Successful negotiation with the Driver-Seat Concept 3658399333, 9783658399337

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Hermann Rock

Successful negotiation with the DriverSeat Concept

Successful negotiation with the Driver-Seat Concept

Hermann Rock

Successful negotiation with the Driver-Seat Concept

Hermann Rock AFINUM Management GmbH München, Bayern, Germany

ISBN 978-3-658-39933-7    ISBN 978-3-658-39934-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39934-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or ­information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer Gabler imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Preface

The most important words in any negotiation: Talk to me (Dominick J. Misino, Former Primary Negotiator for the NYPD).

Who do you think needs to be the best negotiator? Politicians? Company employees or perhaps union negotiators? Without question, negotiating skills are necessary when it comes to new laws, buyouts, or a collective bargaining agreement. But the elite negotiators are specially trained police officers. When police officers have to negotiate with a hostage taker, the hostages’ lives depend on their skills. Learning from them therefore means learning from the best. That’s what this book is about.

Another Negotiation Book – Why? What is special about this book can be reduced to three aspects as follows: • Firstly, the team strategy, which is an indispensable and at the same time essential part of professional negotiation management, is consistently applied. The Driver-Seat Concept therefore strictly separates the tasks of the Decision Maker (the person who makes the decisions, e.g., the senior project manager or the head of the project manager) and the tasks of the negotiator (the person who leads the negotiations as the “extended arm” of the Decision Maker) and thus truthfully depicts the lived reality of professional negotiation leadership. • Secondly, the Driver-Seat Concept is deliberately not oriented towards the classical type of presentation, in which (depending on the author’s preference) certain subject areas are dealt with in sequence; rather, the structure deliberately follows the typical chronological sequence of a negotiation. • Third, the strategies and tactics of the crisis negotiation model are applied appropriately (to the extent that they are transferable) to all types of negotiations and are presented in a comprehensive and structured manner. This innovative approach (the consistent separation between the acting persons, the observance of the typical time sequence of a negotiation and the analogous application of the v

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strategies and tactics of the model of crisis negotiations) characterizes the Driver-Seat Concept and makes it easier for you to put it into practice immediately. The concept is based on a systematic analysis of common negotiation models. First, I analyzed the three basic models of negotiation and tested them in daily practice, i.e., the power-oriented model of confrontation (e.g., Soviet Style), the consensus-oriented model of cooperation (especially the Harvard Concept), and the convenient model of (quick) compromise (familiar from politics). The negotiation results achieved in each case were not satisfactory to me. That is why I followed up on a hint by Ury, one of the authors of the world-famous Harvard Concept. Namely, in his indispensable book for professional negotiation management, Getting Past NO, he pointed out the special efficiency of the methods of police negotiation management (Ury 2007, p.  163 ff.). This reference fundamentally changed my life as a negotiator. Namely, I became intimately involved with the crisis negotiation model and thus the strategies and tactics of FBI negotiators, or elite negotiators. Since the crisis negotiation model is taught at the FBI Academy at Quantico (also referred to as the “Harvard of Law Enforcement”), among other places (see Strentz 2018, p. xii), I was able to draw on some very powerful literature. In doing so, I found that the crisis negotiation model is a hybrid model that combines the basic models of confrontation and cooperation mentioned above in a structured way. I have begun to analyze the operation of each of the strategies and tactics of the FBI or crisis negotiation model and apply them accordingly in my negotiations. The result of many years of research and constant practical application at the negotiating table is the present Driver-Seat Concept. It is a self-contained, independent, scientifically based, and practically functioning hybrid model which, among other things, makes the strategies and tactics of the crisis negotiation model usable for all types of negotiations. In particular, it explains the professional combination of confrontation and cooperation in the form of an independent strategy. At the same time, in the course of many years of analysis, I was able to identify seven weaknesses in relation to the Harvard concept and have compensated for them in the present Driver-Seat Concept. If you are interested in the detailed analysis, you will find it at the end of the book in Chap. 6. Apart from the seven weaknesses mentioned above, the behavioral recommendations of the Harvard Concept are also part of the best practice recommended in this book. To me, the elite includes all police-trained negotiators whose job it is to use professional negotiation techniques to prevent violent action, if possible, in crisis situations.

On the Genesis of the Book In parallel to my negotiation practice as a lawyer and the experience I have gained (negotiating over 150 successful M&A transactions and countless other negotiations since 1998), I have also constantly studied the relevant negotiation theory.

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M&A stands for “mergers and acquisitions,” i.e., the merger or purchase/sale of companies. In 2008, I began to read and systematically evaluate numerous books and articles on negotiation, social psychology, and neuromarketing. Over the course of many years, I tested the various recommendations in my own negotiations and included those practices with which I repeatedly achieved good results in a best-practice checklist. From this bestpractice checklist (which has been revised again and again), the present book has emerged piece by piece since 2013.

The Elite as Role Model It is no coincidence that this book begins with a quote from Dominick J. Misino, a former negotiator for the New York City Police Department (NYPD). Misino negotiated, among other things, the 1993 hostage drama concerning passenger flight LH 592 from Frankfurt/Main to New York (cf. Misino 2004, p. 1 f.). All hostages were released by the hostage taker in New York (JFK). Misino has also conducted negotiations for the New York City Police Department in over 200 crisis situations. Misino has used techniques that work in any other negotiation situation.

It was, in fact, the NYPD that established the Emergency Services Unit in 1972 (cf. Noesner 2010, p. 32) and began to develop a best practice with regard to negotiations. This best practice was to be used as an alternative to violent and not infrequently very bloody liberation operations. The occasion was the Munich Olympic bombing of September 5, 1972, which began as a hostage situation and ended with the murder of all eleven Israeli hostages. The NYPD assumed that something similar could happen in New  York City. Harvey Schlossberg and Frank Bolz then developed the first concept for crisis negotiations (see Strentz 2018, p. 3 ff.). This was the birth of the systematic development of professional negotiation methods in relation to crisis situations. In 1974, the FBI then developed a training program at the national level (building on the NYPD’s findings) concerning the conduct of negotiations in crisis situations (such as hostage taking) (cf. Noesner 2010, p. 33; cf. Voss and Raz 2016, p. 9 ff.). I briefly and memorably refer to the negotiation methods developed by the NYPD and advanced by the FBI in this book as “FBI methods” or the “model of crisis negotiation” (cf. the textbook Crisis Negotiations by McMains and Mullins 2014). Approximately 70% of all police negotiators in the USA today are trained with attention to FBI methods (McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 5).

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Many of the negotiators trained in this way (such as Dominick J. Misino, quoted at the beginning of this article) use their enormous experience and the fact of the universal applicability of the crisis negotiation model even after leaving police service by advising companies on how to conduct negotiations professionally. This is also the path chosen by Matthias Schranner, a former negotiation expert for the Bavarian police and founder and CEO of the Schranner Negotiation Institute in Zurich (www.schranner.com). Implementing his recommendations (e.g., Schranner 2016a) meant for me the entry into truly professional negotiation. By participating in various trainings of the Schranner Negotiation Institute (seminars, annual N-Conference), I perfected my strategies and tactics in parallel to finishing this book. On May 22, 2018, after several training sessions in Munich, Zurich, and Vienna, the Schranner Negotiation Institute confirmed my certification as an Advanced Negotiator.® Overall, the recommendations for action of the crisis negotiation model now shape my negotiation management and thus also this book. My orientation towards the FBI methods or the crisis negotiation model is also based on the fact that as a lawyer I very often find myself in exactly the same situation as the FBI or police negotiator: I am considered the “enemy” by the other side at the beginning of the negotiation and have to work hard to earn their trust before I can get to the heart of the substantive negotiations. The motto “Talk to me” (Misino 2004, p. 85) points to the FBI’s “Behavioral Change Stairway Model.” This is the central tool that professional negotiators use to guide their behavior in crisis negotiations (cf. Sect. 3.8).

The Aim of This Book The aim of this book is to provide you (with special reference to the model of crisis negotiations) with a universally applicable structure for your everyday private and professional (easy and/or complex) negotiations. As soon as you have mastered best practice after intensive training, you are a “professional negotiator.” In this situation you can “lead” any kind of negotiation in the truest sense of the word in a planned and goal-oriented way. My goal is that after reading this book and after many practical exercises (these are possible every day) you will always be in the “driver seat” in the future and thus have the entire negotiation process under control. In order to achieve precisely this, you need a generally valid and at the same time coherent concept, namely the “Driver-Seat Concept.” In terms of negotiation management, it consists of three basic strategies and tactics (bundles of actions) and tactical measures (individual actions) assigned to them. The three basic strategies are: • The task-oriented team strategy of the Decision Maker • The behavioral BMI strategy of the Primary Negotiator • The process-oriented ABC strategy of the Decision Maker These three basic strategies are put into practice with three basic tools, namely an organization chart, a staircase with seven steps, and an Open Points List (OP list).

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The benefits of the Driver-Seat Concept are not limited to (difficult) business negotiations and other conflict management situations (e.g., dispute resolution). Rather, knowledge of best practice will also help you in any everyday negotiation, be it in the family sphere, among friends, and/or in the office with colleagues. I guarantee that if you apply the Driver-Seat Concept, as the name of the concept suggests, you will always remain in the driver seat in your negotiations. I do not, however, guarantee that you will always achieve your goals. That would be shady. I just want you to actually control what you can control at all times: your behavior. Forget everything else. If you apply the Driver-Seat Concept and thus best practice, you have at least done all that is feasible to be successful in the outcome. That’s all you can do. So, without exception, stick to expert Jim Camp’s brilliant tip (Camp 2002, p. 92): At the same time, this means that at least strategically and tactically you do not make mistakes that can jeopardize the substantive success. Please keep in mind that the FBI “Control what you can control, forget the rest.”

experts originally had a very respectable success rate of 90 to 95% with the application of the crisis negotiation model. As for the rest, “We play the hand we are dealt. Some hands can never win” (Strentz 2018, p. 84). I hope you will use the best practices outlined in this book to achieve a similarly high success rate in your easy and even difficult negotiations in the future. Kohlrieser assumes 95% (cf. Kohlrieser 2006, p.  103); Noesner assumes 90% (https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshwolfe/2013/08/29/from-­waco-­to-­wall-­street-­a-­ discussion-­o f-­c rime-­a nd-­b usiness-­w ith-­t he-­f bis-­f ormer-­c hief-­h ostage-­ negotiator/#1d3237c42b10. Accessed: 12/9/2018). Now that the world has changed and hostage takers do not necessarily want to survive, the success rate is around 83% (cf. McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 130).

Please also note the “correct” definition of success: “Successful negotiation” does not mean that you get your original positions accepted.

“Successful negotiation” means: • The Decision Maker develops the positions and specifies the application of professional negotiation strategies. • The Primary Negotiator asserts the positions and uses the tactics typical of the strategy in question. (continued)

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(continued) • The negotiator (i) (partially) enforces the positions or (ii) together with the negotiating partner finds creative solutions that satisfy both the Decision Maker and the partner (“Remember, the purpose of negotiation is not to win, but to leave everyone satisfied”; McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 257) or (iii) professionally ends the negotiations if the parties cannot find a solution that satisfies everyone (“No deal is better than a bad deal”; Voss and Raz 2016, p. 117).

Practice and Theory In this book, on the one hand, the practice (street level) is to be conveyed, i.e., I would like to present you with a guide “from practice for practice.” On the other hand, the scientific background is outlined, so that you (based on the understanding of the strategies/tactics/ tactical measures) can decide for yourself at any time what is “why” right for you in the specific situation (academic level). The model for me is the work Crisis Negotiation by McMains/Mullins, which the FBI expert Gary Noesner recommends with the following words: “… it works at street level (and) is the only book out there which really covers it from that academic perspective.”

Warning In this book, you get a very detailed insight into the practice of the elite negotiators, namely the Crisis Negotiation Unit of the FBI (CNU): “They are the best of the best” (Voss and Raz 2016, p. 96). Some authors of the publicly available texts explicitly point out that these insights are not actually published for everyone to see. For example, Greenstone makes it unequivocally clear in the first pages of his book, The Elements of Police Hostage and Crisis Negotiation, that it is “Not intended for general use or for public consumption” (Greenstone 2005, p. iv). In his book, Strentz explicitly warns all those who learn FBI methods to outmaneuver police against using the tactical team, i.e., snipers, who can’t take a joke: “If one decides to play games and attempt to use this text to frustrate law enforcement and correctional negotiators then he or she will face the severity of our tactical elements; … they do not play games” (Strentz 2013, p. 5). I want to make it expressly clear that the sole purpose of this book is to help you secure the driver seat in your personal or professional difficult and complex commercial negotiations. Exclusively! If you want to use the know-how from this book to outsmart the police, this is life-threatening.

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Note of Thanks My special and unreserved thanks go first of all to all the so-called “difficult negotiators”: Many thanks for the constant challenges that have led me to deal intensively and critically with the various models of negotiation management and, in the process, to develop my own concept based on the model of crisis negotiations. In truth, there are no difficult negotiating partners. There are only negotiating partners with whom we have difficulties (cf. Salewski 2008, p. 165).

I would also like to thank Matthias Schranner, whose excellent books and personal training sessions gave me an insight into the world of professional negotiation. I would also like to thank all the other professional negotiators who have published their specialist knowledge and thus, in the course of intensive research, given me the opportunity to understand and apply the groundbreaking know-how of the best and to make it fruitful for (peaceful) private and economic negotiations in this book. My thanks also go to my AFINUM colleagues, with whom the professional implementation of the crisis negotiation model has been great fun for many years. Together, we have been able to successfully conclude difficult negotiations where others would have failed. Within the framework of our AFINUM Academy, we were able to discuss many negotiation situations and are constantly working on becoming better as a team. I would also like to thank Mr. Schömann-Finck, who has made an extremely important contribution as a journalist and editor: He has practically ensured, with the commitment and conscientiousness of a co-author, that what you are holding in your hands right now is worded in such a way that it is good and easy for you to read. The intensive discussions about the rearrangement of individual passages of text, the deletion of entire pages, and the drafting of new, better explanations were very instructive for me; I would not want to miss them. I would also like to thank Torsten Schneider, Investment Director of AFINUM Management GmbH, who is responsible for ensuring that you can easily remember the key statements thanks to his very memorable illustrations. Many thanks also to the very experienced negotiator RA Dr. Oliver Thurn, Munich, who presented the Driver-Seat Concept with me during a 3-day negotiation training at the HSG (St. Gallen), and many thanks to the participants of the International Executive MBA Program, who rewarded us with the feedback “overall method, easy to memorize & useful for preparation.” I also owe special thanks to Springer Gabler Verlag, in particular to my editor Guido Notthoff, who looked at my first draft very quickly and then immediately entered into negotiations regarding the publishing contract. I am also very grateful to Mr. Notthoff for the sustained support that followed.

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Of course, last but not least, I owe an extraordinary debt of gratitude to my family. Without their support, this “sideline” alongside my full-time job as a lawyer would simply not be possible. München, Bayern, Germany

Hermann Rock

References Camp, J (2002): Start with No. Crown Business, New York Kohlrieser, G. (2006): Hostage at the Table. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco McMains, M./Mullins, W. (2014): Crisis Negotiations. 5th edition, Elsevier, Amsterdam Misino, D. (2004): Negotiate and Win. McGraw-Hill, New York Noesner, G. (2010): Stalling for Time. Random House, New York Salewski, W. (2008): Die Kunst des Verhandelns. Wiley-VCH, Weinheim Schranner, M. (2016a): Verhandeln im Grenzbereich. 13thedition, Econ Ullstein List, München Strentz, T. (2013): Hostage/Crisis Negotiations, Lessons learned from the Bad, the Mad, and the Sad. Charles C. Thomas, Springfield Strentz, T. (2018): Psychological Aspects of Crisis Negotiation. 3rd edition., Routledge Taylor & Francis, New York London Ury, W. (2007): Getting Past NO. Bantam Books, New York Voss C./Raz T. (2016): Never Split The Difference. HarperCollins, New York

Contents

1 Definition, Structure, Preparation   1 1.1 Definition of Negotiation ��������������������������������������������������������������������������   1 1.2 Structure����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   3 1.3 Preparation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   9 1.4 Fast Track��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   9 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  10 2 Seven  Tasks of the Decision Maker  11 2.1 First Set Up Your Team (DM Task No. 1)��������������������������������������������������  12 2.1.1 Decision Maker����������������������������������������������������������������������������  15 2.1.2 Primary Negotiator ����������������������������������������������������������������������  19 2.1.3 Secondary Negotiator ������������������������������������������������������������������  21 2.1.4 Bad Guys��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  23 2.1.5 Experts������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  26 2.1.6 Team Spirit������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  28 2.1.7 Three Basic Models for Practice��������������������������������������������������  28 2.1.8 Write a Team Mail������������������������������������������������������������������������  30 2.1.9 Summary��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  31 2.2 Deal with Your Options (DM Task No. 2) ������������������������������������������������  32 2.2.1 Definition and Benefits ����������������������������������������������������������������  33 2.2.2 Start with Your Professional Options Mind Set����������������������������  34 2.2.3 Continue with the “Active Analysis” of Your Options������������������  36 2.2.4 Remain Realistic: “Safe Options” or “Possible Options”?����������  37 2.2.5 Consider the Window of Opportunity������������������������������������������  39 2.2.6 Summary��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  42 2.3 Develop Your Positions (DM Task No. 3)��������������������������������������������������  43 2.3.1 Step 1: Build Your Position Foundation���������������������������������������  45 2.3.2 Step 2: Analyze Your Own Situation��������������������������������������������  46 2.3.3 Step 3: Develop Your Individual Positions ����������������������������������  58 2.3.4 Work on Your Position Mind Set��������������������������������������������������  69

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2.3.5 Summary��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  71 2.3.6 Summary “Mission Development” ����������������������������������������������  72 2.4 Learn: Constantly Evaluate the Current Information at Any Given Time (DM Task No. 4)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  73 2.4.1 Step 1: Ignore the Positions Communicated by the Partner ��������  77 2.4.2 Step 2: Analyze the Partner Team������������������������������������������������  80 2.4.3 Step 3: Analyze the Situation(s) ��������������������������������������������������  82 2.4.4 Step 4: Interpret the Partner Positions������������������������������������������  92 2.4.5 Step 5: Clarify the Real Content of the Partner Positions������������  94 2.4.6 Step 6: Define the Individual Conflicts���������������������������������������� 103 2.4.7 Step 7: Analyze Your Own Situation�������������������������������������������� 110 2.4.8 Summary Learn���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 110 2.5 Adapt: Determine the Strategies and Positions (DM Task No. 5) ������������ 113 2.5.1 Address the Five Conflict Strategies�������������������������������������������� 115 2.5.2 Always Start with Professional Confrontation ���������������������������� 119 2.5.3 Decide on a Conflict Strategy Again After the OP List Is Available �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 122 2.5.4 Decide Again with Regard to the Positions���������������������������������� 126 2.5.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 126 2.5.6 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 133 2.6 Discuss Next Steps (DM Task No. 6)�������������������������������������������������������� 134 2.6.1 Organize a Team Meeting������������������������������������������������������������ 134 2.6.2 Optimize Possible Options with CFO Tactics������������������������������ 136 2.6.3 Do Not Apply the BATNA Model������������������������������������������������ 138 2.6.4 Write the Next Steps Mail������������������������������������������������������������ 138 2.6.5 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 138 2.7 Your Instruction: Give the Negotiator the Negotiation Instruction (DM Task No. 7)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 139 2.7.1 Learn �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 141 2.7.2 Bargain������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 142 2.7.3 Report Back���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 144 2.7.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 144 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 146 3 Ten  Tasks of the Negotiator 149 3.1 Always Consider the Other Side as A Partner (PN Task No. 1)���������������� 151 3.1.1 Develop A Positive Basic Attitude������������������������������������������������ 152 3.1.2 Emphasize the Common Goal, Show Respect������������������������������ 153 3.1.3 There Are No Difficult Negotiating Partners�������������������������������� 154 3.2 Always Stay Cool (PN Task No. 2) ���������������������������������������������������������� 155 3.2.1 Variant 1: Encourage A Time-out ������������������������������������������������ 156 3.2.2 Variant 2: Apply the APO Rule���������������������������������������������������� 157

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3.2.3 Variant 3: Silence�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 158 3.2.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 158 3.2.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 158 3.3 Train the Use of the Weapons of Influence (PN Task No. 3) �������������������� 159 3.3.1 Deal with the Intuitive System I and the Analytical System II���� 160 3.3.2 Deal Intensively with the Weapons of Influence�������������������������� 162 3.3.3 Checklist: Weapons of Influence�������������������������������������������������� 162 3.4 Train Defense Against Influence (PN Task No. 4)������������������������������������ 164 3.5 Use the Time Factor Correctly (PN Task No. 5)���������������������������������������� 165 3.5.1 Take Sufficient Time�������������������������������������������������������������������� 166 3.5.2 Consistently Interrupt Each Round of Negotiations with Time-Outs ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 167 3.5.3 Always Ignore Deadlines�������������������������������������������������������������� 170 3.5.4 As A General Rule, Do Not Set Deadlines ���������������������������������� 171 3.5.5 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 172 3.6 Consider Power as A Mere Illusion (PN Task No. 6)�������������������������������� 173 3.6.1 Do Not Make Assumptions About the Distribution of Power������ 174 3.6.2 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 175 3.7 Accept the Negotiation Assignment (PN Task No. 7)�������������������������������� 175 3.7.1 Learn: Constantly Evaluate the Latest Information���������������������� 177 3.7.2 Bargain������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 178 3.7.3 Report Back���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 179 3.8 Visualize Your Behavior with the BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8)������������ 179 3.8.1 Active Listening80 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 184 3.8.2 “Tactical Empathy”: Show Understanding ���������������������������������� 202 3.8.3 Level 3: Achieve 51% Confidence������������������������������������������������ 206 3.8.4 Stage 4: Learn: Constantly Evaluate the Latest Information�������� 215 3.8.5 Level 5: Bargain���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 217 3.8.6 Level 6: Intensify the Weapons of Influence�������������������������������� 223 3.8.7 Level 7: Compliance/Non-Compliance���������������������������������������� 225 3.8.8 Westfalen Negotiations ���������������������������������������������������������������� 226 3.8.9 Summary BMI Stairway �������������������������������������������������������������� 233 3.9 Visualize the Negotiation Process (PN Task No. 9)���������������������������������� 233 3.10 Negotiate! (PN Task No. 10)���������������������������������������������������������������������� 234 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 237 4 Round of Negotiations 239 4.1 Opening������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 240 4.1.1 Small Talk ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 241 4.1.2 Agenda������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 242 4.1.3 Smart Start������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 243 4.1.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 247

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4.2 Middle of Act Two ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 248 4.2.1 Phase A: Analyze Open Points ���������������������������������������������������� 252 4.2.2 Phase B: Break 4 Change ������������������������������������������������������������ 261 4.2.3 Concessions Package Procedure�������������������������������������������������� 263 4.3 Good Bye: Say Goodbye Professionally���������������������������������������������������� 274 4.3.1 Stay in the Game�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 276 4.3.2 Walk Out �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 277 4.3.3 Game Over������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 278 4.3.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 279 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 279 5 Influence 281 5.1 Sympathy �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 284 5.1.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 286 5.1.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 286 5.1.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 289 5.1.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 291 5.1.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 291 5.2 Anchoring�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 293 5.2.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 293 5.2.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 294 5.2.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 297 5.2.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 299 5.2.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 300 5.3 Arguments�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 303 5.3.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 303 5.3.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 304 5.3.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 307 5.3.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 308 5.3.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 308 5.4 Examples���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 311 5.4.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 311 5.4.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 312 5.4.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 315 5.4.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 316 5.4.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 316 5.5 Pictures������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 317 5.5.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 317 5.5.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 318 5.5.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 319 5.5.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 321 5.5.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 321

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5.6 Story���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 322 5.6.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 322 5.6.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 323 5.6.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 324 5.6.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 325 5.6.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 325 5.7 Social Proof������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 326 5.7.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 327 5.7.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 327 5.7.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 328 5.7.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 329 5.7.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 330 5.8 Authority���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 331 5.8.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 331 5.8.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 332 5.8.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 333 5.8.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 335 5.8.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 335 5.9 Fairness������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 336 5.9.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 336 5.9.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 337 5.9.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 338 5.9.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 339 5.9.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 340 5.10 Priming������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 340 5.10.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 340 5.10.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 343 5.10.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 344 5.10.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 345 5.10.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 345 5.11 Framing������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 346 5.11.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 346 5.11.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 348 5.11.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 349 5.11.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 351 5.11.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 351 5.12 Participation ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 355 5.12.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 355 5.12.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 357 5.12.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 357 5.12.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 358 5.12.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 359

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5.13 Reciprocity������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 359 5.13.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 360 5.13.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 361 5.13.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 363 5.13.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 364 5.13.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 366 5.14 Consistency������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 368 5.14.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 368 5.14.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 369 5.14.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 369 5.14.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 371 5.14.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 371 5.15 Scarcity������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 373 5.15.1 Definition�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 373 5.15.2 Deployment���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 374 5.15.3 Defense ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 374 5.15.4 Summary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 375 5.15.5 Basics�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 375 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 376 6 Driver-Seat  Concept in Comparison 377 6.1 Confrontation �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 378 6.2 Cooperation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 381 6.2.1 First the Analysis of the Conflicts, Then the Solution (Cooperation)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 381 6.2.2 Seven Differences Between Harvard I/Harvard II and the Driver-Seat Concept���������������������������������������������������������������������� 383 6.3 Compromise���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 392 6.4 Driver-Seat Concept���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 392 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 394 7 Checklist  for the DM 395 7.1 Team Formation (DM Task No. 1)������������������������������������������������������������ 396 7.2 Checklist: Options (DM Task No. 2) �������������������������������������������������������� 397 7.3 Positions (DM Task No. 3)������������������������������������������������������������������������ 397 7.4 Learn (DM Task No. 4)������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 399 7.5 Adapt: Determine the Strategies and Positions (DM Task No. 5) ������������ 401 7.6 Discuss Next Steps (DM Task No. 6)�������������������������������������������������������� 402 7.7 Your Instruction (DM Task No. 7) ������������������������������������������������������������ 403 8 Checklist  for the Primary Negotiator 407 8.1 Always Consider the Other Side as a Partner (PN Task No. 1) ���������������� 407 8.2 Always Stay Cool (PN Task No. 2) ���������������������������������������������������������� 407

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8.3 Train the Use of the Weapons of Influence (PN Task No. 3) �������������������� 408 8.4 Train Defense Against Influence (PN Task No. 4)������������������������������������ 408 8.5 Use the Time Factor Correctly (PN Task No. 5)���������������������������������������� 408 8.6 Consider Power as a Mere Illusion (PN Task No. 6) �������������������������������� 409 8.7 Accept the Negotiation Instruction (PN Task No. 7) �������������������������������� 409 8.8 Visualize Your Behavior with the BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8)������������ 412 8.9 Visualize the Negotiation Process (PN Task No. 9)���������������������������������� 416 8.10 Negotiate! (PN Task #10)�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 416 9 Checklist: Negotiation Round 417 9.1 Opening������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 417 9.2 Middle of Act Two ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 417 9.2.1 Phase A: Analyze Open Points ���������������������������������������������������� 417 9.2.2 Phase B: Break 4 Change ������������������������������������������������������������ 418 9.2.3 Phase C: Concessions Package Procedure������������������������������������ 419 9.3 Good Bye: Say Goodbye Professionally���������������������������������������������������� 420 9.3.1 Stay in the Game�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 420 9.3.2 Walk Out �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 420 9.3.3 Game over������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 421

1

Definition, Structure, Preparation

First, I briefly introduce the definition of negotiation and explain the structure of the book. I will not discuss the three basic models of negotiation management that exist alongside the crisis negotiation model and the Driver-Seat Concept until the end of this book. The three basic models are the models of confrontation derived from conflict research (e.g. Soviet Style), cooperation (example Harvard Concept I and Harvard Concept II) and compromise (e.g. politics). These three models are compared with the Driver-Seat Concept. The latter is a hybrid model in which the models of confrontation and cooperation familiar from conflict research are combined in a structured way. The Driver-Seat Concept also represents an independent, scientifically sound (academic level) and practically functioning (street level) concept. It compensates for the seven weaknesses of the Harvard concept identified in this book (cf. Chap. 6).

The book “The Harvard Concept” is often referred to as “Harvard Concept I” or “Harvard I” and the book “Getting Past NO” is often referred to as “Harvard Concept II” or “Harvard II” (cf. Portner 2010, pp.  176  ff. and 214 ff.). I adopt this terminology.

1.1 Definition of Negotiation … negotiation … is the use of communication to exercise influence … (Dolnik/Fitzgerald).

There are naturally different definitions with regard to the term “negotiation”. At its core, it is about communication with the aim of influencing (cf. Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2008, p. 1). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 H. Rock, Successful negotiation with the Driver-Seat Concept, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39934-4_1

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1  Definition, Structure, Preparation

Initial Situation: Different Positions The initial situation is always the same: there is a project. This can only be realized if at least two parties, who are mutually dependent on each other, reach an agreement. If the agreement cannot be reached easily, the negotiations begin automatically. Either an agreement is reached and the joint project is realized, or no agreement is reached and each party decides on the other option that best serves its own interests. The projects are as varied as our everyday lives: they can be about going to a restaurant, booking the next holiday, buying a washing machine, a car, an apartment or a house. In the professional sector, it can be, for example, the employment contract for the next job, the negotiation of the remuneration in the existing job, a supply contract or a complex set of contracts such as (e.g. company purchase agreement, joint venture) or in politics an international treaty (e.g. BREXIT). There are no limits to the variety. Whenever we take different positions (high compensation or low compensation) on certain issues (e.g. amount of compensation) in these projects (e.g. employment contract), we start negotiating (in everyday situations as well as in non-everyday situations). In short, the initial situation is when several parties hold different positions with regard to a project that is to be jointly implemented (regardless of whether it is trivial or sophisticated). Negotiation Is Persuasion With respect to the trial that then followed, I found a very striking definition in the literature written by FBI experts that gets to the heart of the matter: After that, negotiation is communication with the target, • get as much information as possible and • to exert influence on the communication partner, • so that the communication partner changes his thinking and also his behavior and decisions (cf. Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2008, p. 1; cf. Voss and Raz 2016, pp. 17 and 47).

The actual negotiation or negotiation as such is therefore nothing other than communication with the aim of reducing one’s own information deficit and influencing the negotiating partner and thus (sometimes easy, sometimes difficult) persuasion. It is important to bear in mind that this is always a play in which you only know your own script. After you enter the stage as an actor (i.e. sit at the negotiating table), you must first understand the other side’s script in order to then write a joint script with the other side for the end of the play: “Negotiation is a fluid process. It is like a play in which negotiators and the actor start across the stage from one another with different scripts” (McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 130). The Driver-Seat Concept, shows you how to write your script for complex negotiations and how to deal with the other side’s script.

1.2 Structure

3

1.2 Structure The book is structured as follows: Chaps. 2 and 3 explain how to prepare for each negotiation. A strict distinction is made between the preparation of the person who makes the decisions (in the language of the FBI, the “Decision Maker”) (cf. Chap. 2) and the person who has to negotiate these decisions on behalf of the Decision Maker as his extended arm, i.e. the negotiator (in the language of the crisis negotiation model or the FBI, the “Primary Negotiator” or just the “negotiator” for short) (cf. Chap. 3). Chapter 4 is dedicated solely to the conduct of the negotiation by the Primary Negotiator in the specific negotiation situation. It explains in detail how you, as the negotiator, can optimally structure your negotiations so that you, as the Primary Negotiator, always remain in the “driver seat”. In Chap. 5, the aspect of influence, the crowning glory of every negotiation, is dealt with in greater depth. The most important weapons of influence are presented, so that after some training you will be able to decide confidently at any time which weapons you want to use in which specific situation. In addition, you will learn how to fend off the weapons when they are used against you. In his standard work “Influence”, Cialdini speaks very memorably of the “Weapons of Influence” (Cialdini 2007 cf. p. 1 ff.). This term is adopted in this book.

In Chap. 6, the three basic models of negotiation management are outlined and compared with the hybrid model developed here, namely the Driver-Seat Concept. In particular, the seven weaknesses of Harvard I and Harvard II are explained and how these are compensated for in the Driver-Seat Concept. In Chap. 7 I provide you with the checklist you need for the Decision Maker, Chap. 8 contains the checklist for the Primary Negotiator and Chap. 9 the checklist relating to the course of the negotiation round. To be more specific, the following aspects are presented in the individual chapters: Chapter 2 Chapter 2 explains the seven tasks of the Decision Maker. These seven tasks are part of the TOP LADY formula developed in this book. TOP LADY stands for the terms Team, Options, Positions (and thus for the development of the Decision Maker’s mission) and the terms Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction (and thus for the further development of the mission by the Decision Maker). Each task is numbered and designated as “DM Task No. …” . At the core of each task is the following: 1. Team: Every type of negotiation (always) starts with the task-oriented team strategy, i.e. the Decision Maker determines the project team and, as part of it, the Negotiation Team and distributes the individual tasks. This is DM task number 1 (see Sect. 2.1). Finally, three basic models are recommended for the practice of

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1  Definition, Structure, Preparation

2.

3.

4.

5.

your private and professional negotiations (Standard Team, Performance Team and High Performance Team). The special case of the One Man Team is also explained. Options: As a Decision Maker, you should consider your possible options, actively shape them and realistically assess them. This is DM task No. 2 (see Sect. 2.2). It is particularly important to realize that a lack of options is not synonymous with hopelessness. Options are a “nice-to-have”, not a “must-have”. Positions: After that, you build your position foundation. Then you analyze your own situation, consisting of a World-Check, a Leverage-Check, an Options-Check and the Overconfidence-Check. Based on your situation, you adjust the standard positions of the position foundation and develop your individual positions in relation to each topic of your project. First, you will design your target positions in order to then optimize them for the start of the negotiations (starting positions). In addition, you will deal with which positions represent your lower or upper limit (stop positions). This is DM task No. 3 (see Sect. 2.3). You will also acquire the right mind set. If you as a Decision Maker have fulfilled these three tasks, you have developed your mission (Mission Development). After that, you should review your mission after each new piece of information (Mission Control). This is an iterative process according to points 4, 5, 6 and 7 below. Learn: Based on each new piece of information, keep reassessing your negotiating partner’s situation and, in particular, try to understand the positions you really mean as part of an iterative process. If and to the extent that these positions are in conflict with yours, you can define the conflicts very precisely. This, of course, depends on you getting sufficient and accurate information. This iterative process of constantly re-­evaluating your partner’s positions and defining the conflicts as a result is DM Task No. 4 (see Sect. 2.4). In concrete terms, this involves initially ignoring the partner’s positions and analyzing the team and the partner’s situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check). In the World-Check you try to understand the individual world of your negotiating partner. Then you interpret the positions originally stated (and initially ignored by you) against the background of your partner’s situation. You will then clarify these assumptions or presumptions in order to finally define conflicts. So it’s (boiled down to the essentials) about: Ignoring, Analyzing, Interpreting, Defining. Adapt: As the Decision Maker, determine on the one hand whether you will adapt your positions on the basis of the new information. Secondly, determine the correct conflict strategy in each case, which the Primary Negotiator has to implement at the negotiating table with the appropriate tactics (including positions). The first thing to do is to find the right strategy regarding the analysis or definition of the conflicts. Only then is it a question of the appropriate strategy, from your point of view, regarding the resolution of the conflicts. This is DM task No. 5 (cf. Sect. 2.5). Here the five common conflict strategies are discussed (confrontation, avoidance, giving in, compromise and cooperation). It also explains how professionally managed conflict in

1.2 Structure

5

practice typically leads to consensus on six levels (Schwarz) and how unmanaged conflict can lead to a common demise on nine levels (Glasl) (cf. Sect. 2.5.5). 6. Discuss: Discuss your assessment with regard to your partner’s situation and the positions derived from it as well as your own positions or your further course of action (also with regard to possible options) in the team in order to reduce the risk of wrong decisions. This is DM task No. 6 (cf. Sect. 2.6). 7. Your Instruction: give your Negotiator an instruction related to your mission. The assignment typically contains three types of instructions: –– Learn: First, determine how the Negotiator, as your extended arm, will first prepare your DM Task No. 4 (Learn) by following the essential steps of the Learn task: Ignore, Analyze, Interpret, Clarify, Define. –– Bargain: Determine which positions your Negotiator should take or which conflict strategy your Negotiator should implement using the tactics he or she is familiar with. –– Report Back: Instruct your Negotiator to report back to you on a regular basis. Reporting then leads to you exercising your mission control and issuing a new instruction if necessary (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, LADY for short). This is DM task No. 7 (cf. Sect. 2.7). Chapter 3 Chapter 3 explains the ten tasks of the Primary Negotiator. The tasks in Sects. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 inclusive relate to the mind-set phase of the Negotiator. The tasks in Sects. 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 relate to the action phase of the Negotiator. Each task will be numbered consecutively and referred to as “PN Task No. …”. 1. PN task No. 1 is about the fact that the “other side” must always be considered as a partner, namely as a “negotiating partner” (cf. Sect. 3.1). 2. PN task No. 2 is about training your own self-control, i.e. always staying cool (cf. Sect. 3.2). 3. PN task No. 3 asks the Negotiator to deal intensively with the Weapons of Influence, which are described in detail in Chap. 5 (cf. Sect. 3.2.5). 4. PN task No. 4 explains how to effectively ward off influence by the Negotiator (cf. Sect. 3.4). 5. PN task No. 5 deals with the aspect of time (cf. Sect. 3.5). 6. PN task No. 6 deals with the aspect of power (cf. Sect. 3.6). 7. PN task No. 7 is the start of the Action phase (see Sect. 3.7). Here the Negotiator accepts the Decision Maker’s order according to DM task No. 7 (Your Instruction). This interface, i.e. the issuing of the instruction by the Decision Maker and the simultaneous acceptance of this instruction by the Primary Negotiator, is the entry point to the “360° Negotiation Concept” developed in this book. This states that the Negotiator

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performs PN tasks 7, 8, 9, and 10 and reports to the Decision Maker during time-outs according to PN task No. 10. In doing so, the Decision Maker receives new information and fulfills its tasks No. 4 to 7 (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, or LADY). With the new order to the Negotiator, the Negotiator starts again to fulfill his tasks. This 360° cycle is only terminated when the Decision Maker instructs the Negotiator to end the negotiations by reaching an agreement or breaking off. 8. PN Task No. 8 states that after accepting the Decision Maker’s mission, the Primary Negotiator must address the behavioral BMI strategy by repeating or visualizing all seven stages of this strategy and integrating the Decision Maker’s mission or mandate into the BMI strategy (at Stage 5) (see Sect. 3.8). BMI stands for the terms Bonding, Mission and Influence. Implementing the BMI strategy means that you first start by establishing a relationship with your negotiating partner in a professional manner (bonding). So you always start with bonding (stages 1–3 inclusive). Only then do you focus on the mission of your partner (level 4) and the assertion of the positions or the mission of your Decision Maker (level 5). If you are not able to assert your mission or your positions immediately, you will intensify the so-called Weapons of Influence on level 6 on the one hand and on the other hand you will fend off the influences of your partner even more consciously (Influence). Either you achieve a change in the behavior of your partner at level 7, i.e. an agreement (Compliance) to your positions or you achieve no agreement (Non-Compliance). In the case of Non-Compliance, you “park” the Open Points on an “Open Points List”. If you do not resolve the Open Points to your satisfaction, the negotiations will be terminated. The behaviors of the seven steps are rarely distinct from each other. Rather, they often merge or overlap. The transitions are therefore often fluid. For example, you influence your partner by your very first appearance. However, the staircase with the seven steps is an excellent image that helps you to be aware at all times of which actions you are currently focusing on. In negotiations which are particularly challenging from the outset (e.g. settling a dispute) you will experience the seven steps relatively clearly (cf. the Westphalia negotiations in Sect. 3.8.8). 9. PN task No. 9 reminds the Primary Negotiator to become aware of the procedural flow of a professionally managed negotiation immediately before each negotiation (cf. Sect. 3.9). The Primary Negotiator will therefore run through the structured negotiation process outlined in Chap. 4 (cf. Sect. 4) in his mind’s eye. This structured negotiation process always consists (in the case of the application of the Driver-Seat Concept) of three elements: (i) the Opening, (ii) the Middle of Act Two (with the three phases Analyse Open Points, Break 4 Change and Concessions Package Procedure) and (iii) the element Good Bye. 10. PN task No. 10 (Negotiate!) states that you, as Primary Negotiator, now take action and fulfil PN tasks No. 7 (Order), No. 8 (BMI strategy) and No. 9 (Structured negotiation process, especially in connection with element 2, i.e. the ABC strategy) in the negotiation room (cf. Sect. 3.10). In addition, PN task No. 10 states that you should

1.2 Structure

7

always suggest time-outs, inform the Decision Maker and have a new order or new instructions issued and in this way actively live the 360° Negotiation Concept. Chapter 4 Chapter 4 details how you, as a Negotiator who has prepared yourself according to Chap. 3, optimally structure the process as such in every negotiation so that you, as the Primary Negotiator, always remain in the driver seat. It discusses those tactics/tactical measures that you can apply (unchanged) in every negotiation. 1. The Negotiator starts with the first element of the negotiation process, the Opening (Small Talk, Agenda, Smart Start). 2. Immediately after the opening, the second element begins, namely the element of every negotiation that is always the greatest challenge for every Negotiator: the element that I refer to in this book as Middle of Act Two. This element consists of three processual phases, which you can control very confidently with the processoriented ABC strategy developed in this book. –– In Phase A (Analyze Open Points), you as the Negotiator adamantly advocate the starting positions given to you by the Decision Maker (DM Task No. 7 and also PN Task No. 7). Whenever you cannot prevail, you take the point to an Open Points List (“OP List”). The OP List is one of your most important tools in any challenging negotiation. Only when you have worked out all the Open Points and thus fully defined or analyzed all the conflicts, is Phase A over. The strategy of choice is Professional Confrontation (see Sect. 4.2.1). –– In Phase B (Break 4 Change) you talk to your Decision Maker about a possible change of conflict strategy. Phase B is therefore a particularly significant timeout. While you were not cooperative in Phase A in order to define the conflict as precisely as possible, your Decision Maker will, according to the ABC strategy recommended as a rule in this book, decide in Phase B to behave cooperatively in the subsequent Phase C. This will result in a change of strategy. As a result, you combine the basic models of confrontation (Phase A) and cooperation (Phase C) and thus apply a hybrid model. Of course, if your Decision Maker so dictates, you can also continue your negotiations with confrontation or end the negotiations by giving in or by a quick or false compromise. –– If your Decision Maker chooses the Situation-Oriented Cooperation recommended as a rule in this book, you enter Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure). You then offer concessions in the form of packages (according to the Decision Maker’s particular order). Instead of the original starting positions, you now negotiate package items, which are always presented as a unit in their total. A change to one package item by the partner entitles you to change all package items. The goal is to agree on a package that satisfies both sides. 3. The third element, the Goodbye, is designed differently depending on whether you want to continue the negotiation together, you initiate a tactical deadlock, or the Decision Maker wants to stop the negotiation altogether.

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Chapter 5 In Chap. 5, the aspect of influence, the crowning glory of every negotiation, is dealt with in greater depth. Here, the essential weapons of influence are presented so that, after some training, you will be able to decide confidently at any time which weapons you want to use in which specific situation. I will mention three weapons that are particularly effective in any difficult negotiation (priming according to Sect. 5.10, framing according to Sect. 5.11 and participation according to Sect. 5.12). It also outlines how to protect yourself when your partner uses the weapons of influence against you. Chapter 6 Chapter 6 first outlines the three basic models for conducting negotiations: • Confrontation • Cooperation and • Compromise These are then compared with the Driver-Seat Concept (a hybrid model). Seven weaknesses are identified in relation to Harvard I and Harvard II. In addition, it is shown how the Driver-Seat Concept compensates for these seven weaknesses. Concerning Chaps. 7, 8 and 9  In Chap. 7 I provide you with the checklist you need for the Decision Maker, Chap. 8 contains the checklist for the Primary Negotiator and Chap. 9 the checklist relating to the course of the negotiation round.

At this point, please allow me to make the following general remark: In all chapters of this book, you will find rules that are deliberately formulated in a simple manner and introduced with “always” or “never”, for example. It will not be overlooked that there are of course situations in which the respective rule is not applicable. Nevertheless, I deliberately use these rules so that you first mentally internalize a principle. In difficult or complex situations you must be able to fall back on simple rules. If you have succeeded in internalizing the rules, you will no longer deviate from this principle lightly. I would like you to feel compelled to come up with a plausible justification before claiming the existence of an exceptional case. Therefore, please always follow the principle first and deviate from it only in justified exceptional cases. This is also taught at the FBI: “Policy gives everyone a starting point” (Strentz 2018, p.  296). Deviations are permissible, but only if the commander (Decision Maker) allows it: “We have … learned it is absolutely necessary to have well-defined guidelines from which commanders can approve negotiators’ deviations in a very deliberate and well-thought-out manner” (Strentz 2018, p. 269).

1.4  Fast Track

9

1.3 Preparation It needs no special emphasis that every project should be optimally prepared. Faulty preparation is also preparation for failure: “Failing to prepare is preparing to fail”. This wisdom, which is said to have come from the coaching legend Bob Wooden (Shell 2006, p. 137), also applies unreservedly to negotiation. The Optimal Preparation Those who have enough time to prepare professionally can learn about the best practice measures in this regard in detail in Chap. 2 and then in Chap. 3. A strict distinction is made between the persons involved: Chap. 2 explains the seven tasks of the Decision Maker (TOP LADY) and Chap. 3 presents the ten tasks concerning the preparations/actions of the Primary Negotiator. For better differentiation (as already pointed out above) the tasks of the Decision Maker are called “DM-tasks” and the tasks concerning the Negotiator are called “PN-tasks” and numbered consecutively. You will be guided step by step through the individual activities in each of the two chapters. Negotiating Without Preparation At the same time, it is clear to every practitioner that optimal preparation is not always possible. This reality is also taken into account in this book. In Sect. 1.4 you will find three variants for a quick introduction to this book.

