Taming Politics: Plato and the Democratic Roots of Tyrannical Man 3515124578, 9783515124577

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Studies in Ancient Monarchies

Ivan Jordović

Taming Politics Plato and the Democratic Roots of Tyrannical Man

Ancient History Franz Steiner Verlag

studies in ancient monarchies Herausgegeben von Ulrich Gotter (Konstanz), Nino Luraghi (Oxford) und Kai Trampedach (Heidelberg)

volume 5

Taming Politics Plato and the Democratic Roots of Tyrannical Man Ivan Jordović

Franz Steiner Verlag

Umschlagabbildungen: Links: King Tiglath-pileser III of Assyria. Stone panel, ca. 728 BCE. From the Central Palace in Nimrud, now in the British Museum. © akg / Bible Land Pictures Mitte: Emperor Justinian. Mosaic, ca. 540 CE. Church of San Vitale, Ravenna. © akg / Bildarchiv Steffens Rechts: Alexander the Great at the Battle of Issos. Mosaic, ca. 100 BCE. From the Casa del Fauno, Pompeii, now in the Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Napoli. © akg / Nimatallah Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2019 Druck: Memminger MedienCentrum, Memmingen Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-12457-7 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-12458-4 (E-Book)

To Kurt Raaflaub in friendship and admiration

CONTENTS PREFACE ......................................................................................................... 9 I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 11 II. THE GORGIAS ......................................................................................... 21 1. Gorgias ................................................................................................... 23 1.1. Gorgias and Pericles’ Generation ................................................... 24 1.2. Freedom and Power ........................................................................ 29 1.3. The Rhetor’s Freedom .................................................................... 30 1.4. Collective Wisdom ......................................................................... 32 1.5. Pericles, Polis Tyrannos and the Patron-Tyrant Concept ............... 37 1.6. Athenian Archē ............................................................................... 41 1.7. Absolute Sovereignty and Absolute Self-Sufficiency .................... 46 1.8. Summary ......................................................................................... 49 2. Polus ....................................................................................................... 51 2.1. Polus and the Post-Periclean Generation ........................................ 52 2.2. Archelaus ........................................................................................ 54 2.3. Polus and the Arginusae Scandal .................................................... 57 2.4. The Concept of Freedom to Do What One Pleases ........................ 58 2.5. Plato and the Concept of Freedom to Do What One Pleases ......... 62 2.6. Plato and the Destructive Nature of the Concept of Freedom to Do What One Pleases .............................................. 65 2.7. Polus and Emulating the Happy Tyrant .......................................... 73 2.8. Summary ......................................................................................... 79 3. Callicles .................................................................................................. 81 3.1. Callicles and Alcibiades’ Generation ............................................. 83 3.2. Callicles and Shame ........................................................................ 85 3.3. Callicles and Erōs ........................................................................... 89 3.4. Erōs, Demos, Expansionism and Alcibiades .................................. 95 3.5. Callicles and the Tyrant’s Erōs..................................................... 102 3.6. Callicles and Pleonexia................................................................. 105 3.7. Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa ............................................. 108 3.8. The Doctrine of the Right of the Stronger .................................... 120 3.9. Socrates and Solon ........................................................................ 131 3.10. Summary ..................................................................................... 136 III. THE REPUBLIC .................................................................................... 139 1. Tyrannical Man and Philosopher-King ................................................ 142 1.1. Thrasymachus, Callicles and Polus .............................................. 142 1.2. Thrasymachus and Thucydides..................................................... 148

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1.3. Glaucon and Adeimantus .............................................................. 151 1.4. Philosopher-King .......................................................................... 155 1.5. Mirror of Tyrants .......................................................................... 160 1.6. Politicus and the Mirror of Tyrants .............................................. 165 1.7. Tyrannical Man, the Demagogue and the Populist ....................... 173 1.8. Summary ....................................................................................... 179 IV. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................. 183 V. BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................... 187 1. List of Abbreviations ........................................................................... 187 2. Works Cited ......................................................................................... 187 VI. INDEX .................................................................................................... 209 1. Index Locorum ..................................................................................... 209 2. General Index ....................................................................................... 228

PREFACE This study represents a thoroughly revised and enlarged version of the Serbian edition Platon i demokratski koreni tiranskog čoveka. Studije o kneževskom ogledalu, antidemokratskoj teoriji i tiranskoj tipologiji u klasičnoj Grčkoj, Beograd 2015, 216 pp. My research on tyranny in the late fifth and early fourth century led to a first brief encounter with Plato and the right of the stronger. It was illuminating and at the same time intimidating, as it raised more questions than answers. However, the final spark which ignited this project was the work on Aristotle’s concept of extreme tyranny. There are three main reasons why it has taken me a long time to write this book. One is that for me as a historian, the field of philosophy was and in many ways has remained terra incognita. Another reason is that at the time I was also working on two other books. The post-communist and post-war situation in Serbia necessitated writing a history of the Ancient Greeks (Stari Grci. Portret jednog naroda, Beograd 2011, 534 pp.). Its aim was to provide undergraduate and graduate students with an up-to-date study of Greek history from the earliest times to Alexander the Great. The subsequent research on Plato encouraged critical engagement with Xenophon’s political thought. This led not only to a new book project but to the postponement of the present study, as the work on Xenophon gave me a better understanding of Plato and vice-versa. As the manuscript on Xenophon is now at an advanced stage, I sincerely hope it will appear in the not too distant future. The last reason was that more than 70% of the research literature included in this book is not available in Serbian libraries. Thus, progress depended in many ways on the help of others. My colleagues Svetozar Boškov, Ivana Dobrivojević and Boris Stojkovski were kind enough to copy many works while on sabbaticals or short trips abroad. Nonetheless, this study would be unthinkable without the assistance of various grants. The Fondation Hardt afforded me two short stays in its most beautiful surroundings. A generous fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung allowed me three longer visits to Bielefeld. Thanks to colleagues at the University, above all Uwe Walter, Bielefeld will always be remembered as a contemporary ‘Shangri-La’. The inspiring blend of intellectual challenge and friendship helped greatly in the completion of the manuscript. An early draft of the manuscript was read by Kurt Raaflaub. His critical reading was an invaluable aid for improving and streamlining both style and content. The comments of Marijana Ricl to the Serbian edition proved very instructive. Uwe Walter and Kai Trampedach graciously read the manuscript in its advanced phase and their insightful suggestions helped sharpen my understanding of many issues.

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I am deeply grateful to the editors, in particular Kai Trampedach, for the opportunity to publish my book in the Studies in Ancient Monarchies series, and for the useful remarks and suggestions. The staff of the Franz Steiner Verlag – Katharina Stüdemann and Andrea Hoffmann – have made this an ideal publishing experience. Since English is not my native language I am indebted to Alexandra and Mary Popović, who improved my many linguistic shortcomings and errors. Some chapters of the volume drew on my own previously published material: ‘Bios Praktikos and Bios Theoretikos in Plato’s Gorgias’, in: A. Stavru – C. Moore (eds.), Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue, Leiden: Brill, 2018, 369–385; ‘Platons Kritik des demokratischen Konzepts der Freiheit zu tun, was man will’, in: Jordović I. – Walter U. (eds.), Feindbild und Vorbild. Die athenische Demokratie und ihre intellektuellen Gegner, Historische Zeitschrift Beihefte (Neue Folge) Bd. 74, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018, 183–208. I am much obliged to the publishers of these essays for permission to reuse this material freely in the present study. Translations of ancient and modern texts are given in the bibliography. I dedicated the Serbian edition to my wife Jelena. My gratitude for her love, patience and support cannot be expressed in words. The English edition I dedicate to Kurt Raaflaub. His numerous studies on Greek political thought have left a lasting impact on me and his readiness to help in word and deeds has been of tremendous importance.

I. INTRODUCTION The Greeks perceived tyranny as the opposite of any good government, be it democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy or monarchy. Therefore, the study of the typology of tyrants can not only help us to better understand ancient tyranny but also to gain an insight into the evolution of Greek thought in general. Fourthcentury Athens holds a key place in this respect for several reasons. On the one hand, the Athenian democracy emerged renewed and strengthened from the late fifth-century turmoil. After its catastrophic defeats in the Peloponnesian War, the loss of its maritime empire and two coup d’états, the second of which turned into an open civil war, Athenian democracy proved to be quite stable and resilient. The constitution was slightly reformed and from then onwards democracy became more efficient and less radical. During the better part of the fourth-century the authority of the Athenian demos was undisputed. It was only the defeat in the Lamian War in 322/1 that opened the way for the dissolution of Athenian democracy. On the other hand, the same period saw the strengthening and deepening of antidemocratic thought as well as an increasingly complex and wide-ranging typology of tyrants. Finally, fourth-century Athens saw the emergence of a wide range of texts reflecting on the nature of politics through the figure of the tyrant, the Great King, the tyrannical man etc. The concurrence of these developments and phenomena cannot be explained away by coincidence. Plato, Xenophon and Isocrates in particular make it evident. All three men were Athenians. Their childhood and youth was marked by the Peloponnesian War, two coups and restoration of democracy. In their writings, they critically assess the way in which the Athenian people rule, without deluding themselves that change in the Athenian political system is possible under the existing circumstances. All three of them are involved in a competitive exchange of ideas, influencing each other through this ‘debate’.1 All three thinkers are among the most important sources for the typology of tyrants in the fourth-century. Finally, Isocrates and Xenophon write texts praising an ideal monarch, and even some Plato’s dialogues are to some extent related to this literary genre. Ancient literary theory paid no serious attention to the so-called Fürstenspiegel genre. As a result, it did not develop a single term for the texts that usually dealt with a single ruler or his successor and expounded the principles and virtues of good government.2 The modern concept of Mirror of Princes originated in the middle ages (speculum regale, speculum regis, speculum morale regium etc.). The medieval Mirror of Princes genre was not shaped on the model of similar ancient texts. Isocrates’ Cyprian Orations and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia did not begin to 1 2

See Ober 1998: 11, 43–51, 290–351. See Eder 1995b: 157.

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attract attention until the Renaissance. Since the medieval genre was an independent new creation, it is not useful in tracing the origin of the ancient type of Mirror of Princes. As opposed to the medieval genre which emerged at a time when monarchy was uncontested, in classical Athens such works were produced at the time of the rule of the people.3 Pierre Hadot’s argues in his comprehensive study that the Mirror of Princes was widespread in antiquity, even though texts bearing such a title cannot be traced before the twelfth-century AD.4 Yet, Walter Eder, in his groundbreaking article Der Fürstenspiegel in der athenischen Demokratie, justly criticizes Hadot for his too broad and vague appreciation of the Mirror of Princes genre. According to Eder, the criteria of form (prose encomium), of content (praise of an autocrat) and of the practicality of advice reveal that amongst pre-Hellenistic authors only Xenophon’s and Isocrates’ writings can be classified as Mirror of Princes literature.5 The fourth-century has long been misconceived as having been a time of crisis of the Greek polis in general and the Athenian democracy in particular. It has been believed that the inability of the traditional polis to cope with the growing socio-political challenges caused widespread dissatisfaction with the existing socio-political order regardless of individual social status and cultural background; and that, consequently, many turned their back on the traditional, democratic or oligarchic order and embraced the idea that a ‘strong man’ placed above all social groups and their narrow interests could be the answer to social problems.6 The fact that tyranny re-emerged in the Greek world after nearly two generations – the last generation of earlier tyrants had been in power in the concluding decade of the fifth-century – has been interpreted as an obvious sign of the crisis. In that regard, it has also been observed that many Athenian intellectuals had ties with the most important protagonists of the later tyrannies (Syracuse, Cyprus, Thessaly, Athens, etc.). All this has given rise to the influential hypothesis that the authors writing in the Mirror of Princes genre longed for a monarchical leadership either in Greece as a whole or in the individual poleis, a hypothesis linked to the assumption that those authors hoped for ruthless tyrants to be turned into good rulers by means of good education.7 In the last few decades, this thesis, and thus the basic premise of the theory about the origin of Mirror of Princes, has been effectively challenged.8 The reemergence of tyranny cannot be linked to the structural crisis of the polis.9 In

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

See Eder 1995b: 157–158. See Hadot 1972: 556; cf. also Haake 2015: 60, 63–64. See Eder 1995b: 159–160; Nippel 2017: 252–255; cf. also Balot 2006: 184–187. See, e.g., Stroheker 1953/54: 381–382; Hadot 1972: 573; Frolov 1974: 401–402, 407–410, 414; Barceló 1993: 246–248. See Hadot 1972: 573–578. See, e.g., Deininger 1993: 55–76; Rhodes 1994: 589–591; Eder 1995a: 11–28; Davies 1995: 29–42. See Jordović 2005.

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addition, Eder has raised several important objections.10 The image of the fifthcentury tyrant as a ruthless oppressor of his fellow citizens remained in force in the fourth-century. Despite this markedly negative image, the Athenians did not denounce relations with monarchs and tyrants who ruled far from Attica until after Athens’ defeat by Macedonia. Personal contacts with autocrats (Plato’s with Syracuse) or their praise (Isocrates’ of the rulers of Cyprus) were not condemned or sanctioned. Apparently, the Athenian demos did not perceive such behaviour as a serious threat to its rule. As a matter of fact, contrary to the fifth-century perception, in the fourth-century the demos saw oligarchy, not tyranny, as an antipode of democracy.11 Furthermore, Plato, Isocrates, Xenophon and Aristotle never advocated a territorial monarchy; their overall political thinking remained bound to an autonomous and self-sufficient polis. Finally, even a cursory review of what Isocrates and Xenophon deem to be the attributes of a good ruler reveals their concurrence with the aristocratic-oligarchic ‘canon’ of virtue. All this has led Eder to conclude that the origin of the Mirror of Princes genre was closely linked to the specific socio-political situation in Athens, i.e. that the genre in fact reflected aristocratic virtues.12 Due to the traumatic events of 411 and 404/3 the Athenian democracy developed a strong distrust of, even aversion to, oligarchic sentiments. The regime of the Thirty Tyrants in particular had made an enduring negative impact. Consequently, in the fourth-century Athenian democracy it seemed less dangerous to eulogise aristocratic virtues by praising ancient and faraway autocracies than by writing in a manner that could have easily been labelled as oligarchic.13 This is an innovative understanding of Mirror of Princes insofar as it shows that the traditional approach of examining this literary genre, and the typology of tyrants, separately from antidemocratic thought has become obsolete. The Fürstenspiegel literary genre cannot be fully understood without taking antidemocratic thought and democratic ideology into account since they are closely linked phenomena.14 There is a prevalent opinion in academic circles that several writings of Xenophon and Isocrates may be classified under the Mirror of Princes category. But the opinions diverge widely with regard to Plato. While some, such as Hadot, include Plato among representatives of this literary genre, others, such as Eder, vehemently disagree. Although Eder’s view at first seems justified, given the strict criteria he proposes, there are reasons why no study of fourth-century writings which reflect on the nature of politics through the figure of the tyrant, the Great King and the tyrannical man can be considered complete without the famous philosopher. Plato is not just one of the greatest thinkers of his time. He is also, as his dialogues such as the Gorgias, Republic, Statesman and Laws show, keenly interested in political thought. More importantly still, Plato’s theory about 10 11 12 13 14

See Eder 1995b: 160–171. See Kaibel 1893: 196; Rhodes 1981: 461–462; Jordović 2006: 31–32. See Eder 1995b: 171–173. See Eder 1995b: 166–173. See, e.g., Barceló 1993; Roberts 1994; Ober 1998; Nadon 2001; Samons 2004; Gray 2010.

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how even the best human nature can turn bad and become capable of worst crimes as a result of bad education, and about the emergence of the tyrannical from the democratic man, put the issue of proper education for gifted young people in the centre of Greek political thought. There was just a small step from this position to the question of the virtues of a good ruler. However, in the recent past some have argued against the existence of the Mirror of Princes as a strictly literary genre.15 In his stimulating contribution to the concept of the Mirror of Princes in Greco-Roman antiquity, Matthias Haake argues that the strong focus on content and its paraenetic intention has led to the misleading conclusion that a wide range of very different texts can be seen as Fürstenspiegel.16 He starts, following Wolfgang Raible, from the premise that pre-modern texts need to have five constitutive elements to establish a literary genre: the author is seen not as an individual but as a member of a specific social group with a characteristic social role; the addressee is regarded in the same manner; the form of the text; the content of the text; the implied audience of the text. In applying this model it must be observed that the author, addressee and audience constitute the explicit frame of the communicative situation of the text.17 Regarding this model, Haake deduces that the treatises Peri Basileias, whose earliest specimen was in all likelihood Aristotle’s On Kingship, form a literary genre.18 The characteristics of this genre are: the authors are always philosophers writing in their social role as intellectuals; the addressees are without exception Hellenistic kings; the form is a self-contained prose text; the content consists not of monarchical theory or concrete instructions for a ruler, but portrays the figure of the good monarch as opposed to the tyrant; the audience is the world of the Hellenistic cities.19 Concerning the socio-political, cultural and historical context of this genre, Haake concludes that on a highly symbolic level, the treatises On Kingship were, like the civic ruler cult, a part of the communication between the cities and the kings in the Hellenistic period.20 The texts which reflect on monocratical rule (archaic tyrants, Hellenistic kings, Roman emperors etc.), but do not fulfil the above criteria, Haake subsumes under the term monocratological texts.21 His argument is undoubtedly useful, since it alerts us to the risks of an overly broad understanding of the Mirror of Princes. Nonetheless, this study should show that a strict categorization is not always helpful in grasping the development of political thought. In ancient Greece there was no profound difference between philosophy and political theory. Since Greek philosophers decisively influenced the development of the field of human thought that is now often subsumed under the term ‘political theory’, Athenian political and philosophical texts have for a long time been the 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

See E. M. Jónsson 2006: 164; cf. Haake 2015: 63–66, esp. 65–66. See Haake 2015: 58–78, esp. 66–73; see also Id. 2018: 299–315, esp. 309–315. See Haake 2015: 69–70; Raible 1980. See Haake 2013: 168; Id. 2015: 70. See Haacke 2015: 70. See Haacke 2015: 70–72. See Haacke 2015: 73.

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subject of study of philosophers and political theorists. By their very nature philosophical and theoretical treatises seek to find eternal truths, be they metaphysical ones or the principles of human political action. However, as much as they strive for objectivity, political philosophers are inevitably embedded in the political realities of their own time, and their work often tends to reflect a desire to change those realities. Such approach to political thought is recognisable even in the works of some of the greatest ancient historians. Whereas the primary focus of the modern historian is to provide an objective and reasonable account of historical events, in ancient Greece that was just one of the purposes of historical writing. Some of the major Greek historians, such as Thucydides, were guided by Cicero’s famous motto: historia magistra vitae est. Thus Thucydides endeavoured not only to give an accurate account and make sense of historical events but also to understand and provide insight into inherent laws of human history, which is why the famous Athenian historian is said to be one of the precursors of modern political thought.22 It is not surprising, then, that philosophers and political theorists who study the works of their Greek predecessors tend to focus on what seems to be timeless in their texts and to neglect the historical context in which the texts were created. This, in turn, opens the door to a propensity to read ancient political texts from the perspective of a philosophical tradition that eventually derived from them rather than in the appropriate historical context. It may also promote the perception that more or less fully worked out political theories must precede political practices.23 As a result, the risk of reading modern mind-sets and values into ancient texts increases. A good example of such tendencies is the so-called Darker (Ironic) Reading of Xenophon’s Hiero and Cyropaedia.24 Neglecting the political and historical context in which ancient texts were written also results in the tendency to examine them in isolation from one another. By way of contrast, this study proposes a shift of focus to the historical context. Thus it examines the links between Plato’s dialogues and democratic ideology, antidemocratic thought, typology of tyrants and texts traditionally subsumed under the notion of the Mirror of Princes.25 Undoubtedly Plato’s philosophy aimed to give timeless answers to timeless questions. Nonetheless, his horizon of experience was not timeless – his self-limitation to the world of the polis is the best example. More importantly, his formative years were profoundly shaped by widespread and intense turmoil. Plato was born between 428/27 and 425/24,26 so that his transition from boyhood to manhood saw the annihilation of the Athenian forces in Sicily, the first overthrow and restoration of democracy, the flourishing of the sycophants and Alcibiades’ comeback. In his twenties he

22 See Strasburger 1968: 412–476, esp. 413–414, 420, 423–426, 434–435, 437–438, 442–466; Jaeger 1973: 479–489; Ober: 2006: 131–159, esp. 131–136, 153–159. 23 See Vidal-Naquet 1995: 21; Ober 1994b: 154–156. 24 See Gray 2010: 56–67. 25 Regarding notions of ideology and democratic ideology see Ober 1989: 38–40; Raaflaub 2006a: 398–401; Schofield 2006: 282; Jordović – Walter 2018b: 19–33. 26 Diog. Laert. 3.2; see Nails 2002: 243–247.

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witnessed Alcibiades’ definite downfall, the Arginusae affair, the historic defeat of Athens, the tyranny of the Thirty and Socrates’ trial. Even in the case that the Seventh Letter is not authentic, which is not the prevalent opinion,27 it was written around the middle of the fourth-century by someone who was very familiar with the matter.28 In this letter the ‘Damascene moment’ of Plato from bios politikos to bios philosophikos is explicitly linked to the tyranny of the Thirty and Socrates’ trial.29 During the reign of terror of the Thirty Tyrants, about 2,500 people were executed, some 1,500 of them citizens.30 Athens had at that time certainly fewer than 30,000 citizens, probably less than 20,000. Some scholars assume that the number could be as low as 13,000.31 This means that over a period of eight months, around 5–10% of Athenian citizens were murdered as a result of the wave of repression by the Thirty. Not surprisingly, some contemporaries claimed that in eight months they killed almost more Athenians than all the Peloponnesians in the last ten years of the war (413–404).32 Andrew Wolpert has shown that the numerous and arbitrary executions, the massive expulsions, the ruthless confiscations of property and the deprivation of thousands of Athenians of their civic rights burned deeply into the collective memory.33 Every reader of Plato should ask himself how he would react and what impact it would have on his worldview if in his formative years he witnessed at first hand the killing of 5–10% of his fellow adult males – particularly bearing in mind that this happened over a short period of time, without the assistance of modern methods of killing, in a relatively small area and in an open-air society where many citizens knew one another. To this should be added that one of Plato’s relatives was the leader of this regime (Critias), while another was a high-ranking member (Charmides).34 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34

See Aalders 1972: 151–152, 166–167; Knab 2006: 1–6. See Aalders 1972: 148–149; Trampedach 1994: 255–277, esp. 255, 258–259, 276. Pl. Ep. 7.324b–326b. For the notion of Damascene moment and Plato see Haake 2009: 118–119. Isoc. 7.67; 20.11; Aeschin. 3.235; Schol. Aeschin 1.39; Arist. Ath. Pol. 35.4; see Lehman 1995: 145; Jordović 2005: 184–185; Wolpert 2006: 213–222, esp. 217–218; Shear 2011: 180–185, esp. 182. In the Ecclesiazusae Aristophanes mentions in passing that the number of Athenian citizens is 30,000 (Ar. Eccl. 1131–1133). However, Mogens Hansen (1986: 27) argues that this is a conventional figure of little or no value whenever it is found. The number of citizen at the end of Peloponnesian war was, in any case, much lower than 30,000, considering that 404 is an all-time low and 31,000 is the higher figure for the number of adult male Athenian citizens in the fourth-century; see Hansen 1986: 14–69; Id. 2006: 20; Bleicken 1995: 546–548. Jochen Bleicken (1995: 99) says that according to a pessimistic assessment 2/3 of Athenians, who were fit for military service, died during the Peloponnesian war. It therefore follows that the number of Athenian citizens in 404 could have been around 16,000–17,000. Eberhard Ruschenbusch (1979: 145–147, esp. 146) gives the absolute lowest estimate by claiming that Athens had only 13,000 citizens at the end of the Peloponnesian war. Xen. Hell. 2.4.21; cf. also Isoc. 4.113. Wolpert 2002; see, e.g., Xen. Hell. 2.3.14–17, 21, 38–40; 47; Diod. 14.4.3–4, 32.2; Lys. 12.21–22, 30–31, 96–97. See Irwin 1992: 60–61; Hitz 2010: 103–104.

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That Socrates’ trial represents a turning point in Plato’s life is well-known. The Apologia Socratis, and the fact that Socrates was a key figure in almost all of Plato’s dialogues are proof of a deep attachment. Xenophon explicitly points out that the prevailing opinion that Socrates had been the teacher of Alcibiades and Critias was the main reason for his indictment.35 Even fifty years after the trial, Aeschines mentions as a well-known fact that the “sophist” Socrates was put to death because he was the teacher of the leader of the Thirty.36 Alcibiades and Critias were responsible for the greatest man-made catastrophes of the Peloponnesian war era. The former was a driving force behind Athens greatest military defeat (the Sicilian expedition), the Spartan occupation of Deceleia and the first overthrow of democracy (the Four Hundred).37 The latter was the leader of the most heinous regime in Athens history – the Thirty Tyrants.38 This implies that Socrates, at least in the eyes of some Athenians, was partially responsible for their defeat and the dreadful wave of terror to which they fell victim. The root cause of Athens’ downfall was a current and important question in the fourth-century. The best-known answer is provided by Thucydides in his Obituary for Pericles. According to the historian, the main culprits for the defeat of Athens were the politicians who succeeded Pericles. Their immense, selfserving ambition meant they were so at odds with one another that they did not lead the demos, but surrendered the leadership to its whims. Personal intrigues after Sicily led to the first internal strife. Nonetheless, Athens’ power was so great that for many years it withstood its numerous enemies. The Athenians did finally succumb, when they again became victim of their own private quarrels. Thus, Athens’ downfall was not the result of the strength of her enemies or a systemic defect of democracy, but of the internal discord induced by egotistical and powerhungry politicians.39 Lysias, Aeschines and even Plato confirm that this was indeed a widely-held belief among the Athenians.40 Since Alcibiades and Critias were the two most notorious politicians, this sort of answer certainly did not help to exempt Socrates. Plato’s answer was, as will be shown, diametrically opposed: democratic ideology was to blame for the emergence of individuals who thought only in categories of power and Socrates could not have done anything about it. It is often said of Plato that his perception of the nature of democracy is marked by prejudice and a philosophical approach to the extent that his interpre-

35 Xen. Mem. 1.2.12–47; see also Pl. Ap. 19c–d, 32c–d, 33a–b; Diog. Laert. 2.38–39. 36 Aeschin. 1.173. 37 Thuc. 2.65.11–12; 6.19, 88.10, 91.6, 93.1–2, 103.2–4, 104; 7.2, 18.1 (Deceleia), 7.87.5–8.1 (Sicily); 8.48.1–4 (the Four Hundred). 38 See Jordović 2005: 169–225. 39 Thuc. 2.65.7, 10–13; see Bleckmann 1998: 318–333. 40 Lys. 2.63–65; Aeschin. 2.176; Pl. Menex. 243d; Isoc. 20.10–11; see also Ar. Eq. 180–222, 1111–1150, 1321, 1339–1354; Lys. 12.40; 25.21–22, 25–28; Isoc. 4.75–79; 18.45–46; Arist. Ath. Pol. 28, esp. 28.1; cf. Rhodes 1981: 344–345; Bleckmann 1998: 324; Schofield 2000: 198–199; Wolpert 2002: 121–123.

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I. Introduction

tation of historical facts and political reality is far too free.41 Doubtless Plato did not care much about the specific structures of any particular political system. The focus of his attention was the effect of a political order and the influence of its predominant values on the moral and psychological conditions in the state,42 although here too he has been criticised for not taking sufficient account of reality.43 Such objections are certainly not groundless, but one of the main aims of the present study is to show that, while conceiving and writing his theory on the origins of tyrannical man, Plato had a clear perception of the development of Athenian democratic ideology and that this affected his condemnation of democracy to a far greater degree than is generally imagined.44 A further objective is to demonstrate that Plato drew on democratic political theory and practice not only in criticising democracy, but also in advancing his own political theory. In the light of this and my own background, this study will focus on the structure and development of some of Plato’s concepts and their relationship to the historical context. In other words, this investigation attempts to fuse intellectual history, conceptual history and classical philosophy.45 In his fascinating analysis Kurt Raaflaub has shown that freedom became a political virtue only after the Persian wars.46 The conceptualisation of political freedom (both internal and external) was the result of Greek experience with the tyrants, the new isonomic constitution, renewed factionalism among the aristocracy and, most importantly, the threat of “enslavement” under the yoke of the Great King.47 After 478, the uniqueness of Athenian archē was the catalyst for the evolution of the terminology of freedom.48 It reached its maturity during the middle and later years of the fifth century, when the Athenian naval alliance revealed its true nature. Freedom and its opposite became progressively important factors in interstate debates and negotiations. As a result, an increasingly differentiated terminology of freedom, domination and servitude emerged. The 41 See, e.g., Ostwald 1986: 244; Vidal-Naquet 1995: 33; Frede 1997: 253, 258–265; Dalfen 2004: 109; Kersting 22006: 266–268; Scott 2008: 375; cf. also Annas 1981: 302–305, esp. 304; Popper 71992: 52; Yunis 1996: 136–145; Morgan, 2003: 199–200; contra Monoson 2000: 113–153; see also Anders Sørensen’s (2016) careful analysis of Plato’s assessment of democracy’s epistemic potential. 42 Pl. Rep. 368c–369a, 544d–e; 545b; 548d; see Frede 1996: 260–261; Id. 1997: 258–259. Kurt Raaflaub (1992: 50–59) has shown that ethical aspects were an integral part of political thought in the late fifth-century. 43 See Frede 1996: 260-266; Id. 1997: 261–265. 44 Sara Monoson (2000: 113–114) notes: “Plato’s depiction of democracy as exquisitely vulnerable to collapse into tyranny does not explain the dynamics of Athenian history, nor does it address the variety of changes that have occurred in actual regimes. Aristotle complains about this feature of Republic 8, pointing out that the history of Greek cities shows that regimes change form in all directions and for reasons more diverse that Plato has Socrates speak of in Republic 8 (Politics 1316a1–b30).” 45 Cf. Vidal-Naquet 1995: 21; Ober 1994b: 154–157; Raaflaub 2004: 5–9; Schofield 2006: 4–5. 46 See Raaflaub 2004: 23–57. 47 See Raaflaub 2004: 45–117. 48 See Raaflaub 2004: 118–128.

I. Introduction

19

allies’ loss of sovereignty and Athens’ interference in their internal affairs meant that the situation of the allies was understood as doulosynē, that autonomia evolved into a catchword against Athenian supremacy and that Athens was labelled as a polis tyrannos.49 For the Athenians, because of their special circumstances, freedom and independence could only mean sovereignty over their empire (archē). In simple terms, rule over others is declared to be the prerequisite for freedom.50 Consequently, the Athenians developed the notion of absolute sovereignty (equality or superiority in all agreements), absolute self-sufficiency (the capability to ensure by its own power the permanent fulfilment of all needs), and absolute freedom (freedom not merely from domination by others but to dominate others).51 Since, in the eyes of the Athenians by late Periclean times only Athens, as polis tyrannos, complies with all these elements, it is the megistē polis kai eleutherōtatē.52 The final development took place around the 440s, as shifts in domestic politics and ideological conflict caused freedom to evolve into a fundamentally democratic virtue.53 Accordingly, as shown by Thomas Morawetz’s analysis of the concept of freedom to do what one pleases, demos’ freedom on the level of internal politics was also strongly associated with tyrannical behaviour and rule (dēmos tyrannos).54 This extremely brief overview of the concept of political freedom reveals how the notion of political freedom progressed from not being unfree, to being equal and not being ruled at all, and eventually to the concept that only the ruler is fully free. As mentioned above, this evolution was closely intertwined with the development of the Athenian archē and democracy. Thus, the idea that absolute freedom leads to tyranny and that the driving force behind this striving for total freedom were the Athenian democracy and archē, was conceptualized no later than the age of Pericles. From it follows that the core elements of Plato’s thesis that the pursuit of absolute freedom transforms the democratic man into a tyrant, existed long before the Gorgias and the Republic were written. The aim of this study is to show how Plato took over this and other democratic concepts and inverted them, in order to show that (democratic) Athenian striving for absolute freedom would lead not only to the oppression of other Greeks, but of the Athenian democrats themselves.55

49 50 51 52 53 54 55

See Raaflaub 2004: 128–165, 193–202; cf. also Id. 1994: 111 with n. 17. See Raaflaub 2004: 166–193. See Raaflaub 2004: 181–193. See Raaflaub 2004: 189–190. See Raaflaub 2004: 203–243, 247–249. Morawetz 2000; see also Kallet 2003: 117–144; Ober 2003: 229–235; Raaflaub 2003: 81–82. Aristotle reaches a similar conclusion with regard to Sparta (Pol. 1333b29–33): ἔτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαίμονα νομίζειν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν: ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο πειρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἄρχειν· – And again it is not a proper ground for deeming a state happy and for praising its lawgiver, that it has practised conquest with a view to ruling over its neighbours. This principle is most disastrous; it follows from it that an individual citizen who has the capacity ought to endeavour to attain the power to hold sway over his own city; (trans. H. Rackham).

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This analysis will also reveal that Plato’s criticism of democracy was largely based on thorough knowledge of other authors of his time. Numerous intertextual connections can be found, especially with Thucydides, Aristophanes, Herodotus and Euripides. It is conspicuous in particular that certain parts of their works influenced Plato – in Thucydides Pericles’ Funeral Oration, Pericles’ last speech, the Obituary for Pericles, the Melian Dialogue, and the Sicilian Debate, and in Herodotus the Lydian logos and the debate in Xerxes’ crown council. In fact, Greek political thought did not produce a single work that was comprehensive and systematic enough to be considered a statement of democratic political theory.56 Accordingly, criticising the authors, or rather those parts of their works, that reflected democratic ideals was one of the best methods available to discredit democratic ideology. The focus of the study is on two of Plato’s works: Gorgias and Republic, but mainly on the former. The reason for this approach, which may perhaps seem unusual, is that the model of degeneration of constitutions in Book 8 of the Republic – notably the two worst systems, democracy and tyranny – picks up on the theories of Thrasymachus. His arguments, again, simply encapsulate and round off what Gorgias treats at greater length and depth. If Gorgias gives a detailed account of the process of democratic man’s transformation into tyrannical man, then parallels must exist between this dialogue and the Republic. That they do indeed exist has been accepted for some time.57 The first and greater part of this study, therefore, examines the Gorgias with the intention to demonstrate how Plato, through allusion to important democratic concepts, values, and ideals (such as freedom, equality, or licence to do what one pleases), and by reference to the great leaders of democracy (such as Pericles, Nicias and Alcibiades),58 endeavours to show that the democratic ideology of freedom is responsible for the emergence of individuals whose ideal and teaching is the right of the stronger, that is, tyranny. At the same time, connections will be pointed out between Callicles and the tyrannical man of the Republic. However, since not all connections can be reconstructed in this way, the second, shorter part of this study is dedicated to the Republic and the connections between this, Plato’s best-known work, and Gorgias.

56 See Jones 1957: 41; Raaflaub1989: 33–34; Id. 2018a: 154–160; Nippel 2016: 74–78; Jordović – Walter 2018b: 12–13, 25–27. 57 See the part The Republic. 58 For Plato’s descriptions of evolution as a transition of generations, i.e. father-son stories, see Kersting 2006: 273.

II. THE GORGIAS The Gorgias is not only one of the longest but also among the most complex of Plato’s dialogues. The constant introduction of new questions, the resulting continual expansion of the subjects discussed, and the build-up of opposites gave rise to a wide variety of opinions on the meaning and objective of the dialogue, issues on which disagreement among scholars is considerable. The major themes usually cited are justice, criticism of Sophistic teachings (rhetoric), and the defence of Socrates.1 Since Gorgias was Plato’s most important political dialogue prior to the Republic, numerous studies emphasise its political dimension.2 This study will attempt to show that Gorgias offers in fact a subtle criticism of Athenian democratic ideology; it will therefore not examine all aspects of the dialogue.3 This approach does not, and does not intend to, question the importance of other factors (such as the role of the sophists or that of teaching) in influencing the conception of the Gorgias.4 An important feature of the Gorgias is its equivocality which is at times so pronounced as to amount to an ambiguity that can easily confuse readers or interpreters and lead them down the wrong path.5 This feature is perhaps best visible in the date of the dialogue’s action. Indications provided by Plato suggest that it could have taken place at any time over a period of about twenty years.6 The tеrminus post quem is 427, the year when Gorgias first came to Athens and, as head of the Leontinian delegation, inveigled the Athenians into their first military intervention in Sicily. Thus, Gorgias’ rhetorical skill is indirectly linked to the greatest Athenian disaster – the (second) Sicilian campaign. The prytany of Socrates’ tribe in the year 407/6 marks the terminus ante quem. Hence, Socrates’ “political skill” is directly linked to his “unsuccessful” opposition to the violation of the law during the infamous Arginusae trial. These peculiarities of chronology along with other inconsistencies, already a subject of criticism in ancient times, 1 2

3 4 5 6

Cf. Kobusch 1996: 47-63; Apelt 1998: 2–3; Heitsch 2004: 50–51; Dalfen 2004: 107–113. See Dodds 1959: 31–34; Klosko 1983: 579; Schofield 2000: 192; Rowe 2007c: 27–28; Tarnopolsky 2010: 29. Harvey Yunis and Josiah Ober have established numerous intertextual links between Gorgias and other contemporary works, which also criticized democracy, Yunis 1996: 136–236, esp. 136–171; Ober 1998: 198–199. Cf. Vogt 1968: 296–297; Guthrie 1975: 294–296. However, this approach is not challenging the importance of the aristocracy for the emergence and development of the Athenian democracy. Cf. Vidal-Naquet 1995: 21, 29–33. The Gorgias is characterized by a strong political dimension, see Rowe 2007b: 29, 31–32. The fact that the dialogue is named after Gorgias, who of all Socrates’ interlocutors speaks the least, is an excellent example of this; cf. Levett 2005: 210; Rowe 2007d: 94–95. See Fussi 2000: 42; Dalfen 2004: 119–122; Tarnopolsky 2010: 30–31; cf. also Benardete 1991: 7.

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II. The Gorgias

lead to two conclusions.7 First, they suggest to the reader that the discussion at the centre of the dialogue is not only fictitious but also of a very generalised nature. For the same reason, it is also impossible to determine the place where the discussion unfolded.8 Nor, again, is it possible to form an idea of the identity of Callicles.9 The elusive identity of the main protagonist of the dialogue allows a portrayal not only of the character of a certain person, but of a specific type of personality, in this case the sort that is guided only by the principle might is right, i.e. tyrannical man.10 The second conclusion is that the systematic use of anachronisms and their deliberate linking to the chief points of the dialogue exclude any possibility that this might be a case of coincidence or oversight.11 Instead, it seems more reasonable to assume that these chronological pointers are meant to serve as signposts, by which Plato endeavours to outline the genesis of a depraved ethic.12 That this is a lengthy process can be seen from the division of the Gorgias into three smaller discourses, during which the standpoints of Socrates’ interlocutors gradually harden into unscrupulous individualism and reflections on categories of power.13 In other words, Socrates’ interlocutors in the Gorgias – Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles – personify the scale of increasing imperfection in ways that are similar to the ongoing degradation of bad constitutions and the corresponding psychopathology of the human characters in the Republic. Opposite them stands Socrates as the paradigm of the perfect philosophical way of life. The present study analyses this history of ethical decline as well as the factors with which Plato links it.

7

8 9 10

11 12 13

Diod. 12.53.2–5: “Now when Gorgias had arrived in Athens and been introduced to the people in assembly, he discoursed to them upon the subject of the alliance, and by the novelty of his speech he filled the Athenians, who are by nature clever and fond of dialectic, with wonder. […] In the end he won the Athenians over to an alliance with the Leontines, […].“ (trans. C. H. Oldfather); see also Thuc. 3.86.3; Pl. Grg. 473e–484а; Xen. Hell. 1.7.15; Ath. 5.216c, 217c–218e; cf. Dodds 1959: 17–18, 247–248; Yunis 1996: 118–119; Dalfen 2004: 120. The chapter II.3.9. Socrates and Solon shows that during the Arginusae scandal Socrates was only ostensibly unsuccessful, since no one could have curbed the totally blinded dēmos (tyrannos). See Fussi 2000: 45–46; cf. also Dodds 1959: 188; contra Dalfen 2004: 11. On the numerous attempts to identify which well known Athenian (e.g. Critias, Alcibiades) is concealed behind Callicles’ name see Gauss 1956: 58–59; Dalfen 2004: 132–137. William Guthrie (1969: 102) reached the following conclusion as a result: “Plato may well have taken elements from different sources and built up in the person of Callicles a somewhat stylized presentation of the doctrine ‘might is right’ in its most extreme form.”; see also Leppin 2013: 156. The following comment of Otto Apelt (1998: 5) makes this evident: “Alles in diesem Werk ist hinsichtlich der Darstellungsform auf das feinste abgewogen, alles auf das genaueste und in ruhigster Erwägung berechnet, alles mit frischesten Farben gegeben.” On the unity of the different parts of Gorgias see Stauffer 2006. Cf. Hentschke 1971: 38; Ostwald 1986: 244; Rutherford 1995: 142; Stauffer 2006: 15; Doyle 2006: 599–600. The increasingly harsher positions of Socrates’ interlocutors concur with the harsher tone of the discussion; see Klosko 1983: 591–592.

1. GORGIAS The first and briefest conversation in the Gorgias takes place between Socrates and Gorgias of Leontini, from whom the dialogue derives its name.1 The starting point is Socrates’ question to the famous sophist concerning the art (technē) in which he has been trained. Gorgias replies that oratory is his profession which he has not only mastered but is also capable of teaching to others. Gorgias cites ʽspeechʼ (logos) as the subject of rhetoric.2 Socrates objects that other arts also use speeches, and in the discussion that follows both men arrive at the conclusion that oratory is a skill of persuasion that creates belief, not knowledge, of what is really just or unjust.3 In spite of this, Gorgias continues to glorify his profession, pointing out that it encompasses all others and rules over them.4 At the same time, he distances himself from the unjust use of rhetoric, offering the opinion that it is just to punish those who abuse oratory but not the teachers of the art themselves.5 Socrates perceives here an inconsistency and asks whether a teacher of rhetoric should also instruct his students in what is just and unjust. Gorgias replies in the affirmative, thus contradicting himself: he had previously admitted that oratory could be used for unjust purposes,6 while Socrates had used numerous analogies to show that a man who has successfully completed training for a profession is precisely that for which the profession has equipped him. The logical consequence is that a person who has learned what is just is also just.7 At this point, the discussion between Gorgias and Socrates is interrupted: Polus joins in the conversation, insisting that his teacher has only agreed with Socrates out of a sense of shame. Based on this brief review of the exchange of opinions between Gorgias and Socrates, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the topics of conversation are solely philosophical questions and the negative aspects of sophistic teaching, in this case rhetoric. This impression is all the more powerful since the term rhētorikē, the original term for the art of oratory, appears for the first time in this dialogue, with a simultaneous and explicit attack on the sophists who teach it.8 Although this impression has held sway for a long time, it is too one-dimensional. The term orator (rhētōr) has unequivocally political connotations. It is not only used for an active and engaged citizen who appears publicly in the Assembly,

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Pl. Grg. 449c–461b. Pl. Grg. 449d–e; see Irwin 1979: 114; Dalfen 2004: 180. Pl. Grg. 452e, 455a. Pl. Grg. 456a–b. Pl. Grg. 456c–e. Pl. Grg. 459d–460b. Pl. Grg. 460 b–c. Pl. Grg. 448d–452a; see Yunis 1996: 17; Id. 1998: 225–226; Schiappa 1999: 14–23.

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but also as a synonym for the word ʽpoliticianʼ.9 Accordingly, it is no surprise that in the Gorgias Socrates calls famous past statesmen of Athens ʽrhetorsʼ.10 Gorgias’ discussion with Socrates leaves no doubt that he applies the terms rhetor and rhetoric primarily in a political sense. Although at the beginning he gives a rather vague definition of the orator’s skill,11 Gorgias then goes on to claim that it entails the ability to use words in order to persuade the courts, the council, the people in the assembly, or any kind of political gathering.12 Later, as proof of the power of rhetoric, Gorgias says that the shipyards, docks, and fortifications of Athens were raised thanks to the rhetorical skills of Themistocles and Pericles.13 In view of all this, it is not surprising that recent studies emphasize that Plato wrote the Gorgias not least to criticize democratic rhetoric and knowledge.14 The political dimension of the Gorgias, however, is much broader and cannot be reduced merely to these two aspects. A series of indicators permit the conclusion that the dialogue contains a fundamental condemnation of the Athenian democratic order. This is reflected in the fact that Plato establishes a connection between all of Socrates’ interlocutors and Athenian democratic ideology. That the views of these interlocutors become increasingly radical suggests that Plato intends to trace the emergence of an unscrupulous mentality that thinks primarily in categories of power. In this process, the famous sophist from Leontini is assigned the role of a catalyst. Indeed, Plato links Gorgias himself in multiple ways with the Athenian ideology of freedom. 1.1. Gorgias and Pericles’ Generation That Plato links the famous sophist with the Athenian ideology of freedom is obvious in Gorgias’ third definition of the nature of rhetoric which claims that, thanks to his rhetorical skill, the rhetor is easily able to convince the masses in the assembly to elect him rather than a true professional state physician.15 Directly 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

See Finley 1962: 12–13; Hansen 1983: 33–55; Rhodes 1986: 140–141; Ober 1989: 104–12; Yunis 1996: 9–12; Id. 1998: 229; Sørensen 2016: 48–49. Pl. Grg. 520a–b. According to Gorgias, rhetoric is the art of speech and its subject is the greatest and best of human concerns (Pl. Grg. 450b, 451d); cf. Yunis 1996: 119–120; Dalfen 2004: 188. Pl. Grg. 452e; cf. Rhodes 1986: 140. Pl. Grg. 455d–e. See Yunis 1996: 136–60; Ober 1998: 190–213; Schofield 2006: 65–66; Sørensen 2016: 43. Pl. Grg. 456b–c. First definition: rhetoric is a craft which carries out and achieve everything through speech (Pl. Grg. 450b–d, 451d). Second definition: rhetoric is in reality the greatest good. It is the source of freedom for humankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the source of rule over others in one’s city (Pl. Grg. 452d–e). Yunis (1996: 123) points out that the physician serves throughout Plato’s work and in particular in Gorgias as a paradigm for the political technē; see also Trampedach 1994: 167–168. In the Sicilian debate Nicias says to the prytanis that he should be “physician for the state when it has taken bad advice”, and that he should “help his country as much as possible or at least not willingly harm it” (Thuc. 6.14); see Hornblower 2004: 69–70. On the physician – statesman analogy in

1. Gorgias

25

before this statement, the sophist cites Themistocles and Pericles in support of his theory.16 Abruptly, and without being prompted specifically, he then goes on to expound on the just use of the rhetorical skill, insisting that the teacher of rhetoric is not responsible for its abuse by his pupils, and conceding that pupils abusing this power must be punished severely:17 ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν. φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅποι βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ ὁπότερον δεῖ αἱρεθῆναι ἰατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἰατρόν, ἀλλ᾽ αἱρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὁντιναοῦν ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὑτὸν ἑλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν περὶ ὅτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶν καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης· δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθεν πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι – ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι – οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δὲ οἶμαι ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾆτα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίαι χρείᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ᾽ ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα. Yes, I’ll try to reveal clearly the whole power of rhetoric to you Socrates. For you showed the way well yourself. I take it you know that these dockyards and the Athenian’s walls and the harbour-equipment have come from Themistocles’ advice, some from Pericles’, but not from the craftsmen. And I tell you, if a rhetor and a doctor went into any city you like and to compete in speeches (logos) in the Assembly or in any other gathering about which of them should be chosen a doctor, the doctor would end up nowhere, but the man powerful at speaking would be chosen if he wanted it. And if he were competing against any other craftsmen whatever, the rhetor more than anyone else would persuade them to choose him; for there is nothing on which he wouldn’t speak more persuasively than any other craftsmen, among a mass of people. Well, that is the kind of power the craft has, and how great it is. But now, Socrates, rhetoric should be used the same way as any other competitive craft. For indeed someone should not use other competitive crafts against everyone, just because he has learnt to box and to do mixed fighting and to fight in armour so as to beat friends and enemies alike – he shouldn’t, just because of this, strike, wound or kill his friends. [...]; but that is no more reason why he should steal their reputation either from the doctors, just because he has the power to do that, or from the other craftsman, but he should use rhetoric justly as well, as any competitive craft should be used. But I think that if someone the age of Plato see Marshal 2000: 18; Brock 2000: 27–29; Id. 2013: 71–73, 151; Hornblower 2004: 69–70. 16 Pl. Grg. 455d–e. 17 Pl. Grg. 455d–e, 456b–d, 457b–c (trans.T. Irwin).

26

II. The Gorgias acquires the rhetorical craft and then does injustice with this power and craft, we should not detest his teacher and expel him from the city. For the transmitted his craft for a just man to use, but the pupil is using it the opposite way; and so it is just to detest, expel, and kill the one who used it wrongly, but not his teacher.

A close reading of other parts of the Gorgias reveals that this theory of the teacher’s innocence is not mentioned here accidentally. Rather, it plays an important part in establishing a direct link between Gorgias’ arguments and another vital part of the dialogue that presents its direct antithesis – the moment when Socrates denounces the famous Athenian statesmen in his polemical exchange with Callicles in the third part of the Gorgias, to which I turn here.18 It is ironic that this very criticism on the part of Socrates, which is often held to be one of the key proofs of his non-historical approach to the past, actually gives the entire work a clearly historical perspective.19 Like Gorgias before him, Socrates uses the term rhetor for a politician,20 thereby equating politicians and their politics with the sophists and their teaching.21 He also cites the example of the physician. However, unlike Gorgias, Socrates portrays himself as physician who genuinely cares about his fellow-citizens and predicts that, for that very reason, he will be put on trial.22 Moreover, he explains that Pericles, Themistocles, Miltiades, and Cimon were bad politicians since they caused the citizens to become worse and much wilder.23 Besides, he claims, bearing primary responsibility for the policies they had implemented, they were deservedly punished.24 18 Pl. Grg. 515c–520b, esp. 519c–520b. 19 This does not mean that Plato does not distinguish between the absolutely theoretical and truly practical philosophy and that within the latter he does not differentiate between ethics and politics. However, taking this as an irrefutable proof of Plato’s lack of sense for political reality is far-fetched. 20 Socrates uses the notions prostatēs and politikos to refer to politicians (Pl. Grg. 473e, 484d, 513b, 515c, 519b-c); he also calls them dēmēgoroi and public orators (Pl. Grg. 520a–b); see also Connor 1971: 116–117. 21 Pl. Grg. 515c–d, 517b–c, 518b. 22 Pl. Grg. 464b, 464d–e, 514d, 518a, 521a, 521e–522e; see also Rep. 340d–e, 389b–c, 425e– 426e (physician – ruler – helmsman); Plt. 266e (statesman – charioteer); 296e (statesman – helmsman); 297e–299e (physician – ruler – helmsman); Leg. 719e–720e, 722e–723a, 905e (physician – lawgiver – ruler – gods – helmsman – charioteer); Hippoc. VM 20 (sophist – physician – philosopher); Thuc. 6.14 (statesman – physician); cf. Irwin 1979: 241; Trampedach 1994: 168; Marshal 2000: 18; Brock 2000: 28; Id. 2013: 69–75, 151; Ungefehr– Kort 2001: 562–563; Hornblower 2004: 69–70; Ricken 2008: 195–9; Levin 2014: 67–68; Rossetti 2018: 275–276. 23 Pl. Grg. 516a–d. Socrates’ way of thinking is not such that his fellow-citizens would find strange or unusual. In Aristophanes’ Frogs, Aeschylus and Euripides comment that the duty of a poet is to ethically improve the citizenry (Ar. Ran. 1008–1012). This point of view corresponds with the fact that comedy was an important part of the socio-political life in democratic Athens. The contemporary political scene is the focus of the Frogs as the mention of Alcibiades, Cleitophon and Theramenes or the parrhēsia in the contest between Aeschylus and Euripides shows (Ar. Ran. 533–541, 937–952, 967–970, 1422–1432); see Dover 1994: 10–37, esp. 20–23, 309–314; Sommerstein 1996: 240–242; Morawetz 2000: 163. 24 Pl. Grg. 515e–519b, esp. 518e–519d.

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Although Socrates refers to Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon and Pericles together, his argument reveals that his condemnation is directed chiefly against Pericles, that is, that Plato wants to combine in the person of Pericles all negative features of Athens in the period known as the Pentekontaetia that preceded the Peloponnesian War.25 This, combined with the fact that Socrates’ criticism represents a counter-thesis to Gorgias’ arguments in the first part of the dialogue, allows us to conclude that the character of Gorgias is Plato’s code for Pericles.26 This conclusion may seem overly bold, particularly if we bear in mind that many Athenians were prejudiced against the sophists – as Aristophanes’ Clouds and Plato himself confirm.27 Yet the point here is not the opinion of common Athenians but rather that of Plato who makes no distinction between democratic ideology and the sophists, as he again confirms in the Republic:28 ἕκαστος τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἁθροισθῶσιν, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν· οἷόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργάς τις καὶ ἐπιθυμίας κατεμάνθανεν, ὅπῃ τε προσελθεῖν χρὴ καὶ ὅπῃ ἅψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁπότε χαλεπώτατον ἢ πρᾳότατον καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἑκάστας εἴωθεν φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἵας αὖ ἄλλου φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦταί τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει,

25 Cf. Yunis 1996: 141; Schofield 2006: 211–212. Miltiades and Cimon are mentioned primarily to show that the punishment of Pericles was rather an important characteristic of the rule of the people than an exception or accident. In addition, both statesmen were associated with the rise of Athens and punished after having achieved their greatest successes. Aristides is not mentioned here since he was ostracised due to Themistocles’ political agitation (Plut. Them. 11; Arist. 7; Arist. Ath. Pol. 28.2; 41.2); cf. Rhodes 1981: 292; Welwei 1999: 47. Moreover, Aristides acted with great circumspection while organizing the first assessment of the Delian League, and thus avoided involvement with the imperialist foreign policy of Athens (Thuc. 1.91.3; Plut. Arist. 23–24; Cim. 6.1–3 different Arist. Ath. Pol. 23.3–24); cf. Petzold 1994; Welwei 1999: 80. Socrates’ praise of men who remain righteous despite their might proves the decisive influence it had on Plato’s opinion (Pl. Grg. 526a–b); see Wilke 1997: 81. Themistocles, on the other hand, is more often mentioned in the Gorgias. Presumably, this is due to Thucydides’ positive attitude towards him, i.e. his portrayal of Themistocles as equal to Pericles in terms of his statesman-like qualities; see Leppin 1999: 143–167, esp. 147–148, 154, 162–163, 167–168; Rood 2004: 138; 227 n. 7; Rhodes 2006: 533; Foster 2010: 112 n. 67, 129–131; cf. also Regenbogen 1961: 229; Gommel 1966: 74–77. Furthermore, Thucydides opines that Themistocles marked a new course in Athenian foreign policy, the most famous proponent of which was no other than Pericles; see Bayer 1968: 203; Woodhead 1970: 38. In this respect, it is indicative that Pericles, in his Funeral Oration, praises the generation which fought in the Persian wars and acquire the archē subsequently enlarged by his own generation (Thuc. 2.36.2–3; see also 1.144.4); see HCT II: 104–106. Even Plato distinguishes in the Laws between Athens’ constitution before and after the Persian wars (Pl. Leg. 698a–b); cf. Schöpsdau 1994: 486–487; Schofield 2006: 78–79. 26 Pl. Phdr. 267a–c, 269a–270a; Menex. 235e; Symp. 215e. This cannot be reconciled with the point of view that Gorgias was a democrat or supporter of Pericles; cf. Dreher 1984: 63–88. 27 Pl. Men. 91b–c. 28 Pl. Rep. 493a–c (trans. P. Shorey), see also 492a–c; Phdr. 248e; Tht. 167c, 172d–173a; Euthyd. 305c–e; cf. Irwin 1992: 65; Schofield 2006: 63–65; Sørensen 2016: 54–57. Eric Robinson (2007: 109–122, esp. 122) argues that the sophist, having grown up in democracies, learned and taught techniques of popular political power.

28

II. The Gorgias καταμαθὼν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα συνουσίᾳ τε καὶ χρόνου τριβῇ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὡς τέχνην συστησάμενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὅ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζῴου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη μήτε ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι. τοιοῦτος δὴ ὢν πρὸς Διὸς οὐκ ἄτοπος ἄν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι παιδευτής; Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals, inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast which he had in his keeping, how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable, never having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator?

It comes as little surprise that in Gorgias too Socrates argues that rhetoric, like cookery, aims only at producing charis and hēdonē, which is why it is just a subset of flattery (kolakeia) and a simulacrum of a branch of politics (politikēs moriou eidōlon).29 Plato’s main reason for this approach is that in his criticism of democracy he disagrees with Thucydides’ version of events,30 including the latter’s model of the downfall of Athens in the Peloponnesian War; he is thus disposed critically toward the idealisation of Pericles and the glorification of Athenian democracy with which it is connected. According to Plato, not only did the decline of Athens not begin with the death of Pericles, but the very statesmen who had led the Athenian people before the Peloponnesian War were the chief culprits in corrupting Athens, and this is very clearly stated in the third part of the dialogue.31

29 Pl. Grg. 462d–463d, 464d–465d, 466a; see also 500e–501b, 503a–b, 517b–518c, 520a–521b, 521e; cf. Trampedach 1994: 166–167; Mesch 2007: 149–157; Tarnopolsky 2010: 41–55; Sørensen 2016: 36–42, 46–58. 30 For connections between Plato’s dialogues and Thucydides, see Pohlenz 1913: 238–256; Bayer 1968: 216–226; Hornblower 1987: 121–125; Id. 1995: 47–68, esp. 55–56, 62–63; Gomperz 1996: 582; cf. also Schofield 2006: 1. Josiah Ober (1998: 7–12, 43–121) speaks about a ‘critical community’ in which he, in addition to Thucydides, includes Plato. 31 Pl. Grg. 503b–c, 515c–517c, 518e–519b; see also Menex. 241e–242a; Leg. 698a–701c; cf. Schöpsdau 1994: 485–516; Schofield 2000: 196–198; Stauffer 2006: 152–158.

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1.2. Freedom and Power It is clear from Gorgias’ second definition of the nature of rhetoric that Plato’s criticism is primarily directed against the democratic ideology of freedom and Thucydides’ idealisation of Pericles:32 Σ. ἴθι οὖν νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστιν τοῦτο ὃ φῂς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ. Γ. ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ. S. So come on, Gorgias. Consider yourself questioned by both these men and myself, and give us your answer. What is this thing that you claim is the greatest good for mankind, a thing you claim to be producer of? G. The thing that is in actual fact the greatest good, Socrates. It is the source of freedom for humankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the source of rule over others in one’s city.

The equating of the rhetoric with freedom and rule, i.e. with the greatest good (megiston agathon), is hardly coincidental, since in the Republic too, freedom is cited as the greatest good of the democratic order.33 Even more importantly, prior to the Peloponnesian War, eleutheria and archē were the central components of the Athenian ideology of freedom, and as such were marked as ʽgreatestʼ34 It is of no less importance that this definition in the dialogue for the first time examines the question of ʽpower and ruleʼ that comprises the essence of the arguments put forward by Polus and Callicles.35 Consequently, this place in the dialogue has two complementary functions. On the one hand, it establishes a connection between the arguments of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. On the other, the ideas of all three are from the very beginning of the dialogue associated with Athenian democratic ideology.36 Plato thus again indicates that the character of Gorgias, which stands for Pericles, represents the beginning of a development process. It is important to bear in mind here that the conceptual pair ʽfreedom and powerʼ soon led to the concept of ʽfreedom through powerʼ.37 32 Pl. Grg. 452d (trans. D. J. Zeyl); see also 451d; Menex. 234c–235c; cf. Irwin 1979: 116; Schofield 2000: 196–198; Id. 2006: 72. It is necessary to keep in mind that Thucydides was just articulating what was a general attitude pervading Athens after so many funeral orations and other speeches praising Athens’ achievement. For connections between Thucydides and Gorgias, as well as Plato’s intention to challenge Thucydides’ portrayal of Pericles, see Kahn 1963: 223–224; Bayer 1968: 216–226, esp. 222–226; Hornblower 1987: 122–124, 174–175; Yunis 1996: 136–171; Ober 1998: 198, 210; Schofield 2000: 196–198, 211–212. 33 Pl. Rep. 562b–c; see Meier 1979: 426. 34 Cf. Thuc. 2.62–63.2, 64.3; 3.45.6 (greatest good); 6.82–83.4, 87.2, 89.6; 7.69.2; Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.8; Eur. Supp. 352–353; see also Hdt. 1.170.1–2; Lys. 2.18, 33, 55, 61–63. Concerning this topic see Dodds 1959: 202; Raaflaub 1994: 118–126, esp. 122–124; Id. 2004: 166–181, 187–190; cf. also Hornblower 2000: 367, 370, 383 n. 30. 35 See Rutherford 1995: 147–148; Rowe 1998: 248; Dalfen 2004: 188–189; Sørensen 2016: 43; cf. also Hentschke 1971: 37; Nonvel Pieri 1991: 326; Yunis 1996: 119–120; Doyle 2010: 8. 36 See Dalfen 2004: 188. 37 See Raaflaub 1981: 223–224; Id. 2004: 190–193.

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The only difference between the definition provided by Gorgias and the democratic concept is that the sophist also introduces the notion of rhetoric, claiming that it is the source of freedom and power. Still, this does not mean that his definition departs essentially from democratic values, particularly if we bear in mind that both share the same logic and principles. Although, according to Gorgias, power (archē) is not a condition for freedom, but rather rhetoric is a condition for both power and freedom, his view does not contradict the democratic concept of freedom and power. The reason is that, according to democratic ideology, oratory forms the very base of the democratic process of decisionmaking, while despite all his power and influence a rhetor is, at the same time, subordinated to the authority of the people – which Socrates himself points out a little later in the dialogue.38 1.3. The Rhetor’s Freedom Besides those mentioned already, Gorgias’ second definition of the art of rhetoric has two more purposes. First, it transposes the democratic ideology of freedom (that is, power) from the collective level (of the demos or Athens) to the individual (of the rhetor or politician).39 This prompts the question of what influence this ideology had on the Athenian elite or, put more precisely, whether members of the upper classes internalized it. John Cooper has observed that some translators misinterpret the phrase eleutherias autois anthrōpois in Gorgias’ second definition, and relate freedom mistakenly to the orator, not the people.40 This fallacy results from the ambivalence inherent in the definition, whose purpose is to evoke the contradictory position of the orator in democracy – a topic that for the first time became a subject of

38 Pl. Grg. 513a–c, 516d–517c. Pericles (Thuc. 2.40.2–3): „καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομέν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι· ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει.“ – […] and we Athenians decide public questions for ourselves or at least endeavour to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the belief that it is not debate that is a hindrance to action, but rather not to be instructed by debate before the time comes for action. For in truth we have this point also of superiority over other men, to be most daring in action and yet at the same time most given to reflection upon the ventures we mean to undertake; with other men, on the contrary, boldness means ignorance and reflection brings hesitation.” (trans. Ch. F. Smith); cf. Thuc. 2.37.1, 60.5; Dem. 1.1; see Hansen 1983: 151–180; Ober 1989: 314–324; Id. 1998: 89; Yunis 1998: 229–232. 39 This interpretation is supported by the fact that Gorgias speaks both about the freedom of the people and the power (archē) of the individuals (Pl. Grg. 452d–e). 40 Pl. Grg. 452d2–8; see Cooper 1999a: 33 with n. 5; cf. Dalfen 2004: 19. See, for example, the translation of Terence Irwin (1979: 19, 116): “It is in reality the greatest good, Socrates, and is responsible for freedom for a man himself, and at the same time for rule over others in his own city.”; cp. also Dodds 1959: 202.

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philosophical contemplation in this dialogue:41 the rhetor on the one hand leads the people and is one of the most powerful individuals in the polis, while on the other hand, he completely depends on the will of the demos.42 All things considered, Gorgias’ definition can be linked to Thucydides’ idealised image of Pericles, and especially with a famous sentence in the Funeral Oration that is even more ambivalent:43 “And so Athens, though in name a democracy, gradually became in fact a government ruled by its foremost citizen”.44 This statement is immediately preceded by one of the most controversial sentences in Thucydides’ work: “[...] kateiche to plēthos eleutherōs, [....]”.45 The construction of the sentence leaves us in some doubt as to whether eleutherōs pertains to the multitude or to Pericles. Some renowned scholars think that eleutherōs refers to Pericles and that, therefore, the phrase says that Pericles dealt with the commons freely.46 Other eminent authorities on Thucydides believe that eleutherōs is related to the people; accordingly the sentence suggests that Pericles restrained the multitude without restricting its freedom.47 Such interpretations of the sentence’s construction are certainly acceptable, but modern studies fail to observe that it is quite unusual for a meticulous stylist, such as Thucydides, to leave one of the key passages in the entire work equivocal.48 This in turn suggests that the historian intentionally formulated this sentence ambiguously so as to draw attention to the paradoxical relation between the rhetor and the people. Probably the most likely solution to this striking ambiguity is given by Johannes Classen and Julius Steup, who assume that eleutherōs includes both Pericles and the people: “in a free manner, without restricting freedom founded on constitution and custom.”49 One of the central features of democracy – the rhetor rules over the demos and is ruled by it at the same time – also applied to Pericles, as Thucydides himself admits immediately before eulogising him. The people imposed a fine even on the great 41 Pl. Grg. 452d, 466b–e, 510b–511b. 42 See, e.g., Pl. Tht. 172e–173b; Dem. 3.30; 23.209; Arist. Pol. 1274a5–7; cf. Parry 1989: 143– 146; Ober 1989: 335–336; Schofield 2006: 69. The ambivalent position of the rhetor is at the centre of the plot of Aristophanes’ Knights. The demagogues are portrayed as crooked servants, who on the one hand, are totally depended on the good will of the demos and on the other, slyly manipulate the Athenian people to their own advantage; cp. Brock 2013: 115. 43 Socrates’ claim in Phaedrus that Pericles is the most perfect orator chimes with Thucydides’ sentiment (Pl. Phdr. 269e; Thuc. 2.65.9); cf. Ober 1989: 87. 44 Thuc. 2.65.9 (trans. Ch. F. Smith). It was not Thucydides’ intention to suggest that the Athenian democracy under Pericles was not a true democracy, see Lehmann 1997: 42 n. 48; Id. 2008: 20–22; Leppin 1999: 153. 45 Thuc. 2.65.8. Simon Hornblower (1991: 346; 1994: 69 n. 165) points out that this expression echoes a well-known line of Solon (fr. 37 W [31 G.-Pr.]: ouk an katesche dēmon) and is picked up at 8.86.5 where it is applied to Alcibiades. 46 See HCT II: 192; Edmunds – R. Martin 1977: 187–188; Ostwald 1986: 225; Farrar 1988: 167 n. 69; Leppin 1999: 152–153. 47 See Marchant 1891: ad loc; Finley 1947: 164; Smith 1951: 377; Rhodes 1988: 119; Hornblower 1991: 345. 48 Cf. Walter 2010: 415. 49 Classen and Steup (41897: 123): „in freier Weise, ohne die in Verfassung und Sitte begründete Freiheit zu beschränken.“; cf. also Parry 1989: 143–146; Hornblower 2004: 80–81.

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and mighty statesman, only to entrust him again, right afterwards, with the affairs of the state.50 Moreover, it seems, Thucydides formulated this sentence ambiguously for yet another reason. It indirectly, but even more strongly, emphasizes Pericles’ unique achievement that is at the same time supposed to be understood as an ideal. Thus immediately after that ambivalent sentence democracy is marked as rule by the first man, while Pericles’ acting for the common good and superior qualities as a statesman are contrasted with the fatal submission to the demos on the part of subsequent politicians who are solely guided by unscrupulous selfishness.51 Gorgias’ second definition of rhetoric, therefore, concerns one of the fundamental problems of the democratic system – a problem that also ranks supremely in Thucydides’ assessment of Athenian democracy – the question of the relation (or rather, interdependency) between politicians and demos. Unsurprisingly, Plato’s position on this issue is diametrically opposed to Thucydides’. The mere fact that in the definition of rhetoric in the Gorgias the notion of freedom pertains to the masses, not to the orator, clearly indicates Plato’s standpoint – although it is easily possible to conclude from Gorgias’ explanation of the nature of rhetoric that the orator should be freer than anybody else since he rules over the multitude. This, of course, suits Polus’ and Callicles’ arguments but we must not forget that Socrates invests a huge effort throughout the dialogue to demonstrate, as one of his central arguments, the essential inaccuracy of their position. 1.4. Collective Wisdom Gorgias’ third definition of rhetoric (thanks to his rhetorical skill, the rhetor is easily able to convince the masses in the assembly to elect him rather than a true expert) leaves the reader with the impression that the sophist’s standpoint on the rhetor’s political omnipotence is justified.52 Although this view is not completely refuted in this part of the Gorgias, it establishes an indirect link with the dialogue’s last part where it is refuted. This connection is established by the antithesis rhetor – expert (physician) that Gorgias introduces into the dialogue.53 The argument that in the assembly the orator is superior to a real expert, in spite of the latter’s expert knowledge, is suggestive since precisely in this context Socrates says that the multitude does not possess real knowledge.54 This represents an attack on one of the main pillars of Athenian democratic ideology.55 50 Thuc. 2.65.3–5; see also Pl. Grg. 503b–c, 515e–517c, 518e–519b; Hornblower 1987: 122–123; Ober 1989: 187–191, 309–333; Yunis 1996: 146–150; Rhodes 2006: 534–535; Tiersch 2018: 67– 69. 51 Thuc. 2.65.10–12; cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 28; Isoc. 8.124–128; 15.230–236; Lys. 30.28; see Rhodes 1981: 344; Connor 1984: 75–76 n. 58; Chambers 1990: 270; Yunis 1996: 68–69; 87–116. 52 Pl. Grg. 456a–c. 53 Pl. Grg. 456b–c. 54 Pl. Grg. 459a–b; cf. Prt. 319b–e; Hdt. 3.81.1–2, 5.97.2; Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.6–9; Thuc. 6.39.1. Gorgias’ glorification of rhetoric and stressing its greatest successes, such as the building of

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In Protagoras’ famous myth about the origin of civilization, which is part of a rare theoretical elaboration of the rule of the demos, one of the central thoughts is that in the democratic process of decision-making everyone has the same right of participation, notwithstanding his level and kind of knowledge.56 Protagoras insists that his understanding is shared by all Athenians.57 In Thucydides’ Funeral Oration, Pericles, while acknowledging the role of an elite, also endorses the standpoint that all citizens can and should take active part in the life of the polis.58 In the Mytilenian Debate, the notorious demagogue Cleon even goes a step further in claiming that the multitude runs the polis better than the elite, since simpler people are not convinced that they are smarter than the law.59 Finally, in a debate in Syracuse the demagogue Athenagoras, offering what is held to be an unequivocal defense of democratic thought, in particular expresses the opinion that the multitude as a collective is best in deciding on all important matters.60 This belief in collective wisdom became a firm topos in the fourth-century, and Aristotle expanded it theoretically.61 The attack on the concept of the demos’ collective wisdom has been discussed by scholars in the context of the criticism of democratic decision-making, but adequate attention has not been paid to another aspect. This concept is, as noticed by Josiah Ober, one of the central egalitarian tenets of Athenian political ideology.62 Consequently, its refutation also challenges the democratic idea of equality. Socrates does this in his search for true knowledge and, more importantly, he is not alone in this. Even earlier, Gorgias emphasises that the orator can overpower the expert (physician) and convince the masses of whatever he wants to. With this

55

56

57

58 59 60 61 62

walls and dockyards, reflects his faith in the democratic decision-making process. However, his agreement with Socrates’ opinion that the multitude has no true knowledge indicates that his faith can be shaken at times when democracy appears not to have been so effective. See Ober 1989: 163–165; Id. 1996: 148–149, 156; Roberts 1994: 39–41; Wallace 1998: 215. The importance of interpretation for the assessment of Protagoras’ political views in the dialogue named after him is discussed in Wallach 1994: 333 with n. 25. This study considers Protagoras’ political views as being of secondary importance. Pl. Prt. 320c–332a, esp. 322d–323a; cf. also 323a–327e; see Manuwald 1999: 168–209; Leppin 1999: 42–46; Farrar 1989: 86–87. Ryan Balot (2013: 184–188, esp. 186) argues that “Protagoras’ long presentation is not a significant democratic theory so much as a subtle Platonic critique of democratic ideas”. Pl. Prt. 322d–323a. The influence of Athenian political experience is also revealed by fact that Protagoras presents his myth in response to Socrates’ remark that virtue cannot be taught, which the behaviour of the Athenians in the Assembly exemplifies (Pl. Prt. 319b–d); see Manuwald 1999: 159–161, 173. Thuc. 2.40.2, cf. 2.37.1; 6.39.1; Eur. Supp. 410–412; 433–442; Hdt. 3.80.6; see Gundert 1968: 125–126; Müller 1996: 1–5; Leppin 1999: 88; Winton 2004: 32–34; Harris 2006: 29–39. Thuc. 3.37.3–4. Thuc. 6.39.1; Ober 1989: 163–165; Leppin 1999: 93; Raaflaub 2004: 237–238. Arist. Pol. 1281a40–1281b7; 1282a15–17; 1283b27–35; Isoc. 13.8; Dem. Ex. 44.1, 45; Hyp. 1.14; see Ober 1989: 163–165, 303; Schütrumpf 1991: 496–500, 523, 551; Nebelin 2018: 140–146; Piepenbrink 2018: 256–259. See Ober 1989: 163–170, esp. 163; Pabst 2003: 47–48.

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self-confident statement, the sophist demonstrates that he does not have a high regard of the multitude’s knowledge, which he then also openly says to Socrates.63 It is thus clear that the challenge to the concept of collective wisdom in the Gorgias is also meant to refute the democratic ideal of equality. This establishes yet another connection between Gorgias and Callicles, because, as other authors confirm, the democratic concept of collective wisdom stood in opposition to the superior individual (that is, the tyrant).64 Thus Aristotle, following an older democratic tradition, argues that the demos collectively is superior to the ʽbest manʼ.65 In Euripides’ Suppliants the concept of collective wisdom is cited in the context of refuting tyranny, while in the Anonymus Iamblichi it serves to negate the right of the stronger.66 The rejection of the concept of the demos’ collective wisdom is also significant, because it establishes a connection between Gorgias’ third definition of rhetoric and Socrates’ standpoint, expressed during the discussion with Polus, that the all-powerful tyrant only does whatever seems to him to be best, not what is best (dokein-einai).67 At the beginning of the Constitution of the Athenians Ps.Xenophon states that the main reason for writing the treatise is the criticism that the demos acts ill-advisedly and to its own disadvantage. In his view the rule of the people may not be good for the polis or good absolutely, but it nonetheless perfectly serves the self-interest of the demos. He emphasises that in the deliberation process, the demos’ decision to favour the worst and not the best people is founded and well thought through, because these political leaders, despite their moral failings, act to the advantage of the demos.68 Accordingly to the Old Oligarch, the Athenian demos, in the words of Socrates, does what is best for it, and not what seems best, as many contemporary critics wrongfully assume. The infamous demagogue Cleon certainly falls under Ps.-Xenophon’s category of the worst people.69 This is remarkable insofar as both Thucydides and Aristophanes address the demos’ susceptibility to deception and self-deception in the context of the demagogue – demos relationship and the omnipotence of the Athenian people. The correct or incorrect use of the demos’ almightiness is the unspoken topic of the Mytilenian Debate, since the destruction of a whole polis depends on the decision of the popular Assembly. At the beginning of his speech in the Mytilenian Debate, Cleon notes that the Athenian empire is a tyranny (polis tyrannos), which is why the people have to determine the best decision from this perspective. It is only afterwards that rhetoric becomes the subject of discussion. 63 Pl. Grg. 456b–c, 459a–c. 64 Pl. Grg. 502d–e (The rhetor treats the members of the assembly as children). 65 Arist. Pol. 1286a25–1286b1. Eckhart Schütrumpf (1991: 548, 551–552) observes that the ‘best man’ recalls the wise and genuine king in Plato’ Statesman. 66 Eur. Supp. 410–422, 429–441; Anon. Iambl. DK 89 [82] 6.4; for other parallels see Schütrumpf 1991: 548. 67 Pl. Grg. 466c–467a. 68 Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.1, 4–9; 2.19; 3.1; cf. Ober 1998: 18; Osborne 2004: 13; Marr – Rhodes 2008: 68, 70, 133, 135–136; Flaig 2018: 288; Raaflaub 2018a: 164–169, 171. 69 See Ar. Eq. 180–181, 188–194, 217–220, 336, 733–740, 948–954, 1251–1252; Thuc. 3.37.3–5.

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Cleon claims that ordinary men manage public affairs better than their more gifted compatriots. They are impartial judges of the democratic deliberation process, since they mistrust their own cleverness, are content to be less learned than the laws and less competent than others to criticise the words of an able speaker. At the same time, the infamous demagogue warns that the demos’ predilection for elaborate display of oratory can mislead the masses into reaching a false decision. He denounces his adversaries as over clever public speechmakers that place personal gain over the public good.70 His opponent, Diodotus, strongly criticizes Cleon and complains that his demagoguery is, in reality, corrupting the democratic deliberation process. By arguing solely from the position of expediency, Diodotus convinces the demos to make the best decision: not to destroy Mytilene.71 In Aristophanes’ Knights, Cleon’s demagoguery is again the object of criticism. The competition between the Paphlagon (Cleon) and the sausage-seller illustrates even better that repugnant demagoguery is based on two methods. The first is to intimidate political rivals and denounce them as selfish, dishonest and corrupt. However, this method does not ensure the demagogue the benevolence of the people, its main aim is to prevent others from gaining it.72 The second method is flattery and its purpose is to win the affection of the demos. The flattery consists of two elements. The first is to assure the demos that its interest will be best served by the demagogue. Hence, Cleon claims to have brought tangible benefits to the demos (e.g. pay, food) and for this reason he claims to be a friend and lover of the people.73 The notions philos and erastēs indicate not only loyalty but also identification with the demos.74 Cleons’ achieves this by identifying himself with the power of the Athenian archē. For this reason he is not only a vigorous warmonger, approves the exploitation of the allies and compares himself with Themistocles, but also pledges that the Athenian demos will rule over all Greeks and even the whole world.75 It is striking how openly its omnipotence is accentuated in the play: the demos is monarch of Greece, king of the Greeks and all men tremble before the Athenian people as before a tyrant.76 According to 70 Thuc. 3.37.1–38.7; see Ober 1998: 96–97, 101. 71 Thuc. 3.42–43 (Cleon), 44.2–4 (advantage), 49 (decision to spare Mytilene); see Ober 1998: 98–102. 72 Ar. Eq. 58–72, 255–264, 274–312, 344–374, 391–396, 442–481, 694–713, 823–829, 836– 840, 862–865, 913–918, 1017–1020. 73 Ar. Eq. 45–59, 266–272, 644–682, 715–718, 725–748, 763–805, 871–890, 878–881, 904– 911, 1017–1034, 1100–1119, 1163–1193, 1207–1226, 1340–1343. 74 Ar. Eq. 273, 731–734, 769, 773, 792, 820, 848, 861, 869, 946, 1163–1164, 1199, 1335, 1340– 1343. 75 Ar. Eq. 76, 173, 278–279, 465–467, 475–479, 565–580, 667–673, 702, 743–744, 794–819 (rule over all Greeks / Themistocles), 846, 933, 965–966 (arksai se dei / chōras hapasēs), 985–996, 1005–1008, 1034–1040, 1058–1059, 1086–1089 (pasēs gēs basileueis), 1152– 1159, 1172, 1300–1315 (war against Carthago and the demagogue Hyperbolus), 1319, 1329– 1334; see Kopp 2015. 76 Ar. Eq. 1114 (tyrannos), 1330 (monarchos), 1333 (basileus); cf. Isoc. 7.26 (tyrannos); Aeschin. 3.233 (basileus); Arist. Pol. 1274a7 (tyrannos); Dem. 3.30; 23.209 (despotēs); see Teegarden 2014: 106–109.

