Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I: Zimbabwe as a Case Study 3031353226, 9783031353222

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Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I Zimbabwe as a Case Study Edited by Esther Mavengano · Isaac Mhute

Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I

Esther Mavengano · Isaac Mhute Editors

Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I Zimbabwe as a Case Study

Editors Esther Mavengano English and Media Studies Department Faculty of Arts, Great Zimbabwe University Masvingo, Zimbabwe

Isaac Mhute Language, Literature and Culture Studies Midlands State University Gweru, Zimbabwe

Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion College of Human Sciences University of South Africa Pretoria, South Africa Georg Forster/Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of English Faculty of Linguistics, Literature and Cultural Studies Institute of English and American Studies Technische Universität Dresden Dresden, Germany ISBN 978-3-031-35322-2 ISBN 978-3-031-35323-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To all lecturers who became the greatest of mentors and ‘springs’ of inspiration. Your scholarly guidance and kindness will forever be cherished

Preface

The Zimbabwean postcolonial political landscape is characterised by events that point to an unexpected recreation of the colonial environment. The oppression and suffering of the black majority have since been resuscitated by a black ruling elite this time in spite of the partnership between the two parties in the bloody liberation struggle that saw both partners dedicating everything at their disposal to eradicate the agent of their suffering for almost a century. The promises that mobilised everyone against the colonial master have surprisingly been realised only by the members of this ruling elite, a situation that resembles the Biblical Judas Iscariotian deceit of Jesus Christ. In this regard, this multi-authored volume brought about discussions by scholars from diverse disciplines on Language/discourse, literature, the media and a culture of deceit in the Zimbabwean postcolonial political landscape. Efforts are made by the chapters to show how greed conquered the ruling elite so much that it goes to any length in perpetrating injustices that ensure its happiness and retention of power at the expense of their faithful partners for the liberation struggle. Gweru, Zimbabwe

Isaac Mhute

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Acknowledgements

We would like to express our deep appreciation to all colleagues, friends and subject specialists who rendered their support one way or another in the process of writing and publishing this volume. We also received enormous assistance during the production of this book from Madison Allums, Shreenidhi Natarajan, Matthew Savin and Henry Rodgers, who are certainly an incredible and exceptional team at Palgrave Macmillan in India. We are indebted to all reviewers whose important role greatly upgraded the ultimate quality of the chapters in this book. You are certainly remembered and cherished. Lastly, we have formidable backing from our families. Thank you very much for encouraging and supporting us always.

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Contents

1

Introduction: Contextualising the Notion of Deceit in the Postcolonial Zimbabwe’s Political Landscape Isaac Mhute and Esther Mavengano

1

Part I Language/Discourse and a Culture of Deceit in Zimbabwe’s Politics (2–6) 2

3

4

5

Polit(r)icking and Massaging the Ballot in Zimbabwe’s Transitions Liberty Muchativugwa Hove The Paradox of Postcolonial Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Zimbabwe’s False Dawns Tawanda Shura and Isaac Mhute Vachingovukura (Whilst They Are Barking Ineffectually): The Mango Idiom and Postcolonial Deceit in Zimbabwe’s Political Discourse Edmore Dube Judas Iscariotism and Zimbabwe Opposition Politics: Deceit, Fear of Difference and Language of Misrepresentation Wilson Zivave

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27

47

63

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CONTENTS

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The Political Landscape and a Culture of Deceit in Postcolonial Zimbabwe: Scholarly Discourse Under Siege Temba T. Rugwiji

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Part II The Poetic and Sonic Narratives of Political Deceit in Postcolonial (7–12) 7

8

9

10

11

12

The Polemics of Zimbabwean Nationalism in Fictional and Political Discourses ‘Nyika Inovakwa (Kana Kuputswa) Nevene Vayo’ (A Nation Is Built [or Destroyed] by Its Owners) Esther Mavengano Through the Lenses of Betrayal: Ambivalence and Other Markers of Deception in Aaron Chiundura Moyo’s Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo (1985) Angeline Mavis Madongonda and Enna Sukutai Gudhlanga The Post-independence Zimbabwean Leadership and the Literary Imaginings of Betrayal in I.T. Mabasa’s Novel Mapenzi (1999) Wellington Wasosa Judas Culture in Post-colonial Zimbabwe: Gender and Land Redistribution in Raymond’s Choto’s Vavariro (1990) Enna Sukutai Gudhlanga and Angeline Mavis Madongonda Metaphorisation and Erotisisation of the Female Body in David Mungoshi’s The Fading Sun: A Symbolic Representation of the Postcolonial Zimbabwean Society Andrew Mutingwende and Esther Mavengano Politics of Deceit: Dynamics of Political Jingles in Postcolonial Zimbabwe Vimbai M. Matiza

105

127

149

167

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CONTENTS

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Part III The Media, Conflict and a Culture of Deceit in Postcolonial Zimbabwe’s Politics (13–18) 13

14

15

16

17

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The Media, Conflict and Culture of Deceit in Postcolonial Zimbabwean Politics Takavafira Masarira Zhou

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An Analysis of the Nexus Between Media and Political Polarisation in Zimbabwe Gift Gwindingwe

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Citizen or Alien? Politics of Urban Control and the Dis(ex)tortion of Democracy in Zimbabwe Andrew Mutingwende

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Power, Politics and Public Media Deceit in Zimbabwe, 2000–2023 Pedzisai Ruhanya and Bekezela Gumbo

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Modelling Electoral Integrity on Political Campaigns in Zimbabwe: The Problems of Deception and Lying During General Elections Gift Masengwe “Sanctions Are the Source of Our Suffering”: Of ZANU-PF’s ‘Exhausted’ Rhetoric and Blame-Gaming Tactics as Hegemonic Preservation Collen Sabao

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Edmore Dube (Ph.D.) holds a doctoral degree from the University of Zimbabwe. He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo; with a huge interest in issues of justice and peace; critiquing jambanja (2018) and the ‘armed state’ (2019). He is a member of the African Consortium for Law and Religious Studies (ACLARS) and ATISCA. He has contributed to the ACLARS volumes on challenges besetting African heritage (2017) and impediments to human flourishing in Africa (2019), as well as the ATISCA discourse on religion and development (2019). Bekezela Gumbo is a Ph.D. student at the University of the Free State in South Africa. He also serves as the principal researcher at the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute in Harare, Zimbabwe. He also teaches comparative political development in Africa at Africa University. He has published widely on political transitions in Zimbabwe. His research interest is on the politics of transition and the quest for sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Gift Gwindingwe (Ph.D.) is a Media and Cultural Studies lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University, Mashava Campus. He holds a Ph.D. in Communication from the University of Fort Hare, South Africa. He is a former member of the Research Committee and currently a member of the Great Zimbabwe University International Relations Committee. He has published papers in local (South African) accredited journals. xv

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His research interests are in the following areas: Cultural Studies, Postcolonialism, Politics and the pervasive nature of digital media in shaping today’s communication terrain. Enna Sukutai Gudhlanga (Prof.) holds a Doctor of Literature and Philosophy in African Languages from the University of South Africa. She is an associate professor and chairperson of the Department of Languages and Literature at Zimbabwe Open University. An avid researcher, Enna holds certificates in Gender Mainstreaming from OSSREA, CODESRIA and UNIDEP. Her study interests constitute gender, Africa and the development of its literatures, cultures and world outlooks. She is concerned with the ultimate self-definition and complete mastery of the African people’s own life. Her publications include African Literature, Mother Earth and Religion (Delaware: Vernon Press, 2022), coedited with Musa W. Dube and Josephine Muganiwa; and Gender, politics and land use in Zimbabwe, 1980–2012 (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2015). She has presented papers on gender issues at many international conferences. Enna is also interested in sociolinguistic issues like democracy, language rights, planning and policy. She is also a research fellow at the University of South Africa and is a member of the Circle of Concerned African Women Theologians. She has also been appointed to the Zimbabwe National Language Advisory Committee for the period 1 May 2022–30 April 2027. Liberty Muchativugwa Hove (Prof.) is a full professor in English Language & Literature in English at North-West University and formerly a postdoctoral research fellow, University of Limpopo, South Africa. He is Deputy Director in the School for Literature and Language Education. Current research interests are in nation and narration, critical literary theory, cultural metissage and applied language studies, especially curriculum renewal through the decolonisation project, curriculum theory and pedagogics of teaching English. Muchativugwa Hove is a National Research Foundation (NRF) C rated researcher with articles in excess of 35 in national and international journals, 12 book chapters, 6 coedited books on the dynamics of teacher education, quality education and an edited book on auto/biography. This article extends my contribution to debates on nation and narration, the matrices of identity and cultures in imagining the postcolonial state.

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Angeline Mavis Madongonda is a senior lecturer in the Department of Languages and Literature at the Zimbabwe Open University. Currently she is the programme leader for the Bachelor of Arts in English and Communication Studies programme (BAECS) and a Ph.D. candidate. She is an accomplished writer, researcher, and academic. Her research interests include subaltern voices and geocriticism. Her publications include ‘Environmental Intrusions and Land Dispossession: A Postcolonial Eco-critical Reading of Selected Poems in Musaemura Zimunya’s Jikinya, Kingfisher and other stories’. In ES Gudhlanga, J Muganiwa, MW Dube (eds.). Mother Earth, Mother Africa, Creative Literature and the Global Environmental Crisis. New York: Vernon Press (2022); “Knock Knock Knock” The paradox of the Music genre and Serious Discourse in HIV/AIDS Communication African Journal of Rhetoric: Rhetoric and Language of Decolonisation in Africa Vol. II, pp. 151–171 (2019), The Art of Survival: Depictions of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean in Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, (2015). Rev. Gift Masengwe (Ph.D.) is a postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Education, University of Free State, and a research fellow at the University of South Africa. His interests in the interaction of Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe, in close reading with contemporary new world dynamics of Industrialisation, Globalisation, Decolonisation and Post-humanism have seen him publish books, chapters and articles across disciplines of theology, health, philosophy, culture, development, gender and environment with topics of currency in recent publications on the Church of Christ in Zimbabwe and the state in Zimbabwe. Vimbai M. Matiza (Ph.D.) is a senior lecturer in the Department of Languages, Literature and Cultural at Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. She holds a Bachelor of Arts Honours degree in African Languages and Culture, an M.A. in African Languages and Doctor of Philosophy degree in African Languages and Literature with the University of South Africa. She is a researcher with interest in African cultures and their contribution to the development of mankind. She has researched and published in areas of Language and development, Drama/ theatre for development, Oral literature, Discourse analysis, Culture and Music and Onomastics, among other Cultural and African issues. She has also presented on several local, regional and international conferences on different areas mentioned above.

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Esther Mavengano is a lecturer who teaches Linguistics and Literature in the Department of English and Media Studies, Faculty of Arts at Great Zimbabwe University in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. She holds a Ph.D. in Linguistics and Literary studies obtained from the University of North West in South Africa. Her research areas maintain the interface of linguistics and poetics. She has interests in language policy and planning, sociolinguistics, language use in media and political discourses, translingual practices in fictional writings, identity issues in contemporary transnational Anglophone/African literature, religion and gender, stylistics and language education in ‘multi’ contexts. She has published in reputable international journals including Cogent Arts and Humanities, African Identities, Literator and Journal of Multicultural Discourses, among others. She is a Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, UNISA, in South Africa. She is currently a von Humboldt Postdoctoral Fellow at TU (Techische Universitat) DresdenInstitute of English and American Studies, Department of English, Germany. She is a coeditor of Zimbabwe in the Post-COVID-19 Era: Reflections, lessons and the Future of Public Health. Routledge Publisher—https://www.routledge.com/Zimbabwein-the-Post-COVID-19-Era-Reflections-Lessons-and-the-Future-of/Mav engano-Marevesa-Jakaza/p/book/9781032487748. Isaac Mhute is an associate professor with Midlands State University’s Department of Language, Literature and Culture Studies taking linguistics, English, strategic communication and research modules. He is a chief examiner for language and literature with an international examining board, professional editor and translator/back translator (English and Shona). He graduated with a Doctor of Literature and Philosophy in African Languages from the University of South Africa whose focus was on the morphological, syntactic and semantic representation of grammatical relations. His research interests are in both theoretical and applied linguistic areas such as language policy and development, syntax and semantics, onomastics as well as language and strategic communication issues in education, among others. Andrew Mutingwende is a lecturer in the Department of English and communication at Midlands State University. His research interests are in discourse analysis, language and politics, religion and language use. He has published in these areas.

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Temba T. Rugwiji (Ph.D.) is currently a research fellow at the University of Pretoria in South Africa since October 2013. He earned his Ph.D. in Literature and Philosophy at the University of South Africa. Rugwiji has published widely on various themes in accreditated journals. His research interests include African Studies, Biblical Hebrew, Child abuse, Creationism, Cultural Heritage, Hermeutics, Geo-politics, postcoloniality, rape and sexuality, among others. He has travelled internationally for research and presentations of papers. Rugwiji is also a pastor of a Baptist Convention Church in Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe. Currently, Dr. Rugwiji is working on a project aimed at critiquing Charles Darwin’s theory of Evolution and natural selection. Pedzisai Ruhanya (Ph.D.) is a lecturer in the Department of Creative Media and Communication at the University of Zimbabwe. He is also a founder and director of the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute. He holds a Doctor of Philosophy in Media and Democracy. He has many publications on transition politics in Zimbabwe. His research interest is on the role of media in democratic transitions. Collen Sabao (Prof.) is an associate professor of Linguistics, Literature and Communication in the Languages and Literature Department at the University of Namibia. As a lecturer and researcher, Prof. Sabao’s research interests lie in the areas of Phonetics and Phonology, Political Discourse, Media Discourse, Pan Africanism, Afrocentricity, Appraisal Theory, Argumentation, World Literatures and Rhetoric. He has published extensively in these areas, having published 31 (thirty-one) articles and several chapters in internationally refereed publications. He also holds a Bachelor of Arts Honours Degree in English and Communication and a Master of Philosophy in Theoretical Linguistics from universities in Zimbabwe and a Ph.D. in African Languages (Applied Linguistics) from Stellenbosch University (South Africa). He is also an American Council of Learned Societies Fellow’14 and an African Humanities Fellow ‘14. Prof. Sabao is also an amateur footballer and an elder elect of Records in the House of Nyabinghi Rastafari. Tawanda Shura is a graduate from the University of Zimbabwe (B.A. English and History); Zimbabwe Open University (Post Graduate Diploma in Education, B.A. Special Honours in Media and Communication Studies and B.A. Special Honours in Literature in English) and

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Midlands State University (Master of Arts in Strategic Communication Studies). Wellington Wasosa (Ph.D.) is a senior lecturer and current chair of the Department of African Languages and Literature at Madziwa Teachers’ College. He holds a doctoral degree from the University of South Africa. His research interests are on African literature and culture, onomastics and sociolinguistics. Wilson Zivave is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of South Africa. During his study, he has been interrogating policy implementation and challenges associated with the Religious Studies curriculum in Zimbabwean secondary schools. His research interests are in religion, policy and education, religion and gender, religion and culture, Old Testament issues as well as religion and contemporary issues. He has written and published in these areas. Currently, he lectures in the department of Religious Studies at Hwange College of Education. Takavafira Masarira Zhou (Ph.D.), holds a doctorate in environmental history from the University of Zimbabwe. He is an environmental historian, a Lemba, trade unionist and Human Rights defender. Zhou has lectured at Mutare Teachers College, Africa University and Great Zimbabwe University (2004–2008) where he helped to transform the history subject area into the Department of History and Development Studies. He has presented various papers at conferences in Zimbabwe, Africa, Europe and Asia. He has also published on African agriculture; white settler farming; the environmental impact of mining in Zimbabwe; peace and security in Africa; History curricula changes in Zimbabwe; post2016 Africa’s development; teacher education; poverty, natural resources curse, underdevelopment and sustainable development in Africa; poverty, conflict and vulnerability in Africa; Climate Change and Environment in 21st Century Africa; Indigenous Knowledge Systems and general history and politics of Zimbabwe.

List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

14.1 14.2 14.3 16.1

CCC logo ZANU-PF logo A bin emoji used to dismiss an argument on social media Four-pronged analytical framework for studying power politics media deceit

265 266 267 300

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Contextualising the Notion of Deceit in the Postcolonial Zimbabwe’s Political Landscape Isaac Mhute and Esther Mavengano

Colonialism was Africa’s greatest challenge for the past century as it saw the reduction of its peoples into substandard humans whose rights and dignity were considered worthless. As such, its termination was the continent’s major achievement expected to transforming lives by ushering in collective happiness for the various peoples in Africa. It was anticipated

I. Mhute (B) Midlands State University, Zvishavane, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] E. Mavengano English and Media Studies Department, Faculty of Arts, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa Georg Forster/Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of English, Faculty of Linguistics, Literature and Cultural Studies, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1 Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_1

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to allow the spirit of oneness that had won the liberation struggle against the disruptive colonial order, that had haunted the continent for over a century, to flourish thereby marking the dawn of the long overdue era characterised by freedom of association and expression as well as an amicable sharing of the milk and honey flowing throughout the entire continent that had been forcibly taken away by the colonialists. Unfortunately and surprisingly, after the attainment of the much yearned for independence, Africa has, instead, become strife-ridden and a culture of betrayal manifests strongly in the realm of postcolonial politics as evident in the fear of difference and politics of misrepresentation. The most daunting fact is that the liberation movements across Africa, such as African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe, the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), FRELIMO in Mozambique, the National Liberation Movement in Ghana (NLM) and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania, have all become infamous for practices such as factionalism, abuse of human rights, corruption, economic mismanagement, violence, hate speech, autocracy as well as cracking on dissent, all of which are totally divorced from the ethics that characterised the liberation struggles. The practices are totally aligned to the former mother powers whose ways the people invested their all to eradicate. Apparently, after independence, the African political landscape has become wholly entangled in deceit, misgovernance, mudslinging and finger pointing, regionalism and ethnicity as liberation movements try to achieve their main goal that is, permanently clinging to power. Their participation in the liberation struggle has become a justification for their desire to continuously perpetrate the very injustices that were typical of the former colonial master without being questioned. Any one challenging this order is quickly publicised as an enemy of the liberation struggle who intends to sell the nation back to the imperialists. All this has come as an astonishment to the populaces of the respective nations as the new approach is typical of the values the people collectively focused on getting rid of through the bloody liberation struggles. Therefore, while the people expected a complete eradication of unjust practices that had become typical of the colonial era, unfortunately, the culture

Institute of English and American Studies, Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden, Germany

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of deceit has even seen the new leadership committing far more crimes on fellow blacks than the colonial governments which have bred unexpected nostalgia for the colonial leadership. This culture of betrayal in postcolonial African politics informed by shared traits of greed, opportunism, disappointment, blame game, self-centredness, battle for power and quest for self-preservation, among others, resembles the Judas’ act of deceit in the New Statement. In reminiscence of that betrayal of Jesus, this multi-authored book volume evokes this biblical epic in the context of postcolonial African politics in an attempt to generate a nuanced and multifaceted academic dialoguing platform with a particular gaze on the aspects of treachery, fear of difference (oppositional politics), and discourses/semiotics of (mis)/ self-representation. It has chapters penned by distinguished scholars from various disciplines who contribute scholarship to the complexities and dynamics of the postcolonial African politics, explicating the intricacies and problematics that define the continent from independence to the present-day. The analyses, conceptual insights and perspectives go a great way in helping the audience understand the complexities and dynamics of the postcolonial African politics of the present moment. The volume breaks down traditional boundaries in order to embrace scholarship that crosses disciplinary borders. It brings scholars from different backgrounds into active academic dialogue with each other to produce knowledge and essential analytical lenses provided by diverse disciplines such as linguistics, literary analysis, history, philosophy, media and religious studies, among others. The book places political thinking and postcolonial political systems under the scholarly gaze with the view to highlight and enhance the participation of African scholarship in the political processes of the continent. This is extremely significant as it is through probing the limitations of existing disciplinary perspectives that we appreciate the complexity of the postcolonial African politics. This first volume focuses solely on language, literature and the media and the culture of deceit in Zimbabwean postcolonial politics. It is divided into three parts the first of which dwells on language/discourse and the culture of deceit in Zimbabwe’s politics. The six chapters making up the part demonstrate how, for instance, the history that has characterised Zimbabwe post the Ian Smith political assemblage in 1979 is characterised by phenomenal tricks meant to manipulate the politics and practices of elections and the accompanying transitions for the benefit of

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the ruling party. In fact, the options of hope and change have been skilfully replaced after the euphoria in 1980 and the political landscape in Zimbabwe has morphed into spectacular dictatorship and total discreditation of the electoral processes. The part also demonstrates how every Zimbabwean blindly thought independence would be driven and indexed on celebratory conviviality since the thinking was that the country had transitioned from the quagmire of coloniality to the yearned for political, economic and social Mecca. It demonstrates how the people continuously get fooled into retaining the ruling party that has betrayed them since 1980 in power due to well-thought-out unfulfilled manifestos dwelling on deceitful manipulation of linguistic expressions. The part also traces this deceitful character into utterances by new political parties like the Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC) that have yet to gain an opportunity to be voted into power raising the possibility of the politics of betrayal being typical of the DNA that defines Zimbabwe’s body politic. Together, the chapters in first section also demonstrate how the biblical Judas narrative is applicable to the Movement for Democratic Change, a political opposition party in Zimbabwe in which deceit, factionalism, fear of difference and language of misrepresentation have been rife since its formation in 1999. The part, in short, proves how it is this Judas Iscariotism, which is informed by shared traits of greediness, disharmony opportunism, egocentricism and factionalism that has led to toxic opposition politics in Zimbabwe that cannot redeem people from the clutches of the ruling party. To clearly account for the seriousness of the matter, the second part focuses on the poetic and sonic narratives of political deceit in postcolonial times. It has six chapters demonstrating how literature, as an honest mirror of reality, accounts for the deceit that has become typical of Zimbabwean postcolonial politics. For instance, in spite of the land being the main reason for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, at independence its return to the black majority, from whom it was snatched by the colonialists, was never prioritised as captured in Vavariro (Choto, 1990) and Kuridza Ngoma nedemo (Moyo, 1985). Instead of its being the most valuable aspect they yearned for the entire colonial period and upon which the mobilisation of the majority for participation in the liberation struggle was centred, it remained out of reach of the peasants whose desperate efforts to invade the farms landed them in real trouble at the hands of the same law designed by the former coloniser but now being

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enforced by fellow blacks who had partnered them in the war of liberation. The part demonstrates how the situation clearly shows how the partners in the liberation struggle had come to be differently treated after the attainment of independence with some animals proving to be more equal than others (Orwell, 1945). The part’s discussion on Mapenzi (Mabasa, 1999) shows that the political leadership in post-independence Zimbabwe betrayed the people by authoring and presiding over the crises afflicting the nation in spite of the people having invested immensely in the liberation struggle. What transpires is typical Fanonian “pitfalls of national consciousness” (Fanon, 1963) as the advent of independence to a greater extent failed to uplift the majority of the people’s lives as they continuously battle various political, social and economic crises. Such discussions in the part demonstrate how deceit has become so rampant in the Zimbabwean postcolonial political landscape. The third and final part goes on to consider the media, conflict and a culture of deceit in postcolonial Zimbabwean politics. The part demonstrates how the mainstream media, for instance, has been captured by the ruling party to act as agents of deceit and betrayal in the Zimbabwean postcolonial political landscape. Through the captured media, the state has managed to portray the opposition formations, particularly the CCC supporters, as proverbial ‘totemless’ or ‘totem-eating’ people who refuse to be yoked with ZANU-PF and as a result are constant victims of, violence, ideological and physical exclusion from the urban space (Muponde, 2004). As such, the weaponisation of state agents to destabilise peace in urban spaces has not been objectively covered by both state media. This status quo invites more effective and implementable research to quell further harm through the ruling party’s interference with independent bodies like the media and other state apparatuses. The part demonstrates as well how in such circumstances where the mainstream media is controlled by political authorities, it becomes an enormous task for the social media to play its democratic role of making public officials accountable. Thus, while mainstream media has become a tool for ensuring the ruling elite dwells on deceitfully manipulating the general populace for its happiness, social media has become the only alternative opportunity through which provision of full and fair information is ensured so that citizens can make informed political choices. It is the only logical way for investigating the concentrated powers of the elected

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representatives as well as interpreting events with a view to assisting citizens in understanding complex issues in their societies. This clarifies how much the postcolonial Zimbabwean mainstream media has become as fully captured as it was during the colonial era. It has deceitfully retained its position as a weapon through which the interests of the ruling elite are advanced at the expense of the majority’s wishes. In conclusion, it is appropriate to assert that a clear assessment of the analyses advanced by all the chapters demonstrates a very clear recreation of the suffering that characterised the lives of the majority black people during the Rhodesian era. Preying on the helplessness of the people by the leadership has become the order of the day again with the media and other institutions being used as tools in the process. It is unfortunate that this time the environment has been recreated by blacks on blacks and after both had pledged to sacrifice everything as a team for its extinction for their collective benefit. The ruling elite went on to assume the role previously meant for the white master by taking the entire benefit for itself. This points to the highest level of betrayal the book likens to that of the Biblical Judas Iscariot on Jesus Christ. This is being presented as the reason for the suffering that has bedevilled the country for over four decades of independence.

References Choto, R. (1990). Vavariro. Baobab Books. Fanon, F. (1963). The Wretched of the Earth. Grove Press. Mabasa, I. T. (1999). Mapenzi. College Press. Moyo, A. C. (1985). Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo. Zimbabwe Publishing House. Muponde, R. (2004). The worm and the hoe: Cultural politics and reconciliation after the Third Chimurenga. In B. Raftopoulos & T. Savage (Eds.), Injustice and political reconciliation. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. www.ijr. org.za Orwell, G. (1945). Animal Farm. Secker and Warburg Publishers.

PART I

Language/Discourse and a Culture of Deceit in Zimbabwe’s Politics (2–6)

CHAPTER 2

Polit(r)icking and Massaging the Ballot in Zimbabwe’s Transitions Liberty Muchativugwa Hove

Introduction There is no nation without a past, but ‘new’ nations such as Zimbabwe that have been created through the complex armed decolonisation process garner significant attention as each election and ‘transition’ mobilises divisive constellations. This chapter explores the ways in which uncertainty, terror and fear have haunted the electoral processes in Zimbabwe over the past forty years, and how these have been documented. The current intractable political problems in Zimbabwe can be traced to the majority– minority discourses on ‘national identities’ that compete with alternative visions of nationhood stirred by Robert Mugabe in 1980, when he decided to contest the elections as a breakaway splinter of the Patriotic Front that had been recommended at the Lancaster House agreement in 1979. I argue here for “a polysemic understanding of the past” which is “focused on the gaps, the places of absence where origins are situated in

L. M. Hove (B) North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_2

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the present but as such are unstable haunted grounds” (Haider, 2020, p. 1). This critical discourse analysis allows us to understand the narratives of promise, betrayal and the grammar of violence entrenched in the political, economic and moral features of Zimbabwean elections to generate adaptive and comparatist assessments of postcolonial enunciations about the dystopic entanglements in Zimbabwe. The gory spectacles of what happens before the elections compared to the woundedness that carry futures in Zimbabwe need to be interrogated further as the nation revisits each time the elected take on the mettle to run the nation: “Kutonga kwaro gamba” in the sonic version of one of the praise singers post the coup that installed Mnangagwa into power, and true to the gory history of the liberation struggle, tolerance for those that betray ‘gwara remusangano’ (the ways of the collective), Zimbabwe’s electoral history has been one of scars and corpses. The chapter is primed by the question whether the transition and the installation of Mugabe or even Mnangagwa instantiate new authenticities, militarised bureaucracy predicated on erasure of the in/famous legacies of Robert Mugabe and an incestuously self-referential ideological minting. Critical retrospection seems impossible in the postcolonial genealogy of restless suspicions and guerrilla tactics where adversarial constellations are invariably othered as ‘mahure’ (prostitutes), ‘vatengesi’ (sell-outs), ‘mhandu’ (traitors) or ‘zvimbgwasungata’ (puppets of the West). When the opposition is labelled in these loaded terms, they are policed, imprisoned and denied platforms for different voicing so that ‘magamba’ (the architects of the liberation struggle) can continue to personalise history and loot the state. James Baldwin, acclaimed African-American novelist, essayist and activist of note, once submitted the workaday observation that ‘we are our history’. This apportions agency to the participants in shaping history. The question that remains is how history is remembered, especially when we accede to the fact that interest in the past is most intense in moments of upheaval and crises of legitimacy, as is the case in Zimbabwe in 2023. As looting of national resources, corruption, impunity, tyranny, political accidents, ethnicity, adversarial constellations and violence against Zimbabweans continued, collecting, cataloguing and preserving the truth has never been so vital as a counter-narrative to the choreographed distortions of elections and history that Robert Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa and ZANU (PF) masterminded. The historical record of elections, in particular, has the power to preserve legacies, transform the

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nation and shape identities—but it does not write itself: national elites have corpsed the paths to the ballot box and equally massaged the voting outcomes with uncanny consistency to repress rather than uphold democracy. History is an activity, and what makes it into the archives depends on the actions the ordinary electorate takes now.

History Matters: Crises of Political Legitimacy Krigger (2005, p. 2) sums up the two strategies that ZANU (PF) has deployed in every general election, regardless of its contexts, issues and contestants, to maximise its power. Organised violence and intimidation of the opposition, albeit of varying intensity, has been a recurrent strategy of the ruling party before, during and often after elections to punish constituencies that dare oppose it. The youth wing of the ruling party has been an important instrument of the ruling party’s macabre violence. The perpetrators of election violence have enjoyed impunity, often buttressed by presidential pardons and amnesties. None of the youth league and the vindictive Central Intelligence Organisation members has been brought before the law to atone for the murders and the maiming. Besides coercion, ZANU (PF) has also engaged in a political discourse that demonises its key opponents as reactionary, subversive and often stooges of whites and/or foreigners. Again, Krigger (2005, p. 5) outlines that in 1980, the principal contenders were Abel Muzorewa’s United African National Council (UANC) and the two liberation movements, Robert Mugabe’s ZANU (PF) with its Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU with its Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). There was no common voters’ roll in 1980. Without this common roll, the first elections were conducted at the behest of observer missions while the architects of the ballot were the armed militants of the parties. Violence and intimidation were under-reported. Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front (RF) party won all the 20 seats reserved for whites. This was a recalcitrant show of the obduracy that had characterised white minority rule. It was also a poorly crafted relic from the Lancaster House Conference that recommended a ‘racialised’ transformation by stipulating that there would be these reserved seats. In essence, racialising the electoral process was an affirmation of Ian Smith’s refusal to accept ‘black majority rule…not even a thousand years’. Mugabe’s ZANU (PF) won 57 out of 80 seats and 63% of the vote, authorising him to form

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a new government. What historians and archivists have not reported is the intransigence of the ZANU (PF) military wing, which had retained many of its trained men and women outside the assembly points in case the election results turned out differently. These guerrillas (magamba) remained in their operational areas, goading and coaxing and intimidating voters to cast their choice on the cockerel ( jongwe) symbol of the party, lest they return to the forest to relaunch the armed struggle. The Patriotic Front, the name by which ZAPU contested the election, won 20 seats and just over 24% of the ethnically riven vote, and the UANC, despite the South African government’s financial largesse, won only 3. Despite the public rhetoric of reconciliation, ZANU (PF) receded to its coercive practices: the ruling party’s one-party mentality was evident in its political discourse and use of strongarming. ZANU (PF) used the state media to promote only its war contributions and war songs and used its party slogans and symbols at the first celebration of Heroes’ Days and at the viewing of the first two national heroes’ bodies (Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo and Josiah Tongogara). At rallies, ZANU (PF) used the characteristic war slogans to denigrate ZIPRA, ZAPU and Joshua Nkomo and their role which was disseminated as effete in the armed struggle. In the 1985 elections, ZANU (PF) had to prepare the common voters’ roll and delimit constituencies, for which there had been no time in the 1980 election. There were delays in these preparations that led to the postponement of parliamentary elections from March to June–July 1985. This initial delay and deferring of dates has become a characteristic insignia of manipulation by the ruling party over the years. In 1985, therefore, the contending parties had only nineteen days to campaign. ZANU (PF) this time campaigned on its positive performance in the first five years of independence and doggedly promoted a one-party state. Opposition and democratic processes were silenced. The youth and war veterans sang into the ballot boxes. The dissidents, never exceeding 400 in number, engaged in unspeakable acts of brutality, targeting ZANU (PF) officials and innocent civilians, but the government’s massive counterinsurgency campaign, directed at the armed dissidents and all Ndebele and ZAPU members, killed more innocent civilians as documented in the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report (1989). In the common roll elections which were held in the first four days of July, PF-ZAPU lost 5 seats but held 15, all in Matabeleland. ZANU (PF) gained 7 seats to garner a total of 64 and won 77% of the registered vote. This was 8 seats more than the 56 won without a voters roll—a

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higher percentage than in 1980. Overall turnout—voters as a percentage of those registered—declined from about 84% in 1980 to between 70 and 80%. This could be attributed to the lesser coordinated harassment and goading that characterised 1980 voting patterns. The parliamentary and presidential elections, held from 28 to 30 March 1990, occurred in a new and less simmering political context. The violence against ZAPU/ZIPRA and all Ndebele civilians had ended in a Unity Accord in December 1987, merging ZAPU into ZANU (PF). In a classic mockery of ZAPU, the city of Harare had just finished one of the finest architectural designs along Samora Machel Avenue and named it Karigamombe, the black bull logo for Joshua Nkomo’s party. The merger gave the new united party, still obdurately named ZANU (PF), 99 out of 100 parliamentary seats. Days later, having earlier approved a constitutional amendment to create an executive president with unusually wide powers, parliament ‘voted’ for Mugabe to become president. Mugabe wielded immense Emergency Powers and became Commanderin-Chief of the Defence Forces as well as Chancellor of all universities in the state. Again, Krigger (2005, p. 14) is astute in observing that authoritarian trends were palpable in the rationale for emergency powers applied this time on the Mozambican border against RENAMO in the eastern districts, repression of Harare university and tertiary students, including the near-bombing of MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. The civilians in Manicaland, who bore the brunt of Renamo attacks, had remarkably similar experiences of the atrocities of post-war dehumanisation akin to security forces’ behaviour in Matabeleland during the 1980s. Violence and a tapestry of bloodbaths reared its head again in the fashion of ZANU (PF) tradition and the urgency to stymie opposition. The general elections held on 8–9 April 1995, in Robin Reginald Farquharson’s striking phrase, had ‘a deceptive air of reality about them’ of the type that might have confused casual observers into a belief that a real test of the popular will was in progress. Chan (2012) was later to write a historical tract that he entitled Old treacheries and new deceits, exploring the political landscape of southern Africa, examining how it is poised to change over the next years and what the repercussions are likely to be across the continent. Of the 150 seats in the legislature, 55 ZANU (PF) seats were not contested. The party could, in addition to these 55, count on another 30 seats since the president was mandated to appoint 12 non-constituency members and the political predisposition of the eight provincial governors and ten chiefs elected by local chiefs but

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beholden to the government were all predictable. It is this ‘predictability’ in the outcomes of elections in Zimbabwe under the ruling party and the shambles of ‘international political observers’ that has riled the citizens and the voters. In effect, then 85 seats were already not in contention but, rather, in the hold of ZANU (PF) even before the election started. The ruling party was the only one eligible for state funding. There was massive voter apathy as the results were already clearly in favour of the ruling party. These elections themselves attracted a poll of only 57%, so much less than in 1980 and 1995. Finally, ZANU (PF) could rely upon the plurality of the single member district electoral system to obscure still further any decline in voter popularity (Kadima & David, 2002; Verdery, 1999). The elections saw 161 candidates participate, representing seven parties who were competing for only 65 seats. Of these contestants, ZANU (PF) fielded 65; ZANU-Ndonga (Sithole) fielded 30 and the Forum Party of Zimbabwe (Enoch Dumbutshena, former Chief Justice of the Republic had retired and striven to form a party) fielded 28. Three minor parties fielded a candidate each, and there were 30 who stood as independent candidates (six of the independent candidates were breakaway individuals disgruntled by the machinations in ZANU [PF]). The elections were boycotted by a number of opposition groups including ZUM (Zimbabwe Unity Movement) and the United Parties that announced their decision just a day before they should have made their nominations. They objected to an unfair electoral regulatory framework. They saw through the very porous and malleable electoral framework that Tobaiwa Mudede (Registrar General) shamelessly put forward for the election process. The provisions of the Political Parties Finance Act of 1992 meant that state funding was to be made available only for those parties that had 15% or more electoral support. This effectively resulted in an annual disbursement of Z$32 million to ZANU (PF). The ruling party’s dominance of much of the media also gave it a major advantage. The solo national television, ZBC, and the news channels gave unprecedented airtime to the ruling party, silencing the opposition in toto. Both channels were manned by pliant personnel whose proclivity towards the ruling party was unquestionable.

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The Interregnum Parliament elections were held on 24–25 June 2000. Elections were held for all the popularly chosen seats in Parliament two months after the normal expiry of the members’ term of office. The strong challenge posed to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU [PF]) by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which was formed in September 1999 made the 24–25 June 2000 parliamentary elections the most closely contested since independence from Britain since 1980. Although Zimbabwe has never been a one-party state, ZANU-PF has ruled the country since 1980, making it a de facto one-partystate regime. In February 2000, ZANU-PF had suffered the first defeat in the country’s history, in a constitutional referendum in which the government polled 45% of the votes against 55% for the opposition. This was the official counting as regulated and sanitised by the Registrar General, Tobaiwa Mudede. To date, many citizens remain sceptical about the counting of the votes that took over two months. The opposition rejected the draft Constitution which would have increased President Robert Mugabe’s executive and emergency powers, allowing him to dissolve Cabinet and Parliament and rule by decree. In the inchoate political violence during the period between the constitutional referendum and the general elections, 30 lives were lost (many were opposition activists; the figure is what was officially reported but the numbers of those that died or were delimbed is unofficially higher). Over 100 were injured, and at least 6,500 were displaced and substantial damage was caused to personal and public property. On 16 May, President Mugabe announced the date of the parliamentary elections, dismissing high speculation that he might cancel the polls (initially scheduled for April). This slight postponement (another trick in the arsenal of massaging voter patterns) was intended to allow sufficient time for adequate preparation (read ambushing the voters and threatening them to the point of death if they voted for ‘change’ or otherwise). The electoral campaign was launched on 7 April, a day after the outgoing Parliament, dominated by the ZANU-PF, approved a bill empowering the government to seize hundreds of white-owned farms without paying compensation. In retrospect, this presidential authorisation to seize the land was prompted by the treachery of the British government when it rescinded support for land reclamation as enshrined in the Lancaster

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House Agreement. Under its land reform programme, the Government wanted white farmers—who owned more than 70% of the country’s arable and productive land—to give up half of their land holdings for redistribution to landless peasants. Opponents of the president accused him of using the land issue to demonise the opposition while securing support among the rural poor, straining race relations and plunging Zimbabwe into a crisis which the country has not been able to resolve. The electoral campaign was characterised by incendiary political violence: the MDC complained that it could campaign safely only in 25 out of 120 constituencies. Another subject of contention in the political campaign was the disastrous economic situation, including a dire shortage of foreign exchange and an unprecedented high inflation. Zimbabwe denied many international observers accreditation to monitor the elections. An American observer group was pulled out of Zimbabwe after describing the election as the worst it had ever seen. UN observers, self-appointed arbiters of the rule of law and democracy, also withdrew from the country. Unlike the past three parliamentary elections which had been characterised by voter apathy, more than five million people registered to vote and a total of 566 candidates stood for the election, the first in which the ruling ZANU-PF party was opposed in all 120 constituencies. Despite months of fierce pre-election violence, on the day of the elections, Zimbabweans voted peacefully, but the head of the European Union observers described the contest as seriously flawed. Again, the same registrar general was in charge of the process, propped by a military-led consortium housed at Defence House along Second Street that was called Joint Military Operations. Results showed that the ZANU-PF had gained a narrow victory while suffering serious losses. It won 62 of the 120 directly elected seats, while the MDC won 57. The remaining seat went to an independent candidate. Under the Constitution, President Mugabe could appoint 20 members of the 150-member parliament and 10 more MPs elected by traditional chiefs. Nearly a month after the elections, on 18 July 2000, the newly elected members of parliament were sworn in. They elected as Speaker, by secret ballot, the former Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, the government’s candidate for the post. From minister of (in)justice, Mnangagwa became Speaker of Parliament, a Squealer-like role from the acclaimed Animal Farm.

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STATISTICS Round no 1 (24 June 2000): Elections results Number of registered electors Voters

5,049,815 2,490,556 (49%)

Round no 1: Distribution of seats Political Group ZANU-PF Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Independents

Total 62 57 1

Comments: The other 30 seats: 20 appointed by the Head of State and 10 traditional chiefs

Distribution of seats according to sex: Men: Women: Per cent of women:

136 14 9.33%

The skewness in the gender representation is a subject for another chapter, but suffice to state that perhaps this fortifies the patriarchal nature of Zimbabwean politics and the toxic masculinity of violence in the electoral process manned by phallocentric ‘dividuals ’.

The Realpolitik of the Army’s Operation Restore Legacy In an article called “Repetition without change” critical discourse analysis establishes that Operation Restore Legacy was a dramatic displacement of Robert Mugabe that culminated in repetition and no meaningful metamorphosis to the timbre of life for ordinary citizens. As in the past, the general citizens’ emotions were whetted on the drop sides of armoured vehicles that lined the streets of Harare. In the inner chambers of several rendezvous, ‘old and new treacheries’ were being minted. A cabinet

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was being named, with many army generals and military veterans for the ‘new dispensation’. Autoethnography and biography tampered the moment and vilified Robert Mugabe while others preened the scales off ‘the crocodile, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa’ for his inauguration as president of Zimbabwe. Ndlovu’s book, In the Jaws of the Crocodile, ‘romances the coup… while Nyarota’s The Graceless Fall of Robert Mugabe’, is a ‘soberer historical take’ (Moore, 2018, p. 2). The books, about the end of Mugabe’s nearly four decades of ruling Zimbabwe, arrive at a time when journalists have to constantly rush to beat tweets and Facebook posts. This haste can work against their claim to be offering something closer to truth’s complexities than can be rendered in 280 characters… [What we need is more than] a hagiography of Mnangagwa… [We] need deconstruction, not replication (Moore, 2018, p. 2). Spurred by Mugabe’s removal from State House, the texts project the ambivalence of belonging in a postcolonial state that reverts to an intricate state security apparatus, much to the chagrin of both the national and international communities. Be they political autobiographies, documentaries or musical performances, the texts minted on the eve of Mnangagwa’s inauguration reflect and refract interpretations based on the cultural, social, gender, class and personal politics, making all writing positioned and within a specific stance (Creswell, 2007, p. 179). I, therefore, trace the instances of textual ‘undecidability’ in so far as these writings and renditions have ‘subtexts’ that position the material spectacles of transition within the historical moments before and after the ‘epiphany of the coup de grace’.

