Thailand and the Japanese Presence, 1941-45 9789814377720

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Established as an autonomous organisation in May, 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre fOJ: scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted problems of modernization and development, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-four-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the Government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is ex officio chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

"Copyright subsists in this publication under the United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911, and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication, or extracts therefrom, without the written permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore."

Publications Review Committee

Professor Kernial S. Sandhu (Chairman) Dr. Corazon M. Siddayao (Co-ordinator) Dr. Huynh Kim Khanh Mrs. P. Lim Pui Huen Mr. M. Rajaretnam Mrs. Christine Tan

Thailand and the Japanese Presence, 1941-45 is the sixth in the Research Notes and Discussions series published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. This series comprises contributions which represent the tentative results of ongoing research, and of discussions, printed for the purpose of stimulating further thought on specific projects.

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in the work that follows rests exclusively with Dr. Thamsook Numnonda and her interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

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The Inst1tute also publishes books and other papers from time to time in the following series: specialized studies on topics BOOKS/MONOGRAPHS: relating to Southeast Asia. SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS: an annual review of significant political, economic and social developments in the region, with emphasis on the ASEAN Contents include analyses in depth of topics countries. of regional concern and of specific issues on a country-bycountry basis. FIELD REPORTS: studies embodying the results of, and based exclusively on, the Institute's research programme; OCCASIONAL PAPERS: professional papers issued periodically on a variety of topics of regional interest. TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: papers and proceedings of Trends seminars held on individual Southeast Asian countries; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES: publications based on proceedings of International Conferences sponsored by the Institute itself or in conjunction with other organizations; CURRENT ISSUES SEMINARS: publications growing out of the Institute's Curren& Issues series of seminars, the objective of which is to bring together knowledgeable and interested people to discuss topics of current concern and importance to the region. SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: aimed at wider circulation of Southeast Asian thinking, these publications are original contributions in English of Southeast Asians or translations of their significant papers and monographs appearing in one of the local or national languages of the

region; ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMME: publications based on the oral memoirs of persons who have made notable contribution to, or have first-hand information to impart on, certain aspects of the developments of Singapore and Malaysia; LIBRARY BULLETINS: papers on Southeast Asian librarianship and bibliography. 3rd October 1977

Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

CONTENTS Page Acknowledgements

i

Prologue

iii

I:

THE

II:

"THE NEW

III:

THAI RESPONSE TO THE JAPANESE PRESENCE

43

IV:

THE THAI RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

63

V:

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THAILAND, 1941-45

83

SECO~D

HORLD 'N'AR COMES TO THAILAND

THAILA..~D"

APPENDIXES

A:

1 21

97

AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THAILAND CONCERNING THE PASSAGE BY THE JAPANESE FORCES THROUGH THAI TERRITORY

99

PACTE D'ALLIANCE ENTRE LE JAPON ET LA THAILANDE,21 DECEMBER 1941

lOl

ROYAL PROCLAMATION ISSUED BY THE REGENT OF THAILAND IN THE NAME OF KING ANANDA M~HIDOL ON 16 AUGUST 1945

103

D:

WHO'S WHO

105

E:

MEMBERS OF THE FREE THAI MOVEMENT

119

B: c~

F':

In England

119

In the United States

120

THAI CABINETS'CHRONOLOGY, 1938-57

BIBLIOGRAPHY

123 125

Acknowledgements Since I began this research in June 1975, I have had the unflagging support of many persons and institutions. It is impossible to give a full list of them, but I must single out the following names for special thanks. Among them are the benefactors who have rendered me financial support: the Ford Foundation and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore; Dre Tej Bunnag of the Thai Foreign Ministry; Dr. Vinita Krairiksh, Lecturer at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University; the staff of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, especially my two colleagues, Lim Joo-Jock and Tan Sok Joo, who helped in reading part of the first script. To Lim Yoon Lin, another colleague at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, must go my special thanks. She not only painstakingly went through the entire manuscript to render my English more readable but also gave me the benefit of her comments and suggestions. September 1976 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Thamsook Numnonda

Prologue On 8 December 1941 troops of the Japanese Imperial Army invaded Thailand and demanded free passage through Thai territory to invade British Malaya and British Burma" The request was granted by the government of Prime Minister Pibulsongkram. This decision was the first of many to be taken by Pibulsongkram in the next month-and-a-half, culminating in the Treaty of Alliance with the Japanese Government on 21 December 1941 and Thailand's declaration of war against Britain and the United States on 25 January 1942. The Japanese troops remained in Thailand until their surrender on 15 August 1945. The Japanese presence in Thailand, though short, had significant effects on the country's political and social structures. Politically, it initiated the struggle between the pro-Japanese and the anti-Japanese factions among the promoters of the 1932 coup d'e-cat. This was lat:er to lead to an open split in the postwar era between the military and the civilian politicians, a rivalry which has continued in present day Thai politics. Economically, the Japanese presence was responsible for the disruption of trade, severe inflation, widespread corruption as well as blackmarketing and profiteering. Socially, the Japanese presence was one of the main factors that strengthened Pibulsongkram' s drive towards a"New and Greater Thailand". Pibul's nation-building programmes, the effects of which can still be felt today in certain sectors of Thai life, have contributed remarkably to Thailand's status in the international scene. Despite the fact that much of what is happening in present day Thai society has roots in the wartime period, the story of the Japanese presence in Thailand has remained largely untold. The war years as a whole comprise a littleknown chapter in modern Thai history. Of the published works by Thais, the great bulk have dealt with the ac·tivi ties of the anti-Japanese resistance, both in Thailand and abroadc Most of them are biographies, autobiographies, memoirs, and second-hand accounts, often of doubtful accuracy. There is, however, one exception. This i.s a. competent piece of scholarly study based on documentary evidence entitled Tha1: Zand and the Second World ~var, by Direk Jayanam, the Foreign Minister when the Japanese troops entered Thailand. His work, however,

iv

mainly described the war situation in the Pacific and Thai foreign policy, shedding little light on the Japanese presence in Thailand. Like the Thai works, the publications in English for this period comprise mainly personal accounts of the resistance movement or of the construction of the notorious Burma-Thailand Railway. A very prolific author on the war is, probably the prewar British Minister in Bangkok, The Crossroads has given Sir Josiah Crosby, who in Siam: a survey of the last years of the Absolute Monarchy in "Siam", t.he "Siam" of the 1930s and of the first year of the Japanese presence while he was an internee in Bangkok. Sir Josiah~s survey, however, is seen by many Thais as only another biographical piece of work. There is a detailed account of the background of events that led to war in Thailand, based largely on Japanese sources in Thadeus Flood 1 s "Japan 1 s Relations with Thailand: 1928-1941" (unnublished doctoral thesis, University of Washington, 1967). Flood has traced the development of rapproahement between these two countries during the decade immediately preceding the outbreak of war in the Pacific in 1941. His thesis is based on the theory that Pibulsongkram, the Thai Prime Minister, was already predisposed, before the Japanese invasion in Thailand in December 1941, to favour Japan in its Flood, however, has emerging struggle with the livest. Japan's relations examine to 1941 not gone beyond the year years. war with Thailand during the Delving into the historical background of the war years in Thailand, the researcher has ventured into an entirely unexplored field of history, in which the most elementary facts are as yet quite unknown. To study the context of this thesis, original sources in various archives and libraries in Thailand, .Japan, Washington, D.C., London and the Republic of Singapore have been examined extensively. The voluminous files of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Assembly, the Thai Prime Minister's Office and the Thai Most of these RoyaL Gazette, have been consulted. materials 1 until now, have not been studied by Thai The writer scholars nor consulted by foreign researchers. is fortunate to have been the first person given the privilege of access to Thai Government documents relating to foreign affairs after 1930.

v

The files of the Japanese Foreign Office were examined by the writer to gain an insight into Japanese actions in Thailand. As regards the English language materials, the documents of the Department of State, Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, ~vashington, D.C., the National Archives, WashingtoJ, D.C. , and the Public Record Office, London were also consulted. Besides the official documents, newspapers and magazines in Thai, Japanese, and English pertaining to Thailand during that p~riod, records and notes written by both authorities and private individuals involved in the events of that epoch had been analysed. In this study the writer attempts to examine and analyse the Japanese presence in Thailand, the Thai response and the changes effected in the Thai way of life in that span of four years. It is the writer's contention that throughout the war period, Thailand was the only country in Southeast Asia that maintained its independence, sovereignty and honour in that, the administration of the country was vested in Thai authorities, especially in the person of the Prime Minister. In addition to this, Thailand was the only Southeast Asian country with an indigenous army operating independently of the Japanese army. Hence, in Thai view, the Japanese army was not an army of occupation but rather, a "guest" army. The first chapter explains how almost overnight Thailand became one of the key areas for the Japanese in the pursuit of their "Co-Prosperity Sphere". It examines in detail the crucial connection between Thailand's abandonment of neutrality and its declaration of war upon t.he Allies a.nd its eagerness to climb on to the victorious Japanese bandwagon. The second chapter traces Pibul' s act.ions and the ideas of his New Thailand programmes in t.he light of the Japanese presence. Pibul believed that since Thailand was at war and the Japanese were present in the country, the Thais should demonstrate to the world that they were maintaining their old culture and civilization. To Pibul the only way for Thailand to survive was to adopt a policy of adaptation under a strong dictatorship. This was translated into a campaign to foster a true "Thai Culture".

Vl

Pibul's ideas, in particular the fostering of a "New and Greater Thailand" are examined in depth here. The third and fourth chapters explore the nature and the background to the conflicts between the pro-Japanese and the anti-Japanese factions among the top Thai leaders. The author tri·es to show how the Thai politicians who had once been classmates during their student days in the 1920s in France and had once worked closely together to engineer the 1932 coup d'etat, differed in their opinions in tackling the wartime problems. The fourth chapter also describes the existence and activities of the Thai resistance movements against the Japanese both at home and abroad, and points out the mutual dislike and suspicion ~~ong their leaders - feelings which finally created a reservoir of mutual misunderstanding and irreconcilability among the military and civilian politicians in Thai politics today. Chapter Five examines the economic situation in Thailand during the Japanese military presence. Japan benefitted greatly from Thailand 1 s rich sources of raw materials, especially rice and other essential supplies but these commodities were wholly paid for. Even prices were properly "controlled" in some cases. The Thai Government was under considerable pressure, at times even duress, but up to the very end it was in the interest of both parties, J'apan and Thailand, to preserve and work within the framework of Thai sovereignty and the Thai bureaucratic system. The underlying thesis of this work - the Thai talent for survival - is confirmed with Japan•s surrender in August 1945. Pro-Axis throughout the greater part of the war, the Thai Government was nevertheless seen by the Allies to be pro-Allies towards the end of the War. In reality, the Thais were not so much pro-Japanese or pro-Allies as pro-Thai. The Thai art of diplomacy had once again saved the nation. And this, of course, has a.lways been the way the Thais have met and overcome every crisis.

I:

SECOND WORLD WAR II COMES TO

THAIL~~D

On 8 December 1941 the Thai Government under Field Marshal Pibulsongkram, the Prime Minister, gave free passage to Japanese forces through Thai terri t,ory" 1 This action was in sharp contrast to the government's policy proclaimed a few months earlier that it would fight any aggressor "to the last drop of blood" and undertake a "scorched-earth" policy. It was to be of inestimable value to Japan in providing its forces with a network of highways, railways, and airports reaching right to the frontiers of Burma and Malaya, thus paving the way for its startling victories in the Pacific. Pibul addressed the nation in a broadcast: On December 8, 1941, since about 2 o'clock a.m., Japanese forces entered into [sic] Thailand by sea in the Provinces of Singora, Pattani, Prachuapkhirikan, Nakhon Sithamarat, Surat Thani, and Bang Pu, while on land they came in by way of the Provinces of Batt.ambong and Pibulsongkram. Almost eve·rywhere the Thai military and police forces put up a sturdy struggle. At the same time, news came from abroad to the effect that the Japanese navy attacked Hawaii and the Philippines of United States and landed troops at Khota Baru in Bri t.ish Malaya and made a heavy attack by air on Singapore. In this connection, the Japanese Ambassador came to the Official Residence of Prime Minister on December 7, 1941 at 10.30 o'clock p.m. and explained to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that war had been declared on Great Britain and the United States but that Japan did not consider Thailand as an enemy but she was obliged by necessity to ask for passage through 'I'hai territory.

1

Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo, Japan (hereafter cited as DRO) File Second World War (Pacific), No, A 7"0,0.9-3-1~ "Agreement between Japan and Thailand'', 8 December 1941.

2

Having thoroughly examined the matter, His Majesty's Government consider that the events which has [sic] thus occurred could not be avert.ed. Although Thailand had t.ried all she could, she could not get clear of them, and from the nature of the events which had occurred, further struggle would entail the loss of Thai blood without achieving its purpose. It has therefore been necessary to take into consideration the proposals of the Japanese Governments and concede passage to the Japanese armed forces .... 2 While the whole nation was caught by surprise, the House of Representatives convened a special secret session on 9 December 1941. Pibul was not present for some unknown reason, but a cabinet member, Captain Tawal Thamrong-Nawasawat, the Minister of Justice, was there on his behalf. Tawal explained the reasons for allowing the Japanese to use Thai territory and asked for the full support of Parliament. At one point he said, " ... what is happening at present is just unavoidable. It has got 11 to be accepted as an issue which we cannot avert 3 oo

oo

Many questions were asked. They focussed on issues of neutrality, sovereignty and the honour of Thailand, the reaction of the Allies, the financial situation of the Thai baht, the exact nature of the permission of free passage t.o Japanese troops as. well as the government's foreign policy towards Japan,4 Of most concern to Parliament was the country's independence. Unfortunately, Tawal was unable to answer these questions for reasons of security. All he could do was to inform Parliament of the written assurance of the

2

• Foreign Ministyy Arahives, Bangkok, File 2 (Second World War). No, 2 (Pacific War) hereafter cited as FM 2/2. Part I Incidents at the beginning of Japanese invasion and the maintenance of peace, (Hereafter cited as FM 2/2.1), No, 22200-22210/2484, Foreign Ministry - All Thai Ministers and Consuls, 8 December 1941"

3

Rai~n.gan Kanpraahum Sapha Phuthaen Ratsadon. (Hereafter cited as Proceedings of the National Assembly), No, 1/2484, Third Special Session (Typewritten), 9 December 1941, p. 3,

4

Ibid,$ ppo 4-9,

3

Japanese to respect the independence, sovereignty and honour of Thailand. He also assured Parliament of the government's policy to remain neutra1.5 Events moved very fast. On 10 December 1941, two days after the announcement of free passage to the Japanese troops, the Thai Government declared a state of emergency. A day later, the Offensive-Defensive Pact with Japan was signed. Under its terms Thailand agreed to give Japan such military co-operation as was necessary for the above purposes.6 An hour before the signing of the pact Pibul convened a Cabinet meeting to decide whether Thailand should abandon its neutrality.? In his memoirs Pibul recalled what he told his Cabinet colleagues: ..•. The¥ [the Japanese] told me straightforward [sicj last night that we had only one choice - that was to co-operate militarily with them .... Frankly speaking, I do not know what to do • . . . If we reject t.he demand we will be disarmed and become helpless ... , but if we fight, it means the complete collapse of the whole nation •..• What I have in mind is that since we have already allied [ourselves] with them we have to collaborate actively,,oo But what will happen in the future I cannot. predict •.•• I do not see how we can survive Had we fought from December 8, we would not have had a chance to sit at this meeting and the whole thing would not have to be prolonged. If we want to live longer we have to talk with them and surely we will come under pressure ceaselessly. However, the Japanese promised me

5

Loc,cit,

6

FM 2/2. Part 16 The Declaration of War on Great Britain and the United States, Communique, December 1941,

7

Vichit Vichitvadhakarn, Tu Thong [Golden cupboard],(Bangkok, 1970), pp. 20-22,

4

that if we join them, they would be fully satisfied and respect us ...• 8 During the meeting which was attended by twenty-two of the twenty-four ministers, no minister raised any point of argument.9 All of them understood the dangerous situation and agreed that since they had surrendered from the first moment it was too late and very unwise to start fighting then.lO The crucial the meeting room had been waiting hour later Pibul

hour came at 11.00 a.m. when Pibul left to meet with the Japanese Ambassador who in the hall. When he returned half an simply told his colleagues:

I have already signed it. As I had said earlier I did not know what to do. We have to fight and die ahead. There is no more time to look backward •... Please be calm and be prepared for the worse •••. However the Japanese seem deeply happy •... 11 The House of Representatives was not informed about the pact until almost two weeks later because the Japanese Ambassador had asked the Thai Government to regard the agreement as a temporary and incomplete one, and that the contents be held in strict confidence.l2 On 12 December 1941, Pibul delivered a second broadcast to the public to explain the necessity of a military alliance with Japan: ...• When the nation is facing a serious dilemma, we Thais, excellent warriors, must learn to adapt ourselves. Our ship is being hit by irresistible storms. Not only we but also the others suffer the same fate. We have 8

Anant Pibulsongkram, Jompon Paw Pibutsongkram (Field Marshal Pibulsongkram), val. II (Bangkok, 1975), pp. 318-320.

9

Vichitvadhakarn, op.cit., pp. 20-22.

10 Anant Pibu1songkram, op.cit,, pp. 324-326, 11 Ibid, 12 Proceedings of -c.he Nationat Assembty, No. 4!2484, "The Government's Agreement with Japan", 23 December 1941, pp. 63-64,

5

to sacrifice no matter whether we have to pretend, to be pleased, to be happy or to be unhappy 13 At the same time, he also called upon his fellow-countrymen to show a better disposition towards Japanese troops when meeting them on the street or at home and to treat them with courtesy and kindness.l4 He went further by accusing Great Britain of having deprived Thailand of its territory, and concluded that a cordial friendship between the Thais and the British could not continue. On 14 December 1941, the Thai Government again signed another agreement with Japan, agreeing to fight side by side with the Japanese troops in Burma.l5 No reasons were given for the above decision. The Offensi.ve-Defensive Pact of 11 December f and the military Agreement of 14 December were formally agreed upon by the two governments in the form of a Treaty of Alliance on 21 December 1941. The treaty stipulated that should elther of the parties be engaged in an armed conflict with another country, the second party was to side with the other immediately, and to accord it all possible assistance, whether political, economic or military" There were also two insertions. First, there was a secret protocol touching on a promise of the restoration of some of Thailand's "lost provinces" in Malaya and in Burma. Second, the Agreement bet.ween Japan and Thailand of 8 December 19 41 concerning free passage to the Japanese forces through the Thai territory was abolished.l6

13

FM 2/2,1, "Suggestions of the Interior Ministry to people", 13 December 1941.

14

FM 2/2,1, "Announcement of the Finance Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the etiquette given to Japanese Soldiers", 6 January 1942.

15

Sang Patthanothai, Khwam Nuk nai Krong Kang (Reflections Bangkok, 1956, p. 537.

i6

FM 2/2, 3. Part 3, Treaty Negotiations with

~n

Prison)

Japan~ "Memorandum on the Treaty of Friendship between Thailand and Japan",

6

To give it due solemnity, the Treaty was signed before the most sacred Emerald Buddha, an unprecedented act in Thai historyc The incident was proudly described a year later by the Foreign Minister Vich1t Vichitvadhakarn, a most loyal supporter of Pibul, as thus: ...• We believe in the truth of the Lord Buddha, therefore, any act performed before him must be considered that we will always abide by the truth and nothing but the truth. We shall honour our words and respect the pact literally, spir1 tually and honestly. And since the conclusion of that historic pact much Nippon and Thai blood has been spilled on the battle fronts for a common cause. The pact of fait"h has become by now a pact of blood between the two nations ., .. 17 It should be noted that the languages used in the Agreement were Thai and French, an indication of the strong anti-British feelings held by both governments that they refused to use the Engl1sh language. The National Assembly was informed about the Treaty of Alliance on 23 December 1941 when members received three booklets each concerning the Alliance Treaty between Japan and Thailand, the attached Secret Protocol, and the exchanged letters between the two Prime Ministers, and told to keep the attached Protocol secret. Vichitvadhakarn warned the Assembly: .•.. Please be careful. If this document appears somewhere, the damage is twofold. Firstly, other countries will lose faith in us and secondly, if any foreigner gets hold of it, our future plan will be destroyed •.•. 18 A strong incentive for the Assembly members was the restoration of the former Thai provinces in the Agreement. Indeed, the overall atmosphere of the House was enthusiastic.

17

Mala& Slnpo, 25 January 1943,

18

Proaeedmgs of dw Nat&onaZ AssEirrlb2y,

No, 4/248"1, "The Thai Agreement with the Japanese Government", 23 December 1941, pp. 63-64.

7

Most representatives supported the government's decision to fight side by side with Japan. Deeply moved, Vichitvadhakarn announced in an emotion-filled voice that: The Japanese. soldiers told us that whether we want to declare war on the Allies or to recall our Ambassadors from those countries depends on our own judgement. \lve must wait and see . • . . However, I am most sure that all Honourable members were [sic] unanimously agree with me that since we have already come to this point we have to go ahead .... 19 The decisive moment for Thailand came on 25 January 1942 when it declared war on Great Britain and the United States. The government's communique gave the reasons for the Declaration as follows: ...• It appeared that Great Britain and the United States continuously conducted hostilities against Thailand by invading [sic] troops into her territory and by bombing raids against civilian as well as military targets. This act was brazen encroachments [sic] on the sovereignty, territory and independence of Thailand and was a violation of the International Law. We could no longer tolerate •o•• ..•. In the past Thailand has been oppressed in many ways by England. The British did everything to prevent the development of the country, especially in the industrial field .. ,. As far as the United States is concerned, all Thais should remember that during the IndoChina War, the American Government refused to sanction the delivery of a shipment of airplanes, previously paid for by Thailand. 2 0 History also 19

Proc:eedings of the National Assembly, No, 4/2484, "The Thai Agreement with the Japanese Government", 23 December 1941, pp. 74-75,

20

Khuang Aphaiwongse (who later became Prime Minister after the fall of Pibul in 1944) was sent by the government in 1940 to buy aircraft ' in America but when the shipment arrived in the Philippines the White House refused to deliver them to Thailand for fear that those weapons

8

reveals that the United States failed to mediate or to assist our country when we were at loggerheads with France in 1893 •••. 21 Vichitvadhakarn who was accorded the honour to announce to the Thai nation that Thailand was at war with Great Britain and the United States described the 11 most memorable day 11 22 of his life thus: it was the night of January 24 that there was a hea~~ air-raid on Bangkok. Bombs fell on the National Assembly - an incident which caused the greatest indignation among the people. On the morning of January 25, at 10.00 aom. a meeting of the Council of Ministers convened" It was at that meeting that a declaration of war was decided on. All the 24 ministers who composed the Council voted in favour of war on Britain and the United States 23 our·declaration of war at the time was merely a pure formality ••. because if we had not sympathized with Nippon's cause we would not have allowed her troops to pass through our country on the very first day of an outbreak of the War of Greater East Asia ..•• No Government can make such a momentous decision within a few hours if, it had not already in its mind a fixed policy to be followed under such circumstances ..•. would fall into Japanese hands. See Ruang Kong Nai Khuang Aphaiwongse, (The Story of Khuang Aphaiwongse), Cremation Volume, Bangkok, 1968, p. 58. 21

The Royal Gazette, "The Declaration of War on Great Britain and the United States", Part 55, 25 January 1942, pp. 558-559, Sir Josiah Crosby, then British Ambassador in Thailand, branded the declaration as "a record of childish insincerity which must be wellnigh unique in the history of international relationships, and future generations of Siamese will assuredly blush to recall it". See Josiah Crosby, Siam: The Crossroads, London, 1945, p, 137.