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Aristophanes this omnipotence is precisely the reason why the demos is particularly prone to deception and self-deception:77 Χορός:

ὦ Δῆμε καλήν γ᾽ ἔχεις ἀρχήν, ὅτε πάντες ἄνθρωποι δεδίασί σ᾽ ὥσπερ ἄνδρα τύραννον. ἀλλ᾽ εὐπαράγωγος εἶ, θωπευόμενός τε χαίρεις κἀξαπατώμενος, πρὸς τόν τε λέγοντ᾽ ἀεὶ κέχηνας: ὁ νοῦς δέ σου παρὼν ἀποδημεῖ.

Δῆμος:

νοῦς οὐκ ἔνι ταῖς κόμαις ὑμῶν, ὅτε μ᾽ οὐ φρονεῖν νομίζετ᾽: ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἑκὼν ταῦτ᾽ ἠλιθιάζω. αὐτός τε γὰρ ἥδομαι βρύλλων τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν, κλέπτοντά τε βούλομαι τρέφειν ἕνα προστάτην: τοῦτον δ᾽, ὅταν ᾖ πλέως, ἄρας ἐπάταξα.

Chorus:

Demos, your rule is glorious indeed, seeing that all men fear you like a man of autocratic power. But you are easily led astray, you enjoy being flattered and deceived and every orator holds you agape, with your mind present and yet absent!

Demos:

There’s no brains under that long hair of yours, if you think me witless; this imbecility of mine is deliberately put on. For I get personal pleasure out of my daily feed, and also I deliberately fatten up one thief of political leader; and when he is full up, I raise my hand and strike him down.

Since the demos becomes aware only at the end of the play of the true extent of its blindness, these words reveal that a tyrant-like power prevents the Athenian people in political decision-making from seeing that they only do what seems and not 77 Ar. Eq. 1111–1130 (trans. A. H. Sommerstein); see also 750–755, 1130–1150; cf. Schubert 1993: 77–80; Kopp 2015: 38–45.

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what is best for them.78 If one considers that in Knights the demos willingly presides over a contest as to who is better at manipulating it, then it becomes clear that, in Aristophanes view, the Athenian people’s excessive self-confidence in their power makes them particularly vulnerable to demagogic agitation.79 Ps.-Xenophon, Thucydides and Aristophanes show that the idea that the ruler in spite of (or actually due to) his might, has only the illusion of doing what is best for him, is an important element of the discourse on democracy in the twenties of the fifth-century. Thucydides’ Mytilenian Debate and Aristophanes’ Knights indicate that the concept of the dēmos monarchos (polis tyrannos) in combination with Cleon’s demagoguery had a particularly strong impact on the emergence of this view. 1.5. Pericles, Polis Tyrannos and the Patron-Tyrant Concept The enthusiasm with which Gorgias speaks of the orator’s power (archē), while linking his character with Pericles, conveys to the reader in yet another powerful way Plato’s opinion that a close connection exists between the democratic ideology of freedom and Callicles’ idealisation of tyranny.80 The reason is that archē was also the most common term for the Athenian sea empire and, as such, in two ways links Pericles with the term of tyranny. Although significant differences between Pericles and the next generation of politicians (above all Alcibiades) cannot be denied, it would be a major mistake to conclude, on these grounds, that the great statesman had any scruples concerning the expansion of the Athenian archē.81 When Pericles in the Funeral Oration talks of the reasons that will make Athens an object of admiration by contemporaries and future generations, he does not mention the achievements of Athenian democracy or culture, but solely the strength of Athenian archē, which has left imperishable monuments of evil and good. His argumentation leaves no doubt about his conviction that Athens’ hegemony is justified, since it is the fruit of the Athenians’ superior spirit and even the Athenian subjects cannot complain that Athens is not worthy to reign over them:82 78 This occurs some 200 verse later, and, interestingly, at this point the monarchical character of the rule of the people is again emphasised (Ar. Eq. 1329–1355). 79 Ar. Eq. 749–756, 836–840, 1105–1110, 1224–1225; see also 351–352, 395–396, 712–721. 80 It should be noted that Alcibiades, who is associated with Callicles in the dialogue, declares at the very beginning of the Sicilian Debate that he is best suited to take command (archein) (Thuc. 6.16.1). 81 Cf. Bloedow 2000: 295–309. The differences between Alcibiades and Pericles in regard to the foreign policy are underlined by de Romilly 1963: 210–213; Macleod 1983a: 79–82; Rengakos 1984: 109–110; Ober 1994a: 111–113; see also Bloedow 1990: 9; Id. 1991: 212. An excellent survey of the different opinions on Thucydides’ attitude towards Pericles’ foreign policy is given in Nicolai 1996: 264–281. 82 Thuc. 2.41.1–4 (trans. Ch. F. Smith, with minor changes); cf. also 2.36.2–40.5; see Hornblower 1991: 309; Samons 2004: 55–57; Id. 2007: 293. Jacqueline de Romilly (1963: 130–136) points

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II. The Gorgias ‘ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν εἴδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες παρέχεσθαι. καὶ ὡς οὐ λόγων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κόμπος τάδε μᾶλλον ἢ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια, αὐτὴ ἡ δύναμις τῆς πόλεως, ἣν ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν τρόπων ἐκτησάμεθα, σημαίνει. μόνη γὰρ τῶν νῦν ἀκοῆς κρείσσων ἐς πεῖραν ἔρχεται, καὶ μόνη οὔτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει ὑφ᾽ οἵων κακοπαθεῖ οὔτε τῷ ὑπηκόῳ κατάμεμψιν ὡς οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἀξίων ἄρχεται. μετὰ μεγάλων δὲ σημείων καὶ οὐ δή τοι ἀμάρτυρόν γε τὴν δύναμιν παρασχόμενοι τοῖς τε νῦν καὶ τοῖς ἔπειτα θαυμασθησόμεθα, καὶ οὐδὲν προσδεόμενοι οὔτε Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτου οὔτε ὅστις ἔπεσι μὲν τὸ αὐτίκα τέρψει, τῶν δ᾽ ἔργων τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἡ ἀλήθεια βλάψει, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβατὸν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τόλμῃ καταναγκάσαντες γενέσθαι, πανταχοῦ δὲ μνημεῖα κακῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἀίδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες. In a word, the I say that our city as a whole is the school of Hellas, and that, as it seems to me, with the utmost grace and versatility, prove him self-sufficient in the most varied forms of activity. And that this is no mere boast inspired by the occasion, but actual truth, is attested by the very power of our city, a power which we have acquired in consequence of these qualities. For Athens alone among her contemporaries, when put to the test, is superior to the report of her, and she alone neither affords to the enemy who comes against her cause for irritation at the character of the foe by whom he is defeated, nor to her subject cause for complaint that his masters are unworthy. Many are the proofs which we have given of our power and assuredly it does not lack witnesses, and therefore we shall be the wonder not only of the men today but of after times; we shall need no Homer to sing our praise nor any other poet whose verses may perhaps delight for the moment but whose presentation of the facts will be discredited by the truth. Nay, we have compelled every sea and every land to grant access to our daring, and have everywhere planted everlasting memorials both of evil and of good.

Even more important, however, is that, in his last speech, Pericles openly calls the Athenian archē a tyranny:83 [...] ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχῆς στερήσεως καὶ κινδύνου ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἀπήχθεσθε. ἧς οὐδ᾽ ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, ·[...] ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον [...] γνῶτε δὲ ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν ἐν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὸ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἴκειν, πλεῖστα δὲ σώματα καὶ πόνους ἀνηλωκέναι πολέμῳ, καὶ δύναμιν μεγίστην δὴ μέχρι τοῦδε κεκτημένην, ἧς ἐς ἀΐδιον τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις, ἢν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδῶμέν ποτε (πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι), μνήμη καταλελείψεται, Ἑλλήνων τε ὅτι Ἕλληνες πλείστων δὴ ἤρξαμεν, καὶ πολέμοις μεγίστοις ἀντέσχομεν πρός τε ξύμπαντας καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους, πόλιν τε τοῖς πᾶσιν εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην ᾠκήσαμεν. [...] on the contrary, loss of empire is also involved and danger from the hatred incurred in your sway. From this empire, however, it is too late for you even to withdraw, [...] for by this time the empire you hold is a tyranny, which it may seem wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is dangerous to let go. [...] And realize that Athens has a mighty name among all mankind because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but more freely than any other city has lavished lives and labours upon war, and that she possesses to-day a power which is the greatest that ever existed down to our time. The memory of this greatness will be left to posterity forever, how that we of all Hellenes held sway over the greatest number of Hellenes, in the greatest wars held out against our foes whether united or single, and inhabited a city that was the richest in all things and the greatest. out that Pericles’ attitude corresponds to the convictions of his contemporaries. In this respect too, the admiration Polus and Callicles feel for archē, i.e. tyranny, is significant. 83 Thuc. 2.63.2–64.3. (trans. Ch. F. Smith).

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That this is not an accidental association becomes apparent when we consider that during the late 450s and early 440s – during the very time when Pericles was the leading politician in his polis – a metaphor introduced for Athens was polis tyrannos.84 The appearance of this term shows that for Pericles and his contemporaries it was quite natural to transfer the term of tyranny from an individual level to that of a polis’ foreign policy.85 The question arises whether an opposite process could have also taken place. The answer is affirmative.86 Pericles and Alcibiades prove this, since one of the reasons why they were accused of tending towards tyranny was their foreign policy.87 Pericles, not Alcibiades, was the first Athenian democratic politician to have been accused of striving towards tyrannical rule.88 Since he had, as no democratic leader before or after him, dominated the political life of his city, opponents attacked him of, by relying on the peoples’ support, striving towards tyranny and compared him to Pisistratus.89 Echoes of these attacks can be heard even in Herodotus.90 However, the cause for these attacks was not only Pericles’ domestic policy, but also his uncompromising policy of strengthening the Athenian archē.91 This could explain why accusations against Pericles appeared soon after the emergence of the metaphor polis tyrannos. The accusation that Pericles strove towards autocracy helps us understand why Plato, through the character of Gorgias, aimed at connecting the statesman with Callicles. Conversely, there are strong indications that one of the motives prompting Herodotus to develop the concept of a patron-tyrant (to be discussed below) was to defend Pericles from that very accusation.92 With this concept, Herodotus wanted to show that the emergence of a demagogue-tyrant was in-

84 Thuc. 1.122.3, 124.3; 2.63.2; 3.37.2; 6.85.1; Ar. Eq. 1111–1114, see also 1329–1330, 1333. For dating of the polis tyrannos metaphor see Raaflaub 1979: 245, 251; Id. 1984: 69–78; Id. 2004: 133–134; Brock 2013: 124. For the identification of the Athenian archē with tyranny see also Schuller 1978: 10–12; Barceló 1990: 416, 419–424. 85 See Raaflaub 1979: 243–245. Euphemus speech in Camarina is particularly revealing in this respect (Thuc. 6.85.1). 86 See Raaflaub 2002: 11–40; Jordović 2005: 136, 163–164. 87 Jordović 2005: 136, 155–165, esp. 158–164; Forde 1989: 168–170; see also Bloedow 1991: 212–215; Leppin 1999: 157 n. 5. This was certainly not the only factor, see Jordović 2005: 131–168. 88 See Ehrenberg 1956: 106; Jordović 2005: 135–139; Lehmann 2008: 33–34, 163; Heftner 2011: 34–36. 89 Plut. Per. 16.1–2; Telecl. fr. 45 K.-A.; Cratin fr. 73, 114, 118, 171, 258 K.-A.; cf. Connor 1971: 205; Schwarze 1971: 40-45, 59–61, 171–172, 185–186; Klein 1979: 503–507; Podlecki 1998: 175–176; Jordović 2005: 135–136; McGlew 2006, 164–173. 90 Pericles is compared to a lion (Hdt. 6.131.2); tyrant – lion analogy (Hdt. 5.56.1, 92.β3); see Schubert 1994: 7–8; Spahn 2000, 25; Jordović 2005: 135; Scott 2005: 29–30, 430–431. 91 Plut. Per. 12, 16.1–2; Telecl. fr. 45 K.-A.; cf. Schwarze 1971: 96–99; Klein 1979: 503–504; Hölkeskamp 1998: 2–3; Schubert 2003: 118–119; Jordović 2005: 136. 92 See Jordović 2010: 10; cf. also Nippel 2017: 250.

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conceivable in fifth-century Athenian democracy – the very opposite of Plato’s intention.93 Modern studies assume that Plato was the first to formulate explicitly the concept of a power-loving demagogue who establishes autocracy, and that this Platonic concept exerted powerful influence on other ancient authors.94 A further assumption claims that it was mainly the rise of Dionysius I that stimulated the development of this concept.95 However, justified suspicions were long raised concerning the historical foundations of this concept,96 and recent analyses of the sources have shown that its roots are older and that, in this respect, Herodotus’ influence on Plato was crucial.97 Even a cursory comparison of Herodotus’ Constitutional Debate and relevant passages in Plato reveals very important parallels.98 In particular, after Otanes has presented the traditionally negative view of tyrannical rule, Darius takes a diametrically opposite standpoint, claiming that monarchy emerges from democracy, since when the people rule the ʽbadʼ predominate, joining together and harming the community. Their destructive activities are stopped only by a leader of the people (prostas tis tou dēmou) who therefore is glorified by the multitude and in the end elected as their monarch:99 δήμου τε αὖ ἄρχοντος ἀδύνατα μὴ οὐ κακότητα ἐγγίνεσθαι· κακότητος τοίνυν ἐγγινομένης ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἔχθεα μὲν οὐκ ἐγγίνεται τοῖσι κακοῖσι, φιλίαι δὲ ἰσχυραί· οἱ γὰρ κακοῦντες τὰ κοινὰ συγκύψαντες ποιεῦσι. τοῦτο δὲ τοιοῦτο γίνεται ἐς ὃ ἂν προστάς τις τοῦ δήμου τοὺς τοιούτους παύσῃ· ἐκ δὲ αὐτῶν θωμάζεται οὗτος δὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, θωμαζόμενος δὲ ἀν᾽ ὦν ἐφάνη μούναρχος [ἐών]· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ δηλοῖ καὶ οὗτος ὡς ἡ μουναρχίη κράτιστον. ἑνὶ δὲ ἔπεϊ πάντα συλλαβόντα εἰπεῖν, κόθεν ἡμῖν ἡ ἐλευθερίη ἐγένετο καὶ τεῦ δόντος; κότερα παρὰ [τοῦ] δήμου ἢ ὀλιγαρχίης ἢ μουνάρχου; ἔχω τοίνυν γνώμην ἡμέας ἐλευθερωθέντας διὰ ἕνα ἄνδρα τὸ τοιοῦτο περιστέλλειν, χωρίς τε τούτου πατρίους νόμους μὴ λύειν ἔχοντας εὖ· οὐ γὰρ ἄμεινον. Then again, when the people rule it is impossible that wickedness will not occur; and when wickedness towards the state occurs, hatred does not result among the wicked, but strong alliances; for those that want to do the state harm conspire to do it together. This goes on until 93 See Jordović, 2010: 10; cf. also Wüst 1935: 55; Bringmann 1976: 274; contra: Stroheker 1953/1954: 389–390. 94 Pl. Rep. 565e–566a, 566e, 568c–d; Arist. Pol. 1305a 7–27, 1310b 11–16, 29–31, 1315a 31–41. 95 Arist. Pol. 1305a22–28, 1310b 29–31.; see Stroheker 1958: 4; Heuss 1971: 29, 33–38; Lintott 1982: 185–186, 240, 246, 249; Gehrke 1985a: 150; Schütrumpf – Gehrke 1996: 487; Monoson 2000: 126; Schofield 2006: 103, 119–120; cf. also Adam 1902: 257–261; Berve 1967: 353; v. Ungern-Sternberg 1987: 1145–1146, 1151. 96 Cf. Spahn 1977: 79–83; Stahl 1987: 60–73, 105, 134–135; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989: 141–153; Barceló 1993: 84; Heuss 1971: 20; Schütrumpf – Gehrke 1996: 487, 549; de Libero 1996: 393–394, 400–402; see also Nippel 1980: 120–121; Gehrke 1985: 309–339, 352; v. Wees 2002: 76–77, 81. In this connection it is interesting to note that Dionysios I did not seize power by exploiting social animosities; see Jordović 2005: 255–262; contra Stroheker 1958: 37, 39–43, 53, 150–153, Frolov 1973: 90–91, 96–98, 106; Lintott 1982: 199–200, 260–261; Sanders 1987: 133–134; Berger 1992: 41–43, 57–58, 64; Sordi 1992: 20. 97 See Jordović 2010: 1–15; Ryffel 1949: 57–58, 66–68, 90. 98 See Stroheker 1953/1954: 385; Jordović 2010: 2–3. As for the Constitutional debate see Ryffel 1949: 63–72; Bringmann 1976: 266–279; Bleicken 1979: 148–172; Alonso–Núñez 1998: 19–29. 99 Hdt. 3.82.4–5 (trans. A. D. Godley).

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one of the people rises to stop such men. He therefore becomes the people’s idol, and being their idol is made their monarch; and thus he also proves that monarchy is best. But (to conclude the whole matter in one word) tell me, where did freedom come from for us and who gave it, from the people or an oligarchy or a single ruler? I believe, therefore, that we who were liberated through one man should maintain such a government, and, besides this, that we should not alter our ancestral ways that are good; that would not be better.

It follows unequivocally from Darius’ presentation that this ‘leader of the people’ cannot be one of the ʽbadʼ ones, since he is the very person who stands up to them, protecting the rest. His rise to power thus results from his engagement for the common good. Hence Darius does not contradict himself when he later claims that a monarch takes the best care of the people, apart from the fact that it is a monarch who has brought freedom to the Persians. This recalls Gorgias’ claim that oratory conveys power to the individual and freedom to the people.100 Behind Darius’, or rather Herodotus’, theory of the patron-tyrant stands a thought process that is almost identical with that underlying Plato’s concept of the demagogue-tyrant in the Republic; the main difference is simply that in Herodotus this concept develops in reverse order. To Plato, the demagogue (that is, the champion of the people) is the most corrupt individual in the polis. Purely out of selfish reasons, he incites the demos against the elite (that is, the good ones) but, once he comes to power, he turns against the people and ends the unlimited freedom that has ruled so far.101 If we also take into consideration that Herodotus was mostly inclined for democracy and Plato against it, it is difficult to resist the impression that in this case, as in many others, Plato takes an idea from the democrats to turn it against them. The concept of the patron who becomes a tyrant is thus turned into the concept of the demagogue who becomes a tyrant, and in both cases this is linked to Pericles.102 In doing so Plato drew amply on Thucydides’ and Aristophanes’ critique of the post-Periclean demagogues, in particular the infamous Cleon.103 1.6. Athenian Archē Other, even more obvious, connections between the opinions of Gorgias and the expansionism of the Athenian archē show that, by mentioning the archē in the first part of the Gorgias, Plato aims at making democratic ideology responsible for the emergence of unscrupulous individuals like Callicles. These connections also highlight Plato’s moral approach to judging aspects of Realpolitik. In the third part of the dialogue, Socrates criticises Pericles for being the first to have introduced pay for jurors and so corrupting the Athenians, making them lazy, cowardly, talkative, and greedy.104 It is this objection that usually attracts most 100 101 102 103 104

Hdt. 3.82.5; Pl. Grg. 452d. Pl. Rep. 565e–566a, 566e, 568c–d; cf. Jordović 2010: 3. Jordović 2010: 3. See chapter III.1.7. Tyrannical man, the Demagogue and the Populist. Pl. Grg. 515e.

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attention. All things considered, however, Pericles’ support of the demos’ increased political participation was not Plato’s greatest objection to his policy – as is suggested by Callicles’ reply to Socrates that such objections are often heard from people with ʽcauliflower earsʼ, that is, oligarchs. It is not likely that Plato, in whose works the apology of Socrates is so pervasive, would have permitted himself such a sharp reproof of his teacher.105 Correspondingly, Socrates himself offers no such criticism elsewhere in the Gorgias, and we understand why Plato never mentions Ephialtes who initiated important political reforms for the benefit of the demos but was not linked to the rise of the Athenian archē.106 On the other hand, the Gorgias contains evident allusions to the archē.107 In his conversation with Callicles, Socrates mentions Pericles, Themistocles, Cimon and Miltiades, primarily because, in the memory of their fellow citizens, they are inseparably connected with the rise of their polis:108 καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζῃ· ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἳ τούτους εἱστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν. καί φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν δι᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως συναιτίων. And what you’re doing now, Callicles, is just like this. You’re eulogizing people who feasted the Athenians, indulging them with what they had an appetite for. It’s said that they made the city great; but that it’s swelling and festering because of these earlier people – no one notices this. For without justice and temperance they have left the city full of harbours and dockyards and walls and tribute and that sort of rubbish. And so when that crisis of the disease comes, they’ll hold responsible the advisers who were there at the time, and eulogize Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, the ones responsible for the evils. And perhaps they’ll seize on you, if you’re not careful, and on my companion Alcibiades, when they lose both their more recent gains and what they had before, though you aren’t wholly responsible for the evils, but perhaps partly responsible.

The phrase ‘made great’, emphasized by Socrates, in essence echoes the conception of the ‘greatness of Athens’, which in Thucydides appears in connection with the Athenian archē in several notable places:109 105 This seems all the more true as Socrates was put on trial because of his “oligarchical connections”; see Jordović 2008: 14, 23–26. 106 See Rood 2004: 231. 107 See Yunis 1996: 140–150. 108 Pl. Grg. 518e–519a (trans. T. Irwin); see also 480b; Thuc. 8.64.5. Although Miltiades (515c– d, 516d) was not a democrat in the same way as Pericles since Athens was still not a fullyfledged democracy in his day, the victory at Marathon was, in view of the democrats, the finest hour of the Athenian democracy – as evidenced by Aristophanes’ comedies. 109 Thuc. 2.36.1–4 (trans. Ch. F. Smith ) cf. also 1.23.6, 93.3–4, 143.5; 2.15.2, 36, 38.2, 41.4, 43.1, 62.1, 64.3; 5.111.4; 6.89.6; 7.77.7; esp. 2.36, 38.2, 64.3; Lys. 2.63; Ar. Eq. 813–818; Pl. Grg. 469e; see Gaiser 1975: 29; Rusten 1989: 205; Foster 2010: 200–201; Hornblower 1991: 298, 339; Yunis 1996: 142–143; Diller 1968: 654.

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‘ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων πρῶτον· […] μέχρι τοῦδε ἐλευθέραν δι᾽ ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαν. καὶ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν: κτησάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξαντο ὅσην ἔχομεν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπόνως ἡμῖν τοῖς νῦν προσκατέλιπον. τὰ δὲ πλείω αὐτῆς αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς οἵδε οἱ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες μάλιστα ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ ἐπηυξήσαμεν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πᾶσι παρεσκευάσαμεν καὶ ἐς πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην αὐταρκεστάτην. ὧν ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν κατὰ πολέμους ἔργα, οἷς ἕκαστα ἐκτήθη, ἢ εἴ τι αὐτοὶ ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν βάρβαρον ἢ Ἕλληνα πολέμιον ἐπιόντα προθύμως ἠμυνάμεθα, μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω· ἀπὸ δὲ οἵας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰ καὶ μεθ᾽ οἵας πολιτείας καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἵων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, […]. I shall speak first of our ancestors, […] they by their valour transmitted to our times a free state. And not only are they worthy of our praise, but our fathers still more; for they, adding to the inheritance which they received, acquired the empire we now posses and bequeathed it, not without toil, to us who are alive today. And we ourselves here assembled, who are now for the most part still in the prime of life, have further strengthened the empire in most respects, and have provided our city with all resources, so that it is sufficient for itself both in peace and war. The military exploits whereby our several possessions were acquired, whether in any case it were we ourselves or our fathers that valiantly repelled the onset of war, Barbarian or Hellenic, I will not recall, for I have no desire to speak at length among those who know. But I shall first set forth by what sort of training we have come to our present position, and with what political institutions and as the result of what manner of life our empire became great; […].

These words of Pericles from the Funeral Oration reveal that in Athens eleutheria and archē were seen as a transgenerational achievement. In addition, Athens’ greatness cannot be attributed entirely to the (democratic) political institutions but also to the (democratic) way of life. In his praise of Pericles as a statesman, Thucydides says that it was under his leadership that Athens reached the peak of its greatness.110 Pericles successfully restrained the Athenian masses, drafting and skilfully implementing a cautious war strategy which stood a good chance of success. Only during the time of his egotistical and unscrupulous successors did the multitude become unruly, and an aggressive war policy prevailed that was to lead to the downfall of Athens.111 Interestingly, Thucydides lets Alcibiades in Sparta say that his family – which in all likelihood refers not only to himself but especially to Pericles as well – had been intent on suppressing the predominant akolasia,112 while maintaining the utmost greatness and freedom achieved by 110 Thuc. 2.65.5; cf. Gaiser 1975: 30. At the beginning of his account of the Pentekontaetia, Thucydides uses a phrase which differs in form but has a similar meaning (1.89.1); cf. HCT I: 256; Hornblower 1991: 134. The phrase about Athenian statesmen (that is, good citizens) raising Athens to its greatness is also found in other sources: Lys. 25.32; 28.14; Ps.-Andoc. 4.1; see also Isoc. 7.62, 64; cf. Raaflaub 1984: 67. 111 Thuc. 2.65. Thucydides refers to the Sicilian expedition and, in doing so, to Alcibiades, whom Plato relates to Callicles. 112 This is suggested by Alcibiades’ mention of his family’s moderation (metrios) in politics, while Thucydides in his obituary praises Pericles for restraining the demos towards moderation (Thuc. 2.65.5; 6.89.5); see Leppin 1999: 152, 166, 206–207; Hornblower 2008: 513. The Old Oligarch also criticizes the licence of the people and points out that the ‘good’ are least affected by it (Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.5, 10); cf. Gray 2007: 49–51, 190. Fritz Taeger (1925: 182–187) finds that the polemic of the Old Oligarch is mainly directed against Pericles’ Funeral Oration (Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.1–3, 9–10, 14–15, 2.2–7). Isocrates claims that the

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Athens (megistē polis kai eleutherōtatē).113 Thucydides’ influence on the Platonic Socrates’ condemnation of Athenian policy is particularly striking because he represented a standpoint that was diametrically opposed to Socrates’.114 Besides, Callicles, whom Socrates links with Alcibiades, de facto shares Thucydides’ judgment by saying that the famous statesmen were good for Athens, while he has nothing good to say about the generation of politicians that followed Pericles.115 Finally, Socrates warns Callicles that he and Alcibiades will be punished by the people, if and when Athens fails, while the real culprits (Pericles, Themistocles, and Cimon) will be applauded.116 Socrates’ contestation of the benefits of the rise of Athenian archē in the third part of the dialogue has its counterpoint in Gorgias’ third argument in favour of the power of rhetoric – the Long Walls, shipyards and docks of Athens were built due to the rhetorical skills of Themistocles and Pericles.117 These were far more than mere construction projects – they were the foundations and symbols of the power of the Athenian archē. Otherwise, it would be difficult to understand how Socrates could have considered them as a cause of the demos’ licence.118 It is hardly surprising that Plato is only following in the footsteps of Thucydides, Herodotus, Aristophanes and Pseudo-Xenophon. Thucydides describes in detail how after the Persian Wars, thanks to Themistocles’ cunning, the Athenian walls were rebuilt; moreover, he had given the advice to secure and fortify the Piraeus.119 It clearly follows from this report that, in Thucydides’ view, it was Themistocles who was mainly responsible for Athens’ strategic focus on its fleet, thus setting the foundations of Athenian archē.120 Herodotus records the famous

113 114

115 116 117 118 119 120

democratic constitution trains its citizens to mistake insolence (akolasia) for democracy (Isoc. 7.20). Thuc. 6.89.4–6; see also 7.69.2. Pl. Grg. 515e–516e, 517b, 519a–b; Thuc. 2.65.6–13; cf. Yunis 1996: 136–152, esp. 136, 141– 145; Ober 1998: 210; Schofield 2006: 71. Thucydides indeed speaks of moderation and restraint, and not about prudence and righteousness, but the meaning is nonetheless the same since Socrates criticizes the earlier statesmen, i.e. Pericles, for making the demos licentious instead restraining it; cf. Leppin 1999: 206–207. Pl. Grg. 503b–d, 515d–516d, 517a. Pl. Grg. 519a–b; cf. Yunis 1996: 34, 136, 142–145; Ober 1998: 210. Pl. Grg. 455d–e. Pl. Grg. 516a, 517b–c, 519a. Thuc. 1.89–94. Themistocles even advised to the Athenians, if they were hard pressed on land, to go down to the Piraeus, and resist all their opponents with their fleet (Thuc. 1.93.7– 8); see Foster 2010: 104. Thuc. 1.89.1, 93.3–4, 7–8; 2.13.2, 7; cf. 1.69.1, 107.1, 4; Ar. Eq. 813–818; see Rood 2004: 227 n. 7, 232; Hornblower 1991: 137, 140, 167, 170–171; Kallet-Marx 1993: 39; Foster 2010: 103–104. A particularly illustrative comment on the importance of the long walls was made by Victor Hanson (2005: 26): “The Long Walls, built between 461 and 456, and connecting the city to the Piraeus were the most revolutionary development in the history of Greek strategy. At a single stroke the fortifications provided immunity from the age-old tactic of attacking agriculture to prompt pitched battle or induce starvation through the burning of dry grain crop. With the Long Walls, Pericles had vastly expanded on Themistocles’ earlier achievement.”

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story of the ‘wooden wall oracle’ on the eve of Xerxes’ invasion. The Athenians interpreted the ʽwooden wallsʼ to mean their battleships for which Themistocles deserved the greatest credit and which were to have a decisive impact on the outcome of the war.121 Aristophanes’ comedy the Knights is also indicative in this respect, mentioning the build-up of the Piraeus and linking it to the demos’ dominion over the seas and bodily pleasures.122 The understanding that giving priority to sea power (thalassocracy) was one of the pillars of the rule of the people developed relatively early, as Ps.-Xenophon confirms.123 The importance he attaches to this connection becomes apparent when, despite his hostility and contempt for the masses, he explains at the very beginning of his work that the demos’ role in running the fleet seems to justify their political empowerment.124 According to Ps.-Xenophon, the only weak point of such focus on sea power is that Athens is not an island. This disadvantage is set off by the demos’ ability to abandon the unprotected countryside to the mercy of the enemy and withdraw into Athens and the Piraeus, a tactic that had become possible by the building of the city’s fortifications.125 The notion of Athens as an island appears in Pericles’ first speech in Thucydides in the context that enemy attacks could not actually harm Athens in any way.126 In his last oration, Pericles 121 Hdt. 7.141–144; see also Ar. Eq. 1036–1040; cf. Blösel 2004: 64–107, esp. 64–67, 73–74, 79–80, 98–107; cp. also Erbse 1992: 106–112. Themistocles identifies the polis with the fleet in one more passage in Herodotus – when during the council on the eve of the battle of Salamis the Corinthians question Themistocles’ right to take part in the discussions since he has no polis (apolis: Hdt. 8.61); cf. L. Kallet 2001: 162 n. 40; Blösel 2004: 193 (see also Aesch. Pers. 348–349; Soph. OT. 56–57; Thuc. 7.77.7; Pl. Leg. 778d; Isoc. 3.13; Lycurg. Leoc. 47; Dem. 18. 299). 122 Socrates’ denouncement of the elder statesmen in the discussion with Callicles bears strong resemblance to these lines in Aristophanes. This is all the more interesting because Aristophanes mocks the notorious demagogue Cleon for his desire to match Themistocles (Ar. Eq. 810–819; 884–886; Pl. Grg. 518c–519a); cf. Neil 1909: 118–119; contra Sommerstein 1981, 187. 123 Cf. Frisch 1942: 63–87; Raaflaub 2007: 121–136. Thucydides confirms it, when he says that as late as 457 some Athenians secretly invited the Lacedaemonians in the hope of putting an end not only to democracy but also to the building of the Long Walls (Thuc. 1.107.1, 4); see HCT I: 314; Hornblower 1991: 170–171; cf. Xen Hell. 2.2.20 see also 2.2.11–15, 4.8.9–10. 124 Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.2; see Hermann-Otto 1997: 136. The Old Oligarch calls the multitude ‘madmen’ (mainomenoi) (Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.9); cf. Kalinka 1913: 120; Marr –Rhodes 2008: 73. For other expressions used to refer to the demos see Leppin 1999: 35. 125 Xen. Ath. Pol. 2.14–16; cf. Hermann-Otto 1997: 138. Pericles’ strategy of surrendering the countryside to the enemy was a subject of discussion and criticism in the fourth-century; see Ober 1985: 51–66, 82–84, 192. For more details on Pericles’ strategy, see Rood 2004: 140; Hanson 2005: 20, 29–30, 42–43, 45–48. The devastations did not have a catastrophic effect on Athenian agriculture; see Hanson 1983: 109–126, 145–151. The negative effects on Attica of the Athenian decision to avoid land warfare are discussed in Hanson 2005: 45–48, 61. Pericles’ strategy was partially anticipated by Themistocles when the Athenians decided to evacuate their polis and put their hopes in the fleet during the war against Xerxes, see Hanson 2005: 25–26. 126 Thuc. 1.142.2–3, 143.4–5, cf. 1.81, 93.6–7; 2.13.2; see Bayer 1968: 186, 203; Hornblower 1991: 230; Foster 2010: 147–149, 164, 180, 189; Taylor 2010: 42–46.

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even points out that the devastation of Attica as a consequence of the strategy of treating Athens as though it were an island cannot be compared to the value of the power (dynamis) conferred by the Athenian archē.127 1.7. Absolute Sovereignty and Absolute Self-Sufficiency That Gorgias and Thucydides mention the construction of the Long Walls, docks, and shipyards is significant not only because these edifices represented the material foundations of the Athenian archē but also because they stimulated the development of the democratic ideology.128 As shown by Kurt Raaflaub, the reliance on fortifications and the priority attributed to the fleet prompted ideas of absolute sovereignty and absolute self-sufficiency, two of the three elements of the Athenian concept of absolute freedom.129 This concept was developed by 431, at the latest; according to Plato, it bore the main responsibility for the emergence of tyrannical man and the concept of might is right, as will be shown in Socrates’ conversations with Polus and Callicles.130 As Thucydides reveals, the reconstruction of the city walls, the building of the Long Walls, and the construction of the fortified Piraeus harbour imprinted themselves deeply on the Athenian consciousness, greatly facilitating the development of a concept of absolute sovereignty.131 This idea interprets any kind of compliance as weakness and submission,132 it is therefore potentially aggressive, and will usually not tolerate a passive or neutral stance, as exemplified in the Melian Dialogue that advocates might is right.133 In Thucydides’ Funeral Oration, Pericles directly links Athens’ self-sufficiency with the expansion of its power during the time of their fathers’ generation.134 Yet Pericles does not interpret self-sufficiency in quite the customary way.135 The idea 127 Thuc. 2.62.2–3; see Foster 2010: 189. 128 See Raaflaub 2004: 181–182. 129 See Raaflaub 1984: 56–59; Id. 2004: 181–187. It is possible that Plato again had Thucydides in mind since he attaches considerable significance to the building of the Long Walls at the time of Themistocles. 130 Thuc. 3.45.6, 6.89.6, 7.69.2; Hdt. 1.210; see Raaflaub 1984: 56–57; Id. 2004: 187–188. 131 See Raaflaub 2004: 182; cf. also Foster 2010: 100–101. This can be inferred from Themistocles’ statement in Sparta, publicly admitting that the walls have been completed, and informing the Lacedaemonians that in the future they will have to deal with a people fully aware of the difference between their own and general interests (Thuc. 1.69.1, 91.4–5, 7), see Rood 2004: 227 n. 7. For the significance of wall-building in Thucydides’ work, see also Tsakmakis 1995: 73–76, 151–155. It cannot be excluded that the city fortifications and Long Walls were mentioned in the Gorgias because they had been rebuilt a few years before Plato wrote this dialogue. Like many Athenians, Plato interpreted this as a return to the old imperialist policies. 132 Thuc. 1.140.5–141.1, 2.60.1, 6.86.1–3; Eur. Heracl. 61–62, 191–201, 243–245, 284–287, 954–957: see Raaflaub 2004: 181–184, esp. 183–184. 133 Thuc. 5.95–99; Raaflaub 1984: 58, 82 n. 47; Id. 2004: 184. 134 Thuc. 2.36.1, 3, 38.2, 41.4. In the Funeral Oration archē, greatness, and freedom are mentioned next to self-sufficiency; cf. Gaiser 1975: 32–33; Raaflaub 1984: 59–60. 135 See Widmann 1967: 27–28; Foster 2010: 203–205.

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of autarkeia appears for the first time in Herodotus’ Lydian logos, in a conversation between Solon and Croesus. The Athenian lawmaker explains to the Asian king that there is no such thing as complete self-sufficiency and that it is but a calm acceptance of inevitable restrictions and dependencies in life.136 Even though Pericles’ understanding of autarkeia echoes Solon’s view, it departs from it in that it interprets self-sufficiency more broadly as the ability to obtain through the power of the polis all the products of the world:137 ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν μηδὲν οἰκειοτέρᾳ τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. And our city is so great that all the products of all the earth flow upon us, and ours is the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our own soil with no more home-felt security of enjoyment than we do those of other lands.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Pericles says that Athens is perfectly selfsufficient (autarkestatē) both in peace and war. The absolute self-sufficiency presupposes the active use of power based on control of the sea.138 This notion of an active and indirect autarkeia can also be recognized in the Old Oligarch, just before he compares Athens with an island – although he does not explicitly mention self-sufficiency as such.139 The significance of the concept of autarkeia for the dialogue of the Gorgias is not limited to its connection with the edifices mentioned above. Even more importantly, Pericles in the Funeral Oration claims the concept for Athens which he says is the school of all of Hellas, and again when he insists that each individual Athenian is absolutely sufficient (sōma autarkēs) unto himself.140 Conspicuously, Pericles at the same time exalts the dynamis and greatness (meta megalōn) of the Athenian archē. He emphasizes that even Athens’ subjects do not object to their masters on the grounds that they are not worthy. He also declares that the Athenians have raised everlasting monuments of good and evil through their daring conquests which will make them the objects of admiration by their contemporaries and later generations. Such reduction of autarkeia to the individual level, coupled with the open glorification of power (to put it mildly), reveals significant correspondences with the views expressed by Callicles. Plato, it is true, does not use expressis verbis the term autarkeia in connection with this protagonist of the right of the stronger, but he does use the term self-

136 Hdt. 1.32.8–9; cf. Gigon 1976: 101. 137 Thuc. 2.38.2 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); see Widmann 1967: 27–28; Gaiser 1975: 33; Scanlon 1994: 143–176, esp.143 n. 1, 146, 156. 138 Thuc. 2.36.3; cf. 2.41.1, 1.81.2; see Widmann 1967: 28; Gaiser 1975: 33–34; Raaflaub 1984: 59–60; Hornblower 1991: 126, 303. 139 Xen. Ath. Pol. 2.2–3, 7, 11–12; cf. Isoc. 4.42; Hermipp. fr. 63 (PCG); Ar. Vesp. 517–520; Arist. Ath. Pol. 23.3–4; 24; see de Romilly 1963: 117; Widmann 1967: 28; Gaiser 1975: 34, 87–88; Raaflaub 1984: 59–60, 82. 140 Thuc. 2.41.1–4; see Kakridis 1961: 63.

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mastery (enkrateia).141 This notion, as Xenophon attests in Memorabilia, was directly linked to the ideal of self-sufficiency.142 This also applies to Plato, since Socrates, who advocates self-mastery, believes that those people are happy who do not need anything.143 This allows the conclusion that Plato saw a connection between Pericles and Callicles. Pericles’ understanding of autarkeia as the ability, based on the thalassocracy, actively to acquire all the products of the world in essence negates the traditional ideal of self-sufficiency. Since Callicles rejects the ideal of enkrateia, believing it best to be able to satisfy all one’s wishes although they constantly appear anew, we may thus be justified to define him, in Periclean terms, as absolutely self-sufficient; at least, it seems, Plato wants the reader of his Gorgias to see it that way:144 Σ. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν καὶ τῷ μὲν ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἴνου, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἑκάστου τούτων εἴη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ᾽ ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ᾽ ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ᾽ ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δ᾽ ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας· ἆρα τοιούτου ἑκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω; Κ. οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ᾽ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρεῖν. S. See now if you’re saying something like this about the life of each of the two men, the temperate and the intemperate: – Suppose for instance that each of two men has lot of jars, and one has sound and full jars, one full of wine, another of honey, another of milk, and many other full of many things. And suppose the sources for each of these things are scarce and hard to find, provided only with much severe effort. Now when one man has filled up, he brings in no more, and doesn’t care about them, but is at rest as far as they are concerned. The other man has sources like the first man’s that can be drawn on, though with difficulty. But his vessels are leaky and rotten, and he is forced to be always filling them day and night, or else he suffers the most extreme distresses. Now if this is how each man’s life is, do you say that the intemperate man’s life is happier than the orderly man’s? When I tell you this, do I persuade you at all to concede that the orderly life is better than the intemperate, or don’t I persuade you? C. No, you don’t, Socrates. For that one who is filled up has no pleasure at all anymore. It’s 141 Pl. Grg. 491d–e; cf. Rep. 368b–c, 430e–431b; cp. Rowe 2007c: 36–40. Louis-André Dorion (2007: 127–135) underlines that Socrates associates enkrateia with self-government (heautou archein). 142 Xen. Mem. 1.2.1, 14; 1.6.1–10; cf. Gigon 1953: 25, 27; Dodds 1959: 299; Widmann 1967: 31; Warnach 1971: 686; Irwin 1979: 194; Raaflaub 2004: 185; Dalfen 2004: 361, 366–367. Xenophon’s remark that Socrates’ life was self-sufficient (autarkestata zōnta) and free of all desires (enkratestaton), as opposed to Alcibiades and Critias who, he claims, were the most honourable of the Athenians is of particular interest (Mem. 1.2.14); see Gigon 1953: 41. 143 Pl. Grg. 492e. For an instance of the use of these words to describe the notion of selfsufficiency, see Dodds 1959: 299; Irwin 1979: 194; Dalfen 2004: 366–367. 144 Pl. Grg. 493d–494a (trans. T. Irwin); cf. 491d–494c, esp. 491d, 492e, 494b–c; Rep. 560e–562a.

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what I was saying just now – living like a stone once he has filled up, with no more enjoyment or distress. No; living pleasantly is in this – in having as much as possible flowing in.

This is important not only because it demonstrates the influence of democratic ideology on Callicles, but also because Thucydides in his description of the great plague reveals Pericles’ idea of absolute autarkeia as an illusion, just as Herodotus does in the Lydian logos by refuting Croesus’ claim that he is the happiest (most self-sufficient) man.145 1.8. Summary A remarkable degree of congruence and numerous analogies lead to several conclusions. Firstly, the first part of Gorgias marks the beginning of a process of ethical and political degradation, to which Plato draws attention. Secondly, Plato uses the character of the sophist Gorgias to show that this degradation originates from the time between the rise of the Athenian archē and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The third conclusion is that Plato subtly associates the character of the sophist Gorgias with the statesman Pericles because Plato combines in the person of Pericles all negative features of Athens in the period known as the Pentekontaetia preceding the Peloponnesian War. Besides, Pericles’ opponents accused him of striving towards tyranny through his reliance on popular support. These denunciations stimulated Herodotus to develop the concept of a patron-tyrant, which in turn influenced Plato to conceive the concept of a demagogue-tyrant. The fourth conclusion is that Gorgias’ association of the art of oratory to freedom and power fulfils several functions. It reveals that Gorgias’ position is rooted in the Athenian ideology of freedom and power. Furthermore, it establishes through the examination of the question of ʽpower and ruleʼ a connection between the arguments of Gorgias, Polus and Callicles. In addition, it transposes the democratic ideology of freedom (power) from the collective level (that of the demos or Athens) to the individual (rhetor or politician). Finally, it indicates that despite all his power and influence a rhetor is, at the same time, subordinated to the authority of the people. The fifth conclusion is that the attack on the concept of collective wisdom in the Gorgias is also meant to refute the democratic ideal of equality. This establishes yet another connection between Gorgias and Callicles, because the democratic concept of collective wisdom stood in opposition to the superior individual. Gorgias’ rejection of the concept of the demos’ collective wisdom is also connected to Socrates’ standpoint that the all-powerful tyrant only does whatever seems to be best to him and not what is best. Ps.-Xenophon, Thucydides and Aristophanes 145 Thuc. 2.51.3, 36.2; Hdt. 1.32.8–9; cf. also Thuc. 7.28.1; see Macleod 1983c: 150–151; Raaflaub 2006b: 197; Taylor 2010: 69, 163–164. To what extent Plato’s understanding of autarkeia is opposed to that of Pericles is visible in the Republic where the origin of the polis is explained by the fact that no one is self-sufficient (369b); cf. Höffe 1997: 73.

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show that this way of thinking is an important element of the discourse on democracy and that the concept of the polis tyrannos (dēmos monarchos) in combination with Cleon’s demagoguery had a particularly strong impact on its emergence. The sixth conclusion is that Gorgias’ praise of the power of rhetoric – the Long Walls, the shipyards and docks of Athens were built thanks to the oratorical skills of Themistocles and Pericles – is not only an allusion to the archē but also a counterpoint to Socrates’ contestation of the benefits of the rise of Athenian archē in the third part of the dialogue. Moreover, Gorgias’ mentioning of the construction of these edifices is significant because the reliance on fortifications and the priority attributed to the fleet prompted the ideas of absolute sovereignty and absolute self-sufficiency, two of the three elements of the Athenian concept of absolute freedom. We now need to look at the second part of Gorgias and the correlations between Polus’ position and the democratic ideology of freedom and power.

2. POLUS Socrates’ second interlocutor in the dialogue is Gorgias’ pupil Polus.1 He joins the discussion criticizing his teacher that only shame causes him to agree with Socrates’ claim that an orator must know what is just and unjust.2 In a lengthy discourse, Socrates then develops the idea that rhetoric is not an art but merely expertise in producing delight and gratification, in fact a kind of flattery.3 Without examining Socrates’ arguments too deeply, Polus contradicts them with the theory of the extraordinary power of the rhetor that is just as great as that of tyrants, since he can do as he pleases – kill, despoil or exile whomever they want.4 Socrates disproves Polus’ theory by differentiating between arbitrariness (licence to do what one pleases) and doing what one really wants, and also by pointing out the difference between the means and the end.5 In this way, Socrates shows that the real purpose of our actions is always directed toward something good and, therefore, rhetors and tyrants neither do what they want nor dispose of great power.6 Polus then says he believes that it is better to do injustice than to suffer it, and cites the example of the Macedonian king Archelaus whom, he says, many people envy.7 Socrates refutes this as well, introducing the idea of beauty, and succeeds in getting Polus to concede that beauty is useful, pleasant and good, while deformity or disgrace are painful and evil.8 Socrates concludes that by being punished the unjust experiences something beautiful and good, since beauty is just and justice is beautiful.9 Faced with this cunning inversion of his original theory, the bewildered Polus is forced to agree with Socrates’ presentation, even though it seems absurd to him.10 As in the case of Gorgias, Plato does not give Polus a chance to challenge Socrates’ theory seriously, since Callicles then interrupts the conversation.11

1 2 3 4

Pl. Grg. 461b–481b. Pl. Grg. 461b–c. Pl. Grg. 462b–466a. Pl. Grg. 466b–e. He does not embark here on a new topic since Gorgias has already discussed this matter, as Joachim Dalfen (2004: 144) has shown; see also Grg. 513a–b. 5 Pl. Grg. 466e–467d. 6 Pl. Grg. 468a–d. 7 Pl. Grg. 469b–471d. 8 Pl. Grg. 474c–475e. 9 Pl. Grg. 476a–479e. 10 Pl. Grg. 479e–480e. 11 Pl. Grg. 481b.

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2.1. Polus and the Post-Periclean Generation Before submitting Polus’ arguments to closer inspection we should, as in the case of Gorgias, examine the generation of Athenian politicians with whom Plato identifies Polus. For with the appearance of Polus in the dialogue a change of generations takes place, not only because Polus is Gorgias’ pupil, but because Socrates constantly refers to the age difference, underlining Polus’ impulsiveness and youth.12 If Plato links the character of Gorgias to Pericles, then the question arises as to the generation of Athenian politicians with which he wishes to connect Polus. King Archelaus (413–399) was an important ally of Athens during the second half of the Peloponnesian War. He fought on the side of the Athenian forces in northern Greece in 411 and, in the last phase of the war, delivered ship building materials to the Athenians and even had ships built in Macedonia.13 Because of these services, in 407/406 he was proclaimed an Athenian proxenos and euergetēs.14 It therefore seems reasonable to assume that Socrates’ comment – that almost all Athenians share Polus’ opinion of Archelaus’ happiness – reflects the predominant mood in Athens at the time this assembly decision was passed. A more obvious sign that with Polus, Plato introduces, a generation change, is Socrates’ remark that Polus can call as witnesses Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates and Pericles’ entire household to support his view that Archelaus is to be envied.15 It is characteristic of these “witnesses” that they belonged to moderate circles loyal to Athenian democracy but were involved in the worst democratic excesses and defeats of the last decades of the fifth-century, and in fact were their victims. Nicias, son of Niceratos, will be forever remembered for the Sicilian expedition, the worst defeat of Athenian imperialist politics. Nicias, it is true, was an opponent of an aggressive foreign policy, but in spite of all his efforts, as Thucydides shows in the Sicilian Debate, he did not succeed in resisting its dynamics.16 His clear submission to the demos resulted in his heading a campaign which he personally opposed and in the disastrous outcome of the expedition.17

12 Pl. Grg. 461c, 463e, 466a. 13 Diod. 13.49.1; And. 2.11. 14 IG I2 105 (IG I3 117; HGIÜ I 150). The significance of this honour is underlined by the fact that only a few years earlier (415) Perdiccas II, the father of Archelaus, had sworn an oath to have the same enemies as Athens and to supply the Athenians alone with shipbuilding material (IG I2 71 = HGIÜ I 121); see Borza 1990: 162–163; Hammond – Griffith 1979: 138– 139. It cannot be excluded that the assembly passed this resolution on Alcibiades’ initiative. It would constitute another link between Polus’ views and Callicles’ ideas. Moreover, it should be noted that this decision of the Athenian assembly was made at about the same time as the Arginusae trial. 15 Pl. Grg. 471d, 472a–b. Archelaus is enviable since he can with impunity do what he pleases (Pl. Grg. 471a–472a). For the role of witnesses in Athenian law, see Thür 2005: 146–167. 16 See Pouncey 1980: 119–123. 17 Thuc. 6.8.4, 24–25; 7.8, 14.4, 48.3–4, 49; cf. Gribble 2006: 459–462.

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Nicias’ brother Eucrates fought in the battle of Aegospotami. After the final defeat he was appointed strategos, opposing Theramenes’ peace treaty, the destruction of the Long Walls and the Piraeus fortifications, and the surrender of the ships. When the Thirty Tyrants came to power, he was killed.18 Nicias’ brother Diognetus may be the investigator of 415, but also may be the Diognetus informed against by Teucrus for profaning the Mysteries.19 In Eupolis’ Dēmoi in 415 he is mentioned as “the strongest by far of the younger rascals”.20 According to Lysias, the sycophants drove him, at one point, into exile. Nonetheless, he neither took the field against the city nor came to Decelea. When the Thirty came to power, Diognetus returned to Athens. However he did not join the oligarchs, but remained loyal to the demos.21 Aristocrates, son of Scelios, was one of the signatories of the Peace of Nicias.22 During the government of the Four Hundred, he associated with moderate circles who were opposed both to the radical oligarchs and to Alcibiades.23 Enjoying the trust of the demos even after 411, he was elected strategos several times between 410 and 406. He took part in the battle of Arginusae and was a defendant in the ensuing notorious trial, which the opponents of democracy believed to be one of the demos’ worst offences. He was then sentenced to death and executed.24 The phrase ʽPericles’ entire householdʼ can only refer to Pericles’ son of the same name. At the supposed dramatic time of the Gorgias (427–405), Pericles and his other two sons were already dead, victims of the plague in 430/429.25 As the only events in which Pericles took part were the battle of Arginusae and the ensuing trial, ʽPericles’ entire householdʼ can be understood as one more sign for this legal and political scandal.26 All these circumstances indicate that, according to Plato, the character of Polus stands for the generation of Athenian politicians that followed after Pericles. Plato’s mentioning of Nicias and his brothers, and Aristocrates reveals that this generation became politically prominent in the years after Pericles’ death.27 The phrase ‘Pericles’ entire household’ fulfils two functions. First, it emphasizes that this post-Periclean generation of politicians continued Pericles’ policies. They were generally loyal to the democratic order and unconditionally supported the 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27

Lys. 13.13–38; 18.4–6; Nails 2002: 145–146. And. 1.14–15; Davies 1971: 405. Eup. fr. 99 (PCG); see Ostwald 544, 548 with n. 43. Lys. 18.8–11. Thuc. 5.19.1, 24; Nails 2002: 51–52. Thuc. 8.89.2, 92, 99.2; Arist. Ath. Pol. 33.2; Dem. 58.67. It is important to understand that for most participants of the coup d’état, especially those who were not radical oligarchs, the existence of the Athenian sea empire could not be brought in question, cf. Heftner 2001: 49, 62, 87–88, 126, 128–129, 241, 325–326, 329–330. Xen. Hell. 1.5.16, 6.29; 7.2, 34–35; Diod. 13.100.1–5, 101–102. Plut. Per. 36.8–9. Xen. Hell. 1.5.16, 6.29; 7.2, 16, 21; Mem. 3.5.1–28 (Socrates and Pericles the Younger). Cf. Geske 2005: 15–17, esp. 17.

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Athenian archē. In spite of this, they were associated with the greatest failures of the Athenian demos, whose victims they were: the Sicilian campaign, Arginusae, and Aegospotami. The second function is to avoid the mentioning of Pericles the Younger’s name – he was considerably younger than Nicias, Eucrates and Aristocrates. This is in order to avoid the identification of this generation of politicians with another post-Periclean generation – that of Alcibiades and Critias. These two infamous Athenians stand for those post-Periclean politicians who did not fall victim to democracy; but the Athenian demos became their victim. 2.2. Archelaus Polus, in showing that the tyrant, or the rhetor, can do whatever he wants – that is, that it is better to do injustice than to suffer it – refers to the example of the Macedonian ruler Archelaus.28 This reference explicitly points to a causal relation between Polus’ theories and Callicles’ doctrine of the right of the stronger. Socrates himself does this in the Afterlife Myth by which he refutes Callicles’ theory, saying that Archelaus will meet with just punishment in any case, if what Polus says of him is true.29 But the mentioning of Archelaus is in several more ways relevant for an understanding of the Gorgias. It could be connected to Antisthenes, one of the most famous Socratics. According to the Hellenistic tradition, he studied rhetoric with Gorgias and his first career was that of a rhetor.30 It was only later that he became an ardent disciple of Socrates.31 Antisthenes wrote a text called Archelaus or On Kingship.32 Its content has been lost; the only surviving information is that Antisthenes rejected Gorgias in some way.33 This text might be the principal source for the story of how Archelaus allegedly invited Socrates to his court, but the philosopher declined. The anecdote survived throughout antiquity and is not mentioned in any other primary Socratic literature.34 The title implies that it was a treatise on kingship; it probably contains a comparison of some sort between Archelaus and Socrates.35 If this was indeed the case, then correlations with Plato’s Gorgias can be found. Socrates repudiates Gorgias’ teachings and states in his discussion with Polus that he cannot say if Archelaus is happy or wretched, because he “never met the man”.36 More importantly, Socrates uses the Afterlife Myth as the final 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

Pl. Grg. 470d–471d. Pl. Grg. 525d. See Prince 2015: 13, 41–42, 45, 685–686. See Prince 2015: 13–15, 45–75. The alternative title On kingship was in all probability added during the Hellenistic period; see Murray 1971: 21–23, Haake 2003: 109–110 n. 20. Ath. 5.220d; see Prince 2015: 686. Arist. Rh. 1398a24; Diog. Laert. 2.25; Ael. VH 14.17; see Murray 1971: 21; Prince 2015: 162–163. Cf. Murray 1971: 21. Pl. Grg. 470d; see Prince 2015: 163.

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argument to denounce Callicles’ life of unscrupulous omnipotence as a malignant fantasy. In this myth, as already stated, Socrates avers that people like Archelaus will inevitably be punished, while the philosopher (and others who live like him) will go to the Islands of the Blessed.37 The reference to the afterlife may be understood as an allusion to violent death, as the discussion between Callicles and Socrates repeatedly confirms.38 Through an accident of history, Archelaus was murdered in 399, the same year as Socrates was put to death. According to Plato’s logic, the former died as a result of his tyranny, the latter because of his philosophy. The contrast tyrant (tyrannical man) – philosopher is omnipresent in the Gorgias, appearing for the first time in the discussion between Socrates and Polus.39 At the heart of their debate is the question of whether to do an injustice is worse than to suffer it. This is the basic issue underlying the contrast of unjust life – just life, as confirmed by Socrates’ Afterlife Myth and Glaucon’s speech in the Politeia.40 One the one hand, Polus eulogizes the unjust life by equating it with the life of a tyrant, of which Archelaus is the prime example.41 On the other, Socrates, who embodies and advocates the bios philosophikos, affirms the bios dikaios.42 He explicitly denies that he would choose the life of a tyrant.43 Furthermore he argues not only that suffering injustice is better than doing injustice, but that not being punished within one’s lifetime for doing the greatest injustice (as, for instance, a tyrant) is actually the greatest evil.44 Hence, for Socrates Archelaus is wretched (athlios) beyond other men.45 The contrasts tyrant – philosopher and unjust life – just life occupy a prominent place in the debate between Callicles and Socrates, too, and are subsumed under the dichotomy bios praktikos – bios theōrētikos.46 Another indication that the reference to the contradictions contained in dichotomy vita activa – vita contemplativa are connected with the person of Archelaus is that Callicles invokes Euripides’ tragedy Antiope. The play probably dates from 408, just before Euripides went to Archelaus’ court in Macedonia where he spent his last years.47 Euripides was criticised in conservative circles for 37 Pl. Grg. 525d, 526a–b. 38 Pl. Grg. 486a–c; 508c–d, 511a–b; 521b–d; 522c–e; 525d; 526e, 527c. 39 Pl. Grg. 467a, 468e–469c, 473e, 479d–e, 481c–482b, 484c–487d, 500c, 507b–c, 510b–c, 513c, 515a, 526c; see also Rep. 578c. 40 Pl. Grg. 522c–523b, 525b–d; Rep. 358e–359b, 360b–e; see also Grg. 507a–c; Rep. 347e, 352d, 357a–b; cf. Sedley 2009: 53–58, 66, esp. 53–54, 57, 66; Rowe 2012: 189–190. 41 Pl. Grg. 470d–471d; 472c–d; Sedley 2009: 66. 42 Pl. Grg. 522c–523b, 526c. 43 Pl. Grg. 469c. 44 Pl. Grg. 469b–e, 470b–471d, 472c–475e, 479c, 508b–509a, 509c–d, 511a–c (doing injustice is worse than to suffer it); 469b–e, 473d–e, 474b, 476a–479d, 509b, 522e, 524e–525e (doing injustice and not being punished is the greatest evil); see also Rowe 2012: 196–197. 45 Pl. Grg. 469a–b, 470d–e, 471a–b, 472d–e, 473d–e, 478d, 479b, 479d–e; see also 525d. 46 See chapter II.3.7. Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa. 47 Pl. Grg. 484e, 486b–c (Eur. fr. 183N2, 185 N2, 199 N2); cf. Grg. 485e; see Lesky ³1971: 369; Hose 1995: 143–147, esp. 144, 146; Dalfen 2004: 338–342; contra Scullion 2003: 389–400, esp. 394–396.

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his closeness to the sophists, his naturalistic realism that placed man at the centre of the action, and his re-examination of the heroic. In the famous poetic contest in Aristophanes’ Frogs, Euripides is presented as a follower of a fully developed radical democracy, while his opponent Aeschylus personifies the generation of fighters at Marathon with all their virtues.48 More importantly, Plato in the Republic categorically condemns Euripides as a friend of tyranny and someone who glorifies it. Plato also quotes Euripides to prove that the tragedian had associated with a tyrant.49 As Archelaus was the only autocrat with whom Euripides had been in close contact, he is the only one who can be meant here. Moreover, Euripides’ wrote Archelaus, a play celebrating the founder of the Macedonian dynasty.50 In a surviving fragment of the tragedy tyranny is rated second only to the gods – it does not have immortality, but it has the rest.51 It seems that Archelaus in the play was portrayed as a brave and bright young man, worthy of his ancestor Heracles. At the command of Apollo he founded the old Macedonian capital, Aigai.52 In the Euripides Vita it is said that the purpose of the play was “to please Archelaus”. Some scholars focus on the person of Archelaus and come to the conclusion that the aim of the play was to flatter, legitimise or even educate Archelaus. Other interpretations presume that its plot was devised to celebrate the Greek ancestry of Archelaus and promote the Macedonian tendency towards Hellenisation.53 Although the fragmentary condition of the play prevents any final conclusion as to its purpose, the praise of the mythical Archelaus must have positively reflected on his historical namesake. Finally, when speaking of freedom to do as one pleases or living as one likes as the main characteristics of democracy, Aristotle in his Politics quotes from Euripides.54 In the discussion between Polus and Socrates, this concept is at the centre of the debate, and Archelaus is cited as the example for its correctness.

48 Ar. Ran. 830–1471. Euripides boasts about his democratic attitude as in his tragedies he allowed everyone to speak alike – women, slaves, masters, the young and the old. Furthermore, he brags about teaching the demos to speak and names Cleitophon and Theramenes as his disciples (937–969); see Dover 1994: 10–37, esp. 20–23, 309–314; Sommerstein 1996: 240– 242; cf. also Hose 1995: 177–181. 49 Pl. Rep. 568a–b: “ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόμενον ἐφθέγξατο, ὡς ἄρα «σοφοὶ τύραννοί» εἰσι «τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ.» καὶ ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς οἷς σύνεστιν. – “Because among other utterances of pregnant thought he said, ‘Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.’ He meant evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise.” (trans. P. Shorey); cf. also Pl. Grg. 502b–d. In fact this verse belongs to Sophocles (fr. 14 Radt); see Rufener 2000: 988. It seems justified to assume that this very stay at the Macedonian court made Plato in the Republic (568a–b) characterize Euripides as a poet who extols tyranny; see also Arist. Pol. 1311b30–35; cf. Dalfen 1974: 16–17; Harder 1985: 129– 131. For Plato’s critique of poetry in the Republic see Halliwell 1997: 313–331. 50 See Harder 1985: 125–126. 51 Eur. Archel. fr. 250. 52 See Harder 1985: 129, 131–137. 53 See Harder 1985:129–131. 54 Arist. Pol. 1310a32–34, fr. 891N2.

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Thucydides is another great Athenian thinker with whom Plato loves to disagree. The famous historian gives a notably favourable account of Archelaus, though he does not praise him for his ethical qualities. Thucydides comments at the end of Book 2 that Archelaus, when he became king, cut straight roads and in military matters generally surpassed all the eight kings who preceded him.55 2.3. Polus and the Arginusae Scandal The Arginusae affair, although never explicitly mentioned, has an important place in the second part of the Gorgias. In addition to the above mentioned signs (Aristocrates, Pericles the Younger) there is another one which implies that. When Polus objects to his interlocutor for the second time that he stands in contradiction to all other people, the philosopher defends himself by saying that he, Socrates, is not a politician. In support of this, he relates that when he was prytanis and his tribe was presiding over the Council of Five Hundred, he did not understand how the votes were taken.56 From Plato’s Apology and Xenophon’s works we learn that this particular vote determined the death sentence for the strategoi who had commanded fleet at the battle at Arginusae in 406.57 Besides identifying the generation to which the character of Polus belongs, the Arginusae affair is also relevant because, as described by Socrates, it relates to Polus’s main line of argument in no less than four ways.58 Firstly, the trial constitutes the apex of the concept of freedom to do what one pleases,59 the same idea that, according to Polus, embodies the most enviable characteristic of the rhetor’s (and tyrant’s) power.60 This system of values was first circulated in the mid-fifth century by opponents of an increasingly powerful democracy, at the time still known as licence to do what one pleases. It was later taken up by the democrats who made it an incontrovertible part of their understanding of freedom, as evidenced by the Funeral Oration.61 Its most notorious debacle was the Arginusae scandal, in which any kind of submission to existing law was equated with restricting the demos’ sovereignty. Xenophon describes the reaction of the crowd in the ekklēsia when several Athenians dared 55 Thuc. 2.100.2; see Hornblower 1991: 376; Id. 2004: 65. 56 Pl. Grg. 473e–474a. 57 Pl. Ap. 32b; Xen. Mem. 1.1.18, 4.4,2; Hell. 1.7.15; see Dodds 1959: 247; de Strycker 1994: 161–163, 344–345; Stokes 1997: 155–156; Heitsch 2002: 131–134. 58 Whether Athenian law was violated during the Arginusae trial is not relevant for this study. On the trial and its legal aspects, see Baumann 1990: 69–76; Bleckmann 1998: 509–571, esp. 569–571, Welwei 1999: 236–240, esp. 239; Burckhardt 2000: 128–143, esp. 137. 59 Cp. Flaig 2018: 276–277. A detailed review and analysis of the concept of freedom to do what one pleases and its different forms of expression (to do what one wants, the licence to do what one pleases, to live as one likes etc.) is given in Morawetz 2000; cf. also Raaflaub 1981: 283–284, 333–334; Collette-Dučić 2019: 417–442, esp. 417–428. 60 Pl. Grg. 466b–467b, 468d–e, 469c–e, 470a–b, 473c. 61 Thuc. 2.37.2–3; see Morawetz 2000: 105–106; cf. also Diller 1968: 654–656; Loraux 1986: 183–185.

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to contest the proposal that a joint sentence be passed on all the strategoi: “And some of the people applauded this act, but the greater number cried out that it was monstrous if the people were to be prevented from doing whatever they wished.”62 Secondly, the illegal execution of the generals and the aggressive intimidation of all those who opposed the will of the demos led to the idea of freedom to do what one pleases easily becoming power licence to kill whoever one pleases, as interpreted by Polus time and again in the Gorgias.63 Thirdly, the Arginusae trial is the best example of Socrates’ idea that a tyrant or wielder of power does not do what he really wants, even though he can kill and banish whomever he wishes.64 In fact, soon after the strategoi were executed, the Athenians regretted their earlier verdict and decided to charge the persons who had sought the punishment of the generals, since they had misled the demos.65 Fourthly, Socrates was ultimately the only one who firmly opposed the violation of the law during the Arginusae trial, and who could not be intimidated by threats.66 Plato thus gives additional weight to Socrates’ standpoint in his conversation with Polus – that the general opinion of the many was irrelevant to him and that to do injustice is worse than to suffer it.67 2.4. The Concept of Freedom to Do What One Pleases Plato intentionally links Polus’ argument that a rhetor (tyrant) does what he pleases to the major debacles of post-Periclean democracy, as we may conclude from the fact that he cites Nicias as a case in point. In the speech Thucydides 62 Xen. Hell. 1.7.12 (trans. C. L. Brownson): “τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἔνιοι ταῦτα ἐπῄνουν, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται.”; for this slogan see Morawetz 2000: 114–131. 63 Pl. Grg. 466b–e; see also Rep. 359c–d, 360b–c; cf. Morawetz 2000: 169. The universal topic of antidemocratic thought is the demos’ tendency to confiscate private property, expel and kill (Pl. Ap. 30c–d; Cri. 46c; Rep. 565e–566a; Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.14). For the application of this principle to an autocrat, see, for example, what Herodotus writes about Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian Empire. During the campaign against the Massagetae, he committed a sacrilege against the gods and revealed his aspiration to limitless expansion (Hdt. 1.189, 206– 207); cf. Bichler 2000: 267. Cyrus is convinced to be above all humans and especially happy (Hdt. 1.204.4); cf. Marg ³1982: 296; Bichler 2000: 267. When Cyrus was overcome by hubris and exposed the character of a tyrant, he accused Darius, who would later restore the Persian empire, of plotting against him. In the circumstances, Hystaspes, the father of Darius, declared to Cyrus that he could do with Darius whatever he pleased since he had made the Persians free men and the rulers of all people (Hdt. 1.209.3–4, 210). To do whatever one pleases in this case also means to kill whoever one pleases; cf. Hornblower 2000: 367, 383 n. 30. 64 Pl. Grg. 466c–468e. 65 Xen. Hell. 1.7.35; Diod. 13.103.2; Arist. Ath. Pol. 34.1. Plato indirectly points this out in the Apology of Socrates when Socrates says that the Arginusae trial was illegal and that the demos had come to realise it (Pl. Ap. 32b). 66 Xen. Hell. 1.7.9–15; cf. de Strycker 1987: 332–339, 344. 67 Pl. Grg. 469b–e, 471e–472c.

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gives him immediately before the annihilation of the Athenian army in Sicily, Nicias tries to encourage his demoralised compatriots to fight on, reminding them of their fatherland, the freest in the world, and of the untrammelled liberty of daily life that all enjoy there:68 [...] πατρόθεν τε ἐπονομάζων καὶ αὐτοὺς ὀνομαστὶ καὶ φυλήν, ἀξιῶν τό τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτόν, ᾧ ὑπῆρχε λαμπρότητός τι, μὴ προδιδόναι τινὰ καὶ τὰς πατρικὰς ἀρετάς, ὧν ἐπιφανεῖς ἦσαν οἱ πρόγονοι, μὴ ἀφανίζειν, πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομιμνῄσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας, [...]. [...] addressing them by their father’s name, their own name, and that of their tribe, and admonished them: if anyone had any claim to distinction, he urged him not to prove false to his own reputation; if any had illustrious ancestors, the should not dim the glory of their fathers’ deeds of valour; he also reminded them of their fatherland, the freest in the world, and of the uncontrolled liberty in daily life that all possessed in it; [...]

It is striking that it is he – of all Athenian politicians of the time the least partial to unscrupulous power ethics – who invokes the ideals of Pericles’ Funeral Oration:69 ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι᾽ ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ᾽ ἡδονήν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μέν, λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι. And not only in our public life are we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from suspicion of one another in the pursuits of every-day life; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold.

Thus, on the one hand we have Pericles at the apex of Athenian power, and on the other Nicias at the moment of the greatest defeat of the Athenian archē. The historian chooses this way of demonstrating that, because of the desperate situation in which the Athenian army finds itself, the ideals of the Funeral Oration have become empty phrases – notably the glorification of Athenian might and freedom to do what one pleases – something which Thucydides underlines.70 The deceptive impression of omnipotence on the part of the polis tyrannos has turned into a cataclysmic experience of powerlessness.71 The bitter irony that comes to the surface and is impossible to ignore clearly suggests that Plato is not treading entirely new paths in the Gorgias, and that the reference to Nicias is all but coincidental.72

68 Thuc. 7.69.2 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); cf. Pl. Rep. 557b; see Raaflaub 1981: 222; Id. 2004: 189; Morawetz 2000: 115–116, esp. n. 250; cf. also de Romilly 1963: 80 n. 2; HCT IV: 446. 69 Thuc. 2.37.2; see de Romilly 1963: 202 n. 1; Flashar 1969: 51–52; HCT IV: 446; Loraux 1986: 181; Morawetz 2000: 104–107, 115; Rood 2004: 193–201, esp. 193–194, 198; Hornblower 2008: 692. 70 Thuc. 7.69.2; cf. Flashar 1969: 51–52; Macleod 1983c: 145–146; Leppin 1999: 155; Morawetz 2000: 115; on Nicias see also Will 2003: 99. 71 Thuc. 6.31; 7.84–85, 87.5–6. 72 This irony has already been pointed out by Hellmut Flashar 1969: 52.

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That Plato wants to go much further than merely to disqualify the concept of freedom to do what one pleases, is revealed by Polus’ use of this set of values in order to compare the power of the rhetor with that of the tyrant:73 Π. πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν; Σ. οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. Π. ἀλλὰ μὴν [δὴ] λέγω γε. Σ. ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες. Π. τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; P. What do you mean, they don’t count? Don’t they have the greatest power in the cities? S. No – not if you say that having power is a good to the man with the power. P. Well, I do say so. S. Then I think the rhetors have the least power of anyone in the city. P. What? Aren’t they like tyrants? Don’t they kill whoever they want to, and expropriate and expel from the cities whoever they think fit (dokein).

In his comprehensive study of the concept of freedom to do what one pleases (exousia ... poiein hoti tis bouletai), i.e. to live as one pleases (zēn hōs bouletai tis), Morawetz shows that it appeared as licence to do what one pleases possibility and as a product of anti-democratic polemics in the mid-fifth century.74 It is indicative that it emerged at this time to denounce the new internal and external might of the demos as tyrannical rule, as seen from Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound and Sophocles’ Ajax and Antigone.75 A couple of decades later, the Arginusae scandal breathed new life into identifying it with the arbitrariness of the masses. This was important since in the meantime the democrats had already reacted to earlier anti-democratic polemics. The democrats, on the one hand, made this value system into one of the pillars of the democratic concept of freedom.76 The importance of this is best reflected in Aristotle’s Politics where, in addition to equality and to rule and be ruled in turns, to live and do as one pleases is defined as the foundation of democratic freedom.77 All things considered, Pericles’ Funeral Oration is the most striking evidence of this change in the democratic understanding of freedom, together with another important departure: the voluntary restriction of that same freedom. Thus Pericles, immediately after his statement on the freedom and ease of daily life enjoyed by Athenians underlines that this must in no way diminish reverence for the representatives of authority, or obedience to written and unwritten nomoi.78 This receptiveness towards self-restraint, or balance between two principles: freedom

73 74 75 76

Pl. Grg. 466b–c (trans. T. Irwin). Pl. Rep. 557b; Arist. Pol. 1317b12; see Morawetz 2000: 49–101, esp. 56–69, 76–81. Aesch. PV 938–942; Soph. Aj. 1081–1086; Ant. 499–508. Thuc. 2.37.3; cf. also Xen. Ath. Pol. 2.17; Eur. IA 330; Ar. Nub. 439–456; Lys. 491–492; Xen. Hell. 1.7.12; see Hansen 1996: 92–95; Morawetz 2000: 101–131, esp. 101–114. 77 Arist. Pol. 1310a 31–34, 1317a 39–b14, 1319b 27–30, see Morawetz 2000: 49–56. 78 Thuc. 2.37.2–3; see Morawetz 2000: 105–106; cf. also Loraux 1986: 183–185.

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and respect for the law, thus precluding excessive freedom, also appears in the court speeches of the fourth-century.79 On the other hand, democrats associated tyranny – or, for that matter, anything else that was believed to be opposed to democracy – with this concept. In Herodotus’ Constitutional Debate, the supporter of democracy makes doing as one pleases the attribute of an autocrat, evincing hubris, envy and all kinds of carnal vices. The concept is further related to the accusation that a tyrant is not answerable to anyone, emphasising the deviation from typical democratic procedures (such as the euthyna).80 If the Persian king was in Greek understanding a tyrant par excellence then,81 according to Herodotus, Cambyses united in his person all the worst traits of the tyrant.82 Cambyses is connected with the idea of licence to do what one pleases in the depiction of his most egregious sacrileges and evil-doing, at a time when, Herodotus thinks, he was already mentally disturbed: unable to restrain his love for his own sister, he turns to the royal judges to enquire whether a law exists that allows him to marry her. The answer is that such a law does not exist, but that there is a nomos that permits the Great King to do what he pleases.83 The tendency to identify doing what one pleases with arbitrariness and antidemocratic conduct increased after the reign of the Thirty Tyrants. In particular, it became popular to make this connection in court speeches in the fourth-century. In a speech of 399, Lysias mentions licence to do what one pleases several times in connection with the regime of the Thirty.84 In Against Androtion, Demosthenes compares Androtion’s offences with those of the Thirty, and uses the term to describe the height of his bad deeds and arrogance.85 He follows the same principle in Against Timocrates.86 Even Xenophon, who was certainly no democrat,

79 Dem. 23.67; 21.170; 25.24–25; 26.9; 51.15; 59.88. This is all the more important, since trials, as Morawetz (2000: 144) points out, were a rather unsuitable place to advance such a slogan as one of the major features of democratic freedom. 80 Hdt. 3.80.3; see Morawetz 2000: 71, 74. On the euthyna procedure see Ostwald 1986: 40–42; Hansen 1991: 222–224; Haßkamp 2005: 94–95. 81 Cf. Waters 1966: 168; Berve 1967: 193, 625–626; Walser 1975: 531–532; 536–537; Bichler 1985: 125–147; Id. 2000: 275–277, 282–285; Borzsák 1987: 289–297; Lateiner 1989: 163– 186; Sonnabend 2003: 24. 82 Thus Cambyses is the only legitimate Persian ruler who, in Otanes’ speech in the Constitutional Debate, is explicitly called a tyrant (Hdt. 3.80.2); see Jordović 2005: 145 n. 80; 163 n. 203; cf. also Immerwahr 1966: 169; Alonso-Núñez 1998: 23. 83 Hdt. 3.31.3–6, esp. 4, mad: Hdt. 3.30.1 (mainomai), 33; see also Rep. 359c–d, 360b–c. This also indirectly follows from the Constitutional Debate where Cambyses is characterised as a ruler completely overcome by hubris just before doing whatever one pleases is recognised as the mark of a tyrant (Hdt. 3.80.2–4). 84 Lys. 25.1–3, 30–35, esp. 31–33; see Morawetz 2000: 136–137. 85 Dem. 22.47–56; see Morawetz 2000: 138–139. 86 Dem. 24.75–76; see Morawetz 2000: 139–140.