The Legacies of Terror and Violence After the coup-that-was-not-a-coup dubbed “Operation Restore Legacy” and the subsequent removal of Robert Mugabe from the presidency of Zimbabwe in November 2017, the nation ‘inaugurated and commissioned’ a symbol of radical alterity that haunted and continues to plague it. An elaborate grammar of violence overlayed by promise characterised November 2017 (Mukonori, 2017). The presidency in Zimbabwe became an instantiation of the ‘intimate enemy’, the uncanny stranger in the nation who fought against incarceration and torture till the lowering of the Union Jack, but soon reinvented the same mechanisms

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of subjugating ‘the people’ through the invention of new, convenient constellations of ethnic and political assemblages. Read through the lens of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011, p. 12), the military cabinet of Emmerson Mnangagwa was ‘repetition without change,’ a nationalist monologic Chimurenga history in Zimbabwe that propped up the nationalists’ claims to being the progenitors and guardians of the postcolonial nation. Edyta Lorek-Jezinska ´ and Katarzyna Wi˛eckowska (2017, p. 8) describe ghosts as a capacious conceptual category by which a whole range of meanings and implications are expressed. They can be used to analyse processes of textual and social exclusion of marginalised others or to deconstruct hegemonic procedures behind the construction of norms, identities and literary canons. Nyarota (2018, p. 163) insists that what the myriad ‘ghosts’ at the National Heroes Acre and State House share are the urgency of the voice of the spectre and the questions of responsibility and responsiveness to the Zimbabwean crisis. This analytic trope is also usefully deployed in Fontein (2018, p. 54) who recognises that ‘one problem that any discussion of rumours faces, like studies of jokes and humor, is that what they mean or rather do is so context dependent; their efficacy is dependent upon their performance and reception as much as on their ‘content’ per se’.

The Memorialisation of Dead Bodies Muchemwa (2010, p. 2) makes a trenchant observation in stating that, in the first decade after 1980, the new postcolonial Zimbabwean state embarked on a massive project of replacing the colonial grand narrative with one that [told] the stories of all its citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion and gender. In addition to renaming all the roads leading into and out of all towns in Zimbabwe after Robert Mugabe, one of the most remarkable projects was the architectural design of the National Heroes Acre where, beyond the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the purpose was to immortalise, memorialise and commemorate the remains of select participants in the struggle for national sovereignty. This project inaugurated a spectacular visual, oral, grand and authorised narration of the nation. The shrine was trashed when questionable personalities and non-heroes were accorded national honours at the acre. It is also important to note that when Robert Mugabe died outside Zimbabwe in 2019, he stated he would not want to be buried at the national shrine, yet Emmerson Mnangagwa and the politburo insisted on burying millions

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of scarce foreign currency in designing a final resting place for Mugabe at the desacralised national shrine. Mnangagwa was replicating the script of ‘selective burial of heroes at the shrine’ when all the citizens needed no reminder of who the real heroes were. Hove (2021, p. 134) observes that there is an uncanny irony that of all Zimbabwe’s rulers, Ian Smith, Abel Muzorewa, Canaan Banana and Robert Mugabe, none is interred at this national shrine for a diverse range of ‘reasons’. The war of liberation becomes the master script of memorialisation and sacrifice for the reclamation of the land in 1980 as much as it is in 2023. History is not an academic exercise in Zimbabwe—whoever controls the past controls the future and Terence Ranger, a British-born historian, characterises this as “patriotic history” (Ranger, 2004). Ranger said this patriotic history “is intended to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition [repudiating] academic historiography [whose] attempt [is] to complicate and question”. One observes in the two narratives of Ndlovu and Nyarota what I read as a dramaturgy of distancing and proximation: Nyarota evaluates and celebrates the ousting of a dictator while Ndlovu privileges the inauguration of Mnangagwa, focusing only on how Mugabe had consistently performed a clever balancing act, playing the Lacoste faction off against the G-40 and fostering internal rivalries that kept all sides accountable only to him as the centre. Throughout the narrative, In the Jaws seeks to inscribe that Mugabe underestimated the clout of Chiwenga and Mnangagwa, showing how this politicomilitary axis moved swiftly to prevent the detention of Chiwenga, relocate Mnangagwa to South Africa for his own safety and effectively place Mugabe under house arrest. Ndlovu curates Mnangagwa’s political ascension so that it appears to have emerged from an orderly process within ZANU-PF itself because then the Lacoste leaders materialise as having planned to use economic recovery as the foundation of domestic legitimacy. Ndlovu races to erase significant interpellations in the inauguration of Mnangagwa. He is, therefore, enthusiastic to report on his own report “End of an era as Mugabe finally resigns” in the front page of Business Day on 22 November 2017 (Ndlovu, 2018, p. 173) rather than reflexively examine the subtexts and counter-texts in the spectacles of transition. He is, of course, ‘writing history from the position of convenient alignment’, where he ‘repudiates academic historiography with its attempts to complicate and question’ (Ranger, 2004).

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Ndlovu trivialises the tensions and machinations while Nyarota appears to appreciate the complexity of politricking at play. Nyarota concedes that Mnangagwa’s decision to hold an ‘early’ election can be seen to have been motivated by two factors. First, there was the need to legitimate his rule both domestically and internationally, otherwise he risked alienation as a coup leader. If ZANU-PF, the party from which he had been summarily expelled and which he now led, could win a competitive election, difficult questions about the ‘military-assisted transition’ would quickly fade. Nyarota also observes that the second imperative was that Mnangagwa desired to establish a strong mandate to assert his own authority over the ruling party and government itself, a phenomenon aptly captured in the phrase ‘repetition without change’. This dimension is clarified in the inescapable reality that the new political dispensation was beset by civil-military tensions. Beardsworth et al. (2019, p. 4) are accurate in submitting that senior military figures were rewarded for their role in removing Mugabe, starkly marked by the appointment of Chiwenga as Vice President and Minister of a collapsed health system. There are unsubstantiated claims that Chiwenga demanded that a quota of positions within the party and bureaucracy be reserved for military leaders. This explains the appointment (and subsequent elimination) of Perence Shiri (he masterminded the Gukurahundi massacres in the Midlands and Matabeleland Province in the 1980s, together with Major General Sibusiso Moyo (the general who became the face of the military takeover and then died in inexplicable circumstances) as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Later, another military strategist, Rex Nhongo (Solomon Mujuru) was to die in a blaze on a farm he had taken over from a white owner). Such claims resonated with Zimbabwean citizens in part because the last two decades have seen a gradual process through which the state has been militarised (Fontein, 2010; Kilgore, 2007).

Massaging the Ballot and Indexing Popularity The fractious politics in ZANU (PF) that Nyarota traces in Chapter 6 (Origins of factionalism) illustrate closely how the party polarised the nation, fragmenting the people of Zimbabwe into patriots, war veterans, puppets, traitors, sell-outs, born-frees and enemies of the nation. Mnangagwa’s hallmark speeches after the inauguration exhibit such categorisations. “Pasi nemhandu” (loosely, let us deftly rid ourselves of traitors)

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illustrates how the same ‘old treacheries and new deceits project the citizens as non-patriotic sell-outs and an enemies of the people’. There are a number of studies that have adequately shown that the political crisis in Zimbabwe was equally an economic crisis, a social crisis as well as a crisis of expectations, history and social identity (Alexander & McGregor, 2013; Chigudu, 2019; Hammar et al., 2003; Muchemwa, 2010, p. 505; Raftopoulos, 2003). In the ensuing melee, anger and outrage were violently stymied by state political apparatuses, reinforcing a national sense of indignation and impotence. There is a patina of adequacy when Nyarota shows how this economic slide paralleled a decline in the legitimacy and popularity of the ruling party: ZANU (PF) has consistently manipulated election processes and outcomes so as to remain in power, however much the opposition fares in the race (Busby, 2020; Chimhanda, 2003; Davis, 2005). If ever Mugabe’s concern was ‘the welfare of the people of Zimbabwe’ and that he had a ‘desire to ensure a smooth, peaceful and non-violent transfer of power that underpins national security, peace and stability’, then the supplement in Mnangagwa has morphed the same script with no substantial development in the nation and the welfare of its citizens. ZANU-PF under Mnangagwa has not shown any paradigm shift from authoritarianism and violence to democracy and tolerance of opposition, repressive traits that were perfected under Mugabe. In the post-election violence of 2018, Ray Ndlovu (2018, pp. 196–198) fast-paces the narrative perhaps to match the multiplicity of incongruous events that were unfolding. Then he states: “The Crocodile’s hold on power had only been delayed, but not denied”. This statement leaves a foul after-taste, considering that this is made immediately after the alienating verdict of Justice Malaba: It is not for the court to decide elections; it is the people. It is the duty of the court to strive in public interest to sustain that which the people have expressed their will in. Therefore this application ought to be dismissed with costs…Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa is duly declared the winner of the presidential election held on the 30th of July 2018.

Exactly a page afterwards, Ndlovu seems to contradict himself: “The victory of Emmerson Mnangagwa in the ZANU (PF) succession race in 2017 was not just a personal triumph against rivals in the ruling party who intended to put an end to his long political career…it was a victory that

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had far greater importance…The triumph of November 2017 symbolised a victory for the military. The military had once again confirmed its status as the ultimate kingmakers in Zimbabwe’s politics” (Ndlovu, 2018, p. 199). The judiciary dismisses with costs a legitimate challenge, the military in General Phillip Valerio Sibanda denies any knowledge of who ‘had ordered the deployment of the army onto the streets of Harare to beat up people at night’ and the fourth estate in Ndlovu cauterises post-election violence: “while the defeated Cobra talked war, the victorious Crocodile pledged peace at State House” (Ndlovu, 2018, p. 196). Mnangagwa was a party to Mugabe’s securocratic arsenal and looting kleptocracy since 1980 and earlier even. In retrospect, the pungwes of the liberation war were repeated encounters and rehearsals of indoctrination. The Chimurenga liberation song is a polysemous and liminal composition (Khan, 2018), invested with the capacity to resist the reification and reductive symmetries of a grand cultural narrative (Titlestad, 2004), promoted by partisan politics.

In Closing Mnangagwa has reacted to contesting voices in what we read as compulsive ways. Mnangagwa’s perfect script of victory began to fall apart upon the announcement of ‘massaged election results’. When Nelson Chamisa and opposition protesters took to the streets of Harare following allegations that the presidential election result was being rigged in favour of ZANU (PF), they met with a hard-line military response that led to the death of seven people. The militarisation had long been consolidated by the removal of police from the national space, especially from roadblocks, and their replacement by soldiers from the barracks. Then, in early 2019, protests against an increase in the price of fuel—amidst a deteriorating economic situation—were brutally put down by the security forces, while access to the internet was shut down. The Mugabe era is replicated without change. This raises a challenging question in trying to explain the inconsistency in the Mnangagwa’s rule. The Chimurenga aristocracy (Muchemwa, 2010; Radway, 2008) enacted in the hierarchisation of heroism into national, provincial and district heroes continues in the transition, with Perence Shiri declared a national hero in 2020 despite his gory participation in Gukurahundi. Hove (2021, p. 138) argues that this is illustrative of the selective memory of ZANU (PF), where patriotic corpses are always readily available to

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sustain the rhetoric of heroic sacrifice. The “limits to liberation” are predicated on an explication of Chimurenga ideology, the extermination strategy of Gukurahundi, the haughtiness of “Operation Murambatsvina”, as well as the intransigence of “Operation Restore Legacy” as the four pillars of ZANU (PF)’s drive for hegemony (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). The arrest and incarceration of journalists in 2020, the inflationary economy and the tacit dangers of a speculative rumour archive all make for an inflamed future in a transition that seems not to have offered a meaningful change. Elections in Zimbabwe, as demonstrated in this chapter, have a long and embossed history of violence, intimidation, manipulation of outcomes and the unchanging priming, recycling and reinstatement of old treacheries and new deceits.

References Alexander, J., & McGregor, J. (2013). Introduction: Politics, patronage and violence in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies, 39(4), 749–763. Beardsworth, N., Cheeseman, N., & Tinhu, S. (2019). Zimbabwe: The coup that was, and the election that could have been. African Affairs, 1–17. https:// doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adz009 Busby, M. (2020). Archiving Black America. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/? msgControlName=reply_to_sender&msgConversationId=669347092100657 5616&msgOverlay=true. Accessed 28 July 2020. Chan, S. (2012). Old treacheries, new deceits: Insights in Southern African politics. Jonathan Ball Publishers. Chigudu, S. (2019). The politics of cholera, crisis and citizenship in urban Zimbabwe: ‘People were dying like flies.’ African Affairs, 118(472), 413– 434. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady068 Chimhanda, C. C. (2003). ZAPU and the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe 1957– 1980 (PhD thesis). University of Cape Town. Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative research designs: Selection and implementation. The Journal of School Nursing, 35(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/001 1000006287390 Davis, C. (2005, July). État Présent: Hauntology, spectres and phantoms. French Studies, 59(3), 373–379. https://doi.org/10.1093/fs/kni143, 24 August 2016. Fontein, J. (2010). Between tortured bodies and resurfacing bones: The politics of the dead in Zimbabwe. Journal of Material Culture, 15(4), 423–448. Fontein, J. (2018). Political accidents in Zimbabwe. Kronos, 44, 33–58. https:// doi.org/10.17159/2309-9585/2018/v44a3

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Haider, N. (2020). Spectrality, partition and borders. South Asian Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/02759527.2020.1765070 Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B., & Jensen, S. (2003). Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: Rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crisis. Weaver Press. Hove, M. L. (2021). Spectacles of transition: Texts and counter-texts in the historiography of Zimbabwe in transition. In O. Nyambi, T. Mangena, & G. Ncube (Eds.), Cultures of change in contemporary Zimbabwe: Socio-political transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa. https://doi.org/10.4324/978100 3190271-12 Kadima, D. T. L., & David, P. (Eds.). (2002). Zimbabwe. In Compendium of elections in Southern Africa (pp. 443–445). EISA. Khan, K. B. (2018). Girls of war and echoes of liberation: Engaging female voices through Chimurenga songs about Zimbabwe’s armed struggle. Muziki, 15(1), 58–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/18125980.2016.1249165 Kilgore, J. (2007). We are all Zimbabweans now. Random House Struick. Krigger, N. (2005, January). ZANU (PF) strategies in general elections, 1980– 2000: Discourse and coercion. African Affairs, 104(414), 1–34. Lorek-Jezinska, ´ E., & Katarzyna, W. (2017). Hauntology and cognition: Questions of knowledges, pasts and futures. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum. https://doi.org/10.12775/ths.2017.001 Moore, D. B. (2018). Zimbabwe minus Mugabe: Two books on his fall and Mnangagwa’s rise. News24. Available at: https://www.news24.com/new s24/zimbabwe-minus-mugabe-two-books-on-his-fall-and-mnangagwas-rise20181218 Muchemwa, K. Z. (2010). Galas, biras, state funerals and the necropolitan imagination in re-constructions of the Zimbabwean nation, 1980–2008. Social Dynamics, 36(3), 504–514. https://doi.org/10.1080/02533952. 2010.517623 Mukonori, Father Fidelis S. J. (2017). Man in the middle: A memoir. The House of Books. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2011, June 15–18). The construction and decline of Chimurenga Monologue in Zimbabwe: A study in resilience of ideology and limits of alternatives. Paper presented under Panel 109: Contestations over Memory and Nationhood: Comparative Perspectives from East and Southern Africa at the 4th European Conference on African Studies (ECAS4) on the theme: “African Engagements: On Whose Terms?” held at Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2012). Rethinking “Chimurenga” and “Gukurahundi” in Zimbabwe: A critique of Partisan national history. African Studies Review, 55(3), 1–26.

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Ndlovu, R. (2018). In the jaws of the crocodile: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s rise to power in in Zimbabwe. Penguin Random House. Nyarota, G. (2018). The graceless fall of Robert Mugabe: The end of a dictator’s reign. Penguin Random House. Radway, J. (2008). Foreword. In A. F. Gordon (Ed.), Ghostly matters: Haunting and the sociological imagination (2nd ed., pp. vii–xiii). University of Minnesota Press. Raftopoulos, B. (2003). The state in crisis: Authoritarian nationalism, selective citizenship and distortions of democracy in Zimbabwe. In A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos, & S. Jensen (Eds.), Zimbabwe’s unfinished business. Weaver Press. Ranger, T. (2004). Nationalist historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: The struggle over the past in Zimbabwe. Journal of southern African studies, 30(2), 215–234. Titlestad, M. (2004). Making the changes: Jazz in South African literature and reportage. Unisa Press. Verdery, K. (1999). The political lives of dead bodies: Reburial and post socialist change. Columbia University Press.

CHAPTER 3

The Paradox of Postcolonial Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Zimbabwe’s False Dawns Tawanda Shura and Isaac Mhute

Extended Synopsis The advent of independence in 1980 was a defining moment for Zimbabwe. It was a time that many thought would be driven and indexed on celebratory conviviality since the thinking was that the country had transitioned from the quagmire of coloniality to the yearned for political, economic and social Mecca. Rightly so, the people were traversing on a given—Zimbabwe was now independent, Mugabe was in power, reconciliation was the running leitmotif, the Zimbabwe dollar was at par with the British pound, the same was also weightily better than the greenback and Robert Nesta Marley (Mugabe’s namesake) performed at Rufaro

T. Shura Tafara High 1 School, Harare, Zimbabwe I. Mhute (B) Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_3

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stadium in rhapsodic approbation of a new socio-political order. All this was stoutly evincive of something special coming from Black Africa. The questions that incessantly begged being are: Was this progressive trajectory going to be a sustained continuum? and Was Mugabe going to remain incorruptible and pro-poor constant? Mugabe was human. Mugabe also had his human foibles that ultimately blemished his record. It is also chronicled here that it was not Mugabe alone since he did not occur and/or exist in a social or political lacunae. The politics round and around Mugabe proved punishing. The Black Socialist, that Mugabe was, had a panoply of constituents and constituencies to please and gradually he and the country were creaking through and sooner than later the wheels were off. The Black Zimbabweans wanted land. They wanted jobs and the stipendiary rewards that do come with the territory. It should be noted here that the land issue was the galvanising force that led many Zimbabweans to abandon all that mattered in their lives (be it schooling, family or jobs) and in substitution came in the yearning for the freedom and liberation of one’s country. This land that they considered sacred heritage was never a realised phenomenon. The land remained in the hands of the erstwhile colonial Caucasian and the paradox of it all being that such a cohort constituted a nominal fraction of the larger and bigger African population. This was ultra-heterodox, an aberration from the norm. More so, this was obtaining in “independent” Zimbabwe. The ZANU-PF government dithered and the people took it upon themselves to be their liberators. They deployed coercion as a means to be legatees to the lands of “their” ancestors. Their modus operandi was the principle of natural justice—that which was fraudulently deprived of one should in-like-manner be repossessed. Mugabe acted, albeit late, and the definitive land reform roller coaster was activated. The world, most especially Tony Blair’s United Kingdom and Bush’s United States, cried fouled and responded with the so-called “illegal sanctions” in place to date. This was despite the fact that just after 1980 and a couple of years thereafter, Mugabe was tagged the “darling of the West”. Gukurahundi was and is still an albatross on the necks of Zimbabwean politicians, most especially Robert Mugabe and President Emmerson Mnangagwa. This was an anathema since it involved a lot of bloodletting and paradoxically it was not a fight against Rhodism but one that pitied the Shona against the Ndebele. It is estimated that at least 20,000 Ndebeles, and those who were thought to be in league with the same,

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became victims of extrajudicial deaths and/or murders at the hands of the North Korean interned fifth brigade. It is alleged that the crime of the Ndebeles was that they were thought to be the founts of the dissident menace that was spreading like a festooned cancerous wound in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands provinces. After the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU, the former late president of Zimbabwe, Robert Gabriel Mugabe could only manage a weakened paraadmission: “it was a moment of madness”. It is only now that the “Second Republic” is seized with the matter with the aim of bringing the issue to rest through a commission of inquiry. The Chiefs in the affected areas are seen as reference points since the spirits of the dead need to be appeased and atonement activated. It is the thinking of the present ZANU-PF government that compensatory awards should be extended to the affected families. Noted it should be the fact that this Gukurahundi debacle has resulted in an iron curtain that separates the Shona and the Ndebele, thus it is hoped that the foreseen government intervention will not be one of the episodic political posturing that brings nothing more than false dawns. In line with the above, Mhiripiri (2015, p. 192) takes a different view and argues that the hitherto subsisting image of Zimbabwe as a “jewel of Africa” is being systematically dismembered since the political and economic direction the country is now taking divergent and incompatible to “international interests”. The scholar further argues that a myriad of scholars have brought to notice the “rogue regime” status of Zimbabwe. Mhiripiri (2015) is rather cynical and sceptical as regards this kind of framing of the Zimbabwe story. First, the scholar posits that the Zimbabwean government’s image as plummeted to rock bottom level because European and North American “business interests” and “land ownership” are under threat “from a Zimbabwean state that purports to be redistributing wealth to its own marginalised people”. What is of critical interest from the Mhiripiri thesis is the idea of a subtle two-pronged approach whereby both Occident and/or North American capitalistic and cannibalistic interests as well as the Zimbabwe government’s foxy and manipulative tendencies are under scathing attacks? The use of the word “purports” strongly points to a Zimbabwean government that is accused of employing deception as a tool to curry political traction and favours from the Zimbabwean masses. The scepticism does not end there. The aforementioned “Gukurahundi” is referred to by Mhiripiri as the “socalled Gukurahundi massacres”. This then brings us back to the focus of this chapter whereby the post-independence state of the Zimbabwean

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State is framed as being unbearably chaotic. Despite an admission from the high places of power that the Gukurahundi epoch was part of the dark times that soiled the humanity of Zimbabweans (a period framed by the late former president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe as a moment of madness), some are of the opinion that at most Gukurahundi only qualifies the prefix “so-called”. This may be correct to some extent since political activists suffix the word Gukurahundi with “massacre”. For the ZANU-PF government, this was just the beginning of trouble in paradise. It seems fate and the Occident were in collusive complicity. The Bretton Woods Institutions in the ilk of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank came knocking and under their sleeves was the fatal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (hereafter referred to as ESAP). The net effects were stratospheric inflation, mass job losses, suppressed and depressed local industry enhancement and grinding penury. This was ironic and paradoxical. The loans that were extended by the said institutions were meant to serve and save Zimbabwe from the vagaries of the unpredictable world economic spaces. The inverse happened and the purple bubbles that were a result of Zimbabwe’s independence soon busted and the independence euphoria was deflated. The people were disgruntled and disillusioned. The ultimate feeling was that of displacement. The masses felt displaced because the advent of independence had elevated them to the lofty pedestals of the comfort zone that come with independence, freedom, fraternity and liberty. This was now all Utopian. Compounding the situation was the opaque politics of the day. The ubiquity of influence peddling was now the order of the day—Willogate and Willowvale Scandals pervaded the body politic. High ranking ministers were accused of putrid corruption. The names Maurice Nyagumbo, Enos Nkala and Kumbirai Kangai fall in this cohort. It was now black on black thus pointing to the crude reality that ugliness, be it political, economic and/or social is an inherent human trait that should never be aligned to race, creed, skin pigmentation or any other prejudice. Infighting in ZANU-PF results in the formation of parties like the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) fronted by Edgar Tekere hitherto Mugabe’s right-hand man. Zanu Ndonga also comes to the fold. This lucidly points to the fact that the politics of the land was now poisoned and this mushrooming of new political entities was a sign that a myriad of alternative views were pervasive in the country and these also wanted their space in the Zimbabwean political sun. The early years of the 2000s were politically defining. The Movement for Democratic Change was

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formed under the headship of Morgan Richard Tsvangirai. This proved to be a decisive test for the Mugabe ZANU-PF government. In 2008, the harmonised national elections resulted in a hung government. A rerun was done. The MDC pulled out and the international community tagged the elections “bloody” and “sham”. ZANU-PF was accused of hacking down its own people but who were accused of supporting the MDC. The MDC was also accused of being a violent disposition both metaphorically and literally. Those of a ZANU-PF persuasion accused the MDC of being the authors of the economic sanctions that were playing havoc to the Zimbabwean economy. The same political cohort was also accused of perpetrating violence against all whom they believed to be supporters of ZANU-PF. Tsvangirai died in 2017 and Nelson Chamisa took over the reins of power and an umbrella political outfit code named the MDC Alliance was born. The alliance was dismembered due to political differences and another political outfit: MDC-T, led by one Douglas Mwonzora came to the fore. A political tussle ensued between MDC Alliance and MDC-T over assets and party name resulting in the Citizens Coalition for Change being formed under the leadership of Nelson Chamisa. Meanwhile, there was political turmoil in ZANU-PF as Mugabe got overthrown through an alleged military-assisted putsch. Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa took over as the First Secretary of ZANU-PF as well as the new Chief of the Zimbabwe government resulting in the birth of the Second Republic. This was considered a new dawn by all and sundry. Just as Morgan Tsvangirai was Robert Mugabe’s nemesis, Nelson Chamisa became Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa’s bane. The above palpably exhibits the tragedies that visited upon and still visit Zimbabwe—the Postindependence trauma, trials, hardships, deficiencies and prejudices. The above does capture a slew of false and oftentimes missteps that defined the Zimbabwean body politic from Independence Day to the present Second Republic epoch.

Communicative Strategics: Practicality or Moot Nous The Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa government adorably calls itself the second republic. This is alive to the idea that they want to draw that line of divide that separates them from the Mugabe government or “regime”. The fact that they tag themselves thus is intended as a pointer

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to positive deviations and variances comparatively to former President Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s government. It should be recorded here that a conspicuously palpable ‘them’ and ‘us’ principle is under application whereby the “them” is shrouded in Cimmerian and socially hideous darkness and the “us” is a political foil and antonym of and to the “them”. The “us” is the second republic that associatively exhibits a generative rather than a degenerative transition. Jakaza (2022, p. 188) posits that whenever a nation has a chance to change its leadership, a chance also presents itself to “communicate their desired plans and prognosis of a new leadership and country”. The same further adduces that, “the new leadership is presented with opportunities to strategically communicate their distinctiveness”. This is exactly what the new ZANU-PF government has managed to do and this is what Jakaza (2022) calls “discontinuance discourses as an organisation’s strategic communication”. Allied to the above is the communicative strategics from the Nelson Chamisa-led political ensemble. Whereas ZANU-PF ardent operators see themselves as constituting the second republic, Chamisa’s CCC frame the same as an aberration from the yearned for political scheme of things, and hence negatively labels them as a “regime”. It is worth noting that the word regime here takes a crude, murky and opaque leaning and as such is a pointer to a dearth of all democratic principles that vehicle modern nation-states. On the other hand, the word “republic”, as deployed by the Mnangagwa government, seeks to position the same as a government steeped in the ethos of modern forms of governance where tenets of egalitarianism, rule of law, human rights, freedom of expression and association are the pillars that define the existential matrix. The hanging question is: What is it that the second republic has done for the masses that in turn is of political or social or economic agency and traction? Unemployment is reportedly high and on the increase. Grinding abjection is the in-vogue social malady and the psyche of the wretched is overburdened by disillusionment, disequilibrium and disenchantment. Meanwhile, in tagging the ZANU-PF government a “regime” the CCC is implicitly arguing that what it will politically offer if given a chance would be a better proposition devoid of the alleged ZANU-PF excesses. The paradox, however, being that Nelson Chamisa seems to frame the Zimbabwean masses as foolish and gullible to the extent of thinking of “spaghetti roads” before earning a living wage or before being able to electrify the countryside or fully macadamise the Zimbabwe road network. The above exemplifications are stout pointers to the ill use of supposed

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strategic communication. Here the strategics are indexed on the warped ethos of deception, manipulation and systematic misuse of that which should be strategic communication. Hallahan et al. (2007, p. 4) argue that there are various communicative stratas that are employed by organisations so as to fulfil their objectives. Of traction with regard to this discussion is political communication. The scholars posit that the purpose of political communication is to “build political consensus” and to “influence voting in elections…”. This chapter argues that ZANU-PF and CCC seem not to be using political communication, as advanced and advised by Hallahan et al. (2007). There is no generation when the whole gamut of ZANU-PF political campaign messages is vortexed on the ED Pfee rhetoric. The messages on their own sound aesthetically pleasing but is it all that matters? Why not base the political campaigning and marketing on bread and butter issues like worker salaries, infrastructural development, industrial advancement and a globalised social zeitgeist? The ED Pfee mantra seems to be footnoted on the notion that, through an uncanny cunning manner, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa would be the president of Zimbabwe. That which the CCC considers strategic communication is rather devoid of such. Their argument is premised on the “Godisinit ” dictum. This is a Machiavellian campaign message by the CCC political party to invoke God’s name in its political games all in an attempt to hoodwink the voting publics into believing that it is God’s will that it is now time that CCC in general and Nelson Chamisa in particular should rule Zimbabwe. This is done under the knowledge that a couple of millions of the Zimbabwean population subscribe to the notion of God or Musikavanhu as the earthly torch-bearer, thus when God’s name is called upon then chances are stout that people will stop and ponder on the messages that come thereafter. Argenti et al. (2005, p. 83) are of the opinion that strategic communication “is communication aligned with the organisation’s overall strategy to enhance its strategic positioning”. Similarly, Hallahan et al. (2007, p. 4) unpack the same as purposeful communication that is aimed at advancing an organisation’s mission. It is, therefore, argued here that any communication as argued by the above collage of scholars is strategic as long as the aim is to enhance and advance the organisation’s mission, never mind the means deployed to convey the communication. This seems to be exactly what ZANU-PF and CCC have done. All they seem to care about is their winning of elections and at whose expense they do not care. It is, thus argued that the political campaign messages by both parties are rancid

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and stale since they are divorced from the yearnings, hopes, dreams and aspirations of the voting publics. The irony of it all is that naturally and ordinarily there should be a social contract between a political party and its voter and/or would-be voter niche. The anticipated social reciprocity is never factored in by the two foxy political entities.

Language Policy and False Dawns Ngugi (1987) argues that language is a carrier of culture and this has proven to be a truism in as far as Zimbabwe is concerned. For example, the Shona concepts of “Baba” or “Amai” cannot be equated to “Father” or “Mother” in relation to the Occidental ways of knowing. In Shona culture, the said concepts are pointers to the biological matrix of being the source of the offspring(s) as well as being an epitome of respect and reverence for anyone of adult or elderly stature and station. As regards the Westphalian ways of knowing, “Father” and “Mother” are mere pointers to fathering and mothering in the context of the role or roles during the sexual handshake between husband and wife and that which ultimately results in the birth of a child or children. The continued use of the English language as the main language of choice for a slew of national contexts is one of the foremost colonial relics, hence the Ngugian argumentation of the need to “decolonise” the African psyche and mind. It is now forty-two years after Zimbabwe gained its independence but still the English language towers over other national languages like Shona and Ndebele. Job interviews are mainly conducted in English, the teaching–learning enterprise is largely an English language affair and even courting or wooing is done in English. Those who deploy the so-called queen’s language for the previously mentioned rituals are considered sophisticated, refined, polished and smart. Those who use any of the Aboriginal languages are tagged as rustic and archaic. It is in this vein that Tollefson (2002, p. 179) opines that, “in multilingual states, language policies in education play a central role in state efforts to manage language conflict”. Linearly, Obeng (2002, p. 71) argues that “most African governments have vacillated in their rhetoric and their practice concerning language policies but proceed with little or no implementation of such policies because of their fear of stepping on some big toes, both at home and abroad, and, therefore, causing political turmoil or losing political power”. This seems true because Murungudzi (2009, pp. 24– 25) postulates that there are fifteen minority languages in Zimbabwe viz:

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Katanga, Nyanja/Chewa, Tonga of Mudzi District, Tonga, Shangani/ Tsonga, Sotho, Venda, Kunda, Xhosa, Sena, Hwesa, Nambya and Barwe. The Zimbabwe government has since declared sixteen official languages but the paradox that clogs the mental horizons of a Zimbabwean linguist or strategic communicator being none of the above fifteen languages are of national currency and colour. Their usage is all but regional if not sectile. Zimbabwe boasts of being one of the countries that come tops in Africa as regards literacy levels and rates. It is worth noting that literacy simply implies the ability to read and write, thus it does not translate to social, cultural, political or economic astuteness. More so, the literacy levels that would be referred to would have the reading and writing of English language as the point of departure. Despite the hyped literacy ratios, Zimbabwe still lags behind other African countries like South Africa, Botswana and Rwanda in terms of industrial development and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Chimhundu (2002) forwards the thesis that in Zimbabwe language usage is fundamentally “diglossic” and as Wardhaugh (1998, p. 87) posits that it comprises language varieties separated by functions that are either high (H) or low (L). It is in this regard that this chapter argues that the English language has a high (H) function in Zimbabwe since, for instance, examinations across the educational spectrum are written in English (other than those that concern language subjects), government business is mostly done in English, the usage of the new media ecologies is also mostly done in English and the National television station, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation’s programming, is mostly in English. Shona and Ndebele, in that order, also enjoy a relatively high function. The other thirteen languages that have been designated official languages by the Zimbabwean Constitution of 2013 do enjoy peripheral and nominal usage, thus are at the extreme end of the low (L) function. It is recorded here that the usage of one’s language in a battery of contexts is a pointer to the confidence that comes with one owning and defining one’s spaces. This is not the case for Zimbabwe, hence there is an urgent need for a recalibration and redirection of policy that would effectively result in languages like Shona and Ndebele possessing the high function status.

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Statehood and Violence Zimbabwe has been both a victim and instigator of violence since its birth. It should be noted also that its statehood is or was a result of violence. A protracted war had to be waged against the Ian Douglas Smith regime for the attainment of independence. Sachikonye (2011, p. 42) postulates that in the Zimbabwean post-colony, political violence “has been a major instrument of ascendancy to power as well as a bulwark against contenders for power”. It is recorded here that the said political violence is not only physical violence that causes grave and grim bodily harm. Oftentimes, it is emotional and/or psychological violence that emanates from verbal violence. At times, the violence is a melting pot of the aforementioned shades or typifications of violence. In 2017, there were accusations laid bare by the Mnangagwa camp to the effect that he was poisoned (through ice-cream and some months prior to the new Presidency of the Republic of Zimbabwe) or there was an alleged attempt to poison him when his office was said to have been smeared with cyanide. All this happened during the Mugabe era. The media, both the fourth and fifth estates went into overdrive and were now party to the perpetuation of violence. It was subtly suggested that this was or were the Machiavellian workings of the pro-Mugabe camp. It was also cunningly suggested that the ice creams that were at the centre of the poisoning saga were from Gushungo Holdings—owned by the late former president of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe. The chapter considers this violence since no empirical trail has been proffered to buttress and substantiate the accusations. All and everything were and is left to conjecture. On the other hand, the so-called G-40 element was aiming its arrows of violence against the now president of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. The chief culprits were Jonathan Moyo, Grace Mugabe, Mandi Chimene, Saviour Kasukuwere, Patrick Zhuwao and at times Mugabe himself. The grain and substance of their anger at Mnangagwa was that he was alleged to be a political schemer who was targeting to usurp power, thus effectively aiming at removing Mugabe from office through unconstitutional means. George Charamba, the then-Presidential Spokesperson was also a victim of Grace Mugabe’s violent verbal aspersions and tirades and so was Kazembe Kazembe. Of high irony was the hard cold fact that these political actors were from the same political party, ZANU-PF but still at each other’s throats. It was also out of order and protocol that a first lady had the temerity to attack the person and office

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of the vice president of the land on national television. Ministers were neither spared. Ironic and unbeknown to the G-40 cohort was that an attack on the vice president (Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa) and some of the government ministers was also an implicit formal accusation and rebuke on the person of Mugabe their preferred choice. This was on the premise that he was the appointing authority as well as the Chief Political, Social, Diplomatic and Economic Officer of the land. Ultimately, Mnangagwa was unceremoniously axed as the country’s vice president. Mnangagwa felt his life was in danger, thus he self-banished to neighbouring South Africa and would return in a couple of weeks to “rule you” (in reference to Mugabe) and Zimbabwe. It should be noted that the Mnangagwa return should be treated as part of the violence equation. It is alleged that he owes the crown to a soft coup. It is also alleged that the houses of Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Ignatius Chombo were pounded by heavy and sophisticated military hardware—all in an attempt to smoke them out and possibly for a kill or ultimate arrest. Moyo and Kasukuwere skipped the country’s borders and so did Mandi Chimene and Messrs Walter Mzembi and Patrick Zhuwao. All this evidential material points to a country that was and is at loggerheads with itself, its citizens and its leadership. A case worth scholarly reportage also is that of the now CCC ensemble. As it is constituted now, CCC is a political collage of former allies turned coated to foes and possibly the extreme position of rank enemies and/or antagonists masquerading under the façade of collegiality and oneness. Considered should be the Biti-Chamisa-in-out political romance, the Sikhala-Chamisa-in-out political spades, the Chamisa-Matongo tussle, the Chamisa-Gorden Moyo betrayals, the Chamisa-Morgen Komichi flipflopping, the Chamisa-Khupe fallout and, the grandest of them all, the Chamisa-Mwonzora debacle. Noted should be the allegations against Nelson Chamisa also that he usurped power from supposed beneficiaries of the same after the demise of Morgan Tsvangirai. It is also alleged that, according to the then constitution of the Movement for Democratic Change, a Congress was supposed to be convoked and convened so that a new party president would be elected. This was never done and a political fight ensued—Chamisa and his henchmen on one side and Elias Mudzuri as well as Morgen Komichi and Douglas Mwonzora on the other side of the MDC political gulf. Interestingly, this subtle but overt violence was perpetrated by a party that wanted to portray itself as the total inverse proposition of ZANU-PF, a political community whose name tag speaks

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to “democratic change”. Unfortunately, their violence was nowhere near the ethos of democracy and positive transition. This was the tragedy that polluted the Zimbabwean political scapes. Niebuhr (1941, pp. 171–172) posits that, “…one error is the belief that violence is a natural and inevitable expression of ill-will, and nonviolence of goodwill, and that violence is, therefore intrinsically evil and non-violence intrinsically good. While such a proposition has a certain measure of validity, or at least of plausibility, it is certainly not universally valid”. This is what obtains in Zimbabwe most especially when the military complex reacts and responds to public or mass excesses that lean on violence. What the so-tagged independent media fail to realise is the fact that any action naturally draws an equal action and/or reaction. It, hence follows that citizen violence may be met with state violence. The state violence would be ameliorative rather than anything else. The 2018 Zimbabwe harmonised elections which pitted Mnangagwa’s ZANU-PF and Chamisa’s MDC Alliance resulted in citizen violence in the streets of Harare. The masses burned market stalls, smashed shop windows and burnt down vehicles. This drew the ire of the establishment and soldiers who were sent out to quell the violence. Six fatalities were recorded and the independent media went into overdrive condemning the military “violence”. They were silent as regards the pandemonium and destruction that was caused by the citizenry—in fact, do such “citizens” deserve the tag. Tatira and Marevesa (2011, p. 188 citing Raftopulous, 2009, p. 229) posit that in the 2008 general elections, that brought Mugabe of ZANUPF and Tsvangirai of MDC head to head, the latter proved to be the partial victor after he pulled 47.9% of the votes while the former managed 43.2% of the same. What this result only proved was the fact that Tsvangirai was more popular at that time comparatively to Mugabe. This was a political statement that did not go all the way in paving an electoral victory for Morgan Richard Tsvangirai. The Constitution directed that for one to be declared president of the country, then one should draw fifty per cent plus one vote of the total votes. The obtaining scenario called for a run-off. Raftopolous (2013, p. 229) succinctly unpacks the run-off thus: “it was, however, the violence that preceded the presidential run-off at the end of June that played the country into further political uncertainty. The violence inflicted by the ruling party on the electorate as punishment for its loss in the March election and as warning against the repeat of such a vote, was the worst seen in the country since the Gukurahundi massacres

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in the mid-1980s”. At the centre of it all is the uncalled-for political excesses as reported by Raftopolous whereby violence is deployed as a means and tool to cow the masses into electoral submission and acquiescence. Ordinarily, one’s vote should never be a result of political coercion or unwarranted influence peddling. If a vote is a result of such, then the entire process is a violent one and as such, such a modus operandi in the direction of modern electoral tenets should be expunged since it is politically, socially and humanely anathema. On 11 September 2008, Tatira and Marevesa (2011, p. 188) report that a mediation process brokered by Thabo Mbeki was signed. The result was the Global Political Agreement that resulted in three principal political parties viz ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M forming what was to be known as the Government of National Unity or the Inclusive Government. Despite this chance to foster peace and harmony in the land of Zimbabwe, it seems all was spurned by the three principals namely Robert Mugabe, Richard Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara. Raftopolous (2013, p. 230) argues that the GPA “presented severe threats and opportunities, seemingly irresolvable contradictions and a small opening for moving beyond the political impasse”. Tellingly, it is worth to adduce that the run-off had presented itself as an open opportunity for the masses on the one hand and the political opposition on the other hand to rally in unison so that the Mugabe stranglehold on power would be discontinued. This was never to be the case all because of violence. Tsvangirai pulled out of the run-off race and it all became moot. Mugabe stormed to an unwarranted victory. This then brings to focus the warped political architecture of Zimbabwe. Mugabe did claim electoral victory for the run-off despite unfairly elbowing out Tsvangirai. The Mugabe loyalist and apologist would argue that Tsvangirai decided not to be party to the run-off on his own volition and accord but then what of the violence that had become ubiquitous visitors to his mass of supporters? ZANU-PF would further argue that the run-off was never a dictatorial construct of and by itself since it was all steeped in the Constitution. Meanly, the party would posit that it followed all the legal requirements round and around the precepts of a run-off. Allied to the above, Crick (1982, p. 56) negatively tags democracy as “perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of public affairs. It is everybody’s mistress…”. Correspondingly the Afro Barometer paper number 12 (p. 8) posits, “in short, Zimbabweans have an unambiguous preference, even passion, for democratic forms of rule; they have no desire to change to non-democratic alternatives even though

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the state of democracy they live under is very much imperfect. They, thus have no nostalgia for authoritarian alternatives to multiparty systems or for reverting to the old colonial order”. Similarly, Hoffman (1988, p. 131) posits that, “democracy is without doubt the most contested and controversial concept in political theory…because it embodies such a wide range of contradictory meanings”. In 1985, Enos Nkala, a Ndebele speaker was appointed by Robert Mugabe as the Minister of Home Affairs. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and the Legal Resources Foundation (1997, p. 69) report that Nkala had an age-old grudge against the ZAPU strongman, Joshua Nkomo, that dated to the split between ZANU and ZAPU in 1963. Soon after his appointment, Nkala militantly ranted, “We want to wipe out the ZAPU leadership. You have only seen the warning lights. We haven’t yet reached full blast…the murderous organisation and its murderous leadership must be hit so hard that it doesn’t feel obliged to do the things it has been doing”. Considered should be the fact that this is soon after national independence is attained from Britain, thus instead of rallying as solid nationalistic units, ZANU and ZAPU are at fatalistic loggerheads. During the armed struggle, the two parties had waged a sustained guerrilla war against colonial Rhodism and this was separately but in concert, since the objective was to dismantle the colonial edifice that polluted the Zimbabwean social, political and economic arenas. By way of conjecture, it may be posited that when Nkala tagged the ZAPU leadership as “murderous”, he was implicitly referring to the dissident menace that was allegedly being masterminded by the said party. The euphemistic dig, “the things it has been doing” is similarly minted. Historically and materially, it has been proven that there are doses and grains of veracity in as far as the dissident issue emanating from the doorstep of ZAPU is concerned. Despite this abrasive historical truth, Nkala should have exercised some brotherly restrain, some compatriot’s comradeship that should have ultimately actuated directed reprimand mechanisms that would effectively avoid putting the country on the red terror that ensued—Gukurahundi. It is not outside rationality to posit that the bloodletting that ensued was partly a result of the Nkala inflammatory rhetoric. The CCJP and the Legal Resources Foundation Report (1997, p. 70) have it that, “one of the worst cases of dissident violence took place immediately after the election in August 1985, in the Mwenezi District of southern Zimbabwe. Here 17 Shona-speaking villagers, including small children,

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were murdered by dissidents, allegedly for voting for ZANU-PF in the elections. Thirty-five people were herded into a hut and the Ndebele speakers were then allowed to leave. The rest of the people were shot at and the hut was set on fire. As survivors tried to escape, they were shot, including two year olds. The dissidents then went on to loot a nearby store and killed a further five people, bringing the total number murdered that day to twenty-two”. The report further posits that these gory attacks by the dissident element were occasioned by a foxy plan to coerce the government to spread the curfews to Shona-speaking parts of the country so that the trials and tribulations that were experienced in Matabeleland would become a universal phenomenon. Some dissidents proffered the claim that the tribalistic tendencies and excesses of the government in the 1980s triggered this massacre. It is worth chronicling here that from both ends it seems the tribal card had been raised and its attendant vagaries were taking their toll. The deaths of the masses either as victims of the dissidents or Gukurahundi were all extrajudicial and/or enforced. This was rank tragic. The excesses of the Gukurahundi episodes are still boring social, economic and political perforations to this day. The Ndebeles are highly incensed by what they consider to be a well-orchestrated scheme whose thrust was to decimate the Ndebele tribal. The Unity Accord signed between Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU has somewhat ameliorated relations to amity levels albeit tensions are still of stratospheric inflation. The online news portal, Pindula News, reports (October 23, 2022) that “members of Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army, ZAPU’s military wing during the armed struggle, are demanding US$ 20 billion as compensation for properties that were confiscated by the government at the height of Gukurahundi”. Such a disbursement would effectively faint and bring to death an already comatose economy. The Sunday Mail instalment of 23 October 2022 reports that President Mnangagwa has launched “a manual on Gukurahundi community engagement processes by chiefs, including a report on their consultative meetings, as the Second Republic takes bold steps to foster national unity. Traditional leaders crafted and adopted the Gukurahundi manual to guide victim-friendly public hearings to ensure national healing”. Tellingly it is now forty-two years since Zimbabwe got its independence but still the issue of Gukurahundi is still an albatross on the being of the

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state and nation. It is our hope that the Second Republic under the headship of President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa would put the issue to rest through the premise of fair and just interventions. Towards the end of 2016 and three quarters into the year 2017, the telegraphic line, “Stop it” was always associated with a raging Grace Mugabe, wife to the late former president of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Grace Mugabe employed this line whenever she was reprimanding government and/or ZANU-PF functionaries whom she and her so-called G-40 cabal considered to have failed to kowtow to the expected government and/or party principles and tenets. Fast forward to 2022, a new media enigma has decided to use the pseudonym “Dr Stop It” and superficially imitates the tonal lines that were characteristic of Grace Mugabe’s speeches. This murky character writes through the “myzimbabwe.co.zw online stable”. In its 16 October 2022 instalment, ‘Dr Stop’ writes that, “In a country where 90% of the population is estimated to be jobless…since Ngwena and his Lacoste staged the coup against Baba, tens of thousands of people have lost their sources of income as companies close down and university graduates are increasingly finding it difficult to secure decent jobs”. It is worth recording here that agenda setting as well as framing have been used to pivot and magnify the messages. The 90% unemployment statistic seems hyperbolised. Furthermore, the writer takes a political marketing/campaign slant and pitch. The diction betrays it all—“jobless”, “coup”, “Ngwena and his Lacoste” and “Baba”. It is posited here that the word “coup” is meant to create that feeling of revulsion for “Ngwena and his Lacoste”. The writer further manufactures a (mis)balance by juxtapositions of “Ngwena” and “Baba”. The former is an adorable and/or distasteful allusion to President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa depending on the ideological position on which one is indexed. In the case of this fictitious interchange, Dr Stop. It is almost lucid that the intended reading of the text should be the dominant one—Ngwena = Crocodile = Vengeance = Ruthlessness—consider the coup. On the other hand, there is the “Baba” concept. This is both representational and presentational. Associatively, the word exudes maturity, power, love, being loved and reverence. It, thus may be postulated that the so-called independent media is trying to impress upon the Zimbabwe publics that the G-40 element is still on and there is life and vitality within its ranks henceforward trouble in paradise for President Mnangagwa. The media is now part of the violence. They fan the same through inflammatory agenda setting.

