Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II: Across National Contexts 303142882X, 9783031428821

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Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II Across National Contexts Edited by Esther Mavengano · Isaac Mhute

Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II

Esther Mavengano · Isaac Mhute Editors

Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II Across National Contexts

Editors Esther Mavengano English and Media Studies Great Zimbabwe University Masvingo, Zimbabwe Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences UNISA Pretoria, South Africa

Isaac Mhute Department of Language, Literature and Culture Studies Midlands State University Gweru, Zimbabwe Senior Research Associate in the Faculty of Humanities University of Johannesburg Johannesburg, South Africa

Department of English, Faculty of Linguistics, Literature and Cultural Studies, Institute of English and American Studies, Alexander von Humboldt/Georg Forster Postdoctoral Research Fellow TU (Technische Universitat Dresden) Dresden, Germany

ISBN 978-3-031-42882-1 ISBN 978-3-031-42883-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Preface

The advent of the postcolonial era in the Sub-Saharan Africa was marked by ululations and jubilations across Africa and her diasporic communities. Indeed, it was a long-awaited moment of respite for the previously debased people whose hopes and aspirations for a better future amplified the ecstasy. Unfortunately, the joy was cut short because since the attainment of independence, Sub-Saharan Africa has become notoriously infamous for ethnic conflict, corruption, egoism, power struggle, abuse of power, autocracy, poverty, hate speech, xenophobia among other injuries which speak about the unfolding cultures of deceit. The postcolonial environment and lived experiences have elicited heated multidisciplinary conversations which are centered on the apparent ambiguities. The thwarted optimism vis-à-vis the prospects of creating prosperous and democratic African futures become a rich site of research for the African scholars. In the same vein, scholars in this book take up this much needed debate focusing on the unnerving evidence of postcolonial cultures of deceit which are arguably entangled with contemporary politics in SubSaharan Africa. It is public knowledge that a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa experience power struggles, ethnic conflicts, socioeconomic strife, misgovernance and despotism. Countries, such as Nigeria, Mozambique, South Africa, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, just to mention but a few, come to mind in this regard. One then wonders, why are the Sub-Saharan Africans still confronted by such problems when most of the countries have long-attained independence? v

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Do the nationalist leaders turn against their own people in their quest for power? In entering into these polemical conversations, there is also need to interrogate the impact of colonialism on psyches and practices of the postcolonial African people, both in their respective roles as political leaders and the mass. Contributors in this volume reflect on and probe the various forms of the postcolonial cultures of deceit that continue to demand emancipatory governance and progressive politics. The consistent scholarly scrutiny is necessary an attempt to resist oppressive cultures which undermine freedom of choice or expression. Such debates are aimed at providing salient insights that could transform the fate of the postcolonial African people. The contributors underscore the importance of creating a postcolonial space that is characterized by the blissful living, where the masses enjoy the freedoms of a liberated humanity. Gweru, Zimbabwe

Isaac Mhute

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, we would like to thank the Almighty God for the grace, guidance and protection throughout the writing of this book. We will continue to seek divine backing in this scholarship journey. Special thanks go to the external expert reviewers whose expertise and experiences immensely aided in reshaping our preliminary thoughts. This is not our last book, therefore, we continue to value your guidance and support. We are also appreciative of an excellent team of authors from Sub-Saharan Africa who responded to the call and contributed to this book. Thank you very much for your participation in telling the postcolonial Sub-Saharan African stories. We are reminded of Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s remarkable warning about the danger of single storytelling. Adichie rightly contends that a single story is incomplete and always laden with false information. Taking from this incredible understanding, we believe that together, we voice our postcolonial anxieties and seek to have accountable governance and political leadership which can then calm down the current nervous condition. We hope to stimulate scholarly debates on the unsettling and detrimental turns unfolding in the postcolonial Sub-Saharan African era which do promote political integrity and restore confidence in African humanity. In addition, we are also grateful to Palgrave’s competent and efficient team, Madison Allums, Shreenidhi Natarajan, Matthew Savin and Henry Rodgers, who offered us expert advice and backing during the production and publication of the book. Palgrave has become our publishing home which we would not

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want to lose. It is certainly well represented by its Editorial staff. Last but not least, we dedicate this book to all the people across the world who crave to see the respect of human dignity in postcolonial Africa and beyond.

Contents

1

The Sub-Saharan African Postcolonial Politics: A Daunting Present Esther Mavengano and Isaac Mhute

1

Part I (2–5) Cultures of Deceit in Postcolonial Sub-Saharan Literary Imaginings 2

3

4

Memorialising Gender and Childhood Under the Throes of von Trotha’s Extermination Order: Trauma, Agency and Survival in Serebov’s Mama Namibia Nelson Mlambo, Collen Sabao, and Coletta Kandemiri Speaking from Below: Reflections on the Postcolonial Subaltern Practices of Resisting Deceit and Penury in Valerie Tagwira’s Novel, Trapped Esther Mavengano Towards Using Literature to Deal with Fear of Ethno-Religious and Linguistic Differences in African Post-colonial Politics Ogonna Nchekwube Nkereuwem

21

41

63

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x

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CONTENTS

The Postcoloniality and Decoloniality of Namibian Literature in Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land Collen Sabao and Nelson Mlambo

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Part II Language/Media and Postcolonial Deceit in Sub-Saharan Africa (6–10) 6

7

8

9

10

Postcolonial Gender Dichotomies: Integrating Digital Technologies, Local Content, and Local Languages in Empowering Rural-Black Women in Southern Africa Gift Masengwe and Wadzanai Chihombori-Ndlovu Hate Speech, a Source of Linguistic, Religious and Ethnic Intolerance Among the Sub-Saharan African Peoples: The Case of Nigeria Odey Simon Robert, Goodluck Chigbo Nwode, and Bibian Ugoala “We’ll Fish Out MP Mole and Punish the Person”: Language, Politics, and Culture of Deceit in Ghana’s Politics Charles Prempeh Mass Media in Deceitful Pragmatic Misrepresentation of, and the Heightened Intergroup Conflicts Among Sub-Saharan African Ethno-Religious and Linguistic Groups Caroline Nonye Osuchukwu, Bibian Ugoala, and Odey Simon Robert Post-colonial Political, Economic and Ethnic Discourse: A case of Mozambique and Rwanda Donald Peter Chimanikire, Valerie Rumbidzai Jeche, and Jane Tsitsi Mudzamiri

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Part III The Media and Political Deceit in Postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa (11–14) 11

Survival of the Private Media Under Zimbabwe’s Politico-Economic Crises Pedzisai Ruhanya and Bekezela Gumbo

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CONTENTS

12

13

14

Digital Authoritarianism in Postcolonial Nigeria: Internet Control Techniques and Censorship Desmond Onyemechi Okocha, Maureen Chigbo, and Melchizedec J. Onobe

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Tragic Labels, Catastrophic Consequences: Colonial Treachery and the Cameroonian Calamity Jacob Mapara

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Populism as a New Political Tactic of Postcolonial Deceit in Nigerian Contemporary Digital Era Desmond Onyemechi Okocha and Jesse Ishaku

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Part IV (15–18) Postcolonial Political Dialectics in Religion and Human Rights Discourses 15

16

17

18

19

The Impact of Legacies of the Past on the Emergence of Conflict and Deceit in Sub-Saharan African Politics Fabian Maugnganidze

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Iscariotean Dialectics and the Demise of Emancipatory Pan-African States in Sub-Saharan Africa Kizito Michael George

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Discourse on Violent Disenfranchisements and Threats to Religious and Ethnic Minorities in Postcolonial Zimbabwe Edmore Dube The Entanglement of the Church and the State During Mugabe’s Reign in Postcolonial Zimbabwe: A Social Conflict Perspective Tobias Marevesa and Esther Mavengano A Culture of Deceit and Human Rights Violations in Postcolonial Sub-Saharan African Politics Fabian Maunganidze

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The Youth and Political Leadership and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa Takavafira Masarira Zhou and Costain Tandi

383

‘Too Good to be True’: Unfulfilled Campaign Promises, Pledges, and Political Deceit in Zimbabwe Gift Mwonzora

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Wadzanai Chihombori-Ndlovu is an information scientist with a Masters in Information and Knowledge Management (MIKM) from the University of Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa. Her work revolves around policy, access to information and the Internet. She extensively works in socio-informatics (socioeconomic and political issues) with civil society, government and public institutions. Her work emphasis is on digital inclusion (for women and girls) by bridging gap between marginalized societies and policy development/implementation. She heads the Policy and Governance Desk of the Internet Society Zimbabwe Chapter (ISOCLINE). She deputizes on the Internet Society, Global Chapter’s Advisory Committee and Steering Committee, and she is the African Representative in the Chapters Advisory Council. She participated in the drafting of the Computer Crime and Cyber Security Bill of Zimbabwe’s ICT Policy. She advocates for meaningful Internet access, digital technologies and the information economy for a diverse group of marginalized women and girls in most SADC countries. Edmore Dube Ph.D., holds a doctoral degree from the University of Zimbabwe. He is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo; with a huge interest in issues of justice and peace; critiquing jambanja (2018) and the ‘armed state’ (2019). He is a member of the African Consortium for Law and Religious Studies (ACLARS) and ATISCA. He has contributed to the ACLARS volumes on challenges besetting African heritage (2017) xiii

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and impediments to human flourishing in Africa (2019), as well as the ATISCA discourse on religion and development (2019). Kizito Michael George Ph.D., is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Religious Studies and Philosophy at Kyambogo University. He holds a Master of Philosophy Degree in Gender and Development from the University of Bergen (Norway) and obtained a Ph.D. in Development Ethics from Makerere University in 2019. He is a member of the American Philosophy Association (APA) and International Development Ethics Association (IDEA). His research interests include: development ethics, Pan-Africanism, White saviorism, human rights, poverty eradication, gender, jurisprudence and African philosophy. Bekezela Gumbo is a Ph.D. student at the University of the Free State in South Africa. He also serves as the Principal Researcher at the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute in Harare, Zimbabwe. He also teaches comparative political development in Africa at Africa University. He has published widely on political transitions in Zimbabwe. His research interest is on the politics of transition and the quest for sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Jesse Ishaku is a Ph.D. student at the Bingham University, Nigeria, with focus on Strategic Communication, Development Communication, and Media and Society. He obtained his BSc in Mass Communication from Taraba State University, Jalingo, in 2014 and an MSc in Mass Communication from Bayero University, Kano, in 2019. He is presently a Lecturer in the Department of Mass Communication, Taraba State University, Jalingo Taraba State, Nigeria. Valerie Rumbidzai Jeche is a Lecturer of International Relations and Politics at University of Zimbabwe. She holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science and a Master’s Degree in International Relations both attained at the University of Zimbabwe. She is currently studying toward a Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and is due for graduation this year. She has over five years teaching experience and is also a research fellow for agrarian studies. She is a published scholar who has written articles in international law, politics and governance, gender and politics, agrarian studies, international economic relations and constitutional law.

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Coletta Kandemiri Ph.D., is a Lecturer at University of Namibia (UNAM). She has a number of publications including journal articles and book chapters. Her research interests are in literature studies. Tobias Marevesa Ph.D., is a Senior Lecturer in New Testament in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, under the Joshua Nkomo School of Arts and Humanities at the Great Zimbabwe University where he teaches New Testament Studies and New Testament Greek. He holds a Ph.D. with the University of Pretoria in South Africa. He is also a Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion (RITR) in the College of Human Sciences University of South Africa (UNISA). His areas of interest are New Testament studies and politics, Pentecostal expressions in Zimbabwean Christianity, culture, human rights, gender-based violence, COVID-19 pandemic and pedagogical issues. He has also published in the area of New Testament studies and conflict resolution in the Zimbabwean political landscape. He has attended and presented a number of papers in both regional and international conferences and has published articles and book chapters in reputable international journals and book projects. He is a member of the New Testament Society of Southern Africa (NTSSA), Reading Association of Nigeria (RAN), Association for the Study of Religion in Southern Africa (ASRSA), African Consortium for Law and Religion Studies (ACLARS) and the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies (ICLARS). Gift Masengwe Ph.D., is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Education, University of Free State, and a Research Fellow at the Institute of Theology and Religious Studies. His interests in the interaction of Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe, in close reading with contemporary new world dynamics of industrialization, globalization, decolonization and post-humanism have seen him publish books, chapters and articles across disciplines of theology, health, philosophy, culture, development, gender and environment with topics of currency in recent publications on the Church of Christ in Zimbabwe and the state in Zimbabwe. Fabian Maunganidze Ph.D., is an experienced pastor, lawyer, scientist and lecturer. He is passionate about law, business and motivation. He is currently the Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences and the Chairperson of the Department of Physiology at the

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Midlands State University in Gweru. He is also a Researcher who is interested in business development, intellectual property rights and medical law. He has more than 25 years business experience, more than 17 years lectureship experience and more than 16 years pastoral experience. He has a great deal of knowledge in chemical pathology, human physiology, human rights law, medical law and constitutional law as well as experience in business rescue and product development. He has authored a number of books on Christian living, motivation and marketing. He is currently the examiner in Marketing Strategy and Business Law at the Southern Africa Institute of Marketing (SAIM). He has been a business consultant for many companies in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Esther Mavengano is a Lecturer who teaches Linguistics and Literature in the Department of English and Media Studies, Faculty of Arts at Great Zimbabwe University in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. She holds a Ph.D. in Linguistics and Literary studies obtained from the North West University (NWU), Mafikeng, in South Africa. Her research areas maintain the interface of linguistics and poetics. She has interests in language policy and planning, sociolinguistics, language use in media and political discourses, translingual practices in fictional writings, identity issues in contemporary transnational Anglophone/African literature, religion and gender, stylistics and language education in ‘multi’ contexts. She has published in reputable international journals including Cogent Arts and Humanities, African Identities, Literator, Journal of Multicultural Discourses, among others. She is a Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, UNISA, in South Africa. She is currently the Alexander von Humboldt/Georg Forster Postdoctoral Fellowship Award at TU (Techische Universitat) Dresden’s Institute of English and American Studies, Department of English, Faculty of Linguistics, Literature and Cultural Studies, in Dresden, Germany. She is a member of both the Zimbabwean Circle of Women and the Southern African Circle of Women. She has co-edited the book Zimbabwe in the Post-COVID-19 Era: Reflections, lessons and the Future of Public Health. Published by Routledge, in 2023, Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I: The 2023 Election and Beyond as well as Electoral Politics Volume 11: The 2023 Election and Beyond, both published by Palgrave: Macmillan in 2023. Her forthcoming co-edited books are: Language matters in Zimbabwe: Reflections on and aspects of the state of Zimbabwean languages,

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to be published by Routledge, and Multidisciplinary Knowledge Production and Research Methods in Sub-Saharan Africa: Language, Literature and Religion, which is a under production and will be published by Palgrave in 2023. Isaac Mhute is an Associate Professor (Prof. Dr.) with Midlands State University’s Department of Language, Literature and Culture Studies taking linguistics, English, strategic communication and research modules. He is a chief examiner for language and literature with an international examining board, professional editor and translator/back translator (English and Shona). He graduated with a Doctor of Literature and Philosophy in African Languages from the University of South Africa whose focus was on the morphological, syntactic and semantic representation of grammatical relations. Prof, Isaac Mhute is also a Senior Research Associate in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Johannesburg in South Africa. His research interests are in both theoretical and applied linguistic areas such as language policy and development, syntax and semantics, onomastics, as well as language and strategic communication issues in education, among others. He has written books such as Membering the Rhodesian Linguistic Agenda in Zimbabwe published by Routledge and Edited books such as Strategic Communications in Africa: The Sub-Saharan Context published by Routledge. Nelson Mlambo Ph.D., is an Oxford University Fellow at Wolfson College and a Senior Postdoctoral and World Literature Lecturer at the University of Namibia. He has published intensively and has supervised over thirty masters and Ph.D. students. Gift Mwonzora Ph.D., is a Zimbabwean scholar and is a holder of a Ph.D. in Political Sociology from Rhodes University in South Africa. He has worked as a Research Fellow at Rhodes University in the Department of Sociology and in the Department of Law at the Northwest University in South Africa. He is currently a Research Fellow in the Institute of Institutional Change and Social Justice at the University of Free State (UFS) in South Africa. He has published on areas that include democracy, democratization, transitional justice, elections, social media, human rights, social movements and political violence. Goodluck Chigbo Nwode Ph.D., is a Lecturer in the Department of Languages and Linguistics, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki. He holds

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B.A. (Honours) in Languages and Linguistics, M.A. in Syntax, and Ph.D. in Applied Linguistics, all from the Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria. He specializes in Applied Linguistics and other related interdisciplinary areas. He has got several inter/national publications in Applied Linguistics, Syntax, Igbo and related areas. Bibian, Ugoala, Ph.D. Dr. Bibian, Ugoala is a Lecturer in the Department of English, at the National Open University of Nigeria. Her areas of research interest are: analyzing discourse in natural language settings, multimodal discourse analysis, pragmatics, media discourses and computer-mediated discourses. She has published widely in national and international journals and attended many conferences and seminars, among others. Desmond Onyemechi Okocha is an Associate Professor (Prof. Dr.) and Head, Department of Mass Communication, Bingham University, Nigeria, a Research Fellow, the University of Religions and Denominations, Iran and Member of the Swiss-based International Panel on the Information Environment (IPIE). He was a Special Adviser on Digital Media and Strategic Communication to Abia State Governor, Nigeria, from 2020 to 2023. His working career spans over several countries including the Gambia, Ghana, India and Nigeria. He holds a Diploma in Media Studies from Ireland, Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) degree in Management from the United Kingdom, Master of Arts (MA) in Mass Communication from Sikkim Manipal University, India, and Ph.D. in Mass Communication from NIMS University, Rajasthan, India. Besides, working and consulting for World Bank, Global Fund for Women and Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) funded projects, he was the pioneer National Knowledge Management and Communication Coordinator for the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) funded Livelihood Improvement Family Enterprises in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. He is the Founder of Institute for Leadership and Development Communication, Nigeria. He has published over 80 articles in refereed journals, conference proceedings, books and 2 edited books. His current research interests include digital journalism, immersive communication, mass media and society, digital activism, social media, development communication and corporate communication. Melchizedec J. Onobe Associate Professor (Prof. Dr.), is a communication scholar with socio-scientific interest in media and society development issues, cultural communication, digital media and brand communication. He has about 18 years combined work exposure and experiences

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as a researcher, journalist and editor. He holds a B.A degree, M.A and a Ph.D. in Mass Communication from universities in Nigeria. He has taught in some prestigious universities in Africa and published widely. He is a co-editor of a book of Reading, Nigeria: Journeying in SocioEconomic and Political Development and also Social Spiral of Silence and the Narratives of African Culture in Contemporary Media. He is currently in the Department of Mass Communication, Bingham University Karu, Nasarawa state, Nigeria, and was a sabbatical Professor in the Department of Mass Communication, Nasarawa State University Keffi, Nasarawa State, Nigeria. Caroline Nonye Osuchukwu Ph.D., holds doctoral degree in English Language (EBSU), M.A. ESL (UNN), and B.Ed. English Language and Literary Studies (UNN), N.C.E. (Anambra State College of Education, Awka). She has many published works, including journal articles, to her credit. She has taught English Language and Literature in many secondary schools. Her areas of interest include phonetics and phonology, pragmatics, discourse analysis, linguistics, feminism and gender studies, among others. She is currently a Lecturer in the Department of English and Literature, Nwafor Orizu College of Education, Nsugbe, where she teaches several language-related courses. Charles Prempeh Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Cultural and African Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi-Ghana. He holds a Ph.D. degree in Theology and Religious Studies from the University of Cambridge (Wolfson College), United Kingdom, since 2021. He also holds a certificate in Public Engagement with Research (AHRC-TORCH outline course): organized by the University of Oxford, in 2021. Before joining Cambridge for his doctoral studies in October 2017, he undertook two years of doctoral coursework in interdisciplinary Social Studies at the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR), Makerere University (Uganda), and taught undergraduate students for a semester. He also holds a Master of Philosophy Degree in African Studies from the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, in Legon. In 2010, after completing his coursework, he was awarded the prestigious Agyeman Award for academic excellence. As an African Studies scholar, his research has an interdisciplinary dimension, incorporating areas such as gender, popular culture, religion, history, politics, education, philosophy and cultural studies. He has published in these areas in prestigious journals including African

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Studies Quarterly, Journal of Religion in Africa and Religion Compass. He has held several leadership positions as president of the Student Union at the MISR, the Cambridge University Ghana Society (CUGS), currently a founding member and communications director of the Vacation Initiative for Science Africa (VISA), a registered Ghanaian-based NGO and Director of Research for another registered Ghanaian-based NGO—Centre for Sustainable Livelihood and Development. Odey Simon Robert is an erudite Ebonyi State University (EBSU) linguist. He is a consultant, researcher, writer, editor and scholar, with over fifty scholarly publications to his credit in reputable international and national publishing bodies. Being multidisciplinary postgraduate scholar of the Bekwarra tribe, he concentrates on themes in languages and linguistics, philosophy, religion, feminism and gender studies, education, media studies, politics, leadership and development, sociology, psychology, history and international relations, among others. He has worked with several research firms and schools, including tertiary institutions. He has been teaching English Language and Literature in both tertiary and secondary institutions for over fourteen years. Pedzisai Ruhanya Ph.D., is a Lecturer in the Department of Creative Media and Communication at the University of Zimbabwe. He is also a founder and director of the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute. He holds a Doctor of Philosophy in Media and Democracy. He has many publications on transition politics in Zimbabwe. His research interest is on the role of media in democratic transitions. Collen Sabao Prof. Dr. is an Associate Professor of Linguistics, Literature and Communication in the Languages and Literature Department at the University of Namibia. As a lecturer and researcher, his research interests lie in the areas of phonetics and phonology, political discourse, media discourse, Pan-Africanism, afrocentricity, appraisal theory, argumentation, world literatures and rhetoric. He has published extensively in these areas, having published 31 (thirty-one) articles and several chapters in internationally refereed publications. He also holds a Bachelor of Arts Honours Degree in English and Communication and a Master of Philosophy in Theoretical Linguistics from universities in Zimbabwe and a Ph.D. in African Languages (Applied Linguistics) from Stellenbosch University (South Africa). He is also an American Council of

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Learned Societies Fellow’14 and an African Humanities Fellow ‘14. He is also an amateur footballer and an Elder Elect of Records in the House of Nyabhinghi Rastafari. Costain Tandi is a Ph.D. student at Tilburg University in Netherlands and a Lecturer for National Strategic Studies at Mkoba Teachers College in Gweru Zimbabwe. His research interests include but not limited to indigenous knowledge systems, African jurisprudence climate change and variability, rural poverty, agriculture and community development. He has published in these areas. Bibian Ugoala Ph.D., obtained her Bachelor of Arts, Master of Arts and Doctoral degrees in English language from the University of Lagos. She holds a Higher National Diploma in Mass Communication from the Federal Polytechnic Oko, Anambra State. She is currently a Lecturer in the Department of English Language and Literature, Faculty of Arts, National Open University of Nigeria. She teaches courses related to the use of English language in different communicative settings. Her areas of research interest include: critical discourse analysis, media discourse, multimodal discourse, Internet discourse, pragmatics and stylistics. She has published widely in national and international Journals. Takavafira Masarira Zhou Ph.D., holds a doctorate in environmental history from the University of Zimbabwe. He is an environmental historian, a Lemba, trade unionist and Human Rights defender. He has lectured at Mutare Teachers College, Africa University and Great Zimbabwe University (2004–2008) where he helped to transform the history subject area into the Department of History and Development Studies. He has presented various papers at conferences in Zimbabwe, Africa, Europe and Asia. He has also published on African agriculture; white settler farming; the environmental impact of mining in Zimbabwe; peace and security in Africa; history curricula changes in Zimbabwe; post2016 Africa’s development; teacher education; poverty, natural resources curse, underdevelopment and sustainable development in Africa; poverty, conflict and vulnerability in Africa; Climate Change and Environment in 21st Century Africa; indigenous knowledge systems; and general history and politics of Zimbabwe.

List of Figures

Fig. 11.1

Fig. 11.2

State of Political Crisis in Zimbabwe (Source Average analysis of IEP’s Global Peace Index and World Bank’s Rule of Law Index) State of Economic Crisis in Zimbabwe (Source Average UNDP HDI and World Bank GDP Growth rate 2018)

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CHAPTER 1

The Sub-Saharan African Postcolonial Politics: A Daunting Present Esther Mavengano

and Isaac Mhute

Introduction In reminiscence of Steve Biko’s (1987) memorable call for self-recovery and remoulding of African humanity in the new historical epoch, it is essential to reflect on how the existing realities speak to or against such crucial imaginary of the postcolonial world. This book emerges as a response to the postcolonial manifestations of political deceit. Arguably,

E. Mavengano Department of English and Media Studies, Faculty of Arts, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa Department of English, Faculty of Linguistics, Literature and Cultural Studies, Institute of English and American Studies, Alexander von Humboldt/Georg Forster Postdoctoral Research Fellow, TU (Technische Universitat Dresden), Dresden, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_1

1

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E. MAVENGANO AND I. MHUTE

the prevalent betrayals have given birth to untold suffering for the political subjects in the modern-day Sub-Saharan Africa, and the scholarly views submitted are steeped in re-visioning and contesting such circumstances. During the period of colonisation, the colonised Africans suffered extreme dehumanisation under the segregatory white regimes (Fanon, 1963; Biko, 1987; Ngugi, 1994; Mignolo, 2000; Muchemwa, 2013; Mavengano, 2020). The brutal colonial rule and its socio-political and economic logics were deeply entrenched in a deliberate effort to create frontiers which subjugate and dehumanise the perceived racial others, black Africans (Mignolo, 2000; Ngugi, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018; Mavengano & Hove, 2020; Mavengano, 2022). The troubling question that arises in the contemporary postcolonial era in Sub-Saharan Africa is, has this scenario changed with the ascending of Africans to political power? If not, what is the African problem in the postcolonial era that hampers the efforts from emerging victorious and remaining appreciative of the liberation struggles against foreign invasion? Why are the masses failing to recover from the onerous conditions of dismembering, dehumanisation and oppression which were produced by colonisation? Muchemwa (2013.p. 15) notes that: Some of the problems of postcolonialism are connected to expectations it raises concerning the shifts it signals in temporality, spatiality, epistemology and ideology. The postcolonial critique that is premised on rupture with the colony is, however, haunted by an intractable….

His observation points at the complicity of the postcolonial milieu characterised by attitudes, practices and experiences that emerged after colonialism which do not match the anticipated ideals of postcoloniality. The mismatch and astonishing paradoxes witnessed in the postcolonial period have generated profound dissatisfaction that burdens the postcolonial subjects (Mavengano, 2020; Modiri, 2017; Moyo & Mavengano, 2021; Muchemwa, 2013). Throughout the 21 chapters of this volume, I. Mhute (B) Department of Language, Literatute and Culture Studies, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] Senior Research Associate in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

1

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attention is given to the various appearances of political deceit and postcolonial paradoxes which are highlighted as part of the current African problem. The postcolonial challenges are engendered by the toxic political culture as appropriately asserted by Moyo and Mavengano (2021). The authors in this volume bring to attention the different kinds of political deceit observable in their national diverse contexts. Quite notable is what Moyo and Mavengano (2021) elucidated as the stubborn political culture that is anchored in ethnicity, otherisation, political arrogance, politics of eatery including the dictatorial configurations of governance in postcolonial period which have reconstituted a distinct Orwellian world as depicted in George Orwell’s (1945) classic novel, Animal Farm. In other words, the postcolonial African environment has maintained sociopolitical and economic binaries visibly marked by distinct groups of the rich (elites or elitism and the poor, (the homo-sacer figures in Agamben’s (1998) terminology) who are the modern-day Spivakian subaltern (Mavengano, 2023), living at the periphery). Yet, Africans participated in the liberation wars against foreign domination in a bid to reclaim their lost freedoms and rights (Meredith, 2005; Muchemwa, 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018). What is evident in the various chapters in this book is lack of emancipatory politics which departs from the oppressive practices. The present-day African leaders who inherited power from white settlers are accused of being wolves in sheep clothes, to borrow the biblical analogy, and have a black skin but a white mask, in Fanonian language (Fanon, 1968). Contributors in this volume provide convincing evidence which suggests the persistence of the colonial configurations and conceptions of power. The engagements with lived realities of grotesque power in the hands of the postcolonial rulers heighten a sense of entrapment as the postcolonial subjects find themselves victimised by their African leaders. The masses did not expect such undesirable turn of events after the protracted liberation struggles in Africa. This scenario troubles ideas of independence, nationhood, self-rule, Pan-Africanism, Africanisation, Black Empowerment, Ubuntuism, which have always been linked to racial identities by the postcolonial rulers as earlier on appropriately argued by Mavengano, Marevesa and Nkamta (2022). The semantic hollowness of these notions also speaks about betrayal in languaging and discourses that hide realities of people dogged by endless suffering and disenchantment. Such formulations initially served as scripts of transformative agenda in the infant years of independence, and the embedded dreams are yet to be

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lived realities. Such reflections and articulations of despondency bring to the fore Achille Mbembe’s (2001) construct of the postcolony which seemingly prognosticated in a sceptical attitude towards the triumph of the postcolonial self-governance, postcolonial and decolonisation schools of thought which privilege ruptures or disconnections from the colonial binaries, ethnic antagonism and other forms of othering practices. The chapters underline the painful process of pursuing possibilities of freedoms, human rights and re-imagining the African humanity in the present moment where rulers of the African postcolonies are consumed with selfinterest, greed and betrayal as has already been predicted by Ayi Kwei Armah’s (1968) monumental title The Beautyful Ones are not Yet Born. It cannot be contested that these postcolonial illogicalities cast a grey shadow over the possibility of fashioning a different world, or attaining decolonial futures in Africa without investing political will towards that direction as rightly argued by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020). It is relevant to say that authors in this volume point at politicsculture of deceit and suggest that it is one of the central problematics to be dealt with in postcolonial African struggles. The tragic situation is intensified by the fact that the same politicians who fought together with the masses against oppression are now the perpetrators who cause untold agony for their own people. In other words, the political systems that dislodged colonial regimes in Africa are deeply implicated one way or the other in the malaises, injustices, impunities and fragmentation of African humanity through toxic bordering, corruption, conflicts, abuse of power and suffering experienced in the postcolonial Sub-Saharan African societies. This also implies that attaining a decolonial African world remains a messy project ridden with cognitive empires, dissonances and inconsistencies (Alemazung, 2010; Mavengano & Nkamta, 2022; Mignolo, 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018). It is from this intricate milieu that this volume finds its discursive praxes and entry points into the existing discourses about postcoloniality or lack thereof. The increasing concern speaks about the shocking realisation of divergence from ideals of independence anticipated by the general African population in the postcolonial era. The chapters in this volume are structured in four sub-sections. The first segment reflects on how cultures of deceit find expression in the postcolonial Sub-Saharan literary imaginings. The four chapters in the section endorse Mavengano’s (2020, p. 1) remark that:

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…the usefulness of literary art derives from its transformative capacity, meaning that it is used as a veritable medium for portraying realities which are sometimes unspeakable (in other discursive platforms) and ultimately shape our perceptions and worldviews through critical and engaging discussions that arise in literary discourse(s).

The chapters which examined African literary texts produced in the postcolonial era share the same view with Kehinde (2003), Hove (2016) and Mavengano (2020, 2023) that African writers have a persistent commitment to their communities as their works reflect and refract the socio-political events in the social order. The second part explores the uncanny relationship between language, media and postcolonial political cultures of deceit in Sub-Saharan Africa. The segment has five chapters which interrogate the linguistic and media aspects vis-à-vis manifestations of political betrayal. The third section has four chapters and its thrust is on the postcolonial media landscapes in postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Of note here is that the four sections in this volume do not maintain rigid boundaries since some of the chapters examine more than two thematic motifs. In other words, there is a profound interface as the chapters feed into each other. The last segment has six chapters which interrogate the postcolonial political dialectics in religion and human rights discourses. Below, we briefly unpack the thrust of each of the four sections. In Chapter 2, Nelson Mlambo, Collen Sabao and Coletta Kandemiri provide a nuanced historical analysis of the Herero/Nama-German conflict in Namibian context which adversely impacted on the subjugated people. Some of the survivors are yet to recover from painful memory and the trauma caused by the sad encounter. The postcolonial context has not helped much to heal the wounds sustained during the period of domination. Their study traces the genesis of the postcolonial conflict and points at the horrors suffered and the persistent problems emanating from the damaged psyches of the postcolonial subjects. Mlambo, Sabao and Kandemiri use a historical novel set in colonial Namibia as a framing reference to contribute to discourses on children’s experiences of conflict, memory and reconciliation in the postcolonial context. They deployed trauma and resilience theorisation together with postcolonial ecocriticism to reflect on the modes of representation and how they can shed light on genocidal historiography. Most essentially, this chapter provides suggestions on how global futures of peace can be imagined and conceived

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through these historical experiences. Esther Mavengano’s chapter entitled, ‘Speaking from below: Reflections on Postcolonial Subaltern Practices of Resisting Deceit and Penury in Valerie Tagwira’s novel, Trapped’, follows in this section and bemoans the condition of entrapment suffered by the ordinary people in the present-day Zimbabwe. The chapter paints a daunting picture of an abject national space in Valerie Tagwira’s literary text. The cul-de-sac national space is more accentuated when the experiences of the fictive characters resemble real-life realities thereby blurring the boundaries between fiction and postcolonial tragedies. The title of the examined novel, Trapped, becomes a salient idiom which conveys the multifaceted reality of the postcolonial human world. The idiom is part of emotive language that discloses distress, cynicism and unhomeliness of the post-independent national space. Mavengano draws insights from Michel de Certeau’s conceptualisation of resistance, Bell Hooks’ notions of talking back and the margin space, as well as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s theorisation of the subaltern, to argue that the ‘flight’ of citizens from Zimbabwe speaks about the unhomeliness of the postcolonial national space. The study also poses critical questions which disrupt essentialist conceptions of Africanity, belonging, citizenship and nationhood as propagated by African nativists which are blind to the realities of widening gaps between postcolonial rulers and the common people. The precarity of the subaltern classes is registered in their perpetual nervous condition and marginality which find unambiguous articulations in modern-day Zimbabwean literature. The focal novel studied by Mavengano foregrounds how the central characters who are either professionals employed by the government or unemployed university graduates and their existential experiences denote Agamben’s (1998) notions of bare life and the figure of homo-sacer. According to Agamben’s formulation, ‘bare life’ is to be understood as human life stripped of all political and legal qualities and is placed within the possibility of death. The life of such deemed unimportant people is defined by precarity. Yet, Mavengano contends that the unsettled ordinary Zimbabweans contest state-imposed bare life together with conceptions of homeland, citizenship and belonging by engaging in acts of everyday resistance such as ‘fleeing’ from the hostile ‘homeland. Mavengano argues that this dimension has not been given much scholarly attention in current migration discourses. The fictive characters imagine their escape from their condition in the same way Zimbabwean migrants have been key subject of debate in current migration discourses in Southern Africa. The study concludes that analyses of

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civil resistance provide new perspectives to think about migration and Zimbabwe’s complex socio-political milieu in the current conversations. Nkereuwem, Ogonna Nchekwube’s chapter follows with its analytical gaze on how the postcolonial African politicians participate in separatist discourses which emphasise ethno-religious and linguistic differences for their selfish reasons. African oral and written literature is used to interrogate the fear of difference which is based on imagined and real ethnic enclaves in postcolonial modern-day Nigeria. Reiss and McNally’s Expectancy Theory of fear is adopted to submit that African literature could be used positively to deal with the fear and promote harmonious intercultural relations in postcolonial Africa. Elsewhere, Mavengano and Hove (2020) propose that Othering logics are a telling evidence of the fear of difference anchored in racist traditions which enacted selfOther boundaries and the prevalence of these binaries today exposes the complexity of becoming a new African humanity in postcolonial era. Nkereuwem, Ogonna Nchekwube’s study is a new conversation about the troubled terrain of self-Other cultural and linguistic frontiers in the postcolonial context of elaborate systems of exclusionary and dogmatic practices that re-inscribe in/visibility and dialectics of de/coloniality in the postcolonial era as correctly observed by Mavengano (2022). The last chapter in this section examines discourses of representation and resistance in Namibian literature as typified by Lauri Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Jaspar D. Utley’s The Lie of the Land. The chapter highlights the complicated historical memory of colonial imperialism and its effects on postcolonial identities in Namibia which remain troubled and fragmented. The second section in this volume has five chapters which locate cultures of deceit in the realm of language/ languaging and media discoursers. Gift Masengwe and Wadzanai Chihombori-Ndlovu’s chapter entitled, ‘Gender dichotomies: Integrating Digital Technologies, Local Content and Local Languages in empowering Rural-Black Women in Southern Africa’, offers gender sensibilities by exposing the presence of institutional power and historical inequalities which promoted genderbased differences in terms of access to technological development in Southern Africa. The re-enactment of gender biases and social hierarchies speaks about the historical legacies of deceit from the colonial era that remain in place. Masengwe and Chihombori-Ndlovu propose that a shift from colonial gender power structures is imperative in postcolonial Southern African context and beyond. Masengwe and

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Chihombori-Ndlovu contend that women are not adequately represented in decision-making processes regarding access to these technologies. Their study reinforces the claim that the postcolonial era is still maintaining (dis)connections. One such (dis)connection is the rural–urban binaries that prevail in terms of (in)accessibility of the technological activities. The lack of women’s agency on digital platforms prevents the creation of alternative narratives for social change especially in the context of postcolonialism and modernity. Issues such as unaffordable, inaccessible and unavailable mobile devices and data have hampered many women from accessing digital technologies. Ethical concerns regarding women’s privacy, data protection and online safety need to be adequately addressed. The study concludes that addressing gender politics and postcolonial deceit requires multidisciplinary approaches, collaborative efforts and critical reflection on digital inclusion, equitability and fair practices. In other words, there is need to interject the tendencies that ensue to naturalise gender and spatial differences. These efforts should be extended beyond the Southern Africa region to tackle systemic issues that affect women’s access to information and opportunities for political participation across Africa. Robert Odey Simon, Nwode, Goodluck Chigbo and Bibian Ugoala’s chapter entitled, ‘Hate Speech, a Source of Linguistic, Religious and Ethnic Intolerance among the sub-Saharan African Peoples: The Case of Nigeria’, analyses ethnic, linguistic and religious differences as a source of conflict in postcolonial Nigeria. The study concludes that hate speech is the bane of linguistic, religious and ethnic intolerance among SubSaharan African peoples. Therefore, it is imperative to desist from the use of divisive language that does not promote harmony and co-existence of diverse ecological compositions defining postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa, which constitute linguistic, religious and ethnic groups. The thematic subject and recommendations in this chapter are consistent with Mavengano, Marevesa and Nkamta (2022)’s reflections on xenophobic practices in the context of post-apartheid South Africa, who posit that it is unfortunate that Africans today do not put concerted effort to disrupt the artificial boundaries which were erected between them as a result of racial segregation as well as the white settler’s fear of perceived contamination. It is this segregatory logic which was inherited and continues to fracture African humanity by emphasising rigid ethnic, linguistic, spatial and socio-economic boundaries. The Us/Them binaries violate African ethics embedded in Ubuntu, Pan-Africanism and Africanisation philosophies

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which encourage Africans to come together and engender a new peaceful environment after the disruptions of colonisation. However, it is quite disturbing that the chapters that deal with this subject on ethnic, linguistic and religious tensions in this volume convey the problematic process of self-reading from the shackles of colonial thinking and practices. In Chapter Eight, Charles Prempeh studies language and deceit in Ghana’s postcolonial politics. Prempeh argues that Africa’s postcolonial politics is a complex replica of its colonial governance system in the sense that language remains a key instrument of political deceit in postcolonial historical epoch as it was utilised for the same function by the colonial regime. With language as key in communication, the political elites use political deceit to routinise power against the ruled. Osuchukwu Caroline Nonye, Bibian Ugoala and Robert Odey Simon’s chapter interrogates the different factors that lie behind the sustained ethnic, religious and linguistic intolerance in postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa, which largely accounts for different kinds of postcolonial war in the region. This study explores pragmatic misrepresentations of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups by mass media. Selected scholars’ words and annotated excerpts, which blame mass media for misrepresenting these groups and playing negative roles in conflicts, form the primary data. The study reveals that mass media cause and escalate conflicts, as they pragmatically misrepresent the aforementioned groups. The misrepresentations breed recurrent ethno-religious and linguistic intolerance that degenerates to violent conflicts among the groups. It concludes that pragmatic misrepresentations are manifestations of language misuse and the bane of intergroup conflicts engulfing this African region. It recommends reorientation and attitudinal change as the panacea. Agenda Setting and Speech Acts Theories ground the study. They both explain media influence on the masses, for which acts leading to conflicts are exhibited by both individuals and groups. Chapter Ten’s focus is on the postcolonial political, economic and ethnic discourses in Mozambique and Rwanda. In the chapter, Donald Peter Chimanikire, Valerie Rumbidzai Jeche and Jane Tsitsi Mudzamiri argue that the increasing political and economic inequalities which exist in Mozambique and Rwanda contribute to ethnic and linguistic prejudices and become a source of the current conflict. The third section of this volume comprises of five chapters. Pedzisai Ruhanya and Bekezela Gumbo’s chapter on Survival of the Private Media under Zimbabwe’s Politico-economic crises examines the impact of the politico-economic crisis on the operations of journalists working for

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Zimbabwe’s two main private publications, the Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ) and Alpha Media Holdings (AMH) between 2013 and 2018. They are interrogated in the auspices of the three constituent elements of the Habermas’ public sphere. Through an analysis of research data from interviews with AHM and ANZ journalists, the chapter exposes the undermining of the agenda setting, watchdog and adversarial roles of the news media in an economically turbulent Zimbabwe where bribes and inducements were rampant and defined journalism practices. The chapter further reveals the unprecedented ways in which the economic turmoil has created political and corporate bullies who use financial muscles to facilitate bribes and unethical journalism taking advantage of poorly paid journalists. The study recommends that media unions, like the Zimbabwe Union Journalists (ZUJ), enforce journalism and media ethics among journalists. Desmond Onyemechi Okocha, Maureen Chigbo and Melchizedec Onobe’s study on ‘Digital Authoritarianism in Nigerian Internet Control Techniques and Censorship’ focuses on the suppression of online journalism in the Nigerian context. Specifically, it examines the measures used by the state to muzzle or censor online journalism and their implications on press freedom enshrined in Sect. 39 of the 1999 Constitution as Amended. The study examined how digital authoritarianism affected online journalism in Nigeria and concludes that some online journalists do not understand what digital authoritarianism is all about—the legislation and other means through which Nigerian government breaches digital rights in the country. It established that digital authoritarianism is an offshoot of the authoritarian theory of Mass Communication whereby the state uses the instruments of power at its disposal to seek to control or curb information dissemination in the digital space, usually with the excuse of protecting national interests, security or sovereignty. The study, therefore, recommends capacity building and awareness creation to sensitise online journalists about media regulations including the Cybercrime Act, which restrict or suppress media freedom and how they can be protected. Jacob Mapara’s chapter entitled ‘Tragic labels, catastrophic consequences: Colonial treachery and the Cameroonian calamity’ is anchored on the coloniality theory and notes and argues that the end of colonialism on the African continent was characterised by a culture of deceit, treachery and arbitrary decisions that served the interests of the colonialists and not the Africans. Mapara makes reference to the biblical analogy

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of Judas Iscariotism to point at a culture of pretending to care whilst backstabbing the Blacks which prevails in Cameroon today in fights between what is labelled Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon. What adds to the tragedy, as the chapter notes, is the fact that the victims of this colonial predatory culture of divide and rule have embraced these labels that were created in Britain and France. The Cameroonians go about their everyday activities bearing this badge of division crafted around AngloFranco languages with pride, without even realising that the colonial matrix of power persists through them. The chapter laments the fact that these labels have lit a fire that latently burns at the fabric of nations’ unity and this has led to conflict and bloodshed as can be seen unfolding in Cameroon today. With its focus on Cameroon, the chapter looks at this betrayal of the self that continues to trail Africans on their continent and casts calumnies at the trio of Britain, France and the United Nations as the main authors of the current crisis. The chapter concludes by arguing that African nations have been subjected to the Europeans’ culture of deceit where they work together and at times in cahoots with the United Nations in selling dummies to Africans. Desmond Okocho and Jesse Ishaku’s chapter on Populism as a new Political Tactic of Postcolonial Deceit in Nigeria’s Contemporary Digital Era follows and examines populism as a new political tactic or deceit in Nigeria. The authors used critical theory and employed conceptual analysis in their discussion. They, however, contend that in countries with a disjointed economy and significant social injustices like Nigeria, populism has electoral relevance because it serves as a foundation for conflicting claims of emancipation from the socioeconomic conditions that plague the populace. Unfortunately, the complex nature of populism makes it nigh-impossible for its adherents especially in nascent democracy like Nigeria to provide stable and good leadership style that could salvage ‘the people’ from the shackle of mental slavery, economic hardship, insecurity and other issues bothering on bad governance. Contrary to what is generally believed, the chapter reveals that populism appears to be closely linked to corruption, which is detrimental to sustainable development in Nigeria. The chapter, however, recommends a paradigm shift and transformational leadership style which revolves around intellectual stimulation, idealised influence, inspirational motivation and individualised consideration in order to meet up with populist demands. The last section has seven chapters and it begins with Fabian Maugnganidze’s chapter entitled, ‘The impact of legacies of the past on the

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emergence of conflict and deceit in Sub-Saharan African politics’ which interrogates the contribution of the colonial past and a culture of deceit in the postcolonial period. Dube, just like Spivak (1999), Tamale (2006), Muchemwa (2013), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020) among others, cites the troubled encounter with the colonial settler as having lasting tragic imprints in the postcolonial era. The study also analyses the concept of democracy and deceptive tendencies which have fuelled instability in SubSaharan Africa. It touches on the different types of conflicts, their possible triggers and the people who benefit from the postcolonial conflicts. In Chapter Sixteen, George Michael Kizito explores the betrayed emancipatory African dream in the postcolonial period. Kizito argues that the problematic of realising an emancipatory Pan African state is concealed in the construction of a black-skinned African with a white mind—an observation that was also made by Kwame Nkrumah (1975; Ngugi, 1986). This white settler’s mindset persists in present-day rulers with a black skin. Using an existentialist and phenomenological critique, Kizito argues that despite the eminence of a cataclysmically neo-colonial buttressed post-independence African state, the African dream of an apocalyptic emancipatory state is alive, real and eminent analogous to the second coming of the Lord Jesus Christ. Edmore Dube’s chapter with the title ‘Discourse on violent Disenfranchisements and Threats to Religious and Ethnic Minorities in Postcolonial Zimbabwe’ interrogates violations of religious freedoms and voting rights of Malawian, Zambian, Mozambican and Indo-Pakistani minorities with significant Muslim proportions. Dube posits that publications, including newspapers, show that the minorities are under siege from the political elite. Zimbabwe’s recent jambanja (violent, divisive and disoriented land reform and plebiscites) negatively impacted on aliens’ rights leaving them insecure. Peculiar to this insecurity is its association with government as opposed to disillusioned sectarian groups, resulting in the victims having no resort for redress, courting the ire of church bodies. The referendum loss of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and civic groups in 2000 abolished conciliatory politics, rekindling the debate on citizenship and entitlements during colonialism (1890–1980). The redefined nationhood thriving on authoritarian identity politics has been punitive on the ‘stateless alien natives’ and ‘subject races’. The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (2001) meant to disenfranchise immigrants sympathetic to the opposition MDC ahead of the crunch 2002 Presidential Election. Many of

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these immigrants suffered intimidation, beatings, violent displacement, property rights violations and disenfranchisement. War veterans threatened to reclaim commercial land from Indo-Pakistanis, urban aliens, barred from urban African townships and identified by cards marked ‘00’ denoting no local geographical coding. Although not targeting religious freedom per se, this violent and insecurity prone crackdown on minorities did affect organised Muslim worship in this de facto Christian state. The chapter is motivated by the need to locate the perceived ‘alien minorities’ in the politically violent postcolonial Zimbabwean situation. Dube’s study also conveys the challenges of breaking the yoke of colonial attitudes and the hate of the perceived Others. Tobias Marevesa and Esther Mavengano’s chapter on ‘The Entanglement of the Church and the State during Mugabe’s Reign in Postcolonial Zimbabwe: A Social Conflict Perspective’ discusses the church and the state entanglement in modern-day Zimbabwe. The authors problematise this equivocal relationship of these two public institutions which they claim has provoked polemical scholarly conversations. The chapter’s arguments were framed through making references to the biblical text, Romans 13:1ff in a quest to understand Zimbabwe’s complicated interface of religion and politics. The social conflict approach is adopted as a conceptual framework to provide avenues which generate nuanced readings and understandings of the messy relations between the church. The notion of postcolonial deceit is analysed vis-a-vis the understating of the church serving as a watchdog which should be concerned with issues of justice, protection of human rights, peace, among others. It has emerged in this chapter that the interpretation of Romans 13:1ff and relevance to the Zimbabwean context is a site of controversy as there is no consensus on its meaning. There are no clearly defined roles or demarcations visà-vis how the church should relate with the state or the reverse. This situation has given birth to the paradoxical function of the church in Zimbabwe, which is both an empowering and muzzling institution for the postcolonial members of the subaltern classes. The discourses of human rights is taken up by Fabian Maunganidze who explores the principles of trust and honesty. Human rights are moral principles or norms for certain standards of human behaviour belonging to every human for protection of the dignity of all humans from severe political, legal and social abuses. However, deceitful political players create crisis and conflict situations that ignite, instigate and perpetuate human rights violations and abuses. The unconstitutional removal of leaders

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like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Patrice Lumumba in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso is classical example of the culture of deceit in African politics. Moreover, these developments culminated in gross human rights abuses perpetrated by both political opponents and the general citizenry. Although the African Union has made significant efforts to promote the observance and protection of human rights by coming up with treaties like the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Protocol of the African Court and others, the ratification of these treaties by member states is very slow with some African states showing reluctance to grant individual access of their citizens to the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights. To make it worse, even the security forces of some states are involved in human rights violations. Whilst the International Criminal Court has kept open the investigations of war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and other human rights abuses in several Sub-Saharan African countries, this has had very little impact on the protection of human rights in political conflict zones. Maunganidze’s chapter further analyses the challenges of the concept of democracy and its successful implementation as a framework for the peaceful conduct of politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, whilst identifying the main trends and challenges in preserving human rights and curbing the culture of deceit in Sub-Saharan African politics. Takavafira Masarira Zhou and Costain Tandi’s chapter explores the dynamics of youth participation in political leadership and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa in the postcolonial era which is characterised by political impunity. The focus on youth and political leadership and governance is a relatively new priority, though extremely timely, particularly considering events and democratic transitions in North African states (2010–2011) as well as Zambia (2021), in Southern Africa. Using a meta-theory of change and qualitative historical methodology, punctuated by triangulation of sources and voices from different perspectives, the study examines the young people’s disenfranchisement from and dividend in political and administrative leadership positions. Sub-Saharan Africa’s leadership of ‘sick old and corrupt men’ cling to power with the resultant continued dictatorial and predatory regimes, stifling of pluralism, development of underdevelopment, and poverty and misery. It is our argument that despite young people’s undoubted participation, contribution and catalysing important changes throughout history, they are disengaged from governance and political-decision making. The last chapter in this volume is from Gift

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Mwonzora who investigates one of the most exigent aspects of political communication: whether campaign promises, and pledges effectively sway voters to vote for particular candidates. By drawing on the Zimbabwean case study, the chapter shows how politicians often use campaign pledges and promises to hoodwink voters. This is pronounced through false, fake and unfulfilled promises and misrepresentations. Many voters then fall for the lies, empty policy and programmatic promises by political candidates, thus falling vulnerable to deception by politicians. The chapter established that political deceit goes contrary to the dictates of democratic representation and participatory democracy.

Concluding Remarks It is evident that the subject of political cultures of deceit in the context of postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa is a polemical one. In conclusion, it is suitable to assert that a clear evaluation of the analyses proffered by all the chapters validates the view that the postcolonial world for the majority of ordinary Sub-Saharan Africans is yet to be a reality. It is sad that in the postcolonial era, the suffering of the masses who continue to be projected as the wretched of the earth (Fanon, 1963) has been reinvented by black political leaders whose greed and self-centredness blind them from caring for the plight of their people. The ruling elites enjoy national resources whilst the general public struggle even to feed themselves. Thus, it is imperative to state that postcolonial political betrayal requires ongoing academic scrutiny and multifaceted inquiries in order to continue to offer transformative suggestions that could be positively utilised for the betterment of postcolonial existential conditions. Cognisant of the central role of the postcolonial African politics, we suggest that political actors should honestly and dutifully utilise their propelled positions to positively impact on masses’ lives. As has been noted by the contributors in this volume, political leadership in the Sub-Saharan Africa is found wanting and deceitful in its service to the people. It is our sincere hope and prayer that this volume, together with volume one in this series, provides useful resource material for transforming the political environment in the contemporary Sub-Saharan postcolonial era.

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Meredith, M. (2005). The state of Africa: A history of fifty years of independence. Free Press. Mignolo, W. D. (2000). Local histories/global designs: Coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking. Princeton University Press. Milazzo, M. (2013). Racial power and colour-blindness: The sad black stories of Kgebetli Moele’s Room 207 and twenty- first century black South African fiction. Journal of Commonwealth and Postcolonial Studies, 1(1), 33–57. Modiri, J. (2017). The jurisprudence of Steve Biko: A study in race, law and power in the “afterlife” of colonial- apartheid. Unpublished thesis: University of Pretoria. Moyo, T., & Mavengano, E. (2021). A Déjàvu of Orwellian ‘proportions’: Rereading animal farm in the context of Zimbabwean politics of change. In O. Nyambi, T. Mangena & G. Ncube (Eds.), Cultures of change in contemporary Zimbabwe: Socio-political transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa, (pp. 171–184). Routledge Publishers. Muchemwa, K. Z. (2013). Imagining the city in Zimbabwean literature 1949 to 2009 (PhD Thesis). Cape Town, Stellenbosch University. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2018). Epistemic freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and decolonization. Routledge. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2020). Decolonization, development and knowledge in Africa: Turning over a new leaf . Routledge. Ngugi wa Thiong’o. (1986). Decolonizing the mind: The politics of language in Africa literature. James Currey. Ngugi wa Thiong’o. (1994). The language of African literature. In Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, edited by P. Williams & L. Chrisman (pp. 435–455). Columbia University Press. Ngugi wa Thiong’o. (2009). Something torn and new: An African Renaissance. Basic Civitas Books. Nkrumah, K. (1975). Redefinition of Neo-Colonialism, in M. Mutiso GideonCyrus & SW. Rohio (Eds.), Readings in African political thought, (pp. 415– 418). Heinemann. Orwell, G. (1945). Animal farm. Signet Classic. Spivak, G. C. (1999). A critique of postcolonial reason: Towards a history of the vanishing present. Harvard University Press. Tamale, S. (2020). Decolonization and Afro-Feminism. Daraja Press. Zeleza, P. T. (2006). The troubled encounter between postcolonialism and African history. Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 17 (2), 98– 136.

PART I

(2–5) Cultures of Deceit in Postcolonial Sub-Saharan Literary Imaginings

CHAPTER 2

Memorialising Gender and Childhood Under the Throes of von Trotha’s Extermination Order: Trauma, Agency and Survival in Serebov’s Mama Namibia Nelson Mlambo , Collen Sabao , and Coletta Kandemiri

Introduction On 2 October 1904, General Lothar von Troth, a German, uttered one of the first documented instances of a policy of genocide, the Vernichtungsbefehl (“annihilation order”). The order was ruthlessly carried out and resulted in the extermination of nearly 90 per cent of the Herero population in Namibia. According to Gewalt (1999, pp. 172–173), the genesis of this colonial horror through the Vernichtungsbefehl was heralded thus:

N. Mlambo · C. Sabao (B) Department of Humanities and Arts, University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia e-mail: [email protected] C. Kandemiri Welwitchia Health Training Centre, Windhoek, Namibia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_2

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I, the great General of the German troops send this letter to the Herero people. The Herero are no longer German subjects. They have murdered and stolen, they have cut off the ears, noses and other body parts of wounded soldiers, now out of captain will receive 1000 Mark, and whoever delivers Samuel will receive 5000 Mark. The Herero people must, however, leave the land. If the populace does not do this I will force them with the Groot Rohr [cannon]. Within the German borders every Herero, with or without a gun, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will no longer accept women and children, I will drive them back to their people or I will let them be shot at. These are my words to the Herero people. The great General of the mighty German Kaiser.

When General Lothar von Trotha issued this notorious “extermination order” to wipe out the Herero tribe in what was then-German South West Africa (and now Namibia), during the next few months, it was carried out to the letter, with sadistic pleasure and utmost vengeance. Probably fourfifths of the Herero people, women and children included, perished one way or another, though the survivors’ descendants now number 200,000plus in a total Namibian population of approximately 2.5 million, and they are scattered across a vast and mainly arid land (Kandemiri et al., 2020, 2021). The smaller Nama tribe, which also rose up against the Germans, was sorely afflicted too, losing perhaps a third of its people, in prison camps or in the desert into which they had been chased (Kandemiri et al., 2020, 2021). It is this momentous period that has ignited a marked interest in literary historiography as demonstrated by numerous ‘factional’ writings that have flourished since the publication of Mama Namibia by Mari Serebrov in 2013, which is indicative of how cultural artefacts define us as homo narrans (Mlambo & Kandemiri, 2015), that is, storytellers, who create and recreate life in its multifacetedness. It is in this fold that faction, that is, a retelling of a story concerning real people and events, imaginatively constructs dialogue and incidents where no factual record exists, is birthed, and this is a modest avenue to recount colonial ineptitudes and their multifarious dimensions.

Positioning the Genocide in Critical Discourses Considerable amounts of literature have been published on the 1904– 1908 Namibian genocidal history. These include studies by De Souza Correa (2011), who researched some forms of sharing experience, with

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the task of memory and of rewriting history in view of the genocide during the colonial war (1904–1907) in South West Africa. In addition, Dyck (2014), Kossler (2015), Thornley (2013) and Van Mil (2011) echo the same sentiments, that the Herero conflict was the first genocide of the twentieth century. Particular interest has also been with regard to the use of story-telling to recreate the “what” of the genocide as an alternative and complementary voice to make visible, alive and vibrant the many depths and facets of this historical epoch (Kandemiri et al., 2020, 2021; Nandenga, 2019). However, it is worth noting that for some, faction that is in the form of narrative history or historical fiction, has not been readily accepted in the academy as a legitimate form of history. Kandemiri (2019) notes that historical fiction as a genre has been regarded as impractical due to the inevitable conflict between artistic composition and historic verisimilitude. Yet still, we hold that historical fiction particularly that which captures postcolonial wars, allows us to fully understand and imaginatively capture what really happened. It is through reading historical fiction that we are accorded the opportunity to be touched and moved by exactly what happened, and, thus, to connect to our lost humanity and capture the magnitude of human cruelty. In essence, through historical fiction, colonial horrors become alive beyond simple historical facts given in numbers and the historical past tense. This is because even after we know the facts, we continue to search for sense and meaning by unravelling the “how” that is enshrined in historical fiction which is the essence of our humanity. Historical novelists such as Serebrov, in our case, expose the reader to the inner lives of people across time and place, and in doing so, this illuminates history’s untold stories, thereby allowing the reader to experience a more complex and immersive truth. Furthermore, Bortolotti (2015) attempts to model the “inevitable conflict” by noting that historians seek to answer the question, “What happened?” and, therefore, historians turn to empirical data, while writers of historical fiction seek to explain “What was it like?” and, therefore, they tend to create imaginatively. In addition to this, in historical fiction, the basic dimensions of culture, the political, aesthetic and cognitive all converge to give the reader a sense of truth and authenticity (Bortolotti, 2015). In this vein, a number of literary studies on the representation of the 1904–1908 conflict have been done. Yet, as Becker (2020) notes, still we know very little about the experience of those who lived through this first systematic mass extinction of the twentieth century, though we have little information that is available through some forty-seven testimonies

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which were recorded and published in 1918 in a scathing official British report about German colonial rule in Namibia, known as The Blue Book (Becker, 2020). Nonetheless, Kandemiri et al. (2020) posit that historical novels recreate the same event but from different angles, yet several incidents emerge in the novels which relate to the historical reality that is now re-enacted through art. Furthermore, an analysis of the historical novel reveals that there seems to be a thin line between the imaginative literary works and the historical events that took place (Kandemiri & Mlambo, 2020). We, therefore, submit that the selected novel demonstrates literature’s immediacy in recreating some critical arguments that are still unsolved even in present-day Namibia about the general welfare of the people with the problems that are still linked to the nation’s history (Mlambo, 2014). The present chapter was framed by the trauma and resilience theory (Mlambo, 2013, 2014, 2015), through an emphasis on how colonial subjects were indeed historical makers—that despite the horrors of colonial subjugation, their resilience is a critical marker to reckon with. It is through this recognition of the traumas of colonial wars that Warikandwa and Nhemachena (2017) emphasise the historical fact of colonial land dispossession and the present need for restorative justice for the Nama and Herero reparation claims which are anchored in the 1904–1908 conflict. It is worth registering as well how interests in genocidal discourses in other contexts have sought to revivify the often glossed-over dimensions of racial horrors. For example, Reches and Sondaite (2016) analysed how Holocaust survivors coped with difficult, life-threatening and painful situations in their lives during the Holocaust through the identification of factors of resilience to the trauma they experienced. The study suggests that both external (social support and circumstances) and internal factors (changes in values, integration of traumatic experience and self-reliance) determined the resilience towards trauma by Holocaust survivors. Thus, the present chapter explores the resilience of the child survivors of the 1904–1908 conflict from a literary perspective as well as the trauma they suffered at the hands of the Germans. In addition to the above-mentioned, the voice of the child/girl-child victim who survived the genocide in Namibia has, to a greater extent, remained silent or has been masked by other voices. A universal cultural endorsement in many old-style African societies was that girls were only supposed to be seen and not heard, and this may partly elucidate why the experiences during the genocide have not been extensively and powerfully

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registered as they ought to. However, the few-recorded testaments from child/girl-child victims who survived the genocide have not been easily accessible and it is texts such as Mama Namibia by Serebrov which bring forth these testimonies as a testament of the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of colonial wars on the girl-child. Therefore, there is a crucial need to allocate testaments of these child/girl-child victims so that society can be more proactive in stopping genocides and conflicts before they start. However, with recent endorsements of child-centred historical methods and interdisciplinary approaches, the experiences and memories of child survivors of the post-1904–1908 wars and genocides have also begun to be scrutinised. This provides us with a new and crucial opportunity for methodical and focused comparative studies of timely topics such as the role of the child’s gender and agency as well as different community groups and resources that empower children to survive. Moreover, Dyck (2014) notes that it might be puzzling that the genocide in then-German South West Africa remains little studied if compared to other events of similar categorisation. Furthermore, Dyck (2014, p. 14) remarks that “the methods of killing during the Herero conflict were similar to those Nazis used in the Holocaust, thus, both genocides involved premeditated starvation, dehydration, and overwork in concentration camps, and mass executions”. This is what is invariably encountered in Mama Namibia and examining the truth-laden account in this text provides insights into the desirability of interdisciplinary perspectives to issues that confront humanity. This also places the Namibian story on the world map as the Namibian nation is often erroneously presented as a model of democracy, often ignoring the deep wounds which refuse to heal and voices of pain and discontent which threaten peace if not listened to. It is, thus, critical to answer questions with regard to, “What consequences does the treatment of childhood in wars and genocides have for today’s culture of remembrance in the respective states?”. Despite the tormenting times and the horrendous deaths that the Hereros and Namas experienced as a result of the presence of the Germans, some of them survived the traumatic conditions and managed to build some form of resilience. The Germans created a cruel situation that was extreme and that bordered on the lowest points of human perversity. The extermination order in its capacity also incited the German soldiers to lose that strand which separates humans from other forms of creation as they perpetrated extreme barbarism against fellow humans.

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Yet, what is of particular interest is a deliberation of the forms of resilience that the survivors adopted, and in particular Jahohora, as a means of coping and surviving under the less-than-favourable conditions as presented in Mama Namibia.

Resilience and Survival as Represented in Mama Namibia In Mama Namibia (2013), resilience is observed in some of the characters and for this chapter, the focus is on the girl-child Jahohora, as she withstands the strains of the conflict from all directions. The disappearance of her family stimulated an even tougher life as she was left alone and her vulnerability to the German soldiers created yet another grander obstruction that proved to be almost insurmountable. Despite these overwhelming hostilities, Jahohora seems to have defied a predetermined destiny of all Hereros as she survives in the desert and further survives to tell the Herero account of what transpired during the 1904–1908 period.

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As a fledgling teenager who witnesses the brutal murder of her whole family at the age of 12, she is left all alone. Jahohora naturally blends with the wilderness as it was the only embracing company by far better than the company of the German soldiers. Bereavement, confusion, hunger, starvation and loneliness are what she endured, and she instinctively found comfort in the surrounding environment in the absence of familial human beings. Aping the natural rhythm of nature provided her with that reassurance of the importance of life as illustrated in Mama Namibia; “I hear the wild dogs barking in the distance. I bark back. I hear the hyenas cry. I try to make the same sound. I laugh at myself. It keeps me from being lonely” (Serebrov, 2013, p. 163). This in itself is the manifestation of resilience exhibited by Jahohora. She undergoes the traumatic events of witnessing the deaths of so many people at once and yet she still finds the strength to imitate wild animals despite the life-denying realities around her, where the smell and reality of death reign supreme, and yet she still can afford to laugh at herself. The laughing part may be described as ‘therapeutic’ as she honestly confesses that it helped in containing loneliness. This concurs with Bonanno (2008) who asserts that actions such as laughing actually reduce negative emotions and increase social support and contact though there is restricted human-social contact for Jahohora. Jahohora’s life is transformed into that of scavenging as she rummages and moves from one place to another. The idea of communality has been muddled by the presence of the Germans alongside the extermination order. For Jahohora to keep on surviving, she has to improvise anything that she encounters and what she feels and senses may be useful as illustrated in the text: I go into a hut that’s not burned as badly as the others. I dig in the ashes, looking for anything I can use. I find a sharp cutting stone and two firestarting rocks…I put the cutting stone in the pouch with the fire rocks. (Serebrov, 2013, p. 164)

The badly burnt huts are symbolic of the devastated lives of the Hereros while the hut that is not badly burnt is emblematic of Jahohora; she is hard-pressed on all sides but she still stands. Also, the idea of digging in the ashes and picking some things is representative of Jahohora trying to pick up her shattered life and keeping it in the pouch. It is her resilience streak that makes her keep the paraphernalia based on the hope of living further than that day—to survive and tell the story,

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which concurs with Ledesma’s (2014) argument that survival is one of the concepts that are associated with resilience. Not only does Jahohora stay in one place, but she also roams from one wrecked village to the other as she is driven by the impulse to continue living. Her character best suits what Fletcher and Sarkar (2011) refer to as hardiness, a factor that is linked to resilience, involving the commitment to finding a meaningful purpose in life. The desire to live is what shapes Jahohora into a character that is malleable and protean (Mlambo, 2015), even under extreme and life-denying conditions. She adjusts and adapts accordingly, hence making life and being alive a reality. This is evidenced where Jahohora says: I go from one village to the next, finding nothing but bones and ashes. The nights are colder and the water scarcer. I shiver as I walk in the darkness. I wish I could start a fire so I could get warm. And to cook the small birds and rabbits I kill with my little spear. But a fire might bring the soldiers. I have seen what they do to Herero….I must eat my meat uncooked. (Serebrov, 2013, p. 164)

Enduring the extreme difficulties become her everyday reality but still, Jahohora would do anything to keep on holding on to her frail and fractured life, as she sees nothing in it but the will to live on, hence, she says, “I’m so hungry I become like a vulture, using my sharp stone to cut pieces of spoiled meat from the dead cows and goats along the path” (Serebrov, 2013, p. 165). Her choices are restricted and constrained such that she just eats even the putrid flesh from decomposing animal carcasses since it is only what is available. Surviving becomes the only goal that she aims for and under circumstances of this nature, the foetid smell would not deter her, thus, Jahohora demonstrates pragmatic morality and resilience traits. The conditions that Jahohora is exposed to could have had two possible outcomes, to continue suffering and live or to surrender and die. And even though, in some instances, Jahohora’s choice of food is restricted, there are some occasions where even the rancid meat became unavailable, which implies the upping of the levels of suffering and increasing the chances of dying from starvation. This is confirmed when she states, “And when there is no meat on the carcasses, I chew on the bones. At least it feels like eating something” (Serebrov, 2013, p. 165). Thus, the chewing of the bones is indicative of the extreme suffering that

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is occasioned by the war that Jahohora did not even start but one which makes her a victim who has to survive. In spite of the limitations that she faces, Jahohora makes unthinkable decisions for her to be able to see another day and this could be interpreted as directly linked to the issue of resilience as there is a collaboration of the body and mind simply to keep Jahohora alive. It is, therefore, through literature, Jahohora’s story in particular, that we learn about events that remain hidden from us. Through literature, these events give us expressive power, and through reflection on the world, fiction is the way through which trauma can be expressed. This is in agreement with Cloete and Mlambo’s (2014) argument that trauma is a wounded story that needs to be told, and this idiom can be found in both fictional and non-fiction texts, and Jahohora’s story is an example of this. When exposed to different environments, humans tend to adjust accordingly; for some, it is just adapting positively and for others, it is the exact opposite (Mlambo, 2015). In this vein, death itself is not something that can be readily accepted, whether it repeats on a daily basis or at a rate faster than usual, it can never be assented to, which implies that death cannot be readily accepted. On many occasions, Jahohora is exposed to traumatic incidences and yet at the age of 12, before she becomes a teenager, she handles most of the situations with great caution and maturity, which, under normal circumstances, would not have been possible. Jahohora reveals some unique characteristics that were born out of the conditions she is exposed to: I trip over something. I put my hands down to break my fall. They touch the face with no life. Once, I would have screamed. Not now. I have seen too many bodies to be frightened by death. It is my life. (Serebrov, 2013, p. 166)

The natural fear of a dead human is a normal human trait but this natural instinct has been stripped off Jahohora as she has been traumatised for a long time through being exposed to too many dead bodies which are the consequences of the postcolonial genocide. However, almost ironically, this has essentially sculpted her into a tough young person with a robust and enduring character, which are all traits that are associated with resilience. Moreover, the ability to control some of the reactions that are reflexive or instinctive depicts a level of resilience that has been spawned by the environment in which Jahohora finds herself. Besides, ‘screaming’

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could have easily sold her out to the enemy, hence controlling it is a sign of resilience. Also, the ability to think and react quickly to any situation saves Jahohora on numerous occasions from being spotted by German soldiers. She even devises and successfully pretends to be one of the dead bodies as a way of deceiving the soldiers who amenably are the paramount threat to her life as illustrated thus: There are no hiding places. So I lie among the bodies. If the soldiers come, maybe they’ll think I’m dead…I lie still as death, even though I feel his pee [German soldier] trickling down on me. It makes me sick. (Serebrov, 2013, pp. 169-170)

This incident marks a situation when a German soldier decides to unfeelingly urinate on the Herero corpses and this is exactly where Jahohora is hiding. The urine from the soldier could have provoked Jahohora to spring from where she lay, but she remained calm and still. She knew that any other form of reaction beyond pretending to be dead would cost her life, and that awareness made her to simply endure. Jahohora witnesses some gruesome scenes, and as a young girl, she could only be a mere witness who could not do anything about it. Again, it is through these endless murders and brutalities that she develops an even sturdier form of resilience. One of the remarkable scenes she witnesses is that of the soldiers raping and afterwards killing the victim with sadistic pleasure, as stated in the text: I hear several soldiers walking nearby…He (one of the German soldiers) bends over a young Herero woman…One by one the soldiers lie on the woman. When the last one is done, they smile at each other. One of them picks up his boom stick. It has a spear on it. He pushes the spear into the woman’s belly. The soldiers laugh as they go back to their camp. (Serebrov, 2013, p. 170)

In this brutal rape and murder scene, Jahohora manages to tactfully hold herself and control her emotions, and that essentially saves her from also being a rape and murder victim just like the other Herero woman who was rapped and bayonetted. Jahohora derives her courage and resilience from exceedingly extreme exposure to scenes such as the one in the above quotation. Such traumatic scenes bring about trauma and psychological injury, thus echoing Walsh’s (2007) observation and

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Lemaire’s (2011) comment on traumatic experiences being responsible for damaging and injuring the victim both physically and psychologically. Under such unique and relentlessly grim circumstances, Jahohora has only one choice, which is to be calm and enduring and, thus, save her own life. The German soldiers’ mistreatment and traumatising of the Hereros further reinforce the level of resilience in characters such as Jahohora who often witness the brutalities. The brutality and suffering that Jahohora experiences teach both her body and soul to survive by accepting the ‘little or no food’ mode of life ever since she lost her family and she resorts to living in nomadic solitude. It is the resilience that is built from the exposure to insufficiency that makes her keep on fighting to keep alive. This is not in any way meant to romanticise, celebrate and trivialise the horrors of her life but to accept that during war times, human brutality gets amplified and yet amidst all the suffering, a resilient and survivor instinct is a possibility. And from a young African girl in the name of Jahohora, we read and live through these harsh realities which should never be repeated: My belly isn’t full. I want to eat all the food. But I bundle up most of it. I must keep it for tomorrow and the next tomorrow and the next tomorrow. I don’t know when I will find more food. (Serebrov, 2013, p. 172)

The conditions force Jahohora to mature mentally and yet she is only a child, having lost her family at the age of 12 and surviving in the harsh desert for years. Evident from the above is that she has to think about tomorrow and with that in mind, she eats sparingly the food that was left for her by the ‘skinny German soldier’. Though her stomach does not get filled up, her future without food is what controls and limits her from eating up everything. The idea of eating sparingly and thinking of the following day and the future is expressive of the concept of survival as identified by Ledesma (2014), and, in this regard, Jahohora is prudent with the little food that she has and this also reflects her maturity, ingenuity and her being protean as a means to survive. Moreover, Jahohora also realises that solitude is likely to drive her insane and to prevent that from happening, she resorts to singing as a way of reminding herself that she is still alive. This is evident when Jahohora says, “I quietly sing the praise songs Tjikuu and Mama taught me. Singing helps me stay awake. But it makes me sad” (Serebrov, 2013, p. 173). The singing is reflective and has a sentimental attachment to the people that

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Jahohora cherishes and misses at the same time, hence the singing that she does also brings about some melancholic atmosphere. The issue of having monologues has become a norm and a part of her life to erase the loneliness that she has since adopted. This is observed in yet another incident where she says: I go back to my little hut on the hill. It’s very quiet. Too quiet. I talk softly to myself and sing songs. It breaks the quiet, but not the loneliness. It’s hard to sleep. I think about the women. About my family. About home. (Serebrov, 2013, p. 187)

Not only does she sing to herself, but she has also developed a tendency of talking to herself and the monologue is tainted with traits that show resilience as the text illustrates, “I want to lie down. Right here. With the sun burning me. But I know I can’t. Not yet. If I do, I may never wake up. I have to get water before it’s too late” (Serebrov, 2013, p. 176). Talking to herself is a sign of reassuring herself that she is there and alive, and a reminder that she still has a life ahead of her, especially considering the precariousness of being alive under the war circumstances where she is not an instigator but a recipient of the perpetrators’ onslaught. When the rainy season finally arrives, life changes for the better for Jahohora as food availability improves significantly. Gratitude is a trait that illuminates her life and she thanks mother earth. Nonetheless, the other side is still as dull and gloomy as loneliness remains a critical concern and yet in spite of that, resilience traits are discernible as she does not show any signs of giving up on her life but she devises a way of fighting loneliness as evidenced from Mama Namibia: I have everything I need. Except my family. When I get lonely, I talk to myself. I tell the stories Mama and Tjiku told me. I must remember them. Someday I will tell them to my children.… Who will be the tate of my children? (Serebrov, 2013, p. 180)

The impulse to talk to herself brings a form of therapy to Jahohora’s dark side and this encourages her to soldier on. Also, the shift of seasons from a harsh dry and unforgiving environment to a rainy and supportive environment that provides food could be interpreted as nature rewarding Jahohora for being resilient during the past times, which again is illustrative of the natural co-existence between humans and the environment.

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Jahohora relies highly on the environment and still finds meaning and importance in her life even under the punishing conditions instigated by the Germans. Thus, through the interaction with the environment, Jahohora develops survival tactics because: As soon as the sun wakes, I check my traps. The first two are empty. The last one has a rabbit. It’s a skinny rabbit. I use my cutting stone to sharpen a branch into a new little spear to kill the rabbit. I’m sorry I have to kill it. I’ve seen too much death. But I need its meat so I can live. (Serebrov, 2013, p. 179)

Besides the food that is now available in the veld, Jahohora practises caution as a means to survive by avoiding anything that attracts the German soldiers’ attention. She avoids making a fire as this can instantly reveal her hiding place and she also becomes extremely vigilant every time she visits a waterhole. Though lonely, being prudent in her situation is a scheme for survival that is linked to resilience as her toughness exudes through her character: Even though I have seen no one for a long, long time, I always stop before I reach a new water hole. This time, I quietly climb a tree so I can look over the area. I see a small tail of smoke, my heart beats loudly. I hear voices. They are using Herero words! I look closely. A Herero man and woman sit by the fire. Don’t they know how dangerous that is. Even when I know I’m alone in the veld, I eat my meat raw. A fire would show soldiers where I am. (Serebrov, 2013, pp. 180-181)

Jahohora also resorts to eating raw meat as a means of surviving as her body needs nourishment (though not the best of it at this moment in time) and cooking the meat would mean lighting up a fire which was certainly unwise to do. Therefore, she considers the way the Herero man and woman are perilously exposing themselves to be extremely dangerous. Yet still, Jahohora does not give up on life despite the perilous life that she endures, instead, she struggles through the sufferings and at the same time she develops through them, which is a critical marker of the resilience motif. Thus, the life that Jahohora has taken up, which is shaped by resilience, echoes Ungar’s (2011, p. 2) assertion that “Not only can a person bounce back from substantial adversity, but he or she can actually grow through their challenging experiences”. In this case, Jahohora

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is extremely resilient as she develops fortitude and thereby survives her tribulations that are occasioned by German colonial aggression.

Retaining Indigenous Knowledge Systems The use of indigenous knowledge (IK) became a critical point of survival when the Hereros’ lives suddenly changed because of the instigation of the Germans. The use of IK is evident in Mama Namibia (2013) through Jahohora. Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) play a critical role in making human beings sustain themselves in the face of unprecedented adversity. Jahohora learnt a lot about life through the knowledge that is transmitted to her by her father, “Tate takes Mama and me into his secret healing garden to show us a special plant that is medicine for the milk cows” (Serebrov, 2013, p. 20). This informal knowledge system becomes a tutorial that she later applies to save herself from being captured and taken to the death camps. Jahohora’s intricate knowledge of her surrounding environment confirms the intersection between humans and the environment, and, with that, she survives in the harsh Omaheke desert, hence echoing Maunganidze’s (2016) claim that, “Because human identity is regarded as an extension of the environment, there is an element of inseparability between people and the natural world” (p. 2). Jahohora is able to hunt by trapping small creatures for food; she digs the ground for tubers (unkis), as well as moving from one berry bush to the other for survival. It is possible to do all this because she has knowledge of the area and she is alert to the edible odds and ends that she comes across as a survivor and not simply a victim. Thus, she confirms Mapara’s (2009) definition of IKS as “a body of knowledge, or bodies of knowledge of the indigenous people of particular geographical areas that they have survived on for a very long time” (p. 140). She had to survive the harsh postcolonial war, and she indeed survived against all odds. Moreover, Jahohora is not just a survivor but also a saviour, saving the life of Ikuaterua, who was on the verge of death. She is just a wanderer in the desert, but with the knowledge and help of her surroundings and the knowledge passed to her from her father, she manages to resuscitate Ikuaterua, who was so emaciated that “a small breeze could blow him over” (Serebrov, 2013, p. 188). She takes care of him until he recovers, though not fully as indicated in the novel, “At last, the man is able to sit up and drink without me holding the water pouch for him. He talks

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softly. His voice is just a whisper” (Serebrov, 2013, p. 189). It is the collaborative effort of the environment and Jahohora’s knowledge of that environment that enables Ikuaterua to recover through the help he gets from Jahohora. Another significant part which relates to IKS is the ability of Jahohora to relate to her environment based on the knowledge she has and her familiarity with Mother Nature’s provisions which all enable her to survive. After Ikuaterua has recovered and before leaving Jahohora, he warns her that, “They [German soldiers] would come…And what they do to Herero girls is very bad. They just kill the men, but they force the girls and the women to lie with them. Then they kill them” (Serebrov, 2013, p. 190). The fear of being a victim and prey of the German soldiers is what prompts Jahohora to take a drastic measure of smearing her body with a poisonous plant simply for her to survive. She recalls the plant that her father once showed to her as a dangerous plant which can have disastrous effects if it just as much as get in contact with human skin. However, it is ironic that that which kills actually saves her, thus, Jahohora walks around in the veld looking for the poisonous plant. She finds one plant and says, “I tear a leaf off. It stings my hands. It must be the right plant” (Serebrov, 2013, p. 202). The idea of her remembering the deadly plant, in a way, glorifies the African way of instruction, that is orally and informally, and this is what makes her survive. Thus, Nkondo (2012) argues that the western perception of African indigenous knowledge as a mere repetition of practices without any theory to explain them is a depiction of western cultural and intellectual arrogance. Evident here is that the non-theoretical and oral practices are the ones which inspire survival in Mama Namibia as evidenced by Jahohora in this instance. Jahohora applies the poisonous plant all over her body and she does this ironically ingenuous act while she is aware of the effects that the plant would have on her, but she felt that this was the only way for her to be ‘untouchable’ and, thus, be left alone and, therefore, survive. She chooses to do this as a protective mechanism against being captured and abused: The plant might make me sick, but it could protect me. I pick more leaves and rub them all over my body. I feel like I am on fire. I look down at my arms and legs. They’re covered with little bumps—like lots and lots of bug bites. I don’t want to put the leaves on my face, but I have to. I gently rub them on my neck and then on my cheeks, my chin and my forehead.

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I’m careful not to let them touch my eyes. When I’m done, I itch so badly that I want to scratch my skin off. (Serebrov, 2013, p. 202)

Serendipitously, after developing the sores, Jahohora survives being captured and raped and then either killed or thrown into concentration camps which had become death camps owing to hunger and starvation. Interestingly, the IKS as presented in Mama Namibia were not documented and ‘proven scientifically’ but they were potently passed on from generation to generation orally (Kandemiri, 2019). Jahohora in a way illustrates how IKS function in societies. Mapara (2009) observes that indigenous knowledge systems manifest themselves through different dimensions and among these are agriculture, medicine, security, botany, zoology, craft skills and linguistics. Using IKS, Jahohora uses a poisonous plant to create a personal sanctuary which indeed became a fortification as she developed non-life-threatening wounds, which is exactly what she wanted. The pain makes me sleep a lot … Tiny little maggots have crawled inside the sores, making them worse than they were before … it hurts to touch anything. And when I stand, the earth moves as if I’m turning in circles. I almost fall. I grab the tree again to steady myself. I pick up a broken branch to use as a walking stick and walk—very, very slowly—toward a waterhole. (Serebrov, 2013, pp. 202-203)

Though Jahohora is already undernourished and applying the poisonous plant further worsens her condition, she falls sick and at the same time, ironically, an effective defensive mechanism is now in place. German soldiers visit Jahohora’s waterhole and when they see her, they make sure that they do not get close to her because her skin has blisters which they think could be some contagious sickness. Her self-inflicted wounds, therefore, deterred the men from doing anything to her. She has been fortified by wounds and blisters. Thus, indigenous knowledge saves Jahohora despite the adversity brought about by the war. Indigenous knowledge can essentially provide solutions to the existing problems of that time (Risiro et al., 2013). Yet, Africa’s indigenous knowledge which preserved lives then is marginalised in contemporary times.

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Conclusion The Herero and Nama genocide remains a contested issue with a historical-present and yet owing to it being under-investigated, it can be regarded as a “forgotten” genocide. The chapter provided some insights through which we can read the presentation of gender and childhood as engendered by von Trotha’s extermination order. The chapter demonstrated how postcolonial wars are sites of trauma, memories of deceit, agency and survival, and through Serebov’s Mama Namibia, the reader is transported back to a historical epoch and live it, experience it and imagine it ad infinitum. Mama Namibia as historical fiction, allows us to rethink fiction, memory and cultural production for peaceful futuremaking. The novel provides various recollections of the genocide and validates how ethnic relics and/or creative establishments narratively act as vehicles of recollection and deliver a revitalisation of conflict, brutality and race-thinking. The author venerates how the genocide can serendipitously offer an aesthetic that valorises historical accounts of pain, brutality and violence as foundations for peaceful negotiations and the valorisation of the victims’ positive traits. Identifying and registering the genocide itself through the eyes of children survivors allows us to think about, think through and discuss the unsaid, the unsayable and yet-to-be-said character personalities that actually unite humanity, and go beyond victimhood. Therefore, the chapter sought to register the often overlooked magnitudes of the Herero genocide, which is their agency: their pliability and aptitude to survive. These are qualities that have been overlooked in research on colonial genocide; and the chapter, through Jahohora, brings forth the argument that in order to construct futures that are informed by history, an examination of children under genocidal contexts and how they survived is a critical area of concern. The chapter used the trauma and resilience theory, and thoughts from memory studies to illustrate how cultural production can aid in the replication of genocidal historiography and above all, how international futures of amity can be considered. The study found that the child survivor displayed varied patterns of resilience as well as varying survival tactics. The Germans fashioned a hostile condition as illustrated in the text and Jahohora had to rely on the environment for survival thereby demonstrating the relationship that exists between human beings and the environment.

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Indigenous Knowledge Systems (ICS) play a key role in enabling people to persevere in the face of adversity. It is the consciousness of this indigenous knowledge that the child/girl-child victim of the 1904–1908 conflict could survive, such as knowing which rhizomes to dig from the ground for food and rehydration. The chapter, therefore, explored the IKS of the child/girl survivor as a means of survival and resilience in the face of an adversary as presented in the genocidal novel.