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could not resist using this democratic topos in emphasizing the repressive nature of the regime of the Thirty.87 The democratic perception of freedom to do what one pleases, therefore, has two sides: a positive one that is democratic and is compatible with submission to the rule of law, and a negative one that is tyrannical, oligarchic and representative of despotic regimes. 2.5. Plato and the Concept of Freedom to Do What One Pleases Overall, then, it is clear that by refuting Polus’s theory of the extraordinary power of rhetors – since like a tyrant they can do what they please – in his Gorgias Plato condemns the concept of freedom to do what one pleases. However, in his criticism Plato did not simply return to the earliest antidemocratic interpretation of this concept. Instead, he integrated some elements of the positive (the direct coupling of licence to do what one pleases with freedom, especially freedom of every-day life) and the negative side (arbitrary and tyrannical conduct) of the democratic understanding of this concept. In this way he transformed in effect the democratic view of freedom to do what one pleases into its very opposite. The Arginusae scandal was certainly useful here, as is particularly visible in the Republic’s description of democracy as a pandemonium of uncontrolled freedom. Democracy, in this view, allows all citizens to be completely free, the entire polis is filled with freedom, there is freedom of speech, and everyone enjoys the freedom to do what he pleases.88 As a consequence of all this, in a democracy everyone can order his life just as it pleases him, while equality and absence of compulsion rule – but not the law. The most diverse characters live in this kind of system, it allows for a wide variety of customs, and its appearance is that of a coat of many colours. As a result of this prevalence of absolute freedom anyone can choose the constitution that pleases him:89 [...] καὶ ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη αὖ πολιτεία; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ δημοκρατικός τις ἀναφανήσεται. – δῆλον, ἔφη. – οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅτι τις βούλεται; – λέγεταί γε δή, ἔφη. – ὅπου δέ γε ἐξουσία, δῆλον ὅτι ἰδίαν ἕκαστος ἂν κατασκευὴν τοῦ αὑτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ, ἥτις ἕκαστον ἀρέσκοι. – δῆλον. – παντοδαποὶ δὴ ἂν οἶμαι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ μάλιστ᾽ ἐγγίγνοιντο ἄνθρωποι. – πῶς γὰρ οὔ; – κινδυνεύει, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι· ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο. καὶ ἴσως μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ταύτην, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδές τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ ποικίλα θεώμενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν. – καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη. – καὶ ἔστιν γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐπιτήδειον ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτείαν. – τί δή; – ὅτι πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ βουλομένῳ πόλιν κατασκευάζειν, ὃ νυν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς δημοκρατουμένην ἐλθόντι

87 Xen. Hell. 2.3.13, 21; cf. also 2.3.16, 4.1; see Morawetz 2000: 134–136. For the tyrannical character of the regime of the Thirty see Jordović 2005: 169–214. 88 Pl. Rep. 557b. 89 Pl. Rep. 557а–d (trans. P. Shorey); cf. also 558c, 561e, 563d–e, 568d.

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πόλιν, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρέσκῃ τρόπος, τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι, ὥσπερ εἰς παντοπώλιον ἀφικομένῳ πολιτειῶν, καὶ ἐκλεξαμένῳ οὕτω κατοικίζειν. [...] and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man.” “It is plain,” he said. “To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every man licence to do as he likes?” “So it is said,” he replied. “And where there is such licence, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan for leading his own life in the way that pleases him.” “Obvious.” “All sorts and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other?” “Of course.” “Possibly,” said I, “this is the most beautiful of polities as a garment of many colours, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps,” I said, “many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women when they see bright-coloured things.” “Yes indeed,” he said. “Yes,” said I, “and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution.” “Why so?” “Because, owing to this licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own.”

An insatiable thirst for freedom prompts licentiousness that leads to the elimination of fundamental differences between young and old, citizens and noncitizens, men and women. Even animals enjoy unrestrained freedom.90 In the end, tyranny emerges out of this excess of freedom:91 ἡ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ πόλει. – εἰκὸς γάρ. – εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας, ἐξ οἶμαι τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία πλείστη τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτη. And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state.” “Yes, that is probable.” “Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution than democracy – from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude.

At the same time, the Republic clearly points out that the state that was once freest of all, after being reduced to slavery, like the tyrant’s soul, can least do what it wants:92 πρῶτον μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὡς πόλιν εἰπεῖν, ἐλευθέραν ἢ δούλην τὴν τυραννουμένην ἐρεῖς; – ὡς οἷόν τ᾽, ἔφη, μάλιστα δούλην. – καὶ μὴν ὁρᾷς γε ἐν αὐτῇ δεσπότας καὶ ἐλευθέρους. – ὁρῶ, ἔφη, σμικρόν γέ τι τοῦτο· τὸ δὲ ὅλον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικέστατον ἀτίμως τε καὶ ἀθλίως δοῦλον. – εἰ οὖν, εἶπον, ὅμοιος ἀνὴρ τῇ πόλει, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν 90 Pl. Rep. 562b–563d; see also Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.10–12; Ar. Ran. 948–952 The freedom to do what one pleases is, together with eleutheria, the key parameter for the emergence of radical democracy, combining to engender the excessive licence, equality, and variety that define the democratic constitution; see Pl. Rep. 557b–e, 558c, 561e, 563d–e, 568d. Plato speaks of anarchia but it is clear from the context, and certain remarks of the Old Oligarch that resonate with Plato’s views, that anarchia can be translated as akolasia, as so many translators do (Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.5, 8, 10–12); cf. Nakategawa 1995: 34–36. 91 Pl. Rep. 564a (trans. P. Shorey); see Zeitler 1983: 72–76. That the concept of freedom to do what one pleases is the most prominent feature of democratic freedom confirms that Plato’s argument refers primarily to this idea. 92 Pl. Rep. 577c–e (trans. P. Shorey).

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It is impossible to miss the parallels between this depiction of democracy in the Republic and the Gorgias. In the latter, too, Polus clearly places the idea of licence to do what one pleases in a democratic context (rhetor). Socrates denounces the dokein-einai (to seem – to be), i.e. doxa-alētheia (belief – truth) dichotomy to be the hallmark of rhetoric and uses it to prove that the unjust potentate (rhetor/tyrant) is incapable of differentiating between what is truly good and what merely seems to be so:93 Π. τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; […] Σ. οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες, ‘ἦ οὐχὶ ἀποκτεινύασιν ’ οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; Π. ἔγωγε. Σ. λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτ᾽ ἐστιν τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι. P. What? Aren’t they like tyrants? Don’t they kill whoever they want to, and expropriate and expel from the cities whoever they think fit (dokein). […] S. Weren’t you just now saying something like this; ‘Don’t the rhetors kill whoever they want to, like tyrants, and expropriate and expel from the cities whoever they think fit?’ P. Yes, I said so. S. Then I say that these are two questions here, and I’ll answer you both of them. For I say,

93 Pl. Grg. 466b–e (trans. T. Irwin); see also 459c–e, 464a–465a, 466a–b, 466d–468e, 471e, 472b, 481c; see Heinimann 1945: 42–58, 116–117, 139, esp. 57–58; Pohlenz 1953: 425–427, 430–431; Doods 1959: 217; Dalfen 2004: 216, 219, 241. It is noteworthy that the dokeineinai and doxa-alētheia antitheses are reminiscent of the enactment formula of the Athenian Ecclesia (edoxe tō dēmō: it seemed right to the people).

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Polus, that both the rhetors and the tyrants have least power in the cities, as I was saying just now; for they do practically nothing, I say, that they want to, but do whatever they think is best.

Power to do what one pleases is incompatible with justice and the rule of law, as plainly follows from Polus’ explanation of the power of the rhetor or tyrant: to do injustice, which is equated with doing what one pleases, is better than to suffer injustice.94 Socrates’ argument forces us to conclude that doing as one pleases results in licentiousness; in Socrates’ view, doing injustice and licentiousness are the greatest evils and it is therefore worse to do injustice (do as one pleases) than to suffer it.95 Socrates compares those who worship the power to do what one pleases and think that doing injustice is better than to suffer it, with victims of the worst disease. Their wretched souls are so corrupt that they are incapable of voluntarily accepting any remedy. Due to this inability to recognize what is truly good, the blinded potentates (rhetors/tyrants) can never do what they really want. They possess only the illusion of freedom of action, since they have no freedom of will – they can never select the truly good, and must always choose what is actually bad for them. Thus in the Gorgias Plato for the first time discusses complete loss of freedom – absolute non-freedom.96 2.6. Plato and the Destructive Nature of the Concept of Freedom to Do What One Pleases All things considered, Plato chose freedom to do what one pleases as the main target of his criticism because he thought that it best embodied the idea of absolute freedom in Athenian democratic ideology,97 which in turn engendered the doctrine of might is right and the idea of absolute non-freedom. Book 8 of the Republic shows that Plato was driven by this premise. In his discussion of how a champion of the people, a democrat, becomes a tyrant, this thought takes a central position: “And in truth, any excess is wont to bring about a corresponding reaction to the opposite in the seasons, in plants, in animal bodies, and most especially in political societies.”98 Plato then concludes: “And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state.” […] 94 Pl. Grg. 466b–c, 468e–469c, 470a–d. 95 Pl. Grg. 470e, 472d–479e, esp. 477d–478a. Licentiousness (akolasia) is one of the most popular objections to democracy (Hdt. 3.81.2; Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.5, 10; Thuc. 3.37.3; 6.89,5; Isoc. 7.20; 12.131; Xen. Mem. 1.2.12). 96 Polos (Pl. Grg. 466c–468e, 469c–470b, 473b–e, 475d–e, 478e–479e); Callicles (Pl. Grg. 504d– 505d, 514d, esp. 521a–522e); see also Rep. 425e–426c; 576a, 577d–578a, 579c–e (tyrannical man), 590a–b (akolasia as thremma; close relationship between: tryphē, malakia and deilia; kolakeia, aneleutheria and ochlōdes tērion); Ep. 7.330c–331a; cf. Heitsch 1989: 3, 23–29. 97 Pl. Rep. 557b; cf. Schofield 2006: 109. 98 Pl. Rep. 563e–564a: “καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην φιλεῖ εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἐν ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασιν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα.” (trans. P. Shorey).

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“Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution than democracy – from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude.”99 One might think that this view could be rejected rather easily as the product of Plato’s prejudices or, to put it bluntly, his bitter animosity towards Athenian democracy.100 Closer examination, however, reveals that Plato’s view is very much grounded in theory and that he is by no means alone in his condemnation of absolute freedom. An even stronger judgment can be found in some modern philosophers. In a chapter entitled Absolute Freedom and Terror, Hegel concludes that the pursuit of absolute freedom lies at the root of revolutionary terror in France in 1793/94: “Universal freedom, therefore, can produce neither a positive work nor deed; there is left for it only negative action; it is merely the fury of destruction. […] The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too which has no inner significance or inner filling, for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely free self. It is thus the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water.” The German philosopher concludes: “Absolute freedom as pure self-identity thus has within it negation; but this means that it contains difference in general, and this again it develops as an actual difference.”101 The theoretical foundation of Plato’s view lies in the assumption that not a single virtue worthy of the name, and likely to remain so, can exist or be valid on its own. It must always be linked to certain positive values, while simultaneously detaching itself from negative ones. Even the absolute good which unites all virtues in itself requires its opposite, an antipode that will delimitate and define it, as Mikhail Bulgakov simply but exquisitely depicts it in the conversation between

99 Pl. Rep. 564a: ἡ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ πόλει. […] εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας, ἐξ οἶμαι τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία πλείστη τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτη.” (trans. P. Shorey); see Zeitler 1983: 72–76. That the concept of freedom to do what one pleases is the most prominent feature of democratic freedom confirms that Plato’s argument refers primarily to this idea. 100 See, e.g., Frede 1997: 261; Popper 71992: 52. Morawetz (2000: 161) makes the following observation: “Es ist durchaus interessant, daß Aristoteles dieses eigenartige Konstrukt Platons vor dem Hintergrund seiner eigenen, streng empirisch ausgerichteten metabole-Forschungen überhaupt ernst nahm.”; cf. Kersting 22006: 266–269, esp. 268. 101 Hegel 1977: 359–361 (trans. A. V. Miller) – “Kein positives Werk noch Tat kann also allgemeine Freiheit hervorbringen; es bleibt ihr nur das negative Tun; sie ist nur die Furie des Verschwindens. [...] Das einzige Werk und Tat der allgemeinen Freiheit ist daher der Tod, und zwar ein Tod, der keinen inneren Umfang und Erfüllung hat; denn was negiert wird, ist der unerfüllte Punkt des absoluten freien Selbsts; er ist also der kälteste, platteste Tod, ohne mehr Bedeutung als das Durchbauen eines Kohlhauptes oder ein Schluck Wassers. [...] Die absolute Freiheit hat also als reine Sichselbstgleicheit des allgemeinen Willens die Negation, damit aber den Unterschied überhaupt an ihr und entwickelt diesen wieder als wirklichen Unterschied.” (Hegel 1986: 435–438); see also Maurer 1970: 188–189, esp. n. 20; Nippel 2016: 182. In 1793, the slogan Unité, Indivisibilité de la République, Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité ou la mort appeared on the facades of many Parisian houses instead of Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.

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the Devil (Woland) and Yeshua’s disciple (Matthew Levi) in his novel The Master and Margarita.102 Of all the virtues, this probably applies most to freedom, as one can only be free of something. The notion of freedom per se, therefore, presupposes the existence of some boundary or opposite, whatever that may imply.103 This assumption is corroborated in turn by the historical circumstances in which this value system appeared in ancient Greece. Before freedom (eleutheria) became a superior abstract value, it was a simple negation and therefore a form of delimitation and demarcation. Freedom primarily implied the non-loss of social and political status by an individual due to economic, internal or foreign subjugation.104 Key events in the Greek “discovery” of freedom were the Persian Wars, the fall of tyranny in Athens and the emergence of democracy. As a result the notion came to embrace more values and became irreversibly affirmative.105 From then on, above all in Athens, freedom became identified with patriotism, courage, self-sacrifice, self-confidence, local self-government, moral superiority, the rule of law, isonomia, isēgoria, parrhēsia, and other positive values.106 Thus, as much as the meaning and value of freedom increased and was enriched by these values, it was also delimited by them. Both the democrats of Athens and their opponents were well aware of these two evolutionary features in the idea of freedom, confirmed inter alia in its use for propaganda purposes during the Peloponnesian War.107 Due to the internal and external development of Athens, particularly in the second half of the fifth-century, numerous, major, and sometimes unbridgeable gaps opened up between the idealised perception of freedom and reality. Towards the outside, the Athenians reconciled the notion of freedom with the realities of their archē by means of an elaborate ‘ideology of power’.108 Internally, the 102 Bulgakov 1967: 156–157 (trans. M. Glenny): As soon as you appeared on this roof you made yourself ridiculous. It was your tone of voice. You spoke your words as though you denied the very existence of the shadows or of evil. Think, now: where would your good be if there were no evil and what would the world look like without shadow? Shadows are thrown by people and things. There’s the shadow of my sword, for instance. But shadows are also cast by trees and living things. Do you want to strip the whole globe by removing every tree and every creature to satisfy your fantasy of a bare world?’ / ‘You’re stupid.’ / ‘I won't argue with you, old sophist,’ replied Matthew the Levite. 103 Cf. Zeitler 1983: 44–45; Sartori 1987: 301–306, esp. 302, 304; Schofield 2006: 111, 117. 104 See Raaflaub 2004: 23–57; cf. Farrar 2007: 179–180; Hansen 2010: 2–5. Freedom could refer to the whole polis as the battle cry of the fighters at the battle of Salamis in Aeschylus’ Persians shows (402–405): “ὦ παῖδες Ἑλλήνων, ἴτε / ἐλευθεροῦτε πατρίδ᾽, ἐλευθεροῦτε δὲ / παῖδας, γυναῖκας, θεῶν τέ πατρῴων ἕδη, / θήκας τε προγόνων· νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών.” – ‘On, you men of Hellas! Free your native land. Free your children, your wives, the temples of your fathers’ gods, and the tombs of your ancestors. Now you are fighting for all you have’ (trans. H. W. Smyth); see Raaflaub 2004: 61. 105 See Raaflaub 2004: 58–102. 106 See Raaflaub 2004: 203–238. 107 See Raaflaub 2004: 166–202. 108 See Raaflaub 2004: 166–193.

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democrats tried to resolve contradictions by emphasising the integrative, inclusive and protective nature of their understanding of freedom.109 The success of these attempts was dubious, to say the least, since they tended to deepen inconsistencies in understanding rather than to resolve them. The concept of freedom through power did nothing to moderate criticism of Athens’ role as a tyrant city (polis tyrannos), just as the concept of freedom to do what one pleases had failed to reduce the condemnation of the masses for playing that of dēmos tyrannos.110 Furthermore, the Peloponnesian War only intensified the destructive tendencies of Athenian democratic ideology, as they are visible in the Melian Dialogue, the Sicilian campaign and the Arginusae scandal. Overall, then, it seems tempting to conclude that the concept of freedom to do what one pleases, more than any other value concept, had the potential of negating all the values inherent in the democratic ideal of freedom, including freedom itself. Any kind of restriction was foreign to it. The democrats themselves and their opponents were fully aware of this, demonstrating a profound need to set limits to freedom to do what one pleases, or to criticise the lack of them.111 Yet, since freedom to do what one pleases is in principle devoid of any restriction, it makes it possible, as argued by Plato, to assign equal value to any norms, notwithstanding their actual value. Hence the concept necessarily becomes a real fury of disappearance, since it inevitably causes norms to lose their binding character:112 τούτων δέ γέ που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μεγάλοισι τέλεσι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατάγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ ὑποκοριζόμενοι, ὕβριν μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦντες, ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν. ἆρ᾽ οὐχ οὕτω πως, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, νέος ὢν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθέρωσίν τε καὶ ἄνεσιν; [...] Ζῇ δὴ οἶμαι μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκων καὶ χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς· ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν εὐτυχὴς ᾖ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῇ, ἀλλά τι καὶ πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος τοῦ πολλοῦ θορύβου παρελθόντος μέρη τε καταδέξηται τῶν ἐκπεσόντων καὶ τοῖς ἐπεισελθοῦσι μὴ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν ἐνδῷ, εἰς ἴσον δή τι καταστήσας τὰς ἡδονὰς διάγει, τῇ παραπιπτούσῃ ἀεὶ ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν παραδιδοὺς ἕως ἂν πληρωθῇ, καὶ αὖθις ἄλλῃ, οὐδεμίαν ἀτιμάζων ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἴσου τρέφων. [...] καὶ λόγον γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ οὐ προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ παριεὶς εἰς τὸ φρούριον, ἐάν τις λέγῃ ὡς αἱ μέν εἰσι τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἡδοναί, αἱ δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ κολάζειν τε καὶ δουλοῦσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀνανεύει τε καὶ ὁμοίας φησὶν ἁπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἴσου. [...] καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἔπεστιν αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡδύν τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον τοῦτον χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ παντός. – παντάπασιν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, διελήλυθας βίον ἰσονομικοῦ τινος ἀνδρός. – οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ παντοδαπόν τε καὶ πλείστων ἠθῶν 109 110 111 112

See Raaflaub 2004: 227–235. See Raaflaub 2004: 181–193. Cf. Raaflaub 1979: 237–252; Schubert 1993: 77–80. Pl. Rep. 560d–562a (trans. P. Shorey); cf. Hitz 2010: 111–112. The term anarchia serves here as an antonym for kosmios (560d–e). For the intrinsic link between the democratic concept of equality and the wide extent of freedom in private life in Athens; see Jordović 2019: 288– 301, esp. 301.

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μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι· ὃν πολλοὶ ἂν καὶ πολλαὶ ζηλώσειαν τοῦ βίου, παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν τε καὶ τρόπων πλεῖστα ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχοντα. [...] τί οὖν; τετάχθω ἡμῖν κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ, ὡς δημοκρατικὸς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενος; – τετάχθω, ἔφη. “And when they have emptied and purged of all these the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed and occupied, and whom they are initiating with these magnificent and costly rites, they proceed to lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and prodigality and shamelessness, resplendent in a great attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in celebration of their praises they euphemistically denominate insolence ‘good breeding’, licence ‘liberty’, prodigality ‘magnificence’, and shamelessness ‘manly spirit’. And is it not in some such way as this,” said I, “that in his youth the transformation takes place from the restriction to necessary desires in his education to the liberation and release of his unnecessary and harmful desires?” [...] “Then, in his subsequent life, I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time no more on his necessary than on his unnecessary pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the period of storm and stress does not last too long, and as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him passes, and he receives back a part of the banished elements and does not abandon himself altogether to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality, forsooth, and so lives turning over the guard-house of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them all equally.” [...] “And he does not accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honourable and good desires, and others from those that are base, and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he shakes his head at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed.” [...] and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end.” “That is a perfect description,” he said, “of a devotee of equality.” “I certainly think,” said I, “that he is a manifold man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that like that city he is the fair and many-coloured one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities.” [...] “Shall we definitely assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with democracy and would properly be designated as democratic?” “Let that be his place,” he said.

Besides, freedom to do what one pleases contains a profound internal contradiction, since unlimited freedom makes it possible for freedom itself to be abolished. In a famous historical example, this potential was realised in the Athenian assembly’s decision at Colonus in 411 to dissolve democracy. The result was, as Thucydides comments, that the Athenian people were deprived of their freedom, having spent almost a hundred years as subjects to no one and accustomed for over half of that time to rule over subjects of their own.113 As noted by Jacqueline de Romilly “the act of ruling” appears here “as the perfect expression of both internal and external freedom, and, in fact, as a superior freedom”, while Kurt Raaflaub speaks of “a comprehensive ‘hyperconcept’ of power and rule”.114 The threat of the graphē paranomōn and eisangelia required that prior to the decision to abolish democracy, a decree was passed in the same assembly: “that any Athenian should be permitted with impunity to offer any motion he 113 Thuc. 8.67.2–3, 68.4–69.1; see also 6.89.6; 7.69.2. 114 de Romilly 1963: 80; Raaflaub 2004: 189.

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pleased”.115 It can be argued that the possibility to propose in the Assembly with impunity whatever decree or law one pleased is not the same as freedom to do what one pleases. However, there are four arguments against this kind of objection. Firstly, in Athens (open) debate was seen as a precondition for political action.116 Secondly, it seems that Plato anticipates the Austinian speech-act theory, which is fundamental to an understanding of the functioning of the Athenian democracy: the constative role of speech (to state something) is in practice inseparable from its illocutionary and performative function (to make something happen).117 Because of this Plato does not restrict himself to the usage of the term exousia as a synonym for parrhēsia and isēgoria, but equates the freedom to say whatever one pleases with the freedom to do whatever one pleases. At the beginning of the discussion, after Polus asks if he is at liberty to say as much as he likes, Socrates confirms that the greatest freedom to speak is in Athens.118 Soon after, Polus extols the power to do whatever one pleases. Sophocles’ Antigone reveals that the absence of a clear differentiation between the licence to do and to say whatever one pleases came up very early and that it was not a Platonic invention:119 ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τυραννὶς πολλά τ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ εὐδαιμονεῖ κἄξεστιν αὐτῇ δρᾶν λέγειν θ᾽ ἃ βούλεται. But tyranny, blest with so much else, has the power to do and say whatever it pleases.

Thirdly, Morawetz argues convincingly that Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound and Sophocles’ Antigone demonstrate that the licence to do what one pleases aimed from the beginning at denouncing the tyranny of the demos by emphasizing the absolute supremacy of the Assembly and that it does what it pleases not by violating the laws, but by and through them.120 Fourthly, from Polus’ and Gorgias’ statements it is clear that the rhetor’s power to do what he pleases is based on his ability to manipulate the opinion of the masses. The all-powerfulness of the rhetor rests on the omnipotence of the Assembly and its inability to differentiate between what is truly good and what merely seems to be so (orator vs. collective wisdom). 115 Thuc. 8.67.2; “[...] ἐξεῖναι μὲν Ἀθηναίων ἀνατεὶ εἰπεῖν γνώμην ἣν ἄν τις βούληται· [...].”; see also Arist. Ath. Pol. 29.4; cf. Rhodes 1981: 378; Ostwald 1986: 374. The Demophantus’s decree against tyranny and subversion of democracy was passed after the fall of the Four Hundred; see Ostwald 1986: 409, 414–415; Welwei 1999: 405 n. 305, 311. 116 Thuc. 2.40.2–3, 60.5; Dem. 1.1; see Ober 1989: 314–324; Id. 1998: 89; Yunis 1998: 229–232. 117 Ober 1994b: 160–163; Id. 1998: 36–38. 118 Pl. Grg. 461d–e: “Π. τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι; / Σ. δεινὰ μεντἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. – P. What? Won’t I be at liberty to say as much as I want to? / S. Indeed it would be a hard on you, my good friend, if you came to Athens, where there is most liberty to speak in Greece, and then you were the only one here denied it.” (trans. T. Irwin); see also Rep. 557b; Dem. 9.3 (parrhēsia/exousia); cf. Doods 1959: 222; Irwin 1979: 129; Dalfen 2004: 231. 119 Soph. Ant. 506–507 (trans. R. Jebb). 120 See Morawetz 2000: 59–69, 76–81, esp. 68–69, 80–81.

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All this explains why Plato in the Republic establishes a cause-and-effect relationship between the inversion of values as the most destructive consequence of democracy and democracy’s most exalted ideal – absolute freedom.121 It is precisely this unlimited desire for freedom for freedom’s sake that causes democratic man to accord all his basic instincts equal rights and become isonomic man (isonomikos anēr).122 The result of this equation of good and bad desires (pleasures) is the rule of abandon and disorder, not justice.123 As a further result, licentiousness develops, which ultimately results in the emergence of tyrannical man.124 The Republic thus establishes a causal connection between freedom to do what one pleases, inversion of values, licentiousness and the emergence of tyrannical man. Hence, Polus’ emphasis on the excessive power of the rhetor plays a secondary role in Gorgias. The main function of his vigorous advocacy of the power to do what one pleases is to make it obvious that the democratic concept of freedom to do what one pleases is one of the foundations of Callicles’ doctrine of the right of the stronger, as is recognisable from its lack of any order (taxis) and his belief that all desires (epithymiai) are equal. The Republic lists this among the main features of the democratic character.125 Callicles’s striking 121 Pl. Rep. 558c: ταῦτά τε δή, ἔφην, ἔχοι ἂν καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, καὶ εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα. – “These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike!” (trans. P. Shorey), see also Rep. 557b–d. Prior to Plato, it was the Old Oligarch who made the connection between the inversion of values and the rule and freedom of the people (Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.8–13; 2.17–19). Isocrates went an important step further in the Panathenaicus in comparison to the Old Oligarch. In the context of the confusion of notions (values) in the democracy, he mentions alongside freedom the freedom to what one pleases (Isoc.12.131; cf. also 7.20); cf. Roth 2003: 170–171. Nonetheless, both authors failed to grasp the full “potential” offered by the concept of freedom to do what one pleases. 122 Pl. Rep. 560e–561e, esp. 561e; cf. 559d; see Maß 1921: 242–243; Vlastos 1964: 26–27; Zeitler 1983: 73–75; Lisi: 1985, 167–168, 171–172; Blößner: 1997, 276–277; Scott 2000: 19–23; Lombardini 2011: 407–408. 123 Pl. Rep. 560e–561e; cf. Frede 1997: 263; Saxonhouse 1998: 278–282; Kiersting 22006: 280. 124 Pl. Rep. 572d–573d. The universal character of the causal connection between unbounded freedom for freedom’s sake and tyranny is concisely summarised by Alexis de Tocqueville in the chapter Tyranny of the Majority (1863: 332): “Unlimited power is in itself a bad and dangerous thing. Human beings are not competent to exercise it with discretion. God alone can be omnipotent, because his wisdom and his justice are always equal to his power. There is no power on earth so worthy of honour in itself, or clothed with rights so sacred, that I would admit its uncontrolled and all-predominant authority. When I see that the right and the means of absolute command are conferred on any power whatever, be it called a people or a king, an aristocracy or a democracy, a monarchy or a republic, I say there is the germ of tyranny, and I seek to live elsewhere, under other laws.” – (trans. H. Reeve); see also Flaig 2018: 275–285. 125 Pl. Grg. 466b–c, 470d, 471a–d, 493c; 494e–495a, 503e–504d, 508a, Rep. 559d, 560d–561е, esp. 561d; Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.5; cf. Trampedach 1994: 164; Dalfen 2004: 377; Parry 2007: 391– 392, 394; Levin 2014: 29–31. For evidence that taxis and kosmios are synonymous see Dalfen 2004: 413–414, 431–432.

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resemblance to the democratic and isonomic man is revealed by his following remark:126 „ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι᾽ ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. [...] ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν φῂς σὺ διώκειν, ὧδ᾽ ἔχει· τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀνθρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια. The fine and just according to nature is this, what I’m speaking freely (parrhēsiazomenos) of to you now – the man who is to live rightly should let his appetites grow as large as possible and not restrain (kolazein) them, and when these are as large as possible, he must have the power to serve them, because of his bravery (andreia) and wisdom, and to fill them with whatever he has an appetite for at any time. [...] But in truth, Socrates – the truth, you say you pursue – it is this way: luxury (tryphē), intemperance (akolasia), and freedom (eleutheria), if it is well supplied, this is virtue (aretē) and happiness (eudaimonia); and those other things, those ornaments, those agreements of men contrary to nature, those are rubbish (phlyaria), worth nothing.

As far as Callicles is concerned, the inversion of values has already taken place, and he can therefore frankly declare that, according to natural law or the doctrine of might is right, luxury, excess and freedom are in fact virtue and happiness. The interpretation of the absence of any distinction between the different appetites as virtue and happiness discloses Callicles as an advocate of freedom to do what one pleases, and so he can without hesitation label the laws as unnatural human conventions.127 The connection between the inversion of values and the freedom to do what one pleases is also reflected in Callicles’ conclusion that, if Socrates is right in his final refutation of Polus’ theories, all human life is turned upside down.128 Accordingly, Socrates mocks Callicles for being initiated in the Greater Mysteries before the Little.129 The importance of freedom to do what one pleases for characters like Callicles is also discernible in the fact that the term exousia, which it very often means, occurs no less than three times in the Afterlife Myth which serves as definitive proof of Socrates’ position.130 Apparently the state of mind of the democratic man in the Republic is such that he refuses to accept the words of truth when anyone tells him that there are good as well as bad desires, and that the latter should be tamed.131 This would explain why the young Athenian is portrayed in Gorgias as someone who is obviously infested by the worst 126 Pl. Grg. 491e–492c (trans. T. Irwin); see also Grg. 497d, 499a–501c, 504a–505c; Aristoph. Equ. 150–184; Vesp. 548–630, 650–651; Eccl. 214–240; Isoc. 7.20; 12.131; cf. Touloumakos 1986: 33–35; Parry 2007: 396, 402. 127 Pl. Grg. 492c; see also Arist. Pol. 1310a33–36; cf. Trampedach 1994: 164; Schofield 2006: 111, 117, esp. 119. 128 Pl. Grg. 481c; see also 511a. 129 Pl. Grg. 493a, 497c; Pl. Rep. 560d–e; see Dalfen 2004: 371, 373, 389–390; cf. also Edmonds 2017: 197–215 (Alcibiades). 130 Pl. Grg. 525a, 525d, 526a; see Dalfen 2004: 490. 131 Pl. Grg. 492c; Rep. 561b–c; cf. Schofield 2006: 111, 117, esp. 119.

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disease.132 It is for this reason that Callicles persists throughout the Gorgias in turning a deaf ear to Socrates’ arguments and the Afterlife Myth, which are words of truth per se – the genuine physician (Socrates) fails to cure his patient (Callicles) from his severe illness (the democratic ideology). Callicles’ resemblance to the isonomikos anēr and his glorification of tyranny indicate that in the case of the young Athenian, the transformation from democratic to tyrannical man has largely taken place. It is worth emphasising that according to Plato, a man of a tyrannical nature need not necessarily hold the position of a tyrant; he can be a private person (idiōtēs).133 Consequently, there is no contradiction in the assertion that Callicles has a tyrannical temper while intending to take an active political part under democracy. True, Plato is alone in making the connection between value inversion in democracy and the rise of the tyrannical being, but in according absolute freedom a leading role in the emergence of tyrannical man he was preceded by Herodotus. In his Constitutional Debate, the latter has the Persian nobleman Otanes, who favours the rule of the demos, say that freedom to do what one pleases turns every king into a despot.134 Being a historian, he naturally does not perceive this process with a philosopher’s eye and so lacks theoretical consistency and depth. This, along with the concept of patron-tyrant, is an instance of how Plato turns a theory found in Herodotus into its opposite.135 2.7. Polus and Emulating the Happy Tyrant The parallels in the Gorgias between Polus’ views and democratic ideology are not confined to freedom to do what one pleases – as is confirmed by Polus’ opinion that a person who enjoys tyrannical power, who can kill whom he pleases and seize the other’s property, may be considered a happy and enviable man:136 πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὑτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῷ ποιῶν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;

132 Pl. Grg. 504b–505e; see also 478e–479e; 514d, 521a–522e; Rep. 425e–426c; Ep. 7.330c–331a; cp. Balot 2006: 194–196. 133 Pl. Rep. 578a–c; see also Parry 2007: 402. 134 Hdt. 3.80.3. 135 Jordović 2010: 1–15. 136 Pl. Grg. 473b–d (trans. T. Irwin), see also 469a; 470d–e, Leg. 661a–b; Soph. Ant. 506–507. The most fortunate (olbiōtatos) despot Croesus was almost burned alive on a pyre and was saved only by divine intervention (Hdt. 1.30.2–3, 32.1–2, 86–87.2). The tyrant Polycrates, who enjoyed great good fortune (megalē eutychia), was horribly murdered and his corpse then crucified (Hdt. 3.40–44, 125).

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II. The Gorgias What do you say? If someone doing injustice is caught plotting against a tyranny, he’s put on the rack, he’s mutilated, his eyes are burnt out, and when he has himself suffered all kinds of other terrible outrages, and has seen his wife and children suffer them, he’s finally crucified or burnt in a pitch coat, will he be happier than if he escapes punishment, becomes tyrant, and lives out his life ruling in the city, doing whatever he wants to, envied, and congratulated for his happiness by the citizens and by foreigners too? Is this what you say can’t be refuted?

In the typology of tyranny the despot’s happiness is often mentioned in conjunction with envy.137 An excellent example is preserved in a poem by Archilochus of Paros – the earliest testimony for the word tyrant – in which the poet says that he does not envy (zēlos) the ruler of Lydia Gyges, nor yet does he burn for tyrannical power.138 However, Polus’ use of zēloûn, zēlos or zēlōtos in the context of a tyrant’s power to do what he pleases or kill whom he pleases, shows that in this case the word has a deeper meaning than the traditional translation ʽto envyʼ.139 Here too Plato was influenced by Thucydides, who uses zēloûn in several key places of his work in the context of democratic ideology, not in the sense of ‘envying’ someone but rather ‘emulating’, ‘striving after’ ‘aspiring’ towards’ and ‘looking up to’ something. The significance of this second meaning is reflected in the fact that the term zēlōtēs derives from it, meaning emulator, zelous admirer or follower.140 Thus Pericles begins his eulogy of Athenian democracy in the Funeral Oration by stating that Athens does not emulate (zēloûn) any form of government or its laws. On the contrary, the Athenian constitution is imitated by others (mimeomai).141 In the Melian Dialogue, another key place in Thucydides, the Athenians say that that they ou zēloumen the Melians in their irrational hope that the Spartans will save them from destruction. The phrase ou zēloumen is usually translated as “do not envy”, but the entire context indicates that zēloûn can also be understood as an invitation to be looked up to. The Melians’ hope is based on their inability to accept the rules of the right of the stronger, a doctrine the Athenians had presented immediately before,142 concluding that one should adapt oneself to acting according to this doctrine. The following quotation from Pericles’ last speech unequivocally shows that zēloûn is used to point out that the values and perceptions of Athenian democratic ideology should be emulated or looked up to:143

137 Sol. fr. 33W (29a G.-Pr.; 23.1–7 D); Hdt. 1.30.2–4, 32–33; 2.161.2; 3.40–44.1; Aeschyl. Pers. 709–714; Bacchyl. 5.49–55; Soph. OT 1525–1526; cf. Jaeger 51973: 713. 138 Archil. fr. 19 W; see Cobet 1981: 49–50; Parker 1998: 150–152. 139 Pl. Grg. 468e8; 469a1, a4, a11, 473c7. 140 See Frisk 21973: 612. 141 Thuc. 2.37.1; cf. Gaiser 1975: 39. Johannes Kakridis (1961: 23) thinks that this passage also points to the self-sufficient nature of the Athenian constitution. This is further suggested by the fact that Pericles’ statement is preceded by his claim that Athens is the most self-sufficient city (Thuc. 2.36.3); cf. Kallet-Marx 1993: 19, 113. 142 Thuc. 5.105.3. 143 Thuc. 2.64.3–4 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); see also Lys. 2.69. Only non-Athenians are envious because they do not hold the archē. Consequently, apragmōn and zēloûn refer to the Athenians.

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“[...], πόλιν τε τοῖς πᾶσιν εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην ᾠκήσαμεν. καίτοι ταῦτα ὁ μὲν ἀπράγμων μέμψαιτ᾽ ἄν, ὁ δὲ δρᾶν τι καὶ αὐτὸς βουλόμενος ζηλώσει· εἰ δέ τις μὴ κέκτηται, φθονήσει. [you] inhabited a city that was the richest in all things and the greatest. These things the man who shrinks from action (apragmōn) may indeed disparage, but he who, like ourselves, wishes to accomplish something will make them the goal of his endeavour (zēlōsei), while every man who does not possess them will be envious (phthonēsei).

The contrast between zēloûn and phthonein plainly shows that in mentioning the former Pericles expects his fellow citizens to look up to the Athenian archē and identify themselves with it.144 A further argument for the view that in Polus’ case zēloûn should be interpreted as to ‘emulate’, ‘look up to’, ‘strive after’ and not ‘to envy’, is given by Isocrates’ and Xenophon’s Mirror of Princes. In To Nicocles, Isocrates instructs the young ruler to emulate (zēlou) not those who have most widely extended their archē, but those who have made best use of the power they already possess. Nicocles will enjoy the utmost happiness (teleōs eudaimonēsein) not if he rules over the whole world at the price of fear, danger, and baseness, but rather by being the man he should be and by acting with moderation.145 Nicocles should also imitate (mimou) the deeds of men whose reputations he aspires to (zēlois).146 At the end of Euagoras, Isocrates says how he advises young people to study philosophy by praising others, in order that by emulating (zēloûntes) those who are eulogized, they may desire (epithymōsin) to adopt the same pursuits. At the same time he uses the word ‘tyrant’ for Euagoras.147 In Xenophon’s Hiero it is said that due to the joys (euphrosynas) it brings, tyranny is an object of desire (epethymoun) to many and all the world looks up to (ezēloun) the tyrants.148 The fact that zēloûn is linked to epithymein suggests a positive attitude towards its object. Conversely, phthonein implies a negative feeling towards its object, as confirmed at the end of Hiero by the conclusion that the happy (eudaimonōn) tyrant will not be envied by others (ou phtonēthēsē).149 The context in which Polus uses zēloûn and the examples in Thucydides, Isocrates and Xenophon show, therefore, that this term should be understood as expressing more than ‘to envy’ and should be translated with ‘to emulate’, or ‘look up to’.150 This is not an insignificant difference.151 In the former case, the

144 145 146 147 148 149 150

It is also indicative that in an earlier passage where he calls the Athenian archē a tyranny, Pericles explicitly warns of the hate of the allies and enemies of Athens (Thuc. 2.63.1–2). For more details about the notion of apragmōn/apragmosynē see chapters II.3.7. Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa and III.1.4. Philosopher-king. Isoc. 2.26; cf. 3.59. Isoc. 2.38. Isoc. 9.77–78 (emulate); 9.27, 32, 66 (tyrant). Xen. Hier. 1.2, 9; 2.3–5. Xen. Hier. 11.11, 15. See also Hes. Op. 20–26, esp. 23; Archil. fr. 54 West; Thgn. 455; Simon. 584 PMG; Aesch. Ag. 939; Pers. 710, 712; PV 330; Soph. Ant. 1161, OC 943; OT 1526; El. 1027; Aj. 552; cf. Walcot 1978: 2–3. For more examples see Kurke 1991: 123 n. 43.

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term has a negative undertone and signifies a strong but nonetheless superficial feeling – it is possible to envy the tyrant because of the benefits he enjoys without longing for his position of power, in fact one might even reject it.152 The context and mood in which Polus states his opinion eliminate the possibility of a superficial predisposition or negative connotation.153 In the latter case, this term has a more positive connotation. More importantly, it points to the internalisation of certain values and views. The passages quoted from Thucydides together with those in other Platonic dialogues where the meaning of zēloûn, zēlos and zēlōtos is ambiguous, confirm that in the Gorgias zēloûn, zēlos and/or zēlōtos are used to demonstrate that on the individual level a far-reaching process of adopting democratic ideology is involved.154 Several places in which the political context is particularly stressed – for instance in the Republic – show that zēlos and zēloûn are identified with the adoption of certain political and thereby social values.155 The importance Plato attributes to Polus’ use of zēloûn, zēlos and zēlōtos becomes even more apparent when we consider that these terms are only used in two other places in the Gorgias: in the third part of the dialogue, first by Callicles, and then by Socrates.156 Two points may be observed here. First, both interlocutors use zēloûn in connection with democracy – Callicles in a positive and Socrates in a negative sense.157 Secondly, the term is used to emphasise the differences between vita activa and vita contemplativa. All this points to the conclusion that through Polus’ use of zēloûn, zēlos and zēlōtos, Plato wishes to show that the next step following the glorification of Athenian democratic ideology, which Gorgias advocates in the first part of the dialogue, is the emulation or adoption of these values by others, which ultimately produces individuals such as Callicles. That this is precisely Plato’s intention is revealed by Socrates’ comment that Callicles, if he wishes to become the most influential man in the city (acquire great power),

151 On this difference and the difficulties of translating the notion zēlos see Rapp 2002: 674–676. 152 Pind Pyth. 2.89–97; cf. Kurke 1991: 123 with n. 43; Rapp 2002: 674–676. 153 Pl. Grg. 468e, 469a (zēloûn/zēlōtos). Gonzalez Lodge (1890: ad loc) translates zēlōtos in 469a as enviable, and immediately afterwards adds: “By an easy shift, the personal idea is transferred to the action itself.”; cf. also Schmidt 1969: 198; Stauffer 2006: 62. Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides evidence that the notion zēloûn/zēlos might stand for emulation (Arist. Rh. 1388a 29–36); see Sandys 1877: 131–132; Kennedy 1991: 160–162; Rapp 2002: 674–676; Konstan 2007: 259–260. 154 See, e.g., Pl. Phdr. 232a, 233b; Leg. 679c; Symp. 197d, 209d, 213d. 155 Emulation is mentioned twice during the discussion about the decline of timocracy. During the emergence of the oligarchical man, the son is said to have emulated the father (Pl. Rep. 550e, 553a). The democratic man equalizes all values, emulates all life-styles, and therefore many people envy (emulate) him (Pl. Rep. 561c–e). In Protagoras, there is some talk of emulation and imitation amid discussion about learning virtue and the reasons why good men do not teach to their sons the virtue in which they themselves excel (Pl. Prt. 326a). 156 Pl. Grg. 486c–d, 522b. 157 Democracy is not explicitly mentioned, but it is clear from the context that Callicles intends to be politically active in a democratic system.

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must not only imitate (mimētēn) the Athenian demos – who, he hints, is tyrannical – but become genuinely like them in nature (autophyōs homoion toutois):158 εἰ δέ σοι οἴει ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἥτις σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλεύῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός. But if you think anyone will pass on to you some craft which will make you powerful in this city when you are unlike this political system, better or worse than it – then I think you are planning wrongly, Callicles. For you shouldn’t be an imitator, but like them in your own nature if you are to achieve anything genuine towards friendship with the Athenian demos – yes, with Demos the son of Pyrilampes too.

Socrates’ observation is preceded by Callicles’ statement that a disciple who imitates (mimoumenos) his tyrant master, will if he wants, kill and seize property from the one who does not imitate (mē mimoumenon) the tyrant, a statement which strongly reminds us of Polus’ views:159 Σ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν. Κ. οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἑκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα; Σ. οἶδα, ὠγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ᾽ εἰμί, καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα. S. Won’t the greatest evil belong to him when his soul is wretched, and he is disfigured by his imitation of his master and by his power? C. Somehow you always twist the discussion upside down, Socrates. Don’t you know that this imitator will kill that non-imitator of yours, if he wants to, and confiscate all he has? S. Yes, I know it, my good Callicles, if I’m not deaf. I’ve often heard it from you and Polus just now, and from practically everyone else in the city. But now you listen to me too. He will kill him if he wants to, but it will be a base man killing a fine and god man.

One of the central notions of Plato’s thought, and of philosophy in general, is the idea of happiness.160 Yet, as far as the term eudaimonia is concerned, it seems that in the Gorgias Plato is thinking of more than philosophical problems.161 Tyranny 158 Pl. Grg. 513a–b (trans. T. Irwin); see also 511а; Rep. 424a–427a, esp. 425c; Tht. 172e–173b; cf. Flaig 1994: 52. The entire discussion which revolves around the political life in Athenian democracy indicates that Socrates means the Athenian demos when using the term tyrant (Grg. 510a–513d; cf. Arist. 1274a5–7; Dem. 3.30; 23.209); see Ober 1998: 208; Id. 2003: 229–232; Herrmann 2011: 35–8; Brock 2013: 28–30, 115, 155, 159; Sørensen 2016: 44–45. 159 Pl. Grg. 511a–b (trans. T. Irwin). Plato relates to Polus’ thesis here, which is also reflected in Socrates’ comment that a man who submits to a tyrant will have great power in the city (Grg. 466b, 510d). 160 For more details on the notion of eudaimonia in Plato see Perls 1973: 158; Schriefl 2009: 284–288. 161 This does not mean that the metaphysical aspects of the notion of eudaimonia are set aside; see Pl. Grg. 472d–479e.

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is commonly equated with happiness and as Euripides’ Phoenissae reveal, might even be viewed as ‘happy injustice’.162 However, Johannes Touloumakos has shown that the idea of eudaimonia was also politicized under Athenian democracy in the second half of the fifth-century. Hence, eudaimonia was also linked to the power of the demos.163 In Aristophanes’ plays eudaimonia is associated with the claim by the leader of the people that he is acting for the benefit of the demos, as well as with the omnipotence of the demagogues. The famous playwright also links happiness with benefits the Athenians enjoy because of the position of the dēmos monarchos.164 The Funeral Oration, in which happiness is identified with freedom, shows that through Polus’ statement that people envy (zēlōtos) a tyrant and believe the tyrant who does what he pleases to be happy (eudaimonizomenos), Plato is also alluding to democratic value notions.165 It is interesting that in the same context Pericles calls upon his fellow citizens to look up (zēlōsantes) to their compatriots who have bravely laid down their lives for the polis, and therefore for the Athenian archē. More importantly, by freedom Pericles also implies the freedom to do as one pleases, since he has previously named this concept as one of the main aspects of freedom.166 In the Areopagiticus and Panathenaicus, Isocrates too observes that the demos understands freedom to do what one pleases as eudaimonia, which testifies to the fact that it was quite common in democratic Athens to connect freedom to do what one pleases with happiness.167 Polus’s proclamation of freedom to do what one pleases as identical with happiness is finally important for yet another reason. Polus thus anticipates Callicles’ claim that, in accordance with the doctrine of the right of the stronger, licentiousness and freedom are in fact aretē and eudaimonia.168 Again, Polus exposes the link between freedom to do what one pleases and might is right by his 162 Pind Pyth. 3.82–89; Aeschyl. Pers. 709–714; Soph. Ant. 506–507; OT 1525–1526; Eur. Phoen. 506–507, 549; Alc. 653–654; Archel. fr. 250; Beller. fr. 286; Hdt. 1.30.2–4, 32–33; 2.161.2; 3.40–44.1; Democr. DK 68 B 251; Xen. Cyr. 8.7.6–8; Hier. 2.3–5; 11.15; cf. Mastronarde 1994: 288–290, 308. 163 See Touloumakos 1986: 19–37, esp. 33–37. 164 Aristoph. Ach. 656–658; Equ. 150–184, 1163–1164; Vesp. 548–630, 650–651; Eccl. 214–240. 165 Thuc. 2.43.4; Pl. Grg. 473c. Polus’ mention of the atrocities committed by King Archelaus can be interpreted as proof that he who does what he pleases is happy (Grg. 470d–471d). He does not, however, explicitly refer to the concept of freedom to do what one pleases. By specifying King Archelaus’ crimes, Polus shows that, in his view, the Macedonian despot lived in accordance with the most devious form of that concept – to kill whoever one pleases (Grg. 469c). Besides, the marked irony with which Polus says that Archelaus is the most unhappy man clearly points to Socrates’ claim that orators, i.e., tyrants, who do what they please are unhappy (Grg. 468d–469a). The direct connection between the freedom to do what one pleases and the notion of happiness is also implied by the fact that the notion of athlios is first used in connection with that concept and later as an antonym for the notion of eudaimonia (Grg. 469a, 470d, 471a, 471c, 472d, 507c); see also Rep. 576c–d, 577c–578c. 166 Thuc. 2.37.2–3; see Morawetz 2000: 105–106. 167 Isoc. 7.20; 12.131; see Morawetz 2000: 158–159. 168 Pl. Grg. 492c, cf. 491e, 494e–495a.

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reference to the Great King as the embodiment of happiness, since Callicles also refers to Xerxes and Darius in support of his line of argument.169 The degree to which Plato holds freedom to do what one pleases crucial for the development of an ethic of power is seen in the Afterlife Myth, when Socrates declares happiness to be the just life (vita contemplativa), which is diametrically opposed to Callicles’ vita activa. At this point Socrates takes the Great King as an example to warn how licence (exousia), luxury (tryphē), excess (hybris) and incontinence (akrateia) corrupt the soul of the powerful and mighty.170 2.8. Summary The examination of Polus’ views permits several conclusions. Firstly, Polus’ mentioning of Archelaus, apart from providing a time frame, serves to indirectly draw attention to the causal relationship between Polus’ theories and Callicles’ doctrine of the right of the stronger. Secondly, Plato introduces with Polus a generation change in Gorgias, as revealed by the remark that Polus can call as witnesses Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates and Pericles’ entire household to support his claim that Archelaus should be envied. Plato associates Polus with the post-Periclean generation of politicians which continued Pericles’ policies. They were generally loyal to the democratic order and unconditionally supportive of the Athenian archē. Nevertheless, they are associated with the greatest failures of the Athenian demos – the Sicilian campaign, Arginusae, and Aegospotami. The most prominent representative of this generation was Nicias. The third conclusion is that Polus’ mentioning of Archelaus could be related to Antisthenes’ Archelaus and that it anticipates the contrast bios tyrannikos (bios adikos) – bios philosophikos (bios dikaios) from the discussion between Callicles and Socrates. In addition, it alludes to Euripides’ stay at the court of the Macedonian king and to the plays Antiope and Archelaus. The fourth conclusion is that in the second part of the Gorgias Plato alludes in several ways to the Arginusae affair. This trial constitutes the apex of the concept of freedom to do what one pleases and is an excellent example of how this concept can easily turn into power to kill whoever one pleases, as interpreted by Polus. Moreover, the Arginusae trial is the best example of Socrates’ idea that a tyrant or wielder of power does not do what he really wants, even though he can kill and banish whomever he wishes. Finally, Socrates was ultimately alone in opposing the violation of the law during the Arginusae trial. The fifth conclusion is that Plato condemns the democratic concept of freedom to do what one pleases by refuting Polus’ theory of the extraordinary power of 169 Pl. Grg. 470e, 483d. 170 Akrateia (Pl. Grg. 525a); eudaimonia (523a, 525e); exousia (525a, 525d, 526a); Great King (524e–525a); hybris (525a); just life (523a–b, 526c–e); tryphē (525a); see also Ap. 40d (Great King); cf. Dalfen 2004: 490.

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rhetors – since they can do what they please like a tyrant. Plato chose this concept as the main target of his criticism because he thought that it embodied the idea of absolute freedom in Athenian democratic ideology, which in turn engendered the doctrine of might is right and the idea of absolute non-freedom. A closer examination reveals that the concept of freedom to do what one pleases, more than any other value concept, has the potential of negating all the values inherent in the democratic ideal of freedom, including freedom itself. Since it was free of any kind of restriction, freedom to do what one pleases makes it possible to consider all norms as equal in terms of their value, regardless of what that value really is. Besides, freedom to do what one pleases contains a profound internal contradiction, since unlimited freedom makes it possible to abolish freedom itself. For that reason, Plato establishes in the Republic a cause-and-effect relationship between the inversion of values, as the most destructive consequence of democracy and democracy’s most exalted ideal – the absolute freedom. The Republic establishes a causal connection between freedom to do what one pleases, inversion of values, licentiousness and the emergence of a tyrannical man. The sixth conclusion is that the parallels in the Gorgias between Polus’ views and democratic ideology are also confirmed by his opinion that a person who enjoys tyrannical power, who can kill whom he pleases and seize the property of others may be considered a happy and enviable man. However, Polus’ use zēloûn, zēlos and zēlōtos shows that the word has a deeper meaning in this case than the traditional translation of ‘envy’. The context in which Polus uses zēloûn, zēlos and zēlōtos and the examples in Thucydides show that this term should be understood as expressing more than ‘to envy’ and should be translated with ‘to emulate’, ‘strive after’ or ‘look up to’. In the Gorgias, zēloûn, zēlos and zēlōtos are thus used to demonstrate that a far-reaching process of internalization of democratic ideology is taking place at the individual level (Callicles). The seventh conclusion is that Polus’s proclamation of freedom to do what one pleases as identical with happiness not only reflects the influence of democratic ideology, but also foresees Callicles’ claim that, in accordance with the doctrine of the right of the stronger, licentiousness and freedom are in fact virtue and happiness. We now need to look at the third part of Gorgias and the correlations between Callicles’ position and the democratic ideology of freedom and power.

3. CALLICLES Socrates’ third and last interlocutor is Callicles. Although the dialogue Gorgias was not named after him, he is in fact the main dramatis persona. It is he who opens the dialogue, and it concludes by invoking his name. His discussion with Socrates is twice as long as that of Polus and three and a half times longer than that of Gorgias.1 Callicles is the paradigm of an individual who thinks solely in categories of power and believes only in might is right.2 With his doctrine of the right of the stronger, he is the absolute antipode to Socrates’ philosophy and his rejection of the talion principle. Socrates himself says on numerous occasions that Callicles represents an ideal testing ground for his views,3 and Callicles confirms that this is true. Unlike Gorgias and Polus, he persists throughout in turning a deaf ear to Socrates’ arguments. Their opposition to each other is far from superficial, as both not only underline differences between vita activa and vita contemplativa, but also openly warn the other that their way of life leads to disaster.4 The last part of the dialogue begins with Callicles’ sudden question whether Socrates means seriously what he is saying to Polus, since if he does, then the whole life is turned upside down.5 Socrates answers that he is in love with philosophy and Alcibiades, while Callicles loves the Athenian demos and Demos, son of Pyrilampes. Socrates immediately adds that he speaks like this because he is listening to his beloved – philosophy.6 In the long speech that follows, Callicles presents his main arguments. First he makes the same objections as Polus has earlier and explains that his predecessor had only yielded to shame in backing down before Socrates’ argument that it is worse to do injustice than to suffer it.7 Then he expounds his doctrine of the right of the stronger according to which the weaker (elements in the polis) had established laws to oppress the stronger, since it is just by nature for the ʽstrongerʼ to have more and to rule over the weaker.8 Callicles does not stop at that but goes on to state that philosophy is good only for young people, while it incapacitates mature men for public life, which may in the end cost them their lives.9 Socrates responds to these fierce attacks by saying that 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Pl. Grg. 447a, 527e; see Fussi 2000: 49. Socrates’ discussion with Callicles comprises forty– five Stephanus pages (Grg. 481c–527e), that with Polus twenty (461b–481b), and that with Gorgias twelve (449c–461b); cf. Ostwald 1986: 244 with n. 169; Rutherford 1995: 141–142; Doyle 2006: 600. See Kahn 1996: 126. Paul Shorey (1933: 22) attributes to Callicles „the most eloquent statement of the immoralist’s case in European literature.“ Pl. Grg. 486d–488b, 485a–e; 500c. Pl. Grg. 486a–b, 519a–b. Pl. Grg. 481b–c. Pl. Grg. 481d–482c. Pl. Grg. 482c–483a. Pl. Grg. 483b–484c. Pl. Grg. 484c–486d.

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he is lucky to have met Callicles, since he is an ideal person with whom to examine his views.10 From that moment on, Socrates poses questions that aim at exposing weaknesses and inconsistencies in the doctrine of the right of the stronger: Are stronger and better identical? Who are the better? Should one be master of himself? Are pleasure and good identical? How should a person live? Is political art (rhetoric) directed at the welfare of soul or the gratification of pleasures?11 Callicles replies that the better (stronger) are those who are wiser, more intelligent in the city’s affairs and have courage, and that they should rule and have more than the less worthy; that one should not practise temperance, since moderation is shameful, and desires should be given free reign; and that Themistocles, Miltiades, Cimon, and Pericles were good rhetors and statesmen.12 However, the more Socrates, by using elenchus (form of inquiry and discussion), forces Callicles to contradict himself, the more the latter demonstrates an unwillingness to take an active part in the conversation.13 Socrates therefore begins a dialogue with himself and shows that it is more shameful to suffer than to do injustice.14 He goes on to say that friendship with the ruler (in this case the demos) can bring protection against suffering injustice, but cannot save a person from doing injustice and thereby corrupting his soul with the greatest evil. Accordingly, saving oneself even from death at this price is a too high price to pay.15 The statesman’s true goal is to improve his fellow citizens, and so Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles were not good statesmen.16 However, it is Alcibiades and Callicles who will be declared the main culprits, even though they are only accomplices.17 Socrates then predicts that he himself will be convicted, but only because he was a true statesman.18 In the end, Socrates tells the myth of how Zeus founded a righteous court for the deceased – this is the Afterlife Myth. Since everything is revealed in this court, the naked soul of every deceased person receives the reward it truly deserves. So, in the end, even the most powerful oppressors will not evade their rightful punishment.19 Callicles remains silent to all this, a clear sign that Socrates has failed to reach him with his arguments, and this is how the Gorgias ends.20

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Pl. Grg. 486d–488b. Pl. Grg. 488d, 489d, 491d, 495а, 500c–d, 501b, 502e–503a, 512e, 513d–e. Pl. Grg. 490a, 491a–492c, 503b–c. Pl. Grg. 497b–c, 499b, 505c–d, 506b–c, 507a, 510a, 516b, 519d–e. Pl. Grg. 505e–509e. Pl. Grg. 510a–513d. Pl. Grg. 513e–519d. Pl. Grg. 519a–b. Pl. Grg. 521c–522e. Pl. Grg. 523a–526d. Pl. Grg. 527e.

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3.1. Callicles and Alcibiades’ Generation In the Gorgias, Callicles represents another generation than Polus does, less because of the age difference that cannot have been great, than because of Callicles’ very strong advocacy of might is right. Nothing certain can be said about his identity, nor is there any reliable information about his date of birth.21 All references are indirect. Socrates says that Callicles loves Demos, who was born about 440 and was the son of Pericles’ close associate Pyrilampes.22 Andron, the son of Androtion, who is mentioned as Callicles’ friend, was born in 450. Even though he himself belonged to the regime of the Four Hundred, after their fall he accused some of their leaders of high treason.23 Socrates’ statement that Callicles is beginning to pursue public affairs indicates that at the dialogue’s dramatic time his interlocutor was a fairly young man.24 These circumstances indicate that Callicles was born around the middle of the fifth-century. That Socrates places Callicles and Alcibiades on the same level confirms that, according to Plato, Callicles represents Alcibiades’ generation.25 It is worth noting that for contemporaries of the most controversial Athenian politician of the late fifth-century, the issue of his youth was not as crucial as is usually believed.26 Alcibiades did not differ so much in age from some of his political opponents, such as Nicias, Aristocrates and Pericles the Younger, as in his extremely aggres-

21 That Callicles is not a fictional character, is supported by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1920: 208–209; Barker London 41951: 81; Dodds 1959: 12; Guthrie 1969: 102; Jaeger 51973: 718; Irwin, 1979: 110; Roßner 1998: 177; Nails 2002: 75; Groarke 2008: 101. The opposite view cannot be ruled out but has several serious weaknesses. Although much about Callicles remains unknown, there is a fair amount of information about him and his entourage. Furthermore, the Gorgias was written for Athenian upper class readers, particularly in intellectual circles, and it is highly unlikely that Plato would have dared to associate a fictional character with real persons such as Andron, Demos and Chaerephon. Besides, Pyrilampes was not just Demos’ father, but also Plato’s step-father, because Plato’s mother had remarried after the death of her first husband (Pl. Prm. 126a–c; Procl. comm. in Pl. Prm. 126); see Davies 1971: 300–301; Scholz 1998: 75; Dalfen 2004: 313. The lack of information about Callicles’ political activities might be due to his possibly premature and violent death, a fate suffered by many Athenians during the Peloponnesian War; see Dodds 1959: 13; cf. Hoffmann 1997: 111–112. 22 Pl. Grg. 481d–e, 513b; Chrm. 158a; Ar. Vesp. 97–98; Ach. 61–63; Plut. Per. 13.15; see Davies 1971: 169–170; Nails 2002: 124. The relationship between erastēs and erōmenos points out that Callicles was somewhat older than Demos. 23 Pl. Grg. 487c; Prt. 315c; see Davies 1971: 34; Ostwald 1986: 246, 401–402, esp. n. 223; Nails 2002: 28–29; Dalfen 2004: 346. 24 Pl. Grg. 515a; Nails 2002: 75. 25 Pl. Grg. 481d, 519a. This is one of the reasons why so many scholars believe that Alcibiades or Critias are the true persons behind the name of Callicles; cf. Kriegsbaum 1913: 37–38; Dodds 1959: 12; Guthrie 1969: 299; Jaeger 51973: 410, 718; Apelt 1998: 167–168 n. 1; Roßner 1998: 177–178; Vickers 1999: 267–268. 26 The generation gap often suspected to have existed at the time of Alcibiades is not to be taken seriously. Alcibiades “youth” is stressed for the purpose of denouncing his egotistical and unscrupulous character, see Jordović 2008: 20–21.

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sive foreign policy and his arrogance in both public and private life, which could easily have been interpreted as a sign of hubris.27 Seeing that Callicles advocates the right of the stronger, evidences a profound contempt for the masses, and idealises tyrannical rule, we might well ask how such a person can be called a democrat. In fact, no one, including Plato, claims explicitly that he is one. All the latter wants to prove is that democratic ideology is responsible for transforming Callicles into someone who is very close to, if not identical with, the tyrannical man in the Republic. Callicles does not believe in democratic principles, but he has (in modern terminology) been indoctrinated (brainwashed) by them.28 He is therefore prepared to become politically engaged within the democratic system even though he is not its supporter.29 For the same reason, Socrates constantly reproves Callicles for his complete ideological subordination to the demos.30 This excerpt from Alcibiades’ speech in Sparta in 415/414 may be seen as a reflection of such a mindset:31 ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προέστημεν, δικαιοῦντες ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἐτύγχανε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὖσα καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασῴζειν, ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι. ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο· [...]. But it was of the whole people that we were leaders, deeming it right to help preserve that form of government under which the state had, as it chanced, attained its highest greatness and completest freedom, and which had come down to us – for as to democracy of course, all of us who have any sense well understood what it was, and I better than anyone, inasmuch as I have been most injured by it; but indeed nothing new can be said about an admitted folly [...].

Alcibiades, in effect, admits that he came to terms with the rule of the people only out of a lust for power. The unmistakable positivity of ‘most great’ and ‘most free’, which are synonymous with Athenian archē, allow the conclusion that in Alcibiades’ view it is perfectly reasonable to identify oneself with the empire, as it brings ultimate power and freedom. However, the disparaging ‘admitted folly’ indicates that he approves popular rule only as long as it satisfies his need for a leading position in political life.32 Analysis so far has shown that Socrates’ discussions with Gorgias and Polus serve as an introduction to that with Callicles, especially by pointing to the evolution of Callicles’ theories and their dependence on democratic ideology. From the very beginning of the third part of the dialogue it can be seen that Callicles takes over a great deal from his predecessors and that he is reproducing democratic ideas. 27 Cf. Jordović 2005: 140–168. Nonetheless, Alcibiades acted within the framework of the Athenian democratic order. He is reminiscent of Callicles in this respect as well. 28 The highest level of indoctrination does not imply that one conscientiously and openly believe in a certain ideology, but adopt its principles without being aware of them. 29 Pl. Grg. 485d–e, 500c, 515e, 517a–b, 519b. 30 Pl. Grg. 481d–e, 513a–b, 518a–b, 518e–519а; see Ober 1998: 205–209. 31 Thuc. 6.89.6 (trans. Ch. F. Smith, with minor changes); see Hornblower 2008: 514-515. 32 Thuc. 6.16.1 (archein), 4–5 (ison/isomorein); cf. Ober 1998: 110.

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3.2. Callicles and Shame The notion of shame (aidōs/aischynē) can prove invaluable for an understanding of the character of Callicles.33 In previous studies, Plato’s use of this term in key places of the dialogue was either given insufficient consideration, or attention was directed to its connection with Gorgias and Polus.34 Scholars therefore often concluded that Plato uses the term to achieve two related goals: first, to show that Socrates’ interlocutors inwardly share his beliefs,35 and second, to place Gorgias and Polus in a position which denies them any opportunity of seriously questioning Socrates’ views:36 „ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν παθόντος Πώλου πάθος ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ᾽ αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ φαίη· διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν. καί σου καταγελᾶν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς, τότε. νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔπαθεν. καὶ ἔγωγε κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. Socrates, I think you swagger in your speeches, as if you were really a mob-orator. And now you’re making this speech when you’ve done the same thing to Polus that Polus was denouncing Gorgias for letting you do to him. For remember he said that you asked Gorgias whether, if anyone wanting to learn rhetoric came to him without knowing just things, he would teach him. The Gorgias was ashamed, said Polus and said he would teach him, because of man’s habit, since they would be offended if someone said he couldn’t teach about just things. Because of this agreement, said Polus, Gorgias was forced to contradict himself, and this is exactly what you like. And then Polus laughed at you, rightly, I think. But now you have done the same thing over again to him. And for just this I can’t admire Polus myself, for his concession to you that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it; for from this agreement he himself in turn was bound up by you in the argument, and was muzzled, after being ashamed to say what he thought.

These interpretations are certainly reasonable but not fully satisfactory. Undeniably, shame in a culture such as that of Greece was an effective regulatory mechanism and therefore a powerful argument in debate.37 This, however, does not entirely explain why Callicles’ shamelessness and the sense of shame shared by Gorgias and Polus are also strongly emphasised in the third part of the dialogue.38 Several observations on Plato’s motive show that it must have been deep and serious, and 33 These terms appear in the Gorgias more than 75 times; see Race 1979: 197. 34 Pl. Grg. 461b, 482c–d, 487a–b, 508b–c. 35 See Mckim 1988: 36ff.; Kahn 1996: 138; Rechenauer 2002: 248. It is important to note that elenchein, which is used to describe Socrates’ method of enlightening himself and others, also means to disgrace, dishonour, see Tarnopolsky 2007: 290–291. 36 Pl. Grg. 482c–e (trans. T. Irwin); see Dalfen 2004: 214, 227, 479. 37 Pl. Grg. 487b; see Adkins 1960: 154–156; Dover 1974: 236–242; Herman 2006: 164–165. 38 Pl. Grg. 482c–d, 487a–b, 494d, 508b–c.

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that the notion of shame in the conversation between Callicles and Socrates serves three additional functions. For those who sympathised with the rule of the demos, the notion of shame was an important moral and political category. In his famous myth about the origin of humans and cities, the pro-democratic Protagoras declares aidōs and dikē to be conditions of political skill (politikē technē) or political virtue (politikē aretē) without which communal life would be impossible.39 In the Funeral Oration, Pericles restricts the concept of freedom to do what one pleases by pointing out that the violation of unwritten laws brings shame (aischynē).40 In Aristophanes’ Clouds, the Better Argument, embodying old democratic virtues, claims that it will teach the young to be ashamed of doing wrong, to respect their elders and parents, and avoid anything that could endanger the image of holy Shame (Aidous).41 The Worse Argument, on the other hand, represents the new kind of education with which Socrates is linked. It advocates following one’s desires (hēdonai) for young boys, women, food and drink, since they are necessities of nature (physeōs anankas), and states that there can be no shame (aischron) or wrong in that.42 Plato hints at a political connotation in the notion of shame in Gorgias, with Socrates’ many links between Callicles’ willingness to speak freely (parrhēsia) and shamelessness (aischynē).43 This is relevant insofar as the idea of parrhēsia occupies a central position among the democratic values.44 In Aristophanes’ Knights, shamelessness (anaideia) is the sole leader (monē prostatei) of the Athenian politicians (rhētorōn).45 The rivalry between the Paphlagon, who stands for the notorious demagogue Cleon, and the sausage-seller is actually a competition to see who will outdo the other in shameless speaking.46 At the same time it becomes clear that shameless speaking is to be equated with shameless acting.47 Aristophanes demonstrates that shamelessness is one of the distinguishing features of the selfish and unscrupulous demagogues.48 These examples suggest, therefore that the first function of shame in the third part of the Gorgias is to place Callicles’ views in the context of an ongoing democratic debate on the qualities of the good citizen and good leadership.49

39 Pl. Prt. 322c–d; cf. Erffa 1937: 194–195, see also 52; cf. also Cairns 1993: 355–360; Trampedach 1994: 179–181; Farrar 1998: 96–97, 102, 116; Manuwald 1999: 195–199. 40 Thuc. 2.37.3; cf. Erffa 1937: 189; Cairns 1991: 359 n. 47. 41 Ar. Nub. 991–995; Erffa 1937: 173–174; Dover 1968: LVII–LXVI; MacDowell 1995: 136–142. This place in the Clouds highlights the close connection between aidōs, aischynē and aischron; cf. Sommerstein 1982: 209–210; for Plato see Kahn 1983: 96, n. 19; Dalfen 2004: 239–240. 42 Ar. Nub. 1071–1082; see Ostwald 1986: 265–266; Dalfen 2004: 380. 43 Pl. Grg. 487a–b, 487d, 492c–d, see also Isoc. 16.22–23. 44 Ar. Thesm. 541; Pl. Rep. 557b; Dem. 18.77; 21.123–124; see Raflaub 2004: 223–224. 45 Ar. Eq. 276–277, 324–325, 409–410. 46 Ar. Eq. 275–77, 384–385, 397–399, 409–410, 1206. 47 Ar. Eq. 273–487, 624–682, 694–720, 730–749, 764–950, 1005–1110, 1153–1253. 48 Ar. Eq. 190–193. 49 This is also suggested by the fact that Callicles regards shame as a convention (kata nomon); see Race 1979: 199.

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Rejection of shame as a value turns up in the doctrine of the right of the stronger in Thucydides and the tyrannical character in the Republic. In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenian negotiators ardently advise the Melians not to have any consideration for the feeling of shame (aischynē) and, when making their final decision, to be guided solely by Realpolitik or the principles of the right of the stronger.50 When Plato in the Republic talks about the emergence of democratic man and the inversion of values that accompanies it, he constantly reverts to shame.51 Giving free rein to desires stimulates the emergence of shamelessness in democratic man.52 However, the process of moral corruption is not complete before in the next generation,53 in tyrannical man, son of democratic man, the absence of any form of shame becomes one of the chief traits.54 [...] καὶ ἐάν τινας ἐν αὐτῷ δόξας ἢ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὠθεῖ παρ᾽ αὑτοῦ, ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης, μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ. παντελῶς, ἔφη, τυραννικοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέγεις γένεσιν. [...] and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.” “A perfect description,” he said, “of the generation of the tyrannical man.”

In the Gorgias, Socrates emphatically and frequently criticises the young protagonist of might is right for his lack of shame, and even hints that he is shameless, a catamite:55 Κ. ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος. Σ. τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκρίνου μόνον. C. How absurd you are, Socrates – a real mob orator. S. Yes, Callicles. You see that’s how I shocked both Polus and Gorgias, and made them ashamed. But you certainly won’t be shocked or ashamed – you’re brave. Now just answer.”

Callicles himself scornfully rejects any feeling of shame and claims that, in keeping with nature, desires should be given free rein, that the weak are ashamed of their inability to do so and so pronounce licentiousness shameful:56 50 Thuc. 5.111.3; see Erffa 1937: 188–189; cf. also Hornblower 2008: 248. The Melians have just stressed their confidence that the Lacedaemonians will come to their aid because of their kinship and their sense of shame (Thuc. 5.104.5). 51 For connections between this passage and the Gorgias see Kobusch 1996: 52, 57, 59–60. 52 Pl. Rep. 560a, 560d–561e. 53 Pl. Rep. 560a, 561a–562a, 562e–563a, 571a, 574c, esp. 572b–d. 54 Pl. Rep. 573a–b (trans. P. Shorey), see also 562e, 568e–569b, esp. 571a, 571c–d, 572d–573c, 575a, 576b. 55 Pl. Grg. 494d–e (trans. T. Irwin), see also 487a–b, 489a, 492d, 494c–e; Ar. Eq. 1242. The significance of kinaidos is underlined by the fact that here it seems to have been substituted for the first time for the notion of katapygōn, which is used to describe a licentious and sexually insatiable person. It is possible that Plato uses the term kinaidos here because of its connection with aidōs; see Davidson 2002: 198–199, 201; Dalfen 2004: 380. 56 Pl. Grg. 491e–492a (trans. T. Irwin), see also 482d–e. Furthermore, Socrates qualifies Callicles’ equation of values as parrhēsia; cf. Tarnopolsky 2010: 96–100. In the context of

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II. The Gorgias ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι᾽ ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ οἶμαι τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσιν τοὺς τοιούτους δι᾽ αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δή φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, [...]. No. The fine and just according to nature is this, what I’m speaking freely of to you now – the man who is to live rightly should let his appetites grow as large as possible and not restrain them, and when these are as large as possible, he must have the power to serve them, because of his bravery and wisdom, and to fill them with whatever he has an appetite for at any time. But I think this isn’t in the power of the many. And so they blame these people out of shame, concealing their own powerlessness, and say that intemperance is actually shameful, [...].

Bearing in mind that Gorgias and Polus accept Socrates’ argument because they feel ashamed, the fact that Callicles adheres to his views to the end, even after the contradictions of his theory have been pointed out to him, can be taken as another sign that any sense of shame is foreign to him.57 This goes to show that the second function of shame in the Gorgias is to demonstrate to the reader that in Callicles’ case the transformation of democratic into tyrannical man has largely taken place. In previous chapters we have shown that Callicles in many ways relies on what Gorgias and Polus have had to say. However, so as not to blame the sophists – instead of democratic ideology – as the main culprits for Callicles’ way of thinking, and also for dramaturgical reasons, Plato contrives to create an artificial distance between the three. He achieves this through the notion of shame. This third function of shame can best be observed through the example of Callicles’ attitude towards the opinion of the crowd. In the debate between Polus and Socrates it becomes clear that Polus, although evincing a disturbingly frivolous attitude towards morality, remains within the boundaries of convention,58 while Socrates, rejecting the lex talionis and advocating a different understanding of shame, has completely broken away.59 However, by criticizing Polus’ sense of shame, Callicles succeeds in turning the entire situation around.60 Socrates is now

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his critique of the inversion of values in a radical democracy, Isocrates notes that the democrats confuse parrhēsia with equality (Pl. Grg. 492c–d; Isoc. 7.20). Pl. Grg. 494a–b, 497a–c, 499b, 501c, 505c–d, 506b–c, 510a, 513c–d, 515e–516d, 522e, 527c–e; cf. Cooper 1999a: 52; Dalfen 2004: 381, 395–396; contra Gigon 1959: 110; Kahn 1996: 136; Kobusch 1996: 51. Pl. Grg. 468e–469a, 470c–d, 471c–472b; cf. Sol. fr. 33 W (29a G.-Pr.). Socrates emancipates himself in the Gorgias from the traditional – and democratic – perception of shame by being exclusively guided by justice rather than the opinion of the multitude (469b–c, 479c–d, 480c–e, 482b–c, 508d–e, 509b–c, 522c–e, 527b–d). The same conclusion can be reached from arguments in other Platonic dialogues (Ap. 28b, 29d–e, 35a– b; Cri. 46d–47d, 49); see Adkins 1960: 155–156; Vlastos 1991: 179–199; Id. 1995a: 30–42; Trampedach 1994: 162; Ober 1998: 168, 176–177, 181, 184–186; Rechenauer 2002: 249– 250; Dalfen 2004: 228, 265–266. That is exactly Plato’s intention, as Callicles at this point accuses Socrates of having turned human life upside down (Pl. Grg. 481c). Socrates’ “happiness” at finally finding a touchstone, in other words, a real challenge to his views, has the same effect (Pl. Grg. 486d–487e). His

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the one advocating the opinions of the masses, while Callicles presents himself as an uncompromising opponent of conventional beliefs as the demos holds them.61 Thanks to this ploy, Callicles is the first to get an opportunity to expound his faith in the right of the stronger as something contrary to the beliefs of the majority.62 3.3. Callicles and Erōs The notion of love (erōs) is important to the third part of the Gorgias, since it is crucial in helping us understand the paradox that Callicles represents the right of the stronger while at the same time being completely under the spell of democratic ideology. From the outset of the third part of the dialogue, Plato underlines the importance of erōs and Socrates’ linking of it to democratic ideology, immediately after Callicles joins the discussion and turns to his new interlocutor with an unusual analogy. Both men have two loves: Socrates philosophy and Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, while Callicles loves the Athenian demos and Demos, son of Pyrilampes. Both have found that they lack strength to oppose the objects of their love. In Socrates’ case, this is mainly philosophy, while with Callicles it is the Athenian demos. Meanwhile, Alcibiades and Demos are allotted supporting roles in the comparison:63 λέγω δ᾽ ἐννοήσας ὅτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταὐτόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἑκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου· ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλεύμασίν τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἑκάστοτε ἃ διὰ τούτους λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπά ἐστιν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὅτι εἰ μή τις παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ παύσῃ ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καί μοί ἐστιν τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ ἧττον ἔμπληκτος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, [...]. I say this realizing that you and I are now actually affected the same way; each of us is a lover of two beloveds, I of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias and of philosophy, and you of two beloveds, the demos of Athens and the Demos of Pyrilampes. Yes, I notice you each time, clever though you are – whatever your beloved says and however he says things are, you can’t contradict him, but you change this way and that. In the Assembly, if you’re saying something and the Athenian demos it’s not so, you change and say what it wants. And with praise of Callicles’ benevolence, friendship and frankness is shown to be false in the course of the dialogue; cf. Szlezák 1985: 196–199. 61 Pl. Grg. 481b–c, 482c–483a; cf. Kobusch 1978: 96–97. 62 Pl. Grg. 483a–484b. 63 Pl. Grg. 481d–482a (trans. T. Irwin).

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II. The Gorgias this fine young man the son of Pyrilampes you’re affected in other similar ways. For you’re incapable of opposing the proposals and speeches of your beloved; and if someone were amazed whenever you say the things you say because of your beloveds, at how absurd these things are, then no doubt you’d tell him, if you wanted to tell him what’s true, that unless someone stops your beloved from saying these things, you’ll never stop saying them either. And so you must suppose that you’re bound to hear the same sorts of things from me. Don’t be amazed that I say these things, but stop my beloved, philosophy, saying them. For she says what you hear from me now, my friend; she’s much less impulsive than my other beloved. For this son of Cleinias says now this, now that; but philosophy says always the same.”

