Taming Politics: Plato and the Democratic Roots of Tyrannical Man 3515124578, 9783515124577, 9783515124584

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STUDIES IN ANCIENT MONARCHIES Herausgegeben von

Ulrich Gotter (Konstanz), Nino Luraghi (Oxford) und Kai Trampedach (Heidelberg)

VOLUME 5

Taming Politics Plato and the Democratic Roots ofTyrannical Man

Ivan Jordovic

Franz Steiner Verlag

Umschlagabbildungen: Links: King Tiglath-pileser III of Assyria. Stone panel, ca. 728 BCE. From the Central Palače in Nimrud, now in the British Museum. © akg I Bible Land Pictures Mitte: Emperor Justinian. Mosaic, ca. 540 CE. Church of San Vitale, Ravenna. © akg / Bildarchiv Steffens Rechts: Alexander the Great at the Battle of Issos. Mosaic, ca. 100 BCE. From the Časa del Fauno, Pompeii, now in the Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Napoli. © akg / Nimatallah

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet iiber abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschliefilich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschiitzt. Jede Verwertung aufierhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulassig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2019 Druck: Memminger MedienCentrum, Memmingen Gedruckt auf saurefreiem, alterungsbestandigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-12-457-7 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-12458-4 (E-Book)

To Kurt Raaflaub in friendship and admiration

CONTENTS PREFACE........................................................................................................... 9 I. INTRODUCTION................................

II.

11

THE GORGIAS....................................................................................... 21

1. Gorgias.................................................................................................. 23 1.1. Gorgias and Pericles’ Generation................................................. 24 1.2. Freedom and Power...................................................................... 29 1.3. The Rhetor’s Freedom.................................................................. 30 1.4. Collective Wisdom.................................................................... ...32 1.5. Pericles, Polis Tyrannos and the Patron-Tyrant Concept............ 37 1.6. Athenian Arche.......................................................................... ...41 1.7. Absolute Sovereignty and Absolute Self-Sufficiency ................. 46 1.8. Summary........................................................................................ 49 2. Polus...................................................................................................... 51 2.1. Polus and the Post-Periclean Generation...................................... 52 2.2. Archelaus....................................................................................... 54 2.3. Polus and the Arginusae Scandal.................................................. 57 2.4. The Concept of Freedom to Do What One Pleases......................58 2.5. Plato and the Concept of Freedom to Do What One Pleases...... 62 2.6. Plato and the Destructive Nature of the Concept of Freedom to Do What One Pleases.................................... 65 2.7. Polus and Emulating the Happy Tyrant........................................ 73 2.8. Summary........................................................................................ 79 3. Callicles................................................................................................. 81 3.1. Callicles and Alcibiades’ Generation........................................... 83 3.2. Callicles and Shame...................................................................... 85 3.3. Callicles and Eros........................................................................... 89 3.4. Eros, Demos, Expansionism and Alcibiades........... .................... 95 3.5. Callicles and the Tyrant’s Eros....................................................102 3.6. Callicles and Pleonexia................................................................105 3.7. VitaActiva and Vita Contemplativa............................................108 3.8. The Doctrine of the Right of the Stronger.................................. 120 3.9. Socrates and Solon....................................................................... 131 3.10. Summary.................................................................................... 136

III. THE REPUBLIC................................................................................... 139 1. Tyrannical Man and Philosopher-King.............................................. 142 1.1. Thrasymachus, Callicles and Polus............................................ 142 1.2. Thrasymachus and Thucydides................................................... 148

8

Preface

1.3. 1.4. 1.5. 1.6. 1.7. 1.8.

Glaucon and Adeimantus............................................................. 151 Philosopher-King......................................................................... 155 Mirror of Tyrants......................................................................... 160 Politicus and the Mirror of Tyrants............................................ 165 Tyrannical Man, the Demagogue and the Populist..................... 173 Summary...................................................................................... 179

IV. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS................................................................ 183

V. BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................... 187 1. List of Abbreviations.......................................................................... 187 2. Works Cited........................................................................................ 187

VI. INDEX..................................................................................................... 209 1. Index Locorum....................................... 209 2. General Index...................................................................................... 228

PREFACE This study represents a thoroughly revised and enlarged version of the Serbian edition Platon i demokratski koreni tiranskog čoveka. Studije o kneževskom ogledalu, antidemokratskoj teoriji i tiranskoj tipologiji u klasičnoj Grčkoj, Beograd 2015, 216 pp. My research on tyranny in the late fifth and early fourth century led to a first brief encounter with Plato and the right of the stronger. It was illuminating and at the same time intimidating, as it raised more questions than answers. However, the final spark which ignited this project was the work on Aristotle’s concept of extreme tyranny. There are three main reasons why it has taken me a long time to write this book. One is that for me as a historian, the field of philosophy was and in many ways has remained terra incognita. Another reason is that at the time I was also working on two other books. The post-communist and post-war situation in Serbia necessitated writing a history of the Ancient Greeks (Stari Grci. Portret jednog naroda, Beograd 2011, 534 pp.). Its aim was to provide undergraduate and graduate students with an up-to-date study of Greek history from the earliest times to Alexander the Great. The subsequent research on Plato encouraged critical engagement with Xenophon’s political thought. This led not only to a new book project but to the postponement of the present study, as the work on Xenophon gave me a better understanding of Plato and vice-versa. As the manuscript on Xenophon is now at an advanced stage, I sincerely hope it will appear in the not too distant future. The last reason was that more than 70% of the research literature included in this book is not available in Serbian libraries. Thus, progress depended in many ways on the help of others. My colleagues Svetozar Boškov, Ivana Dobrivojević and Boris Stojkovski were kind enough to copy many works while on sabbaticals or short trips abroad. Nonetheless, this study would be unthinkable without the assistance of various grants. The Fondation Hardt afforded me two short stays in its most beautifiil surroundings. A generous fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung allowed me three longer visits to Bielefeld. Thanks to col­ leagues at the University, above ali Uwe Walter, Bielefeld will always be remembered as a contemporary ‘Shangri-La’. The inspiring blend of intellectual challenge and friendship helped greatly in the completion of the manuscript. An early draft of the manuscript was read by Kurt Raaflaub. His critical reading was an invaluable aid for improving and streamlining both style and content. The comments of Marijana Rici to the Serbian edition proved very instructive. Uwe Walter and Kai Trampedach graciously read the manuscript in its advanced phase and their insightful suggestions helped sharpen my understanding of many issues.

10

Preface

I am deeply grateful to the editors, in particular Kai Trampedach, for the opportunity to publish my book in the Studies in Ancient Monarchies series, and for the usefiil remarks and suggestions. The staff of the Franz Steiner Verlag Katharina Stiidemann and Andrea Hoffmann - have made this an ideal publishing experience. Since English is not my native language I am indebted to Alexandra and Mary Popović, who improved my many linguistic shortcomings and errors. Some chapters of the volume drew on my own previously published material: "Bios Praktikos and Bios Theoretikos in Plato’s Gorgias’, in: A. Stavru — C. Moore (eds.), Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue, Leiden: Brill, 2018, 369-385; ‘Platons Kritik des demokratischen Konzepts der Freiheit zu tun, was man will’, in: Jordović I. - Walter U. (eds.), Feindbild und Vorbild. Die athenische Demokratie und ihre intellektuellen Gegner, Historische Zeitschrift Beihefte (Neue Folge) Bd. 74, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018, 183-208. I am much obliged to the publishers of these essays for permission to reuse this material freely in the present study. Translations of ancient and modem texts are given in the bibliography. I dedicated the Serbian edition to my wife Jelena. My gratitude for her love, patience and support cannot be expressed in words. The English edition I dedicate to Kurt Raaflaub. His numerous studies on Greek political thought have left a lasting impact on me and his readiness to help in word and deeds has been of tremendous importance.

I. INTRODUCTION The Greeks perceived tyranny as the opposite of any good govemment, be it democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy or monarchy. Therefore, the study of the typology of tyrants can not only help us to better understand ancient tyranny but also to gain an insight into the evolution of Greek thought in general. Fourthcentury Athens holds a key place in this respect for several reasons. On the one hand, the Athenian democracy emerged renewed and strengthened from the late fifth-century turmoil. After its catastrophic defeats in the Peloponnesian War, the loss of its maritime empire and two coup d’etats, the second of which tumed into an open civil war, Athenian democracy proved to be quite stable and resilient. The constitution was slightly reformed and from then onwards democracy became more efficient and less radical. During the better part of the fourth-century the authority of the Athenian demos was undisputed. It was only the defeat in the Lamian War in 322/1 that opened the way for the dissolution of Athenian democracy. On the other hand, the same period saw the strengthening and deepening of antidemocratic thought as well as an increasingly complex and wide-ranging typology of tyrants. Finally, fourth-century Athens saw the emergence of a wide range of texts reflecting on the nature of politics through the figure of the tyrant, the Great King, the tyrannical man etc. The concurrence of these developments and phenomena cannot be explained away by coincidence. Plato, Xenophon and Isocrates in particular make it evident. Ali three men were Athenians. Their childhood and youth was marked by the Peloponnesian War, two coups and restoration of democracy. In their writings, they critically assess the way in which the Athenian people rule, without deluding themselves that change in the Athenian political system is possible under the existing circumstances. Ali three of them are involved in a competitive exchange of ideas, influencing each other through this ‘debate’.1 Ali three thinkers are among the most important sources for the typology of tyrants in the fourth-century. Finally, Isocrates and Xenophon write texts praising an ideal monarch, and even some Plato’s dialogues are to some extent related to this literary genre. Ancient literary theory paid no serious attention to the so-called Filrstenspiegel genre. As a result, it did not develop a single term for the texts that usually dealt with a single ruler or his successor and expounded the principles and virtues of good govemment.2 The modem concept of Mirror of Princes originated in the middle ages (speciilum regale, speculum regis, speculum morale regium etc.). The medieval Mirror of Princes genre was not shaped on the model of similar ancient texts. Isocrates’ Cyprian Orations and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia did not begin to 1 2

Sce Obcr l 998: 11,43 51,290-351. See Eder 1995b: 157.