22

Syonan Sinbun, 26 January 1943,

23

MaZai Sinpo, 26 January 1943,

9

Thailand has been ever ready for Nippon 1 s call and when that call at last came we readily answered ••. "24 It was obvious that the steps towards the declaration of war were taken in haste. The Declaration was only drafted on the morning of 25 January and the Cabinet had intended to make an announcement at noon on that dayc The draft had earlier been submitted to the Prime Minister and the three-member Council of the Regents, However, when the hour drew close, only two Regents had signed. The third Regent, Pridi Bhanomyong, was not in Bangkoko If the government were to wait for Pridi's signature, it would have been impossible for it to make the announcement at. the scheduled hour. Prince Adhit, the Chairman of the Regency Council, then decided to announce Pridi's name without the latter's signature on it.25 •rhe government 1 s action can perhaps be explained by the fact that 25 January was the day which marked the g,reat victory of King Naresuen of Ayudhya over the Crown Prince of Burma in the late seventeenth century or that Pibul had by t.hat time long since stopped respecting democratic procedures. Many questions arise over how the Thai Government came to terms with the Japanese with such striking speed" The whole drama started on 8 December when the Cabinet allowed the Japanese the use of Thai territory, and culminated in the Declaration of War on Great Britain and the United States on 25 January. Was it true that Thailand had no other alternative when it allowed the Japanese troops to march through its territory? Was it necessary for Thailand

24

Malai Sinpo, 25 January 1943,

2.5

Thawee Bunyaket, "Kawtetj ing Permterm Kiewkap Hetkarn nai Fratet Thai Rawang Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 2" (~Supplementary facts conce:r:·ning events in Thailand during the Second World War") in Direk J ayanam, Thai Kap Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 2 (Thailand and World War II), Bangkok, 1970, p. 205. In later years Pridi connnented that this cieclaration was illegal, for it had not been submitted to the National Assembly nor to him as Regent of the Kingdom. See Pridi Bhanomyong, "The Pridi Bhanomyong Story", Bangkok Post, 26 November 1974,

10

to have a military pact with Japan? Was the Thai Declaration of War on Great Britain and the United States on 25 January 1942 the act of a puppet government? What were the genuine sentiments of the Thai people? The whole episode deserves a closer reexamination. On 7 December 1941 at 10.30 p.m., His Excellency T. Tsubokami, the Japanese Ambassador, called on the Deputy Prime Minister, Police General Adul Adjuldejarat and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Direk Jayanam, at the Palace of Roses with the request that Japanese troops be allowed to pass through Thailand in all directions - by land, sea and air. It was pointed out that permission had to be grant.ed by 2.00 a.m, 8 December and that Japan had declared war on Great Britain and the United States. Pibul was out of Bangkok at this crucial timee Adul who refused to see the Ambassador asked Direk, as head of Foreign Affairs, to receive the delegation. Direk requested the Japanese to wait till t.he return of the Prime Minister who was also the Supreme Commander but this was not accepted. The Japanese threatened that delay would mean bloodshed. Direk tried to explain that as Thailand was under martial law the government was not competent in the absence of the Prime Minister and the Supreme Commander, to take any decision on this vital matter. The Japanese Ambassador left but insisted on an immediate reply the following morning.26 When Pibul returned at 7.00 a.m. on 8 December, he convened a Cabinet meeting right away. The Japanese Ambassador had been waiting since 6.00 a.m. Three parties attended the conference; the pro-ally group led by Pridi, then Finance Minister, and backed strongly by Direk; the neutral group and the definitely pro-Axis group, headed by Pibul.27 The session began with Direk reporting what had happened but he was cut short by Pibul who urged: "Let's

26

Direk Jayanam. op.cit,, pp, 108-109,

27

Nicol Smi t.h and Blake Clark • Into Siam Underground Kingdom (New

York, 195Q), p, 263,

11

28 decide what to do." At this stage, Pridi cautioned that before making a hasty decision the Cabinet should consider the nation's honour and future welfare. To him the Japanese action was a dangerous breach of peaceful coexistence. In Pridi's words: (Pibul) interrupted and forbade me to proceed. There were even some ministers who thought accession to the Japanese demand was not sufficient and that we should become Japan's ally in order to recover territories long ago taken from us by England and France. As usual, I was in the minority .... 29 Most of the ministers agreed that the Government could not stand up against the Japanese, Pibul then went out immediately to inform the Japanese Ambassador that the Cabinet had acceded to his request. He also ordered a cease-fire.30 28

Loc.cit,

29

Pridi Bhanomyong» 11 The Pridi Bhanomyong Story 11 , in The Bangkok Post, 26 November 1974. According to one source~ Vilas Osathananda, Minister of State without Portfolio, had a violent argument with Luang Sindhu Songgramjai, Minister of Education, which ended in a fist fight, after which he left the meeting and then resigned from the Cabinet. See also United States Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as U.S. APchives), General Report of Conditions in Thailand~ December 1941-June 1942, No. D.S. 892.00/233, p. 5.

30

After Pibul had left the room, Vanit Pananonda, Director General of the Department of Commerce, who had accompanied the Japanese Ambassador informed the Cabinet about Japan's three alternatives. The first was a request only for the passage of troops, The second was a defensive military alliance with Japan, The third was a joint Declaration of War on Britain and the United States~ in return for the lost provinces in the Malay Peninsula to Thailand. The Cabinet was divided. Pro-Axis members were strongly in favour of the third plan. Neutrals did not say anything. But Pridi, Adul and Direk stood firm on the first one. In the end, the pro-Allies members were able to swing the majority and it was accepted, Direk, op.cit., p. 109. Pibul and Vichitvadhakarn both mentioned in their own memoirs that there were four plans proposed by the Japanese. But neither could remember the fourth one, See Pibulsongkram, 11 Karnruammeu Lae

12

Up to this point it would be fair to say that the permission for free passage to the Japanese troops was justified. The Japanese attack and demand were sudden and most senior officials were well aware that a small country like Thailand would be torn to bits if she chose to resist Japanese pressure. Though some members of the House of Representatives urged the government to fight saying that the country had spent time and money training the military and there were so many generals and captains around,31 it was essentially an emotional reaction against "the loss of face". It was apparent that Pibul himself was helpless during that critical moment. He recalled his confrontation with the Japanese upon his return to Bangkok on 8 December thus: .••. There were only two Thais in that room - Vanit and I. We have to face the most threatening words. There were more than twenty Japanese comprising the Ambassador, the Military Attache, the Generals and the Colonels. All wore swords, pointing at all directions. 'I'hey demanded my immediate decision without giving me time to consult the Cabinet. They did not even allow me to leave the room. It was only when Vanit asked them to honour me as Prime Minister that they let me go I came out to tell my colleagues what was happening The Cabinet then unanimously agreed to surrender and allowed the Japanese troops to pass through Thailand ..•. 32 One should also believe Pibul when he swore that he had never had any prearrangement either in verbal or written form with the Japanese~33 In his memoirs it was evident that Pibul was fully aware that war might break

Tartan Yeepoon Samai Songkhram" ("The Co-operation and Resistance Movements during the Second World War") in Buang Rag Praahathipathai (The Beginning of Democracy), Bangkok, 1974, p. 433. 31

Thai Mai (New Thai), 24 January 1946. the War Criminal Trial,

32

Pibulsongkram, op.cit,, pp. 433-434.

33

Ibid., 430.

Direk's testimony during

13

out. Four days before the fall of Pearl Harbour he had consulted General Vichit Cirasongkram, the Chief of the General Staff, about taking precautions against a possible Japanese attack and General Vichit had explained to the Cabinet the probable routes of a Japanese invasion which turned out to be exactly those mapped out by him.34 The Offensive-Defensive alliance with Japan on 21 December coming only two weeks after the Japanese invasion deserves a more careful study. After the defeat of Japan Pibul and his clique had tried to defend themselves, both in writing and public forums that they had been coerced by the Japanese to commit actions against their own freewill. Pibul wrote: .•• if the people were to know of the pressure which the Japanese exerted in forcing me to join in the defensive and offensive treaty . • . I am sure they will fully sympathise with me and my government. It would take too long to relate the story in full, allow me therefore to point out briefly that I tried to argue and stubbornly refused to do anything till I got a headache. The Japanese who packed my residence at each occasion comprised of military officers as well as diplomats, all of them screamed to have their demands carried out. At times we argued from 2 o'clock in the afternoon until midnight. We had to yield in the end as they threatened to follow instruction from Tokyo by disarming our army on the very day unless we complied to their demands. Sometimes they even threatened me through the telephone, while their forces were in readiness to carry out the threat in earnest. r thought then that it would be better to suffer our grief in silence by letting

.. 34

Pibulsongkram, op.cit., p. 431. See also the memoirs of Thawee Bunyaket in Jayanta K. Ray, Portraits of Thai Politics (New Delhi, 1972), p. 76, Thawee's testimony on this issue carries much weight. According to him, he had no reason to pay anything to Pibul more than what v1as due him on the basis of actual performance, (Thawee became Prime Minister right after the end of the War).

14

the Japanese have their way until opportunity allowed us to take revenge on them later on •••• 35 However, others, like Pridi and Direk who did not share Pibul's belief, saw the event in a different light. To them Pibul took the drastic step to abandon Thailand's traditional policy of neutrality entirely on his own initiative. They believed that the major incentive for Pibul was the news of Pearl Harbour and the sinking of the so-called unsinkable British battleships,"Prince of Wales" and "Repulse". This was a tremendous advantage for the Japanese which made the Pro-Axis Thais believe in an Axis victory. In Direk's words: ... Pibul immediately called his cabinet and told them that he and some of his friends had looked deeply into the matter and thought it was best to co-operate to the extent of a military alliance ..•. Then he had the nerve to tell us he had already approached the Japanese on the subject of Plan Two (a military alliance with Japan), and had gone so far as to ask the Ambassador to meet him at the palace within an hour when he promised him an answer. Half an hour later the Japanese, as scheduled, arrived. Pibul then said, 'And this time I will sign, Direk Jayanam, we do not need your signature' ..•. "36 Taking the divergent views of both sides into consideration it would appear that the account by the pro-Allies elements has more weight. However, Pibul should not be blamed for being the sole driving force that pushed Thailand into the arms of the Axis Power. Japan appeared invincible after they had sunk the British battleships and conquered Penang in lightning speed. In general, the Thai public, the military, and even most of

35

Pibulsongkram, op, cit., pp, 436-43 7. The English translation is taken from U.S. AraM,ves, File No. D.S. 892.00/9-3045 "Pibulsongkram's Circular Letter addressed to Editors of various Newspapers".

36

Nicol Smith, op.cit., p. 265.

15

the Chinese and the Allies' own personal Thai friends believed at that time that Britain was down and Japan was the winner. Pibul, a militarist, who liked to be as strong as possible,37 wanted, of course, to lead a strong nation. And if Japan had won the war, Pibul would probably have been a national hero. Japan's "Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere" was a good advertisement that offered political and economic hope for the Thais. Thailand's situation had in the past given rise to the favourite outcry among Thai politicians that the country was beset by the British Lion, the French Tiger and the Chinese Dragon.38 It is understandable that when the opportunity presented itself, many would turn opportunists. The cry for brotherly unity between Japan and Thailand, the former as elder brother and the latter as younger brother, rang out among the Thais.39 That Pibul alone made the final decision is also conceivable. From the time he came to power in 1938 he had been arrogating more and more power to himself. Other ministers were seldom willing or able to oppose him. The Thais were inclined to accept the triple slogan - One Leader - Pibul, One United Nation - Thailand, and One Object - Victory.40 Pibul thus took it for granted that his voice was the Voice of the Nation. He had announced over radio that he accepted full responsibility for any action taken. Pibul made one big mistake. When the situation took a turn for the worst and he realized that he had backed the loser, he lost his usual military poise. He lacked the courage to tell the truth. Instead he tried to find all kinds of excuses to justify his decision to ally Thailand with Japan. In fact there would have been nothing wrong if he had stood up and openly stated that at that time he had done what he thought was absolutely right and best for Thailand. 37

Syonan Times, 26 June 1942.

38

Loa.ait. By then it was said that the British Lion had its tail twisted and had run off to the West, while the French Tiger was a friend and was purring contentedly in Indo-China, and the Chinese dragon had lost all its teeth.

39

Nippon Times, 25 January 1942.

40

Mal.ai Sinpo, 6 January 1943.

16

While Pibul could be forgiven for his efforts to accommodate Japan, he had to bear full responsibility for bringing Thailand into war with England and the United States. He seemed to have pursued his policy too far because one could see no real advantage for Thailand by gambling heavily on Japan's victory •. In fact, this move was to have profound repercussions on domestic politics in postwar Thailand. Pibul's claim that the Declaration of War was in reality a trick to deceive Japan41 was not at all convincing. Neither did Vichitvadhkarn's statement carry much weight." With the downfall of Japan, Vichitvadhakam explained that it was due to sheer necessity that Thailand had to wage war because it was the only way to keep the Thai armed forces alive. By declaring war against the Allies, Thailand could obtain large amounts of armaments from the Japanese for later use. Secondly, the Thai Government had to take urgent steps to control the property of the enemy countries that had been confiscated by the Japanese soon after their invasion into Thailand. It was claimed that the move was necessary since it dealt directly with custom duties which could only be legally authorized after Thailand had declared war on those countries. Thirdly, it was a necessary bargain in order that Thailand could get back those Thais who were employees of foreign companies and had been arrested by the Japanese. This would have been impossible if the Thai Government had no prisoners-of-war to offer to the Japanese in return. Thus, it was argued Thailand had only one choice, that is, to regard the nationals of the Allies as enemies.42 This explanation seems to contradict what Vichitvadhakarn had said at the time of the Declaration: .•.. Our spontaneous participation in this sacred war has been motivated by a resolute determination to eradicate the evils of AngloAmerican influences from this part of the world and thereby liberate imperialist power .•.• 43 It was true that the Declaration of War was the deliberate act of Pibul and that he was at that time an 41

Pibulsongkram, op.cit., p. 437,

42

Vi chi tvadhakarn, op, c.i to, pp, 2 7-43.

43

Matai Sinpo, 25 January 1942,

17

absolute dictator. He no longer tolerated dissension from others and those who disagreed with him were asked to get out or got "promoted". A week after the Japanese t.roops had installed themselves in Thailand, Direk stepped down as Foreign Minister and became the Deputy Minister.44 Pibul himself took over the post. In early January of the following year, Direk was appointed Thai Ambassador to Tokyo. Pridi who had all along tenaciously clung to his belief in the Allies was another target. The Japanese forced Pibul to elevate Pridi from his post in the Ministry of Finance to a post of higher rank devoid of any executive power.45 Thus, Pridi had to leave the Cabinet on 16 December 1941 and was elected unopposed by the National Assembly on a 71 to 1 vote - t.o a vacant seat in the Regency Council. 46 By a brilliant political stroke, Pibul had removed from high office two of his most recalcitrant colleagues, thus strengthening his position and reasserting his personal leadership. The Cabinet was now filled with his own men and Pibul assumed that people would agree wit.h what he did. As regards the public, they had no say whatsoever. For many years past the Thais had been flooded with ultra-nationalist programmes and had learned to know and believe in only one leader - Pibul. However, there remained some silent hard-headed elements who resented the blatant opportunism of their government in declaring war on two former friendly nations. Leaflets deploring the government's policy were distributed throughout Bangkok. As a result, twelve top journalists were arrested and put on trial. Two were sentenced to life

44

Proaeedings of the National Assembly, No. 3/2484, "The Royal Appointment of the Ministers", 16 December 1941, pp. 45-46.

45

Bangkok Post, 26 November 1974.

46

Proceedings of the National Assembly, No. 3/2484p "The By-Election of the Regent", 16 December 1941, pp. 46-49. Pridi wrote that because he was forced to,he accepted the decision thinking that the new office would give him time to organize an anti-Japanese resistance movement, known later as the Free Thai Movement. See Bangkok Post, 26 November 1974. Direk commented that Pridi was so popular that Pibul dared not refuse him another post. See Nicol Smith, op.cit., p. 265.

18

47 imprisonment.• Direk, the newly appointed Thai Ambassador to Tokyo, was stunned by the Declaration of War. M.R. Seni Pramoj, the then Thai Minister to Washington, learned the news with sad disbelief, Convinced that the Cabinet had made the Declaration because it had been bullied into the move by a dominating premier, Seni refused to deliver the Declaration of War to the American Secretary of State, Hull, as instructed. Public opinion and the mass media were silenced. The Thai people were strictly forbidden to tune into other radio stations apart from Radio Thailand and Radio Japan. The Press was under the rigid censorship of the government and not. allowed to report. good news about the Allies but only political news which came solely from Thai and Japanese Government. sources. 48 Any newsman respon~ible for pubishing "unpleasant" news would be executed. 4 9 Pibul himself was an active writer. His articleswritten under various pen-names appeared in every daily newspaper and were aired over radio day and night in a deliberate attempt at thought control. While it is debatable whether Pibul was right or wrong ln allying Thailand with Japan the fact remains that the war was unpopular with the Thais. The nation in general resented the Japanese presence in the country. As war dragged on they learned to detest the Japanese as they had detested no other nation in the world. Prince Bidayalongkorn, the well-known Thai scholar, who pinned his faith on Britain, the country he knew so well, remarked: .•• I wish to know how people in general feel. An aged man like myself is so very pained to see foreign soldiers pouring into our country and behaving like masters •.•. Our family and our ancestors have been badly harassed during

47

Pornpirom Iamtham, Bot Bat Tang Karn Maung Kong Nang Sue Pim Thai 1932-1945 (The Political Role of Thai Newspapers, 1932-1945). Master's Degree Thesis, Unpublished, Chu1alongkorn University, Bangkok, 1973, p. 77.

48

Pornpirom Iamtham, op.ciL, pp, 77-86,

49

Praahaahar~

(The Nation), 10 May 1942.

19

the past two or three years but the pains do not hurt me as much as when I see the Thai nation being looked down on at this moment. How does our new Leader - a true Thai who vigorously teaches us to love the Thai nation since, he says, under the Absolute Monarchy the King was so dictatorial that no one knew how to love the country - feel right now?SO Princess Poonpisamai recalled a heart-breaking incident concerning her father, Prince Damrong, one of the leading Thais of the latter half of the 19th century. In 1942 the Prince returned home from his long exile in Penang. One day he went to the Temple of the Emerald Buddha and spotted two Japanese soldiers. The Prince asked Princess Poon who was with him, "Who are those who put on the Japanese hats?" The daughter did not answer, pretending to ignore his question. But the Prince asked again, "Don't you hear, I ask who are those with the Japanese hats?" Princess Poon then had to reply, "The Japanese themselves, Sir." Prince Damrong immediately realized that the Japanese soldiers had been roaming about everywhere in the country. He lost his temper on the spot and scolded every one near him. From that day on the Prince became very upset and complained on several occasions that he wanted to die since there was nothing worthwhile to live for. Since that time he did not care to look after himself neither had he any inspiration to do anything ·- a completely different man from what he had been.Sl

50

Att:a Chivapr(l];)at Phra Wo.r(l];)ongtheu Khrom Muen BidayaZap Preutiyakorn (Biography of Prince Bidayalap), Cremation Volume, (Bangkok , 19 74) , p , 11 7 •

51

Chivit Lae Ngan Kong Somdej Krom Phya Domrong Rajanubah (The Life and Works of Prince Damrong), Princess Poon Pisamai (Bangkok, 1974), pp' 90-91.

II :

"THE NEW

THAILA..~D"

When the Japanese came in 1941, Thailand had just entered a period of nation-building under the government of Pibulsongkram. The development of the new Thai society in the shadow of the Japanese presence is a little known but nevertheless important chapter in modern Thai history. The effects of that period can still be felt in certain sectorsof Thai life today. When Pibul became Prime Minister of Thailand in December 1938 he made it clear both to his colleagues in government and to the people of Thailand that a new era was on the horizon for this ancient kingdom. Being one of the Promoters of the 1932 coup that started a democratic regime, Pibul had inherited the general belief of the new eHi te that Thailand was entering a period of "nationbuilding" and that he had the responsibility to lead the nation" 1 Pibul 1 s first task was to strengthen his position as well as consolidate his claim to be the sole leading force in Thailand. Within one month of taking office Pibul arrested some 40 people on charges of treason. Of these, eighteen were immediately executed, twenty-six condemned to life imprisonment, and the rest expelled from the country. This drastic step was meant to serve as a warning to potential opposition figures.2 In a further effort to strengthen his position Pibul immediately worked to undermine the prestige and strength of his ultimate adversary, the monarchy. He prohibited the display of the picture of ex-king Rama VII, who was in exile in England. In early 1939 the government filed suit against the ex-king on charges of misusing some six million baht of crown property< The state won its case and the ex-king 1 s property and private residence were confiscated. It was a relentless drive to power on Pibul's part. By 1939 he had emerged as uncrowned monarch in Thailand. 1

Charnvit Kasetsiri, 11 The First Phibun Government and Its Involvement in World War Il 11 , Jour'VI.al of the Siam Soc:iety, Vol. 62, Part 2, July 1974, pp, 39-41,

22

Besides the Premiership, he held the portfolios of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Education.3 Where the military was concerned, Pibul was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and Supreme Commander of Armed Forces.4 Once in power Pibul turned his energies to the equally important task of building popular support for his regime by arousing and mobilizing the national consciousness of the people. The Thais were constantly reminded that they were now living in a "new Siam" which was in the process of rebuilding itself. His goal was a new and greater Thailand for the Thais who would henceforth "possess good culture, good etiquette, good health, good clothing, good accommodation and good profession".5 The earliest move of this national awakening came in May 1939, when the "Siamese" Assembly approved a government suggestion that the name of the country be officially changed from "Siam" (Prathet Sayam) to "Thailand" (Prathet Thai). In a speech advocating the change, Pibul explained that the name "Thailand" would make clear that the country belonged to the Thais. The word "Thai" would embrace all sections of the population, regardless of race, caste, creed, or geographic distinction. Terms such as "Northern Thai", "Isan Thai", "Thai Islam", it was argued, were not conducive to the maintenance of the state and a united nation like Thailand.6 3

Apart from a short period as Minister of Education (16 February 19427 March 1942) Pibul held the other three Ministries throughout the term of his office, See Manoon Borisud, Ruang Khana Ratthamontri (The Cabinets), Bangkok, 1965, pp. 134-142,

4

To ensure his firm control over the military, Pibul elevated his supporters to prestigious and powerful positions. In 1941 alone, about 8,000 decorations were handed out and some 30 generals appointed. See wendell Blanchard 9 Thailand~ Hraf Press, New Haven 1958, p 122. 0

5

Department of Publicity, Pramuan Kham Prasai Khong Phanathan Jorrrpon PCM Pibutsongkram (Pibul's Speech Collections), Second volume, Bangkok, 1942, p. 3.

6

Benjamin A. Batson, "The Fall of the Pibul Government, 1944", The Journal of the Siam Soaiety, Vol, 62, Part 2, July 1947, p. 91.

23

The process of moulding a new Thai society moved with dazzling speed. To serve as a guideline the government passed a set of Rattha Niyom or Cultural Mandates of the State, by which they hoped to alter the structure of Thai society and transform it into a new order. Between June 1939 when the first Rattha Niyom was proclaimed and January, 1942 when war was declared upon the Allies, twelve Rattha Niyom were handed down.7 These Rattha Niyom comprised a series of principles and slogans aimed at uplifting the national spirit and moral code of the nation and instilling progressive tendencies and a "newness" into Thai life.8 To emphasize the break with the past, the date of the 1932 coup, 24 June, was adopted as the National Day and the old New Year's Day 13 April - abandoned in favour of 1 January so that the Thai New Year would conform with that of the western world.9 At the same time the words of the National and Royal Anthem were changed.

7

In 1939 there were six RatthaNiyom, in 1940 in 1942 one. The 12 Rattha Niyom were:

three, in 1941 two and

1, 2. 3. 4,

Rattha Niyom on the names of the country, people and nationality. Rattha Niyom on protecting the country's security, Rattha Niyom on the name of the Thai people, Rattha Niyom on saluting the national flag, the national anthem and the royal anthem. 5, Rattha Niyom on the use of the Thai produce, 6. Rattha Niyom on the tune and words of the National Anthem. 7. Rattha Niyom on calling the Thais to build their nation, 8, Rattha Niyom on the Royal Anthem. 9, Rattha Niyom on the Thai language and the duty of good citizens, 10. Rattha Niyom on the dress of the Thais. 11, Rattha Niyom on the daily routine work of the Thais. 12. Rattha Niyom on the treatment of the children, the aged and the handicapped, 8

KenneLh Perry Landon, The Chinese in Thailand, Oxford University Press, 1941, p, 188.

9

Prior to the change Pibul had appointed a Committee to study the matter, The Committee came out with the results that the Thai New Year's Day should fall on 1 January. The reasons were that: l,

People wrongly thought that it was the Christian belief to adopt the New Year's Day on 1 January. In fact Julias Ceasar was the

24

The Rattha Niyom had a psychological impact on the Thais that their country had entered a new era. Under the new society, detailed advice were set out to govern the people's way of life. The Thais were exhorted to protect their own country and not act as representatives for foreign interests or show favouritism towards them. They were urged to take pride in their nationality and literature. All Thais had to salute the hoisting of the National Flag when the National Anthem was played at 8.00 a.m. each day. A good Thai was one who was generous and ready to help the sick, the aged and the unfortunate. Even his daily schedule was spelled out for him. His day should comprise three periods - one for work, one for private activities, and one for relaxation - and he was advised to sleep six to eight hours at night and take four meals a day. For their leisure, they were encouraged to learn to feed the family chicken., dogs an.d "?iss, \Need the gaxO.en., "£)1.an.t, xepaix the house and fix farm tools. Additionally they should be sociable and keep themselves well-versed in current affairs by listening to Radio Thailand, reading books and talking to friends and relatives. Spurred by his ardent nationalism to build a new Thailand, Pibul was determined that Thais should be masters in their own house. The Rattha Niyom were also aimed at inculcating a greater sense of economic self-help among the Thais. They were advised to choose an occupation and "work at work" rather than "play at work and work at play". Most of the rules and regulations were geared to ensuring a better life for the Thais. The Employment Act of 1941 required all unemployed Thai citizens aged below 50 to register at the nearest local office.lO The Beggars Act of 1941, placed beggars throughout the Kingdom under the

2, 3. 4. 5,

first two who originated the idea. Some eastern countries for example Japan and China had already adopted 1 January as the New Year's Day, It was international practice. It was close to the Thai ancient concept. To suit the Thai climate since January was the best month of the year,

Suparb-burut (The Gentleman), 9 February 1939, 10

Ratahakitjanubegsa.