Aristophanes and Euripides reveal that Socrates’ analogy does not represent anything unusual and does not stand apart from the terminology of the time. It may be seen from the Knights, the Acharnians and the Birds that the supporters of democracy often called themselves lovers of the demos, including the notorious demagogue Cleon.64 In the Phoenician Women, Polynices says that everyone loves his fatherland.65 Thucydides offers the best evidence that Socrates’ claim of Callicles loving the Athenian demos can be interpreted as an echo of democratic ideology. Thus Pericles in the Funeral Oration calls upon his fellow citizens to be lovers (erastai) of the power of Athens:66 [...], ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, [...]. Nay rather you must daily fix gaze upon the power of Athens and become lovers of her, and when the vision of her greatness has inspired you, reflect that all this has been acquired by men of courage who knew their duty and in the hour of conflict were moved by a high sense of o honour, [...].

Pericles’ appeal reflects an idealised relation between the lover and the beloved, as between the citizen and his polis. In such a relationship both sides exhibit selfcontrol, mutual respect and reciprocity. It follows that the relationship is not based on the submission or domination of either. The citizen is energetically engaged in the welfare of his polis, and the community in turn recognises and values his contribution in the appropriate manner.67 By equating the relationship between 64 Ar. Eq. 727, 732–735, 746–748, 769–773, 790–791, 820, 1163–1164, 1340–1344, esp. 732– 735, 1163–1164, 1340–1344; Ach. 143; Av. 1278–1279, 1316; Nub. 1187; see also Isoc. 8.121; see Connor 1971: 97; Crane 1998: 318–319; Brock 2013: 115–116, 154–155. Another related notion is philopolis (Thuc. 2.60.5; 6.92.2, 4; Ar. Lys. 545; Pl. Ap. 24b; see also Pl. Ap. 29d); cf. Connor 1971: 102–103; Hornblower 1991: 333; Peterson 2011: 40. The enemies of the rule of the people were called ‘lovers of monarchy’ (Ar. Vesp. 474). 65 Eur. Phoen. 358–359; see also Aesch. Eum. 852. 66 Thuc. 2.43.1 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); see also 60.5; cf. Kakridis 1961: 88; Immerwahr 1973: 27– 28; Monoson 1994: 253–276; Yunis 1996: 81; Crane 1998: 319. Pericles’ usage of erotic expressions was stimulated by Aeschylus (Aesch. Eum. 851–856); see HCT II: 137; Monoson 2000: 72; Ludwig 2002: 132; cf. also Sommerstein 1989: 250. One of the abstract deities introduced into the Athenian religion at the time of democracy was Erōs, see, Parker 1996: 227–242; Herman 2006: 338. 67 See Monoson 2000: 64–87, esp. 77–87. The conclusions reached by Sara Monoson seem to be correct, but her stressing of the significance of penetration, under the influence of Michel

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polis and citizen with that of lover and beloved, a more active and passionate relationship is established than in traditional comparisons of patriotism with the relationship between parent (the fatherland) and child.68 In Thucydides, erōs is associated with another phenomenon – Athenian imperialism, the central theme of the Sicilian Debate. Nicias says that older citizens should not be ashamed (mē kataischynthēnai) to oppose the campaign, nor to be sick lovers (dyserōtas) of things unattainable.69 At the end of the Sicilian Debate, Thucydides himself concludes that the Athenians have been overcome by erōs to set out on this major campaign.70 This double mention of erōs in the context of the imperialist spirit of the Athenian archē shows that its citation by Pericles in the Funeral Speech in the context of Athens’ power (dynamis) and greatness (megalē) cannot be mere coincidence.71 In Gorgias, the notion of erōs not only places Callicles and his beliefs in a democratic context, it is also intended to explain his internal contradictions, how it is possible for him to advocate the right of the stronger while blinded by democratic ideology. Although nowhere in his works did Plato develop a comprehensive and integral theory of love, Phaedrus and the Symposium are instructive for an understanding of the subject, since the views they contain help to explain how Socrates and Callicles were possessed by one and the same erōs, but to very different effect.72 The first part of Phaedrus is composed of three speeches on the nature of erōs. By differentiating between good and bad erōs, Lysias’s oration and Socrates’ first speech in many ways reflect a traditional understanding of love.73 However, after his first speech, Socrates essentially distances himself from this standpoint and in the second speech and palinode declares that erōs represents a whole and as such can lead to true knowledge.74 Socrates counts erōs as a form of divine madness (mania).75 One of its outstanding characteristics is that beauty, unlike justice, prudence and other eternal Forms, is the only one that can be immediately recognised in its earthly manifestation.76 The lover, possessed by the divine madness of erōs, at first yearns for physical beauty. Through his desire, he begins to divine the radiance of the Beautiful-itself and to recall it, while longing grows in him for the eternally

68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76

Foucault and Kenneth Dover, seems to be too one-dimensional, see Davidson 2004: 78–118, esp. 86, 92, 94–5, 97–98, 114–118. See Ludwig 2002: 333. Thuc. 6.13.1; cf. 3.45.5; Eur. Hipp. 193; see Rengakos 1984: 111; Hornblower 1991: 436; Id. 2004: 73; Id. 2008: 335. Thuc. 6.24.3; cf. Eur. IA 808–809; see Ludwig 2002: 135; Hornblower 2008: 361. Cf. Ober 1998: 198; Raaflaub 2006b: 203; Shanske 2007: 46–47; Taylor 2010: 147–149. See Ferrari 1992: 248; Kraut 2008: 287. For the translation of erōs as love see Halperin 1985: 161–163; Ferrari 1992: 269. Pl. Phdr. 231a–234c, 237a–241d; cf. also Symp. 180c–d, 185e–186a. Pl. Phdr. 242c–e. Pl. Phdr. 244a–245c, esp. 249d–e. Pl. Phdr. 250b–d; cf. Haleprin 1985: 176–182.

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beautiful. This longing helps the lover (erastēs) gradually to recall the transcendental nature of justice, prudence and other eternal Forms.77 The relationship between the lover and the beloved grows from carnal lust into true friendship (philia).78 In this way, erōs leads those in love towards an ordered life (kosmios), self-control (enkrateia), philosophy and pure knowledge, which opens the gate to the realm of eternal perfection.79 In the course of the palinode, Socrates expands on the divine effects of lovers’ madness by comparing the soul taken over by erōs to a chariot with a charioteer, drawn by a pair of winged horses, one white, the other dark. The allegory reveals that the path of love is not a straight one, and that a bitter battle rages between mutually opposed forces in the souls of those possessed by erōs. The charioteer who guides the winged chariot strives towards true knowledge, since only thus can he perceive that colourless, formless, intangible but truly existing essence – the realm of true being.80 The white horse is good, beautiful and of noble breed.81 He yearns for honour (timēs erastēs), but has a sense of shame (aidōs) and prudence (sōphrosynē). He is the friend of true thinking, submitting not to the whip and goad, but only to ʽword and admonitionʼ.82 The dark horse is bad, ugly, wild, violent, insolent (hubris), impudent and shameless. He lacks self-control, is prone to lawlessness (paranomia) and completely in the power of carnal passions. The charioteer manages to control him only by the utmost effort and brute force.83 However, the outcome of this struggle is uncertain. When he sees the beloved for the first time, the licentiousness horse, intoxicated by carnal love and in spite of all the beatings, succeeds in forcing the charioteer and the white horse to draw near to erōmenos.84 The charioteer manages in time to regain control over the chariot and distance himself from the beloved. To the dark horse, who resists with might and main, raging at the charioteer and his fellow-steed for want of courage (deilia) and manhood (anandria) and for breaking their agreement, the charioteer is forced to promise that he will return later.85 This scene repeats itself many times until the bad horse, overcome by brute force, submits to the charioteer’s will.86 But there is another struggle going on: the charioteer too is battling his desires. If he were not, the dark 77 Pl. Phdr. 250d–253c, esp. 251a–b, 252e–253c. The same is true for the erōmenos, since his love ideally becomes a reflection of the love of the erastēs (Pl. Phdr. 255d–e). 78 Pl. Phdr. 255a–b, 255e; 256a, 256c. These places reveal that relapse into carnal love occurs during this process but prove that a true friendship is the ideal form of love for Socrates. On the relationship between erōs and philia, see Kraut 2008: 286–287. 79 Pl. Phdr. 256. 80 Pl. Phdr. 247c; see Rowe 21988: 179–180; Ferrari 1992: 264. 81 Pl. Phdr. 253d–e. 82 Pl. Phdr. 253d–e. The white horse feels aischynē after having been overcome by lust for a moment (Pl. Phdr. 254c). 83 Pl. Phdr. 253e–254e; see Ferrari 1992: 264. 84 Pl. Phdr. 254a–b. 85 Callicles also rebukes Socrates for his lack of manhood (Pl. Grg. 485c–d). 86 Pl. Phdr. 254e; see Ferrari 1987: 190. Having finally been constrained, the bad horse is overwhelmed with fear when he sees the beautiful one; see Ferrari 1985: 1–10.

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horse would never have had the opportunity to break away and impose his will. Even later, when the charioteer has subdued him and is beginning to communicate more closely with the beloved, he falls into the temptation of lust. However, shame and reason help erastēs and erōmenos to master themselves (enkrateia) and retrieve the way towards an orderly and philosophical way of life.87 At the end of his palinode, Socrates makes the distinction between this ideal relationship and another community of those who love each other, but which does not quite succeed in satisfying the exacting demands of philosophy.88 This shows that in his second speech, Socrates’ starting point is the ideal case and that he has in mind the ideal effect of erōs. At the same time, it becomes clear that he does not imply that this ideal will be reached.89 On the contrary, it is far easier to go astray and take the path of carnal desires, which will be reflected in the fate of the soul as shown by the Law of Adrasteia.90 According to this law, the human soul spends its existence between its fall to earth and return to the celestial spheres in ten incarnations, in exact proportion to the insight and knowledge it has gained.91 The philosophical nature is the highest form of incarnation, the tyrant the lowest.92 Although in the palinode Socrates represents erōs as being single in nature, the description of the struggle for the right path shows that it possesses a duality, that it has an ‘earthly’ and a ‘heavenly’ side.93 In this light, Socrates’ description of the effects of the bad erōs in the first speech of Phaedrus help to complete the picture of what takes place in the soul of the erastēs when he turns away from the right path, fails to master the madness of his love and is overcome by the bad side of erōs. The conclusion “As wolves love lambs, so lovers love their loves” characterises the entire first part of Socrates’ speech.94 The lover is obsessed by desire which prevents him from considering the happiness and welfare of the beloved. Instead, he endeavours to keep him inferior, so that he becomes fearful, ignorant, slow in speech and dull of mind. Therefore he abhors all that is headstrong, equally strong 87 Pl. Phdr. 255a–256b, esp. 255a, 255d–256b (makarios, enkratēs, kosmios); see Ferrari 1987: 186–187. Elizabeth Belfiore (2006: 185–217, esp. 185–191) points out that all three parts of the chariot have both good and bad qualities. 88 Pl. Phdr. 256b–d. It is also suggested by Socrates’ Law of Adrasteia (Pl. Phdr. 248c–249c); see Heitsch 1993: 103–105, 120 n. 233. 89 It is symptomatic that Phaedrus himself did not completely succumb to the ideal effect of erōs. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain how he was involved in the desecration of the Herms in 415 and sentenced for it; see Ostwald 1986: 539, 544, 549; Rutherford 1995: 248– 249, 258; Rhodes 2001: 416. 90 As Ernst Heitsch (1993: 119) argues, this does not mean that any man cannot experience the existence of another world from which he actually originates and for which he is consequently predestined (Pl. Phdr. 249d–e). 91 Pl. Phdr. 248c–249d. 92 The second worst incarnation is that of a sophist or demagogue (Pl. Phdr. 248c–249c); cf. Heitsch 1993: 103–105, 120 n. 233. Christopher Rowe (21988: 180) notes that the tyrant’s life is the only one not paired with any other, since he is in a class of his own. 93 Kraut 2008: 303. For the duality of the erōs in the Symposium see Detel 2003: 88. 94 Pl. Phdr. 241d; cf. Rhodes 2001: 448–449.

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or stronger.95 The lover would like to see his beloved deprived of connection to his kin and friends, without a family or property of his own.96 Out of envy and fear, the lustful erastēs tries to dissuade his beloved from all beneficial contacts – philosophy in the first place – which would make a man of him.97 The lover endeavours to physically soften the beloved too, accustoming him to an unmanly (anandros) way of life.98 As soon as he falls out of love, the lover abandons the one who was the object of all his longings up to that moment.99 All this goes to show that there is no real friendship (philia).100 The reason for this behaviour is that the erastēs is more sick than sane because of his hēdonē. He is arrogant (hubris), shameless, envious, unfaithful, malicious, brazenly blunt (epaischeis parrhēsia) and incapable of self-control.101 His actions are determined by a ceaseless and overwhelming internal necessity (anankē).102 Although Socrates is not explicit on the subject it appears that the lover is weak and, strictly speaking, without the freedom to make decisions, indeed, without freedom in general. He is a slave to voluptuousness and therefore quite willing to serve the beloved as long as it accords with his desires.103 A historical example of such behaviour cannot be found in Plato but exists in Thucydides in the person of Alcibiades, whose presumptuous behaviour aroused suspicions among his fellow citizens that he nurtured ambitions of tyranny.104 This led to his defecting to the Lacedaemonians in the middle of the war. In a speech in Sparta 415/414, Alcibiades explains his betrayal by saying that even though he was in love with his city (philopolis), he had been unjustly banished from it and so his homeland was no longer his.105 He was thus forced from being a friend of Athens to become its enemy (tous philous anankasantes polemious genesthai).106 According to him, the true philopolis is not someone who would not attack his homeland if he lost it through injustice, but who, out of longing 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103

Pl. Phdr. 238e–239b. Pl. Phdr. 239d–240a. Pl. Phdr. 239b. Pl. Phdr. 239c–d. Pl. Phdr. 241a–b. Pl. Phdr. 241c–d. Pl. Phdr. 237e–238b, 239a–b, 240c, 240e, 241a. Pl. Phdr. 238a, 240c–d, 240e, 241, esp. 240c–d. Pl. Phdr. 238e, 240d. In this respect, the behaviour of the dark horse is characteristic. It is willing to collaborate with the charioteer and the white horse as long as they approach the beloved one or pretend to do so (Pl. Phdr. 254a–d). It should be noted that the tyrannical man from the Republic and the lover from Phaedrus have many features in common (Pl. Rep. 574e–575a, 575e–576a). 104 See Jordović 2005: 140–155. 105 Thuc. 6.92.2. As Richard Kraut (2008: 286–287) rightly pointed out there is no semantic oddity in the thesis, which Plato endorses, that there is philia in the best kind of erotic relationship. 106 Thuc. 6.92.3. Since Alcibiades has previously explained how he and his family used to serve the demos, philopolis can be understood here also as philodēmos (Thuc. 6.89.3–6; cf. 2.60.5). However, the fact that Alcibiades at the same time criticises the rule of the people shows that the equating of these terms in his case should be taken cum grano salis. His affection for the demos is self-centred; it stands in direct relation to his position within the democracy.

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(epithymein) for it, tries to regain it in all kind of ways, which obviously also include high treason.107 Alcibiades exhibits all the contradictions of a person in the grip of the bad erōs. He has willingly served the object of his love as long this was in accordance with his desires, and now that this is no longer the case, he may use any means available to resubmit it to himself.108 The Symposium corroborates that this is precisely how Plato saw Alcibiades. In his love for Socrates, Alcibiades is shown as constantly oscillating between admiration and the most pernicious jealousy.109 Although this jealousy turns to a desire for revenge and although he is rejected several times, Alcibiades still endeavours to submit Socrates to himself.110 He does not succeed but, judging from Aristophanes’ Frogs, he managed to bring the Athenian demos into a position very similar to the unhappy erōmenos in Phaedrus.111 The comedy was performed in 405 after Alcibiades’ second and last departure from Athens, and in it the feelings of Athens towards him are summed up in the following line: “The city yearns for him (pothei) but hates him too, yet wants him back.”112 Euripides and Aeschylus, who have opposing opinions on everything else in the comedy, agree in their disapproval of Alcibiades. Euripides says that he only knows how to serve himself and is very quick to inflict injury on the state, while Aeschylus says that a lion cub should not be reared in the city, but when he reaches maturity, one has to accommodate to his ways.113 3.4. Erōs, Demos, Expansionism and Alcibiades The ambivalence of the lover overcome by lust in Phaedrus can perhaps provide an answer to the question of how Callicles’ contradictory attitude towards the demos is at all possible. He is, on one hand, the erastēs of the demos and very influenced by democratic ideology, while on the other hand he openly advocates the right of the stronger and rejects the democratic principle of equality, feeling only the deepest contempt for the masses. This is possible because Callicles shows all the features of the character of the charioteer possessed by the bad erōs in the form of the dark horse.114 This analogy is not entirely groundless since, in the third part of Gorgias, Socrates compares Pericles, Themistocles, Cimon and Miltiades with a charioteer, whom the horses have thrown from the chariot, 107 108 109 110 111 112 113

Thuc. 6.92.4; see also 8.48.4; cf. Heftner 2011: 118–121. Cf. McGlew 1993: 188–189; Price 2001: 260–262; Ludwig 2002: 332–333. Pl. Symp. 213b–d (mania, philerastia), 214d–222b; cf. Krüger 61992: 284–285. Pl. Symp. 213d, 214e, 216b–c, 217b–d, 219b–d, 222a, 222c–d. Pl. Phdr. 240e–241c. Ar. Ran. 1425–1426. Ar. Ran. 1427–1433. Aeschylus’ comment is especially interesting, since Callicles compares strong natures with lions while Socrates in the Republic makes the same comparison with Thrasymachus (Pl. Grg. 483e; Rep. 341c). For the lion – tyrant analogy see p. 39 n. 90. 114 Pl. Grg. 482b–c. Dan Avnon (1995: 315) notes that: “This unwitting acquiescence to the rule of the passions prevents him from apprehending the eternal, and harbours the danger of Callicles developing multiple selves at war with one another.”

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demonstrating that they had not been good statesmen since they made the demos more ferocious and wild, for which they were ultimately punished.115 It is noteworthy that in the critique of the contemporary rhetoric in Phaedrus, Pericles is highlighted as the most perfect practitioner of this art.116 Callicles categorically rejects the philosophical and orderly way of life.117 He was, he tells us, brought into contact with philosophy but does not accept it as his way of life, since he believes that it corrupts the individual, makes him unmanly (anandros) and incapable of public service.118 The young Athenian aristocrat declares his opinion frankly (parrhēsia) and without shame (aischynē).119 He scornfully rejects sōphrosynē, enkrateia and hēsychia.120 He is in favour of all pleasures (hēdonai) and desires (epithymiai) being given free rein.121 This he declares to be freedom and living without restraint (akolasia).122 However, by saying that the need to satisfy all pleasures is in accordance with nature and that a better life is like a cask with a hole which needs to be constantly refilled, Callicles is actually admitting that this is kind of behaviour is a compulsion.123 This is precisely Plato’s theory, since Socrates uses the term kinaidos for the life which Callicles glorifies. The term relates to the person who cannot control his sexual life, let alone his life in general.124 More importantly, a kinaidos is not only someone who cannot govern himself, but seeks that others should rule him:125 Σ. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ᾽, ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλ᾽ ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς; 115 Pl. Grg. 515e–516e; cf. Ap. 30e; Rep. 493a–c, 496d; see Brock 2013: 150, 159, 171 with n. 30. In the Politicus, the statesman is directly compared to the charioteer (Plt. 266e). For the juxtaposition of the helmsmen and the charioteer, see Hom. Il. 23.316–318; Pl. Prt. 338a–b; Leg. 905e–906a; cf. Brock 2013: 86–87, 96–97 n. 22, 148, 171–172 n.35. 116 Pl. Phdr. 266d–270b, esp. 267a–c (Gorgias, Polos), 269a–270a (Pericles); see also Menex. 235e; Symp. 215e; Thuc. 1.139.4; 2.65.8–9; Ar. Ach. 528–531; Eup. fr. 102 (PCG); Plut. Vit. Per. 8.1–3, 15; cf. Ferrari 1987: 68–81, esp. 70–74; Hornblower 1991: 346; Heitsch 1993: 151–168, esp. 152, 160 with n. 337, 164–168 with n. 358. 117 Pl. Grg. 484c–486d, 493–d, 505d, 506d–507c, 508a–b; see also p. 167 n. 172. 118 Pl. Grg. 484c–e, 485b–e, 486c–d. 119 Pl. Grg. 487a–b, 487d, 492d. 120 Pl. Grg. 491d–е, 493e. The relevance of the notion of enkrateia in the Memorabilia is discussed in chapter II.1.7. Absolute Sovereignty and Absolute Self-Sufficiency. 121 Pl. Grg. 491d–e, 494a–b, 494e–495a. 122 Pl. Grg. 492c. 123 Pl. Grg. 491e–492e, 493b–494c. 124 Pl. Grg. 494e; cf. James Davidson (2002: 192–215, 288–289, esp. 199–201, 213; Id., 2004: 78–118, esp. 86, 92, 94–95, 97–98, 114–118) convincingly argues against the interpretation that the kinaidos or katapygōn was despised only because of his subordinate position during sexual intercourse; contra Dover 1978: 52–53, 84–85, 100–109; Winkler 1990: 45–70, esp. 53–54; Halperin 1990a: 93; Id., 1990b: 266–267, 270; Tarnopolsky 2010: 39–40, 80–81, 84– 85, esp. 39–40. 125 Pl. Grg. 494b–e (trans. T. Irwin); cf. 493e–494a; Rep. 560e–562a; Ar. Eq. 1242. Terence Irwin (1979: 197): “The ‘torrent-bird’, charadrios, is normally identified with the stone-curlew, reputed to excrete as fast as it eats.” For kinaidos as someone who cannot govern himself, but seeks that others should rule him see Winkler 1990: 54; Ludwig 2002: 190.

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Κ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Σ. χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε. τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν; Κ. ἔγωγε. Σ. καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν; Κ. λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν. […] Σ. [... ] ὁ τῶν κιναίδων βίος, οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; S. But if the inflow is large, mustn’t the outflow be large too, and mustn’t there be big holes for the outflow? C. Of course. S. Then you’re speaking of some kind of torrent-bird’s life, not a corpse’s or a stone’s. Tell me now; are you talking about something like being hungry and eating when you’re hungry? C. I am. S. And being thirsty and drinking when you’re thirsty? C. That’s what I’m talking about – and about having all the other appetites and having the power to fill them and enjoy it, and so living happily. […] S.: […] – in the life of catamites, isn’t that strange and shameful and wretched?

It is noteworthy that, on the one hand, the sausage-seller, caricatured as a sort of super-demagogue in Aristophanes’ Knights, proudly boasts, among other shameless deeds, to have sold his body for money.126 On the other, towards the end of the play, when he reveals his true affection for the rule of the people, he admonishes the demos to be more cautious about the insincere pledges of the demagogues to be lovers and friends of the Athenian people.127 Even though he seeks the friendship (philia) of the Athenian people, Callicles’ relationship to the demos is not that of true friendship, not only because of his advocacy of the right of the stronger, but because the price of this friendship is the erasure of Callicles’ identity, and the demos will nevertheless in the end turn against him.128 Indeed, the ironic note in Callicles’ and Socrates’ statements of mutual friendship leads to the conclusion that Plato does not consider Callicles capable of genuine friendship.129 These parallels between the erastēs who has succumbed to lust, the dark horse from Phaedrus and Callicles explain how it is possible for the protagonist of the right of the stronger to want to rule the demos and at the same time be subjected to it.130

126 Ar. Eq. 1242, see also Ran. 740. The sausage-seller actually uses the term binein (illicit intercourse/fornication); see Sommerstein 1981: 208. 127 Ar. Eq. 726, 732–735, 746–748, 769–773, 790–791, 820, 1340–1344, esp. 1340–1344. 128 Pl. Grg. 510, 513a–c; see also Ar. Eq. 1125–1130. Many critics of the rule of the people argue that there is no true friendship between the demos and its leaders; see Jordović 2011: 59–61. 129 Pl. Grg. 485e, 487e, 491d, 499c, 500b, 513c, 519e; see also Ar. Eq. 1340–1344; cf. Duncan 1974: 23–25. In connection with Callicles’ complaints about Socrates see Gentzer 1995: 17. Dalfen (2004: 467) shows that hetairos and philos can have the same meaning, i.e. friend. 130 See Pl. Rep. 560e–562a. For different explanations of how it is possible for Callicles to love and detest the demos at the same time see Kamtekar 2005: 319–338.

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There are several other reasons why the term erōs is important for understanding Callicles. Neither the bad erōs nor the good is directed solely at one specific object of desire. As has been stated already, the good erōs leads from beauty to cognition. Neither is the bad erōs restricted only to the erōmenos. Once it overcomes someone, as expressed on several occasions in Phaedrus and Gorgias, lust becomes its own purpose.131 From there, as shown in the Republic, there is an increasing requirement for as much political power as possible to satisfy growing, more diverse and ever new desires.132 Therefore, tyrannical power is the most ardent desire of a person possessed by the bad erōs.133 Judging by the sources, democratic ideology shared some of these tendencies with the bad erōs. The values which initially formed only its elements turned into ideals for their own sake, growing into values which justified domination and which were impossible or even perilous to resist. At internal level, one example of this is the concept of freedom to do what one pleases which, as has been shown, abides no restriction. On the external plane, this is a concept of absolute freedom which postulates the democratic concept of freedom through power.134 In this respect, it is indicative that Pericles calls upon the Athenians to become lovers of their polis in this very context. The sources also contain evidence that the imperialistic spirit of the Athenian archē had become its own purpose and that freedom of action had been lost. In the Speech of the Corinthians in Sparta on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, Athenian expansion is compared to the campaigns of Xerxes.135 One of the essential features of Athenian mentality is their constant need to gain more (pleonexia), and the view that inaction (hēsychian apragmona) is something bad.136 In the Mytilenian Debate, Cleon calls the Athenian archē a tyranny so as to prove that Mytilene must be destroyed, since Athenians have essentially lost the freedom of action.137 In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians, by explaining the annihilation of Melos as a natural necessity (physis anankaia) and the right of the stronger, admit that they do not have complete freedom of action.138 Alcibiades, who according to Plato has the same understanding of erōs as Callicles, opines in the Sicilian Debate that the dynamic of imperialistic expansion is impossible to restrain. Athens cannot afford inaction (hēsychia), it answers every plea for help so as to expand its power, the limits of its expansion are impossible to determine, constant action against others is necessary (anankē), and finally, either one rules over others or falls under their 131 132 133 134 135

Pl. Grg. 494a–b. Pl. Rep. 573d–575d; cf. Grg. 492a. Pl. Rep. 575d. See Raaflaub 2004: 166–193. Thuc. 1.69.5; Rengakos 1984: 35; Hornblower 1991: 114. During the building of the archē, the Athenians adopted many mechanisms of rule used by the Persian Empire, see Raaflaub 2009: 89–116. 136 Thuc. 1.70.8; cf. Foster 2010: 83–84. 137 Thuc. 3.37.2, 40.4; cf. 2.63.2; de Romilly 1963: 210, 313–316; Rengakos 1984: 59–60. 138 Thuc. 5.105.2; cf. 1.75.3, 76.1–2; 6.87.2; de Romilly 1963: 56–57; Jaeger 51973: 501, 503– 504; Rengakos 1984, 99; Ostwald 1988: 18–19, 42, 54.

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rule.139 Georg Deininger summarizes Alcibiades’ theories well in the following thought: “Power is no longer in the hands of the Athenians, but the Athenians are in the hands of power; they are enslaved and can no longer determine how far they want to apply it.”140 Plato’s view of the close connection between erōs and the imperialistic spirit is to be found in Gorgias, where Callicles is not only a spokesman for the unrestrained life but also for unlimited expansion: he cites the campaigns of Xerxes against the Hellenes and Darius against the Scythians as examples to prove that according to the law of nature, the ʽstronger ruleʼ and have more.141 From Herodotus we learn that in the eyes of the Hellenes, both campaigns were the product of unlimited imperialism and that the Persian rulers had demonstrated in their persons the utmost hubris, tyrannical traits and uncontrolled lust.142 Furthermore, in the debate in Xerxes’ crown council (one of the bases for Thucydides’ Sicilian Debate) when deciding to embark on a campaign against the Greeks, Xerxes exhibited key elements of Athenian imperialism.143 Xerxes states that he is acting according to ancestral law, according to which the Persians never rested (ētremisamen) and each ruler enhanced (prosektēsanto) Persian power.144 He always wants more (pleon ti echein) and has exaggerated desires (pollōn epithymeein).145 The expansion which Xerxes advocates recognises no borders and both those who are guilty and those who are not will be enslaved.146 The Great king believes that to stand still (hēsychiēn) is dangerous, since the enemy will not rest and will attack.147 Xerxes claims that a person who is not in favour of expansion is a coward and unmanly.148 Overall, these passages on Persian imperialism in Herodotus stand in a dialectical relationship to Athenian imperialism. Callicles reference to Darius and Xerxes recalls patterns of thought that were familiar to Athenian intellectuals in the last third of the fifth century. What is his purpose in doing this? Perhaps, and this is my suggestion, Plato has Callicles invoke Xerxes and Darius in order to hint that Athens has turned into its own archetypal enemy – the Persian Empire,149 139 Thuc. 6.18.1–4; cf. de Romilly 1963: 51, 211–212, 314; Rengakos 1984: 108–110; Ostwald 1988: 38; Shanske 2007: 57–58. 140 Deininger (1939: 78): “Nicht mehr die Athener haben die Macht, sondern die Macht hat die Athener; sie sind ihre Sklaven und können nicht mehr bestimmen, wie weit sie sie anwenden wollen.” 141 Pl. Grg. 483d–e. 142 Darius (Hdt. 4.84, 91.2, 118); Xerxes (Hdt. 7.8, 10.η, 11.1–2, 35, 52, 187.2; 8.35–38, 108– 113); cf. Waters 1971: 62, 69; Marg ³1982: 297–301; Lateiner 1989: 172–181; Bichler 2000: 293–297, 318–322, 328, 333–337, 357–359; Raaflaub 2002: 28; Dewald 2003: 34–35, 47–49. 143 Hdt. 7.5–18; see Hunter 1973: 181 n. 7; Kallet 2001: 85–120, esp. 85–97; Raaflaub 2002: 11– 40, esp. 13–14, 19–20, 22–26. 144 Hdt. 7.8.α. 145 Hdt. 7.16.α 2, 18.2. 146 Hdt. 7.8.γ. 147 Hdt. 7.11.2–3. 148 Hdt. 7.11.1. 149 Thuc. 6.76.3–4; Ar. Equ. 1086–1089; see Connor 1984: 155–157; Kopp 2015: 30–36.

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just as Callicles’ character is similarly supposed to show how democratic man grows into a protagonist of the right of the stronger. Finally, invoking Xerxes and Darius serves to indicate that the imperialism of Athenian archē will share the same fate as these two campaigns, and that Callicles, who cannot see all this, is totally blind. Plato makes it known that he truly believes that simple bodily desires can develop into more complex ones, such as an unscrupulous and radical craving for absolute power, by letting Socrates speak of his own two loves and those of Callicles. In this manner, he creates a bridge between the field of simple and the field of complex desires, showing how they are intertwined. By mentioning his love for Alcibiades and philosophy in the same breath, Socrates shows that he has transcended the path of physical desire and chosen the path of love towards wisdom.150 This is substantiated by his belittling references to Alcibiades, with whom Socrates was not physically in love as we learn from the Symposium, and by his stressing his own submission to philosophy. As opposed to this, the accentuation of Callicles’ attraction to Demos, Pyrilampes’ son, is intended to class Callicles’ love for the Athenian demos as a base passion. Callicles’ path leads from physical desire and love of the Athenian demos to the doctrine of the right of the stronger.151 Therefore both Socrates’ critical examination and refutation of Callicles’ views begins from the doctrine of the right of the stronger, proceeds to a discussion of physical desire, and concludes with proving Callicles’ total blindness and submission to the Athenian demos. In connecting “simple” with more “complex” desires, Plato does not step into terra incognita. In Herodotus, the Asian despots, possessed by hubris, state their will for unlimited expansion, thus revealing in their persons all the worst traits of a tyrant.152 However, Herodotus too is only reiterating established opinion. Alcibiades is probably the most famous example of the influence and prevalence of this thinking. From early youth, he was associated with a sexually wanton lifestyle and seems to have made no attempt to quash the rumours circulating about him,153 otherwise, he would not have chosen to emblazon his shield with a thunder-bearing Erōs.154 It is also interesting that, according to the orator Antiphon, one of the first lovers of Alcibiades was called Democrates.155 Such sexual wantonness was part of the typology of tyrants current in the fifth-century and contributed significantly to Alcibiades being suspected of lusting after tyranny, but this was not the only reason.156 According to Thucydides, the Athenians were 150 Cp. Pl. Rep. 474c–475c. 151 Cf. Ludwig 2007: 224–225. 152 Cf. Marg ³1982: 290–301; Immerwahr ³1982: 497–540; Lateiner 1989: 163–186; Bichler 2000: 247–359; Balot 2001: 100–106; Raaflaub 2002: 28; Dewald 2003: 32–35, 47–49; Jordović 2005: 163–164 with n. 203 and 204. 153 On Alcibiades’ transgressions of sexual norms and the relevant sources see Wohl 1999: 365– 379; Jordović 2005: 140–145. 154 Plut. Alc. 16; Ath. 12.534e; cf. Wohl 1999: 352. 155 Plut. Alc. 3.1; cf. Wohl 1999: 370. 156 See Jordović 2005: 131–168.

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afraid that Alcibiades yearned for tyranny (hōs tyrannidos epithymounti) because of the great (undemocratic) lawlessness (paranomia) in his personal life, and the spirit (dianoia) visible in his actions.157 From the context of this sentence and the surrounding sentences, it can be concluded that dianoia primarily related to Alcibiades’ political ambitions.158 Since Alcibiades’ speech in the Sicilian Debate, in which he claims that boundaries cannot be set to the empire’s expansion, leans on this statement by Thucydides, it seems logical to assume that the Athenians’ fear was also caused by this extreme expansionist spirit, the more so since Alcibiades himself tries to back up his standpoint with a warning that a pacific policy (hēsychia) would inevitably mean a very different way of life:159 καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τῷδε καθέσταμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιβουλεύειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἀνιέναι, διὰ τὸ ἀρχθῆναι ἂν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων αὐτοῖς κίνδυνον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοιμεν. καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἥσυχον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὁμοῖον μεταλήψεσθε. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs.

The example of Alcibiades is all the more significant since he not only shares many traits with Callicles but also appears in the Symposium as a paradigm of the bad erōs.160 In this dialogue, Socrates in his praise of erōs proceeds from the desire for the sensually beautiful to the philosophical cognition of Beautiful-initself.161 This is the philosopher’s erōs.162 The manner in which Alcibiades appears on the scene in the dialogue and his subsequent open exposition of his love for Socrates show just how far he actually is from Socrates’ erōs.163 Alcibiades 157 Thuc. 6.15.4; 28.2; see also 1.130, 132.2–3, 138.1–3; cf. Tsakmakis 1995: 180; Id. 2006: 178; Jordović 2005: 158–159 n. 181. 158 Cf. Bloedow 1990: 4 n. 10. 159 Thuc. 6.18.3 (trans. R. Crawley); cf. 3.40.4; see de Romilly 1963: 212; Jordović 2005: 158– 165; Hornblower 2008: 351. Herodotus also uses the term dianoia in connection with Croesus’ campaign against the Persians which he considers to be the reflection of a tyrannical hubris and excessive ambition for expansion (Hdt. 1.46.2; 90.3; cf. 2.169.2). 160 See Kraut 2008: 303–306. 161 Pl. Symp. 210a–212a; cf. also Prt. 309a–c. 162 Pl. Symp. 204b; see also Rep. 474c–475c; cf. Rutherford 1995: 193–196; Rowe 1998b: 205– 206; Schwab 2000: 210–216, esp. 213; Hunter 2004: 90–91; White 2004: 375; Schofield 2006: 159–160. 163 Cf. Osborne 2002: 100; Edmonds 2017: 194. Plato’s attitude towards Alcibiades as expressed in Protagoras could also be relevant. In this dialogue, Alcibiades wholeheartedly supports Socrates. However, Critias, known for his excessive sense of honour, follows with the comment that Alcibiades always loves victory (philonikos) (Pl. Prt. 336d-e; cf. Xen. Mem. 1.2.14). This leads to the conclusion that Alcibiades does not support Socrates because of his philosophical views, but because of his ‘love’ for victory, i.e. the fulfilment of a current desire. On the other hand, the opening few sentences in the Protagoras underscore that Socrates’ love is directed towards the spiritually beautiful rather than the physically beautiful,

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appears very drunk, refuses to honour the rules of the symposium, declares himself symposiarch and tries to force the others to reach a state of intoxication as soon as possible.164 Socrates “fears” that in his frenzy (mania), his beloved will do him physical harm, which shows that Alcibiades has really turned from an erōmenos into erastēs.165 Alcibiades’ love is love for an individual, not of universal beauty, since he only yearns for Socrates. It is carnal because he is trying to seduce Socrates.166 The use of the term philerastia, which essentially means love towards love, in reference to Alcibiades shows that for him erōs has become its own purpose.167 This can be understood from Socrates’ reply that Alcibiades is trying to get genuine beauty in return for apparent beauty, i.e. ʽgold for bronzeʼ, and that he in fact does not recognise true beauty, or true erōs.168 Socrates’ self-control makes the difference even more pointed. He does not, like so many others, fall for Alcibiades’ beauty, he is never drunk, cannot be bought and bears the adversities of war better than anyone else.169 In contrast, Alcibiades is self-complacent, conceited, jealous, incapable of restraining his desires, speaks quite openly of his lechery and, with the exception of Socrates, is not made to feel ashamed by anyone.170 Alcibiades, it is true, has the potential for philosophy.171 Socrates’ words affect him and this is why he is fond of him.172 This shows that the bad erōs has not taken hold of Alcibiades to the same degree as the tyrannical man. However, as desire for the love of the demos and public honours leads Alcibiades away from the path of Socrates’ erōs, the indications are that the erosion of these differences is more a matter of time than anything else.173 3.5. Callicles and the Tyrant’s Erōs Although the similarities between Alcibiades and Callicles are striking, Callicles goes one important step further. Not only is he not enchanted by Socrates, he dismisses the path of philosophy with open and utter scorn. Erōs has indeed overcome every aspect of Callicles’ personality so it is not surprising that similari-

164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173

and that the same is true of his love for Alcibiades (Pl. Prt. 309a–c, 316a); cf. Goldberg 1983: 135; Taylor 1991: 64–65; Allen 1996: 89; Manuwald 1999: 91, 280–281, 290–291. Pl. Symp. 212d–214b; cf. Rutherford 1995: 197–198; Gribble 1999: 250–251; Davidson 2002: 68–70. Pl. Symp. 213c–d; see Rutherford 1995: 201–202; Wohl 1999: 366: Cleary 2007: 41–42. Cf. Rutherford 1995: 198–199; Hunter 2004: 98–112; Cleary 2007: 42–43. Pl. Symp. 213d (mania, philerastia); cf. Kraut 2008: 305. Pl. Symp. 218d–219a; cf. Gribble 1999: 243–244 with n. 88; Edmonds 2017: 209–210. Pl. Symp. 214a, 216a–c, 217a–d, 219b–220b, 222c; cf. Görgemanns 2001: 136, 155–156; Cleary 2007: 42–44; White 2008: 75–79. Pl. Symp. 213c–d, 215b–e–216c, 217b–218d, 219b–d. Gribble 1999: 218–222, 237, 244. Pl. Symp. 215e–216c, Grg. 481d; Alc. I 127d, 131c–d; cf. Ellis 1989: 20–23; Gribble 1999: 237. Pl. Symp. 216b–c; Alc. I. 132a; cf. Kuhn 1980: 294; Gribble 1999: 238–245; Schwab 2000: 214–215; Denyer 2001: 226–227; Benardete 2001: 265–266; Kraut 2008: 303, 306; Edmonds 2017: 211–212.

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ties between him and the tyrannical man in the Republic are obvious. The bad erōs possesses tyrannical man to such an extent that he is devoid of shame or sensibility and there no folly or shameless deed insolence he is not prepared to commit.174 Under the influence of the bad erōs, the tyrannical character stifles any tendency towards moderation within himself and believes himself not only capable of ruling men but also the gods.175 The height of his desire is to throw his polis into slavery, in other words to become tyrant.176 New desires constantly rear their heads and rule him to such an extent that he is prepared to inflict evil even on his parents.177 He does not do what he wants to do and his soul is constantly and unavoidably unappeasable.178 Tyrannical nature rejects friendship and knows only how to rule or to serve.179 That is why he is prepared, before coming to power, to flatter the masses and do whatever it takes to grasp tyranny.180 Besides these parallels that show that in Callicles the metamorphosis from democratic into tyrannical man has in fact taken place, Plato’s description of the psychopathology of tyrannical man in the Republic is significant because, unlike Gorgias, it states three things crucial for an understanding of Callicles. First, the bad erōs plays a key role in the transformation of democratic into tyrannical man. In democracy, the future tyrannical nature has been taught all kinds of lawlessness known as ‘absolute freedom’, but only erōs leads to the extinguishing of all democratic perceptions of what is good, shameful or just.181 Secondly, erōs is responsible for tyrannical man losing all governance over himself or his ego. Plato underscores this by saying that erōs rules the tyrant like a tyrant, that tyrannical man is ruled by desires during his waking hours as others are in their sleep, and that he is in a frenzy (mania) from desire.182 [...] καὶ ἐάν τινας ἐν αὐτῷ δόξας ἢ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὠθεῖ παρ᾽ αὑτοῦ, ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης, μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ. – παντελῶς, ἔφη, τυραννικοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέγεις γένεσιν. – ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ πάλαι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον τύραννος ὁ Ἔρως λέγεται; [...] καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν, ἃς πάλαι εἶχεν δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας, αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμέναι, δορυφοροῦσαι τὸν Ἔρωτα, κρατήσουσι μετ᾽ ἐκείνου, αἳ πρότερον μὲν ὄναρ ἐλύοντο ἐν ὕπνῳ, ὅτε ἦν αὐτὸς ἔτι ὑπὸ νόμοις τε καὶ πατρὶ δημοκρατούμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ. τυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ Ἔρωτος, οἷος ὀλιγάκις ἐγίγνετο ὄναρ, ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος ἀεὶ γενόμενος, οὔτε τινὸς φόνου δεινοῦ ἀφέξεται οὔτε βρώματος οὔτ᾽ ἔργου, ἀλλὰ τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἔρως ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ ζῶν, 174 Pl. Rep. 571c–d. 175 Pl. Rep. 573b–c; cf. Hdt. 4.91.2; 7.35, 187.2; 8.109.3. 176 Pl. Rep. 575d; cf. Hdt.1.96.1–2; 3.53.4; 5.32; Soph. OT 587–589, 601; see Rhodes 2001: 454; Ludwig 2002: 141, 149; Parry 2007: 402. 177 Pl. Rep. 573d–574c; see also 571d, 574e–575a, 577d, 579c–580a. 178 Pl. Rep. 577e–578a. 179 Pl. Rep. 574c, 576a, 579d–e. 180 Pl. Rep. 575e. 181 Pl. Rep. 572d–e, 574d–e. In the Apology, Socrates says that the people are asleep and that he is waking them up for which he will be put to death (Ap. 31a). 182 Pl. Rep. 573b, 574d–575a (trans. P. Shorey), see also 571b–c (paranomia), 573a–b, 576b, 577d, 578a; cf. Eur. Andr. fr. 136 (Nauck); Soph. Trach. 441–444; see Ferrari 2005: 65.

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II. The Gorgias ἅτε αὐτὸς ὢν μόναρχος, τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ πόλιν ἄξει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τόλμαν, ὅθεν αὑτόν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ αὑτὸν θόρυβον θρέψει, τὸν μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσεληλυθότα ἀπὸ κακῆς ὁμιλίας, τὸν δ᾽ ἔνδοθεν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεθέντα καὶ ἐλευθερωθέντα· ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ὁ βίος τοῦ τοιούτου; [...] and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside. ” “A perfect description,” he said, “of the generation of the tyrannical man.” “And is not this analogy,” said I, “the reason why Love (Erōs) has long since been called a tyrant?” [...] and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honourable and the base, the opinions accounted just, will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it – I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul. But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity, so to speak, of him in whom it dwells to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen, in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one?”

It follows that with Callicles, his love for the demos has caused him to be “brainwashed”. This effect of erōs is significant because it explains why Callicles is on the one hand willing to become similar in nature to the Athenian demos, while, on the other hand, he pays no heed to Socrates’ line of argument. Callicles’ remarks that Socrates is constantly twisting words, that he talks like a demagogue and that the ʽweakʼ are with the connivance of the law, i.e. criticism and praise, ruling over the ʽstrongʼ, reveal that this supporter of the right of the stronger has a great suspicion towards words in general.183 By advocating the doctrine of the right of the stronger and constantly pointing out that Socrates will lose his life if he continues on his path, Callicles shows that he is susceptible only to brute force. He is blinded by erōs to such an extent that, like the dark horse in Phaedrus, he only understands the language of force, and this is not the language spoken by Socrates. Thirdly, the depiction of tyrannical man in the Republic shows that he is not alone. Besides him, there are other individuals similar to him, which explains why Plato chose the elusive and otherwise unknown Callicles to describe the emergence of tyrannical man.184

183 Pl. Grg. 482c, 482e–483a, 483b–c, 489b, 494d, 495b. 184 Pl. Rep. 575a–d.

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3.6. Callicles and Pleonexia In advocating the right of the stronger and pointing out that desires should be given free rein, Callicles represents the opinion that those who are better, or rather stronger, should ʽhave moreʼ (pleon echein):185 ἀλλὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων. For this is what I think the just by nature is – that the man who is better and wiser should rule over the lower men, and have more than them.

The young Athenian, it is true, does not actually utter the word pleonexia, but this changes nothing, since Socrates uses it to tell him that he is wrong to think that the most important thing is to ʽhave moreʼ.186 Callicles’ positive attitude towards pleonexia is another testimony of his dependency on Athenian democratic ideology, since the term was closely associated with the expansionist spirit. In Herodotus, in the debate in Xerxes’ crown council, Artabanus tells Xerxes that he has taken to the way of thinking which always wants more (pleon ti echein).187 Besides, the Father of History also says of Themistocles, after the victory at Salamis and in reference to the Andarian Dialogue in which the traditional right of the stronger is represented, that he was insatiable in his desire to have more (pleonekteōn).188 In Thucydides, in a speech to the Athenian assembly in 433 referring to the conflict between Corinth and Corcyra, the Corinthians explicitly warn the Athenians not to be carried away by the immediate but risky advantage (to pleon echein) of accepting the Corcyraean alliance. Nonetheless, Athens sided with Corcyra. As a result of this, in the Debate at Sparta, the Corinthians portray the Athenians, without explicitly using these expressions, as men driven by pleonexia and polypragmosynē:189 οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν· [...] αὖθις δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· [...] καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους· οἴονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἄν τι κτᾶσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι. κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται καὶ νικώμενοι ἐπ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς. καὶ ἃ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦνται, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες. ἢν δ᾽ ἄρα του καὶ πείρᾳ σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες 185 Pl. Grg. 490a (trans. T. Irwin), see also 483d, 490a–491a, 491d. 186 Pl. Grg. 508a. Pleon echein, pleonektein, pleonektēs have the same meaning in Plato, see Weber 1967: 5–9, 93–115; cf. also Dalfen 2004: 323–325. 187 Hdt. 7.16.α.2, 7.8.α.1; see Weber 1967: 33–36, 39; Regenbogen ³1982: 95; Raaflaub 1987: 227–229. 188 Hdt. 8.111–112.1, esp. 112.1; cf. Weber 1967: 29–36. Heinz Weber believes that Herodotus does not use the idea of pleonexia in a negative sense, but overlooks the fact that it occurs in the context of the Andarian dialogue. 189 Thuc. 1.42.3; 70.2–9 (trans. Ch. F. Smith, with minor changes), 75.3–77.5; cf. HCT I: 232; Raaflaub 1994: 108–109, 123; Taylor 2010: 17, 25–26, 78, 228; Foster 2010: 83.

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II. The Gorgias ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρείαν· μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσί τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν ἃ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν. καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον· ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι. For they are given to innovation and quick to form plans and to put their decisions into execution, [...] Again, they are bold (tolmētai) beyond their strength, venturesome beyond their better judgement, and sanguine in the face of dangers (euelpides); [...] they are always abroad, while you are always at home; for they expect by absence from home to gain something, while you are afraid that, if you go out after something, you may imperil even what you have. If victorious over their enemies, they pursue their advantage to the utmost; if beaten they fall back as little as possible. Moreover, they use their bodies in the service of their country as thought they were the bodies of quite other men, but their minds as thought they were wholly their own, so as to accomplish anything on her behalf. And whenever they have conceived a plan but fail to carry it to fulfilment, they think themselves robbed of a possession of their own; and whenever they go after a thing and obtain it, they consider that they have accomplished but little in comparison with what the future has in store for them; but if so happens that they try a thing and fail, they form new hopes (antelpisantes) instead and thus make up the loss. For with them alone is it the same thing to hope (elpizousin) for and to attain when once they conceive a plan, for the reason that they swiftly undertake whatever they determine upon. In this way they toil with hardships and dangers, all their life long; and least of all men enjoy what they have because they are always seeking more (aiei ktasthai), because they think their only holiday is to do their duty, and because they regard untroubled peace (hēsychian apragmona) as a far greater calamity than laborious activity. Therefore if a man should sum up and say that they were born neither to have peace (hēsychian) themselves nor to let other men have it, he would simply speak the truth.

In response to the accusation of living only to acquire, the Athenians give the traditional interpretation of the right of the stronger and argue that no one has ever abstained from having more when he had the chance to gain something by force. In doing so, they attach an ethically negative value to pleonexia, but at the same time underline that it is immanent to human nature and that Athens has shown a high degree of moderation in that respect. The Corinthians’ critique of Athenian national characteristics culminates shortly thereafter at the meeting of the Peloponnesian League, when they refer to pre-war Athens as a polis tyrannos:190 καὶ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλιν τύραννον ἡγησάμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως καθεστάναι, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἤδη ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ διανοεῖσθαι, παραστησώμεθα ἐπελθόντες, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀκινδύνως τὸ λοιπὸν οἰκῶμεν καὶ τοὺς νῦν δεδουλωμένους Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσωμεν. And so, in the conviction that the state which has set itself up as tyrant in Hellas is a menace to all alike, ruling over some already and designing to rule over others, let us attack and reduce it, and henceforth dwell in security ourselves and set free those Hellenes who are already enslaved.

190 Thuc. 1.124.3 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); see also 1.122.3; 2.63.2; 3.37.2; cf. Raaflaub 2003: 77– 81; Id. 2004: 133–134.

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Diodotus explains in the Mytilenian Debate in 427 that exousia (affluence) through arrogance (hybris) and pride (phronēma) leads to pleonexia. He also links the desire to have more, to hope (elpis) and desire (erōs), and makes an analogy between the behaviour of men and states:191 ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκῃ τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ᾽ ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὀργῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἑκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ᾽ ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς κινδύνους. ἥ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δ᾽ ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν ἐκφροντίζων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα, πλεῖστα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ὄντα ἀφανῆ κρείσσω ἐστὶ τῶν ὁρωμένων δεινῶν. καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔλασσον ξυμβάλλεται ἐς τὸ ἐπαίρειν· ἀδοκήτως γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρισταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τὰς πόλεις, ὅσῳ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἕκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλέον τι αὑτὸν ἐδόξασεν. Nay, men are lured into hazardous enterprises by the constraint of poverty, which makes them bold, by the insolence and pride of affluence, which makes them greedy, and by the various passions engendered in the other conditions of human life as these are severally mastered by some mighty and irresistible impulse. Then, too, Hope and Desire are everywhere; Desire leads, Hope attends; Desire contrives the plan, Hope suggests the facility of fortune; the two passions are most baneful, and being unseen phantoms prevail over seen dangers. Besides these, fortune contributes in no less degree to urge men on; for she sometimes presents herself unexpectedly and thus tempts men to take risks even when their resources are inadequate, and states even more than men, inasmuch as the stake is the greatest of all (megistōn) – their own freedom (eleutheria) or empire over others (archē) – and the individual, when supported by the whole people, unreasonably overestimates his own strength.

From Hermocrates’s speech at the Conference at Gela in 424, which concluded the First Sicilian Expedition, it is clear that pleonexia was inherent to Athenian archē.192 This has led some modern scholars to believe that the Sicilian Debate also mentions an ʽexcessive desire to have moreʼ, due to Thucydides’ comment that the Athenians have been overcome by erōs.193 In view of the numerous analogies between Gorgias and Thucydides, it is noteworthy that the historian does not use the term pleonexia in relation to Pericles. However, the negative connotations of the term are such that he may have found it to be incongruous with his positive image of the great statesman. From Pericles’ glorification of Athenian power in the Funeral Oration, anyone who did not favour the rule of the people might have reached the conclusion that the famous statesman was prone to pleonexia. That this is indeed the case may be seen in the fact that many modern scholars, who are certainly not opponents of democracy, believe so.194 191 Thuc. 3.45.4–6 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); see de Romilly 1963: 324; Weber 1967: 42–43; Balot 2001: 158. 192 Thuc. 4.61.5; cf. also 4.17.4, 21.2, 62.3; see de Romilly 1963: 336–343; Weber 1967: 51–54; Hornblower 1996: 173, 177, 225–226. 193 Thuc. 6.24.3–4; see Connor 1984: 168 n. 25; Hornblower 2008: 363; Foster 2010: 121 n. 5; cf. also Nicolai 1996: 273. 194 See Weber 1967: 58–59; Hornblower 1987: 174–175; Foster 2010: 174, 180, 201, 210; Taylor 2010: 276–277.

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Thucydides’ use of the value pleonexia is important for another reason. He does not only use it in the context of Athenian imperialism, but cites it as one of the main causes of civil war (stasis) in the Pathology of War, since from pleonexia and ambition comes the pursuit of power, an opinion most strongly supported by Euripides, as his Phoenissae reveal: 195 πάντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν· ἐκ δ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule which greed and ambition inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardour which belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry.

Callicles’ favourable attitude to pleonexia is also important because it connects him with important passages in the Republic in yet another way.196 In Book 9, Plato predicts that tyrannical man will, in the same way that pleasures and erōs have conquered him, want to have more.197 In the same book, in a comparison of the just and unjust life that follows a description of the life of a tyrannical man, it is stated that pleonexia is a trait of the unjust man who is insatiable, in conflict with others and who does not know wisdom and virtue. The parallels between this view and Callicles are more than obvious.198 3.7. Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa The impression gained from sources of the late fifth- and early fourth-centuries is that in Athens there was a widespread notion of two paths, two ways of life and education to be chosen by the youth of the upper classes.199 The same sources reveal considerable controversy over the role of polypragmosynē (meddlesomeness) and apragmosynē (love of a quiet life) in political life.200 While the democrats greatly favoured a politically active life, among many men of substance the prevailing sentiment was for a quiet life apart from public affairs. In Aristophanes’ Clouds, a work which all sources confirm was familiar to most of its contemporaries, the Better and Worse Arguments compete over which is the superior or more useful. The Better Argument, which claims to represent 195 Thuc. 3.82.6, 8; Eur. Phoen. 531–554; esp. 3.82.8 (trans. Ch. F. Smith, with minor changes); see Weber 1967: 44–46; Macleod 1983b: 128–129; Hornblower 1991: 485; Mastronarde 1994: 303, 310. 196 See chapter II.2.6. Plato and the Destructive Nature of the Concept Freedom to Do What One Pleases. 197 Pl. Rep. 574a. 198 Pl. Rep. 586a–b. The passages in Book 1, 2 and 9 of the Republic in which the notion of pleonexia appears are evidently inter-related (Pl. Rep. 343d–e, 349b–c, 349e, 350b, 359c, 362b, 574a, 586a–b); cf. Algra 1996: 48. 199 See Connor 1971: 175–198, esp. 196–197; Donlan 1980: 174; cp. Apelt 1998: 9; Scholz 1998: 101. 200 See Nestle 1926: 129–140; Ehrenberg 1947: 46–67; Dienelt 1953: 94–104; Allison 1979: 10– 22; Lateiner 1982: 1–12; Carter 1986.

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justice, favours the old education that prevailed when sōphrosynē was the accepted custom. Supposedly, young men were once brought up in a spirit of chastity (sōphrosynē), shame (aidōs/aischynē), respect for their elders, suppression of lust, and development of physical strength and manliness.201 In keeping with this, the relationship between a boy and his lover would be full of carnal restraint.202 The Better Argument argues that youths should spend time in the gymnasia and the Academy instead of chattering idly in the agora and litigating in the courts.203 Accordingly, the Better Argument links sōphrosynē with apragmosynē, which is the quality of the incorruptible, loyal and old-fashioned moderate citizen.204 Traditional education in the Clouds is associated with democracy, since the former had reputedly produced the heroes of Marathon, Athens’ most illustrious sons. The Worse Argument advocates a new kind of upbringing in the form of a sophistic education. This denies the very existence of justice, glorifies a life of selfish hedonism, indecency, wantonness, and effeminacy, and claims that there is nothing one should be ashamed of if one only responds to the necessities of nature (physeōs anankas).205 The Worse Argument rejects sōphrosynē and its use in controlling desires.206 The degree to which everything has been turned upside down may be seen in the appeal to the example of Heracles. The Worse Argument uses the greatest and manliest of the Hellenic heroes to prove the advantages of effeminacy. A youth who takes this path is obviously totally unbridled in sexual terms, as may be seen from the epithet ‘wide-assed’ (euryprōktos) applied to him in the Clouds.207 Finally, the Worse Argument argues that as much time as possible should be spent in the agora ʽexercising the tongueʼ, that is, rhetoric. In the comedy, Socrates appears as the ambassador of this new education.208 201 The notion sōphrosynē carries in the Clouds a strictly moral connotation in the sense of ‘chastity’ or ‘purity’; see North 1966, 99. 202 Ar. Nub. 961–984, 1014–1023, esp. 991–995. 203 Ar. Nub. 961–1023. 204 Ar. Nub. 1006–1007; see North 1996: 98. 205 Ar. Nub. 1043–1079, esp. 1046–1052 (deilos vs. andreios); see also 1014–1023. 206 Ar. Nub. 1060–1074; see Rademaker 2005: 229. 207 Ar. Nub. 1085. The term euryprōktos is related to the notion of kinaidos (catamite) as may be seen from the usage of the term katapygōn (lecher), denoting a young men taking the path suggested by the Worse Argument (Ar. Nub. 1023); cp. Ludwig 2002: 247–250, esp. 249. Moreover, the notion of euryprōktos can be associated with a democratic politician and Alcibiades (Ar. Eq. 423–428, 1240–1243; Ach. 716); see Ludwig 2002: 43. The Worse Argument has turned everything upside down. Hence the Better Argument can say that the Worse Argument will persuade a young man to consider all that is foul fair and all that is fair foul (Ar. Nub. 1020–1022); Ludwig 2002: 246. Aristophanes’ first play the Banqueters seem also to have contained a competition between the old and new education, epitomised by two brothers: ‘Chaste Boy’ (sōphrōn) and ‘Buggered Boy’ (katapygōn). Interestingly, the ‘Buggered Boy’ is associated with Alcibiades (fr. 205 PCG); see Bromberg 2018: 37–38. 208 The portrayal of Socrates in the Clouds as a typical representative of the new education was facilitated by three circumstances. Firstly, Socrates was to the average Athenian a far more familiar figure than any representative of the sophistic movement. The reason for this was that he, contrary to the sophists, often talked with the common people. Secondly, the average Athenian might not have been able to tell the difference between Socrates and the sophists.

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If Plato is to be believed, Socrates himself was convinced that Aristophanes’ depiction of him as a sophist – and thus a proponent of the Worse Argument – had greatly contributed to many Athenians’ belief that he really was corrupting their youth.209 The Socratics invested much effort in disproving this image. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates is declared to be the only true educator in Athens.210 A similar sentiment is expressed in Xenophon’s Apology.211 In the Memorabilia, Xenophon describes how Socrates related Prodicus’ story of Heracles’ choice between the path of virtue and the path of vice in order to lead his interlocutor to virtue.212 More importantly, the same work explicitly states that Socrates had had a positive influence on the young Critias and Alcibiades.213 Although it is not immediately obvious, Plato’s Gorgias is also intended to defend Socrates from the charge of corrupting youth and thus from implicit or explicit association with the Worse Argument’s educational program. This is evident from the fact that each time Socrates and Callicles refer to the vita activa – vita contemplativa dichotomy, both of them allude to the trial of 399.214 Accordingly it comes as no surprise that the contest between the Better and the Worse Argument in the Clouds serves as a base for the debate between Socrates and Callicles, except that like a reflection in a mirror, right becomes left and left becomes right. The young Callicles follows in the Gorgias the path extolled by the Worse Argument.215 He listens to the sophists and learns rhetoric.216 He claims that doing injustice is better than suffering it, and calls upon the laws of nature and openly rejects justice.217 He is governed by the bad erōs, because of which he demands a free rein for desires and the rejection of all shame.218 He dismisses sōphrosynē

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Thirdly, as noted by Andrea Capra (2018: 75): “it was easy to ascribe as many doctrines as possible to someone who famously professed none”. Due to these circumstances, it was easy for Aristophanes to depict Socrates as a sophist who is practicing physiologia and has Pythagorean/Orphic traits (Pl. Ap. 17c–d, 19c–20d, 22d–23a, 23e–24a, 28a, 30a–b, 30e–31a, esp. 19d, 22e–23a; Ar. Nub. 331–334, 360, 1111; Ran. 1491–1499); see Henderson 1990: 304; Rutherford 1995: 41; Edmunds 2006: 414–424; Jordović 2008: 16–17; contra Vander Waerdt 1994: 57–79. Pl. Ap. 18b–d, 19b–20c, 23d; see also Phd. 70b–c; see Vander Waerdt 1994: 52–54. Jacques Bromberg (2018: 32–59, esp. 48–58) points out that the influence of the Clouds on the public perception of Socrates must be assessed in the light of an intellectual comedy tradition, which greatly influenced the intellectual atmosphere of Athens in the 430s and 420s. Cf. de Strycker 1994, 8–13; see also Ober 2001: 179–180. Xen. Ap. 3, 5, 19–23, 26, 34, esp. 19–21, 26. Xen. Mem. 2.1.21–34. Xen. Mem. 1.2.12–18, 24–26, 29–47; see Gray 1998: 41–59, esp. 48. Pl. Grg. 484c–486c, 520a–522e, 524b–526e; esp. 486a–b, 521b–522e, 526c–e; cf. Ap. 28a–e, 30c–31a, 38d–e; see Ober 1998: 210–211; Danzig 2003: 285, 290; Dalfen 2004: 340, 475– 478, 498. See North 1966: 97; Rademaker 2005: 229. Pl. Grg. 447a–c, 449a. Pl. Grg. 483a–484a. Pl. Grg. 482e, 487b, 494a–d.

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and its use in controlling pleasures and desires.219 The fact that Plato uses the term kinaidos for the life towards which Callicles strives also indicates unbridled sexuality.220 Callicles calls upon the mythical hero Heracles to prove the sound basis of the doctrine of the right of the stronger.221 The young Athenian wants to take part in public life and obviously attaches great importance to the ability to win a case in court.222 Notwithstanding all the concurrences, there is a real difference between the Gorgias and the Clouds. Callicles has become what he is, not because Socrates was his teacher, but because he adopted democratic values.223 This thought lay heavy with Plato, since in the Republic his brothers agree with Socrates’ claim that the best natures, those particularly gifted for philosophy, turn into arrogant villains who inflict the greatest evils on the city, due to their education by the masses.224 Plato also mentions the sophists in this context, but says that their contribution is incomparably less relevant than the influence of democracy, as the sophists actually teach adjustment, that is, subordination to the rule of demos.225 Socrates shares many qualities with the Better Argument. He harshly criticizes the sophists and their teachings, and most so rhetoric. Justice is most important to him. He praises prudence (sōphrosynē), shame (aischynē), and self-control, the mastery of one’s needs (enkrateia).226 In the Apology Socrates always converses with the common people in the agora, but this is only implied in Gorgias.227 In this dialogue Socrates rejects a public political life and is not prepared to use his oratorical skill (ʽtongueʼ) to win in court, not even to save his life.228 Socrates teaches the youth real values and not democracy, which he equates with the sophists.229 Thus, in Gorgias Plato has turned Aristophanes’ agōn of the logoi upside down – Socrates now embodies the ideals of the Better Argument, while his opponent stands for the values of the Worse Argument. Callicles and Socrates, however, not only represent two different kinds of education but also two paths between which young aristocrats under democracy can choose.230 The importance of this subject for Gorgias may be seen in the 219 Pl. Grg. 491d–492b. 220 Pl. Grg. 494e. 221 Pl. Grg. 484b–c. Callicles incorrectly quotes Pindar, since the famous poet did not advocate the right of the stronger, see Dodds 1959: 270–271; Hornblower 2004: 84–85; Dalfen 2004: 332–333. 222 Pl. Grg. 484d, 485d, 486a–d. 223 Pl. Grg. 481d–e, 513a–b, 518a–b, 518e–519a; see Ober 1998: 202–209. 224 Pl. Rep. 489d–495c, esp. 492a–c, 494c–d, 495a–b; cf. also Grg. 525e–526a; Leg. 691c–d. 225 Pl. Rep. 492a–c. 226 Pl. Grg. 491d–492c, 494c, esp. 491d, 494c. The meaning of the notion sōphrosynē changes in course of the dialogue. Therefore, this notion means in Gorgias prudence as well as temperance; see Rademaker 2005: 312–315, esp. 314. 227 Pl. Ap. 19d, 29d–31a, 33b, 36b–c; Grg. 447a. 228 Pl. Grg. 473e, 522d–e; see Ober 1998: 210. 229 Pl. Grg. 520b; see also Rep. 492a–b. 230 See Donlan 1980: 174. Walter Connor (1971: 175–198, esp. 196–197) speaks of a choice between two paths: to conform to the rules of a democratic political life or to withdraw from

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discussion between Callicles and Socrates, which deals the difference between bios praktikos and bios theōrētikos.231 One path leads to a philosophical way of life, which strives towards justice and turns its back on the daily political life of the polis.232 In Gorgias the philosophical life is personified in the character of Socrates. Callicles, as the protagonist of the right of the stronger and consequently a paradigm of injustice, embodies the opposite path.233 It is the path of public life and adjustment to the democratic rules of the game. Due to the upheavals of 411 and 404/403, this adjustment was interpreted in both ancient and modern times as only a seeming submission on the part of the young aristocrats. However, this interpretation is precisely what Plato wishes to refute. An indication for this is Alcibiades’ admission in the Symposium to be strongly attracted by Socrates’ speech (the philosophical life), but his interest in public affairs (Athenaiōn prattein) and desire for the love of the crowd prevail in the end.234 Plato gestures at the term apragmosynē to show that Callicles has opted for the vita activa, and does not know the vita contemplativa, having completely fallen under the influence of democratic ideology. The notion apragmosynē is not mentioned expressis verbis anywhere in the Gorgias. Plato, however, uses its negated antonym – ou polypragmonēsantos.235 Callicles depicts the difference between bios praktikos and bios theōrētikos by comparing himself with Zethus, and Socrates with Amphion from Antiope, one of Euripides’ last plays, performed in about 409.236 In this tragedy, like an echo of the debate on the place of apragmosynē and polypragmosynē in Athenian democracy, one of the central questions is the opposition between the man who is heading towards public life and the man who opts for a withdrawn life that is devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and art.237 Zethus harshly condemns the quiet life. He believes that the

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politics; cf. Apelt 1998: 9; Scholz 1998: 101. For Plato, Alcibiades’ path is that of accepting the rules of democratic political life. Pl. Grg. 484c–486d, 500c–d, 506b, 510a–511b, 512d–513e, 521d–522e; cf. Kahn 1996: 126– 127, 134. Pl. Grg. 473e, 500c, 507d–508a; cp. Rep. 495b–c; Xen. Mem. 4.1.3–5; see Apelt 1998: 7–9; Scholz 1998: 79; Ober 1998: 186, 236. Plato’s mentioning of Aristides as an example of a good statesman is no proof that he does not distance himself from the political life of his polis, since the return to the conditions prior to the Persian wars is impossible (Pl. Grg. 526b). Besides, Plato criticizes Aristides in Meno for failing to educate his son properly (Pl. Men. 94). Contra Nightingale 1995: 70–73, esp. 72. Pl. Symp. 215e–216c. Pl. Grg. 526c. Pl. Grg. 484e–485e; Eur. Ant. 183, 185–186, 188; see Dodds 1959: 275–276; Wassermann, 1968: 403; Carter 1986: 163, 173; Hose 1995: 139–143; Nightingale 1995: 77–78; Dalfen 2004: 336, 338–339. Eur. Ant. 184–188, 193–194, 196, 200, 202, 219, 227 (910); see Nestle 1926: 129–140; Ehrenberg 1947: 46–67; Dienelt 1953: 94–104; Allison 1979: 10–22; Carter 1986: 163–173; Nightingale 1995: 73–76. Some modern scholars, however, argue against the identification of Zethus and Amphion with the dichotomy vita activa – vita contemplativa. John Gibert (2009: 23–34) suggests that Zethus is not the opposite of just one type of quietist. On the contrary, his

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withdrawn life renders man incapable of helping his polis and friends with advice and action, of debating legal matters and taking part in war. Consequently, the man’s character is corrupted, he becomes unmanly, and his house is ruined.238 Amphion’s reply follows, according to the rules of oratorical contest. He rejects the criticism of his twin, Zethus, pointing out that the apragmōn is a true friend of his polis and friends. In fact, notwithstanding his reclusive life, his moderation and prudence enable him to provide better advice than the rash leaders of the people and the ignorant mob.239 Zethus wins the discussion, but in the end the play proves Amphion right. He is only seemingly unuseful since thanks to his musical art the walls of the Thebes are erected.240 Socrates points out that his own views coincide with Amphion’s.241 He calls the masses ignorant, while saying of rhetors and politicians that they have the skill of persuasion but not true knowledge, and that their own gain is more important to them than the welfare of the community.242 He asserts that he is one of the rare Athenians who undertakes true political art (politikē technē), and the only one who works for the good of the city (politika), since he strives for the best, for prudence, that is, temperance (sōphrosynē) and justice (dikaiosynē).243 The following three quotations best exemplify the profound difference between Socrates and Callicles on the bios praktikos – bios theōrētikos dichotomy:244 οἶμαι μετ᾽ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἕξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. I think I am one of the few Athenians – not to say the only one – who undertake the real political craft and practice politics – the only one among people now. I don’t aim at gratification with each of speeches I make, but aim at the best, not pleasantest, and I’m not willing to do ‘these subtle things’ that you advise me. That’s why I won’t know what to say in court.

238 239 240 241 242 243

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ideal represents just another variety of quietism, which is complementary to that of Amphion. Both of them have the potential to be selfish elitists conspicuously beneficial to the polis. Eur. Ant. 184–188, 193–194, 196, 219; see Carter 1986: 164–167, 172. Eur. Ant. 193–194, 196, 200, 202, 206, 227 (910); see Carter 1986: 167–171. See Grote 1994: 27; Hose 1995: 142–143. Pl. Grg. 506b. Pl. Grg. 502d–e, 510b–511a, 513b–c, 517a–c, 518e–519a, 520a–b, 521b, 526d, see also 455a–d, 459. Pl. Grg. 502e–503a, 504d–e, 507a–b, 515b–c, 517b–c, 519a, 521d–522a, 526a–b, 527d, esp. 507a–b, 521d–522a; cf. Dodds 1959: 369; Jaeger 51973: 738–739; Irwin 1979: 191, 220–221; Dalfen 2004: 424–425. In the discussion between Socrates and Callicles sōphrosynē means the control of pleasures and desires, as well as prudence, on which see Rademaker 2005: 312– 315, esp. 314. In the Gorgias the notion sōphrosynē is closely related to the value term enkrateia (Pl. Grg. 491d–e; cf. Rep. 430e), per Dalfen 2004: 360–361. The question whether Socrates here claims to have true political expertise is of secondary importance. For the present chapter it is more important that Socrates expresses an understanding of the political craft that is diametrically opposed to the traditional perception of political expertise; see Shaw 2011: 187–197, esp. 191–194. Pl Grg. 521d–e (trans. T. Irwin).

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According to Socrates, the judgment of the dead as envisioned in the Afterlife Myth shows that the life of a private man (andros idiōtou) or philosopher (philоsophos) who rejects polypragmosynē is in every respect better than the life preferred by Callicles:245 ἐνίοτε δ᾽ ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ᾽ ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μέν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. [...] ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπό τε τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν· χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνῄσκω ἀποθνῄσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσῃ σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾖ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, [...] But sometimes he [Rhadamanthys] noticed another soul that had lived piously and with truth, of a private man or of someone else; but most of all, so I say Callicles, of some philosopher who did his own work and was no meddler during his life; then admired this and sent him off to the Isles of the Blessed. […] For myself, then, Callicles, I am persuaded by these accounts, and I consider how to present my soul as healthy as possible before the judge. And so I dismiss the honours accorded by most men. I practice the truth. And I will try to be really the best that is in my power in life and, whenever I die, in death. And I call all other men, as far as it is in my power – yes, I call you, Callicles, in reply to your – to this life and this contest, which I say is worth more than all the contests here. And I reproach you because you won’t be able to defend yourself when you face that court of justice and that judgment I was speaking of just now.

Callicles comes out with opinions that could easily be those of Zethus. Philosophy is fine, but only in one’s youth. If a man continues practicing it later, then his noble nature is corrupted. He becomes a coward, unmanly, and his house remains empty. Such a man is not only incapable of helping his polis or anyone else with advice, he is not even able to save himself if he finds himself in mortal danger:246 ταὐτὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ. ὃ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, […] ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς· κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνήσθην. […] νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ᾽ ἰλιγγιῴης ἂν καὶ χασμῷο οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγόρου τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι. […] ἀλλ᾽ ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ᾽ εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις· 245 Pl. Grg. 526c–e (trans. T. Irwin). 246 Pl. Grg. 485c–486c (trans. T. Irwin); see Scholz 2006: 45–48.

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ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά. Well, philosophizers strike me the same way too. For when I see philosophy in a young boy, I admire it, I find it suitable, and I regard him as a free man, and a non-philosophizer as un-free (aneleutheros), someone who will never expect anything fine or noble from himself. But when I see an older man still philosophizing and not giving it up, I think this man needs a beating, Socrates. For, as I was saying just now, this person is bound to end being unmanly (anandros), even if he has an altogether good nature; for he shuns the city centre and the public squares where the poet says men win good reputations. […] Now, Socrates, I’m quite friendly (philikos) towards you. And so I find you strike me now as Amphion struck Zethus in Euripides, whom I recalled just now. […] For as it is, suppose someone arrested you, or some other philosopher, and threw you into gaol, claiming you were doing injustice when you were doing none; you know you’d have no idea what to do with yourself; you’d be dizzy, you’d gape, not knowing what to say; you’d go into court, to face some inferior wretch or an accuser, and you’d be put to death if he wanted the death penalty for you? […] My excellent friend, listen to me; ‘stop these examinations’; practise the culture of the world’s affairs’; practise what will earn you the reputation of wisdom; ‘leave these subtleties to others’ – whether we ought call them nonsense or rubbish (phlyaria) – ‘from which you will live in an empty house’. Don’t emulate (zēloun) those who examine these trifles, but those with a living, reputation, and many other goods.

The fact that Plato reflects on the bios praktikos and bios theōrētikos in the context of Socrates’ trial, and that he alludes to the ignorance of both the masses and the politicians, shows that he uses this dichotomy to establish an alternative framework for evaluating success and failure (ethical as well as political). This framework, in turn, indicates that the demos by definition was incompetent to judge Socrates’ conduct in life. The coincidence of Callicles’ views with those of Zethus shows that the young Athenian, despite his vehement support for the right of the stronger, is willing to subordinate himself to the democratic rules of public life. The unusual concurrence of Plato’s views with Euripides’, of whom he otherwise has nothing good to say, would be astonishing were it not for the following circumstance.247 Callicles’ favorite, Zethus – and therefore he himself – exhibits many parallels with the Pericles and Alcibiades whom Thucydides presents.248 In the Funeral Oration, having said of the Athenians that they are lovers of beauty (philokaloumen) without extravagance and wisdom (philosophoumen) without softness, Pericles claims that according to the general opinion an individual who takes no part in public affairs and who minds his own business is useless:249 φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ᾽ εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας· […] ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἑτέροις πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι· μόνοι γὰρ τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν, [...] 247 Since Euripides is the only tragedian whose work is discussed in the Gorgias (484e, 485e), and because he is directly criticized by Plato in the Republic (568a–b), it is safe to assume that Socrates’ critique of the composition of tragedies in the Gorgias primarily refers to him (502b–d; cf. Ap. 22a–c). 248 Cf. Carter 1986: 172. 249 Thuc. 2.40.1–2 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); cf. Carter 1986: 27; Raaflaub 2006b: 196; Rossetti 2018: 274–275.

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II. The Gorgias For we are lovers of beauty yet with no extravagance and lovers of wisdom yet without weakness (malakia). […] And you will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business you will find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in public affairs, not as one who minds his own business (apragmōn), but as good for nothing; […]

These parallels are not superficial, as apragmosynē has another no less significant aspect. This is revealed by Pericles in his last speech, when he calls the Athenian archē (empire) a tyranny and says that apragmones are useless, cannot protect themselves, and are a danger to the Athenian empire. He goes on to state that an apragmōn despises the greatness of Athens, whereas he who wants to achieve something – emulates Athens’ greatness:250 ἧς οὐδ᾽ ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιὼς ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἀνδραγαθίζεται· ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον. τάχιστ᾽ ἄν τε πόλιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑτέρους τε πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν καὶ εἴ που ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτόνομοι οἰκήσειαν· τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγμον οὐ σῴζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον, οὐδὲ ἐν ἀρχούσῃ πόλει ξυμφέρει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὑπηκόῳ, ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν. [...] γνῶτε δὲ ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν ἐν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὸ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἴκειν, πλεῖστα δὲ σώματα καὶ πόνους ἀνηλωκέναι πολέμῳ, καὶ δύναμιν μεγίστην δὴ μέχρι τοῦδε κεκτημένην, ἧς ἐς ἀΐδιον τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις, ἢν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδῶμέν ποτε (πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι), μνήμη καταλελείψεται, Ἑλλήνων τε ὅτι Ἕλληνες πλείστων δὴ ἤρξαμεν, καὶ πολέμοις μεγίστοις ἀντέσχομεν πρός τε ξύμπαντας καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους, πόλιν τε τοῖς πᾶσιν εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην ᾠκήσαμεν. καίτοι ταῦτα ὁ μὲν ἀπράγμων μέμψαιτ᾽ ἄν, ὁ δὲ δρᾶν τι καὶ αὐτὸς βουλόμενος ζηλώσει· εἰ δέ τις μὴ κέκτηται, φθονήσει. From this empire, however, it is too late for you even to withdraw, if any one at the present crisis, through fear and shrinking from action does indeed seek thus to play the honest man; for by this time the empire you hold is a tyranny, which it may seem wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is dangerous to let go. Men like these would soon ruin a state, either here, if they should win others to their views, or if they should settle in some other land and have an independent state all to themselves; for men of peace are not safe unless flanked by men of action; nor is it expedient in an imperial state, but only in a vassal state, to seek safety by submission. [...] And realize that Athens has a mighty name among all mankind because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but more freely than any other city has lavished lives and labours upon war, and that she possesses to-day a power which is the greatest that ever existed down to our time. The memory of this greatness will be left to posterity forever, how that we of all Hellenes held sway over the greatest number of Hellenes, in the greatest wars held out against our foes whether united or single, and inhabited a city that was the richest in all things and the greatest. These things the man who shrinks from action (apragmōn) may indeed disparage, but he who, like ourselves, wishes to accomplish something will make them the goal of his endeavour (zēloun), while every man who does not possess them will be envious.