References Becker, M. (2020). The plight of the Rohingya: genocide allegations and provisional measures in the Gambia V Myanmar at the International Court of Justice. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJlIntLaw/2020/15.html Bortolotti, S. P. (2015). The finagling art of historical fiction. Linguistics and Literature Studies, 3(3), 111–119. Bonanno, G. (2008). Loss, trauma, and human resilience: Have we underestimated the human capacity to thrive after extremely aversive events? Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, and Policy, S(1), 101–113. Cloete, I., & Mlambo, N. (2014). A literary exploration of trauma and resilience in Tagwira’s the Uncertainty of Hope. NAWA: Journal of Language & Communication, 8(2), 92–105. De Souza, C. (2011). History, memory, and commemorations: on genocide and colonial past in South West Africa. https://www.scielo.br/j/rbh/a/prrLk7Krx gxn8QsD5GPx5nq/?lang=en. Dyck, K. (2014). Situating the Herero genocide and the Holocaust among European colonial genocides. Chrome extension:// https://www.iz.poznan.pl/plik,pob efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ ierz,921,39ff75735dbab2a13c53d6c2d9886a08/41-10-KIRSTEN-DYCK. pdf. Fletcher, D., & Sarkar, M. (2011). Psychological resilience: A review and critique of definitions, concepts and theory. A summary of this work was presented at the 2011 European Congress of Sport Psychology, Madeira, Portugal. Gewalt, Jan-Bart, (Trans.). (1999). Herero Heroes. James Currey. Kandemiri, C. M., Mlambo, N., & Pasi, J. S. (2021). Disruption of social settings in selected narratives of genocide. Journal of African Languages and Literary Studies (JoALLS), 2(1), 131–155. Kandemiri, C. M., Mlambo, N., & Pasi, J. S. (2020). Literary reconstructions of the 1904–1908 Herero Nama conflict in Namibia Journal of African Languages and Literary Studies (JoALLS), 1(3), 7–32. Kandemiri, C. M. (2019). Revisiting, revitalising and archiving oral literature (folklore): Resilience and survivalist tenets in selected Namibian historical

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novels. German Literature Archive Marbach (DLA). Narrating Africa Workshop. 5–6 September 2019. Deutsches Literur Archic, Marbach, German. Kössler, R. (2015). Namibia and Germany: Negotiating the past. University of Namibia Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvh8r4d4 Ledesma, J. (2014). Conceptual frameworks and research models on resilience in leadership antecedent. SAGE Open, 4(3), 1–8. Lemaire, C. M. (2011). Grief and resilience. In F. J. Stoddard, A. Pandya, & C. L. Katz (Eds.), Disaster, psychiatry: Readiness, evaluation, and treatment (pp. 179–202). American Psychiatric Publishing Inc. Mapara, J. (2009). Indigenous knowledge systems in Zimbabwe: Juxtaposing postcolonial theory. The Journal of Pan African Studies, 3(1), 139–155. Maunganidze, L. (2016). A moral compass that slipped: Indigenous knowledge systems and rural development in Zimbabwe. Cogent Social Sciences, 2, 1–12. Mlambo, N., & Kandemiri, C. M. (2015). Articulating the unsayable: An exploration of “visible voices” in Sifiso Nyathi’s The Other Presence. Journal of Arts & Humanities, 04(10), 53–64. Mlambo, N., Kangira, J., & Smit, T. C. (2015). Critical reflections on surviving against all odds in Valerie Tagwira’s The Uncertainty of Hope. International Journal of Language and Linguistics, 2(2), 48–56. Mlambo, N. (2011). Urban lives and the complexities of change: Cultural transformation for survival in contemporary Zimbabwean fiction. NAWA Journal of Communication, 5(1), 199–210. Mlambo, N. (2013). Exploring the literary representations of urban survival and coping strategies in selected contemporary Zimbabwean fiction in English from 1999 to 2009 (Doctoral thesis, University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia). https://www.repository.unam.edu.na/. Mlambo, N. (2014). Trauma, resilience and survival strategies in crisis times: An Afrocentric literary approach. Scholars Press. Mlambo, N., & Pasi, J. (2010). Book review: Undisciplined heart by Jane Katjavivi. NAWA Journal of Communication, 4(2), 92–105. Nandenga, A. N. (2019). Reconstruction of atrocities through fiction in Namibia: An evaluation of Mari Serebrov’s Mama Namibia and Lauri Kabuitsile’s The Scattering. (Masters thesis, University of Namibia). https://reposi tory.unam.edu.na/handle/11070/2586. Nkondo, M. (2012). Indigenous African knowledge systems in a polyepistemic world: The capabilities approach and the translatability of knowledge systems. Paper presented at the Southern African Regional Colloquium on Indigenous African knowledge systems: methodologies and epistemologies for research, teaching, learning and community engagement in higher education. Howard College Campus: University of KwaZulu-Natal. Reches, R., & Sondaite, J. (2016). Resilience to trauma by Holocaust survivors: Factors in surviving, coping and thriving. Mykolas Romeris University.

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Risiro, R., Tshuma, D. T., & Basikiti, A. (2013). Indigenous knowledge systems and environmental management: A case study of Zaka District, Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe. International Journal of Academic Research in Progressive Education and Development, 2(1), 19–39. Serebrov, M. (2013). Mama Namibia. Word Weaver Publishing House. Thornley, C. M. (2013). “Heaps of sand.” Genocide in German Southwest Africa and press silence in 1904. (Master’s thesis, The State University of New Jersey, New Jersey). https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/39452/ PDF/1/play/. Ungar, M. (2011). The social ecology of resilience: Addressing contextual and cultural ambiguity of a nascent construct. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 81(1), 1–17. Van Mil, J. (2011). The African Reich: Germany’s imperial campaign in Africa (1880–1914). (Bachelor’s thesis, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands). http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=121528. Walsh, F. (2007). Traumatic loss and major disasters: Strengthening family and community resilience. Family Process, 46(2), 207–227. Warikandwa, T.V., & Nhemachena, A. (2017). Colonial land dispossession and restorative justice after genocide: An appraisal of the practicality of the Nama and Herero reparation claims. In T.V., Warikandwa, & A. Nhemachena (Ed.), Transnational land grabs and restitution in an age of the (de-)militarised new scramble for Africa: A Pan African socio-legal perspective. Langaa Publishers.

CHAPTER 3

Speaking from Below: Reflections on the Postcolonial Subaltern Practices of Resisting Deceit and Penury in Valerie Tagwira’s Novel, Trapped Esther Mavengano

Introduction In recent years, the challenge of Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa and other Southern African countries has triggered cases of xenophobic violence and some of the immigrants even lost their lives and/

E. Mavengano (B) English and Media Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa Department of English, Faculty of Linguistics, Literature and Cultural Studies, Institute of English and American Studies, Alexander von Humboldt/Georg Forster Postdoctoral Research Fellow, TU (Technische Universitat Dresden), Dresden, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_3

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or properties. Xenophobia takes various forms including physical threat, verbal abuse, daunting punitive laws and discriminatory attitudes, just to mention a few (Mavengano & Nkamta, 2022). The recent outbursts by the Limpopo Provincial Minister Phophi Constance Ramathuba in South Africa also speak about a growing anti-migration calls from Zimbabwe’s Northern neighbour. These are just referent points utilised to frame the discussion of postcolonial manifestation of political betrayal which is, however, not limited to South Africa. Despite these ugly episodes of xenophobia and in some cases tragic loss of lives, Zimbabwean immigrants living in such hostile environments have remained deaf to their government’s call to all its citizens to return home. This study refers to Valerie Tagwira’s novel to interrogate the reasons why Zimbabweans pay a deaf ear to their government’s call and continue to migrate to other countries even when there is telling evidence of hostility in some of the host countries. The main thrust of the chapter is not to discuss migration, but rather, the study concentrates on aspects that make modern-day Zimbabwe an unhomely and forbidding space that compels its supposed owners to ‘flee in droves’ to unfamiliar host(ile) countries.

Theoretical Mappings: Michel de Certeau, bell hooks and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak This study draws on Michel de Certeau’s analysis of resistance, bell hooks’ (1989a/1989b) explications on the importance of ‘talking back’ and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s notion of the subaltern, to rethink the ‘flight’ of citizens as acts of resistance by those living at the fringes of the Zimbabwean society today. The works of these three scholars have demonstrated a compelling desire to rebuke practices of domination and contest prevailing injustices which impose muteness on the oppressed groups. Spivak’s concept of the subaltern, which is located in the postcolonial theorisations, responds to the question of suppression and silencing of the troubled and marginalised subjects in postcolonial societies such as Zimbabwe. Spivak (1988a/1988b) holds the vision that subalterns cease to be subalterns when they speak out and reclaim their expressive voices, of which they have been robbed. Likewise, hooks (1989a, p. 5) explicates that “talking back” is to “speak as an equal to an authority figure.” Both Spivak and hooks write against voicelessness, caution that the dominated people cannot be represented by the privileged people and underscore the urgent need for self-representation from these groups (hooks, 1989a/1990; Spivak, 1988a). For bell hooks

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(1989b, p. 19), silencing takes place practically everywhere because “we live in a world in crises—a world governed by politics of domination.” She further states the urgency to demand the “right to speech” and “make the speech heard” (ibid.: 8). Similarly, hooks warns that silence is an act of submission to the oppressive culture. The implication here is that when the oppressed people do not counter attack a culture of domination, they preserve the state of affairs. In addition, hooks (1990) talks about the ambiguities about living in the margin of the society. For her, the margin is a critical space of resistance which is an act of risk and daring (1989b/1990) in a bid to demand justice and liberated voice. Essentially, hooks does not regard marginality as a state of prostration and deprivation but rather views it as a site of radical possibility for the oppressed people. In other words, marginality is the prerequisite that produces counter-hegemonic narratives, which in turn could function as the voice establishing the much desired subversive consciousness for both the othered people and the hegemonic power (Bhabha, 1994; hooks, 1990). Although hooks’ views were not referring to the postcolonial African context, her thoughts are useful in interrogating the current unfolding situations in most African states including Zimbabwe. In this regard, the adopted theories in this study establish and foreground the perspectives of the postcolonial Others whose voices have been muffled. Michel de Certeau’s (1984) resistance theory is further utilised to underline the strengths of the subjugated people rather than their precarity and ineptness through exploring the surviving strategies that members of the subaltern parade in the examined novel.

Valerie Tagwira’s Trapped (2020) Valerie Tagwira is a female novelist whose memorable maiden entry into Zimbabwean fictional writing was marked by her novel, The Uncertainty of Hope which was published in 2006. Her debut novel won the National Arts Merit Award in 2008 and has attracted the attention of both scholars and critics interested in postcolonial African literature. Tagwira is a specialist obstetrician and gynaecologist who lives in Harare, a capital city of Zimbabwe. She has so far written two novels and a few short stories. Her second novel titled Trapped, is set in Zimbabwe’s prevailing socio-political and economic milieu. This modern eon is deployed to depict a society that is confronted with problematic circumstances which dishearten the working class. Elsewhere, Mavengano (2022, p. 80) elaborates that Zimbabwe’s existing historic “epoch is overtly accentuated in

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the Zimbabwean literary oeuvre as defined by bleakness, pessimism, state’s acts of brute force, and ordinary citizens experiencing extreme conditions of precarity.” The cityscape in Tagwira’s literary oeuvre figuratively represents the nation on the brink of collapse due to economic and political crises The national space is a precinct of strain and relentless distress for ordinary citizens (Mavengano, 2023a; Muchemwa, 2013). Tagwira’s second novel, Trapped foregrounds the plight of the public health practitioners, senior citizens, unemployed university graduates among other sections to make a point about the persisting teething troubles which affect the general public’s welfare in present-day Zimbabwe. Her central characters, irrespective of the fact that they are educated, belong to the peripheral sections of Zimbabwean society, whose living or working circumstances are appalling. The novel, like other recent literary texts from Zimbabwe, indicts the government for the citizens’ precarity which is mainly engendered by those in power. As in her first novel, The Uncertainty of Hope, Tagwira’s writing illustrates a compelling concern with the plight of workers and signifies the desire to defy subjugation of the subaltern classes in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Tagwira’s fictive works open a platform to speak up to the authorities, exposing the everyday struggles of the general public in a dog-eat-dog scenario that delineates Zimbabwean environment from 2000 to the present day (Mavengano, 2022; Moyo & Mavengano, 2021; Muchemwa, 2013). In Trapped, disenchantment, poor working conditions, meagre salaries, precarity among other disheartening aspects are heightened tropes which compel some medical professionals to throw ethics of conduct to the wind and engage in unlawful activities in order to put food on their tables. Similarly, frustrated unemployed graduates and other disgruntled skilled workers leave the country in search for a meaningful life elsewhere outside the national borders. According to Kehinde (2003), African literature serves as a pertinent site that responds to human experiences and creative works belong to the people not the elite or ruling class. Contemporary Zimbabwean literature shows its discernible propensity to speak truth to power or talking back according to bell hooks (1989a). This echoes Flora Veit-Wild’s words cited in Mavengano (2023a, p.10) observation that Zimbabwean and African writers in general, “write against blindness and a craving to speak against present injustices”. Tagwira’s writing affirms Kizito Muchemwa’s (2013) argument that writing in African literature is a process of de-silencing, a mnemonic device for preserving lives that are vulnerable and hopeless.

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When the Mighty Rule with an Axe, the Lesser Animals with Faint Hearts Languish in Misery The novel, Trapped, from the onset, illuminates a pitiful public health crisis in contemporary Zimbabwe. Unesu is one of the medical practitioners employed at a public hospital and the following passage serves as a telling confirmation of a dire situation: Unesu was ready to drop. Emergency on-call shifts at the hospital were not for the faint-hearted. The pace was intense and there was a relentless influx of patients arriving at all hours. Some presented profound clinical challenges after being referred in extremis from provincial and district hospitals. Without dexterity, speed, and attention to detail, a life could be lost in a heartbeat. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 1)

Readers are told that the collapsing health delivery has competent health professionals such as nurses, gynaecologists and obstetrics who are: constantly on their feet, as they made spirited attempts at cross-covering each other for periodic breaks and the briefest of stolen power-naps. They needed to rest because without exception, and despite a forty-eight-hour weekend on call, Monday was considered a normal working day. They’d be expected to be fresh-eyed, clearheaded and coherent during the morning ward round. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 1)

Another example of overworked government health workers is presented through Professor Chaka who doubles as both obstetrics and gynaecologist in a state hospital. She was ever on her feet assisting junior doctors with patients who had complications. Despite these frantic efforts to serve lives, the patients keep on dying. Unesu, one of the junior doctors at the hospital, shares this information when one of the patients under his care died and his supervisor, Prof Chaka scolded him: No errors had been made and nobody had deteriorated or died because of any act of commission or omission on his part. It wasn’t his fault that the urea and electrolytes machine hadn’t been working for two days. Neither was it his fault that the two patients for whom he’d ordered urgent blood transfusions were still waiting while their relatives searched for money to pay the hospital for the blood. Intravenous drug stock-outs were not of his making. So why did the Prof have to be so obsessive? Afterwards, it took John’s good sense to mollify him. ‘Don’t take these things personally,

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Unesu. Prof doesn’t mean any harm.’ ‘Listen, the man practically dissected me in front of patients! … “He doesn’t mean any harm”! You’re joking, right? Get real, John! What’s the chance that anyone receives excellent care in this dump?’. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 2)

The litany of problems faced by public health institutions in Zimbabwe profoundly speaks about a shattering situation. The medical experts are both physically and psychologically overwhelmed. The phrase “in this dump” in the above quote serves as an emotive amplifier that gives prominence to the grave working conditions and the overall sense of precarity that it generates. Health professionals do everything possible to save lives but the level of deterioration in these hospitals renders their service inadequate. It is not only Tagwira who chronicles the sad story of the collapsing or already collapsed public health in Zimbabwe, as Bulawayo (2022), in her recent novel, Glory, also depicts Zimbabwe as a nation where its citizens go to the hospitals to die. In her early writing in We need new Names, Bulawayo (2013) has no kind words to describe her motherland as she sums up the observable traits of unhomeliness in Zimbabwe by using an elaborate faecal trope “‘kaka country’to highlight the magnitude of decay in the country (Mavengano & Hove, 2019). The same can be said about Dangarembga’s (2018) ‘mournable body metaphor’” captured in her title which serves as a figure of speech alluding to an appalling state of her nation. These dominant tropes in Zimbabwean fictional writings entail cynicism, disillusionment and precarity which haunt ordinary Zimbabweans today. A similar thematic motif is found in Bulawayo’s recent novel, Glory which satirises the appalling state of public health in Zimbabwe by highlighting that citizens go to the hospitals to die rather than live (Mavengano, 2023a). These Zimbabwean writers deploy metaphorisation, symbolism and grotesque imagery as important signifiers of an obscene cosmology in a troubled contemporary Zimbabwe. The cul-desac socio-economic national environment has given birth to an alienating sense of (un)belonging in the members of the precariat(Mavengano, 2023b). It is imperative to concede that these uncanny traits in presentday Zimbabwe impudently construct a haunting national space which compels citizens to flee from both political repression and economic deprivation. In another illuminating passage, the grievances of public health practitioners are further laid bare:

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Checking his mobile phone, Unesu found nothing on voicemail. He switched on mobile data, which had been off since Saturday. His phone pinged through a flood of WhatsApp messages that had been on hold. MedSch Class of ’14 group was at it again. There was a heated exchange about their worsening working conditions in government hospitals. What were their employer’s obligations? Weren’t such poor working conditions a violation of their constitutional rights as employees? Should they go on strike or not? What about their responsibility to patients? (Tagwira, 2020, p. 10)

We are also told that “Unesu, slapping his face with cold water, he felt a moment of anger and resentment: he worked in a system that pushed people to the brink” (Tagwira, 2020, p. 8). One of the prominent aspects that have generated the present ugly state of the public health system in Zimbabwe is the politics of arrogance, here epitomised by the Professor Chaka who refuses to acknowledge the failure of the responsible authorities to address a profoundly discernible decline of public health system. Contemporary Zimbabwean literary writings have repeatedly highlighted an obstinate condition in which the ruling elite is remote from the general populace (Mavengano & Moyo, 2023). The public health institutions are portrayed as predatory sites which paradoxically threaten lives of the desperate patients. This is not mere fictional writing because the line between fictional imaginary and the unfolding reality in the context of Zimbabwe is problematic. It is, thus, appropriate to argue that the image of the hospital serves as a metaphor that Zimbabwean nationhood is primarily defined by the writer. This kind of signification of the nation calls to attention the urgency of restorative measures to reverse the catastrophic trajectory taken by the ill-fated country. When Unesu complains about his working woes to his unemployed friends, Cashleen and Delta who are both unemployed university graduates, they fail to understand him: They’d both thought that he was being petty or childish. How could having a job ever be a problem? What did he mean when he said his experiences as a medic were traumatic? …He’d given up trying to convince them, to make them see. They were obviously too shut into the martyrdom of joblessness to understand. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 13)

The above excerpt does not imply that Cashleen and Delta are ignorant of the ongoing suffering of both the (un)employed and the general

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public. Rather, their reaction to Unesu’s disgruntlement is only informed by their even worse condition and desperation to get a job even if it would not bring any meaningful change into their current status as jobless university graduates. These characters are used to explain why the exploited Zimbabwean professionals keep holding on the unrewarding jobs and degrading status because out there in the country, there are worse scenarios of university graduates who have been dehumanised by their impoverishment to an extent that they are ready to accept anything from the exploitative employers. It is this environment that forces Unesu’s friend to drop from undertaking medical studies at the university after six months of training to join the illegal diamond dealings with a Lebanese cartel across the border in Mozambique. We get to know that this is a bold decision that comes with risks since Unesu only envies his friend’s fearlessness but cannot follow him. Unesu represents both committed professionals who genuinely want to provide services to their country and exploited workers. The government does not care about their conditions of service despite the workers’ commitment to provide public service. Unesu is also among the faint-hearted citizens who do not wish to engage in scrupulous deals. Yet, later in the novel, he together with his medical colleagues engage in illegal medical practices such as helping university students and graduates to abort their unwanted pregnancies at a private hospital. The unethical conduct of these doctors is part of the infamously new cultural idiom known as kungwavha-ngwavha or kuita yose yose to use the street lingo which simply refers to any possible means taken to secure survival. The kungwavha-ngwavha philosophy in a dog-eat-dog Zimbabwean context disregards the question of morality because the end justifies the means. Desperate citizens driven by their misery, instinctively throw away cautions and the ethical question to the dogs as a mechanism of survival, enduring autocracy and politics of conceit. A dominant motif in Tagwira’s novel is a fascinating presentation of the young characters who are determined to defy the odds. The university graduates such as Cashleen and Delta keep searching for jobs despite a clear indication that, their job hunt is in vain: The weekend had stretched endlessly and the days ahead held little, if any, promise. There was yet another power cut. Cashleen stared sightlessly into the gloom. While she’d never expected to walk into a job soon after graduation, she’d believed that her 2.1 pass in Media and Journalism Studies would count for something. That was over a year ago. Then

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she’d immersed herself in job-hunting, eagerly watching out for opportunities, networking, and submitting applications. But she’d been disheartened as advertisements for both employment and graduate-trainee learnerships dwindled. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 16)

This passage registers a melancholic tone which is informed by prolonged suffering and a state of paralysis that defines the lives of the ordinary people in Zimbabwe. Muchemwa (2013) contends that the ruling party in Zimbabwe is in charge of domestic resources and it is only this group that leads lavish lifestyles while the majority of the ordinary citizens strive to feed themselves and their families. The egoistic culture saw the nation falling from its elevated position of grace as a bread basket of the Southern African region to become another heartbreaking story of the postcolonial failed state in Africa (Moyo & Mavengano, 2021). Certainly it is difficult to find jobs in a country experiencing prolonged power cuts which disrupt the industries and threaten their existence. Such reading is supported by the textual evidence provided by the writer because we get to know that: Across most sectors, companies had downsized, while others had simply closed. Several of those still in business had cut salaries and suspended workplace benefits such as medical aid, housing and other allowances. It was expected that this trend would continue, and even escalate, as the economic downturn remained unabated, plunging many into poverty. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 16)

It is well-documented that, from as early as the year 2000, Zimbabwean economy has been a thorn in the flesh for most common Zimbabweans, some of whom decided to migrate before being consumed by the numerous crises which manifested since then (Chitando, 2016; Magosvongwe, 2014; Mangeya, 2014; Mavengano, 2020; Mavengano & Hove, 2019; Moyo et al., 2012; Muchemwa, 2013).

Ndiyo Zimbabwe yedu (That Is Our Zimbabwe): Politics of Suffering and Resilience in an Unhomeliness Space The existing state of affairs in Zimbabwe evokes Orwellian allegorical depiction of Russia under Stalin’s leadership (Moyo & Mavengano, 2021). Arguably, Zimbabwe has long established a sad postcolonial

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scenario that can be summarised by evoking a Shona language adage kutonga nedemo mumaoko which literally means ruling with an axe in hands. The axe metaphor here denotes grotesque forms of power. The title of this section is drawn from one of the most significant figures in the twenty-first-century postcolonial studies, Homi Bhabha (1994), whose work draws attention to the injurious effects of physical or psychological displacement. In this study, the concept of unhomeliness is not only used to refer to those caught between two cultures in the diasporic space as Homi Bhabha theorised but it is also used to interpret the distinctive sites of the elite and the marginalised citizens in Zimbabwe. The latter’s uncanny displacement is more painful because it complicates notions of citizenship, belonging, identity and nationhood in the postcolonial era. The implication of this situation is that the lesser animals in Orwellian terminology have restricted options either to flee from the oppressive national space, driven by the quest to be different animals somewhere, or stay and agonise in despair. Tagwira’s novel articulates the complexity of such choices by troubling both the conditions of being unhomed Zimbabwean citizens or fleeing but become unsettled migrants in diasporic spaces. The text also conveys a problematic dichotomy between the two circumstances as earlier highlighted by McGregor and Primorac (2010), who point at the convolutions of being Zimbabwean in the elsewhere. Such presentation reminds us of Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1982, p. 19) in his text, I Will Marry when I want, who reveals a state of dilemma by hypothesising that “I ran away from a cold land only to find myself in a frost land,” signifying an incessant state of abjection. In both cases, the members of the subaltern class occupy a liminal space, to borrow from Homi Bhabha (1994), and, therefore, suffer from acute sense of abjection and precarity. It is imperative to consider that a sense of being is attained from associated rights which are denied in both sites. It is, thus, important to reflect on these two positions and the productive contradictions in responding to existential conditions and perspectives of those living at the fringes. In this regard, the study seeks to propagate the resilience theory in the interpretation of Tagwira’s literary depiction of a culture of domination, or what Fisher (2006) regards as fearism and the plight of the subaltern classes, with a particular focus on skilled government workers and unemployed university graduates in present-day Zimbabwe. The chief objective is to demonstrate the coping strategies as an unfolding resistance to the oppressive ruling elite. In response to the imposed survival crisis, the oppressed embrace survival of the fittest philosophy as a technique

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necessary in a society that threatens their existence. However, their fate seems to be difficult to reverse. Sando rebukes the state and after he fails to transform the government’s attitude towards the general public, he decides to leave the country. Yet, the diasporic site does not offer him relief: ‘I’m sick, Cash. Very sick,’ he said. She waited for him to explain exactly what he meant, but he didn’t, so she had no choice but to imagine the worst. Her heart contracted. The emotional and physical pain that he was going through was right there for her to see. She couldn’t reconcile this broken Sando before her with the young man who’d been so full of vitality and dreams for a brighter future when he left for South Africa. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 300)

In South Africa, Sando joins thousands if not millions of Zimbabwean migrants who crossed the national borders in search of a better life. However, Sando like his other African migrants in post-apartheid South Africa, is detested and discriminated by the potential employers and the South African community. He embarks on job-searching which is both a shattering and dehumanising process for him. He is a political fugitive, as the Zimbabwean government wants him for attempting to overthrow the regime with his dissenting messages. A close scrutiny of Sando’s situation shows that he goes to South Africa not only in search of a job but also looking for a site that will nurture his liberal thinking. It is quite unfortunate that his search produces more agony: Cashleen’s mind fell into a vortex of the most extreme imaginings. How dare Sando go down that path? One heard of disappearances and state sanctioned abductions of people who stepped out of line. Of men in black suits and dark glasses who plucked dissenters off the street into cars with tinted windows and no number plates. Spooks who snatched people from their homes in the middle of the night. Such stories were told with conviction, but it was difficult to know what was true, and what not. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 301)

The victim, Sando dzangu Chidhakwa, has been a critic of the government who migrated to South Africa but could not secure a decent job there due to the bureaucracy and xenophobic attitudes that further push the immigrants to the margin. Mbembe (1992) offers impetus formulations of the nature of power in the postcolonial states under what he

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considers as dictatorial rulership. He postulates that power in a postcolony is executed in spectacles of commandment, a notion that refers to a vicious mode of rule, a replica of colonial forms (Mavengano, 2023a). Sando’s efforts to represent the subdued voices of the underpaid workers, unemployed graduates, condemned pensioners, vendors and the suffering general public draws the attention of the state which views speaking back as a threat to its sovereign power. Teachers are among the Fanonian wretched of the earth (Fanon, 1963), in both Tagwira’s novel and real Zimbabwe today as articulated in the following passage which exposes how Cashleen’s father, a retired teacher bemoans the fate of teachers in the country: In the past, he’d often spoken of years when teachers were respected, well-paid professionals who retired on a good pension. Even the President himself was said to have been a highly respected teacher. Now everyone knew how badly paid they were and the profession had become a subject of ridicule. Cashleen had seen teachers’ jokes circulating on WhatsApp. If you want to get rid of troublesome baboons raiding your fields, just threaten you’ll force them to become teachers. They’ll never come back. On days when street-kids don’t get any money begging on the streets, they refer to themselves as teachers! (Tagwira, 2020, p. 170)

The ridicule has recently extended to university lecturers, doctoral holders and professors whose salary cannot be used to pay food enough to sustain them for a month, not to mention affording to pay fees for their own children at the same state institutions they teach. What amplifies their vulnerability is the inability to compel the government to pay attention to their circumstances. Sando’s case heightens the tragic manifestation of absurd forms of power in what Achille Mbembe (1992, 2001) theorises as a postcolony or a damaged polity that terrifies subjects who do not bow to its violent mode of governance (Mavengano, 2023a, 2023b). Tagwira deploys this character to typify a seat of power that uses force to silence those who dare challenge its authority. At the same time, this character signifies everyday resistance (Scott, 1985), and his writing on social media against oppression conveys an undaunted struggle in the postcolonial era. He is also representing the “Bornfree” generation which protest the heavy handedness and neglect of duties by the postcolonial leaders. Sando defies a culture of fearism imposed to muffle protesting voices in the country. Delta’s parents, Mr Choto and his wife are pensioners who

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worked for the government until retirement but they struggle to feed themselves. The government introduced the bond notes amidst public protest by this does not change its decision. Sadly, the bonds notes are meant for the subaltern public whilst the ruling enjoys lavish lifestyles using the American dollar, a currency beyond the reach of many workers in Zimbabwe. Mr Choto criticises the government’s decision but his wife tells him that: ‘Imi! They’ll do whatever they want. Whether we like it or not. The bond notes will come if they say so. ’Delta frowned. This was the resignation with which her mother now accepted everything: power cuts, leaking water pipes, burst sewage pipes, uncollected refuse, and disappearance of her pension. The feistiness which had always characterised her had disappeared. It was a kind of dying inside and it made Delta uneasy. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 171)

Submission to fate and disillusionment are however, condemned in the text. The young generation is anxious about its future and feels obliged to transform their bare condition of living which resembles Agamben’s (1998) formulation of the figure of homo sacer and camp life. Tanaka, another unemployed graduate who joined market vending to feed herself, tells Cashleen that: Can you believe that there are some young people like us who do nothing at all! Personally, I’m committed to doing my bit for the common good. Just imagine what would happen if we had enough people willing to drive change together. We pride ourselves with being an educated country, but just look at the mess that surrounds us. Just look at Harare, it’s a shambles. The economy… it’s in free fall. Who’s going to fix this, if we young people just watch and do nothing?’ The words rolled so easily off her tongue that Cashleen felt this was not the first time they’d been uttered. She was left in no doubt that Tanaka was a true activist or even a budding politician, but this wasn’t the time to explore such sensitive topics. They hardly knew each other. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 179)

The passage registers Cashleen’s sense of insecurity hence she has not been participating in actively political activism. She has been scared of the consequences of doing so and yet:

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the feeling that life had her trapped firmly in a corner was unbearable. She realised she’d have to fight back. She couldn’t allow herself to remain a victim of circumstances. She had a new understanding of the frustrations that had driven Sando across the border, and the anger that had turned him into a fearless activist. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 254)

Cashleen is conscious of the ongoing threat of violence and the impunity that the perpetrators wield. Taking this reality of abuse of political power into account, it is awfully rare to find characters like Sando who boldly dare the authorities and be prepared to risk themselves. Elsewhere, Mavengano and Nkamta (2022) contend that it is essential to consider the implications of the politics of fear in the current conversations of migration and xenophobia. Fear or fearism to borrow Michael Fisher’s (2006/2019) concept is a pertinent motif and is a dominant technology utilised by the ruling elite to continue with dehumanisation of the powerless masses. For Dozier (1998, p. 3), “Fear brings out the best and worst in human beings” and Fisher (2019) further posits that it is this exclusive and enigmatic feature of fear that ought to inspire us to reflect more strongly and critically about its nature and function than we previously have as humankind. Fisher has rightly posited that the politics of fear should be interrogated a crucial way to establish “the dynamics of everyday fear in people’s lives” (Fisher, 2019, p. 3). Michel Fisher (2018) offers illuminating insights about the ambiguous effects of fear in contemporary world. He explicates that indeed, fear is fast becoming a caricature of itself. It is no longer merely an emotion, or a response to the awareness of threat. It has become a cultural idiom through which we signal a sense of increasing agitation about our place in the world. Fear according to Fisher (2018/ 2019) can be paralysing and/or an enabling force that compels individuals or collective groups to take transformative actions. In this context, Sando, Cashleen and Tanaka who are all young become symbolic figures of the awakening potential, which could be viewed as the new Chimurenga spirit in the youths that resists a culture of fear which has entrapped ordinary Zimbabweans for a prolonged period since early 2000. Perhaps, it is necessary to explain that the term Chimurenga in Zimbabwean context is a historical concept, an anti-fearism philosophy that drove oppressed black Zimbabweans to fight against white settlers. Arguably, the Chimurenga philosophy has become a recurrent motif in contemporary Zimbabwean literary texts. For example, in Bulawayo’s Glory, it is

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again the young people who function as leading political activism against both Mugabe and Mnangagwa regimes (Mavengano, 2023a). The same trope is discerned from her earlier novel, We need new names. Tagwira’s novel seems to suggest that until the oppressed masses learn to embark on determined trajectory of change which of course is a perilous enterprise, the politics of fear will continue to ensnare them. The implication is that the Zimbabwean society urgently needs to rethink and embrace novel methods of fear management as critical aspect of socio-political alteration. Tagwira’s writing does not romanticise this stance because, it also shows the expected risk of getting the state’s brutal response. Indeed, the masses did not bargain for such a country with street kids everywhere, long bank queues snaking through the streets, unemployed university graduates such as Zenith who used to be called Mr Bling due to his smartness now wearing threadbare overalls engaging in street vending and has become a shadow (Tagwira, 2020, p. 44). Readers are also told that Cashleen has a sibling in the diaspora named Rufaro who scolds her for not finding a job after completion of the university education. The sister is tired of overworking in the diaspora to fend for her family living in Zimbabwe. She shouts at Cashleen “you have to break your cycle of dependence. You must get a job or get the hell out of my apartment!…Cashleen couldn’t let this pass. ‘Sisi Rufaro, it’s not easy. I’ve been trying. There are no jobs. You need to come and see what’s happening in Zimbabwe…’ ‘I’m doing no such thing. My psychiatrist says you’re not trying hard enough. And I agree. Get off your backside and do something. Anything! ’ (Tagwira, 2020, p. 86). This is another telling evidence that shows how Zimbabweans living abroad remain victims of the overwhelming socio-economic situation.

The Same Salary Regime for Cleaners, Academic Doctors and Professors: A Contemporary Slap in the Face This section draws parallels that exist between Tagwira’s novel and the real state of affairs in the modern-day Zimbabwe. Unesu. wished himself as far away as Dr Mazwi, who was now in the USA because of the stressful poor salary ever deteriorating working conditions. The Minister of Education had announced that graduates shouldn’t expect the

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government to facilitate employment creation; that they ought to create employment for themselves and others. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 259)

The novel re-articulates the government discourse that has seen Zimbabwean university staff such as professors and doctors being accused of not producing the right graduates with practical skills to revive the collapsing industry. In the novel, Delta poses a fundamental question about how the Minister is expecting a chemical engineer with no connections, no work experience and no financial resources to establish a viable job for himself or start by establishing an industry. Paradoxically, we are told that the same Minister “sends his children to study abroad” (Tagwira, 2020, p. 259), so that they will remain in the elite class. The government ‘arrogance is exposed by its refusal to be accountable for the sad state of affairs in the country and readers told that even the President mocked citizens who left the country. The president of the fictive Zimbabwean society in Tagwira’s novel has a foul mouth as he at the height of the hyperinflation which fuelled mass exodus, says: Most are fools and cowards who’ll end up cleaning old people’s bottoms in England’s care homes anyway’. She wondered if that had been really true, or just the man having a shot at mocking his desperate citizens who were seeking relief elsewhere. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 153)

The late and former president Robert Mugabe is o record condemning ordinary Zimbabweans who flee the burning nation to borrow NoViolet Bulawayo’s fictive language in We need new names. Unesu calls his job as a medical doctor “modern-day slavery,” showing his contempt for the poor salary. The evocation to colonial condition troubles the notions of postcolonialism and independence in Zimbabwe. Likewise, recently, brain drain was reported at state universities as lecturers look for alternative means to earn a living elsewhere. The government’s one-size-fits-all COVID-19 allowance, which is given across all university grades, has created insignificant differences between professors and cleaners. Lately, this political arrogance has been demonstrated through biopolitical measures to curb migration of public health workers such as nurses and doctors. Zimbabwean government through its current Minister of health who also doubles as the Vice President declared plans to criminalise the foreign recruitment of its health employees who are underpaid.

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In early April, Zimbabwe’s Vice-President and Health Minister, Dr. Constantino Chiwenga, indicated the state’s plan to introduce a law criminalizing the foreign recruitment of the country’s health workers. “If one deliberately recruits and makes the country suffer, that is a crime against humanity. People are dying in hospitals because there are no nurses and doctors… Zimbabwe frowns at this heinous crime which is also a grave violation of human rights,” he said. (https://peoplesdispatch.org/ 2023/04/21/between-an-ailing-public-sector-and-migration-curbs-zim babwes-health-workers-left-with-few-options/)

Public health workers representatives, however, reportedly responded to the government by citing the following challenges: We have been facing challenges in the health sector for over two decades, these have now become perennial problems. Health workers are leaving the country to go to South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, but also to the UK, because of the poverty salaries that they are being given. A medical doctor is earning roughly around US$400 a month. Major hospitals, including the four central hospitals, are facing shortages of basic medications such as paracetamol. At the moment, there is not a single working radiotherapy machine in the country. Our biggest hospital has only one maternal operating theatre, which was built before 1980. People are dying from things that are preventable.” Dr. Norman Matara, secretary general of the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR), told Peoples Dispatch in April 2023. (https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/ 04/21/between-an-ailing-public-sector-and-migration-curbs-zimbabweshealth-workers-left-with-few-options/)

Clearly, the government in contemporary Zimbabwe should work towards improving the quality of life for the general citizens who for a long time lived in Agamben’s camp conditions.

Concluding Remarks: Ensnared and a Broken Humanity The discussion in this chapter implicitly and explicitly foregrounded deferred dreams of both the employed and unemployed citizens as the nation reels under hostile socio-economic and political problems. Tagwira’s novel, Trapped adopts writing against silence or resistance mode to expose vulnerability of the skilled workers, graduates as well

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as the general public. Tagwira’s writing is in line with what Muchemwa describes as a process of de-silencing, a mnemonic mechanism of preserving lives that are endangered by the power. Equally important, the case of Sando’s victimisation and the ultimate condition of insanity represents the extreme form of performing power in the modern-day Zimbabwe signifying how the state inscribes silence on citizens. His mental instability and the battered frail body are loaded with semantic tropes that reinforce Achille Mbembe’s conception of the postcolonial vulgarity of power and telling evidence of political betrayal. Sando’s body serves as a vital metaphor that signifies the besmirched state of independence in the country and the brutal atrocities in a mournable nation of Tsitsi Dangarembga. Sando ends up being in a dejected state at the government-owned hospital. This ironic presentation suggests his failure to effectively fight the regime which ultimately succeeded to put him in default mode of life and is finally confirmed in a space that is controlled by the same regime he has been fighting. Thus, Sando, represents the creation of bare life through state’s brutal authority and he, like his fellow subdued postcolonial subjects are denied the freedom of speech because the act of speaking is closely monitored by the regime. The metaphor of insanity speaks about the adverse effects of the state’s impunity and how the enslaved citizens suffer as a result of the biopolitical rule. Sando ends up hopelessly being in a hospital suggesting what Mbembe (2003, p. 15) denotes as necropolitics which entails subjectivities in an in-between of life and death or the “subjugation of life to the power of death,” and the status of living dead. In the novel, the state detains, persecutes and even eliminates certain citizens who are considered toxic. These repressive tactics are operated to maintain power in postcolonial era. This depiction of life in present-day Zimbabwe by the novelist Valerie Tagwira, reenacts colonial dehumanisation practices which were enforced to muffle protesting Africans. The study also revealed that issue of politics of fear or fearism has not been discussed at length in current discourse about Zimbabwean immigrants and its related xenophobic and postcolonial narratives. This is a serious problem because it is vital to deeply reflect on the effects of real or imagined daily consequences of speaking truth to power in Zimbabw? How does the ideology of fearism works for or against the ordinary people in Zimbabwe today? It cannot be overstated that fearism has been a central element in the political sphere in Zimbabwe and conversations or formulations of immigration and resistance should articulate this reality

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as part of the standing complications. By such an analysis, we don’t run the risk of overlooking the complex structure of political hegemony and at the same time, we acknowledge the micro-forms of everyday resistance by the general public. The present-day Zimbabwe is soiled and wounded by politics of arrogance and inconsiderate leaders. The post-independence Zimbabwean political leadership denies the masses the right to free speech (Mavengano, 2020; Mavengano & Marevesa, 2022; Moyo & Mavengano, 2021; Muchemwa, 2013). Most significantly, the novel troubles current xenophobic and migration discourses particularly constructed by South Africans which accuse ordinary Zimbabwean of not being passive victims of the state. Contrary to these discourses, the novel shows how Zimbabweans engage in numerous acts of resistance although the results may have little effect on the authorities. It is worth noting here that Tagwira’s text also challenges essentialised ideas of home, homeland which disregard the unfolding reality of an acute loss of home. The home is neither here nor there in the context of the novel where some postcolonial subjects are repeatedly suffering from a sense of dislocation either within the national borders or in the diasporic space. The projection of characters in constant search of sense of being interject politics of space and location tied to the identity conversations. Fleeing from the teething domestic problems does not offer Zimbabwean migrants a moment of relief hence the novel portrays migration as a tragic voyage because the migrant figures only return to Zimbabwe to die after contracting diseases and enduring discrimination in the diaspora. This portrayal further accentuates the narratives of displacement and distress in the novel. The ending of the novel does not offer a much needed closure to the suffering of the subaltern characters, thereby suggesting an ongoing battle for survival in an intimidating homeland and a continuous deep feeling of estrangement for both local and diasporic citizens. The weapons of the weak of talking back and resistance as suggested by Scott (1985) and hooks (1989a) do not scare those in corridors of power. These citizens have lost a geography of identity, to use Kizito Muchemwa’s (2013) verbal expression, as they keep searching for a conducive sphere that offers them a genuine respite from a perpetual sense of entrapment and a lingering politics of suffering. Furthermore, this chapter highlighted a pressing demand to seek new conversations about implications of the intersection

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between fearism, migration and everyday forms of resistance, a dialectical phenomenon. This can generate openings for evocative liberative discourses which stand against a forbearing presence of silent grief in the context of the present-day Zimbabwe.

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Mavengano, E. (2022). Rethinking the boundaries of self-other and the logics of de/coloniality in Harare North and One foreigner’s ordeal: A decolonial perspective. ACTA Academia, 54(2), 95–114. Mavengano, E. (2023a). The phallocentric paradox and semantics of Eve’s myth in Zimbabwe’s contemporary national politics: An ecofeminist reading of Bulawayo’s novel, Glory, HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 79(3), 1–9. a8070. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v79i3.8070 Mavengano, E. (2023b). The interaction of language and politics: Polysemanticism in the aphorism ‘we died for this country, so we will rule Zimbabwe forever.’ In E. Mavengano & S. Chirongoma (Eds.), Electoral politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I: The 2023 election and beyond (pp. 131–148). Springer Nature and Palgrave Macmillan. Mavengano, E., & Hove, M. L. (2019). Kaka country: An intertextual reading of national dysfunction in Bulawayo’s we need new names and Jinga’s One foreigner’s ordeal. Literator, 40(1), a1595. https://doi.org/10.4102/lit. v40i1.1595 Mavengano. E., & Marevesa (2022). A critical discourse analysis of media landscape and political conflict in Zimbabwe. In I. Mhute, H. Mangeya, & E. Jakaza (Eds.), Emerging trends in strategic communication in the Sub Saharan Africa (pp. 224–240). Routledge Publishers. Mavengano, E., & Moyo, T. (2023). The semiotics of political schisms and prospects of nation-rebuilding: “Varakashi 4ED” and the “Nerrorists” forever’. In E. Mavengano & S. Chirongoma (Eds.), Electoral politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I: The 2023 election and beyond (pp. 65–89). Springer Nature and Palgrave Macmillan. Mavengano, E., & Nkamta N. P. (2022). Bare life and subjectivity in postindependence era: the figure of homosacer in selected Southern African narratives. African Identities. https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2022.202 8602, https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2022.202860 Mbembe, A. (1992). Provisional notes on the postcolony. Africa, 62(1), 3–37. Mbembe, A. (2001). On the postcolony. University of California Press. Mbembe, A. (2003). Necropolitics. Public Culture, 15(1), 11–40. McGregor, J. & Primora, R. (2010). Zimbabwe’s new diaspora: Displacement and the cultural politics of survival. Berhahn Books. Moyo, T., Gonye, J., & Mdhongwa, T. (2012). An elixir to the claustrophobia of home? Representation of the diaspora in Harare North and selected stories from Hunting in foreign land other stories. International Journal of Asian Social Science, 2(80), 1378–1391. Moyo, T., & Mavengano, E. (2021). A Déjàvu of orwellian proportions: Rereading animal farm in the context of Zimbabwean politics of change. In O. Nyambi, T. Mangena, & G. Ncube (Eds.), Cultures of change in contemporary

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Zimbabwe: Socio-political transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa (pp. 171– 184). Routledge. Muchemwa, K. Z. (2013). Imagining the city in Zimbabwean literature 1949 to 2009 (PhD Thesis). Stellenbosch University. Ngugi, T. (1982). I will marry when I want. Heinemann Educational Books. Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. Yale University Press. Spivak, G. C. (1988a). Subaltern studies: Deconstructing historiography. In R. Guha & G. C. Spivak (Eds.), Selected subaltern studies (pp. 3–34). Oxford University Press. Spivak, G. C. (1988b). Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the interpretation of culture. University of Illinois Press. Tagwira, V. (2006). The uncertainty of hope. Weaver Press. Tagwira, V. (2020). Trapped. Weaver Press.

CHAPTER 4

Towards Using Literature to Deal with Fear of Ethno-Religious and Linguistic Differences in African Post-colonial Politics Ogonna Nchekwube Nkereuwem

Introduction Ethno-religious and linguistic differences have remained some major sources of fear among most Africans. These differences that are naturally sources of blessings had been turned into sources of recurrent violent conflicts among the different groups in Africa. The fear of these differences also obtains in the political arena of African nations. As a way of finding solution to the fear of these differences in post-colonial African politics, this study proposes efficacious use of both oral and written literature to deal with the fear. It argues that dealing with the fear of these differences would do away with, or drastically reduce, political violence, ethno-religious and linguistic conflicts and other allied matters arising

O. N. Nkereuwem (B) Department of Language and Communication Education, School of General Studies, Federal College of Education (Technical), Asaba, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_4

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from the differences. The study shall show that literature has the capacity of rousing the confidence of African peoples and beyond in their ethnoreligious and linguistic differences, as blessings and existential necessities that make groups and culture interdependent. One way of showing its capacity in doing so is the descriptive analysis of both primary and secondary functions of literature. Its importance and capacity in dealing with the aforementioned fear rest on these functions. Literature had existed long before human beings began to read and write (Ahmed, 2017; Dibie & Robert, 2014). Before the invention of writing (systems), stories were told and engraved on scrolls, stone tablets, walls and carvings (Agbedo, 2000; Ahmed, 2017; Brummet et al., 2003; Robert, 2018). Also, it is agreed that before the emergence of civilisation across the globe, stories were found among the constellations, beneath the depths of the oceans and within the woodland realm (Ahmed, 2017). These historical reflections tell of how long literature has been serving various purposes from time immemorial. It is conscious of the foregoing realities that this study rises to show how literature could serve as a mechanism for dealing with the fear of ethno-religious and linguistic differences in post-colonial African politics.

A Concise Exposition of What Lies Behind Fear Fear has been conceptualised variously by different scholars. All the definitions emphasise danger. For example, Gore et al. (1998, p. 36) have defined fear as ‘a negatively valence emotion that is usually accompanied by heightened physiological arousal.’ In our context, it implies that danger is perceived by members of the three sets of African identity groups under study. They fear their ethno-religious and linguistic differences. To that end, this study proposes the use of literature to deal with and get rid of the fear. Rather than nurturing and living with fear consistently, they ought to build confidence against it. The people show tensed response to perceived, realistic and realisable external threats to their well-being and safety, which have immediate and lasting unpleasant and harmful effects on them. Considering the effects, it is quite obvious that a viable mechanism like literature ought to be used to get rid of it from their minds. They perceive and sometimes suffer threats arising from these three identity differences among them in politics and other spheres. This thought is captured by Marks’ (2002) conception of fear as the emotion arising from perceived or real looming danger. While fear

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obviously involves emotional tension, it does not always produce extreme results. One could merely feel uneasy, unsafe, apprehensive or threatened without any real terror. In that case, fear is perceived. So, fear could come from present threats to safety or imagined dangers. Fear is natural as a reflex action. It is a survival mechanism in that with it, we make efforts to stay safe by avoiding what could threaten our safety. Thus, it pushes one towards self-preservation (Britten, 2001; Deutschendorf, 2015; Maslow, 1968). Yet, for the avoidance of its effects, it is agreed that fear has to be avoided, managed and overcome (Britten, 2001; Deutschendorf, 2015; Maslow, 1968; Metcalf, 2016). Scholars agree that one hand fear is created or produced (Deutschendorf, 2015; Welford, 2013); on the other, it creates or begets itself (Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership, 2014). Fear stifles, prevents and cripples learning, development, individual and group contributions and other meaningful activities (Deutschendorf, 2015; Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership, 2014; Metcalf, 2016). It thwarts ability (Britten, 2001), causes inhibition (Metcalf, 2016), health challenges and a whole lot of problems. Symptoms of fear include trembling, restlessness, emotional instability, chest pain, fast heartbeat, sweating, chill, stomach upset, nausea, dry mouth, low or punctured breath. Besides, other symptoms of fear include being furious, weird, depressed and weighed down, loss of control and having a sense of impending danger or death. The fear exhibited by the three identity groups under study is phobia. Phobia is the fear situation of twisting a normal fear response, directed towards an object or a situation of no real danger or threat. It is simply the case or situation of fearing fear itself. Fear makes some people die many times before their real death. Following what their political leaders and other elites had caused, most of the people even fear things that are not after them. Obviously, ethno-religious and linguistic differences are never after anyone, because these are abstract entities given life or concrete existence by human beings. In reality, they are not after anyone. Human beings, who give them life or concrete existence, paint them as sources of threats to persons of the opposite groups. The negative deeds of elites and their mobilised and brainwashed disciples are the underground factors behind the fear nurtured and exhibited by the people(s) under study. It is in view of the foregoing realities that one understands that the fear these people are gripped with and do exhibit is phobia. They have phobia for the opposite identity groups along with the persons making up members

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of the groups. For example, Muslims have phobia for Christians and vice versa. Ethnic hate, arising from ethnic prejudices against members of other ethnic groups, rouses phobia for members of other ethnic groups and causes ‘shadow fear.’ Shadow fear is the fear of what is neither real nor threatening to one. Various factors are responsible for fear. These include negative events, real or realistic environmental dangers, life-threatening occurrences, imagined events, the unknown, encountered and internalised experiences, certain future events, certain situations and real environmental dangers (Britten, 2001; Deutschendorf, 2015). In terms of ethno-religious and linguistic fear, these people(s) suffer the following types of fear: generalised, panic and social anxiety disorders, and specific phobia. Mind training is one way of coping fear. Be mindful of what your mind fears and make attempt to overcome them. Turning your face away from what your mind is preoccupied with at a given time helps a lot. Doing so requires being mindful. Train your mind to be receptive to others outside your identity groups. Train your mind against the act of discriminating against persons of other identity groups. Get social support and employ stress management.

Theoretical Framework There are many etiological and cognitive theories of fear. The Expectancy theory of Fear (EToF hereafter) is taken to ground this study. EToF is one of the cognitive theories of fear. The pioneer theorists of the Expectancy Theory are Steven Reiss and Richard McNally, who propounded it in 1985. Reiss and McNally (1985) make three major postulations. First, almost all people are motivated to avoid stimuli or situations that arouse expectations of danger. Second, anxiety sensitivity is a personality variable related to both biological factors and to learning about the real and imagined consequences of becoming anxious. Third, people come to learn that there are certain environmental cues which make them anxious. The fundamental view of the theory is expressed by the formula: Fb = Ed + (Ea × Sa). Fb represents fear behaviour or the tendency to avoid a feared stimulus; Ed is the expectation of danger; Ea is the anxiety expectancy and Sa is the anxiety sensitivity, which refers to the degree to which a person finds the experience of anxiety to be obnoxious. It is understood from the formula that a feared stimulus is avoided. Besides, either expectations of

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danger or expectations of experiencing anxiety motivate the avoidance of a stimulus. Reiss (1991) shed more light on the theory by postulating that expectancies regarding what will happen when the feared stimulus is encountered and sensitivities are essential to understanding human fears. These expectancies and sensitivities relate to the reasons a person hold for fearing anticipated events. Reiss (1991) emphasises that some, not all fears, are partially or wholly motivated by expectations and sensitivities to anxiety. Reiss’s expectancy theory has received little support for its main hypothesis, that some fears are motivated partially or wholly by expectations and sensitivities to anxiety. His emphasis is on the fear of fear, which implies being worried about fearing the expected event causing the fear, rather than fearing the expected event per se (Reiss, 1991, p. 145). It follows that people expect and are sensitive to events that pose danger or threat to life and safety. Leaning on McNally and Steketee’s (1985) study, Reiss (1991) argues that fears can be motivated by expectations of danger, panic attacks or embarrassment. Similarly, Gursky and Reiss (1987) lean on McNally and Steketee’s (1985) study to aver that people with severe animal phobias are very much concerned about possible anxiety reactions to the feared animals. Since participants did not show the possible outcomes underlying their fears, when they encounter the feared stimuli, it is baseless to conclude that such outcomes are significant to animal phobias. Likewise, in the case under study, it is baseless to think that ethnoreligious and linguistic differences are sufficient grounds for phobias or other forms of fear among plural cultures and other identity groups like religion, politics, sex/gender and so on. Based on Reiss’ (1991) categorised fears, the people under study do not exhibit common fear, fundamental fears, fear of negative evaluation and the like other fears. Rather, they exhibit fear of anxiety, fear of illness and injury or death. McNally and Steketee (1985) revealed that people with severe animal phobias anticipated physical attacks, panic attacks and concerns about insanity, embarrassment and having a heart attack upon encountering their feared animal. The focus of the theory is on animal or phobias concerning animals. In our case, human beings, not animals, are the focus. However, the human beings expect, are sensitive to and fear physical and panic attacks, and show concern about insanity, embarrassment and having psychological trauma upon encountering the feared political, ethnic, religious and linguistic events that rouse fears. The feared events

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include violent ethno-religious conflicts and electoral and other forms of political violence. Fear makes one anxious and anticipatory, with the possible consequence being embarrassment (Reiss & McNally, 1985). For McNally and Louro (1992), anxiety expectations are very strong for people with agoraphobia and panic disorders, but theses do not exist in people having specific phobia. Taylor et al. (1992) inform that compared to participants with a range of other anxiety disorders, individuals with specific phobia have the least anxiety sensitivity. These scholars found no disparity in anxiety sensitivity between people with specific phobia and non-phobic control participants (Taylor et al., 1992). They argue that “simple phobics may be unlikely to develop anxiety sensitivity beliefs because the ‘panic’ attacks in this disorder are predictable and situationally bound” (Taylor et al., 1992, p. 257). Finally, the anxiety expectancy measures, described by Reiss and McNally (1985) and developed by Gursky and Reiss (1987) for specific fears, involve outcomes that are precise physiological and emotional symptoms described as what characterise a phobic of fear response. The outcomes include perspiring, feeling nauseous, having rapid heartbeat, feeling nervous or shaky, etc. On the whole, regardless of the explanatory deficiencies and inadequacies of Reiss and McNally’s (1985) EToF, its central ideology and postulations are still viable and obtainable in contemporary research and practical situations. It offers substantial explanations for some fears and phobias. The theory offers a theoretical grounding to this present study, which concerns itself with fears arising from mind concealment against other peoples and groups, merely because of ethno-religious and linguistic differences, in African post-colonial politics. Insights from the theory valuably contribute to dealing with the fear of these differences. The theory is considered suitable for this study basically because the fear of ethno-religious and linguistic differences among African peoples and groups has traces to expectations in these three spheres, besides politics and others. In other words, the fear arises from and about unmet political, religious, ethnic and linguistic expectations among these peoples and groups. The masses do not get what they really expect from their ethnic, religious and political leaders and elites. Thus, they nurture and exhibit fear of both the known and the unknown. While the masses know and have fear about political violence, they fear the unknown of the violence. This includes the extent of the political violence, where, when and how the violence would be carried out, the casualties of the violence, the end

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results of political violence and other misdeeds in post-colonial African society. These raise panic among African peoples and groups that inhabit the continent.

Functions of Literature as Weapons for Dealing with the Fear of Differences Literature, Ahmed (2017) affirms, deals with every aspect of life in diverse ways. The primary functions of literature are known to be information, education, entertainment, instruction, depiction of realities, mirroring life and society, preservation and transmission of culture (Ahmed, 2017; Keerthika, 2018; Nwachukwu-Agbada et al., 2011; Robert, 2016; Robert & Anura, 2018; Smith, 1934; Zala, 2013). Literature is the mirror with which reality and ideology are seen and moulded. It moulds people’s life and gives them a new perspective on their lives and the lives of others (Ahmed, 2017). This reality implicitly tells of how literature could serve as a means of dealing with the fear of ethno-religious and linguistic differences in post-colonial African politics, once it is used. Once literature is rightly deployed and used efficiently for any purpose, it undoubtedly offers efficacious results. The lives of contemporary Africans could be moulded by literature in such a way that their perspectives on the ethno-religious and linguistic differences among them would change from the negative to the positive conception of them. Again, literature plays essential roles in society for the well-being of individuals and the society at large. Literature, an art, is said to be the base of human cultures, beliefs (religions) and traditions (Ahmed, 2017). It is agreed that culture is transmitted to generations through both oral and written literature (Ahmed, 2017; Keerthika, 2018; Robert, 2016; Robert, Abubakar et al., 2016; Robert, Besong et al., 2016; Zala, 2013). Beyond the transmission, every given known culture is made known to and learnt by peoples of other cultures through various aspects of literature. The differences under study are aspects of culture, as applicable to the cultures of the African peoples of the studied region—sub-Saharan (West) African peoples. It is the means through which ways of life, knowledge, societal systems, ideologies, worldviews, beliefs, thoughts, feelings, discoveries, experience, innovations and so on are recorded and kept for posterities (Keerthika, 2018). In what lends credence to the foregoing, Anigbogu and Uwakwe (2016, p. 3) note, ‘apart from giving pleasure to readers, literature

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broadens and deepens human knowledge.’ It is not just a field of study but also a vast prosperous career with huge prospects. Thus, it offers economic opportunities, wealth, job and fame to the professionals as well as some members of the audience (Ahmed, 2017; Allen, 1933; Harbage, 1941). Many persons earn a living through various activities of literature, without which they would have been miserable and/or vulnerable and thereby constitute nuisance to society. Thus, making literature a lucrative and more prosperous profession would distract unemployed or other vulnerable people that are susceptible to elitist manipulations using ethno-religious and linguistics as the mechanism for achieving their selfish political and economic goals and/or interests. That is to the issues at stake could be dealt with using literature to engage them meaningfully. Once they are engaged as such, their minds would be distracted from fear and crimes. Also, literature has been a mechanism for carrying out scientific, technological and philosophical activities, with huge prospects. For example, questions about realities, the validation of truth, scepticism, etc. are debated and showcased through literature in both written and oral forms. Eliot (1932, p. 115) demonstrates in his analogy of literature and philosophy that they both preoccupy themselves with truth, and correlate through their professionals. These are good ways of dealing with fears of the known and the unknown using literature. Literature takes centre stage in information economy cum information and communication. Ideas are kindled by literature. Thus, once used rightly, misinformation, fake news, rhetoric’s, falsehoods, etc. about these feared differences, literature keep individual abreast of vital real information get rid of matters arising from the politicising and religionising the differences among these peoples and groups in Africa. Besides, in politics, religion and various other sectors, ideas and information are made and expressed through one form or genre of literature or the other. Literature proves itself a source of therapy and consolation through songs, dance, rhythm, mime, chorography, drama, and other harmonious pieces that give message and inspiration to people. Thus, literature has health and psychological values to offer the individual who keys into its therapeutic potentials. Thus, it is capable of dealing with health challenges arising from fear—fear disorders. Be it so, its place in dealing with the issues at stake cannot be overemphasised. Religion, ethnicity or tribe and language are all aspects of culture. All cultures have these three non-material aspects, which serve as identities. As the base of culture, it is quite easy for it to be used to deal

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with ethno-religious and linguistic differences among African peoples. It is through literature, especially oral literature that attempts are made to unravel mysteries and explain what lies beneath the physical world and mortal-immortal relationship and interactions. The Bible for Christians, the Quran for Muslims, the Torah for Jews and the Bhagavad Gita, Ramayana and Vedas for Hindus, among others, are all works of literature with which the faithful of these religions are taught their beliefs, doctrines and dogmas, morality, mortal-immortal relationships and interactions, religious ways of living, virtues and things of the spirit or metaphysical world, among others. Literature is undoubtedly made out of the lore of life (Zala, 2013, p. 28). It is created by a society. Both past and present events, happenings and stories are narrated orally or in writing, or in both written and spoken forms, through literature (Robert, Abubakar et al., 2016; Robert, Besong et al., 2016). This secondary function of literature connects it to history, whereby there is a sustained interdependence between them (Aristotle, 1985; Okpeh, 2005; Robert, 2016). Thomas Warton, the first real historian of English poetry, has maintained that literature uniquely ‘records the features of times and preserves the most picturesque and expressive representation of manners’ (Warton, 1774, p. 1). History relies on literature for historical facts (Ahmed, 2017; Okpeh, 2005; Robert, 2016; Robert & Anura, 2018). This implies that history cannot do any meaningful historical (re)construction without literature. Using poetry to describe the relationship or interdependence between literature and history, Aristotle (1985, pp. 167–168) has held that the poet is concerned with what may happen, while the historian is concerned with what has happened. Poetry, like myth (mythology), folktale and legendary, is affirmed to be the root of the philosophy field (Udofia, 2014, pp. 14–19; Uduigwomen, 2014, pp. 2–6, 8–12). Present and future generations learn from the deeds of their ancestors and thereby avoid their errors and improve on their good deeds, legacies and feats (Keerthika, 2018). Through these, literature could be used efficaciously to deal with fear of the politicised and religionised differences in the political sphere of the African society. It is also quite interesting that revolutions have been made and new world orders realised through literature (Ahmed, 2017; Keerthika, 2018; Uwatt, 2015, p. 1; wa Thiong’o, 1991, pp. 34–35; Zala, 2013, p. 30). Thus, attaining a new world order in the area of dealing with the fear plaguing Africa is very possible with the effective use of literature.

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Social activities and socio-cultural ways of living involve and are shaped by literature. One’s level of reading, education and exposure to literary activities and the socio-cultural activities shaped by literature influences one’s experience, responses to situations, level of reasoning, behaviour and self-comportment, kind of perception of and relation with people, etc. Literature gives either factually or imaginatively origin, migration, settlement and historical exploits of different peoples of the world (Zala, 2013, p. 30). Law and order are maintained through literature. Laws, policies, principles and ideals are preserved for both oral and written dissemination and transmission by literature. Literature allows for selfassessment, and a critical evaluation or judgement of others. It impacts on members of a society in various regards. The manifestations of the positive impacts literature exerts on society include the emergence of new world orders, reforms, civilisation, modernity, urbanisation, industrialisation, innovations, and even significant development. In addition, literature exerts influence on individuals. Reading skills and habits are essential to literature. Building and inculcating these in the individual are done by literature both directly and indirectly. Through reading, the individual gets exposed to a lot of things they would not know without engaging in reading. With reading, an individual gets to know things, places, cultures, people, etc. that are even out of their reach. Literature enlivens readers and gives them hope (Ahmed, 2017). In consideration of the impact or influence literature exerts on readers and other audiences of literary works, and the knowledge it offers them, Ahmed (2017) categorises the functions of literature into two. The first is literature of power, which implies that the function of literature moves the heart and mind of readers. The second is literature of knowledge, which refers to the function of teaching (Ahmed, 2017). The two-function categorisation falls short of various other functions of literature, both primary and secondary functions. So, this study does not imbibe it. Literature is affirmed to be a catalyst of development, as evidenced in the place of literature in the monumental development of UAE (Keerthika, 2018; Zala, 2013). It is a veritable means of organising and engaging social activities. Also, literature creates avenues for self-development through a wide range of books available to the individual for reading that brings about selfimprovement, development and changes (Zala, 2013). Critical thinking and reflection, and creative writing are induced by literature or literary instinct (Besong, 2021; Zala, 2013). Creative and imaginative skills as well as creativity and imagination are products of literature (Zala, 2013).

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Realities are made, upheld, expressed, taught, transmitted and sustained by literature along with language and other fields of human endeavour. The language of a people is also represented by literature (Zala, 2013). Being that literature concerns itself with society (Zala, 2013), it delves into sociological matters, which ethno-religious and linguistic concerns, such as differences, are integral parts of. Linguistically, literature plays symbolic role in speech constructions and symbolic communication. Literature acquaints its learners and users with advanced and technical knowledge of language use for various purposes. With literary skills, figures of speech are used to communicate in varied ways, such that a listener (an addressee) could be insulted without he or she knowing or realising it, because they lack the literary knowledge of that peculiar way of language use. What would ordinarily sound repulsive, harsh, offensive, etc. is made otherwise with the use of figures of speech. For example, instead of saying, ‘Your dad died on his way to work,’ one would rather say, ‘Your dad kicked the bucket (or gave up the ghost) on his way to work.’ By saying so, the tension the word ‘die’ would have created is either got rid of or reduced. By using innuendo to criticise a womaniser thus: ‘You are good at issues concerning women,’ he would not be offended if s/he has no literary knowledge of the meaning of what is said. Rather, such a person feels that s/he is eulogised (praised). Saying ‘Jesus is the lion of the tribe of Judas’ is pragmatic rather than semantic. This statement is literary, but not literal. It is metaphorical. Euphemism is used to make jest of a pretender viz., ‘This is Angela, the pregnant virgin I told you about.’ Irony is used to communicate the opposite of what is intended. Paradox exemplifies a typical linguistic situation of polysemy and semantic and pragmatic meanings. For example, ‘the child is the father of the man’ is a figurative speech with two levels of meaning. At the surface level of the meaning, it makes no sense or is rather confusing. Conversely, at the deep phase of the meaning, it makes sense that the man’s child has grown up and becomes his father at old age, now that the man has become more like a child and needs care from young(er) persons. The examples are many. Stylistics is another way in which literature impacts on language use. Literary devices are made use of for stylistic communication. Registers (special vocabularies) of literature have direct bearing to language and linguistics. Most linguistic constructions, which are not literally correct and acceptable, are made literarily correct and acceptable. Thus, literature could be used to right the elitist constructed wrongs and falsehoods that cause fears.

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More so, literature also plays the secondary role of proffering significant solutions to some problems. This reality tells of the ability of literature to find solutions to the matters arising from the differences among African peoples and identity groups. The symbolic and technical portrayal of people and phenomena is another secondary function of literature. Literature is affirmed to play a significant role in aesthetics (Keerthika, 2018). The beauty of a society is depicted and upheld by literature. The beautification or glorification of things and people is a task undertaken by literature. Beyond aesthetic values, literature upholds, presents, portrays and teaches societal values and norms that constitute the ethics, customs and traditions of a particular society (Ahmed, 2017; Keerthika, 2018; Robert, 2016; Zala, 2013). Literature offers and preserves what people have to do and those they ought not to do (Keerthika, 2018). As Zala (2013, p. 28) puts it, literature teaches people how to live and let others live too in society. Therefore, given the foregoing x-rayed and analysed functions of literature, it is quite clear that literature has the functional capacity of dealing adequately with the issues at stake and many others in Africa and beyond. The issues are those bordering on the fear of ethno-religious and linguistic differences in African post-colonial politics. The differences are politicised and made religious. The indigenous politicians hold to them as what should be used against political opponents to attain political victory. The expectations of the masses are not met. Consequently, various issues crop up. The fear of ethno-religious and linguistic differences is caused by the elites. Politicians (political leaders) are at the apex of the hierarchy of causative agents of this fear among their people(s). The religious elite follow next. These ones are influenced by the political elite, additional to their own personal religious inclinations and misdeeds. The politicians mobilise religious and ethnic elites for the task for causing tension among the masses. They use both oral and written literature negatively to cause and rouse tension in the minds of the masses about ethno-religious and linguistic differences. These differences are not grounds for tension or fear, but the elites politicise the differences and make them seem to be threats, dangers and means of discrimination among ethno-religious and political groups. Also, ethnic leaders are deeply involved in ill-act of causing fear among the African masses over ethno-religious and linguistic differences. The fear, roused by the elites, causes political tension, division, intolerance, disintegration and sour intergroup relations among African peoples

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in and outside the political arena. Scrupulous African politicians and elites use literature negatively in the light of Judas’ culture of deceit to express and spread differential fears among African peoples. It is to that end that this study argues that once the negative use of literature is reversed, it would serve a viable means of dealing with ethno-religious and linguistic differences in the political arena of post-colonial Africa. Literature could be used positively to deal with the fear by instilling confidence and the spirit of smooth intergroup relations for peace and unity in post-colonial Africans. Literature could be used positively and sustainably to pursue and achieve deconstruction and reconstruction elitist rhetoric, tales and incitement; wide sensitisation, mind training and attitudinal change; and cultural reformation, good neighbourliness. Sensitising the peoples of Africa about these differences as being blessings rather than curses or sources of troubles among identity groups involves the use of oral and written literature. Both the primary and secondary functions of literature are what make it a viable mechanism for dealing with ethno-religious and linguistic differences in the political arena.

Conclusion This study has shown that literature could be used to deal with the fear of ethno-religious and linguistic differences, which engulf African nations. In the first place, it is the same literature that is used negatively by politicians and other elites to turn the blessings of the differences to curses or plagues. Conversely, it is just a case of reversing the current elitist misuse of literature, from using it wrongly to using it rightly, in order to attain deserving results that would sustainably help in dealing with the fear of the differences among African peoples with their plural identity groups. The viability of literature in dealing with the fear rests on its primary and secondary functions, with which it proffers solutions to various problems. On the whole, the study concludes that the fear causes political tension, division, intolerance, disintegration and sour intergroup relations among African peoples in and outside the political arena. Thus, it recommends mind training, attitudinal change, wide sensitisation, cultural reformation, good neighbourliness, and deconstructing elitist rhetoric, tales and incitement as the panacea. Doing so requires all hands being on deck to get rid of the issues at stake. These include good governance, political socialisation and participation, with all agents of socialisation rising to the challenge of combating the issues at stake.

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Marks, I. (2002). Innate and learned fears are at opposite ends of a continuum of associability. Health Services, 18(4), 32–43. Maslow, A. H. (1968). Toward a psychology of being. D. Van Nostrand Company. McNally, R. J., & Louro, C. E. (1992). Fear of flying in agoraphobia and simple phobia: Distinguishing features. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 6, 319–324. McNally, R. J., & Steketee, G. S. (1985). The etiology and maintenance of severe animal phobias. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23(4), 430–435. Metcalf, T. (2016). How does fear in the workplace inhibit learning? Retrieved 27 July, 2022 from http://work.chron.com/fear-workplace-inhibit-learning20934.html Nwachukwu-Agbada, J. O. J. et al. (2011). Exam focus: Literature in English 2011–2013 for WAEC (WASSCE) and NECO (SSCE). University Press Plc. Okpeh, O. O. (2005). The historian and his facts: A reflection on historical theory and methodology. The Journal of History and Diplomatic Studies. Reiss, S. (1991). Expectancy model of fear, anxiety, and panic. Clinical Psychology Review, 11(2), 141–153. Reiss, S., & McNally, R. J. (1985). Expectancy model of fear. In S. Reiss & R. R. Bootzin (Eds.), Theoretical issues in behaviour therapy (pp. 107–121). Academic Press. Robert, O. S. (2016, July). Appraising a historian’s literary contribution to social order: Prof. Okpeh, Ochai Okpeh, Jnr. Spring International Journal of Arts and Humanities, 3(12), 110–114. ISSN-2360–7998. Robert, O. S. (2018). Formation, types and processes of questions in Bekwarra language of northern Cross River. International Journal of Language, Literature and Culture, 5(3), 27–34. Robert, O. S., Abubakar, Z. A., & Besong, E. N. (2016). Library, information technology, oral literature and history education and sustenance in contemporary Nigeria. Sub-Sahara Scholar International Journal of Contemporary Education Research– JCER-2016-057. Robert, O. S., Besong, E. N., & Dibie, D. A. (2016). Retracing our sociocultural norms/values for a better African society. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (IJHSS), 2(4), 1–5. Robert, O. S., & Anura, F. (2018, February 9–18). Poetic appraisal of state custodians’ sins against the state: Philip Umeh’s ‘Ambassadors of poverty’. International Journal of Academic Pedagogical Research (IJAPR), 2(2), ISSN: 2000-004X. Smith, H. (1934). On De Bonald, relativism in Bonald’s literary doctrine. Modern Philology, 22(2), 193–210. Taylor, S., Koch, W. J., & McNally, R. J. (1992). How does anxiety vary across the anxiety disorders. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 6, 249–259. Udigwomen, A. F. (2014). The Greek cultural context: The transition from poetry to philosophy. In A. F. Udigwomen & C. A. Udofia (Eds.), A critical

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history of philosophy: Ancient and medieval (pp. 1–13). Ultimate Index Book Publishers. Udofia, C. A. (2014). Early pioneers: The myth and reality about their authorship and origination of Western philosophy. In A. F. Udigwomen & C. A. Udofia (Eds.), A critical history of philosophy: Ancient and medieval (pp. 14–20). Ultimate Index Book Publishers. Uwatt, E. B. (2015). Revolutionary imagery in the poetry of Niyi Osundare. Paper Presented at the Faculty of Arts Seminar Series, Fulafia. wa Thiong’o, N. (1991). Writers in politics. Heinemann. Warton, T. (1774). History of English poetry 1774–1781 (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press. Welford, C. (2013). Fear in the workplace. Retrieved 27 July, 2022 from http:// www.hrmagazine.co.uk/article-details/fear-in-the-workplace Zala, J. B. (2013). Literature and society. International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences, 1(5), 26–31.

CHAPTER 5

The Postcoloniality and Decoloniality of Namibian Literature in Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land Collen Sabao

and Nelson Mlambo

Introduction Postcolonial and decolonial studies within Africa, and especially in Namibia in the current context, are quite critical to the understanding of modes of self-definition and self-referencing—both individually and collectively, especially so with regard to concepts of culture, race, class, nationhood and identity. One of the generically critical defining characteristics of African literature is its contestations of narratives of Africa by the erstwhile colonial masters (Fanon, 2008). Fictional narratives by African writers have thus been chiefly interested in re/membering, re/ writing and re/configuring the story of the African continent and her experiences of the epoch of colonial encounter and settlement (Achebe,

C. Sabao (B) · N. Mlambo University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_5

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1975; Sabao et al., 2021). In the process of narration, including selfwriting, the black self is attempting to reconfigure their cultural and moral compass. These fictional historiographies of the African experience of colonialism are attempts to redeem the self—individually and collectively. In this regard, drawing from Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land as part of Namibian fictional imaginaries in English, we here argue that Namibian literature on the Herero/Nama genocide, as postcolonial writings, demonstrates an engagement with the ensuing discourses and the “empire” in search of the redemption of their culture and common concerns. The two selected narratives (Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land) are imagined here as representing contrasting narratives of Namibia’s (and by extension, Africa’s) colonial experiences seeking to redeem, reclaim, historicise and memorialise the historical experiences of the Herero/Nama people with the ultimate goal of re/locating and re/claiming the individual and collective identity and memory—with all its pain and trauma. In so doing, these postcolonial writers imagine a redefinition and redemption of the self postcolonially— a decolonial process of sorts—through re-membering and remembering a historiography that had been dis-membered by a former colonial master who seeks to obfuscate such a history of trauma, pain and suffering. There is a reclaim of the heritage of the Herero/Nama people through the fictional reconstruction and reliving of the trauma of the epoch of colonialism. In the process, such writings form part of a grander postcolonial project of reclaiming history and of the ‘empire writing back’ (Ashcroft et al., 2003).

The Postcoloniality and Decoloniality of African Literature African modes of self-writing (Mbembe, 2000) are critical to our understanding, interpretation and comprehension of the African experiences and cultural and individual identities. As such, studies on identity and identity formation are crucial within African scholarship—especially so in so much as they are instrumental to the negotiation of the relations between Africa and the former colonial masters in the contemporary world. Fictional narratives by African writers have thus been chiefly interested in re-membering, remembering, re/writing, re/claiming and re/ configuring the story of the African past and her experiences of the epoch

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of colonial encounter and settlement (Achebe, 1959; Sabao et al., 2021), which has been dis-membered through colonial and imperial narrations of the same. In the process of narration, including through fictionalised histories, the former colonised and their descendants seek to redefine and redeem themselves postcolonially. In this regard, evinced through Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land, these narratologies reflect the nature of how the postcolonial writers engage with history in search of ‘remnants’ of their beings, of their cultural modes of self-definition and common concerns. The corpus of fictional imaginaries on the Herero/ Nama genocide, as exemplified here through Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land, thus, represent instances of representation and resistance (Fanon, 2008). The broader corpus of Namibian literature centred on the Herero/Nama genocide is often constituted of contested narratologies of the events of colonialism, especially so in the interpretation of the experiences of colonialism and can also be seen to be located in these dialogically divergent characterisations of what Fanon (2008) imagines as ‘representation and resistance’. Discourses on colonialism and attendant meta-discourses of genocide, war, segregation and culture are thus of paramount importance to Namibian people (Herero/Nama) as evidenced through these fictional imaginaries. Within the individual and collective memories of the Herero/Nama peoples, there exists a shared, historicised and memorialised trauma of the experiences of colonialism characterised by genocide, dispossession of materialities (Kandemiri, 2021), rape and torture, as fictionalised in Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land. These literary works evince concerted efforts to reclaim the past— history—through debunking Eurocentric imperial and colonial imaging and narration of such experiences. This is a process akin to re-negotiating and re-formulating new modes of reclaiming the self individually and collectively. As such, more than a century since the end of German colonial rule in Namibia, relations between the former colonial power and the Namibian Herero/Nama ethnolinguistic communities brutalised and traumatised by German colonial policies, remain acrimonious, and fictional imaginaries on the events of the colonial encounter and especially so the genocide, such as Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land, continue to attempt to seek to re/construct and memorialise this history. Within this context, we can imagine that the contemporaneously tumultuous engagements

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between Germany and Namibia culminated from Germany’s reluctance to assume responsibility for the Herero/Nama genocide in Namibia—a dark period in colonial history that continues to define the manners in which the Herero/Nama people continue, even in the contemporary, to grapple with identity issues. This is further imagined in the context of the traumatic and brutal manner in which German colonial policies deeply impacted their cultural identities. It is thus envisioned that the two narratives under examination here are attempts at historical redemption and in the process proffer avenues through which postcolonial reconciliation can be achieved. The narratives seem to proposition that the most feasible way through which reconciliation can be attained is by memorialising and historicising the ‘truth’, with Germany accepting responsibility for the genocide and its attendant trauma, as it still proliferates within the Herero/Nama peoples.

Namibia (Herero/Nama) and German Historical Relations: Literary Iterations The relationship between Namibia and its former colonial masters, (as reflected through the selected literary imaginaries, Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land), is characterised by intense exchanges with regard to the significance as well as the consequences of the era of colonial occupation, the colonial wars of the early twentieth century in the erstwhile colony of South West Africa (now Namibia) (Kössler, 2008). The country colonial history begins with the arrival and colonisation of Walvis Bay by the Dutch in 1783 (Melber, 2017). Between 1904 and 1907, the then South West Africa, experienced conflict with Germany (De Souza-Correa, 2011). During that period, “Namibians were stripped of critical materialities and immaterialities, hence they were ‘decentred’ due to exposure to ‘dehumanising’ incidents” (Kandemiri & Mlambo, 2017). Subsequent to this, the massacre of the native Herero/ Nama peoples in what has been argued to be the first genocide of the twentieth century has been part of this history. Further occupation of the country by South Africa in 1920, after a protracted war spanning from 1915, is also characterised by hostile modes of existence defined by subjugation, racial segregation, economic segregation as well as a generally repressive form of governance of native Namibians.

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Germany’s massacre in Namibia of native Namibians, largely of Herero/Nama origin, has widely been imagined as the first twentiethcentury genocide. These events have been fictionalised, reconstructed and historicised through literary memory in narratives such as Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land. Historical reconstructions through fictional imaginaries have, more often than not, been acceptable as a form of counter discourse or narration, especially within postcolonial discourses. This is so because they have been observed to be imbued with narrative ‘truths’ collected from both individual and collective memory. It is of course critical to observe that such acts of reconstructing historiographies through the imaginative eye are not without their own subjectivities. As Sabao and Javangwe (2018, p. 49) observe, The past is not stashed somewhat neatly in some memory bank where it can be neatly retrieved for present use. The past has to be reconstructed in a process that is often typified by enchanted visions of distant events, blank memories, and deliberate suppressions of undesirable memories, falsifications as well as omissions and commissions. Implied in this is the fact that memories in auto/biography writing are only useful to the extent to which they coincide with the act of the writer’s remembering, or preferred memories.

This is highly so, as such narratives tend to mostly take the form of selfwriting, often through memory reconstructed from oral tradition. There is also a danger in this in that such forms of narratives, … [tend to be] defined more solidly by [their] contradictions than by what binds [them] together… imbued with a politics of [their] own that starkly threatens any form of theoretical cohesion or the possibility of narrating coherent self-identities through [them], as much as this is the most salient of [their] claim. (Sabao & Javangwe, 2018, p. 48)

Despite these acts of alleged genocide having occurred in Namibia more than a century ago, and could also be possibly diluted through history and time, they continue to be memorialised and re-membered by native Namibians especially so through fictional imaginaries such as Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land. These imaginaries have largely been shaped by not only the need to re-imagine and reinvigorate the collective memory of the Herero/Nama people through the historicisation of these events, but also because the effects of such

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events are still contemporarily profoundly alive in the collective memory of Namibians. In the aftermath of Germany’s dominion over Namibia, the historical memory of the Herero and Nama peoples has awakened through narratives that are reflectively critical of the immeasurably gruesome and traumatic effects of the colonial project on their modes of both individual and collective referencing and definition. A crucial and central concern in the discourses of genocide between Namibia and Germany has been the incessant refusal by the Germans to acknowledge having committed acts of genocide in Namibia. Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land in memorialising and historicising the genocide, provide fictional reconstructions of the events of the genocide, which the Germans have consistently and conveniently denied and continue to presently downplay. This is exemplified by stern rebuffs during visits by Chancellor Kohl in 1995 and President Herzog in 1998. In the immediacy of such, the Herero People Reparations Corporation (HPRC) filed lawsuits against the German administration and German firms which participated in the colonial ventures (Kössler, 2015). Pursuant to that, sometime in January 2017, the Herero and Nama leaderships filed a class-action lawsuit suing the German government for deliberately sidelining them within negotiation processes with the government of Namibia about the 1904–1908 genocide (Tjitemisa, 2020). The reparations debate and negotiations, for all intents and purposes speak to a movement towards decoloniality for both the German and Namibian histories alike. Germany, despite being on record as previously acknowledging “moral responsibility” for the deaths of over 65,000 persons of Herero and Nama origins, has continuously circumvented proffering an official apology for the ‘genocide’—a political move argued to be resulting from the need to avoid the payment of reparations. This has occasionally been imagined by many, especially from within the Herero/Nama community in Namibia as a deliberate ploy by the Germans to expunge all memory of the genocide from history, and as also resulting from attempts at self-cleansing—a global image preservation stunt. Fictional imaginaries such as Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land are a rejection of this and reclaim this part of the past—with all its horror and trauma—as a form of postcolonial narration and reaffirmation of the facticity of this dark and horrendous epoch in Namibia’s colonial history. Reconstructions and reimaginations of the genocide re-enact, relive, historicise and memorialise these atrocities committed against the Herero/Nama people

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for posterity. In 2019, however, the German Development Minister, Gerd Mueller, in a potential slip of the tongue admitted to ‘war crimes’, ‘wars of extermination’ and ‘genocide’ (Amakali, 2020). During the five-year period spanning from 2015 to 2020, a record eight rounds of negotiations surrounding the genocide and potential resolutions to the impasse around it had been convened between representatives from both the German government and the Herero/Nama people—and these alternated between Berlin and Windhoek. A further 15 meetings of the Special Political Cabinet Committee (SPCC) on the alleged genocide, seeking for an apology and reparations and convened by the Namibian vice president are also recorded (Amakali, 2020). As a concession, after the eighth round of negotiations, the Namibian and German teams in principle reached an understanding on a draft declaration, which technically was an admission of the veracity of the narrative of genocidal events purported to have been done by German colonial troops in Namibia. Despite a seeming breakthrough in 2017, there still exists an impasse over the nature and reasons for reparations—since Germany still refuses to the present, to admit to genocidal crimes committed in Namibia against the Herero/Nama population. Subsequently, the ensuing deadlock has provoked widespread frustration within Namibia’s Herero/Nama community and in the process, the experiences of the suffering of Herero and Nama peoples culminating from the said genocide has preoccupied the major concerns of Namibian literature in general, in most of the instances writing postcolonially in manners that evoke the re/lived pain and suffering the Herero and Nama peoples have endured and continue to endure as a consequence of this unfortunate and dark episode of colonial encounter and settlement. The fictionalisation of the Herero/Nama genocide through literature generally, and through Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land in particular, seems to be accepting of the fact that the historical event of colonialism has forever shaped the manner in which human beings (the Africans to be precise) define themselves with regard to gender, race and class. Within postcolonial imaginations of the self, especially in the context of life after the period of colonial encounter and settlement, the black African person suffered a serious crisis of identity— configured by the dis-membered and unremembered past. As such the postcolonial, through fictional reconstructions of the past as typified by Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land continues

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to re-engage and re-imagine the past with all its hurt, horror, pain and trauma in order to ‘truthfully’ re/shape and re/negotiate a ‘factual’ and functional identity. As Fanon (2007, p. 83) would observe, “[t]he black man among his own in the twentieth century, does not know at what moment his inferiority comes into being through the other”. Another one of the resultant effects of slavery and colonialism was racism. For the black man, the two epochs are characterised by severe methods of emasculation, segregation, dehumanisation, subjugation, exploitation and evidently, ‘othering’—the majority of factors that are also characteristic of German—Namibia post/colonial relations and the attendant era of genocide as depicted in Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land. Postcolonially, African, Caribbean and African American fictional writers have over the years endeavoured to capture this manner in which slavery and colonialism mongrelised the individual as well as collective modes of identity and identity formation for subsequent generations. As such, fictionalised historical narratologies such as Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land not only re-configure the past, but also re/claim and reconstruct it for posterity, for the benefit of future generations. This largely results from the observed distortions of the collective culture that shapes collective identities. The domestic culture, and also the person, becomes ‘polluted’ by the infiltration of new cultures and new forms of relating—which in turn reconfigures social relations and hierarchies. Hall (1990, p. 225) observes, with regard to the foregoing that, The inner expropriation of cultural identity cripples and deforms. If its silences are not resisted, they produce, in Fanon’s vivid phrase “an individual without an anchor, without horizon, colourless, stateless, rootless—a race of angels.” Nevertheless, this ides of otherness as an inner compulsion changes our conception of ‘cultural identity’. In this perspective, cultural identity is not a fixed essence at all, lying unchanged outside history and culture. It is not some universal and transcendental spirit inside us on which history has made no fundamental mark.