(Hereafter referred to as The Royal Gazette),

Vol, 58, 30 September 1941, "The Employment Act, 1941".

25

government's welfare programme. 11 Another Act promised landless farmers that the government would look into their difficulties.l2 The Thais were encouraged to earn money in their free time by tending vegetable gardens and raising domesticated animals like pigs, poultry or oxen, washing clothes and selling noodles. The Rattha Niyom also stressed that Thai national life should be lived primarily for the advantage of the Thai people and not to benefit unduly any foreign sections of the population. The new society was to be "Thailand for the Thais". To emphasize "Thai-ness" a regulation was passed on 3 November 1939 that Thai patriots should observe the following points: they should eat only Thai food, wear only Thai clothing and assist one another to enter commerce, trade and industry, and support all public works and ventures for the good of the Thai nation.l3 Under Pibul the blows against foreign interests both large and small fell almost capriciously. The measures taken included the formation of the government-controlled Thai Rice Company, a law reserving bird's-nest concession to the government or its agents, the Salt and Tobacco Act of 1939 which brought the salt and tobacco industries under government control, a law governing the slaughtering industry by putting it in the hands of Thais, the Vessels Act of 1939, restricting ownership of ships trading within Thai waters to Thais, the Fishing Act of 1939 reserving the right to fish in Thailand's territorial waters to Thais and the Liquid Fuels Act giving the government control over the processing and marketing of gasoline and oil throughout the country.l4 By a Royal Decree of 1942 twenty-seven different occupations and professions were reserved exclusively for Thais.l5 11

The Royal Gazette, Vol. 58, 1941".

12

The Royal Gazette, VoL 58, 24 March 1942, "The Land Distribution Act, 1942".

13

Kenneth Perry Landon, op.cit., p. 188.

14

Ibid., pp. 219-259.

15

The Royal- Gazette, Vol. 59, Part 1221, 5 June 1942, "The Professions Reservations Act, 1942". These occupations included the making, casting, or selling of the images of the Lord Buddha, making or

7 October

1941, "The Employment Act,

26

While the Thai nation was in the process of transforming itself under Pibul's nationalistic zeal, another phase of the nationalist campaign - territorial expansion - was put into action. The first year of the Pibul Government saw Thailand embarking on one of the most expansionary periods in her history. This was to culminate in the annexation of Laotian and Cambodian territories from occupied French Indochina in 1941.16 Japan's support for Thailand in this respect helped to legitimize the Thai-Japanese alliance in the eyes of the people. This "territorial conquest" not only had a deep psychological effect on the vast majority of the people in making them believe that they were not only living in a "new society" but also in a "Greater Thailand". It was a great boost to Pibul's position as Thailand's sole leading force. The enthusiastic drive towards a Greater Thailand was definitely given an impetus when Pibul hitched the Thai wagon to the star of Japan and declared war upon the Allies in early 1942. The national awakening campaign that had initially been concerned with adopting new names for the race and nation, and new words for the National and Royal Anthems, took a more serious direction. The whole programme began to have stronger effects on the mass of the population. Pibul was determined that the Thais should appear "civilized" to the outside world. To him, a pretext used by the colonial powers for intervening in a country was the "uncivilized" character of its people. He was convinced that Thailand's long standing independence was due to the conscious modernization efforts of her two greatest Kings, Mongkut and Chulalongkorn. These two monarchs had tried to accommodate the western powers at a time when their aggressive thrust threatened Thailand's survival. On this basis, a policy of adaptation was of prime importance to selling of bricks, firewood, charcoal, or torches, manufacture of women's hats, cutting or tailoring of women's dresses, weaving wicker, making of dolls or toys, manufacture of umbrellas, hair waving or hair cutting, and the legal profession. 16

The annexed territories consisted of the three areas of Laos and Cambodia, The first was the area known as Sayaboury, across the Mekong from the royal Laotian capital of Luang Prabang. The second was Champasak in the southern part of Laos. The third in Cambodia, consisted of the two provinces of Siemreap and Battambang. See Charnvit Kasetsiri, op.cit.

27

Thailand's independence and this was translated into a campaign to foster a true "Thai Culture". By "Thai Culture" Pibul meant "a true Thai at heart" who will "give true love to Thailand and render true devotion to the prosperity and greatness of Thailand".l7 The heart of Pibul's campaign was to instill a love for Thailand. This was helped by his campaign to stir up pride among the people in all things Thai. It is no exaggeration to say that when war started Pibul was already obsessed with the idea that he was the only leader for Thailand. Because Thailand was· at war, he believed that it was his duty to provide strong leadership for the country. In fact, it had long been in his mind, as suggested by his writings in the early 1930s, that Thailand needed a strong leader as much as "an animal herd needs its leader".l8 The new emphasis was that the nationalist movement had to be faster and more decisive. Another factor which was largely responsible for the rising tide of nationalism among the Thais was the Japanese presence. Through Japan Thailand was able to embark on her "grand" territorial expansion during the Pacific War. In 1943 as a result of negotiations with Japan, Thailand acquired territories which were part of British Burma and British Malaya. The Thais were certainly proud of the restoration-which they believed testify to the nation's power and glory. Japanese propaganda both inside and outside Thailand gave the Thais encouragement in their drive towards a Greater Thailand. Since the late 1930s the Japanese had been convincing the Thais of the advantages and the invincible position of their "New Order in Greater East Asia", and the concept of "Asia for the Asiatic" 1 and "the Co-Prosperity Sphere",l9 and their intention to respect 17

Withayoo Sam (The Radio Journal), "The Premier's Speech on the Auspicious Occasion of the National Day on 24 June 1942", Vol. 8, August 1942.

18

Charnvit Kasetsiri, loc.cit.

19

For example, the Thai and Japanese Governments agreed to call babies born on 1 January 1943 "Children of Greater East Asia". They also organized "Maternity Association for Greater East Asia" installing Madame Pibul as Adviser to the organization. 910 boys and 722 girls born on this auspicious day were to receive educational subsidies

28

and preserve Thai independence, and assist Thailand in expanding her territory. The Thais came to bel1eve that they could stand together with the Japanese as equal partners in overthrowing western domination in Asiao20 On the diplomatic side, the Thai-Japanese Cultural Agreement was signed in 1942. Its objective was to confirm the two nation's mutual respect for each other's culture and promote better understanding between the two peoples. It was a psychological boost for the Thais that a world power had finally recognized Thailand's culture. To emphasize the close ties between the two countries, there were interchanges of economic, cultural and goodwill missions involving prominent statesmen of both countries. They included the former Prime Minister of Thailand, Colonel Pahol, and the former Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Hirota. The Japanese Prime Minister himself, General Hideki, Tojo, visited Bangkok in July 1943. Scholarships were offered to Thai students for study in Japanese colleges. The Japanese Cultural Institute (The Nippon Bunka Kaikan) to promote the two countries' cultures was set up in Bangkok in early 1943.21 These close relations with Japan assured the Thais that their country was important and a great leader of Asia. The dominate feature of Pibul's regime after the Japanese invasion was Dictatorial Leadership, with himself as the sole architect and instigator.22 Under him there up to the age of twenty and were able to undergo medical examination and treatment free of charge. See FM 2/2, Part 12. Japanese Propaganda (hereafter cited as FM 2/2.12), a translated version of the Mainiohi, Tokyo, Saturday, 6 February 1943. 20

FM 2/2,

Part 5, The Meeting of thE> Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (hereafter cited as FM 2/2,5), "The Establishment of the New Order in Greater East Asia" Pibul 's notes to Domei Nev7s Agency, 22 November 1943, and Syonan Shinbun, 13 April 1944,

21

This Institute later changed its name to The Japanese-Thai Cultural Institute (The Nittai Bunka Kaikan), The Mainiohi, Tokyo, 3 February 1943,

22

Thai Mai (The New Thai), 22 February 1946,

Thawee Bunyaket's testimony during the War Criminal Trial. Thawee said that Pibul was imitating the fascist and national socialist ideology of Hitler and

29

was to be strict obedience to the leader's orders. Campaigns were vigorously carried out across the nation to glorify the Great Leader. Newspapers were instructed that. their main function was to praise and honour Pibul. This was done by striking headlines saluting and glorifying Pibul. Depending on the editors' fancy, they included:

Nikorn (People) - Hail Pibulsongkram Suwannapoom (The Golden Land) -Our Nation's Security Depends On Believing In Our Leader

Sri Krung - Nation Will Survive If We Believe In Pibulsongkram Pra MUan Wan - Save The Nation By Believing In Pibul Every Thai home had to hang Pibul's picture so that the people would not forget the man who was doing a lot of good things for a new Thailand.23 Pibul's picture was also shown in cinemas, and the audience would rise and bow Japanese-style in homage to it.24 On his birthday the National Flag was hoisted and the press hailed it with banner-headlines and lead editorials. Vichitvadhakarn, his closest follower, even wrote a play on that auspicious occasion, likening him to a god with powers to restore sight to the blind.25 Pibul himself was his best public relations man. His personal charm and power of persuasion worked greatly in his favour. His speeches and writings were always convincing with the public. His many articles written under various pen names such as Samak Ki Chai (United Victory), Samak Ki Thai (United Thai), etc., were

Mussolini. Pibul was also very fond of reading books about Napoleon and liked to compare himself to Napoleon. He had dreams of becoming a Napoleon one day. See also Jayanta K, Ray, Portraits of Thai Politics, Oriental Longman Ltd., New Delhi, 1972, p. 75. 23

Sri Krung, 18 March 1942.

24

Sri Kuang, 11 July 1942.

25

John Coast, Some Aspeats of Siamese PoZitias, New York, Institute of Public Relations, 1943, p. 22.

30

published in the press and broadcast over radio every day. Thus millions of Thais read and listened to his ideas. He coined slogans to arouse and inflame the people to strive for the glory of Thailand: "Be a Thai, behave like a Thai"; "One who hates his own Nation is Dead"; "Be a Thai, buy only Thai produce"; etc. In the process, he received much publicity and the applause of the masseso The mass media was Pibul' s best v1eapon in the nationalist campaign. He monopolized the radio and press and used them effectively to achieve his goals. The Press Act of 1942 empowered the Minister of Interior or Pibul himself to prohibit publication of any material he might consider contrary to the public interest. All political or economic news had to come directly from the Thai and Japanese Governments. Newspapers were warned that they had to report only good news about the Axis. In reality they became pro-Axis propaganda organs.26 The only radio station at that time was the one owned and controlled by the Department of Publicity. Its most popular programme was a series of funny sketches between two fictitious characters, Mr. Mann and Mr. Kong. The main aim of the radio station was to instruct the peoole in the ideology of the new Thai society. Nearly eighty per cent of the programmes was concerned with the activities of Pibul and his government. The broadcasts were also directed at intensifying Thai dislike for the Allies.27 Government officials were instructed to listen closely to the broadcasts. Pibul himself was an avid listener who turned in to the Mr. Mann and Mr. Kong programme practically every day. If he missed any programme, the script would be sent immediately to him.28 26

Pornpirom Lamtham, "The Political Roles of Thai Newspapers from the Revolution of 1932 to the End of the Second World War", Unpublished M.A. thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, 1973, pp. 69-83.

27

Thai Mai (The New Thai), 17 March 1946. Pairoj Jayanam' s testimony during War Criminal Trial. He was the spokesman of the Pibul Government,

28

On one occasion when his radio set broke down while he was at the seaside, Pibul immediately made a long distance call (considered a luxury in Thailand during those days) ordering a postponement of the Mr. Hann and Hr. Kong programme pending his further instruction. See Sang Pattanothai (Hr. Mann), Khwam Nuk Nai Krong Kang (Reflections in Prison), Bangkok, 1956, pp. 208-214.

31

Plays, songs and Thai literature were freely utilized in the nationalist campaigns. Vichitvadhakarn, the Director of the Department of Fine Arts, wrote a number of plays and songs based on Thai history which glorified Thailand's struggle for independence and Thai historic figures renowned for their patriotism. The aim in all cases was to persuade the Thais to be above all good Thai patriots.29 The driving force behind Pibul's campaign to create an ideal "Thai Culture" was the National Council of Culture which was founded in 1942. Pibul saw in it the means for the mass education of the population. The National Council of Culture comprised five departments: the Department of Spiritual Culture; the Department of Traditions; the Department of Arts; the Department of Literature and the Department of Women.30 From the start, it worked in full force. Its keynote was blitz. Beginning in 1942 the moves towards a Greater Thailand were rapid, increasing in tempo till mid-1944 when Pibul resigned. Perhaps the most dramatic change under the Great Leader was the dress reform. Traditionally, most Thai women wore the pasin, a sarong wrapped around the waist and folded into a skirt, and a simple cotton blouse. Men also wore the pasin or panung, or the Chinese trousers. At home they usually wore the pa-koa-ma, a long piece of cloth which could be used for various purposes. Men hardly wore shirts. The Pibul Government considered such traditional garb not "proper" for a civilized society like Thailand. It wanted to show the world that Thailand was highly civilized and that the Thais could lay claim to their own culture.31 Pibul decreed that a "universal" 29

The plays included Supan Blood, Pra Raj Manu, Pra Chao Krung Thornburi, Suk Talang, Maha Dewi, Nan Chao, Po Khun Pa Muang, etc", while some of the song titles were: Wake Up The Thais; Thai Blood; Thai Land; Love Thailand; United Thais; Thailand Moves Forward; Thai Police Force; Thai March; Thai Unity; Love The Nation; The Youth Movement, etc. For summaries of the plays see Charnvit Kasetsiri, op.cit. Chairnvit gives an excellent picture of what the government campaign was about.

30

The Royal Gazette, "The National Act, 1943" (Second IssuE:), Vol, 60, Part 1, 1 January 1943.

31

The Bangkok Times, 2 July 1942.

Pairoj Jayanam's interview,

32

dress should be adopted and that everybody wear "proper" clothes, meaning coat, trousers, shirt, tie, shoes, skirt, blouse, hat. and gloves. Even the colours of dresses for d1fferent. uses were specified. For example, outdoor-work dress should be in grey, blue or kaki and indoor-work dress in dark blue. The dress reform was something close to Pibul's heart. In. his speeches and writings he exhorted the people to wear "properly", paying particular attention to hat-wearing, Pibul believed that hat-wearing was essential to a country's survival and that. it was identical with progress.32 Thus, Thai citizens were ordered to put on hats on all occasions. To emphasize the importance of hat wearing even during wartimer Pibul made a broadcast to Thai women thus: My Dear Ladies, please do not take it for granted that it is unnecessary to wear hats during the war-days. On the contrary. hats have become more important than ever .... 33 The styles, patterns, and colours of hats to be worn were set down in great detail. From that time on, hats became the most favourite subject of talk among the 'I'hais. There even emerged a slogan, "Hat Leads Nation to Power". 34 Stern measures were taken against people who did not wear hats. They were prohibited from boarding buses or entering government offices even for the purpose of paying taxes. On many occasions those who refused to conform were severely punished,. 35 32

The Department of Publicity, Pr~Man Kham Prasai Khong Phanathan Lorrrpon Pa;u; PibuZsongkram (Pibul 's Speech Collections)? "Muak", (Hats), p, 38.

33

Sri KY"'A-ng, 28 January 1942,

34

M,R, Kukrit Pramoj, Si Pandin (The Four Regions),

35

Thawee Bunyaket recalled one incident in Portraits of Phai Poli&ics: ",,,. One day, while passing by one of the departments under me, he (Pibul) noticed two women who did not wear hats. Next day he wrote a letter to me that he saw two girls working under me who did not use hats and that the matter should be investigated. I kept the letter with me for a few days, I then wrote. back to say that the mat·cer was investigated and that the complaint against my staff was not correctc I emphasized that there was none in this country who

Bangkok~

1972, p.645.

33

The dress reform received a warm response from women in all circles. To popularize the movement the government tried to ask the Consort of King Chulalongkorn, a wellknown "Leader of Fashion" in the nineteenth century to set the trend. Almost 90 then, the aged consort still attracted public attention with her grace and charm.36 But in an angry outburst, Ex-Queen Srisavarinthira rejected Pibul's request to have her picture taken wearing a hat: .... I have ceased to be myself these days. Now you come to bother with my head. I will not put the hat on If you really want it so ... cut my head off and put the hat on it yourself ., .. 37 After the dress reform the government turned its attention to eliminating the old custom of chewing betelnut because it consider the habit a deep national disgrace which had to be stamped out and the people practising it had to be condemned. They looked like they had blood over their mouths and because of their blackened teeth, they generally appeared ugly and older than their age. Besides, this custom encouraged spitting on roads and sidewalks.38 would try to disobey the orders of the Premier. Perhaps some outsiders came to the office to talk to our employees and they were hatless. I wrote this because I had a suspicion that the Premier might punish the two girls if we admitted the fault. I evaded the complaint because I knew the Premier was not in a position to prove it. I, of course, told the two girls that I would not force them to wear hats, as it was against their will. But they should be careful lest they should face difficulties like the one I saved them from." See Jayanta K. Ray, op.cit., pp. 85-86. 36

Prince Damrong Rachanuparb, Praahoom Lakorn Duk Dam Ban (Selections of Ancient Drama), Bangkok, 1943, p. 81.

37

Quoted in Sompob Chandaraprapa, Sam Dej Pra Srisavarinthira (Her Majesty Srisavarinthira), Bangkok, 1973, p. 371. There was also a story of a great poet, Prince Bidyalongkorn, who refused to obey Pibul's command. The Prince would take his four great danes out for a walk and let them wear the hats while he himself wore none. Retold in The Bangkok Post by Vibhanand Rangsit, 23 January 1977.

38

The Department of Publicity, Pra MUan Wattanatham (Selected Articles on Culture), "Advice of the National Council of Culture concerning the bad effects of chewing betel-nut", 1 February 1943, pp. 75-82.

34

The Ministry of Interior ·took the strictest measure by banning people who chew betel-nut from entering government offices. Provincial Governors were ordered to cut down all palm trees and stop the sale of betel-nut in the markets. As a result of this drastic order, the Thais had to give up a favourite pastime for the sake of a Greater Thailand. An important change that took place in the new Thailand was the simplification of the 600-year old Thai written language. The reason given for the change was that: •... ~ve Thais must have our own national language" Any nation that has not got her own language will soon lose their identity and independence. We Thais have already had our own language, we must have it reformed. At the moment our Thai language is so difficult to learn. \ve have also borrowed many foreign words. This should not happen to Thailand an independent and highly-cultured nation .... 39 To effect a change, a distinguished panel of Thailanguage experts was formed. The panel recommended that some of the consonants and vowels be dropped and the more commonly used ones retained.40 Difficult spellings of some words were also simplified. Based on their recommendations, the government adopted the language simplification measure on 29 May 1942. Names and naming patterns were also to be regulated. The government disapproved of the traditional naming pattern on the ground that some Thai female and male names were identical while others had unpleasant meanings like pig, rat, short, pale, etco or had foreign origino Henceforth, the names of flowers, vegetables and fruits such as cucumber, orange, durian and rose were to be female names while names of weapons or militant-meaning words such as

39

Sri Krung, "Pibul 's Speech calling for a change of the written language". 27 May 1942" Of the 44 consonants in the Thai alphabet, 12 sets have exactly the same sound and tonal quality.

40

Thirteen consonants and £iva vowels were dropped, were 44 consonants and 32 vowels_,

Formerly, there

35

sword, brave, strong, etc. were reserved for males. With the decree, people with so-called "uncivilized" names had to have them changed in keeping with the spirit of Thai nationalism. The use of foreign words were totally banned. For every day greeting sa-wad-dee and not "hello" should be used. Foreign place names such as Ban Kaek which meant a place where Indians and Malays lived, were replaced by Thai names. Pibul himself coined many new Thai words and the linguists hailed him a "great lexicographer". The traditional titles of Khun, Luang, Phra, Phraya and Chao Phraya were regarded as old-fashioned since they perpetuated class distinction, an idea which was unacceptable to a modern Thailand. The government believed that all men in a civilized society were equal. In May 1942, all titled civil servants were allowed to relinquish their titles and assume their own names. Among those who dropped the use of their titles were Luang Pradist Manutham, Luang Pibulsongkram and Luang Vichitvadhakarn. They became Mr. Pridi Bhanomyong, Mr. Pleak Pibulsongkram, and Mr. Vichit Vichitvadhakarn respectively.41 As mentioned earlier, the main theme of Pibul's nationbuilding was to educate the people to be "civilized". To this end the Leader also concerned himself with all the niceties of etiquette. A detailed code of conduct stipulating the appropriate manners and conduct for different occasions was handed down by the National Council of Culture. They included rules of etiquette governing the cremation ceremony, the marriage ceremony, the use of visiting cards, the bus-riding system, etc. Detalled advice was published in the press as to what dress the bride and groom should wear on the wedding day, what the proper size of visiting cards should be, how to use the cards, how to behave when waiting for a bus, how to lower one's head gracefully when greeting important people, etc" The Thais were told to impress other people by showing a pleasant personality. Village headmen (kan-nans) all over the country were given a briefing on how to behave in a "civilized" style. They were instructed to train their

41

The

Roya~

Gazett:e, VoL 59, 19 May 1942, "The Abolition of Ranks

and Titles Act".

36

village folks to hold themselves upright and keep their heads steady, and refrain from squatting in public or straddling a baby on the hip because it spoiled one's good look" Additionally, the people were encouraged to join clubs, applaud at shows, use forks and spoons and sit on chairs. Above all, the Thais should never allow themselves to look sloppy even for a single moment. In keeping with a "civilized" way of living, the people were encouraged to live in decent houses made of bricks instead of in shabby-looking bamboo huts.42 Even their daily diet was spelled out for them. The Thais were urged to eat pork, duck, chicken, meat, vegetables, eggs, et.c. under a campaign for better nutrition which emphasized increased consumption of food other than rice. Through pos·cers, leaflets and the Mr. Mann-Mr. Kong radio programmes, the people were constantly reminded of the importance of a balanced diet and correct cooking practices. In ma.trJ.monial life, t.he wife was to be "lovingly" treated as an equal and if there \•Jere reports of friction the husbands would be punished. Husbands were even urged to kiss their wives goodbye each morning before leaving for the office. In particular they were to observe the following five rules: (1) Honour her as a wife; (2) Do not look down upon her; (3) Be faithful to her; (4) Let her be a master at home; and (5) Give her good clothes. To emphasize national physical fitness and preparedness, the Pibul Government emulated the Japanese by attempting to impose military-style discipline on the populace. Government officials and ordinary people had to undertake long route marches and learn the rudiments of military drill.43 On 12 May 1944, the Government: proclaimed a national code of valour, the Wiratham, which stressed military and cultural valour along the lines of Bushido, the Japanese order of chivalry. It consisted of the following fourteen principles:

42

The Department of Publicity, Pra !~an Wattanatham (Selected Articles on Culture)~ Bangkck, 1943, pp. 18-21.

43

Sri Krung, 20 March 1942, 21 March 1942. and 29 March 1942.

37

{1}

The Thais love their nation more than their lives.

(2)

The Thais are great warriors.

(3)

The Thais are hard-working in agriculture and industry.

(4)

The Thais enjoy a good living.

(5)

The Thais are well dressed.

(6)

The Thais speak according to what their hearts say.

(7)

The Thais are peace-lovers.

(8)

The Thais worship Buddha more than their lives.

(9)

The Thais honour their children, women and the aged.

(10) The Thais follow the Leader. (11) The Thais grow their own food. (12) The Thais are best to their friends and worst to their enemies. (13) The Thais are honest and grateful. (14) The Thais leave behind property for their children.44 As part of the campaign to nurture true Thai-ness laws and orders were promulgated to preserve and promote traditional Thai values. In 1943 the government founded the University of Fine Arts to promote artists as well as arts, music and painting. The University comprised three Faculties - Faculty of Sculpture, the Faculty of Sculpture, the Faculty of Painting and the Faculty of Music and Drama. Each offered a five-year course and fees were waived.45 11

11

,

44

Suparb-Bu~t

45

The Royal Gazet:te, 30 March 1943, "The University of Fine A-rts Act, 1943".

(The Gentleman), 17 May 1944.