12

I. Introduction

attract attention until the Renaissance. Since the medieval genre was an independent new creation, it is not usefol in tracing the origin of the ancient type of Mirror of Princes. As opposed to the medieval genre which emerged at a time when monarchy was uncontested, in classical Athens such works were produced at the time of the rule of the people.3 Pierre Hadot’s argues in his comprehensive study that the Mirror of Princes was widespread in antiquity, even though texts bearing such a title cannot be traced before the twelfth-century AD.4 Yet, Walter Eder, in his groundbreaking article Der Fiirstenspiegel in der athenischen Demokratie, justly criticizes Hadot for his too broad and vague appreciation of the Mirror of Princes genre. According to Eder, the criteria of form (prose encomium), of content (praise of an autocrat) and of the practicality of advice reveal that amongst pre-Hellenistic authors only Xenophon’s and Isocrates’ writings can be classified as Mirror of Princes literature.5 The fourth-century has long been misconceived as having been a time of crisis of the Greek polis in general and the Athenian democracy in particular. It has been believed that the inability of the traditional polis to ćope with the growing socio-political challenges caused widespread dissatisfaction with the existing socio-political order regardless of individual social status and cultural background; and that, consequently, many tumed their back on the traditional, democratic or oligarchic order and embraced the idea that a ‘strong man’ placed above ali social groups and their narrow interests could be the answer to social problems.6 The fact that tyranny re-emerged in the Greek world after nearly two generations - the last generation of earlier tyrants had been in power in the concluding decade of the flfth-century - has been interpreted as an obvious sign of the crisis. In that regard, it has also been observed that many Athenian intellectuals had ties with the most important protagonists of the later tyrannies (Syracuse, Cyprus, Thessaly, Athens, etc.). Ali this has given rise to the influential hypothesis that the authors writing in the Mirror of Princes genre longed for a monarchical leadership either in Greece as a whole or in the individual poleis, a hypothesis linked to the assumption that those authors hoped for ruthless tyrants to be tumed into good rulers by means of good education.7 In the last few decades, this thesis, and thus the basic premise of the theory about the origin of Mirror of Princes, has been effectively challenged.8 The reemergence of tyranny cannot be linked to the structural crisis of the polis.9 In

3 4 5 6 7 8

9

See Eder 1995b: 157-158. See Hadot 1972: 556; cf. also Haake 2015: 60, 63-64. See Eder 1995b: 159-160; Nippel 2017: 252-255; cf. also Balot 2006: 184-187. See, e.g., Stroheker 1953/54: 381-382; Hadot 1972: 573; Frolov 1974: 401-402, 407-410, 414; Barcelo 1993: 246-248. See Hadot 1972: 573-578. See, e.g., Deininger 1993: 55-76; Rhodes 1994: 589-591; Eder 1995a: 11-28; Davies 1995: 29-42. See Jordović 2005.

I. Introduction

13

addition, Eder has raised several important objections.1011 12 The image of the fifthcentury tyrant as a ruthless oppressor of his fellow citizens remained in force in the fourth-century. Despite this markedly negative image, the Athenians did not denounce relations with monarchs and tyrants who ruled far from Attica until after Athens’ defeat by Macedonia. Personal contacts with autocrats (Plato’s with Syracuse) or their praise (Isocrates’ of the rulers of Cyprus) were not condemned or sanctioned. Apparently, the Athenian demos did not perceive such behaviour as a serious threat to its rule. As a matter of fact, contrary to the fifth-century perception, in the fourth-century the demos saw oligarchy, not tyranny, as an antipode of democracy.n Furthermore, Plato, Isocrates, Xenophon and Aristotle never advocated a territorial monarchy; their overall political thinking remained bound to an autonomous and self-sufficient polis. Finally, even a cursory review of what Isocrates and Xenophon deem to be the attributes of a good ruler reveals their concurrence with the aristocratic-oligarchic ‘canon’ of virtue. Ali this has led Eder to conclude that the origin of the Mirror of Princes genre was closely linked to the specific socio-political situation in Athens, i.e. that the genre in fact reflected anstocratic virtues. 12 Dne to the traumatic events of 411 and 404/3 the Athenian democracy developed a strong distrust of, even aversion to, oligarchic sentiments. The regime of the Thirty Tyrants in particular had made an enduring negative impact. Consequently, in the fourth-century Athenian democracy it seemed less dangerous to eulogise aristocratic virtues by praising ancient and faraway autocracies than by writing in a manner that could have easily been labelled as oligarchic.13 This is an innovative understanding of Mirror of Princes insofar as it shows that the traditional approach of examining this literary genre, and the typology of tyrants, separately from antidemocratic thought has become obsolete. The Filrstenspiegel literary genre cannot be fully understood without taking antidemocratic thought and democratic ideology into account since they are closely linked phenomena.14 There is a prevalent opinion in academic circles that several writings of Xenophon and Isocrates may be classified under the Mirror of Princes category. But the opinions diverge widely with regard to Plato. While some, such as Hadot, include Plato among representatives of this literary genre, others, such as Eder, vehemently disagree. Although Eder’s view at first seems justified, given the strict criteria he proposes, there are reasons why no study of fourth-century writings which reflect on the nature of politics through the figure of the tyrant, the Great King and the tyrannical man can be considered complete without the famous philosopher. Plato is not just one of the greatest thinkers of his time. He is also, as his dialogues such as the Gorgias, Republic, Statesman and Laws show, keenly interested in political thought. More importantly still, Plato’s theory about

10 11 12 13 14

See Eder 1995b: 160—171. See Kaibell893: 196; Rhodes 1981: 461 462; Jordović 2006: 31-32. See Eder 1995b: 171-173. See Eder 1995b: 166-173. See, e.g., Barcelo 1993; Roberts 1994; Ober 1998; Nadon 2001; Samons 2004; Gray 2010.

14

I. Introduction

how even the best human nature can tum bad and become capable of worst crimes as a result of bad education, and about the emergence of the tyrannical from the democratic man, put the issue of proper education for gifted young people in the centre of Greek political thought. There was just a small step from this position to the question of the virtues of a good ruler. However, in the recent past some have argued against the existence of the Mirror of Princes as a strictly literary genre.15 In his stimulating contribution to the concept of the Mirror of Princes in Greco-Roman antiquity, Matthias Haake argues that the strong focus on content and its paraenetic intention has led to the misleading conclusion that a wide range of very different texts can be seen as Filrstenspiegel^6 He starts, following Wolfgang Raible, from the premise that pre-modem texts need to have five constitutive elements to establish a literary genre: the author is seen not as an individual but as a member of a specific social group with a characteristic social role; the addressee is regarded in the same manner; the form of the text; the content of the text; the implied audience of the text. In applying this model it must be observed that the author, addressee and audience constitute the explicit frame of the communicative situation of the text.17 Regarding this model, Haake deduces that the treatises Peri Basileias, whose earliest specimen was in ali likelihood Aristotle’s On Kingship, form a literary genre.18 The characteristics of this genre are: the authors are always philosophers writing in their social role as intellectuals; the addressees are without exception Hellenistic kings; the form is a self-contained prose text; the content consists not of monarchical theory or concrete instructions for a ruler, but portrays the figure of the good monarch as opposed to the tyrant; the audience is the world of the Hellenistic cities.19 Conceming the socio-political, cultural and historical context of this genre, Haake concludes that on a highly symbolic level, the treatises On Kingship were, like the civic ruler cult, a part of the communication between the cities and the kings in the Hellenistic period.20 The texts which reflect on monocratical rule (archaic tyrants, Hellenistic kings, Roman emperors eto.), but do not fulfil the above criteria, Haake subsumes under the term monocratological texts.21 His argument is undoubtedly usefol, since it alerts us to the risks of an overly broad understanding of the Mirror of Princes. Nonetheless, this study should show that a strict categorization is not always helpful in grasping the development of political thought. In ancient Greece there was no profound difference between philosophy and political theory. Since Greek philosophers decisively influenced the development of the field of human thought that is now often subsumed under the term ‘political theory’, Athenian political and philosophical texts have for a long time been the 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

See E. M. Jonsson 2006: 164; cf. Haake 2015: 63-66, esp. 65-66. See Haake 2015: 58-78, esp. 66-73; see also Id. 2018: 299-315, esp. 309-315. See Haake 2015: 69-70; Raible 1980. See Haake 2013: 168; Id. 2015:70. See Haacke 2015: 70. See Haacke 2015: 70-72. See Haacke 2015: 73.