In a manner of speaking, Hall admits to the role and extent to which history and by extension historical events have reconfigured traditional collective modes of self-referencing and identity. In the process, the shared modes of identity become tampered with and the essence of

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a unified and homogeneous identity fast becomes elusive, as demonstrated through the divergencies within the historical accounts of the genocide, which pit contesting narratives against each other. Quickly, the individual becomes alert to the fact that cultural identity “… is not onceand-for-all. It is not a fixed origin to which we can make some final and absolute Return” (Hall, 1990, p. 225). Fanon (2008) makes further submissions regarding how colonialism and slavery have also impacted the manner in which the individual— the black man to be precise—imagines the ‘self’. With the cultural and spiritual anchorages eroded through the expunging of his history as exemplified by the German position on the Herero/Nama genocide, the black man can no longer identify collectively but individually. This individuation is born out of the diversity of existential experiences that have debunked all forms of collectivism and collective identity. Further to this, the individual, postcolonially, must now self-reference and self-defines through new modes of identity shaped through the eyes and words of the former coloniser—in this regard in relation to the new ‘other’, who for our purposes is the white man, and the shifting cultural and existential landscapes that his intrusion into the black cultured world implies. The black man must now define the ‘self’ not in terms of their relation to the homogeneous others, but the new domineering ‘others’—the white man—whose sifted and self-centred recollections of the past create an inverted identity which the postcolonial must now embrace. His fact of blackness thus is conditioned comparatively with regard to the white person, and how such white man decides to imagine him. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some critics will take it on themselves to remind us that this proposition has a converse. I say that this is false. The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man. Overnight the Negro has been given two frames of reference within which he has had to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less pretentiously, his customs and the sources on which they were based, were wiped out because they were in conflict with a civilization that he did not know and that imposed itself on him. (Fanon, 2008, pp. 82–83)

In confronting the hypocrisy of these colonially imagined identities and histories, fictional imaginaries such as Kubuitsile’s The Scattering

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and Utley’s The Lie of the Land reframe and recover historical identities—merged with effects of factual histories through narrations drawn from individual and collective memory. Through such narratives as with Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land, the postcolonial writer informs on the ‘true’ manners through which the African (precisely the Herero/Nama people in the current context) can holistically imagine themselves within unsifted history and experiences imbedded within collective memory. In the process of narration, including self-writing, the black self is attempting to reconfigure their cultural and moral compasses. These writings, typified by Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land, are attempts to redeem the self—individually and collectively. For example. Achebe’s Things Fall Apart demonstrates this attempt to re-engage with African modes of identification. He believes that, the role of the novelist is to be a teacher of his culture (Achebe, 1959). In this regard, the postcolonial would engage with the writer in search of frames of their culture and common concerns. Hall (1990, p. 224) however warns against the dangers of always configuring cultural identity in the collective. Hall observes, as Fanon (2008) has also done, that cultural identity has, through events in history, become complex and diluted. Hall thus suggests that there is a need to focus on perhaps a different conceptualisation of cultural identity, and thus submits that, There is however, a second related but different view of cultural identity. This second position recognises that, as well as the many points of similarity, there are also critical points of deep and significant differences which constitute ‘what we really are; or rather—since history has intervened— ‘what we have become’… Cultural identity, in this …sense is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’. It belongs to the future is as much as the past. (Hall, 1990, p. 224)

In this regard, we can imagine cultural identity, while having a history, as also quite mutating—and like everything with a history, also undergoes eventual transformations. Cultural identities thus need not be imagined in essentialised ways as some fixed hieroglyph drawing from the past (Fanon, 1952). They are thus, experienced and reconfigured in line with events as they occur in the world. The colonial experiences of the natives, especially through colonial systems such as assimilation (in Francophone Africa) and Apartheid (in some sections of Southern Africa), reshaped the relations

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between races and in the process the modes of identifying the ‘self’ in relation to the ‘other’—in some cases resulting in the black man’s mimic of the other (the white) race (Bhabha, 1984). Within the context of African nations, Namibia included, and during the period of colonial encounter and settlement, the same conditions also manifest. Colonial modes of relations and political configurations speak to the segregation of black people at the expense of the pedestalisation of the white race as a superior race. In South Africa and South West Africa (now Namibia), the political system of Apartheid legally elevated the white race over the black majority race solely on the basis of race (Friedman, 2011).

The Postcoloniality and Decoloniality of The Scattering and The Lie of the Land: Memory and Historicity of Trauma and Resilience In understanding the postcolonial and decolonial nature of the two texts, critical themes such as identity, material dispossession, inhuman treatment and violence (including the rape of women and children) and genocide warrant exploration. We here draw textual evidence from the two texts, Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land, to demonstrate the re/presentation of these themes within Namibian society and history. As illustrated earlier on, identity (individual and collective) is central to postcolonial and decolonial processes. This is so because postcolonial discourses are characteristically about the reaffirmation of identity, largely by the formerly colonised, in the aftermath of colonial encounters—how they grapple with issues such as hybridity (Bhabha, 2012; Easthope, 1998) resulting from the cultural collision that colonialism represented. Colonial enterprises sought to culturally erode African civilisations and cultures through, especially linguistic imperialism. The Lie of the Land, for example, demonstrates efforts by the German colonial regime to subdue the linguistic and cultural heritages of the natives (Herero/Nama) through an imposition of European ‘civilisation’. Language is a superstructural semiotic tool which embeds a people’s culture (Sabao, 2013). A people’s traditions and culture are encapsulated in the living museum of language. In The Lie of the Land, identity is explored through language usage and the cultural functions of language. As explicated above, language serves more than just a communicative function. It is a carrier of culture and a storehouse of knowledge about

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traditions and culture. It is the vehicle through which cultural codes are transmitted. Part of the colonial modus operandi entailed eroding native languages and sometimes also annihilating the people who speak them through genocide. The Germans, as established in The Lie of the Land, believed, despite imagining natives as savages—a form of ‘othering’ of the natives -, that gaining the ability to speak the native languages, would fast-track their colonial intentions for ‘civilisation’. Learning the languages of the savages might well be a good thing as it will not be long before they fully accept German civilisation and our language. You must examine their heathen tongue before they vanish altogether. (Utley, 2017, p. 5)

What is paradoxical in the above quote, considering the genocidal tendencies of the Germans, is how the Germans express the desire to learn how to communicate with natives in their native languages—Herero and Nama—yet at the same time harbour intentions of annihilating the speakers and in the process contribute to the extinction of the language and the civilisation it carries. This makes for a classic case of conflicted interests. In clear demonstration of ‘othering, the description above also depicts the natives as ‘savages’—equating them to ‘uncivilised’ cannibals perhaps reminiscent of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness depictions of African natives. This is further reinforced by the fact that the Nama people also express discomfort with being called Hottentots —a derogatory term referencing the click sounds in their native language. In the text, Thomas a native Nama who, while transporting Samuel to German South West Africa (GSWA) from Walvis Bay, expresses this resentment of the descriptor by the Nama people. Thomas verbalises this discontentment by remarking that, “I don’t like the name. We call ourselves Nama” (Utley, 2017, p. 21). Thus, in a move representative of reclaiming the identity of the self individually, as well as of the Nama collectively, Thomas remonstrates Samuel to use the correct identification marker, Nama. This ‘othering’ that Utley, through Thomas, clearly rejects and deconstructs is symbolically synonymous to Said’s (1978) ‘Orientalism’—through which according to Shabbir and Ahmed (2020, p. 53),

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… the ‘Orient’ or ‘non-Europeans’ along with their specific traditional cultures are presented as the unreachable, uncivilised, unreasonable, mysterious, barbaric, and backward terming them as the ‘Other’ whereas the ‘Occident’ or the ‘Europeans’ especially the white western people including their cultures are unquestionably considered as more reachable, civilised, reasonable and advanced in terming themselves.

The novel The Lie of the Land (Utley, 2017) on the other hand, evinces the multiplicity of manners through which trauma from the genocide was experienced emotionally, materially and physically by the Herero/Nama people between the years 1904 and 1908 as well as in the present. The genocidal tendencies of the German are clearly replicated as demonstrated also by their thirst for killing as illustrated by how they would also attempt to annihilate the Jews in what then became known as the AuschwitzBirkenau genocide. With regards to the Herero/Nama genocide, the Germans were indeed in possession of advanced weaponry, advanced military training and of course the mental fortitude and will to execute the natives. This proclivity for genocide is demonstrated in the text through the following excerpt which illustrates the callousness of the German military in massacring the Herero people as part of the colonial enterprise and re/imagined through fictional narratology: ‘Hang them’ Hartmann ordered a cart to be drawn up under the tree. The prisoners were made to stand on the cart while rough nooses were placed around their necks and slung over branches of the thorn tree. The old man, blood streaming down his back, was held up by two of the women. The keening and moaning had stopped. The mad old man was still grinning and mumbling even as the noose was placed around his neck. Hartman smiled as he gave the order. A soldier whipped the horses and the cart drove off, leaving the Ovaherero dangling. I distinctly heard the flogged man’s head snap. He was the lucky one. As we rode on, David joined me. He was looking distinctly green. I turned around and saw all their bodies, men and women, swinging from the thorn tree. One or two of them were still kicking. I found myself glad that no children had been captured. (Utley, 2017, p. 46)

The narrative demonstrates further how the trauma culminating from the genocide profoundly affects survivors in almost as similar a fashion as it would also affect a narrator (who recollects the lived experiences), the

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reader as well as the listener of such reconstructed memory and history through fiction. Through the pain, demonstrated by the emotiveness in the narrator’s voice—a pain that can be re-membered in the minds and emotions of the reader or listener regarding the callousness with which the Herero/Nama people were executed or hung—the narrator reminds the German government and people of the heinousness of the actions of their forebears and in the process re-members the dis-membered memory and lived experiences of the Herero/Nama people. The text thus manages to re-live, historicise and reconstruct a past that perhaps the Germans would be so keen to expunge—in the process reconfigure and recover this traumatic history through some form of counter narrations/ discoursing of the genocide. The excerpt demonstrates through the verbalisation of General Hartmann that the Germans were callous and inhuman, especially as evinced by the manner in which they executed the extermination orders given out by Von Throta. This incident demonstrates just one instance of many, in which the German army massacred natives in Namibia. In this particular case, the Germans had encountered a group of desolate elderly Herero men and women, struggling after being left behind by the main group. The group is lagging because it is constituted of the frail and weak who are struggling to walk. General Hartmann gives an order for their torture; ‘Flog them’, he said. ‘Loosen their tongues, we need to continue our march and I cannot waste any more time’ (p. 45). This type of torture typical of the multiplicity of instances of similar experiences emotively evinces horrid and dreadful memories even for the reader to merely visualise and re-imagine. The fictional goal of the re/construction of such an incident is a clear signal of the desire to re/member and memorialise this collective memory. In the process, it is, in a manner of speaking, the empire writing—a reminder of the callousness and heinousness of their past deeds which the former coloniser seeks to erase from the official history as well as the collective memories of the affected peoples. The incident also illustrates the nature of the inhumanity of the European colonisers and the trauma culminating from such experiences. Here, General Hartmann gives orders to David, one of his subordinates, to hang all these struggling Herero old persons. This form of massacre makes ones reflect on this history expunged from official narratives of the German colonial ‘conquest’. This reconstruction of a dark memory typifying an almost common occurrence for the Herero/Nama people, is psychologically unfathomable and traumatic for the individual and collective mind to

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imagine. This is so, in the context in which re-membering, remembering and memorialising this history of genocide is highly emotive, especially so in that, despite this seemingly overt evidence of trauma culminating from the genocide, up to the present, the Germans still insist that this example of the extermination of the Herero people is not tantamount to an annihilation of a race of people (genocide) but instead just a war between two feuding civilisations (Rivera, 2012). The condition of the Herero/Nama people as candidates for extermination was further worsened by the fact that there was no provision for the arrest of Herero/Nama people as prisoners of war in General Von Trotha’s Extermination Order. It was an exterminate on sight order, and meant that any Herero or Nama person captured would be massacred. There was indeed no benefit at all in voluntarily surrendering. The extermination spared no one—old or young, the blind, the frail, the disabled—all fell victim of the annihilation order as demonstrated in the excerpt below: At one point we came across eight or nine sick Herero women who had been left behind after a skirmish with some mixed-race Basters who were our allies then. Some of the women were blind and they had been left food and water. We heaped wood around the hut they were lying in and set fire to it. (Utley, 2017, p. 82)

Further evidence, for example, is that, like most other Germans, Hartmann was also a collector of the skulls of slain natives in his garden and around his habitat, and these were displayed visibly as trophies of conquest as well as emblems of power and pride. These had the power to scare away the natives, and also acted as a clear message of their fate should they defy German authority. In explaining the source of the skulls for example, he says: I didn’t find them. I claimed them. After a skirmish a few months ago, I had them cleaned and brought them here. A lot of fellows did the same. After all, we had great sport hunting them down. (Utley, 2017, p. 34)

Here, Hartmann clearly callously confesses to the killing of native Herero/Nama people for sport, further sustaining the imaging of the native as the ‘other’. Furthermore, the fact that a scientist who has recently arrived in the colony from Berlin, a Doctor Fischer, requires the

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skulls of massacred Herero/Nama natives for some supposed ‘scientific study’ through which he seeks to ‘factually determine’ evidence of degeneracy within the ‘savages’ speak to the ensuing discourse of ‘othering’ which the text also seeks to postcolonially decolonise. The scientist, … actually, wants to prove that they are animals and inferior to us Germans. We already know they are not far above the apes. What else is there to study? We should concentrate on getting rid of them. (Utley, 2017, p. 34)

The Herero people, however, have over the years only been able to express their version of events orally, until recently through the publication of literary imaginaries that reverse the events of history and thus represent alternative or rather contrasting narratives. In this way, the literature replaces the oral narratives popularised amongst the Herero over the events of the genocide. The texts are thus able to transcend both ethnolinguistic and geographical boundaries and remind the Germans in more popular discourses, that these fictional imaginaries represent the events of history that they wish not to remember and let known—a postcolonial mode of writing as well as a decolonial one too. The Scattering is also rife with instances that evince genocidal trauma. The novel recollects the profoundly traumatic genocidal events and experiences that are so pronounced to easily erase from individual and collective memory, and are clearly transposed to the mind of the reader. The voice reconstructing these experiences, evinces deeply embedded personal pains that similarly emotively affect the reader too. The text emphatically reconstructs the brutality of the German army, deeply entrenched in the collective memory of the descendants of the Herero/Nama people— passed down generationally through oral tradition. It is a shared memory of the trauma of genocide which is constantly in a state of being remembered—a history of the trauma of extermination of their ancestors which the German colonial master seeks to obfuscate. In The Scattering, this is illustrated by the reconstruction of an incident in which a Herero girl is murdered in public by three members of the German army. Narrated through the eyes of the character Tjipuka, the gruesome killings which she witnesses from behind a bush where she was hiding, represent one of many such acts that evince the callousness and senselessness of the annihilation of a whole tribe of people.

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In this incident, the German soldiers publicly and callously kill a Herero girl in full view of the character Tjipuka, who witnesses the incident from behind a bush. The physical harm was not only restricted to genocidal killings demonstrated by the killing exemplified in the excerpt. Other forms of human suffering such as the rape of children and women as well as general inhuman treatment and torture, also accompanied the genocidal traumatic experiences of the Herero/Nama people under German colonial domination. Such traumatic experiences of public rape are exemplified by the reconstructed memory below: The tall German ran his hands down the front of the woman’s dress. With sudden violence, he ripped the dress open and tore again at her petticoat underneath, revealing her bare breasts. She brought her hands up to cover herself, and the tall German slashed them with a knife-one, two—and red strips appeared and dripped down each hand as she pulled them away. They bled, but she made no sound. She put her arms at her sides and waited. The blood dripped down her hands and fell to the ground—the ground so greedy for Herero blood. The tall German turned her around and bent her over. He lifted her dress and used his knife to tear away her pants. He pulled out his manhood, already stiff, and pushed it into her. She was silent. The bush was silent…. (Kubuitsile, 2016, p. 43)

The raped victim, having been made to endure the humiliation of a public sexual violation, is further subjected to a public execution—a double shaming of sorts. He grabbed her breasts. He twerked the nipples with his fingers and smiled at her kindly. Her face was blank. No one was there. Then the tall German took out his knife, grabbed her by the back of the head, and sliced the knife across the skin of her neck. He jumped back to avoid getting soaked in her blood. She fell to the sand where the last of her life gurgled away. (Kubuitsile, 2016, p. 43)

The tragic and traumatic nature of the rape, followed by the gruesome murder, speaks to the heinousness of the German military. The graphic nature of the descriptions is undergirded by affective and emotive undertones, which are also easily transferrable to the mind of the reader. In the process, a reader’s engagement with such gravity of violence constructs a vivid mental image of the brutality of the experience, which is reflective of perhaps the nature of the collective memory that the Herero/Nama

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people have, from which the decolonial processes represented through these fictionalised historicisation seek to address. The trauma of bearing witness to the butchery of one’s clansmen, borne by the eye witness Tjipuka, symbolically represents the collective trauma of the Herero/ Nama people that has become part of their heritage and contemporary existential realities.

Conclusion: The Criticality of Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies Postcolonial studies are critical to our understanding of the African past and present. They represent a sense of “writing back to the Empire” (Ashcroft et al., 2003) and of Spivak’s (2003; 2015) notion of “the subaltern speaking”, and are essentially important to the definition and identity of peoples across the world. In the same regard, the postcolonial writer in Namibia, as exemplified by Kubuitsile’s The Scattering and Utley’s The Lie of the Land thus/ engages with history and all its traumas, in search of a redemption of their culture and common concerns—a sense of reclaiming the self through re/writing, re-membering, re/membering and re/reading the self individually and collectively. One however needs to be awake to the fact that identities are not stagnant and thus mutate. Hall (1990, p. 224), for example, warns against the dangers of re/ configuring cultural identity in the collective always. Hall observes, as Fanon (2007) has also done, that cultural identity has, through events in history, become complex and diluted. Hall suggests that there is a need to focus on perhaps a different conceptualisation of cultural identity, and thus submits that, There is however, a second related but different view of cultural identity. This second position recognises that, as well as the many points of similarity, there are also critical points of deep and significant differences which constitute ‘what we really are; or rather—since history has intervened— ‘what we have become’… Cultural identity, in this …sense is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’. It belongs to the future is as much as the past. (Hall, 1990, p. 224)

In this regard, we can imagine cultural identity, while having a history, as also quite mutating—and like everything with a history, also undergoes eventual transformations. Cultural identities thus, need not be imagined

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in essentialised ways as some fixed hieroglyph drawing from the past (Fanon, 2008). They are thus experienced and reconfigured in line with events as they occur in the world. We here thus imagine that there exist new modes of identity creation specifically by the Herero/Nama peoples of Namibia from postcolonial and decolonial perspectives. In thinking so, we hope that we can contribute to ongoing discursive engagement on identity issues in Africa and the African diaspora.

References Achebe, C. (1959). Things fall apart. Heinemann African Writers. Achebe, C. (1975). Morning yet on creation day: Essays. Anchor Press. Amakali, M. (2020, August 6). Genocide descendants turn up the heat. New Era. https://neweralive.na/posts/genocide-descendants-turn-up-the-heath Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G., & Tiffin, H. (1998). Key concepts in post-colonial studies. Psychology Press. Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G., & Tiffin, H. (2003). The empire writes back: Theory and practice in post-colonial literatures. Routledge. Bhabha, H. K. (1984). Of mimicry and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse. October, 28, 125–133. Bhabha, H. K. (2012). The location of culture. Routledge. Conrad, J. (1902). Heart of darkness. Blackwood’s Magazine. Correa, S. M. D. S. (2011). History, memory, and commemorations: On genocide and colonial past in South West Africa. Revista Brasileira de História, 31, 85–103. Easthope, A. (1998). Bhabha, hybridity and identity. Textual Practice, 12(2), 341–348. Fanon, F. (1952). The fact of blackness. Postcolonial Studies: An Anthology, 15(32), 2–40. Fanon, F. (2007). The wretched of the earth. Grove/Atlantic, Inc. Fanon, F. (2008). Black skin, white masks. Grove Press. Friedman, J. T. (2011). Imagining the post-apartheid state: An ethnographic account of Namibia. Berghahn Books. Hall, S. (1990). Cultural identity and diaspora. In J. Rutherford (Ed.), Identity: Community, culture, difference (pp. 231–242). Lawrence & Wishart. Kandemiri, C. (2021). Literary archives of conflict, the decoloniality of materialities and resilience in selected narratives of genocide in Namibia (PhD Thesis). University of Namibia, Namibia. Kandemiri, C., & Mlambo, N. (2017). The literary constructions of the metaphysical in the African milieu. In A. Nhemachena, J. Kangira, & N. Mlambo (Eds.), Decolonisation of materialities or materialisation of (re-)

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colonisation: Symbolisms, languages, ecocriticism and (non)representationalism in 21st century Africa (pp. 305–321). Langaa RPCIG. Kössler, R. (2008). Entangled history and politics: Negotiating the past between Namibia and Germany. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26(3), 313– 339. Kössler, R. (2015). Namibia and Germany: Negotiating the past. University of Namibia Press. Kubuitsile, L. (2016). The scattering. Penguin Random House South Africa. Mbembe, A. (2000). African modes of self-writing. Codesria Bulletin, 1, 4–19. Melber, H. (2017). Genocide matters-negotiating a Namibian-German past in the present. Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien, 17 (33), 1–24. Nandenga, A. N. (2019). Reconstruction of atrocities through fiction in Namibia: An evaluation of Mari Serebrov’s Mama Namibia and Lauri Kabuitsile’s The scattering (Master’s thesis). University of Namibia. Rivera, A. A. (2012). Did the German actions in the Herero rebellion of 1904–1908 constitute genocide? Fort Leavenworth KS. Sabao, C. (2013). The sexual politics of the female body in contemporary Zimbabwean youth sociolects in interpersonal communicative contexts. Journal of Pan African Studies, 5(10), 80–88. Sabao, C., & Javangwe, T. (2018). Sensitivities to auto/biographical ‘truths’ and images of ‘self’. Comparing ‘stance-taking’ in the textuality of the editorial reactions to Morgan Tsvangirai’s At the Deep End in The Herald and NewsDay. NAWA Journal of Language & Communication, 12(1), 45–67. Sabao, C., Mahomva, R. R., & Mhandara, L. (Eds). (2021). Re/Membering Robert Gabriel Mugabe: Politics, legacy, philosophy, life and death. LAN Readers. Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Shabbir, G., & Ahmed, U. (2020). Bridging the Gulfs between occidentalism and orientalism. Hazaraislamicus, 9(02), 40–57. Spivak, G. C. (2003). Can the subaltern speak? Die Philosophin, 14(2), 42–58. Spivak, G. C. (2015). Can the subaltern speak? In Colonial discourse and postcolonial theory (pp. 66–111). Routledge. Tjitemisa, K. (2020, September 28). We will continue fighting. New Era. https://neweralive.na/posts/we-will-continue-fighting Utley, J. (2017). The lie of the land. University of Namibia.

PART II

Language/Media and Postcolonial Deceit in Sub-Saharan Africa (6–10)

CHAPTER 6

Postcolonial Gender Dichotomies: Integrating Digital Technologies, Local Content, and Local Languages in Empowering Rural-Black Women in Southern Africa Gift Masengwe and Wadzanai Chihombori-Ndlovu

Introduction This chapter addresses the intersection of gender inequality, postcolonial deceit, language, and digital technologies in empowering rural black women in southern Africa. It highlights the historical oppression of African women during colonialism and the persistence of postcolonial

G. Masengwe (B) Research Institute for Theology and Religion, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] The Office of the Vice Chancellor (Research), Zimbabwe Open University, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_6

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deceit, which continues to impact women’s education, employment, and overall development. The chapter recognizes the power of digital technologies and local content, particularly when using local languages, in empowering women and in challenging stereotypes. The 2023 International Women’s Day theme ‘DigitALL: Innovation and technology for gender equality’ serves as a catalyst for this empowerment drive. It emphasizes on the importance of investing in women and girls as a means of investing in the overall development of society. Language is identified as a tool that has been used to perpetuate stereotypes and gender oppression. The chapter acknowledges the sexist and discriminatory nature of many African languages, which has hindered progress in gender equality. It highlights the need to challenge these language biases and promote the use of local languages in digital spaces to bridge the gap between men and women in the economic and social sphere. The chapter emphasizes the importance of Ubuntu philosophy and solidarity in promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment. It raises the question of how language can be utilized to empower women and overcome the postcolonial deceit that hampers the growth and development of women in southern Africa. Overall, our chapter sheds light on the complex dynamics of gender inequality, postcolonial deceit, indigenous languages, and digital technologies in southern Africa. It emphasizes the need to challenge stereotypes, promote local languages, and harness the power of digital spaces to reduce economic and social disparities between women and men.

Justification for This Study The writers of this chapter, while both were residing in South Africa, chose to focus on their experiences in the country and beyond to highlight the urgent need to address gender discrimination and violence against women. The high incidence of femicide and gender-based violence in South Africa, as evidenced by the alarming statistics and reported cases,

W. Chihombori-Ndlovu Internet Society Zimbabwe Chapter (ISOCLINE), Harare, Zimbabwe

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serves as a stark reminder of the challenges faced by women in the region (EWN, 2019). We make reference to the EWN report, which documented numerous cases of femicide in South Africa, with women being victims of various forms of violence including shootings, stabbings, and other acts of brutality. The response from the South African President, acknowledging the gravity of the situation and calling for measures such as opposing bail and parole for perpetrators, reflects the national concern and recognition of the need for action (EWN, 2019). The chapter also draws attention to the power of music as a medium to raise awareness and advocacy for change. The song ‘Madoda Sabelani’ by Loyiso Gijana serves as an invocation, appealing to men to take responsibility and put an end to violence against women (Mlamla et al., 2021). Gijana’s music addresses the grim reality of gender-based violence in South Africa and advocates for accountability and justice. By highlighting these specific incidents and initiatives in South Africa, the chapter underscores the urgency of addressing gender inequality and violence against women in the country. It serves as a call to action, emphasizing the need for comprehensive efforts to combat gender-based violence and to promote gender equality in all countries of southern Africa. Indeed, differential economic statuses between men and women contribute significantly to gender inequalities in southern Africa. The disparities in income levels based on educational attainment, as highlighted in the City Press report (2019), clearly demonstrate the bias of the labor market and the impact on earnings between genders (i.e., for every 100 rands received by a man of the same level with the woman, uneducated women got 54 rands, high school women 68 rands, and college graduates 63 rands) (City Press Staff Reporter, 2019). The lower earnings of women, even with the same qualifications as men, reflect the systemic barriers and discrimination they face in accessing equal opportunities and fair remuneration. Moreover, women’s access to basic services such as electricity, water, and sanitation is often limited, especially in poorer households. This burden falls disproportionately on women, who are responsible for tasks such as collecting firewood and fetching water from distant sources, in addition to their other household and care-giving responsibilities. This further exacerbates their economic and time constraints. The introduction of digital spaces and technologies has the potential to be a game-changer for women in this context. Access to information through digital platforms can empower women to take charge of their health, learn new

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skills, and access opportunities for socioeconomic and political advancement. However, it is important to acknowledge the existing inequalities in internet connectivity and digital access. The statistics provided in the City Press report (2019) indicate disparities in access to internet connectivity across different demographic groups, with Africans having lower rates compared to other racial groups (i.e., whites at 90%, Indians at 78%, coloreds at 64%, and Africans at 58%) (City Press Staff Reporter, 2019). Given these challenges, the study aims to discuss the intersection of gender issues, digital spaces, local languages, and local content as means to address women’s socioeconomic and political advancement. By promoting digital inclusion and developing localized content in local languages, efforts can be made to bridge the gender gap and empower women to overcome the socioeconomic barriers they face in southern Africa.

The History of Gender Issues in Southern Africa The history of gender challenges in southern Africa highlights issues of inequity and unfair treatment faced by black women in post-independence Africa. Significantly, foreign languages and theories produced power matrices that distanced local populations from content development in their indigenous knowledge and practices. This shift had consequences for the advancement of African women’s identities and the recognition of their contributions (Sunderland, 1996). Language plays a crucial role in perpetuating and justifying gender discrimination based on differences that undermine women’s education, employment, and personal growth. Linguistic practices and language power dynamics carry the material goods of gender discrimination, shaping social perceptions that justify unequal treatment of women. The chapter explores the history of gender discrimination, spanning the pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods in southern Africa (Guyo, 2017). Understanding this history is essential to comprehend the persistent challenges faced by women today, particularly in digital spaces. By examining local content and historic narratives that have been used to undermine women, the chapter shed light on the need to address these issues and empower women within the digital realm. The discussion on digital spaces in the chapter recognizes the emergence of new language aspects in the post-modern era (Cameron, 2005). However, it also underscores the importance of considering local content and historical context

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to comprehensively tackle the gender disparities and discriminatory practices that continue to affect African women. By acknowledging the historical roots of these challenges, efforts can be made to rectify them within digital spaces and beyond. Pre-colonial History The depiction of African women as oppressed and confined to domestic roles in contemporary society is a result of a school of thought that aimed to oppress them both as black individuals and as women. However, historical evidence challenges this notion by highlighting the important roles that African women played in ‘production, religion, and politics’ (Moagi & Mtombeni, 2020, p. 1) throughout history. African women had significant contributions in areas such as food security, childcare, and other societal aspects. However, the status of African women, within the context of gender politics, has evolved over time and has been influenced by various institutions that propagated inequalities such as religion and culture. Even in postcolonial Africa, deceitful language has been used in government initiatives and those of international organizations that claim to empower women but often falling short of achieving true equity. The Afro Gazette indicates that ‘There are still equity gaps across the globe in educational outcomes and student success metrics’ (2023). Women and girls thus continue to face limited access to education, health care, economic autonomy, and representation at decision-making platforms. Language, as a medium of communication, reflects the biases and power dynamics of the dominant group in society, including gender biases. This leads to the association of language with masculinity and undermines female participation in important aspects of life, such as leadership. However, historical examples across Africa demonstrate the influential roles women held in various domains, including political, religious, and familial spheres. Women served ‘in politics as Princesses, Queen mothers, and regents; and in religion as prophets, diviners, and rainmakers’ (Moagi & Mtombeni, 2020, p. 1). They played active roles in public and private domains such as in the rise of the Zulu kingdom by Mantatisi, Regent Queen Mkabayi, resistance to colonialism by Yaa Asantwa, the Ghanaian Queen Mother, and the strong leader, Ethiopian Empress Uelete Rutael (Ndlovu, 2008). Unfortunately, language, using the power dynamics within it, has reinforced social attitudes of restricting the agency of women throughout

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history. However, colonialism came with significant changes on language and cultural norms that often reinforced gender inequalities and sexism in Africa (Afisi, 2010). Previous languages did not have biases and hierarchies that diminished the power and status of women in society as women had power and authority as war commanders, judges, and family heads. Understanding the historical context and the impact of colonialism on language and gender roles is essential for addressing the persisting inequalities and striving for gender equity. By recognizing the power of language to both oppress and liberate, efforts can be made to challenge and transform the linguistic and social structures that perpetuate gender inequalities and reclaim the inclusive and empowering aspects of pre-colonial languages. Pre-colonial societies in Africa saw women complementing their male counterparts rather than being subordinated to them. The divisions of labor between sexes were not rigid, and women could engage in tasks traditionally associated with men (Moagi & Mtombeni, 2020, p. 1). However, the arrival of colonialism and the influence of colonial Christianity introduced distorted interpretations of gender roles, perpetuating the notion of women as ‘weaker vessels’ (1 Peter 3:7) and diminishing the understanding of the active participation of women in pre-colonial African societies (Shin & Bang, 2013). Unfortunately, the historical evidence regarding women in pre-colonial southern Africa is limited due to the biases of European male recorders who focused on influential men. Despite this limitation, it is evident that women in pre-colonial times accumulated status, recognition, and authority, and ‘were never backstage’ (Moagi & Mtombeni, 2020, p. 2; Ndlovu, 2008, p. 111). They were independent, influential decisionmakers within their communities and created alternative gender roles. While some accounts depict men dominating women in royal settings (Eldredge, 2014), other sources argue that women in southern Africa were useful in ruler-ship, religion, and economics, challenging the notion of their restriction to domestic settings (Weir, 2000). Accessing this content often relies on oral traditions, which were the primary means of passing on local knowledge and languages. Local languages contained culturally-relevant phrases and information that empowered women in various endeavors. Local languages reproduced local technologies through which local content became accessible to both genders. However, the introduction of colonial technologies and the associated expenses limited marginalized groups, including women, from accessing

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and utilizing local content, further perpetuating inequalities among rural populations in southern Africa (Hall & Mtero, 2021). Finally, literature suggests that African women were not subservient to men, as evidenced by women who ruled empires, shrines, and business dealings in pre-colonial southern Africa (Netshitangani & Msila, 2014). The impact of colonialism and the subsequent inaccessibility and unaffordability of language and local content for marginalized rural populations have diminished available leadership roles and opportunities for women. It is important to recognize the historical agency and sensible contributions of women in order to challenge the deficient narratives militating against the transformative work in leadership styles that can empower women today (Chapman & Benis, 2017; Lopez-Zafra & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). Colonial and Post-colonial History The impact of colonialism on gender roles, language, and gender inequalities in southern Africa restructured society. Words and phrases were developed to reinforce negative stereotypes on African people in general, and women in particular, a power dynamic that favored men over women. Although men were regarded as boys, hence became ‘playboys’ until death, women were regarded as ‘prostitutes’ among these indignities (Fromkin et al., 1998). This language perpetuated the idea that men were superior and more capable than women in various aspects of life, such as work and intelligence. This helped to propel the colonial-capitalist economic structure. In colonial history, the structuring of society coincides with the development of political, economic, and religious colonization. The colonial language and gender politics were further designed to subjugate and suppress resistance from the native population. This structuring used language as a tool to reinforce and create further native subservience. Differences in gender roles and values were targeted as a threat to the success of the colonial enterprise. Women’s collective work and opportunities for social transformation were undermined, resulting with women competing with their peers. They were encouraged to pursue individual mobility in specific professions that were traditionally associated with women such as teaching, child rearing, or cooking (Netshitangani, 2019). Postcolonial laws and Bills of Rights in southern African countries, especially on the dignity of women, have remained deceitful as efforts

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did not equip women with capacities to socially transform their own spaces. The initiatives by the UN on digital technology for women are an acknowledgment of the limitations of current efforts (Afro Gazette, 2023). Religion, too, played a role in the colonization process by promoting beliefs and practices that oppressed women’s rights. Interestingly, the former US President, Jimmy Carter, left the Southern Baptist Convention at 74 years of age because he recognized how his Christian beliefs contributed to the oppression of women’s rights. The impact of religion on gender equality is highlighted as a form of colonization. When he left, he stated that he believed: ‘the most serious violation of human rights on Earth is the abuse of women and girls’ (Haddock, 2023). Furthermore, language and gender differences continue to affect women’s opportunities and earning capacities in the workplace. Metaregression analysis used across industries, professions and commitments, indicates that colonialism empowered and incapacitated women, economically (Haroon & Sumayya, 2013; Louis et al., 2013). Stereotypes about women’s abilities, such as being seen as less skilled or unable to excel in particular fields, persist. Also, discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, education, and career is still prevalent, with language often used to justify these inequalities like ‘This work needs a man’; ‘This work needs an educated man’; ‘This work needs an educated strong man’; or ‘This work is for an educated and dedicated white man.’ Women became discriminated against because their responsibilities as mothers, domestic chores, and marital status contributed significantly toward wage differences and career limitations in the long and short-run in their professions (Hollyforde & Whiddett, 2002; Luthans, 2011; Moorhead & Griffin, 2014). Gender and education are often used as determining factors for job outcomes, with women being perceived as lesser skilled because of societal expectations that they can multitask at home but not excel in specific areas at work (Ornstein, 2011). As a result, investing in women’s education and empowering them is of low priority, with women not being seen as vital for business growth and success. This led to the assigning of women in society with lower statuses, which has affected their earning trajectory (Brijlal et al., 2013). Local languages also contributed and continue to contribute to the devaluation of women’s skills and capabilities. Phrases that depict boys as more versatile and intelligent compared to girls reinforce the notion that

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men are more favorable and competent in the workplace (Netshitangani, 2019). This portrayal of women as foolish, ill-mannered, and unreliable perpetuates gender stereotypes and leads to women being de-skilled and experiencing lower earning capacities (Johansson et al., 2005). However, there is a growing recognition of the importance of investing in women and girls. Initiatives like Melinda Gates’ message that ‘When we invest in women and girls, we are investing in the people who can invest in everyone else’ highlights the significant contributions women make to society. In cultures like the Zulu, women are often the responsible caregivers and providers for their families (Isike & Uzodike, 2011, p. 225). The Zulus say: ‘if a man, as the head of the family, does not provide for his family, he knows that the mother will. But, if women do not care enough for their children, they know their children risk neglect’ (Mncwango & Luvuno, 2015, p. 245). Recognizing and valuing the roles and capabilities of women can promote the livelihood of every person and challenge the negative attitude of women being subordinate to men. Further, the South African Constitution in Section 9 emphasizes equality and prohibits unfair discrimination. However, this has not contributed to women’s livelihood in South Africa as the language of discrimination has continued to exist and contributed to the gender wage gap and disparities in women’s earning capacities. The South African Constitution promotes the education of women for the transformation of society. We believe that well-educated women can help reduce the wage gap between men and women and increase their earning opportunities. As the South African Constitution advances, eradicating the language of discrimination by investing in women’s education, we contribute toward gender empowerment and create an equitable society. Recognizing and valuing the capabilities of women can lead to social transformation and bridge the wage gap between men and women, age and race, class and status, particularly in highly-educated positions (Ioakimidis, 2012, p. 31). Positively, tenure and earnings reflect on the heterogeneous quality of the worker on the entity (Sloane & Theodossiou, 1993, p. 421). Besides individual qualities, wage disparities may be a result of one’s attachment to the job. We therefore contend that language plays a crucial role in advancing women to acquire these capacities through higher education and training because it challenges the discriminatory language and practices. In all, the historical and ongoing impacts of colonialism on gender roles, language, and gender inequalities need to be confronted through

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education and socialization. This calls for gentler approaches to the limitations of women in their womanhood, motherhood, and wifehood among other things (Bagraim & Harrison, 2013; Ioakimidis, 2012). This drive is perceived to promote gender equality and social transformation.

Digital Technologies, Local Content, and Local Language Efforts in Africa The context of the study is among English-speaking countries in southern Africa, although the general view of the region includes former Frenchand Portuguese-speaking countries. This limitation came from the understanding that language proficiency is important in conducting research, hence the need to draw examples from countries where the researchers have linguistic competences. It needs to be noted that there is widespread diversity on the experiences and challenges faced by women in Englishspeaking countries of southern Africa face varying degrees of cultural, historical, and socioeconomic challenges. While the study may not encompass all countries in the region, it can still provide valuable insights and shed light on the common issues faced by women in those countries, noting the unique dynamics and contexts when it comes to gender equality, language discrimination, and women’s empowerment in each of the concerned countries. Various organizations and countries have carried out initiatives to empower women through digital technologies and local content development in southern Africa that recognize the importance of providing women with access to technology, digital literacy training, and relevant content in local languages to bridge the gender gap in digital inclusion and promote gender equality. By focusing on initiatives such as Tanzania Women of Achievement (TWA) (MyZA Admin, 2015), Ugandan Women in ICT Initiative (WICTI) (Owiny & Amuriat, 2016), Namibian Women in Computing and Information Technology (NAWIT) (Gervasius, 2020), Women in Technology (WIT) program in Botswana (Nleya, 2021), Women in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) in Malawi (A4AI, 2021; GSMA, 2015: MACRA, n.d.), and Africhix program in Kenya (Africhix, n.d.), She Leads Africa (SLA) in Nigeria (SLA, n.d.), Zimbabwe School of Internet Governance Forum (ZIMSIG) (IGF, 2022) and South African Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (SADCDT) (G.S.A., n.d.), these programs aim at enhancing women’s participation in the digital revolution and in

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promoting economic and social empowerment. Emphasis has been on local languages, local content, digital media, and e-commerce among other initiatives in southern Africa. Local content development (LCD) plays a crucial role in empowering African and rural women by providing them with relevant information and resources in local languages. This approach recognizes the importance of culturally-relevant and linguistically appropriate content that addresses the specific needs and challenges faced by women in local communities such as health, education, finance, and entrepreneurship. Thus, ‘Local content development policy can enhance government processes, promote public–private partnerships, advance the business environment, and expand value creation’ (Alhajri, 2021). Local content in local languages enhances and improves the life conditions of women using digital spaces in southern Africa and support sustainable socioeconomic and political development. LCD is ‘culturally-relevant and linguistically appropriate’ for Kenyan rural women (Masiero et al., 2018). Digital technologies have similarly provided rural Nigerian women entrepreneurs with ‘more relevant and accessible information that can help them make better business decisions’ (Olawumi, 2018). It is encouraging to see the efforts made to increase women’s access to technology, digital literacy, and local language content. By addressing the digital gender inequality gap and promoting gender-responsive digital literacy, these initiatives contribute to creating more inclusive and equitable societies. However, we need to note that the gadgets and software we are advocating to use for digital gender equality are developed in European and Eastern countries. Thus, the idea to increase local people’s participation in the digital revolution, with women as a priority, probably should first consider localizing software development by women. Madam Monica Geingos, the First Lady of Namibia’s opening, remarks on July 30, 2020, that: ‘I wish I was surprised by research’s confirmation that women’s issues lag behind in the online space. I am not. The internet is a mirror into society’s soul. It reflects who we truly are. If women’s empowerment and access is a problem in society, it will be a problem online’ (Gervasius, 2020) highlights the need to address gender inequality in software development, technology entrepreneurship, and digital innovation to ensure there is more gender-inclusive and supportive process to empower women. This chapter was written during the International Women’s Day on March 8, 2023, that emphasized on ‘DigitALL: Innovation and technology for gender equality.’ The commemoration acknowledged that

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languages have historically empowered and disenfranchised women in society. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) understanding that ‘Local content is a key driver of sustainable economic development, including employment creation, industrialization, and technological advancement’ has provided a variety of opportunities for men and women to explore talent and invest in digital gender technologies. Further, investing in local content development, which includes the use of local languages, can positively impact the lives of women in southern Africa. Lack of local content and local language support has hindered the penetration of digital technologies in local communities. However, the increasing availability of digital devices and connectivity in many countries should make these technologies more affordable and accessible. Gender-responsive digital literacy initiatives that address specific webbased needs and challenges faced by women are essential in promoting gender inclusivity and empowerment. Some countries, such as Rwanda, have made efforts to provide internet access in local languages, enabling women to engage with digital technologies more effectively. The African Flagship Languages Initiative (AFLI) at the University of Florida has also worked to promote the use of local African languages on the internet, providing access to information in native tongues such as Akan/Twi, French, Swahili, Wolof, and Zulu through the Boren awards (AFLI, n.d.; ALT, n.d.). Language is a tool that has perpetuated discrimination and sexism in colonial and postcolonial Africa. Language highlights the challenges women face in climbing up the ranks of power due to patriarchal views. Colonial and cultural attitudes continue to undermine women who lack solidarity with other women to address institutional inequalities undermining women from accessing power. This means language perpetrated inequalities through stereotypes. Overcoming these barriers therefore requires initiatives that enable women’s access to digital technologies and provide training in digital skills. This is particularly crucial for rural areas where digital technologies have been difficult to promote, especially Zimbabwe and South Africa (Chisamya & Kanyane, 2019; Sithole, 2018). UN statistical estimations on gender digital divide in southern Africa indicate that fewer women (28%) compared to men (35%) are estimated to have access to the internet in 2023 (Reuters, 2023). This percentage translates to 259 million people, raising concerns that ‘Their lack of inclusion, by contrast, comes with massive costs’ (Reuters, 2023). Given that

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women constitute a significant portion of the population in southern Africa, it is crucial to address the challenges they face in accessing and utilizing digital technologies. Lack of access to technology, digital literacy, and content in local languages contributes to this disparity. Initiatives aimed at raising awareness, providing training, and promoting the use of local languages can bridge this divide, empower women, and create business opportunities (Web Foundation, 2015). This is what Madam Geingos referred to saying: ‘When we read the data, when I go through research, it puts into words and statistics what many of us have been feeling, hearing and seeing our whole lives ’ (Gervasius, 2020). In this, the training of women in digital technologies serves as an initiative for digital inclusion, gender equality, internet connectivity, and the growth of the technology industry. In conclusion, local content, local languages, and gender-responsive initiatives advocate for further progress and investment in initiatives that prioritize women’s empowerment in digital spaces. To promote gender equality and address women’s economic development through digital technologies in southern Africa, the question of affordability, availability, and accessibility of digital devices and connectivity, as well as fostering solidarity among women and challenging discriminatory attitudes, should become more significant strides taken on behalf of women by countries and organizations.

Women Empowerment Drives Through Digital Technologies Women in the Arts and Media Industry Digital technologies using local content and local languages, especially in music, art, and media, are important for promoting the inclusivity and agency of women to connect with other women across the world. The representation of women in the arts and media has been a topic of discuss for a long time, stretching from the 1970s to the early 2000s. While it is true that historically, there has been a gender disparity in the music industry, with more male singers and filmmakers compared to women, it is important to recognize the progress that has been made in recent years in view of Aretha Franklin’s 1976 ‘Respect ’ (Ritz, 2014) and Gloria Gaynor’s 1978 ‘I will survive’ (Gaynor, 2002). Since then, records like 2001 ‘Survivor’ by Destiny’s Child (Destiny’s Child et al.,

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2001), 2006 ‘Not Ready to Make Nice’ by D. Chicks (Chicks, 2006), and an 18-year-old Katy Perry (2012), in the biopic ‘Part of Me,’ says in a camera that ‘I feel like I was never even allowed to think for myself, and having any kind of feminist, live on your own, independent spirit is just of the devil’ (Perry, 2012). There are now more platforms and initiatives dedicated to promoting and amplifying the voices of women in the arts and media industry. Digital technologies, including streaming platforms, social media, and online communities, have played a significant role in providing opportunities for women artists to showcase their talents and connect with audiences on a global scale. These platforms have allowed for more diverse voices to be heard and have opened doors for emerging female artists who may have faced barriers in the past. While there may still be challenges and barriers to overcome, digital technologies have the potential to empower women by providing them with a platform to share stories, and connect with a wider audience. It is crucial to continue supporting and advocating for gender inclusivity in the music industry and ensuring that women have equal opportunities to succeed and have their voices heard. Addressing Challenges of Digital Gender Technologies The impact of digital literacy through access to the World Wide Web (WWW) raises concerns impeding women’s potential to rise through the digital technologies such as financial constraints, world capitalism, Western consumerist marketing, Western recolonization, and languageethical barriers. The first challenge affecting women from achieving universal digital access is money. Financial constraints limit women’s ability to purchase digital devices and data without getting subsidies, or public free internet centers or affordable data platforms. The costs of devices and internet in southern Africa are currently prohibitive for low-income families, requiring the program on women empowerment to bridge the digital divide by empowering women to achieve gender inclusivity. The second challenge is the global influence of capitalism, which is trying to colonize the world through local content and languages. Concerns are that by promoting women to enter into digital technology, we are facilitating world colonization by the capitalist society for their income generation and populations control because it promotes both

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local and global content, which impacts on cultural values. Digital technologies however have provided marginalized voices with opportunities that call us to critically examine elements of power dynamics and potential for gender exploitation through the influence of capitalism. Digital empowerment thus needs to explore the promotion of information access education, and economic opportunities against the effects of population control, capitalization, and exploitation as we bridge the digital gender gap in the digital economy. Global influence on local content thus must be guarded for its promotion of critical thinking and cultural preservation that strikes a balance between cultural heritage and global influences. The third challenge deals with marketing and consumerism. Westernproduced products are marketed to women through digital platforms that serve as channels for advertising products that increase women’s appetites for self-promotion and comparison. The broader concerns of commercialization and globalization are consumption and competition in beauty enhancers, fertility products, and sexually inclusive information on sex toys and social courting. While it is true that online platforms influence consumer behavior, the agency and freedom of women to make informed choices about their purchases and consumption patterns promote a diverse range of content that empowers them against harmful stereotypes and biases. In an interesting story, an anthropologist was surprised by the power of Ubuntu Philosophy that emphasizes collective well-being over individual competition (Sullivan, 2023). He attempted to manipulate three boys of different sizes and ages to compete for a basket of fruits. Instead, the kids did not run to the basket but walked side by side with arms around each other because they felt that it was not good for one person to enjoy the basket of fruits when their friends are miserable. This is both respect for cultural values and responsible citizenship. Digital technologies and the internet can provide opportunities for cultural exchange, knowledge sharing, and the preservation of traditions while also fostering individual empowerment. Citizens thus need to be informed about responsible digital behaviors and promote critical thinking in the face of increased ranges of products and services through education and health completion due to potential negative effects of digital technologies. The fourth challenge deals with digital literacy on rural populations. While rural populations have financial constraints to purchase devices and data, producing accessible local content in local languages can be a faster way of re-colonizing southern Africa as every citizen is captured

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into the capitalist mentality. The concern calls for the affordability and access to devices and data on one hand, and the design of policies that prioritize equitable access to technology, improved connectivity, and addressing financial constraints faced by marginalized communities. While it is important to consider the cultural implications of digital initiatives, the promotion of local languages and content can also serve as a means of preserving cultural diversity and empowering marginalized communities as digital inclusion initiatives reach all segments of society. It is therefore crucial to strike a balance between economic opportunities and cultural preservation by providing affordable access, digital skills training, and localized content in local languages can help bridge these gaps. The fifth concern is the promotion of African languages through foreign initiatives can be seen as being driven by motives beyond digital gender inclusion and literacy due to the ethical violations met by such platforms. While there may be concerns about the intentions behind certain initiatives, it is essential to assess them on a case-by-case basis. Collaborative efforts can foster language preservation and cultural exchange and provide opportunities for economic growth, without solely serving the interests of foreign entities. The sixth and final concern is privacy when the internet is not used responsibly, especially in marital relationships. Digital platforms have wrecked many marriages due to potential exposure of inappropriate online content. This includes the protection of children from accessing inappropriate content like pornography. Protecting children online requires a collaborative effort involving parents, educators, policymakers, and technology companies. Implementing robust age verification mechanisms, promoting digital literacy among children, and establishing safe online environments can help mitigate these risks. This also calls for parental controls, age restrictions, and educational programs to help promote a safe online environment for children. This calls for a multifaceted approach to education, regulation, and digital literacy programs that promote responsible digital behaviors, digital citizenship, and online safety. In all, these concerns can be mitigated by ensuring local content initiatives through digital platforms promote the agency of women and their economic opportunities using local languages.

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Local Content Development as Ubuntu for Women in Digital Spaces Local content development (LCD) is important for the empowerment of women in southern Africa using local languages on local content. By promoting the values of Ubuntu philosophy and incorporating local languages, LCD enables digital inclusion and access to information for women, helping them overcome gender inequalities and contribute to sustainable economic development. The lack of local content in local languages on the internet has been a major hindrance for women in southern Africa, as they were excluded from the information economy on digital super-highways. Inclusion of women in the digital economy, along with access to technology and digital literacy, can greatly benefit them and their communities if the language barrier is eradicated (ZimSIG, n.d.). By integrating local languages into digital spaces such as Swahili, Zulu, Wolof, and Akan/Twi, the values of Ubuntu ethic can be mainstreamed on the internet, aligning it with African culture that respects women (Huyer & Sikoska, 2003). This allows women and girls to access information [on health issues, education, culture, and employment], communicate effectively, and connect with other women both regionally and globally. There is need for localized and gender-sensitive content and services on the internet, as emphasized in publications such as the UNESCO report: Empowering Women in Africa Through ICT-Based Entrepreneurship that empowers African women through ICT-based entrepreneurship. Access to digital spaces, education, and training in ICT can empower women for gainful employment and increased incomes, contributing to cultural preservation and economic development. This has been promoted by books and music such as African Media and the Digital Public Sphere (2009) edited by Okoth Fred Mudhai, Wisdom J. Tettey, and Fackson Banda; and music and drama that added a rich flair in this avocation, for instance Robin Thicke featuring Pharrell Williams, T.J. in ‘Blurred Lines ’ (Thicke et al., 2013) whose controversial song on consensual sex made headlines in America. Thicke suggests that consent can be reached without explicit agreement, which is stereotypical, to view women as submissively and inappropriately demanding for sex without verbal consent. In this derogation and exploitation through music, women are degraded, demeaned, and objectified as bitches, whores, and gold diggers and objects of sex. Men seem to control everything including

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sex, violence, power, hatred, and mistreatment. These attitudes have been highlighted as being caused by culture and religion; hence, organizations like ‘Men Against Child Abuse’ (Van Niekerk, 2014) and the ‘Black Women Caucus ’ (Taylor, 1983) were formed to tackle gender-based violence in South Africa. To accelerate the development of digital spaces for women, events like the International Women’s Day commemoration in 2023 with the theme ‘DigitALL: Innovation and technology for gender equality’ (Reuters, 2023) focused on celebrating women’s achievements and closing equity gaps in politics, economics, and entertainment among others (Reuters, 2023). Governments play a crucial role in enacting measures to bridge the digital divide and address structural inequalities in education, income, and job opportunities. Investing in LCD and promoting access to affordable data and devices are vital for empowering marginalized black women in Africa (Reuters, 2023). Initiatives have been launched to increase access to affordable devices and data, but it’s important to consider challenges related to access, information, internet safety, and legislative measures to protect individuals, especially children, from abuses in digital spaces. In conclusion, LCD in local languages can promote digital inclusion, empower women, and help overcome language-content barriers. By investing in LCD, women in southern Africa can access information and resources, contributing to their economic and social well-being. However, access to affordable data and devices, along with legislative measures and the values of Ubuntu philosophy, is necessary to ensure the protection and empowerment of women in those digital spaces.

Conclusion Promoting local content and local languages on the internet can have a significant impact on the lives of women in black Africa. By providing information and services in local languages, women can better access and engage with their communities, as well as connect with other women in their region. This chapter has outlined the importance of digital spaces in the lives of women if development has to be inclusive. The International Women’s Day was just an eye opener for this study, which has challenged the researchers to look at how local content and local languages can be useful on women empowerment in Africa.

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CHAPTER 7

Hate Speech, a Source of Linguistic, Religious and Ethnic Intolerance Among the Sub-Saharan African Peoples: The Case of Nigeria Odey Simon Robert, Goodluck Chigbo Nwode, and Bibian Ugoala

Introduction It is quite regrettable that instead of using language rightly for nationbuilding, national integration and cordial peaceful intergroup relations, it is rather misused in various regards, inclusive of being misused for all that concerns linguistic, religious and ethnic plurality. Although hate speech has no single definition, it is generally understood to mean verbal attacks

O. S. Robert (B) Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] G. C. Nwode Department of Languages and Linguistics, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_7

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on or disparages of certain groups and individuals by some other individuals and groups, on the basis of the typically metonymical features inherent to the groups and the individuals under verbal attacks (Benesch, 2011, pp. 3–4; Scheffler, 2015, p. 44). It is affirmed that there is a strong link between hate speech and violence or violent conflict (Ezeibe, 2020; Nwosu & Nwokolo, 2022; Scheffler, 2015). Again, as Nwosu and Nwokolo (2022, p. 2) agree, hate speech is a phrasal term that describes any kind of expression or statement that vilifies, humiliates and incites hatred against individuals and groups other than the speaker’s own ethno-religious, linguistic and political groups, sex folk, and social class. In social relations, most people are reserved or sentimental. They (tend to) relate only (best) with those they consider are of their social classes, professional fields and ethno-religious and linguistic enclaves. This is predicated by their preconceived or internalised prejudices about and against others. These internalised prejudices continuously manifest and affect interpersonal and intergroup relations among individuals and groups. As such, such relations become sour. With such internalised prejudices, individuals and groups express hate speeches against one another or each other. This study argues that it is what is internalised about others that one expresses against them in form of hate speech. It follows that ethnic hate speech is a product of what has been cognitively internalised in the mind and linguistically expressed by certain individuals and groups about and against other individuals and groups outside their own folks or groups. In the words of Nwosu and Nwokolo (2022, p. 3), hate speech of all categories ‘produces the same damaging effects’ of violence and disorder, arising from anger, internalised prejudices and hatred. It is given the foregoing that this study rises to demonstrate that hate speech is a source of linguistic, religious and ethnic intolerance among the sub-Saharan African peoples.

B. Ugoala Department of English, Faculty of Arts, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria

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Empirical Studies Bayer and Bárd (2020) argue that ‘hate speech and hate crimes poison societies, as they threaten individual rights’, human dignity and equality; rouse or reinforce tensions between and among social groups; disrupt public peace and security, and law and order; and shatter peaceful coexistence and smooth intergroup relations among peoples, groups and individuals. Bayer and Bárd’s (2020) study found that lack of adequate of mechanisms for prevention and response breaches statutory and conventionalised values. Consequently, disagreement arises over divergent values and rules. Their study charges concerned authorities to take proactive measures against hate speeches, hate acts and hate crimes, and improve on extant ones. It proposes concrete, enforceable and systematic soft and hard legislative measures as the panacea. Going by the foregoing, it is quite clear that Bayer and Bárd’s (2020) study, like many others, upholds the need to combat hate speech so as to reduce or do away with hate acts and hate crimes in society. It charges concerned authorities to devise workable or pragmatic measures against hate speech, because it has devastating effects on society, particularly groups and individuals subjected to hate speech by their contemporaries that are against them. Thus, the study lends credence to the central position of this current study, which argues that hate speech is a negative linguistic trend that ought to be got rid of through strong operational legislations; for freedom of speech does not preclude punishment for such misuse of language. Bagga and Lavery’s (2019) study looks at the laws in Africa against apostasy, blasphemy and hate speech. Hate speech is said to be criminalised in 29 African countries. These are Angola, Benin, Burundi, Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, the Gambia, Uganda and Zimbabwe (Bagga & Lavery, 2019, p. 5). Also, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia are reported to have pending or proposed legislation to criminalise hate speech (Bagga & Lavery, 2019, p. 5). The study reveals that hate speeches have religious, ethnic, linguistic and political undertones (Bagga & Lavery, 2019, p. 1). The extant laws against hate speech, apostasy and blasphemy are said to have some grave implications on the human rights of the citizens. Laws against blasphemy and apostasy are affirmed to be mechanisms for controlling religious

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speeches that concern faith or human-divine relations (Bagga & Lavery, 2019, pp. 1, 5). Laws against hate speech are majorly executed through the media, as the media are restricted likewise (Bagga & Lavery, 2019, pp. 1, 5). Sierra Leone is one of the West African nations where freedom of expression and religion are at risk. Hate speech laws are noted to be aimed at reducing intolerance and hatred in society (Bagga & Lavery, 2019, p. 1). In the end, the study shows that hate speech, blasphemy and apostasy ought to be regulated with effective legislations so as to avert the grave effects of these trends on society in various regards. It recommends the involvement of United States and other powerful nations in combating these trends (Bagga & Lavery, 2019, p. 2). This current study subscribes to the recommendations of Bagga and Lavery’s (2019) study. The findings are empirical and widely justifiable. Their study demonstrates that hate speech, blasphemy and apostasy are intertwined. However, the concern of this current study is on hate speech. This current study argues that blasphemy does not require legal legislations or restrictions, for anyone who commits the crime of blasphemy does that at his/her peril with the Supreme Being, the unseen Spirit, who could met out any punishment of choice to such a mortal being guilty of blasphemy. One fresh example is the gruesome murder and lynching of Deborah Yakubu in Sokoto, Nigeria, for purportedly blaspheming against the Islamic Prophet Mohammed. Blasphemy does not require legal legislations or restrictions because it is mythical or religious and could be controlled by preachment and moral teachings faulting and discouraging acts of blasphemy and apostasy. Slander, libel and litigation should not be misconstrued for blasphemy. Also, apostasy does not deserve legislative measures. After all, defection from one political party to another does not attract any punishment. Being a member of any religious or otherwise group is ideally (supposed to be) voluntarily or willingly. That is the right to freedom of religion. So, denunciation of one’s religion does no harm to the individual or their group. Since doing so is not harmful, it is needless punishing for apostasy or making law against it. What has to be done is for religious groups to preach against and discourage denunciation of one’s faith. Continuous encouragement and conviction of the faithful by clerics and fellow members are the panacea, and not legislative actions or restrictions. Making laws against apostasy is more like or implies the practice by cult groups that do not let their members denounce membership whenever they want to do so.

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The study carried out by Cahill et al. (2019) made an assessment of the utilisation of Twitter data to elucidate the prevalence of hate crimes in the United States. The goals of the study are to: address the lack of reliable knowledge of the prevalence of hate crimes; identify and analyse online hate speech and examine the nexus between online hate speech and offline hate crimes. The analysis of tweets gathered showed religiously and racially motivated crimes as being the highest. However, the mixed results, which were inconsistent, showed no possibility of using online behaviour to identify offline risk. The study recommends the enforcement of policies that could appropriately check against the use of hate speech online. Their study is essential to the current one, as it tells of the implications of both online and offline hate speeches. Like this study, their study argues against rather than for hate speech and demands that legislative regulation of hate speech would address the crimes associated with or arising from hate speech. Obviously, hate speech has grave effects and thus need to be regulated with strong legislations, as voiced out by UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, viz: ‘We must recognise the limits of legislation to combat hate speech and incitement’. Dieng voiced out this phrase on the ‘Hate Speech and Incitement to Genocide Panel Discussion’ that was organised in 2013 by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM, 2013, p. 17). Despite talking about the limit of legislation to combating hate speech, it is quite clear that Dieng is realistic of the fact that legislations against hate speech are viable mechanisms for addressing the issues of hate speech, such as crimes emanating from hate speech. Scheffler (2015) demonstrates that legislations against hate speech are productive or result oriented, as they prevent the emergence of some crimes and uprising among groups and individuals. It is understood from Scheffler (2015, p. 8) that hate speech is identified to be what remotely lies behind the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the Kenyan PEV in 2007/2008. Similarly, it is observed that hate speeches were behind the Jewish genocide by Hitler and other Nazi leaders, as such speeches were used against the Jews (Nwosu & Nwokolo, 2022). Checking against hate speech is imperative because the right to free speech does not preclude penalty for hate speech. Free speech implies having the freedom or dignity as a human person to make speeches or voice out one’s mind on different matters of public concern. This study does not subscribe to the argument that free speech is a mechanism for democratisation and democratic participation (Malik,

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2012; Mendel, 2006, p. 29), and so, it should be restricted with legislations (Sunstein, 2003, p. 110; Mendel, 2006, pp. 29–30). Haupt (2005), Malik (2012) and Leiter (2012), among their other like scholars, make arguments in favour of hate speech, claiming that it is a mechanism for criticising as well as getting at an unfavourable government and so making legislations against it implies restricting citizens or groups belonging to the minorities from being part of democracy. Just as Benesch (2008) rejects such misleading arguments that attempt to sustain hate speech, this study rejects their views and strongly condemns hate speech. It goes on to argue that strong sustained legislations against hate speech are viable mechanism for checking against flaming words and tendencies by individuals and groups. Such legislations would prevent conflict, war and other forms of violence that sprawl from hate speech. For example, the recent war between Russia and Ukraine (Astrov et al., 2022; Grajewski, 2022) is partly a product of hate speech and hate crime, arising from ethnic, linguistic, political and even religious prejudices and intolerance by Putin against his Ukrainian contemporary.

Hate Speech, a Source of Religious Intolerance Religious intolerance is borne out of religious ideologies, orientations, doctrines, dogmas, tales, indoctrinations, rhetoric, sermons and speeches, among others. These ground as well as rouse religious hatred at the first phase and ethnic, linguistic and political hatred among individuals and groups at the second phase. Recurrent religious conflicts are results of such wrong linguistic constructions in which language is used technically, negatively and deceitfully to incite some individuals and groups against others. For example, recently, the sermon given by Pastor Tunde Bakare to a congregation contained hate speech against the Igbo people of South-Eastern Nigeria. Bakare claimed that the Igbo cannot produce a president or lead Nigeria as a president, because they were cursed by the late Tafawa Balewa, the first Prime Minister of Nigeria at his point of death, when murdered in the bloody military coup led by several Igbo officers. In Bakare’s words, ‘The day they killed Tafawa Balewa, they removed his turban, poured wine on his head, forced him to drink and shot him. And while he was being killed, he said, ‘none of your tribe will ever rule Nigeria” (Nwosu & Nwokolo, 2022, p. 1). The question is why late Tafawa Balewa did not also curse persons of other tribes, who were involved in his murder.

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Although Bakare claimed he was out to break this curse laid on the Igbo by the late Tafawa Balewa, it is quite worrisome that his account is entirely different from all other known or heard accounts. His account is even different from those narrated by some of those who participated in the coup that took the life of Sir Tafawa Balewa, including that given by Adewale (1981) and Pa Olusegun Osoba, the journalist, who reported that he saw the corpse of the late Prime Minister without any bullet wound. Bakare saw no need to deliver other tribes, whose officers were also involved in the gruesome murder of the first Prime Minister. His additions are mere assumptions that typify his long conceived and internalised prejudices against the Igbo. Those prejudices are what had (un)consciously pushed out his expressed ethnic hate against the Igbo. It is possible that if he weren’t a pastor, he must have been inciting and mobilising some Northern youths for a fresh retaliation. Meanwhile, he forgot the death tolls of the Igbo to that coup. He insinuates that the death of many Igbo in that coup meant/means nothing, but only for that of Balewa. The preachment was not and is never necessary. But because it is what he had conceived and internalised, at that point in time, he could not help holding back the thought. Thus, he rather expressed it. The preachment came ahead of the Nigeria’s 2023 general elections that Igbo candidates for presidency are emerging. Obviously, with such preachment, Northerners, who have had the mind of supporting any Igbo presidential candidate, would simply decline and begin to see such a candidate from ethnic and religious angles, as an enemy coming up to rule them. Thus, apart from inciting his congregation present at the church event of the day, Pastor Bakare also succeeded in inciting the whole of the other members of the Nigerian masses against the Igbo. In the first place, he reawakened the consciousness of the lineages of the late Sir Tafawa Balewa, Muslims and other Northern Nigerian peoples to the tragic historic event with an avoidable preachment. On the other hand, for covering the role of the Northern and South-Western officers, who took part in the coup, the Igbo are bound to feel aggrieved by that act. The Igbo are reminded of having lost 30,000 Easterners in the North to the coup (Nwosu & Nwokolo, 2022). To that end, Bakare succeeded in rousing mixed feelings in Northerners and Southerners, the Igbo in particular. The implication of the foregoing case of hate speech is that religious hate speech could be borne out of ethnic or regional prejudices against a tribe or a region. Even when

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it is not borne of these prejudices, it still rouses ethnic hate and prejudices, which later produce ethnic hate speech. Similarly, a UK-based Yoruba secessionist group leader, Adeyinka Grandson, is known for repeatedly expressing hate speeches on the new media against other ethnic groups in Nigeria. That led to the 54 months jail term he got recently from a UK court for inciting racial hatred (Ezeibe, 2020; Nwosu & Nwokolo, 2022). Members of the separatist Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) are bent on expressing ethnic, religious, linguistic and political hate speeches. They practically exhibit ethnic, religious, linguistic and political hatred against peoples from Northern. Chiluwa (2012) reports that members of Biafra Online Campaign Group (BOCG) make resistance posts and comments on their platforms and customised websites against Nigerian government. The group engages in online campaigns, social criticisms and verbal attacks on Nigerian government, which all involve hate speeches. Just recently, in May, 2022, pregnant Fatima Jibrin from Adamawa and her four children along with the unborn child were all gruesomely murdered by some youths in Anambra, only because she was Hausa or a Northerner. In fact, the situation is such that almost every Easterner based in Eastern Nigeria believes that anyone from the North is Hausa or Fulani. That is also the case with most of the Northerners, who consider everyone from South-East and South-South as Igbo. Just as most NorthCentral Nigerian peoples know that South-South peoples are not Igbo, so also the South-Southerners also know that not everyone from the North is Hausa or Fulani. Obviously, the ethno-linguistic plurality in SouthSouth and North-Central is what makes the peoples of these two regions to be realistic of the fact not everyone from the North is of Hausa or Fulani origin and not everyone from Southern Nigeria is an Igbo. SouthSouth, comprising Cross River, Akwa-Ibom, Delta, Edo, Bayelsa and Rivers States, is characterised by ethno-linguistic clusters. That is also the case with North-Central (formerly Middle Belt), which has many ethnic and linguistic minorities. North-Central Nigeria comprises Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa, Plateau, Niger, Kogi, Kwara and Federal Capital Territory (FCT). On religious basis, Ima Sadiq, an Imam, had advised Muslims to vote Muhammadu Buhari rather than President Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 elections, because it is a sin for a Muslim to support and vote a non-Muslim (Ezeibe, 2020; Nwosu & Nwokolo, 2022). There is no such injunction in the Quran. Yet, he incited the Muslim faithful he could and

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thereby made them to internalise that misleading and inciting orientation. If it is a sin for a Muslim to vote for a non-Muslim, then it is or should also be a sin for a non-Muslim to support and vote for a Muslim. Regrettably, this is neither said nor done. Non-Muslims do support and vote the Muslims without such religious sentiments. That statement is that of sowing a serious division between the faithful of Islam and Christianity. Religious, ethnic and political leaders exert strong influence on their subjects. Thus, any incitement or hate speech given out by any of these sets of leaders is bound to be taken seriously by their subjects. Gradually, if not resisted, such expressed hate speech becomes a moral code with which most of the subjects get indoctrinated.

Hate Speech, a Source of Ethnic and Linguistic Intolerance The language of a people is the means of communication among them. Their worldviews, thoughts, feelings, bias, dealings, messages, etc., are all communicated through their language. Even when they use other languages to communicate whatever they do, their indigenous languages must have laid the foundation for the expression of whatever they say on daily basis. Their indigenous languages here refer to their mother tongues, immediate environment languages and Creoles. Before an individual speaks a second or a formal (an official) language, they must have first of all mastered the language(s) of their immediate environment, which could be their mother tongue or any other language they are born into or grow with. We argue that while the individual’s mind is the beginning point of hate speech, the language spoken by the individual is the means through which they express their internalised prejudices against others. The prejudices against others, which they have been internalising within them, are what they share out with others and express in the form of hate speech. Given the foregoing linguistic situation, the individual grows up being attuned to the linguistic endeavours that are inherent to the languages they are used to. The implication of the above is that linguistic plurality is one form of identity differentiation among individuals and groups. Language is used to express differences among individuals and groups. People who speak one language are usually more united than those that are not. Yet, among those who speak or use one language, those who speak the various dialects are more united with their fellows, who

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speak the same dialects with them, than with those who share the same language, but not the same dialect, with them. Having used a familiar language or dialect to internalise certain sentiments (prejudices) against others, linguistic intolerance arises among the individuals against other persons outside their linguistic enclaves. Linguistic intolerance grows and manifests hand-in-hand with ethnic intolerance. This is because people who speak a language or a dialect share a language and a dialect respectively and a tribe too. Every tribe has a language and several dialects. For example, Igbo people share the Igbo language at the macrocosm and dialects at the microcosm of their linguistic enclave. These same people are of the same ethnic group. This is also the case with Bekwarra of Upper Cross River, South-South, Nigeria. In the case of Bekwarra, geographical-political, social and educational factors and many years of distance from each other had caused Afrike, Mbube and some Utugwang dialects of Bekwarra to evolve as full-fledged languages, even though they are dialects of Bekwarra and still exhibit as well as share mutual intelligibility with Bekwarra Language till date. The examples are legion. Those mentioned above suffice for others. The central message to that end is that linguistic differences among peoples of plural linguistic and ethnic settings ground their linguistic sentiments or prejudices about and against others. We further argue that these sentiments and/or prejudices have a meeting point at both linguistic and ethnic phases, whereby the two work hand-in-hand with each other. So, the foregoing explanations give a clear insight to what gives rise to linguistic and ethnic intolerance among the sub-Saharan African peoples, as among the Nigerian peoples. Essentially, culture is the motherboard of language, religion, race, tribe or ethnicity and other forms of identity. Language is the means with which all identities are revealed, expressed and known. It is thus clear that there is an existential nexus between language, religion, tribe or ethnicity. That is why intolerance in one metamorphoses and spreads to the others, and from the two others to polity and other indigenous systems of a people. Having said the foregoing, we now turn to ethnic hate as the base of ethnic intolerance. Ethic hate rises from expressed and shared ethnic prejudices about certain ethnic groups by some members of other ethnic groups. It is the linguistic means of identity that is used to express these prejudices. Ethnic prejudices are why some peoples have and express phobia for intermarriage (Des Forges, 1999, pp. 58, 67) and certain combined, multiple or diversified ethnic activities involving different ethnic nationalities (Robert, Besong & Dibie, 2016). Such prejudices

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created, internalised, nurtured and expressed by members of the Tutsi and the Hutus ethnic groups are what had caused death of 800,000 within a few weeks (Mehler, 2006, p. 249, 256; Nwosu & Nwokolo, 2022, p. 2). The genocide left untold effects on Rwanda, as 1.8 million people became internally displaced persons and about 2.1 million Rwandans fled from the country by September 1994 (Mehler, 2006, p. 249). This study argues that political hate speeches, rooted in ethno-religious and linguistic sentiments, were some of the remote factors behind the uprising that followed the Kenyan December general elections. Language was misused in discussing, responding and reacting to matters arising from the general elections. This trend applies to the cases of general elections in various nations of the sub-Saharan Africa. Such speeches expressing prejudices against political groups by individuals and groups are what had resulted to ‘local and regional violence’ (HIIK, 2008, p. 36). Local language stations routinely called for the eviction of other ethnic groups (CIPEV, 2008, pp. 298–299). The media are affirmed to have played a negative role in the Rwanda genocide and the Kenyan post-electoral violence (PEV) in 2007/2008 (Benesch, 2008, p. 504; Des Forges, 2007, p. 45; Straus, 2007, p. 612; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2012, p. 8). Politicians and other key public office holders are affirmed to have been behind the genocide in Rwanda and the post-electoral violence in Kenya (Benesch, 2008, pp. 486, 517; Des Forges, 1999, pp. 12, 14, 47, 71, 101, 176, 178–179, 358; HIIK 2008, p. 36; Scheffler, 2015, pp. 17–19; Umati, 2013, p. 14). In particular, politicians are affirmed to incite members of their own ethnic, religious, linguistic and political groups against their opponents and their own people, as in the case of Rwanda (Straus, 2007, p. 611). They incite conflict, ethnic hate, division, genocide, disintegration, disunity, disasters and all kinds of insecurity (Mehler, 2006, p. 252; Scheffler, 2015, pp. 17–19; 32–38; Straus, 2007, p. 611). It is in view of the above that Ezeibe and Ikeanyibe (2017) say hate speech has become a political campaign strategy, which needs to be flushed out of our political system. Ethnic prejudices are underground flaming factors behind derogatory terms for other ethnic groups, which cause enmity, relegation, negative perception and remarks about the prejudiced groups. The derogatory term ‘Inyenzi’ (cockroach) is noted to have played a role in the Rwandan genocide, because it is a form of dehumanisation that ‘gained sad notoriety during the Rwandan genocide’ (Benesch, 2008, p. 505; Des Forges, 1999, pp. 191–192; Scheffler, 2015, p. 16; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2012,

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p. 8). Definitely, this term among the Hutus never went down well with the Tutsi. Ibrahim Shehu Shema, the former Governor of Katsina State, is known to have often called his political opponents ‘cockroaches’ that ought to be crushed (Ezeibe, 2020; Nwosu & Nwokolo, 2022). Robert (2017, p. 4) discusses the derogatory term ‘Udam’ used by the Tiv for the Bekwarra and their neighbours in Cross River and Akwa-Ibom and ‘Iyakuro’ used by the Yala for the Bekwarra. He explains the etymologies of these two terms, which were originally not used as derogatory terms but metonymic words. He regrets that most Tiv contemporaneous feel that the term ‘Udam’ is a derogatory term and thereby make the younger ones internalise such orientation and act negatively towards the so-called Udam people. Similarly, the Hausa call the Igbo ‘Inyamiri’, which implies ‘cunning or dubious people’. The Tiv had been given the derogatory label ‘Munchi’ by the Hausa. In fact, most Nigerian peoples have different derogatory labels for other ethnic groups. The examples are legion. In all cases, no group likes to be given or describe with a derogatory label. Be it as it may, the implication of the foregoing is that the use of derogatory labels for ethnic groups by some others contributes to causing hate speech about and against such peoples dabbed with the derogatory terms. Also, Facebook had to remove Nnamdi Kanu’s page in February 2022 because of his continuous violation of its community rule on harm and hate rule. In other words, Kanu’s page was removed on account of his regularly expressed hate speeches against other ethno-linguistic groups like Hausa. The Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (AYCF) is an ethnic group of Northern youths, which engages in hate speech and and crime. AYCF gave a public notice in June 2017 that all Igbo in the North should vacate the whole of North within three months. On gender lane, various dehumanising and degrading speeches against women across cultures are said to be gender-based hate speeches rooted in ethnic orientation that sows, breeds or allows for ethnic intolerance (Dibie et al., 2016; Robert et al., 2016). According to Dibie et al. (2016), held and expressed prejudices against groups manifest in male–female relations in society, for which patriarchal culture grounds sexist prejudices against women in society. Men with patriarchal ideologies often express and share sexist (or gender-based) hate speeches about and against women. That is, conceived or learned and internalised sexist prejudices against women are what get expressed and spread as sexist hate speeches against women, and vice versa in sometimes. Then, from gender-based hate speeches to

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gender stereotype and discrimination, the prejudices metamorphosed to gender-based violence. It should be noted that gender sentiments (that is, prejudices) are not only expressed and perpetuated by males alone against females. Females do same or even worse against males. However, the ratio is what makes the difference. More males than females engage in the act of holding, expressing and sharing sexist hatred and gender-based prejudices.

Conclusion This study demonstrates that hate speech has a significant place in the linguistic, religious and ethnic intolerance among sub-Saharan African peoples. Although this negative linguistic trend of language misuse does not apply to sub-Saharan African peoples alone, this study focuses its geographical coverage on sub-Saharan Africa alone. Still, the microcosmic coverage is focused on Nigerian peoples of this African region. The study basically argues against hate speech, unlike some studies that argue in favour of hate speech. It takes side with its like studies that frown at hate speech and demand that legislative measures be evolved and wedged against hate speech and the like trends. Although this study does not concern itself with blasphemy and the like others, it argues here that blasphemy is mythical and mystic, as what concerns sin against the divine, the Spirit, an immortal being, and so human penalties are not supposed to be enacted and executed against the defaulters. Crimes of blasphemy should be left alone by humans for the Spirit. On the whole, the study concludes that hate speech is the bane of linguistic, religious and ethnic intolerance among sub-Saharan African peoples. Therefore, it is imperative to desist from the use of divisive language that does not promote harmony and co-existence of diverse ecological compositions defining post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, which constitute linguistic, religious and ethnic groups.

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Bagga, F., & Lavery, K. (2019, December). Apostasy, blasphemy, and hate speech laws in Africa: Implications for freedom of religion or belief . United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. www.uscirf.gov Bayer, J., & Bárd, P. (2020, July). Hate speech and hate crime in the EU and the evaluation of online content regulation approaches. Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate-General for Internal Policies PE 655.135. Benesch, S. (2008). Vile crime or inalienable right: Defining incitement to genocide. Virginia Journal of International Law, 48(3), 485–528. Benesch, S. (2011). Contribution to OHCHR initiative on incitement to national, racial, or religious hatred. http://voicesthatpoison.files.wordpress. com/2012/01/beneschohchr1.pdf Cahill, M., Migacheva, K., Taylor, J., Williams, M., Burnap, P., Javed, A., Liu, H., Lu, H., & Sutherland, A. (2019). Understanding online hate speech as a motivator and predictor of hate crime. Paper (document number 304532; award number 2016-MU-MU-0009) prepared for National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. RAND Social and Economic Well-Being, retrieved April 2022. Chiluwa, I. (2012). Social media networks and the discourse of resistance: A sociolinguistic CDA of Biafra online discourses. Discourse and Society, 23(3), 217–244. Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence [CIPEV]. (2008). Kenya: Commission of inquiry into the post election violence (CIPEV) final report. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/15A00F 569813F4D549257607001F459D-Full_Report.pdf Des Forges, A. (1999). Leave none to tell the story: Genocide in Rwanda. Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme, Human Rights Watch (Ed.). http://addisvoice.com/Ethiopia%20under%20Meles/Rwanda.pdf Des Forges, A. (2007). Call to genocide: Radio in Rwanda, 1994. In A. Thompson (Ed.), The media and the Rwandan genocide (pp. 41–54). Pluto Press. Dibie, G. A., Gotau, J. T., & Robert, O. S. (2016). Socio-cultural and educational implications of ethno-religious discrimination to national integration and development. Federal University Lafia’s Faculty of Arts 2nd Annual Research Conference, 2nd–4th February. Ezeibe, C. (2020). Hate speech and election violence in Nigeria. Journal of Asian and African Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909620951208 Ezeibe, C., & Ikeanyibe, O. (2017). Ethnic politics, hate speech, and access to political power in Nigeria. Africa Today, 63(4), 65–83. Grajewski, M. (2022, March 1). BRIEFING, what think tanks are thinking: War in Ukraine. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS).

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Haupt, C. E. (2005): Regulating hate speech—Damned if you do and damned if you don’t: Lessons learned from comparing the German and U.S. approaches. Boston University International Law Journal, 23(299), 299–335. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research [HIIK]. (2008). Conflict barometer 2008. Heidelberger Institute for international Conflict Research (Ed.). http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictB arometer_2008.pdf Leiter, B. (2012, July 19). Jeremy Waldron. The harm in hate speech. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/32077-the-harm-inhate-speech/ Malik, K. (2012, April 19). Why hate speech should not be banned. Pandaemonium. http://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speechshould-not-be-banned/ Mehler, A. (2006). Der Völkermord in Ruanda. In P. Imbusch & R. Zoll (Eds.), Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Eine Einführung (pp. 249–272). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Mendel, T. (2006). Study on international standards relating to incitement to genocide or racial hatred. For the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide. http://www.concernedhistorians.org/content_files/file/TO/239. pdf Nwosu, B., & Nwokolo, N. (2022, April 18–25). A cautionary note on hate speech and violence the forthcoming 2023 general elections in Nigeria. Nextier SPD Policy Weekly, 6(9). Robert, O. S. (2017). The imperative of projecting, promoting and developing Bekwarra through ICT (Catalog No. v356513). Grin Publishers. Robert, O. S., Besong, E. N., & Dibie, G. A. (2016). Retracing our sociocultural norms/values for a better African society. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (IJHSS), 2(4). A publication of Mediterranean Publications and Research International. Scheffler, A. (2015). The inherent danger of hate speech legislation: A case study from Rwanda and Kenya on the failure of a preventative measure. Based on master’s thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies, M. L. Pelley (Ed.). fesmedia Africa, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Straus, S. (2007): What is the relationship between hate radio and violence? Rethinking Rwanda’s “Radio Machete”. http://pas.sagepub.com/content/ 35/4/609.abstract Sunstein, C. R. (2003). Free speech. In C. R. Sunstein (Ed.), Why societies need dissent (pp. 96–110). Harvard University Press. Umati. (2013): Umati: Monitoring online dangerous speech, October, 2012– January, 2013. http://research.ihub.co.ke/uploads/2013/february/136101 3008_819_929.pdf

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USHMM. (2013, September 6). Hate speech and incitement to genocide panel discussion. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqWgwIreHzM Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2012). Propaganda and conflict: Theory and evidence from the Rwandan genocide. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/dyanagi/Research/ RwandaDYD.pdf

CHAPTER 8

“We’ll Fish Out MP Mole and Punish the Person”: Language, Politics, and Culture of Deceit in Ghana’s Politics Charles Prempeh

Introduction “We will fish out MP mole and punish the person,” said a Member of Parliament (MP) for the New Patriotic Party whose fellow MP betrayed the party and voted an opposition MP as the country’s Speaker of Parliament on the night of 7 January 2021. The bitter expression of Samuel Atta Akyea, the NPP MP, was an expression of a disappointment that set Ghana’s politics on an unprecedented turn. The NPP’s disappointment brought out the issue of trust as a very important ingredient in competitive politics. This is because political party formation and public governance is about the organisation of a group of people, both kin and non-kin members who share a particular ideology of governance.

C. Prempeh (B) Research Fellow, Centre for Cultural and African Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_8

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By shared political ideology and political culture, the group compete in democratic elections, hoping to assume the control of governance. In Ghana, since independence, the quest to forestall any fragmenting of the country around ethnic and religious lines is such that since the early postcolonial era, the political elites led by Kwame Nkrumah, the country’s first president passed a law to proscribe the formation of political parties around ethnic and religious sentiments.1 This position has been upheld by the country’s 1992 Constitution that requires of politicians to ensure that their political parties have branches across the country. Not only that, the constitution demands that ministerial appointments possess cross-regional reflection. The decentralisation of the country’s governance, which has largely not worked well, is also meant to ensure that the entire nation is represented in governance.2 Despite all these measures, ethnocentrism has been a major challenge of Ghana’s partisan politics.3 The issue is also that, just like most parts of the advanced world, including America, recent research indicates that citizens’ trust for the government of Ghana has declined.4 The decline in trust also comes against the background that the virtue of trust is very critical in governance—which several scholars have observed.5 In this chapter, therefore, I build on existing literature, pulling together the nexus between language, politics, and betrayal, by looking at a broader discussion of culture of deceit and providing another perspective on trust in governance. As an interdisciplinary analysis, my goal is to discuss trust as entanglement of various segment of society, such as the human being as a social being, the human quest for liberty, and the state as a sociocultural construct. My argument, therefore, is that it is trust that mediates between the human quest for liberty and gregariousness in an embodied state—the two of which needs to be balanced, else an extreme skew to either direction leads to a betrayal of trust. Through trust, routed in the promise as performance of language, the ruled could pre-empt the possibility of betrayal in governance. So, my chapter maintains that to understand the political culture of deceit in postcolonial Ghana, one 1 Gocking (2005). 2 Essuman and Akyeampong (2011). 3 Arthur (2009). 4 Bob-Milliar and Lauterbach (2021) 5 Lewis and Weigert (2012) and Helliwell et al. (2014).