38

Keen on creating pure Thai music, Pibul ordered the Department of Fine Arts to form a Thai orchestra comprising 45 female musicians. The Pamwong (dance circle) a folk dance, was revised along the same pattern throughout the country and became the most popular dance of the day.46 All government departments had to tune in to Radio Thailand daily so that their officials could practise the ramwong. To encourage musical performances, the Ministers of the Interior, Education, and Health were empowered to direct what types of musical instruments to be used and for what purposes, and the techniques to be adopted.47 Some musical instruments such as the long drums, flutes and gongs were banned on grounds that they were not Thai-originated. Puppet shows and a light drama called like were also prohibited on grounds that they detracted from the traditional Thai dance drama.4E In reviewing Pibul's reforms and measures one could see that his policy of adaptation was a curious blend of East and West. While it strove to preserve the Thai past, the models adopted were clearly western. But to Pibul there was no contradiction. He contended that there was much good in the West as well as much that was evil and it was his duty to select the good and introduce them to the Thais. He believed that the "good" things from the West would help the country in its process of "nation building". One may well ask whether there was any other motive behind Pibul's aggressive, nationalist programmes hitherto unknown in Thai history, aside from his dream to build a Greater Thailand. A year after the Axis' defeat, Pibul explained that the real motive behind his whole ultranationalist programme was to prevent the Thais from coming under the influence of "Japanification" and to show the world that the Thais were not at all alarmed by the war-time

46

Ramwong dancing is quick and lively. The women usually form a wide circle and face inward, while the men standing behind also face inward.

47

'The RoyaZ Gazette, "The National Culture Act, 1943", op.cit.

48

Sri Krung, 15 September 1942.

The Zike was traditionally produced by troupes of wandering players who appeared at temple festivals. The action was lively and the dialogue spontaneous.

39

conditions. The primary aim behind the establishment of the National Council of Culture was to prevent the spread of Japanese culture in Thailand. According to Pibul, he emphasized the adoption of European-style dresses and the use of forks and spoons because he was afraid that the Thais might start adopting the Japanese mode of dress and using chopsticks. The Cultural Department of Women was it was claimed, another official organization to prevent Thai women from working or associating with Japanese, A good number of women joined the Council with the result that the Japanese had trouble getting female employees. On the adoption of a new Thai spelling system, Pibul claimed that it was aimed at preventing the teaching of the Japanese language in the schools by arguing that before Thai youths could learn a new language, they must first become proficient in the use of their own language's new spelling system.49 In Pibul's own words: the procedure which I took in forcing the people to believe and follow the leader, even without knowing the real motive and thereby losing some of their privileges, was the only course open to me for the purpose of overthrowing the Japanese in the end ..•. Let me emphasize that the work of my g·overnment during the last three odd years of its office had been aimed only at the final overthrow and defeat of the Japanese. Unfortunately we had to resign before having the opportunity to see its result being achieved.50 Was Pibul's grand design of a Greater Thailand his own initiative? Was it an imitation of the Western fascist and national socialist ideology? Was it an emulation of the Japanese samurai ethic? Or was it a weapon against Japanification? While it is difficult to assess what Pibul's real motives were, the Thais appeared to have readily accepted his ultra-nationalist programmes. They enjoyed and found excitement in them, although at times they must have found the pace of change too fast for them. 49

U.S. Arc:hives, No. D.S. 892.00/9-3045, Pibulsongkram's Circular Letter Addressed to Editors of Various Newspapers. (Translated).

50

U,S, Arc:hives, No. D.S. 890.00/9-3045, Pibulsongkram's Circular Letter Addressed to Editors of Various Newspapers. (Translated).

40

The "leader" style of government came to an end in August 1944 when Pibul and his Cabinet resigned en bloc following the defeat of two Government Bills in the National Assembly. They were for raising the status of Petchabun, the new national capital, to that of a special administrative district, and for the construction of a Buddhist holy city in the vicinity of Saraburi.Sl On taking over the reins of government Khuang Aphaiwongse stressed in his first speech in the House of Representatives: "I am not the Leader, I am the Prime Minister". 52 Quickly the new government began to demolish Pibul's many reforms towards modernization. Khuang'smoves to dismantle Pibul's programmes could be described as an attempt to win mass popularity. It was apparent that by the middle of 1943 Pibul and his government had become isolated from and unpopular with the people. His nationalist programmes were becoming too fast for the Thais, and although they followed him initially, they had reached a stage where they longed to escape from his "rigid and annoying" leadership. Khuang came to power at a time when Allied victory was becoming more apparent. Thus he felt he had a responsibility to undo the work of the government that had declared war upon the Allied Powers. Within two weeks after assuming office Khuang put a stop to the official Ramwong practice on Wednesday afternoons. The new government deemed it a senseless act and a great waste of government time.53 The new Minister of Interior instructed all provincial governors to be lenient towards people who did not wear hats and shoes.54 With his hand strengthened after Pibul's dismissal from the post of Supreme Commander of Armed Forces a month after

51

These two bills were submitted to the Assembly for ex post facto approval on 20 and 22 July respectively. The Assembly rejected both Bills and the Cabinet tendered its resignation to the Council of Regents in accordance with the provision of the Thai Constitution.

52

Sri Krung, 14 September 1944.

53

Ibid,, 10 August 1944.

54

Ibid., 11 August 1944.

41

his resignation, Khuang abolished the code of valour, the Wiratham, the new written language, the new name pattern as well as the daily Mr. Mann-Mr. Kong programmes. The spate of rules and regulations issued by Pibul, covering subjects ranging from the chewing of betel-nut to the use of visiting cards, etc. were scrapped within two months of Khuang's assumption of office. It is true much of Pibul's doctrine has been discredited, for instance, the anti-Chinese stance of his policy has been abandoned. But many of his social reforms have contributed remarkably to Thailand's status in later years while helping the country to retain her true Thai identity.

III:

THAI RESPONSE TO THE JAPANESE PRESENCE

Japanese troops marched into Bangkok on the afternoon of 8 December 1941, and in less than twenty-four hours the invasion of Bangkok was completed. The 50,000-strong Japanese armed force met with only minor or no resistance from the Thais. Thus they could occupy nearly all important strategic points in the north, central and eastern Thailand within a short period. In Bangkok the Japanese Army quickly closed down British, Dutch, French and American commercial houses and arbitrarily converted for their own use many large buildings, including the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the principal international club which included the race course and golf course, the Thai National Stadium, a portion of Chulalongkorn University, the Wattana Wittaya Academy (an American girls' school) as well as the new municipal port area with its mile-long wharf and large warehouses. All Europeans other than nationals of the Axis countries, and Americans were arrested and confined in a civilian internment camp on the premises of the University of Moral and Political Sciencesl in Bangkok while diplomats of enem~ countries were interned in their respective legations. 1

The old name of Thammasat University.

2

A total of some 300 persons were confined in a civilian internment camp while a small number for reasons of old age or poor health, were permitted to remain under guard in their residences. The number of foreigners during the war-years were: Americans 77 Belgians 10 British 254 Czechoslavakians 27 French 31 Germans 98 Greeks 4 Hungarians 2

Iranians 12 Iraqs 3 Italians 167 Dutch 11 Norwegians 5 Panaguayans 1 Polish 5 Portuguese 73

Rumanians 4 Russians 35 23 Spanish Swedish 8 Swiss 30 Syrians 3 Yugoslavs 7

The figures were only estimates because of the war. A number of foreigners left Thailand without reporting to the authorities. See FM 3/3, File, Prisoners-of-War, Part 10. Lists of Foreign Subjects in Thailand. 8 May 1942, 26 February 1944 and 10 March 1945,

44

outside Bangkok the Japanese stationed large detachments of soldiers in the cities, villages and towns and mounted guards at all railway stations, telegraph offices and other strategic points. The best building in a certain place was invariably occupied by Japanese soldiers and used as their headquarters. Darrell Berrigan, an American United Press correspondent, who escaped from Thailand after the Japanese invasion, wrote the first eye-witness account of the capitulation of Bangkok and the entry of the foreign troops: ..•. The surrender of Thailand stunned the native population''"' The Thailanders ... wept as they stood dazed in the streets or watched a Japanese bomber circle ominously overhead .•.. 3 The Thai people were amazed at the rapidity and completeness of the invasion. Initially the majority of the people were not particularly interested in the Japanese presence. Being "good" Thais they considered the issue a national policy and assumed that they had nothing to do with the Japanese. But it was not long before they realized that the Japanese presence had disrupted their daily routine, their homes, their customs and their economy. However, they were too bewildered, ignorant and frightened by the war and soldiers to do anything. Among the small privileged and educated class, comprising mainly government officials, army, navy and police officers, business and professional men and the nobility, the predominant feeling was one of hostility towards and fear and hatred of the Japanese. But there were few Thais who dared to express their feelings openly. Most paid lip service to the Japanese.4

Arohives, "Free Thai Movement", 27 November 1942, No. D.S. 892,01/21, p. 24.

3

U,S,

4

Sir Josiah Crosby, the then British Minister to Thailand, recalled what touched him on the day he left Thailand after eight months' interment: " .•.. Hundreds of people had lined the approaches to the wharf and many of them :caised their hats in salutation to us, it was in no sense a hostile crowd, it was definitely friendly, and I believe that it was the desire to bid farewell to us ,,,, And on the wharf itself were many Siamese .•• who joined in the farewells wit:h smiles and with every manifestation of goodwilL It was more

45

Among the top leadership, there was a small group who were pro-Japanese. They controlled the mass media in the country and under Japanese tutelage, were responsible for the wartime propaganda to show the world that Thailand was a willing and enthusiastic partner in Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia. Opinions differed as to the exact composition of this group but it was fairly certain that it included the Prime Minister, Field Marshal Pibulsongkram, Vichit Vichitvadhakarn, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vanit Pananonda, Minister without Portfolio, Luang Seri Roengriddhi, Director General of Railways, Colonel Prayoon Pamornmontri, Minister of Education and head of the Youth Movement, and Prince Wan Waithayakon Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Council of Ministers.S In addition, there was a somewhat larger group of government officials who had profited personally through the Japanese invasion and the subsequent seizure and confiscation of the property of enemy aliens in Thailand. This group was outwardly pro-Japanese. As regards the Armed Forces, it is difficult to appraise their attitude accurately. Undoubtedly the army was infected by Japanese victories in the Far East, but the majority of the officers were staunch adherents of the Deputy Minister of Defence, General Luang Phrom Yothi, who was staunchly anti-Japanese and pro-Allies.6 The Air Force like a cordial send-off than the shipping a~vay of a band of suspect enemy aliens". See, Sir Josiah Crosby, op.cit., p. 143. 5

On 6 March 1942, a month after the declaration of war upon the Allied Power, the Pibul Cabinet resigned, and a new wartime cabinet was formed. Pibul was reappointed Premier and held three other ministerial portfolios - the Ministries of Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs. All his "followers" were in the Cabinet. Police General Adul Aduldejarat was Deputy Minister of Interior, Vichit Vichitvadhakarn became Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Prayoon Pamornmontri became the Minister of Education, and Vanit Pananonda, Minister Without Portfolio. See Prasert Pattamasukon, Ratthasapa Thai Nai Rob Si Sib Song Pi (Forty-two Years of Thai Parliamentary System), Bangkok, 1974, pp. 391-392.

6

U,S, Arahives, Kenneth Perry Landon, "Thailand's Foreign Policy", No. 892-00/9-3044, p. 35,

46

was anti-Japanese to such an extent that Thai aviators were forbidden by the Japanese to take their planes off the ground for several months after the invasion of Thailand. The Thai Navy, however, was sympathetic to the Japanese. Throughout the war the Japanese kept their first promise to the Thais, that is, to respect the independence, sovereignty and honour of Thailand. There was no Japanese control over the Thai Army or the Thai administration. The two nations were equal partners and were never in the militarist relations of the conqueror and conquered. Thailand can be said to have been the only country in Southeast Asia where the indigenous army operated independently from the Japanese army which was in the Thai view, not an army of occupation but a "guest" army. However, in reality there was friction between the two armies although there was no recorded case of fighting between them. The real control of Thailand was vested in Thai authorities especially in the person of the Prime Minister. The minimal influence exerted by the Japanese usually took the form of "friendly" persuasion or "well-meant" advice conveyed through subservient Thai leaders. Dr. Ba Maw, the wartime Burmese Prime Minister, who visited Thailand soon after the war ended recalled that: I found Thailand almost undamaged by the war .••. The Thais appeared to be completely carefree and unconcerned with the tremendous ..• storms ••. over the region around them. That, of course, has always been the way they have met and overcome every crisis that has overtaken the Southeast Asian region When all the great neighbouring nations were once crushed and enslaved by Western colonial nations the Thais alone succeeded in saving their freedom. It seemed now that this pri?eless ;alent for survival had saved them agaln .... There were at least three reasons why the Japanese wanted Thailand as an ally. First, the Japanese were concentrating their efforts on other countries. If they could get what they wanted in terms of economic co-operation and transportation facilities for their war effort without 7

Dr. Baw Maw, Breakthr•ough in Burma, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 405.

47

fighting the Thais for it, it suited their purpose to maintain good relations with the Pibul Government. Second, soon after they came into the country the Japanese had signed the Treaty of Friendship with Thailand which stipulated that the Japanese would treat Thailand as an ally. Being "good and honest" Japanese they believed that any hostile move against the Thais would be a dishonourable betrayal of their Alliance. Third, the Thai position was unique, being a country which had never beer. colonized by the European powers. It thus suited the Japanese in their propaganda effort to demonstrate that they treated Thailand, the only other independent country in Southeast Asia, as an equal ally. For the first eighteen months of the Pacific War it would appear that the Pibul Government had made the right decision in siding with the Japanese. Japanese forces were victorious from the borders of India to the Aleutians, and Thai troops proclaimed a great victory in the Shan States of Burma.B Confident of a final Axis victory, Pibul declared in June 1943: I do not have the least doubt about Nippon's dominant position in East Asia. Nor do I have any apprehension about the war developments in Europe. The epochal results that Nippon has achieved the extensive theatre of war have made it absolutely impossible for the United States to make any effective counter-attack, and Nippon's victory has now become immutable and unfailing.9 In July 1943, the Japanese Premier, Hideki Tojo visited Bangkok and made the "sensational" announcement that Japan planned to transfer to Thailand the four Malay States of Perlis, Kedah, Kela.ntan and Trengganu which were ceded to England in 1909 and the Shan States of Kentung and Moung Pan, in gratitude for Thailand's aid to Japan as well as to demonstrate the Japanese ideal of "Co-Prosperity".lO

8

The newly occupied territory was called Saharat Thai Deum (Province of Original Thai), London Times, 16 April 1943.

9

Ma~ai

10

Sinpo, 16 June 1943,

London Times, 6 June 1943, 15 July 1943,

48

The actual transfer of the states of British Burma and British Malaya took place on 20 August 1943. Under the terms of the transfer Japanese administration in those states would cease within sixty days from the date of the signing of the treaties.ll The Thai press and radio carried news of the nationwide Thai rejoicing over the annexations. Pibul spoke with passion over the annexation of Malay Provinces: ...• Britain by threats with warcraft and guns robbed Thailand of these territories .... By the transfer of the four provinces ..•. Nippon had avenged the insult and injustice Britain inflicted on Thailand .... I would like to pay respect to His Emperor's soldiers and His Excellency Tojo for their sacrifices Our gratitude will be forever remembered in Thai History ..•. 12 While alliance with Japan gave Thailand certain territorial advantage, the Japanese presence also brought about a political crisis in Thailand. The Japanese presence

11

The negotiations regarding the transfer of the Malay provinces were kept in the strictest confidence. The Ministry of Interior issued an instruction forbidding discussion of the territory issue with any Japanese. This measure was taken probably after Direk Jayanam, the Thai Ambassador to Tokyo had reported to the Foreign Minister that the Japanese public opinion was against the retrocession of the four Malay States since they thought they had already made many sacrifices. See FM 2/2, Part 17, The Malay States, Vichitvadhakarn's Memo, 8 July 1943 and FM 2/2.1?, Direk Jayanam, Foreign Minister, 16 July 1943. As regards the Shan States, Dr. Ba Maw, the Burmese Adipadi during the Japanese Occupation, recalled his meeting with Premier Tojo in Singapore in July 1943, in his book Breakthrough in Burma, that after the issue of the transfer of the two Shan States to Thailand had been raised he told Tojo about the unhappiness of the Burmese and the Shans concerning the dismemberment of the Shan territory and its people. Tojo was apologetic but said that Japan had promised the two sections to Thailand as a price for becoming an ally. See Dr. Ba Maw, op.cit., p. 324.

12

Pibul revealed that the then Mayor of Bangkok actually attended the ceremony of transfer of these territories with tears in his eyes. MaZai Sinpo, 10 July 1943. See also Pramuan Wan, 14 July 1943.

49

marked the beginning of a political struggle between the pro-Japanese and the anti-Japanese factions within the 1932 coup group which eventually resulted in an open split between the civilian and military politicians evidence of which is still present in Thailand's politics today. The first crisis in the Cabinet occurred in February 1943 when two important Cabinet members, Khuang Aphaiwongse, the Minister of Commerce, and Thawee Bnuyaket, the SecretaryGeneral of the Prime Minister's Office, resigned in protest against Pibul. Being pro-Allies, their resignation indicated that they had given up hope of working with Pibul and his clique and that they were ready to oppose them openly.l3 The second clash between the government and the Assembly was over the issue of the nomination of the House Speaker and Deputy House Speaker. In July, 1943 Pibul tried to force the members' choice of House Speaker and

13

The event that led to the resignation was that in February 1943 Pibul had handed in a handwritten resignation to Prince Adhit, thE Chairman of the Regency Council, on grounds of poor health. Reluctant to accept the resignation, Prince Adhit asked Thawee,the Secretary-General to the Cabinet, to make sure with Pibul whether he really meant it. Pibul sent in a second letter confirming his decision to resign. The Regent then informed Pridi Bhanomyong, the other Regent, the Speaker of the Legislature, and the Cabinet members. All recommended the acceptance of Pibul's resignation. Thawee eventually ordered the announcement of the resignation on radio. On hearing the broadcast Pibul apparently changed his mind. He made a show of force by deploying troops and armoured cars in Bangkok, and got the announcement of his resignation cancelled, calling it a misunderstanding. Pibul severely blamed Thawee for having ordered the broadcast. On the same day Thawee resigned from his Cabinet position irl spite of Pibul 's attempts to urge him to stay on. Khuang who had seen Pibul's letters indicating and confirming his intention to resign, also resigned in disgust. See Pramot Phungsunthon, editor,

Bang Ruang Kiekap Phra Boromwongsanuwongsa Nai Rawang Songkram Lok Khram Thi 2 (Some Accounts Concerning the Royal Family During the Second World War), Bangkok, 1972, pp. 60-61. (The section pp. 38101 is by Pridi). Khuang Aphaiwongse, "Karn Plien Ratthaban Jompon Paw Pibulsongkram" ("The Change of Pibul Government"), Buang Rag Praahathipathai (The Beginning of Democracy), Bangkok, 1974, pp. 412413, and Sawang Lanleu, Sam Sib Jed Pee Hang Karn Patiwat (Thirtyseven Years of Revolution), Second Edition, Bangkok, 1971, p. 92,

50

Deputy House Speaker, Thawee Bunyaket and Khuang Aphaiwongse, to step down in order that candidates more to his liking could be appointed. Pibul contended that both Thawee and Khuang were not known to the Japanese and therefore were not suitable to occupy such important positions especially during a time of war.l4 Significantly, it was the Japanese issue which Pibul's opponents used to engineer his downfall a year later. In fact from mid-1943 on, plans were afoot among the Assembly members to oust Pibul. Rumours began circulating in Bangkok that Assembly members would be tried as war criminals at the end of the war, if they continued supporting Pibul. They were reinforced by broadcasts from Kandy and New Delhi which hinted that there was not only a danger to certain individuals but also xo the nation as a whole and that the only way for Thailand's survival was to overthrow Pibul.l5 It was widely believed that Pridi, the Regent, played an important role in engineering these rumours.l6 Pridi also asked Adul Aduldejarat, the Police Director-General, to stop prying into the affairs of House members.l7 It implied an indirect request for Adul's co-operation in the drive against Pibul.

14

Proaeedings of the National Assembly, No. 1/2486 (General session), "House Speaker and Deputy House Speaker Election", Saturday, 26 June 1943, p. 268. Proaeedings of the National Assembly, No. 2/2486 (Secret Session), 1 July 1943, pp. 271-273, 286-287, 291-295. Proaeedings of the National Assembly, No. 4/2486, a letter of the Secretary-General to the Cabinet - the Assembly, 8 July 1943, pp. 306-307. Proaeedings of the National Assembly, No. 5/2486, 15 July 1943, p. 335. See also Thawee Bunyaket, "Supplementary facts concerning events in Thailand during the Second World War", in Direk Jayanam, Thailand and World War II, pp. 206-207.

15

Netra Kemayothin, Chivit Nai Pon (Life of a General), Bangkok, 1967, vol. 1, pp. 10-11.

16

It was believed that Pridi was behind the election of the House Speaker in July 1943. Pridi planned to have Thawee nominated so that he could set up the Thai Government-in-Exile~ in Chungking, China. This government would consist of Pridi as the King's representative, Thawee as the House Speaker, and another Cabinet member as the Government's representative.

17

Thai Mai (The New Thai) February 1946. the War Criminal Trial.

Pridi's testimony during

51

The declining fortunes of Japan was another factor which caused dissatisfaction with Pibul among the House members. By 1944 it was evident that the Axis were losing ground fast. They had suffered a series of decisive defeats: the fall of Rome, followed by the Normandy invasion and the spectacular fall of Paris. On the other side, the Soviet armies were surging forward. In the East, the Americans had recaptured Saipan and Tinian. Meanwhile many Thais had suffered from the highhandedness of the Japanese Army. Individual Jap'anese were arrogant in their behaviour towards the Thais and there were often unpleasant incidents between Thais and Japanese.l8 The Thais had also suffered from essential commodity shortage, increased taxation and heavy air-raids. Between 1943 and 1944 Bangkok alone was attacked by almost 4,000 Allied air bombersi causing much damage in property and great loss in lives. 9 Schools were closed, and normal civic and social activities greatly disrupted. Worse still, the whole country was affected by the heaviest flood Thailand had ever experienced which laid waste the countryside and caused tremendous damage to lives and property.20 Life under wartime conditions was an unending

18

FM 2/2.11, Deputy Foreign Minister - Lt. Colonel Chai Pradipasena, 15 May 1942. There was a report about a group of Japanese soldiers searching more than fifty to sixty Thai houses for a belt which had been lost while a Japanese soldier was bathing, It was later found to have been misplaced by the soldier himself near a bush. FM 2/2.11, note of Lt. Colonel Chai, 20 January 1944, The Japanese were usually referred to contemptuously by the Thais as "disreputable dwarfs", a very low form of opprobrium in the Thai language.

19

Statistics of air attacks in 1944: Year

Number of Air Bombers

Dead

Seriously Injured

Property Damage Costs (baht)

1944

1907

1306

752

28,376,157

Source: 20

FM 2/3.8, Foreign Minister- Head of the Economic Mission, June 1947.

To calm the people who might conclude that the flood was the will of heaven, Pibul, in a broadcast to the nation, discussed at some length on the science of meteorology and explained that the flood was only a natural phenomenon, such as might be expected every tlventy-fi ve years, Prac:haahart (The Nation) , October 1942,

52

struggle for existence. Many Thais began to fear that there would be even more grievous disaster under the pro-Axis Government of Pibul. As a result, they began to think of leaving both the sinking Japanese boat and Pibul. By this time too most Thais had become resentful of Pibul' s ultranationalist programmes. ~'\Teighed down by the regime's many rules and regulations, the Thais felt that they had been deprived of all their freedom and right. Thus the pendulum of popular opinion began to swing against Pibulo The Japanese too were becoming disenchanted with Pibul. They suspected that he was making plans to go over to the side of the Allies while at the same time they feared that his growing unpopularity would also adversely affect their cause since Pibul had been so closely identified with them.2l After the war, Khuang recalled that by the summer of 1944 the Japanese had become so distrustful of the Pibul regime that there was a real and immediate danger that the Japanese military would seize control of the whole Thai civilian and military administration, as they did in French Indochina in March 1945, if the Pibul Government had remained in office for another twenty-four hours.22 The Pibul Government was finally toppled by the National Assembly in July 1944 as a result of the defeat of the Petchaboon and Saraburi Bills. Critics of the proposed motion to set. up Petchaboon, a town several hundred miles from Bangkok, as another capital and to build a Buddhist city covering an area of about 2,400 acres in Saraburi province, 80 miles north of Bangkok, were mostly members of Pridi's underground movement. They objected strongly to the choice of Petchaboon as a capital. Petchaboon, a town in a relatively inaccessible valley ringed by mountains was considered a malarial jungle. Of the 127,281 people conscripted and sent there in early 1944, 14,316 had taken ill and 4,040 had died of jungle fevers and other diseases. 23 21

Pramot Phungsunthan, op,cit., pp, 64-66.