1.4 Fast Track There are readers who have bought this book in order to prepare for an important negotiation as quickly as possible. Due to the very practical structure of the Driver-Seat Concept, it is of course possible to read the basic strategies concerning negotiation in isolation and study other parts of the book later (in quieter times). The Very Hasty Negotiator If you are in a hurry and you are the person who has to do the negotiating, please read only PN task 8 (see Sect. 3.8). PN task No. 8 deals with one of the three basic strategies, namely the behavioral BMI strategy of the negotiator. The associated BMI tool is the stairway with seven steps, the “BMI stairway”. If you have not been able to prepare yourself in terms of content, then simply move along the first four steps of the BMI stairway and end the conversation, for example, with the sentence: “I would like to summarize your points again as follows: … I regret that I was unable to prepare adequately for the reasons stated at the beginning. I will

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take your points as they are, discuss them with my project manager (or boss or client) and get back to you as soon as possible.” It sounds strange, but it’s true: You learn the BMI strategy best when you are not prepared in terms of content. The reason is very simple. Lacking substantive preparation, you can say little yourself and are forced to listen. Whereas as a young lawyer I strictly refused to engage in negotiations if I could not prepare at all, today it is the other way around. I enjoy listening and the consequent reduction in the information deficit that characterizes any negotiation. On step 4 of the BMI stairway, I then very confidently exit the negotiation for the time being with the above quote. Later, I return to the negotiating table with an order or a specific instruction from the Decision Maker. The Very Hasty Decision Maker If you are in a hurry and you are the person who makes the decisions, you should only deal with DM task No. 1 (see Sect. 2.1). DM task No. 1 also deals with one of the three basic strategies, namely the task-oriented team strategy of the Decision Maker. The associated team tool is the organization chart. Set up your team and assign roles. Send your Negotiator into the negotiation and ask them to only take the first four steps of the BMI stairwy and then report back to you (see above). After that, you can then perform the rest of your duties. The Impatient Man On the other hand, if you are rather impatient (like myself) and want to read the very most important tactics/tactical actions first, then please deal with the three basic strategies in the following order: • Start with the task-oriented team strategy (of the Decision Maker) (see Sect. 2.1); • Then look at the negotiator’s behavioral BMI strategy (see Sect. 3.8); • Then deal with the process-oriented ABC strategy of the Decision Maker (cf. Chap. 4).

References Cialdini, R. (2007): Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. Collins Business, New York Dolnik A./Fitzgerald K. (2008): Negotiating Hostage Crises With New Terrorists. Praeger Security International, Westport London McMains, M./Mullins, W. (2014): Crisis Negotiations. 5th edition, Elsevier, Amsterdam Portner, J. (2010): Besser verhandeln. 2nd edition, Gabal, Offenbach Shell, R. (2006): Bargaining for Advantage. Penguin Books, New York Strentz, T. (2018): Psychological Aspects of Crisis Negotiation. 3rd edition., Routledge Taylor & Francis, New York/London Voss C./Raz T. (2016): Never Split The Difference. HarperCollins, New York

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Seven Tasks of the Decision Maker

Apply the TOP LADY formula: Team, Options, Positions, Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction.

Negotiations are conducted in order to achieve an objective goal, i.e. a mission. The missions are as varied as life itself. For example, it is about an employment contract, a car purchase, the purchase of a property, the renting of an apartment, the conclusion of a supply contract, the agreement of a joint venture/a complex company purchase, an agreement between shareholders, the resolution of a (complex) dispute or just about the next visit to a restaurant or a holiday with the partner. The Decision Maker who wants to achieve a mission will, as part of professional preparation, perform the following seven tasks (cf. Fig. 2.1), which are explained in detail below. The TOP LADY Formula As outlined above (see Sect. 1.2), the Decision Maker has seven tasks, but they have nothing to do with direct negotiation. These seven tasks are part of the TOP LADY formula developed in this book: • form a team (and not negotiate themselves) (“Team”) • develop several options, if this is possible (“Options”) • develop the positions for each option (“Positions”). These first three steps are fundamental and serve to first develop a starting point with regard to one’s own positions. The abbreviation for these three activities (mission development) is TOP (Team, Options, Positions), which is a good way of supporting your thinking, because the Decision Maker is always “on the TOP”.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 H. Rock, Successful negotiation with the Driver-Seat Concept, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39934-4_2

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Concessions Package Procedure for example

14 - 18 o'clock

• •

Negotiating package positions for the first time Ends with agreement on the final positions or the (provisional/final) termination of the negotiations.

End the negotiations with one of the following three tactics: (Always behave as if the talks were never finally over) goodbye

• • •

Stay in the Game ("Buy time - be patient") Walk Out ("Deadlocks can always be broken") Game Over ("Never burn your bridges")

Fig. 4.1  Three elements of the negotiation round – Opening. (Source: Own representation)

4.1 Opening

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4.1.1 Small Talk Engage in small talk (Matthias Schranner).

Small talk is annoying to many people. Well-prepared negotiators want to get down to business quickly. This is understandable, but unprofessional. Small talk is a very important tactical element of negotiation. Professional negotiators can generate sympathy in this way. Sympathy, in turn, is one of the Weapons of Influence (see Sect. 5.1) that can bring about bonding. This in turn makes agreement (i.e. compliance) by the negotiating partner more likely. Small talk can bring about trust and openness (cf. Nadler 2007, p. 10). Sympathy is generated (scientifically proven; cf. Sect. 5.1), among other things, by emphasizing similarities (same hobbies, same holiday destinations, same preference for certain sports clubs, etc.) and praising the other side. The negotiation expert Matthias Schranner always praised hostage-takers during his time as a police negotiator, telling them, for example, that they act very professionally (cf. www.schranner.com/de/ news/2014/08/26/die-­erste-­minute-­eines-­gesprächs. Accessed: 10.06.2018). In the meantime, I have developed the following practice for myself when I am assigned the role of Primary Negotiator: I initiate the small talk (if the negotiating partner doesn’t do it), but I no longer actively end it. So I always let my negotiating partner do the small talk for as long as they want to. I then enjoy the talkativeness and gather valuable information in the process. So I get a double benefit: On the one hand, I promote the bonding process that can lead me to the trust level of over 51% (affective). On the other hand, with every single word I get valuable information for the situation check (WorldCheck, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and especially the emotional and the rational world of my negotiation partner (effective). In the meantime, I no longer have a problem if, for example, more than 30 min of a 2-h conversation are devoted to small talk. As a “rookie”, i.e. as a beginner, I got nervous after only 5 min of small talk and suggested to finally talk about the text of the contract. What a fatal mistake! So the first rule is: “Make small talk” (Schranner 2016b, p. 108). When transitioning to the matter at hand, the Professional Negotiator will behave in exactly the same way as the FBI Expert and emphasize cooperation with a very positive attitude, highlighting that they will work together to find a solution regarding any conflicts (cf. Schranner 2016a, p. 136).

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“Bar Negotiations”

Finally, there is a special kind of small talk that a negotiator once used: He had suggested such an early negotiation date in a Frankfurt hotel that everyone had to arrive the evening before. He then informed us that he had reserved seats in the bar for 9 p.m. on the evening before the negotiation so that we could talk “in a relaxed atmosphere” about things other than the deal. Of course, we couldn’t turn down this invitation. The evening was very nice and the mood the next morning at the negotiating table was just different than usual. As a result, after many months, we (sellers at auction) had a successful signing and closing with exactly this negotiating partner. Of course, this was largely due to the purchase price, but in addition, the atmosphere was always positive and much less aggressive than in the countless deals where the negotiations did not start in a hotel bar.

4.1.2 Agenda Start … with an agenda (Matthias Schranner).

It is very useful and also common practice to exchange an agenda before negotiations so that everyone can prepare accordingly. This applies to “Face 2 Face” negotiations as well as to conference calls and all other types of communication. So please always start the purely factual conversation with an agenda (Schranner 2016b, p. 145).

4.1.2.1 Use the One-Text Procedure When it comes to contracts, the best practice is very simple: use the contract text as an agenda. The primary goal here is to first gain sovereignty over the contract, i.e. to create the first draft yourself and send it to all parties involved (cf. Dawson 1999, p. 130 ff.). Points that you deliberately want to leave open, simply put in brackets and mark this open point in yellow, so for example: “The annual bonus amounts to a maximum of […] euros. The entitlement arises if the following conditions are met: (i) […], (ii) […], (iii) […]. The amount of the bonus is determined as follows: […].” Thus, everyone immediately sees that you have put the topics “annual bonus” as well as the conditions for the occurrence of the bonus and the amount of the bonus on the agenda. You have deliberately left these items open in order to encourage the partner to make the first offer (cf. Sect. 4.1.3). In the subsequent exchange of contract texts (contract sovereignty typically changes with each draft), you also use these brackets to mark points on which no agreement has yet been reached or which no one has yet wanted to insert, such as addresses or other banalities. This “one text procedure” (cf. Fisher et al. 2002, p. 164 ff.), according to which all parties involved always refer to one version of the text or the amendment version of this text, ensures that all parties are always talking about the same thing, i.e. are literally “on the same page” and thus agree on what is open and therefore still needs to be clarified.

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4.1.2.2 Page Turning or Big Points First? Experience shows that it does not always make sense to discuss every single point from page one to the last page (“Issue By Issue” or “Page Turning”) of the text at hand one by one. This is because this procedure takes a long time and there may then not be enough time to discuss the points that are really important to both sides (“Big Points”). It may therefore be better to agree at the beginning of the negotiations to discuss all the “big points” in advance during the available time frame (who has to leave the current negotiating round and when?), but not to resolve them (cf. Sect. 4.2.3) (“big points first”). If you can get the partner to name his Big Points, you reduce your information deficit, you learn in this way what is really important to your partner and often why it is important to him. Please do not think that you have to solve “Big Points” first. The dynamics of the negotiation may make it easier to solve Big Points if you have discussed other conflicts beforehand and possibly held out the prospect of a possible solution (as part of an overall package). 4.1.2.3 Do Not Set Deadlines In some cases, it is recommended to set a time frame for individual topics (cf. Schranner 2016a, p. 94 ff.). I do not consider this to be expedient (cf. Sect. 3.5.4) and advise against it: “Do not set a deadline on yourself” (Goergen 2016, p. 30). Ultimately, every issue needs its time. There are no quick solutions in difficult negotiations: “In this business, there is no quick fix” (Misino 2004, p. 50). 4.1.2.4 Let the Partner Set the Agenda in the Beginning If the other side sends you the agenda and you see a compelling need for change, communicate it immediately. In all other cases (no compelling need for change), follow Misino’s recommendation without reservation. He advises to let the negotiating partner set the agenda, at least at the beginning: “Let them drive the discussion agenda, at least at first” (Misino 2004, p. 65). This way you can start to build trust or a trust level of 51%. You will also learn what is important to your partner and reduce the information deficit. After your first time-out, you report to the Decision Maker. The Decision Maker now assumes the task of Mission Control (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, LADY for short) and gives you an order (if necessary) regarding the completion of the agenda. In this way, you can change the agenda in your direction at any time during the negotiation (“My boss just told me on the phone during the break that we absolutely have to talk about the points … Please let us put this on the agenda”).

4.1.3 Smart Start You go first (Dominick J. Misino).

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After both parties have agreed on the aforementioned procedure (contract as agenda, possibly priority of the Big Points), one of the parties must now open the negotiations in terms of content, i.e. state certain positions and explain why it represents these positions. Make it a habit to let your partner open the negotiations; only open them yourself, when the other side refuses to open (Smart Start). The basic rule is: “You go first” (Misino 2004, p. 123).

4.1.3.1 Opening by the Other Party and Rejection of the First Offer It is advisable to let the other person open up. This is the core statement of the “Never Open Rule” (cf. Shell 2006, p. 158; Voss and Raz 2016, p. 129 ff.). This applies both to the start of negotiations and to the continuation of talks after a pause in negotiations (time-out), during which both sides have exchanged their thoughts in isolation and internally. The Never Open Rule is based on the information deficit that constantly exists in any negotiation. You usually do not know what your negotiating partner would give you. You don’t know his situation (especially his emotional and rational world). You only know what you consider reasonable, and believe you know what your partner considers reasonable or fair. Knowing that people make decisions in their gut and reason with their brain (see Sect. 2.4.3), you should not make assumptions about other people’s possible decisions. Always remember the rule of the FBI or Greenstone Law No. 19: “To assume anything makes an ASS of U and ME” (Greenstone 2005, p. 148). This is also why the FBI’s best practice is “Let the subject make the first offer” (Goergen 2016, p. 28). Since I have been enforcing this in the negotiation teams I advise, we constantly receive astounding successes when we compare our (false) assumptions with reality in the debriefing. Below I would like to describe just two examples that impressively demonstrate the success of the Never Open Rule:

Castle Park Negotiations

I had advised a manager regarding his job change. After he had completed all the interviews and was now about to have the final interview on the contract and thus also on the conditions, he asked me whether he should name the first figure in order to set the famous “anchor”. My advice was: Absolutely not, or do you know exactly what this employer wants to pay you? If you are asked about your salary expectations, you should say: “I find the job very interesting. I definitely want to take on this challenging role. My compensation must fit the overall compensation concept of your company. I am not familiar with this concept. Therefore, it is difficult for me to give you a figure”. The manager followed through exactly. The CEO replied, “You skillfully played that back, all right, I would offer you as fixed compensation … p. a. Euros and as variable compensation … Euro p. a. As a company car I could imagine a …”. The manager replied (as a one man team) after discussing all points: “Thank you very much for the package. I would like to think it over again thoroughly and would then get back to you at short notice”. (continued)

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(continued)

The result: the manager asks for a little more and also received the desired compensation. The contract was signed a week later. The manager had doubled his salary compared to the last job. This doubling was only based on the Never Open Rule. If the manager had set his anchor as recommended many times in the literature, he would have set it much lower due to his lack of information. He believed he could increase his final salary by 50% at best. I told him, “To assume anything makes an ASS of U and ME” (Greenstone 2005, p. 148). Greenstone was right.

Isar Negotiations

My client wanted to conclude a consultancy contract for 3 years with a very competent person. My client’s careful and rational analysis revealed that the consultant was likely to demand EUR 250,000 p.a., resulting in an amount of EUR 750,000 for 3 years. I accompanied my client into the negotiations as Primary Negotiator and agreed with him in advance that I would apply the Never Open Rule. After we had discussed the details of the consultancy agreement, I asked the consultant: “Do you already have a house number with regard to the amount of the annual remuneration, there is still an unfilled square bracket in the contract”. The consultant answered: “Yes, I think 60,000 EUR p.a. would be appropriate in this particular case. That is sufficient for me.” I looked questioningly at my client, who hesitantly said, “Hmm, that’s EUR 180,000 for three years, but I think that’s conceivable if the overall package is right, so we can agree on all the open points.” The Never Open Rule had brought us EUR 570,000 in just a few minutes, which is over half a million euros. I could continue the list of examples as long as you like. Instead, however, I would rather remind you once again of Greenstone Law No. 19: “To assume anything makes an “ASS” of “U” and “ME””(Greenstone 2005, p. 148).

Overall, let your counterpart open whenever possible. This gives your team the advantage to gather and evaluate information, especially regarding the counterparty’s interests, leverage, and options: “Letting your counterpart anchor first will give you a tremendous feel for him” (Voss and Raz 2016, p. 200). Don’t let anyone tell you that in such a case the anchor will work against you. You are a Professional Negotiator and therefore know how to use and ward off the Weapons of Influence (see Sect. 5.2). If this is successful, i.e. the negotiator opens, the Professional Negotiator starts Active Listening80 as planned. In addition, you always have three instructions to follow: Learn, Bargain, Report Back (see Sect. 3.7).

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The opening by the other party should be met with a professional rejection of the first offer. The rule is: “Never say yes to the first offer” (Dawson 1999, p. 23). This tactical measure prevents angering the negotiating partner. In the case of a quick agreement, the negotiating partner could either think angrily that he has asked too little and not negotiated well enough, or he could skeptically assume that “something is wrong” if the other party gives in too quickly (cf. Dawson 1999, p. 23 f.). Moreover, this tactical measure opens up room for negotiation if each party puts the aspect on its respective Open Points List.

4.1.3.2 Active Opening: Position Bargaining or Situation Talk If you do not succeed in getting your partner to open because he cleverly refuses to open the negotiations, you as the negotiator must actively open. In this case, please start with the so-called I statements20 (I messages), as outlined in Sect. 3.8.5. If the partner expects you to explain your position immediately, then start accordingly. If, on the other hand, it seems inappropriate for you to start with the positions, then you should opt for Situation Talk as your introduction. In detail: 4.1.3.3 Position Bargaining When you open with the positions, first state the starting positions specified by the Decision Maker (cf. Sect. 2.3.3). This tactical measure creates room for negotiation, prevents the final deadlock and leads to great satisfaction on the part of the other side if it can “negotiate away” something from the starting positions later (in Phase C). Accordingly, Rule No. 7 of the FBI Guidelines from the 1980s reads, “Start bidding high to give yourself room to negotiate (ask for all the hostages)” (McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 21). Starting positions are also a “deliberate anchor” (cf. Sect. 5.2) (a weapon of influence) and thus a component of influence. They force your negotiating partner to adjust in the categories “too high” or “too low”. This is a classic activity of Intuitive System I. In addition, you should generally not advocate starting positions with a “take it or leave it” attitude. The rule formulated by Misino applies: “Dictating terms – don’t do it” (Misino 2004, p. 115). Instead, signal a willingness to negotiate, but reserve this for a separate phase (concessions package procedure according to Sect. 4.2.3). 4.1.3.4 Situation Talk If the future relationship is particularly important, such as in an employment relationship and you (e.g. as an employee) are negotiating as a one man team, then you should not start off with a demand. You should absolutely talk first about your value proposition and therefore the value you create for the company. This value or leverage is the basis for the compensation demand. In addition, you can hint at any options that may exist in the abstract. I call this type of start “Situation Talk” because you don’t start with the positions, but with the situation underlying those positions, specifically your leverage. After that, you can elegantly present your demands: “Against the background of this situation, I would like to discuss the following compensation package with you …”.

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In addition, you have the chance that your partner interrupts you and starts with his offer. Then you should immediately start Active Listening.80

4.1.3.5 Exception: Opening in Crisis The above recommendations do not apply in a crisis, i.e. an emotionally tense situation. If I am allowed to mediate in a crisis situation (e.g. dispute between shareholders), I naturally follow the tips of the crisis negotiation model without restriction: “Introduction: name, agency, a willingness to help” (Goergen 2016, p.  34). I introduce myself and emphasize that I want to help: “Hi, my name is Hermann Rock, I am a lawyer. I am here to help you. We want to work out a solution together today”. This is immediately followed by a tactical pause. Now I let the other side talk and listen (cf. Sect. 3.8.1). This approach was already described by Ury in his book “Getting Past NO”: “Detective Lieutenant Robert J.  Louden, a trained hostage negotiator began a conversation with …‘How ya doin?’ My name is Bob and I’m here to see what’s going on. I’m here to help sort this out and help us get out of this mess”(Ury 2007, p. 164). This kind of opening is also described by Noesner: “Hello, my name is Gary and I’m here to help” (Noesner 2010, p. 12). Such an opening is also in line with best practice in 2018: “My name is … I am with the … department. Are you OK?” or “Can you tell me what’s going on?” (Strentz 2018, p.  49). After that, please be sure to listen (very) patiently: “Remember, they have a story to tell” (Strentz 2018, p. 51). Basically, keep in mind that you are willing to solve your partner’s problem, not your own: “Problem ownership: willingness to help solve their problem” (Goergen 2016, p. 34). After that, emphasize the emotions: „Identify the feeling. First skill to be used. Never let a feeling go by without labeling it”. “You sound …” “You seem …” “I hear …” (Goergen 2016, p. 25).

4.1.4 Summary

[Summary Opening]

1. Small Talk: “Engage in small talk” (Schranner). 2. Agenda: “Start … with an agenda” (Schranner). 3. Smart Start: Basically, let your partner open: “You go first” (Misino). Exception: start with a situation talk or your positions. 4. Special case crisis: “My name is … I am with the … department. Are you OK” or “Can you tell me what’s going on?” (Strentz).

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4.2 Middle of Act Two … trying to write a script … (McMains/Mullins).

The second element of the negotiation (cf. Figure 4.2) is, in summary, about implementing the conflict strategies that the Decision Maker specifies to you as Negotiator (cf. Sect. 3.7). In addition to avoidance (i.e. not negotiating), your Decision Maker basically has the choice between. • • • •

Confrontation or Giving in Compromising or Cooperation (see Sect. 2.5.1).

According to the Driver-Seat Concept, your Decision Maker starts with Professional Confrontation (Phase A), then decides anew (Phase B) and finally, ideally, assigns you to implement the conflict strategy Situation-Oriented Cooperation (Phase C). The Elements Opening

• • •

Ideally starts with small talk Followed by confirmation or clarification of the agenda Start of the Smart Start phase - observe the Never Open Rule

Analyze Open Points Communication of own positions • Phase ends with the complete Definition of all conflicts

• for example

09 - 12 h

Open Points List

Break 4 Change Middle of Act Two

for example

12 - 14 h

• Reporting of the N-Team to the Decision Maker • Mission Control (Learn > Adapt > Discuss > Your Instruct.) • First order with package positions to the Negotiator

Concessions Package Procedure for example

14 - 18 o'clock

• •

Negotiating package positions for the first time Ends with agreement on the final positions or the (provisional/final) termination of the negotiations.

End the negotiations with one of the following three tactics: (Always behave as if the talks were never finally over) goodbye

• • •

Stay in the Game ("Buy time - be patient") Walk Out ("Deadlocks can always be broken") Game Over ("Never burn your bridges")

Fig. 4.2 Three elements of the negotiation round: Middle of Act Two. (Source: Own representation)

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Driver-Seat Concept does not envisage giving in or reaching a quick compromise. Notwithstanding this, it may of course be right from the Decision Maker’s point of view to opt for giving in or a false compromise. In terms of your behavior, you apply the BMI strategy within phases A and C as a Professional Negotiator. You therefore know at any time exactly which phase (A, B or C) you are in and on which of the seven steps of the BMI stairway you are currently focusing. Write the Script with Your Negotiating Partner So far in this book there has been a seamless transition from chapter to chapter or section to section. This literally changes dramatically after the opening. You don’t even know approximately what’s coming up. Therefore, after the opening, it is not uncommon for negotiations to suddenly appear chaotic or completely unstructured. This is especially the case if the negotiators get on each other’s nerves and the atmosphere in the negotiating room deteriorates significantly. While you typically have everything under control in the preparation phase and during the opening, now nothing goes according to plan. You perceive disorder, i.e. chaos. This is the case in any challenging negotiation. All negotiations, both in terms of large deals and small deals, are chaotic: “All negotiations, large and small, are chaotic” (Wheeler 2013, p. 5). The most apt comparison I have ever read in a textbook comes from an FBI textbook. There, a comparison to drama is made that could not be more apt: A negotiator who begins a negotiation in a crisis situation experiences this entry exactly as if he, as an actor, were to enter the stage in the middle of the second act of a drama (i.e. during the escalation of the conflict), but without, and this is the crucial point, knowing the script. Based on his preparation, the Negotiator only knows how he and his Decision Maker imagine the script of the negotiation from their own point of view. He does not know how the negotiating partner imagines the script of the negotiation. He certainly does not know what the script will look like that he will shape together with the Negotiator from now on. The Negotiator must therefore first find his way around because he does not know the first act (the initial situation of the negotiating partner), the beginning of the second act (development of the conflict from the negotiating partner’s point of view) and certainly not the third act, i.e. the resolution of the conflict: “For negotiators, intervening in a crisis is like an actor entering the play in the middle of Act Two, but without a script” (McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 131, emphasis by the author). As a Negotiator, you must therefore first find out what happened in Act One of the negotiating partner, i.e. first understand the situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and thus the script of your partner and thus in particular his emotional and rational world. Then you need to understand how in Act Two so far the conflict has developed from your partner’s point of view. Finally, as a Professional Negotiator, you need to write the script for the solution together with your partner: “At the same time, he or she is trying to write a script and to direct the subject who already has his or her own script towards a new ending” (McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 131; author’s emphasis).

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Professional Negotiators are able to stay in the driver seat at all times in any negotiation, no matter how tense the atmosphere, to understand Act One and the first half of Act Two, and finally to write the script for Act Three together with the Negotiator. Mind Set This starts with the general mind-set: you need to accept the chaos or entering the stage in the middle of the second act (without knowing your negotiator’s script) as positive (cf. Wheeler 2013, p. 4) and at the same time see it as a challenge you are looking forward to. “Learn to be comfortable being uncomfortable” (Greenstone 2005, p. 148). The Three Phases This is very easy if you know how to structure the negotiations and the typical chaos that accompanies them. The core element “Middle of Act Two” consists of three phases, which you actively shape with the (process-oriented) ABC strategy: Analyse Open Points, Break 4 Change, Concessions Package Procedure. The application of the ABC strategy, which is based on the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI) (cf. www.kilmanndiagnostics.com. Accessed: 12.09.2018), ensures that you first fully define or analyze the conflict and only then resolve it, thus professionally managing the negotiation process. • Phase A (Analyze Open Points): First start defining the conflicts by analyzing the Open Points: “Analyse Open Points”. Depending on the project, this can be the case after the first meeting, but can also take weeks/months. In this first phase, if you follow the Driver-Seat Concept, you apply the conflict strategy Professional Confrontation. Avoidance, giving in, compromise and cooperation are basically not an option in the first phase. • Phase B (Break 4 Change): After the complete conflict analysis, in Phase B you, as the Negotiator, report to the Decision Maker on the individual conflicts and your findings to date. Your Decision Maker reviews the previous conflict strategy and decides whether he wants to change the strategy (Break 4 Change). In doing so, he has a choice: he can consciously decide to continue the confrontation or to change. If he wants to continue the confrontation, after Phase B you will stubbornly defend your Decision Maker’s positions and win or lose as a result. In the case of a change, your Decision Maker has the choice between giving in (i.e. ending the negotiations), the quick or false compromise (i.e. also ending the negotiations) or cooperation in order to find a consensus in a phase that is often very time-consuming (namely Phase C). • Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure): Finally, you start with the third phase of the negotiations; now, if your Decision Maker has opted for cooperation, the focus is on resolving all conflicts by tying up the negotiation packages: Concessions Package Procedure. Cooperation, which is an essential part of the Driver-Seat Concept, represents the “supreme discipline” (Schranner 2013, p.  85), as highlighted above. As a reminder, “this strategy can only be used by professional negotiators, as a high level of expertise, empathy and, above all, tactical skill are indispensable” (Schranner 2013,

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p. 85). In this phase, you apply the conflict strategy Situation-Oriented Cooperation. It ends with the consensus or the inconclusive termination of the negotiations. Implementation of the BMI Strategy Phases A and C are characterized by the application of the BMI strategy in terms of your behavior. In both Phase A (Analyze Open Points) and Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure), you should therefore follow the seven steps of the BMI stairway as described in Sect. 3.8. The application of the BMI strategy ensures that you behave professionally at all times during the negotiation and know at all times which of the seven steps of the BMI stairway you are currently on and which activities you need to focus on. 1. Your strategy paper: –– Phase A: Place a white sheet of paper with the heading “OP list” in front of you. –– Phase C: Place the package list provided by Decision Maker in front of you. 2. Start with the bonding –– Level 1: Active Listening80 (Non-verbal behavior, W-questions, Listening without interrupting, Active Listening Statements, Silence, Notes, Communication Analysis) –– Level 2: Tactical Empathy (“I understand your situation”) –– Level 3: (“We want to get … 51%”)(disclosure of personal information by your negotiating partner). 3. Focus on your mission –– Stage 4: Learn (“You go first”) –– Level 5: Bargain (“Bargain Hard”) (Phase A) or “Use “give and take” bargaining” (Phase C). Create Open Points List (Phase A) or use seven tactics related to packages (Phase C). 4. Intensify Weapons of Influence at Level 6 –– –– –– ––

Series 1: Sympathy, Anchoring, Arguments Series 2: Examples, Pictures, Story Series 3: Social Proof, Authority, Fairness Series 4: Priming, Framing, Participation

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and additionally in Phase C –– Series 5: Reciprocity, Consistency, Scarcity. 5. At level 7, define together the open points (Phase A) or all packages (Phase C). 6. Encourage time-outs –– to define the conflicts in Phase A (Analyze Open Points) with the N-Team (Learn) –– to develop packages in Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure) with seven tactical measures. Use time-outs for reporting to the Decision Maker. Remember: the decisions are made by your Decision Maker: “Role of the negotiator: REMEMBER: We are NOT the Decision Maker” (Goergen). 7. Implement the current negotiation instruction In the next negotiation, implement the last negotiation instruction given (You go first, Bargain, Report Back). In this way, you have the chaos under control, you shape the negotiations and together you write the script for the resolution of the conflicts to the end.

4.2.1 Phase A: Analyze Open Points Negotiating is not making friends (Dominick J. Misino).

Definition Phase A (Analyze Open Points) begins with the initial communication of your Decision Maker’s positions to your negotiation partner and ends when all parties agree for the first time that they have defined all conflicts and documented them in an Open Points List. Ask your negotiation partner the question, “If we solve all of these problems, do we have a deal?” (Ross 2006, p. 139). If the answer is “yes”, Phase A is over. This phase can thus be precisely narrowed down. Choice of Conflict Strategy In Phase A, if you follow the Driver-Seat Concept, only the conflict strategy Professional Confrontation is used. The four other conflict strategies (i) avoidance, (ii) giving in, (iii) compromise and (iv) cooperation are, as already emphasized several times, generally not an option in the first phase according to the Driver-Seat Concept advocated here.

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Mind Set Confrontation is difficult for many people because they prefer to behave in ways that win friends. However, negotiations are not conducted to win friends: “Negotiating is not making friends” (Misino 2004, p. 171). Negotiations are conducted to achieve the goals set by the Decision Maker. Misino has therefore advised young negotiators in his trainings to treat the negotiating partner neither as a friend nor as an enemy and to focus on the goal: “Leave your friend attitude outside … leave your cop attitude outside … focus on your goal” (Misino 2004, p. 171). If you are highly motivated to argue your starting positions in Phase A, you will encounter resistance, at least in part, and thus create conflict. There are people who avoid conflict wherever possible. This is an automatic reaction of Intuitive System I, which tells us “conflict is dangerous, avoid it” (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 100). However, these people automatically become victims of the conflict as a result (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 100). They give in and relinquish leadership of the negotiation. The Professional Negotiator has learned to see conflict as something positive. Therefore, without exception, “Conflict is positive” (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 101) applies to you. Without exception, accept every conflict as a challenge to resolve it after it has been fully analyzed or defined. In doing so, be prepared to transform the destructive potential into a positive outcome. In Phase A, play the game to win it: “Play to win” (Ross 2006, p. 22). Whenever a conflict arises, you should address it openly in the first phase and work it out or define it precisely (analysis of the conflict) and only focus on achieving the common goal (resolution of the conflicts) after all conflicts have been fully analyzed. Take your cue from George Kohlrieser’s brilliant metaphor: “Put the fish on the table”. Put the fish (conflict) on the table, do the hard work of cleaning it, and then enjoy a great fish dinner (conflict resolution). If you don’t put the fish on the table, it will start to stink under the table: “It is a process to be managed so that the destructive potential is converted to a positive outcome” (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 100). As a Professional Negotiator, you know that conflict paves the way to great deals (Voss and Raz 2016, p. 211). Therefore, never avoid an honest and clear conflict where you treat your partner with dignity and respect: “don’t avoid honest, clear conflict”. Finally, always assume: “In the end, all conflicts can be solved” (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 112). This strategy of Professional Confrontation is implemented with the following seven tactical measures: • Your strategy paper: Place a white sheet of paper in front of you with the heading “OP list”. • Start with bonding (steps 1 to 3 of the BMI stairway) • Focus on the Mission (Learn and Bargain Hard) (Levels 4 and 5 of the BMI stairway).

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Intensify the Weapons of Influence (Step 6 of the BMI Stairway). Define together the Open Points (Step 7 of the BMI Stairway). Encourage time-outs (discussions in the N-team, reporting to the Decision Maker). Implement the updated negotiation brief by placing your updated strategy paper in front of you.

4.2.1.1 Your Strategy Paper: Place a White Sheet of Paper in Front of You At the very beginning of the negotiation, put a white sheet of paper in front of you with the heading “Open Points List”. Then you automatically remember not to give in, but to note down every point that remains open on this list. Please note: Making the Open Points List is to prevent you from making any concessions early on. In Phase A, conflicts are only analyzed or defined. Solutions are not sought in this analysis-only phase. So please do not make any concessions in Phase A, even if this is very difficult (cf. Ross 2006, p. 192). Giving in (early) on positions is a (unfortunately common) cardinal mistake. The only concession that you as a Professional Negotiator are allowed to make at the beginning of the negotiation is quickly outlined: “Active Listening”80: “Listening is the cheapest, yet most effective concession we can make” (Noesner 2010, p. 66). 4.2.1.2 Start with Bonding Start with the Active Listening80 tactic, i.e. step 1 of the BMI stairway (see Sect. 3.8.1). Continue with Tactical Empathy, i.e. level 2 of the BMI stairway (see Sect. 3.8.2). In accordance with Concept 51, check whether you have a Trust Level of more than 51%, i.e. whether you are at level 3 of the BMI stairway (cf. Sect. 3.8.3). If you have reached this Trust Level, you have achieved the “Bonding” objective. You must now maintain or increase this trust level. To recap: • Stage 1: The aim is to understand the negotiating partner. The tool or tactic for this is Active Listening80 (see Sect. 3.8.1). The Active Listening80 tactic is affective (because you build trust) and at the same time effective (because you learn a lot about the negotiator’s mission). This tactic consists of seven tactical actions: • Control your nonverbal behavior and voice • Ask open questions (unless your partner talks without being asked) Listen without interrupting (let the partner finish) • without thinking about counter-arguments at the same time (i.e. full concentration on what is heard) to put yourself in your partner’s situation or world (Role Reversal) • Issue Active Listening Statements Minimal Encouragers (Minimal Consent) Mirroring (repeating the last words) Emotional Labeling (reflect emotional evaluation)

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• • • •

•

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Paraphrasing (factual summary) and Summarizing (summary of the factual content in connection with the emotional evaluation) Take Effective Breaks Take notes Analyze the four levels of communication Stage 2: Here you show your negotiating partner that you understand him (from his point of view), i.e. you have to communicate understanding. This is the tactic of empathy or tactical empathy (cf. Voss and Raz 2016, p. 50 ff.; cf. Sect. 3.8.2). Stage 3: If you successfully complete stages 1 and 2 (this can take seconds or even days or months), you will eventually reach a level of mutual trust of at least 51% (see Sect. 3.8.3). This is about “rapport” or “trust”. Stage 3 is therefore the first important intermediate goal that you want to achieve by using the two tactics Active Listening80 and Tactical Empathy. One important indication is that your partner is revealing personal information to you. The formula for successful bonding is therefore: Active Listening80 + Tactical Empathy + Time = at least 51% Trust.

4.2.1.3 Focus on the Mission At level 4 (Learn) and level 5 (Bargain) of the BMI stairway, missions are communicated. The communication is optimized by the use of the Weapons of Influence. Levels 4 and 5 and 6 (Influence) are rarely clearly distinguishable in reality. Instead, the transitions are very often fluid. Nevertheless, Stages 4 and 5 and 6 are deliberately presented as separate stages in the Driver-Seat Concept. By doing so, you keep reminding yourself (every time you look at the BMI stairway) that you should always try to let your partner start (level 4) before you communicate your positions (level 5). In addition, you should always make yourself aware that the mere communication of a position (“I imagine an annual salary of EUR 100,000”) must be separated from the numerous Weapons of Influence (“this remuneration is appropriate from my point of view because …;”“… this is market standard”). Level 4 (Learn): You Go First At Level 4 (Learn), continue to use Active Listening80. Now that trust has been established, you focus on finding out as much as possible about your partner’s mission. As a rule, you let your partner start: “You go first” (for the Never Open Rule, see Sect. 4.1.3). If your partner does not want to start, then you have to start and communicate the mission of your Decision Maker already at level 4, unless you start with the situation talk and are interrupted. If you have managed to get your partner to open, you should first listen to his positions and take notes. You know that they are apparent positions, you know that communication breakdowns are normal. You will take this into account in the next time-out when you evaluate all the information professionally (ignore, analyze, interpret, clarify, define).

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Level 5 (Bargain): Bargain Hard On the basis of trust (level 3) and your insights into the partner’s mission (level 4), you can now communicate your positions (i.e. the mission of your Decision Maker) in the form of I-messages (I-statements20) at level 5 (Bargain). If and to the extent that this leads to compliance on the part of your negotiating partner, you have already achieved your goal at level 5. When you have the floor, start the substantive discussion with the starting positions given to you by the Decision Maker, which are called that because you start with them. Overall, Voss’ motto applies, according to which you should always negotiate hard in Phase A (Analyze Open Points): “Bargain Hard” (Voss and Raz 2016, p. 188). In the role of the Negotiator, your first substantive task after the Smart Start is to consciously and purposefully celebrate classic position bargaining, i.e. you (or an expert such as a lawyer) represent your own positions in a tough or unyielding manner. Position bargaining also characterizes the early stages of police crisis negotiations (cf. McMains and Mullins 2014, p.  137). In other words, they are not (yet) willing to cooperate. As already mentioned several times, as a negotiator you should strictly separate between your behavior and the substantive demands. Always behave in a very friendly and respectful manner. At the same time, defend the positions given to you by the Decision Maker intensively, without giving in. Matthias Schranner told us in a training session, “You have to decide: do you want to be loved or respected?” If you want to be loved, you give in; if you want to be respected, you fight for your mission. State your position and use the Weapons of Influence at the same time, without focusing exclusively on this. Continue this behavior until you feel that you are not making any progress. Then intensify the use of the Weapons of Influence that you feel are appropriate (see below). If you cannot achieve agreement, you have to put the point on the Open Points List (see below). With Position Bargaining you pursue four goals: • First, you want to earn respect, which is only possible if you are (initially) assertive (cf. Glasl 2013, p. 243). • Secondly, you want to convince your partner of the correctness of your position and cause your partner to give in. This usually happens in relation to a part of the positions. • Third, you want to gather the information that you will evaluate in the next time-out so that your Decision Maker can perform his DM task No. 4 (Learn). So it’s (once again) about: Ignore, Analyze, Interpret, Clarify, Define. • Fourth, get into the very effective 5-step ARRT Return Concessions tactic, which is a combination of the Anchor Effect, the Contrast Principle, and the Rule of Reciprocity (see Sect. 5.13.1). Please remember to keep a record of everything your partner says. Position Bargaining not only underlines your will to assert yourself, it also provides you with a great deal of valuable information about your partner’s situation or emotional and rational world and

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allows you to recognize the Real Conflicts and the mere Perceived Conflicts. You provide this information to your Decision Maker so that he or she can develop creative solutions in Phase B and Phase C.

4.2.1.4 Intensify the Weapons of Influence Remember to optimize the communication of your starting positions with the Weapons of Influence. Even before communicating the positions, think about which of the 15 Weapons of Influence you want to use, e.g. to achieve agreement with regard to certain starting positions. The communication of the (starting) positions and the use of the Weapons of Influence is usually a unified act at first. Stage 4 (Learn), Stage 5 (Bargain) and Stage 6 (Influence), as already emphasized several times, can rarely be sharply delineated; rather, it is often a fluid transition: you listen to a position of the partner (Stage 4), then put forward your position (Stage 5) and immediately justify this, e.g. with “because” (Stage 6). As mentioned earlier, the distinction between the stages is meant to remind you of the following: let your partner first present and talk out his positions (Stage 4), only then state your positions (Stage 5), consciously using what you consider to be the right Weapons of Influence. Whenever you can’t get your point across (e.g., in a time-out), go through your checklist with your team. Consider whether you have already used all of the following 15 Weapons of Influence. • • • •

Series 1: Sympathy, Anchoring, Arguments Series 2: Examples, Pictures, Story Series 3: Social Proof, Authority, Fairness Series 4: Priming, Framing, Participation

and additionally in Phase C • Series 5: Reciprocity, Consistency, Scarcity. After the time-out, intensify the use of the Weapons of Influence (level 6).

4.2.1.5 Create the Open Points List Start with the First Conflict If a position has been discussed long enough, and even the intensified use of the Weapons of Influence does not lead to success (compliance), you should make the proposal to put the respective conflict on an Open Points List in order to resolve it later. The Open Points List is thus nothing more than the “Documented Deadlock”. This list is your most important document in the negotiation. On this list you record all Open Points, i.e. all points on which you cannot agree after intensive attempts to convince each other. This OP list is therefore completed “piece by piece” during the negotiation.

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Such deadlocks are an indispensable part of best practice. If you go for the deadlock, it shows how convinced you are of your position and that you are committed to enforcing it. It also tests how convinced your partner is of their respective opposing positions or whether they are willing to make concessions. Overall, deadlocks lead to a precise elaboration of the opposing positions: “It clarifies my position and also theirs” (Ross 2006, p. 78). By putting the precisely worked out conflicts on the OP list, you show that you are prepared to think about the conflict again later (in another phase) (Ross 2006, p.  95). Dawson also refers to this tactic as the “Set-Aside Gambit” (Dawson 1999, p.  66 ff.). Slatkin refers to the tactic as “Now and later” (Slatkin 2005, p. 60). End the List with A Control Question You must continue this procedure until the Open Points List is complete. Whether the list is complete is clarified by agreement with the negotiating partner. I typically use the control question used by Ross or his client Donald Trump for this purpose: “If we agree on all of these items, do we have a deal?” (Ross 2006, p. 94). If your partner answers the question with “No”, you must clarify the remaining Open Points. If your partner answers “Yes” to this question, there is currently a complete Open Points List from the point of view of all parties. With regard to the BMI stairway, you are at level 7 (Compliance/Non-Compliance). This also concludes Phase A (Analyze Open Points).

4.2.1.6 Encourage Time-Outs Professional negotiators always encourage time-outs (cf. Sect. 3.5.2). Time-outs are an important negotiation tactical tool (cf. Misino 2004, p.  65  f.). Time-outs serve, among other things, to activate the Analytical System II in order to think critically on the one hand and creatively on the other. Only if you have enough time to activate your Analytical System II, which works very slowly, can you define the conflicts. So buy time to think critically and creatively: “Buy Time to Think” (Ury 2007, p. 44). Discuss in the N-Team Comply with the first instruction in your negotiation brief as set out in Sect. 3.7.1 and go through the following checklist: • Step 1: “and most demands, frankly, are bullshit” Ignore the positions communicated by your partner. Evaluate them as apparent positions and throw them into your mental wastebasket. • Step 2: “There is always a team on the other side” Analyze the partner team. Negotiate with the Decision Maker, if possible.

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• Step 3: “Continue evaluation of situation” Analyze situation(s) consisting of –– –– –– –– ––

World-Check (“I must get into your world”), Leverage-Check (“Leverage is having something the other guy wants”), Options-Check (“I like to keep every option open in life”) and Overconfidence-Check (“Do not simply trust intuitive judgement”). Step 4: “Hear what isn’t being said”

Interpret the apparent positions to develop (current) Assumed Partner Positions. • • • • •

Step 5: “never assume – clarify statements” Clarify the (currently) Assumed Partner Positions Fake position Yes: “‘Yes’ is nothing without how” Fake position No: ““No” is a reaction, not a position”. Step 6: “Define the problem clearly”

Define the Perceived Conflicts (Harvard Orange) and/or Real Conflicts precisely. • Step 7: “Be an agent of reality” Analyze your own situation, especially your leverage and options. Report Back Time-outs are not only used for discussion in the N-Team. You should also use timeouts for reporting to the Decision Maker. The Decision Maker receives new information from you. He then fulfills the tasks of the Mission Control (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, in short LADY) and possibly gives you, as Primary Negotiator, a new instruction with regard to the positions to be asserted. Always heed the advice from Goergen’s Field Guide, “Role of the negotiator: REMEMBER: We are NOT the Decision Maker” (Goergen 2016, p. 65).

4.2.1.7 Implement the Current Negotiation Instruction According to your PN task No. 7, accept the respective current negotiation instruction. Visualize (again) the seven steps of the BMI stairway (PN task No. 8). Visualize (again) the negotiation process (PN Task No. 9). Continue the negotiation (PN Task No. 10) and implement each instruction at Level 4 (Learn), Level 5 (Bargain), and Level 6 (Influence). Either you reach agreement on your position at level 7 (Compliance or Behavior Change) or the conflict becomes part of the Open Points List (Non Compliance).

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4.2.1.8 Summary Summary: Phase A: Analyse Open Points

1. Your strategy paper: Place a white sheet of paper in front of you with the heading “OP list”. On this sheet, successively note down the Open Points. 2. Start with the bonding –– Stage 1: Active Listening80; (Nonverbal Behavior, W Questions, Listening Without Interrupting, Active Listening Statements, Silence, Taking Notes, Communication Analysis); –– Level 2: Tactical Empathy (“I understand your situation”); –– Level 3: (“We want to get … 51%”) (disclosure of personal information by your negotiating partner). 3. Focus on your mission –– Stage 4: Learn: (“You go first”); –– Level 5: Bargain (“Bargain Hard” and create OP list). 4. Intensify Weapons of Influence at Level 6 –– –– –– ––

Series 1: Sympathy, Anchoring, Arguments Series 2: Examples, Pictures, Story Series 3: Social Proof, Authority, Fairness Series 4: Priming, Framing, Participation and additionally in Phase C –– Series 5: Reciprocity, Consistency, Scarcity. 5. At Level 7 (Compliance/Non-Compliance), create the open items list if you do not achieve compliance. 6. Encourage time-outs –– to discuss your findings with the N-Team, –– to report to the Decision Maker (reporting): Remember your role: “Role of the negotiator: REMEMBER: We are NOT the Decision Maker” (Goergen). 7. Accept the updated negotiation brief (PN Task No. 7), Visualize the BMI strategy (PN Task No. 8), Visualize the negotiation process (PN Task No. 9), Negotiate (PN Task No. 10).