I. Introduction

15

subject of study of philosophers and political theorists. By their very nature philosophical and theoretical treatises seek to find etemal truths, be they metaphysical ones or the principles of human political action. However, as much as they strive for objectivity, political philosophers are inevitably embedded in the political realities of their own time, and their work often tends to reflect a desire to change those realities. Such approach to political thought is recognisable even in the works of some of the greatest ancient historians. Whereas the primary focus of the modem historian is to provide an objective and reasonable account of historical events, in ancient Greece that was just one of the purposes of historical writing. Some of the major Greek historians, such as Thucydides, were guided by Cicero’s famous motto: historia magistra vitae est. Thus Thucydides endeavoured not only to give an accurate account and make sense of historical events but also to understand and provide insight into inherent laws of human history, which is why the famous Athenian historian is said to be one of the precursors of modem political thought.22 It is not surprising, then, that philosophers and political theorists who study the works of their Greek predecessors tend to focus on what seems to be timeless in their texts and to neglect the historical conteXt in which the texts were created. This, in tum, opens the door to a propensity to read ancient political texts from the perspective of a philosophical tradition that eventually derived from them rather than in the appropriate historical context. It may also promote the perception that more or less fully worked out political theories must precede political practices.2324 As a result, the risk of reading modem mind-sets and values into ancient texts increases. A good example of such tendencies is the so-called Darker (Tronic) Reading of Xenophon’s Hiero and Cyropaediau Neglecting the political and historical context in which ancient texts were written also results in the tendency to examine them in isolation from one another. By way of contrast, this study proposes a shift of focus to the historical context. Thus it examines the links between Plato’s dialogues and democratic ideology, antidemocratic thought, typology of tyrants and texts traditionally subsumed under the notion of the Mirror of Princes.25 Undoubtedly Plato’s philosophy aimed to give timeless answers to timeless questions. Nonetheless, his horizon of experience was not timeless - his self-limitation to the world of the polis is the best example. More importantly, his formative years were profoundly shaped by widespread and intense turmoil. Plato was bom between 428/27 and 425/24,26 so that his transition from boyhood to manhood saw the annihilation of the Athenian forces in Sicily, the first overthrow and restoration of democracy, the flourishing of the sycophants and Alcibiades’ comeback. In his twenties he

22 23 24 25

26

See Strasburger 1968: 412-476, esp. 413-414, 420, 423-426, 434-435, 437^438, 442M66; Jaeger 1973: 479-489; Ober: 2006: 131-159, esp. 131-136, 153-159. See Vidal-Naquet 1995: 21; Ober 1994b: 154-156. See Gray 2010: 56-67. Regarding notions of ideology and democratic ideology see Ober 1989: 38MO; Raaflaub 2006a: 398-401; Schofield 2006: 282; Jordović - Walter 2018b: 19-33. Diog. Laert. 3.2; see Nails 2002: 243-247.

16

I. Introduction

witnessed Alcibiades’ defmite downfall, the Arginusae affair, the historic defeat of Athens, the tyranny of the Thirty and Socrates’ trial. Even in the case that the Seventh Letter is not authentic, which is not the prevalent opinion,27 it was written around the middle of the fourth-century by someone who was very familiar with the matter.28 In this letter the ‘Damascene moment’ of Plato from bios politikos to bios philosophikos is explicitly linked to the tyranny of the Thirty and Socrates’ trial.29 During the reign of terror of the Thirty Tyrants, about 2,500 people were executed, some 1,500 of them citizens.30 Athens had at that time certainly fewer than 30,000 citizens, probably less than 20,000. Some scholars assume that the number could be as low as 13,000.31 This means that over a period of eight months, around 5 10% of Athenian citizens were murdered as a result of the wave of repression by the Thirty. Not surprisingly, some contemporaries claimed that in eight months they killed almost more Athenians than ali the Peloponnesians in the last ten years of the war (413—404).3233 Andrew Wolpert has shown that the numerous and arbitrary executions, the massive expulsions, the ruthless confiscations of property and the deprivation of thousands of Athenians of their civic rights bumed deeply into the collective memory. 33 Every reader of Plato should ask himself how he would react and what impact it would have on his worldview if in his formative years he vvitnessed at first hand the killing of 5 10% of his fellow adult males - particularly bearing in mind that this happened over a short period of time, without the assistance of modem methods of killing, in a relatively small area and in an open-air society where many citizens knew one another. To this should be added that one of Plato’s relatives was the leader of this regime (Critias), while another was a high-ranking member (Charmides).34 27 28 29 30

31

32 33

34

See Aalders 1972: 151-152, 166-167; Knab 2006: 1-6. See Aalders 1972: 148-149; Trampedach 1994: 255-277, esp. 255, 258-259, 276. Pl. Ep. 7.324b-326b. For the notion of Damascene moment and Plato see Haake 2009: 118-119. Isoc. 7.67; 20.11; Aeschin. 3.235; Schol. Aeschin 1.39; Arist. Ath. Pol. 35.4; see Lehman 1995: 145; Jordović 2005: 184-185; Wolpert 2006: 213-222, esp. 217-218; Shear 2011: 180-185, esp. 182. In the Ecclesiazusae Aristophanes mentions in passing that the number of Athenian citizens is 30,000 (Ar. Eccl. 1131-1133). However, Mogens Hansen (1986: 27) argues that this is a conventional figure of little or no value vvhenever it is found. The number of Citizen at the end of Peloponnesian war was, in any case, much lower than 30,000, considering that 404 is an all-time low and 31,000 is the higher figure for the number of adult male Athenian citizens in the fourth-century; see Hansen 1986: 14-69; Id. 2006: 20; Bleicken 1995: 546-548. Jochen Bleicken (1995: 99) says that according to a pessimistic assessment 2/3 of Athenians, who were fit for military Service, died during the Peloponnesian war. It therefore follows that the number of Athenian citizens in 404 could have been around 16,000-17,000. Eberhard Ruschenbusch (1979: 145-147, esp. 146) gives the absolute lowest estimate by claiming that Athens had only 13,000 citizens at the end of the Peloponnesian war. Xen. Hell. 2.4.21; cf. also Isoc. 4.113. Wolpert 2002; see, e.g., Xen. Hell. 2.3.14-17, 21, 38-40; 47; Diod. 14.4.3-4, 32.2; Lys. 12.21-22,30-31,96-97. See Irwin 1992: 60-61; Hitz 2010: 103-104.

I. Introduction

17

That Socrates’ trial represents a tuming point in Plato’s life is well-known. The Apologia Socratis, and the fact that Socrates was a key figure in almost ali of Plato’s dialogues are proof of a deep attachment. Xenophon explicitly points out that the prevailing opinion that Socrates had been the teacher of Alcibiades and Critias was the main reason for his indictment.35 Even fifty years after the trial, Aeschines mentions as a well-known fact that the “sophist” Socrates was put to death because he was the teacher of the leader of the Thirty.36 Alcibiades and Critias were responsible for the greatest man-made catastrophes of the Peloponnesian war era. The former was a driving force behind Athens greatest military defeat (the Sicilian expedition), the Spartan occupation of Deceleia and the first overthrow of democracy (the Four Hundred).37 The latter was the leader of the most heinous regime in Athens history - the Thirty Tyrants.38 This implies that Socrates, at least in the eyes of some Athenians, was partially responsible for their defeat and the dreadful wave of terror to which they fell victim. The root cause of Athens’ downfall was a current and important question in the fourth-century. The best-known answer is provided by Thucydides in his Obituary for Pericles. According to the historian, the main culprits for the defeat of Athens were the politicians who succeeded Pericles. Their immense, selfserving ambition meant they were so at odds with one another that they did not lead the demos, but surrendered the leadership to its whims. Personal intrigues after Sicily led to the first intemal strife. Nonetheless, Athens’ power was so great that for many years it withstood its numerous enemies. The Athenians did fmally succumb, when they again became victim of their own private quarrels. Thus, Athens’ downfall was not the result of the strength of her enemies or a systemic defect of democracy, but of the intemal discord induced by egotistical and powerhungry politicians.39 Lysias, Aeschines and even Plato confirm that this was indeed a widely-held belief among the Athenians.40 Since Alcibiades and Critias were the two most notorious politicians, this sort of answer certainly did not help to exempt Socrates. Plato’s answer was, as will be shown, diametrically opposed: democratic ideology was to blame for the emergence of individuals who thought only in categories of power and Socrates could not have done anything about it. It is often said of Plato that his perception of the nature of democracy is marked by prejudice and a philosophical approach to the extent that his interpre-

35 36 37

38 39 40

Xen. Mem. 1.2.12—47; see also Pl. Ap. 19c-d, 32c-d, 33a-b; Diog. Laert. 2.38-39. Aeschin. 1.173. Thuc. 2.65.11-12; 6.19, 88.10, 91.6, 93.1-2, 103.2—4, 104; 7.2, 18.1 (Deceleia), 7.87.5-8.1 (Sicily); 8.48.1-4 (the Four Hundred). See Jordović 2005: 169-225. Thuc. 2.65.7, 10-13; see Bleckmann 1998: 318-333. Lys. 2.63-65; Aeschin. 2.176; Pl. Menex. 243d; Isoc. 20.10-11; see also Ar. Eq. 180-222, 1111-1150, 1321, 1339-1354; Lys. 12.40; 25.21-22, 25-28; Isoc. 4.75-79; 18.45-46; Arist. Ath. Pol. 28, esp. 28.1; cf. Rhodes 1981: 344-345; Bleckmann 1998: 324; Schofield 2000: 198-199; Wolpert 2002: 121-123.