22

Benjamin A. Batson, "The Fall of the Phibun Government, 1944", The Journal of the Siam Soaiety, Vol. 62, Part 2, July 1974, pn 114,

23

Proaeedings of the National Asserrb Zy, No, 9/2487, the statement of the Interior Minister in the House of Representatives, pp. 5-6, The figures given were not the final ones,

53

Besides, it was difficult for supplies to reach the place, and the town could be easily surrounded by enemy troops and was wide open to air attacks. As for the proposed Buddhist city at Saraburi, the anti-Japanese faction saw in it the wasteful extravagance that characterized Pibul's dreams of granduer. At a time of worsening economic conditions, they argued that the government should concern itself with the problems of the "mouth and stomach". It was also pointed out that the plan would involve large scale expropriation of land and eviction of farmers, which was altogether incompatible with Buddhist principles.24 Pibul attributed his defeat to his inability to defend the Bills publicly in the face of the Japanese presence. At his war crime trial after the war, he argued that the construction of Petchaboon and the establishment of a holy city, Monthon (City of Buddha) were in fact his anti-Japanese military plans, hence top secret. What he had in mind was to make Petchaboon which was surrounded by mountains, a defence centre from which direct military operation could be launched against the Japanese. Pibul also defended the Petchaboon project on the ground that the labour conscription which it entailed, gave him an excuse for not providing the Japanese with a labour force they wanted for the construction of a southern highway. It was claimed that the project was indirectly responsible for the Japanese failure to invade Assam because they were unable to complete the highway in time to send reinforcements there.25 As for Buddha Monthon, the real motive behind it according to Pibul was thus: ...• When I saw the time was ripe to prepare to fight the Japanese, •.. I began building a base at Petchaboon and also a road from Bangkok to Lampang (in the far north) and reaching all the way to the Chinese forces stationed in Yunnan .... However, the construction of the base at Petchaboon and of the road from Bangkok to Lampang made the Japanese suspicious. They wanted to know what we were building up there so secretly. In fact

24

Benjamin A. Batson, op.cit., p. 102.

25

U.S. A~ohives, No. D.S. 892.00/9-3045, Pibulsongkram's Circular Letter Addressed to Editors of Various Newspapers. (Translated).

54

they sent high ranking officials from Tokyo to inspect the constructions at Petchaboon. After they became very suspicious they planned to occupy the operation grounds of the (Thai) Second Army, which was stationed around Saraburi (south of Petchaboon) around Kuba Mountain. When I learned of this •.• I ... brought in the monks {thus establishing a religious sanctuary) by announcing the establishment of Buddhaburi Monthon in this area •.•. 26 It would appear that Buddha Monthon was meant to be a sanctuary for Thai refugees and a refuge for those who had to flee in the event that fighting broke out with the Japanese. 27 According to Pibul, he resigned "in order to preserve the sacredness of democracy and to uphold the constitution as the highest law of the land".28 In later years, Madame Pibulsongkram claimed that her husband's resignation was due to his conviction that Thailand's postwar situation would be easier with a new Prime Minister, as "he had declared war on the Allies, and the Allies were going to win".29 However, there is evidence to suggest that Pibul's first thought was to dissolve the House. But Adul Aduldejarat suggested a resignation since there was reason to believe that he would be renominated as was the common practice in Thai politics.30 Pibul complied.31 26

Netra Kemayothin, op.cit., pp. 351-352, Anant Pibulsongkram, F'ield Marsha& Pibulsongkram, pp. 363-365. The translacion is taken from Jayanta K. Ray, op.cit,, pp. 204-205,

27

Jayanta K. Ray, op,citr, p, 205,

28

Loc.cit.

29

Benjamin A. Batson, op.cit,, p. 108.

30

Thai Mai (The New Thai), 14 March 1946. War Criminal Trial,

31

Pibul's resignation was submitted to Prince Adhit, the Chairman of the Regency Council. The Prince at first did not endorse it. Instead he wrote to ~he House Speaker recommending that a new Prime Minister be elected. But the Speaker could not agree since it was tentamount to committing an act of treason had Pibul, the

Adul's testimony during the

55

Oddly enough, his resignation came only three days after the fall of Tojo Cabinet. The Japanese presence also figured prominently in the search for a new Premier. Pridi, the prime mover behind the ouster of Pibul, narrowed his choice to Thawee and Khuang, two well-known anti-Pibul men. Ultimately Khuang was thought to be a better choice. Thawee, a respected lawyer and an experienced administrator, was notoriously anti-Japanese. It was felt that it would be difficult for him to manage the delicate situation of dealing with the Japanese whereas Khuang, with his moderat.e views, was considered more acceptable not only to the various factions in the Assembly but also to the Japanese,32 The Thai "sealed-room politics" worked well. Khuang was the unanimous choice of the House members and was installed Prime Minister by Pridi who had just become the sole Regent of the country.33 Prime Minister, not yet formally resigned. In a dilemma Prince Adhit was forced to endorse Pibul 1 s resignation and ask the House to elect a new Prime Minister. The Assembly members unanimously elected Pahol, the venerable elder statesman who had led the military forces in the 1932 coup and had served as Prime Minister from 1933-1938, But Pahol declined nomination on grounds of health and old age. In fact Pahol told a close friend the reason for his refusal was that two days after his nomination, Pibul sent a general to ask whether he was really accepting Premiership. This made him feel uneasy because in 1938 when Pahol stepped down he went to see Pibul in person and asked Pibul to take over the office. But this time Pibul kept quiet and did not bother to come to see him, Such an attitude implied that Pibul still wanted to be the Premier. See Chalaw Srisarakorn, Santiban Tai Din (The Underground Secret Police) and Khuang Aphaiwongse, "The Change of Pibul Government", cited in The Beginning of Democracy, p. 414. 32

Pramot Phungsunthon, op.cit., pp. 68-69.

33

Prince Adhit, the Regent Prince spoke strongly against Khuang's nomination. At a meeting with the House Speaker and Khuang, the then Deputy Speaker, Prince Adhit expressed concern over Khuang's inexperience and unpopularity. He made it clear that he preferred more qualified men like Pibul or Pahol. The Prince even warned Khuang repeatedly of possible military moves by Pibul. In fact, Prince Adhi t was so gripped by fear of Pibul that he kept asking Khuang to turn down the position. But Khuang did not yield. Having no other way out the Regent consulted the House Speaker as to what

56

Though the "Pibul Get Out" campaign had began from the time of the controversial nomination of the House Speaker, its success took everyone by surprise. In 1944, the Constitution of 1932 was still in force. The Assembly was made up of appointed and elected members, both having the same numerical strength and enjoying the same powers. The appolnted members were predominantly military men and usually supporters of the government. In the heyday of Pibul' s power most government-sponsored Bills had been passed by large majorities. Liang Jaiyakarn, one of the leaders of the anti-Pibul group in the Assembly summed up Pibul's fall as a "fluke",34 Sir Josiah Crosby, the prewar British Minister in Thailand, saw in it "the collapse ... of the militarist faction headed by Luang Pibul". But Sir Josiah could not understand "why the Japanese should have allowed Luang Pibul, their quisling par excellence, to vacate the scene "35 This same question had been raised by one American who acted in collaboration with Pridi's underground movement. The explanation he received was that "they [the Japanese] can't afford a showdown. It would take troops away from the Burma theatre. It is a good policy right now for them to pretend to encourage popular government", 36 0

•••

Khuang's main task was to keep the country in order while at the same time prevent the Japanese from taking complete control of the country - a dangerous role for any political leader to play. His government was essentially a civilian government, Only seven out of the twenty-two Cabinet members were from the military ranks, Thawee became the Minister of Education as had been designated by Pridi to do, The Speaker suggested that the Prince did not have to endorse the nomination if it was against his own will. Finally Prince Adhit tendered his own resignation. It was approved by the House of Representatives by a vote of 62 : 2. The House immediately uominated Pridi the sole Regent by a vote of 70 : 1, See Chalaw Srisarakorn, op.cit,, p. 63. Proceedings of the National Assembly, No. 7/2487 (General Session), Tuesday, 1 August 1944, pp. 1-2, 22 and Khuang Aphaiwongse, ChivitKhongKapaahao (My Life), Bangkok, 1969, p. 77. 34

Benjamin A. Batson, op.cit., p. 106.

35

Sir Josiah Crosby, op.cit., pp. 166-167, by the writer's,

36

Ni::::ol Smith and Clark Blake, Into Siam the Underground Kingdom, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1945, p. 196,

The words are italicized

57

37 prior to the Premier's nomination. Thawee recalled later that he had chosen the Ministry of Education because it would allow him time to conduct the underground movement and at the same time utilize the schools, colleges and universities and mobilize thousands of teachers and students for the movement.38 To keep in check the military who many had expected would try to sabotage the new civilian government, Pahol was appointed to a Cabinet post wi~~out portfolio. He was the only one whose prestige could rival that of Pibul.39 On assuming office, Khuang presented a six-point programme to the National Assembly.40 In International affairs the stress was on the promotion of friendly relations with foreign powers, in particular Japan, on the basis of existing treaties and conventions. As for domestic affairs, Khuang chose to follow Pridi's advice "to continue the worthwhile programmes of the Pibul regime, but to drop those that were 'unpopular with the people' or 'premature'".41 As for the Japanese, what was needed, in Khuang's view, was not less co-operation with them but more. Khuang di.d not believe in Pibul's ill-concealed attempts to play both sides of the fence. To him they were likely to result

37

Pramot Phungsunthon, op.cit., p. 70.

38

Jayanta K. Ray, op.cit., p. 101.

39

On the face of the Cabinet appointments, it suggested a real triumph for Khuang and his anti-Japanese civilian colleagues in weaning the pro-Japanese militarist faction headed by Pibul from the political diet they had followed since the end of Absolute Monarchy more than a decade ago.

40

The six-point programme stressed: (1) Strict observance of the Thai Constitution and loyalty to the King; (2) Adherence to the six principles announced by the People's Assembly during the Thai Revolution; (3) Protection of people's rights and interests; (4) Co-operation between government and people; (5) Stabilization of national finances and (6) Promotion of friendly relations with foreign powers. The RoyaZ Gazette, Part 47, Vol, 61, p. 1519.

41

Quoted in Benjamin A, Batson, op.cit,, p. 111.

58

in the loss of what remained of Thailand's independence. Thus Khuang made the maintenance of good relations with the Japanese one of his top priorities.42 He preferred not to have any personal knowledge of the activities of the anti-Japanese underground movement which was led by Pridi, Thawee and Adul, except indirectly from some of their leaders in his government. In contrast to Pibul who had tried to explain at great length how he had frustrated the Japanese war efforts through his programmes, Khuang never did so. After the war he even offered to go to Japan to consult with the Japanese even though by 1944-45 such a journey would be extremely hazardous. Pibul on the other hand had refused to undertake such a trip when he was Prime Minister. From the very start, the new government was troubled by the Japanese presence. On his first day in office, Khuang learned that one southern province was seized by the Japanese and several Thai policemen killed.43 At that time it was estimated that Japan had roughly 150,000 Japanese soldiers making up 12 divisions in Thailand and along the frontier of Burma and Indochina.44 There were widespread rumours in the country that Thailand would be taken over by the Japanese military - a prospect t.hat created panic among all the Thais. It was apparent that the choice of Khuang as Prime Minister disappointed the Japanese. They knew that Khuang was a Pridi man. The Japanese would have preferred Pahol or Luang Sindhusongkram, the Minister of War. Pahol was the only member of the promoters of 1932 revolution who had had extensive dealings with Japan. He had spent two years on military duty there between 1919 and 1921, a~d in 1943 was the Head of a Thai Goodwill Mission to Japan.45 As for Luang Sindhusongkram, when he was the Naval Chief of Staff in 1935, the Thai Assembly passed a huge budget for naval construction and expansion. The then Japanese 42

Benjamin A. Batson, op.cit., pp. 115-116.

43

F'POCJ(;;edings of th~ National Assembly, No. 7*2487, 1 August 1944.

44

Nicol Smith and Clark Blake, op.cit., p. 243,

45

Edward Thadeus, Flood "Japan's Relations with Thailand, 1928-41", Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Washington, 1967, pp. 51, 68, 90,

59

Minister to Thailand, Yatabe, seized the opportunity to persuade the Thai navy to make their naval purchases from Japan. To achieve their goal, the Japanese invited the Thai naval purchasing committee which included Luang Sindhusongkram to Japan in August, 1935, where they were royally received and shown around Japanese naval facilities. No one was more impressed with the Japanese hospitality than Luang Sindhusongkram who summed up his feelings thus: my gratitude As for myself, I will not express in words: only watch what I do from now on •.•• 46 He proved to 'be a steadfast friend of Japano After the committee 1 s return the Thai navy ordered twenty ships f~om Japan as a first step in its naval expansion programme.47 Soon after Khuang assumed office, the Japanese Minister queried Pridi about the change of government and about Khuang. Pridi tactfully requested the Japanese not to concern themselves with Thai internal politics since the recent change of government was within the context of the constitutional process and was a purely internal affair.48 However, Thailand's reputation as a breeding ground of Allied agents and their distrust of Khuang made the Japanese fear that Khuang might be playing a double gameo Consequently they kept him under close surveillance. When Khuang discovered that he was being shadowed by Japanese agents he remonstrated with the Japanese and threatened to resign. Khuang's threat worked. The Japanese knew that in the face of their precarious war situation, the resignation of Khuang who enjoyed the overwhelming confidence of the Thai Parliament would "stir up Thai's _political world into a hornet's nest".49 Thus they contented themselves with the fact that the Khuang Government was no less friendly to them than was its predecessor. No matter what attempts the Khuang Government made in cultivating good relations with the Japanese, there remained a real danger that the Japanese forces would seize control 46

Quoted in E, Flood, op.cit., p. 99.

47

Lac., ci to

48

Pridi Bhanomyong, op,cit,, p. 69.

49

Quoted in Benjamin A. Batson, op.cit,, p.ll6.

60

of the whole Thai civilian and military administration. By May 1945, the AXis defences in Europe had crashed completely. In Asia, Manila had fallen, and an all-out British offensive had opened in Burma while U.S. forces were heading towards Okinawa, the very doorstep of Japan. As their war situation worsened and they readied themselves for a last-ditch war in various parts of As1a, the Japanese demanded more Thai co-operation while at the same time they became highly suspicious of the people. Rumours were widespread that many Thais in government were collaborating with the Allies. Now and again the Japanese confronted Pridi and Khuang with evidence varying from parachute deliveries of arms and secret agents in various outlying districts to the presence of guerrilla training camps in the jungles. There were at least two serious clashes between the Thai and Japanese Governments. The first came in May 1945 over the Japanese demand for a loan of one billion baht in addition to the amount already promised for the year. The Thai Government was then on the verge of bankruptcy. The only way they could get out of it was to fight the Japanese. But acting upon the secret advice of Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia, they postponed the uprising until the Allies were ready for a simultaneous attack. In the meantime Khuang bargained the loan down to fifty million. 50 As it was obvious that the Thai Government could not meet the Japanese demand the country became more tense with rumours about a Japanese takeover. The following incident vividly shows the strain then prevailing: ...• The Japs planned a celebration for the twenty-eight of June. Elaborate banquets were slated for Bangkok and the capitals of the provinces. All the Thai big shots were invited, and most of them were scared half to death, because it was at just such an affair several months before that the Japs had assassinated the underground leaders in Indo-China and taken over the Government. The rumour all over Thailand was that history was going to repeat itself .... Thirty Thais in one of the distant garrisons near the Malaya border had been assassinated by their hosts that evening. Ruth (Pridi) believes that word of the switch in plans reached this spot too late, and the dinner program went off there as it 50

Netra Kemayothin, op,cit,, p, 235,

61

had been originally intended everywhere 51 c • tl

0

A more serious confrontation was over the Thai guerrilla movement. In July 1945 the Japanese uncovered three secret airfields in the northeast of Thailand. They immediately demanded an explanation from the Thai Government and actions against the "traitors". When it was learned that the Japanese were on their way to investigate the airfields, the Thais prepared themselves to fight the Japanese at long last. But Tokyo surrendered before any shooting began. Despite the watchful eyes of the Japanese and the many odds against him, Khuang played his difficult role well. By the time Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945 the Khuang Government was regarded by the Allies as an anti-Japanese government. In fact Khuang was not so much pro-Japanese or pro-Allies as pro-Thai. The Thai talent for survival had once again saved the nation.

51

Nicol Smith and Clark Blake, op.cit., pp, 228-229.

IV:

THE THAI RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

The Thai Resistance Movement against the Japanese started shortly after the outbreak of the Pacific War and remained active until the war ended. The movement was organized by various groups both at home and abroad. Its activities can be divided into ~wo major phases: the early phase, from December 1941 to August 1944, when the various anti-Japanese groups of Thais at home and in the United States and England, formed the movement and worked separately, and the later phase, from August 1944 to August 1945, when the various resistance groups banded together in a united front in Thailand under the dynamic and charismatic leadership of Pridi Bhanomyong, the Regent. This movement was knowr.1. as the Free Siamese or Free Thai Movement. The Thai Resistance Movement first came into the open in the United States. On the day the Japanese invaded Thailand, M.R. Seni Pramoj, the Thai Minister in Washington, declared that Thailand's basic orientation was towards the Allies "no matter what may happen", and that. the Thais would look to the United States for her co-operation in fighting Japanese coercion .1 In a public broadcast t.o Bangkok on 10 December 1941, Seni publicly denounced the Pibul Government" He proclaimed the founding of a "Free Thai Movement" to liberate Thailand, and called for the unity and will power of the Thais to drive the Japanese out of Thai soilo2 Thereafter Seni's Free Thai Legation in Washington became the rallying point for pro-Allies Thai students. These students denounced the Japanese Army as "the enemy of the Thais" and called Pibul's regime "a puppet government which had collaborated with the enemy against the will of the people".3 Owing to lack of funds, Seni's

1

Memorandum by Cordell Hull, 8 December 1941" Depan.ment of State: file no. (hereafter cited as D.S.) 740.0011 P.W./1004 quoted in James V. Martin Jr., "Thai-American Relations in World War II", 7'he Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 2:2., no. 4 1 August 1963, p. 460.

2

Seni Pramoj, Chumnum Wannakadi Thang Karn Muang (A Collection of Political Literary Works), Thai Wattana Panich, Bangkok, 1968, p. 1.93,

3

SamreJ, "That Thailand May Be Free", Asia, February 1945.

64

Free Thai Movement could only begin operations in April 1942. This was after the American Government had agreed to release Thai assets in the United States upon the safe return of the prewar American Minister from Bangkok.4 The activities of the Free Thai Movement ranged from broadcasting to military co-operation with the American Army. The broadcast was conducted daily throughout the war. Its purpose was to let the public know that the Thais opposed Pibul's collaboration with the Japanese and that they wished to avoid the consequences of defeat in the event of an Allied victory.S Seni's plans for American military support were warmly received by the State Department. The Free Thai Army was set up to work with the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) and to prepare a political warfare campaign against the Japanese in Thailand. The soldiers of the Free Thai Army were "the most intelligent men that OSS has ever recruited - a group of hand-picked Siamese, Ph.D.'s and M.A.'s from Harvard, M.I.T. and other leading American universitJ.es .•.• They are absolutely top .... "6

4

Seni Pramoj, op.cit., pp. 205-206,

5

Initially Seni Pramoj wrote and broadcasted the script himself, Later Thai students took over the job and Seni spoke only once a month. Fearing its impact on the people in Thailand, the Pibul Government prohibited the people from listening to the broadcasts. In Bangkok, there were weekly broadcasts in Thai from Rome, which were directed specifically at the "Free Thais in North America" to convince them that they ~vere wrong in their political st:and. There was also a Bangkok broadcast to counteract the Thai broadcasts from the United States. See U.S. Arohives, File no, D.S. 892.01/21, "Free Thai Movement", 27 November 1942, p. 40.

6

Nicol Smith and Clark Blake, Into Siam the Underground Kingdom, p. 17. Seni recalled that when Thailand declared war on the United States, there were about 120 Thai students in that country. Of this number, 100 students refused to return to Thailand in the first exchange party that took place in the summer of 1942 and in fact no Thais took advantage of the second exchange. At that time any foreigner in the United States could be drafted into 1.ts army and sent to any part of the world. Seni feared that if the Thai students were drafted in this fashion, the Free Thai Hovement would have no opportunity of sending its men to Thailand to engage in anti-Japanese activities, Seni thus

65

The Free Thai Army was financially independent. Its soldiers wore Thai uniform and the Thai National Flag was always kept flying at their headquarters. After four months of training, twenty-one of the thirty-nine trainees were commissioned as officers. They formed an expeditionary force under the Thai Military Attache, Lieut,Colonel Kharb Kunjara.7 Plans were made to use Chinese territory as a base for an overland infiltration into Thailand. The group together with OSS officials sailed for India in March 1943, reaching Bombay in June and arriving in China in the summer of 1943. In China the Thai "students-turned-agents" and their OSS colleagues faced difficulties in dealing with the Chinese Government. Though China offered the shortest way to reach Thailand through the north, Kharb had to wait for more than twelve months before his agents could penetrate Thailand. In June 1944, the first two Thai agents were sent into Thailand through Indochina, only to be killed by Japanese soldiers near the border. Another group of four took a different route by way of Kunm1ng, Luang Prabang and Vientiane. After eighty-seven days of struggle they finally trudged across the Thai border in October 1944c8 A few days later they secretly installed themselves in the Bangkok headquarters of the national police, whose chief, Adul Aduldejarat, was the number two man of the underground movement. Thereafter contact was established between the Free Thais in China and the underground movement in Thailand. L1ke their counterparts in the United States, many Thai students in England were resentful of the Pibul Government after the Japanese invasion of Thailand but there was no Free Thai Legation in London to which they could turn. The Thai Minister there regarded all Free Thai activi~ies as illegal and strongly refused to give any

used the OSS for his o-vm pursuiL Thai Poli'tios, p, 154, P~bul

1

7

Lieut Colonel Kharb was

8

Nicol Smith, op.cit,, pp. 182-183.

See Jayant:a K. Ray, Portrait;s of

s close confidante. In 1948, when PLbui came back to power, he became Pibul's personal military adviser,

66

support to the movemento Nevertheless, there was such a movement.9 In December 1941, the Thais in Britain sent a message to the Legation in Washington congratulating it on its public denunciation of the Pibul Government, Two months later they decided to organize their own resistance movement, and began to look for a leader. Prlnce Chula Chakrabongse, a grandson of King Chulalongkorn was approached. A well-known Britisheducated scholar with a British wife, the Prince would have proved himself a good connection with the Brltish. But he declined the invitation on the ground that he wanted to keep himself out of politics.lO Another potential leader was Prince Subha-Sawasdi, a brother-in-law of exKing Rama VII, who very much wished to head the movement. However, although the Prince was "the only Siamese the British recognized as being good", he wa~ politically unacceptable to most of his countrymen.ll The Free Thais then asked Seni in the United States to help them. In reply Seni assigned Mani Sanasen,l2 a Secretary at the Thai Legation in Washlngton to take on the job. On his arrival in London in June 1942, Mani was very much struck by the attitude of his compatriots there:

9

This was amply proved by the fact that only the Minister and one Secretary of the Thai Legation and 23 others, mostly students out of some 100 Thais in England decided to return home on repatriation. The rest including seven members of the Legation staff chose to remain in England'· See The Foreign Office Record (hereafter cited as F ,0,,), file no, 371 no, 35977, "The Free Thais in England", Report by Mani Sanasen for 1942-43, September 1943e

10

Chula Chakrabongse, H,R,H, Prince, 'Ih;J 'I'uJain Have Met:, London, 1956, po 238,

11

R, Harris Smith, C.'en~'raZ.

OSS The Seoret H-isf;o:ty of Ameriaa 's First lntelhgenae Agenay, University of California Press, 1972,

p. 296,

12

Mani Sanasen was then a Secretary at the Thai Legation in Washington, Before that, he had worked at the League of Nations in Geneva for nearly s1xteen years.

67

•.• ,The general feeling wat that of resentment against a government that had led the country to ruin, of frustration and disappointment that the Thais in positions of authority in England had failed to give any lead in the right direction, o•• and anxiety to help in the United Nations war effort so effectively as to demonstrate the real sympathies of the Thai people to all the world ." •. 13 Mani and some of the Thai student leaders in England drew up the objectives of the Free Thai Movement. While their main aim was to help liberate Thailand, the group also pledged not to take part in politics and to dissolve the movement once their goal had been achieved.l4 The movement was formed in July 1942 with 56 members. Of these, many are today respected members of Thai society. They included: H.R.H. Princess Sukhodaya, the wldow Queen of King Rama VII, and Puey Ungpakorn, then doing research work at the London School of Economics.lS One month later, the Free Thai members decided to form their own single unit to "keep the fighting Thais ••• together in one group••.l6 After some weeks of tough negotiations with the British Government, the latter allowed the group to be formed on 9ondition that the Thais agreed to join the Pioneer Corps, 1 Thirty-six Thai students were then recruited to undergo six months of military and intelligence training. Mani reported to Seni as follows: 13

F.O, 3?1/359?'1, "The Free Thais in England", pp. 1-2.