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must understand the philosophical foundation of promise in governance, which Friedrich Nietzsche in his On the genealogy of morality and Hannah Arendt in her The human condition identified as foundation to trust.6 The point, therefore, is also about how the political parties and, by extension, the nation would bridge the various segment of the country to advance human flourishing. In this chapter, therefore, I leveraged my analysis of extant literature and online news items to discuss the trajectories of betrayal in Ghana’s politics. The chapter is structured in three main sections. The first section discusses the history of the politics of betrayal, arguing primarily that the phenomenon is not new in Ghana’s politics. The next discusses the recent case of political betrayal and deceit, focusing on the country’s election of an opposition MP as Speaker of Parliament, which is rather unprecedented in Ghana’s duo-political system since the country’s re-democratisation in 1992. The shock that the leaders of the two political parties and their sympathisers expressed indexed the criticality of trust in public governance. The last section discusses trust as a political capital, indicating the various straddles that could impede its practice in Ghana’s politics. The last section also reflects on how language serves as the channel for the articulation of deceit in politics. Often language is used in a manner that blurs and even confuses the unsuspecting public about the extent of deceit in politics. I reflect on language because the politics of deceit thrives on how politicians use the language of deceit to foster cognitive control and shift attention of the public from the truth.7 The nexus is because language and politics also stem from the general use of language in politics to incite, inflame, heal, and unite a nation.8 I conclude by reflecting on how Ghana’s politics can bridge gaps, away from political deceit, to foster human flourishing. My contribution to the analysis on trust is that I put the virtue in an interdisciplinary context, indicating how history and other disciplines such as sociology and religion, other than just political studies, provide an insight into the political culture of deceit and betrayal.

6 Nietzsche (2006) and Arendt (1958). 7 Sarzynska-Wawer et al. (2023). 8 Mavengano et al. (2022).

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Ghana’s Politics of Betrayal in Context As I have stated above, the issue of political betrayal and deceit is not new in Ghana’s politics. First, colonial politics, which formed the basis of postcolonial governance in Ghana, was predicated on the deceit of divide and rule, using religion, violence and legislation.9 Second, J. B. Danquah, one of Ghana’s foremost nationalists felt betrayed by Kwame Nkrumah. Upon independence, Nkrumah’s application of draconian laws such as the Preventive Detention Act of 1958, allowed for the president to arrest and detain opponents without trial.10 It was this law that Nkrumah used to arrest and detain Danquah, who eventually died in prison. In his letter to Nkrumah, expressing how much he felt betrayed, Danquah was, inter alia: You will recall that when in 1948 we were arrested by the British Government and sent to the North for detention they treated us as gentlemen, and not as galley slaves, and provided each of us with a furnished bungalow (two or three rooms) with a garden, together with opportunity for reading and writing. In fact, I took with me my typewriter and papers for the purpose, and Ako Adjei also did the same, and there was ample opportunity for correspondence. Here, at Nsawam, for the four months of my detention up to date (8th January to 9th May 1964), I have not been allowed access to any books and papers, except the Bible, and although I was told in January that my application to write a letter to my wife, Mrs. Elizabeth Danquah, could be considered if I addressed a letter to the Minister of the Interior, through the Director of Prisons, I have not, for over three months, since I wrote to the Minister as directed on the 31st January, 1964, received any reply, not even a common acknowledgement from the Minister as to whether I should be allowed to write to my wife or not. As I had no opportunity to make any financial provision for my wife and children at the time of my arrest, this delay in the Minister’s reply has made it impossible for me to contribute to the progress and maintenance of my wife and also for the education of my children as is my duty to the nation.11

9 Owusu (2020) and Boahen (1985). 10 Gocking (2005). 11 Ashigbey (2021).

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He added as follows: I confidently assure you, Sir, that when my representations reach you, it will be realized that my contribution in the said period of “recent months” to the intellectual and cultural achievement of the country was such that what should have been sent to me on January 8, 1964, was not a hostile invasion of my home and family, like enemy territory, together with my arrest and detention, but rather a delegation of Ghanaian civil officials and other dignitaries to offer me the congratulations of the nation and the thanks of the Government for my inestimable and distinguished contribution to the higher achievements of our great nation. This, however, was not to be, and I find myself locked up at Nsawam Prison in a cell of about six by nine feet, without a writing or reading desk, without a dining table, without a bed, or a chair or any form of seat, and compelled to eat my food squatting on the same floor where two blankets and a cover are spread for me on the hard cement to sleep on, and where a latrine pan (piss pot) without a closet, and a water jug and a cup without a locker, are all assembled in that narrow space for my use like a galley slave.12

Nkrumah, just like the colonial regime, pragmatically deployed religion and legislation to gag freedom of expression and imprisonment of political dissenters.13 Meanwhile, while he persuaded the people of the Gold Coast that independence would birth the political kingdom of prosperity, some of his Ministers, including Krobo Adusei, were accused of massive corruption.14 Ghana’s novelist, Ayi Kwei Armah, dramatised Ghanaians’ sense of Nkrumah’s betrayal in his political novel, The beautyful ones are not yet born.15 Critiquing Nkrumah of having betrayed his promise to the marginalised, the so-called Veranda boys with whom Nkrumah formed his CPP party, Armah wrote as follows: “Yes. Life gets hard when veranda boys are building palaces in a matter of months.”16 As part of his political propaganda against J. B. Danquah and the elites before him, including Arko Adjei who invited Nkrumah to Ghana to participate in the struggle

12 Ashigbey (2021). 13 Omari (1970). 14 Gocking (2005). 15 Armah (1969). 16 Armah (1969, p. 109).

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against politics, Nkrumah profiled himself and the young as Veranda boys to spite Danquah’s political class.17 Nkrumah also felt betrayed by Ghanaians when he was overthrown in 1966. In his Dark days in Ghana, which Nkrumah wrote in 1968 when serving as Ahmed Sékou Touré’s co-president in Guinea, he rebutted all charges of corruption raised against him.18 When on 13 January 1972, a group of military men overthrew K. A. Busia, the civilian governor after Nkrumah, Nkrumah wrote to Busia. Much as Nkrumah’s regime forced Busia into exile, Nkrumah saw Busia’s service to the nation while an opposition leader as an index of a traitor. So, upon his overthrow, Nkrumah who felt Busia betrayed him and the Ghanaian cause wrote a letter to Busia, stating, inter alia, I am sure that you now realize that those who criticise other people without bothering to assign good reasons for their criticisms eventually end up as victims of their own circumstances.19

Political betrayal is, therefore, not new in Ghana. But the recent one which occurred on 7 January 2021 was quite unprecedented. So, I dedicate the next section to that.

Political Culture of Deceit in Ghana in Ghana’s Recent “Hung” Parliament On 8 January 2021, Ghana’s political journey took a major unprecedented turn, since the country’s re-democratisation in 1992. Since 1992, when both local and international pressure and most likely personal reasons compelled Jerry John Rawlings, Ghana’s former military and later civil president to re-democratise after a decade of military rule, political power has alternated between two political parties.20 The two political parties, Rawlings’ National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), have alternatively ruled Ghana, giving the

17 Bob-Milliar (2014). 18 Nkrumah (1968). 19 Nkrumah (1972, p. 23). 20 Agomor (2019).

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country a duo-political legislative culture.21 This leaves the other minor political parties, including Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP), with almost no material possibility of ever coming back to power, since Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966. The duo-political culture is a form of winner-takes-all politics where the ruling party rules over the three main arms of government, namely the Executive, Judiciary, and Legislature— often reflecting the politics of tyranny of majority.22 This implies that since 1992, whenever the NDC or the NPP takes over power, they exercise absolute control over all the arms. The president would elect his Ministers and propose someone for the position of the Speaker of the Legislature (Parliament) and the Chief Justice (head of the Judiciary)— which has complicated the role of the Council of State as a consultative authority, whose head is also determined by the president.23 To be sure, all the nominees of the president are subject to parliamentary approval, since the House is expected to work as the representative of Ghanaians. Nevertheless, because the ruling party often has the majority parliamentarians, it is also always the case, at least since 1992, that the nominees of the president are vetted and approved, according to majority vote of the president’s parliamentarians. Since 1992, the margin of representation between the ruling party’s parliamentarians and that of the opposition has been significant, such that even if there is any defection in voting to decide on government’s business, no significance is recorded. Nevertheless, all this changed during the 2020 elections. Ghana’s 7 December 2020 presidential and parliamentary elections were not like anything the country had witnessed since 1992. The difference between the 2020 elections and the previous was the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. The outbreak of the pandemic in Ghana on March 2020 negatively impacted the country’s economy. Like the rest of the world, Ghana’s economy suffered major disruption as a result of the pandemic and its controversial lockdown rules.24 By December 2020, Ghana’s economy was already taking a nosedive—bringing hardship to several Ghanaians whose livelihood was hardly any better before the Covid-19. Consequently, much as the government of Ghana, under the NPP, touted

21 Agomor (2019) and Gyampo (2015a). 22 Gyampo (2017). 23 Gyampo (2015b). 24 Aduhene and Osei-Assibey (2021).

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their achievement, particularly their introduction of a free secondary school education for all Ghanaians, the overwhelming and metastasising impact of the pandemic cast a bleak on the possibility of the NPP retaining power. The difficulty the NPP had in retaining power as the country went into the December 2020 elections was also because of two other reasons. First, a group of young men and women had leveraged the impact of the pandemic to launch both local and trans-local online movement called #FixTheCountry to call the political elites to as it were #FixTheCountry. The hashtag, #FixTheCountry, among others demanded a constitutional reform to strip the president of excessive power. Charging the country’s 1992 Constitution that was expected to “set Ghana on the rails for shared prosperity, liberation and true democracy … that abuse of power, corruption, inequality and immoral elite politics will give way to freedom! Nearly 30 years on; those dreams have remained still born.”25 The group concluded, based on the above aspirations that: The Constitution has failed in its assumptions and in its design. It has become the most prominent face of a Republic that has entrenched vile corruption; institutional disregard for Ghanaian lives; human right abuses; and economic exclusion. Its provisions have been instrumentalized to shield immorality and provide immunity for the corruption of a decrepit political class. Its ethos has been infested with greed, inhumanity and criminal insensitivity.26

With the #FixTheCountry Movement pursuing an agenda of constitutional reform that several Ghanaians readily identified, the Movement garnered massive support in Ghana and globally, indexed by street protests at different levels of intensity in Ghana and some countries in Europe, including Germany.27 The NPP government was becoming unpopular as a result of both the local and international demonstrations. Not only that, the NPP was involved in incidents that a section of the public read as scandals. The first was the party’s violation of its own imposed lockdown rules to hold a massive open-air funeral for its 25 Vote of no confidence in the 1992 Constitution, https://fixthecountrygh.com/pet ition/new-constitution-for-a-new-generation/. 26 Ibid. 27 Ghanaweb (2021e).

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deceased former party General Secretary, Kwadwo Owusu Afriyie, who was also the CEO of the country’s Forest Commission.28 The second was an alleged spiteful ethnocentric comment that one of the party’s stalwart Member of Parliament for Adansi Asokwa, Kobina Tahir Hammond made about the Ewe of the Volta Region of Ghana.29 Already, since the 1990s, a group of ethnic nationalists, who called themselves as the Homeland Study Group—founded in 2017—have been seeking to lead the secession of the Volta Region from Ghana.30 As it is very typical of most competitive democratic constituencies, the opposition NDC leveraged the two cases for political capital. The NDC harped the issue to the point of resonating with several Ghanaians for two reasons. First, funerals are important for Ghanaians, for both commercial and socio-religious reasons. Several Ghanaians, particularly the Akan ethnic group, have deeply commercialised funeral such that it is a source of money-making for the bereaved families. Since the 1990s, efforts by the Asantehene to ban what is often referred to as ostentatious funerals have hardly made any impact, since the Asantehene’s social contract with the Asante hardly includes determining something as personal to families and individuals. The second reason, the Akan cherish funeral for the role it plays in making the ultimate transition of the deceased from the material world to the world of the ancestors—giving rise to the idea of closure.31 So, without closure, burial with all the attending funeral rites, the deceased is believed to potentially wreak havoc on the living. For all this reason, funeral is a sociogenic practice, by which reason the number of attendees is a mark of success and source of pride for the deceased family. Consequently, some Akan people in the Eastern Region had to suspend the burial of their deceased relatives during the state’s ban on funerals. Even when the ban on social distancing rules was limited in April 2020, the limitation of funeral participation to only 30 people still meant that several families had to delay the burial of late relatives. The situation was so serious with mortuaries getting full with all the health implication that the Okyenehene, Osagyefo Amoatia Ofori Panin II, ordered the people

28 Gyimah (2021). 29 Ghanaweb (2020a). 30 Adotey (2022). 31 Parker (2021).

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in his constituency in Akyem Abuakwa in the Eastern Region of Ghana to retrieve and inter their deceased relatives within a month.32 The scourge of ethnocentrism continues to undermine Ghana’s governance and also index the fact that the modern state is a socio-cultural construct. During the pandemic, Ghanaian citizens living on the frontiers of the national borders and itinerant transnational traders were negatively affected.33 As part of the continuing legacies of colonial partition of Africa, the Ewe and other ethnic groups, including the Akan and Mossi, are divided across national boundaries and continue to move across boundaries to interact. These groups continue to participate in the sociogenic activities with their counterparts across borders. In the Volta Region, as my research visit a few years ago indicated, there are Ewe people who work in Ghana and yet sleep in Togo; there are also Ewe women in Togo married to Ghanaian Ewe men in Ghana who spend the night at husband’s home, but continue to work in Togo. The same is possibly true of the other groups, where the Mossi in Ghana continue to interact with the Mossi in Burkina Faso; and the Akan in Ghana, particularly the Aduana group, doing the same with their counterparts in the Côte d’Ivoire. For this transnational citizenship, the biometric method of constructing and affirming citizenship which has been part of Ghana’s political regime since the late 1990s has politicised citizenship. Through the biometric system, it is now easier for government to police the bodies of migrants who move across national borders. The case of the Ewe is rather highly contentious. Considering that Rawlings, the founder of the NDC had a parent from Ewe, the perception in Ghana is that the majority of the Ewe, largely in the Volta Region of the country, are sympathisers of the NDC. It is, therefore, assumed in public discourse that voter registration exercise towards general elections, the citizenship border and cross-border citizens are politicised.34 The NPP, historically tracing its roots to the United Party of K. A. Busia,35 already has bad reputation with migration issues. For example, in 1968, the UP embarked on an immigration policy, known as Alien

32 Ghanaweb (2022b). 33 Hlovor and Botchway (2021). 34 Addotey (2023). 35 Fordwor (2010).

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Compliance Order in 1968 that resulted in several migrants leaving the country.36 Since 1992, the NDC had often leveraged that against the NPP. So, the charge against K. T. Hammond was quite unnerving to the NPP, especially at the heat of the 2020 election; coming against the fact that Ghana has a record of incumbent party often declining in vote—even when they win—whenever it goes into elections to seek a second term. For reasons including the above, the opposition and several other Ghanaians accused the NPP of having betrayed the trust Ghanaians reposed in them.37 Compounding all this, during the NPP’s parliamentary primaries, the party antagonised some of its Members of Parliament who were seeking re-election. The result was defection of the party’s MP for Fomena Constituency who had entered the country’s parliament in 2016, to contest as an independent candidate and winning as an independent candidate.38 Unfortunately, for the NPP, several of their MPs lost their seats to the NDC. The result was that the parliamentary vote was equally split between the two parties with each getting 137 seats in parliament—creating an unprecedented scenario of a hung parliament since the country’s 1992 re-democratisation.39 The “hung” parliament posed a major challenge for a country with a long history of winner-takes-all politics. Given an evenly split parliament, every government’s nominee has become a matter of intense political manoeuvring and negotiations among parliamentarians. The Ghana-Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) conducted a survey that indicated that Ghanaians are divided over the country’s split parliament. But several Ghanaians think the situation in parliament is good for the country’s democratic experiment, as it will make government and MPS more responsible to their constituencies.40 The NPP, however, who are in government, represented by Mr Joseph Osei-Owusu, are rather worried about the current state of the country’s parliament, as the rancour in parliament burdens government business—rendering parliament less

36 Peil (1971). 37 Ghanaweb (2021d). 38 Ghanaweb (2020b). 39 2020 Parliamentary Results, https://ec.gov.gh/2020-presidential-election-results/

2020-parliamentary-results/. 40 Ghana-Centre for Democratic Development (2022).

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effective in terms of the passage of laws as compared to the previous parliament.41 That the hung parliament is generally impacting negatively on government business in parliament means more than just the suggestion by Mr Osei-Owusu who is also the First Deputy Speaker of Parliament. The issue is more about the importance of the role of trust, the betrayal of which undermines efficiency in governance. It is against the issue of mistrust in government that the hung parliament has become a nightmare to the ruling party, even though its former MP, Andrew Asiamah who went independent, realigns with the party during voting and also serves as the country’s Second Deputy Speaker of Parliament. The problem of trust also centres on the unprecedented political practice where an NDC opposition Member of Parliament, Alban Kingsford Sumana Bagbin, was on the night of 7 January 2021 voted as the country’s Speaker of Parliament. He secured 138 votes against the NPP’s Prof. Mike Oquaye who had 137.42 This came against the background that the NPP had an advantage of an independent parliamentarian and an already serving Speaker of Parliament, Prof. Aaron Mike Oquaye, who had been re-nominated by the president to serve for the second term. The election of the Speaker of Parliament was hotly contested and also marked by violence—including exchange of blows among some parliamentarians and snatching of ballot boxes, as none of the parties was certain of victory. The chaotic situation in parliament was such that the military had to step in to quell a potential spill-over of party election violence into national violence.43 Beginning from midnight of Wednesday 7 January 2021, Ghanaians waited with bated breath until the elections ended around 9:00 am, Thursday 7 January 2021. The declaration of Mr Bagbin as Speaker of Parliament rather set the camp of the two political parties on different pathways—the NDC celebrated the victory as a mark of their capacity to negotiate across party. While the NPP berated themselves as having betrayed the party. It was against that state of defeat that the NPP’s MP for Abuakwa South Constituency, Mr Samuel Atta Akyea, indicated that

41 Ghanaweb (2023a). 42 Nyabor (2021). 43 Ghanaweb (2021c).

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the NPP “will fish out the mole who voted against the NPP’s nominee for the Speaker of Parliament position.”44 Several analysts, including the country’s famous pollster, Ben Ephson, have rationalised the election of Mr Bagbin, rather than Mike Oquaye, as a result of the character of fairness and firmness which the former has exhibited over his seven-term period in parliament as an MP and as a Second Deputy Speaker at some point.45 Meanwhile, to the NPP, the whole election process, which also was encumbered with violence, including some MPs snatching ballot boxes and exchanging blows, indexed a mark of betrayal on the part of the MP who voted against the party’s nominee. Since the election of an NDC MP as Speaker of Parliament, the NDC has also experienced a major case of betrayal with some of their MPs voting for Ministerial nominees of the NPP. In March 2023, some MPs of the NDC, against party’s wishes, voted for four ministerial nominees of the NPP’s government. These nominees included Mr K. T. Hammond (had 18 NDC votes), as Minister for Trade and Industry, Bryan Acheampong (had 31 NDC votes) as Minister of Food and Agriculture, Stephen Asamoah Boateng (had 11 NDC votes) as Minister of Religious Affairs and Chieftaincy, Mohammed Amin Adams (had 16 NDC votes) as Minister of State at the Ministry of Finance, Osei Bonsu Amoah as Minister for Local Government and Rural Development, and Stephen Amoah (had 10 NDC votes) as Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry.46 In the case of the NDC, too, its members, including former President John Dramani Mahama, slammed the party’s MPs for “betraying NDC supporters and Ghanaians over their selfish interest.”47 Peeved by what she also considered as a historical betrayal of the NDC party, Dr Zanetor Agyeman-Rawlings, NDC MP for Klottey Korle in Accra, said as follows: On Friday night, I felt this deep pain that maybe it was perhaps better that he (JJ Rawlings) was not alive to witness what had happened to the NDC. But then again, I thought perhaps had he been alive he would probably

44 Ghanaweb (2021b). 45 Ghanaweb (2021a). 46 Ghanaweb (2023d). 47 Ghanaweb (2023d).

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have challenged all of us to go and swear on Antoa or dare to take a lie-detector test!48

Trust and Political Culture of Deceit I have already stated that in public governance, trust is the valve around which political community is established. The issue of trust is such that the public sphere is expected to be neutral in providing space for everyone.49 Meanwhile, the public sphere as neutral or secular is far ideal than a social fact. As a social fact, the public sphere is a domain for both economic and political activities, both of which involve competition. The competition in the public sphere is also such that even sports that is usually expected to entertain readily generates conflict, once the focus shifts from entertainment to competition. In all this, there is a need for an umpire in the governance of the public sphere. The issue is even more complicated when measured against two contradictory aspects of human beings—the human quest for liberty and gregariousness. Sociologists have long established that human beings are social beings who gesture towards gregarious, fostered and sociogenic activities.50 Through such participation in sociogenic activities, human beings make sense of their world. Meanwhile, individuals are not just social beings, they have self-interests that could run into conflict with other interests. For this reason, since the Christian Reformation of the sixteenth century, which broke ecclesiastical power, the birth of the modern state came with the idea of freedom from the individual.51 Leading Europe into its modernity, the Christian Reformation of the sixteenth century, provided layers of intellectual discussion around public governance and individual governance. All this giving rise to the idea of social contract, developed by European social scientists—primarily, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, all concerned with two issues of relevance for public governance: the nature of human beings and the condition of the state of nature.52 Hobbes disagreed 48 Ghanaweb (2023c). 49 Habermas (1992). 50 Berger (1967). 51 Merriman (2010). 52 For detailed discussion, see Nelson (1996).

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with Locke and Rousseau over the human nature, arguing that human beings are ontologically selfish and the state of nature completely lawless. The other two rather read the human condition and the state of nature differently. They argued that the state of nature has virtue while human beings are not ontologically self-centred. Nevertheless, they all agreed that competing interest which could mar public governance needs to be structured. The result was the idea of social contract, which is about the formulation of laws to govern power and its use in public governance. Consequently, since the eighteenth century, the issue of power and trust has dominated political philosophy and theories. In precolonial societies, including the Akan, the issue of power and governance was also acted more than theorised. So, the Asantehene, for example, was hardly a dictator as his exercise of power was constricted by the council of elders, made of the various heads that constituted the Asante Kingdom.53 Unlike a written document or constitution, as in the case of European social contract, religion was explicitly deployed to index the nexus between the material and the metaphysical worlds for order. For all these reasons, governance of the public is about liberty and power or order. How could the public be governed on a balanced keel between liberty and power? Lack of a careful balance results in the betrayal of trust and politics of deceit. Meanwhile, the fact of individual selfinterest has long been recognised by social scientists and biologists such as Adam Smith and Charles Darwin, respectively, who considered selfinterest as the base of human survival. In indigenous cultures in Africa, the tension has often been between the ideas of communalism and individual subjectivity—which was contested between Kwame Gyekye and Michael Onybuchi Eze. Gyekye argues for the idea of communalism, while Eze argues for the individual as a constitutive member of society.54 Whatever it is, the individuals who constitute the modern state are individuals with layers of kinship and non-kinship ties. They are, therefore, individuals with multiple layers of loyalties to family, faith (religious persuasion), and friends—out of one or more combination these are leveraged for political party formation. But, as I said, because Ghana’s Constitution requires political parties to have their reach beyond religion, ethnic and regional divide, political parties would have the task of

53 Busia (1951). 54 Gyekye (1992) and Eze (2008).

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convincing individual members with competing loyalties to yield to party whip in governance, especially in parliament. The above as context means that we can appreciate what may come across to many Ghanaians as grant betrayal and politics of deceit when Mr Bagbin was elected as the 8th Speaker of Parliament as part of governance. The question in the public was why the betrayal? Why did an MP of the NPP vote for Mr Bagbin? The same question went to the NDC MPs who voted and approved the nominees of the NPP government. The answer to all these questions is simply that: we have deliberately, through socialisation and education, accepted a deliberately constructed illusion to keep us together as a people. Ghanaians have accepted the emblems of state as shared illusion—albeit deliberately created—to help us mimic the family. The shared illusion did not come from anything rational, but rather religion or if you like faith. Citizens have invested faith, not rationality into the emblems of state to make it possible for us to co-interact as one people. Transposing the above argument to politics in Ghana, proving that the state is not real and that it is younger than the family, let us take just two main recent cases. The first one was the election of the current Speaker of Ghana’s Parliament, Hon. Alban Sumana Kingsford Bagbin. Born on 24 September 1957 at Sombo in the Upper West Region of Ghana. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree in Law and English at the University of Ghana in 1980. He proceeded to the Ghana School of Law at Makola in Accra after which he was called to the bar in 1982.55 He also holds an Executive Masters in Governance and Leadership from the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA), established in 1961 to originally train public servants with administrative and professional competence.56 He has accumulated expansive working experiences. From 1980 to 1982, he worked at the Bureau of Statistics and Statistical Service as the acting Secretary to the Statistical Service Board, while between 1982 and 1983, he worked as Personal Manager of the erstwhile State Hotels Corporation (Ambassador/Continental Hotels) before travelling to Libya to teach English at the Suk Juma Secondary School in Tripoli. He returned to Ghana in 1986 and joined the Akyem Chambers, a firm of legal practitioners, consultants, and notaries public, as a

55 Honorable Alban Bagbin, https://ar.ug.edu.gh/honorable-alban-bagbin. 56 History of GIMPA, https://www.gimpa.edu.gh/about/history-of-gimpa/.

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partner. He served as an external solicitor of the Credit Unions Association of Ghana (CUA), Nii Ngleshie family of James Town, and a number of private business firms in Accra from 1989 to1992. From 1993 to date, Mr Bagbin has been a partner of the Law Trust Company, a firm of legal practitioners, consultants, and notaries public.57 Mr Bagbin has been the National Democratic Congress (NDC) Member of Parliament since 1994 who rose to the rank of Majority Leader for the House. Since joining parliament, he has served in different offices. In the first Parliament of the Fourth Republic, which came into effect in 1992, he was made the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Subsidiary Legislation and Vice Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Mines and Energy, as well as Member of Committee on Local Government and Rural Development. From 1995 to date, Hon Bagbin has been a member of a group known as Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) and a member of the International Law and Human Rights Programme of the PGA. From 1996 to 2001, he was appointed Chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Restructuring of the Water Sector (Ministry of Works and Housing) while between 1997 and 2001, he was a member of the National Media Commission. In the Second Parliament of the Fourth Republic, Mr Bagbin was the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs with oversight responsibilities for the Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Electoral Commission, National Commission on Civic Education, Office of Parliament and Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs. He was the chairman of the Public Accounts Committee from 2001 to 2005. He was also the Vice Chairman of the Appointments Committee of Parliament. Alban Bagbin was the Second Deputy Speaker in the 7th Parliament.58 He was nominated to the office of the Minister for Water Resource, Works and Housing by H. E. Professor John Evans Atta Mills following a Cabinet Reshuffle in January 2010 and subsequently appointed Minister of Health.59 To be sure, Bagbin is an important national figure to make a point that the state is an imagined construct. Coming from an opposition party, the NDC, to contest and win against a sitting Speaker of Parliament, Mike Oquaye (whose New Patriotic Party had been re-elected to

57 Boakye (2021). 58 Boakye (2021). 59 Boakye (2021).

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lead the nation), Bagbin’s election was read and interpreted differently. Several of the NPP MPs and their supporters threw counter-accusations among themselves for having betrayed the nation, given that in a hung parliament, they had the benefit of the vote of sympathiser independent MP, Hon Isaac Kwame Asiamah, MP for Atwima Mponua Constituency of the Asante Region, who himself was/is a member of the NPP. As I have stated, the election of Bagbin came across to the NPP and several of their supporters as a shock; while for the NDC, it was part of their capacity to leverage their diplomatic skills. For some political scientists, the election of Bagbin was an indication of Ghana’s favourable giant step in its democratic experiment. But must we be surprised? Responding to this question explains why I have taken you through a long and winding detour about a brief biography of Bagbin. Thus, let me now tease out the importance of what I have done—again, arguing that the state is a social and cultural construct. First, Bagbin has lived long enough to have established friendship locally and trans-locally across the various divides of life—religion, politics, profession. So, certainly, he is not just a member of the NDC; he is both a social being with social ties. This means that people from all walks of life will relate to him from different perspectives, based on what they consider very important. He is a Catholic, so members of the Catholic faith, across the political divide, would most likely prefer Bagbin for an important national position. It is, therefore, possible for a Catholic in the New Patriotic Party to vote for Bagbin. Again, if an NPP MP came from Bagbin’s hometown or region, chances are that, given the office he would occupy, such an MP would vote for Bagbin. Also, if an NPP MP is an alumnus of the University of Ghana, that MP may vote for Bagbin. If an NPP MP ever had an important help from Bagbin, such an MP may vote for Bagbin. Bagbin is also noted for his strong moral stance on some issues, such as corruption and same-sex issues. For this reason, an NPP MP who ideologically identifies with Bagbin may vote for him. In all this, I sum up three things that may have gone in favour of Bagbin’s redefining of Ghana’s political history: Faith, family, and Friends—which I call 3Fs. These three factors can hardly succumb to political party whip to influence vote in a particular direction of a political party. All this is also because, human beings have complex alliances with political party hardly coming into the equation as the most important. As far as I can tell, for several Ghanaians sharing common faith in the same God, sharing the same family and ancestral history (even if imagined) and being friends may ultimately trounce political party—which like the state

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is secondary to all the three factors. The same 3Fs may help establish a political party, but once a political party takes a national and transnational coloration, cleavages within the party would be formed to fragment the political party based on the same 3Fs. The same principle, as I have espoused above, could be used to explain the controversial parliamentary approval to Nana Addo Dankwa AkufoAddo’s appointment of six ministerial nominees, K. T. Hammond as Minister for Trade and Industry, Bryan Acheampong as Minister of Food and Agriculture, Stephen Asamoah Boateng, as Minister of Religious Affairs and Chieftaincy, Mohammed Amin Adams as Minister of Local Government and Rural Development, and Stephen Amoah as Deputy Minister of Trade.60 The irony of politics is that, the NDC is also accusing a section of its MPs for having betrayed the party. But without going into yet another analysis, I conclude that a betrayal of a political party would pale in significance when MPs look at the 3Fs that I have discussed above—they all index the fact that the state, with the political party as a unit, is simply of less significance when it comes to the ultimate loyalty of citizens.

Language and Politics of Deceit The discussion also brings out the interface between language and politics, which as observed by Ansah is based on the cognitive endowments of the human mind rather than social practice. Language, therefore, plays an important role in politics61 Language is used in politics to persuade, foster coercion, legitimise and delegitimise a political action.62 There is also a direct link between language and trust. As observed by Chilton, as social beings who tend to identify with other people, language is necessary for knitting people together and group solidarity is sustained if “one can trust people’s communication about what is ‘useful’ and ‘harmful’.”63 So, understanding the cognitive use of language, one, therefore, deploys language to deceive and dominate. Politicians also use language to trigger emotional exertion from their audience to excite fear and guilt

60 Ghanaweb (2023b). 61 Ansah (2017). 62 Chilton (2004). 63 Chilton (2004, p. 200).

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and also shift attention from themselves as complicit in a negative political action.64 Leveraging the above theoretical background, I discuss the content of language of deceit in Ghana’s hung parliament. As part of his emotional discharge against a perceived party mole who may have voted for Mr Bagbin, Mr Atta Akyea is reported to have stated to the media as follows: See when I say I’m for the New Patriotic Party and the course of the New Patriotic Party I might disagree but so long as that’s what the party’s pleasure is, he should toe the line. That is how you are counted as one of us. What you’ve done is that you have empowered the people on the other side and if he’s so found, I’m of the humble view that he should be punished.65

The above statement appeals to the emotions of the NPP sympathisers, but it brings out the complex entanglement between trust and freedom. From Mr Akyea’s assertion that the MP should have toed party line, he did not answer the question of whether such an action is borne out of trust. By emphasising party loyalty, he obscured the important context of trust and freedom under which human society works. Individuals must have the freedom to act, both according to their conscience and also societal norms, which I have said may be informed by the complex web of relational ties. So, for the NPP to expect the perceived mole to have simply followed the path of loyalty, against conscience and liberty of the individual undermines the importance of trust in politics. Perhaps, the NPP could have found out about the promises made to their MPs that informed one of them to have voted against Prof. Mike Oquaye. Could it have also been that the MP was rather more concerned about the efficiency of Ghana’s Parliament in advancing human flourishing, given that Prof Oquaye is rumoured to have lost his efficiency as a result of old age? For example, the current NPP-majority leader of parliament, Mr Osei Kyei-Mensah Bonsu, disclosed in an interview with JoyNews that some NPP members had already decided to vote against Prof Oquaye for reasons, inter alia, Oquaye’s declining health.66 Given that, was Mr Akyea

64 Zuckerman et al. (1981). 65 Ghanaweb (2021b). 66 Ghanaweb (2022a).

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expecting party loyalty to supersede the efficiency of Ghana’s Parliament in carrying out the function of governance? Similarly, Dr Zenator Rawlings’ assertion that his father would have possibly challenged the NDC’s MPs to appear before Antoa to prove their innocence or otherwise could be read as deceitful. First, Ghana’s former President Rawlings’ government was accused by several Ghanaians for several infractions, including corruption and human rights violations.67 A founding member of the NDC, Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings (both wife of Rawlings and mother of Dr Zenator), defected from the NDC and founded her own political party, and has been accused by some NDC sympathisers as having betrayed the party.68 The other issue is that appealing to Antoa has not materially impacted Ghana’s fight against corruption or enhanced the country’s economic prospects. Much as research over the years have admitted that some Ghanaian politicians appeal to the metaphysical, there has not been an instance where Antoa has empirically and materially proven efficient in Ghana’s governance. Also, knowing that issues of the metaphysical are very subjective and hardly admissible in Ghana’s legal jurisdiction, could one read Dr Zenator’s statement as an emotional discharge to rather blur the complexity of political alliances? We could similarly deploy the political and rhetorical use of language to understand the politics of deceit in colonial and early postcolonial Ghana. For example, the colonial administrators deployed the language of rumour against a few Asantehene for their involvement in human sacrifices as part of mobilising Gold Coast sentiment against the Asante Kingdom.69 Also, Danquah’s appeal to the imagined benign colonial administrator obscured the overwhelming negative impact of the colonial administration on the Gold Coast masses. Danquah did not also appreciate the fact that Nkrumah felt betrayed because he thought Danquah was among those who worked against his inclusion in the Watson and Coussey Committee that drafted a new constitution for the emerging postcolonial state.70 Similarly, Nkrumah’s satirical consolation of K. A. Busia blurred the fact that the coup against him was informed by

67 Haynes (2023). 68 Ghanaweb (2011). 69 Akurang-Parry (2021). 70 Rahman (2007).

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what majority of Ghanaians read as a solution to his dictatorial regime, economic mismanagement and arbitrary detention and imprisonment of political dissenters.71 All this points out how politicians use language and rhetoric to foster lies and deceit. Through communication, politicians obscure the importance of competence over convenience in governance—a situation that has situated politics in the cog of betrayals and counter-betrayal. But more importantly, the discussion here brings out the role of language in the performance of politics. Through language, politicians perform politics to their advantage, obscuring facts and truth from the governed. It also demonstrates the performative role of promise as a possible channel of pre-empting the politics of deceit that has characterised politics in Ghana. I take up this issue in my concluding reflection below.

Concluding Thought: Betrayal and Promise The discussion has unveiled the issue of trust and its complications in public governance—all indexing the entanglement between politics, language and betrayal in Ghana. I have highlighted, however, that because the state is a social construct that exists largely in the socialised minds of citizens, trust in governance needs to be properly governed. The question, then, is how to govern people of varying interest without compromising both liberty and order. It is here that I make recourse to Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt. These two individuals were critical social scientists who were concerned about, inter alia, public governance— focusing on law and liberty. In their analysis, they both identified making of promises as critical in the retention of trust in governance. It is through promise that leaders bind themselves to keeping the balance between individual’s liberty and order. This is also important because the governance of the modern state is about managing competing interests; it is about individuals whose interest morph into the construction of the state. In the case of Ghana, the president and the various apparatuses of Ghana are to protect the interests of citizens, for which reasons the sovereignty of the country lies with Ghanaians. As part of the swearing in of political elites, including the president, they all promise to do good to all manner of people, since the people are the major stakeholders of power.

71 Barker (1969).

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Nevertheless, since the 1990s when the country re-democratised, the country’s duo-political system and increasing partisan politics have worked in the interest of obstructing checks and balances. The result of this is what citizens read as the elites’ violation of the promise that undergirded the trust reposed in governance. The breakdown of trust has, therefore, fostered the complex restoration of the elites’ multilayers of kinship and non-kinship ties, which is often read in simplistic terms as political betrayal. For this reason, to restore confidence in public governance, the promises that politicians make to the governed must be considered sacred and inviolable. This means that simply appealing to the deities through imprecation or invocation of curses would hardly suffice. This is because the Akan deity, Antoa famous in the imagination of Ghanaian politicians and the entire Akan religious cult, is a transaction religion. As a transactional religion, God is not worshipped directly; God is worshipped through the deities, considered children of God who have a will and whose will can be appeased through rituals. So, through rituals, individuals can manipulate the will of the deities to their advantage. In the end, the issue comes back to the upholding of the promises politicians make when they assume office as sacred and critical.

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Nietzsche, F. (2006). On the genealogy of morality (K. Ansell-Pearson, Ed., C. Diethe, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. Nkrumah, K. (1968). Dark days in Ghana. Panaf Books. Nkrumah, K. (1972). A letter of consolation to Dr. Kofi A. Busia: On the coup in Ghana. The Black Scholar, 3(9), 23–26. Nyabor, J. (2021, January 7). Alban Bagbin elected Speaker of 8th Parliament. https://citinewsroom.com/2021/01/alban-bagbin-elected-spe aker-of-8th-parliament/ Omari, T. P. (1970). Kwame Nkrumah: The anatomy of an African dictatorship. C. Hurst. Owusu, M. A. S. (2020). Nationalism in question: A study of key categories in Ghanaian history, 1863–1965 (PhD thesis). Submitted to Dalhousie University. Parker, J. (2021). In my time of dying: A history of death and the dead in West Africa. Princeton. Peil, M. (1971). The expulsion of West African aliens. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 9(2), 205–229. Rahman, A. A. (2007). The regime change of Kwame Nkrumah: Epic heroism in Africa and the diaspora. Palgrave Macmillan. Sarzynska-Wawer, J., Pawlak, A., Szymanowska, J., Hanusz, K., & Wawer, A. (2023). Truth or lie: Exploring the language of deception. PLoS ONE, 18(2), 1–17. Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1981). Verbal and nonverbal communication of deception. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 1–59.

CHAPTER 9

Mass Media in Deceitful Pragmatic Misrepresentation of, and the Heightened Intergroup Conflicts Among Sub-Saharan African Ethno-Religious and Linguistic Groups Caroline Nonye Osuchukwu, Bibian Ugoala, and Odey Simon Robert

Introduction The plural nature of most African nations accounts for the ethno-religious and linguistic conflicts characterising them (Ibeani & Onu, 2001; Omeje, 2012). According to Ibeani and Onu (2001), socio-cultural, economic

C. N. Osuchukwu (B) Department of English and Literature, Nwafor Orizu College of Education, Nsugbe, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] B. Ugoala Department of English Language and Literature, Faculty of Arts, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_9

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and political factors are some of the reasons responsible for conflicts generally, as in those engulfing Sub-Saharan Africa. Mass media are affirmed to be both constructive and deconstructive (Adeyanju, 2018, p. 73), which highlights the extent to which they engage in pragmatic representations and misrepresentations of various groups in Africa. They are affirmed to have played both constructive and deconstructive roles in Rwanda genocide, Balkan wars, the recurrent violent conflicts in Nigeria and Kenya across decades, etc. (Adeyanju, 2018, p. 73). The media serve as mechanisms for propaganda and the propagation of clashing interests and values that lead to wars and other violent conflicts among African peoples. Most of the conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa border on ethnic, religious and linguistic differences among the groups. This study sets out to demonstrate that most persons in the mass media are not conscious of the reality that their being has both a relative and an absolute determination. As the study will demonstrate, it argues that the pragmatic misrepresentation of these three sets of societal groups by the mass media is the bane of intergroup conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the course of engaging with the thrust of the study, its arguments and the wholesomeness shall be anchored on the media Agenda Setting Theory and the linguistic Speech Acts Theory. Thus, the study shall theoretically explicate how pragmatic misrepresentations of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups by the mass media constitute the bane of the recurrent conflicts engulfing West Africa. Next, it will make a concise expository presentation and a descriptive analysis of causes and effects of the recurrent conflicts in Africa. Afterwards, the study shall go on to analyse some (annotated) excerpts and words of selected scholars, which blame the media for their negative role in the recurrent conflicts among the groups and for pragmatically misrepresenting some of the groups. From the analysis, a valid conclusion will be drawn on what the pragmatic misrepresentations of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups imply and result to.

O. S. Robert Department of Languages and Linguistics, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria

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Conflict and Pragmatic Misrepresentation: A Brief Explication The various definitions of conflict in the literature point to the common reality that conflict is an abnormal situation of being into a harmful or violent struggle over clashing interests, goals, aspirations, ideologies, views, thoughts, feelings, difficult choices, etc., between and within individuals and groups. Conflicts over citizenship, elections, transitional justice and distribution of power are regarded by Vladisavljevi´c and Voltmer (2017, p. 1) as ‘democratisation conflicts.’ Their study reveals that ‘cross-national variations’ of democratisation conflicts depend on country and regional contexts, administration type and the stage of democratisation matter, types of democratisation conflicts involved, mindset, perception and personal dispositions of the respective press, and political influence on the media (Vladisavljevi´c & Voltmer, 2017, pp. 1– 2). The foregoing observations offer a valuable insight to what obtains in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of democratisation conflicts. Be it as it may, it is quite clear that similarities abound among different countries on the theme of the mass media and ‘democratisation conflicts.’ The conflict between two or more individuals or groups is interconflict, while that within individuals or groups is intra-conflict. Thus, there is no point engaging in conceptualising conflict. The concept of conflict resolution means the act of negotiating for peace or reconciliation between two or more individuals or groups in conflict, or getting rid of one’s own internal (intra-personal or intra-group conflict), with the aim of resolving extant or current conflict and avoiding its recurrence. Representing conflict pragmatically involves taking practical stance, approaches, perspectives and measures capable of proffering practical solutions to issues, causes and effects of conflicts. It also involves conflict practical and realistic re/presentation of conflicts. As Bublitz and Norrick (2011, p. 3) note, to act pragmatically involves approaching and handling imminent problems and daily activities practically rather than theoretically, speculatively and idealistically. The intentional and unintentional errors and falsehoods in representing conflict pragmatically constitute pragmatic misrepresentations. Misrepresentation also takes the form of representing individuals, a group or some groups in bad light. The meaning-based extensional and socialbased constructions of individuals, groups and phenomena in practical rather than mere theoretical ways and contexts constitute what this study

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calls pragmatic representation. Here, it is a case of phenomenal and group representations by the mass media. The phenomenal representation involves the (mis)representation of the phenomenon of conflict. The mass media represent images, interests, goals and aspirations of different ethnoreligious, linguistic, social, political, educational and regional groups, and while at the same time communicating their own inclinations, intentions and feelings to the masses. The media may (re)present individuals, groups or phenomena in bad or good light. When the pragmatic (re)presentation is in bad light, it amounts to misrepresentation. Also, when it is not realistic on pragmatic lane, it is pragmatic misrepresentation. For this study, the misrepresentation of the various groups, which is pragmatic, is the bane of the sustained ethno-religious and linguistic intolerance leading to recurrent conflicts among these African peoples. The ethno-religious, linguistic, ideological, ontological and nationhood differences among Sub-Saharan African peoples are natural and ideally sources of blessings and comparative advantages for the peoples of this region over those of the other regions of Africa that lack these nationhood attributes. Regrettably, the peoples mostly thread the paths laid down for them by the elites. Among such people are those in the mass communication profession, who engage in sensational and penchant journalism that at one point cause and, at other point, fuel ethno-religious and linguistic intolerance among the peoples of the region. The multifaceted intolerance degenerates to violent conflicts among different groups of the region. Nigeria takes the lead in this negative trend. That path is that of ethno-religious and linguistic inclinations, sentiments and discriminations, with various grave implications or effects (Dibie et al., 2016). The elites had constructed, popularised and even institutionalised negative ethnic, religious and linguistic trends, which have become a kind of an atomic bomb that blasts the region with recurrent conflicts . The mass media, as agents of the state, also thread the path thereby misrepresenting a larger number of the ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in the West African region.

Theoretical Framework This study is grounded by McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) Agenda Setting Theory (AST hereafter) of the media and Austin’s (1962) Speech Act Theory (SAT henceforth) of linguistics. These two theories are considered suitable for this study in view of its thrust. Let us begin with AST

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and return to SAT later. Accordingly, the Agenda Setting Theory (AST) of the media is developed by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw. AST describes the ability of the media to influence the audience in order to accord relevance and prominence to whatever or whoever they (the media) so wish or decide to (Chiakaan & Ahmad, 2011; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Ojie, 2020; Robert & Besong, 2016). The theorists postulate that the media exert strong influence on the public, such that the audiences get instilled with what they should think and not what they think (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). As Ojie (2020, p. 443) notes, agenda setting revolves around creating public awareness and the concern of salient issues by news media. That is to say the extent to which the media set and execute agenda on a person(s), a group(s) and a thing(s) determines public knowledge of, confidence in and attitude towards what and who the media have given attention and set agenda for. Essentially, AST postulates that media does not objectively reflect and present reality but rather filter and shape it to what they want/like. Next, whatever and whoever the media so-select, set agenda for, draw attention to and make popular, the public does same, considers them likewise and holds them in high esteem. It should be noted that the central emphasis is that whatever and/or whoever the media pay attention to, draw agenda for and make their image with significant media contents and jingles, they automatically become prominent, popular, relevant and most cherished, valued or applauded (Chiakaan, 2013; Chiakaan & Ahmad, 2011; Robert & Besong, 2016, 2017). By so doing, the media demonstrate their agenda-setting role and influence in speech acts on the masses. By implication, AST explains what the mass media do in (mis)representing ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in Sub-Saharan African nations. Having influenced the audience with reasonable positive media content about some of the ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in the region, such groups gain recognition and prominence over others. On the other hand, those that the media do not set and carry out same or similar agenda for, the audience consider them with contempt. The contemptuous considerations of the other ethnic, religious and linguistic groups left out by the mass media lead to bias, negative attitude, disregard and misrepresentation of the realities about these groups indicted and/or neglected by the mass media. By concentrating only on a few popular groups for reasons such as ethno-religious sentiments, political control and influence, corrupt practices, unprofessionalism and breach of media ethics, the mass media in

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this region under study make some of the inherent groups popular. In contrast, the same mass media indict and neglect the others and thereby make them unpopular. In the struggle for self-assertion, conflict arises, as the relegated and marginalised groups clash with their counterparts (exalted or made popular groups) that have been made popular and important by the media. Thus, at one point, the mass media lay foundation for or cause some of the conflicts in the region under study through misrepresentations of some of the groups. Such misrepresentations arise from ethnocentrism, extremism, religious fundamentalism/ fanaticism, unprofessionalism, etc. (Dibie et al., 2016). At other times, they fuel conflicts caused by the groups or the political class along with other elitist classes through reportage and media contents that are characterised by varied pragmatic misrepresentations. For example, penchant and sensational journalism, under-reportage, misinformation, fake news, etc., by the media fuel conflicts among groups. These practices are affirmed to be bad, unethical and flaming (Adebisi, 2017; Okoye, 2011; Robert & Besong, 2016). We now return to John L. Austin’s linguistic theory of Speech Acts (herein Speech Acts Theory—SAT). SAT explains how words and utterances could be used technically to achieve effects or intentions. The theory is used to supplement AST that is dwelled on above. The contemporary relevance as well as the viability of Austin’s SAT is affirmed by Agwuocha (2019), among others. Like AST, SAT emphasises the influence of a speaker’s communication content on the listener. By implication, SAT explains that the mass media technically use words and utterances to achieve effects or intentions. Their intentions are communicated strategically and technically. To that end, this study argues that in the course of engaging in strategic communication, aimed at conveying their intentions for setting agenda for a few or some of the groups in the plural SubSaharan African society, the media misrepresent, indict and/or neglect some groups. At the same time, in doing so, they duly represent their ‘exonerated’ or most preferred groups. There is no gainsaying the fact that each member of the press (media) belongs to an ethnic, a religious and a linguistic group, respectively. Be it so, most of them are bound to and do express and show ethno-religious and linguistic sentiments against other groups that are not theirs. They do so even against their media professional ethics.

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Leaning on SAT, this study argues that the media engage in and exhibit locutionary speech act. This act involves producing meaningful and intelligible utterances to the audience. The utterances convey the intentions of the media. The utterances have effects on the audience—the masses. The effects include arousal of conflict tendency in some of the masses. Next, the study goes on to observe that illocution act is achieved by both the mass media and the public (audience). The media evoke their intentions and feelings to their audience. As Austin (1962) has noted, there is an intention for every communication. Some of what the media evoke constitutes misrepresentations of some groups in bad light. That is, they deploy pragmatic elements to represent or convey their messages or drawn agenda. In return, the audience reacts or responds to what is evoked. That illustrates how the influence exerted on the public by the media warrant certain actions that lead to conflicts, either immediate or later. In addition, this study avers that perlocutionary act comes up from the effects of the meaningful utterances made by the mass media. The resultant actions are perlocutionary. The evoked intentions constitute the effects the mass media exert on the public as regard ethnic, religious and linguistic matters. The media bring to bear their intentions and feelings about such matters. The audience or public act upon the communicated intentions and feelings of the media. In the course of disseminating their intentions and feelings about ethno-religious and linguistic matters, as communication content of their journalism practice, both representations and misrepresentations are realised as perlocutionary acts. Given the foregoing, it is quite clear that SAT aptly explains communication processes and speech acts involved in mass communication and journalism by the mass media on varied themes. It also linguistically explains what transpires between mass media and the masses, and between speakers and listeners (audience). On the linguistic lane, SAT looks at and beyond meaning cognition and generation on various lanes—from semantics to pragmatics, and from sociolinguistics to psycholinguistics. Be it as it may, SAT fails to explain or theorise the multifaceted implications of the speech acts and pragmatic acts effects in varied speech contexts. The feedback effects of what is communicated by speakers, as in the mass media, are left out by SAT. There are several factors that hamper the manifestation of the noted effects of the speaker on the listener. Both SAT and AST fail to consider as well as explain such factors. Thus, both SAT and AST leave out how to deal with the effects, as they neither mention nor

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deal explicitly with these concerns about the effects. Yet, it is quite interesting that despite the pitfalls of SAT, its main postulations and ideals are not only theoretically viable but also practically realisable. Also, it aligns with AST in various regards. For example, both AST and SAT demonstrate that the media as well as speakers in general usually influence the audience (public) to do what they did not or would not want to do save not for the influence exerted on them through the evoked intentions and feelings of the media.

Dynamics, Causes and Effects of Conflicts in West African Region While some studies affirm the prevalence of recurrent ethno-religious and linguistic conflicts in Nigeria (such as Adetiba, 2013; Alao et al., 2012; Alubo, 2006; Alozieuwa, 2016; Besong & Robert, 2019; Bouchat, 2013; Otite, 1999; Otite & Albert, 1999; Reychler, 2002), the giant of Africa, others establish occurrence and recurrence of violent conflicts that commonly characterise Sub-Saharan African nations as a whole (such as Adeyanju, 2018; Albert, 1999; Meredith, 2006; Quadri & Oladejo, 2020). Although ethnic consciousness in Africa (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya) with the attendant conflicts arising from it dates back to pre-colonial time, colonial constructions and those of their immediate African successors aggravated, magnified and sustained it (ethnic consciousness) into postcolonial Africa (Quadri & Oladejo, 2020). The ethno-religious pluralism and multilingualism characterising Sub-Saharan Africa have been turned into avenues for bitter recurrent conflicts among its constituent groups. Politicians and other elites of the region are responsible for the negative trend. Thus, religious, ethnic, linguistic and political manipulations and cajoles; bad leadership producing frustrated, impoverished and incapacitated followers; power and chieftaincy tussles, contestations over resource control, management and sharing parameters; and clashed values, interests, aspirations, etc., are affirmed to be the major causes of the violent recurrent conflicts in the region (Alemika & Okoye, 2002, p. 28; Egwu, 2001, p. 29; Sule, 2015, p. 29; Ukoha, 2003, p. 4). Didiugwu’s (2014) study examines ways in which the mass media could help arrest the challenges to the process of African integration. It maintains that for the realisation of regional integration, African media should make significant sustained paradigm shift from Western journalism and contents to African indigenous ones.

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As Otite (1999) has affirmed, conflict arises from the pursuit of different interests, goals and aspirations by individuals and/or groups in a given social and physical environment, as in Nigeria and most other parts of Africa. By implication, the pursuit of divergent interests, goals and aspirations by ethnic, religious, linguistic and political groups causes violent conflicts in this region, like elsewhere in the world where such pursuit is bound to give rise to violent conflicts. These groups have divergent interests, goals and aspirations that clash in various regards. The different groups clash over varied interests, pursuits, perspectives, worldviews, teachings, doctrines and dogmas, ways of life, etc. Some Muslim and Christian groups in Ghana are affirmed to often clash on account of these (Acquah, 2011). Acquah (2011, p. 3) reveals that ‘religious extremism and intolerance by some Muslim and Christian groups in Ghana’ threaten not just peace and tranquillity but also ‘undermine traditional religious and cultural values that foster peaceful co-existence.’ Dispute over boundaries is one major cause of conflict among West African nations (Albert, 1999; Meredith, 2006). The colonialists had wrongly carved out the boundaries of African nations. Consequently, the wrong boundary demarcation by the colonialists has remained one major source of violent intergroup conflict. Meredith (2006, p. 1) observes that the colonialists never considered the ethnic, religious, linguistic, political and historical differences among African peoples in carrying out boundary demarcations in Africa. For example, the over four hundred and eighty ethnic groups (if they are not more than that, when fully represented or adequately counted) in Nigeria were forcefully merged together without considering their differences and erstwhile level of intergroup tolerance. Consequently, there have been sustained violent clashes among them in the course of pursuing their varied interests, goals and aspirations (Alani, 2003, p. 80; Alozieuwa, 2016, p. 8). The clash of group interests, goals and aspirations, etc., has led to various wars between and among peoples of this African region—the Sub-Saharan Africa. Wars are the results of such sustained bitter contestation over resources and structural imbalance among African nations. In his contribution to the discourse on causes of the recurrent violent conflicts in Nigeria, Alozieuwa (2016, p. 12) notes that the violent conflicts posing severe security challenges to Nigeria over the years are the aftermaths of the Nigerian Civil War. This observation is apt, but Alozieuwa (2016, p. 12) fails to point out the remote factors behind the Civil War, which brought to place the lingering aftermath effects.

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Leadership tussle was the lead remote factor. Personality clash and clashed personal interests also caused the Civil War. Besides, ethnic grievances came to play and took precedence over religious and linguistic sentiments in what gave rise to personality clash between Ojukwu and Gowon, which led to the Civil War. Ethnic mobilisation is one mechanism Ojukwu had used to get the Igbo people and some other peoples of the South to become aggrieved and stood with him on the idea of division or separation from the North. Another factor is the imbalance in the distribution and control of resources and power parameters. Adetiba (2013, pp. vii–viii) shows that the socio-political exclusion of some ethnic, religious and linguistic groups from politics, policy-making, development processes and other meaningful public ventures poses threats to national development and accounts for protracted conflicts among various groups in Nigeria as well as beyond. In consideration of the ethno-religious, linguistic and political differences, suspicion, distrust, fear and thoughts and expressions of marginalisation arose among these peoples. Leaders and elites of the various Nigerian peoples thereby sow division among their peoples and roused their ethnic consciousness to division rather than unity, intolerance rather than tolerance, disintegration rather than integration, violence, conflict, war and insecurity rather than peace and so on. This act of sowing division on the line of ethnicity, religion and linguistic identity among the peoples of a nation does not apply to Nigerian leaders alone. Most of their contemporaries of other African nations emulated those of Nigeria. This study argues that although in pre-colonial times, African nations had fought over chieftaincy and resources (e.g. land, limestone, salt, water bodies, economic trees or plants, etc.), the conflicts were not of the magnitude obtained in post-colonial Africa. Communal clashes over farming land and borders have spanned pre-colonial to post-colonial times. The conflicts then were not religious and had no serious or recurrent ethno-linguistic underpins. The ill systems and obnoxious leadership practices introduced into African sovereign societies by the colonialists as well as sustained by most post-colonial African leaders and those created, institutionalised and sustained by the same post-colonial African leaders are what have magnified the conflicts. Despite playing a significant role in the formation and sustenance of Hausa-Fulani political hegemony in Northern Nigeria through their preferences of these two ethnic groups to others in Nigeria, the colonialists never practically engaged in using politics or leadership of ethno-religious and linguistic parameters, ethnic

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hate, character assassination, ethno-religious, gerrymandery and deliberate distraction of administrative and developmental focus. These systems and practices were rather evolved and introduced into Nigerian society by the indigenous political leaders of Nigeria along with their allied elites of other sectors. Adding their ill ways, systems and misdeeds to those of their colonial predecessors, the indigenous leaders succeed(ed) in creating the problems that continuously ravage post-colonial Nigeria. This negative development applies to most other nations of the Sub-Saharan Africa. Another cause of the spate of conflict in developing African nations, just like most other developing nations of the globe, is high population density. Human population is said to be increasing daily by 280,000 to 300,000 people (America’s Climate Choice, 2010, p. 15; Bisong & Apologun, 2014, p. 37; Cunningham & Cunningham, 2006, p. 75). An average of 4–5 children are said to be born every second, while an average of 2 persons die every second (America’s Climate Choice, 2010, p. 15). Concerning this point, Bisong and Apologun (2014, p. 37) note that this noted difference between birth and death rates shows a gain of 2.3 more humans per second in world’s population. In 2004, the U.S. Census Bureau projected that the total world population was about 6.4 billion people and was growing at 1.4% per year, implying that the world is adding nearly 73 million more people per year (America’s Climate Choice, 2010, p. 15). By implication, the increase in population without a proportionate economic growth causes imbalanced rise in human population, whereby there is a higher population competing for scarce resources. Consequently, conflicts surface among competing individuals and groups in the course of the struggle for survival, which is that of the fittest (i.e. survival of the fittest). In addition, the protracted conflicts among the Sub-Saharan peoples are caused by contestation over resources (Alao et al., 2012). This involves sustained violent struggle over resource ownership and control parameters. The conflict over natural and human resources is also a product of mismanagement (Bisong & Apologun, 2014), as in the Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, mismanagement does not allow for effective exploration, management, control and distribution of resources. Apart from misusing natural resources, they are largely looted by a very small circle of individuals and groups. These misuse and loot provoke those marginalised and consequently rouse their consciousness to resistance mechanisms. Violence, insurgency, militancy, terrorism, conflict and war, among others, are some of the mechanisms deployed and used by these marginalised

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individuals and groups in West Africa and beyond, who are excluded or pushed out of the resource utilisation chain. Several factors account for the mismanagement of resources, which include negative orientation and attitude towards the non-human constituents of the ecosystem, corrupt and unfavourable practices, loot and misuse, greed, obnoxious policies, bad leadership and followership (Robert, 2020), deforestation and forest depletion (Nielsen, 2006, p. 35; Wilson, 1988, p. 4), desert encroachment and reckless mining, among others. For example, some of these factors are responsible for the militancy in the Niger Delta region of South-Southern Nigeria. Although the above discussion may not be exhaustive, it suffices for the concerns of the discourse here.

Presentation and Analysis of Data Media’s Misrepresentation of the Groups This section engages with analysing single and group views on mass media’s misrepresentations of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a central focus as well as emphasis on the cases of Nigeria. To start with, studies by Ugwu and Ozoemena (2019), Robert, Besong and Dibie (2016), Robert (2015) and Evwierhoma (2007), among others, lament and express dissatisfaction with the misrepresentations of ethnic and linguistic groups in Nigeria. They unanimously regret that of the over five hundred languages in Nigeria, the commonly mentioned number is ‘over 250, 280 or 350’ only. The implication is that many ethnic and linguistic groups in Nigeria are underrepresented and misrepresented by the mass media and most other information resources (Evwierhoma, 2007; Robert, 2015; Robert & Besong, 2016), such as library resources, (un)published written documents and archival sources. In terms of reportage of conflicts, mass media are not expected to: ‘overblow the report’ of conflicts ‘to avoid inflaming the audience’; ‘present the report in a manner that would draw listenership, readership and/or viewership for patronage of the reporters’ medium,’ and not the otherwise (Edogor et al., 2015, p. 87). They are expected to ‘provide truthful information, equitable reportage of two conflicting parties, accurate and adequate reportage that would enable citizens to form well-informed opinions’ (Nord & Stromback, 2006, p. 85). According to Vladisavljevi´c and Voltmer (2017, p. 2), in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa, the quality of media coverage is hampered by ‘bias, emotionalisation and polarisation.’ Besides, ‘conflicts over the

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control of power generate sharp polarisation, while elections force media towards a more restrained style of reporting’ (Vladisavljevi´c & Voltmer, 2017, p. 2). From the above words of Vladisavljevi´c and Voltmer (2017, p. 2), it could be inferred that mass media coverage of conflicts in SubSaharan Africa is characterised by lack of or poor quality, because the media show ethno-religious, linguistic and other sentiments and deliberate polarisation of realities about various groups. They show such sentiments and deliberately polarise the realities because of membership and ethnocentric inclinations. Next, Tsaku’s (2017) study, entitled ‘Public perception of NBS’ reportage of Nasarawa ethnic crisis,’ reveals the misrepresentation of some ethnic, linguistic and religious groups in Nasarawa by the the mass media. Her study shows that ‘the [Nasarawa] public is largely dissatisfied with the reportage of the crisis by the Nasarawa Broadcasting Service (NBS), Lafia.’ NBS is Nasarawa state government-owned broadcast (mass) media. The state is situated in North-Central, Nigeria. The study also reveals that ‘the public perceive the reportage negatively, basically because there are commonly obtained penchant, ethnocentric and prejudiced elements in their reportage, which hamper the effective management and resolution of the crisis.’ The above words from Tsaku’s (2017) study confirm that mass media in Sub-Saharan Africa truly misrepresent various groups, even in reporting conflicts and the associate issues among the groups making up nations like Nigeria. Their internalised ‘penchant, ethnocentric and prejudiced’ journalistic practices are made manifest in their reportage of the conflicts between and among ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in Nasarawa State. Tsaku’s (2017) study concludes that NBS along with other mass media contributes significantly ‘to the recurrence of the crisis in the state,’ as ‘NBS press are yet to duly practice the reportage of crisis…, without inciting or fuelling the crisis and supporting either (one) of the warring ethnic groups engulfed in the crisis.’ In a study’s report that lends credence to the findings of Tsaku’s (2017) study, Alozieuwa (2016, pp. 5–6) observes that ‘most of the conflicts in the North, epitomised by the Hausa-Fulani hegemony, are sectarian in character, mirroring the deep divisions, among Nigeria’s over 450 ethno-linguistic groups, where most of them are dabbed ‘minority’ and grossly marginalised.’ Consequently, ‘the bitter recurring ethnic crisis in Nasarawa continuously thrives’ (Alozieuwa, 2016, p. 6). Alozieuwa (2016, pp. 5–6) traces the

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causes of the rifts among the warring ethnic groups to ‘rivalry and competition for the abundant but badly managed material resources, and the subsequent hegemonic tendencies among the ethnic groups.’ The finding of Katu’s (2016, pp. iii–iv) states in part that the ‘conflict behaviour pattern of Plateau State conflict audiences’ is informed by the negative influential ‘power of the mass media’ in information dissemination about conflicts, and the ‘indigene versus settler dichotomy.’ The implication of Katu’s finding is that the mass media give misinformation to the public about conflicts as a result of which the behaviour of the public gets influenced and altered from good (positive) to bad (negative) behaviour towards some groups and residents of given areas. Similarly, Sule (2015) examines the extent to which mass media generate, escalate and de-escalate religious-based conflicts in Northern, exposing the effects of such roles by the media on national development and intergroup relations among Northern Nigerian peoples. ‘Radio broadcasts, television news and International News Agencies’ were proven to ‘escalate ethno-religious conflicts’ via their reports (Sule, 2015, p. xii). These media breach professional ethics in order to favour and ‘be loyal to their owners, editors, ethno-religious affiliations and geographical locations’ (Sule, 2015, p. xii; Yoroms, 2009, p. 24). The study concludes that ‘the escalation of conflicts affect the socio-economic development of Northern Nigeria and Nigeria at large’ (Sule, 2015, p. xiii). As such, Sule’s study justifies this study’s indictment of the mass media for the recurring conflicts confronting post-colonial West African nations. An excerpt from Galadima and Olaniyi (2009, p. 212) reads, ‘ethnic, political and religious identities and sentiments always prevent the media from being objective and neutral.’ The authors drew this finding from their critical study of several newspapers’ and magazines’ coverage of casualties and the management of the conflicts in Plateau State between 2001 and 2002. The newspapers are ‘the Punch, the Trust, the Nigeria Standard, This Day and the Champion. The magazines are Newswatch, the Tell, The News and The Week.’ The analysis of their gathered data proved that the studied mass media are ethnically, religiously, linguistically and even regionally biased. The above excerpt confirms the central argument of this current study that mass media in Sub-Saharan Africa hold and show ethno-religious and linguistic sentiments that cause conflicts in the region on the one hand and fuel conflicts among groups on the other. The practice of sentimental identities does not allow them to be objective and neutral. Doing or being so is unprofessional, as media professional ethics

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is breached by such media. Studies, such as Kukah’s (1993), confirm media’s penchant for exaggerating details of ethnic, religious, linguistic and other related crises. The exaggeration of such details fuels their intensity of the crises. By exaggerating the details, new phases of conflict arise elsewhere on account of the ones given exaggerated reportage. If not elsewhere, an ongoing conflict that is exaggerated gets fuelled up with such exaggeration and thus instead of ending up, the conflict keeps on escalating in that very place where the reportage is made. In considering role played by the mass media in escalating or de-escalating conflicts, Yoroms and Mu’azu (2009, pp. 3, 8) and Yoroms (2009, pp. 15, 24– 28) observe that factors such as ‘ownership, location, ethnic, religious or regional affiliation affect the way the mass media cover conflicts.’ Ekeanyanwu (2005, p. 25) has observed, viz: ‘the pattern of reporting crises, conflicts and its management by the Nigerian press since the nationalistic days seems to be continuing.’ This means that media reportage of conflicts and how they are managed in Nigeria, as in other Sub-Saharan African nations, are done by the mass media with ethnoreligious and linguistic sentiments. Ekeanyanwu (2005, p. 25) points out that in handling the crises over forgery scandals by Alhaji Salisu Buhari, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Evan Enwerem, the former Senate President, ‘the press showed ethnic and linguistic bias,’ when ‘compared to’ how they ‘handled Governor Tinubu’s case.’ In the words of Ekeanyanwu (2005, p. 25), ‘It is believed that because the Nigerian press is more or less Yoruba controlled or dominated press, Tinubu survived (because he is a Yoruba man), while the other personalities got drowned in the political murky waters.’ This excerpt tells volume of how Nigerian mass media are sentimental and show tribalism, religious extremism and linguistic prejudices. From the excerpt, it is learnt that the Nigerian media is dominated by the Yoruba ethnic group and so when carrying out media role in matters involving personalities of other ethnic groups versus a Yoruba personality or personalities, the Yoruba press (members) exhibit ethnic sentiments, discrimination and favouritism. The above data gives a clear insight to how this practice obtains among the Yoruba press in Nigeria, Benin Republic and other Western African nations. Finally, Olayiwola (1991, p. 3) demonstrates that Nigerian mass media operate in ways that cause national disintegration and compound extant national issues, as a result of ‘the extant patterns of mass media ownership and their impact on the coverage of selected national issues’ (Olayiwola,

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1991, p. 3). Clearly, Olayiwola (1991, p. 3) justifies the position of this study that the mass media play negative roles in the recurrent conflicts engulfing the African region under study. The above quotation from the work reveals several interesting facts. First, there are existing institutionalised patterns that mass media are made to follow, which allow for misrepresentations of some groups and the due (ideal) representations of other groups on the basis of prejudices against other groups. Second, the mass media are proven by Olayiwola’s (1991) study, like those of many other scholars, to impact on national issues both positively and negatively, with the latter impact preceding the former. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the mass media cause and escalate conflicts, even though they also have the capacity of de-escalating and preventing conflicts in the society.

Conclusion This study has explored pragmatic misrepresentations of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups by mass media in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. The study argues that by misrepresenting some groups, the media play negative roles in the conflicts among these groups and breach professional ethics. Next, it has exposed the core factors behind the sustained ethnic, religious and linguistic intolerance that largely accounts for different recurrent conflicts among these groups. Sometimes, the media cause conflicts among the groups where they operate. At other times, they fuel conflicts caused by bodies, groups and individuals other than them. Language, medium of communication, is used for various (mis)representations of groups, individuals, nations, phenomena, etc. When language is used duly and positively to construct and represent them, there is no misrepresentation. When it is used otherwise, misrepresentation arises and obtains. Therefore, the study concludes that pragmatic misrepresentation is a manifestation of language misuse. This proves that the way language is used determines conflict emergence, escalation or de-escalation, and the efficacy of conflict management and resolution strategies. Efficient language use, reorientation and attitudinal change are recommended, as the panacea.

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CHAPTER 10

Post-colonial Political, Economic and Ethnic Discourse: A case of Mozambique and Rwanda Donald Peter Chimanikire, Valerie Rumbidzai Jeche, and Jane Tsitsi Mudzamiri

Introduction African countries today face greater challenges to peace and stability than ever before. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa, including Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo, are a volatile mix of insecurity, instability, corrupt political institutions and poverty. Alarmingly, most of the African countries lack the political will to maintain previous peace agreements and thus have fallen prey to continuous armed ethnic conflict. This is partly due to ineffective conflict management. The most common

D. P. Chimanikire (B) · J. T. Mudzamiri Department of Governance and Public Management, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] V. R. Jeche Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_10

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conflicts that sparked in these countries were mostly ethnic conflicts and even between states thus intra- and interstate conflicts were most common in African states. After gaining independence, there was a shift from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts in most African countries. In essence, this shift was due to the spread of intra-conflicts to the international arena. Ethnic conflicts in Africa were spreading due to religious fundamentalism. As alluded to by Gurr and Marshall (2003) have written that most African conflicts are caused by the combination of poverty and weak states and institutions. This chapter is meant as a contribution towards the ongoing search for new means of managing ethnic conflicts in Africa. Using Mozambique and Rwanda as case studies, it compares the management of ethnic conflicts in both countries and shows the difficulties in managing deeprooted and complex conflicts. The governments of Mozambique and Rwanda have taken bold constitutional steps to reduce tension, but the continuing ethnic and religious conflicts raise questions about the effectiveness of these mechanisms. This study proposes, among other things, that ethnic conflict was at the heart of both countries’ development problems. Politicized ethnicity has been detrimental to national unity and socio-economic well-being. It is important to note that most of these ethnic conflicts were caused by colonialism, which compounded interethnic conflict by capitalizing on the isolation of ethnic groups. The divide-and-conquer method was used to pit ethnicities against each other, thus keeping the people from rising up against the colonizers. Distribution of economic resources was often skewed to favour a particular group, pushing marginalized groups to use their ethnicity to mobilize for equality. These were the seeds of conflict.

Theoretical Approaches to Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict According to Regalia (2017, p. 3), ethnic groups are defined as a community of people who share cultural and linguistic characteristics including history, tradition, myth and origin. Scholars have been trying to develop a theoretical approach to ethnicity and ethnic conflict for a long time. Horowitz and Gurr (2003) agree that the ethnic conflicts experienced today—especially in Africa—are deep rooted. These conflicts over race, religion, language and identity have become so complex that they are difficult to resolve or manage. Ethnicity has a strong influence on

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one’s status in a community. Ethnic conflicts are therefore often caused by an attempt to secure more power or access more resources. The opinion of this study is that conflict in Africa is synonymous with inequality. Wherever such inequality manifests among groups, conflict is inevitable. Hence the question, how can we effectively manage ethnic conflict in Africa to avoid further human losses? Is there a blueprint for conflict management?.

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict There is no agreement as to the exact number of ethnicities in Africa, although it is estimated to be in the thousands, Cataloguing Africa’s ethnic populations is difficult not only due to the vast number and variety of ethnicities, but also due to the fact that individual ethnicities are in a state of constant change (Darch, 2016). Therefore, it is difficult to generalize how ethnicities come into existence, and moreover identify an exact definition of ethnicity. Broadly speaking, an ethnicity is a group of people who share an identity, which is marked by a characteristic such as language, culture, leadership or inhabited territory. One must understand that an ethnicity is, in essence, a social contract, a product of society and social interaction between people. In Africa, ethnicity as a social construct has been shaped by African and European colonial actions. Africans constructed ethnicity by forming communities where those in power offered protection and wealth (in the form of land and livestock) in exchange for loyalty and labour. These groups created a culture, a language and a hierarchy of power governed by rules and traditions, which made them distinct. Such ethnolinguistic enclaves become sources of conflict and othering logics in most of the post-colonial African nations that are characterized by multi-ethnic and multilingual groups such as Nigeria, South Africa, Republic of Congo, Liberia, Cameroon, Uganda, among others (Mavengano, 2022; Mavengano et al., 2022). During the process of European exploration and colonization, European powers grew attached to the label “tribes” as a reference for the indigenous peoples who had been colonized (Regalia, 2017). Further, ethnic conflict is a concept that is difficult to define and perhaps, more difficult to comprehend. Conflict between ethnicities is a phenomenon that has occurred for hundreds of years and in all corners of the earth. Yet, for an in-depth understanding ethnic conflict, it is critical to address the following questions: What precipitates bloodshed

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between ethnic groups? Why are some parts of the world more susceptible to conflict, whereas others enjoy relative tranquility? And finally, why does ethnic conflict continue to exist in modern society? In Ethnic Conflict, authors Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff define ethnic conflict as such: “The term conflict describes a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspectives entirely just, goals. An ethnic conflict is one particular form of this: that in which the goals of at least one party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions.” Throughout Africa, myriad ethnic groups exist, each with its unique culture, customs and political institutions. Given its diversity, it is not surprising that Africa has, therefore, experienced a vast number of civil wars and genocides directly related to fissures that have developed along ethnic line.

Roots of Mozambique’s War The route to the war is also important. Conflict is normal and natural in any society and is linked to processes of change. Conflicts are often resolved through local processes of negotiations and mediation (Fabricus, 2018). If the conflict is not resolved, it can escalate into violent conflict. This may be resolved or sometimes escalates to the level of a fullscale war. Although not always, civil wars often pit an aggrieved group against the state. The grievance often relates to the sharing of resources (Faleg, 2019). The aggrieved group recruits supporters, among whom a shared identity is important; “we” are discriminated against because of our ethnicity or religion, for example. The grievance is a key factor, but recruiting also requires a “flag,” which symbolizes the cause or a shared identity. Applying this to Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, it can be seen that the 1964–1974 independence war began because local people were oppressed by Portuguese colonial authorities (Fabricus, 2018). The colonial authorities were seen to be taking the wealth of the area and leaving nothing behind. Resources were the grievance, and the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) waved the “flag” of independence as the way to fairer shares. The conflict became violent as the colonial authorities resisted. As the war escalated, both sides gained outside backing. The Frelimo movement gained support from socialist states, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China (Haysom, 2018). Portugal gained

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backing from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Frelimo is now the government, and people along the coast see themselves as marginalized by a Frelimo elite. The post-2000 resource boom, driven by rubies, graphite and natural gas led to increased poverty and sharply increased inequality. Marginalized groups argued that Frelimo oligarchs were siphoning off the wealth, as the Portuguese had done before. When the insurgency began, farmers, fishers and artisanal miners joined in the fighting as they had been displaced by mine owners and gas companies (Burke, 2019). The grievance was the same in both wars. Independence had been the flag 51 years earlier; this time, the flag is Islam. The Swahili coast extends south 700 km into Mozambique and includes the coastline of Cabo Delgado and Nampula province (Burke, 2019). People of the Swahili coast have been Muslim for a millennium, and Islam has been adapted to local conditions, including matrilineal family structures in Cabo Delgado. The war thus far continues in areas largely occupied by Muslims and KiMwani speakers (Faleg, 2019). After 2010, local fundamentalist preachers began to argue that the economic problems in Cabo Delgado were due to a corrupt form of Islam (Littlejohn, 2015). They argued that the Islamic Council of Mozambique (Cislamo) was based in southern Mozambique, dominated by Frelimo, and that official Islamic leaders were helping Frelimo steal the wealth. According to Faleg (2019, p. 17), the independence war was fought 50 years before to bring about equity. Likewise, the fundamentalists said that sharia law would bring equity and a fairer share of the province’s wealth. The conflict escalated into violence, with the fundamentalists fighting both Cislamo and the state. In 2017, it became a war against the state, and the flag was a particular form of Islam. When the insurgency began, farmers, fishers and artisanal miners joined in the fighting as they had been displaced by mine owners and gas companies.

Causes of Conflict in Mozambique: Internal Roots, Grievances and a History of Violence Burke (2019, p. 12) argues that the roots of the Cabo Delgado civil war involve a complex mix of history, ethnicity and religion, and the war has been fuelled by poverty, growing inequality and the “resource curse”. On the east, Cabo Delgado borders the Mozambique Channel, which is part of the Indian Ocean, and there are a series of islands along the coast

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(Club Mozambique, 2019). The land is flat for 50 km inland and less than 100 m above sea level. This area has been occupied by the Mwani for centuries. The people are Muslim fishers, traders and small farmers. There is extensive trade along the coast, with historical links to Zanzibar, which is only 700 km north, rather than the present Mozambican capital, Maputo, which is 2000 km to the south by sea (Clun Mozambique, 2019). West of this coastal strip is the Mueda plateau, which rises to 884 m just 100 km inland from the sea. The area was occupied by the Makonde in the 1700s and 1800s, to probably avoid slave traders, malaria and colonizers. The Makonde also have links to Tanzania, and independence in Tanzania in 1963 had a strong influence on them. Frelimo was founded in 1962 and began its war for independence in 1965, with mainly Makonde leadership but with strong involvement from the Mwani (Regalia, 2017). The first shots were fired in 1964 in Chai, on a boundary and in a mixed Mwani-Makonde zone, which has also been the centre of fighting in the current war. After independence, the Mwani argued that they were marginalized, as the Makonde in Frelimo gained power, and key Makonde liberation fighters then became the oligarchs of Cabo Delgado. Many more Makonde than Mwani received pensions as liberation fighters, and Makonde were accused of grabbing coastal land and businesses (Mavhinga, 2019). Many young men who fled from Mocimboa da Praia following violence joined the insurgents in the hope of gaining jobs. Outside Makonde areas, Cabo Delgado became a forgotten province, with low levels of literacy and education and high levels of poverty. However, from the 1990s, Cabo Delgado proved to be one of the richest provinces in natural resources (Littlejohn, 2015). Now, most of the province is allocated for mining exploration and exploitation which in law takes precedence over farmers and existing occupants. Many of the mining licenses were grabbed by the Frelimo elite. Thousands of farmers and fishers were pushed off their land, and artisanal miners, particularly those mining for rubies, were evicted, beaten and even killed (Club Mozambique, 2019). Young people with basic education could not get jobs, while the gas and mining company crews and the Makonde Frelimo elite became wealthy with relatively luxurious cars and houses. In Mocimboa da Praia, for example, young men with very basic literacy said they were educated and would not do the back-breaking work done by their illiterate parents, including farming with only a hoe, or catching fish standing on the beach with a net. Many

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migrated to towns and became itinerant traders and street sellers. They watched gas workers drive by in 4 × 4s, who never stopped to support them by buying their goods. Their anger was aimed at “foreigners”— mainly people from the south of Mozambique—who were believed to be in league with Frelimo in Maputo and taking the good jobs (Club Mozambique, 2018). Coastal Cabo Delgado and Nampula have a history of violence against local elites. In 1999, there were angry local demonstrations against cholera prevention and treatment teams, who were accused of spreading the disease rather than treating it (Darch, 2016). In Cabo Delgado province, in Montepuez, two health workers were killed. In Mecufi, a crowd attacked and burned a cholera treatment and isolation tent. In the neighbouring Nampula province, there were attacks in five mainly coastal districts. More cholera riots followed in 2001 in Nampula. Researchers sent to coastal Nampula were shocked to find that many people believed the local elite wanted them dead. This is linked with common local beliefs in vampirism and in the elites’ intention to drink their blood (shupa-sangue) or sell it (International Crisis Group, 2019). Muidumbe district is one of the areas affected by the current civil war. It forms a boundary between Makonde and Mwani areas. In 2002–2003, 24 people were lynched after being accused of magically commanding seven lions that ate 46 local people (Regalia, 2017). The accused were important people—the district administrator, chiefs, members of Frelimo and a local businessman. What is important here is that many people believe that local elites do not just want to exploit them. They want to drink their blood and steal their organs (Fabricus, 2018). The protests are against authority figures, who are often only a little richer and more powerful than those protesting. Thus, in looking at the Cabo Delgado civil war, it is important to take into account this violence, and the genuine belief of many people that elites want them dead and they are acting to defend their lives and those of their families.

Religion More than a decade before the start of the current insurgency, in 2005, riots in Mocimboa da Praia for the first time took on a religious tone (Lee, 2019). After independence, Makonde liberation fighters moved down from the plateau to Mocimboa da Praia. The Makonde are traditionally Catholic, and they made the first religious move when, from

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2000, they began erecting large crosses in the predominantly Muslim town (Mavhinga, 2019). The Mwani responded with loudspeakers on mosques broadcasting the call to prayer. A 2005 by-election for mayor was disputed when the Frelimo candidate was declared the victor. In September 2005, there was a confrontation that reflected the town’s division. One side identified itself as Mwani, Muslim and supporters of the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), and it attacked the other side self-identified as Makonde, Christian and Frelimo. Officially, there were 12 deaths and 18 houses destroyed. Twelve years later, the new civil war also began in Mocimboa da Praia (Machave, 2018). The 2019 visit of Pope Francis to Mozambique was seen as support for the Christian candidate in the national elections (6 September 2019). The crosses may have reflected a rise in religious fundamentalism. Tanzania saw an increase in both Christian and Islamic fundamentalism in the 1990s and 2000s. Playing on the description “born-again Christians,” Tanzanians began to refer to “born-against Muslims”. Northern Cabo Delgado still looks over the border to Tanzania, and local Islamic preachers travelled to Tanzania for training. Some returned and set up local fundamentalist mosques, urging supporters not to send their children to state schools, to restrict the space for women and to wear shoes in mosques. Cislamo has a southern leadership and is close to Frelimo. Radical preachers argued that these purveyors of false Islam were supporting Frelimo to steal the local wealth. Sharia law would be fairer, they claimed. The Frelimo oligarchs and President Nyusi himself are Makonde and Christian. The people with grievances are Mwani and Muslim, and they see their traditional Islamic leaders siding with the Frelimo elite (Crisis Group, 2018). Thus, it seems unsurprising that the insurgents initially chose the flag of fundamentalist Islam to challenge both Frelimo and its perceived local supporters. This was underlined in the 2019 national elections, when the Catholic Nyusi was standing against the Muslim Renamo candidate, Ossufo Momade, and Pope Francis made an unprecedented visit to Mozambique during the election campaign. In the middle of the expanding civil war in Cabo Delgado, this was seen as support for the Christian candidate. Confrontations between new fundamentalist mosques and existing mosques had been increasing for some time and were sometimes violent. In 2015, some local preachers began to train militias. One group carried out the initial attack on Mocimboa da Praia (Crisis Group, 2019). Small

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groups attacked villages, following a similar pattern. About a dozen young men, mostly armed with machetes, raided villages at night, beheaded people and burnt houses, but left before the police arrived. Wealthier individuals in the village and local leaders known to have opposed fundamentalists were often targeted. Initially, the insurgents had local support. By June 2018, they were more organized and attacked towns and road traffic (Burke, 2019).

Giving Control to the Military As in many countries, fear of a possible military coup leads to keeping the armed forces weak and divided. In Mozambique, power was divided between the army, paramilitary riot police and the security service, Serviço de Informações e Segurança do Estado (SISE), which answers only to the president (Burke, 2019). Although the riot police are better paid and trained and less corrupt than the army, it is widely recognized that neither has the capacity to win the war. Frelimo’s guerrilla warfare tactics have been forgotten, and the riot police and army have not had effective counter-guerrilla training (Crisis Group, 2019). Initially, the government tried to conceal the events in Cabo Delgado and then treated it as merely criminal action to be dealt with by the police. As the war escalated, the paramilitary riot police under the Ministry of the Interior did much of the fighting on the government side. The dominance of the Ministry was highlighted by press conferences given by the head of police or the Interior Minister. The Interior Ministry contracted the Wagner Group and then the DAG. There have been major conflicts between the Defence Force and the Ministry of the Interior as a result. For example, the army refused to cooperate with the Wagner Group (Faleg, 2019).

Is a Purely Military Victory Possible? Studies of civil wars repeatedly point to group inequality and natural resource rents as central to the wars. Any definitive resolution to the war requires responding to the grievances. Thus far, Mozambique has singularly failed even to recognize the grievances (Haysom, 2018). A key problem is that the Cabo Delgado oligarchs partly responsible for the grievances are too powerful within the ruling Frelimo party, and Frelimo depends on its patronage network, which in turn depends on resource

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rents (Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 2019). Another issue repeatedly ignored by government is that human rights violations by soldiers and police have pushed local people to side with the insurgents. The police and army have been responsible for serious human rights abuses, ranging from beatings and killings of civilians to setting up roadblocks simply to collect tolls. This has turned local people against the armed forces and increased the number of recruits for the insurgents. Both sides appear to be trying to force people to flee, and virtually, the entire population from the war zone is now registered as internally displaced (Fabricus, 2018). Frelimo has increasingly appealed for international military and humanitarian support, but on narrow terms that ensures Frelimo remains in control. It does not want the Southern African Development Community (SADC), EU or UN peacekeeping missions involved as they are inevitably accompanied by political assessments, which will point to the failure to redress grievances and human rights violations. The EU Observer Mission’s critical report on the 2019 national elections was a harsh reminder of the power of international groups (European Union Election Observer Mission Mozambique, 2019). Instead, Frelimo wants to negotiate semi-secret agreements with individual governments and private military contractors to provide support to build Mozambique’s own military. The government wants humanitarian agreements with individual UN agencies to support the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. It also wants finances to cover its expenses. Frelimo and the government hope that by representing themselves as the victim of a global enemy, Islamic terrorists and a player in the new East–West Cold War, they will attract support without being closely scrutinized. They intend to end the war within a few years, while maintaining the rent system. However, the country’s history suggests that, without dealing with the many grievances, this will fail.