Enemies of Athens also believed that apragmosynē was incompatible with the Athenian imperialistic policy, as is confirmed by the Corinthians’ speech in Sparta on the eve of the Peloponnesian War.251 Alcibiades goes furthest in the Sicilian debate. For him apragmosynē and its related hēsychia have become antonyms to 250 Thuc. 2.63.2–64.4 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); cf. Ehrenberg 1947: 48; Carter 1986: 38–39. 251 Thuc. 1.70.8–9; see also p. 105–106.

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the spirit of limitless expansion.252 The degree to which Alcibiades interprets apragmosynē as the antithesis of radical expansionism is demonstrated by his accusation that Nicias is upholding the policy of apragmosynē.253 In reality, however, Nicias advocated only taking a more cautious policy, not the abandoning the expansion of Athenian archē.254 Apart from linking it in another way with democratic ideology, Callicles’ criticism of apragmosynē is also significant because it directly connects him with the imperialistic spirit (tyrannical character) of the Athenian empire.255 The debate about whether the superior life should be a bios praktikos or a bios theōrētikos is a major topic in the last part of Gorgias. It paves the way for the development of philosophy into an alternative politics.256 Socrates begins with the relocation of ideas from the political sphere to the metaphysical, which up to then had not been considered a part of politics. In his conversation with Polus, Socrates transposes political notions to the soul.257 Concern for the welfare of the soul is declared politikē technē, while legislation (nomothetikē technē) and administration of justice (dikastikē technē) are its corrective elements.258 The entire dialogue is characterized by a fundamental criticism of existing political theory and practice. This leads Socrates to negate the existence of an independent political sphere that would be separate from ethics.259 Hence Socrates can claim that the key criterion in evaluating a politician is whether he makes the citizens better.260 Even with this deviation from the traditional understanding of politics, the Socrates of the Gorgias still moves within the frame of the Socrates of the Apology.261 However, in completely rejecting bios praktikos and giving absolute priority to bios theōrētikos (philosophikos) in the third part of Gorgias Socrates goes another important step 252 Thuc. 6.18.2, 6–7; see also Rep. 566e; cf. Ehrenberg 1947: 50. Thucydides demonstrates that in Athens hēsychia was seen as synonymous with apragmosynē (Thuc. 1.70.8–9); see Ehrenberg 1947: 46; Hornblower 1991: 77; Id. 2004: 61. 253 Thuc. 6.18.6. 254 The same conclusion can be reached on the basis of Thucydides’ statement in the Obituary for Pericles, according to which Pericles was dormant (hēsychazontas), but the Athenians acted contrary to his advice, which is an obvious reference to the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 2.65.7); cf. Hornblower 1991: 343. 255 This can be also inferred from the fact that, in seven out of eleven instances we have in Thucydides, apragmosynē and apragmōn are mentioned only by Pericles and Alcibiades, who are apparently the only Athenians to condemn them (Thuc. 2.40.2, 63.2–3, 64.4; 6.18.6–7); see Allison 1979: 13. 256 Cf. Ober 1998: 165, 190–191. 257 See Dodds 1959: 226; Trampedach 1994: 166–167; Dalfen 2004: 242–243, 247–248. 258 Pl. Grg. 464b–c, 465b–d; see also Marshal 2000: 16–19; Rowe 2007c: 33–34. 259 This is important insofar as the primary expression of the demos’ identity during the fifth– century was political, see Raaflaub 1983: 529, 535; Meier 31995: 249–261. Many social and economic inequalities continued to exist in Athens in spite of the egalitarian elements of democratic ideology. The demos did not aspire to address such inequalities, since they were of secondary importance for the citizen’s political identity, see Raaflaub 1983: 529–536; Id. 1996, 139–159. 260 Pl. Grg. 502e–503c, 516b–e, 521a–522c (physician); see Sedley 2009: 59–62. 261 Pl. Ap. 30a–b, 32d–33a, 36c–d; cf. Prt. 319e–320c; see Ober 1998: 168–177.

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further.262 This may be observed from the change in the way Socrates’ attitude to political life is presented. To underline the shift and the difference between this new position and Socrates’ political beliefs in the Apology and Crito, we may “distinguish” between “two” Socrates in Gorgias. Accordingly, the purpose of this distinction is not in any way to address issues related to the so-called Socratic problem, since the question of whether Plato became emancipated from his teacher or not in the course of time is of secondary importance for the argument presented here.263 The “first” Socrates stays in the agora, is well acquainted with the oratory of the courts, is appointed prytanis in 406, takes part in the work of the ekklēsia and listens to Pericles’ orations.264 In spite of this, he says of himself that he is not a politician.265 This “first” Socrates outstrips Gorgias and Polus in dialogue. He has many features in common with the Socrates of the Apology and Crito. In these dialogues, Socrates does not take part as a politician in public life but is well acquainted with his fellow citizens, since he frequents public places trying to improve them.266 He loves the Athenians, but cherishes philosophy more than anything else:267 ‘ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα ἀλλ᾽ ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ᾽ ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανῇ·’ εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι· ‘ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι· ‘ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελῇ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις;’ “Socrates, this time we will not do as Anytus says, but we will let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer spend your time in this investigation or in philosophy, and if you are caught doing so again you shall die”; if you should let me go on this condition which I have mentioned, I should say to you, “Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way: “Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honour, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?”

He does not manage the affairs of the greatest city, most famous for its wisdom and strength, since that would have cost him his life and he would be of no use to 262 Cf. Trampedach 1994: 169; Ober 1998: 178, 190–192, 211. 263 A detailed account of Plato’s attitude towards Socrates and the different interpretations of it can be found in Rowe 2007a. Gabriel Danzig (2018: 8–18) has given a brief but very instructive synopsis of the Socratic question. 264 Pl. Grg. 447a, 455e, 471e–472b, 473e, 503c. 265 Pl. Grg. 473e. 266 Pl. Ap. 29c–30b, 30e–31b, 31d–32a. 267 Pl. Ap. 29c–e (trans. H. N. Fowler), see also 24b.

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anyone. Nevertheless, Socrates is a polypragmōn, but only because on a personal level he works to make his fellow citizens better, as a gadfly persistently wakes a noble but sleepy horse.268 Therefore, a quiet life (hēsychia) is unacceptable to him.269 He compares himself in the Gorgias with a physician and is prepared to practise true political craft in order to make his fellow citizens better – even at the cost of his life.270 From all of the above, it appears that Socrates in two ways serves his polis. The first form of public service is to be prytanis, to serve in war and to take part in the work of the assembly. The second is to speak to the fellow citizens in order to “improve them”, that is, philosophizing is as a form of public service.271 Nonetheless, from Pericles’ or Alcibiades’ point of view Socrates is strictly speaking still an apragmōn, since he keeps at a distance from the excesses of the rule of the people and Athenian imperialist policy.272 The “second” Socrates certainly shares many of the characteristics of the first, but there are visible differences. According to Callicles, he avoids the agora because he lacks experience; he is unfamiliar with the laws and does not know how to communicate with people.273 What Callicles says is, of course, not true, but it serves to point out that the “second” Socrates looks like an idiōtēs, even by Plato’s standards. He is no longer a gadfly who constantly wakes his fellow citizens, since when he comes before court he will not be able to say: “I do all this only for your sake, judges,” which is Socrates’ main thesis in the Apology.274 Consequently, he does not succeed in convincing Callicles.275 The “second” Socrates says that he has taken up politics, but by claiming that he is the only one to do so and that ethical standards are the only relevant ones, he shows that the divide with traditional politics is absolute.276 The souls of politicians, then, will not go to the Isles of the Blessed, whereas the soul of a private man (anēr idiōtēs) or philosopher who did his own work (ta hautou prattein) and did not meddle in other people’s affairs (ou polypragmonēsantos), will.277 Thus politics, as the “second” Socrates understands it, is actually nothing other than philosophy, which possesses the possibility of transforming politics into politics as it should be.278 268 Pl. Ap. 30e, 31c–32a, 36b, 37d; see Carter 1986: 185; Strycker 1994: 337; Heitsch 2002: 125 with n. 228, 129. Malcolm Scholfield (2006: 22, 24) rightly points out that by general standards Socrates is an apragmōn, and that he makes considerable effort to distance himself from such an image in the Apology. 269 Pl. Ap. 37e–38a. 270 Pl. Grg. 513e, 521a–522c; see also Rep. 426a–427a. 271 See Schofield 2006: 25–26. 272 See Jaeger 1928: 6 with n. 1. 273 Pl. Grg. 484d, 485d; cf. Ober 1998: 201. 274 Pl. Grg. 521e, 522c; Ap. 29c–30c, 30e, 31c–32a, 36b, 37d; Kahn 1996: 130; Ober 1998: 211– 212. 275 Pl. Grg. 499b, 505c–d, 506b–d, 507a, 510a, 516b–d, 519d, 522e, 527c–e; see Ober 1998, 193, 206, 214–215. 276 Pl. Grg. 521d–522a, cf. also 503a, 507c–509c, 515b–c, 517b–c, 519a, 521d–522a, 526a–b, 527d; see Trampedach 1994: 168. 277 Pl. Grg. 525d, 526c; cf. Ober 1998: 211–212. 278 See Trampedach 1994: 170–171; Schofield 2006: 66.

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The dialogue ends with the “second” Socrates telling Callicles that the way of life the latter recommends is worthless, proposing instead that his fellow citizens should take up politics only when they acquire an adequate (obviously philosophical) education, and even then only if it is necessary, and if they are capable of giving advice.279 Therefore Plato, by thematising the notions of bios praktikos and bios theōrētikos, takes on an approach diametrically opposed to the prevailing democratic ideology of his time, with the aim of replacing the traditional understanding of politics.280 As far as Plato is concerned, even the “second” Socrates only seems to be a complete idiōtēs and apragmōn. Accordingly, in his closing words Socrates reminds Callicles that a man must practise, not seeming (dokein) but being (einai) good, in private (idion) and public (dēmosion) life.281 These words anticipate the philosopher-king of the Republic. 3.8. The Doctrine of the Right of the Stronger Every society and every age is familiar with some form of the right of the stronger. The Greeks were certainly no exception as Homer, Hesiod and Herodotus show.282 However, this traditional, pre-sophistic right of the stronger is neither abstract, nor theoretically justified. It is not distinguished by any new moral quality and is not used in an attempt to establish some new ethic.283 In a way, the “immature” traditional right of the stronger remains only one of many possible ways of acting and behaving and is, as a rule, considered to be negative.284 Along with the traditional right of the stronger, however, the Greeks knew another right, grounded in theory, which will be referred to in this study as the doctrine of the right of the stronger. This is as far more complex matter, since behind it lies an essentially different view of the world, as it proposes that acting in accordance with the right of the stronger is not merely the only thing possible, but even more importantly, the only right thing to do. All existing conventions and social values are rejected as specious restraints, and at the same time there is an attempt to replace them with a new ethic which advocates a diametrically opposite system of values. The theoretical foundation of the doctrine of the right of the stronger is the nomos-physis antithesis, since in an abstract way it estab279 Pl. Grg. 527d–e; see Trampedach 1994: 169, 173; Kahn 1996: 128, 131; Ober 1998: 242–243. 280 Since the bios praktikos – bios theōrētikos dichotomy exposes the fallacious nature of the democratic understanding of a good citizen and politician, then the jury, composed of members of the demos, was by definition incompetent to pass a fair judgment on Socrates’ conduct of life. In the Apology Plato also argues that the court was incompetent; see Danzig 2003: 315. 281 Pl. Grg. 527b. 282 Hom. Il. 21.106–113; Hes. Op. 213–250; Hdt. 8.111.2–3; see also Martin 1976: 160–161; Crane 1998: 72–75. 283 Hesiod, for example, criticises the right of the stronger from the utilitarian point of view (Hes. Op. 213–284). This utilitarianism and the associated justice (dikē, dikaion) are not theoretically founded see Spahn 1986: 11–12. 284 Hes. Op. 203–212.

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lishes the fundamental contradiction between nature (physis) and conventions, the laws (nomoi) created by people.285 According to this antithesis, the root of this contradiction is the view that human law is not an expression of divine will or the natural order of things and that it is in conflict with the laws of nature, which correspond to the real order of things.286 All these distinguishing features of the doctrine of the right of the stronger can be recognised in the person of Callicles in Gorgias:287 ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς αὑτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὑτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν· ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσιν φαυλότεροι ὄντες. [...] ἡ δέ γε οἶμαι φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; [...] ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα· πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας, κατεπᾴδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα λέγοντες ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. But in my view those who lay down the rules are the weak men, the many. And so they lay down the rules and assign their praise and blame with their eye on themselves and their own advantage. They terrorize the stronger men capable of having more; and to prevent these men from having more than themselves the say that taking is more shameful and unjust, and that doing injustice is this, seeking to have more than other people; [...] But I think nature itself shows this, that it is just for the better man to have more than the worse, and the more powerful than the less powerful. Nature shows that this is so in many areas – among other animals, and in whole cities and races of men, that the just stands decide in this way – the superior rules over the weaker and has more. For what sort of justice did Xerxes rely on when he marched against Greece, or his father against the Scythians? [...] But I think these men do these things according to nature – nature of the just; yes, by Zeus, by the rule of nature, though no doubt not by the rule we lay down – we mould the best and strongest among us, taking them from youth up, like lions, and tame them by spells and incantations over them, until we enslave them, [...]. But I think that if a man is born with a strong enough nature, he will shake off and smash and escape all this. He will trample our writings, charms,

285 It is a logical conclusion based on the nomos-physis antithesis and the closely related notion of natural necessity (Thuc. 5.105.2). All sources demonstrate that the nomos-physis antithesis is central to the right of the stronger concept. In this respect, it makes no difference whether the author is a philosopher (Plato), historian (Thucydides), sophist (Anonymus Iamblichi) or the disciple of a sophist (Callicles). 286 See Menzel 1922: 14–16, 21; Heinimann 1945: 116–117; Koester 1968: 521–527; Striker 1987: 79–88. 287 Pl. Grg. 483c–484b (trans. T. Irwin).

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The only other place in the sources where the doctrine of the right of the stronger, with all its distinguishing features is represented is the Melian Dialogue of Thucydides:288 ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ μετ᾽ ὀνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς ἢ δικαίως τὸν Μῆδον καταλύσαντες ἄρχομεν ἢ ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα, [...] δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς βλάπτει ἡ ἔχθρα ὑμῶν ὅσον ἡ φιλία μὲν ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ μῖσος δυνάμεως παράδειγμα τοῖς ἀρχομένοις δηλούμενον. τῆς μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐμενείας οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς οἰόμεθα λελείψεσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω τῆς ἀνθρωπείας τῶν μὲν ἐς τὸ θεῖον νομίσεως, τῶν δ᾽ ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βουλήσεως δικαιοῦμεν ἢ πράσσομεν. ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν. καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι χρησάμενοι, ὄντα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ καταλείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ, εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἂν καὶ ἄλλους ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει ἡμῖν γενομένους δρῶντας ἂν ταὐτό. καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ θεῖον οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος οὐ φοβούμεθα ἐλασσώσεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπί γε τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ προύπτοις κινδύνοις πλεῖστα διαφθείρουσαν ἀνθρώπους αἰσχύνην τρέψεσθε. πολλοῖς γὰρ προορωμένοις ἔτι ἐς οἷα φέρονται τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλούμενον ὀνόματος ἐπαγωγοῦ δυνάμει ἐπεσπάσατο ἡσσηθεῖσι τοῦ ῥήματος ἔργῳ ξυμφοραῖς ἀνηκέστοις ἑκόντας περιπεσεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνην αἰσχίω μετὰ ἀνοίας ἢ τύχῃ προσλαβεῖν. ὃ ὑμεῖς, ἢν εὖ βουλεύησθε, φυλάξεσθε, καὶ οὐκ ἀπρεπὲς νομιεῖτε πόλεώς τε τῆς μεγίστης ἡσσᾶσθαι [...]. Well, then, we on our part will make use of no fair phrases (onomatōn kalōn), saying either that we hold sway justly because we overthrew the Persians, or that we now come against you because we are injured, [...]. Rather we presume that you aim at accomplishing what is possible in accordance with the real thoughts of both us, since you know as well as we know that what is just is arrived at in human arguments only when the necessity on both sides is equal, and that the powerful exact what they can, while the weak yield what they must. No; for your hostility does not injure us so much as your friendship; for in the eyes of our subjects that would be a proof of our weakness, whereas your hatred is a proof of our power. Well, as to the kindness of the divine favour, neither do we expect to fall short of you therein. For in no respect are we departing from men’s observances regarding that which pertains to the divine or from their desires regarding that which pertains to themselves, in aught that we demand or do. For of the gods we hold the belief, and of men we know, that by a necessity of their nature wherever they have power they always rule. And so in our case since we neither enacted this law (ton nomon) nor when it was enacted were the first to use it, but found it in existence and expect to leave it in existence for all time, so we make use of it, well aware that both you and others, if clothed with the same power as we are, would do the same thing. And so with regard to the divine favour, we have good reason not to be afraid that we shall beat disadvantage. For surely you will not take refuge in that feeling which most often brings men to ruin when they are confronted by dangers that are clearly foreseen and therefore disgraceful – the fear of such disgrace. For many men, though they can still clearly foresee the dangers into which 288 Thuc. 5.89, 95, 105, 111.3–4 (trans. Ch. F. Smith).

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they are drifting, are lured on by the power of a seductive word – the thing called disgrace – until, the victims of a phrase, they are indeed plunged, of their own act, into irretrievable calamities, and thus incur in addition a disgrace that is more disgraceful, because associated with folly rather than with misfortune. Such a course you will avoid, if you take wise counsel, and you will not consider it degrading to acknowledge yourselves inferior to the most powerful state [...].

This conclusion is, however, contradictory to the view that the doctrine of the right of the stronger was endorsed even before the Peloponnesian War. The speech by the Athenians in Sparta on the eve of the conflict is usually taken as chief evidence for this theory.289 In this speech, the views of the Athenians are indeed present standpoints close to the typical logic of the doctrine of the right of the stronger, but there are still essential differences. The first to spring to the attention is that the Athenians invest considerable effort in justifying the dominant position of their polis, in spite of the fact that at the same time they boast of it with surprising frankness.290 In contrast, there is a resounding absence of any kind of justification in the form of ethical, historical or social arguments that might have helped Callicles and the Athenian envoys at Melos. The only way they can validate their unscrupulous position is that it reflects the current balance of forces, which can hardly be called a justification. In the speech in Sparta, the Athenians justify their hegemony in quite a few ways.291 One explanation is that they owe their leading position in Greece to the extraordinary sacrifices they had made during the Persian Wars for the well-being of all Greeks.292 Besides, the Athenians demonstrate a need to point out that they had not snatched archē by force, and that the leadership had fallen to them only because the Spartans themselves refused to take the lead in the war against the Persians after 479. The Athenians also say that once they had acquired hegemony they never let it go, since they had succumbed to the most powerful instincts: honour, self-interest and, most importantly, fear:293 καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι· ἐξαὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας. καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθημένους, καί τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κατεστραμμένων, ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν [...] And indeed we did not acquire this empire by force, but only after you had refused to continue to oppose what was left of the barbarian forces, and the allies came to us and of their own accord asked us to assume leadership. It was under the compulsion of circumstances that we were driven at first to advance our empire to its present state, influenced chiefly by fear, 289 Thuc. 1.73–86; cf. Strasburger 1958: 32–33; Kiechle 1963: 301–304; de Ste Croix 1972: 14; cf. also Kriegsbaum 1913: 24–43. 290 Thuc. 1.73.1, 76.2–4, 78; see Deininger 1939: 11–12, 59; Strasburger 1958: 17–41; de Ste. Croix 1972: 7–13; Jordović 2005: 85–88. 291 Cf. Rengakos 1984: 25–28. 292 Thuc. 1.73.2–75.1. 293 Тhuc. 1.75.1–4 (trans. Ch. F. Smith).

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As their last argument, the Athenians contended that they had been more moderate and just towards their allies than was strictly necessary, in view of their position.294 All these arguments fly in the face of the logic of the doctrine of the right of the stronger, which asserts that it is only right to acquire power through strength or force, and that any form of consideration for others is a sign of weakness.295 Besides the differences we have mentioned, there are also deviations in the terminology between the Athenian speech in Sparta and the Melian Dialogue. The Athenians in Sparta do not refer to physis, but to anthrōpeios tropos:296 οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνεῖμεν ὑπὸ [τριῶν] τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελίας, οὐδ᾽ αὖ πρῶτοι τοῦ τοιούτου ὑπάρξαντες, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι, ἄξιοί τε ἅμα νομίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες μέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε, ὃν οὐδείς πω παρατυχὸν ἰσχύι τι κτήσασθαι προθεὶς τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο. ἐπαινεῖσθαί τε ἄξιοι οἵτινες χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὥστε ἑτέρων ἄρχειν δικαιότεροι ἢκατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν γένωνται. ἄλλους γ᾽ ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν· Thus, there is nothing remarkable or inconsistent that, acting in the way that the human beings always will, we accepted an empire when it was offered us, and then, constrained by three all-powerful motives – honour, fear, and self-interest – declined to give it up. Nor again, are we the first who have entered upon such a course, but it has ever been an established rule that the weaker is kept down by the stronger. And we think that we are worthy of power; and there was a time when you thought so too; but now, you calculate what is in your own interest and then talk about justice – which no one, when opportunity offered of securing something by main strength, ever yet put before force and abstained from taking advantage (pleon echein). And they are to be commended who, yielding to the instinct of human nature to rule over others, have been more observant of justice than they might have been, considering their power.

For two reasons, this expression cannot be identified with the doctrine of the right of the stronger, which corresponds to ʽnatureʼ. Since the term physis is not used at all, this place in Thucydides cannot be translated as ʽhuman natureʼ, as is often the

294 Тhuc. 1.76.3–77.6. This is a very important argument because the excessiveness is characteristic of the doctrine of right of the stronger. Callicles is in favour of indulging the passions while the Athenian envoys at Melos dismiss any moderate and fair action, and the consequent friendship of the Melians, as a sign of weakness. (Pl. Grg. 491d–492c; Thuc. 5.90–97). The Worse Argument in the Clouds, particularly where the nomos-physis antithesis occurs, rejects prudence and decency since they prevent people from indulging their passions (Ar. Nub. 1071–1082); see Heinimann 1945: 140; cf. also Sommerstein 31991: 209–214. 295 Cf. Thuc. 5.89, 95. 296 Тhuc. 1.76.2–4 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); contra Deininger 1939: 83.

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case.297 A more appropriate translation would be ʽhuman wayʼ (of behaviour).298 Therefore, the term physis, which plays a central role in the Melian Dialogue and with Callicles, is not used here at all. The second reason is that, even when the term physis is used later on in the Athenian speech in Sparta instead of tropos, it still refers solely to the behaviour of people (tē anthrōpeia physei), not to the behaviour of all living beings in general. Besides, at no time do the Athenians in Sparta refer to some law (nomos) or justice (dikaion) or necessity (anankē) of nature, which is indeed the case in the Melian Dialogue and with Callicles in Gorgias.299 Instead, they use the term aei kathestōs.300 The fact that the Athenians’ speeches in Sparta and Athenian standpoints in Melos show considerable congruence in argumentation,301 although deviating in their central concepts, cannot be written off as coincidence.302 The difference mentioned between the terms ʽnatureʼ and ʽhuman natureʼ is quite significant.303 The use of the term physis is caused by the nomos-physis antithesis, whose starting point is the unbridgeable gap between nature and manmade conventions. We should also bear in mind that ʽnatureʼ, as a broader term, must include ʽhuman natureʼ, while the reverse is not at all implied. Furthermore, in all reliably confirmed cases which refer to the doctrine of the right of the stronger or the nomos-physis antithesis as, for instance, Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue, Callicles in Gorgias or Aristophanes’ Clouds, only the term physis is used, but not ʽhuman natureʼ – strong proof that it cannot be mere coincidence. Speaking of the doctrine of the right of the stronger, the Athenian envoys in Melos explicitly say that it applies equally to both people and gods.304 They speak of the ʽnecessity of natureʼ, not about the anankē of ʽhuman natureʼ.305 In Callicles’ case too, physis relates to both people and animals, and even to states.306

297 298 299 300 301 302

303 304 305 306

See Smith 1969: 129; Landmann 2002: 48. Cf. Hornblower 1991: 121–122. Thuc. 5.105.1–2; Pl. Grg. 484a–b. Тhuc. 1.76.2; see Hornblower 1987: 186 with n. 99. Тhuc. 1.76.1–2; 5.105.1–2; see Connor 1984: 151 with n. 32. This is all the more so given that Thucydides often uses the notion of ‘human nature’ and not in the context of the doctrine of the right of the stronger. He uses, for example, the notion of ‘human nature’ in the Great Plague Episode (Thuc. 2.50.1), the Mytilenian Debate (Thuc. 3.39.5, 45.7) and the Pathology of War (Thuc. 3.82.2, 84.2) cf. Topitsch 1943–1947: 50–67. The notion of physis is also used in other contexts such as the discussion on the nature of Themistocles, the audience of the Funeral Oration and the widows (Thuc. 1.138.3; 2.35.2, 45.2). In Aristophanes’ Clouds, Strepsiades is asked if eloquence is part of his nature (Ar. Nub. 486). Herodotus, who does not mention the nomos-physis antithesis, also often speaks of human nature (Hdt. 3.65.3; 8.38, 83.1). Georg Rechenauer (1991: 162–167) points out that Thucydides’ usage of the notion of anthrōpeia physis departs from that of the sophists. Тhuc. 5.105.1–3. Thuc. 5.105.2, contra Topitsch 1943–1947, 53, 59; Will 2006: 113–119. Pl. Grg. 483d. Referring to the behaviour of animals is not accidental. Hesiod gives the behaviour of a hawk as an example. In the Clouds, Phidippides justifies the beating of his father by pointing out that roosters and other animals do the same (Ar. Nub. 1427–1431, cf.

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In Aristophanes’ Clouds, which contains the oldest preserved example of the use of the nomos-physis antithesis, it also applies to the necessity of ʽnatureʼ, which not even Zeus himself can evade.307 In Antiphon’s examination of the nomosphysis antithesis and necessity of ʽnatureʼ, only the more general term physis is used, even though his entire debate explicitly refers to people.308 An identical case can be found with the sophist Hippias and the Anonymus Iamblichi.309 From all this, the conclusion would seem to be that, in respect of the Athenians’ speech in Sparta, there can be no question of the doctrine of the right of the stronger, only of the right itself.310 Virtually all comments on the Athenians’ speech in Sparta apply to the speech by Hermocrates in Gela, also linked to the doctrine of the right of the stronger.311 It is obvious that Thucydides deliberately avoids mentioning the doctrine in the context of another incident of the Peloponnesian War, although there was occasion to do so, as shown by the Mytilenian Debate.312 In it, Cleon declares that the destruction of Mytilene, which had previously capitulated, is necessary and just, while openly calling the Athenian archē a tyranny. The notorious demagogue, further points out that Athenians must not show mercy towards the Mytilenians, since this would be interpreted as weakness. Despite all this, Cleon at no time presents a single argument which could even distantly recall the doctrine of the right of the stronger.313 Strong denials are also voiced by quite a few scholars that the Melian Dialogue represents the doctrine of the right of the stronger. The main objection is that the Athenians never demand the right of the stronger, that is, they do not explicitly say that might is right.314 Although this criticism is not entirely unfounded, for a number of reasons it seems to be wrong. First, the conditions in which the discussion takes place are different from those experienced by Callicles. In the negotiations with the Melians, the Athenians really do not have to prove or demand anything, since their arguments are not only of verbal nature. Their military supremacy is so great that the question never

307 308 309

310 311 312 313 314

also Av. 753–768). The explanation or justification of the nomos-physis antithesis by referring to the behaviour of animals is an important element of it; see Heinimann 1945: 145–147. Ar. Nub. 1075–1084; cf. Ostwald 1986: 260. DK 87 B 44a. Pl. Prt. 337c–e (DK 86 C1); cf. Hoffmann 1997: 151–157, 161. Anonymus Iamblichi uses the nomos-physis antithesis to demonstrate that law and justice are founded in ‘nature’. He speaks only about ‘nature’ in general, and not about ‘human nature’. An identical situation can be found when Anonymus Iamblichi explains why a ʽsuperhumanʼ, in terms of Callicles thesis, could never succeed in imposing itself (DK 89 6.p.100.5.1ff.). Thuc. 1.73–78, 80–86, esp. 1.82.1–3, see also 3.68.1–2; 4.59–64. Тhuc. 4.61.5; HCT I: 236; HCT IV: 515–516; de Romilly 1963: 254–257; Guthrie 1969: 86; Connor 1984: 123–124; Rengakos 1984: 32–33 with n. 75, 84. See Wassermann 1947: 22; Liebeschuetz 1968: 73–74; Alker 1988: 814. For an overview on the excesses of warfare during the Peloponnesian war, see Jordović 2005: 24–39. Тhuc. 3.37.2. See Menzel 1922: 57; Deininger 1939: 104–107; Brunt 1969: 200; de Ste Croix, 1972: 14–15; Radt 1976: 34–35 n. 3; Ostwald 1986: 309–310; Hoffmann 1997: 147; Hornblower 2008: 223, 244.

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arises of whether they can carry out by force what they say they will. There is complete congruence between word and action. That is why they say that the negotiations only have the Melians’ salvation as an objective, at the same time revealing that they are not concerned whether the negotiations succeed or not.315 Callicles, on the other hand, has no weapons to speak for him, and his position is actually closer to the Melians than the Athenians. Socrates is the one who is superior. More importantly, by previously defeating Gorgias and Polus, who represent views that anticipate Callicles’, Socrates has demonstrated his superiority even before the young Athenian has had a chance to say anything. Therefore, Callicles finds himself in an inferior position from the outset.316 That is why he explains his beliefs with such candour and forthrightness. Secondly, it must not be forgotten that these two dialogues represent two significantly different discourses. The Melian Dialogue is not a philosophical tract, or even a political treatise, but rather a reproduction of political negotiations.317 This circumstance imposed limitations on Thucydides in using abstract reasoning. Thirdly, the aim of such parleys is not to elucidate the nature of justice or truth, good or evil. Their purpose is to achieve a particular political objective, in this case for the Melians to “voluntarily” accept Athens’ supremacy. Any discussion on the meaning or ethical basis of Athenian hegemony would distance the Athenians needlessly from this goal, since it would place them in an unfavourable negotiating position. Proof is to be found in the Melians’ unsuccessful attempts to steer the negotiations in this direction and the Athenians’ refusal to allow them; also in the fact that every time the Athenians speak of justice, it is only after the Melians have provoked them.318 One wonders, therefore, how much the statement might is right would have strengthened the Athenian negotiating position, as the subject of discussion in all likelihood would then have shifted to the Athenians and the nature of justice, not the Melians and their unconditional surrender. In fourth place, the attitude of the Athenian envoys towards the notion of justice changes in the course of the Melian Dialogue. Initially, the Athenians endeavour to avoid any discussion about justice and then, similarly to Thrasymachus, they do not give a new definition of justice, but only observe that its 315 Thuc. 5.87, 101.2–5; see Macleod 1974: 389–390. The inferior position of the Melians is evident in the fact that at the beginning of the negotiations they plead with the Athenians for forgiveness and that they have to choose between enslavement and annihilation (Thuc. 5.88, 92–93); see Deininger 1939: 6–11. 316 This is reflected in the words with which Callicles opens the third part of the Gorgias (Pl. Grg. 481b–c): „εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει; [...] εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;“ – “Tell me Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest about all this, or is he joking? [...] For if you’re in earnest, and all these things you say are true, wouldn’t the life of us men be upside down? And don’t we apparently do everything that’s opposite of what we should do?” (trans. T. Irwin). 317 See Macleod 1974: 387. 318 Thuc. 5.89–90, 104–105; Macleod 1974: 394–395; Radt 1976: 35.

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implementation is closely connected with the balance of power in daily life.319 Later on, however, opinions change. The Athenian envoys, it is true, do not explicitly say might is right in 5.105 either, but it may still be concluded from the context that this is their point. After the Melians claim in 5.104 that the Athenians’ actions are unjust and contrary to the will of the gods, in 5.105 the Athenian envoys respond that their actions are in accordance with natural necessity and that the law that one rules wherever one has power was not enacted by them and that it will exist forever. Thus denying that they are acting unjustly, the Athenians are essentially saying that their action is just and in accordance with the law of nature. That they truly believe this is also confirmed by their saying several times that their views are in accordance with the will of the gods – and the gods were held to be the highest instance of justice.320 Besides, by saying that physis anankaia is a law (nomos), the Athenians demonstrate that they share Callicles’ view which speaks of natural right (kata physin tē tou dikaiou), as well as natural law (kata nomon ge ton tēs physeōs).321 From all of the above, it is clear that the Athenians stand for the doctrine of the right of the stronger, but without literally defining it. Other parallels with Gorgias confirm that the doctrine of the right of the stronger is represented in the Melian Dialogue. The Melian Dialogue has a special place in Thucydides’ opus, since it is alone in analyzing an historical event and a phenomenon in the form of a dialogue.322 Furthermore, both dialogues have a generalising character. By the use of generalised expressions in depicting the negotiations, such as ʽthe Atheniansʼ and ʽAthenian envoysʼ, Thucydides deliberately avoids personifying the doctrine of the right of the stronger in any way. He thus lets it be known that this doctrine is not the result of someone’s personal standpoint, but rather a general phenomenon, closely connected with the imperialist spirit of Athenian archē.323 It is obvious that in this respect Plato followed Thucydides. The doctrine of the right of the stronger is clearly formulated only in one place – in Gorgias. Callicles, who is shown as the product of Athenian democratic ideology, is in a way anonymous, since he was obviously not widely 319 Thuc. 5.89. For Thrasymachus see chapter III.1.1. Thrasymachus, Callicles, and Polus. 320 Cf. Graves 1891: ad loc; Menzel: 56–58; Deininger 1939: 34–35; Balot 2006: 111–112. There are numerous examples of the gods being regarded as the ultimate instance of justice. The phrase dikē dwells with the gods, i.e. sits by the side of Zeus, can be found in Hesiod, Sophocles and Aristophanes (Hes. Op. 259, Soph. OC 1382; Ar. Nub. 903). In the elegies of Solon dikē is a divine force (Sol. fr. 13 W (1 G.-Pr.)); see Mülke 2002: 252–255. In the Afterlife Myth in Gorgias Socrates describes the gods as the guarantors of justice (Pl. Grg. 523a–526d; cf. Rep. 352a–b); cf. Schmidt 1986: 27–28; Rechenauer 2002: 233, 246. The play Sisyphus demonstrates that even those who did not believe in the gods believed that religion guarantees the effectiveness of justice (DK 88 B 25); cf. Hoffmann 1997: 274–287; Jordović 2005: 77. Finally, in the Melian dialogue, the Melians identify justice with divine favour (Thuc. 5.104). For associating the activities of the lawgiver with the gods see Hölkeskamp 1999: 47–48. 321 Thuc. 5.105.2; Pl. Grg. 483e; cf. Dodds 1959: 268; Ostwald 1986: 249–250; Dalfen 2004: 328. 322 See Deininger 1939: 114–115; Wassermann 1947: 19; Morrison 2000: 119; 123–124; Hornblower 2008: 219. 323 See Wassermann 1947: 19.

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known. It is interesting too that both works subtly suggest that Alcibiades favours the doctrine of the right of the stronger. In Thucydides, this is expressed by stating that Alcibiades had led the operations at Argos, immediately before the Melian Dialogue. The Sicilian Debate then directly follows the destruction of Melos, with Alcibiades declaring his opinion on unlimited expansionism.324 In Gorgias, Alcibiades is directly connected with the doctrine of the right of the stronger in comparing Callicles’ fate numerous times with his. Another correspondence between these two dialogues is that that those who oppose the logic of the doctrine of the right of the stronger will meet with the worst of fates, and will not be able to do anything about it.325 It is also intimated in Gorgias, albeit not so vociferously, that a bitter fate awaits Callicles as well.326 There is nothing similar in the Melian Dialogue, but the fact that it is immediately followed by the depiction of the Sicilian campaign, the greatest Athenian disaster, implies that Thucydides has tacitly said the same.327 Callicles and the Athenian envoys at Melos are completely blinded by the doctrine of the right of the stronger because of which they take upon themselves the role of patronising the other side, while they themselves remain deaf throughout to all counter-arguments.328 Callicles has already been mentioned in this respect. The delusion of the Athenian envoys at Melos is shown by their absolute refusal to accept the use of the usual arguments in the talks, such as justice, merit, shame, freedom, the common good etc.329 The Athenian envoys emphasise their delusion even more by refusing to discuss the future even hypothetically and by rejecting hope as an argument, since in the immediate future this same feeling of hope will incite the Athenians to the disastrous Sicilian expedition.330 Another similarity between these two dialogues is the sanctimonious attitude of the supporters of the doctrine of the right of the stronger towards their interlocutors. Although issuing threats of total annihilation and demonstrating overt contempt for the moral standpoints of the opposing side, the Athenian negotiators, when saying that they will not use fine words (onomatōn kalōn), that they will say what they really mean and that the subject of discussion is the Melians’ salvation (sōtēria), in many ways call to mind the insincere statements of Callicles’ openness and goodwill towards Socrates.331 Because of this, some scholars mistakenly believed that the harsh and ruthless 324 Thuc. 5.84.1–2, 115.1; 6.8–26, esp. 18. 325 Thuc. 5.87, 93, 103, 105.3, 111, 113; Pl. Grg. 486a–c, 521c–522d. The only difference is that Socrates is aware of his certain death whereas the Melians still hope that they will be saved. 326 Pl. Grg. 519a–b. 327 Thuc. 6.1; 7.86.5–6. The Melian dialogue is a prelude to the account of the Sicilian expedition; see Deininger 1939: 77; Wassermann 1947: 30; Kallet 2001: 19; Taylor 2010: 135. 328 Thuc. 5.85, 87, 89, 93, 101, 103, 111, 113; Pl. Grg. 484c–486d, 487d; cf. Garst 1989: 15; Morrison 2000: 121, 123, 137. 329 Cf. Wassermann 1947: 21, 29–34; Liebeschuetz 1968: 74–76; Morrison 2000: 126–129, 132. 330 Thuc. 5.102–103, 105.5, 111, 113; 6.24–5, 30.2, 31.6; see Wassermann 1947: 30–31, 35; Macleod 1974: 391, 395, 400; Morrison 2000: 133–136; Hornblower 2008: 383; Taylor 2010: 20, 137–138, 154. 331 Thuc. 5.85, 87, esp. 89; Pl. Grg. 485е–486е, 487; see also Rep. 576a.

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tone of the Athenian envoys had a humanitarian goal – to save the Melians from annihilation.332 However, if the tone of the Athenian envoys proves anything, it is complete indifference to the Melians’ fate. The only thing the Athenians want is the city’s surrender, since this is the easiest way to reach their objective.333 That is why they flatly refuse the Melians’ offer of friendship.334 It is symptomatic that in Gorgias too, as we have seen, it gradually becomes apparent that Callicles’ statements of friendly feelings towards Socrates are nothing but empty words. From what has been said, it seems acceptable to assume that the doctrine of the right of the stronger made its appearance under the strong influence of Athenian democratic ideology and the imperialist spirit of Athenian archē. Further evidence that the doctrine was not merely another sophistic theory is that there is no mention of it in Aristophanes’ Clouds, in which one of the central themes is the negative influence of sophistic education on young Athenians. The explanation that this was because the right of the stronger was too complicated for the broad masses fails to convince, since Aristophanes uses the nomos-physis antithesis, which is by far the most complex part of this doctrine. There are scenes in the comedy that would have been more than suitable for something of the kind. One of them is when Phidippides beats Strepsiades, offering by way of explanation that it is justified for a son to beat his father.335 Finally, it needs to be said that, without the sophists, the doctrine of the right of the stronger would not have appeared, since their influence was manifold.336 The first and perhaps most obvious was that by preaching relativism and emphasising successfulness, the sophists made it possible for many moral conventions to be questioned. Secondly, they provided the necessary theoretical apparatus, particularly in the form of the nomos-physis antithesis, with the help of which others were able to formulate the doctrine of the right of the stronger. Thirdly, sophistic teaching was aimed at man with man as its starting point, the centre of attention being the action of the individual within the polis, i.e. the relation of the individual towards the community, the law and justice.337 Through anthropocentrism, individualism and concentration on the political realm, the sophists directed their contemporaries’ attention towards the happenings of political life, thus facilitating the transfer of experiences from this sphere to the individual one.338 All these influences manifested themselves indirectly. The sources have no mention of a single sophist being an advocate of the doctrine of the right of the stronger. All that has been stated can be seen in Gorgias. Neither Gorgias nor Polus present the nomos-physis antithesis as confirmation for any of 332 333 334 335 336 337

See Bosworth 2009: 312–317, esp. 318. Thuc. 5.87, 91.2, 93, 111.4–5, 113; cf. Wassermann 1947: 35. Thuc. 5.94–95. Ar. Nub. 1427–1446. See, e.g., Hudson-Wiliams 1950: 156–169; Macleod 1974: 385–400. See Martin 1976: 151. The anthropocentric attitude of sophists is also reflected in Antiphon’s formulation of his nomos-physis antithesis in relation to an individual; cf. Raaflaub 1992: 27– 28. 338 Cf. Martin 1976: 151.

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their problematic views. Callicles is a disciple of the sophists, but Plato nevertheless gives unequivocal precedence to the destructive influence of democratic ideology. 3.9. Socrates and Solon Since Callicles adheres to his opinions throughout the dialogue, we might ask if Socrates’ elenchus in Gorgias was successful or not.339 Although the question seems valid, there is also another possibility: that Callicles’ intransigence in refusing to abandon his views actually serves to defend Socrates. The reason for this perhaps unusual explanation is the belief that Plato is discreetly comparing his teacher with Solon. Plato is the first source to reveal that for various groups engaged in the cultivation of knowledge (Wissenspflege), in the classical period the Seven Sages served as a means of identification and legitimacy.340 At the time Gorgias was written, invoking Solon was popular, since in the late fifth-century democrats had begun to consider the Athenian legislator to be the founder of democracy, while the opponents of the rule of the demos invoked him in order to give their advocacy of patrios politeia more weight.341 Plato was obviously aware of this, since he cites Solon not only as the chief lawmaker, but also as the wisest of the famous Seven Sages.342 Plato includes the Seven Sages in philosophical tradition, distinguishing it from sophistic tradition and thereby associating their activities with the Oracle of Delphi.343 This is particularly interesting since it is indirectly implies that Socrates, of whom the Delphi had said that there was no one wiser, in a way belongs to the tradition of the Seven Sages, or is superior to them.344 There is support for this interpretation in the existence of indications that under the influence of the tradition of putting questions to the Oracle, Chaerephon asked Pythia whether 339 Pl. Grg. 499b, 505c–d, 506b–d, 507a, 510a, 516b–d, 519d, 522e, 527c–e; see Ober 1998: 193, 206, 214–215. 340 Pl. Prt. 343a; Chrm. 164d–165a; Hp. mai. 281c–d; Ti. 20d–e; see Manuwald 1999: 330–331, 335–337; Asper 2006: 98–101; Engels 2010: 13–15. 341 Thuc. 8.76.6; Arist. Ath. Pol. 29.3, 34.3, 41.2; Pol. 1273b36–39; Lys. 34; Isoc. 7.15–16, 20– 22, 31–35, 56–61, 70; 12.148; Dem. 22.30–32; Aeschin. 3.257; see Ruschenbusch 1958: 398– 424; Rhodes 1981: 345–347; Ostwald 1986: 370, 378; Hansen 1991: 297–298; Munn 2000: 135; Mossé 2004: 242–259. By comparing the writings of Solon and Anaximander, Katarina Nebelin (2016: 110–120) was able to show how the Pre–Socratic’s have drawn on the existing political vocabulary in order to compensate for the immaturity of the philosophical terminology. 342 Cf. Pl. Phdr. 258b, 278c. Solon the lawgiver (Pl. Symp. 209d; Rep. 599e; Leg. 858e); Solon the wisest of the Seven Sages (Pl. Prt. 343a–b; Ti. 20d–e, 21b–c); cf. Manuwald 1999: 335– 337, who emphasises that the oldest list of the Seven Sages is given in Protagoras. 343 Pl. Prt. 316d, 342a–343c; see Manuwald 1999: 330–332, 337. 344 Pl. Ap. 21a; see Wehrli 1973: 195; Manuwald 1999: 337. Since Solon is the wisest of the Seven Sages, it follows that he is second to Socrates who is the wisest of all men.

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there was anyone wiser than Socrates and that some of the Seven Sages are also mentioned within this tradition.345 It is significant that Chaerephon also appears in Gorgias, where, despite the fact that he is not one of the participants in the debate, he plays an important role.346 Plato’s intention of discreetly comparing Socrates to Solon, not just any Solon but the one from Herodotus’ Histories, is revealed in the famous dialogue between Croesus and the Athenian legislator.347 In Herodotus, Solon is not only a lawmaker and one of the wise (sophistai), he is also a philosopheōn, important because this is the first time that this verb appears in Greek literature and the Father of History does not use it again.348 Croesus in turn serves as a paradigm of Persian rulers, who are known to be tyrants par excellence.349 The topic of discussion is essentially the question of how one should live and is, as in Gorgias, directly linked with the question of human happiness.350 Croesus asks Solon the question “Who is the happiest in the world?” convinced that the answer will be himself in view of his riches and power.351 He thus reveals himself to have succumbed to the same delusion as Polus and Callicles. On the example of Croesus, oriental (tyrannical) arrogance and Greek sōphrosynē are contrasted for the first time.352 It is even more important that the Lydian ruler is shown as someone so overtaken by hubris, pleonexia and expansionism that his downfall is inevitable.353 This paradigmatic nature of Croesus is illustrated by contrasting his character with the image of the Athenian lawmaker, which is essentially the same stylistic technique applied in Callicles’ case in Gorgias:354 345 See Herzog 1922: 149–170, esp. 161–169; de Strycker 1994: 77–78; Manuwald 1999: 336– 337; Heitsch 2002: 76; cf. also Nightingale 1995: 92 (philosopher as a new kind of sage); contra Peterson 2011: 20, 27–30, 35–36, 220–221, 241, 255–256. It should be noted that a statue of Gorgias with a flattering epigram was erected in Delphi during his lifetime (DK 82 A7); see Herzog 1922: 165. 346 Chaerephon opens the debate in the dialogue with a question for Gorgias, prevents the famous sophist from ending the discussion and, finally, refers Callicles, when he interrupts the debate, to Socrates (Pl. Grg. 447c–448d, 458c–d, 481b). 347 Hdt. 1.29–34.1, 47–49, 86–88 (lawgiver: 1.29–30.1); see also Diod. Sic. 9.2.1–4, 26.1–27.4. 348 Hdt. 1.29.1, 30.2 (theōria/philosophein); see Albert 1992: 118; Nightingale 1995: 16–17 with n. 8; Riedweg 2004: 168–170; Asheri – Lloyd – Corcella 2007: 100; Rossetti 2018: 273–274. 349 Pl. Grg. 470d–e, 472d, 492c, 507c. For more on Croesus as a prototype of an Asian despot see Pohlenz 1937: 11–12; Regenbogen 1961b: 123–124; Raaflaub 1987: 241–246; Long 1987: 64–65; Erbse 1992: 10, 12, 29–30; Heuss 1995: 387–388, 414; Bichler 2001: 244; Dewald 2003: 33–35, 43; Asheri – Lloyd – Corcella 2007: 66. 350 Hdt. 1.32; Pl. Grg. 472c–d, 487e–488a, 492e, 500b–c, 521a–b; cf. Gaiser 1975: 66–67; Kastely 1991: 101; Dalfen 2004: 284, 401; Irwin 2013: 263, 266–268, 276–286, esp. 283. 351 Hdt. 1.30.1–3, 31.1, 32.1, 32.4–34.1, 86.6, esp. 32.1, 86.6. The terms olbios and eudaimonia used in the discussion between Croesus and Solon are synonyms, see Asheri – Lloyd – Corcella 2007: 102; cf. Regenbogen 1961b: 113; de Strycker 1994: 77. 352 See Regenbogen 1961b: 123; Erbse 1992: 12–13; Heuss 1995: 394. 353 See Raaflaub 1987: 243–244; Gammie 1986: 176–177; Bichler 2001: 244–245, 248–250. 354 Hdt. 1.30.2–3, 32.1–2 (trans. A. D. Godley). In this way, the conversation between Croesus and Solon is placed in the Athenian context; cf. Raaflaub 1987: 241–242; Erbse 1992: 14, 21, 29; Bichler – Rollinger 2001: 86.

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θεησάμενον δέ μιν τὰ πάντα καὶ σκεψάμενον ὥς οἱ κατὰ καιρὸν ἦν, εἴρετο ὁ Κροῖσος τάδε· ‘ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, παρ᾽ ἡμέας γὰρ περὶ σέο λόγος ἀπῖκται πολλὸς καὶ σοφίης εἵνεκεν τῆς σῆς καὶ πλάνης, ὡς φιλοσοφέων γῆν πολλὴν θεωρίης εἵνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας· νῦν ὦν ἐπειρέσθαι με ἵμερος ἐπῆλθέ σε εἴ τινα ἤδη πάντων εἶδες ὀλβιώτατον. ὃ μὲν ἐλπίζων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ὀλβιώτατος ταῦτα ἐπειρώτα: Σόλων δὲ οὐδὲν ὑποθωπεύσας ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐόντι χρησάμενος λέγει ‘ὦ βασιλεῦ, Τέλλον Ἀθηναῖον. […] Σόλων μὲν δὴ εὐδαιμονίης δευτερεῖα ἔνεμε τούτοισι, Κροῖσος δὲ σπερχθεὶς εἶπε ‘ὦ ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, ἡ δ᾽ ἡμετέρη εὐδαιμονίη οὕτω τοι ἀπέρριπται ἐς τὸ μηδὲν ὥστε οὐδὲ ἰδιωτέων ἀνδρῶν ἀξίους ἡμέας ἐποίησας; ὁ δὲ εἶπε· ὦ Κροῖσε, ἐπιστάμενόν με τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες ἐπειρωτᾷς ἀνθρωπηίων πρηγμάτων πέρι. ἐν γὰρ τῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ πολλὰ μὲν ἐστὶ ἰδεῖν τὰ μή τις ἐθέλει, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παθεῖν. After Solon had seen everything and had thought about it, Croesus found the opportunity to say, “My Athenian guest, we have heard a lot about you because of your wisdom and of your wanderings, how as one who loves learning you have travelled much of the world for the sake of seeing it, so now I desire to ask you who is the most fortunate man you have seen.” Croesus asked this question believing that he was the most fortunate of men, but Solon, offering no flattery but keeping to the truth, said, “O King, it is Tellus the Athenian.” […] Thus Solon granted second place in happiness to these men. Croesus was vexed and said, “My Athenian guest, do you so much despise our happiness that you do not even make us worth as much as common men?” Solon replied, “Croesus, you ask me about human affairs, and I know that the divine is entirely grudging and troublesome to us. In a long span of time it is possible to see many things that you do not want to, and to suffer them, too.

In response to Croesus’ question of who is the happiest, Solon rejects tyrannical power, not considering it to be happiness, and warns of the fatal end awaiting the despot.355 Instead, the Athenian lawmaker praises the life of the ordinary man (anēr idiōtēs) who lives in accordance with traditional values such as family, the common good and revering the gods.356 For someone said to be the father of Athenian democracy, this is a surprisingly apolitical view of the world, since, even though he lauds sacrifice for the good of the polis, Solon never mentions any kind of political activity.357 He is himself represented as someone who had, after passing laws, abandoned political life and Athens, turning to exploring (theōria) the world in his travels.358 Solon, therefore, prima facie may appear as an apragmōn, although the term itself is not mentioned. The end of the story, however, proves Solon’s understanding and use of power to be correct. Consequently, he is the paradigm for the idiōtēs who only seems to be an apragmōn but is actually the genuine politikos anēr. These are not the only similarities between Solon and Socrates. The Athenian lawmaker rejects fortune, giving precedence to 355 Hdt. 1.32, 86.3–5. Aristotle reveals that Solon’s anolbios is synonymous with athlios (Hdt. 1.32.5–6, 9; 33; Ar. Eth. Nic. 1100a5–33). By denying the happiness of a tyrant, Herodotus’ Solon establishes, just like in his elegies, a causal connection between the behaviour and the punishment to follow. 356 The death of Cleobis and Biton, who yoked themselves to a wagon so that their mother could arrive to the temple in time, indicates it (Hdt. 1.31.2–5). 357 According to Solon, Tellus is the happiest man because, besides being blessed with his family, his death in the battle to defend his home polis was glorious (Hdt. 1.30.3–4). 358 Hdt. 1.29–31.1; Pl. Leg. 951a–c; Arist. Pol. 1324a25–29; cf. Long 1987: 66; Riedweg 2004: 166–168, 171; Laks 2005: 32 with n. 43; Nightingale 32006: 63–66; Rossetti 2018: 274.

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moderation and modesty.359 He does not believe (as Pericles does) that any man can be self-sufficient (autarkēs).360 He believes a beautiful death, by which he obviously means both being slain in war and in the service of the gods, to be happiness.361 There are also visible similarities in the manner of argumentation. At the end of the debate in Gorgias, when Callicles not only refuses to accept what he is been told, but is so angry that he virtually stops speaking, Socrates relates the Afterlife Myth. Through it, Socrates explains that his views are in accordance with divine order, and also that divine retribution inevitably catches up with even the most powerful tyrants, but not the private men.362 Something similar occurs in Herodotus.363 Solon’s explanation that neither Croesus nor any despot could be the happier than the common men called down the wrath of the Lydian ruler. The Athenian lawmaker, therefore, substantiates his view by invoking the will of the gods.364 Solon’s words are then confirmed by the role of the Delphic Oracle and Apollo in Croesus’ downfall. A concurrence which is important for the answer to the question of whether Callicles’ refusal to be instructed is proof of Socrates’ failure, is that Croesus turns a deaf ear to all Solon’s warnings, believing him to be a ‘great fool’.365 Croesus is blinded by his wealth, and the desire for expansion to such a degree that he even misinterprets the prophecy of the Delphi Oracle.366 Only at the stake, when words have been replaced by brute force, does he come to his senses, remembering his conversation with Solon and in his repentance announces to the Persian king Cyrus the Great: “He was a man who ought to have talked with every king in the world. I would give a fortune to have had it so”, thinking of the Athenian lawmaker.367 After this, Croesus is saved at the last minute from certain death by Apollo.368 Despite all, Croesus still has not entirely comprehended the extent of his blindness, since he still believes that he is not responsible for his downfall but was rather tricked by the god.369 Only after Pythia’s new response, 359 Hdt. 1.32.4–9. A marked reserve towards the rich can be seen from Solon’s claim, without any supporting evidence, that one of the advantages of the poor is that they have happy and healthy children. 360 Hdt. 1.32.7–8; Irwin 2013: 295–307; see chapter II.1.7. Absolute Sovereignty and Absolute Self-Sufficiency. 361 Hdt. 1.32.7–9, cf. 30.5; 31.3–5. In the Apology and Gorgias, Socrates declares that he only fulfils the will of gods, that he does not fear death, that wealth means nothing to him and he has no money, while the Symposium reveals his courage in war (Pl. Ap. 21a, 23a–b, 28e, 29а, 29d, 30c–d, 31b, 32d, 36b, 37e–38b, 39а–b; Grg. 508d–e, 525c–e, 526d–e; Symp. 220d–221b). 362 Pl. Grg. 525d–e, 526c. 363 Cf. Regenbogen 1961: 114. 364 Hdt. 1.32, esp. 1.32.1, 9. 365 Hdt. 1.33 (amathēs); cf. Sol. fr. 33W=29a G.-Pr. (ouk ephy Solōn bathyphrōn oude boulēeis anēr); Pl. Grg. 527c–d (anoētos). 366 Hdt. 1.53–56.1. 367 Hdt. 1.86.3–5 (trans. de Sélincourt and Marincola). 368 Hdt. 1.87.1–2. 369 Hdt. 1.87.3–4, 89.1, 90.2–4.

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Croesus realises how deeply he has erred.370 The fact that Solon did not succeed in convincing Croesus is no any kind of failure, since only Apollo could have succeeded in doing so, and then not immediately and only by the use of force. In this way, all that was shown was that hubris had completely possessed Croesus. The same can be said of Callicles’ unwavering endorsement of the doctrine of the right of the stronger. It shows that neither Socrates nor anyone else can do anything in this respect, since Callicles has been overcome by the bad erōs, because of which he only has ears for the Athenian demos and only understands the language of power and brute force.371 If he is not responsible for Callicles, then Socrates does not bear any guilt for his lack of success in changing people such as Alcibiades or Critias, even though he was acquainted with them. Plato’s discreet comparison of Socrates with Solon is also reflected in his hint that his teacher is a lawmaker.372 Socrates in conversation with Gorgias says that the art of legislation (nomothetikē technē) is a part of political art (politikē technē), and then later claims that he [Socrates] is the only one who practises politics (politika).373 It cannot be excluded that this too is one of the reasons why in the Afterlife Myth, Minos and Rhadamanthus, who were respected lawmakers, are made judges of the souls of the deceased.374 That Socrates’ failure is not actually so follows from the fact that the ending of the dialogue has another important function. With Callicles remaining unconvinced to the end, the way is open for unresolved issues in Gorgias to be more extensively and deeply examined in the Republic, where political order serves as a heuristic means for investigating the influence of justice and injustice on the soul and a new answer is given: either the philosophers will become kings, or the kings philosophers.375 Along with many other analogies to be discussed later, the circumstance that Plato’s most famous work begins with the question of whether Socrates can persuade someone who does not want to listen and who represents the logic of force, testifies that this is indeed intended. There is, however, a small but important difference. Socrates’ interlocutors (Polemarchus, Glaucon and Adeimantus) refuse to listen to him so as to force him to join their discussion:376 370 Hdt. 1.91. The former king of Lydia, who has become a close adviser of Cyrus the Great after experiencing his ‘enlightenment’, makes an attempt to play the role of Solon. The result, however, is the same. Croesus cannot prevent the Persian king, blinded by hubris, from becoming a victim of imperial might in his turn (Hdt. 1.86.3–6, 88–90.1, 207–208, 212–214); see Erbse 1992: 29; Asheri – Lloyd – Corcella 2007: 65, 142, 212; Flower 32008: 282. 371 See Pl. Rep. 561b; cf. Klosko 1983: 594. 372 See Rowe 2007a: 150. 373 Pl. Grg. 464a–465d, 521d–522a. 374 Pl. Grg. 523e–524a; Ap. 41; see Heitsch 2002: 168–169; Dalfen 2004: 485. Minos and Rhadamanthus are mentioned just at the beginning of Plato’s Nomoi (Pl. Leg. 624a–b); see Schöpsdau 1994: 153–155. 375 Pl. Rep. 366e–369a, 473c–d; cf. Schütrumpf 1997: 29; Frede 1997: 252. For the same reason, Book 1 of the Republic, which has much in common with the Gorgias, ends up in aporia; cf. Rowe 2007a: 195–196. 376 Pl. Rep. 327c–328b, esp. 327c (trans. P. Shorey), see also 328c–d, 357a–358e, 367e–368c; cf. Sesonske 1961: 32–36; Klosko 1983: 582.

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II. The Gorgias ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτέ μοι πρὸς ἄστυ ὡρμῆσθαι ὡς ἀπιόντες. – οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. – ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν; – πῶς γὰρ οὔ; –ἢ τοίνυν τούτων, ἔφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ᾽ αὐτοῦ. – οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔτι ἓν λείπεται, τὸ ἢν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι; – ἦ καὶ δύναισθ᾽ ἄν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πεῖσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας; – οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων. – ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε. Whereupon Polemarchus said, “Socrates, you appear to have turned your faces townward and to be going to leave us.” “Not a bad guess,” said I. “But you see how many we are?” he said. “Surely.” “You must either then prove yourselves the better men or stay here.” “Why, is there not left,” said I, “the alternative of our persuading you that you ought to let us go?” “But could you persuade us,” said he, “if we refused to listen?” “Nohow,” said Glaucon. “Well, we won’t listen, and you might as well make up your minds to it.”

Socrates’ interlocutors in the Republic in this manner indirectly show that they are prepared to hear what he has to tell them, and this greatly concerns the question: “How should one live?” and “Is the life of an unjust man better and happier than the life of a just one?”.377 3.10. Summary А remarkable degree of congruence and numerous analogies allow us to make several conclusions. The first conclusion is that, according to Plato, Callicles represents Alcibiades’ generation. The main difference between Alcibiades and his political opponents, such as Nicias, Aristocrates and Pericles the Younger, was not so much his age, but rather his extremely aggressive foreign policy and his arrogance in public and private life that could have easily been interpreted as a sign of tyrannical ambitions. The second conclusion is that the notion of shame is central to understanding of Callicles’ character. Plato uses the term not only to show that Gorgias and Polus inwardly share Socrates’ beliefs and thus to deny them any opportunity to seriously question his views but also to use this notion in order to place Callicles’ views in the context of an ongoing democratic debate about the qualities of a good citizen. Furthermore, the rejection of shame as a value emerges in the doctrine of the right of the stronger in Thucydides and the tyrannical character in the Republic. Plato demonstrates, with the help of the notion of shame, that the transformation of democratic into tyrannical man in Callicles’ case has largely taken place. Finally, Plato uses this notion to give Callicles the opportunity to create an artificial distance between him and Polus, i.e. Gorgias, and falsely present him as an uncompromising opponent of conventional beliefs typical of demos. The third conclusion is that the notion of love (erōs) is crucial in understanding the paradox that Callicles represents at the same time the doctrine of the right of the stronger and is blinded by democratic ideology and the expansionist spirit of Athenian archē. Aristophanes, Euripides and Thucydides reveal that Plato’s linking 377 Pl. Rep. 344d–e, 347e, 352d, 357a–b, cf. 578c, Grg. 472c–d, 500c; see Stemmer 1988: 529, 535, 539; Williams 1997: 59; Schütrumpf 1997: 34; Frede 1997: 265.

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of Callicles with erōs and democratic ideology does not stand apart from the terminology of the time. A short examination of Phaedrus and the Symposium shows that, in Plato’s view, erōs has a dual nature, i.e. it has an ‘earthly’ and a ‘heavenly’ side. The lover, possessed by the bad side of erōs, is driven by desire which prevents him from considering the happiness and well-being of the beloved. Instead, he endeavours to keep the beloved in an inferior position. He willingly serves the object of his love as long as this is in accordance with his desires. This ambivalence of the lover who finds himself in the grip of the bad erōs explains how it is possible for the protagonist of the right of the stronger to want to rule the demos and at the same time be subjected to it. A historical example of such behaviour cannot be found in Plato but it exists in Thucydides in the person of Alcibiades. The term erōs is also important for understanding Callicles, because once one is overcome by bad erōs, lust becomes its own purpose. The democratic ideology was similar in this respect with the bad erōs. The values which initially formed its elements turned into an end in itself: they justified the domination [of Athens, i.e. demos] and were impossible, or even perilous, to resist (e.g. the idea of freedom through power). The comparison between Callicles and the psychopathology of the tyrannical man in the Republic illustrates that in Callicles the metamorphosis from democratic into tyrannical man has in fact taken place and that the bad erōs played a key role in this transformation. Moreover, it makes clear that Callicles’ love for the demos has caused him to be “brainwashed” and that there are other individuals like him. The fourth conclusion is that Callicles’ positive attitude towards pleonexia is another testimony of his dependency on Athenian democratic ideology and striking similarity to the tyrannical man in the Republic. The fifth conclusion is that the dichotomy vita activa – vita contemplativa plays an important role in the third part of Gorgias. The sources of the late fifth and early fourth centuries reveal a widespread notion of two paths, two ways of education pursued by the youth of the upper classes. Even more importantly, the contest between the Better and the Worse Argument in Aristophanes’ Clouds serves as the bases for the discussion between Callicles and Socrates. Callicles follows the path extolled by the Worse Argument, while Socrates upholds numerous qualities put forward by the Better Argument. Callicles and Socrates, however, represent not only two different kinds of education, but also two paths between which young aristocrats in a democracy can choose. Socrates’ path leads to a philosophical way of life, which strives towards justice and turns its back on the daily political life of a polis. Callicles, as a paradigm of injustice, embodies the opposite path. It is the path of public life and adjustment to the democratic rules of the game. Callicles thus depicts the difference between the two paths by comparing himself with Zethus and Socrates with Amphion from Euripides’ play Antiope. Furthermore, several speeches in Thucydides confirm that Callicles embraces the spirit of Pericles and Alcibiades regarding polypragmosynē and apragmosynē. The debate about the respective advantages of bios praktikos and bios theōrētikos has another, and no less important, function. Plato’s fundamental criticism of the existing political theory and practice, which permeates the entire

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dialogue, serves to consistently negate the existence of an independent political realm separated from ethics. Therefore, politics is actually no more than philosophy, which possesses the possibility of transforming politics into politics as it should be. The sixth conclusion is that the doctrine of the right of the stronger seems to have made its appearance under the strong influence of Athenian democratic ideology and the imperialist spirit of Athenian archē. Along with the traditional right of the stronger, the Greeks knew of a doctrine of the right of the stronger. This doctrine professes that acting in accordance with the right of the stronger is the only right course of action. All existing conventions and social values are rejected as specious restraints; at the same time, an attempt is made to replace them with a new ethics which advocates a diametrically opposite system of values. The theoretical foundation of this doctrine is the nomos-physis antithesis. These distinguishing features of the doctrine of the right of the stronger can be recognized in the person of Callicles in Gorgias and in the Melian Dialogue of Thucydides. This position is, however, contrary to the generally accepted view that the doctrine of the right of the stronger was formulated before the Peloponnesian War. An analysis of the speech delivered by the Athenians in Sparta on the eve of the conflict gives no indication of the doctrine itself – there is only the right of the stronger. In this speech, the views of the Athenians are indeed close to the typical logic of the doctrine of the right of the stronger, but there are still some essential differences such as that between the terms ʽnatureʼ and ʽhuman natureʼ. There are several flaws in the argument that the Melian Dialogue does not reflect the doctrine of the right of the stronger, simply because the Athenians never explicitly say that might is right. The conditions in which the discussion takes place are different from those experienced by Callicles – the Athenian (military) supremacy is so overwhelming that they can always impose their will. It must also not be forgotten that the Melian Dialogue is not a philosophical tract, or even a political treatise, but rather an account of political negotiations. To be true, the Athenian envoys do not explicitly say that might is right, but their denial of the charge that they are acting unjustly constitutes an implicit claim that their action is just and perfectly in accordance with the law of nature. The seventh and last conclusion is that Callicles’ intransigence in refusing to abandon his views actually serves to defend Socrates. Plato intends to discreetly compare Socrates with Solon, more specifically with that Solon who “unsuccessfully” instructs Croesus in Herodotus’ Histories. Plato reveals through this comparison that Socrates cannot be blamed for failing to change individuals such as Callicles, i.e. Alcibiades or Critias. Moreover, with Callicles’ remaining unconvinced to the end, the unresolved issues from Gorgias could be further examined in the Republic.

III. THE REPUBLIC So far, we have seen from Gorgias that the character of Callicles served Plato to exemplify how democratic ideology can convert an individual into someone who exalts tyranny and is guided solely by the doctrine of might is right. If the Gorgias gives a detailed account of the process of democratic man’s transformation into tyrannical man, then parallels must exist between this dialogue and the Republic. That they do indeed exist has been accepted for some time. This part of the study will focus on several key questions and will not strictly follow the structure of the Republic, let alone attempt to give a comprehensive analysis of the dialogue. At the centre of Book 1 is the question of what is justice. After a relatively short discussion between Socrates, Cephalus and Polemarchus on this topic Thrasymachus bursts into debate.1 With his definition of justice as the interest of the stronger it becomes clear that he is the counterpole to Socrates.2 The model of failing forms of government in Book 8 of the Republic – notably the two worst systems, democracy and tyranny – picks up on the theories of Thrasymachus.3 A thorough and consistent reconstruction is therefore needed of how Thrasymachus’ arguments summarize and round off what Gorgias, Polus and Callicles treat at greater length and depth.4 Attention will also focus on the discussion of the ‘most perfectly unjust’ polis since it is a clear indication of the intertextual relation between Book 1 and Thucydides.5 Just as the Gorgias ends in “failure” by Socrates since Callicles remains unconvinced, so does Book 1 end in an aporia. Though Socrates demonstrates that justice is more profitable than injustice, he admits that he did not answer the question of what justice is.6 However, in contrast to Callicles, Glaucon and Adeimantus do not fall silent. At the beginning of Book 2 Glaucon reprimands Socrates for this failure and demands that he shows what justice and injustice are, that is, to prove justice to be good in itself, for its own sake as well as its consequences.7 Plato’s brothers make their contribution to Socrates’ undertaking 1 2 3 4

5 6 7

Pl. Rep. 330d–336b. Pl. Rep. 336b–354a; esp. 338c–339a, 343b–d. See Friedländer 1960: 56, 59, 107–8; Annas 1981: 34–35; Rutherford 1995: 212; Algra 1996: 41–43, 47–50, 59; esp. 47–48; Schütrumpf 1997: 31; Kiersting 22006: 263, 265–266. See Gigon 1976: 63, 70–71, 86, 88; cp. 38, 76, 91, 103–104; cf. also Gauss 1954: 130; Friedländer 1957: 235–236; Id. 21960: 107–109; Irwin 1979: 10, 215; Klosko 1983: 579; Lisi 1985: 167; Rutherford 1995: 153, 215; Kahn 1996: 144–145; Kobusch 1996: 52, 57, 59–60; Schofield 2000: 204; Id. 2006: 266–267. A brief overview of different views on the independence of Book 1 of the Republic is given in Erler 2007: 204–205. Pl. Rep. 351a–352d. Pl. Rep. 353e–354c. Pl. Rep. 357a–358e, 368c.

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by giving accounts of the origin and function of justice in any human community, which imply that justice is no virtue at all.8 In response to these paeans to injustice, Socrates introduces an analogy between city and soul.9 However, he does not fall back on the notion of the ‘most perfectly unjust polis’, but instead resorts to the more elaborated antithesis between the ‘true and healthy’ (city of pigs) and the ‘luxurious’ (inflamed) city, where the latter bears resemblance to the ‘most perfectly unjust’ polis, that is Athens.10 Based on this analogy and antithesis, he next embarks on constructing the Callipolis, an endeavour which he continues to pursue through Books 3, 4, 5 and 6.11 It eventually leads to the introduction of the notion of the philosopher-king. For these reasons the revelation of how Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ views in key respects coincide with those of Polus and Callicles, should serve as further proof that the concept of the philosopher-king emerged as a direct counter-model to the image of the tyrannical man. While in the Gorgias the tyrannical man, Callicles, is analogous to Athens as polis tyrannos and the Athenian people as dēmos tyrannos, in the Republic the philosopher-king corresponds to the Callipolis. Plato hints at this relation in Book 9:12 ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἂν εἴη ὁμοιότητι, δημοτικὸς δὲ κατὰ δημοκρατουμένην, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὕτω; – τί μήν; – οὐκοῦν, ὅτι πόλις πρὸς πόλιν ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, τοῦτο καὶ ἀνὴρ πρὸς ἄνδρα; – πῶς γὰρ οὔ; – τί οὖν ἀρετῇ τυραννουμένη πόλις πρὸς βασιλευομένην οἵαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν; – πᾶν τοὐναντίον, ἔφη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρίστη, ἡ δὲ κακίστη. “Does not the tyrannical man,” said I, “correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude, the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise?” “Surely.” “And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness is the same as that of the man to the man?” “Of course.” “What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it?” “They are direct contraries,” he said; “the one is the best, the other the worst.”

8 9

Pl. Rep. 358e–368c; esp. 358e–362c (Glaucon), 362e–367e (Adeimantus). Pl. Rep. 368d–369; cf. Höffe 1997: 70–71, 84–93; Ferrari 2005: 59–61; Schofield 2006: 114– 117. 10 Pl. Rep. 369b–372d (true and healthy city), 372e–374c (luxurious and inflamed city); see Trampedach 1994: 189; Höffe 1997: 73–84. The tryphōsa and phlegmainousa city shares some of its most important characteristics with the ‘most perfectly unjust’ polis: pleonexia and the resulting bellicosity (Rep. 349b–350d, 351a–d, 373d–374a). Socrates’ describes Athens in the Gorgias as an abnormally swollen city (Grg. 518d–519a). Many fifth-century authors see a direct link between Athens’ ability to import all kind of goods from around the world and the democratic ideal of shared luxury (Thuc. 2.38; Xen. Ath. Pol. 2.7–12; Ar. Vesp. 665– 679; Hermipp. fr. 63 PCG. (=Ath. 27d–e); see also Xen. Vect. 1.3); see Braund 1994: 41–47, esp. 43–45 (Plato). Both the ‘luxurious’ and the democratic polis consist of a great variety of people (Rep. 373b–d, 557b–c). It is also worth recalling that in Socrates’ view the origin of the (true and healthy) polis, lies in the fact that no one is self-sufficient (Pl. Rep. 369b–c). In contrast to him, Pericles is of the opinion that Athens and each Athenian are absolutely selfsufficient (Thuc. 2.36.3, 38.2, 41.1). 11 Pl. Rep. 374e–541b. 12 Pl. Rep. 576c–d (trans. P. Shorey), see also 576e.

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In Plato’s view the circumstance that a tyrant city is ruled by a tyrant is not inconsistent with the traditional concept of the polis tyrannos. The reason is simple: in both cases the true ruler are the uncontrolled appetites, they have completely enslaved both tyrant and tyrant city.13 In Books 5 and 6 Plato expounds the notion of the philosopher-king.14 As it is hard to overestimate the significance of this concept, it is all the more important to understand its direct links to the Gorgias since it is further confirmation of the intrinsic connection between the notion of the philosopher-king and its absolute antipode – the tyrannical man, Callicles. Analysis of these correlations between the Gorgias and the Republic paves the way for an overview of how in both dialogues Plato uses a wide range of dichotomies in order to examine and explain the emergence of tyrannical man. These dichotomies indicate that even though Plato did not compose the Gorgias as a Mirror of Princes, he nonetheless unintentionally facilitated the emergence of the genre. Even a brief analysis of concepts such as the statesman, the moderate and courageous man in the Politicus, taken in the context of the Republic may seem somewhat surprising. The reason is fairly straightforward: the existence of congruities between the Politicus on the one hand and the Republic, the Gorgias and Thucydides on the other, should show a high degree of continuity in Plato’s thought, both in regard to the notion of the true political expert and the relation to the so-called Mirror of Princes genre. In Books 8 and 9, democratic and tyrannical man take centre stage.15 Almost all crucial aspects (licence to do what one pleases, ēros, shame etc.) of both have been discussed in previous chapters, together with some reflections on the concept of the demagogue-tyrant. Nonetheless, this concept will be considered more closely here as it deals with one of the key steps in the metamorphosis of democratic into tyrannical: the seizure of power. The emphasis is on Thucydides’ and Aristophanes’ assessment of the demagogue’s modus operandi.16 The intention is to show not only that Callicles exhibits central features of the demagogic mindset, but also how Plato’s critique of democracy could contribute to a better understanding of modern populism.

13 Pl. Rep. 577c–578b, 579c–e; cf. Blössner 2007: 371; Kraut 2007: 400; Schofield 2006: 267– 268; see also Ferrari 2005: 94–98. 14 Pl. Rep. 473b–502c, 521c–541b. 15 Pl. Rep. 555b–587e; esp. 558c–562a, 571a–579e, 587b–e. 16 Pl. Rep. 564a–566d.

1. TYRANNICAL MAN AND PHILOSOPHER-KING 1.1. Thrasymachus, Callicles and Polus In scholarly circles, Thrasymachus is often considered an advocate of the doctrine of might is right, or at least a strong supporter.1 There are similarities which might lead to the conclusion that Thrasymachus and Callicles share the same view of the world. The rejection of the old Greek ethic ʽGive every man his dueʼ serves both as an excuse to get involved into the discussion.2 Furthermore, at the beginning of both debates, Socrates resorts to an analogy with gold.3 Later on, he compares Thrasymachus with a lion, while Callicles does this by reference to ʽthe strongerʼ.4 Both accuse Socrates of agitating like a spokesman of the people, or rather Plato’s teacher uses the comparison himself so as to forestall such an accusation.5 Both Thrasymachus and Callicles try to humiliate Socrates by comparing him to a child.6 Both enter into discussion with Socrates in an angry tone.7 Thrasymachus, it is true, does not attack apragmosynē, but Socrates describes him as someone who cannot stay still (ouketi hēsychian ēgen).8 Finally, he expresses a growing unwillingness to continue the conversation.9 There are other more serious similarities which can hardly be rejected as coincidence or existing for dramatic effect. Both share the view that laws were created by man and reflect the interests of those who pass them.10 Besides, they point out that people criticise injustice not so much for moral reasons as out of fear of becoming its victims.11 Both Thrasymachus and Callicles are fascinated by tyranny and ‘the stronger’.12 Both belittle ‘the goodʼ calling them simple-minded, Pl. Rep. 338c–339a; 343b–d; cf. Dümmler: 1889, 79; Burnet 1914: 121; Friedländer 21960: 57; Guthrie 1969: 88–89; Gigon 1976: 70–71; Hornblower 1987: 185–186; Rutherford 1995: 207; 213; Crane 1998: 259–260. A short but very instructive review of different assessments of Thrasymachus can be found in Chappell 1993: 1–2. 2 Pl. Rep. 331e–332b, 335d–336b; Grg. 480e–481c; cf. Sol. fr. 13 W (1 G.-Pr.); see Schütrumpf 1997: 33, 40; Dalfen 2004: 308. 3 Pl. Rep. 336e; Grg. 486d; see also Rep. 359d–e (Gyges’ golden ring), 503a (ruler tested like gold tried in fire); Symp. 219a (Alcibiades); Plt. 303d–e (politikē technē); Ep. 7.324d–e (in comparison to the Thirty the democratic polity looked golden). 4 Pl. Rep. 341c; Grg. 483e. 5 Pl. Rep. 350c; Grg. 482c, 494d, 519d. 6 Pl. Rep. 343a; Grg. 485b–c. 7 Pl. Rep. 336b–e; Grg. 481b–c, 482c–d. 8 Pl. Rep. 336b. 9 Pl. Rep. 342e, 344d, 345b, 346c, 348a, 350d–e, 352b, 353e–354a; Grg. 497a–b, 499b, 501c, 505c–d, 506a–b, 507a, 510a, 516d, 521a–b, 522e. 10 Pl. Rep. 338e; Grg. 483b–c; cf. Stemmer 1992: 16. 11 Pl. Rep. 344c; Grg. 483c. 12 Pl. Rep. 338c, 339a, 343c; Grg. 483a–c, 484a–c, 488b–e, 489e (the stronger); Pl. Rep. 338d– e, 344a–c, 348d; Grg. 483d–484a, 492a–c (tyranny); cf. Annas 1981: 48.