14

Puey Ungpakorn, "Tahan Chua Krow" ("A Temporary Pioneer Corp"), in Direk Jayanam, ThaUand and Seaond World WaY', pp. 220-221.

15

F. 0, 3?1/359??, "The Free Thais in England",

16

Loc,ciL

17

Mani reported back to Seni Pramoj that the War Office had assured him that the unit would be part of the Pioneer Corps in name and not in fact ar1d that their designation would be quite different as soon as they went overseas,

68

..•. The record of the unit in England is one of which all Free Thais can justly feel proud. They bore their hardships, and they were real ones, with equanimity and even cheerfulness ..•• Wherever they were quartered, they were the most popular troops and the local population showed them generous hospitality ...• 18 In early 1943 the well~trained Thai unit left London by sea for India where they were placed under Force 136, the cover-name of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in the Far East, and began to prepare themselves to infiltrate their homeland in order to work with the underground, if one existed. Their task was successful. On 18 August 1944, the SOE headquarters at Calcutta received the first radio message from their two agents in Bangkok after they had made contact with the underground. This was two months ahead of the Free Thai operations in China. In Bangkok, the underground movement operated secretly from the country's highest office, namely that of the Regent. Pridi Bhanomyong, the prewar Finance Minister "kicked upstairs" by Pibul who made him a Regent barely a week after the Japanese invasion, was the leader of the movement. Working with him were members of Parliament, bureaucrats and military officers. Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Commander of the Allies in Southeast Asia, honoured Pridi as "one of the romantic figures in the war in Southeast Asia" whose "name could only be uttered in a whisper, and the whole story was top secret".l9 · Pridi's underground movement was motivated by a double objective: firstly, to fight the Japanese invaders;~and secondly, to negotiate with the principal Allies.20 Pridi wanted the Allies to make void Pibul's declaration of war, recognize the Thai Resistance and number the Thais among their Allies like they did with General de Gaulle's French

18

F,O,

3?1/359??, "The Free Thais in England", p. 4.

19

Lord Louis Mountbatten's Speech reported in The London Times, 18 December 1946.

20

Pridi Bhanomyong, Buang Lang Ka~ Kor Tan Kabuan Ka~ Seri Thai (Some Accounts Concerning the Establishment of the Free Thai Movement), Bangkok, 1972, p. 13.

69

Committee for National Liberation. 21 Initially Pridi planned to set up a government-inexile in northern Thailand. However, owing to very tight Japanese control over the area, the plan was dropped. Pridi then turned to establishing contact with the Allies for outside assistance. The task was difficult. England cons1dered Pibul's declaration of war valid, while each of the other Allies, the United States, Russia, the French National Committee and China, had its own policy. Unknown to the Free Thai organizations abroad, Pridi sent four successive envoys to contact the Allies. The first mission was sent to China in early 1942 but they appeared to have disappeared without trace.22 The second envoy, Kamjad Balankura, was dispatched to Chungking in March 1943. The purpose of his mission was fourfold: first, to convince the Allies that Pibul's declaration of war on 3ritain and the United States was unconstitutional and therefore should be nullified and that the existing Treaties of Friendship between Thailand and the Allies were still in force; second, to set up a "Free" Thai Government on Indian terri tory with diplomatic relations with the British and American Governments; third, to make arrangement for Pridi and his colleagues who would form the nucleus of the proposed government, to escape from Thailand; lastly, to work for the release of Thai reserves frozen in British and American banks for the use of the government-in-exile.23 On his arrival in Chungking, Kamjad was arrested by the Chinese, but was allowed to radio Washington. But he received no answer to his plea. The Chinese were suspicious and kept him under surveillance. Eventually Kamjad met Prince Subha-Sawasdi, a Force 136 Free Thai agent, only to learn that neithe:r, the British nor the Chinese favoured the idea of a government-in-exile and that Sir Josiah Crosby, the prewar British Minister to Bangkok, did not know him.24 21

The Bangkok Post, "The Memoirs of Pridi Bhanomyong", 26 November 1974.

22

Nicol Smith. op.cit,, p, 91.

23

Chantana, X,O, Kroop (X.O. Group), Bangkok, 1954, pp. 88-112, 130-132.

24

D.S, 792,93;37, Chungking despatch no. 1129, 9 July 1943 quoted in James V. Martin, op.cit,, p. 463.

70

Before Kamjad could make further attempts to reach Washington, he mysteriously "fell ill" and "died of cancer". 25 Pridi's th1rd mission, entrusted to Sanguan Tularak 26 and Daeng· Guan Tilaka2 7 in the winter of 19 4 3, was able to carry Kamjad's message from Chungking to Washington to win the support of Seni Pramoj and the State Department. The United States Government was at first chary of recognizing "any particularly Thai group" in connection with the government-in-exile proposals.28 But Seni who was in favour of the plan worked hard to persuade the State Department to accept the plan. Finally the United States agreed to support Pridi to get out of the country without political commitments.29 The fourth mission, led by Thavil Udol, a meWber of Parliament from the northeast, went to China in September 1944, Its role was limited t.o maintaining liaison between the Chinese Government and the Thai underground. In a letter to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Pridi wrote: .••. I am sending to China another ... to obtain the recognition of the Allied powers and the permission to set up a provisional government or an organ of a similar nature in Allied territory •..• Only in this way can the Thai people be awakened and mobilized in order to free themselves from the clutches of the Japanese aggressors •..• 3o 25

R, Harris Smith, op.cit., p. 300.

26

Sanguan became Thailand's first postwar ambassador to China in 1946. He was dismissed from his post following Pibul's return to power in 1948.

27

Daeng was a longtime resident in England. He became Khuang Aphaiwongse's brother-in-law when the latter married Leka, his younger sister.

28

James V. Martin, op.cito, p. 463.

29

At a meeting with Seni on 1 Febr~ary 1944, the State Department confirmed American support for Thai independence,

30

Thavil Udal became a Minister in the Pridi Government after the

71

On the whole, Pridi's missions brought about cooperation among the various anti-Japanese groups. They made the first link between the underground in Thailand, the OSS and Force 136. As one OSS agent remarked: At last ... the two hundred and twenty thousand square miles of Thailand were no longer an information blackout .••• 31 It should be noted that as late as October 1944, neither the Force 136 nor OSS agents knew who the "real" leader of the Thai underground was. The Allied agents were only informed that a strong resistance network existed in Thailand under "one big shot who could command the strategy".32 In view of the fact that the anti-Japanese movements in Thailand, the United States and in England had started shortly after war broke out and that by mid-1942 all the organizations knew of the other's existence, one may well ask why joint operations in Thailand only came about eighteen months later. What were the reasons behind this unnecessary delay? A probable answer is that the delay was caused by disagreement between the United States and Britain over the status of Thailand and by mutual dislike and suspicion among the Thai leaders themselves. The first, and a fundamental, divergence between the United States and Britain was over the question of declaring war upon Thailand. Neither regarded the conclusion of the Thai-Japanese Offensive-Defensive

war. He was assassinated in 1947 by "unknown enemies" while being detained in prison in connection with Pridi's unsuccessful coup attempt in 1947. See also U.S. A~ahives, D.S. 892.00/5-2345. "Controls During and After Liberation", p. 16. With the help of the United States, the Chinese adopted the American stand towards Thailand's independence. In February, 1944, Generalissimo Chiang Kai -shek publicly declared: "China as well as her Allies, have no territorial ambitions in Thailand, and have no intention of undermining her sovereignty and independence ..•• " 31

Nicol Smith, op.cit., p. 183.

72

Alliance of 21 December 1941 as sufficient reason to declare war on Thailand, however on account of it, the British proposed on 24 December 1941 that the Thai Minister in London be recognized as "the representative ..• of the free people of Thailand" while the State Department decided on 19 January 1942 to recognize the Thai Minister in Washington as a "Minister of Thailand''.33 The question of declaring war on Thailand was reviewed when Thailand declared war on Britain and the United States on 25 January 1942. By that time the Japanese had already invaded Penang and Burma from Thai territory and Singapore was under seige. The hard-pressed British were thus not in a mood to be charitable. They retaliated by declaring war on Thailand in early February. The United States, however, refrained from doing so, but explained to the British that she would treat as enemies any Thai forces opposing, obstructing, or threatening the United States or the Allied forces, and she would regard Thailand "for various purposes, including economic and psychological warfare, as enemy-occupied terri tory"" 34 By mid-1943 when agents of the Thai underground appeared in Chungking with news of a strong underground network in Thailand, London brought the question of Thailand's future to the fore in February 1944" But the Anglo-American diplomatic dialogue dragged on. The United States, with a strong postwar Thailand in mind, decided to assist Pridi to get out of the country and form a governmentin-exile. Nevertheless, the State Department pointed out that although it sympathized with the Free Thai Movement, "we have not made and we do not contemplate making ... any polit.ical commitment to any particular Thai national or Thai group prejudicing the future situation".35 The British took an entirely opposite view. Whitehall sent the State Department a proposed declaration condemning the Pibul Government for betraying Anglo-Thai friendship.

33 U.S. Arah-ives, D,S. 892oOO/l-l04S, "Postwar Status of Thailand",

10 January 1945, 34 U,S, Archives, D.S, 892.01/55, Memorandum handed to Lord Halifax, undated and unsigned and Memorandum of conversation, 20 March 1944, 35

Loc,c~t"

73

It also said that only if the Thais made efforts to "save themselves from the wors·t consequence of their betrayal" would the British Government "support the emergence o5 a free and independent Thailand after the war is over". 6 Sir Josiah Crosby commented that: ••.. The cause of Siam is exceptional in that she alone among the countries of Southeast Asia is at the same time an independent state and an enemy of Great Britain ••• upon whom she has formally declared war o e o she will thus of necessity be liable to punishment .... 37 The State Department on the other hand could not agree with the Foreign Office's ploy. It suggested instead that the statement should not be made at all or that it include at least an unequivocal commitment that Britain had no territorial ambitions in Thailand. The British concurred but they insisted that they would not offer Pridi the presidency of any Free Thai Committee.38 The British had all along deprecated the "practical value" of Pridi's movement. "If the resistance", declared Whitehall, "is to be encourajed, it may need a spur rather than a sugarplum •••. " 9 Since Britain and the United States were unable to agree on the long-term objective for which the war was being fought, it was not feasible for them to work together or for Pridi to set up a Thai government-inexile. The Thais thus had to make their own hedge against fate when in July, 1944 they overthrew Pibul, and soon afterwards, make Khuang Prime Minister, leaving Pridi as the sole Regent" Mutual dislike and suspicion between Seni and Pridi, and between Seni and Lieu~ Colonel Kharb led to a bitter 36

U.S. Arahives, D.S, 892.00/5-2345, Top Secret, "Thailand, Controls During and After Liberation", pp. 1-9.

37

Sir Josiah Crosby, "Observations On a Post-War Settlement in Southeast Asia", International Affairs, July 1944, p. 362,

38

James V. Martin, Jr,, op,cit., p. 465,

39

u,s,

Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 1, pp. 1315-1319 in R. Harris Smith, op.cit., p. 304.

74

split among the anti-Japanese Thai leaders. The PridiSeni differences dated back to the time when Seni was appointed Thai Minister to Washington in 1940. Seni believed that his surprise appointment was due to Pridi. He claimed that he was then popular with the students of the Thammasat University, and that Pridi anxious to keep the University which he had founded his own sphere of influence, manoeuvred to negate his popularity by sending him out of the country.40 Of Pridi's underground, Seni said: .••. Many people imagine that our Free Thai Movement was in a sort of alliance with Pridi's Free Thai Movement. This is completely wrong There was virtually no connection .... 41 What was more distressing was a divergence of .views between Seni and Lieut.Colonel Kharb. While in Chungking, Kharb bitterly complained about the lack of support from the "Thai Minister" in Washington. This was certainly true. Evidence shows that Seni had refused to recognize Lieut.Colonel Kharb as the representative of the Free Thai Movement. He suspected that Kharb, a close confidante of Pibul, had been appointed Military Attache in Washington by Pibul in order to keep a close watch on him.42 On the personal level, Seni disliked both Pibul and Pibul's policies. In his wartime memoir Seni wrote: •.•. Before the war started in Thailand our government was very dictatorial and became unpopular in the United States .•.• I was worried that if Japan attacked our country the United States would not help us. Therefore I sent Pibul a full report on the situation .•. but nothing could stop the Government. In August 1941, I wrote a personal letter to Pibul, suggesting the creation of the resistance movement

40

Jayanta K. Ray, op.cit., pp. 148-149.

41

Ibid., pp. 157-158,

42

Seni Pramoj, "Rai-ngan Karn Jaerajar Rangab Sathana Songkram Britain Yai Paw Saw 2489" ("Report on Negotiations with Britain Concerning the Prewar Status of Thailand"), Praahum Nibhon (Seni's Collected ~.Jorks), Bangkok, 1966, pp, 37-38,

75

in case Thailand was invaded •..• no reply ..•• 43

But I received

Thus because of individual differences between the leading figures co-operation among the Free Thais took a long time to materialize. There was another underground movement in Thailand which few people know about. Madame Pibul claims that her husband had started an underground anti-Japanese movement long before Pridi did. With him was his right-hand man, Adul Aduldejarat who after Pibul 1 s downfall, became a dynamo of Pridi 1 s underground. 44 According to Pibul, his anti-Japanese plan involved both military measures to drive out the Japanese and nonmilitary measures to minimize war casualties. To quote Pibul 1 s words: Most of our people did not know in detail either the obstacles which we had put up against the Japanese or the offensive plan that had been prepared, ever since our territory was invaded on 8 December 1941, in order to overthrow them in the final stage. That is why I have been wrongly accused of leading the country to collaborate with Japan oeoo45 One of the movement's aims was to make contact with the Allies. This has been described in detail by General Netra Khemayothin, then a Major, in a Thai book entitled Life of a General, in the chapter, "Field Marshal Pibulsongkram 1 s Underground". General Netra explained that by early 1944 Pibul had been in close contact with the Chinese Government. Plans to attack the Japanese were

43

Seni Pramoj, "Kwam Sampan Rawang Thai-America Rawang Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 2" {'Thai-American Relations in World War II"), Chumnwn Wartnakadi Thang Karn MUang (A Collection of Political Literary Works), p, 195.

44

Jayanta K. Ray, op,cit., p. 13,

45

U.S, Are:hives, D.S, 892.00/9-3045, Pibulsongkram 1 s Circular Letter Addressed to Editors of various Newspapers (Translation), p. 6.

'

76

drawn up by the Chinese and the Thai Governments and the latter had provided the Chinese Army in Yunnan with reports on the location and movements of the Japanese troops, and rice, medicine, and canned food.46 In mid1944 Pibul had wanted to send Adul Aduldejarat on a secret mission to the Allied headquarters in Chungking but before he could do that he was forced to resign.47 Pibul claimed that he had done his best to struggle against the Japanese in the country. His efforts ranged from blocking supplies of commodities and foodstuffs to the Japanese, to obstructing them in their acquisition of premises, etc.48 Moreover, Pibul said he knew of the 46

General Netra wrote that he was one of the officers assigned by Pibul to negotiate with Chinese representatives in Yunnan in April 1944. The minutes of the meetings were submitted to Pibul a few days later. General Netra recalled that most certainly the Japanese knew what was going on because soon after his return, Major Sung Yoa, a liaison officer with the Japanese North Army went to inspect the meeting place. Then the Japanese army officers demanded a speedy invasion of the Thai troops in Yunnan. See Netra Kemayothin, Chivit Nai Pan (Life of a General), Bangkok, 1967, pp. 325-333.

47

Netra Kemayothin, op.cit., pp. 336-340 and U.S. Archives, D.S. 892.00/9-3945, Pibulsongkram's Circular Letter Addressed to editors of various newspapers (Translation), p. 10.

48

According to Pibul, he had ordered the Thai authorities to deprive the Japanese of all facilities for obtaining rice until the latter had to resort to using military trains to transport the commodity, The government also encouraged the people to cultivate other kinds of crops. As regards other provisions such as hides, skins, cotton wool, etc., Pibul personally instructed that all these necessities be hidden from the Japanese. In one incident, when Pibul learnt that Chinese merchants were busy buying up a certain kind of bathing sheet to resell to the Japanese, he promptly ordered the merchandise to be requisitioned for military use. Concerning communication and the building of highways, the Thai Government resolved not to build or improve any highways while the war was on, except those which might be used to fight against the Japanese. Instruction was also despatched to provincial police authorities to notify owners not to rent houses to the Japanese.

77

arrival of each Allied agent, but he had pretended to be ignorant for fear that it would complicate his dealings with the Japanese. He also pointed to the fact that all Allied nationals and agents interned in Thailand were given every possible comfort.49 Pibul summed up his overall activities as follows: .•. I have never allowed myself to be used as their [the Japanese] stooge ...• I never requested any individual or group of persons to render assistance to the Japanese. Neither did I ever hold or attend meetings with an aim to help or co-operate with them It is obvious that nothing could be revealed while the enemy was still in our country. Therefore, of the various things that we did during the last few years, some are known to the public and some are not. The people might not like my government in some ways as they were forced to hinder and resist the Japanese without their knowing it. I would repeat again that the Government could not say anything except ask the people to obey and follow only the instruction 50 •

C

II

t!

What Pibul had said about his resistance movement is not without evidence. But when did he start it and how much did he know of Pridi's actual operations? Thawee Bunyaket, an important secret agent then, had acknowledged in his writing that the success of the Pridi-led underground movement owed a lot to Adul Aduldejarat. But he had not mentioned Pibul's support behind Adul's efforts in this direction. According to Thawee Pibul had planned military measures to dislodge the Japanese when the Axis defeat was imminent and also sought to establish contact with the Allies with a view to evolving a joint anti-Japanese strategy.Sl Pridi on the other hand, did not mention Pibul's name in his writing. Even when he spoke of Adul's role in the underground, he pointed out that Adul came to join his

49

U.S, Arohives, D.S. 892.00/9-3045, Pibulsongkram's Circular Letter.

SO

Loc,cit.

51

Jayanta K. Ray, op.cit., p. 13.

78

camp only after the downfall of Pibul in July 1944. Prior to tha~Pridi said, it was difficult and almost impossible to comprehend Adul's exact attitudes since he had hitherto been Pibul's "gestapo".52 After Khuang Aphaiwongse had become the Prime Minister in August 1944, the underground network stepped up its activities. The increased number of government officials in the underground ensured that large-scale operations could be carried out smoothly. Among the leaders were Pridi Bhanomyong who exerted great influence in the administration; Adul Aduldejarat, the Police Chief; and Thawee Bunyaket, the Minister of Education. One OSS agent recalls "more cooperation from officials and inhabitants of Thailand than from any other nominally Axis country".53 And a Force 136 official remarked: .•. perhaps it is wrong to imagine that Pibul did us a great deal of harm .... Indeed far from doing us harm, we may even say he did us a good turn unwittingly. By preaching resistance with such pomp and vigour and then by_ caving in at the first possible moment, he brought discredit upon a proud and sensitive people. He made the Siamese angry with him and ashamed of their country, and such a mood is fertile ground for the growth of a resistance movement •••• 54

In the last months of 1944, areas of co-operation among the underground agents steadily widened. Secret missions were filtering in and out of Thailand on an everincreasing scale.SS The state people, under Adul, guarded isolated airports used by the United States and British 52

Sangworn Suwannacheep, Anusorn Nai Ngarn Phra Rajahathan Pleung Sop Pon Reu Tri Sangworn Suwannaaheep(In Memory of Rear Admiral Sangworn Suwannacheep), Bangkok, 1973.

53

Edgar Snow, "Secrets from Siam", Saturday Evening Post, January 1946,

54

Andres Gilchrist, Bangkok Top Secret, Hutchinson, London, 1970, Po 15,

55

An authoritative account of the exploits of Thai agents in Thailand

is given in Nicol Smith, op.cit., Chapters 11-15.

79

planes bringing in weapons, ammunition and medicine foi the underground. Allied soldiers managed to slip lnto the country to train Thai guerrillas. By March 1945 there were 13 Thai guerrilla outposts trained by Americans and 11 trained by British, each consisting of a minimum of five hundred guerrillas.56 These units first started in central Thailand. In 1945 they moved up to the north, northeast and the south. The unlt leaders moved quickly about the countryu distributing anti-Japanese pamphlets, establishing resistance networks, and preparing the people for an armed uprising against the J·apanese,57 There was mutual trust between the Free Thai Movement and the Allied Powers with the former receiving all possible help from the Allies. In return intelllgence r:eports on Japanese t.roop strength movements were sent daily from Bangkok to Allied Headquarters in Ceylon, These reports wer:e of help to Allied bombers in their bombing raids on Japanese camps, On the ground, Thai guerrillas tried various devices to sabotage the Japanese war efforts. They destroyed many bridges of strategic value to the Japanese and disrupted the supply of petrol to the Japanese Army" Free Thai Movement personnel encouraged gangsters to rob the Japanese of their possessions, in particular thelr weaponso They even used dancing girls and poisoned food to destroy the Japanese.58 Despite their military strength, the Japanese could do little to counteract the mounting Thai sabotage. When the surrender of the Axis became imminent, Pridi was anxious to obtain an Allied declaration guaranteeing Thailand 1 s postwar independence. He wanted to set up a provisional government to repudiate the declarationsof war on Great Britain and the United States and to declare war on Japan. To this end Pridi sent the following message to the State Department in May 1945: 56

Thawee Bunyaket, "Tha1land during the Second World War", 1'he Beginning of Democracy, pp. 318-319,

57

Auan Nakarathap, "Lang Chak Seri Thai Nai Changwat Udornthani" ("Behind the Free Thai Movement in Udornthani Province"), Jullasarn KrongkaY-ri 1'amra (Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities), 3rd Year, Vol- 3i April-June 1976, pp, 68-75,

58

Thawee Bunyaket, op,clt,, 321-324,

80

..•. Not long ago the Thai Government would not accede to a Jap demand for an additional credit of 100,000,000 bahts. I have been informed by the present government that they will not remain in office if the Japs persist in this matter. In that event, a new government would have to be installed and it would have to take action against the Japs by first ordering void all debts and agreements the Pibul regime had contracted with the Japs, including the treaty on the incorporation of four states in Malaya and Shan States into Thailand, as well as declaration of war against England and the United States. The basis of relations between these two nations and Thailand will to us be set up as they were prior to Pearl Harbour '"""59 But nothing came out of it. The State Department, foreseeing strong British opposition, objected to the proposed plan. Britain deprecated Pridi 's Free Thais as "nothing more than a band of intriguing politicians, without military support, more trouble than they were worth, with no prospect of developing into an effective resistance movemen·t". 60 In fact, the United States and Great Britain could not agree on the peace terms that should be offered Thailand at the end of the war. Having failed to establish a government-in-exile, Pridi tried repeatedly to obtain the permission of the Allies to launch an armed uprising against the Japanese. But the OSS cautioned him not to take any premature action against the enemy without first co-ordinating his efforts with those of Admiral Mountbatten, the Allied Commander in the area. 61 By June 1945, Pridi had with him between 50,000 and 90,000 well armed and trained Free Thais. This force was ready to fight the Japanese when Admiral Mountbatten gave

59

U.S. Arahi?Jes, D. S, 892.00/5-2345,

11

Control During and After

Liberation,, p. 19. 60

Andrew Gilchrist, op.cit., pp. 83-and 92.