18

1. Introduction

tation of historical facts and political reality is far too free.41 Doubtless Plato did not care mucli about the specific structures of any particular political system. The focus of his attention was the effect of a political order and the influence of its predominant values on the moral and psychological conditions in the state,42 although here too he has been criticised for not taking sufficient account of reality.43 Such objections are certainly not groundless, but one of the main aims of the present study is to show that, while conceiving and writing his theory on the origins of tyrannical man, Plato had a clear perception of the development of Athenian democratic ideology and that this affected his condemnation of democracy to a far greater degree than is generally imagined.44 A further objective is to demonstrate that Plato drew on democratic political theory and practice not only in criticising democracy, but also in advancing his own political theory. In the light of this and my own background, this study will focus on the structure and development of some of Plato’s concepts and their relationship to the historical context. In other words, this investigation attempts to fiise intellectual history, conceptual history and classical philosophy.45 In his fascinating analysis Kurt Raaflaub has shown that freedom became a political virtue only after the Persian wars.46 The conceptualisation of political freedom (both intemal and extemal) was the result of Greek experience with the tyrants, the new isonomic constitution, renewed factionalism among the aristocracy and, most importantly, the threat of “enslavemenf ’ under the yoke of the Great King.47 After 478, the uniqueness of Athenian arche was the catalyst for the evolution of the terminology of freedom.48 It reached its maturity during the middle and later years of the fifth century, when the Athenian naval alliance revealed its true nature. Freedom and its opposite became progressively important factors in Interstate debates and negotiations. As a result, an increasingly differentiated terminology of freedom, domination and servitude emerged. The

41

42

43 44

45 46 47 48

See, e.g., Ostwald 1986: 244; Vidal-Naquet 1995: 33; Frede 1997: 253, 258-265; Dalfen 2004: 109; Kersting 22006 : 266-268; Scott 2008: 375; cf. also Annas 1981: 302-305, esp. 304; Popper 71992: 52; Yunis 1996: 136-145; Morgan, 2003: 199-200; contra Monoson 2000: 113-153; see also Anders Sorensen’s (2016) careful analysis of Plato’s assessment of democracy’s epistemic potential. Pl. Rep. 368c-369a, 544d-e; 545b; 548d; see Frede 1996: 260-261; Id. 1997: 258-259. Kurt Raaflaub (1992: 50-59) has shown that ethical aspects were an integral part of political thought in the late fifth-century. See Frede 1996: 260-266; Id. 1997: 261-265. Sara Monoson (2000: 113-114) notes: “Plato’s depiction of democracy as exquisitely vulnerable to collapse into tyranny does not explain the dynamics of Athenian history, nor does it address the variety of changes that have occurred in actual regimes. Aristotle complains about this feature of Republic 8, pointing out that the history of Greek cities shows that regimes change form in ali directions and for reasons more diverse that Plato has Socrates speak of in Republic 8 {Politics 1316al-b30).” Cf. Vidal-Naquet 1995: 21; Ober 1994b: 154-157; Raaflaub 2004: 5-9; Schofield 2006: 4-5. See Raaflaub 2004: 23-57. See Raaflaub 2004: 45-117. See Raaflaub 2004: 118-128.

I. Introduction

19

allies’ loss of sovereignty and Athens’ interference in their intemal affairs meant that the situation of the allies was understood as doulosyne, that autonomia evolved into a catchword against Athenian supremacy and that Athens was labelled as a polis tyrannos.V9 For the Athenians, because of their special circumstances, freedom and independence could only mean sovereignty over their empire (arche). In simple terms, rule over others is declared to be the prerequisite for freedom.49 50 Consequently, the Athenians developed the notion of absolute sovereignty (equality or superiority in ali agreements), absolute self-sufficiency (the capability to ensure by its own power the permanent fulfilment of ali needs), and absolute freedom (freedom not merely from domination by others but to dominate others).51 Since, in the eyes of the Athenians by late Periclean times only Athens, as polis tyrannos, complies with ali these elements, it is the megiste polis kai eleutherotate,52 The final development took place around the 440s, as shifts in domestic politics and ideological conflict caused freedom to evolve into a fiindamentally democratic virtue.53 Accordingly, as shown by Thomas Morawetz’s analysis of the concept offreedom to do what onepleases, demos’ freedom on the level of intemal politics was also strongly associated with tyrannical behaviour and rule {demos tyramos).54 This extremely brief overview of the concept of political freedom reveals how the notion of political freedom progressed from not being unfree, to being equal and not being ruled at ali, and eventually to the concept that only the ruler is fiilly free. As mentioned above, this evolution was closely intertwined with the development of the Athenian arche and democracy. Thus, the idea that absolute freedom leads to tyranny and that the driving force behind this striving for total freedom were the Athenian democracy and arche, was conceptualized no later than the age of Pericles. From it follows that the ćore elements of Plato’s thesis that the pursuit of absolute freedom transforms the democratic man into a tyrant, existed long before the Gorgias and the Republic were written. The aim of this study is to show how Plato took over this and other democratic concepts and inverted them, in order to show that (democratic) Athenian striving for absolute freedom would lead not only to the oppression of other Greeks, but of the Athenian democrats themselves.55

49 50 51 52 53 54 55

See Raaflaub 2004: 128-165, 193-202; cf. alsoId. 1994: 111 withn. 17. See Raaflaub 2004: 166-193. See Raaflaub 2004: 181-193. See Raaflaub 2004: 189-190. See Raaflaub 2004: 203-243, 247-249. Morawetz 2000; see also Kallet 2003: 117-144; Ober 2003: 229-235; Raaflaub 2003: 81-82. Aristotle reaches a similar conclusion with regard to Sparta {Pol. 1333b29—33): eri 8š on 8ta tovio 8si rr|v iroAv evSaijiova vouičciv Kai tov voLioOĆTtjV ereatvstv, oti Kparstv ijaKqoi:v širi to tibv rrć'/.r/.c ap%etv: ratna vap pcvd/.riv c/.a ofj/.ov vdp ori Kal tov toAtov toj Svvapevco tovto rtEtparsov SuvKEtv, oiuog 8vvr|Tai ti)c oiicciac Ttd/.civc ap'/ctv - And again it is not a proper ground for deeming a State happy and for praising its lawgiver, that it has practised conquest with a view to ruling over its neighbours. This principle is most disastrous; it follows from it that an individual Citizen who has the capacity ought to endeavour to attain the power to hold sway over his own city; (trans. H. Rackham).

20

I. Introduction

This analysis will also reveal that Plato’s criticism of democracy was largely based on thorough knowledge of other authors of his time. Numerous intertextual connections can be found, especially with Thucydides, Aristophanes, Herodotus and Euripides. It is conspicuous in particular that certain parts of their works influenced Plato - in Thucydides Pericles’ Funeral Oration, Pericles’ last speech, the Obituary for Pericles, the Melian Dialogue, and the Sicilian Debate, and in Herodotus the Lydian logos and the debate in Xerxes’ crown council. In fact, Greek political thought did not produce a single work that was comprehensive and systematic enough to be considered a statement of democratic political theory.56 Accordingly, criticising the authors, or rather those parts of their works, that reflected democratic ideals was one of the best methods available to discredit democratic ideology. The focus of the study is on two of Plato’s works: Gorgias and Republic, but mainly on the former. The reason for this approach, which may perhaps seem unusual, is that the model of degeneration of constitutions in Book 8 of the Republic - notably the two worst systems, democracy and tyranny - picks up on the theories of Thrasymachus. His arguments, again, simply encapsulate and round off what Gorgias treats at greater length and depth. If Gorgias gives a detailed account of the process of democratic man’s transformation into tyrannical man, then parallels must exist between this dialogue and the Republic. That they do indeed exist has been accepted for some time.57 The first and greater part of this study, therefore, examines the Gorgias with the intention to demonstrate how Plato, through allusion to important democratic concepts, values, and ideals (such as freedom, equality, or licence to do what one pleases), and by reference to the great leaders of democracy (such as Pericles, Nicias and Alcibiades),58 endeavours to show that the democratic ideology of freedom is responsible for the emergence of individuals whose ideal and teaching is the right of the stronger, that is, tyranny. At the same time, connections will be pointed out between Callicles and the tyrannical man of the Republic. However, since not ali connections can be reconstructed in this way, the second, shorter part of this study is dedicated to the Republic and the connections between this, Plato’s best-known work, and Gorgias.

56 57 58

See Jones 1957: 41; Raaflaubl989: 33-34; Id. 2018a: 154-160; Nippel 2016: 74-78; Jordović - Walter 2018b: 12-13, 25-27. See the part The Republic. For Plato’s descriptions of evolution as a transition of generations, i.e. father-son stories, see Kersting 2006: 273.

II. THE GORGIAS The Gorgias is not only one of the longest but also among the most complex of Plato’s dialogues. The constant introduction of new questions, the resulting continual expansion of the subjects discussed, and the build-up of opposites gave rise to a wide variety of opinions on the meaning and objective of the dialogue, issues on which disagreement among scholars is considerable. The major themes usually cited are justice, criticism of Sophistic teachings (rhetoric), and the defence of Socrates.1 Since Gorgias was Plato’s most important political dialogue prior to the Republic, numerous studies emphasise its political dimension.2 This study will attempt to show that Gorgias offers in fact a subtle criticism of Athenian democratic ideology; it will therefore not examine ali aspects of the dialogue.34This approach does not, and does not intend to, question the importance of other factors (such as the role of the sophists or that of teaching) in influencing the conception of the Gorgias? An important feature of the Gorgias is its equivocality which is at times so pronounced as to amount to an ambiguity that can easily confuse readers or interpreters and lead them down the wrong path.5 This feature is perhaps best visible in the date of the dialogue’s action. Indications provided by Plato suggest that it could have taken place at any time over a period of about twenty years.6 The terminus post quem is 427, the year when Gorgias first čame to Athens and, as head of the Leontinian delegation, inveigled the Athenians into their first military intervention in Sicily. Thus, Gorgias’ rhetorical skill is indirectly linked to the greatest Athenian disaster - the (second) Sicilian campaign. The prytany of Socrates’ tribe in the year 407/6 marks the terminus ante quem. Hence, Socrates’ “political skill” is directly linked to his “unsuccessful” opposition to the violation of the law during the infamous Arginusae trial. These peculiarities of chronology along with other inconsistencies, already a subject of criticism in ancient times, 1 2

3

4

5 6

Cf. Kobusch 1996: 47-63; Apelt 1998: 2-3; Heitsch2004: 50-51; Dalfen 2004: 107-113. See Dodds 1959: 31-34; Klosko 1983: 579; Schofield 2000: 192; Rowe 2007c: 27-28; Tamopolsky 2010: 29. Harvey Yunis and Josiah Ober have established numerous intertextual links betvreen Gorgias and other contemporary works, which also criticized democracy, Yunis 1996: 136-236, esp. 136-171; Ober 1998: 198-199. Cf. Vogt 1968: 296-297; Guthrie 1975: 294-296. However, this approach is not challenging the importance of the aristocracy for the emergence and development of the Athenian democracy. Cf. Vidal-Naquet 1995: 21, 29-33. The Gorgias is characterized by a strong political dimen­ sion, see Rowe 2007b: 29, 31-32. The fact that the dialogue is named after Gorgias, who of ali Socrates’ interlocutors speaks the least, is an excellent example of this; cf. Levett 2005: 210; Rowe 2007d: 94-95. See Fussi 2000: 42; Dalfen 2004: 119-122; Tamopolsky 2010: 30-31; cf. also Benardete 1991: 7.