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or fools, while praising those who share their view of the world as prudent.13 Another important coincidence is that pleonexia is looked upon favourably.14 However, closer inspection shows that it is more appropriate to see Thrasymachus as speaking on behalf of their contemporaries who have lost all illusions and who follow the developments of the time with deep pessimism, than an individual like Callicles who absolutely rejects virtue:15 [...] φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. [...] τίθεται δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἑκάστη ἡ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ αὑτῇ συμφέρον, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικούς, τυραννὶς δὲ τυραννικούς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως· θέμεναι δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι συμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα. τοῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐστιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὃ λέγω ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον· αὕτη δέ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε συμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. ὅτι οἴει τοὺς ποιμένας ἢ τοὺς βουκόλους τὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ τῶν βοῶν ἀγαθὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέποντας ἢ τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὑτῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας, οἳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν, ἄλλως πως ἡγῇ διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ ὥσπερ ἄν τις πρὸς πρόβατα διατεθείη, καὶ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖν αὐτοὺς διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἢ τοῦτο, ὅθεν αὐτοὶ ὠφελήσονται. καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἶ περί τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας, ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, οἱ δ᾽ ἀρχόμενοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἐκεῖνον ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν. σκοπεῖσθαι δέ, ὦ εὐηθέστατε Σώκρατες, οὑτωσὶ χρή, ὅτι δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει· “I affirm that the just is nothing else than the advantage of the stronger. [...] “And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their – the rulersʼ – advantage and the man who deviates from this law they chastise as a law-breaker and a wrongdoer. This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states – the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere, the advantage of the stronger.” “Because you think that the shepherds and the neat-herds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers, differ at all in their thoughts of the governed from a man's attitude towards his sheep or that they think of anything else night and day than the sources of their own profit. And you are so far out concerning the just and justice and the unjust and 13 Pl. Rep. 343d, 348c–d (euētheia); Grg. 489e–491e, esp. 491c–e (ēlithios). 14 Pl. Rep. 343d–e, 349b–c, 349e, 350b–d; Grg. 483c, 490a–c; cf. Dalfen 2004: 356–360. 15 Pl. Rep. 338c–339a, 343b–d (trans. P. Shorey); cf. Kerferd 1947: 19–27; Guthrie 1969: 88– 89. Thrasymachus’ pessimistic statement that all constitutions are tailored to serve the needs of the rulers can also be found in other contemporary sources. (Pl. Rep. 338c–339a; Lys. 25.7–12; Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.1–20, esp. 1.5–8; 3.10–11; Hdt. 3.80–82; 5.78); cf. Gelzer 1937: 1, 3–7, 11, 50, 57; Raaflaub 1992: 27, 42; Leppin 1999: 142.

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Unlike Callicles, who criticises the laws and justice as helping only the weak, Thrasymachus claims that justice is the very thing which benefits only the stronger.16 A no less significant difference is that Thrasymachus does not carry his argument consistently to the end as Callicles does. He never mentions an essentially new definition of justice.17 In this respect, by using terms such as euboulia, sophia, arethē, agathos and sympheron, Thrasymachus offers no moral evaluation of justice, saying that he perceives it from a solely utilitarian perspective.18 Therefore, when Thrasymachus and Socrates are arguing whether justice or injustice is agathon, they are not in conflict over whether justice is a virtue, but whether it is good or not in the utilitarian sense.19 For this reason Thrasymachus, unlike Callicles, does not say that the action he advocates is just, only that it is good judgement and prudent.20 Thrasymachus, therefore, does not attempt to postulate a new natural law and replace the traditional ethic with a new one.21 At no time, therefore, does he call upon the nomos-physis antithesis, which represents the theoretical foundation for the doctrine of the right of the stronger.22 Plato himself confirms the significance of its absence of by allocating it an important place in the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus, which go a step further than Thrasymachus.23 Even the hidden amoral side of the doctrine ‘justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger’ only gradually becomes apparent when provoked by Socrates’ elenchus.24 An important shift then occurs in Thrasymachus’ opinions.25 His starting point is that rulers, i.e. the stronger, declare their own benefit and advantage to be justice and that they are entitled to do so.26 In the further course of the dialogue, it is true that Thrasymachus admits under pressure 16 Pl. Rep. 338c–339a, 343b–d; cf. Grg. 483b–c; Leg. 714b–715b; see Steinthal 21890: 69; Kriegsbaum 1913: 19–21; Taylor 1926: 268; de Romilly 1992: 120; Weiss 2007: 95–96. 17 See Stemmer 1992: 18–22; Chappell 1993: 7–10; Hoffmann 1997: 76–77, 79–82, 91; contra Schütrumpf 1997: 40–41. 18 See Stemmer 1992: 22–23; Hoffmann 1997: 91–92; Blössner 2007: 254. 19 See Stemmer 1988: 544–549. 20 See Furley 1979: 81–82; Stemmer 1988: 545; Id. 1992: 24. 21 See Dodds 1959: 14–15; Annas 1981: 48; Schütrumpf 1997: 43; Weiss 2007: 94–95; contra Kerferd 1947: 26–27. 22 See Steinthal 21890: 68; Schütrumpf 1997: 43; Stemmer 1992: 25; Chappel 1993: 14–15; contra Schmitz 1988: 577–578. 23 Cf. Pl. Rep. 358b–362c, 362d–367b. According to Otfried Höffe (2010: 453), the philosophical debate in the Republic, strictly speaking, starts with Glaucon and Adeimantus. 24 See Steinthal 21890: 67–68; Annas 1981: 37–38. 25 See Gigon 1976: 60. 26 Pl. Rep. 338c–342e.

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from Socrates that rulers adhere to injustice.27 However, not even then does he at any time say that injustice is in fact justice, or that it is in any way ethically superior to it.28 Therefore Thrasymachus, unlike the power-obsessed Callicles, despite having put up a strong resistance at the end of the debate agrees – if only ostensibly – with Socrates’ perception of justice, thus demonstrating that he is susceptible to reason.29 Another no less significant difference is that Thrasymachus and Callicles define the term ‘stronger’ in different ways. For Thrasymachus it is purely political, while Callicles understands it as a socio-political term.30 Therefore Thrasymachus says that rulers and the stronger are only superior in the political sphere, while Callicles thinks that stronger natures are in every respect superior to others. That it is no slight matter may be seen from the fact that this difference between Thrasymachus and Callicles is also reflected in their understanding of nomos. Thrasymachus first interprets it as regulations passed by the polis, demonstrating a narrow and strictly legalistic understanding of the idea of law.31 Callicles’ perception of nomos is broader and extends not only to laws but all the rules of common life, i.e. all human conventions.32 Taken together this leads us to the conclusion that Thrasymachus’ view of justice is more descriptive than prescriptive.33 However, the sophist of Chalcedon does have one prescriptive theory on a kind of behaviour that is useful for the individual.34

27 Pl. Rep. 343a–344c. 28 It is indicative that Thrasymachus at first declines to call justice a vice (Pl. Rep. 344c; 348c); cf. Weiss 2007: 98. He claims instead that justice is goodness of heart and simplicity whereas injustice is goodness of judgment (Pl. Rep. 348c–d, cf. 336b–c, 343c–d). Socrates says immediately afterwards that Thrasymachus regards injustice as good, and the sophist agrees with him without giving it much thought (Pl. Rep. 348e). However, given the previous statements of Thrasymachus and the fact that he is being systematically pressurised by Socrates to take increasingly radical positions, as well as the impossibility of gauging the extent to which his later statements in the dialogue correspond with the views of the historical Thrasymachus, it might be assumed that here Plato is advancing his own opinion; see Steinthal 21890: 68; Gigon 1976: 68–70; Guthrie 1969: 298; de Romilly 1992: 121; Chappell 1993: 4–13; Kiersting 22006: 34. 29 Pl. Rep. 353d–354a. 30 Pl. Rep. 340d–e, 341b–c, 342b, 342d; Grg. 482e–484c, 490a, 491e–492c; see Weiss 2007: 94. Even when he gives examples from daily life, Thrasymachus primarily takes them from the political domain (Pl. Rep. 343d–e). 31 Cp. Pl. Leg. 714c–d; see Sørensen 2016: 17. 32 See Stemmer 1992: 17. 33 See Brandt 1984: 563–564, esp. 565; Chappell 1993: 3–17; Kiersting 22006: 30. There is a fine but important difference between noticing a relationship, which might imply a subversion of values, and rejection of those same values; cf. Guthrie 1969: 96–97; de Romilly 1992: 120–121; Chappell 1993: 12; Hoffmann, 1997: 92–93, 105–106; see also Joseph 1935: 17; Boter 1986: 267, 279; who maintain that the position of Thrasymachus can be described as “ethical nihilism” together with “psychological egoism”. An excellent example for the above can be found in Xenophon’s Memorabilia in which Socrates expounds a view with which Thrasymachus would probably be in agreement (Xen. Mem. 2.1.12–13). 34 See Chappell 1993: 12–13.

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In understanding Thrasymachus it is equally important to remember that he has a lot more in common with Polus than with Callicles. Both sophists are caricatured from the outset as tactless, arrogant and malicious characters who, under pressure from Socrates’ elenchus, are eventually forced to abandon their initial views. With Polus this manifests itself in a sense of shame, while Thrasymachus blushes.35 Similarities between the two sophists do not end here: their views also coincide. When Thrasymachus speaks enthusiastically of the power of injustice by equating tyranny with ʽmost perfect injusticeʼ in his second attempt to “open [Socrates’] eyes”, he reveals a view very similar to that of Polus, since the sophist from Acragas is also inclined to equate tyranny (the omnipotence of rhetors) with the greatest injustice.36 This is not a superficial coincidence, since both of them perceive the tyrant as the happiest.37 In both dialogues, the term eudaimonia appears for the first time in this context.38 Thrasymachus and Polus both point out that all people share their opinion that the tyrant is happy.39 Another shared view is that a tyrant is held to be happy primarily because he remains unpunished.40 Further on in the conversation between Thrasymachus and Socrates, injustice, which is identified with tyranny, is linked with the concept of licence to do what one pleases.41 Therefore, Thrasymachus’ open admiration of the ‘stronger’ (tyrant) and Polus’ of the rhetor (tyrant) because of ʽgreat powerʼ is not surprising.42 Thrasymachus’ praise of injustice as being mightier, freer and more masterful recalls not only Gorgias’ and Polus’s Athenocentric understanding of rhetoric, but also the salient features of the Athenian ideology of freedom.43 There are important theoretical similarities, too, between Thrasymachus and Polus. Both refrain from using the nomō-physei formula, but their views are founded on the distinction between appearance and reality, i.e. the dokein-einai or

35 Pl. Rep. 350d, 354a; Grg. 482c–e. Thrasymachus ostensibly gives in to Socrates’ arguments. Regardless of the insincerity of his giving up the argument, he is anxious not to offend the people who listen to the discussion which suggests a comprehension of shame typical of the shame culture – something that Thrasymachus has in common with Gorgias and Polus (Pl. Rep. 352b). 36 See Weiss 2007: 100. 37 Pl. Rep. 344a–b; Grg. 469a–b, 470d–471c, esp. 471c. 38 Pl. Rep. 344a–b; Grg. 469a–b, 470d, 471c. The fact that in Gorgias the term ‘misery’ appears first is of minor importance since, in both dialogues, eudaimonia is related with athlios, or is used as an antonym (Pl. Rep. 343a; Grg. 471c). Euripides, ‘the poet of tyrants’ dwelt on the weakness of the conventional moral values as late as 430 in his play Bellerephon (Eur. fr. 286); cf. Collard 1995: 105, 114. 39 Pl. Rep. 344b–c; Grg. 471c–472c. 40 Pl. Rep. 344b–c; Grg. 471, 472d–473a. 41 Pl. Rep. 345a. 42 Pl. Rep. 343e–344c; Grg. 466a–b, 467a, 469e; cf. Adam 1938: 39–40; Dalfen 2004: 255. The ‘on a large scale’ phrase makes an indirect connection with Callicles, see Pl. Grg. 513a. 43 Pl. Rep. 344b–c, 348e, 350d, 351a; Grg. 448c, e, 451d, 452d–e, 456a, 461b, 463d, 466b.

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doxa-alētheia opposite.44 Although this dichotomy preceded the nomos-physis antithesis to which it is essentially akin, it cannot be unconditionally identified with it.45 It is conspicuous that in both dialogues Socrates uses these opposites to prove that the unrighteous potentate (the stronger/rhetor/tyrant) is not capable of differentiating between what is truly good and what merely seems to be so.46 With Thrasymachus, the dokein-einai, or doxa-alētheia dichotomy is important for another reason. It proves that there is no contradiction between Thrasymachus’ two definitions of justice: “justice is the advantage of the stronger (to tou kreittonos sympheron)” and “justice is, in reality (tōi onti), the good of another (allotrion agathon)”.47 The circumstance that where Thrasymachus’ definitions appear together the dokein-einai or doxa-alētheia appear as well, clearly shows their consistency.48 There are three answers to the question as to why Plato chose to show Thrasymachus as sharing similarities with Callicles, Polus and even Gorgias. The first is that in Gorgias, the influence of democratic ideology on opinions which Plato condemns is examined in depth, so that in the Republic the reader can be satisfied with its condensed form. The second is that in this way, it is once again confirmed that a connection exists between Gorgias, Polus and Callicles, or rather that the doctrine of might is right has evolved from the views put forward in the first two parts of Gorgias. The third answer is generalisation, i.e. Plato’s wish not to link the standpoints he attacks in the Republic with any specific person. This was certainly influenced by the fact that the work is more abstract in character than Gorgias. As the Republic also takes the form of a dialogue, it would not have been altogether possible to avoid connecting it to certain figures. Several mechanisms were brought into play in order to show that its views and ideas reflected widespread opinion. One is that Thrasymachus simultaneously presents 44 Pl. Rep. 334c–335b, 336c, 339b–341c, 343c, 349a; Grg. 459c–e, 464a, 466d–467b, 468c–d, 471e, 472b, 481c; cf. Doods 1959: 217; Gigon 1976: 41, 55; Schmitz 1988: 580; Yunis 1996: 122; Schütrumpf 1997: 36; Dalfen 2004: 216, 219, 241. In addition to this dichotomy, there is also the logos-ergon; cf. Ober 1998: 232–240. 45 See Heinimann 1945: 42–58, 116–117, 139, esp. 57–58; cf. Pohlenz 1953: 425–427, 430–431. The importance of this antithesis for Thrasymachus is also clear from the repeated references made to it by both Glaucon and Adeimantus (Pl. Rep. 361a–c, 362a, 365b–c, 367b–c). 46 Pl. Rep. 339b–341c; Grg. 466d–467b; cf. Allen 1984: 198–199; Sørensen 2016: 24–28. 47 Pl. Rep. 338c, 343b–c. These definitions are considered not to be compatible by Dodds 1959: 14–15 n. 3; Cross – Woozley 1964: 38–48, esp. 41; Maguire 1971: 145–146. On the other hand, Kerferd 1947: 19–27; Id. 1964: 12–16; Nicholson 1974: 210–229; Sørensen 2016: 24– 28 argue that Thrasymachus’ theses are consistent; see also Hourani 1962: 110–120; Hadgopoulos 1973: 204–208; Algra 1996: 57–58. For numerous and diverse interpretations of the meaning of Thrasymachus’ thesis see Hoffmann 1997: 72–73 n. 5. 48 Pl. Rep. 347d–e, 367b–c. Probably the best explanation of the consistency of Thrasumachus’ definitions of justice is given in Hoffmann 1997: 71–89; cf. also Harlap 1979: 353–365. The extent to which the dokein-einai antithesis, i.e. doxa-alētheia dichotomy, is central to Thrasymachus may be seen from his dismissing of Cleitophon’s thesis that the advantage of the stronger means whatever to the stronger seems to be to his advantage. (Pl. Rep. 340b–c). Thrasymachus uses the dokein-einai antithesis in order to prove that the stronger is not blinded by appearance.

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the standpoints of several different persons.49 A second is that Glaucon and Adeimantus pick up from his argument, while at the same time presenting the views of Polus and Callicles. A third is frankly stating that the opinions of Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus on justice and injustice represent the general way of thinking.50 The fourth and last mechanism is to point out that the real educators of youth are the masses, and that the sophists (including Thrasymachus) teach only what the people already think.51 1.2. Thrasymachus and Thucydides In view of the similarities between Thrasymachus, Callicles and Polus, it is no coincidence that the subject of the ʽmost perfectly unjustʼ (teleōtate ousa adikos) polis comes up in conversation between Socrates and Thrasymachus.52 This polis is at the same time the ʽbestʼ (aristē) polis, which is in the first place capable of enslaving numerous other cities while aspiring to enslave others as well.53 Its rule rests on injustice.54 This injustice is responsible for hatred which, again, causes the loss of internal unity, the forming of factions and the outbreak of strife in the best polis.55 Some vestiges of justice at first restrain the unjust from acting in the same way towards each other as they do to their opponents. Finally, however, they begin to inflict injustice upon one another. Because of this, they not only cease to act in cooperation but become incapable of acting in agreement with themselves. Divisions and conflicts (staseis) appear, because of which the best polis is no longer capable of maintaining its earlier power:56 πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην; – πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη. καὶ τοῦτό γε ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος. – μανθάνω, ἔφην, ὅτι σὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ τόδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ. πότερον ἡ κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἕξει, ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; – εἰ μέν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες ἔχει, ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία, μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δ᾽ ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἀδικίας. – πάνυ ἄγαμαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεις μόνον καὶ ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνῃ πάνυ καλῶς. – σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι. – εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε· δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν ἢ στρατόπεδον ἢ λῃστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κοινῇ ἐπί τι ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πρᾶξαι ἄν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῖεν ἀλλήλους; – οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. – τί δ᾽ εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖεν; οὐ μᾶλλον; – πάνυ γε. – στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἥ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν· ἦ

49 Eckart Schütrumpf (1997: 33, 39–40) points out that Thrasymachus also picks up on the theses of Cephalus and Polemarchus. 50 Pl. Rep. 358a, c, 360d, 363e–367a; cf. Schütrumpf 1997: 30–31. 51 Pl. Rep. 492a–c, 493a–c. 52 Pl. Rep. 351a–b. 53 Pl. Rep. 351b; cf. also 348d. It is of interest that the earlier mentioned fragment from the play Bellerephon also refers to relations between states (Eur. fr. 286). 54 Pl. Rep. 351c. 55 Pl. Rep. 351d–352a. 56 Pl. Rep. 351b–352d (trans. P. Shorey).

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γάρ; – ἔστω, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι. – ἀλλ᾽ εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε. τόδε δέ μοι λέγε· ἆρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις ἐγγιγνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι κοινῇ μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων πράττειν; – πάνυ γε. – τί δὲ ἂν ἐν δυοῖν ἐγγένηται; οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσουσιν καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἔσονται ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις; – ἔσονται, ἔφη. – ἐὰν δὲ δή, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἑνὶ ἐγγένηται ἀδικία, μῶν μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕξει; – μηδὲν ἧττον ἐχέτω, ἔφη. – οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινὰ φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἵαν, ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι, ἔτι δ᾽ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ; οὐχ οὕτως; – πάνυ γε. – καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ δὴ οἶμαι ἐνοῦσα ταὐτὰ πάντα ποιήσει ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις· ἦ γάρ; [...] ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲ πράττειν μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων οἷοί τε, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὕς φαμεν ἐρρωμένως πώποτέ τι μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πρᾶξαι ἀδίκους ὄντας, τοῦτο οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθὲς λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μήτοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ᾽ οὓς ᾖσαν ἅμα ἀδικεῖν, δι᾽ ἣν ἔπραξαν ἃ ἔπραξαν, ὥρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικίᾳ ἡμιμόχθηροι ὄντες, ἐπεὶ οἵ γε παμπόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἄδικοι τελέως εἰσὶν καὶ πράττειν ἀδύνατοι· ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει μανθάνω, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον ζῶσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προυθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, σκεπτέον. A city, you would say, may be unjust and try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection.” “Certainly,” he said; “and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete.” “I understand,” I said, “that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this, whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice.” “If,” he replied, “what you were just now saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice; if it is as I said, with injustice.” “Admirable, Thrasymachus,” I said; “you not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers.” “I am trying to please you,” he replied. “Certainly not,” said he. “But if they didn’t, wouldn’t they be more likely to?” “Assuredly.” “For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so?” “So be it,” he replied, “not to differ from you.” “That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable of effective action in common?” “By all means.” “Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just?” “They will,” he said. “And then will you tell me that if injustice arises in one it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it?” “Have it that it keeps it,” he said. “And is it not apparent that its force is such that wherever it is found in city, family, camp, or in anything else it first renders the thing incapable of cooperation with itself owing to faction and difference, and secondly an enemy to itself and to its opposite in every case, the just? Isn’t that so?” “By all means.” “Then in the individual too, I presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature to produce. It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an enemy to himself and to the just. Is it not so? […] Now that the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action and the unjust incapable of any common action, and that if we ever say that any men who are unjust have vigorously combined to put something over, our statement is not altogether true, for they would not have kept their hands from one another if they had been thoroughly unjust, but it is obvious that there was in them some justice which prevented them from wronging at the same time one another too as well as those whom they attacked; and by dint of this they

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The formulation ʽthe best and most perfectly unjust polisʼ recalls Pericles’ view of Athens in his Epitaphios and last speech in Thucydides. Pericles, it is true, does not explicitly say that it is the best, but this can be easily concluded from his praise of the Athenians as aristoi and Athens as the wealthiest and greatest polis, which enjoys the most famous name since it had ruled the largest number of Hellenes in the greatest wars.57 At the same time, Pericles says that Athens is hated and its rule a tyranny, the gaining of which seems unjust (adikon dokei einai), but it is dangerous to let it go (apheinai de epikindynon).58 From this it can be deducted that Athens can be said to be the polis tyrannos, i.e. the most unjust polis. Socrates’ thoughts on the most perfectly unjust polis are in yet another sense an allusion to Thucydides. In the only place where he expresses a personal opinion on the causes of Athens’ downfall, the Athenian historian represents a view diametrically opposite to Socrates’ explanation for the collapse of the best and most unjust polis. This is the obituary for Pericles of Thucydides.59 In it the historian claims that Athens under Pericles, due to the latter’s moral and statesmanlike qualities, had increased in strength and attained the height of its greatness. Pericles’ sudden death was a stroke of fate. The moral degradation of his successors (private ambition, greed and lust for power) led to the domination of the whims and passions of the masses. Disastrous campaigns were undertaken and ultimately internal conflicts broke out, leading to the ruin of Athens.60 Thucydides’ interpretation of the causes of Athens’ downfall recalls the description in the conversation between Socrates and Thrasymachus of the self-destructive effect of the most perfect injustice on the ʽbest polisʼ. In both cases, the crumbling of moral fibre causes disunity and strife, because of which the polis finally declines.61 Plato’s Menexenus confirms that these parallels between Pericles’

57 Thuc. 2.37.2, 41–42.1, 43.1, 46, 64.3, 5, cf. 61.4; Lys. 2.63; Pl. Ap. 29d; see Kakridis 1961: 27–28; HCT II: 108–109; Kallet 2003: 137. 58 Thuc. 2.63, 64.4; cf. 3.37.2; see also Pl. Grg. 467a, 468e–469c; Rep. 360c–d; 361a–d. 59 Thuc. 2.65. In the obituary for Pericles, the great statesman receives nothing but praise, see Westlake 1968: 38–42; Herter 1968: 268–272. According to Thucydides, Pericles had all the makings of a true statesman – prudence, forethought, incorruptibility, patriotism and selfassertion (Thuc. 2.60–65.1, 65.5–10, 13); Yunis 1996: 67–76; Leppin 1999: 148, 151–154, 161, 167–168. 60 Thuc. 2.65.7, 10–12; cf. also Isoc. 8.126–127; Arist. Ath. Pol. 28.1–4; Eur. Supp. 232–237; see Connor 1971: 87–136; Ostwald 1986: 199–290, esp. 190–191; Rhodes: 1988: 24–25; Hornblower 1991: 341–348; Nicolai 1996: 277–281; Leppin 1999: 127 n. 4; 135; Taylor 2010: 269–273. 61 Pleonexia is discussed before the case of the perfectly unjust polis. It might be concluded on this account that the wish to have more is one of the causes of stasis in the most unjust polis, which tallies with Thucydides’ Pathology of War (Pl. Rep. 349b–350d; Thuc. 3.82.6, 8).

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speeches and the Republic can only be intentional.62 Plato repeats in this dialogue a widespread belief, and not his opinion, when he speaks of Athenian democracy as being truly an aristocracy and that internal dissent was to blame for Athens’ downfall.63 There are, however, two essential differences between Plato and Thucydides. According to Socrates, citizens in the unjust polis had been partially corrupted even while it was still powerful.64 Besides, the unjust polis corrupted the citizens, not the other way round.65 In this context, it is noteworthy that Plato in the Menexenus explicitly says that a constitution (politeia) moulds/educates (trephein) its people.66 If we apply this view to Athens, it follows that its demise began even under Pericles, which is just as depicted in Gorgias.67 Thucydides takes quite the opposite view. As has already been said, according to him the downfall of Athens began only after Pericles’ death, and his successors, the demagogues, are to blame for it, since they were unable to restrain the demos. For these reasons one might argue that ʽmost perfectly unjustʼ polis announces the city-soul analogy which appears at the beginning of Book 2.68 1.3. Glaucon and Adeimantus Similarities between Gorgias and the Republic are not limited to Thrasymachus, they may also be seen in Glaucon and Adeimantus. At the beginning of Book 2 of the Republic they are given the role of advocati diaboli. After the dialogue between Socrates and Thrasymachus concludes in aporia, they express their readiness to continue and conclude the discussion on justice and injustice. It is no coincidence that it is Glaucon who in the first sentences of Book 2 calls on Socrates not merely to appear to persuade his interlocutors but truly to do so, since at the beginning of Book 1 he answers negatively to Polemarchus’ rhetorical question as to whether Socrates can persuade someone who does not want to listen.69 By giving his half-brothers the role of advocati diaboli, Plato achieves three objectives. First, their speeches complement Thrasymachus’ earlier theory, which 62 Menexenus is, besides Gorgias, one of Plato’s dialogues most frequently related to Thucydides; see Kahn 1963: 220–234; Bloedow 1975: 33–34; Yunis 1996: 138–139. An interesting interpretation of this dialogue can be found in Haßkamp 2005: 69–79. 63 Pl. Menex. 238b–239a; 243d; see also Lys. 2.63–65; Aeschin. 2.176; Isoc. 20.10–11; cf. HCT II: 109; Loraux 1986: 189–190. 64 Pl. Rep. 352b–d. 65 This can be inferred from the fact that the ‘best’ polis, which is the epitome of injustice, is in the focus of attention (Pl. Rep. 351a–b). It is indicative in this respect that while discussing individuals or groups, Socrates speaks of their collective activities, i.e. he uses the plural (Pl. Rep. 351c, 351e, 352b–c). 66 Pl. Menex. 238c. 67 Pl. Grg. 503b–c, 515c–517c, 518e–519b. 68 It is worth noting that Thucydides has an affinity for the community-individual and the cityindividual analogy; see Hunter: 1989: 17–30; Morrison 1994: 525–541. 69 Pl. Rep. 327c, 357a–b.

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points to the impulses which caused it and which it generated in its turn.70 Secondly, it becomes evident that neither Glaucon nor Adeimantus are speaking on their own or Thrasymachus’ behalf.71 It is thus quite clear that the opinions formulated in these two speeches are not connected with any specific person, but that they have been deliberately placed in a broader context.72 Thirdly, with the help of Glaucon and Adeimantus a connection is established between Thrasymachus’ theories and the degradation of constitutions in Book 8, and thereby also between Gorgias and the appearance of tyrannical man in the Republic.73 The similarities between Polus’ speech and those of Glaucon and Adeimantus are manifold. One is to be found in Glaucon’s opening sentence of Book 2 of the Republic when he uses the dokein-einai or doxa-alētheia dichotomy to begin his “defence” of injustice. This antithesis comprises the gist of Glaucon’s speech – the differing fates of the perfectly unjust and perfectly just man.74 Glaucon’s comparison of these two fates starts with the assumption that to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong.75 Another similarity between Glaucon and Polus is the close connection between most perfect injustice and licence to do what one pleases, in the sense of to kill whom one pleases.76 Glaucon dedicates a considerable part of his argumentation, illustrated primarily by the legend of the Ring of Gyges, to the licence to do what one pleases, showing that he, like Polus, attaches great importance to it.77 In similar fashion, Glaucon says that an individual who did not make use of the licence to do what one pleases would be declared by his fellow citizens to be the most unhappy (athliōtatos) and foolish (anoētotatos) of men.78 Finally, the appearance of the licence to do what one pleases or kill whom one pleases in the story of Gyges’ Ring links it and Polus with tyranny. Gyges was the first ruler to have been called tyrant by the Greeks, and he was an ancestor of Croesus.79 70 See Allen 1987: 52, 57; Weiss 2007: 92, 99; Yunis 2007: 2; Rowe 2007b: 43; Kamtekar 2010: 65. There are quite significant differences between Thrasymachus’ thesis and that of the two brothers; cf. Weiss 2007: 100–101. For the relationship between Thrasymachus’ theses and the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus see also Hoffmann 1997: 102–109. 71 Pl. Rep. 357a, 358b–d, 368a–b; cf. Annas 1981: 59; Schütrumpf 1997: 30–31; Trampedach 2006: 7. 72 Pl. Rep. 358b–c, 362e–365a, 367a. 73 Cf. Annas 1981: 59; Schofield 2006: 266, 269. 74 Pl. Rep. 357a, 361b–362d. 75 Pl. Rep. 358e. 76 Pl. Rep. 359c, 360b–c; Trampedach 2006: 8. 77 Pl. Rep. 359c–360d (exousia: 359c, 360d), esp. 360b–d; cf. Trampedach 2006: 7–8. The freedom to do what one pleases is identified with god-like omnipotence (Pl. Rep. 360b–c). Glaucon’s claim that no man, regardless of his character, could resist the temptation to do what he pleases with impunity is very reminiscent of Aristotle’s statement that the freedom to do what one pleases cannot contain the evil that exists in every human being (Pl. Rep. 360b; Arist. Pol. 1318b39–1319а2); cf. Gehrke – Schütrumpf 1996: 633. 78 Pl. Rep. 360d, 361d (eudaimōn). 79 Archil. fr. 19, 23 West; Hdt.1.13, 16, 26; see de Libero 1996: 23–26; Bichler 2001: 233–234.

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Glaucon’s “praise” of injustice, in the same way as Thrasymachus’ opinions, shares the ideas of Polus and Callicles. One is the delineation of three categories of good with which Plato’s half-brother begins his speech, and which is akin to the relation of the means to the end in Gorgias.80 Linking the question What are justice and injustice? with the question What kind of influence do justice and injustice have on the soul? which Glaucon poses at the beginning of his deliberation, is also used by Socrates in his dialogues with Polus and Callicles to refute the theory that injustice pays.81 Finally, there are quite a few reference points which Glaucon shares only with Callicles. In age, Glaucon and Adeimantus belong more to the generation of Callicles than that of Polus.82 More importantly, Plato’s half-brother shares Callicles’ view that the desire to always have more is a salient human characteristic and that condemnation of pleonexia is only the consequence of people’s inability to fulfil it.83 Unlike Thrasymachus and Polus but similarly to Callicles, the basis for Glaucon’s theoretical deliberations is the nomos-physis antithesis.84 The claim that law and laws were created as an agreement among the helpless to defend themselves from injustice immediately calls to mind Callicles’ theory that the ʽweakʼ invented laws so as to protect themselves and master the ʽstrongʼ.85 In the last part of his speech, Glaucon contrasts the perfectly just man with the perfectly unjust one and this in their purest form.86 The most unjust man has the greatest skill, courage, strength, wealth, the help of his friends, pleonexia, and the readiness to resort to the most unscrupulous methods such as demagogy and brutal terror. In spite of all this, the most unjust man enjoys the greatest reputation of being just and favoured by the gods.87 The most just man is simple and noble; he not only seems to be just, but really is so. Through no fault of his own, throughout 80 Pl. Rep. 357b–c; Grg. 467c–468e, 499b–500a; see Gigon 1976: 90–91; Boter 1986: 268–272. 81 Pl. Rep. 358b–d; Grg. 477b–e, 479b, 480a–b, 493a–c, 523c–e, 524c–525a, 526d; cf. Boter 1986: 281. 82 The dramatic date of the Republic is equally difficult to determine as that of Gorgias. Different dates are put forward spanning for almost twenty years (425–409/408), see Erler 2007: 202–203. Glaucon and Adeimantus were born around 430, see Davies 1971: 332–3. Adeimantus appears in the dialogue for the first time in the company of Polemarchus and Niceratus (Pl. Rep. 327a–c). Niceratus was the son of Nicias. He was a trierarch in 410/409 and was murdered during the terror of the Thirty (IG I3 375,36; Lys. 18.9–10; 19.47; Xen. Hell. 2.3.39; Diod. 14.5.5). Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus and brother of Lysias, was also executed by the Thirty (Lys. 12). The fact that Glaucon and Adeimantus are associated with Niceratus and Polemarchus in the dialogue can be seen as another indication that their speeches at the beginning of Book 2 should be understood in the democratic context, the more so as they speak as devil’s advocates, giving vent to a wide-spread opinion rather than in their own name; see also chapter II.2.1. Polus and the Post-Periclean Generation. Other meanings of Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ connection with Polemarchus and Niceratus are discussed in Ferrari 2005: 11–14; esp. 14. 83 Pl. Rep. 359c, 362b; Grg. 483c, 490a–c; see Gigon 1976: 104. 84 Pl. Rep. 358e–359c; Strauss 1964: 86–87. 85 Pl. Rep. 358e–359b; 360c; Grg. 482e–483d; see also DK 83 A3; cf. Weiss 2007: 100. 86 Pl. Rep. 360e–362c. 87 Pl. Rep. 360e–361b (andreia), 362b–c.

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his entire life he is labelled as being extremely unjust. Despite everything he refuses to be swayed and regardless of the blows of fate and the injustices inflicted upon him, he remains true to justice until his death.88 Based on this image and what has been said earlier in the chapter on Callicles about the differences between him and Socrates, it seems justified to say that Glaucon’s contrasting of the perfectly unjust and just man has its counterpart in the opposing of vita activa and vita contemplative in the third part of Gorgias.89 It is therefore no coincidence that a piece of Socrates’ concluding advice to Callicles is that one should beware of inflicting injustice more than of suffering it, and that man should strive to be good, and not only to seem so.90 Glaucon’s brother Adeimantus, like Polus, does not use the nomos-physis antithesis in his discourse, but he does use the dokein-einai, or doxa-alētheia antithesis. With its help, he demonstrates the destructiveness of singing the conventional praises of justice, which do not laud justice for itself but rather its importance in acquiring a good reputation.91 Adeimantus also underlines that these conventional odes to justice, where he is primarily referring to poets, corrupt young people by teaching them that, notwithstanding true values, they should adapt to the “real” state of things.92 This is nothing other than adapting to majority opinion, for which Socrates criticises Callicles in Gorgias. Similarly to the protagonist of the doctrine of might is right, Adeimantus represents the standpoint that people (the majority) are not just of their own accord, but only condemn injustice out of an inability to commit it themselves with impunity.93 Finally, Adeimantus points out that poets believe that the gods can be bribed, because of which the unjust will not only not be punished, but will be cleansed of all their sins.94 This image of the gods is diametrically opposed to the vision of them as protectors of justice in the Afterlife Myth, where Socrates claims that the gods are only interested in justice, that every evil deed leaves a clear imprint on the soul of the perpetrator and that 88 Pl. Rep. 361b–362a (haploun, gennaios). 89 Glaucons’ contrasting of the life of a perfectly just and a perfectly unjust man is related to the Gorgias since he quotes a verse from Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes in the passage where he describes how the majority believes that a just man, after suffering the worst injustices, will realise that it is better to be unjust, and just pretend to be just: „βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος, / ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.“ – “Reaping a deep furrow in his mind / From which trusty plans bear fruit.” (Pl. Rep. 362a; Aesch. Sept. 593–594). This verse was originally used in the play in the opposite meaning and later associated with the famous Aristides (Plut. Arist. 3; 25); see Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1893: 160; Tucker 1908: 124; Heinimann 1945: 57; Hutchinson 1985: 137–138. This is important insofar as Aristides is the only Athenian statesman praised by Socrates in the Gorgias. This praise occurs just before the end of Myth of the Afterlife, at which point the Athenian statesman is said to have stood out as one of a few men in power who remained righteous despite their great authority and the possibility to do wrong with impunity (Pl. Grg. 526a–b). 90 Pl. Grg. 527b. 91 Pl. Rep. 363a, 365b–c. 92 Pl. Rep. 362e–366e, esp. 365, 366b; cf. Gigon 1976: 119. 93 Pl. Rep. 366c–d. 94 Pl. Rep. 365c–366b.

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therefore every criminal will certainly meet with well-deserved punishment, which will cleanse his soul.95 It also becomes obvious that these two depictions of the gods are connected by the places in which they are found in the works. The Afterlife Myth at the very end of Gorgias is a call to a just life. Adeimantus’ speech, and so also the poetic image of the gods, puts an end to the glorification of injustice in the Republic and is followed by a debate on the nature of justice, which serves Plato to elaborate his metaphysical counter-model. 1.4. Philosopher-King In Book 5 and 6 of the Republic the concept of the philosopher-king appears. Plato’s inquiry into the nature of the concept is closely related to the relationship between the true philosopher and the political realm, a question which displays many parallels with the Gorgias. The first correlation is that the traditional understanding of politics must be replaced by a new (philosophical) one. Socrates justifies his standpoint that the philosophers should become rulers and vice versa, arguing that until this occurs, the cities and people will have no rest from evil and there will be no happiness in public or private life.96 As the discussion continues, Socrates denies the possibility that any existing constitution is suitable for the true philosopher.97 The second correlation is the rebuttal of the impression that philosophers are of no use. After Socrates’ elucidation of the essential characteristics of the true philosopher and why he should be in power, Adeimantus repeats almost word for word Callicles’ assessment of the uselessness of the philosopher.98 Socrates’ refutes this critique with the ship of state metaphor:99 the ruler is compared to a tall, strong shipowner who is, however, nearsighted and deaf. The sailors are always crowding around him, doing everything possible to get him to turn the rudder over to them. In the struggle, the crew ruthlessly gets rid of their more successful rivals. Then, having disabled their noble shipowner, they take command of the vessel, consume its cargo in drinking and feasting, and make the sort of voyage one would expect of such people. To those who help them get the ship under their control they award the flattering titles of skilled sailor, navigator and able seaman, although in reality they have no knowledge of navigation. At the same time they dismiss the ship’s navigator (the true philosopher) though he is the only one with adequate knowledge to direct the ship’s course.100 Aristophanes

95 Pl. Grg. 523c–525c. 96 Pl. Rep. 473c–e; 499b–c, 501e, 540d; see also Plt. 293c, 311b–c; Leg. 712a; Ep. 7.326b, 328a; cf. Flaig 1994: 37–42. 97 Pl. Rep. 497a–b, see also 496. 98 Pl. Rep. 487b–e; Grg. 485a–486c; see Spaemann 1997: 175; Schofield 2006: 158. 99 See Brock 2013: 53–62, esp. 57–59; cf. Schofield 2006: 123. 100 Pl. Rep. 487e–489a.

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proves that Plato’s ship of state metaphor is a reference to democracy.101 In the Knights, the demos is portrayed as an senile old man, easy to manipulate, but with one crucial difference – at the end of the play the Athenian demos is rejuvenated and comes to its senses.102 The quarrelling sailors resemble Paphlagon and the sausage-seller, who serve as a paradigm for the nature of the demagogues. The false leaders of the people seek only personal advantage at the expense of the common good.103 In the struggle for the favour of the Athenian people, Paphlagon and the sausage-seller rely not only on shameless flattery. As genuine demagogues, they also viciously denounce and defame each other.104 The comparison of the true navigator with the useless stargazer calls to mind Aristophanes’ Clouds and the distorted picture of Socrates.105 Unsurprisingly, there also similarities between the ship of state metaphor and Socrates’ condemnation of the Athenian statesmen (Themistocles, Miltiades, Cimon and Pericles) in the discussion with Callicles, as well as ʽthe best and most perfectly unjust polis’ in Book 1 of the Republic. Furthermore, immediately after the metaphor, Socrates’ advises Adeimantus: if someone says that true philosophers are useless for the many, to respond that their uselessness is the fault of those who will not use them, and not of the philosophers themselves.106 This advice summarizes in essence Socrates’ answer to Callicles, in particularly his willingness to be a physician (true expert) to the demos, even at the cost of his own life, and Callicles’ refusal to listen to him. The third correlation is that philosophy is not to blame for the emergence of the worst wrongdoers, but the demos and the sophists. Having concluded that philosophic natures are the best souls, Socrates comments that with proper education they will grow to every kind of virtue. However, if they are ill-educated they will become pre-eminently bad. His evidence for this is the prevalent and disastrous effect of the demos (democratic ideology) on the best natures. At the same time he reduces the sophist to the role of intermediary in achieving the will of the demos, someone who teaches only subservience to democratic ideology with no knowledge of true politics:107 οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφυεστάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἴει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης ἀλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίγνεσθαι,

101 Aesch. Sept. 1–3, 652; Supp. 438–442; Soph. Ant. 162–163, 188–190; see also Plt. 297e– 299e; Leg. 905e; cf. Sedley 2007: 261; Ricken 2008: 195–199; Hitz 2010: 107–108; Brock 2013: 55–58. 102 Ar. Eq. 40–46, 269–272, 395–396, 713–720, 752–755, 881–886, 1111–1130, 1321–1328, 1349. 103 Ar. Eq. 258–260, 280–283, 297–298, 353–363, 435–439, 715–718, 776, 801–809, 828–835, 1025–1034, 1215–1227. 104 Ar. Eq. 40–67, 190–193, 213–220, 273–487, 624–682, 694–720, 730–749, 764–950, 1005– 1110, 1153–1253, 1339–1355. 105 Ar. Nub. 171–173, 194–195, 200–203, 225–240, 250–253, 262–434; see Sedley 2007: 261. 106 Pl. Rep. 489a–d. 107 Pl. Rep. 491e–492c (trans. P. Shorey); see also 492d–493d; Phdr. 248e; Tht. 167c, 172d– 173a; Euthyd. 305c–e; cf. Schofield 2006: 64.

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ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι; – οὔκ, ἀλλά, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτως. – ἣν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν, ἂν μὲν οἶμαι μαθήσεως προσηκούσης τύχῃ, εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἀνάγκη αὐξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα τρέφηται, εἰς πάντα τἀναντία αὖ, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχῃ. ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγῇ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθείροντας δέ τινας σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστάς, παιδεύειν δὲ τελεώτατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἵους βούλονται εἶναι καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; – πότε δή; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. – ὅταν, εἶπον, συγκαθεζόμενοι ἁθρόοι πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἤ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους σύλλογον σὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκάτερα, καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δ᾽ αὐτοῖς αἵ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν ἐπηχοῦντες διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου. ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἴει καρδίαν ἴσχειν; ἢ ποίαν ἂν αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου οἰχήσεσθαι φερομένην κατὰ ῥοῦν ᾗ ἂν οὗτος φέρῃ, καὶ φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσειν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσεσθαι τοιοῦτον; “It is.” “Then,” said I, “Adeimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil?” “No,” he said, “that is the case.” “Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue. Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists, and that there are sophists in private life who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning, and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart’s desire young and old, men and women?” “When?” said he. “Why, when,” I said, “the multitude are seated together in assemblies or in courtrooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamour and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise. In such case how do you think the young man’s heart, as the saying is, is moved within him? What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm the same things that they do to be honourable and base, and will do as they do, and be even such as they?”

A young man educated by the multitude and the sophists, particularly if he is a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, will be full of arrogance and great expectations. If someone were to [come to him and] tell him the truth – that he has no sense and must gain insight – he would turn a deaf ear. And even if he happens to be moved towards philosophy, the pressure of his environment would be so strong that he would not continue to philosophize.108 The resemblances to Callicles are striking. The young Athenian is noble, full of himself, has great expectations, in his youth he was interested in philosophy, he takes classes from a

108 Pl. Rep. 494c–495b.

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sophist, has succumbed completely to democratic ideology and refuses to listen to Socrates. The fourth correlation is that the true philosopher only seems to be an idiōtēs, but actually he is not. When he speaks of the characteristics of the true philosopher, Socrates never argues that philosophy should be an end in itself.109 He admits indeed that the madness of the multitude – which is why no one who minds the business of the cities (ta tōn poleōn prattei) does virtually anything sound (hygiēs) – would lead to the death of the philosopher who would fight for justice in public life (as Socrates 1). Therefore it is better for him to keep still (hēsychia) and do his own work (ta hautou prattein), like a man in a storm, content to be able to live his own life and keep himself pure from evil or unrighteousness (as Socrates 2).110 This still does not mean that the true philosopher is or should be an idiōtēs. The explanation is that none of the existing constitutions is suitable for the true philosopher, but if he lives in a state appropriate to his nature he will save the common weal (koinon), as well as the private (idion), and will achieve the greatest thing. At this point, it should be emphasized that Socrates in the closing words of the Gorgias reminds Callicles that a man must practise not seeming to be good, but being so in private and public life. Consequently, from the perspective of Athenian democracy the true philosopher is, like Socrates from the Gorgias, an idiōtēs, while Plato argues that he is not an idiōtēs, because only he has the potential for true politics and is only for the time being prevented from putting it into practice.111 Accordingly, the just city is one in which each class of citizens refrains from polypragmosynē and does its own work, while the just person is one in whose soul each part does its own work.112 Since only the philosophers possess real knowledge of the forms and are perfectly just, in the ideal city, as Eric Brown remarks, the ruling class (philosophers) minds its own business by ruling the state.113 Thus, there is no insurmountable gap between the “first” Socrates and “second” Socrates in their understanding of ta hautou prattein and polypragmosynē. In this way Plato redefines nothing less than the entire vita activa – vita contemplativa dichotomy, since now only the bios philosophikos represents the genuine bios politikos and as such it alone epitomises the counterpole to a traditional understanding of bios praktikos. It is for this reason that Plato consciously avoids the terms apragmosynē and apragmōn when it comes to Socrates and the bios philosophikos. Instead he resorts to the expression ta hautou prattein, which looks similar but is not the same as apragmosynē. For the 109 See Spaemann 1997: 175. 110 See also Ar. Eq. 258–263. 111 Pl. Rep. 496b–497b; 592a–b; see Schofield 2006: 27–30, 155–156, 158–164. The Old Oligarch calls the Athenian multitude mainomenoi (Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.9). 112 Pl. Rep. 433a–c, 434b–c, 441d–e, 443; see also Grg. 506d–507c; cf. Flaig 1994: 50–51; Kraut 1997: 276–277; Brown 2009: 489–490; Nebelin 2016: 161–162. Book 8 confirms that Plato understands polypragmosynē in the traditional sense of the word (Pl. Rep. 549c–550b); cf. Brown 2009: 485–486. 113 Pl. Rep. 441e–443e, 473c–e, 475c–479e, 519d–520e; see Kraut 1997: 274, 277; Brown 2009: 489–490; Kamtekar 2010: 74–76; Nebelin 2016: 161–162, 347–348.

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“ignorant” democrats these two modes of conduct might appear similar or even identical. From their perspective, the difference between the rejection of one specific and all existing constitutions is in fact insignificant, because both lead to the renunciation of democratic political process as such. However, according to Plato ta hautou prattein is the underlying principle of the best political order: the Callipolis. Consequently, the tenet that each person performs the function for which he is by his nature best suited is par excellence political. It is therefore hardly surprising that Plato implies that the Athenian demos is in fact the true apragmōn. As a ‘bazaar of constitutions’ and a political system that dispenses a certain equality to equals and unequals alike, democracy is the absolute antipode to ta hautou prattein, as understood by Plato.114 If someone fails to abide by the basic principle of genuine politics, even if he exercises supreme power, it would not be wrong to say that in fact he is politically inert. Hence, in the Apology the demos is compared to a sluggish horse (hippos nōthesteros), while Socrates is portrayed as a gadfly (myōps) and a polypragmōn. Socrates even argues that throughout his life he did not keep quiet (hēsychia) because he neglected what most men care for – money-making, property, military office, public speaking and the various offices, plots and parties that crop up in a polis.115 Plato is even more unequivocal in the Republic, where he refers to members of the demos as apragmones, despite being the largest and most potent group when democracy meets in assembly. The only other instance of the use of this notion is the changed soul of Odysseus.116 In simple terms, Plato’s philosopher cultivates a new form of quietism. He abstains from traditional politics only to embrace the proper practice of it more closely. His quietism is political action in its purest form. At the same time, since democracy is only a poor imitation of genuine politikē technē, political activity by the demos is in direct proportion to its distance from real political activity (philosophy). Demos’ polypragmosynē is in truth nothing but another form of the detested apragmosynē. To sum up, there are three types of quietism according to Plato. The traditional emerged out of dissatisfaction with the rule of the people, but in the end encompassed most aspects of life, or at least was perceived as doing so. The democratic type is far more malicious, as it deceitfully conceals its true nature under the mask of polypragmosynē. These two forms of quietism are two

114 Pl. Rep. 557d, 558c; cf. Plt. 303a; see also Adkins 1976: 301–303, 314–316, 325–327. 115 Pl. Ap. 30e, 31c–32a, 36b; see also p. 166 n. 168; cp. Blank 2018: 72–74, 104–106. Since for Plato the world of traditional politics is a world of falsehood and distortion, he would in all probability believe that the words of Hannah Arendt (2006: 247) are absolutely applicable to the relationship between it and the philosopher: “Only where a community has embarked upon organized lying on principle, and not only with respect to particulars, can truthfulness as such, unsupported by the distorting forces of power and interest, become a political factor of the first order. Where everybody lies about everything of importance, the truthteller, whether he knows it or not, has begun to act; he, too, has engaged himself in political business, for, in the unlikely event that he survives, he has made a start toward changing the world.” 116 Pl. Rep. 565a, 620c.

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sides of the same coin. The third and last type is that of the philosopher, who renounces the world of traditional politics in order to pursue genuine politikē technē. These four correlations between the Republic and the Gorgias allow for two conclusions. The first is that the philosopher-king constitutes the absolute counterpoint to the tyrannical man, i.e. Callicles. This observation is corroborated by the fact that in Book 9 the basileus is the absolute opposite of the tyrannos.117 There is no city more wretched than one under a tyranny and none happier than one under a kingship. While the king lives the most pleasant life, the tyrant lives the most unpleasant.118 According to Plato, there are three primary classes of pleasure (love of wisdom, love of honour and love of gain), which are reflected in three types of men (lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain).119 Of these three, only the love for wisdom is genuine, since it leads to the truest pleasure. The other classes are merely shadows and reflections (eidōlon) of the truest pleasure.120 In the case of the king, the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division in it. Hence the kingly and orderly desires are closest to order (taxis) and law (nomos) which, again, are closest to reason. Accordingly, the king enjoys self-mastery.121 The tyrant has run away from law and reason. He has gone beyond the two spurious classes of pleasure and dwells with certain slave pleasures. Not surprisingly, his soul can least do what it wants and is to the highest degree the slave of its erotic and tyrannical desires (erōtikai te kai tyrannikai epithymai).122 The second conclusion is that the philosopher-king represents the ideal union of bios praktikos and bios theōrētikos. As for both the true philosopher and tyrannical man the question of proper education arises in the context of the deleterious influence of democratic ideology which, coupled with the subordinate role of the sophists, makes it abundantly clear that the question of how to re-educate tyrannical man leads us to ask how one should go about educating the philosopher-king. 1.5. Mirror of Tyrants In the Introduction, the thesis was advanced of a relationship between Plato and the emergence of fourth-century texts which reflect on the nature of politics through the figures of the tyrant, the king and the Great King (e.g. Isocrates and Xenophon). In the course of the present study, Plato’s preference for dichotomies became obvious. An overview is given below:

117 118 119 120 121 122

See Heintzeler 1927: 71–80; Parry 2007: 407. Pl. Rep. 576e, 580b–c, 587b–e. Pl. Rep. 580e–581c. Pl. Rep. 581d–587c. Eidōlon (587c), skiagraphein (583b, 586b), see also 585b–e. Pl. Rep. 580a–c, 586e–587b, 579e–580c, 583b, 587b–e; see Kraut 1997: 276, 278. Pl. Rep. 571b–c, 572b, 572d–573e, 574e–575a, 577d–e, 587b–c.

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The Gorgias rhetor (Gorgias) rhetoric/sophistic (Polus) rhetor/tyrant (Polus, Great King, Archelaus) doing injustice is better (Polus, Archelaus, Callicles) bios adikos (Polus, Archelaus, Great King, Callicles) tyrant is most happy (Polus, Callicles) in love with the demos (Callicles) intemperate life (Callicles) bios praktikos (Callicles) tyrant (Archelaus) tyrant (the Athenian demos)

physician (Socrates)123 true politics (Socrates)124 philosopher (Socrates)125 suffering injustice is better (Socrates)126 bios dikaios (Socrates)127 tyrant is most unhappy (Socrates)128 in love with philosophy (Socrates)129 temperate life (Socrates)130 bios theōrētikos/philosophikos (Socrates)131 idiōtēs (Socrates)132 physician (Socrates)133

The Republic ruler (Thrasymachus) injustice is more profitable (Thraymachus, Glaucon, Adeimantus)

physician (Socrates)134 justice is more profitable (Socrates)135

123 Gorgias – rhetor (Pl. Grg. 449a, c–d, 456b–c, 457a–b, 459a–b); Socrates – physician (Pl. Grg. 452a, 452e, 455a–b, 456b–c; 457a–b, 459a–b, 464b–e, 465b–d, 467c, 478a–d, 479a–b, 480a– c, 490b–c, 491a, 500b, 501a, 504, 517e, 521a, 521e). 124 Pl. Grg. 462b–463e, 464b–465e, 466e–467a, 500b–501a, 502d–503d, 517e–519c, 520a–c, 521d–e. 125 Polus – rhetor/tyrant (Pl. Grg. 448d, 466b–c, 467a, 469c, 525d); Archelaus – tyrant (Pl. Grg. 470d, 471a–d, 525d); Great King – tyrant (Pl. Grg. 470e); Socrates – does not want to be a tyrant (Pl. Grg. 469c, 510b–511a); Socrates – philosopher (Pl. Grg. 481d, 484c, 485b–c, 487c–d, 500b–c, 526c). 126 Polus – doing injustice is better than suffering injustice – hereafter DIIBTSI – (Pl. Grg. 466b– c, e, 468a–b, 468d–e, 469b–c, 472d–473a, 474c); Archelaus – DIIBTSI (Pl. Grg. 470d–e, 471a–d, 472d, 479d); Callicles – DIIBTSI (Pl. Grg. 482d–e, 483a–c); Xerxes and Darius – DIIBTSI (Pl. Grg. 483e); Socrates – suffering injustice is better than doing injustice (Pl. Grg. 466d–e, 469b–c, 472d–473a, 474b, 479c–d, 480c, 489a, 499e, 508b–509c, 526a, 527b). 127 Polus – unjust life (Pl. Grg. 468d–469c, 470a–c, 472d, 473b–d, 525d); Callicles – unjust life (Pl. Grg. 481c, 483b, 486e–487b, 492a–d, 493c–494e, 507e–508a); Great king – unjust life (Pl. Grg. 524e–525a); Socrates – just life (Pl. Grg. 468d–470c, 470e, 472c–d, 473d–e, 486a– c, 486e–487b, 487e–488b, 495e, 500b–d, 507b–e, 511b–c, 512e, 521d–522e, 523a–b, 526d–e). 128 Pl. Grg. 470d–471d, 472d–473e, 478c–479a, 479d–e, 492b–c, 494c. 129 Callicles (Pl. Grg. 481d–482, 503c); Socrates (Pl. Grg. 481d–482a). 130 Pl. Grg. 491d–495a. 131 Callicles – in love with the demos (Pl. Grg. 485c–486d, 487b–e, 513c–d); Callicles – has to become as much like the demos as possible (Pl. Grg. 510b–511a, 513a–c, 521b); Socrates – bios philosophikos (Pl. Grg. 484c–486a, 487c–d, 489e, 500c, 526c, 527b–d). 132 Pl. Grg. 525e, 526c. 133 Pl. Grg. 510b–511b, 521a–522a. 134 Pl. Rep. 340d–341a, 341c, 341e–343a, 346b–e, 349e–350a, 360e. 135 Thrasymachus (Pl. Rep. 343b–344a, 348b, 353b); Glaucon (Pl. Rep. 358c–d, 359c, 360b–d); Adeimantus (Pl. Rep. 364a, 366b–c); Socrates (Pl. Rep. 345a–b, 350c–d, 588b, 589a–c).

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doing injustice is better (Glaucon) bios adikos (Thrasymachus, Glaucon) most completely unjust man (Thrasymachus, Gyges, Glaucon) bios praktikos/politikos sailors/seamen (demagogues) the many (demos, sick) the many/the democratic/sophistic education tyrant bios kakos/athlios (tyrannical man) tyrannical man/tyrant

suffering injustice is better (Glaucon)136 bios dikaios (Socrates, Glaucon, Adeimantus)137 most completely just man (Socrates)138 bios theōrētikos/philosophikos139 true navigator (true philosopher)140 true philosopher (true expert, physician)141 philosophic education142 idiōtēs143 bios agathos/eudaimon (philosopherking)144 philosopher/philosopher-king/king145

The circumstance that most persons are simultaneously associated with several value notions confirms the connections mentioned earlier between Gorgias, Polus, Callicles, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus, as well as between Gorgias and the Republic. These congruities also point to the thought processes behind the works of Isocrates and Xenophon which focus on the personality of the autocrat (Euagoras, Nicocles, Cyrus, Hiero). Plato did not write the Gorgias that it might be classified under the Mirror of Princes category or as a monocratological text. However, he opened the door to this with the wide range of dichotomies he uses to examine and explain the emergence of tyrannical man. In the typology of tyrants and wisdom literature, the autocrat is almost always the opposite of a good citizen, hence there are no examples of an attempt to (re-)educate the tyrant. Indeed, there are cases of giving advice to the autocrat, but that is not the same. Moreover, there is a widespread impression, as Herodotus shows, that even giving advice is ultimately futile.146 On the surface Plato’s message seems similar, but it is actually more complex. His frequent analogous application of different dichotomies makes 136 Pl. Rep. 358e. 137 Thrasymachus (Pl. Rep. 344a, 347e); Socrates (Pl. Rep. 344d–345b, 354a, 591b–e); Glaucon – just life is better (Pl. Rep. 347e–348a); Glaucon – unjust life is better (Pl. Rep. 358c–d); Adeimantus (Pl. Rep. 365a–c). 138 Thrasymachus – tyrant (Pl. Rep. 344a–b); Glaucon – Gyges (Pl. Rep. 359c–360b, 360e– 362c); Socrates (Pl. Rep. 359b, 361b–c, 361e–362a). 139 Pl. Rep. 347a–d, 434b–c, 441c–d, 443c–d, 487a–e, 496b–497b, 497e–498c, 499b–d, 520a–d, 521b, 549c–550b, 592a–b. 140 Pl. Rep. 487e–489b. 141 Pl. Rep. 489b–c, 493e–494a, 499e–500b, 500d–e, 586b–c. 142 Pl. Rep. 492a–d, 493a–d, 496a. 143 Pl. Rep. 578c. 144 Pl. Rep. 571a, 576b–e, 577b, 578b–c, 579d, 580b–c, 587b–e. 145 Tyrannical man / tyrant (Pl. Rep. 494c–495b, 571a–578c, 579c–e, 580b–c, 587a–e); philosopher / philosopher-king (Pl. Rep. 473c–d, 474b–c, 497b–c, 498b–c, 499b–c, 500d–501a, 501d, 502a, 576d–e, 580b–c, 581c, 582b–c, 583b, 587a–e). 146 See, e.g., Croesus and Cyrus (Hdt. 1.29–33, 86, 88–89, 206–208); cf. Erbse 1992: 24–29; Asheri – Lloyd – Corcella 2007: 65, 96, 142, 212.

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it clear that Callicles does not personify only the tyrannical man (the unjust life), he also epitomizes the traditional way of doing politics (love for the demos, bios praktikos). In other words, bios tyrannikos stands for the traditional bios politikos, while Socrates’ bios philosophikos (the just life, the physician, idiōtēs) represents the new (right) way of doing politics. Hence, by thematising the issue of Callicles’ education, Plato addresses the question of the right education for gifted young people, who are especially vulnerable to bad (democratic) education. Thus, analogous to the problem of the re-education of the tyrannical man, comes that of the instruction of young, ambitious, outstanding individuals. Plato’s answer is that either philosophers will become kings, or the kings and rulers will pursue philosophy seriously and effectively.147 In this way, Plato subsumed the naturally gifted person, the right education, a real knowledge of politics and all the characteristics of the true philosopher under the concept of the philosopherking. In doing so he was the first to use a positive image of the (idealised) autocratic ruler as a projection of his own political views and principles. Isocrates and Xenophon followed in his footsteps. The influence manifests itself in the fact that the paradigm of the good ruler in Isocrates’ and Xenophon’s writings reflects their political ideas and not the political reality. Even when the good ruler is addressed as a tyrant, he is still the antithesis of the bad tyrant and his vices.148 While Isocrates implicitly addresses the Cyprian rulers from the position of a philosopher and presents Nicocles as a student of philosophy, in Hiero the contrast ruler – wise man (sophos) occupies a prominent place.149 In To Nicocles, Nicocles or The Cyprians, Euagoras and Hiero the instruction of the tyrant is also considered within the context of the dichotomy ruler (tyrannos, monarchos, dynastēs) – private man (idiōtēs).150 Obviously, Plato, Isocrates and Xenophon differ somewhat in their understanding of ruler, philosopher, private man and wise man, but this is a consequence of disagreement with regard to the nature of politics, philosophy and education. By reducing the sophists and rhetors,151 to the role of intermediaries of a democratic ideology, Plato made them co-responsible for the appearance of individuals such as Callicles, i.e. the tyrannical man. This could have provoked Isocrates to write works in the style of Mirror of Tyrants in order to prove the opposite. Plato’s profound conviction that with traditional politics it was impossible to wrest young, gifted individuals from the grip of democratic ideology, may have inspired Xenophon to write Hiero, since in this treatise the wise man successfully reeducates the tyrant. At this point, we should examine the question of which notion is best suited for these texts. According to Haake, the terms Mirror of Princes and Peri Basileias 147 Pl. Rep. 473c–d; see also Ep. 7.326b. 148 Cf. Luraghi 2013a: 19. 149 Isoc. 3.1; 9.8; 15.270–276; Xen. Hier. 1.1. For more information on the relationship between Isocrates and the notion philosophia, see Schiappa 1999: 162–184. 150 Isoc. 2.2–6, 8, 13; 3.17–21; 9.24–25, 27–28, 66, 72; Xen. Hier. 1.2–3, 7–8. 151 In Plato’s view sophistry and rhetoric are inextricably mixed together (Pl. Grg. 465c); see Schiappa 1999: 163.

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cannot be used for the writings of Isocrates, Xenophon, and Plato. However, if we apply Haake’s classification then we can see that it is indeed possible to speak of a literary genre with regard to the writings of Isocrates and Xenophon: both authors are writing in their social role as intellectuals, perceiving their principle role to be love of wisdom and the education of others; the addressee is the ruler; the texts are in prose and self-contained; the content consists of a portrayal of the figure of the good ruler, implicitly or explicitly as opposed to the (bad) tyrant, within the dichotomy of ruler – philosopher/wise man/private man; the audience are the young, ambitious and inquisitive members of the elite of the Greek poleis. Antisthenes might probably be mentioned together with Isocrates and Xenophon, as the alternative title (On kingship) of his Archelaus and Cyrus indicates.152 Since the main addressee is the good autocratic ruler for whom the term tyrant is also unhesitatingly used, the present study proposes Mirror of Tyrants as a genre title for these treatises of Isocrates and Xenophon. Even Plato’s Gorgias can be partially classified under Mirror of Tyrants, despite the fact that three differences may be noted. One is the absence of an addressee. Nonetheless, too much importance should not be attributed to this circumstance, since Callicles (the tyrannical man) is actually the main dramatis persona – his discussion with Socrates is longer than those with Gorgias and Polus combined. The second divergence is that the answer to what is true politics, i.e. true statesmanship, is only hinted at in the Gorgias, while the answer is given in other dialogues. The third and last difference is that in Plato, the image of the good tyrannical man cannot be found. However, he develops the concept philosopher-king, which implies that rulers can be educated in the right manner.153 In view of these correlations and divergences it can be concluded that the Gorgias, and the Republic do not belong to the Mirror of Tyrants genre, but by devising the concept of the tyrannical man and philosopher-king these works contributed to its appearance. In doing so they also influenced the Peri Basileias genre. Even if we accept Haake’s view that Aristotle wrote the first treatise On kingship, Plato’s influence is still more important than he is willing to admit.154 One of the central characteristics of this genre is that it occurs in the form of a communication between the philosopher and the ruler. Considering the extent to which the philosopher (philosopher-king) – tyrannical man contrast is omnipresent in the Gorgias and the Republic, one cannot avoid the impression that it must have had a lasting effect on the Peri Basileias genre. One might add that in Aristotle’s time there was no developed concept of Hellenistic kingship and that his model of extreme tyranny was heavily influenced by Athenian democracy.155

152 153 154 155

Cf. Murray 1971: 18–23; Prince 2015: 144–146, 162–163, 308–313, 686. Pl. Rep. 473c–d, 502a. See Haake 2013: 168–173. See Jordović 2011.

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1.6. Politicus and the Mirror of Tyrants At this point it seems appropriate to focus briefly on the Politicus, since this dialogue substantiates the understanding of Plato’s relation to the Mirror of Tyrants presented here. A cursory glance at some of the views and arguments put forward in this dialogue exposes important correlations between it, the Gorgias and the Republic. From the outset of the discussion, the Eleatic Stranger asserts that both a ruler (archōn) and a private citizen (idiōtēs) can possess the special expertise of the politikos.156 He refers to this statesman as a wise and genuine king, calling his special expertise the true art of kingship.157 In contrast to the (traditional) legislator, the statesman possesses the ability to assign to each individual what is appropriate for him (to prosēkon apodidonai/prostattein to prosēkon).158 Here it should be noted that in the Republic, prosēkein is closely linked with ta hautou prattein and mentioned with remarkable frequency in connection with the bios philosophikos.159 Furthermore, the politikos is compared with the physician and the helmsmen. As the physician cures his patients with or against their will, and the helmsmen steers only for the good of the ship and sailors, so the statesman is guided not by the will of his subjects, but by knowledge and justice.160 In this way he makes his citizens better. The price of this is that the true statesman is not called a physician or a helmsman but a star-gazer, a kind of loquacious sophist. In addition, anyone who is properly qualified may haul him into court for corrupting the young and persuading them to follow the art of medicine, or piloting in an unlawful manner and exercising arbitrary rule (autokratoras archein) over patients or ships, i.e. the citizens.161 These are clear allusion to Socrates’ fate.162 The Eleatic Stranger also uses the analogy of gold refining, equating expert knowledge of statesmanship with pure gold while associating other related but lesser kinds of expertise (generalship, the art of the judge and a certain type of rhetoric) with copper, silver and adamas.163 The remark of the Eleatic Stranger that all existing constitutions are mere imitations of genuine statesmanship allows us to draw two important conclusions.164 One is that 156 Pl. Plt. 259a–b; see also 292e–293a; cf. Rowe 1995: 1–2, 5; Cooper 1999b: 167-168, 180; Ricken 2008: 94–95; Seeck 2012: 9, 28, 30; Kahn 2013: 225. 157 See p. 173 with n. 226. 158 Pl. Plt. 295a–b; prosēkein: 269c–d, 294d, 309d, 311c. 159 Pl. Rep. 441d–e, 442a–b, 444b, 453b, 474b–c, 485d–e, 488d, 490b–c, 491d, 492a, 495b–c, 496a, 497a, 500b, 501d, 504d; see also 585d–e, 587e–588a; Grg. 485b, 507a–b, 517e, 525a, 526b–c; cp. Dem. 57.1–2, 4–6, 24–25, 30, 32, 34, 36, 44, 46, 56, 69; cf. Blok 2017: 8–9, 54, 66. 160 Pl. Plt. 296e–297b, 299a–c, 300d–e; physician / patients / medicine (259a, 268a–c, 293b–c, 295c, 296c, 297e–299c); helmsmen / ship (296e–297a, 297e–299c, 302b); charioteer (266e); herdsmen / herd rearing (261d–e, 264b, 266e, 267b–d, 268a–c, 275a–c, 276e, 287b, 295e); beehive / king–bee (293d, 301d–e); see Lane 1998: 40–46; Brock 2000: 28; Id. 2013: 69–75, 151, 159–60; Ricken 2008: 191–192, 195–196; Seeck 2012: 10. 161 Pl. Plt. 299b–c; see Schofield 1999: 34; Ricken 2008: 85, 198. 162 See Larivée 2018: 25; Candiotto 2018: 235–236. 163 Pl. Plt. 303d–304a; see also Grg. 486d; Rep. 336e, 503a; cf. Ricken 2008: 210. 164 Pl. Plt. 300c–301c; cf. Rowe 1995: 14–15, 17; Ricken 2008: 203.

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genuine politikē technē under the existing constitutions cannot be practised to the full; the other that in spite of this limitation and regardless of the consequences, it is an ideal to be striven for. More conclusive proof that these similarities to the Gorgias and the Republic are no coincidence is the introduction of a distinction between two types of men who are extremely hostile to each other and take opposed positions in many things.165 The part of virtue pervading the character of the first type is sōphrosynē (moderation/temperance). These men live a quiet life (hēsychos bios/hēsychaios), mind their own business (ta sphetera autōn prattontes) and are ready by all means to keep peace of some kind with foreign states. As a result of their passivity and aversion to war, they are perpetually at the mercy of those who attack them, which is why their cities often fall into slavery.166 The well-ordered nature (kosmia physis/kosmioi) is only moderate to a certain degree, since it will become genuinely sōphrōn and phronimos only if it is mixed with the courageous part of virtue. Otherwise, ill-timed and excessive moderation will be too deep, slow and soft (malakōtera), and as such will be censured as cowardliness (deila), foolish sluggishness (blakika), and simple-mindedness (euētheia).167 The well-ordered and quiet nature is not as truly moderate as the politikos and lacks his politikē technē. Accordingly, his sort of hēsychia must be that of the traditional apragmōn, not that of the philosopher-king, which is why he is someone who in all spheres of life prefers peace and quiet.168 It is not hard to recognize that his nature exhibits the same features as those of the apragmones, criticised by Pericles, Alcibiades and Callicles. In the Funeral Oration, having said of the Athenians that they are lovers of wisdom without softness (malakia), Pericles emphasizes that the man who takes no part in public affairs is not an inactive (apragmōn) but a useless character.169 In his last speech, the great statesman warns his fellow citizens that apragmones are not expedient for an imperial but a subject state, which seeks safety in submission. Accordingly, if such men were to prevail they would soon ruin the state, since unless flanked by men of action, they are incapable of protecting themselves.170 In the Sicilian debate 165 Pl. Plt. 306a–308b, esp. 306b, 308b; see Cooper 1999b: 182–183; Ricken 2008: 216–218; Seeck 2012: 11. 166 Pl. Plt. 307a, 307e–308a; see Ricken 2008: 218, 223, 225–226; Seeck 2012: 149. 167 Pl. Plt. 307b–c, 309e, 310e; malakos (307a, 307c, 309b); see Rowe 1995: 241; Id. 2018: 316– 317; Lane 1998: 3–4, 142–146, 171–172, esp. 171–172; Ricken 2008: 218; Seeck 2012: 147– 148. 168 Traditional hēsychia: Pl. Plt. 307b–e, 309e, 310d–e (nōthesteros), esp. 307d–e (quietism in relation to the organization of life as a whole); Chrm. 159b–160d, esp. 159b ([...] sōphrosynē einai to kosmiōs panta prattein kai hēsychē, en te tais hodois badizein kai dialegesthai, kai ta alla panta hōsautōs poein); Thuc. 1.70.8–9; 6.10.2, 18.2, 4, 6–7; see also 6.24.4, 25.2. Philosopher’s hēsychia: Pl. Rep. 496d, 497b–c, 503b–c; Ap. 30e, 31c–32a (nōthesteros / polypragmosynē), 36b. 169 Thuc. 2.40.1–2; see also 42.4, 43.6. Victoria Wohl (2002: 175–177) shows that the semantic scope of malakia is broader than softness and cowardice and that as an antonym of andreia, it also means unmanliness. 170 Thuc. 2.63; see Rowe 2018: 321.

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Alcibiades argues that apragmosynē (hēsychia) is the opposite of limitless expansion and reproaches his rival Nicias for this “failing”. Nicias, on the other hand, urges the Athenians not to vote for the expedition out of fear of seeming soft (malakos) or because they have a morbid love of what is distant.171 It is no less remarkable that the active political life envisioned by Callicles runs absolutely contrary to the well-ordered and temperate life.172 Moreover, in his eyes the philosophical way is the path of unmanliness.173 Callicles also, like the lotus-eaters in the Republic, stigmatises sōphrosynē as anandria.174 His derogatory attitude towards sōphrosynē is reflected in the labelling of the temperate as fools (ēlithioun).175 In his first sentence in the Republic, Thrasymachus not only rebukes Socrates for talking nonsense (phlyaria) and acting like a fool (euēthizomai), but addresses him as very simple-minded (euēthestatos).176 More importantly, the sophist explicitly says that injustice rules the truly simple and just, and that justice is a most noble simple-mindedness.177 Immediately prior to Socrates’ introduction of the distinction between the just and unjust man, Thrasymachus reiterates that the just man is simple-minded.178 Even though Callicles never calls Socrates simple-minded, he dismisses him for uttering nonsense and denounces conventional morality as phlyria.179 Finally, both Callicles and Thrasymachus compare Socrates to a child.180 The second kind of men in the Politicus inclines more towards courage (andreia). They drive their cities into war and involve them in hostilities with powerful opponents and either utterly destroy their fatherlands or make them slaves and subjects of their enemies.181 This courage manifests itself in activities which can be characterized as sharp (oxys), manly courageous (andreios), quick (tachys), manly (andrikos) and vehement (sphodros).182 If the courageous soul is 171 Thuc. 6.13.1; see also 7.77.7; cf. Wohl 2002, 171, 174–180, 198–199; Balot 2014: 124. 172 Pl. Grg. 491e (sōphrōn), 492b–c (sōphrosynē), 493c–d (bios kosmios, bios sōphrōn), 503e– 505d, (taxis, ataxia, kosmos, sōphrosynē), 506d–507c (taxis, kosmos, kosmios, kosmiotēs, sōphrōn, sōphrosynē), 508a–b (kosmos, sōphrosynē); see also Rep. 561d; Phdr. 256b; Lys. 26.3; cf. Irwin 1979: 195, 219–222; Schofield 2000: 196; Dalfen 2004: 375–376; Ricken 2008: 223. 173 Pl. Grg. 485c–d (anandros); see also p. 109. 174 Pl. Grg. 492b; Rep. 560d (aidōs, anandria, aneleutheria, ēlithiotēs, kosmios, sōphrosynē); cf. Lane 1998: 183. 175 Pl. Grg. 491e; cp. 527c–d (anoētos); Rep. 560d; see also Hdt. 1.33 (amathēs), 60.3 (prēgma euēthestatos/euēthiēs ēlithou); Sol. fr. 33W (ouk ephy Solōn bathyphrōn oude boulēeis anēr). In the Charmides, Socrates theatrically notes that the simple-minded (euēthēs) and fools (ēlithioun) believe that minding one’s own business is temperance (to ta hautou prattein sōphrosynēn einai) (Pl. Chrm. 162a–b); see also Ar. Nub. 1006–1007; cf. Coulson 2016: 30. 176 Pl. Rep. 336b (phlyaria), 336c (euēthizomai), 343d (euēthestatos), see also 515d (phlyaria); cf. Dodds 1959: 294; Hobbs 2000: 165 n. 65; Coulson 2016: 41–42. 177 Pl. Rep. 343c (euēthikos), 348c–d (gennaia euētheia); see Coulson 2016: 42–46. 178 Pl. Rep. 349b (euēthēs); see Coulson 2016: 45–46. 179 Pl. Grg. 486c, 489b, 490c, 490e, 492c (phlyarein/phlyaria), see also 470c, 519a; Rep. 581d; cf. Doods 1959: 312; Hobbs 2000: 139–140 with n. 6, 164–165 with n. 65. 180 Pl. Rep. 343a; Grg. 485b–c, 499b–c, see also 470c, 521e. 181 Pl. Plt. 308a. 182 Pl. Plt. 306e; see Ricken 2008: 217; Seeck 2012: 147–148.

