d t o b e Faydang's father' s rea l sister; sh e i s a member o f Faydang' s clan , the L o clan) . Touby' s presen t alignmen t wit h t i e Governo r assures tha t Faydan g wil l b e aligne d with th e opposition , i n thi s case th e Communists . General Van g Pa o worke d hi s wa y u p throug h th e ranks , first under th e French , an d late r unde r th e Laotians . Hi s bas e o f power i s primaril y wit h th e army , thoug h h e enjoy s considerabl e respect amon g th e Me o a s th e firs t o f thei r grou p t o attai n a high commissione d rank . H e ha s considerabl e powe r sinc e h e is militar y commande r i n th e are a wher e man y Me o refuge e camps ar e located . His famil y i s connecte d wit h Touby' s b y kin ship ties, 7 an d th e tw o ar e no t no w i n direc t competitio n fo r leadership of the Meo. MEO SOCIAX , ORGANIZATION—FAMIL Y AN D CLA N

The patrilinea l cla n syste m o f th e Me o dominate s thei r socia l organization, servin g a s a primar y focu s fo r thei r cultur e a s a whole b y tyin g togethe r social , political , economic , an d religiou s aspects o f behavior . Th e basi c uni t o f th e Me o socia l structur e is th e "household " o r patrilinea l extende d family , meanin g no t only thos e wh o liv e unde r on e roof , bu t als o includin g al l thos e under th e authorit y o f on e househol d head . Thu s a singl e house in Laos ) t o th e centra l government . Toub y wa s give n a plac e i n th e cabinet . Shortly afte r h e too k thi s position , h e wen t t o Xien g Khouan g t o visi t hi s family . Upon arrivin g there , he—an d Cha o Sa i Kham—calle d a meetin g o f al l distric t chiefs (tasseng), bot h Me o an d Lao . Th e Governo r declared tha t h e wa s breakin g away fro m th e centra l governmen t an d aske d al l hi s distric t chief s t o joi n wit h him i n resistin g al l enemies . Th e probabl e reaso n fo r thi s was tha t Toub y an d the Governo r feare d a Communis t take-ove r o f th e Laotia n government , an d the Governo r sa w a chanc e t o reasser t a clai m t o Xien g Khouan g autonomy . An allianc e was mad e wit h Princ e Phoum i Nosava n (th e "Rightist") , the n base d in Savannakhet , wh o furnishe d arm s an d materie l t o Cha o Sa i Kha m an d Touby . Xieng Khouan g repledge d it s loyalt y t o Vientian e afte r a chang e i n th e government. * There i s a regula r patter n o f exchang e o f wome n betwee n th e tw o clans . Women o f Van g Pao' s cla n (Vang ) becom e wive s o f me n i n Touby' s cla n (Ly), an d wome n o f Touby' s cla n ca n becom e wive s o f me n fro m Van g Pao' s clan.

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hold coul d includ e a man' s unmarrie d daughters , hi s son s an d their wive s an d children , an d possibl y hi s sons ' sons ' children , and migh t als o include a few othe r feeble o r otherwise dependen t relatives. A U member s o f th e househol d carr y th e cla n nam e of th e househol d hea d i n additio n t o thei r give n name . Th e cla n name refer s t o descen t fro m a mythica l ancestor , an d commo n membership i n a cla n serve s a s a bon d o f kinshi p an d friendshi p between peopl e wh o woul d otherwis e b e strangers . Member s of th e sam e lineage , wh o ca n trac e thei r commo n descen t fro m a know n ancestor , refe r t o thei r lineag e mate s b y a commo n term meanin g "m y older s an d youngers. " Th e lineag e doe s no t seem to be a functional socia l unit. The actua l plac e o f residenc e i s determine d b y th e numbe r of peopl e i n th e household . I f th e househol d get s to o large , i t may split . Th e numbe r livin g i n a singl e hous e range s u p t o thirty-four, bu t frequentl y a married so n will build hi s own hous e near hi s father' s an d wil l remai n unde r hi s father' s authority . Deep respec t fo r elder s i s highl y valued , s o muc h s o tha t cor poral punishmen t o f childre n nee d no t be resorte d to . Even afte r a so n ha s married , h e continue s t o respec t th e authorit y o f hi s father. Wome n hav e authorit y ove r children , bu t i n al l famil y matters th e father' s wor d i s final . A s soo n a s it appear s tha t a n unreconcilable conflic t ma y brea k out , th e househol d wil l split . The resul t i s a tendenc y fo r developmen t o f "ste m families " as residentia l units . Th e oldes t so n usuall y stay s wit h his father , while younge r son s leav e th e househol d i f th e househol d splits . Overt expression s of conflic t withi n th e family ar e very negativel y valued, an d a househol d shoul d spli t i n orde r t o maintai n goo d relations between famil y members . A chil d i s alway s responsibl e t o hi s father . I f th e fathe r i s not th e hea d o f th e household , h e i n tur n i s responsibl e t o th e household head , wh o i s usuall y hi s father , grandfather , o r elde r brother. Althoug h th e househol d hea d ha s final authorit y i n household matters , h e i s no t a dictator—hi s decision s represen t his considered opinio n afte r discussion s wit h th e adul t me n unde r his authority . Th e authorit y o f th e fathe r diminishe s wit h dis tance: a ma n wh o move s ou t t o se t u p a n independen t house hold wil l becom e a househol d hea d i n hi s ow n righ t i f h e move s far enoug h away . [ 27 6 ]

ME O O F XIEN G KHOUAN G PHOVINC E

The averag e Me o villag e contain s abou t eigh t houses , wit h the range betwee n on e and forty. Whe n there is only one household i n th e village , the househol d hea d i s als o th e villag e head ; when ther e ar e severa l household s o f th e sam e clan , th e eldes t household hea d usuall y functions a s village head. The leadership pattern i s mor e comple x wher e mor e tha n on e cla n i s present ; this is discussed below under political organizations. Marriage. Although fo r som e purpose s th e househol d i s a n independent unit , i t als o operate s withi n th e large r contex t o f the patrilineal clan system, as is seen most clearly in the practices of courtshi p an d marriage . Customar y la w forbid s marriag e within th e clan, and thi s is backed by a modified "brother-sister " taboo betwee n peopl e o f th e opposit e se x from th e sam e clan . Acquaintance wit h eligibl e girl s i s mad e a t suc h event s a s the New Yea r festival , whe n whol e village s ar e invite d t o visi t vil lages belongin g t o anothe r clan . Thes e festivitie s ar e a tim e of courtship; friendship s mad e a t thi s tim e ar e followe d u p whe n the bo y visit s th e girl' s village . I f th e gir l respond s favorabl y to the boy, the relationship should end in marriage. Marriage ca n only be realized afte r considerabl e maneuvering. The youn g ma n mus t secur e a "go-between, " usuall y a n elde r brother o r paterna l uncle , t o negotiat e wit h th e girl' s parents . They may insis t tha t the gir l wai t unti l he r elde r siste r marries , or unti l he r younge r sibling s gro w older , o r the y may wan t a high bride-price . I f a settlemen t canno t b e reached , th e youn g couple may elope, leaving the settlements to be made later, often with the aid of a panel of neutral parties. If th e marriag e take s plac e i n th e norma l fashion , th e brid e and groo m exchang e silve r neck-bands , an d the familie s o f th e bride an d groo m exchang e visit s an d feasts . Suc h visit s and th e exchange o f gift s whic h accompan y the m encourag e clos e rela tions between the two households and, to some measure, between their tw o clans. Although th e groo m i s suppose d t o provide th e bride-wealt h necessary fo r th e marriage , hi s household ma y assis t hi m i n ac cumulating th e necessar y amount. Their evaluatio n o f th e bride, and th e pas t contribution s o f th e groo m to th e othe r householders, wil l conditio n thei r decision . I n addition , th e youn g ma n is expecte d t o accumulat e an y wealth h e ca n i n anticipatio n o f [ 27 7 ]

LAOS : G . LINWOO

D BARNE

Y

marriage. Th e househol d hea d wil l sometimes mak e gift s t o him , and h e ma y ear n an d kee p extr a amount s fo r thi s purpose . The weddin g feast s alway s involv e contribution s o f th e house hold a s a whole . Therefore , th e brid e an d groo m incu r economi c obligations t o th e entir e household , whic h serv e t o ti e th e ne w couple mor e firmly t o thei r househol d an d t o reinforc e th e mar riage bonds . By virtu e o f marriage , th e brid e give s u p he r membershi p i n her father' s househol d an d cla n an d he r right s t o inheritanc e from he r father . Sh e become s a membe r o f he r husband' s house hold an d clan , bu t sh e ma y occasionall y visi t he r parents' home . Polygyny i s permitted , an d wealth y me n ofte n ca n affor d sev eral wives. Often a man wil l inherit his deceased brother' s widow . One o f th e wive s i n a polygynou s househol d i s considere d t o be th e mos t importan t o r "bi g wife, " wh o direct s th e househol d activities o f othe r wives . Wive s liv e togethe r unde r th e sam e roof, sharin g th e sam e sleepin g area ; an d n o emotiona l problem s appear t o result from thi s arrangement . Although divorc e i s possible , i t i s no t frequent , an d i t i s strongly discouraged , sinc e i t woul d disrup t relation s betwee n clans. A panel , consistin g o f a representativ e o f th e husband' s household, o f th e wife' s parents ' household , an d o f th e distric t chief (se e below ) ma y b e convene d t o hea r th e couple' s com plaints an d t o advis e the m i n patchin g u p th e quarrel . Marriage i s use d b y th e Me o t o creat e tie s betwee n clans ; good marita l relation s ar e conducive to goo d clan relations, whic h in tur n ar e conduciv e t o furthe r marriage s betwee n th e clans . These relationship s ar e renewe d an d reinforce d b y the reciproca l festivals an d marriage feasts . ME O POLITICA L ORGANIZATIO

N

The ful l scop e of th e traditiona l Me o political syste m has neve r been presen t withi n Xien g Khouan g Province . Historicall y i t ap pears tha t th e Me o ha d a strongly organize d kingdo m som e tim e before the y entere d Lao s (se e Bernatzi k 1947:Chs . 2, 6) . Durin g the colonia l perio d the y wer e a t firs t unde r th e rigi d authorit y of th e French ; th e Japanes e occupatio n durin g Worl d Wa r I I broke thi s pattern , an d afte r th e wa r th e Frenc h substitute d a form o f indirec t rule . A t presen t the y ar e unde r th e nomina l [ 27 8 ]

ME O O F XIEN G KHOUAN G PROVINC

E

authority o f th e Roya l La o Governmen t (RLG) , bu t the y ar e caught i n th e conflic t betwee n th e RL G an d th e Pathe t Lao . Despite thei r year s o f nomina l submissio n t o centra l authority , the Me o hav e maintaine d thei r ow n loca l politica l system . Units of Meo Political Structure. Th e basi c units o f Me o politi cal structur e (househol d an d village ) an d th e basi s fo r politica l action (respec t fo r elders ) hav e alread y bee n mentioned . Highe r levels o f authorit y hav e bee n buil t largel y o n th e mode l o f th e household. Th e chie f o f a villag e i s himsel f a househol d head , and in multi-house villages he is ordinarily the eldes t of the household heads . A fe w exception s t o thi s rul e whic h th e autho r ha s noted see m t o hav e resulte d fro m recognitio n b y th e villager s of th e militar y honor s whic h th e individua l receive d fro m th e government. The villag e chie f (nai ban) function s betwee n household s i n much th e sam e manne r a s doe s th e househol d hea d betwee n members o f th e household . Th e village chie f i s an honored leade r on th e loca l scene , holdin g a plac e o f prestig e i n loca l festivals , judging inter-househol d disputes , an d als o representin g th e vil lage t o th e outsid e world . H e i s expecte d t o ac t fo r th e goo d of th e community . H e i s responsibl e fo r maintainin g ol d trail s and openin g ne w ones , and fo r organizing th e move of th e villag e to a ne w location . H e ha s authorit y i n emergencies . Durin g th e Communist occupatio n i n th e earl y 1950' s th e villag e chie f wa s responsible fo r th e defens e o f th e villag e an d fo r it s evacuation . But th e villag e chief i s not a dictator, an d h e act s with th e advic e of th e othe r househol d heads . I f a famil y feel s abused , i t i s fre e to establish residence in another area . When a villag e contain s household s fro m mor e tha n on e clan , disputes ar e mor e common . Apparentl y th e governmen t recog nizes only on e chie f fo r suc h a village, while th e loca l populatio n generally recognize s th e eldes t househol d hea d o f each cla n t o be a chief . Ther e appear s t o b e harmon y i n mos t loca l affairs , but difficult y arise s an d tension s develo p whe n outsid e o r upper level authoritie s attemp t t o enforc e measure s throug h onl y on e of th e chiefs. Stron g feeling s ma y result i n th e los s o f cooperatio n between th e clans . I n on e cas e th e autho r observed , th e minorit y clan grou p move d t o a ne w sit e onl y a five-minute wal k away . Subsequently th e tw o group s regaine d friendl y relationships , [ 27 9 ]

LAOS : G . LINWOO D BAENE

Y

which wer e cemente d b y intermarriage , bu t th e settlement s re mained apart . The distric t chie f (tasseng) ma y hav e a s many a s forty village s under hi s supervision . I t i s at thi s level tha t resemblanc e t o tradi tional Me o politica l structur e ma y break down . At the tim e of th e author's field work , the district chiefs were appointe d b y th e para mount Me o chie f (fo r Xien g Khouang) , Toub y Lyfong , actin g in conjunctio n wit h th e La o provinc e governor . Toub y seem s to hav e attempte d t o confor m t o wha t ma y hav e bee n th e tradi tional patter n b y selectin g as distric t chiefs me n wh o were villag e chiefs an d wh o wer e member s o f th e predominan t cla n i n th e district. Th e distric t chie f i s th e primar y channe l o f communica tion betwee n th e village s an d hig h governmen t officials . H e i s often calle d upon t o settl e dispute s betwee n village s o r member s of differen t village s (e.g . the marriag e disput e mentione d above) . The Me o hop e t o settl e dispute s a t th e lowest leve l o f author ity: intra-famil y dispute s shoul d b e settle d withi n th e house hold; inter-househol d dispute s withi n th e village ; inter-villag e disputes withi n th e district ; an d inter-distric t dispute s shoul d be settle d withi n th e spher e o f Touby' s authority . Suc h dispute s are no t necessaril y betwee n masse d group s a t th e differen t levels , but migh t b e betwee n individual s fro m thes e differen t levels . Disputes betwee n Xien g Khouan g Me o ar e seldo m allowe d t o go beyon d Touby . I n case s involvin g th e Me o wit h member s of othe r ethni c groups , Touby ha s serve d a s counse l for th e Meo . In thi s role h e ha s prove d himsel f ver y influentia l amon g Frenc h and La o officials . Touby Lyfong, Paramount Chief. Toub y Lyfong' s relatio n t o the Governo r o f Xien g Khouan g ha s alread y bee n mentioned . His positio n wa s recognize d b y th e French , an d he ha s continue d to receiv e recognitio n fro m th e Roya l La o Governmen t i n Vien tiane. Fo r a shor t tim e i n 196 0 he wa s a membe r o f th e cabine t (as Ministe r o f Justic e an d Ministe r o f Healt h an d Welfare) . He als o ra n successfull y fo r electio n a s a deput y whe n i t becam e evident tha t i f h e di d no t d o s o a followe r o f Faydan g woul d be elected . A t th e presen t tim e (1965 ) h e i s a n appointe d mem ber o f th e King' s Council , representin g th e Meo . H e ha s con sistently champione d th e Me o people . Whil e holdin g position s of influenc e withi n th e governmen t administration , h e ha s [ 28 0 ]

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E

retained th e respect , confidence , an d suppor t o f th e Me o people . He i s know n throughou t th e whol e area , and th e Me o ar e quic k to respon d t o request s mad e b y him . The governmen t ha s give n him a hous e i n Vientiane , bu t h e make s frequen t trip s t o th e Meo are a an d ha s move d hi s famil y bac k t o Xien g Khouan g Province to maintain his contact with the Meo there. During th e earl y 1950' s Toub y live d i n Xien g Khouan g nex t to th e La o governor , an d h e maintaine d a Me o militia . Durin g World Wa r I I an d agai n durin g th e Communis t invasio n o f 1953-1954 h e wa s give n a field comman d besid e th e Frenc h an d Lao commander s an d throug h his Me o militi a furnishe d th e gov ernment force s wit h intelligenc e an d guerrill a support . His militar y rol e wa s probabl y importan t i n establishin g hi s present positio n o f influence , thoug h h e n o longe r ha s a militar y command. H e helpe d t o brin g abou t th e cooperatio n o f th e Me o and centra l governmen t force s i n resistin g the Japanes e an d late r the Communis t invaders . Today th e governmen t see s Toub y a s th e representativ e o f the Me o an d th e communicato r betwee n th e Me o peopl e an d the administration . Th e Me o se e Toub y a s on e wh o ca n com municate thei r thought s t o th e governmen t an d ca n influenc e the government . Thu s Toub y act s a s the connecting lin k betwee n the La o governmen t an d th e Meo' s indigenou s politica l system . The variou s Me o district s ar e no w brough t togethe r unde r a n office whic h the y hav e no t institute d bu t i n whic h Toub y ha s been installe d wit h powe r fro m th e centra l government . Thu s he seem s t o warran t th e titl e "paramoun t chief " o f th e Meo , at leas t i n Xien g Khouang . Me o in othe r province s ar e not repre sented i n th e sam e way . Toub y i s generall y wel l receive d b y the Me o in other provinces , but th e degre e of his influence amon g them i s uncertain . Rewards of Political Leadership. Th e economi c return s o f po litical offic e ar e significant , bu t no t sufficien t t o suppor t a ma n and hi s family . Neithe r villag e chie f no r distric t chie f receive s a regula r salary , thoug h bot h ma y b e i n a positio n t o benefi t from contro l o f trade . Th e villag e chie f receive s gift s fro m hi s villagers, bu t thes e ar e essentiall y t o assis t him i n th e hospitalit y he i s expecte d t o sho w t o visitors , includin g Chines e traders , who alway s sta y i n th e chief s hous e whe n the y visi t th e village . [281 ]

LAOS ! G . LINWOO D BARNE

Y

Both th e villag e chie f an d th e distric t chie f ar e suppose d t o re ceive a smal l commissio n o n al l taxe s an d fees the y collect . Fee s and taxe s fo r suc h things a s birt h an d marriag e certificate s hav e been collected from th e Meo only in recent years. The write r consider s th e villag e t o b e th e leve l a t whic h th e indigenous Me o political syste m operate s today . The distric t leve l seems t o b e a transitio n fro m traditiona l Me o village s t o th e central government' s bureaucracy , an d Toub y ha s bee n a majo r factor i n th e maintenanc e o f thi s relationship . The extende d fam ily househol d ha s no t ye t bee n directl y affecte d b y centra l gov ernment administration , an d i t continue s t o b e th e basi c uni t of Me o social and political structure . Laotian Policy toward Tribesmen. Th e declare d Laotia n pol icy has been t o consider all individuals bor n in Laos to be Laotia n citizens an d t o incorporat e al l ethni c group s int o th e nationa l policy. A s citizens , al l ar e suppose d t o b e responsibl e fo r taxes , military service , an d conformanc e t o La o law , althoug h enforce ment o f thes e provision s ha s bee n difficul t becaus e o f th e civi l war. Nonetheless , th e variou s ethni c group s ar e graduall y bein g introduced t o th e nationa l politica l system , an d contac t wit h representatives o f th e nationa l governmen t ha s sometime s bee n very intensive , a s i n th e refuge e program s describe d i n Ward' s paper. Th e Me o o f Xien g Khouan g hav e twic e sen t representa tives t o th e nationa l assembl y (Toub y an d hi s brothe r Toulya) . But i t i s stil l difficul t t o sa y whethe r thi s ha s bee n a n hones t attempt t o hav e thes e people s full y represente d i n th e federa l government o r whethe r i t i s merel y a stopga p measur e t o ste m the apparen t nationalis m o f th e Meo . Th e hono r an d prestig e given t o Toub y an d othe r Me o leaders , th e educationa l facilitie s being offere d t o the Me o o n a n increasin g scale , an d othe r bene fits no w availabl e t o th e Me o would indicat e th e forme r motive . The government' s rulin g agains t usin g th e Me o languag e i n a written for m migh t indicat e th e latte r motive. M E O ECONOM

Y

The rol e o f th e househol d i n the Me o socia l an d politica l struc ture i s reflected a s wel l i n Me o economy . Th e divisio n o f labor , pattern o f subsistence , lan d tenure , propert y rights , inheritance , and th e economi c factor s relatin g t o marriag e an d religiou s rite s are al l tie d int o socio-politica l aspect s o f th e household . [ 28 2 ]

ME O O F XIEN G KHOUAN G PROVINC

E

Rice. Uplan d ric e i s th e basi c foo d stapl e o f th e Me o popula tion i n Xien g Khouang . It s production , whic h i s supervise d b y the househol d head , require s th e ful l cooperatio n o f th e entir e household. A regula r annua l cycl e o f activitie s simila r t o thos e of other upland people s i n Southeast Asia is followed . Planting i s carrie d ou t a t th e beginnin g o f th e rain y seaso n in lat e Apri l an d May . Th e wor k ma y b e don e b y an y membe r of th e family . Lat e i n Octobe r whe n th e rain y seaso n closes , the grai n ripen s quickly , an d everyon e join s i n th e harvest . Tem porary shelter s ar e erecte d o n th e field , whic h mus t b e watche d until th e harves t i s complete d an d th e ric e i s safel y store d i n the village . Th e ric e stalk s ar e cu t b y han d an d gathere d int o large stack s o n th e field. Thi s wor k mus t b e don e quickl y s o that overripe grai n will not be lost . The wome n an d girl s flail th e stalk s t o remov e th e rice , whic h is the n carrie d a s muc h a s on e day' s wal k t o th e village , wher e it i s stored i n granarie s th e me n hav e built . The entir e househol d is involved i n the harvest . A ric e field ma y b e use d fo r thre e o r fou r successiv e years . Ideally, som e ne w groun d i s cleare d eac h year , an d poore r soi l is allowe d t o li e fallow . Clearin g start s a s soo n a s i t i s certai n that th e harves t ca n b e successfull y completed . Som e o f th e stronger me n begi n th e clearing , an d other s joi n the m a s soo n as th e harvest i s finished. Th e heav y vegetatio n o f th e ne w fields is cu t an d allowe d t o dr y unti l March , whe n i t i s burned . Th e field i s the n cleare d fo r planting , whic h take s plac e afte r th e first few rainy day s allow the soil to be loosened . Other Crops. Potatoes , corn , squash , an d othe r mino r foo d crops ar e grown , bu t pla y a minor rol e i n th e Me o diet . Potatoe s are sometime s sol d t o Westerners , bu t ar e most commonl y use d as fertilize r i n th e opiu m fields. (Thi s exampl e o f th e sophisti cated uplan d agricultur e seem s quit e differen t fro m th e method s employed b y Me o i n Thailand , describe d i n Geddes ' paper. ) Corn an d squas h ar e fe d t o livestoc k unles s th e ric e harves t i s light. Opium. I t appear s tha t ever y househol d ha s it s opiu m field, a fence d plo t nea r th e village . Th e soi l mus t b e carefull y pre pared, an d fertilize d wit h potatoes . Mos t o f th e opiu m cultiva tion, includin g th e harves t (whic h require s grea t skill) , i s don e by women . [ 28 3 ]

LAOS : G . LINWOO

D BARNE

Y

Opium ha s bee n th e mai n sourc e o f cas h incom e for th e Me o and ofte n serve s a s a mediu m o f exchange . Th e first missionarie s in th e are a wer e quit e shocke d t o find carefull y wrappe d lump s of opiu m i n th e offering s a t church . Th e us e o f opiu m a s a stan dard o f exchang e i n Xien g Khouan g market s coul d b e observe d openly durin g th e earl y 1950's . The Frenc h authoritie s wer e sup posed t o contro l opiu m production , bu t eve n durin g th e colonia l period muc h illicit trade in opiu m too k place . Undoubtedly, som e of th e opiu m wen t int o Thailan d i n exchang e fo r foreig n manu factured good s (Embre e 1949:155) , an d thi s patter n persists . The Frenc h ha d a n inspecto r i n th e field durin g th e harves t season, wh o visite d th e village s an d wa s suppose d t o purchas e all th e opium . N o opiu m wa s suppose d t o b e shippe d ou t o f the provinc e excep t b y th e French . Thoug h th e sam e la w stil l applies unde r th e La o government , th e La o governmen t doe s not hav e a progra m t o purchas e opiu m an d i s unabl e t o contro l its shipment . Productio n i n Xien g Khouan g i s no w greatl y re duced becaus e o f th e wa r and resultin g difficultie s i n maintaining opium fields an d arrangin g transpor t an d marketing . At th e tim e o f th e writer' s field wor k (earl y 1950's ) Xien g Khouang wa s th e onl y provinc e i n al l o f Indochin a wher e th e government officiall y permitte d cultivatio n o f th e opiu m poppy . The Frenc h administrato r tol d th e write r tha t a n estimate d 6 0 percent o f th e me n o f th e provinc e wer e user s o f opium . Its grea t wort h an d th e eas e o f transpor t mad e opiu m o f unique value . A t th e tim e o f th e fiel d wor k on e kil o wa s wort h one-half to n o f rice . I t wa s use d fo r barte r i n th e Xien g Khouan g market, in district markets, and in the villages. Other Products, Fla x i s les s importan t toda y tha n i n earlie r periods sinc e Chines e merchant s trad e clot h fo r opium. 8 Bu t women stil l spi n fla x an d mak e thei r elaboratel y dye d an d em broidered skirt s out of heavy linen . Livestock. Livestoc k pla y a ver y importan t par t i n Me o econ omy. Poultry , goats , pigs , buffalo , an d cattl e ar e foun d i n mos t villages. The y are used fo r mea t an d fo r cas h sale s i n th e market . 'Trading i n th e village s wa s don e b y Chines e merchant s wh o ha d settle d in th e valle y towns . Thi s patter n wa s beginnin g t o brea k dow n i n th e 1950's , by whic h tim e Me o wer e comin g t o valley-tow n market s themselves. Caravan s of Chines e trader s fro m Nort h Vietna m use d t o com e int o th e valle y towns , but thes e trader s di d no t ordinarily ventur e int o th e mountai n village s fo r trade .

[ 28 4 ]

ME O O F XIEN G KHOUAN G PBOVINC E

The reputatio n o f Me o a s carefu l anima l husbandme n i s confirmed b y comparin g thei r livestoc k wit h those of other ethni c groups. Poultry is used for mea t an d a s the most commo n sacrific e in cas e o f illness . Egg s ar e eate n onl y occasionally . Large r ani mals are used for sacrifice onl y for sever e illnesses. Meo horse s ar e wel l groome d an d fe d an d splendidl y traine d as pack an d saddl e animals . They ar e very important i n extendin g the spee d an d rang e o f Me o transpor t an d travel . Ever y house hold ha s a t leas t on e horse , whic h i s unde r th e supervisio n o f the househol d head . Althoug h anothe r membe r o f th e househol d may conside r th e hors e t o b e his , i t i s hi s onl y t o us e an d car e for—actual ownershi p reside s i n th e household , an d car e o f th e animal is supervised by the household head . Land Ownership. Lan d i s owne d an d use d by th e peopl e wh o have cleare d it . Usuall y a Me o househol d wil l hav e thre e o r four ric e fields an d on e opiu m field i n production . Thi s varie s with th e siz e of th e household, number o f nuclea r families , wives , and children . A marrie d ma n ma y star t wor k o n a field o f hi s own i f h e ca n d o s o withou t upsettin g th e distributio n o f labo r in the household's interests . Division of Labor. Th e divisio n o f labo r i n agricultur e ha s already bee n described . I n addition , i t shoul d b e note d tha t women ar e responsibl e fo r th e preparatio n an d servin g o f food , including poundin g o r grindin g grain , winnowing , an d cooking . Women carr y all the water . Firewood i s brought i n b y th e boys , but olde r me n assis t the m from tim e t o tim e i n fellin g tree s an d cuttin g th e woo d int o lengths fo r carrying . Me n buil d an d repai r fence s an d building s and car e fo r th e livestock . Part-tim e specialist s serv e a s silver smiths an d gunsmiths , bu t the y mus t supplemen t thei r incom e with ric e production . ME O MATERIA L CULTUKE—HOUSEHOL

D POSSESSION S

The Me o hous e i s made entirel y o f wood . Unlik e th e house s of th e Laotians , i t i s buil t directl y o n th e ground , wit h a dir t floor. Tw o fireplaces ar e foun d i n ever y house—on e i s use d fo r cooking, an d th e othe r i s use d a s the cente r fo r al l socia l gather ings. On e are a o f th e wal l i s reserve d fo r a shrin e o r alta r fo r the spirits , o r Tlan. [ 28 5 ]

LAOS : G . LINWOO D BAKNE Y

Every househol d ha s a t leas t on e ric e pounde r fo r huskin g rice. On e rotatin g ston e cor n mil l i s als o th e commo n propert y of th e household . Thi s ite m i s no t foun d amon g othe r ethni c groups i n Laos . Tools , saddles , crossbows , Meo-mad e flintloc k guns, musica l instruments , an d th e variou s item s neede d for foo d preparation mak e u p mos t o f th e material good s whic h on e finds in al l Me o households . Wealt h i s tie d u p i n livestock , opium , and silver . Soli d silve r bar s ar e use d i n trade , an d othe r piece s are use d fo r ornament . Silve r o r opium , no t pape r money , i s th e medium o f exchange in the hills. Inheritance and Property Distribution. Househol d property , including livestock , i s unde r th e supervisio n o f th e househol d head. Upo n hi s deat h th e propert y i s no t reall y inherited , sinc e it continue s t o belon g t o th e household . Th e propert y no w come s under th e supervisio n o f th e ne w househol d head , wh o ma y b e a younge r brothe r o r the eldes t so n o f th e deceased . I n th e even t of th e deat h o f a husband i n th e household , th e wido w continue s to hav e th e us e o f th e material s whic h h e "possessed. " Unles s she i s quit e elderly , sh e i s likel y t o becom e a secon d wif e o f her husband' s brother . Upo n he r deat h th e material sh e had fro m her firs t husban d i s redistribute d withi n th e household . Onc e an individua l ha s move d ou t o f th e househol d (b y marriag e o r fission o f th e household) , h e o r sh e n o longe r share s i n thi s distribution. The contribution s o f th e househol d i n marriag e ceremonie s have alread y bee n mentioned . Th e entir e househol d als o contributes t o th e financial burden s o f religiou s rites , taxes, and funeral s of househol d members . ME O FOLKLOR E AN D BELIEF S

Meo folklore , whic h contain s th e "Histor y o f th e Meo, " i s in a vocabular y littl e use d i n curren t speech . Th e form s eithe r have passe d ou t o f us e o r reflec t contac t wit h th e Chinese . Th e lore i s tol d i n couple t for m an d ca n b e recite d fo r day s b y th e few ol d me n wh o remembe r it . Thei r histor y refer s t o ancestra l heroes wh o supposedl y too k o n spirit-lik e qualitie s an d continu e to ai d th e Me o today . Othe r ancestra l figures becam e jealou s and continu e toda y t o attemp t t o thwar t th e benevolen t ances [ 28 6 ]

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tors. Bot h varietie s o f thes e spirit-lik e being s ar e referre d t o a s TUn (se e Graha m 1954; Savin a 1930) . Th e folklor e tell s o f a first creation , followe d b y a grea t flood, with tw o survivor s i n a barrel , an d a grea t serie s o f conflict s an d exploit s befor e th e tim e o f th e cla n "fathers. " Thes e "fathers" ar e vaguely identifie d wit h th e present-da y clans . I t appear s tha t th e Me o cla n system i s tie d i n with th e folklor e bot h a s a myt h o f it s origi n an d a s a descriptio n o f it s interna l organization . Th e relationship s betwee n folklor e personage s ar e consisten t wit h behavio r i n th e househol d an d clan s describe d in thi s paper . Th e Me o ar e predominantl y animisti c an d believ e i n man y Tlan, whic h the y classif y accordin g t o thei r functions . Ther e ar e TUn o f th e water , o f fertility , o f th e trail , o f th e hearth , o f th e sleepin g quarters , o f th e ric e field , fo r hunting , an d numerou s othe r categories . Th e Me o als o hav e a concep t o f a suprem e being, who m the y cal l Fua Tai. I n Me o thinking , Fu a Ta i create d all thing s an d originall y ha d clos e communicatio n with man . H e becam e dismaye d wit h ma n an d lef t hi m i n th e charg e o f th e world o f th e Tlan. Fu a Tai stil l exists , bu t i s n o longe r concerne d with man' s affairs . Som e Me o believ e tha t a person' s spiri t goe s to liv e i n th e lan d o f th e Tlan afte r hi s funeral ; other s sa y hi s spirit return s t o liv e i n hi s ol d house . Difference s o f opinio n o r interpretatio n o f thi s kin d ar e common ; Me o belie f i s no t a uni fied o r universall y accepte d bod y o f doctrin e (cf . Morechan d 1955, wh o indicate s simila r variation s i n belief s amon g th e Me o of Nort h Vietnam) . Th e Me o observ e a n annua l visi t wit h thei r househol d Tlan, which som e believ e t o represen t thei r ancestors . Th e door s ar e shut , an d n o on e i s allowe d t o ente r o r leav e unti l th e visi t i s over. Informant s hav e reporte d tha t the y neve r sa w o r hear d anythin g durin g thi s period , bu t kne w tha t the y shoul d al l b e gathere d i n on e hous e so th e Tlan woul d find them . Religious Practitioners. Th e Tu-ua-neng (religiou s practi tioner ) ha s a ver y importan t rol e i n a Me o village . Ther e ma y b e mor e tha n on e i n a sizabl e village . Th e positio n ma y be take n b y male s o r females . Certai n power s an d responsibilitie s are believe d t o b e give n t o th e Tu-ua-neng b y th e Tlan. A

Γ ?87 ]

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Y

"power," possibl y a Thn whic h dwell s i n him , enable s th e Tu-ua-neng t o cur e th e sick , determin e th e meanin g o f sign s and dreams , giv e securit y t o a ne w infant , predic t th e futur e through ordeals , an d in genera l communicat e between th e livin g Meo an d th e Thn worlds . H e ma y achiev e increase d statu s de pending o n his effectivenes s i n dealin g wit h th e Tlan world . Thi s is reflecte d i n hi s succes s a t curing , drivin g awa y malevolen t Tlan, an d influencin g th e Thn worl d fo r th e welfar e o f Me o society. The Tu-ua-neng i s calle d i n t o divin e th e caus e o f illness , cur e the sick , protec t th e villag e from epidemics , officiat e a t funerals , make al l fetishes , an d erec t shrine s an d altar s i n homes , alon g trails, an d i n ric e fields . Smal l fee s ar e pai d t o hi m fo r hi s ser vices, bu t h e i s no t a full-tim e specialis t an d mus t supplemen t his income wit h ric e farming . Th e offic e i s not directl y inherited ; the Tu-ua-neng i s appointe d an d give n hi s power s b y th e Thn. Such appointment i s teste d pragmatically . The Tu-ua-neng ar e no t i n competitio n wit h secula r villag e chiefs—their realm s ar e i n differen t area s o f behavior . Bu t th e Tu-ua-neng ar e no t necessaril y conservative . I n fact , the y ma y be amon g th e first i n a villag e t o accep t religiou s chang e an d conversion t o Christianity . Meo ar e generall y awar e o f thei r associatio n wit h th e Thn and o f thei r obligation s towar d the m i n orde r t o cultivat e thei r goodwill an d secur e thei r assistance . Th e Me o sho w thei r defer ence b y numerou s taboo s an d ceremonies . Bu t individual s var y in thei r attitude s towar d Thn. Som e see m deepl y confiden t o f the effectivenes s o f th e varie d observances . Other s appea r t o continue i n thei r belie f becaus e o f traditio n an d th e hop e tha t it wil l d o the m som e good . I t appear s t o thi s write r tha t th e Meo h e observe d ma y hav e bee n involve d i n muc h mor e specifi c attempts t o contro l th e Thn worl d tha n woul d b e indicate d b y Bernatzik (1947 ) an d othe r investigator s who m h e quotes . A t the sam e tim e i t appear s tha t th e Me o o f Xien g Khouan g ar e not united in any pattern of beliefs. One ma y as k whether thi s disparity i n beliefs ma y no t indicat e an attitud e o f insecurit y amon g th e Meo . Althoug h th e cla n an d household remai n tightl y integrated , ther e appea r t o be change s taking plac e i n traditiona l pattern s o f Me o life , especiall y i n th e [ 28 8 ]

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matter o f belief . Thi s ma y b e th e first evidenc e o f a breakdow n in Me o culture . RECENT CHANGE S I N M E O CULTUR E

The year s sinc e 194 0 hav e brough t man y change s t o th e Me o of Laos . Thes e peopl e ha d bee n driftin g southwar d fro m Chin a for abou t thre e generations . The y entere d a n are a wher e the y were mor e accessibl e t o Wester n influenc e an d t o contact s wit h other ethni c groups . Their geographi c positio n i n th e mountain s which li e across major route s o f transportation , an d thei r capacit y for militar y organization , hav e mad e the m o f grea t strategi c im portance. The y hav e bee n engulfe d i n a serie s o f war s an d politi cal upheavals. Afte r 194 0 control o f Lao s passe d fro m th e Frenc h to th e Japanese , t o th e Lao , bac k t o th e French , an d bac k agai n to th e Lao , wh o becam e embroile d i n a conflic t wit h th e Viet namese Communist s an d a lingerin g civi l wa r (wit h th e Pathe t Lao). Durin g thes e time s o f stres s th e variou s ethni c group s were place d unde r commo n danger s an d hardships. I n some case s such condition s resulte d i n close r communicatio n an d coopera tion betwee n them . Thu s th e Me o wer e unde r sever e externa l pressure, i n additio n t o th e constan t chang e tha t take s plac e within an y culture . I n recen t year s thei r entir e environmen t ha s been drasticall y altered—th e hill s hav e becom e th e scen e o f al most continuou s warfare , mos t o f th e Me o hav e bee n relocate d into refuge e camps , an d thei r traditiona l economi c pattern s ca n no longer be followed . But eve n betwee n 194 0 an d 1950 , whe n externa l pressure s were no t s o great , ther e wer e startlin g changes . A marke t scen e after 195 0 woul d revea l a larg e numbe r o f Me o bot h buyin g and selling . A decad e earlie r the y wer e rarel y see n i n town . I n the 1950' s man y Me o wer e engage d i n wag e work , albei t stil l primarily a s a supplemen t t o th e livelihoo d derive d fro m horticulture. After 195 0 a fe w Me o actuall y ha d change d thei r economi c patterns completely. 9 A fe w ha d lease d terrace d fields fo r irri gated-rice farming ; som e o f thes e wer e encourage d an d under * Some o f thes e change s ma y hav e bee n du e t o conversio n t o Christianity . Meo Christian s wer e no longe r subjec t t o taboo s whic h mad e animis t Me o reluc tant to engage in lowland occupations .

[ 28 9 ]

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Y

written b y Touby . Stil l othe r Me o ha d becom e mechanics , trained medica l practitioners , an d specialist s i n othe r type s o f work. Although mos t Me o maintaine d a basi c mountai n rice-opiu m economy, a tren d towar d a modifie d cas h econom y wa s evident . The Me o were anxiou s t o posses s Wester n goods , including sad dles, knives , saws , an d othe r tools , bicycles , guns , medicine , sun glasses, clothing , an d flashlights; an d thos e livin g nea r tow n ha d even begu n t o bu y moto r bike s an d jeeps . Th e Me o displaye d an avi d interes t in ne w item s o f materia l technology , bein g quic k to adop t ne w tool s suc h a s sewin g machines . Suc h purchase s required cash , whic h wa s obtaine d largel y throug h sal e o f opium, wag e labor , an d sal e o f surplu s agricultura l products . There wer e als o change s i n th e politica l sphere . Th e district level bridg e betwee n Me o an d th e nationa l governmen t ha s al ready bee n indicated . However , intelligen t interes t i n thi s large r political configuratio n wa s onl y beginnin g t o emerg e a s th e Me o came t o b e considere d citizen s o f Lao s an d wer e represente d in th e Nationa l Assembly . Th e Me o interes t i n suc h thing s wa s stimulated b y increase d enforcemen t o f taxatio n an d licensing . The interes t wa s augmente d b y increase d literacy , mor e frequen t contact wit h town , an d Me o candidate s fo r provincia l an d na tional office . The change s ha d no t ye t affecte d Me o villag e politica l struc ture becaus e th e traditiona l link s betwee n distric t an d villag e continued t o b e used . Bu t th e increasin g participatio n i n govern ment taxation , legislation , an d militar y programs indicate d a defi nite chang e i n th e basi c Me o attitud e towar d authority . Meo bega n t o receive , an d t o make , thei r ow n opportunitie s for medica l car e an d variou s civi l functions , especiall y education . In man y Me o village s school s wer e se t u p b y th e villag e house holders themselves . Ofte n th e village s wer e abl e t o pa y a highe r salary t o th e La o schoolteache r tha n th e governmen t pai d i n the officia l publi c school s (th e norma l fe e wa s on e ba r o f silve r per pupi l pe r semester) . Th e rat e of literac y ha d bee n extremel y low amon g the Meo , bu t wa s increasin g rapidly . Eve n th e publi c school i n Xien g Khouang , basicall y fo r th e Lao , admitte d Me o children. Thos e wit h consistentl y hig h scholarshi p wer e per mitted t o complet e thei r elementar y education , an d som e wer e [ 290 ]

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sent o n t o lycaes a t Vientian e an d Saigon . Other s receive d specialized trainin g in various trade s an d professions . Of course , ther e wer e point s o f stres s i n thi s patter n o f mod ernization. A chil d wh o attende d schoo l fo r man y month s i n Xieng Khouan g wa s no t subjec t t o th e direc t socia l sanction s of hi s household . H e wa s intellectuall y superio r t o hi s elder s when h e returne d home , an d migh t wis h t o dominate th e house hold, o r t o mov e awa y t o becom e a specialis t i n som e ne w lin e of work . Althoug h som e returne d t o thei r household s t o partici pate a s muc h a s possible i n traditiona l affairs , thos e wh o forgo t their household' s clai m o n the m wer e subjec t t o genera l criticis m from th e Me o population . Wage labo r wa s anothe r sourc e o f stress . Traditionally , th e household me t it s need s fo r cas h throug h endeavor s i n whic h the entir e househol d participated , e.g . opiu m production , th e raising an d sellin g o f livestock , an d s o forth . Th e communa l en deavors reinforce d th e traditiona l socia l patter n o f th e Meo , bu t wage labo r an d individua l specializatio n pu t a strai n o n tradi tional patterns of cooperation . Political chang e ha s no t ye t cause d sever e strain s i n th e house hold, bu t ultimatel y i t stand s a s a threa t t o household stability . If fre e election s le d a n individua l t o place confidenc e an d respec t in peopl e wh o wer e no t traditional-styl e leaders , som e instabil ity migh t als o develo p withi n th e household , upo n whic h th e traditional politica l syste m ha s bee n modeled . Despite th e change s i n Me o culture , ther e i s stil l littl e inter marriage betwee n th e Me o an d othe r ethni c groups . Th e Me o appear t o wan t t o maintai n recognitio n an d distinctio n a s a group, an d thi s desir e seem s t o continu e eve n i n th e changin g conditions o f th e 1960's . Th e cultura l horizon s o f th e Me o see m to hav e widene d a s a resul t o f recen t experiences , bu t th e basi c orientations d o no t see m t o hav e changed . Th e Me o appea r t o be read y t o adop t ne w technique s an d method s i f b y doin g s o they thin k that Me o societ y ca n benefi t an d gai n prominence . One exampl e o f thi s i s religion . Her e agai n i t i s instructiv e to loo k a t th e reactio n o f Toub y Lyfong . Th e Protestan t mission aries (mostl y Americans ) hav e continue d t o wor k wit h th e Me o through th e troubled year s sinc e the en d o f th e Frenc h Indochin a War. [291 ]

LAOS ! G . LINWOO D BAKNE

Y

They hav e offere d a for m o f identificatio n wit h a religio n clearly distinc t fro m th e Buddhis t religio n o f th e lowlan d Lao . Touby ha s no t declare d himsel f t o b e a Christian , bu t h e ha s allowed on e o f hi s wive s an d severa l o f hi s childre n t o becom e Christian.10 H e ha s als o advise d th e Me o peopl e t o liste n sympa thetically t o th e messag e o f th e missionaries , an d o n ceremonia l occasions, i n th e presenc e o f Laotia n an d America n officials , h e has aske d fo r Christia n prayer s t o b e said . I d o no t mea n t o imply tha t al l Me o Christianit y i s simpl y expedient , bu t I d o want t o indicat e that , thoug h i t wa s neve r intende d a s such , identification wit h Christianit y als o ca n serv e a s a mean s o f sym bolic distinction fro m th e Buddhist Lao . Perhaps th e Me o ar e undergoin g a revitalizatio n movemen t as Wallac e define s i t (1956:265) : " a deliberate , organized , con scious effor t b y members o f a societ y t o construc t a mor e satisfy ing culture. " Th e Me o appea r t o b e competin g consciousl y i n the La o national societ y fo r recognitio n i n man y phase s o f life — political, economic , occupational , educational , an d religious . Obviously th e La o governmen t recognize s th e loyalt y o f th e Meo to thei r ow n group . The governmen t view s th e Me o attitud e with som e apprehension—admittedly , thi s i s wh y th e govern ment ha s prohibite d th e printin g o f an y materia l i n th e Me o language.11 I t ha s feare d tha t th e possessio n o f thei r ow n writte n 10

Given th e natur e o f Me o famil y structure , "allowed " i s probably a misleadin g verb; hi s relative s mus t hav e ha d hi s explici t permission , i f no t hi s orders , t o become Christian . The patter n o f conversio n withi n Touby' s famil y i s no t typical . I n mos t Me o villages th e decisio n t o conver t t o Christianit y i s discusse d withi n th e communit y by th e househol d heads . A vot e i s taken , an d i f ther e i s a substantia l minorit y opposed t o Christianity , non e wil l becom e Christian . I f ther e i s n o substantia l opposition, thos e househol d head s wh o vote d t o becom e Christia n infor m thei r families tha t thencefort h the y wil l be Christians . But, unlike th e Ya o (se e Kandre' s paper), ther e i s n o nee d fo r Christia n an d non-Christia n Me o t o spli t int o sepa rate villages. Touby's stan d an d th e positio n o f othe r high-rankin g Me o have , n o doubt , been importan t i n influencin g th e hig h rat e o f conversio n t o Christianit y amon g the Meo . Ther e ar e no w a t leas t 5,00 0 Me o Christian s ou t o f 8,50 0 Christian s in al l o f Laos . Protestan t missionarie s hav e worke d i n norther n Lao s fo r abou t fifty years , an d althoug h the y entere d Xien g Khouan g Provinc e fo r a shor t period befor e Worl d Wa r II , the y hav e bee n continuall y activ e ther e onl y sinc e 1949. Th e conversions o f Me o hav e al l bee n made i n th e pas t fiftee n years . "This prohibitio n ha s no t bee n enforce d i n recen t years . A Me o Cultura l Committee ha s bee n formed , unde r a Catholi c priest , wit h Catholi c Me o an d Protestant Me o members . The y publis h a newspape r i n a Me o phoneti c script , which does not reflect an y particular religiou s persuasion .

[ 29 2 ]

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language migh t b e th e capston e t o th e alread y stron g in-grou p feeling o f th e Meo , thus destroyin g al l hope o f formin g a nationa l unity which crosses ethnic barriers. Several feature s o f th e refuge e progra m (whic h i s outline d in Ward' s paper ) ar e relevan t i n concludin g ou r discussio n o f recent changes . Th e traditiona l econom y o f th e Me o ha s bee n totally disrupte d a s a resul t o f th e almos t continuou s warfare . Today mos t o f the m ar e livin g i n refuge e center s wit h far large r concentrations o f populatio n tha n eve r wer e attaine d unde r nor mal condition s (roughl y fourtee n thousan d Me o i n on e refuge e center). Althoug h som e resettlemen t ha s take n plac e i n area s which hav e bee n secure d b y th e centra l government , th e Me o in th e large r refuge e camp s an d i n area s no t securely controlle d are dependen t fo r subsistenc e o n airlifte d rice , an d o f cours e can no t produc e o r transpor t opiu m t o markets . Man y me n hav e become member s o f th e Roya l La o army , an d thei r extende d families hav e followe d the m t o th e arm y camps . Th e arm y ha s found tha t th e Me o d o not mak e dependabl e soldier s when sepa rated fro m thei r familie s fo r lon g periods , an d th e Me o hav e found tha t ric e drop s ar e mor e dependabl e whe n the y ar e nea r an army camp . Finally, i t i s indicativ e o f th e resilienc e o f Me o socia l structur e that household , village , an d eve n distric t grouping s hav e bee n maintained withi n th e refuge e camps . Th e house s hav e bee n regrouped accordin g t o th e village s the y wer e i n befor e the y were force d t o flee thei r homes , an d th e traditiona l pattern s o f leadership i n household , village , an d distric t hav e bee n main tained. BIBLIOGRAPHY BERNATZEC, HUG O

1947 Akh a un d Meau : Problem e de r angewandte n Volkerkund e i n Hinterindien. Innsbruck , Wagner, 2 vols. EMBREE, JOH N FE E

1949 A visi t t o Laos , Frenc h Indochina . Journa l o f th e Washingto n Academy o f Scienc e 39. EMBREE, JOH N FE E an d LILLIA N DOTSO N

1950 Bibliograph y o f th e people s an d culture s o f Mainlan d Southeas t Asia. Ne w Haven , Yal e University , Southeas t Asi a Studies .

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1954 Song s an d storie s o f th e Ch'ua n Miao . Washington , D.C. , Smithsonian Institutio n Miscellaneou s Collection s Vol . 123 , no. 1 . MATHTEU, A . R .

1959 Chronologica l tabl e o f th e histor y o f Laos . In Kingdo m o f Laos. Saigon , France-Asie , Englis h edn . MORECHAND, GU Y

1955 Principau x trait s d u chamanism e Me o Blan c e n Indochine . Bul letin d e l'Ecol e Francais e d'Extreme-Orien t 47:509-542 . Roux, H E N R I an d TRA N VA N C H U

1954 Quelque s minorite s ethnique s d u Nor d Indo-Chine . France-Asi e 10:135-419. SAVINA, F . M .

1916 Dictionnair e Miao-Tseu-Francais . Bulleti n d e l'Ecol e Francais e d'Extreme-Orient 1 6 ( 2 ) . Hanoi . 1930 Histoir e de s Miao . Hongkong , Imprimeri e d e l a Societ e de s Missions-Etrangeres d e Paris , 2d . edn . SMALLEY, W I L L I A M A .

1956 Th e gospe l an d th e culture s o f Laos . Practica l Anthropolog y 3:47-57. WARNER, DENI S

1965 A

[ 29 4 ]

cautionar y repor t o n Laos . Th e Reporter , 3 3 (10):35-3 8 (December 2 ) .

CHAPTER 8

U.S. Aid to Hill Tribe Refugees in Laos JAMES THOMA S WAR D

INTRODUCTION

Although thi s pape r provide s a genera l descriptio n o f th e United State s Agenc y fo r Internationa l Developmen t (USAID ) Refugee Relie f Program , conducte d i n cooperatio n wit h th e Royal Laotia n Governmen t (RLG) , it s mai n emphasi s i s o n a particular phas e o f th e program : assistanc e t o Me o hil l trib e refugees i n Xien g Khouan g Provinc e fro m 196 3 t o 1965 . Th e opinions expresse d i n thi s pape r ar e thos e o f th e autho r an d entirely hi s responsibility . BACKGROUND

The Kingdo m o f Lao s attaine d independenc e i n 195 4 a s a re sult o f th e Genev a Conference . Thi s conference , whic h marke d the en d o f Frenc h dominatio n i n th e Indochines e peninsula , als o created th e independen t state s o f Cambodi a an d Vietnam . Dur ing th e colonia l perio d th e Frenc h ha d se t th e boundarie s o f Laos fo r thei r administrativ e purposes . Frenc h administratio n in Lao s followe d th e patter n o f indirec t rule ; extensiv e exploita tion o r developmen t o f th e econom y wa s no t attempted , an d little modernizatio n wa s achieved . Th e problem s o f buildin g a modern natio n tha t confronte d th e RL G wer e a s formidabl e a s those facin g an y o f th e ne w nations . Th e creatio n o f a sens e of unit y amon g th e divers e ethnic , linguistic , an d cultura l group s was paramount . O n to p o f al l thi s wa s a civi l wa r tha t i s stil l in progress . Th e 196 2 fourteen-natio n Genev a Conferenc e wa s an attemp t t o resolv e th e problem s o f interna l discor d tha t ha d escalated int o a grea t powe r confrontation . Th e resultin g treat y provided fo r a neutral , independent , an d unifie d Laos , rule d b y a Governmen t o f Nationa l Unio n compose d o f th e Conservative , Neutral, an d Communist-oriente d Pathe t La o factions . [ 29 5 ]

LAOS : JAME S THOMA S WAR D

The Kingdo m consist s o f approximatel y tw o millio n citizens , who ar e sprea d ove r a n are a o f 91,00 0 squar e miles. Th e ethni c Lao, comprisin g onl y hal f o f th e tota l population , ar e generall y found i n th e lowlands , especiall y i n th e Mekon g Rive r Valley . The elite ethni c La o liv e i n th e cities , an d the y dominat e th e political, economic , an d socia l lif e o f th e country ; wherea s th e peasant masse s liv e i n rura l village s an d practic e subsistenc e paddy-rice cultivation . The othe r hal f o f th e populatio n ar e hil l tribes , wh o usuall y live i n remot e uplan d area s an d practic e swidde n o r shiftin g rice cultivation . Th e La o Then g o r "Kha, " including th e KJImUi* , are Mon-Khmer-speakin g group s tha t ma y antedat e al l th e othe r inhabitants; the y compris e abou t 2 5 percen t o f th e tota l popula tion an d ar e distribute d throughou t Laos , generall y i n th e lowe r hill elevations . Th e remainin g 2 5 percen t ar e th e Me o (Miao) , Yao (Man) , Uplan d Ta i (Black , White , Red , an d Lu e groups) , Akha (Ekaw) , an d Lah u (Mussuh) . Thes e group s ar e foun d in norther n an d centra l Laos , area s o f widesprea d Pathe t La o insurgency. A s a consequence , th e larg e majorit y o f refugee s i n Laos are tribal peoples who inhabit these areas. USAID REFUGE E KELIE F

The widesprea d refuge e proble m i s cause d b y th e protracte d "revolutionary warfare " bein g wage d b y th e Pathe t La o wit h support fro m th e Democrati c Republi c o f Vietnam . Muc h o f th e area o f Xien g Khouang , Sa m Neua , an d Na m Th a province s ha s been occupie d b y Pathe t La o fighting units , and , a s a conse quence, thousand s o f mountain peopl e hav e bee n dislocate d fro m their home s an d ric e fields. Mos t hav e sough t refug e i n th e mor e remote mountai n area s an d hav e defende d themselve s agains t the aggressors . Man y refugee s hav e los t al l o f thei r househol d goods excep t thos e item s whic h the y coul d carr y awa y o n thei r backs. A s a humanitaria n gesture , an d i n respons e t o a reques t from th e Prim e Ministe r o f th e La o government , USAI D ha s undertaken a n emergenc y assistanc e program i n cooperation wit h the RLG Ministry of Social Welfare . By th e en d o f 196 4 over 150,00 0 refugee s wer e receivin g assis tance, primaril y rice , an d als o othe r basi c necessities , suc h a s [ 29 6 ]

U. S . AI D T O HIL L TEIB E KEFUGEE S

clothing, blankets , cooking-pots , tools , an d seed . Becaus e road s in thes e remot e mountai n area s ar e almos t nonexistent , 9 0 per cent o f th e refuge e supplie s ar e delivere d b y ai r drop . Thi s amounts to a daily drop of about fifty tons. Of th e approximatel y 141,50 0 refugee s i n th e north , ther e ar e an estimate d 88,00 0 Me o tribesme n locate d primaril y i n Xien g Khouang an d Sa m Neu a provinces . Sizabl e number s o f La o Theng refugee s (26,500 ) ar e foun d i n th e norther n provinces . There ar e a n estimate d 19,00 0 ethni c La o refugees , mainl y i n Sam Neua , wit h other s i n Luan g Praban g an d Xien g Khouang . In Na m Th a Provinc e ther e ar e approximatel y 6,00 0 Ya o an d 2,000 Lue , wit h smalle r number s o f othe r tribe s represented . The remainin g refugee s ar e La o an d La o Then g refugee s wh o have gon e t o Vientian e o r t o th e souther n province s o f Khamoune, Sedone, and Attopeu . The tota l numbe r o f refugee s fluctuates greatly . A s fightin g increases, th e peopl e ar e force d t o leav e thei r homes ; the y ma y be ne w refugees , o r ol d refugee s wh o ha d previousl y receive d assistance and ha d possibl y becom e self-sufficien t i n foo d produc tion. A s a resul t o f th e Pathe t La o 196 4 sprin g offensive , 30,00 0 new refugee s wer e adde d t o th e rolls , offsettin g approximatel y the sam e numbe r wh o becam e self-sufficien t becaus e o f a goo d harvest i n othe r areas . Unde r th e mos t idea l condition s (goo d security an d a good rice crop) , the 30,000 new refugees displace d after sprin g plantin g wer e expecte d t o requir e suppor t fo r th e remainder o f 196 4 an d unti l Novembe r 1965 , whe n thei r ne w crop was harvested . The amoun t o f nee d varie s greatl y fro m plac e t o place . I n locations nea r th e fighting areas , th e dependenc e o n relie f i s much greate r tha n i n relativel y secur e areas . Of th e tota l numbe r of refugee s a t th e beginnin g o f 1965 , i t wa s estimate d tha t b y the en d o f th e yea r probabl y one-thir d woul d becom e self-suffi cient, one-thir d partiall y self-sufficien t (gro w enoug h ric e fo r maybe si x months), an d one-thir d completely dependen t becaus e of th e fighting , cro p failure , etc . Whil e th e immediat e ai m o f the relie f progra m ha s bee n t o provide basi c sustenanc e t o hard pressed refugees , th e long-rang e ai m i s permanen t resettlemen t in secure , productiv e areas , i n a manne r tha t wil l be acceptabl e [ 29 7 ]

LAOS : JAME S THOMA S WAR D

to th e triba l peoples . Sinc e th e militar y situatio n i n th e norther n areas doe s no t offe r muc h encouragemen t a t present , extensiv e resettlement ha s not been attempted there . AID T O ME O BEFUGEE S I N XTEN G KHOUAN G PROVINC E

The larges t numbe r o f refugee s i s t o b e foun d i n Xien g Khouang Provinc e amon g th e Me o tribe . Th e Me o ar e relativ e newcomers t o Laos . Mos t immigrate d i n th e pas t centur y fro m China an d Nort h Vietnam . I t ha s bee n estimate d tha t ther e ar e between tw o an d one-hal f an d thre e millio n Me o peopl e livin g in Thailand , Laos , Nort h Vietnam , an d th e Chines e province s of Kweichow , Kwangsi , an d Yunnan . I n Lao s th e La o languag e is th e lingu a franca , an d mos t Me o villag e leaders , eve n i n th e most remot e areas , kno w som e La o i n additio n t o thei r ow n language. Traditionally, th e Me o hav e preferre d mountai n living . Mos t build home s i n th e highe r elevations , explainin g tha t the y find it difficul t t o becom e acclimatize d t o valley livin g an d paddy-ric e cultivation. I n an y case , thei r isolatio n ha s helped preserv e thei r cultural identity . Althoug h Me o histor y ha s bee n characterize d by centurie s o f oppressio n an d disruptio n (firs t i n China , late r in Vietna m an d Laos), th e Me o hav e maintaine d a stron g feelin g of independenc e an d a fierc e resistanc e t o thei r oppressors . The y have ofte n demonstrate d tha t n o matter ho w difficul t thei r pligh t as refugee s ma y be , the y ar e abl e t o overcom e thes e disadvan tages. Generall y speaking , th e Me o hav e unusua l initiative , adaptability, an d a n abilit y t o organiz e themselves . Thi s latte r trait is probably base d o n their strong clan system . The Me o practic e a n animisti c typ e o f religio n rathe r tha n the Buddhis m tha t predominate s amon g th e Lao . Thei r Me o an cestors ar e venerated ; villag e shaman s communicat e wit h spirits , disperse evi l spirits , an d practic e medicin e (se e Barney' s paper) . The agricultur e o f th e Me o depend s o n shiftin g cultivation . The cycl e o f dry-ric e cultur e begin s i n Februar y whe n th e fores t area o f a mountainsid e i s cleared . Afte r th e tree s have bee n cu t and dried , the y ar e burned . I n Apri l o r Ma y th e soi l of th e swid den i s loosene d an d ric e seed s planted . The n come s th e rain y season, an d afterward s th e ric e i s harvested , usuall y i n Novem ber. Maiz e i s an importan t cro p amon g th e Meo , wh o als o rais e [ 29 8 ]

U. S . AI D T O HIL L TRIB E REFUGEE S

cabbage, gree n beans , squash , cucumbers , turnips , swee t pota toes, eggplant , etc . Opiu m cultivatio n i s traditiona l an d ha s i n the pas t serve d as a cash crop . It s importanc e ha s declined , how ever, i n th e pas t severa l year s a s goo d productio n area s hav e been los t an d acces s t o market s ha s bee n limited . I n som e case s non-refugee tribesme n wh o gro w opiu m an d wh o hav e a wa y of gettin g i t t o lowlan d marke t area s wil l trad e i t for consume r commodities—cloth, sugar , sweetene d canne d milk , flashlight batteries, etc.—eithe r fo r thei r ow n consumptio n o r for marketin g in thei r ow n locale . Som e authoritie s believ e tha t i n a perio d of militar y security , afte r transportatio n facilitie s mak e market s more accessible , increase d vegetabl e productio n coul d replac e opium i n importanc e a s a cas h crop . Th e Me o ar e enthusiasti c about livestoc k productio n an d rais e cattle , pigs , horses , an d water buffalo . I n additio n t o anima l husbandry , th e Me o exce l as blacksmiths . Mos t village s hav e a t leas t on e blacksmith , wh o is usuall y quit e competen t i n makin g agricultura l implements , axes, knives, and muskets. The cente r o f refuge e activitie s i n Xien g Khouan g Provinc e is th e Me o villag e o f Sa m Thong , situate d i n a mountai n valle y south o f th e Plai n o f Jar s a t a n elevatio n o f 4,00 0 feet . Approxi mately one-hal f o f th e province , particularl y th e lowe r elevation s including th e Plai n o f Jars , th e ol d provincia l capital , an d th e main roa d whic h connect s th e Plai n o f Jar s wit h Vin h o n th e Gulf o f Tonkin , i s unde r Pathe t La o control . Th e Me o refuge e villages ar e locate d i n th e mountains , whic h rang e u p t o 9,00 0 feet. Whil e rice i s delivered b y ai r drop , other relie f requirement s are delivere d b y shor t take-of f an d landin g (STOL ) aircraf t de signed fo r landin g o n short , roug h ai r strips . Thes e ai r strip s have bee n buil t b y th e refugees . Us e o f aircraf t i s essentia l t o the operatio n o f th e relie f progra m becaus e i t i s th e onl y wa y of gettin g t o th e refugees . Relie f commoditie s ar e lande d a t Sa m Thong b y large r aircraft , usuall y Caribous , an d shuttle d t o refu gee location s vi a smalle r aircraft , usuall y Heli o Couriers . The USAI D refuge e coordinato r fo r Xien g Khouan g i s Edga r Buell, a ma n with vas t experienc e wit h triba l people s i n general , and th e Me o i n particular . Perhap s th e secret s o f Buell' s succes s have bee n hi s empath y an d tirelessness . Hi s languag e facilit y and agricultura l backgroun d hav e helpe d hi s understandin g o f [ 29 9 ]

LAOS : JAME S THOMA S WAH D

local problems , an d i n five year s wit h th e hil l peopl e h e ha s developed numerou s persona l contacts . H e probabl y know s mos t of th e leader s i n th e large r village s i n th e area , an d h e visit s them regularly . H e alway s travel s wit h a Laotia n counterpart , bringing th e messag e o f th e greate r communit y o f Laos . Buell' s efforts a t assistin g refugee s o n th e villag e leve l hav e gaine d fo r him th e admiratio n o f bot h th e triba l peopl e an d th e La o government. When report s o f ne w refugee s ar e receive d a t Sa m Thong , Buell o r on e o f hi s tw o America n assistants , wit h a nativ e coun terpart, visi t th e displace d people . A t thi s tim e relocatio n site s are discussed , an d th e headma n compile s a lis t o f th e familie s and number s o f peopl e involved . Th e villager s ar e encourage d to reestablis h themselve s quickly , t o buil d thei r homes , an d t o select area s fo r ric e cultivation . The y ar e tol d tha t the y wil l re ceive ric e fro m th e sk y onl y temporarily , unti l the y ar e abl e t o harvest thei r own . Th e mos t pressin g need s o f th e villager s ar e determined an d commoditie s quickl y provided . Mos t commo n needs ar e blankets , cooking-pots , clothing , an d tools . Me o refu gees receiv e stee l bar s t o fashio n thei r ow n tools , whic h ar e su perior t o "ready-made " tools . I f the y nee d clothing , the y ar e furnished wit h blac k clot h t o mak e thei r own . Villager s receiv e vegetable seed s t o plan t garden s a s a mean s o f varyin g thei r diets. Refugees ar e encourage d t o buil d a schoo l fo r thei r children , and the y ar e provide d wit h schoo l supplie s an d a teache r t o help th e childre n t o lear n La o a s a secon d language . The large r village school s ma y hav e severa l classe s fo r severa l grades . Th e highest schoo l i s a groupe scholaire locate d a t Sa m Thong . Thi s school accept s advance d student s fro m a numbe r o f village s an d is supervise d b y th e Ministr y o f Education . Som e o f th e triba l graduates hav e bee n accepte d fo r furthe r stud y a t th e Lyce e and Teache r Trainin g Cente r i n Vientiane . Mas s educatio n fo r hill people, never attempte d i n the past , ha s been enthusiasticall y received by the villagers. A Meo medic will visit the new refugee s an d trea t thei r numer ous ailment s wit h moder n medication . Th e medi c supervise s th e construction o f a smal l dispensary , an d th e villag e elder s ar e asked t o selec t a youn g ma n t o g o t o Sa m Thon g fo r medi c [ 30 0 ]

U. S . AI D T O HIL L TKIB E REFUGEE S

training. Th e trainin g progra m consist s o f classroo m an d on-the job trainin g fo r fou r months . Afte r th e medi c complete s th e course, h e return s t o hi s villag e wit h medicine s t o car e fo r hi s own people . Th e USAI D Publi c Healt h Divisio n support s a n eighty-bed hospita l a t Sa m Thon g wit h personne l an d medicines . Equipment fo r th e hospita l wa s provide d b y USAI D an d th e Colombo Plan . Mos t o f th e hospita l beds ar e filled with casualtie s of wa r o r victims o f malaria , malnutrition , an d othe r ailments . VILLAG E CLUSTE R PROGRA M

A commo n proble m amon g ne w nation s wit h traditiona l so cieties i s th e grea t ga p betwee n dominan t urba n elite s an d th e rural masses ; i n Lao s th e latte r probabl y constitute s 9 5 percen t of th e population . Th e Pathe t La o movemen t i s attemptin g t o mobilize th e rura l populatio n wit h th e techniqu e o f "revolution ary warfare " tha t wa s successfull y applie d i n Nort h Vietnam . The Roya l Lao Governmen t wit h USAI D assistanc e i s attemptin g to influenc e rura l area s throug h th e Villag e Cluste r Progra m (Khet Phatanakhane ) an d th e Refuge e Relie f Program . The Cluste r Progra m i s a pilo t rura l developmen t progra m for th e lowlan d area s wher e th e ethni c La o ar e predominant . It concentrate s assistanc e fo r th e improvemen t o f education , health, agriculture , an d transportatio n i n a comple x o f existin g villages. Whil e th e locatio n o f cluster s i s determine d b y nee d for economi c improvement , strategi c consideration s ar e impor tant, a s som e cluster s ar e located o n the perimeter s o f RL G influ ence. La o provincia l official s an d thei r USAI D counterpart s mee t with distric t o r villag e leader s to determine th e mos t urgen t com munity needs—whethe r the y ar e wells , schools , acces s roads , small irrigatio n dams , dispensaries , o r agricultura l o r livestoc k improvements. Th e multi-purpos e village-leve l worker s assistin g the villager s ar e th e U.N.-traine d La o Fundamenta l Educator s and th e youn g America n volunteer s o f th e Internationa l Volun tary Services . There i s no relocation o f villagers involved. Usuall y a marke t tow n i s selecte d a s cluste r headquarters , th e cente r for developmen t work . I n th e center , dependin g o n th e villagers ' desires, a n improve d schoo l i s built , a demonstratio n garde n i s established, an d a dispensar y t o serv e al l th e village s i n th e clus ter i s constructed . Th e cluste r cente r serve s th e surroundin g vil [301 ]

LAOS : JAME S THOMA S WAR D

lages, whic h ma y numbe r anywher e fro m a half-doze n t o tw o dozen. Thi s i s a self-hel p program : th e villager s contribut e then labor, land , an d loca l materials , whil e th e governmen t an d USAID furnis h advice , equipment , an d othe r materials . Th e de gree o f villag e cooperatio n an d th e succes s o f th e cluste r depen d on th e calibe r o f th e loca l leadership . I t i s fel t tha t th e cluste r program ha s bee n moderatel y successful , an d th e si x origina l cluster area s starte d i n Septembe r 196 3 hav e bee n expande d t o twelve. Villagers ' attitude s towar d th e progra m ar e no t eas y t o determine, an d additiona l researc h shoul d b e conducte d here . Changed attitude s ar e muc h mor e importan t tha n th e numbe r of project s completed . CENTRA L GOVERNMEN T AN D TRIBE S

In th e northern triba l area s th e authorit y o f th e centra l govern ment ha s bee n virtuall y nonexistent ; however , thi s non-involve ment wit h th e tribe s i s changin g (bu t se e Barney' s chapte r re garding Meo-La o relationship s i n Xien g Khouang) . Th e proble m of th e tribe s ha s bee n on e o f informa l discriminatio n b y th e low land Lao , perhap s becaus e o f cultura l an d economi c differences . This ha s been intensifie d b y lack of communicatio n an d transpor tation facilities . Whil e th e ethni c La o fee l superio r t o th e tribes men, the y d o no t vie w the m wit h th e sam e contempt reputedl y held b y th e Vietnames e towar d th e montagnards. Tw o Meo s hold hig h governmen t position s i n Laos . Th e RL G ha s closel y cooperated wit h Toub y Lyfong , formerl y a governmen t ministe r and vice-chairma n o f th e Nationa l Assembly , an d Genera l Van g Pao, Commande r o f th e Secon d Militar y Region . Visit s t o th e tribal area s b y th e King , th e Crow n Price , Prim e Ministe r Sou vanna Phouma , an d othe r governmen t leader s hav e bee n impor tant. Th e retur n t o Xien g Khouan g Provinc e o f th e civilia n La o Provincial Governo r fro m exil e i n Vientian e i s most significant . The Civi l Wa r ha s itensifie d th e fragmentatio n o f th e tribes . The Pathet La o movemen t wit h it s "Wa r o f Nationa l Liberation " has, in th e past , successfull y recruite d man y triba l peoples , especially amon g th e La o Theng , th e mos t deprive d group . Thei r propaganda appea l promise s equalit y an d a n en d t o oppressio n from colonialist s an d neo-colonialists . The Pathe t La o has empha sized a popular unite d fron t o f al l peoples rather tha n th e autono [ 30 2 ]

U. S . AI D T O HIL L TBIB E BEFuGEE

S

mous region s fo r triba l group s foun d i n Chin a an d th e Demo cratic Republi c o f Vietnam . Th e Meo have prove n effectiv e guer rilla fighters o n bot h sides ; i n thei r nativ e environs , the y ar e often superio r t o lowlan d troops . Whil e a dissiden t Me o leade r named Faydan g joine d Princ e Souphanavon g i n th e earl y day s of th e Pathe t La o movement , th e majorit y o f Me o have remaine d loyal t o th e centra l governmen t i n Vientiane , probabl y becaus e of th e leadershi p o f Toub y Lyfon g an d Genera l Van g Pao . Th e Refugee Relie f Progra m ha s provide d a vehicl e fo r th e centra l government t o becom e directl y involve d wit h th e triba l peoples . The centra l governmen t i s no w i n a stron g positio n t o asses s their need s an d t o offe r relie f an d service s t o th e victim s o f th e fighting. Althoug h th e progra m ha s bee n limite d i n scope , i t i s hoped tha t th e return s wil l b e promisin g amon g no t onl y Meo , but als o La o Theng , Yao , an d ethni c La o refugees . I t i s onl y through village-leve l contact s suc h a s thes e tha t th e Roya l La o Government wil l b e abl e t o presen t t o th e tribe s a clea r imag e of itself—a n imag e tha t wil l b e respecte d an d supported .