22

II. The Gorgias

lead to two conclusions.7 First, they suggest to the reader that the discussion at the centre of the dialogue is not only fictitious but also of a very generalised nature. For the same reason, it is also impossible to determine the place where the discussion unfolded.8 Nor, again, is it possible to form an idea of the identity of Callicles.9 The elusive identity of the main protagonist of the dialogue allows a portrayal not only of the character of a certain person, but of a specific type of personality, in this case the sort that is guided only by the principle might is right, i.e. tyrannical man.10 The second conclusion is that the systematic use of anachronisms and their deliberate linking to the chief points of the dialogue exclude any possibility that this might be a case of coincidence or oversight.11 Instead, it seems more reasonable to assume that these chronological pointers are meant to serve as signposts, by which Plato endeavours to outline the genesis of a depraved ethic.12 That this is a lengthy process can be seen from the division of the Gorgias into three smaller discourses, during which the standpoints of Socrates’ interlocutors gradually harden into unscrupulous individualism and reflections on categories of power.13 In other words, Socrates’ interlocutors in the Gorgias - Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles - personify the scale of increasing imperfection in ways that are similar to the ongoing degradation of bad constitutions and the corresponding psychopathology of the human characters in the Republic. Opposite them stands Socrates as the paradigm of the perfect philosophical way of life. The present study analyses this history of ethical decline as well as the factors with which Plato links it.

7

8 9

10

11

12 13

Diod. 12.53.2-5: “Now when Gorgias had arrived in Athens and been introduced to the people in assembly, he discoursed to them upon the subject of the alliance, and by the novelty of his speech he filled the Athenians, who are by nature clever and fond of dialectic, with wonder. [...] In the end he won the Athenians over to an alliance with the Leontines, [...].“ (trans. C. H. Oldfather); see also Thuc. 3.86.3; Pl. Grg. 473e-484a; Xen. Hell. 1.7.15; Ath. 5.216c, 217c-218e; cf. Dodds 1959: 17-18, 247-248; Yunis 1996: 118-119; Dalfen 2004: 120. The chapter II.3.9. Socrates andSolon shows that during the Arginusae scandal Socrates was only ostensibly unsuccessful, since no one could have curbed the totally blinded demos (tyrannos). See Fussi 2000: 45 46; cf. also Dodds 1959: 188; contra Dalfen 2004: 11. On the numerous attempts to identify which well known Athenian (e.g. Critias, Alcibiades) is concealed behind Callicles’ name see Gauss 1956: 58-59; Dalfen 2004: 132-137. William Guthrie (1969: 102) reached the following conclusion as a result: “Plato may well have taken elements from different sources and built up in the person of Callicles a somewhat stylized presentation of the doctrine ‘might is right’ in its most extreme form.”; see also Leppin 2013: 156. The following comment of Otto Apelt (1998: 5) makes this evident: “Alles in diesem Werk ist hinsichtlich der Darstellungsform auf das feinste abgewogen, alles auf das genaueste und in ruhigster Erwagung berechnet, alles mit frischesten Parben gegeben.” On the unity of the different parts of Gorgias see Stauffer 2006. Cf. Hentschke 1971: 38; Ostwald 1986: 244; Rutherford 1995: 142; Stauffer 2006: 15; Doyle 2006: 599-600. The increasingly harsher positions of Socrates’ interlocutors concur with the harsher tone of the discussion; see Klosko 1983: 591-592.

1. GORGIAS The first and briefest conversation in the Gorgias takes place between Socrates and Gorgias of Leontini, from whom the dialogue derives its name.1 The starting point is Socrates’ question to the famous sophist conceming the art (techne) in which he has been trained. Gorgias replies that oratory is his profession which he has not only mastered but is also capable of teaching to others. Gorgias cites 'speech’ (logos) as the subject of rhetoric.2 Socrates objects that other arts also use speeches, and in the discussion that follows both men arrive at the conclusion that oratoiy is a skill of persuasion that creates belief, not knowledge, of what is really just or unjust.3 In spite of this, Gorgias continues to glorify his profession, pointing out that it encompasses ali others and rules over them.4 At the same time, he distances himself from the unjust use of rhetoric, offering the opinion that it is just to punish those who abuse oratory but not the teachers of the art themselves.5 Socrates perceives here an inconsistency and asks whether a teacher of rhetoric should also instruct his students in what is just and unjust. Gorgias replies in the affirmative, thus contradicting himself: he had previously admitted that oratory could be used for unjust purposes,6 while Socrates had used numerous analogies to show that a man who has successfully completed training for a profession is precisely that for which the profession has equipped him. The logical consequence is that a person who has leamed what is just is also just.7 At this point, the discussion between Gorgias and Socrates is interrupted: Polus joins in the conversation, insisting that his teacher has only agreed with Socrates out of a sense of shame. Based on this brief review of the exchange of opinions between Gorgias and Socrates, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the topics of conversation are solely philosophical questions and the negative aspects of sophistic teaching, in this case rhetoric. This impression is ali the more powerful since the term rhetorike, the original term for the art of oratory, appears for the first time in this dialogue, with a simultaneous and explicit attack on the sophists who teach it.8 Although this impression has held sway for a long time, it is too one-dimensional. The term orator (rhetor) has unequivocally political connotations. It is not only used for an active and engaged Citizen who appears publicly in the Assembly,

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Pl. Grg. 449c -461b. Pl. Grg. 449d-e; see Irwin 1979: 114; Dalfen 2004: 180. Pl. Grg. 452e, 455a. Pl. Grg. 456a-b. Pl. Grg. 456c-e. Pl. Grg. 459d-460b. Pl. Grg. 460 b-c. Pl. Grg. 448d-452a; see Yunis 1996: 17; Id. 1998: 225-226; Schiappa 1999: 14-23.

24

II. The Gorgias

but also as a synonym for the word 'politician’.9 Accordingly, it is no surprise that in the Gorgias Socrates calls famous past statesmen of Athens 'rhetors’.10 Gorgias’ discussion with Socrates leaves no doubt that he applies the terms rhetor and rhetoric primarily in a political sense. Although at the beginning he gives a rather vague definition of the orator’s skill,11 Gorgias then goes on to claim that it entails the ability to use words in order to persuade the courts, the council, the people in the assembly, or any kind of political gathering.12 Later, as proof of the power of rhetoric, Gorgias says that the shipyards, docks, and fortifications of Athens were raised thanks to the rhetorical skills of Themistocles and Pericles.13 In view of ali this, it is not surprising that recent studies emphasize that Plato wrote the Gorgias not least to criticize democratic rhetoric and knowledge.14 The political dimension of the Gorgias, however, is much broader and cannot be reduced merely to these two aspects. A series of indicators permit the con­ clusion that the dialogue contains a fondamental condemnation of the Athenian democratic order. This is reflected in the fact that Plato establishes a connection between ali of Socrates’ interlocutors and Athenian democratic ideology. That the views of these interlocutors become increasingly radical suggests that Plato intends to trače the emergence of an unscrupulous mentality that thinks primarily in categories of power. In this process, the famous sophist from Leontini is assigned the role of a catalyst. Indeed, Plato links Gorgias himself in multiple ways with the Athenian ideology of freedom.