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Discussion Despite the attainment of independence, some forty-two years back, Zimbabwe is still traversing spaces that are conflict pervaded and the tag, an etiolate state, would be most apt. The generic form of coloniality is the white versus black modus operandi that was the in vogue phenomenon during Rhodism. It is argued here that as of now, Zimbabwe is still yoked to the tentacles of coloniality because it is now black versus black—an aberration if not of greater scope since its now brother on brother and/or sister on sister. The advent of independence in 1980 brought some relief but the masses soon realised that it was all ephemeral—Gukurahundi soon reared its hideous visage and the nation-state was extended an overt reality check and recalibration. Independence was, thus a skin-deep dawn that was wrapped in politics of fictitious reality and political affectations. The attempt to muzzle out ZAPU from the political party radar by ZANU-PF did not garner the yearned for traction. The Zimbabwe Unity Movement fronted by Edgar Tekere came to the fold. At least there was a modicum of universal political good practice in that Zimbabwe could not be framed as a one-party state steeped in the (dis)ethos of tyrannical tendencies. Unfortunately, Tekere’s party failed to effectively challenge the ZANU-PF hegemony, hence another dawn that drew blanks. It was envisaged that the Unity Accord would end the Gukurahundi red terror. Mugabe and Nkomo joined hands and the political marriage resulted in ZANU-PF. What was suffixed was the “Patriotic Front” part of the bargain. The ZANU prefix remained as the root. The ZAPU element was swallowed into oblivion. Nkomo was a junior partner in the government that ensued and the Matabeleland region still accused the government of tribalistic policies that were informed by tribal prejudices and stereotyping. Another false dawn had jig-sawed the Zimbabwe nation-state. The advent of the MDC brought some hope and optimism to the Zimbabwean masses. Morgan Richard Tsvangirai was a refreshing alternative proposition who had successfully stood up for the rights of workers as the leader of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The 2008 general election saw Tsvangirai piping Mugabe but still failed to get the ultimate Constitutional approbation since the vote per cent was below the fifty per cent plus one vote threshold. Ultimately death comes in, Tsvangirai dies of colon cancer. In comes Nelson Chamisa and also there were high and lofty expectations among the populace. Chamisa is

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accused of being dictatorial by his political comrades. A battery of political party offshoots is birthed from the mother MDC. There is political party pluralism but no palpable beneficiation which seems to be accruing to the voting publics. All in all, there is the lofty but thin rhetoric that has polluted the political arena as of now.

Conclusion The Zimbabwe postcolonial politics, as discussed in this chapter is one rooted in the hope-despair and high-low correlation. The chapter captured the ironies of existence and survival in postcolonial Zimbabwe. 1980 is framed as the year the country got its political independence albeit the same may be considered sectile since not all members of the nation-state were and are considered independent and free from most especially political and social prejudices. The foremost indigenous tribes (by way of numbers than anything else), the Shona and the Ndebele were victims of intra-internecine tribal ructions and this was notwithstanding the fact that they had racially suffered under Ian Smith’s Rhodesia. The two tribes were recipients of the vagaries of coloniality and it was the national hope that after the attainment of independence, the existential matrix would morph positively and cease the dehumanisation trajectory that was the coordinated phenomenon during colonialism. Gukurahundi and its predecessor, the dissident menace heavily hanged on the neoabused frames of the Shona and Ndebele sufferers. Zimbabwe needs the proverbial break and this can only happen if the afore-discussed false dawns are re-engineered so as to redirect the country’s economic, political and social ways of knowing and doing. It is also hoped and projected that the ‘Second Republic’ will live in tandem with its tag that points to a positive socio-politico digression.

References Argenti, P.A., Howell, R.A. & Beck, K.A. (2005). The strategic communication imperative. MIT Sloan Management Journal, 46(3). Chimhundu, H. (2002). Adoption and adaptation in Shona. University of Zimbabwe. Crick, B. (1982). Defence of politics. Penguin.

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Hallahan, K., Holtzhausen, D., Van Ruler, B., Vercic, D. & Srirames, K. (2002). Defining Strategic Communication. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 7 (1), 3–35. Hoffman, J. (1988). State, power and democracy. St. Martins Press. Jakaza, E. (2022). Discontinuance, discourses as an organisation’s strategic communication: A case of ZANU-PF. In H. Mangeya, I. Mhute, & E. Jakaza (Eds.), Strategic communications in Africa: The Sub-Saharan context. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Mhiripiri, N. A. (2015). Narratives of the Zimbabwe crisis, national sovereignty, and human and media rights violations. In S. Adejumobi (Ed.), National democratic reforms in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. Murungudzi, T. (2009). English as a language of learning and teaching: Perspectives of secondary school teachers in the Masvingo District (Zimbabwe). Unpublished Masters Dissertation Submitted at the University of South Africa. Myzimbabwe.co.zw. (2022, October 23). Ngugi wa Thiong’o. (1987). Decolonizing the mind: The politics of language in African literature. Zimbabwe Publishing House. Niebuhr, R. (1941). Moral man in immoral society: A study in ethics and politics. Charles Scribner’s Sons. Obeng, S.G. (2002). For the most part they paid no attention to our native languages. The politics about languages in Sub-Saharan Africa. In G.O. Obeng and B. Hartford (eds). Political independence with linguistic servitude. The politics about languages in the developing world. Nova Science Publishers. Raftopolous, B. (2013). An overview of the GPA: National conflict regional agony and international dilemma. In B. Raftopolous (Ed.), The hard reform: The politics of Zimbabwe’s global political agreement (pp. 1–38). Weaver Press. Sachikonye, L. (2011). When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe. Jacana. Tatira, L., & Marevesa, T. (2011, November). The global political agreement (GPA) and the persistent political conflict arising there from: Is this another manifestation of the council of Jerusalem? Journal of African Studies and Development, 3(10), 187–191. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and The Legal Resources Foundation. (1997). Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980 to 1988. Africa Synod House. The Sunday Mail. (2022, October 23). Tollefson, J. W. (2002). Language rights and the destruction of Yugoslavia. In J. Tollefson (Ed.), Language policies in education. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. Wardhaugh, R. (1998). An Introduction to Sociolinguistics (3rd ed.). Blackwell.

CHAPTER 4

Vachingovukura (Whilst They Are Barking Ineffectually): The Mango Idiom and Postcolonial Deceit in Zimbabwe’s Political Discourse Edmore Dube

Introduction This chapter presents the enduring culture of deceit standing as an obstacle to the fulfilment of the dreams of the liberation struggle, especially democracy as envisaged by the pre-independence sloganeering of one-man-one-vote (The Voice of the Tribes, 1968). The Second Chimurenga (liberation struggle) was especially seen as a panacea to the utopian democratic dispensation of equals. This chapter, however, deconstructs the utopian expectations as wartime propaganda now refuted by idioms more prevalent in the mouths, or in the actions of the ruling

E. Dube (B) Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_4

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elite comprising of those with war credentials and their religious backers. The author selects one verbal idiom (vachingovukura—whilst they are barking ineffectually), and one nonverbal idiom (the mango) for emphasis among others of the same category. It is argued that the mango idiom originated in the early 1980s as a nonverbal idiom of the ruling elite, only to be popularised as a verbal and action idiom of the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) in the early 2020s (Raftopoulos, 2006; RosGwen24News, 2022). The idiom is discussed below, first as the nonverbal Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANUPF) deceptive mechanism for control and later as the CCC mango strategy for survival in a volatile political environment (Zvemu Zimbabwe, 2022; Sambiri, 2022). The chapter opens with a short discussion on the desktop methodology and the postcolonial theory, which inform this study. That discussion is followed by three sections and a conclusion. The first of these sections evaluates the use of the ZANU-PF mantra “vachingovukura tichingotonga” (whilst they are barking ineffectually, we leisurely rule on); particularly how it has affected internal and external relations leading to political and economic downturn. That fallout is discussed in relation to the ideals of the liberation struggle. The second one deals with the touting of reconciliation by Robert Gabriel Mugabe as a façade for buying time to acquaint himself with colonial tactics of power retention, through the abuse of the security and the law. The final section preceding the conclusion deals with the verbal use of the mango strategy, as a positive move to protect the rural opposition members at the mercy of traditional rulers fighting in ZANU-PF corner to protect their fiefdoms. The chapter then concludes that the idiomatic use of the strategies by ZANU-PF is meant to deceive the masses (both ZANU-PF and the opposition). Their use by the opposition, however, is meant as survival camouflage for at risk membership. The motivation behind the contribution is to deconstruct luring images whose realities convey profound cleavages and existing binaries of deceit and domination, standing as betrayals of the revolutionary struggle.

Methodology and the Conceptual Framework This chapter utilises the desktop methodology as a qualitative tool for data gathering, and the postcolonial theory as the analytical framework. The desktop approach restricts the research to that which can be found

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in written records, accessible to one working from a conveniently placed desk. The source documents could be those in the public domain, or those placed in special collections (Goundar, 2012). This particular research is limited to the former, dealing with documents in the public domain, which further researchers can consult and verify authenticity. Most of those documents on the two major idioms in question are deposited on the internet, which is replete with views on them. Making use of written records is a cost-effective measure in places with good access to the internet; especially where subscription has been made to quality journals. This method has, therefore, been adopted for those obvious advantages relating to the availability of the relevant documents. Since the method is more concerned with documented information, it is often called documentary analysis (Sileyew, 2019). Perspectives in the selected documents are assessed to speak to the current topic, discussed within the postcolonial discourses. From the onset of this research, it was intriguing why the ZANU-PF, a reputed liberation movement, was exuding a character reminiscent of the colonial regimes, despite many years into postcolonialism. It was, therefore, necessary to employ the postcolonial theory to decipher the reasons for the salient connections with the much despised colonial establishment for which a successful liberation struggle was waged. The postcolonial theory is basically “committed to addressing the plague of colonialism” (Parsons & Harding, 2011, p. 1). It is clear that liberated African states continue to hold onto the tactics of their former colonisers for survival of the ruling elite (Ashcroft et al., 2007; Lye, 1998). One reason for the employment of oppressive tactics and coarse rhetoric is waning popularity. Just as the colonial masters justify their stranglehold on power through the skewed laws enforced by a partisan security system, liberation movements soon resort to the same to remain in power. Coveting power is a lifeline for the perpetuation of colonial methods of leadership retention. Once independent, the liberation icons do not want to share power, which damages their popularity. They soon become enemies of the people they liberated and have to fight for their self-imposed right to rule. The education system modelled on the West does not assist them turn round their situations independent of the West, forcing them to revive some memories loathed by their people. In other words, they default on the promises of the liberation struggle, presenting themselves as egotistic and deceitful leaders. The identities of the lower classes remain those of poverty-stricken and yearning for liberation from the cycle of

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poverty, while the leadership assumes the seemingly invincible position of the erstwhile colonial master. Ever since the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), the postcolonial theory has become part of the critical theories for literature in postcolonial territories. One of the prominent articles of the theory has always been on the duality of identity or the excessive use of “otherness”. In the case of this research: liberators and the liberated, patriots and sell-outs (zvimbwasungata), the rulers and the ruled. The dialectic opposites implied here are such that if the liberators are masculine, ordered and good, then the opposition must be effeminate, chaotic and evil. The postcolonial theory challenges these dichotomies and is certainly “a means of defiance by which any exploitative and discriminative practices, regardless of time and space, can be challenged” (Rukundwa & van Arde, 2009, p. 1171). This particular research critiques the “othering” of the ruled by the ruling elite, starting with the dehumanising description of their communication as nothing other than worthless dog bark (kungovukura). Though the dog secures a home, it occupies a denigrated position in most Zimbabwean homes, where it is often addressed through insults and beatings for no apparent reasons. Pfutseki (offensive informal expression of dismissal and rejection), hamba (go away) and kure (go far away)—often accompanied by a landing switch—are the most common terms of disdainful addresses to the dog. Vachingovukura and its salient implications, therefore, call for more attention.

Vachingovukura and the ZANU-PF Intransigence This section discusses how ZANU-PF subverted the liberation agenda by making itself the sole benefactor and, therefore, the sole ruler. One of the reasons for fighting colonialism was the lack of democracy, which was legally protected by segregating statutes favouring the white race. The whites were made superior through parliamentary legislation supported by various ministerial statutory instruments requiring from blacks nothing short of compliancy in a horse and rider relationship (Karekwaivenane, 2011). ZANU-PF under Robert Gabriel Mugabe became that colossal figure assuming the Aryan jacket and demanding nothing short of compliance from fellow blacks, who suffered an unfathomable brunt of the liberation war culminating in independence in 1980. ZANU-PF is not meant for every card holder, but the ruling elite who treat the rest as ZANU-PF only for election convenience. The masses are the necessary

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fodder for the election, and the enduring pedestal for power by the selfstyled liberation group (Dube, 2018). Though the leadership speaks so much about the spilled blood, it is often disheartening to note that the actual casualties largely belong to the non-benefiting majority who fail to benefit from the blood of their kin and kith who perished at the war front. If those who lost their relatives in the liberation struggle raise their voices in expectation they are labelled illegitimate non-compliant opposition with a regime change agenda. The one-man-one-vote agenda is no longer a suitable mode in independent Zimbabwe because the new leaders have become sacrosanct and cannot be challenged. Those disgruntled families who lost their relatives at the front or in post-independence disturbances (CCJP & LRF, 1997), opposition politicians and churches critical of the current ruling regime are sneered at as toothless bulldogs barking at the magnificent sardonic elephant. The most sarcastic words of mockery for opposition in Zimbabwe are attributed to Mugabe’s right-hand man of over half a century—his eventual successor, President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. Although such intransigence seems to continue unabated in the Second Republic under Mnangagwa, the genesis of the coarse statement lies in the First Republic, when Mnangagwa was not just a right-hand man, but a key minister (Pindula, 2017). Pindula (2017) quotes Mnangagwa as having bragged: “Vachingovukura tichingotonga” (whilst they are barking ineffectually, we leisurely rule on). The third person plural “va” separates the speaker from the object of speech, while “chingo” represents the consistent futility in the barking (vukura). The explanation is that the ruling party imaged as an elephant may not be assailed by dogs, and, therefore, does not mind them. In reality, however, ZANU-PF minds them and often wants to direct their pattern of voting, to avoid defeat (Makumbe, 2009). In the June 2008 run-off forced by the opposition leader Morgan Richard Tsvangirai peeping Mugabe in the first round, the opposition was directly forced to reverse their voting patterns through Operation Wavhotera Papi (Operation for whom did you vote), through which those accused of having voted ‘wrongly’ in the March 2008 election received retribution and were expected to confess and convert to the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). (Tarusarira, 2014, pp. 94–95)

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The claim that they rule on oblivious of the existence of the opposition is nothing more than deceptive political bunting. It is partly meant to discourage the faint-hearted among the opposition who then think that voting is futile because ZANU-PF will not relinquish power. In reality when the opposition ignores the ineffectual barking label, it is the mantra itself which turns out to be non-effective barking. It needs militia rescue to maintain some clout in the post-election period. In this sense, the canine metaphor of barking dogs, ‘vachingovukura’, assumes new meaning about the haunting threat posed by the main opposition party in Zimbabwe. Contrary to ZANU-PF’s dismissive and arrogant attitude towards the CCC, the relentless use of vachingovukura exposes the ruling party’s deep fear of the opposition whose maiden entry into Zimbabwean politics cannot be underrated. Taken literally, the vachingovukura mantra negatively portrays ZANU-PF as a non-listening party, which takes supplication and political competition as incessant barking not worth listening to. This ideology was much expounded on by the then Zimbabwe’s vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, at a by-election campaign rally for the Chirumanzu-Zibagwe constituency on 22 March 2015. He stressed in the local Shona language: Chinzwai chokwadi chandinokutaurirai zuva rakacheka nyika. Nyika yedu yeZimbabwe, kungaite chando, kungapisa, kungaite maguta, kungaite nzara, isu seZanu-PF hatife takaregera kana kukanganiswa kutungimira nyika ino (The Sunday Mail, 2015). (Hear the truth that I tell you in broad daylight. [In] our country Zimbabwe, there may be cold, heat, plenty, hunger, we as ZANU PF will never let go or be disturbed in leading this country).

This statement in the name of ZANU-PF is packed with invincibility. Not even nature may shake the party’s hold on power, or alter its role as the leading party of Zimbabwe. The then-vice president further dismissed the opposition as “zvimbwasungata zvinotumwa nevavengi vedu” (dogs of imperialism sent by our enemies) (Ibid.). He refused to accept them as genuine competitors for political power, choosing to see them as foreign stooges and puppets of the regime change agenda. Lack of genuineness makes them illegitimate politicians not worth to wield the ruling sceptre. They are best symbolised by dogs in the bondage of former colonial powers. In this particular speech Morgan Richard Tsvangirai,

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the former prime minister of Zimbabwe is accused of being in league with the United States and some non-governmental organisations bent on removing the ZANU-PF government from power. The then-vice president does not mince his words but reiterates that: “Asi sezvandinogara ndichitaura, Zimbabwe, Zanu-PF, VaMugabe, leadership yedu yose, vemakereke vedu vose, varimi vedu vose, ticharamba tichingofamba tichienda mberi vamwe vachingohukura” (But as I always say, Zimbabwe, ZANUPF, Mr. Mugabe, our entire leadership, all our church faithful, all our farmers, we shall continue to forge ahead while others continue to bark) (Ibid.). This gives the impression of one leader, one party and its leadership mandated to lead with the support of select churches and farmers worth of the possessive “our”. There is no place for listening to those outside this select group. Mugabe actually dared the bishops of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) to form a political party if they wanted to test political heat (Dzirutwe, 2007). He was reacting to a pastoral letter that called him to order with respect to human rights and the ever-dwindling democratic space. The RCC, however, went on to remind the ZANU-PF establishment that they should not forget that “God hears the cries of the oppressed” (Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference [ZCBC], 2007), even if the ruling elite dismisses their cry as imperial dog bark. That put the RCC in the wrong basket of parties loathed by the establishment, despite its momentous liberation contribution, and the fact that the ZANU-PF presidium and key ministers were Catholics for a good part of our independence. Their Catholicism was practised outside the social teachings summarised in the principle of the common good, which would not accept human beings being counted among dogs. That would be seen as dehumanising for those created in the image of God. The church saw the patriotic narrative of counting only ZANU-PF among the rulers of Zimbabwe as setting the arms of the clock backwards, and, therefore, reminded the ruling party to move on with time in another not well-received pastoral letter, The March is not ended (ZCBC, 2020). Like the 2007 one, the pastoral letter raised so much dust that the international community had to come in support of the beleaguered president of the ZCBC, Archbishop Robert Ndlovu, of Harare. What the church was basically saying was that the opposition cries were legitimate Zimbabwean voices needing political and economic space. Even the South African government and the ruling African National Congress (ANC) once departed from the traditional quiet diplomacy to stand with

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the bishops that the Zimbabwe march to democracy was still unfinished business (Chikohomero, 2020). The regional community blamed the ZANU-PF policy towards the opposition and fair criticism as the cause of the crisis in Zimbabwe. The divisive misrule of Mugabe had led to international isolation that the Second Republic was trying to rectify without conciliating the domestic critics blaming misrule for the loss of Zimbabwe’s bread-basket status and acquisition of begging-nation status (Moyo & Mavengano, 2021). The criticism by the African players meant that the Pan-Africanist stance that the ruling elite had been relying on all along was crumbling (Christopher, 2007). Camouflaging misrule under the mango strategy was losing weight as outsiders were beginning to witness the undercover deeds themselves.

Mugabe and the Negative Use of the Mango Strategy The mango strategy is a survival strategy that pits appearance versus reality. The folly of invincibility demonstrated by the late president brought his demise in a re-enactment of what William Shakespeare would qualify as the tragedy of hubris and hamartia. This ambiguous and deceitful character of the ruling party in the present-day Zimbabwe is borne out of the contrasting colours of the mango fruit, with green outside and yellow inside. The green, generally taken to represent life, progress or the licence to proceed with approved movement, has been overused by Mugabe and the ruling elite. For Mugabe and the ZANU-PF outfit, however, the mango green colour is the public visual and auditory signal to do what was right, while the actual action is subverted in the opposite direction by the yellow inside. In 1980, the euphoric population of Zimbabwe smarting from a brutal liberation war that had dragged on for decades expected swift fulfilment of the wartime promises, to inherit the privileged status of the erstwhile white rulers. Instead, Mugabe turned around and stressed reconciliation as the route to unity and development—a tried and tested path to human flourishing (Raftopoulos & Savage, 2005). That created implosive hope, with the erudite seeing open betrayal of what then became known as wartime propaganda. The majority were convinced by the sweet talk of Mugabe, the first prime minister of independent Zimbabwe, that the future was bright. He stressed that it was right to create a unity government with the losing parties in order to forge ahead as one. In that regard, Joshua

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Nkomo and the leading members of his Zimbabwe African People’s Union Patriotic Front (PF-ZAPU) were brought in to work with the ZANU-PF government. Nkomo accepted the role of a Home Affairs minister. Reconciliation appeared fathomable as the nascent independent government accepted ministers even from the defeated Ian Smith (the last colonial ruler). That is how Senator Calvawell and Dennis Norman became part of government, helping with the procedures and protocols of a real government. In the military Major Dyke, the hard core trainer of the Rhodesian troops, was retained to help standardise the new tripartite army comprising the military wings of ZANU-PF, PF-ZAPU and the Rhodesian army. The political, military and employment spheres seemed headed for panacea status, even with the economy still in the hands of the former colonial masters. A number of families even got settled in areas with developed infrastructure including good schools and clinics. The subversive side of the theory of reconciliation soon began to tell. First, while the rest of the population was persuaded to be content with reconciliation supported by lawful acquisition of property, the simmering reports of corruption soon exploded into a full-fledged Willogate scandal of 1988 (Laakso, 2003). Sitting ministers were jumping the queue to obtain cars at Willovale Motor Industries, which they later sold at exorbitant prices. This enraged those who respected orthodox ways of property acquisition as envisaged by reconciliation and the Lancaster House Constitution. The Gukurahundi massacres, which many believed were meant to decimate the PF-ZAPU power bases in the Midlands and Matabeleland Provinces, gave rise to the theory that the unity government was meant to eliminate legitimate opposition to ZANU-PF (CCJP & LRF, 1997). It was seemingly meant to create a de facto one-party state by making PF-ZAPU vote with ZANU-PF in support of government proposals. The inclusion of Major Dyke and Andy Flower of the Rhodesian intelligence was meant to inculcate the colonial security tactics in the new forces. Thus the liberation forces were brought into line with the tactics of the third segment of the security forces—the Rhodesian Forces and secrete services ways of courting and destroying the legal competitor. While the majority of Zimbabweans were enjoying the newfound conciliatory politics, Mugabe was galvanising himself with colonial tactics of stalking one’s competitor. That became very handy when the mantra “Mugabe must go” eventually became a reality. No piece of legislation or human being could moderate his love for unfathomable power. He ensured that the constitutions of the party and the country gave him

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sufficient power to deal with any legitimate political adversary. That was emboldened by the presidency’s ability to be a self-contained legislature. He made use of temporary powers to make laws that enforced his will on the people without resort. The population was simply expected to comply with power just as before independence (Karekwaivenane, 2011). By the time people gathered courage to reject compliance with acts they believed were contrary to the spirit of reconciliation and the common good, Mugabe was already emboldened by the presidential powers of 1987, with which he could pardon his cronies at will (Bratton, 2014, p. 2). By 1989 he could pardon the scandalous perpetrators of the Willogate scandal. He had mastered the use of unrepealed colonial laws like the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) and the Emergency Powers Acts (EPA) of 1960. LOMA “gave the police extensive power to arrest nationalists and was used frequently to stop meetings simply by arresting speakers” (Houser, 1979, p. 2), and Mugabe likewise used it to stop opposition meetings. When it pleased him, he changed LOMA to MOPA (Maintenance of Order and Peace Act), which largely plagiarised the former. Such laws galvanised Mugabe’s power, and with him the Zezuru tribe, as the anointed rulers of Zimbabwe. It was only through the military marching orders that he left the seat to a prominent Karanga of the southern Midlands region, Emmerson Mnangagwa, who inherited the same laws. That was a daring move considering that Mugabe already had Generation 40 around him, to carry on the Zezuru mantle under the new leadership of Sydney Sekeramai (Kaizira, 2018). That Mnangagwa tended to use strong Karanga terminology as in ‘vachingovukura’ instead of ‘vachingohukura’ (Zezuru dialect) may linguistically be read in the context of a tribal tussle for power. Mnangagwa’s use of the strong Karanga dialect instead of the Zezuru used in formal Shona language further amplifies his Otherisation discourse. The strong Karanga dialect evokes the memorable ethnic cleavages and ethnic nationalism in Zimbabwe anchored on the claim of the Shona superiority, and yet the Shona themselves are riddled by the Karanga–Zezuru dialectics (Doke, 2005). It is worth noting that the kuvukura narrative does not only marginalise and otherise those in the opposition camp, but is rather evident of a deeply fragmented nation at a time when some segments of the Ndebele communities demand the formation of a Ndebele state. This makes all the aggrieved segments of the nation ‘barking dogs’, alerting the rulers of the ever-accumulating grievances. The ambiguities of the identities of the ‘barking dogs’ are

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further created by their faceless and namelessness—just ‘barking dogs’. The dogs perhaps refer to all critical voices including opposition politicians, the dissenting clergy, human rights groups, the West and all those against Zezuru hegemony and/or ZANU-PF intransigency. These may also include other marginalised ethnic minorities crying for autonomy from the Shona and ZANU-PF politics. Anybody thinking outside the box is worthy enemy status as a ‘barking dog’. Such hate speech of labelling was galvanised by laws stretching back to the colonial state and often modified to suit the context. Such laws were already in force when the CCC rose from the implosion of the MDC factions, which had suffered two decades of the informal mango strategy of ZANU-PF. The CCC, therefore, arose with a different notion of the mango strategy which it publicised as relevant in the new milieu.

The Mango Idiom as a CCC Strategy This section discusses how the CCC adapted the mango strategy to suit the new context. The CCC, the major offshoot of the MDC, was quick to seek solutions to galvanise itself against perilous exposure to recriminations by the ZANU-PF militia. The new party (CCC) formed in February 2022, ahead of crucial council and parliamentary by-elections pitying it against ZANU-PF in March 2022, was quick to notice loopholes in the opposition strategies of its predecessor. The daring MDC’s confrontational approach was replaced by the cautious approach in which members were encouraged by their leader, Nelson Chamisa, to pretend to be ZANU-PF (alias green), but to vote overwhelmingly for CCC (alias yellow). In that, they were encouraged to be deliberately what they were not, for the purposes of security and safety. Chamisa urged “his supporters to avoid needlessly exposing themselves to possible physical harm by ZANU PF activists as cases of politically-motivated violence increase[d] ahead of the 2023 elections” (Staff Reporter, 2022). In that, Chamisa fell for deceit by encouraging his following to avoid the 2008 scenario where in excess of 200 cadres of the MDC-T lost their lives through kuvukura (barking) exposure, putting themselves in the willing hands of the militia. His botched by-election campaign in Gokwe-Kambuyuni in which at least 13 of his members were injured had forced him to see wisdom in “Operation Mango—green outside and yellow inside” (Staff Reporter, 2022). The T-shirts were equally shouting, and yet they did not always match the heart, which was more reflective of personality. In

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that regard, committed members of CCC could put on ZANU-PF regalia and still vote wisely to land a CCC victory. Such deceit was more plausible for the rural areas where recrimination was more violent. Cucsman, a revolutionary musician and fervent supporter of CCC, explained more closely: Mango Strategy is a phenomenal strategy our rural folks can utilize to save them[selves] from intimidation, persecution and stigmatization. As we all know a mango is green outside but inside its whole yellow. This is another way we can outgun ZANU PF. Take their goodies, their fertilizer, agricultural inputs and frustrate them come the Election Day!! (Zimnews24, 2022)

The strategy was meant to counter deceit with deceit. During the liberation war, masses were promised that the prophecy of Isaiah would be a reality in the new Zimbabwe: “they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more” (Isaiah 2:4). Yet the sharing of food and farm inputs had become so partisan from the onset of land reform in 2000 to the extent that scholars tended to refer to that as the weaponiaation of aid (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Though some CCC members remained visible doing what they code-named mugwazo (assigned door-to-door campaigns) and REAP (register, elect and protect [the vote]), the rest went underground for security reasons. The visible and underground members mapped out the election polling centre as the only necessary rendezvous in the current political environment.

Conclusion This chapter concludes that the use of the term “vachingovukura” was pejorative and meant to harm others in a highly politicised political environment. It was targeted at anyone critical of the ruling elite, especially the opposition MDC and later the CCC supporters. The aim was to harm them emotionally and to incense ZANU-PF supporters against them, since their humanity had been removed and replaced by the animalism presented in the form of a dog. Though the expression “vachingovukura” is meant to demonstrate the invincibility of the interlocutors, it is not devoid of fear. The fearful ZANU-PF supporters are strengthened by the assurance that there is nothing coming their way. In that regard, it

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is meant as a confidence builder for the gullible supporters who need someone to point out the way for them. That it is always used against the most vibrant opposition means that it is functional and handy in preparing supporters against such vibrant opposition. In that regard, the use of the terminology is a setback to the ideals of the liberation struggle that envisaged a society of freedom and equality, with no one rubbishing the other. The unleashing of the militia onto the opposition shows inappropriateness of the expression, because, without the militia, the opposition has legitimate strength to take over leadership. That the interlocutors have to solicit the militia means that it is them who are powerless in the utilisation of the democratic space, meaning that the reverse use of the expression is more appropriate in a democracy. The presence of a restless mongrel is arguably unnerving as evident in violent response and other toxic mechanisms adopted by ZANU-PF in a bid to muzzle the ‘barking dogs’. The mango strategy has been effectively used by both the ruling elite and the opposition. The elite has used it as a cover-up strategy by speaking well of the relations with the “other”, and hacking the same underground. In that regard, it has been used more to lull both the opposition and the international community not to see the real intentions of the much-hyped post-independence reconciliation of the liberation war belligerents. Mugabe and ZANU-PF skilfully stole all the political space while the opposition and the rest of the world were still mesmerised by the eloquently pronounced reconciliation for all former warring parties. Thus, while the green mango skin signified that all was well, the yellow inside signified the paling away of cordiality, being gradually replaced by disunity and acrimony. By 1987, PF-ZAPU had disappeared leaving a trail of dead supporters. Power was gradually centralised in the president who used it to bail out his supporters, while inversely submerging his political opponents. By that time the green colour had become suspect, but its effects in delaying realisation were already telling in that every institution had been turned to support the ruling party behind the scenes. The aggrieved citizen, therefore, hardly had any resort for redress. The citizens had to find a way of getting over the hurdle of no resort by using the same mango cover for seeming compliance—which became the CCC’s major resort for survival. The deliberate mango mantra was meant to strengthen those who felt guilty of not standing firm even in cases of adversity. While many with positions not allowing them to openly

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fraternise with the opposition found solace in belonging to the underground group, some remained vocal in the public political arena, daring all vicissitudes through mugwazo and REAP. All that was meant to fight postcolonial deceit.

References Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G., & Tiffin, H. (2007). Post-colonial studies: The key concepts. Routledge. Bratton, M. (2014). Power politics in Zimbabwe. Lynne Rienner Publishers. CCJP & LRF. (1997). Breaking the silence: Building the true peace (A report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and the midlands 1980–1988). Mambo Press. Chikohomero, R. (2020, August 14). Ramaphosa reacts to internal pressure on Zimbabwe. Institute for Security Studies. Accessed 27 February 2023 from https://www.defenceweb.co.za/governance/governance-govern ance/iss-ramaphosa-reacts-to-internal-pressure-on-zimbabwe/ Christopher, J. L. (2007). Crisis as catalyst: Contemporary Zimbabwe and the reinstatement of religion in a global era. Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies, 8(2), 117–138. Doke, C. M. (2005). The unification of the Shona dialects (2nd ed.) Allex Project. Dube, E. (2018). The search for justice and peace: Reflections on the jambanja discourse as an articulation of justice foreshadowing peace. In E. Masitera & F. Sibanda (Eds.), Power in contemporary Zimbabwe (pp. 15–30). Routledge. Dzirutwe, M. (2007, May 4). Mugabe warns Catholic bishops over politics. Reuters. Accessed 2 March 2023 from https://www.reuters.com/article/uszimbabwe-mugabe-bishops-idUSL0430109020070504 Goundar, S. (2012). Research methodology and research method: Methods commonly used by researchers. Victoria University of Wellington. Houser, G. (1979). From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: A chronology 1930–1976. Africa Fund. Human Rights Watch. (2003, October 24). Not eligible: The politicization of food in Zimbabwe. Accessed 25 February 2023 from https://www.hrw.org/ report/2003/10/24/not-eligible/politicization-food-zimbabwe Kaizira, T. (2018, May 18). Zimbabwe: Why the Sekeramayi Project failed. All Africa. Accessed 2 March 2023 from https://allafrica.com/stories/201805 180229.html Karekwaivanane, G. H. (2011). ‘It shall be the duty of every African to obey and comply promptly’: Negotiating state authority in the legal arena, Rhodesia 1965–1980. Journal of Southern African Studies, 37 (2), 333–349. https:// doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2011.579440

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Laakso, L. (2003). “Opposition Politics in Independent Zimbabwe”. African Studies Quarterly 7 (2/3), 119–137. Lye, J. (1998). Contemporary literary theory. Brock University. Makumbe, J. (2009). Zimbabwe: Survival of the nation. Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern & Southern Africa. Moyo, T., & Mavengano, E. (2021). A Déjàvu of Orwellian proportions: Rereading Animal Farm in the context of Zimbabwean politics of change. In O. Nyambi, T. Mangena, & G. Ncube (Eds.), Cultures of change in contemporary Zimbabwe: Socio-political transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa (pp. 171– 184). London. Parsons, J. B., & Harding K. J. (2011). Post-colonial theory and action research. Turkish Online Journal of Qualitative Inquiry, 2(2), 1–6. https://eric.ed. gov/?id=ED537800 Pindula. (2017, November 6). Video throwback: Mnangagwa’s “Vachingohukura Tichingotonga” speech. Accessed 22 February 2023 from https://news.pin dula.co.zw/2017/11/06/video-throwback-mnangagwas-vachingohukura-tic hingotonga-speech/ Raftopoulos, B. (2006). The Zimbabwean crises and the challenges for the left. Journal of Southern African Studies, 32(2), 203–219. https://doi.org/10. 1080/03057070600655988 Raftopoulos, B., & Savage, T. (Eds.). (2005). Zimbabwe: Injustice and political reconciliation. Weaver Press. RosGwen24News. (2022, August 27). Chamisa launches ‘Operation Mango’ to counter Zanu PF terror. Accessed 21 February 2023 from https://rosgwe n24.com/chamisa-launches-operation-mango-to-counter-zanu-pf-terror/ Rukundwa, L. S., & Van Arde, A. G. (2009). The formation of postcolonial theory. HTS Theological Studies, 63(3), 1171–1194. https://doi.org/10. 4102/hts.v63i3.237 Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism. Pantheon Books. Sambiri, T. (2022, August 28). President Chamisa’s operation mango gives Mnangagwa sleepless nights. Accessed 20 February from https://www.zimeye. net/2022/08/28/president-chamisas-operation-mango-gives-mnangagwa-sle epless-nights/ Sileyew, K. J. (2019). Research design and methodology. ItechOpen. https://doi. org/10.5772/intechopen.85731 Staff Reporter. (2022, August 28). Lie Low, Chamisa Tells CCC Supporters. The Zimbabwean. https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2022/08/ lie-low-chamisa-tells-ccc-supporters/ The Sunday Mail. (2015, March 22). Tsvangirai in (another) trip of shame. The Sunday Mail. https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/mna

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Tarusarira, J. (2014). Religion in times of crisis in Zimbabwe: A case study of churches in manicaland and its theodicy of liberation. In G. Ganiel, H. Winkel, & C. Monnot (Eds.), Religion in times of crisis (pp. 93–115). Brill. The Voice of the Tribes. (1968). Rhodesia’s chiefs. Accessed 2 March 2023 from https://www.rhodesia.me.uk/voice-of-the-tribes/ ZCBC. (2007). God hears the cry of the oppressed. ZCBC Social Communications. ZCBC. (2020). The March is not ended. ZCBC Social Communications. Zimnews 24. (2022, September 21). Citizens coalition for change supporter introduces mango strategy. Zimnews 24: Local and International News. Accessed 2 March 2023 from https://zimnews24.com/index.php/2022/ 09/21/citizens-coalition-for-change-supporter-introduces-mango-strategy/ Zvemu Zimbabwe. (2022, October 15). Vanhu vese ava ndeve CCC inonzi Mango strategy Chamisa ngaazorore hake akapinda kare. Accessed 2 March 2023 from https://www.facebook.com/zvemuzimbabwe/videos/vanhuvese-ava-ndeve-ccc-inonzi-mango-strategy-chamisa-ngaazorore-hake-aka pinda-/1445891945918595/

CHAPTER 5

Judas Iscariotism and Zimbabwe Opposition Politics: Deceit, Fear of Difference and Language of Misrepresentation Wilson Zivave

Introduction Judas Iscariotism is a pejorative or derogatory concept which describes the behaviour of the traitor or betrayer. The issue of Iscariotism is common everywhere in modern politics. It has stifled democracy as well as ensuring that there is justice, equity and nation-building in many developing countries. This is true of the Zimbabwean opposition political party MDC where Judas Iscariotism has split the party numerous times because of greed, opportunism and self-ambitious political charlatans. Ultimately, it has resulted in deceit, chicanery and political grandstanding among many politicians who are motivated by egocentricism, charlatanism and self-aggrandizement. For this reason, many political leaders today are in

W. Zivave (B) Department of Religious Studies, Hwange College of Education, Hwange, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_6

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position of influence because of Judas Iscariotism. The concept Iscariotism is derived from Judas Iscariot who is a controversial figure in the Bible whose role in betraying Jesus is understood in various ways. Biblical exegesis of Judas narrative reflects that he is a hypocrite, lover of money and a political opportunist. It is this dubious character which has led him to be a made symbol of all greedy, lying and power-hungry politicians in contemporary politics. The issue of Judas Iscariotism is prevalent in Zimbabwean opposition politics, particularly the MDC. Opposition politics is largely associated with the Movement of Democratic Change which was formed in 1999 and today the party is sinking into oblivion in the Zimbabwean political landscape. The party was formed by trade unionists, academics and lawyers to confront the myriad of socio-economic and political problems which were blamed on the ruling party ZANU-PF’s mis-governance and lack of constitutionalism (Mungwari, 2017). However, since its formation of MDC, the political party has split several times. The political splits of the MDC have been blamed in Judas Iscariotism within the party where some members because of the love for money have betrayed the cause of the struggle fought by the opposition party. The scenario is not only unique in the opposition politics but also in the ruling party. This is partly blamed on people who love money, positions and fame at the expense of organisational objectives. This paper examines the Judas culture in opposition politics in Zimbabwe by identifying faulty lines with regard to the betrayal of the people’s struggle through splits and defections of influential people in the opposition party. Given the political context of several political defeats of the opposition party in Zimbabwe, the chapter identifies the Judas culture that would help to enhance vigilance, success and democratic credentials of opposition parties in Zimbabwe. This chapter is informed by Judas’s culture of betrayal, deceit, lying and language of misrepresentation which is alive in the MDC since its formation. This has dampened the spirit of voters in recent elections and subsequently caused voter apathy. Political change in Zimbabwe has thus remained wishful thinking.