A Brief Case Study: Rwanda The African country of Rwanda has a long history of ethnic conflict. The most horrific display of violence occurred from April to July of 1994, between two of Rwanda’s ethnic groups: the Tutsi and the Hutu. The Rwandan Genocide, as it came to be known, was one of the bloodiest ethnic conflicts in history. The attempted extermination of the Tutsi by the Hutu people resulted in 800,000 deaths, the majority being Tutsi (Powers 386). One tool used to perpetuate the genocide

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was the radio, from which anti-Tutsi propaganda was transmitted. The programme Kangura, which translates to “Wake Up,” broadcasted “The Ten Commandments of the Hutu.” This propaganda device declared “All Tutsis are dishonest in business,” and “Hutu must stop taking pity on the Tutsi,” along with other disparaging statement (Powers 338–339). Four of these commandments referred to women, and Kangura portrayed Tutsi women as dangerous seductresses who thought that they were superior to the Hutu. This anti-Tutsi propaganda served to exaggerate the differences between the Hutu and Tutsi, and cause people to strongly identify with their own ethnicity. Therefore, when Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed after his plane was shot down on April 6, 1994, the Tutsi militia (The Rwandan Patriotic Front, a.k.a. the RPF) was blamed, and all Tutsis became the target of extreme violence. Both organized Hutu militia and nonmilitary citizens, who were armed with clubs and machetes, participate in the mass killing of Tutsi. Hutu turned against their Tutsi neighbours, as no Tutsi was to be spared, including women and children. One aspect of the genocide involved the mass rape of Tutsi women. These women were raped, forced to watch the murder of other family members and then often killed. Tutsi women who managed to survive these atrocities claimed that their Hutu rapists mentioned their ethnicity either before or during the act of rape. The words of the rapists reflected anti-Tutsi propaganda, as victims recall their perpetrators saying, “We want to see if a Tutsi woman is like a Hutu Woman,” and “You Tutsi women think that you are too good for us”. It is clear that much of the sexual violence was ethnically motivated, and that the Hutu who participated in the mass rape of Tutsi women were trying to humiliate and degrade the Tutsi people as a whole.

Causes of Conflict in Rwanda The conflict which has been devastating Rwanda for several decades is an identity-based conflict. There is an identity-based conflict when a human group is convinced, rightly or wrongly that it is threatened by another group “enemy” (or perceived as such) of disappearing or of being reduced physically or politically (Shyaka, 2003). That type of conflict generally breaks out between communities which have been living together for a long time and the frontlines are set up along identity distinctions, whether material or not (Thual, 1995). The identity-based conflict is therefore a

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conflict in which collective narcissisms confront each other. They crystallize on the basis of the sense of belonging to an ethnic group, a territory, a language, a religion and a culture. It could also be based on history, ideological constructions and political affiliations. The latter elements are specifically typical to the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda.

Bad Leadership and Bad Governance African problems are not only due to lack of good governance of the state. They are also related to lack of management and eradication of negative ideologies inherited from colonial times. Nepotism, clientelism, corruption and exclusion which have been practised by the successive powers in this country since it acceded to independence have led to social split and identity-based fission and, eventually, to the crystallization of conflictgenerating cleavages. The role of politicians continuously remains at the heat exacerbation of identity-based conflicts, which are tearing African peoples apart (Brown & Kane, 1994). Identity-based wars would not occur today in Rwanda if post-colonial leaders had not systematically built their political discourse on themes dividing communities. Bad governance as a causal factor has formed around three fundamental structures: a bad start of independences, unequal distribution of national resources and conflict-generating systems. When we take a panoramic look at African countries, we quickly realize that countries, which have been less affected by conflicts, are those, which managed to avoid chaos in the wake of their independence. Those who have had a very bad start of independence are still affected by the spiral of chronic crises (Shyaka, 2003). The three former Belgian colonies are a typical example. They successively became real political orphans due to the physical elimination of their leaders who incarnated and wanted to realize national unity. Since independence, the democratization of African countries has been a permanent demand from both African people and foreigners. And the continent has been attempting to start up the democratic process without success. Most of African countries have constantly adopted a model of democracy imported from the west and incompatible with their socio-cultural and political particularities. And partisan cleavages have permanently focused on identity. In such circumstances, ethnocracy has become the synonym of democracy and the former was preached as being the latter. Rwanda has failed to avoid turmoil from the idea of democracy,

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which was misunderstood and had a bad start. To cap it all, even some Western democracies pleaded for ethnocracy in Africa (Shyaka, 2003).

Injustice and Unequal Distribution of National Resource Poor management and unequal distribution of national resources are the epidemics that have been devastating Africa since independence, particularly in DRC. In Rwanda, the new political oligarchies monopolized the power and the resources of the young independent state on the basis of identity, be it “ethnic” (Hutu), regional (South, North) or other (Gordon-Bates, 1994). As a result, political powers favoured the climate of corruption, hegemony and exclusion. Jobs and schools were distributed unequally in favour of groups in power. This situation complicated social relations, resulting in frustration of the underprivileged and in crystallization of the sense of belonging to an identity, from crises and conflicts. Burundi did not do better and inequalities of opportunity arose around regionalism and ethnicism. The cleavage “North South” in Uganda was based also on unequal distribution of resources to which the country has failed to eliminate.

Colonization The colonial and missionary heritage as a causal factor of conflicts has developed along different perspectives, the ideological line, the theories about the populating of Rwanda, the institutional line related to the artificiality of the borders of states inherited from colonization and the political line based on “divide and rule” practices which have characterized colonial policies and which are at the root of the political instrumentalization of ethnicity in modern African states, in Rwanda in particular (Shyaka, 2003). Due to the idea they had of the local populations, to the racial theories and the mythologies they had introduced into colonies, the segregation judgements they practised, colonial powers— whether German or Belgian—and European missionaries passed on to Rwanda identity antagonisms which today are putting the country of the thousand hills to fire and sword. In his effort to “civilize” and dominate, the colonizer concocted a range of myths which have been the subject of several publications in the metropolis and which will be cultivated in colonies through instruction to such an extent that the interested persons

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themselves have ended up identifying themselves with them up to the present day. As the Rwandan society was organized into racial hierarchies, the Tutsis, the superior group by definition, became the “natural candidates” for assisting colonizers. Considered as inferior, the Hutus were condemned to be “naturally dominated.” The indirect colonial rule system, like a company director who recruits employees for his/her company branch, had no other option but to select the intermediaries among the elements who were “genetically the best” (Gordon-Bates, 1994). Those ideological convictions of racial inequality and genetic and natural domination have sown the seeds of social injustice and, when applied to the local administration, they have undermined the social fabric (Shyaka, 2003). The privileges granted arbitrarily to some and often to the detriment of others have resulted in frustrations, by transforming ethnicity into a political phenomenon. Belgians in their colonies, following the example of the British, the French or the Portuguese, have not hesitated to apply the “divide and rule” principle with the purpose of not only having their representatives on the ground but also better submitting them. In several African countries, faced with the resistance and the reluctance from some relatively strong groups, the colonizer has managed to neutralize them by alienating them or by opposing them to other weak ethnic groups on the pretense of liberating them from oppression (Shyaka, 2003).

Conclusion Communities will demand independence and self-determination when they consider that their value systems are no longer taken sufficiently into account by the society in which they have formed a part and the elites which rule it. Therefore, it is desirable that African leadership can and should rise and take up the challenge by working towards development for the benefit of all citizens of the continent. Politics of cultural plurality has sensitized that the more fairly a society is organized, the more the people tend to forget about the particularism that divide them. Conversely, the more unfairly a society is organized, the more its citizens revive and cling to all manner of cleavages of deep segmentation and the more conflicts arise. Africa should work towards getting out of the zone of turmoil, characterized by poverty, repression and war, in which it

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has existed all along, into zone of peace, in which can be found peaceful, democratic and wealthy nations.

Recommendations However diverse the conflicts in Africa are, it is becoming increasingly clear that these conflicts cannot be contained within the present state frameworks, especially with the very terrible cases of state failure such as in Somalia, Sudan and Congo (DRC). Notwithstanding, some ideas are being advanced which may help to solve this problem. Continental Development Imperative Instead of consistently blaming the woes of the continent on colonialism, slave trade and the like, African leaders should take the challenge and work towards the development of the continent for the benefit of Africans. While working towards such a stable environment, more analysis has to be made about this great idea of democratization. What must be noted is that democracy can only be nurtured in a stable and secure society, but cannot be sustained in the midst of social turmoil and political instability. It is good leadership that brings development and prosperity and ultimately eliminates conflicts. African countries have to find answers to their conflicts by comprehending and understanding the underlying causes and histories of these conflicts and work out ways of averting potential conflicts. This can be done, just as in the case of ACDESS, by undertaking case studies of conflicts in countries, with a view to developing appropriate and realistic policies towards averting conflicts in the continent. This is a bold step in the right direction. It is clear that Africa is being rediscovered and it should be prepared for a new scramble, albeit in a positive direction, as world powers would not wish to be left out of this new scramble which was to, in the words of former US President Bill Clinton, “complete the circle of history… to reach across the Atlantic to build a new partnership based on friendship and respect.”

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New Conflict Management Ways Finally, it is important that Africans develop new ways of conflict management. It is true that artificial societies created by colonialism in which different nationalities, ethnic groups and tribes were forcibly yoked together cannot be wielded in peaceful nation-states that can be stable and prosperous, and the problem is not peculiarly African; deeply segmented societies exist virtually everywhere. The mere presence of many ethnic groups in a country does not necessarily bring about internal stability, animosity and conflicts. What makes the difference between stable plural societies and unstable ones is usually the response of the leadership to the fact of multinationalism.

Solution to the Problem of Wars and Conflicts in Africa As a way out of the predicament of wars and conflicts that have bedevilled Africa, it is apt to offer some valuable suggestions based on a thorough analysis of the causes of the problem. In this wise, two major broad solutions may be experimented with to bail Africa out of recurrent conflicts and wars. These are committed and sincere leadership and eradication of poverty. • Committed and Sincere Leadership African states need committed and sincere leaders that will lead by example and who act as good, responsible and responsive fathers to all the component sections and peoples in their countries so as to promote peace and harmony within the confines of their respective countries. This can be done in a number of ways: (i)(i) Even distribution of resources African leaders must ensure an even distribution of resources among the various geo-political zones in their countries. Marginalization of one unit/ group should not be allowed in order to win the support and cooperation of all and sundry and to avoid any feeling of alienation.

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(ii)(ii) Promotion of rule of law African leaders should also endeavour to promote the rule of law. This involves equal access to justice by all citizens irrespective of their status, respect for court decisions by the government and influential, and conduct of free and fair periodic elections among others. When and where leaders promote the rule of law as indicated above, there are a guarantee of peaceful coexistence among people and a peaceful transition of power from one government to the other. Succession dispute-related conflicts that are very rampant in Africa may thus be easily eliminated. (iii)(iii) Protection of Fundamental Human rights African leaders should also promote, protect and guarantee the fundamental human rights of their citizens. In particular, the fundamental rights of freedom of speech, association and religion should be guaranteed. People should be free to assess and criticize the performance of government without fear of persecution. Opposition must be tolerated while the fourth realm of government, the press, must not be censured. In this wise governments would always be kept on her toes to provide qualitative and sincere leadership in their countries. (iv)(iv) Eradication of Poverty Without much controversy, one may boldly declare that poverty is the root of all evils in Africa. A poor person, who has been economically humiliated and financially traumatized, may not be said to be in his/her right senses. Hence, it may be apt to observe that a hungry person is a mad man. He/she can steal, kill, maim and destroy. Poverty can demean a person and affect his/her psychology negatively. Hence, a major policy instrument for peace and stability in Africa that is riddled with wars and conflicts is the eradication or at worst, a reduction of the monster of poverty. This can be achieved in a number of ways as suggested below: (v)(v) Equal access to qualitative education Governments in Africa should give their citizens equal access to qualitative education. The importance of education to the socio-economic

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development of a nation has been well articulated in the Millennium Development Goal. Education, no doubt, is a lever to human and societal development. Apart from imparting skill and knowledge in the citizens, it will also eliminate ignorance. Education will also empower citizens for employment in the future. It makes labour more mobile across the globe. Opportunities for survival are very much available to the educated people (Aremu, Johnson Olaosebikan 2010, pp. 549–560). (vi)(vi) Gender-Sensitive Resource Distribution Ethnic conflicts have been exacerbated due to gender differences. This has led to the subjugation of women. This paper recommends the empowerment of women through equitable distribution of resources. Resources should be distributed equally among women and man such that chances of women subjugation are limited. If women are empowered, instances of the abuse of women will be limited.

References Aremu, J. O. (2010, October). African research review: An international multidisciplinary. Journal Ethiopia, 4(4), Serial No. 17. Burke, J. (2019, October 15). Mozambique election is ‘test for democracy’ in wake of peace deal. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/ 15/mozambique-election-in-test-for-democracy-in-wake-of-peace-deal Brown, L., & Kane, H. (1994). Rwanda: Behind the headlines. Unpublished manuscript, Worldwatch Institute. Club Mozambique. (2019, October 14). CNE says 10 polling stations cannot open in Cabo Delgado. Crisis Group. (2019). Mozambique October 2019 Crisis Group (2018) Mozambique Tracking Conflict. Darch, C. (2016). Separatist tensions and violence in the ‘model post-conflict state’: Mozambique since the 1990s. Review of African Political Economy, 43(148), 320–327. European Union Election Observer Mission Mozambique. (2019). EU deploys EOM to Mozambique European Union Election Observer Mission Mozambique (2019) Mozambique Preliminary Statement. Fabricus, P. (2018, November 20). Mozambique’s apparent Islamist insurgency poses multiple threats. Institute for Security Studies. Faleg, G. (2019). Conflict prevention in Mozambique: Can there be peace after the storm? European Union Institute for Security Studies.

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Geopolitical Intelligence Services. (2019). Mozambique: The biggest corruption case in Africa. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/mozambique-the-biggestcorruption-case-in-africa,politics,2878.html Gordon-Bates, K. (1994, October). The hard lessons of Rwanda. Crosslines, 2(4– 5), 1–6. Haysom, S. (2018). Where crime compounds conflict: Understanding northern Mozambique’s vulnerabilities. Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime. Lee, S. W. (2019). Mozambique’s Resource Curse, Berkeley Political Review. https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2019/12/03/mozambiques-resource-curse/ Littlejohn, G. (2015). Secret stockpiles: Arms caches and disarmament efforts in Mozambique. Small Arms Survey. Machave, B. (2018, October 7). Mozambique’s tense elections: How we got here? African Arguments. Mavengano, E. (2022). Rethinking the boundaries of self-Other and the logics of de/ coloniality in Harare North and One Foreigner’s Ordeal: A decolonial perspective. ACTA Academia, 54(2), 95–114. Mavengano, E., Marevesa, T., & Nkamta, N. P. (2022). Religion and language as a panacea to peacebuilding and development in Zimbabwe: A critical discourse analysis approach. Language Discourse and Society, 10(2), 23–34. Mavhinga, B. (2019). Broad amnesty in Mozambique likely to fuel future abuses. Human Rights Watch. Regalia, S. (2017). The resurgence of conflict in Mozambique: Ghosts from the past and brakes to peaceful. Institut Français des Relations Internationales. Shyaka, A. (2003). Conflits en Afrique des Grands Lacs et Esquisse de leur Résolution, Varsovie, Ed. Dialog. Thual, F. (1995). Les conflits identitaires. Ellipses, passim.

PART III

The Media and Political Deceit in Postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa (11–14)

CHAPTER 11

Survival of the Private Media Under Zimbabwe’s Politico-Economic Crises Pedzisai Ruhanya and Bekezela Gumbo

Introduction Justifying the Focus The chapter focuses on how private journalists at the two-leading privately run publishing houses, ANZ and AMH, navigated and survived the dual economic and political crises in Zimbabwe focusing on the period between 2013 and 2018. The chapter looks at how journalists faced with poor salaries, salary cuts and late salary payments survive and how that impact on the journalists’ ethics of accuracy and fairness, the right to reply, right to privacy, impartiality, fair comment, protection of

P. Ruhanya (B) Department of Creative Media and Communication, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] B. Gumbo University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_11

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sources, promoting and protecting the public interest and national security. The impact of the journalists’ economic turbulence on the quality and content of AMH and ANZ publications is also interrogated. The chapter contributes to the larger body of literature on the impact of big corporates and powerful elites’ relationship with journalists in the context of an economic crisis and how that affects the journalist’s capacity to play their agenda setting and watchdog roles to serve the public interest. Using Habermas’s public sphere theory, the chapter interrogates the role and capacity of the private press under an economic crisis to broaden, democratise the public sphere so that it is accessible to serve the public interest of making those in power accountable. The main thesis is that politico-economic decay in Zimbabwe has created a political culture of deceit in the media which affects the role and ethics of journalists. The Dual Transition Crisis underpinning the Public Sphere in Zimbabwe The dual crises underpinning the public sphere in Zimbabwe have, on the one hand, been a struggle to transition from a securocratic state characterized by deterioration in rule of law, closure of the civic and democratic space, disputed elections and violation of human rights (Gumbo & Ruhanya, 2022; Makumbe, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). While, on the other hand, it has been a struggle to transition from socioeconomic underdevelopment challenges such as high unemployment, corruption, deteriorating service delivery and decline in real gross domestic product have defined the Zimbabwe state post-2000 (Chitiyo et al., 2016; Makumbe, 2009). I. The Political Crisis The genealogy of this political and economic crisis is traceable to the turn of the century due to, among other things, a result of the failed Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAP) implemented in 1990, attempts to impose a one party-state and involvement in regional war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998, democratic deficits and rising poverty among the working class, student and workers’ strikes, and civil society organizations calling for constitutional reforms (Hammar & Raftopoulos, 2003; Saunders, 2000, 2011). Mustapha and

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Whitefield (2009, p. 216) submitted that by the late 1990s and then more rapidly after 2000, “the logic of the Zimbabwean state was rapidly transformed. With a worsening economic crisis and the strictures of structural adjustment, the state became partisan as it strove to maintain control”. Alexander (2009, p. 189) suggests that ZANU PF’s strategies of the mid-1990s left it politically vulnerable. Structural adjustment, a stalled land reform programme, declining state capacity and accountability, and elite corruption combined to undermine the political capital derived from the delivery of development and the nationalist mandate. The situation worsened after ZANU PF lost parliamentary elections in 2008 and a disputed presidential election that led to the inclusive government in 2009 (Mapuva, 2017). The 2013 election though won by ZANU PF did not resolve the economic and political crisis but was actually worsened by the power struggles to succeed Mugabe that began in 2014 (Mapuva, 2017). In the absence of a vibrant economy and a government that frowns upon the private media for being oppositional and promoting regime change, examining how the private press navigated the dual economic and political crisis facing the state is of critical interest. The period under investigation was preceded by the formation of a government of national unity in 2009 between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and two formations opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations following a disputed presidential election outcome of June 2008 (Alexander, 2009). The unity government lasted until 2013 when ZANU PF regained its control of state politics after winning disputed elections that year. However, the victory of ZANU PF did not turn around the economic fortunes of the state as unemployment continued to rise and capacity utilization of industries deteriorated due to lack of foreign direct investment in the country (Mapuva, 2017). The liquidity crisis became the order of the day as banks ran short of cash to dispense to their customers. Cash queues became a daily phenomenon during that period. The economic crisis was marked by an equally acute political crisis in the ruling ZANU PF around succession to the ageing President Robert Mugabe which began with the firing of the then Vice President Joyce Mujuru in 2014 and later Vice President Mnangagwa on 6 November 2017 and the subsequent military coup that toppled Mugabe on 15 November and his forced resignation on 21 November 2017 (Ruhanya & Gumbo, 2022). Figure 11.1 below illustrates the state of the political crisis that serves as the background undergirding the role of private media in the Habermas’ public sphere in Zimbabwe.

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The State of Political stability

The state of the Rule of law

-2

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Mugabe Era 2004 2008

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Fig. 11.1 State of Political Crisis in Zimbabwe (Source Average analysis of IEP’s Global Peace Index and World Bank’s Rule of Law Index1 )

II. The Economic Crisis The economy of the state was badly damaged by the political crisis. For instance, in 2006, inflation rate was 1,184,6% and it increased to + 11,000,000% by July 2008 (Makumbe, 2009). The inflation went on despite the government’s unorthodox monitory policies such as introduction of bearer cheques and re-basing of the Zimbabwe currency by deleting three zeros (Makumbe, 2009). Poverty levels shot up from 27% in the early 1980s to above 90% in the late 2000s. Increase in unemployment was estimated above 80% in 2008 (Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions [ZCTU] 2008 in Makumbe, 2009). Many people lost their savings through these government policies. This created distrust of government across the Zimbabwean society which was mainly evidenced by increased number of citizens queuing to withdraw all their earnings from their banks and take them home, increased number of citizens opening offshore accounts to put their savings and increased number of citizens who banked huge sums of cash at home evident in amounts of 1 These figures are an average score for each segment. Rule of law index interpretation: (−2.5 weak; 2.5 strong); political stability index interpretation: weighted on a scale of 1–5, the lower the score the more peaceful the country.

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cash taken by armed robbers in houses and home-made money safes in Zimbabwe (Chitiyo, et al., 2016). The corresponding poor performance of ZANU PF in 2000 and 2008 elections testified the decaying political legitimacy of the ruling elite in Zimbabwe. Figure 11.2 below gives a comparative analysis of key indicators of the state of the economy between the Mugabe era, GNU era and the Mnangagwa era. During the political power struggles in the ruling party that became vicious between 2014 and November 2017, Zimbabwe’s economy was hugely affected by the uncertainties as many companies closed down. The economic performance of the state had huge impact on the business performance of the private press in the country as many businesses closed down while others became informal (International Crisis Group, 2018). The 30 July 2018 election that followed shortly after the 2017 coup détat was a critical juncture to legitimate President Mnangagwa’s authority within his party, the country and externally (International Crisis Group, 2018). Unfortunately, the results were disputed by the opposition, election observers and citizens who on 1 August 2018 protested in the streets of Harare (Motlante Commission Report, 2019). In response, the Mnangagwa government unleashed the military which shot and killed at-least 6 unarmed citizens and injured 35 (International Crisis Group, 2018;

Average Human development

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Fig. 11.2 State of Economic Crisis in Zimbabwe (Source Average UNDP HDI and World Bank GDP Growth rate 2018)

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Motlante Commission Report, 2019). Although the government instituted a the Motlante Commission of Inquiry into these atrocities, it failed to redeem the eroded internal and external legitimacy as the commission’s recommendations were never implemented (Motlante Commission Report, 2019). Thus, in this context, this chapter considers how the private press and its journalists operated, survived and safeguarded journalism ethics under this dual and simultaneous economic and political instability and the attendant public sphere.

The Press in Zimbabwe’s Dual Crisis The media system in Zimbabwe like in many African states, before the early 1990s, was primarily national and government controlled focusing on national development (Ansah, 1991). The focus of the state-run newspapers was national development and the de-racialization of the political economy long dominated by a white colonial minority population. However, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund guided structural adjustment and liberalization of the economy that began in 1991, efforts to democratize and open up the media to private sector investment began to take shape in the 1990s with the emergence of privately owned commercial newspapers like The Independent in 1996; a weekly financial newspaper and its sister publication The Standard in 1997 published every Sunday by AMH. In 1998, ANZ, a private media publishing house, was formed and began publishing two main newspapers, The Daily News (1999) and The Daily News on Sunday (2001), which were a daily and weekly publications, respectively. Chuma (2005) submits that from the late 1990s, the private print media in the newly liberalized, privatized and de-regulated but restrictive, polarized media and often repressive and violent political environment rapidly diversified and pluralized giving the citizens alternative voices other than the government voice that was disseminated by state-controlled Zimpapers publications such as The Herald, The Chronicle daily papers and The Sunday Mail and The Sunday News weekly publications supported by the monopoly of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television (ZBC-TV). Apart from an unstable economic environment, the media in Zimbabwe operates under a battery of laws targeting the private media in order to exclude critical perspectives on the governance situation (Chiumbu & Moyo, 2009). Laws that undermined the performance

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of news media included the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) of 2002, which among other things compelled journalists and media institutions practising in Zimbabwe to register with a government-appointed commission. Matsilele and Ruhanya (2021) observe that Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) of 2001 entrenched the monopoly of the sole state broadcaster, the ZBC while the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002 infringed on the exercise of fundamental civil and political liberties by making it unlawful to assemble, protest or demonstrate without police clearance.

Methodology This study is a qualitative study utilizing in-depth interviews from purposively sampled journalists from the two publications. Ten journalists were chosen on the basis of their experience, positions and willingness to provide critical information on the operations of the two newspapers during the period under investigation. The semi-structured interviews in order to allow flexibility in interviewing the respondents. These interviews were done between February and March 2023. The use of a qualitative method was to preserve and analyse in the situated form, content and experiences of social action, rather than to subject it to mathematical or other formal transformations. Lindlof and Taylor (2002) argue that actual talk and gestures are some of the raw materials of analysis in qualitative studies. The research participants were ANZ and AMH journalists from The Daily News, Daily News on Sunday, The Financial Gazette, The Independent, The Standard and Newsday. The research was done in Zimbabwe, mainly in Harare, the capital city. Data were recorded using a voice recorder and written notes were taken as backup. Liamputtong (2009) argues that interviews in social science research are understood as special conversations, while Holstein and Gubrium (2003), cited in Liamputtong (2009, p. 42), suggest that “interviewing is a means of collecting empirical data about the social world of individuals by inviting them to talk about [their] lives in great depth”. An important observation in this chapter is that the researcher heard the perspectives of research participants in their own words, and came to know about their economic circumstances and how they circumvented them in order to survive. The research provides the authentic voices and stories of the lived circumstances of the research participants in an economy under distress and recession. The process of interviewing is one in which researchers

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continually make choices that are based on the scope of the research, interests and prior theories about which data they intend to extract and explore further with the research participants and the data they do not want to pursue (Jones, 1985, p. 47). However, Jones cautions that in carrying out the interviews, ambiguity should be avoided (1985, p. 47). Jones argues that researchers are more likely to get useful data if respondents are informed at the outset about the research topic, even in broad terms, and provided with justification for the researcher’s interest in the investigation. The research was to understand the impact of the economic crisis on the welfare of journalists and how journalism ethics are protected or compromised. The journalists reveal openly that there were no longer ethics to protect as journalists openly take bribes from sources thereby compromising their profession and the content of the publications.

Media and the Public Sphere Theoretical Perspective Regardless of how one evaluates the functions and performance of the media, it is advanced that media institutions have become the major platforms and the privileged scenes of political activities (Dahlgren, 2009, p. 35). Habermas submitted that: The public sphere we mean first of all, a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A position of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a body… Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion – that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly, and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions –about matters of general interest … In a large public body, this kind of communication requires specific means of transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. (2006, p. 73)

Today, newspapers and magazines, radios and television are the media of the public sphere. Discussions about media and their service to democracy are usually framed by notions of the “public sphere” which emphasize that the media must provide citizens with information, ideas and debates about current affairs to ensure that the public are informed as they participate in democratic political processes (Dahlgren, 2009, p. 34). Habermas’

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idea of the public sphere, defined as a metaphorical space where access to information affecting the public good, is available, where discussion is ideally free from domination, and participation is on equal basis, is part of the critical role that the media play in a democratic society (Curran, 2002). The media facilitate the formation of a public sphere by providing an arena for public debate and by reconstituting private citizens as a public body in the form of public opinion. However, while Habermas’ idea of the public sphere illuminates debate on the significance of the media in democratic discourses, it is not without limitations. Fraser (2007) notes that the concept of the public sphere was developed not simply to understand communication flows but also to contribute to a normative political theory of democracy. Hence a public sphere is conceived as an inclusive and fair space for the communicative generation of ideas, where publicity is supposed to discredit views that cannot withstand robust scrutiny and to assure the legitimacy of those views that do. In mobilizing the considered sense of civil society, publicity is supposed to hold public officials accountable and to assure that the actions of the state express the will of the citizenry (Fraser, 2007). Fraser criticized the concept of the public sphere for failing to acknowledge women and those subaltern groups in society which did not have access to it. More so, the concept of the public sphere fails to recognize that society is stratified and people have unequal access to resources and public forums. She also offers the perspective the state has multinationals, multi-residential citizens and therefore has no-bounded community as in the Westphalian State, as Habermas posited (Fraser, 2007). From the findings of this chapter, the concept of the public sphere is undermined by corrupt journalism practices such as taking bribes by journalism to circumvent the effects of the deteriorating economic situation in the country. The role and power of big corporate businesses and rich political elites in Zimbabwe have also contributed to the practices of unethical journalism as they are often times accused of paying bribes journalists to under play their watchdog and investigative rule taking advantage of their poor working conditions as a result of a failing economy.

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Findings Using Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, this study argues that the unethical practices have eroded, “the public sphere as a sphere which mediates between society and state, in which the public organises itself as a bearer of public opinion, accords with the principle of the public sphere— that principle of the public information which once had to be fought against and arcane policies of monarchies and which since the times has made possible the democratic control of state activities” (Habermas, 2006, p. 74). McQuail (2005) argues that the power of the press arose from its ability to give or withhold publicity and its informative capacity and that the most crucial freedom was to report and comment on the deliberations, assemblies and acts of governments. Press freedom becomes a cornerstone of representative democracy. Under circumstances where the business and political elites capture journalists and their institutions as they strife to survive effects of a “casino” economy, the adversarial, watchdog and agenda setting role of the media are eroded and the service of the media to the nurturing and broadening of democratic values especially in developing contexts such as Zimbabwe hardly exists.

Impact of the Economic Turmoil on Journalism Ethics A senior editor with the Zimbabwe Independent, a publication of AMH and an executive of the Zimbabwe National Editors Forum decried the impact of the economic crisis on the operations of the media. “As we speak, Zimbabwe’s media sector is going through serious economic times as leading companies, including Zimbabwe Newspapers Group (Zimpapers), Alpha Media holdings (AMH), Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ) and the state-run Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) are forced to retrench, slash salaries and embrace convergence as part of restructuring, downsizing and cost-cutting measures for survival” (Interview with senior editor of Zimbabwe Independent). He said that the decline in traditional print and profits in mainstream media as audiences migrate online has caused newsrooms to shrink their staff and sizes. The editor said media houses including AMH are struggling to pay workers on time due growing gap between their cost structures and revenue bases due to structural changes on the media landscape, technological advances and struggling economy.

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The editor argued that as the media newsrooms and budgets shrink, investigative journalism has suffered because genuine diversity and pluralism in Zimbabwe largely exist in the print and online media. He pointed out that: “Due to the viability problems, poor remuneration and delayed salaries, journalists in Zimbabwe are now increasingly compromising ethics. Professional standards are no longer observed as they used to be. As a result, the quality of writing and reporting is going down, partly because professional journalists, amateurs and lay persons operating online now co-exist as anyone can wake up and publish, unfortunately in the name of journalism. We are dealing with serious cases of bribes by journalists in newsrooms as a result of the declining economy where journalists are becoming uncouth in order to survive. There is no more investigative journalism to pride ourselves as professionals” (Ibid). A former editor of ANZ publishers of the privately controlled the Daily News and the Daily News On Sunday observed that taking bribes by journalists threatens the capacity of the media to watch the activities of powerful people in society. He said that the role of corporate and political elite bullies taking advantage of the poor living conditions of journalists due to poor economic conditions to avoid public scrutiny and accountability has eroded the journalists’ capacity to make those in power accountable as critical stories are not reported in exchange for money paid to poor journalists. The ANZ editor narrated his personal experience with an unnamed corporate institution that attempted to bribe him so that he could write and publish favourable stories about a senior politician of the ruling ZANU PF party during battles for succession before former President Robert Mugabe was ousted by the army in November 2017. “Salaries of journalists are poor. Most journalists earn less than US 700 dollars. I was asked by a bank to write positive stories about President Mnangagwa and get paid a monthly salary of US 5000 but I refused. A poorly paid journalist would take it. In circumstances like this where the salaries that are mostly delayed due to operational problems journalists take bribes to survive. They have families to look after and the money is inadequate and big corporates and the powerful elites take advantage and offer bribes. We have corporate bullies like Econet, National Social Security Authority and Delta Beverages. They tell you to kill a story in order to get advertisements. We did that in order to survive” (Interview with ANZ former editor).

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In this regard, Habermas submitted that only when the exercise of political control “is effectively subordinated to the democratic demand that information be accessible to the public, does the political public sphere win institutionalized influence over the government through the instruments of law making bodies” further arguing that, “the expression of public opinion refers to the task of criticism and control which a public body of citizens informally—and in periodic elections, formally as well— practices vis-à-vis the ruling structure organized in the form of a state” (Habermas, 2006, p. 74). This paper argues that the public sphere as mediated by the press through publications of ANZ and AMH is undermined by stifling of freedom of expression through bribes as journalists seek to survive in a deteriorating economic environment. A senior journalist with AMH’s Newsday argues that because of the economic deterioration, corporate interference and efforts by management of private press to appease state authorities in order to avoid closure of newspapers for failing to pay statutory obligations such as taxes and pension contribution, the role of the press as the fourth estate questionably exists. “There is no more role of the media as the fourth estate under these hard-economic conditions. The media is no longer playing its watchdog role. Journalists are compromised because they take bribes in order to survive. Imagine a situation where a journalist has not been paid for three months and someone offers a bribe of US 1 000 dollars to kill a story, do you think the journalist will leave the money and proceed with an empty stomach when family that wants to pay bills, buy food and send children to school? It is not possible and the truth of the matter is that bribes are taken and, in the process, weaken the role of the media in a democratic state particularly during the political transition Zimbabwe is grappling with where political players should be made to account by providing accurate information to the citizens” (Interview with senior AMH journalist). In this regard, the journalist observes that the workplace has become a medium not for earning salaries and protecting professional growth and ethics but an aberration of the same and a platform advance the livelihoods of journalists using company resources for corrupt practices as the effects the economic crisis bites companies, workers and journalism practices (Ibid).

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Political Polarization and Ethical Journalism Decay in Zimbabwe The ethical decay in journalism has a political inclination given the inter and intra political polarization and factional politics in the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and opposition political parties like Citizens Coalition for Change and once main opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T). Private press journalists argue what causes the decay is a collapsing economy that the political actors are taking advantage of. “Most journalists have their politicians that they protect and promote across and within political parties in Zimbabwe. Usually we don’t mix our clients to avoid being exposed for double dealing. This situation was prevalent during the succession power struggles in ZANU PF that culminated in the November 2017 military takeover and the struggles for power following the death of opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai in February 2018”, observed a senior reporter who preferred to be called Tawanda who works for AMH The Standard newspaper. “If you look at political stories on factionalism in ZANU PF that the private press writes you would not believe that its carried by the usually opposition media. The same applies to stories about power struggles in the MDC after Tsvangirai’s death. The level of partisanship and polarized stories show you that reporters are taking bribes. The stories can’t be spiked because it’s a chain of people in the editorial team that are bribed. You can see that there are reporters for ZANU PF, MDC and their different factions” (Interview with Tawanda). A former news editor of ANZ said that the level of political embeddedness has compromised professional ethics. “When you have journalists behaving like political commissars of political parties it compromises issues of fairness and accuracy, the right of reply, impartiality and protection of sources that are cardinal ethics of journalism. As editors, we have to be extra careful and robust to keep our papers credible” (Interview with former ANZ news editor). An ANZ senior journalist said envelope journalism to protect the political interests of the elite and economically powerful opposition was rampant as a result of the deteriorating economic situation in Zimbabwe. “At the Daily News at times we report like the state-controlled newspapers against top politicians and government officials because some journalists are on the pay roll of politicians. Bribes are rampant as journalists struggle

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with their lives because of poor salaries and bad working conditions. If someone offers me United States 5000 dollars to kill a story, I will do so because my family needs food. Even an offer of US 200 dollars can stop reporting a public interest story such as public-sector corruption. Very few journalists now write critical investigative stories against powerful politician” (Interview with ANZ senior journalist). A news reporter with AMH suggested that what explains the resilience of some journalists to remain at work even if they have three months’ salary arrears is because, “moonlighting using company facilities keep journalists at work. It is no longer shameful for journalists to publicly talk about bribes by their sources because that is how some journalists survive in this collapsing economy” (Interview AMH news reporter). An executive of the Zimbabwe Editors Forum decries the economic disruptions on the viability and strength of the media pointing out that the disruptions have serious implications for ethics, professional standards and media regulation in an environment where authorities sometimes resort to arrests and the use of draconian libel laws to muzzle and silence journalist. “A strong media is critical for every society. It is of vital importance for Zimbabwe. So, the disruptions and unethical practices such as bribes need to be guarded against. The media needs to be protected not only from disruptions but also from political and commercial influences, as well as social interest groups” (Interview with Zimbabwe Editors Forum executive). This view is shared by a senior journalist at ANZ who preferred to be identified as Nyasha who observed that, “The few big companies including government entities that are commercially viable wield enormous power because of the advertising revenue they offer. These entities demand positive coverage in return for advertisements. They tell newspapers what they want published and it is rare to read stories that scrutinize their business management” (Interview with Nyasha). The interviews from the respondents who are from the private press in Zimbabwe that has a history of confronting abuses by both the state and the corporate sector suggest that the compromise on ethical journalism in Zimbabwe due to the economic crisis would affect free flow of information necessary to protect the public interest. In such circumstances, newspapers and journalists as critical elements of democratizing the public sphere are weakened, and the public interest is left vulnerable to the vagaries of the powerful political and economic elites.

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Conclusion This study reveals important role of the media especially an ethical press that is able to hold those in power accountable at a period when Zimbabwe is undergoing a dual political and economic crisis happening simultaneously. As discovered in this research, a private press that is captured by commercial and political elites in search of profits and political power at the expense of service to the public interest to access information and to use that information to make the powerful accountable becomes as an anathema to the democratic role of the media. When journalists openly take bribes from the political elites and when the corporate sector uses their commercial power of giving advertisements to publications in a bid to force journalists to fail their watchdog and agenda setting roles, the impact of the economic crisis has undesirable consequences to the nurturing of a democratic state. From the study, it can be argued that the economic crisis weakens the ability and capacity of journalists to play their watchdog, adversarial and agenda setting roles. These roles are critical in the service and nurturing of a democratic society, especially in developing contexts such as Zimbabwe. The study reveals that the philosophical underpinnings of free speech in a democratic society can be undermined by deteriorating economic conditions that undermine the ethical practices of journalism. The study shows that understandings of the political economy of the media and journalistic practices are not universal. Using Western lenses to critique journalism practices in developing contexts may not be helpful. Curran and Park (2000, p. 3) have challenged what they described as the parochialism of “western media theory”. They assert that it has become routine for universalistic observations of the media to be advanced in English texts on the basis of evidence found in very few countries. However, the world is changing in ways that make this narrowness unsustainable, positing that globalization, the Cold War, the rise of the Asian economy, the emergence of centres of media that are alternative to places like Hollywood, and the general growth of media studies across the world, require a different analysis. The ethical practices of journalists in a developed economy are arguably different from those such as Zimbabwe where the public has been compromised by unethical practices such as bribe taking. When journalists are bribed as shown in this study, ethical and professional considerations such as right to reply, fair comment and accurate reporting in the public interest are compromised, and the public becomes the victims of manipulated and muzzled information. In this

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regard, it was recommended that the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists (ZUJ) and the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe (VMCZ) working with the statutory body, the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) work together to establish an agreed ethical code that guides how journalists operate. This is important because a profession without an ethical code can easily discredit the operation of a critical pillar, the media whose functions are valuable in the service of a democratic society.

References Alexander, J. (2009). Zimbabwe since 1997, Land and the language of war. In A. Mustapha & L. Whitefield (Eds.), Turning point in African democracy. James Currey. Ansah, P. (1991). Blueprint for freedom. Journal of index on Censorship, 20(9), 3–88. Chitiyo, K., Vines, A., & Vandome, C. (2016). The domestic and external implications of Zimbabwe’s economic reform and re-engagement agenda. Chatham House. Chiumbu, S., & Moyo, D. (2009). Media, politics and power: Re-gearing policy and propaganda in crisis Zimbabwe. In K. Orgeret & H. Ronning (Eds.), The power of communication (pp. 179–216). Oslo Academic Press. Chuma, W. (2005). Zimbabwe: The media market failure and political turbulence. Equid Novi, 26(1), 46–62. Curran, J. (2002). Media and power. Rutledge. Curran, J., & Park, M. (Eds.). (2000). De-westernizing media studies. Routledge. Dahlgren, P. (2009). Media and political engagement, citizens, communication and democracy. Cambridge University Press. Fraser, N. (2007). Transnationalizing the public sphere: On the legitimacy and efficacy of public opinion in a post-Westphalian World. http://eipcp.net/transv ersal/0605/fraser/en. Accessed 10 March 2023. Habermas, J. (2006). The public sphere: An encyclopaedia article. In M. Gigi & D. Douglas (Eds.), Media and cultural studies: Key works. Blackwell Publishing. Hammar, A., & Raftopoulos, B. (2003). Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: Rethinking land, state and nation in Zimbabwe’s Unfinished business, rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crisis. Weaver Press. Jones, S. (1985). Depth interviews. In R. Walker (Ed.), Applied quantitative research. Gower. Liamputtong, F. (2009). Qualitative research methods. Oxford University Press. Lindolf, T., & Taylor, B. (2002). Qualitative communication research methods. Sage.

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Makumbe, J. (2009). The impact of democracy in Zimbabwe: Assessing political, social and economic developments since the dawn of democracy. Mapuva, J. (2017). Zimbabwe’s economic interventionist policies: Critical issues and perspectives. African Review, 44(2), 29–49. Matsilele, T., & Ruhanya, P. (2021). Social media dissidence and activist resistance in Zimbabwe. Media, Culture & Society, 43(2), 381–394. McQuail, D. (2005). Mass communication theory (5th ed.). Sage. Mustapha, A., & Whitefield, L. (Eds.). (2009). Turning points in African democracy. James Currey Press. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2003). Dynamics of the Zimbabwe crisis in the 21st century. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 3(1), 99–134. Pigou, P., & Africa, S. (2018). Tensions rise ahead of Zimbabwe’s elections. Report from International Crisis Group, 27 . Ruhanya, P., & Gumbo, B. (2022). The securocratic state: Conceptualising the transition problem in Zimbabwe. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 1–19. Saunders, R. (2000). Zimbabwe’s growth towards democracy 1980–2000. Edwina Spicer Production. Saunders, R. (2011). Zimbabwe: Liberation nationalism–old and born-again. Review of African Political Economy, 38(127), 123–134. Watch, C. (2019). COMMISSIONS WATCH 31 January Motlante Commission of Inquiry Report.

CHAPTER 12

Digital Authoritarianism in Postcolonial Nigeria: Internet Control Techniques and Censorship Desmond Onyemechi Okocha, Maureen Chigbo, and Melchizedec J. Onobe

Introduction Digital authoritarianism, based on the authoritarian theory of mass communication, is where the media is influenced and overpowered by power and authority in the nations (Bajracharya, 2018). The authoritarian concept is anchored on the belief that the media must respect and work in accordance with the wishes of authorities, although not under direct control of the state or ruling classes and cannot work independently and their works are subjected to censorship (Bajracharya, 2018). In the evolution of mass media in Nigeria from the colonial era through the long years of military rule, which ended in 1999 and the commencement of the civilian administration till date, there has always

D. O. Okocha (B) · M. Chigbo · M. J. Onobe Bingham University, New Karu, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_12

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been an attempt by successive governments to muzzle or control the press. Under various governments the instruments of control have largely been through legislation, physical surveillance, banning or closure, and other security measures including destruction of property (printed copies of Newspapers and magazines). However, with the advent of digital technology, especially in the last decade, it has been observed that the legacy of military rule— authoritarianism—still persists in Nigeria, including in media control. The government in Nigeria has not fully matured into a true democracy with respect for freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution as amended in 2011. In addition, Section 22 of the same Constitution stresses that the mass media shall at all times be free to uphold the responsibility and accountability of the government of the people. Despite these provisions, Nigerian governments have over the years infringed on press freedom and media rights. The stricture is more in the digital journalism era. Thus, this paper looks into digital authoritarianism in Nigeria as a carryover from the past by various administrations to maintain a hold on the media, especially in the dissemination of information through electronic technology, which blossomed in the last decades with internet penetration along with thousands of websites and bloggers, who disseminate raw information about happenings in the society including government activities. This work on “Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria: Internet Control techniques and Censorship” outlines measures adopted by Nigerian governments over the last decade to control or muzzle digital media and space in the country. It also provides information on how digital media have thrived in the country despite attempts to muzzle it. The study reviewed literatures on digital authoritarianism and analyzed data obtained through in-depth interviews of 37 media professionals. It made a startling finding that a good number of the media personnel have no inkling of what digital authoritarianism is about.

Objectives 1. To discover how the federal government of Nigeria has been muzzling the digital media. 2. To examine the measures through which the government hinder the media from fulfilling its constitutional obligations.

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3. To outline how media practitioners have coped with digital authoritarianism.

Research Questions 1. How is the Nigerian government influencing information dissemination through digital media? 2. What techniques are the government using to muzzle or censor the digital media? 3. How is the media coping with digital authoritarianism in Nigeria?

Theoretical Framework Digital authoritarianism in Nigeria was examined through the framework of the authoritarian theory of the press. This concept explained why different variants of government—monarchy, dictatorship, liberal, communist, totalitarian, and even democracies—grab the theory to justify control and suppression of the media albeit the modern-day digital media, all in a bid to protect their sovereignty. Fred S. Siebert et al. (1956) noted that authoritarian theory was adopted by most countries when society and technology became sufficiently developed to produce the “mass media” of communication. For Siebert, the theory is the basis for the press systems in many modern societies; even where it has been abandoned, it has continued to influence the practices of a number of governments, which theoretically adhere to libertarian principles and has determined the mass communication pattern for more people over a longer time than any other theory of press control. The scholar’s view on authoritarian theory paves way for understanding why Nigeria uses instruments of the state to control and censor the digital media given its capacity to reach mass audience. Nigeria runs a hybrid government swinging between dictatorship and liberalism that would do doing everything to protect its sovereignty by controlling and suppressing information dissemination through the mass media, which could torpedo the state if otherwise is done. The above postulations justify the use of authoritarian theory to study the modern-day ubiquity of the digital media and the effort of the state

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to effectively control the digital media and how the media can be free from being repressed.

Conceptual Clarifications Digital authoritarianism in this study concerns measures adopted by the government of Nigeria to curb dissemination of information through electronic technology and require professional and amateur journalists to submit to the whims and caprices of the authorities. This definition is supported by the authoritarian theory of mass communication which illustrated how English monarchs used this approach when the printing press was invented by censoring, licensing, taxation, and making laws (Bajracharya, 2018). This normative theory of mass communication practice in nations stresses state capture of mass media which must respect what authorities want and work according to their wishes even though they are not under direct control of the state or ruling classes. The press and media cannot work independently and their works are subjected to censorship (Bajracharya, 2018). Agreeing, Roberts and Ali (2021) recorded how digital authoritarian states and corporations use digital technologies to suppress the media, adding that in Africa, Egypt, and Zimbabwe imported artificial intelligence-based technologies from the United States and China to spy on their own citizens’ mobile and internet communications. They concluded that such actions by the state close civic space and diminish citizens’ rights to freedom of opinion and expression and culminate in internet shutdowns by African governments. For instance, Nigeria shut down Twitter from operating in the country’s internet space for seven months and only reopened it in January 2022. Control techniques are guidelines, legal instruments, and other covert and overt means through which the government prevents the digital media from disseminating information it does not want to make public. Thus a digital authoritarian gathers information about citizens and consumers through technical advances in data analytics and machine learning—ranging from mass facial recognition system to predictive policing. Both democratic and authoritarian countries face an increasingly self-sustaining cycle of surveillance and data extraction that is reducing individual consent (Miller, 2020).

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The state also controls digital media professionals through threats they face in the discharge of their duties—such as arrests, legal action, imprisonment, kidnapping, intimidation, bombing, killings, and various other forms of harassment and violence (Ogwezzy-Ndisika et al., 2021), in addition to information walls through fear, friction, and flooding as digital repressive toolkit. Other strictures on free flow of information online by the state include censoring critical voices, targeted blocking of Internet Protocol (IP) Address, Domain Name System (DNS) filtering, and redirection or Uniform Resource Locator (URL) filtering. An example is the firewall created by China. Also, governments increasingly pressure tech companies to take down content and share user data, which can be observed in transparency reports published by large online platforms (Glowacka et al., 2021). Censorship, in this context, refers to methods of suppression of the digital media in Nigeria. Citizens’ digital rights are breached if they are subject to digital surveillance; if they are covertly targeted with disinformation to manipulate their beliefs and behavior; if their mobile or internet connection is restricted (Roberts & Ali, 2021); internet shutdowns, and paywalls. Digital dictators target traditional democratic values and freedoms; flood the internet and other outlets for speech, press, and assembly with inauthentic accounts (“bots”), deepfakes, and use new tools of digital propaganda to amplify narratives, build polarization, and increase “us versus them” divisions; determine the kind of messages their population can and cannot access with the help of advanced communications technologies, which can also prevent them from contributing to online discussions or mobilization (Miller, 2020).

Literature Review The increasing trend in digital authoritarianism across the world with media personnel bearing the brunt is largely due to the state’s determination to control information dissemination in the digital age. This proclivity to maintain an iron fist on the media has been on from the authoritarian days of colonialism and military dictatorships and has transcended to the present age of the ubiquitous internet. As stated earlier, this is based on the authoritarian theory of mass media. Consequently, digital authoritarianism which has been spreading globally cuts across different regime types and implicates companies developing cutting-edge

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technologies, a common element across these efforts is surveillance and control (Miller, 2020). The international sale and government contracting of these new and powerful tools drive us toward an uncertain, potentially less democratic future (Miller). With the aid of newer technologies states can now easily shut down the internet in their various spheres of influence. Internet shutdowns dominate in developing and/or non-democratic countries, where relevant protective legal provisions are non-existent or limited and rarely acted upon (Glowacka et al., 2021). Glowacka et al. documented about 213 shutdowns in 33 countries in 2019. India led with 385 shutdowns since 2012, followed by Venezuela, Yemen, and Iraq. Also, Bangladesh, Belarus, Ethiopia, Indonesia India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe were listed among those that imposed or continued with internet shutdowns. Other examples of digital shutdowns recorded by Glowacka et al. during the pandemic included the blackout and phone restrictions state authorities imposed on the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, which hindered humanitarian groups from addressing threats posed by COVID19. They concluded that internet shutdown, which vary in scale, scope, location, and frequency, have detrimental effects on society, limits access to reliable, open, secure, and affordable internet and therefore prevents the dissemination of critical for development of the society. In Nigeria, the internet space was partially shut down when Twitter was banned in June 2021 by Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari after his tweet was deleted by the platform and his account suspended temporarily over a tweet on the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) agitation. The offensive tweet: “those who misbehave today” will be treated in “the language they will understand,” inferred to the wanton killings of people from the South East during the Nigerian-Biafran Civil War 1967– 1970. The tweet infringed on Twitter user rules prohibiting content that threatens or incites violence. Nigerians circumvented the ban on Twitter site by using Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and shared their opinion on other apps, like Indian-based microblogging site Koo (Blakenship & Golubski, 2021). The authors said deletion of the tweet is part of a larger conversation around the role of social media in politics and the national conversation as the world has seen social media platforms like Twitter impact democracy and politics, social movements, foreign relations, businesses, and

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economies around the world in recent years (Blakenship & Golubski, 2021).

Momentum in Digital Authoritarianism Globally A perspective into how digital authoritarianism is gaining momentum across the globe has been linked to a combination of retreating US leadership and the COVID-19 pandemic which emboldened China to expand and promote its tech-enabled authoritarianism as world’s best practice (Khalil, 2020). He documented how Chinese engineered digital surveillance and tracking systems are now exported around the globe in line with China’s Cyber Superpower Strategy. This is also setting standards and new norms on digital rights, privacy and data collection, suppression of dissent at home, and promoting the CCP’s geostrategic goals. The danger for other countries importing Chinese technology, Khalil argued, is that it will result in a growing acceptance of mass surveillance, habituation to restrictions on liberties, and fewer checks on the collation and use of personal data by the state, even after the public health crisis subsides. Thus, she warned democratic governments to be vigilant in setting standards and preserving citizens’ rights and liberties. The warning resonated in the study on 10 digital rights landscape countries—Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Cameroun—detailing how opening and closing of online civic space affects citizens’ digital rights (Roberts & Ali, 2021). The argument of Khalil, Robert, and Ali justified the 2021 online campaign in Nigeria for #EndSARS nationwide protest against police brutality, which the state promptly described as an attempt to overthrow the government. This authoritarian bent to governance culminated in the clampdown on the protesters at the Lekki toll gate in Lagos, which was streamed online. The Nigerian youth went online to begin their campaign to get the government to scrap the draconian security apparatus, which was supposed to crack down on criminals but instead turned its angst on youths and citizens who were mostly innocent. Aggrieved youths who could not find space offline in the society began their mobilization online. Consequently, the protests and the subsequent crackdown on the famous Lekki toll gate protesters. In milieu that ensued, both the traditional and digital media which covered the event were targeted for

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harassment, violence, extortion, and in some cases elimination by security agents. For instance, Obianuju Catherine Ude, popularly known as DJ Switch, who streamed live the Lekki Toll gate crackdown is now on an asylum in Canada after alleged threat to her life by the state. The crackdown on Lekki protesters elicited global outrage. Consequently, Nigeria deployed the five tactics often used by the state to close online civic space in Africa. They include digital surveillance, disinformation, internal shutdowns, legislation, and arrest for online speech (Roberts & Ali, 2021). Also, StearsData report (undated) commissioned by Luminate stated that the Nigerian government has been building its surveillance capacity, with allocated budgets exceeding NGN15 billion since 2017. Although the government claims that these capabilities are being built to fight domestic terrorism, StearsData stated they can be used to spy on citizens. According to the scholars, any comprehensive analysis of digital rights requires consideration of the wider political, civic space, and technological contexts. They argue that countering the threats to democracy and digital rights required new evidence, awareness, and capacity and proposed applied research to build new capacity in each country to effectively monitor, analyze, and counter the insidious impact of surveillance and disinformation; and a program to raise awareness and mobilize opinion to open civic space and improve citizens’ ability to exercise, defend, and expand their digital rights. Even so, authoritarian states tend to sustain their hold on the digital space by being pragmatic, resourceful, and connected to a global network of governments and companies that mutually benefit from sharing data and funding research projects; this next innovation in authoritarianism will increasingly encourage self-censorship and cyber sovereignty to reduce the influence of democracy activists and free press, both at home and abroad (Miller, 2020). Corroborating, Dorota Glowacka et al. (2021) added that the challenge related to the use of digital technologies by authoritarian regimes has continued to deepen as liberal democracies like EU undertook many valuable and well-designed policy initiatives in this field, but still have to decide whether tackling digital repression is a core geopolitical interest at the highest political level.

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Instruments for Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria As the threat to digital rights in Nigeria increases, one of the laws enacted to control digital media is the Cybercrimes (Prohibition and Prevention) Act 2015 which comprises wide-ranging legal, regulatory, and institutional framework that prohibits, prevents, detects, prosecutes, and punishes cybercrimes (Uba, 2021). There is also the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2011 that prohibits unauthorized transmission, obtaining, reproduction, or retention of any classified matter. Other legislation and regulations which can be used broadly to restrict digital space in Nigeria include the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) Act 2007 Section 26; the National Health Act 2014; Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2019; and the Consumer Protection Framework of 2016.

Research Methodology The research used purposive sampling method to select media stakeholders who were interviewed through structured questionnaire done over a period of two weeks to generate qualitative data in addition to the information generated through literature review. Those interviewed include media professionals, who are mostly members of the Guild of Corporate Online Publishers (GOCOP), an 82-member umbrella peer review group of professional journalists. Thirty-seven media practitioners were interviewed based on the three research questions stated above to ascertain the veracity of the authoritarian theory as the basis for the study and also examined whether professionalism by the media can check digital authoritarianism.

Data Analysis The interviewees, who are marked A-1 to A-37, are all based in Nigeria. 77.8% of them are within the age range from 51 to 60, 11.1% (31–50) while above 60 (11.1%). There educational qualifications ranged from 55.6% (Master’s Degree), 11.1% (PhD) while 33.3% had other educational qualifications which were not specified. Surprisingly despite their

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educational qualifications not all of them responded to all the questions asked. But those who did elucidate on digital authoritarian practice, control and techniques.

Q1: Knowledge of Digital Authoritarianism Responses from 16 interviewees showed knowledge of digital authoritarianism although one of the journalists called on the phone to request for explanation of the concept. Summarily, the responses captured salient aspects of digital authoritarianism to include censorship of the digital media/population by the state through the use of technology. The three responses that stood out are: Digital authoritarianism “Is the way that many leaders around the world wield the power of the internet and technology to gain or solidify control over their people.”—(A-1) “This refers to the use of IT, social media to control populations usually by government.”—(A-2) “Censorship of the social media/online media”—(A-5)

Q2: Beginning of Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria Responses from 17 participants showed different dates for the commencement of digital authoritarianism in the country although state control of the media in Nigeria began during the colonial rule in the nineteenth century and transcend to military dictatorship of the 1980s and the hybrid authoritarian/democratic practice now. Striking responses tracing its origin are thus: “As soon as Nigeria joined the information superhighway during Obasanjo’s first tenure as civilian President in 1999/2000. Internet explorer came with Facebook, etc.” (A-11) “Digital authoritarianism began at the dawn of the millennium and blossomed with the growth and advancement of democracy and technology which gave the people the impetus to increasingly question how their lives are being run by their leadership. (A-12)

“With Cybercrimes Act of 2015” (A-14)

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Q3: How Digital Authoritarianism Play Out in Nigeria Seventeen respondents are of the view that digital authoritarianism manifests in the form of June 4, 2021, shutdown of microblogging platform (Twitter); regulation of the use of technological devices; state labeling every news not authored by them as fake, censorship, digital surveillance, data collection, propaganda, patronage; clampdown on opposing online media/social media practitioners, legislation, and policy framework; and surveillance by security agencies, tapping of phone lines, emails. Companies also collect data on sites visited by people and flood their mails and social media platforms with adverts along their perceived preferences. Also, it occurs through state quest to control information mechanism, subversion of civil liberties, and open society institutions; deliberate shutdown of internet using security agencies’ equipment, targeting online owners. One of the striking responses states: “The Cybercrimes Act specifies limits and areas that people must not cross. It makes defamation a criminal rather than civil offence” (A-15).

Q4: Targets of Digital Authoritarianism and Why Interviewees listed targets of digital authoritarianism as the Nigerian press, civil society groups, entire population largely youths; critics of government, online publishers, editors; activists, and whistleblowers.

Q5: Causes of Digital Authoritarianism Interviewees cited inciting statements, fake news; desire to control the heart and minds of the people, deception, intolerance, fear of public opinion and adverse criticism; desires by companies to advertise products; abuse of power, misinformation, and dissemination of false information as the cause for stricture of media. Statement by two interviewees captured the causes thus: “Digital authoritarianism is caused by “The crave by autocratic governments to maintain firm control and ensure that the people of the society don’t challenge their corrupt conduct and abuse of office.” (A-11)

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“With the advent of citizen journalism, obviously, the scope of journalism has widened. Through this, ’top secrets’ are being revealed. This is clearly not in the best interest of the government.” (A-12)

Q6: Nigerians’ Reaction to Digital Authoritarianism Data from interviewees show that Nigerians react negatively, passively, and cautiously to digital authoritarianism. They also condemn, create awareness about its implications, and resort to lawsuits. Some use alternative IT channels to circumvent restrictions like switching to VPN to bypass the recent Twitter ban. In the case of phone tapping, they use encrypted platforms like WhatsApp; advocacy. For instance, Interviewee (A-16) said: “Digital authoritarianism is a development that is not welcomed by most Nigerians. And so, whenever there is whip of authoritarianism creeping in, such as the Cybercrimes Act, ban of twitter etc, Nigerians collectively rise against such development.”

Q7: Instruments of Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria Interviewees listed the instruments state use to muzzle the media as mass surveillance, internet fire walls and censorship, internet blackout, coercion, pronouncements by government agencies; regulations, use of online digital platforms, social media, radio and television for disinformation, spy gadgets; cyber stalking law; veiled threats and refusal of support/ patronage/adverts to practitioners. Others are propaganda; intimidation by security agents—the DSS and intelligence agencies, police, Armed Forces, and EFCC and ICPC; restriction of the internet and social media systems which has enhanced public freedom and right of speech; anti-social media bill; executive orders; and use of artificial intelligence, high-tech surveillance, and repression.

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Q8: Instances of Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria Sixteen interviewees variously cited ban of Twitter and the directive to prosecute users of the microblogging and social networking service who defied the order; police arrest of youths indiscriminately, which resulted in the ENDSARS protests; arrest/detention of some of practitioners; threat of enactment of social media bill to censor social media/online practitioners; compulsory NIN registration, BVN et al.; and jailing of government critics.

Q9: Techniques the Government Uses to Control Digital Media in Nigeria Only eight interviewees were able to state the techniques government uses to muzzle the digital media. They include shut down of media houses; ban on the use of social media (Twitter); use of social media influencers; legal arm twisting, intimidation; introduction of new broadcasting rules and heavy fines on broadcast stations just to gag the media; deploying existing and new legislation; clampdown on critics and media owners; regulations, undue monitoring, denial of patronage/advertisement, cyber bullying and licensing of digital space.

Q10: Operators of Digital Media Contribute to Digital Authoritarianism Seventeen interviewees stated that digital media operators contribute to digital authoritarianism by being blackmailers; publication of falsehood which places the government on a moral pedestal to act; unprofessional conducts and deliberately misinforming the public at times. For instance, Interviewee—A7 said: “Some unscrupulous operators deliberately publish fake and damaging reports which could threaten the safety and territorial integrity of the Nation.”

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Q11. How not to be victim of digital authoritarianism Seventeen interviewees opined that media practitioners can avoid digital authoritarianism by being professional, sticking to ethics; upgrading knowledge, IT skills; propagating truth, fairness, and objectivity; fact checking and having zero tolerance for fake stories; having a strong legal department, etc. The views of interviewee A-2 capture it thus: “Media need to adhere strictly to the ethics of their trade. 2. They need to be more professional whether as traditional or new media practitioners. 3. They need to constantly engage in order review to remind themselves of their responsibilities and what they needed to do to come back to the sanity lane. 4. Always remind themselves of the sacred role of the media and the need to defend the people against dictatorship.”

Q12: Role the society (CBO, NGOs, Civil society groups) plays to negate digital authoritarianism The respondents agreed in their various responses that the civil society should continue advocating for free press, transparency in government, respect for human rights; set agenda for free media; resist muzzling of public opinion; train and engage the media; sensitize the public; lobby National Assembly to prevent harsh legislation against the media; protest against internet shutdown; and scrutinize every government. Interviewees A-12 captured the views of all the views of all the seventeen respondents stating society can help the media: “By remaining resolute and committed to the principles of open society system; through promotion of democratic ethics to strengthen democracy and through collaborative partnership with other agents of democracy and interface with government so as to build mutual trust and understanding.”

Q13: Professionalism as a check to digital authoritarianism Surprisingly, out of 13 responses, 10 interviewees agreed that professionalism can curb digital authoritarianism. One said “no” outright while another said “it will not help completely.” Interviewees A-11 suggested that:

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“A group of media professionals can come together to set a new tone to regulate digital operations of their members. A group known as GOCOP currently serves that purpose for media professionals in the online/ new media space”.

Q14: Future of Digital Media Majority of the interviewees predicted a bright but challenging future. Of the 17 responses only five predicted a tough and bleak future field with landmines. The positive views were captured by Interviewee A-5, who stated: “Despite threats of authoritarianism. Digital media is the future of media practice. People can no longer wait to be served news any more. New media has come to fill that space and it is doing so creditably despite the gaps and challenges besetting the industry presently.”

Discussion of Findings Qualitative data from the literature reviewed and opinions from interviews with media practitioners fulfilled the objectives of the study. They were used to establish that Nigeria has been influencing the digital media through regulations and censorship, undue monitoring, denial of patronage/advertisement, arrests and detention of practitioners; cyber bullying and licensing of digital space among others. All these measures were corroborated by scholars such as Miller, Glowacka et al. and backed by the authoritarian theory of the mass media propounded by Siebert, Shepherd, Machiavelli, who advocated state stricture of the media to protect sovereignty. Given the limited time for this research which lasted three weeks, it is only an attempt to establish, define, and analyze the various techniques of digital authoritarianism used by state authorities in various countries, Nigeria in particular. It also outlined the impacts of the techniques on the rule of law, press freedoms, human rights, and democracy and amplified the fact that digital journalism has come to stay in Nigeria and that practitioners are not going to be fazed by digital authoritarianism as respondents predict a bright future for the industry.

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The study gathered qualitative information from media workers, mostly those practicing in the digital media through structured in-depth interviews. In large part, many of the responses supported the theoretical framework for this paper that digital authoritarianism is borne out of the state’s determination to control, suppress, and influence the online media. They also agreed that such a move by government infringed on the rights of freedom of speech and also contrary to the obligation of the media to hold government accountable. The study identified techniques of digital authoritarianism in Nigeria to include legislation, crackdowns; spy gadgets; cyber stalking law; veiled threats; refusal of support or give patronage/adverts to practitioners; and intimidation of citizens/journalists by security agents. It was also found that state deploy information technology, artificial intelligence; propaganda to foil public freedom and right of speech. Also identified are mass surveillance, internet fire walls and censorship, and internet blackout. These findings are in line with the opinions of scholars on authoritarian theory of mass communication which was used for his research, although such acts by the state breached constitutional provisions on obligations of the press and freedom of speech. An important finding is that media practitioners own up that some online journalists and social users are partly to blame for digital authoritarianism because of fake news, hate speech, and dissemination of false information, which government seeks to curtail through regulations such as the Cybercrime Act; propaganda and disinformation among others. The study found that digital authoritarianism is based on the principle of authoritarian theory of mass communication whereby the state seeks to control the mass media to ensure it disseminates only the information that is in its interest. Respondents agreed that digital authoritarianism exists in Nigeria through “Clampdown on opposing online media/social media professionals//mediums.” According to respondents, the reason for digital authoritarianism is because state authorities want to establish sovereign control over online information space. This explains why multiple states have adopted measures to control the flow of data in and out of their national borders and isolate “domestic” internet from the global network. Hence imposing new cross-border data transfer and storage restrictions, as well as centralizing technical infrastructure as a necessary protection for user privacy, to improve cybersecurity threats against threats posed globally (Glowacka et al., 2021).

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Of all the responses on digital authoritarianism, only three stood out. Interviewee A-1 described digital authoritarianism as “the way that many leaders around the world wield the power of the internet and technology to gain or solidify control over their people.” Interviewee A-2 described it as “the use of IT, social media to control populations usually by government”; while Interviewee A-3 said: “Digital authoritarianism is the use of the internet and it’s many social media variants by leaders with authoritarian or dictatorial tendencies; a means by which governments and business entities control their citizens through technology.” Summarily, 17 respondents believe that digital authoritarianism began in Nigeria “Since the early 2000s from the advent of the internet in Nigeria but became more vicious since the current government and in particular with the enacting of the Cybercrimes Act of 2015. It escalated in 2021 when government suspended Twitter”. For disseminators of information, who ought to be well informed on issues pertaining to their profession, some responses from respondents reinforce the notion that some online media professionals do not adequately know/understand digital authoritarianism or when it started in Nigeria as can be seen in the following responses: “Not quite sure but can’t be recent”; “Digital authoritarianism began at the dawn of the millennium and blossomed with the growth and advancement of democracy and technology which gave the people the impetus to increasingly question how their lives are being run by their leadership.” One interviewee said “March 29, 1984, “Buhari’s administration,” while another said: “Around 2015 shortly after the onset of the Bihari administration,” and “It is safe to declare that it started with the advent of social media.” These responses support the need to build the capacity and increase awareness and knowledge of media professionals on the control and regulation digital authoritarianism in the country. Another important finding is that some journalists who are transiting to digital journalism from the traditional media do not understand the concept of digital authoritarianism and are therefore not in a position to protect or defend their rights. One of the journalists interviewed actually asked for an explanation of what digital authoritarianism was about? This is probably why Roberts and Ali stated that countering new threats to democracy and digital rights requires new evidence, awareness, and capacity. The data is not available, but some journalists in Nigeria are not even aware of the media laws and the contents of Cybersecurity Law

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of 2015 or the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act of 2011 relating to guidelines for their operation. The study showed that journalists in Nigeria are resilient in doing their job despite digital authoritarianism. Some of them have survived the strong-arm tactics of the State including Agba Jalingo, an online journalist, who was charged with treason in Cross River State, South-South Nigeria, for criticizing State governor Ben Ayade. There was the case of Jonathan Ugbal and Jeremiah Archibong, news editor and managing editor, respectively, for the CrossRiverWatch, an online newspaper owned by Jalingo. The pair was charged with “unlawful assembly” for covering a protest and prosecuted by the police. Ugbal and Archibong were arrested by the police in Calabar on August 5, 2019, alongside Nicholas Kalu, the Calabar Correspondent of The Nation newspaper, while covering the #RevolutionNow protest called by Nigerian activist Omoyele Sowore. Janlingo was recently released and freed from all charges of defamation and treason. Nonetheless, there is a need for improved citizen sensitization and mobilization, awareness creation as well as building and strengthening the capacity of journalists to protect the rights of citizens and for effectively check of digital authoritarianism.

Recommendations 1. As part of efforts to counter the threats to democracy and digital rights, this work recommends deliberate development of a body of evidence, awareness creation as well as capacity building and strengthening of citizens and media professionals. 2. There should also be effective analysis and monitoring of various digital authoritarian measures, increased stakeholder knowledge, and constructive engagements by various arms and agencies of government, civil society groups, the media, and other non-state actors toward addressing the concerns of state authorities, the media, and citizens at large. 3. While state authorities should be persuaded to eschew the tendency toward abridgement of the fundamental human rights and press freedom, through digital authoritarianism, the media must also undertake through self-regulatory mechanism, measures to curtail fake news, hate speech, and violation of individual or corporate freedoms under the guise of exercising press freedom.

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Conclusion The research buttressed the need for safeguard and protection of fundamental human rights, press freedom, and improvement of the digital media space. It agrees with (Roberts and Ali) on the need for a program to raise awareness and mobilize opinion to open civic space and improve citizens’ ability to exercise, defend, and expand their digital rights. There is also need to strengthen the capacity of both the citizens and media professionals, in particular online journalist for increased knowledge of existing and emerging legislation related to digital authoritarianism to ensure that the state remains steadfast to uphold constitutional provision for a free digital media with obligations to hold government accountable. If this is done, the future is bright for digital media practitioners, who will be empowered to know not to exceed the bounds of their freedom.

References Authoritarianism. Britannica (Britannica.com Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved February 28, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/topic/authoritarianism Azelmat, M. (2018/2019). The rise of digital authoritarianism: Is the internet to be blamed? European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation. A.Y. Queens University Belfast. Retrieved. February 25, 2022, from https://repository.gchumanrights.org/bitstream/handle/20. 500.11825/1070/Azelmat.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 Ayamew. Y. E. (2021, December 20). From digital authoritarianism to platforms’ leviathan power: Freedom of expression in digital age under Siege in Africa. Mizan Law Review, 15, 455–492. Bajracharya, S. (2018, March 14). Four theories of the press in businesstopia. Retrieved February 16, 2022. Blakenship, M., & Goluboki, C. (2021, August 11). Nigeria’s Twitter Ban is a misplaced priority. Retrieved March 16, 2022. Africa in Focus. Brookings. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 2011. Francis, O. (2020). Nigeria: Data privacy and protection under the Nigerian Law. Retrieved 19 February, 2022. https://www.mondaq.com/nigeria/pri vacy-protection/895320/data-privacy-and-protection-under-the-nigerian-law Glowacka, D., et al. (2021). Digital technologies as a means of repression and social control, p. 653. European Parliament Coordinator: Policy Department for External Relations Directorate General for External Policies of the Union. (2021, April).

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Kperogi, F. A. (2020). Nigeria’s digital diaspora: Citizen media, democracy and participation. Retrieved. April 3, 2022. https://books.google. com.ng/books?id=SynKDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Data+%26+ Digital+Rights+in+Nigeria&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiW-ZCWsvf2Ah UJV8AKHUEwAr0Q6AF6BAgIEAI#v=onepage&q=Data%20%26%20D igital%20Rights%20in%20Nigeria&f=false. University of Rochester Press. ISBN-13:978-1-58046-982-1. Khalil, L. (2020, November). Digital authoritarianism, China and COVID. Lowy Institute Analysis. Lilkov, D. (2020). Made in China: Tackling digital authoritarianism. Wilfred Martens Centre for European Studies, 19(1), 11D. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1781685820920121 Lynch, M. (2021, August). Digital activism and authoritarian adaptation in Middle East. Project on Middle East PoliticaL Science 4–7. Stanford Global Policy Incubator Cyber Policy Center. Mansted, K. (2020, May 28). Strong yet Brittle: The risk of digital authoritarianism. Alliance for Democracy. Mare, A. (2020). State ordered internet shutdowns and digital authoritarianism in Zimbabwe. International Journal of Communication, 14, 4244-426319328036/20200005.02.02.2019. http://ijoc.org Miller. M. N. (2020, June). Digital threats to democracy: Ruling with silicon fist. Technology for Global Security. Morgus, R. (2020). The spread of digital Russia’s authoritarianism. Artificial intelligence, China, Russia and the global order. Air University Press. Retrieved. 105.112.68.211 on Wednesday, 3 February, 2022.16.03. https:// about.jstar.org/terms Nigerian Communications Commission Act. Retrieved. March 16, 2022. Nigerian Communication Commissions website. Ogwezzy-Ndisika, A., et al. (2021). Appraising the right to freedom of expression and safety of journalists in digital age (pp. 455–482). Issues in Fourth and Fifth Estates of the Realm Festschrift on Professor Afolabi Akinfeleye. University of Lagos Press. Roberts, T., & Ali, A. M. (2021). Opening and closing online civic space in Africa: An introduction to ten digital rights landscape 9–42. Digital Rights in Closing Space: Lessons Learnt from Ten African Countries. https://doi.org/ 10.19088/IDS. Institute of Development Studies. Siebert. F. S., et al. (1956). Four theories of the press: The authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and Soviet concepts of what the press should be and do (pp. 1–14). University of Illinois Press. Retrieved. March 28, 2022. https://books.google.com.ng/books?id=4QoePDdcC8C&printsec=frontc over&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

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StearsData, Data & Digital Rights in Nigeria. Assessing the activities, issues and opportunities (pp. 1–46). Luminate. Suntai, D. I., & Targema, T. S. (2017, July/December). New media and democracy in Nigeria: An appraisal of the opportunities and threats in the Terrain. Brazilian Journal of African Studies, 2(41), 198–209. E—ISSN 2448-3923/ ISSN 2448-3915. Uba, J. (2021, 7 July). Nigeria: Cybercrimes and Cyber Laws in Nigeria: All you need to know. Retrieved. March 16, 2022. Olisa Agbakoba Legal. https://www.mondaq.com/nigeria/security/1088292/cyb ercrimes-and-cyber-laws-in-nigeria-all-you-need-to-know.

CHAPTER 13

Tragic Labels, Catastrophic Consequences: Colonial Treachery and the Cameroonian Calamity Jacob Mapara

Introduction It is a sad but tragic historical fact that Africa as it currently stands is a colonial edifice despite the so-called independence. What is, however, harrowing is the realization that this persistent colonial presence has so much to do with betrayal by the former colonialists, not Blacks to the Whites as is usually the case. It notes that the unbundling of the European empires on the African continent was not done by the erstwhile colonizers with the best of intentions. There is nowhere where this is clear other than in West Africa, especially in Cameroon and Nigeria. While in Nigeria the North and the South were both under British colonial rule, the system of direct rule and indirect rule that was employed led to the cataclysm that was to lead to the Biafra War (6 July 1967–15

J. Mapara (B) Chinhoyi University of Technology, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_13

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January 1970) (UNESCO, 2016). In Cameroon, it was a case of merging two countries that were originally under different colonial powers and were thus exposed to different European languages and cultures. They were merged into one country without the consent of the colonized. The additional burden has been that of the formerly colonized willingly accepting labels such as Anglophone and Francophone as apt in describing them as if they have no indigenous ones. This obsession with the former colonialists and their languages has probably also led to some Africans looking down upon their complexion such that they have gone the skinbleaching way. This apparently comes from the fact that “Blackness has been created or shaped as a problem by white people, and as a result, some black people believe this and have started hating their blackness” (Moshoadiba & Senokoane, 2020, p. 1). Politically, post-independence Africa has remained linked to the colonial structure in the sense that her education and other related cultural activities are tied to the former colonial powers in what Mignolo and Escobar (2010), Mignolo (2011), Walsh and Mignolo (2018), and others like Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 2015) refer to as the colonial matrix of power. This tragic scenario is also realized for example in Zimbabwe, where some schools, especially private ones, offer both the Zimbabwe School Examinations Council (ZIMSEC) and Cambridge curricula to their students. The idea is to come up with students who will fit in the United Kingdom (the UK) or some of its powerful and rich former dominions like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The ties to the former colonial power have remained even in higher education, the military, and the judiciary, where the robes and wigs adorned by judges are not suitable for Africa’s tropical weather. In higher education institutions, especially universities, the journals that are accepted as top-notch are those that are housed in the West (both physical and conceptual) and their citadels of tertiary education (Mapara, 2023). In teachers’ colleges, most of the books that are accepted as essential for educational foundations are by western scholars like Jean Piaget and Laurence Kohlberg. Militarily, most of the countries have remained linked to the former colonial powers and they buy most of their fighting hardware from the same. Their judges are also largely guided by the laws that they inherited from former colonial powers. It is essential to point out that the language labels that most Africans continue to proudly carry and flaunt are grounded in colonialism and part of the causes of conflicts in post-colonial Africa as the Cameroon case

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discussed in this chapter demonstrates. The chapter notes that so much suffering has been wrought in Cameroon as a result of pride in perpetual colonization, something that is sustained by language labels and practices, a critical trait that characterizes the major antagonists in the fighting.

Pre-colonial Cameroon The history of precolonial Cameroon as reflected in archaeological findings shows that the Iron Age may have occurred between 1000 and 100 BC when it is assumed to have become well-established (Lavachery et al., 2010). This place is also believed to have been the watershed of Bantu migrations into the rest of sub-Saharan Africa as is reflected through linguistic analysis, backed by archaeological and genetic evidence, and this was around 1000 BC. Worth noting is the fact that Cameroon or Kamerun as the Germans called it was not a state, but a colonial creation. However, the name Cameroon is an example of an exonym that stuck. It was christened by Portuguese explorers for the Rio dos Camarões (‘River of Prawns’) (Nana, 2016). Pre-colonial Cameroon saw the emergence of the Sao civilization (Hudgens & Trillo, 1999). This civilization was known for its ornate terracotta and bronze artwork as well as round, walled settlements in the Lake Chad Basin. The area was also influenced by Islam as it expanded southwards from the Kanem-Bornu Empire from what is today Chad (AlAnbaki, 2021). To the south were small political principalities that were not affected by the expansion of the Kanem-Bornu Empire. The area was, however, affected by the Slave Trade just like most of West Africa, and this trade petered out with its international abolition. Although around this time there was the Aro Confederacy, which was expanding its economic and political influence from south-eastern Nigeria into western Cameroon, its growth and influence were cut short by the arrival of British and German colonizers. These colonizers were coming out of the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 where Africa was parcelled out between European powers, into what the Europeans referred to as spheres of influence and a place in the sun. The Berlin Conference marked the beginning of the division of Africa along arbitrary boundaries, that in most cases split the same ethnic groups and these found themselves not only in different countries but at times under different colonial powers that spoke different languages and at times even practised different versions of the Christian faith. A case in

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point is that of the Manyika (a Shona sub-group) that found themselves in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe today) and Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) (Ranger, 1989). The result is that today Mozambique is referred to as Lusophone and Zimbabwe as Anglophone. The occupation of Africa especially after the Berlin 1884–1885 Conference saw an influx of missionaries into the continent. While these missionaries played a significant role in developing writing systems for the languages of the colonies, they were also the thoroughfare through which European languages came to dominate largely sub-Saharan Africa and the introduction of foreign ones (Chimhundu, 2005a, 2005b; Doke, 1931; Tucker, 2017; Viriri, 2004) like English, French, and Portuguese. The political entities that had existed before colonialism were anchored on Islam and African Indigenous Religions, but there were no language-induced conflicts and Nana confirms this when she posits, “Cameroon prior to colonization had many languages, with none having precedence over the other” (2016, p. 168). It thus means that the challenges that Cameroon faces emanate from two European languages, English and French, and the cultural practices associated with them. The combination of these two aided by the UN creates a potent Judas complex that is proving difficult to extinguish.

Cameroon in the Colonial Period It is a betrayal of the human spirit and freedom for outsiders to agree to divide lands that do not belong to them. Such was the shameless avarice that was exhibited at Berlin between November 1884 and February 1885 when Africa was divided among European powers. This is the fate that befell the country that was to be called Cameroon as well as others on the African continent. Cameroon (spelt as Kamerun in German) became a German colony in 1884: Between 1884 and 1916, Cameroon was part of the German colony of Kamerun. Following its defeat at the end of World War I, Germany lost its colonies, and the erstwhile Kamerun territory was partitioned between France and the United Kingdom into two distinct territories as Mandated Territories of the League of Nations. (Mabeu & Pongou, 2021)

The above words are instructive. They present the parcelling out of Cameroon between Britain and France being indicative of the nature of

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colonialism and European wars. They were wars of conquest and acquisition, and this explains why the country was transferred from German ownership to Britain and France as spoils of war after Germany’s defeat in the First Great European War, christened the First World War. The transfer of German Kamerun was under the guise of Mandate Territories of the League of Nations. Like other colonial territories, Cameroun was first blighted by German, and later by French, in the areas that the French took over, and English in what was dubbed the British Mandate, and later Trust Territory. It is essential to bear in mind that the British and the French adopted different forms of colonial rule in their different jurisdictions. While there were different forms of rule, such as direct and indirect (Mamdani, 1996), it was the potency that was borne by the assimilation policy of the French and the Portuguese that was aimed at uprooting Africans from their culture and languages. Commenting on the French policy in West Africa, Enugu notes that the policy’s main aim was to turn Africans into ‘Frenchmen’ through the process of education. He states, “The French educational policy in Africa was therefore meant to make the Africans culturally French” (Egudu, 1978, p. 30). It seems the project has been a success because, in former Portuguese colonies, most people have both first names and surnames that are Portuguese. For the former colonies of France, French has become the dominant language and most, if not all people today see themselves as French and take pride in this. Unfortunately, this colonial hangover has been carried over into the post-independence period, and with devastating effects such that the national sense of belonging is fast dissipating among the Anglophones in Cameroon. One issue as Ranger (1989) and Chimhundu (1992) observe is the introduction and manufacture of what they call tribes and tribal divisions among the colonized Africans. There was also in addition, the overcounting of African languages with some dialects turned into languages (Banda, 2009; Prah, 1998), and in others, the languages of those perceived as minorities were suppressed (Doke, 1931; Mapara & Nyota, 2008). The created ethnicities, together with the overcounted languages, played a significant divisive role in putting a wedge between the colonized. These colonial fictions served the colonialists very well because they ensured that there was little or no unity between the colonized and oppressed. Even where there are and were different languages, the imperial governments saw it practical and to their advantage to emphasize the

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differences between the language groups and not the obvious similarities. It is these exaggerations and colonial emphases that made most African states adopt European languages at independence as official idioms. For Cameroon, this decision has been disastrous. It is equally important to appreciate that colonial policies were interested in “total” assimilation (Obeng & Adegbija, 1999), as well as complete subjugation and control of Blacks. The practices had a direct effect on the colonized in terms of languages and culture. These practices were further entrenched by colonial education whose main purpose was to create docile and compliant Africans. These guidelines were for the colonized to be in the mould and image of the colonizers in both attire and language, but not in political stamina, space, and intellect. Ngugi (1986) vividly captures the trauma that learners in colonial schools went through as they were compelled by school authorities to speak in English and abandon their mother tongue. He states that it was a very humiliating experience to be caught speaking Gikuyu within the school premises. Says Ngugi: Thus one of the most humiliating experiences was to be caught speaking Gikuyu in the vicinity of the school. The culprit was given, corporal punishment - three to five strokes of the cane on bare buttocks - or was made to carry a metal plate around the neck with inscriptions such as I AM STUPID or I AM A DONKEY. (Ngugi, 1986, p. 11)

These words capture the reality that the colonial education system was intended to cultivate Africans that were buffoons and masters of mimicry, a culture that has persisted to this day even after the attainment of political independence if ever such a thing called political independence exists. Again, here is made open the case of the Judas complex that is realized through self-betrayal. In most cases, if not all, those who self-betray may not even be aware of their selling out traits. The issue of having an education system that would create submissive Africans is confirmed by the existence of institutions of higher education like Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone which trained theologians whose majors were in religion and the classics (Hargreaves, 1979). The same scenario is realized in Cameroon which was part of French West Africa where some subjects in the education portfolio were reserved for the high commissioner who was French to decide on (Atangana, 2010). The results of such an education system are that it was aimed producing

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Africans that would parrot, ape, and mimic European ways, especially those of the colonizing power. This type of education disarmed Africans and uprooted them from their languages and cultures such that they took pride in being like the colonizers. The tragic consequence is that such an aping culture has persisted in former colonial Africa to this day, and there is arguably nowhere other than in Cameroon where its greatest heat is felt and has endured. It is a bomb that has exploded with devastating consequences.