[ 30 3 ]

PART V I : MALAYSI

A

MALAYSIA : I N T R O D U C T I O

N

MALAYSIA, includin g th e state s o f Sarawa k an d Saba h (Nort h Borneo) o n Borneo , Singapore , an d th e Mala y states , wa s founded i n Septembe r 1963 . Previousl y thes e state s ha d bee n administered b y th e Britis h unde r a variet y o f administrativ e devices, thoug h th e Federatio n o f Malay a (th e Mala y states ) had achieve d independenc e i n 1957 . I n Augus t 196 5 Singapor e was separate d fro m th e othe r member s o f Malaysia . Th e paper s in thi s volum e dea l wit h Sarawa k an d Sabah , bu t som e back ground on the rest of Malaysia is also relevant. The pre-colonia l inhabitants o f Malaysi a wer e almos t al l speak ers o f Malayo-Polynesia n languages , bu t the y were no t culturall y uniform, no r wer e the y politicall y unifie d (se e Gullic k 195 8 for a description o f indigenous political structure) . There was the usua l split betwee n th e sophisticated , literate , aristocrati c familie s an d the rura l masses , an d ther e wa s als o a differenc e betwee n th e coastal people , wh o ha d bee n converte d t o Isla m a s a resul t o f contacts wit h Ara b an d India n traders , an d th e people s o f th e interior o f th e Malaya n peninsul a an d Borneo , mos t o f who m retained thei r traditiona l animisti c religions . Th e populatio n o f the interio r o f th e Malaya n peninsul a ha s evidentl y alway s bee n quite small , consistin g o f shiftin g cultivator s an d hunter s an d gatherers (mos t o f thes e people—Seno i an d Semang—ar e non Malay i n speech) . But , a s Harrisso n tell s us , th e interio r popula tion o f Borne o was , an d stil l is , relatively large , an d ha s enjoye d a hig h standar d o f livin g an d a fairl y sophisticate d cultur e with out, however , havin g direc t contac t wit h on e of th e world's majo r centers o f civilization .

The presen t ethni c compositio n i s eve n mor e divers e sinc e i t now contain s ver y substantia l number s o f Chines e an d Indian s in additio n t o th e Malay s an d "indigenou s minority " (i.e. , non Islamic) peoples . What i s no w Malaysi a wa s no t politicall y unifie d o r centrall y controlled unde r nativ e rule whe n th e Britis h bega n t o tak e ove r the are a i n 1824 . There ha d alread y been thre e centurie s o f Euro pean contac t b y thi s time . Coasta l sultanate s ha d waxe d an d waned. Thei r orientation , lik e tha t o f th e earl y Europeans , wa s toward th e se a an d contro l o f trade , rathe r tha n consolidatio n [ 30 7 ]

PETE R KUNSTADTE R

of th e hinterlands . Th e contro l b y coasta l sultanate s ove r th e inland area s wa s base d o n contro l o f rivers , an d thu s ove r th e only practica l route s t o th e interior . Earl y Mala y settlement s were o n th e coas t and a t rive r mouths , wher e the y coul d contro l the oversea s exchange s o f prestig e good s suc h a s hornbil l ivor y from th e interior of Borneo and jars from China . After th e British , i n on e guis e o r another , ha d gaine d contro l over wha t wa s t o becom e Malaysia , interes t i n th e hinterland s as sources o f ra w material s increased , especially i n tin an d rubbe r on th e Malaya n peninsul a an d peppe r an d gol d o n Borneo . Ordinarily ethni c Malay s wer e no t use d a s worker s o n planta tions o r i n mines . Instead , worker s wer e imported , firs t fro m southeastern Chin a an d later , especiall y i n Malaya, from souther n India an d Ceylon . Apparentl y th e Indian s wer e importe d i n a deliberate attemp t t o weake n th e potentia l contro l th e Chines e would hav e ove r th e economy . Thu s lon g befor e independenc e problems o f balancin g ethni c minoritie s wer e recognized , an d attempts wer e mad e t o dea l wit h them . Unti l i t becam e eviden t that th e constituen t part s o f Malaysi a woul d becom e indepen dent, th e polic y wa s on e o f divid e an d rule . India n an d Chines e participation i n politics was not encouraged , an d th e Malay s were recognized a s havin g a "specia l position " i n spit e o f th e fac t that th e economy was largely in non-Malay hands. The "indigenou s minority " peopl e i n Malay a ar e relativel y few, bu t the y for m th e majorit y o f th e population s o f Saba h and Sarawak . I n Malay a wher e th e aborigine s hav e bee n unde r the administratio n o f a Protecto r o f Aborigines , th e officia l polic y is tha t the y shoul d b e integrate d wit h th e Mala y populatio n (Carey 1961 ; Federatio n o f Malay a 1961) . However , relativel y few attempt s hav e bee n mad e t o integrat e the m int o th e nationa l economy an d society . O n Borneo , especiall y i n Sarawak , th e situ ation ha s evidentl y bee n quit e different , sinc e th e indigenou s peoples hav e bee n give n educatio n fo r a numbe r o f year s unde r British administration . Som e o f thes e educate d Bornean s fea r that the y ma y com e t o b e treate d a s a "protected " an d isolate d minority alon g th e sam e line s a s th e Malaya n aborigines . S o fa r their windo w t o th e civilize d worl d ha s bee n throug h the British , using th e Englis h language , an d thu s the y ma y fea r th e Malay sianization o f th e educationa l syste m an d th e replacemen t o f English b y Mala y a s th e language o f civilization . Thi s i s a situa [ 30 8 ]

MALAYSIA: INTRODUCTIO

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tion analogou s t o th e on e foun d i n Burma . But at least th e fiscal problem s ar e no t comparabl e t o thos e i n Burma , sinc e Malaysi a is investin g mor e i n th e Borne o state s tha n i t receive s i n th e form o f taxe s i n attempt s t o rais e th e Bornean s t o th e level s of literac y an d healt h alread y achieve d i n Malaya . Th e problem s of minoritie s continu e t o b e amon g th e knotties t wit h whic h Malaysia mus t deal. The Britis h too k contro l ove r Malaysi a i n a serie s o f step s recognizin g o r creatin g man y differen t sort s o f politica l entitie s in th e process . Th e result ha s been a comple x legal picture , which persists unde r th e Malaysia n constitution , includin g th e recogni tion o f th e politica l an d religiou s position s o f th e heir s t o th e ancien t sultanates . Suc h law s hav e implication s t o th e almos t uniforml y non-Mosle m minorities , sinc e the y clearl y impl y a na tiona l religio n (Islam ) wit h it s implie d socia l an d politica l fea tures. Harrisso n ha s indicate d som e o f th e anxietie s fel t by som e of th e peopl e o f Sarawa k a s a resul t o f this—anxietie s whic h are quit e simila r t o thos e reporte d by Lehma n amon g th e minori ties i n Burm a afte r th e passage o f th e Stat e Religio n Act . Th e dange r whic h thi s raise s fo r th e constructio n an d mainte nanc e o f nationa l unit y i s particularl y clea r becaus e o f th e very different ethni c compositio n o f th e severa l states . Saba h an d Sarawak ar e predominantl y non-Mala y an d non-Moslem . Singa pore, whic h i s approximatel y 7 5 percen t Chinese , evidentl y lef t the Federatio n o f Malaysi a a t leas t i n par t becaus e o f th e eco nomi c an d politica l disadvantage s give n t o Singapore , whic h were designe d int o th e constitutio n in orde r t o protec t th e posi tion o f th e Malay s i n th e Federatio n as a whole . Bu t resistanc e to federatio n i s not onl y ethnicall y based . Brunei , whic h i s th e most "Malay " o f al l th e Borne o states , apparentl y decline d t o join th e Federatio n becaus e o f conflict s ove r th e positio n o f th e Sultan o f Brune i vis-a-vi s th e sultan s o f th e Mala y state s ( a dis put e goin g bac k t o pre-colonia l history) , an d als o becaus e o f the oil-base d affluenc e o f Brune i as compare d with th e other states. The ethni c difference s ar e reflecte d i n difference s i n settlemen t patter n an d occupatio n a s wel l a s religion . Th e Malay s hav e been primaril y ric e cultivators , small-holdin g rubbe r growers , or fishermen. The y ar e generall y foun d i n ethnicall y homoge neou s communities , in the coasta l areas . The Chines e an d Indian s have usuall y bee n economicall y an d geographicall y distinct . Γ 309 ]

PETE H KUNSTADTE R

They ar e ofte n foun d inland , i n plantation s o r mines . Th e Chi nese hav e become laborers , traders , an d shopkeepers . Man y hav e become wel l educate d an d ar e involve d i n th e professions , an d they hav e attaine d a dominan t plac e i n commerce . The Indian s and Ceylones e hav e becom e plantatio n an d railroa d worker s and , as i n Burma , hav e become involve d i n money-lendin g an d bank ing. Bot h th e Chines e an d th e Indian s hav e traditionall y sen t remittances t o thei r overseas relatives , an d bot h hav e bee n re sponsive t o political events affecting thei r homelands . The minoritie s wer e involve d i n th e Secon d Worl d Wa r an d its aftermath i n a variet y o f significan t way s whic h hav e affecte d the interna l cohesio n o f th e nation . Th e indigenou s minoritie s in Borne o wer e quit e activ e an d effectiv e a s guerrilla s agains t the Japanes e (Harrisso n 1959) . Th e Japanes e wer e a t leas t par tially successfu l i n incitin g anti-Britis h sentimen t amon g th e In dians o f Malay a b y promisin g t o liberat e Indi a fro m Britis h colonial rule . Th e Chinese , largel y with Communis t organizatio n but als o with Britis h backing , carrie d ou t organize d an d effectiv e resistance afte r th e Japanese invasion . Especiall y afte r th e Com munist take-ove r i n China , th e Chines e Communist s i n Malay a organized resistanc e t o th e British , wh o ha d returne d t o reclai m their colon y an d foun d economi c chao s lef t b y th e Japanese . In thi s rebellion , th e so-calle d Malaya n Emergency , th e Chines e were quit e unsuccessfu l i n developin g large-scal e suppor t amon g the Malays or among the other minorities. 1 Today th e problem s o f nation-buildin g ar e complicate d fo r Malaysia b y th e Philippin e claim s i n Saba h (base d o n claim s of th e ol d SuI u sultanate ) an d Indonesia' s polic y o f "Confronta tion." Th e "Confrontation " polic y ha s involve d th e Indonesian s in a pledg e t o "crus h Malaysia, " an d i t seem s t o hav e tw o ra tionales whic h hol d implication s fo r minorities . First , i t appeal s to pan-Mala y sentiment , an d second , i t appeal s agains t neo-colo nialism. Thes e appeal s have evidentl y falle n quit e flat i n Borneo, where th e confrontatio n ha s involve d th e greates t amoun t o f military action . Her e th e indigenou s populatio n doe s no t vie w itself a s bein g ethnicall y Malay , an d ha s regarde d th e Britis h 1

TlIe aborigine s o f th e Mala y peninsul a wer e les s effectiv e tha n th e Borne o natives agains t th e Japanes e (Slimmin g 1958) . However , the y playe d a majo r role durin g th e Malaya n Emergenc y becaus e th e guerrilla s wer e operatin g ou t o f the interior , whic h wa s occupie d almos t exclusivel y b y aborigine s (Mado c 1961; Stace y 1953 ; Westwoo d 1962) .

[ 31 0 ]

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2

as it s protector s agains t arme d invasion. A s Harrisso n an d Le y tell us , th e indigenou s people s o f Borne o hav e continue d t o b e loyal t o Malaysi a an d he r Britis h advisers , an d hav e strongl y resisted th e Indonesia n invasions . Like mos t border s i n Southeas t Asia, th e boundar y betwee n Malaysia n an d Indonesia n Borne o cuts acros s ethni c distributions . Bu t th e Indonesian s d o no t see m to hav e bee n successfu l i n persuadin g th e indigenou s peopl e o n either sid e o f th e borde r t o joi n th e Indonesia n cause . I n fact , "Confrontation," an d th e specia l militar y an d economi c ai d which i t produce d i n Saba h an d Sarawak , ma y hav e resulte d in greate r loyalt y o f th e indigenou s minoritie s t o Malaysi a tha n would hav e bee n th e cas e i f ther e had bee n n o outsid e threat . BIBLIOGRAPHY For bibliographi c informatio n o n th e ethni c group s o f Malaysi a se e Ken nedy (1962) . Fo r genera l ethnologica l backgroun d se e Col e (1945 ) an d Skeat an d Blagde n (1906) . Fo r tw o excellen t studie s o f group s i n Malaysia n Borneo se e Freema n (1955 ) an d Gedde s (1954) . Fo r a shorte r accoun t o f the Dusu n se e William s (1965) . Se e Firt h (1946 ) an d Swif t (1964 ) fo r studies o f Malaya n peasan t communities . Fo r studie s o f th e Malaya n "Emergency" se e Py e (1956) , Purcel l (1954) , Shor t (1964) , an d Osborn e (1965:9-19). Fo r a discussio n o f th e rol e o f th e Malaya n aborigine s i n thi s struggle se e Federatio n o f Malay a (1960 , Appendi x F ) , Holma n (1958) , and Williams-Hun t (1952) . Fo r genera l treatment s o f Malaysi a se e Wan g (1964), Gullic k (1964) , an d Parme r (1964) . Fo r a discussio n o f relation s between Singapor e an d Malaysi a se e Osborn e (1964) . Fo r som e aspect s o f the Indonesia n vie w o n "Confrontation " se e Willne r (1965) . Fo r som e aspects o f problem s o f developmen t o f nationa l loyaltie s amon g th e divers e peoples i n Indonesi a se e Skinne r (1959) . R E F E R E N C E S CITE

D

CAREY, I . Y .

1961 Ranchanga n lim a tahun . Fiv e yea r plan . Kual a Lumpur . 2

Certainly th e pan-Mala y rational e woul d hav e n o appea l t o th e Chinese ; however, th e Indonesian s see m t o hav e ha d considerabl e succes s amon g th e Chinese o f Sarawa k i n appeal s fo r anti-Malaysi a action , includin g politica l assassi nations (New York Times, Jul y 4 , 1965 ; se e als o Harrisson' s paper , n . 1) . Th e question o f th e Sarawa k Chines e respons e t o "Confrontation " ma y actuall y b e much mor e complicated , sinc e i t apparentl y involve s direc t tie s wit h th e Com munists of mainlan d Chin a (Toppin g 1966 ) a s wel l a s wit h Chines e Communist s in Indonesia . Evidenc e fo r th e latte r suggestio n i s foun d i n th e fac t tha t armed confrontation ha s bee n abandone d b y Indonesi a sinc e th e Communis t cou p faile d in Indonesia i n Septembe r 1965 . This cou p attemp t wa s followe d b y anti-Chines e measures couple d wit h blood y suppressio n o f th e Indonesia n Communist s (Lewi s 1966). [311]

PETE R KUNSTADTE B COLE , F . C .

1945 Th

e people s o f Malaysia . Ne w York, D . Van Nostrand .

FEDERATIO N O F MALAYA , MINISTR

Y O F INFORMATIO N

1960 E n d o f th e Emergency . Kual a Lumpur . 1961 Statemen t o f polic y regardin g th e administratio n o f th e aborig in e peopl e o f th e Federatio n o f Malaya . Kual a Lumpur . F I R T H , RAYMON D

1946 Mala y fishermen : thei r peasan t economy . London , Kega n Paul , Trench , Trubne r an d Co. , Ltd . FREEMAN , J . D .

1955 lba n agriculture . London , Britis h Colonia l Office , Colonia l Re searc h Studies . GEDDES , W . R

.

1954 Th e Lan d Dyak s o f Sarawak . London , Britis h Colonia l Office , Colonia l Researc h Studies . GULLICK , J . M

.

1958 Indigenou s politica l system s o f wester n Malaya . London , Uni versity o f London , Th e Athlon e Press . Londo n Schoo l o f Economic s Monograph s o n Socia l Anthropolog y 17 . 1964 Malaya . Ne w Yor k an d Washington , Frederic k A . Praeger , re vised edn . HARRKSON , T .

1961 Worl HOLMAN , DENNI

d within : a Borne o story . London , Cresse t Press . S

1958 Noon

e of th e UIu . London , Heinemann .

KENNEDY , RAYMON D

1962 Bibliograph y o f Indonesia n people s an d cultures . Revise d an d edite d b y Thoma s W . Maretzk i an d H . Th . Fischer . Ne w Haven , Yal e University , Southeas t Asi a Studies , b y arrangemen t with Huma n Relation s Are a Files , 2 d revise d edn . LEWIS , ANTHON Y

1966 Indonesi a purge : 100,00 0 sai d t o die . Red s an d pro-Red s re porte d slai n sinc e cou p attempt . Th e Ne w Yor k Times , Januar y 13, pp . 1-2 , stor y dateline d London . MADOC , G . C .

1959 Jungl e fort . In Strait s Time s Annua l fo r 1961 , pp . 70-73 . Singapore , Strait s Time s Press . OSBORNE , M I L T O N E .

1964 Singapor e an d Malaysia . Ithaca , Ne w York , Cornel l University , Departmen t o f Asia n Studies , Southeas t Asi a Program , Dat a Pape r 53 . 1965 Strategi c hamlet s i n Sout h Vietnam : a surve y an d a comparison . Ithaca , Ne w York , Cornel l University , Departmen t o f Asia n Studies , Southeas t Asia Program , Dat a Pape r 55 . PARMER , J . NORMA N

1964 Malaysia . In Government s an d politic s o f Southeas t Asia , Georg e McTurna n Kahin , ed . Ithaca , Ne w York , Cornel l Uni versity Press , 2 d edn. , p p. 279-371 . Γ 31 2 1

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N

PURCELL, VICTO R

1954 Malaya : communis t o r free. Stanford , Stanfor d Universit y Press . PYE, LUCIA N

1956 Guerrill a communis m i n Malaya : it s socia l an d politica l mean ing. Princeton , N.J. , Princeton Universit y Press . SHORT, ANTHON Y

1964 Communis m an d th e Emergency . In Malaysia : a survey , Wan g Gungwu, ed . Ne w York , Washington , an d London , Frederic k A. Praeger . SKEAT, W . W. , an d C . O . BLAGDE N

1906 Paga n race s o f th e Mala y peninsula . 2 vols . London , Mac millan. SKINNER, G . W I L L I A M (ed. )

1959 Local , ethnic , an d nationa l loyaltie s i n villag e Indonesia : a symposium. Ne w Haven, Conn. , Yal e University , Southeas t Asi a Studies, Cultura l Repor t Series . Distribute d i n cooperatio n wit h the Institut e o f Pacific Relations , Ne w York. SLIMMING, J .

1958 Temia r jungle ; a Malayan journey . London , J . Murray . STACEY, T .

1953 Th e hostile sun ; a Malaya n journey . London , Duckworth . SWIFT, M . G .

1964 Capital , savin g an d credi t i n a Mala y peasan t economy . In Capital, savin g an d credi t i n peasan t societies , Raymon d Firt h and B . S . Yamey , eds . Chicago , Aldin e Publishin g Co. , p p . 133-156. TOPPING, SEYMOU R

1966 Re d Chin a help s Malaysi a rebels . Welcome s leade r o f grou p formed t o toppl e regime . Th e Ne w Yor k Times , Januar y 14 , story dateline d Hon g Kong . W A N G GUNGW U (ed. )

1964 Malaysia : a survey . Ne w York, Washington , an d London, Fred erick A . Praeger . WESTWOOD, T .

1962 Th e face o f the beloved. London , G. Allen . WILLIAMS, THOMA S RHY S

1965 Th e Dusun : a Nort h Borne o society . Ne w York, Holt , Rinehar t and Winston , Inc . WILLIAMS-HUNT, P . D . R .

1952 A n introductio n t o th e Malaya n Aborigines . Kual a Lumpur , The Governmen t Printer . WrLLNER, AN N R . 1965 Th e view fro m Jakarta . Th e New Leader, Marc h 15 , p p. 12-15 . Periodicals T H E N E W YORK TIMES . Ne w York .

[ 31 3 ]

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R

TABLE 1 1 DISTRIBUTION O F ETHNI C GROUP S I N BRUNEI , SABAH , AND SARAWA K (196 0 CENSUS) » BRUNE I MALAYSI b

Group Saba Bajau (indigenou s population ) [Baha u grou p ?] Bajau Illanun Bisaya (indigenou s population ) [Klamanta n group] Brunei (indigenou s population ) Ceylonese (include s India n an d Pakistani ) Chinese Cantonese Foochow Hailam (Hainanese ) Hakka Henghua Hokkien Teochew Other Cocos Islande r Eurasian European Indonesian Kadazan (Dusun ) (indigenou s population ) [Klamantan group ] Kayan (indigenou s population ) [Baha u group ] Kedayan (Kadayan ) (indigenou s population ) [Klamantan group ] Kelabit (indigenou s population ) [Klamanta n group] Kenyah (indigenou s population ) [Baha u group ] Land Daya k [Lan d Daya k group ] Malay Melanau (Milanau ) [Klamanta n group ] Murut (indigenou s population ) [Klamanta n group] Orang Sunge i Philippine nativ e Punan (indigenou s population ) [Puna n group ] Sarawak nativ e Sea Daya k (Iban )

A

h Sarawa

k

59,710 55,779 3,931 7,000 2,900° 21,800

10,053 23,450 3,180 104,542 15,251 5,270 57,338

300

11,924 5,991 8,768 1,909 772 1,124 24,784

2,803 2,355 229,154 17,432 70,125 5,717 70,221 8,278 28,304 21,952 7,125 538 1,093 3,241

145,229 7,899 13,000

33,500 400

100

7,871

1,645 22,138 15,112 7,473 1,911

7,207 2,040 8,093 57,619 129,300 44,661 5,214 4,669 237,741 (continued)

[ 314 ]

MALAYSIA : INTHODUCTIO

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TABLE 1 1 (continued) BBUNE I MALAYSI

Group* Saba Sino-native (indigenou s population ) SuIu (indigenou s population ) Tidong (indigenou s population ) Other Other indigenou s Muslim s Total al l communitie s

A

h Sarawa 7,438 11,080 4,417 583

400 83,300 454,421

k

902 744,529

a

Source s fo r populatio n figures: Jone s (1962A , 1962B) . For meanin g o f "indigenou s population " se e Harrisson' s pape r (pp . 320 343 ff.) . Classificatio n o f th e group s [i n squar e brackets ] i s fro m Kenned y 1962). Th e basi s fo r classificatio n o f Borne o population s i s quit e unclear , an d inconsistent amon g th e severa l censuse s an d othe r sources . c This figur e include s Europea n population . b

REFERENCES CITE D JONES, L . W

.

1962A Nort h Borneo , a repor t o n th e censu s o f populatio n 1960 . Kuching. 1962B Sarawak , a repor t o n th e censu s o f populatio n 1960 . Kuching . KENNEDY, RAYMON D

1962 Bibliograph y o f Indonesia n people s an d cultures . Revise d an d edited b y Thoma s W . Maretzk i an d H . Th . Fischer . Ne w Haven, Yal e University , Southeas t Asia n Studies , b y arrange ment wit h th e Huma n Relation s Are a Files , 2 d revise d edn .

t 31 5 ]

PETE R KUNSTADTE H

TABLE 1 2 POPULATION AN D LINGUISTI C AFFILIATIO N O F ETHNI C GROUPS O F TH E FEDERATIO N O F MALAYA » Est. Populatio n

Group Chinese tota l (195 7 census ) Hokien Hakka Cantonese Tiechieu Hainanese Kwongsai Hengkwa Hokchia Other Indian (includin g Pakistani ) "Malaysian" tota l Malay

281,200

Indonesian "Aborigines" Jakun (aborigina l Malays ) Negrito (Semang ) Senoi Semai Temiar Jah Hu t Che Won g Semelai ( = Jakun? ) Other Buddhist Tha i Total (195 7 census )

2,333,756 740,600 508,800 505,200 283,100 123,000 69,100 46,100 11,900 34,300 696,186 3,125,474 2,802,900

41,360 4,213-14,000+ 841- 3,00 0 20,480-26,900 12,451-15,000 9,408-10,000 1,300- 1,70 0 180- 20 0 2,821 11,626 15,000b 6,278,758

Language Chinese

Indo-European — Malayo-Polynesian: Malay Malayo-Polynesian: Malay — Malayo-Polynesian: Malay Senoi-Semang Senoi-Semang

? — Tai: Southwester n

a

Populatio n figures ar e fro m Census of the Federation of Malaya, 195 7 fFell 1959) ; linguisti c classification s an d underline d population figures ar e from LeBa r et al. 1964 . Becaus e populatio n figures ar e take n fro m severa l sources, the tota l o f thi s table doe s not equal the census total. b Figure from Thompso n an d Adloff (1955:160) . REFERENCES CITE D FELL, H .

1959

1957 populatio n censu s o f Malaya , Repor t No . 14 . Kual a Lumpur.

LEBAB, FRAN K M. , GERAL D C. HICKEY , an d JOH N K . MUSGRAV E

1964 Ethni c group s o f mainlan d Southeas t Asia . Ne w Haven , Huma n Relations Are a Files Press. THOMPSON, VIRGINIA , an d RICHAR D ADLOF F

1955 Minorit y problem s i n Southeas t Asia . Stanford , Stanfor d Uni versity Press .

CHAPTE R 9

Tribes, Minorities, and the Central Governmen t in Sarawak, Malaysi a TO M HARRISSO N

I. INTRODUCTIO N THE mSTOBICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUN D OF CONFRONTATIO N

The first genera l consideratio n wit h regar d t o Sarawa k i s that , although i t i s onl y on e stat e i n th e Federatio n o f Malaysia , i t is much th e largest . I t i s one of th e newest an d has many feature s in commo n wit h Sabah , th e othe r Malaysia n stat e o n Borneo , and no t s o muc h i n commo n wit h th e muc h olde r an d mor e homogeneous politica l unit s o f th e ol d Mala y Federation . Th e old Federatio n o f Malay a o n th e peninsul a i s no w th e centra l nexus o f th e ne w Federatio n o f Malaysia , forme d o f ol d British administered territorie s i n 1963 . Thi s no w include s Sabah , an d Sarawak, bu t no t Brunei , whic h wa s previousl y als o Britis h ter ritory i n wester n Borneo , no r Singapore , whic h lef t th e Federa tion i n August 1965. Second, whil e politically , psychologically , an d no w als o mili tarily w e hav e t o thin k o f Sarawa k i n th e contex t o f Malaysia , it i s als o unavoidabl e t o thin k o f i t i n th e contex t o f Borneo . This contex t o f Borne o is in many respects th e main on e in whic h Sarawak ha s develope d th e characteristic s o f th e interio r an d of th e minoritie s an d hil l people s wit h whic h thi s boo k i s con cerned. O n th e whole , th e direc t influenc e fro m Malaya , an d indeed fro m muc h o f th e mainland , ha s bee n rathe r smal l unti l very recen t times . Contact s withi n th e grea t islan d o f Borneo , and betwee n Borne o an d th e surroundin g island s whic h ar e no w part o f Indonesi a o r th e Republi c o f th e Philippine s hav e bee n great indee d ove r thousand s an d perhap s eve n ten s o f thousand s of years . Intra-islan d contact , evolution , an d independen t devel [ 31 7 ]

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opment hav e als o take n plac e withi n Borneo . Whil e Sarawa k is an integral , geographicall y large , an d indee d enthusiasti c seg ment o f Malaysia , i t i s comparativel y unimportan t economicall y and numericall y a s regard s th e vote . O n th e othe r hand , i t i s also a larg e par t o f th e islan d o f Borneo , o f whic h mor e tha n two-thirds i s in th e hand s of , unde r th e contro l of , an d t o som e extent, historicall y connecte d wit h th e Republi c o f Indonesi a (under th e previous Dutc h regime) . These aspect s com e int o al l tha t follows , becaus e thinkin g within th e islan d ca n ofte n greatl y influenc e th e thinkin g out ward o r th e thinkin g fro m outsid e abou t an y par t o f th e island , and i t i s i n thi s patter n tha t w e hav e t o pu t th e presen t Con frontation situatio n betwee n Malaysi a an d Indonesia . Confronta tion i s t o som e exten t a continuatio n of , an d als o a contradictio n of, a ver y ancien t historica l process . Ther e ha s bee n a generall y northwestward movemen t throug h th e islan d o f Borne o ove r many centurie s whic h ha s involve d man y o f th e interio r tribes . This movemen t ha s le d larg e element s o f group s suc h a s th e Kelabits, Kenyans, Kayans, Iban (Se a Dayaks), and Lan d Dayak s to th e wes t sid e o f th e island , whic h i s no w a par t o f Malaysia . Much large r section s o f th e sam e group s stil l remai n o n th e east and souther n sides (no w a part of Indonesia) . Confrontation generall y follow s th e geographica l watershe d between th e river s tha t flo w wes t an d th e river s tha t flow eas t in Borneo . Thi s lin e wa s adopte d a s th e politica l boundar y be tween th e Dutc h an d th e Britis h i n th e las t century . Confronta tion i s recognize d a s a geographica l fac t o f lif e whic h greatl y influenced th e peopl e lon g befor e an y white-skin s eve r cam e t o this par t o f th e worl d and , a t th e sam e time , a s a contradictio n of geographica l realities . Th e peopl e themselve s ar e intimatel y intermixed o n bot h side s o f th e border . The y ar e th e sam e eth nically an d culturall y an d hav e a commo n aristocrac y an d elabo rate trad e an d othe r associations—cultural , religious , an d s o on—which wer e neve r broken until th e Indonesian s forcibl y exer cised the policy of Confrontatio n i n 1963. THE CHINES E MINORIT Y

It i s als o necessary t o ad d a third , rathe r differen t an d i n some ways lesser, consideration . Lesser , tha t is , from th e poin t o f vie w of a specia l attentio n t o minoritie s an d hil l tribe s o f th e interio r [ 31 8 ]

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borders an d thos e othe r relate d matter s whic h particularl y concern thi s book . Thi s thir d elemen t i s th e Chines e presenc e in Sarawa k (a s indee d i n Malaysi a generally) . Onc e mor e w e find bot h a continuatio n o f a n ancien t traditio n an d a n interrup tion. Chines e influenc e i n trad e an d Chines e cultura l contac t (and t o a smal l exten t physica l an d genetica l contacts ) hav e continued. The y bega n a t th e star t o f th e Christia n era , lon g before th e adven t o f Isla m i n wes t Borne o an d int o Sarawa k particularly. The grea t Chin a trad e which cam e down befor e th e beginnin g of th e T'an g dynast y i n th e sevent h centur y brough t iron , porce lain, beads , silks , an d th e man y othe r thing s whic h wer e o f th e highest valu e t o th e people . Thes e wer e trade d righ t int o th e interior o f Borneo , wher e yo u stil l find ver y ancien t Chines e beads an d T'an g jar s a s th e high-valu e object s o f th e uplan d Kelabits, Kenyans , an d Kayans . Thi s continuit y o f Chines e out side influenc e wa s the n largel y submerge d b y a multiplicit y o f factors, includin g th e growin g influenc e fro m th e West , an d o f Islam fro m Arabi a throug h Malay a an d Java , an d s o on . Thes e reached Sarawa k an d west Borne o onl y in the fourteenth century , at th e beginnin g o f th e Min g dynasty . B y tha t tim e th e Chin a trade i n thi s are a wa s alread y muc h reduced , bu t th e Chines e cultural background , thoug h subsequentl y ver y muc h sub merged, ha s som e relevanc e t o th e othe r mai n conflic t situa tion insid e Sarawak : Confrontatio n an d th e hil l an d othe r minor ity questions . With th e comin g o f Islam , w e hav e th e los s o f Chines e influ ence throug h trade , the n th e return o f th e Chinese a s gold miner s and a s worker s i n th e peppe r groves , an d the n thei r adven t t o political an d economi c powe r ove r a large par t o f Sarawa k onl y during thi s century . I d o no t propos e i n th e res t o f thi s pape r to pursu e thi s matte r o f th e Chinese , bu t i t i s essentia l t o recog nize it , becaus e i t i s thes e Chines e wh o pos e th e othe r grea t problem insid e Sarawa k an d Malaysia—tha t o f Communism . Very few peopl e i n Sarawak, othe r tha n th e Chinese , are involve d in Communism . O n th e othe r hand , man y o f th e attitude s o f the larg e Chines e populatio n i n Sarawa k whic h ar e attribute d to Communis m ar e i n par t actuall y du e t o thei r feeling s o f an cient prid e an d cultura l continuit y an d t o th e fac t o f a complet e lack of an y continuity insid e Sarawak itself. [ 31 9 ]

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There ar e abou t 250,00 0 Chines e i n Sarawak a t present , almos t the sam e numbe r a s i n th e othe r racia l "minority, " th e Se a Dayaks, an d bot h o f the m outnumbe r th e Malay s i n Sarawa k by almos t tw o t o one . Th e Chines e population i s increasin g fast est o f all . Of thes e Sarawa k Chinese , abou t 8 0 percent wer e bor n in Sarawak , bu t les s tha n 1 percen t ar e i n th e thir d o r fourt h generations o f nativ e born . (Se e "Definitio n o f Citizenship, " o n pp. 34 4 ff. below. ) I t i s here, entirel y i n th e lowlands , awa y fro m the Indonesia n borde r (excep t wher e the border come s very clos e to th e coas t i n th e southwest) , tha t th e CC O (Chines e Com munist Organization ) situatio n i s serious. 1 Thoug h th e Chines e are no w almos t a numerica l majorit y i n Sarawa k an d ar e indee d dominant economically , the y ar e adoptin g al l th e attitude s o f a minorit y group . Thu s a great many o f th e attitude s whic h ar e described i n othe r chapter s i n thi s boo k a s characteristi c o f hil l and inlan d minoritie s ar e i n fac t take n b y th e muc h mor e edu cated, sophisticated , an d economicall y well-of f Chines e i n th e lowlands an d mainl y i n th e towns—th e bi g town s lik e Kuching , Sibu, an d Mir i i n Sarawak . W e canno t pursu e thi s here , bu t I think i t shoul d b e note d fo r consideratio n i n th e future : "minor ity" attitude s ca n b e expressed , ver y strongl y indee d an d i n mor e sophisticated terms , b y majorit y group s i f ther e i s n o lon g cul tural traditio n in situ o r i f ther e i s an y feelin g o f instability , lack of tenure, and so on. Although thes e Chines e ar e al l full y recognize d a s citizen s of Sarawak , the y ar e distinguishe d fro m wha t ar e calle d th e "in digenous" peopl e wh o ar e citizen s bu t ar e als o classe d a s "na tives." "Natives " hav e certai n additiona l rights , fo r instanc e i n land, whic h ar e no t possesse d b y th e non-natives , tha t i s th e Chinese, no r b y th e English , no r o f cours e b y other s lik e th e Indians, wh o ar e onl y a ver y smal l numbe r i n Sarawak . 1

Since thi s chapte r was written , event s hav e move d t o withi n a fe w mile s of th e capital , Kuching . O n Jun e 27 , 1965 , ther e wa s a rai d o n th e polic e statio n at th e eighteent h mile , i n whic h tw o polic e officer s (on e th e brothe r o f Sarawak' s Iban Chie f Minister ) wer e murdered, a s wer e severa l Chines e civilians , includin g women an d children . Th e backgroun d o f thi s inciden t i s no t clea r concernin g the degre e o f direc t Indonesia n influence . Extensiv e resettlement , alon g th e line s followed durin g th e Malaya n Emergency , ha s no w bee n pu t int o effec t i n thi s area. Som e 8,00 0 Chines e hav e bee n regrouped . Th e "native " people s o f th e area hav e bee n allowe d t o remai n i n thei r ow n home s an d holding s (a s o f July 20 , 1965) .

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THE CULTURA L BACKGROUN D O F NATIV E MINORITIE S

Cultural backgroun d an d cultura l continuit y ar e th e mos t im portant thing s i n th e Borne o context . I n fact , i t i s ver y difficul t to understan d an y o f th e attitude s o f th e peopl e today—whethe r in centra l governmen t o r i n stat e governmen t o n th e coast , i n Kuching, o r amon g th e ver y remot e people s lik e th e nomadi c Punans in th e interio r o f th e Rajang Delt a o r th e uplan d Kelabit s in th e remot e highland s o f th e Fourt h an d Fift h Divisions—i f we d o no t recognize th e traditiona l background s an d association s of th e peopl e themselves . I n connectio n wit h thi s cultura l back ground, thre e thing s requir e emphasis . First , ther e i s toda y a great dea l o f cultura l diversit y withi n Sarawa k i n particula r an d Borneo generally . Ther e ar e a number o f distinc t linguisti c an d cultural groups , an d eve n thoug h thes e peopl e ar e rapidl y learn ing Mala y (th e nationa l language) , ne w ethic s an d outlooks , and eve n thoug h the y ar e ver y loya l Malaysian s (man y ar e i n fact fighting o r running grea t risks fo r Malaysi a alon g th e borde r right now) , the y are , beside s bein g Malaysians , ver y decidedl y Kelabits, Kenyahs , Kayans , Muruts , Bisayas , Ibans , o r Dayaks . There i s a t presen t n o indicatio n tha t thi s attitud e i s diminishing . On th e contrary , ther e ar e stron g indication s tha t th e ver y ac t of becomin g nationall y consciou s a s Malaysian s i s als o accentuat ing thei r loca l group , traditiona l group , an d ancestra l grou p con sciousness a s Kelabit s o r Iban s o r eve n nomadi c Punans . Thi s is a familiar patter n al l throug h Southeas t Asia , perhap s becom ing accentuate d i n Sarawak . Becaus e Malaysi a i s a n entirel y ne w concept, whos e operatio n ha s affecte d Sarawa k fo r onl y tw o years, ther e i s n o traditiona l patter n t o facilitat e th e acceptanc e of a national outlook , a s ther e i s fo r instanc e i n Thailand , whic h has bee n a n entit y fo r hundred s o f years , o r eve n i n Laos , which was a n administrativ e entit y withi n th e Frenc h Indochines e stat e for quite a long time. In Sarawak , althoug h ther e ar e onl y quit e smal l number s o f people lik e Kelabits , the y nevertheles s ar e ver y strongl y Kelabits . Even i f the y ar e cuttin g thei r hair , o r goin g t o school , o r bein g Christians (whic h the y increasingl y are) , o r possibl y late r o n becoming Mohammedans , th e strengt h o f thei r triba l identifica tion i s likel y no t onl y t o remain , bu t possibl y t o increase . Thi s [321 ]

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is, o f course , no t necessaril y unhealth y o r contradictor y withi n Malaysia, becaus e thes e peopl e hav e go t t o hav e a ver y stron g feeling o f identification , especiall y whe n the y ar e bein g aske d to suffer considerabl y unde r Confrontation . The secon d implicatio n o f cultura l backgroun d i s tha t thi s di versity an d identit y o f smal l an d ofte n remot e group s i s tie d up wit h th e geograph y o f Sarawa k i n Borneo . Thi s geograph y is somewha t distinc t fro m tha t o f mos t o f mainlan d Southeas t Asia, an d indee d fro m mos t o f th e island s too , excep t Ne w Guinea. Lik e Ne w Guinea , th e interio r o f Borne o is extremel y difficult t o ge t into , an d th e terrai n itsel f i s enormousl y compli cated. On e i s wel l awar e tha t althoug h th e mor e remot e part s of Thailand an d Lao s an d th e Malay a Peninsul a ar e mountainou s and difficul t country , nonetheless , o n th e whol e lik e Burma, the y have a n orde r an d a symmetr y an d a n explorabilit y whic h i s lacking i n Borne o a s i n Ne w Guinea . I n th e interio r o f thes e islands w e hav e a grea t mas s o f chaotic , confuse d mountainou s terrain intersecte d b y river s which , althoug h in Borne o the y gen erally run wes t an d east , nevertheless hav e all kinds of diversifica tions an d crisscrosses , s o tha t a t an y on e momen t i n th e interior , unless yo u hav e a compass , you canno t possibl y tel l wher e yo u are merely from th e direction o f rivers or mountains. This terrai n mean s that i t take s literall y month s t o wal k acros s the islan d o f Borne o (an d unti l ver y recentl y walkin g had bee n the onl y wa y to travel) . Indee d man y o f th e Indonesia n activitie s connected wit h Confrontatio n i n th e interior—confrontin g north ern Sarawa k an d als o souther n Sabah—ar e stil l conducte d o n foot, wit h immens e suppl y problem s an d lon g journey s fro m th e east coas t o f Indonesia n Kalimantan . Terrai n ha s o f cours e greatly complicate d th e populatio n an d inhabitatio n o f interio r Borneo. It ha s meant , briefly , tha t larg e area s o f Borne o ar e stil l uninhabited. Ther e is probabl y mor e uninhabited , unuse d coun try i n Borne o tha n almos t anywher e els e i n th e worl d excep t in th e Amazo n Basin . Second, th e terrai n ha s mean t tha t wher e a grou p settle s i n and become s locall y successful , a s fo r instanc e th e Kelabit s i n the upland s abov e 3,00 0 fee t i n nort h Sarawa k an d northwester n Kalimantan, i t i s possibl e fo r the m t o liv e i n considerabl e im munity an d isolatio n an d t o develo p a ver y successfu l wa y o f t 32 2 ]

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life an d a fairl y hig h standar d o f livin g eve n b y moder n stan dards. Thi s i s somethin g tha t the y ar e mos t reluctan t t o giv e up o r give away to anybody outside for an y reason . OUTSIDE INFLUENCE S AN D INTERNA L DEVELOPMEN T

Third, thi s terrai n an d thi s backgroun d o f diversit y lin k u p with a ver y lon g traditio n o f biologicall y moder n ma n (Homo sapiens) withi n Borne o itself . Kelabit s i n th e middl e o f Borne o or Se a Dayak s a littl e neare r th e coas t hav e ver y advance d cul tures, beautifu l arts , an d hig h craftsmanship , goo d standard s o f living, highl y develope d philosophie s an d theologies , persona l courage, immediat e intelligence , an d adaptability : thes e ar e al l genuine characteristic s o f mos t o f th e peopl e I a m talkin g about . Outsiders al l to o ofte n assum e tha t thes e thing s mus t hav e bee n acquired elsewhere . Al l sort s o f writing s an d mos t o f th e con temporary standar d work s o n thi s are a attribut e th e highl y devel oped cultur e an d persona l integrit y o f thes e people s t o al l sort s of migration s fro m th e nort h an d th e west, o r t o the interpolatio n of Buddhism , o r t o som e othe r outsid e influence . I d o no t thin k this i s a valid historica l reconstruction fo r th e interio r o f Borneo. Our ow n Sarawa k Museu m excavation s o f th e Grea t Cav e a t Niah i n wester n Sarawak , runnin g continuousl y sinc e 1954 , hav e now identifie d Homo sapiens materia l a t a dept h i n stratifie d deposit whic h ha s bee n date d b y Carbo n 1 4 fro m ove r 35,00 0 years ago . Thi s evidenc e i s no w widel y accepte d a s showin g that biologicall y moder n ma n wa s presen t i n wes t Borneo , i n Sarawak, a t leas t 35,00 0 year s ago . Simila r evidenc e i s comin g from Palawa n i n th e souther n Philippines , an d I hav e n o doub t that more will be found elsewhere in Southeast Asia . This mean s tha t w e hav e t o loo k a t thes e cultures , an d th e minorities amon g them , a s thing s tha t hav e develope d ove r a very lon g perio d o f time . Further , m y ow n researche s durin g the las t twent y year s tha t I hav e spen t i n Sarawa k d o no t indi cate tha t outsid e influence s hav e bee n th e mai n ones , althoug h they hav e bee n a n importan t factor . Ther e ha s bee n a tremen dous ancient , indigenou s growt h o f thes e loca l cultures , whic h have, o f course , diversified , a s al l human an d al l anima l activitie s do; bu t the y hav e a hig h degre e o f indigenou s an d endemi c characteristics. [ 32 3 ]

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The reall y strikin g impressio n gaine d fro m al l the archeologica l work w e hav e don e i n Sarawa k sinc e 194 7 and i n th e Nia h Cav e since 1954 , take n i n correlatio n wit h othe r wor k tha t ha s bee n done i n Indonesia , i n Malaya , an d especiall y i n th e Philippines , is th e pictur e o f a ver y highl y advance d cultur e achieve d b y the lat e Ston e Ag e al l throug h thi s area. 2 Befor e an y o f th e mod ern theologica l o r intellectua l impact s suc h a s Christianity , Bud dhism, Hinduis m an d Mohammedism , ther e wa s a hig h degre e of organize d civilizatio n (i n th e broa d sense ) i n man y o f thes e places. In fact , o f course , thi s i s continued i n a rather crud e for m by ove r a millio n peopl e i n centra l Ne w Guinea , wh o wer e iso lated fro m th e outsid e worl d unti l les s tha n te n year s ago . Again, there wer e grea t geographica l barrier s whic h prevente d outsid e penetration. By th e lat e neolithi c Ston e Age , sa y abou t 2,00 0 year s befor e Christ, ther e wer e alread y beautifull y mad e object s an d highl y organized societie s i n wester n Borneo . Th e peopl e ha d a n elabo ration o f jewelry , artistry , an d craftsmanship , an d the y showe d what coul d b e fairl y describe d a s a lov e o f th e dea d tha t wa s obviously connecte d wit h a dee p intellectua l an d spiritua l feel ing. Thi s wa s displaye d no t onl y i n exquisitel y laid-ou t primar y burials o f th e dead , bu t als o i n loving , detailed , an d expensiv e treatments o f th e bone s b y secondar y burial s an d cremation , es pecially o f babie s an d o f mother s wh o die d i n childbirth . Thi s sort o f thin g lon g pre-dated th e Hind u influence s t o whic h cus toms like crematio n hav e usually been attribute d b y author s writ ing fro m a Southeas t Asia n perspective . Thes e peopl e ha d a dy namic cultur e (whic h w e kno w intimatel y becaus e o f th e caves ) which extende d eve n int o th e remotes t upland s tha t ar e inhab ited today , wher e w e fin d th e ston e tool s in situ i n irrigate d root-crop situations . Offshore , the y penetrate d i n boat s eve n t o the tinies t island s an d tin y cave s o n thes e islands , whic h wer e used fo r burials . I n fact , Borne o generally , an d particularl y Sarawak, ha s a n astonishingl y rich cultura l background , whic h is expressed i n its life today . Of course , thi s backgroun d ha s bee n influence d b y man y out 2 This materia l i s detaile d i n a pape r I gav e t o th e Roya l Societ y o f Arts , published by the Smithsonia n Institution i n 1965.

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side sources ; I a m stressin g endemi c nativ e aspect s becaus e the y are most relevant for th e present book . Outside influence s fro m China , fro m India , an d especiall y along th e coas t fro m Arabi a b y wa y o f India , Malaya , an d Jav a in th e for m o f Isla m i n late r times , als o hav e bee n important . But the y hav e no t shifte d th e basi c patter n o f wha t on e migh t call Borneo-ness , excep t wher e acces s fro m th e coas t i s easy . The area s whic h ar e o f eas y acces s t o th e coas t are , relativ e to th e whol e o f Borneo , small , an d i n th e cas e o f Sarawak , par ticularly so . O n th e othe r hand , th e influence s whic h hav e brought peopl e int o contac t wit h mor e recen t outsid e civilizatio n such a s Mohammedan , an d stil l mor e recen t Europea n o r West ern civilization , are , an d hav e been , a t wor k t o brin g peopl e down towar d th e coast . This sor t of centrifuga l effec t i s evidentl y not a n ancien t one , o r a t leas t no t a n overwhelmingl y powerfu l ancient one , in wester n Borneo . The evidenc e i s strong tha t ther e were s o man y attraction s an d advantage s o f livin g inlan d amon g the mountain s an d i n th e coole r climate s wit h mor e easil y con trolled vegetation s a t th e slightl y highe r altitude s whic h wer e more secur e fro m interference , tha t a very larg e populatio n (run ning t o millions o f people) live d mainly in what w e now conside r to be th e "minorit y triba l borde r areas. " Ther e i s overwhelmin g evidence tha t man y o f thes e area s whic h no w hav e smal l popula tions onc e had muc h large r ones , as they stil l d o i n simila r condi tions i n centra l Ne w Guinea . Moreover , ther e i s absolut e evidence fro m archeology , folklore , an d proto-histor y tha t larg e areas whic h ar e no w onl y inhabite d b y nomadi c Punan s (e.g . in th e centra l Thir d Divisio n o f Sarawak ) wer e onc e densel y inhabited. Fo r instance , i t i s no w possibl e t o wal k fo r te n day s in wha t appear s to b e virgi n jungl e i n th e uppe r Rajan g are a in Sarawa k an d ye t o n analysi s an d detaile d exploratio n t o dis cover tha t i n on e quit e smal l are a o f a fe w mile s ther e ar e th e remains o f bi g prehistorica l longhouses , mor e tha n fourtee n i n one specifi c area . BELATIONS BETWEE N INTEBIO B AN D COAS T

This i s als o importan t i n a wa y fo r ou r presen t theme , sinc e many lowlander s toda y clin g t o thei r uplan d an d inlan d origins . [ 32 5 ]

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There i s n o longe r a tendenc y t o mov e downwar d an d outward ; and, o n th e contrary , som e thinkin g i n favo r o f a revers e mov e is no w developing . Indeed , som e younge r leader s an d thinker s are perhap s comin g t o th e conclusio n tha t thei r fairl y recen t ancestors mad e a mistak e i n movin g s o fa r northwes t an d wes t and comin g ou t o n th e coast . Th e peopl e o f th e coasta l plains , whose population i s developin g rapidly , no w fac e a land shortag e and th e problem s o f th e ver y poo r soi l characteristi c o f th e low lands o f Sarawak. 3 In th e pas t th e outwar d movemen t wa s conditione d b y th e advent o f trad e good s an d ne w demand s introduce d fro m th e outside. Ther e i s archeologica l evidenc e tha t i n th e pas t ther e were change s o f fashio n an d wha t on e migh t cal l consume r un rest. Th e ide a tha t ther e ha s bee n a rigidl y stable , conservativ e outlook amon g thes e hil l tribe s i n Borne o i s unfounde d eve n in shor t terms ; ther e i s chang e i n th e value s of , an d interest s in, ol d objects , eve n jar s an d glas s beads . Ther e i s n o reaso n whatever t o thin k tha t ther e eve r ha s bee n an y complet e con servatism. I n fact , conservatis m i s maladaptive fo r surviva l unde r the pressure s o f equatoria l tropica l rai n forest . Borne o livin g i s extremely difficul t an d require s constan t experiment , innovation , and initiative . Th e adven t o f iro n o n th e coas t wa s tremendousl y important. I t effecte d jus t a s grea t a technologica l revolutio n as th e adven t o f malari a control , o r schoolbooks , o r anythin g else fro m th e Wes t today ; i n fac t th e resultan t revolutio n wa s probably muc h greater . In additio n t o th e introductio n o f new materia l wants , anothe r important facto r i n reducin g th e interio r populatio n fo r a tim e was th e adven t o f th e European s i n th e sixteent h century ; th e introduction o f ne w disease s an d epidemic s ha d a decimatin g effect o n th e previousl y isolate d inlan d populations . Again , i n folklore an d genealogie s ther e i s abundan t evidenc e o f th e terri ble impac t o f ne w disease s suc h a s smallpox , influenza , measles , and eve n whooping-cough , whic h sometime s devastate d uplan d ' I shoul d ad d her e tha t th e povert y o f th e lowlan d sandston e soi l i s a ver y important facto r i n Sarawa k an d wes t Borneo . Thi s i s no t th e cas e i n Sabah , where ther e i s a rich volcani c soi l o n th e coast , an d i s seldo m tru e o n th e mainland, wher e ther e ar e alluvia l deposit s an d othe r goo d soil s whic h ar e generally lackin g o n th e Sarawa k coast .