61

U,S. Archi?Jes, D.S. 892.00/5-2345, PP• 4-5,

11

Thailand, Thai Resistance 11 ,

81

the word. But "V-J Day" came before the Free Thais could have a chance to prove their worth. The question arises as to whether Japanese intelligence was aware of the Free Thai Movement" Observers of this period suggest that the Japanese, especially General Nakamura, the Supreme Commander, knew much of what was going on in Thailand. They agree that the Japanese could easily have arrested the top leaders of the movement and placed the whole country under strict martial law. Then, why didn' "i: they do it? A probable explanation was that by the time the J·apanese came to know about the Resistance Movement they were already on the defensive in the war. If they had started action against Pridi or any other Free Thai leaders, they would have had to carry the job through. This would have meant •tlholesale arrests, shootings and the military occupation of the country, which 1n their turn would have led to more outbreaks of resistance and guerrilla sabotage. Their armies in Burma might have to be withdrawn to deal with the situation in Thailand. It was essential to their war efforts to keep Thailand a friendly nation so that t.hey would not be attacked from the rear. This may help to expla1n why ·the Japanese took no drastic action against the Thai Government apart from the threatening them whenever they came across supply deliveries or other traces of the activities of the Free Thais. With Japan's surrender, her presence in Thailand was abruptly terminated and the struggle of the Free Thai Movement against t:.he enemy came to an end. But a different type of bat tlt? - a scramble for political power among the Free Thais - raas about to beg in. Direk J ayanam, a v1ell respected Thai and elder statesman described the postwar situation as thus: ... many Thais were in the Free Thai Movement .... Some were good and some ~N'ere bad. Some were idealist.s and some were opportunists. When the war \.-Jas over, some became millionaires, some were given ranks and positions, some remained the same, and some stayed unknovm, being completely forgotten. Worse still, a few years after, many had been looked down on as "Pridi men". This is regrettable. All Thais know that the Free Thai~ achievements belor.g to the whole nation and neither to any individuals nor to Pridi. Nonetheless those Free Thai members have still been branded "Pridi Clan" .... 62 62

Direk Jayanam, op.cit,, p. 180,,

82

The deep-seated distrust and jealousy among the leading Free Thais resulted in mutual suspicion and irreconciliable differences among their supporters. Effects of these have permeated through postwar Thai politics till today.

V:

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THAILAND, 1941-45

In his speech to the nation on 24 June 1942, six months after the war had started in Thailand, Pibulsongkram warned the people that the country was actually on the verge of bankruptcy.l It was certainly true that the financial position of the government was indeed critical. Sixty per cent of Thailand's currency reserves was frozen in London and New York and its currency debased to parity with the Japanese yen but in reality below parity because of Japanese pressure. There was practically no import and export trade while internal trade was badly disrupted. Government revenues had diminished to a fraction of their prewar amount, and there was no reserves and only a very limited source of private wealth to draw upono A major factor in Thailand's economic crisis was the effective devaluation of the baht in relation to the yen. A yen-baht parity agreement was signed in Tokyo on 22 April 1942 by Vanit Pananonda, head of a Thai economic mission to Japan earlier in the month. It meant a devaluation in the baht by approximately 33%. The prewar baht-yen exchange was at the rate of 150-160 yen for 100 baht. There are no available sources to show whether there were preexisting conditions that had led to a loss of foreign purchasing power in the baht, thus making the agreement a mere formalization of these conditions, or whether it was a one-sided agreement forced upon her by the Japanese Government. It was definitely a major factor in Thailand's worsening inflationary condition during the war. The Thai economic mission also pledged Thailand's adherence to the "Yen Bloc". Under an agreement signed in Tokyo on 2 May 1942, Thailand undertook to settle all foreign trade accounts in yen. On 18 June 1942, Japan granted Thailand a loan of 200 million yen to serve as "currency reserve"" The loan was made possible by the special issue of "military yen",

1

Bangkok Times, 25 June 1942o

84

similar to the currencies used by the Japanese Army in Hong Kong and other occupied areas"2 The yen-baht parity worked in Japan's favour because it allowed her to buy Thai raw materials at a lower yen priceo In theory, this would also enable Thailand to sell goods competitively and in larger quantities but in reality it was not so because under war conditions Thailand could not produce enough for exports. Another burden imposed upon 'I'hailand was the Japanese demand for the setting up of baht funds for the use of the Japanese Army in Thailand. From December 1941 to June 1942, the assistance took the form of a loan. The Thai National Banking Bureau loaned the money to the Yokohama Specie Bank in Bangkok at 4% interest per annum and was repaid the principal in gold at the rate of 3.06 baht per fine gramme. Later, between July 1942 to December 1943, a system of giving reciprocal credits was adopted. Under the new system, the Yokohama Specie Bank instructed the Bank of Japan to credit the account of the Bank of Thailand at the Bank of Japan with 11 special yen 11 • The Bank of Thailand in return credited the account of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Bangkok, at the Bank of Thailand with baht. As for the 11 Special yen 11 credited to the Bank of Thailand, during the period July 1942 to June 1943, the Japanese Government permitted it to be used in purchasing gold up to 50% of the total amount, but from July to December 1943 only 21% was permitted, the value of gold being fixed at 4.8 baht per fine gramme.3 The funds.received by the Japanese authorities between December 1941 and June 1943 totalled 491,701,083 baht or approximately 196,700,000 baht per year which was higher than the ordinary expenditure of the Thai Government

2.

Foreign M?-nist:Yi:f Arohives, Bangkok, File:

j

1/M 2/2,6, Repcrt of the Ministry of Finance on Japanese military

Adviser to the Ministry, Part: Thai-Japanese Agreement, 1942, Head of the Economic Mission che Foreign MLnister, 8 July 1942,

expenditur:e 9 9 June 1944,

85

4 in any year. As the war dragged on, the expenditures increased. In 1944 the sum received by the Japanese was 514 million baht and in 1945, 799.4 million baht while Thai Government revenues totalled only 209 million baht per year.5 Indeed, government revenues lagged behind expenditure throughout the war. The Japanese presence in Thailand also disrupted the country's hitherto favourable balance of trade. When war broke out in Europe in 1939, Thailand's foreign trade had shown signs of expansion. Between September 1939 to August 1940, exports to England, China and Japan increased due to increase in the sale of rice. England was the largest market for Thai tin and rubber,6 followed by Norway,

4

Japanese Military Expenditures Including Cost of Construction of Railways, December 1941-December 1943 A11sets Received in Exchange Credit granted to Japanese Authorities (in baht)

Period

Dec. 41-June 42

15,001,083.00

July 42-Dec. 42 Jan. 43-June 43

40,500,000c00 ) 18,000,000 . 00 )

6

Weight

Value

4,896,246.10

15,001,083.00 (3.06 baht per gramme)

29,500,000.00

6,041,666. 70

29,000,000.00 (4.80 baht per gramme) 30,000,000.00 (4.80 baht per gramme)

July 43-Dec. 43

143,200,000.00

113,200,000.00

6,250,000.00

Total

216,701,083.00

142,700,000.00

17,187,912 . 00

Source:

5

Gold Credit in 'Special yen'

74,001,083.00

FM 2/2.6, Japanese Military Expenditures.

Loc,ciL

Pr•ince Wiwatthanachaiyanusom (Prince Wiwat Memorial Volume), (Bank of Thailand, 1961), p, 291.

86

7 Japan and Denmark. The following three tables show the steady increase in Thailand's balance of payments (Tables 1 and 2) and collection of custom duties (Table 3) during the prewar years. Table 1:

Prewar Export Income (in baht) 8

Year

Live stocks

Food (mainly) Rice) and Beverages

Raw Materials

Handicrafts

1938 1939 1940 1941

629,860 780,872 1,033,098 1,332,540

103,102,533 119,915,960 100,778,916 157,068,931

67,645,240 86,181,868 74,048,020 121 '777, 712

1,674,350 1,805,189 2,035,987 2,203,353

Table 2:

Prewar Balance of Payments (in baht) 9

Year 1938 1939 April-June 1940 7

Imports

Exports

129,630,731 129,619,582

176,760,534 215,023,945

Balance of Payments +4 7 , 12 9 , 80 3 +85,404,363 +25,221,773

The Numbers of In-coming and Out-going Vessels were as follows: Year In-going Vessels Out-going Vessels 824 824 1937 887 1938 888 1939 959 961 1940 625 616 548 1941 551

8 Kraom Lekathikarn Khana Ratthamontrai (hereafter referred to as The Deparatment of the 8earaetaray-GeneraaZ of r;he Counail of Ministers). "Annual Export Income", Statistics Division, Bangkok, part. 21, p. 159. 9

Prince Wiwat, op.cit., pp. 299-330.

87

Table 3:

Prewar Sources of Custom-Duties (in baht)

10

Year

Import duties (Beer, Wine, and other Alcoholic Liquids

Export Duties

Fees

Domain Revenue

1939 1940 1941

30,738,457 28,279,224 33,499,337

7,311,590 6,621,976 11 ,049 '843

315,549 243,662 553,154

7,170,464 7,199,579 10,025,163

Total

45,536,060 42,344,441 55,124,497

After the Japanese invasion of Thailand in December 1941 they controlled all its seaborne trade, with the power to dictate the imports and exports, and only Japanese ships were to be used for trading purposes. Japanese commercial firms with headquarters in Bangkok controlled every principal line of trade. Many local business enterprises including the principal local hotel, the Oriental, were bought up by Japanese businessmen. The three large British banks were closed down. It was only in mid-1942 that Thailand could open up trade with Japanese occupied areas such as Singapore, Japanese-held China, Java, Malaya and the Philippines. In 1942 and 1943 Japan was the largest market for Thai goods. In 1942 shipments to Japan totalled 98% of Thailand's total exports.ll From 1944 to 1945, however, Singapore became Thailand's largest export market, possibly because of the difficulty of shipping goods to Japan. The following table shows two largest markets for Thai exports between 1942 and 1945.12 10

Prince Wiwat, op.cit., pp. 299-330.

11

Proceedings of the NationaL Assembly, No. 10/2485, second Session, Thursday, 27 August 1942 and Vichit - Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers, Confidential, 27 August 1942.

12

From 1944 onwards as a result of Allied sea blockade, the trading routes between Thailand and Japan and Thailand and Java were cut off. See Ubol Chiraswadi, op.cit., p. 268.

88

Year

Largest Market for Thai Exports

Value in Baht

1942 1943 1944 1945

Japan Japan Singapore Singapore

76,218,754 40,509,939 28,664,794 45,365,977

Second Largest Market for Thai Exports

Value in Baht

China Singapore Malaya Hong Kong

8,536,936 23,225,810 13,096,109 13,329,546

With the Japanese invasion of Thailand, imports into the country began to drop sharply. Hitherto the country had relied heavily on European countries for such essential commodities as machinery, medicine and drugs, metal manufactures, textile manufactures, chemical products, electrical goods, cigarette paper, condensed milk, etc. The virtual cessation of imports resulted in a serious shortage of these commodities. Importers could turn to no source except Japan. At the same time, prices of many of their remaining stock items were tightly controlled to such an extent that they could only sell them at a loss. The Japanese Army made the situation worse by obtaining all available Thai rice and other foodstuffs to provision its armies in Thailand, Burma and Malaya. Even buffaloes which the farmers needed for ploughing their rice-fields were demanded by the Japanese. Available stocks of metals, machinery, and manufactured products such as electric refrigerators, sewing machines, -pianos, lubricants, gold and silver articles, household furniture and clothing were bought up or confiscated for immediate shipment to Japan. As a result goods of all kinds, both capital and consumer goods were practically exhausted. Stocks of medicines ran out. Oil became very scarce and soap was almost unobtainable. Stocks of flour were low. Even vegetables became luxuries which few consumers could afford. The sale of meat and the slaughter of animals were strictly controlled while the ·transportation of cattle from one province to another was forbidden. Sugar, matches, cooking oil, gasoline, kerosene, fuel oils and clothing materials were rationed after June 1942. Within six months of the Japanese invasion, stocks of oil for public consumption had rapidly dwindled and their

89

prices skyrocketed. The gasoline ration for private cars in Bangkok in June 1942 was 10 litres per month. Public buses in Bangkok were forced t.o resort more and more to charcoal gas burners.l3 In Bangkok a form of electric current rationing for domestic use was effected by limiting the quantity of electric light bulbs available. Besides Bangkok, only a small number of cities and towns had electricity. As most of the power plants were operated by diesel motors, the shortage of diesel oil had seriously curtailed their operation by the end of 1942o By mid-1943 all copper coins had disappeared from circulation, having been bought up by the Japanese to be melted down for use as metal. Even the copper screening in an American girls' school in Bangkok was r±pped out. Newspaper firms ran out of paper stock with the result that they had to resort to rice-paper, the cost of which went up to 200 baht per ream as against a few baht before the war.l4 The fact that the Japanese had diverted Thai railways for military uses, also caused severe problems to the freight traffic in the country.lS It led to big differences in the prices of the same goods in different parts of the country. For example, in 1944 salt in Bangkok cost 6 baht a picul but in the north it cost between 120 and 200 baht a picul.l6 The Japanese Government tried to help the Thai Government by importing certain essential goods but due to

13

Judging from the large number of Japanese army motor vehicles operating on the streets of Bangkok and the many military airplanes flying so often over the city the Japanese Army of Occupation appeared to have been well supplied with motor and aviation gasoline,

14

M,L, Manich Jumsai, History of Anglo-Thai 1970, p. 263,

15

The Thai Government had to the Japanese military use, relating to discussions on Thai and Japanese Economic

16

Rela~ions,

Chalermnit,

supply 10 locomotives every day for Minutes of meetings economics and trade between the Attaches, 5 February 1943.

FM 2/2, Part 8,.

Prooeedings of the National, Assembly, No. 13/2485, 16 June 1942.

90

the drop in industrial production in Japan, they could not meet the requirements. In 1943 Thailand ordered 500 railcars from Japan but the latter could supply only 50 on the excuse that they had wrongly translated the order form. Again, when Thailand asked for 100 trucks, Japan could only provide lo.l7 Sometimes the Japanese were forced to explain that a considerable number of their merchant vessels bound for Bangkok from Japan had been sunkol8 Japan's lack of response thus became a source of dissatisfaction to Thai authorities. A report from the Thai Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers read: .•.. Japan gets whatever she wants from Thailand but whatever Thailand wants is really difficult to get. Japan always says that she is facing a difficult wartime and the Japanese people have to learn to be patient and to sacrifice. Therefore, the Thais should sympathize with them •... But Japan never tries to come to agreement with us in terms of economic understanding and we are always a 1 oser •... 19 An annoyed Premier Pibul complained: to request one-sided assistance from Thailand would place the Government in a difficult position, for it appears to me that we have been rendering assistance to Japan

17

The Department of the

Secretary-Genera~

of the Council of Ministers,

Minutes of the meetings relating to the discussions on economics and trade between the Thai and Japanese Economic Attaches, 9 April 1943, 18

It was estimated that only about one out of every ten Japanese ships plying between Bangkok and Japan managed to reach its destination. Between February and May 1942 The Bangkok Times noted the arrival of only eight Japanese cargo vessels, or one ship every ten days.

19

The Depariment of -che Secretary-General of -r;he CounaiZ of Ministers, Minutes of the meetings relating to the discussions on economics and trade, March-April 1943. Memorandum, Thanat Khoman - SecretaryGeneral of the Council of Ministers.

91

all along and receiving very little in return 20 .,

"'

tl

•

Another serious feature of the import trade situation was the growing practice of the Japanese to import goods without payment of customs duty. Evidence of such practices could be found in the following notice which appeared in The Bang~ok Times of 9 May 1942: .••. Those liable to the payment of custom duty on imported and exported goods are requested to assist the State by refraining from trying to evade such by depending on the war in Greater East Asia. There has been a marked drop in customs receipts 21 Because of the forced supply of baht funds for the expenditure of the Japanese military, the country's economy was hit hard. It led to the unlimited issue of notes. On 30 November 1941, eight days prior to the Japanese invasion of Thailand, currency in circulation was 275,331,688 baht. When war ended, on 31 August 1945, the total was 1,922,650,348, representing a seven-fold order of expansion"22 Meanwhile, the currency devaluation which occurred early in the war years had disastrous effect on prices of goods. Imports 6~ The Japanese Military Expendiwre, Pibul - Thai Ambassador in Japan, 25 July 1944,

20

FM 2/2, Part

21

U.S. Arahives, General Report on Conditions in Thailand, December 1941 to June 1942, D.S. No. 892.00/233, p, 27.

22

Bank of Thailand, Thi Raleuk Krob Rob Pee Thi Yeesib (Twentieth Anniversary Volume), Bangkok, 1962, p. 11, Before the large-scale issue of notes which led to inflation in the later war years, there was in fact a shortage of notes in the ea:cly days of the war. In prewar times all Thai currency was pnnted by the firm of Thomas De La Rue and Company of London. During the war years the firm stopped its operation for Thailand. With notes worth 16.2 million baht being held in Thomas De La Rue's stocks, the currency situation became tight. On 21 December 1941, the Finance Minister decreed that coins of poor value could be legal tendero In 1943 the Thai Government decided to order notes worth 57.5 million baht from Japan, but due to transportation difficulties the notes could not be shipped to Thailand. The Thai Military Department then took over the job of printing the smallest unit of paper currency of 1-baht denomination. Though the printing press \vas cperated twenty hours a day, the supply of banknote.s was still short

92

became very expensive and other goods also rose in price. At the same time with too much•money chasing too few goods, the productive capacity of the country was disrupted, resulting in a great shortage of vital commodities. Prices rose steeply far beyond the private income of the masses, and in some cases several hundred per cent more than their prewar level. To give some notable examples - by 1945 the price of white sugar was 39 times rrore t.'l1an its 1937-40 average, iron and steel bars 69 times, white cotton shirting 43 times, and gray cotton yarn 29 times their 1937-40 average.23 The cost of living index recorded a 100-fold increase from 1938 to 1945. The most spectacular spiral took place towards the close of the war in the period March 1944 to August 1945.

Year

Cost of Living Index 100 139 '90 176.99 29L56 30L12 327,46 409.07 1~069,542 4

1938 1941 1942 December 1943 January 1944 February 1944 March 1944 August 1945

of demand. Later the government ordered three other private printing presses - Jin Kuang, Kra Suang Vanich and Kimpai - to do the job, The new notes were of poorer quality because of the poor paper used) and the colours were not fast. They did not have sufficient backing in gold, U.S. dollars, pounds sterling or other reserves a prewar sine qua non. In fact, the actual value was far below the face value. There was widespread contempt for the new notes which were labelled "scrap paper". The same contempt was manifested for currencies issued during the Japanese Occupation in Malaya and Singapore. 23

James c. Ingram~ Eaonomia Change in University Press, 19'71, p. 164.

24

The index was based on family budget of white-collar workers and wage earners in Bangkok. PM 2/2.6. Memorandum on the expenditures of the Japanese Army, prepared by the Department of Economics, 7 August 1944, see also Prince Wiwat, op.cic., p. 89.

Thailand~

1850-19?0, Stanford

93

From 1942 onwards the control of inflation became the main aim of the fiscal and monetary policy of the Thai Government. A variety of measures including Act Proclamations, increased taxation and fees, savings campaigns, self-sufficiency campaigns and the establishment of state industries and nationalized companies were introduced to curb inflation. The government tried to control price increases and the supply of commodities. Even as early as 1939 when war started in Europe, a law was passed to effect price and goods control. The controlled items were chemical products, medicine and drugs, weapons, jutes, glass bottles and gold.25 By a decree in 1940 the government gave itself wide powers to impose rationing of household commodities" In early 1942 ration tickets were used in Bangkok and Dhornburi for rice, lard, soap and matches.26 In the same year the government instructed merchants to submit a detailed statement of the amount and value of their stocks< They were liable to a fine not exceeding 10,000 baht, or five years' imprisonment or both if they fail to declare or give false information. There must have been cases of evasion for a year later the government threatened to take extreme action - execution or life imprisonment - if the public failed to co-operate. In August 1944 attempts were made to increase the supply of foodstuff and curb the serious inflation in the country by abolishing the control of some commodities such as sugar, cloth, soap, matches, cotton yarn, steel and facilitating the free flow of essential materials from a surplus area to an area in need.27 But the efforts came 25

The Royal Gazette, Vol. 56, 26 October 1939, Richard A. Bunyai wrote that the gold market experienced a brisk business in 1943. The price of gold increased from about 100 baht per 15 grams to 330 baht. On 15 December 1942 the Thai Government issued a gold embargo ordinance which prohibited the exportation of gold in any form, unless special permits to export were obtained from the Thai Finance Minister, Violators of the ord1nanc.e would be "punished" with corporal punishment of 20 years or less or a fine of 20,000 baht or less, or the contraband gold would be confiscated", See Richard A, Bunyai, Money and Banking in China and Southeast: Asia Dur-ing -che Japanese Military Oc:aupat'ion~ 193?-1945 (Tai Wan Enterprices Co. Ltd., 1974), p. 62.

26

1'h6 Na-cion, July 1942.

27

Thai Mai (The New Thai),

12 September and 22 November 1944,

94

to nothing since goods were scarce and no one would sell their commodities without huge profits notwithstanding the price control orders. Meanwhile the state revenue increased through the introduction of new taxes such as the Emergency State Funds Act, the Literacy Promotion Act, the Bachelor Act, the Tobacco Act, the Salt Act, etc. The government also opened gambling houses in Bangkok and in the provinces. Without four months, from 3 February 1943 to 10 May 1945 the yield from this move amounted to 12,946,714 baht or 22o8% of the monthly revenue.28 To siphon off excess cash funds the government adopted various measures. In February 1943 all civil servants earning monthly salaries over 300 baht were ordered to open banking accounts and their emoluments were henceforth to be paid by a bank transfer into their banking account. On 8 February 1944 the government passed the Emergency Savings Act, withdrawing thousand baht notes from circulation29 and giving 1% Savings Bonds in exchangeo This reduced the note circulation by 371.5 million baht or one-third of the total currency notes.30 However; the relief was only temporary because the bonds were redeemable in twelve months. In April 1944 a decree was passed requiring persons to use cheques for any payment in excess of 1,000 baht. In June 1944 the Gold Reserve Act came into effect. The government issued a 3% Savings Bonds worth 30 million baht. The redemption was valid in eight years either in cash or in gold.Jl

28

Prince Wiwat, op.cit,, p. 86.

29

One thousand baht notes in circulation formed only 1% of the total currency. The government issued 50 baht banknotes in its place. P1•aahaahart (The Nation), 10 February 1945.

30

Bank of Thailand, op,cit., pp. 17-18. It should be noted that prior to the Emergency Savings Act, the government had announced its intention to fight inflation and reduce the high cost of living. Their warning created panic and people rushed to convert their 1,000 baht notes into small issues or sold them for only 500-700 baht,

31

Prince Wiwat, op.cit., p. 101,

95

Whatever measures came into operation, the government could do little to fight inflation in the cduntry. In fact, no real solution was possible as long as war conditions prevailed and the Japanese presence remained in the country. Besides the hardship suffered by the general public, the deteriorating economic conditions led to blackmarketing, profiteering and hoarding of essential commodities, resulting in widespread corruption in Thailand which had slnce been accepted as "a Thai way of life". A root cause of the problem was the presence of the Japanese since they were willing to pay extremely high prices for the goods they required, Cheating became a widespread "sport" and cheating the Japanese, a national duty. A new class of citizens was born - the nouveau riahe whose business morality could be summed up as "more smuggling . o . more money". The details of t.his racket are well-known in Thailand. Some of these big wartime smugglers are today respected members of Thai society. The widespread corruption during the Japanese presence was Thailand's worst wartime legacy.

A P P E N D I X E S

A: AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THAILAND CONCERNING THE PASSAGE BY THE JAPANESE FORCES THROUGH THAI TERRITORY The undersigned, duly authorised by their respective governments,agree as follows: 1. In order to cope with the urgent situation in the East Asia, Thailand shall give to Japan the permission of passage by the Japanese forces for the said passage as well as immediate execution of measures to avoid every possible conflict which may arise between the Japanese and the Thai forces. 2. The particulars for the execution of the precedent paragraphs shall be agreed upon between the military authorities of the two countries. 3c Japan shall guarantee that the independence, sovereignty and honour of Thailand be respected.

Done in duplicate, at Bangkok, on the 8th Dec. 194lo

T. Tsubokamai The Japanese Ambassador

Direk Jaiyanama The Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs

Source:

Diplomatic Reaord Office, Tokyo, Japan File Second World War (Pacific)

I

noo A. 7.0.0o 9-3-1.

101

B:

PACTE D'ALLIANCE ENTRE LE JAPON ET LA THAILANDE, 21 DECEMBER 1941

Le Gouvernement Imperial du Japon et le Gouvernement Royal de la Thailande, fermement convaincus que l'etablissement du nouvel ordre dans l'Asie Orientale est le seul moyen de realiser la prosperite dans cette sphere et la condition indispensable au redressement et renforcement de la paix mondiale, et animes de la volonte ferme et irreductible d'eliminer a fond toutes les mauvaises influences faisant obstacle ace but, sont convenus des articles suivants: Article 1 Une alliance est etablie par le Japon et la Thailande entre eux sur la base du respect mutuel de l'independance et de la souverainete. Article 2 Au cas ou le Japon ou la Thailande se trouvera dans le conflit arme vis-a-vis d'une ou de plusieurs tierces Puissances, la Thailande ou le Japon se rangera immediatement du c6te de l'autre comme son allie et lui pretera l'aide avec tous ses moyens politique, economique et militaire. Article 3 Les details relatifs a l'execution de l'article 2 seront determines, d'un commun accord, entre les authorites competentes du Japon et de la Thailande. Article 4 Le Japon et la Thailande, en cas de guerre poursuivie en commun, s'engagent a ne conclure ni l'armistice ni la paix que par le commun accord complet.