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not tamed and does not share in what is just, it will slide towards becoming a kind of beast (thēriōdēs), while this sort of courage will be deplored as excessive (hybristika) and manic (manika).183 In his extensive research of the concept of courage, Ryan Balot successfully demonstrates its role as a fundamental democratic ideal.184 Pericles’ Funeral Speech reveals that the transformation of courage into a distinctively democratic virtue is above all to be credited to the great statesman.185 He was the one who envisioned (practical/technical) knowledge as a key constituent and a distinctive characteristic of democratic courage.186 By comparing Athens and Sparta, he emphasises the distinction between democratic courage founded on knowledge and traditional, unreflective, externally induced courage, which is discipline-, shame- and law-driven.187 Pericles further defines courage as the defender of Athens’ freedom, which in turn is to be equated with the eudaimonia.188 By declaring this rational and more egalitarian courage to be one of the pillars of the Athenian archē, he also intrinsically links it with bellicose imperialism.189 As expected, Callicles echoes Athenian ideology in this respect too. He not only brands the many (weak men) as unmanly, but also philosophy, which he falsely equates with apragmosynē.190 It is also striking that he associates courage with the stronger, the wise (phronēsis) and the absence of softness of soul (malakian tēs psychēs).191 By stating that this is courage with knowledge (epistēmē), he tacitly recognizes that there is also a kind that lacks it. Moreover, he believes that courage and knowledge are different from each other and from good. Callicles is also deeply convinced that happiness is the full satisfaction of the most demanding epithymai, and that courage and wisdom enable the ‘stronger’ to realize this kind of eudaimonia. At the same time he dismisses the reproach that licentiousness is shameful. Plato thus suggests that Callicles has internalized an immoderate view of the courage so representative of democracy, since it calls insolence good education, anarchy freedom, prodigality magnificence and shamelessness courage.192 Socrates utterly rejects these views.193 In the further course of discussion he systematically disassembles Callicles’ line of argumentation. In doing so, he repeatedly mentions courage and cowardliness and comes to diametrically opposed 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193

Pl. Plt. 307b–c, 309e, 310d; cf. Rowe 2018: 316–317. Balot 2014. Thuc. 2.39–40.1; see also 1.70.1, 3, 6; cf. Balot 2014: 14–15, 25–47, 74, 93, 115–119, 146–147. Thuc. 2.40.2–3; see also 1.70.2; cf. Balot 2014: 25–33, 39–46; see also 47–104. Thuc. 2.39; Hdt. 7.104.4–5, 139.3–6; see Millender 2002: 33–59, esp. 33–47; Balot 2014: 38, 81–108, 206–209. Thuc. 2.43.4; cf. Balot 2014: 31–33, 39; see also 104–107. Thuc. 2.41.3–43.5; see also 6.13.1, cf. Balot 2014: 32–37; see also 109–119, 124–128. Pl. Grg. 485c–d, 492a–b, see also 492c; Rep. 491b, 549c–550c; cf. Hobbs 2000: 140. Pl. Grg. 489e–490a, 491a–d, 491e–492a, 497e; cf. also Rep. 556b–c, 564b; see Irwin 1979: 187, 189; Dalfen 2004: 354, 358–359. Pl. Grg. 491e–492a, 492c; Rep. 560c–e; see also 429a–430c; cf. Irwin 1979: 191–194, Balot 2014: 11, 342. Pl. Grg. 495c–e; see Irwin 1979: 200; Dalfen 2004: 354, 382–383.

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conclusions.194 He concludes that restraint of desires is the precondition for happiness, which is why restraint is temperance and the temperate man will do what is fitting (sōphron ta prosēkonta prattoi). This man is just, pious and courageous and, as such, entirely good.195 Socrates then contrasts the temperate with the intemperate man in political life.196 This is coupled with the question of whether the political man (politikos anēr) should make his fellow-citizens as good as possible, even if it means risking being condemned to death though innocent. Socrates’ answer is unambiguous: in his care for the polis, the politician should like the physician compel citizens towards what will make them better and not indulge their appetites.197 This is the path of true political art (alēthōs politikē technē) which only Socrates follows.198 He does not deny that following this path could lead to capital punishment, but nonetheless no one should fear death unless he is altogether unreasonable (alogistos) and unmanly (anandros).199 Thus Socrates redefines courage. It is the absolute opposite of bellicose expansionism and licentiousness, i.e. licence to do what one pleases. It is for this reason that Socrates claims that Pericles has made the Athenians idlers, chatterers, spongers and cowards (deilos).200 However, true courage is not to be confused with apragmosynē because Socrates is not an apragmōn. Thus true courage is intrinsically linked to genuine moderation and political art, and is aimed at making the citizens better. In the Republic the madness of the many compels the philosopher to avoid (democratic) public life.201 Plato’s choice of words is not as uncommon as might appear, since Ps.-Xenophon called the demos ‘madmen’ (mainomenoi).202 In Book 9, Plato compares erōs to a great winged drone and claims that it is the champion of idle desires. Its body-guard is madness. As such, erōs slays any opinions or appetites capable of shame until the soul of the tyrannikos anēr is purged of moderation and filled with mania brought in from outside.203 Plato thus associates maniacal behaviour with democracy and the tyrannical man. Another sign that the courageous type from the Politicus has internalised important democratic values is the risk of sliding towards bestiality. An important point of Socrates’ criticism of Pericles in the Gorgias is that he has made the 194 Pl. Grg. 497e–498c, 498e–499a, 507b; see also 463a; cf. Irwin 1979: 202–206; Hobbs 2000: 151–154; Dalfen 2004: 392–395. 195 Pl. Grg. 506c–507c; see also Plt. 295a–b; Rep. 491b. Prosēkein: Grg. 471a, 479e, 485b, 491c–d, 507a–b, 517e, 525a, 526b–c; cf. Irwin 1979: 219–224; Dalfen 2004: 423–425. 196 Pl. Grg. 507d–508a. 197 Pl. Grg. 508d, 510d, 511b, 512e–513a, 513d–514a, 514d–515b, 517b–c, 521a–522c; cp. Plt. 296e–297b. Politikos / politikos anēr / politikē / politika pragmata / ta politika / alēthōs politikē technē: Grg. 463d, 464b, 473e, 484d–e, 513b–c, 514b, 515c, 516d, 517a, 518b, 519b–c, 521d, 527d. 198 Pl. Grg. 521d–522a; cf. Ricken 2008: 83. 199 Pl. Grg. 522d–e; see also 480c; Ap. 34e–35a; Cri. 45d–e; Phd. 61d, 63d–68a, 68c–69c, 114d– 115a, 116b–117c; cf. Hobbs 2000: 152–157; Balot 2014: 69. 200 Pl. Grg. 515e. 201 Pl. Rep. 496c; cf. Schofield 2006: 27–28. 202 Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.9. 203 Pl. Rep. 572e–573b.

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Athenians much wilder than they were before and hence less just, because the tame are just.204 In the Republic, Socrates recounts how Thrasymachus interfered in his discussion with Polemarchus, emphasizing how the sophist could no longer keep quiet (ouketi hēsychian ēgen) but coiled himself like a wild beast.205 It is no less remarkable that Socrates depicts the demos as a great strong beast and the many as wild beasts.206 When Plato discusses the emergence of tyrannical man, he associates the unnecessary with the wild and beastly part of the soul, along with unlawful desires and pleasures.207 Finally, Thucydides’ account of the inversion of values in the Pathology of War should be briefly addressed:208 καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν· τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη, ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος. καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ᾽ ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὕποπτος. [...] οὕτω πᾶσα ἰδέα κατέστη κακοτροπίας διὰ τὰς στάσεις τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ, καὶ τὸ εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη, τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν· The ordinary acceptation of words in their relation to things was changed as men thought fit. Reckless audacity came to be regarded as courageous loyalty to party, prudent hesitation as specious cowardice, moderation as a cloak for unmanly weakness, and to be clever in everything was accounted a true man’s part, but caution in deliberation a specious pretext for shirking. The hot-headed man was always trusted, his opponent suspected. [...] So it was that every form of depravity showed itself in Hellas in consequence of its revolutions, and that simplicity, which is the chief element of a noble nature, was laughed to scorn and disappeared, while mutual antagonism of feeling, combined with mistrust, prevailed far and wide.

As the passage indicates, Thucydides reduces behaviour in a civil war to two major patterns. The first is associated with words like tolma, alogistos, andreia, emplēktōs oxy etc., while the second is closely linked to mellēsis, promēthēs, sōphrōn, deilia, anandros, euētheia, gennaios etc. Thucydides perceives the first pattern of behaviour as the driving force of stasis, as it is inherent in all warring factions. The second is characteristic of those who are not the catalyst of civil strife, but rather its “collateral damage”. Nonetheless, these victims of stasis are not entirely blameless since they failed to defend themselves, despite or even because of their forethought, cautiousness and moderation:209 204 205 206 207 208

Pl. Grg. 516a–c (agriotēs, agrios, zōon); see Irwin 1979: 235; Dalfen 2004: 457. Pl. Rep. 336b (thērion). Pl. Rep. 493a–c (thremmatos megalou kai ischyrou, megalou zōou), 496c–d (thēria, agriois). Pl. Rep. 571b–c (thēriōdes, agrion); see also 563c, 588c, 588e, 589c–d, 590b, 591b–c. Thuc. 3.82.4–83.1, esp. 3.82.4–5, 83.1 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); see also 3.45.7; 4.62; Grg. 463e, 482; 501b; Rep. 441e; Plt. 306e, 307b, 311a; cf. Macleod 1979: 56–57, 61–62. Gennaios: Thuc. 2.41.5; 3.83.1; Plt. 309a; Rep. 348c–d, 361b; Grg. 485c, 485e, 494e, 512d, 521a–b. 209 Thuc. 3.82.4–5, 7–8, 83.3–4, esp. 82.5, 7–8 (trans. Ch. F. Smith); cf. Macleod 1979: 57–60, esp. 59–60; Hornblower 1991: 486–488.

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ἐπιβουλεύσας δέ τις τυχὼν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος· προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτὴς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένος. [...] ῥᾷον δ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται. [...] τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο. He who succeeded in a plot was clever, and he who had detected one was still shrewder; on the other hand, he who made it his aim to have no need of such things was a disrupter of party and scared of his opponents. [...] And in general it is easier for rogues to get themselves called clever than for the stupid (amatheis) to be reputed good, and they are ashamed of the one but glory in the other. [...] And citizens who belonged to neither party were continually destroyed by both, either because they would not make common cause with them, or through mere jealousy that they should survive.

The similarities between Thucydides and Plato are simply too great to be ignored.210 Admittedly, a pattern of behaviour is not the same as a type of people. However, Plato is actually speaking of weaving together the disposition (ēthos) of the courageous and the moderate.211 Disposition and a pattern of behaviour are not diametrically opposed; on the contrary, the latter is usually greatly determined by the former. This brief comparison illustrates that when it comes to the typology of men in the Statesman there are substantial similarities to the Gorgias, the Republic and Thucydides. The quiet kind of man has much in common with the traditional apragmōn, while the courageous type displays notable features of the democratic and tyrannical man. At the same time it may be noted that in the Gorgias Socrates manifests all the characteristics of the true statesman in the Politicus. He is portrayed as a paradigm for the individual who possesses knowledge of the genuine political art, because he successfully unites moderation, justice and courage. Thus Socrates served as the model not only for the philosopher-king, but for the true statesman.212 Another aspect which the Politicus shares with the Gorgias and the Republic is the idea that not all persons can be re-educated (educated). This is reflected in the view that one of the greatest responsibilities of the art of kingship is to educate only those whose natures are capable of being educated in the direction of what is noble. Those individuals, who by their evil nature degenerate into godlessness, excess and injustice are excluded from the community, while those who wallow in ignorance and baseness are downgraded to the status of slaves, i.e. deprived of all basic rights.213 The correlations allow of two conclusions. Firstly, there is a high degree of continuity between the Gorgias, the Republic and the Politicus, in particular with regard to challenging democratic ideology.214 Secondly, the closeness of the 210 211 212 213

Contra Lane 1998: 185. Pl. Plt. 308e, 309b, 310a, 310c, 310e, 311a-b; cp. Rowe 2018: 309, with n. 1. Cf. Rowe 1995: 10; Id. 2007b: 31; Ricken 2008: 83–84. Pl. Plt. 308e–309a; see also Rep. 590c–d; cf. Vlastos 1995b: 90–95, esp. 93–94; Ricken 2008: 221; Seeck 2012: 152. 214 See also Schofield 1999: 34–37; Rowe 2018: 324–326.

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Statesman to Mirror of Tyrants literature indicates that Plato was well aware that the concepts of the tyrannical man and the philosopher-king share some important similarities with the genre. The question which remains to be answered is: can the Politicus be classified under the Mirror of Tyrants or not? Two circumstances point into this direction. One is that the treatise attempts to define the special expertise which is the sine qua non of the genuine statesman.215 The other point is that the term politikos refers to the ideal ruler, whether he rules or not, respectively whether he exists or not.216 At the same time there are several arguments against subsuming the Statesman into the Mirror of Tyrants genre. The extensive use of diairesis in the conversation between the Stranger from Elea and the young Socrates leads to an ever more precise definition of the politikē (technē/epistēmē) of the statesman.217 Yet, as noted by Christopher Rowe, the long series of divisions and expositions of methodological points seems excessive, which is why the “the aim of the search for the statesman is at least as much for the sake of their becoming better dialecticians, better able to discuss important topics in a methodological productive way (285c – 286b).”218 At the same the Statesman omits to explicitly address the issue of how to achieve and implement this special expertise.219 A prime example of this tendency is Plato’s approach to the all-important concept of weaving. The Eleatic Stranger elaborates extensively on the nature and significance of this concept, while on the other hand he refrains from giving advice on how the “skill of weaving” can be acquired, taught and applied.220 The politikos and his art of ruling remain equally elusive, since the focus of the diairesis is primarily to show what is not politikē epistēmē.221 This flagrant imbalance in intellectual effort indicates that Plato never intended to compose this dialogue as a Mirror of Tyrants. It seems instead that the idea underlying this somewhat unusual approach is to illustrate that Mirror of Tyrants writers have grossly misconceived even the methodological basics of their subject.222 Three circumstances help corroborate this. Firstly, the Politicus belongs to the dialogues of the late period. Accordingly, it was probably written after Isocrates and Xenophon had published their most important writings in the genre, or at least around the time when some of them were already in circulation.223 Secondly, the Eleatic Stranger categorizes law215 See Rowe 1995; 1–4, 15; Ricken 2008; 93–156, 241; Larivée 2018: 23–24, 27–29. 216 Pl. Plt. 259a–b, 292e–293a; see Rowe 1995: 1, 3, 5; Id. 2000: 236–238; Kahn 2013: 225. 217 Pl. Plt. 267a–c, 276b–277a, 305e, 311b–c; see Rowe 1995: 14, 18; Id. 2000: 234–235; Ricken 2008: 91–92, 105–106, 234–238; Seeck 2012: 14–16, 30–50, 84–86, esp. 14–16, 26–27, 37, 49, 84–86. 218 Rowe 1995: 1, see also 7, 14; cf. Saunders 1992: 466; Cooper 1999b: 165; Schofield 1999: 38; Ricken 2008: 233–234; Seeck 2012: 99–103. 219 See Schofield 1999: 33, 38; Rowe 2000: 237–8 with n. 10; Seeck 2012: 10. 220 Pl. Plt. 279b–283b, 281a, 285d, 286b, 305e, 308d–e, 309b, 309e, 310e–311c; cf. Lane 1998: 46–61, 163–73; Ricken 2008: 148–154, 217–218; Seeck 2012: 78–88. 221 See Kahn 2013: 228; Larivée 2018: 13, 15–19, 29–30. 222 Cp. Tiersch 2018: 61. 223 Cp. Skemp 1952: 13–17; Brandwood 1992: 90–120, esp. 106, 109, 113–114; Atack 2018: 511–516, esp. 512–513.

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abiding monarchical rule as the best of all existing constitutions. However, he not only underlines the distinction between kingship and tyranny, but declares that both constitutions are imitations. While lawless tyranny is a bad imitation, lawabiding kingship is included among the good imitations.224 Consequently, all treatises that use historical autocratic rulers as a paradigm of ideal rulership inevitably reproduce just good or bad imitations (or both) of the genuine politikē technē (epistēmē).225 That is why Plato for his ideal statesman (ruler) and his special expertise uses the terms politikos, politikos anēr, alēthinos basileus, basilikos anēr, ontōs basileus, phronimos basileus, ontōs epistēmōn, ontōs basilikē, alēthōs politikē etc. and not simply basileus, monarchos or even tyrannos.226 Thirdly, if Plato really wished to elucidate all aspects of the kingly art, i.e. politikē/basilikē (technē), it would have required a more extensive dialogue, something like the Republic or the Laws.227 Even though the Statesman cannot be subsumed into the Mirror of Tyrants category, its polemic nature nonetheless demonstrates that its author was well aware of the influence of the genre and felt compelled to criticize it strongly.228 His urge to distance himself from this type of literature while simultaneously reiterating some of the fundamental ideas of the Gorgias and the Republic, indicates that Plato was also conscious that by posing the question of the reeducation of tyrannical man and projecting a positive image of the idealised autocratic ruler (philosopher-king) as a showcase for his own political principles, he contributed to the emergence of the Mirror of Tyrants as a genre. 1.7. Tyrannical Man, the Demagogue and the Populist Ascertaining the relevance of Greek political thought for understanding contemporary political phenomena is always difficult and at times a thankless task. The reason is quite simple: due to differences in the social and political structure and in historical experience, it is far easier to draw the wrong rather than the right conclusions.229 Thus the purpose of this analysis of Plato’s assessment of democracy is not to convince anyone that it is correct, or that it necessarily should apply to modern representative democracy. As has already been pointed out, the main objective is to show that his critique is founded on an intimate knowledge of 224 Pl. Plt. 291d–e 301a–c, 302b–e (mimeomai, mimēma, epistēmē-doxa), 303c (eidōlon, mimētēs); cf. Rowe 1995: 236; Id. 2000: 44; Id. 2018: 324–325; Ricken 2008: 181–183, 187, 192–195, 203, 208–209, 245–246, 252; Seeck 2012: 124–125, 131–133, 136–139; Kahn 2013: 229–231. 225 See also Rep. 520b–d, 586b–e, 587b–e (eidōlon), 598b–d (mimēsis-alētheia, mimēsis-epistēmē); cf. Saunders 1992: 466–467; Rowe 1995: 236; Cooper 1999b: 179–180; Luraghi 2013b: 142. 226 Pl. Plt. 258b, 259b, 259d, 276e–277a, 292d, 297e, 300c–e, 301b–d, 305a, 305d, 308d; esp. 292d, 301b; cf. Parker 1998: 164–166; Seeck 2012: 9, 16–17, 25–26, 29–30, 77, 113–114, 130–134, 142–143. 227 See also Schofield 1999: 33–35. 228 Contra Larivée 2018: 32. 229 See, e.g., Lane 2001: 97–132.

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Athenian democratic ideology. Whether and to what extent his conclusions are justified is ultimately left to the reader to determine. This said, Plato’s analysis of the relationship between democracy and the emergence of ruthless, power-hungry individuals could help towards a better understanding of a political phenomenon which is on the rise even in some of the most stable and prosperous democracies of our age – populism.230 As shown by Moses Finley, the demagogues – as leaders of the people in the neutral sense of the word – were a structural and indispensable building block of the Athenian political system.231 So it is hardly surprising that the concept of the demagoguetyrant, as has been pointed out, represents one of the core elements of Plato’s model of the transformation of democratic into tyrannical man in Book 8 of the Republic.232 According to this concept, one of the central characteristics of democracy is the tendency of the people to be led by a class of men, also referred to as drones, whose influence is based on eloquence and the power of persuasion. These leaders of the people falsely accuse the wealthy of plotting against the masses and deprive them of their wealth, of which a smaller part is distributed to the demos, while keeping the lion’s share for themselves.233 This provokes internal disturbance and division, which causes the misguided people to select one among the drones as their champion and protector. He controls a docile mob and stirs up civil war against the wealthy by bringing false charges, banishing some and killing others, while hinting at the abolition of debts and redistribution of land. In this way the leader of the people is transformed from a democratic into a tyrannical man – from man to wolf.234 Despite being strongly Athenocentric and generalised, this model exhibits some characteristics of the modus operandi typical of so many populists – demagoguery in the form of spreading anti-elitist resentment, while simultaneously presenting oneself as the protector of the common people and their interests. It is a well known fact that demagogues use fear as a driving factor to get people to behave in a way they might otherwise abhor. It is usually assumed that the main reason for this politics of fear is to elicit a powerful emotional response that can override reason and prevent a critical assessment of the political circumstances. Yet, this is only one part of the equation; the other is that this politics of fear simultaneously postulates (tacitly or expressly) egotism as the prime mover of political action. In this way the people believe that they act rationally when they are actually behaving pseudo-rationally or at best partially rationally. Self-interested egotism is unquestionably one of the cardinal principles of politics, but certainly not the only one. If one of the best-known definitions of 230 I would like to thank Kai Trampedach for pointing me towards this similarity. 231 See Finley 1962: 19; see also Mann 2007: 16–32, esp. 21–23, 26–30. For the origins and different usage of the notion demagogue see Finley 1962: 4–5; Connor 1971: 109–119; Zoepffel 1974:75–88. 232 For the concept of the demagogue-tyrant see chapter II.1.5. Pericles, Polis Tyrannos and the Patron-Tyrant Concept. 233 Pl. Rep. 564b–565c; see also Aristoph. Vesp. 1101–1121; Eur. Suppl. 410–425. 234 Pl. Rep. 565c–566d.

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politics is the art of the possible, another fundamental principle is compromise. However, by means of the politics of fear the demagogue establishes the most malignant kind of political egotism. This understanding of self-interest is based on the premise that all political relations between opponents are ultimately a zerosum game. Thus, though compromise is a basic principle of political life, the logic that whenever one side gains another must lose inevitably results in its being suppressed or even eliminated in favour of a black and white pseudo-reality. By claiming that the opponents (whoever they may be) already act with ruthless selfishness and shamelessly exploit the naivety and trust of the people, the demagogue convinces the masses that they have no choice other than to behave with equal egotism. The people tend to fall victim to this crude but efficient method because the demand to act egotistically is directly linked to something which is usually perceived as its exact opposite – the common good. Thus, in the eyes of the people, they and the demagogue act egotistically only out of necessity and for the higher good. Consequently, in reality their behaviour is not morally reprehensible, that is, ruthless selfishness becomes a value which is not a priori morally repugnant, but normal and under some conditions even desirable. As a result the people show a remarkable degree of tolerance to the transgressions of the demagogue. Since egotism is perceived as the true driving force of political action, the demagogue’s insolent agitation is not seen as a sign of his bad character, but rather as a proof of his loyalty to the common cause. He is only “revealing” the true nature of politics and current political circumstances, while other politicians and members of the elite for various reasons (primarily personal, such as gain, gutlessness, lust for power, etc.) continue to “deliberately deceive” the people. Even a short glance at Thucydides’ Mytilenian Debate illustrates how effectively demagogic agitation imposes egotism, zero-sum thinking, necessity and fear as the driving factors of politics. One line of argument of the infamous demagogue Cleon is that the Athenians are too naive and trustful. They erroneously assume that their allies are loyal because they value the goodwill (eunoia) of Athens, not because they fear its strength (ischys). Given that the allies are loyal not on higher moral grounds but solely out of self-interest and fear, the Athenians must act on the same basis. If not, they will lose their tyrannical empire (tyrannida echete tēn archēn) and bear all the consequences of their previous domination. This reasoning, together with the claim that even if the Athenians were kind to their own detriment (blaptomenoi autoi) the allies will feel no gratitude (charizēsthe), means nothing other than that Athenians cannot cease to act according to zero-sum logic and are forced to continue to oppress the allies to their own advantage. The Athenians also need to bear in mind that the Mytilenians have with the worst intentions abused their trust. This cannot be tolerated, not only because the Mytilenians are incorrigible, but also because other allies will inevitably follow their example.235 Cleon’s other line of argument is 235 Thuc. 3.37.1–2, 39.2–40.1, 3–5; 4.21.3 (anēr dēmagōgos); see also Aristoph. Equ. 1111– 1114; cf. de Romilly 1963: 160–161.

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that the demand of some Athenian politicians to spare Mytilene is motivated by gain and vanity, not out of concern for the common good.236 The fearsome efficiency of these two lines of argument is best illustrated by the fact that even Cleon’s opponent is compelled to agree that the prime mover of politics is egotistical behaviour. Thus, Diodotus persuades the people to trust him and not put to death all male adult citizens of Mytilene and enslave the women and children, by arguing solely from expediency, urging that they deliberately neglect all other traditional arguments (justice, humanity, gratitude, revenge etc.).237 The centrepiece of Aristophanes’ Knights is the rivalry of two demagogues – the Paphlagon (Cleon) and the sausage-seller. Each strives to convince the demos that he is the most trustworthy leader of the people because he will fulfil even the basest, thus most egotistical, desires of the demos (food, material gain, absolute power etc.),238 while the other is actually a self-serving politician who acts only in his own interests.239 The logical consequence of equating loyalty with the fulfilment of the most basic appetites and declaring that all participants in political life are motivated by self-interest (the only criterion being whether this is in alignment with the interest of the people) is to relativise the negative valuation of egotism. This in turn inevitably leads to a relativity of moral values. Hence, it is completely understandable why the contest in loyalty between Paphlagon and the sausage-seller is portrayed by Aristophanes as a competition in hypocritical submissiveness, which takes the form of an agōn in selfishness and shamelessness.240 It is also noteworthy that the rivalry between Paphlagon and the sausageseller is depicted as a zero-sum game. The demagogue either enjoys the favour of the people and as a result a leading position on the political stage with all the attendant advantages, or finds himself in disfavour with the demos and becomes the victim of ill-treatment (verbal, judicial, financial etc.) by his more successful opponent.241 There can be no doubt that the playwright is caricaturing, but only to a certain degree; otherwise his audience (the people) would not understand the critique, which aims to instruct.242 So it is hardly surprising that the demos, which has partly given in to moral relativism, tends to underestimate or overlook the full extent of the moral corruption of its leaders. Consequently, there is no contradiction in Thucydides’ observation expressed in the last paragraph just before the Mytilene 236 Thuc. 3.37.4–5, 40.1. 237 Thuc. 3.42.1–5, 43.1–2, 44.1–2, 46.5 (bia), 47.5. 238 Aristoph. Equ. 46–52, 255, 642–682, 715–718, 744–745, 773–785, 797–800, 810–819, 871– 874, 881–886, 953–955 965–969, 1005–1010, 1065–1066, 1078–1079, 1085–1108, 1164– 1220, 1356–1361; Vesp. 515–520, 605–619, 655–712, 1359–1363. 239 Aristoph. Equ. 255–257, 280–283, 435–480, 725–745, 801–835, 864–889, 927–947, 956, 1030–1035, 1067–1072, 1211–1227; Vesp. 596, 907–916. 240 Aristoph. Equ. 276–277, 296–299, 324–480, 634–641, 683–690, 1206, 1232–1253; see also chapter II.3.2. Callicles and Shame. 241 Aristoph. Equ. 1–6, 40–70, 164–183, 195–210, 235–239, 255–263, 276–277, 353–374, 389– 396, 457–460, 475–489, 642–682, 694–713, 790–791, 823–835, 912–926, 943–959, 1105– 1108, 1125–1150, 1221–1225, 1248–1255, 1350–1353, 1359–1363, 1395–1408. 242 Cf. Mann 2007: 42–43, 94–96.

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Debate that Cleon was the most violent man in Athens, and at the time exercised by far the greatest influence over the people.243 Accordingly, the assumption that someone like Callicles could become popular among those he deeply despises should not be dismissed as a defamatory exaggeration. In this context it is worth noting that one of Aristophanes’ more telling criticisms of Cleon is that an important characteristic of the demagogue is a feeling of utter contempt for the demos.244 Plato’s Callicles reveals three essential parallels with the demagogic mindset. The first is that the doctrine of the right of the stronger is the most extreme form of zero-sum thinking, as it is freed from all constraints except the power relation. The logic of might is right means nothing other than that the stronger takes all. The extent to which Callicles’ worldview is formed and conditioned by simplistic zero-sum logic can be measured by the fact that either the many with their hypocritical morals will tyrannize and take advantage of the stronger, or the stronger, freed from all false beliefs and misconceptions, will rule over the weaker and exploit them. There is no middle ground and no place for compromise.245 The second correspondence is that the doctrine of the stronger is politics of fear in its purest form. The position that the all-decisive factor is power, implicitly or explicitly reduces political relations to violence, which in turn means that political action is ultimately defined by fear.246 The extent to which fear dominates Callicles’ frame of mind is revealed by the fact that in his opinion, both the weak and the strong are driven by it. The many (the weak) criticise injustice not so much out of moral considerations as from fear of becoming its victims. Because of this they terrorize (ekphobein) the stronger by saying that having more is shameful and unjust.247 Even Callicles, the archetype of the stronger, wishes to become the most influential man in the city, not only out of lust for power; his other motive is to protect himself from the arbitrariness of the many, who like a tyrant can kill whomever they wish. Due to this he is even prepared to become genuinely like the Athenian demos in nature.248 Fear is also an important symptom and driving force of the demagogue-tyrant in the Republic. According to 243 Biaiotatos tōn politōn (Thuc. 3.36.6); orgē (Thuc. 3.36.2, 38.1, 42.1); ōmon kai mega (Thuc. 3.36.4, see also 3.82.1); timōria (Thuc. 3.38.1), oiktos (Thuc. 3.40.2–3); mē malakizomai (Thuc. 3.40.7); allokotos (Thuc. 3.49.4); threat of flogging (Aristoph. Equ. 65–69); charge of conspiracy / tyranny (Aristoph. Equ. 235–239, 255–263, 475–479, 628, 860–866; Vesp. 342– 345, 464–507, 953); language of violence/unrestrained appearance (Aristoph. Equ. 283–314, 694–711; 1014–1020; Vesp. 1032–1043; Plut. Nic. 8.3), threat of brute force / bia (Aristoph. Equ. 363); to destroy/to kill (Aristoph. Vesp. 403–419, 894–898); hormē (Arist. Ath. Pol. 28.3); see also Aristoph. Vesp. 240–244, 704–705, 993–998, 1284–1291; cf. de Romilly 1963: 157–158; Rhodes 1981: 352–353, esp. 353; Hornblower 1991: 418; Stein-Hölkeskamp 2000: 83–85; Price 2001: 216; Jordović 2005: 32–33. 244 Pl. Grg. 489c, 521a; Aristoph. Equ. 395–399, 712–722. 245 Pl. Grg. 483b–484c; see also Thuc. 5.86, 89, 92–95. 246 Thuc. 5.86–87, 91.2–93, 97, 101. 247 Pl. Grg. 483c; see also Rep. 344c (phoboumenoi), 358e–359b; Thuc. 3.42.5. 248 Pl. Grg. 510a–511b, esp. 510b (phobein); see also 479a, 522e, 525b; cf. chapter II.2.7. Polus and Emulating the Happy Tyrant.

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Plato, when a city gets bad cupbearers for its leaders and so gets drunk on the unmixed wine of freedom, then the same leaders have to be very pliable and behave as willing slaves, otherwise they will be punished as oligarchs. As unrestrained freedom turns everything upside down in the public sphere (rulers behave as subjects while subjects behave as rulers) it also brings anarchy into the private realm, which is why the father fears his son and the teacher his students.249 This is obviously an allusion to Thucydides’ controversial claim that after Pericles’ death, all the leaders of the demos (Cleon, Hyperbolus, Nicias, Alcibiades etc.) were not leading the people, but vice versa: “because each was struggling to be first himself, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the people.”250 It is therefore only consistent with Plato’s line of argument that in Book 9 of the Republic he repeatedly emphasises that a tyrannical city and a tyrannical man are full of fear.251 A logical outcome of the first two concurrences is that Callicles shares with the demagogue a third essential disposition: the conviction that to act egotistically in the same manner as others is an unavoidable necessity, which must be internalised if one is to avoid the role of the victim. The shared tendency of the demagogues and advocates of the right of the stronger to perceive and explain politics through the prism of egotism, zero-sum logic, fear and necessity is one of the main reasons why their worldview thrives in times of war and deep political and social crisis, as such times are fertile ground for such reasoning. These concurrences between Callicles and the demagogue are important for yet another reason. The demagogue lies shamelessly by definition. However, as pointed out by Hannah Arendt, the self-deceived liar who proves to be in the same boat as his victims will appear vastly superior in trustworthiness to the coldblooded liar. The reason for this is: “Only self-deception is likely to create a semblance of truthfulness, and in a debate about facts the only persuasive factor that sometimes has a chance to prevail against pleasure, fear, and profit is personal appearance.“252 Thus, even an individual who on the surface feels and expresses profound aversion towards a specific political order can nonetheless seduce its supporters, because he has unconsciously internalized the fundamental values of this same political system, albeit in a distorted form. According to Plato, as has been shown, this is exactly what happened to Callicles. Plato’s critique of democracy could prove to be beneficial for a better understanding of populism in one more way. His analysis is founded on two valuable insights. One is that the seeds of failure of a political system are sown in its success (excesses). Accordingly, the ultimate cause of the breakdown of a 249 Pl. Rep. 562c–563a; see also Thuc. 2.65.9–11; cf. chapter II.2.6. Plato and the Destructive Nature of the Concept of Freedom to Do What One Pleases. 250 Thuc. 2.65.9–11, esp. 10 (trans. S. Hornblower): “ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρῶτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι”; cp. Connor 1971: 87–150; contra Hornblower 1991: 346–348; Mann 2007: 15–16, 23–24, 75–96; see also p. 17, 28. 251 Pl. Rep. 578a, 579b, 579e. 252 Arendt 2006: 258.

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constitution is not its obviously dysfunctional element, or the power-hungry and unscrupulous individual, but its entire structure (socio-political and ideological).253 In other words, the demagogue-tyrant is not the primary cause of the collapse of democracy, but rather a consequence of its even more deep-seated problems, which he merely brings to a climax. The root cause of the rise of the tyrannical man lies in democracy’s exaggerated worship of its highest values, in particular freedom.254 The other insight is that if we wish to defeat a political enemy, we have to understand him and even be prepared to learn from him, an observation which is manifest in the Plato’s unspoken willingness to critically engage with and invert many democratic concepts in order to give shape to his own political theory.255 By contrast, populists foster an over-simplification of political relations by sowing division and exploiting discord in political life. A key instrument here is defamation of one’s adversaries as the primary cause of current political troubles. In this way, a friend-enemy distinction is vigorously promoted at political level, to which the populist’s supporters as well as his strongest opponents tend to fall victim. In consequence, the opposing parties show a widespread tendency not only to accuse one another in public, but actually to believe that the other is solely responsible for all existing problems. For these reasons, intellectual engagement with Plato’s way of reasoning might be instructive if we are to avoid a black-and-white mindset in evaluating modern populism. Thus, some might say paradoxically, even those who completely disagree with Plato’s critique of democracy can still learn from it.256 1.8. Summary The examination of Thrasymachus’, Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ views in Book 1 and the beginning of Book 2 of the Republic leads to several conclusions. Firstly, Thrasymachus’ arguments, again, simply encapsulate and round off what Gorgias treats at greater length and depth. Nonetheless, things are not so simple. There are important similarities existing between Thrasymachus and Callicles and which cannot be considered as coincidence or a dramatic effect. However, a closer inspection shows that Thrasymachus does not carry his argument consistently to the end as Callicles does. He never mentions an essentially new definition of justice and never calls upon the nomos-physis antithesis. Unlike Callicles, who criticises the laws and justice as helping only the weak, Thrasymachus claims that 253 Pl. Rep. 544d–e. Malcolm Schofield (2006: 115) notes: “Here we simply need to recall the point that Plato, like Tocqueville, is interested as much (if not more) in the whole style of life and scheme of values in a social and political system as in its arrangements for government.”; see also Lane 2001: 132–134. 254 Pl. Rep. 564a. 255 For how antidemocratic thought in Athens drew on democratic theory and practice see Jordović – Walter 2018a. 256 Cp. Jordović – Walter 2018b: 31–33.

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justice benefits only the stronger. Moreover, Thrasymachus has a lot more in common with Polus than with Callicles, as e.g. both found their argument on the dokein-einai or doxa-alētheia dichotomy. Plato chose to show Thrasymachus as sharing similarities with Callicles, Polus and even Gorgias, in order to present in the Republic in condensed form the questions examined in depth in Gorgias. In this way, it is once again confirmed that a connection exists between Gorgias, Polus and Callicles, or rather that the doctrine of might as right has evolved from the views put forward in the first two parts of Gorgias. In addition, Plato avoids linking the standpoints he attacks in the Republic with any specific person. The second conclusion is that the discussion between Socrates and Thrasymachus on the subject of ʽthe best and most perfectly unjust polisʼ recalls Pericles’ view of Athens in his last speech and Thucydides’ interpretation of the causes of Athens’ downfall. It comes as no surprise that Plato takes quite the opposite view. The citizens in the unjust polis had been partially corrupted even while it was still powerful. Besides, the unjust polis corrupted the citizens, not the other way round. If we apply this view to Athens, it follows that its demise began even under Pericles, which is just as depicted in Gorgias. The third conclusion is that the similarities between the Gorgias and the Republic are not limited to Thrasymachus, they may also be seen in Glaucon and Adeimantus. Their speeches complement Thrasymachus’ earlier theory and it becomes evident that neither Glaucon nor Adeimantus are speaking on their own or Thrasymachus’ behalf. In this way, their role of advocati diaboli makes it possible to establish a connection between Thrasymachus’ theories and the degradation of constitutions in Book 8, and thereby also between Gorgias and the appearance of tyrannical man in the Republic. Consequently, Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ speeches contain many of the ideas of Polus and Callicles. The fourth conclusion is that Plato’s inquiry into the nature of the philosopherking represents the ideal union of bios praktikos and bios theōrētikos, standing in absolute counterpoint to the tyrannical man, Callicles. The fact that for the true philosopher, as well as the tyrannical man, the question of a proper education arises in the context of the devastating influence of the democratic ideology and the subordinate role of the sophists, indicates that the question of how to reeducate the tyrannical man leads to inquiry as to how to educate the philosopherking. By subsuming the naturally gifted person, the right education, true knowledge of politics and all the characteristics of the true philosopher under the concept of the philosopher-king, Plato was the first to use a positive image of the (idealised) autocratic ruler as a projection of his own political views and principles. In this way he influenced the emergence of Isocrates’ and Xenophon’s treatises, whose main addressee is the good autocratic ruler. These writings have all the characteristics of a literary genre, which is why the genre title Mirror of Tyrants is proposed for them. The brief analysis of the Statesman reveals substantial similarities to the Gorgias, the Republic and Thucydides. The quiet kind of man has much in common with the traditional apragmōn, while the courageous type displays notable features of the democratic (tyrannical) man. Their image as two opposite

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poles in the stasis resembles to some extent Thucydides’ description of two patterns of behaviour in the Pathology of War. At the same time it can be noticed that the true statesman manifests key characteristics of Socrates in the Gorgias and the philosopher-king in the Republic. Although the Statesman shows some important characteristics of the Mirror of Tyrants, it cannot be subsumed into this genre. However, the similarities, the focus on methodological issues, the polemic nature and the reiteration of some of the fundamental concepts of both Gorgias and the Republic suggest that Plato felt it necessary to criticize the Mirror of Tyrants, not only because he considered these writings to be influential, but also because he wished to make a clear distinction between this type of literature and his concept of the tyrannical man and the philosopher king. The seventh and last conclusion is that there are significant correspondences between Callicles and the negative picture of the demagogue in Thucydides and Aristophanes, which they created while heavily influenced by Cleon’s political activity. Because of this, and the methodological approach of Plato’s critique of democracy, the model of the tyrannical man (demagogue-tyrant) could contribute to a better understanding of modern populism.

IV. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS Plato seems to have been perfectly familiar with contemporary authors. There are numerous intertextual links to the writers who are considered crucial to our understanding of Athenian democratic ideology, and who mostly take a favourable view of democratic thinking. The importance of such links becomes even greater when we find that they occur in key places in the Gorgias and coincide with key places in other sources, Thucydides, Herodotus and Aristophanes in particular. This, of course, is hardly new. It has already been established that Plato’s critique of rhetoric and the democratic decision-making process inclines to Thucydides. What is new is that this study shows that Plato set himself a higher goal in writing the Gorgias: to lay out a fundamental critique of democratic ideology in the context of its connection to the Athenian archē. By linking democratic values and ideas such as archē, power, freedom, autarkeia, freedom to do as one pleases and pleonexia with the views of Socrates’ interlocutors who think in categories of power, Plato endeavours to show that democratic ideology is crucial to the emergence of personalities such as Callicles, who idealise tyranny and overtly champion the doctrine of the right of the stronger. But Plato does not stop there. He associates Gorgias, Polus and Callicles with certain generations of Athenian politicians and uses them to show how the might is right doctrine and a fascination with tyranny arose from the way of thinking imbued with democratic values from the time of the Pentekontaetia, thereby demonstrating that the roots of unscrupulous thinking in categories of power predate the Peloponnesian War and in fact go back to the golden age of the Athenian archē – the age of Pericles. Considering that the views of Gorgias, Polus and Callicles coincide with those of Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus in key respects, the Gorgias appears to provide a more detailed and less abstract picture of a key component of the successive degeneration of bad constitutions and related psychopathologies, as demonstrated by characters in the Republic – the transformation of democratic into tyrannical man. This illustrates the enormous effort that Plato put in penetrating all aspects of democratic ideology, suggesting that his line of argument that democratic ideology, with its glorification of power and freedom, is responsible for the appearance of individuals who are guided by the might is right precept, and who idealise tyranny, was much less influenced by prejudice and philosophical considerations than commonly thought. Tyrannical man is for Plato the direct result of the interaction of two sides of the same coin: the Athenian people as dēmos tyrannos, and Athens as polis tyrannos. This means, in effect, that in his view it is impossible to fully evaluate the Athenian democratic system without appreciating the role of the Athenian

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archē; for Plato they are Siamese twins, an opinion shared by Ps.-Xenophon, Aristophanes and Thucydides. Greek political thought produced not a single systematic work of sufficient breadth to be considered a statement of democratic political theory. At the same time numerous texts were published, which were critical of the rule of the people. The arguments in these writings were frequently at a very high theoretical level, even political utopias were designed. Since some of the authors such as Ps.Xenophon, Xenophon and Isocrates, are among the most important political thinkers of the age, while others, such as Plato and Aristotle, are counted among the most important theorists of mankind, one might be drawn to the misleading conclusion that the critics of democracy were intellectually superior to its supporters. However, Plato’s thorough understanding of democratic ideology and the abundance of intertextual links to fifth-century works reveal that he drew on democratic political theory and practice not only in criticising democracy, but also in advancing his own political theory. The fact that in doing so he revised and inverted many democratic concepts and values goes to show that while his monumental intellectual achievement was timeless, the same cannot be said for its foundations. This is a telling corroboration of the conclusion that by contributing to the development and complexity of Plato’s political thought, democratic ideology greatly, if inadvertently, influenced Greek political thought in general. Whether or not we agree with Plato’s criticism of democracy – the system of government widely believed to be worth striving for by all – Plato’s familiarity with the elements of Athenian democratic ideology makes his criticism still relevant. Today too, democracy is praised by its supporters, who point to its successes and extol freedom as its greatest achievement, while its critics claim that this very freedom leads to destructive individualism and that in the most powerful democracies there are discrepancies between the proclaimed ideals and the realities of power politics. Bearing the latter in mind, the question of whether Plato was a sympathiser of totalitarianism or not is actually the wrong question.1 The fact that the sophists and poets of the Gorgias and the Republic are denounced for educating young people in accordance with the ideas of the demos and that Socrates fails to win over Callicles shows that Plato believed that all the means available at the time failed to prevent the emergence of young people whose ideal was tyranny. The threat that Plato sees as coming from democracy is the greatest threat of all: a total loss of freedom. That indoctrination with democratic ideology leads to that is best confirmed by his opinion that tyrannical (democratic) man, despite possessing absolute power, ends up doing precisely what he least wants to. Indoctrination is so deep that the tyrannical man is in fact completely unaware of it, and that he has lost the use of his free will. Because of this and the maxim that radical times require radical measures, in the Republic Plato proposes a solution how to avoid the worst – the total loss of freedom. Whether the proposed solution is appropriate

1

Cp. Schofield 2006: 194–240.

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or not is another question.2 What is certain, however, is that the issue of the complete loss of freedom, or absolute non-freedom, is discussed for the first time in the Gorgias. Thus, not only did Athenian democracy develop the concept of absolute freedom, but it also strongly influenced the emergence of the idea of absolute non-freedom. There is yet another reason for Plato’s radical break with the traditional understanding of politics. The example of Callicles illustrates that, according to Plato, within the framework of traditional politics it is impossible not only to reeducate tyrannical man, but to pursue politics as they ought to be pursued. Since the political is completely “contaminated” by the democratic discourse, the only solution is to discard the conventional conception of the politics, and to develop a fundamentally new concept based on philosophy. Plato’s redefinition of notions and concepts such as absolute self-sufficiency (enkrateia), patron-tyrant (demagogue-tyrant), politics (philosophy), politician (philosopher-king), political activity (to mind his own business / to do his own work / to asign what is befitting) is a clear sign of the democratic tendency to monopolize the terminology of politics.3 In other words, Plato acknowledges that democratic ideology has succeeded in assuming the position of a hegemonic discourse,4 which is why his reaction to democracy and traditional political thought should also be judged from this point of view. Another important finding is that the Gorgias dialogue gave rise to the appearance of the Mirror of Tyrants genre in ancient Greece. The Gorgias and the Republic do not belong to this influential literary genre, but this study shows that Plato contributed to its appearance. The subject matter in these dialogues is the education of young members of the elite or aristocracy. Plato was neither the first nor the only to address this topic. From the time of Aristophanes, Euripides and Thucydides, authors pointed to the destructive behaviour of the upper-class youth and the need for their education, which has often been misinterpreted in scholarly circles as evidencing a generation gap in late fifth-century Athens.5 What distinguishes Plato from other authors is that he not only raised the issue of the young aristocrats’ education but also analysed it thoroughly, attaching much greater importance to it than anyone did before. By frequent analogous application of different dichotomies Plato equated the problem of the re-education of tyrannical man (the tyrant) with the instruction of young and ambitious members of the elite. Moreover, he was the first to use a positive image of the idealized autocratic ruler, the philosopher-king, as a projection of his own political views. In this way he stimulated the emergence of Mirror of Tyrants treatises. Plato closely associates Gorgias, Polus and Thrasymachus with democratic ideas and twice explicitly denounces the sophists as mere intermediaries of democratic knowledge. As he is one of the harshest critics of the sophist movement, 2 3 4 5

Cp. Trampedach 1994: 170–171, 236. See Ober 1994b: 165; Jordović – Walter 2018b: 25–26. See, for example, Jordović 2014: 135–142; Jordović – Walter 2018b: 25–29, 34–35. See Jordović 2008.

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and someone who himself did not hesitate to draw on democratic ideology (although in a different manner), this reproach should not be taken lightly. Hence this study proposes that examination of the sophist movement needs at least partially to be refocused. The question of the influence of democratic praxis and theory on the development of sophistic teachings deserves to step out of the shadow of the old question of the “destructive” influence of the sophists on Greek society (democracy). The last but not less important finding of this study concerns Plato’s claim that a person like Callicles is the product of a process that has been going on for decades and generations: such claim clearly contradicts the popular academic theory which posits a generation gap in Athens in the last third of the fifth-century.6

6

See Forrest 1975: 37–52; contra Jordović 2008. Kurt Raaflaub (2018b: 222–232) gives a new and interesting interpretation which presupposes a rebellion of young aristocrats against democratic egalitarianism and pressure to conform.

V. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS References to ancient texts follow the conventions of Simon Hornblower – Antony Spawforth – Esther Eidinow (eds.), The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Oxford 42012 and H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edn., rev. H. Stuart Jones (1925–40); Suppl. by E. A. Barber and others (1968). Unless otherwise indicated, standard reference works and journals are abbreviated following the conventions of L’Année Philologique and S. Hornblower – A. Spawforth – Esther Eidinow (eds.), The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Oxford 42012. G.-P. HGIÜ PMLA P&P Ph&Rh PTh WPQ ZÖR

B. Gentili – C. Prato, Poetarum Elegiacorum Testimonia et Fragmenta, Pars Prior, Leipzig 1979 K. Brodersen – W. Günter – H. Schmitt, Historische griechische Inschriften in Übersetzung, Bd. 1: Die archaische und klassische Zeit, Darmstadt 1992 Publications of the Modern Language Association of America Past and Present Philosophy & Rhetoric Political Theory The Western Political Quarterly Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht

2. WORKS CITED AALDERS, G. J. D. 1972: ‘Political thought and political programs in the Platonic Epistles’, in: K. v. Fritz (ed.), Pseudepigraphea I, Entretiens sur L’Antiquité classique 18, VandœuvresGeneva, 145–187. ADAM, J. 1938: The Republic of Plato: Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices, Vol. I, Cambridge. ADAM, J. 1902: The Republic of Plato, Vol. II, Cambridge. ADKINS, A. W. H. 1960: Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values, Chicago/London. ADKINS, A. W. H. 1976: ‘Polupragmosune and “Minding One’s Own Business”: A Study in Greek Social and Political Values’, CPh71, 301–327. ALBERT, K. 1992: ‘Zum Philosophiebegriff Platons’, Gymnasium 99, 101–118. ALGRA, K. A. 1996: ‘Observations on Plato’s Thrasymachos: The Case for Pleonexia’, in: K. A. Algra – P. W. van der Horst – D. T. Runia (eds.), Polyhistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy, Leiden, 41–59. ALKER, JR., H. R. 1988: ‘The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue’, AJPSR 82, 805– 820. ALLEN, R. E. 1984: The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I: Euthyphro, Apology,ꞏCrito, Gorgias, ꞏMenexenus, Translated with Analysis by R. E. Allen, New Haven/London.

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VI. INDEX 1. INDEX LOCORUM A. LITERARY TEXTS

593–594: 154n.89 652: 156n.101

AELIANUS [Ael.] Varia Historia [VH.] 14.17: 54n.34

Supplices [Suppl.] 438–442: 156n.101 ANDOCIDES [And.]

AESCHINES [Aeschin.] Against Timarchus 1.173 On the Embassy 2.176: 17n.40, 151n.63 Against Ctesiphon 3.233: 35n.76 3.235: 16n.30 3.257: 131n.341 AESCHYLUS [Aesch.] Agamemnon [Ag.] 939: 75n.150

On the Mysteries 1.14–15: 53n.19 On his Return 2.11: 52n.13 ANTIPHON [Antiph.] DK 87 B44a: 126n.308 ANON. IAMBLICHUS [Anon. Iambl.] DK 89 6.4: 34n.66 DK 89 6.p.100.5.1.ff: 126n.309 ARCHILOCHUS [Archil.] 19 West: 74n.138, 152n.79 23 West: 75n.150, 152n.79

Eumenides [Eum.] 852: 90n.65 ARISTOPHANES [Ar.] Persae [Pers.] 348–349: 45n.121 402–405: 67n.104 709–714: 74n.137, 78n.162 710: 75n.150 712: 75n.150 Prometheus Vinctus [PV] 938–942: 60n.75 Septem contra Thebas [Sept.] 1–3: 156n.101

Acharnenses [Ach.] 61–63: 83n.22 143: 90n.64 528–531: 96n.116 656–658: 78n.164 716: 109n.207 Aves [Av.] 753–768: 126n.306 1278–1279: 90n.64 1316: 90n.64

Ecclesiazusae [Eccl.] 214–240: 72n.126, 78n.164 1131–1133: 16n.31 Equites [Eq.] 1–6: 176n.241 40–46: 156n.102 40–67: 156n.104 40–70: 176n.241 45–59: 35n.73 46–52: 176n.238 58–72: 35n.72 65–69: 177n.243 76: 35n.75 150–184: 72n.126, 78n.164 164–183: 176n.241 171–173: 156n.105 173: 35n.75 180–181: 34n.69 180–222: 17n.40 188–194: 34n.69 190–193: 86n.48, 156n.104 194–195: 156n.105 195–210: 176n.241 200–203: 156n.105 213–220: 156n.104 217–220: 34n.69 225–240: 156n.105 235–239: 176n.241, 177n.243 250–253: 156n.105 255: 176n.238 255–257: 176n.239 255–264: 35n.72, 176n.241, 177n.243 258–260: 156n.103 258–263: 158n.110 262–434: 156n.105 266–272: 35n.73 269–272: 156n.102 273: 35n.74 273–487: 86n.47, 156n.104 274–312: 35n.72

210 275–277: 86n.45–46, 176n.240–271 278–279: 35n.75 280–283: 156n.103, 176n.239 283–314: 177n.243 296–299: 176n.240 297–298: 156n.103 324–325: 86n.45 324–480: 176n.240 336: 34n.69 344–374: 35n.72 351–352: 37n.79 353–363: 156n.103 353–374: 176n.241 363: 177n.243 384–385: 86n.46 389–396: 176n.241 391–396: 35n.72 395–396: 37n.79, 156n.102 395–399: 177n.243 397–399: 86n.46 409–410: 86n.45–46 423–428: 109n.207 435–439: 156n.103 435–480: 176n.239 442–481: 35n.72 457–460: 176n.241 465–467: 35n.75 475–479: 35n.75, 177n.243 475–489: 176n.241 565–580: 35n.75 624–682: 86n.47, 156n.104 628: 177n.243 634–641: 176n.240 642–682: 35n.73, 176n.238, 241 667–673: 35n.75 683–690: 176n.240 694–713: 35n.72, 176n.241, 177n.243 694–720: 86n.47, 156n.104 702: 35n.75 712–722: 37n.79, 177n.244 713–720: 156n.102 715–718: 35n.73, 156n.103, 176n.238 725–748: 35n.73, 176n.239 726: 97n.127 727: 90n.64 730–749: 86n.47, 156n.104 731–734: 35n.74

VI. Index 732–735: 90n.64, 97n.127 733–740: 34n.69 743–744: 35n.75 744–745: 176n.238 746–748: 90n.64, 97n.127 749–756: 37n.79 750–755: 36n.77 752–755: 156n.102 763–805: 35n.73 764–950: 86n.47, 156n.104 769: 35n.74 769–773: 90n.64, 97n.127 773: 35n.74 773–785: 176n.238 776: 156n.103 790–791: 90n.64, 97n.127, 176n.241 792: 35n.74 794–819: 35n.75 797–800: 176n.238 801–809: 156n.103 801–835: 176n.239 810–819: 45n.122, 176n.238 813–818: 42n.109, 44n.120 820: 35n.74, 90n.64, 97n.127 823–829: 35n.72 823–835: 176n.241 828–835: 156n.103 836–840: 37n.79 846: 35n.75 848: 35n.74 860–866: 177n.243 861: 35n.74 862–865: 35n.72 864–889: 176n.239 869: 35n.74 871–874: 176n.238 871–890: 35n.73 878–881: 35n.73 881–886: 156n.102, 176n.238 884–886: 45n.122 904–911: 35n.73 912–928: 176n.241 913–918: 35n.72 927–947: 176n.239 933: 35n.75 943–959: 176n.241 946: 35n.74 948–954: 34n.69

953–955: 176n.238 956: 176n.239 965–966: 35n.75 965–969: 176n.238 985–996: 35n.75 1005–1008: 35n.75, 176n.241 1005–1010: 37n.79, 86n.47, 156n.104, 176n.238 1014–1020: 177n.243 1017–1020: 35n.72 1017–1034: 35n.73 1025–1034: 156n.103 1030–1035: 176n.239 1034–1040: 35n.75, 45n.121 1058–1059: 35n.75 1065–1066: 176n.238 1067–1072: 176n.239 1078–1079: 176n.238 1085–1108: 176n.238 1086–1089: 35n.75, 99n.149 1100–1119: 35n.73 1111–1114: 39n.84, 175n.235 1111–1130: 36n.77, 156n.102 1111–1151: 17n.40, 36n.77 1114: 35n.76 1125–1130: 97n.128 1125–1150: 176n.241 1152–1159: 35n.75 1153–1253: 86n.47, 156n.104 1163–1164: 35n.74, 78n.164, 90n.64 1163–1193: 35n.73 1164–1220: 176n.238 1172: 35n.75 1199: 35n.74 1206: 86n.46, 176n.240 1207–1226: 35n.73 1211–1227: 176n.239 1215–1227: 156n.103 1221–1225: 176n.241 1224–1225: 37n.79 1232–1253: 176n.240 1240–1243: 109n.207 1242: 87n.55, 96n.125, 97n.126

211

VI. Index 1248–1255: 176n.241 1251–1252: 34n.69 1300–1315: 35n.75 1319: 35n.75 1321: 17n.40: 35n.74 1321–1328: 156n.102 1329–1330: 39n.84 1329–1334: 35n.75 1329–1355: 37n.78 1330: 35n.76 1330–1344: 97n.127 1333: 35n.76, 39n.84 1335: 35n.74 1339–1355: 17n.40, 156n.104 1340–1344: 35n.73–74, 90n.64, 97n.127, 129 1349: 156n.102 1350–1353: 176n.241 1356–1361: 176n.238 1359–1363: 176n.241 1395–1408: 176n.241 Lysistrata [Lys.] 491–492: 60n.76 545: 90n.64 Nubes [Nub.] 439–456: 60n.76 486: 125n.302 903: 128n.320 961–984: 109n.202 961–1023: 109n.203 991–995: 86n.41, 109n.202 1006–1007: 109n.204, 167n.175 1014–1023: 109n.202, 205 1020–1022: 109n.207 1023: 109n.207 1043–1079: 109n.205 1046–1052: 109n.205 1060–1074: 109n.206 1071–1082: 86n.42 1075–1084: 126n.307 1085: 109n.207 1187: 90n.64 1427–1431: 125n.306 1427–1446: 130n.335 Ranae [Ran.] 533–541: 26n.23 740: 97n.126

830–1471: 56n.48 937–952: 26n.23 937–969: 56n.48 948–952: 63n.90 967–970: 26n.23 1008–1012: 26n.23 1422–1432: 26n.23 1425–1426: 95n.112 1427–1433: 95n.113 Vespae [Vesp.] 97–98: 83n.22 240–244: 177n.243 342–345: 177n.243 403–419: 177n.243 464–507: 177n.243 474: 90n.64 515–520: 176n.238 517–520: 47n.139 548–630: 72n.126, 78n.164 596: 176n.239 605–619: 176n.238 650–651: 72n.126, 78n.164 655–712: 176n.238 665–679: 140n.10 704–705: 177n.243 894–898: 177n.243 907–916: 176n.239 953: 177n.243 993–998: 177n.243 1032–1043: 177n.243 1101–1121: 174n.233 1284–1291: 177n.243 1359–1363: 176n.238 Thesmophoriazusae [Thesm.] 541: 86n.44 Fr. (PCG) Banqueters 205: 109n.207 ARISTOTLE [Arist.] Athenaiōn politeia [Ath. Pol.] 23.3–4: 47n.139 23.3–24: 27n.25 24: 47n.139 28: 17n.40, 32n.51

28.1–4: 150n.60 28.2: 27n.25 28.3: 177n.243 29.3: 131n.341 29.4: 70n.118 33.2: 53n.23 34.1: 58n.65 34.3: 131n.341 35.4: 16n.30 41.2: 27n.25, 131n.341 Ethica Nicomachea [Eth. Nic.] Book 1 1100a5–33: 133n.355 Politica [Pol.] Book 2 1273b36–39: 131n.341 1274a5–7: 31n.42, 77n.158 1274a7: 35n.76 Book3 1281a40–1281b7: 33n.61 1282a15–17: 33n.61 1283b27–35: 33n.61 Book 5 1305a7–27: 40n.94 1305a22–28: 40n.95 1310a31–34: 60n.77 1310a32–34: 56n.54 1310a33–36: 72n.127 1310b11–16: 40n.94 1310b29–31: 40n.94–95 1311b30–35: 56n.49 1315a31–41: 40n.94 Book 6 1317a39–b14: 60n.77 1317b12: 60n.74 1319b27–30: 60n.77 1318b39–1319a2: 152n.79 Book 7 1324a25–29: 133n.358 1333b29–33 Rhetorica [Rh.] Book 2 1398a24: 54n.34 Fr. 891N2: 56n.54

212 ATHENAEUS [Ath.] Deipnosophistae 5.216c: 22n.7 5.217c–218e: 22n.7 5.220d: 54n.33 12.534e: 100n.154 BACCHYLIDES [Bacchyl.] 5.49–55: 74n.137 CRATINUS [Cratin.] Fr. (K.-A.) 73: 39n.89 114: 39n.89 118: 39n.89 171: 39n.89 258: 39n.89

VI. Index Against Androtion 22.30–32: 131n.341 22.47–56: 61n.85

14.4.3–4: 16n.33 14.5.5: 153n.82 14.32.2: 16n.33

Against Aristocrates 23.67: 61n.79 23.209: 31n.42, 35n.76, 77n.158

DIOGENES LAERTIUS [Diog. Laert.] 2.25: 54n.34 2.38–39: 17n.35 3.2: 15n.26 9.2.1–4: 132n.347 9.26.1–27.4: 132n.347

Against Timocrates 24.75–76: 61n.86 Against Aristogiton I 25.24–25: 61n.79 Against Aristogiton II 26.9: 61n.79

EUPOLIS [Eup.] Fr. (PCG) Demes 99: 53n.20 102: 96n.116

On the Trierarchic Crown 51.15: 61n.70 EURIPIDES [Eur.]

CRITIAS DK 88 B25: 128n.320 DEMOCRITUS [Democr.] DK 68 B 251: 78n.162 DEMOSTHENES [Dem.] Olynthiac I 1.1: 30n.38, 70n.116 Olynthiac III 3.30: 31n.42, 35n.76, 77n.158 Philippic III 9.3: 70n.118 On the Crown 18.77: 86n.44 18.299: 45n.121 Against Midias 21.123–124: 86n.44 21.170: 61n.79

Against Eubulides 57.1–2 165n.159 57.4–6 165n.159 57.24–25 165n.159 57.30 165n.159 57.32 165n.159 57.34 165n.159 57.36 165n.159 57.44 165n.159 57.46 165n.159 57.56 165n.159 57.69 165n.159 Against Theocrines 58.67: 53n.23 Against Neaera 59.88: 61n.79

Alcestis [Alc.] 653–654: 78n.162 Heraclidae [Heracl.] 61–62: 46n.132 191–201: 46n.132 243–245: 46n.132 284–287: 46n.132 954–957: 46n.132 Hippolytus [Hipp.] 193: 91n.69 Iphigenia Aulidensis [IA] 330: 60n.76 808–809: 91n.70

Exordia 44.1: 33n.61 45: 33n.61

Phoenissae [Phoen.] 358–359: 90n.65 506–507: 78n.162 531–554: 108n.195

DIODORUS SICULUS [Diod.] 12.53: 22n.7 13.49.1: 52n.13 13.100.1–5: 53n.24 13.101–102: 53n.24 13.103.2: 58n.65

Supplices [Supp.] 232–237: 150n.60 352–353: 29n.34 410–412: 33n.58 410–422: 34n.66 410–425: 174n.233 429–441: 34n.66 433–442: 33n.58

VI. Index Fr. (Nauk2) Andromeda 136: 103n.182 Antiope 183: 55n.47, 112n.236 184–188: 112n.237, 113n.238 185: 55n.47 185–186: 112n.236 188: 112n.236 193–194: 112n.237, 113n.238–239 196: 112n.237, 113n.238– 239 199: 55n.47 200: 112n.237, 113n.238 202: 112n.237, 113n.238 206: 113n.238 219: 112n.237, 113n.238 227: 112n.237, 113n.238 Archelaus 250: 56n.51, 78n.162 Bellerophon 286: 78n.162, 146n.38, 148n.53 GORGIAS [Gorg.] DK 82 A7: 132n.345 HERMIPPUS [Hermipp.] Fr. (PCG) Basket-Bearers 63: 47n.139, 140n.10 HERODOTUS [Hdt.] 1.13: 152n.79 1.16: 152n.79 1.26: 152n.79 1.29: 132n.348 1.29–30.1: 132n.347 1.29–31.1: 133n.358 1.29–33: 162n.146 1.29–34.1: 132n.347 1.30.1–3: 132n.351 1.30.2: 132n.348, 354 1.30.2–3: 73n.136

1.30.2–4: 74n.137, 78n.162 1.30.3–4: 133n.357 1.30.5: 134n.361 1.31.1: 132n.351 1.31.2–5: 133n.355 1.31.3–5: 134n.361 1.32: 132n.350, 133n.355, 134n.364 1.32–33: 74n.137, 78n.162 1.32.1: 132n.351, 134n.364 1.32.1–2: 73n.136, 132n.354 1.32.4–9: 134n.359 1.32.4–34.1: 132n.351 1.32.5–6: 133n.355 1.32.7–8: 134n.360 1.32.7–9: 134n.361 1.32.8–9: 47n.136 1.32.9: 133n.355, 134n.364 1.33: 134n.365, 167n.175 1.46.2: 101n.159 1.47–49: 132n.347 1.53–56.1: 134n.366 1.60.3: 167n.175 1.86: 162n.146 1.86–87.2: 73n.136 1.86–88: 132n.347 1.86.3–6: 133n.355, 134n.367, 135n.370 1.86.6: 132n.351 1.87.1–2: 134n.368 1.87.3–4: 134n.369 1.88–89: 162n.146 1.88–90.1: 135n.370 1.89.1: 134n.369 1.90.2–4: 134n.369 1.90.3: 101n.159 1.91: 135n.370 1.96.1–2: 103n.176 1.170.1–2: 29n.34 1.189: 58n.63 1.204.4: 58n.63 1.206–207: 58n.63 1.206–208: 162n.146 1.207–208: 135n.370 1.209.3–4: 58n.63 1.210: 58n.63 1.212–214: 135n.370 2.161.2: 74n.137, 78n.162 2.169.2: 101n.159 3.80–82: 143n.15 3.80.2: 61n.82

213 3.30.1: 61n.83 3.31.3–6: 61n.83 3.31.4: 61n.83 3.33: 61n.83 3.40–44: 73n.136 3.40–44.1: 74n.137, 78n.162 3.53.4: 103n.176 3.65.3: 125n.302 3.80.2–4: 61n.83 3.80.3: 61n.80, 73n.134 3.80.6: 33n.58 3.81.1–2: 32n.54 3.82.4–5: 40n.99 3.82.5: 41n.100 3.125: 73n.136 4.84: 99n.142 4.91.2: 99n.142, 103n.175 4.118: 99n.142 5.32: 103n.176 5.56.1: 39n.90 5.78: 143n.15 5.92.β3: 39n.90 5.97.2: 32n.54 6.131.2: 39n.90 7.5–18: 99n.143 7.8: 99n.142 7.8α: 99n.144 7.8α1: 105n.187 7.8γ: 99n.146 7.10η: 99n.142 7.11.1: 99n.148 7.11.1–2: 99n.142 7.11.2–3: 99n.147 7.16α2: 99n.145, 105n.187 7.18: 99n.145 7.35: 99n.142, 103n.175 7.52: 99n.142 7.104.4–5: 168n.187 7.139.3–6: 168n.187 7.187.2: 99n.142, 103n.175 7.141–144: 45n.121 8.35–38: 99n.142 8.38: 125n.302 8.61: 45n.121 8.83.1: 125n.302 8.108–113: 99n.142 8.109.3: 103n.175 8.111.2–3: 120n.282 8.111–112.1: 105n.188 8.112.1: 105n.188

214

VI. Index

HIPPIAS ELEUS DK 86 C1: 126n.309

Areopagiticus 7.15–16: 131n.341 7.20: 65n.95, 71n.121, 72n.126, 78n.167 7.20–22: 131n.341 7.26: 35n.76 7.31–35: 131n.341 7.56–61: 131n.341 7.62: 43n.110 7.64: 43n.110 7.67: 16n.30 7.70: 131n.341

HIPPOCRATES De vetere medicina [VM] 20: 26n.22

On the Peace 8.121: 90n.64 8.124–128: 32n.51 8.126–127: 150n.60

HESIOD [Hes.] Opera et Dies [Op.] 20–26: 75n.150 23: 75n.150 203–212: 120n.284 213–250: 120n.282 213–284: 120n.283 259: 128n.320

HOMER [Hom.] Iliad [Il.] 21.106–113: 120n.282 23.316–18: 96n.115 HYPERIDES [Hyp.] In Defence of Lycophron 1.14 ISOCRATES [Isoc.] To Nicocles 2.2–6: 163n.150 2.8: 163n.150 2.13: 163n.150 2.26: 75n.145 2.38: 75n.146 Nicocles or The Cyprians 3.1: 163n.150 3.13: 45n.121 3.17–21: 163n.150 3.59: 75n.145 Panegyricus 4.42: 47n.139 4.75–79: 17n.40 4.113: 16n.32

Euagoras 9.8: 163n.149 9.24–25: 163n.150 9.27: 75n.147 9.27–28: 163n.150 9.32: 75n.147 9.36: 75n.147 9.66: 163n.150 9.72: 163n.150 9.77–78: 75n.147 Panathenaicus 12.131: 65n.95, 71n.121, 72n.126, 78n.167 12.148: 131n.341

LYCOPHRON [Lycoph.] DK 83 A3: 153n.85 LYCURGUS [Lycurg.] Against Leocrates [Leoc.] 47: 45n.121 LYSIAS [Lys.] Funeral Oration 2.18: 29n.34 2.33: 29n.34 2.55: 29n.34 2.61–63: 29n.34 2.63: 42n.109, 150n.57 2.63–65: 17n.40, 151n.63 Against Eratosthenes 12: 153n.82 12.21–22: 16n.33 12.25: 17 n.40 12.30–31: 16n.33 12.40: 17 n.40 12.96–97: 16n.33 Against Agoratus 13.13–38: 53n.18

Against Sophists 13.8: 33n.61

On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nicias 18.4–6: 53n.18 18.8–11: 53n.21 18.9–10: 153n.82

Antidosis 15.230–236: 32n.51 15.270–276: 163n.149

On the Property of Aristophanes 19.47: 153n.82

On the team of horses 16.22–23: 86n.43

Defence against a Charge of subverting the Democracy 25.1–3: 61n.84 25.21–22: 17n.40 25.25–28: 17n.40 25.30–35: 61n.84 25.31–33: 61n.84 25.32: 43n.110

Against Callimachus 18.45–46: 17n.40 Against Lochites 20.10–11: 17n.40, 151n.63 20.11: 16n.30

VI. Index On the Scrutiny of Euandros 26.3: 167n.172 Against Ergocles 28.14: 43n.110 Against Nicomachus 30.28 Against the Subversion of the Ancestral Constitution of Athens 34: 131n.341 PINDAR [Pind.] Pythian [Pyth.] 2.89–97: 76n.152 3.82–89: 78n.162 PLATO [Pl.] Alcibiades I [Alc.] 127d: 102n.172 131c–d: 102n.172 132a: 102n.173 Apologia [Ap.] 17c–d: 110n.208 18b–d: 110n.209 19c–d: 17n.35 19b–20c: 110n.209 19c–20d: 110n.208 19d: 110n.208, 111n.227 21a: 131n.344, 134n.361 22a–c: 114n.247 22d–23a: 110n.208 23a–b: 134n.361 23d: 110n.209 23e–24a: 110n.208 24b: 90n.64, 118n.267 28a: 110n.208 28a–e: 110n.214 28b: 88n.59 28e: 134n.361 29a: 134n.361 29c–e: 118n.267 29c–30b: 118n.266 29c–30c: 119n.274

29d: 90n.64, 134n.361, 150n.57 29d–e: 88n.59 29d–31a: 111n.227 30a–b: 110n.208, 117n.261 30c–d: 58n.63, 134n.361 30c–31a: 110n.214 30e: 96n.115, 119n.268, 274, 159n.115, 166n.168 30e–31a: 110n.208 30e–31b: 118n.266 31a: 103n.181 31b: 134n.361 31d–32a: 118n.266 31c–32a: 119n.268, 274, 159n.115, 166n.168 32b: 57n.57, 58n.65 32c–d: 17n.35 32d: 134n.361 32d–33a: 117n.261 33a–b: 17n.35 33b: 111n.227 34e–35a: 169n.199 35a–b: 88n.59 36b: 119n.268, 274, 134n.361, 159n.115, 166n.168 36b–c: 111n.227 36c–d: 117n.261 37d: 119n.268, 274 37d–38a: 119n.269 37e–38b: 134n.361 38d–e: 110n.214 39a–b: 134n.361 40d: 79n.170 41: 135n.374 Charmides [Chrm.] 158a: 83n.22 159b: 166n.168 159b–160d: 166n.168 162a–b: 167n.175 164d–165a: 131n.340 Crito [Cri.] 45d–e: 169n.199 46c: 58n.63 46d–47d: 88n.59 49: 88n.59

215 Epistulae [Ep.] 7.324b–326b: 16n.29 7.324d–e: 142n.3 326b: 155n.96, 163n.147 328a: 155n.96 7.330c–331a: 65n.96, 73n.132 Euthydemus [Euthyd.] 305c–e: 27n.28, 156n.107 Gorgias [Grg.] 447a: 81n.1, 111n.227, 118n.264 447a–c: 110n.216 447c–448d: 132n.346 448c: 146n.43 448d: 161n.125 448d–452a: 23n.8 449a: 110n.216, 161n.123 449c–d: 161n.123 449c–461b: 23n.1, 81n.1 449d–e: 23n.2 450b: 24n.11 450b–d: 24n.15 451d: 24n.11, 15, 29n.32, 146n.43 452a: 161n.123 452d: 29n.32, 30n.40, 31n.41, 41n.100 452d–e: 24n.15, 30n.39, 146n.43 452e: 23n.3, 24n.12, 161n.123 455a: 23n.3 455a–b: 161n.123 455a–d: 113n.242 455d–e: 24n.13, 25n.16–17 455e: 118n.264 456a: 146n.43 456a–b: 23n.4 456a–c: 32n.52 456b–c: 24n.15, 32n.53, 34n.63, 161n.123 456b–d: 25n.17 456c–e: 23n.5 457a–b: 161n.123 457b–c: 25n.17 458c–d: 132n.346 459: 113n.242 459a–b: 32n.54, 161n.123 459a–c: 34n.63

216 459c–e: 64n.93, 147n.44 459d–460b: 23n.6 460b–c: 23n.7 461b: 85n.34, 146n.43 461b–c: 51n.2 461b–481b: 51n.1, 81n.1 461c: 52n.12 461d–e: 70n.118 462b–463e: 161n.124 462b–466a: 51n.3 462d–463d: 28n.29 463a: 169n.194 463d: 146n.43, 169n.197 463e: 52n.12, 170n.208 464a: 147n.44 464a–465a: 64n.93 464a–465d: 135n.373 464b: 26n.22, 169n.197 464b–c: 117n.258 464b–e: 161n.123 464b–465e: 161n.124 464d–e: 26n.22 464d–465d: 28n.29 465b–d: 117n.258, 161n.123 465c: 163n.151 466a: 28n.29, 52n.12 466a–b: 64n.93, 146n.42 466b: 77n.159, 146n.43 466b–c: 60n.73, 65n.94, 71n.125, 161n.125– 126 466b–e: 31n.41, 51n.4, 58n.63, 64n.93 466b–467b: 57n.60 466c–467a: 34n.67 466c–468e: 58n.64, 65n.96 466d–e: 161n.126 466d–467b: 147n.44, 46 466d–468e: 64n.93 466e–467a: 161n.124, 126 466e–467d: 51n.5 467a: 55n.39, 146n.42, 150n.58, 161n.125 467c: 161n.123 467c–468e: 153n.80 468a–b: 161n.126 468a–d: 51n.6 468c–d: 147n.44 468d–e: 57n.60, 161n.126 468d–469a: 78n.165 468d–469c: 161n.127

VI. Index 468d–470c: 161n.127 468e8: 74n.139, 76n.153 468e–469a: 88n.58 468e–469c: 55n.39, 65n.94, 150n.58 469a: 73n.136, 76n.153, 78n.165 469a1: 74n.139 469a4: 74n.139 469a11: 74n.139 469a–b: 55n.45, 146n.37– 38 469b–c: 88n.59, 161n.126 469b–e: 55n.44, 58n.67 469b–471d: 51n.7 469c: 55n.43, 78n.165, 161n.125 469c–e: 57n.60 469c–470b: 65n.96 469e: 42n.109, 146n.42 470a–b: 57n.60 470a–c: 161n.127 470a–d: 65n.94 470b–471d: 55n.44 470c: 167n.179–180 470d: 54n.36, 71n.125, 78n.165, 146n.38, 161n.125 470d–e: 55n.45, 73n.136, 132n.349 470d–471c: 146n.37 470d–471d: 54n.28, 55n.41, 78n.165, 161n.128 470e: 65n.95, 79n.169, 161n.125, 127 471: 146n.40 471a: 78n.165, 169n.195 471a–b: 55n.45 471a–d: 71n.125, 161n.125–126 471a–472a: 52n.15 471c: 78n.165, 146n.37–38 471c–472b: 88n.58 471c–472c: 146n.39 471d: 52n.15 471e: 64n.93, 147n.44 471e–472b: 118n.264 471e–472c: 58n.67 472a–b: 52n.15 472b: 64n.93, 147n.44

472c–d: 55n.41, 132n.350, 136n.377, 161n.127 472c–475e: 55n.44 472d: 78n.165, 132n.349, 161n.126–127 472d–e: 55n.45, 161n.128 472d–473a: 146n.40, 161n.126 472d–473e: 161n.128 472d–479e: 65n.95, 77n.161 473b–d: 161n.127 473c: 57n.60, 78n.165 473c7: 74n.139 473b–d: 73n.136 473b–e: 65n.96 473d–e: 55n.44–45, 161n.127 473e: 26n.20, 55n.39, 112n.232, 118n.264– 265, 169n.197 473e–474a: 57n.56 473e–484a: 22n.7 474b: 55n.44, 161n.126 474c: 161n.126 474c–475c: 100n.150 474c–475e: 51n.8 475d–e: 65n.96 476a–479e: 51n.9, 55n.44 477b–e: 153n.81 477d–478a: 65n.95 478a–d: 161n.123 478c–479a: 161n.128 478d: 55n.45 478e–479e: 65n.96, 73n.132 479a: 177n.248 479a–b: 161n.123 479b: 55n.45, 153n.81 479c: 55n.44 479c–d: 88n.59, 161n.126 479d: 161n.126 479d–e: 55n.39, 45, 161n.128 479e: 169n.195 479e–480e: 51n.10 480a–b: 153n.81 480a–c: 161n.123 480b: 42n.108 480c: 161n.126, 169n.199 480c–e: 88n.59 480e–481c: 142n.2

VI. Index 481b: 51n.11, 132n.346 481b–c: 81n.5, 89n.61, 127n.316, 142n.7 481c: 64n.93, 72n.128, 88n.60, 147n.44, 161n.127 481c–482b: 55n.39 481c–527e: 81n.1 481d: 83n.25, 102n.172, 161n.125 481d–e: 83n.22, 84n.30, 111n.223 481d–482: 161n.129 481d–482a: 89n.63, 161n.129 481d–482c: 81n.6 482: 170n.208 482b–c: 88n.59, 95n.114 482c: 104n.183, 142n.5 482c–d: 85n.34, 85n.38, 142n.7 482c–e: 85n.36, 146n.35 482c–483a: 81n.7, 89n.61 482d–e: 87n.56, 161n.126 482e: 110n.218 482e–483a: 104n.183 482e–483d: 153n.85 482e–484c: 145n.30 483a–484a: 110n.217 483a–c: 142n.12, 161n.126 483a–484b: 88n.62 483b: 161n.127 483b–c: 104n.183, 142n.10, 144n.16 483b–484c: 81n.8 483c: 142n.11, 143n.14, 153n.83, 177n.247 483c–484b: 121n.287 483c–484c: 177n.245 483d: 79n.169, 105n.185, 125n.306 483d–e: 99n.141 483d–484a: 142n.12 483e: 95n.113, 128n.321, 142n.4, 161n.126 484a–b: 125n.299 484a–c: 142n.12 484b–c: 111n.221 484c: 161n.125 484c–e: 96n.118 484c–486a: 161n.131 484c–486c: 110n.214