[ 32 6 ]

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valleys i n a singl e stroke . Onl y recentl y ha s ther e bee n any medi cal control . BORNEO A S A PAR T OF SOUTHEAST ASI A

An adequat e explanatio n o f huma n behavio r i n Sarawa k mus t be quit e complicated . Th e longe r on e stays , an d th e mor e on e travels (an d I thin k I hav e travele d t o almos t ever y corner , val ley, an d triba l grou p i n Sarawak) , th e mor e one become s awar e of th e country' s extrem e complexit y an d diversity . W e canno t ignore thes e complications , but w e must not overemphasiz e them . Indeed, afte r readin g about , an d travelin g t o som e exten t i n other part s o f Southeas t Asia , I a m convince d tha t whil e th e Kelabits o f th e centra l upland s o f Borneo , fo r instance , ar e a highly specialize d people , ther e ar e a grea t man y majo r parallel s not onl y betwee n the m an d th e peopl e i n Malaya , bu t als o between the m an d th e Kachin s an d Karen s i n Burma , th e tribe s in th e Chiengrna i are a o f Thailan d an d th e people s i n th e ex treme nort h o f Laos , an d elsewhere . Therefor e an y emphasi s on difference s include s th e convictio n tha t ther e i s a distinc t sort of Southeas t Asia n person . We hav e t o face , therefore , thi s seemin g contradiction , whic h is probabl y largel y a matte r o f communication s an d time . A Kelabit i n centra l Borne o i s probabl y prepare d i n th e ultimat e analysis t o sacrific e hi s lif e rathe r tha n sto p bein g a Kelabit ; on th e othe r hand , h e woul d probabl y settl e dow n i n a yea r if yo u pu t hi m i n th e Kare n hill s o f Burma . W e hav e actuall y had i n th e las t tw o year s a n experimenta l situatio n o f thi s kin d which ha s no t bee n adequatel y studied : a larg e elemen t i n th e British force s invoke d t o assis t i n eas t Malaysi a unde r treat y with Malay a ar e Ghurka s fro m Nepal , an d th e Ghurka s hav e been extensivel y use d t o protec t th e borde r area s i n Sarawak . This i s th e firs t tim e tha t outsider s o f an y kin d hav e suddenl y appeared i n th e remotes t hinterlan d minority-grou p situations . Usually withi n jus t a da y th e Ghurka s hav e becom e integrate d with th e loca l communities , an d quit e a numbe r o f the m ar e thinking o f settlin g dow n i n Sarawak ; som e have actuall y alread y settled dow n i n retiremen t i n th e hinterland s o f Sabah . Thi s de velopment i s being welcomed b y the local people. In sum , th e minorit y group s fee l lik e a "minority, " an d yet , [ 32 7 ]

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at th e sam e time , the y fee l a onenes s wit h a muc h wide r grou p of people . An d ther e i s some rea l cultura l validit y i n tha t feelin g of oneness . SARAWAK A S A PAR T O F BORNE O

As I hav e alread y explained , th e gradua l patter n o f migratio n through Borne o ove r th e las t 10,00 0 year s an d mor e ha s bee n from th e southeas t t o th e northwest . Man y o f th e people s i n the Malaysia n par t o f Borneo , a s als o i n th e stat e o f Brunei , which i s no t a par t o f Malaysia , stil l hav e th e mos t intimat e and self-recognize d cultura l affinitie s an d eve n kinshi p affinitie s with th e peopl e t o th e eas t i n Indonesia n Kalimantan . Thes e are no t jus t th e feeling s o f commo n experience s a t meetings , such a s thos e tha t occu r whe n a Ghurk a meet s a Kayan , bu t actual association s an d know n folklor e genealogie s showin g com mon origins a t points on the eastern side of Borneo. If w e star t fro m th e extrem e nort h o f th e Sarawa k borde r where i t join s Sabah , behin d Lon g Pasi a i n th e headwater s o f the Padas , an d continu e southward , w e com e upo n a successio n of peopl e t o who m thi s applies . Th e Murut s o f th e Trusa n Rive r in th e Fift h Divisio n o f Sarawa k kno w tha t the y hav e al l mi grated northwestwar d fro m Kalimantan . Th e Kelabit s a little fur ther sout h i n th e to p o f th e Fourt h Divisio n o f Sarawak , thoug h they hav e bee n ther e probabl y longe r tha n an y othe r peopl e in Sarawak , hav e a muc h large r segmen t o f thei r ow n peopl e across th e borde r i n Kalimantan , an d th e Sarawa k elemen t i s only a smal l minority . Ther e ar e a t leas t te n time s a s many Kela bits o n th e othe r sid e o f th e watershed . Comin g furthe r sout h again, w e hav e th e Kayan s an d th e Kenyah s i n th e Fourt h an d Third Divisions , who hav e al l their ol d cultura l storie s an d origi n stories centere d i n Kalimantan . Ther e ar e onl y a fe w thousan d of thes e people , thoug h the y occup y a hug e are a i n centra l Sarawak, bu t ther e ar e nearl y a hundre d thousan d o f the m ove r in Kalimantan . Movin g sout h again , w e com e t o th e Se a Dayak s (the Ibans) , th e mos t numerou s racia l grou p i n Sarawak , bu t they ar e also more numerous i n Kalimantan, an d thei r genealogie s show tha t i n fac t mos t o f the m migrate d westwar d int o present day Sarawak , approximatel y eightee n t o twent y generation s ago , from th e Kapua s Rive r i n Kalimantan . Th e sam e applie s t o vari [ 328 . ]

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ous peopl e no w calle d Lan d Dayaks . So , for abou t five hundre d miles o f border , alon g whic h w e ar e no w confronte d wit h Indo nesian troops , ther e i s a n absolutel y commo n heritage , an d i n every cas e for eac h person i n Sarawak ther e are between fiv e an d fifty peopl e o f th e sam e linguistic , cultural , ethnic , an d self conscious entities o n the Indonesian sid e of the border . This ha s grea t implications , o f course . On e o f the m i s tha t the Indonesian s ar e provin g unabl e t o us e an y local , indigenou s native peopl e o f th e interio r i n thes e Confrontatio n activities . They hav e t o b e carrie d ou t almos t entirel y b y Javanese . An d secondly, o f course , th e Javanes e ar e intensel y unpopula r i n thenwhole activit y alon g tha t border , wher e everythin g the y d o i s disturbing a previousl y completel y satisfactor y relationshi p ove r the watershed s alon g a borde r whic h wa s neve r recognize d ex cept i n purel y nationa l o r internationa l politica l terms . S o w e have t o thin k o f th e middl e o f Borne o a s a hug e area , large r than th e stat e o f Lao s o r Vietnam , wher e ther e ar e man y hil l tribes. Thoug h th e statistic s fo r Sarawa k o r fo r Saba h sho w fe w of them , an d ther e i s n o prope r censu s o f Kalimantan , i f th e three are take n together , th e cente r o f Borne o has a n overwhelm ing majorit y o f suc h peopl e fo r th e whol e islan d o f Borneo . The y outnumber th e Chines e o r an y othe r grou p i n th e lowland . An d here I shoul d add , o f course , tha t th e Chines e an d th e Malay s only liv e i n th e lowlands , thoug h the y occasionall y g o inland , e.g. fo r Confrontatio n purposes . I n norma l times , an d unti l 1963 , in th e whol e interio r o f Sarawa k ther e wer e n o Chines e living , and onl y on e o r tw o ver y smal l communitie s o f rathe r atypica l Malays a t place s lik e Belag a i n th e middl e Rajang , an d non e permanently in the interior proper . II. DEMOGRAPHI C AN D E C O N O M I C CONSIDERATIONS POLITICA L VS . ETHNI C BOUNDABIE S

The firs t consideratio n wit h respec t t o th e statistic s o f popula tion i s tha t th e boundarie s o f th e state s bea r littl e o r n o relatio n to th e realitie s o f ethnic , cultural , o r religiou s distribution . Sarawak i s a politica l creatio n o f th e Brookes , an d mos t o f i t [ 32 9 ]

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is well under a century old , a s indeed i s the cas e also with Sabah . Of course , thi s situatio n i s simila r ove r muc h o f Southeas t Asia . RELIGIO N

We ar e fortunate , i n th e forme r Britis h territorie s o f Borne o (Sarawak, Sabah , an d Brunei) , i n havin g a n accurat e censu s undertaken i n 1960 , from whic h we deriv e th e following informa tion for th e religion of the population . TABLE 1 3 RELIGION I N BRUNEI , SABAH , AN D SARAWA K STAT E

RELIGIO N

Muslim Christian Animist Total

Brunei Number Percen 50,516 60. 6,796 8. 26,565 31. 83,877 100.

t 2 1 7 0

Sabah Number Percen 172,324 75,247 206,850 454,421

37.9 16.6 45.5 100.0

t

Sarawak Number Percen 174,123 23. 117,755 15. 452,651 60. 744,529 100.

t 4 8 8 0

In Brunei , th e onl y on e o f th e thre e territorie s wher e th e Mus lims ar e i n th e majority , th e populatio n di d no t suppor t th e "Malaysian solution"—tha t is, the y di d no t joi n wit h th e othe r two British-administere d Borne o states , togethe r wit h Singapor e and th e Mala y States , i n formin g th e Federatio n o f Malaysia . In Sarawa k an d Sabah , Mala y Muslim s ar e no w exercisin g in creased influenc e (thoug h the y for m a minorit y o f th e popula tion) throug h th e federa l lega l syste m operatin g fro m Malay a proper. Table 1 1 (o n pp . 314-315 of th e Malaysi a sectio n of thi s book ) shows a detaile d breakdow n o f th e ethni c group s i n thes e terri tories. Th e animist s mentione d i n Tabl e 1 3 ar e predominantl y Dayaks, plu s "minority " o r triba l people , althoug h som e o f thes e peoples, notabl y amon g th e Muruts , hav e recentl y bee n converted t o Christianity . "MINORITY" AN D "MAJORITY " POPULATION S

The ter m "minority " ha s t o b e applie d wit h car e fo r severa l reasons. Firstly , som e smalle r group s "own " suc h vas t areas , [ 33 0 ]

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within whic h the y ar e th e exclusiv e residents , tha t the y hav e not, unti l ver y recently , fel t themselve s t o b e minorities . The y live i n a basicall y localize d cultura l context . Secondly , a s alread y mentioned, althoug h th e Kelabits , fo r instance , numbe r onl y a few thousan d i n Malaysia n Borneo , thei r linguistic , cultural , an d kin associate s numbe r i n th e ten s o f thousand s i n Kalimantan . Thirdly, attitude s withi n th e grou p and attitude s o f thos e outsid e of i t d o no t necessaril y depen d o n a consideratio n o f numerica l majority o r minorit y position . Th e situatio n o f th e Chines e i n this regard has already been referred to . With thes e qualification s i n mind , w e ca n conside r th e follow ing people s a s "minority" : Murut , Kelabit , Kenyan , Kayan , an d Punan. Thes e group s ar e foun d primaril y inlan d i n remot e areas , along th e approximatel y five-hundred-mile-long commo n borde r with norther n Kalimantan . Workin g fro m nort h t o south , thes e groups ar e arranged a s in Table 14. TABLE 1 4 LOCATION O F "MINORITY " POPULATION S I N SARAWA K Ethnic Grou p

"Inland" Numbe r (approximate)

Sarawak Administra tive Divisio n

Murut Kelabit Kenyan Kayan Punan (nomads )

3,000 2,000 8,100 6,000 4,700

Fifth Fourth Fourth an d som e Thir d Mostly Thir d Third an d Fourt h

These groups , plu s a fe w tin y one s numberin g unde r 10 0 eac h (Ukit, Bukitan , B a Mali , etc.) , giv e a tota l o f abou t 25,00 0 wh o are minorit y people s i n th e sens e tha t the y ar e small , isolate d groups. Sea an d Lan d Dayak s liv e nea r th e borde r onl y a s i t come s closer t o th e coasta l plai n i n th e Lowe r Thir d Divisio n an d dow n to th e First . Her e remotenes s i s n o longe r a factor, an d th e com munications an d othe r criteri a discusse d belo w (unde r "Lega l Relationships") d o no t operat e t o kee p thes e peopl e exclusive , "undeveloped," etc. , althoug h othe r factor s ma y hav e simila r effects. Abou t 10,00 0 o f th e Lan d Dayak s liv e i n th e interior , and a small fraction o f th e Se a Dayaks (Iban ) als o live in remot e [ 33 1 ]

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areas. Whe n thes e ar e adde d to th e group s enumerate d above , we ge t fa r les s tha n 50,000 , o r abou t 7 percen t o f th e tota l Sarawak populatio n o f 750,000 , wh o inhabi t abou t one-hal f o f the tota l area . These inlander s an d uplander s therefor e control , eve n i f onl y by custo m an d knowledge , a hug e lan d are a whic h i s stil l primi tive i n communications . I t i s thi s are a whic h i s no w th e crucia l one fo r som e securit y an d relate d operation s unde r direc t Con frontation (a s contraste d wit h th e mos t accessibl e lowlan d areas , mainly i n th e southwest , wher e interna l pressures , whic h hav e not affecte d th e interior , continu e t o loom largest) . The norther n sectio n is , i n thes e an d al l othe r respects , th e truly "tribal " on e i n th e sens e use d i n th e res t o f thi s book . The 25,00 0 peopl e involve d ca n b e broke n dow n i n tw o dimen sions: locatio n o f settlemen t an d typ e o f community . Nin e thou sand liv e i n th e mountainou s region s whic h canno t b e reache d by water , an d thi s include s mos t o f th e actua l "border, " whil e sixteen thousan d liv e o n th e rive r lines . Twenty-on e thousan d live i n longhous e communitie s o f fro m on e hundre d t o eigh t hundred people , whil e fou r thousan d ar e nomads , thoug h man y of thes e ar e no w a t leas t temporaril y "semi-settled. " A small , fully nomadi c elemen t (i n abou t te n bands ) cover s a vas t are a otherwise uninhabited . ECONOMIC RELATION S O F ' HIL L TRIBES "

The econom y o f th e hil l area s i s characterize d b y relativel y primitive method s o f productio n an d distributio n accentuate d by remotenes s an d th e physica l difficult y i n reachin g th e area . Several point s deserv e emphasi s here . First , n o trad e o f an y kin d can b e carrie d ou t b y thes e hil l minoritie s excep t throug h th e coastal center s an d th e Chinese , thoug h cooperative s ar e no w beginning t o gai n strength . O n th e whole , th e previou s govern ment ha d take n ver y littl e par t i n inlan d trad e matters , fo r rea sons made clea r below . The tota l contributio n o f th e "insid e half " o f Sarawa k t o th e national econom y i s almos t insignificant . I woul d estimat e i t a t less than 1 percent o f th e "expor t economy " (probabl y fa r less) , and no t mor e tha n 2 percen t (probabl y les s tha n 1 percent ) of th e "impor t economy " i n consume r goods , etc. Of th e imports , [ 33 2 ]

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a larg e par t ha d gon e ove r t o Kalimanta n fo r man y decade s unti l 1963. Confrontation ha s now completel y cu t off tha t trade . Principal "exports " o f th e pas t wer e rattan , damar-gum , wil d rubber , rhino horn , hornbill ivory, bezoar stones , and deer' s antlers . Thes e have eithe r muc h les s valu e now , o r ar e i n shor t suppl y du e to earlie r "overproduction " inland . Buffaloe s (live ) remai n a Murut specialty . The y ar e walke d t o th e coas t fo r sale , whic h takes up to fifteen days. The basi s o f th e inlan d econom y wa s on e o f makin g thei r ow n subsistence b y ric e an d (wild ) protein , a patter n whic h i s de pendent fo r it s succes s o n a grea t expans e o f lan d an d jungle . There wa s als o barter-trad e betwee n groups , valleys , an d acros s the border . Fo r example , Puna n mat s fo r Kenya n knives ; Kelabi t spring sal t (ver y important ) fo r Kaya n beads ; hil l tobacc o fo r lowland cook-pots . Small-scal e periodi c "export " trip s wer e mad e to lowlands for cas h goods, such as cloth. The presence , fo r th e first time , o f larg e outsid e group s bega n in 194 5 (parachutist s unde r th e author' s command) , an d reap peared i n 196 3 (Britis h an d Malaysia n forces) , bot h time s du e to militar y necessity . I n som e area s thi s ha s introduce d muc h more cas h an d deman d fo r labor , whic h wa s previousl y nil ; bu t the impac t ha s bee n ver y uneve n an d s o far withou t lasting influ ence on the basic economy discussed above . The smal l sum s neede d fo r taxes , shotgun cartridges , etc. , until now hav e bee n me t b y th e mean s o f occasiona l tradin g trip s to th e coast . However , owin g t o th e declin e i n suppl y o f som e items (becaus e o f earlie r overintensiv e hunting ) an d t o th e de cline i n deman d fo r othe r products , increasingl y thi s "export " has bee n o f inlan d men, wh o com e dow n an d wor k fo r period s of som e months , usuall y i n th e Chines e sawmill s o r o n th e Brunei oilfield s i n orde r t o ge t cash . Unti l th e recen t increas e in deman d fo r consume r goods , ofte n a ma n woul d d o thi s in on e stretc h t o provid e fo r a lifetime , makin g al l hi s cas h needs i n on e operation . Thi s i s changin g too , wit h educatio n and the new consumer tastes of th e young. GOVERNMEN T PROGRAM S FO R TH E TNTERIOR

Before th e formatio n o f Malaysi a ther e wer e fe w governmen t programs directe d a t th e interior , no r wa s th e situatio n unde r [ 33 3 ]

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the rul e o f th e Brooke s resented . Th e advantage s o f bein g "lef t in undisturbe d possessio n an d peace, " an d a n en d t o al l head hunting, afte r all , wer e great . Onc e Sarawa k becam e a Crow n colony, th e pac e increased . Bu t distance s ar e great , an d popula tion vastly scattered . Th e bi g impacts cam e in the following orde r of successio n an d eventua l importance . I hav e arrange d the m by th e 196 4 scal e i n th e interior , thoug h the y ar e not necessaril y still the sam e in importance . Service Law Police, etc . Education Medical, includin g WH O Airways, subsid y Agriculture

Present Order of importance Scale appearance S 1 Uneven (se e below ) 4 Slight 2 Rapidly accelerated , 3 2 large no w 1 Steady developmen t 4 Local an d somewha t 5 Locally ver y im portant erratic Local advic e an d ai d 6 3

There hav e als o bee n expensiv e ne w governmen t operation s arising fro m borde r an d Confrontatio n repercussions . Fo r exam ple, i n Apri l 196 5 a ne w schem e t o suppl y fir e extinguisher s t o longhouses was announced a t a cost of one million dollars . The expenditur e b y governmen t fa r exceed s an y for m o f reve nue o r servic e receive d fro m th e area . Grea t effor t an d devotio n has bee n show n b y som e section s o f th e government , notabl y individual distric t officers , schoolteachers , doctors , an d other s (mostly British , Chinese , Malay , an d Indians ) i n thes e services . Such work can be dangerous an d is often thankless . The cooperativ e movemen t ha s go t a smal l bu t strengthenin g hold i n th e interio r lately , bu t wil l presen t considerabl e difficul ties o f administration , audit , etc. , until communication s improve . No inlan d communit y ha s yet succeede d i n producin g a "cas h crop" tha t ca n b e economicall y exporte d t o th e coast , whic h would hel p t o solv e th e economi c imbalance . Thi s imbalanc e is o f cours e on e facto r whic h ha s encourage d a "let-alone " atti tude onc e th e responsibilitie s o f th e government , i.e. , health, edu cation, security , hav e bee n fulfilled . This i s no t fo r wan t o f trying . Som e expensiv e inlan d experi ments mad e withi n m y ow n knowledg e sinc e 195 0 have include d cocoa, coffee , turkeys , Brahmi n cattle , ponie s (fo r transport) , [ 334 ]

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oranges, cabbages , potatoes . Al l hav e faile d primaril y becaus e of supervisor y an d transpor t difficultie s directl y du e t o distances , terrain, an d th e lon g period s o f rai n an d "permanen t cloud " in th e interior . No valuabl e mineral s hav e bee n foun d inlan d i n workabl e amounts. There i s one big coal deposit , but i t is in an uninhabite d valley at an elevation of 4,000 feet. I I I . SOM E S P E C I F I C ISSUE S GEOGRAPHICA L THINKIN G

As I hav e trie d t o indicat e i n th e preliminar y part s o f thi s paper, geograph y i s on e o f th e mos t complicate d an d complicat ing thing s fo r huma n being s i n Sarawak , an d i n Borneo generally . The geographica l factor s whic h le d t o th e politica l boundarie s now dividin g Malaysi a an d Indonesi a ar e realisti c i n physica l terms, bu t bea r littl e relatio n t o huma n realities . O n th e othe r hand, ther e i s anothe r typ e o f structur e withi n Borne o whic h has a muc h greate r antiquit y an d remain s o f underlyin g signifi cance t o man y o f th e nativ e peoples . Thi s i s th e ol d conceptio n of th e sultanate , whic h wa s base d o n a natura l geography . Th e sultanate operate d fro m th e coasta l outflo w cente r o f on e o r mor e river system s an d thei r hinterlands . Thi s patter n goe s bac k lon g before th e Mohammeda n sultanates ; there i s ample evidenc e tha t the nativ e (pagan ) sultanate s existe d a s earl y a s th e eight h cen tury, som e si x centurie s befor e th e adven t o f Isla m i n wes t Borneo. One o f th e reason s wh y th e sultanat e o f Brune i wa s s o wea k that i t los t muc h o f it s territor y t o th e Brooke s i n Sarawak , an d to th e chartere d compan y i n Sabah , wa s tha t i t wa s extende d to th e poin t o f geographica l unreality . I t ha d trie d t o contro l the whole west coas t of Brune i instead o f th e outflows int o Brune i Bay itself , whic h forme d th e natura l entity . Th e othe r sultanate s of Borne o di d no t ge t involve d i n suc h territoria l complexitie s and i n fac t hav e remaine d importan t righ t throug h th e Dutc h occupation an d int o Indonesia n occupatio n today . I onl y mentio n this becaus e no t onl y ar e th e othe r presen t politica l boundarie s complicated fo r huma n beings , thoug h perfectl y adequat e fo r [ 33 5 ]

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geography an d politics , bu t th e subdivision s o f th e countr y itsel f are sometime s complicated . CENTRALIZATIO N AN D DECENTRALIZATIO

N O F TH E STAT E

One o f th e grea t difficultie s fo r an y centra l governmen t i s knowing ho w fa r t o entrus t majo r responsibilitie s t o remot e an d little-known minorities . Thi s ha s becom e particularl y importan t very recentl y i n Confrontatio n an d affect s suc h problem s a s th e arming o f th e borde r people , an d particularl y th e degre e o f arm s and independenc e whic h may o r may not be give n t o such organ izations a s th e Borde r Scouts . Th e difficultie s o f regula r soldier s and regula r militar y unit s i n controllin g hundred s o f mile s o f border throug h extremel y difficul t an d ofte n uninhabite d coun try, a s i n muc h o f th e Thir d Divisio n i n Sarawak, wher e a grea t area o f th e borde r i s nowher e nea r an y huma n settlement , put s a premiu m o n givin g big responsibilities t o th e loca l people. This, of course , i s alway s limite d b y th e fea r tha t the y migh t becom e irresponsible a t som e later date . LOCA L ATTITUDE S AN D REPRESENTATIO N FRO M TH E INTERIO R

There is , i n Sarawak, a n activ e traditio n o f interna l leadershi p expressed outwar d t o th e coas t whic h wa s buil t u p b y th e Brookes fro m th e middl e o f th e las t century . Thi s contrast s wit h the situatio n i n mos t countrie s o f Southeas t Asi a an d eve n wit h Sabah withi n Malaysia . Administrativ e contac t wit h th e coas t was accentuate d b y th e secon d postwa r governo r unde r th e colonial system , Si r Charle s Arde n Clarke , wh o introduce d loca l elections. These local elections an d loca l authoritie s were strongl y developed i n Sarawa k withi n th e las t decad e precedin g th e Fed eration o f Malaysia . Eve n i n th e remotes t area s i n th e interior , the peopl e hav e conducte d on e man-on e vote election s an d hav e elected representative s democraticall y t o distric t councils , fro m there t o divisiona l councils , and fro m ther e t o the Counci l Neger i (national council) . Fro m thi s nationa l counci l a t presen t a ver y generous quot a o f member s o f parliamen t an d senator s g o through t o th e Malaysia n Parliamen t i n Kual a Lumpur . Thi s re cent traditio n o f loca l governmen t i s extremel y importan t i n Sarawak an d doe s no t see m t o fin d an y parallel , fo r instance , in Thailan d o r Lao s o r Cambodia . Th e peopl e hav e go t thi s ide a [ 33 6 1

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very clearly in mind now and ar e extremely keen on it. It mean s that th e Muruts , Kelabits, th e Kenyahs * th e Kayans , an d suc h people, minorities everywhere , are represented i n the very center of government . Fo r example , Temonggon g Oya u Lawa i Jau , a member o f th e Governmen t Allianc e Party , who i s th e hea d o f the Kenyah s an d Kayan s i n th e Fourt h Divisio n o f Sarawak , i s also on all the following councils: district, divisional, and Council Negeri; an d i s als o i n th e Senat e i n Kual a Lumpur . Moreover , the Sarawa k Stat e governmen t an d th e Malaysia n governmen t have show n grea t commo n sens e i n not restrictin g politic s t o a one-party system or any other kind. To take an example, Temonggong Oyau Lawai Jau's own first cousin is in the opposition party, the SUPP (Sarawa k United People's Party), which is very critical of th e Allianc e government , thoug h not anti-Malaysian , an d h e also ha s bee n electe d throug h thes e channel s t o th e Parliamen t in Kual a Lumpur , wher e h e sit s i n oppositio n t o hi s cousin . This mean s tha t th e people i n th e remot e area s ar e not reall y placid an d directe d fro m th e center . I f the y ar e not bein g ade quately considered , the y ar e stil l i n a stron g positio n t o expres s their opinions . I f the y d o no t thin k tha t sufficien t measure s ar e being take n t o protect them , fo r instance , o r the y ar e no t bein g sufficiently allowe d t o protec t themselves agains t Confrontation , they ar e i n a positio n t o sa y so . And, o f course , thi s affect s al l sorts of othe r things : education, medical facilities, veterinary services, communications, and so on. Therefore, w e have in Sarawak something which appear s t o be lackin g i n many of th e countrie s under discussio n i n this book, that i s that th e minorities ar e able to communicat e directl y t o th e centra l government , an d the y do so. There have been a number of cases where they have raised issues which have been sympathetically an d immediately considered b y th e centra l government , an d thei r request s hav e bee n met. This is, perhaps, one of th e healthiest feature s o f th e whole situation as far as the minorities are concerned. It i s quit e clea r tha t i n certai n countrie s i n Southeas t Asia , the hil l tribe s hav e bee n significantl y neglecte d o r underrated , as i n Lao s an d probabl y Vietnam . I n Sarawa k thi s ha s neve r really bee n entirel y s o eve n unde r th e Brookes , a s I hav e described earlie r i n thi s section , an d i t i s definitel y no t s o today . Indeed, prioritie s ar e bein g give n b y th e Malaysia n governmen t [ 33 7 ]

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to anythin g tha t concern s thes e remote r peoples , prioritie s eve n more ou t o f proportion t o thei r economic and numerical contribu tion tha n wa s th e cas e i n th e past . Thi s i s a vita l distinctio n which I must emphasize . THE QUESTIO N O F LANGUAG E

The issu e o f languag e i s extremel y complicate d throughou t Southeast Asia . Perhap s i t i s no t s o complicate d i n Sarawa k a s elsewhere becaus e Mala y i s now widel y use d a s the lingu a franc a among thes e divers e group s o f people , though , o f course , thi s is onl y spoke n Malay . O n th e othe r hand , Englis h had previousl y been adopte d unde r th e colonia l regime a s the languag e o f teach ing. Considerabl e confusio n develope d betwee n 194 6 an d th e formation o f Malaysi a i n 196 3 ove r thi s requiremen t an d th e new an d ver y natura l requiremen t o f Mala y a s a nationa l lan guage. Thi s i s a proble m tha t ha s t o b e thrashe d ou t further . Fundamentally, i t appear s tha t anybod y i n Sarawa k i s prepare d to lear n Malay , an d t o spea k Mala y an d adop t Mala y fully . Bu t again w e com e bac k t o th e underlyin g feelin g o f fea r tha t to o much pressur e o n thi s issu e ma y accentuat e th e feelin g o f loca l tribalism an d minorit y anxiet y whic h I referre d t o a t th e ver y beginning o f thes e observations . THE EFFEC T O F RELIGION : ISLA M AN D ANIMIS M

It i s perhap s relevan t t o mentio n tha t ther e i s a differenc e between th e outloo k o f Isla m an d Buddhis m i n regar d t o othe r peoples. I t i s implici t i n tru e Mohammeda n belie f tha t i t i s de sirable, i f no t necessary , t o conver t others . Ther e is als o a muc h more forcefu l elemen t i n Mohammeda n missionizin g an d prose letyzing, whic h i s absen t i n muc h o f Buddhis t thinking , an d i t is Buddhis t thinkin g whic h affect s s o man y o f th e countrie s o f Southeast Asi a an d mos t o f thos e represente d i n thi s book . Thi s is no t t o mak e an y distinctio n o f majo r importanc e betwee n th e common Asia n outloo k o f th e two, but onl y t o sa y tha t th e broa d atmosphere o f Malaysi a i s perhap s less gentl e an d less negativ e in a religiou s sens e tha n i t woul d be , say , i n Laos , wher e Bud dhism i s ver y mild , wher e Christianit y i s almos t negligible , an d where animis m i s extremel y diffuse . I n Sarawa k w e hav e a situa tion wher e ther e i s a ver y activ e Isla m o n th e coast , a n increas [ 33 8 ]

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ingly activ e Christia n minority , an d a large an d ver y complicate d form o f animism inland, which is now under pressure . This i s al l tie d u p wit h th e pas t tradition s o f headhuntin g and aggressio n an d warlikenes s whic h wer e ver y muc h a par t of paga n animis m amon g th e hil l people s o f Sarawa k an d th e rest o f Borneo . Thi s aggressivenes s ha s foun d it s expressio n als o in th e enthusiasti c respons e tha t thes e inlan d peopl e mad e t o British parachut e unit s organize d agains t th e Japanese . Th e in ternal tribe s retoo k a ver y larg e par t o f Borne o eve n righ t dow n to Brune i Bay , killin g Japanes e i n th e rati o o f abou t thre e hun dred Japanes e for ever y on e o f themselve s kille d i n thei r guerrill a warfare. Again , i n th e rebellio n i n th e stat e o f Brune i i n Decem ber 1962 , th e hil l tribe s rallie d an d blocke d th e whol e area , th e hinterland behin d Brunei , s o tha t i t wa s impossibl e fo r th e rebel lion t o sprea d inlan d o r fo r th e rebel s themselve s t o ge t bac k to Indonesia . This sor t o f mal e dynamis m an d aggressivenes s i s extremel y important i n Borneo . I t i s a par t o f th e thinkin g no t onl y o f the hil l peopl e bu t also , i n a differen t way , o f th e Malay s o n the coas t wh o hav e par t o f th e sam e sor t o f Borne o traditio n which I mentione d earlier . Th e outloo k i s therefor e differen t fo r anyone tryin g t o dominat e th e area . Althoug h ther e i s violenc e in a countr y lik e Vietnam , i t seem s t o hav e fewe r an d shallowe r cultural root s a s compared wit h Borne o where, in Sarawak, stand ing u p fo r yoursel f an d no t bein g pushe d aroun d i s a tremen dously importan t par t o f thinking . Fo r th e sam e reason , peopl e have take n activel y t o politics , a s mentioned above , because poli tics i s a wa y o f self-expressio n an d self-assertion . Ther e i s n o hesitation i n sayin g exactl y what yo u thin k an d givin g your opin ion i n Sarawak , wherea s on e i s immediatel y struck , a s I hav e been, whe n travelin g i n Thailan d o r Laos , wit h th e quietness , gentility—gentleness, almos t negativeness—o f th e people . Th e people i n Sarawa k ar e generous , hospitable , nice an d polite , bu t they wil l no t hesitat e t o stan d u p fo r themselves , spea k u p fo r themselves, and , i f necessary , shoo t fo r themselves , whic h i s exactly what the y ar e doin g agains t Indonesia . CONFRONTATIO N WIT H INDONESI A

Finally, i t ough t t o b e mad e clea r tha t ther e i s n o sympath y among th e interio r people s fo r th e Indonesia n attitude s o f Con [ 33 9 ]

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frontation. Ther e ha s bee n n o cas e of disaffectio n an d movemen t across the borde r fro m th e Malaysia n side . On th e contrary , ther e has bee n considerabl e movemen t fro m th e Kalimanta n sid e to ward Sarawak , an d i f w e allowe d i t t o b e so , ther e woul d prob ably b e a massiv e one . Th e Indonesia n Confrontation , a s fa r a s it concern s th e interio r an d th e hil l people s i s a contradictio n of al l thei r ow n feeling s an d ther e i s evidenc e tha t th e peopl e on th e Indonesia n sid e o f th e borde r ar e eve n mor e fe d u p wit h it than anybod y on th e Sarawak side of the border . COMPARISONS WIT H FOU R ADJACEN T COUNTRIE S

The State of Sabah. Althoug h th e Sarawa k positio n compare s fairly closel y t o tha t i n Sabah , with a basically commo n tradition , three factors ar e importantly differen t there : (1) Saba h (a s Nort h Borneo ) wa s develope d b y Britis h busi nessmen an d directe d b y a Boar d o f Director s i n London ; ther e was n o loca l whit e hierarch y an d no t alway s a ver y visibl e con tinuity o f control . Th e primar y concer n wa s no t inherite d famil y principles, albei t vague , a s in Sarawak , bu t dividends , i n a decen t way. Therefore , les s attentio n wa s pai d t o smal l group s an d thei r rights tha n i n Sarawak . I f thes e eve r cam e int o conflic t wit h such outsid e thrust s a s development, lan d use , etc. , the y ha d to tak e secon d plac e (n.b . th e grea t difference s i n timbe r an d rubber lan d us e i n Saba h compare d wit h Sarawak) . A differen t attitude towar d governmen t an d authorit y resulted . I n Sarawa k outsiders, money, missions , an d s o on wer e largel y exclude d unti l 1946. (2) Fo r associate d reasons , Saba h gav e mor e attentio n t o th e extension o f communication s an d a t leas t minima l administratio n than th e Brookes , whos e laissez-faire wa s extreme , bu t i n nativ e terms "positive " i n tha t i t wa s base d o n a wid e knowledg e of , sympathy for , an d suppor t of , th e minorit y nativ e idea s an d institutions. (3) Ethnologically , almos t th e whol e o f th e Saba h British Dutch (no w Malaysian-Indonesian ) borde r hinterlan d wa s inhabited b y on e group , th e (Tagal ) Muruts , excep t fo r a smal l group o f "Lu n Daye " (Kelabits ) a t Lon g Pasi a an d th e Moham medan Tedong s towar d th e eas t coast . Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo). Th e Dutc h attitud e i n th e [ 340 ]

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eastern two-third s o f Borne o wa s determined , eve n mor e tha n i n Sarawak, b y th e grea t distance s an d terrai n difficultie s involved . It i s stil l a majo r expeditio n t o ge t fro m Tareka n t o th e border . To wal k alon g th e borde r require s extraordinar y heroism . Broadly, th e Dutch , wit h man y economi c opportunitie s i n th e other easie r an d mor e fertile-soile d zone s o f thei r grea t archi pelagic empire , lef t th e Borne o hinterlan d t o itsel f almos t a s the Brooke s did . Th e Dutc h als o looke d a t i t wit h a har d an d practical view , rathe r differen t fro m th e intellectua l approac h of th e Brookes . The Netherland s administratio n exercised , fro m outsid e an d a fe w inlan d station s lik e Lon g Nawang , muc h mor e legalistic , paper control . Although , i n fact , thi s wa s largel y nomina l an d did no t operat e a t th e longhous e level , i t reflecte d a n attitud e of dominance whic h the y constantl y mad e fel t i n othe r way s in dealings with native chiefs an d customs . Within thi s syste m the y showe d clos e responsibilit y an d pa ternalism. (The y di d mor e wit h educatio n tha n th e Britis h o r the Brookes. ) Thi s wa s appreciabl y affecte d b y th e nearnes s o f Sarawak. Th e existenc e o f benevolen t feudalis m an d libera l hissez-faire ove r th e borde r pose d a challeng e t o th e Dutc h the n exactly a s i t ha s don e t o th e Indonesian s since—an d i t i s indee d a direc t reaso n fo r Confrontatio n no w tha t th e discrepanc y i n conditions o n th e othe r sid e o f th e borde r amon g peopl e o f in timately interrelate d (an d ofte n intermarried ) group s is so acute . Despite difference s i n theory , interio r Kalimanta n ha s therefor e developed i n practic e closel y t o resembl e interio r Sarawak . Malaya (the Pre-Malaysian Federation of Malaya). I n Malay a proper, fo r variou s reason s (includin g th e demograph y o f th e late Ston e Ag e an d th e geograph y o f th e peninsula) , Isla m cam e to dominat e th e whol e countr y fro m it s inceptio n i n th e four teenth centur y t o th e establishmen t o f ful l outsid e governmen t in th e nineteent h century , thi s latte r tendin g t o crystaliz e th e theological status quo i n al l thes e countries , excep t i n regar d to Christianity . Thi s i s importan t t o Malaysia , becaus e centra l government thinkin g o n Borne o ha s bee n insistentl y conditione d by th e peninsula experience . Islam onl y hold s th e coasta l plai n (an d b y n o mean s al l o f that) i n Sarawak , Sabah , an d Kalimantan . I n Malay a onl y a smal l [341 ]

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and weakene d fragmen t o f "pagans " remain s inlan d i n fragmen tal groups an d with extensiv e deculturalization ove r five centuries. They hav e n o "hinterlan d retreat, " a s ther e i s a coas t withi n a fe w days ' wal k o n eithe r side ; an d th e interio r terrain , thoug h tough, doe s no t compar e i n complexit y wit h tha t o f Sarawak Kalimantan, wher e th e commo n borde r run s fo r five hundre d miles, o f whic h ove r hal f i s reall y rugged . Thu s retrea t fro m the coasta l pressures , whic h buil t u p dens e uplan d population s in Borne o (reduce d b y a revers e movemen t sinc e whit e govern ment), wa s seldo m possibl e e n mass e i n Malaya . Thos e wh o re sisted th e oute r worl d usuall y ende d u p somewha t adrif t (semi nomadic, nothin g lik e th e riche r settle d culture s o f Kelabi t o r Kayan) an d i n smallis h "pockets " rathe r tha n great , thoug h dis tant, valley s (Bario , Kalalan , Usu n Apau , Usu n Lenau , Baloi ; cf. Bawang , Bahau , Ap o Kayan , Kapua s i n Kalimantan) . The positio n o f thes e paga n people s i n Malay a wa s muc h a s among th e aborigina l people s o f Australia—an d ver y differen t from tha t i n Borne o a s a whole . Thi s i s a fundamenta l poin t that wa s no t properl y understoo d b y som e o f th e intereste d Malaya partie s befor e th e implementatio n o f Malaysi a a s a ne w nation. As i n Australia , thes e people s hav e lon g bee n officiall y classe d as "aborigines " an d treate d no t onl y a s a minority , bu t also , by implication , a s somewha t inferior . Thi s attitud e wa s largel y set u p b y th e Britis h an d wa s inherite d b y Malaysia . No w understandable pressure s ar e developin g t o de-aboriginiz e th e rather feebl e Sakai , etc. , broadly terme d a s orang asli ("th e earl y men"). This is well known amon g the residents of Borneo. It mus t b e emphasize d tha t th e inlan d peopl e o f Borne o gen erally, an d o f Sarawa k especiall y (fo r reason s outline d above) , do no t eve n begi n t o fee l tha t the y ar e inferior . Fo r historica l reasons o f war , etc. , they ma y eve n fee l a bi t superio r t o some . Their cultur e date s bac k thousand s o f years . The y fee l i t t o b e as ric h an d a s dee p a s an y tha t ha s com e since , a t leas t unti l Western technocracy . Bu t the y ar e no t conservativ e an d seldo m "backward" in attitude towar d modern times . The ide a tha t thes e outsiders, howeve r man y time s mor e nu merous, shoul d dominat e th e inlan d b y proces s o f law , eve n i f it i s "democratic, " i s fundamentall y intolerabl e t o them . An d this i s on e o f th e basi c problems , perhap s th e basi c proble m [34 2 ]

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in th e contex t o f thi s volume , in thi s particular field fo r th e year s almost immediatel y ahea d i n Malaysia , i n Indonesia , an d in othe r areas. New Guinea: A Borneo Parallel? Though perhap s Ne w Guine a is ou t o f th e mai n are a o f consideration , I dra w attentio n t o the appreciabl e parallel s betwee n th e huma n situation s there , in a n eve n toughe r terrai n o f simila r size , divide d int o territorie s now o n th e fringe s o f a confrontation , bu t wit h a n eve n highe r degree o f "interna l isolation " until recently . The situatio n i n centra l Ne w Guine a (wit h whic h th e autho r is familiar ) toda y approximate s tha t i n centra l Borne o som e cen turies ago . Ther e wa s the n a muc h greate r inlan d populatio n in Borneo , centere d o n a serie s o f grea t plateau s (onl y on e o f which i s populate d today) , cultivatin g roo t crop s befor e ric e was known there, with Stone Age techniques. The impact s o f (a ) iro n tools , (b ) gunpowder , (c ) communi cations an d technology , i n tha t order , hav e followe d a closel y similar course . Bu t Ne w Guine a ha s bee n save d o n enormou s parallel effec t i n th e earl y stages : th e decimatin g epidemic s o f smallpox, cholera , etc. , whic h strippe d whol e rive r system s o f human lif e fro m abou t 160 0 t o 189 0 A.D . Medica l techniques , a fourth ite m o f change , hav e bee n introduce d i n phas e wit h diseases i n thi s generation . Th e effec t o f a fift h factor , Christia n missionaries, is too complex for concis e comparison . I indicate d briefl y som e o f thes e "ol d plateaus " o f populatio n and depopulatio n problem s i n th e Dickso n Asi a lectur e t o th e Royal Geographica l Societ y (publishe d i n thei r Geographical Journal 1964) . Th e questio n suggeste d b y thes e comparison s is : Does Ne w Guine a fac e i n th e futur e a mor e intricat e versio n of what we are facing now in Borneo? APPENDIX LEGAL RELATIONSHIP S BETWEE N TRIBA L AND M I N O R I T Y P E O P L E S AN D C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T S : SARAWA K LEGA L STATU S O F MINORIT Y PEOPLES : SUMMAR Y

Much o f th e lega l statu s o f th e "minority " o r "triba l popula tion" i s undefine d an d base d primaril y o n traditio n an d "mutua l [34 3 ]

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respect." I t i s therefore rathe r vulnerabl e t o new , outside , forma l litigation o r codificatio n b y th e "majority. " Thes e peopl e ar e deeply awar e o f that . The y truste d th e Britis h s o muc h becaus e they wer e a n eve n smaller , indee d a microcosmic , minority i n their mids t an d eve n i n th e capital . I t i s wort h emphasizin g here tha t althoug h outsid e legislatio n coul d alte r remot e statu s and upse t minorit y rights , (a ) ther e i s n o sig n o f an y intentio n to d o s o o n an y significan t scal e a t presen t (bu t a ne w orde r must involv e som e changes , t o brin g abou t tha t order) ; (b ) th e lack o f intentio n t o mak e majo r change s i s partly becaus e every one i s wel l awar e o f th e fac t that , a t leas t a s thing s wer e i n 1965, i t woul d b e impracticabl e t o carr y throug h sudde n change s of an y kin d i n thi s terrai n an d cultura l climat e withou t th e good will o f th e inlan d people ; (c ) t o los e tha t goodwil l coul d hav e serious repercussions , o n th e border , fo r example . Onc e more , in fact, geograph y operate s i n Borneo politics. DEFINITION O F CITIZENSHI P

Citizenship i s define d basicall y b y birth . Al l Sarawak-bor n hold, theoretically , proo f o f citizenshi p i n th e for m o f a simpl e identity card . I n fact , severa l thousan d inlan d fol k hav e n o papers, thoug h the y ar e full y recognize d a s citizens . Eve n th e pure nomad s ar e ful l citizen s i n thi s sense . I n Brook e times , u p to 1946 , n o paper s wer e needed . Th e fac t o f payin g ta x mean t citizenship. Thi s wa s usuall y on e dolla r (Straits ) pe r mal e or , in th e cas e o f nomads , paymen t i n kind , mat s fo r example . There i s a n importan t distinctio n betwee n "natives " an d "non-natives," mostl y verbal , bu t significant . Thi s bega n i n th e late 1950' s an d wa s directe d a t contro l o f Chines e dominance . "Natives" continu e t o enjo y specia l privilege s unde r th e Malaysian constitution . Thes e native s are , i n effect , al l th e Sarawakians excep t fo r th e Chinese . N o present Chines e are mor e than sixt h generatio n here , an d fe w mor e tha n eve n four . Ac tually, man y Kenyan s an d Lan d Dayak s in borde r area s ar e als o recent immigrants , bu t fro m acros s th e Kalimanta n border , no t from overseas . All hil l triba l peopl e ar e therefor e "citizens. " They hav e neve r been bothere d i n detai l wit h lowlan d governmenta l regulation s involving liberties , and , unti l th e Indonesian s mad e i t impossible, they literall y ignore d nationa l boundaries . [ 344 ]

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Special effort s hav e bee n mad e fo r th e hil l people , particularl y since 1946 , i n th e sphere s o f medica l service s ("th e ul u dresse r system") an d education . I starte d th e firs t uplan d schoo l a s earl y as 1946 , an d muc h priorit y ha s bee n give n t o remot e school s if an d whe n th e loca l peopl e hav e becom e enthusiastic . A n im portant resul t i s tha t th e go-ahea d tribe s hav e bee n abl e t o ad vance themselve s considerabl y i n th e pas t decade . A Bara m Kenyah recentl y go t a Firs t Honour s degre e i n La w a t Cambridge, England , an d a Kelabi t represente d Sarawa k a t a Colombo Pla n meeting , wher e hi s Englis h dazzle d th e "Indians. " In general , th e ol d polic y o f "kindnes s t o th e remote " ha s been continued , bu t slowl y reduce d i n balance (notabl y lenienc y before th e ne w law) . However , a t n o tim e hav e th e mos t "primi tive" Punan nomad s bee n treate d a s a separat e clas s o f person . They ar e jus t inlan d citizens , wit h allowance s mad e fo r th e fact s of remoteness . Th e neares t thin g t o an y specia l attitud e t o the m is th e priorit y give n i n th e author' s officia l appointmen t t o th e post o f "Governmen t Ethnologis t an d Curator. " Bu t thi s appointment onl y give s a vagu e advisor y o r interventionar y rol e to thi s office r i f som e aspec t i s bein g seriousl y neglected , fo r example, rea l motive s fo r a triba l killing . I n fact , curatin g ha s proved t o tak e u p 9 5 percen t o f thi s job , unlik e th e situatio n in Malaya , wher e unde r th e Britis h "aborigines " an d "museums " were ofte n conjoined , t o th e 9 5 percen t neglec t o f th e latte r prior t o 1960 . CUSTOMARY LA W AN D LOCA L AUTONOM Y

Variations i n customar y la w wer e accepte d a s implici t i n th e whole Brook e metho d o f governmen t fo r a century . Thi s wa s to som e exten t dictate d b y extremel y difficul t terrain , ver y poo r communications, th e grea t are a t o b e covered , lo w populatio n density, an d th e multiplicit y o f sub-group s (a t leas t fifteen languages). Many o f th e triba l group s i n th e hinterlan d ha d a ver y stron g hereditary clas s structure , base d o n mythologica l cultur e heroes , carefully kep t genealogies , an d a long-establishe d wa y o f life . This provide d rathe r eas y controls ; th e chief s wer e "appointed " on a traditiona l basi s an d paid , unti l recently , by a share o f fines, etc. Only seriou s crim e wa s deal t wit h downriver , b y whit e o r [ 34 5 ]

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Malay magistrate s (administrativ e officer s i n court) . Th e Ken yah-Kayan-Kelabit people s especiall y len t themselve s t o thi s pro cess. Thi s situatio n continues , an d al l thei r electe d representa tives sinc e 196 3 hav e bee n th e sam e clas s leaders , i n trul y fre e elections. (See also pp. 347-4 8 below. ) The Iban s (Se a Dayaks ) an d Lan d Dayak s hav e les s heredi tary politica l structure , an d leadershi p wa s formerly largel y base d on wa r an d headhunting . Th e suppressio n o f thes e activitie s b y the governmen t le d t o contro l problem s with man y complication s (e.g. "rebellions " b y loca l "live-wires" ) righ t u p t o 1940 . Her e the ne w electora l syste m sinc e 195 0 ha s me t a rea l nee d an d produced quit e ne w sort s o f leaders—includin g th e Chie f Minis ter an d others, Ibans previously not known . Judges an d othe r officials , therefore , wer e fo r a lon g tim e al l locally supplied , fo r an y bu t th e mos t seriou s offenses . However , better communication s an d th e "orderl y mind " o f post-Brook e government hav e graduall y reduce d lega l power s a t thi s level . This ha s bee n compensate d for , however , b y a n increas e i n al l sorts o f duties , suc h a s lookin g afte r visitin g WH O personnel , agricultural advisers , an d othe r person s onl y see n sinc e ne w financing an d communication s hav e bee n available—outboar d motors o n rivers , planes , an d no w helicopter s overland . It shoul d b e noted , however , tha t i n practic e a goo d dea l mor e has alway s bee n settle d a t th e loca l leve l tha n authorize d officially—and thi s i s stil l th e case . Th e unit y o f th e longhouse , still dominan t everywher e i n th e interior , lend s itsel f t o suc h arrangements s o lon g a s th e issu e i s no t betwee n tw o commu nities. Th e wors t case s ar e thos e o f lan d dispute s and , sometimes , disputes betwee n adjacen t longhouse s ove r individua l duria n and othe r frui t trees . Som e o f thes e hav e continue d fo r decades—and ar e trie d ou t o n ever y ne w distric t officer , fo r ex ample, th e Bidayu h cas e o n th e Serian-Kalimanta n border . Until ver y recently , ethnologica l overla p wa s slight , an d n o Malays o r Chines e live d inlan d excep t a t a fe w tradin g point s (Belaga, Lon g Akar) . Thi s i s changin g now , an d eve n remot e areas ar e bein g draw n int o possibl e clashe s o f grou p interest , notably over timber right s (se e p. 349 below). It wil l b e clea r fro m th e abov e tha t th e "villages " hav e ful l rights o f self-organization . On e majo r tensio n poin t here has bee n [346 ]

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a tendenc y t o fragmentatio n wit h populatio n growt h o r becaus e of secondar y dispute s withi n a longhouse, fo r exampl e whe n tw o upper-class brother s fal l out . Th e Brooke s mad e i t illega l t o spli t up longhouse s fo r trivia l reason s suc h a s this , an d discourage d opposition t o th e headma n o r to communa l decision s reache d in th e prope r traditiona l way . Legislatio n wa s use d t o suppor t communal leaders , an d bi g penaltie s wer e impose d a t point s where individua l decision s coul d affec t th e whol e o f a longhous e community. Prior t o Brooke rule th e people ha d t o get on together , becaus e the whol e headhuntin g patter n mad e fo r tigh t longhous e unity , as th e lon e individua l coul d no t survive . Any decisio n wa s acte d upon b y th e communit y a s a whole . Wit h th e suppressio n o f headhunting, i t becam e possibl e fo r th e firs t tim e fo r peopl e t o be "selfish " an d individualistic . Ha d thi s tendenc y bee n allowe d to g o unchecked , n o furthe r authorit y woul d hav e bee n possibl e in th e interior , an d th e situatio n i n regar d t o lan d tenur e woul d have becom e chaoti c a s communitie s fragmented . Th e Brookes , therefore, continue d th e ol d traditio n o f longhous e solidarit y in a ne w setting . But , o f course , b y mutua l consen t o r eve n o n administrative decision , a longhous e coul d spli t u p i f necessary , for exampl e becaus e o f growt h o f populatio n an d pressur e o n the land . This outsid e influenc e ha s bee n increase d sinc e 1946 , bu t t o a ver y larg e exten t th e basi c attitude s ar e stil l decide d locall y and no t seriousl y affecte d fro m outside . Th e mor e remot e th e area, th e mor e thi s i s so , o f course ; fo r instance , som e Punan s have still never seen a film or heard a radio. LOCAL ORGANIZATION AND CENTRAL GOVERNMEN T

The syste m o f loca l governmen t representatio n u p t o th e cen tral government , starte d b y Si r Arde n Clark e an d muc h devel oped b y Si r Anthon y Abell , give s eac h grou p o f longhouse s a n elected representativ e (ofte n a ma n younge r tha n th e olde r chiefly type , an d usuall y th e so n o r nephe w o f on e o f these— • never females) . Throug h distric t council s thi s pyramid s t o Coun cil Negeri , wher e i n 196 5 the remote r minoritie s ar e quit e power fully represente d b y a Muru t English-speakin g Baptist , age d 42 ; the paramoun t chie f o f th e Kayan-Kenyahs , age d 65 , an d hi s [34 7 ]

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English-educated Roma n Catholi c son ; an d a Lahaha n Kayan , ex-teacher, age d 40 , a ful l ministe r i n th e stat e governmen t (a s of Jun e 1965) . The ol d traditio n o f direc t acces s t o th e governo r from remot e peoples continues . Th e presen t governo r i s a belove d Mala y wit h many year s o f Brook e an d the n colonia l service . Th e remote r peoples ar e jealou s o f thei r ver y considerabl e rights , an d ther e is always concer n les t thes e be los t by chang e of regime or contro l from afar . On e o f th e wors t mistake s th e Japanes e mad e wa s to ignor e thi s i n 1942 ; and th e Indonesian s mad e simila r mistake s after th e Republi c too k ove r a wid e are a o f Kalimantan , bu t they ar e now goin g almos t t o th e othe r extreme , insofar a s condi tions allow them t o do so. There hav e bee n n o thought s o f semi-autonomou s states . Th e nature o f th e terrai n ha s mad e eac h area—no t necessaril y "tribe"—in effec t semi-autonomou s i n al l matter s o f concer n t o them until very recently . The bi g ne w problem s o f th e stat e no w ar e t o a considerabl e extent connecte d wit h populatio n increas e an d pressure s (Sarawak wa s formerl y widel y underpopulated , enablin g "ex travagant" agriculture an d jungl e use) an d with the ne w overlap s of rac e resultin g fro m this , fro m ne w communications , an d als o from ne w an d les s traditional outsid e attitudes . LAND AN D RESOURC E LA W

Title t o lan d i s simpl y secure d b y hereditar y occupation , an d there ar e n o rea l lan d title s fo r th e interio r othe r tha n "custo m and agreement. " However , a n importan t ne w lan d study , base d on carefu l researc h befor e th e formatio n o f th e Federatio n o f Malaysia, produce d ne w legislatio n originall y schedule d t o com e up a t Counci l Neger i i n Marc h 1965 . Som e immediat e reaction s to th e "realism " o f th e bill s wer e s o shar p tha t th e meetin g was, i n a n unusua l step , deferre d unti l Ma y fo r furthe r consideration.4 4

When thes e lan d law s wer e du e t o com e u p i n Council Neger i i n Ma y 1965, the y precipitate d a politica l crisi s whic h nearl y spli t th e Allianc e Part y along th e line s o f "native " an d "non-native " interests . Tw o Malay-Melana u minis ters temporaril y withdre w fro m th e stat e government , whic h ha s sinc e bee n reformed t o includ e them , plu s on e mor e leadin g Malay , on e mor e Iban , an d one Kaya n (se e pp . 347-348) . Th e lan d matte r ha s bee n shelve d fo r detaile d re examination.

[ 34 8 ]

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Until no w th e longhous e ha s bee n th e norma l landholdin g unit. Bu t withi n thi s ther e ar e a multiplicity o f individua l rights , both temporar y an d hereditary , arrive d a t b y "custo m an d agree ment," as well a s by status . Native governmen t reserve s ar e formulate d b y la w t o cove r the abov e an d appl y equall y ove r larg e coasta l area s inhabite d by Malay s an d Melanaus . Th e situatio n i s therefor e extremel y complex, i n term s o f futur e development an d administrativ e logic. ECOLOGICA L DIFFERENCE S AN D LAN D LAW S

Upland area s ar e no t speciall y differentiate d i n la w fro m low lands, bu t b y definitio n (sinc e access until ver y recently ha s bee n only o n foo t an d infrequent ) hav e bee n totall y unde r traditiona l native controls . No w bot h Iban s an d Chines e have , unde r nee d for land, begu n t o push a t eve n som e o f th e remot e places—Usu n Apau, Long Seridan, for example . Inland irrigatio n ha s unti l ver y recentl y bee n confine d t o tw o small groups an d has never been legall y differentiated . Forests, whic h stil l cove r 7 5 percen t o f Sarawak , hav e bee n the subjec t o f extensiv e legislatio n an d massiv e contro l sinc e th e thirties. Th e governmen t hold s al l bu t "ow n use " right s ove r vast areas . It is here tha t rac e an d populatio n pressure s ar e build ing u p strongly . Sarawa k i s no t a ric h country , an d timbe r i s a majo r asset—i t i s fa r an d awa y th e numbe r on e resourc e i n more develope d Sabah . Broadly then , forest resource s ar e considered governmen t prop erty. But , whateve r th e ma p says , th e people s o f th e are a fee l that dee p loca l rights ar e involved , especiall y when , a s is happen ing now , an y questio n o f developmen t b y outsider s arises . Th e government ma y tak e on e view, an d th e Daya k anothe r i n this. As a resul t o f th e abov e situation , fellin g jungl e i s no w no t allowed ove r wid e areas . I n practice , i t ha s prove d extremel y difficult t o enforc e th e law , an d large-scal e intrusion s hav e bee n made, especially by Iban s an d Lan d Dayaks , in the now crowded , poor-soil area s o f th e southwest . I n som e districts , attemptin g to contro l wha t i s calle d th e Kasa r syste m i s abou t th e bigges t administrative headach e (eve n u p t o Niah i n th e Fourt h Divisio n and middle Limbang in the Fifth Division) . [ 34 9 ]

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Shifting cultivatio n i s the only syste m used ove r most o f the in terior, an d ther e i s n o la w o f an y kind , customar y o r written , against i t unles s i t intrude s o n th e interest s o f anothe r grou p or, latterly, of governmen t itself . No law s contro l specifi c crops . Rubbe r an d coconut s hav e bee n under assiste d scheme s durin g variou s regimes : Brooke , colonial , and Malaysian . Opium , an d th e smokin g o f it , ar e illegal . To bacco i s grow n fo r it s ow n use—bu t on e Christia n missio n ha s prohibited it s growt h sinc e 195 0 wit h damagin g effect s o n th e barter econom y i n that area . REQUIREMENTS FO R LAN D TITLE S

Fencing i s unknow n i n th e interior , excep t temporarily , fo r example, aroun d ric e fields agains t dee r an d pig . Surve y i s no w required fo r al l titl e i n th e lowlands , bu t no t i n th e area s a t present unde r discussion . Despit e heroi c effort s b y on e o f th e most competen t departments , titl e registration i s slow du e t o ter rain trouble s an d s o on . I t i s noteworth y tha t a larg e slic e o f the interio r i s stil l no t properl y surveyed , includin g th e ol d Dutch border . Therefore , "use-right " i s th e effectiv e determinan t of lan d titl e i n practic e i n th e interior . Cadastra l surve y ha s bee n attempted bu t no t completed . Militar y an d nava l unit s ar e no w giving priorit y t o fina l surve y inland , a s ar e Russian-aide d sur veyors i n Kalimantan . Streams an d rive r course s fal l withi n th e traditiona l lan d pat terns an d ar e no t exclude d fro m use . They ar e ofte n determinan t boundaries, a s the y ar e easil y recognize d an d littl e changing . WATER RESOURCE S

There i s s o muc h rai n an d wate r tha t wate r rights hav e neve r been o f concer n excep t o n th e salin e coast . However , th e tin y upland-irrigation secto r ha s know n difficultie s an d on e ver y seri ous disput e betwee n individual s ove r a n irrigatio n ditc h (i n th e Bario Valley , 1951) . Recentl y increase d populatio n concentra tions, a s wel l a s th e sprea d o f irrigatio n technique s int o ne w interior areas , under governmen t encouragemen t sinc e 1950 , may increase the tendency towar d disputes . [ 35 0 ]

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GAM E RESOURCE S

Hunting right s fal l withi n th e sam e pattern , naturally ; bu t it i s ofte n impracticabl e t o defin e mountainou s jungl e sector s a s between adjacen t longhouses , an d th e us e o f jungl e fo r huntin g is more elasti c tha n us e for "potentia l felling " an d othe r exploita tion. Moreover , th e requirement s o f certai n sort s o f hunting , fo r example, rhino , wil d ox , o r pi g migratio n pursuit , ma y tak e parties ove r lon g journey s (fo r example , th e autho r wa s ou t fo r one of these for twenty-si x day s in 1946) . NOMAD S AN D SETTLEMEN T

The stil l full y nomadi c Puna n group s i n th e Thir d Division , who liv e entirel y o n wild-jungl e produce , hav e a separat e net work o f inter-grou p relationship s connecte d wit h thei r specia l niche in Borneo ecology . Again, ne w condition s an d pressure s ar e workin g t o accelerat e a lon g (prehistoric ) proces s leadin g towar d th e settlin g o f thes e nomads. Powerfu l incentive s t o roa m remain , involvin g onl y a few hundred peopl e but thousand s o f squar e miles. TAXATIO N

Taxation i s stil l simpl y o n a capitatio n basi s i n th e interio r and i s very low. All moneys g o first to the state , not t o th e centra l government, an d mos t ar e returned , visibly , t o th e loca l authority. There i s n o ta x o n land , property , income , house , livestock , or slaughtering . Ther e ar e taxe s payabl e on : shotguns , schoo l fees (ofte n waive d an d likel y t o b e wholl y s o befor e lon g a s in Malaya ; i t wa s a curren t politica l issu e i n Sarawa k i n 1965) , wireless receiver s (ofte n onl y on e pe r longhous e needed) , alco hol i f purchase d (mos t i s stil l homemad e an d therefor e no t tax able), an d o n a wid e rang e o f previousl y rar e an d no w commo n commodities suc h a s cloth , tinne d foods , an d cartridges , b y cus toms revenue . No sor t o f corvee labo r ha s eve r bee n require d excep t fo r th e following: (1) I n Brook e times , fre e porterag e o f dut y officer s fro m on e house to the next (thi s is now paid for) . [ 35 1 ]

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(2) Sinc e lat e 196 4 ther e ha s bee n nationa l registratio n wit h a potentia l fo r compulsor y servic e i n defens e b y th e young . (N o inland peopl e ar e a s ye t affected , no r ar e the y likel y t o b e immediately.) There i s n o recognize d syste m o f intra-grou p taxation , bu t there ar e extensiv e system s o f cooperatio n an d grou p dut y i n the man y aspect s o f lif e i n th e interio r whic h ca n onl y b e don e on tha t basis ; fo r example , fellin g jungl e fo r ric e fields , o r build ing a longhouse .