Triple-Edged Sword and the Fallacy of Independence Deceit and betrayal were and still are part of the stock-in-trade of the colonialists in Africa. There is nowhere where this is manifest other than from the onset of colonization prefaced on the greed and acquisitiveness as well as racial superiority laid bare at Berlin and at the coming down of the curtains as each colonial enterprise folded. All this was unleashed under the guise of a civilizing mission founded on Livingstone’s Christianity, commerce, and civilization. The so-called honourable mission to redeem the African ‘noble savage’ (Brown, 1983; Wasserman, 1994) remains as hollow as the independence that African countries such as Cameroon were served. It is a dish of horror; a tragedy of epic proportions that only highlights the savagery that is inherent in the EuroAmerican psyche as reflected in the acts of Britain, France, and the United Nations. The colonial history of Cameroon is mired and complex when compared to that of other African colonies that are Burundi, Rwanda, South West Africa (now Namibia), Tanganyika, and Togo which were all German possessions (Beckhaus-Gerst, 2012; Berghahn, 2017; Schilling, 2014, 2019). While others were transferred to one country, the story of Cameroon is different. It was divided between Britain and France, with France getting quite a huge chunk of territory. This division that saw France get the lion’s share of the Mandate Territory from the start “made French influence preponderant in Cameroon” (Njeuma, 1995, p. 27). It is thus clear that the betrayal of Cameroon does not start and end with the division of the country into two Mandate Territories of the League of Nations after Germany’s defeat in the First World War (1914–1918), but with the silence of the League’s successor, the United Nations in allowing France to grant her territory independence. Most people in Cameroon are

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of the opinion that the country has never been independent because they see France as having continued to run the show, a thing that has added to the post-independence troubles that are based on the contestation of two European languages in an African setting, with Africans as antagonists. Fröhlich (2019) quotes Nfor, one of the Cameroonians he interviewed: In 1960 Cameroon was a protectorate of the United Nations, divided in two. How could France grant Cameroon independence? They should have obtained independence through a referendum organized by the United Nations, as happened in the Anglophone part of the country. (No big party for Cameroon’s independence, para 3)

These words are a serious indictment of France. This is more so when it is considered that western Europe considers herself the bastion of democracy. The will of the Cameroonians should have been considered, but that was not to be so because the French desired a neo-colonial puppet through “a complex network of patron-client relationships” (Recchia, 2020, p. 515), that would sustain their interests, not those of the Africans. This reality was brought into effect through the banning of the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC) in 1955 because it advocated for severing ties with France and establishing a socialist state. France was thus not comfortable with this development and chose the more malleable Ahmadou Ahidjo who was the leader of the moderate Union Camerounaise and thus side-lined the more radical UPC (Riches & Kavanagh, 2013). In 1960, on January 1, French Cameroon became independent, and after a referendum, British Cameroon became independent in February 1961 and joined the larger Cameroon which forms about eight-tenths of the country. The February 1961 plebiscite was on whether British Cameroon should join the former French colony and reunite the country that was divided by the League of Nations (Awasom, 1998, 2002; Takougang, 2019). Although reunification appears to have been in good faith, it was the dissolution of the Cameroon Federation in 1972 (Atabongwoung, 2020), that arguably sowed the seeds of the current challenges, and there also seems to have been an unwillingness to join the Federation by some from as far back as 1961. This is noted by the fact that the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly did not adopt the Federation’s Constitution (Enonchong, 2020). One can argue that some in the Southern Cameroons had a foreboding that joining the Federation

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would mark the end of their autonomy, something that seems to have happened. The post-1972 developments have shown that Cameroon has remained a French client state, and it is France’s influence that has carried the day with the French whether deliberately or erroneously fomenting the challenges with some television commentators in France using incendiary language to further heighten the tensions in an already explosive situation.

The Curse of the French Language and British Betrayal One thing that has come out clearly from the above discussion so far is that the colonial languages and heritage on the African continent and in Cameroon in particular have remained divisive. It is sad that during the colonial period, it was the European languages and cultures versus the African ones. In Cameroon today, it is Africans identifying with the English and French languages and cultures that are decimating one another. The Cameroon conflict needs to be understood first by noting that it does not make sense to believe that monolingualism works. It does not. But before the languages are tackled, there is the issue of oil that was discovered in the former British colony and the Francophones are not prepared to see the Anglophones gain autonomy because they fear that they will secede and enjoy oil wealth (alone). Besides the oil issue, this is also an environment where a former colonial and to some extent global power sees its influence on the wane. French was once the language of diplomacy but it no longer is. The reality is that it has remained one of the languages of the UN courtesy of the Europeanization of international bodies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) where it is one of the official languages. It also remains the lingua franca of the former colonies of French West Africa and also the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda on mainland Africa. This, however, does not make it a significant language outside these zones. Its influence is checked by English and to some extent by Portuguese, Spanish as well as Arabic in the Maghreb region of North Africa. Yet the French have always wanted to remain on African soil and have even made the so-called Francophones believe in their superiority. This perception sowed the seeds of the conflict that has manifested today because it created a situation where the ‘Francophone’

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Cameroonians saw their ‘Anglophone’ counterparts as lesser beings that were fit for exploitation and oppression (Gerber, 2018). That France and the French public are to a large extent complicit in the Cameroonian conflict is borne out in an experience that Jua and Konings (2004) observed in 2002 when they were watching a soccer match between Cameroon and Mali. They state that the winner of that day’s match was to play Senegal, which had already qualified for the final after beating Nigeria. While initially they (Anglophones) appeared to identify stalwartly with the national team, as was patent in their comments on the prowess of Cameroon’s ‘Indomitable Lions’, there was a change immediately after the French commentator remarked that, whatever the outcome of the match: “la finale sera une affaire francophone”, almost reflexively and in unison, they shouted: “Cameroon is not a Francophone country!” Suddenly any identification with the national team seemed to have disappeared. Even a later remark by the commentator that one of the Cameroonian players was an Anglophone failed to change the mood and restore their enjoyment of the match. (Jua & Konings, 2004, p. 1)

What the above quotation makes clear is the meddling nature of the French media, just like that of its government. It is colonial arrogance and carelessness that caused the commentator to say what he stated. What is clear is that through him, it can be concluded that France still sees Cameroon as a French colony, and not legitimately a country that has both English and French as equal official languages. The fact that Jua and Konings (2004) say that the commentator later stated that there was one Anglophone player in the national team to hopefully rectify his error does not in any way minimize the damage, but in fact, adds to the minoritization of the Anglophones. Such subtle nudging is not very different from the indifference that France paid to Rwanda in events that were to lead to the Rwanda genocide (Meredith, 2011). It is indicative of France’s desire to maintain its presence on the African continent at whatever cost. The commentator’s words also smack of the perpetuation of the French ideology of assimilation even when Cameroon is supposed to be independent. That France is in some way responsible for some of the challenges that Cameroon is facing is further amplified by Kamga (2011). Though referring to Nicholas Sarkozy’s new approach in Afro-Franco relations,

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especially when dealing with the so-called Francophone countries, he states: Yet, since he took office, N. Sarkozy has been rather aloof from the Cameroonian head of State. It is worth noting here that President Biya, who recently became the most senior Francophone head of State in Africa, is considered as one of the pillars of françafrique, a system of personal, ambiguous and corrupt relations between French presidents and their African counterparts. (Kamga, 2011, p. 1)

These words echo the position of the football commentator who referred to Cameroon as Francophone and the French take pride in this. Although Sarkozy is presented as being rather aloof from Paul Biya, the current President of Cameroon, what is clear is the involvement of the French political leadership in African, states pursuing not African interests but those of France. What is also quite telling is the reference to Biya as one of the pillars of françafrique that she sums up as “a system of personal, ambiguous and corrupt relations between French presidents and their African counterparts) (Kamga, 2011, p. 1). The above words are also an accusation on Biya who in the context of Anglophone and Francophone relations in Cameroon would definitely not favour a federal system of government. However, what is very patent in Kamga’s words is the betrayal of the Cameroonian people by the French political leadership. The reference to corrupt relations is quite telling. While corruption is clearly part of the French political leaders’ psyche and DNA as seen in the Sarkozy-Gaddafi links (Rasmi, 2021), what is underscored is the continued strong presence of France in Cameroon and by extension in her other former colonies on the African continent. The Cameroon Anglophone-Francophone entanglement is also mired in oil and the desire of the former British colony’s initial request for the restoration of the Federation as was agreed in 1961, and latterly they now speak of the wish to break away into a separate state. The Southerners, who are largely Anglophone, complain that they are not benefiting from the oil revenue yet it is extracted in their lands. They thus feel that if the federation is restored or there is decentralization, they will benefit more from the oil revenue. On the other hand, those from Francophone Cameroon are of the opinion that the pursuit of Anglophone autonomy is an attempt by the latter to break away from the union for economic reasons. This perception is premised on the

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discovery of large deposits of oil in the Anglophone region, and their consequent exploitation that commenced in 1977. It is worth noting that “revenues from that oil now make up a significant part of the nation’s gross domestic product, are usually cited as reasons for the post-Cold War push for greater levels of autonomy for the Anglophone minority within Cameroon” (Awasom, 1998, p. 164). What is clear is that while the crisis is driven by the languages of the former colonialists, Britain and France, that even led to the inheritance of two different legal systems at independence in Cameroon, the conflict appears to be also fanned by Francophone Cameroon’s fear of losing revenue from oil. What is, however, important to note is that the problems according to Awasom (1998) go back to the pre-independence period and are anchored on a minority that yearns for independence every time it feels victimized and marginalized. Awasom’s (1998) observations are critical because the spectre of autonomy again reared its head and this time with a more ferocious backlash in 2016, when the Southerners, “anglophone teachers’ and lawyers’ unions launched peaceful protests against the ‘neglect’ and ‘marginalisation’ of the two English-speaking regions” (Orock, 2022, Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight, para 10). The protestors were irked by the events that were unfolding in their area at the initiation of the government. Huge crowds participated in the year-long protests. Their main grievance was the appointment of Francophone teachers, prosecutors, and judges in Anglophone areas, denouncing these appointments as the government’s strategy of a gradual but steady process of the francophonization of their area (Orock, 2022). They were further miffed by the fact that in some of the Francophone regions, such as Douala and Yaoundé, which are host to large communities of Anglophones, French is habitually the only language that is used to access essential public services. It is such occurrences that have raised the ire of disgruntled Anglophones who are aggrieved about the crevasse between the official claim that Cameroon is a bilingual state and the reality of the Anglophones’ de facto second-class citizenship (Orock, 2022). The year 2016 did not just result in the blackout of internet services in Anglophone Cameroon but also in the shooting dead of unarmed protestors with some of those arrested being abused in detention such that some have now been led to decide that there be a separate state that secessionists have called Ambazonia.

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While the French have persistently added faggots to the fire that is already raging in Cameroon, the British and the United Nations are equally to blame in that they did not give the Southern Cameroonians an option to become independent as a separate state. Some of the Anglophones question the legitimacy of the UN-imposed referendum of 11 February 1961. They contend that by compelling British Cameroonians to choose to join either Nigeria or French Cameroon as the path to their independence, the UN’s execution of its own provisions for decolonization in Article 76 (b)—apropos the attainment of independence for former trust territories—was flawed. In doing this, the UN ignored the people’s yearning and wishes for independence, an act that flouts the very fundamental provisions of the UN’s decolonization framework (Awasom, 2002; Orock, 2022). The above discussion has revealed a long-winded betrayal that was cobbled on the table of European colonial greed that cared not about the Africans. The Cameroon conflict is one that is fuelled by the languages of the former colonialists and has today spiralled almost out of control such that Egeland declared: The international community has fallen asleep at the wheel when it comes to the crisis in Cameroon. Brutal killings burned villages and hundreds of thousands of displaced people – and the reaction is a deafening silence. (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2019, Cameroon tops list of most neglected crises, paragraph 1)

These words speak to how the world has become insulated from Cameroon’s challenge yet the very countries that sowed the seeds of this pandemic of violence, France and the UK remain mum and do nothing to extinguish the raging fires that they started and fuelled. Ndofor and Ray (2022) raise the same concern and in fact state that in terms of global attention to conflicts, Cameroon is now at the periphery and almost forgotten while the Russo-Ukrainian War receives “the lion’s share of global media coverage and diplomatic engagement” (Ndofor & Ray, 2022, Cameroon: Africa’s Unseen Crisis, paragraph 1). This is seen as an African problem and not in the context of colonial history and the 1884 Berlin Conference’s parcelling out Africa among the European nations. Cameroon’s case is thus summed up as not one of the “‘ethno-nationalist’ conflicts in terms of one cultural community and one language” (Achankeng, 2015, p. 13), but one enabled by the existence

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of policies that have advantaged those who speak French over those who speak English (Lounsbery, 2015, p. 346).

Conclusion This chapter has discussed and highlighted the tripartite betrayal of Cameroon by Britain, France, and the United Nations. This colonial legacy has led to internecine bloodletting in some instances that has led to a loss of lives and the destruction of infrastructure. It has been noted that while France and her language should shoulder the greatest burden in the blame, Britain and the United Nations laid the foundation of the current crisis in February 1961 when they carried out a plebiscite where they asked the British Cameroonians to choose between joining either the former British colony of Nigeria or former French Cameroun which was now Cameroon. This referendum was flawed even by United Nations standards because the option of self-rule was never floated. But then when one considers the heat and anger as well as cruelty and arrogance that accompanied decolonization, there seems to have been little or no worry about the fate of what was to happen to the smaller Cameroon that was joining its bigger Francophone sister. The problem today is that the Francophone majority is throwing around its weight and is even francophonizing Anglophone areas through the appointments of civil servants like judges in the Anglophone areas. These happenings coupled with French involvement and acts of its citizens and political leaders are all pointers to the reality of betrayal and the fact that self-rule was never meant to be a success by the withdrawing former colonialists.

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Ndofor, H. A., & Ray, C. A. (2022, May 9). Cameroon: Africa’s unseen crisis. Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/ cameroon-africas-unseen-crisis/ Ngugi, waT. (1986). Decolonizing the mind: The politics of language in African Literature. Zimbabwe Publishing House. Njeuma, M. Z. (1995). Reunification and political opportunism in the making of Cameroon’s independence. Paideuma: Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde, 41, 27–37. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40341690 Norwegian Refugee Council. (2019, June 4). Cameroon tops list of most neglected crises. https://www.nrc.no/news/2019/june/cameroon-tops-listof-most-neglected-crises/ Obeng, S. G., & Adegbija, E. (1999). Language and ethnic identity in subSaharan Africa. In J. A. Fishman (Ed.), Language and ethnicity (pp. 353– 368). Oxford University Press. Orock, R. (2022, March 17). Cameroon: How language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/cameroon-how-language-plunged-a-cou ntry-into-deadly-conflict-with-no-end-in-sight-179027 Prah, K. K. (1998). Introduction: The missing link in African education and development. In K. K. Prah (Ed.), Between distinction and extinction: The harmonization and standardization of African languages (pp. 1–16). Witwatersrand University Press. Ranger, T. O. (1989). Missionaries, migrants and the Manyika: The invention of ethnicity in Zimbabwe. In L. Vail (Ed.), The creation of tribalism in Southern Africa (pp. 118–150). James Currey. Rasmi, F. (2021). Beyond the war: The history of French-Libyan relations. Atlantic Council. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30743 Recchia, S. (2020). A legitimate sphere of influence: Understanding France’s turn to multilateralism in Africa. Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(4), 508–533. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1733985 Riches, C., & Kavanagh, D. (2013). A dictionary of political biography. Oxford University Press. Schilling, B. (2019). German colonialism in Africa. The English Historical Review, 134(567), 390–403. Schilling, B. (2014). Postcolonial Germany: Memories of empire in a decolonized nation. Oxford University Press. Takougang, J. (2019). African state and society in the 1990s: Cameroon’s political crossroads. Routledge. Tucker, A. (2017). Orthographic systems and conventions in sub-Saharan Africa. In J. Berry & T. Sebeok (Ed.), Linguistics in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 618– 653). De Gruyter Mouton. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111562520-024

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CHAPTER 14

Populism as a New Political Tactic of Postcolonial Deceit in Nigerian Contemporary Digital Era Desmond Onyemechi Okocha and Jesse Ishaku

Introduction Politics, the world over, is evolving both in its dimension and focus. This is because the advent of the digital media (social media) has actually shaped and redefined how political engagements are being conceived by both the leaders and the led. Social media offers opportunities for individuals to express themselves about social injustices and issues affecting their social well-being through digital activism. According to Moses et al., (2022a, 2022b), while digital activism is a form of online advocacy for human equity, social injustice hampers the citizens’ fundamental human

D. O. Okocha (B) Department of Mass Communication, Bingham University, Bingham, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] J. Ishaku Department of Mass Communication, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_14

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rights, especially the rights of the proletariats and the downtrodden. Consequently, different societies and countries have tried to adopt a political system that best suits the well-being and betterment of its citizenry. According to Henry (2013), structural improvements which is supposed to be a child of democracy have not been as effective as anticipated in creating the political institutions and leadership agency needed to support social progress. On their part, Okocha and Agbele (2023) observe that, because democracy allows for public engagement, it has developed into a form of government that is crucial to global politics. However, democracy in Nigeria which is supposed to be government of the people, for the people, and by the people according to popular definition is now a mirage or at best, at its embryonic stage. This supports O’Donnell’s (2004) claim that, modern democracy is not really by the people, but it is for the people, which emphasizes the significance of social ownership of both political institutions and their outcomes. According to Okocha and Agbele (2023), in an ideal democracy, citizen engagement is paramount. Be that as it may, politicians in both developed and developing countries (like Nigeria) especially during electioneering campaigns or political debates use to come up with policy statements and manifestos that are usually mouth-watering and endearing to quite a good number of people in the society. For instance, Tijani (2015) states that, President Muhammadu Buhari and his vice president, Yemi Osinbajo and other top members of the party, made lots of promises to Nigerians, upon which they rode gallantly to power. Aesop, a Greek author and Fabulist (620 & 564 BCE) asserts that, “when all is said and done more is said than done.” “Despite the constant government rhetoric in their policies for sustainable development, it has continued to shows ineptitude, poor political will, corruption and mismanagement” (Adam et al., 2017). According to Gildenhuys (1988), the state’s responsibility is to ensure that all of its citizens have access to the basics of life, such as housing, healthcare, education, pensions, and protection from losing their employment by fostering an atmosphere that is favorable. Yet, today a new generation of “populists” are making it almost impossible for all these to be achieved. Dunmoye (2003) opines that, accountability has since colonial rule relapsed and a skewed social distribution of resources propelled organized groups to exert pressure against marginalization, however; the larger expectation is that democracy actually prevails more from the bottom than from the top where the political elite is more. Hence, the

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public’s growing dissatisfaction with the existing situation has increased the discontent with the populists’ appeal. Increasing inequality, globalization, and technological progress have made many Nigerians feeling left behind, while horrific terrorism, kidnapping, and banditry particularly in the country’s north, cause concern, fear, and uncertainty. This chapter, however, sets out to ascertain whether populism has become a new political tactic in postcolonial Nigeria, identify the relationship between populism, politics, and corruption in Nigeria as well as assess the opportunities for a paradigm shift in populists’ movement especially in today’s digital era in Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem In recent years, according to Eiermann et al. (2017), pivotal political events—including the election of President Donald Trump in the USA, the Brexit vote, the electoral success of Italy’s Five Star Movement, Brazil’s abrupt turn to the right with the election of President Jair Bolsonaro, and the doubling of support for populist parties throughout Europe—have propelled the term “populism” from the pages of academic journals into the public eye. Populism frequently develops as a result of legitimate worries about how well institutions and political representation are run in various nations. The appeal of populism, in contrast, frequently stems from genuine worries about how mainstream parties have failed to address issues that affect residents and how institutions have failed to provide policy outcomes that matter to citizens (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Populism can also develop in situations where there have been severe economic setbacks and where broad-based growth will require economic systems to undergo disruptive change. According to Aiginger (2020, pp. 38–42), “populism can range from persuasive politics to a dangerous agenda that creates internal and external conflict, negates climate change and rejects human rights.” The decline of political parties that backed Universalist views of human rights gave rise to populism (Urbinati, 2017). Since there seems to be a total deviation from the main essence of the populists’ movement globally, this chapter however, seeks to examine whether populism has become a new political tactic in Nigeria where the leaders use it to their advantage to the detriment of the common people whom they vow to protect.

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Theoretical Framework This chapter is hinged on the critical theory. One of the distinctive features of critical theory is critiquing. According to Thompson (2018, pp. 1–14): Critical theory is a distinctive form of theory in that it posits a more comprehensive means to grasp social reality and diagnose social pathologies. It is marked not by a priori ethical or political values that it seeks to assert in the world, but by its capacity to grasp the totality of individual and social life as well as the social processes that constitute them. It is a form of social criticism that contains within it the seeds of judgment, evaluation, and practical, transformative activity.

Critical theory questions conventional approaches to examining and interpreting organizational phenomena (Scherer, 2009). Its roots can be traced back to the “Frankfurt School,” which produced thinkers like Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jürgen Habermas. Critical theory’s fundamental goal is to expose current forms of oppression and dominance while providing alternatives that would emancipate individuals who were previously marginalized and silenced. Critical theory reveals the dominance, control, and suppression that lie behind things that at first glance seem neutral, necessary, and progressive. Critical theory suggests inclusivity through the democratization of control and decision-making, thus opens up possibilities for analysis of power, discourse, and historical understandings (Harney, 2014), because it expects emancipatory reflection of transformed social practices (Schroyer, 1973). Contrary to popular belief, critical theory has always focused on the normative validity of human progress, the need to defend the political and cultural values of the enlightened, and through sane and rational consciousness and action (Bronner, 2004). The key insight of a critical theory of society is, therefore, not meant to impose some set of a priori values and ideals onto the social world, but to unravel the contradictions that already exist within it; to make evident an emancipatory insight into the very fabric of what we take as basic to our social world. The justification for anchoring the study on critical theory is that first, it aims to reveal the dominance, control, and suppression that lie behind things that at first glance seem neutral, necessary, and progressive when in real sense they are not. Secondly, critical theory has always focused on the normative validity of human progress, the need to defend the political and

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cultural values of the people through sane and rational consciousness and action. It questions the various power structures that exist in the society, fights the continued endorsement of the prevailing irrational and dominating relations, exposing the selfish interests of the elites while offering emancipatory insights to the situation at hand.

Populism at a Glance Majority of scholarly works that examine populism start by highlighting how difficult and vague the phrase is. A successful concept-building process, or simply a meaningful discussion about this, is hampered by a number of fundamental issues (Taggart & van Kessel, 2009). Historians have questioned whether the purported populist parties and movements throughout history and in different parts of the world actually share many similarities. It is noteworthy that there is a considerable unwillingness to establish definitions on populism. Canovan (1981, p. 294) cites two common traits of populism but is hesitant to offer a definition—namely, “the exaltation of and appeal to the people and anti-elitism”. Taggart (2000) offered definitions of populism based on six traits: opposition to representative politics, a heartland, a lack of core beliefs; a response to a sense of crisis, self-limitation, and chameleon-like behavior. Also, a number of academics have used comparable concepts to gauge the level of populism present in political parties’ or leaders’ language (Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 2009; Hawkins, 2009; Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn, 2009). However, there is no consensus on how to define populism, but there have been attempts at doing so recently, and there seems to have been a proliferation of this kind of work, which may be due to the heterogeneity of usage. It’s also plausible to argue that the term’s broad use throughout history and geography is what makes populism so difficult to define. Even though explanations of populism frequently include elements like an appeal to the “ordinary people” and an anti-elitist critique, they are frequently too vague to accurately identify which actors or groups fall under the populist category. In fact, efforts to do so have only been made more difficult by the fact that a lot of academics use the phrase to refer to a wide variety of political actors without providing a precise or explicit definition of the notion. Furthermore, as Worsley (1969, p. 218) noted over 40 years ago, the fact that movements that are called “populist” rarely identify themselves as such makes things much harder.

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Even if experts could agree on the fundamental traits of populism, it is still unknown how it manifests itself. Others argue that populism should be treated as a more fully fledged ideology (Barr, 2009; Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008) or as an ideology lacking core values and as a result attaching to other ideologies (Taggart, 2000). Although some scholars use populism to denote a certain personal style or an opportunistic strategy to boost electoral appeal (e.g., Betz, 1994), others argue that populism should be treated as a more fully fledged ideology. This has implications on how populist actors are categorized as well. While populism can be viewed as a tool that can be used by any political actor under the first method, the second approach is more likely to produce a more limited set of populist examples. Based on the foregoing, since populism is dramatically shifting the global political landscape according to Kyle and Gultchin (2018), politicians cannot begin to provide substantive and trustworthy solutions until they have a thorough understanding of the populism phenomena. However, populism has two main tenets: (1) outsiders, including established elites, are in war with a nation’s “real people,” and (2) the true people’s will should not be constrained. The populace are portrayed as morally decent… economically striving, hardworking, family-oriented, plainspoken, and endowed with common sense, in the words of sociologist Brubaker (2017). Outsiders purportedly do not belong to the moral and hardworking true people. Even though populism always rests on these two fundamental tenets, it can manifest in a variety of ways depending on the situation—cultural, socioeconomic, and antiestablishment populism (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Populists primarily employ three (3) tactics to fan this insider–outsider divide: 1. a political style in which populists identify with insiders; 2. an effort to define and delegitimize outsiders; and 3. a rhetoric of crisis that elevates the conflict between insiders and outsiders as a matter of national urgency. According to Kyle and Gultchin (2018), from four (4) to twenty (20) populist leaders have gained power globally, a staggering fivefold increase between 1990 and 2018. These nations include not only those in South America, Eastern and Central Europe where populism has historically

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been most common, but also those in Asia and Western Europe. Populism is now more prevalent in systemically developed countries than it once was in emerging democracies, where it used to be more common. Be that as it may, according to some academics, “populism has characteristics that make it manipulative by nature, making it a dishonest method of political opportunism that preys on the concerns of the populist constituency” (Betz, 1994, p. 4). Betz further explained populism as largely a political tactic, with speech or rhetoric “intended to harness feelings of resentment and use them strategically” (p. 198).

Politics in Nigeria: Is Populism Becoming New Political Tactic in Nigeria? Politics in Nigeria has attracted the attention of so many researchers from different disciplines within the art, humanities, and the social and management sciences (such as Henry, 2013; Yagboyaju, 2023). Different approaches have been employed by these researchers both within and outside the country in order to critically explain and understand some of the ideologies of major political parties such as the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC). In their bid to win different political positions in the country, candidates of the PDP, APC and other emerging political parties have employed different political strategies and tactics in order to lure or convince Nigerians to vote for them with the hope of creating a better Nigeria for all. This, for instance, is captured in the words of Adeyemi (2023) when he states that, the survival of the wisest now prevails over that of the fittest for one to win elections in Nigeria. And being the greatest at propaganda might dramatically increase the likelihood of winning the popular vote, which could lead to electoral success. Regrettably enough, both the major parties, that is, the PDP and the APC, have had the opportunity of governing the country at one point or the other but without any remarkable achievement or landmark development which is contrary to their outrageous and fake promises as objectified in their contested mantras—“Power to the People” for the PDP and “Change” for the APC. Interestingly, the political strategies and tactics as well as the battle cries for the two (2) major political parties in Nigeria—the PDP (Power to the People) and the APC (Change) mantra—have actually worked on the preexisting bias of so many Nigerians. Commenting on Zimbabwe’s contemporary political environment, Mavengano (2023) points at

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the interaction of language and modern-day African politics. When properly examined, the “Power to the People” mantra of the PDP in over a decade of its leadership was able to convince Nigerians on the need for a switchover from military rule (which is usually characterized as unfriendly, harsh, undemocratic, and anti-people policies) to civilian rule (which is believed to be democratic, friendly and people-oriented). Mavengano and Moyo (2023) contend that political discourse is laden with emotive lexical items which are used to sway the crowds, and yet, the semantic hollowness of such words is profoundly discernible in everyday living conditions of the masses in Africa’s postcolonial era. Ojo (2014 & 1994), notes that Nigeria’s democratization march has been a cheered one which resulted into concomitant commencement of another round of transition programming, thereby making democratic reforms a tall expectation. Consequently, the “Change” mantra of the APC, on the other hand, promised Nigerians “change” that will fight against endemic corruption, insecurity, inflation, etc. and usher in economic prospects and viability, institutional reforms, etc. There is seemed to be a striking relationship between PDP and APC campaign strategies/tactics and the whole idea of populism which is usually people-centered and anti-elitists. While corroborating, Adeyemi (2023) observes that, most Nigerian politicians used to deploy different propaganda techniques such as name calling and profiling, playing the common man, playing politics with words and the testimonials in order to win elections. The concept of populism as a political discourse and that of populism as a strategy of political mobilization, according to Jansen (2011, p. 82), try to explain its capacity in luring “ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people.” According to Michira (2014), politicians have developed original linguistic styles that depart from commonplace speech. This stance is debatably accurate for Nigeria and many other nations, as it cannot be stressed enough how important word choice is in political campaigns. Politicians have been given a wide range of lexical options over the years, along with their ability to utilize language strategically. While corroborating, Abdel-Moety (2015, p. 8) claimed that, “there is proof that political speech (rhetoric) exhibits power through the clever use of language that helps politicians to control political information”. Two of the most important factors for political candidates to succeed in any election campaign are the use of skillful language and the capacity to persuade and impress audiences with

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discourse full of thoughts, emotions, and excitement (Jalali & Sadeghi, 2014). So many dangerous rhetoric of presidents in their bid for populist appeal around the globe have been examined by different researchers. Notable among them, according to Roth (2018), was the assessment of the dangerous rhetoric of the US president, Donald Trump. Trump addressed many Americans’ frustration with economic stagnation and a culture that was becoming more and more diverse in a way that violated fundamental notions of dignity and equality, sometimes outright and other times through code and indirection. He (President Trump) made derogatory remarks about immigrants and refugees, attacked a judge for having Mexican descent, made fun of a disabled journalist, denied numerous claims of sexual assault, and promised to limit women’s authority over their own fertility. To make matters worse, much of his speech also lacked any real substance (Roth, 2018). The situation with Nigerian presidents is not in any way different from what is obtainable around the world. Ochonu (2018, p. 1) reported that: It makes one dizzy trying to keep up with President Buhari’s shifting, contradictory rhetoric on herdsmen killings. He has alternated between outright denial of herdsmen’s AK-47 possession and suggesting that there could be a new, deadly group of herdsmen, a group with origins outside Nigeria. His position is marked by waffling and confusion. Because he goes back and forth and contradicts himself on this issue, his words have elicited multiple interpretations, and he comes across as unsure of what the problem is, let alone of the solution.

In the same vein, Egbujo (2018) reported that, Obasanjo also asserts patriotism. He makes a democratic credentials claim. He believes that President Buhari has failed beyond repair. Nonetheless, many Nigerians hold opposing opinions. Because they haven’t been given better electable choices, many people are stuck with Buhari. Many people are afraid due to history of willful treasury plundering. However, there may be some truth in what Obasanjo is saying. Buhari has disappointed a lot of people. Many believe that, among a pack of wolves, President Buhari is the least corrupt. However, the president may have a clannish demeanor, but many people admire him for rejecting the massive amassing of personal wealth (Egbujo, 2018). According to Egbujo (2018), Obasanjo was observed

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at various points attesting to President Buhari’s above average performance, but later ordered Buhari not to run in the 2019 elections due to his appalling performance. The reason Nigeria is where it is today is because there has not been any sustained period of good leadership and the nation never placed a priority on developing leaders and establishing moral politics. Furthermore, Onunaiju (2022) reported that, more than 85% of those who braved the odds of existential social and political perils to support Major General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd.) as president in 2015 were rural peasants, farmers, and urban residents, including artisans, unemployed youths, professionals, and even radical intelligentsia, who have no regard for conventional political or social norms. With the hopes that President Buhari would immediately alleviate their existential problems of poverty, hunger, security, unemployment, and the horrifying and mindless looting of public resources by public officeholders, they toiled, stood in long voting lines, and overcame intimidations and inducements by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the country’s then ruling party (Onunaiju, 2022). President Buhari has been in power for eight years, yet as he prepares to leave, he makes no claims to having accomplished anything in the fields for which millions of Nigerian workers labored to elect him. It is glaring that populism has become a new political tactic in Nigeria. This is because the term has been used by opportunists who usually take advantage of the masses by posing themselves as “pro-people and anti-elites” especially during electioneering campaigns only for them (politicians) to quickly change from “anti-people to pro-elites” after winning the elections. This assertion is in line with the observation of Betz (1994) when he pointed out that, “populism has characteristics that makes it manipulative by nature, making it a dishonest method of political opportunism that preys on the concerns of the populist constituency” (p.4).

Populism, Politics, and Corruption in Nigeria: The Nexus The works of Athenian and Roman thinkers held two distinct meanings of corruption, as Buchan and Hill (2014) note. One was the general moral and spiritual deterioration that afflicts citizens without distinction as a result of the gap between empirical realities and the standards by which

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they are judged naturally. Later, Ibn Khaldun (Hindess, 2012) and Machiavelli (Burcham & Lyons, 2013; Buchan & Hill, 2014) supported this “naturalist” perspective. The other interpretation was limited and legalistic, that is, “public office corruption”—the use of a position of public trust for personal gain. Scholars over the years abandoned the naturalist tradition in order to concentrate on how to ensure that public employees wouldn’t transgress the bounds of their position in order to pursue aims that differed from the public good because their purpose was practical and goal-oriented. Stanley (2008), Moffitt and Tormey (2014), and others have noted that, populism lacks institutional components that indicate shared goals or a philosophy of governance; it lacks a global or international populist movement; it lacks key theorists or canonical texts; and all of its representations have a local rather than a universal appeal. Populism evolution was associated with the Russian narodniks, who held that revolution would come from the people (narod), and the rural populist politics of the American mid-West (Allcock, 1971). The phrase was once again accepted in connection to McCarthyism at the end of the decade, and it was used widely in Kornhauser’s “Politics of Mass Society” to characterize the type of government that develops when democratic forms of representation are not matched by the rule of law. Despite the fact that different scholars have different opinions on populism as a whole, most of their definitional components are still valid today, such as the aim of gaining power for the people as a whole and the usual leadership of intellectuals or the view of the more archaic section of the people as repository of virtue (Mendilow & Phélippeau, 2021). It is the insufficient level of political institutionalization (Kriesi, 2014), pent-up animosity engendered by the negative mimesis toward the reform processes launched… after 1989 and the rejection of the Westernizing Liberal elites (Krastev & Holmes, 2019) as well as the inability of leaders to foster a perception of procedural fairness among others (Lind, 2022). It can be argued that, social media platforms can serve as a potent tool or avenue for democratic participation and populist movement. Moses et al., (2022a, 2022b) opine that, heightened concerns over the influence of the social media platforms in promoting civic activism and instigating agitations against repressive governments the world over seems to be a welcome development. They, however, contend that, social media have become scapegoats that authorities in developing nations target

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for regulation and justify such attempts by emphasizing the relationship between the platforms and national security. According to Agerberg (2017), personal experiences with local facilities (such as healthcare and education) that are thought to be suffering from corruption are a powerful indicator of support for populist causes. Hence, the question that arises is whether populists in power can fulfill their campaign pledges (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015). On the other hand, Curini (2017) investigates how political corruption is used as a wedge issue in largescale national campaigns. In this context, he draws attention to the fact that populist parties disregard issues that serve the interests of certain groups but rather concentrate on matters that affect “the people” as a whole. Based on the foregoing, it will be quite imperative to understand the historical evolution of the two (2) main political parties in Nigeria, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC), in order to establish the relationship between populism, politics, and corruption in Nigeria. The PDP was founded in August 1998, and because they have won four of the six presidential elections since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule or democratically elected government in 1999, they have comfortably controlled the country’s affairs for more than 10 years (Aleyomi, 2013). During its reign, the PDP according to Katsina (2016) did not just experience issues with leadership throughout its time in office, but has also had a lack of clear ideological beliefs that might have directed its government and provided direction for its members serving in public offices. After ousting the PDP in 2015 due to its’ highly monetized politics, individualistic inclinations of its politicians, incoherent party doctrines, and party defection among other things, the APC—considered as Nigeria’s strongest opposition—managed to create a president for the first time (Olowojolu, 2015). Consequently, the APC was created in February 2013 when three equally potent opposition political parties in Nigeria merged as a result of the PDP’s ongoing and seemingly unstoppable political power. The PDP’s subsequent failure may be related to the party’s poor performance in Nigerian administration and lack of willpower to address issues bothering on corruption, Boko haram insurgency, kidnapping and banditry, embezzlement/misappropriation of public funds, insecurity, etc. However, the APC administration which poses itself as Nigerians’ messiah have been equally adjudged by so many indexes and researchers as one of the worst dispensation in the history of

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Nigeria. This situation is in line with the observation of Kossow (2019) and Müller (2016) who try to show the relationship between populism and corruption. The former claims that corrupt individuals simply exploit populist language as a deception to further their agendas, while the latter contends that the association between populism and corruption is the result of an ideological presupposition.

Populism in Nigeria: Could There Be Opportunities for a Paradigm Shift? Populism in Nigeria has not actually yielded the desired result as it has been seen to be counter-productive which is contrary to popular belief that it is people-oriented. This situation actually calls for a paradigm shift and transformation in leadership style especially in nascent democracy like Nigeria. Both the term “paradigm shift” and the concept of “transformational leadership” emphasize change that is going in the correct direction for societal renewal. The term paradigm shift refers to a hypothesis that was first seriously considered in Thomas Kuhn’s key work, the “Structure of Scientific Revolution” (1962). It describes a change from business as usual to a tangible radicalization of circumstances and attitudes. While having a scientific origin, the term “paradigm shift” has been used by a variety of disciplines to refer to a large and dramatic departure from the social “norm.” In Nigeria, for instance, during the 2023 general elections, electorates on different social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram were seen to have posted/tweeted how they came out in their numbers to vote for the candidate of their choice because they are tired with the government of President Muhammadu Buhari. According to Papathanassopoulos and Negrine (2019), tweets have evolved from being only informational bites to being involved in processes of political, diplomatic, and journalistic interaction. Moreover, because it involves both political players and the general public, such communication is no longer the domain of the informed. To this end, Kuhn (1962) promotes paradigm shift, a movement that creates a new, innovative, and transformative landscape in our society, as he asserts that the limiting, normative perspective of textbooks and science limit our awareness of revolutionary tendencies in the human world. According to the Kuhnian viewpoint, paradigm shift is revolutionary in the fullest sense of the word (Sosteric, 2005). With its ontological distinctiveness, transformational leadership in the Kuhnian sense

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(Everman, 2006) bothers on finding an alternative leadership style or model while building on Nigeria’s budding democratic culture. Bernard Bass lists four interconnected elements that he believes are essential for leaders to take followers into transformational leadership in his explanation of how leaders create the ties required to make transformational leadership possible. Bass (1985) expanded on James McGregor Burns’ idea of transformational leadership, which at first leaned toward political leadership, by establishing four essential components for preparing people for change. Bass (1985) suggests the following elements as important for transformational leadership. These elements are essential for bringing about change in Nigeria’s political system. 1. Intellectual stimulation: In Bass’ concept, intellectual stimulation refers to a leader’s capacity to influence and alter his followers’ perceptions of problems, awareness of them, and solutions through the use of their intellectual engagement. The approach to the mind, according to Soyinka, is not the path of the blade or the bullet but rather the unseen, yet palpable path of dialogue, which may be difficult but eventually ensures the expansion of our private social beings (Soyinka, 2002). This is because by involving followers in the decision-making process, intellectual stimulation encourages them to come up with innovative ways to effect change. By including followers in the process of decision-making and problem-solving that will affect their social, economic, environmental, and political well-being, intellectual stimulation encourages followers to consider new techniques and means to bring about transformation. 2. Inspirational motivation: Leaders look on inspirational motivation appeal to energize the populace and increase their awareness of the consequences of acting improperly. Such leaders ought to be able to motivate their followers to envision the world as they want it to be in the future. The motivational aspect in this context denotes a leadership style in Nigeria that will communicate a powerful, fearsome vision of the future by imagining how to transfer the current populist key ingredients into reality. 3. Idealized influence: This characteristic puts into perspective transformational leaders that serve as examples for followers. Followers will be motivated by leaders who are transparent, and they will ultimately mimic such leaders and internalize their ideas and manner of operation for the rebirth of society. Burns thinks that for optimal influence

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to occur, leaders and followers must develop real trust. The charisma or idealized impact of the leadership should be characterized by high moral and ethical standards if it is to be truly transformational. Without a strong moral and ethical foundation, true transformative leadership will be difficult to achieve for both the leader and the followers. Essentially, charismatic leadership is involved here. Doing outstanding acts and deeds that inspire followers to be committed to helping leaders to realize their goals and dreams are referred to as charismatic leadership. According to Nadler and Tushman (1989), charismatic leadership or idealized influence is characterized by three essential characteristics: envisioning, enabling, and energizing. 4. Individualized consideration: According to Bass’ contention in this section of his philosophy, leaders treat each follower as an individual and offer coaching, mentorship, a sense of purpose, vision, and opportunity for personal development. This strategy satisfies each person’s demand for self-actualization, self-fulfillment, and selfworth while simultaneously educating the next generation of leaders. It also naturally encourages followers to achieve more and advance in the field of self-development.

Conclusion The idea of populism which actually evolved from developed countries is presently being adopted and used in different developing countries which Nigeria is not an exception. This is because it is believed to meet the hopes, aspirations and yearnings of the masses when properly adopted and utilized. Unfortunately, populism in most of the nascent democracy, like Nigeria, seems to be counter-productive as it has failed to provide the desired results. Leaders, who are supposed to be populists, acting for the people as against the elites are seen to have only adopted the populist appeal especially during electioneering campaigns just to grab the seats they have been vying for in order to fulfill their personal, selfish and parochial interests as against the people’s interests. There is no doubt that politicians in Nigeria have actually adopted populism as a new political tactic/strategy in securing political seats. However, just as the concept is evolving over the years, the masses are equally beginning to understand how manipulative and misleading the whole idea of populist movement is, and how it has negatively affected

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their societies and dashed the hopes and aspiration of the common man in diverse ways. Consequently, people are revolting against the status quo because they believe it to be fundamentally defective and have failed to serve the interests of the people. It, therefore, becomes quite imperative to take the issues that gave rise to populism seriously in order to develop a meaningful political ideology that can be truly pro-people and anti-elitists.

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PART IV

(15–18) Postcolonial Political Dialectics in Religion and Human Rights Discourses

CHAPTER 15

The Impact of Legacies of the Past on the Emergence of Conflict and Deceit in Sub-Saharan African Politics Fabian Maugnganidze

Introduction Apart from the rise of religious fundamentalists in the Middle East and the more recent war in the Ukraine, Africa remains the cauldron of conflict where armed violence seems to be on the increase. The unlawful changes of governments in at least four West African nations, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali between 2020 and the beginning of 2022 and the flaring tensions and violence in Mozambique and Eswatini, are signs of uncontained instability in Africa. African armed conflicts probably account for more than half of global war-related deaths with millions of people being displaced. What is more disheartening is that the African crisis seems to

F. Maugnganidze (B) Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] Legal Institute Online, GWERU, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_15

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be gaining momentum with more conflicts being ignited all over the continent. Whether this resurgence of conflict is an African cultural phenomenon, a natural passing phase or a stage-managed looting exercise is debatable. But the deleterious effects of the colonial hangover and deceptive (mis)information cannot be ignored. As Chennells (1999) posits, colonisation itself exerts fundamental effects on the colonised population from the day they are colonised. These populations begin to make adjustments from the start and continue to adjust even after they have been granted freedom. As such, the residual effects of colonialism continue lingering in their minds, thought processes and culture long after the colonialists have left, that is if the colonialists ever leave at all. Hence, the colonial impact can to a great extent determine a society’s propensity for conflict and violence. As Okoyo (1977) argues, “Africa’s post-colonial present can be said to have been fashioned for Africa by Africa’s colonial past.” This notion is supported by Cohen (1995) who argued that the internal conflicts in Africa have their roots in colonialism. The conflicts are a consequence of the flawed processes of colonisation, decolonisation and the subsequent nation building. In fact, the creation of the modern Sub-Saharan African state by former colonial powers had deception, inequalities and a high propensity for conflict infused in it (Cohen 1995). It is this reality and other issues that have given rise to the argument that the colonial legacy is intricately connected to perennial conflicts in Africa. Although the term “postcolonial” can be generally used in the historical sense as the period after decolonisation, it can also be used as an ideological concept (Lazarus, 2011). Hence, postcolonialism “refers to a loose body of writing and thought that seeks to transcend the legacies of modern colonialism and overcome its epistemic confines. It refers to a relational position against and beyond colonialism, including colonialism’s very culture” (Go, 2016). As Chennells (1999) explains, “post-colonialism is concerned with the worlds which colonialism in its multiple manifestations, confused, disfigured and distorted, reconfigured and finally transformed.” However, in this discourse, focus will not be so much on the theory of postcolonialism, but rather on how African politics has been adulterated by the colonial experiences and deceptive misinformation that have shifted leadership thinking from the African philosophy of Ubuntu to a form of Western democracy that is turning out to be a square peg in a round hole. What is best for Africa can never be realised in the eyes and thinking of the West. Self-determination is a right that Africa should be allowed

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to enjoy without being extorted to conform to global capitalism and misplaced interventionist notions whose pseudo-benevolence has reduced the continent to a basket case. As Ogunyankin (2019) posits, there should be “a commitment to a politics of decolonization in all domains and a move towards the creation of identities, spaces and products that work for Africa(ns) despite the warnings of certain theoretical frameworks.” The way Sub-Saharan Africa is right now, should not be blamed solely on Africans without considering where it is coming from. The underdevelopment, predatory, dependent and neo-patrimonial nature of Africa was never a creation of the Africans (Ikome, 2007). It is therefore time that the Western world and all former colonial powers take responsibility for the mess they created on the continent through centuries of incessant pillaging and socio-cultural debilitation. On the other hand, Africans must emancipate themselves from a culture of deception, selfdenigration and self-pity. It is not always right to blame everyone else without introspection. Democracy in Africa The calls for democratic reforms in Africa are genuine, especially when many African states have endured poverty, institutionalised corruption, unaccountable leaderships or long histories of military rule, inadequate service delivery and unfair elections. On the other hand, Western liberal democracy has been implemented in Africa although it is characterised by deceit, election rigging and violence. In the end, democratisation has only paved way for stage-managed multiparty elections without any improvement on the welfare of the impoverished African electorate (AdejumoAyibiowu, 2019). Indeed, there is so much deception in African politics that it has become a serious challenge to national and continental stability. Despite the emergence of authoritarian regimes after independence, there have been significant challenges from movements and individuals who have been advocating for democratic governance. Demands for pluralism have been persistent and many African leaders have been coerced into agreeing to jettison the one-party systems in favour of multiparty popular participation and regular competitive elections in a free democratic space (NRC, 1992). Unfortunately, many inept and greedy leaders have introduced counterfeit democracy with corrupt governance and chaotic violent elections which have been referred to by some as “African style democracy” (Adejumo-Ayibiowu, 2019). However, this

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may actually be a symptom of the failure of the direct extrapolation of the Western style of democracy in the African setting. Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa has been difficult to establish and embrace to the levels attained in the West. Some scholars have attributed this failure in governance to undemocratic African cultural values, but others have also argued that colonialism and foreign subjugation have created a perverted form of African culture that is not a true reflection of Africa (Adejumo-Ayibiowu, 2019). In any case, African values and traditions should be considered when advocating for democracy. Yes, the guiding principles may be the same, but there is need for Africa to define her own unique form of democracy without copying everything prescribed by the West (NRC, 1992). Indeed, the differences in history, culture and environments are so significant that African democracy should be developed by Africans themselves without being arm-twisted by donors who are only determined to further their agendas. In fact, this fascination with the Western style of democracy without considering African values is probably the reason why we are seeing a gradual reversal of the “third wave of democratisation” in Africa. Campbell and Quinn (2021) contend that the African states under authoritarian rule are on the increase and this has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Governments were using the guise of enforcing the restrictions of the pandemic to use the brutal force of the security services to subjugate opponents as in Uganda and Tanzania or postpone elections as in Ethiopia and Somalia. It is agreed that change is inevitable and democratic values are essential for peace and stability, but imposing a one size-fits-all form of democracy on every nation may be a recipe for disaster.

The Colonial Legacy and Conflict in Africa The contribution of greediness to almost every conflict should never be underestimated. As such, the real causes of recurrent conflicts in Africa should be addressed without hiding behind the finger. The contributions of the colonial past should be considered as much as the greediness of the leaders who rig elections and divert state resources through corrupt dealings. It is a fact that colonialism created gross inequalities and skewed power relations which have been exacerbated by bad governance resulting in the flaring of conflicts all over the continent. Former colonial masters have also tried to protect their interests by supporting deceptive despots without any effort towards fostering good governance. A good example

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is the American, French and Belgian support for the kleptocratic authoritarian, Joseph Mobutu in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)). They protected him for a long time and it only took the collapse of the Soviet Union for them to reluctantly leave him to account to the people of the DRC (Ikome, 2007). The political repression and lack of respect for human rights in Africa by leaders who use violence and manipulation of the state media to retain power is a mirror of the tradition of their colonial past which the West in many instances, is turning a blind eye to. Impact of the Colonial Legacy on African Democracy Every individual is a product of his or her past and Africa can never fully reform without confronting the ghost of colonialism. The strategy of “divide and rule” is very much alive in African politics as it was during the colonial period. Morrock (1973) defines “divide and rule” as an imperialist’s conscious effort to create or turn to his advantage, inherent differences in the subjugated colony or population which may be linguistic, tribal, cultural or religious. So, the colonialists ensured that their power was sustained by deviously exploiting the coordination problems amongst the African natives that they had colonised. Potential insurrection was prevented by obliterating African concentrations of power through discriminatory sanctions and offers within communities that were previously harmonious. This culture of deceit was implanted even into the minds of the current Sub-Saharan African politicians who consistently use deception to get ahead. In Rwanda, the minority Tutsi group was made to seem superior to the chagrin of the majority Hutu, who did not realise that the problem was not with the Tutsi but with the coloniser. One language, one country, one ethnicity, but so much hatred that a million people had to be brutally exterminated for nothing. The colonial legacy is to a great extent the elephant in the room when we analyse the challenges of democracy and deceit in African politics. Colonialism destroyed the African democratic institutions that existed and set up a non-democratic system that took away the self-respect and dignity of Africans. During the colonial days, the colonialists never pretended to be democratic or level headed. In fact, their autocratic rule was unapologetic and they destroyed the indigenous African structures and culture as much as they could (NRC, 1992). It is therefore oxymoronic for the former colonial powers to show impatience in the democratisation of

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Africa when they are the ones who destroyed the African self-governance and developed a culture of violence, oppression and selfishness. According to some scholars, the hangover of colonialism continues to linger in African politics as many African countries are still fulfilling the purpose of exploitation that was concocted by the Europeans at the 1884 Berlin Conference (Adejumo-Ayibiowu, 2019). Of note is the perpetuation of “divide and rule” politics by postcolonial Sub-Saharan African politicians to survive in office. African rulers have mastered the art of breaking up rival power concentrations into smaller segments individually having less power than the ruler. Autocratic rulers like the former Zairean President Mobutu and the former Emperor of the Central African Republic (CAR) Jean-Bédel Bokassa were famed for continuously shuffling their cabinets so as to create vulnerable and uncertain systems characterised by a total dependence of the public officials on the ruler. These strategies disoriented opponents and deterred any potential concentration of power on those who were likely to remove the ruler (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Leslie, 1993; Morrison et al., 1989). The “divide and rule” politics has also filtered down to many institutions permeating down to the grassroots. It has been reported that individuals not belonging to the ruling party or party members not contributing to the upkeep of the party are generally left out despite being qualified and experienced. In the end, there is a collapse of government machinery to the detriment of the State (Maduegbuna, 2015). Therefore, some of the deceptive and repressive techniques that characterised colonial domination have been preserved or even perfected in postcolonial Sub-Saharan African politics. The training that many African leaders received from the former colonisers whether directly or by observation, shaped their thoughts and aspirations even though they may have claimed that they were fighting the system. Colonial rule was characterised by violence and expression of power and that became a culture that stuck in the African leaders becoming their political tradition. It is not a secret that where there is political repression, there is also violation of human rights and almost always, there is also bad governance. This situation has existed in Africa since the colonial days. Achankeng (2013) describes colonial rule as an antithesis of democracy. The usurpation of power and the dispossession of the people’s right to self-determination and other fundamental human rights is in itself an authoritarian pedagogy that develops despotic autocrats who believe that they have been destined to rule by force. It

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is therefore immoral for any colonialist to start accusing a despot of being undemocratic when colonialism itself was never set up based on consensus or agreed rules. Indeed, colonialism was created and sustained by violence, coercion and socio-culturally destructive policies like the divide and rule strategy which manipulated and intensified inherent social cleavages due to differences in tribe, class or religion, so that illegal rule can be established (Okoyo, 1977). Therefore, there can be no excuse for colonialism especially when people agree to the importance of the right to self-determination. By its very nature, colonial rule can never be associated with good governance and democracy. After all, the only real colonial legacy that has remained imprinted in the minds of many African political leaders of old is that power is maintained by violence. Many African leaders have retained the colonial tradition and are even teaching their successors that politics and power in Africa is a game of violence and the tradition of violent repression should be retained and reinforced (Achankeng, 2013). A new way of thinking is therefore needed if democracy in Africa is to be free from deception, coercion and manipulation. It is unfair for some scholars to claim that it is part of the culture of Africans to be corrupt when they ignore the inhibitive and destructive impact of decades of colonialism that subjugated African cultural systems, perverting African life as well as its governance systems. Other scholars claim that Africa had democracy as an intrinsic part although it was not the same as Western democracy. The colonialists destroyed the African set up and introduced claims that African culture was totally autocratic. However, it is the imposition of the foreign ethos from the West that caused cultural, governance and developmental distortions in Africa. The result is that multiparty elections are often a façade in Africa and Western institutions have often insisted on reforms that only solidify their parasitic relations with poor African countries for continued exploitation (Adejumo-Ayibiowu, 2019). Culture is dynamic and it develops over a period of time. Hence, what is seen in Africa now is a culmination of decades of cultural genocide perpetrated by the unrepentant colonialists, some of whom now label Africa as the Dark Continent. Even the agenda of democracy that is being pushed into Africa now is to some extent an extension of modified colonial laws which often vary from the local culture. But in precolonial African cultural democracy, good moral standards and social development leading to good governance were an expectation. That is why there were mechanisms in place

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in most African systems to ensure that rulers conform to the expected morals (Adejumo-Ayibiowu, 2019). There is no doubt that good and bad rulers come. Even Western countries have them, but African cultural systems should not be blamed for issues that were caused by their ruthless colonial past. Scholars who point a finger at the colonial system and colonialists should not be blindly taken as anti-West. They bring out another dimension to the root causes of African conflicts that some people do not want to hear. During decolonisation, the truth is that the former colonial masters had no interest in the success of their former colonies, at least not at the expense of their own interests. They were never in search of good leaders. Instead they were more interested in handing over power to their despotic puppets who protected the former colonialists’ interests at the expense of their people. There is a general tendency of the world powers to preserve the influence of the former colonisers over African countries and their leaders. That is why Africa is where it is today (Achankeng, 2013). Indeed, Africa has not been allowed to chart her own course in politics. The present day African democracy is not home grown but, it is a chimeric legacy of colonial and modern Western prescriptions that are creating chaos and perpetual violence. Democracy is good, but the way it is being implemented in Africa does not take into account the socio-cultural variables that are making it a stillborn system.

Types of Conflicts in Africa African conflicts are of various types but they belong to two main families which are intra-state and inter-state conflicts. The main conflicts range from annexationist conflicts, civil rights conflicts, political transition conflicts and inter-ethnic conflicts. Achankeng (2013) described 6 main types of conflicts that occur in postcolonial Africa. There are disputes between governments that have degenerated into violent interstate conflicts. Although they may not have been numerous, they were mainly caused by border disputes between neighbouring countries. Interstate conflicts in Africa are a classical example of problems of artificially created colonial borders which haphazardly lumped up different nations or parts of different nations, creating new nations at independence (Ikome, 2012). There was the Aouzou strip conflict between Chad and Libya from 1973 to 1994, the 1963–1967 war between Kenya and Somalia and the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia from 1964 to

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1978. There was also the war between Tanzania and Uganda that toppled the Ugandan dictator, Idi Amin in 1979 (Pearson, 2003) and the 1977 conflict between Egypt and Libya. In addition, the 1998 to 2000 border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea adds to the examples of inter-state conflicts in Africa (Achankeng, 2013). Another type of inter-state conflict that occurred in Africa is the annexationist conflicts. These occur when two nations fight over territory which historically or under international law, does not belong to either of them. Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act as well as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter amongst others, provide for the inviolability of borders, but two annexationist conflicts are notable in Africa. The oilrich Bakassi Peninsula in the Gulf of Guinea was the subject of conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon from 1993 to 2006 (Baye, 2010). The Cameroon Republic and Morocco engaged in annexationist wars over British Southern Cameroons in 1961 and Western Sahara in 1975. These two conflicts were a result of illicit agreements by colonial powers which disregarded the right to self-determination by the people of those nations (Achankeng, 2013; McGovern, 2010). Before colonialism, some ethnic groups which were once autonomous nations were broken apart and incorporated into reorganised colonial states where they became minority groups in two or more African countries. This reorganisation also resulted in some rival ethnic groups being bunched together in one state resulting in perpetual conflicts like the Liberian and Somali clan conflicts. Postcolonial ethnic conflicts like the Rwandan genocide (BBC, 2011) were exacerbated by the colonial divide and rule strategy that always pitted one ethnic group against the other so that they could not team up against the colonialists (Achankeng, 2013; Maduegbuna, 2015; Leslie, 1993). Article 1(2) of the UN Charter makes self-determination a fundamental human right. As such, there were many liberation conflicts on the African continent in which entire peoples or nations fought for liberation from colonial arrangements especially where political dialogue failed. Examples include the South Sudan war, the Eritrean War of independence and the Namibian War of independence (Achankeng, 2013). Sometimes, the democratic process in the country results in disputes that lead to tensions and conflicts. These political transition conflicts have occurred in many countries including Zimbabwe in 2008 resulting in the brokered Government of National Unity. Similar conflicts have occurred in CAR, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad and the Congo. When

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democratic systems are blocked or adulterated as in rigged elections, the resolution of group differences through non-violent means fails and political transition conflicts erupt (Achankeng, 2013; Cohen, 1996). The recurrence of such conflicts in Africa is worrisome and may be an indicator of a serious underlying socio-political problem that needs to be uprooted. In some societies, certain groups of people may struggle to be recognised as belonging to a given country with the full rights of citizens to share in the wealth of the country. Issues of political legitimacy, participation in governance and access to other rights may lead to civil rights conflicts. There is a section of the population of a country that considers itself marginalised or excluded by the national social framework and therefore wage a war to seek a redress of the situation. Examples include the uprising of the Tuareg in Mali, the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and the Berbers of Algeria’s fight against the Arab ruling class (Achankeng, 2013). Unresolved issues always harbour the potential for conflict and even civil war, especially where the colonial past has sown seeds of strife and inequalities amongst the people.

Unlawful Changes of Government in Africa Despite decades of independence from colonial occupation, the international peace building efforts are suffering major setbacks as various types of conflicts and unconstitutional changes of governments are continuing in Africa. The coups in the four West African states of Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali in a space of twenty-four months as well as the flaring tensions and violence in Mozambique and Eswatini, are testimony of deep-rooted unresolved issues in Africa. Historically, African leaders gave the military a taste of power by politicising the military in an effort to hang on to power by force. This ended up being an indirect invitation to the uniformed forces to take over power in Africa (Ikome, 2007). The tone for postcolonial Sub-Saharan African coups was set by demobilised Togolese soldiers in January 1963 after being denied integration into the Togolese army. They assassinated President Sylvanus Olympio and replaced his government with a puppet civilian government (Decalo, 1976). Between August 2020 and March 2022, there were six successful coups and two failed coups in the northern half of Africa. In Mali, Colonel Assimi Goïta arrested President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta on the 18th of August 2020, forcing him to resign and a transitional government was

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formed. On the 24th of May 2021, Goita seized power from transitional President Bah N’ Daou (Nishioka, 2022). The May 2021 coup was the fifth in the history of Mali which became independent in 1960 (CPA, 2022). In Chad, the military took over after President Idriss Deby Itno had been killed by rebels on 20 April 2021. The military announced Mahamat ibn Idriss Deby Itno as the head of the transitional military council, dissolving the parliament, constitution and government (Nishioka, 2022). There had been four military coups in Chad since independence (EISA, 2010). In Guinea, the commander of special forces Mamady Doumbouya took over power holding President Alpha Condé hostage on the 5th of September 2021 (Nishioka, 2022). This was the fourth coup ever since Guinea became independent in 1958 in addition to the perpetual conflict and repression of dissent by the various governments in the country (Schmidt, 2021). In Sudan, General al-Burhan seized power on the 25th of October 2021. He dissolved the Sovereign Council that was led by General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan, who had led the 2019 coup, and pushed out the civilian cabinet led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok Al-Kinani, arresting the civilian leaders (Nishioka, 2022). In Burkina Faso, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, seized power on the 23rd of January 2022 from the democratically elected President Roche Marc Christian Kaboré (Nishioka, 2022). The 2022 coup was the sixth coup in a country that has been independent for six decades (Africa News, 2022). In the 2020 to 2022 coup season, there were failed coups in Niger on the 31st of March 2021 and in Guinea-Bissau on 1 February 2022. (Nishioka, 2022). The recent successive coups in Africa, dubbed the “Coup Contagion” (Nishioka, 2022), were just a reaffirmation of the crisis that started in the 1960s. From the Togo coup of January 1963, there were coups in Congo-Brazzaville in August 1963, Dahomey in October 1963, mutinies in Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika in early 1964 as well as a coup in Gabon in February 1964 (Decalo, 1976; Ikome, 2007). In November 1965, there was a coup in Congo – Leopoldville (now DRC). After French intervention and the restoration of the Dahomean President Leon Mba, there were further coups in Dahomey in November and December 1965. In CAR as well as in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), there were coups in January 1966. In addition, Nigeria experienced coups in January and July 1966 and Ghana also experienced its first coup in February 1966 (Ikome, 2007). These numerous coups in just 4 years set a very

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bad precedence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa. It is very difficult to believe that all these coups were entirely the result of the incompetence of African leaders, because that would not be true. Yes, there was autocratic leadership and some faults in some leaders, but the deceitful hand of the former colonial powers is evident in many of these coups. Why Democracy Is Still difficult in Africa Democracy in Africa is often a freak melodramatic show that rarely achieves any intended effect due to unfair systems that do not allow the free will of the people to be heard. Regular elections are just an expensive legitimisation exercise for political demagogues whose clutches on power can never be loosened by a mere pen and paper. This democratic smokescreen has been succinctly summed up in the following statement: “What one observes in many African countries is an ‘artificial government’—‘government by deception,’ run by a phalanx of degreed bandits sporting Ray-Ban sunglasses and bazookas. They are not only out of touch with the people but perennially locked in combat with them…. They prey on the rural populations to line their own empty pockets. They raid livestock, loot homes, divert humanitarian aid, and extract false taxes.” (Ayittey, 1999)

The modern postcolonial Sub-Saharan African state has been doomed to fail from the onset. The colonial powers created artificial boundaries mixing diverse regional and ethnic groups, unevenly distributing development opportunities and national wealth. The fuse of this ticking time bomb was lit when gross inequalities were introduced in power relations right from the colonial era. Moreover, the chaotic decolonisation process left the new States in a tense state that was bound to disintegrate into conflict (Achankeng, 2013; Cohen, 1995). Hence, the current autocratic thinking of most African politicians makes real democracy a pipe dream.

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Can Africa Confront the Challenge of Perpetual Instability? When considering how far Africa has come with all types of conflicts causing death and destruction, you would expect that the people of Africa have learnt something from it all. However, there are still autocratic systems (with a single ruler exercising undisputed and unlimited power) as in Eswatini (HRW, 2020) or dictatorial systems in which a small group of people holds all power as in Burundi (HRW, 2020b). Indeed, such systems will never promote peace and as long as Africa is ruled by such despots, instability will never end. In Eswatini, cries for real democracy are getting louder with riots in 2021 amid allegations of extrajudicial killings of pro-democracy activists demanding the unbanning of opposition parties and constitutional reforms. The constitution empowers the king to appoint the prime minister, ministers, judges and heads of government agencies (Laterza, 2021; The New Humanitarian, 2021). They were also protesting against the system where parliament is appointed partly by popular vote and partly by the king (Freedom House, 2020). Hence, the highest authority in Eswatini remains the king with the power to veto bills and even dissolve an elected parliament (IPSS, 2021, Freedom House, 2020). He can even create customary law and enforce it (IPSS, 2021). In Burundi, the authoritarian policies of the ruling party have been characterised by violent repression against all opponents of the system (Freedom House, 2021). Former President, Pierre Nkurunzinza’s abusive tenure ended in 2020, but his successor, Évariste Ndayishimiye has not improved the situation since the May 2020 presidential elections. There are still serious human rights abuses with arbitrary arrests and unlawful killings whilst several journalists and defenders of human rights remain in prison (Amnesty International 2020; HRW, 2020b). The incumbent president won the 2020 election, but it is reported that there was a wide-ranging campaign of repression, violent intimidation and arrests. The accountability of government officials to the electorate is virtually non-existent and civil society has no participation in policymaking. Politicians do not conduct open meetings with the voters due to recurrent assassinations. The executive controls the judiciary whose inadequate training, lack of resources and corruption make the rule of law impossible. The criminal justice system is under the perennial interference of the executive and the security situation is extremely poor (Freedom House,

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2021). Such systems are a definite ignitor of conflict and Africa will continue to struggle until the leaders make deliberate efforts to be fair and democratic.

Conclusions and Recommendations African politics has been transformed into a game of death, not only for the participants themselves, but also for the spectators and anyone else passing by. The high levels of poverty due to decades of colonial exploitation followed by exploitation of national resources by the ruling elite have ravaged African countries to the extent that more than two thirds of Africans live in extreme poverty. This selfish scenario is not a cultural phenomenon, since the African Ubuntu philosophy emphasises on sharing rather than individualism. However, the colonial system conditioned Africans to be selfish as each one strives to be like the white former colonisers who enjoyed the national wealth in front of the Africans who could only wish to be like them. Therefore, conflicts can never end in Africa as long as the issue of poverty is not addressed and the ghost of colonialism has not been exorcised. It is therefore our recommendation that African states begin to develop African heritage-based thinking in their citizens from a tender age. Africans should free themselves from the impractical prescriptions of external forces and develop their own systems of sustainable development that do not necessarily have to conform to Western values. It is time for Africans to be mentally decolonised and set free indeed. Moreover, the African Union should start taking the internal socio-political problems of member states seriously and help them before things get out of hand.

References Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J., & Verdier, T. (2004). Kleptocracy and divide-andrule: A model of personal rule. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(2), 162–192. Achankeng F (I). (2013). Conflict and conflict resolution in Africa: Engaging the colonial factor. AJCR 2013/2 https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ conflict-and-conflict-resolution-in-africa/ Adejumo-Ayibiowu D. (2019). Western style ‘democracy’ in Africa is just a way of pushing the neoliberal agenda. Open Democracy https://www.ope ndemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/western-style-democracy-in-africa-is-just-away-of-pushing-the-neoliberal-agenda/

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Africa News. 2022. “1960 – 2022: The long history of coups d’état in Burkina Faso” 25 January 2022 https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/25/19602022-the-long-history-of-coups-d-etat-in-burkina-faso// Ayittey, G. (1999). Africa in Chaos. St Martins Griffin. Baye F. (2010). Implications of the Bakassi conflict resolution for Cameroon. AJCR https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/implications-of-the-bakassi-con flict-resolution-for-cameroon/ BBC. (2011, May 17). “Rwanda: How the genocide happened” BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486 Centre for Preventive Action (CPA). (2022, May 12). “Instability in Mali” Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tra cker/conflict/destabilization-mali Chennells A. (1999). Essential diversity: Post-colonial theory and African literature. Brno Studies in English 5: 109 – 126. https://digilib.phil.muni.cz/bit stream/handle/11222.digilib/104498/1_BrnoStudiesEnglish_25-1999-1_9. pdf?sequence=1 Cohen, H., & J. (1995). What should we do when nations get angry? Nexus Africa, 1(2), 11–14. Cohen H. J. (1996). Conflict management in Africa Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Africa Notes, 181 https://www.csis.org/analysis/afr ica-notes-conflict-management-africa-february-1996 Decalo S. (1976). “Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style” Yale University Press. Electoral Institute of Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). 2010. Chad: Authoritarian regimes, elections and coups (1962–1996) https://www.eisa. org/wep/chaoneparty.htm Freedom House. (2020). “Eswatini 2020” https://freedomhouse.org/country/ eswatini/freedom-world/2020 Freedom House. (2021). “Burundi” https://freedomhouse.org/country/bur undi/freedom-world/2021 Go, J. (2016). Postcolonial thought and social theory. Oxford University Press. Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2020). “Eswatini events of 2020” https://www. hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/eswatini-formerly-swaziland Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2020b.) “Burundi events of 2020” https://www. hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/burundi Ikome FN. (2007). The nature and character of the post-colonial African state. in Good coups and bad coups: The limits of the African Union’s injunction on unconstitutional changes of power in Africa (pp. 18–29) Institute for Global Dialogue http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07759.7 Ikome FN. (2012). Africa’s international borders as potential sources of conflict and future threats to peace and security” Institute of Security Studies Paper 233. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/145411/Paper_233.pdf

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Institute of Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Kingdom of Eswatini conflict insights September 2021 https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Esw atini-Conflict-Insights-vol-1_06092021. pdf 2 Laterza V. (2021, August 7). “Can eSwatini’s monarchy recover from the ongoing crisis?” Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/8/7/can-esw atinis-monarchy-recover-from-the-crisis Leslie WJ. 1993. “Zaire: Continuity and political change in an oppressive state. Westview Press. Maduegbuna, A. N. (2015). Divide and rule: The bane of effective governance in Africa. Humanity and Social Sciences Journal, 10(2), 81–86. McGovern G. (2010). “Foreword” In: Stephen Z and Mundy J. 2010. Western Sahara: War, nationalism, and conflict irresolution. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY. Morrison DG, Mitchell RC, Paden JN. 1989. “Central African Republic (CAR). In: Black Africa” Palgrave Macmillan, London. Morrock, R. (1973). Heritage of Strife - Effects of Colonialist Divide and Rule Strategy Upon Colonized Peoples. Science & Society, 37 , 129–151. National Research Council (NRC). 1992. Democratization in Africa: African views, African voices. The National Academies Press, Washington, DC https://doi.org/10.17226/2041. Nishioka S. (2022). “A rise in coups in Africa?” American Security Project 02 Mar 2022 https://www.americansecurityproject.org/a-rise-in-coups-in-afr ica/ Ogunyankin GA. (2019). Postcolonial Approaches to the Study of African Politics. Oxford research encyclopedia of politics https://oxfordre.com/pol itics/view/https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/ acrefore-9780190228637-e-830. Okoyo M. (1977). Africa and political stability. Africa, No. 74, October 1977: 93–96. Pearson R. (2003, August 17). Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, ousted in 1979, dies. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/ 2003/08/17/ugandan-dictator-idi-amin-ousted-in-1979-dies/59069087408f-4bb6-b29b-58d189208fb9/ Schmidt E. (2021, September 21). The historical roots of Guinea’s latest coup French colonialism, exploitation by international mining companies and Western counterterrorism initiatives have played critical roles. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/09/21/ historical-roots-guineas-latest-coup/ The New Humanitarian. (2021, July 13). Weeks of rioting fail to force reform in Eswatini. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2021/ 7/13/weeks-of-rioting-fails-to-force-reform-in-eswatini

CHAPTER 16

Iscariotean Dialectics and the Demise of Emancipatory Pan-African States in Sub-Saharan Africa Kizito Michael George

Introduction The attainment of independence by a number of Sub-Saharan African states in the 1950s, 60s and 70s meant that Africans were going to be controllers of their own social, political and economic destinies. These destinies would be actualized through the construction of Pan-African states that would emancipate African men and women from poverty, ignorance, disease, discrimination, civil strife, slavery and exploitation. Independence, therefore, meant the total dismantling of racist colonial policies, laws and institutions and their replacement with Pan-African ones.

K. M. George (B) Department of Religious Studies and Philosophy, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_16

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The agitations for independence created a false impression that Africans were united in their quest for freedom and emancipation. What was missed is the fact the Judases who collaborated with the colonialists in their quest to bring different African tribes under the ambit of western imperialism were part and parcel of the struggle for independence. The fact that Africans participated in their own colonization and in the selling of fellow Africans to European and Arab slave traders implied that independence would usher in Black imperialists as new Iscariots who would betray that Pan-African dream of realizing emancipatory post-colonial African states. African leaders and scholars erroneously associated African communalism and communitarianism with equality, equity, solidarity and altruism (care for the interests of others). The Mbitian (1969, p. 215) “Iam because we are” dictum was thought to be synonymous with emancipation and freedom. However, African communalism was quite disconnected from egalitarianism and social justice. It was in tandem with collective dictatorship and hegemonic masculinity or patriarchal dominance. This means that women emancipation was going to be a challenge in the post-independent African states. More so, a number of communalistic African societies were indeed intrinsically altruistic but extrinsically egoistic. This implies that although they promoted the interests of their tribe mates, they looked at members of other tribes as aliens who need to be excluded in order to reinforce the social cohesion and solidarity of the tribe. Therefore, the self and otherness social dichotomy was a fundamental tenet of many African communal societies. This would later act as a crevice for the betrayal of fellow Africans to neo-colonial imperialists. The British imperialists actually used the extrinsic egoism characteristic of many tribal/ethnic communities to implement their divide and rule policy in African colonies. In Uganda, for instance, they constructed the Baganda as the most civilized tribe and the Acholi as a primitive and violent tribe (Lwanga-Lunyiigo, 1987, p. 6). Similarly, the colonialists constructed the Tutsis as Europeans with Black skins and the Hutus as an inferior lot (Mamdani, 2001, p. 88). This colonial construction not only created enmity between different tribes and ethnic groups in a particular polity but also became a breeding ground for betrayal, colonial manipulation, and subjugation. The imperialist used ethnic conflict to cement social division and betrayal among African tribes and ethnic groups (Ali

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et al., 2019, p. 1052). This benefited the imperialists in the sense that they usually posed as mediators between warring African parties. Phenomenologically speaking, the white colonialists managed to create social, political and cultural systems that aliened Africans from their values, norms and traditions. The Western Education system, for example, deconstructed the Black African mind that cherished African social values and cultural systems and replaced it with a White mind in a Black skin (Fanon, 1952, 2004, pp. 64 & 225). This social dislocation made a number of Africans to hate Africa which produced them and love Europe which enslaved them (Ndlovu-Gatshene, 2015, p. 489). Black skinned but white minded Africans, therefore, acted as a formidable imperialist defense against the implementation and actualization of emancipatory Post-colonial Pan African states.

The Capitalist and Socialist Divide in African States after Independence In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of African states such as Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, Mali, Zimbabwe and Uganda opted for socialism as a viable Pan-African system that would guarantee development and political stability. Socialism was chosen due to its close affinity to African Communalism or Communitarianism. The proponents of African Socialism argued that this ideology was the best alternative for Africa because it promotes the common good of all Africans unlike the capitalist ideology that safeguarded individualism and selfishness. The capitalist system was rejected by African leaders because it was associated with colonial exploitation and imperialistic extirpation. Although almost all African states pretended to be socialistic immediately after independence, capitalistic states such as Kenya soon declared their capitalistic orientation. They accused socialist African states of being man eat nothing societies and socialist states also counter accused them of being man eat man societies. The embracement of a colonial capitalistic system by a number of African states immediately after independence was a clear Iscariotean betrayal of African people in general and the Pan-African cause in particular. In Kenya for example, the common citizens expected their leaders to address the land injustices fostered by British imperialism after attaining independence on 12th December 1963. The British colonialists dispossessed Kenyan People of their fertile lands and freely passed it over to their

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white citizens. Between 1902 and 1961, the British colonial government reserved vast areas of prime land exclusively for European settlers. These White highlands were located in “Machakos, Nairobi, Thika, Mt Kenya region, Laikipia, Naivasha, Nakuru, Kericho, Sotik, Lumbwa, Songhor, Nandi, Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia and Mt Elgon” (Kibii, 2021). Between 1902 and 1915, about 7.5 million acres (20%) of the best and most fertile land in Kenya was reserved for the settlers as Crown Property. Three quarters of the land that was grabbed for white settlers belonged to the Masaai (Lonsdale, 1977) who ironically acted as collaborators for the British imperialists alongside the Kamba and the Luhya Wanga (Hornsby, 2013). Jomo Kenyatta betrayed the hope Kenyans had in land restitution and redistribution after independence. During negotiations for Kenya’s independence, Jomo Kenyatta accepted the colonialists’ demands that the White settlers remain on their farms if they wished to and that land be transferred only on the basis of “willing buyer, willing seller” (Kibii, 2021). Kenyatta also maintained the colonial system of freehold land titles. The land occupied by the settlers was also subjected to the market forces so that those who had money could purchase it. Rich government officials from Kenyatta’s government purchased large chunks of land and only few poor people were able to acquire land through the government’s Settlement Fund Trustees (Veit, 2011). The rich Kenyatta family was able to purchase ‘’an estimated 500,000 acres (2,000 sq km). That represents a large chunk of the 28 m acres (113,000 sq km) of arable land in Kenya’’ (MCGreal, 2008). The unjust capitalist land acquisition system in Kenya has created a scenario where more than half the arable land in the country is in the hands of only 20% of the population. This implies that two-thirds of the people own, on average, less than an acre per person and 13% of Kenyans do not own any land (MCGreal, 2008). Coastal regions in Kenya have experienced a lot of injustice since the Arab Invasion of the coast. However, in the 1970s, Jomo Kenyatta promised to address the historical injustice embedded in land acquisition of coastal beaches by issuing a presidential edict that barred the sale of all beach plots of land without his permission (Kiibi, 2021). This unfortunately led to control of these assets entirely into presidential favour. These beach plots were taken over by top government officials, including Kenyatta, further dispossessing the inhabitants. This process was administered by Coast Provincial Commissioner (PC), Eliud Mahihu, who had the

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discretion to decide who could and could not buy coastal plots (Hornsby, 2013). Kenyatta also acquired large sisal farms in Taveta in 1972 jointly with the Greek Criticos family, pushing more inhabitants to become squatters. In 1972 still, it was revealed that the Mombasa County Council had waived all rates on companies and properties owned by the Kenyatta family (Hornsby, 2013). In 2016, the Kenyatta family relinquished 2,000 acres of its land to squatters in Taita Taveta (Kibii, 2021). This was looked at as a good gesture of returning land to the original owners, however, the acres that were returned were meager at least and peanuts at most.

Single Party Dictatorship and the Dearth of the Pan-African Dream African leaders who embarked on the journey of steering African states on the path of social liberation after independence unfortunately turned the states into single party dictatorships. They focused on the promotion and protection of Social and Economic rights such as food, water, education and health to the detriment of Civil and Political rights such as the right to vote, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. Civil and political rights were thought to be an obstacle to the realization of economic wellbeing and social progress. Julius Nyerere, for instance, opined that the right to vote was useless to a hungry Tanzanian citizen (Howard, 1983, p. 467). He also regarded Multiparty politics as un-Tanzanian and un-African (Phillips, 2015, p. 114) and anti-development. This is a betrayal because the essence of fighting for independence cannot be divorced from emancipation of Africans in terms of both Civil and Political Rights as well as Economic, Social and Cultural rights. The evolution of socialist policies in Africa after independence was indicative of an eminent clash between communalistic interests and individual rights. This was occasioned by the Ubuntu philosophy that is premised on the thinking that in Africa, the good of the community takes precedence against the good of the individual (Venter & Olivier, 1993, p. 29). Therefore, dictatorship of the majority was envisaged to be necessary in safeguarding the communitarian interests of African societies. The existence of cephalous (kingdoms) and acephalous (chiefdoms) societies created paternalistic African states that were premised on the unquestionable king/chief mentality. The post-independence African

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leaders like Jomo Kenyatta, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere were projected as fathers of the nations whereas opposition politicians, civil servants and peasants were depicted as children who must succumb to the rules and instructions of their Pan-African fathers. The above mentioned leaders used paternalistic measures to suppress any opposition to what they perceived as Pan-African government policies such as Nyerere’s Ujamaa policies in Tanzania. This Paternalism that was characteristic of so called Pan-African Socialists states was built on a gerontocracy or rule of elders (Magni-Berton & Panel, 2020, p. 2). Within the African moral and integrity setting, children are supposed to respect and obey the elders without question. Leaders such as Julius Nyerere, and Jomo Kenyatta were bequeathed with the title Mzee or elder. This symbolized superior wisdom of the leaders and unquestionable loyalty of all citizens of the state to these wise old men. Ridding on the paternalistic and gerontocracy ticket, Socialist African leaders were able to entrench their own political parties into power by subjugating all opposition movements. This culminated into gross violations of human rights because citizens were treated as pawns in the communal socialist development experiment. For instance, a number of Tanzanians challenge the hero and saint narrative surrounding the contribution of Julius Nyerere to the development of Tanzania. They “pierce the hero image of Nyerere by articulating critiques of the suffering they underwent during the forced re-location of Nyerere’s villagization policies, planned economy, and repression of political dissent” (Phillips, 2015, p. 115). Therefore, Tanzanian Socialism was not an ideology that evolved from the free will of the people. It was imposed on the people by the government and led to the establishment of mandatory Ujamaa villages in rural areas (Magoti, 2012, p. 213) where human rights were violated with impunity.

Black Imperialism and the Upsurge of Zombie Leviathans in African States Africa is the richest continent on the face of the earth in terms of natural resources. It is “thought to contain 42% of the world’s bauxite, 38% of its uranium, 42% of its gold,73% of its platinum, 88% of its diamonds and around 10% of its oil without taking into account that new oil reserves are being discovered every year” (Bush, 2007, p.32). After losing the battle against the clamor for territorial independence in African states, the

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white imperialists embarked on their ruse of creating puppet Black African dictators who would rule the so-called independent African polities in the interest of the white imperialists. Their first target was Zaire (DR Congo) which is believed to be the richest country on the face of the earth in terms of mineral resources. Mubutu established a totalitarian system that led to the death of PanAfrican advocates. He connived with the imperialists to assassinate the Pan-Africanist Patrice Lumumba in order to entrench his dictatorship (Gibbs, 1995, p. 175; Ludo De Witte, 2010, p. 141). For 32 years, Mubutu presided over a corrupt state that drove a rich nation to abject poverty. The budget for the presidency during Mubutu’s rein was as follows: 1972(28%), 1978(29%), 1980(33%), 1982(35%), 1984(39%), 1988(49%), 1990(80%) and 1992(95%) (Remo, 1997, p. 43). Like King Leopold of Belgium who killed 10 million Congolese citizens in addition to plundering ivory, gold, rubber and minerals (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 27), Mobutu became a Black White Imperialist who inherited King Leopold’s legacy of turning Congo into a personal property (Berwouts, 2017, p. 12). His regime was characterized by murder of political opponents under sham trials. For instance: On June 2, 1966, Emmanuel Bamba (finance minister), Alexandre Mahamba (foreign minister), Evariste Kimba (former senator, foreign minister, and prime minister), and Jerome Anany (defense minister) were hanged in Kinshasa, capital of Zaire. They were found guilty of high treason by governmental decree 66–338 of May 30, 1966; their guilt was determined in a court martial led by five high-ranking military officers close to Mobutu’s regime. Before the trial, the government spokesman announced on national television that the four politicians were likely to receive capital punishment and could face public hanging. (Ikambana, 2007, p. 56)

Paul Biya is another black imperialist dictator that has ruled Cameroon for over 40 years. His autocratic leadership has been entrenched by military paraphernalia from Cameroon’s former colonial master France. France is the leading exploiter of Cameroon’s resources alongside the United States of America and other European powers. Although Cameroon has mineral resources such as oil, gas, aluminum, bauxite, cobalt, diamonds, gold and iron ore, it is one the poorest and most corrupt countries in the world (Financial Transparency Coalition, 2009).

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In 2021, Cameroon Ranked 144 out 180 most corrupt countries in the world. 72% of people believed that corruption had increased in the past 12 months (Transparency International, 2021). Cameroon also ranked 153 out of 189 countries in the 2020 Human Development Index. An estimated 40% of Cameroon’s 27.2 million people live below the poverty datum line. In particular 52% for women live below the poverty datum line (WFP, 2022). Biya’s wealth is estimated at 100 million US dollars and his foreign assets include several castles in France and Germany in addition to the Isis villa on the Cote d’Azur (CCFD, 2007). Like Mubutu, Hastings Kamuzu Banda established a repressive one party political system that ruled Malawi from 1964 to 1994 (Geddes et al., 2018, p.70). During his time in office, thousands of Malawians were murdered and tortured (Drogin, 1995). His capitalist regime was greatly supported by European imperialists who were given the privilege to pillage Malawi’s mineral resources. Banda’s betrayal of the Pan-African dream was manifested through his maintenance of diplomatic relations with the racist apartheid government in South Africa (Banda, 2014, p. 27). During his visit to apartheid South Africa on 16th August 1971, Kamuzu Banda was welcomed by a 21 gun salute. He complemented his hosts by reiterating that South Africa did not need a certificate of respectability because it already had one (Miller, 2015, p. 450). It is estimated that during his rule, he managed to accumulate about 320 million US dollars in personal assets as big proportion of Malawians languished in poverty (Tenthani, 2000). More so, Equatorial New Guinea (ENG) which attained independence in 1968 was ruled by the self-proclaimed life president Francisco Macias Nguema until he was overthrown in 1979 by his nephew Teodoro Obianga Nguema Mbasogo who rules the country with an iron hand up to today. The country has less than 2.5 million people and is one of the largest oil producing countries in Africa. However, the level of poverty, human rights abuse and corruption in the country is appalling. ENG is considered one of the criminal states in the World alongside Comoros, Seychelles (Bayart et al., 1999, p.26). Obianga Nguema, the current leader of ENG, has been described as a tropical gangster and an afro fascist (Kligaard, 1990). According to Global Witness “$3OO-$5OO million of the country’s oil revenues were deposited in a Riggs Bank account that is controlled by President Obiang, in Washington DC” (Yates, 2006, p. 17). The UN has also divulged “that 80% of the national income is in the hands of

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5% of the population, and that ‘the exceptional economic boom which followed the discovery of major oilfields in the mid-1990s has not led to any improvement in the economic, social and cultural rights of the population, more than 65% of which live in conditions of extreme poverty’’ (Yates, 2006, p. 17).