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4.2.2 Phase B: Break 4 Change Negotiators are not in the business of meeting demands, but rather of satisfying needs (McMains/Mullins).

Definition Phase B (Break 4 Change) is defined as follows: “Phase B” describes the period from the initial discussion of the Open Points List (which both parties refer to as complete) with the Decision Maker and ends with the Decision Maker’s instruction to the Negotiator to assert the first situational package and the package items contained therein. Thus, this phase can also be precisely delimited. Phase B consists on the one hand of reporting by the Negotiator or ideally the negotiating team to the Decision Maker. On the other hand, it consists of mission control (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, LADY for short) by the Decision Maker. In the context of DM task No. 5 (Adapt), the Decision Maker checks a change of strategy in order to finally, ideally, issue the first instruction with (situation-oriented) package positions to the Negotiator. This concludes Phase B at the same time. Choice of Conflict Strategy The “Break 4 Change” is thus the break that is supposed to initiate a fundamental change in strategy according to the Driver-Seat Concept. It is about more than just an ordinary time-out. It is about changing the rules of the game and the mind-set. In place of the Professional Confrontation, which is necessary to explore the situation of the negotiating partner (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then precisely define the conflicts, among other things, it is now a matter of determining how to satisfy the needs of the negotiating partner in particular, which have been analyzed so far, without sacrificing one’s own interests: “Negotiators are not in the business of meeting demands, but rather of satisfying needs” (McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 136). Of course, this does not apply if your Decision Maker instructs you to continue being assertive (Professional Confrontation) or to give in or make a false compromise. If your Decision Maker wants to prevail no matter what, you must continue to use Phase A tactics; either prevail or be defeated. If your Decision Maker instructs you to concede or make a false compromise, this is very simple and requires no elaboration in this book. However, if your Decision Maker is looking for a solution that satisfies all parties, he or she will choose Situation-Oriented Cooperation; this somewhat more time-consuming method is recommended and described in this book. Mind Set You know that the Decision Maker will now change strategy. Instead of Professional Confrontation, Situational Cooperation will take over. Continue to enjoy the conflict. However, rethink by now mentally setting yourself up to find solutions that satisfy both

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sides with creativity, flexibility and patience, so strive for: “Creativity  – Flexibility  – Patience” (Goergen 2016, p. 17). Whereas in Phase A you only played the game to win (play to win), i.e. to either enforce positions or bring about a deadlock (OP list), you now change your Mind Set to break the deadlock again. You continue to play to win, but also to find creative solutions that are acceptable to all parties. From now on, “play to win” (Ross 2006, p. 22) and “look for mutually acceptable creative solutions” (Ross 2006, p. 33).

4.2.2.1 Report Back: Report to the Decision Maker Report comprehensively to the Decision Maker as a Negotiator. Present your current Open Points List to the Decision Maker. If possible, involve the other members of the negotiation team so that as much information or (subjective) interpretations as possible are passed on to the Decision Maker. The Decision Maker now performs its task of further developing the mission (Mission Control): Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, or LADY for short. The Decision Maker will usually also listen to package proposals from the N-Team and discuss them within his team, which he chairs. As a result, however, he alone must decide on the package positions to be asserted by the Negotiator in Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure).

Example

As an employee, you report to your advisor (who acts as a Decision Maker) that there are three outstanding issues regarding the service contract with your current employer: the amount of fixed remuneration, the amount of variable remuneration and the duration of the contract. For example, your employer will only offer the fixed and variable compensation you request if you sign a fixed term of at least two years, which you do not want. You now want to stick with your last package. Your consultant might now advise you, for example, based on his distance: Define the requirements for the variable compensation components in such a way that they are very likely to be achieved and sign the two-year contract. However, allow yourself a special right of termination in the event that the variable compensation is not paid. You can justify such a package briefly by stating that you value the performance orientation or variable components very much and are also very attached to the company, so that you basically want to spend at least two more years there. However, in the event that your compensation expectations cannot be realized, you would like to have the option of changing your orientation. In the aforementioned case, the parties signed the package proposed by the employee exactly as the consultant had recommended from a distance.

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4.2.2.2 Accompany the Mission Control Advise your Decision Maker on Mission Control (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, LADY for short). In particular, discuss the individual stages of DM Task No. 4 (Learn): Ignore, Analyze, Interpret, Clarify, Define. 4.2.2.3 Accept Your Negotiation Assignment Accept the respective updated negotiation brief (PN Task No. 7), Visualize the BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8), Visualize the Negotiation Process (PN Task No. 9), Negotiate (PN Task No. 10). As the Primary Negotiator, have as broad a mandate as possible in terms of package items so that you have enough flexibility to negotiate different packages in turn without having to ask for approval for each package again. 4.2.2.4 Summary “Break 4 Change” 1. Report Back: report back to the Decision Maker during the time-out so that he can get a picture of the situation and the partner’s positions derived from it. 2. Advise your Decision Maker on Mission Control (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, or LADY for short). 3. Assume the respective updated negotiation brief (PN Task No. 7), Visualize the BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8), Visualize the Negotiation Process (PN Task No. 9), Negotiate (PN Task No. 10). Assert package positions at Level 5 (Bargain) and Level 6 (Influence).

4.2.3 Concessions Package Procedure Concessions are the language of cooperation (G. Richard Shell).

Definition Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure) is defined as follows: It begins with the initial negotiation of package positions in the form of situation-oriented packages and ends with agreement on the final positions or the (provisional/final) termination of negotiations. In this phase, which now follows, the parties try to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome. The key to this is packages, i.e. you try to find solutions that satisfy everyone from a mix of give (your concessions) and take (concessions of the partner) for all positions. Whenever you can’t get your way with the package positions, you will time out again to discuss new solutions, at least in the N-Team. If your new solution is not covered by the last order, you will ask the Decision Maker to continue developing the mission again (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, LADY for short), i.e. to give you a new instruction as a result. This change between time-out and package negotiation happens very often in this Phase C and thus characterizes this phase just as much as cooperation in the form of give and take. This third and final negotiation phase can also be precisely delimited.

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Choice of Conflict Strategy If you are in Phase C, your Decision Maker has decided in favor of the conflict strategy Situation-Oriented Cooperation and thus, conversely, against continuing Professional Confrontation and against switching to the conflict strategy of giving in or (false) compromise. Mind Set You must now enter the negotiations with the same mind-set with which the whole negotiating team entered phase B. Continue to enjoy the conflict and seek solutions that satisfy both sides with creativity, flexibility and patience. So strive for: ‘Creativity – Flexibility – Patience’ (Goergen 2016, p. 17). In doing so, try to create an atmosphere in which the term “problem-solving” has a central function: “Create an atmosphere for problem-­ solving” (Goergen 2016, p. 19). Play to win, but also to find creative solutions that are acceptable to all parties: “Play to win” and “look for mutually acceptable creative solutions” (Ross 2006, pp. 22 and 33). It’s kind of like being a Litigation Lawyer, which is a lawyer who specializes in litigation. Of course, both the plaintiff’s lawyer and the defendant’s lawyer want to win. It is with this mind set that you conduct the litigation. So both trial lawyers start with the mind set “play to win”. Nevertheless, in very many cases, they will later settle by way of a compromise because the court will suggest a mutually acceptable solution to you. It is at this moment that the Litigation Lawyer needs to rethink. Now (and only now!) is the time for the hitherto hard fighter to “look for mutually acceptable creative solutions”. If a litigation lawyer were to think “win-win” from the outset and suggest to his client that the other side should win as well, his client would surely quit the case very quickly. The Mind-Set “Play to win and look for mutually acceptable creative solutions” thus differs significantly from the much propagated Mind-Set called “Win-Win”, which I categorically reject. If you think from the outset “OK, my partner should also win something”, then you have demotivated yourself and are no longer prepared to fight hard and persistently for your goal. You don’t even want to win anymore. You want to let the other person win too. In my experience, this mind-set leads directly to “false compromise”, i.e. a very poor conflict resolution strategy (see Sect. 2.5.1). My findings coincide with those of Jim Camp: “Win-Win Will Kill Your Deal” (Camp 2002, p. 1 ff.). Again, play to win first. Play only after the conflict has been fully analyzed to also find creative solutions that are acceptable to all parties: “Play to win” and “look for mutually acceptable creative solutions” (Ross 2006, pp. 22 and 33). An illustrative example of this procedure is the Elbe negotiations outlined at the end of this section.

4.2.3.1 Your Strategy Paper: Put the Current Package Proposal in Front of You Your most important document in Phase A was your white sheet of paper with the heading “OP list”. On this list you recorded all open points and completed this OP list “piece by

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piece” during the negotiation. In the last meeting with your Decision Maker (time-out), you added the current package item, which is an integral part of this package, after each open item or on a separate page for each open item.

4.2.3.2 Start the Bonding Process Now apply the BMI strategy again and gradually climb the BMI stairway. Start with the Active Listening80 tactic, step 1 of the BMI stairway (see Sect. 3.8.1). Continue with Tactical Empathy, i.e. level 2 of the BMI stairway (see Sect. 3.8.2). According to Concept 51, check whether you have a trust level of more than 51%, i.e. whether you are at level 3 of the BMI stairway (see Sect. 3.8.3). To recap: • Stage 1: The aim is to understand the negotiating partner. The tool or tactic for this is Active Listening80 (see Sect. 3.8.1). The Active Listening80 tactic is affective (because you build trust) and at the same time effective (because you learn a lot about the negotiator’s mission). This tactic consists of seven tactical actions: • Control your nonverbal behavior and voice • Ask Open Questions • Listen without interrupting (let the partner finish) without considering counter-arguments at the same time (i.e. full concentration on what is heard) to put yourself in your partner’s situation or world (Role Reversal) • Issue Active Listening Statements Minimal Encouragers (Minimal Consent) Mirroring (repeating the last words) Emotional Labeling (reflect emotional evaluation) Paraphrasing (factual summary) and Summarizing (summary of the factual content in connection with the emotional evaluation) • Take Effective Breaks • Take notes • Analyze the four levels of communication • Stage 2: Here you show your negotiating partner that you understand him (from his point of view), i.e. you have to communicate understanding. This is the tactic of empathy80 or tactical empathy (cf. Voss and Raz 2016, p. 50 ff.; cf. Sect. 3.8.2). • Stage 3: If you successfully complete stages 1 and 2 (this can take seconds or even days or months), you will eventually reach a level of mutual trust of at least 51% (see Sect. 3.8.3). This is about “rapport” or “trust”. So Stage 3 is the first important intermediate goal you want to achieve by using the two tactics Active Listening80 and Tactical Empathy. The formula for successful bonding is therefore: Active Listening80 + Tactical Empathy + Time = at least 51% Trust.

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4.2.3.3 Focus on the Mission Your Decision Maker has instructed you to implement the conflict strategy “Situation-­ Oriented Cooperation”. In this case, you as Negotiator will from now on cooperate with the negotiation partner in order to jointly develop situation-oriented and creative solutions with regard to the Open Points (conflicts). Solutions are creative if they settle something new and thus resolve the conflict because all parties are satisfied due to the preservation of their own interests/needs in each case (cf. Ross 2006, p. 24). In addition, your Decision Maker has ideally given you his package positions in relation to each of the open points in the last time-out and has thus instructed you with communicating an overall package. In the next round of negotiations, focus on the goal you have been given and a positive solution to the individual conflicts: “Focus on the goal and a positive solution” (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 197). Level 4 (Learn): “You Go First” Whenever possible, try to let your partner open up. Remember the FBI: “We have a rule. We never give the suspect anything first” (Misino 2004, p. 142). Be aware that package positions can also be apparent positions, remember that communication breakdowns are normal; remember the steps “Ignore, Analyze, Interpret, Clarify, Define”. Whenever you, as a negotiator, uncover a Perceived Conflict in the definition of the conflicts, you must keep this insight to yourself. So in the case of the orange deal, please don’t say, “Ooh, we don’t have a conflict there if you want the flesh, because I only want the peel.” After recognizing the Perceived Conflict, continue to say that you want the whole orange and guard your secret. In short, never comment on Perceived Conflicts, they are “package jewels”. Level 5 (Bargain): “Use “Give and Take” Bargaining” At level 5, Phase C is about cooperation in the form of give and take. Bargain in stage C therefore means: “Use “give and take” bargaining” (Goergen 2016, p. 12). The conflict strategy of Situation-Oriented Cooperation is implemented at the negotiating table with the following seven tactics: 1. First of all, make the package principle clear: Before you present even a single package item, please make it absolutely clear that it is a carefully coordinated overall package. Politely and respectfully emphasize that any deviation from the present negotiation package will therefore necessarily lead to all points being open again. Emphasize this package principle monotonously over and over again. It is true: “No issue is closed until all issues have been decided” (Shell 2006, p. 169). This will prevent your partner from “cherry-picking”. You also prevent the constant and annoying nibbling of individual aspects. Also, new open points that are identified during negotiations always result in the last negotiated package no longer being “binding”. So

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it starts again with a time-out, in which the extended Open Points List is now discussed. The “negotiating circle” begins again (cf. Kunkel et al. 2006, p. 146). 2. Always emphasize your willingness to cooperate: In addition, emphasize your willingness to work with your partner to find other creative packages until all open issues are resolved to the satisfaction of all parties. Always emphasize that you are looking for a joint and at the same time creative solution: “We all want this deal. We have so much in common that we should be able to creatively resolve the Open Issues in one package.” Professional Negotiators use the terms “common” and “solution” very frequently in order to constantly maintain the positive mood necessary for creative thinking (on Priming, see Sect. 5.10). You will not hear any destructive remarks from Professional Negotiators in Phase C. These are reserved for the Bad Guy. 3. Always present the package items “in one piece”: When you have the floor, present the package items agreed upon with your Decision Maker in one piece. If you are interrupted, politely and firmly ask that you be allowed to present your package in full before it is discussed. 4. Do not comment: initially present the package items without any commentary, concentrate on the precise presentation of the items you are presenting. At most, add a brief summary comment at the end of the package proposal. 5. Sell Perceived Conflicts as concessions: In particular, sell Perceived Conflicts as concessions. In relation to the orange deal, where you only want the peel, you could, for example, formulate: “We have understood that the pulp is particularly important to you. Subject to agreement on all outstanding points, we could probably accommodate you on this point, i.e. you can have all the flesh. We would then just take the peel”. Perceived Conflicts carry the solution within them. They are “low hanging fruits”, i.e. you can now sell an alleged concession as a concession. In negotiations, you typically uncover many Perceived Conflicts. Each one is a “bargaining chip” You can sell these points as concessions without actually having to give anything in return. 6. Basically, keep the same order: It is easiest if you always present the Open Points in the same order. However, you can also rearrange the points and start with your concessions in order to send a positive signal very quickly. 7. Emphasize the reciprocity: After you have so far formulated the positions precisely without any commentary, you should once again clearly emphasize any concession at the end. In this way, make it clear to your partner again and again that you want to cooperate with him and are prepared to make concessions. Check whether you also want to use other weapons of influence (e.g. “My boss wants to hold on to this position”, on Authority see Sect. 5.8). As pointed out several times, the transition from level 5 (Bargain) and level 6 (Influence) is usually smooth.

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4.2.3.4 Intensify the Weapons of Influence As just highlighted, remember to optimize the communication of your package positions with Weapons of Influence. Even before communicating the packages, think about which of the 15 Weapons of Influence you want to use, e.g. to achieve agreement with regard to certain positions. The communication of the (package) positions and the use of the Weapons of Influence is usually a unified act at first. Stage 4 (Learn), Stage 5 (Bargain) and Stage 6 (Influence), as already emphasized several times, can rarely be sharply delineated; rather, it is often a fluid transition: you listen to a position of the partner (Stage 4), then put forward your position (Stage 5) and immediately justify this, e.g. with “because” (Stage 6). As mentioned earlier, the distinction between the stages is meant to remind you of the following: let your partner first present and talk out his positions (Stage 4), only then state your positions (Stage 5), using what you consider to be the correct Weapons of Influence (Stage 6). Whenever you don’t get your point across (e.g., in a time-out), go through your checklist. Consider whether you have already used all of the following 15 Weapons of Influence: • • • • •

Series 1: Sympathy, Anchoring, Arguments Series 2: Examples, Pictures, Story Series 3: Social Proof, Authority, Fairness Series 4: Priming, Framing, Participation and additionally in Phase C Series 5: Reciprocity, Consistency, Scarcity.

4.2.3.5 Log All Packages Keep a log of all concessions “(Greenstone 2005, p. 54). Also note down your analyses of your partner’s situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, OverconfidenceCheck). Remember Donald Trump’s “Deal Book”, in which he has noted down all relevant events concerning the respective deal (cf. Ross 2006, p. 135 ff.). Always send an e-mail to your partner when you are ending negotiations for the day after the discussion regarding the respective current package status in order to avoid misunderstandings. Ask your partner to confirm or communicate his understanding regarding the current package status and thus the status on level 7 of the BMI stairway (compliance/ non-compliance). 4.2.3.6 Encourage Time-Outs For example, end your package proposal with the sentence: “We are happy to leave the room now so that you can discuss our proposal at your leisure”. If you have listened to your partner’s package, you should also ask for a time-out: “Thank you very much for your proposal. We would like to vote on this one internally. Could we have a short break (again)?” This gives each party the opportunity to coordinate internally (in the negotiation room or in a “break-out room”) or to analyze the proposal. In a constructively conducted package negotiation, you usually need much more time for the time-outs than for the

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presentation and brief discussion of the package positions. This makes the time-outs in Phase C particularly important. In these time-outs you must be particularly flexible and creative. The motto “Be flexible – be creative” (Goergen 2016, p. 29) applies without restriction. Such time-outs are either followed by renewed discussions or immediately by new package proposals, again with brief comments. Structure your time-outs as follows: First Discuss in the N-Team Have your discussion in the Negotiation Team first, before checking whether you need to involve the Decision Maker. You will need to call in the Decision Maker if the package you are agreeing to or want to present next is not covered by the Decision Maker’s last instruction. Make sure that you can arrange your time-outs in a separate room (break-out room) at any time during the negotiations without being disturbed. Do Not Make Unilateral Concessions- Never! When agreeing on the next package internally, remember the basic principle of reciprocity according to Sect. 5.13. Do not make a concession without at the same time demanding a concession from the negotiating partner; the following applies without restriction: “Something for something” (Misino 2004, p.  123). So, within the framework of the package principle, make sure that you do not give anything away without receiving something in return and make your partner work hard for every concession later in the negotiating room: “Use “give and take” bargaining. “Make him work for everything” (Goergen 2016, p.  12). Remember Greenstone Law No. 48: “Something for nothing has little value” (Greenstone 2005, p. 149). Thus, Captain Frank Bolz (Leader of the first NYPD Hostage Negotiations Team) was also the first to learn that you should never give anything away without something in return: “You never give anything away for free – that was one of the first lessons of bargaining” (Bolz and Hershey 1995, p. 219). This tactic is of fundamental importance. It characterizes Phase C and serves to find solutions with which all parties are satisfied, using the weapon of Reciprocity (cf. Sect. 5.13). Note this in relation to each package item that you now modify internally. Check the Definition of the Conflicts The definition of the conflicts is the focus of Phase A (Analyse Open Points). However, your assessment may change constantly. Discuss the last assessment of the situation, so go through the checklist together according to Sect. 3.7.1 (Ignore, Analyze, Interpret, Clarify, Define). Solve Real Conflicts Creatively The real challenge are the Real Conflicts, so if in relation to the orange deal both really want the orange. Then you have to find something “new” (creative) so that both are satisfied. One gives up the orange in exchange for something else that is important to them. For example, one sister in the orange deal could say: You can have the whole orange if you

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lend me two euros for a week so that I can buy myself an orange juice today. If the other sister is willing to do this, both have found a so-called consensus, a creative solution that both are 100% satisfied with. In terms of Real Conflict, find resolution by satisfying interests (including what are called Basic Human Needs). Try to determine which interests your partner wants to satisfy in terms of which package items. Satisfying these interests (e.g., why does your partner want the short notice?) is the key to creative and satisfying solutions that can be called consensus. At the same time, avoid “false compromises” that just don’t lead to the satisfaction of the parties. As a reminder, the FBI starts from the following Basic Human Needs (cf. McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 136): • • • • •

Security: physical and psychological security, absence of damage. Recognition: one’s own view of things is understood by others. Self-determination (Control): the feeling of being able to make one’s own decisions. Respect (Dignity): being able to save face. Accomplishment: the feeling of having achieved something. Example

In the Minsheng negotiations (cf. Sect. 2.4.6), the managing director’s need for security was satisfied by a three-year contract, in return for which he relinquished the unrestricted control of the financial area originally demanded. The majority shareholder was able to satisfy his need for control by being able to issue instructions to the managing director at any time (via the shareholders’ meeting). Both parties were 100% satisfied with this conflict resolution, which satisfied their interests. They therefore reached a consensus. Previously, both had threatened to break off negotiations due to “lack of trust”. I was able to resolve this Real Conflict along with several Perceived Conflicts in a package that the parties signed a few weeks later.

Move Little in Relation to Important Points You may (as far as this is covered by the Decision Maker’s mandate) generously accommodate your partner on unimportant issues, but show little movement on important issues: “Make big moves on your little (less important) issues and little moves on your big (most important) issues” (Shell 2006, p. 169). Something else applies if and to the extent that you can creatively resolve a Real Conflict. Report Back Check together in the N-Team whether your package proposal is covered by the Decision Maker’s current instruction. If yes, you may leave the Break-out Room and re-enter the Negotiation Room. If no, then you must contact the Decision Maker so that he can complete his “Mission Control” task (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, or LADY for short).

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Please definitely remember to call in the Decision Maker if you have any doubts about the specific scope of the last instruction. I know from my own experience that in this phase you very quickly become euphoric because you believe that you yourself have found the best of all solutions. Please note that it is in this situation that the Decision Maker’s “go” is particularly valuable. He sees things from a distance, you on the other hand are in the middle of the action and accordingly do not have enough distance to your “brilliant solution”. So, I cannot repeat it often enough, always heed the advice from Goergen’s Field Guide: “Role of the negotiator: REMEMBER: We are NOT the Decision Maker” (Goergen 2016, p. 65). Check If the Time-Out Was Long Enough Finally, check whether the time-out was long enough in terms of duration to be proportionate to the importance of the open points (conflicts). For your partner, only those packages are valuable in which you have discussed your concessions hard internally and possibly even had to coordinate them by phone with the Decision Maker. If, for example, you only need an hour but consider 1.5 h to be appropriate, then do as all professionals do: talk for half an hour about other things, such as cars, holidays, sports, etc. This is relaxing for the whole N team. Only continue the negotiation talks with your partner after 1.5 h.

4.2.3.7 Accept the Updated Negotiation Mandate Accept the respective updated negotiation brief (PN Task No. 7), Visualize the BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8), Visualize the Negotiation Process (PN Task No. 9), Negotiate (PN Task No. 10). 4.2.3.8 Summary of the Concessions Package Procedure 1. Your strategy paper: Put a white sheet of paper in front of you with the heading Package List On this sheet, note all package items that are covered by your Decision Maker’s instruction 2. Start with the bonding –– Stage 1: Active Listening80: Nonverbal Behavior, W Questions, Listening Without Interrupting, Active Listening Statements, Silence, Taking Notes, Communication Analysis. –– Level 2: Tactical Empathy (“I understand your situation”). –– Level 3: (“We want to get … 51%”) (disclosure of personal information by your negotiating partner).

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3. Focus on your mission –– Stage 4: Learn (“You go first”). –– Level 5: Bargain (“Use “give and take” bargaining”) –– First clarify the package principle (“no issue is closed until all issues have been decided”). –– Always emphasize your willingness to cooperate. –– Always enter package items “in one piece”. –– Do not comment on the positions –– Sell Perceived Conflicts (package jewels) as concessions –– Always keep the same order. –– Emphasize reciprocity. 4. Intensify the Weapons of Influence Stage 6: –– –– –– –– ––

Series 1: Sympathy, Anchoring, Arguments Series 2: Examples, Pictures, Story Series 3: Social Proof, Authority, Fairness Series 4: Priming, Framing, Participation and additionally in Phase C Series 5: Reciprocity, Consistency, Scarcity.

5 . Log all packages until you reach agreement (stage 7). 6. Encourage time-outs –– Discuss first in the N-Team (Break-out-Room) –– Do not make unilateral concessions (“something for something”) –– Check the definition of the conflicts (ignore, analyze, interpret, clarify, define) –– Solve Real Conflicts Creatively –– Move little in relation to important points –– Report Back: “Role of the negotiator: REMEMBER: We are NOT the Decision Maker” (Goergen) –– Check if the time-out was long enough. 7. Assume the respective updated negotiation brief (PN Task No. 7), Visualize the BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8), Visualize the Negotiation Process (PN Task No. 9), Negotiate (PN Task No. 10). Assert package positions at Level 5 (Bargain) and Level 6 (Influence). An illustrative example of this procedure is the Elbe negotiations outlined below.

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4.2.3.9 The “Elbe Negotiations” A very clear example from my practice is the Elbe negotiations, where we were able to work through all three phases of the negotiation in one day. The negotiations began at 10.00 a.m. and ended at 10.15 p.m. on the same day, i.e. after 12 h and 15 min. Each party was represented at the negotiating table by six persons. The Team consisted of (i) two Decision Makers, (ii) two lawyers, one of whom was a Primary Negotiator and the other a Secondary Negotiator, and (iii) two experts. Our team consisted of: (i) a Primary Negotiator (project manager) and a Secondary Negotiator (my role), (ii) a lawyer as expert and (iii) three experts for specific topics. This constellation was optimal and typical: we negotiated without a Decision Maker, while the other side appeared at the negotiating table with two Decision Makers. A professional opening followed (small talk, the sales contract with the marked notes served as an agenda; the partner opened to now verbally justify his comments in the text). Phase A (Analyze Open Points) lasted approximately 5 h, Phase B (Break 4 Change) lasted approximately 90  min, and Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure) lasted approximately 6 h. I will outline the process in detail so that you can get an immediate impression: Phase A: Analyze Open Points 1. 10.00 a.m. to 1.55 p.m. (approx. 4 h): Exchange of arguments, confrontational in terms of content, very cooperative in person, if no agreement possible: “I think we’re going round in circles, let’s put this on the Open Points List, please”. 2. 13.55 hrs to 14.35 hrs: Lunch together with small talk (time-out No. 1). 3. 2.35 p.m.-3.10 p.m. Continuation of “Professional Confrontation”.

Phase B: Break 4 Change 4. 15.10−16.40 (90 min): Time-out No. 2 and at the same time Phase B We analyze the open points and consider package positions, whereby on the one hand starting positions that are important to us remain unchanged and on the other hand package positions are formulated that in our estimation protect both our interests and the interests of the partner. We have determined the situation and in particular the interests of the partner in Phase A through position bargaining or the implementation of the tactics of the conflict strategy of “Professional Confrontation”.

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Phase C: Concessions Package Procedure 5. 4.40 p.m. to 4.50 p.m. (10 min): We present package No. 1 after the other side does not want to open (Never Open Rule not applicable). The package is presented as a whole in one piece, but its content is not discussed. 6. 16.50–17.00 (10  min): The negotiator asks clarifying questions to understand the package positions. There is no discussion of the content. 7. 17. 00–17.35 (35 min): Time-out No. 3: The partners discuss our package proposal internally in a separate room (break-out room). 8. 17. 35–17.40 (5 min): The partner presents package No. 2. We only ask clarifying questions. 9. 17.40–18.00 (20 min): Time-out No. 4: We discuss package No. 2 in a separate room and put together a new package, package No. 3. 10. 18.00–18.05 (5 min): We present package No. 3. There is no discussion of the content. 11. 18.05–18.10 (5 min): Time-out No. 5: Our partner consults on our package No. 3. 12. 18.10–19.25 (1 h 15 min): The partner opens up to us that we have a common solution except for two points. We notice that we have forgotten an important point and bring it into the negotiation. It is discussed intensively. Factual solutions are sought. 13. 19.25 h–20.05 h (40 min): Time-out No. 6: We discuss in a separate room what a solution could look like with regard to the new point and talk to an expert on the phone. 14. 20.05–21.15 (1 h 10 min): We present our wording. First crisis with harsh tone and accusations. Primary Negotiator saves the day using Active Listening80 tactics and Tactical Empathy (“Why can’t you put it like that?, Aah, I see. Yes, we understand your point of view, how can we solve this together?”). 15. 21.15–22.00 (45  min): Calming down and discussion of another document (consensual). 16. 22.00–22.15: Joint confirmation of package items to be implemented in writing now (package No. 4), planning of Next Steps, friendly farewell. After a further full day of negotiations (misunderstandings usually arise when formulating creative solutions) and a 2-day notarial certification (signing) with many interruptions for negotiations on open points, the deal was finally also completed (closing).

4.3 Good Bye: Say Goodbye Professionally It’s not over until it’s over (James L. Greenstone, Law No. 147).

The correct farewell (cf. Figure 4.3) is part of professional negotiation. It not only ends the meeting, but also prepares the ground for the next round of negotiations. Even if it appears that there will be no further talks because the positions are too far apart and there is (currently) no prospect of an agreement, one must not become careless when saying goodbye. Because often a break-off is not the end, but only the respite before new talks.

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Elements Opening

• • •

Ideally starts with small talk Followed by confirmation or clarification of the agenda Start of the Smart Start phase - observe the Never Open Rule

Analyze Open Points for example

09 - 12 h

• •

Communication of own positions Phase ends with the complete definition of all conflicts

Open Points List

Break 4 Change Middle of Act Two

for example

12 - 14 h

• • •

Reporting of the N-Team to the Decision Maker Mission Control (Learn > Adapt > Discuss > Your Instruct.) First order with package positions to the Negotiator

Concessions Package Procedure for example

14 - 18 o'clock

• •

Negotiating package positions for the first time Ends with agreement on the final positions or the (provisional/final) termination of the negotiations

End the negotiations with one of the following three tactics: (Always behave as if the talks were never finally over) goodbye

• • •

Stay in the Game ("Buy time - be patient") Walk Out ("Deadlocks can always be broken") Game Over ("Never burn your bridges")

Fig. 4.3  Three elements of the negotiation round: good bye. (Source: Own representation)

The way you leave depends on how your Decision Maker wants to keep the game going. Does he want to continue negotiating? Abandon the negotiations for tactical reasons? Or is the deal actually off (for now)? No matter what the goals are: Please be sure to take into account that experience teaches that even negotiations that have been “finally” broken off can be resumed very quickly. Situations change all the time, so you never know when you will meet again the negotiating partner whom you just want to cancel with “great anger”, for example. Even after a final cancellation, you don’t know if it’s over yet. Life teaches us the banality that it’s not over until it’s really over: “It’s not over until it’s over” (Greenstone 2005, p. 152). Therefore, in each of the following three variations, behave as if the game is never finally over, even if you think it is at the time of the bye: • Option 1 (Stay in the Game): If your Decision Maker wants to continue negotiating, i.e. stay in the game, say goodbye as described in Sect. 4.3.1. • Option 2 (Walk out): If your Decision Maker has instructed you to stage a tactical break in the negotiation, walk out according to Sect. 4.3.2. • Option 3 (Game over): If your Decision Maker instructs you to finally end the negotiations, say goodbye as described in Sect. 4.3.3.

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4.3.1 Stay in the Game Buy time – be patient (Michael G. Goergen).

Rarely do you have a deal after a single meeting. You may have only been able to climb the first two steps of the BMI stairway (Active Listening80 and Tactical Empathy). You may also have already been able to climb Step 3 (“We want to get … 51%”). You may also have already heard the partner’s positions (Level 4: Learn). At level 4 (Learn) you end, for example, if you have not been able to prepare yourself sufficiently before the negotiation. You may also have already discussed the first or all conflicts at level 5 (Bargain). In short: Negotiations are often too complex to first define all the conflicts in a single meeting and then still find solutions that satisfy both sides. As a rule, it is then advisable to end the negotiation round and arrange a new meeting. Time-outs are always helpful (see Sect. 3.5). If your Decision Maker has instructed you to pause the negotiations if necessary, you should first realize how important the pause in negotiations is for all parties. Do not, under any circumstances, consider it a flaw if you have not reached a result in the current round of negotiations. As a Professional Negotiator you know how important it is to buy time and be patient; so your highly professional motto is: “Buy time  – be patient” (Goergen 2016, p. 20). Then say goodbye as follows: • Emphasize the common ground: In any case, thank them for the constructive conversation (no matter how constructive it was) and emphasize the common ground or the common goal and the will to continue to find common solutions. • Keep a record of the open points: If there are already open points, summarize them (Open Points List) that you still want to clarify together. • Make your willingness to cooperate clear: if there are already Open Points, emphasize that you are very optimistic about a future resolution of the Open Points. • Announce the coordination with the Decision Maker: When leaving, say that you will discuss all aspects discussed today with your Decision Maker in a timely manner. This is how you show: Your Decision Maker makes the decisions. • Agree on Next Steps: Always announce a written document that summarizes the results of the last round of negotiations. This can be a mere email, a Letter of Intent (LOI), a mark up to an LOI, a draft contract, a mark up to a draft contract, an isolated open items list, or an isolated package list, depending on the status of the negotiations. At the same time, schedule the next round of negotiations in which you want to continue your negotiations on the basis of the aforementioned document. Repeat this procedure until the signing or the (tactical/final) termination of negotiations.

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4.3.2 Walk Out Deadlocks can always be broken (George H. Ross).

Instead of agreeing on the next round of talks, your Decision Maker may instruct you to tactically break off the negotiations. This is particularly useful if you are already at level 7 (compliance/non-compliance) of the BMI stairway and have staged a deadlock due to a lack of possible compliance, i.e. you are currently not prepared to discuss the open points any further. This allows your Decision Maker to test whether the Deadlock is truly insurmountable. However, to ensure that conversations can actually be resumed after a time-­ out, you should make sure that you treat your partner with respect in terms of your behavior. After all, he or she should be happy to resume face-to-face contact with you at any time, even if the substance of the negotiations is difficult. Remember that a deadlock can be overcome at any time: “Deadlocks can always be broken” (Ross 2006, p. 77). Then say goodbye as follows: • Emphasize the common ground: In any case, thank them for the constructive conversation (no matter how constructive it was) and emphasize the common ground or the common goal and the will to continue to find common solutions. • Record the open points: Summarize the open points, i.e. the individual conflicts that triggered the deadlock (Open Points List). • Make clear your current lack of willingness to cooperate: Make it clear that you are not currently optimistic about a future resolution of the outstanding issues. In such situations, I would say in a respectful tone before parting, for example: “I am sorry, I currently see no possibility of resolving the open issues to your satisfaction as well as to ours. I would therefore like to end the basically constructive discussions” (see also Schranner 2016b, p.  192). With this formulation, you can initiate a “Back in the Game” at any time: • You can later point out that while you no longer saw an agreement option, your Decision Maker sees new creative ways to solve the deadlock. • You can later point out that your opinion that the deadlock was not resolvable was based on when it was, but now it is a different time and the situation has changed.

Announce the Vote with the Decision Maker Announce that you will discuss all aspects with your Decision Maker in a timely manner. This will show that it is not your fault that the deadlock has not yet been overcome. Present Next Steps as Possible Just emphasize that you are of course always open to further discussions and creative solutions that will lead to the deadlock being overcome. Always announce a written document that reflects the results of the negotiation round and thus describes the deadlock

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precisely, so that you and your partner know specifically on which points you cannot find an agreement at the moment. If at some point there are Next Steps because you or your partner suggest continuing the negotiations, you are “Back in the Game”.

4.3.3 Game Over Never burn your bridges (George H. Ross).

The third possibility is the really wanted final termination of the negotiations. If your Decision Maker gives you this instruction because he really wants to end the negotiations, you should make this termination very polite and without any aggression or accusations of any kind. So never burn your bridges with your partner (especially by disrespectful behavior): “Never burn your bridges” (Ross 2006, p. 78). Then say goodbye as follows: • Emphasize the common ground: In any case, thank them for the constructive conversation (no matter how constructive it was) and emphasize the common ground or the original common goal and the will you had to find common solutions. • Record the open points: Summarize the open points, i.e. the individual conflicts that triggered the deadlock (Open Points List). • Make clear the Decision Maker’s non-cooperation: Make it clear that your Decision Maker has instructed you to end the negotiations. Remain open to contact. Emphasize that you personally regret that the negotiations have ended. Continue to make it clear that you personally are, of course, always open to further discussion and creative solutions that will lead to the deadlock being overcome. This will keep the channel of communication open with you. Always announce a written document that reflects the results of the last round of negotiations and thus describes the deadlock precisely, so that you and your partner know specifically on which points you did not find an agreement and your Decision Maker broke off the negotiations. If there are Next Steps after all, you are “Back in the Game”.

References

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4.3.4 Summary Summary Good Bye: Say Goodbye Professionally

Mind-Set: Life teaches us the banality that it’s not over until it’s really over: “It’s not over until it’s over”. In each of the following three variations, behave as if the game is never finally over, even if you think it is at the time you say goodbye. 1. Stay in the Game (“Buy time – be patient”) –– –– –– –– ––

Emphasize the commonalities Record the Open Points Make your willingness to cooperate clear Announce the vote with the Decision Maker Agree on Next Steps.

2. Walk out (“Deadlocks can always be broken”) –– Emphasize the commonalities –– Record the Open Points –– Make clear your current lack of willingness to cooperate: “I’m sorry, I don’t see any way to resolve the open issues to both your and our satisfaction at this time. I would therefore like to end the basically constructive talks” –– Announce the vote with the Decision Maker –– Present Next Steps as possible. 3. Game over (“Never burn your bridges”) –– –– –– ––

Emphasize the commonalities Record the Open Points Make clear the non-existent willingness to cooperate of the Decision Maker Keep an open mind about making contact.

References Bolz, F./Hershey, E. (1995): Hostage Cop. Rawson Wade, New York Camp, J (2002): Start with No. Crown Business, New York Dawson, R. (1999): Secrets of Power Negotiating. 2. Aufl., Career Press, Pompton Plains Fisher, R./Ury, W./Patton, B. (2002): Das Harvard-Konzept, sachgerecht verhandeln, erfolgreich verhandeln. 21. Aufl., Campus, Frankfurt a.M./New York Glasl, F. (2013): Konfliktmanagement. 11. Aufl., Haupt/Freies Geistesleben, Stuttgart Goergen, M. (2016): Crisis Negotiatiors Field Guide. 3. Aufl., Eagle Training, Minneapolis Greenstone, J.  L. (2005): The Elements of Police Hostage and Crisis Negotiations. Routledge, New York/London

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Kohlrieser, G. (2006): Hostage at the Table. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco Kunkel, A./Bräutigam, P./Hatzelmann, E. (2006): Verhandeln nach Drehbuch. Redline Wirtschaft, Heidelberg McMains, M./Mullins, W. (2014): Crisis Negotiations. 5. Aufl., Elsevier, Amsterdam Misino, D. (2004): Negotiate and Win. McGraw-Hill, New York Noesner, G. (2010): Stalling for Time. Random House, New York Ross, G. (2006): Trump Style Negotiation. Wiley-VCH, New Jersey Shell, R. (2006): Bargaining for Advantage. Penguin Books, New York Schranner, M. (2013): Faule Kompromisse. Econ, Berlin Schranner, M. (2016a): Verhandeln im Grenzbereich. 13. Aufl., Econ Ullstein List, München Schranner, M. (2016b): Teure Fehler. 8. Aufl., Econ, Berlin Slatkin, A. (2005): Communication in Crisis and Hostage Negotiations. Charles C Thomas Publisher, Ltd, Springfield Strentz, T. (2018): Psychological Aspects of Crisis Negotiation. 3. Aufl., Routledge Taylor & Francis, New York/London Ury, W. (2007): Getting Past NO. Bantam Books, New York Voss C./Raz T. (2016): Never Split The Difference. HarperCollins, New York Wheeler, M. (2013): The Art of Negotiation. Simon & Schuster, New York

Essays Nadler, J., (2007): Build Rapport  – and a Better Deal, in Negotiation, Vol. 10, Nr. 3, S. 9, 10) Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School

5

Influence

After Chap.4 dealt with the entire process of a professionally conducted negotiation, Part 5 now deals with the Weapons of Influence, i.e. those behaviors with which we try to convince other people of our positions. Of course, you will also learn how to effectively ward off these weapons when they are directed against you. If you cannot get your positions accepted in a negotiation at level 5 of the BMI stairway (Bargain) (see Sect. 3.8.5), you, as Primary Negotiator, will call a time-out and study the Weapons of Influence intensively. You will analyze (ideally in a team) which Weapons of Influence you have already used and discuss which Weapons you now want to intensify on level 6 of the BMI Stairway (Influence) according to Sect. 3.8.6. In doing so, you will be doing real “persuasion” as a negotiator at level 6 of the BMI stairway. PN task 3 (see Sect. 3.2.5) already outlines the basics of influence. There it is emphasized that it is imperative that every Professional Negotiator knows how these weapons work in order to be able to use them in a targeted manner. In this Chap. 5, the Weapons of Influence are now described in detail. The term “Influence” is used deliberately in this book as a reminder of the great work of the same name by Prof. Robert Cialdini. The book Influence is considered by experts to be the standard work on influence (cf. http://www.harvardbusinessmanager.de/blogs/ sechs-prinzipien-der-ueberzeugungskunst-a-1122442.html. Accessed: 09/15/2018). Cialdini is even referred to as the “Godfather of Influence” (cf. https://www.influenceatwork.com/. Accessed: 15.09.2018). The term “influence” here refers to the “weapons” (Cialdini speaks of the Weapons of Influence (cf. Cialdini 2007, p.  1 ff.)) which, as scientific research has shown, lead to people being able to influence the behavior of others (or their attitudes, beliefs and perceptions) (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 548). Those who use these weapons correctly therefore have a good chance of asserting their positions.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 H. Rock, Successful negotiation with the Driver-Seat Concept, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39934-4_5

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Conversely, as a Professional Negotiator you must be able to defend yourself against influencing your negotiating partner (cf. PN task No. 4 according to Sect. 3.4). Because your partner will also use these weapons consciously or unconsciously. In order to understand how the Weapons of Influence work in your brain, you need to know the interaction of the Intuitive System I and the Analytical System II. This is already outlined in PN Task No. 3 (see Sect. 3.3). I’ll repeat the basics here so you don’t have to scroll back. Synopsis- “Exercise Influence”

Fundamental to the understanding of influence is the scientific knowledge that any kind of influence can always affect two different systems of the human brain: • the Intuitive System I (motto: “Action”) and • the Analytical System II (motto: “Think”). Positions expressed in negotiations and, for example, their justification are always processed in Intuitive System I and only possibly in Analytical System II. Intuitive System I, which is always active, can process approximately 11 million bits per second. Analytical System II, on the other hand, which must first be activated, can only process about 40 bits per second (cf. Häusel 2013, p. 8). So every second, 11,000,000 (intuitive) bits compete with 40 (analytical) bits. Those reactions that Intuitive System I produces determine your behavior unless Analytical System II is activated and then intervenes with a time delay to regulate. The Professional Negotiator uses these two systems as follows: • First: The Professional Negotiator uses the variety of weapons of influence. He thus specifically tries to use as many types of influence as possible for himself. • Secondly: The Professional Negotiator will repeatedly activate his own Analytical System II in order to fend off the “attacks” of the other side. Since the activation of the Analytical System II takes time, the Professional Negotiator needs many breaks (time-outs). He even needs a lot of breaks. The break is therefore an indispensable tactical measure for him (cf. Misino 2004, p. 147).

If you, as a negotiator, do not achieve agreement with “normal” influencing, which of course happens all the time, you should go through the individual weapons of influence again in a time-out using your checklist (cf. Sect. 3.3.3) and consider which weapons you now want to intensify. Think carefully about which weapons you want to use intensively and in which order. In such cases, I typically ask the negotiating team or the project team (i.e. with the participation of the Decision Maker) the following questions about each individual open point:

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Colleagues, we have not yet been able to get our way, let us have another intensive discussion about what we may have overlooked or which weapons we should now intensify: • Besides the arguments presented so far, is there a better argument that might be more convincing to our partner in his world? • Can we construct a good example that shows why our position is preferable, can we name a good picture or tell a story to support our position? • Can we show that our position is usual, i.e. that it corresponds to the standard? Have we sufficiently pointed out that the position was given to us “from above”? Can we explain that our position is fair? • Have we pointed out sufficiently often that we want to work out a solution together? Have we explained well enough what benefit the partner has if he follows our position? Conversely, have we also made clear what certain disadvantage he will have if he does not follow our position? Have we sufficiently involved our partner and asked him to propose solutions? This kind of internal discussion is usually very helpful and will in any case lead you to prepare well for level 6 (Influence) of the BMI stairway. At level 6 (Influence) you must try even harder than before to exert influence on the negotiating partner: “The negotiator must always be looking for ways to exercise influence” (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2008, p. 143). To do this, keep going through the checklist of weapons of influence according to Sect. 3.3.3 or ask and answer the above questions internally in the team. A solid knowledge of how the weapons of influence work is one of your most important skills as a Primary Negotiator, especially if you are at level 6 (Influence) of the BMI stairway. This is because each individual weapon you use to influence is your currency, i.e. your respective means of payment: “in negotiation one’s currency is influence” (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2008, p. 155). In other words, you choose the right weapon of influence (means of payment) and receive consent (consideration) in return. This can be demonstrated by the following examples: • Their “means of payment” is: “that’s the way we do it” (cf. Sect. 5.7); the hoped-for counterpart is: “ok, then we’ll do it that way”; • Their “means of payment” is: “that’s what my boss told me to do” (cf. Sect. 5.8); the hoped-for counter performance is: “ok, then we can only do it this way”; • Their “means of payment” is: “if you agree to my position, you will have the following advantages …” (cf. Sect. 5.11); the hoped-for quid pro quo is: “Oh, that’s right, then we can agree that way”. Ideally, therefore, you receive consent (consideration) solely for your influencing statement (means of payment). In this case, you do not pay for the approval with a material

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renunciation (e.g. giving in with regard to a position). This is exactly what your primary goal must be: first try to gain approvals through influencing statements rather than by (partially) giving up a position of your own. Your secondary goal is to (partially) give up your own position later in Phase C of the negotiation (Concessions Package Procedure) in order to get something else in return (cf. Sect. 5.13). In the following, I will present the Weapons of Influence that are most important from my point of view, taking into account the following structure: First, I distinguish between Phase A (Analyze Open Points) and Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure). In Phase A I distinguish four different series, which you can use again and again in this or a similar way. I assign three weapons to each series, so that in relation to Phase A I present you with a total of 12 classic Weapons of Influence. For Phase C, I’ve only assigned a single series with three Weapons of Influence. You should only use these in Phase C (and not before), besides which the other series remain applicable in Phase C, of course. In Phase (B) (Break 4 Change), no Weapons of Influence are used against the negotiating partner. In Phase B the members of the team use the Weapons of Influence against each other and defend against them. The order chosen here for the individual Weapons is by no means compulsory, it is only for orientation. Each weapon and its defense is therefore explained in such a way that you can deal with each weapon in isolation at will. The descriptions therefore do not build on each other. Duplications and repetitions, especially with regard to the tips on defense of the respective weapon are therefore intended. However, as already mentioned above, you should generally not use weapons assigned to Phase C in Phase A. This is especially true for reciprocity, which only develops its full efficiency in Phase C. Each weapon is provided with its own digit. The presentation is thereby structured in the same way in each digit. First, I briefly describe the weapon and then outline how you can use it (i.e., best practice). Then I explain how to defend against each weapon if it is used against you (consciously or unconsciously). Finally, where necessary, the summary is followed by an explanation of the basics, taking into account scientific findings in conjunction with examples from practice. In addition to Weapons of Influence, I distinguish between various “multiplier effects”, which I call this because they can amplify, i.e. multiply, the effect of individual weapons (cf. Fig. 5.1).