1.1. Gorgias and Pericles’ Generation That Plato links the famous sophist with the Athenian ideology of freedom is obvious in Gorgias’ third definition of the nature of rhetoric which claims that, thanks to his rhetorical skill, the rhetor is easily able to convince the masses in the assembly to elect him rather than a true professional State physician.15 Directly 9 10 11

12 13 14 15

See Finley 1962: 12-13; Hansen 1983: 33-55; Rhodes 1986: 140-141; Ober 1989: 104-12; Yunis 1996: 9-12; Id. 1998: 229; Sorensen 2016: 48—49. Pl. Grg. 520a-b. According to Gorgias, rhetoric is the art of speech and its subject is the greatest and best of human concems (Pl. Grg. 450b, 451 d); cf. Yunis 1996: 119-120; Dalfen 2004: 188. Pl. Grg. 452e; cf. Rhodes 1986: 140. Pl. Grg. 455d-e. See Yunis 1996: 136-60; Ober 1998: 190-213; Schofield 2006: 65-66; Sorensen 2016: 43. Pl. Grg. 456b-c. First definition: rhetoric is a eraft which carries out and achieve everything through speech (Pl. Grg. 450b-d, 45 Id). Second definition: rhetoric is in reality the greatest good. It is the source of freedom for humankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the source of rule over others in one’s city (Pl. Grg. 452d-e). Yunis (1996: 123) points out that the physician serves throughout Plato’s work and in particular in Gorgias as a paradigm for the political techne-, see also Trampedach 1994: 167-168. In the Sicilian debate Nicias says to the prytanis that he should be “physician for the State when it has taken bad advice”, and that he should “help his country as much as possible or at least not willingly harm it” (Thuc. 6.14); see Hornblower 2004: 69-70. On the physician - statesman analogy in

1. Gorgias

25

before this statement, the sophist cites Themistocles and Pericles in support of his theory.16 Abruptly, and without being prompted specifically, he then goes on to expound on the just use of the rhetorical skill, insisting that the teacher of rhetoric is not responsible for its abuse by his pupils, and conceding that pupils abusing this power must be punished severely:17 ak'k’ e.y& oot rtetpacopai, & EeoKparsc;, cuuporg i/TOKa/ah/ai. rf]v Tfjg ppropiKfji; liuvaiuv artaaav aiiroc. yap ica/.oic uipip'paoi. oiaOa yap Sijjrou ori w vscopia raura icai m Tsi/r] to AOpvaicov Kai f| i&v Apevcov icaTacncsuf| šic Tfjg 0eliitook/.ćouc ovptPou/ftc. ye.yove\>, ra 8’ ek Tfjg ncpiK/.r.ovp 6Xk’ ouk ek tćov dipiioupy>v. vt^Ea0ai sv £KKXr)cjta i) ev a/.'iJji tivI ni>/j.6y(n oitĆTEpov Ssi aipsOfjvai iarpov, ou8apou av (pavfjvat tov iarpov, a/./.’ alpEOfjvat av tov sircsiv Suvarov, si Pow.oi.to. icai si rtpoc Tspov sirtoi 6 pipropiKop i] aA.X.og oorioouv TĆOV 61]piOI)p'/d)V EV KX.f|0£l. f] LIEV OUV 8wa(J.lg TOCaUTT] EStIv Kai TOtaUTT] TT]C TĆ'/VpC 8ei lićvtoi. a> ScuicpaTKc. rij |Sr]Topii vijv, & KaMdKlet;, opoiorarov tovtco EpydCrp čyi«opidy:i; dvOpcbJtov;, o't Toijzov; sloTiaKaotv r:i)tC'ta 8’ ayyđa Terpppšva Kai aa0pd, dvavKdčoiTo 8' asi Kai vukto. Kai puspav mpTt/.ćivai aura, fj tii; ćo/drac A.wtowo /-rujtac' apa roiodrov ŠKaršpov ovroc rod piou, /.r/sip rov rov dKO/.doTov evSatpovšarepov sivat fj tov rof> Koaplou; itetSco rt as ratna Xeymv avy%pfjaai rov Koaptov piov rob fzKO/.darov apstvco stvat, fj on ttsiOco; K. ou TtsiOsig, ćb Ldurparcc. rd> psv yap !rdpp šksIvco ovkšt’ saziv ijSovij odospia, d/.'/.o. tout’ saziv, 6 vvvSf] eyw ekeyov, ro mansp M0ov tjrjv, šitstSav it/jjpdiorp iipTC ‘/aipovra šzi pijzr: Mmodpsvov. aVd šv rovza> saziv zo ijSćoic Gjv, šv rq> d>q ji/.sigtov šmppsiv.

S. See now if you’re saying something like this about the life of each of the two men, the temperate and the intemperate: - Suppose for instance that each of two men has lot of jars, and one has sound and fnll jars, one full of wine, another of honey, another of milk, and many other full of many things. And suppose the sources for each of these things are scarce and hard to find, provided only with much severe effort. Now when one man has filled up, he brings in no more, and doesn’t care about them, but is at rest as far as they are concemed. The other man has sources like the first man’s that can be drawn on, though with đifficulty. But his vessels are leaky and rotten, and he is forced to be always filling them day and night, or else he suffers the most extreme distresses. Now if this is how each man’s life is, do you say that the intemperate man ’s life is happier than the orderly man ’sl When I teli you this, do I persuade you at ali to concede that the orderly life is better than the intemperate, or don’t I persuade you? C. No, you don’t, Socrates. For that one who is filled up has no pleasure at ali anymore. It’s

141 Pl. Grg. 491d-e; cf Rep. 368b-c, 430e^l31 b; cp. Rowe 2007c: 36-40. Louis-Andre Dorion (2007: 127-135) underlines that Socrates associates enkrateia with self-govemment (heautou archeiri). 142 Xen. Mem. 1.2.1, 14; 1.6.1-10; cf. Gigon 1953: 25, 27; Dodds 1959: 299; Widmann 1967: 31; Wamach 1971: 686; Irwin 1979: 194; Raaflaub 2004: 185; Dalfen 2004: 361, 366-367. Xenophon’s remark that Socrates’ life was self-sufficient (autarkestata zonta) and free of ali desires (enkratestatori), as opposed to Alcibiades and Critias who, he claims, were the most honourable of the Athenians is of particular interest {Mem. 1.2.14); see Gigon 1953: 41. 143 Pl. Grg. 492e. For an instance of the use of these words to describe the notion of selfsufficiency, see Dodds 1959: 299; Irwin 1979: 194; Dalfen 2004: 366-367. 144 Pl. Grg. 493d-494a (trans. T. Irwin); cf. 491d-494c, esp. 491d, 492e, 494b-c; Rep. 560e-562a.

1. Gorgias

49

what I was saying just now - living like a stone once he has filled up, with no more enjoyment or distress. No; living pleasantly is in this - in having as much as possible flowing in.

This is important not only because it demonstrates the influence of democratic ideology on Callicles, but also because Thucydides in his description of the great plague reveals Pericles’ idea of absolute autarkeia as an illusion, just as Herodotus does in the Lydian logos by refuting Croesus’ claim that he is the happiest (most self-sufficient) man.145

1.8. Summary

A remarkable degree of congruence and numerous analogies lead to several conclusions. Firstly, the first part of Gorgias marks the beginning of a process of ethical and political degradation, to which Plato draws attention. Secondly, Plato uses the character of the sophist Gorgias to show that this degradation originates from the time between the rise of the Athenian arche and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The third conclusion is that Plato subtly associates the character of the sophist Gorgias with the statesman Pericles because Plato combines in the person of Pericles ali negative features of Athens in the period known as the Pentekontaetia preceding the Peloponnesian War. Besides, Pericles’ opponents accused him of striving towards tyranny through his reliance on popular support. These denunciations stimulated Herodotus to develop the concept of a patron-tyrant, which in tum influenced Plato to conceive the concept of a demagogue-tyrant. The fourth conclusion is that Gorgias’ association of the art of oratory to freedom and power fulfils several functions. It reveals that Gorgias’ position is rooted in the Athenian ideology of freedom and power. Furthermore, it establishes through the examination of the question of 'power and rule’ a connection between the arguments of Gorgias, Polus and Callicles. In addition, it transposes the democratic ideology of freedom (power) from the collective level (that of the demos or Athens) to the individual (rhetor or politician). Finally, it indicates that despite ali his power and influence a rhetor is, at the same time, subordinated to the authority of the people. The fifth conclusion is that the attack on the concept of collective wisdom in the Gorgias is also meant to refute the democratic ideal of equality. This establishes yet another connection betvveen Gorgias and Callicles, because the democratic concept of collective wisdom stood in opposition to the superior individual. Gorgias’ rejection of the concept of the demos’ collective wisdom is also connected to Socrates’ standpoint that the all-powerful tyrant only does whatever seems to be best to him and not what is best. Ps.-Xenophon, Thucydides and Aristophanes 145 Thuc. 2.51.3, 36.2; Hdt. 1.32.8-9; cf. also Thuc. 7.28.1; see Macleod 1983c: 150-151; Raaflaub 2006b: 197; Taylor 2010: 69, 163-164. To what extent Plato’s understanding of autarkeia is opposed to that of Pericles is visible in the Republic where the origin of the polis is explained by the fact that no one is self-sufficient (369b); cf. Hoffe 1997: 73.

50

II. The Gorgias

show that this way of thinking is an important element of the discourse on democracy and that the concept of the polis tyrannos {demos monarchos) in combination with Cleon’s demagoguery had a particularly strong impact on its emergence. The sixth conclusion is that Gorgias’ praise of the power of rhetoric - the Long Walls, the shipyards and docks of Athens were built thanks to the oratorical skills of Themistocles and Pericles - is not only an allusion to the arche but also a counterpoint to Socrates’ contestation of the benefits of the rise of Athenian arche in the third part of the dialogue. Moreover, Gorgias’ mentioning of the construction of these edifices is significant because the reliance on fortifications and the priority attributed to the fleet prompted the ideas of absolute sovereignty and absolute self-sufficiency, two of the three elements of the Athenian concept of absolute freedom. We now need to look at the second part of Gorgias and the correlations between Polus’ position and the democratic ideology of freedom and power.