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Muruts of Sabah (NorthBorneo ) C . H . LE Y

INTRODUCTION

Sabah. Sabah , until 196 3 known a s British Nort h Borneo , form s the norther n extremit y o f th e islan d o f Borneo , bein g bordere d to th e sout h b y Sarawa k an d Kalimanta n (Indonesia n Borneo) . There ar e approximatel y 85 0 mile s o f coas t an d abou t 28 0 mile s of border—th e borde r wit h Indonesia n Kalimanta n bein g approx imately 20 0 mile s long . Thi s territor y lie s roughl y equidistan t from Manila , Saigon , an d Singapore . Sabah's tota l territoria l are a i s no w 29,50 0 squar e mile s an d consists o f fertil e coasta l an d centra l plai n area s wit h larg e un developed mountainou s jungles , mainl y t o th e south . Moun t Kinabalu, 13,45 5 feet, i s the highes t mountai n i n th e north , muc h of th e remainde r o f th e hig h groun d bein g o n th e souther n bor der, wher e three - t o four-thousand-foo t ridge s an d mountain s make communication s an d administrativ e wor k ver y difficult . Although th e coasta l area s ar e relativel y wel l developed , th e urban area s i n th e interio r ar e inadequatel y service d b y dus t roads subjec t t o flooding, an d th e majorit y o f river s o n th e wes t side ar e unsuitabl e fo r transportin g anythin g large r tha n smal l perahus powere d b y outboar d motors . Excep t o n th e eas t sid e near Tawa u n o road a s yet reache s neare r tha n withi n fort y mile s of th e souther n border , thu s leavin g communication s i n thi s bor der are a relian t o n ai r travel . Borne o Airway s an d commercia l charter service s suppl y a regula r passenge r an d freigh t servic e to th e large r centers , bu t mos t o f th e border-are a ai r trave l i s now mad e possibl e b y th e presenc e o f Securit y Force s whos e military operation s deman d th e constructio n o f airfield s an d heli copter landin g zones . Population of Sabah. Th e tota l populatio n o f Saba h i s approxi mately 455,00 0 (se e Tabl e 15) . Th e indigenou s peopl e o f Saba h [ 35 3 ]

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Y

can b e divide d int o thre e mai n groups , totalin g abou t 306,500 . (See pp . 320 , 34 4 fo r definitio n o f "native " an d "indigenous " populations.) TABLE 1 5 D I S T R I B U T I O N O F E T H N I C G R O U P S I N SABA H (1960 CENSUS ) Ethnic Grou p Numbe Indigenous 306,49 Dusun (Kadazan ) 145,22 Bajau 59,71 Murut 22,13 Other indigenou s 79,42 Non-Indigenous 147,92 Chinese 104,54 Other non-indigenou s 43,38 All communitie s 454,42

r 8 9 0 8 1 3 2 1 1

The Kadazan s (o r Dusun ) ar e th e larges t singl e trib e an d are divide d int o "coastal " an d "hill " peoples ; thei r cultivation s cover th e centra l plain s o f Saba h an d larg e coasta l areas . Man y have bee n influence d b y outsid e societie s an d hav e accepte d Chinese and Europea n methods of cultivation . The Baja u (horsemen ) ar e on e o f th e Mala y o r para-Mala y groups, whic h als o includ e th e Brune i Malay , Dayak , SuIu , II lanun, an d Tidong . The Muru t ar e th e smalles t an d mos t backwar d indigenou s group an d fal l fa r behin d thos e mentione d abov e i n nearl y al l aspects o f economi c progress , health , an d education . A s the y inhabit th e borde r areas , thi s pape r deal s onl y wit h them . The Chines e ar e th e larges t immigran t grou p and , a s i n mos t places i n Southeas t Asia , contro l genera l commerc e i n al l towns . Their numbe r an d influenc e i s constantl y expanding . I n 191 2 they forme d 12. 5 percen t o f th e populatio n an d no w numbe r over 23 percent o f the population . Historical Background. Th e whol e o f thi s area , includin g th e Malay Peninsula , Borneo , an d Celebes , wa s plague d b y anarch y and pirac y fo r man y year s unti l Wester n tradin g companie s began t o tak e a n interes t i n th e are a i n th e nineteent h century . One o f th e first contact s wa s mad e b y th e Eas t Indi a Company , [ 354 ]

MUBUT S O F SABA H (NOKT H BORNEO)

to who m Sulta n Ami r o f SuI u cede d hi s possessio n (th e nort h an d eas t o f Sabah ) i n 1763 . A tradin g bas e wa s mad e i n th e norther n islan d o f Balembangan , bu t it di d no t flourish. Meanwhile , Raja h Brook e ha d create d hi s astonishin g adminis trativ e paradis e i n Kuching , an d th e Britis h were cede d th e islan d of Labua n b y th e sulta n o f Brune i i n 1847 . Brunei , throug h year s of rebellion , corruption , an d strife , wa s i n a stat e o f decay , an d th e othe r territorie s the n controlle d b y th e Sulta n wer e i n th e same condition . Strangel y enough , on e o f th e firs t contact s wa s mad e b y a n America n i n 1865 , whe n th e Sulta n o f Brune i cede d th e wes t coast o f Saba h t o th e America n Tradin g Company , led b y Josep h Torre y o f Massachusetts . Torre y se t u p a tradin g pos t a t Kimani s an d importe d som e o f th e first Chines e worker s fro m Hon g Kong . However , lac k o f experienc e an d financ e le d hi m t o han d ove r th e enterpris e t o Baro n Overbeck , Austria n Consu l i n Hon g Kong , i n 1875 . Overbec k i n tur n wa s supersede d b y Alfre d Dent , a Britis h businessman , i n 1877 . Den t acquire d possession s coverin g nearl y al l Saba h (cede d by th e Sultan s o f Brune i an d SuIu) , produce d th e first semblanc e of la w an d order , an d initiate d organize d trade . Thi s ventur e was supporte d b y th e smooth-runnin g Raja h Brook e administra tion i n Kuching , Sarawak , and , o f course , b y th e presenc e o f th e Britis h nav y o n th e islan d o f Labuan , fro m whic h the y con trolle d pirac y an d protecte d th e mai n trad e lin e t o Japa n an d China . Dent' s administratio n le d t o th e grantin g o f th e Roya l Charte r formin g th e Nort h Borne o Charte r Company , which administere d th e countr y fro m 188 1 unti l 1941 , when th e Japanes e invaded . Although th e territorie s wer e mad e a Britis h protectorat e i n 1888, financ e fo r th e administratio n cam e fro m Londo n busines s houses ; an d i t wa s onl y i n 1946 , afte r th e devastatin g Japanes e war, tha t Nort h Borne o wa s take n o n a s a Britis h colony . I n 196 3 Nort h Borne o gaine d self-governmen t an d wa s rename d Sabah . Als o i n 196 3 Saba h joine d th e Federatio n o f Malaysia , a n ac t whic h wa s directl y followe d b y protest s fro m th e Philippine s an d Indonesi a an d thei r attempt s t o reasser t claim s t o thi s territory . Indonesia' s subsequen t Confrontatio n polic y (wit h actua l arme d incursions ) ha s necessitate d th e strengthenin g o f borde r control . Γ 355 1

MALAYSIA : C . H . LE Y

It shoul d b e note d tha t whil e recruiting , training , an d adminis tering th e Saba h Borde r Scouts , w e hav e bee n greatl y hampere d by th e fac t tha t ther e ar e ver y fe w natura l leader s t o b e foun d who ar e sufficientl y educate d t o b e abl e t o carr y ou t elementar y administrative duties . Thi s ca n possibl y b e attribute d t o th e fac t that th e Nort h Borne o Charte r Compan y (i n contras t t o th e Rajah Brook e regim e i n Sarawak ) di d littl e t o furthe r th e ad vanced educatio n o f it s subjects . Th e ravage s an d slaughte r dur ing th e Japanes e occupatio n wer e als o contributor y factors . The Muruts. Th e Murut s ar e a proto-Malay peopl e originatin g from Asi a an d ar e closel y relate d t o th e Kelabit s o f Sarawak . The present-da y Murut s liv e inland , an d th e are a the y occup y lies sout h o f th e lin e whic h join s Buki t Tru s Mad i an d th e nort h of Brune i Bay . They ar e divide d int o tw o groups : thos e wh o cultivat e hil l paddy; an d thos e cultivatin g we t paddy . The Murut sub-tribe s ar e as follows: (1) Timogun } (5 " (6 (2) Naba i [ (3) Boaka n I 1 . . . . (7 cultivators (4) Pelua n

) Taga l } Mostl y hill ) Kolu r | paddy/tapioc a ) Lundaya J cultivator s

In thi s pape r w e ar e dealin g wit h th e secon d grou p almos t exclusively, a s th e Murut s o f th e borde r area s ar e relian t entirel y on hill-padd y and/o r tapioc a (shifting ) cultivation , wit h th e usual supportin g crops . Except i n area s wher e th e Borne o Evangelica l Missionarie s have influence , th e Murut s ar e pagan , thei r attitud e an d approach t o lif e bein g comparabl e t o th e Sema i Seno i o f Mala y and th e Jarai of centra l Vietnam . The present-da y Muru t village s consis t o f severa l bambo o o r jungle hewn-plan k hut s wit h atta p o r zin c roofing , an d seldo m exceed on e hundre d people . Thi s tota l woul d hav e bee n house d in on e larg e longhous e som e year s ag o whe n headhuntin g wa s prevalent. Th e suppressio n o f headhuntin g ha s ha d severa l detri mental sid e effects , th e mos t importan t bein g th e causin g o f a vacuum i n th e religiou s aspec t o f th e Muru t lif e an d th e subse quent increase d stat e o f apathy . Headhuntin g an d th e awarenes s [ 35 6 ]

MURUT S O F SABA H (NORT H BORNEO )

of bein g hunte d b y anothe r grou p bonde d eac h longhous e int o a purposefu l uni t le d b y th e headman , wh o arrange d th e com munal ceremonie s whic h virtuall y generate d thei r wa y o f life . The denial of headhunting als o possibly caused the following : (1) Increas e i n case s o f violenc e withi n th e communit y (usually psychoti c seizures—amok) , whic h wer e unhear d o f when headhuntin g provide d th e outle t fo r violence . (2) Th e greate r sprea d o f diseas e throug h increase d friendl y contact betwee n village s (3) Th e undermining o f traditiona l grou p leadershi p Although strictl y banned , headhuntin g i s stil l though t abou t in th e backwar d areas , an d on e ca n discus s th e merit s o f can nibalism with som e of the olde r men. The method o f decapitation , processing, an d preservin g th e skul l ha s bee n describe d t o th e writer—the essentia l ceremonia l tastin g o f th e victim' s flesh (sweet lik e monkey ) soundin g particularl y repugnan t t o non Murut ears . This , o f course , i s on e o f th e mos t strikin g o f th e cultural difference s settin g thes e peopl e apar t fro m lowlan d administrators. Diet. Th e Murut s plan t hil l padd y an d tapioc a a s thei r stapl e crops, grea t ceremonia l importanc e bein g attache d t o harvest . Cultivation generall y follow s th e standar d patter n wher e th e jun gle i s cleare d i n April , burn t of f i n August—th e wome n plantin g the seed s i n th e hole s mad e b y th e men' s plantin g sticks . Fiel d houses ar e constructed , an d thes e ar e use d a s guar d post s an d eventual storag e points for th e crops . The harves t i s celebrate d wit h muc h festival , markets , an d the consumptio n o f larg e quantitie s o f a poten t loca l wine calle d tapai, processe d eithe r fro m ric e o r tapioca . Th e supplementar y crops includ e swee t potatoes , maize , loca l spinach , edibl e fungi , bananas, an d jungl e fruit . Male hunter s suppl y protei n i n th e for m o f wil d fowl , deer , pig, an d fish. Fishin g method s includ e net , line , traps , o r th e stupefying o f th e fis h wit h tube r juice . Fis h (an d meat ) i s ofte n salted an d store d i n bambo o container s wit h ric e an d herb s fo r six to nin e months . Th e resul t i s a dish , particularl y unappetizin g to th e foreig n tongue , calle d Jaru k i n th e Pensianga n area . I t is usuall y presente d o n festiv e occasion s wit h th e tapai wine , [357]

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Y

when all-nigh t singin g partie s an d dancin g t o gon g musi c las t for severa l days . Resources. Althoug h Saba h ha s larg e timbe r concession s an d deposits o f chromite , copper , coal , an d peat , non e o f thes e ar e workable i n th e Muru t hil l area . Ther e ar e n o rubbe r estate s in th e souther n borde r region , an d consequently th e Muru t econ omy i n thi s are a ha s n o chanc e o f developmen t b y thes e means. Trade, Barter, and Exchange. Th e priz e possession s i n a Muru t household ar e tapai jars , bras s gongs , wate r buffaloes , beads , blowpipes, spears , and , mor e recently , shotgun s an d pape r money. An ide a o f th e valu e o f thes e materia l possession s ca n b e gained fro m th e followin g accoun t o f th e marriag e procedur e among th e Taga l grou p o f Muruts . Th e suito r initiall y inform s his parent s o r guardia n tha t h e i s intereste d i n hi s prospectiv e bride, and , followin g famil y discussions , hi s parent s visi t th e house o f th e gir l an d i n furthe r discussion s determin e whethe r the gir l hersel f i s intereste d an d als o whethe r he r parent s hav e any objection s t o th e propose d marriage . I f th e gir l agrees , th e mother o f th e suito r take s th e prospectiv e brid e hom e t o he r house, th e fathe r o f th e gir l havin g decide d whe n th e marriag e feast wil l b e hel d a t hi s house . Th e suito r an d th e betrothe d then liv e a s man an d wif e unti l suc h tim e a s the feas t i s arrange d and th e dowr y establishe d an d collected . Thi s perio d i s generall y between a mont h an d si x weeks . Th e dowr y usuall y consist s o f cash, buffaloes , jars , an d gongs , an d i s adjuste d t o confor m wit h the financial statu s o f th e suito r an d th e statu s o f th e bride' s parents. Nowadays , cas h take s precedence , followe d b y buffaloe s and jars , althoug h previousl y th e latte r tw o wer e predominant . Jars ar e divide d int o fou r categories , an d althoug h tri e differenc e is difficul t t o describe , th e evaluatio n i s mad e accordin g t o typ e (old Chinese) , materia l (glaze d o r otherwise) , an d age . Th e four type s o f jar s are : Tiluan, worth abou t $60 0 (Malaysia n dolla r = U.S . $0.33) Binikul, worth abou t $20 0 Balayong, wort h abou t $15 0 Mandalalair, wort h abou t $15 0 The dowr y i s pai d a t th e weddin g festival , bu t i f th e bride groom i s unabl e t o pa y i t i n ful l a t tha t time , anothe r festiva l [ 35 8 ]

MURUT S O F SABA H (NORT H BORNEO)

is held th e followin g year , whe n th e balanc e o f payment i s made. The fathe r o f th e brid e is , however, permitte d t o visi t th e hous e of th e newly-marrie d coupl e a t an y tim e i n late r year s an d clai m any articl e whic h h e choose s a s a n additiona l dowr y payment . Although thi s practic e i s no t vigorousl y enforced , I hav e know n recently a squabbl e ove r a brand-ne w transisto r radi o se t whic h was asked for in this context . The Orang Tua ("headman" ) witnesse s th e festiva l an d dowry payment , an d th e marriag e i s finalized. Th e coupl e com mence thei r marrie d lif e b y livin g i n th e groom' s parents ' house. The requiremen t o f th e dowr y a s on e o f th e powerfu l force s pushing th e Murut s int o th e labo r marke t i s clearl y see n fro m the precedin g example . Par t o f thei r incom e i s no w obtaine d by me n wh o wor k a s casual labo r o n rubber estate s t o th e nort h or wh o ar e directl y employe d unde r th e Polic e a s Borde r Scout s or i n othe r governmen t labo r activities . Th e barte r trad e continues, an d frequen t Tamu s (o r markets ) provid e th e oppor tunity t o trad e jungl e produc e fo r th e "shinin g essentials " sup plied b y th e Chines e shopkeepers . It shoul d b e note d tha t unti l Confrontatio n close d th e border s between Kalimanta n an d Sabah , al l trad e good s wer e brough t into th e are a b y th e fe w Chines e shopkeeper s i n th e Pensianga n and Sapulu t b y wa y o f th e mai n rivers , whos e outlet s ar e i n Kalimantan. Th e closin g o f th e borde r ha s necessitate d th e sup ply o f good s b y ai r fro m th e trad e cente r i n Sabah . Som e mean s of pric e contro l ha s bee n achieve d b y th e fac t tha t militar y air craft assis t i n supplyin g essentia l good s (iodize d salt , etc. ) b y airdrop. The Administration. Althoug h th e Muru t follo w thei r ow n reg ulations an d custom s concernin g hereditar y law s (Pesak a an d Pencharian), marriages , burials , etc. , th e day-to-da y structur e is base d o n th e Saba h government' s administrativ e law , whic h covers all groups in the territory . The chai n o f administratio n i s passed fro m th e electe d Legisla tive Assemb y i n th e capita l t o th e residents , wh o i n tur n contro l the distric t officers . Bot h government-appointe d an d hereditar y headmen wor k fro m thi s leve l an d hav e direc t an d continua l contact wit h th e nativ e population . (Centra l governmen t repre sentation ha s not , a s yet , bee n decentralize d t o th e exten t o f allowing loca l elections , a s i n Sarawak. ) [ 35 9 ]

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Y

All Sabah' s populatio n i s serve d i n th e sam e way , an d wit h the presen t confrontatio n severa l emergenc y wa r committee s ar e also operative , whic h allo w militar y an d operationa l matter s t o be brought int o the normal pattern o f administration . Legal Status. Al l triba l peopl e residen t i n Saba h ar e citizen s of Saba h an d receiv e th e sam e benefit s o f citizenship , bein g per mitted t o tak e par t i n an y occupatio n an d t o ow n lan d o r prop erty of an y sort . Immigration law s appl y t o all , bu t th e smal l amoun t o f loca l cross-border traffi c i s not controlled , a s it woul d b e impracticabl e to d o s o with limite d staf f an d poo r communications . Native Law. Nativ e la w i s recognize d b y th e centra l govern ment, eac h distric t havin g it s ow n native court , whic h deal s wit h breaches o f nativ e custo m subjec t t o th e approva l o f th e distric t officer. Crime s o f violence ar e a Stat e Polic e matte r an d ar e deal t with accordingly . Native chiefs , appointe d b y th e government , ar e leader s o f these court s an d wit h th e distric t officer' s sanctio n pas s judg ments an d sentence s (usuall y fines bu t sometime s imprisonment ) for case s whic h infring e o n th e religious , inheritance , matrimo nial, sexual , o r day-to-da y customs o f th e group . Loca l law s var y slightly from are a to area . The nativ e cour t ha s jurisdictio n ove r anybody , bu t ca n onl y apply loca l law s pertaining t o marriage, etc. , if on e o f th e partie s is a native . I f th e partie s ar e o f differen t se x an d race , the n th e native cour t wil l rul e accordin g t o th e loca l law s an d custom s of th e female' s group . Th e distric t office r i s alway s referre d t o and hi s sanctio n i s require d befor e th e nativ e cour t ca n operate . Villages ar e organize d wit h Orang Tuas (lit . "Ol d Men" ) a s appointed leader s reportin g t o distric t officers , who i n turn repor t to residents . The y ar e no t permitte d t o organiz e themselve s an d are not organize d int o autonomou s groups . No special representa tives o n th e ministeria l leve l exist , a s certai n member s o f minis tries ar e i n fac t natives . Anyone ca n hav e quick an d direc t acces s to th e centra l governmen t b y bypassin g th e loca l administratio n and writing directl y to a minister. Government Programs. I t i s th e long-ter m polic y o f th e Saba h government t o encourag e th e change-ove r fro m cultivatio n o f hill padd y t o tha t o f we t paddy . Thi s migh t entai l th e resettle t 36 0 ]

MURUT S O F SABA H (NORT H BORNEO)

ment o f Muru t group s fro m borde r area s t o plain s area s furthe r to th e north . Her e the y coul d settl e an d benefi t fro m improve d crops (includin g we t paddy ) an d th e man y aid s fro m govern ment agencies , includin g medicines , education , an d agricultura l assistance. Thi s actio n woul d definitel y b e o f materia l benefi t to man y o f th e Muru t groups , provide d the y move d o f thei r own fre e will . However , a t presen t ther e i s a traditona l fea r an d distrust o f bein g resettled , an d i t i s unlikely tha t the y wil l agre e to mov e i n th e foreseeabl e future . I f the y ar e eve r t o b e moved , advice from a n anthropologist wil l be essential . While the y stil l liv e i n thei r presen t inaccessibl e areas , the y do inadvertentl y receiv e ta x concessions , bu t thes e concession s are du e t o th e administration' s physica l inabilit y t o lev y rathe r than t o a deliberate relief. Native Lan d Title s are , however , subjec t t o ta x relie f a s follows: Native Other No premium s Premium s $ 5 u p t o $5 0 lst-6th yea r ni l ren t lst-6t h yea r $ 1 pe r acre/yea r 6th yea r onward s 5 0 cent s pe r 6th-10t h yea r $ 4 per acre/yea r r $ 6 per acre/yea r acre/year Thereafte Special schools , educatio n scheme s i n general , an d Healt h Centre scheme s ar e al l bein g organize d t o cove r th e wet-padd y areas; hil l area s ar e bein g deal t wit h mor e o n a n ad hoc an d temporary basis . In th e Keninga u an d othe r accessibl e area s schoolin g i s free , as is medicine , althoug h hospital s charg e nomina l fee s whe n th e patient i s able t o pay . Present Lan d Settlemen t Scheme s provid e fre e roads , irriga tion, drainage , plantin g materials , fertilizers , an d occasionall y buffaloes an d housin g assistance. When th e tim e comes to resettl e the Murut s o f th e hil l borde r areas , thes e scheme s wil l b e spe cially adjuste d t o attrac t th e peopl e an d initiat e a voluntar y change o f cultivation methods . Land and Resources Law. Titl e t o lan d i s secure d throug h the distric t office r o n application . Group s ca n have area s gazette d to the m a s nativ e reserve s o r grazin g reserves . Alienation i s only [ 36 1 ]

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Y

possible afte r th e lan d i s regazette d an d n o longe r use d fo r it s original purpose . No fencin g i s require d fo r title s t o b e recognized , bu t lan d must b e officially surveye d t o be titled . Use-righ t t o land i s recognized. Ther e ha s bee n n o officia l cadastra l surve y made . Uplan d areas ar e ofte n no t gazette d owin g to lack of administrativ e facili ties, bu t i n theor y ther e shoul d b e no difference fro m th e lowland areas. Irrigate d area s ar e th e sam e a s non-irrigate d areas . Forest lan d i s differentiate d fro m othe r lan d wher e timber con cessions exist . Thi s come s unde r th e "Majo r Scheme, " an d tea k and othe r timbe r extractio n i s subject t o royalties paid eventuall y to th e Stat e Developmen t Fund . Fores t resource s ar e govern ment property , an d onl y secondar y jungl e ca n b e cu t fo r cultivation. There ar e n o law s agains t shiftin g cultivation , bu t encourage ment is , an d wil l be , give n t o eventua l resettlemen t i n lowlan d areas. Ther e ar e n o law s agains t cultivation , althoug h ther e i s a la w agains t th e possessio n o f opiu m ($2,00 0 fine) an d thi s is therefor e no t cultivated . The centra l governmen t own s stream s an d rive r courses , als o the wate r rights . Ther e ar e n o huntin g right s excep t b y mutua l group agreement , whic h i s entirel y loca l an d varie s i n differen t areas. License s mus t b e obtaine d t o shoo t pigeons , deer , an d elephants, an d firear m permit s ar e necessar y fo r shotgu n owners . Taxation. Taxatio n applie s t o al l groups , althoug h certai n area s escape becaus e o f their remot e location. Lan d ta x ha s bee n men tioned above . Cattl e ta x ($ 1 pe r buffalo/year ) i s payabl e t o th e local distric t council . Cattle - an d pig-remova l ta x ($1 0 fo r cattl e and $ 2 fo r pig ) i s als o payabl e t o the distric t council. Dwelling house ta x i s $1.5 0 pe r house/year . Incom e ta x i s o n stat e scale s but generall y not applicable . There i s als o a lan d ta x o r educatio n ta x o n land , payabl e to th e centra l government , whic h provide s fund s fo r schoo l staf f wages ($ 1 pe r acre/year) . Ther e i s n o ta x o n th e loca l tapai (rice wine) , althoug h i t i s a n offenc e t o distil l it . Group s ar e no longe r subjec t t o cal l fo r casua l labor , althoug h thi s wa s s o under Charte r Compan y rule . Group s d o no t hav e th e righ t t o tax themselves . Confrontation. Followin g Indonesia' s polic y o f Confrontatio n [ 36 2 ]

MURUT S O F SABA H (NORT H BORNEO )

of Malaysi a an d physica l cross-borde r attack s i n Sarawa k an d Sabah i n 1963 , Malaysia n Securit y Force s (includin g Gurkh a and Commonwealt h troops ) wer e deploye d t o contai n thi s offensive. In Saba h th e borde r wit h Kalimanta n (Indonesia ) stretche s from Lon g P a Si a t o Tawa u o n th e eas t coast— a larg e par t o f this border being unexplored an d totall y uninhabited . Naturally, i t wa s necessar y tha t th e indigenou s populatio n should b e invite d t o assis t i n th e defens e o f th e territor y and , as a result , th e Saba h Borde r Scout s wer e recruite d fro m th e resident Muru t population in the border areas . It i s interestin g t o not e tha t i n thi s are a Confrontatio n ha s done a grea t dea l i n unitin g th e Muruts . Althoug h th e ide a o f "Malaysia" i s somewha t remot e t o them , th e influ x o f variou s Security Force s ha s involve d the m i n a unite d defens e schem e for Malaysia . It i s greatl y t o th e advantag e o f Malaysi a tha t ther e i s n o need t o "wi n over " thes e tribes ; thei r allegianc e t o th e adminis tration i s firm as a result o f year s of sympatheti c treatmen t unde r the British . Som e o f th e Indonesia n soldiers , i n garriso n o n th e Kalimantan sid e o f th e border , hav e antagonize d Muru t groups , thus convincin g th e Murut s i n Saba h tha t Indonesia n rul e woul d not benefi t them . Severa l partie s o f discontente d Muru t refugee s have arrive d i n Saba h fro m acros s th e border , supportin g thi s idea, despit e th e fac t tha t n o attemp t ha s bee n mad e t o encour age suc h migration an d n o specia l inducements hav e been offere d to the refugees . Plan of Action. Th e threat s fro m Indonesi a ca n b e liste d a s follows: (1) A direc t invasio n usin g airborn e an d lan d troop s (2) Smal l incursio n operations , ambushes , snea k attack s (3) Subversio n i n al l areas , particularl y thos e know n t o b e pro-Indonesia (ther e ar e approximatel y 13,00 0 peopl e i n Saba h who originat e fro m Kalimantan ) o r wh o ar e politicall y rip e fo r revolt The first threa t woul d b e a n almos t purel y militar y commit ment. Th e thir d on e i s a Polic e Specia l Branc h task , whic h i s currently bein g deal t wit h successfully . Th e secon d threa t repre sents wha t ha s actuall y happene d i n th e borde r area s t o date , [ 36 3 ]

MALAYSIA: C . H . LE Y

and ou r Pla n o f Actio n i s therefor e base d o n this . I t i s regrette d that owin g t o securit y reason s I a m no t permitte d t o giv e an y detailed descriptio n o f th e curren t Pla n o f Actio n i n thi s area . However, broadl y speaking , th e polic y i s t o activat e th e loca l population so tha t the y for m a forward scree n o f nationa l loyalt y reporting o n sighting s o f peopl e an d aircraft , an d incidents , an d where possibl e defendin g thei r lan d agains t attac k an d takin g an activ e par t i n apprehendin g intruders . Thi s entail s improve ments i n communications , ne w roads , bette r rive r services , an d assistance fro m militar y Securit y Force s i n th e are a i n th e for m of ai r travel . Several government/militar y welfar e campaign s ar e con stantly i n progress , and thes e ar e aime d a t maintaining th e popu lation's cooperatio n an d awarenes s o f th e politica l situatio n an d constantly remindin g the m o f th e centra l government' s support . The pla n i s provin g successful , an d th e genera l excitemen t of Confrontatio n supplie s a satisfying outle t fo r th e Murut' s natu ral aggressiveness . It is , however, a scheme which needs continua l moral suppor t i n al l forms. I t woul d no t tak e muc h mismanage ment o r lac k of suppor t t o star t a decay which , onc e established , would caus e the whole scheme to deteriorate. It i s vita l tha t Malaysi a kee p th e initiativ e wit h th e borde r population an d maintai n a progressiv e enlightene d policy . CONCLUSIONS

As state d above , ou r Actio n Progra m i s progressin g well , bu t the followin g suggestion s ar e pu t forward , a s thei r implementa tion woul d d o a grea t dea l t o assis t i n administrativ e wor k i n this area . Ofte n to o muc h emphasi s i s pu t o n Nationa l Ai d an d assistance i n th e for m o f militar y assistance . I n thi s are a a n enormous amoun t o f goo d coul d b e don e with th e following : (1) Additiona l healt h ai d (th e Governmen t Healt h Centr e scheme doe s no t cove r remot e borde r area s adequately ) i n th e form o f a "helicopte r dispensary, " possibl y manne d b y Malaya n personnel, thu s providin g a n importan t an d direc t servic e t o th e hill tribesma n a s wel l a s fosterin g "Malaysia " an d nationhood . (2) Increas e an d improvemen t o f radi o program s i n Muru t language (allowin g fo r variou s dialects) . Moun t Kinabal u i n the nort h o f Saba h no w ha s a n F M transmitte r i n operation , [364 ]

MURUT S O F SABA H (NORT H BORNEO )

and i t shoul d no t b e difficul t t o suppl y F M receiver s t o th e triba l population i n remote areas . A well-organized progra m woul d pro vide a n invaluabl e servic e both educationall y an d politically . Th e present fifteen-minutes-a-day Muru t progra m pu t ou t b y Radi o Sabah is inadequate an d sometime s inaudible . (3) Thi s are a require s facilitie s fo r additiona l trainin g i n th e following fields : (a) Loca l leadershi p course s suc h a s obtaine d a t a n Outwar d Bound Schoo l ("Outwar d Boun d Schools " ar e leadership-train ing establishment s whic h hav e bee n forme d fo r youn g peopl e who, o n completio n o f th e course , retur n t o thei r industria l o r administrative employmen t i n Britai n o r th e Commonwealt h ter ritories—they combin e instructio n i n self-relianc e an d initiativ e with physica l conditionin g an d instructio n i n technique s fo r working wit h othe r nationalities) . Thes e shoul d incorporat e a s many tribe s an d nationalities as possible, thus fostering enterpris e and promoting international understanding . (b) Specia l civi c course s fo r establishe d loca l leaders , t o en courage thei r understandin g o f simila r adjacen t societie s i n direc t relationship t o bolsterin g nationalism . (c) Facilitie s t o trai n centra l governmen t officer s i n dealin g with minority-grou p problems , wit h th e objec t o f thei r workin g into th e administrativ e networ k a t loca l governmen t level . All thes e course s woul d benefi t i f the y wer e conducte d o n an international footing , thereb y increasin g nationa l prid e a s wel l as aidin g internationa l tolerance .

[ 36 5 ]

PART V I I : THAILAN

D

THAILAND : INTRODUCTIO

N

IN THAILAND , a s elsewher e i n Southeas t Asia , i t i s difficul t t o arrive a t a satisfactor y an d consisten t definitio n o r characteriza tion o f triba l an d minorit y populations . Neithe r language , no r literacy, no r ecolog y i s completel y effectiv e i n predictin g th e sort o f lif e th e peopl e lea d o r thei r relationshi p wit h th e centra l government. Th e paper s o n Thailan d whic h follo w dea l wit h a serie s o f populations , som e o f whom , lik e th e Lua? , confor m fairly wel l t o th e classi c definitio n o f tribe s a s somewha t isolate d groups wit h distinctiv e cultures . Bu t i n genera l th e pictur e w e get i s a variable one . For example , th e I u Mie n (Yao) , describe d by Kandre , ar e quit e worldl y in thei r outloo k an d individualisti c in their orientation, in marked contras t t o the stereotyp e o f tribes men a s communalistic . The criterio n o f literac y i s sometime s use d t o distinguis h tribe s from minorities , bu t her e als o th e differenc e i s blurred , a s man y of th e Ya o an d Me o ar e literat e i n Chinese , an d th e Kare n hav e used a missionary-invented scrip t fo r ove r a hundred years . Likewise, criteri a base d o n ecolog y o r econom y d o no t serv e t o dis tinguish triba l from othe r populations . Tha i peoples i n som e area s of Thailan d liv e i n th e hill s an d practic e swidde n (slash-and burn) agriculture , rathe r tha n irrigate d agricultur e (e.g . aroun d Nan, se e Jud d 1964 ; i n Kanchanabur i Province , se e Ster n 1965:7). Religio n serve s u s n o better—th e worshi p o f spirit s (phi) i n som e o f th e mor e isolate d Tha i communitie s ma y b e more importan t tha n Buddhism , an d "tribal " peopl e lik e th e Lua? claim to have been Buddhists for centuries . The dominan t majorit y ma y no t b e economically dominan t in th e natio n (witnes s th e numerou s charge s agains t th e Chines e minority); an d i n fac t th e Centra l Thai s (define d linguistically ) are not even a plurality of the nation's population . Minority and Tribal Populations. Thailand , according t o censu s figures, i s on e o f th e mos t homogeneou s nation s i n Southeas t Asia, i n term s o f languag e (th e peopl e ar e predominantl y Tha i speakers), ethni c o r "national " origin (predominantl y Thai) , an d religion (predominantl y Buddhist ) (se e Table 16) . A breakdow n of censu s figure s o n eac h o f thes e dimension s wil l allo w u s t o sort ou t mos t o f th e importan t minoritie s an d som e o f th e tribes,

[ 36 9 ]

.......

~

c.:I

~

Northeast b (Num- (Perber) cent)

Buddhism Islam Christianity Hinduism Confucianism Others None Unknown Total

Religion

24,563,523 93. 5 8,938,025 99.4 1,025,569 3.9 973 + 150,053 40,044 .6 .4 3,483 + 231 + 461,317 1.8 10,056 .1 969 + 35,238 .1 13,979 + 232 + 4,754 + 1,013 + 26,257,916 8,991,543

Population over five years able to speak Thai 21,256,766 97.0 7,408,663 98.7 Population over five years unable to speak Thai 661,779 3.0 99,502 1.2 Total 22,018,545 7,508,165

Language

Whole Kingdom (Num- (Perber) cent)

560,662 44.2 1,180,520 99.3 669,011 52.8 68 + 1,242 1,706 .1 .1 117 + 19 + 34,695 2.7 694 + 265 + 23 + 350 + 9 + 552 + 40 + 1,267,194 1,183,088

7.9

915,917 92.1

Eastern d (Num- (Perber) cent)

396,630 36.5 73,255 1,088,117 1,994,172

691,487 63.5

Southern· (Num- (Perber) cent)

REGION

3,078 15,964 536 2,183 16,074 6,402 193 1,280,623

1,~35,493

(conlinu",,)

1,711,117 80.1 104,105 4.9 30,092 1.4 2,169 .1 + .2 281,205 13.2 1,3 4,277 .2 .5 989 + 1,381 .1 + 2,136,435

96.5 .2 1.2

3.6

1,741,689 96.4

Urban! (Num- (Perber) cent)

131,126 12,3 64,682 1,065,589 1,806,371

~

',.

934,463 87.7

Western· (Num- (Percent) ber)

TABLE 16 LANGUAGE, RELIGION, AND NATIONALITY IN THAILANDa

1"1

;:l

t"l

t:I >i

>

>i

II: rn

c::

;:l

t"l

"d t"l

>i

~

+ + + +

+ + + +

+ + + +

+ + + + + + + + +

+

b

a

Source: Thailand Population Census, 1960, Changwad Series (Bangkok). The northeast region, included in this table for comparative purposes, is more "typically Thai" according to these demo- Z graphic measures than the rest of Thailand. The census definition of the northeast area includes Buri-ram, Chayaphum, ~ Kalasin, Khon-kaen, Loei, Mahasarakham, Nakhornphanom, Nakhornratchsima, Nongkhai, Roi-et, Sakonnakhorn, Srisaket, 0 Surin, Ubonratch-thani, and Udornthani provinces. ~ • The southern area for purposes of this table includes the provinces of Nara-thiwat, Pattani, Satun, Songkhla, and Yala, Q which contain the greatest proportion of Malays. The other southern provinces of Krabi, Phang-nga, Phuket, Ranong, and 0 Trang have a total of 98,928 Moslems; Phranakhorn Province (Bangkok), Phranakhornsri-ayuthaya and Thonburi add another z 123,01l, most of whom are probably Malays. d The eastern area for purposes of this table includes the provinces of Srisaket and Surin, which contain the highest proportion of Cambodians in Thailand. • The western and northern border area for purposes of this table includes the provinces of Chiengmai, Kanchanaburi, Maehongson, and Tak, which contain the highest proportion of tribal people as measured by this census. f Urban area includes only Phranakhorn and Thonburi provinces (which include the metropolitan area of Bangkok), an area of Chinese concentration. Urban vs. rural breakdowns by ability to speak Thai, religion, and nationality are not available in published census materials. Census figures yield an underestimate of total ethnic Chinese population since many ethnic Chinese were born in Thailand, are able to speak Thai, and are Buddhists, and thus are indistinguishable from ethnic Thais in the census.

+

+

Thailand 25,737,180 98.2 8,930,137 99.3 1,240,456 97.2 1,180,518 99.3 1,271,173 99.3 1,921,500 89.9 21,010 Chinese 409,508 1.6 24,213 1.9 6,938 .5 .3 2,305 204,301 9.6 .2 Burmese, Lao, Cambodian, Vietna45,002 .2 29,139 .3 984 188 1,502 .1 mese .1 347 Indian, Pakistani, Ceylon 6,694 555 596 45 585 3,452 .2 5,043 154 European 270 5 207 .2 3,644 2,830 Other 51 227 1 63 1,838 .1 497 1,603 Unknown 148 26 55 296 26,257,860 Total 8,991,543 1,276,434 1,183,088 1,280,623 2,136,379 = Less than 1/10 %

Nationality

PETE H KUNSTADTE H

but fo r reason s detaile d belo w thes e censu s figures shoul d no t be though t o f a s anythin g bu t crud e minimal estimate s fo r triba l and minorit y populations. 1 Despite th e overal l appearanc e o f homogeneity , ther e ar e im portant regiona l an d cultura l differences . Eve n withi n region s that giv e th e outwar d appearanc e o f uniformity , ther e ma y b e historical difference s whic h ar e importan t i n th e mind s o f th e people involved . Ther e i s now , an d ha s bee n fo r man y years , considerable interna l migratio n i n Thailand . Som e o f thi s ha s been spontaneou s a s individuals , families , o r segment s o f com munities hav e move d primaril y i n respons e t o economi c oppor tunities. Ther e ha s als o bee n deliberat e polic y fo r movemen t of communitie s o r section s o f communitie s followin g warfar e o r as a form o f tribute . Thu s man y communitie s i n th e nort h trac e their origin s t o othe r geographica l locations , sometime s i n Burm a or Laos , from wher e the y were moved a s a result o f wars betwee n the variou s Norther n Tha i principalities . Suc h group s a s th e Tha i Yawng an d Thai-Lu e ar e no t distinguishabl e fro m othe r Tha i peoples i n censu s records . The Mala y minority , locate d primaril y i n th e souther n prov inces o f Nara-thiwat , YaIa , Pattani, Songkhla , an d Satun , appear s most clearl y whe n censu s figures fo r languag e (inabilit y t o spea k Thai) an d religion (Islam , rathe r tha n Buddhism ) ar e examined. 2 There wa s a tota l o f 1,025,56 9 Moslem s i n 1960 , wit h 670,00 0 of the m i n th e five southernmos t provinces . The Cambodia n (o r Khmer ) minority , locate d i n th e easter n provinces o f Suri n an d Srisaket , emerge s fro m a n examinatio n of censu s figures o n languag e (almos t 80,00 0 non-Thai speakers) . They ar e nominally Thai citizens an d ar e Buddhists . Because the y ar e Tha i national s an d speaker s o f a dialec t o f 1

Thailand Population Census, 1960, i s th e sourc e fo r al l populatio n figures unless otherwis e specified . 2 There ar e als o man y Malay s (a s indicate d b y th e numbe r o f Moslems ) around Bangko k (Phranakor n an d Thonbur i provinces ) an d Ayuthay a (Phran akhornsri-ayuthaya Province) , primaril y du e t o th e deliberat e polic y o f movin g Malays ou t o f th e Sout h durin g th e nineteent h century . Blanchard' s assertion s that "seven-eighth s o f al l th e Moslem s ar e concentrate d i n th e are a directl y adjacent t o th e Federatio n o f Malay " an d tha t "the y accoun t fo r abou t 8 0 percent o f th e populatio n i n th e fou r southernmos t provinces " ar e no t confirme d by th e 196 0 census . Cf . Wendel l Blanchar d et al. (1957:60 ) an d th e Thailand Population Census, 1960.

[ 37 2 ]

THAILAND : INTBODUCTIO

N

Thai, th e larg e populatio n o f Northeaster n Thais , wh o hav e a somewhat distinctiv e cultur e an d economy , d o not appea r i n cen sus breakdowns . Th e Northeaster n Thai s discusse d b y Huf f ar e isolated b y lac k o f communicatio n an d transportatio n facilities . Though the y spea k a dialec t o f Thai , i t i s a t bes t barel y under standable t o official s fro m centra l Thailand . Th e sam e ma y b e true o f othe r Tha i dialec t groups , suc h a s th e Lu e (se e Moer man's pape r i n thi s volum e an d Moerma n 1965 ) an d th e Sha n in norther n Thailand . The Chines e ar e concentrate d i n centra l Thailand , alon g rail ways an d majo r transportatio n route s an d i n urba n areas , an d are foun d predominantl y i n business an d commercia l occupation s (see Skinner , 1957) . They appea r i n the census figures a s Chines e nationals (409,508 ) an d als o a s practitioner s o f Confucianis m (461,317). Thes e ar e gros s underestimate s o f th e tota l ethnic Chinese, wh o ma y numbe r a s man y a s 2,600,00 0 (Skinne r 1965 ) or eve n 3,799,00 0 (Overseas Chinese Economy Yearbook 1964) . These urba n Chines e ar e quit e differen t fro m th e rura l Yunnan ese describe d b y Mote . People identifie d ethnicall y a s Indians , wh o ma y als o be Paki stani b y nationality , sho w up i n censu s figure s unde r India n an d Pakistan nationalitie s (onl y 6,694 ) an d a s Hindu s (3,483 ) an d Moslems. I t i s impossibl e t o distinguis h Thai-speakin g Malay s from Thai-speakin g "Indians " b y mean s o f thes e roug h break downs o f censu s figures . Althoug h n o studie s hav e bee n don e of th e "Indians, " the y see m eve n mor e concentrate d i n urba n areas and marketing occupation s tha n ar e the Chinese . Still othe r minorit y group s canno t b e detecte d b y thes e crud e methods o f analysi s o f th e populatio n figure s fro m th e 196 0 cen sus. Thes e includ e suc h group s a s th e Soa i o r Kui , livin g nea r the Cambodia n border , wit h estimate d populatio n o f 150,00 0 (Smalley 1964:85) , forme r triba l people wh o hav e becom e Thai ized o r Khmer-ized . Th e Mon , mos t o f who m liv e i n Ratbur i Province, wes t o f Bangkok , "ar e descendant s o f prisoner s o f wa r or o f refugee s fro m Burmes e oppressio n wh o migrate d i n 1600 , 1660, 1774 , an d finally i n 181 4 . . . . Estimate s o f thei r popula tion range from 60,00 0 to 100,000" (Blanchard 1957:63-64) . Mor e have move d t o Thailan d sinc e th e Unio n o f Burm a faile d t o establish a Mo n stat e (Ster n 1965:3) . Variou s Thai-speakin g [ 37 3 ]

PETER KUNSTADTER

groups, suc h a s th e Ph u Thai , livin g i n th e Northeast , wit h esti mated populatio n betwee n 70,00 0 an d 100,000 , an d th e Shan , who liv e betwee n Chiengma i an d th e Burm a border , wit h esti mated populatio n o f 30,00 0 (Blanchar d 1957:63-64) , ar e fairl y similar t o othe r Thai s i n cultur e an d ar e a t leas t nominall y Buddhist, Thai-speaking , an d Tha i nationals , thu s indistinguish able from othe r Thais in the census. The triba l peopl e d o no t for m a homogeneou s group . The y are concentrate d mainl y i n th e nort h an d wes t (ther e ar e als o about thre e hundre d ver y primitiv e Negrit o people s i n th e ex treme south). 3 The tribe s ca n b e divide d int o a t leas t three majo r linguistic groups : Tibeto-Burma n (includin g Karen , Akha , Lahu , Lisu); Miao-Yao ; an d Mon-Khme r (includin g Ti 5Ui, Lua? , Khrnu?, Ph i Thon g Luang , an d Mrabri). 4 (Se e Tabl e 17. ) Th e tribal peoples hav e severa l distinc t economies : we t rice , dr y rice; opium-corn-livestock; truck-gardening ; huntin g an d gathering ; wage labor . The y als o have numerou s varietie s o f culture , socia l organization, an d religion . Estimation o f tota l triba l populatio n i s difficult . "Nomadi c hill tribes " wer e no t counte d i n th e 196 0 census . Som e o f th e settled tribesme n sho w u p i n th e norther n province s a s peopl e who ar e unabl e t o spea k Thai , o r a s peopl e wit h religio n liste d as Others " o r "None. " Examinatio n o f censu s figures alon g these line s reveals a high proportio n o f triba l people i n Maehong son Provinc e (abou t 4 0 percen t non-Thai-speaking) , wh o ar e probably primaril y Karen s livin g i n th e Khu n Yua m Valley . Us e of censu s material s i n thi s wa y give s onl y a minima l estimat e of triba l people , sinc e th e nomadi c hil l tribe s wer e no t counted , and sinc e man y o f th e hil l peopl e ar e bilingua l an d ma y cal l themselves Buddhist s fo r censu s purposes . 'Brandt (1961:128-137 ) estimate s tha t ther e ar e thre e hundre d Negrito s i n several differen t band s i n Trang , Phatalung , Nara-thiwat , an d YaI a provinces . They ar e speaker s o f Mon-Khme r language s an d exhibi t varyin g degree s o f acculturation. 4 Language grouping s her e d o no t necessaril y confor m t o ultimat e historica l relationships. Kare n an d Akha-Lahu-Lis u ar e evidentl y representative s o f quit e distinct group s o f Tibeto-Burma n languages , thoug h the y ar e probabl y ultimatel y related; affiliatio n o f Miao-Ya o i s uncertain , bu t ma y b e Sino-Tibeta n an d thu s ultimately relate d t o th e abov e languages ; th e Mon-Khme r language s evidentl y belong t o severa l distinc t group s o f tha t family . Se e note s accompanyin g th e Burma populatio n an d linguisti c affiliatio n tabl e fo r furthe r discussio n o f th e problems involve d i n linguisti c classification .

[374 ]

THAILAND : INTRODUCTIO

N

This brie f revie w o f th e censu s material s indicate s th e inade quacy o f censu s material s fo r al l bu t th e mos t genera l guesse s with regar d t o number s an d distribution s o f triba l an d minorit y peoples, an d suggest s tha t a specia l effor t mus t b e made t o ge t accurate censu s materia l i f th e tru e exten t o f th e triba l an d mi nority population an d their problems is to be known . Laws Regarding Minorities and Tribes. Unti l recen t years , when th e specia l problem s o f hil l tribe s hav e begu n t o be recog nized b y governmen t officials , th e legislatio n wit h respec t t o mi norities ha s bee n directe d primaril y a t th e Chinese . Th e polic y has vacillated between encouragin g immigration an d discouragin g it, an d betwee n allowin g o r encouragin g assimilatio n o r makin g it difficul t o r impossibl e t o "becom e Thai " eve n fo r peopl e bor n in Thailand , wit h on e Tha i parent . Variation s i n polic y hav e been clearl y relate d t o interna l economi c condition s (need s fo r labor, desire s t o encourag e Tha i participatio n in , o r contro l of , certain industrie s o r occupations , desire s t o contro l balanc e o f payments) an d interna l o r externa l politica l condition s (us e o f anti-minority-group actio n t o promot e nationa l solidarity ; response t o threat s fro m Japa n durin g th e Secon d Worl d War , and fro m Communis t Chin a sinc e th e 1950's) . The primar y lega l means use d t o implemen t governmen t policie s hav e bee n law s respecting immigratio n an d naturalization , restriction s o n employment i n governmen t service , restrictions o n certai n occu pations an d nationalization o f industrie s i n which minorities wer e predominant, restriction s o n th e leasin g an d holdin g o f property , and restriction s o n schoolin g an d us e o f non-Thai-languag e text books (se e Skinne r 1957:219-20 , 368-70 , 374) . The implication s o f al l of thes e laws for triba l an d non-Chines e minority group s hav e no t bee n clearl y worke d out . However , it i s clea r tha t definitio n o f citizenshi p i s on e o f th e crucia l laws . The law s see m t o hav e ha d virtually n o effec t o n th e Thai-speak ing minoritie s wh o ar e simpl y assume d t o b e ful l citizens . Ther e seems t o b e n o clea r polic y a s t o whethe r hil l people s ar e o r are no t citizens . Th e Lua ? see m t o be , bu t som e Me o group s (because the y ar e assume d t o b e recent immigrants ) apparentl y are not . I t i s vital that thi s questio n b e clarifie d sinc e citizenshi p determines lega l treatmen t i n s o many facets o f life . For example , from man y standpoint s i t woul d b e desirabl e fo r hil l trib e mem [375]

PETE H KUNSTADTE R

bers t o serv e i n th e Borde r Patro l Police . The y kno w triba l lan guages an d custom s an d ar e familia r wit h th e territory ; member ship i n th e Borde r Patro l woul d b e a metho d b y whic h the y could participat e o n a mor e o r les s equa l leve l i n Tha i govern ment agencie s an d lear n abou t Thailan d an d Tha i cultur e i n the process . Unfortunately , however , i f tribesme n ar e considere d as aliens , the y canno t serv e i n th e Borde r Patrol . Likewise , ther e may be doub t a s t o whethe r the y ar e legall y eligibl e fo r benefit s received fro m th e Hil l Tribe s Divisio n o f th e Departmen t o f Public Welfare . Another proble m fo r alien s i s th e ownershi p o f land . I f land holding law s ar e enforce d o n th e "alien " tribesme n (o r o n alie n minorities suc h a s th e Yunnanes e "Haw") , the y wil l hav e n o security i n thei r agricultura l land , an d i t wil l b e useles s fo r th e government t o try to stabilize their settlements. 5 Restrictions o n occupation s ar e no t ye t a problem , sinc e vir tually al l o f th e hil l peopl e ar e self-employe d agriculturalists , but i f an y attemp t i s mad e t o brin g "alien " tribesme n int o th e lowland economy , inhibitin g law s woul d hav e to b e removed . Laws wit h respec t t o foreign-languag e school s an d textbook s have becom e a proble m onl y i n a fe w specia l instances , becaus e in genera l ther e ar e no school s for th e hill peoples, and th e peopl e are illiterate . Th e governmen t has , however, shown concer n wit h the possibilit y o f schoolin g fo r Ha w hil l peopl e (Yunnanes e Chi nese), an d som e us e o f foreig n (Le., tribal ) languag e i n hil l schools is no w bein g considere d (se e p . 38 6 below) . Wit h th e exception o f th e Kare n an d possibl y som e Me o an d Ya o (wh o are literat e i n Chinese) , ther e i s n o lon g traditio n o f educatio n and literac y amon g triba l people . The Kare n script , a modificatio n o f th e Burmes e script , wa s developed i n Burm a b y missionarie s ove r a hundre d year s ago . A considerabl e literatur e exist s i n thi s script , an d a n unknow n number o f Karen s i n Thailand , primaril y Christian , ar e literat e in thei r ow n language . Thi s i s taugh t t o the m b y missionaries , both Kare n an d foreign . Government policy , a s fa r a s i t ha s manifeste d itsel f wit h re 5 In fac t th e proble m o f lan d ownershi p b y hil l tribesme n i s mor e complicate d than thi s becaus e o f th e genera l questio n o f legalit y o r illegalit y o f uplan d swidden cultivation .

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gard t o hil l trib e languages , ha s bee n t o teac h triba l student s (both i n Borde r Patrol and publi c schools ) t o spea k an d becom e literate in Centra l Thai . Attempts hav e been mad e i n recent year s to conver t missionar y script s o f triba l language s fro m a Roman style phonetic scrip t t o a phonetic scrip t based o n Thai character s (Schlatter 1963 ; Smalle y 1964:8 0 ff.) . Example s o f som e o f th e problems whic h develo p onc e ther e i s a veste d interes t i n a par ticular scrip t ar e a s follows . Som e Ya o tribesme n d o no t wis h to giv e u p a Ya o scrip t makin g us e o f Chines e characters , sinc e they valu e th e Chines e cultura l traditio n an d conside r Roma n or Tha i character s t o hav e lowe r prestige . Th e Lua? , wh o hav e been using a missionary phoneti c scrip t onl y since th e lat e 1950's , consider th e scrip t t o b e thei r ow n (the y ar e surprise d t o se e English written wit h th e sam e kin d o f letters) , an d ar e reluctan t to chang e ove r t o a Thai-characte r phoneti c scrip t whic h wa s developed in 1961. In spit e o f thei r ambiguou s statu s a s citizens , hil l tribesme n are evidentl y subject , a s resident s o f Thailand , t o taxe s an d t o the criminal law s o f Thailand. 8 I n practice , sinc e most hil l tribes men liv e remot e fro m polic e o r courts , thei r dail y activitie s ar e probably no t controlle d b y Tha i law , thoug h apparentl y n o stud y has bee n mad e o f thi s subjec t (se e Kunstadter' s pape r belo w fo r illustration i n th e cas e o f th e Lua?) . Customar y famil y patterns , inheritance laws , an d propert y an d religiou s customs 7 o f th e tribal people s conflic t a t a numbe r o f point s wit h Tha i law , bu t since thes e matter s ar e rarely , i f ever , brough t int o Tha i court s at the presen t time , th e issu e i s not a s yet a n important one . As alread y mentioned , th e questio n o f triba l propert y i s no t at al l clear. I hav e no t been abl e t o find a written referenc e t o th e law whic h i s suppose d t o clai m fo r th e Tha i governmen t al l lan d over 2,50 0 fee t (80 0 meters ) elevation . Presumabl y hous e sites , gardens, an d irrigate d fields coul d b e excepte d fro m thi s i f titl e were registered , bu t ther e i s littl e evidenc e tha t hil l tribesme n "The la w i n thi s repec t seem s unambiguous . "Whoeve r commit s a n offens e within th e Kingdo m shal l b e punishe d accordin g t o th e law. " Th e Pena l Cod e of Thailan d an d Its Amendment, Sectio n 4. 7 For example , Sectio n 38 1 o f th e Pena l Cod e o f Thailand : "Whoeve r cruell y illtreats, o r kill s an y anima l wit h unnecessar y suffering s shal l b e punishe d wit h imprisonment no t exceedin g on e mont h o r fine no t exceedin g on e thousan d baht , or both. " Th e effec t o f thi s law , i f i t wer e enforced , coul d b e t o prohibi t buffal o sacrifices, a n essentia l part of man y tribal rituals.

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have availe d themselve s of th e opportunit y t o file claims fo r title , though tribesme n livin g i n th e lowland s ofte n d o registe r then land (e.g . Ster n 1965:8) . A s mentione d above , hil l tribesmen' s ambiguous citizenshi p statu s make s suc h registratio n problemati cal. Sinc e th e cuttin g o f swidde n field s (rai) i s illega l (thoug h taxed), an d sinc e forest resource s ar e claimed by th e government , it i s doubtfu l i f hil l tribesme n coul d la y clai m t o mos t o f th e land whic h the y actuall y use . There i s apparentl y n o lega l recog nition even of use-right to swidden areas . There ar e apparentl y n o law s recognizing , o r protectin g fro m alienation, lan d hel d communall y b y triba l village s (apparentl y villages coul d ow n lan d i f the y wer e formall y organize d a s cor porations, partnerships , o r som e othe r legall y constitute d body) . Water right s see m assure d t o hil l tribesme n unde r Tha i law , again dependen t o n th e questio n o f lan d ownership. 8 Second t o th e law o f lan d ownership , the law which potentiall y would hav e th e greates t economi c effec t o n som e hil l tribe s i f it were enforce d i s tha t prohibitin g sal e o f opium. 9 Fo r practica l and politica l reason s thi s law has been enforce d onl y sporadically. Most opiu m fields an d opiu m grower s ar e i n area s remot e fro m police posts . Also , governmenta l official s hav e com e t o realiz e that unles s a n adequat e substitut e were foun d fo r opiu m produc tion, th e actua l prohibitio n o f opiu m sale s would b e economicall y disastrous fo r th e severa l tribe s dependen t o n opiu m fo r a livin g (see, e.g. , Paty a Saiho o 1963 ; an d paper s b y Gedde s an d Manndorff i n thi s volume) . Th e Borde r Patro l Police , wh o visi t opium-growing tribe s an d no w th e locatio n o f opiu m fields, ar e under (informal? ) order s no t t o interfer e wit h opium-growin g at thi s time , and t o th e best o f my knowledge have not interfered . There hav e bee n accusation s b y tribesme n tha t Provincia l Polic e have threatene d destructio n o f thei r opiu m fields a s a mean s of extortion , bu t I hav e n o direc t evidenc e o f thi s fro m persona l observation. Nonetheless , th e fac t tha t th e tribesme n ar e practic 'The Civi l an d Commercia l Cod e (Thailand) , Sectio n 1339 : "Th e owne r of a piec e o f lan d i s boun d t o tak e th e wate r tha t flows naturall y ont o i t from highe r land . Wate r tha t flows naturall y ont o lowe r lan d an d i s necessar y to suc h lan d ma y b e retaine d b y th e owne r o f th e highe r lan d onl y t o suc h extent a s it is indispensable t o his land." 'Proclamation o f th e Revolutionar y Party , No . 37 , Decembe r 9 , 1958 .

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ing a n illega l occupatio n woul d mak e the m eas y target s fo r extortion. Hill tribe population s ar e subjec t t o various forms o f taxation , but enforcemen t o f thes e taxe s apparentl y varie s wit h distanc e from administrativ e center s (se e Kunstadter' s pape r belo w fo r taxation amon g th e Lua?) . THAI ORGANIZATION S CONCERNE D WIT H HIL L TRIBE S

There i s a surprisin g numbe r o f finger s i n th e pi e o f triba l programs. Despit e th e fac t tha t som e hill trib e village s ar e integrated int o th e Tha i governmental system through officia l recog nition o f villag e headmen, th e ordinar y service s (police , schools, public health , an d medica l care ) hav e bee n brough t int o th e hills onl y infrequently . Instead , a serie s o f specia l program s has been develope d fo r hil l tribe s an d othe r mor e o r les s isolate d minority peoples . Som e o f thes e wil l b e mentione d her e onl y briefly, sinc e the y ar e dealt wit h a t greate r lengt h i n th e paper s which follo w (fo r a n earlie r revie w o f thes e programs se e Patya Saihool962). Local Administration. Thailan d i s divide d int o seventy-on e provinces (changwad), whic h ar e furthe r divide d int o district s (amphur), whic h ar e i n turn divide d int o commune s (tambon), each compose d o f severa l village s (muban). 10 Official s a t th e provincial an d distric t leve l ar e civi l servants , appointe d b y th e central government . Assistant s t o th e district officer s ar e ofte n drawn fro m th e localit y i n whic h the y serv e an d mor e often , therefore, hav e firsthand knowledg e o f th e distric t an d it s mi nority an d remot e rural population s tha n do th e distric t officers , who ar e regularl y transferre d fro m on e district t o another . Th e selection o f commune headman (kamnan) i s made, or approved , by th e distric t officer , a s i s selectio n o f villag e headme n (pu jai ban or kae ban). Judges , police, welfare, an d healt h worker s have thei r loca l office s i n distric t town s o r sub-distric t towns , 10 A highe r leve l o f administratio n group s th e province s int o region s o r circle s (phak). Fo r example , Regio n Fiv e consist s o f Maehongson , Chiengmai , Chiengrai , Lamphun, Lampang , an d Phra e provinces . Militar y an d religiou s organizationa l levels ar e als o groupe d int o paralle l regions , e.g . fo r th e Buddhis t churc h an d for th e army .

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and confin e mos t o f thei r activitie s t o thes e immediat e regions — they d o not ofte n tou r th e more remote section s o f th e districts . The genera l patter n o f Tha i loca l administration ha s bee n im posed o n som e triba l villages—mos t o f th e large r triba l village s have headme n nominate d b y th e villager s an d recognize d b y the distric t office r (nai amphur), A t presen t onl y rarel y d o hil l tribesmen occup y as high a position a s that o f commun e headma n (kamnan).11 Thi s seem s t o represen t a chang e fro m th e olde r days whe n th e governmen t (o r principalities ) use d mor e o f a system o f indirec t rul e an d gav e officia l recognitio n t o higher level triba l leaders . Fe w triba l group s i n Thailan d ar e politicall y organized a t mor e tha n a villag e o r related-villag e level, 12 although ther e are , o f course , kinship an d economi c connection s between villages , and recognition o f cultura l identity . Provincial Police. Th e Provincia l Polic e ar e responsibl e fo r la w enforcement throughou t th e country , bu t hav e relativel y littl e to d o wit h la w enforcemen t i n remot e triba l villages . However , there hav e bee n numerou s storie s o f abus e o f thei r power s for ex tortion in hill villages. Provincial Police are available on call by th e village headman i n th e even t o f a serious crime . Provincia l Polic e may tak e th e initiativ e i n comin g u p t o th e hill s i f the y believ e a crim e ha s bee n committe d i n th e valle y b y a hil l dweller . Pro vincial Polic e ar e charge d wit h enforcin g law s wit h regar d t o opium an d liquor-brewing , whic h ar e frequentl y violate d b y hil l tribesmen. The y hav e n o specia l progra m fo r enforcemen t o f laws i n th e hills . Border Patrol Police (BPP). Th e Borde r Patro l Polic e i s a n elite, speciall y traine d para-militar y organizatio n distinc t fro m Provincial Polic e an d th e arme d forces , whic h wa s founde d abou t ten year s ag o (se e USO M 196 3 fo r a genera l descriptio n o f thi s 11 I d o kno w o f a valley Lua ? village whos e headma n i s th e kamnan o f a serie s o f Tha i villages . H e an d hi s villag e ar e so Thai-ize d a s t o mak e the m indistinguishable i n language , dress , economy , an d religio n fro m othe r Tha i vil lages. Smalle y (1965 ) report s tha t ther e ar e many Ku i an d Cambodia n kamnans in th e Northeast . Ster n report s tha t ther e hav e bee n valle y Kare n distric t officer s in th e regio n o f Sangkhlaburi . Thi s wa s a hereditar y offic e grante d b y th e provincial governo r an d passe d o n fo r severa l generation s unti l 1924 . A t presen t the higher-leve l officer s i n thi s are a ar e Tha i civi l servant s (Ster n 1965:2) . " Kandre' s pape r i n thi s volum e indicate s a groupin g o f a serie s o f Ya o village s under a singl e headman , an d evidentl y thi s groupin g i s not determined b y kinship. Several Kare n "daughter " village s ma y b e groupe d unde r th e headma n o f th e "parent" village (se e below) .

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program). Th e primar y missio n o f th e BP P i s t o maintai n th e security o f th e borde r an d t o gathe r intelligenc e i n borde r an d remote regions . Th e BP P i s supplie d an d traine d wit h th e as sistance o f U.S . funds, advice , an d equipment , channele d throug h the Unite d State s Operation s Missio n (USOM) . In orde r t o carr y out it s missions, the BPP has tried deliberatel y to befrien d loca l populations . Sinc e it s geographica l are a o f re sponsibility include s th e area s wher e triba l population s ar e con centrated (borde r an d interna l hil l areas) , i t ha s come t o assum e certain responsibilitie s wit h regar d t o triba l people . Recruitmen t policies for th e BP P have favored me n wh o kno w triba l language, and thes e me n hav e bee n statione d i n th e localitie s wit h whic h they ar e alread y familiar . Trainin g stresse s respec t fo r triba l peo ple an d thei r customs . Th e BP P defer s t o Provincia l Polic e fo r actual la w enforcement . A number o f program s with specifi c applicatio n t o tribal peopl e have been designe d an d carrie d ou t b y th e BPP . I n remot e area s the genera l procedur e i s a s follows . A patrol walk s int o th e area , sites ar e selected , an d tribesme n ar e persuaded t o buil d airstrips . They ar e rewarde d fo r thei r tim e b y bein g give n tool s (whic h they woul d ordinaril y purchase) , food , an d incidenta l medica l attention. Whe n th e airstri p i s completed, a plane i s landed, ofte n with medica l an d technica l personnel . Seed s an d anima l breedin g stock ar e distributed . Complaint s wit h regar d t o local administra tion ar e listene d to , an d attempt s ar e made , b y relayin g thes e complaints directl y t o Bangkok , t o straighte n ou t problem s a t the highes t leve l (e.g . complaint s wit h regar d t o abuse s o f Pro vincial Polic e ma y g o directl y t o Borde r Patro l headquarter s i n Bangkok, the n t o Provincial Polic e national headquarters , whenc e orders fo r actio n ar e issue d t o th e loca l Provincia l Polic e post) . Border Patro l Polic e have order s not t o interfer e wit h administra tion a t th e loca l triba l villag e leve l (e.g . the y wil l no t mak e decisions wit h regar d t o choic e o f villag e headman) . The y ar e not suppose d t o interfer e wit h suc h illega l activitie s a s opiu m culture, unlicensed brewin g o f liquor , sacrific e o f animals , possession o f unlicense d guns , etc. an d apparentl y ar e unde r n o obliga tion t o interfere , no r d o the y repor t thes e activitie s t o Provincia l Police. Neithe r d o the y interfer e wit h loca l custom s wit h regar d to marriage , religion , an d s o forth , thoug h thes e custom s ma y [ 38 1 ]

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conflict wit h Tha i law . Th e Patrol s retur n t o th e village s onc e a month . Informally , throughou t thei r stay , the y tal k t o th e peo ple abou t Thailan d an d it s governmen t an d distribut e picture s of th e Kin g an d Quee n an d th e Emeral d Buddha , whic h serv e as symbols of national unity . In anothe r program , starte d earl y i n 1964 , abou t a hundre d hill tribesme n fro m severa l differen t tribe s wer e selecte d fo r training b y th e BPP . Tw o o r thre e youn g leader s fro m eac h o f thirty o r fort y village s wer e take n t o Chiengma i an d traine d i n first aid , agriculture , sanitation , an d s o forth , a s wel l a s bein g given politica l indoctrination . The y wer e the n returne d t o thei r villages t o establis h ai d station s an d distributio n point s fo r tech nical information . For a t leas t five years th e Borde r Polic e have bee n establishin g schools i n som e triba l village s wher e ther e ar e concentration s of school-ag e children , an d staffin g the m wit h BP P teachers . Classes, u p throug h th e fourt h primar y grade , ar e conducte d in which th e childre n ar e taugh t t o speak, read, and write Centra l Thai. Ther e ar e no w 14 4 o f thes e schools , wit h a tota l o f 6,00 0 students (Youn g 1965:11) . The general pattern o f the curriculu m is tha t o f th e Tha i publi c schools . School building s ar e built wit h the assistanc e o f villagers , usin g material s gathere d i n th e fores t or supplie d b y th e BPP . Schoo l supplie s ar e provided , a s ar e uniforms fo r th e children . Th e progra m ha s no t expande d a s rapidly a s tribes-peopl e hav e desired , apparentl y becaus e o f lac k of teachers . A s o f lat e 1964 , plan s wer e underwa y t o sen d triba l students wh o ha d finished th e fou r year s t o th e publi c school s nearest thei r villages , o r t o establis h a n advance d triba l schoo l in Chiengmai o r Chiengrai. On th e whole , th e BP P progra m wit h triba l peopl e seem s t o work quit e well , bu t ther e ar e som e problems . Th e difficult y of enlistin g "alien " tribesme n int o th e BP P ha s alread y bee n mentioned. Th e potentia l conflic t betwee n th e BP P an d Provin cial Polic e ha s als o bee n suggested . Th e BP P i s a potential riva l of th e Provincia l Police , o r eve n th e army , an d i s perhap s de liberately bein g kep t i n a weakene d conditio n t o preven t this . As indicated , th e BP P ha s a direc t lin e t o communicat e tale s of misconduc t (blackmail , abus e o f triba l women , etc. ) t o Bang kok. Anothe r sourc e o f frictio n i s tha t BP P me n o n patro l ar e [ 38 2 ]

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supposed t o ge t pe r die m allowances , whil e Provincia l Polic e do not . However , pe r die m payment s hav e bee n withhel d fro m BPP me n (a t leas t i n th e are a wit h whic h I a m familiar), forcin g the patrol s t o pa y fo r thei r ow n foo d an d carriers , o r t o tak e food fro m th e village s the y visi t an d impres s loca l peopl e t o carry the m fo r nothing— a procedur e whic h defeat s th e BPP' s effectiveness. The Ministry of Education. A hil l tribe s progra m ha s bee n set u p i n th e Ministr y o f Educatio n t o overse e program s o f hil l tribe education . Th e woma n i n charg e o f thi s progra m wa s for merly assigne d t o on e o f th e school s i n Maesariang , Changwa d Maehongson, a borde r provinc e whic h ha s a high proportio n o f tribal population . Sh e cooperate d wit h an d gav e mora l suppor t to missionar y educatio n programs . Specia l encouragemen t wa s offered t o triba l student s (primaril y sympatheti c treatment) — but n o specia l program s ha d bee n establishe d fo r the m a s o f 1964. Meeting s wer e hel d i n Chiengma i i n Jun e 196 5 a t whic h curricula fo r hil l tribe s school s wer e worke d out , and a n attemp t was mad e t o defin e a polic y o n us e o f triba l language s i n thes e schools. Bot h Ministr y o f Educatio n an d Borde r Patro l personne l cooperated i n thi s effor t (Smalle y 1965) . Furthe r wor k o n thi s project wil l b e financed, i n part , b y th e Asi a Foundation . An offe r wa s mad e b y th e Asi a Foundation t o give scholarship s to hil l trib e students . Implementatio n o f th e project wa s delaye d when question s wer e raised abou t th e amount s of th e scholarship s (they wer e fel t t o be inappropriatel y large , since they were equa l to abou t doubl e th e averag e cas h incom e i n tha t par t o f Thai land) an d abou t th e place where the scholarships shoul d be give n (the provincia l sea t vs . th e distric t wher e mos t o f th e triba l stu dents wer e concentrated) . Thes e problem s have apparentl y bee n successfully resolved . Department of Public Welfare, Hill Tribes Division. Th e De partment o f Publi c Welfare , Hil l Tribe s Division , ha s a progra m (complete wit h anthropologica l adviser ) whic h i s especiall y con cerned wit h th e economi c developmen t o f hil l tribes . Thi s pro gram is discussed at length in Dr. ManndorfFs paper . Activities o f th e Triba l Researc h Centre , als o unde r th e Department o f Publi c Welfare , ar e describe d i n Dr . Geddes ' paper. [ 38 3 ]

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The Ministry of Defense. Th e Ministr y o f Defens e i s responsi ble fo r th e Mobil e Developmen t Uni t (MDU ) program , whic h was originall y a Tha i idea , strongl y backe d b y th e lat e Prim e Minister Sarit . Team s o f agricultural , medical , economic , an d propaganda expert s g o ou t int o th e rura l countrysid e t o tr y t o determine an d t o satisf y fel t need s an d t o sprea d th e wor d tha t the governmen t i s benevolen t an d intereste d i n rura l areas . Th e program wa s originall y designe d t o comba t subversio n an d infil tration i n th e Northeas t o f Thailand , bu t i s no w (o r i s abou t to be ) applie d i n hil l trib e countr y i n th e North . (Thi s progra m is deal t wit h a t lengt h i n Dr . Huff' s paper. ) Th e Ministr y o f Defense ha s als o becom e activ e i n encouragin g researc h o n th e problems of people in the remote areas of Thailand . The Ministry of Health. Th e Ministr y of Health , i n cooperatio n with th e Worl d Healt h Organizatio n an d USOM , ha s a malari a control an d eradicatio n program , whic h attempt s t o reac h al l villages i n Thailand . Malari a ha s bee n eradicate d i n most o f low land Thailan d bu t remain s a majo r proble m i n mos t o f th e hil l areas. Th e progra m operate s i n tw o stages . Activit y i n th e first ("control") phas e attempt s t o reduc e th e mosquit o populatio n by us e o f insecticid e spray s i n al l houses i n th e nation . Th e sec ond ("eradication" ) phas e attempt s t o eliminat e th e malari a organism b y treatin g al l huma n "carriers " wit h drugs . Th e ma laria contro l peopl e ar e suppose d t o tak e a censu s o f eac h hous e and, i n th e eradicatio n phase , trea t "fevers " an d giv e medicin e to clos e contact s o f person s suspecte d o f havin g malaria . S o fa r the problem s i n th e triba l village s ar e s o grea t tha t the y hav e not gon e beyon d th e sprayin g phas e in th e mor e accessibl e areas . No patter n o f economi c developmen t o r birt h contro l i s geare d in wit h th e malari a progra m i n spit e o f it s tremendous efficiency , even a t th e "control " phase , i n reducin g th e deat h rate. 13 The Ministr y o f Healt h i s als o suppose d t o provid e fre e medi cal car e t o thos e wh o nee d it . S o fa r ther e ha s bee n n o attemp t to exten d thi s servic e t o th e hill s (probabl y becaus e o f shortage s of mone y an d traine d personne l eve n i n th e mor e heavil y popu 18 "The malari a contro l progra m successfull y reduce d th e malari a deat h rat e from a n averag e o f 25 0 death s pe r 100,00 0 populatio n t o 3 5 death s pe r 100,00 0 population." Unite d State s Operatio n Missio n t o Thailan d (USOM ) 196 2 :P.D. 39.