484c–486d: 81n.9, 96n.117, 112n.231, 129n.328 484c–487d: 55n.39 484d: 26n.20, 111n.222, 119n.273 484d–e: 169n.197 484e: 55n.47, 114n.247 484e–485e: 112n.236 485a–e: 81n.3 485a–486c: 155n.98 485b: 165n.159, 169n.195 485b–c: 142n.6, 161n.125, 167n.180 485b–e: 96n.118 485c: 170n.208 485c–d: 92n.85, 167n.173, 168n.190 485c–486d: 161n.131 485d: 111n.222, 119n.273 485d–e: 84n.29 485e: 55n.47, 97n.129, 114n.247, 170n.208 486a–b: 81n.4, 110n.214 486a–c: 55n.38, 129n.325, 161n.127 486a–d: 111n.222 486b–c: 55n.47 486c: 167n.179 486c–d: 76n.156, 96n.118 486d: 142n.3, 165n.159 486d–488b: 81n.3, 82n.10 486d–487e: 88n.60 486e–487b: 161n.127 487a–b: 85n.34, 85n.38, 86n.43, 87n.55, 96n.119 487b: 85n.37, 110n.218 487b–e: 161n.131 487c: 83n.23 487c–d: 161n.125, 131 487d: 86n.43, 96n.119, 129n.328 487e: 97n.129 487e–488a: 132n.350 487e–488b: 161n.127 488b–e: 142n.12 488d: 82n.11 489a: 87n.55, 161n.126 489b: 104n.183, 167n.179 489c: 177n.244 489d: 82n.11

217 489e: 142n.12, 161n.131 489e–490a: 168n.191 489e–491e: 143n.13 490a: 82n.12, 105n.185, 145n.30 490a–c: 143n.14, 153n.83 490a–491a: 105n.185 490b–c: 161n.123 490c: 167n.179 490e: 167n.170 491a–d: 168n.191 491a–492c: 82n.12 491c–d: 169n.195 491c–e: 143n.13 491d: 48n.144, 82n.11, 97n.129, 105n.185, 111n.226 491d–e: 48n.141, 96n.120– 121, 113n.243 491d–492b: 111n.219 491d–492c: 111n.226, 124n.294 491d–494c: 48n.144 491d–495a: 161n.130 491e: 78n.168, 167n.172, 175 491e–492a: 87n.56, 168n.191–192 491e–492c: 72n.126, 145n.30 491e–492e: 96n.123 492a: 98n.132 492a–b: 168n.190 492a–c: 142n.12 492a–d: 161n.127 492b: 167n.174 492b–c: 161n.128, 167n.172 492c: 72n.127, 72n.131, 78n.168, 96n.122, 132n.349, 167n.179, 168n.190, 192 492c–d: 86n.43 492d: 87n.55, 96n.119 492e: 48n.143–144, 132n.350 493a: 72n.129 493a–c: 96n.117, 153n.81 493b–494c: 96n.123 493c: 71n.125 493c–d: 167n.172 493c–494e: 161n.127

218 493d–494a: 48n.144 493e: 96n.120 493e–494a: 96n.125 494a–b: 88n.57, 96n.121, 98n.131 494a–d: 110n.218 494b–c: 48n.144 494b–e: 96n.125 494c: 111n.226, 161n.128 494c–e: 87n.55 494d: 85n.38, 104n.183, 142n.5 494d–e: 87n.55 494e: 96n.124, 111n.220, 170n.208 494e–495a: 71n.125, 78n.168, 96n.121 495a: 82n.11 495b: 104n.183 495c–e: 168n.193 495e: 161n.127 497a–b: 142n.9 497a–c: 88n.57 497b–c: 82n.13 497c: 72n.129 497d: 72n.126 497e: 168n.191 497e–498c: 169n.194 498e–499a: 169n.194 499a–501c: 72n.126 499b: 82n.13, 88n.57, 119n.275, 131n.339, 142n.9 499b–c: 167n.180 499b–500a: 153n.80 499c: 97n.129 499e: 161n.126 500b: 97n.129, 161n.123 500b–c: 132n.350, 161n.125 500b–d: 161n.127 500b–501a: 161n.124 500c: 55n.39, 81n.3, 84n.29, 112n.232, 136n.377, 161n.131 500c–d: 82n.11, 112n.231 500e–501b: 28n.29 501a: 161n.123 501b: 82n.11, 170n.208 501c: 88n.57, 142n.9 502b–d: 56n.49, 114n.247 502d–e: 34n.64, 113n.242

VI. Index 502d–503d: 161n.124 502e–503a: 82n.11, 113n.243 502e–503c: 117n.260 503a: 119n.276 503a–b: 28n.29 503b–c: 28n.31, 32n.50, 82n.12, 151n.67 503c: 118n.264, 161n.129 503e–504d: 71n.125 503e–505d: 167n.172 504a–505c: 72n.126 504: 161n.123 504d–505d: 65n.96 504b–505e: 73n.132 504d–e: 113n.243 505c–d: 82n.13, 88n.57, 119n.275, 131n.339, 142n.9 505d: 96n.117 505e–509e: 82n.14 506a–b: 142n.9 506b: 112n.231, 113n.241 506b–c: 82n.13, 88n.57 506b–d: 119n.275, 131n.339 506c–507c: 169n.195 506d–507c: 96n.117, 158n.112, 167n.172 507a: 82n.13, 119n.275, 131n.339, 142n.9 507a–b: 113n.243, 165n.159, 169n.195 507a–c: 55n.40 507b: 169n.194 507b–c: 55n.39 507b–e: 161n.127 507c: 78n.165, 132n.349 507c–509c: 119n.276 507d–508a: 112n.232, 169n.196 507e–508a: 161n.127 508a: 71n.125, 105n.186 508a–b: 96n.117, 167n.172 508b–c: 85n.34, 38 508b–509a: 55n.44, 161n.126 508c–d: 55n.38 508d: 169n.197 508d–e: 88n.59, 134n.361 509b: 55n.44 509b–c: 88n.59

509c–d: 55n.44 510: 97n.128 510a: 82n.13, 88n.57, 119n.275, 131n.339, 142n.9 510a–511b: 112n.231, 113n.242, 177n.248 510a–513d: 77n.158, 82n.15 510b: 177n.248 510b–c: 55n.39 510b–511a: 161n.125, 131 510b–511b: 31n.41, 161n.133 510d: 77n.159, 169n.197 511a: 72n.128, 77n.158 511a–b: 55n.38, 77n.159 511a–c: 55n.44 511b: 169n.197 511b–c: 161n.127 512d: 170n.208 512d–513e: 112n.231 512e: 82n.11, 161n.127 512e–513a: 169n.197 513a: 146n.42 513a–b: 77n.158, 84n.30, 111n.223 513a–c: 30n.38, 97n.128, 161n.131 513b: 26n.20, 83n.22 513b–c: 113n.242, 169n.197 513c: 55n.39, 97n.129 513c–d: 88n.57, 161n.131 513d–e: 82n.11 513d–514a: 169n.197 513e: 119n.270 513e–519d: 82n.16 514b: 169n.197 514d: 26n.22, 65n.96, 73n.132 514d–515b: 169n.197 515a: 55n.39, 83n.24 515c: 26n.20, 169n.197 515b–c: 113n.243, 119n.276 515c–d: 26n.21, 42n.108 515c–517c: 28n.31, 151n.67 515c–520b: 26n.18 515e: 41n.104, 84n.29, 169n.200

219

VI. Index 515e–516d: 88n.57 515e–516e: 96n.115 515e–517c: 32n.50 515e–519b: 26n.24 516a–c: 170n.204 516a–d: 26n.23 516b: 82n.13 516b–d: 119n.275, 131n.339 516b–e: 117n.260 516d: 42n.108, 142n.9, 169n.197 516d–517c: 30n.38 517a: 169n.197 517a–b: 84n.29 517a–c: 113n.242 517b–c: 26n.21, 113n.243, 119n.276, 169n.197 517b–518c: 28n.29 517e: 161n.123, 165n.159, 169n.195 517e–519c: 161n.124 518a: 26n.22 518a–b: 84n.30, 111n.223 518b: 26n.21, 169n.197 518c–519a: 45n.121 518d–519a: 140n.10 518e–519a: 42n.108, 84n.30, 111n.223, 113n.242 518e–519b: 28n.31, 32n.50, 151n.67 518e–519d: 26n.24 519a: 83n.25, 113n.243, 119n.276, 167n.179 519a–b: 81n.4, 82n.17, 129n.326 519b: 84n.29 519b–c: 26n.20, 169n.197 519c–520b: 26n.18 519d: 119n.275, 131n.339, 142n.5 519d–e: 82n.13 519e: 97n.129 520a–b: 26n.20, 113n.242 520a–c: 161n.124 520a–521b: 28n.29 520a–522e: 110n.214 520b: 111n.229 521a: 26n.22, 161n.123, 177n.244

521a–b: 132n.350, 142n.9, 170n.208 521a–522a: 161n.133 521a–522c: 117n.260, 119n.270, 169n.197 521a–522e: 65n.96, 73n.132 521b: 113n.242, 161n.131 521b–d: 55n.38 521b–522e: 110n.214 521c–522e: 82n.18, 129n.325 521d–e: 113n.244, 161n.124 521d: 169n.197 521d–522a: 113n.243, 119n.276, 135n.373, 169n.198 521d–522e: 112n.231, 161n.127 521e: 28n.29, 119n.274, 161n.123, 167n.180 521e–522e: 26n.22 522b: 76n.156 522c: 119n.274 522c–e: 55n.38, 88n.59 522c–523b: 55n.40, 42 522d–e: 111n.228, 169n.199 522e: 55n.44, 88n.57, 119n.275, 131n.339, 142n.9, 177n.248 523a: 79n.170 523a–b: 79n.170, 161n.127 523a–526d: 82n.19, 128n.320 523c–e: 153n.81 523c–525c: 155n.95 523e–524a: 135n.374 524b–526e: 110n.214 524c–525a: 153n.81 524e–525a: 79n.170, 161n.127 524e–525e: 55n.44 525a: 72n.130, 79n.170, 165n.159, 169n.195 525b: 177n.248 525b–d: 55n.40 525c–e: 134n.361 525d: 54n.29, 55n.37–38, 45, 72n.130, 79n.170,

119n.277, 161n.125, 127 525e: 79n.170, 161n.132 525e–526a: 111n.224 526a: 72n.130, 79n.170, 161n.126 526a–b: 27n.25, 55n.37, 113n.243, 119n.276, 154n.89 526b: 112n.232 526b–c: 165n.159, 169n.195 526c: 55n.39, 42, 112n.235, 119n.277, 161n.125, 131–132 526c–e: 79n.170, 110n.214 526d: 113n.242, 153n.81 526d–e: 134n.361, 161n.127 526e: 55n.38 527b: 120n.281, 154n.90, 161n.126 527b–d: 88n.59, 161n.131 527c: 55n.38 527c–d: 134n.361, 167n.175 527c–e: 88n.57, 119n.275, 131n.339 527d: 113n.243, 119n.276, 169n.197 527d–e: 120n.279 527e: 81n.1, 82n.20 Hippias maior [Hp. mai.] 281c–d: 131n.340 Leges [Leg.] Book 1 1. 624a–b: 135n.374 Book 2 661a–b: 73n.136 Book 3 679c: 76n.154 691c–d111n.224 698a–b: 27n.25 698a–701c: 28n.31 Book 4 712a: 155n.96 714b–715b: 144n.16 714c–d: 145n.31 719e–720e: 26n.22 722e–723a: 26n.22

220 Book 6 778d: 45n.121 Book 9 858e: 131n.342 Book 10 905e: 26n.22, 156n.101 905e–906a: 96n.115 Book 12 951a–c: 133n.358 Menexenus [Menex.] 234c–235c: 29n.32 235e: 27n.26, 96n.116 238b–239a: 151n.63 238c: 151n.66 241e–242a: 28n.31 243d: 17n.40, 151n.63 Meno [Men.] 91b–c: 27n.27 94: 112n.232 Phaedo [Phd.] 61d: 169n.199 63d–68a: 169n.199 68c–69c: 169n.199 114d–115a: 169n.199 116b–117c: 169n.199 70b–c: 110n.209 Phaedrus [Phdr.] 231a–234c: 91n.73 232a: 76n.154 233b: 76n.154 237a–241d: 91n.73 237e–238b: 94n.101 238a: 94n.102 238e: 94n.103 238e–239b: 94n.95 239a–b: 94n.101 239b: 94n.97 239d–240a: 94n.96 239c–d: 94n.98 240c: 94n.101 240c–d: 94n.102 240d: 94n.103 240e: 94n.101, 94n.102 240e–241c: 95n.111 241: 94n.102 241a: 94n.101 241a–b: 94n.99 241c–d: 94n.100 241d: 93n.94

VI. Index 242c–e: 91n.74 244a–245c: 91n.75 247c: 92n.80 248c–249c: 93n.88, 92 248c–249d: 93n.91 248e: 27n.28 249d–e: 91n.75, 93n.90 250b–d: 91n.76 250d–253c: 92n.77 251a–b: 92n.77 252e–253c: 92n.77 253d–e: 92n.81–82 253e–254e: 92n.83 254a–b: 92n.84 254a–d: 94n.103 254c: 92n.82 254e: 92n.86 255a: 93n.87 255a–b: 92n.78 255a–256b: 93n.87 255d–e: 92n.77 255d–256b: 93n.87–88 255e: 92n.78 256: 92n.79 256a: 92n.78 256b: 167n.172 256c: 92n.78 258b: 131n.342 266d–270b: 96n.116 267a–c: 27n.26, 96n.116 269a–270a: 27n.26, 96n.116 269e: 31n.43 278c: 131n.342 Politicus [Plt.] 258b: 173n.226 259a: 165n.160 259a–b: 165n.156, 172n.216 259b: 173n.226 259d: 173n.226 261d–e: 165n.160 264b: 165n.160 266e: 26n.22, 96n.115, 165n.160 267a–c: 172n.217 267b–d: 165n.160 268a–c: 165n.160 269c–d: 165n.158 275a–c: 165n.160 276b–277a: 172n.217

276e: 165n.160 276e–277a: 173n.226 279b–283b: 172n.220 281a: 172n.220 285d: 172n.220 286b: 172n.220 287b: 165n.160 291d–e: 173n.224 292d: 173n.226 292e–293a: 165n.156, 172n.216 293b–c: 165n.160 293c: 155n.96 293d: 165n.160 294d: 165n.158 295a–b: 165n.158, 169n.195 295c: 165n.160 295e: 165n.160 296c: 165n.160 296e: 26n.22 296e–297a: 165n.160 296e–297b: 165n.160, 169n.197 297e: 173n.226 297e–299c: 165n.160 297e–299e: 26n.22, 156n.101, 165n.160 299a–c: 165n.160 299b–c: 165n.161 300c–e: 173n.226 300c–301c: 165n.164 300d–e: 165n.160 301b: 173n.226 301a–c: 173n.224 301b–d: 173n.226 301d–e: 165n.160 302b: 165n.160 302b–e: 173n.224 303c: 173n.224 303a: 159n.114 303d–e: 142n.3 303d–304a: 165n.163 305a: 173n.226 305d: 173n.226 305e: 172n.217, 220 306a–308b: 166n.165 306b: 166n.165 306e: 167n.182, 170n.208 307a: 166n.166–167 307b: 170n.208

VI. Index 307b–c: 166n.167, 168n.183 307b–e: 166n.168 307c: 166n.167 307d–e: 166n.168 307e–308a: 166n.166 308a: 167n.181 308b: 166n.165 308d: 173n.226 308d–e: 172n.220 308e: 171n.211 308e–309a: 171n.213 309: 165n.158 309a: 170n.208 309b: 166n.167, 171n.211, 172n.220 309e: 166n.167–168, 168n.183, 172n.220 310a: 171n.211 310c: 171n.211 310d: 168n.183 310d–e: 166n.168 310e: 166n.167, 171n.211 310e–311c: 172n.220 311a: 170n.208 311a–b: 171n.211 311b–c: 155n.96, 172n.217 311c: 165n.158 Protagoras [Prt.] 309a–c: 101n.161, 102n.163 315c: 83n.23 316a: 102n.163 316d: 131n.343 319b–e: 32n.54 319e–320c: 117n.261 320c–332a: 33n.56 322c–d: 86n.39 322d–323a: 33n.56–57 323a–327e: 33n.56 326a: 76n.155 336d–e: 101n.163 337c–e: 125n.309 338a–b: 96n.115 341c: 142n.4 342a–343c: 131n.343 343a: 131n.340 343a–b: 131n.342

Respublica [Rep.] Book 1 327a–c: 153n.82 327c: 135n.376, 151n.69 327c–328b: 135n.376 328c–d: 135n.376 330d–336b: 139n.1 331e–332b: 142n.2 334c–335b: 147n.44 335d–336b: 142n.2 336b: 142n.8, 167n.176, 170n.205 336b–c: 145n.28 336b–e: 142n.7 336b–354a: 139n.2 336c: 147n.44, 167n.176 336e: 142n.3, 165n.163 338c: 142n.12, 147n.47 338c–339a: 139n.2, 142n.1, 143n.15, 144n.16 338c–342e: 144n.26 338d–e: 142n.12 338e: 142n.10 339a: 142n.12 339b–341c: 147n.44, 46 340b–c: 147n.48 340d–e: 26n.22, 145n.30 340d–341a: 161n.134 341b–c: 145n.30 341c: 95n.113, 161n.134 341e–343a: 161n.134 342b: 145n.30 342d: 145n.30 342e: 142n.9 343a: 142n.6, 146n.38, 167n.180 343a–344c: 145n.27 343b–c: 147n.47 343b–d: 139n.2, 142n.1, 143n.15, 144n.16 343b–344a: 161n.135 343c: 142n.12, 147n.44, 167n.177 343c–d: 145n.28 343d: 143n.13, 167n.176 343d–e: 108n.198, 143n.14, 145n.30 343e–344c: 146n.42 344a: 162n.137 344a–b: 146n.37–38, 162n.138

221 344b–c: 146n.39–40, 43 344c: 142n.11, 145n.28, 177n.247 344d: 142n.9 344d–e: 136n.377 344d–345b: 162n.137 345a: 146n.41 345a–b: 161n.135 345b: 142n.9 346b–e: 161n.134 346c: 142n.9 347a–d: 162n.139 347d–e: 147n.48 347e: 55n.40, 136n.377, 162n.137 347e–348a: 162n.137 348a: 142n.9 348b: 161n.135 348c: 145n.28 348c–d: 143n.13, 145n.28, 167n.177, 170n.208 348d: 142n.12, 148n.53 348e: 145n.28, 146n.43 349a: 147n.44 349b: 167n.178 349b–c: 108n.198, 143n.14 349b–350d: 140n.10, 150n.61 349e: 108n.198, 143n.14 349e–350a: 161n.134 350b: 108n.198 350b–d: 143n.14 350c: 142n.5 350c–d: 161n.135 350d: 146n.35, 43 350d–e: 142n.9 351a: 146n.43 351a–b: 148n.52, 151n.65 351a–d: 140n.10 351a–352d: 139n.5 351b: 148n.53 351b–352d: 148n.56 351c: 148n.54, 151n.65 351d–352a: 148n.55 351e: 151n.65 352a–b: 128n.320 352b: 146n.35 352b–c: 151n.65 352b–d: 151n.64 352d: 55n.40, 136n.377 353b: 142n.9, 161n.135 353d–354a: 145n.29

222 353e–354a: 142n.9 353e–354c: 139n.6 354a: 146n.35, 162n.137 Book 2 357a: 152n.71, 152n.74 357a–b: 55n.40, 136n.377, 151n.69 357a–358e: 135n.376, 139n.7 357b–c: 153n.80 358a: 148n.50 358b–c: 152n.72 358b–d: 152n.71, 153n.81 358b–362c: 144n.23 358c: 148n.50 358c–d: 161n.135, 162n.137 358e: 152n.75, 162n.136 358e–359b: 55n.40, 153n.85, 177n.247 358e–359c: 153n.84 358e–368c: 140n.8 358e–362: 140n.8 359b: 162n.138 359c: 108n.198, 152n.76– 77, 153n.83, 161n.135 359c–d: 58n.63, 61n.83 359c–360b: 162n.138 359c–360d: 152n.77 359d–e: 142n.3 360b: 152n.77 360b–c: 58n.63, 61n.83, 152n.76–77 360b–d: 152n.77, 161n.135 360b–e: 55n.40 360c: 153n.85 360c–d: 150n.58 360d: 148n.50, 152n.77–78 360e: 161n.134 360e–361b: 153n.87 360e–362c: 162n.138 360e–362e: 153n.86 361a–c: 147n.45 361a–d: 150n.58 361b: 170n.208 361b–c: 162n.138 361b–362a: 154n.88 361b–362d: 152n.74 361d: 152n.78 361e–362a: 162n.138 362a: 147n.45, 154n.89 362b: 108n.198, 153n.83

VI. Index 362b–c: 153n.87 362d–367b: 144n.23 362e–365a: 152n.72 362e–366e: 154n.92 362e–367e: 140n.8 363a: 154n.91 363e–367a: 148n.50 364a: 161n.135 365: 154n.92 365a–c: 162n.137 365b–c: 147n.45, 154n.91 365c–366b: 154n.94 366b: 154n.92 366b–c: 161n.135 366c–d: 154n.93 366e–369a: 135n.375 367a: 152n.72 367b–c: 147n.45, 48 367e–368c: 135n.376 368a–b: 152n.71 368b–c: 48n.141 368c–369a: 18n.42, 139n.7 368d–369: 140n.9 369b–c: 140n.10 369b–372d: 140n.10 372e–374c: 140n.10 373b–d: 140n.10 373d–374a: 140n.10 374e–541b: 140n.11 Book 3 389b–c: 26n.22 Book 4 424a–427a: 77n.158 425c: 77n.158 425e–426c: 65n.96, 73n.132 425e–426e: 26n.22 426a–427a: 119n.270 429a–430c: 168n.192 430e: 113n.243 430e–431b: 48n.141 433a–c: 158n.112 434b–c: 158n.112, 162n.139 441c–d: 162n.139 441d–e: 158n.112, 165n.159 441e: 170n.208 441e–443e: 158n.113 442a–b: 165n.159 443: 158n.112 443c–d: 162n.139

444b: 165n.159 Book 5 453b: 165n.159 473b–502c: 141n.14 473c–d: 135n.375, 162n.145, 163n.147, 164n.153 473c–e: 155n.96, 158n.113 474b–c: 162n.145, 165n.159 474c–475c: 101n.162 475c–479e: 158n.113 Book 6 485d–e: 165n.159 487a–e: 162n.139 487b–e: 155n.98 487e–489a: 155n.100 487e–489b: 162n.141 488d: 165n.159 489a–d: 156n.106 489b–c: 160n.140 489d–495c: 111n.224 490b–c: 165n.159 491b: 168n.190, 169n.195 491d: 165n.159 491e–492c: 156n.107 492a: 165n.159 492a–c: 27n.28, 111n.224– 225, 148n.51 492a–d: 160n.142 492d–493d: 156n.107 493a–c: 27n.28, 96n.115, 148n.51, 170n.206 493a–d: 160n.142 493e–494a: 160n.141 494c–d: 111n.224 494c–495b: 157n.108, 162n.145 495a–b: 111n.224 495b–c: 112n.232, 165n.159 496: 155n.97 496a: 160n.142, 165n.159 496b–497b: 158n.111, 162n.139 496c: 169n.201 496c–d: 170n.206 496d: 96n.115, 166n.168 497a: 165n.159 497a–b: 155n.97 497b–c: 162n.145, 166n.168

VI. Index 497e–498c: 162n.139 498b–c: 162n.145 499b–c: 155n.96, 162n.145 499b–d: 162n.139 499e–500b: 160n.141 500b: 165n.159 500d–e: 160n.141 500d–501a: 162n.145 501d: 162n.145, 165n.159 501e: 155n.96 502a: 162n.145, 164n.153 503a: 142n.3, 165n.163 503b–c: 166n.168 504d: 165n.159 Book 7 515d: 167n.176 519d–520e: 158n.113 520a–d: 162n.139 520b–d: 173n.225 521b: 162n.139 521c–541b: 141n.14 540d: 155n.96 Book 8 544d–e: 18n.42, 179n.253 545b: 18n.42 548d: 18n.42 549c–550b: 162n.139 549c–550c: 168n.190 550e: 76n.155 553a: 76n.155 555b–587e: 141n.15 556b–c: 168n.191 557a–d: 62n.89 557b: 59n.68, 60n.74, 62n.88, 65n.97, 70n.118, 86n.44 557b–c: 140n.10 557b–e: 63n.90, 71n.121 557d: 159n.114 558c: 62n.89, 63n.90, 71n.121, 159n.114 558c–562a: 141n.15 559d: 71n.122, 125 560a: 87n.52–53 560c–e: 168n.192 560d: 167n.174–175 560d–562a: 68n.112 560d–e: 68n.112, 72n.129 560d–561e: 71n.125, 87n.50 560e–561e: 71n.122–123

560e–562a: 48n.144, 96n.125, 97n.130 561a–562a: 87n.53 561e: 62n.89, 63n.90, 71n.122 561b–c: 72n.131 561c–e: 76n.155 561d: 167n.172 562b–c: 29n.33 562b–563d: 63n.90 562c–563a: 178n.249 562e: 87n.54 562e–563a: 87n.53 563c: 170n.207 563d–e: 62n.89, 63n.90 563e–564a: 65n.97 564a: 63n.91, 66n.99, 179n.254 564a–566d: 141n.16 564b: 168n.191 564b–565c: 174n.233 565a: 159n.116 565c–566d: 174n.234 565e–566a: 40n.94, 41n.101, 58n.63 566e: 40n.94, 41n.101, 117n.252 568a–b: 56n.49, 114n.247 568c–d: 40n.94, 41n.101 568d: 62n.89, 63n.90 568e–569b: 87n.54 Book 9 571a: 87n.53–54, 162n.144 571a–578c: 162n.145 571a–579e: 141n.15 571b–c: 103n.182, 160n.122, 170n.207 571c–d: 87n.54, 103n.174 571d: 103n.177 572b: 160n.122 572b–d: 87n.53 572d–e: 103n.181 572d–573d: 71n.124, 87n.54, 160n.122 572e–573b: 169n.203 573a–b: 87n.54, 103n.182 573b: 103n.182 573b–c: 103n.175 573d–574c: 103n.177 573d–575d: 98n.132 574a: 108n.197–198 574c: 87n.53, 103n.179

223 574d–e: 103n.181 574e–575a: 94n.103, 103n.177, 182, 160n.122 575a: 87n.54 575a–d: 104n.184 575d: 98n.133, 103n.175 575e: 103n.180 575e–576a: 94n.103 576a: 65n.96, 103n.179, 129n.331 576b: 87n.54, 103n.182 576c–d: 78n.165, 140n.10 576b–e: 162n.144 576d–e: 162n.145 576e: 140n.12, 160n.118 577b: 162n.144 577c–e: 63n.92 577c–578c: 78n.165, 141n.13 577d: 103n.177, 103n.182 577d–e: 160n.122 577d–578a: 65n.96 577e–578a: 103n.178 578a: 103n.182, 178n.251 578a–c: 73n.133 578b–c: 162n.144 578c: 55n.39, 136n.377, 160n.143 579b: 178n.251 579c–e: 65n.96, 141n.13, 162n.145 579d: 162n.144 579c–580a: 103n.177 579d–e: 103n.179 579e: 178n.251 579e–580c: 160n.121 580a–c: 160n.121 580b–c: 160n.118, 162n.144–145 580e–581c: 160n.119 581c: 162n.145 581d: 167n.179 581d–587c: 160n.120 582b–c: 162n.145 583b: 160n.120–121, 162n.145 585b–e: 160n.120 585d–e: 165n.159 586a–b: 108n.198 586b: 160n.120 586b–c: 160n.141

224

VI. Index

586b–e: 173n.225 586e–587b: 160n.121 587a–e: 162n.145 587b–c: 160n.122 587b–e: 141n.15, 160n.118, 121, 162n.144, 173n.225 587c: 160n.120 587e–588a: 165n.159 588b: 161n.135 588c: 170n.207 588e: 170n.207 589a–c: 161n.135 589c–d: 170n.207 590b: 170n.207 590c–d: 171n.213 591b–c: 170n.207 591b–e: 162n.137 592a–b: 158n.111, 162n.139 Book 10 598b–d: 173n.225 599e: 131n.342 620c: 159n.116

219b–d: 95n.110, 102n.170 219b–220b: 102n.169 220d–221b: 134n.361 222a: 95n.110 222c: 102n.169 222c–d: 95n.110

Symposium [Symp.] 180c–d: 91n.73 185e–186a: 91n.73 197d: 76n.154 204b: 101n.162 209d: 76n.154, 131n.342 210a–212a: 101n.161 212d–214b: 102n.164 213b–d: 95n.109 213c–d: 102n.165, 170 213d: 76n.154, 95n.110, 102n.167 214a: 102n.169 214d–222b: 95n.109 214e: 95n.110 215b–e: 102n.170 215e: 27n.26, 96n.116 215e–216c: 102n.172, 112n.234 216a–c: 102n.169 216b–c: 95n.110, 102n.172 216c: 102n.170 217a–d: 102n.169 217b–d: 95n.110 217b–218d: 102n.170 218d–219a: 102n.168 219a: 142n.3

Vita Aristides [Arist.] 3: 154n.89 7: 27n.25 23–24: 27n.25 25: 154n.89

Theaetetus [Tht.] 167c: 27n.28, 156n.107 172d–173a: 27n.28, 156n.107 172e–173b: 31n.42, 77n.158 Timaeus [Ti.] 20d–e: 131n.340, 342 21b–c: 131n.342 PLUTARCH Vita Alcibiades [Alc.] 3.1: 100n.155 16: 100n.154

Vita Cimon [Cim.] 6.1–3: 27n.25 Vita Nicias [Nic.] 8.3: 177n.243 Vita Pericles [Per.] 8.1–3: 96n.116 8.15: 96n.116 12: 39n.91 13.15: 83n.22 16.1–2: 39n.89, 91 36.8–9: 53n.25 Vita Themistocles [Them.] 11: 27n.25 PSEUDO-ANDOCIDES [Ps.-Andoc.] 4.1: 43: 110

PSEUDO-XENOPHON [Xen.] Athenaiōn politeia [Ath. Pol.] 1.1: 34n.68 1.1–3: 43n112 1.1–20: 143n.15 1.2: 45n.124 1.4–9: 34n.68 1.5: 43n112, 63n.90, 65n.95 1.5–8: 143n.15 1.6–9: 32n.54 1.8: 29n.34, 63n.90 1.8–13: 71n.121 1.9: 45n.124, 169n.201 1.9–10: 43n112 1.10: 43n112, 65n.95 1.10–12: 63n.90 1.14: 58n.63 1.14–15: 43n112 2.2–3: 47n.139 2.2–7: 43n112 2.7: 47n.139 2.7–12: 140n.10 2.11–12: 47n.139 2.14–16: 45n.125 2.17: 60n.76 2.17–19: 71n.121 2.19: 34n.68 3.1: 34n.68 3.10–11: 143n.15 SIMONIDES [Simon.] 584 PMG: 75n.150 SOLON [Sol.] Fr. 13 W (1 G.-Pr): 128n.320, 142n.2 Fr. 33 W (29a G.-Pr): 74n.137, 88n.58, 134n.365, 167n.175 Fr. 37 W (31 G.-Pr): 31n.45

VI. Index SOPHOCLES [Soph.] Ajax [Aj.] 552: 75n.150 1081–1086: 60n.75 Antigone [Ant.] 162–163: 156n.101 188–190: 156n.101 499–508: 60n.75 506–507: 70n.119, 73n.136, 78n.162 1161: 75n.150 Electra [El.] 1027: 75n.150 Oedipus Coloneus [OC] 943: 75n.150 1382: 128n.320 Oedipus Tyrannus [OT] 56–57: 45n.121 587–589: 103n.176 601: 103n.176 1525–1526: 74n.137, 78n.162 1526: 75n.150 Trachiniae [Trach.] 441–444: 103n.182 Fr. 14 Radt: 56n.49 TELECLIDES [Telecl.] Fr. (K.-A) 45: 39n.89, 91 THEOGNIS [Thgn.] 455: 75n.150 THUCYDIDES [Thuc.] 1.23.6: 42n.109 1.42.3: 105n.189 1.44.4: 27n.25 1.69.1: 44n.120, 46n.131 1.69.5: 98n.135 1.70.1: 168n.185 1.70.2: 168n.186

1.70.2–9: 105n.189 1.70.3: 168n.185 1.70.6: 168n.185 1.70.8: 98n.136 1.70.8–9: 115n.251, 166n.168 1.73–86: 123n.289 1.73–78: 126n.310 1.73.1: 123n.290 1.73.2–75.1: 123n.292 1.75.1–4: 123n.293 1.75.3: 98n.138 1.75.3–77.5: 105n.189 1.76.1–2: 98n.138, 125n.301 1.76.2: 123n.290, 125n.300 1.76.2–4: 124n.296 1.76.3–77.6: 124n.294 1.78: 123n.290 1.80–86: 126n.310 1.81: 45n.126 1.82.1–3: 126n.310 1.89–94: 44n.119 1.89.1: 43n.110, 44n.120 1.91.3: 27n.25 1.91.4–5: 46n.131 1.91.7: 46n.131 1.93.3–4: 42n.109, 44n.120 1.93.6–7: 45n.126 1.93.7–8: 44n.119, 120 1.107.1: 44n.120, 45n.123 1.107.4: 44n.120, 45n.123 1.122.3: 106n.190 1.122.3: 39n.84 1.124.3: 39n.84, 106n.190 1.130: 101n.157 1.132.2–3: 101n.157 1.138.1–3: 101n.157 1.138.3: 125n.302 1.139.4: 96n.116 1.140.5–141.1: 46n.132 1.142.2–3: 45n.126 1.143.4–5: 45n.126 1.143.5: 42n.109 2.13.2: 44n.120, 45n.126 2.13.7: 44n.120 2.15.2: 42n.109 2.35.2: 125n.302 2.36: 42n.109 2.36.1: 46n.134 2.36.1–4: 42n.109 2.36.2: 49n.145

225 2.36.2–3: 27n.25 2.36.2–40.5: 37n.82 2.36.3: 46n.134, 47n.138, 74n.141, 140n.10 2.37.1: 30n.38, 33n.58, 74n.141 2.37.2: 59n.69, 150n.57 2.37.2–3: 57n.61, 60n.78, 78n.165 2.37.3: 60n.76, 86n.40 2.38: 140n.10 2.38.2: 42n.109, 46n.134, 47n.137, 140n.10 2.39: 168n.187 2.39–40.1: 168n.185 2.40.1–2: 114n.249, 166n.169 2.40.2: 33n.58, 117n.255 2.40.2–3: 30n.38, 70n.116, 168n.186 2.41–42.1: 150n.57 2.41.1–4: 37n.82, 47n.140 2.41.3–43.5: 168n.189 2.41.4: 42n.109, 46n.134, 140n.10 2.41.5: 170n.208 2.42.4: 166n.169 2.43.1: 42n.109, 90n.66, 150n.57 2.43.4: 168n.188 2.43.6: 166n.169 2.45.2: 125n.302 2.46: 150n.57 2.50.1: 125n.302 2.51.3: 49n.145 2.60–65.1: 150n.59 2.60.1: 46n.132 2.60.5: 30n.38, 70n.116, 90n.64, 66, 94n.106 2.61.4: 150n.57 2.62.1: 42n.109 2.62.2–3: 46n.127 2.62–63.2: 29n.34 2.63: 150n.58, 166n.170 2.63.1–2: 75n.143 2.63.2: 39n.84, 98n.137, 106n.190 2.63.2–3: 117n.255 2.63.2–64.3: 38n.83 2.63.2–64.4: 115n.250 2.64.3: 29n.34, 42n.109, 150n.57

226 2.64.3–4: 74n.143 2.64.4: 117n.255, 150n.58 2.64.5: 150n.57 2.65: 43n.111, 150n.59 2.65.3–5: 32n.50 2.65.5: 43n.110, 112 2.65.5–10: 150n.59 2.65.7: 17n.39, 117n.254, 150n.60 2.65.8: 31n.45 2.65.8–9: 96n.116 2.65.9: 31n.43–44 2.65.9–11: 178n.249–250 2.65.10–12: 32n.51 2.65.10–13: 17n.39 2.65.11–12: 17n.37 2.65.13: 150n.59 2.100.2: 57n.55 3.36.2: 177n.243 3.36.4: 177n.243 3.36.6: 177n.243 3.37.1–2: 175n.235 3.37.1–38.7: 35n.70 3.37.2: 39n.84, 98n.137, 106n.190, 126n.313, 150n.58 3.37.3: 65n.95 3.37.3–4: 33n.59, 34n.69 3.37.4–5: 176n.236 3.38.1: 177n.243 3.39.2–40.1: 175n.235 3.39.3–5: 175n.235 3.39.5: 125n.302 3.40.1: 176n.236 3.40.2–3: 177n.243 3.40.4: 98n.137, 101n.159 3.40.7: 177n.243 3.42.1: 177n.243 3.42.1–5: 176n.237 3.42.5: 177n.247 3.42–43: 35n.70 3.43.1–2: 176n.237 3.44.1–2: 176n.237 3.44.2–4: 35n.70 3.45.4–6: 107n.191 3.45.5: 91n.69 3.45.6: 29n.3, 46n.130 3.45.7: 125n.302, 170n.208 3.46.5: 176n.237 3.47.5: 176n.237 3.49: 35n.70 3.49.4: 177n.243

VI. Index 3.68.1–2: 126n.310 3.82.1: 177n.243 3.82.2: 125n.302 3.82.4–5: 170n.208–209 3.82.5: 170n.209 3.82.7–8: 170n.209 3.82.4–83.1: 170n.208 3.82.6: 108n.195, 150n.61 3.82.8: 108n.195, 150n.61 3.83.1: 170n.208 3.83.3–4: 170n.209 3.84.2: 125n.302 3.86.3: 22n.7 4.17.4: 107n.192 4.21.2: 107n.192 4.21.3: 175n.235 4.59–64: 126n.310 4.61.5: 107n.192, 126n.311 4.62: 170n.208 4.62.3: 107n.192 5.19.1: 53n.22 5.24: 53n.22 5.84.1–2: 129n.324 5.85: 129n.328, 331 5.86: 177n.245 5.86–87: 177n.246 5.87: 127n.315, 129n.325, 328, 331, 130n.333 5.88: 127n.315 5.89: 122n.288, 124n.295, 128n.319, 129n.328, 331, 177n.245 5.89–90: 127n.318 5.90–97: 124n.294 5.91.2: 130n.333 5.91.2–93: 177n.246 5.92–93: 127n.315 5.92–95: 177n.245 5.93: 129n.325, 328, 130n.333 5.94–95: 130n.334 5.95: 122n.288, 124n.295 5.95–99: 46n.133 5.97: 177n.246 5.101: 129n.328, 177n.246 5.102–103: 129n.330 5.102.2–5: 127n.315, 128n.321 5.103: 129n.325, 328 5.104: 128n.320 5.104–105: 127n.318 5.104.5: 87n.50

5.105: 122n.288, 128 5.105.1–2: 125n.299, 301 5.105.1–3: 125n.304 5.105.2: 98n.138, 121n.285, 125n.305 5.105.3: 74n.142, 129n.325 5.105.5: 129n.330 5.111: 129n.325, 328, 330 5.111.3: 87n.50 5.111.3–4: 122n.288 5.111.4: 42n.109 5.111.4–5: 130n.333 5.113: 129n.325, 328, 330, 130n.333 5.115.1: 129n.324 6.1: 129n.327 6.8–26: 129n.324 6.8.4: 52n.17 6.10.2: 166n.168 6.13.1: 91n.69, 167n.171, 168n.189 6.14: 24n.15, 26n.22 6.15.4: 101n.157 6.16.1: 37n.80, 84n.32 6.16.4–5: 84n.32 6.18: 129n.324 6.18.1–4: 99n.139 6.18.2: 117n.252, 166n.168 6.18.3: 101n.159 6.18.4: 166n.168 6.18.6: 117n.253 6.18.6–7: 117n.252, 255, 166n.168 6.19: 17n.37 6.24–25: 52n.17, 129n.330 6.24.3: 91n.70, 107n.193 6.24.4: 166n.168 6.25.2: 166n.168 6.28.2: 101n.157 6.30.2: 129n.330 6.31: 59n.71 6.31.6: 129n.330 6.39.1: 32n.54, 33n.58, 60 6.76.3–4: 99n.149 6.82–83.4: 29n.34 6.85.1: 39n.84–85 6.86.1–3: 46n.132 6.87.2: 29n.34, 98n.138 6.88.10: 17n.37 6.89.3–6: 94n.106 6.89.4–6: 44n.113 6.89.5: 43n.112, 65n.95

227

VI. Index 6.89.6: 29n.34, 42n.109, 46n.130, 69n.113, 84n.31 6.91.6: 17n.37 6.92.2: 90n.64, 94n.105 6.92.3: 94n.106 6.92.4: 90n.64, 95n.107 6.93.1–2: 17n.37 6.103.2–4: 17n.37 6.104: 17n.37 7.2: 17n.37 7.8: 52n.17 7.14.4: 52n.17 7.28.1: 49n.145 7.48.3–4: 52n.17 7.49: 52n.17 7.69.2: 29n.34, 44n.113, 46n.130, 59n.68–69, 69n.113 7.77.7: 42n.109, 45n.121, 167n.171 7.84–85: 59n.71 7.86.5–6: 129n.327 7.87.5–6: 59n.71 7.87.5–8.1: 17n.37 8.48.1–4: 17n.37 8.48.4: 95n.107 8.64.5: 42n.108 8.67.2: 70n.115 8.67.2–3: 69n.113 8.68.4–69.1: 69n.113 8.76.6: 131n.341 8.86.5: 31n.45 8.89.2: 53n.23 8.92: 53n.23 8.99.2: 53n.23 XENOPHON [Xen.] Apologia [Ap.] 3: 110n.211 5: 110n.211 19–23: 110n.211 26: 110n.211 34: 110n.211 Cyropaedia [Cyr.] 8.7.6–8: 78n.162 Hellenica [Hell.] 1.5.16: 53n.24, 26

1.6.29: 53n.24, 26 1.7.2: 53n.24, 26 1.7.12: 60n.76 1.7.15: 22n.7 1.7.16: 53n.26 1.7.21: 53n.26 1.7.34–35: 53n.24 2.2.11–15: 45n.123 2.2.20: 45n.123 2.3.13: 62n.87 2.3.14–17: 16n.33 2.3.16: 62n.87 2.3.17: 16n.33 2.3.21: 16n.33, 62n.87 2.3.38–40: 16.n.33 2.3.39: 153n.82 2.3.47: 16n.33 2.4.1: 62n.87 2.4.21: 16n.32 4.8.9–10: 45n.123 Hiero [Hier.] 1.1: 163n.149 1.2: 75n.148 1.2–3: 163n.150 1.7–8: 163n.150 1.9: 75n.148 2.3–5: 75n.148, 78n.162 11.11: 75n.149 11.15: 75n.149, 78n.162 Memorabilia [Mem.] 1.1.18: 57n.57 1.2.1: 48n.142 1.2.12: 65n.95 1.2.12–18: 110n.213 1.2.14: 48n.142, 101n.163 1.2.24–26: 110n.213 1.2.29–47: 110n.213 1.6.1–10: 48n.142 1.7.9–15: 58n.66 1.7.12: 58n.62 1.7.15: 57n.57 1.7.35: 58n.65 2.1.12–13: 145n.33 2.1.21–34: 110n.212 3.5.1–28: 53n.26 4.1.3–5: 112n.232 4.4.2: 57n.57 12.12–47: 17n.35

De vectigalibus [Vect.] 1.3: 140n.10

B. INSCRIPTIONS Historische griechische Inschriften in Übersetzung [HGIÜ] I 121: 52n.14 I 150: 52n.14 Inscriptiones Graecae [IG] I2 71: 52n.14 I2 105: 52n.14 I3 117: 52n.14 I3 375.36: 153n.82

2. GENERAL INDEX absolute freedom: 19, 62–63, 65–66, 71, 73, 80, 103, 185. See also freedom to what one pleases absolute non-freedom: absolute freedom 185; erastēs 94; freedom to what one pleases 63–65, 80; tyrannical man 63–65, 184– 185. See also aneleutheria; inability to do what one really wants; to seem – to be absolute self-sufficiency: Callicles 48–49; democracy 19, 46–50, 74 n. 141; Pericles 38, 46–48, 74 n. 141; Solon 47, 134. See also enkrateia absolute sovereignty: 19, 46, 50 Adeimantus: 135, 139–140, 144, 146–147, 151–157, 161–162, 179–180 Aeschines: 17 Aeschylus: 26 n. 23, 56, 60, 67 n. 104, 70, 95, 154 n. 89 Aegospotami: 79 Afterlife Myth: 54–55, 72–73, 79, 82, 134– 135, 154–155 aidōs, see shame aischron, see shame aischynē, see shame Aigai: 56 akolasia (licentiousness): anarchia 63 n. 90; the beast within 65 n. 96; Callicles 48, 72, 87–88; democracy 43–44, 65 n. 95; Socrates 48, 65; akrateia (incontinence): 79. See also enkrateia Alcibiades: 15–17, 20, 22 n. 9, 26 n. 23, 31 n. 45, 37, 39, 42–44, 48 n. 142, 53–54, 72 n. 129, 81–84, 89, 94–95, 98–102, 109 n. 207, 110, 112, 116–117, 119, 129, 136–138, 142 n. 3, 166–167, 178 alogistos (unreasonable): Diodotus 107; pathology of war 170; Socrates 169. See also euētheia amathia (ignorant, stupid): democracy 30 n. 38; Solon 134 with. n. 365, 167 n. 175; pathology of war 171. See also euētheia Amphion: 112–113, 115, 137 anaideia: democratic man 68–69; demagogues 86. See also shame; shamelessness

anandria (cowardice, unmanliness): Callicles 94, 114–115, 168; erōs 92, 94; Socrates 41, 168–169; Worse Argument 109. See also andreia; deilos; malakia anankē (necessity): Alcibiades 94, 101; Callicles 96–97, 128; erastēs 94; most perfectly unjust city 148–149; Melian Dialogue 98, 121 n. 285, 122–123, 125– 126, 128; tyrannical soul 63–64, 68–69; Worse Argument 109. See also compulsive behaviour anarchia (insolence, disorder): akolasia 63 n. 90; democratic man 68–69; tyrannical man 103–104. See also akolasia; kosmios Anaximander: 131 n. 341 andreia (courage, manliness): anaideia 68– 69; Callicles 72, 82, 87–88, 168; courageous nature 167–168; democracy 168; freedom 67; isonomic man 68–69; malakia 166 n. 169; pathology of war 170; Pericles 90; Socrates 134 n. 361, 168–169; most unjust man 153. See also tolma; anandria; courageous nature Andron (son of Androtion): 83 Androtion: 61 aneleutheria: the beast within 65 n. 96; Callicles 114–115; kosmios 167 n. 174; tyrannical soul / tyrant city 63–64. See also absolute non-freedom anoētos (silly, foolish): Glaucon 152; Socrates 134 n. 365, 167 n. 175. See also anoia; euētheia anoia: Melian Dialogue 122–123 anolbios (unblest, wretched): 133 n. 355. See also athlios Anonymous Iamblichi: 34, 121 n. 285, 126 antidemocratic thought: 11, 13 Antiphon (orator): 100, 126, 130 n. 337 Antisthenes: 54, 79, 164 anthrōpeia physis (human nature): 124–126, 138 anthrōpeios tropos (human way): 124–125 Anytus: 118 Apelt, Otto: 22 n. 11 Apollo: 56, 134–135

VI. Index apragmosynē (love of a quiet life): Alcibiades 117, 167; incompatible with democracy and empire 74–75 with n. 143 and 144, 98, 106, 108–109, 112–117, 119–120, 137; the true spirit of democracy 158– 159; Callicles 112–113, 168; moderate nature 166, 171, 180; Socrates 113–116, 119–120, 158–159, 169, 171; Solon 133; Thrasymachus 142. See also hēsychia; nōthēs; polypragmosynē; prosekein; ta hautou prattein Archelaus: 51–52, 54–57, 78–79, 161 Archilochus: 74 Arginusae scandal: 21, 53–54, 57–58, 68, 79 Arendt, Hannah: 159 n. 115, 178 Aristides: 27 n. 25, 112 n. 232, 154 n. 89 aristocracy (constitution): 11 Aristocrates (son of Scelios): 52–54, 57, 79, 83, 136 Aristophanes: 20, 26 n. 23, 31 n. 42, 34–37, 41–42, 44–45, 49, 56, 78, 86, 90, 95, 97, 108–111, 125, 128 n. 320, 130, 136– 137, 141, 155–156, 176–177, 181 Aristotle: 13–14, 18 n. 44, 19 n. 55, 33–34, 60, 66, 76 n. 153, 152 n. 77, 164 Artabanus: 105 Athens / Athenians / Attica: 11–13, 15–17, 19–20, 26 n. 23, 27–31, 33–39, 42–50, 52–54, 58–60, 67–70, 74–75, 78–79, 83 n. 21, 90–91, 94–95, 97–101, 105–110, 113, 115–118, 123–130, 133, 137–138, 140, 150–151, 166–170, 175–177, 179– 180 Athenian archē (empire): 18–19, 27 n. 25, 34–35, 37–39, 41–46, 50, 53 n. 23, 59, 67, 74 n. 143, 78–79, 91, 98–101, 105– 107, 116–117, 119, 123, 128, 130, 168, 175, 183–184; greatness 29, 38–39, 42– 43, 47, 75, 84, 90–91, 107, 116, 118, 122–123, 138, 150, 157. See also dēmos monarchos; polis tyrannos; unlimited expansionism Athenagoras: 33 athlios (wretched): Archelaus 55; Callicles 97; Croesus 133 n. 355; freedom to what one pleases 78 n. 165, 152; bios kinaidos 97; Solon 133 n. 355; tyrannical soul / tyrant city 55 n. 45, 63– 64, 161–162. See also anolbios; happiness autarkeia, see absolute self-sufficiency; enkrateia

229

autonomia: 19 Avnon, Dan: 95 Balot, Ryan: 168 basileus (art of kingship): 162, 165, 171, 173. See also politikos basileus – tyrannos: 160, 162, 173 Belfior, Elizabeth: 93 n. 87 Better Argument (kreittōn logos): 86, 108– 109, 111, 137. See also Worse Argument bios (way of life): bios adikos – bios dikaios 55, 77, 79, 108, 152–155, 161–163; bios athlios – bios agathos (eudaimōn) 162; bios praktikos – bios theōrētikos 55, 79, 112–120, 137, 158, 160–163; bios tyrannikos – bios philosophikos 55, 79, 93, 161–163; bios philosophikos as bios politikos 158, 160–161, 165. See also vita activa – vita contemplativa Biton: 133 n. 356 Bromberg, Jacques: 110 n. 209 Brown, Eric: 158 Bulgakov, Mikhail Afanasyevich: 66 Callicles: 20, 22, 26, 29, 32, 34, 37–39, 41– 42, 44–49, 51, 54–55, 71–73, 76–77, 79–91, 95–105, 108, 110–115, 117, 119–121, 123–132, 134–148, 153–154, 156–158, 160–164, 166–168, 177–181 Callipolis: 140–141, 159 Camarina: 39 n. 85 Cambyses: 61 Capra, Andrea: 110 n. 208 Chaerephon: 83 n. 21, 127 n. 316, 131–132 Charmides: 16 Carthago: 35 n. 75 Cephalus: 139, 148 n. 49 chariot (as analogy for erōs): 92–95 charioteer: Athenian politicians 95–96; erōs 92–93, 95; helmsman 26 n. 22, n. 96 n. 115, 165; statesman 96 n. 115, 165 Cimon: 26–27, 42, 44, 82, 95, 156 city-soul analogy: Aristophanes: dēmos tyrannos as a a tyrant 36; Plato: Athens – Callicles 77, 104, 140; Callipolis – philosopher-king 140; democratic man – democracy 65–66, 69, 76 n. 155; tyrannical man – tyrant city 63–66; most perfectly unjust city 148–151; zēlos 76 with n. 155; 140; Thucydides: polis tyrannos – Pericles 39; Diodotus 107; community – individual / city – individual analogy 151 n. 68

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Classen, Johannes: 31 Cleitophon: 26 n. 23, 56 n. 48 Cleitophon: 147 n. 48 Cleobis: 133 n. 356 Cleon: 33–35, 37, 45 n. 122, 50, 86, 90, 98, 126, 175–178, 181 collective wisdom (of the people): 32–37, 49, 70, 115 Colonus (meeting): 69 compulsive behavior: Callicles 96–97; kinaidos 96–97, tyrannical soul / tyrant city 63–64, 103; unlimited imperialism 98–99, 101. See also anankē Connor, Walter: 111 n. 230 Corcyra: 105 Corinth / Corinthians: 98, 105–106, 116 Cooper, John: 30 courageous nature: 167–168, 171. See also andreia, mania crisis of the polis: 12 Critias: 16–17, 22 n. 9, 48 n. 142, 54, 83 n. 25, 101 n. 163, 110, 138 Croesus: 47–48, 73 n. 136, 101 n. 159, 132– 135, 138, 152, 162 n. 146 Cyprus: 12–13 Cyrus the Great: 58 n. 63, 134–135, 162 n. 146 Dalfen, Joachim: 51 n. 4 Danzig, Gabriel: 118 n. 263 Darius: 40–41, 58 n. 63, 79, 99–100, 161 n. 126 darker (ironic) reading: 15 Deceleia: 17, 53 deilia (cowardice, effeminacy): the beast within 65 n. 96; erōs 92; moderate nature 166; pathology of war 170; Worse Argument 109. See anandria Deininger, Georg: 99 Delphi: 131–132 demagogue / demagoguery: 34–37, 40, 78, 93 n. 92, 97, 141, 156, 174–178. See also demagogue-tyrant, populism demagogue-tyrant: 39–41, 49, 141, 174, 177, 179, 181. See also patron-tyrant, populism democrats / democracy: 11, 13, 40–41, 76, 84, 86, 173–174, 183–184 Democrates: 100 dēmokratikos anēr (democratic man): 14, 19– 20, 62–63, 69, 73, 76, 87–88, 100, 104, 141, 171, 174, 180, 183. See also isonomikos anēr; tyrannikos anēr

Demos (son of Pyrilampes): 81, 83, 89, 100 dēmos (the people): 11, 13, 19; 57–58, 60, 78, 88–89, 104, 115, 117 n. 259, 156–157, 159, 174–178; great strong beast / wild 26–28, 96, 169–170; like horses which are out of control 95–96 dēmos monarchos (tyrannos): 19, 22 n. 7, 34– 37, 50, 68, 70, 77–78, 140, 183. See also polis tyrannos Demosthenes: 61 diairesis: 172 Diodotus: 35, 107, 176 Diognetus: 53 dianoia (intention): 101 Dionysios I: 40 doing injustice is better than suffering injustice: 55 n. 44, 58, 85, 154 n. 89, 161– 162. See also freedom to do what one pleases dokein-einai, see to seem – to be Dorion, Louis-André: 48 doulosynē: 19 Dover, Kenneth: 91 n. 67 doxa-alētheia: 64, 147, 152, 154, 180. See also doxa-epistēmē; mimēsis; to seem – to be doxa-epistēmē: 23, 173 n. 224. See also mimēsis Eder, Walter: 12–13 egotism (political): 174–178 eidōlon (simulacrum/phantom): rhetoric 28; existing constitutions 173 n. 225; tyrannical pleasures 160 n. 120. See also mimēsis ekphobein (terrorize): 121, 177. See also politics of fear ēlithios (foolish): Callicles 142–143, 167; dēmos tyrannos 36; Pisistratus 167 n. 175; Socrates 167 n. 175. See also euētheia elenchus: 82, 85 n. 35, 131, 144, 146 eleutheria, see freedom enkrateia (self-mastery): 47–48; autarkeia 47–48 with n. 142–143; Callicles 48, 96; erōs 92–93; Socrates 111. See also absolute self-sufficiency Ephialtes: 42 epithymia (desire): 27–28, 68–69, 71–73, 75, 82, 87–88, 96–97, 99–103, 110–111, 156, 160, 168–170. See also hēdonē

VI. Index erastēs (lover): 83 n. 22, 90–94, 97, 102, 109, 137; of monarchy 90 n. 64; of the people 35, 89–91, 97; of philosophy 89–91 erōmenos (beloved): 83 n.22, 92–95, 98, 102, 109, 137; Demos 89–90; Alcibiades 89– 90 erōs (love): 89–93, 98–99, 101–104, 110, 135–137, 160, 169; as a chariot 92–93, 94 n. 103, 95–96; as a tyrant 103–104; for the people 81, 89–100, 100, 102, 161; for philosophy 81, 89–90, 92–93, 100–102, 161; for pleonexia 107 equality: 34, 49, 68 n. 112, 71 n. 121, 95, 117 n. 259 ēthos (disposition): 171 Euagoras: 75, 162 Eucrates: 53–54 eudaimonia, see happiness euētheia (simple-mindedness): moderate nature 166; pathology of war 170; Pisistratus 167 n. 175; Socrates 167 n. 175; Thrasymachus 142–144, 167. See also alogistos; amathēs; anoētos; anoia; ēlithios; gennaios; phlyaria Euphemus: 39 n. 85 Eupolis: 53 Euripides: 20, 26 n. 23, 34, 55–56, 78–79, 90, 95, 108, 112, 115, 137, 146 n. 38, euryprōktos (wide-assed): 109. See also kinaidos; katapygōn eutychia (fortunate): democratic man 68–69; Polycrates 73 n. 136. See also happiness exousia (licence): Afterlife Myth 72 with n. 130, 79; as affluence 107; democratic concept 59–60, 62–63; Glaucon 152 n.77; Nicias 59; parrhēsia 70 with n. 118; Socrates 72, 79. See also freedom to do what one pleases Flashar, Helmut: 59 n. 72 flattery: 35, 133, 156. See also kolakeia Finley, Moses: 174 Foucault, Michel: 90–91 n. 67 freedom (democratic notion): 18–19, 24, 43– 44, 49, 60–63, 66–69, 84, 184–185; greatest good 29; freedom and power 19, 29–32, 68–69, 84, 98, 107. See also freedom to do what one pleases freedom to do what one pleases: 19, 51, 53, 56–66, 68–73, 78–80, 98, 146, 152, 169; god-like omnipotence 152 n. 77; as happiness 78, 80, 168; impunity 52 n. 15, 146, 154 n. 89; to kill whoever one

231

pleases 51, 58, 73, 78–79, 152; shame 86;. See also absolute freedom; exousia; freedom Fürstenspiegel: 11–14. See also Mirror of Princes Gela (congress of): 107, 126 gennaios (noble): most just man 153–154 with n. 88; justice 167 with n. 177; pathology of war 170 with n. 208. See also euētheia generation gap (in Athens): 83 n. 26, 185–186 Gibert, John: 112 n. 237 Glaucon: 55, 135–136, 139–140, 144, 147– 148, 151–154, 161–162, 179–180 gold (analogy): 102, 142, 165 Gorgias: 21 n. 5, 22–24, 26–27, 29–34, 37, 39, 41, 44, 46, 49–52, 54, 70, 76, 81, 84–85, 87–88, 96, 118, 127, 130, 132 n. 345–346, 135–136, 139, 146–147, 161– 162, 164, 180 Great King: 11, 13, 18, 58 n. 63, 61, 79, 99, 160 Guthrie, William: 22 n. 10 Gyges: 74, 142 n. 3, 152, 162 Haake, Matthias: 14, 164 Hadot, Pierre: 12–13 Hanson, Victor: 120 happiness (eudaimonia): akolasia 48, 68–69, 72, 97; Archelaus 51, 55, 73–74, 78 with n. 165; Athens’ freedom 168; Callicles 48–49, 72, 78, 97; city-soul analogy 140; Croesus and Solon 132–133; Cyrus 58 n. 63; democratic man 68–68; expansionism 19 n. 55; freedom to do what one pleases 78, 152 n. 78; Great King 79; just and unjust life 149–150; kosmios 48; Nicocles 75; olbios 132 n. 351; Pericles 168; Polus 73–74, 146; philosopher-king 155, 162; Thrasymachus 143–144, 146; tyrant 73–74, 77– 78, 146, 162. See also athlios; eutychia; makarios; olbios hēdonē (pleasure): 28, 48, 59, 68–69, 71, 86, 94, 96, 106, 110–111, 156, 170. See also epithymia Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: 66 Heitsch, Ernst: 93 helmsman: 26 n. 22, 96 n. 115, 165. See also physician Heracles: Archelaus 56; Callicles 111; Prodicus 110; Worse Argument 109

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herdsman: politikos 165 n. 160; Thrasymachus 143–144. See also physician Hermocrates: 107, 126 Herodotus: 20, 39–41, 44, 47–49, 58, 61, 73, 99–101, 105, 120, 125 n. 302, 132–134, 138 Hesiod: 120, 125 n. 306, 128 n. 320, 162 hēsychia (stillness, keep quiet): Alcibiades 98, 101, 116–117; Athens empire 98, 101, 106, 116–117; Callicles 96; Great king 99; moderate nature 166–167; Socrates 119, 159; Thrasymachus 142, 170; true philosopher 158–159. See also apragmosynē Hiero: 162 Hippias (sophist): 126 Homer: 38, 120 hope (elpis): Diodotus 105–107; Melian Dialogue 129 Höffe, Otfried: 144 n. 23 hubris: Alcibiades 83–84; Cambyses 61 n. 83; Croesus 101 n. 159, 132, 135; Cyrus 58 n. 63; dark horse 92; erastēs 94; Great king 79, 99–100 Hyperbolus: 35 n. 75, 178 Hystaspes: 58 n. 63 ideology: 15 n. 25 ideological indoctrination: 84, 103–104, 137. See also self-deception idiōtēs (private person): Socrates 114, 119– 120, 161; Solon 133; true philosopher 158; tyrannical man 63, 73; counterpoint to the tyrant (ruler) 161–165. See also apragmosynē inability to do what one really wants: erastēs 94; polis tyrannos 58–59, 98–99; tyrannical soul / tyrant 51, 63–65, 103, 160; Xerxes 99. See also absolute nonfreedom; compulsive behavior; to seem – to be injustice: Adeimantus 161 n. 135; Callicles 161 n. 126 and 127; Glaucon 139–140, 153–154, 161 n. 135, 162 n. 136; Polus 161 n. 126 and 127; Thrasymachus 144– 146, 161 n. 135; most perfectly unjust city 148–150. See also justice inversion of values: Callicles 71–73, 80, 127 n. 316; democratic man 87; Isocrates 71 n. 121; isonomic man 71–73, 80; pathology of war 170–171; Ps.Xenophon 71 n. 121; tyrannical man 87; Worse Argument 109 with n. 207

Irwin, Terence: 30 n. 40, 96 n. 125 Isocrates: 11–13, 44 n. 112, 71 n. 121, 75, 78, 160, 162–164, 172, 180 isēgoria: 67, 70 isonomia: 67 isonomikos anēr (isonomic man): 68–69, 71, 73. See also dēmokratikos anēr justice: Callicles 121; Glaucon 153–155; Melian Dialogue 122, 127–129; Socrates 139, 161; Thrasymachus 143–145, 147– 150. See also injustice Kakridis, Johannes: 74 n. 141 katapygōn (lecher): 87 n. 55, 96 n. 124, 109 n. 207. See also euryprōktos; kinaidos kinaidos (catamite): 87, 96, 109 n. 207, 111. See also euryprōktos, katapygōn kolakeia: the beast within 65 n. 96; rhetoric 28, 51. See also flattery kosmios (orderly way of life, orderliness): anarchia 68 n. 112; Callicles 48, 96, 167; erōs 92–93; isonomic man 68 n. 112; moderate nature 166; taxis 71 n. 125. See also sōphrosynē; taxis; anarchia; akolasia Kraut, Richard: 94 n. 105 Lacedaemonians, see Sparta lion: Alcibiades 95; Callicles 95 n. 113, 121; Pericles 39 n. 90; Thrasymachus 95 n. 113, 142; lion – tyrant (analogy) 39 n. 90 Lodge, Gonzalez: 76 n. 153 luxurious and inflamed city: 140. See also true and healthy city; most perfectly unjust city Lysias: 17, 53, 61, 91, 153 n. 82 Macedonia: 13, 52 mainomenoi (madmen): dēmos 45 n. 124, 158, 169 makarios (blessed, happy): 93 n. 87, 62, 68. See also happiness malakia (softness, unmanliness): 115–116, 166–168; the beast within 65 n. 96. See anandria mania (frenzy): Alcibiades 95 n. 109, 102 n. 167; Cambyses 61 n. 83; courageous nature 168; erōs 91; tyrant / tyrannical city 64, 87, 103–104, 169. See also mainomenoi Marathon (battle of): 42 n. 108 Massagetae: 58 n. 63 Melos / Melians: 74, 87, 98, 123, 127–130 Militiades: 26–27, 42, 82, 95, 156

VI. Index mimēsis (imitation): 74, 77, 173 with n. 224 and 225; mimēsis-alētheia 173 n. 225; mimēsis-epistēmē 173 n. 225. See also eidōlon; dokein-einai; doxa-alētheia; doxa-epistēmē Minos: 135 mirror of princes: 11–15, 141, 162, 164. See also Fürstenspiegel; mirror of tyrants mirror of tyrants: 160, 163–165, 172–173, 180–181, 185. See also mirror of princes moderation: Callicles 82; Melian Dialogue 124; Pericles 43–44 with n. 112 and 114; pathology of war 170; Solon 134; tyrannical man 103. See also sōphrosynē moderate nature: 166–167, 171. See also anandria; apragmosynē; euētheia; kosmios; sōphrosynē monarch / monarchy: 11–13, 40–41, 173. See also tyranny / tyrant Monoson, Sara: 18 n. 44, 90 n. 67 Morawetz, Thomas: 19, 60, 66, 70 most perfectly unjust city: 139–140, 148–151, 180. See also polis tyrannos multitude see dēmos myōps (gadfly): 159 Mytilene / Mytilenians: 35, 98, 126, 175–176 Nebelin, Katarina: 131 n. 341 Nicias: 20, 24 n. 15, 52–54, 58–59, 79, 83, 91, 117, 136, 167, 178 Niceratus: 153 n. 82 Nicocles: 75, 162–163 nomos :145, 160 nomos-physis: 120–122, 124 n. 294, 125– 126, 128, 130, 138, 144, 146–147, 153– 154, 179 nomothetikē technē (legislation): Socrates 117, 135; Solon 131–132, 135 nōthēs (sluggish): apragmosynē 159; dēmos 159; moderate nature 166 n. 168. See also apragmosynē Ober, Josiah: 21 n. 2, 28 n. 30, 33 Odysseus: 159 olbios (happy, blest): 73 n. 136, 131–133, 134 n. 359. See also happiness Old Oligarch, see Pseudo-Xenophon Oligarchy / oligarchs: 11, 13, 40–42 oligarchic man: 76 n. 155 Otanes: 40, 61 n. 82, 73 Paphlagon: 35, 86, 156, 176 paranomia (lawlessness): Alcibiades 101; dark horse 92; Thrasymachus 143; tyrannical man 103 n. 182

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parrhēsia (freedom of speech): democracy 62, 67; Callicles 72, 86, 96; erastēs 94; equation of values 87 n. 56; exousia 70, 72; Polus 70; shamelessness 86 patron-tyrant: 39–41, 49, 73. See also demagogue-tyrant Peloponnesian War 11 peri basileias 14, 164. See also mirror of princes Pericles 17–18, 20, 24–33, 37–39, 41–50, 52– 53, 59–60, 62, 64–65, 78, 82–83, 86, 90–91, 95–96, 98, 107, 115–117, 119, 134, 137, 140 n. 10, 150–151, 156, 166, 168–169 Pericles the Younger 53–54, 57, 74–75, 83 Persians / Persian empire: 41, 58 n. 63, 101 n. 159, 123–130, 58 n. 63, 98 n. 135, 99 Persian wars: 18, 27 n. 25, 44, 67 Phaedrus: 93 n. 89 Phidippides: 125 n. 306, 130 philia (friendship): apragmōn 113; dēmos 35, 77, 82; Callicles 77, 97, 114–115, 129– 130; erastēs 92, 94; Melian Dialogue 122, 124 n. 294, 130; most perfectly unjust city 148–149; tyrannical soul 103. See also erōs philerastia (fond of having lovers): 95 n. 109, 102. See erōs philodēmos: 35, 90, 94 n. 106. See also philia; philopolis philonikos (love for victory): Alcibiades 101 n. 163; stasis 108 philopolis: 90 n. 64; Alcibiades 94; Socrates: 118. See also philia; philodēmos philos, see philia philosophein: Pericles 115; Socrates 118; Solon 132. See also theōria philosopher/philosophy (true): 155–156, 158, 160, 162–163, 168–169. See also bios philosopher-king: 135, 140–141, 155–160, 162–164, 166, 171–173, 180–181. See also bios; mirror of tyrants phlyaria (foolery): Callicles 72, 114–115, 167; Thrasymachus 167. See also euētheia phronēsis: Callicles 72, 88, 168; moderate nature 166 phthonos (envy): 75–76, 94, 116, 133, 171. See also zēlos physician: expert 24–25, 32–33; rhetor 24– 26, 32; 161; ruler 161; statesman 24 n. 15, 26 n. 22, 165, 169; lawgiver – ruler –

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VI. Index

gods – helmsman 26 n. 22, 165; Nicias 24 n. 15; Socrates 26, 73, 119, 156, 161, 169. See also charioteer; helmsman; herdsman Pindar: 111 n. 221 Piraeus: 44–45, 53 Pisistratus: 39 pleonexia (desire to have more): Athenians 98–99, 105–107, 124; Callicles 105, 121, 137, 143; Croesus 132; Glaucon 153; luxurious and inflamed city 140 n. 10; most unjust polis 150 n. 61; stasis 108; Themistocles 105; Thrasymachus 143; tyrannical man 108; Xerxes 105, 121 Polemarchus: 135–136, 139, 148 n. 49, 151, 153 n. 82, 170 politics of fear: 174–175, 177–178. See also demagogue; populism; zero-sum game politikē (true political knowledge, statesmanship): 24 n. 15, 28, 86, 113, 117, 119, 135, 158–160, 163–166, 169, 171– 173 politikos (political expert, statesman): 34 n. 65, 133, 141, 163–166, 169, 171–173 politician (traditional): 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 49, 57, 82, 86, 113, 117–118. See also rhetor polis tyrannos (tyrant city): 19, 34–39, 50, 59, 68, 75 n. 143, 98, 106, 116–117, 126, 140–141, 150, 175, 178, 183. See also city-soul analogy; dēmos monarchos polis – fleet (analogy): 45 n. 121. Polus: 22–23, 29, 32, 34, 38 n. 82, 49–58, 60, 70–81, 84–85, 87–88, 96, 117–118, 127, 130, 132, 136, 139–140, 146–148, 152– 154, 161–162, 164, 180 Polycrates: 73 n. 136 Polynices: 90 polypragmosynē (meddlesomeness): Athenians 105–106, 108, 112; Callicles 137; just city 158; Socrates 108, 112, 114, 119, 159, 166 n. 168. See also apragmosynē populism: 174, 178–179, 181. See also demagogue, demagogue-tyrant Prodicus: 110 prosēkein (befitting): bios philosophikos 165; moderate nature 169; ta hautou prattein. See also apragmosynē Protagoras: 33, 86 Pseudo-Xenophon: 34, 43–45, 47, 49, 63 n. 90, 71 n. 121, 158 n. 111, 169

Pyrilampes: 83 Pythia: 134 Raaflaub Kurt: 18, 46, 69, 186 n. 6 Rhadamanthys: 114, 135 Raible, Wolfgang: 14 rhetoric / rhetor(s): 21, 23–32, 34–35, 41, 49, 51, 58, 62, 64–65, 70, 85–86, 109–111, 113, 118, 146, 163; true politics 161. See also physician, politician right of the stronger (traditional): 120 right of the stronger (doctrine): 120–131 Romilly, Jacqueline de: 37 n. 82, 69 Robinson, Eric: 27 n. 28 Rowe, Christopher: 93, 172 ruler: 161–165 Schütrumpf, Eckhardt: 34 n. 65, 148 n. 49 Salamis (battle of): 45 n. 121, 67 n. 104, 105 Sausage Seller: 35, 87, 97, 156, 176. See also demagogue Schofield, Malcolm: 119 n. 268, 179 n. 253 self-deception: 34, 36, 178. See also ideological indoctrination seven sages: 131–132 shame (aidōs / aischynē / aischron): Better Argument 109; Callicles 88–89, 110, 121; democracy 86; doing injustice 82, 85, 88; ēlithiotēs 167 n. 174; erōs 103– 104; Gorgias 51, 85; Melian Dialogue 122–123, 129; pathology of war 171; Polus 85, 146; shame culture 85, 146 n. 35; Socrates 88 with n. 59, 102, 111, 118; Thrasymachus 146; tyrannical man 87, 103–104; white horse 92. See also anaideia; shamelessness shamelessness: Callicles 85, 87, 168; dark horse 92; demagogues 86, 97, 156, 176, 178; democratic man 69, 87; erastēs 94; tyrannical man 87, 103–104. See also anaideia; kinaidos; shame ship of state metaphor: 155–156 Shorey, Paul: 81 n. 2 Sicilian expedition: 15, 17, 21, 52, 53, 68, 79 Sicily: 15, 17, 59 Socrates (trial of): 16–17, 110, 165 Solon: 31 n. 45, 47, 131–135, 138, sophist(s): 22, 26–28, 88, 93 n. 92, 109–111, 130–131, 146, 148, 156–157, 163, 184– 186 Sophocles: 60, 70, 128 n. 320 sōphrosynē (moderation, temperance): anandria 167, 169–170; apragmosynē 109; Athens 42; Better Argument 109;

VI. Index Callicles 48, 96, 167; Croesus 132; erōs 92, 103, 167; lotus-eaters 167; moderate nature 166, 169; pathology of war 170; Socrates 42, 48, 111, 113; tyrannical man 87, 103. See also moderation; kosmios Sørensen, Anders: 18 n. 41 Sparta / Spartans: 19 n. 55, 43, 45–46 n. 123 and 131, 74, 84, 94, 98, 105, 116, 123– 126, 138, 168 stasis (civil strife): 108, 148–150, 170–171, 174 Strepsiades: 125 n. 302, 130 Syracuse: 12, 33 ta hautou prattein (to do his own work):, Callipolis 159; philosopher-king 158– 159; prosekein 165; Socrates 119, 158– 159, 167 n. 175. See also apragmosynē Taeger, Fritz: 43 talion principle: Socrates 81, 88 taxis (order): basileus 160; Callicles 71, 167 n. 172; democratic man 68–69, 71. See also kosmios Tellus: 132 Teucrus: 53 thalassocracy (sea power): 45 Themistocles: 24–27, 35, 42, 44–46, 50, 82, 95, 105, 156 theōria: 132–133 with n. 348. See also philosophein Theramenes: 26 n. 23, 53, 56 n. 48 Thessaly: 12 Thirty Tyrants: 13, 16–17, 53, 61–62, 153 n. 82 Thrasymachus: 20, 127, 139, 142–153, 161– 162, 167, 170, 179–180 Thucydides: 15, 20, 27 n. 25, 28–29, 31–32, 34, 37, 41–46, 49, 57–59, 69, 74–76, 80, 87, 91, 94, 99–101, 105, 107–108, 115, 117 n. 252, 254 and 255, 121–122, 124– 129, 136–139, 141, 148, 150–151, 170– 171, 175–176, 178, 180–181 Tocqueville, Alexis de: 71 n. 124, 179 n. 253 tolma (courage, over-boldness): Athenians 30 n. 38, 38, 90, 105, 107; pathology of war 170; tyrannical man 104. See also andreia to seem – to be: Adeimantus 154; Athenian Assembly 64 n. 93; Athens archē 123– 124; dēmos 34, 70; dēmos monarchos 36–37; Callicles 120, 158; freedom to do what one pleases 64–65; Glaucon 151–

235

153; Pericles 150; polis tyrannos 38, 49; Polus 60, 146–147, 181; Socrates 120, 151, 158; Thrasymachus 146–147, 181. See also doxa-alētheia; doxa-epistēmē; eidōlon; mimēsis Touloumakos, Johannes: 78 Trampedach, Kai: 174 n. 230 trephein (bring up, mould): 151 true and healthy city (city of pigs): 140. See also luxurious and inflamed city; most perfectly unjust city tryphē (softness, luxury): Athens 140 n. 10; Callicles 72; Great King 79; luxurious and inflamed city 140; Socrates 79; tyrannical man 65 n. 96 typology of tyrants: 11, 13, 100, 162–164 tyrannikos anēr (tyrannical man): Callicles 22, 73, 84, 87–88, 104, 137, 164; courageous nature 171; demagoguetyrant 174, 178–179; democracy / democratic man 18, 20, 73, 87–88, 137, 183; erastēs 94 n. 103; erōs 103–104, 108, 169; inversion of values 87–88; mirror of princes 13–14, 164, 173, 180– 181, 185; pleonexia 108; philosopherking 160, 162, 164, 172–173, 180–181; total loss of freedom 184. See also democratic man; isonomic man; tyrant tyranny/tyrant(s) Alcibiades 94, 100–101; Athenian democracy 18–19, 60–65; Callicles 84; Croesus 132; enviable 73– 76, 80; erōs 93 n. 92, 103–104; Euripides 56; Glaucon 152; Gyges 152; happiness 77–78, 161; Herodotus 100; in the fifth and fourth century; mirror of tyrants 163–164; omnipotence 34–35, 37, 39–41, 49, 55, 70, 71 n. 124, 152; philosopher-king 160–163; rhetor 58, 65; Socrates 134; Solon 133; Thrasymachus 143, 146. See also monarchy; tyrannikos anēr unlimited expansionism (imperialism): Alcibiades 117, 129, 167; Athens 98– 101, 116–117, 128–129; Callicles 99; courageous nature 168; Croesus 132, Xerxes 99–100. See also anankē, compulsive behaviour vita activa – vita contemplativa 55, 76, 79, 81, 108–120, 137, 154, 158. See also bios Weber, Heinz: 105 n. 188 Wohl, Victoria: 166 n. 169

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VI. Index

Wolpert, Andrew: 16 Worse Argument (hēttōn logos) 86, 108–111, 124 n. 294, 137. See also Better Argument Xenophon: 11–13, 15, 17, 48, 57, 61, 75, 110, 145 n. 33, 160, 162–164, 172, 180 Xerxes: 20, 45, 98–100, 105, 120, 161 n. 126 Yunis, Harvey: 21 n. 2, 24 n. 15 zēlos (emulate): Aristotle 76 n. 153; Callicles 115; democratic man 69; Isocrates 75;

Melian Dialogue 74; Pericles 74–75, 78, 116; Polus 73–74, 78; Xenophon 75. See also phthonos zero-sum logic: demagogue 175–178; Callicles 177–178. See demagogue, populism Zethus: 112–115, 137 Zeus: 82, 120, 126, 128 n. 320

Plato is often reproached for having a distorted view of democracy due to prejudice and an elitist philosophical approach. Such objections are not utterly groundless, but they miss the gist of the matter. One of the main aims of this study is to show that, while conceiving his critique of democracy, Plato has a clear perception of its development and elements. A further objective is to demonstrate how he draws on democratic ideology to advance his own political theory. Accordingly, this book will expose numerous intertextual

ISBN 978-3-515-12457-7

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connections of Plato with other authors of this epoch. The first and greater part of this study reveals how in the “Gorgias” Plato gives a detailed account on the process of democratic man’s transformation into tyrannical man. The second part examines the parallels between this dialogue and the “Republic” . Thus, Plato’s intimate knowledge of democratic ideology shows that his criticism of phenomena such as absolute freedom, demagoguery (populism), glorification of power, traditional politics etc. remains relevant.

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