5.1 Sympathy As a rule, we most prefer to say yes to the requests of someone we know and like (Robert B. Cialdini).

Series 1 begins with sympathy (cf. Fig. 5.2). A Professional Negotiator will first try to generate sympathy in Phase A in order to support the bonding process (steps 1 to 3 of the

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Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 Reciprocity

+ Series 5

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.1 Most important “Weapons of Influence” and multiplier effects. (Source: Own representation)

Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.2  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Sympathy. (Source: Own representation)

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BMI stairway). He will then, in due course, recite his starting positions and thus set his anchor. Thereafter, each anchor is typically first defended with arguments. This series (sympathy, anchor, arguments) occurs frequently in practice in this order.

5.1.1 Definition “Sympathy” is one of the six Weapons of Influence impressively explained by Cialdini in his important work “Influence” (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 167 ff.). The “Liking Rule” formulated by Cialdini states that sympathy leads to the development of a relationship (“social bond” or “liking bond”), which in turn has the consequence that we are more likely to be influenced than without the existence of the relationship based on sympathy. As a result, we are also more likely to change our behavior or attitude. Put simply, the point is that we all tend to answer “yes” to requests from people we know and like. For example, we are more willing to buy something from a likeable person than an unlikeable one, regardless of the commodity (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 310). For example, the Tupperware business model with its private sales events is essentially based on the well-staged use of the weapon of sympathy (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 169 ff.).

5.1.2 Deployment The weapon of sympathy is typically brought to bear through the following behaviors (cf. Opresnik 2013, p. 118 ff.): • • • • • •

Cause familiarity, Emphasize similarities, respectfully, Give credit where credit is due, Strive for a positive self-portrayal and Emphasize common goals and cooperation (this is especially effective in difficult situations).

Specifically: Induce Familiarity in the Run-up to the Negotiation  Start as early as possible to build up familiarity with the future negotiating partner. You can achieve this by contacting them as often as possible before the talks begin, either by telephone or in person. Use every opportunity to make personal contact before the negotiation. In the business world, for example, the “luncheon technique” (Cialdini 2007, p. 193) is practiced very intensively, i.e. you go to lunch with people with whom you want to conduct important negotiations. In this case, regardless of all other effects (e.g. casual conversation on topics where one

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finds common ground), the mere act of eating together is perceived as something positive that brings about familiarity. A particular example is the bar negotiations (cf. Sect. 4.1.1), where our negotiating team was invited by the partner team to have a drink at the hotel bar the evening before the negotiations in order to bring about familiarity. It worked; the negotiations, which were tough in terms of content, were conducted personally in a very respectful and thus professional manner in the months that followed. Emphasize Similarities  Whenever possible, highlight similarities with your negotiating partner: “Oh, your son/daughter also studies in …”; “What, you also like to go to the mountains?”, “You are also an FC Bayern fan …”; “You also like to go jogging …”.  Example

Perfect in the technique of finding similarities was a waiter who served me at a steakhouse in Manhattan/New York and, like any professional waiter, negotiated the size of his tip by his behavior from the first moment of contact. He wanted to know where I was from. After I answered “Munich,” he said, “Oh, last night I decided to go to Munich this year.” At the next table, he asked the guests the same question a little later and of course he answered that he was going to travel to their hometown (Miami) this year. I was amused by this tactic, which the waiter actually used to generate sympathy, so I tipped him generously after the meal. After all, he needs money if he is going to travel so much. ◄ You can also bring about similarities by using the technique of mirroring behavior. If your partner interlocks their hands, interlock your hands too, if your partner puts their hands on the table, put your hands on the table too, etc.: “Monkey see, monkey do” (Pink 2012, p. 76). Behave Respectfully, Praise  Behave respectfully at all times. Show by your posture that you respect your counterpart as a negotiating partner. Give him your full attention without checking your e-mails or taking phone calls during the negotiation. Every glance at your smartphone is evidence of a lack of respect for your negotiating partner and a wasted opportunity to build up sympathy through positive behavior, which in turn is the basis for the core of the negotiation process: influence. As already highlighted above, Schranner praised the respective hostage-takers, telling them, for example, that he was “very professional in his approach”. In this way, he was able to generate sympathy (www.schranner.com/de/news/2014/08/26/die-erste-minuteeines-gesprächs. Accessed: 12.09.2018). Make Sure You Present Yourself in a Positive Light  Use the technique of self-enhancement by dressing appropriately and talking about topics that your counterpart finds pleasant or interesting (cf. Werth 2010, p.  89). It is advisable to get to know your future

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negotiating partners as part of your preparation. The more you know about them, the more likely you are to be able to prepare yourself for what clothing is appropriate, what content interests your partner and what competence he expects from you. There may even be mutual acquaintances. Everyone knows how easy it is to get an appointment with a fully booked specialist (doctor, lawyer, consultant) if we can point to a mutual acquaintance. Use the technique of self-deprecation by also reporting on failures or negative characteristics. This will make you appear modest and credible (cf. Werth 2010, p. 90). Also use the technique of self-disclosure by revealing personal information and thus appearing open and honest (cf. Werth 2010, p. 90). Of course, this must not be information that gives your negotiating partner an advantage with regard to the specific subject of the negotiation. Finally, you can use the association principle by ensuring that your negotiation partner perceives something positive (step 1) and then automatically links this positive with your person (step 2). In this way, the positive in the result rubs off on you (cf. Werth 2010, p. 86; Cialdini 2007, p. 188 ff.). If, for example, you know that your negotiation partner holds a certain person in high esteem, then you could apply the association principle and generate sympathy if, for example, you tell your negotiation partner that you know exactly this person well. We know this kind of application of the association principle under the name “name dropping” (cf. Werth 2010, p. 89; Cialdini 2007, p. 203). Another application of the association principle is the so-called halo effect. If your negotiation partner highly values a certain characteristic in you (e.g. special [sporting] successes), then you have the chance that this single positive characteristic will lead him to have a positive overall impression of you by way of association. This may make it easier for you to influence your partner (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008 p. 124). The use of the halo effect is an integral part of advertising. Thus, celebrities (who are perceived positively) are “combined” with a certain product in which the celebrity presents the product or uses it (e.g. drives a certain car or wears a certain watch) (cf. Werth 2010, p. 87). In this way, the “charisma” of the celebrity is transferred to the product, which is thus more likely to be purchased. Attention: The association principle also works in the opposite direction. If your negotiating partner makes a mental association between a negative event and you, he will perceive you negatively: “The nature of bad news infects the teller” (Cialdini 2007, p. 188). Emphasize Common Goals and Cooperation When the Going Gets Tough  Especially in a difficult negotiation situation that is emotionally charged, the formula for success is: Emphasize common goals, thereby eliciting cooperation, and thereby eliciting sympathy. Emphasize your common goals and the need for both sides to work together (cooperation) to achieve those goals. Simply emphasizing the common goals promotes cooperation, which in turn causes sympathy, which facilitates influence. Cialdini (Cialdini 2007, p. 181) specifically recommends,

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Highlight Common Goals when they Are Obvious • reinforce common goals when they are weak, and • create common goals when they do not (yet) exist. Nothing to add to that. However, avoid reactance: Please be sure to keep in mind that the “right measure” is what matters. If you overdo it, the negotiating partner will become aware of the targeted use of the weapon of sympathy. He then typically reacts with “reactance”, i.e. he resists the influence in order to restore his own freedom of action (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 253 ff. and p. 558).

5.1.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

This means: If you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find a wording example at the end of this paragraph. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always.

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Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. Here, then, is the weapon of sympathy. Defend: If your partner • • • • • •

before the trial, trying to induce familiarity, stressed similarities during the trial, behaves very respectfully, praises, makes an effort to present himself in a positive light and in a difficult negotiation situation, while behaving respectfully, emphasizes the common ground and the need for cooperation,

then you know you’re dealing with a professional who will use the weapon of sympathy against you. Please do not let yourself be influenced by external attractiveness. As soon as you perceive attractive people, the so-called “beauty is good assumption” automatically takes effect (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 124). According to social psychological research, this assumption leads to the fact that physically attractive people are “usually perceived as more sociable, dominant, mentally healthier, more intelligent, and more socially competent” (Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 124). This assumption is essentially false (see Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 124). Nevertheless, we tend to find attractive people more likeable and are more likely to be persuaded by them. This is why attractiveness is also used in advertising, with good-looking people promoting products. The beauty-is-good assumption is based on the halo effect described above, according to which a single positive characteristic (in this case attractiveness) determines our overall impression of that person (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 124). Again, the beauty is good assumption is wrong. So please do not let yourself be convinced by your negotiating partner because he is attractive from your point of view. To ward off the gun, ask yourself self-critically whether you find the negotiating partner likeable. If so, you should consciously distinguish between the sympathetic person and the purely factual aspects of the intended deal (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 207). Therefore, ask yourself the control question, “Would I make this deal the same way with someone I disliked?” If you answer “no” to the question, then you want to make the deal with this person because he or she is sympathetic to you, but not because the deal is beneficial to you. Now formulate your defense statement and write it down. Your defense statement might be, for example: “Once again, thank you very much for the very pleasant discussions. Having weighed up all the pros and cons, I can now offer you the following proposal: …”.

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If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.1.4 Summary How to use  Try  before the trial to induce familiarity, • • • • •

to emphasize similarities during the trial, to behave with great respect, praising your negotiating partner, to strive for a positive self-portrayal and emphasize the common ground and the need for cooperation, especially in a difficult negotiating situation.

Defense  Apply the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Take a Time-out, Activate Analytical System II, Identify the Weapon (in this case Sympathy), Formulate and Write Down the Defense Statement.  Defend: To ward off the gun, ask yourself self-critically whether you find the negotiating partner sympathetic. If so, you should consciously distinguish between the sympathetic person and the purely factual aspects of the intended deal (cf. Cialdini 2007, p.  207). Therefore, ask yourself the control question, “Would I make this deal the same way with someone I disliked?” If you answer “no” to the question (ideally after consulting with your Decision Maker), then you should block out the person and focus on the purely factual aspects. Now formulate your defense statement and put it in writing. Your defense statement could read, for example: “Once again, thank you for the very pleasant conversation. After considering all the pros and cons, I can now offer you the following proposal: …”. If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.1.5 Basics Sympathy (emotional affection) has a definite effect. Sympathy makes it more likely that you will be able to influence your negotiating partner. According to Cialdini’s “Liking Rule”, we are more likely to say “yes” to people we find likeable (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 167). Persuasion research (cf. Werth 2010, p. 86 ff.) has also determined how sympathy can be generated, namely by triggering positive feelings in the negotiating partner through the following activities:

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Familiarity Makes You Likeable  Sympathy depends on how often we have contact with a person or whether a familiarity develops (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 127). This contact can be reduced to merely sitting next to each other repeatedly in lectures. This phenomenon is also referred to as the “good is familiar phenomenon”. It is based on the “Mere Exposure Effect”, according to which the repeated perception of things and/or people triggers a feeling of familiarity. The motto is: “Familiarity makes likeable”. He Who Is Like Me Must Be Good  Research also confirms a clear connection between similarity and influence: the greater the similarity to a person, the greater the possibility of that person influencing us (cf. Werth 2010, p. 86). The following examples by Werth are astounding: petitions are more likely to be signed if the petitioner is dressed similarly to the person being addressed. Insurance agents are more successful with people who are similar to them in age, religion, political views, or tobacco use. The possibility of influence is greater if both negotiating partners have the same birthday. Supervisors even rate employees who are similar to them better (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 126). This scientifically confirmed effect, according to which similarity increases the possibility of influence, is also referred to as the “similar to me effect” (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p.  126). The motto is: “Whoever is similar to me must be good” (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 127). Praise and Compliments  On the one hand, you can cause sympathy through your nonverbal behavior (smile, eye contact, leaning forward). On the other hand, verbal behavior is crucial. You can evoke sympathy if you show interest in your negotiating partner by listening to him (Active Listening80) and expressing agreement wherever possible. Praise and compliments, in particular, work very well. It is not without reason that Cialdini has devoted a separate section to the topic of “Compliments” (Cialdini 2007, p. 174 ff.). In this section, Cialdini reports, among other things, on the very successful car salesman Joe Girard. Girard sent his more than 13,000 customers monthly postcards with the text “I like you”. This generated sympathy and was, among other things, exactly why he was so successful. Common Goals Facilitate Influence  The creation of sympathy also succeeds by making it clear to the negotiating partner that the cooperation is to the benefit of both sides. The effect of cooperation was demonstrated very impressively in a summer camp (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 181): First, the students of this Summer Camp were divided into two groups (Eagles and Rattlers) to compete with each other. Because of the competition, a real enmity was created between the two groups (as desired by the director of the experiment). Then, in a second step of the experiment, situations were deliberately created in which maintaining the enmity or competition would have resulted in harm to all students. For example, the camp’s central water supply was cut off. The students now realized that only concerted effort would help to restore the

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old condition of running water for all. The originally hostile groups now suddenly had a common goal.

The central scientific finding was: common goals lead to cooperation and this promotes sympathy, which in turn makes it easier to exert influence (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 181). As highlighted above, it is recommended that we need to highlight common goals when they are obvious, reinforce when they are weak, and create when they are not (yet) present (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 181). This tactic of stabilizing the relationship and focusing on achieving a common goal is one of the most significant tactics of all in crisis situations: “keep the bond … and stay focused on a common goal” (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 120).

5.2 Anchoring Any number … will induce an anchoring affect (Daniel Kahneman).

5.2.1 Definition When we want to judge something (the amount of a price for a property, the amount of rent for an apartment, the age of an object, the length of a flight route, the height of a tower, etc.), our brain always looks for a comparison value or reference point that we know: the so-called anchor (cf. Fig. 5.3). From this reference point, we then adjust, for example, in the categories “too high” or “too low”. Without exception, every number that you perceive in a temporal context with the estimate to be made causes the anchoring effect: “Any number that you are asked to consider as a possible solution to an estimation problem will induce an anchoring effect” (Kahneman 2013, p. 120). This means that even numbers or amounts that have no factual connection with the current decision to be made have an anchoring effect on our decisions. So really any number that is mentioned before an upcoming judgment, even randomly, acts as an anchor with respect to the judgment to be made afterwards (Kahneman 2013, p. 120). In one experiment, the subjects even oriented their decisions to numbers that they had previously consciously perceived by chance by spinning a wheel of fortune (cf. Sect. 5.2.5). In social psychology, this activity of Intuitive System I is called the “anchor heuristic” (Fischer et al. 2014, p. 32). The anchor heuristic is now even considered the “prototype of intuitive or heuristic thinking” (Fischer et al. 2014, p. 32). The heuristic, which is a simple rule of thumb that can quickly lead to useful solutions with little information, is in contrast to the algorithm. The algorithm takes into account all (and only this) information that is relevant for the decision-making process in question (cf. Fischer et al. 2014, p. 33).

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5 Influence Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.3  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Anchoring. (Source: Own representation)

For your negotiations this means: All positions that one party names in the negotiation automatically act as reference points or anchors for the other party. The other party therefore automatically starts to adjust from the reference point according to the criteria “too high” or “too low”. However, positions only act as reference points if they are classified as “fair” by the other side. Moreover, the more knowledge those concerned have about the value being assessed, the less positions act as anchors (cf. Schweizer 2005, p. 86).

5.2.2 Deployment Since your respective position is automatically perceived by your negotiating partner as a reference point from which your partner adjusts, you should always communicate positions that are very favorable to you. In this way, you can achieve a satisfactory result even if your partner only adjusts slightly “downwards” or “upwards”. Specifically: Observe the Requirement of Fairness  Remember that the anchor effect does not work if your partner (e.g. because of his expertise) considers your position to be “unfair”. Therefore, as a matter of principle, stick to Shell’s rule: Only assert positions (anchors) that you can justify afterwards “with a straight face” (Shell 2006, p. 160), i.e. do not

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blush in the process. This is, of course, the responsibility of the Decision Maker who gives you the positions. In Phase A, Always Communicate the Starting Positions  When you communicate your positions, in Phase A (Analyze Open Points) you should present the starting positions that your Decision Maker has developed, taking into account the Anchor Effect. With this “Highball Offer” (e.g. as a seller) or “Lowball Offer” (e.g. as a buyer) you force your partner to adjust from this reference point as long as only Intuitive System I is activated. In Phase C, Always Communicate the Package Positions  The same applies to Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure): if you communicate package positions, these should also be developed by your Decision Maker, taking into account the anchor effect. Basically Follow the Never Open Rule  Many authors recommend opening negotiations with the first offer oneself in order to set an anchor and force the partner to adjust from these reference points (cf. Jung and Krebs 2016, p. 50 ff.). At first, this sounds plausible. However, this recommendation is based on the (not explicitly formulated) assumption that you know exactly what positions your partner would actually take if he were allowed to make the first offer. In reality, however, you usually have an information deficit. Namely, you do not know for sure what positions your partner would communicate if he were allowed to make the first offer. You often have only guesses, which, moreover, are not infrequently based on what you think is reasonable or fair. Due to your regularly existing information deficit, I recommend exactly the opposite: Basically apply the “Never Open Rule” and do not make the first offer. What good is the anchor if you don’t know which positions your partner will name? You may name an amount (anchor) that your partner will be very happy to accept because he would have been willing to pay you much more in salary, rent, purchase price, and so on. To remind you of this central rule also in the context of your behavior, I have deliberately included a Step 4 in the FBI’s BCSM called “You go first” (Misino 2004, p. 123). This principle is also part of the Opening (see Sect. 4.1.3). Please make the first offer only in one case (and only then) exceptionally: If you are exactly 100% sure that your partner would not make you a better offer for you if he opened up to you with his first offer. In this context, you should also carry out the Overconfidence-Check with your Decision Maker (see Sect. 2.3.2). Do not assume what is reasonable and/or fair from your point of view, assume what is reasonable and/or fair in the highly individual (emotional and rational) world or situation of your partner. Based on my own many years of experience, I am certain: you will very rarely really know which positions your partner will communicate. When in doubt, please apply the

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Never Open Rule (“You go first”) and then initiate a time-out after perceiving your partner’s positions so that the anchor heuristic does not work against you (cf. Shell and Moussa 2008, p. 154). Please also remember a rule for FBI negotiators that I cannot repeat often enough because it is so helpful: “To ASSUME anything makes an “ASS” of “U” and “ME””(Greenstone 2005, p. 148). Use Multiplier Effects  Always consider using the “multiplier effects,” which I call them because they can amplify or multiply the effect of the particular weapon of influence. The four most important multiplier effects from my point of view are: • Primacy effect: Name the item or bundle of items that are most important to you first. This is how you take advantage of the “primacy effect”, which states that when people are given a list of things, they are good at remembering those that are mentioned first. This is due to the fact that no other information is yet available that would hinder storage in long-term memory (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 557; cf. Shell and Moussa 2008, p. 167). • Recency effect: Repeat the position or the bundle of positions that are most important to you at the end of your presentation. In this way, you also make use of the “recency effect”, which states that when people list things, they remember well those that are mentioned at the end. This is due to the fact that this information is not overwritten by subsequent information and is thus available for longer in short-term memory (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 558; cf. Shell and Moussa 2008, p. 167). • Mere Exposure Effect: Repeat the type of influence (here positions) moderately over and over again and thus use the “Mere Exposure Effect”, which says that people, if they are repeatedly exposed to the same “stimulus”, can automatically develop a more positive attitude towards it. Note, however, for one thing, that too much repetition has a negative effect. Note, secondly, that the Mere Exposure effect can lead to an even stronger negative attitude if your partner has a negative attitude towards your arguments in the first place. In short, use moderate repetition of your influence if your partner does not obviously reject your positions completely (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 223 ff.; cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 66 f.). • Contrast effect: The contrast effect states that our brain perceives the difference (contrast) between two objects of evaluation and thus one of the two objects appears “bigger”, “better”, “more beautiful”, “more valuable”, etc. (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 554). When we value something (e.g. a (purchase) object or an amount of money), we do not value it absolutely. Rather, we constantly evaluate it relatively, namely on the basis of a comparison with a reference point (higher or lower price, smaller car, worse housing location, etc., etc.): “Depending on the object of comparison, we perceive one and the same thing differently” (Werth 2010, p. 80) Kahneman also speaks of “reference dependence” (Kahneman 2013, p. 275). Only the comparison brings about clarity: “Comparison creates clarity” (Pink 2012, p. 134).

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Example

Cialdini describes a classic example that should not be missing from any explanation of the contrast effect (also called contrast principle) and can be easily understood by anyone: Place three vessels with water in front of you: on the left a vessel with cold water, on the right a vessel with hot water and in the middle a vessel with lukewarm water. Step 1: First dip your left hand into cold water and at the same time dip your right hand into hot water. Step 2: Then, after a short while, dip both hands simultaneously into the middle vessel with the lukewarm water. Now you will feel the contrast effect “up close and personal”: the same temperature (lukewarm water) subjectively appears warm on the left hand and cold on the right hand (cf. Kahneman 2013; p. 282; Cialdini 2007, p. 12). Depending on the reference point (cold water or hot water), we perceive one and the same temperature differently. ◄

5.2.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

This means: If you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (targeted or untargeted), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a real timeout protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find an example of wording at the end of this section. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always.

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Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. Here then is the anchoring. Defend: Be aware that every position that your partner communicates is always (necessarily!) first perceived by you as a reference point from which you automatically adjust according to the pattern “too high” or “too low”. Even if you do not immediately believe this as a rationally acting negotiator. It is like this. Listen to Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman (see Kahneman 2013, p. 127): • detach yourself completely from the reference point your partner has named • and think independently or analytically about the position as if your partner’s reference point did not exist. This complete rethinking is precisely the reason for the recommendations to the Decision Maker in Task 4 (Learn) to always begin by viewing the partner’s positions as illusory positions or smoke candles and to immediately throw them into the mental wastebasket (cf. Sect. 2.4). In addition, the Decision Maker should develop his own positions. If these should contradict the (just currently) Assumed Partner Position, you have a Real Conflict that you have to resolve (in Phase C). This should only be done by adjusting if this is in the Decision Maker’s interest. Now formulate your defense statement and write it down. If, in the course of a rational analysis, you have come to the conclusion that your partner’s positions are absurd, politely clarify this and cite completely different reference points (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 127) without making adjustments in relation to your partner’s positions. Your defense statement might be, for example: Thank you very much for your offer. I am a little uncomfortable with the positions you mentioned. I would like to propose the following offer with the following positions: ….

If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant. Example

I myself once experienced the anchor effect very impressively during a private negotiation about a property: The seller demanded 200,000 EUR for a property. The offer seemed spontaneously reasonable to me and I thought: 20% discount is certainly possible. Despite knowing about the anchor effect, I intuitively accepted the amount of 200,000 EUR as a reference point and adjusted immediately. After that, however, I activated my Analytical System II and thought in a completely new way, using standard market valuation criteria. After several hours of intensive research, I came to the conclusion that the market value of the specific property

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was more likely to be around EUR 110,000. Out of interest I arranged a viewing appointment with the estate agent. At the end of the appointment, which lasted about 1 hour, I asked “How flexible is the seller in terms of the purchase price, I have only been able to determine a market value of about 110,000 EUR in a rough valuation?”. To my very great astonishment, the estate agent replied, “Yes, the seller wants 200,000 EUR, that seems ambitious to me. But he will certainly not sell for 110,000 EUR”. Out of interest, I asked a local credit institution for a valuation. The result was quite clear: “We value the property at EUR 100,000”. I then told the realtor that at a price of EUR 100,000 I would think about buying it. The realtor then ended the negotiations very professionally. As I learned later, the seller could not find a buyer. This is not surprising: he had initially set the anchor at 200% of the market value in a very aggressive manner and hoped that only intuitive adjustments would be made. However, he had overlooked the fact that unrealistic or unfair anchors lead to the negotiating partner (like me) feeling “ripped off” from the outset and thus lacking the trust necessary for any negotiation. ◄

5.2.4 Summary How to use  1. Whenever we want to judge something (the amount of a price for a property, the amount of rent for an apartment, the age of something, the length of an airplane route, the height of a tower, the price of a car, etc.), our brain always looks for a comparison value or reference point that we know, i.e. the anchor. 2. Any number that is given to us in the temporal context of the impending judgment is automatically used as a reference point, regardless of the factual connection to the matter at hand. 3. This knowledge should not lead you to make the first offer in a negotiation. Instead, apply the Never Open Rule as a matter of principle. Step 4 of the BMI stairway is therefore “You go first”. In the context of the opening, the Driver-Seat Concept recommends the “Smart Start”, namely to let the partner open (cf. Sect. 4.1.3). If you still want to make the first bid, discuss this with your Decision Maker and do the OverconfidenceCheck according to (Sect. 2.3.2). Clarify whether you really know 100% what positions your partner will take (in the very near) future. Note: “To assume anything makes an ASS of U and ME”. 4. Always use the anchor effect consciously by communicating the starting positions or package positions given by your Decision Maker on level 5 of the BMI stairway (Bargain)

Defense  1. Defend yourself against the anchor effect by throwing your partner’s apparent positions into your mental wastebasket, by consciously initiating time-outs, by activating your Analytical System II and thereby assuming that your partner wants to set a reference point with you from which you should adjust according to the pattern “too high”

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or “too low”. Listen to the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman (cf. Kahneman 2013, p.  127):  disengage completely from the reference point your partner has named, so displace the anchor • and think independently or analytically about the position as if your partner’s reference point did not exist • then present your own positions or those of your Decision Maker and set a counteranchor; you manage the resulting conflict confidently with the ABC strategy according to Sect. 4.2.

5.2.5 Basics The anchor heuristic is now considered the “prototype of intuitive or heuristic thinking,” as noted above. Conscious Anchors and Unconscious Anchors  Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman differentiates between two different types of anchors: conscious and unconscious: A “conscious anchor” is given when one consciously adjusts from a given reference point in the categories “too high” or “too low”. A very high purchase price mentioned by a seller, for example, is such a conscious anchor (reference point), because the negotiating partner (buyer), if he initially accepts the anchor (with his Intuitive System I), will move downwards from it. Similarly, a very low purchase price mentioned by a buyer is a conscious anchor; the seller consciously adjusts upwards (with his Intuitive System I) (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 120). An “unconscious anchor”, on the other hand, is when a randomly perceived number continues to have an unconscious effect and you make an evaluation after the random perception. This is a so-called “priming effect” (see Sect. 5.10), i.e. a “primary stimulus” (randomly perceived number) paves the way for the “secondary stimulus”, i.e. your evaluation. Intuitive System I then tries its best to construct a world in which the anchor corresponds to the value to be valued (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 123). This is explained in more detail below (Scientific Experiments). Anchor for the Purpose of Own Motivation  If you set yourself a concrete goal (see Sect. 2.3.3) and set out to achieve it, you set an anchor for yourself. This concrete goal is also a reference point which, according to the “Prospect Theory” by Kahneman/Tversky (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 278 ff.), leads to the following effects: If you do not reach your goal (reference point), this is perceived as a “loss”, the phenomenon of loss aversion (cf. Sect. 5.11) then leads to a “mental pain”. If you were to exceed your goal, it would “only” be a “gain” which would only be felt half as much as the “loss”. You will therefore work very hard to reach your goal in order to avoid the pain of Loss Aversion.

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Kahneman demonstrates this very clearly using the “New York cabdrivers”: these typically have a daily sales target (reference point). On rainy days they reach it very quickly, on sunny days it takes longer. Economically, it would make sense to work long hours on rainy days and then have more free time on a sunny day to enjoy Central Park, for example. Loss aversion typically causes different behavior: Taxi drivers work only until they reach their daily revenue goal. From that moment on, the “mental pain” of Loss Aversion is eliminated and the mere profit is not as important. As a result, they typically finish work earlier on rainy days and later on sunny days (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 303). Scientific Experiments  Because of the extraordinary practical importance of the anchor heuristic, I would like to outline four more of the numerous scientific experiments on the anchor heuristic below:

The Wheel of Fortune  In this experiment, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman first manipulated a wheel of fortune with numbers from one to 100 so that it stopped at either 10 or 65. The students who participated in the series of experiments were first required to observe the wheel of fortune as it was made to spin by Tversky/Kahneman. After the wheel of fortune stopped by itself, each student had to write down the number that was on the wheel of fortune, i.e. 10 or 65. Afterwards, Tversky/Kahneman asked two questions. • Question No. 1: Is the percentage of African states in the United Nations above or below the number you just noted (i.e., above/below 10 percent or above/below 65%)? Answers were noted, but these did not matter. The question was only intended to cause the previously noted anchor (10 or 65) to be repeated again in the form of a question. • Question No. 2: What percentage of African countries do you estimate are in the United Nations? Although it was obvious that the number of a wheel of fortune could not provide any useful information to answer the question, the students were nevertheless influenced by the anchor of question 1: the group of students who had noted down the number 10 estimated the number of African states to be 25% on average and the group who had noted down the number 65 estimated the number of African states to be 45% on average. The “anchor 10” thus caused the average estimation result 25, the “anchor 65” led to the average estimation result 45 (cf. Kahneman 2013 p. 119).

Dice on the Judge’s Table  German judges with more than 15 years of professional experience were presented with a shoplifting case. After that, they had to roll a dice that showed only a 3 or a 9 when manipulated. After seeing the result of the dice, the judges were asked two questions each: • Question No. 1 to the judges with a dice result of “3”: Would you impose a prison sentence of more or less than three months? The answers were noted. They also served here to repeat the anchor.

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• Question No. 2: What specific penalty would they impose? • Result: the judges imposed an average of five months. • Question No. 1 to the judges with a dice result of “9”: Would you impose a prison sentence of more or less than nine months? The answers were noted. They also served here to repeat the anchor. • Question No. 2: What specific penalty would they impose? • Result: the judges imposed an average of eight months. Here, too, the respective anchor had an effect. Anchor “3” caused the discretionary decision of five months’ imprisonment, “Anchor 9″ led to the discretionary decision of eight months’ imprisonment (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 125). Real Estate Agent  In another experiment, real estate agents received the exposé of a house for sale. They were also allowed to view the property. To one group, the experimenter gave a price that was 12 percent above (high anchor) the price actually asked by the seller; to the other group, however, he told them a price that was 12 percent below (low anchor) the price actually asked by the seller. The real estate agents who had been exposed to the high anchor estimated the value of the property to be significantly higher than those real estate agents who had been told the low anchor. When asked whether they had been influenced by the price mentioned (high or low anchor), the real estate agents answered with a clear “no” (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 125). Wine Auction  Students had to write the last two digits of their social security number as a “possible prize” in a list of various items. One of the items was a bottle of a “valuable French red wine.” Students were then asked to write down whether they would buy the item (including the bottle of wine) for that price. “Yes” or “No” were the only acceptable responses. Finally, students were asked, “What is the maximum price you would pay for the bottle of wine?”. Students with the highest final digits on their own social security number (80 to 99) made the highest offers (US$37 on average) and students with the lowest final digits (1 to 20) made the lowest offers (US$12 on average). Across all products, the bids of those students with the highest final digits were 216 to 346% higher than the bids of students with the lowest final digits (see Ariely 2010, p. 59 ff.). All these experiments show very impressively how easily we are all influenced: we automatically adjust from a given number, regardless of whether this number has a factual connection to the topic to be decided. The only way to prevent this is to time out and activate your Analytical System II. Conversely, you should use the effect in the negotiation and name a correspondingly high or low starting position (Phase A) or package position (Phase C) on step 5 (Bargain) of the BMI stairway (cf. Sect. 3.8.5).

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Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.4  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: arguments. (Source: Own representation)

5.3 Arguments Arguments … are the bread and butter of negotiation (G. Richard Shell).

This Sect. 5.3 deals with arguments in the narrower sense (cf. Fig. 5.4). It is not, however, about argument in the broader sense, i.e. any statement intended to convince the negotiating partner of one’s own position (cf. however Shell 2006, p.  56, who also refers to other Weapons of Influence such as standards and authority as argument). The other “tools”, which in addition to the argument, are supposed to convince the negotiating partner, are listed in this book as Weapons of Influence in their own right. Just as the so-called “bread and butter business” is the core business of a company, the presentation of arguments is part of the negotiator’s core business: “Arguments … are the bread and butter of negotiation” (Shell 2006, p. 56). Nevertheless, it is only one of the 15 Weapons of Influence outlined in this book, an important “entry-level weapon”, but by far not the most successful weapon.

5.3.1 Definition Arguments are reasons with which you present your positions or claims in such a way that a logically thinking objective third party would confirm that your position is presented conclusively, taking the argument into account (cf. Heussen and Pischel 2014, Part 2, para. 381). In this context, the argument is introduced with “because”, for example.

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Example

The employer offers the employee a special bonus in the amount of EUR 5000 per calendar year, whereby the “whether” and “how” of the granting is to be at the employer’s discretion. The employee, on the other hand, suggests: “Let us please describe the conditions of entitlement so precisely that an uninvolved third party could decide whether and in what amount the special bonus is to be paid, because otherwise there is a risk that we will argue about the accrual of the entitlement and the amount in the future and that this dispute will put a strain on our relationship. We could avoid this by defining it as precisely as possible.” This is a logical argument because the reasoning is coherent from a reasonable person’s point of view. If the negotiator (employer) is persuaded by this argument because he himself thinks and acts rationally, he may respond to it. If, on the other hand, the employer argues, “I don’t think much of such definitions, because they don’t cover all the facts of life either, so there may be disputes later despite the definition”, this counter-argument is also correct. Now, the employee will argue, for example, that attempting a definition will provide more clarity to both sides and is more likely to reduce the likelihood of a dispute than not having a definition at all. The employer can go along with that. He can therefore follow a “good” argument without losing face (see Heussen and Pischel 2014, Part 2, para. 381 a to c.). Then the negotiation is quickly and successfully concluded solely on the basis of the discussion of “purely rational arguments”. However, the employer may also state, without mentioning any factual arguments, that it simply does not feel like dealing with tedious definitions. In this case, the phase of “purely rational argumentation” is over quickly and without a common solution. The Professional Negotiator is not irritated by this, because he knows that the rational argument is only one of the many weapons of influence, nothing more (cf. Conger 2013, p. 75). He then concentrates on the remaining Weapons of Influence. ◄

5.3.2 Deployment After you have first generated sympathy and then “anchored” as a Negotiator with your positions, you should now justify these anchors (positions) with conclusive arguments, subject to the following statements. Prepare Coherent Arguments in Relation to Your Positions  Before the negotiation, discuss in the team (i.e. also with the Decision Maker, who first develops the mission and then controls it) which position you will justify as a negotiator and how. Also think about the expected counter-arguments of your partner and consider which conclusive arguments you will present as a Negotiator in response. Bear in mind that your position can seem arbitrary without a comprehensible justification or that you yourself can seem arrogant. Use Arguments Only in a Relaxed Atmosphere  Only use your prepared arguments in a relaxed atmosphere in which your partner is basically prepared to deal with them. Or vice

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versa: Be extremely cautious with the use of arguments in tense situations where the “air is thick”. The reason for this advice is very simple: In an emotionally tense situation your partner is not at all willing or not at all able to analyze conclusive arguments. If your partner feels stress, i.e. if he is in danger according to his own subjective assessment, he will primarily make his decisions in the (always active) Intuitive System I and will not additionally activate the Analytical System II (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 42). Reasonable arguments can therefore not be processed in a stress situation at all where they would have to be processed in your partner, namely in Analytical System II (cf. Schranner 2016b, p. 93 ff.). Advocate Your (Strong) Arguments Without Claiming Truthfulness  Please note: “Every argument contains the seeds of aggression” (Salewski 2008, p. 111), namely when the arguer believes to be right. Such bossiness is more likely to lead to resistance from your partner than to the intended compliance (cf. Sect. 3.8.7). Also the opinion of having “good arguments” yourself easily leads to dominant behavior. This in turn can lead to your partner perceiving the dominance with which you present the arguments instead of the arguments. It is precisely this perceived dominance that is very likely to trigger resistance in your partner (cf. Salewski 2008 p.  113). This makes compliance rather unlikely. Accordingly, personalities who like to focus on arguing are not considered efficient negotiators (cf. Strentz 2018, p. 43). In short: Argue without claiming to be “in the right”, because “bossiness is the worst” (Schranner, in Harvard Business Manager, 01/2018, p. 46 f.). Instead, present your arguments gently and as an I-statement20 (cf. Sect. 3.8.5) (cf. Salewski 2008, p. 114). In case of strong resistance, switch to Active Listening80 (cf. Salewski 2008, p. 114) or to the other Weapons of Influence. Pay Attention to the “Because” Even in Weak Arguments  Pay attention to the “because” even in weak arguments. In the copier experiment, which is very well known in social psychology, the US psychologist Ellen Langer (Harvard University) found out that demands/positions which are justified with “because” are more likely to be complied with than demands which are not justified with “because”. This is true even if the justification is nonsensical (cf. Shell and Moussa 2008, p. 161 ff.). In the photocopier experiment, a student was to try to get other students who were waiting in line at a photocopier to let him go ahead and make his copies immediately. The experiment consisted of three different questions. The purpose was to find out which question was most likely to get one let in front. The questions and the results were: • Question 1: “Excuse me, I have five pages to copy here. Can I please use the copier because I’m in a hurry?” • In this case (real reason question), 94% of students allowed the asking fellow student to walk past them to the copier.

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• Question 2: “Excuse me, I have five pages to copy here. Can I use the copier, please?” • In this case (question without justification), 60% of students allowed the asking fellow student to walk past them to the copier. • Question 3: “Excuse me, I have five pages to copy here, can I please go ahead because I want to copy?” In this case (question with nonsensical reasoning), 93% of the students allowed the fellow student asking the question to walk past them to the copy machine. Ellen Langer called this phenomenon, according to which the mere presentation of a “because” leads to compliance “mindless compliance”. Consider Counterarguments as Valuable Information  A negotiation situation only becomes interesting when your partner presents plausible counter-arguments (at least from his point of view) and you then continue your argumentation intensively and respectfully as long as there is no stress situation. The “trick” here is: Respectfully refute your partner’s arguments with the necessary athletic ambition and at the same time concentrate on analyzing your partner’s arguments in order to understand his situation and especially his emotional and rational world. For it is in this world that you must negotiate.

Use Multiplier Effects  Always consider the use of multiplier effects (see Sect. 5.2.2). • Primacy effect: State first the argument or the bundle of arguments that you consider to be the most persuasive. This is how you take advantage of the primacy effect, which says that when people are given a list of things, they are good at remembering the ones that are mentioned first. • Recency effect: At the end of your presentation, repeat the argument or the bundle of arguments that you consider to be the most convincing. In this way, you also make use of the recency effect, which states that when listing things, the ones that are mentioned at the end are remembered best. • Mere Exposure Effect: Repeat the type of influence (arguments in this case) again and again in moderation and thus use the Mere Exposure Effect. This states that when people are repeatedly exposed to the same “stimulus”, they can automatically develop a more positive attitude towards it. • Contrast effect: The contrast effect states that our evaluations are always relative, namely based on a comparison with a reference point (higher or lower price, smaller car, worse residential location, etc., etc.). Therefore, make sure you provide strong contrasts in your arguments (“Yes, the high price is justified because the quality of the product is so excellent. Compared to the risk you run when buying an inferior product (…) this purchase price is relatively cheap”). Remember: “Comparison creates clarity” (Pink 2012, p. 134).

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5.3.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

So if you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the impact of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find a formulation example at the end of this paragraph. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. So here is the argument. Defend: • In doing so, realize that every argument your partner makes forces you to deal with their point of view. • Then check the arguments for plausibility. Now formulate your defense statement and write it down. Look for counter-arguments (ideally together with your Decision Maker). Often, based on your experience, you have already coordinated these in detail with your Decision Maker before the negotiation.

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Your defense statement might be, for example: Thank you very much for your arguments. I can understand your arguments and your point of view. Please take into account that I sit on the other side of the table. As a result, I naturally see things somewhat differently. Please let me briefly present my counter-arguments: ….

If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.3.4 Summary How to use  1. Arguments have the purpose to justify a position conclusively, to make it rationally comprehensible. 2. Consider the following: –– –– –– –– ––

Prepare your arguments before the negotiation Use arguments only in a relaxed atmosphere Advocate your arguments without claiming truthfulness Use the term “because” Consider counterarguments as valuable information to understand the partner situation

3. Use Multiplier Effects: –– Primacy effect and recency effect (state important arguments at the beginning and repeat at the end), –– Mere exposure effect (repeat arguments) and –– Contrast effect (black and white comparison).

Defense  Fight Back: Time Out, Activate, Identify, Formulate and Write Down.

5.3.5 Basics By making arguments, you can essentially accomplish three things: getting your partner to agree, reinforcing your message with your partner, and reducing your information deficit.

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Possible Consent  On the one hand, you have the opportunity to convince your partner with your arguments. In the best case, he will agree on level 7 of the BMI stairway (compliance/noncompliance) (see Sect. 3.8.7). This usually happens with regard to individual positions even in difficult negotiations. In this case, or if you allow yourself to be convinced by counter-arguments, you will find yourself in a pleasant negotiation in which the conflicts (the originally opposing positions) are resolved “reasonably”. In practice, however, the complete resolution of all conflicts on a rational level happens very very rarely in my experience. From the perspective of Harvard I, however, this is the only permissible way of resolving conflicts (cf. Sect. 6.2.2); this view is explicitly not shared by the DriverSeat Concept. The partner’s agreement based on an argument you put forward is very questionable especially because the effect of factual or logical arguments cannot be estimated. It is only certain that your logical argument will be processed in the Intuitive System I of the negotiating partner, but it is completely uncertain whether and how your logical argument will also be processed in the Analytical System II of the negotiating partner. Or the other way round: As a Negotiator you do not know whether your argument will even “reach” the partner where it can be processed appropriately, i.e. in his Analytical System II. So the “compellingly logical” argument from your point of view can convince your partner, but it does not have to. If your partner is not willing to activate his Analytical System II in order to deal with your arguments, it will remain with a processing in the Intuitive System I. Accordingly, your arguments or other information will only be processed heuristically by your partner (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 250). However, if your negotiation partner is willing and able to activate his Analytical System II to engage with your logical arguments, “in the case of high personal relevance of the topic and high cognitive capacities … the quality of the arguments (can be) decisive for whether the recipient is convinced or not” (Werth/Mayer 2008, p. 250). This is also the assumption of the so-called Elaboration Likelihood Model (“ELM”). The ELM assumes that people only think about rational arguments (or detailed and highquality information) when they want to and when they have the time to process these arguments/information. If he “does not feel like” dealing with arguments/information, the processing of the arguments or information takes place exclusively in Intuitive System I and thus emotionally or heuristically (cf. Fischer et al. 2014, p. 91). According to the (somewhat more differentiated) theory of the Heuristic Systematic Model (“HSM”), humans only deal with rational arguments when they are motivated to do so, i.e. when they really want to deal with the argument. The HSM assumes that there are three different motives in humans: the truth motive, the defense motive, and the social impression motive. This means concretely: • If your negotiating partner is dominated by the “truth motive”, he will strive to make an “objectively correct” decision, the information processing will then be more balanced. Your partner will especially evaluate according to pros and cons.

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• If your negotiation partner is dominated by the “defense motive”, he will strive to defend his positions without being “distracted” by rational arguments. The processing of information then takes place in a “distorted” way. This motive is naturally very strong in lawyers. • If your negotiating partner is dominated by the “social impression motive”, the processing of arguments/information and the possible change of your own attitude depends on the impression your negotiating partner wants to leave on other people. For example, if your partner wants to be seen as particularly fair, he will allow himself to be convinced by your rational arguments if this leads to a fair result from his individual point of view. The information processing is then rather balanced. If, on the other hand, your partner wants to be perceived as a “consistent” person, he will not be persuaded to change his behavior or change his position. In this case, information processing tends to be “distorted” (cf. Fischer et al. 2014, p. 92 f.). In summary, it can thus be stated: Whether and how your partner processes your arguments depends on the individual personality of your negotiation partner. If he is not willing to activate his Analytical System II, he will process your arguments heuristically. This can be good or bad. Even if your partner activates his Analytical System II, his reaction depends on which motive is currently moving him. If the defense motive predominates, you will have typical difficult negotiations and should analyze all utterances that are defensive in order to enter your partner’s emotional and rational world. The same is true if the social impression motive dominates and your partner wants to be perceived as consistent. Counterarguments to Reinforce Your Message  Furthermore, with each counterargument you should be aware that your partner remembers your argument better precisely because of the intensive mental engagement with your argument (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 251). In other words, rational argumentation not only has the purpose of convincing, it has the purpose of “forcing” your partner to mentally engage with your arguments. This is how you reinforce your message. Counterarguments as Information Carriers  Finally, consider the exchange of arguments as a very effective way to reduce your information deficit. The counter-arguments give you valuable clues about your partner’s situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check). This may help you to better interpret the positions, which are always developed based on the situation at hand. Of course, this is only preliminary (“Never assume – clarify statements”).