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Statement of the Problem The research is an investigation that examine how Judas’ traitorship, fear of difference and language of misrepresentation serves as a lens for understanding postcolonial African politics in the Movement for Democratic Change party in Zimbabwe.

Research Methodology The research is based on a discursive research approach which involves the collection of data from secondary sources. Berger (2000) believes that discursive research approach is a qualitative research methodology that involves a close examination of previous research studies on the topic under discussion but analysing it in the present context. In this context, data from newspapers will be used to examine the Judas culture in the MDC. The approach will examine the causes of Judas culture in the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change.

Theoretical Framework: Postcolonial Interrogative Research Before critiquing Judas Iscariotism in opposition politics in Zimbabwe, it is necessary to comprehend tenets of postcolonial perspective of contemporary politics. Post-colonialism refers, largely, to a wholesome of critical anti-colonial views that display an awareness of the strategies in which five centuries of modern European colonialism persist in moulding political views and trends, including those concerning the production of knowledge (Ghandi, 1998). The birth of postcolonial scholarship is credited to the anti-colonial struggles from the twentieth century up to the present. Scholars such as Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1998) and Frantz Fanon (1970, 2004), for example, criticised injustices and violence bred by the imperialist in Asia, Africa and the Americas. Modern scholarship has further extended the understanding of postcolonial studies by rethinking disciplinary practices or established ways of doing history, anthropology and literary criticism. Literary scholars in Religious Studies and Biblical studies, too, have felt the need to shed their Eurocentric lenses to revisit their canonical texts from postcolonial perspectives as it has affected colonised and even colonised powers. For some, this has been a strategy to re-interpret and unravel the abandoned aspects of New

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Testament passages, while for others, it has been a case of re-interpreting biblical texts, particularly in the New Testament from a new theoretical framework. From Religious Studies, postcolonial perspectives have been taken seriously in re-interpreting Religious Studies. The next section explores the implications of the Judas narrative in contemporary politics.

Deceit, Fear of Difference and Language of Misrepresentation Defined Deceit refers to the act of causing someone to accept as true or valid what is false or invalid. Put differently, deceit is the act or practice of deceiving by politicians so that they gain positions and recognition which they do not deserve (Gupta & Ortony, 2018). In this context, deceit is a culture of lying by politicians. On the other hand, fear of difference often leads to stereotypes and prejudice. Language of misrepresentation is any form of communication that carries information that is untrue but has the capacity of convincing the person being lied to admit that it’s true. Language of misrepresentation result in political supporters losing faith in their leaders because they feel deceived. The result of language misrepresentation is loss of support and collapse of the political party (Mungwari, 2017).

The Background of Judas Iscariot The word “Iscariot” is a corruption of the Latin word “sicarius”, which literally translates to a “dagger man” (Klassen, 1996; Sorensen, 2011). The meaning of Judas Iscariot is shrouded with a lot of negativity as it is associated with deceit, greediness and opportunistic behaviour. According to Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg (1834), Iscariot means “the liar” or “the false one” in the Aramaic language. However, other scholars beg to differ arguing that the fact that New Testament writers refer to Judas as the betrayer of Jesus does not warrant him to be given the suffix name “the false one” or “the liar” (Klassen, 1996). Such scholarship contend that “Iscariot” was a common surname as there was also the son of Simon Iscariot. The first name “Judas” was also a common name during the time of Jesus particularly among the Jews. Judas was the contemporary of Jesus and he lived in the first century AD. He was the disciple of Jesus during His three years from 30 to 33AD and he is the one who initiated the betrayal of Jesus in 33 AD which culminated in the death of Jesus. Politically, Israel was under Roman

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imperial rule and he is one of the disciples who resented Roman imperial rule. Israel was already a divided land with Samarians, Jews and other local groups, but with the Roman occupation, Israel was even more a conflicted state (Klassen, 1996). For this reason, he joined the Jesus movement for political reasons. However, some believe that he joined a group of trusted followers of Jesus because of money. Sorensen (2011, p. 7) states that Judas Iscariot is a historical person who betrayed the historical Jesus and died after the betrayal of Jesus. This means that the historical authenticity of Judas is reliable. However, there are some scholars who believe that Judas is a fictional character created to stereotype Jews as bad people (Klassen, 1996). Judas Iscariot is a historical figure who was one of the 12 disciples of Jesus Christ who later betrayed Jesus. Therefore, it is prudent to argue that Judas is a real historical figure whose existence directly influenced the death of Jesus. There is very scanty information about the childhood and early life of Judas Iscariot. The suffix name, “Iscariot”, indicates that he came from the town of Kerioth (also known as Carioth) in the kingdom of Judaea, as the Hebrew word “Iscariot” means “man from Kerioth” (Sorensen, 2011, p. 5). There are two historical personalities with the name Iscariot in the Bible. The first one is Judas Iscariot, the traitor, deceiver and greed one (Matthew 10:4). The other Iscariot is Simon Iscariot, the father of Judas (John 6:71). Some scholars argue that Judas might have been from Galilea. They argue that most of Jesus’ disciples were from Galilea (Klassen, 1996). Galilea was full of entrepreneurs who earned a living through fishery and tax collecting. It is the business enterprising nature of Galileans that resulted in Judas that led to the betrayal of Jesus. However, Judas was probably the best-educated man among the twelve and the only Judean in the Master’s apostolic family (Klassen, 1996). This means he was a Judean and not a Galilean. His name suggests that he was a Judean. Judas Iscariot is one of the inner circles of Jesus who was in charge of the treasury (John 12:6; John 13:29). Sorensen (2011, p. 6) believes that Judas might have been a taxi collector because of his personality which is described as greedy and uncaring. It is further argued that Judas may have been a colleague of Matthew the taxi collector as evidenced by his greediness. Tax collectors could do anything to have extra revenue even in the form of betrayal. The betrayal of Jesus was influenced by Judas’s personal enrichment drive and he managed to convince the opponents of Jesus to pay thirty pieces of silver.

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Judas loved to live a luxurious life and this is the reason why he was always after money throughout his life. During dinner, he was agitated that Mary had wasted expensive oil by pouring it over Jesus’ feet (John 12:5). It is argued that Judas protested that the perfume would have been sold and the money given to the poor. The character of Judas is cunning in this case as he was a well-known thief and his intention for encouraging the selling of perfume was to steal from the coffers. John 12:6 states, “He did not say this because he cared about the poor but because he was a thief”. He fully intended to swindle money from the treasury and fund his love for a luxurious lifestyle. Judas is therefore any extravagant who wanted to live a lavish life.

The Betrayal of Jesus The climax of Judas’ personality is seen in the betrayal of Jesus (Matthew 26:14–16, Luke). The misuse of expensive oil by the woman is the root cause of betrayal from Judas’s perspective. This is because Judas was driven by greediness and hence the motive of betraying Jesus was for economic gain. Jesus had constantly foretold his betrayal (John 6:70– 71). According to John 13:2, the devil entered into Judas and this culminated in the betrayal of Jesus. The biblical narrative indicates that Satan influenced Judas’ actions of betraying Jesus. However, greed maybe considered as the main driver for betrayal. Judas’s betrayal exposed his hypocrisy as one who pretended to love Jesus. According to John 13:26–28, Jesus told his disciples that the one whom he was going to give a morsel was going to betray him. Judas was given a morsel and left the scene after being exposed for deceit. This implies that betrayers when they are exposed they leave the organisation due to fear. Judas, however, came back later in the night in the garden of Gethsemane and kissed Jesus (Matthew 26:48). Imposters do not show their real character, they pretend when they execute their plans. Judas had been given thirty pieces of silver by the chief priest and elder (Matthew 27:3). This payment reflects deceit as part of Judas’ way of operating. It is reflected by Matthew one of four Gospel writers that Judas received thirty pieces of silver for betraying Jesus. The figure “thirty pieces of silver” is also similar to what Zechariah received in the Old Testament when he received thirty pieces of silver for his labour (Zachariah 11:12–13). Zachariah took the money ‘to the potter’, supposedly because the money was insulting and the chief priests took the money for purchasing a field

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(Klassen, 1996). Therefore, thirty pieces of silver is a figurative amount which is symbolic of the modest sum of money that Judas received. So it seems that Matthew selected thirty pieces of silver, when the chief priests could probably have paid Judas a greater amount for him to betray Jesus in order to fulfil the Old Testament prophecies. Judas’ objective may well have been similar to that of a mercenary who betrayed Jesus to the elite. However, John 12:6 explains that Judas was ‘a thief’ and politicians during the time of Jesus initiated the betrayal of their opponents. This implies that the betrayal of Jesus might have been engineered behind the scenes by those who felt threatened by Jesus’ fame, possibly the Roman officials and the Sadducees.

Understanding the Character and Personality of Judas Iscariot The character and personality of Judas Iscariot is difficult to understand. Uraguchi (1998) underscores that the character of Judas Iscariot presents a problem which is hard to solve, yet rewarding to the diligent effort. As previously adumbrated, Judas, being the treasurer who was in charge of money-handling among the disciples of Jesus (John 13:29), formed the basis of Judas’ love for money leading to deceit and dishonesty as part of his way of conducting business. Judas is also characterised as the deceiver and a hypocrite who pretended to love those around him. He joined the Jesus movement through hypocrisy. The Judas’ kiss is not a sign of love but a hypocritical symbol meant to deceive Jesus during his arrest. It is a kiss that reflects the language of misrepresentation, he represented himself as a close associate of Jesus but on the other hand, the kiss is a reflection of Judas as a liar and hypocrite. Therefore, the Judas kiss presented the pretentious nature of Judas who wanted to be seen as holy but he in actual fact was a hypocrite. This reflects that Judas was self-centred because he followed Jesus for personal gain. His allegiance to Jesus was cosmetic and lacked truthfulness. Judas is an opportunist who always positioned himself to benefit from the change of the system. He is portrayed as a person who used his position for his own personal gain. This is because Judas did not want the Romans to rule over Palestine and he saw the opportunity having a better position when the Roman rule is removed through the coming of Jesus. Jesus was understood by Judas as a political messiah whose coming

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had political ambitions to remove imperial rule (Campbell, 1986). Klassen (1996) believes that Judas had a misconception that Jesus was going to establish a political kingdom and put down Roman oppression. It is this motive that reveals the character of Judas as an opportunist. He wanted to be associated with power and authority. One can therefore conclude that opportunists create self-contentment which is dangerous to the welfare of others. Lastly, Judas is considered a psychologist because he was able to analyse and understand Jesus as Christ. The revealing of the identity of Jesus Christ to the masses (John 6:64) is the true feature of fear of difference which resulted in the betrayal. While this paper is alive to the fact that Judas is full of deceit, trickery and language of misrepresentation, his role in ensuring that Christian salvation is realised is crucial.

Findings on the Judas Culture in the MDC The research found that the Judas culture is prevalent in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In general, the character and personality of Judas Iscariot which is characterised by love of money, lying, corrupt, opportunism and self-centred in the quest to outwit others as well as gaining fame and fortune through unscrupulous means have been the norm within the main MDC. In this paper, I argue that there are several mechanisms which the Judas culture or character is applied and implied in the opposition party, MDC where it has become a perennial loser as was experienced in previous elections due to splits and defections which were motivated by personal ego and aggrandisement. The Judas culture is overtly seen in the politics of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) where the objectives of the movement have always remained a mirage. The failure of the MDC to challenge the ruling party is largely blamed on the Judas culture that has been exuded by some cadres from 1999 to present (Madzimure, 2022).

Splitting of MDC and Iscariotism It should be noted that the MDC is a political party that was formed in September 1999. Maroleng (2004a, 2004b) attributed the formation of the MDC to the decline of the standards of living in Zimbabwe which led MDC galvanising civic groups and the ZCTU into a political party. Thus the formation of the MDC was motivated by trade unionism. For this reason, Asuelime and Simura (2014) believe the ZCTU is seen as

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the foster mother of MDC. The 2000 parliamentary election was the first contestable election that the party was tested in terms of its popularity and political ideology. In this election, the movement proved to be popular and many leaders in the movement began to position themselves to lead the party. Maroleng (2004a, 2004b) underscores that in 2000, MDC won 57 seats and ZANU-PF 62. It is because of this that the MDC became the most successful opposition in Zimbabwean politics thus far (Maroleng, 2004a, 2004b). Regardless of this promising start of the MDC, the preceding elections were not promising as the popularity of the party continued to dwindle. This was caused by the Judas culture in the MDC, and it caused several splits in the party. Thus there has been deceit, betrayal and language of misrepresentation which has dampened optimism among the majority of Zimbabweans who continue to suffer because of the deteriorating economic and political situation. The party was formed at the height of economic and political challenges which created a fertile ground for opportunism, deceit, fear of difference and language of misrepresentation. This is evidenced by the 2005 MDC split which saw two factions, namely, MDC-T and MDC being led Morgan Tsvangirai and Professor Welshmen Ncube emerging as a result of Iscariotism. Madzimure (2022) avers that Tsvangirai led a faction that was against participating in senate elections, while Professor Welshman Ncube led a faction that supported participating in senate elections. This also resulted in a further split when Job Sikhala formed MDC99. Hartwell (2018) believes that differences in opinion over participation in nation senate elections was the cause of the split. According to The Guardian of Monday 28 November 2005, 26 members of the MDC joined Ncube in defying Tsvangirai as they contested the senate elections. However, the reason does not hold water as the Judas culture seems to have influenced the split since there was greed and lying at the party of Ncube. Welshmen lied that Tsvangirai had violated the constitution but he wanted to play regional politics. Ncube was blamed for being a Central Intelligence Operative who betrayed the movement for personal gain, he wanted fame in Matebeleland region. Many politicians in Tsvangirai’s camp argued that Welshmen Ncube received his thirty pieces of silver in the form of land which he benefited during the land reform. Fascinating is the political emergence of Authur Mutambara to the helm of MDC despite the fact that Ncube had decided to break away. This means that

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Iscariotism of Ncube was not about position but money. It is his Iscariotism that affected the main MDC’s led by Tsvangirai to have a sluggish performance in the harmonised election conducted in 2007. When the MDC split in 2005, Sikhala joined the faction led by Welshman Ncube and Gibson Sibanda but in 2009 he broke away to form his own party, MDC-99. Madzimure (2022) supports this saying the anti-Senate faction was to become the present-day MDC Ncube. Sikhala blamed Ncube for inviting Arthur Mutambara who was not familiar with the core values of the MDC politics. Sikhala blamed Mutambara and Ncube for the Judas culture because they had acted in deceit in appointing each other in high influential positions. The acts of Iscariotism grew in the movement as Gabriel Chaibva quit in MDC in 2009. Chaibva belonged to the MDC green which was led by Welsheman Ncube and later of Authur Mutambara. Nehanda Radio (2010) states that Chaibva was a national executive member in the smaller MDC party led by Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara which broke away from MDC-Tsvangirai. He is described as the nomadic legislator but his political nomadism is a reflection of the Judas culture among MDC politicians. Chaibva just like Judas betrayed the MDCT for “self-preservation” (Campbell, 1986). This implies that Chaibva betrayed MDC-T to preserve himself from sinking into political oblivion. This is one of the reasons why Judas betrayed Jesus so that he preserved himself from the persecution that Jesus was going to experience. Betrayers are nomadic, Judas during the night was with both Jesus and later on with Jesus’s opponents. Chaibva became a fierce critic of the MDCT and has enjoyed media coverage because of his Iscariotism. This is true when comparing with Judas who was given preferential treatment by the Sadducees and Pharisees who sought to destroy Jesus. Chaibva today has been rewarded with posts such as the commissioner of National Reconciliation by the government for betraying the MDC-T. In 2014, the Judas culture which had been engraved in the MDC-T exposed itself when several leaders from the MDC-T formed their splinter opposition parties. Interestingly, the level of Iscariotism in the MDC became much higher among the opposition elite. Biti formed MDC Renewal, Job Sikhala formed MDC 99 as well as Mangoma Wellington formed Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe (RDZ). Madzimure (2020) believes that the split of MDC formations is because of poor ideological standing by political leaders within the MDC-T who pursue politics for personal gain than the success of the party. Splitting for Mungwari

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and Vhutuza (2017) is a feature of a polarised MDC. I argue that polarisation is caused by the Judas culture within opposition ranks and this has resulted in the ruling party cementing its political hegemony. Magaisa (2017) says in 2014, Biti abandoned MDC-T to form MDC Renewal, which later on changed to the name to Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) the party he led before re-joining the MDC Alliance which resurrected in the form of CCC. It is this polarisation and Iscariotism which led Biti to be expelled from the MDC-T. He was accused of being an opportunist who wanted Tsvangirai to relinquish power for his own benefit and not the masses. On the other hand, Biti blamed Tsvangirai for the defeat in 2013 where Mugabe had obtained 61% against Tsvangirai’s 34% (Mungwari & Vhutuza, 2017:173). Biti is thus blamed for being deceitful by Tsvangirai who lambasted him saying, “Mr Biti deceived us all. The men doesn’t believe in anything except his power” (British Broadcasting Cooperation, 2014). Tendai Biti was disloyal just like Judas Iscariot. This submission attests that Iscariotism with its indelible features like deceit, lying and language of misrepresentation is motivated by love of power which does not take the opposition party forward but backward. In the MDC, there is a “lust for power or what may be described as ‘sit-tight in office syndrome,’ money politics, looting of public funds” (Anyarogbu & Asadu, 2020). All these features are Judas Iscariotic in nature. Mangoma Iscariotism is also seen when he was expelled from the MDC-T after calling on Tsvangirai to step down. This is seen as Iscariotism because Mangoma wanted to be the leader himself. This seems to be true when he formed another party different from the party led by Tendai Biti which they formed after being expelled from the MDC-T led by Tsvangirai in 2014. Mangoma formed Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe (RDZ) because he is seen as an opportunist who wanted position. Although he blamed Biti and others for allegedly courting a ZANU-PF faction linked to former Vice President Joice Mujuru that is calling itself People First, Mangoma is seen exhibiting the Judas culture by forming his own party. MDC Renewal Team spokesperson, Jacob Mafume, dismissed Mangoma’s move accusing him of being power-hungry a trait that Judas exhibited when he betrayed Jesus. Both Biti and Mangoma left the MDCT to form MDC Renewal Team claiming that MDC-T was failing to be properly run by Morgan Tsvangirai. The two had the Judas culture since they did it to gain money and positions. They were greedy and motivated by their ego. Therefore, the 2014 MDC-T split resulted in Biti-Mangoma Iscariotism which was motivated by self-seeking fame, and

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the desire to get money and positions. Mangoma Iscariotism is also seen when he was expelled from the MDC-T after calling on Tsvangirai to step down. This is seen as Iscariotism because Mangoma wanted to be the leader himself. This seems to be true when he formed another party different from the party led by Tendai Biti which they formed after being expelled from the MDC-T led by Tsvangirai in 2014. Mangoma formed Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe (RDZ) because he is seen as an opportunist who wanted position. Although he blamed Biti and others for allegedly courting a ZANU-PF faction connected to People First a party led by former Vice President Joice Mujuru. Mangoma is seen exhibiting the Judas culture by forming his own party MDC Renewal.

POLAD and Iscariotism In 2018, after the passing on of Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC-T was divided further into MDC Alliance and MDC-T led by Nelson Chamisa and Thokozani Khupe respectively. This was after Chamisa was accused of post-grabbing. This rise of Chamisa is punctuated by a tempestuous political environment such that any of those people like Mwonzora, Mudzuri, Khupe and her allies purportedly opposed to Chamisa’s elevation had been labelled Judas Iscariot because they were considered unpopular by the masses and were meant to divide votes. Khupe and her allies believed that Chamisa was not qualified to lead the party hence he played deceit in politics. One of Khupe’s ally Obert Gutu claimed that Chamisa had no mandate to lead the party while the other majority members of the national executive sided by Chamisa. The way Chamisa took over the leadership reflects Iscariotism because Tsvangirai was on the deathbed. Chamisa’ ascension to power however is as seen as Iscariotism because constitutionally Khupe was supposed to takeover. He claimed to be the anointed one and deserved to be the leader. Khupe accused Chamisa for being an Iscariot. Be that as it may, it was his popularity and eloquence that made him loved by the opposition party supporters. On the other hand, Chamisa also accused Khupe of being a betrayer for not siding with his popularity as well as Khupe’s involvement in the Political Action Dialogue (POLAD) which was formed after the 2019 elections to make it appear as if there was democracy and inclusivity through constructive dialogue with all political parties in Zimbabwe. According to Newsday, Khupe is labelled as someone who is money driven, greedy full of deceit for sanctifying the new dispensation and reception of the political grant

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which is given as per number of mps in Parliament. The $88 million budget for POLAD is the most visible sign of the ZANU-PF regime’s plan to buy the opposition and of the compromised former opposition parties’ willingness to sell their voices for a few pieces of silver (Nehanda Radio, 2019). POLAD benefits are a form of thirty pieces of silver given by the ruling elite to those who betray the real opposition values.

Mwonzora and the Judas Culture In 2019, Supreme Court then judged that Chamisa was not the legitimate leader of the MDC-T which contested the election as the MDC Alliance. The MDC-T rushed to conduct the extraordinary congress where Mwonzora was elected to become the leader of the MDC-T. Khupe lost at the congress and this created division between MDC-T supporters. Mwonzora went on to recall councillors, mayors and members of parliament who claimed to be aligned to Chamisa because of the court judgement. In this case, the courts were engaged in political corruption as Mwonzora with the help of ZANU-PF sustained his power, status and wealth (Amundsen, 1999, p. 3). The inferred constitutionalism which is rendered to Mwonzora’s faction under the influence of the Supreme Court creates space for Mwonzora to be labelled a Judas Iscariot. This is because Mwanzora believed that he had the constitutional right of recalling MDC Alliance which refused to recognise him when he was appointed as the leader by the court. His political party received money under the Political parties finances Act. This is ‘the politics of deceit’ and it is a gimmick used to capture the practice of immorality by politicians in politicking, bad mannerism that has been widely accepted as a formidable part of the political culture (Anyarogbu & Asadu, 2020). Mwonzora was favoured by the ruling party as they saw him as a moderate opposition who was accommodative to the ruling party policies. For this reason, Chamisa’s supporters gave Douglas Mwonzora was given the name Mwonzorewa which is taken from the name Muzorewa who is famous for betraying during the liberation struggle (Nehanda Radio, 2022). The Mwonzerewa sarcasm is hinged on his lying, deceit, fear of difference and language of misrepresentation. It can be read as the Judas culture of betraying the values of the MDC by discredit another true opposition led by Nelson Chamisa. The Mwonzorewa in this case is synonymous to Iscariotism. This is seen when Mwonzora lied about some “smooth handover takeover of MRT House” without the assistance of state security yet

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he was assisted (Myzimbabwe, 2020). Mwonzora was recognised as the right heir of Morgan Tsvangirai by ZANU-PF as well as attracting media coverage and winning of court cases through the support of state. In this context, political corruption affects how decisions are made and it involves manipulation of courts for political mileage (Amundsen, 1999, p. 3). In September 2021, ZANU-PF confessed that it was comfortable to work with Mwonzora than Chamisa in POLAD. For this reason, due to deceit and language of misrepresentation, Mwonzoras’ party is now called the “state-sponsored opposition” (Welshman Ncube cited in Nehanda Radio on 07 September 2021). This is because of the monetary and legal backing that the party had enjoyed breaking the norm where the opposition dined and enjoyed protection from the ruling party. Deceit, lying and language of misrepresentation propelled Mwonzora to the helm of MDC-T as he claimed to be the leader of both the MDC-T and MDC Alliance. Mattes et al. (2020) support this by saying dishonesty in politics is a long-standing tradition. Mwonzora is accused by Khupe of peddling lies that she was the leader of MDC-T. The belief that politicians lie to the people in order to deceive them is a reality (Bellamy, 2019, p. 1). Mwonzora’s deception is seen in flip-flopping on the legitimacy of Mnangagwa. At one end, he describes him as an illegitimate leader when he was still MDC Alliance secretary-general and at the other end he is described as legitimate after he was state assisted to take over Harvest House as well as the leadership of MDC-T and subsequently MDC alliance. It is alleged that Mwonzora treacherously ascended to power in the 2020 extraordinary congress, whose results were disputed by Khupe (Masvingo Mirror, 2022). Mwonzora misled, hid the truth, or promoted a belief, concept, or idea that is not true concerning MDC leadership wrangle. His deception is seen when recalled all strong members backing Chamisa (Nehanda Radio 13 February 2021). This means that some Zimbabwean citizens failed to get representation in parliament because of Mwonzora’s deception. This gave ZANU-PF the much-needed twothirds majority in order to pass the repressive Constitutional Amendment Bill No 2 (Muponde in Newsday 2021). Judas was assisted by the Sadducees and Chief Priests in ensuring that Jesus was nailed, a scenario similar to the help of given by Mwonzora to take the Headquarters of the MDC Alliance. MyZimbabwe news of 12 July 2020 claims that the factional wars escalated even further after Khupe seized the party’s iconic national headquarters, the Morgan Richard Tsvangirai House—allegedly with the assistance of State security forces.

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The MDC-T then split again in 2022 when Khupe blamed Mwonzora for abusing the party constitution by claiming that he was the leader of two political parties. For this reason, Khupe expelled Mwonzora from MDC-T and Mwonzora reacted by expelling Khupe who quickly rejoined the new party formed by her former nemesis Nelson Chamisa. Madzimure (2022) avers that Mwonzora suspended Dr. Khupe from MDC-T accusing her of dining with enemies and causing unrest in the fragile MDC-T party while Khupe responded by expelling Mwonzora from MDC-T because he had technically left the party by joining the MDC Alliance. The split has caused the party to be labelled puppets of Westerners whose objectives have always been to advance and protect the interests of Third World countries (Madzimure, 2022). I argue that the splits subjugate the interests of democratic people in Zimbabwe and the main cause of splits is to gain monetary rewards that are poured to individuals who divide the party so that ZANU-PF maintains its grip on power. For this reason, Mwonzora Iscariotism has been the greatest scandal in opposition politics.

The Impact of Iscariotism in Zimbabwe However, Judas’s actions are a replica of individuals in the MDC. Ncube, Mwonzora and Khupe are largely considered as the Judas Iscariots of the MDC who sold the struggle for fame, fortune and positions. Madzimure (2022) support this saying “It is an institution which is more than the individual. In these MDC formations, there is more of individualism, MDC, MDC-T, MDC-N, MDC-99, and MDC-Alliance”. This individualism has resulted in the betrayal of the movement and this has resulted in the poor performance of the MDC in elections especially all elections which came after 2000. Absolutely there is no general election that has happened without a Judas in the MDC. Unlike Jesus who was only aware of Judas’ plan because he was God who knows all things, the MDC is always caught unaware because all those who have betrayed the MDC have successfully done it. Judas spent time with Jesus with all the other disciples and listened to Jesus all the time, so is many MDC Judas Iscariots who have dined with the national executive and some have even advised Tsvangirai. Despite the movement working to achieve a political goal, the Judas culture has always been engraved in the opposition politics. Many have been members of the MDC from its inception just like Judas who has always been with Jesus

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for years, have been motivated by lies, deceit and language of misrepresentation to offer a Judas kiss through mere sloganeering in the MDC as a sign of allegiance to the party but in actual fact they are enemies of the movement through defections to ZANU-PF and formation of their own parties. This is the betrayal of the MDC, and today, the party has sunk deep into political oblivion. Indeed, the MDC has been characterised by the spirit of Iscariotism; the spirit that makes prominent politicians to think they are wise and brave to negate the cause of the movement when in actual sense they are lovers of money and opportunist. Judas’ lies and deceit are clear in the MDC leadership from 2005 to the present. This selfishness is a mark of Judas culture because Ncube, Mwonzora and Khupe Iscariotism is aimed at selfgain than the achievement of democracy as well as total liberation from oppression and repression being perpetuated by ZANU-PF. Most elections in Zimbabwe have revealed so many Judas Iscariots in the opposition politics and the ruling party ZANU-PF is blamed for implanting betrayers in the opposition party. This has made Judas Iscariotism a permanent culture and the modus operandi of many opposition politicians who maintain his legacy by betraying their political associates through lying, deceit and language of misrepresentation. The MDC founding members and those who joined later despite being close associates of Morgan Tsvangirai have betrayed the MDC in most crucial times. These politicians talked, hugged and worked with Morgan Tsvangirai but they were political fanatics who wanted to gain popularity and position through deceit and lying just like Judas Iscariot. Mattes et al. (2020) state that political leaders have the privilege of lying. The splits initiated by Welshman Ncube, Biti, Mangoma, Khupe and Mwonzora reflect their characters as Judas Iscariots of the modern politics. Mwonzora whose nick name is Mwonzorewa is an architype Judas in opposition political landscape who destroyed the movement into oblivion. He has destroyed the party through lies and deception. Mwonzora lied that MDC alliance was not a party but also claimed that it was a party after he was assisted to take over leadership of the party by the courts and the deception was that he recalled all members of parliament who were aligned to Chamisa. MDC Alliance was a party yet it was an alliance in order to control members of parliament who had won under MDC alliance (Mahere, 2022). Chamisa (2022) further attest that Mwonzora lied by alleging that he had formed a coalition with the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) in order to attract sympathy and redeem his political

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career from ending. Lying and deception in politics extend from outright mendacity to deny or hide a misdemeanour that might harm a politician’s personal reputation (Bellamy, 2019, p. 1). His party enjoys protection from state security and media coverage. In the name of constitutionalism Mwonzora exhibited his pretence, false ethics, false integrity and false loyalty by taking the MDC-T party which was a leading principal in the alliance pact that had participated in the election as MDC Alliance. This can be argued that the Judas culture played a crucial role in the political ascendency of Mwonzora. The taking of MDC alliance and recalling of MDC Alliance councillors and parliamentarians reflect that he betrayed the legacy of Morgan Tsvangirai for self-gain and self-recognition. Mwonzora recalled 41 MDC Alliance legislators from Parliament and 165 councillors and claimed his party was ready for by-elections to replace them (Nehanda Radio, 2021). This is despite the fact that the party he claimed to be leading, MDC-T only got two seats in the 2018 elections. Mwonzora deceitfully claimed leadership of two different parties MDCT and MDC alliance. It is clear that the politics of deceit is instantiated in various ways in MDC, such as short-changing the electorate of their political choice and political gerrymandering. For this reason, Mwonzora perpetuated the legacy of Judas by inheriting party leadership through lies, deceit and language of misrepresentation. In the light of the above, the schisms have left most supporters of the MDC in despair and divided leading to the failure by the party to provide meaningful challenge to the ruling party ZANU-PF (Magaisa, 2017). This chapter argues that as Zimbabwe preparing for the 2023 general elections, it is unavoidable and undeniable that there is a need for identifying the Judas elements in the newly formed Citizens Coalition for Change which has its own roots from the MDC. Ghandi and Reuter (2008) note that dictatorial incumbents usually want divisions within the opposition parties to cement their rule. Therefore, incumbent authoritarian regimes implicitly or explicitly disallow alliances among the opposition parties (Mungwari & Vhutuza, 2017, p. 173). I argue in this paper that the Judas culture in the MDC is caused by infiltration of the opposition party as well as having personal attributes like greed, selfishness and venal which are the bench marks of Iscariotism of some opposition members.

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Conclusion It is discernible from the above discussion that Judas Iscariotism which is characterised by deceit, lying and language of misrepresentation in the pursuit personal glory, money and receiving protection from the ruling party is a scandal to democracy and rule of law. The effects of this Judas Iscariotism in politicking in opposition politics are enormous as it has led to failure of to dislodge the ruling party; a fact that is exemplified in the recent election defeats and defection of some opposition members. This has also led to institutional decay in MDC; a terrible precedence set by the Judas Iscariots political elites to enable them perpetuate politics of deceit, fear of difference and language of misrepresentation. The overall implication of this blight is the rapid growth of political apathy among the helpless masses. The discussion established that the Judas culture discourse presents many leaders in the MDC as lovers of money and liars as their political betrayals exposes the façade of constitutionalism in the opposition political party. It has the historical splits of the MDC in the light of the Judas culture of the opposition politicians revealing cases of deceit, lying and language of misrepresentation. The discussion has demonstrated that Judas culture is conceptualised as opposition politics have proven it through various splits. It emerged from the discussion that the splits that the MDC has experienced have been caused by the need for money and favours from the ruling party. The discussion tapped from the several splits, the Mwonzorewa mantra and POLAD role in opposition politics to claim that Judas culture in the MDC is caused by self-aggrandizement. The analysis maintained splits have been caused by money pampered on opposition stalwarts, thereby imaginatively engendering democracy in Zimbabwe. Conflict of Interest

I declare that this paper has no conflict of interest.

References Amundsen, I. (1999). Political corruption: An introduction to issues. Michelsen institute of Development Studies and Human Rights. Anyarogbu, J. C., & Asadu, G. C (2020). William James’ pragmatic theory of truth: A hermeneutic of the politics of deceit in Nigeria. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 18(6).

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Asuelime, L., & Simura, B. (2014). The MDC and the changing geo-political landscape in Zimbabwe. Selected themes in African political studies: advanced in African economic, social and political development. Springer international Publishing. B.B.C Zimbabwe: Tsvangirai ‘expels’ Tendai Biti from MDC, 29 April 2014, www. bbc.com/news/world-africa-27212025 Bellamy, R. (2019). Lies, deception and democracy. bibiloteca della liberta liv, Retrieved from www.centre.noudi.lt Berger, A. A. (2000). Media and communication research methods: An introduction to qualitative and quantitative approaches. Sage Publication. Campbell, D. B. J. (1986). The synoptic Gospels. Mazongororo Paper converters. Chamisa, N. (2022). ‘It’s all fake,’ Chamisa Dismisses Mwonzora Meeting Report, https://zero.pindula.co.zw/its-all-fake-chamisa-dismisses-mwonzorameeting-report/ Fanon, F. (1970). A dying colonialism (H. Chevalier, Trans.). Penguin. Fanon, F. (2004). The wretched of the earth. Grove Press. Ghandi, L. (1998). Postcolonial theory: A critical introduction. Edinburgh University Press. Ghandi, J., & Reuter, O. J. (2008). Opposition coordination in legislative elections under authoritarianism, Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, August 27–31. Gupta, S., & Ortony, A. (2018). Lying and deception. In J. Meibauer (Ed.), The oxford handbook of lying. Oxford Handbooks. Retrieved from https:// doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.11, Accessed 23 January 2023. Hartwell, L. (2018). What went wrong with Zimbabwe’s MDC-T? Hengstenberg, E. W. (1834). Judas Iscariot Biography (Betrayer of Jesus), https://www.thefamouspeople.com/ Klassen, W. (1996). Judas: Betrayer or Friend of Jesus? Fortress. Madzimure, J. (2022). Zimbabwe: No ideological grounding in MDC—Analysts, The Herald 24 January 2022. Magaisa, A. (2017). BSR: MDC alliance—An oasis or a mirage? Mahere, F. (2022, January 19). Mahere exposes Mwonzora Lies, https://www.zim eye.net/2022/01/19/mahere-exposes-mwonzora-lies-2/ Maroleng, C. (2004a). Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change: Briefing notes, Institute for Security Studies, Situation Report Maroleng, C. (2004b). Zimbabwe’s MDC: Perils and prospects, African Security Review, Institute for Security Studies. Masvingo Mirror. (2022). Mwonzora to Recall Khupe from Parliament over split. Retrieved from https://masvingomirror.com/mwonzora-to-recallkhupe-from-parliament-over-split.

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Mattes, K., Popova, V., & Evans, J. R. (2020). Deception detection in politics, can voters tell when politicians are lying? https://doi.org/10.1007/511109021-07747-1 Mungwari, T., & Vhutuza, E. (2017). Opposition political parties’ coalition in Zimbabwe: Challenges and possibilities. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 11(7), 172–181. Muponde, R. (2021). X-mayor dumps MDC-T over Mwonzora ‘deception, The Newsday 6 May 2021. MyZimbabwe. (2020, July 12). MDC Drama: Khupe exposes Mwonzora’s lies, plots to expel him as she now wants to unite with Chamisa, Retrieved from https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/67238-mdc-drama-khupe-exposesmwonzoras-lies-plots-to-expel-him-as-she-now-wants-to-unite-with-chamisa. html Nehanda Radio. (2019, November 12). MDC response to POLAD $88million budget https://nehandaradio.com/ Nehanda Radio (2021). MDC-T Splits as defiant Khupe says Mwonzora fired himself from party. Retrieved from https://nehandaradio.com/2022/ 01/21/ Nehanda Radio. (2022, January 23). Mwonzora skeletons tumble, Retrieved from https://nehandaradio.com/2022/01/23/mwonzora-skeletons-tumble/ Sorensen, R. B. (2011). Fact or fiction—Judas Iscariot, unholy Grail novel series Uraguchi, B. A. M. (1998). The psychology of Judas. Doshisha University, Iscariot, www.journals.uchicago.edu/

CHAPTER 6

The Political Landscape and a Culture of Deceit in Postcolonial Zimbabwe: Scholarly Discourse Under Siege Temba T. Rugwiji

Background to the Study The present project examines the negative impact of deceit discourse on scholarship in postcolonial Zimbabwe. It is argued that scholarship in Zimbabwe is under siege. In a previous contribution, it was explored that the demise of scholarship in Zimbabwe was triggered by geopolitical and socioeconomic factors (see Nunn, 2005, p. 8). Among the five push factors that Alex Nunn mentioned, the factor of “political and socioeconomic instability or oppression” seems to be playing a much bigger role in precipitating a culture of deceit. Numerous educated people are not gainfully employed in Zimbabwe. A few are hired by unfancied companies which pay them humiliating wages. Commencing with a discussion on the political landscape in postcolonial Zimbabwe, the study

T. T. Rugwiji (B) Univrsity of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_7

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argues that the current political system is prohibitive to sincere investigation and transparent research findings. The project is not exclusively meant for the academic community; the readership in general will benefit from the insights because the culture of deceit appears to be accelerating through the entire Zimbabwean society at an unprecedented rate. Although a debate on deceit discourse in postcolonial Zimbabwe is largely leveraged during the reign of Robert Mugabe as President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, now the reigning President after winning the harmonised elections in August 2018 (Rugwiji, 2018, p. 376), cannot be exonerated from the ideologies of his predecessor. Mnangagwa familiarised himself with Mugabe’s Marxist–Leninist philosophy which seeks to promote communism (see Lansford, 2007, pp. 9–24). Mnangagwa was Mugabe’s confidante since the late 1960s until 2017 (Bearak, 2017). Mugabe’s philosophy sought to dismantle all perceived colonial appendages. The opposition parties (i.e. Movement for Democratic Change [MDC] and Citizens Coalition for Change [CCC]) are collectively perceived by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party as an extension of the colonialist insurgence. Hence, Mugabe’s deceit discourse on the public space for political and election mileage was always marked by the following refrain: “Zimbabwe will never be a colony again…” (Willems, 2013, pp. 22–33). So, Mnangagwa would hardly have escaped Mugabe’s philosophy. Apparently, Emmerson Mnangagwa’s pseudonym “Garwe” (meaning “crocodile”) turns to characterise him as an uncompromising person. In a previous interview, Mnangagwa was quoted saying, “The crocodile never leaves the water to search for food. It waits patiently and strikes at the appropriate time” (Bearak, 2017). The chapter argues that deceit discourse is not a phenomenon that is only prevalent in political circles. In scholarship, there are also numerous inclinations which suggest the deepening of a culture of deceit. The present chapter focuses on discourse of deceit, its characteristics and its negative impact in postcolonial Zimbabwe. In order to achieve the above objective, theoretical framework (postcolonial theory) and research methodology (action research) are brought into the fold because they both play a very critical role in guiding the development of the conversation. Autoethnography as a method is also considered because of the factors included in the conversation which affected scholarship on a personal level. As already indicated, a participant observation will also be roped in as part of the data pool.

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Theoretical Framework The present chapter is premised on postcolonial theory (postcolonialism) as opposed to colonial theory (see Lomba, 2015). Colonial theory often examines how colonisers used their military, economic and political power to control and exploit the colonised peoples, as well as how the colonised peoples responded to and resisted this control. Thus, Maldonado-Torres (2007, p. 243) remarked as follows about colonial theory: Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day.

In contrast, postcolonial theory (or postcolonialism) focuses on geopolitical and socioeconomic occurrences after obtaining independence. For White (1993, p. 1), postcolonialism “denotes an end to colonialism and the subsequent existence of a different reality” (see also Hall, 1996, pp. 242–260; Frankenberg & Mani, 1993, pp. 292–310). Hence, Sugirtharajah (2002, p. 2) writes: Despite the formal withdrawal of European nations, the term “postcolonial” is thought to be an appropriate one because of the persistence of newer forms of economic and cultural colonialism which keep a number of newly independent states in check and constrain their freedom. The term as it is now used, whether referring to textual practices or psychological conditions, or historical processes, depends on who uses it and what purpose it serves.

Hadjor (1992, pp. 150–152)’s description is more political when he pens of postcolonialism as “a state thought to be at least institutionally free of foreign control, and one now possessing a greater measure of political autonomy than it did under colonialism”. Guided by postcolonialism as

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a theory, this chapter explores culture of deceit as perpetuated not necessarily by an arm of government or individuals assigned by the ruling elite but also by professionals participating in various scholarly debates and research environments.

Research Methodologies As generally perceived by various scholars, this section on research methodologies is critical for the present study. In view of the above, one would disagree with Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s thesis that “Research methodologies are tools of gate-keeping” (2015, p. 489). On the contrary, research methodologies are fundamental to unlocking conduits towards a focused academic discourse. The study employs Action research as a methodological approach (see McNiff & Whitehead, 2005, pp. 3– 5; Mertler, 2014; Rowell et al., 2015, pp. 243–270; Stringer & Ortiz, 2021). The conceptualisation of action research for this chapter was fostered by reading previous works on postcolonial Zimbabwe (i.e. book chapters, dissertations, peer-viewed articles, newspaper articles, periodicals, etc.) which were lurking not necessarily in terms of thematic alignment and objectivity, but more so that most contributions presented a reactionary approach against individual writings which challenged the system that promotes deceit. In addition to action research as an approach, the study also employs Autoethnography (Chang, 2008). The use of Autoethnography was adopted because some of the discussions included in this chapter are punctuated by personal experiences. Furthermore, participant observation is also part of the data pool (see Ciesielska et al., 2018, pp. 33–52).