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lated lowlan d areas) . Tribesme n ar e eligibl e (apparently ) fo r this service , but ther e hav e bee n complaint s that the y hav e bee n charged excessivel y fo r it . Department of Forestry. Th e Tha i governmen t ha s take n a monopoly o n tea k an d thu s "owns " al l tea k tree s an d othe r valuable lumbe r trees . Sinc e man y o f thes e tree s gro w i n hil l areas, an d sinc e thes e tree s wer e customaril y use d fo r construc tion b y hil l peoples , ther e i s a n inevitabl e sourc e o f conflic t ove r this resource . A t th e minimum , thi s conditio n lead s t o th e possi bility o f extortio n b y th e forestr y officials . Anothe r conflic t possi bility exist s becaus e o f th e practic e o f swidde n (slash-and-burn ) agriculture. Forestr y official s clai m tha t thi s metho d o f agricul ture destroy s fores t resources , but triba l peopl e clai m tha t tea k forests d o no t mak e goo d ric e land , s o the y d o no t cu t ther e anyway, an d i f the y cease d makin g swidde n fields entirely , a s the foresters migh t desire , they would starve. 14 Postwar expansio n o f th e lumbe r industr y ha s offere d som e wage labo r (e.g . elephant-driving ) t o tribesmen , bu t th e job s available t o triba l peopl e decreas e a s wor k an d transportatio n become mor e mechanized . INTERESTS O F FOREIG N GOVERNMENTS AN D INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION S

United States Information Service (USIS). Th e Unite d State s Information Servic e (USIS ) ha s tw o sorts of interest s wit h regar d to hil l tribe s an d rura l minorities , bot h o f whic h fal l unde r th e general classificatio n o f increasin g popula r suppor t fo r th e Roya l Thai Governmen t an d strengthenin g nationa l integration . USIS attempt s t o strengthe n tie s betwee n triba l group s an d the natio n throug h broadcast s i n triba l an d regiona l dialects . This projec t ha s no t bee n ver y activ e recentl y fo r tw o reasons . First, th e centra l governmen t polic y i s t o promot e th e us e o f Central Tha i language and script , so as to discourage regionalism ; the governmen t therefor e restrict s broadcast s i n regional dialects , except, apparently , i n us e o f regiona l son g styles , suc h a s th e "These statement s ar e base d o n m y observation s i n northwester n Thailand . Stern, i n wester n Thailand , confirm s th e generalizatio n tha t swidde n agricultur e is no t destructiv e t o existin g fores t resource s (1965:8) . H e als o indicate s tha t swidden agricultur e ma y b e considerabl y mor e productiv e tha n irrigate d agricul ture (1965:7) .

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molam o f th e Northeast . Second , USI S doe s not hav e sufficien t technical staf f t o monito r tribal-languag e broadcasts , s o that , al though i t i s possible , fo r example , t o ge t someon e t o translat e from Tha i int o Me o an d t o mak e Meo-languag e broadcasts , i t has no t prove d possibl e t o ge t a n independen t translatio n bac k into Tha i an d English , an d s o chec k o n wha t i s actuall y bein g said. There i s a t presen t n o precis e knowledg e o f th e number s o f radio set s i n triba l villages . Apparentl y thi s i s quit e variable , with th e riche r tribes (opium-growin g groups ) muc h mor e likel y to hav e radio s tha n th e othe r groups . Ther e ar e plan s underwa y to expan d th e capacit y fo r broadcasting , i n par t i n respons e t o the fac t tha t Radi o Pekin g regularl y broadcasts i n suc h language s as Meo . Another approac h aime d a t increasin g nationa l integratio n i s to educat e th e Tha i populatio n o n th e subjec t o f triba l an d re gional minoritie s i n Thailand . A serie s o f films wit h Tha i soun d tracks ha s bee n mad e b y USIS , showin g triba l an d minorit y groups an d emphasizin g thei r human-nes s a s wel l a s showin g cultural differences . USI S ha s als o pu t o n exhibition s fo r Thais , showing examples of triba l art s an d crafts . United States Operations Mission (USOM). Activitie s o f USOM wit h regar d t o tribe s ar e primaril y directe d t o givin g support t o th e Borde r Patro l Polic e (q.v.) , principally b y furnish ing advisor y an d trainin g personne l an d equipment . Wit h regar d to rura l minorities , activitie s includ e th e norma l rang e o f com munity developmen t an d othe r services , wit h concentratio n o n the Northeas t becaus e o f it s relative economi c underdevelopmen t and strategi c importance , no t becaus e o f it s regiona l minorit y characteristics. USOM ha s assiste d th e Tha i Ministr y o f Healt h (q.v.) , th e malaria contro l an d eradicatio n program , an d othe r healt h pro grams. USO M ha s als o give n financial suppor t an d som e supplie s and equipmen t fo r th e Rehabilitatio n Village s an d Ne w Lif e Foundation ru n b y Mr . Rober t Wulff . Tw o o f thes e villages , lo cated i n Chien g Da o an d Ho t district s o f Chiengma i Province , are in tribal areas an d involv e tribal people . U.S. Department of Defense. Th e Departmen t o f Defens e i s involved i n minorit y an d triba l affair s primaril y throug h assis [ 38 6 ]

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tance i n term s o f equipmen t fo r th e MD U progra m o f th e Tha i Ministry o f Defens e (q.v.) . It i s als o activel y promotin g researc h on hill an d minorit y people s i n cooperatio n wit h th e Tha i Minis try o f Defense . Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEAT O ha s shown it s interests i n hill tribe s throug h provisio n o f fellowship s for stud y o f hil l trib e group s (se e Dr . Geddes ' pape r i n thi s volume). A s a result o f experience s i n Malay a an d Sout h Viet nam, SEAT O i s wel l awar e o f th e strategi c importanc e o f thes e groups. UNESCO Division of Narcotic Drugs and the Opium Trade. The opiu m trad e ha s man y internationa l implication s sinc e th e drug i s ofte n transporte d illegall y acros s nationa l borders . I n th e case o f Thailand , th e proble m i s on e o f contro l o f flow o f opiu m from Burm a an d Lao s a s wel l a s contro l o f productio n i n th e export fro m Thailand . Th e UNESC O Divisio n of Narcoti c Drug s is concerne d t o assis t th e countrie s involve d t o sto p thi s traffic , and t o eliminat e opiu m production . I n Thailan d triba l peopl e are th e chief , i f no t th e only , producer s o f opiu m an d ar e als o said t o b e involve d i n th e earl y stage s o f opiu m transportation . The exten t o f th e proble m ca n b e judge d fro m th e estimat e o f 75 t o 10 0 ton s annua l productio n o f ra w opiu m (figure s cite d byPatyaSaihool963). Some o f th e problem s o f opiu m productio n b y triba l peopl e in Thailan d ar e discusse d i n th e paper s o f Dr . Gedde s an d Dr . Manndorff. International Interests —Nationalist Political Movements. Thai land ha s borders wit h Burm a an d Lao s wher e nationalistic, sepa ratist, an d othe r politica l movement s ar e takin g plac e amon g segments o f population s whic h ar e als o presen t i n Thailand . Therefore Thailan d migh t b e use d a s a "neutra l land base " fro m which Karen , Shan , Lao , or Chines e Nationalist s coul d operate , much a s th e Vie t Con g hav e use d Nort h Vietna m t o operat e against Sout h Vietnam . Th e minorit y an d triba l population s i n Thailand migh t als o b e target s fo r infiltratio n fro m th e outside , e.g. by th e Pathe t Lao . As regard s th e Burm a border , ther e i s a clea r possibilit y o f such a n occurrence , because ther e ar e Chinese , Shan , an d Kare n minorities i n Thailand , an d becaus e ther e are , o r hav e been , a [ 38 7 ]

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series o f uprising s o f Chinese , Shan , an d Kare n minoritie s i n Burma. With regar d t o Karens , i t i s Tha i governmen t polic y t o reduc e this possibilit y b y patrollin g th e borde r are a an d restrictin g th e flow o f arm s an d supplie s acros s th e border . Th e Tha i Karen s with who m I a m familia r hav e relativel y littl e o r n o "nationalis tic" sentimen t excep t fo r a genera l feelin g o f fellowshi p wit h other Karen s (se e Lehman' s pape r regardin g Kare n "national ism" in Burma) . Ther e i s n o agitatio n o r over t organizatio n o f Karens i n Thailan d fo r politica l purposes . Whil e ther e ma y b e passive suppor t fo r th e movemen t i n Burm a i n term s o f friend ship an d hospitality , ther e i s littl e activ e suppor t i n term s o f providing money , supplies , equipment , o r men . Ai d to th e Kare n revolt i n Burma , suc h a s i t is , seem s motivate d b y profit , no t patriotism. Communist Activities. Ther e i s n o evidenc e o f successfu l Communist activit y amon g th e hil l people s i n th e northwest . Broadcasts fro m Chines e station s ca n b e receive d quit e easily , but ther e ar e fe w i f an y radio s owne d b y Lua ? o r Karen . Ther e is n o evidenc e o f direc t subversion , suc h a s th e politicall y moti vated assassination s whic h hav e bee n reported i n th e Northeast . PRIVATE ORGANIZATION S

Missionary Activity. Christia n missionarie s hav e bee n activ e among triba l an d minorit y people s i n Thailan d longe r tha n an y other organizations . Th e firs t Catholi c priest s i n Thailan d accom panied th e Duk e o f Albuquerque i n 1511 . Two Dominicans , wh o arrived i n 1555 , wer e th e firs t residen t missionaries . Bot h wer e put t o deat h withi n fiftee n years . Thre e Frenc h missionarie s ar rived i n 1662—the y wer e imprisone d o r driven ou t o f th e countr y in 168 8 i n a reactio n agains t th e Frenc h followin g th e deat h of Kin g Nara i i n Ayuthaya . Mos t o f th e earl y wor k o f th e Catho lic missionarie s wa s directe d towar d foreigner s (Annamite s an d Cambodians a s wel l a s Europeans ) afte r initia l attempt s wit h the Thai s faile d (Jesui t Father s 1963:B-12-B-14) . A few Catholi c churches remaine d a t th e tim e th e first Protestan t missionarie s arrived i n 1828 . Work wa s starte d b y th e Protestant s amon g th e Chinese an d Mo n minoritie s almos t immediatel y i n th e are a around Bangkok . Medica l wor k wa s starte d i n th e 1830' s an d [ 38 8 ]

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has remaine d a n importan t aspec t o f missio n activit y u p t o th e present da y (Well s 1958:5) . The first Protestan t missionar y t o g o t o th e Nort h wa s th e Reverend Danie l McGilvary , wh o wen t t o Chiengma i i n 186 7 for th e purpos e o f teachin g religion , establishin g schools , an d caring fo r th e sic k (McGilvar y 1912:Ch . IV ; Well s 1958:53) . His activitie s soo n brough t hi m int o conflic t wit h th e Princ e o f Chiengmai, Cha o Kawilorot . Appeal s for assistanc e from th e Thai government i n Bangko k b y McGilvar y a s well a s by Britis h lum ber interest s resulte d i n th e sendin g of a Siames e Hig h Commis sioner t o Chiengma i i n 1869 , alon g wit h tw o America n mission aries, on e o f whom , th e Reveren d N . A . McDonald , wa s actin g American Consul . Th e Princ e die d i n 187 0 o n th e wa y hom e from a tri p t o pa y tribut e t o th e Kin g i n Bangkok . I n 187 8 hi s successor Cha o Intano n yielde d t o pressure from Kin g Chulalong korn an d th e Siames e High Commissione r i n Chiengma i t o accep t a proclamatio n o f religiou s toleratio n whic h allowe d freedo m of religio n i n Thailand . Much o f th e earl y wor k an d earl y succes s o f missionarie s i n the Nort h wa s amon g triba l peopl e an d forme r slaves . McGilvar y had starte d wor k amon g th e Karen s th e first yea r h e wa s i n Chiengmai (Well s 1958:54) , an d h e continue d t o visi t amon g the hil l tribe s throughou t hi s career . H e visite d a "Mu-so " (Lahu) grou p i n 1891-1892 , wher e h e ha d considerabl e succes s in convertin g on e whol e village , bu t n o succes s wit h individual s or othe r village s (McGilvar y 1912:32 6 ff., 34 4 ff.). Th e Lah u at tha t tim e wer e alread y cultivatin g opiu m i n the hill s betwee n the Ma e Ko k an d Fang , an d i n som e case s wer e addicte d t o it. Th e origina l caus e o f addiction , accordin g t o McGilvary , wa s medicinal us e o f opiu m fo r dysenter y (McGilvar y 1912:34 6 ff.) . McGilvary visite d amon g the Khmu ? an d Lame t i n Lao s i n 1898 , but permissio n fo r Protestant s t o missioniz e i n Lao s wa s denie d by the French . An American Baptis t missionar y accompanie d Kare n Christian s from Burm a t o Chiengma i a s earl y a s 1872 . Kare n Christian s from Burm a hav e continue d missionar y activity , sometime s inde pendently an d sometime s wit h America n Baptis t help , sinc e tha t time (Truxto n 1958:56) . Chiengmai ha s continue d t o b e a cente r fo r missionar y wor k t 38 9 ]

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in Norther n Thailan d an d the adjacen t part s o f Lao s and Burma . The followin g lis t wil l giv e a n ide a o f th e exten t an d variet y of wor k b y foreig n Protestan t group s amon g minorit y an d triba l groups i n Thailand . (1) America n Bibl e Society—wor k wit h norther n people s in cluding th e Lao , Meo , Yao , Thai-Lue , an d Thai-Yuan . Portion s of th e Bibl e publishe d i n norther n language s an d distribute d as earl y a s th e 1890' s (Well s 1958:195) . Wor k o f th e America n Bible Societ y continue s a t th e presen t tim e wit h Dr . Willia m Smalley, a n anthropologica l linguis t residen t i n Thailand , givin g professional linguisti c advic e o n transcriptio n o f tribal dialects . (2) Th e Unite d Christia n Missionar y Society—work wit h Mo n and Chines e minoritie s (Well s 1958:198) . (3) Th e Worldwid e Evangelizatio n Crusade—wor k wit h th e Karens (Well s 1958:198) , an d wit h Khmu ? i n Na n Provinc e (Judd 1966) . (4) Th e Souther n Baptist Mission—wor k wit h Chines e (Well s 1958:205). (5) America n Churche s o f Chris t (o r Christia n Churches ) Mission—work wit h Ya o an d Me o i n Chiengra i an d Na n prov inces, an d wit h th e Thai-Lu e i n Chiengra i (Well s 1958:205) . (6) Th e Oversea s Missionar y Fellowshi p o f th e Chin a Inlan d Mission i n Thailand—cam e int o Thailand afte r bein g force d ou t of Chin a afte r th e Communis t revolution . The y wor k wit h triba l groups suc h a s Lisu , Meo , Lahu , an d Yao , which ar e als o foun d in Chin a (Well s 1958:205-206) . They have als o begun work wit h Pwo Karens . (7) Th e America n Baptis t Mission—wor k wit h th e Karens , especially Ska w Karens , an d wit h Swatow-speakin g Chines e (Fridell 1956:20-27 ; Truxto n 1958:56-^9 ; Well s 1958:208-209) . (8) Ne w Tribe s Mission—wor k wit h th e Lua ? (Lawa) , Karens, an d Norther n Thai s (Well s 1958:209 ; Schlatte r 1963) . (9) Th e Christia n Brethre n Mission—a n Englis h grou p work ing primaril y i n Malaya , bu t als o amon g th e Mala y an d Chines e Christians i n Thailand . (10) Th e Bibl e Societies i n Southeast Asia—wor k wit h variou s missionary group s o n problems o f translatio n o f triba l an d minor ity languages . [ 39 0 ]

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(11) Th e Churc h o f Christ i n Thailand (se e below, n. 17) . A meetin g o f Protestan t missionarie s wa s hel d i n th e 1950' s at whic h territoria l an d triba l assignment s o f missionar y group s were mad e t o avoid , wher e possible , duplicatio n o f effort s an d conflicts o f interest . There ar e severa l order s o f Roma n Catholic s wh o hav e bee n active amon g triba l an d minorit y groups . A s wit h som e o f th e Protestant group s i n th e North , man y o f th e Catholic s wer e originally workin g i n Chin a an d move d t o Thailan d afte r th e Com munist take-over . Bot h Catholi c an d Protestan t missionarie s wor k among som e o f th e sam e groups , e.g . th e Karens . (Se e Kun stadter's pape r belo w fo r detail s o f som e o f th e missionar y programs.) The effectivenes s o f Christia n missionarie s i n convertin g th e population o f Thailan d ha s no t been great . The y hav e ha d thei r greatest succes s wit h tribal , minority , an d economicall y depressed group s (e.g . forme r slaves) . Ther e ar e onl y abou t 150,000 Christian s i n Thailand 15 ou t o f a populatio n o f 26,000,000—about . 6 percen t (Thailand Population Census, 1960)—but missionarie s hav e don e importan t wor k i n medicin e and, paradoxically , secula r education , introducin g thes e t o area s where the y di d no t previousl y exis t i n Thailand . I n genera l i t can b e state d tha t th e missionarie s hav e no t fostere d separatis m or triba l nationalis m t o th e exten t tha t the y hav e bee n accuse d of doing , fo r exampl e i n Burm a o r India. 16 Thi s i s probabl y be cause o f th e greate r degre e o f religiou s toleratio n amon g th e dominant populatio n (a s compare d wit h India) , th e relativ e re moteness an d smal l numbe r o f triba l peopl e a s compare d wit h the mai n par t o f th e Thai populatio n (an d thei r consequen t lac k of conflict) , th e relativ e eas e o f assimilatio n int o Tha i societ y at th e sam e leve l a s othe r peasants , an d t o th e fac t tha t mis sionaries hav e no t bee n s o directl y identifie d wit h a singl e colonial power (a s they were in India, Burma, or Vietnam). Law s " T h e Catholic Directory of Thailand (Jesui t Father s 1963:B-28 ) state s tha t there wer e 109,13 3 Catholic s i n Thailan d i n 1959 , almos t hal f o f who m wer e in th e Bangko k area . Thes e figures ar e no t necessaril y comparabl e t o censu s figures fo r Christians . "But se e Mara n L a Raw' s pape r i n thi s volum e fo r a n exampl e o f th e nation building effect s o f missionarie s i n Burma .

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with respec t t o propert y ownershi p an d educatio n hav e require d religious organization s t o develop , a t th e minimum , paralle l Thai-national an d foreig n missionar y structures . Fo r example , the Presbyteria n missionar y activity , whic h wa s onc e largel y American dominated , ha s becom e Thai-ize d a s th e Churc h o f Christ i n Thailand , wit h Tha i officer s an d titl e to lan d an d prop erty in th e names o f Thai nationals. 17 Other Private Organizations —the Asia Foundation. Activitie s of th e Asi a Foundatio n wit h respec t t o tribe s an d minoritie s ar e summarized i n Mr. Pierson's paper i n this volume. FINGERS I N TH E TRIBA L PIE—SUMMAR Y AN D CONCLUSION S

It i s clea r fro m th e preceding paragraph s tha t ther e ar e man y different interest s impingin g fro m th e outsid e ont o th e triba l an d rural minorit y peoples . Thes e includ e th e interest s o f th e Roya l Thai Governmen t an d o f government s o f othe r nation s a s wel l as o f internationa l organizations . Som e o f th e othe r interest s i n tribal an d rura l minoritie s hav e no t ye t bee n specified—suc h as interest s i n th e land , lumber , game , an d agricultura l resource s " Th e Presbyterian s starte d wor k i n Thailan d i n 1840 , an d a Tha i nationa l Protestant church , th e Churc h o f Chris t i n Thailand , was establishe d i n 1934 . Until th e Japanes e occupatio n fore d th e suspensio n o f America n missionar y work i n 1941 , mos t o f th e reponsibilit y fo r th e progra m an d institution s o f this churc h remaine d i n th e hand s o f th e Presbyteria n Mission . Tha i leadershi p kept som e institution s an d mos t loca l churche s operatin g durin g th e Secon d World War . Afte r th e wa r th e wor k wa s carrie d o n b y join t committees , hal f appointed b y th e Tha i nationa l church , an d hal f b y th e cooperatin g missions . Since 1957 , whe n th e Presbyteria n Missio n i n Thailan d was dissolved , al l polic y and program s hav e bee n th e ful l responsibilit y o f th e nationa l church . Individua l missionaries ar e stil l servin g unde r th e Churc h o f Chris t a s "fraterna l workers, " but the y com e onl y upo n specifi c reques t o f th e nationa l church . A simila r arrangement ha s existe d betwee n th e national churc h an d th e Disciple s o f Chris t since 1961 . Th e Churc h o f Sout h India , th e Unite d Churc h o f Chris t i n th e Philippines, th e Churc h o f Chris t i n Japan , th e Korea n Presbyteria n Church , and th e Chines e Churc h o f Indonesi a hav e als o sent fraternal worker s t o Thailand . The America n Baptist s an d th e Marburge r Missio n ( a Germa n group , primaril y Lutheran) wor k unde r th e nationa l church , bu t maintai n thei r ow n missionar y organizations i n Thailand . The regiona l organization s (phak) o f th e Churc h o f Chris t i n Thailan d ar e structured i n par t alon g ethni c line s whic h ar e no t paralle l wit h th e government' s regions (n . 10 , above) . Phak XI I o f th e nationa l church , aroun d Bangkok , is Chinese . Phak X i s Kare n (America n Baptist s wor k wit h al l Protestan t Karen s in Thailand , bu t thre e o f th e fou r Kare n "associations " o f Baptis t churche s are stil l relate d t o th e Burm a Baptis t Convention) . Th e norther n district s o f the nationa l churc h (phaks I-V ) hav e churche s wit h Lue , T ? in, an d Khmu ? members, bu t al l o f thes e churche s no w us e th e Norther n Tha i dialec t (Jud d 1966).

[ 39 2 ]

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of th e area s occupie d b y thes e peoples . Triba l people hav e bee n deprived o f thei r lan d resource s when , a s i n th e exampl e o f th e Phumibol Dam , part s o f th e are a flooded happe n t o b e occupie d by triba l people , thoug h o f cours e thi s conditio n i s no t confine d to triba l peopl e alone . Lumbe r resource s i n area s traditionall y occupied b y triba l peopl e hav e bee n los t t o thes e people a s th e Royal Tha i Governmen t ha s take n a monopol y o n the m an d ha s granted right s t o larg e corporation s fo r exploitatio n o f thes e re sources. Access to gam e in tribal area s i s not restricted , an d gam e is hunte d i n increasin g amount s b y lowlan d peoples . Ther e ar e also economi c interest s o f lowlan d peopl e i n th e triba l peoples , both a s market s fo r manufacture d good s an d a s producer s o f agricultural produce , rice , vegetable , livestock , opium , an d cer tain craf t product s (wove n mats , shoulde r bags , basketry , etc.) , and som e fores t products . I n genera l th e uplan d peopl e ar e a t the merc y o f th e lowlander s t o se t th e condition s o f trade : itiner ant trader s ar e abl e t o se t thei r ow n prices , since ther e i s littl e competition. Lowlan d buyer s o f hil l product s ordinaril y hav e the advantag e in settin g prices, because th e burde n o f transporta tion t o marke t i s place d o n th e producers , wh o ar e naturall y reluctant t o retur n thei r produc e t o th e hill s an d wh o hav e n o way t o stor e thei r good s nea r th e marke t i n orde r t o wai t fo r favorable prices . In genera l i t ca n b e sai d tha t th e hil l an d rura l minorit y peo ples hav e n o channel s o f communicatio n t o th e agencie s o r per sons whos e decision s affec t thei r lives . Th e onl y possibl e excep tion t o thi s i s th e syste m whic h exist s i n som e o f th e Borde r Patrol programs . O n th e sid e o f th e administratio n o f program s affecting hil l tribe s an d rura l minoritie s ther e i s littl e evidenc e of coordinatio n o f effort s eithe r i n plannin g o r i n carryin g ou t programs. Thi s situatio n wil l becom e increasingl y troublesom e as mor e an d mor e program s mov e fro m th e plannin g an d pilo t project stag e int o full-scal e action . In compariso n wit h man y Southeas t Asia n nation s Thailan d is fortunat e i n enjoyin g a relativel y homogeneou s population , a lon g traditio n o f independence , boundarie s whic h correspon d reasonably wel l wit h ethni c distribution s (excep t fo r La o an d Shan population s i n th e Northeas t an d Northwest) , a commo n set o f symbol s o f nationa l unit y (th e monarch y an d Buddhism) , [ 39 3 ]

PETE R KUNSTADTE R

and dialect s which , thoug h the y ma y no t alway s b e mutuall y intelligible, a t leas t ca n b e transcribe d wit h a commo n writin g system an d offe r relativel y simpl e problems o f cross-dialec t teach ing. I n vie w o f th e commo n background , i t shoul d b e relativel y easy t o blu r th e boundarie s betwee n th e variou s minorit y groups. It remain s t o be see n whether o r not th e Roya l Thai Governmen t can capitaliz e o n thes e advantage s an d ca n us e th e existing rura l community structure s (a s discusse d i n Moerman' s paper ) t o bin d the rural masses into a national structure . Although th e paper s which follo w indicat e tha t ther e i s a grea t deal o f variatio n amon g th e triba l peoples , ther e ar e man y rea sons t o b e hopefu l tha t som e for m o f cultura l pluralis m ca n b e worked out . I n genera l th e Thai s hav e bee n quit e toleran t o f cultural an d religiou s differences , an d thu s the y ca n star t th e attempt t o dra w tribes-peopl e int o th e nationa l structur e wit h much les s o f a residu e o f il l will tha n i s th e cas e i n othe r coun tries. Bu t unde r th e presen t circumstance s o f rapi d expansio n of th e lowlan d Tha i population int o previously remot e area s con tact an d conflict s ar e boun d t o tak e place ; th e tribesme n ar e no longe r remote , an d simpl e abstrac t toleratio n wil l n o longe r be a satisfactory basi s for nationa l integration . REFERENCES CITE

D

BLANCHARD, WENDELL , et al.

1957 Thailand : it s people , it s society , it s culture . Ne w Haven , Human Relations Area Files Press. BRANDT, JOH N

1961 Th e Negrit o o f Peninsula r Thailand , Journal of th e Siam Societ y 49 (2):123-158 . FRTOELL, ELME R A .

1956 Baptist s i n Thailan d an d th e Philippines . Philadelphia , Th e Judson Press . JESUIT FATHER S (eds. ) 1963 Th e Catholi c director y o f Thailan d 1963 . Bangkok, Tha i Inc . JUDD, LAURENC E C .

1964 Dr y ric e agricultur e i n Norther n Thailand . Ithaca , Southeas t Asia Program , Departmen t o f Asia n Studies , Cornel l University , Data Pape r No . 52. (Thi s i s a portion o f a doctora l dissertatio n entitled "Cha o Rai : dr y rice farmer s i n Norther n Thailand, " Cornell Universit y 1961 , which contain s additiona l informatio n

[ 39 4 ]

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on triba l people s wh o ar e "becomin g Thai " an d o n attitude s of th e people s toward th e government. ) 1966 Persona l communication . McGrLVABY, DANIE L

1912 A

hal f centur y amon g th e Siames e an d th e Lao : a n autobiog raphy. Ne w York , Flemin g H . Revel l Company .

MOERMAN, MICHAE L

1965 Ethni c identificatio n i n a comple x civilization : wh o ar e th e Lue? America n Anthropologis t 6 7 (5):1215-1230 . OVERSEAS CHINES E ECONOM Y YEARBOO K

1964 Oversea s Chines e econom y yearboo k o f 1964 . Taipeh . PATYA SATHO O

1962 Repor t o n th e hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailand . [Bangkok ] mimeographed. 1963 Th e hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailan d an d th e opiu m problem . Bulletin o n Narcotic s 1 5 ( 2 ) : 35-45 . PBASOBCHAI YAMAL I an d WATAN A RATANAWICHI T

1962 Th e civi l and commercia l cod e (o f Thailand) , Book s I—IV . Bang kok, Wichi t Nilapaichit . SCHLATTER, DONAL D

1963 Persona l communication . SKINNER, G . W I L L I A M

1957 Chines e Societ y i n Thailand . Ithaca , Cornel l Universit y Press . 1965 Persona l communication . SMALLEY, W I L L I A M A. , et al.

1964 Orthograph y studies : article s o n ne w writin g systems . London , United Bibl e Societies . 1965 Persona l communication . STEBN, THEODOR E

1965 Researc h upo n Kare n i n villag e an d town ; Uppe r Khwa e Noi , Western Thailan d [Bangkok] , mimeographed . THAILAND

N.D. Th e pena l cod e o f Thailan d an d it s amendment . Translate d by Luan g Duly a Sathy a Patived , Bangkok . THAILAND, CENTRA L STATICA L O F F I C E , NATIONA L ECONOMI C DEVELOPMENT BOAR D

1962 Thailan d populatio n census , 1960 , Changwa d Series . TRUXTON, ADDISO N STRON G

1958 Th e integratio n o f th e Kare n people s o f Burm a an d Thailan d into thei r respectiv e nationa l cultures : a stud y i n th e dynamic s of cultur e contact . Ithaca , Cornel l University , Maste r s thesis . UNITED STATE S OPERATIO N MISSIO N T O THAILAN D (USOM )

1962 Thai-America n economi c an d technica l cooperation . Novembe r 1962, Bangkok , Unite d State s Operation s Mission .

[ 39 5 ]

PETE R KUNSTADTE B

1963 Th e civi c actio n progra m o f th e Borde r Patro l Polic e an d th e USOM Publi c Safet y Division . Bangkok , USO M Communica tions Medi a Division . WELLS, KENNET H E .

1958 Histor y o f Protestan t wor k i n Thailand : 1828-1958 . Bangkok , Church o f Chris t in Thailand . YOUNG, GORDO N

1962 Th e hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailand . Bangkok , th e Sia m So ciety, Monograph 1 , 2d edn . 1965 A ligh t i n th e jungle . Sawadd i 3(4):10-11 , 26 . Bangkok .

[ 39 6 ]

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TABLE 1 7 POPULATION AN D LINGUISTI C AFFILIATIO N OF ETHNI C GROUP S O F THAILAND » Group [Sub-group s (Synonyms i n Parentheses)]

Est. Population in Thailand b

Central Tha i [(Sia - 10,000,000" mese)] Lao-Thai [(North eastern Thai, Tha i Isan)] 9,000,000« 2,600,000d Chinese

Location (i n Order o f Siz e of Population)

Language

Thailand, Malaya , Laos

Tai: Southwester n

Thailand, Lao s China, Southeas t Asia

Tai: Southwester n Chinese

2,000,000« 2,000,000«·« 1,025,000'

Thailand Thailand, Malay a Malaya, Thailan d

Kui

150,000«

Phu Tha i [(Phoutai) ]

100,000*

Thailand, Cam bodia Laos, Nort h Viet nam, Thailan d Yunnan, Burma , Thailand, Laos , North Vietna m Burma, Thailan d

Tai: Southwester n Tai: Southwester n Malayo-Polynesian: Mala y Mon-Khmer: Khmeric Tai: Southwester n

Northern Tha i [(Khon Muang , Yuan)] Southern Tha i Thai-Malay

Thai-Lue [(Lu) ]

71,600

Karen [(Yang , KaI ieng), Sgaw (S'kaw) .> Pwo, B'ghw e (Kayah), Taungthu ] Mon Meo [(Miao) , sev eral dialects ]

71,400'

Akha [(Ekaw, Ikaw) ]

25,00Oi

T?in [(Kh a Tin) ]

18,90Oi*

Lisu [(Lasaw , Lishaw, Lisaw) ]

17,30Oi

Lahu [(Musser) , several dialects ]

15,050''

60,000 45,80Oi

Tai: Southwester n

Sino-Tibetan: probably Ti beto-Burman, Karen Burma, Thailan d Mon-Khmer: Mon Kweichow, Hunan , Miao-Yao: Mia o Szechwan, Kwangsi, Yun nan, North Viet nam, Laos, Thailand Tibeto-Burman: Yunnan, Burma , Burmese-Lolo, Thailand, Lao s LoIo grou p Thailand, Lao s Mon-Khmer: N . Laos Tibeto-Burman: Yunnan, Burma , Burmese-Lolo, Thailand LoIo grou p Yunnan, Burma , Tibeto-Burman: Burmese-Lolo, Thailand, Lao s LoIo grou p (continued)

[ 39 7 ]

PETER KUNSTADTER TABL E 1 7 (continued) Est . Grou p [Sub-group s (Synonym s i n Populatio n Parentheses) ] in Thailand * Yao [(I u Mien , Man) ] 10,20O i

Lawa [(Lua ? )]

Locatio n (i n Orde r o f Siz e o f Population ) Kwangsi, Kwang tung , Hainan , Nort h Vietnam , Laos, Thailan d Thailan d

Languag e Miao-Yao : Ya o

Mon-Khmer : Palaungi c Mon-Khmer : N . Khmu ? [(Khamu , 7,600)··» Laos, Thailan d Mou) ] Lao s Chinese : Yunnan 6,617+ " Yunnan , Burma , Ha w [(Ho , Hor , ese Thailand , Lao s Yunnanese) ] Mon-Khmer : 2,000 Thailan d Chaobo n [("Lawa") ] Palaungi c 300» Negrit o [(Tonga) ] Malaya , Thailan d Senoi-Semang : Seno i Mon-Khmer : N . 100' Ph i Ton g Luan g Thailan d Laos ? [(Yumbri) ] 4 0 + Ρ Thailan d Mon-Khmer : N . Mrabr i Laos ? Bra o [(Lave , Love) ] [unavailable ] Laos , Thailand , Mon-Khmer : Cambodia , PBahnaric , N . Bahnari c Sout h Vietna m Tibeto-Burman : Jinghpa w [(Kachin) ] [unavailable] 1» Burma , Yunnan , close t o Bod o Thailan d grou p Mon-Khmer : [unavailable ] Khme r [(Cam Cambodia , Sout h bodian) ] Vietnam , Thai Khmeri c lan d Tai : Southwester n Thailan d [unavailable ] Khora t Tha i [unavailable ] Burma , Thailand , Malayo-Poly Moke n nesian : Mala y Malay a Tai : Southwester n [unavailable] 1, Laos, Thailan d Phua n Tai : Northern · Saek [(Sek) ] [unavailable ] Laos, Thailan d Tai : Southwester n Sha n [(Ngio , Ta i [unavailable ] Burma , Yunnan , Thailan d Yai)] Mon-Khmer : ? So [unavailable ] Laos, Thailan d Thailan d tota l 26,257,91 6 (1960 census ) 9,000i.i

(continued) a

Se e note s accompanyin g Burm a populatio n tabl e fo r source s o f linguisti c classification . Informatio n o n populatio n distributio n i s fro m LeBa r et al. (1964), excep t wher e noted . b Group s whos e population s ar e unknow n ar e liste d alphabetically . • Source fo r estimate s o f speaker s o f variou s Tha i dialect s i n Thailan d i s Brown (1965) .

[ 39 8 ]

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TABL E 1 7 (continued) d

Th e Thailand Population Census, 1960 (Thailan d 1962A ) list s 409,50 8 as citizen s o f China ; Skinne r (1965 ) give s 2,600,00 0 a s th e numbe r o f ethni c Chines e i n Thailand ; th e Overseas Chinese Economy Yearbook of 1964 give s 3,799,00 0 a s th e numbe r o f Chines e i n Thailand . "LeBa r et al. (1964:205 ) give s 1,500,00 0 a s th e estimate d populatio n fo r th e " P a k Tai, " wh o ar e sai d t o b e speaker s o f a patoi s calle d dambro, an d wh o live i n Chumpo n an d Nakhornsrithammara t Provinces . Brow n (1965 ) dis cusses a Souther n Tha i dialec t calle d Ta k Bai , bu t doe s no t mentio n P a k Ta i or dambro. H e state s t h a t speaker s o f Souther n Tha i dialect s liv e in th e south ern province s fro m Chumphor n to Nara-thiwat . ' Figur e fo r Thai-Mala y populatio n i s derive d fro m th e 196 0 census ; th e estimat e i s base d o n th e numbe r o f Moslems . Thi s religiou s groupin g i s no t strictl y comparabl e wit h th e estimate s fo r linguisti c grouping s elsewher e i n thi s table . * Ku i populatio n figure fro m Smalle y (1964:85) . ·> LeBar et al. (1964:228 ) giv e 70,00 0 to 100,00 0 a s th e estimate d Ph u Tha i populatio n i n Thailand . Brow n (1965:14 ) give s n o populatio n estimate , bu t state s t h a t Ph u Tha i "i s spoke n i n th e villages o f Sako n Nakho n an d Nakho n Phano m Provinces. " Th e combine d "agriculture " populatio n o f thes e tw o province s i n th e 196 0 censu s wa s ove r 750,000 , bu t w e hav e n o way o f tellin g ho w man y o f thes e rura l peopl e wer e Ph u Tha i speakers . 1 Figur e fo r Kare n include s Sga w (S ? kaw), Pwo , B ? ghwe, an d Taungth u Karen . Th e figure quote d i s fro m Youn g (1964:85) , bu t o n th e basis o f experi enc e i n Maehongso n Provinc e I fee l tha t thi s i s a minima l estimate . i Estimate s o f thes e triba l population s ar e fro m Youn g (1964:85) . k LeBa r et al. (1964:128 ) stat e tha t th e estimate d T?i n populatio n i n Thailan d i s betwee n 12,00 0 an d 35,000 . 1 Young' s estimat e fo r Law a populatio n i s fo r mountai n village s only . Ther e ar e uncounte d thousand s o f Law a i n th e valley s i n variou s stage s o f becomin g Thai . m Young' s estimat e o f th e numbe r o f Khmu ? livin g i n mountai n village s is 3,30 0 (Youn g 1962:85) . LeBa r (1965 ) estimate s tha t ther e ar e a t leas t ? 5,000 t o 7,60 0 Khmu ? i n Thailand . Hi s figures refe r t o ethni c K h m u , bor n ? in Lao s o r Thailan d o f K h m u parents . Becaus e ther e ar e man y Khmu ? indi viduals livin g al l ove r Thailan d i n variou s stage s o f "becomin g Thai, " i t i s very difficul t t o arriv e a t a n accurat e figure. Smalle y (i n LeBar et al. 1964:113 ) consider s th e Khmu ? languag e t o b e close r t o th e Mon-Khme r language s o f Sout h Vietnam , althoug h i t i s usuall y classifie d wit h Palaun g an d Wa . W e have followe d Thoma s (1965 ) i n assignin g K h m u ? t o th e N . Lao s group . n Populatio n estimat e fo r th e rura l Yunnanes e " H a w " i s fro m Mot e (i n thi s volume) . ο Estimat e o f Negrit o (Tonga ) populatio n i n Thailan d i s fro m Brand t (1961:133) ; th e sam e peopl e ar e calle d Seman g b y LeBa r et al. (1964:182) , citin g a 195 8 publicatio n o f Seidenfaden . p Populatio n figure fo r Mrabr i i s fro m Boele s (1963:154) , wh o state s t h a t ther e ar e probabl y fort y individual s i n on e of th e two group s visited . W e follo w Smalle y (1963:191 ) i n distinguishin g Mrabr i fro m th e Yumbr i o n linguisti c (continued)

[ 39 & ]

PETE R KUNSTADTE R

TABLE 1 7 (continued) grounds. Smalle y state s tha t neithe r Yumbr i no r Mrabri i s closely relate d t o K h m u ? o r T ? in, bu t Thoma s (1965 ) lump s al l of thes e i n his N. Laos group . « Maran La Raw (personal communication) report s having met a Jinghpa w Kachin whos e famil y wa s originall y fro m Kengtun g (Sha n State , Burma) . This man' s family, alon g with a number o f others including som e Atzi Kachin , have live d i n Thailan d fo r abou t tw o generations. Quit e a fe w Jinghpaw ar e reported t o have com e int o Chiengra i Province , Thailand , followin g th e mili tary take-ove r i n Burma i n 1962. 1 Brown states that there are "relatively few" Phuan in Thailand (1965:13) . "Linguistic identificatio n o f the Sae k i s from Gedne y (1965) . REFERENCE S CITE

D

BoELES, J . J . 1963 Secon d expeditio n t o th e Mrabr i o f Nort h Thailan d ("Kho n Pa"). Journa l o f the Siam Societ y 5 1 ( 2 ): 133-160. BRANDT, JOH N H .

1961 Th e Negrito o f peninsula r Thailand . Journa l o f the Siam Societ y 49(2):123-158. BROWN, J . MARVI N

1965 Fro m ancien t Tha i t o moder n dialects . Bangkok , Socia l Scienc e Association Press . GEDNEY, W I L L I A M J .

1965 Persona l communications . LEBAR, FRAN K M. , GERAL D C. HICKEY , an d JOH N K. MUSGRAV E

1964 Ethni c group s o f mainlan d Southeas t Asia . Ne w Haven, Huma n Relations Are a File s Press . MARAN L A R A W

1965 Persona l communication . OVERSEAS CHINES E ECONOM Y YEARBOO K

1964 Oversea s Chines e econom y yearboo k o f 1964 . Taipeh . SKINNER, G . W I L L I A M

1965 Persona l communication . SMALLEY, W I L L I A M A .

1963 Note s o n Kraisri' s an d Bernatzik' s wor d lists . Journa l o f th e Siam Societ y 5 1 ( 2 ) : 1 8 9 - 2 0 1 . 1964 Th e us e o f non-Roma n scrip t fo r ne w languages . In Orthog raphy studies : article s o n ne w writin g systems , Willia m A . Smalley et al. London, Th e United Bibl e Societies . THAILAND, CENTRA L STATISTICA L O F F I C E

1962 Thailan d populatio n census , 1960 : whol e kingdom . Bangkok , Central Statistica l Office , Nationa l Economi c Developmen t Board. THOMAS, DAVI D D .

1965 Persona l communications .

[ 40 0 ]

CHAPTE R 1 1

A Minority and Its Government: Th e Thai-Lue of Norther n Thailan d MICHAE L MOERMA N

This pape r argue s tha t concer n wit h hil l people s shoul d no t blind us to th e importanc e o f settle d rural minorities. After briefl y suggesting wh y wor k amon g Tha i lowlander s i s feasibl e an d im portant, I wil l describ e a Thai-Lu e village. 1 The n I wil l relat e in som e detai l ho w tha t villag e reacte d t o th e announcemen t of a n impendin g Communis t attack . Thi s episod e wil l permi t me t o sugges t som e genera l strategie s fo r improvin g th e relation ship betwee n Norther n Tha i minoritie s an d thei r government . THE SETTIN G

The Lu e ar e no t a "tribe, " sinc e tha t ter m i s bes t reserve d for people s whos e basi c mean s o f productio n i s shiftin g cultiva tion o r foragin g an d wh o therefor e usuall y liv e i n th e hills . Suc h tribal peoples compris e abou t 1 percent o f Thailand' s population. 2 Aside fro m them , an d fro m th e Chines e an d Indians , Thailan d is relatively homogeneous . Ye t i n thi s Buddhis t natio n ther e ar e more tha n on e million Musli m lowlanders. Although Centra l Tha i is th e nationa l language , a t leas t hal f o f th e population speak s 1 Ban Pin g i s a Thai-Lu e village o f abou t 12 0 households i n Chiengra i Province , where m y wif e an d I live d fo r fourtee n month s fro m 195 9 t o 1961 . I a m pleased t o b e abl e t o than k th e Foreig n Are a Trainin g Fellowshi p Progra m of th e For d Foundatio n fo r generousl y sponsorin g m y research . Som e o f th e observations upo n whic h thi s pape r i s base d wer e mad e i n th e summer s o f 1964 an d 196 5 whil e I wa s i n Thailan d a s a consultan t t o USOM . I n 196 5 grants fro m th e Cente r fo r Internationa l Studie s a t Berkele y an d fro m th e Aca demic Senat e o f UCL A permitte d m e t o retur n t o Ba n Pin g fo r thre e weeks . This paper , however , i s base d almos t entirel y o n observation s mad e durin g 1960 . My institutiona l affiliation s hav e absolutel y n o implicatio n tha t opinion s ar e share d by th e For d Foundation , th e Universit y o f California , AID , o r USOM . 2 Population percentage s com e fro m Census for Thatiand, 1960 , an d Young , 1962. (Se e Introduction : Thailand , an d Tabl e 1 7 fo r furthe r detail s o f number s of minorit y populations. )

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other Tha i dialects . Thei r linguisti c diversit y nee d no t concer n us here , wer e i t no t ofte n associate d wit h divergencie s o f ethni c identification (Moerma n 1965) . Lik e th e hil l tribes , man y o f these peopl e liv e nea r borders . Tha i minoritie s ar e fa r mor e nu merous tha n th e hil l people s an d locate d quit e a s strategically . Lue villager s i n Chiengkha m an d Chiengkhawng , an d probabl y other minority Tha i a s well , ridicule an d resen t militar y an d eco nomic ai d directe d solel y a t th e hill peoples, whom they generall y regard a s od d o r foreig n an d who m the y ofte n thin k inferior . There i s concer n abou t th e hil l people s becaus e the y liv e i n small communities, isolate d from on e another , an d withou t muc h supra-village politica l organization . Th e minorit y Thai , o n th e other hand , ar e usuall y unde r th e surveillanc e an d contro l o f the Roya l Tha i Governmen t an d ar e comparativel y accessibl e by road . Ther e i s concer n abou t som e hil l peoples becaus e the y grow a n annua l thre e millio n dollar s wort h o f opiu m (Thailan d 1962:63), a cro p fo r whic h w e hav e n o profitabl e lega l alterna tive. Th e Tha i gro w ric e an d othe r crop s o f whic h w e approv e and hav e som e knowledge . Compare d wit h ou r abysma l igno rance o f th e hil l peoples , w e kno w rathe r a lo t abou t th e lan d tenure system s an d agricultura l technolog y o f minorit y Thai . Moreover, man y governmen t official s kno w thei r language , thei r aspirations, and thei r wa y o f life . In sum , th e lowlan d minoritie s ar e numerous , strategicall y lo cated, an d amenabl e t o presen t knowledg e an d administrativ e resources. Ther e ar e als o pressin g politica l reason s wh y the y should b e give n ou r attention . Newspape r reports , rumors, polic y statements, an d curren t developmen t program s sugges t tha t som e of u s are alerte d t o th e possibilitie s o f dange r fro m th e Thai-La o of th e Northeas t an d fro m th e Malay s o f th e South . Simila r dan gers are possible in the North . In 1960 , whe n I wa s livin g i n Ba n Ping , a Thai-Lu e villag e in th e extrem e nort h o f Thailand , a messenge r brough t a not e on officia l pape r t o th e headman' s house . Sinc e th e headma n had gon e fishing, hi s wif e ha d thei r twenty-three-year-ol d so n read th e note to her. Its text: Fieldnote No. 1. Thi s i s t o infor m th e headma n tha t Me o [Com munists fro m Laos ] wil l ente r Tambo n Yuan , Amphu r Chiengkham toda y [ 3 Decembe r I960] . Tel l you r peopl e [ 40 2 ]

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to b e ready . I f you r se e them , rus h immediatel y t o th e dis trict office , o r t o th e borde r polic e o r loca l polic e stations . They wil l b e abl e t o hel p you . [Signature ] This message , onc e read , wa s sen t alon g t o th e nex t village . As migh t b e expected , th e not e cause d anxiet y an d confusion—so muc h s o tha t it s autho r late r denie d havin g sen t it. A s migh t furthe r b e expected , th e peasant s o f Ba n Pin g di d not immediatel y for m a n efficien t citizens ' army . Wha t one migh t not expect , an d certainl y woul d no t expec t i n centra l Thailand , is th e followin g sentiment , whic h wa s widel y repeate d b y th e villagers. Fieldnote No. 2. Abou t 6 0 year s ag o w e wer e conquere d b y th e Central Thai . W e offere d the m candle s an d flower s [sign s of respec t an d loyalty] . The y becam e ou r caw naj ["offi cials" o r "rulers" ] an d w e pa y the m taxes . Whe n th e Com munists come , the y ma y conque r th e Centra l Thai . The n we wil l offe r the m flower s an d candle s an d cal l the m caw naj. W e wil l pa y the m taxe s an d al l wil l b e a s before . W e are th e commo n people ; wha t happen s t o official s doe s no t concern us . I f ther e i s war , w e mus t leav e fo r a whil e i n order t o avoi d vandal s an d stra y bullets. Whatever sid e wins, we will return an d call them ou r leaders. 3 I hav e writte n elsewher e (Moerma n 1961:8 ) o f m y reluctan t belief tha t suc h sentiment s woul d probabl y b e foun d i n man y villages whic h ar e significantl y simila r t o Ba n Ping . I t i s also ' my hopefu l belie f tha t i n suc h village s simila r sentiment s migh t be mad e a s harmles s a s the y wer e i n Ba n Ping . Le t u s tr y the n to discove r whic h o f Ba n Ping' s specification s ar e both relevan t to it s reactio n an d likel y t o b e foun d i n other , similar , communities. Communality. Ba n Pin g i s a physicall y an d administrativel y demarcated communit y o f kinsme n who al l have the sam e famil y name. Fields , river , forest , ceremonia l gates , an d villag e prid e separate Ba n Pin g fro m neighborin g villages . All villag e childre n 3 Many villager s tol d version s o f thi s tale . Th e thre e me n who m m y note s mention specificall y hav e al l travele d an d trade d widely . One i s literat e i n North ern Thai , an d another , a forme r headman , literat e i n bot h Norther n an d Centra l Thai scripts . Thi s ma n complete d th e thir d grad e o f elementar y school . M y previous repor t (1961:6 ) tha t n o on e expresse d thes e sentiment s "wh o ha d completed thei r fou r year s o f elementar y education " i s thu s technicall y correct , but quit e misleading .

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attend th e sam e school ; al l villagers atten d an d suppor t th e sam e temple. Onc e eac h yea r Ba n Pin g i s seale d of f fro m outsider s for th e ceremon y a t whic h th e villag e spiri t i s propitiated . In centra l Thailan d administrativ e jurisdictions , loca l names , topographic borders , an d schoo l zone s ofte n fai l t o coincide . There th e "villag e community " i s frequentl y th e analyti c cre ation o f th e socia l scientist , jus t a s th e "administrativ e hamlet " (mu ban) i s frequentl y th e artificia l creatio n o f th e Ministr y of th e Interior . I d o no t clai m tha t clearl y demarcate d stron g natural communitie s ar e eithe r restricte d t o th e Nort h o r uni versal there . Bu t suc h communitie s see m t o b e characteristi c o f the region , an d thi s i s probabl y base d o n genera l similaritie s of histor y an d geograph y whic h distinguish norther n fro m centra l Thailand. Much o f centra l Thailan d consist s o f broa d flood plai n criss crossed wit h navigabl e canals . Th e Nort h i s compose d o f rela tively narro w rive r valley s unite d b y a fe w poo r road s an d sepa rated b y difficul t terrai n whic h i s unsuitabl e fo r Tha i method s of irrigate d agriculture . Thes e environmenta l feature s ma y un derlie th e relativ e compactnes s an d isolatio n o f norther n villages . The irrigatio n system s an d th e pre-moder n state s o f th e Nort h were loca l an d limited . Trad e wa s i n th e hand s o f Tha i people s (and Yunnanes e Moslem s o r "Haw") , fo r onl y afte r th e Siamese 4 began direc t administratio n o f th e Nort h di d settle d Chines e merchants becom e conspicuou s there . I n Chiengkham , an d prob ably throughou t th e North , religiou s organizatio n wa s als o acephalous. Priest s wit h seniorit y an d spiritua l attainment s wer e highly respected , bu t the y exerte d littl e authorit y ove r temple s other tha n thei r own . Compare d t o centra l Thailand , th e region s and state s o f th e Nort h wer e politically , culturally , economically , and ecclesiasticall y isolated , independent , an d self-sufficient . Th e North no t onl y share s thi s heritag e wit h Chiengkham , i t share s the Centra l Tha i conquest whic h abruptly altere d it . The Siamese Conquest. Th e interna l histor y o f Thailan d i s largely th e histor y o f th e gradua l expansio n o f Siames e contro l over othe r Tha i rulers . Th e powe r o f Bangko k increase d rapidl y toward th e clos e o f th e nineteent h century , perhap s i n defens e 4 For convenience , thi s pape r sometime s use s th e wor d "Siamese " t o mea n Central Thai .

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against th e Europea n colonia l power s i n Burm a an d Lao s wh o were threatenin g th e loosel y governe d principalitie s o f th e North . A Roya l Commissione r wa s sen t fro m Bangko k t o Chiengma i in 1869 (McGilvar y 1912:121) , an d a governor i n 187 3 (Kingshil l 1960:12). I n 190 4 Chiengkha m receive d it s first distric t officer . The Sha n rebellio n o f 1901-190 2 wa s th e immediat e stimulu s for enforcin g th e direc t administratio n o f Lampang , Chiengrai , Nan, an d perhap s othe r norther n province s also . The rebellion , trivial enoug h i n itself , ha d far-reachin g effects , fo r i t reveale d t o the Siames e th e weaknes s o f thei r hol d o n th e [Norther n Thai ] States , the povert y o f thei r rura l administration , an d th e inadequac y o f thei r military administration , whic h tripl e revelatio n wa s th e direc t instiga tion o f som e o f th e mos t importan t reform s o f th e administratio n of the last twenty years. (Graha m 1924:172 )

The inceptio n o f direc t Siames e administratio n wa s a sudde n and recen t even t fo r muc h o f Nort h Thailand . I hav e show n the importanc e o f tha t even t fo r Ba n Ping' s attitude s towar d the natio n an d towar d th e Communis t invasio n wit h whic h i t was threatene d (se e Fieldnote No. 2, above) . Sinc e I hav e foun d no detaile d account s o f th e Siames e conques t o f th e Nort h i n the historical literature (vide Curti s 1903 : Appendix), it is worthwhile t o quot e a n elderl y villager' s repor t o f th e Sha n rebellio n and o f th e first appearanc e o f Centra l Tha i officials . I n th e man y northern communitie s wher e the y presumabl y exist , i t i s suc h reports an d memorie s whic h hel p t o for m villagers ' attitude s to ward thei r government . Fieldnote No. 3. Th e Siames e cam e i n th e followin g way . The y had take n Phra e an d sa t there . I n Chiengkham , Chiengrai , Chiengsaen an d othe r place s th e Sha n wer e makin g a lo t of trouble . The y refuse d t o pa y th e hea d tax . The y roame d about i n smal l band s an d pillaged , jus t a s th e Me o presentl y do i n Laos . Th e loca l Sha n merchant s o f Chiengkha m an d other place s joine d wit h th e Sha n bandits . Th e Lor d o f Lif e of Na n [wh o rule d Chiengkham ] eithe r di d no t kno w o r could no t d o anythin g abou t it . Then , whe n I ha d lef t th e temple [ca. 1901] , th e Siames e cam e fro m Phra e t o pu t down th e Shan . Th e Sha n conscripte d Grandfathe r Na w [another ol d villager , no t like d b y m y informant ] alon g wit h people fro m othe r village s t o carr y an d clea n fo r them . Th e [ 40 5 ]

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N

conscripts wen t wit h Sha n arm y a s fa r a s Ba n O j [3 0 kilometers away ] wher e the y me t th e Siamese . Afte r th e Siamese twic e fired thei r cannon , Na w an d th e other s ra n away. Na w ra n al l th e way home . The Siames e the n entere d Chiengkham. . . . They entere d on horseback, elephant , an d on foot . Th e Ca w Muan g Chiengkha m cam e ou t t o mee t them wit h a n offerin g tra y o f candle s covere d wit h gol d leaf an d wit h branche s t o whic h gol d an d silve r wer e tied . He welcome d the m t o Chiengkha m an d the y calle d hi m "kamnan." The y buil t a for t wher e th e distiller y i s now , and bega n t o appoin t official s unti l thi s day . The y bega n to cal l th e villag e chie f "headman " [phu jaj ban]. With thi s an d simila r events th e Nort h becam e par t o f Thailand : suddenly, forcefully , an d completely . Insidarity. Ba n Ping , lik e som e othe r village s i n th e district s of Chiengkham , Chiengkhawng , Therng , Pua , Lae , Maesai , an d Chiengsaen, i s a Thai-Lu e village . Althoug h ther e ar e compara tively few Lu e i n Thailand , i t shoul d b e remembere d tha t almos t all norther n villager s ca n b e recognize d as , an d ofte n identif y themselves as , some variety o f Thai : Kho n Muan g (Yuan) , Shan , Lao, Lue , Yawng , Khyn , etc . The divergen t ethni c identificatio n of Ba n Ping , althoug h unusuall y strong , i s not unique (Moerma n 1965). Ethni c identificatio n a s a minorit y Tha i peopl e ca n some times imped e nationa l identification . I f i t persists , i t might , i n extreme situations , mak e a grou p sympatheti c to irredentist prop aganda. Th e Lu e o f Ba n Pin g ofte n spea k nostalgicall y o f th e "Old Country " i n Yunnan . The y liste n regularl y t o folk-son g broadcasts fro m China . The lif e o f th e villager s o f Ba n Pin g i s base d o n growing , eating, an d sellin g inundate d rice . Lik e othe r Tha i wh o inhabi t North an d Northeas t Thailand , Laos , an d Yunnan , the y ea t onl y glutinous rice , an d mos t o f th e ric e the y gro w i s glutinous . Sinc e officials ea t non-glutinou s rice , thi s preferenc e symbolize s th e differences o f cultur e an d o f clas s whic h separat e th e norther n villager fro m hi s government. 5 Furthe r cultura l difference s involve villagers ' prid e i n thei r self-sufficiency . Althoug h Ba n 5

1 wa s impresse d b y a Mobil e Developmen t Uni t tea m i n Northeas t Thailan d eating glutinou s ric e fo r th e on e mea l I observe d durin g th e summe r o f 1964 . Although th e kin d o f ric e eate n ma y see m a mino r matter , i t i s frequentl y alluded t o whe n norther n villager s tal k abou t officials . (Se e pape r b y Le e Huf f in thi s boo k fo r furthe r discussio n o f Mobil e Developmen t Units. )

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Ping's retentio n o f weavin g i s atypical , th e contras t betwee n th e Western-style khak i uniform s o f official s an d th e loose-fittin g in digo garment s o f norther n villager s i s nearl y universal . Th e offi cial, o f course , als o speak s i n Centra l Thai , a dialec t whic h man y villagers understan d wit h difficult y an d mos t spea k wit h diffidence. Probabl y throughou t th e North , invidiou s difference s of diet , dialect , an d dres s distinguis h officials—"peopl e wh o ea t monthly money"—fro m "ou r kin d o f Tha i wh o wor k fo r a living." Ban Pin g i s bu t a lon g day' s wal k fro m th e mountain s whic h separate Chiengkha m fro m th e Muan g Khaw p Distric t o f north ern Laos . Sixt y kilometers o f rutte d trac k an d washed-ou t bridge s connect i t wit h th e neares t pave d road . Th e thic k dus t o f th e dry seaso n conceal s hole s an d ridge s fro m th e rice-truc k drivers , who nee d eigh t hour s t o reac h th e pave d roa d a t Phayao . I n the rain y season , me n an d ox-cart s slo g throug h a knee-dee p porridge o f heav y mud , an d th e tri p take s three , o r eve n ten , days. Th e pat h t o Chiengkham , althoug h sai d t o b e on e o f th e worst i n Thailan d (Blofel d 1960:54) , i s no t unrepresentativ e o f the Nort h an d i s bette r tha n man y i n Maehongso n an d isolate d parts o f Nan. 6 Harassing Regulations. I n Ba n Ping , a s i n mos t isolate d vil lages, th e fanner' s mai n contact s wit h th e governmen t ar e th e taxes an d fee s collecte d an d th e order s give n b y it s representa tives. Thi s give s hi m a vie w o f official s whic h I thin k i t quit e imperative fo r Tha i nationa l leader s t o b e awar e of . M y attemp t to depic t tha t viewpoin t doe s no t necessaril y mea n tha t I agre e with it . Th e villager' s attitud e towar d hi s governmen t depend s neither o n m y vie w o f hi s situatio n no r eve n o n hi s "actual " situation; i t depend s o n wha t h e think s hi s situatio n ough t t o be. The village r fear s th e police , send s an d get s n o mail , i s give n few healt h services , ha s neve r hear d o f agricultura l extension , and sometime s see s littl e us e i n compulsor y education. 7 Mos t 8

A roa d currentl y bein g constructe d wit h America n hel p wil l probabl y reduc e rainy-season trave l tim e t o Chiengra i fro m thre e day s t o thre e hours . ' Althoug h the y sometime s complai n tha t compulsor y primar y educatio n de prives the m o f youn g boy s t o car e fo r th e cattle , villager s ar e gla d tha t the y and thei r childre n ar e literate . I n thei r realisti c view , however , ther e i s n o point t o educatio n beyon d th e fourt h grad e unles s on e i s assure d o f governmen t employment.

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villagers ar e usuall y quit e unawar e o f receivin g an y valuabl e services whatsoeve r fro m th e government . Officials , i n additio n to demandin g labo r an d passin g o n unsolicite d an d ofte n confus ing advice , see m t o b e mainl y concerne d wit h collectin g licens e fees fo r gambling , distilling , tree-felling , an d butchering . Th e villager, however , think s thes e latte r activitie s perfectl y legiti mate an d explain s thei r officia l proscriptio n a s bein g motivate d only b y a desir e t o rais e revenue . I n Ba n Pin g villager s assum e that thes e fee s an d taxes , thes e exaction s fo r whic h nothin g i s returned, becom e th e officials ' salaries . Sinc e th e Tha i us e reci procity a s th e rhetori c fo r socia l relations , i t seem s especiall y unjust fo r official s t o harass an d control while providin g no palpa ble beneficia l services . An occasiona l officia l ma y b e admired ; a rar e village r ma y form a short-live d profitabl e friendshi p wit h a low-rankin g civi l servant; perhap s ther e i s a genera l expectatio n tha t th e govern ment coul d b e aske d to ameliorat e calamities . Fa r mor e typically , villagers fea r official s an d tr y t o avoi d them ; official s ar e ignoran t of villager s an d trea t the m condescendingly . Whe n officials , an d the governmen t the y stan d for , ca n n o longe r guarante e orde r and protection , on e n o longe r owe s the m taxe s an d obedience . So it wa s towar d th e Princ e o f Na n whe n th e Sha n hel d Chieng kham, so it wa s towar d th e Sha n whe n th e Siames e too k Chieng kham fro m them , s o i t woul d b e towar d th e Roya l Tha i Govern ment shoul d they , i n turn , fai l a s protectors . Th e ter m "politica l loyalty" would b e difficul t t o translat e int o th e Thai-Lu e dialect ; the concep t ha s n o relevanc e t o th e traditiona l relationshi p be tween peasan t an d official , betwee n villag e an d nation , betwee n state an d state . I rathe r suspec t tha t th e concep t i s ephemera l even for moder n Thailand . Perhap s th e most that ca n be expecte d from peasant s i s passiv e acceptanc e o f governmen t an d fait h that official s know , car e about , an d ar e competen t t o accomplis h the well-being o f commo n people . No t affection, bu t a willingnes s to defe r defectio n i s a reasonabl e goa l fo r "nationa l loyalty " programs. Whe n forc e fails , legitimacy , no t love , i s th e strengt h of governments . THE ME O PANI C O F 1 9 6 0

The insularity , isolation , ethni c pecularity , socia l an d cultura l disadvantages, hostilit y towar d officials , an d histor y o f conques t [ 40 8 ]

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with whic h I hav e describe d Ba n Pin g ar e quit e widesprea d among minorit y Thai . Althoug h Ba n Pin g i s perhap s unusua l in th e exten t t o whic h i t show s thes e characteristics , it s farmer s neither welcome d th e Me o no r fled thei r village . Th e reason s for thi s resoluteness , o r indifference , ca n hel p u s t o understan d and t o develo p th e strengt h o f Norther n Tha i communities . The villager s expecte d a n attac k fro m Me o Communis t invaders. A s invader s fro m Laos , the y were , fo r th e ol d me n at least , probabl y n o mor e foreig n no r objectionabl e tha n wer e the Sha n wh o conquere d th e Yua n o f Nan , o r th e Siames e wh o conquered th e Sha n o f Chiengkham . I specif y th e ol d men , be cause th e young , largel y a s a resul t o f thei r schoolin g (Moerma n 1964:43-47), identif y themselve s wit h Thailan d mor e generall y than d o th e ol d an d hav e als o cease d t o practic e som e distinc tively Lu e customs . I suspect , however , tha t eve n th e youn g failed t o suppor t "th e enemy, " no t becaus e the y cam e fro m across th e border , bu t becaus e the y wer e Communists , attackers , and Meo . The expecte d invader s wer e Communists , a wor d whic h means "wicke d person " an d littl e more—althoug h som e i n Chiengkham, especiall y i n th e marke t town , kno w an d clai m to objec t t o th e Communis t polic y o f takin g fro m th e ric h t o give t o th e poor . Ther e ar e n o influentia l villager s wh o kno w that "Communism " threaten s suc h value d thing s a s th e practic e of Buddhism , leisur e an d respec t fo r th e aged , nationa l indepen dence, and family privacy. 8 For ove r fou r month s befor e th e announcemen t o f th e impend ing attack , villager s ha d bee n hearin g report s tha t Me o tribes men, wh o wante d t o asser t thei r contro l ove r th e lowlan d people , were sackin g an d burnin g villages i n th e contiguou s par t o f Laos . Ban Ping , then , expecte d armed , violent , an d destructiv e peopl e with hostil e interests . Th e expecte d invaders , moreover , wer e hill peoples o f who m lowlan d villager s ar e often fearfu l an d con temptuous. Th e villagers ' reactio n t o politica l agent s abl e t o mobilize thei r grievances , o r eve n t o invader s wh o wer e fello w Lue, might have been quit e different . It i s comfortin g tha t Ba n Pin g di d no t welcom e th e Me o in vaders. I t i s strikin g tha t Ba n Ping , unlik e som e nearb y villages , 8 In 196 5 villager s seeme d mor e knowledgeabl e abou t Communis m tha n the y were i n 1960 .