102

Article 5 Le present Pacte entrera en vigueur des sa signature. Il aura une duree dix ans. Les deux parties se consulteront au sujet du renouvellement du present Pacte au moment convenable avant l'expiration de ladite duree.

a

En foi de quoi, les soussignes dument autorises cet effet par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, ont signe le present Pacte et y ont appose leurs cachets. Fait en double exemplaire, a Bangkok, le vingt-etunieme jour du douzieme mois, de la seizieme annee de Syowa, correspondant au vingt-et-unieme jour du douzieme mois de la deux mille quatre cent quatrevingt quatrieme annee de l'ere bouddhique.

L'Arnbassadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiare du Japon TEIJI TSUBOKAMI

(L.S.)

Le President du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de la Thailande PIBULASONGGRN~

Source:

(L.S.)

Diplomatia Reaord Offiae, Tokyo, Japan. File Second World War (Pacific), no, A. 7.0.0. 9-3-1.

103

C:

ROYAL PROCLAMATION ISSUED BY THE REGENT OF THAILAND IN THE NAME OF KING ANANDA MAHIDOL ON 16 AUGUST 1945

"Whereas Thailand has pursued a fixed policy of maintaining strict neutrality and of combatting foreign aggression by all means, as is clearly evidenced from the enactment in B.E. 2482 (1941) of the Law "Defining the Duties of Thais in Time of War", this fixed determination was made clear when Japan moved her forces in Thai territory on the 8th December 2484 (1941) , by acts combatting aggression everywhere, and numerous soldiers, police, and civilians lost their lives thereby". "This circumstance, which stands as evidence in itself, shows clearly that the declaration of war on Great Britain and the United States of America on the 25th January 2485 (1942) , as well as acts adverse to the United Nations, are acts contrary to the will of the Thai people and constitute an infringement of the provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the lando The Thais people inside as well as outside the country, who were in a position to help and support the United Nations who are lovers of peace in this world, have taken action by every means to assist the United Nations as most of the United Nations are already aware. This shows once again that the will of the Thai people does not approve of the declaration of war and of acts adverse to the United Nations as already mentioned". "Now that Japan has agreed to comply with the declaration of the United States of America, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union which was made at Potsdam, peace is restored to Thailand as is the wish of the Thai people". "The Regent., in the name of His Majesty the King, hereby openly proclaims on behalf of the Thai people that the declaration of war on the United States of America and Great Britain is null and void and not binding on the Thai people as far as the United Nations are concerned. Thailand has resolved that the good friendly relations existing with the U nit.ed Nations prior to the 8th December BoC. 2484 (1941), shall be restored and Thailand is ready to co-operate fully in every way with the United Nations in the establishment of stability of the world."

10 4

"As for the territories the occupancy of which Japan entrusted to Thailand, namely the States of Kelantan 1 Trengganu, Kedah, Perlls, Kengtung, and Muang Phan, Thailand has no desire for the territories and is ready to arrange for their delivery as soon as Great Britain is ready to t.ake deli very thereof" c "As for any other provisions of the law having effects adverse to "che United States of America, Great Bri tai.n 1 ar~d the British Empire, their r.·epeal shall be considered hereaftern All damages of any kind resulting from those la~tJs will be legitimately made g·ood". "In concluslon 11 aJ..l the Thai people, as well as aliens who are in the Thai Kingdom, are requested to remain in t.ranquility and not to commit any act which will constitute a disturbance of public order. They should hold steadfastly to the ideals which have been laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations at; San Francisco""

Source:

The Royal &aze~tef Vol. 62, Part 44,dated 16 August l945o

105

D:

WHO'S WHO

Names here are alphabetized according to the first syllable of the given names. The Free Thai members in the United States and in Great Britain are listed separately at the end of the main listing. Adhit Dhibaapha, H.H, Prince (1904-47) Commonly known as Prince Adhi t, A son of Prince Chumporn and a grandson of King Chulalongkorn. Educated in England, first attached to the British Royal Navy and later to Cambridge University. Private Secretary to King Rama VII: 1932-33. Member of the Council of Regency: 1933-44. Chairman of the Council of Regency: 1935-44. The Prince resigned as Chairman of the Council in July 1944 over the issue of the appointment of Prime Minister. Adul Aduldejarat, Police General (1892-1969) Son of a Ceylonese British subject, Director-General of the Police Department. Widely regarded as one of the most powerful figures in the late 1930s and the 1940s. It was he who was mainly concerned in unearthing conspiracies against the government during the above period.

Under PahoZ, Government: Dec. 1938.

Deputy Interior Minister, Dec, 1937-

Under Pibul Government: Aug. 1944,

Deputy Interior Minister, Dec. 1938-

During the Second World War Adul was a very active member of the Underground Movement under the nicknames "Betty" and "Pulou". Chairman of the Investigation Committee of the War Crime, 1945-46,

Under Thawee Government: Sept. 1945,

Deputy Interior Minister, Aug. 1945-

Under Seni Government: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health, Sept. 1945-Jan. 1946, From 1946 to his death in 1969 Adul lived in complete seclusion at the Pol~ce Headquarters. He refused to receive any visitors except his close relatives.

10 6

Bidayalap, His Highness (1885-1974) Known as Prince Dhani. Born on 7 November 1885, Was educated at Rugby and Oxford. Returned to Thailand and entered the Ministry of Interior, 1908. Secretary of the State Council, 1915-25. Minister of Education, 1926-32. Toured the Federated Malay States, the Straits Settlements, Indochina, Hong Kong, Japan and the Philippines to study the education systems, 1927. Retired into private life after the coup d''etat in 1932, Member of the Supreme Council, 1946. Council, 1949-74. The Regent, 1951.

President of the Privy

His Highness had been regarded as the most distinguished Thai scholar during his days. Was the President of the Siam Society for 30 years. Author of books and articles in Thai and. English on history, literature and culture.

Chula Chakrabongse, His Royal Highness (1907-63) Grandson of King Chulalongkorn and son of Prince Chakrabongse by a Russian mother. Educated at Harrow and Cambridge and later married to a British lady. Lived in England most of the time and came to Thailand only on short visits. Prince Chula was a well-known historian and author of books in English and Thai. His Royal Highness died in England in 1963.

Damrong, H.R.H. Prince

(1862-1943)

Born on 21 June 1862, was a son of King Mongkut, a half-brother of King Chulalongkorn and a grand-uncle of King Rama IX. AdjutantGeneral, War Office, 1887. Toured Europe: 1891 and 1920 Minister of Interior, 1892-1915. Under his able and energetic direction, the Ministry of the Interior rapidly became the most powerful in the kingdom. Member of the Supreme Council: 1925-33, Lived in exile ~n Penang: 1933-42. Died in Bangkok, 1943. Founder of the National Library and the Museum. His Royal Highness has been honoured as the "Father of Thai History". Author of more than 600 scholarly works.

107

Direk Jayanam (1905-68) Born on 18 January 1905 in Pitsanulok, a town in northern Thailand. Received a law degree in Thailand and never studied abroad. First joined the Ministry of Justice as an interpreter in 1924,

Under Pahol Government: Deputy Secretary-General of the Prime Minister's Office, 1935, Secretary-General of the Prime Minister, 1936-40, Acting Director-General of the Department of Publicity, 1938, Under Pibul Government: Minister without Portfolio~ Dec. 1938July 1939, Deputy Foreign Minister, July 1939-Aug, 1941. Foreign Minister, Aug, 1941-Dec, 1941. Deputy Foreign Minister, Dec. 1941Jan 1942, Thai Ambassador to Tokyo, Jan. 1942-Dct. 1943. Foreign Minister, Oct- 1943-Aug. 1944. Minister of Justice,31 Aug.-Sept. 1945. 1945. Aug.-Sept. Minister of Finance, 31

Under Thawee Government: Under Seni Government:

Minister of Finance, Sept. 1945-Jan.l946.

Under Pridi Government:

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mar, 19n Sur>vey.

Price, William. "The White Elephant Turns Black." FortnighrZy. May 1938. Ripley, s. Dillion. Winter 1947. Samrej, Nai. 1945.

Yale Review.

"Incident in Siam."

"That Thailand May be Free."

Show 1 Edgar. "Secrets from Siam." January 1946. "Thailand: Ally in Secret." 3 September: 1945.

The

Asia.

February

Saturday Evening Post.

Newsweek.

Vol. 26, No. 10,

Thompson, Virgina. "Siam and the Great Powers." Foreign PaZioy Reports. Vol. 21, No. 24, 1 March 1946. Woddis, H.C.K. "Siam: Cockpit of Anglo-American Interests." Eas rE.:rn World. January 19 49. Yasukichi, Yatabe. "Our Place in Siam's Progress." Contemporary Japan. V, 1937.

134

Articles:

In Thai

11 Abbhasarapa Dhevakul, Princess. Karn Tawai Kwa:r:m Plodpai Dae Somdej Phra Srisavarinthira Lae Phra Borom Wongsanuwcngsa 11 [ 11 The security protection for Queen Srisava:rinthira and the Royal Family,.]" In Pramot Phungsunthon. Bang Ruang Kiekap Phra Boromwongsanuwongsa Nai Rawang Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 2 [Some accounts concerning the Royal Famlly during the Second World War], Bangkok, 1972.

11 Auan Nakarathap. Lang Chak Seri Thai Nai Changwat 11 Udornthani ["Behind the Free Thai Movement in Udornthan1 Province 11 ] . Jullasa1•n KYongkarn TamY'a [Journal of the Social Science and Humanities]. 3rd Year, Vol. 3, April-June 1976.

Charnvi t Kasetsiri. "Pridi Bhanomyong Kab Karn Muang Thai 11 ["Pridi Bhanomyong and Thai politics]. Journal of the Social Sai6nae and Humanities. 3rd Year, Vol. 3, April-June 1976. 11 Direk Jayanam. Prawa.t Kharn Toot Lang Samai Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 1 11 [ 11 Diplomatic history after the First World War 11 ] , In Direk Jayanam. Praahoom Pathakatha Chut La Soot [A collection of the latest speeches]. Suksit Syam, 1971.

Khuang Aphaiwongse. "Karn Plien Ratthaban Jompon P. Pibulsongkram" ["The change of Pibul government"]. The Beginning of Demoaraay. Thai Rath, 1973. Kobkua Suwannathat-Pien. "Karn Kien Prawattisat Bab Chart Niyom: Pitcharana Luang Vichitvadhakarn" ["Nationalistic historical writing: Vichitvadhakarn as a case study"]. Journal of the Tharr.masat UnivePsitb. 6th Year 1 Vol. 1, June-September 1976. Netra Kemaycthin. "Ngarn Khong Seri Thai Nai Pratet" ["The Thai underground activities"]. The Beginning of Democracy. Thai Rath, 1973. 11 Pibulsongkra.m, P. Karnruammeu Lae Tartan Yeepun Samai Songkhram" ["Thai co-operation and resistance during the war"]" The Beginning of Democracy" Thai Rath, 197 3,

135

Pisalsukumvit (Prasob Sukum). "Karn Pathibat Ngan Nai Rawang Lae Lang Songkhram Nai Kandy, Nai New Delhi Lae Nai s aharat America" ["The activities during and after the Second World War in Kandy, New Delhi and the United States"]. In Direk Jayanam. Thai land and World War II., Thai Wathana Panich, 2nd Edition, Bangkok, 1970. Pridi Bhanomyong. "Hetkarn Bang Yang Nai Khana Pu Samrej Ratchakarn" ["Some incidents within the Council of Regents"]. In Pramot Phungsunthon. Some Accounts

Concerning the Royal Family During the Seaond World War. Bangkok, 1972, Puey Aungpakorn, "Tahan Chua Krow" ["A Temporary Pioneer Corp"],, In Direk Jayanam. Thailand and World War II. Thai Wattana Panich, 2nd Edition, Bangkok, 1970. "Musawathaweramani" ["Telling lies"]. 1952.

Assumption College Journal.

"Phra Boromwongsanuwongsa Lae Krabuan Karn ---.,S,_e_r_l.,...,-Thai" ["The Royal Family and the Free Thai Movement"], In Pramot Phungsunthon" Some Acaounts c

Concerning the Royal Family During the Seaond World War. Bangkok, 1972. Seni Pramoj. "Rai-ngan Karn Jaerajar RanCJab Sathana Songkhram Britain Yai Paw Saw 2489" L"Report on negotiations with Britain concerning the power status of Thailand"], Praahum Nibhon [Seni's collected works]. Bangkok, 1966. "Kwam Sampan Rawang Thai - America Rawang Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 2" ["Thai-American Relations in World War II"], Chumnum Wannakadi Thang Karn Muang [A collection of political literary works]. Bangkok, 1966. Suchi t Bunbongkarn. "Amnaj Tang Karn Muang Khong Pun am Tang Taharn Khong Thai: Suksa Prieb Tieb Rawang Jompon Paw Pibulsongkram Kab Jompon Sarit Thanarat" ["Political power of the Thai military leaders: a comparative study between Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram and Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat"]. Rak Muang Thai [Love Thailand]. Vol. 1, Thai Watt ana Panich, 19 76.

136

Thamsook Numnondac "Muang Thai Yook Chua Punam" ["Thailand under the leadership of Pibulsongkram"], Journal of the Thammasat University. 6th Yearv Vol. 1, JuneSeptember 1976. . "Mua Thai Koa Soo Songkram Lok Khrang Thi 2" ["How Second World War came to Thailand"]. Varasarn Prawatisat [Journal of History]. Srinakarinviroj University, Vol. 1, 1976. Thawee Bunyaket. "Kawetetjing Permterm Kiewkap Hetkarn Nai Pratet. Thai Rawang Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 2" ["Supplementary facts concerning the events in Thalland during World War II"]. The Beginning of Demoaraay. Thai Rath, 1973.

Alsop, Stewart and Braden, Thomas. Sub Rosa - The O.S.S. and Amerioan Espionage. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1946, Ba Maw. Breakthrough in Burma. 196 8. Bateson, Charles. 1968.

The War with Japan. ThaiZand.

Blanchard, Wendell. Borton, Hugh et al.

Yale University Press,

1

eds.

Art.ioZes on Japan,

The Cresset Press,

New Haven:

Hraf Press, 1958.

A SeZeated List of Books and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954.

Chula Chakrabongse, His Royal Highness. London: G.T. Foulis & Co., 1956. Coast, John, Railroad on Death, edition, 1948.

The Twain Have Met,

The Aiglon Press, 3rd

Coast, John. Some Aspeats of Siamese PoZitios. Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943.

New York:

Collier, Basil. The War in the Far East, 1941-45. York: William Morrow, 1969. Courtney, Browne. Tojo: 'l'he Last Banzai. Rhlnehart & Winston, 1967.

U.S.A.:

New

137

Craigie, Sir Robert. 1945. Crosby, Sir Josiah.

Behind the Japanese Mask. Siam:

The Crossroads,

Hutchinson,

London, 1945.

Darling, Frank C. Thailand and the United States, Affairs Press, 1965.

Public

Darling, Frank and Ann. Thailand, The Modern Kingdom, Pacific Press, 1971. Durnford, John. 1958.

Branch Line to Burma.

Fahey, James J.

Pacific War Diary 1942-1945.

Ford, Corey and Bacbain, Alastair. York: Random House, 1945. Gaotte, John. 1970.

London:

Gilchrist, Andres. 1970.

Macdonald, U.S.A., 1963.

Cloak and Dagger.

Japan Fights For Asia. London: Bangkok Top Secret,

Asia

New

Macdonald,

London: . Hutchingson,

Ingram, C. James. Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970. Stanford University Press, 1971. Jumsai, Manich. History of Anglo-Thai Relations, Chalermnit, 1970. Kirby, Major-General S.W. London, 1957-65.

The War Against Japan.

Bangkok: Vols. 1-4,

Kogun, Suburo Hayashi. The Japanese Army in the Pacific War. Quentico, V.A.: The Marine Corps Association, 1959. Landon, Kenneth Perry. The Chinese in Thailand. University Press, 1941. Landon, Kenneth Perry. Siam In Transition, Greenwood Press, 1968.

Oxford

New York:

Minear, Richard H. Viator's Justice, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Princeton University Press, 1971. Nuechterlein, Donald E. Thailand and the Struggle for SoutheasT Asia, Cornell University Press, 1965.

138

Ray, Jayanta K. Portraits of Thai Politiaa. Oriental Longman Ltd., 1972.

New Delhi:

The Reports of GeneraL Maa Arthur. 2 Vols, ( 4 books) . Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government, Printing Office, 1966. Smith, Nicol and Blake Clark. Into Siam the Underground Kingdom, New York and Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Company, 1954. Smith R. Harris. OSS~ The Searet Hist:ory of Ameriaa's F'irs-c Central InteZligenae Agr:mcy, University of California Press, 1972. Sparrow, Gerald.

Land of the Moonflower.

Stanton, Edwin F. Brief Authority. Brothers Publishers, 1956. Swinson, Arthur, Toland, John. Japanese 1970. Books:

F'ouY' Samurai.

The Rising Empire~

Sun~

London, 1955.

New York:

London:

Harper and

Hutchinson, 1968.

'l'hr:J Dealine and Pall of -r;he New York: Random House,

1936-1945,.

In Thai

Anant Pibulsongkram, Major-General. [Field Marshal Pibulsongkram]. 19 76

Jompon Paw Pibulsongkram 4 Vols. Bangkok, 1975,

0

Bank of Thailand. Thi Raleuk Krob Rob Pee Thi Yeesib [Twentieth Anniversary Volume]. Bangkok, 1962.

Anuaorn Nai Ngarn Phra Rajchathan Pleung Sop Jompon Pin Chocnhawan [General Pin Choonhawan Memorial Volume]. Bangkok, 19 7 3. Buang Rak Praahathipathai [The Beginning of Democracy]. Thai Rath, 1973. Chalaw Srisarakorn. San t·iban Tai Din [The underground secret police]. Bangkok: Mitra Thai Press, 1946. Chantana. x.o, Kroop [x.o. Group], 2nd Edition. Bangkok: Kowna Press, 1954,

139

Charoon Kuvanonda. Chiwit Karn Torsu Khong Jompon Paw PibuZsonakram [The struggles of Field Marshal Pibul Songkramj, 2nd Edition. Bangkok: Aksornchareuntat Press, 1953. Damrong Rachanuparb, His Royal Highness. Praahoom Lakorn Duk Dam Ban [Selections of ancient drama]. Bangkok, 1948. Department of Publicity. Pramuan Kham Prasai Khong Phanathan Jompon Paw PibuZsongkram [Pibul's collected speeches], Vol. 2. Bangkok, 1942. Direk Jayanam. Thai Kap Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 2 [Thailand and World War II], 2nd Edition. Bangkok: Thai Wattana Panich, 1970.

Disapongsa Anusorn [Prince Disapongsa Memorial Volume]. Bangkok, 1966. Kuang Aphaiwongse. Ruang Kong Nai Khuang Aphaiwongse [The Story of Khuang Aphaiwongse]. Cremation Volume. Bangkok, 1968. Kukrit Pramoj.

Si Pandin [The four reigns].

Bangkok, 1972.

Manoon Borisud. Ruang Khana Rattamontri [The Cabinets]. Bangkok, 19 72. Ministry of Education, Culture Division. Karn Taeng Kai Khong Thai [Thai dress]. Bangkok, 1960.

Nai Pon Pu Sue Sat [The faithful general]. Police General Adul Aduldejaraj Memorial, Cremation Volume, Bangkok, 1970. Netra Kemayothin. Chivit Nai Pon [Life of a general]. Bangkok: Kasem Banakit, 1967.

-----------• Ngarn Tai Din Khong Pan Ek Yothi [The underground movement of Colonel Yothi]. 2 Vols. Bangkok: Kasem Banakit, 1967. Poonpisamai, Princess. Chivit Lae Ngan Khong Somdej Krom Phya Damrong Rajanubab [The literary works of Prince Damrong], Bangkok: Fuang Ansorn Printing House, 1975.

140

Pramot Phungsunthon, edo Bang Ruang Kiekap Phra Boromwongsanuwongsa Nai Rawang Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 2 [some accounts concering the Royal Family during the Second World War], Bangkok, 1972.

Pramuan Rattha Niyom [A nationalist ideological ~ovement]. Yim Sri Press, 1942. Prasert Pattamasukon. Ratthasapa Thai Nai Rob Si Sib Song Pi [Forty-two years of Thai Parliament], Bangkok, 1974 , Prasi t Luli tananda,_, Katika Sanya Sampantha Maitri Rawang Pratet Thai Lae Pratet Yeeeun [Regulations of treaties between Thailand and Japanj, Thammasat University Pres s , 19 41 "

Kor Kamnod Kwarm Kaojai Kan Pen Kwarm Lap [Rules of secret understanding], Thammasat University Press, 1941. Prayoon Pamornmontri, Lieut .-General. Chi vi t Ha Paendin Khong Kapaahao [My life under five reigns]. Bangkok: Fuang Ansorn Printing House, 1975. Preda Darntrakool. Nai Khuang Kae Maethap Yipun [Premier Khuang and Japanese generalsj, Bangkok: Yimsri, 1949, Pridi Bhanomyongc Bang Ruang Kieokap Karn Kor Tang Khana Rasadorn Lae Praohathipatai [Some accounts concerning the establishment of the People's Party and democracy]. Bangkok: Nitivej Press, 1972.

Buang Lang Karn Kor -Tang Kabuan Karn Seri Thai [Some accounts concerning the establishment of the Free Thai Movement]. Bangkok: Prajak Press, 1972. Publicity Department. Pramuan Kham Prasai Khong Phanathan Jompcn Paw Pibulsongkram [Collections of speeches of Field Marshal Pibulsongkram]. Vol. II. Bangkok, 1942. Sang Phattanothai. Suk Thai Nai Roi Pee [One hundred years of Thai battles]. Bangkok, 1942.

Khwam Nuk Nai Krong Kang [Reflections in prison]. Bangkok, 19 56 o

141

Anusorn Nai Ngarn Phra Rajahathan Pleung Sop Pon Reu Tri Sangworn Suwannaoheep [In memory of Rear Admiral Sangworn Suwannacheep]. Bangkok: Chuan Pim Press, 1973"

Sangworn Suwannacheep.

Sawang Lanleu. Sam Sib Jed Pee Hang Karn Patiwal; [Thirtyseven years of revolutions]. Bangkok 1 1971. Seni Pramoj, M.R. Chumnum Wannakadi Thang Karn Muang [A collection of political literary works]. Bangkok: Thai Wattana Panich, 1968. Bangkok:

Praahum Nibhon [Seni's collected works]. Ruam Sarn, 1966.

Sompob Chandaraprapa. Som Dej Pra Srisavarinthira [Her Majesty Sr1savarinthira]. Aksorn Samai, 1973. Sri Burapa. Lae Fai Khang Na [Look beyond]. Kasem Karn Pim, 1975.

Bangkok:

Thawee Jullasup, General. Chart Nue Sing Aun Dai [Nation 1s beyond everything]. Bangkok: Worawut Karn Pim, 19 74. Vichit Vichitvadhakarn. Tu Thong [Golden cupboard]. Bangkok, 1 October 1970 •

. Vichitvadhakarn Anusorn [In memory of Bangkok: Prime Minister's Office,

Vichitvadhakarn]. 1962.

Wanwaithayakorn Prince. Wanna Nibhon [Prince Wan's Works]. The Social Science Association Press, 1975. Withetsakoranee. Si Sib Song Pi Hang Rabob Praahathipathai [Forty-two years of democracy]. Bangkok: Ruam Karn Pim Press, 1975. Wiwatthanachaiyan, Prince. Wiwatthanaohaiyanuson [Prince Wiwat memorial volume]. Bank of Thailand, 1961. Theses Flood, Edward Thadeus. "Japan's Relations with Thailand~ 1928-1941." Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, i967.

142

"Singapore unde:t. 'che Japcmesef 1942-1945." Unpubl1shed Academ~c Exerc1se for the Degree of the Bachelor of Arts, Unlversity of Singapore, 1956.

Lee:; Ah Chaln

Ponpiromr lamtham" "Bo-c. Ba-c, Tang Kan1 Maung Kong Nang Sue P1m Thai l932-l945"["The Po1itical Roles of Thai Newspapers from the Revolution of 19 32 t.o the end of the Second Wo:rld Wa.r "] , Unpub ..ushed M.A. thesis, Chulalongkorn Un1vsrs1ty, 1973. Ubol; Chi:ras awadi. "Sapawa Tar;g Karr.~ Muo.ng Se-c.ha.ki t. Lae Sangkorn Khong, Prathet 'l'hal Nai R.awang Songkhram Lok Khrang Tin 2" [ "'I'he Po l1tica.l , Econcm1-:: and Social Conditlons of Tha1land During the Second World War"]. Unpubtl.shed f'.LA. thesls, Cb.taaJ.ongkorn Universit.y, 1974, Yap

1

Hong Kuan.

"Perak under the Japanese;· 1942-1.945