The Political Landscape in Postcolonial Zimbabwe Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was colonised by Britain in 1890 (see Masaka, 2012; Mbuvayesango, 2006; Rugwiji, 2014), and only changed hands from one coloniser to another in November 1965 when Ian Douglas Smith rebelled against Britain by pronouncing a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Anglin, 1994). Southern Rhodesia then assumed a new name “Rhodesia”. Black majority rule was obtained on 18 April 1980 after sixteen years (July 1964–December 1979) of the armed struggle for liberation (Makumbe, 2006; Sibanda, 2005). Robert Gabriel Mugabe became Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. In this research when the phrase

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“postcolonial Zimbabwe” is mentioned, reference is made to a new dispensation when black people obtained independence from colonial rule. Thus, Rugwiji (2014, p. 1021) remarked that: “Since independence from the British colony then known as ‘Rhodesia’ in 1980, the Zimbabwean society had enjoyed only a short stint of democracy and freedom from colonialism”. President Mugabe’s leadership during the first years of democratic rule (1980–1990) was acknowledged all over the world as one of the best eras of African democratic rule. Notable among Mugabe’s achievements were road construction, establishment of health institutions and investment in education (Asuelime & Simura, 2013, pp. 51–65). The Zimbabwean society may not be justified to lose sight of Mugabe’s remarkable achievements. However, a paradigm shift in Mugabe’s leadership emerged when political power avowed to an individual superseded national obligation and economic development. Following the formation of the MDC in September 1999 led by the late Morgan Tsvangirai, the traditional majority supporters of ZANU-PF “shifted camp” to support the new party. Numerous previous studies have attributed the loss of ZANU-PF’s support to MDC as the beginning of Mugabe’s political malevolence. The opposition leader himself, Morgan Tsvangirai, was hospitalised after sustaining injuries from severe beatings (Holland, 2008, p. xix). An informal stoolpigeon1 shared on Mugabe’s discourse of proudly admitting that “Takachirova Tsvangison2 ” (literally translated as “We thoroughly lashed Tsvangirai”). Following the escalation of persecutions countrywide, Tsvangirai went and sought refuge at the Dutch Embassy in Harare (Banya, 2008). Others have attributed Zimbabwe’s socioeconomic crisis to “land occupation” as opposed to “land reform” (see for example, De Villiers, 2003). In my view, Zimbabwe’s troubles had already begun earlier. The land occupation was a reactionary plot by ZANU-PF to win the support back from the opposition. It is on record that “the majority of the victims of political violence during the parliamentary elections of 2000 were members and supporters of opposition political parties” (Makumbe, 2006, p. 48). Thus, 1 The informant remains anonymous. 2 “Tsvangison” was Robert Mugabe’s deliberate coinage of Morgan’s surname (correctly

spelt as “Tsvangirai”). Mugabe referred to Morgan as “Tsvangison”, likening him to Western people with names such as “Livingstone”, “Winston”, “Kingston”, etc. Mugabe accused Tsvangirai as a puppet of the West. A consensus view suggests that numerous white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe were members of the MDC-T.

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the culture of deceit by ZANU-PF was sustained by accusing the opposition for precipitating the current socioeconomic crisis in Zimbabwe (see Masaka, 2012, p. 64). In view of the above observation on a sustained culture of deceit, besides the “electoral fraud by the ruling ZANU-PF” (Makumbe, 2006, p. 45), a large section of the Zimbabwean population still believes that Mugabe’s philosophy was legitimate. The fact that there are people who still vote for ZANU-PF under the leadership of Emmerson Mnangagwa, is symptomatic of a discourse of deceit that was inscribed on people’s minds over a long period of time. Another example of deceit discourse can be extracted from Maundeni (2004, p. 189)’s study which argued that: “Economic development of Zimbabwe has not been successful since the postcolonial state elite took power in 1980”. Numerous studies conducted so far on postcolonial Zimbabwe have concluded that Robert Mugabe’s first ten years into independence were superb. Almost all postcolonial discourses on the situation in Zimbabwe have posited that Zimbabwe’s economy between 1980 and 1990 was very good. The economy became to decline in the mid-1990s and the worst at the beginning of the 2000s. With that view in mind, Maundeni’s assertion may not escape the hack as one of the discourses that preach deceit. Maundeni needed to also explore Mugabe’s celebrated achievements.

Deceit (or Deception) Deceit is a synonym of deception. In the present debate, the two terms deceit and deception will be used interchangeably because literally defined, they both mean “false representation”. Collins (2018, p. 11) explains deception as “an act or a statement which misleads, hides the truth, or promotes a belief, concept, or idea that is not true”. For example, there is a “False belief that only autochthonous people who are physically living in Africa can produce, within a closed circle limited to themselves alone, a legitimate scientific discourse on the realities of the continent” (Mbembe, 2002, pp. 239–273). Deception is also used “to limit relationship harm by avoiding conflict or relational trauma” (Guthrie & Kunkel, 2013, pp. 141–157). Deception “may also be used to facilitate the dissolution of an unwanted relationship” (Cole, 2001, pp. 107–129). Elsewhere, deception is permissible for the production of credible research findings. For example, Christensen (1988, p. 670) thinks the employment of deception in research is critical because of: “The need for conducting research that may solve social problems and the necessity for preserving the dignity

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and rights of the research participant”. Based on previous experiments involving participants, Christensen opined that deception is not harmful to research subjects (respondents). Thus, Christensen (1988, p. 668) adds that: “Research participants do not perceive that they are harmed and do not seem to mind being misled”. In his support of Christensen, Kimmel (1998, p. 805) also writes that: “Prohibiting all deception has the egregious consequence of preventing researchers from carrying out a wide range of important studies”. In other words, for both Christensen and Kimmel, deception can be part of a credible research study. However, Christensen’s and Kimmel’s opinions are not received well by Ortmann and Hertwig (1998, p. 806) who argued that “Deception can strongly affect the reputation of individual labs and the profession, thus contaminating the participant pool”. Another example of deception comprises dating, age, looks, size of body etc., especially when photos are presented online. In view of the above deception, researchers, namely Toma and Hancock (2010, p. 335) wrote that: “Less attractive people were found to be more likely to have chosen a profile picture in which they were significantly more attractive than they were in everyday life”. Toma and Hancock added that individuals lied “about objective measures of physical attractiveness such as height and weight” (2010, p. 335). There are various types of deceit which include the following representative examples: category deception, fabrication, identity concealment, impersonation, ostensible promise and propaganda. The above deceit types are discussed below. Category Deception Category deception concerns giving false impression (see Cornwell & Lundgren, 2001). According to Cornwell and Lundgren (2001, p. 17), the deceit also includes “age reduction” in order to fit into a particular age category. In view of category deception, reports were heard of some athletes who attempted to fake their ages in order to qualify as participants. With the invention of modern technology which can determine the actual age of an individual, it will not always be possible for some sporting persons to fake their ages. Reports were also heard of athletes who were examined and subsequently disqualified concerning gender disparities (i.e. male or female). Election time in Zimbabwe is a scary moment. A previous report on the voter registration in Zimbabwe revealed the names of deceased voters (Smith, 2011; see also Mswazie,

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2018). Reports coming from the passport office in Harare, indicate that foreign nationals are paying bribes to get the documents, while citizens are also coned by touts in order to receive the document expediently without waiting in long queues. Reports of people losing their cash are numerous (Kafe & Chara, 2023). Fabrication Leech (1983, p. 178) affirms that fabrication can be described as something that is formed such as a lie. It is a kind of falsification or misrepresentation of facts. For example, someone steals a car and parks it in the yard of another person. Or someone commits murder and during night time throws the dead body in another person’s yard. In my view, people act in this way perhaps because they are wanted suspects to be interrogated for criminal activities by law enforcement agencies. There are several incidents among societies in which some individuals fabricate a narrative in order to give a completely different picture of the original scenario. Impersonation According to Cornwell and Lundgren (2001, p. 18) impersonation is the procedure of pretense in order to act as another person. They went on to state that if a particular person poses as your twin brother that is considered impersonation. There are people who look alike so much that it will be not easy to identify them as different. Sometimes people take advantage of their impersonation to deceive or defy a system. Some people may not appear in person to deceive and rob unsuspecting individuals; they do so telephonically and impersonate the voice of a known person. Usually, people lose their cash or property by giving them to a stranger. In some cases, there are reports of fraud involving top human resources individuals of a company or government department for allegedly benefiting and siphoning organisation’s resources through “ghost workers”. In this case, the deceit of impersonation may also depict a company/government department still keeping a list of persons/employees who either left the organisation or have since died but are impersonated as still living and receiving their wages.

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Identity Concealment Considering identity concealment (also known as “self-concealment”) as deceit is also in order. Larson and Chastain (1990) defined selfconcealment as “a predisposition to actively conceal from others personal information that one perceives as distressing or negative”. There are some people whose actual identity is not the one that identifies them within the community. In fact, defrauders carry dual indemnity in order to present themselves differently in a particular setting. For example, reports were established from some residences in Zimbabwe where a copy of an identity document (ID) belonging to someone else was recovered at the scene of robbery. It was conveyed that the recovery of the ID copy led to the alleged arrest of the actual ID owner for interrogation regarding the robbery incident (Tondo, 2023). With the escalation of criminality as a consequence of unemployment in Zimbabwe, individuals must report to the Police immediately when their IDs are missing. Ostensible (False) Promise John Searle (1969) defined “ostensible promise” as a promise that is made to appear as if it were a genuine promise, but is not actually intended to create a binding obligation. Searle, maintains that: “Certain utterances, such as promises, perform speech acts that create obligations or commitments, but the validity of these speech acts depends on the intentions of the speaker”. In his book, Searle (1969) explored that: Language is not just a means of representation, but also a way of performing actions, such as making promises, giving orders, asking questions, and making assertions. In this book, Searle lays the foundation for his theory of speech acts, and provides a detailed analysis of the structure and rules of speech acts, including promises, in natural language.

Searle’s definition and explanation would provoke the dimension of advertisement in merchandising business, especially in food stores and supermarkets. Consumers are usually, and sometimes unknowingly, deceived by the advertisement to pay for an item that has either overstayed its lifespan on the shop shelf or which is not selling because of its poor texture quality (see Chibueze, 2018, pp. 100–121). Sometimes ostensible promise also involves underscoring a political mileage in order to maintain the grip on power. For example, President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s call to the

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international community that “Zimbabwe open for business now…” was not taken seriously. The following report by Tafi Mhaka is assertive of President Mnangagwa’s actions at home contradicting his message to the international community: Since becoming the president of Zimbabwe in November 2017, despite repeatedly paying lip service to calls for democratic reform, Emmerson Mnangagwa did little to further human rights and democratic freedoms in the country. Instead, his government deepened Zimbabwe’s economic struggles, enabled endemic corruption, fuelled instability, and targeted opposition figures, rights activists and journalists to strike fear into a restive population.

Several people are reportedly deceived by individuals who masquerade as official details on assignments to search the occupants’ homes. Or somebody who borrows money in the pretext that he will return it the next day and never to be found again. In Africa, deceitfulness is common where desperate job seekers are deceived by individuals who ostensibly pretend as employment agencies and demand cash upfront to guarantee a job placement. It was also discovered that highly educated individuals are among the job seekers who are defrauded this way. Propaganda Fitzmaurice (2018, p. 64) says: “The word propaganda can be traced back to 1621–1623, when it first appeared in Congregatio de progapanda fide, meaning ‘congregation for propagating the faith’”. Meanwhile, Fitzmaurice (2018, p. 64) writes that: “By early in the twentieth century, around the time of the First World War, the word propaganda began to define political rather than religious indoctrination, reflecting the shift in societal power from Church to State”. Thus, “Propaganda emerges as being political and partisan in nature, in its attempt to coerce or persuade a mass audience to conform to a particular point of view” (Fitzmaurice, 2018, p. 64). Fitzmaurice (2018, p. 64) further remarked: “Historically, propaganda has always been used as an instrument of control and conformity by the dominant social power”. In our postcolonial dispensation, the term propaganda has also been given a new meaning which serves the purpose of “de-legitimating previous regimes and in grounding new claims to political legitimacy” (Wang, 2008, p. 787). Kluver (1995, pp. 11–12)

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concurs that: “Propaganda’s task is to mobilise individuals, and uses whatever tools, ideological, economic, or political, to bring about the result. The outcome is a disregard for truth and validity”. In Zimbabwe, propaganda discourses are numerous to mention. I will give a few examples. In view of Kluver’s affirmation of propaganda disregarding “truth and validity” (1995, p. 12), Robert Mugabe’s (the late President of Zimbabwe’s) deceit discourse comes to the fore. Both the electronic media and scholarly publications drew the attention of the readership by writing on and making reference to Robert Mugabe when he unleashed his thunderous speech, namely: “Blair, keep your England and I will keep my Zimbabwe” (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009, p. 1139). The above rhetoric echoes Mugabe’s discourse of conflict, even with what everybody knows “to be true about the world” (Wagenmakers et al., 2011, p. 426). The challenge that research scientists now have is to demystify the propaganda of demonisation whose seed was sown by Mugabe during his reign as President of Zimbabwe (1980–2017). The language that one speaks and hears everyday becomes part of them. If Mugabe could impact his audience when he spoke in English language, in my opinion, he could influence much more people when he spoke in the vernacular Shona language to his local audience in Zimbabwe. Propaganda and deceit discourse that President Mugabe preached everyday affected the psyche of commoners in Zimbabwe, especially rural communities. Thus, the Shona people have the Proverb: Zamu ramai vangu rinokudza kudarika ramaifofo (literally translated: “the breast of my mother enables growth than the neighbour’s”). The closer English equivalence of the above proverb is: “Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t” (see Moulding et al., 2016, pp. 345–354). In my view, Mugabe’s propaganda discourses influenced the political consciousness of Zimbabwean citizens towards elections.

Scholarly Discourse Under Siege Earlier on in this chapter, the phrase “scholarly discourse under siege” was postulated. The meaning of the above phrase now needs to be elongated and validated. Although so far Mnangagwa’s rulership in postMugabe era (Rugwiji, 2018, p. 376) cannot be precisely described as disrupting scholarship, it appears in my view, that Mugabe’s successor has not forgotten revolutionary principles and propaganda for which ZANUPF is popular. In spite of his preaching about peace and compensation

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of commercial farmers whose farms and properties were vandalised and confiscated during the land invasions of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Kriger, 2003, p. 407; Lahiff & Cousins, 2002, pp. 652–666) the international community is still not convinced that Mnangagwa can surprisingly implement a favourable and different approach in the future opposed to the antagonism of his predecessor. While Mugabe suffocated the education system in Zimbabwe (both primary and secondary education) by his isolation and exclusion of some teaching practitioners whom he accused of supporting the opposition MDC, he did not conclude his antics by prejudicing professionals at the lower level of the education system in Zimbabwe. The educators were literally being “punished” for supporting the opposition MDC (Chireshe & Shumba, 2011, pp. 113–118; Rugwiji, 2014, p. 1014). In my view, Mugabe interpreted the teachers’ support of MDC as biting “the finger that feeds them” (Akinfemisoye, 2018, pp. 337–356). Higher institutions also suffered setbacks of different shapes and sizes. The research was not spared either. Loyal professors and academics serving at various universities in Zimbabwe suffered persecution for their publications. A prominent sociologist and researcher, Tawanda Hondora, was arrested and imprisoned for his research on politics and governance in Zimbabwe. The report says while on duty to investigate a case in Sadza, a group of people believed to be patriotic to ZANU-PF, “kicked, slapped, punched, and whipped” Hondora. He was arrested and led to the Police for interrogation (Meldrum, 2001). Other arrests of academics included: Ibbo Mandaza, Jonathan Moyo and Hope Chisanzete and several others. Mandaza was a prominent political economist and researcher in Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime arrested and harassed Mandaza several times for criticising government policies. Another report says in 1999, Mandaza, who owned the Zimbabwe Mirror Group Newspapers (ZMGN) was arrested and tried for what was described as “spreading alarm and despondency under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act” (Wetherell, 1999). While at some point Jonathan Moyo assumed the position of minister of higher education in Zimbabwe, he was not unaware of being on the list of Mugabe’s most-wanted individuals. A critic of the Mugabe regime, Moyo was harassed and persecuted for his research and writings. Hope Chisanzete was a researcher and lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe. She too was arrested and imprisoned for her notable research contribution on land reform and human rights violation in Zimbabwe. During the previous years, the

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ZANU-PF leadership had made several arrests that included the secretarygeneral of ZCTU, Wellington Chibhebhe; Lovemore Matombo, the group’s chairman; Raymond Majongwe, a teachers’ union leader; Lovemore Madhuku, head of the National Constitutional Assembly; Brian Raftopoulos and John Makumbe, of Zimbabwe in Crisis Coalition; and Andy Moyse, of the Media Monitoring Project (Meldrum, 2003). The arrests were of high-profile individuals from local universities where they performed numerous research tasks. Others owned media houses. The arrest were an attempt to mute the voices clamouring for decency and a culture of transparency in Zimbabwe.

Diligent Peer-Review and Publication Wager et al. (2002, pp. 3–12, cited in Wincka et al., 2011, p. 96) wrote that: “The term peer-review is used to describe a system whereby a paper is scrutinised by people who were not involved in its creation but are considered knowledgeable about the subject”. Establishing a peerreview system for academic papers and research proposals is not new with numerous journals. However, what may be unique is to encourage individual reviewers to perform their task diligently. Earlier in this chapter, it was stated that “Peer-review is a skill” (Rugwiji, 2014, p. 1018). However, every skill can be developed. Almost all journals will attach reviewing guidelines to the reviewer and these should be followed. It is the task of the journal editor to stress on the seriousness of the review task together with strict timeline to return a reviewed manuscript. One can also enhance reviewing skills online. There are various platforms and Apps available online which can be accessed in order to equip oneself for a successful review task. Research contributions on reviewing a manuscript can also be accessed (e.g. Hoppin, 2002, pp. 1019–1023; Lee, 1995, pp. 87–92; Provenzale & Stanley, 2005, pp. 1–7, etc.). The question of confidentiality should be adhered to. One may need to look at the reviewing task from an aviation perspective. Before the aircraft flies into the airspace, different technicians and engineers will do routine checks on every part of the passenger aircraft before it takes off into the airspace. Most causes of plane crash and flight casualties recorded so far are reportedly blamed on human error (see Hobbs, 2021, pp. 25–32). So, the reviewers need to carefully examine what they release for publication. A peer-reviewed research article can be likened to a golden artefact because its purification is enhanced by a rigorous process of peer-review by one’s

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colleagues/peers. Peggy L. Chinn supports this view when he wrote that: “Good ideas do not happen in a vacuum. In the academic community, scholarly discourse, both verbal and written, provides the context from which good ideas grow” (2015, pp. 1–4). Reports have been received of articles withdrawn from the institutional database because they appeared in questionable journals, technically known as “predatory journals” (see Tin et al., 2014, pp. 69–81). In recent years, higher education departments of some countries had to scrutinise journals to separate authentic ones from predatory journals. It was discovered that some journals were of dubious character. Such journals are not recognised by almost all higher education institutions.

Conclusions Guided by Postcolonial theory and Action research as a method, the chapter explored on the culture of deceit in postcolonial Zimbabwe. The study highlighted numerous instances of deceit discourses which were used to influence the Zimbabwean society to behave a particular way. It was explored that during the reign of President Mugabe (1980– 2017), researchers were harassed and arrested for expressing dissenting views which criticised the government; they were intimidated, harassed or arrested. The ZANU-PF regime had successfully etched a culture of fear so that potential critics are restrained by the arrests of colleagues from higher learning institutions. Harassment and arrests, and in some cases, disappearances of some individuals, were employed as strategies to perpetuate deceit discourses. The Mugabe government regime also sought to control the narrative through the use of propaganda so that transparency in scholarship is scarce. It was chronicled that although reports of harassment and arrests of scholars for publishing purely scientific realities among societies are somewhat nominal following the departure and demise of President Robert Mugabe, the rise of President Emmerson Mnangagwa is not promising a friendly reaction either. There are still unresolved issues of geopolitical and socioeconomic nature which tend to prohibit scholars to conduct independent research. Nuances of propaganda still enjoy their space in various forms. When these crises are resolved, they naturally create a conducive environment for transparent research. Additionally, it was echoed that a culture of deceit cannot be blamed entirely on the political landscape in Zimbabwe. Individual scholars and researchers are

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also accountable for providing the readership with authentically and ethically researched narratives. It was contended that because of multifarious increases in predatory journals, articles should appear only on credible research platforms. Lastly, a synopsis of the dynamics discussed above evidently pronounces scholarship which is under siege.

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PART II

The Poetic and Sonic Narratives of Political Deceit in Postcolonial (7–12)

CHAPTER 7

The Polemics of Zimbabwean Nationalism in Fictional and Political Discourses ‘Nyika Inovakwa (Kana Kuputswa) Nevene Vayo’ (A Nation Is Built [or Destroyed] by Its Owners) Esther Mavengano

E. Mavengano (B) Department of English and Media Studies, Faculty of Arts, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] Research Institute for Theology and Religion, College of Human Sciences, UNISA, South Africa Department of English, Faculty of Linguistics, Literature and Cultural Studies, (Technische Universistat Dresden) Institute of English and American Studies, Dresden, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_8

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Introduction: All Animals Are Equal but the Ruling Elite Are More Equal Than the Subaltern In this introductory section, I begin by evocating George Orwell’s (1945, p. 76) remarkable philosophical observation that ‘all animals are equal but some are more equal than others.’ Orwell’s startlingly remark drew our attention to the world of hypocrisy, injustice, inconsistencies and inequalities. Most importantly, these traits are usually shown by crafty ruling elite classes as depicted his fictional oeuvre. I find the uncanny resemblance between Orwellian world and the present-day Zimbabwe quite absorbing as suitably reasoned by Moyo and Mavengano (2021). Orwell’s envisioned society in his classic novel, Animal Farm provides a significant entry point into the current study which focuses on the dialectics of Zimbabwean nationalism as embedded in both contemporary Zimbabwean novels and as framed in the narrative ‘nyika inovakwa nevene vayo’ which is popularised by the post-Mugabe ruling elite. Yuval-Davis (2006) asserts that the politics of belonging is crucial for any critical political discourse on nationalism, racism or other contemporary politics of belonging. In another context, John Crowley (1999, p. 24) hypothesised the politics of belonging as “the dirty work of boundary maintenance”. The discourses of (un)belonging are employed to fracture humanity into ‘us’; and ‘them’ dichotomies as well as practices of hegemonic power over those imposed on the condition of otherness (Mavengano, 2022). Prominent scholars of nationalism such as Anderson (2006) and Smith (2008) have stressed that nationhood is a socially (and politically) constructed state of mind as opposed to the essentialists who regarded nations as natural entities existing from ancient times. These observations are deeply enlightening, especially in the context of transitional politics and enunciation of difference in Zimbabwe. The politics of belonging also brings into conversation conception of citizenship and rights associated with how one or a group is positioned vis-à-vis the national space (Anderson, 1983/1991). In other words, citizenship does not only denote membership in an imagined political community but rather is utilised to confer or forfeit social and political rights including responsibilities (Agamben, 1998; Marshall et al., 2000; Mavengano, 2020). Sithole (2022, p. 13) points out that “across the world, citizenship is sometimes scapegoated as a weapon to malign, divide, and marginalise the participation of specific

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individuals in politics”. This brings into the debate Benedict Anderson’s (1983/1991) understanding of nations as ‘imagined communities.’ Orwell (1946) has maintained that politicians are adept at altering language to influence ordinary people’s thought processes. It is, therefore, impetus to qualify, interrogate and perhaps correct words used in political discourses because politics itself is a mass of deceit, elusions, folly, odium and schizophrenia (Orwell, 1946). In my analysis, I move from the fictional writings of Valerie Tagwira’s (2020) Trapped and NoViolet Bulawayo’s Glory (2022), which I intertextually read together with the narrative “nyika inovakwa nevene vayo”. The economic and sociopolitical context in Zimbabwe provides a salient discursive site from which the reading of these discourses is interrogated. I perceive my use of these contemporary texts as enhancing a deeper understanding of the intricate relationship between contemporary Zimbabwean fiction and the conceptions of citizenship, belonging and nationhood in present-day Zimbabwe. My purposive selection of the fictional texts is guided by their contemporaneity and thematisation of the different fissures of current representations of socio-political identities which apparently expose the problematics of postcoloniality, ambiguities of belonging, the inadequacies of Zimbabwean citizenship and nationalism. I regard the novels as intricate modes of communicating differences which convey postcolonial subjectivities through suggestive language and style which delineate (re)constructing of conspicuous socio-political of identities and creation of contested sensibilities about Zimbabwean nationhood. My reading interrogates the competing ambiguities of the term “vene venyika” which literary means the owners of the country and problematises the semantic relations that expose othering logics. Taking further Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2009) question about the existence of people called Zimbabweans, I also quiz the current discourses of statehood. Through the prisms of the studied novels, I argue for alternative construction of citizenship and nationalism which rectify erected binaries. This aims to reassess the present-day conception of Zimbabweanness in view of transition politics and narrative about nation-building which obviously calls to question new practices of justice and belonging. In my analysis, I also probe whether the optimism reflected during the removal of Mugabe in 2017 is merited. I pose the question, what has the country benefited so far in terms of social and political transformation in light of the discourse about ‘kuvaka nyika’ (nation (re)building). In this sense, I explore the nexus between

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what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) terms Mugabeism and post-Mugabe sociopolitical realities in Zimbabwe. I deploy Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony, Anderson’s (1983/1991) imagined communities and Spivak’s (1988) subaltern notion to pay particular attention to the manifestation of paradoxes that convey what Hove (2021, p. 160) would call ‘the subtexts and counter- texts spectacle of transition” in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe.

Conceptual Frameworks This study is based on Gramscian’s formulation of hegemony and following Benedict Anderson’s concept of the imagined nation as well as Spivak’s theorisation of subaltern to locate the discussion within the sphere of post-Mugabe’s toxic politics in Zimbabwe. These notions form the analytical praxes of the construction of Zimbabwean nationalism as intertextually depicted in selected Zimbabwean novels and in the present political narrative about “Nyika inovakwa nevene vayo” (a country is built by its owners), fleshing out the socio-political contextual understandings of belonging, citizenship and nationalism. According to Antonio Gramsci (1971), who is a Neo-Marxist political theorist, hegemony is a cultural process by which one class dominates the other. The dominators carry on to preserve power and the ruled submit to the potentates. The term hegemony has its roots from the Greek word h¯egemonia (¹γεμoν´ια) which denotes leadership and rule (Chernow & Vallasi, 1994). For Chernow and Vallasi (1994, p. 1215), the term hegemony basically means to put something into the ear of the commoners and make them believe in it. Gramsci further expounds that hegemony is an act of accepting the domination of one class upon another not by using force but rather by this authority gained through the institution situated within the public society’s approval. In this chapter, the adage nyika inovakwa nevene vayo, is treated as part of the present-day dialectics on Zimbabwean nationalism laden with contemporary politics of (un)belonging, contested Zimbabwean citizenship as well as discourses of entitlement and status. Both fictional and the aphorism nyika inovakwa nevene vayo are examined as sites of creating difference and otherness. Communication as rightly argued by Graber (1993, p. 305) is an “essential activity in politics due to the reason that in political communication it is the lifeblood of politics that links together the various parts of society and permits them to work as an integrated whole”. Likewise, Rajagopalan (1999, p. 205) claims that, because societies will always be stratified, language too will always be

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politically stratified. “There is violence in language because human relations are fraught with power inequalities” (1999, p. 203); “it is in the very nature of human languages, all of them, to be driven by power inequalities”. This study contends that socio-political consciousness is constructed through language use engrained in political discourse (van Dijk, 1995). Since politics is generally perceived as the game of the mind (Theocharis et al., 2020, p. 1), political players constantly engage in perpetual battles to name, delegitimise, undermine and disrepute and outdo the assumed political Others. In the same vein, Mahmood Mamdani (2001) explains such a political pragmatism as ‘define and rule’, where power is capable of naming the Othered, and by so doing control its subjects who assume the homosacer identity in Agamben’s (1998) theorisation. Earlier on, in another context, George Orwell (1946) accentuated politicians’ fascination with controlling the meaning and use of words in the political domain. This scenario is at play in Zimbabwe’s postcolonial context and the studied novels also suggest modes of subverting Otherisation and subjugation of those whose subjectivity and difference are illuminated or imposed in hegemonic discourses. These manifestations of hegemonic practices and othering logics not only rob the urgency of the dominated groups but also impinge upon routine life and human relations in the national space in Zimbabwe (Mavengano, 2022). Spivak (1988) used the concept of subaltern to denote a group that is omitted from society’s recognised configurations for political representation and thus deprived of expressive voice and status in their society. The subaltern group occupies an inferior or subordinate place in a society. This study does not only expose how the subaltern are created but also convey their convalescing consciousness or challenging of what theorist Jean-François Lyotard (2002) would call “grand narratives”, in the fictional world of the novel as well as in Zimbabwe’s present political context. The deployment of coercion or what Althusser calls repressive state apparatuses is a critical marker of post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. There is little deployment of ideological state apparatuses or consent. Mugabe used both consent and coercion effectively.

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“When Did the Rain Begin to Beat Us?” Chinua Achebe Would Question Zimbabwe Today In reminiscence of the Igbo proverb ‘when did the rain begin to beat us,’ which was popularised by a distinguished African creative writer, Chinua Achebe (1989, p. 43), when he was meditating on the postcolonial African politics and the living conditions of the masses who have maintained subaltern position. This philosophical question suggests that it is an impetus to take a step back into Zimbabwe’s post-independence history in trying to respond to the emerging problems. In 1980, when Zimbabwe attained her independence from British colonial rule, she became a beacon of hope for the entire Southern African region. (Mavengano & Marevesa, 2022; Moyo & Mavengano, 2021; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Nyambi, 2013). In tracing the contours of the post-independent Zimbabwe historical trajectory, the cracks began to show during the infant years. Yvonne Vera’s Stone Virgins, Novuyo Tshuma’s House of Stone, Christopher Mlalazi (2012) Running with mother, NoViolet Bulawayo’s (2022) Glory fictionalise the haunting historical event which claimed the lives of about 20,000 people in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces (Meredith, 2009; Rwafa, 2012). The infamous Gukurahundi era was characterised by an orgy of state violence, beatings, torture and mass killings. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020) commenting on Gukurahundi, note that it was an orgy of ethnic-driven cleansing leading to a one-party nation. Muzondidya (2009, p. 179) observes that the deployment of Korean-trained Fifth Brigade to solve a ‘political problem’ in the provinces dominated by Ndebele-speaking people led to loss of life and property. Mugabe’s government alleged that the civilian population in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces actively supported dissidents in their areas thereby justifying their torture and brutal carnages (Meredith, 2009). The public executions of the alleged enemies were random and the victims included women and children (ibid). This became a telling evidence that the Mugabe leadership failed to move beyond ethnic or political binary logic and the apparently inherited autocratic state which was entrenched by colonialism and white minority rule (Muzondidya, 2009). In this regard, Raftopoulos & Mlambo (2009, p. 201) point out effects of “the damaged psyches of the African people” and how the colonial political legacies continue to haunt African nationalist politics. Due to the increasingly weaning support of the ruling party profoundly witnessed from the year 2000, the Zimbabwe National African Union

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Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), used what Ranger (2004) described as ‘patriotic history’ which is a monologic version that also served as an ideological weapon targeting internal and external ‘enemies’ of the state (Muchemwa, 2010; Muzondidya, 2010; Ranger, 2004). The patriotic history also became instrumental in sustaining a project of delegitimising opposition politics and imposing political subjectivities on those marked Others (Raftopoulos, 2009; Muchemwa, 2013). The constructed narrative foregrounded the essentialised conceptions of citizenship, race and belonging which then generated new obstructions to the urgency of national reconciliation and nation-building (Mashingaidze, 2010; Muzondidya, 2004). A collective memory of history is important for re-imagining a shared present and future. Despite the visible efforts by the state to silence the memory of Gukurahundi horror and trauma, this moment of madness as it was described by the late Robert Mugabe, has remained a festering wound and ‘a haunting legacy of terror’ according to Hove (2021, p. 157). The choreographed distortions of history that Mugabe and ZANU-PF masterminded is also used for hegemonic purposes and to loot national resources as part of ZANU-PF’s exclusive entitlement (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Hove, 2021; Mavengano, 2020). It is this selective state-authored history that was used to reconstruct nationalist struggle leading to the discriminating repatriations and reburial of particular heroes at the National heroes acre in Harare. This saw ZANUPF loyalists interred at the national shrine including Herbert Chitepo and Josiah Magama Tongogara. In addition the memorialisation of some sites such as Chimoio, Tembwe and Nyadzonia was done while relegating to obscurity the bombings and deaths at Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) military sites such as Freedom Camp, Westlands Farm, Nampundwe Camp, Mkushi Camp, JZ Moyo and Victory Camp (Hove, 2021, p. 159). Of note here is the fact that Emmerson Mnangagwa was Mugabe’s close ally, a relationship that started during the colonial era (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020). The mechanisms of Otherisation were amplified as a counter-discourses to the growing support of the opposition politics, especially with the maiden entry of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. ZANU-PF had to up its tactics by condemning white Zimbabweans as adversaries, thereby backing forceful farm invasions vilifying black Zimbabweans who supported the MDC and labelling them traitors, ‘sell-outs’ or puppets of the West (Mlambo, 2013, p. 49). This turn of events also bought to the fore new contestations of

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Zimbabwean citizenship, belonging and nationhood. ZANU-PF’s definitions were aligned to its political ideology and its interests to disinherit every other person who didn’t fit in its category of patriotic citizens and nationalism (Mavengano, 2020). This sad development of Us–Them dichotomies, is sufficiently represented in Zimbabwe’s literary landscape. For instance, in Tagwira’s The Uncertainty of Hope and Trapped, Tendai Huchu’s The Harare Hairdresser, Mujajati’s The Sun Will Rise Again, among others. Ironically, it is not every Tom and Dick in ZANU-PF who enjoys the privileges of the ‘Us’ or owners of the country (vene venyika) category. The reality unfolding in Zimbabwean fictional writings and in real life is that ordinary supporters within ZANU-PF are victims of the socio-economic situation generated by the inconsiderate leaders. These grassroot supporters are only relevant during elections. It is the time when they are elevated to the status of owners of the country who can decide the fate of the political Others and even punish them accordingly. Unfamiliar with power possession, these supporters become fanatics in ‘implementing discipline of opposition members or enemies (vavengi)’. Another paradox conveyed by the ruling party is about Mugabe’s 1977 declaration that Zimbabwe was “a natural ‘Shona’ nation” (Mlambo, 2013). One wonders who these powerful Shona are. Does this mean all Shonas in Zimbabwe? How about the Shona people who support opposition parties? Are these included as owners of the country since they are Shonas? This again troubles the meaning of ‘vene venyika’ owners in the current politics in Zimbabwe.

Dialectics of Zimbabweanness: Do Zimbabweans Exist? (Vene Venyika) Valerie Tagwira and NoViolet Bulawayo’s fictional works recast NdlovuGatsheni’s (2009) monumental question that is yet to get a convincing answer. For Abowitz and Harnish (2006, p. 653), the term citizenship “confers membership, identity and rights of participation and assumes a body of common political knowledge”. During colonialism, race was a central defining motif (Muzondidya, 2004). Black Africans were collectively treated as the inferior Other during the colonial setup. However, the racialised marginal space became a position of subversion as the oppressed people came together against their common white oppressor. This was the trend in many African countries including Zimbabwe. The various ethnic

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groups mobilised and fought fearlessly against British colonialism and ultimately won the battle. The common segregated African humanity was a strong unifying force. Both civilians ‘povo’ and the armed comrades came together and risked their lives for a common good (Muchemwa, 2010). The masses who cooked under the boiling sun at rallies were quickly forgotten and a black elite nationalism emerged in the postcolonial era as fictionalised in Chenjerai Hove’s Red Hills of my Home Freedom Nyamubaya On the Road Again, Alexander Kanengoni’s Echoing Silences, Chenjerai Hove’s Chairman of Fools, Yvonne Vera’s Red Butterfly, among others. These literary texts underscore postcolonial political deceit and the masses’ sacrifice during the liberation struggle is long forgotten by the political leaders. What is further disheartening is the depiction of this deliberate forgetfulness that even relegates some of those who fought in front lines as armed soldiers. A case of a character Hondo in The Uncertainty of Hope, a war hero whose liberation credentials are suspended by the sovereign power to borrow Agamben’s (1998) language. Hondo’s house is destroyed during a state-sponsored programme. He is victimised by the same leaders he fought alongside during the war. Such powerless heroes have lost respectability and position in the discourse of vene venyika (owners of the country), as they live at the fringe of society like any other ‘povo,’ postcolonial subjects. This scenario is also seen through Munashe in Echoing silences and Benjamin Tichafa in Harvest of Thorns who are turned into objects of disdain. In the novel Glory, the ruling class possesses land and benefits from government sponsorship whereas the ordinary people remain isolated: Who’ll ever forget that time we kicked white farmers off our land? We showed them who Africa really belongs to! You didn’t come with land on a ship when you colonized us and you have the audacity to call yourself a farmer kukuru-kukuru! Ha! And now we have our land back. Well, when I say “we,” I don’t necessarily include me myself per se, since I personally don’t own any land. It’s mostly those ones under that tent over there, but they’re still Black like me, so, there’s that. (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 25)

In another telling passage in Tagwira’s novel, Trapped, we are told that: Cashleen, not willing to give up, she’d tried, but failed to get a postgraduate scholarship. Meanwhile, she knew of a minister’s son, an ex-classmate

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with average grades, whose state-sponsored Master’s was well underway because he’d been offered a full scholarship soon after graduation. Just like that. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 17)

The state redefined a number of terms such as (non) citizen, (un)belonging and nationhood (Mavengano, 2020; Nyambi, 2013). These fictional writings question these awkward definitions. Bulawayo’s first novel, We need new names powerfully castigates the Mugabe regime for persecuting and pushing some citizens to the periphery (Mavengano & Hove, 2019). Talking about post-2000 political context Muchemwa (2010) bemoans the increasing emphasis on ‘party nation, “a Zanufied nation.’ To be a member of the ruling party qualifies one as a Zimbabwean but this is not enough for one to benefit from the national cake. One needs to be part of the Inner Circle to receive a chuck of the cake (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009). Another dimension of Zimbabwean statehood is related to gender construction. Zimbabwe is portrayed as the land of fathers in both fiction and real life. The strong Karanga dialect which is discernible in this discourse suggests a Shona ethnicised nationhood instead of promoting multicultural citizenship and solidarity. This reading is further endorsed by the exclusionary estrangement aesthetics deployed in constructs of mhandu ‘enemies’ and vatengesi ‘sell-outs’ which are all terms from Shona language. The limits of this image of nationhood are apparent as women are then viewed as the subaltern group trapped in their gendered bodies. This highly masculinised national imaginary disregards the socio-economic well-being of the inferiorised women whose survival depends on male politicians’ decisions which have so far proven to be scandalous and insensitive. The male ruler in this gender hierarchy is the owner of the nation and is at liberty to make even detrimental governance decisions and practice politics of tyranny that nevertheless affect the entire Zimbabwean nation-state. Spivak (1988) writes, within the ideological construction of gender, the male figure is kept dominant. It should be noted that nation-rebuilding in prevailing socio-economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe is not an easy feat (Mavengano & Marevesa, 2022). This observation calls for the dismantling of any barriers that have previously fractured Zimbabwean humanity such as race, ethnicity and politics in order to make consolidated efforts from all sections of society towards nation-building.

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The Folly of Believing in Political Invincibility: “Even Monkeys Fall from Trees” I begin this section with NoViolet Bulawayo’s (2022, p. 69) warning that “even monkeys fall from trees”, and “power is a kind of dew” (it evaporates with the rise of heat), (Simba idova rinopera nekupisa kwezuva) (ibid, p. 75). In the context of her novel, Glory, this is an unmistakable insinuation of political arrogance demonstrated by politicians in Zimbabwe. At the beginning of Bulawayo’s novel, the arrival of the Old Horse is elegantly described: Enter the father of the nation: the ruler whose reign is longer than the nine life spans of a hundred cats, also the longest-serving leader in a continent of long-serving leaders, and indeed in the whole wide world. (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 8)

Mugabe’s reign was defined by intimidation, self-censorship and fear which were instruments of his prolonged stay in power. It is on record that Mugabe’s government targeted and victimised its critics, writers and opposition members. Some have disappeared with no trace of their whereabouts and others have lost their lives (Hove, 2021). This made him a feared leader not only by the public but also by his cronies within the party and government. When the socio-economic and political conditions sharply deteriorated, his allies around him would hesitate to speak the truth as doing so would attract a label of being a sell-out (mutengesi). The politics of fear reduced everyone within the party to adopt a zombie figure. However, Mugabe later became a victim of his political script. He made poor economic and political decisions and his close allies were cheering him in approval. Power had corrupted the Old Horse to an extent that he believed himself as a leader who was decreed by God to “rule and rule and keep ruling, a leader who’d in turn decreed the very sun to head his cheer-leading squad” (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 25). It is, however, the same dreaded leader whose downfall is narrated in the following passage: The morning appeared like any other morning and indeed would’ve been any other morning had we not woken up to the seismic rumor that the Father of the Nation had been taken hostage by his very own Defenders in the night. The news felt to us like we’d been shot in the gut, tholukuthi so stunned, so shaken were we that at first we didn’t know what to do, what

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to say, what to think, where to hold, where to touch, and where to let go; yes, we’d always understood, even though some of us no longer believed we’d ever see it happen in our lifetime, that the Old Horse’s dawn would someday arrive, one way or the other, but none of us thought it’d come the way it did; tholukuthi we didn’t expect it from behind our backs like a thief, no, not by night. (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 69)

When the ostensibly invincible is finally toppled by his military, we are told that there was “celebration left, right and center” (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 75). The unnamed persona has this to share with the reader: …we remembered just how long it’d taken for the Old Horse’s dawn to come, how all the proper and possible ways with which we’d tried to free ourselves from his tyrannous rule had failed, and, sobered by these realizations, we very quickly put our regret aside because there was one thing and only one thing that was true and mattered-tholukuthi the Old Horse was finally falling at last. And so, families and friends came together and celebrated. Sworn enemies touched heads and celebrated. Complete strangers stood with each other and celebrated. Supporters of both the Opposition and the Party of Power came together and celebrated. (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 71)

In his last days of reign, Mugabe was reckless, selfish and stubborn (Willems, 2013). This compromised his legacy as a legendary war hero and also jeopardised his regional and international relations. He became blind to potential pitfalls and his demise re-enacted Aristotelian saying ‘pride goeth before a fall.’ This should be a living reminder to the current leadership to avoid a recurrence of history, especially with reference to conceit indicated in the infamous ‘Tichingotongaaaa, muchingovukuraaa’ (we will continue to rule while the dogs bark fanatically and helplessly).