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N

did no t fle e th e feare d attack . I t i s remarkabl e tha t Ba n Ping , without an y outsid e leadershi p o r inspiration , reacte d i n th e idea l manner: b y formin g a villag e sentr y force . Sinc e a n anthropolo gist rarel y ha s th e opportunity—althoug h h e alway s ha s th e obli gation—of presentin g his readers with the information upo n which his analysi s i s based , I shoul d lik e t o quot e a t som e lengt h fro m my fieldnotes. 9 Fo r th e privileg e o f doin g thi s I incu r th e dut y of pointin g ou t ho w Ba n Ping' s uniqu e reactio n t o a particula r event suggest s ho w simila r communitie s migh t b e expecte d t o react t o simila r events . Fieldnote No. 4 i. 3 Decembe r 1960 . Th e headman' s son , wif e and th e messenge r interpre t th e notic e [se e Fieldnote No. 1, above ] t o mean tha t th e Me o may ente r a t som e indefinit e time i n th e future . The headman' s so n ha s complete d schoo l an d i s on e o f th e mor e "citified" youths . Th e youn g messenge r i s als o literat e an d cur rently i n school . Thei r miscomprehensio n o f a simpl e announce ment doe s no t ste m fro m stupidit y o r ignorance . W e wh o boar d planes, extinguis h cigarettes , tak e medicines , selec t detergents , and atten d conference s al l o n th e basi s o f writte n instructions , have learne d t o rea d closely , seriously , an d attentively , a s i f ou r lives depended—a s indee d the y ofte n do—upo n th e word-for word correctnes s wit h whic h w e interpre t writte n messages . In formation officer s an d governmen t official s ofte n mak e th e funda mental erro r o f assumin g tha t villager s assig n th e same , o r eve n greater, realit y t o writte n word s a s the y d o t o spoke n word s and t o observe d phenomena . Readin g i s largel y irrelevan t t o vil lage life , an d message s conveye d i n writin g ar e usuall y fancifu l or approximate. 10 Fieldnote No. 4 ii. Whe n th e headma n returns , hi s opinio n i s quite different . Befor e callin g a meeting , h e walk s quickl y down th e roa d deliverin g verba l message s t o M an d others . The headma n ring s th e bambo o gon g whic h summon s a group o f men , youn g an d old , ver y quickly . Muc h excite d 8

These ar e th e unedite d fieldnotes type d whil e th e event s the y describ e wer e occurring. Th e onl y change s mad e fo r thi s presentatio n ar e deletion s o f prope r names, translation s o f nativ e words , an d th e addition s enclose d i n brackets . 10 Some o f th e ver y fe w type s o f writte n message s upo n whic h action s ar e based ar e usuall y phrase d wit h fals e precision . A n invitatio n to atten d a n ordina tion a t "12:0 0 hours " mean s "Com e afte r breakfast , a t an y tim e betwee n 10:0 0 A.M. an d 3:0 0 P.M. "

[ 410 ]

THAI-LU E O F NOKTHEB N THAILAN D

talk becaus e the y al l alread y kno w th e issue . A n ol d ma n says rumo r ha d i t tha t th e Me o ha d reache d th e headman' s house. Th e headma n tell s the m tha t th e distric t offic e say s the Me o ar e comin g today . The y shoul d gathe r thei r valu ables an d prepar e t o flee. M say s tha t i f th e soldier s wer e here, there would be nothing t o fear . M i s a wealth y forme r headman . Althoug h quit e unpopular , h e is ofte n influential . In othe r situations , a s i n thi s one , villager s sho w rathe r hig h regard fo r th e army , whic h the y conside r efficien t an d relativel y free fro m corruption . O n anothe r occasion , whe n a n ol d woma n wandered of f int o th e forest , I wa s quit e impresse d b y th e wa y in which tw o commo n soldier s wh o happene d t o b e i n th e villag e took charg e o f th e searc h party , leadin g th e villager s respectfull y and politely . Fieldnote No. 4 Ui. M an d the n P sugges t tha t a mu kot [grou p of youn g me n t o patro l th e paths ] b e formed . Afte r firs t objecting tha t al l ar e i n th e fields , th e headma n agrees . A mu kot (Thai : mu truad), "inspectio n group, " o f bachelor s and youn g marrie d me n i s sometimes forme d t o patrol th e villag e when fire, cattl e theft , o r violenc e ar e feared . W e ca n als o se e how M an d eve n P, a trader, hav e begu n t o exert more leadershi p than th e headman , whos e authorit y i s nonetheles s stil l necessar y if M's suggestions ar e to be carried out . Fieldnote No. 4 iv. M . say s loudly , an d al l agree , tha t th e nigh t is th e tim e o f danger . A, a n aggressiv e youn g man , suggest s as a jok e tha t al l flee int o tow n righ t now . Som e sugges t a fores t villag e t o flee t o whe n th e tim e comes . Headma n says w e nee d merel y t o g o t o som e seclude d field s nea r th e village. A forme r policema n suggest s tha t th e villag e d o whatever I do . "I f h e flees, w e flee." Anothe r ma n say s that I canno t fle e becaus e I hav e to o man y possession s t o carry. A n olde r ma n seem s quit e please d an d relieve d a t my pla n t o questio n th e distric t office r an d polic e chie f to morrow i n orde r t o fin d th e truth . H e say s tha t rura l peopl e are easil y fooled . Perhap s th e not e fro m [ . . . ] wa s jus t a devic e t o hav e u s leav e ou r home s s o the y ca n b e looted . He wil l as k m e tomorro w wha t th e trut h i s in orde r t o kno w the best thin g to do. [411 ]

THAILAND : MICHAE L MOEHMA N

After excite d discussio n o f man y points , includin g th e rumor tha t a larg e contingen t o f Tha i soldier s ha s alread y reached a villag e abou t 2 0 kilometer s distant , th e grou p disperses. This discussio n suggests , a s man y subsequen t event s confirm , the villagers ' reasonableness , thei r patheti c desir e fo r accurat e information, an d thei r mistrus t o f it s officia l channels . The y real ize tha t th e presumabl y knowledgeabl e strange r i s a n inappro priate model , bu t hop e t o mak e us e o f hi s superio r contact s wit h the outsid e world . Fieldnote No. 4 v. Almos t immediatel y afterwards , peopl e begi n to carr y . . . valuable s fro m thei r house s t o thos e o f rela tives wit h carts . Lon g line s o f wome n for m t o mil l ric e against an y possibl e trip . Villagers o f bot h sexe s an d variou s ages , al l wit h "troubled hearts, " com e t o ou r hous e i n orde r t o lear n whether w e kno w mor e tha n the y do . A n elderl y ma n say s what man y other s will : W e won' t reall y flee th e village , but jus t tak e th e childre n awa y fro m th e dange r o f stra y bullets an d leav e th e olde r peopl e t o watch th e possessions . After th e meeting , man y sa y the y ar e afraid . Headma n draws u p a lis t o f tw o guar d groups , eac h o f twelv e me n who ar e no t i n th e fields. Shortl y befor e dark , th e almos t continuous grou p befor e th e headman' s hous e grow s larger . K join s th e grou p and , afte r som e wa r stories , suggest s that a military-styl e watc h b e formed , wit h eac h grou p t o stand watc h hal f th e night ; th e secon d grou p shoul d slee p all togethe r an d b e awakene d b y th e firs t grou p whe n i t wants relief . Afte r som e shor t discussion , thi s suggestio n i s accepted, M bein g th e loudes t supporter . Headma n accept s it as a fait accompli. K suggests , M quickl y seconding , tha t th e secon d grou p sleep o n ou r porch . Headma n suggest s w e giv e th e grou p our alarm-clock . Constructive leadershi p ha s no w passe d t o K, whos e possibl e role i n rura l developmen t program s wil l b e discusse d i n th e con cluding sectio n o f thi s paper . However , i f th e headma n coul d not salvag e hi s appearanc e o f leadershi p (b y makin g lists , nod ding approval , requisitionin g th e alar m clock ) prid e migh t mak e [ 41 2 ]

THAI-LU E O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

him a n activ e an d effectiv e opponen t o f th e plan s develope d by K an d M. Fieldnote No. 4 vi. Th e villager s intercep t a fe w traveler s fro m town wh o sa y tha t al l i s quie t there . A cyclis t fro m tow n reports: man y hav e close d u p thei r houses , civilia n watch men hav e bee n poste d a t a numbe r o f places ; K late r tell s me tha t i t wa s thi s new s whic h spurre d hi m t o sugges t th e military-style postin g o f th e guard . H e sai d tha t i t wa s wha t they used to do in the army . 4 Decembe r 1960 . I g o t o tow n t o fin d ou t whethe r ther e is an y basi s fo r al l th e anxiety . Othe r Pin g peopl e wh o g o for th e sam e purpose : K an d five youn g househol d heads , all o f who m hav e ha d rathe r extensiv e experienc e workin g and tradin g outsid e th e village . A answer s thos e wh o as k wher e h e i s goin g tha t h e want s to se e th e helicopter . T o m e an d P h e say s a fe w time s that h e want s t o find ou t th e truth . H e i s ill a t eas e becaus e living i n th e countr y on e neve r know s wha t i s happenin g and he wants t o hear th e market news . . . . Honest an d intelligibl e informatio n abou t th e worl d beyon d thei r village i s on e o f th e basi c service s whic h a n anthropologis t pro vides fo r th e people upon whos e hospitality hi s research depends . This i s clearl y a servic e whic h Tha i official s coul d easil y an d casually perfor m fo r isolate d villagers . Back i n America , I receiv e occasional letter s fro m Ba n Ping . I t i s pathetic , bu t indicativ e of th e stat e o f communicatio n i n thi s area , tha t me n wh o ca n hear shootin g fro m acros s th e mountain s fee l tha t the y mus t ask a foreigner wh o live s half a world awa y fo r accurat e informa tion abou t event s i n Laos. Fieldnote No. 4 vii. Th e twelve-ma n mu kot i s o n dut y an d th e night i s quie t unti l 11:00 . The n thre e cart s pas s throug h bringing th e distric t office r t o th e tobacc o plan t [h e ha d been a t th e provincia l capita l fo r a fe w days ] and , fro m there, t o town . Thei r nois e cause s som e excitement . Tw o of th e carters , upo n returning , tel l ou r mu kot tha t th e Me o have entere d an d tha t th e townsme n ar e fleeing. Afte r this , people begi n t o mil l abou t o n th e brightl y moon-li t road . The headman , thoug h shoutin g fo r calm , tell s hi s famil y to stea m ric e an d pac k th e cart . A s evidenc e o f rea l caus e [ 413 ]

THAILAND : MICHAE

L MOERMA N

for fear , villager s shou t tha t th e distric t officer' s wif e ha s fled t o th e tobacc o plant . Ban Ping' s anxiet y i s illustrate d b y th e turmoi l cause d b y th e rumor-mongerin g carters . Sinc e th e distric t officer' s wif e i s bette r informe d tha n they , wha t sh e doe s t o protec t hersel f i s a bette r guide t o villager s tha n wha t official s tel l the m t o do . Actually , th e distric t officer' s wif e an d som e othe r prominen t townswome n spen t th e previou s nigh t a s wel l a t th e tobacc o plant . I t wa s unfortunat e tha t th e Me o scar e coincide d with a provincia l meet ing whic h Chiengkham' s experience d distric t office r wa s require d to attend . Ha d h e bee n presen t i n Chiengkham , I a m sur e tha t th e attac k rumo r woul d hav e cause d less anxiet y an d confusion . Fieldnote No. 4 viii. K become s th e leader , a s h e di d las t night . H e tell s th e tnu kot grou p t o g o bac k t o thei r posts , shout s over an d ove r agai n tha t ther e hav e bee n n o shots , suggests tha t a fe w peopl e bicycl e towar d th e tow n t o se e i f ther e really i s an y trouble . H e ha s n o takers , eve n afte r makin g th e fina l suggestio n tha t h e an d th e headma n d o i t together . Th e headma n divide s hi s tim e betwee n shoutin g tha t th e kot grou p shoul d g o t o aler t a n isolate d sectio n o f th e village an d makin g sur e tha t hi s ow n car t is read y fo r a getaway . Of th e man y stranger s goin g bot h way s o n th e road , th e most exciting , afte r th e rumor-mongers , wer e tw o cart s o f old women , childre n an d mattresse s fleeing a Lu e villag e nea r town . On e o f th e fleeing wome n spok e o f havin g see n Meo : "The y hav e entered . I kno w o f 1 0 o f them , on e a woman. " After talkin g wit h th e headman , whom the y excite d greatly wit h thei r story , th e refugee s reques t permissio n t o sleep here . N say s tha t i f othe r village s ar e fleeing here , the n w e have nothin g to worry about . K i s no w extremel y anxiou s t o find th e truth . While head ma n talk s wit h refugees , K harangue s th e youn g men : Ar e the y reall y men ? ar e the y afrai d t o fight? wil l the y merel y flee an d welcom e thos e wh o hav e com e t o tak e thei r prop ert y an d houses ? H e speak s quit e fiercely an d wit h littl e self-consciousness . Th e youth s shif t abou t uneasily . Thos e acquainte d wit h villag e Thailan d will find thi s scen e o f determine d an d aggressiv e leadershi p a s strikin g an d surprisin g as I did . Γ 414 1

THAI-LU E O F NOBTHER N THAILAN D

Fieldnote No. 4 ix. Thamacaj , th e villag e sage , tell s th e ol d women refugee s t o b e calm , ther e i s n o reaso n t o flee. The y should retur n an d car e fo r th e sic k ol d ma n the y hav e lef t behind. Thamacaj the n tell s tha t whe n th e Siames e firs t cam e t o take Chiengkham , i t wa s als o th e Lu e villager s closes t t o town wh o fled. Peopl e fro m othe r village s an d th e stay-at homes fro m thei r villag e loote d thei r houses . A t tha t time , Thamacaj's elde r brothe r wa s ver y sick . Hi s fathe r pleade d with th e villag e no t t o leave , fo r ther e woul d b e n o on e to comfor t th e boy , o r bur y hi m i f h e died . Ba n Pin g an d a neighborin g villag e staye d behin d an d s o los t nothing . Everything wa s take n fro m th e abandone d villages . Thamacaj suggest s th e followin g cours e o f action : Hea r a lo t o f shootin g fro m th e market , tak e valuable s an d sup plies an d sen d th e wome n an d childre n away . Leav e on e person t o guar d eac h house . Whe n th e guard s se e th e sol diers, the y ca n leave . Soldier s d o no t loo t becaus e the y d o not hav e eithe r plac e o r us e fo r househol d stuffs . Headman an d K spea k t o a grou p o f peopl e a t th e edg e of th e village . Som e o f the m walkin g fro m village s nea r town, som e fro m tobacc o plant . The y sa y tha t man y peopl e have fled th e neighborin g villag e an d tha t it s animal s hav e been le t loose by their owners . At leas t on e othe r villag e wa s completel y abandoned . N o on e fled Ba n Ping . Fieldnote No. 5. 5 Decembe r 1960 . C report s tha t th e isolate d part o f Ba n Pin g wher e h e live s wa s fa r les s excite d tha n the mai n village . Jus t a fe w household s wit h parent s o r chil dren i n th e mai n villag e wante d t o g o an d sta y wit h thei r relatives. Afte r all , i f one' s parent s fle e an d on e doesn't , what's th e use ? Later i n th e day , P visits : hi s jo b i s t o repai r th e kot shelter opposit e th e shop . H e attempt s t o ge t som e childre n to g o from hous e t o house an d reques t spar e thatc h t o reroo f the shelter . Childre n refus e t o g o becaus e the y ar e "shy. " They sa y tha t peopl e wil l refus e the m an d tel l the m the y don't hav e an y thatch . The emergenc y over , Ba n Ping' s abilit y t o cooperat e become s dormant. [415]

THAILAND : MICHAE L MOEBMA N RECOMMENDATIONS

Having entice d th e reade r thi s far , I ca n confes s tha t th e rec ommendations whic h follo w fro m m y length y narrativ e neithe r follow fro m th e inciden t describe d no r ar e mean t a s recommen dations fo r actio n programs . Instead , the y ar e merel y intende d to stimulat e th e thinkin g o f thos e i n th e Tha i an d U.S . govern ments wh o ar e mor e competen t an d responsibl e tha n I t o devis e programs. The y d o no t follo w fro m th e narrative , i n th e sens e that the y ar e suggeste d no t b y "Th e Grea t Me o Panic " itself , but b y th e cause s whic h I thin k underli e "Th e Panic. " T o th e Lue, a s t o th e Forsythes , "dange r i s . . . indispensabl e i n bring ing ou t th e fundamenta l qualit y o f an y society , group , o r indi vidual," and a uniquel y stressfu l even t ma y revea l importan t fea tures whic h ar e alway s present , bu t normall y unobservable . In additio n t o comment s mad e durin g th e cours e o f th e narra tive, there ar e thre e genera l features o f Ba n Ping's reaction whic h have implication s fo r th e developmen t o f stabilit y an d resistanc e to subversio n amon g Norther n Tha i minorities . Th e villager s ha d little fait h i n officials ; unde r appropriat e leadershi p the y wer e able to organize for communit y protection an d benefit . Harassing Regulations and Faith in Officials. Throughou t thi s essay I hav e emphasized , perhap s eve n exaggerated , th e compo nents o f indifference , ambivalence , suspicion , an d hostilit y i n th e villager's attitud e towar d officials . Althoug h thes e ar e no t hi s only feeling s towar d officials , government , an d nation, thes e feel ings ar e nonetheles s ofte n presen t an d alway s potentiall y impor tant. I hav e attempte d t o trac e the m t o insularity , isolation , eth nicity, relativ e deprivation , an d t o th e memor y o f conquest . These factor s Ba n Pin g share s with muc h o f th e North . Economi c development, education , enhance d socia l opportunities , roa d con struction, improve d loca l administration , an d th e deat h o f th e elders wil l probabl y alte r al l o f thes e specification s an d diminis h their consequences . Bu t i s ther e nothin g swifte r an d cheape r than th e man y year s o f elaborat e program s whic h suc h develop ments require ? Along wit h som e form s o f "voluntary " labor—especiall y o n roads outsid e th e village—ther e ar e probably n o governmen t reg ulations whic h antagoniz e villager s mor e tha n thos e concernin g [ 41 6 ]

THAI-LU E O F NOHTHER N THAILAN D

gambling, distilling , butchering , an d forestry . I t i s less the regula tions themselve s tha n thei r apparen t motiv e an d th e seemin g injustice i n thei r enforcemen t tha t th e villager s fin d s o objection able. I n discussin g thes e regulations , I shal l b e talkin g o f trivi alities. Th e villager' s worl d i s composed o f suc h trivialities , whic h to him , an d t o hi s nationa l loyalty , sometime s loo m muc h large r than million s o f dollar s wort h o f constructio n equipmen t i n th e hands, and o n the roads, of governmen t officials . To th e villager , th e polic e appea r unable , o r unwillin g t o pre vent o r eve n investigat e cattl e thefts , th e crim e mos t though t of an d feared . Durin g thei r periodi c inspectio n trips , th e police , instead, as k onl y abou t gamblers , moonshiners , butcher s an d trouble-makers (phu-raj). Th e polic e ar e pleased whe n th e head man, wh o protect s hi s villagers , report s none , bu t th e villager s think tha t the y ar e willin g t o accep t bribe s fo r th e releas e o f any whom the y find or accuse . At thei r monthl y audienc e wit h th e distric t officer , headme n are officiall y told , a s al l villager s know , tha t th e purpos e o f out lawing homemad e spirit s i s t o increas e th e sale s o f th e license d distillery fro m whic h th e governmen t collect s a substantia l fee . Since villager s d o not thin k tha t money s collecte d b y th e govern ment ar e eve r use d fo r thei r benefit , thi s justificatio n hardl y elicits thei r activ e support . Regulations agains t unlicense d gamblin g antagoniz e fe w vil lagers i n Chiengkha m becaus e th e distric t office r intelligentl y waives th e regulation s fo r wakes , a t whic h loca l custo m require s card games . Villagers , however , ar e disturbe d whe n th e polic e seem unabl e t o contro l (an d sometime s eve n participat e in ) th e large-scale gamblin g whic h semi-professionals , ofte n townsmen , conduct i n th e countrysid e durin g th e rain y season . I n addition , villagers, for who m nationa l lotter y ticket s ar e usuall y to o expen sive, se e n o reaso n othe r tha n revenu e an d brib e collectio n fo r proscribing th e chea p "thre e numbe r lottery " o n whic h the y place thei r bets . With rar e exceptions , th e villager s butche r animals , usuall y pigs, onl y fo r feast s o r t o ea t i n th e field s a t harves t time , o r to exchang e fo r rice . Sinc e thei r purpose s ar e no t commercial , they find i t quit e objectionabl e t o pa y a fee , th e motive s fo r which, onc e again , the y regar d a s purel y fiscal . T o sav e th e fe e [417]

THAILAND: MICHAE L MOEHMA N

and avoi d confrontin g a n official , the y butche r secretly , bu t i n fear o f informer s o r detection . Villagers fel l tree s i n orde r t o buil d thei r house s an d granaries . When th e specie s o f timbe r use d require s a governmen t stamp , they fin d tha t som e official s ma y b e willin g t o pocke t a smalle r payment tha n th e liste d fee . Whe n a ne w specie s i s pu t o n th e restricted list , the y complai n tha t th e official s wil l nex t collec t fees fo r permissio n t o cu t bambo o o r eve n grass . Like th e regula tion o f anima l slaughter , fellin g fee s ar e see n b y th e village r to interfer e wit h hi s livelihood . Taxation and Licensing. I f trivia l regulation s ar e o f crucia l importance t o villagers , perhap s thes e regulation s woul d b e eas y to modify . I sugges t th e following : 1. Encourag e distric t officials , an d especiall y low-rankin g ones , to report honestly whether villagers resent the collection of these fees. 2. Th e Roya l Tha i Governmen t shoul d conside r th e exten t t o which revenu e collectio n i s th e mai n purpos e o f thes e regula tions. The amount of revenue collected should be compared to the administrative costs. Fa r mor e importantly , bu t o f fa r greate r difficulty, the socml and political costs of antagonism toward officials should be considered. 3. Th e Roya l Tha i Governmen t shoul d conside r whethe r th e regulations properl y serv e thei r non-fisca l purposes . Doe s payin g fees t o butche r a n uninspecte d anima l whic h wil l b e eate n a t home maintai n publi c health ? Doe s proscribin g pett y gamblin g while supportin g a nationa l lotter y discourag e villager s fro m squandering thei r savings ? Woul d unrestricte d villag e construc tion destro y silvicultura l resources ? I d o no t assum e tha t th e answer t o thes e an d simila r question s i s "No. " I merel y suggest : (a) tha t the question s b e aske d abou t th e effect s o f thes e regula tions; (b ) tha t th e non-fisca l benefit s b e compare d wit h th e non fiscal costs ; (c ) tha t th e regulation s b e enforce d s o a s t o maxi mize thei r non-fisca l benefits ; (d ) tha t thei r non-fisca l purpose s be explaine d t o villagers honestly an d intelligibly . Northern villagers , lik e middle-clas s Americans , woul d rathe r not pa y fee s t o thei r government . Som e fees , howeve r muc h th e villagers tr y t o avoi d them , ar e no t resented . Villager s ar e con vinced tha t registerin g thei r cattl e wil l hel p the m recove r stole n [ 41 8 ]

THAI-LU E O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

animals. Althoug h mos t complai n o f th e inconvenienc e o f regis tration, an d som e accus e low-rankin g official s o f chargin g mor e than the y report t o provincial officers , villager s value th e registra tion servic e an d thu s d o no t fee l tha t it s fe e i s unjustified . I t would b e wort h th e effor t o f tryin g t o explai n t o villager s ho w other fee s an d regulation s ar e intende d t o protec t natura l resources o r public healt h an d welfare . 4. Greate r attentio n shoul d b e give n t o showing villagers the ways in which they benefit from government expenditures. Sinc e these "nuisanc e fees " ar e probabl y a ver y smal l fractio n o f gov ernment revenues , i t migh t wel l prove possibl e t o retain fee revenues for use in the district (or tambon) where they were collected. I f villager s knew that a particular school , or well, or healt h station, o r pesticid e ha d bee n provide d b y mean s o f thei r licens e fees (o r eve n fines) , the y would , I expect , objec t fa r les s tha n they no w d o t o fee s whic h appea r t o serv e n o purpos e othe r than payin g th e "monthl y mone y eaten " b y officials . Th e nex t stage o f suc h a program woul d b e t o have village representatives choose the projects for which the fees could he used. Th e selec tion o f suc h project s migh t wel l b e assigne d t o th e tambon coun cils whic h th e Tha i governmen t hope s t o revitalize . Th e onl y way t o make thes e councils , or an y governmen t agency , meaning ful i s to give them budget an d authority . Community Organization. Thos e fo r who m rura l Thailan d means onl y th e centra l plain s ar e likel y t o b e surprise d a t Ba n Ping's reactio n t o th e attac k announcement . Th e nativ e organiza tion o f a sentr y force , appeal s t o villag e histor y an d t o villag e pride, th e feelin g tha t th e villag e shoul d ac t a s a unit , th e fac t that n o singl e individua l o r househol d too k solitar y refuge , th e mutual concer n o f kinsme n an d neighbors—al l thi s seem s foreig n to th e allege d "loos e structure " o f Tha i societ y (Embre e 1950) . The fac t o f Ba n Ping' s communalit y challenge s accepte d notion s of Tha i rura l society . I t was , i n part , t o documen t thi s challeng e that I quote d a t suc h lengt h fro m m y fieldnotes. Th e fac t tha t what I hav e see n i n Ba n Pin g i s differen t fro m wha t on e hear s and read s abou t Ban g Cha n (Shar p et al. 1953)—th e villag e upon whic h mos t scholarl y idea s abou t rura l Thailan d ar e based—has interestin g implication s fo r ethnography . Tha t north ern minorit y Tha i village s ma y diffe r fro m Centra l Tha i village s [419]

THAILAND : MICHAE L MOEHMA

N

in precisel y thos e way s i n whic h Ba n Pin g differ s fro m Ban g Chan ha s intriguin g implication s fo r developmen t programs . Perhaps on e reaso n wh y communit y developmen t (CD ) ha s often bee n ineffectiv e i n Thailand i s that C D worker s hav e rarel y tried t o develo p a community : a natura l socia l uni t whos e resi dents thin k o f themselve s a s members , a uni t wit h som e degre e of organization , leadership , an d pride . T o th e exten t tha t suc h community unit s exis t i n th e North , C D an d simila r community based program s shoul d prov e mor e effectiv e ther e tha n elsewhere. Bu t th e communit y mus t no t merel y exist , i t mus t also b e officiall y recognized . Th e natura l communit y rarel y an d only accidentall y coincide s wit h th e mu-ban an d tambon, th e "hamlets" an d "communes, " int o whic h Thailan d i s divide d fo r administrative purposes . Th e unit s recognize d b y governmen t agencies ar e usuall y irrelevan t t o th e rura l communit y an d some times weake n th e rura l community . Villag e name s an d th e way s in whic h villager s us e the m ar e probabl y th e bes t indice s o f community boundarie s (Moerma n 1965) . Fo r rapidl y surveyin g a larg e area , i t woul d b e a fairl y accurat e procedur e t o assum e that templ e congregations , especiall y whe n the y coincid e wit h school districts , constitut e a natura l community . I suggest : (1) that this procedure, or more intensive ones, he used to locate and delimit natural northern villages; (2) that only such natural viUages or, whe n village s ar e to o small i n resource s o r populatio n redistricte d tambons compose d of suc h village s an d neve r violatin g thei r boundarie s be used for programs intended to develop or revitalize rural communities; (3) tha t th e failur e o f C D where thes e demarcating procedure s have no t bee n use d i s insufficien t proo f tha t C D an d simila r programs will not work when they are used. Appropriate Leadership. Som e critic s o f rura l program s hav e suggested tha t insufficien t us e ha s bee n mad e o f th e Buddhis t clergy. I t woul d alway s b e a mistake t o antagoniz e villag e priest s and alway s desirabl e t o solici t thei r cooperation . I t i s impossibl e to mak e regula r us e o f the m a s leaders , however , sinc e i n man y villages thei r ver y prestig e depend s o n dissociatio n fro m secula r concerns. Moreover , i n Ba n Ping , i n Chiengkham , and , I think , rather generall y i n th e North , th e yout h o f th e rura l clerg y di minishes thei r capacit y fo r leadership . I n muc h o f Nort h Thai [ 42 0 ]

THAI-LU E O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

land, th e norma l clerica l caree r consist s o f ordinatio n a s a novic e (when abou t fourteen) , remainin g i n th e templ e onl y unti l shortly befor e o r just afte r on e is old enough (twenty ) t o becom e a priest , an d the n leavin g t o resum e th e secula r lif e b y courtin g and startin g a famil y (cf . Moerma n 1966) . Ba n Ping' s templ e has neve r ha d a pries t olde r tha n thirty . Th e wid e distributio n of thi s clerica l career—wit h it s young , an d therefor e powerless , priests—is suggeste d b y th e regiona l rati o o f novice s t o priest s (see Tabl e 18) , an d b y th e ag e distributio n o f "priests " (includ ing novices) a s shown in the census (se e Table 19) . TABLE 18 * CLERGY I N NORT H AN D CENTRA L THAILAND , 196 0

Region

Priests

Novices

Ratio o f Priests t o Novices

Central North Chiengkham

85,955 7,591 183

19,010 20,935 608

5:1 1:3 1:3

* Source: Personal communication , Departmen t o f Religion , Bangkok . TABLE 19 * PERCENTAGE O F "PRIESTS " A T DIFFEREN T AGE S Reg ion Central North Chiengrai Province

Age of "Priests" 13-19 20-29 17 48 71

45 36 20

30+ 39 10 9

* Source: Derive d fro m Thailand Population Census I960, Changwad Series, tables of marital status. Census definition o f "priests" includes novices.

Ban Ping' s encouragin g reactio n t o th e threatene d invasio n required an d receive d effectiv e secula r leadership . Sinc e I kne w the villager s well , I migh t hav e bee n abl e t o predic t tha t me n like K and M, an d S, N, Kk, an d Ss, would mak e effectiv e leaders . But predictions , lik e communit y demarcations , whic h requir e a year o f intensiv e field wor k t o b e accurat e fo r a singl e villag e have n o large-scal e practica l value . Is ther e no t som e mor e gen [ 42 1 ]

THAILAND : MICHAE L MOERMA N

eral procedur e whic h woul d permi t u s t o locat e effectiv e leader s with approximat e accuracy ? The effectiv e emergenc y leader s o f Ba n Pin g wer e forme r headmen, ex-policemen , traders , forme r teachers , an d i n th e cru cial instanc e o f K, arm y veterans . Suc h me n ar e al l acquainte d with th e worl d outsid e th e village . Veterans , especially , hav e learned t o tak e an d t o giv e command s an d hav e experience d one o f th e mos t moder n an d modernizin g institution s availabl e to rural Thais. 11 It i s such men who m th e headma n ha s appointe d to th e "developmen t committee " tha t i s suppose d t o improv e the village . I t i s suc h me n wh o i n thei r agricultura l an d com mercial practices , a s i n th e ambition s the y hav e fo r thei r chil dren's education , ar e mos t receptiv e t o innovation . Perhap s th e most importan t characteristi c o f thes e person s i s tha t despit e the stimulu s an d trainin g the y hav e receive d i n town s an d camp s and cities , the y hav e returne d t o Ba n Pin g an d ar e ful l member s of th e villag e community . Thes e me n hav e gained , an d use , knowledge fro m thei r extra-villag e experiences . The y ar e ofte n influenced b y th e expectation s an d judgment s whic h the y thin k that townsme n an d official s make , ye t thin k o f themselves , an d have chose n t o live , a s villagers. 12 From th e above , i t i s reasonable t o conclud e tha t former headmen, ex-civil servants, and especially veterans are worth training. How, an d i n wha t shoul d the y b e trained ? I sugges t tha t any thing w e wan t th e villager s t o kno w an d d o ca n b e taugh t an d done throug h suc h men . Much o f th e effort , an d money , an d hop e investe d i n develop ing nationa l loyalt y i n Tha i village s goe s int o program s whic h consist i n par t o f increasin g th e contac t betwee n peasan t an d official b y bringin g official s int o villages . I n North , Northeast , and Centra l Thailand , I hav e witnesse d an d closel y observe d very man y confrontation s betwee n villager s an d officials . Thes e observations, admittedl y casua l an d imprecise , lea d m e t o fee l that wit h th e genera l exception s o f schoolteacher s an d o f high 11

It shoul d als o b e note d tha t veteran s kno w ho w t o tak e order s an d ho w t o use arms , trainin g whic h I presum e i s no t ignore d b y subversives . Wer e I tryin g to subver t villages , I woul d concentrat e o n veterans , underemployed , aggressiv e young men , an d nakleng ("ruffians") . 12 In mor e technica l terms , thei r extra-villag e experience s an d trainin g hav e changed thei r referenc e group s but no t their identificatio n group .

[ 42 2 ]

THAI-LU E O F NORTHER N THAILAN D

ranking official s wh o mee t villager s infrequently , an d wit h th e special exceptio n o f som e extraordinar y individuals , official s rarely sho w understanding , knowledge , o r interes t i n th e villager's poin t o f view . Althoug h I hop e tha t m y observation s are unrepresentativ e an d m y analysi s false , i t i s presentl y m y conviction tha t th e way s i n whic h official s typicall y compor t themselves i n village s an d th e action s whic h the y ofte n deman d (unrequited feasting , road-widening , house-moving , toile t construction) ofte n hav e th e consequenc e o f increasin g th e re sentment an d hostilit y whic h villager s fee l towar d them . In al l agraria n countries , village r an d officia l hav e lon g live d in differen t worlds , s o tha t eac h ha s a somewha t distorte d vie w of th e other . Tha i leader s ar e awar e o f thi s an d ar e commite d to doin g somethin g abou t it . I n orde r t o increas e th e unit y an d mutual understandin g o f peasan t an d official , I sugges t tha t pro grams whic h injec t civi l servant s int o village s b e complemente d by program s whic h remov e villager s fo r training . Th e Mexica n government, especiall y i n Chiapas , ha s ha d ric h experienc e an d some succes s a t trainin g promisin g villager s wh o the n retur n t o their communitie s t o teac h an d encourag e literacy , sanitation , agricultural improvement . Th e program s o f th e Institut o Nacional Indigenist a shoul d b e examine d i n orde r t o discove r whether the y coul d profitabl y b e modifie d fo r Tha i conditions . I woul d thin k i t quit e desirabl e t o trai n selecte d norther n mi nority Tha i villager s i n th e rudiment s o f villag e sanitation , first aid, midwifery , pes t control , hom e crafts , poultry-breeding , etc . The traine d villager s the n coul d teac h an d lea d thei r fellows . Such knowledge i s better taught , an d it s relevance t o rural condi tions occasionall y bette r understoo d (cf . Moerma n 1964:36-37 ) by villager s tha n b y officials . Th e grea t dange r o f suc h trainin g is tha t thos e wh o receiv e i t ma y b e unwillin g t o retur n t o thei r villages. This dange r woul d be minimize d b y offerin g th e trainin g to those , lik e veteran s an d forme r civi l servants , wh o have read y show n tha t the y find villag e life mor e rewardin g tha n its alternatives . I t woul d b e furthe r minimized , an d othe r advantages derived , b y encouragin g thos e who have bee n traine d to mak e reasonabl e charge s fo r th e (medical , veterinary , etc. ) services the y perfor m fo r thei r neighbors . Moreover , instructio n conducted an d exemplifie d b y fello w villager s migh t wel l encour [ 42 3 ]

THAILAND : MICHAE

L MOEBMA

N

age the creativity an d self-reliance whic h developmen t program s directed by socially distant officials preclude. REFERENCES CITE D BLOFELD, J .

1960 Peopl e o f th e sun : encounter s i n Siam . London , Hutchinson. CURTIS, L . J .

1903 Th e Lao s o f Nort h Siam . Philadelphia , Th e Westminste r Press. EMBREE, J . F .

1950 Thailand : a loosel y structure d socia l system . America n Anthropologist 52:181-193 . GRAHAM, W . A .

1924 Siam . Tw o vols.: Vol . II. London, Alexande r Moring , Ltd., The D e La Mor e Press . KlNGSHTLL , K .

1960 K u Daeng—th e Re d Tomb : a villag e stud y i n Norther n Thailand. Chiengma i (Thailand) , Princ e Royal' s College . MCGILVARY, D .

1912 A

hal f centur y amon g th e Siames e an d th e Lao . Ne w York, Flemin g H . Revel l Company .

MOERMAN, M .

1961 A

Norther n Tha i village . Bangkok , USIS . Southeas t Asi a Survey, Regiona l Researc h Repor t 8 . 1964 Wester n cultur e an d th e Thai wa y of life . Asia , 1:31-50 . 1965 Ethni c identificatio n i n a comple x civilization : wh o ar e the Lue ? America n Anthropologis t 67(5):1215-1230 . 1966 Ban g Ping' s temple : th e cente r o f a "loosel y structured " society. In Anthropologica l Studie s i n Theravad a Bud dhism. Ne w Haven , Yal e University , Southeas t Asi a Studies. Cultura l Repor t Serie s 13 , pp . 137-174 . SHARP, L. , et al.

1953 Siames e rice village : a preliminar y stud y o f Ban g Chan , 1948-1949. Bangkok , Cornel l Researc h Center . THAILAND, CENTRA L STATISTICA L O F F I C E

1961 Thailan d populatio n census , 1960 , changwad series . Bang kok, Nationa l Economi c Developmen t Board , Centra l Sta tistical office . THAILAND, D E P A R T M E N T O F PUBLI C W E L F A R E

1962 Repor t o n th e socio-economi c surve y o f th e hil l tribe s in Norther n Thailand . Bangkok , Ministr y o f th e Interior , Department o f Publi c Welfare . YOUNG, G .

1962 Th e hil l tribe s o f Norther n Thailand . Bangkok , Th e Sia m Society, Monograp h 1 , 2d edn.

[ 42 4 ]

CHAPTE R 1 2

The Thai Mobile Development Unit Program LEE W . HUF F

INTRODUCTION

The principa l Tha i governmen t effor t devote d t o developmen t of th e country' s generall y remot e area s i s calle d th e Mobil e De velopment Unit , o r MD U program . "Remote, " a s use d here , re fers t o al l territor y outsid e Bangko k an d th e centra l plain s area . MDU wa s no t specificall y designe d a s a "minority " program , but i t ha s o r wil l affec t man y minorit y groups . Furthermore , in th e sens e tha t fo r decade s Bangko k ha s bee n Thailand— a reference t o th e centralizatio n o f authority , wealth , religion , an d culture i n th e capita l cit y an d th e relativ e isolatio n an d neglec t of th e province s (changwad) —one i s no t remis s i n considerin g all th e resident s o f outlyin g area s a s minoritie s o f a sort . Background. Th e Roya l Tha i Governmen t (RTG ) gav e birt h to th e mobile developmen t concep t i n 1962 . The obviou s politica l and militar y instabilitie s o f it s neighbor s i n Southeas t Asia , ofte n Communist-inspired, le d t o a littl e stock-takin g withi n Thailand . The widesprea d us e an d succes s o f insurgenc y suggeste d tha t the sam e techniqu e migh t b e applie d there , an d a n assessmen t of thi s dange r wa s made . I t wa s conclude d tha t i n th e remot e sections o f th e countr y ther e wer e condition s whic h coul d con ceivably b e exploite d b y skille d insurgents , unles s corrected : The establishmen t o f Mobil e Developmen t Unit s i s th e resul t o f the initiatio n o f Hi s Excellenc y th e Prim e Ministe r afte r seein g th e impoverished livin g condition s o f th e peopl e i n variou s rura l places . They liv e thei r live s now i n th e sam e wa y a s tha t o f thei r forefathers . They ar e needy , lac k education , prope r house s an d hav e no t enoug h food no r clothing . Whe n the y ar e sic k ther e i s n o docto r t o atten d them. I t i s necessar y t o hel p thes e sorrowfu l peopl e immediatel y s o that they may be moderately happier (sic) . (Anon . 1963A^O) 1 'Mobile Development i s a n officia l publicatio n o f th e Nationa l Securit y Com mand, Ministr y o f Defense , Bangkok , Thailand . It s purpose is to keep the public informed o f ti e varie d activitie s o f th e Mobil e Developmen t Uni t Program .

[425]

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The RT G ver y wisel y sa w th e proble m i n term s o f preventin g the growt h o f condition s conduciv e t o insurgency ; henc e th e action respons e ha s bee n frame d largel y i n term s o f preventio n rather tha n suppression . There wer e severa l nation-wid e developmen t program s alread y in existenc e a t th e tim e MD U wa s started . A s a rule , however , they functione d mor e o r les s independently , an d the y wer e no t strongly i n evidenc e i n th e remotes t areas . I t make s sense , o f course, to plan an d bas e development effort s i n areas with reason able concentration s o f population , loca l resources , etc . Bu t looked a t i n a securit y context , thes e perfectl y sensibl e pro grams ar e likel y t o reac h las t th e area s tha t nee d the m most . MDU wa s t o fil l thi s ga p and , hopefully , for m a bridg e betwee n the presen t an d a future whe n mor e conventiona l program s coul d take thei r place . Its primar y rational e was t o extend a meaningfu l government presenc e t o th e remot e areas , ofte n fo r th e firs t time . Thus MD U i s a developmen t progra m motivate d b y th e RTG' s concern fo r a potentia l securit y problem . American s cal l i t pre ventive counter-insurgency . Clearly , i t doe s no t involv e combat , and i t goe s wel l beyon d normall y understoo d version s o f short term militar y civi c action . Th e RT G simpl y discerne d th e clos e connection betwee n underdevelopmen t an d nationa l securit y an d defined th e wor k o f helpin g th e peopl e t o develo p themselve s as "one face t o f th e nationa l securit y problem " (ibid. :11). The Tha i judgmen t t o g o t o th e remot e areas , well i n advanc e of formulatin g detaile d plan s fo r large-scal e economi c develop ment an d wit h n o plan s fo r a dramati c socia l revolution , show s an understandin g o f th e pas t insurgenc y experienc e i n nearb y Malaya an d th e Philippines : What wa s successfull y accomplishe d i n bot h countrie s an d contribute d perhaps mor e to th e contro l o f insurgenc y wa s th e reestablishmen t of th e authorit y o f th e government . Thi s wa s achieve d b y implement ing fir m policie s an d als o b y reawakenin g th e people' s confidenc e and hop e throug h convincin g evidenc e tha t th e Governmen t di d car e about their welfare . (Pauke r 1962:12 )

This fram e o f referenc e catche s th e spiri t o f MDU . "Development" i n Thailand , whethe r economic , social , o r po litical, contain s a n elemen t o f paradox. Th e countr y i s in no sens e impoverished. B y an d large , ther e i s enoug h foo d t o eat . Mos t [ 42 6 ]

THA I MOBIL E DEVELOPMEN T UNI T PROGRA M

farmers ow n thei r land , an d ther e ha s bee n n o shortag e o f it . The climat e i s mild , thereb y minimizin g requirement s fo r shelte r and clothing . Althoug h minoritie s exist , relativel y speaking , th e population i s considered ethnicall y homogeneous. Languag e diffi culties ar e minimal . Perhap s 9 0 percen t o f th e peopl e ar e Bud dhist, an d thi s grou p appear s t o be generall y free o f factionalism . Toleration o f religiou s minorities , particularl y Moslem s an d Christians, i s remarkabl y "pure. " Mos t cit y peopl e ca n find a job, and , a t th e worst , underemploymen t o r seasona l unemploy ment ma y occur . Violenc e i s regarde d unfavorabl y a s a mean s of settlin g disputes . A youn g an d belove d roya l famil y serve s a s a rea l symbo l o f nationa l unity . Historically , governments , what ever thei r form , hav e bee n paternalistic . O f singula r significance , Thailand's succes s i n avoidin g colonia l conques t ha s protecte d the natio n agains t th e psychologica l scar s which hav e s o preoccu pied th e res t o f Asi a sinc e 1945 . The Tha i hav e bee n a self-gov erning natio n fo r a s lon g a s the y ca n remember , withou t inter ruption. Th e econom y ha s neve r bee n seriousl y strained . Many Tha i peopl e ar e awar e o f thi s abundanc e an d ar e grate ful fo r it . I t ha s bee n succinctl y summarize d b y on e o f them : Peoples o f othe r countrie s di e o f famine . W e Thai s di e o f overeating . Even thoug h mos t o f u s d o no t g o abou t i n motorcars , nearl y al l have, a t least , a loin-clot h t o wea r aroun d ou r middle . Sinc e w e ar e high i n ou r standar d o f contentment , livin g an d eatin g simpl y a s our forefather s i n th e past , mos t o f u s conside r thi s countr y goo d enough for continued existence . (Sen i Pramoj 1965 )

Why, then , b e concerne d abou t potentia l insurgency ? An d ho w does on e resolv e th e abov e contradictor y statement s abou t pov erty an d wealth ? In poin t o f fact , bot h ar e correct , th e secon d a s a genera l con clusion, th e first whe n applie d t o particula r area s o f th e country , especially i n th e Northeast . Al l advantage s ar e relative , an d within Thailan d the y ar e unevenl y spread . Th e deficiencie s which d o occu r ar e foun d i n th e mos t inaccessibl e part s o f th e kingdom, fa r fro m Bangkok . I n vie w o f th e eas e wit h whic h Thailand's strength s ca n be viewed from th e perspectiv e o f Bang kok's char m an d affluence , th e Tha i governmen t ha s bee n unusu ally perceptive i n recognizing an d assessin g realistically th e prob lem areas which do exist. [427 ]

THAILAND : LE E W . HUF F

Several "remot e areas " fai l t o shar e full y i n th e nationa l en dowment. I n th e mountainou s Nort h th e majo r problem s ar e geographic an d ethnic , an d ar e discussed i n detail in other paper s in thi s volume . I n th e Sout h problem s sometime s recu r wit h re spect t o the remnants o f th e Malaya n Communis t Terroris t move ment, wh o hid e ou t i n jungle s o n bot h side s o f th e Thai-Malay sian border ; a n Islami c minorit y i s concentrate d i n a fe w o f th e southern provinces , an d ther e ar e occasiona l Mala y separatis t groups. I n th e sparsel y populate d wester n province s robbe r bands flourish. Bu t i t is the Northeas t whic h present s th e greates t worry. The Environment. Northeas t Thailan d i s a high, semi-ari d pla teau are a coverin g fiftee n provinces , o r abou t one-thir d o f th e total lan d are a o f th e country . Accordin g t o th e 196 0 census , its populatio n wa s almos t nin e millio n (se e Tabl e 20) . Wit h a growth rat e o f abou t 3 percent annually , th e figure mus t be abou t ten millio n i n 1965 . I t i s th e poores t regio n i n Thailand . Th e land i s no t good , largel y du e t o th e presenc e o f sand y an d lat eritic soil s an d poo r drainage ; nevertheless , 9 5 percen t o f th e heads o f villag e familie s reportedl y ow n thei r ow n land , an d TABLE 2 0 POPULATION O F TH E NORTHEAST * Province

Population

Buriram Chayaphum Kalasin Khon-Kaen Loei Mahasarakham Nakhornphanom Nakornratchsima (Korat ) Nongkhai Roi-et Sakonnakhorn Srisaket Surin Ubonratch-thani (Ubon ) Udornthani (Udorn ) Total

583,585 486,472 426,795 844,075 210,535 499,373 436,482 1,094,774 256,530 668,193 426,755 601,356 581,732 1,130,712 744,174 8,991,543

* Source: Thailand Population Census, 1960.

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in man y area s soil s ar e "poor " onl y i n th e sens e tha t the y ar e used improperl y to grow ric e whe n the y ar e bette r suite d to other crop s (Bangkok World, Octobe r 28,1964) . Diet s are unbalanced, an d undernutritio n i s widespread . Th e principa l cro p an d staple foodstuf f i s glutinou s rice ; i n fact , abou t 7 5 percen t o f the ric e consume d i n Northeas t village s i s o f thi s "sticky " variet y (ibid.). Th e are a i s subjec t t o flooding i n th e four - o r five-month rainy season , althoug h mea n averag e rainfal l i s les s tha n i n th e south an d centra l plains . Daytim e temperature s ar e especiall y hot. Wate r i s i n shor t suppl y muc h o f th e res t o f th e yea r du e to a combinatio n o f geologic , climatic , an d huma n factors , e.g . rapid runoff , hig h evapo-transpiration , an d inadequat e catchmen t facilities. Groun d wate r i s ofte n brackish , an d soil s ar e s o salin e in som e place s tha t villager s readil y produc e sal t b y runnin g water throug h handful s o f dir t an d boilin g th e runoff . Villager s may hav e to wal k fou r kilometer s t o find drinkin g wate r a t th e peak o f th e dr y season . I t ha s bee n estimate d tha t onl y abou t 4,000 o f 14,00 0 village s i n th e are a hav e a n adequat e wate r supply.2 Underemployment tend s t o b e high , bu t fe w farmer s ar e i n debt. Th e averag e monthl y cas h incom e o f a Northeas t villag e family i s 24 9 bah t (U.S . $12.45) . Averag e annua l incom e pe r capita throughou t th e region i s 910 baht ($45.50) , with th e figure being 2,50 3 bah t i n town s an d 89 1 bah t i n villages . Th e tow n figure i s comparabl e t o tha t foun d i n othe r town s i n th e country , except i n Bangkok , bu t i t ha s bee n estimate d tha t Northeas t village income s ar e onl y abou t 6 5 percent o f thos e i n othe r Tha i villages (se e Thailan d 1964 ; Lon g 1964:8 ; Bangkok World, Oc tober 28 , 1964) . MD U ofte n operate s i n th e poores t o f those , for instance , i n Ba n F a Huan , Changwa t Ubol , wher e cas h in come pe r famil y i s estimate d a t onl y 200 baht ($10.00 ) annually . Education ha s als o lagged i n the Northeast . Mos t villages hav e to shar e a poorly-equippe d school ; an d goo d teacher s ar e no t attracted b y auster e villag e living . A s o f 1962 , 9 5 percen t o f the head s o f villag e familie s i n th e Northeas t ha d ha d les s tha n four year s of education o r none at all. Traditionally, relation s betwee n farmer s an d official s hav e bee n 'Figures attribute d t o Mr . Bunchan a Arthakorn , Deput y Ministe r o f Nationa l Development, Bangkok World, June 29 , 1963.

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indifferent o r worse , i n larg e par t becaus e me n sen t t o post s in th e province s hav e characteristicall y take n th e assignmen t a s a mar k o f failure . Career s wer e mad e i n th e capital , no t i n th e hinterland, reflectin g th e ol d traditio n tha t "th e onl y advantag e an officia l sa w i n a distan t pos t wa s th e greate r freedo m i t gav e to us e a n officia l positio n t o gai n wealt h b y dubiou s mean s o r perhaps, i f th e officia l wer e governo r i n a n importan t distan t province, the opportunit y t o glor y in heading a regime that repre sented a miniatur e Bangkok " (Vell a 1955:325) . O n th e othe r hand, official s hav e ha d t o wor k withi n a highly centralize d bu reaucratic system : "Tigh t contro l ove r thei r operation s i s exer cised fro m Bangkok , wit h initiativ e discourage d an d littl e discre tion permitted " (Thoma s 1962:17-18) . Th e furthe r on e i s fro m Bangkok, th e les s responsiv e th e syste m tend s t o be . Ther e ar e also, o r ca n be , seriou s "discontinuities " betwee n th e officia l and th e villager—socially , politically , an d culturally—an d thes e lead t o feeling s amon g villager s o f apartnes s fro m th e govern ment an d it s representative s (fo r excellen t examples , analysis , and summar y se e Moerma n 1961:4-7) . Thes e ar e ofte n exacer bated i n th e remot e areas , an d on e finds th e white-colla r worker s and farmer s livin g i n highl y compartmentalized , separat e loca l worlds. During period s o f parliamentar y government , th e Northeas t was frequently represente d b y parties an d group s give n generall y to opposin g th e governmen t i n power , formulatin g "leftist " pro grams, demandin g alleviatio n o f regiona l economi c distress , an d supporting a neutralis t foreig n polic y (Wilso n 1961:13 ; 1962:31 , 241). A grou p o f abou t 60,00 0 Nort h Vietnames e refugee s settle d on th e Tha i sid e o f th e Mekon g Rive r afte r fleeing th e Frenc h Indochina Wa r i n th e mid-1950's . They now live together i n larg e groups, mostl y i n o r nea r towns . The y hav e no t bee n assimilate d into Tha i society , an d thei r allegianc e t o H o Ch i Minh , wh o they rever e an d remembe r a s a grea t nationalis t figure , i s caus e for concern. 3 Periodi c repatriation s t o Nort h Vietna m ar e arranged unde r Re d Cros s auspices , bu t th e migratio n tend s 3 Ho worke d a s a n organize r i n Thailan d i n th e lat e 1920's . I hav e visite d Ban Non g On , Changwa t Udon , wher e h e allegedl y lived . Severa l ver y ol d Vietnamese familie s ar e stil l ther e today .

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to b e offse t b y th e birthrate . Finally , ther e i s th e troublesom e question o f th e ethni c significance o f th e population o f the North east, whic h ha s tie s wit h peopl e acros s th e rive r i n Laos . O n the basi s o f thi s catalogu e o f considerations , i t becam e obviou s that condition s di d exis t whic h a skille d dissiden t migh t b e abl e to exploi t t o hi s ow n advantage . Accordingly , seve n o f th e firs t nine MD U operation s area s were placed i n Northeast Thailand. 4 The Population. Th e peopl e o f th e Northeas t compris e abou t 30 percen t o f th e populatio n o f th e entir e country . Abou t 9 0 percent o f the m liv e i n village s an d far m t o ear n thei r living . There i s som e confusio n ove r th e prope r ethni c designatio n o r designations fo r them , an d on e ca n cit e evidenc e t o suppor t either homogeneit y o r heterogeneity . I n m y experience , mos t villagers i n th e Northeas t usuall y describ e themselve s an d thei r language i n on e o f thre e ways : Thai Isan (Northeas t Thai) , Thai-Lao, o r Lao. Th e officia l censu s doe s no t distinguis h between the m an d Thai , o r Cambodia n Thai . Anthropologist s usually lum p Tha i an d La o togethe r i n a singl e "Thai " o r "Greater Thai " ethnolinguisti c classification . Seidenfaden ha s sai d tha t th e "Lao s o f th e Mekhon g valley . . . for m th e bul k o f th e populatio n i n th e forme r circle s of Udor n an d Roi-e t i n Northeas t Thailan d an d i n th e forme r circle o f Prachin " (1958:10) , bu t h e furthe r assert s tha t "I t ha s been argue d tha t th e peopl e o f Lao s includin g thos e o f Northeas t Thailand, neve r calle d themselve s anythin g els e tha n Laos . T o this i t ma y b e sai d tha t i n th e census, take n b y th e Kin g o f Lan Chan g (Laos ) i n th e yea r 1376 , the inhabitant s wer e calle d Thai" (ibid: 90) . Anothe r explanatio n o r interpretatio n i s mor e dogmatic: "Th e La o diffe r bu t littl e fro m th e Thai , an d ar e in realit y a s muc h Tha i a s ar e th e Tha i (Siamese) . Th e nam e Lao havin g bee n bestowe d o n the m b y th e Tha i an d ma y b e due t o th e fac t tha t th e La o occupie d lan d formerl y people d by Lawa . Thei r languag e ha s som e dialectica l variation s an d con tains fewe r importe d Sanscri t an d Pal i word s tha n Thai " (Nint h Pacific Scienc e Congres s 1957:26) . Th e recen t HRA F stud y o f ethnic group s i n Southeas t Asi a shed s ver y littl e ligh t o n thi s question, notin g simpl y tha t "th e Siames e a t time s refe r t o th e 4 For a contemporar y Tha i accoun t o f event s leadin g t o establishmen t o f th e MDU progra m se e Theh Chongkhadikij , 1963.

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Tai-speaking glutinous-ric e eater s livin g i n th e plain s an d low land river valley s t o th e nort h an d northeas t o f centra l Thailan d as Lao" (LeBa r et al. 1964:215) . I a m incline d t o agre e wit h th e "conservativ e estimate " b y Keyes tha t abou t seve n an d one-hal f millio n o f th e nin e millio n people i n th e Northeas t ar e Thai-La o an d conside r themselve s as suc h (Keye s 1964A:2) . This i s all the mor e interestin g becaus e there ar e onl y abou t a millio n La o peopl e i n Lao s itsel f (abou t one-half o f th e population ) (ibid.; LeBa r et al. 1964:215) . Th e Thai-Lao o f th e Northeas t ar e distinguishe d mainl y b y thei r dialect, thei r tast e fo r glutinou s rice , an d thei r fol k music , al l of whic h ma y b e les s significan t i n thei r mind s tha n th e genera l differentiation o f themselve s a s "countr y hicks " an d thei r Bang kok an d vicinit y cousin s a s educated , wealthy , "cit y slickers." 5 It i s al l rathe r difficul t t o judge , bu t o n th e basi s o f visit s t o dozens o f village s i n Northeas t Thailand , particularl y throughou t Udorn, Sakonnakhorn , an d Nakho n Panom , i t i s m y impressio n that th e "Lao-ness " displaye d b y villager s tend s t o b e a matte r of famil y feelin g o r kinshi p rathe r tha n an y particular associatio n with government s o r states , i.e. , i t i s somethin g the y tak e fo r granted. I t i s noteworthy, however , tha t the Tha i Isa n (an d mos t other Thai ) i s quick t o conside r a Vietnamese, Chinese , or India n as a n alie n eve n i f h e ha s citizenship ; h e i s no t likel y t o s o classify a visito r fro m Laos . Nevertheless , th e government' s con cern i s with "potential, " an d i t i s a t leas t possibl e tha t thi s ethni c differentiation i n th e Northeas t coul d b e playe d upon , perhap s in combinatio n wit h problem s o f economi c depression , socia l in ertia, and administrativ e laxity . It shoul d b e sai d tha t th e nationa l syste m o f compulsor y four year schooling , i n forc e sinc e 193 2 an d recentl y increase d t o seven years , has begu n t o affect citizen s living outside th e centra l plains area . Moerman , fo r instance , reache d a ver y unambiguou s conclusion while living in a Northern Thai village: 5 In thi s connectio n I hav e bee n struc k b y Professo r Amyot' s accoun t o f th e relationship betwee n a smal l marke t tow n i n Srisake t Provinc e an d th e eve n smaller village s aroun d it . H e sa y ther e i s a stric t "tow n an d countr y difference " between th e tow n an d it s satellites : "It s peopl e easil y tak e superio r attitude s and pok e fu n a t th e countr y yokels . The peasant s . . . ar e ill-at-eas e wit h the m and b y preferenc e see k ou t peopl e o f thei r ow n conditio n . . . elsewhere " (Amyot 1964:4) .

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It i s ou r stron g impressio n tha t i n area s . . . wher e official s ar e es tranged, th e draf t widel y scattered , officia l radi o broadcast s largel y irrelevant t o villag e life , an d governmen t service s almos t non-existent , the loca l elementar y schoo l i s overwhelmingl y th e mai n sourc e o f national consciousnes s an d loyalty . Lesson s i n th e nationa l language , in Tha i history , religion , an d geography—howeve r superficia l an d im perfectly remembered—hav e a profoun d eifec t o n villag e life . . . . It i s on e o f th e foundation s o f nationa l consciousnes s an d thu s o f na tional security . (Moerma n 1961:8 )

Keyes ha s expresse d simila r view s afte r length y persona l ob servation o f Northeas t villages (Keye s 1964A:3) . MDU team s occasionall y encounte r anothe r typ e o f ethni c o r religious minorit y proble m i n th e Northeast , o n a muc h smalle r scale. Thes e ar e ver y widel y scattere d village s compose d o f peo ple wh o tak e prid e i n distinguishin g themselve s fro m bot h thei r Thai an d La o neighbors . Fo r instance , I hav e bee n i n So , Kha , Phu Thai , an d Catholi c villages . On e see s fe w significan t identi fying physica l characteristic s i n people , dress , agriculture , o r buildings, but language an d custom may differ . Perhaps th e greates t proble m i n th e Northeas t i s th e possibl e disastrous consequence s o f rapi d populatio n growth , a seriou s shortage o f land , inefficien t lan d use , an d fallin g income s throughout th e region . A s the Worl d Ban k Repor t note d i n 1963: "Considering th e North-Eas t a s a whole , populatio n pressur e has no t ye t becom e a n acut e problem, but th e decreasin g fertilit y of th e lan d i n combinatio n wit h a rapi d increas e i n populatio n could caus e th e North-Eas t t o becom e a trul y depresse d are a within a decade" 8 (Plateniu s 1963:2) . THE MD U CONCEP T

The exac t source s o f th e MD U concep t ar e difficul t t o pi n down. Som e believ e tha t i t gre w ou t o f discussion s amon g stu dents a t th e Tha i Nationa l Defens e College , a n institutio n anala gous to th e American Nationa l Wa r College . Certain mobil e tea m activities ar e clos e relative s o f thos e performe d first b y th e Mo bile Informatio n Team s (MIT ) organize d b y th e Ministr y o f Interior an d pu t i n th e field i n Februar y 196 2 wit h th e advic e and assistanc e o f th e Unite d State s Informatio n Service . Tha i 8 Platenius wa s adviso r t o the Committe e o n the Development o f th e Northeast and represented th e World Bank Advisory Group. See also Long (1964:25-28) .

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military ofiBcer s an d thei r America n colleague s a t th e Join t United State s Militar y Assistanc e Advisor y Grou p (JUSMAAG ) also discusse d th e insurgenc y issu e an d th e problem s involve d i n planning t o meet it . I t i s probably fai r t o say tha t al l thes e factor s had som e influenc e o n th e formulatio n o f th e progra m an d or ganization whic h wer e subsequentl y created . I n essence , how ever, th e MD U progra m ha s bee n Tha i created , Tha i initiated , and Tha i operated. 7 Although program , no t organization , i s th e focu s o f thi s paper , one organizationa l decisio n merit s brie f attention . I n accordanc e with th e above-mentione d linkag e o f underdevelopmen t wit h in surgency an d developmen t wit h counter-insurgency , th e RT G decided t o integrat e civil , police , an d militar y resource s withi n a singl e comman d structure . I n thi s fashio n eac h contributio n would b e mad e i n coordinatio n wit h th e others , an d th e disad vantages o f separat e program s wit h particula r veste d bureau cratic interest s an d goal s woul d b e minimized . Thi s directin g authority wa s establishe d i n a Nationa l Securit y Centra l Com mand b y cabine t decisio n o n Apri l 10 , 196 2 (Anon . 1963B:12) . The ne w comman d ha s functione d a s par t o f th e Offic e o f th e Prime Ministe r an d th e Suprem e Command , Ministr y o f Defense . Following polic y guidanc e develope d b y a twenty-one-ma n Policy Committee , compose d primaril y o f th e ministers o f partici pating ministries , thi s centra l offic e ha s authorit y t o develop com prehensive developmen t program s i n th e area s i n whic h MD U operates an d t o cal l upo n civil , police , an d militar y department s for th e materia l an d personne l require d t o d o th e jo b (ibid. :13). In brief , th e proble m i s define d an d analyze d a t a singl e source , a singl e se t o f objective s an d a n actio n progra m ar e formulate d there, an d th e resource s require d fo r executio n ar e acquire d b y it an d applie d throug h it . Th e position s i n th e centra l headquar ters ar e filled primaril y b y militar y officer s fro m th e army , navy , and ai r force . The y provid e th e analytical , planning , an d opera tional skills , but especiall y leadership . Th e civi l ministrie s suppl y technical knowledg e an d experience . ' There i s som e popula r misconceptio n o n thi s point . Pres s account s frequentl y call MD U a n America n assistanc e program , e.g . Methvi n (1964:121-122) . Al though th e Unite d State s ha s purchase d som e expensiv e equipmen t item s fo r MDU an d ha s begu n t o focu s certai n conventiona l developmen t program s i n MDU areas , th e MD U progra m ha s not bee n dependen t o n outsid e advic e and assistance .