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5.4 Examples Examples are the door openers of persuasion (G. Richard Shell/Mario Moussa).

As already emphasized several times, the Professional Negotiator typically starts with factual-logical argumentation in a relaxed atmosphere. If and to the extent that he cannot convince, he uses other weapons of influence. Not infrequently, the arguments are followed by examples, pictures and stories (cf. Fig. 5.5). It is much easier to convince the negotiating partner of one’s own positions if one can present them vividly in this way. The advantage of examples, pictures and stories is that the brain processes them in a completely different way than mere words. The Professional Negotiator takes advantage of this. These three weapons are part of Series 2, which begins with the “Examples” weapon.

5.4.1 Definition According to Duden, an example is “a typical individual case picked out at random (as an explanation for a certain phenomenon or process)” (https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Beispiel#Bedeutunga. Accessed: 18.09.2018). Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.5  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Examples. (Source: Own representation)

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With an example, you can explain to your partner in the negotiation, on the basis of an individual case, why you hold a certain position, or how this position affects a concrete situation. Example

The experienced managing director of a company wanted to convince his much younger colleague to offer several employees, who were to be dismissed for operational reasons, a standard market severance payment immediately during the termination interview. The younger managing director did not want this. Thereupon the experienced managing director said: “We all know that an employee who receives a notice of termination usually brings an action for protection against dismissal in order to obtain a severance payment” (cf. on social customary practice Sect. 5.7). The younger managing director replied: “It may well be that this is customary, but here in our rural area no one is going to take legal action against us”. The experienced manager refuted these assumptions by describing a concrete individual case: “Our competitor, which has its production only a few streets away, had to make redundancies last year. He was sued by all the affected employees so that they would receive severance pay. As a result, they all received severance payments, even after lengthy labor court proceedings. We may be able to avoid such lawsuits by immediately offering severance pay at market rates.” Thereupon, the younger managing director was convinced and agreed to the proposal of the experienced managing director (notice of termination in connection with the offer to pay severance pay). This approach was successful in this case. ◄ The description of a typical individual case (example) is very congenial to the knowledge processing of the human brain. Our brain constantly stores examples, either as a prototype (typical example) or as an individual example (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, pp. 47 and 21). In science, the term “exemplar-based representation” is used for this (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 22). It is thus obvious that the description of an example serves as a door opener for persuasion: “Examples are door openers of persuasion” (Shell and Moussa 2008, p. 181). The transition to the story or to the description of images is fluid, because an example can of course also be told as a story and can also be optimized with images. In particular, you can use a story you have experienced yourself as an example: “This clause is so important to me because I have experienced myself what can happen if you agree otherwise: …”.

5.4.2 Deployment Prepare good examples in relation to your positions with which you can clarify why the position is important from your point of view. Before the negotiation, discuss in the team (i.e. also with the Decision Maker who first develops the mission and then controls it) with regard to all positions not only the arguments but also the respective typical individual

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cases. Also think about expected counterexamples of your partner and consider how to refute them if necessary. Remember that positions only become truly understandable through an example. So always be prepared for the following classic question from your partner: “Can you give me an example”? Example 1 A frequent point of contention in contract negotiations of all kinds is the question of whether the state courts should have jurisdiction in the event of conflicts or whether an arbitral tribunal should be constituted. I prefer arbitration courts and always justify this view with the following example: If we were to have a real dispute and as a result would have to go to court, then in a state court we may find that the judges cannot judge our case at all because they lack the specific expertise. Whereas if we go to arbitration, you have the ability to appoint one of the three arbitrators, for example. So you can designate someone you personally trust and value for their expertise. We would do the same. This always ensures that at least two of the three arbitrators have tremendous expertise. The arbitrators we each choose will then jointly agree on a third judge, namely the presiding judge. In addition, the arbitration court does not meet in public. If, for example, topics are to be discussed that are not intended for the public (for example, the purchase price), then the arbitration court is the right court for this. In my opinion, this example shows that an arbitral tribunal is superior to a state court.

If the objection then follows that it is very unlikely that the state court has no expertise, I reply, among other things, with the following example: “I have already experienced it myself that the judge of a higher regional court who had to adjudicate on a dispute about a contract had previously worked for years as a public prosecutor. I have also seen it happen that a judge at a regional court who had to decide on the clauses of a loan agreement of a major bank had previously worked for years as a judge in rental disputes.” In almost all negotiations in which we discussed the “right court”, I have so far been able to convince with these examples. Example 2 Banks typically use clauses in their contracts that are based on their own “satisfaction”. Banks are thus the only negotiating partners I have met in my entire professional life who try to make the fulfilment of their own contractual obligations dependent on subjective feelings (namely their own satisfaction), without using objective standards. Banks formulate, for example: “The loan amount will only be disbursed if the borrower has fulfilled all disbursement requirements according to Annex 5 to the satisfaction of the bank on the date of the agreed disbursement.” Annex 5 then contains, for example, several pages of various disbursement requirements (submission of confirmations of all kinds, current excerpts from the commercial register, liquidity plans, etc.).

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In such a case, as the borrower’s legal representative, I always explain that with such a clause, for example, the bank employee who must verify the existence of all the disbursement requirements can simply state: “I am not satisfied with the proof of the disbursement requirements.” I then add: “With this simple statement (“I am not satisfied”), which the borrower cannot refute, your bank can refuse to disburse without my client being able to do anything about it. For example, if an employment contract stated that the employer had to pay the salary at the end of the month only if he was satisfied with the employee’s work, many wages would not be paid.” This typical isolated case is dismissed in negotiations by bank representatives by saying that, after all, such a thing would never happen and that this is not how “satisfaction” is to be understood. Then I continue with further examples: You can rightly argue on the day of the agreed disbursement that you are not satisfied with the liquidity planning for the next 12 months and refuse the disbursement. You can argue that you are not satisfied with the commercial register extract from a certain state (e.g. Bahamas) etc. etc. I then lay the multi-page attachment of payout requirements in front of me and calmly begin to form an individual example for each payout requirement in which the bank might be dissatisfied for good reason. In all cases, I am then interrupted after some time: “Ok, we understand what you mean, but how do we want to solve this?” My answer is always the same: let us, on the one hand, settle as many points as possible before signing and, on the other hand, with regard to the points that have not been settled, let us clarify which objective criteria must be met after signing. My success rate in this type of negotiation is exactly 100% due to the use of very many examples. With the purely factual-logical argument (“that puts us at a disadvantage, because it depends solely on your assessment”), on the other hand, I have not been successful in any case. Consider Your Partner’s Examples as Valuable Information  You should pay particular attention to examples given by your partner. These give you a very good opportunity to understand the situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, OverconfidenceCheck) (see Sect. 2.4.3) and in particular the emotional and rational world of your partner.

Use Multiplier Effects  Always consider the use of multiplier effects (see Sect. 5.2.2). • Primacy effect: Give the example that you think is most persuasive first. This is how you use the primacy effect, which says that when people are given a list of things, they are good at remembering the ones that are mentioned first. • Recency effect: At the end of your presentation, repeat the example that you consider to be the most persuasive. In this way, you also make use of the recency effect, which states that people remember well those things that are mentioned at the end of a list. • Mere Exposure Effect: Repeat the type of influence (example here) moderately over and over again. In this way, you use the Mere Exposure Effect, which states that when

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people are repeatedly exposed to the same “stimulus”, they can automatically develop a more positive attitude towards it. • Contrast effect: Use the contrast effect, paint “black and white”. The contrast effect states that our evaluations are always relative, based on a comparison with a reference point (higher or lower price, smaller car, worse housing location, etc., etc.). For example, in example No- 1 above, state, “Do you want the purchase price you received to be talked about publicly in a state court and read about in the local press? Or would you rather no one know what purchase price you received despite a court proceeding?” Remember, “Comparison creates clarity” (Pink 2012, p. 134).

5.4.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

So if you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the impact of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find an example of wording at the end of this section. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you.

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Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. So here is the example. Defend: First, realize that each example will initially influence you. Now formulate your defense statement and write it down. On the one hand, explain why your partner’s example does not fit the specific situation you are in together. On the other hand, look for counter-examples that support your positions. Your defense statement might be, for example: Your example is very good. However, I am not quite sure whether it fits our concrete situation. I see the following differences between our concrete situation and the situation underlying your example. … In my opinion, the following example fits our common situation better: ….

If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.4.4 Summary How to use  In the negotiation, you can use an example to explain to your partner, on the basis of a typical individual case, why you hold a certain position, or how this position affects a specific situation. Use many examples and thus use the example as a door opener for persuading your negotiating partner (“Examples are door openers of persuasion”; Shell and Moussa 2008, p. 181). Defense  Refuse examples from your partner by explaining why the example does not fit and give counter-examples. 

5.4.5 Basics As mentioned above, the structure of our knowledge is based, among other things, on socalled categories, which are represented by typical examples (prototypes) or individual examples. Our brain is thus very receptive to examples: “In order to categorize, we can draw on both abstract information such as prototypes and concrete examples” (Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 22). Very professionally acting lawyers focus on the best possible accuracy in their examples, because they later have to formulate the contract accordingly. Every word then counts. Therefore, negotiations conducted in the presence of lawyers are typically characterized by the exchange of very concrete examples.

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5.5 Pictures Pictures are quick shots into the brain (Werner Kroeber-Riel/Franz-Rudolf Esch).

5.5.1 Definition Images are processed differently than speech. When you perceive images (cf. Fig. 5.6), you can store so many details in a period of 1.5 s to 2.5 s that you can even recognize an image of medium complexity later. Images therefore have a very rapid effect on the brain. They are stored practically automatically and also with less mental effort than pure voice messages. This is convenient for the brain. Moreover, the brain processes images without sufficient analytical control. Images (e.g., attractive woman next to a luxury car) trigger associations or associations of thoughts “without these associations being mentally controlled and checked according to the analytical laws of language logic” (Kroeber-Riel and Esch 2015, p. 239). It is precisely this lack of analytical control that makes images more easily persuasive than words and thus a good means of influence. This also applies to images that are transported with words, such as “it is important to stay in the driver seat”, “we have to build bridges”, “we are on the home stretch”, “we are all in the same boat”, “please look at the points through our glasses for a moment”, etc. Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, examples, pictures) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, examples, pictures) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, examples, pictures) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.6  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Pictures. (Source: Own representation)

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Images are thus quick, convenient, and persuasive, or in other words, “images are quick shots to the brain” (Kroeber-Riel and Esch 2015, p. 239).

5.5.2 Deployment When preparing the relevant arguments, you should also prepare suitable images. This effort will be rewarded in the negotiation, because every image that you describe with words (e.g. “we are all in the same boat”) works quickly (1.5 to 2.5 s), is processed comfortably, i.e. automatically, and bypasses your partner’s analytical control, i.e. it is initially convincing. Example

In the case of company takeovers, there is an intensive discussion in every negotiation about which guarantee declarations a seller has to make. When I started these negotiations about 20 years ago, I was very often active as the buyer’s lawyer. In doing so, I worked with a sample contract which, on the one hand, stated the purchase price (in the millions) on one page of the contract and, on the other hand, contained the warranty declarations which described the essential characteristics of the company to be purchased on about 20 pages. I quickly realized how difficult it is to explain to sellers with arguments why the buyer needs so many warranty statements. The reactance or defensive attitude of the sellers was usually enormous, although it is factually and logically completely clear that a buyer wants to know what he is transferring the purchase price of millions for. Nevertheless: with factual-logical arguments I often got nowhere. I then came up with the following images, with which I still work successfully today: First, I designate the one page with the purchase price as “Part B” in the contract text. The 20 or so pages concerning the guarantee declarations and the legal consequences in the event that a guarantee declaration is incorrect, I give the heading “Part C” in the contract text. This way I have a short term for both the one page and the 20 pages. When, during the negotiations, discussions started about why so many guarantees had to be given, that this was “completely excessive” or a “script for a horror film” (also a very good image), I got up and moved to the flipchart. There I drew a scale. On the left scale pan was “Part B”, i.e. the purchase price in millions. On the right-hand side of the scale was “Part C”, i.e. the text concerning the guarantee declarations. Then I explained: “Part B” (i.e. the purchase price you receive) must always be in balance with “Part C”, i.e. the condition description of your company. The buyer pays the purchase price on the left-hand scale only if you make the declarations according to the right-hand scale. The warranties ensure that the buyer gets what they pay for, so the left and right scales balance each other out. I have now used another image: On the right-hand scale, we’re actually just going into the glove compartment of your car and looking at the owner’s manual. There you can see how much horsepower your car has, what the transmission is like, what lights your car has, etc. That’s what the warranty statements correspond to.

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With these two pictures (scales and operating instructions) I have so far in all cases been able to overcome the originally existing resistance to extensive guarantees. ◄ In all other negotiations, too, I spend a lot of time in the run-up to the negotiations in the team developing good images that support our (rational) chain of arguments with which we always enter. Thus, in addition to argument, I use a weapon that is fast (1.5 to 2.5 s recording time), convenient (processing in the brain is automatic without effort), and persuasive (analytical control is bypassed). Use Multiplier Effects  Always consider the use of multiplier effects (see Sect. 5.2.2): • Primacy effect: Name the image that you think is most persuasive first. This is how you use the primacy effect, which says that when people are given a list of things, they are good at remembering the ones that are mentioned first. • Recency effect: At the end of your presentation, repeat the image that you consider to be the most persuasive. In this way, you also use the recency effect, which says that people remember well the things that are mentioned at the end of a list. • Mere Exposure Effect: Repeat the type of influence (image here) in moderation over and over again, thus taking advantage of the Mere Exposure Effect, which states that when people are repeatedly exposed to the same “stimulus”, they can automatically develop a more positive attitude towards it. • Contrast effect: Use the contrast effect, paint “black and white”. The contrast effect states that our evaluations are always relative, based on a comparison with a reference point (higher or lower price, smaller car, worse housing location, etc., etc.). For example, in the above example, I state, “If the scales are balanced, we can buy, but if the scales are not heavy enough with the warranty statements, the contract is not balanced, we cannot buy then.” Remember, “Comparison creates clarity” (Pink 2012, p. 134).

5.5.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

This means: If you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a

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real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find a wording example at the end of this paragraph. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. So here is the picture. Defend: Be aware that the images have already left their mark on your Intuitive System I and are influencing you accordingly. Now formulate your defense statement and write down this statement. First, transform the core statement of your partner’s respective picture into language, and then check this text analytically. Then refute the respective core statement. Also, look for images that support your positions. Your defense statement might be, for example: I like your picture very much. However, I am not quite sure whether the core statement fits our concrete situation. I see the following differences between our concrete situation and the facts on which your picture is based. … In my opinion, the following picture fits our common situation better: ….

If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant. In the case mentioned above, where I was told that my contract was “the script of a horror film”, I asked very politely and respectfully what exactly the “horror” was. We then went through the individual comments one by one using Active Listening80 (see Sect. 3.8.1). In essence, I refuted my partner’s concerns with concrete examples (cf. Sect. 5.4). Finally, I replied: “If we formulate all this correctly together, we will write the screenplay for our own success story”.

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5.5.4 Summary How to use  Use as many images as possible to present your positions convincingly. Remember: “Pictures are quick shots to the brain” (Kroeber-Riel and Esch 2015, p. 239). Images work quickly (1.5 to 2.5 s), are processed comfortably, namely automatically, and bypass the control of your partner through the Analytical System II. This makes them convincing at first. Defense  Deflect the persuasiveness of the particular image your partner uses (“Your contract is the script for the horror film”) by translating the respective core statement into language and then reviewing this text analytically (“What is the horror in concrete terms?”). Develop an image that clearly expresses your point of view (“Together we write the script for our own success story”).

5.5.5 Basics In advertising, images are “the most effective technique to help advertising succeed” (Kroeber-Riel and Esch 2015, p.  238). Images are, after all, quick, convenient and persuasive: When you perceive images, you can store so many details in a period of 1.5 s to 2.5 s that you can later recognize an image of medium complexity. The image offers “vividness at first glance and comprehension at second glance” (Kroeber-Riel and Esch 2015, p. 315).

Images are stored in the brain practically automatically and with less mental effort than is the case with voice messages. Our memory processes emotional stimuli or factual information in three steps: First, we perceive an external image, e.g. the image motif of an advertisement; during the reception of the stimulus, our brain transforms this external image into an internal image that we perceive with our “inner eye”, the perceptual image is created; finally, our brain creates a memory image, i.e. the image that we perceive when the stimulus is no longer present, i.e. we no longer see the image motif of the advertisement (cf. Kroeber-Riel and Esch 2015, p. 390). Emotional impressions are also stored in the process, one also speaks of “stored feelings” (cf. Kroeber-Riel and Esch 2015, p. 391). In addition, images are less conscious and are remembered much better than spoken communication (Kroeber-Riel and Esch 2015, pp. 213 and 242). A text, on the other hand, has to be understood word by word. With the text or language you can argue rationally (see above Sect. 5.3), with an image you can “impress emotionally” (Kroeber-Riel and Esch 2015, p.  236). Therefore, advertising uses the image to address the feelings and needs of the consumer; the text, on the other hand, provides the information on how to satisfy the feelings and needs (cf. Kroeber-Riel and Esch 2015, p. 237).

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5.6 Story Stories are efficient carriers of meaning (Christian Scheier/Dirk Held).

5.6.1 Definition The story is an independent means of communication alongside language or text (cf. Scheier and Held 2012, p. 76 ff.; cf. Fig. 5.7). The purpose of storytelling is for the negotiator to explicitly communicate the positions he or she is taking and/or to communicate hidden (implicit) messages (e.g. a warning). The communication medium “story” should present the messages in a simple and vivid way without triggering any resistance (reactance). The explicit and implicit messages should convince the negotiating partner and thus bring about a change in his attitude or behavior on level 7 of the BMI stairway according to Sect. 3.8.7 (Compliance/NonCompliance). Both messages have an immediate effect on Intuitive System I (cf. Scheier and Held 2012, p.  83), which practically searches for structured and coherent stories without questioning the quality and quantity of the facts underlying the story (cf. Kahneman 2013, p.  264). This is especially efficient because stories activate the so-called mirror neurons of your negotiator and thus he automatically experiences and emotionally Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.7  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Story. (Source: Own representation)

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empathizes with the story (cf. Scheier and Held 2012, p. 79). The story can thus more easily lead to persuasion, bypassing the Analytical System II. Stories that have been personally experienced have a particularly convincing effect.

5.6.2 Deployment Before each negotiation, think about which positions are likely to lead to intense discussions. Then consider which structured story you want to use to explicitly express your core message and which “hidden” messages you want to convey. Example Explicit Message  For example, I know that in every M&A negotiation I have to discuss various clauses that are disadvantageous to my client. I then start with arguments on each of these clauses and listen to the counter-arguments. Sometimes I succeed in negotiating a clause away with reasonable arguments. If this does not help, in almost 100% of all cases I convince my negotiating partner to remove the clause by telling a structured story, which I have also personally experienced in each case and which always begins as follows: “In the course of an arbitration which I conducted myself, all three judges told me that this clause was ambiguous or incomprehensible. This came as a great shock to me, especially as I did not even notice the ambiguity at the time. Now that this clause has failed the practical test, I do not want to use it again. I would not feel comfortable with such a clause that even experts cannot interpret. Let us please find a solution that is practical”. After that, we usually find a clause that both sides are happy with. Example Implicit Message  In the liability cases I have handled for buyers as an attorney in my professional life, I never threaten the seller with criminal charges. I only warn against it in the form of a true story: For example, when talking to the seller, I intersperse the following story: “My client’s interest is only in being held harmless economically. He is not interested in reporting the facts to the public prosecutor’s office. However, a few years ago, in my capacity as a lawyer, I had to report a similar liability case at my client’s shareholders’ meeting. I was then asked whether I had filed a criminal complaint. I answered in the negative, because such a charge cannot be reversed and my client really only wants financial compensation. Then I was asked if a financial settlement was imminent. I had to answer in the negative. Thereupon the shareholders’ meeting decided: Initiate arbitration proceedings and file criminal charges with the public prosecutor’s office”. This story shows my negotiating partner very clearly how great the risk is that I will have to initiate criminal proceedings on the basis of “higher authority” (cf. Sect. 5.8), e.g. in the form of a shareholders’ meeting, if we do not reach an out-of-court settlement quickly. In one case, the opposing lawyer even called me after the out-of-court settlement and expressly thanked me for my “particularly prudent approach”. He had understood the implicit message perfectly and worked towards a quick settlement with which both sides were satisfied.

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5.6.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

So if you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the impact of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find a formulation example at the end of this paragraph. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. Here then is the story. Defend: Be aware that the story has already left its mark on your Intuitive System I and is influencing you accordingly. First, turn the core message of your partner’s story into language, then review this text analytically. Then refute the core message. Also, look for a story that supports your positions. Now formulate your defense statement and write down this statement. Your defense statement might be, for example: Your story sounds very good. However, I am not quite sure if it fits our specific situation. Here’s what I see as the differences between our specific situation and the facts underlying your story. … In my opinion, the following story fits our situation better: ….

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If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant. For example, in the arbitration example above, I would respond, “I sympathize with your story and your disappointment with the arbitration. It may be that the judges were not engaged enough to interpret the clause correctly. I’m not worried that it would work out differently in our case” (rebuttal to the core statement that the clause is not practical). I would then continue, “I have also conducted or assisted in a number of arbitrations, I have only dealt with very dedicated judges who were able to resolve all issues and proposed a mutually acceptable settlement to us” (new story supporting my point).

5.6.4 Summary How to use  Before each negotiation, think about which positions are likely to lead to intense discussions. Then consider which structured story you want to use to explicitly express your core message and which hidden messages you want to convey. The communication medium “story” should present the explicit messages simply and vividly and the implicit messages unobtrusively so as not to trigger any resistance (reactance). The story acts on the Intuitive System I, which searches for structured and coherent stories without questioning the quality and quantity of the facts (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 264). In addition, the story activates the so-called mirror neurons of your negotiation partner. This means that he automatically experiences the story and feels emotionally involved (cf. Scheier and Held 2012, p. 79). Defense  Fight back against the story by analyzing and refuting the core message, as you would with a picture. In addition, you should tell a new story that supports your point of view.

5.6.5 Basics People love stories because they have always been an important means of communication (in addition to purely linguistically conveyed information). This is due to the fact that the brain has a so-called “episodic memory”, the task of which is to store stories (cf. Scheier and Held 2012, p. 78 ff.). This episodic memory is strongly linked to emotions and is “the most highly developed memory system in humans” (Scheier and Held 2012, p. 80). It organizes stories especially in terms of patterns or temporal structure (cf. Fuchs, Storytelling: What brain-friendly marketing stories look like, in Häusel 2012, p. 137 ff.).

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Stories have the task of “transmitting meanings and cultural knowledge in coded form, i.e. implicitly, from generation to generation. This is how fairy tales and myths have been transmitted from generation to generation” (Scheier and Held 2012, p. 79). Stories can trigger strong emotions and move us, even to changes of opinion and/or behavior. Stories are so efficient because the so-called mirror neurons mean that the person hearing the story has to experience it themselves in order to understand it (cf. Scheier and Held 2012, p. 79). Mirror neurons are “capable of generating in us those states that we perceive in other persons: We experience what others feel in the form of a spontaneous inner simulation” (Scheier and Held 2012, p. 49).

5.7 Social Proof … an action is more correct if others are doing it (Robert B. Cialdini).

The weapons of influence in series 3 are based on the following social psychological findings: When people are uncertain, they like to orient themselves to the majority with regard to their own decision (social probity; Fig. 5.8). They follow the advice of authorities and orient themselves to what they personally perceive as fair (fairness). Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.8  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Social Proof. (Source: Own representation)

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5.7.1 Definition The principle of Social Proof can be summed up by the rule of thumb “What everyone does is good/correct” (Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 287). The mere fact that many people do something leads us to believe that this behavior is right precisely because of this (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 117). The principle of Social Proof works especially when we are uncertain how to decide and when the members of the group whose opinion we want to follow are similar to us (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 140). A frightening example from reality is the so-called “Pluralistic Ignorance”: Again and again it is reported in the press that people who are victims of an attack are not helped, although a lot of fellow human beings observe this attack. The effect can be explained as follows: Fellow human beings observe each other and see that no one helps. From this they draw the conclusion that it is not necessary to help the victim and refrain from any help. A situation exists “in which each person decides that since nobody is concerned, nothing is wrong” (Cialdini 2007, p. 133). The background is therefore the conviction that the majority must be right: “an action is more correct if others are doing it” (Cialdini 2007, p. 117). In this context, the case of “Kitty Genovese” was the starting point for research into the question of why, as the number of people increases, the willingness to help decreases. In March 1964 in New York, a young woman in her late 20s named Kitty Genovese was raped by a perpetrator for over half an hour and then murdered. 38 people simply witnessed this gruesome act standing at a window from her apartment. It was only half an hour after the death of the young woman that someone called the police (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 129 f.). In daily life, the principle of Social Proof (“what everyone does is good/correct”) is constantly used to influence our behavior. For example, bowls for tipping (e.g. in the toilet area in a restaurant) are stocked with appropriate coins beforehand so that visitors remember that it is “socially customary” to give 50 cents, for example. Advertisements and web portals tell us that certain products are the “best selling” product. Some stores deliberately allow only a certain number of people into the store so that a long queue forms outside the entrance. It then shows all passers-by: many people want to buy here, so the products must be good. In other words: It is not arguments or details about the benefits of the product that are supposed to convince us, but only the indication that many other people have already bought or want to buy the product (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 117).

5.7.2 Deployment The use in the negotiation is relatively simple: Refer again and again to the fact that the positions you represent correspond to the market standard. Classic formulations in relation to the weapon “Social Proof” are, for example:

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• “that’s the way we do it”, • “this is in line with the standard in our industry”, • “I don’t know any different and it’s a best practice”. Those who have mastered the weapons of influence will therefore in particular point to an (alleged) standard as often as possible.

5.7.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

So if you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find an example of wording at the end of this section. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. So here is the reference to the (alleged) standard.

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Defend: Realize that the reference to the standard has already left its mark in your Intuitive System I and has influenced you accordingly. For you believe that the positions of your partner are acceptable because they (supposedly) correspond to the standard. Question (if possible) the standard as such. State that there is no situation here in which the claimed standard is applicable. Now formulate your defense statement and write down this statement. Your defense statement might be, for example: • Denial of the standard: “I only know this standard in relation to the xy industry. In our industry, on the other hand, this standard does not exist” or “it may be that you perceive this as a standard, my personal experience is that there is no such standard at all, rather each case is agreed differently”. • Inapplicability of the standard: “Thank you for your reference to the standard. I am not quite sure whether the standard, which applies to “standard cases”, will help us in our “special case”. I would like to think with you about how we want to handle the special case at hand.” You can also ask the following question: “How would we both settle this if the standard just mentioned did not exist?” In a flash you are in a completely new discussion that distracts from the standard and opens the door to the individual solution for the individual case. • Conflicting standards: “Your standard is interesting, our standard is exactly the opposite. Let’s consider how we would resolve our issue if these two standards did not exist.” If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.7.4 Summary How to use  Always refer to the fact that the positions you represent are in line with the market standard. Classic formulations in relation to the weapon “Social Prooof” are, for example: • “that’s the way we do it”, • “this is in line with the standard in our industry”, • “I don’t know any different and it’s a best practice”. Use the social psychological insight that the mere fact that many people are doing something leads your negotiating partner to believe that this behavior is therefore correct (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 117). It is true: “an action is more correct if others are doing it” (Cialdini 2007, p. 117).

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Defense  Dispute (if possible) the standard (“my personal experience is that there is no such standard at all, rather each case is agreed differently”). Justify the inapplicability of the standard. Make it clear that the standard does not help here because a special situation exists and then ask: “How do we want to solve this special case together?”

5.7.5 Basics The mode of action of the principle of Social Proof is based on the human need to make correct decisions or to behave correctly. In the case of uncertainty, people evaluate the behavior of other people as information about reality and thus as an orientation for “correct” behavior (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 285 ff.). The behavior of others is also proof that this can be implemented in reality. In his recent work Pre-Suasion, Cialdini describes an experiment whose result surprised himself. He found that the principle of Social Proof influences people’s behavior more strongly than the pursuit of one’s own economic advantage (cf. Cialdini 2016, p. 163). Cialdini explains this by saying that one’s own economic advantage, which is held out as possible, is just possible. The observable behavior of others, on the other hand, is obviously realizable. The experiment was designed to get different households to save energy. The Cialdini team asked four different groups to reduce their energy consumption every week for a month. For groups 1 to 3, the Cialdini staff referred to benefits (“you will save a lot of money by reducing energy consumption”) or social responsibility (“it is in line with social responsibility to save energy”). To the fourth group, on the other hand, they only said: “Most residents in your area reduce their energy consumption”. So here the principle of Social Proof (“What everyone does is good/correct”) was applied. At the end of the month, the research team evaluated the energy consumption. The result: The fourth group, which was motivated only by the principle of Social Proof, had saved about 3.5 times as much energy as the other three groups. Cialdini and his team were also very surprised to find that their own economic advantage did not motivate a change in behavior as strongly as Social Proof. Cialdini explains the result of the experiment with “Feasibility”. If one knows that others do the same, one knows that the behavior is feasible. There is no doubt whether one can really achieve something with the recommended behavior: “The great rigor of sociallyproof information is that it destroys the problem of uncertain achievability” (Cialdini 2016, p. 163).

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5.8 Authority … subordinates stop thinking … and start reacting (Robert Cialdini).

5.8.1 Definition Authority (Latin auctoritas, prestige, dignity) describes the state of superiority of a person, a group or an institution. Humans by nature have a deep-seated sense of duty towards authority (Cialdini 2007 p. 213; cf. Fig. 5.9). From birth we are trained that obedience to genuine authority is right and disobedience is wrong (cf. Cialdini 2007 p. 216). In short, people tend to acknowledge authorities and consequently to submit to their instructions. Authority leads to a relationship of superiority/subordination, which gives the superior (i.e. the authority) the power to impose its will. Loyalty, trust and obedience to the bearer of authority follow from this. Authority is typically based on three aspects (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 313), which can overlap: • Authority can be based on a formal status within a hierarchy and is thus given on the basis of a certain position or office and thus at the same time independent of personal characteristics;

Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.9  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Authority. (Source: Own representation)

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• Authority can also be based on expertise; expertise, in turn, results from personal characteristics such as performance, age, experience, knowledge, intelligence, and so on; • Authority can also be based on mere symbols, namely the so-called “status symbols”, which can indicate formal status and/or expertise. Status symbols are, for example, titles (titles of nobility, “Prof.”, “Dr.” “Director”, etc.) expensive cars, elegant clothes, expensive watches, etc. Authority based on a formal status we know in every organization with its hierarchy levels, without which we would live in chaos. We also know it from institutions like the police. Authority based on expertise we feel as a welcome aid to decision making. Authority, no matter what it is based on, leads to blind obedience in our Intuitive System I. As soon as a recognized authority gives us an order, we stop thinking and follow the order: “… once a legitimate authority has given an order, subordinates stop thinking in the situation and start reacting” (Cialdini 2007, p. 219). In short, we react without thinking. This is precisely what makes the weapon of authority so effective. This effect has now also been demonstrated by modern experiments using a brain scanner. In one experiment, scientists measured brain activity in subjects after they were asked to make a complex economic decision in which they had to choose one of two given possible solutions. In variant 1, the subjects were left to their own devices and had to independently consider whether to choose the first or second possible solution. The brains of these subjects showed the expected activity in the corresponding areas. In variant 2, a control group received the advice of a university professor, i.e. an expert, regarding the correct solution. The subjects followed this advice and the brains showed no activity in the corresponding areas (cf. Cialdini 2016, p. 164). The expert’s advice thus prevented thinking. This automatism can also be studied in the field of medicine. If the doctor has issued a prescription, this is usually not doubted by other parties involved (patient, nurse, pharmacist, other doctors). For example, Cialdini describes an amusing case: an ear doctor prescribed ear plugs for a patient’s right ear. On the prescription, he omitted the full phrase (“Place in right ear”) and wrote only (abbreviated), “Place in R ear.” The dutiful nurse read “Place in Rear” on the prescription and rectally inserts the earplugs into the patient. Although rectal insertion of ear plugs obviously makes no sense, neither the patient nor the nurse questioned the prescription of the authority “physician.” This story is classic evidence of influence by authority: we react without thinking.

5.8.2 Deployment As a negotiator, invoke the formal status of your Decision Maker. Emphasize that he has prescribed the positions you present at the negotiating table. Emphasize the authority or decision-making power of the Decision Maker. This works because people can be influenced by authority. This tactic of referring to a “higher authority” who has the authority to decide something is also called the “Higher Authority Gambit” (cf. Dawson

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333

1999, p. 64 ff.). For example, a professional car salesman will say to a customer who asks for a discount that is too high: “Oh, that’s difficult, I’ll have to ask my boss about that; I’ll do that now and come right back”. Our intuition then typically makes us “cave in” quickly after the car salesman returns from the boss, because if the boss doesn’t reduce the price further. In particularly important negotiations, there should also be an Ultimate Decision Maker above your Decision Maker, who must first meet to agree to the Decision Maker’s instructions. This prevents you from being forced to seek approval from within the negotiation. You cannot simply call a committee (see Sect. 2.1.1). In addition, as a negotiator, refer to experts and use the authority that comes from their advice (“Our tax advisor is an expert in this field, he strongly recommended that I …”; “Our lawyers advise me to definitely …”). Consciously use status symbols by showing through clothing (e.g. suit and tie, depending on the industry), watch, shoes, etc. that you are competent and that people should follow your suggestions/positions. Don’t overdo it or you may come across as untrustworthy. A doctor has it very easy, he only has to put on a white coat and he already symbolizes authority and not seldom experiences corresponding compliance with his patients.

5.8.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

This means: If you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. An example of wording can be found at the end of this paragraph. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction.

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• Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, do not make any spontaneous decisions unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening. If it is not a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. So here the appeal to an authority, i.e. a “Higher Authority” and/or an expert and/or the presentation of status symbols. Defend: Realize that the appeal to authority has already left its mark on your Intuitive System I and influenced you accordingly. Proceed as follows: • If your partner refers to a Decision Maker (i.e. an authority that is not present), then you should try to negotiate directly with this Decision Maker. Try to convince your partner that a solution will be found more quickly if the authority is present, i.e. sitting at the table. However, please never let references to the “Higher Authority”, i.e. the boss, lightly persuade you to agree to a position that you do not want to agree to. • If your partner refers to an expert whose advice should (also) convince you, there are five things in particular to keep in mind: • Clarify whether the expert has sufficient expertise to assess the relevant positions; • Clarify whether the expert knows the relevant facts in sufficient detail to be able to assess the relevant positions? • Clarify whether the expert’s conclusions are plausible; • Always call in an expert you trust and critically review his opinion: does he have sufficient expertise, does he know the relevant facts, are his statements plausible? • If necessary, call in a second expert. In any case, never blindly trust the expert that your partner hires and pays. • If your partner cleverly presents status symbols, the defense is even easier. Ask yourself if a title, an expensive car, and/or an expensive suit and/or a competent appearance are really signs of authority or expertise. The answer is clearly “no.” Now formulate your defense statement and write down this statement. Your defense statement might be, for example: • If your partner refers to a Decision Maker (i.e. an authority that is not present), you can e.g. formulate: “Your boss has given you his order without knowing the concrete negotiation situation. If he were sitting here at the table, he might take a different position. Why don’t you bring him along next time?” If you do not have the opportunity to speak to the Decision Maker, you need to encourage an appropriate number of time-outs so that your immediate negotiating partner has the opportunity to confer with his Decision Maker often enough: “Let’s take a break so that you have enough time to confer with your boss.”

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335

• If your partner refers to an expert, you can formulate: “I don’t know the expert you mentioned. Of course, I do not question the competence. However, I must do certain due diligence. Please give me some time so that I can inform myself accordingly”. In addition, you can formulate: “In order to be able to assess your expert’s statement, I would need to know what facts he based his statement on and how he specifically justifies the result. Could I speak with him, or do you have a written opinion?” If necessary, you can also formulate: “I cannot judge this topic at all. I would like to consult my own expert (e.g. tax advisor) on this. It might even be easiest if the experts shortcircuit each other.” If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.8.4 Summary How to use    As a negotiator, invoke the formal status of your Decision Maker. Emphasize that he has prescribed the positions you present at the negotiating table. Emphasize that you have no decision-making authority of your own. Point out that your Decision Maker must also have his instructions approved by a committee (if this is true, of course). • As a negotiator, refer to experts and thus use the authority that comes from their advice (“My lawyers advise me to …”). • Use status symbols. Pay attention to your appearance, which signals competence (especially clothing).

Defense    Ask for the partner’s Decision Maker to participate in the negotiation so that you can reach solutions quickly; if necessary, encourage many time-outs so that your negotiating partner can coordinate with his Decision Maker. • Clarify the competence of the expert on whom your partner relies, clarify whether the expert has based his opinion on all the relevant facts, clarify whether the expert’s conclusions are plausible, involve an expert yourself if necessary. • Ignore status symbols, they have no meaning.

5.8.5 Basics Prof. Stanley Milgram conducted a series of very revealing experiments in 1963 to study obedience to authority, which yielded shocking results. The subjects were told that the experiment was to explore whether punishment led to better learning performance. It was explained to each participant that all subjects would be divided into two groups, teachers and students. In reality, the students were actors. The students sat in a different

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room from the teachers and were wired in such a way that they could supposedly receive electric shocks from the teacher as punishment for solving an assignment incorrectly. In short, the teacher believed he could punish the student with electric shocks; however, the student was an actor who was only pretending to feel electric shocks. The teachers started (according to their opinion) with light shocks (15 V). After that the (fictitious) volt strength was continuously increased up to 450 V (lethal shock). When the students (actors) were writhing in pain, screaming and asking to stop the experiment, many teachers wanted to stop the experiment. However, most continued because the experimenter in the white coat (authority) instructed them, on the one hand, to continue asking questions and, on the other hand, to continue continuously increasing the (fictitious) volt strength. Internally, the following rule applied: The experimenter had to ask the teacher to continue the experiment a total of four times if the teacher did not want to administer any more electric shocks. If the teacher still did not want to continue, the experiment was to be terminated. The result, which was more than shocking for Milgram and his team, was that more than 60% of the test subjects were prepared to administer lethal electric shocks of 450 V because of the instruction of the experiment leader (authority), and this only because the leader as authority said sentences like • • • •

“Please continue”, “The experiment requires you to continue”, “It is absolutely necessary that you continue” and “You have no choice, you must continue”.

Milgram and his team had asked psychiatrists before the start of the experiment to estimate how many test participants would be willing to administer lethal electric shocks. The estimate of these experts was: about 0.2% of the test participants. So even these experts were very surprised at the result. Milgram also conducted the experiment in other cultures and countries, and the results were always similar (Fischer et al. 2014, p. 144 ff.).

5.9 Fairness Ask “What makes that fair?” (William Ury).

5.9.1 Definition Fairness (cf. Fig. 5.10) is synonymous with an attitude that is subjectively perceived as just and honest. According to utilitarian ethics, it is unfair to enjoy benefits to which one is not entitled. The human need for fairness has been demonstrated, for example, in the Ultimatum Game, which is very well known in social psychology: Partner 1 receives 100 EUR from the game leader. Partner 1 is to share this money with another participant (Partner 2). Partner 1 may only make one offer to partner 2, in which

5.9 Fairness

337 Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.10  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Fairness. (Source: Own representation)

he explains how he would like to divide the 100 EUR between the two partners. Partner 2, in turn, may only answer “Yes” or “No”. If he answers “Yes”, the division will be exactly as suggested by partner 1. If partner 2 answers “no”, no one receives any of the 100 EUR, which are instead confiscated by the game leader. From a purely economic point of view, the division 99 EUR for partner 1 and 1 EUR for partner 2 would be attractive for partner 2. This is because he would receive something that he otherwise would not have received. However, the “typical Partner 2” rejects offers below 20 EUR; many reject offers below 30 EUR and some even reject offers below 40 EUR (cf. Nasher 2013, p. 169). This behavior is not rational. Rather, it demonstrates the subjective need to punish others with a “no” for their behavior, which is perceived as unfair (cf. Shell 2006, p. 62).

5.9.2 Deployment In accordance with the outstanding importance, the aspect of fairness should always be observed. For one thing, you can always emphasize that you are looking for a solution that is perceived as fair by all sides. In very difficult situations, Ury’s recommended question in particular can turn things around significantly. Ask your negotiating partner, when they insist on positions you oppose, “Why is that fair?” (Ury 2007, p. 85) and then keep quiet (tactical silence according to Sect. 3.8.1). In this way, you will make your negotiating partner reconsider his own demands and use fairness as a yardstick.

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I myself have been able to achieve a significant change in thinking and acting with this question several times and use the new dynamics of the conversation as a basis for creative solutions. Either you find a common standard for what is fair, or you both admit to yourselves that you interpret the concept of fairness differently. In this case, the weapon of fairness will not help you.

5.9.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

This means: If you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find an example of wording at the end of this section. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, if you do not have enough distance from what is happening, you should not decide spontaneously under any circumstances. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. Here, then, is the “F-bomb,” as Chris Voss calls it (Voss and Raz 2016, p. 124).

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Defend: Realize that the demand for fairness has already left its mark on your Intuitive System I and has influenced you accordingly. Do not start justifying yourself, ask why your partner considers your positions “unfair”. Chris Voss recommends, for example, the following response: “It seems like you’re about to explain to me why you think I’m treating you unfairly” (Voss and Raz 2016, p. 125). Now formulate your defense statement and write down this statement. Your defense statement might be, for example: Fairness is a very good keyword. Please explain to me to what extent you find my position unfair.

Then wait for the answer and only then set out your standards of fairness. If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.9.4 Summary How to use  Always emphasize that you want to work with your partner to find a solution to any conflict that both sides feel is fair. In very difficult negotiations, keep asking your partner the question, “Why is your proposal fair?” Either you find a common standard for what is fair, or you both admit to yourselves that you interpret the concept of fairness differently. In this case, the weapon of fairness will not help you. Defense  If your partner self-identifies his or her positions as fair, but you can’t see the fairness, you should ask, “Why do you think my positions are unfair?”

5.9.5 Basics The result of the Ultimatum Game shows very clearly that we are all not rational beings. Only the following behavior of the two participants would be rational: Partner 1 offers partner 2 one euro in order to keep 99 EUR himself. Partner 2 immediately agrees. Partner 2 would not receive a single euro without partner 1’s random offer. As Chris Voss rightly puts it, “We’re all irrational, all emotional” (Voss and Raz 2016, p. 121). This has also been discovered by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio: Intelligent people with brain damage in areas where emotions arise could describe facts logically, but could not make decisions. We can therefore only make decisions based on our emotions (cf. Voss and Raz 2016, p. 122).

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Professional Negotiators always have the “feel” for fairness in mind. They know that people do not act rationally and typically want to sanction a subjectively perceived breach of the requirement for fairness.

5.10 Priming We now know that the effects of priming can reach into every corner of our lives (Daniel Kahneman).

Series 4 begins with priming, continues with framing, and ends with the weapon of participation (cf. Fig. 5.11).