“Nyika Inoputswa Nevene Vayo”: A Hazy Glow of New Dispensation in Zimbabwe When Robert Mugabe was toppled from power in 2017, there was an overwhelming public celebration in Zimbabwe which was telling evidence of how the masses have craved for political change. In the novel Glory, the new President Tuvius Delight Shasha, who took after the Old Horse, an allusion to Mugabe, is initially viewed as “the Savior of Jidada country” and ‘Bringer of change”,”since the military ‘soft coup’ was perceived as

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God’s intervention to save his long-suffering people” (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 93). Yet, the coming of the ‘new leader’ to occupy “the Seat of Power within the same ruling “Party of Power” is a mere allusion of change (p. 93). This is evident because the dogs and defenders of the state (metaphorised police and soldiers) continue to ruthlessly beat up protesters and members of the opposition parties. In addition, the Seat of power continue to steal elections after the demise of the Old Horse. (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 97). The dogs and defenders of the state act on impulse and do not consider the morality of their actions because we are told that: It is often easy to forget the beauty and grace of a dog-a creature that can rip flesh into chunks, spill blood out of sheer impulse, crush bone like it were fragile China, hump anything from a human leg to a car tire to a tree trunk to a sofa, all without a single grain of shame, shit all over the place as if it excretes unadulterated gold, be faithful to its master even if that master were a known brute, murderer, sorcerer, tyrant, or devil, viciously attack without apparent provocation, devour human excrement no matter how well fed it is (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 14).

The new socio-political order is strikingly depicted through ridicule and satirical cabinet which has names such as “Minister of the Revolution, the Minister of Corruption, the Minister of Things, the Minister of Nothing, the Minister of Propaganda, the Minister of Homophobic Affairs, the Minister of Disinformation, and the Minister of Looting” (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 14). One wanders then if this bizarre cabinet can be entrusted with the task of nation-building (kuvaka nyika). Besides the uncanny onomastic stylisation of the ministerial posts, readers are also told that dogs’ primary function that is even rewarded is to leave those who dare dissent against the “Seat of Power bleeding profusely, with red, real red blood all over” or even “ to vanish like smoke, never to be seen again” (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 15). Poignantly, the ordinary supporters of the Seat of Power’s gullible loyalty is conveyed in the following passage: Loyalty is legacy if I must say, and that’s the truth itself. Today some idiots will actually laugh at you for wearing the Father of the Nation’s regalia, taunt you, saying, All these years of Independence, what have you to show for it besides the regalia, isn’t it time for real Change? Trying to manipulate an animal into switching sides. And I just beat my wings and say, Tsk-tsk-tsk! Because, have you woken up one day and looked at your

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parent and said, You’re old, you’re useless, you’re this and that and so I’m getting another parent, it’s time for Change? No, you don’t! Never! It’s the Father of the Nation for Life! Party of Power for Life. (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 24)

This blind loyalty is also fictionalised in Chikwava’s Harare North and Tagwira’s The Uncertainty of Hope. For Gramsci (1971), hegemony cannot simply be produced through coercion but always needs to be balanced with consent. Sadly, the ruling class does not reciprocate this gesture from its naive grassroots supporters. The unnamed supporter also brag: They don’t call us the jewel of Africa for nothing, no ma’am. What is it we don’t have in this Jidada? Land, minerals, water, good climate, everything. And why are the Chinese and these multinational companies swarming all over this country like flies?! It’s because they know a jewel when they see it! Don’t even be fooled by how things may appear right now—I mean the terrible roads that kill people, the potholes, the broken sewer systems, the decrepit hospitals, the decrepit schools, the decrepit industrial sector, the decrepit rail system, or should I say a generally decrepit infrastructure. Then of course there’s the poor standard of living, the millions who’ve crossed and still cross borders in search of better, the misery and such things that may look depressing at first glance, that’ll make you think you’re maybe looking at a ruin. All these things happen to countries, it’s a fact of countryness, but rest assured we were in top form once. (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 25)

The passage points to the complexity of Zimbabwean political problems. Although there is extensive literature about how the ruling party has been manipulating and interfering with the electoral process, it is important to also note that ZANU-PF still enjoys the support of the same marginalised people who do not imagine the nation beyond the liberation movement. Of course, this does not take away the credibility of the allegations of rigging. In other words, the country is politically fragmented to effectively chart a successful power transition plan. The novel also makes reference to the Matabeleland dubbed ‘Gukurahundi’ civil war and mocks the government’s arrogance in avoiding a public apology. “.. were it a moment of madness, truly, you think we’d have spent all that time- beginning ‘n ‘83, then ‘84, then ‘85, then ‘86, then ‘87? No, Comrades, no moment lasts that long!” the Savior said (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 113). The

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demarcation between the Mugabe and post-Mugabe rule is blurred as we are told that it is the new ruler of the Jidada nation who reveres the memory of the atrocious act: “And that exceptional unit defended the Revolution something sweet! If I could have that kind of unit today, right now, Comrade, I’d be the happiest ruler in the whole wide world!” His Excellency said, speaking slowly and looking at the Minister of Things with the fondness of a lover. “I can’t even imagine how that fat Dissident leader escaped the jaws of a crocodile! (Bulawayo, 2022, p. 116) The unambiguous and brazen contempt of the Otherised ethnic group is a telling evidence of how ethnic politics thrives even after the departure of Mugabe from power and elusive national reconciliation (Mashingaidze, 2010). The crude passage identifies the post-Mugabe leadership, as an ally of Mugabe who together committed heinous crimes against unarmed civilians in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces (Maedza, 2017). The writer fictionalises the reality of the enduring ethnic tension in Zimbabwean politics which urgently needs a feasible solution. The return of this discourse even after all parties, all ethnic groups participated in solidarity against the Mugabe regime re-enacts how ZANU-PF immediately turned against Nkomo and his supporters after attaining independence. This exploitative attitude is a long-mastered tactic traceable to the colonial history. It is the ruling party’s politics of betrayal that triggered a civil war from 1983 to 1987 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Nyambi, 2013; Ranger, 2004). The official history of the nation and nationhood is characterised by palpable politically motivated omissions and suppression of other narratives and players for hegemonic benefits (Mavengano, 2020; Muchemwa, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009; Sithole, 2022). The novel also exposes the politics of eatery according to Achille Mbembe (1992) which is officialised by a designated “ministry of looting”. The elite class lavishes on the national cake while the subaltern groups languish in penury. The national bourgeoisie’s scandalous self-enrichment obsession is dramatised by over-decorated, overdressed and over-perfumed bodies of the Inner Circle on Independence Day. The subaltern masses are watching the specular elite class from a distance. The public is located in the open grounds under a blazing sun and the Chosen ones (the Inner Circle) are sheltered under a shed and seated on expensive furniture. The two social classes are distinctively marked and the masses; subjectivity and vulnerability are sturdily heightened. Furthermore, the novelist deploys the aesthetics of muteness as members of the public are scared

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of the dogs whose readiness to pounce on those who want to leave the grounds intimidates them. In this sense, the dogs take a metaphoric image of the ruthless despot ready to stage power in Mbembean formulation of autocracy in the post-colony (Mbembe, 1992). This depiction falsifies the dubbed ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ which orchestrated the removal of Mugabe (Hove, 2021). Thus, Bulawayo’s novel ridicules ZANU-PF’s political script about reinstatement of human dignity in Zimbabwe which was sold to the regional and international communities to earn their support and to sanitise the ‘soft coup.’ In Trapped, ordinary people, professional, university graduates are the subaltern in the ruling party’s imagined Zimbabwean nation. Cashleen one of the numerous university graduates fails to secure a job despite graduating with a 2.1 degree in Journalism and Media. She is known as one of the best performers by her lecturers and yet she ends up being a poor street vendor engaging in a cat and mouse battle with the police in Harare. We are told that: Across most sectors, companies had downsized, while others had simply closed. Several of those still in business had cut salaries and suspended workplace benefits such as medical aid, housing and other allowances. It was expected that this trend would continue, and even escalate, as the economic downturn remained unabated, plunging many into poverty. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 16)

During one of these daily episodes, Cashleen fell and her body lay nude in the street. The embarrassing experience conveys an assault on the basis of human dignity. The incident also exposes vulnerability of even the educated in contemporary Zimbabwe whose education does not offer decency but rather serves as a source of shame. Her nudity is caused by the police (the figure of power), which strips Cathleen’s rights to decency. Cashleen here becomes a metonymic representation of not only university graduates but the metaphor could be extended to include all professionals whose daily survival is a struggle in Zimbabwe. Medical professionals in public hospitals also helplessly lose lives on a daily basis. Unesu narrates how depressing it is to lose patients: It was ironic that their patient had been called Kundai, a name signifying perseverance and overcoming odds. But some were stacked too high to be defied. Unesu knew for certain that her death could have been prevented if only the hospital had been well-resourced. However, there

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was an unwritten rule that you never told this truth to grieving relatives. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 30)

These public hospitals do not have even “painkillers”. In Glory, readers are told that the public hospitals in Zimbabwe are places where ‘ordinary animals; (the public) go to die. This ironic function of public health institutions conveys a strong message about the failure of leadership. Unesu rhetorically reflects: How could a dysfunctional health system exist when leaders could be airlifted to South Africa for all manner of ailments, including ones that could be managed locally? Charter a whole plane for someone to go as far as Malaysia for a routine medical check-up or cataract operation? Or have their family members flown to the same Far East just to deliver a baby? And yet here, at home, it wasn’t sophistication that was lacking. It was just the basics that was all. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 33)

Harare’s inner city is an eyesore, the surrounding of Market Square is described as; filthy and congested this part of the city with carelessly discarded litter which had become a permanent feature of the landscape. A network of potholes disfigured the road and acted as receptacles for dirty water that was flowing freely from a burst pipe…the whiff of an offensive odour from sewage (Tagwira, 2020, p. 43). Having electricity is a rare privilege of the rich, Delta asks Cashleen, “so, no ZESA again? Any chance you will have power today”? Cashleen’s response “Iwe-ka. Not a chance. Maybe tomorrow or Monday” reveals how the public has learnt to normalise the abnormal living conditions as she further explains that: [T]here was a time when I thought I’d never get used to this. But it’s now so normal that I’d worry if there were power and clean running water every day. We now get water three days a week, Garbage removal trucks hadn’t been seen for at least two weeks and nobody knew when they’d turn up, if at all. As if that wasn’t enough, an overwhelming stench suffused the air. However, nobody else seemed to mind, so Delta gritted her teeth and got on with whatever had to be done. Clearly, hygiene standards were eclipsed by the need to make money. (Tagwira, 2020, p. 226)

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Conclusion: Is It the Zimbabwe We All Want? It is apparent that the narrative nyika inovakwa nevene vayo is problematised by the examined fictional texts. The two contemporary novels depict a cul-de-sac national space that is haunted by an autocratic and narcissistic post-independence political culture which disregards the plight of the masses “povo” who continue to occupy a subaltern position in Zimbabwe. The socio-economic and political problem confronting majority of the ordinary people in Zimbabwe have failed to disappear as ironically suggested by Winky D’s song ‘Disappear,’ which encourage the suffering masses to sing ‘happy! Happy!’ to forget the realities of “the drab teeming environs” observed by Tagwira (2020). The masses have remained Trapped, finding it very difficult to endure Waiting for the Rain in the midst of Things falling apart and The Sun is not rising Again. It is this perpetual haunting sense of the uncertainty of hope that troubles the notions of “kuvaka nyika (nation-building) and nyika inovakwa nevene vayo (a country is built or developed by its owners). The unsettled question that demands further reflection is, who are the entitled owners of Zimbabwe? Is the ambiguous term owners refer to a few Chosen ones, “the Inner Circle” together with their wives and children and even their domestic animals as depicted by NoViolet Bulawayo in her recent novel, Glory? Are the owners a few God-ordained powerful males, referred to as ‘Mals’ destined to rule, rule and rule forever, (Tichingotongaaaa) in Bulawayo’s words? The cul-de-sac national space generates a sense of entrapment for unemployed university graduates turned cum vendors in tatters, caricatures of their former selves, wandering in the streets. These graduates have no prospects of getting solid careers and some fall victim to sexual abuse, bribery and despair as depicted by the two novelists. All this highlights the brutality, deceit and hardship of the postcolonial space. Most profoundly in the studied novels is the representation of the current malaise in Zimbabwe which is generated by a corrupt political leadership. The autocratic political culture survives through hegemonic discourses and mere falsehood. The loss of conscience and political arrogance are foregrounded traits of the post-independence leadership in Zimbabwe. The two writers successfully constructed a subversive and counter-narrative (a talking back to power), that conveys a message that nyika irikuputswa nevene vayo vanesimba (the country is being destroyed by some of its powerful citizens). The nyika inovakwa nevene vayo discourse is used for tragic hegemonic purposes which further widen

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existing socio-economic and political inequalities. It is a denial of equal rights and equal access to national resources. In addition, such a narrative is deployed to construct exclusions, conceal realities of misrule and ill practices like corruption, violence and malpractices that fault the electoral process in present-day Zimbabwe. It is essential to find ways that dismantle any form of barriers to pave the way for equal membership and participation towards nation rebuilding. It is imperative for the current government to use new language and embrace liberal articulations of citizenship and statehood that enable feelings of belonging to foster cohesion and harmony.

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CHAPTER 8

Through the Lenses of Betrayal: Ambivalence and Other Markers of Deception in Aaron Chiundura Moyo’s Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo (1985) Angeline Mavis Madongonda and Enna Sukutai Gudhlanga

Introduction In this chapter, we explore the paradoxical play Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo whose analysis exposes, how a few years after independence, the masses were duped out of their birthright, the land. Instead of reclaiming their

A. M. Madongonda · E. S. Gudhlanga Department of Languages and Literature, Zimbabwe Open University, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] E. S. Gudhlanga (B) Department of African Languages, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_9

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land, the betrayed black majority continued to have running battles with the white man who, at that time, ironically enjoyed the protection of law enforcement agents against the very people who were robbed. In the play, the white man retains the land instead of it being returned to the rightful owners, the black majority, a reversal of the promises of independence. The new government adopted a policy of reconciliation which meant forgetting the wrongs of pre-independence and starting to build a postcolonial state based on unity devoid of conflict (Rwodzi, 2020). Thus, the culture of betrayal in the play Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo occurs on several levels: there is betrayal from the top when the newly independent state declared reconciliation with the erstwhile enemy who was supposed to relinquish the land forcibly stolen from the black people; then betrayal among the newly independent black peasants whose self-imposed leaders take the opportunity to grab material gains for self-aggrandisement as well as abandonment of the same peasants by a section of former freedom fighters who retreat to the comforts of the city, to join the new political elite class without fulfilling the promises of independence. At the same time, the peasants betray the newly elected leadership through their rejection of the reconciliation policy, a policy whose credibility could justifiably be questioned as it was largely unwritten (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020). The chapter takes on a qualitative design and uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a method of analysis to show how the use of deceitful language is often a precursor and a marker of an impending larger form of betrayal. Thus, by analysing the language of selfimposed political leaders, the traits of deception are revealed and could have been avoided had the betrayed taken cue of such characteristics. This chapter is also informed b.y Postcolonial theory as well as Ubuntu philosophy. The two are used to critique the culture of deceit in the play Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo by Aaron Chiundura Moyo.

Background The New Testament book of Matthew (Chapter 26 verses 14–16) provides the story of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and shows the basis of his deception by one of his own trusted disciples, Judas Iscariot for thirty pieces of silver. This example of biblical betrayal appears to lay the foundation of a culture of betrayal by one who appeared to belong to a group yet possessed ulterior motives. Within the context of post-colonial Africa and other former colonised lands, the culture

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of deceit has often been associated with the reneging by post-colonial governments in honouring the aspirations of independence where “black hegemony would supplant white supremacy to establish black utopia” (Sibanda, 2020, n.p.). However, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020, p. 6) attribute the failure of those aspirations in post-independence due to the fact that “The liberation movements were clear on what they were against (anti-racism, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism) and very unclear on what they were for”. Thus, there was no clear-cut plan over how to benefit directly from independence. As a result, post-colonial treachery is initially instigated by the disillusionment that sets in as people realised that they were not attaining what they believed were the fruits of independence, that is, a hope for a better future which addressed pre-independence inequalities. Rwodzi (2020, p. 4) identifies the various factors that impeded the success of reconciliation and these include “the country’s ethnic diversity, the colonial legacy of racism, autocratic intolerance of political dissent, a racialised, unequal socio-economic regime, the armed struggle that tore the fabric of Zimbabwean society for two decades and the land ownership question”. With such fissures, the reconciliation project became a farce as shall be demonstrated in the analysis section of this article. This chapter, thus, explores the political discourse in the making of deceit and provides some tips on how to identify, some of the markers of deception that are warning signs of the larger picture of national betrayal. The land reform programme that occurs in the late 90s in Zimbabwe, more than a decade after the writing of Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo, shows the result of the grander scale of betrayal in post-colonial Zimbabwe where the majority of Zimbabweans still remain landless. The biblical Judas culture of deceit in this chapter reflects how the post-colonial Zimbabwean government has failed to keep its preindependence promises, but, instead, defaulted on these, leaving the majority to wallow in poverty without a solid economic base. However, through political rhetoric, deception can be easily exposed and, thus forewarn the potentially gullible of its pitfalls. In this chapter, reference has been made to flashbacks on pre-independence ideals and how these are revisited in order to expose the deception when juxtaposed to what transpired later on in the play. This study is a Critical Discourse Analysis of Aaron Chiundura Moyo’s Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo, a play targeting the discourse of the political leadership in the play. Other works that have dealt with the concept of post-colonial in Zimbabwe betrayal are Shimmer Chinodya’s

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Harvest of Thorns, Alexander Kanengoni’s Echoing Silences as well as Freedom Nyamubaya’s On the Road Again, Dusk of Dawn, among others. However, the cited works have exhibited the betrayal in postcolonial Zimbabwe from the perspective of former freedom fighters. The selected text (Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo) provides the concept of betrayal from the vantage point of the masses represented by a group of peasants who invade a local farm. Betrayal in the post-colonial state itself has become a dominant theme in numerous post-colonial African literatures, thus, underlining the broader culture of deceit. A few lessons can be learnt through the study of the language of deception that can alert the potentially gullible individuals of the red flags and as a result, help them act wisely in similar circumstances.

Methodology In this chapter, we argue that it is possible to detect the language of deceit. The study is qualitative in outlook and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is used as a tool to analyse the drama text, Kuridza Ngoma neDemo. This tool of analysis was developed by Norman Fairclough (2001) who defined it as an interdisciplinary approach that combines discourse analysis with critical theory. According to Mullet (2018), CDA is a qualitative analytical approach for critically describing, interpreting and explaining the ways in which discourses construct, maintain and legitimise social inequalities. van Djik (1993, p. 249) concurs with this when he says CDA is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the relations between discourse, power and social inequalities through examining “the role in the (re)production and challenge of dominance”. It examines how language is used to construct social relationships, identities and ideologies. CDA, thus, focuses on the ways in which discourse shapes and is shaped by power structures in society and Janks (1997) says it provides multiple points of analytic entry. It, therefore, looks at how language can be used to oppress or empower individuals and groups, as well as how it can be used to create or reinforce social hierarchies. CDA also examines how discourse can be used to challenge existing power structures and create new forms of social organisation. In other words, by analysing how discourse functions in the context of post-colonial betrayal, it is possible to identify markers of deceit in Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo, a play conveniently selected for the purpose of exposing betrayal in postcolonial Zimbabwe. CDA is used in this chapter to assist in understanding

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how language can be used to manipulate people’s beliefs and attitudes as well as create or reinforce stereotypes and prejudices.

Theoretical Framework This study also uses postcolonial theory to examine the relationship between erstwhile colonisers and the colonised, focusing on the postcolonial power dynamics that exist between them. It looks at the legacy of colonialism and how it has shaped the societies of today. In this paper, postcolonial theory is used to both challenge and explain the legacies of colonialism, particularly the power dynamics of the coloniser and the colonised in the period of transition from colonial to post-colonial. It also offers insights into how resistance to colonialism has shaped the people’s agency to further resist the oppressive structures of colonialism that continue to exist after independence. Of importance to note is how the same people who appear to dislodge the colonial structures use the very systems that have oppressed them for self-empowerment. Of note is the use of violence and installation of power structures that further oppress those without any proximity to power as revealed in Aaron Chiundura Moyo’s Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo. It is, thus, not surprising that the postcolonial claim to power is played out using violent systems as a way of asserting its hegemony. Postcolonial scholar Fanon (1963) argues that, since the coloniser deployed violence on the colonised, the colonised can only free themselves from colonialism through violence as well. To retrieve their humanity lost through the brutality of colonialism, violence offers a catharsis that restores their self-esteem and control. Liberation struggles in Africa and elsewhere have proved the validity of this fact and most of the countries eventually regained their political independence. Bhabha (1984) (another postcolonial scholar) argues that the colonised usually mimic their masters, that is, members of a colonised society imitate and take on the culture of the colonisers, that is, “the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other” (Bhabha, 1984, p. 126). In other words, mimicry is the strategy of adopting the style and approach of an authority figure or established power in order to gain credibility. Unfortunately, violence is one of the colonial ‘values’ that the colonised mimic. Fanon (cited by Josh, 2016, n.p.) foresaw this and he states that without a clear vision and plan in place for decolonisation and with inequalities still existing, violence tends to “reproduce the power relations of oppression … with the only

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difference being, the parties to this power relation”. Fanon (1963) also makes an apt observation that the process of decolonisation is “quite simply the replacing of a certain “species” of men by another “species” of men… there is a total, complete and absolute substitution” (Fanon, 1963, p. 35). Fanon therefore believes that, without decolonisation changing the social structure from the bottom up, the populace would not gain much in terms of significance. Cabral (cited in Meissenherder, 1993) also concurs when he observes that, for successful decolonisation to take place, then there is a need for class suicide by the political elite where everyone starts on the same wavelength. Without this, the political elites as a class will preserve and reproduce themselves as a privileged class. Thus, postcolonial theory is a suitable theory to analyse the play Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo as it seeks to explore the effects of colonialism and its aftermath on both the coloniser and the colonised. Its strength lies in its ability to open up new avenues of understanding, to challenge assumptions and to provide a framework for analysing the complexities of postcolonial societies. However, Rukundwa and van Aarde (2007, p. 1173) cite one Christian who states that “literature, the voice of people who are not in power, is ever ‘in danger of extinction or of co-optation’, not because the weak cannot theorise, but because they are ‘constantly limited by societal structures’ which are the product of imperialism and colonialism”. This is consistent with what Gayatri Spivak says that the subaltern cannot speak. This chapter also uses Ubuntu philosophy (Samkange & Samkange, 1980) which emphasises the importance of collective responsibility and togetherness, in a close-knit kinship, “a oneness and indivisible wholeness” of the people indigenous to Africa (Ramose, 1999, p. 36). It is a belief system that is built on the concept of sharing, compassion and respect for all of humanity. At its core, Ubuntu philosophy encourages individuals to practice generosity, humility and kindness in order to improve community livelihoods. It emphasises the interconnectedness of humans within communities and how the actions of one can adversely or positively affect the other (Mawere & Mubaya, 2016; Mugumbate et al., 2021). Proponents of Ubuntu philosophy believe that individuals should strive to act in accordance with their highest ethical principles, rather than for personal gain. In this context, deception has no place and honesty is highly revered. They view the world as a shared space and recognise that each person has their own unique gifts and talents that can contribute to the collective good. As such, Ubuntu philosophy allows

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individuals to explore their strengths, while also supporting others in their community. However, this approach can be seen as an oversimplification of the complexities of society and can be difficult to maintain in practice especially where communal challenges surface and the community is put under test. The ideals of the liberation struggle were all strived for. However, when these were curtailed and the frustrations of unfulfilled hopes surfaced, rogue elements surfaced and took matters into their own hands. This chapter, for this reason, exposes some of the frustrations of betrayal and disillusionment that force unsanctioned movement by people into the farms of former white colonialists. While people are forced to act as a group guided by group values, such values are put into question as some individuals actively get involved in the farm invasion for personal gain rather than for the benefit of the community. This has shown that the philosophy can be abused and misinterpreted as responsible for the gullibility of a group or community. This is the case with the drama text Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo. While Ubuntu philosophy also offers a unique approach to problem-solving and conflict resolution, with the emphasis on collaboration and consensus, its benefits (when taken advantage of by social misfits) can be put into question. Such weaknesses, however, should not dismiss the value of Ubuntu in creating harmonious, equitable and peaceful society. If taken positively it does away with individualistic tendencies and has the potential to promote economic and social development, as it encourages individuals to share resources, knowledge and ideas. On face value, this appears the case in the post-colonial era when people invade farms for what appears the benefit of all but an analysis of Kuridza Ngoma neDemo reveals deep-seated betrayal and deceit. The playwright, Moyo, provides a mirror into what actually transpired on the ground as the Judas culture of deceit takes root through what appears to be genuine and justified land reclamations from former white colonialists. Thus, in this paper, Ubuntu philosophy is used to critique the actions of self-imposed political leaders and elites who abandon its values in pursuit of personal gain.

Ambivalence and Markers of Deceit in Language and Propaganda Speech Deceitful language is a common phenomenon which can be seen in many aspects of everyday life. Handoko et al. (2015) refer to deception through language as “social engineering…[an] act of manipulating or deceiving a

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person to take an action that may or may not be in the ‘target’s’ best interest” (p. 136). Oesch (2016) cites deception as one of the biological functions of language that separates humans from animals. It is often used to manipulate, conceal and distort information or exploit people for personal gain. By understanding the complexities of deceitful language, one can better protect themselves from its damaging effects and use it to their advantage. This, according to (Adha, 2020), is a result of the urge by a speaker to try and convince people of the truthfulness of their utterances. He says “when the speaker lies, he or she will show a strong psychological response because he or she wants to make the statement sound truthful and reliable even though he or she knows that it is false” (Adha, 2020, p. 15). Adha goes on to say “liars will always try to avoid being caught in a lie…[so they] try to conceal their message within a discourse of truth and in non-deceptive context” (Adha, 2020, p. 17). Detecting deception has taken various forms with lie-detecting tests and other forensic methods, nonverbal and verbal, among others (Reid et al., 2017) being used. Nevertheless, it is possible to detect deception using natural language analysis methods. The question which may need addressing is has the playwright Moyo has been able to capture the deception that comes with natural language through the play Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo? Being a social observer and commentator, Moyo’s creative work is derived from the everyday experiences of the communities around him. This makes his creative work an accurate representation of what was transpiring soon after independence in Zimbabwe. Comparisons of what used to be said during the war (pre-independence) and what is transpiring in the post-colonial era are done to reveal the deception. Deceitful language constitutes such signals that can indicate when someone is being deceptive with their words. Propaganda or political rhetoric is one such area which constitutes some of the deceitful language used to influence the thoughts and beliefs of its audience or to sway their opinions. Scholars have identified the seven propaganda devices embedded in political communication, that is, name calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card stacking and bandwagon (Sproule, 2001). These are delineated as follows: 1. Name calling—consists of giving a bad label to a person, a group, an idea or an event so that it conjures an emotional attitude of hostility and rejection.

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2. Glittering generalities—involves using some attractive or impressive words or ideas which mislead the people. 3. Transfer—the propagandist identifies themselves and their cause with the collective representation acceptable to the public at large. 4. Testimonial—under this technique, the propagandist links a thing with the name of some distinguished person. 5. Plain folk—Persuaders and leaders present an identity with ordinary people. The politician professes that they are just like others, with their common virtues and vices. 6. Card stacking—This is when true facts are twisted and coloured by the propagandist to suit their interest and impress their listeners. 7. Band wagon—Under this technique the propagandist advertises that since everybody is doing a thing, therefore, one may as well do it. (Adapted from Sproule, 2001, p. 136) In other words, using the above devices can detect how the language of political figures is usually skewed to manipulate the audience into agreeing with the politician resulting in the creation of a desired ideology, what Louw (1993, n.p.) calls “manufactured consent”. Kress (cited by Mahdiyan et al., 2013, p. 35) admits that one “powerful way of examining ideological structure is through the examination of language”. The ideology being pursued in Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo is that of reclaiming land that was forcibly taken at the inception of colonialism. The lead speaker sets the agenda that the masses have to consent to through card stacking for example. In the play, the agenda is that of reclaiming ancestral land that was forcibly taken by the colonial regime. This is despite the discourse of reconciliation whose aim was to bury past conflicts. Identifying such markers can help the potentially gullible to protect themselves from being manipulated or tricked. Spreaders of propaganda are also egocentric, usually needing the support of the masses to justify their own personal motives. In the case of the play Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo, peasants represent the gullible masses that are hoodwinked into believing they stood to benefit from farm invasions by their self-imposed leaders. Huxley (cited by Bressler, 1959, p. 17) aptly puts it when he says, “The effects of false and pernicious propaganda cannot be neutralised except by a thorough training in the art of analysing its techniques and seeing through its sophistries”. Ambivalence is also another marker that is particularly common in deceitful language, as it can be used to both conceal and reveal truths.

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It allows one to convey a message that is both positive and negative, or to imply multiple meanings in a single statement. This is one effective way of manipulating people, as it can cause confusion and uncertainty in the listener. Adelson (2004) observes that ambivalence is one quality that can identify a liar. At the same time, while the deceiver may not be directly lying, they are still not being truthful or are conveying halftruths. Understanding and recognising ambivalence as deceitful language is also essential for spotting a lie and making sense of what the real motive behind a message is than what is actually being said.

Aaron Chiundura Moyo’s Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo: A Synopsis The play is set on a farm, Tangwena, which has been invaded by peasants who feel entitled to reclaim what they believe to be their right—their land. Individuals who appear to spearhead the invasion are self-imposed leaders, as such, Tinazvo and Vhoti drive the activities at the farm. They are already planning on parcelling out land albeit on ethnic grounds. However, the occupation of the farm is not without its own drama as there are clashes between the white man’s security team as well as law enforcement agents such as the police as the self-righteous new occupants stage their own defense by violently rebuffing being evicted from the farm. To add to this, their leader (Tinazvo)’s son (Hondo) and his wife (Shinga), both ex-combatants, visit and deliver disappointing news that the invaders were acting outside of the confines of the law and needed to be evicted from the farm. This is at variance with most of the peasants who feel entitled to the farm based on war promises that they would get back their fertile land once independence was attained. The play ends with more conflict with Hondo and Shinga heading for the city while the occupants of the farm face an uncertain future with an imminent eviction.

Language of Deceit in Aaron Chiundura Moyo’s Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo The peasants in the play understand the goals of the struggle, that of resolving colonial imbalances in land ownership that should have immediately followed the attainment of independence (Gudhlanga, 2016). Tinazvo underlines this when he says, “Isu sevanhu vakarwa hondo

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nemabhunu aya, takafunga zvekuti titame kubva kujecha kusina mbeu tichiuya mupurazi rino rine uchi nemukaka. Ko ndizvoka zvatakafira” (Some of us who fought the war with these Boers, thought of vacating the sandy [unproductive] lands coming to this farm which is full of milk and honey. Isn’t it what we died for [during the war]) (Moyo, 1985, p. 6). This was based on the war promises and Tinazvo reflects back on such. At the same time, the statement also reveals the ironic and hegemonic discourse of entitlement constructed by the war veterans as well as quasi-war veterans such as Tinazvo whose discourses expose their sense of ownership of the struggle, more than the general populace. However, the black landless majority, represented by the group of peasants in the play, do not remain the passive mass but become agents of their own change particularly when they are frustrated by the delayed redistribution of land as was expected soon after independence. Disillusionment with the promises of independence sets in, leading to people taking matters into their own hands resulting in invasions of white-owned farms. While farm invasions of this nature may appear to portray a united front in terms of reclaiming land, a deeper analysis reveals otherwise. Independence meant new beginnings and equal opportunities yet what is found in Moyo’s play speaks volumes of the betrayal of such ideals. The reconciliation discourse that was adopted at independence where the olive branch was extended to former foes of the people appeared to have scuttled such ideals. The satiric play is dominated by the speeches and actions of one individual (Tinazvo) followed by his proxy (Vhoti) who preside over fellow peasants and through self-eulogising utterances meant to win them supporters and consolidate their leadership positions. This alone is a pointer of the underlying fomenting deceit as the rest of the characters are reduced to a flat consenting, parroting and even cheering mass at the domineering discourse and actions of the two. Yet, what is unique about the play Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo is how the disillusionment and betrayal (as with a significant number of other works on the concept) target not the largely war veterans body which actively participated in the gun combat, but the masses whose hopes were pinned on independence for deliverance. Struggles for land and demands for resettlement into previously white-owned farms is spearheaded by the peasants themselves. The setting of the play, Tangwena, is historic of the struggles and resistance led by Rekai Tangwena over his people’s traditional land turned into a white-owned Kaerezi ranch (Moore, 2005). Owing to these struggles, the name Tangwena has also

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become significant onomastic stylisation to depict squatter, makeshift camps in contemporary Zimbabwe. Here Moyo uses the imagery of a squatter camp in post-independence Zimbabwe symbolising how the people have been ironically turned illegal settlers in a land which is supposed to be their own. The ironic repeat of history is profoundly captured as blacks are reliving the moments of pre-independence forced removals now pervading post-colonial Zimbabwe (Gudhlanga, 2016). Yet the signs of deception have always been evident. Tinazvo exhibits individualistic and egocentric tendencies as he speaks for himself as reflected in the emphatic ‘I’ which excludes all others around him. The irony that underlines his actions and what he purports to represent as the custodian of the people are oxymoronic, “Kana ndichinge ndati hondo ngaimire, inofamira kumira” (When I say the war has to stop, it has to stop). He refers to himself as “Chamangwiza mumutunhu uno” (the macho man on this side of the land) (Moyo, 1985, p. 6), “shangwiti” (powerful man) (p. 32) and even a real king (Mambo chaiye) (p. 33) as compared to his proxy Vhoti whom he refers to as a mere chief (Sabhuku) (p. 33). This is in a conversation with his wife whose praises tickles his ego making his hunger for power obvious. In a similar scenario, when he is praised by his praise totem by the man whom they had accommodated at the farm, his ego is inflated. He, thus, becomes the political, social and judicial authority, responsible for all major decisions at the farm. People accused of different misdemeanours are brought before him. He claims fairness, giving voice to the accused as well as fair trials, and to underline this, it is initially presumed the other villagers would actively take part in the trial but the reverse becomes true. The whole scenario is reduced to a Tinazvo/Vhoti charade. The speed at which the trials are conducted, questions and immediate answers proffered all show total disregard for the majority: “Pane anopokana nazvo here? Hapana. Ndatenda chaizvo” (Is there anyone opposed to this? Nobody. Thank you very much) (Moyo, 1985, p. 31) A sentence is immediately passed. Even before the trial, the alleged arrested criminals are treated with contempt—they are tied together using rope including one of the most ruthless and crudest ways of tying up an alleged offender (mbiradzakondo) (p. 27). There is no fair trial; the goat thief has his sentence passed down by Tinazvo’s compatriot, Vhoti, whose knack for sadistic brutality is evident. On top of the fine, the goat thief is supposed to get whipped. The same applies to the alleged witch who is sentenced to death but has to be whipped before being buried alive. Tinazvo’s rhetoric is very clear that he has become

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a power unto himself and this constitutes building a security team for himself and consolidating his own power, synonymous to that of the farm owner. Vhoti reveals this when he asks, “Ko vakomana vanochengetedza runyararo vari kupiko?” (Where are the young men who are supposed to maintain peace?) (Moyo, 1985 p. 26). While this may appear to be well meaning strategy of ensuring safety, beneath this statement one can see the building of Tinazvo’s personal security. To top it up, he feels having a son who fought in the way places him in a better position than everyone else to occupy the farm as well as a cow the peasant supporters into submitting to his wishes. Tinazvo’s overt and blatant impatience with the masses with whom he is supposed to have collegial relationship is also shocking. He interjects one man who is about to present his grievance, “Nguva dzadyana muchinda” (We no longer have time young man) (Moyo, 1985, p. 15). This, said to someone about to present a grave situation, demonstrates little respect and tolerance for the people around him. The malicious commands and reprimands are dehumanising. He shouts, “Ndati chibatai imbwa dzenyu! Muri kuda kutotamba nedare nhai?” (I said shut up! You want to play with authority?) (Moyo, 1985, p. 26) His contemptuous behaviour is complemented by his actions in the stage directions (Tinazvo ave kutaura achibaya mumwe nemumwe wavo netsvimbo yake- (Tinazvo speaks while poking each one of them with his knobkerrie) (p. 28). In the play, despite the end of the war and attainment of independence, the rhetoric is still centred on the discourse of war and this is accentuated by the brutalising of fellow blacks. There are numerous references to war as if the people are reliving a wartime even among themselves. References to the war are numerous: “sapanguva yehondo nanhasi zvichakangodaro” (we are still conducting business as in a war situation) (Moyo, 1985, p. 31). The reconciliation policy, as preached by the new government, has been rejected by the group and racial and ethnic cracks as well as other conflicts continue to exist. Tinazvo’s actions in the play are shaped by his thirst for vengeance, hence his attempts at seeking out Rukato—an enemy deemed a sell-out during the war. At some point, Tinazvo calls himself a sell-out in reverse with the sole purpose of underlining the vengeful spirit to settle war conflict. Thus, the labelling and name calling are aimed at justifying a well-orchestrated plan for retribution. As a result, all that take sides with targeted enemies bear the same label; the security man from the farm (Toro) and the policeman are still being referred to as a sell-outs (Moyo, 1985, pp. 1–2). The labelling technique that Tinazvo uses to

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justify his actions and the name calling is also directed at the white man, mupambevhu (land thief), Bhunu (Boer), his security man and policemen vatengesi (sell-outs) and these labels are repeated throughout the play. This is deliberately done to whip up the emotions of the peasantry class at the farm who would view the “sell-outs” as the barrier between them and the successful takeover of the farm. All this is also done to mask the truth of the new thrust of reconciliation adopted by the government. Threats such as “tichanhongana chete” (I will get you) (Moyo, 1985, p. 6), “ndinokuvhara nembama” (I will slap you right across the face) (p. 7) underline the ambivalence of a people purporting to be a unified community. This betrays people who proclaim to be working together for a common purpose. Mlambo (2013) confirms what happens in Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo when he observes that, the armed conflict sowed deep seeds of racial hostility that would prove almost impossible to overcome after independence… the terms [whites] used to describe Africans in general and those that were invading their farms, in particular, were a disturbing throwback to the racist labels of the liberation war period… deeply embedded in the Zimbabwean psyche is the mutual hostility born of the armed conflict days; something that has militated against any meaningful reconciliation, a necessary prerequisite for true nation-building. (Mlambo, 2013, p. 56)

Tinazvo’s speeches are characterised by a multitude of propaganda devices that are meant to hoodwink his followers. The glittering generalities and transfer techniques are also displayed and in a lengthy eulogy of the sacrifices he made for the liberation struggle, he says, Purazi rino takabvuta kubva kumubhunu asina musoro. Uyu ndiwo mubairo weduvo wenhamo dzatakaona muhondo. Hapana airara mumba napamusana penyaya dzenyika…Huku, mbudzi dzangu dzose ndakapedza ndicibikira imi vana kuti murove hondo makasima. Kana mbatya ndaitega. Mombevo ndidzo dzakabvutiwa nemabhunu. Musha wese wakapiswa ndokusara ndangove kugara pamhene. (We grabbed this farm from the foolish white man. This is our reward for the tribulations we experienced during the war. No one slept at home due to the politics of the land. I finished all my chickens, goats cooking for you to wage an effective war. I would buy even clothes. My cattle were grabbed by the white man. My

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whole homestead was burnt down leaving me homeless). (Moyo, 1985, p. 12)

An analysis of the chronology of his activities in the war reveals hyperbolic tendencies of a deceptive orator. When he speaks of his contribution to the war, he combines it with the vantage point of majority of the people as well showing how all were justified to take back land. The initial authoritative ‘I’ shifts and/or is replaced by ‘we’ and here the plain folk technique is used so that Tinazvo identifies with everyone. This shift is one of the numerous repetitions where he justifies his actions and anyone can see that reference to a plural course of action is reflective of an evasive tendency to avoid accountability. He goes on to say, “Zvino hondo yapera kudai izvi, muri kuda kuti tirambe tichingogara mumasango here mabhunu achitambisa nyika kudai?” (Now that the war has ended, you want us to remain living in the forests while the Boer is misusing the land?) (Moyo, 1985, p. 14). Here, Tinazvo appears to use blackmail on his listeners with the above statement constituting an accusatory tone (muri kuda [you want]), which implies if the people fail to take the farm they are responsible for their fate. The rhetoric question appeals to people’s emotions so that they support his cause, thus, betraying his underlying motive of occupying the farm, particularly the farmhouse. The forests he refers to are his and other villagers’ former homes and his rejection of such is quite evident. He is the opportunist who wants to reward himself as well as grant himself dominion over the farm. Like Judas he is materialistic as reflected in him eyeing the farmhouse. While he may be staying in a makeshift shelter, like everyone else, his intentions are very clear—he offers the farmhouse to his son and his wife for the night showing a calculated moved meant to pave the way for him to gain entry into the house as well. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2020, p. 6.) confirm through their observation that it appears independence brought with it the freedom by political elites “to accumulate resources ahead of everyone else, through a process known as bureaucratic state parasitism”. Also interesting is how the war veterans such as Hondo and Shinga may constitute the betraying class from the perspective of the villagers at the farm. From whence the letter Hondo writes his father (Manica Rd), is an indication that Hondo somehow has become part of the ruling elite who have found comfort in the luxury of the city. Instead of standing by the masses who stood by them during the war, they leave them at the mercy of the law enforcement agencies facing an imminent incarceration.

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The end of the play symbolises the final act of deception by political elites as they retreat to the comforts of the city leaving behind the villagers in an unresolved tumultuous situation. We thus observe the making of an emergent black political elite class which is at odds with the wishes of the peasants. Moyo satirically exposes the hypocrisy of the war veterans who rescind promises to reclaim land by the black majority immediately after the attainment of independence. Moyo cleverly concludes the play with the four family members together as if to expose the sinister motive by Tinazvo, that of benefiting his family at the expense of the other peasants. He is even co-opting his son into a gun battle to eliminate perceived opponents who stand between him and the farm. The climax is when he offers his son a place to sleep and even reveals his disappointment when his son rejects the offer, “Ndanga ndafunga zvekukupa zimba ziguru iro remubhunu zvino e-” (I had thought of giving you the Boer’s big farmhouse but— [I give up]) (Moyo, 1985, p. 45). Tinazvo’s speeches are inundated with repeated rhetorical questions as well as mobilising statements “Ko chataifira chiiko? Handiti ivhu rino? …Ndiri kunyepa here hama dzangu?… Pane chakaipa here tikatorera bhunu iri purazi zvachose?” (What did we die for? Isn’t it the land? Am I lying my clansmen? Is it a crime if we permanently take the farm away from the Boer?) (Moyo, 1985, p. 6). People would chorus, even sing and dance their agreement—a clear sign that the orator’s deceptive techniques have been effective. Gonye (2013, p. 66) has referred this as the “political indoctrination through kongonya [dance], song, and speech”. Tinazvo proves his mastery of a combination of persuasion, blackmail and arm-twisting techniques on fellow peasants such that they submit to his bidding. However, his scheming (through scrutiny) is gradually revealed; for him, the pre-independence crimes and grudges born particularly out of the liberation war are archived to be played out once independence is attained. At the same time, he wishes to quench his desire for material possessions.