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The underlyin g theme s o f th e MD U progra m ar e essentiall y "nation-belonging" an d "nation-building. " Th e governmen t wishes t o tel l th e peopl e i n remot e area s tha t the y ar e value d citizens o f th e country , tha t the y hav e a stak e i n th e nation , and tha t the y ca n assis t i n improvin g th e natio n s o a s t o benefi t it an d themselves . Considerabl e effor t i s expende d t o sho w tha t the governmen t doe s car e abou t th e welfar e o f al l it s peopl e and wishe s t o hel p them ; however , MD U i s very carefu l t o avoi d making promise s whic h i t canno t fulfill . I t als o tries t o emphasiz e the self-hel p concept , i n whic h th e villager s mus t sho w som e evidence of wishing to help themselves . Slogans suc h a s "Tha i help s Tha i t o develo p Thailand, " "Th e people ar e th e hear t o f th e nation, " an d "Everyon e mus t wor k against tim e t o develo p th e Tha i nation " ar e characteristi c o f the MD U messag e t o rura l citizens . Thousand s upo n thousand s of photograph s o f th e Kin g an d Queen , th e Emeral d Buddha , and th e Prim e Ministe r ar e distribute d an d ofte n accompanie d with shor t explanator y talk s t o dramatiz e th e thre e pillar s o f stability i n th e nation—crown , religion , an d government . I t i s not uncommo n fo r MD U team s t o fin d peopl e livin g i n remot e areas wh o d o no t kno w wh o thei r Kin g an d Quee n o r Prim e Minister are. 8 This campaig n t o encourag e "nation-belonging " an d "nation building" appear s t o hav e a grea t dea l o f resemblanc e t o Kin g Wachirawut's effort s t o introduc e th e concep t o f nationalis m int o Thailand a t th e tur n o f thi s century . Vell a ha s writte n tha t al though th e Tha i ha d lon g demonstrate d a sens e o f patriotism , they ha d take n thei r cultura l identit y ver y muc h fo r granted . Wachirawut, worrie d tha t hi s peopl e migh t overindulg e thei r acceptance o f Wester n ideas , exalte d "th e Tha i country , th e Thai nation , th e Tha i people , th e Tha i virtues, " and underscore d the significanc e o f Tha i Buddhis m a s a nationa l asse t (Vell a 1955:352).9 Som e fift y year s later , th e Tha i ar e makin g muc h the sam e appea l t o countryme n wh o ver y likel y misse d th e firs t one. "Nor i s thi s phenomeno n uniqu e t o Thailand . (Cf . Schram m 1964:69-72. ) I t i s revealin g i n thi s contex t tha t Tha i administrator s lis t "nationalistic as on e o f severa l trait s wit h a "distinc t modern , non-traditiona l connotation to whic h the y aspir e bu t ma y no t possess . Th e othe r trait s mentione d i n thi category ar e ambition , efficiency , group-mindedness , an d abilit y t o plan . Se Mosel (1964:4) . 8

" " s e

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The mos t tellin g exampl e o f th e government' s sincerity , how ever, i s th e willingnes s o f official s t o g o int o th e rura l area s an d to behav e i n accordanc e wit h th e message s the y bring . Th e RT G believes tha t i f i t act s i n thi s fashion whil e th e Communist s onl y talk, th e latte r wil l gathe r n o followin g an d indee d wil l b e dis credited. Prim e Ministe r Thano m Kittikachor n state d thi s posi tion clearly , afte r a field inspectio n o f MD U areas , whe n h e re marked tha t Communis t propagand a wa s "onl y a lo t o f tal k with n o actio n t o benefi t th e peopl e s o th e peopl e ca n no w se e the differenc e betwee n th e Communis t tal k an d wha t th e govern ment i s actuall y accomplishing " (Bangkok World, Februar y 18 , 1965). MDU operation s area s ar e selecte d o n th e basi s o f thei r remoteness, th e relativ e absenc e o f long-ter m developmen t programs an d othe r governmen t services , an d a judgmen t con cerning thei r potentia l a s source s o f futur e insurgenc y activity . Extensive survey s o f eac h are a ar e mad e i n advance , an d a cen trally locate d villag e i s picke d t o b e th e sit e o f a field headquar ters. Note that provinc e capitals an d distric t towns are not chosen . This ha s th e effec t o f emphasizin g bot h th e 'people-to-people " character o f th e progra m an d th e fac t tha t i t i s no t intende d to b e a n assistanc e progra m brough t b y on e se t o f official s solel y to benefit another . As o f Ma y 1965 , MD U program s ha d bee n initiate d i n th e following provinces : Kalasin , Sakonnakhorn , Nakhonphanom , Nongkhai, Udornthani , Loei , an d Ubonratch-than i i n th e North east an d YaI a and Nara-thiwa t i n the South . The nex t two MDU' s are schedule d fo r Uttradi t an d Na n i n North Thailand . Siz e varies widely, e.g . fro m th e singl e smal l distric t i n Kalasin , whic h launched a n MD U i n th e summe r o f 1962 , t o a 9,900-square kilometer are a i n Ubo n involvin g abou t 55,00 0 families . Terrai n factors affectin g eas e of movement frequently contro l this decision . In Bangko k personne l fo r eac h ne w MD U field grou p ar e drawn fro m variou s contributin g ministrie s an d place d i n a rigor ous trainin g program . The y ar e briefe d o n th e MD U mission , the specifi c task s t o be performed , an d th e performanc e expecte d from eac h ma n an d th e grou p t o whic h h e belongs . A s a resul t of accumulate d experience , trainin g i n "face-to-face " contac t with villag e peopl e ha s bee n increase d fro m thirt y minute s t o [ 43 6 ]

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abou t te n hours . Ma p exercise s an d field trial s ar e als o hel d i n orde r t o improv e th e efficienc y o f th e grou p an d t o reduc e th e learnin g tim e require d whe n actua l operation s begin . Th e MD U progra m i s divide d int o thre e phases , th e las t tw o o f whic h ar e onl y vaguel y separable . Th e bod y o f thi s pape r i s devote d t o discussion o f them . Phase I: Impact. Th e primar y purpos e o f th e first phas e o f an MD U operatio n i s psychologica l impact . Very littl e "develop ment " i n an y forma l sens e i s achieved . Thre e mobil e team s o f seventee n me n eac h ar e sen t ou t fro m th e headquarter s t o visi t a pre-selecte d numbe r o f villages in th e are a for fort y t o forty-fiv e days. The y sta y i n eac h village fo r on e t o thre e days , sto p briefl y in other s alon g th e way, an d encourag e resident s o f neighborin g villages t o "dro p in " a t thos e place s schedule d fo r a visit. 10 Eac h mobil e tea m i s le d b y a youn g militar y officer , man y of who m hav e bee n traine d i n America n militar y schools . Hi s deput y i s frequentl y th e deput y distric t office r o r loca l educatio n officer. A docto r i s provide d b y th e Ministr y o f Publi c Health , an d h e i s assiste d b y th e loca l Publi c Healt h Office r i f ther e is one . Ther e ar e representative s fro m th e Departmen t of Publi c Welfare an d th e Ministr y o f Cooperatives . Publi c Relation s De partmen t personne l operat e audiovisua l equipment . Servic e me n are use d a s drivers , mechanics , cooks , an d communication s specialists. 11 All tea m member s ar e dresse d i n civilian clothes , an d n o weap ons ar e carried ; indeed , man y o f th e team s bu y cap s o r shirt s distinctiv e fo r th e area s the y wor k i n an d wea r the m proudl y as a tea m badg e o f membership . A typica l tea m travel s i n a small carava n o f abou t fou r vehicles , on e o f whic h i s equippe d as a soun d truck . The y ar e a s self-sufficien t a s possible , includ ing providin g thei r ow n beddin g an d foo d supplies , s o a s to minimiz e demand s o n th e village . Eve n "gifts " ar e turne d down becaus e i t i s know n tha t thi s traditiona l form o f appeasin g " F o r a detaile d accoun t of a typica l Phase- I MD U operatio n see Huf f (1963) . I t i s importan t to not e tha t th e mobil e team s ar e compose d o f Tha i member s only. The y ar e no t accompanie d by foreig n advisor y personnel . Methvin' s remar k (1964:121) tha t MD U group s "ar e staffe d b y personne l fro m severa l Tha i an d U.S . governmen t branches " i s completel y incorrect . Individua l American s hav e been permitte d t o accompan y mobil e team s fo r brie f period s a s observers , bu t only o n a n occasiona l basis . u

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visiting dignitarie s i s accomplishe d a t th e villagers ' expense . Some foo d ma y b e purchase d locall y i f surplu s item s ar e avail able. Villag e youngster s ar e aske d t o dra w wate r fo r th e team , but th e wate r i s carefull y ratione d b y th e tea m leade r i f th e village supply is low (an d ofte n i t is). The team' s cam p i s mad e a s publi c a s possibl e s o tha t th e villagers wil l com e t o i t t o watc h an d talk . Par t o f th e team' s mission i s t o tal k abou t th e importanc e o f publi c healt h an d sanitation, an d th e villager s ar e give n plent y o f opportunit y t o observe tea m member s eatin g well-cooke d food , takin g bath s with soa p an d water , Tha i style , i n open-ai r surroundings , an d using crud e temporar y latrines . Th e purpos e o f thes e demonstra tions i s no t t o transfor m Tha i rura l village s int o spotles s mode l towns, bu t merel y t o inspir e th e peopl e t o remov e th e wors t excesses whic h contribut e t o th e incredibl e variet y an d amoun t of enteri c diseas e whic h bese t peopl e o f al l ages . On e sampl e of five hundre d schoolchildren , fo r example , wa s foun d t o b e completely infeste d wit h stomac h parasites , an d 9 0 percen t o f them ha d tw o o r mor e varieties . The tea m docto r i s extremel y popular . H e ma y trea t 150-20 0 patients pe r day . Seriou s illnesse s ar e no t common , bu t enteri c diseases, malaria-induce d diseases , an d vitami n deficiencie s ar e found everywhere . Interestingly , kidne y stone s ar e quit e evident , perhaps du e t o th e hig h minera l conten t o f th e water , an d re spiratory ailment s ar e abundant . Som e MD U team s hav e als o undertaken specia l vaccinatio n campaign s t o thwar t epidemics . It shoul d b e note d tha t villager s i n th e Northeas t ar e no t afrai d of th e docto r o r hi s medicine . Pills , an d especiall y injections , are rea l statu s symbols—everybod y want s one . Thi s doe s no t necessarily reduc e th e influenc e o f loca l her b doctors , becaus e people ar e incline d t o fee l tha t th e ne w an d th e ol d medicin e each ha s it s place an d ca n be expecte d t o be worthwhile in differ ent situations. 12 Mobil e team s tha t encounte r extremel y seriou s 12

Keyes (1964 B :8-9) ha s define d th e variou s kind s o f loca l "doctor " wh o have th e abilit y t o preven t o r cur e sicknes s o r war d of f evi l influences : h e may b e a practitione r o f traditiona l medicine , traine d i n givin g shots , an exorcise r and appease r o f spirits , a mediu m wh o ca n communicat e wit h discontente d ancestor spirits , o r "h e ca n hav e th e powe r t o destro y spirit s whic h posses s a n individual an d eat ' his soul." See also Lux (1962:38 , 51),

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cases o f illnes s tr y t o arrang e evacuatio n o f patient s b y lan d vehicle or helicopter t o a provincial hospital. The publi c welfar e officia l ask s th e headma n o r schoolteache r to dra w u p a lis t o f need y families . Th e lis t i s the n verifie d b y the team , usin g suc h technique s a s lookin g a t th e ric e i n th e prospective recipient' s storag e buildin g an d countin g hi s buffalo . This i s don e t o insur e tha t villag e official s d o no t pac k th e lis t with friends , relatives , an d creditors , an d i t i n tur n underscore s the sincerit y o f th e government' s " people-to-people " message . Welfare assistanc e take s th e for m o f clothin g fo r school-ag e children—shorts an d shirt s fo r th e boys , skirt s an d blouse s fo r the girls—an d T-shirt s an d blanket s fo r ol d folks . Thes e ar e usu ally presente d a t larg e outdoo r assemblies , wit h adult s invited , where a publi c addres s syste m i s se t up , name s ar e called , pre sentations ar e made , an d senio r tea m member s giv e shor t talk s on publi c health , education , cooperatives , an d othe r genera l themes associate d wit h th e MD U mission . Westerner s sometime s feel tha t thes e assemblie s caus e embarrassmen t t o th e ai d recipi ents, wh o allegedl y d o no t lik e t o parad e befor e thei r peers , and caus e resentmen t amon g thos e wh o receiv e nothing . M y own opinion , afte r observin g thes e ceremonie s i n countles s vil lages, i s tha t th e recipient s ar e please d an d mos t o f th e res t are delighte d tha t somebod y go t something . Nearl y al l th e schoolchildren receiv e a pencil , eraser , piec e o f candy , o r othe r token gift . Occasionall y ver y ol d peopl e ar e sen t t o a nationa l home fo r th e aged ; blin d boy s ar e offere d a chanc e t o atten d a specia l school ; o r a new house is provided t o old people withou t families wh o are existing on village charity alone . Evenings ar e devote d t o a lon g progra m o f movie s an d shorts . At leas t onc e betwee n reel s th e tea m leade r give s a tal k an d repeats th e genera l purpos e o f th e MD U operation . Thi s proce dure i s use d partl y becaus e o f th e knowledg e tha t repetitio n of theme s help s peopl e remembe r an d partl y becaus e th e villag e in questio n i s jam-packe d wit h ne w peopl e wh o hav e walke d or arrive d b y ox-car t fro m othe r location s t o tak e par t i n th e occasion. Fo r mos t o f th e village s affected , th e MD U movie s are th e first (som e hav e bee n visite d b y smal l dru g truck s show ing movie s abou t thei r paten t medicin e cure-alls) . Th e film s [ 43 9 ]

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range fro m newsreel-typ e coverag e o f th e roya l family' s periodi c visits around th e countr y t o shorts abou t Buddhis m an d Bangkok , Thai railways , an d considerabl y edite d "full-length " epic s abou t the America n Wes t an d Tarzan . Th e us e o f local-dialec t soun d tracks maximize s audienc e comprehension , bu t entertainmen t value i s high regardles s o f language , at least the first time around . To achiev e rea l substantiv e effect , however , movie s shoul d b e in th e loca l dialect , attune d t o th e educationa l leve l o f th e audi ence, ampl y illustrate d wit h shot s o f thing s familia r t o th e vil lager, ver y simpl e i n photographi c technique , an d reasonabl y sensitive to th e cultura l fram e o f referenc e o f th e audienc e (fo r more detailed discussio n see Huff 1964:46-51 ; Moerman 1961 : Appendix). I t i s eas y t o excit e an d visibl y impres s th e villag e audi ence, bu t muc h mor e difficul t t o determin e exactl y wha t inter pretation the y put o n what the y see. Team leader s als o see k ou t th e bes t musician s an d singer s i n the villag e an d invit e the m t o perfor m ove r th e publi c addres s system befor e th e home-tow n audience . Invariabl y thi s i s an out standing "crow d pleaser. " I recal l bein g presen t durin g a friendly, impromptu , bu t rea l competitio n betwee n tw o villag e headmen wh o excelle d i n singin g moh lam, th e loca l fol k music . The larg e audienc e wa s thrille d wit h th e due l an d wa s mor e than jus t a littl e please d wit h th e interes t th e tea m too k i n th e proceedings. The us e o f loca l musi c ha s bee n develope d i n thre e ways . The firs t i s achieve d b y makin g tap e recording s "o n th e scene " and replayin g the m ove r th e soun d system . Som e mobil e tea m leaders hav e thi s musi c playin g a t thei r headquarter s muc h o f the day . A secon d metho d i s to use professional moh lam troupe s to giv e performances. Thi s involve s a sort of sun g narrative abou t events i n th e histor y o f th e village , th e immediatel y surroundin g area, an d th e region . Som e o f th e song s resembl e historica l epi c stories, bu t man y involv e recen t happenings , an d a hig h pre mium i s place d o n th e performe r wh o i s abl e t o innovat e an d cleverly a d li b o n th e spot . Jokes , ofte n a fe w shade s of f color , are wove n int o th e stor y t o provid e comi c relief, an d i n th e cas e of moh lam group s accompanyin g MD U teams , appropriat e MDU theme s ar e included . Th e thir d us e of th e music, not necessarily relate d t o MD U specifically , i s o n radi o program s beame d [ 44 0 ]

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into th e region . Radio s ar e n o longe r a luxury , thank s t o th e advent o f th e transistor . Approximatel y 5 percen t o f th e familie s in Northeas t village s ow n one , an d growt h i n sale s i n recen t years ha s been phenomenal . I n a study of fort y village s I directe d in a relativel y remot e sectio n o f Udor n Province , villager s ha d about seve n hundre d transisto r radio s o f varie d siz e an d make . Shortwave i s received fro m al l ove r th e world , bu t eve n o n regu lar broadcas t band s i t i s possibl e t o pic k u p a variet y o f Tha i stations an d broadcast s fro m Laos , China , Burma , Cambodia , and th e Phillippines . Moh lam i s th e overwhelmin g progra m fa vorite wit h villagers . Th e governmen t radi o statio n a t Kho n Kae n is especiall y popula r becaus e i t cater s t o it s audienc e accordingly.13 I n short , thi s simpl e demonstratio n o f sensitivit y to loca l cultur e appear s t o hav e grea t appea l t o peopl e o f al l ages in the Northeast. 14 MDU doe s no t mak e a n issu e o f "Communism " o r subversio n unless villager s hav e bee n expose d t o propagand a o r hav e ques tions. The n the y discus s i t frankly ; i n particula r the y mov e quickly t o expos e an d discredi t th e usuall y inep t broadcast s o f the clandestin e "Voic e o f th e Tha i People " radio whic h occasion ally ar e directe d agains t a specifi c MDU . Fo r instance , th e radi o reported tha t MD U personne l i n Ubo n wer e indoctrinatin g th e children wit h imperialis t idea s an d givin g the m poisone d candy . The MD U commande r calle d th e youngster s an d thei r parent s to a n assembl y wit h alacrity , poke d fu n a t th e broadcasts , con ducted a questio n an d answe r gam e abou t Tha i nationa l heroes , and passed out candy all around. He made his point. The ke y t o succes s o f MD U wor k clearl y i s no t th e variou s functions whic h ar e performe d pe r se—e.g . healt h o r publi c wel fare—but th e manne r i n whic h the y ar e executed . Th e tea m leader set s th e ton e fo r hi s group , an d i f h e succeed s i n com municating convincingl y wit h villagers , th e operatio n i s likel y to b e productive . Goo d tea m leader s spen d a grea t dea l o f tim e 33 The station' s effectivenes s i n competin g fo r listener s ma y spar k som e unethica l counter-measures. Prim e Ministe r Thano m reporte d earlier thi s yea r tha t h e ha d been warne d o f Communis t plan s t o sabotag e th e station , an d h e ordere d th e Army t o provide securit y accordingly . ( Bangkok Post, January 24 , 1965. ) "See Bangkok World, Octobe r 28 , 1964 ; Keye s (1964A:3) ; USIS/Thailan d (1964:20, 24-33) . Th e effect s o f mas s medi a o n th e informatio n level s i n rura l villages ar e discussed i n Schram m (1964:73-76) .

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just talking—t o headmen , farmers , housewives , teachers , villag e priests, shopkeepers , an d schoolchildren. 15 Th e stron g an d favor able impac t o f a Bangko k officia l inquirin g an d talkin g abou t local problem s o n a low-pressure , informa l basis , ofte n i n th e local dialect , canno t b e overestimated . Hi s willingnes s t o ea t sticky ric e withou t makin g wisecracks , t o drin k loca l wate r with out fear , t o observ e suc h custom s a s removin g one' s shoe s i n a villager' s hous e o r th e wot (Buddhis t temple) , an d t o dea l with loca l peopl e withou t condescensio n i s equall y importan t in enhancin g th e credibilit y o f th e government' s message . I t ma y very wel l outlas t th e pills , clothing , movies , an d othe r materia l aspects o f th e team' s visi t i n th e mind s o f th e villag e people . Moerman's analysi s o f th e cultura l discontinuit y whic h ca n exist betwee n distric t official s an d villager s include s th e followin g succinct description : An officia l dresse d i n hi s western-styl e khak i unifor m goe s t o addres s the wide-trousered , home-spu n cla d resident s o f a village . H e speak s in Centra l Thai , whic h man y understan d onl y wit h difficult y an d al l speak wit h diffidence . Th e addres s over , h e i s fe d a mea l o f boile d rice whic h h e eat s wit h a for k an d spoon . Th e villager s ea t steame d glutinous ric e wit h thei r fingers. Thes e seemingl y superficia l distinc tions ar e emblem s o f rea l difference s i n identification . (Moerma n 1961:6)

MDU behavior , b y an d large , aim s a t eliminatio n o f thi s stereotype. Perhaps I shoul d underscor e th e fac t tha t m y faith i n the valu e of thi s behavio r i s no t base d o n a Wester n backgroun d an d nor mative bias. The fact s ar e tha t o n th e basi s o f numerou s observa tions, i t becam e clea r tha t thi s informal , ope n sor t o f behavio r produced mor e effectiv e response s amon g villag e peopl e tha n did behavio r whic h wa s mor e forma l o r "official, " o r relie d heav ily on a relationship o f superio r t o inferior. Villag e people alread y recognize th e official' s status . The y d o not , therefore , expec t hi m to ac t contrar y t o it , eithe r b y undu e self-effacemen t o r b y a n unnecessary sho w o f power . The y respec t thos e wh o ca n an d will explai n th e reason s wh y a particula r cours e o f actio n i s o r 15

The numbe r o f shop s i n village s throughou t th e Northeas t i s startling , an d the rising powe r an d statu s o f th e merchan t i s forcin g realignmen t o f th e tradi tional village status system. See Keyes (1964 B :7-8).

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is no t desirable ; thei r enthusias m an d response ar e ofte n notice ably reduce d whe n explanation s ar e not forthcoming . A s Amyo t (1964:14) ha s note d cogently : "Learnin g (an d conviction ) re quire th e continuin g presenc e o f a teacher , wh o teache s pref erably b y doing , ove r a n extende d period , s o tha t al l may hav e an opportunit y t o convinc e themselve s o f th e utilit y o f th e in novation." I n a simila r vein , on e o f th e difficultie s facin g th e Ministry o f Cooperative s representativ e o n a mobil e tea m i s the short amoun t o f tim e availabl e t o explai n th e intricacie s o f a farmer's cooperative . Thi s ide a is not grasped easil y in a one-hou r talk, an d cooperatives ' organizer s soo n learne d tha t thei r prose lytizing require d a longer-ter m effor t tha n mobil e team s coul d accommodate. One significan t aspec t o f mobil e tea m operation s i s th e self help project , an d i t i s significan t b y eithe r it s presenc e o r it s absence i n an y particula r village . Th e self-hel p concep t i s basi c in th e philosoph y o f communit y development . I t ha s bee n de scribed a s th e "fundamenta l tenet " o f successfu l militar y civic action programs , an d Secretary o f Stat e Dea n Rus k ha s said tha t "self-help i s the most importan t singl e facto r i n the developmen t process a s a whole " (Walterhous e 1964:17). 18 I t ma y likewis e be on e o f th e mos t delicat e o f issue s t o handl e a t th e villag e level. MDU ha s receive d tw o kinds o f advic e abou t self-help . Som e said tha t th e people i n the Northeast ha d received s o little atten tion fo r suc h a lon g tim e an d ha d s o commonl y associate d re quests t o d o villag e wor k wit h steril e road-buildin g exercise s in lie u o f taxe s o r t o impress visitin g official s tha t i t woul d b e dangerous t o as k the m t o d o anything . I n short , thi s vie w wa s a compoun d o f belie f tha t th e governmen t "owed " th e peopl e something plu s som e fea r tha t a totall y negativ e o r cynica l re sponse woul d b e forthcomin g t o any self-help wor k request , i.e. , a compoun d o f the normative an d the practical. Th e second typ e of advic e counsele d tha t th e entir e effor t mus t b e base d o n the self-help principl e les t th e MD U program encourag e farmer s t o believe tha t th e governmen t existe d solel y t o do thing s fo r the m and tha t "development " o r "progress " wa s entirel y somebod y M The Rus k quotatio n i s cite d fro m U.S . Hous e o f Representatives , Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs o n HR 5490 (Apri l 1963) , p . 5 .

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else's responsibility , no t thei r own. 17 Thu s MD U wa s damne d if it did and damne d if it did not rely on self-help. In fact , MD U ha s followe d a pragmati c pat h betwee n thes e positions tha t emerge s i n wor d an d dee d a s a sor t o f principl e of "join t help. " I t tend s t o believe , a s I do , tha t "th e village r expects th e governmen t t o d o thing s fo r him , bu t give n som e help an d organization , h e i s willing t o g o alon g wit h governmen t projects," an d i t operate s o n thi s assumptio n (Moerma n 1961:7) . It i s recognized tha t Tha i villager s d o no t hav e a stron g traditio n of undertaking publi c o r community projects , exceptin g collectiv e concern fo r th e wot an d certai n religiou s celebrations 18 and , i n my opinion , concer n whe n cattl e thieve s harras s thei r cattl e an d buffalo. Thi s i s no t t o sa y villager s ar e absolutel y selfish , rathe r that cooperatio n tend s t o b e extende d withi n familie s o r amon g close friend s fo r readil y identifiabl e mutua l gain. 19 Th e base s of socia l relationship s ten d t o b e kinshi p ties , marriage , an d friendship. I n thi s schem e "doin g somethin g fo r th e village " is no t alway s a self-eviden t "good. " I n it s genera l theme s MD U constantly emphasize s th e fac t tha t th e governmen t ca n an d wil l help som e t o improv e villag e life , bu t tha t basi c improvemen t is greatl y dependen t o n th e villagers ' ow n efforts . Durin g th e Phase I perio d o f a n MDU , self-hel p i s used wit h restraint . Ther e is a feelin g tha t "mak e work " i s wors e tha n "no work, " an d team leader s ten d t o er r o n th e sid e o f caution . Wisel y used , however, self-help bring s a very high payoff . " I t i s noteworth y tha t on e o f th e mobil e team s wit h MDU- 2 reporte d a few instance s i n whic h agitator s allegedl y tol d villager s befor e th e tea m arrive d that th e tea m ha d bee n instructe d t o d o everythin g for th e villager s an d ha d been give n mone y t o distribut e t o them , whe n i n fac t th e tea m was tol d t o encourage village r participatio n i n self-hel p project s an d ha d n o cas h handouts . The report s wer e considere d rathe r suspec t becaus e o f certai n weaknesse s i n this mobil e team , bu t take n a t fac e valu e the y sugges t th e kin d o f "counter-mea sure" whic h ca n b e use d agains t a legitimat e developmen t program , playin g on ol d experience s with , o r attitude s about , malpractic e i n governmen t administra tion. Fo r detail s se e Huf f (1963:55-56) . 18 For example s o f self-initiate d cooperativ e effor t withi n village s an d betwee n neighboring village s whic h hav e affina l an d consanguinea l tie s se e Lu x (1962:92-93, 110) . 10 The followin g thesi s i s relevan t i n thi s context : " A peasant famil y ca n functio n with les s outsid e cooperatio n tha n an y othe r socia l form . . . . On e reason , then , that peasant s ar e not ver y cooperativ e i s tha t the y do no t hav e t o be . Paradoxica l as i t ma y sound , thei r technolog y permit s the m a degre e o f independenc e denie d members o f mor e primitiv e an d mor e advance d societies " (Foste r 1959:178) .

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The difficultie s ar e apparent. I t i s hard t o identify a meaningfu l work projec t tha t ca n b e complete d durin g a one - o r two-da y stay. MD U team s ten d t o shy awa y from th e traditiona l desultor y display o f roa d repai r work , whic h i s likel y t o recal l ol d an d unpleasant association s wit h th e government . The y hav e learne d that simpl e project s suc h a s erectin g villag e bulleti n board s o r installing a water-sea l latrin e a t th e wat hav e a limite d effec t and ma y requir e a grea t dea l o f explanation . Bulleti n boards , for example , ar e ofte n though t t o b e th e government' s property , not th e village's , an d a demonstratio n o f "public " ownershi p and us e i s needed . Similarly , latrine s a t th e toat ar e though t to b e th e exclusiv e propert y o f th e monk s an d no t a village asse t (there i s a clea r belie f hel d an d sometime s expresse d concur rently b y villager s tha t th e latrin e i s no t likel y t o b e a villag e asset unde r an y circumstance) . No r d o smal l project s involv e enough peopl e o f th e village . Ideally , on e want s widesprea d par ticipation i n th e doin g an d widesprea d sharin g i n th e final product. But whe n a goo d projec t ca n b e identified , a competen t tea m leader ca n exploi t it , i n th e bes t sens e o f th e word, t o advantage . A "goo d project " tend s t o b e on e relate d t o a villag e proble m that fo r on e reaso n o r anothe r ha s meanin g fo r th e villagers . Amyot ha s suggeste d tha t publi c work s project s "see m t o domi nate th e cooperativ e effort s o f th e villagers , bein g bot h mor e often undertake n an d mor e ofte n successful " (Amyo t 1964:14-15). Likewise , project s tha t faile d wer e thos e requirin g a chang e i n th e villagers ' patter n o f living , e.g . "raisin g chickens." H e notes , no t surprisingly , tha t th e villager s alway s do bes t o n project s the y hav e initiate d themselves . O n occasio n one finds a villag e wher e ther e i s unanimou s concer n abou t a problem an d peopl e ar e read y t o act , bu t need , o r thin k the y need, leadership , equipment , specia l skills , o r som e othe r missin g ingredient. I n othe r place s villag e opinio n ma y b e spli t betwee n a larg e majorit y an d a smal l bu t relativel y powerfu l minority . A wis e tea m leade r ma y see k t o mediat e thi s controversy . I n one fairl y larg e villag e i n Sakonnakhor n Province , fo r example , the mai n street s wer e s o filled wit h tree s tha t cart s coul d no t go throug h an d ha d t o mak e inconvenien t detours . Ther e wa s [ 44 5 ]

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widespread agreemen t tha t th e street s shoul d b e cleared ; how ever, eac h tre e ha d a n owner , an d n o on e woul d b e th e firs t to remov e hi s trees . Som e o f th e owner s wer e villag e leaders , well like d an d respected , an d i t wa s har d t o pressur e them . On e of the m wa s als o a n exceedingl y influentia l schoolmaster , wh o inspired a certai n amoun t o f aw e an d fea r becaus e o f hi s obviou s wealth, education , a prosperou s shop , an d a reporte d twenty seven wives . The tea m leade r negotiate d wit h th e owne r o f eac h tree an d graduall y obtaine d consen t t o cu t th e tree s down . A cash paymen t wa s give n t o a wido w wh o woul d los e a fe w pro ductive coconu t trees , an d som e othe r tree-owner s agree d t o cu t down specifie d frui t tree s afte r harvestin g th e nex t crop . Th e bargaining wa s spirited , friendly , an d engage d th e attentio n o f the entir e village . Th e villager s al l pitche d i n t o cu t dow n th e trees an d t o mov e tw o kitche n porche s tha t protrude d int o th e street. Th e projec t wa s handle d s o a s t o reflec t hono r an d estee m on thos e wh o sacrifice d most , includin g a specia l meetin g fo r them a t whic h th e final arrangement s wer e made . Th e villag e priest advise d tha t the y wer e exemplifyin g th e bes t i n th e Bud dhist precep t o f "righ t conduct, " th e foreigne r presen t note d the similarit y o f thi s metho d o f problem-solvin g wit h tha t use d in developin g rural area s in the United States , a drink was shared , and cigar s wer e passe d around . Thes e men , no t th e government , emerged a s the village heroes . Another settin g fo r a usefu l self-hel p projec t i s tha t i n whic h a rea l proble m exists , bu t ha s neve r bee n define d o r discusse d seriously. Th e tea m leader , especiall y on e wh o goe s aroun d con tinuously chattin g wit h villag e people , i s ofte n abl e t o relat e what h e pick s u p i n conversatio n wit h visua l observation s o f the villag e an d perceive , i f yo u will , a significan t bu t unarticu lated "fel t need. " Th e bes t exampl e o f thi s wa s a villag e divide d in tw o b y a dee p strea m spanne d onl y b y a log . Villager s wer e afraid o f thi s "bridge. " Childre n an d other s carryin g wate r ha d slipped off . Ye t ther e ha d neve r bee n a n attemp t mad e b y resi dents o n eithe r sid e t o d o anythin g abou t it . Th e tea m leade r in questio n gauge d th e dept h o f thi s feelin g an d gamble d o n a communit y bridge-buildin g effort . Th e tea m provide d leader ship, organizatio n (althoug h non e o f the m ha d eve r buil t a bridge before) , tools , an d ke y items , lik e nuts , bolts , an d nails . [ 44 6 ]

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Both halve s o f th e villag e joine d i n th e labo r t o cu t th e woo d and erec t it . Ther e wa s grea t prid e take n i n thi s accomplishment . Team leader s als o find tha t villager s ar e intereste d i n repairin g or addin g t o th e wot comple x o f building s an d fences , shorin g up well s an d smal l reservoirs, an d improvin g th e schoo l building , again tendin g t o suppor t Amyot' s observations . In case s of doubt , though, tea m leader s ma y waiv e th e whol e ide a o f a projec t and emphasiz e th e service s th e governmen t ha s brought . The y are likel y t o sen d thei r staf f ou t t o tal k wit h villager s infor mally—something calle d th e "saturatio n technique"—fo r muc h of th e visit , explainin g th e government' s plans , inquirin g abou t local conditions , an d engagin g i n th e smal l tal k whic h help s eliminate "socia l distance, " an d th e like . Th e crucia l facto r i n this modus operandi i s analysi s o f eac h situatio n rathe r tha n an y concern wit h a specifi c typ e o f project . Unlik e s o man y hand books o n civi c actio n an d communit y development , MD U i s problem- o r situation-oriented , no t project-oriented ; henc e i t be hooves thos e wh o see k t o cop y MD U technique s t o teac h sensi tivity to local situations first and project skill s second . It i s particularl y importan t t o not e tha t th e us e o f coercio n in MD U activitie s ha s bee n conspicuou s b y it s absence . Obvi ously, coerciv e actio n woul d completel y defea t th e purpos e o f MDU and , indeed , b e downrigh t counter-productive . Wit h re spect t o self-hel p work , i t ca n b e argue d tha t th e Tha i farme r will tak e an y "suggestion " fro m someon e i n authorit y a s a com mand an d d o it , i.e. , surfac e behavio r ma y b e th e epitom e o f sweetness an d light , bu t i n reality a very polite o r subtl e coerciv e pressure i s exerted . Similarly , on e hear s ofte n tha t villager s si t docilely i n meetings , neve r debat e o r argue , an d alway s d o wha t they ar e told . I t i s impossibl e t o sa y categoricall y tha t thes e phe nomena neve r occu r i n MD U activities . Wha t ca n b e said , o n the basi s o f observatio n an d participation , i s tha t the y ar e re markably reduce d fro m th e customar y norm . On e ca n discer n between th e suggestio n carrie d ou t enthusiasticall y an d tha t car ried ou t pro forma, an d th e significan t featur e i s th e increasin g frequency o f th e former . Th e restrain t show n b y MD U official s in no t pursuin g activitie s whic h d o no t comman d som e popula r support i s equall y observable . An d I hav e see n to o man y vocal , argumentative farmer s i n meeting s t o suppor t a s sacrosanc t prin [447 ]

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ciple th e notio n tha t the y ar e alway s subservient. 20 I n condition s where participatio n i s encouraged , man y wil l participate. 21 It i s als o importan t t o not e tha t loca l officials , especiall y thos e at th e distric t level , ge t thei r first hint s o f th e "Ne w Look " i n governmental style . They tak e thei r cue s from Bangkok , an d the y begin t o se e Bangko k a s represente d b y MD U developin g a n entirely ne w relationshi p wit h individual s a t th e "ric e roots " level. In summary , Phas e I activitie s ar e designe d t o infor m an d t o influence. Th e government' s intention s ar e mad e known , an d a small dow n paymen t t o suppor t the m i s mad e i n th e for m o f services an d entertainment . Th e rol e envisage d fo r th e peopl e and thei r governmen t i n th e futur e i s outlined, bu t n o rash prom ises fo r a soon-to-be-delivere d Utopi a ar e made . Emphasi s i s placed o n th e abilit y o f bot h partie s t o achiev e progres s jointly , and th e government' s action s an d behavio r ar e intende d t o con vey th e convictio n tha t i t wil l d o it s share . Phases II and III: The Follow-up. Intentions , convictions , an d an impac t operatio n lastin g al l o f on e o r tw o day s ar e hardl y sufficient t o transfor m a villag e populatio n int o "tru e believers, " especially i f the y hav e customaril y see n thei r distric t office r onl y once ever y thir d year . Obviously , a n impac t operatio n ca n back fire i f i t succeed s i n incitin g ne w expectation s whic h remai n un fulfilled. Therefor e impac t i n an d o f itsel f i s meaningless ; som e worthwhile follow-u p activit y i s neede d t o validat e it , althoug h nobody ye t know s ho w muc h i s enough . Th e "meaningfu l gov ernment presence " noted abov e must be retained . The MD U approac h t o follow-u p ha s centere d o n th e field headquarters. Durin g Phas e I , teams of expert s based a t the head 20 Gordon Murchi e (N.D.:4 ) ha d simila r experiences : "Surprisingl y enough , the villager s i n th e are a covere d b y th e tea m wer e no t i n an y wa y sh y i n asking pointe d an d direc t questions. " Cf . Amyo t (1964:14-15) , wh o note s tha t in th e conventiona l villag e situatio n h e studied , villager s discusse d bu t neve r openly oppose d project s propose d b y their headman o r abbot . 21 It ha s bee n th e experienc e o f communit y developmen t (CD ) worker s tha t villagers sho w littl e initiativ e an d ar e cowe d b y officials . I woul d speculat e that villager s fee l th e view s o f th e C D worker s ar e no t backe d b y sufficien t power an d influenc e amon g th e official s wh o reall y gover n th e area s i n whic h they live . MD U people , however , posses s considerabl e powe r i n thei r ow n right . They represen t Bangko k directly . Loca l official s defe r t o them ; hence , i f the y encourage village-leve l participatio n an d expressio n o f views , i t i s muc h easie r for villager s t o comply .

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quarters roa m th e are a surveyin g possibilitie s fo r smal l develop ment projects . Man y o f them , fo r example , ar e verse d i n variou s phases o f agricultur e an d anima l husbandry, wate r an d soil s management, an d education . Ou t o f thei r surve y recommendation s the MD U field commande r coordinate s th e preparatio n o f a de velopment plan . I n addition , severa l village s ar e selecte d t o b e "model villages, " an d a Highwa y Departmen t road-constructio n crew i s a t wor k constructin g o r improvin g road s tha t wil l las t longer tha n thos e buil t b y me n wit h shovels . Whenever possible , road wor k i s starte d befor e th e mai n MD U tea m reache s th e field i n orde r t o maximiz e th e latter' s mobility . Muc h o f th e time , however, th e mobile teams activ e in Phase I operate in essentiall y "roadless" terrain . Initially, Phase s I I an d II I wer e intende d t o b e quit e distinct . It wa s believe d tha t Phas e I I woul d las t abou t si x t o eigh t months, encompassin g completio n o f a numbe r o f smal l project s involving dams , schools , gardens , an d th e like . Phas e II I wa s to b e marke d b y a turnove r o f authorit y fro m MD U official s to loca l official s (distric t officer s and/o r th e provinc e governor) . The latte r woul d the n direc t th e long-ter m follow-u p operatio n in conjunctio n wit h representative s o f th e traditiona l functiona l ministries, an d MD U personne l woul d withdraw . I n fact , experi ence durin g th e first tw o year s o f th e progra m demonstrate d that thi s planne d arrangemen t wa s no t practicable , i n par t because loca l authoritie s wer e inadequatel y equippe d o r moti vated t o assum e th e responsibility , bu t largel y becaus e th e con tribution o f MD U personne l gre w t o b e bot h successfu l an d unique. Th e natur e o f thi s contributio n i s discusse d mor e full y below. Suffic e i t t o sa y tha t th e tw o phase s hav e merge d i n prac tice int o a singl e "follow-up " period , an d MD U personne l hav e remained i n th e field t o serv e a s th e catalys t fo r developmen t activity. The lis t o f individua l follow-u p activitie s i s ver y impressiv e and almos t unending . Apparentl y ther e i s n o hesitatio n t o inno vate, an d thi s i s a health y sign . Ther e is n o MD U "fiel d manual " on wha t t o d o i n ever y instanc e i n rural areas , an d i t i s probabl y a goo d ide a no t t o hav e one ; otherwise , ther e woul d b e latrines , tin roofs , an d foo t bridge s i n ever y villag e i n th e Northeas t whether o r no t the y wer e desire d o r needed . Foreigner s ofte n [ 44 9 ]

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fail t o appreciat e tha t "cultura l conditions " var y no t onl y be tween nations , bu t als o withi n them , an d no t onl y betwee n a nation's obviou s geographi c regions , bu t withi n the m a s well . This seriousl y limits th e validit y o f highly generalize d operationa l field manuals . Th e closes t approac h t o th e "fiel d manual " men tality i n MD U i s th e much-debate d "mode l village " concept , and eve n thi s varie s a little , dependin g upo n th e field commander's poin t o f view. Roads , o f course , ar e significant . Their impac t o n rura l communitie s ove r a perio d o f year s i s ver y impressive. I t shoul d b e underscored , however , tha t n o detaile d research t o measur e th e consequen t economi c an d socia l change s has ye t bee n done . Therefor e nobod y reall y know s ho w muc h new roadwa y i s "enough, " no r wha t th e long-ru n implication s of road-building o n rural life ar e likely to be. Personal "befor e an d after " observation s d o confir m th e fac t of change , however , an d severa l factor s stan d out . Bu s an d truc k traffic begin s immediatel y o n almos t an y ne w roa d o r improve d "track." Ther e i s a substantia l amoun t o f thi s traffi c anyho w in th e dr y seaso n whe n temporar y route s ar e establishe d acros s dry ric e fields. Decen t road s lea d t o regularizatio n o f thi s traffic , all-year service , an d reduce d fares . Wha t i s mor e important , vil lagers us e them . It i s sai d fro m tim e t o tim e tha t villagers , i f asked , sa y the y do no t wan t road s o r ar e indifferen t t o th e idea ; however , wher e they hav e bee n pu t in , ther e see m t o b e fe w wit h regrets . Th e economic advantage s becom e quickl y evident . Th e new s abou t market price s arrive s soone r vi a road , an d villager s ca n arrang e to shi p thei r ric e an d othe r product s b y truc k o r bu s when price s are high . Previously , thi s ha d t o b e don e b y ox-cart . Buyer s i n the marke t town s kne w mos t farmer s woul d no t tak e thei r load s back hom e an d used thi s competitiv e power i n bargaining t o thei r own advantage . I n som e case s farmer s hav e bee n abl e t o doubl e their incom e fro m rice sale s b y waitin g fo r a goo d marke t an d shipping b y truck. 22 Roads als o facilitat e movemen t o f people , an d ar e use d fo r that purpose , e.g . t o visi t friends , loo k fo r work , visi t wats an d 22

Incidents o f thi s kin d ar e ver y encouragin g an d no t har d t o find. Wha t remains t o b e establishe d b y researc h i s th e exten t t o whic h thi s intelligen t economic behavior i s shared an d practiced amon g farmers .

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large town s previousl y inaccessible , an d atten d t o busines s i n the amphur town . The y als o brin g medica l facilities , schools , model villages , an d th e lik e withi n th e reac h o f man y mor e peo ple. I n theory , a t least , utilizatio n o f limite d governmen t resources o f thi s typ e ca n b e greatl y increase d b y establishin g them i n conjunctio n wit h a roa d network . I t ma y b e les s expen sive an d mor e realisti c t o worr y abou t transportin g peopl e t o special schools , clinics , an d agricultura l demonstratio n center s than t o wai t unti l ther e i s on e o f eac h o f thes e i n ever y rura l village. As a matte r o f record , ther e wer e abou t five hundre d kilome ters o f laterite-surface d ne w roa d an d trac k constructe d i n th e first thre e MD U area s a s o f Septembe r 1964. 23 Maintenanc e wa s very good . A s a rul e o f thumb , MD U field commander s tr y t o put i n abou t ninet y kilometer s o f roa d pe r yea r i n th e large r MDU areas , a t leas t fo r th e firs t tw o years . Initially , MD U wa s totally dependen t o n th e Highwa y Departmen t fo r road-buildin g equipment an d crews ; however , i n 196 4 th e Tha i an d America n governments signe d a n agreemen t unde r whic h th e Unite d State s agreed t o provide thre e constructio n unit s for direc t use by MD U and si x units fo r assignmen t t o the governor s o f si x key Northeas t border provinces . I t i s intende d tha t al l wil l b e use d fo r roa d construction an d repai r an d othe r publi c work s projects . Th e MDU unit s wil l permi t timel y advanc e work before MD U group s move int o ne w field area s an d rapi d commitmen t t o uniqu e o r special emergenc y situations , shoul d the y arise . Th e provincia l units shoul d encourag e an d greatl y enhanc e th e independen t capability o f governor s t o provid e systemati c follow-u p wor k within thei r jurisdictions . MDU follow-u p activitie s i n th e field o f medicin e tak e tw o forms: establishmen t o f permanen t clinic s a t MD U field head quarters village s an d th e periodi c dispatc h o f mobil e medica l teams throughou t th e are a service d b y tha t headquarters . Thes e clinics ar e staffe d b y doctor s (on e a t a tim e pe r clinic ) fro m the Ministr y o f Publi c Healt h i n Bangko k an d ar e rotate d abou t once a month . I t i s hope d tha t permanen t healt h officer s wil l eventually b e assigned ; however , full y awar e o f th e possibl e neg 23

Figures supplie d b y Mobil e Developmen t Uni t headquarters , Ministr y o f Defense, Bangkok .

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ative consequence s i f th e initiall y establishe d leve l o f servic e is not maintained , th e Ministr y has develope d th e presen t tempo rary-duty arrangement . Medica l official s ar e especiall y aler t t o the proble m o f epidemic s an d ca n reac t quickl y becaus e o f thei r firsthand knowledg e o f th e area . Th e headquarter' s clini c docto r makes periodi c mobil e visits . Occasionally a very specia l progra m is undertaken , a s i n th e cas e o f a n experimenta l projec t t o cur e opium addict s i n Kalasi n Province . Thi s i s "medical" i n th e sens e that i t i s addresse d t o a medica l problem ; th e treatmen t regime , however, i s administere d b y a pries t i n a remot e sectio n o f Saraburi Provinc e (fo r detail s se e Huf f 1964:23) . Result s i n th e first fou r month s o f th e pilo t projec t wer e ver y encouraging , an d it wil l doubtles s b e expande d i f continuin g succes s i s achieved . Volunteers hav e flocked t o atten d th e course . Ministr y o f Publi c Health effort s t o trai n mor e medica l personnel , build mor e healt h stations, and pu t a trained midwif e i n as many villages as possibl e all contribute t o the follow-up . Two healt h problem s ar e noteworth y an d ar e likel y t o b e en countered elsewhere . Healt h educatio n seriousl y lag s behin d th e availability o f rudimentar y medica l care . I n particular , clearin g up enteri c an d ski n disease s i s a profitles s exercis e becaus e th e villager return s immediatel y t o a hom e an d field environmen t where h e contract s th e diseas e o r ailmen t al l ove r again . Doctor s see thi s ver y clearl y wit h babie s wh o ar e bor n fa t an d healthy , but graduall y succum b t o a n environmen t ove r whic h the y hav e little control . I t i s als o frustratin g becaus e th e medica l ma n ca n easily persuad e villager s t o tak e pills , shots , medicines , an d cer tain treatments , bu t h e ha s almos t n o succes s i n gettin g the m to clea n an d coo k foo d properly , was h properl y (despit e a gen uine fondnes s fo r baths) , an d follo w minima l communit y hygien e practices. Thi s seem s t o b e a tas k requirin g join t applicatio n of th e skill s o f th e psychologist , th e specialis t i n communicatio n and education , an d th e healt h expert . Ther e ha s bee n a littl e improvement i n keepin g clea n th e area s beneat h th e familia r raised house s wher e livestoc k i s kept , bu t th e motivatio n fo r this seems mor e ofte n du e t o th e fac t tha t villager s "lik e th e look of it" then to an appreciatio n o f health benefits . The secon d an d mor e operationall y oriente d issu e i s tha t o f introducing som e syste m o f paymen t fo r healt h service s consis [ 45 2 ]

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tent wit h abilit y t o pay . Thi s i s les s difficul t tha n on e woul d expect, a t leas t i n Thailand , becaus e villager s ar e use d t o payin g something fo r th e hel p the y ge t fro m th e traditiona l her b doctor , or midwife , o r eve n healt h officer . Th e questio n i s no t whethe r to pay, bu t ho w much . Firs t step s b y MD U personne l to encour age paymen t b y thos e wh o ca n affor d i t hav e no t backfired . I t is expecte d tha t a syste m o f partia l paymen t o f cost s wil l b e experimented wit h in the oldest MD U areas . Work i n educatio n ha s been concentrate d o n the village schoolhouse an d experimentatio n wit h adul t educatio n courses . Ne w schools ar e bein g buil t an d man y other s substantiall y renovated . Villages quit e ofte n shar e i n th e cost s o f construction . Desks , teaching aids , books , an d eve n pape r ar e i n ver y shor t supply , and MD U i s tryin g t o remed y thes e deficiencie s (especiall y i n textbooks). On e distric t wit h 15,00 0 students , fo r example , ha s less tha n 50 0 desks . Fabricatio n o f desk s an d basi c furnishing s for th e schoo l coul d b e a reasonabl e self-hel p task , eve n fo r Phase I mobil e teams , bu t i t ha s no t bee n exploited . Th e increased numbe r o f graduate s fro m th e country' s expande d teachers college s ha s alread y begu n t o hav e a n impac t o n area s where th e customar y four-yea r compulsor y educatio n ha s bee n taught mostl y b y teacher s wit h littl e o r n o forma l trainin g be yond th e sam e four years . Experimentation i n adul t educatio n ha s bee n inconclusive . Courses i n readin g an d writin g ten d t o fai l i n th e sens e tha t adults los e interes t quickly . Succes s wit h vocationa l trainin g courses varie s b y subjec t an d sometime s b y area . Som e MD U officials believ e tha t th e bes t result s ma y com e fro m combinin g popular vocationa l course s wit h readin g an d writing . Tw o o f the mos t successfu l course s t o dat e hav e bee n barberin g fo r young me n ( a haircu t ma y yiel d tw o baht , o r abou t te n cents) , and beauticia n an d sewin g course s fo r women. 24 Ther e have bee n other attempt s wit h pottery , carpentry , weaving , brick-making , and woodworkin g an d painting . In a very rea l sense , o f course , "communit y development , agri cultural extension , an d a hos t o f othe r project s tha t g o b y differ 24 Dr. G . C . Hickey , presentl y doin g field researc h i n Sout h Vietnam , ha s told m e tha t barberin g course s ar e als o ver y popula r wit h youn g me n fro m certain hil l tribe s locate d i n Vietnam.

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ent name s ar e basically program s i n adult educatio n fo r villagers " (Long 1964:17) . Clearly , w e d o no t kno w wha t technique s ar e most effectiv e i n achievin g th e education , persuasion , an d moti vation desire d i n villag e populations . Whethe r i t b e b y residen t general instructors , specialist s i n eac h subject , mixe d teams , audiovisual means , o r whatever , systemati c evaluatio n o f eac h is a significant unfille d ga p in our knowledge. Agriculture i s o f paramoun t interes t i n a section o f th e countr y commonly though t t o hav e 85-9 5 percen t o f it s populatio n em ployed i n farming. Clearl y then , progres s in thi s field seem s likel y to influenc e favorabl y th e larges t numbe r o f people . Indeed , thi s logic ha s le d Lon g t o conclud e tha t "t o fight insurgenc y i n th e Northeast ou r firs t concer n mus t b e agriculture " (Lon g 1964:12) . MDU starte d slowl y i n it s approac h t o agriculture , bu t b y MDU-3 (Nakhomphanom ) i t bega n t o mov e t o th e forefron t in follow-u p activity . Thi s wa s doubtles s du e i n larg e measur e to th e fac t tha t Nakhomphanom , whil e n o garden paradise , tend s to b e bette r endowe d naturall y fo r farmin g tha n man y o f it s neighbors i n th e Northeast . Nevertheless , agricultura l activitie s receive emphasi s i n MD U follow-u p activitie s everywhere . The phras e "agricultura l extension " seem s t o bes t blanke t these activities . Th e "demonstratio n plot, " i n particular , i s be coming a formidabl e too l i n convincin g th e farme r tha t moder n technology ca n influenc e hi m directl y an d pu t mone y i n hi s pocket. T o th e exten t tha t i t succeed s i n doin g so , th e govern ment receive s credi t fo r introducin g th e ne w technique s an d showing a n interes t i n helpin g farmer s i n term s whic h the y ca n understand. Succes s i s dependent , o f course , o n th e exten t t o which th e farmer s i n questio n ar e sensitiv e t o change s i n incom e and wil l accep t ne w technique s i n orde r t o achiev e it . I n m y opinion th e farme r i n th e Northeas t ha s thi s sensitivit y an d wil l innovate, if show n convincingly. 25 Demonstration plot s a t ke y location s d o par t o f th e sellin g job. Perhaps mor e effectiv e i s the techniqu e o f inducin g th e mos t progressive farmer s i n a villag e t o "try " a ne w cro p o r farmin g 25 Long (1964:14-15 , 20 ) point s t o th e rapi d growth i n recen t year s o f produc tion o f ne w crop s suc h a s kenaf , corn , an d cassav a a s evidenc e i n suppor t of thi s contention . Fo r a somewha t negativ e vie w o f th e Centra l Tha i villager' s ability t o modernize se e Piker (1964:10) .

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method b y offerin g the m fre e seed , fertilizer, pesticide , marketin g assistance, etc. , t o ge t started . I t ha s bee n sai d tha t "probabl y the mos t effectiv e educationa l too l wit h Tha i farmer s i s seein g their neighbor s d o successfull y somethin g new " (Lon g 1964:19) . MDU lean s heavil y o n thi s techniqu e i n it s agricultura l pursuits , looking i n ever y villag e fo r "th e mos t diligen t farmers. " I t ma y also prov e usefu l i n achievin g progres s i n th e healt h educatio n field, althoug h th e difficultie s ar e admittedl y greater . Quit e ofte n the demonstratio n plot s ar e locate d o n lan d donate d fo r th e pur pose b y a kamnan, headman , schoolteacher , o r a well-to-d o vil lager i n hope s tha t thei r "goo d example " wil l motivat e othe r villagers. A displa y o f confidenc e i n th e government' s recommen dations b y a respecte d villag e personalit y i s a definit e asset ; o n the othe r hand , i t ma y b e necessar y the n t o emphasiz e tha t uti lization o f th e ne w cro p o r techniqu e i s no t dependen t o n bein g as wealthy a s the donor . Very ofte n th e centra l issu e i n achievin g innovatio n i n agricul ture amon g a larg e numbe r o f farmers , mos t o f who m d o no t have spar e o r idl e land , i s fea r o f tota l failure . "Innovation " often mean s switchin g fro m ric e t o a cro p whic h canno t b e eate n if th e marke t i s bad , e.g . a fibe r suc h a s cotto n o r kenaf , o r one whic h i s no t a popula r dinnertim e favorite , e.g . corn . Th e strongly independen t farme r simpl y dislike s th e notio n o f utte r dependence o n a possibl y fickl e market . Whateve r th e market , he can eat his rice. The numbe r o f individua l agricultura l task s an d project s trie d out unde r MD U auspice s i s staggerin g (fo r example s se e Huf f 1964:26-30). They may be a s small a s giving ten farmers sample s of America n hay , o r a s larg e a s distributin g frui t tree s t o a n entire villag e o r fertilize r throughou t a n entir e district . Fiel d crops, gardens , anima l husbandry , agriculture , fish, soil s manage ment, an d us e o f tractor s an d moder n equipment , indeed , "th e works," hav e receive d som e attention . Al l o f thi s effor t contrib utes t o th e fac t o f "follow-up, " bu t i t als o make s evaluatio n very difficult . Researc h i s neede d t o determin e th e mos t effectiv e projects o r type s o f project s s o tha t i n th e futur e resource s ca n be concentrate d o n th e mos t productiv e activities . Fiel d tria l with crop s an d technique s i s useful , u p t o a point , bu t i t shoul d not b e extende d indefinitely . Th e observe r ca n collec t man y ex [455]

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amples o f success . There ar e report s o f excellen t ne w cro p yield s and increase s i n income , succes s i n marketin g ne w crops , an d in cooperativ e venture s i n whic h villager s combin e resource s to ren t a vehicl e i n orde r t o shi p product s t o mor e attractive , distant markets . Bu t clos e analysi s o f caus e an d effec t ha s ye t to b e done . One o f th e mos t interestin g feature s o f th e agricultura l wor k has bee n th e wa y i n whic h progres s ha s bee n achieved . Initially , at least , i t wa s accomplishe d wit h almos t n o increas e i n agricul tural extensio n personne l (althoug h a larg e numbe r o f newl y trained me n bega n wor k i n th e Northeas t i n 1965 , a ste p whic h should sustai n th e earl y momentum) . Individua l rice , o r agricul ture, o r livestoc k officer s alread y workin g i n area s selecte d fo r MDU activit y merel y joine d force s wit h MD U whe n i t arrived . But thes e men , an d other s representin g th e regula r functiona l ministries, foun d tha t associatio n wit h MD U wa s o r coul d b e a blessing . Th e MD U field commander s insis t o n goo d wor k an d take a n interes t i n promotin g it . Furthermore , som e o f thei r ow n resources—vehicles, communications , audiovisua l equipment , o r occasionally smal l budgetar y assistance—ar e mad e availabl e t o assist th e loca l officer . MD U ofte n pay s thi s man' s pe r diem , and thi s i s a n excellen t incentive . The MD U staf f ca n als o solv e related problem s whic h ar e beyon d hi s capability , fo r example , arrange transportatio n o f agricultura l product s t o appropriat e markets. Long ha s complaine d tha t on e o f th e majo r difficultie s wit h agricultural extensio n i n Thailan d i s th e plethor a o f agencie s engaged i n doin g piece s o f it . H e ha s als o note d tha t i t woul d probably b e easie r t o coordinat e o r integrat e the m a t th e field or workin g leve l tha n a t th e sea t o f governmen t i n Bangko k (Long 1964:17-19) . I n effect , MD U ha s bee n providin g suc h coordination i n th e field (an d t o som e exten t i n Bangkok ) an d in s o doing has provided a demonstration o f th e value of applyin g developmental resource s i n thi s fashion . Whethe r MD U i s th e ideal organizationa l choic e fo r thi s function , eithe r no w o r i n the future , i s perhap s irrelevant , i n vie w o f th e practica l an d factual contributio n it has been abl e to make to date. Students o f th e Northeas t usuall y hav e thei r ow n favorit e can [ 45 6 ]

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didate o r candidate s fo r th e mos t pressin g villag e "need " o r "want."26 I hav e two : (1 ) protectio n agains t cattl e thieves , which i s discusse d mor e full y below , an d (2 ) water . Alleviatio n of thes e tw o problems would , in my judgment, result i n the great est favorabl e psychologica l impac t amon g th e villag e populatio n we ar e considering . I t wa s note d abov e tha t onl y abou t 3 0 per cent o f th e village s i n th e Northeas t hav e adequat e wate r sup plies, an d i t ha s bee n estimate d tha t i t wil l b e approximatel y the yea r 201 3 befor e on e ca n expec t a drille d wel l i n ever y vil lage, with continue d drillin g a t th e present rat e (Bangkok World, June 29,1963; Platenius 1963:11) . In sever e shortag e areas , MD U ha s trie d desperatel y t o dril l from th e first da y o f Phas e I ; indeed , I hav e bee n wit h drillin g teams provide d b y th e Departmen t o f Mine s wh o stuc k t o a twenty-four-hour schedul e i n th e hottes t day s o f th e dr y season . They hav e no t ha d muc h success , an d th e historica l recor d sug gests tha t thi s wa s t o b e expected . MD U headquarter s surve y teams hav e manage d t o recommen d site s fo r smal l dams , reser voirs, an d fis h ponds , man y o f whic h hav e bee n built . An d eve n when a wel l wit h brackis h wate r i s brough t in , th e wate r ca n be use d fo r bathing , gardens , an d livestoc k purposes . However , this i s no t th e plac e t o discus s th e wate r issu e a t lengt h (fo r details se e Planteniu s 1963:9-13 ; Huff 1963:33-35 ; 1964:31-33) . Suffice i t t o sa y tha t th e MD U progra m ha s no t bee n abl e t o make seriou s inroad s o n thi s proble m a s yet . I n m y opinion , sig nificant progres s mus t awai t th e developmen t o f a n integrate d water-resource managemen t approac h whic h take s accoun t o f all th e specia l factor s whic h s o complicat e th e wate r suppl y problem. For purpose s o f compariso n wit h othe r developmen t programs , 26 In th e village Amyo t studied , resident s liste d thei r preferences , i n order , as mor e land , protectio n fro m drough t an d flooding, livestock , bette r housing , and bette r roads . H e i s correc t i n statin g tha t "fel t an d rea l need s d o no t necessarily coincide . I n man y instances , peopl e ar e no t awar e o f wha t the y nee d to solv e thei r problem s ou t o f lac k o f experienc e o f sophistication. " I n anothe r sample surve y o f five village s i n Nakhornphanom , villager s liste d money , lan d (although 9 2 percent alread y owned land , promptin g th e investigato r t o comment , "as othe r statistica l studie s hav e als o demonstrated , landles s farmer s ar e scarc e in Thailand") , eliminatio n o f flooding an d ric e pests , increasin g far m income , and bette r road s (Yatsushir o 1963:4-5) .