Disorganized Capitalism and the Construction of African Slave States Following the recommendations of the World Bank Berg report of 1981, a number of African states opted for the Neo-liberal path. According to this report, African states are lagging behind as far as the realizing of economic growth is concerned due to state interferences in the economy (Kizito, 2021, p. 85). Therefore, in order to realize development in Africa, it is imperative to evict the state from the development process so that markets take over the distribution of opportunities for wellbeing. Neo-liberalism is premised on the argument that states are not realizing substantive economic growth because of their interference with markets. The market, therefore, needs to be liberated from the tyranny of the state, since market failure is the fundamental cause of meager economic development. The belief in the self-equilibrating power of the market created a paradigm shift from organized capitalism to disorganized capitalism. The former envisages the state as so fundamental in the promotion of development while the latter envisions the market as an invisible hand that guarantees economic development. This New-liberalism (neo-liberalism) (disorganized capitalism) negates the old liberalism (organized capitalism) that was propagated byJohn Maynard Keynes among other economists. It must be noted that this old liberalism made the state a furculum of economic development, social welfare and human wellbeing. The embrace of neo-liberal capitalism by a plethora of African states led to the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that would kindle economic growth. These austere development interventions were recommended by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as inevitable stimulants of the Invisible hand of the market. SAPs included: cost sharing in education and health, retrenchment, recruitment bans in the public service, privatization, liberalization and currency devaluation.

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Accordingly, the financing of free education, free health care, affordable water, and affordable electricity became crimes against neo-liberalism in a number of Sub-Saharan African states like Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Gambia and Zimbabwe. Meanwhile thousands of Africans were retrenched from government jobs. It is estimated that between 2.5 million and 3 million Africans were retrenched from the public service between 1987 and 1992. Ghana in particular retrenched 55,546 public sector employees (Kiggundu, 1997, p. 2). The neo-liberal ideology turned African states into slaves of International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the USA and European Imperial powers. In order to qualify for concession loans from IFIs, African countries had to implement neo-liberal Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Consequently, neo-liberalism caused poverty and desperation that were unheard of in the history of the African continent. It created corruption, nepotism, fraud and banditry that affected the entire edifice of the African society. It also signaled the end of Pan-Africanism and the total betrayal of the dream of forming emancipatory African states.

Neo-Liberal Inspired Poverty and the Surge of Contemporary Slavery Neo-liberal African states such as Uganda, Cameroon and Nigeria understand poverty in terms of the World Bank standard of living on less than two dollars a day. They also understand development in terms of economic growth like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, the economic understanding of development in terms economic growth is very flawed because it violates human dignity, Ubuntu ethics and development ethics in particular. This is because land grabbing, development induced displacements and the destruction of forests to pave way for large scale agriculture all promote economic growth. In other words, the promotion of economic growth not only leads to growth in inequality and injustice but is also tantamount to gross human rights abuses. This is because the economic growth conception of development and wellbeing treats people as cogs in the development process instead of envisaging them as actual ends of development. The blind implementation of neo-liberalism is a typical betrayal of Pan-African liberation. Emancipatory African states, therefore, ought to deconstruct the neo-liberal development by treating economic development as a means to human development.

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The imperialists used the IFIs to create structural poverty in all neoliberal African states. This structural poverty led to the migration of Africans into foreign countries where they were treated as slaves. The neoliberal structural adjustment programmes that were imposed on Africans with the full support of USA, Britain and the European Union are racist policies that can never be imposed on the white race. They aimed at fostering economic eugenics in order to promote the survival of the most economic species of mankind (Kizito, 2022, p. 11). The economically fit species would survive through business innovation and financial ingenuity. The unfit individuals on the other hand would become internal and external slaves. They would be enslaved by Asians and fellow Africans in their own countries while others would be enslaved in America, Europe and Asia. Neo-liberalism is premised on the dictum that the private sector must be the greatest employer. This implies that one either creates a job for him/herself or be forced to be enslaved locally or internationally.

The American Neo-Liberal Oil Wars and the Deployment of African Mercenary Slaves Neo-liberalism created mass proportions of idle African labour that could be tapped to promote the imperialist agendas globally. For instance, the American oil wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia created employment for thousands of Africans who worked as security guards at American military installations and bases. According to Darryl Li (2015) ‘’on US bases abroad, foreign workers are usually paid a fraction of what US citizen contractors and soldiers make; they are not included in the politically sensitive figures of “boots on the ground”; and their deaths and injuries are not officially tallied and are rarely registered in debates in Washington’’. The Sierra Leone government has been accused by Maya Mynster Christensen, a researcher at the Danish Institute, Against Torture for helping British private security service firms recruit former child soldiers to work as guards in Iraq. According to her: British contractors operating on behalf of U.S. security companies recruited up to 10,000 former Sierra Leonean militia fighters from 2009 onwards….Of those recruited, around 3,000 were actually deployed, usually to guard U.S. military bases in Iraq. Some of the recruits found out

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subsequently they would only get paid $200 per month once they got to Iraq, but a number of them went on strike when they arrived. (Esslemont, 2016)

The neo-liberal privatisation of state assets not only led to the outsourcing of state social service provision but also the outsourcing of war. The USA, for instance, hatched a plan of outsourcing over 80 percent of its foreign wars (McFate, 2019). In 2018, the USA was employing 2,002 armed contractors, 746 of whom were Americans and 1,256 were foreigners. Between 2007 and 2012, the US Department of Defense spent about $160 billion on private security contractors. This is almost four times the entire defense budget of United Kingdom (Schwartz & Church, 2013). In 2016, President Barack Obama reduced US troops in Afghanistan to 4,647, however, by 2017, the number of US soldiers increased to 9,800 troops who were supported by more than 26,000 contractors (nearly a 3 to 1 ratio) (Lamothe & Morris, 2016). During the colonial times, Ugandans were employed in the King Africa Rifles (KAR) colonial army which helped the British imperialists to expand their imperial tentacles thought Africa. Today in the 21st Century, Ugandan mercenaries are being recruited to protect American neo-liberal oil interests in the Arab World among other places. They guard oil installations for Multi-national Corporations among other premises. Army veterans in Uganda are paid $1,000 a month which is higher than the average salary at home of less than $300 a year (Guavey, 2016). Ugandans without military training are given military basics such as shooting with an AK-47 before they are shipped out to Iraq among other places where they earn between $400 - $800 dollars a month. It is believed that Uganda now earns more money from exporting guards than from coffee which is a traditional cash crop for the country (Guavey, 2016).

Neo-liberal Inspired Unemployment and the Enslavement of African Female Domestic Workers in the Middle East Neo-liberal policies greatly dismantled the patriarchal status quo in a number of African countries. Traditionally, men are expected to be the bread winners in the African society. They dominated women and children and occupied dominant economic sectors of society in the public sphere. Women on the other hand were expected to dominate the private sphere

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of the household as mothers, cooks and caretakers of men, children, the elderly and the sick. However, the poverty orchestrated by neo-liberalism in a number of African countries demoted a number of men from their position as heads of the households. Since a lot of men could no longer take care of the households, a number of women stepped up to provide a helping hand in the provision of needs of the family. Some men, however, completely abandoned their wives and children leaving women to be single mothers. Africa was about to experience a paradigm shift from Arabs slave traders who came to Africa to buy slaves in the seventh century to African slaves selling themselves over to Arab slave traders courtesy of neo-liberal disorganized capitalism. Many governments in Africa licensed private companies to recruit Africans for Middle East job opportunities. A number of women looked at this as an opportunity to provide for their children in the wake of absent or financially handicapped fathers. Although most men who were taken to the Middle East worked as security guards, taxi drivers and cashiers in supermarkets, the majority of women were recruited as domestic workers. Those who did not have the requirements to travel to the Middle East were trafficked and ended up working as prostitutes for middlemen who treated them as slaves. African maids worked in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and came from countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Ghana and Nigeria (Nkirote, 2018, pp. 7–9). African slaves working as domestic workers in the Middle East were subjected to torture, rape, starvation and forced labour amidst the abysmal silence of their neo-liberal governments back home. According to Begum (2020), employers forced Domestic workers ‘’to work up to 21 hours a day without rest and no day off, gave them little food, underpaid, delayed or withheld their wages, restricted communication with their families, confiscated their passports, and physically or sexually abused them’’. Uganda is one of biggest exporters of domestic works in the Middle East. It exports 2000 maids a month which totals to 24,000 maids per year (Nangonzi & Serugo, 2022). This definitely excludes the hundreds of maids who illegally enter the Middle East through trafficking. Uganda earns shillings 3.185 trillion (about $900 m) per year from remittances from Ugandans working in the Middle East. 98% of Ugandans seeking

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jobs abroad in the Middle East are recruited as housemaids, cleaners and caretakers of old persons (Ssejjoba, 2022). Ugandan maids have suffered several human rights abuses in the Middle East such as long working hours, non-payment, poisoning (The Independent, 2021) and kidney harvest. On January 17, 2022, the body of Milly Namazzi (26), who was working as a maid in Saudi Arabia was returned to Uganda for burial without out one of the kidneys. Milly, was trafficked from Saudi Arabia to Egypt where her kidney was harvested (Paavo, 2022). Also, Judith Nakintu (38), a single mother of five, sought work in Saudi Arabia in 2019 as a maid in order to take care of her children. However, she was repatriated back to Uganda in 2021 after her right kidney was removed without her consent (Kigongo, 2022).

The Neo-liberalization of Poverty and the Immigration of Africans to Europe Neo-liberal inspired poverty in Latin America forced a number of Latin Americans to undertake long dangerous journeys in order to go to the USA. Likewise, neo-liberalism led to the migration of Africans to Spain, Germany, France and other European countries in order to escape the biting poverty. It is estimated that 11 million Africans have migrated to Europe. Almost 5 million have migrated to the Middle East, and more than 3 million have migrated to North America (Relief Web, 2021). The majority of African Migrants to Europe come from North Africa. Migrants from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia comprise 5 million of the 11 million migrants to Europe (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021). Other Migrants come from Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia. Between 2000 and 2005, an estimated 440,000 Africans Migrated to Europe and other Western nations per year (IOM, 2008, p. 38). Due to pathetic standards of living in African countries occasioned by the implementation of neo-liberal reforms, thousands of Africans also migrated to Canada and USA. Although the number of Africans that migrated to Canada in the 1970s comprised 1.9 percent of the entire population, this figure rose to 13.4% in 2016 (Okeke-Ihejirika et al., 2020, p. 191). As of 2017, 51% of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants leaving in the USA were from Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Kenya (Pew Research, 2018).

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It is not a coincidence that most of African immigrants are coming from countries that fully embraced neo-liberal austerity measures. Neoliberal African states neglected economic and social rights such as the right to food, right to work, right to health and right to an adequate standard of living. Due to state inspired corruption, it was very difficult to get a job in both the public service and private sector. Neo-liberalism created a corrupt class of about 20 percent or even less of the population who controlled almost all the resources and enslaved almost 80% of the population (Shearer, 2010). This corrupt ruling class, which was financed by the IFIs, USA and European Union, spent enormous resources on the military and police in order to entrench itself in power. This forced a number of Africans to flee to Europe, North America and the Middle East as economic refugees.

Land grabbing, Development Induced Displacements and the Neo-liberal Invisible Hand of the Market Land is a precious resource that has reinforced the African communal spirit since time immemorial. It has been used to sustain the livelihoods of African families through subsistence crop farming and animal rearing. In a number of societies, land was a communal resource that was never individualized. It belonged to clans and families and was passed on from parents to children. Colonialism greatly contributed to the individualisation of landownership in Africa. In Uganda, for instance, the British colonialists introduced private mailo land and freehold which were similar to English native freehold. This greatly individualized land ownership in Uganda, however, land grabbing and enmasse evictions of people from land was very rare. Idi Amin the notorious dictator, nationalized all land in Uganda in 1975, however, the spate of land grabbing and land evictions during Museveni’s neo-liberal era was unheard of in Amin’s regime. After independence, the post independent African governments protected land as a vital communal resource. They believed that the protection of people from hunger was more important than other rights such as; the right to vote, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. This was known as the full belly thesis. Pan-Africanism, according to these leaders, therefore, meant safeguarding the right to land and the

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right to food. However, in the 1990s disorganized capitalism or neoliberalism was enforced by the IMF and World Bank on a number of African Countries. Neo-liberalism transformed land from a communal resource to a good that was to be subjected to the whims of market forces. Neo-liberal capitalism also looks at land as a good that had to be individualized and privatized by the states in order to promote economic growth and consequently economic development. This neo-liberal thinking is largely responsible for the upsurge of land grabbing and development induced displacements in a number of African countries. For instance, despite the ardent criticisms by land activists, Zambia’s neo-liberal open door investment policy encourages foreign direct investment on land. Using this policy, government has lured foreign investors into the country by offering them free land and large tax breaks as incentives. However, this has culminated into displacement of local people few of whom have been paid peanuts in compensation (Sikombe, 2015). Several villages, such as Mugoto in Mazabuka District, have suffered the effects of such development induced displacements. With a population of about three thousand people, Mugoto village, which is about 62 miles away from the capital Lusaka, has seen more than half of its population displaced to pave way for Munali Nickel mine (Sikombe, 2015). The villagers in this area have lived on this land for more than fifty years practicing both commercial and subsistence farming that enabled them live decent lives (Human Rights Watch, 2017, p. 40). Rights activists argue that unless government puts in place deliberate land policies to protect the welfare of local people from powerful foreign neo-liberal investors, land displacements will persist unabated (Sikombe, 2015). Rural residents in Serenje district have also faced severe suffering over the past few years due to commercial farming. Some commercial farmers have burned or bulldozed homes, uprooted trees, and evicted residents with no compensation and no meaningful opportunity to contest their removal(Human Rights Watch, 2017, pp. 40–47). In addition, according the Witness Radio-Uganda, a non-government organization, more than 35,000 people from over 20 villages in Uganda were rendered homeless after being evicted from about 9,300 acres of land in Kiryandongo to pave way for large scale farming (Kisige, 2020). The evictors worked with security agencies and private security guards to intimidate the locals, journalists and human rights defenders (Kitatta, 2020).

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The Observer news media divulged that: the evictees were forced to accept as little as $78 (Shs 300,000) as compensation for their land, and those that protested, like Stella Akiteng, the secretary for women at Nyamuntende village, were arrested and detained for more than a week over charges of inciting violence, malicious damage to property, arson and aggravated robbery. For 83-year-old David Isingoma, when the evictors raided his Kisalanda village and ordered him to vacate, he asked his children to seek the intervention of the Kiryandongo resident district commissioner’s office, but to his surprise, they were arrested and detained at the police. The father of 25 held about 100 acres of land at Kisalanda village which he has since lost. The last time he checked, his family graveyard had been razed. (Kitatta, 2020)

Neo-Liberalism and Fraudulent Accumulation of Capital through Ponzi Schemes The implementation of neo-liberal reforms in Africa led to the emergency of a wealth capitalist class that was devoid of business ethics and corporate integrity. This class accumulated wealth through banditry, extortion, manipulation and fraud. This neo-liberal capitalist class embezzled billions from the peasants and middle class citizens under the silent watch of the neo-liberal state. They established ponzi schemes through registered micro-finance institutions, Non-government Organisations and Banks. According to Tudor (2009, p. 10): In its original meaning, the term ‘Ponzi’ refers to a particular form of financial fraud which is often described as ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’. In Ponzi schemes, investors are attracted by the offer of unfeasibly high rates of return. Investors’ deposits are then used by the scheme’s operator to make interest payments to previous investors meaning that Ponzis are dependent on achieving a state of constant expansion in order to prevent their collapse. Their success is also contingent, therefore, on the assumption that a significant proportion of investors will not seek to withdraw funds at the same time.

Louis De Koker (2012) also opines that: A Ponzi scheme is an investment scheme that pays returns to early investors out of money invested by new investors rather than from genuine business

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profit. This fact is not disclosed to the investors, who believe their funds are used to finance a very profitable business. The schemes often offer abnormally high returns to attract investors. Ponzi schemes collapse when they are unable to secure sufficient new investments to service returns promised to the earlier investors or if they are detected and shut down by regulatory agencies or law enforcement.

In Uganda, for instance, Thousands of families across the country were left in debt after their money was swindled by an organisation that posed as a charity. Caring for Orphans, Widows, and the Elderly (COWE) had the appearance of a respectable non-profit organisation. They had nice offices as a ‘good’ yardstick for corporate credibility, were registered with the Uganda National NGO board and described themselves as a community membership organisation that would lift the vulnerable out of poverty. (Kavuma, 2016)

COWE operated for years, before collapsing in 2007. It is estimated that poor Ugandans lost $ 2.7million US dollars that included more than 390,000 robbed from widows and Orphans (Duggan, 2016, p.200).The Bank of Uganda and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were aware that COWE was taking deposits from the public contrary to the legal frame work regulating Micro Finance Institutions but chose to keep silent (Solli, 2015). The Bank of Uganda perfunctorily intervened by freezing the accounts of the organization on the grounds that they were collecting deposits from the public without the requisite licence (The New vision, 2009). However, the Ugandan High Court quashed the decision after COWE complained they had not been given a fair hearing. Although the high court’s decision was later overturned by the appeals court in 2009, the decision was too late. This is because immediately after COWE’s accounts were unfrozen by the high court, some of the directors emptied the organisation’s accounts, and fled with millions of deposits of Ugandans (The New vision, 2009). More than fourteen years later, no officer affiliated with COWE has been punished for the fraud. Furthermore, Kenya has also had a history of financial Ponzi pyramid scams since the introduction of neo-liberal reforms. In 2007, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) froze the accounts of 270 organizations operating Ponzi schemes. More than 148, 784 Kenyans lost 8 million shillings in

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these fraudulent schemes (Kubania, 2016). Despite the large number of victims and amount of money lost, not a single director or owner of the 270 companies involved has been reprimanded. Some simply vanished while the others like Deci founder George Donde, whose firm had the highest number of investors, died under mysterious circumstances (Kubania, 2016). In 2015, over 126,000 victims of pyramid schemes opened a suit to recover the Shillings 4.15 billion they lost to fraudsters in 2007. Through a petition filed at the High Court, the investors sought orders authorizing the use of the assets of the fraudulent schemes that the Central Bank of Kenya(CBK) confiscated in 2007 (The Business Daily, 2015). The petitioners argued that the continued withholding of the funds, failure to arrest and prosecute the architects of the fraudulent schemes, and reluctance to compel them to surrender the fraudulently accumulated wealth is an injustice. The victims sued the Attorney General, CBK, and principal secretaries for Finance, Office of the President as well as Co-operative Development and Marketing, for compensation over money they lost in 257 pyramid schemes (The Business Daily, 2015). Their petition was however dismissed by the high court on 6th May 2016 for lacking merit (Petition no.90 of 2015). As of September 2023, the victims of the Ponzi fraud were yet to get justice.

Conclusion The problematic of African emancipation and self-determination lies in the Western construction of Black imperialists in various countries throughout Africa. These Black Iscariots rule the citizens of Africa at the barrel of the gun. They have not only enriched themselves and their cohorts at the expense of the African citizens but have also surrendered the mineral wealth of African states to neo-colonialists who in turn have offered them the financial and military clout to hold on to power. Under the guise of the so called neoliberal scientism, the Black imperialists have surrendered the development policy sovereignty of African states to the World Bank (WB) and International monetary Fund (IMF).These IFIs have facilitated the eviction of African states from development and poverty eradication and relinquished this cardinal state role to the invisible hand of the market. Accordingly, the state has been forced to refrain from the promotion and protection of the right to education, right to

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health, right to food, right to work, rights to water, right to social security and right to an adequate standard of living among other social and economic rights. Neo-liberal capitalism must be vehemently resisted in Africa because it is racist ideology that fosters not only development imperialism but also economic eugenics. There is therefore an argent need to resurrect the dream of realizing Pan-African emancipatory States through pro-active civic engagements and conscientious peaceful civil disobedience. It is also pertinent to re-situate the decolonial and post-colonial discourses in the both the African public and private spheres as a key empowerment measure in the resistance against black imperialism and neo-colonial subjugation.

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CHAPTER 17

Discourse on Violent Disenfranchisements and Threats to Religious and Ethnic Minorities in Postcolonial Zimbabwe Edmore Dube

Historical Underpinnings The postcolonial treatment of aliens is historically bound to colonisation by British imperialists. The British based in South Africa took over the land north of the Limpopo River at the behest of Cecil John Rhodes, a British financial mogul and colonial think tank, who dreamt of British hegemony from Cape to Cairo (Alfred, 1950; Alfred et al. 1920). Rhodes assembled an armed group officially known as the Pioneer Column with the express aim of annexing and pacifying the land north of the Limpopo River by end of 1890. The volunteers were under the command of the

E. Dube (B) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_17

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British South Africa Company (BSAC) formed by Rhodes for the eventual administration of the colonised territory, named (Southern) Rhodesia after him for the next ninety years (1890–1980). The intention was to exploit gold which was thought to be in abundance in the envisaged northern end of the South African Rand (meaning land full of gold) (Dube, 2017). Although the amount of mineral wealth discovered in Rhodesia may have been lower than originally dreamt of, it was enough for the establishment of sprawling mining settlements. These where especially ubiquitous along the country’s Great Dyke which dissects the country through its centre from Bindura to Mberengwa (Schoenberg et al., 2003). Those pioneers who did not benefit from mine claims were given large tracts of land for their part in the colonial enterprise. These two enterprises (mining and farming) attracted lots of diaspora labour from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, not equally endowed with such wealth and white pay masters. Even then, recruiting companies contracting Africans from these less endowed neighbours were authorized and supported by government (Mandivenga, 1983). These were legalized by Ordinance No. 9 of 1899. These labour agencies were further assisted by better pay in Southern Rhodesia. For example, where Nyasaland (Malawi) offered three to five shillings a month, Southern Rhodesia offered twenty-five to thirty shillings for the same length of time (Gelfand, 1961). 1n 1908 Southern Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau recruited 5000 Africans from Nyasaland alone. The recruiting agent was the Southern Rhodesia Government in agreement with the Governor of Nyasaland, Sir Alfred Sharpe (Mandivengam, 1983). This did nothing to stop voluntary job seeking Africans traversing the dangerous lands on foot, with many losing their lives on the way and upon arrival. In a batch of 774 recruited by government of Southern Rhodesia in 1908, one hundred and thirteen lost their lives to pneumonia alone in eight months. Though survivors were repatriated with their families at the expiry of their twoyear contracts, many of them returned on their own (Mandivenga, 1983). Many of those working in the mines were met by marauding lung diseases—the “cough-and-spit-blood-disease of the mines” (MahachiHarper, 2017, p. 158). Nancy Mahachi-Harper, is very critical of the colonial callousness in mines, in her historical novel, Footprints in the Mist of Time, 2017. Those who preferred clothing industries were some of the best tailors prominent for their smartness and dexterity. Due to their tidiness, good hygiene and civil characters, African immigrants were often

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preferred as cooks and yard attendants by white colonists (Mandivenga, 1986). Thus immigrants from surrounding countries contributed much to the development of Southern Rhodesia through their civil synergies, sweat and loss of lives. By 1920 the population of mine workers from Nyasaland outnumbered any other nationality including Southern Rhodesians. Southern Rhodesians comprised about 26% of the mine workforce by 1930 (Ranger, 1970, p. 148). More immigrants were brought in to build the mighty Lake Kariba and supportive administrative infrastructure in Salisbury (now Harare) during the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–1963). Salisbury as the federal capital of the three federal territories, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (now Malawi), drew more immigration than the capitals of the other to territories. The influx of African immigration was complemented by that of the Indo-Pakistanis who followed the British into their various colonies to sell their labour or to open up small to medium size wholesale and retail shops (Madivenga, 1983). Some came to Southern Rhodesia as indentured labourers for the construction of the Beira-Salisbury railway line. Southern Rhodesia was a special place for the Indo-Pakistanis because a regiment of their own kin and kith had participated in the Pioneer Column. The Khan regiment had secured Fort Victoria (now Masvingo). The Khans are still around and the revered grave of their prominent progenitor is still massively extant at the upper entry of Nyanda Mountain pass, besides the tarred road as it passes close to the small Nyanda Dam. Khan farm still exists too. Of importance to the chapter, both African immigrants from the surrounding territories and the Indo-Pakistanis had a large Muslim minority. By the time Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980, it was already clear that the colonists and indigenous peoples only valued foreign labour without commensurate civil liberties, including electoral franchise. The colonists housed immigrants next to places of labour, but ruled them out of electoral race because they lacked property to protect through election (Muzondidya, 2007). The British feared gullible plebian power with nothing to protect when electing a government could scuttle ‘progress.’ Both African and Indo-Pakistani immigration was prohibited from rural areas by proscriptive laws. Key among these inhibitive laws were Government Notice No. 223 of 1898 which proscribed non-aboriginal Africans from settling in rural Southern Rhodesia (Muzondidya, 2007, p. 327);

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the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which divided land into separate racial domiciles; and the Land Husbandry Act of 1951, which structured villages and culled excess livestock. The rural areas, then called African Reserves or Tribal Trust Lands, were generally divided between the Shona and the Ndebele, who were historically portrayed by white historians as less cordial with each other. It was thought wise to keep immigrants out of the Shona-Ndebele designated territories to preserve peace. The immigrant minorities were therefore kept in towns, mining settlements and farming compounds (Muzondidya, 2007). The World Dictionary of Minorities and Indigenous People (2018) puts the percentage of these immigrant minorities at under 6%. It estimates the Shona population at 75%, Ndebele 17%, and combined Shangaani, Tonga and Venda (minus other indigenous minority groups) at 2%. The estimates omit the Kalanga, Koisan, Nambya, Sotho, Tswana and Xhosa, officially recognised by the constitution of Zimbabwe, Chapter 1, Section 6 (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). Guhlanga (2005, p. 54) contends that “Shona, spoken by at least 75% of the population and Ndebele spoken by 10% to 16% are the dominant indigenous languages.” English, though foreign, claimed a superior spot through domination of official environments (Chimhundu, 1993). Guhlanga (2005, p. 56) estimates the rest of the indigenous languages at 6% of the population, leaving out at least 3% for immigrant languages. Chewa, a language widely spoken by the immigrant population from Malawi and Zambia, and to some extent those from Mozambique, was finally promulgated as one of the official languages recognized by the 2013 constitution of the republic of Zimbabwe. Though Zimbabwe is a constitutional secular democracy, most of its highly educated population has been through church owned schools which “ensured continued suffocation of the rest” of religions (Dodo, 2017, p. 125). Educated administrators and politicians have often paraded Christian pastors at public events, further squeezing out other faiths. One such religious persuasion under siege because of both Christian onslaught and political insensitivities has been Islam. Past census reports have omitted religious orientations making it difficult to estimate numbers. Some postulations have put Islam at 3% of the Zimbabwean population (Dodo, 2017), but in the absence of concrete statistics that remains just estimation. Historical evidence has shown that:

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The demographic structure of the religions in Zimbabwe has also been shaped along political, ethnic and racial lines... segregatory laws have up to this day seen communities sharing a common belief especially immigrant workers from Malawi and Mozambique who are Muslims clustering themselves in either mining or farming settlements. There are clearly defined settlements that house distinct members of particular religions. (Dodo, 2017, p.126-127)

Any assault of these haven spaces is inevitably an assault on particular religions. Such assaults have been magnified by the postcolonial state.

The Postcolonial State and the Disenfranchisement of Immigrant Population Independence dawned upon a fragmented factious multiracial society, with constitutional prohibitions for interracial fraternity and integration (Rhodesia Catholic Bishops Conference 1970). The postcolonial state came with a lot of hope for all those who believed that independence brought erasure of the receding colonial period of disenfranchisement and insecurity for the subject people. Both ZANU PF and Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF ZAPU) manifestos promised racial and ethnic harmony, accompanied by one man one vote (Hwami, 2022, p. 5; Raftopoulos & Savage, 2005). Hope seemed more realistic with the espousal of the doctrine of reconciliation by Robert Gabriel Mugabe, the founding Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. Yet the discourse of “patriots, puppets, dissidents and the politics of inclusion and exclusion” was thinly under the surface embellished by the reconciliation rhetoric (NdlovuGatsheni, 2008a, 2008b, p. 81). That façade defined the state for what it real was from the very beginning. From the onset of independence ZANU PF did not tolerate opposition and therefore a fellow liberation movement, PF ZAPU, was the first to suffer the brunt of that policy (Sylvester, 1986). Those who voted for the opposition PF ZAPU (and later the MDC) were “traitors, sell-outs, puppets and enemies of Zimbabwe” (Hwami, 2022, p. 6). The temperament of ZANU PF worsened markedly with the loss of the referendum to the MDC and the democratic forces in February 2000. Its approach to the general election of July of the same year became extremely violent, recriminate and intimidating (Kriger, 2005, p.1). The

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immigrant population, counted on the side of the MDC, was accused of tilting the scales in the February referendum. White farmers were accused of having transported their workforce with a large immigrant minority to vote against a clause of compulsory land acquisition with no compensation, which had been proposed in the draft constitution of 2000. Immigrant workers were already aware of the policy of omitting them from land redistribution, and might have been wary of loss of both jobs and domicile. Resettlement before 1999 focused on rural ‘decongestion’ and alleviation of poverty among the indigenous people registered and confirmed by their rural traditional authorities (headman and chiefs) (Raftopoulos & Savage, 2005). The 1992 Land Acquisition Act and the 1998 donor conference were quiet about those with no rural homes. Likewise, the immigrants were left out because they had no rural homes and no traditional authorities domicile in rural areas. That forced them to use their newly acquired voting franchise to dismiss the proposed constitution, courting the ire of fiery ZANU PF war veterans and youth militia. Colonists did not allow those Africans working on farms to vote, and for seventeen years after independence they still could not vote “in local government elections because they lacked status as property-owning ratepayers or rent-payers” (Muzondidya, 2007, p. 331). It was only in 1997 that farm workers were given the franchise to vote. They used the franchise to defeat ZANU PF in the referendum of February 2000, whose clause on land threatened to compulsorily evict them from their domicile on the farms. The farms were compulsorily acquired despite disapproval by the referendum, with the immigrants losing livelihoods, domicile and bearing assault wounds for associating with the discourse of retaining land in the hands of white farmers. The jambanja approach preferred by the ruling elite in the removal of white farmers and their large immigrant labour tended to be not only “violent and coercive, but also disorganised and divisive” (Muzondidya, 2007, p. 325). It eulogized ZANU PF and its militia of war veterans and youth, while denigrating white farmers and their sympathisers. Mugabe was clear that “Zimbabwe belongs to the Zimbabweans, pure and simple … white Zimbabweans, even those born in the country with legal ownership of their land, have a debt to pay. They are British settlers, citizens by colonization (Christine Amanpour, CNN, 2009 cited in Hwami, 2022, p. 4). By 2003 two thirds of the farm labourers had been displaced with only 5% absorbed for resettlement though over 50% had indicated they wanted to be resettled.

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Mamdani (2001) opined that the issues pertaining to the settler-native binaries had to be objectively debated, as that had a lot to do with property ownership and rights thereof. For that reason the farm workers, with a large immigrant population became victims in ZANU PF’s fight for survival. Immigrant farm workers forming 36% of the population by 1972 proved to be the straw that broke the camel’s back in the struggle for prominence between ZANU PF and democratic forces led by the MDC (Clarke, 1977, p. 32). The referendum indicated that ZANU PF popularity had plummeted, coming as it did on the heels of successful stay-aways that had dented the image of the ruling party at the turn of the century. Citizens were complaining about rise of cost of living caused by spiraling costs of fuel and rampant corruption (Taundi, 2010, p. 3). The ruling party fronted war veterans and youth militia “even as it accused its opponents of subversive violence” (Kriger, 2005, p. 1). It refused to take responsibility for the violence perpetrated by its own ranks and file, giving the world the impression that it was, in fact, under siege. President Mugabe dangled pardons and promotions for the perpetrators of violence which made them act with impunity, to the great chagrin of the farming communities, urban dwellers and the international community (Makumbe & Compagnon, 2000, p. 4). The president was bent on fulfilling his earlier statement that “as clear as day follows night... ZANU-PF will rule in Zimbabwe forever. There is no other party besides ours that will rule this country” (The Herald, 18 January 1982). ZANU PF used organized violence, intimidation and intense surveillance on opponents, including civic organisations intending to speak on behalf of the suppressed. “Besides coercion, ZANU(PF) has also engaged in a political discourse that demonizes its key opponents as reactionary, subversive, and often stooges of whites and/or foreigners” (Kriger, 2005, p. 2). In speaking about his opponents Mugabe was not hesitant to publicly state that “death will befall them” (Kriger, 2005, p. 27). Moven Mahachi, the late former Minister of Defence, confirmed on 2 June 2000 that they were capable of moving door to door killing their opponents. Border Gezi, the late former ZANU PF political commissar and Minister of Indigenization, accepted ZANU PF prowess in spilling blood (Kriger, 2005, p. 28). To further squeeze the immigrant population, Phineas Chihota, former Deputy Minister for Industry and International Trade, reached out for a colonial definition to tag them. He defined them as urban dwellers without rural homes, while an indigenous person was one who had a rural home (Hwami, 2022, p. 11). That was

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premised on the colonial government which settled indigenous populations in rural areas, and immigrant Africans close to their work places in towns, mines and on farms. The same scenario continued after independence. During an election rally in Bindura in 2000, President Mugabe singled out the residents of the high density suburb of Mbare Musika in Harare as “undisciplined, totemless elements of alien origin” (NdlovuGatsheni, 2009, p. 1152). Although they touted him back as one of them, he never seemed to budge down. Kriger (2005, p. 30) notes that. Police support unit officers were deployed in the suburbs of Harare and other cities and towns, purportedly to maintain order and prevent an outbreak of post-election violence. Instead, they assaulted residents, including senior MDC party officials, as part of a strategy of reprisals for urban voters’ support for the MDC. This campaign of terror by the army and police continued sporadically into 2001.

The immigrant minorities who were counted together with the opposition as saboteurs, had no one speaking on their behalf per se. Immigrants and opposition politicians lacked the non-violence charismatic call of John Lewis, able to utilize black power to manipulate the discourse of the necessary trouble (Johnson, 2022, pp. 38–39). The immigrants suffered with no viably organized representation to appeal to—tribal, national or political harmony (Green, 2022, p. 6). Though the suffering had a large minority factor, the government generally made it appear blanket and neutral. In that case in 2012 authorities joined the rest of the world in celebrating the unanimously adopted United Nations Declaration for Minorities of 1992 (Dziva & Dube, 2014, p. 396). These celebrations focused on national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. These aspects cannot be overlooked in the development of nations, although such contributions often lack acknowledgment and support from ruling elites (Prah, 1993). The post-modernist human rights discourse focuses on the importance of these aspects in development. The fact that student movements joined the reform agenda led to the promulgation of Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education Regulations, 2002; 2006, which made the teaching of National Strategic Studies (NSS) compulsory in tertiary institutions including teachers’ colleges and polytechnics. The subject is intended to nurture patriotism in the minds and hearts of the young adults. Patriotism is here interpreted to mean following the current ‘war liberators’ and never to compete with them, or

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support those who do. In other words, the subject is meant to inculcate passivity in the face of adversity as long as that strengthens the current leadership stranglehold on power.

The Urban Dwellers Immigrant population was ubiquitous in towns, forming more than 50% of the urban workforce by the 1950s (Ranger, 1970, p. 148). That was quite apparent in the colonial capital Salisbury (Harare). Such immigrants included the over-regulated Africans and the less restricted Indo-Pakistanis. The Indo-Pakistanis were equally less propertied despite being less restricted than Africans with respect to the Pass Laws and the Urban Areas and Accommodation Act of 1946 (Muzondidya, 2007, p. 328). “Up to June 1964, Indians owned only 24 residential stands in the four major towns of Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali and Gwelo” (Muzondidya, 2007, p. 330). Those allowed to vote could not field candidates of their own race but could only vote for white candidates of their choices. New immigration was outlawed by Foreign Migratory Labour Amendment Act of 1958 which authorized the repatriation of all those who were still neither citizens nor permanent residents of Rhodesia. Most of the immigrants stayed on as they could not return to face rampant unemployment at home, with nothing to show for their long years of absence. Their stay had no bearing on civil entitlements as they were seen as here solely to work. The Land Tenure Act of 1969 ensured separate development for races, which ensured distinctive areas of domicile (RCBC, 1970). Indo-Pakistanis could not own land in African townships or strictly European areas of settlement, but independence opened up some space for those with resources to get educated and fill in some vacancies in the growing black economy. They could contribute in terms of labour, but could not assume those spaces representing the indigenous Zimbabwean breed. There was therefore logical uproar when Indian young women clinched places to represent Zimbabwean beauty in 1987 and 1997 (The Sunday News, 16 August 1987; Sunday Mail Magazine, 31 August 1997). At the turn of the century, disgruntled groups turned to the opposition MDC for salvation. With the destruction of the farming communities due to excessive jambanja, opposition concentrated in urban areas. ZANU PF was irked by the successive losses to the opposition in towns and cities. It conceived Operation Murambatsvina (violent urban clean-up)

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after four successive losses to the opposition. The idea was to disperse the urban population by destroying cheap houses used by the plebeians (Tibaijuka, 2005). The government argued that those were illegal structures to be cleared off in the operation clean-up. Their occupants were supposed to go to their rural homes where they would settle in legitimate houses recognized by traditional authorities – with their voting impact being neutralized by the rural majority coerced by traditional authorities to vote for ZANU PF. Contributing to debate in parliament, the outspoken deputy minister Phineas Chihota said there was no apology for the untold destruction since it affected non-aboriginals (The Zimbabwe Independent 1 July 2005). The Indo-Pakistanis, though denigrated as exploitative Coolies (makura), were not affected by the operation in the same manner as African immigrants from Malawi (manyasarandi/ maburandaya), Mozambique (mamoskeni) and Zambia. The pejorative naming was designed as psychological torture, and therefore destruction of domicile though seemingly blanket was meant to be a double sword for those with no rural homes for resort (Mahachi-Harper, 2017; Muzondidya, 2007). Government officials were adamant that those with no rural homes should go back to their nations to reclaim their citizen rights (Human Rights Watch, 2005, pp. 31–32). The Indo-Pakistanis were threatened with unfathomable compliance otherwise their trading licenses and land leases would be withdrawn. The churches were critical of the government moves, which forced them to draft a more amiable way forward. Three church bodies, Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) and Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), put forward a blueprint for harmonious development called The Zimbabwe we Want (ZCBC, EFZ and ZCC 2006). Central to the document were democracy and human rights as pillars of acceptable development. When government rubbished the proposal the ZCBC issued one of its most critical pastoral letters on the postcolonial state to date, God Hears the Cry of the Oppressed, 2007. The government showed that it was not prepared to be moderated even by religious formations, by branding the ZCBC a bunch of upcoming politicians. Mugabe dared them to form a political party, to experience the steam of virulent politics of Zimbabwe. That left the minorities and the general masses with no direct spokespersons acceptable to the political establishment, which accepted nothing short of sheepish following – no competition or picketing as both belonged to opposition politics of saboteurs and sellouts.

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The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 2001 and the Aliens The ruling ZANU PF did its homework by combing through the voters’ role. They discovered that the foreigners on the voters’ role were all the opposition needed to make a difference in urban areas. To deal with the aliens’ flirtation with tilting of power, the ZANU PF government crafted the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 2001. The Act was ostensibly meant to disenfranchise immigrants ahead of the crunch 2002 presidential election, which they feared the MDC had the advantage due to the general disgruntlement and anti-ZANU PF sentiment. The Act introduced a cumbersome structure to prove that one had renounced their original citizenship. There was no place for dual citizenship, which affected many immigrants including Africans, Indo-Pakistanis and Europeans. Many immigrants and Zimbabweans born outside the country found it difficult to participate in political processes, following the promulgation of the prohibitive Act. “In general, the state has readily deployed the politics of race, ethnicity and indigeneity to challenge subject minorities’ claims to land and other entitlements” (Muzondidya, 2007, p. 336). The Indo-Pakistanis were accused by war veterans of looting developed land in Zimbabwean cities since independence and of fueling inflation through the black market (Dawn, 2002). The commensurate punishment would be to withdraw their hold on land which is a resource for the patriotic. Blood had been spilled so that indigenous Zimbabweans would benefit if they chauvinistically supported the leadership (Dawn, 2002). In that, ZANU PF showed that it did not hesitate to craft protective laws that kept it in power for as long as it had means to do so, either through parliament or through the Temporary Presidential Powers.

Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated that the violent disenfranchisement of the ‘alien’ population by the postcolonial state was linked to power dynamics and had its roots in the legalistic colonial state. The colonial state had accepted the alien component only as mitigation to demands in the labour market, minus the pertinent civil rights. Generally ‘aliens’ had been legislatively kept out of the voting processes because voting was meant to protect property, and therefore those without property tended

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to trade their votes for frivolous gain in the short term. In essence they had nothing to protect, yet protection of property as a perspective of development was seen as the key principle behind casting a vote. Independence ushered in the postcolonial state with a negligible number of ‘subject races’ and ‘alien natives’ on the voters’ role. The independence government did not rectify this as a matter of urgency which implied that they accepted the status quo. The farm workers had to wait for seventeen years before they could test the voting franchise. It was unfortunate that their franchise came at a time when the government was on the brink of collapse, with extreme pressures from labour unions and consumers of skyrocketing commodities. Their test of the voting process in the 2000 referendum was scaffold by the willing paymaster seeking to save his farm. The farm workers voted en masse to protect their jobs and domicile on the farms as they had no other homes outside commercial lands. In that they voted to keep the farms in the hands of their white employers, by rejecting a draft constitution with a compulsory acquisition clause. That angered the ruling elite who violently reacted by introducing the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 2001, which immediately disenfranchised them by introducing cumbersome proof for having renounced their national citizenships. They were further disenfranchised by violent dispersal from the farms. Some were able to leave with bitter wounds, and yet others succumbed to the violent pressure. Religious communities organized following settlement patterns on the farms equally succumbed to jambanja. The practitioners were told to go back ‘home.’ With more than two thirds of organized minority worship on the farms having been destroyed by 2005, it was the turn of the ‘shameless’ urban “vabvakure having no manners and failing in their duty to discipline children from an early age” (Mahachi-Harper, 2017, p. 5). The young urbanites had stirred the hornet’s nest by overwhelmingly voting for the opposition MDC, which Mugabe and the ruling party saw as shameless for ‘totemless’ urbanites to do. This name-calling was meant for psychologically tormenting the ‘alien minorities’ for daring to exercise their franchise contrary to the expectations of their ‘war liberators.’ Instead of joining their ‘liberators’ they had dined with ‘sellouts and stooges of the West.’ The cheap crowded urban dwellings popular with the urban poor were destroyed, further punishing those who had moved from farms to towns. Nearly a million urban dwellers were affected by the destruction, which further squeezed ‘alien natives’ and ‘subject races’ domicile in towns, with no resort to any other homes outside the urban

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spaces (Tibaijuka, 2005). Political maneuvers have kept the minority citizenship contingent to the whims of those in power. The fear is that they may be the ‘straw’ with the voracity to break the jinx of the continued stranglehold on power by the ‘patriots’ of Zimbabwe, a doubtful label self-attached to the ruling elite as an exclusion mechanism. Patriotism is defined as the ability to chauvinistically toe the line of those currently in power.

References Alfred, B. (1950). The cape-to-cairo railway and train ferries: Discussion. The Geographical Journal, 55, 101–108. Alfred Bigland, E. Grogan, C. Christy, Mr. Melland, M. T., & General, C. (1920). The Cape-To-Cairo Railway And Train Ferries, The Geographical Journal, 55(2), 101–110 Chimhundu, H. (1993). The Vernacularisation of African languages after independence. DIOGENES, 41(161), 35–42. Clarke, D. G. (1977). Agricultural and plantation workers in Rhodesia. Mambo Press. Dawn. (2002, April 25). Zimbabwe vets vow to grab Asians property, Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/407534/zimbabwe-vets-vow-to-grabasians-property. Dodo, O. (2017). Inter-religious conflicts: A review of Zimbabwe’s religious landscape, post-independence. Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies, (IJOURELS), 7 (2), 125–137 Dube, E. (2017). Zimbabwe land tenure impact on development and justice delivery. In M. Mawere & T. R. Mubaya (Eds.), African studies in the academy: The Cornucopia of theory, praxis and transformation in Africa? (pp. 137–158). Langaa Research and Publishing. Dziva, C., & Dube, B. (2014). Promoting and protecting minority languages in Zimbabwe: Use of the 1992 UN Minorities Declaration. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 395–413. https://doi.org/10.1163/ 15718115-02103004 Government of Zimbabwe. (2013). Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Fidelity Printers. Green, M. C. (2022). Religion, state, and the fragility of democracy. Journal of Law and Religion, 37 , 37–45. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2021.74 Gelfand, M. (1961). Migration of African labourers in Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1890–1914). African Migrant Labour, 7 (8), 293–300.

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Gudhlanga, E. S. (2005). Promoting the use and teaching of African languages in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Journal of Educational Research (Z.IER), 17 (1), 54–68. Human Rights Watch. (2005, September 11). ‘Clear the Filth’: Mass evictions and demolitions in Zimbabwe. Human Rights Watch, 31–32. Hwami, M. (2022). Settlers, sell-outs and sons of the soil: The creation of Aliens in Zimbabwe and the challenge for higher education. Cultural and Pedagogical Inquiry, 4(1), 4–26. Johnson, T. L. (2022). Moral faith and the legacy of John Lewis’s political visionof ‘Good Trouble.’ Journal of Law and Religion, 37 , 37–45. https:// doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2021.74 Kriger, N. (2005). ZANU(PF) strategies in general elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and coercion. African Affairs, 104(414), 1–34. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/afraf/adi016 Mahachi-Harper, S. N. (2017). Footprints in the mist of time. Zimbabwe Publishing House. Makumbe, J., & Compagnon, D. (2000). Behind the smokescreen. University of Zimbabwe Publications. Mamdani, M. (2001). When does a settler become a native? Citizenship and identity in a settler society. Pretext: Literacy and Cultural Studies, 10(1), 63– 73. Mandivenga, E. C. (1983). Islam in Zimbabwe. Mambo Press. Mandivenga, E. C. (1986). Islam in Zimbabwe: A study of the religious developments from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century (PhD Thesis). University of Aberdeen. Muzondidya, J. (2007). Jambanja: Ideological ambiguities in the politics of land and resource ownership in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies, 33(2), 325–341. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2008a). Patriots, puppets, dissidents and the politics of inclusion and exclusion in contemporary Zimbabwe. EASSRR, 24(1), 81– 108. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2008b). Nativism and the Debate on African Public Sphere in Postcolonial Africa: Reflections on a Problematic ‘Reverse-Discourse’ (Plenary Presentation delivered at the Council for the Development of Social Science in Africa (CODESRIA)’s 12th General Assembly: Governing the African Public Sphere, Yaonde, Camroon, 7–11 December 2008). Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2009). Making sense of Mugabeism in local and global politics: “So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe”. Third World Quarterly, 30(6), 1139–1158. Prah, K. K. (1993). Mother tongue for scientific and technological development in Africa. Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society.

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Raftopoulos, B., & Savage, T. (Eds.). (2005). Zimbabwe: Injustice and political reconciliation. Weaver Press. Ranger, T. (1970). The African voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898–1930. Heinemann. RCBC. (1970). Land tenure act and the Church. Mambo Press. Schoenberg, R., Nägler, F., Gnos, E., Kramers, J. D., & Kamber, B. S. (2003). The source of the Great Dyke, Zimbabwe, and its tectonic significance: Evidence from Re-Os Isotopes. The Journal of Geology, 111(5), 565–578. https://doi.org/10.1086/376766 Sylvester, C. (1986). Zimbabwe’s 1985 elections: A search for national mythology. Journal of Modern African Studies, 24(1), 229–241. Sunday Mail Magazine. (1997, August 31). Gorgeous Una Shines to the Top. Sunday Mail Magazine. Taundi, J. B. (2010). The pro-democracy movement in Zimbabwe (1998Present). International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 1–14. http://www. nonviolent-conflict.org/. The Sunday News. (1987, August 16). Controversy hits beauty contest. The Sunday News. The Zimbabwe Independent. (2005, July 1). Urban Dwellers not Zimbabwean— MP. The Zimbabwe Independent. Tibaijuka, A. K. (2005). Report of the fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scopeand impact of operation Murambatsvina by the UN special envoy on human settlements issues in Zimbabwe. UN, pp. 1–100. World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. (2018). https://minori tyrights.org/country/zimbabwe/. ZCBC, ZFZ & ZCC. (2006). The Zimbabwe we want: Towards the national vision for Zimbabwe. Print Works. ZCBC. (2007). God hears the cry of the oppressed: A pastoral letter on the current crisis in Zimbabwe. Social Communications.

CHAPTER 18

The Entanglement of the Church and the State During Mugabe’s Reign in Postcolonial Zimbabwe: A Social Conflict Perspective Tobias Marevesa and Esther Mavengano

T. Marevesa Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Joshua Nkomo School of Arts and Humanities, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] E. Mavengano (B) Department of English and Media Studies, Faculty of Arts, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa Department of English, Faculty of Linguistics, Literature and Cultural Studies, Institute of English and American Studies, Alexander von Humboldt/Georg © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_18

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Introduction The ambivalent and complicit relationship between the church and the state is a troubling subject which invites ongoing academic scrutiny. This worrisome scenario existed in Zimbabwe during the Mugabe era hence it demands attention in the post-Mugabe society in the context of transformational politics. During Mugabe’s tenure, the liaison between the church and government provoked constestations and heated debate. In this chapter, Romans 13: ff provides useful discursive praxes which are utilised to read and interpret the existing relationship of the church and state today in Zimbabwe. Gusha (2020) posits that when confronted with Romans 13:1ff, the interpretation becomes very a messy business because there is no consensus on how best this biblical text can be understood. Questions which come to mind are: Can God ordain dictators as rulers? Is revolting against political tyrants the same as revolting against God? Are Christians allowed to participate in political activities? How can both the church and state deploy language to reconstruct a new dispensation in the context of post-Mugabe Zimbabwe? These are vexing questions which evoke multiple responses from anchored in different perspectives. It is the focus of this chapter to interrogate Romans 13:1ff from a social conflict theory in an attempt to understand the church-state imbroglio in Zimbabwe.

The Social Conflict Perspective Social conflict theory is the theoretical framework is adopted for the purpose of examining the church and state relations of the Roman period as it is in Romans 13:1ff and re-contextualise it in Zimbabwe during Mugabe’s reign. Karl Marx is alleged to be the father of social conflict theory (Bratton, 1997, p. 135). In this theory, Marx postulates that persons in different social groups are seen to be competing for equality, power, and resources. The advocates of social conflict theory view society

Forster Postdoctoral Research Fellow, TU (Technische Universitat Dresden), Dresden, Germany T. Marevesa Research Institute of Religion and Theology, College of Humanities and Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa

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as a site of struggle and competition. The inequalities cause social conflict between those in power and those who seek power (Dahrendorf, 1958, p. 175). In Zimbabwe, the church and state conflict took place where the two social groups through interaction with each other tried to gain or take social power at the same time trying to prevent the other group from attaining their own. The views of Marx’s are in sync with the features of a capitalist society which is characterised by exploitation and discrimination. It inspired the socialist mind set “of the world’s economies and societies today, the contradictions and competition in social relationships and the natural instability and conflict emanating from the world of the “haves’ and the “have not” (Dahrendorf, 1958, p. 175). Conflict is unavoidable especially where there is social disparity and power struggle. Similarly, the competition between the church and state social groups in the Zimbabwean political landscape over power, property rights, legal practices among others has resulted in deep rooted social conflict.

The Context of the Roman Church During Paul’s Period (In Relation to the Roman State) It is not clear how the church in Rome was founded by Paul because there was no relationship between him and the Roman community he wrote his letter to them. According Colin (2012, p. 489), “[h]e neither established the church at Rome, nor, in fact, had he ever visited the illustrious city. The letter concerns not specific issues within the Roman church per se, but rather Paul’s articulation of his own gospel.” It is imperative to examine the historical background of the Roman Empire during the time of Paul for a better understanding of Romans 13:1–7. A number of scholars such as Colin (2012); Carter (2004); Esler (2003); Witherington among others are faced with interpretational challenges when they consider Romans 13:1–7. What was Paul’s aim in telling his audience to submit to the governing authorities? The contemporary mind set of a governing authority is the governing system as it is conceptualised in the twentieth century. The question is that: Is it the same concept as it is understood today? It is possible that we are dealing with a context which is different with that of Paul’s time. This understanding of the historical environment may help to appreciate the text in its own context. According to Gusha (2020, p. 4), [P]aul’s ministry was exercised during the period when the Roman Empire was the superpower of the day; this is the socio-economic and political context that needs to be understood

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as part of the exegesis.” Colin (2012) proposed three historical and social propositions of the Roman context which informs the understanding of background of Paul’s argument. The first was advanced by Kasemann (1980, p. 351) who argue that: Paul’s exhortation in Chapter 12 is against ‘enthusiasm’ and that this carries over into Chapter 13, where Paul is resisting the attitude which in virtue of heavenly citizen views earthly authorities with indifference or content.

It is probable that the idea of the heavenly authorities is quite different from the authorities which are earthly. This debate was contested by various scholars such as Kasemann (1980) Neufeld (1994) for some time. Nevertheless, Neufeld (1994, p. 94) rebutted Kasemann’s view citing that: “[c]aution must be used with Kasemann’s conclusions; he tends to draw questionable parallels between the situation in the Corinthians community and the one in Rome.” McDonald examined the historical context from the point of view of payment of taxes. McDonald assert that “[p]aul is thus warning his readers in 13:1–7 against joining a selfish opposition to excessive taxation, which is a form of conforming to “this world.” This theory is support by internal textual and historical evidence. In the Roman taxation system, there was an appeal by the government to its citizens to pay taxes. There were various types of taxes, but the commonly used ones were just two which are telos and phoros. The tax that was levied on people and land for people who were non-citizens was phoros which was also called the provincial tax. Whereas telos was type of tax that was levied for goods, service and income (Esler, 2003, p. 332). It is difficult to identify which type of tax which Paul was referring to when he was encouraging Christians to pay taxes, Was he referring to telos or both? What if an individual refuses to pay tax what will be the implication? According to Gusha, 2020, p. 5), “[w]hat is important is that Paul is writing during the period when the Roman government was in control of the vast empire, and the governing system was quite different from the contemporary democratic system.” This historic background will help to assess the context during Paul’s time. The other theory of the historical context in Rome during the time of Paul was advanced by Culpepper (1974, p. 457) who argued that “Paul’s concern in Romans 13:1–7 is that Jewish Christians refrain from

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joining a revolutionary, nationalistic movement which might undermine the unity of Jews and Gentiles in the Roman Church.” It is likely that the Jewish Christians who were in Palestine were in liaison with their counterparts in Rome and were agreeing on the ant-Roman royal rule. This may have resulted in the expulsion of the Jews from Rome in about AD 49. According to Gusha (2020), chances are that the Jewish personalities such as Priscilla and Aquila could have been causalities of this event. If this view is to go by, it is probable that Paul could not have wanted the same scenario to happen again to the Christians who were in Rome. From the beginning of his letter up to Romans 11, Paul made an effort to argue that there is equality between Jews and Gentiles before God. It is, therefore, possible that Romans 13:1–7 was written to a mixed audience. It is most likely that Paul wrote his letter to the Romans during a period where the context was characterised by murder, adultery, palace skirmishes among other forms of injustice. Collins (2012) argue that even though the palace was experiencing power struggle and strife, Christians were not in danger from politically motivated persecutions. The systematic persecutions were experienced at a later period during the time of Emperor Nero Collins (2012, p. 495) argue that “those who are familiar with Paul’s missionary carrier know that he had found the Roman Empire a help in his work.” In a similar way, Thiselton also argue that “in Paul’s life the authority of Rome had saved him from the arbitrary persecutions of Jews, the attacks of bandits, and much else.” The Roman Empire had created a conducive environment which promoted peaceful movement in the entire ancient Near East. People would travel to different places with minimum danger, this helped Paul to missionary work to different places spreading the good news. The infrastructural development helped Paul’s travelling in his mission work to different parts of the Roman Empire. It is probable that Romans was written during the initial reign of Nero when it was more peaceful than the one during Augustus Caesar’s Pax Romana (Saime, 2019). When Rome was experiencing this peace the government was not using excessive power to rule the empire. The peaceful environment in the empire led Paul to have a respectful regard towards the Roman government of the day. Paul had a Roman citizenship he was enjoying several privileges like making a direct appeal to the emperor. These privileges could have informed Paul to tell his audience to submit to the government of the day. According to Gusha (2020, p. 4), “all these promises would be abandoned a few years later, as Nero blamed Christians for the fire he set on the palace to justify his building project

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on a new palace.” However, this a difficult history to be reconstructed because there is no textual evince that support this. It remains a theory that needs to be substantiated and examined in order to have a sound historical reconstruction.

The Church in the Political Troubled Terrain in Zimbabwe The entanglement between the Church and state in not a novel phenomenon in the ancient and the contemporary world of today. The Church has been persecuted, muffled, muzzled and victimised by different states across the globe. The ambiguous position of The Church in Zimbabwe today emanates from the idea that it is expected to the voice of the voiceless and by denouncing the injustice abuse of human rights, corruption, oppression among others (Mavengano et al., 2022. The Church’s troubled terrain can be traced from the time immemorial. There are several questions which can be asked regarding the Church and state relations by contemporary Christians such as in Zimbabwe, For instance, Can Christians submit to any abusive government or not? What type of a government may Christians follow and support? Which kind of government may Christians submit to? These and other questions are troubling Christians when they try to understand Romans 13:1–7. It is undeniable fact that there are governments which are oppressive, dictatorial, corrupt, and abusive among others. The question that arises then which seeks answers is, what are Christians supposed to do? It is interesting to note how the above questions can be reconciled with Romans 13:1–7. A case point is what Chamburuka (2012, p. 204) referred as an example, “in Germany during the 1930s and 40s, theologians used Rom 13 to encourage submission to the Nazi regime, especially since it was democratically elected.” During this period Dietrich Bonhoeffer and his associates stood up to fight against Nazism when he encouraged Christians to join him in self-sacrifice. Bonhoeffer (1959, p. 35) “accepted the traditional Lutheran view that there was a sharp distinction between politics and religion” The example of Bonhoeffer clearly show the entanglement and the troubled terrain between the Church and state from as far as the first century. A very good example of a Germany leader who Bonhoeffer (1959, p. 36) argued that, “Hitler was antichrist, the archidestroyer of the world and its basic values, slavery, death and extinction for

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their own sake, the Antichrist who wants to pose the negative as positive and as creative.” These leaders such as Hitler of Germany, Saddam Hussain of Iraq,Mu’ammar Al-Qadhdhafi of Libya, Mobuto Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Robert Mugabe were known of being dictatorial, Antichrist and against human rights. Can it be argued that the examples of these leaders were ordained by God? Does it mean that if Christians revolt against these types of leaders have revolted against God? Should Christians be involved in politics or not? Is it really possible to bring the concept that was raised by Paul to the Christians in Rome to our own context in Zimbabwe? Gusha (2020) raised a pertinent aspect in applying what took place in a context which is outside a given period. Gusha suggested a concept of appropriation. He defined appropriation of “biblical texts [which] means that the texts are applied outside of their original historical context to give insight to new issues” (Gusha, 2020, p. 9). Related to this study, the ‘original historical context’ should be understood as Roman Empire throughout Paul’s time and the ‘new issue’ is the Church’s troubled terrain in the post-Mugabe era. Therefore, the Bible is a very old and ancient book that was produced in a different context than ours. It is difficulty to apply it straight away in our own context but it is imperative to select principles and themes that we appropriate to our contemporary context. Heacock (2016, p. 4) aptly argued that “this reality offers a new means of engagement both with the contemporary culture and the text.” As appropriation is applied on Romans 13:1–7 to the Church’s troubled terrain in the post-Mugabe era, there is need to assess and analyse the text on how it is speaking to the issues of social justice and corruption. What should Christians do when governments are abusing its own citizens? A government can be perceived as obedient when it is in compliance with the country’s constitution. This is a measure in which a government is seen to be in good conduct or in terror with its citizens. Is the postMugabe government compliant with its constitution? Governments are different in their conduct with their people some are good while others are tyrants. For instance, the Roman government is labelled as “the beast of the sea” in Revelations 13:7. Our measure of obedience is determined by the government’s compliance with the constitution of the country. This is our measure of a government that is not a terror to good conduct. Is this the case with the Second Republic? The truth of the matter is that governments differ, and this proposition might not apply to other governments. For example, in

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Revelations 13:7 the Roman government is described as ‘the beast of the sea’. In Acts 5:29, the apostles refuse to submit to their governing authorities. The Second Republic, since its inception, is on record as having committed human rights abuses to the extent of killing lawful protesters. Chapter 4: 59 of the constitution of Zimbabwe allows for the freedom to demonstrate and petition. Therefore, shooting demonstrators is a serious infringement of the country’s supreme law (constitution). In Zimbabwe, the Church and state relations was characterised by schisms between the government and the Church. The main contender was the Catholic Church under the late and former president Mugabe’s tenure. The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC) proved to be the voice of the voiceless. This is the mandate of the church as Chamburuka (2012, p. 203) rightly pointed out that, “the church must stand up and seek a platform with the state or government without fear or favour.” Like the Catholic Commission of Justice and Peace (CCJP) of the Catholic Church she should not be frightened by statements made by politicians. The person of Pius Ncube made a significant voice in the wilderness, unfortunately, his effort was futile because his end was so pathetic no one supported him even his church. He was persecuted by political players as he was standing for the church. During the Mugabe regime, there were certain churches such as the one of Reverend Obadiah Musindo who belonged to the African Independent Church appeared to be an organ of the state. According to Chamburuka (2012), Rev Musindo was seen on the local TV channel campaigning for ZANU PF as well as singing songs that venerated the former president as chosen by God. The Anglican Church is another example where there is evidence of the entanglement between the Church and state. This denomination ended up in a split because of politically related issues this took place during the Zimbabwe Crisis. According to Sachikonye (2011, p. 75), “some churches supported Mugabe’s exhausted nationalism, while others aligned themselves to the critical civic movements.” Bishop Norbert Kunonga was involved in an entanglement with Bishop Gandiya over their political affiliation in their dealings with the affairs of the church. Bishop Norbert Kunonga “expressed support for President Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (PF) (ZANU PF) party” (Marevesa, 2019, p. 98). The tension within the denomination resulted in the split of the Church and the excommunication of Bishop Kunonga from the Anglican Church of Province of Central Africa (CPCA). The whole saga in the denomination became complex (Smith, 2010, 4) when the state through the police

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appear on behalf of Bishop Kunonga “over Christmas, police threatened residents in townships near the capital, telling them they would be beaten if they attended churches loyal to Gandiya.” Although the state used the police to support Bishop Kunonga on the bases of political reasons. The same state which supported Bishop Kunonga later abandoned him when he messed up his political career. What is significant is that the Church should not masquerade herself in being used by the state for its political mileage but the Church should preach the gospel and pray for her political leadership. The Church and state in the new dispensation was not very different from the Mugabe period. The Church was actively involved coup of the former president of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe. There was a peaceful transitional arrangement from the old dispensation to a new dispensation which was led by Mnangagwa. The Catholic Church was instrumental in conflict resolution between the former president Mugabe and those advocating for the resignation of the incumbent. Father Fidelis Mukonori acted as a mediator between the military and Mugabe (Marevesa, 2019). Soon after the demise of the former president Mugabe and the appointment of Mnangagwa as the President of Zimbabwe, the church was the first to endorse the new President. According to Share (2021), the religious leaders vowed to rally behind the new President in the coming harmonised elections and they encouraged him to transform in becoming the bread basket of Africa as it used to be. Speaking on behalf of different churches leaders who attended the meeting National Elders Forum chairperson Bishop Felex Mukonowengwe implored the President to remember that the church has always been an unwavering developmental partner of state in the construction of businesses, schools and hospitals. This demonstrated that the church and state were relating well. The Catholic Church globally communicate their views on the prevailing circumstances by means of letters. The Catholic Bishops is body within the Catholic Church that communicates issues in the situation of human rights abuses, political and economic injustice. The Catholic Bishops could not remained muffled in light of the abuses and sufferings of the people of Zimbabwe they wrote a letter to the government reprimanding all the ills which they had committed. The argued that the government is suppressing dissenting voices such as the opposition political parties such as the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A). The Catholic Bishops wrote that: “the suppression of people’s anger can only serve to deepen the crisis and take the nation into crisis”

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(ZCBC, 2020, online). The Catholic Bishops observed that the clampdown on dissension could be unprecedented. The second issue which the Catholic Bishops was the highest level of corruption in all departments of government as well as in society. The Catholic Bishops argue that, “the corruption in the country has reached alarming levels … there hasn’t been equally a serious demonstration by government to rid the country of this scourge” (ZCBC, 2020). When the second republic ascended to helm of power they promised to bring corruption to its knees, but it is yet to be realised. The letter from the Catholic Bishops was not well received by the government and its proxies. The politicians responded by saying that the letter was an example “of a ‘third force’ (third force is a term used by ZANU-PF in reference to its enemies who, they claim, want to displace them), that seeks to dismantle the democratically elected government. The other senior government official (a permanent secretary in the ministry if information) Nick Magwana did not have kind words in his response to the letter by the Catholic Bishops, he argued, “it is unfortunate when men of the cloth begin to use the pulpit to advance a nefarious agenda for detractors of our country” (The Guardian, 2020, 4). The regime enablers also condemned the Catholic Bishops letter. These enablers are Apostle Andrew Wutawunashe, a Pentecostal church leader and Bishop Samuel Mutendi of the Zion Christian Church. According to Dube (2021, p. 28), “[a] regime enabler is an individual or group that helps politicians gain power and, then, helps them to maintain power.” Their significant role in this scenario was to discredit another voice from the church in the political space in Zimbabwe. Magaisa (2019) posits that religious voice is utilised as strategy to counter the revolution in a bid to silence emerging voices against ZANU-PF. One of the enablers responded to the Catholic Bishop’s letter saying, the letter is “inappropriately prescriptive and grossly disrespectful” (Dube, 2021, p. 30). This response from a fellow clergy is grossly unacceptable, he could have sought audience with the Catholic Bishops before making such a statement. The enablers’ response demonstrated that the church is divided against the state, whereas the church should stand firm against injustice practises against the voiceless people. It is significant to note that the church and state relations were not rosy, it has been a rocky and thorny terrain where there were political causalities of the church leaders. However, there also moments where there was a cordial relationship between the church and state.

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The Role of Language in “New Dispensation” or The Second Republic This section brings to attention the role of language in society vis-à-vis the present day discourses about Second Republic and new dispensation in Zimbabwe. Language is important in people’s lives. It is with language that people communicate their ideas. Language can be utilised for multifarious functions which include to communicate principles of socio-political conduct within the national space. Opara (2016, p. 11) submits that “dispute resolution heavily relies on words or language.” It is an irrefutable fact that language has a fundamental role in causing and resolving conflict. This means that it is vital to examine language use in the process of generating and promoting new political thinking in tandem with the vision of new political order after the demise of the former president Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. The socio-political and religious terrains in Zimbabwe have been pervaded by decisive language and hate speech deployed to underscore differences in sociopolitical, economic and religious ideologies. The self-other logics have defined Zimbabwean political landscape for quite some time. The church and state should rethink languaging in order to generate a conducive national environment. During Robert Mugabe’s reign, Zimbabwe established and nurtured culture of toxic and confrontational politics which profoundly manifested in political speeches and national addresses by high profile politicians. This political culture is deeply entrenched in the socio-economic, political and religious facets of the nation that it is one of the pertinent imperatives of Mnangagwa’s leadership to dislodge the daunting repressive political culture that has been in place for several years to pave way for new political pragmatism. Mavengano (2020) argues that language is instrumental in shaping beliefs, values thoughts and perceptions of reality. In Zimbabwe the Mugabe’s kleptocratic and totalitarian system thrived through language of political intimidation and violence among other scrupulous mechanisms which were usually projected in political speeches in order to silence and stifle opposition parties. The polemical question that needs to be addressed is that, how can the utopian vision proposed in the rhetoric of ‘new political dispensation and the much desired birth of the’ Second Republic’ become a reality in post-Mugabe era against political intolerance, violence, self-other logics and hate speech? Aside with the sheer political rhetoric, what can be

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done towards transforming political attitudes and behaviour which ultimately give birth to new political thinking? Certainly, it is important for the nation to enjoy political tranquillity and socio-economic development after several years of political conflict and economic quagmire. Van Dijk is of the view that language utilised by politicians is mostly meant to present or preserve power and political ideologies. This bring the ideas that language is never neutral but rather salient in controlling thought and behavior. Weiss and Wodak (2003, p. 14) clarify that “language is not powerful on its own” but “gains power the use powerful people make of it.” Fairclough (1998) earlier on submits that language in discourse is employed in framing process whereby language users consciously or unconsciously act to construct a point of view. He further argues that the power of words is embedded in the ability of the rhetor to use effectively argumentation strategies. What this means is that language is instrumental in construction of the semantics of power and domination which are essential elements of political discourse. This brings to the fore Duncombe’s (2002) argument that language one of the fundamental forms of covert politics that is deployed by the power structures to govern society. Frank submits that: [l]anguage combines the functions of a mirror, a tool and a weapon… [1t] reflects society… human beings use it to interact with one another... [and] language can be used by groups that enjoy the privileges of power… to legitimise their own [including political, and economic] values system by labelling others ‘deviant or inferior.’

The above citation underscores the politics of language and languaging (Mavengano et al., 2022). Elsewhere, Cyril (2019) and Mavengano & Moyo (2023 posit that language could be deployed in a positive manner to engender harmony in the society. According to Yusuf, language if not carefully used “could be as destructive as a nuclear arsenal.” The realm of language can be utilised to oppose, insult, generate violence, abuse, resolve or incite conflict, foster unity among other communicative intentions. This implies that language is a fundamental aspect that can be used for nation building or vice-versa since it has also potential to intensify or resolve political tension. Politicians in postMugabe society need to be conscious of how language can be deployed to un/make strangers within the national body politics, destroy or foster national unity and peace-building. It is apparent that language use is

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critical for the creation of peaceful national environment.This speaks to the enduring legacy of Mugabeism as rightly argued by Moyo and Mavengano (2021). A radical stance must be taken that disrupts and departs from toxic politics that fuels intra and inter party conflict. Members of the opposition were previously cast by the Mugabe-led government as enemies of the state, ‘mhandu’ or puppets of the West, such demonization fuels hate (Mavengano & Moyo, 2023. Mnangagwa government has a task to distance itself from such toxic politics that have ruined the nation. These ideas point at the necessities of strategic languaging in sociopolitical realms in order to bring together diverse sections of the Zimbabwean society. Most importantly, the post-Mugabe government needs to avoid exclusionary discourses and hate speech but rather emphasise unity of purpose among the citizenry which will ultimately generate sociopolitical tolerance. Mavengano (2020) commenting on political violence and autocratic tendencies in Zimbabwe during Mugabe era argues that Zimbabweans are not only those who align themselves with the ruling party. The problematic exclusionary logics in the politics of Zimbabwe have produced nothing but suffering of the citizenry. Factionalism, political conflict, scapegoating, displacement, economic and political paralysis, dictatorship, and violence are some of the ugly outcomes of unthoughtful use of language in the realm of politics in Zimbabwe. The current President has a mammoth task to break away from such political culture and strive to transform the political environment in Zimbabwe. Mavengano (2023) contends that the narrative about new dispensation should not be reduced to mere political rhetoric to further advance egocentric political motives by parochial leaders at the expense of the general populace. In other words, the Second Republic is possible only if those in the corridors of power make necessary socio-political reforms and encourage and practice, unity, peaceful political contestations for all political positions.

Reflections It has emerged that the Church and the state relationship has been a entangled and contested issue for centuries. The debate has continued as to how the Church should relate with the state up to date. In the contemporary times, it has been observed that there is no consensus among scholars over the Church-state relation. From the above discussion, it was established that several Christians in Zimbabwe are confused whether

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the Church should participate or not in national politics as it is characterised by mistrust, mudslinging, finger pointing, blame game among others. It is evident that during Mugabe’s era and in the new dispensation the relationship between the Church, state and government was and has remained complex and awkward (Mavengano, 2023). Different scholars were divided confronted with Romans 13:1ff, their interpretations were very complicated because several questions were asked especially if the text is applied to the Zimbabwean context during both Mugabe and Mnangagwa era. This chapter has interrogated Romans 13:1ff in the context of Roman state and the Church particularly whether the context of the text will help understand Zimbabwe’s religio-political dynamics. It is imperative that that there is urgent need to heal the beloved country (Zimbabwe) from political polarisation, mudslinging, political victimisation, character assassination, blame game and mistrust. The healing of Zimbabwe from such ills and religio-political impunities can only be initiated by the concerted effort by all churches with the help of the state. For the economic and political development of Zimbabwe there should peace and mutual working together between the church and state.

Conclusion It can be concluded that the Church and the state relationship has been problematic and entangled since the first century church. This debate has continued up to the contemporary times as to how the Church should relate with the state. Regardless of the responses by state, the church is still relevant and should be within her terrain in promoting accountability, basic human rights and transparency. It was been established that the church in Zimbabwe as in Romans 13:1–7 should understand god’s will and then access the governing authorities in compliance with the will. The role of the church is to interrogate if the governing authorities are harassing its people to force them in having good conduct. The implication here is that if appropriating Romans 13:1–7 to the Zimbabwean context it is also important to determine whether the governing is in tandem with God’s will. The process of proposition may not forbid the church from revolting against the dictatorial and brutal states, Zimbabwe included. Nevertheless, Romans 13:1–7 should not be conceived as legitimating and legalising brutal deeds by the state. It is important to note that Romans 13:1–7 has been abused and wrongly interpreted globally, but this chapter recommends that this chapter should not be interpreted

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out of context. Significantly, the church should be seen as a prophetic body and being the voice of the voiceless, the mother to the motherless and the father to the fatherless. This chapter recommends that in the environment of crisis and problems such as the abuse of human rights, dictatorship, political and religious leaders should position their narratives to endorse accountability, social justice, peace, as a process of healing the nation to foster development.

References Bonhoeffer, D. (1959). The Cost of Discipleship. Macmillan. Bratton, L. B. (1997). Themes on conflict theory: An integrative model for practitioners, in Journal of Teaching in Social Work, 15(1–2), 131–146, Routledge. Carter, T. L. (2004). The irony of Romans 13. Novum Testamentum, 46(3), 209–228. Chamburuka, P. M. (2012). ‘A theological reflection on Romans 13:1–7 in the 21st Century Zimbabwe Politics’, in Bible and politics in Africa studies. University of Bamberg Press. Colin, K. (2012). Paul’s letter to the Romans. Grand Rapids, Wm &B Eerdmans. Culpepper, R. A. (1983). Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design, Fortress Press. Cyril, A. (2019). The role of language in conflict resolution in Nigeria: Implication for translation. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, 27 (4), 306–311. Dahrendorf, R. (1958). Towards a theory of social conflict, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(2), 170–183, Sage. Dube, B. (2021). ‘To hell with Bishops’: Rethinking the Nexus of State. Special Issue of Religion, Law, and Politics, 12(5), 27–48. Dube, B (2020). Covid-19 and #Zimbabwelivesmatter: Rethinking the need for social justice and respect for human rights in Zimbabwe. Gender & Behaviour 18, 326–335. [Google Scholar]. Esler, P. E. (2003). Conflict and identity in Romans: The social setting of Paul’s letter. Fortress Press. Fairclough, N. (1998). Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. Longman. Fairclough, N. (2002) (ed.) Language in New Capitalism. Sage Publications. Gusha, I. S. (2020). Exegesis of Romans 13:1–7 and its appropriation to the new dispensation of the Second Republic of Zimbabwe. HTS Teologiese Studies/ theological Studies, 76(4), a6041. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.V76i4.6041

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Heacock, C. (2016). Biblical literacy: Cultural appropriations of the scripture and the potential impact upon preaching, Academia, viewed 28 March 2020, from https://www.academia.edu/15300660/Biblical_Literacy_Cultural_App ropriations_of_the_Scriptures_and_the_Implications_for_Preaching. Kasemann, E. (1980). Commentary on Romans, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans. Magaisa, A. (2019, December 14). The regime and its enablers. Saturday Big Read. https://www.bidsr.co.uk/single-post/2019/12/14/Big-SaturdayRead-The-regime-and-its-enablers (accessed on 20 September 2021). Marevesa, T. (2019). Social identity complexity and conflict-resolution in Luke and Zimbabwe, (PhD Thesis). University of Pretoria. Mavengano, E. (2020). A comparative stylistic analysis of selected Zimbabwean and South African fiction (2000–2015), PhD Thesis. North West University. Mavengano, E. (2023). The phallocentric paradox and semantics of Eve’s myth in Zimbabwe’s contemporary national politics: An ecofeminist reading of Bulawayo’s novel, Glory. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 79(3), 1–9. a8070. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v79i3.8070 Mavengano, E., Marevesa, T., & Nkamta, N. P. (2022). Religion and language as a panacea to peacebuilding and development in Zimbabwe: A critical discourse analysis approach. Language Discourse and Society, 10(2), 23–34. Mavengano, E., & Moyo, T. (2023). The semiotics of political schisms and prospects of nation-rebuilding: “Varakashi 4ED” and the “Nerrorists” Forever’ in E. Mavengano & S. Chirongoma (Ed.), Electoral politics in Zimbabwe, Volume I: The 2023 election and beyond, (pp. 65–89). Springer Nature: Palgrave Macmillan. Moyo, T., & Mavengano, E. (2021). A Déjàvu of Orwellian ‘proportions’: Rereading animal farm in the context of Zimbabwean politics of change in O. Nyambi, T. Mangena & G. Ncube (Eds.), Cultures of change in contemporary Zimbabwe: Socio-political transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa, (pp. 171–184). Routledge Publishers. Neufeld, M. G. (1994). Submission to governing authorities: A study of romans 13:1–7. Direction, 23(2), 90–97. Opara, C. G. (2016). Language and culture as conflict resolution tools: Rethinking English as Lingua Franca. British Journal of English Linguistics, 4(5), 11–15. Sachikonye, L. (2011). When a state turns on its citizens: Institutionalized violence and political culture. Weaver Press. Saime, L. (2019). A critical analysis of ‘submit to the governing authority’ (RH 13:1) among some African Pentecostal preachers in Zambia, (PhD Thesis). University of Pretoria. Share, F. (2021, September 28). Churches Endorse ED, The Herald. Smith, A. D. (2010). Zimbabwe’s Anglican Church divided over politics (pp. 2–7). Agence France-Presse.

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The Guardian. (2020, August 24). Catholic bishops in Zimbabwe speak out for first time on human rights abuses. The Guardian. https://www.the guardian.com/global-development/2020/aug/24/catholic-bishops-in-zim babwe-speak-out-for-first-time-on-human-rights-abuses-mnangagwa (accessed on 22 September 2021). Weiss, G., & Wodak, R. (2003). Introduction: Theory, Interdisciplinarity and Critical Discourse Analysis. In G. Weiss, & R. Wodak (Eds.), Critical Discourse Analysis: Theory and Interdisciplinarity (pp. 1–34). Palgrave MacMillan. Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC). (2020). The March is not ended: Pastoral letter of the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishop Conference on the Current Situation in Zimbabwe. http://www.kubatana.net/2020/08/14/ the-march-is-not-ended-pastoral-letter-of-the-zimbabwe-catholic-bishops-con ference-on-current-situation-in-zimbabwe/.

CHAPTER 19

A Culture of Deceit and Human Rights Violations in Postcolonial Sub-Saharan African Politics Fabian Maunganidze

Introduction The relationship between the current deplorable state of Africa and its rich socio-cultural heritage is unfathomable. The challenges that Africa is currently facing do not represent either its potential or the aspirations of its people. For a continent that boasts itself as being the oldest inhabited continent, the second largest and the second most populous, it is strange that it is having to be taught democratic systems from the West and is still grappling with basic survival challenges. The politics across the continent is deceitful, brutal and chaotic, poverty is rampant, violence and war have become a culture and selfishness has destroyed the very moral fibre that Africa is supposed to be synonymous with. This is exacerbated by

F. Maunganidze (B) Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] Legal Institute Online, Gweru, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_19

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a muzzled independent media and State media that churn out deceptive propaganda. In this chapter, we look at the concept of democracy and its implementation as a framework for the peaceful conduct of politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, whilst delving into the main trends and challenges in preserving human rights in Africa. It is critical for the continent to eradicate the culture of deceit in Sub-Saharan African politics and sanitise the reeking national systems of governance being kept afloat by equally deceptive state-owned media. Colonialism was an evil whose welcome end brought hope, joy, expectations of freedom and liberty with inclusive development prospects for Africa. Unfortunately, the majority of the nationalist heroes who fought colonialism and brought independence, became the revered leaders who were so overwhelmed by the glamour of power that they began to resist any attempts or even suggestions of replacement (Makumbe, 2010). They became powers unto themselves, adopting the heavy-handed ruling styles of the colonialists that they fought to remove. They became impervious to correction and only recognise literature and media that sing out their praises and deceive the disgruntled populace. In the guise of national unification and the promotion of oneness amongst the diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, one-party systems were actively promoted or declared, even without real consensus (NRC, 1992). The nationalist heroes metamorphosed into grasping kleptocrats, crocodile liberators and quack revolutionaries (Makumbe, 2010). Some may want to consider precolonial African rulers as barbaric, undemocratic and backward egomaniacs whose culture of repression has resurfaced in the modern African leaders. However, studies have shown that some rights that were accorded to African citizens during the precolonial period are actually being denied in many African countries today. Authoritarian regimes have simply changed the colonialists who were repressing the African citizens and replaced them with equally selfish Africans, courtesy of the colonial legacy (NRC, 1992). Despite the gains made in Africa during the “third wave” of democratisation, where there was a significant shift from 1989 when 66% of the states were not free to 66% being free in 2009, a lot has changed again. In 2021, the number of African states rated as free plummeted to 14% with the security forces playing a pivotal role in repressive rule, just as it was during colonialism (Campbell & Quinn, 2021). Sub-Saharan African social and political freedoms have been to a great extent conditioned by worsening armed conflicts which have left many dead, displaced or in

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abject poverty. 15 armed conflicts were reported in Africa in 2020 (Royo et al., 2021) painting a bleak picture of the continent whose peace initiatives seem to be falling on deaf ears. Moreover, the authoritarian rulers have introduced dubious forms of democracy with rigged elections, fake separation of powers and manipulated presidential terms (Campbell & Quinn, 2021). In the end, pseudo democratic leaders have been continuing their autocratic rule, violating human rights with impunity. They have also set up media systems of serious misinformation to beguile the suffering populations.

Politics, Deceit and Unconstitutional Removal of Governments Democracy assumes that all the actors play fairly. However, politics is a highly competitive field in which deception is literary a tool of the trade. It is unfortunate that the majority of citizens pin their hopes of good representation on individuals who though voted for, are deceptive and uncouth. Indeed, the principles of trust and honesty are at the core of peaceful politics and human rights preservation in any system, but politics especially in Africa, takes it all to a whole new level. In fact, politics and its processes alone involve lies, fabrications, backstabbing, false promises and the art of keeping the people waiting for a future that often never materialises. To sustain this charade, African politicians often employ propaganda and violence leading to unthinkable human rights abuses. The deception in African politics has often led to violent clashes all over Africa. Individuals considered friends in politics have instigated the unconstitutional removal of their leaders from power, some in a blood bath and others through tactical coups. The deposition of leaders like Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana, Patrice Lumumba from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Thomas Sankara from Burkina Faso are classical examples of the culture of deceit that has taken root in SubSaharan African politics. What is more disturbing is that most if not all of these unconstitutional changes of governments are perpetrated by individuals who are expected to have been protecting the very people they removed. Moreover, these developments have often culminated in gross human rights abuses on opponents and the general citizenry. In this chapter, we highlight the deception in the removal of 3 African leaders by those very close to them.

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Kwame Nkrumah (President of Ghana 1960–1966) Dr Kwame Nkrumah was the first African-born Prime Minister of Ghana. He was educated in the United States of America and was an active member of the Pan-African movement, the West African Students’ Union and the African Students Association of America. He was hired by J. B. Danquah, a Ghanaian politician to be the general secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947. In 1949, Nkrumah founded the Convention People’s Party (CPP) which sought self-government through “positive action”, a nonviolent strategy. After winning the 1951 Gold Coast elections, Nkrumah became the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast which later became fully independent in 1957 and changed its name to Ghana. In 1960, Ghana became a Republic and Nkrumah became the President (Stanford University, 1990). Although an autocratic leader, Nkrumah fulfilled his election promises. He had pledged to industrialise Ghana within a generation and by the time he was overthrown, Ghana was focusing on import substitution. There were 68 state-owned factories producing almost everything required by the population including glass, steel, textiles, lorry tyres, shoes, canned fruits and many other products (Quist-Adade, 2022). Despite, this progress, there was growing discontent amongst the ranks in the military and the police (Quist-Adade, 2022). The presence of a culture of deceit was unravelled when the people who were supposed to be closest to him, the commanders of the army and the police, plotted a coup d’état against him. Prior to the coup, there was talk of military involvement in Rhodesia, a possibility unwelcome by the Ghanaian military which was already demoralised. Moreover, according to Major A. A. Afrifa, Nkrumah was forcing the most senior officers of the army into retirement which rattled the forces (Gocking, 2005). This resulted in the military and police coup of the 24th of February 1966 that overthrew Nkrumah whilst he was in China on a mission to broker peace and end the USA-Vietnam War (Gocking, 2005). It is ironic that he was overthrown whilst on a mission to broker peace in another region. The people who were supposed to be on his side as the security forces turned against him. In his book “Dark Days in Ghana”, Nkrumah accused the Ghanaian Commissioner of Police, John Willie Kofi Harlley as the main coup plotter. He alleged that Harlley was under investigation for corruption by Geoffrey Bing, the Attorney General at that time. However, Harlley

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claimed that it was actually Nkrumah and his ministers who were corrupt, hence the coup was a legal act. But after the coup, Bing was detained and his secretary was forced to destroy all the corruption investigation records (Bing, 1968; Nkrumah, 1968). Soon after the coup, Ghanaians celebrated, destroying Nkrumah’s statue. There were demonstrations in support of the National Liberation Council (NLC) which led the coup. What is more disheartening is that Nkrumah’s delegation of 74 men deserted him. Even Quaison-Sackey, the Foreign Minister that Nkrumah had sent to the OAU meeting in Addis Ababa also deserted pledging loyalty to the new government. It was only the President of Guinea, Sekou Toure, who not only offered him refuge, but also made him the honorary co-president of Guinea. Nkrumah died of cancer at a clinic in Bucharest, Romania 5 years later (Gocking, 2005). Evidence that emerged years later proved that the coup was plotted with the support of the Western powers including the USA and Canada (Schalk, 2022; Quist-Adade, 2022). Nkrumah’s story is a true reflection of what it means when some people say that they have no permanent friends, but permanent interests. In African politics, your colleagues are only with you when it suits their interests. It is a painful culture of deceit because those who are supposed to be on your side will not hesitate to violate your rights and the rights of others in pursuit of power. Patrice Lumumba (Prime Minister of the Congo 1960–1961) Patrice Hemery Lumumba (1925–1961) was an African nationalist leader and first Prime Minister of the Congo after independence (which was renamed Zaire and is now the DRC). He effectively led the country for only 10 weeks before the politics of betrayal and deception led to his assassination in 1961 (Britannica, 2022a; Urquhart, 2013). Although revered as one of the iconic African nationalist leaders, Lumumba became the Prime Minister on the 24th of June 1960 but in just seven months, he had been overthrown, betrayed and assassinated (Zane, 2022). Lumumba led the Mouvement Nationale Congolais (MNC) a party formed in 1958 which staged a noisy demonstration in 1959 in Stanleyville. For this, Lumumba was detained, but later released (Urquhart, 2013) to attend the hastily convened Brussels Roundtable Conference set for all Congolese parties (Britannica, 2022a; Encyclopaedia, 2019; Urquhart, 2013). The MNC had refused to take part without Lumumba (Britannica, 2022a).