2. POLUS

Socrates’ second interlocutor in the dialogue is Gorgias’ pupil Polus.1 He joins the discussion criticizing his teacher that only shame causes him to agree with Socrates’ claim that an orator must know what is just and unjust.2 In a lengthy discourse, Socrates then develops the idea that rhetoric is not an art but merely expertise in producing delight and gratification, in fact a kind of flattery.3 Without examining Socrates’ arguments too deeply, Polus contradicts them with the theory of the extraordinary power of the rhetor that is just as great as that of tyrants, since he can do as he pleases - kili, despoil or exile whomever they want.4 Socrates disproves Polus’ theory by differentiating between arbitrariness (licence to do what one pleases) and doing what one really wants, and also by pointing out the difference between the means and the end.5 In this way, Socrates shows that the real purpose of our actions is always directed toward something good and, therefore, rhetors and tyrants neither do what they want nor dispose of great power.6 Polus then says he believes that it is better to do injustice than to suffer it, and cites the example of the Macedonian king Archelaus whom, he says, many people envy.7 Socrates refutes this as well, introducing the idea of beauty, and succeeds in getting Polus to concede that beauty is usefol, pleasant and good, while deformity or disgrace are painfiil and evil.8 Socrates concludes that by being punished the unjust experiences something beautifiil and good, since beauty is just and justice is beautifiil.9 Faced with this cunning inversion of his original theory, the bewildered Polus is forced to agree with Socrates’ presentation, even though it seems absurd to him.10 As in the case of Gorgias, Plato does not give Polus a chance to challenge Socrates’ theory seriously, since Callicles then interrupts the conversation.11

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Pl. Grg. 461b—481b. Pl. Grg.461b-c. Pl. Grg.462b-466a. Pl. Grg. 466b-e. He does not embark here on a new tople since Gorgias has alreadv discussed this matter, as Joachim Dalfen (2004: 144) has shown; see also Grg. 513a-b. Pl. Grg. 466e 467cl. Pl. Grg. 468a d. Pl. Grg. 469b-471d. Pl. Grg. 474c-475e. Pl. Grg.476a-479e. Pl. Grg. 479e-480e. Pl. Grg. 481b.

52

II. The Gorgias

2.1. Polus and the Post-Periclean Generation

Before submitting Polus’ arguments to closer inspection we should, as in the case of Gorgias, examine the generation of Athenian politicians with whom Plato identifies Polus. For with the appearance of Polus in the dialogue a change of generations takes place, not only because Polus is Gorgias’ pupil, but because Socrates constantly refers to the age difference, underlining Polus’ impulsiveness and youth.12 If Plato links the character of Gorgias to Pericles, then the question arises as to the generation of Athenian politicians with which he wishes to connect Polus. King Archelaus (413-399) was an important ally of Athens during the second half of the Peloponnesian War. He fought on the side of the Athenian forces in northem Greece in 411 and, in the last phase of the war, delivered ship building materials to the Athenians and even had ships built in Macedonia.13 Because of these Services, in 407/406 he was proclaimed an Athenian proxenos and euergetes.14 It therefore seems reasonable to assume that Socrates’ comment - that almost ali Athenians share Polus’ opinion of Archelaus’ happiness - reflects the predominant mood in Athens at the time this assembly decision was passed. A more obvious sign that with Polus, Plato introduces, a generation change, is Socrates’ remark that Polus can call as witnesses Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates and Pericles’ entire household to support his view that Archelaus is to be envied.15 It is characteristic of these “witnesses” that they belonged to moderate circles loyal to Athenian democracy but were involved in the worst democratic excesses and defeats of the last decades of the fifth-century, and in fact were their victims. Nicias, son of Niceratos, will be forever remembered for the Sicilian expedition, the worst defeat of Athenian imperialist politics. Nicias, it is true, was an opponent of an aggressive foreign policy, but in spite of ali his efforts, as Thucydides shows in the Sicilian Debate, he did not succeed in resisting its dynamics.16 His clear submission to the demos resulted in his heading a campaign which he personally opposed and in the disastrous outcome of the expedition.17

12 13 14

15 16 17

Pl. Grg. 461c, 463e, 466a. Diod. 13.49.1; And. 2.11. IG I2 105 (IG I3 117; HGIU I 150). The significance of this honour is underlined by the fact that only a few years earlier (415) Perdiccas II, the father of Archelaus, had swom an oath to have the same enemies as Athens and to supply the Athenians alone with shipbuilding material (IG I2 71 = HGIU I 121); see Borza 1990: 162-163; Hammond - Griffith 1979: 138139. It cannot be excluded that the assembly passed this resolution on Alcibiades’ initiative. It would constitute another link between Polus’ views and Callicles’ ideas. Moreover, it should be noted that this decision of the Athenian assembly was made at about the same time as the Arginusae trial. Pl. Grg. 47Id, 472a-b. Archelaus is enviable since he can with impunity do what he pleases (Pl. Grg. 471a-472a). For the role of witnesses in Athenian law, see Thiir 2005: 146-167. See Pouncey 1980: 119-123. Thuc. 6.8.4, 24-25; 7.8, 14.4, 48.3^4,49; cf. Gribble 2006: 459-462.

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Nicias’ brother Eucrates fought in the battle of Aegospotami. After the final defeat he was appointed strategos, opposing Theramenes’ peace treaty, the destruction of the Long Walls and the Piraeus fortifications, and the surrender of the ships. When the Thirty Tyrants čame to power, he was killed.18 Nicias’ brother Diognetus may be the investigator of 415, but also may be the Diognetus informed against by Teucrus for profaning the Mysteries.19 In Eupolis’ Demoi in 415 he is mentioned as “the strongest by far of the younger rascals”.20 According to Lysias, the sycophants drove him, at one point, into exile. Nonetheless, he neither took the field against the city nor čame to Decelea. When the Thirty čame to power, Diognetus retumed to Athens. However he did not join the oligarchs, but remained loyal to the demos.21 Aristocrates, son of Scelios, was one of the signatories of the Peace of Nicias.22 During the govemment of the Four Hundred, he associated with moderate circles who were opposed both to the radical oligarchs and to Alcibiades.23 Enjoying the trust of the demos even after 411, he was elected strategos several times between 410 and 406. He took part in the battle of Arginusae and was a defendant in the ensuing notorious trial, which the opponents of democracy believed to be one of the demos’ worst offences. He was then sentenced to death and executed.24 The phrase 'Pericles’ entire household’ can only refer to Pericles’ son of the same name. At the supposed dramatic time of the Gorgias (427 405), Pericles and his other two sons were already dead, victims of the plague in 430/429.25 As the only events in which Pericles took part were the battle of Arginusae and the ensuing trial, 'Pericles’ entire household’ can be understood as one more sign for this legal and political scandal.26 Ali these circumstances indicate that, according to Plato, the character of Polus stands for the generation of Athenian politicians that followed after Pericles. Plato’s mentioning of Nicias and his brothers, and Aristocrates reveals that this generation became politically prominent in the years after Pericles’ death.27 The phrase ‘Pericles’ entire household’ fulfils two functions. First, it emphasizes that this post-Periclean generation of politicians continued Pericles’ policies. They were generally loyal to the democratic order and unconditionally supported the

18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27

Lys. 13.13-38; 18.4-6; Nails 2002: 145-146. And. 1.14-15; Davies 1971: 405. Eup. fr. 99 (PCG); see Ostwald 544, 548 with n. 43. Lys. 18.8-11. Thuc. 5.19.1, 24; Nails 2002: 51-52. Thuc. 8.89.2, 92, 99.2; Arist. Ath. Pol. 33.2; Dem. 58.67. It is important to understand that for most participants of the coup d’etat, especially those who were not radical oligarchs, the existence of the Athenian sea empire could not be brought in question, cf. Heftner 2001: 49, 62, 87-88, 126, 128-129, 241, 325-326, 329-330. Xen. Hell. 1.5.16, 6.29; 7.2, 34-35; Diod. 13.100.1-5, 101-102. Plut. Per. 36.8-9. Xen. Hell. 1.5.16, 6.29; 7.2, 16, 21; Mem. 3.5.1-28 (Socrates and Pericles the Younger). Cf. Geske 2005: 15-17, esp. 17.

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Athenian arche. In spite of this, they were associated with the greatest failures of the Athenian demos, whose victims they were: the Sicilian campaign, Arginusae, and Aegospotami. The second function is to avoid the mentioning of Pericles the Younger’s name - he was considerably younger than Nicias, Eucrates and Aristocrates. This is in order to avoid the identification of this generation of politicians with another post-Periclean generation - that of Alcibiades and Critias. These two infamous Athenians štand for those post-Periclean politicians who did not fali victim to democracy; but the Athenian demos became their victim.

2.2. Archelaus

Polus, in showing that the tyrant, or the rhetor, can do whatever he wants - that is, that it is better to do injustice than to suffer it - refers to the example of the Macedonian ruler Archelaus.28 This reference explicitly points to a causal relation between Polus’ theories and Callicles’ doctrine of the right of the stronger. Socrates himself does this in the Afterlife Myth by which he refutes Callicles’ theory, saying that Archelaus will meet with just punishment in any case, if what Polus says of him is true.29 But the mentioning of Archelaus is in several more ways relevant for an understanding of the Gorgias. It could be connected to Antisthenes, one of the most famous Socratics. According to the Hellenistic tradition, he studied rhetoric with Gorgias and his first career was that of a rhetor.30 It was only later that he became an ardent disciple of Socrates.3132 Antisthenes wrote a text called Archelaus or On Kingship?7' Its content has been lost; the only surviving Information is that Antisthenes rejected Gorgias in some way.33 This text might be the principal source for the story of how Archelaus allegedly invited Socrates to his court, but the philosopher declined. The anecdote survived throughout antiquity and is not mentioned in any other primary Socratic literature.34 The title implies that it was a treatise on kingship; it probably contains a comparison of some sort between Archelaus and Socrates.35 If this was indeed the case, then correlations with Plato’s Gorgias can be found. Socrates repudiates Gorgias’ teachings and States in his discussion with Polus that he cannot say if Archelaus is happy or wretched, because he “never met the man”.36 More importantly, Socrates uses the Afterlife Myth as the final 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35 36

Pl. Grg. 470d--471d. Pl. Grg. 525d. See Prince 2015: 13, 41-42,45, 685-686. See Prince 2015: 13-15, 45-75. The alternative title On kingship was in ali probability added during the Hellenistic period; see Murray 1971: 21-23, Haake 2003: 109-110 n. 20. Ath. 5.220d; see Prince 2015: 686. Arist. Rh. 1398a24; Diog. Laert. 2.25; Ael. VH 14.17; see Murray 1971: 21; Prince 2015: 162-163. C/Murray 1971:21. Pl. Grg. 470d; see Prince 2015: 163.