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and t o avoi d misunderstanding , I shoul d lik e t o restat e explicitl y that th e bul k o f th e wor k accomplishe d i n th e follow-u p perio d is don e b y specialist s fro m th e regula r civi l ministries , mos t o f whom alread y operat e i n th e are a i n question . A s develope d in th e discussio n o f agricultur e above , MD U personne l merel y guide, motivate, an d coordinat e th e work o f others , and occasion ally contribut e libera l dose s o f imaginatio n an d thei r ow n resources t o spark a project o r program. The reasons the y succee d in thi s amorphous , catalyti c role ar e explaine d mor e fully below . Model Villages and Self-Help. Mos t o f th e follow-u p activitie s mentioned thu s fa r ar e heavil y dependen t o n othe r ministrie s for manpowe r an d financing. I n th e earlies t day s o f MDU , whe n the follow-u p respons e o f thes e ministries wa s a n unknow n quan tity, MD U headquarter s sough t mean s t o ensur e a t leas t som e modest follow-u p directl y unde r it s ow n control . Th e "sampl e village" o r "mode l village " was selecte d a s th e mos t likel y candi date, an d i n thi s contex t i t emerge d a s a cornerston e o f th e fol low-up program . I t provide s tw o practica l advantages : (1 ) a guarantee o f som e follow-u p regardles s o f suppor t fro m othe r quarters, an d (2 ) a n opportunit y fo r MD U t o se t th e pac e fo r work b y others . In eac h larg e MD U are a approximatel y fou r village s ar e se lected t o b e mode l villages . The y ar e usuall y widel y separated . In physica l term s thi s means tha t a good road wil l be constructe d to th e villag e t o connec t i t wit h th e neares t provincia l roa d o f any consequence , an d i t wil l receiv e a large numbe r o f relativel y expensive assets . Radi o comunication s ar e installed ; an d a radi o operator an d perhaps a community developmen t worke r o r healt h officer wil l b e place d i n residence . Indeed , commencin g wit h MDU-8, th e mode l village s hav e bee n assigne d ten-ma n staff s and designate d a s sub-headquarters . Th e staf f i s heade d b y a military office r an d include s a deput y distric t office r an d officer s drawn fro m Publi c Health , Welfare , Education , Agricultur e an d Community Development . Th e MD U field headquarter s begin s work o n thes e village s durin g Phas e I an d continue s t o develo p them wel l int o th e follow-up . Th e mode l village s generall y re ceive a ne w school , meeting house , T V receive r an d fanc y aerial , a children' s playground , healt h station , electri c stree t lights , public addres s system , water-sea l latrines , straight street s an d fences , [458 J

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new streets , well s an d pumps , an d water-tan k storag e an d dis tribution systems . The mode l villag e i s probabl y th e mos t controversia l elemen t of th e MD U program . Foreig n observers , especially , ar e likel y to criticiz e it . Oppositio n i s usuall y base d o n th e belie f tha t giv ing specia l attentio n t o fou r o r five village s i n a n operatio n tha t might involv e tw o hundre d village s wil l onl y creat e il l wil l an d jealousy amon g th e unfavore d majority . Th e man y improvement s incorporated int o th e mos t favore d fe w ar e fel t t o b e undul y lavish frills , an d i t i s argue d tha t th e mone y woul d b e bette r spent i n bringin g les s ostentatious benefit s t o a much large r num ber o f villages . Som e conside r th e mode l village s a s n o mor e than showplace s intende d t o impres s visitor s fro m Bangkok . I t is als o argue d tha t suc h free-spendin g behavio r b y th e govern ment wil l ten d t o stifl e th e ver y self-hel p spiri t which th e govern ment wishe s t o promot e amon g th e people . Ther e i s meri t i n these criticisms . There i s als o somethin g t o b e sai d fo r th e positio n take n b y MDU. To o ofte n th e constructiv e aspect s o f th e mode l villag e technique ar e los t i n th e emotiona l blu r i n th e min d o f th e criti c caused b y th e sigh t o f a T V se t an d electri c light s i n a remot e rural village . Officially , th e explanatio n give n fo r mode l village s is to provide a convincin g demonstratio n o f what th e governmen t and th e peopl e ca n d o whe n the y wor k together , an d t o sho w what th e "goo d life " wil l b e lik e i n th e future . Governmen t spokesmen d o no t promis e t o transfor m ever y othe r villag e i n the countr y int o exac t replica s o f th e mode l villag e overnight . Among othe r things , the y realiz e tha t villager s ar e no t quit e tha t gullible. On e canno t sa y wit h certaint y tha t resident s o f othe r villages whic h d o no t ge t th e specia l treatmen t ar e no t jealou s or envious . O n th e othe r hand , i t canno t b e state d categoricall y that the y al l violently disapprove, either. The fact tha t this smacks of favoritis m an d unequa l treatmen t whe n viewe d throug h som e (especially Western ) eyes , doe s no t necessaril y mak e i t so . I t is a t leas t plausibl e tha t peopl e i n area s whic h hav e no t know n government service s (an d hav e experience d favoritis m i n appli cation wheneve r the y di d appear) , o r hav e bee n mistreate d b y government, wil l vie w th e appearanc e o f an y reasonabl e demon stration o f RT G effor t an d concer n wit h som e favor , an d tak e [ 45 9 ]

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some prid e i n th e fac t tha t i t i s occurrin g i n "their " district , if no t i n thei r village. 27 An d fo r onc e i t i s occurrin g i n a village , instead o f i n th e bac k yar d o f th e run amphur (distric t officer) , where pas t experienc e suggest s i t woul d logicall y b e placed . Th e Thai village r i s sufficientl y intelligen t t o realiz e tha t whe n re sources ar e limited , distributio n become s a problem . H e ma y even conced e tha t on e televisio n se t i n th e distric t i s better tha n none a t all . An d i t i s a t leas t debatabl e whethe r th e governmen t would achiev e a greate r impac t i f i t substitute d garde n seed s for th e T V se t an d gav e eac h famil y i n a give n larg e villag e one package . One especiall y effectiv e MD U fiel d commande r ha s encoun tered villager s wh o questione d th e government' s choic e o f a vil lage i n hi s are a a s a mode l village . H e take s pain s t o explai n the government' s objective s t o them , an d h e use s a n analog y with considerabl e effect . H e explain s first tha t Thailan d ha s onl y one grea t capita l cit y an d tha t i t too k hundred s o f year s t o de velop it . He als o points ou t tha t ther e i s only one province capital , and close r t o home, he call s o n their ow n experienc e t o remembe r how lon g i t too k t o establis h an d develo p thei r ow n amphur (district headquarters ) town . Fro m thi s bas e h e lead s int o th e RTG's dependenc e o n citize n taxes , th e necessit y t o progres s slowly, an d th e fac t tha t th e mode l villag e i s a first ste p i n a long developmen t process . Villager s ca n understan d thi s logic . By an d large , MD U commander s d o no t coun t village r env y about no t bein g selecte d a s a model villag e a s on e o f thei r majo r problems. Another officia l reaso n give n fo r establishin g mode l village s is tha t the y wil l stimulat e other s t o tr y an d hel p themselves , i.e., the y wil l giv e other s a n ide a o f wha t ca n b e don e t o chang e and presumabl y improv e villag e life . Now , th e criticis m tha t what the y se e i s totall y beyon d thei r ow n capabilit y t o provid e must b e discusse d i n thi s context . First , ther e i s probabl y mor e self-help o r villager participatio n involve d i n model village devel opment the n i s commonl y realized . Thi s i s especiall y tru e i n model village s whic h ar e no t als o a n MD U headquarter s wit h 2

'The lac k o f village an d distric t loyaltie s o r identificatio n i n th e centra l plains are a shoul d no t b e permitte d t o obscur e th e fac t tha t suc h loyaltie s do exis t i n the Northeast . Fo r som e plausible explanation s se e Lux (1962:99-100) .

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a larg e residen t staf f o f expert s o n hand fo r a considerable time. 28 When th e electri c generato r i s offered , villager s ofte n hav e t o agree t o cu t th e pole s fo r th e lines . I a m awar e o f a model villag e whose resident s wer e coo l t o thi s proposal . Whe n th e governo r then offere d to recommen d th e MD U tak e th e generato r else where, the y change d thei r minds ; now a n eve r increasing numbe r are signin g u p fo r electricit y i n thei r homes . Th e stree t lightin g is free , bu t ther e i s a charg e fo r powe r i n th e home . Ther e i s also a charg e fo r wate r i n th e large r village s wit h pumpin g an d distribution systems . Villager s i n mode l village s ofte n contribut e labor fo r schools, meetin g houses , an d othe r projects , an d some times donat e lan d fo r th e ne w facilities . Peopl e fro m othe r vil lages wh o com e i n wit h proposal s t o repai r thei r school s ofte n get MD U aid , especiall y ti n roofing . Som e eve n ge t ne w schools . They se e demonstration garde n an d field plot s an d ca n ge t MD U assistance t o start som e in thei r ow n village. They als o see cleane r houses, ne w streets , straigh t street s an d fences , an d smal l ponds , all of which they can copy if they wish. MDU official s ar e candi d abou t th e effec t o f mode l village s in stimulatin g self-hel p improvement s i n othe r villages . The stim ulation occur s "sometimes. " Som e o f th e MD U commander s have brough t headme n an d othe r villag e leaders t o see the mode l villages, an d i n som e instance s the y hav e take n villager s fro m the mode l village s ou t t o tal k t o thei r neighbor s i n othe r villages . In instance s wher e ther e ha s bee n a successfu l project , credi t is usuall y give n t o th e headma n o r kamnan fo r providin g ener getic leadership . MD U headquarter s hav e a goo d recor d o f re sponding t o villager s wh o d o com e u p wit h sensibl e villag e projects. MDU field official s an d loca l nai amphur (distric t officer ) gen erally approv e th e us e o f mode l villages a s a focus fo r loca l devel opment programming , althoug h difference s o f opinio n exist . A few flatly prefe r t o "sprea d th e wealth " rathe r tha n concentrat e on mode l villages . O f tw o particularl y goo d nai amphur, on e felt mode l village s ha d a place i n developmen t wor k i f the y wer e built clos e t o a mai n roa d wher e man y peopl e coul d se e them ; 28 The combine d mode l village-MD U headquarter s village s o f Ba n N a Kh u (Kalasin), Ba n Ku t Ru a Kham (Sakonnakhorn) , an d Ba n Prio n Thu m (Nakhorn phanom) ar e wel l know n an d frequentl y visited . Th e othe r mode l village s i n these MD U area s ar e see n far les s frequently b y outsiders .

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the othe r officia l argue d tha t the y wer e fa r mor e valuabl e i n a remot e locatio n becaus e a roa d wa s buil t t o them , thereb y encouraging heavie r traffi c al l along the route an d a wider impac t throughout a muc h large r area . Outsid e villager s d o com e t o associate th e mode l villag e wit h advantage s fo r themselves . I f it ha s a healt h station , i t ma y b e th e onl y on e fo r miles , an d a goo d road leads to it. Undeniably, differen t village s have differen t reactions . A whole new serie s o f street s wa s cleare d ou t o f th e bus h adjacen t t o one large village , where the y remai n i n majestic isolatio n becaus e nobody wil l mov e ont o them . I n contrast , resident s o f anothe r village requeste d th e MD U commande r t o assis t i n cuttin g a new stree t for the m becaus e the y felt to o crowded, an d th e youn g people ha d nowher e t o go . I wa s presen t whe n th e stree t wa s cut by th e villager s in 1963 , with minimal help from MDU . Whe n I returne d ove r a yea r late r (Apri l 1964) , a doze n ne w house s were o n th e ne w street . B y th e tim e anothe r visi t wa s pai d i n August 1964 , a secon d smalle r stree t ha d bee n cleare d o n villag e initiative a s a communit y project . MD U merel y loane d som e equipment. Thes e villager s als o recentl y decide d t o giv e thre e days' labo r eac h mont h t o villag e improvemen t wor k (o n th e tenth, twentieth , an d thirtieth) . Thi s i s noteworth y i n tha t th e MDU staf f i n residenc e ha d bee n reduce d t o hal f a dozen , al l its majo r project s ha d lon g bee n completed , an d n o pressur e was being applied . In th e MDU- I headquarter s village , villagers becam e s o accustomed t o th e rudimentar y undergroun d wate r distributio n sys tem, a pip e leadin g fro m th e wate r tan k t o tw o o r thre e ta p outlets i n th e village , tha t the y too k i t upo n themselve s t o exten d it. The y pu t i n cemen t pip e mad e i n th e villag e wit h MDU hel p in th e plantin g season . Thi s i s on e o f th e ver y fe w time s I hav e seen villag e me n anywher e engage d i n communit y wor k a t thi s busy tim e o f year . Tw o village s i n Sakonnakhorn , blesse d wit h aggressive Communit y Developmen t (CD ) workers , reporte d that 10 0 percent o f th e houses have water-sea l latrines , for whic h each household pai d twenty-fiv e bah t ($1.25) . Phon Thum mode l village also has close to 10 0 percent coverage . I hav e revisite d village s whic h ha d participate d i n successfu l self-help project s durin g th e mobil e tea m visit s i n Phas e I . I n [ 46 2 ]

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just abou t ever y instanc e th e improvemen t mad e ha s bee n main tained, an d prid e i s take n i n it ; i n a fe w instances , ther e i s evi dence o f additiona l self-hel p wor k i n th e village ; in most o f the m almost nothin g ne w ha s bee n started , an d a reaso n frequentl y given b y villager s i s thei r inabilit y t o organiz e themselve s fo r the purpose . Thu s on e see s som e sign s o f hope , bu t man y indica tions tha t th e traditiona l force s continu e t o dominate . Th e eve r present mode l villag e whic h thes e peopl e wil l se e periodicall y may ver y wel l b e o f muc h greate r importanc e tha n a fleet o f transitory mobil e team s i n stimulatin g th e "improvemen t habit. " MDU official s als o repor t tha t villager s wh o se e th e fencin g in mode l village s ar e sometime s motivate d t o cop y it . The y ar e not particularl y excite d abou t straightenin g ol d streets , especiall y if house s hav e t o b e moved ; however , fence s ar e different . Mos t villages i n th e Northeas t hav e a grea t dea l o f fencin g t o begi n with. Fence s ar e popula r becaus e the y ca n b e use d t o mar k per sonal propert y boundarie s an d t o kee p animal s eithe r i n o r out . MDU official s hav e als o sai d tha t villager s simpl y lik e th e 'loo k of them, " an d som e conside r the m t o b e a "mar k o f progress." 29 In an y event , ther e i s n o evidenc e o f strong-ar m method s t o force fence-building, an d it continues to occur . We mus t als o b e carefu l no t t o underestimat e th e villager' s capacity t o chang e hi s wa y o f life . Argument s tha t h e doe s no t need, doe s no t want , an d canno t ge t TV , electri c power , machinery, an d othe r luxurie s ma y tur n ou t t o b e shortsighted , in whic h cas e th e MDU' s instinc t i n establishin g an d supportin g the mode l villag e concep t wil l loo k somewha t bette r i n retro spect. Som e statistic s fro m a 125-square-mil e are a i n Changwa t Udorn, par t o f whic h i s now include d i n MDU-6 , ar e enlighten ing (dat a whic h follo w ar e fro m Blakesle e et al. 1965) . Thi s was th e area , mentioned above , in which forty village s had abou t seven hundre d transisto r radios . Twelv e o f th e village s ( a respectable 3 0 percen t o f th e total ) hav e thei r ow n electri c gen erators. These ar e communall y owne d i n ever y cas e an d ar e use d to powe r string s o f light s an d loudspeaker s a t wat fairs . The y may b e use d fifteen time s a year i n a singl e villag e an d ar e avail 29 I hav e encountere d village s tha t hav e ha d n o contac t whatsoever wit h MD U or Communit y Development , wit h quit e extensiv e villag e fencin g networks . Som e villagers poin t t o thei r valu e i n keepin g cattl e fro m thieves ; ofte n the y wil l indicate tha t fence s aroun d home s o r th e wat hav e a n aestheti c appeal .

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able o n loa n t o othe r villages . There ar e als o eleven village s wit h pumps, al l privatel y owned , whic h ca n b e rente d fo r abou t twenty bah t ($1.00 ) a n hour . The y ar e use d t o pum p wate r for irrigatio n an d t o drai n fis h ponds . A fe w year s ag o th e sug gestion tha t rura l village s shoul d hav e thei r ow n ric e mill s wa s considered foolish . Ther e ar e no w sixty-tw o mill s i n th e fort y villages i n thi s area . Thes e example s ar e give n t o sugges t tha t the willingnes s an d abilit y o f Northeas t villager s t o "progress " may b e greate r tha n heretofor e realized . Radios , electri c genera tors, pumps , an d rice-millin g equipmen t ar e no t fa r behin d T V and elementar y water-suppl y systems . Indeed , I suspec t tha t there woul d alread y b e a smal l commercia l deman d fo r T V set s in man y part s o f th e Northeas t toda y i f receptio n an d goo d pro gramming wer e guaranteed . I n thi s regard , on e ver y remot e model villag e tha t get s goo d T V receptio n draw s thre e hundre d to fou r hundre d peopl e a nigh t t o watch , man y o f who m wal k in fro m othe r villages . The deman d fo r electricit y i n the model villages has been quit e surprising. Th e government-provide d generato r i s use d t o pro duce street-lightin g fre e o f charg e fro m abou t seve n t o nin e P.M . Villagers hav e th e optio n o f bringin g th e electricit y int o thei r homes i f the y pa y fo r it . Severa l o f th e village s hav e waitin g lists fo r connection , an d villager s pa y fou r t o si x bah t (twent y to thirt y cents ) pe r mont h fo r ligh t i n th e evening . Som e instal l fluorescent light s a t twice the cost . An additiona l facto r i n th e us e o f th e mode l villag e i s its flexi bility i n servin g a variet y o f objectives . Fiel d commander s var y in thei r ow n us e o f it , som e bein g fa r mor e elaborat e tha n others . In MDU- I an d th e tw o section s o f MDU-4 , ther e ar e onl y abou t one o r tw o each , includin g th e MD U headquarter s villages . I n Nakornphanom the y hav e bee n selected , doubtles s wit h som e forethought, s o that eac h i s a n ethni c minorit y village . For exam ple, Ba n Do n Luan g i s a S o village , an d i n Ba n La o th e peopl e are Kha . Rebuildin g a badl y rundow n ol d wot a t Ba n Ku t Ru a Kham, whic h wa s revere d throughou t th e area , ha d a very favor able widesprea d impac t o n th e Buddhis t population , an d i t rein forced th e religiou s imag e o f th e government . Th e larg e villag e of Ba n Akas , Sakonnakhorn, ha s bee n treate d virtuall y a s a mode l village i n orde r t o achiev e a psychological an d politica l objective . [ 46 4 ]

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Prio r t o th e arriva l o f th e MD U th e villag e ha d experience d several arrest s o f it s citizen s a s suspecte d Communists , los t it s official statu s a s a sub-amphur office , an d i n genera l looke d upo n the governmen t rathe r sullenly . Th e governmen t promise d t o up-grade th e villag e t o a sub-amphur, buil d thirty-fiv e kilometer s of road t o connect th e village with th e main Sakonnakhorn-Udor n highway a t Amphu r Phannanikom , pu t i n a water-supply system , and ad d al l th e usua l feature s associate d wit h a mode l village . Through MD U th e governmen t ha s made goo d on all these prom ises an d als o include d a persona l visi t fro m th e Prim e Ministe r for goo d measure . Th e authoritie s repor t tha t ther e n o longe r is unres t i n Ba n Akas . O f parenthetica l interest , th e bu s an d truck traffi c increase d s o muc h o n th e Akas-Phannaniko m roa d that fare s droppe d fro m te n bah t (fift y cents ) t o seve n bah t (thirty-five cents) . In Nakhornphano m an d Sakonnakho m mos t mode l village s are assigne d a C D worke r an d a radio operator , an d the y becom e the mai n agricultura l demonstratio n locatio n i n thei r area . I n brief, the y ar e t o b e th e foca l poin t o f long-ter m developmen t work i n th e area . Th e decisio n t o strengthe n th e staff s a t mode l villages underscore s th e government' s determinatio n o n thi s point. I t i s fel t tha t stretchin g ou t manpowe r an d resource s s o that ever y villag e receive s a littl e bi t o f somethin g woul d b e self-defeating i n suc h larg e areas , and impac t woul d be negligibl e at best . I n concentratin g man y thing s i n a few villages , th e latte r become magnet s drawin g man y visitors , eac h o f who m receive s maximum exposure on the basis of a single trip. This length y discussio n o f mode l village s i s intende d t o brin g to ligh t a s muc h informatio n a s possibl e abou t them . I t i s no t expected tha t i t wil l suffic e t o mak e "believers " o f thos e whos e experience wit h mode l village s elsewher e ha s bee n t o th e con trary; however , i t ma y mak e th e Tha i positio n o n thi s subjec t more understandabl e an d explai n wh y MD U i s no t prepare d to accep t a s definitiv e statement s t o th e effec t tha t "th e mode l village has faile d i n ever y countr y i n which i t has been tried. " Community developmen t program s ar e often foun d i n the rura l areas o f th e developin g nations , althoug h the y ar e not necessaril y associated wit h problem s peculia r t o minorities . I n th e contex t of MDU , Communit y Developmen t (CD ) worker s hav e playe d [465]

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a relativel y mino r role , usuall y limite d t o participatio n i n som e model villag e efforts . Wit h a fe w notabl e exceptions , thei r per formance ha s not bee n ver y satisfactory . On e difficult y ha s been the seriou s proble m o f finding an d trainin g properl y motivate d young peopl e t o fulfil l th e ver y demandin g responsibilitie s o f CD workers in the complex socio-cultural setting found i n Northeast Tha i villages . Thi s i s intensifie d b y ambiguitie s i n definin g precisely wha t th e functio n o f C D workers an d th e C D program as a whol e i s an d ough t t o be . A s a n example , th e followin g conclusion i n a ver y fran k stud y b y a Tha i observe r i s quote d at length : Community developmen t implie s th e implantatio n o f democrac y an d it i s explicitl y recognize d a s th e goa l o f th e Tha i Communit y Develop ment Program . On e o f th e importan t question s t o conside r i s whethe r or no t th e workers , wh o ar e th e ke y personnel , hav e a clea r visio n of thei r wor k goals . Thi s stud y furnishe d dat a whic h contradict s an y assumption o f congruenc e betwee n th e idea s o f th e workers ' an d orga nization's goals . Th e followin g tabl e describe s th e workers ' visio n o f what communit y developmen t i s aimin g toward . Surprisingl y enough , they ten d t o plac e heav y emphasi s o n economi c developmen t o r o n irrelevant points , rathe r tha n implantatio n o f democrac y an d cultiva tion o f loca l leadership . I t i s obviou s tha t the y d o no t hav e a clea r conception o f wha t communit y developmen t i s seeking . Thi s tabl e [below] i s a synopsi s o f th e worker' s ow n replie s i n answe r t o th e open-ended reques t fo r a summar y o f th e cor e idea s o f communit y development. (Titay a Suvanajat a 1964:42 ) THAI COMMUNIT Y DEVELOPMEN T WORKERS ' CONCEP TIONS O F T H E AIM S O F COMMUNIT Y DEVELOPMEN T W O R K T H A I L A N D : 196 2

Items ( Implantation o f democrac y 1 Cultivation o f loca l leadershi p fo r self-hel p activit y 2 Improvement o f villagers ' wealt h 1 Change i n villagers ' attitud e towar d self-hel p 1 Improvement i n loca l governmen t 7 General improvemen t i n rura l econom y 3 General improvemen t i n rura l educatio n 1 No informatio n an d irrelevan t answer s 5

[ 46 6 ]

Percentage N = 102 )

3 3 4 5 6 100

THA I MOBIL E DEVELOPMEN T UNI T PROGRA M

Obviously, i f ther e i s an y relationshi p betwee n th e goal s o f th e CD worker s an d thei r effectiveness , th e contributio n o f th e C D program t o MD U i n thes e unsettle d condition s i s no t likel y t o be a majo r one . Ideally , me n traine d t o encourag e th e develop ment o f rura l village s an d t o imbu e villager s wit h th e spiri t o f self-help coul d b e extremel y significan t i n underwritin g th e suc cess o f long-ter m follow-u p efforts . I t shoul d b e note d tha t a s a rul e MD U doe s no t operat e i n rura l area s tha t alread y hav e a C D program . Thi s commitmen t t o a separat e progra m als o reduces th e availabilit y o f C D resource s fo r MD U work . The MD U field headquarter s ha s othe r form s o f follow-up . It i s constantl y loanin g it s equipmen t t o headme n an d distric t officers wh o devis e a reasonabl e developmen t activity . I t ma y also arrang e t o mov e farmers , o n a voluntee r basis , t o govern ment-operated Self-Hel p Lan d Resettlemen t Center s (nikhom) where the y ar e give n assistanc e i n building a home an d establish ing a ne w farm . Som e o f th e newe r nikhom appea r ver y pros perous, includin g amenitie s suc h a s schools , healt h stations , an d water systems , an d the y ar e usuall y establishe d i n area s wher e upland crop s ar e grown , i.e. , th e soi l i s good , bu t no t suitabl e for traditiona l rice-farming . Th e nikhom a t Amphur Kuchinerai , Kalasin, fo r example , i s so successfu l tha t ther e i s a lon g waitin g list of new applicants. 30 MDU field commander s als o spen d a lo t o f tim e i n meetin g with loca l schoolteachers . The y believ e tha t rea l progres s i s de pendent o n th e yout h o f th e countr y an d tha t schoolteacher s are obviousl y crucia l i n influencin g th e young . Th e teache r ma y also hav e considerabl e prestig e i n villag e adul t society , althoug h I resis t generalizatio n becaus e i n m y experienc e i t seem s tha t the headman , abbot , teacher , elde r citizen , specifi c cla n group ings, o r an y combinatio n thereo f ca n predominat e i n th e affair s of an y give n village . Keye s unmistakabl y assign s th e teacher , who i s a civi l servan t i n th e Tha i syste m o f government , a crucia l position: Those mos t susceptibl e t o th e lur e o f anti-governmen t an d eventuall y leftist o r communis t oppositio n ar e not , however , th e politicall y apathetic peasantry . Rathe r I woul d postulat e tha t th e grou p t o whic h *° The nikhom ide a ha s also bee n trie d amon g th e hil l tribes , wit h considerabl y less success. See Hans Manndorffs pape r in this volume.

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Communist an d leftis t progagand a appeal s th e mos t ar e lowe r echelo n bureaucrats—village schoo l teachers , clerks , etc . I t i s thi s clas s o f people whic h feel s tha t i t doe s no t hav e salarie s commensurat e wit h its positions , a s wa s state d t o m e b y villag e teacher s i n th e are a i n which I worke d o n man y occasions . I t i s als o a grou p whic h is i n a position t o b e awar e o f an d abl e t o evaluat e th e inequalitie s presen t in th e syste m Th e lowe r leve l bureaucrats , particularl y th e village schoo l teachers , stan d i n a crucia l positio n i n thei r abilit y to influenc e th e mas s o f th e populatio n shoul d ther e b e a direc t threa t to th e Northeas t i n tha t i t i s thi s grou p whic h ha s mor e immediat e and intens e contac t wit h th e villager s tha n an y othe r grou p withi n the bureaucracy. (Keye s 1964A:3-4 )

MDU recognize s th e potentia l significanc e o f th e teachers , sees them a s natura l allies , an d trie s t o assis t the m a s muc h a s possible. The centra l headquarter s (MDU-HQ ) i n Bangko k als o con tributes t o th e follow-up . Whe n i t i s convince d tha t a particula r project o r program ha s merit , an d th e responsibl e ministr y canno t support i t completely , MD U frequentl y allot s fund s fro m it s ow n budget fo r it . Thes e "specia l fund " expenditure s ma y reac h sev eral hundre d thousan d bah t pe r yea r pe r MD U an d the y provid e a critica l margi n o f flexibilit y whic h doubtles s i s on e o f th e strengths o f th e MD U concept , assumin g wis e us e o f th e funds . There ar e als o certai n mor e specifi c MDU-H Q activities . Annua l Youth Camp s hav e bee n institute d t o brin g youn g boy s (twelv e to sixtee n years ) fro m th e rura l area s t o Bangko k fo r a few days . This progra m i s well handled, an d abou t th e onl y questio n raise d concerns jus t how much th e boys ar e listened t o when the y retur n home. Som e argu e tha t i t woul d b e wise r t o entertai n youn g adults i n thi s manne r becaus e the y hav e th e abilit y t o influenc e village opinio n mor e strongl y an d ar e likel y t o pla y a leadershi p role i n th e villag e sooner . Ther e seem s t o b e meri t i n bot h approaches. MDU-HQ arrange s so-calle d staf f visit s t o MD U area s ever y month, sendin g severa l headquarter s personne l ou t t o th e field to learn abou t problem s firsthand . Abou t thre e time s a year, thes e visits ar e don e o n a larg e scal e (perhap s thirt y t o fort y people ) and includ e representative s o f al l th e participatin g ministries . The visit s ma y las t on e wee k an d amoun t t o a ful l revie w o f the MD U i n question , o n site . A secon d techniqu e involve s th e [ 46 8 ]

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sending o f follow-u p mobil e teams , twic e a year i f possible , bac k to eac h MD U area . Severa l o f th e me n wh o le d o r participate d on mobil e team s i n th e are a i n th e Phas e I , forty-five-da y effort , go bac k an d visi t village s o n a sampl e basi s t o find ou t wha t is takin g place . Villagers , o f course , ar e ver y impresse d t o se e a familia r face , an d th e practic e lend s credenc e t o th e govern ment's clai m tha t i t i s seriousl y intereste d i n thei r welfare . Valu able lesson s abou t th e impac t o f MD U wor k an d suggestion s for improvemen t ar e gained . The above-mentione d thre e MD U Constructio n Unit s als o giv e the organizatio n a significan t increas e i n it s abilit y t o influenc e follow-up activit y unilaterally . Whil e thes e unit s wil l b e use d often t o d o preparator y roa d wor k i n ne w MD U areas , the y wil l also b e availabl e fo r rapi d commitmen t t o olde r area s whe n a special nee d arises . Thi s greatl y strengthen s th e han d o f MD U staff lef t i n th e field. Experience gaine d fro m livin g i n th e rura l area s als o lead s to th e evolutio n o f ne w concept s fo r improvin g th e government' s response t o need . Th e shortag e o f Buddhis t monk s i n remot e border area s wa s noticed , an d i n Januar y o f 196 5 ove r thre e hundred monk s wer e mobilize d b y th e Prim e Ministe r t o sprea d the teaching s o f th e Buddh a t o th e peopl e livin g there . Appar ently i t i s planned t o sen d ou t ove r si x hundred o f thes e mission aries t o b e "par t o f a campaig n agains t Communis t infiltratio n and subversion " (Bangkok Post, Novembe r 23 , 1964). The Prim e Minister reportedl y "stresse d th e importanc e o f religio n i n th e battle agains t thi s hostil e ideology " (Bangkok Post, Novembe r 23, 1964 ; Bangkok World, Novembe r 23 , 1964 ; cf . Huf f 1963:32-33). The exac t natur e o f futur e relationship s betwee n MD U field representatives an d loca l officials , an d henc e th e natur e o f th e follow-up itsel f i n a long-ter m context , i s unclear . Th e ultimat e MDU goa l i s t o phas e itsel f ou t o f a job . Eventuall y loca l prov ince an d distric t officials , i n collaboratio n wit h th e severa l centra l ministries responsibl e fo r long-ter m economic , social , an d politi cal development , wil l have t o tak e over . A t present , thes e follow up program s ar e operate d i n th e MD U area s b y th e ministrie s in question , i n genera l coordinatio n wit h MDU . The y fac e a difficult bu t challengin g task , especiall y a s developmen t become s [ 46 9 ]

THAILAND : LE E W . HUF F

less a matte r o f publi c work s an d mor e a matte r o f changin g the habit s an d attitude s o f villag e populations . Th e MD U ap proach t o "followup " i n th e remot e area s i t i s concerne d wit h has been, an d i s likely to remain, best characterize d b y th e notio n that an y governmen t servic e i s i n fac t a follow-u p servic e i f i t is there an d i s efficientl y conducted . EVALUATION

The impac t o f MD U o n villager s wh o hav e bee n expose d t o it fo r a reasonabl e perio d o f tim e ha s no t bee n researche d i n depth. Th e ar t an d scienc e o f elicitin g vali d informatio n abou t attitude formatio n an d change , an d th e relationshi p o f attitude s to th e behavio r o f people , i s on e o f th e leas t understoo d aspect s of th e behaviora l sciences . W e als o ten d t o believe tha t opinions , attitudes, an d belief s (OAB ) chang e muc h mor e slowl y tha n actual behavio r because : Behavior, bein g visible , i s mor e responsiv e t o extrem e pressure s and accommodations . OAB's , bein g privat e unti l expressed , ca n b e maintained withou t eve n bein g subjec t t o questio n o r argument . An d there i s n o necessar y reaso n fo r OAB' s an d behavio r t o b e i n harmony : we ar e polit e t o acquaintance s w e reall y don' t like , w e g o alon g wit h the majorit y i n a committe e actio n rathe r tha n mak e a fuss , w e g o to th e poll s eve n thoug h w e reall y don' t car e abou t th e outcome . (Berelson an d Steine r 1964:576) 31

Assuming th e validit y o f thi s statement , on e canno t tell , eve n in th e fac e o f observe d enthusiasti c village r respons e t o MDU , just ho w deepl y th e MD U messag e ha s penetrated . Som e ver y exciting researc h await s th e professionall y qualifie d perso n wh o would tr y to make such an evaluation . It shoul d b e stresse d tha t ver y few o f th e generalization s mad e about th e peopl e wh o liv e i n th e rura l area s o f Southeas t Asi a have bee n substantiate d b y research . Opinion s ar e forme d an d acted upo n fro m amon g th e extreme s represente d b y thos e wh o feel th e behavio r o f farmer s an d tribesme n i s comple x an d ca n never b e predicte d an d thos e who feel i t is simple and ca n alway s be predicted . Fo r instance , i t i s commonl y assume d tha t group s known t o b e fatalisti c an d pessimisti c abou t lif e ar e no t likel y "These author s als o not e (p . 8 ) tha t muc h o f thei r inventor y "i s limited , strictly speaking , t o Wester n culture s an d eve n t o th e America n scene, " whic h makes generalizatio n abou t rura l village s i n Asi a somewha t hazardous .

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to b e intereste d i n economi c progress . I t seem s logica l tha t fatal ists who believ e tha t mens ' lives are determine d b y forces beyon d their contro l wil l no t participat e activel y i n communit y develop ment wor k and , similarly , tha t thos e wh o d o "make " suc h progress wil l overcom e thei r pessimism . Logi c unsupporte d b y evidence ca n b e dangerous . Som e ver y preliminar y result s o n this issu e reporte d b y Whyt e an d William s o n th e basi s o f stud y in Peruvia n villages , includin g som e i n whic h "dynamis m seemed t o b e s o rampan t tha t w e wer e har d presse d t o balanc e our sample, " completel y shattere d th e assume d patter n (1964:17). They concluded, i n general : 1. Th e expecte d negativ e correlatio n betwee n fatalis m an d commu nity well-bein g an d progres s certainl y i s no t a universa l phenomenon . Further researc h ma y sho w tha t n o suc h relationshi p exist s o r tha t there i s a relationshi p onl y unde r certai n condition s whic h remain s to b e discovered . 2. I n practica l terms , thi s suggest s tha t a fatalisti c outloo k o n th e part o f th e inhabitant s o f a communit y i s no t necessaril y a n obstacl e to developmen t efforts . W e ma y eventuall y conclud e tha t thi s orienta tion towar d life , [at ] thi s ver y level , i s simpl y irrelevan t t o th e devel opment process . Apparentl y i t i s quit e possibl e fo r peopl e t o hol d a ver y dar k an d forbiddin g vie w towar d lif e i n general , whil e bein g quite optimisti c abou t th e prospect s fo r progres s i n thei r village . (ibid: 19-20 )

In fact , Whyt e an d William s appea r t o hav e foun d tha t ther e is a significan t differenc e i n th e view s an d behavior s o f peopl e in dealin g wit h "philosoph y o f life " abstraction s an d i n dealin g with mor e immediat e experienc e an d expectations . Ther e i s a heavy flavor o f thi s i n Piker' s thesi s tha t Tha i villager s hav e no t let th e Buddhis t emphasi s o n other-worldlines s an d th e depreca tion o f materia l striving s interfer e wit h thei r concer n fo r economic improvemen t i n thi s world , an d hav e indee d manage d to rationaliz e th e tw o position s b y suggestin g tha t th e achieve ment o f wealt h an d powe r i s indicativ e tha t on e ha s i n fac t al ready reache d a significantl y highe r statio n o n th e roa d t o salva tion. I n short , "nex t worldlines s shoul d no t unde r an y circum stances b e confuse d wit h non-worldliness " (Pike r 1964:10). 32 32 Piker argue s tha t th e ric h ma n ca n donat e mor e money , obtai n a n educatio n more easily , an d d o les s work , therefor e freein g th e min d fo r contemplation . Material success , then , tend s t o confir m one' s ethica l standin g an d als o serv e as a platform fo r improvin g one's position in the future .

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In anothe r context , event s i n recen t year s hav e confirme d tha t there i s widesprea d lac k o f understandin g o f th e relationshi p of variou s Asia n group s t o forc e an d violence . Westerners , i n particular, hav e bee n amaze d b y th e politica l initiatives o f monk s in Burm a an d Vietna m an d th e willingnes s o f man y Buddhist s to engag e i n th e bloodshe d associate d wit h insurgenc y movements. Leac h ha s argue d tha t "Th e practica l consequence s of Buddhis t ethic s ar e greatl y misunderstoo d b y Europeans . Sta tistics mak e i t quit e clea r tha t i n al l countrie s wher e Theravad a Buddhism i s th e officia l religion , th e incidenc e o f murde r an d crimes o f violenc e i s quit e exceptionall y high " (Leac h 1963:131-132). These brie f example s ar e cite d t o sugges t tha t ver y littl e i s known abou t th e basi c characteristic s o f targe t audience s expose d to governmen t developmen t programs . I n particular , ther e i s in adequate recognitio n tha t man y o f th e population s involve d hav e been undergoin g considerabl e chang e an d tha t perhap s olde r "basic characteristics " hav e indee d bee n replace d b y ne w ones . Therefore, measuremen t o f th e succes s o f MDU-typ e program s in effectin g transformation s i n th e attitudes , opinions , an d belief s of th e peopl e expose d t o the m i s no t a n inconsequentia l task . Really prope r assessmen t wil l requir e village-leve l researc h i n depth b y professiona l anthropologists , sociologists , an d psychologists. It shoul d b e sai d tha t thi s i s a two-wa y street . Governments , on th e on e hand , mus t recogniz e th e valu e o f researc h an d en courage it . Bu t th e socia l scientists , o n th e othe r hand , mus t also accep t som e responsibilit y fo r acquirin g an d analyzing , a t the highes t leve l o f professiona l competence , dat a whic h ca n shed ligh t o n th e fundamenta l socio-cultura l factor s affectin g an d perhaps controllin g urban-rura l an d centra l government-minorit y relationships. Unfortunately , to o many o f us are incline d t o defin e our righ t t o th e freedom s o f researc h an d fai l t o recogniz e som e of th e responsibilitie s whic h ar e thei r prope r counterpart . On e can a t leas t pos e th e question : I s i t entirel y appropriat e fo r re searchers t o insist , fo r persona l o r professiona l satisfaction , o n the righ t t o stud y onl y th e couvad e fo r eightee n month s i n a given triba l cultura l settin g whic h i s undergoin g th e traum a o f serious change , directe d o r natural ? Shoul d the y no t als o no w [47 2 ]

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and the n undertak e th e objectiv e stud y o f factor s quit e relevan t to thi s o r simila r chang e situations , especiall y wher e th e adjust ment o f fundamenta l relationship s betwee n majorit y an d minor ity socia l an d cultura l group s i s concerned ? T o b e ver y specific , the Roya l Tha i Governmen t ha s bee n especiall y lenien t i n ad mitting foreig n socia l scientist s t o wor k i n Thailand . Seldom , however, hav e th e latte r develope d an d reporte d informatio n which coul d b e use d t o better infor m an d structur e publi c policy . Had thi s bee n done , th e sever e adjustmen t problem s involve d in rura l developmen t migh t b e muc h bette r understoo d tha n the y now are . Despite th e difficultie s o f direc t measurement , th e recor d sug gests tha t MD U i s havin g a positiv e effect . Physica l change s are clearl y evident . Locall y generate d villag e developmen t projects continu e t o aris e lon g afte r th e mobil e team s hav e com e and gone . Loca l peopl e as k fo r hel p fro m MDU , confid e thei r troubles t o patien t MD U staff , an d generall y demonstrat e activ e cooperativeness a s distinc t fro m passiv e acquiescenc e o r indiffer ence. A n increase d an d sustaine d leve l o f loca l initiativ e an d interest after , say , tw o year s involvement wit h MD U clearl y sug gests tha t MD U ha s ha d som e desirabl e influenc e o n peopl e i n the area s in which it operates. There ar e severa l othe r rathe r encouragin g sign s o f success . These emerg e fro m discussio n wit h MD U personne l wit h lon g field experience . The y ofte n tak e prid e i n an d cit e a s thei r majo r accomplishments thing s othe r tha n kilometer s o f roa d built , schoolhouses roofed , o r dam s dug . Physica l measure s o f "devel opment" ar e important . The y ma y b e a necessar y conditio n fo r success, bu t the y ar e rarel y a sufficien t condition . Th e promisin g achievements are : (1 ) a n enhance d understandin g o f th e natur e of th e Communis t threat , (2 ) a n abilit y t o dea l wit h th e rura l crime problem , an d (3 ) stimulatio n o f loca l official s t o operat e efficiently an d "b e friendly wit h th e people. " Enhanced understandin g o f th e potentia l threa t merel y mean s that MD U peopl e hav e foun d tha t b y livin g an d workin g i n an are a fo r extende d periods , the y ca n lear n t o tel l quit e accu rately th e differenc e betwee n a purel y loca l grievanc e o r disput e and bon a fide Communist-inspire d troublemaking . Th e resul t o f this discernmen t i s a muc h reduce d propensit y t o misinterpre t [473 ]

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a loca l inciden t i n a remot e are a a s Communis t activity . Thi s in turn reduce s th e need for hasty action or reliance on indiscrimi nate polic e sweep s t o "fin d out " wha t i s takin g place . The y have learne d tha t innocen t villager s ver y muc h fea r th e police sweep metho d an d tha t i t shoul d b e use d onl y a s a very selectiv e technique. Thi s experienc e doubtles s ha s applicatio n elsewhere . Similarly, MD U official s hav e becom e awar e o f th e cattl e thef t problem whic h exist s i n som e part s o f th e Northeast . Wealt h is usuall y measure d i n term s o f th e numbe r o f buffal o a farme r owns. Th e anima l i s als o th e primar y beas t o f burde n an d ofte n the principa l mean s o f transportation . Los s b y thef t i s a majo r economic an d emotiona l issue , an d whe n i t occur s villager s wil l become sufficientl y concerne d t o ban d togethe r t o for m villag e patrols, an d i f the y liv e clos e enough , eve n trave l t o Bangko k to petitio n th e Ministr y o f Interior. 33 I visite d a n are a no t in volved i n th e MD U progra m i n 196 4 i n whic h thirty-eigh t o f forty village s ha d o r recentl y ha d ha d suc h villag e patro l sys tems—self-led an d self-equippe d (se e Blakesle e et al. 1965 , fo r details). MD U personne l hav e quietl y take n step s t o energiz e and assis t loca l polic e (sometime s inefficient , ofte n understaffed ) and arrang e fo r rando m securit y patrol s b y regiona l arm y unit s that als o engag e i n civi c actio n work . MDU-sponsore d road s an d intra-area radi o communication s an d th e continuin g trave l o f MDU personne l throughou t th e village s i n their are a als o operat e as a seriou s brak e an d deterren t t o thieving . Th e road s alon e and a vehicl e o r tw o enabl e loca l official s t o reac h i n hal f a n hour part s o f thei r jurisdictio n tha t use d t o requir e hal f a da y or mor e b y bicycl e o r walking . Th e village r i s impressed . Thi s is a governmen t servic e h e ver y muc h wants , needs , respects , and understands . The thir d significan t achievemen t i s bolsterin g th e per formance o f th e distric t office . On e doe s no t develo p a n ac quaintance wit h Tha i administratio n withou t soo n learnin g tha t the distric t office r o r nai amphur i s acknowledge d t o b e "th e most importan t singl e lin k o f th e governmen t wit h th e people " (Sutton 1962:53 ; als o se e n . 23 , p . 7 1 fo r additiona l reference s 53

See, fo r example , Bangkok Post, Novembe r 5 , 1964 , whic h describe s th e visit o f a delegatio n o f fiv e hundre d villager s fro m Prachinbur i Provinc e t o appeal to the Prime Minister fo r help agains t a crime wave.

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supporting thi s observation) . Hi s offic e is "th e government " i n the rura l areas , an d it s performanc e largel y set s th e imag e vil lagers hav e o f thei r governmen t an d it s policies . Distric t office s also hav e seriou s problems . Th e mor e remot e the y are , th e les s likely the y ar e t o hav e a ful l staff , an d man y o f th e me n wh o are assigne d ar e sen t fro m a Bangko k functiona l ministry , e.g. , Agriculture o r Communit y Development , an d hav e divide d bureaucratic loyaltie s an d responsibilities . Th e mos t seriou s an d "conspicuously noticeable " o f thes e i s th e rivalr y betwee n th e nai amphur an d th e polic e assigne d t o hi s district , thereb y com pounding th e polic e issu e mentione d abov e (Ars a Meksawa n 1962:224-233). Amphur official s als o complai n abou t lac k o f vehicles, fuel , an d pe r die m fo r travel , al l of whic h hamper s thei r movement an d reduce s thei r effectiveness . MDU ha s steppe d int o thes e loca l loc i o f power—formidabl e as a whol e i n appearanc e t o th e village r outside , bu t internall y fractionated o r liabl e t o fractionation—wit h highl y interestin g results. Unquestionably , a numbe r o f amphur official s hav e take n their cu e from MD U personne l an d hav e develope d mor e aggres sive, positiv e attitude s i n thei r work . Th e assistance , advice , an d encouragement o f MD U me n ca n stimulat e loca l leaders , espe cially thos e wh o ar e quic k enoug h t o se e th e prestig e whic h accrues t o the m personall y i n thei r jurisdictio n i f the y associat e themselves wit h MDU . Thi s mean s tha t a n energeti c nai amphur who ca n defin e worth y villag e developmen t project s i s likel y to receiv e a friendl y hearin g fro m th e MD U field headquarters , which ma y suppor t hi m wit h a piec e o f equipment , tools , mate rials, o r a smal l budge t allotmen t i n orde r t o encourag e loca l self-help i n th e follow-u p period . I t wa s note d abov e i n th e dis cussion o n agricultur e tha t MD U assiste d othe r member s o f th e amphur staf f i n a simila r fashion . Th e nai amphur wh o show s the abilit y t o negotiat e suc h arrangement s gain s statu s i n th e eyes o f hi s villagers , wh o i n tur n ar e likel y t o sho w renewe d interest i n villag e development . Furthermore , th e MD U commander wh o succeed s i n energizin g a nai amphur make s hi s own jo b infinitel y mor e rewardin g becaus e h e i s free d fro m rou tine worrie s an d ca n thin k abou t th e large r an d longer-rang e aspects o f hi s mission . I t i s clea r a t al l times , however , tha t al though th e nai amphur i s fre e t o mak e suggestion s an d hi s view s [475]

THAILAND : LE E W . HUF F

are solicited , final contro l ove r distributio n o f th e largess e rest s with MDU . Amphur official s wh o hav e witnesse d th e generall y ver y friendly relation s betwee n MD U personne l an d villagers , mont h after month , hav e begu n to see wha t kin d o f behavio r is expecte d of the m b y Bangko k an d ar e learnin g th e importanc e o f devel oping a bas e o f cordialit y i n th e village s i f the y ar e t o produc e the typ e o f accomplishment , i n a developmen t sense , tha t Bang kok (a t leas t a s represente d b y MDU ) increasingl y erpects . I t is a long, hard jo b t o chang e attitudes , bu t MD U official s believ e they ar e encouragin g som e importan t change s i n th e atmospher e at th e amphur office . The rol e playe d b y MD U personne l an d thei r effec t i n th e field canno t b e overestimated . I n general , the y conduc t them selves admirabl y i n dealin g wit h bot h villager s an d officials . I t is know n tha t thei r progra m receive s high-leve l support . I t i s also becomin g know n o n a n increasin g scal e tha t the y produc e results. Accordingly , the y represen t progres s an d comman d re spect. Withdrawa l o f MD U fro m a n are a to o soon , o r an y seriou s weakening i n RT G suppor t fo r MDU , coul d remov e th e "cuttin g edge" of thi s rather usefu l too l o f rural modernization an d reform . In particular , th e abilit y o f MD U personne l t o obtai n decision s in a matte r o f hour s o n project s whic h a nai amphur migh t tak e months t o arrang e throug h th e traditiona l lin e o f communicatio n from villag e t o district , t o provinc e offic e an d perhap s t o Bang kok, make s a terrifi c impac t o n loca l officials . MD U field official s have a grea t dea l o f discretio n t o commi t thei r ow n resource s locally, an d direc t radi o communication s wit h Bangko k ca n brin g approval fo r large r project s rathe r quickly . MD U headquarter s has confidenc e i n it s field staf f an d relie s heavil y o n it s judgmen t of loca l situations . Th e latte r d o no t hesitat e t o b e candi d abou t the situation s i n whic h the y fin d themselves . Thei r mutua l rela tionship ver y muc h erode s th e traditiona l imag e o f Tha i adminis trative behavior : One characteristi c i s th e extrem e centralizatio n o f decision-makin g which lead s t o seriou s delay s i n administration . I t i s partl y du e t o the reluctance o f senio r official s t o delegat e decision-makin g authorit y to subordinates , th e assumptio n bein g tha t the y can' t b e trusted , an d partly becaus e th e latte r ar e unwillin g t o assum e responsibilit y becaus e

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this migh t violat e th e hierarch y o f deferenc e an d sugges t aggressive ness and also because one dislikes saying "no." (Thoma s 1962:29) It i s revealin g t o fin d tha t MD U personne l cit e th e stimulatio n or "reconditioning " o f loca l administratio n a s on e o f thei r majo r achievements, whil e o n thei r side , man y o f th e nai amphur an d other official s applau d MD U fo r guidanc e an d support . Th e po tential fo r troubl e betwee n th e tw o wa s tremendous . I t i s no t hard t o conceiv e o f a situatio n i n whic h MD U migh t hav e rup tured, ignored , o r embittere d loca l line s o f authority . Instea d the result s appea r t o hav e bee n generall y salutary . Th e abov e description o f th e mutuall y advantageou s relationship s whic h have bee n worke d ou t ha s a stron g flavor o f th e concep t o f reci procity, whic h student s o f Tha i cultur e an d societ y fee l pervade s so many interpersona l socia l arrangements . The long-ru n implication s o f thi s situatio n ar e thought-provok ing. I n tim e o f nationa l troubl e a stron g loca l governmen t i s a crucia l asset . I f i t i s weak , th e centra l governmen t mus t tr y to replac e it , an d usuall y fail s becaus e manpowe r i s i n shor t supply o r i s to o inexperienced . Th e prope r polic y fo r a centra l government the n i s t o mak e seriou s effort s t o strengthe n loca l government befor e troubl e starts . I t appear s tha t MD U i s con tributing t o suc h a strengthening i n thos e area s wher e i t operates , and i t ha s th e potentia l t o pla y a n eve n mor e constructiv e rol e in th e future , i n particula r systematizin g a bi t mor e th e informa l help no w give n t o amphur official s t o includ e hel p i n improvin g the fundamental s o f administration . Thi s merel y mean s takin g the nex t logica l ste p fro m encouragin g initiativ e an d changin g attitudes t o actua l concer n wit h principle s an d technique s o f governing. Certainl y i n thos e district s wher e th e nai amphur an d the MD U staf f hav e develope d clos e friendl y relationships , i t i s possible tha t th e nai amphur woul d b e receptiv e t o suggestion s concerning improvement s i n administrativ e practice s (Se e Huf f 1964:8-10). The factor s mentione d here—th e securit y threat , conventiona l crime, an d administration—ar e bein g deal t wit h i n a mos t indi rect an d perhap s unintentiona l way . The y ar e th e essenc e o f the politica l organizatio n o f a country . I n contras t t o insurgents , who emphasiz e politica l organizatio n i n doctrin e an d practice , [ 47 7 ]

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political organizatio n i s treate d ver y gingerl y an d uneasil y b y theorists an d practitioner s o f developmen t an d counter-insur gency. Suc h theorist s an d practitioner s ar e uncomfortabl e whe n it come s t o dealin g directl y wit h th e issu e o f achievin g an d sus taining politica l control , partl y becaus e th e word s themselve s have a slightl y impur e ring , an d littl e more i s sai d beyon d vagu e generalizations abou t constitutions , democracy , etc . Nevertheless , in it s gradua l progres s i n achievin g straightforwar d educationa l (psychological), social , an d economi c objective s an d impact , MDU i s o n th e threshol d o f motivatin g highl y constructiv e ad vances i n administratio n an d government , i.e. , i n th e politica l framework s o crucia l t o th e orderl y developmen t o f a rapidl y changing rura l area . Cultural Tailoring. On e o f th e crucia l question s t o b e consid ered i n dealin g wit h th e desig n o f a developmen t progra m i s the exten t t o which on e must tailo r i t t o th e cultura l background s of th e targe t population . Thes e decisions , o f course , ar e heavil y influenced b y th e relativ e importanc e withi n an y give n countr y of view s concerning , respectively , th e cultura l integrit y an d uniqueness o f minoritie s an d th e desirabilit y o f minimizin g di versity i n th e interes t o f nationa l unit y throug h som e polic y o f integration o r assimilatio n int o th e "majority " societ y an d culture. In Thailan d th e mos t obviou s instance s o f ethni c diversit y ar e found amon g th e triba l group s whic h inhabi t th e nort h an d northwestern hil l areas . Developmen t effort s wit h respec t t o these people s ar e discusse d b y Geddes , Kunstadter , Manndorf f and Moerma n i n othe r paper s i n thi s volume. The MD U progra m will b e extende d int o th e Nort h i n th e secon d hal f o f 1965 . A t present, i t reache s a s fa r a s Loe i Province , whic h form s a transi tional geographi c bridg e betwee n th e Northeas t an d th e North ; however, i n Loe i MD U wor k i s confined t o th e valleys . Hill area s there ar e no t involve d beyon d th e alread y existin g relationship s between th e triba l populatio n an d th e Borde r Patro l Polic e (BPP), wh o attemp t t o teac h school , provid e medica l aid , etc. , whenever the y ca n (se e USO M 1963) . Thi s ha s bee n don e de liberately becaus e th e MD U leadershi p i s no t a t al l convince d that th e approac h an d technique s whic h hav e succeede d i n th e Northeast ar e suitabl e fo r dealin g effectivel y wit h triba l groups . [478 ]

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The tremendou s languag e variation s strik e operator s first i n their priorit y listin g o f problems. 34 Thi s i s no t surprisin g i n a program concerne d primaril y wit h communicatin g effectively . It i s realize d tha t n o organizatio n ca n hop e t o comman d th e dozens o f strang e language s spoken ; henc e som e agreemen t mus t be reache d o n th e fe w language s whic h affec t th e mos t triba l groups, an d the n a capabilit y t o us e the m mus t b e developed. 35 Again, th e principa l sourc e o f experienc e i s th e BPP . Knowledg e of th e taboos , habits, beliefs, an d attitude s o f hill people is almos t nonexistent i n Bangkok ; no r ar e hand y pocke t guide s availabl e in Chiengmai . I t woul d appea r tha t som e leve l o f knowledg e about thes e cultura l factor s woul d b e essentia l t o th e succes s of a n MDU-typ e program , bu t i t remain s fo r th e researche r an d the relativ e handfu l o f peopl e wh o hav e live d wit h triba l group s (mainly medica l missionaries , BP P patrolme n an d anthropolo gists) t o suggest that level and its substance. The operato r ca n neve r kno w al l ther e i s t o kno w abou t a n ethnic group , an d probabl y h e nee d not . Bu t h e mus t hav e suffi cient sensitivit y t o recogniz e wha t i s significan t t o th e minorit y he i s dealin g with an d wha t i s not important . I t ha s been pointe d out, fo r example , tha t o n certai n day s th e Lua ? hil l trib e hol d ceremonies durin g whic h nobod y i s permitte d t o ente r o r leav e the villag e on certai n trails , and als o that thei r pantheon o f spirit s resides i n know n section s o f virgi n fores t hig h i n th e hills , whic h are always of f limit s for agriculture. 36 The operato r needs t o kno w whether thes e standard s o f conduc t ar e absolutel y inviolable , or ar e loosel y hel d an d considere d irrelevan t i n relatio n t o visi tors, o r ca n b e compromise d unde r certai n prescribe d circum 84 MDU experienc e i n remot e area s o f th e Northeas t ha s le d t o creatio n o f one extremel y significan t asset : a n appreciatio n o f th e difficult y o f actuall y con ducting field operation s o f thi s typ e an d a consequen t tendenc y no t t o underesti mate o r gloss over problems. 85 It wa s announce d i n Januar y 196 5 tha t specia l program s i n th e dialect s of th e Me o an d Ya o tribe s wer e bein g trie d ou t experimentall y ove r th e govern ment radi o statio n i n Lampang . Th e directo r o f th e Publi c Relation s Departmen t said he had been instructe d b y th e governmen t t o plan a program o f regula r broad casts t o th e hil l tribe s i n appropriat e dialects . "Th e firs t ste p was t o mak e a surve y a s thoroug h a s possibl e . . . t o find ou t whic h ar e th e bigges t hil l tribes an d whic h dialect s ar e mos t widel y spoke n amon g them " (Bangkok World, January 24 , 1965) . "Based o n discussio n wit h Dr . P . Kunstadte r durin g a visi t t o Ba n P a Pae , Changwat Maehongson , Thailand , i n 1964 .

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stances. Indeed , i n th e cas e o f a Lua ? trai l violation , paymen t of a smal l fin e ma y b e sufficien t redemption . Encroachmen t o n the spirits ' home i s far mor e serious , althoug h Kare n agricultura l operations i n a corne r o f on e suc h locatio n ar e leadin g t o th e ra tionalization tha t i f th e Karen s pa y a substantia l fine, al l wil l be forgiven . Th e poin t i s tha t thos e responsibl e fo r implementin g action program s nee d factua l informatio n t o improv e thei r judg ment i n situation s i n whic h reactio n wit h minorit y group s i s re quired. If , a s i n th e cas e o f th e Lua? , th e religiou s syste m i s viewed b y th e grou p "a s th e centra l cor e o f thei r culture, " th e facts abou t thi s religio n mus t b e acquire d (Kunstadte r 1964:10) . It ma y ver y wel l b e tha t carefu l assessmen t o f triba l behavior s will lea d specialist s t o conclud e tha t government s shoul d no t attempt developmen t program s i n thei r areas . Th e fact s o f lif e are such , however , tha t triba l group s i n Southeas t Asi a ar e bein g forced int o a n inevitabl e relationship , o r "confrontation, " wit h the twentiet h centur y a s i t exist s beyon d thei r smal l territoria l horizons. Th e tas k fo r researcher s the n i s t o infor m bette r thos e who will be required t o undertake thi s responsibility . As note d earlier , ther e i s a distinctiv e Malay-Islami c popula tion i n th e sout h o f Thailand . Th e MD U progra m ha s bee n ex tended ther e b y mean s o f a modest effor t i n YaIa an d Narathiwa t provinces. Prio r t o arrival , th e Secretar y o f th e Musli m Counci l of Thailan d wa s briefe d o n MDU, an d he wrote letters explainin g its purpos e an d urgin g cooperatio n t o al l th e Musli m Committee s in th e operation s area . Adjustment s t o loca l condition s hav e bee n made, wit h notabl e progres s i n th e MD U are a directe d b y a senior Tha i militar y office r wh o i s a Muslim . Hi s staf f include d four othe r Musli m officers , an d thei r knowledg e o f th e possibl e and impossibl e withi n th e contex t o f Islami c teaching s an d loca l custom ha s bee n th e ke y t o th e operation . I t i s als o significan t that, ove r time , thi s commande r ha s inspire d change s i n habitua l behavior tha t simpl y coul d no t hav e bee n accomplishe d i n th e first instanc e b y fiat—or b y a non-Muslim . Fo r example , h e learned o f th e importanc e o f sewin g t o th e familie s i n th e are a and arrange d t o hav e sewin g course s taught . I n orde r t o atten d them, however , th e wome n ha d t o appea r o n th e stree t an d g o to school . Th e me n i n th e are a finally gav e i n t o th e deman d for th e course , doubtles s recognizin g tha t th e ne w trainin g coul d [ 48 0 I

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increase income . Th e change s ar e hardl y earthshaking , bu t som e improvement i n skill s supportin g th e loca l econom y ha s bee n made, th e socia l positio n o f wome n ha s bee n liberalize d slightl y (and th e fac t tha t th e increase d activit y o f Musli m wome n i n the villag e ha s ha d n o untowar d consequence s ha d le d t o som e relaxation o f th e formalis m i n relation s betwee n Musli m an d non-Muslim), an d th e governmen t ha s succeede d i n showin g its abilit y t o assis t it s citizens . Th e tea m leade r ha s als o brough t Muslim an d non-Musli m togethe r i n socia l functions , caterin g to th e dietar y requirement s o f each , an d ha s becom e a feature d speaker i n th e mosque s i n th e vicinity . Undoubtedly , furthe r MDU activit y i n th e Sout h will be modeled afte r thi s experiment . The Northeas t i s differen t fro m th e Nort h an d South . I t lack s the complet e strangenes s o f th e othe r areas . To mak e thre e gros s generalizations, prio r t o initiatio n o f th e MD U progra m Bangko k knew almos t nothin g abou t it s hil l trib e populations ; ver y littl e about it s purel y Malay-Musli m districts ; but , i n contrast , i t seemed t o kno w a lo t abou t th e Northeast—th e proble m wa s to ge t peopl e u p ther e t o appl y thi s knowledge . Subsequently , the Tha i governmen t generate d th e motivation , an d MD U ha s performed th e function . Th e relativ e eas e with whic h i t has don e so suggest s tha t th e abov e generalization s ar e no t to o farfetched . In th e introductio n t o thi s pape r i t wa s note d tha t ethnicall y and linguisticall y th e Tha i o f centra l Thailan d an d th e Thai-La o of th e Northeas t appea r t o b e ver y clos e relative s indeed , par ticularly whe n compare d t o th e distanc e separatin g eac h o f the m from th e hil l tribe s an d th e Malays . A s wea k a s the y hav e bee n historically, tie s betwee n Bangko k an d th e vas t Northeas t are a have existe d fo r a lon g time , an d th e su m tota l o f contac t ha s been extensive . Withi n th e contex t o f MDU , th e Tha i militar y is n o strange r t o peopl e fro m th e Northeast , drawin g man y re cruits fro m tha t area . Wheneve r possible , militar y officer s wh o come fro m th e Northeas t ar e use d i n MD U operations . Thes e factors hav e mean t tha t probabl y les s "cultura l tailoring " ha s been necessar y an d tha t mor e knowledg e ha s bee n availabl e t o do sensibl y wha t ha s bee n required . Th e intelligen t manne r i n which i t wa s applie d ha s bee n discusse d abov e i n detail . Th e success o f MD U t o date , which ha s bee n fa r greate r tha n anyon e had a right t o expect , i s due primaril y t o recognition o f th e valu e [481 ]

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of cultura l sensitivit y i n conductin g a people-to-peopl e progra m productively. Several othe r problem s remai n t o confron t MDU . Ther e hav e been repeate d explici t reference s an d inference s i n th e bod y o f this pape r t o th e desirabilit y o f a muc h mor e intensiv e researc h effort t o determin e th e economic , social , an d attitudina l effect s of MD U work . I t i s hard t o overestimat e th e importanc e o f finding ou t wh y bot h successe s an d failure s hav e occurre d an d t o distill ou t o f th e recor d o f MD U experienc e th e dat a an d under standing require d t o plan , direct , an d implemen t th e constantl y increasing numbe r o f MD U area s (Huf f 1964:20-21 , 46-48) . Given th e tremendou s importanc e attache d t o educatin g an d informing th e publi c i n bot h th e impac t an d follow-u p phases , more effor t i s neede d t o improv e informatio n technique s an d insure tha t the y receiv e th e broades t possibl e applicatio n (Huf f 1963:46-51; 1964:48-49). Similarly, more attention shoul d be pai d to devisin g mor e productiv e mean s o f usin g th e arme d forces , the larges t poo l o f organize d manpowe r i n th e country , i n MDU o r MDU-relate d work . Clearly , th e smal l grou p o f militar y officers wh o hav e create d an d le d MD U ar e th e sourc e o f it s success, an d i t i s the y wh o hav e displaye d an d insiste d upo n the cultura l sensitivit y emphasize d abov e an d sparke d th e wor k of th e civi l ministries ; however , the y ar e smal l i n number , an d the vas t majorit y o f militar y me n si t untappe d o n militar y posts , uninvolved, and—i n thi s context—unproductive . I argu e onl y that i t i s i n th e interest s o f al l developin g nation s wit h sizabl e military force s activel y t o see k optima l utilizatio n o f the m i n de velopment roles (se e Huff 1963:64-66 ; 1964:49-51) . Finally, a wor d o f cautio n abou t th e danger s o f uncoordinate d work. Al l th e MD U achievement s o n th e lis t coul d b e wipe d out b y misfortun e i n othe r governmen t programs . On e canno t conduct a progra m base d o n th e messag e tha t th e governmen t has th e interest s o f th e peopl e a t hear t i f actio n i n som e othe r sphere o f governmen t activit y contradict s th e message . The n both program s lose . Th e mos t likel y candidate s fo r causin g suc h difficulties ar e larg e economi c developmen t projects , especiall y dams, whic h requir e th e resettlemen t o f larg e number s o f people . This i s alway s a delicat e issue , an d a perfec t solutio n wil l neve r be found ; however , thes e situation s mus t neve r b e permitte d [ 48 2 ]

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to g o by default . Proper o r improper handlin g o f th e large numbers of people involved will constitute a highly visible demonstration o f governmen t intentions . I n th e contex t o f MDU , the y should b e seize d a s opportunitie s an d conducte d carefull y t o achieve maximum impact (se e Huff 1964:41-43) . Conclusion. A s a rule, th e Tha i peopl e ar e not pron e t o settl e their dispute s b y violence . Popula r revolution s ar e no t par t o f their experience . Pressure s hav e bee n resolve d b y othe r mean s and usuall y b y th e action s o f thei r rulers . I t i s interestin g tha t Thomas close s hi s stud y o f Tha i government , whic h conclude s that inevitabl e domesti c an d foreig n pressure s wil l necessaril y force th e country to modify th e structure and values of its political system , wit h th e followin g statement . "On e thin g i s certain , however; i f chang e come s i t wil l com e fro m th e top , fo r thi s is the way of Thailand" (Thoma s 1962:33). MDU is a clear example of this dictum. It may be only temporary, an d neithe r fina l succes s no r failur e ca n be claime d a t thi s juncture i n time . Bu t thi s progra m doe s represen t a deliberat e choice o n th e par t o f th e nation s leadershi p t o induce , direct , or a t leas t channe l chang e constructively . I t i s a n interestin g case stud y i n revolutio n fro m above . REFERENCES CITE D AMYOT, JACQUE S

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