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Although Belgium granted the Congo independence in 1960, they made efforts to prevent Lumumba from participating. These attempts failed and the MNC under Lumumba won the elections in May 1960. A power sharing agreement was made with Lumumba as Prime Minister and Joseph Kasavubu as President (Britannica, 2022a; Encyclopaedia, 2019). The country was plunged into a crisis almost immediately with military mutiny from some units who objected to the leadership of their Belgian commander. There was chaos which led to the deployment of Belgian troops purportedly to protect Belgian nationals, although they ended up supporting the secessionist Katangese administration under Moise Tshombe who took advantage of the disturbances (Britannica, 2022a; Encyclopaedia, 2019; Zane, 2022). In the ensuing revolt, Lumumba appealed in vain for United Nations (UN) assistance, then appealed to the Soviet Union to help him move his troops to quash the Katangese revolt (Britannica, 2022a; Urquhart, 2013). Being right is not always accompanied by wisdom. Lumumba was too naïve and too inexperienced to understand that you need to entrench your political power first before you start creating formidable enemies. On the 5th of September 1960, President Kasavubu claimed to have dismissed Lumumba. However, the move was contested resulting in 2 groups claiming to be the legitimate Congolese government. On the 14th of September 1960, Lumumba’s friend and army leader, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, seized power and dismissed both Lumumba and Kasavubu, although he later reached an agreement with Kasavubu. In October 1960, Lumumba was placed under house arrest, guarded by both UN troops and Mobutu’s forces. In November, the UN General Assembly decided to recognise Kasavubu’s government, so Lumumba escaped from confinement only to be arrested again by Mobutu’s troops on the 2nd of December 1960. After being held at a military camp in Thysville, Lumumba was transferred to another location in Katanga because it was felt that the soldiers there were sympathetic to him. There he was handed over to the secessionists who tortured and executed him and two others (Britannica, 2022a; Zane, 2022). It was claimed that he had tried to escape, but was caught and killed by villagers, but this was disputed by many. Despite this unfortunate turn of events, Lumumba was proclaimed a national hero even by his enemies (Britannica, 2022a). This deceptive media charade was meant to sanitise Lumumba’s diabolic elimination. Indeed, his tragic demise was a result of deceitful politics, greediness and neo-colonial forces which were not

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prepared to coexist with a liberal African leader who was not afraid to further the interests of his people. The deception of Mobutu and even the UN left Lumumba to be butchered like a common criminal by people who did not even enjoy the support of the Congolese majority who had voted for Lumumba. Such deception in politics and wanton violations of human rights are preposterous, to say the least. Thomas Sankara (President of Burkina Faso 1983–1987) Venerated as “African Che”, the former Burkinabe President Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara is considered as a continental icon like Patrice Hemery Lumumba (from DRC) and Amílcar Lopes da Costa Cabral (from Guinea-Bissau) (CNR, 2007). Thomas Sankara was a proponent of Pan-Africanism as well as being an ambitious and charismatic army captain who joined the army in Upper Volta at a tender age of 20. His heroic performance in a border war against Mali earned him public attention in 1974, although he later renounced the same war as unjust and useless (Britannica, 2022b; Roth, 2009). He became very popular as a commander for urging the soldiers at the Commando Training Center to help civilians with their work tasks (Roth, 2009). Sankara was just an extraordinary leader whose thinking was far ahead of those of his time. Sankara’s charisma, military achievements and unique leadership style earned him favour amongst the leaders of successive military governments in the early 1980s. In 1981, the Military Committee for Reform and Military Progress (CMRPN) seized power and appointed Sankara as Secretary of State for Information (Roth, 2009). However, his political and personal integrity did not fit in with the CMRPN leadership (Britannica, 2022b). He resigned from his post in 1982 and became an opponent of the regime. In 1983, the Conseil de Salut du Peuple (CSP or Council for the People’s Safety/Council for the Salvation of the People) led by Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo seized power and appointed him as the Prime Minister, but he was quickly dismissed for causing a popular uprising and was placed under house arrest (Britannica, 2022b; Roth, 2009). Sankara’s frequent dismissals in political office was just testimony of his uniqueness which unnerved the deceitful pseudo rulers who wanted to sanitise their unscrupulous agendas. On the 4th of August 1983, the National Council for the Revolution (CNR) under Sankara’s close friend Blaise Compaore, seized power in a popularly supported coup in what was called the “August Revolution”.

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They named the 34 year-old Sankara as President of the Upper Volta and he immediately embarked on an ambitious socio-economic change programme (Britannica, 2022b; CNR, 2007; Roth, 2009). He renamed the country Burkina Faso (the land of upright people/the republic of honourable people). He also embarked on fighting corruption, averting famine, supporting women’s rights, developing national education and healthcare as well as uplifting rural areas (Britannica, 2022b; Roth, 2009). Sankara also emphasised on environmental protection with 10 million trees being planted in his first year alone (Britannica, 2022b; CNR, 2007). It is rare to find a leader like Sankara whose thoughts go beyond the myopic rush for personal wealth. An interest in the environment alone shows a trans-generational mindset. In his reforms, Sankara reduced civil servants’ salaries including his own and banned first-class air travel and chauffeur-driven Mercedes vehicles. He gave high cabinet posts to women, banned forced marriages and reduced infant mortality through immunisation. Cotton and wheat production increased and there was significant development of the rail network. However, Sankara’s reforms were too ambitious, so he became more of an impatient authoritarian. Opposition started mounting and he repressed it by setting up People’s Revolutionary Tribunals for trying corruption cases. He dismissed all teachers for striking and it impacted negatively on the education sector. He banned free press and any trade unions that opposed him in a way that exposed him to serious reprisals (CNR, 2007). It is unfortunate that even good people with good intentions make the most disastrous mistakes. Sankara went ahead of himself and ended up appearing like a tyrant despite his noble intentions. Deceitful political players often take advantage of such slip-ups as they further their own selfish interests. On the 15th of October 1987, Blaise Compaore instigated the assassination of Thomas Sankara in a coup that brought Sankara’s reforms to a screeching halt (Britannica, 2022b; CNR, 2007; Roth, 2009). Although overambitious, it has been argued that the dedication and personal integrity of Sankara coupled with his innovative ideas set a good standard for progressive African leaders (CNR, 2007). As in many other cases in African politics, Sankara was betrayed by his closest friend. His developmental efforts were destroyed by greedy and selfish individuals who never had the nation at heart. Such a culture of deceit creates an arena for serious human rights abuses as the perpetrators of the injustice entrench their power through violence.

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Human Rights Violations in Africa A look at the political arena reveals that politics is associated with lies. Unfortunately, some of the lies have resulted in genocides, wars and human rights abuses. As Sub-Saharan Africa grapples with the violations of human rights perpetrated by politicians who are deceitful and greedy, a lot still needs to be done to promote well-meaning upright individuals who want to build their nations. Gullible citizens have always swallowed the deception of politicians who have made a career out of lying. The lies and deceit are so gross that it is only in politics where people accept such lies and deception as normal. As the saying goes, “if we lie to the government, it is a crime and if the government lies to us, it is just politics !” (Kiereini, 2021). Human rights are moral principles or norms for standards of human behaviour belonging to every human for the protection of the dignity of all humans from severe political, legal and social abuses. However, deceitful political players create crisis and conflict situations that ignite, instigate and perpetuate human rights violations and abuses. Despite efforts at the sub-regional, regional and international levels, conflicts and human rights violations are still rife in Sub-Saharan Africa. Even the security forces of some states are involved. For example, both Nigerian armed forces and Boko Haram have been accused of war crimes. Accusations of army and police brutality and other human rights violations have also been raised in countries where there are political crises like Sudan, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea. There is a general conditioning of social and political freedoms by armed conflicts in Africa (Royo et al., 2021) and this has made the violations of human rights more like a cultural phenomenon. In 2020, it was reported by the Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace) that at least 15 armed conflicts were generating humanitarian crises and affecting civilians in the most horrific manner in Africa. Despite the democratic developments in countries like the DRC, Angola, Sudan, Gambia and Ethiopia, violent conflicts are still raging across the continent and these are characterised by gross human rights violations (Escolapau, 2021). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) published its annual report in mid-2020 citing an increase in forceful displacements of almost 80 million people due to violence and conflicts in Africa. About 6.4 million of these were displaced in the DRC alone, 3.5 million in South Sudan, 2.9 million in Sudan and 2.9 million in Nigeria

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(UNHCR, 2020). This trend has not been abated, with violent insurgencies flaring up with fresh internal displacements, in the Central Sahel region of Africa, especially in Chad and Burkina Faso (UNHCR, 2022). Human rights bodies have also reported serious human rights violations by some security forces like the Nigerian forces who have been involved in war crimes and extrajudicial executions. At least 10,000 people have died in custody in Nigeria under the hands of the state security forces. The international terrorist group Boko Haram has also committed heinous war crimes and crimes against humanity (Amnesty International, 2020a). In 2022, the situation in Mozambique was not any better, with the security forces being involved in extrajudicial executions and indiscriminate killings, especially in Cabo Delgado, where there has been intense fighting (Amnesty International, 2020b). In Tigray, Ethiopia extreme violence was reported in 2020. The war against terrorism has seen a wanton disregard for human rights by both the armed insurgent groups and the security forces. Generally, the African continent has been plunged into chaos with all security forces including the army and the police being involved in many African countries (Royo et al, 2021). The violence and disregard for human rights is difficult to fathom as the AU struggles to restore order on a continent that seems to have lost its mind. Deceitful, selfish and downright immoral leaders are fuelling up violence as they lead their groups into wars that are causing havoc all over the continent.

Africa’s Response to Human Rights violations The African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), have made significant efforts to promote the observance and protection of human rights by coming up with treaties like the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), but the ratification of these treaties by member states is very slow, with some African states showing reluctance to grant individual access to their citizens to the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights. The International Criminal Court has also kept open the investigations of war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and other human rights abuses in several African countries, but this has had very little impact on the protection of human rights in political conflict zones (ICC, 2022). Therefore, the AU has recognised the need for a continental system of human rights protection,

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especially for violations that are perpetrated by member states. The major challenge, however, is the enforcement. The ACHPR was inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), but it is a more specific instrument motivated by the African conception of the term “right” and is peculiar due to its emphasis on the responsibilities of human beings. Article 30 of the ACHPR created the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Commission) and in 1998, there was adoption of the Protocol to the Charter on the Establishment of an African Court of Human Rights (OHCHR, 2003). During the tenure of the OAU, a number of instruments for the protection of human rights were adopted in Africa including the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), the Protocol establishing the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Court) and the Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action of 1999 (Gawanas, 2017; Ssenyonjo, 2018). The OAU has however been criticised for its failure to uphold the values that are inherent in the norms and standards of human rights relating to groups and individuals. The organisation was considered ineffective due to its unconditional non-interference position in the internal operations of sovereign states (Gawanas, 2017). In the African human rights system, the Commission considers human rights allegations by any State which is a party to the ACHPR and makes non-binding quasi-judicial “recommendations”, but the African Court makes judicial decisions that are legally binding. The two bodies are going to be fused resulting in a legally binding African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Ssenyonjo, 2018). The slow development of tighter systems of prevention of human rights violations in Africa is allowing the wanton violation of human rights in African countries, more so in countries with weak democratic systems or countries experiencing perpetual conflicts. The AU’s Achievements in Responding to Human Rights Violations According to Article 45 of the ACHPR, the Commission, which meets twice a year, is empowered to ensure that human and people’s rights are protected. It is also mandated with the interpretation of the ACHPR when requested to do so by a State party. Articles 55–58 empower the Commission to consider communications or complaints that are lodged

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by individuals and non-governmental organisations on their behalf or on behalf of others. Through these and other activities, the Commission has managed to develop standards on the various provisions of the ACHPR, in addition to encouraging African States to develop effective domestic remedies that are accessible to their citizens. This is important because the African system is subsidiary to national systems and should only be accessed for the protection of human rights where the national systems have failed (Ssenyonjo, 2018). That is why Article 56(5) obliges applicants to exhaust domestic remedies before seeking international assistance.

Conclusions and Recommendations The colonial hangover seems to be refusing to go, coupled with authoritarian regimes led by deceptive selfish demagogues and power hungry mercenaries fuelling violence across the continent. It is true that there have been calls for democracy and some semblance of electoral democracy, but the Western liberal democracy is failing to cure the Sub-Saharan African ills. There needs to be seriousness on the part of African States towards the respect for human rights. The culture of violence and suppression of opposition parties through the abuse of State apparatus is a recipe for disaster as violence tends to beget violence. African leaders should shift from the myopic thinking that without them there is no Africa and embrace diversity of ideas. They should develop a form of patriotism that gives preeminence to the development of their countries and their people and the maintenance of peace instead of just taking over power by any means necessary. Africa is crying for selflessness which will eradicate violence and unconstitutional changes of government which have perpetuated a culture of deceit that has caused gross human rights violations across the continent. A captured media is not helping either. It is, therefore, recommended that: • African leaders and future leaders respect the rights of their people and help to create a culture of trust, honesty and patriotism. • African Sates make human rights protection a priority and embrace an African form of democracy that ensures that human rights are respected through the integration of the good aspects of African culture into modern democratic thought.

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• African states should make the ratification of the basic regional treaties on human rights a priority so that the African human rights system is respected and implemented adequately across the continent. • There should be unwavering compliance with the African human rights system through submission of the required reports and the respect for the rulings and recommendations of the African Court and the Commission. • There should be respect for national laws and regulations preserving human rights and the adequate funding of institutions created for the preservation of human rights both at the local and continental levels.

References Amnesty International. (2020a, December 8). “My heart is in pain”: Older people’s experience of conflict, displacement, and detention in Northeast Nigeria. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/3376/2020/en/ Amnesty International. (2020b, September 9). Mozambique: Torture by security forces in gruesome videos must be investigated. https://www.amnesty.org/en/ latest/press-release/2020/09/mozambique-torture-by-security-forces-in-gru esome-videos-must-be-investigated/ Bing, G. (1968). Reap the Whirlwind: An account of Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana from 1950 to 1966. MacGibbon & Kee. Britannica. (2022a). Patrice Lumumba: Biography, facts and death. https://www. britannica.com/biography/Patrice-Lumumba Britannica. (2022b). Thomas Sankara: Ideology, achievements, books and death. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Sankara Campbell, J., Quinn, N. (2021). What’s happening to democracy in Africa? Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/whats-happeningdemocracy-africa California Newsreel (CNR). (2007, October 12). Thomas Sankara: The upright man. California Newsreel. https://newsreel.org/video/THOMASSANKARA-THE-UPRIGHT-MAN Encyclopaedia. (2019). Lumumba Patrice1925–1961. Encyclopedias almanacs transcripts and maps. https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopediasalmanacs-transcripts-and-maps/lumumba-patrice-1925-1961 Escola de Cultura de Pau (Escolapau). (2021). Alerta 2021. https://escolapau. uab.cat/img/programas/alerta/alerta/21/alerta21.pdf

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Gawanas, B. (2017). The African Union: Concepts and implementation mechanisms relating to human rights. https://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshome pages/namibia/Human_Rights_in_Africa/6_Gawanas.pdf Gocking, R. S. (2005). The history of Ghana. Greenwood Publishing Group. International Criminal Court (ICC). (2022). Situations under investigations. http://www.icc-cpi.int/situations-under-investigations Kiereini, D. (2021). Art of political deception. https://www.businessdailyafrica. com/bd/lifestyle/society/art-of-political-deception-3264694 Makumbe, J. (2010). Political context: Zimbabwe. https://www.jus.uio.no/smr/ english/research/projects/ripoca/workshop-april-2010/context-zimbabwe. pdf National Research Council (NRC). (1992). Democratization in Africa: African views, African voices. The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10. 17226/2041. Nkrumah, K. (1968). Dark Days in Ghana. International Publishers. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2003). Human rights in the administration of justice: A manual on human rights for judges, prosecutors and lawyers. United Nations Publication https://www. ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/training9Titleen.pdf Quist-Adade, C. (2022, February 23). The Coup that destroyed Ghana and Africa’s destiny. The Patriotic Vanguard. https://www.thepatrioticvanguard. com/nkrumah-and-the-coup-that-destroyed-africa-s-destiny-11749 Roth, C. (2009). Thomas Sankara (1949–1987). Blackpast. https://www.blackp ast.org/global-african-history/sankara-thomas-1949-1987/ Royo, J. M., Morcillo, C. M., & Millan, I. N. (2021). The human rights situation in sub-Saharan Africa: Progress, violations and remaining challenges in times of pandemic. IDEES. https://revistaidees.cat/en/the-human-rightssituation-in-sub-saharan-africa-progress-violations-and-remaining-challengesin-times-of-pandemic/ Schalk, O. (2022, April 5). Canada and the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah. Canadian Dimension. https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/can ada-and-the-overthrow-of-kwame-nkrumah Ssenyonjo, M. (2018). Responding to human rights violations in Africa: Assessing the role of the African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1987–2018). International Human Rights Law Review, 7 , 1–42. Stanford University (SU). (1990). Nkrumah, Kwame. Stanford University The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute. https://kinginsti tute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/nkrumah-kwame United Nations High Commission for Refugees. (UNHCR). (2020). Global Trends Forced Displacement 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-rep orts/globaltrends/globaltrends2019/#:~:text=One%20per%20cent%20of% 20the,to%20outpace%20global%20population%20growth.&text=During% 202019%2C%20an%20estimated%2011.0%20million%20people%20were%20n ewly%20displaced.

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UNHCR. (2022, June 16). Forced displacement hit record high in 2021 with too few able to go home. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2022/6/62a9cc b54/forced-displacement-hit-record-high-2021-few-able-home.html Urquhart, B. (2013). Character sketches: Patrice Lumumba. UN News Global Perspective Human Stories. https://news.un.org/en/spotlight/patrice-lum umba-brian-urquhart Zane, D. (2022, June 20). Patrice Lumumba: Why Belgium is returning a Congolese hero’s golden tooth. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-61838781

CHAPTER 20

The Youth and Political Leadership and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa Takavafira Masarira Zhou and Costain Tandi

Introduction The study examines the dynamics of youth involvement in postcolonial political leadership and governance, and the consequent impact it has on transparency, accountability, democracy and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. We bemoan the underrepresentation of youth in decision-making processes and argue that participation of young people in political leadership and governance of policies and programmes that directly affect their lives, will foster peace and sustainable development, and lead to increased citizenship which is a major indicator of democracy. To respond to their needs and guarantee that their basic human rights are recognised and enforced, young people’s active and meaningful participation in

T. M. Zhou (B) Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] C. Tandi Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_20

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their societies and democratic practices and processes is of crucial importance. We further argue that meaningful youth participation in political leadership and governance require that young people in their respective organisations, parliament and administration, have opportunities, capacities and benefits from an enabling environment and relevant evidence based programmes and policies at all levels.

Meta-Theory of Change Wagner and Berger (1985) and Vakkari (1997) postulate a meta-theory of change as a philosophy behind something, or the fundamental set of ideas about how phenomena of interests in a particular field should be thought about and analysed. The concept of meta-theory has a lot of overlap with the term paradigm, which was given its modern understanding in science by Thomas Kuhn (1996). In the terms used in this study, Kuhn considered a paradigm to be a meta-theory, the theory, the methodology and the ethos, all combined, of a discipline or speciality. So paradigm would have a broader meaning than meta-theory of change. At the same time, meta-theory of change is absolutely core to any paradigm, and is defining of paradigm in many ways. This study, therefore uses philosophical streams of meta-theory to explore what needs to happen so that young people, institutions and communities can create equitable, transformative and sustainable change together.

Conceptualising Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa can be defined as a geographical and geopolitical region. Geographically, Sub-Saharan Africa is the area and regions of the continent of Africa that lie south of the Sahara. The area comprises Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa and West Africa. The United Nations (UN) (2023), geopolitically define Sub-Saharan Africa in a manner that includes states that only have part of their territory located in the region, in addition to the African countries and territories that are situated fully in that specified region. Generally, the UN Development Programme (2023) uses the term Sub-Saharan Africa to refer to 46 of Africa’s 55 countries, excluding Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia. The African Union (AU) commonly uses Sub-Saharan Africa to indicate all of Africa, except North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco

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and Tunisia). This chapter shall discuss Sub-Saharan Africa, largely as a geographical region, with Sudan that has parts north and south of the Sahara being the only exception as it is taken as part of the region. Since around 3900 BCE (Claussen et al., 1999), the Saharan and Sub-Saharan regions of Africa have been separated by the extremely harsh climate of the sparsely populated Sahara, forming an effective barrier that is interrupted only by the Nile in Sudan, though navigation on the Nile was blocked by the Sudd and the river’s cataracts. There is also an evident genetic divide between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa that dates back to the last and third part of the Stone Age (Neolithic).

Clarification of Keywords Used in the Study Keywords that need clarification are youth, political leadership and governance. The African Youth Charter (2006) recognises young people as individuals within the age range of 15–35. This study subscribes to this delineation of youth. Sadler (2003) defines leadership as a variable that shapes various developments and governance outcomes. Moi (1986) asserts that leadership is the dynamic and catalytic ability of an individual or a group to liberate, engage and direct the constructive endeavours of a people for the betterment of individuals or whole communities, for their material prosperity and socio-cultural uplift, spiritual peace and mental productivity. We use political leadership in this study to imply decisionmaking positions in political parties (members of lower and upper houses), government (cabinet ministers, presidents, administrators), local government (mayors, councillors), as well as community leaders. Adegbami and Adepoju (2017) posit that governance refers to acquiring political power so as to direct a state’s economic power towards development. Governance is, thus, used in connection with decision-making and utilisation of state resources for development. Consequently, the concept good governance involves public officers managing public resources judiciously and in a good way. Udeh (2017) argues that good governance connotes an array of activities such as improved service delivery, citizens’ participation in decision-making, democracy, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, electoral integrity, freedom of the press, equality before the law and inclusion of the maligned groups in the political process. Good governance, therefore, entails transparency, accountability, probity, equity and upholding the rule of law in the exercise of power.

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Historical Background Before looking at how youth can participate in leadership and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is imperative to take lessons from the role of youth in precolonial period, liberation movement and governance in postcolonial periods. The place of youth in the historical narrative has been limited to their contribution to liberation and nation-building (Boeck & Honwana, 2005; Diouf, 2003; Durham, 2000; Frederiksen & Munive, 2010). This study fills a historical gap left by previous scholars by not only highlighting the youthfulness of young people in accounts of nation-states, but also exploring their significance. Zhou (2020) asserts that while youth were not decision-makers in precolonial states in current Sub-Saharan Africa, they had a sense of ownership of such decisions, and participated in their implementation as defensive and productive units that provided state, human and environmental security. Above all, they were politically important, with a fundamental right to publicly criticise traditional authorities who violated the public trust (Busia, 1968; Chazan, 1983). Youth continue to effectively participate in Kgotla (community council, traditional law court) of Botswana village (and in rural Lesotho and South Africa), where decisions are arrived at by consensus—a situation that has also shaped democracy in Botswana (Mapoise & Matsheka, 2007). It was the youth that resisted the advent of colonialism and provided the backbone of the initial primary resistance, though their efforts were fruitless. African youth were both the intellectual and ground forces in the nationalist and Pan-African movements. The year 1929 witnessed the emergence of youth political consciousness, with elite youth of Gold Coast colony, many of whom had studied law in Britain and had been active members of the West African Students Union, supporting the establishment of a “national assembly of youth to study the problems facing the colony and to think and act together as one people” (Boahen, 1979, p. 138). Many youth who later on led independence movements in various African countries attended the Fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945 in Manchester (Ojok & Acol, 2017). Admittedly, it was younger nationalists such as Nigeria’s Nnamdi Azikiwe, Guinea’s Sékou Touré, Mali’s Modibo Keita and Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah who mobilised and structured youth to resist colonial rule, frequently choosing strategies diverse from those of older nationalists (Awoonor, 1990; Chazan, 1974). Keneth Kaunda who became the first President of independent Zambia

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in 1964, entered the political terrain in 1949 at the age of 25 when he became the founding member of the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress, rising within its ranks to Secretary General in 1953, founding Zambian National Congress in 1958, and becoming the president of United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1960 (Kasuka, 2012). Born in 1946, Bantu Stephen Biko became a South African nationalist at the age of 22 and was at the forefront of a grassroots anti-apartheid campaign known as Black Conscious Movement from the late 1960s to 1977 when he died in detention (Briley, 2011). Nelson Mandela who became the first black President in South Africa (1994–1997) and a great statesman, was involved in anti-colonial and African national politics at the age of 25, joining the African National Congress (ANC) in 1943 and cofounding its Youth League in 1944, and serving 27 years in prison for his quest for democracy and egalitarianism in his country (Mandela, 2013). Having joined ZAPU at the age of 22, Alfred Nikita Mangena became the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) commander at the age of 28 and literally built it from ashes into the most effective fighting force by his death in 1978. Josiah Magama Tongogara joined politics at the age of 25 as a member of UNIP in 1963; he switched to Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and by 1972, he had become the military commander of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) (Martin & Johnson, 1981) and for his role in the liberation war has earned the title of Che Guevara of Zimbabwe. Arguably, youth played a pivotal role in the liberation struggle in Africa, with Ghana’s independence in 1957 catalysing the independence of other states, so that by 1965, 37 African states had won independence, with South Africa being the last country to win independence in 1994. It is important to consider fundamental youth leaders who transformed the mindset of their associates by their actions in reinstating good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa after independence. In the then Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)), the then 34 year old Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba expressed values of democracy and egalitarianism, social justice, liberty, human rights and the fight against colonial legacy in 1960 (Musambachime, 1987). He provided a blue print to challenges faced by Congolese, and now for all Africans. Lumumba stood against plunder, looting, wrecking, siphoning and the development of underdevelopment and underdevelopment of development of DRC, denounced the ill treatment of Congolese by their colonial rulers and

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challenged their belief that all answers should come from Belgium. In Burkina Faso, a young revolutionary leader Thomas Sankara who later on became president at the age of 34, fought for participatory democracy, justice, equity, anti-corruption and the liberation of Africa (Harsch, 2013). Sankara believed in the ability of Burkinabés to develop their country, modernise it and build a strong economy and called for a United Front of Africa.

Current Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa It is a historical fact that 70% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 1.22 billion people are youth (Africa Population, 2023; Foresight Africa, 2019). On average, only 14% of the region’s parliamentarians are younger than 40 years (ibid.). The average age of Sub-Saharan African leaders is 62. The average age of the region’s 10 oldest leaders as of January 2023 was 80.1. Indeed, Sub-Saharan Africa has the youngest population globally, but some of the world’s oldest leaders, with Cameroon’s Paul Biya aged 90. Arguably, young people are underrepresented in leadership and governance (political decision-making) positions and their involvement in political parties is dwindling. The increase in the youth population has an economic value provided that these youth are meaningfully engaged. It is imperative to ensure inclusivity of youth in leadership and governance, and most importantly to tap and harness their demographic dividend for increased productivity and a flourishing labour force. Akinyetun (2021) posits that social inclusion of youth in governance is necessary to circumvent societal costs that emanates from the exclusion of youth, such as lower voter turnout rates, economic decline, violence, extremism, crime and instability. Most interventions by Sub-Saharan African government fail to treat youth as partners or agents of governance, and regard them as mere recipients of the dividends of governance. Conversely, engaging youth as leaders of development and in fostering inclusivity and participatory democracy will by far be the most progressive approach in entrenching egalitarianism and sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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Towards Inclusive and Transformative Youth Participation in Sub-Saharan Africa It is our argument that young people must participate in leadership and governance of nations in Sub-Saharan Africa and play key roles in shaping the present and future political, economic and social systems of respective countries. Inclusive participation in leadership and governance is not only a fundamental political and democratic right but also crucial in building stable, peaceful and thriving societies and developing policies that respond to the specific needs of younger generations. Underneath, we examine inclusive and transformative participation of youth in political leadership and governance in the region. Indeed, the growing number of youth in political leadership and governance, national youth-friendly legal frameworks and constitutions, youth policies and strategies, lowering the legal age of voting and eligibility age to run for leadership and governance, capacity building, research and peace-making, are important mechanics and dynamics that can entrench youth participation in decision-making and ensure that they play critical roles as change agents of democracy and sustainable development.

Growth of the Number of Youth in Leadership There is evidence of a growth in the number of youth in leadership positions in Sub-Saharan Africa in the twenty-first century. A Sierra Leonean youth, Massaquoi (2023), argues that increased youth agitation against administration run predominantly by old people led to increased youth spaces in governance and other political spaces in the period 2007– 2023 in Sierra Leone. Asante (2012) asserts that there was growth in the number of young people in parliament in Ghana after 2012 elections. Gambia and Djibouti are ranked first and second in Sub-Saharan Africa, and fourth and ninth, globally, for countries with single and lower chambers, by Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) with 10.34 and 9.23% of parliamentarians under the age of 30, respectively. Gambia is ranked first in Sub-Saharan Africa, and sixth, globally for parliamentarians under the age of 40 and 45, with 36.21 and 56.90%, respectively (IPU, 2021). For upper chambers, Somalia (3.70%), South Africa (1.89%), Kenya (1.47%) and DRC (0.92) are ranked first, second, third and fourth in Sub-Saharan Africa, and second, seventh, eighth and tenth, globally, respectively for parliamentarians under the age of 30. Burundi (28.21%), Kenya (20.59%),

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Somalia (20.37%) and South Africa (15.09%) are ranked first, second, third and fourth in Sub-Saharan Africa, and second, sixth, seventh and tenth, globally, respectively. For parliamentarian under the age of 45, Burundi (41.03%), Kenya (30.88%) and Somalia (29.63%) are ranked first, second and third in the region, and third, seventh and ninth, globally, respectively (ibid.). While the increase of youth parliamentarians is encouraging, it is still significantly low in light of their population density in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the last four years, three women, by then under the age of 35, were appointed to cabinets in Angola, Botswana and Namibia. It is noteworthy that these young women were not allotted to the traditional ‘soft’ portfolios to which women are often deployed. At the age of 29, Bogolo Kanewendo Joy Kenewendo was appointed Minister of Investment, Trade and Industry in Botswana in 2018 (Lowe Morna et al., 2021). At the age of 35, Vera Daves de Sousa became the Angola’s Finance Minister in 2019. She was mandated to revive Angola’s oil-based economy ravaged by a worst recession since the end of the fratricidal war in 2002. At the age of 23, Emma Theofelus became Namibia’s Information, Communication and Technology Deputy Minister in April 2020 (ibid.). Other states in Sub-Saharan Africa, where some young people were appointed ministers by the age of 35 are Mali and Cote d’Ivoire. Arguably, there has been a consistent upward trend in the number of young women in ministerial posts of cabinet rank in the region. Young women’s presence in ministerial positions is an indispensable element towards accomplishing enduring equality and stability. While the proportion of young people in political representation increased in the twenty-first century, the influence that this has had on the policy is questionable. Asante (2012) argues that the growth in the number of young people in parliament does not necessarily guarantee youth representation in national decision-making; rather it promotes tokenism, exclusivity and co-optation of the youth into decision-making structures of states. On the surface, it is conceivable to dismiss young people’ political representation and governance as merely tokenistic and ineffective at large, as old people (particularly males) remain dominant in terms of numbers at the highest level of decision-making in politics and governance. However, it is more prudent to argue that the current outliers do not constitute the critical mass necessary for change. Above all, current leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa must be willing to cede important tasks to young people’s innovative ideas and influence. The number of young leaders

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must be higher considering the demographics of the region. Olufowobi (2018) argues that all that is needed to improve youth participation in political leadership and governance is an enabling environment. Countries with higher levels of accountability collectively outperform those with lower levels. Youth leaders can advance civil society growth, poverty reduction, economic expansion and innovation throughout the region by strengthening the participation of women and youth, promoting human rights, facilitating access to justice and ensuring inclusion of all communities. There are, therefore, legitimate equity arguments for demanding young people’s participation in decision-making, but at the same time, qualitative arguments for their contributions in decision-making are also important. As such, it is crucial to elevate the voices and representation of young people in leadership and governance.

National Youth-Friendly Legal Frameworks and Constitutions Crucial in fostering youth meaningful participation in decision-making and shaping their lives and future is establishing national youth-friendly legal frameworks in Sub-Saharan Africa. Several countries’ laws in the region stipulate an eligibility age to run for parliament at 21 years (for example, Zambia and Zimbabwe), 25 years (Nigeria) or higher, creating a gap between the legal age of majority and/or voting age, on the one hand, and the age at which an individual can serve in elected office (Government of Nigeria, 2018; Government of Zambia, 2016; Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). It is important, therefore, to consider aligning the minimum voting age and the minimum age of eligibility to run for office where appropriate. Equally important is the introduction of youth and women’s quotas in electoral laws to enhance their effective inclusion in political leadership, governance and decision-making. In the South African Development Community (SADC) region, the ruling ZANUPF and Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) in Zimbabwe, the ANC in South Africa and the FRELIMO in Mozambique, have voluntary quotas for both women and youth (Biti, 2023). Unlike FRELIMO and ANC, ZANU-PF still lacks in its representation of women despite being the ruling party, a situation that worsens in elections, as in 2023, where the party faces strong opposition. Identifying and addressing context-specific legal barriers to youth participation in decision-making to make it easier for youth-led organisations to register as legal entities is also crucial.

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The increased participation of citizens in the drafting of national constitutions in the region has resulted in the incorporation of special provisions to foster political participation of youth. Section 20(1)(b) of the Zimbabwean Constitution (2013) states that the state and all institutions and agencies of government at every level must take reasonable measures, including affirmative action programmes, to ensure that youth “have opportunities to associate and to be represented and participate in political, social, economic and other spheres of life.” Article 27 of the Republic of Rwanda Constitution (2015) provides that every citizen, including youth, has the right to participate in the development process of their country. In addition, the constitution allots a special seat to parliament. Article 75(3) of the Constitution (Government of Rwanda 2015) allocates two Deputies in Rwanda’s parliament elected by the National Youth Council. States in Sub-Saharan Africa must support the youth to assume responsibility, and enhance their participation in social, economic, cultural and political development. Not only do constitutions with special provisions for historically marginalised groups lay a strong foundation to foster broad and comprehensive electoral processes, but as the highest law within legal systems, they give relevant stakeholders a possible instrument to develop targeted interventions to promote the participation of youth. Arguably, with 70% of Sub-Saharan Africa made up of youth, it is essential that their voices are heard in decision-making process at all levels to ensure that government policies and programmes reflect their needs and priorities.

National Youth Policies and Strategies The growing twenty-first-century emphasis on youth participation by global actors such as the UN and other development organisations has given impetus to several events, decrees and calls for actions to augment the quality of youth participation in decision-making processes. Consequent to this agenda and the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), national governments in Sub-Saharan Africa have written or updated their youth policies and strategies. Kenya’s Vision 2030 envisages responsible, globally competitive and prosperous youth. Among the specific interventions under the vision are “establishment of youth centres, apprenticeship, mentorship, development of creative industry hubs and youth enterprises financing; and strengthening internships and industrial attachments to enhance employability across public and private

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sectors” (Government of Kenya, 2019). South Africa’s national youth policy is anchored on the premise that youth have the capacity to reduce poverty and inequality, and foster sustainable development in the country (Government of South Africa, 2020). National policies provide an operational framework for multiple actors to develop concrete actions to facilitate meaningful participation of youth in decision-making processes. As much as many countries have developed national strategies and action plans, there are often challenges surrounding their implementation, inclusivity and national character, as often there is conflation of state and ruling party in Sub-Saharan Africa. Frequently, there is a lack of resources allocated to their implementation, and a lack of horizontal accountability and lack of political incentives. Predatory regimes in the region have also reduced national policies to parochial partisan interests, tailor-made to entrench dictatorial regimes and sponsoring rogue youth militia to stifle democracy (Zhou, 2022). While having a national policy does not on its own guarantee effective and inclusive youth participation, it is a starting point. Inclusive or non-partisan national youth policies can mandate government actions, set targets and provide impetus for organisations to increase youth participation in a range of decision-making processes and strategies. These processes include youth parliaments, youth participation in consultative forums, dialogues, peace-making processes and policy-making bodies.

Lowering the Legal Age of Voting One of the most pressing issues in Sub-Saharan Africa’s politics is to realign the region’s voting systems with its age structure. One way to ensure that this becomes a reality, as put forward by Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe Secretary for Young Teachers, Lovejoy Sibanda (2023), “is to lower the voting age to 16 so as to expand opportunities for more young people to help shape their own future.” In most countries in the region, the minimum voting age is 18 years. Cameroon now remains as the only exception with a minimum voting age of 20, despite calls to reduce the voting age to 17 or 16 in the twenty-first century. Cote d’Ivore and Gabon reduced the voting age from 21 to 18 in 2000 and 2018, respectively. Ethiopia has actually reduced the voting age to 16, while both Sudan and South Sudan have reduced voting age to 17 (WorldAtlas, 2017). The advocates for a lower voting age argue that 16year-olds participate in political debates on social media and events, were

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the backbone of liberation struggles in Africa and join the armed forces in some countries. A Liberian youth, Rudolf Brown (2023), asserts that without participation in decision-making, the chronically poor youth will end taking up the gun as rational livelihood strategy or a guarantee to a meal. Arguably, with the youngest and fastest growing population in the world, Sub-Saharan Africa should move to convert the ‘youth bulge’ from a threat into development opportunity.

Lowering Eligibility Age to Run for Leadership and Governance States in Sub-Saharan Africa have committed to constitutions and charters that recognise and support youth participation in electoral cycles, as well as action plans that develop knowledge and skills in young people to enable them to be active citizens and leaders. Yet sound as this may appear, youth representation remains persistently low in leadership, party membership and legislatures. As already alluded to, 70% of the region’s population are youth, yet they represent only 14% of parliamentarian across the region. Fundamentally, the gap between the minimum legal voting age and the ominously higher minimum age at which young people can run as political candidates militates against youth’s involvement in decision-making. As much as the minimum legal voting age is compatible across the region, the age at which citizens can stand as candidates fluctuates extensively. In most countries, citizens must wait several years after gaining the right to vote before being eligible to run for parliamentary office—regularly until age 21 (in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Ghana, etc.) or 23 (Cameroon etc.), or 25 (Nigeria) (IPU, 2018). In Zambia, people are not eligible to be councillors until the age of 19, mayor until the age of 21, president until the age of 35 (Sinkala, 2023). The upper house in Cameroon and Zimbabwe is a preserve of people above 40 years, and so likewise are presidents in Ghana and Zimbabwe. In several countries such as the Central Africa Republic, Cameroon, Madagascar, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia, just to mention a few, presidential age of contest is 35. Arguably, the age gaps between voters and ‘sick old and corrupt’ political candidates, has fostered the election of leaders with only limited accountability towards the youth electorate. Advocates of lowering the age of eligibility for candidacy such as Malema (2023), Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (2023) and Chamisa (2023), argue that it can foster greater diversity and additional choice for voters; equity

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in representation rights for youth who are anticipated to accept adult tasks at legal voting age; fresh ideas and viewpoints; and greater youth participation in decision-making. Critics of a lower candidacy age, particularly from the liberation parties in Southern Africa, assert that maturity and experience are lacking in younger candidates, may become ‘captives’ of a political party and are ill-equipped to endure the burdens of the political environment. Nevertheless, some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have identified age gaps as barricades to greater youth participation and are reflecting on reducing age requirements to run for office. Kenya, for example, has lowered the minimum age for becoming both parliamentary and presidential candidates to the legal voting age of 18 (Government of Kenya, 2010). Sections 65, 106 and 131 of the Nigeria’s Constitution (2018) lowered the age of eligibility for parliamentary representatives from 30 to 25 years, and for the presidency from 40 to 35. The legislation was a result of the youth-led advocacy campaign, #NotTooYoungToRun, an enterprise launched in Nigeria by Yiaga, and now a global campaign for democratic governance, respect for human rights and youth representation in decision-making. Yiaga Africa also propelled a new crusade, ‘Ready to Run,’ in 2018 to identify and support young political entrants.

Capacity Building and Effective Participation of Youth Capacity development must be given utmost consideration in order to enhance meaningful participation of young people in decision-making. The UNDP approach to capacity development “reflects the viewpoint that capacity resides within individuals, as well as at the level of organizations and within the enabling environment” (UNDP, 2008, p. 5). There is a need for greater political empowerment of youth through mobilisation for participation in politics. Such participation may include initiating, facilitating and supporting autonomous youth councils at local and national levels. Equally important is promoting youth meetings/conferences and networking at local, national, regional, continentally and global levels. Above all, creating, training and supporting parliamentary youth committees and caucuses of young members of parliament is crucial for greater inclusion of young people in political decision-making and governance. Massaquoi (2023) points out that the National Youth Service in Sierra Leone has engaged young people in the productive sector and trained them in technical, administrative and other skills through volunteerism

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and placement in different institutions in the period 2007–2023. Most importantly, it has created a platform for young people to engage in governance at different levels. The government of Kenya is committed to empower the youth financially through programmes such as Kenya Youth Employment Opportunity Programmes, Youth Enterprise Development Fund, Ajira Digital Youth Empowerment Programme and Presidential Digital Talent Development Youth Programme (Government of Kenya, 2019). Most importantly, article 26.1 of the Political Parties Act (2011) restrict at least 30% of direct public funding provided for use in “promoting the representation in parliament and in the county assemblies of women, persons with disabilities, youth, ethnic and other minorities and marginalized communities.” Such empowerment can foster improved participation of young people in political leadership and governance in the region. Social empowerment must involve civics education to enhance young people’s role as agents of change in their respective countries. Zhou (2017, 2018) and Zhou and Machenjera (2017) argue that educational empowerment must involve investment in human capital (skills), science and information and communication technologies (ICT). There is a greater need for blending life experience and theory in the Sub-Saharan Africa system of education, with clear-cut benchmarks towards Agendas 2030 and 2063 in which a combination of highly skilled youth’s expertise and the natural resources of Sub-Saharan Africa would be tapped and harnessed for sustainable development of the region. Through this way, we can fulfil participation of youth in decision-making processes as agents of change and responsibility, propellers of our economies, anchors of democracy and conveyor-belts of political, economic and social justice, and alleviation of poverty. Conversely, states in Sub-Saharan Africa must, inter-alia, engage young people through empowerment, public consultations, participatory budgeting programmes, innovative deliberate processes, affiliating advisory youth councils to government or specific ministries, or through youth councils and caucuses at national and sub-national levels. Many youth are organising fluid social movements across borders and around issues of common concern. As such political leaders in SubSaharan Africa should recognise and adapt to this shift in order to better support powerful, organic, youth-led efforts for social change and good governance (Akinyetun, 2021). Zohdy (2017) argues that youth participation should involve working with them in governance, as well as the

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people around them to bridge the gap of eroding trust. Giving the youth a voice in governance and decision-making will help them fulfil their individual potential, avoid negative behaviours, contribute to the well-being of the society and create institutional capacity. Akinyetun (2021) further posits that the most effective participation efforts tend to be those that design participation as an end in itself. A broader base of both citizens and government officials are more likely to participate and see value in such efforts if they are targeted towards solving specific, concrete and tangible lived problems. Arguably, youth and their adult counterparts are generally more likely to participate and see value in their participation if it is structured around meaningful opportunities to change material conditions, decisions/policies or other concrete outcomes, than general participation efforts not linked directly to solving actual challenges in people’s lives. Youth empowerment must, therefore, focus on enhancing skills that would bolster their comprehensive political, economic and social inclusion. It follows from the foregoing that youth should be given a voice in national and community programmes and projects. As put forward by Massaquoi (2023), young people “must be seen as an asset to the nation and not a liability, and their voices must be heard in parliament and government.” As such, they should be transformed from mere participants into partners, and from beneficiaries of programmes into resources for programmes. Therefore, it is essential for national governments to create enabling environment to institutionalise youth participation at all levels. Regional bodies the SADC; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Community of SahelSaharan States (CENSAD); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the East African Community (EAC); and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as well as the African Union (AU) should develop strategies to integrate youth in decisionmaking. The global agencies must continue to support capacity building for youth participation in decision-making. Above all, youth organisations in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa must become more assertive, see themselves as interest groups and not as adversaries and complement and not compete with each other to be viable.

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Youth as Agents of Democracy and Research-Based Decision-Making When the participation of young people in decision-making is tapped and harnessed properly, it enhances democratic processes and practices. Youth participation in developmental processes, including politics and governance, is a fundamental democratic right. It is also essential to note that youth political participation transcends voting but also involves several politically related activities undertaken by youth both online and offline. As propounded by Akinyetun (2021, p. 6), “political participation is about having the wherewithal and opportunity needed to influence decision making as well as engaging in actions and activities so as to contribute to building a better society.” As reflected above, there is sufficient evidence from Africa to show that young people have asserted their role, influence and importance in governance by championing political causes and making giant strides. It is the conviction of Rhize (2016) that young people are leaving their footprints in the sands of time by revolutionising the status quo and provoking governance structures that seek to deepen democratic precepts. Indeed, this assertion is an insight into the potentials that youth in Sub-Saharan hold, especially for governance, democratic consolidation and inclusion. It has become the norm in global best practice that policy and decisionmaking must be based on research (data, facts and evidence) (Zhou, 2019). In promoting democracy and social inclusion, youth are useful in acting as active researchers who could help identify their community needs while also building their capacities with guidance from adult mentors and leaders, and nurturing new youth leaders by promoting supportive networks of parents, teachers and others that can help to build youth capacity and agency to lead. Luhrmann (2013, p. 1) notes that it was Kofi Annan who remarked that “no one is born a good citizen; no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that continue to evolve over a lifetime. Young people must be included from birth. A society that cuts itself from its youth severs its lifeline; it is condemned to bleed to death.” Put succinctly, good citizenship and participatory democracy are not accidental attributes, neither are acquired as givens. Rather, they are consciously developed over time. Evidently, the conception that youth are not ready for leadership given their inexperience, ignorance, pride and immaturity (Offiong, 2018) is no longer tenable and, in the least, inconsequential.

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Youth as Peacemakers It is noteworthy that youth can be peacemakers and thus play dynamic roles as agents of positive and constructive change. Though acknowledging the protuberant threat posed by the rise of radicalisation among youth, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250, on youth, peace and security, formally identifies the constructive and significant contribution of young people in the maintenance of national, regional, continental and global peace and security, accentuating that youth must be viewed as key partners, rather than as victims or perpetrators (UNSCR 2250, 2015). Although youth have been victims of poverty and violence in Africa, they have been and are the primary perpetrators of armed violence and conflict in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Angola, Burkina Faso and Cote d’lvore, Sudan, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Guinea, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Somalia, Nigeria, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa (Zhou, 2017, 2018). In contexts where the disenfranchisement of young people from political processes leads to widespread feelings of injustice, frustration and mistrust, youth can be involved in electoral-related violence, which might occur at different stages of the electoral cycle, mostly during voter registration, campaigning, voting and tabulation of results. There is growing evidence of many young people throughout Sub-Saharan Africa undertaking peacebuilding and violence prevention activities, initiatives and projects to appease tensions, rebuild trust and foster social cohesion. After protracted period of civil war in Sierra Leone, the post-2007 period has seen young people participating in governance actively by taking up political appointments and helping in different ways to consolidate peace and democracy (Massaquoi, 2023). Young people in Kenya, for example, used technology to track violence throughout their country in 2010 and increased political participation in their broader communities in the reporting process (Signé, 2019). Multi-party dialogues are regularly held in Sub-Saharan Africa to embolden cooperation and build trust between the different political actors in the quest for peaceful, free, fair and credible elections. Youth from different political parties came together in May 2018 for a national youth collaborative dialogue on preventing youth electoral violence and building sustainable peace in Zimbabwe, facilitated by the Centre for Conflict Management and Transformation and VIVA in Harare (Chinoputsa, 2023; Matutu, 2023). In Somalia, Elman Peace and Human Rights

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Centre in Mogadishu presents an alternative to militant groups by giving young people vocational skills, education, investment to start social enterprises and leadership training aimed at compelling their peers who are still in armed groups to defect (Extremely Together, 2016). Without durable peace, there will be no participatory democracy and development. Without sustainable development, there will be no peace, no effective participation of youth in decision-making and therefore no enshrined democracy and improvement of the livelihoods of people in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a society where positive peace prevails, youth help to bring about the positive economic, political and social factors that lead to sustainable development. By being peacemakers, youth free up resources, both financial and human, that would otherwise be diverted to controlling or creating violence, and are therefore agents of constructive change and sustainable development.

Conclusion All in all, youth in Sub-Saharan Africa have been disarticulated, marginalised and disengaged from decision-making, and need to be more fully engaged to address the region’s inherent political, economic and social developmental challenges. Young people’s active participation in political leadership and governance can enhance their skills and bring democratic values of life and foster sustainable development in SubSaharan Africa in the twenty-first century. As active citizens, youth can contribute meaningfully to governance and development by bringing about entrepreneurship, innovation and advancement, and improving transparency, accountability and equity, that are critical in providing impetus to combat multi-dimensional poverty, globally. It is imperative, therefore, to institutionalise opportunities for youth involvement at all levels—families, communities, national, regional and continental. The elevation of the voices and representation of young people in decisionmaking is a pre-requisite for durable peace, justice, equity and sustainable development. Arguably, governments in Sub-Saharan Africa must invest more in capital human development of youth and entrench their involvement in decision-making in order to foster democracy and sustainable development of the region, let alone combat poverty, inequality, deprivation and marginalisation. By and large, the young generation should not only be prepared for the future; they also have a role to play today in making decisions that affect the future of Sub-Saharan Africa.

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CHAPTER 21

‘Too Good to be True’: Unfulfilled Campaign Promises, Pledges, and Political Deceit in Zimbabwe Gift Mwonzora

Introduction This chapter, focusing on Zimbabwe, interrogates the imbricated role of political rhetoric insofar as how politicians motivate, encourage, and dupe the electorate through lofty, fake, and empty promises. Such an analysis provides a vantage point to examine how political deceit affects not only electoral accountability but democratic representation by electing politicians who will not deliver on their promises and pledges (Duval & Pétry, 2019; Mansergh & Thomson, 2007; Naurin & Thomson, 2020; Pétry & Collette, 2009). I study Zimbabwe, a fitting and most appropriate case study considering how political candidates lie, misrepresent

G. Mwonzora (B) University of Erfurt, Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, Nordhäuser, Str. 63, Erfurt, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8_21

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facts, overpromise, and fail to deliver. I argue that this calibre of politicians shortchanges voters who would have voted them into office based on their promises and pledges whilst campaigning. Even though the issue of promise making and promise keeping (Corazzini et al., 2014; Pétry & Collette, 2009; Thomson & Brandenburg, 2019) is quite relevant in examining what scholars term the ‘mandate theory’ (Dahl, 1975; Schedler, 1998) of elections, there seems to be no solution as to how politicians can be made to fulfil their policies and stick to their word. This is apart from punishing them at the next polls. This trend is more pronounced in the Zimbabwean and African contexts and in other continents where voters are promised all the nice, beautiful, and good things during election periods only to enter into a political slumber to wake up in the next election with the depressing reality of unfulfilled and empty promises. Before proceeding further with the discussion, a cautionary note suffices. In examining the Zimbabwean case, I focus much of my analysis on political rhetoric, political deception, and misrepresentation dwelling on candidates from the ruling and opposition parties—Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change- Tsvangirai (MDC-T), and more recently Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) which has only participated in the 2022 by-elections and in the 2023 harmonised elections. Though the temptation will be to cover all politicians, including the opposition, with the same evaluative brush strokes, analytical and objective concerns arise. For instance, whilst interpreting and examining the false/empty promises made on the campaign trail, the opposition will charge that it is being judged harshly. Opposition defence is that they were not elected to power. Hence, there was no way they could have effectively delivered on their promises and pledges. All the same, I aver that there is no justification to defend the elected opposition candidates’ (legislators, senators, and councillors) failure to fulfil their promises and pledges within their respective constituencies. It is thus necessary to look at the elected from both the ruling and opposition—those who were accorded the mandate to govern. Situating the debate within a wider context, it has generally been acknowledged that throughout history, politicians have astounded and swayed voters not only with their wits, charisma, depth, and content of their policies, programmes, or manifestoes but also with ‘great’ and populist speeches. To this end, scholars have developed a deep interest in examining the role of political rhetoric and eloquence as forms of

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political campaign. That a candidate’s oratory capabilities can win votes is not disputed even today (Crines, 2013; Grbeša, 2004; Simon, 2002; Thawnghmung, 2016). This is barring the use of other electoral incentives, for example, patronage and violence in contexts where these are effective tools of mobilisation (Alexander & McGregor, 2013; Vokes & Wilkins, 2016). In response, the past decades have witnessed much scholarly interest in examining the role and effect of political communication in election campaigning (Baek, 2009; Ndlela & Mano, 2020; Riaz, 2010). Relatedly, it is incontrovertible that through populist appeals, naked lies, misrepresentation, false promises, pledges, and demagoguery, politicians win the hearts and minds of the electorate not only in the developing but in the developed worlds (Callander & Wilkie, 2007). This is evident in political campaigns laced with false and lofty promises. Viewed from this perspective, political campaigns have ceased being platforms where a festival of ideas festers but have become spaces where lies gain a foothold. Politicians in Africa and elsewhere employ political deceit to woo, hoodwink, and gain electoral support. In short, politicians are quick to make bold yet false promises only to get into power. Once elected, they do not care as they only appear the next time elections are due. The enduring question, however, is why the electorate often falls for the same lies and misrepresentations. The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I present the methodological outline of the study. Following this, I present the theoretical framing before mapping the literature discussion. I then present the empirical discussion, which is followed by concluding remarks.

Methodological Outline The chapter relies on qualitative research methodologies ranging from a critical review of primary and secondary data sources. It relies on the content and interpretive analysis of newspaper articles, grey material produced by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). The study also dwells on critical discourse analysis (CDA) of spoken and written text. This includes analysing party manifestos, party literature, policy documents, political campaign speeches, rally speech, press statements, and media interviews of political candidates during elections. These data sources are complemented by the author’s observations of the style of political campaigns. Next, I present a theoretical discussion underpinning the study.

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Campaign Promise and Mandate Theory of Elections The chapter utilises the campaign and mandate theory of elections to explain politicians’ heightened level of political deceit in modern day societies. Scholars posit that political candidates are held to the theory of campaign promises which espouses that parties must adhere to and live to the principles of decency (Schedler, 1998). This resonates with the moral reasoning of doing what is socially acceptable and generally viewed as decent in the eyes of the voters. This often entails avoiding the temptation to: avoid making promises which one knowingly cannot keep (realism criterion). Second, avoid making promises which one does intend to keep (sincerity criterion). Third, avoid making contradictory promises (consistency criterion). The only exceptions to these moral rules are the occurrence of unforeseen events (natural disaster, economic crisis, war, unanticipated shifts public opinion) which allow a government to renege its moral obligation to keep its election promises. (Pétry & Collette, 2009, p. 3)

Scholars further assert that we must deploy the mandate theory of elections (Dahl, 1975) to understand political candidates’ pledges, promises, and policies. As they posit: According to the theory, political parties make specific pledges in their election platforms, and they try to fulfil as many pledges as possible once elected in power. (Pétry & Collette, 2009, p. 3)

It is contended in much of the democracy representation literature that voters prefer parties to fulfil the promises of their election campaigns. In this regard, the electorate places a higher premium on the party to deliver through promise keeping. This is because voters make decisions based on promises made by politicians (Werner, 2019, p. 1). In this regard, scholars speak of the tendency to overpromise on the campaign trail and, in the process, violate the norm of realism and sincerity (Schedler, 1998, p. 2). Political scientists further posit that ‘the fulfilment of election pledges is at the heart of democratic accountability. If parties are responsive to societal demands, there should be a substantial level of congruence between their policies in government and the promises found in their election

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programs’ (Pétry et al., 2020, p. 1). Davis and Ferrantino (1996) have even developed a positive theory of political rhetoric which predicts that political candidates will lie because they are unable to transfer the value of their reputations as honest politicians. I now turn to a literature discussion in sections to follow.

Political Rhetoric, Campaigning, and Election Pledges Political communication scholars speak of how candidates utilise deceptive promises to woo voters. This is rife during election ‘campaign periods since ‘campaign promises are illocutionary’ speech acts which commit the speaker to do certain things. But at the same time, they also represent ‘perlocutionary’ acts which induce the addressee to do certain things’ (Schedler, 1998, p. 200). In the same vein, scholars have also cautioned against candidates who win votes on populist appeals often laced with over promising. As argued, overpromising makes candidates ‘look naïve, incompetent, irresponsible, or at worst of all words populist’ (Schedler, 1998, p. 199). This, however, is not to say politicians have desisted from spewing populist rhetoric. Scholars have also debated whether voters pay attention to campaign issues or are blinded by political loyalties and personal images (Schedler, 1998, p. 192). In the same literature, emphasis is also paid to voters’ expectations of candidates regarding how the latter is expected to fulfil promises. Against this reasoning, it is not a matter of if and whether— but, how and when candidates fulfill electoral promises and pledges. This resonates with what scholars call the ‘democratic commandment: Thou Shalt honour Thy Electoral Promises’ (Schedler, 1998, p. 194). Although scholars have established that lying destroys the bond between citizens and politicians to the extent beyond redemption, especially when policy promises are not honoured (Patterson, 1993, p. 111) this has not dissuaded politicians from lying during election campaigns. This trend is pervasive across the globe. Whilst the electorate feels hard played and disillusioned by politicians’ lies, the disgruntlement level seems muted in the Zimbabwean context. However, this is not to say voters are not aggrieved or disillusioned. What is peculiar amongst Zimbabwean voters is that they have normalised the trend of politicians failing to fulfill election pledges and promises. To the extent that politicians have become

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comfortable and guaranteed that they will always gain votes even in the enduring wake of fake and unfulfilled campaign promises. The issue of election promises, pledges, and pledge fulfilment has elicited great analytical attention in the campaign communication literature (see, Hillygus & Shields, 2008; Kaplan et al., 2006). This heightened interest underscores the relevance of such to electoral accountability and democratic representation, especially in modern day societies. Within this strand of literature, scholars also underscore the use of ambiguity in political communication, specifically in campaign speeches (Shepsle, 1972). It is crucial to underscore that this is not without intention. Politicians resort to vagueness for a reason. One is that they abhor being held to their election promises, especially when seeking a new mandate (Dahl, 1975). On such grounds, they resort to vague expressions, including overpromising whilst ‘selling’ their candidature. In this regard, political candidates refrain from making clear policies and issue positions, fearing the backlash of failing to deliver (Tavits, 2007). For some scholars: the clarity of a campaign message hinges on whether a candidate has “nothing to hide” (i.e., the candidate’s ideological placement is congruent with the district’s), “nowhere to run” (i.e., the issue is important to the public and cannot be avoided), or “nothing to lose” (i.e., the candidate has little chance of winning and is willing to take risks) (Milita et al., 2014, p. 428).

Scholars argue that elections must have consequences (Werner, 2019). In expanding this argument, it is posited that: after election day government officials do whatever they want, regardless of any prior campaign commitments, they ridicule the very notion of democracy as well. If electoral results do not produce any policy consequences, elections become mere devices to legitimate arbitrariness and contingency, being mechanisms to replace a random one despotic ruler with another. (Schedler, 1998, p. 195)

The above outlined behaviour goes against the principle of promise keeping (Werner, 2019) which is one of the crucial aspects of democratic representation. It is critical to note that as of today, there exist variegated articulations of the appeal of campaign rallies to citizens in different geographic and historical contexts (Szwarcberg, 2012).

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Consistent with this argument, the world over, there is a utility of political campaigning and voter turnout in influencing electoral outcomes (Enos & Fowler, 2018; Kumar, 2022; Szwarcberg, 2012). In many ways, the extant corpora of literature touches on the aspects that make voters turn out/ participate in election rallies (Szwarcberg, 2014). One such study is research that focuses on Tanzania, a country famed for being one of the most rally-intensive countries in Africa (Paget, 2019). Such strands of scholarship look at issues that entice citizens to attend election rallies where lofty promises are made. Scholars writing in a non-African context speak of ‘aesthetic, moral or ritualistic implications of voting’ (Schedler, 1998, p. 195). This also involves the entire election campaigning, where voters are enticed by rally speech and festivities that accompany rally attendance as expressed through song and dance. Some may turn out to get party paraphernalia, some to enjoy the hive of activities, music, dance, and other festivities, and some to get freebies associated with campaign rallies (Mwonzora, 2018). From this perspective, much of the campaign literature has not paid systematic attention to how voters are duped and hoodwinked by political elites and local level politicians, including those vying for councillor positions through political rhetoric (Milita et al., 2014). The scholarly literature evaluating the fulfilment of election pledges has also been evident in countries like Bulgaria (Kostadinova, 2013). Whilst these studies exist, what primarily exist in countries like Zimbabwe are journalistic and grey material. To the extent that we know relatively little about political deceit by politicians. It is in such contexts that it is essential to enquire on whether politicians deliver on what they promise and if not, do they care about lying, overpromising, and underdelivering. Scholars have also noted that voters analyse whom to vote for based on how the candidates address issues (on issue salience see Druckman & Holmes, 2004; Hayes, 2008). Whilst this is a truism, in some contexts, voters are cajoled by politicians’ rhetoric, wits, charisma, and demagoguery (Ghazal-Aswad, 2019; Schroedel et al., 2013; Schweitzer, 1974). In such contexts, voters are then deceived and swayed by the words of promise (intention). Although this is becoming a common trend, less is known regarding how and whether voters evaluate and judge candidates owing to their failure in keeping campaign pledges and promises (Ferejohn, 1986; Naurin & Thompson, 2020). This lacuna is particularly evident in the Zimbabwean context where party labels and campaign

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promises are much of deciding factors than the weight of policy proposals and issue articulations. In holding politicians to account, citizens in several countries, specifically the developing world, are reported to have expressed greater agency. This often yields various accountability measures to check whether politicians have kept or broken election promises (Schedler, 1998; Thomson & Brandenburg, 2019). Whilst this growing research pays specific attention to candidates, it also widens its analytic and empirical gaze to look at political party organisations more broadly, elucidating whether they stick to, veer, or break these promises (Pétry & Collette, 2009). In explaining the value of research on election pledges, scholars underscore the utility of the salience of election promises in election campaigns (Born et al., 2018). The political communication literature is also attentive to the challenges of keeping and fulfilling election pledges (Naurin et al., 2019). Others even utilise non-testable pledges to examine how and whether politicians fulfill electoral promises (Moury, 2011). In this strand of scholarship, some analysts hold that there are specific cues that voters look for in parties (read policy promises) (Werner, 2019). Consistent with this argument, scholars link the importance of promise keeping and pledge fulfilment (Markwat, 2023) in aiding the entrenchment of representative democracy. This is particularly relevant, especially in an era where betrayal and disillusionment of voters is the norm rather than the exception in various polities worldwide. I now turn the discussion to the role and impact of political deceit and misrepresentation in influencing voter decision-making.

Voting for Deceitful Campaign Narratives and Unfulfilled Election Promises This section more fully explains voter behaviour amid fake and unfulfilled election pledges and promises utilising the Zimbabwean case study. Like any other country, Zimbabwe is characterised by politicians who lie, overpromise, and underdeliver to the electorate. This relates to the empirical analysis focusing on politicians from the ruling and opposition who make election promises ad infinitum each time they are on the campaign trail (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018). The unfortunate reality, however, is that most of the pledges and promises made during campaigning remain unfulfilled exposing the semantic hollowness of the political narratives in Zimbabwe. What

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remains surprising, however, in the Zimbabwean context is that even in such a political climate rife with false and empty promises, voters are still hoodwinked into voting for the same candidates (Chibuwe & Munoriyarwa, 2023). This then raises the question of whether voters in much of Zimbabwe are (un)sophisticated, naïve, and gullible. Similarly, such voter behaviour raises critical questions about what voters look for in candidates (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018). It does appear that most of the Zimbabwean voters are enchanted, thrilled, and seduced by the charisma, political rhetoric, demagoguery, and fake promises than the substance of policies, manifestoes, and ideological articulations. It is, thus, unsurprising that voter decision-making is anchored on deceit and lofty promises made by politicians. This, however, is not a peculiarity in Zimbabwe as it is a prevalent trend in much of Africa, including Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and Nigeria. To voters who vote for party labels (party identification) and on partisan cues instead of policy and issue voting, it is thus difficult to see through the lies and deceit of politicians (Callander & Wilkie, 2007). Bucking this trend, we have seen how voters make their choices based on policy substance and issue salience (programmatic voting) in developed societies. In such contexts, there is less infatuation with political rhetoric and personalities. To mask their failures, when Zimbabwean politicians are held against their promises, they may frame and dismiss these pledges as part of political banter whilst on the campaign trail. Such ingenuity, duplicity, and lying breed a culture of trust deficit between citizens and leaders. In the context of Africa, one will be correct to state that the use of deceit as pronounced through unfulfilled election campaign pledges, declaration of intent, and broken promises has yielded in what Dahl succinctly terms as ‘the long and almost unbroken succession of mediocrities’ (Dahl, 1990, p. 358). This has been particularly evident in the election of failed politicians. Often, these politicians do the opposite of what they pledge and promise during election campaigns (Chibuwe & Munoriyarwa, 2023; Tshuma, 2021). Critical to note, however, is that there is no shortage of justifications for such acts (deception of voters) through the breaking of election promises. As argued elsewhere, political candidates often cite ‘efficiency, primacy of competing values, the common good or voter myopia’ (Schedler, 1998, p. 201). For others, for example, Anthony Downs, through his economic theory of democracy, he likened elections to a market place where

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voters are equated to customers who trade their votes to the producers (politicians), and this exchange involves the weighing by voters of both endogenous and exogenous policy preferences of parties or candidates (Downs, 1957). Against this reasoning, it is posited that parties enter into contractual obligations with voters and fulfil these by delivering on their election pledges (Schedler, 1998, p. 194). Whilst, this is expected of parties, we have seen especially within African societies that politicians care less about fulfilling their election pledges and promises once they get into office. They do so, not with a heavy heart considering the forgetfulness of citizens (Schedler, 1998). Scholars remind us that despite being deceived-voters still vote for the politicians who promise them lies. The question, however, is whether voters do have an option. In this regard, some scholars even posed the question on, ‘what does one do when bad faith, lying, and other vices are not aberrations but have become the brazen norm?’ (MacKenzie & Bhatt, 2021, p. 3). In the wake of the enduring lies that have characterised political campaigns, scholars even speak of what is termed as the ‘prodigality of deceit’ (MacKenzie & Bhatt, 2021, p. 3).

Why Zimbabwean Voters Fall for False Promises We can never have a singular explanation for why voters fall for political deceit. The commonsensical explanation lies in informational asymmetry (Duggan, 2000; Greene, 2011). Things have not been helped by the Zimbabwean voters’ lack of sophistication in examining and analysing election promises, pledges, and mandates of candidates, especially those made in the previous elections against the current campaign period. The other explanation relates to information cost (Schedler, 1998). This resonates with the Zimbabwean case where ZANU-PF has, since 1980, monopolised the public media space. The campaign terrain has slightly changed, thanks to the advent of social media. Traditionally, access to information (print and electronic media) has always been a challenge in much of Zimbabwe’s rural areas (Mutsvairo & Muneri, 2019). Citizens thus rely heavily—if not entirely, on the political messaging disseminated through the word of mouth by candidates. Politicians are thus viewed as legitimate voices to whom voters rely on current information. However, through these campaign rallies, the electorate is duped and overpromised developmental projects that rarely come to fruition.

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Even in such a context, ZANU-PF candidates have, since 1980, promised pro-poor development, including tarring rural roads, improved service provision (access to telephone, radio, and television networks), and electricity in the rural areas (Herald, 26 July 2018; ZANU-PF, 2005). However, the reality is depressing and indicates the opposite. The Mnangagwa administration has also replicated the same feat in lying and promising fake promises to the electorate during campaign periods. It is thus unsurprising that in the run-up to the 2018 elections, Mnangagwa promised Zimbabweans that they would secure free medical health care, free primary school education, an end to power cuts, access to clean, portable drinking water in cities, grandiose projects including infrastractural projects such as roads in both rural and urban areas (ZANU-PF, 2018; Reuters, 26 July 2018; Herald, 7 May 2018). To the extent that he promised free health care (NewZimbabwe, 12 June 2018) and a reliable electricity supply, Mnangagwa even erected billboards on the sidelines of major roads articulating his vision for the country (Tshuma, 2021). After wrestling power through a military coup from his former mentor—Robert Mugabe—Emmerson Mnangagwa, in 2017 marking his reign styled as a ‘new epoch’ promised to deal with the high unemployment rate through job creation (BBC News, 22 November 2017).

Political Deceit during Election Seasons Combined with the 2018 election campaigns, the above stated pledges proved to the damned lies and fake promises. One such is the pledge to compensate former white commercial farmers, a promise that has not been fulfilled to date (NewZimbabwe, 7 March 2023). Even in the wake of unfulfilled election promises, ZANU-PF political elites did continue to bury their heads in the sand and lie through their teeth that their party managed to meet all the election pledges (Herald, 17 October 2019). This deceit does not come as a surprise, as corruption still festers in the various government departments. Nevertheless, ZANU-PF leaders promised to nip corruption in the bud in its 2018 election manifesto (ZANU-PF, 2018). This culture of political deceit, as examined through campaign rhetoric accompanied by false election promises, has been an enduring culture in Zimbabwean politics (Chibuwe & Munoriyarwa, 2023). This presumably, can be explained by the fact that Zimbabweans rarely consider retrospective voting where candidates are judged

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and punished based on their previous performances (Healy & Malhotra, 2013). It is thus unsurprising that even amid enduring unfulfilled election promises, ZANU-PF still garners and commands significant electoral support. Bar the use of patronage, violence and other election manipulation strategies and techniques used to woo voters. This brings us to the question of whether the average Zimbabwean voters are a gullible lot who can be dazzled by the flight of kites (read as captivating campaign rhetoric) (Milita et al., 2014). This is considering how they are deceived by the false promises made during election periods. A percipient example is, in the run-up to the 2018 elections, how the vice president of the country and ZANU-PF, Dr Constantino Chiwenga promised Mbare residents (one of the oldest high-density suburbs in Harare) that his party would revamp and renovate the old flats (Standard, 15 July 2018). This fake promise of modernising the flats into state-of-the-art, top notch residential studios/apartments, was only meant to curry favour with the residents (Bulawayo24News, 15 July 2018). Quite to the contrary and fast forward to 2023, Mbare flats are in a worse state than they were in 2018. Such a depressing reality is quite telling of the deceit of political elites during and even post-elections, especially within African countries. One can argue that the problem is not only with politicians but with voters who fail to demand electoral accountability. This is a common trend in various rural areas in Zimbabwe. However, in contrast to such a depressing reality, some political scientists long argued concerning the objective performance of government that ‘voters are not fools’ (Key, 1966). However, cynics might strictly argue to the contrary in the Zimbabwean case. This is considering how voters are deceived yet continue voting for the same faces who short change them. During election seasons, villagers are promised lofty development projects by candidates and post-voting, they are abandoned. However, this is not to suggest that these politicians are punished at the polls. If they are, it is only an insignificant population. Most of these failed politicians, who fail to deliver, are given another/ newer mandate. Not only that, but the electorate again needs to question why the candidate failed to deliver in the last term especially when they come seeking new mandates. Such lack of political consciousness, coupled with the fear of questioning political leaders and evaluating their performance, has thus remained an albatross around the necks of the electorate on the African political landscape. Looked differently, others opine that voters are a forgiving lot

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(Schedler, 1998). They forgive and forget. In this regard, Arendt once remarked that voters wield the ‘power to forgive’ even in the wake of betrayal and unfulfilled election promises (Arendt, 1958, pp. 236–243). Taking from the Arendtian parlance, it come as no suprise that the culture of political deception and lying continues to fester within the Zimbabwean political landscape. It is hard to deny that such deception greatly affects democratic representation, policy articulations, and socioeconomic development with (in) constituencies. However, the failure to question the candidates’ past performance might find expression in the voting and messaging of elections. Very rarely do voters in most African countries, Zimbabwe included, vote on policy, issues and programmes. Often, voters vote with their stomachs (patronage), including handouts, real, or promised (Alexander & McGregor, 2013). To this end, personal information regarding the calibre, depth, integrity, competence, and reliability of the candidate is overlooked (Schedler, 1998, p. 198). Warning against misrepresentation in word and deeds, scholars state that ‘if after election day, government officials do whatever they want regardless of any prior campaign commitments, they ridicule the very notion of democracy’ (Schedler, 1998, p. 195). Whilst this cautionary statement is vital in aiding democratic representation, it is discernible that in much of Africa, politicians are less interested in deepening the tenets and practice of electoral, participatory, and representative democracy. Instead, voters are only seen as important when they enter the voting booth, the only period they bestow the mandate on the politicians (Dahl, 1971). Thereafter, they do not matter but will matter again in the next election. Turning to the dearth of content in candidates’ political pledges, campaigns, manifestos, and policies in the Zimbabwean context, this is not only restricted to the ruling party. It is a deficiency in content that also runs through the opposition parties. It is on such grounds that one is bound to agree with Schedler, who opined nearly twenty-four years ago that much of the world is now beset with ‘meaningless choices’ laden with vacuous or incomprehensible choices’ or with ‘choices between equally disdained alternatives’, thus conjuring ‘theatrical metaphors such as farce or spectacle’ (Schedler, 1998, p. 195). In Zimbabwe, political elites like Nelson Chamisa, in the lead-up to the 2018 polls, made several promises hinged on socio-economic upliftment programmes to the voters if elected to power (Reuters, 26 July 2018). Whilst some of the promises of constructing expressways would

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be criticised by the generality of the Zimbabwean populace and by his foes as ‘utopian’, his defence would be that he did not win political power. On this basis, without being elected into power, there is no way he would implement such programmes and thus cannot be judged for reneging on electoral promises. Such a claim is in sync with the literature. Scholarly accounts remind us that in some contexts, being judged over electoral promises is one greatest fear that may grip politicians (Tomz, & van Houweling, 2009). This may partly explain why political candidates continue on a lying trajectory to hide their failures. It can be further noted that whilst on the campaign trail, legislators and councillors from the MDC-T have guaranteed improved service delivery mostly in the urban areas. These promises range from road rehabilitation (pothole patching) to guaranteed water availability, power supply, and efficient municipal solid waste management through timeous refuse collection (News24, 29 January 2013). However, these have proved to be empty pledges and promises, as evident in the epileptic power supply (incessant power cuts), the sight of potholed roads, dry taps, uncollected garbage in medium and high-density suburbs, and sewerage spewing in streets. Politicians being politicians, it has proven over the past decades that they are always in need of justifications for their failures. To this end, the opposition candidates in Zimbabwe’s cities and towns have found comfort in explaining their failure to deliver by pointing to the meddling of the central government in the running of cities. To this end, the justification for failure and not honouring campaign promises is the interference by the ruling ZANU-PF party within their constituencies. Without the risk of belabouring the obvious, it needs to be underscored that this diversion and scapegoating across the political divide is also evident in the ruling party. ZANU-PF candidates find justification in the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe as the main challenge hindering their effective fulfilment of election pledges and promises (Ndakaripa, 2021). This trend is also pervasive worldwide, where politicians who fail to deliver mandates always find an easy target to shift blame. This may include claims of sabotage by internal foes, ecological conditions, major events, financial constraints, behaviour and conduct of the voters.

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Conclusion The chapter established an ongoing polemic discussion on why the electorate keeps falling for political deceit. This is evident in the Zimbabwean context, where voters continue voting for political candidates who lie, overpromise, and under (or fail to) deliver. However, others would argue that voters are duped because they are gullible. As Machiavelli cautions, it is wise to ‘disguise the fox and to be a great pretender and dissembler’ on the grounds that men are ‘so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived’ (Machiavelli, 2003, p. 48). These are poignant questions worth posing to politicians, especially in contexts like Zimbabwe where voters are duped through political rhetoric at campaign rallies. It will be worth pursuing this research foci to examine how and why rural and urban voters in Zimbabwe continue to fall for political deceit expressed through lies, false promises, and unfulfilled election pledges. Such an inquiry has academic and policy implications for informing our deeper understanding of political efficacy, trust deficit in politics, democratic representation, and participatory democracy.

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Index

A A Culture of deceit, 10, 12, 374, 378 Alienation, 204 B Bane, 8, 9, 137, 170, 172 C Cameroonian calamity, 10 Catastrophic consequences, 10 Church and State, 350, 356 Citizenship, 6, 12, 50, 115, 116, 150, 171, 262, 343, 345, 353, 383, 398 Citizenships, 344 Civil strife, 309 Colonial legacy, 264, 294, 297, 299, 368, 387 Colonial treachery, 10 Conflict, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11–14, 23–26, 37, 38, 63, 68, 82, 87, 126, 130, 135, 154, 169–172, 174–184,

189–192, 197–205, 252, 259, 260, 262, 263, 271, 274, 293, 294, 296, 300–304, 306, 310, 350, 351, 357, 360, 361, 368, 375–377 Corruption, 4, 11, 145, 146, 148, 158, 161, 200, 201, 213, 224, 261, 270, 271, 276, 278–281, 295, 305, 316, 318, 323, 339, 354, 355, 358, 370, 371, 374, 415 Crime, 57, 128, 130, 136, 375, 388 Cultures of deceit, politics, 5, 15 D Deceit, 2–4, 7–9, 11, 13–15, 37, 75, 101, 142–144, 155, 160–162, 212, 257, 295, 297, 368, 369, 371, 375, 405, 408, 411–416, 419 Deception, 15, 239, 281, 294, 295, 297, 299, 304, 369, 371, 373, 375, 406, 413, 417

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42883-8

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INDEX

Decoloniality, 84 De facto Christian State, 13 Demise, 357, 359, 372 Democracy, 11, 12, 14, 15, 25, 130, 148, 200, 203, 218–220, 230, 236, 238, 242, 243, 245, 246, 258, 270, 281, 283, 294–300, 304, 305, 336, 342, 368, 369, 378, 383, 385–389, 393, 396, 398–400, 408, 410, 412, 413, 417, 419 Democratic transition, 14 Digital Era, 11, 271

E Economic turbulence, 212 Emancipatory, 3, 12, 272, 273, 310, 318, 328 Ethnicity, 3, 70, 108, 134, 178, 190–193, 199, 201, 202, 297, 343

G Genocide, 14, 21, 23–25, 29, 37, 80–87, 89–94, 129, 135, 170, 192, 198, 199, 260, 299, 301, 375, 376 Ghana, 9, 14, 141–151, 155, 156, 158, 160–162, 177, 303, 311, 318, 321, 322, 369, 370, 386, 387, 389, 394 Governance, 3, 9, 11, 14, 52, 75, 82, 141–144, 150, 152, 154–156, 161–163, 200, 216, 235, 279, 295, 296, 298, 299, 302, 368, 383–391, 395–400

H Habermas’ public sphere, 10, 212, 213, 219, 220

Hate speech, 8, 125–133, 135–137, 244, 246, 359, 361 Herero/Nama, 5, 24, 25, 37, 80–85, 87–97 Human rights violations, 13, 14, 161, 198, 375–378

I Identities, 3, 7, 12, 34, 50, 59, 64–67, 70, 74, 75, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85–90, 96, 97, 104, 133, 134, 178, 182, 190–192, 199–201, 295 Intergroup conflicts, 9, 170 Intolerance, 8, 9, 74, 75, 126, 128, 130, 133, 134, 136, 137, 172, 177, 178, 184, 239, 359

L Language, 3, 5–9, 50, 70, 73, 89, 90, 102, 104–118, 125, 127, 130, 133–135, 137, 142, 143, 159–162, 180, 184, 190, 191, 200, 252–256, 258, 259, 262–264, 273, 276, 281, 297, 336, 350, 359–361 Literary discourses, 5 Literature, 7, 22, 24, 29, 43, 44, 63, 64, 69–75, 79, 80, 85, 94, 107, 142, 143, 171, 212, 237, 243, 368, 407–412, 418

M Mass media, 9, 170–176, 180–184, 229–233, 243, 244 Media, 5, 7, 9, 10, 52, 111, 113, 114, 128, 132, 135, 160, 170–176, 180–184, 212, 213, 216–226, 229–235, 237–247, 260, 263, 269, 279, 281, 297,

INDEX

325, 368, 369, 372, 378, 393, 407, 414 Memorialising Namibia, 21 Migration, 6, 7, 42, 54, 56, 59, 60, 72, 150, 319, 322 Mugabe’s Reign, 13, 350, 359

N Namibian literature, 7, 80, 81, 85 Nigeria, 7, 8, 10, 11, 110, 127, 128, 130–132, 134, 170, 172, 176–178, 180–183, 191, 229–241, 243–246, 251, 253, 260, 263, 264, 270, 271, 275–278, 280–283, 301, 303, 318, 321, 322, 375, 376, 386, 391, 394, 395, 399, 413 Nigerian peoples, 131, 132, 134, 136, 137, 178, 182

P Pan African, 12 Penury, 6 Pledges, 15, 280, 405–415, 417–419 Political campaigns, 276, 407, 414 Political deceit, 1, 3, 9, 15, 143, 405, 407, 408, 411, 412, 414, 415, 419 Political leadership, 14, 15, 59, 261, 282, 357, 383–385, 389, 391, 396, 400 Politics, 3, 4, 8, 9, 12–15, 43, 47, 48, 54, 55, 58, 59, 63, 64, 67–70, 74, 83, 105, 107, 118, 141–144, 146–148, 151, 155, 156, 158–163, 178, 213, 223, 234, 270, 271, 273, 276, 278–280, 294, 295, 297–300, 306, 313, 337, 342, 343, 350, 354, 355, 359–362, 367–369, 371–375,

427

387, 390, 393, 395, 398, 415, 419 Populism, 11, 271, 273–276, 278–281, 283, 284 Postcolonial African conflicts, 178, 191 Postcolonial era, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 50, 52, 58, 142, 276 Postcoloniality, 2, 4 Power, 2–4, 7, 9–11, 14, 29, 43–45, 48, 50–53, 58, 72, 81, 93, 102–107, 112, 115, 118, 146–148, 154, 155, 162, 171, 176, 178, 181, 182, 191, 194, 197, 198, 201, 205, 212, 213, 215, 219–221, 223–225, 229, 238, 239, 245, 252, 259, 270, 272–274, 276, 278–280, 296–300, 302–305, 314, 317, 323, 327, 335, 340, 341, 343, 345, 350, 351, 353, 358, 360, 361, 368, 369, 371–374, 378, 385, 406–408, 415, 417, 418 Pragmatic misrepresentation, 9, 170–172, 174, 184 Precarity, 6, 43, 44, 46, 50 Promises, 15, 160, 162, 163, 270, 275, 353, 369, 370, 405–419

R Representation, 5, 7, 15, 23, 71, 81, 105, 113, 147, 172, 271, 279, 340, 369, 390, 391, 394–396, 400, 405, 408, 410, 417, 419 Resistance, 6, 7, 42, 43, 50, 57–60, 81, 87, 105, 107, 132, 179, 202, 328, 386

S Social conflict perspective, 13, 350

428

INDEX

Source, 8, 9, 14, 63, 70, 75, 87, 93, 103, 106, 126, 149, 172, 177, 180, 191, 212, 218, 223, 224, 407 States, 14, 25, 28, 43, 51, 182, 190, 192, 201, 204, 216, 232, 234, 236, 239, 244, 255, 256, 261, 270, 275, 295, 296, 301, 302, 306, 309–311, 313, 314, 316–319, 323, 324, 327, 354, 362, 368, 375–377, 379, 384, 386, 387, 390, 392, 396 Subaltern practices, 6 Sub-Saharan Africa, 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 135, 137, 170, 171, 176, 177, 179–182, 184, 253, 295, 296, 368, 375, 383–397, 399, 400 Sub-Saharan African conflicts, 170, 181 Survival, 26, 28, 31, 33–35, 37, 38, 48, 50, 59, 65, 155, 179, 206, 220, 275, 319, 339, 367 T Tragic labels, 10 Trauma, 5, 24, 29, 30, 37, 67, 80–82, 84, 86, 91–94, 96, 256 Trust, 13, 141–143, 151, 152, 154, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163, 242, 263, 279, 283, 369, 378, 386, 397, 399, 413, 419 V Violence, 37, 41, 54, 63, 68, 69, 89, 95, 102, 103, 118, 126, 130,

135, 137, 144, 152, 153, 178, 193–195, 198, 199, 233, 234, 236, 263, 293–295, 297–300, 302, 325, 339, 340, 359–361, 367, 369, 374–376, 378, 388, 399, 400, 407, 416 Voting, 12, 147, 152, 153, 278, 338, 342–344, 389, 391, 393–395, 398, 399, 411, 413, 415–417, 419 W War, 9, 14, 23, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 81, 82, 85, 93, 106, 130, 178, 179, 192–198, 202, 212, 255, 274, 293, 300–302, 320, 338–340, 343, 344, 367, 373, 375, 376, 387, 390, 399, 408 West Africa, 22, 23, 25, 82, 89, 170, 180, 251, 253, 255–257, 259, 384 Y Youth, 14, 235, 338, 339, 383–400 Z Zimbabwe, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 42–47, 49, 50, 52, 55, 57–60, 112, 127, 211–217, 219–225, 232, 234, 235, 252, 254, 275, 301, 311, 318, 335–337, 339, 342, 344, 345, 349, 354–359, 361, 362, 387, 391, 394, 399, 405, 411–414, 416–419 Zimbabwe literature, 6, 44