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argument to denounce Callicles’ life of unscrupulous omnipotence as a malignant fantasy. In this myth, as already stated, Socrates avers that people like Archelaus will inevitably be punished, while the philosopher (and others who live like him) will go to the Islands of the Blessed.37 The reference to the afterlife may be understood as an allusion to violent death, as the discussion between Callicles and Socrates repeatedly confirms.38 Through an accident of history, Archelaus was murdered in 399, the same year as Socrates was put to death. According to Plato’s logic, the former died as a result of his tyranny, the latter because of his philosophy. The contrast tyrant (tvrannical man) — philosopher is omnipresent in the Gorgias, appearing for the first time in the discussion between Socrates and Polus.3940 At the heart of their debate is the question of whether to do an injustice is worse than to suffer it. This is the basic issue underlying the contrast of unjust life - just life, as confrrmed by Socrates’ Afterlife Myth and Glaucon’s speech in the Politeia.^ One the one hand, Polus eulogizes the unjust life by equating it with the life of a tyrant, of which Archelaus is the prime example.4142On the other, Socrates, who embodies and advocates the bios philosophikos, affirms the bios dikaiosn He explicitly denies that he would choose the life of a tyrant.43 Furthermore he argues not only that suffering injustice is better than doing injustice, but that not being punished within one’s lifetime for doing the greatest injustice (as, for instance, a tyrant) is actually the greatest evil.44 Hence, for Socrates Archelaus is wretched (athlios) beyond other men.45 The contrasts tyrant - philosopher and unjust life - just life occupy a prominent place in the debate between Callicles and Socrates, too, and are subsumed under the dichotomy bios praktikos — bios thedretikos,46 Another indication that the reference to the contradictions contained in dichotomy vita activa - vita contemplativa are connected with the person of Archelaus is that Callicles invokes Euripides’ tragedy Antiope. The play probably dates from 408, just before Euripides went to Archelaus’ court in Macedonia where he spent his last years.47 Euripides was criticised in conservative circles for 37 38 39

40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47

Pl. Grg. 525d, 526a b. Pl. Grg. 486a-c; 508c-d, 51 la-b; 521b-d; 522c-e; 525d; 526e, 527c. Pl. Grg. 467a, 468e 469c. 473e, 479d-e, 481c-482b, 484c-487d, 500c, 507b-c, 510b-c, 513c, 515a, 526c; see also Rep. 578c. Pl. Grg. 522c-523b, 525b-d; Rep. 358e-359b, 360b-e; see also Grg. 507a-c; Rep. 347e, 352d, 357a-b; cf. Sedley 2009: 53-58, 66, esp. 53-54, 57, 66; Rowe 2012: 189-190. Pl. Grg. 470d-471d; 472c-d; Sedley 2009: 66. Pl. Grg. 522c-523b, 526c. Pl. Grg. 469c. Pl. Grg. 469b-e, 470b-471d, 472c 475e, 479c, 508b-509a, 509c-d, 511a-c (doing injustice is worse than to suffer it); 469b-e, 473d-e, 474b, 476a-479d, 509b, 522e, 524e-525e (doing injustice and not being punished is the greatest evil); see also Rowe 2012: 196-197. Pl. Grg. 469a-b, 470d-e, 47la-b, 472d-e, 473d-e, 478d, 479b, 479d-e; see also 525d. See chapter II.3.7. Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa. Pl. Grg. 484e, 486b-c (Eur. ft. 183N2, 185 N2, 199 N2); cf. Grg. 485e; see Lesky31971: 369;

Hose 1995: 143-147, esp. 144, 146; Dalfen 2004: 338-342; contra Scullion 2003: 389 400, esp. 394-396.

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his closeness to the sophists, his naturalistic realism that placed man at the centre of the action, and his re-examination of the heroic. In the famous poetic contest in Aristophanes’ Frogs, Euripides is presented as a follower of a fully developed radical democracy, while his opponent Aeschylus personifies the generation of fighters at Marathon with ali their virtues.48 More importantly, Plato in the Republic categorically condemns Euripides as a friend of tyranny and someone who glorifies it. Plato also quotes Euripides to prove that the tragedian had associated with a tyrant.49 As Archelaus was the only autocrat with whom Euripides had been in close contact, he is the only one who can be meant here. Moreover, Euripides’ wrote Archelaus, a play celebrating the founder of the Macedonian dynasty.50 In a surviving fragment of the tragedy tyranny is rated second only to the gods - it does not have immortality, but it has the rest.51 It seems that Archelaus in the play was portrayed as a brave and bright young man, worthy of his ancestor Heracles. At the command of Apollo he founded the old Macedonian Capital, Aigai.52 In the Euripides Vita it is said that the purpose of the play was “to please Archelaus”. Some scholars focus on the person of Archelaus and come to the conclusion that the aim of the play was to flatter, legitimise or even educate Archelaus. Other interpretations prešutne that its plot was devised to celebrate the Greek ancestry of Archelaus and promote the Macedonian tendency towards Hellenisation.53 Although the fragmentary condition of the play prevents any final conclusion as to its purpose, the praise of the mythical Archelaus must have positively reflected on his historical namesake. Finally, when speaking of freedom to do as one pleases or living as one likes as the main characteristics of democracy, Aristotle in his Politics quotes from Euripides.54 In the discussion betvveen Polus and Socrates, this concept is at the centre of the debate, and Archelaus is cited as the example for its correctness.

48

49

50 51 52 53 54

Ar. Ran. 830-1471. Euripides boasts about his democratic attitude as in his tragedies he allowed everyone to speak alike - women, slaves, masters, the young and the old. Furthermore, he brags about teaching the demos to speak and names Cleitophon and Theramenes as his disciples (937-969); see Dover 1994: 10-37, esp. 20-23, 309-314; Sommerstein 1996: 240242; cf. also Hose 1995: 177-181. Pl. Rep. 568a-b: “ori Kai tovto TtvKvfji; btavoiai; e%6pgvov fipOćvća.ro, d> wfjp/_t: /.(iiiTtpoTpTiic. ti, Liij rcpo8i86vat riva Kat t&piuvpni«>)v icai Tfjg ev avrp avgTtiTaKTOO jtdoiv gg tt)v Siavtav ćco'iraiac, [...]. [...] addressing them by their father’s name, their own name, and that of their tribe, and admonished them: if anyone had any claim to distinction, he urged him not to prove false to his own reputation; if any had illustrious ancestors, the should not dim the glory of their fathers’ deeds of valour; he also reminded them of their fatherland, the freest in the world, and of the uncontrolled liberty in daily life that ali possessed in it; [...]

It is striking that it is he - of ali Athenian politicians of the time the least partial to unscrupulous power ethics - who invokes the ideals of Pericles’ Funeral Oration:69 g/.euOćpoic. 8g t(x te Ttpdc, to koivov 7co/,iTvrai. Kal dtpaipobvrat Xpf|j.iara Kal eicpalkovaiv ek tov itokecov 6v av Soidj avrorg; [...] Z. ovk aprt ovrco nag i.7.cyt:q. T] ov%i ditoKTEivliaoTV ’ oi pijzopcc oi>-' av poi'i/.mvTO.i. cbcvrsp oi TOpavvot, Kal /pijpaTa aipatpovvrar Kal cčG.aijvovoiv ek tćov Ttoksmv 6v av SoKfj avtoig; II. il/C) S. /.ć'/ci roivvv šor on Svo ravr’ eotiv to. Epcorr|para, Kai dnoKprvovpai yš aor ttpog djuporspa. Kai rovc; pijropa; Kai robe rvpawovv piirapa/Ari ek tov ev ava/Kaioic EKiOvpiat; Tpetpopsvov rf]V tćov pp ava/Kaicov Kal dvcotpE/.Gv poovGv E/.ciiOćpojciv te Kai aveatv; [...] Zfj 8f] oipat pstd talira. 6 toiooto; ov8sv pd/./.ov d; ava/Kaiou; fj pt) ava/Kaiov; piiovdc dva/.ioKijiv Kai /pipi ata Kai kovovi; Kai (iiarpipac 6Xk’ E&V EVTV/f]; fj Kal pp TCEpa EKpaK/EvSfl, d/./.d TI Kal TtpEljPilTEpOC, -/EVOpEVOC TOV KO/./.OV Oopvpov JtapE/.OdvTO; pćpp te Kataoććpiai tv li.ć;.i\i/8’ ŠKorfjvai šrt vpiv eotiv, st tu; Kat toSe šv r. Kat Svvaptv pEytaTr|v 8f) pić/pi touSe kektt|pevt]v, h; š; ai8tov rok šnipivvoiićvoic., fjv Kai vuv ira::v8č>pćv itoTE (trdvra yap nštpuKS Kai šXaaaovKf]aajiEV. Kairot ratna 6 pšv aTtpa^pcov iićiivair av, 6 8š Spav ti Kal auro; pou'/.ouEvoc y]/x:)oi:i- ei 8š tu; pf] KŠictprat,