Other Facets of Betrayal: Divisive Language, Gendered Actions, Reverse Racism and Nepotism Not every peasant was accepted in these newly invaded farms, according to Moyo. Nepotism and tribalistic tendencies rear their ugly heads with open preference of the people of Datya totem taking precedence and everyone else excluded. Tinazvo admits to his son Hondo, “Dai ndisina

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kuzoita zvekusarura vanhu kwavo, nzvimbo ingadai yatove diki” (Had I not been selective of good people, we would have run out of space) (Moyo, 1985, p. 39). Ironically, among the good are individuals accused of stealing, witchcraft and adultery. Mlambo (2013) concurs with this and traces the divisions among the Shona people along ethnic lines to the liberation struggle itself, a situation which became what Sithole called “struggles within the struggle” (cited in Mlambo, 2013, p. 63). Other divisive and potentially discriminatory tendencies constitute a reference to those who fought directly or whose children fought in the war thus proffering credible war credentials to justify his motive. Here historical facts are used for manipulative purposes by egoistic post-colonial leaders. The masses are excluded in a discourse of entitlement which lay emphasis on ‘real’ heroes being the ex-freedom fighters, a trend referred to by Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2009, p. 950) as “a hierarchical system of elite memorialism”. Tinazvo insinuates and justifies his right on the farm by referring to this fact, “Kuda vanenge vachifunga kuti hatinawo vana vakarwa hondo (Maybe they think we do not have children who fought in the war)” (Moyo, 1985, p. 41). At the same time, some of the ambivalence in some of Tinazvo’s speech is shocking. In one instance he states, “Isu sevanhu vane tsitsi, tinoda kuti mungogara zvenyu pachena…. Chokutanga haungouyi pano wakabata maoko… uofanirwa kurembedza hmwe yamambo… unogona kuunza mombe kana mbudzi kana huku zvayo. Kana usina izvi zvose, tinonyora pasi” (Some of us who are merciful want you to stay here for free…First of all you don’t present yourself with nothing…you have to dangle the king’s [money] bag…you can bring a beast or a goat even a chicken. If you don’t have all that we write your name dawn) (Moyo, 1985, pp. 17–18). He makes it appear that the people at the farm owe it to his beneficence. In the same speech, his true colours show when he states that the farm is free for everyone yet demands payment for one to be accommodated at the same farm. In other words, we see what the beginnings of an establishment of a fiefdom could be run by Tinazvo and Vhoti where those belonging to the Datya totem get preferential treatment. Mlambo (2013) confirms such behaviours when he says, While the Shona- speaking people are the majority of the country’s population - currently comprising approximately 80 per cent of the population - and have been there longer than most other groups that claim Zimbabwe as their home, they are by no means the only ethnic, racial or

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cultural group; neither are they, themselves, a monolithic entity, given the competing subethnic forces within the seemingly united Shona grouping. (Mlambo, 2013, p. 54)

Thus contextualising the episodes when Tinazvo and Vhoti attempt deceiving their target audience also assists in detecting their attempts at deception. Their expressions regarding the seizure of the farms are captured in binary oppositions: supporters of the white system are labelled enemies and sell-outs while those opposed to the white system are regarded as friends. The two’s long usually domineering monologues usually target the masses, the policeman, the farm security man and the two ex-combatants (Hondo and Shinga). They are at pains to explain and justify their actions of invading the white man’s farm. When all of this fails, they exhibit their power through the use of violence to coerce people into submitting to their whims. It is interesting to note that the peasants who have tasted a level of power make use of both the tools of repression that were used by the white man against them, the same violence of the repressive state apparatus symbolised by the beatings and the use of dogs. The discourse from the propagandists speaks reversal of race relations with the vengeful mission of making the white man taste his own bitter medicine, black on black violence and repressive tendencies could have spelt the warning signs of the post-colonial betrayal. Fanon (1963), attributes this to the cathartic effect of violence as the former colonial subject attempts regaining his humanity through exercising power over his former oppressor. Mlambo concurs and adds “It is as if in fighting colonial domination and racial discrimination, liberation movements inadvertently became the very thing they were fighting against” (Mlambo, 2013, p. 60). Sibanda (2020, n.p.) concludes “The degeneration to violence as a means of solving political differences remains a critical emblem of aborted post-independence promises”. The gendered aspect of the occupation of the farm is another pointer to the concept of betrayal yet through the appearance of the excombatants such as Hondo and Shinga, Moyo appears to be emphasising how both men and women participated in the liberation war on an equal footing and hence should enjoy equal opportunities. However, the reverse is true. The only woman at the farm mentioned by name is Rupiza. Tinazvo narrates his colourful profile in the liberation struggle and only mentions Rupiza as an afterthought. Her role is supporting and cheering on her husband. The other two women are criminals who are

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severely punished. This demonstrates a discourse which, while purporting to engender equality and fairness, is contrary to what transpires. Moyo (1985) relegates women to the massified group that parrots consent to decisions made by the male patriarchy Tinazvo and Vhoti. Martiniello (2010, p. 250) observes the roots of the disempowerment of women by citing the creation of the Native Code in 1870 which “undermined the position of women and children, making their subservience to the patriarchs and traditional senior classes stronger and harsher”. Thus, we see women being silent observers of what is transpiring at the Tangwena farm. Rupiza simply supports her husband’s activities without being mentioned as taking any pivotal role.

Conclusion The land, at independence, did not go back to the majority who had been hardest hit by the dispossession of colonialism thereby underlining the betrayal that plays out in most post-independence states in Africa and the Third World. By invading the farm, the peasants fight a losing war both at their own level with their own compatriots as well as at the national level. The title of the play when loosely translated means “using the axe to play the drum”. The idiomatic expression points at the overzealous actions of the peasants which could result in serious repercussions for them. It means, by taking the law into their own hands, the peasants were not just breaking the law but could lend them to lengthy jail terms. Under the same vein, Moyo issues a warning to perpetrators of such actions. Close scrutiny of the way self-imposed leaders speak can be highly illuminating. By examining the patterns in their words, one can better understand their goals and the strategies they use to achieve hidden goals. It is clear that, in this chapter, Tinazvo and Vhoti in Kuridza ngoma Nedemo while appearing to have compradorial tendencies towards fellow peasants, had sinister motives. They reject the call for peace and reconciliation and, through their speeches, one can discern the underlying motives of vengeance and self-aggrandisement. If left unchecked, Tinazvo could evolve and join the political elites who betray the majority of masses in contemporary post-independence states. The gullible peasants take his leadership role and accept his seeming new ideas readily with the hope of getting the rewards of independence. They are easily taken in by persuasive arguments and tend to overlook obvious inconsistencies and potential dangers. However, using CDA, a closer scrutiny of the rhetoric

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of Tinazvo and Vhoti could have revealed the hidden agenda of the two as they betrayed their compatriots.

References Adelson, R. (2004, July/August). Detecting deception. American Psychological Association, 35(7), 70. Adha, A. (2020). Linguistic based cues in detecting deception in Indonesian language use. Argumentum, 16, 14–30. https://doi.org/10.34103/ARG UMENTUM/2020/2 Bhabha, H. (1984, October). Of mimicry and man: Ambivalence of colonial discourse, 28. Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis (Spring), pp. 125–133. Bressler, M. (1959). Mass Persuasion and the analysis of language: A critical evaluation. The Journal of Educational Sociology, 33(1), 17–27. Fanon, F. (1963). The wretched of the earth. Grove Press. Fairclough, N. (2001). Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis (pp. 122–136). Sage. Gonye, J. (2013, April). Mobilizing dance/traumatizing dance: “Kongonya” and the politics of Zimbabwe Dance Research Journal, 45(1), 65–79. Gudhlanga, E. S. (2016). Gender and land ownership in Zimbabwean literature: A critical appraisal of gender and land ownership in selected Shona fiction (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis). UNISA. Handoko, H., Putri, W., Anggreini, D., Sastra, G., & Revita, I. (2015, August 12–13). The language of social engineering: From persuasion to deception 2nd International Seminar on Lingustic. Andalas University. Janks, H. (1997). Critical discourse analysis as a research tool. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 18(3), 329–342. Josh, P. (2016). Fanon on violence and the person. https://criticallegalthinking. com/2016/01/20/fanon-on-violence-and-the-person/. Retrieve 2 February 2023. Louw, B. (1993). Dressing up waiver: A stochastic collocational reading of ‘the truth and reconciliation’ commission (TRC). https://www.academia.edu/844 203/. Retrieved 2 February 2023. Martiniello, G. (2010). Book review of Sam Moyo African land questions, agrarian transitions and the state: The contradictions of neo-liberal land reforms. Review of African Political Economy, 37 (125), 387–389. Mahdiyan, M., Rahbar, M., & Hosseini-Maasoum, S. M. (2013). Applying critical discourse analysis in translation of political speeches and interviews. Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 2(1), 35–47.

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Mawere, M., & Mubaya. R. (2016). African philosophy and thought systems: A search for a culture and philosophy of belonging. Langaa. Meissenherder, T. (1993). Amilca Cabral’s theory of class suicide and revolutionary socialism. Monthly Review, 45(6). http://monthlyreview.org/. Mlambo, A. (2013). Becoming Zimbabwe or becoming Zimbabwean: Identity, Nationalism and State-Building. Africa Spectrum, 48(1), 49–70. Moyo, A. C. (1985). Kuridza Ngoma Nedemo. Zimbabwe Publishing House. Moore, D. (2005). Suffering for territory: Race, place, and power in Zimbabwe. Duke University Press. Mugumbate, J. R., & Chereni, A. (2021). Now, the Theory of Ubuntu has its space in social work (editorial). AJSW, Special Issue on Ubuntu Social Work, 10(1), v–xv. Mullet, D. R. (2018). A general critical discourse analysis framework for educational research. Journal of Advanced Academics, 29(2), https://jou rnals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1932202X18758260?journalCode= joac. Retrieved 6 February 2023 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S., & Ruhanya, P. (2020). The history and political transition of Zimbabwe: From Mugabe to Mnangagwa. Palgrave Macmillan. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J., & Willems, W. (2009, December). Making sense of cultural nationalism and the politics of commemoration under the Third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies, 35(4), 945–965. Oesch, N. (2016). Deception as a derived function of language. Frontiers in Psychology, 7 (1485), 1–7. Ramose, M. B. (1999). African philosophy through Ubuntu. Mond Books. Reid, I. D., Gozna, L. F., & Boon, J. C. (2017, Spring). From tactical to strategic deception detection: Application of psychological synthesis. Journal of Strategic Security, 10(1), 1–21 Rwodzi, A. (2020). Reconciliation: A false start in Zimbabwe? (1980–1990). Cogent Arts & Humanities, 7 (1), 1–18. Samkange, S. J. W. T., & Samkange, S. (1980). Hunhuism or Ubuntuism: A Zimbabwe Indigenous political philosophy. Graham Publishing. Sibanda, F. (2020). Post-imperial imaginaries in Zimbabwe: Interrogating betrayal in the pre- and post-war years in Chinodya’s Harvest of Thorns and Child of War. Literator, 41(1), 1–9. Sproule, J. M. (2001). Authorship and origins of the seven propaganda devices: A research note. Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 4(1), 135–143. Rukundwa, L. S., & van Aarde, A. G. (2007). The formation of postcolonial theory. HTS, 63(3), 1171–1193. Van Djik, T. A. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. Discourse Society, 4(2), 249–283.

CHAPTER 9

The Post-independence Zimbabwean Leadership and the Literary Imaginings of Betrayal in I.T. Mabasa’s Novel Mapenzi (1999) Wellington Wasosa

Introduction This discussion focuses on how the novel Mapenzi articulates the theme of betrayal in post-independence Zimbabwe as there is a visible contradiction between the people’s expectations and the political, economic and social realities obtaining in the nation. The liberation struggle was protracted and bloody, as thousands lost their lives as they fought the diabolic colonial system hoping for improved standards of living. After the attainment of independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had the potential to be a prosperous nation with the then-President of Tanzania Julius

W. Wasosa (B) Department of African Languages and Literature, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_10

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Nyerere describing the country as “a jewel in Africa” (ZCTU, 1996, p. 1). However, this hope quickly vanished as the country grappled with political, social and economic crises with symptoms visible in the late 1980s. Because of the crises, Mutambara (2017) posits that by the year 2000, Zimbabwe was at the crossroads, characterised by an economic crisis of immense proportions, rampant and debilitating corruption, unprecedented levels of poverty and unemployment, the AIDS crisis, the unresolved land question, a constitutional impasse, disrespect of the rule of law and an impending election. It is some of these issues that the author grapples with in his work. The novelist Mabasa blames the political leadership for presiding over the crises and this is part of the betrayal which the research will attempt to discuss.

Afrocentricity and the Role of Literature As indicated earlier, the criticism of the novel is premised on Afrocentricity as a literary theory. Molefe Kete Asante is the one who coined the term Afrocentricity with the major concern being about challenging how Africa has been viewed by other races, especially Europeans who have distorted its culture and past achievements. As Smith (2008) observes, the movement strives at placing the African subject at the center of historical analysis, in the interpretation and manifestation of the cultural will and cultural consciousness. Furthermore, he argues that the movement aims at studying ideas, concepts and events, political and economic processes from the standpoint of black people as subjects and not objects, basing all knowledge on authentic interrogation of location. This cuts across all disciplines be they socio-political, economic, architectural, literary, or religious phenomena with implications on sex, gender and class. When it comes to African literature, the expectation is that it serves purposes in the people’s daily activities by addressing pertinent social, political and economic issues affecting the people. This will thus make the literature relevant as Achebe (1975, p. 45) argues; It is clear to me that an African writer who tries to avoid big social and political issues of contemporary Africa will end up being completely irrelevant- like the absurd man in the proverb who leaves his burning house to pursue a fleeing rat from the flames.

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wa Thiong’o (1997) weighs in by arguing that every writer is a writer in politics with an obligation to expose the injustices in society in order to liberate the people. Thus the theory and its envisaged role of African literature would help in the analysis of the notion of betrayal as evidenced in the political, social and economic realities of post-independence Zimbabwe in relation to the people’s expectations.

Zimbabwe’s “Decade of Crisis” as Evidence of Leadership Ineptitude Zimbabwe has faced various crises since the attainment of independence in 1980 but this reached the zenith during now what is commonly been referred to as “the Decade of Crisis”, spanning between 2000 and 2010 while others prefer the years 1998 and 2008. Alternatively, some scholars use the term “Zimbabwe Crisis” and these include Muzondidya (2008), McGregor (2010) and Muchemwa (2010). The crisis thus becomes a manifestation of how the political leadership has betrayed the nation. According to Mlambo (2006), Zimbabwe has been in an economic, political and social crisis since the turn of the twenty-first century. The crisis, as Mlambo observes is a culmination of the combined effects of misgovernance, political intolerance and economic mismanagement by the ruling elite, a virulent HIV and AIDS pandemic and a severely deleterious economic meltdown. In addition, international ostracism of the country in the wake of Zimbabwe’s controversial “fast track” land reform programme since 2000 and the human rights abuses accompanying it precipitated the economic collapse. Following the promising beginning after independence, Zimbabwe then entered into a period which Muzondidya (2008, p. 189) labels “one of the politics and economics of liberalisation, 1990–1997”. This period saw the initial gains that were made in the provision of social services being steadily eroded by the economic decline of the 1990s. On the economic decline, Hammar and Raftopoulos (2003) note that by 1990, the government under pressure from new global neo-liberal hegemony after the collapse of Soviet socialism, was compelled to design a World Bank-style Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). They further assert that officially cast as a “home grown” reform, ESAP had initially been more about expansion than contraction but the implementation had catastrophic consequences. Also, they observe that because of ESAP, deregulation of prices and the removal of subsidies on basic

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goods meant more hardships for the workers, the poor and the unemployed as prices increased and real wages declined. The government also introduced cutbacks in education and health. Poverty intensified and increased pressure on rural land and natural resources as the retrenched either send their families to rural areas or joined them. Concurring on the hardships the people faced, Sibanda (2002) notes that one of the major objectives of ESAP was trade liberalisation and because of this the cost of living skyrocketed as the government could no longer intervene. He goes on to state there was massive retrenchment as in the first two years saw approximately 25 000 jobs being lost in the private sector. Another result of ESAP according to Muzondidya (2008) was that the urbanites lost faith in the government and engaged in strikes especially the workers as they strived for a better life and one such example of the restlessness among the workers is the general strike of June 1996 as civil servants were supported by civic groups like the churches and human rights organisations. The failure of ESAP and its related hardships led to growing discontent and protests by civil society which marked the beginning of the crisis. As observed by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), there are a number of crucial events that marked and occurred during the crisis. The first was on 14 November 1997 (Black Friday) which witnessed the crash of the Zimbabwe dollar after the government’s decision to pay unbudgeted gratuities and monthly pensions to war veterans. Apart from this, in December 1997, the ZCTU organised a strike to reject a proposal to levy on workers to fund war vets’ gratuities, while in January 1998, there were spontaneous riots against increase in prices of bread and mealie-meal. Later on in March 1998, The Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) was launched two years late but was never implemented. Then in August 1998, the government unilaterally sent troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to help its government against the rebels with estimated costs of US 30 million dollars a month which was not budgeted for. The workers and other civic groups responded in 1999 by setting up the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to challenge the ruling ZANU-PF of Robert Mugabe. Under the leadership of the MDC and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the nation voted overwhelmingly against the government-backed constitution during the February 2000 National Referendum held citing among other concerns the provisions to increase presidential powers as well as to allow the government to

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confiscate land without compensation. Panicking and also as an attempt to win back the lost support of the restive populace, the government immediately initiated the fast-track land reform programme on commercial farms owned by white Zimbabweans. On the foreign affairs front, Zimbabwe withdrew its membership from the Commonwealth in December 2003. Violence also became part of the political landscape. According to McGregor (2010, p. 7), further periods of escalated violence followed the 2005 elections through the state’s politicised programme of urban demolitions known as Operation Murambatsvina (Remove the Filth) through which about 700 000 people lost their homes and/or their informal urban livelihoods. Furthermore, hunger and food shortages were further intensified through Operation Taguta as the military commandeered food and unrealistic price controls thereby rendering the formal trading unprofitable. Bracking and Sachikonye quoted in McGregor (2010, p. 8) observe that after the MDC’s narrow victory in 2008, “state violence to punish its supporters and voters so as to influence the presidential run-off reached new levels through Operation Mavhotera papi”. In the end, they argue that there was political deadlock and in the economic sphere inflation started to sky rocket. It is significant to note that the impact of the crisis was not confined to Zimbabwe only but spilt over into its neighbours, more spectacularly, in the form of economic refugees. Rising inflation and unemployment, rapidly deteriorating living standards and political uncertainty and individual insecurity, among other factors, fuelled a massive brain drain that saw professionals of all kinds, including doctors, nurses, pharmacists, engineers, academics and teachers seeking greener pastures in South Africa, Botswana, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia. All in all, an estimated four million Zimbabweans or a quarter of Zimbabwe’s total population, were estimated to be living in Botswana, South Africa and various Western countries as of June 2005 (http://www.Zim online.co 10 June 2005).

The Political Crisis in Mapenzi As observed earlier on, the political crisis obtaining in the country forms part of the deceit and betrayal. In this section, the focus is on how the political crisis is portrayed in the novel. This is mainly espoused by the main character and protagonist Hamundigone who is a former freedom

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fighter and also a retired teacher. This background makes him the voice of the voiceless as he symbolises both freedom and development of the nation. The war of liberation was an essential historical epoch in the decolonisation process of the nation while the role of education in developing society is indisputable. The unsustainable environment obtaining in the country during the crisis is clearly spelt out at the beginning of the novel by Hamundigone; MuZimbabwe muya mava nechirwere, chirwere chisiri njovhera kana mukondombera. Munhu unotarisa zvauri woona kuti zvinoda kushandurwa. Asi nguva, simba, tariro, cheudzo kana pekutangira unoshaya. (5) (In Zimbabwe, there is a disease which is not an STI or the AIDS pandemic. A person introspects and observes that what you are needs to be changed. However, you would not find time, the zeal and the starting point.)

He also laments about the unsustainable life people were living; Mvura yatinogeza miviri nemweya yehupenyu yabvondoka. Upenyu hwedu hwave madhaka. (5) (The water we use for bodily and spiritual cleansing is now dirty. Our life is now miserable.)

One of the issues Hamundigone condemns on the political scene is the politics of exclusion, polarisation, violence and partisan allocation of national resources practiced by ZANU-PF. This is metaphorically expressed in the novel through one of Zimbabwe’s most supported football teams Dynamos and the behaviour of its supporters. The fans are portrayed as violent against supporters of other teams and use this as a weapon to subdue them. Above all, the fans want the national team to be exclusively comprised of Dynamos players as they are unwilling to reach out to other teams. This intolerance by the football team is used by the author to chastise members of the ruling party ZANU-PF who do not view the opposition as competitors but as enemies who should be annihilated. Ironically, both the party and the team were formed in 1963 as the blacks intensified their voice for self-rule and sport was one of the

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conduits to express these sentiments. McGregor (2010) argues that politically the state lacked tolerance of political diversity relying mainly on coercion rather than persuasion with the state’s hegemonic discourse of citizenship and nationhood also remaining narrow and monolithic. This is in line with Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2004) observations that. The new Zimbabwe state under ZANU-PF failed miserably to make a break with a tradition of nationalist authoritarianism and guerrilla violence as well as colonial settler oppression. The ruling party itself failed to demilitarise itself as militarized liberation movement, not only in practice but also in attitude and style of management of civil institutions and the state at large. The new ZANU-PF government readily assumed the resilient colonial attitude and equally military oriented structures left by the retreating settler state, with serious implications for democracy, human rights and human security.

Therefore, in the end, McGregor (ibid.) notes that the nation of Zimbabwe became polarised along the political lines with even the media reflecting and consecrating this polarisation. This is further corroborated by Raftopoulos and Savage (2005, p. ix) who observes that: Confronted in 2000 with the first real challenge to its rule, ZANU (PF) radically changed the terrain of Zimbabwean politics towards one of frontal assault that had its major targets the former colonial master Britain, the local white people, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the civic movement and in general the farm workers and the urbanites among whom the opposition had gained a substantial number of supporters.

As noted earlier, Dynamos Football Club supporters are violent and unwilling to tolerate competition. In the novel, it is quite clear that they use it as a way of compelling supporters of other teams to cede their loyalty. In politics, ZANU-PF since its inception has always used violence in the same manner against members of the opposition. Sachikonye (2011) notes that there has been institutionalised violence in Zimbabwean politics dating back to the colonial period and war of liberation and unfortunately this spilled into post-independence. As for violence during the war of liberation, Sithole (1999) argues that this was rampant in the main liberation movements ZANU and ZAPU as they failed to inculcate a culture of tolerance among themselves. For example, when ZANU

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broke away from ZAPU in 1963, a lot of violence was witnessed between the supporters of the two parties. Furthermore, Sithole notes that there were ethnic clashes within ZANU which almost derailed the liberation struggle, especially after the assassination of the party’s chairman Herbert Chitepo in 1975. The failure to tolerate opposition resulted in ZANUPF perceiving the opposition as adversaries who should be decimated. As the ruling ZANU-PF stared a possible ouster from power by the MDC after its formation in 1999, the country witnessed an escalation in politics of hate, intolerance and state-instituted violence. Of course, this does not suffice to mean that the country had not witnessed this prior to the formation of MDC. Just after independence, there was a massive crackdown on a fellow liberation movement ZAPU and its supporters mainly in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces as the government allegedly fought “dissidents” who were threatening the stability of the state. A report by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) in 1997 estimated that 20 000 Ndebele-speaking people were butchered in the process which the government code-named Gukurahundi (washing away of chaff). Later on in 1989, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) was formed by Edgar Tekere, a former ally of ZANU (PF) leader Robert Mugabe mainly as a protest against the proposed one-party state, the economic decline and corruption in government. There was violence against ZUM supporters throughout the country. However, the most formidable threat to ZANU-PF dominance arguably came from MDC as could be seen from the reaction of the ruling party after its proposed new constitution was rejected in a referendum in 2000. The opposition MDC and civic groups such as the NCA had campaigned against it. As observed by Mlambo (2006, p. 57); Angered by the result of the referendum and faced with mounting political opposition, the Government was desperate for an issue around which to mobilise political support for itself. It found the answer in the long vexed issue of the land question. Exploiting the long-standing grievances of the African people over the domination of the most productive land by a minority of white farmers, in 2000, Government instigated veterans of the liberation war and other government supporters to invade whiteowned farms in the name of the final war, named the Third Chimurenga, to win economic independence from white domination.

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This decision undoubtedly had far-reaching socio-economic and political consequences as the country plunged into a crisis. One other concern raised by Hamundigone is that the freedom fighters that made selfless sacrifices together with the ordinary citizenry have been pushed to the periphery of national discourse and resource allocation in the post-colony. This can be observed from the riddle he poses; Zvinofadza here? Ndati zvinofadza here vakomana imi? Pinduraiwo chirahwe chikukutu ichi. Poto yakatsva ichibika sadza pamoto, asi kutebhuru kukaenda ndiro dzaiva musherefu. (9) (Is this nice? I said is this nice guys? Can you answer this difficult riddle? The pot was burnt whilst cooking sadza, but plates that were in the shelf graced the table.)

In the riddle, the pot stands for the freedom fighters who sacrificed their lives at the front while the plates symbolises the opportunists at independence who offered little during the liberation war. Those who made the least sacrifice are apparently enjoying the national cake at the expense of the majority after the demise of the white colonial regime hence the feeling of betrayal. People in the post-colony are shown to be tired of sloganeering they were subjected to since the war as they battle to live meaningful life as observed by Hamundigone. In the novel, the Zimbabwean political elite is shown to be alienated from the generality of the people. While he was starving in Harare, Hamundigone is relieved when he saw a former fellow combatant during the war of liberation who is now a Member of Parliament (MP), Garanowako at the parliament building. To his utter dismay, the MP refuses to greet him and ordered security to remove him from the parliament premises. Thus the MP becomes an antithesis of his name Garanowako which calls for harmony with one’s people. He does not show any concern for him which symbolises how the ruling elite has alienated itself from the people who had high hopes after the attainment of independence. He arrogantly orders the security to remove Hamundigone from the premises of the parliament. This drew the ire of Hamundigone labelling the MP mentally unstable. Thus the author shows the nation to be facing a crisis of leadership with a gulf having been created between it and the people. At some point, Hamundigone is shown to be weeping as he witnesses the betrayal of the people by ZANU-PF as the hopes and aspirations of

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the people quickly fed away after the attainment of independence. He played a song by Thomas Mapfumo in which it is shown that the blacks were now under self-rule but faced insurmountable challenges hence his weeping for the nation; It is significant to note that Thomas Mapfumo’s music was an inspiration to many blacks during the War of Liberation as he castigated the oppressive and discriminative colonial system urging the subjugated blacks to free themselves. He called his genre of music Chimurenga in his quest to have the people liberated. Chimurenga is a Shona word for the liberation struggle. However, as the euphoria of independence started to fade away, he became a fiery critic of the ZANU-PF regime which saw him relocating to the United States of America in fear of persecution. The crisis is also characterised by biased allocation and institutionalised rampant looting of national resources. An example cited in the novel was the abuse of the War Victims Compensation Fund as some genuine cases being thrown away while some non-deserving cases were awarded. Some senior ZANU-PF officials and cabinet ministers were awarded shocking amounts of money after they manipulated the law of compensation through gross exaggeration of war-related injuries (Krigger, 2005). Hamundigone is one such victim as he has visible injuries on his body and displayed some form of mental instability as a result of his participation in the war. He complains that he is yet to receive compensation. In reality, the political elite who were on the rear during the war of liberation benefitted more from the fund than the fighters who were on the front. This also comes out during the discussion between the University of Zimbabwe students Magi and Kundai about how some, who masqueraded as freedom fighters, benefitted at the expense of deserving cases. Therefore, Mabasa in his novel reveals the political crisis as being characterised by violence, intolerance and exclusion of the opposition from issues to do with national development including accessing national resources as well as institutionalised looting of the national resources by the ruling elite. All this constitute, part of the betrayal for the citizens as the goal of the liberation struggle for improved life remains an elusive dream.

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Ruinous Economic Policies and the Socio-Economic Crisis The developments on the political front coupled with a number of erroneous economic policies adopted by the government resulted in the country falling into a socio-economic quagmire. As observed earlier, the early years of post-independence were full of promise with massive transformations on social services for the hitherto marginalised blacks but this quickly vanished in the late 1980s as the economy began to reflect signs of rupture. This transformation of Zimbabwe “from buoyancy to crisis” as Muzondidya (2008) argues is metaphorically captured in the novel through the life of the dog Harare previously known as Salisbury. The dog was owned by a white couple before the attainment of independence in Zimbabwe. It is important to note that the capital city during the colonial period was Salisbury and subsequently changed to Harare at independence. It is for the white couple that Mai Heaven (Jerina), who is black, worked as a maid. After independence, the couple resolved to return to Britain but the dog was to remain with the maid as she was used to its upkeep. They had a pet account at Newlands Shopping Center which they had paid for two years and on top of that they gave her extra cash for the dog’s upkeep. She pledged to maintain the standards but contrary to that, after six months she went to the pet shop and lied that the dog had been killed by a car, an action of deceit itself, resulting in her being paid off the balance. She used the money to start selling beer illegally at her house in Chitungwiza. Life did not take long to change for the dog which had been befittingly renamed Harare. Jerina became the political commissar of the Chirigamabhunu Women’s league branch of ZANU-PF. Therefore, it is clear that the author uses the transformation of the life of the dog to satirise how the ZANU-PF political leadership presided over the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy and the resultant misery it piled on the general populace. Just like how Jerina was left as the custodian of the dog and its rich account, the leadership inherited an economically vibrant country from the settler regime but it did not take long for it to recede. The first decade after independence was one of growth especially in service provision, followed by one of stagnation and by that of crisis in the post-2000 period. In the novel Mapenzi, the people are shown to be battling for survival especially the urbanites which also in turn meant hardships for their kinsmen in the rural areas whom they support. For the workers, their

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salaries could no longer match the spiralling inflation resulting in some people shunning formal employment. In the novel, Vincent refuses to be employed at the company where his elder brother Bunny was employed preferring to sell marijuana (cannabis), an illegal adventure. The basis for refusal was that he made more money from drug peddling than what he would get from his monthly salary if employed; Blaz, basa makaita zvenyu sitereki, asi handingamboshandira one thousand and two hundred dollars pamwedzi. Imi munozviziva kuti imari yandinoita pazuva, kana kutodarika. (66) (Brother thank you but I cannot work for one thousand and two hundred dollars per month. You know that I get that amount or more daily.)

The ZCTU (1996) notes that by 2004, 4 out of 5 jobs had been informalised and this can be traced to ESAP which was a market-driven strategy which was worsened by the descent into crisis in 1997 that culminated into the economic paralysis by 2007/2008. Vincent saw it prudent to remain in the risky “business” of selling drugs than going to work because of the hyperinflation that was in existence which rendered salaries worthless. This can partially be attributed to the decision by the government to give war veterans of the liberation struggle and unbudgeted gratuity of ZW50, 000 which resulted in the “Black Friday” on 14 November 1997. On this, Chimhowa et al. (2010) state that on the “Black Friday”, 14 November 1997, the Zimbabwean dollar lost 71.5% of its value, wiping off 46% from the value of shares as external investors lost confidence in the currency. They further note that hyperinflation continued on the upward trend and had reached 231 million per cent by December 2008. The level of poverty among the workers is shown to have reached alarming levels. At some point, Hamundigone, who is then a poorly paid civil servant, is shown to be scavenging for food in waste bins competing with street kids but he is outmanoeuvred as he lacks the agility they have. After that, he is almost beaten to death after he was found eating in a bin that “belonged” to Thomas, a gangster leader. He is confronted with the question;

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Mapihwa nani mvumo yekudya mubhini maTomasi? (26). (Who gave you the permission to feed from Thomas’ bin?).

The problem of poverty was affecting the majority of the populace, and Chimhowa et al. (2010) note that by 2003, about 72% of the population already lived below the total consumption poverty line. Furthermore, they argue that the reduction in social spending by the state also affected basic social services and a programme to reform the civil service saw 25% being laid off. As the crisis took its toll, the people could no longer afford decent accommodation as observed from the shacks in which Vincent and his uncle Sabha lived in. Vincent and Sabha’s backyard shacks (zvitangwena) are shown not to be even fit for animal habitation; Chitangwena chacho chainzi vanodzingwa chaive chakatoorawo zvacho. Yaingovewo imba nekuti vanhu vanoshaya, asi kune vaye vane mari yekuchengeta imbwa, havaimbobvuma kuti imbwa dzavo dzirare munhu makadaro. (111–112) (The shack was in miserable sate. It was house to the poor but for the rich they would not even allow their dogs to live in such a squalid place.)

Moreover, the novelist shows that there is a raging collapse of social relations and moral fabric and these can be traced to the harsh political, socio-economic conditions confronting the people. As Wasosa (2015) posits, the unbearable conditions corroded their humanity and created extreme levels of mental instability and deviance. For instance, in the novel, there is the case of Eddie who was unemployed and living with his girlfriend Heaven at her mother’s house. Based on the prisms of the Shona cultural philosophy, it is unethical for a man and a woman to live together as husband and wife without the payment of the bride price, (roora.) This becomes worse in the case of Eddie as he cannot fend for himself and thus relies on his “wife” Heaven for survival and accommodation. As if this was not enough, he had the audacity to sexually abuse Sarudzai, a maid of his supposed mother-in-law. In the end, he is murdered by Heaven after she discovered the affair. In the end and as discussed earlier, the state is culpable for creating poverty thus in the process betraying its citizens. On this, the ZCTU (1996) contends that.

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The state which had shown some concern for people’s welfare during the first decade of independence, regressed into one that does not respect the basic individual and collective rights of its citizens (a “rogue” state). As the crisis increased, the state clearly showed having been captured by a few individuals for the private ( a “predatory” state) and eventually failed to provide basic services such as education, health, water and sanitation (a “failed” state). (viii)

Another example in the novel Mapenzi of how the harsh economic environment eroded the people’s morality is that of Sabha. He was married to Mai Tanya but subjected her to bizarre and inhuman treatment. For instance, he would steal groceries bought by his wife through vending in order to get money to buy drugs like cannabis. At times he would sell the clothes he will be wearing to buy beer or drugs. The climax of his madness was when he brought a prostitute home, forced the wife off the bed and had sex with the prostitute as the wife watched. Later on, he rapes the wife after finishing with the hooker. In the end, he murders his wife under the influence of alcohol for taking too long to open the door for him as he came from a drinking binge. All this deviant behaviour can be traced to the socio-economic hardships which brutalised the people’s souls hence their awkward behaviour.

Impact of HIV and AIDS The ravaging HIV and AIDS pandemic which claimed thousands of lives was also part of the crisis. Failure by the government to provide decent health services is also part of the betrayal and deceit. As indicated earlier, the government had drastically reduced funding for public health institutions and other social services like education with the advent of ESAP. Also, the period of the crisis witnessed massive brains that included health workers. Clemens and Todd (2005) estimate that there were about 3900 deaths of children annually as of 2005 and half of these were due to HIV and AIDS. Mlambo (2006) is in consensus as he notes that things were made worse by the economic meltdown and the brain drain that it triggered which meant the collapse of the country’s health system at a time when the HIV and AIDS infection rate was very high by world standards. In Mapenzi, Hamundigone is worried at the number of sick and those dying from HIV and AIDS;

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Chiiko chiri kumbonyatsoitika? Ini ndaneta nendufu dzacho ini. Kurwara kwacho nekufiwa kwacho kwanyaya mhani. Kuita kunge kombetisheni. (29) (What is happening? I am tired of the deaths. The sickness and death rate is too much. It appears as if it about competition.)

The effects of HIV and AIDS in Mapenzi are shown mainly through Bunny and Maud, his landlady and later-to-be girlfriend. They had an eight-month affair before Maud succumbed to pneumonia but at the same, she had signs and symptoms of HIV. The stress that Bunny undergoes is shown by the nightmares and hallucinations he had accompanied by profuse sweating at night. The novelist is very clear that if Bunny had his own house, he most probably could have escaped the affair he had with his landlord Maud as being a tenant exposed him. Kuroja kuri mayaziwo futi kana wakazvitarisa! Hupenyu hwako hwenge huri mumaoko emumwe munhu sewachi. (41) (Lodging is not good at all! Your life will be under the control of someone like a wrist watch.)

One can hazard to argue that the author is stressing the point that those who are poor are at high risk of contracting the deadly virus. Bunny’s profession as an auditor would have guaranteed him a house in a functional economy. Just like most of the workers, he was living from hand to mouth because of poor remuneration. As observed earlier, most of the formal jobs were not adequately rewarding as his younger brother Vincent resolved to remain selling marijuana which was more lucrative. On this, the ZCTU (1996) observes that. The unprecedented situation brought about increased poverty, which in turn increased the social and economic marginalisation of those who were already disadvantaged. More importantly the economic policies failed dismally to address the structural distortions in the economy. Informal economy became the largest part of the economy and the middle-classes disappeared (the “missing- middle”). (26)

Apart from affecting the productive workforce represented by Bunny, the pandemic also resulted in thousands of children being orphaned. Maud left behind a toddler son Reuben under the care of her sister Mai Heaven.

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However, he is sexually abused by his cousin Heaven. Apart from that, he feels ostracised by society as his cousin and peers would laugh at him that his mother had died of AIDS. Therefore, apart from the demographic effects, the pandemic is shown to have impacted on the country’s labour force as it took its toll mostly on able-bodied men and women.

Commercial Sex Work by Youths Because of the biting economic environment, young girls, who are a vital cog of the nation’s posterity, are engaging in commercial sex work as a survival strategy in the novel. These include University of Zimbabwe students Magi and Kundai. In a discussion with her friend, Magi unequivocally explains that it is poverty that drives them into commercial sex work. The grants that were provided by the government to students were inadequate to meet their basic needs and this affected most of the girls; Also nenyaya yekuti mari yetinopihwa ishoma kuti ikuitirewo zvaunoda, I just did like what most girls are doing pano. Vanodanana nevarumwe vevanhu vachinyatsozviziva asi they tell you kuti vari kuda kungowana mari yekuti vararame…(48–49) (Also because the grants we are given is not enough to meet your needs, I just did like most girls are doing here. They are knowingly in love with married men but they tell you that they just want to survive.)

Even after graduation, the girls were prone to sexual prowl as they sought better-paying jobs. For instance, Kundai ended up working in an audit section of a company and yet she had an irrelevant BA Honours in English degree. She is later dismissed because of incompetence and she ends up into full-time commercial sex work. Also while at college Magi is raped and impregnated by Mangwiro his sugar daddy whom she dated for survival. Again in the novel, a driver of one commuter omnibus, while passing through the Avenues area where street sex workers wait for their clients, reveals the desperate times for them regardless of the high death rate. Iii, nyika yashata iyi vabereki. Ungati vanhu ivava havaoni kufa kuri kuita vamwe.(31). (The situation is bad. It seems as if they are aware of prevalent deaths.)

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It is therefore apparent that the novelist is contextualising commercial sex work by young women in the obtaining harsh socio-economic environment. Because of the crisis, people are shown to be losing their moral bearings and engaging in life-threatening activities as they battle for survival. Therefore, the state is shown to have betrayed the people by initiating the crises and also its failure to resolve them.

Conclusion It is crystal clear from the discussion on Mapenzi that the political leadership in post-independence Zimbabwe betrayed the people by authoring and presiding over the crises afflicting the nation. What transpires is typical Fanonian “pitfalls of national consciousness” as the advent of independence to a greater extent failed to uplift the people’s lives as they battle various political, social and economic crises. Politically, there is an ever-increasing shrinking of the democratic space in a toxic political environment characterised by polarisation and violence accompanied by an economic quagmire, collapse of social services such as health and poor service delivery in urban areas. Thus in the end there is a feeling of betrayal by their leadership and people question the meaning of independence.

References Achebe, C. (1975). Morning yet on creation day. HEB. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe. (1997). Breaking the silence: Building true peace—A report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and the midlands 1980–1988. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe/Legal Resources Foundation. xvii+261pp+maps. Chimhowu, A., Manjengwa, J., & Ferusa, S. (Eds.). (2010). Moving forward in Zimbabwe: Reducing poverty and promoting growth. Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Zimbabwe. Clemens, M., & Todd, M. (2005). Costs and cause of Zimbabwe crisis. Center for Global Development. Hammar, A., & Raftopoulos, B. (2003). Unfinished business: Rethinking Zimbabwe’s land, nationalism. Weaver Press. Krigger, N. J. (2005). Veterans’ pensions in Zimbabwe: Dispute resolution and nation-building. Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 20(1), 249–272. McGregor, J. (2010). Diaspora and dignity: Navigating and contesting civic exclusion in Britain. In J. McGregor & R. Primorac (Eds.), Zimbabwe’s new

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diaspora; displacement and the cultural politics of survival (pp. 122–143). Berghahn Books. Mlambo, A. S. (2006). The Zimbabwe crisis and the international response. Journal of Contemporary History, 31(2), 54–77. Muchemwa, K. Z. (2010). Old and new fictions: Rearranging the geographies of urban space and identities in post-2006 Zimbabwean fiction. English Academy Review: Southern African Journal of English Studies, 27 (2), 134–145. Mutambara, A. G. O. (2017). In search of the elusive Zimbabwean dream: An autobiography of thought leadership (Vol. 1). SAPES Books. Muzondidya, J. (2008). From buoyancy to crisis, 1980–1997. In B. Raftopoulos & A. Mlambo (Eds.), Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from colonial period to 2008 (pp. 165–200). Weaver Press. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2004). Putting people first: From regime security to human security: A quest for social peace in Zimbabwe, 1980–2002. In A. Nhema (Ed.), The quest for peace in Africa: Transformation, democracy and public policy. International Books. Sachikonye, L. M. (2011). When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe. Jacana Media. Sibanda, A. (2002). State capital and labour migration in Zimbabwe. In K. Matlosa (Ed.), Migration and development in southern Africa: Policy reflections. SAPES Books. Sithole, M. (1999). Zimbabwe’s public eye: Political essays (October 1997–October 1998). Rujeko Publishers. Smith, A. (2008). An afrocentric manifesto (Book review). The Journal of Pan African Studies, 2(7), 87–89. Wasosa, W. (2015). Deviance and moralisation in selected post-independence Shona fictional works (DPhil Thesis). University of South Africa, Pretoria. wa Thing‘o, N. (1997). Writers in politics: A re-engagement with issues of literature and society studies in Africa. James Currey. Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). (1996). Beyond the enclave: Towards a pro-poor and inclusive development strategy in Zimbabwe. Weaver Press.