5.10.1 Definition The priming effect always consists of two steps. In a first step, you activate certain memory contents in your negotiation partner with a so-called “prime stimulus”. This gives you the opportunity to influence the subsequent behavior of your negotiation partner in a second step, without your partner being consciously aware of this (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 52 ff.; Werth 2010, p. 199 f.; 215). A (subsequent) stimulus is thus processed differently in the Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.11  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Priming. (Source: Own representation)

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brain simply because a previous stimulus has already activated certain memory contents or neuronal patterns. The following examples show impressively how our behavior is constantly influenced by priming. A classic of priming experiments is the “Florida Experiment” (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 52): • Step 1: Psychologist John Bargh asked New  York University students to make sentences with five words. He formed two groups. One group had to work with words that evoked associations with the concept of “old people” (Florida, forgetful, gray, wrinkles, etc.). The other group had to work with words that did not contain associations related to “old people”. • Step 2: Then each group was to go to a different office to conduct a different experiment. In truth, the walking as such was the experiment. Bargh wanted to check whether the group that had worked on the topic of “age” would walk significantly slower to the second office than the other group. As expected, this assumption was confirmed. The students were not aware of the effect. The reason for the slower walking: Bargh had first activated a stereotype (role schema), namely “old people” in the brains of the students (primary stimulus). This primary stimulus influenced the subsequent action, i.e. walking to another office (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 390). This also works, for example, with the activation of the stereotype “professor”: people who were told in a general knowledge test that they should “behave like a professor” performed significantly better than people who took the test without this priming (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 390). Advertising also uses priming effects, as the following example shows: In the wine department of an English supermarket, one week of German marching music and one week of French accordion music were played as soft background music (prime stimulus), alternating several times. In the weeks with German marching music the sales of German wines increased, in the weeks with French accordion music the sales of French wines increased significantly in each case. The customers thus made a certain decision (purchase of German or French wine) on the basis of the prime stimulus (music). They were asked after the purchase whether they had noticed anything in the wine department. They answered in the negative (cf. Häusel 2013, p. 143). You can easily demonstrate the priming effect among your colleagues with the following experiment: • Experiment: Step 1: Ask your colleague three questions, each of which he must answer very quickly (only Intuitive System I may work):

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–– What color is snow? –– What color is a wedding dress? –– What color is a polar bear? When you have heard the answer “white” three times, the next step is step 2. Now ask the question “What does the cow drink?” Now you will usually get the answer “milk”. The explanation is simple: first, the neural patterns related to “white” were activated in the brain. Now, when the term “cow” follows, the brain combines “white” with “cow” and automatically associates “milk”. When the respondent activates his Analytical System II after the spontaneous answer produced by his Intuitive System I, he will correct the answer and correct that the cow naturally drinks water. Based on these and numerous similar experiments, we now know that priming effects can influence all actions in our lives: “We now know that the effects of priming can reach into every corner of our lives” (Kahneman 2013, p. 55). With regard to negotiations, the so-called affect priming and the priming of social behavior are of particular importance: Affect Priming  Affect priming means that in step 1 an affect (e.g. positive mood or negative mood) is elicited. In step 2, a judgment is then elicited. Numerous experiments have shown that people typically make “mood-congruent judgments”: “Judgments are influenced by moods: typically they are more positive in positive moods and more negative in negative moods. … thus, in a positive mood, we like almost everything better or find it better – e.g., ourselves, our health, our lives, other people, the future, and even politics …” (Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 101). Priming to Social Behavior  With the weapon of priming you can also influence social behavior. This is shown by the following two experiments concerning politeness and cooperativeness: The test participants were divided into three groups. They each had to work intensively with 30 words by connecting them in such a way that a meaningful sentence was created. Group 1 had to work with “polite” words, group 2 with “impolite” words, and group 3 with “neutral” words (Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (Bargh et al. 1996), cited in Susanne Kößler, Affective priming with emotional pictures in a lexical decision task  – an EEG study, 2006, p.  12; https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/handle/123456789/11329/ Koessler_Dipl.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed: 20.09.2018). All participants were supposed to hand in their results to the experimenter after a certain time. At the time of submission, the experimenter was deliberately having a conversation with another person and simply did not accept the participants’ results (because of the conversation). In other words, he deliberately ignored the participants. The aim of the experimental set-up was in fact to test how many participants interrupted the conversation of the experimenter. The result was clear:

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• of the participants primed for “rudeness,” 63% interrupted the experimenter’s conversation; • of the “neutrally primed” participants, 38% interrupted the experimenter’s conversation; • of those primed for “politeness”, only 17% interrupted the conversation of the experimenter. Conversely, you can also prime aggressive behavior (cf. the basics below), which you should of course always avoid as a professional negotiator. Particularly important for conducting negotiations is the scientifically proven fact that you can also influence your negotiating partner’s willingness to cooperate through priming (cf. Werth 2010, p. 216). In one experiment, scientists had participants first (step 1) solve word puzzles in which the terms “honest” and “fair” appeared. This activated a cooperation target. A comparison group had to work with neutral terms. In a later task (Step 2), participants in each group had to work together with a supposed second participant to solve a task. Those individuals for whom a cooperation goal was activated in step 1 were significantly more cooperative in step 2 than those for whom such a cooperation goal was not activated (cf. Werth 2010, p. 216).

5.10.2 Deployment The aforementioned tactics of affect priming and social behavior priming play an important role in negotiation. In difficult negotiations they are even indispensable. Affect Priming  Always create a positive atmosphere, especially by behaving in a friendly and respectful manner, so that positive decisions are more likely to be made. Conversely, avoid provocation and aggression to make negative decisions less likely. Priming of Social Behavior  Use priming to activate social behavior by repeatedly using the following terms: “together”, “solution”, “fair”. This is especially true in difficult negotiations or difficult situations. With formulations such as “We want to get the project over the finish line together and will therefore also find solutions that we both feel are fair” you prime the joint search for solutions to the respective conflicts. You cause the memory contents “together”, “solution” and “fair” to be activated in your partner and then the subsequent thoughts are processed exactly there. Conversely, “cue stimuli associated with aggression activate the schema for aggressive behavior and make it more likely” (Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 472). Therefore, refrain from formulations such as “You are completely off the mark”, “You simply see it wrong”, “You have not yet understood that …”). This would only provoke

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aggressive behavior or a defensive attitude (reactance) from your partner. If you behave in this way, you show that you are not (yet) a Professional Negotiator.

5.10.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

This means: If you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find an example of wording at the end of this section. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. Here, then, is affect priming and priming to social behavior. Defend: Be aware that the priming has already activated certain neuronal patterns in your Intuitive System I and that this is exactly where you process the consequential stimuli. In relation to affect priming, ask yourself whether you would make the same decision even if you were in a negative mood. After emphasizing the terms “joint”, “solution” and

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“fair”, ask yourself whether your Decision Maker also wants exactly the joint solution that your partner is currently proposing. Now formulate your defense statement and write down this statement. Your defense statement might be, for example: • Defense of Affect Priming: “I’ve thought about this more carefully, your positive presentation is understandable, yet I see things as follows …”. • Defense of priming social behavior: “Like you, I am very interested in a joint solution that is fair to both sides. Currently, I am still uncomfortable with some issues. We must first, with all common ground, resolve the following outstanding issues to the satisfaction of both parties: …”. If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.10.4 Summary How to use  Always create a positive mood, especially by behaving in a friendly and respectful manner, so that positive decisions are more likely to be made (so-called affect priming). Use priming to activate a certain social behavior in your negotiating partner by repeatedly using the following terms: “together”, “solution”, “fair”. This is especially true in difficult negotiations or difficult situations. Defense  Defense against affect priming: Ask yourself (as a negotiator) the control question whether you or your Decision Maker would make a certain decision even if you were in a bad mood. Defense against priming social behavior: In principle, affirm the search for a joint solution, but emphasize that from your point of view the current conflicts (open issues) have not yet been resolved to your satisfaction. Emphasize that you (still) feel uncomfortable.

5.10.5 Basics Just as you can prime cooperation, you can also prime aggression, which a professional negotiator should absolutely refrain from doing. Aggression, i.e. behavior with the aim of harming others, can, according to social psychological research, be brought about by mere so-called aggressive cues (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 440). Such a mere cue stimulus is characterized by the fact that it is associated or linked with aggressive content in the brain of the person concerned. For example, the mere perception of weapons and/or song lyrics with violence-related content can evoke aggressive

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behavior (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p.  471). More generally, “environmental stimuli activate behavioral schemas associated with these stimuli and make the corresponding behavior more available (Anderson et al. 1998). Accordingly, cue stimuli associated with aggression activate the schema for aggressive behavior and make it more likely” (Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 472). In addition to aggressive cues, provocations and social rejection or attacks against the person and the blocking of one’s own goals (frustration) in particular can increase the willingness to be aggressive (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 447). This promotes the danger of the conflict escalating, which the professional negotiator will avoid at all costs.

5.11 Framing Our preferences are frame-bound rather than reality-bound (Daniel Kahneman).

5.11.1 Definition Framing (cf. Fig. 5.12) means in very general terms that “something” is presented either positively (positive framing) or negatively (negative framing) and that this type of presentation demonstrably actually influences the decision outcome in a large number of cases. Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.12  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Framing. (Source: Own representation)

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In this regard, the results vary depending on the framing type. In terms of negotiation management, so-called “goal framing” is of central importance (for further definitions of framing, see Haack/Reimann, Compliance Framing  – Framing Compliance, Working Paper No. 06/2012, University of Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management, p.  22; http://www.fww.ovgu.de/fww_media/femm/femm_2012/2012_06.pdf. Accessed: 20.09.2018). Goal framing is about motivating people to behave in a very specific way (goal). It is therefore about so-called compliance. In the medical field, for example, it is about patients following the doctor’s recommendations. In companies, it is about ensuring that employees comply with all legally relevant regulations. In your negotiations, it is about your negotiating partner agreeing to your positions or demands on level 7 of the BMI stairway (compliance/non-compliance) (see Sect. 3.8.7). First, to induce compliance, you can present the beneficial consequences of the behavior you are trying to motivate (Positive Frame). However, you can also present the adverse consequences of not behaving (i.e., refusing to engage in the very same behavior you are trying to motivate) the other way around (negative frame). In all cases, the subjects are asked whether they are convinced by a certain behavioral recommendation presented as positive, i.e. whether they will behave in this way themselves or not. For one group of subjects, only the potential advantage of following the behavioral recommendation presented as positive is emphasized (positive frame or gain frame). For the other group, only the potential disadvantage of refusing to follow the behavioral recommendation presented as positive is emphasized (negative frame or loss frame). The typical effect can be described as follows: the presentation of the negative consequences of refusing the behavioral recommendation tends to lead to following the behavioral recommendation (cf. Levin et al. 1998, pp. 149 ff., 168). This is illustrated by the following standard example of Breast Self-Examination (BSE), which is very well known in social psychology, according to which a group of women was confronted with either one or the other of the following statements: • To the women in Group 1, the researchers told: Research has shown that women who do breast self-examination have an increased chance of detecting a tumor at an early stage when there is a good chance of cure (Positive Frame). • To the women in group 2, the researchers told: Research has shown that women who do not perform breast self-examination have a low chance of detecting a tumor at an early stage when there is a good chance of cure (Negative Frame). As a result, the negative frame (depiction of the negative consequences of refusing to comply) was more likely to move the women to follow the behavioral recommendation (cf. Levin et al. 1998, pp. 149 ff., 168).

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5.11.2 Deployment The scientific findings on goal framing lead to the following recommendations when conducting negotiations: On the one hand, present the advantages (benefits) that your negotiating partner will have if he agrees to your positions/demands. On the other hand, clearly explain the disadvantages that your negotiating partner has to fear if he does not follow your positions/demands. In this way you activate the so-called “loss aversion” in your negotiating partner (cf. Sect. 5.11.3). In particularly difficult situations, you can activate your partner’s loss aversion by asking the following questions, for example: • “What will happen if we don’t agree?” (Schranner 2016a, p. 182) resp. • “What do you think I’m going to do [if we don’t agree]?” (Schranner 2016a, p. 182). Present the loss your negotiating partner will suffer if he does not follow your positions as certain. Please be sure to note the reference from a police crisis negotiation textbook that presents the combination of gain frame and loss frame as indispensable: “By being both a source of harm and of help, the negotiator can maximize his or her worth to the hostage taker” (McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 151; author’s emphasis). The park negotiations are particularly exemplary.

Park Negotiations

In the Park negotiations, we negotiated in a performance team (see Sect. 2.1.7). The project team therefore consisted of three people: the Decision Maker and the twoperson negotiating team, namely the Negotiator (Good Guy) and me as the lawyer or expert (Bad Guy). The substance of the case was a claim for payment in the amount of EUR 150,000 arising from a cooperation agreement. My client claimed that he was entitled to payment of this 150,000 EUR. Our negotiating partner saw things completely differently and vehemently denied the existence of such a claim. After several written exchanges of rational arguments, our negotiating partner ended the communication. During a break in the negotiations, I thought about how we could get the partner back to the negotiating table. So we considered which of the Weapons of Influence we could intensify on level 6 of the BMI stairway (Influence) (see Sect. 3.8.6). I decided on Framing and I was successful with it. After consulting with the Decision Maker and the Primary Negotiator, I sent an email to the negotiating partners outlining both the positive consequences of reaching an agreement (Gain Frame) and the negative consequences of refusing to agree or pay (Loss Frame): Gain Frame: First of all, I pointed out that a quick settlement is very economical in every way: we can quickly focus on other things that are important to our respective businesses, plus we protect our relationship with each other.

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Loss Frame: I indicated my client’s clear willingness to file suit. I even announced this for a specific date. Then I described the classic side effects of litigation: Loss of money because everyone has to pay their expensive lawyers (by the hour), loss of precious work time because drafting pleadings takes up a lot of each client’s work time, no victory in court because a court typically wants to settle so it can save itself the trouble of drafting a lengthy judgment, loss of stable relationship. Finally, I suggested that we reduce these losses, which we would all have to expect, by appointing an expert as a quasi-arbitrator who would give us his opinion, but to which we would not be bound. In addition, I suggested that the fee for this expert be split 50/50 in any case. The combination of gain frame and loss frame caused the breakthrough. We jointly appointed the quasi-arbitrator. He agreed with us and judged the position of our negotiating partner to be “not in accordance with the prevailing case law”. We then reached a settlement, which was of course characterized by “give and take” (cf. para. 5.13). We did not have to go to court, which would have cost us much more money and time. In the end, we were able to maintain our relationship.

Because of its particular importance, I would like to reiterate the reference quoted above from a police crisis negotiation textbook: “By being both a source of harm and of help, the negotiator can maximize his or her worth to the hostage taker” (McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 151; author’s emphasis). In other words, always combine the gain frame with the loss frame when goal framing.

5.11.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

This means: If you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions.

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• However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find an example of wording at the end of this section. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. Here, then, is framing in the form of Goal Framing (Gain Frame and/or Loss Frame). Defend: If your partner tells you advantages you will have if you follow his respective position (gain frame) and/or your partner tells you disadvantages you will have if you do not follow his respective position (loss frame), there is only one sensible defense: weigh all advantages and all disadvantages of the upcoming decision calmly and from a distance. Because of the special importance of framing, I must remind you again: Ideally, such weighing is done by the Decision Maker; team strategy is indispensable for such weighing. If you are acting as a one-man team, you should ask your consultant. For example, if your Negotiator brings up, “Consider that you will miss out on a great future opportunity for rapid advancement in our company if you don’t take this job just because of today’s lower compensation,” this is a classic loss frame. The potential employer is showing you the negative consequences of your refusal (not taking the job). You should now weigh all the advantages and disadvantages of the potential job and only decide after that. If the current compensation is too low for you and the supposed great future opportunities are not plausible enough, you will probably turn down the job. If the current compensation offered is sufficient for you and the future opportunities sound realistic and are important to you, you will be more likely to accept the job offer. It is only important that you never spontaneously make an intuitive and therefore quick decision based on a frame (gain frame or loss frame). Finally, formulate and write down your defense statement: Your defense statement might be, for example: After careful consideration of all the pros and cons, it is my opinion that ….

If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

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5.11.4 Summary How to use  On the one hand, present the advantages (benefits) that your negotiating partner will have if he agrees to your positions/demands. On the other hand, clearly explain the disadvantages that your negotiating partner will most likely have to fear if he does not follow your positions/demands; in this way you activate the so-called “loss aversion” in your negotiating partner (cf. Sect. 5.11.3). In particularly difficult situations, you can activate your partner’s loss aversion by asking the following questions, for example: • “What will happen if we don’t agree?” (Schranner 2016a, p. 182) resp. • “What do you think I’m going to do [if we don’t agree]?” (Schranner 2016a, p. 182) Present the loss your negotiating partner will suffer if he does not follow your positions as certain. Please be sure to note the reference from a police crisis negotiation textbook that presents the combination of gain frame and loss frame as indispensable: “By being both a source of harm and of help, the negotiator can maximize his or her worth to the hostage taker” (McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 151; author’s emphasis). Defense  Never make an intuitive and therefore quick decision spontaneously based on a frame (gain frame or loss frame). Always ask your Decision Maker to weigh up all the pros and cons. If you are only a one man team, you need enough distance and time to weigh all pros and cons. Ask your advisor or at least sleep on your decision.

5.11.5 Basics Levin et al. distinguish between three different types of framing: attribute framing, goal framing and risky choice framing. All three types differ in the “something” that is “framed” (positively or negatively) and in their effect (cf. Levin et al. 1998, pp. 149 ff., 168). Only goal framing is of central importance for negotiation. Loss Aversion and Loss Framing  Levin et  al. explain the result of the goal framing experiments, according to which the loss frame (i.e. the representation of the adverse consequences in the event of refusal to comply) is more likely to lead to compliance than the gain frame, with the so-called loss aversion (cf. Levin et al. 1998, pp. 149 ff., 172). Kohlrieser confirms this: “Research studies have shown that most people are motivated by the avoidance of pain, fear and loss” (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 55). Because of its paramount importance for human decision-making, the so-called loss aversion should be explained in more detail. Loss aversion describes the phenomenon that the fear of suffering a loss is much stronger than the hope of making a profit. On average, it can be simplified to say that losses are

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felt twice as intensely as gains of the same amount. Kahneman has determined a “loss aversion ratio” of 1.5 to 2.5 (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 284). In this context, please memorize the following rule of thumb: “Loss looms twice” (Kahneman 2013, p. 285). This means: the fear of losing something motivates people more strongly, twice as intensely on average, than the thought of gaining something of equal value. Loss aversion is an effect of Intuitive System I (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 296). If you want to use loss aversion, you must always consider the reference points of your negotiating partner. Loss aversion only works in relation to the reference point that has already been mentioned several times. Typical reference points are: • the current status quo, • an expected result, • a result to which you have a mental claim, although you do not yet have this claim (for example, an employee’s bonus) or • goals you set for yourself. Actual results below the reference point are perceived as losses and actual results above the reference point are perceived as gains. The cause of loss aversion is that our brain is designed to always prioritize negative news. The formula “Bad is stronger than good” applies (Kahneman 2013, p. 302). This has been proven in various so-called “risky choice framing” experiments. I describe these experiments here so that you can get a feel for how the loss frame, which is indispensable for every difficult negotiation, works. If this does not interest you further, you can move on to the next weapon of influence according to Sect. 5.12. If, on the other hand, you want to deal with risky choice framing, you must try to understand the thoughts of a Nobel Prize winner: Risky choice framing represents the significant tool with which Prospect Theory, in particular Loss Aversion, has been scientifically proven. It is always about the possible consequences of a choice situation. The participant in the experiment has a choice between different behavioral options with different risks (cf. Levin et al. 1998, pp. 149 ff., 151). Risky choice framing is always based on the following initial situation: you are i) exposed to a choice situation in which ii) variant 1 leads to a single outcome that is certain and ii) variant 2 has as its object a choice situation that is risky. With respect to the choice situation, the initial reference point (status quo) varies so that the choice situation can lead to a gain or a loss. You are, in abstract terms, in the situation where, with respect to a given situation, you are asked to make i) a choice between a risky and a risk-free option, where ii) your reference point (e.g. status quo) varies, but the final state is identical (cf. example below). This sounds very complicated, but keep in mind that we are talking about experiments whose results led to Kahneman winning the Nobel Prize. Lock in the Sure Gain  In case 1, the result of the decision is associated with a gain in relation to the current reference point, for example (gain frame). Typical reaction: You will

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concentrate on the positive aspects and make a rather risk-averse decision, thus preferring a secure lower gain to a possible higher but uncertain gain. They also see the safe profit as a new reference point (as a new status quo) and do not want to lose this new status quo due to loss aversion. It’s “Lock in the sure gain!” Avoid the Sure Loss  In case 2, the outcome of the decision, e.g. in relation to the current reference point, is associated with a loss (loss frame). Typical reaction: You will focus on the negative aspects and behave rather risk-averse, want to avoid a sure loss and rather hope for the chance not to suffer a loss. The rule is: “Avoid the sure loss”. This can be demonstrated with a very simple example consisting of two variants (gain frame and loss frame). The decision situation is one and the same in both variants, irrespective of the framing and the reference point: you have the choice between two outcomes: i) either you receive a final amount of 1500 US$ for sure or ii) you decide to take a 50:50 risk and then receive either a final amount of 1000 US$ or a final amount of 2000 US$, depending on the outcome of the coin toss. Depending on the framing, people typically make one risk-averse and one risk-inclined decision: Variant 1 (Gain Frame)  You initially receive 1000 US$. You now have a choice: either you receive an additional 500 US$ and thus achieve a secure final amount of 1500 US$ (choice 1). Or a coin toss leads to an uncertain final amount of either 1000 US$ or 2000 US$ (choice 2). In variant 1 (Gain Frame), the majority of the test persons decide in favor of option 1, i.e. the certain win of 1500 US$. The motto is: Lock in the sure gain. Variant 2 (Loss Frame)  You initially receive 2000 US$. You now have the choice: either you immediately return 500 US$ to the experimenter and thus have a certain final amount of 1500 US$ but of course also a certain loss of 500 US$ (choice 1). Or a coin toss leads to either an uncertain final amount of 1000 US$ or 2000 US$ (choice 2). In variant 2 (Loss Frame), the majority of the test persons opt for option 2, i.e. the coin toss or the risk, in order to avoid the certain loss. The motto is: Avoid the sure loss. Kahneman also conducted the following experiments, which I do not want to deprive you of because of the central importance of loss aversion and the activation of loss aversion in your negotiating partner in the form of loss framing: Heads or Tails?  A coin is tossed. If the coin shows heads, the player loses US$100, if the coin shows tails, the player wins US$150 (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 283). Most people do not find this game attractive. The feeling of fear of losing US$100 is more intense than the feeling of hope of winning US$150. Kahneman further reports that most people find the game attractive when the fear of losing US$100 is matched by the hope of making a profit

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of US$200. So the ratio of loss to gain is 1:2. Or the other way around: the “pain” caused by a loss is twice as strong as the “feeling of happiness” caused by a gain of the same amount. The rule applies: Loss looms twice. Self-Test  Kahneman suggests the following self-test (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 284). Step 1: Imagine a 50:50 game (coin toss) in which you can lose ten dollars. What must the minimum win be for you to find the game attractive? If you answer “under ten dollars,” you are seeking risk; if you answer “ten dollars,” you are indifferent to risk; if you answer “over ten dollars,” you have loss aversion. Stage 2: Imagine a 50:50 game (coin toss) in which you can lose US$500. What do the answers look like now? Stage 3: Imagine a 50:50 game (coin toss) in which you can lose US$2000. How do you respond in this case? Typically, loss aversion increases as the amount increases. Finally, there are risks you would never take. The Twins Albert and Ben  Kahneman uses the following example to explain the importance of the respective status quo (which can change at any time) as a reference point: Albert and Ben are identical twins, i.e. they have the same genetic characteristics. They both start with an identical job and with a moderate income. After some time, their boss offers them each a different gratuity, but from the twins’ perspective, they are economically equivalent. The twins must decide: one of them will receive a salary increase of US$10,000 per year and the other will receive 12 days of additional vacation per year. The status quo acts as a reference point: both a salary increase and the extra vacation represent a gain (relative to the reference point); there is no loss. Albert and Ben are indifferent as to which type of economically equivalent gratuity they receive. They therefore flip a coin. The result of the coin toss: Albert gets the raise, Ben gets the extra vacation. After a while, you are offered by the boss to swap the types of gratuity. If both brothers were making purely economic decisions, the swap would be straightforward. However, the loss aversion and the dependence of its effect on the reference point leads to the fact that the exchange rather does not take place: Even now, the status quo acts as a reference point: if Albert keeps the status quo, he has no gain, but also no loss; if he decides to take the additional leave (Gain), he will have to accept a loss of income of US$10,000 to do so (Loss). He will choose to maintain the status quo. The same is true for Ben. If he keeps the status quo, he has no gain but also no loss. If he chooses to take the additional compensation (gain), he will have to accept a loss of time off (12 vacation days) to do so. This example is meant to demonstrate two aspects of the so-called Prospect Theory: First, your decisions are influenced by the Loss Aversion phenomenon. Secondly, whether you feel a loss always depends on your individual reference point (e.g. your current status quo).

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5.12 Participation Negotiation is a ritual – a ritual of participation (William Ury).

5.12.1 Definition Participation (cf. Fig. 5.13) means that you actively involve your negotiating partner in the resolution of the conflict. Participation is one of the most effective weapons in difficult situations. Already Ury emphasized the great benefit of participation in his classic book “Getting past NO”. He writes that negotiators see things completely differently when they are actively involved in the resolution of the conflict. They then agree to solutions they previously rejected. Ury therefore rightly emphasizes that negotiation is also a ritual of participation: “negotiation is a ritual – a ritual of participation” (Ury 2007, p. 111). The point is to create a feeling of belonging to a group through participation, because this in turn is more likely to lead to the negotiating partner showing compliance, i.e. following your demands/positions on level 7 of the BMI stairway (compliance/non-compliance) (cf. Sect. 3.8.7). In his new book “Pre-Suasion”, Cialdini has identified the feeling of belonging to a group (Unity) as the seventh universal principle (along with reciprocity, sympathy, social Weapons of Influence Phase A: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.13  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Participation. (Source: Own representation)

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proof, authority, scarcity and consistency). He distinguishes between “Being Together” (family relationship or other group) and “Acting Together” (cooperation). The latter (Acting Together) is of fundamental importance for negotiation. Social psychology experiments have confirmed that both collaboration and asking for advice can lead to a sense of belonging to a group, which in turn, regardless of the sympathy it creates, can make it easier for you to influence your partner’s behavior. Accordingly, William Ury in his classic book “Getting past NO” already emphasized the great benefits of collaboration or participation, quoting a Chinese proverb: “Tell me, I may listen. Teach me, I may remember. Involve me, I will do it” (Ury 2007, p. 114). The parties acting as “opponents” can thus develop the feeling that you are working together as a group to resolve conflicts. Similarly, Ury recommends asking for advice as a very effective weapon: “Asking for advice is one of the most effective ways you can change the game” (Ury 2007, p. 85). Chris Voss also explains that asking for advice gives the negotiator the feeling of controlling the negotiation: “By implicitly asking the other party for help, these questions will give your counterpart an illusion of control and will inspire them to speak at length, revealing important information” (Voss and Raz 2016, p. 160). Cialdini demonstrates the influenceability due to cooperation and due to asking for advice with the following two examples, among others: Example 1 In one experiment, all subjects had to listen to music through headphones and were asked to tap their fingers on the table according to the rhythm. The subjects were divided into two groups. The first group listened to the same music and tapped accordingly, visible to all members of this group, to the same beat. The members of this group thus developed a sense of belonging. The subjects in the second group each listened to different music and therefore tapped to different rhythms, also visible to all members of this group. Therefore, no sense of belonging to a group developed. Then the second part of the experiment began. The experimenter told the subjects that the study was over and thus they could leave. However, he asked a few selected participants in each group to now answer difficult test tasks relating to mathematics and logic. He told the remaining subjects that they were free to help the selected participants. • In the first group, where all participants listened to the same music and gave the same tapping signals, thus developing a sense of belonging to the group, 49% of the remaining subjects agreed to help the few selected participants. • In the second group, where participants listened to different music and gave different tapping signals, only 18% of the remaining subjects agreed to help the few selected participants. The sense of belonging to a group brought about by cooperation (same tapping) had obviously influenced the willingness to comply with a request (i.e. to show compliance). This also applies to the request for advice. This automatically causes a feeling of belonging and

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thus reinforces the chance of compliance on level 7 of the BMI stairway (compliance/noncompliance) according to Sect. 3.8.7. Example 2

In an online survey about the concept of a new restaurant chain, one part of the respondents was only supposed to give their opinion, while the other part was asked for advice. Finally, the participants were asked to say whether they could imagine eating in such a restaurant. Of the group of participants who were asked for advice, significantly more answered “yes” than of the group of participants who were only asked for their opinion. Cialdini explains why this is so: giving advice awakens a sense of “we” (belonging to a group), which is more likely to lead to compliance (Cialdini 2016, p. 206). ◄

5.12.2 Deployment The use of the weapon of participation is very simple. Emphasize that you are together (like a group) in the same situation and “hand over the problem” by asking questions that concern cooperation and/or have advice as their subject (cf. Ury 2007, pp. 84, 112, Voss and Raz 2016, p. 154; Schranner 2016a, pp. 135, 183). The question: “How do we want to solve this together?” is one of the most effective questions in police negotiation work as well as in all other negotiations (cf. Schranner 2016a, p. 135). Schranner calls this tactic “handing over the problem” and literally states in reference to his police negotiation work, “This tactic … was the most common conversational tactic we used in difficult situations” (Schranner 2016a, p. 134). Not surprisingly, former FBI negotiator Chris Voss confirms this very tactic of participation: ““How I am supposed to do that?” became our primary response to a kidnapper demanding a ransom. And we never had it backfire” (Voss and Raz 2016, p. 168). The questions are just as efficient: • What would you advise? • Can you help me?

5.12.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

This means:

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If you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the impact of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find a formulation example at the end of this paragraph. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, do not decide spontaneously under any circumstances unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening. Unless it is a routine defense – always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. So here is the cooperation or the question of your advice. Defend: Realize that the call to participate has left its mark on your Intuitive System I and influenced you accordingly. You are now basically more willing to find a solution. Play the ball back: Stand helplessly and ask your partner to propose a solution. Now formulate your defense statement And write down this statement. Your defense statement might be, for example: Of course we are striving for a joint solution. I’m a little helpless at the moment. Do you have any idea how we can resolve the open points constructively?

If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.12.4 Summary How to use  Pass on the problem by asking the following questions, for example. • “What would you advise me to do?”

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• “Can you help me?” • “How are we going to solve this together?”

Defense  Ask your partner to suggest a solution: “Of course we are striving for a joint solution. I’m a little helpless at the moment. Do you have any idea how we can resolve the open points constructively?”

5.12.5 Basics The scientific basis can be found on p. 173 ff. of the (newer) work Pre-Suasion by Cialdini. There, in the section “Unity 1: Being Together”, he explains the neuroscientific background of the feeling of belonging to a group or the feeling of unity. While sympathy (see Sect. 5.1) promotes compliance because we have previously identified commonalities (e.g. enthusiasm for the same sports), the principle of belonging to the same group (unity) has an even stronger influence. Whereas in liking we think “Oh, that person is like us,” in feeling like we belong to the same group we think “Oh, that person is of us” (Cialdini 2016, p. 175). We share identities. According to Cialdini, it is about “shared identities” with the motto: “We is the shared me” (Cialdini 2016, p. 175). Because of this group identity, the principle is “All for one, and one for all” (Cialdini 2016, p. 192). This blending of one’s own identity with the identity of the members of the group and thus the great influenceability by requests for action from members of the group have meanwhile also been proven neuroscientifically. The concept relating to ourselves and the concept relating to people very close to us are processed in the brain in the same “circuitry”. As a result, when one of the two concepts is activated, the other concept can be activated, leading to actions that are in the group’s interest instead of our own (Cialdini 2016, p. 176).

5.13 Reciprocity The concession will likely stimulate a return concession (Robert B. Cialdini)

The weapons described so far are mainly used in Phase A (Analyze Open Points). The Professional Negotiator typically uses the three weapons described in paragraphs 5.13 to 5.15 (inclusive) in Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure). This phase focuses on overcoming the deadlock. With this deadlock, you have completed Phase A (Analyze Open Points). In particular, give and take now takes place in the context of reciprocity (cf. Fig. 5.14). In addition, you can use the weapons Consistency and Scarcity.

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5 Influence Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.14  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Reciprocity. (Source: Own representation)

5.13.1 Definition The social norm of reciprocity states that people feel obligated to return favors they receive. This is true even when the favor is not wanted. For example, the giving of promotional gifts is based on the rule of reciprocity. The recipient should feel obliged to buy something, donate money, vote for a party, etc. in return. Moreover, our reciprocations often turn out to be greater than the “social debt” we feel as a result of the favor. It is typically “tit for tat plus one” (Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 318). The perceived “duty to compensate” has such a strong effect that even legislators have taken action by enacting anti-corruption laws (see Cialdini 2007, p. 26). Cialdini emphasizes that the rule of reciprocity has an influencing effect that is far greater than the power of the other five weapons he discusses in his work Influence (Sympathy, Social Proof, Authority, Consistency, Scarcity). Indispensable for professional negotiation are the so-called “Reciprocal Concessions” (cf. Cialdini 2007, p.  36 ff.). These are always effected according to the same pattern, which I call “ARRT Return Concessions Tactics”. The ARRT Return Concessions tactic consists of the combination of the anchor effect, the contrast principle and the rule of reciprocity. The system always works the same way in the following five steps:

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• Step 1: First, the Professional Negotiator makes a very ambitious (but still realistic) demand No. 1 to bring about the anchoring effect (Anchoring). The demanding party assumes that the partner will reject this very ambitious demand. • Step 2: The partner actually rejects the very ambitious demand, as expected by the demanding party (“Reject”). • Step 3: The demanding party now gives in somewhat, i.e. he adjusts his originally very ambitious demand (“Retreat”) and ideally explicitly points out the difference (contrast). • Step 4: The partner perceives the contrast between (ambitious) demand No. 1 and (adjusted) demand No. 2. This in turn Triggers the following: the partner interprets this contrast as a concession on the part of the demanding party, which in turn activates the rule of reciprocity in the Intuitive System I of the partner. • Step 5: Due to the rule of reciprocity, the perception of the (alleged) concession by the demanding party automatically causes a social obligation on the part of the partner to also make a concession: “the concession will likely stimulate a return concession” (Cialdini 2007, p. 49). This technique is also referred to by Cialdini as “larger-then-smaller-request” or “rejectthen-retreat-technique”. In the negotiation literature one also finds the term “door in the face principle”. I use the term “ARRT Return Concessions tactic” because this term better reflects the complexity of the five steps (Anchoring, Reject, Retreat, Trigger, Return Concession). In this context, Cialdini also points to the practice of collective bargaining, in which both sides start the ARRT return concessions tactic with extreme demands, only to make mutual concessions as a result (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 40). Accordingly, Kohlrieser recommends: “Apply the law of reciprocity and concessions making” (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 164).

5.13.2 Deployment The rule of reciprocity, or more precisely the ARRT Return Concessions tactic, is the decisive success factor for the ABC strategy, which is referred to as best practice in this book, and the associated strictly systematic application of two of the five conflict strategies based on the TKI (Thomas Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument), namely Professional Confrontation and Situation-Oriented Cooperation (cf. Sect. 4.2). In Phase A (Analyze Open Points), the negotiator asserts the starting positions and thus creates the anchor effect (see Sect. 5.2 above). The partner then rejects these positions (Reject), so the conflict becomes visible (see step 2 above). The negotiator then defends the starting positions in a friendly/respectful and persistent manner (professional confrontation) in order to learn as much as possible about the partner and to fully define all conflicts first. In Phase B (Break 4 Change), the Decision Maker seeking consensus instructs the Negotiator to change the conflict strategy. The Negotiator then prepares for

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Situation-Oriented Cooperation, while the Decision Maker determines the package positions (usually after hearing the N-Team) (Retreat). In Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure), the Negotiator communicates the package positions to the partner and shows the contrast in each case (see step 3 above). The partner ideally perceives these contrasts as a concession (see step 4 above). This is the decisive trigger. The partner, when Intuitive System I does its rapid work, applies the rule of reciprocity and then in turn grants concessions (compliance). These reciprocal concessions in the form of packages then lead to either a deal at step 7 of the BMI stairway (compliance/non-compliance) (estimated to be the case in about 90% of all my negotiations over the last 20  years) or, at some point, a breakdown in negotiations. The corresponding cooperation statements typically read: Thank you very much for your cooperation and your package proposal. I would now like to propose the following package with the following concessions ….

The ARRT Return Concessions tactic is ideally used as part of a team or in conjunction with the Bad Guy/Good Guy tactic (see Sect. 2.1.4). The Bad Guy concentrates on the hard demands or anchoring and insists on the (high) demands. The Good Guy, on the other hand, then gives in a little (retreat) and thus causes the trigger in terms of a concession by the partner. By acting in this way, the Good Guy (contrast principle!) also appears more sympathetic and can continue the bonding (cf. Shell 2006, p.  173). From the Primary Negotiator’s point of view, the Good Guy/Bad Guy tactic is thus ideal for exerting pressure without being confrontational: “It’s an effective way of putting pressure on the other person without creating confrontation” (Dawson 1999, p. 85). Please walk (again) a few steps in your partner’s shoes: Please be sure to consider that real concessions on the part of your partner, i.e. concessions that fall short of or exceed (depending on the situation) his or her truly desired reference point, inflict real mental pain on your partner: “making concessions hurts” (Kahneman 2013, p. 290). It is precisely this loss aversion (cf. Sect. 5.11) that makes it so difficult to reach agreement in negotiations. Conversely, consider in isolation just one concession you make to your partner: Your partner perceives this “only” as a gain. You, on the other hand, feel a loss with respect to one and the same concession, which you feel (on average) twice as strongly as a gain: “Loss looms twice” (Kahneman 2013, p. 285). Therefore, you are typically only willing to accept this loss if, in the context of reciprocity, you are sure that your partner will also have to bear a corresponding (real or merely feigned) loss: “Because negotiators are influenced by a norm of reciprocity, a concession that is presented as painful calls for an equally painful (and perhaps equally inauthentic) concession from the other side” (Kahneman 2013, p. 305). In other words, in the context of “give and take,” you have the greatest chance of finding a solution that satisfies both sides when both sides have the (subjective) feeling that the other side will suffer equal losses. When making concessions, please always remember the nature of humans: “Animals, including people fight harder to prevent losses than to achieve gains” (Kahneman 2013, p. 305).

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5.13.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

So if you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find an example of wording at the end of this section. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. So here is the concession after the initial high demand (starting position). Defend: Be aware that the concession, that is, your partner’s giving in, triggers the “reflex” in your Intuitive System I that you now also want to make a concession. Orient yourself first: • If you are still in Phase A (Analyze Open Points), you must first define all conflicts, i.e. complete the OP list. It is still too early for concessions, because you cannot yet see what concessions are expected from you in total. Phase A is not over until your partner answers “yes” to the following control question: “If we solve all of these problems, do we have a deal?” (Ross 2006, p. 139).

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• If you are in Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure) and therefore already ready to make concessions, there are two options: • You exchange mutual packages to eventually find one that both parties agree to because they subjectively perceive your losses to be equally painful; note that presumably each side has recognized Perceived Conflicts (cf. orange deal), which are naturally “resolved” with (non-painful) fake concessions; • You are no longer willing to give further concessions and point to your last offered package. Remain open to further creative solutions even in this situation. The motto: “Be flexible – be creative” (Goergen 2016, p. 29) applies without restriction. Now formulate your defense statement and write down this statement. Your defense statement might be, for example: • Phase A (Analyze Open Points): “Thank you very much for your cooperation. Of course, we too are thinking about the points on which we can accommodate you. In order for both of us to make a good decision, we should first define all Open Points and then clarify them later as a whole in the package. So far, we have been very successful in resolving conflicts with this approach”. • Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure): “We very much appreciate your concessions, but at the same time we find it difficult to grant (further) concessions on our part, as otherwise we would not achieve our objectives”. If necessary, you will have to reverse concessions already indicated: “We very much welcome your concession, we can at best meet your demand for x if we reverse our concession with regard to x”. (cf. https://www.schranner.com/de/news/2016/12/15/ich-muss-verhandeln-kann-aber-nichts-geben. Accessed: 28/09/2018). Always remember that time-outs are also helpful now. You also need to activate your professional mind-set. I deliberately repeat it again, the motto: “Be flexible – be creative” (Goergen 2016, p. 29) applies without restriction. If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.13.4 Summary How to use  Use the ARRT Return Concessions tactic. It consists of five steps (Anchoring, Reject, Retreat, Trigger, Return Concession). Proceed as follows in Phase A (Analyze Open Points): –– Step 1: As a Professional Negotiator, first communicate very ambitious (but still realistic) demands (starting position). These will have an anchoring effect on your partner

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(Anchoring). Assume that your partner will reject the starting positions of their Decision Maker. –– Step 2: The partner actually rejects your starting positions, as you expected (“Reject”). Continue ARRT Return Concessions tactics in Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure) as follows: –– Step 3: (after consultation with the Decision Maker) give in somewhat with regard to unimportant starting positions, i.e. adjust your originally very ambitious demands (“Retreat”) and ideally explicitly point out the difference (contrast). In Phase C, always communicate complete packages and thus only package positions. Package positions are either identical to the starting positions or they are adjusted starting positions. –– Step 4: Your partner perceives the contrast between the (original) start position and the (adjusted) package position. This in turn triggers the following: the partner interprets this contrast as a concession that you grant, which in turn activates the rule of reciprocity in the Intuitive System I of the partner (Trigger) –– Step 5: The perception of the concession by you (contrast between the original starting position and the adjusted package position) automatically causes, due to the rule of reciprocity, a social obligation in your partner to also make a concession: “the concession will likely stimulate a return concession” (Cialdini 2007, p. 49). –– Proceed in a similar way in further packages, in that some package positions are now also adjusted again. You can achieve a satisfactory solution for both sides if both sides subjectively have the feeling that the pain felt in each case (loss aversion) is balanced overall. –– Use the Bad Guy/Good Guy tactic The Bad Guy concentrates on the hard demands or anchoring and insists on the (high) demands. The Good Guy, on the other hand, then gives in a little (retreat) and thus causes the trigger in terms of a concession by the partner. Defense  Your defense statement might be, for example: Phase A (Analyze Open Points): “Thank you very much for your cooperation. We too are of course thinking about the points on which we can accommodate you. In order for both of us to make a good decision, we should first define all Open Points and then clarify them later as a whole in the package. So far, we have been very successful in resolving conflicts with this approach”. • Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure): “We very much appreciate your concessions, but at the same time we find it difficult to grant (further) concessions on our part, as otherwise we would not achieve our objectives”.

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If need be, you have to undo concessions already implied: “We very much appreciate your concession, we can at best meet your demand for x if we undo our concession with respect to x.” (is the point here correct?] (cf. https://www.schranner.com/de/news/2016/12/15/ichmuss-verhandeln-kann-aber-nichts-geben. Accessed: 28/09/2018). Always remember that time-outs are also helpful now. You also need to activate your professional mind-set. I deliberately repeat it again, the motto: “Be flexible – be creative” (Goergen 2016, p. 29) applies without restriction.

5.13.5 Basics Two experiments that Cialdini describes explain very well how the ARRT Return Concessions tactic works. They are the experiments called “The Zoo Visit” and “The Contract Negotiations”. Zoo Visit  In Variant 1 of the experiment, the experimenters posed as staff of a mentoring program for juvenile offenders and asked college students if they would be willing to accompany a group of juvenile offenders on a volunteer basis for one day on a visit to the zoo (Anchoring). As expected, the vast majority answered in the negative (Reject). Only 17% of the students said yes to such a voluntary zoo visit. In Variant 2, the investigators asked another group of college students if they would be willing to mentor a group of juvenile offenders on a volunteer basis for two hours per week for two years each (Anchoring). Not a single student answered in the affirmative or all students declined (Reject). Thus, compliance was 0%. The same college students were then asked whether they would be prepared to accompany a group of juvenile offenders on a voluntary basis for one day on a visit to the zoo (Retreat). This question was now (after rejecting the first request) – surprisingly answered in the affirmative by 50% of the students (compliance). Compliance here is based on the Trigger (perception of concession) and the return concession according to the norm of reciprocity. The use of the ARRT return concessions tactic was worthwhile, as compliance with regard to one and the same question tripled (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 39 f.). Contract Negotiations  Social psychologists at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) have demonstrated very clearly that the use of the ARRT Return Concessions tactic is indispensable in contract negotiations. The experimenter gave different experimental participants each a certain amount of money and gave them the following task: he was to divide this amount with a negotiating opponent within a certain time by way of negotiation. If the division succeeds within the time limit, both get to keep the amount negotiated for each other. If the respective trial participant and the negotiating opponent do not reach an agreement, the respective trial participant must return the amount to the experimenter. The participants in the experiment did not know that the opponent was an assistant to the experimenter and had the task of behaving differently.

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Variant 1  In one group of experimental participants, the negotiator made an extreme demand in each negotiation situation, according to which he wanted to receive almost the entire amount. He then insisted on this position. Variant 2  In a second group of experimental participants, the negotiator made a moderate demand in each negotiation situation, according to which he wanted to be slightly preferred. He then insisted on this position. Variant 3  With regard to a third group of test participants, in each negotiation situation the negotiating opponent first made an extreme demand, as in variant 1. He then gave in bit by bit. He was allowed to give in at most up to the amount that corresponded to the amount of the moderate demand according to variant 2. The social psychologists discovered three things in this experiment: • for one, the negotiating opponent received the most money when it used Variant 3, i.e., the ARRT Return Concessions tactic. This did not surprise the researchers. • On the other hand, after the experiment, the participants in variant 3 proudly reported that they had succeeded in persuading the negotiating opponent to make concessions (which was not the case in reality). They also felt that they were responsible for the success of the deal. This effect of “responsibility” was new to the researchers. • Finally, after the experiment, the participants of variant 3 said that they were very satisfied with the result. Receiving concessions thus causes “satisfaction”. This was also new for the researchers (cf. Cialdini 2016, p. 49 ff.). Cookie  In her textbook, Werth describes an example in which the ARRT Return Concessions tactic does not work, namely in the case of a completely excessive demand: She describes a cartoon in which the son first asks the mother whether he may set fire to his mattress (Anchor). As expected, the mother answers in the negative (Reject 1). Then the son asks if he can ride a tricycle on the roof of the house (Retreat 1). The mother answers in the negative again, as expected (Reject 2). Now the son asks if he can have a cookie (Retreat 2). Again, the mother says no. She had not interpreted the contrast between each of her son’s demands as a concession by the son. This also did not activate the rule of reciprocity in her case.

5.14 Consistency Automatic consistency functions as a shield against thought (Robert B. Cialdini).

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5.14.1 Definition The principle of consistency (cf. Fig. 5.15) states that people basically strive to orient their behavior to their previous decisions or to justify these originally made decisions (commitment). This connection between “commitment and consistency” (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 57 ff.) makes sense in principle. You do not have to intensively weigh up all the pros and cons every time you are confronted with an issue for which you have already decided once in favor of a certain behavior (commitment). You can enjoy the luxury of mentally referring to your previous commitment to that question and just behave consistently. You do not need to think again: “automatic consistency functions as a shield against thought” (Cialdini 2007, p. 64). Moreover, consistent behavior is typically associated with personal and intellectual strength, logic, reasonableness, and honesty. Inconsistency, on the other hand, is seen as a negative quality (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 60). One disadvantage of consistent behavior is the so-called escalation of commitment. This phenomenon describes the delayed or complete lack of correction of wrong decisions (cf. Werth 2010, p. 44 ff.). Scientists explain this phenomenon, among other things, by the fact that people tend to justify their own decisions instead of admitting that they have made a wrong decision. In addition, loss aversion is used to explain the phenomenon: When one realizes that one has made losses on a project, for example, one tends to Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

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Series 2

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Story

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Fairness

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Framing

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Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.15  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Consistency. (Source: Own representation)

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continue pursuing it (with the hope of compensating for the loss) instead of realizing that the costs incurred so far are lost forever (so-called sunk costs). This phenomenon of “escalation of commitment” is also called “sunk-cost fallacy” or “sunk cost error” (cf. Kahneman 2013, p. 345). Here, Kahneman reminds us that rational Decision Makers must only be interested in the future consequences of their actions and ignore past losses. Those who, on the other hand, do not make rational decisions, following the consistency principle, stay in bad jobs, hold on to unhappy marriages, and pursue research projects even though they are not promising: “The sunk-cost fallacy keeps people for too long in poor jobs, unhappy marriages, and unpromising research projects” (Kahneman 2013, p. 346.). Follow the Nobel laureate’s advice and don’t base your decisions on the past: “History is irrelevant” (Kahneman 2013, p. 371). Rather, regularly check the “correctness” of your past commitment.

5.14.2 Deployment If you notice in the negotiation that your partner suddenly behaves differently, i.e. inconsistently, with regard to his previous positions and this is disadvantageous for you, you should politely draw attention to this contradiction. If the consistency principle works, your partner will change his mind again and behave consistently, i.e. in line with his previous commitment. Another way to use it is if your partner wants to break off the negotiations. Then you can say: “Now we have negotiated so long and so intensively to conclude the contract. This is exactly what we should do. Otherwise, all the efforts made so far would be in vain”. Emphasize the previous intensive commitment and activate the automatic consistency principle. Due to so-called “escalation of commitment” you can come to a conclusion (cf. Jung and Krebs 2016, p. 362 f.).

5.14.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

So if you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions.

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• However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find an example of wording at the end of this section. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapons of influence. In this case, the appeal to your previous commitment in order to bring about a rash compliance or an “escalation of commitment” with the help of the consistency principle. Defend: Realize that both your previous commitment and your partner’s explicit emphasis on your previous commitment have already left traces in your Intuitive System I and influenced you accordingly. • Keep questioning your previous commitment in light of the information currently available: “Based on the information currently known, does it make sense to stick with this position and/or this project?” Or the other way around: “Would my Decision Maker make the decision at that time (regarding positions and/or the project) the same way again today?” • In doing so, you (or your Decision Maker) should disregard the past commitment and the sunk costs and only make a judgement taking into account the future opportunities and risks of your positions or your project. Now formulate your defense statement and write down this statement. Your defense statement might be, for example: “It is true that we have been following the project very closely so far. However, based on the information currently available, we now see things somewhat differently …”. If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

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5.14.4 Summary How to use  People are basically eager to orient their behavior to their previous decisions and to behave consistently with regard to these decisions. Cialdini refers to this phenomenon as “commitment and consistency” (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 57 ff.). Use this phenomenon as follows: • If your partner suddenly behaves differently, i.e. inconsistently, with regard to his or her previous positions and this is disadvantageous for you, you should politely draw attention to this contradiction (“But you have seen that differently so far, namely …”). This way you have a chance that your partner will behave consistently. • If your partner wants to break off the negotiations, you can say, for example: “Now we have negotiated so long and so intensively in order to conclude the contract. This is exactly what we should do. Otherwise, all the efforts we have made so far would be in vain”. Emphasize the previous intensive commitment and activate the automatic consistency principle. In this way you can possibly bring about an “escalation of commitment”.

Defense    Keep questioning your previous commitment in light of the information currently available: “Based on the information currently known, does it make sense to stick with this position and/or this project?” Or the other way around: “Would my Decision Maker make the decision at that time (regarding positions and/or the project) the same way again today?” • In doing so, you (or your Decision Maker) should disregard the past commitment and the sunk costs and only make a judgement taking into account the future opportunities and risks of your positions or your project. Your defensive statement could, for example, read: “It is true that we have followed the project very closely so far. However, based on the information currently available, we now see things somewhat differently”.

5.14.5 Basics Salespeople use the consistency principle in sales negotiations as follows: They first aim to induce a commitment in the potential customer, i.e. a fundamentally positive decision for the product to be sold. In this way, the potential customer becomes an actual customer. After that, the consistency principle automatically takes effect. Disadvantages, which are called now by the salesman (e.g. long delivery time) are rather accepted, if one decided

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in principle for a product. This is shown by the following two sales techniques, the foot in the door principle and the low ball principle (cf. Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 325 ff.). Foot in the Door Principle  With the foot in the door principle, a small request is first made. If the person asked is prepared to fulfil the request, a commitment is brought about by precisely this decision. This commitment then automatically favors consistent behavior in Intuitive System I for the decisions that follow. This is shown in the following example: Example

Variant 1: An initial group of California homeowners were asked to place a large intrusive sign reading “DRIVE CAREFULLY” in their front yard. Less than 20% of respondents agreed. Variant 2: A second group of California homeowners was first asked to sign a petition for safe driving. The approval rate was nearly 100%. All people who agreed to the first request were then asked (about a week later) to post a large intrusive sign in their front yard that read “DRIVE CAREFULLY” (as in Variant 1). About 60% of the respondents agreed. Thus, compliance almost tripled due to the prior commitment to increased road safety that occurred after the initial request to sign the petition, due to the consistency principle. ◄ Low Ball Principle  In the low-ball principle, an incentive (e.g. a reward) leads to a commitment. Afterwards, the incentive is “removed” again. Nevertheless, the commitment continues to have an effect and promotes consistent behavior. This is illustrated by the following example: Example

Variant 1: Several researchers asked homeowners to participate in an energy saving project. A first group received only appropriate tips and was asked to comply with them. When the researchers checked the actual energy consumption after four weeks, no significant savings were shown. The tips were therefore unable to bring about compliance or a change in behavior. Variant 2: A second group was first lured with an incentive. The researchers promised the participants that if they saved energy, they would be named in the newspaper. The incentive worked. When measurements were taken after four weeks, the researchers found a significant savings in energy consumption. After that, the researchers told these participants that unfortunately they could not be named in the newspaper after all. So the researchers eliminated the original incentive for the future. In the following months, the participants saved even more energy (despite the elimination of the incentive). The reason: the original commitment had led to a change in behavior. This had affected the individuals’ self-image and brought about consistency. You know this from buying a car. First, the salesperson makes a favorable offer in order to induce a

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commitment (“Yes, I would like to buy this car”). After that, the consistency principle automatically takes effect, even if the car becomes more expensive due to various extras. Werth/Mayer formulate: “The desire to be consistent is … greater than the desire to avoid the costs associated with consent” (Werth and Mayer 2008, p. 327). ◄

5.15 Scarcity As a rule, if it is rare … it is more valuable (Robert B. Cialdini).

5.15.1 Definition The principle of scarcity (cf. Fig. 5.16) states that the limited availability of a product alone increases the subjective value of this product (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 237 ff.; Werth 2010, p. 71 ff.). We often encounter this principle in our lives: We all know “limited editions”, time limits (only available until …), advertising exclusivity or holding an auction or emphasizing competition. In all these cases, the subjective value increases with the limited availability: “As a rule, if it is rare … it is more valuable” (Cialdini 2007, p. 239).

Weapons of Influence Phase: Analyze Open Points Series 1

Sympathy

Anchoring

Arguments

Series 2

Examples

Images

Story

Series 3

Social Proof

Authority

Fairness

Series 4

Priming

Framing

Participation

Consistency

Scarcity

Phase: Concessions Package Procedure

Series 1 … Series 4 + Series 5

Reciprocity

Multiplier effects Primacy effect (especially with regard to arguments, images, examples) Recency effect (especially in relation to arguments, images, examples) Mere exposure effect (esp. in relation to arguments, pictures, examples) Contrast effect

Fig. 5.16  Most important “Weapons of Influence”: Scarcity. (Source: Own representation)

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5.15.2 Deployment In professional negotiations, competition for one’s own product is emphasized in order to increase leverage in this way. In company sales, auctions are typically held in order to achieve the highest possible price. After all, if negotiations have been going on long enough and the seller certainly wants to end the negotiations after a certain date, deadlines are set. It is important that after the deadline has expired, you also implement exactly the behavior that you announced beforehand. Otherwise, you will lose credibility for the rest of the negotiation.

5.15.3 Defense Any weapon of influence can be warded off with the AID Rule (Activate, Identify & Defend): Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down).

So if you notice that your partner is using certain Weapons of Influence (consciously or unconsciously), you should first consider self-critically whether you need a time-out to defend yourself. Please do not underestimate the effect of Weapons of Influence. Only a real time-out protects you in the best possible way from intuitive and thus possible adverse reactions. • However, if your routine makes you absolutely sure how to formulate your defense statement and you have enough distance from what is happening in the negotiation, you can implement the defense immediately. Make sure that your defense statement is covered by the Decision Maker’s instruction. You will find an example of wording at the end of this section. • Or: Get in touch with your Decision Maker. Within the framework of the team strategy, he can make a detached decision that corresponds to his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) and then give you a corresponding instruction. • Or: Contact your advisor as a One Man Team (cf. Sect. 2.1.1). If you are unable to ask an advisor, unless you have sufficient distance from what is happening, you should never decide spontaneously. Unless it is a routine defense, always take enough time to make a detached decision. Always. Now consciously Activate your Analytical System II, that is, think slowly about what weapons your partner has used against you. Then Identify the individual weapon of influence. So here is the scarcity.

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Defend: Realize that scarcity has already left its mark on your Intuitive System I and influenced you accordingly. Think critically about whether you (or your Decision Maker) would buy the product(s) if it were not in short supply (limited edition) or if the deadline (time limit) did not exist. Now formulate your defense statement and write down this statement. Your defense statement might be, for example: I take note of the limitation. However, it does not change the positions communicated so far.

If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.15.4 Summary How to use  Emphasize (if possible) the uniqueness of your product or service, so emphasize your leverage. Convey the impression that you are offering a scarce commodity. Set deadlines (if possible) in order to limit the period of freedom of decision. Attention: After the deadline has expired, you must implement exactly the behavior that you announced beforehand, otherwise you will make yourself untrustworthy for the entire remainder of the negotiation. Defense  Think critically about whether you (or your Decision Maker) would buy the product(s) if it were not in short supply (limited edition) or if the deadline (time limit) did not exist. Your defensive statement could, for example, read: “I take note of the limitation. However, it does not change the previously communicated positions”. If you want to emphasize the use of team strategy, you can still note that you have coordinated with your Decision Maker or as a one man team with your consultant.

5.15.5 Basics The principle of scarcity is based on two mechanisms: On the one hand, something that is rare is judged more positively for that reason alone. Secondly, we have the feeling that our freedom of action is restricted because, due to scarcity, we can no longer freely decide at any time whether we want to acquire the product. We resist this restriction of freedom of action by acquiring the product. This behavior of resisting any kind of restriction of one’s freedom of action is referred to in psychology as reactance (cf. Cialdini 2007, p. 237 ff.; Werth 2010, p. 71 ff.).

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References Ariely, D. (2010): Denken hilft zwar, nützt aber nichts. Knaur, München Cialdini, R. (2007): Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. Collins Business, New York Cialdini, R. (2016): Pre-Suasion. Random House Books, London Conger, J.A., The Necessary Art of Persuasion. In: HBR’S 10 Must Reads On Communication (2013), S. 67–89. Harvard Business Review Press, Boston Dawson, R. (1999): Secrets of Power Negotiating. 2. Aufl., Career Press, Pompton Plains Dolnik A./Fitzgerald K. (2008): Negotiating Hostage Crises With New Terrorists. Praeger Security International, Westport London Fischer, P./Asal, K./Krueger, J. (2014): Sozialpsychologie. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg Goergen, M. (2016): Crisis Negotiatiors Field Guide. 3. Aufl., Eagle Training, Minneapolis Greenstone, J.  L. (2005): The Elements of Police Hostage and Crisis Negotiations. Routledge, New York/London Häusel, H.G. (2012): Neuromarketing. 2. Aufl., Haufe, Freiburg Häusel, H.G. (2013): Kauf mich! Haufe, Freiburg Heussen B./Pischel G. (2014): Handbuch Vertragsverhandlung und Vertragsmanagement. 4. Aufl., Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln Jung, S./Krebs, P. (2016): Die Vertragsverhandlung. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden Kahneman, D. (2013): Thinking, Fast and Slow. Penguin Books, New York Kohlrieser, G. (2006): Hostage at the Table. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco Kroeber-Riel, W./Esch, F. (2015): Strategie und Technik der Werbung. 8. Aufl., Kohlhammer, Stuttgart McMains, M./Mullins, W. (2014): Crisis Negotiations. 5. Aufl., Elsevier, Amsterdam Misino, D. (2004): Negotiate and Win. McGraw-Hill, New York Nasher, J. (2013): Deal! Campus, Frankfurt a. M. Opresnik, M. (2013): Die Geheimnisse erfolgreicher Verhandlungsführung. Springer Gabler, Berlin/ Heidelberg Pink, D. (2012): To Sell is Human. Riverhead Books, New York Ross, G. (2006): Trump Style Negotiation. Wiley-VCH, New Jersey Salewski, W. (2008): Die Kunst des Verhandelns. Wiley-VCH, Weinheim Scheier C./Held, D. (2012): Wie Werbung wirkt. 2. Aufl.; Haufe, Freiburg/München Schranner, M. (2016a): Verhandeln im Grenzbereich. 13. Aufl., Econ Ullstein List, München Schranner, M. (2016b): Teure Fehler. 8. Aufl., Econ, Berlin Shell, R. (2006): Bargaining for Advantage. Penguin Books, New York Shell, R./Moussa, M. (2008): The Art of Woo. Penguin Books, New York Schweizer, M. (2005): Kognitive Täuschungen vor Gericht. Dissertation Universität Zürich Strentz, T. (2018): Psychological Aspects of Crisis Negotiation. 3. Aufl., Routledge Taylor & Francis, New York/London Werth, L. (2010): Psychologie für die Wirtschaft. Springer, Heidelberg Werth, L./Mayer, J. (2008): Sozialpsychologie. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg Ury, W. (2007): Getting Past NO. Bantam Books, New York Voss C./Raz T. (2016): Never Split The Difference. HarperCollins, New York Levin I./Schneider S./Gaeth G., All Frames are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes (1998) Vol 76, No 2, 149 ff.)

6

Driver-Seat Concept in Comparison

Private and business negotiations, if one does not opt for the strategy of avoiding or giving in from the outset, can be guided by the following three basic models: • Basic model of confrontation • Basic model of cooperation • Basic model of compromise. These three basic models (cf. Portner 2010, p. 85 and Sect. 2.5.1) each have their weaknesses that prevent you from achieving the best negotiation outcome. Driver-Seat Concept: A Hybrid Model The Driver-Seat Concept rejects the basic model of (false) compromise and combines the two basic models of confrontation and cooperation. Because of this combination, the Driver-Seat Concept is a hybrid model. The Driver-Seat Concept recommends a best practice (consisting of universally applicable strategies, tactics and tactical measures) for negotiations of all kinds, which should result in the assertion of your position being more likely than without the application of this best practice. Driver-Seat Concept: Scientifically Sound and Pragmatic The Driver-Seat Concept is scientifically sound and pragmatic. On the one hand, the Driver-Seat Concept applies strategies and tactics of the crisis negotiation model, which are based on the findings of conflict research and social psychology and are taught, among others, at the FBI Academy in Quantico (“Harvard of Law Enforcement”; Strentz 2018, p. xii), to private and professional negotiations accordingly. Second, the Driver-Seat Concept

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 H. Rock, Successful negotiation with the Driver-Seat Concept, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39934-4_6

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is pragmatic because it recommends behaviors that are typically used and successful in difficult or complex negotiations in the real world, regardless of particular doctrines (e.g., Harvard I and/or Harvard II). In doing so, the behaviors that are recommended must meet two conditions; first, they must not interfere with the building of trust (i.e., bonding) between the negotiators, and second, they must not violate the law. Lying and threatening or pretending to be false is therefore not part of best practice or the Driver-Seat Concept. Three Universally Applicable Strategies of the Crisis Negotiation Model The crisis negotiation model can be read in detail in many textbooks (see e.g. McMains and Mullins 2014) to help young negotiators negotiate. This model, taught at the FBI Academy at Quantico and elsewhere (“Harvard of Law Enforcement”; Strentz 2018, p. xii), is characterized by three universally applicable strategies, among others. • In first place is the task-oriented team strategy (“A Team First”, Misino 2004, p. 14) and thus in particular the strict separation of the tasks of the Decision Maker and the Negotiator (“The boss does not negotiate”; McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 21). • The Primary Negotiator works with a special Mind-Set and, as an extension of the Decision Maker, implements the mission using the tactics with which he is familiar. In particular, he masters the FBI’s Behavioral Change Stairway Model and uses it to implement the Decision Maker’s mission. • Finally, in relation to the process of negotiation, conflicts are analyzed during the basic listening sequence (BLS) before being resolved afterwards during the problem-solving sequence (PSS) (cf. McMains and Mullins 2014, p. 128). Driver-Seat Concept: A New Approach The Driver-Seat Concept enables a new form of negotiation. On the one hand, it applies the three universally valid strategies of the crisis negotiation model analogously and, on the other hand, combines the strengths of the basic model of confrontation with the strengths of the basic model of cooperation. At the same time, the weaknesses of these two models are eliminated. In the following, the three basic models are briefly outlined and the main deviations from the Driver-Seat Concept are commented on.

6.1 Confrontation The basic model of confrontation involves you wanting to assert your own interests (even at the expense of your partner). This is a power-oriented behavior in which you insist on your point of view and show no willingness to cooperate. In an extreme interpretation of this basic model, all means are permitted that help you to assert your positions (cf. Opresnik 2013, p. 12).

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Examples of this type of confrontation include Machiavelli’s recommendations and the Soviet Style. In detail: Machiavelli Machiavelli’s recommendations for action are, very simplified, characterized by maintaining one’s own power: “Whoever becomes the cause that another becomes powerful, perishes himself” (Machiavelli 2011, p.  32). If necessary, power is to be enforced with threats: “Fear of chastisement, however, never fails” (Machiavelli 2011, p. 95). In doing so, there is no point in behaving morally right: “Someone who sets out to act morally well in all things must perish among a mob that does not turn to it. Therefore, a prince who wishes to assert himself must also know how not to act well as needed, and do so or refrain from doing so as necessity requires” (Machiavelli 2011, p. 88). In doing so, every means is justified in order to maintain power: “Let the prince, then, be concerned only with winning and maintaining the state: the means will always be considered honorable and praised by everyone, for the great crowd always keeps it with appearances and the outcome” (Machiavelli 2011, p. 101). The main argument against the concept of threat or power-oriented behavior is the paradox of power outlined by Ury: we believe that the exercise of power, i.e. the unilateral determination of positions against the will of the other, is easy. In reality, things are different: the exercise of power (i.e., the unilateral effort to impose positions against the explicit will of the negotiating partner) is very likely to lead to resistance and thus to power struggles in which both sides only lose. Ury describes the “power paradox” as follows: “The harder you make it for them to say no, the harder you make it for them to say yes” (Ury 2007, p. 131). When you put pressure on your negotiating partner, you not only provoke resistance. You are also impairing the relationship (i.e. bonding) and thus reducing the possibility of influencing the other person. It cannot be repeated often enough: Only bonding gives you the possibility to negotiate with and influence others: “Without a bond, there will not be a negotiation” (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 43). Power-oriented behavior is therefore also an absolute “no-go” tactically from the point of view of the Driver-Seat Concept. Better build a relationship to be able to influence your partner on this basis. You will find the details in PN task No. 8 according to Sect. 3.8. The BMI stairway described there, which is based on the FBI’s Behavioral Change Stairway Model, shows how you should try to persuade your partner to change their behavior without demonstrating power. It specifically emphasizes that you should never threaten, only warn. The warning is respectful. Nevertheless, in the Driver-Seat Concept only such means are permitted that are legally impeccable and, in addition, do not impair the development of the relationship (bonding) with the negotiating partner.

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Soviet Style A good example of power-oriented bargaining is the Soviet Style as described by Cohen (Cohen 1982, p. 121): The negotiator first sets an anchor with extreme starting positions; He points out that he has little or no room for negotiation; The negotiator plays emotional outbursts; He interprets concessions from the other side as weakness and does not return them as a matter of principle (no reciprocity); • At best, concessions are offered very late and only to a very limited extent; • Time does not matter, any deadlines set will be ignored.

• • • •

These tactical measures are all legitimate. You just have to be aware that you cannot build a long-term relationship this way. Therefore, if you want to use these tactical measures, it should be a “one-shot deal” (Cohen 1982, p. 147). Moreover, if necessary, you must also be prepared to lose if the other person does not give in. Differentiation from the Driver-Seat Concept The Driver-Seat Concept chooses confrontation only in Phase A (Analyze Open Points) so that you can achieve the following four goals: • First, you want to earn respect, which is only possible if you are (initially) not giving in (cf. Glasl 2013, p. 243). • Secondly, you want to convince your partner of the correctness of your position and cause him to give in. This usually happens in relation to part of the positions. • Third, you want to gather the information that you will evaluate in the next time-out so that your Decision Maker can perform his DM task No. 4 (Learn) or define the conflicts. So (once again) it’s about Ignore (the Apparent Positions), Analyze (the Team/ Situation), Interpret (the Apparent Positions), Clarify (the Assumed Partner Positions), Define (the Real Conflicts and the Perceived Conflicts). • Fourth, get into the very effective 5-step ARRT Return Concessions tactic, which is a combination of the Anchor Effect, the Contrast Principle, and the Rule of Reciprocity (see Sect. 5.13.1). In doing so, you use the Professional Confrontation strategy, which means you are very respectful in tone and tough on the issues. My tip: If you are planning a one-shot deal, have only your own advantage in mind and can also lose, the basic model of confrontation is the model of choice for you. If, on the other hand, you want to build a relationship in order to influence the partner and then (in Phase C) find a solution that satisfies all parties, you should use the ABC strategy. To do this, focus on Professional Confrontation first, i.e. in Phase A (Analyze Open Points).

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Then take a break (Break 4 Change). Finally, in Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure), apply another strategy (Situational Cooperation) to negotiate a satisfactory solution.

6.2 Cooperation The behaviors described in the basic model of cooperation aim to find (creative) solutions together through cooperation that satisfy the interests of both parties as much as possible. Both parties should be satisfied with the new solution in the end (cf. Opresnik 2013, p. 12). Examples of the basic model of cooperation are Harvard I and Harvard II. The Harvard concept (Fisher et al. 2002, here also referred to as “Harvard I”) and the instructions for action according to Getting Past NO (Ury 2007, here also referred to as “Harvard II”), are deliberately understood as a departure from power strategies (and thus from Machiavelli) (cf. Heussen and Pischel 2014, p. 211). Harvard I foregrounds reason-­ oriented negotiation; Harvard II, in contrast, is emotion-oriented. It is basically right to refrain from power strategies unless you are planning a “one-shot deal”. As a rule, power-­ oriented behavior does not lead to the desired result; rather, as described above, it leads to resistance on the part of the other side. The Driver-Seat Concept adopts many of the recommendations of Harvard I and Harvard II, but also deviates from Harvard I and Harvard II in crucial respects. First of all, it will be explained why cooperation is not a suitable model for the entire negotiation process (cf. Sect. 6.2.1). Then the main differences between Harvard I and Harvard II on the one hand and the Driver-Seat Concept on the other are outlined (cf. Sect. 6.2.2).

6.2.1 First the Analysis of the Conflicts, Then the Solution (Cooperation) The model of cooperation recommends refraining from tough negotiations and instead resolving conflicts amicably. If you use this model of cooperation at the beginning of the negotiation, you will take the second step before the first and will most likely stumble. That is, you will not make the negotiation as successful as it can be if you follow the correct sequence of steps. As explained above (see Sect. 4.2), it is essential for the success of your negotiation that you proceed in the following order: • First analyze or define all conflicts through Professional Confrontation • Only then change the strategy • Seek joint solutions through Situation-Oriented Cooperation. So that you don’t have to scroll back, I’ll repeat the key messages again:

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First Analyze All Conflicts Start with optimistic starting positions: “Aim high in the beginning. This is good, basic goal-setting advice. … It becomes a starting point” (Ross 2006, p. 189). Go into the negotiation with the goal of asserting your starting positions: “Play to win”. Defend your starting positions in a respectful and friendly manner without giving in. Consciously steer into deadlocks: “If you initiate deadlocks as a strategy, always smile and be pleasant as you do it” (Ross 2006, p. 78). So let your negotiator celebrate the identified conflict. The identified conflict must first be discussed intensively until both sides realize that they are not getting anywhere this way. Clarify whether you have analyzed all conflicts with the following question: “If we solve all of these problems, do we have a deal?” (Ross 2006, p. 139). Document all conflicts (Open Points) in an Open Points List. This corresponds to Phase A (Analyze Open Points) of the Driver-Seat Concept. Change the Strategy After the complete conflict analysis, think about how to end the deadlock: “You can always break a deadlock” (Ross 2006, p. 80). Consciously change the strategy in a specially designated pause in the negotiation. This corresponds to Phase B (Break 4 Change) of the Driver-Seat Concept. Look for Solutions Together After analyzing all conflicts, look for creative solutions together. Don’t think primarily about winning, but about both sides being satisfied: “Trump-style negotiation is aimed at creating satisfaction for both sides, not a short negotiation where one side wins and the other side loses” (Ross 2006, p. 70). Think creatively: “Let’s think outside the box” (Ross 2006, p. 95). “Look for mutually acceptable creative solutions” (Ross 2006, p. 33). Be sure to remember to keep accurate records of discussions regarding the packages. Donald Trump used, among other things, a “dealbook” for this purpose, in which he noted all conflicts (opposing positions) and their solutions. This corresponds to Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure) of the Driver-­Seat Concept. Or in short: Play to win, initiate deadlocks as a strategy, look for mutually acceptable creative solutions.

As explained above (cf. Sect. 2.5.5), Gerhard Schwarz argues very convincingly that it is naïve to believe that one can simply skip the phase of discussing a conflict and start cooperating by, for example, only offering constructive criticism. Such conflict-averse thinking tragically misses the positive aspect of conflict: “Conflict has both a selective sense, in that it highlights differences, and the sense of establishing unity and agreement”

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(Schwarz 2014, p. 22, author’s emphasis). The meaning of conflict thus lies “both in its function of dividing and in its opposite function of uniting” (cf. Schwarz 2014, p. 23). Thus, in summary, it can be stated: With regard to the professional management of conflicts, there is a typical chronological sequence in the form of two phases: First comes destructive criticism, which calls something into question, and only then can new alternatives be developed from it (cf. Schwarz 2014, p. 31). The new alternatives can be called constructive criticism. However, an “ideology that only allows “constructive criticism” is very often a conflict avoidance strategy” (Schwarz 2014, p. 32). The intensive and respectful discussion (destructive criticism) in the form of insisting on one’s own position and defending it intensively is what leads to the conflict being precisely defined in the first place (cf. Schwarz 2014, p. 300). Focusing exclusively on cooperation is usually not conducive to achieving the goal. After the general criticism of the negotiation model of cooperation (which also avoids conflict at the beginning of the negotiation), I will now go into the probably best-known representatives of the negotiation model of cooperation: Harvard I and Harvard II. Harvard I, for example, explicitly recommends “framing the negotiation as a cooperation in which the two of you, for all your differences, different perceptions, and emotional aspects, approach the common task side by side” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 74).

6.2.2 Seven Differences Between Harvard I/Harvard II and the Driver-Seat Concept If you compare the Driver-Seat Concept with Harvard I and Harvard II, there are essentially seven differences. You must decide for yourself which strategies and tactics you feel comfortable with. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the Driver-Seat Concept, the following seven differences are also seven weaknesses. Weaknesses that the Driver-Seat Concept compensates for. Difference No. 1: No Overall Concept Harvard I and Harvard II focus on selected aspects of negotiation. However, they do not contain structured instructions for action with regard to all relevant tasks of the Decision Maker and all relevant activities of the Primary Negotiator. This makes Harvard I and Harvard II understandable only to professionals. The beginner lacks the structure necessary to be able to classify the selected recommendations of Harvard I and Harvard II. The Driver-Seat Concept, on the other hand, is also written for beginners and therefore contains an overall concept consisting of structured instructions for both the Decision Maker and the Negotiator, as summarized in Sect. 6.4. My tip: Work with overall concepts that give you comprehensive instructions for action.

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Difference No. 2: No Team Strategy A professional approach to negotiation must include an explanation of the team’s strategy. Neither Harvard I nor Harvard II addresses team strategy. Rather, it accepts task cumulation of decision-making and negotiation by the same person and the concomitant impairment of the objectivity of the decision. Harvard I recognizes the problem of lack of distance (cf. Fisher et al. 2018, p. 99), but does not solve it (for example, by recommending a team strategy). In doing so, Harvard I also rejects the “Good Guy/Bad Guy tactic” as “a deceptive maneuver in the context of psychological warfare” (Fisher et al. 2002, p. 191). In the new 2018 edition, the critique has been toned down somewhat. It is still a “dirty trick” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 188), but only as “a form of psychological manipulation” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 198). The Driver-Seat Concept, on the other hand, explicitly recommends the use of the team strategy. The tasks that the Decision Maker and the Negotiator have to perform are so complex that they cannot be performed by one person at a time (Sect. 2.1). The Driver-Seat Concept also explicitly recommends the use of the Good Guy/Bad Guy tactic. This tactic ensures that one person can build and develop the relationship needed for the negotiation (bonding according to the first three steps of the BMI stairway as described in Sect. 3.8), while another person can communicate in plain language and clear tone those demands that are important to the Decision Maker without having to pay attention to the relationship. If the only person at the negotiating table becomes too explicit, this can prevent the relationship from building and lead to a breakdown in the negotiation. Here the pragmatic approach of the Driver-Seat Concept becomes apparent: it is not helpful to reject a tactic that is an integral part of difficult negotiations and obviously corresponds to the human need to speak plain language on the one hand and to establish relationships on the other. Thus, even the crisis negotiation model recommends that the negotiator, who needs to build trust, blame everything “negative” on someone else: “Blame the problems on someone else” (Greenstone 2005, p. 53). I myself have not experienced a single challenging negotiation in the last 20 years in which the Good Guy/Bad Guy tactic was not used. Consider also that this tactic was used to release 52 U.S. citizens from hostage detention on January 20, 1981 (cf. para. 2.1.4). My tip: Always use the team strategy, including the Good Guy/Bad Guy tactic (see Sect. 2.1.4). Difference No. 3:No Position Bargaining for Conflict Analysis Harvard I advises its readers not to argue or “haggle” over positions. In Chap. I, entitled “The Problem,” the authors make the claim that arguing over positions is not efficient. The 2018 reprint also asserts that “Haggling does not lead to wise, efficient, and consensual decisions” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 28 as well as 2002, p. 21). This is the basic assumption of Harvard I. The Driver-Seat Concept does not follow this basic assumption. According to the point of view represented here, bargaining for positions is not only very efficient, but even

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indispensable. As stated above, position bargaining pursues four goals, which I deliberately repeat to help you remember them: • First, you want to earn respect, which is only possible if you are (initially) not giving in (cf. Glasl 2013, p. 243). • Secondly, you want to convince your partner of the correctness of your position and cause your partner to give in. This usually happens in relation to part of the positions. • Third, you want to gather the information that you will evaluate in the next time-out so that your Decision Maker can perform his DM task No. 4 (Learn) and define the conflicts. So it is (once again) about Ignore, Analyze, Interpret, Clarify, Define. • Fourth, get into the very effective 5-step ARRT Return Concessions tactic, which is a combination of the Anchor Effect, the Contrast Principle, and the Rule of Reciprocity (see Sect. 5.13.1). Even the rejection of confrontation overlooks, again I repeat myself deliberately, the scientific findings of conflict research: “Conflict is positive” (Kohlrieser 2006, p.  101). Therefore, never avoid honest, clear conflict where you treat your partner with dignity and respect: “don’t avoid honest, clear conflict”. Also, always assume that all conflicts are resolvable: “In the end, all conflicts can be solved” (Kohlrieser 2006, p. 112). In other words, the basic assumption of Harvard I (“bargaining does not lead to wise, efficient, and consensual decisions”; 2018, p. 28) is not shared here. My tip is to use position bargaining (cf. Sect. 4.2.1) in Phase A (Analyze Open Points) on level 5 of the BMI stairway in order to define the conflicts. In Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure), on the other hand, use “give and take” bargaining on level 5 of the BMI stairway. Difference No 4: Failure to Take the Whole Situation into Account Harvard I’s call to “Focus on interests, not positions” (Fisher et al. 2002, p. 68) or “Focus on interests, not positions” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 75 ff.) is not sufficient according to the Driver-Seat Concept. Rather, in addition to interests, the entire situation must be analyzed. This includes the World-Check, the Leverage-Check, the Options-Check and the Overconfidence-Check (cf. Sect. 2.3.1). According to the (process-oriented) ABC strategy advocated here (cf. Sect. 4.2), you should first determine the negotiating partner’s overall situation by means of “position bargaining” (insisting on and explaining your own positions). Only in the later Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure) should you negotiate situation-oriented packages. At the same time, do not disclose your own situation as long and as far as possible. Remember that any information can be used against you. Learn from the FBI: “We restrict information given to or received by the subject because knowledge is power and power means control” (Strentz 2018, p. 62). Harvard I fails to recognize this danger, which is why it is very advantageous to negotiate with adherents of Harvard I. Indeed, Harvard I recommends that “… the first thing you

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do is present your interests and considerations …” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 90) or “… it is very wise to disclose your interests” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 93). My advice is to always analyze the whole situation and be very cautious about giving information about your own situation (see Sect. 2.4.3). Difference No. 5: No Individual Conflict Solutions Harvard I: Resolution of conflicts through objective criteria. In terms of resolving the conflicts that exist despite the abandonment of position bargaining due to different interests (e.g. high rent versus low rent, high purchase price versus low purchase price), Harvard I focuses exclusively on reason. This is to avoid confrontation. The new 2018 edition also states that the free will of the negotiators “is not an appropriate basis for a decision, but that a solution must satisfy fair criteria” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 38 f.). In this context, outcomes must be found “that do not depend on the will of the parties involved” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 40). Accordingly, the authors explicitly recommend several times to “achieve an outcome that is independent of the will of the parties involved” (Fisher et  al., p.  132). The benchmark should be solely “objective criteria” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 27). By way of explanation, the authors go on to say, “This means that the yardstick is not discretionary, but must be an objective standard such as market value, expert opinion, good morals, or legal rules” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 39). Finally, it is clarified, “Objective criteria are your cool partner, not allowing you to be pressured. Law makes strong” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 139). Individual solutions to conflicts (e.g. through “give and take bargaining”) are thus rejected; instead, it is exclusively a matter of finding an “objectively correct” solution. Harvard I: Getting Started with the Rules of the Game. In this context, Harvard I recommends setting the rules of the game right at the beginning of the negotiation. For example, the negotiator should say: “This may be unusual, but I would like to know what the rules of the game are. Are we both interested in reaching a smart agreement as quickly and efficiently as possible? Or do we want to play hardball negotiation, with the stubbornest winning?” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 207). Harvard I: Break off in case of Violation of the Rules of the Game. Finally, Harvard I recommends its users to break off negotiations if the other side does not engage with the rules of the game: “If the other side still does not move and does not present any factual arguments for its position, then the negotiation is over” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 139). Wording for termination is even suggested: “I get the impression you have a different idea of negotiation than I do. You have my phone number. If I’m wrong, I’ll be

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happy to be at your disposal. Until then, we will take legal action” (Fisher et al. 2018, p. 192). It should be noted here that Harvard I rejects threats in principle, but recommends them when one’s own rules of the game are violated. In addition, it overlooks the fact that there is often no legal recourse in negotiations; you either reach an agreement or you break it off. Overall, the authors urge users of Harvard I to adhere exactly to this concept, dictate it to the partner, and break off negotiations if the partner wants an individual conflict resolution that deviates from objective criteria. At the same time, many (legal) behaviors that can be experienced on a daily basis in negotiation reality are described as “dirty tricks” (cf. Fisher et al. 2018, p. 188 ff.) and rejected. Thus, Harvard I is in reality a “concept of dictated cooperation”: it is a cooperation in which only fact-based arguments or objective criteria are allowed for conflict resolution. Individual solutions are explicitly rejected by the concept of dictated cooperation. For whatever reason, even the 2018 new edition omits the findings of social psychology or conflict studies, which are briefly reiterated below. First, I would like to address the aspect of confrontation (confrontation is necessary and, moreover, unavoidable) and then the very limited usefulness of factual arguments: Contra Harvard I: Human Decisions Are Not Based on Arguments. The concept of dictated cooperation, according to which conflicts are to be solved exclusively with factual arguments, is not convincing, if only because it contradicts scientific knowledge, according to which “a person (is) not at all able to perceive a thing purely factually, he will always model it with his very personal evaluations, as it were, and attribute to it a personal evaluation aspect in addition to the factual aspect” (Salewski 2008, p. 31). Since people always make their decisions “on an emotional level in the area of tension between desires and fears” (Salewski 2008, p. 47. Author’s emphasis) and precisely not on the basis of factual considerations, it makes no sense to look for solutions in a negotiation that are “independent of the will of the parties”. On the contrary, you need to understand the motives of the negotiating partner in order to interpret his arguments (cf. Salewski 2008, p. 40). Indeed, human decisions are emotional: “the actual decision making is governed by emotion”(Voss and Raz 2016, p.  122). Thus, negotiations are also emotional and not rational, or to put it in a nutshell: “negotiations are never rational, even if it seems so” (Salewski 2008, p. 52). Contra Harvard I: Arguments Only Work if the Partner Is Motivated Accordingly. The concept of dictated cooperation, according to which conflicts are to be solved exclusively with factual arguments, is also not convincing because it depends very much on the personality of your negotiating partner whether and how he processes your arguments (cf. Sect. 5.3.5).

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If your partner is not willing to activate his Analytical System II, he will process your arguments in his Intuitive System I and thus heuristically, which can be good or bad. Even if your partner activates his Analytical System II, his reaction depends on the motive that moves him. • If the defense motive predominates, you have classic difficult negotiations and should analyze all expressions that serve the defense in order to enter the emotional and rational world of your partner. The defense motive can be activated very quickly. Arguments can be perceived as aggression by your partner, as already pointed out above (cf. Sect. 5.3.2): “In terms of the dynamics of conversation, every argument contains the seeds of aggression” (Salewski 2008, p.  111). This is especially true when the arguer sees himself in the right. Such “bossiness” typically leads your partner automatically to resistance instead of the intended compliance regarding your position. Also, thinking you have “good arguments” yourself easily leads to domineering behavior. This in turn can lead to your partner perceiving dominance instead of arguments, which triggers resistance in them just as much (Salewski 2008 p. 113). The statement “right makes strong” (see above) is thus not true. Accordingly, personalities who like to focus on arguing are not considered efficient negotiators (cf. Strentz 2018, p. 43). • If the motive of social impression dominates and your partner wants to be perceived as consistent, you also have difficult negotiations and should analyze all expressions of defense to enter the emotional and rational world of your partner. • On the other hand, if the truth motive dominates, there is a chance that the factual argument will convince your partner. • Contra Harvard I: Objective Criteria Are the Source of Conflict. The assumption that confrontation can necessarily be avoided by relying on objective criteria is also not correct. Objective criteria can resolve conflicts, but at the same time they can also be a source of conflict. Laws, for example, contain a large number of objective criteria which, in reality, are interpreted differently by different parties. That is why there are lawyers who make a very good living from setting out these different interpretations in pleadings before courts. Since judges also have different opinions about the allegedly objective law, it is not uncommon for judgments to differ depending on the instance. Contra Harvard I: Summary. The assumption that one could avoid confrontation by • on the one hand, renounces position bargaining and

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• on the other hand, resolves conflicts of interest through the concept of dictated cooperation (only objective criteria are allowed for conflict resolution), cannot be reconciled with the reality of negotiations, according to my experience as a lawyer in more than 20 years of demanding negotiations. Rather, the following applies: • Conflicts and the associated confrontation are necessary and positive, they must not be avoided. On the contrary, conflicts must be discussed professionally. This also includes position bargaining. • It is often very difficult to solve a conflict with objective criteria or rational arguments. People decide in the end not on the basis of rational arguments, but emotionally. Negotiations are therefore in reality emotional (not rational). • Moreover, people process arguments differently (either only in the Intuitive System I or additionally in the Analytical System II), and the processing depends on the motivation. If the defense motive predominates, the defense of one’s own position is in the foreground, not, for example, the search for a solution that the other side (from your point of view) considers to be rational. You can even jeopardize the success of your negotiation with objective arguments, namely whenever you feel you are in the right. If you rely on objective arguments and your partner is not persuaded by them, this can come across as aggressive. Listen to the very experienced (former) police psychologist Salewski: “Conversationally, in every argument there is the seed of aggression” (Salewski 2008, p. 111). This aggression tends to lead to defense rather than agreement. • The optimal solution: Assume that both Professional Confrontation (cf. Sect. 2.5.2) and Position Bargaining (cf. Sect. 4.2.1) are very effective. Do not only work with arguments (which can be effective), but also use the remaining 14 Weapons of Influence according to Chap. 5 and look for individual solutions which depend on the will of both sides and therefore satisfy both sides.

Difference No. 6: No Assertive Negotiation (CFO Tactics vs. BATNA Model) Both Harvard I and Harvard II recommend the so-called BATNA model, i.e. the constant orientation towards the Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement. As already explained above (Sect. 2.6.3), the BATNA model is not part of best practice: on the one hand, the BATNA model forces you to orient yourself “downwards”, i.e. to a lower reference point; on the other hand, the BATNA model thus simultaneously prevents you from using the motivating power of a target position and thus from orienting yourself to an upper reference point and negotiating confidently. The Driver-Seat Concept also rejects the BATNA model and recommends the CFO tactic instead (see Sect. 2.6.2). With the CFO tactic (Compare, Focus, Optimize) you choose a (preliminary) ranking of the options. In doing so, you optimize the respective

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option by considering to what extent you transfer “advantageous” aspects of other options to your preferred option. My tip: Optimize any options with the CFO tactic (see Sect. 2.6.2). Deficit No. 7: Lack of Comprehensive Influence The Driver-Seat Concept distinguishes between 15 Weapons of Influence and recommends that they be used (cf. Chap. 5). In contrast, Harvard I focuses only on the three weapons “arguments”, “Social Proof” (standards) and “fairness”. Harvard II still mentions the two weapons of participation and framing (activating loss aversion in the section “Don’t Escalate: Use Power to Educate”). Harvard I and II’s reduction to only five weapons of influence (arguments, fairness, Social Proof, participation, and loss framing) is insufficient. Jung/Krebs also find fault with Harvard I’s insufficient attention to the insights of behavioral economics (cf. Jung and Krebs 2016, p. 219). Notwithstanding this, Harvard I and II of course remain “an absolute milestone in negotiation science” (Jung and Krebs, p. 220). My tip: Basically, apply – and defend against – all Weapons of Influence.

[7 Differences from Harvard I and Harvard II]

Thus, in summary, the Driver-Seat Concept differs from Harvard I and Harvard II in terms of seven aspects: 1. The Driver-Seat Concept recommends an overall concept with structured instructions for action. Harvard I and Harvard II, on the other hand, limit themselves to individual, in part very significant instructions for action. 2. The Driver-Seat Concept considers team strategy to be indispensable. Decision Maker and Negotiator must be fundamentally different people. The Bad Guy/Good Guy tactic is also necessary so that, on the one hand, the Good Guy (Primary Negotiator) can establish and maintain the relationship with the partner and, on the other hand, the Bad Guy (e.g. a lawyer) can speak plainly. Harvard I explicitly rejects the Bad Guy/Good Guy tactic. 3. The Driver-Seat Concept considers position bargaining (at least initially) to be necessary in order i) to gain respect, ii) to possibly assert positions, iii) to define the conflicts, and iv) to bring the weapon of reciprocity to bear. Harvard I and Harvard II reject position bargaining. Instead, only interests are to be discussed. 4. The Driver-Seat Concept does not only focus on interests; rather, the entire situation is always analyzed (World-Check, Leverage-Check, OptionsCheck, Overconfidence-­Check). Harvard I and Harvard II focus only on interests; this corresponds to the World-Check. (continued)

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(continued) 5. The Driver-Seat Concept assumes that the resolution of conflicts is based on, among other things, entering the highly individual world of the partner and seeking the solution there. Reasonable arguments can only contribute to conflict resolution if both partners are open-minded about the arguments. This is rarely the case in difficult negotiations. Notwithstanding this, human decisions are emotional and thus negotiations are never rational anyway. Harvard I, on the other hand, assumes the rationally acting human being and allows only “reasonable” conflict solutions that are independent of the will of the parties. This is what I call the dictated cooperation model. The Driver-Seat Concept, on the other hand, recognizes that people process arguments differently (either only in the Intuitive System I or additionally in the Analytical System II) and that the type of processing depends on the motivation. If, for example, the defense motive predominates, the argumentation will never lead to a solution. 6. The Driver-Seat Concept has developed the CFO tactic (Compare, Focus, Optimize) to compare different options. Harvard I and Harvard II apply the BATNA model, which, however, should be rejected (cf. Schranner 2016, p. 125 ff., Voss and Raz 2016, p. 252), because this way you orientate yourself to a lower reference point and not to your target. 7. The Driver-Seat Concept strives for a comprehensive influencing of the negotiating partner as well as a defense against the influencing by the negotiating partner. Harvard I and Harvard II recommend only individual weapons of influence. Summary: The new 2018 edition of Harvard I claims, “There is no more practical and closer-to-reality guide to successful negotiation” (Luksch in Fisher et al. 2018, p.  11). After more than 20  years of intensive negotiation practice and academic study, I argue the exact opposite. With its focus on “objective criteria”, the Harvard concept is a concept of dictated cooperation and thus not suitable for solving really difficult cases by way of bilateral negotiation. It only works if both partners really want to negotiate reasonably. In the last 20 years, this has very very rarely been the case in my practice. With respect to the 2018 new edition, it is more than surprising that any discussion of the criticisms of the Harvard concept, first published in 1981, is missing. Also missing is any reference to the relevant literature. This gives the impression that criticism is not accepted. In this regard, too, the FBI thinks and acts differently and should be a model for us all. It always strives to learn from past mistakes and to adapt its negotiation model: “The police practice of using hostage negotiations … has come a long way during the last 20 years. We continue to learn from our past. Not to do so is to repeat our mistakes” (Strentz 2018, p. 44).

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6.3 Compromise The basic model of compromise is the quick agreement. People are too lazy to take the time needed to find creative solutions that satisfy everyone. It’s not for nothing that people talk about “false compromises.” For example, one meets in the middle of two opposing positions. Each party is dissatisfied, but a quick agreement is reached. There is no attempt to find an optimal solution (cf. Schranner 2013, p. 82). This model is very often used in politics. You can find more on this topic in the book “Faule Kompromisse, Wie gut verhandeln unsere Politiker?” by Matthias Schranner. The Driver-Seat Concept basically rejects the compromise. The reason is very simple. False compromises by definition lead to outcomes with which neither side is satisfied. As described by Schwarz above (cf. Sect. 2.5.5), compromises are often made (at his level 4) in which both sides feel like losers (cf. Schwarz 2014, p. 311). My tip: As a Decision Maker, apply the (process-oriented) ABC strategy, i.e. start with Professional Confrontation in Phase A (Analyze Open Points) and then, after defining all conflicts (Open Points List), think about changing the conflict strategy in Phase B (Break 4 Change). Then basically apply the conflict strategy of Situation-Oriented Cooperation in Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure).

6.4 Driver-Seat Concept How does the Driver-Seat Concept position itself? It is based on the model of crisis negotiations and has adapted and expanded this in relation to private and professional negotiations. The following aspects characterize the Driver-Seat Concept: 1. TOP LADY Formula and 360 ° Negotiation Concept The Decision Maker applies the TOP LADY formula (Team, Options, Positions, Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction). With this he first develops the mission (TOP) and then monitors it (LADY). With his mission to the Negotiator (Your Instruction) he enters the 360 ° Negotiation Concept. The Primary Negotiator accepts this instruction according to PN Task No. 7 and reports to the Decision Maker according to PN Task No. 10. The Decision Maker then resumes the tasks of the Mission Control (LADY) and issues a new instruction. This is practiced until the Decision Maker gives the instruction to conclude the deal by a satisfactory agreement or to cancel it.

6.4  Driver-Seat Concept

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2. Team Strategy The Driver-Seat Concept also relies on the task-oriented team strategy (Sect. 2.1) and makes a strict distinction between the tasks of the Decision Maker (cf. Sect. 2) and the Primary Negotiator (Sect. 3). 3. BMI Strategy Further, the Driver-Seat Concept has extended the FBI’s five-stage Behavioral Change Stairway Model to all types of personal and professional negotiations. I have added Level 4 (Learn) and Level 5 (Bargain). At Level 6 (Influence), the Professional Negotiator intensifies the Weapons of Influence. At level 7 (Compliance/Non-Compliance) the Negotiator either finds a common solution or establishes a (temporary or final) Deadlock. I call the stairway extended in this way with the aspects Bonding, Mission, Influence the BMI stairway and the strategy on which this staircase is based the (behavior-oriented) BMI strategy (cf. Sect. 3.8). 4. ABC Strategy Finally, the Driver-Seat Concept rejects (false) compromise. For your private and professional negotiations, I have developed the (process-oriented) ABC strategy, which ensures that you start every negotiation with the Professional Confrontation. This is Phase A (Analyze Open Points). Once you have noted the conflicts on an Open Points List, pause to allow the Decision Maker to switch strategies during this particular time-out. This is Phase B (Break 4 Change). After that, if you are interested in a long-term relationship with the partner, you will continue your negotiations with the Situation-Oriented Cooperation. This is Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure). Due to the structured combination of Professional Confrontation with Situational Cooperation, the Driver-Seat Concept is also a hybrid model. The Driver-Seat Concept is the model of choice if you are looking for a solution that satisfies both parties for the following reasons: Compromise is rejected because, by definition, it does not satisfy the parties. The confrontation is modified. Professional confrontation applies, with which, among other things, you first define the conflicts (respectful in personal dealings, tough on the matter). Cooperation does not begin until the conflicts have been fully defined (through Professional Confrontation or Position Bargaining). You can remember 90% of tactics with three memorable images: • An organizational chart reminds you of the (task-oriented) team strategy; • The stairway with seven steps reminds you of the (behavioral) BMI strategy and • A calendar sheet with three dates (9 am-12 pm (Phase A), 12 pm to 2 pm (Phase B) and 2 pm to 6 pm (Phase C)) reminds you of the process-oriented ABC strategy.

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References Cohen, H. (1982): You Can Negotiate Anything. Bantam Books, New York Fisher, R./Ury, W./Patton, B. (2002): Das Harvard-Konzept, sachgerecht verhandeln, erfolgreich verhandeln. 21. Aufl., Campus, Frankfurt a. M./New York Fisher, R./Ury, W./Patton, B. (2018): Das Harvard-Konzept. Neuauflage, Deutsche Verlags-­ Anstalt, München Glasl, F. (2013): Konfliktmanagement. 11. Aufl., Haupt/Freies Geistesleben, Stuttgart Greenstone, J.  L. (2005): The Elements of Police Hostage and Crisis Negotiations. Routledge, New York/London Heussen B./Pischel G. (2014): Handbuch Vertragsverhandlung und Vertragsmanagement. 4. Aufl., Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln Jung, S./Krebs, P. (2016): Die Vertragsverhandlung. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden Kohlrieser, G. (2006): Hostage at the Table. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco Machiavelli, N. (2011): Der Fürst. 5. Aufl., Nikol Verlag, Hamburg McMains, M./Mullins, W. (2014): Crisis Negotiations. 5. Aufl., Elsevier, Amsterdam Misino, D. (2004): Negotiate and Win. McGraw-Hill, New York Opresnik, M. (2013): Die Geheimnisse erfolgreicher Verhandlungsführung. Springer Gabler, Berlin/ Heidelberg Portner, J. (2010): Besser verhandeln. 2. Aufl., Gabal, Offenbach Ross, G. (2006): Trump Style Negotiation. Wiley-VCH, New Jersey Salewski, W. (2008): Die Kunst des Verhandelns. Wiley-VCH, Weinheim Schranner, M. (2013): Faule Kompromisse. Econ, Berlin Schranner, M. (2016): Teure Fehler. 8. Aufl., Econ, Berlin Schwarz, G. (2014): Konfliktmanagement. 9. Aufl., Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden Strentz, T. (2018): Psychological Aspects of Crisis Negotiation. 3. Aufl., Routledge Taylor & Francis, New York/London Ury, W. (2007): Getting Past NO. Bantam Books, New York Voss C./Raz T. (2016): Never Split The Difference. HarperCollins, New York

7

Checklist for the DM

The Decision Maker has seven tasks, but they have nothing to do with direct negotiation. These seven tasks are part of the TOP LADY formula: • • • •

form a team (and not negotiate themselves) (“Team”) develop several options, if this is possible (“Options”) develop the positions for each option (“Positions”). These first three steps are fundamental and serve to first develop a starting point in terms of one’s own positions.

The abbreviation for these three activities (Mission Development) is TOP (Team, Options, Positions), which is a good food for thought, since the Decision Maker is always “on the TOP”. The Decision Maker will then repeat the following four steps over and over again, which are also an integral part of the 360° Negotiation Concept. He will continuously • obtain and evaluate information about the situation of the negotiating partner or one’s own situation (“Learn”) • possibly carry out an adaptation of one’s own strategy/positions (“Adapt”) • hold an in-depth discussion with the team on how to proceed (“Discuss”) • give a specific instruction to the negotiator for each option (“Your Instruction”). The last four steps (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, or LADY for short) are used to constantly monitor the mission (Mission Control).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 H. Rock, Successful negotiation with the Driver-Seat Concept, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39934-4_7

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7.1 Team Formation (DM Task No. 1) A Team First (Dominick J. Misino).

1. The role of the Decision Maker and the role of the Primary Negotiator are – in principle – strictly separated. The One Man Team should be the absolute exception! 2. The Decision Maker determines/supervises the mission and leads the entire project team. He always has the following additional roles: Bad Guy not present in the negotiation and Higher Authority. In addition, he must monitor compliance with the division of roles. Greenstone’s Law No. 10 applies: “Negotiators don’t command, and commanders don’t negotiate”. N-Team: 3. The Primary Negotiator is always the Good Guy and thus responsible for bonding; he masters and practices the BMI strategy (cf. Sect. 3.8.) and the Weapons of Influence (cf. Chap. 5). Relationship takes precedence over position. He monitors strict adherence to communication discipline. He is technically very competent and the “single point of contact”. He can also lead the negotiating team (N-Team Leader), but he listens to the advice of the Secondary Negotiator. As N-Team Leader he is responsible for the communication with the Decision Maker, ideally he reports together with the Secondary Negotiator to the Decision Maker. The Primary Negotiator must try to negotiate directly with the Decision Maker of the other side in order to be able to influence him directly. 4. The (very experienced) Secondary Negotiator has several roles. As a non-talking Negotiator, he/she will focus in particular on Active Listening (see Sect. 3.8.1) and on his/her role as coach to the Primary Negotiator. As a coach, he will monitor the Primary Negotiator’s tactics and ensure communication with the Primary Negotiator to the Decision Maker. If he has significantly more experience than the Primary Negotiator, he should be the N-Team Leader. 5. The Bad Guy present in the negotiation is allowed to clearly communicate negative messages and appear “tough and nasty”, he does not have to move on the positions he presents. Position comes before relationship. 6. Experts support the Decision Maker or Primary Negotiator according to the tasks assigned to them. Experts (e.g. lawyers) can act as a present Bad Guy. The Decision Maker decides whether or which experts participate in the negotiations. 7. In almost all cases, you can choose one of the three basic models: The Standard Team (one Decision Maker and only one Primary Negotiator), the Performance Team (one Decision Maker and two negotiating persons, namely one Primary Negotiator as Good Guy and one Bad Guy) or the High Performance Team (one board as Decision Maker, another Decision Maker and three negotiating persons, namely one Primary Negotiator as Good Guy, one Bad Guy and one Secondary Negotiator). Please negotiate as a One Man Team only as an exception. 8. Before negotiations, write a team email internally in which you distribute the roles.

7.3  Positions (DM Task No. 3)

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7.2 Checklist: Options (DM Task No. 2) Maximize Your Options … keep a lot of balls in the air (Donald Trump).

1. Options serve three purposes in particular: gaining flexibility, getting information, building psychological pressure on the partner. You should therefore try to maximize the number of options: “Maximize Your Options … keep a lot of balls in the air” (Trump). 2. Start with your Professional Options Mind Set –– Options are a “nice to have”, not a “must have”; lack of alternatives does not lead to hopelessness, just knowing best practice is the foundation of your confidence, not the existence of options; –– Designate your options neutrally. 3. Continue with the Active Analysis of your options: –– If you (currently) have no options: Complete DM Task No. 2 and complete your DM Tasks No. 3, No. 4, No. 5, No. 6, and No.7. –– If you (currently) have options: Proceed to number 4. 4. Keep it real: Do you have “Safe Options” or “Possible Options”? –– Safe options: Condition security and exercise sovereignty (rare) –– Possible options: at least one of the aforementioned elements is missing (complex). 5. Consider the Window of Opportunity: options are a temporary luxury.

7.3 Positions (DM Task No. 3) Commander sets the goal (Dominick J. Misino).

1. Analyze the position foundation “Keep your goal realistic or you won’t achieve it” (Misino). With regard to your project, first analyze the –– standard topics and –– the standard positions. 2. Analyze your individual situation “Be an agent of reality” (Greenstone). (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check) –– World-Check “Consider carefully what really matters to you” (Shell). Analyze your world intensively. Your world is primarily your individual interests, i.e. your (basically uncommunicated) motives on which your (outwardly communicated) positions are based. In relation to each position, ask yourself, “What do I really want?”

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Your individual positions are an expression of your individual world. –– Leverage-Check “Leverage is having something the other guy wants” (Trump). Ask yourself the following questions over and over again, after each new piece of information: What does your partner need from you qualitatively? Are you (almost) the only one who can deliver exactly this quality? How does your leverage affect your positions to be developed (premium/ discount relative to market standard)? Basically, assume that your negotiating partner only has POSSIBLE options. Believe in yourself and your leverage! –– Options-Check “I like to keep every option open in life” (Trump). What information have you been able to obtain on possible issues and/or positions on those options that you are not actively engaged with at the moment? Based on this information, do you want to change the issues and/or positions related to whichever option you are actively considering? –– Overconfidence-Check “Do not simply trust intuitive judgment” (Kahneman). Every perception leads to judgments in the Intuitive System I.  These judgments can be correct, but they can also be false judgments. Realize that people tend to overestimate their abilities (overconfidence effect), which in turn can lead to misjudgments (overconfidence bias). Combat the effects of the Overconfidence Effect by activating your Analytical System II and answering three questions: The quality question: Do you have relevant information? (Facts/confirmations + necessary for the assessment of the situation) The quantity question: Do you have all the relevant information? The Rationality Question: Have you considered the laws of statistics and probability as well as your own utility? 3. Develop your individual positions “You can’t start negotiating if you don’t know what you want” (Misino). –– Now decide on your target positions, taking into account the position foundation and your individual situation: “You have to know exactly what it is you want” (Misino). Formulate these concrete target positions in writing. Professional target positions are also challenging and therefore motivating. –– Then decide on your starting positions based on the target positions with the Red Face Test: “Start bidding high to give yourself room to negotiate” (Rule No. 7, FBI Guideline 1970). These are the positions with which you send your Primary Negotiator to the start.

7.4  Learn (DM Task No. 4)

399

–– Basically, concentrate on your individual target positions and starting positions. As a matter of principle, only deal with the stop positions as a subordinate matter: “Prepare your bottom line, then set it aside” (Shell). There is one exception: If undercutting/exceeding your stop positions in any case hurts your interests, you must strictly observe the stop positions from the start; for example, the following applies without restriction to suppliers in relation to a price buyer: “Walk away at your identified low price” (Holden). –– Work on your position mind-set: “Commit to your goal” (Shell) think “I am entitled to this” or “I am committed to achieving these target positions”, believe that you can reach your target positions (“I will reach my goals”) and imagine reaching the target positions in pictures. Note: “The power of both success and failure starts inside our minds” (Kohlrieser). –– If necessary, use the TIP tactic (topics, interests, positions) as a guide.

7.4 Learn (DM Task No. 4) Think intelligence first, second, and last (James L. Greenstone).

• Step 1: Ignore (at first) the positions communicated by the partner “And most demands, frankly, are bullshit” (Misino). –– These are smokescreens or apparent positions; always assume the presence of communication breakdowns. –– Throw the apparent positions in your mental wastebasket. –– Listen professionally; consciously hear a position where you remain relaxed: “When a subject demands “$1 million,” the negotiators actually hear “a 6-pack of soda”” (Wind). • Step 2: Analyze the partner team “There is always a team on the other side” (Voss/Raz). –– Do you already have information about your partner’s team line-up? –– Identify the partner team’s Decision Maker (and have your Primary negotiate with them if possible). –– Identify the Primary Negotiator of the Partner Team. –– Consider the diversity of interests of the team members. • Step 3: Analyze the situation(s) “Continue evaluation of situation” (Greenstone). –– World-Check “I must get into your world” (Cohen). Do you already have information about your partner’s world?

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7  Checklist for the DM

The analysis of each partner’s mission (and its components) always begins with the technique of Role Reversal. Role Reversal means in the following order: Consciously leave your own world: “Do not inject your values into the situation” (Goergen). Enter the emotional and the rational world of your partner: “I must get into your world” (Cohen). For the Negotiator, “Negotiate in their world” (Voss/Raz) also applies. Leverage-Check “Leverage is having something the other guy wants” (Trump). Ask yourself the following questions over and over again, after each new piece of information: Do you already have information on your partner’s leverage? What do you need from your partner in terms of quality? Is your partner (almost) the only one who can deliver exactly these qualities? Does your partner think he is the only one who can deliver this quality? Note: “Perception beats reality.” How does the partner leverage that your partner subjectively perceives affect your negotiation assignment, especially your target positions (surcharge/discount)? Options-Check “I like to keep every option open in life” (Trump). Do you already have information about your partner’s options? Does your partner have Safe Options or Possible Options? Does your partner think they have Safe or Possible options? Note: “Perception beats reality.” How do the partner options that your partner subjectively perceives affect your negotiation order, especially your target positions (surcharge/discount)? Overconfidence-Check “Do not simply trust intuitive judgment” (Kahneman). Every perception leads to judgments in the Intuitive System I. These judgments can be correct, but they can also be false judgments. Realize that people tend to overestimate their abilities (overconfidence effect), which in turn can lead to misjudgments (overconfidence bias). Combat the effects of the Overconfidence Effect by activating your Analytical System II and answering three questions: The quality question: Do you have relevant information? (Facts/confirmations + necessary for the assessment of the situation) The quantity question: Do you have all the relevant information? The Rationality Question: Have you considered the laws of statistics and probability as well as your own utility? Step 4: Interpret the partner positions “Hear what isn’t being said” (Greenstone) –– Interpret the last positions communicated by your partner.

7.5  Adapt: Determine the Strategies and Positions (DM Task No. 5)

401

–– The benchmark is your current information on the partner situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check). –– The result of your respective interpretation are the (currently) Assumed Partner Positions. This assumption is as certain as the weather forecast. • Step 5: Clarify the real content of the partner positions “Never assume – clarify statements” (Greenstone). –– Clarify by asking specific questions whether your assumptions according to step 4 (Assumed Partner Positions) are correct (“Is my assumption correct that you actually only need the peel and not the whole orange?”). –– Analyze each “yes”: ““Yes” is nothing without how” (Voss/Raz). –– Analyze each “No”: ““No” is a reaction, not a position” (Cohen). Put the Protection No and the Rejection No on the Open Points List, you are more likely to turn a Protection No into a Commitment Yes. Be sure to note: “To ASSUME anything makes an “ASS” of “U” and “ME”” (Greenstone). • Step 6: Define the individual conflicts “Define the problem clearly” (McMains/Mullins). –– Create an open items list: Own Positions vs. Apparent Positions; take notes on Assumed Partner Positions. –– Analyze the Perceived Conflicts and keep the consensus to yourself in order to be able to give something in Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure) without really losing anything (“Alright, then I’ll just take the peel of the orange and leave the pulp to you”). Perceived Conflicts are “low hanging fruits” in Phase C. –– Analyze the Real Conflicts to resolve them in DM Task No. 5 (Adapt) especially considering the Interests and Basic Human Needs (Safety, Recognition, Self-­ Determination, Respect, Achievement/Success). • Step 7: Analyze your own situation “Be an agent of reality” (Greenstone).

7.5 Adapt: Determine the Strategies and Positions (DM Task No. 5) New intelligence, new command decision on goals (Dominick J. Misino).

1. Deal with the five conflict strategies according to the TKI (Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument): –– Confrontation –– Avoiding –– Giving in –– Compromise –– Cooperation.

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2. Always start with Professional Confrontation, –– That is, the combination of respectful behavior, unyielding insistence on one’s own positions and the willingness to park open points (conflicts) for the time being in order to resolve them later. –– Persist with this strategy until the (current) Open Points List is available. –– Check the (current) completeness of the OP list: “If we solve all of these problems, do we have a deal?” (Ross). –– Do not offer solutions at this stage. –– This strategy characterizes Phase A (Analyze Open Points) and results in a precise analysis or definition of the conflicts. 3. Decide on a conflict strategy again after the OP list is available: –– Continuation of the Professional Confrontation, i.e. behavior as in Phase A, but without the prospect of a creative solution, or –– Change to giving in, i.e. termination of the negotiation or –– Change to compromise, i.e. termination of the negotiation or –– Change to cooperation in the form of Situation-Oriented Cooperation, i.e. continuation of negotiation in Phase C –– Basically switch to the conflict strategy “Situation-Oriented Cooperation”. –– The review of the conflict strategy characterizes Phase B (Break 4 Change). 4. Decide again in relation to the positions –– Decide which positions (start positions or package positions) your negotiator should represent in each case Phase A (Analyze Open Points) is about your starting positions. Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure) deals with your respective package items. –– Note: Positions are based on situations (therefore a situation check is required: World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-­ Check, Overconfidence-Check).

7.6 Discuss Next Steps (DM Task No. 6) Remember that you are working as a team (James L. Greenstone). Be sure to discuss the decisions you made in DM Task No. 5 (Adapt) based on your analysis of each new piece of information in DM Task No. 4 (Learn) as a team. 1. Organize a team meeting –– Face 2 Face is always the first choice, no distractions from reading emails etc. –– Participants: the N-Team and anyone whose expertise is needed to make the best decision. –– Brainstorming (collect ideas first and then evaluate them). –– Actively invite dissent or criticism of your intended decision, because “Pressures to conform can be so strong that members may go along to get along” (Strentz).

7.7  Your Instruction (DM Task No. 7)

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2. Optimize possible options with CFO tactics –– Compare: Now decide which of the options you prefer as part of an overall assessment, taking into account your highly individual situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-­Check, Overconfidence-Check), this is your “Currently Preferred Option”. Label your options neutrally. –– Focus: Then, with respect to each option, focus with tunnel vision in isolation on the conditions relevant to that option, do not be negatively influenced by “worse” conditions of other options. –– Optimize: Consider whether you have learned anything from the negotiation of the other options (by your Negotiator) that you can now use to optimize the positions of your Currently Preferred Option. 3. Do not apply the BATNA model –– The BATNA model forces you to “aim low”, i.e. at a lower reference point: “The problem is that BATNA tricks negotiators into aiming low”. (Voss/Raz). –– Instead, always orient yourself to your optimistic goals: “Those who focus on their desired outcome achieve objectively better results than those who keep in mind their best alternative to an agreement” (Schweizer). 4. Write the Next Steps mail. –– Make it clear who has to perform which tasks and by when. –– In doing so, issue a separate order to the Negotiator as per your DM task No. 7.

7.7 Your Instruction (DM Task No. 7) Finding out what the other side wants is the negotiator’s job. Acting on it is the commander’s (Dominick J. Misino).

1. Learn The Negotiator is your extended arm. He has to provide you with the information you need as a Decision Maker in order to optimally fulfil your DM task No. 4 (Learn). Your Negotiator must therefore practice the same steps at the negotiating table that you do after the Negotiator reports. Therefore, ask your Negotiator to apply the seven steps according to DM Task No. 4 (see Sect. 7.4). These are outlined here as follows for the purpose of brief review. Since you are typically on a first-name basis with your negotiator, the instruction is also formulated accordingly: –– Step 1: Ignore (at first) the positions communicated by the partner “And most demands, frankly, are bullshit” (Misino). Evaluate these as apparent positions and throw them in your mental wastebasket.

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–– Step 2: Analyze the partner team “There is always a team on the other side” (Voss/Raz). Negotiate with the Decision Maker, if possible. –– Step 3: Analyze the situation(s) “Continue evaluation of situation” (Greenstone). World-Check “I must get into your world” (Cohen). Leverage-Check “Leverage is having something the other guy wants” (Trump). Options-Check “I like to keep every option open in life” (Trump). Overconfidence-Check “Do not simply trust intuitive judgment” (Kahneman). –– Step 4: Interpret the partner positions “Hear what isn’t being said” (Greenstone). Interpret apparent positions to develop (current) Assumed Partner Positions. –– Step 5: Clarify the real content of the partner positions “Never assume – clarify statements” (Greenstone). Clarify the (current) Assumed Partner Positions. Fake position yes: ““Yes” is nothing without how” Fake position No: ““No” is a reaction, not a position”. Be sure to note: “To ASSUME anything makes an “ASS” of “U” and “ME””. –– Step 6: Define the individual conflicts “Define the problem clearly” (McMains/Mullins). Define the Perceived Conflicts (Harvard Orange) and/or the Real Conflicts precisely. –– Step 7: Analyze our situation “Be an agent of reality” (Greenstone). Analyze our own situation, especially our leverage and options. 2 . Bargain –– Positions Tell your negotiator the positions you want him to assert at the negotiating table; these are the starting positions before the first negotiation and typically package positions afterwards. You should initially keep the target positions and the stop positions strictly secret. –– Situation For each new instruction, give the negotiator only the information that he absolutely needs to be able to fulfill the specific assignment in a professional manner. –– Strategy

7.7  Your Instruction (DM Task No. 7)

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Always have your negotiator start with the conflict strategy of Professional Confrontation or the starting positions; the first rule is therefore: “Bargain Hard” (Voss/Raz). Have the open items list presented to you, have your negotiator ask the question, “If we solve all of these problems, do we have a deal?” (Ross). After the Open Points List has been presented, basically instruct your negotiator with the strategy of Situation-Oriented Cooperation, i.e. with the communication of your package positions. Now the following applies: “Use “give and take” bargaining” (Goergen). 3 . Report Back –– Explicitly instruct your Negotiator to keep suggesting time-outs to coordinate with you. –– The FBI’s best practice applies without exception: “Finding out what the other side wants is the negotiator’s job. Acting on it is the commander’s” (Misino). –– Now start again with DM Task No. 4 (Learn) or Mission Control (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, LADY for short).

8

Checklist for the Primary Negotiator

8.1 Always Consider the Other Side as a Partner (PN Task No. 1) Never create an enemy (George Kohlrieser).

1 . The other side is always a partner. 2. Or vice versa: the other side is never an enemy: “Never create an enemy” (Kohlrieser). 3. We want to find a professional solution together, this is only possible with a partner; your key words are: –– “help” –– “together” –– “find a solution.” 4. There is no such thing as a difficult negotiator, there are only negotiators with whom you have difficulties.

8.2 Always Stay Cool (PN Task No. 2) Don’t react: Go to the balcony (William Ury).

1. Never react to provocations, put distance between yourself and the negotiation: “Don’t react: Go to the balcony” (Ury). 2. Note: “If you can’t control yourself, you can’t control the situation” (Goergen). –– Variant 1: Suggest a time-out and leave the negotiation room for a short time: “Do not react to provocations. Step away from the scene, calm down, and carefully plan your response” (Kohlrieser).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 H. Rock, Successful negotiation with the Driver-Seat Concept, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39934-4_8

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–– Variant 2: Apply Salewski’s APO rule: Accept, show awareness of the problem, ask open questions. –– Variant 3: Silence.

8.3 Train the Use of the Weapons of Influence (PN Task No. 3) The negotiator must always be looking for ways to exercise influence (Dolnik/Fitzgerald).

1 . Deal with the Intuitive System I and the Analytical System II. 2. Deal with the mode of action of the weapons of influence in Chap. 5. 3. Go through the following checklist: –– Series 1: Sympathy, Anchoring, Arguments –– Series 2: Examples, Pictures, Stories –– Series 3: Social Proof, Authority, Fairness –– Series 4: Priming, Framing, Participation and additionally in Phase C –– Series 5: Reciprocity, Consistency, Scarcity.

8.4 Train Defense Against Influence (PN Task No. 4) Slow down and let your System 2 take control (Daniel Kahneman).

Use the AID Rule (“Time-out, Activate, Identify & Defend (Formulate and Write Down”): 1 . Always encourage a time-out. 2. Activate your Analytical System II. 3. Identify the weapons of influence. 4. Defend: Formulate your defense statement and write it down.

8.5 Use the Time Factor Correctly (PN Task No. 5) In this business, there is no quick fix (Dominick J. Misino).

1. Take enough time: “Slow everything down” (Greenstone) Note: “As negotiators, we must operate as if we are getting paid by the hour not by the job” (Strentz). 2. Consistently interrupt every negotiation by taking breaks: “take time-outs” (Greenstone) Note: “Downtime is work time” (Greenstone), in reality many creative ideas are developed during breaks. The rule is: “Buy time to think” (Ury).

8.7  Accept the Negotiation Instruction (PN Task No. 7)

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3. Basically ignore deadlines: “Ignore deadlines, but be prepared to explain” (Greenstone) Counter: “I’m working on it” (Greenstone) and make it clear that it is not your fault if the deadline is not met: “Blame the problems on someone else” (Greenstone). 4. As a general rule, do not set deadlines: “Avoid Deadlines” (Greenstone); if you set a deadline, you must implement the announced consequences.

8.6 Consider Power as a Mere Illusion (PN Task No. 6) All power is based on perception (Herb Cohen).

1 . You always have an information deficit, so “refrain from estimating power” (Schranner). 2. Use only the sources of power, i.e. all the strategies/tactics of best practice. 3. Or put another way: Use only the sources of power; do not, on the other hand, concern yourself with the distribution of power.

8.7 Accept the Negotiation Instruction (PN Task No. 7) Pay close attention to instructions given to you by the team leader (James L. Greenstone).

1. Learn: Constantly evaluate the latest information As an extension of the Decision Maker, you must practice the same steps at the negotiating table, which your Decision Maker then performs again from a distance after your reporting. Stick to the following checklist: –– Step 1: Ignore (at first) the positions communicated by the partner “And most demands, frankly, are bullshit” (Misino). Evaluate them as apparent positions and throw them in your mental wastebasket. –– Step 2: Analyze the partner team “There is always a team on the other side” (Voss/Raz). Negotiate with the Decision Maker if possible. –– Step 3: Analyze the situation(s) “Continue evaluation of situation” (Greenstone). World-Check “I must get into your world” (Cohen). Leverage-Check “Leverage is having something the other guy wants” (Trump). Options-Check “I like to keep every option open in life” (Trump). Overconfidence-Check

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“Do not simply trust intuitive judgment” (Kahneman). –– Step 4: Interpret the partner positions “Hear what isn’t being said” (Greenstone). Interpret the apparent positions to develop (current) Assumed Partner Positions. –– Step 5: Clarify the real content of the partner positions “Never assume – clarify statements” (Greenstone). Clarify the (currently) Assumed Partner Positions. Fake position Yes: “‘Yes’ is nothing without how” Fake position No: ““No” is a reaction, not a position” Be sure to note: “To ASSUME anything makes an “ASS” of “U” and “ME””. –– Step 6: Define the individual conflicts “Define the problem clearly” (McMains/Mullins). Define the Perceived Conflicts (Harvard Orange) and/or the Real Conflicts precisely. –– Step 7: Analyze your own situation “Be an agent of reality” (Greenstone). Analyze your own situation, especially your leverage and options. 2 . Bargain As highlighted above, you are an extension of the Decision Maker. Accept the instructions as described in Sect. 2.7. Adhere to the following checklist: –– Positions Ask your Negotiator what positions you should assert at the negotiating table. Before the first negotiation, the professional Decision Maker will tell you the starting positions he or she has developed, with which you will begin the negotiations. After you have presented the open items list to your Decision Maker, he will typically (ideally after consulting with the team) give you package items so that you can now bring these items to the negotiating table. A Decision Maker is usually very cautious about communicating target positions and stop positions internally so that they are not inadvertently communicated externally. Make sure you have a good understanding of the starting positions (for initial communication to the partner) or the package positions decided in the team (in Phase C) so that you can communicate them optimally at the negotiating table. –– Situation Remember: the positions your Decision Maker wants to assert are based on his situation; so it’s all about the: World-Check: What is really important to your Decision Maker?

8.7  Accept the Negotiation Instruction (PN Task No. 7)

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In particular, have you understood the emotional and rational world of your Decision Maker? Do you know the most important goals (positions) and interests? You need to try to ask for these so that you can focus precisely on these most important goals. This can be tedious because professional Decision Makers are rather cautious about sharing information (see above). Make a note of your Decision Maker’s key goals and interests. Leverage-Check: Do you know the leverage of your Decision Maker, i.e. its USP (Unique Selling Proposition) or the value it can deliver? Options-Check: Do you know the options of your Decision Maker? In any case, as a negotiator you may only hint at the existence of certain options in your negotiation. Overconfidence-Check: Have you evaluated all relevant facts considering statistics and probability as well as your own benefit? –– Strategy Ask your Decision Maker for the conflict strategy to implement in the next negotiation. In addition to avoidance (i.e., not negotiating), your Decision Maker basically has the choice between. Confrontation or Giving in or Compromise or Cooperation. Typically, you will be instructed with starting with the Professional Confrontation conflict strategy or starting positions; this is Phase A (Analyze Open Points). Bargain thus initially means: “Bargain Hard” (Voss/Raz). The Decision Maker then asks for the list of open points. Whether this is (currently) complete, you have previously clarified with the question “If we solve all of these problems, do we have a deal?” (Ross). Now the Decision Maker thinks about a change of strategy and an adjustment of positions, this is Phase B (Break 4 Change). Finally, if your Decision Maker is looking for a solution that all parties are satisfied with, he will instruct you with implementing the Situation-Oriented Cooperation strategy, i.e., communicating your package positions; this is Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure). Now Bargain means use “give and take” bargaining (Goergen). 3. Report Back –– Always encourage time-outs (see Sect. 3.5) and use them to report to your Decision Maker. –– In this way, you act in a highly professional manner: Finding out the real interests in the context of the negotiation is your job as a negotiator. Making the right decisions on this basis, on the other hand, is the job of the Decision Maker or commander: “Finding out

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what the other side wants is the negotiator’s job. Acting on it is the commander’s” (Misino). –– Finally, the Decision Maker can enter the Mission Control (LADY) process (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction) and give you a new mission.

8.8 Visualize Your Behavior with the BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8) All high performers have a secret – they use their mind’s eye to focus on the benefits and not the pain (George Kohlrieser).

Level 1: Active Listening80 “Talk to Me” (Dominick J. Misino).

1. Control your nonverbal behavior and voice. 2. Ask open-ended questions unless your partner is talking without being asked: –– Open questions are affective and effective –– Ask only one question at a time –– Focus on “what?” and “how?” –– Use the question, “How should I do this?” (“how is key to life”; Voss/Raz) –– In very tense situations, don’t use the question “Why?” –– In these situations, “Avoid asking the “Why” question” (Goergen) –– Prepare already now the DM task No. 4 (Learn): Ignore the Apparent Positions, Analyze the Partner Team, Analyze the Situation(s) (World-Check, Leverage-­ Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check), Interpret the Apparent Positions, Clarify the Assumed Partner Positions, Define the Conflicts (Perceived Conflicts or Real Conflicts). 3. Listen –– without interrupting (let the partner finish); –– without thinking about counter-arguments at the same time (i.e.: full concentration on what you hear); –– to put yourself in your partner’s situation or “world” (Role Reversal); –– ask your Decision Maker to engage a Secondary Negotiator in important negotiations. 4. Issue Active Listening Statements –– Minimal Encouragement: Explain minimal encouragement (ah, uuh, ok). –– Mirroring: repeat the last words (e.g. “2014 most successful year?”); note: “Mirrors work magic” (Voss/Raz). –– Paraphrasing: reproduce the content in your own words (“I think I understand that you are concerned with delivery times, is that correct?”), the rule is: “Paraphrase and ask for corrections” (Ury).

8.8  Visualize Your Behavior with the BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8)

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–– Emotional Labeling: reflect your partner’s emotions in your own words (“I think I understand that you are upset about the delivery times being too long, is that right?”); note: “Don’t ignore the other side’s emotions” (Ury). –– Summarizing: Summarize the content and emotions in your own words (“I think I understand that you are concerned about the delivery times. These were probably too long and that has annoyed you”). 5. Take Effective Breaks –– Be silent on purpose: “Pause and say nothing” (Ury). –– Follow Strentz’s advice: “… the average American can tolerate ten seconds of silence. So, practice silence for eleven, twelve, thirteen seconds …” 6 . Take Notes Follow Greenstone’s advice: “Document the entire scenario. Keep accurate and up-to-date records of everything that happens. … Write things down”. This way you can achieve three goals: –– Firstly, you document important information that can be of great help to you later during negotiations. –– Second, taking notes makes your negotiating partner feel valued; your notes are thus an important contribution to bonding. –– Third, you can reassure yourself when what you see as outrageous demands are made. By keeping silent and taking notes, you avoid commenting; your notes are thus also a tool for your self-control. 7. Analyze the four levels of communication –– What purely factual information does the message contain? –– What does your negotiation partner reveal about himself as a person or about his situation (World-Check, Leverage-Check, Options-Check, Overconfidence-Check), in particular his emotional and rational world? What does he reveal to you about himself? –– What (hidden) call to action does your negotiation partner’s message contain? What exactly should you do or refrain from doing? –– What does the message say about the relationship between you and your partner? Does your negotiating partner feel superior or inferior? Does he see you both on the same level? Level 2: Tactical Empathy As negotiators we use empathy because it works (Chris Voss).

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1. Change shoes: understand the story, understand the expectations, understand the feelings of your negotiating partner: “Empathy is understanding the actor’s expectations, as well as the actor’s story and feelings” (McMains/Mullins). 2. Communicate your understanding of your negotiating partner’s situation and positions: “I understand your point of view”. 3. Praise your negotiating partner. Level 3: Achieve 51% Confidence We want to get … 51 percent (Dominick J. Misino).

1. Check your trust level: Indicator for at least 51% trust: “Subject’s disclosure of personal information” (Goergen). 2. Avoid Bonding Breakers: –– Do not behave disrespectfully: “Show respect for the other party” (Kohlrieser). –– Don’t devalue your partner’s performance. –– Do not violate the dictates of fairness. –– Keep your promises: “Deliver what you promise” (Greenstone). –– Don’t be arrogant; for example, respond to what you see as absurd claims: “I never thought of it that way before” (Strentz). –– Do not lie, do not use tricks: “Negotiators seldom lie. They just engage in tactical expressions” (Greenstone). –– Never threaten, only work with warnings. –– Don’t be aggressive. –– Don’t drive your partner into a corner. –– Never dictate terms: “Dictating terms – don’t do it” (Misino). –– Don’t give advice. 3. Apologize professionally: Your regret, explanation of a cause, acceptance of responsibility, assurance of non-­ repetition, offer of redress, request for forgiveness (Negotiation Briefings July 2016). 4. Respond to Bonding Breaker with a Time-out Step 4: Learn: Constantly evaluate the latest information Think intelligence first, second, and last (James L. Greenstone).

As an extension of the Decision Maker, you must practice the same steps at the negotiating table, which your Decision Maker then performs again from a distance after your reporting. Follow the checklist in Sect. 8.7 (Ignore, Analyze, Interpret, Clarify, Define).

8.8  Visualize Your Behavior with the BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8)

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Level 5: Bargain I’m not comfortable with … (William Ury).

1. Check your current instruction –– Current positions of the Decision Maker? –– Situation of the Decision Maker? –– Current conflict strategy of the Decision Maker? 2. General statements on content –– “I think … I am of the opinion”; –– “Let’s think about whether …”; –– In Phase A (Analyze Open Points), Bargain means “Bargain Hard”; –– In Phase C (Concessions Package Procedure) Bargain means: “Use “give and take” bargaining”. 3. Instead of yes (no “yes”). –– “I could imagine that” (subjunctive!); –– “interesting”. 4. Instead of No (“No to No”) –– “That seems difficult to me”; –– “Let me check what I can do for you”; –– “I’m not comfortable with that”. Level 6: Intensify the weapons of influence (Influence) After all, in negotiation one’s currency is influence (Dolnick/Fitzgerald).

1. Go through the following checklist: –– Series 1: Sympathy, Anchoring, Arguments –– Series 2: Examples, Pictures, Stories –– Series 3: Social Proof, Authority, Fairness –– Series 4: Priming, Framing, Participation –– and additionally in Phase C –– Series 5: Reciprocity, Consistency, Scarcity. 2. Review your defenses against the weapons of influence (AID Rule). Level 7: Compliance/Non-Compliance No deal is better than a bad deal (Chris Voss).

Collect all Open Points on the Open Points List. Try to negotiate the Open Points in the framework of packages. If you cannot find a satisfactory solution, your Decision Maker will end the negotiations: “No deal is better than a bad deal”.

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8.9 Visualize the Negotiation Process (PN Task No. 9) … see a clear picture … (George Kohlrieser).

1. Opening –– Small talk –– Agenda –– Smart Start 2. Middle of Act Two –– Analyze Open Points –– Break 4 change –– Concessions Package Procedure 3. Goodbye

8.10 Negotiate! (PN Task No. 10) As negotiators, we expect to win (James L. Greenstone).

1. Motivate yourself. 2. Activate your self-confidence. 3. Enter the negotiating room and negotiate. 4. Call a time-out. Think about reporting.

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Checklist: Negotiation Round

… it’s a new roll of the dice (Frank Bolz).

9.1 Opening Prepare your opening statement (James L. Greenstone).

1. Small Talk: “Engage in small talk” (Schranner). 2. Agenda: “Start … with an agenda” (Schranner). 3. Smart Start: Basically, let your partner open: “You go first” (Misino). Exception: start with a situation talk or your positions. 4. Special case crisis: “My name is … I am with the … department. Are you OK” or “Can you tell me what’s going on?” (Strentz).

9.2 Middle of Act Two … trying to write a script … (McMains/Mullins).

9.2.1 Phase A: Analyze Open Points Negotiating is not making friends (Dominick J. Misino).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 H. Rock, Successful negotiation with the Driver-Seat Concept, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39934-4_9

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1. Your strategy paper: Place a white sheet of paper in front of you with the heading “OP list” On this sheet, successively note down the Open Points. 2. Start with the bonding –– Stage 1: Active Listening80: –– Nonverbal Behavior, W Questions, Listening Without Interrupting, Active Listening Statements, Silence, Taking Notes, Communication Analysis. –– Level 2: Tactical Empathy (“I understand your situation”). –– Level 3: (“We want to get … 51%”) (disclosure of personal information by your negotiating partner). 3. Focus on your mission –– Stage 4: Learn: (“You go first”). –– Level 5: Bargain (“Bargain Hard” and create OP list). 4. Intensify the Weapons of Influence Level 6: Influence –– Series 1: Sympathy, Anchoring, Arguments –– Series 2: Examples, Pictures, Story –– Series 3: Social Proof, Authority, Fairness –– Series 4: Priming, Framing, Participation and additionally in Phase C –– Series 5: Reciprocity, Consistency, Scarcity. 5. At level 7, create the open items list if you do not achieve agreement (compliance). 6. Encourage time-outs –– to discuss your findings with the N-Team, –– to report to the Decision Maker (reporting): Remember your role: “Role of the negotiator: REMEMBER: We are NOT the Decision Maker” (Goergen). 7. Accept the updated negotiation brief (PN Task No. 7), Visualize the BMI strategy (PN Task No. 8), Visualize the negotiation process (PN Task No. 9), Negotiate (PN Task No. 10).

9.2.2 Phase B: Break 4 Change Negotiators are not in the business of meeting demands, but rather of satisfying needs (McMains/Mullins).

1. Report Back: report back to the Decision Maker during the time-out so that he can get a picture of the situation and the partner’s positions derived from it. 2. Advise your Decision Maker on Mission Control (Learn, Adapt, Discuss, Your Instruction, or LADY for short). 3. Accept the respective updated negotiation instruction (PN Task No. 7), Visualize BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8), Visualize Negotiation Process (PN Task No. 9), Negotiate (PN Task No. 10). Assert package positions at Level 5 (Bargain) and Level 6 (Influence).

9.2  Middle of Act Two

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9.2.3 Phase C: Concessions Package Procedure Concessions are the language of cooperation (G. Richard Shell).

1. Your Strategy Paper: Place a white sheet of paper with the heading Package List in front of you. On this sheet, note all package items covered by your Decision Maker’s instruction. 2. Start with the bonding Stage 1: Active Listening80: Nonverbal Behavior, W Questions, Listening Without Interrupting, Active Listening Statements, Silence, Taking Notes, Communication Analysis. Level 2: Tactical Empathy (“I understand your situation”). Level 3: (“We want to get … 51%”) (disclosure of personal information by your negotiating partner). 3. Focus on your mission Stage 4: Learn (“You go first”). Stage 5: Bargain (“Use “give and take” bargaining”): –– First clarify the package principle (“no issue is closed until all issues have been decided”) –– Always emphasize your willingness to cooperate –– Always enter package items “in one piece” –– Do not comment on the positions –– Sell Perceived Conflicts (package jewels) as concessions –– Always keep the same instruction –– Emphasize reciprocity, that is, mutual give and take. 4. Intensify the Weapons of Influence Stage 6: Series 1: Sympathy, Anchoring, Arguments. Series 2: Examples, Pictures, Story. Series 3: Social Proof, Authority, Fairness. Series 4: Priming, Framing, Participation and additionally in Phase C. Series 5: Reciprocity, Consistency, Scarcity. 5. Log all packages until you reach an agreement (stage 7). 6. Encourage time-outs –– First discuss in the N-Team (Break out Room) –– Do not make unilateral concessions (“something for something”). –– Check the definition of the conflicts (Ignore, Analyze, Interpret, Clarify, Define) –– Solve Real Conflicts Creatively –– Move little in relation to important points –– Report Back: “Role of the negotiator: REMEMBER: We are NOT the Decision Maker” (Goergen) –– Check if the time-out was long enough.

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7. Assume the respective updated negotiation instruction(PN Task No. 7), Visualize the BMI Strategy (PN Task No. 8), Visualize the Negotiation Process (PN Task No. 9), Negotiate (PN Task No. 10). Assert package positions at Level 5 (Bargain) and Level 6 (Influence).

9.3 Good Bye: Say Goodbye Professionally It’s not over until it’s over (James L. Greenstone, Law No. 147).

In each of the following three variations, act as if the game is never finally over, even if you think it is at the time of the Good bye.

9.3.1 Stay in the Game Buy time – be patient (Michael G. Goergen).

1 . Emphasize the commonalities. 2. Keep a record of the Open Points. 3. Make it clear that you are willing to cooperate. 4. Announce the discussion with the Decision Maker. 5. Agree on Next Steps.

9.3.2 Walk Out Deadlocks can always be broken (George H. Ross).

1 . Emphasize the commonalities. 2. Keep a record of the Open Points. 3. Make clear your current lack of willingness to cooperate: “I’m sorry, I don’t see any way to resolve the outstanding issues to both your and our satisfaction at this time. We should end the basically constructive talks.” 4. Announce the discussion with the Decision Maker. 5. Present Next Steps as possible.

9.3  Good Bye: Say Goodbye Professionally

9.3.3 Game over Never burn your bridges (George H. Ross).

1 . Emphasize the commonalities. 2. Record the Open Points. 3. Make clear the non-cooperation of the Decision Maker. 4. Keep an open mind about making contact.

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