Internet Sources http://www.Zimonline.co, 10 June 2005.

CHAPTER 10

Judas Culture in Post-colonial Zimbabwe: Gender and Land Redistribution in Raymond’s Choto’s Vavariro (1990) Enna Sukutai Gudhlanga and Angeline Mavis Madongonda

Introduction The attainment of independence in most African states did not correspond with the much-awaited joy and contentment which was greatly publicised during the liberation struggles of various African countries. The

E. S. Gudhlanga (B) · A. M. Madongonda Department of Languages and Literature, Zimbabwe Open University, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] A. M. Madongonda e-mail: [email protected] E. S. Gudhlanga Department of African Languages, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_11

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African countries had suffered under colonialism and experienced deprivation in all aspects of their lives (Kehinde, 2005). Thus post-colonial African states, Zimbabwe included, has anticipated the post-colonial period where deprivation would be a thing of the past. However, after attaining independence most African states realised that they had only attained flag independence and all the milk and honey that was promised during the liberation struggle never materialised. The post-independence period in Africa did not bring the much-awaited paradise (Kehinde, 2005) which the black Africans so much looked forward to, instead it was a time of continued deprivation of land for both men and women who had fought side by side in the liberation struggle to regain the lost land. The policy of reconciliation meant that reclamation of seized land was no longer possible as past ills were supposed to be buried and forgotten. The failure by the government to expropriate land saw the removal of the blinkers from the people’s eyes as it dawned on them that they had been betrayed. The reality on the ground was that nothing had really changed, the economy including the land, was still out of reach of the general populace. The novel Vavariro (1990) brings to the fore the aspect of betrayal among peasants who had willingly fought the war in anticipation of a better future where they would own land. Thus, the term peasant is used in this chapter to refer to the small-scale farmers in the novel which include both men and women. The chapter also reveals how Raymond Choto’s Vavariro daringly discusses the disillusionment as well as the betrayal that the peasants and the guerillas felt after the failure by the newly post-colonial government of Zimbabwe to redistribute land soon after independence as was promised during the war of liberation. It further exhibits how the culture of betrayal is depicted in post-colonial African states as depicted in the fictional work Vavariro. Investigating this culture of betrayal in post-colonial politics can assist the general African populace not to be gullible to any promises that are made to them but to make informed decisions in whatever activity that they would want to be involved in.

Methodology The chapter adopted a qualitative methodology design which made it possible to investigate the disillusionment in Zimbabwe’s post-colonial agrarian reform and how the gender variable is handled. The purposive sampling method was used in identifying this fictional work that deals

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with the culture of betrayal in the post-colonial land reform programme in Zimbabwe. This type of sampling method enabled the researchers to select sources that were regarded as data-rich sources (Creswell, 2014). The study draws heavily from the Critical Narrative Analysis (Barone, 1992). This design reconnoitres how authors present social stories within social conditions and cultural understandings in which participants are embedded. Critical Narrative Analysis therefore enables the researchers to show how the novel Vavariro exhibits the disillusionment experienced in post-colonial Zimbabwe by the landless peasants when they failed to repossess the land as was promised during the war. Through Critical Narrative Analysis, the study endeavours to document how Shona fiction represents some of the unfulfilled war promises in Zimbabwe. The primary source of data is the Shona fictional work, Vavariro. Other fictional works in both Shona and English that depict post-colonial disillusionment in Zimbabwe were also used for cross-referencing purposes to ascertain the failure of the post-independent Zimbabwe government to deliver its promises to the landless peasants. History sources on disillusionment with the agrarian reform in Zimbabwe were also used as a yardstick to measure whether Shona fiction gives an adequate representation of the failed promises made to the general populace during the war while at the same time recognising the disparities in gender equity.

Theoretical Framework The chapter is informed by Africana Womanism and Afrocentricity. The Africana Womanist theoretical paradigm advocates that African women and men are compatible and work together to liberate themselves from the evils of colonialism (Hudson-Weems, 1993). Africana Womanism has an exceptional agenda true to the prioritisation of race, class and gender (Hudson-Weems, 2007). The theory further states that Africana Womanism is “family centred, not female centred and it is first and foremost concerned with race empowerment rather than female empowerment, which in reality, is a part of, not separate from, the holism of Africana life” (Hudson-Weems, 2007, p. 23). Hence this theory which understands that African women are under the three cards that militate against them namely race, gender and class helps in the understanding of Shona fiction’s portrayal of betrayal and continued dispossession of land from both men and women in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The chapter is also informed by the theory of Afrocentricity which was coined by

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Molefe Kete Asante (1980). Afrocentricity is a theory “which calls for all African phenomena, activities and way of life to be looked at and be given meaning from the standpoint and worldview of Africans” (Gray, 2001, p. 3; Asante cited in Hudson-Weems (ed), 2007, p. 29). Using Afrocentricity enables one to appreciate how men and women of African descent continue to be disinherited from their birth right—the land, a significant number of years after attaining flag independence. Both Africana Womanism and Afrocentricity guide the chapter in the cultural and historical processes that have made Zimbabwean men and women gullible to the war promises and continue to be dispossessed of their land in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Therefore, it is imperative to use such approaches in an endeavour to understand the discourse on gender, betrayal and continued land deprivation in post-colonial Zimbabwe as depicted in Vavariro.

Conceptualising the Judas Culture in Post-colonial African States Judas Iscariot was one of Jesus’s 12 disciples and belonged to Jesus’ inner circle. He however is thought to have betrayed Jesus with a kiss for 30 pieces of silver (Luke 22, verse 47). The bible clearly brings this out when it says, “While he was still speaking, there came a crowd, and the man called Judas, one of the twelve, was leading them. He drew near to Jesus to kiss him: but Jesus said to him, ‘Judas, would you betray the son of man with a kiss?’” (Luke, 22 verses 47–48). Judas who was among the chosen twelve and expected to be close to Jesus is the one who betrayed him. Through the kiss which was meant to be a sign of love it gave away Jesus to his enemies resulting in Jesus getting arrested, persecuted and executed. If one therefore is labelled as having a Judas character, it means that they are being accused of being deceitful or betraying their friends or country. It further refers to a traitor, a greedy and an intemperate miscreant who plots against a righteous benefactor. Furthermore, a Judas character betrays under the guise of friendship just as what Judas did to Jesus in the bible. Thus, most post-colonial Africa governments betray the masses in the guise of camaraderie as they both participated in the liberation struggle together. The elites present some hypocrisy to those governed for they focus on lining their pockets at the expense of the masses. The chapter demonstrates that this element of a Judas character is rampant in post-colonial African states where the masses and in some

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instances even the freedom fighters who successfully waged the war of independence in anticipation of a better life, never benefited from the fruits of independence. Upon attaining flag independence, the masses as well as some of the guerrillas who had sacrificially participated in the war found that they had been gullible to the war promises and never benefited from the fruits of independence. Eli (2020) has discussed post-colonial disillusionment in Nigeria and Ghana through an analysis of A Man of the people (1966) and The Beautyful ones are not yet born (Armah, 1968) respectively. He highlights that post-colonial African governments continue to denigrate and oppress their black compatriots (Eli, 2020, p. 544). He further avers that blacks are being exploited by their own black leaders who had initially promised them paradise upon the attainment of independence. Thus, blacks in both Nigeria and Ghana feel betrayed by their independent governments. Eli further asserts that in post-colonial Ghana and Nigeria “the idealistic, self-sacrificing, nationalist is transformed into a greedy, self-seeking opportunist” (Eli, 2020, p. 554). Eli has mainly captured deception in post-independent Ghana and Nigeria; and the present chapter focuses on the deceitful culture in post-colonial Zimbabwe as depicted in Vavariro. Furthermore, Dadja-Tiou (2018) has also analysed post-independence African leadership in Chinua Achebe’s A Man of the people (1966). He asserts that the post-colonial leadership in Nigeria betrayed their counterparts who fought together with them to accede to independence (Dadja-Tiou, 2018, p. 289). Instead, the new leadership symbolised by Chief Nanga enrich themselves at the expense of the masses who collaborated with them during the fight against colonial rule. The general populace was therefore deceived by the new black leadership, they did not get the promised gains of the anti-colonial struggle. Also, in post-colonial Kenya the hard-won independence, as in many other independent African countries, did not improve the lives of the peasants as was expected. The post-colonial period in Kenya signifies a form of imperialism “through the agency of the new comprador bourgeoisie, the new ruling elite who have dashed the emancipatory promise of the nationalist struggle” (Kehinde, 2005, p. 224). Accordingly, this culture of betrayal is rampant in most post-colonial states as exemplified by the few African countries that have been reviewed. To further ascertain the culture of betrayal and deception in most post-colonial African states, Sibanda (2020) asserts that Shimmer Chinodya’s Harvest of Thorns (1989) and Child of war (Chirasha, 1991)

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are a sure sign of betrayal in post-colonial Zimbabwe where the black people anticipated to establish a black hegemony which would rule over the whites. However, Sibanda demonstrates that this black hegemony did not materialise. The blacks who had fought during the war symbolised by Benjamin did not benefit anything in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Sibanda mainly focused on the guerrillas’ failure to be encrypted into the Zimbabwe National Army or to get any form of employment because they were not educated. This chapter endeavours to investigate how the black peasants who had sacrificially supported the war in anticipation of regaining the lost fertile land did not realise their long-awaited promises. Furthermore, Sibanda discussed Zimbabwean novels published in English and the current study endeavours to analyse Shona fiction represented by Vavariro as demonstrated below.

A Brief Synopsis of the Novel Vavariro Vavariro by Raymond Morgan Choto was published in 1990. The novel revolves around Comrade Tumirai who leads a group of Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) forces to fight against the Rhodesia Front army in the Murewa-Uzumba area during the final days of the liberation struggle from around 1977–1979. The novel also goes further to present the early years of post-colonial Zimbabwe. It depicts Tumirai and other ZANLA forces who are operating in headman Charira’s village in Mrewa and get the full support of the dispossessed peasants in waging the war against the Smith regime (Gudhlanga, 2016). The main purpose of waging the liberation struggle was to reclaim the productive land that black people had lost to white colonial settlers (Choto, 1990). However, soon after independence, the peasants are disenchanted by the turn of events. The sacrifices they had made during the war are not duly rewarded in a post-independent Zimbabwe. For the peasants Zimbabwe got independent as a result of their combined efforts during the struggle (Gudhlanga, 2016). Soon after attaining independence, VaChimoto and VaKanyuchi spontaneously invade Dereki’s farm to fulfil their main purpose of participating in the struggle. These peasants are chased off the farm by their elected Member of Parliament, Nhamoyetsoka, who uses the same state machinery as was used by the colonial regime to chase the new occupants from the fertile land they attempt to repossess (Choto, 1990).

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Manifestations of the Judas Culture, Gender, Disillusionment and Betrayal in Vavariro Vavariro is a quintessence of the disenchantment and treachery that the peasants, both men and women felt soon after independence. Both men and women had suffered land dispossession during the colonial period and in order to regain their land they both participated in the liberation struggle. It is also important to note that the term peasant in African societies referred to a woman (Schmidt, 1992) as women are known to work the land more than their male counterparts. Accordingly, using an Africana womanist approach men could not own land on their own but collectively owned it with their wives or they were only allocated land after getting married. Thus, whenever dispossession of land is discussed in this novel, it refers to both men and women who had been deprived of their land and were collectively working together to regain it. Choto demonstrates that the greatest form of betrayal to the peasants and the guerillas who participated in the liberation struggle was the policy of reconciliation (Choto, 1990). The guerillas and the peasants believed that they were going to take land without paying any compensation. Despite the fact that resolving the colonial racial imbalances in land ownership was a top priority for peasants, after independence the newly independent state followed a policy of reconciliation where all its foes were forgiven. The imbalance in land ownership along racial lines had not been redressed. Regarding reconciliation Mazuruse (2010, p. 32) aptly captures this: In his inaugural address on Independence Day in 1980 the then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert Gabriel Mugabe stunned the whole nation by declaring reconciliation as the cornerstone of his government’s policy in the new Zimbabwe. Reconciliation offered constitutional safeguard for white settlers ensuring that they retained their elitist place in the new Zimbabwean state.

Instead of focusing on rectifying the racial imbalances in land ownership, which was the main driving factor in waging the liberation struggle, the new government set that aside through this new policy. The imbalance in land ownership had been side stepped in a bid to protect white private property. Chung (2006) also concurs with Mazuruse (2010) and avers that the post-independent government through reconciliation “made a

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lot of noise about the rights of white farmers but no attention was paid to the rights of poor peasants who wanted to regain the land that had been taken away from them by colonial settlers” (Chung, 2006, p. 98). This left the peasants in a limbo as they had been made to believe during the second Chimurenga war that the main purpose of the struggle was to regain the dispossessed land (Hanlon et al., 2013; Chigidi, 2009; Kriger, 1992; Makaudze, 2009; Viriri, 2013). Vavariro establishes the incongruity between the war promises and sacrifices that were made by peasants during the war with the actual gains that these peasants got in post-colonial Zimbabwe. It further highlights that the difference between the fulfilment of people’s desires and the new struggles of land ownership between peasants and the emerging black elite is wafer thin. Through peasants like VaChimoto and VaKanyuchi, with their wives who have immediately occupied Dereki’s farm, Choto validates that the real reason of going to war had not produced any results. He brings to the fore the fact that the land ownership issue which was the main reason that forced the black people to take up arms and participate in the liberation struggle has not been resolved. The deprivation of arable land of the indigenous men and women by settler farmers is still glaringly clear in the post-colonial period. The peasants, both male and female, who have sacrificed so much and paid through their sweat and blood, have not yet realised the gains of the liberation struggle. Instead, Choto proves that there is a new class of the elite that has emerged among the black people, and this class consists of the black elites who buy land and own it in the Western sense where they have title deeds and individual ownership. Consequently, apart from racial imbalances in land ownership, Choto also conveys another dimension of injustice that is disproportionate ownership of land according to class. The emergent black elite together with the former colonial masters now own the land while during the colonial regime the blacks fought against injustice in land ownership. In the postcolonial state the poor peasants fight both the colonial masters and the emerging black elite that is now owning the land. The black peasants see the hypocrisy exhibited by the so-called liberators. The new black elites have betrayed their compatriot black masses by leaving them out in the share of the national cake which they are busy enjoying as the elites. Through the novel’s title Vavariro, which when loosely translated means the goal, purpose or aim, Choto paints a picture of the new postcolonial government’s failure to fulfil the aims or purposes of going to

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war. Racial injustices in land ownership are still predominant in postindependent Zimbabwe (Gudhlanga, 2016). This is a clear divergence of the promises that were made during the war. Through the pungwe meetings during the war, the main purpose of waging the liberation war was clearly highlighted through Comrade Tumirai who says to the peasants: Yatakaronga yakaipa, vabereki. Tikabatana zvakasimba nyika tinoitora manje manje. Mapurazi aanaDereki nana Dhingi anenge ava enyu. Chingakutadzisai kutora mapurazi ese aya chii kana imi makarwisa muvengi kuti mutore nyika yenyu? Ivhu ratakatsika iri, ndiro ratiri kuda kutorera muvengi. Pasi navasvetasimba! (Choto, 1990, p. 132) (What we have planned is incredible, parents. If we are united in the real sense, we will take the country [from the whites] very soon after winning the war. Farms like Dereki’s and Dhingi’s will be yours. What can prevent you from taking these farms when you are the real people who gallantly fought the enemy to achieve total liberation? The soil which we are standing on is the one which we want to take from the hands of the enemy. Down with capitalist oppressors!)

The basis for occupying farms through the promises made during the war was made through such persuasive communication by the freedom fighters. Tumirai appeals to parents to collaborate with the freedom fighters in fighting white colonial masters. He wants the peasants to own the struggle. His appeal makes no distinction between men and women but is calling upon all, male and female alike. He is calling upon all peasants to take the struggle seriously because the future is very bright for everyone. He promises all present irrespective of gender that they will own the white men’s farms after the war (Gudhlanga, 2016). They would immediately occupy them upon the attainment of independence. Furthermore, Tumirai unmistakably pledges to the peasants that once they attain independence the land will be theirs since that was the main reason of waging the liberation struggle for he also says to VaChimoto when they discuss Mr Bango’s sellout activities: Zvino mabhunu zvaari kupera kuenda South Africa vachateverawo here? Zimbabwe tatoitora iyi, VaChimoto zvokuti zvinhu zvichatinakira. Mapurazi aana Dereki asina anochengeta aya achatorwa nevanhu nokuti nyika inonga yava yavo. Angakutadzisai ndiani imi makabata pfuti kuti titore

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Zimbabwe kubva kumuchena, ndiani?’ ‘Hapana zvechokwadi,’ vakapindura VaChimoto vakabvumira pfungwa dzavo dziri papurazi raDereki. Vakafunga kukura kwanga kwakaita purazi iri ndokubva vangoti dai hondo yapera zvayo vaenda kundogara papurazi raDereki. Chaivatadzisa chaiva chii chaizvo kana nyika yazenge yatorwa nepfuti? Vakafunga kudaro vakagara nanaTumirai. (Choto, 1990, p. 124) (Now that the Boers are all trekking down to South Africa will he also follow them there? Zimbabwe is already in our hands Mr Chimoto such that things are going to be at our advantage. Farms like Dereki’s that have been abandoned will be taken by the majority black people because the land will be theirs. Who would prevent you from occupying the white man’s farm when you duly participated in the liberation struggle that ushered in independence?’ ‘No one indeed,’ replied VaChimoto when he was busy reminiscing about Dereki’s farm. In his mind he thought about how big this farm was and just wished if the war could soon end so that he could go and occupy Dereki’s farm. What would prevent him from taking over that farm if the barrel of the gun would have ushered in independence? He was thinking about this whilst he was sitting with Tumirai and the other freedom fighters).

The basis for the peasants to take over land in post-independent Zimbabwe is set by the freedom fighters through propaganda used during the pungwe meetings by the freedom fighters. The peasants’ gullibility is exhibited as they unquestioningly trust and believe in all that the freedom fighters promise them, that their contribution to the war through various sacrifices was the only credential needed for one to repossess the land that the white colonial farmers like Dereki and Dhingi have seized from the black people. The hope to own fertile white colonial farms gives the peasants the vigour to whole-heartedly undertake the struggle for they dreamt that at the end of the war the balance of power would tilt in their favour as far as land ownership was concerned. To the peasants the skewed land ownership patterns that favoured the white minority farmers were going to be addressed soon after independence. Chigidi (2009) has also observed that the peasants were promised farms though the government redistribution programmes once the black majority rule was attained. The two dominant parties that fought for the liberation of this country Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) had promised redressing the disparities in land ownership to the land hungry peasants during the

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liberation struggle (Mafa et al., 2015; Tshuma, 1997). Kriger (1992, p. 98) also noted these promises that were made during the war. She states that “the people were promised that they would inherit white farms, houses, cars and jobs”. Chigidi further states that “the peasants were good listeners and had good memories. Above all they were poor. Now that the victory had come, they expected to get land and these other good things immediately” (Chigidi, 2009, p. 218). Raftopoulus has also noted that the peasant was dissatisfied with the government’s very slow pace of redressing the colonial land injustices in the early 80s. He affirms that: “While the government followed its preferred policy of land acquisition at that time, the 1980s witnessed low-intensity land occupations or squatting carried out by various communities” (Raftopoulus, 2004, p. 3). Many scholars confirm the land hungry peasants’ need to instantly get land soon after independence as was promised during the war (Mafa et al., 2015; Magosvongwe, 2013; Moyo, 1995). Choto goes further to exemplify the culture of betrayal prevalent in post-colonial Zimbabwe through the unfulfiment of the promises made to the peasants during the liberation struggle. This is because the new elite of former ex-combatants has formed an emergent social class which no longer shares the same struggles and aspirations of the peasants. The emerging social class of the black elite in the novel is represented by Jeri who has managed to buy land in the exclusive Christon Bank area where he now practices market gardening and sells the produce for the elite in the city of Harare (Choto, 1990, p. 148). Also, Comrade Tumirai who has become an MP for Dande and Mandava areas is also part of the elite. He likewise has bought a house in the high-class and ambient suburb of Harare, in the Grange where the former colonial masters used to live. Furthermore, MP Nhamoyetsoka who comes to evict the peasants from Dereki’s farm is also a member of the social class of the elite that has emerged after independence. Apart from former freedom fighters, the elite also comprise of very fortunate war collaborators like Jeri. These elites have bought land for themselves and have avoided spontaneous occupation of unallocated land like the peasants; they also want their private property which they have newly acquired to be protected by the same Lancaster House Constitution. Moreover, Choto highlights the culture of betrayal through the emerging black elite that fought side by side with the peasants in the liberation struggle and promised them free passage to the white men’s farms as the very same people who come to evict the peasants from their newly

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occupied farms. This brings in some disillusionment on the part of the peasants because the very same people whom they fed during the struggle and the people who advised them that they would occupy white men’s farms soon after independence are the very same people who come to evict them from the farms. Choto neatly captures this through Nhamoyetsoka who comes to the farm that VaChimoto and VaKanyuchi and their families have occupied on 20 May 1981 and advises them that they have illegally occupied Dereki’s farm (Choto, 1990, p. 150). He advises them that as their Member of Parliament he has heard through another white Member of Parliament for Mazowe that there are people who are illegally occupying Dereki’s farm (Choto, 1990, p. 150). Nhamoyetsoka is so hypocritical by listening to a white MP, who was presumed to be an enemy by the peasants. Furthermore, the culture of betrayal is exhibited through Nhamoyetsoka who instructs the peasants to quickly vacate the farm because the relatives of the deceased white farmer now want to take back their kindred’s farm and continue with the farming activities that were carried out there (Choto, 1990, p. 150). The MP further cautions the peasants to swiftly vacate the farm and gives them three months’ notice to go back to their homes, the barren reserves where no meaningful farming production could be practised (Choto, 1990, p. 151). This betrayal of the peasants by the black emergent elite is neatly captured in Nhamoyetsoka and the peasants’ interaction. Mrs Chimoto says to Nhamoyetsoka, “Imi komuredhi imi mune magirazi muri kuziva here kuti hondo yatairwa yaiva yekurwira ivhu ramakatsika iro?” (Choto, 1990, p. 150). (You comrade wearing spectacles, are you aware that the war that we fought was for us to reclaim the very soil you are standing on). Mrs Chimoto quickly reminds the former freedom fighter of the goals and aspirations of the liberation struggle for he seems to have quickly forgotten why people waged the war of liberation to regain back their land (Gudhlanga, 2016). Additionally, VaKanyuchi says, “Handifungi kuti zvamuri kutaura munozviziva. Purazi rino nderaDereki akapfurwa nemakomuredzi munguva yehondo. Muridzi waro akafa kudhara” (Choto, 1990, p. 150) (I do not think that you know what you are saying. This farm belongs to Dereki who was shot by the freedom fighters during the war. The owner of this farm died a long time ago). VaKanyuchi is further reinforcing what Mrs Chimoto has said that the land no longer belongs to the white man but has been taken over by the new occupants, the peasants both men and women as they were assured of that land during the war. Besides, the peasants rightfully own

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the land because they have made a lot of personal sacrifices during the war in order for them to regain back the land that was taken away from them. Choto further demonstrates how the peasants were betrayed by the new black government represented by MP Nhamoyetsoka who evicts peasants from the farm they had occupied. To illustrate the forced evictions Choto says, Mazuva akamedzana sokuseka. Mazuva okudzoka kwamapurisa akakwana. Mapurisa akauya aine pfuti, mabhurudhoza neimbwa. VaChimoto naVaKanyuchi pavakaona motokari dzichisvika, vakabva vaziva kuti zvinhu zvaipa. Mazimbwa amapurisa akatangisa kuhukura zvinotyisa. ‘Hamusi kuda kubva pano here? Mukuru wamapurisa akabvunza achidhonza imbwa yake kuti isarume VaChimoto zvekare. ‘Zvino tinogara kupi?’ VaChimoto vakabvunza vaona kuti nyaya yaipa. Imbwa vaidzitya chaidzo. Ropa rakanga rodonha richibva patsapfu. ‘Hamuna kumusha kwenyu here? Munoda kuita zvekurohwa here kuti munzwe? Izvozvi tanga tanzi tisvikokurumisai mose nembwa kana maita nharo. Purazi ramuri iri nderaDereki, hama dzake dzava kuda kushandisa nzvimbo ino. Kana muchida kwekurima munoenda kuminda mirefu. Muri kuzvinzwa here?’ ‘Tazvinzwa, komuredhi. Zvino tinoenda nei?’ Mukuru wamapurisa akatanga abata chirebvu ndokubva ati ‘Tutirai zvinhu zvenyu mumotokari iyo. Nhasi tiri kunokusiyai mavakudzimba dzenyu.’ VaChimoto navamwe vavo vakatuta zvinhu ndokubva vazviisa mumarori amapurisa. Imbwa dzainge dzakavagarira vachituta zvinhu zvavo. Romusi uyu rakazonyura vava kudongo kwavo. (Choto, 1990, pp. 151–152) (Time quickly passed unnoticed. The days for the return of the police officers drew near. The police came armed, police dogs and bull dozers to evict the harmless peasants from Dereki’s farm. When VaChimoto and VaKanyuchi saw the police arriving in their trucks they knew that everything had gone wrong. The police dogs started barking viciously on the new occupiers. ‘You do not want to vacate this farm?’ the head of the police delegation asked whilst he was straining the dog from biting VaChimoto again. ‘Now where do we go and stay?’ VaChimoto asked. He was so much afraid of dogs, and blood was dribbling from where he had been bitten by the police dog. Do you not have your own homes? Do you want to be beaten in order for you to understand? Right now, we had been instructed to unleash dogs on all of you if you continue to show resistance to vacate this farm. This farm that you are occupying he advised them belongs to Dereki and his relatives who now want to take over his

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farm and use it. If you want land go to the government sponsored resettlement areas. Do you hear me?’ ‘So, comrade how do we get back to our homes?’ asked VaChimoto. The leader of the police delegation advised, “Load your belongings into that truck. Today we are going to leave you at your homes. VaChimoto and his colleagues loaded their staff onto the police trucks. Dogs were waiting for them as they did the packing. By the end of that particular day, they had gone back to their reserves and had vacated Dereki’s farm)

Choto has amply demonstrated the disillusionment experienced by the peasants, both male and female by being forcibly evicted by their government which they had voted into power. The government through the MP descends heavily on the new land occupiers. It unleashes police dogs, sends bulldozers and even armed police officers to unarmed peasants. Through this altercation with the police, Choto establishes that history is cyclical; the use of bulldozers reminds us of how the Tangwena people’s houses were erased by the colonial government as a way of making the blacks move away from their homes with fertile soils to the newly created reserves (Mafa et al., 2015; Magosvongwe & Makwavarara, 2015a; Magosvongwe & Makwavarara, 2015b; Mugari, 2015). Ironically the new independent government uses the same mechanism of forcibly evicting its citizens from the fertile farm they have occupied. Through such a picture of forced removals, Choto proves that independence has not changed anything in terms of land ownership. Vambe (2006) has also noted the irony of this ideological rift between the peasants and the former freedom fighters who now form the elite of the day and are quick to label the peasants who occupy Dereki’s farm illegal settlers. Through showing the ideological delinking between the peasants and the elite, Choto insists that the land issue had not yet been resolved by 1990 when the novel was published. Independence therefore has brought in disillusionment, unfulfilled promises and some form of deceit of the highest order since it is only a group of a selected few individuals, the elites that have benefited from the fruits of independence. The rest of the peasants are, however, forcibly evicted from the land because they have illegally occupied land which belongs to the white man even in post-independent Zimbabwe. Choto thus captures the government’s role soon after independence that it “defended the whites in the economy” (Alexander, 2003, p. 86).

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The other form of betrayal is depicted in the government of Zimbabwe itself which is failing to get land for free from the white farmers but is paying for it through the World Bank policy of willing seller willing buyer and then redistributes it to the people (Mafa et al., 2015; Moyo & Chambati, 2013; Moyo et al., 2015; Tshuma, 1997). Tumirai says to VaChimoto, “Iye zvino hurumende iri kutenga mapurazi kuti vanhu vaende kundoita mushandirapamwe vachirima. Ndosaka taiti mapurazi evarungu achava edu. Handiti muri kuzvionanwo?” (Choto, 1990, p. 157). (Right now, the government is buying farms so that people can be resettled there and practise communal farming. That is why we said that white farms will be ours. Are you not seeing it for yourself?). Repossession of land through buying as the government is now doing was never imagined during the war. Therefore, VaChimoto and the rest of the peasants fail to comprehend why this land has to be bought and yet during the war they had been promised to get the land for free (Kriger, 1992). The irony is that the government was now paying for land that had been expropriated from the black people; the whites themselves had never bought this land when they took it away from black people (Tshuma, 1997). However, VaChimoto who worked very closely with Tumirai during the liberation struggle vividly remembers the promise that he had made to them during the war and decides to visit Tumirai in the city to get first-hand information from him about this deceit that the peasants are now experiencing through farm evictions (Choto, 1990, p. 132). Tumirai plainly tells VaChimoto to vacate the farm and that if he really requires land; he should consider joining the government-sponsored resettlement programme. During his visit to Tumirai, VaChimoto realises that the independence that black Zimbabweans have, is only flag independence and not economic independence which transfers the means of production to black people. Land and other resources still belong to the white man and hence there is a new war that still needs to be fought in order for them to recoup the land, and the new struggle of transferring the meas of production will be done through dialogue and not an armed struggle. Tumirai says to Mr Chimoto, “Iye zvino upfumi huchiri mumaoko evaRungu. Ichi ndicho chokwadi VaChimoto. Hatisati tava noupfumi…” (Choto, 1990, p. 157). (Right now, the economy is still in the hands of the white man. This is the real truth Mr Chimoto. We have not yet achieved economic independence. Instead Tumirai advises VaChimoto to go to the resettlement farms that the government has introduced and not to settle on a

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white man’s farm (Choto, 1990, pp. 157–159). Accordingly, Choto has amply captured the peasants’ disillusionment and deceit at the end of the liberation struggle when peasants both male and female represented by VaChimoto and VaKanyuchi together with their families failed to get the land after making so many sacrifices during the war. The other form of treachery is presented through Kufa who successfully wages the liberation struggle as a freedom fighter but upon independence he was disqualified from joining the Zimbabwe National Army on medical grounds. Choto brings this out when he says; “Kufa akanzi akanga asikakodzeri kuva muuto nokuti aiva nechirwere. Izvi hazvina kumufadza nokuti hondo yese yakanga yapera ari komuredhi” (Choto, 1990, p. 147) (Kufa was informed that he was unhealthy to join the army. This did not please him because throughout the war he was a freedom fighter). The irony is that Kufa had successfully waged the war against the Smith regime with his medical condition but was then deemed unfit to join the Zimbabwe National Army. Failure to join the army and enjoy the fruits of independence is also depicted through Benjamin in Shimmer Chinodya’s Harvest of Thorns (1989). Benjamin successfully waged the liberation struggle but could not acquire the status of a war veteran who could benefit as what was happening to other former freedom fighters. The other form of treachery in Vavariro is brought out through the need for qualified personnel to work in the newly independent government and yet when they waged the war and these qualifications were never required. Everyone was promised employment in independent Zimbabwe. The need for qualified personnel is brought out through Tumirai who says to VaChimoto: Panogona kubuda basa rinenge richida munhu anoziva kuti dy over dx zvinorevei. Kana kuti back titration inofambiswa sei kana rate of turn over inowanikwa sei. Kuti munhu akwanise zvese izvi anofanirwa kuva akaenda kuchikoro. Ndiwo mutsauko uripo VaChimoto. Dai zvainzi munhu wese anogona kuzviita, mukati pane aizoshaya basa here? (Choto, 1990, p. 158) (There could be a job which requires a person who knows what dy over dx means. Or a job which requires one to have knowledge about back titration or one which requires one to have knowledge about rate of turn over. In order for one to be able to do all these things they should have acquired

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education. Thus, the difference Mr. Chimoto. If everyone could do everything without any academic qualifications, do you think there would be people who fail to get employment?)

The peasants therefore are now being disqualified from getting employment and yet during the war those qualifications were not required, everybody simply participated in waging the liberation struggle according to their physical ability and not academic qualifications. Similarly, Benjamin in Harvest of Thorns also fails to get employment because he lacked the academic qualifications and the irony of it all is that these freedom fighters had to discontinue their studies to go for military training and after the war they could not be employed since they did not have the academic qualifications. This amply demonstrates the culture of betrayal in postcolonial Zimbabwe where there are a lot of unfulfilled promises which resulted in disillusionment. Additionally, the freedom of owning land and other universal human rights is not realised in post-colonial period. Choto has amply demonstrated that the peasants do not have the freedom to occupy the white man’s farms in post-independent Zimbabwe. It was not only the deprivation of the freedom to occupy farms but even freedom of association. Choto might have understood this disillusionment better because he himself as a journalist who worked for The Standard newspaper and also currently working for Studio 7 , has observed first hand, the unfulfillment of the war promises. He was jailed together with Mark Chavhunduka for reporting on what was presumed to be subversive material in postindependent Zimbabwe. It is not only peasants who have been duped but even jounalists cannot exercise press freedom in post-independent Zimbabwe.

Conclusion The chapter has amply demonstrated how Choto portrays the mismatch between the promises that were made during the war of liberation and what eventually materialised after independence. The novel brings to the fore and highlights the land dispossession of both black men and women in both the pre-independence as well as post-colonial periods. Vavariro published in 1990, ten years after regaining the independence has brilliantly captured the greatest form of betrayal experienced in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Thus, the author had to use his literary prowess

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to depict the unfulfilled liberation struggle expectations in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Through the use of metaphors, symbols and literary images in the selected fictional work, Choto was able to expose how the masses were so gullible to the promises made to them during the liberation struggle. It has further highlighted the treachery experienced by the peasants in post-colonial Zimbabwe when the much-awaited agrarian reform did not materialise. Choto has boldly written about the culture of betrayal in post-colonial Zimbabwe during a time when it was not fashionable to do so. He has explicitly demonstrated how the emergent black elite was too quick to wear the shoes of the former colonial settlers and used the same mechanisms of state sponsored violence namely, unleashing of police dogs, use of bull dozers to perpetuate the dispossession of land among their compatriot black people whom they had promised heaven on earth during the colonial period. Choto has amply demonstrated that the black majority did not only fail to regain the land as was promised but most universal human rights are missing in post-independent Zimbabwe. The novel Vavariro has thus amply demonstrated the disillusionment, treachery and hypocrisy which characterise the post-colonial period in Zimbabwe.

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Dadja-Tiou, P. (2018). A critical analysis of post-independence African leadership in Chinua Achebe’s A man of the people. International Journal of Innovative Research and Development, 7 (7), 1–6. Eli, B. T. (2020). Post-independence African literature and the theme of disillusionment: Reflections on Achebe’s A man of the people and Armah’s The beautyful ones are not yet born. Journal of Christian University of African Architecture and Technology, 12(6), 543–557. Gray, C. C. (2001). Afrocentric thought and praxis: An intellectual history. Africa World Press. Gudhlanga, E. S. (2016). Gender and land ownership in Zimbabwean literature: A critical appraisal of gender and land ownership in selected Shona fiction (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis Submitted to the University of South Africa). Hanlon, J., Manjengwa, J., & Smart, T. (2013). Zimbabwe takes back its land. Jacana Media. Hudson-Weems, C. (1993). Africana womanism: Reclaiming ourselves. Africa World Press. Hudson-Weems, C. (2007). Nommo/self-naming, self-defining, and the history of Africana womanism. In C. Hudson-Weems (Ed.), Contemporary Africana theory, thought and action: A guide to Africana studies (pp. 289–308). Africa World Press. Kehinde, A. (2005). An aesthetic of realism: The image of post-colonial Africa i Meja Mwangi’s going down river road. Enter Text, 4(2), 223–253. Kriger, N. J. (1992). Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla war: Peasant voices. Cambridge University Press. Mafa, O., Gudhlanga, E. S., Manyeruke, N., Matavire, E. H. M., & Mpofu, J. (2015). Gender, politics and land use in Zimbabwe, 1980–2012. CODESRIA. Magosvongwe, R. (2013). Land and identity in Zimbabwean fiction writings in English from 2000–2010: A critical analysis (Unpublished doctoral philosophy thesis). Department of African Languages and Literature, University of Cape Town. Magosvongwe, R., & Makwavarara, Z. (2015a). Introduction. In Z. Makwavarara, R. Magosvongwe, & O. B. Mlambo (Eds.), Dialoguing land and indigenisation in Zimbabwe and other developing countries: Emerging perspectives (pp. 1–15). University of Zimbabwe Publications. Magosvongwe, R., & Makwavarara, Z. (2015b). Land invaders and land occupiers: Demystifying issues of land indigenisation and further liberation of geophysical and intellectual spaces in Zimbabwean authored post 2000 fictional narratives. In Z. Makwavarara, R. Magosvongwe, & O. B. Mlambo (Eds.), Dialoguing land and indigenisation in Zimbabwe and other developing countries: Emerging perspectives (pp. 45–63). University of Zimbabwe Publications.

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Makaudze, G. (2009). Shona fiction and its treatment of socio-economic issues in Zimbabwe (Unpublished doctoral philosophy thesis), UNISA, Department of African Languages. Mazuruse, M. (2010). The theme of protest in the post-independence Shona novel (Unpublished master of philosophy thesis). UNISA, Department of African Languages. Moyo, S. (1995). A gendered perspective of the land question. Southern African Feminist Review, 1(1), 13–31. Moyo, S., & Chambati, W. (2013). Land and agrarian reform: Beyond white settle capitalism. Codesria. Moyo, S., Tsikata, D., & Diop, Y. (Eds.). (2015). Land in the struggles for citizenship in Africa. Dakar CODESRIA. Mugari, Z. E. (2015). Colonial designs, landscapes and the mediation of forced removals in postcolonial Zimbabwe. In Z. Makwavarara, R. Magosvongwe, & O. B. Mlambo (Eds.), Dialoguing land and indigenisation in Zimbabwe and other developing countries: Emerging perspectives (pp. 64–77). University of Zimbabwe Publications. Raftopoulus, B. (2004). Current politics in Zimbabwe: Confronting the crisis. In D. Harold-Barry (Ed.) The past is the future: Rethinking land, State and Nation in the context of the crisis (pp. 1–18). Weaver Press. Schmidt, E. (1992). Peasants traders and wives: Shona women in the history of Zimbabwe, 1870–1939. Heinemann. Sibanda, S. (2020). Post imperial imaginaries in Zimbabwe: Interrogating betrayal. In the pre- and post-war years in Chinodya’s Harvest of thorns and Child of war. Literator, 41(1), 1–9. The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version. Tshuma, L. A. (1997). Matter of injustice: Law state and agrarian injustice in Zimbabwe. Harare Southern African Political Economic Series. Vambe, M. T. (2006). The struggle for land in the Shona novel: Allegory, seizure and betrayal. The Round Table, 95(384), 265–272. Viriri, A. (2013). “Seiko Musina Morari?”: The carnivalesque modes of the Pungwe institution in selected Shona novels (Unpublished doctoral of philosophy thesis). UNISA, Department of African Languages.

CHAPTER 11

Metaphorisation and Erotisisation of the Female Body in David Mungoshi’s The Fading Sun: A Symbolic Representation of the Postcolonial Zimbabwean Society Andrew Mutingwende and Esther Mavengano

Introduction This chapter is a reader-response critique on postcolonial Zimbabwean political condition as projected from the female body through a constellation of symbols. It explores the metaphorisation of the female corporeality and how such is mapped on the state of the Zimbabwean nation as portrayed in David Mungoshi’s (2009) text, The Fading Sun. The chapter

A. Mutingwende (B) Department of English and Communication, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] E. Mavengano English and Media Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_12

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draws on the Stylistics framework to examine the literary and linguistic effects as part of such metaphorisation and their semantic implications on the discourse of state governance. The representation of national and political discourse through the body of a female being in fictional writings has led to innumerable critics disqualifying male writers as not capable to stand as feminist advocates (Mills, 2005; Williamson, 2001). The politics of the female body has led male feminists’ representation of women in male written narratives to be construed as a subtle perpetuation of the erotisisation, frigidification and objectification of female corporeality (Bataille, 1986). Contrary to this mainstream view by feminists, this chapter troubles such (mis)reading and demonstrates that most male feminists’ representation of the female body is an aesthetic imagination to critique the latter’s misrepresentation. This endeavour has been achieved through the reinvigoration of conceived characteristic vulnerabilities in women into impactful symbols to trigger male consciousness about the former’s gendered prejudices. Against this backdrop, the key research objective is dualist; first, to foreground concealed realities about women’s position and experience within the body politic of the Zimbabwean nation and, second, to explore the metaphorisation and stylistic signification of such position and experience as a site of national discourse. In our analysis, we reorient artistic presentation of female fragilities and prejudices into a symbolic and performative force to help understand the Zimbabwean national politics. Located within the stylistics framework, this chapter contends that Mungoshi’s (2009) literary text provides a significant fictive platform from which to interrogate female vulnerabilities which could be ‘weaponised’ into a litany of ‘de-silencing’ mechanisms to critique country politics.

Conceptual and Methodological Aspects: Locating the Study in Stylistics Terrain Stylistics is a useful framework that offers insights to the analysis of language use in literary works. It establishes the link between language, socio-political world in a literary text and in the production of meaning (Short, 2000). Leech and Short (2007) explain that stylistic analysis is also concerned with how readers interact with the language of literary texts in the meaning-making process. What this implies is that from a stylistics perspective meaning is not a mere product of a literary text

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and a creative writer but rather negotiated as readers bring their knowledge of the social and political world into their interpretation troubling the heuristic process (Mavengano, 2020). In other words, stylistics goes beyond the interrogation of language as it searches for possible linguistic and non-linguistic hints leading to the multi-layered understanding of the text. This is what Bakhtin (1981) refers to as the outsideness of language and languaging in discourse. Thus, linguistic and non-linguistic forms are part of the semiotic signs which signify a referential entity of concept in the world. Agreeably, literary art is often measured on its literary worth and ability to communicate in order to serve the intention (and in some cases producing non-intentional effects) for which it was written (Bakhtin, 1981; Fowler, 1971; Kristeva, 1980). Mavengano (2020) views contemporary stylistics as an interdisciplinary metalinguistic field that provides salient lens to interrogate how meaning is created through language in a text. Mavengano (2020, p. 50) further asserts that linguistics is indispensable in literary criticism. The stylistic theory offers a wide platform for the deconstruction of creative works as a production site of signifier-signified relationships which could also be arrived at through the art of intertextuality. Any sign, whether it is a picture, paralinguistic item, morpheme, phoneme or a stretch of discourse, is believed to have existed in the author’s writing not by accident but rather deliberated for artistic effect In the analysis section, we employ the Stylistics framework to carry out a reader-response deconstructive criticism of Mungoshi’s text, The Fading Sun and then map its linguistic forms on gendered national discourse. The chapter relies on the descriptive qualitative data with the corpus drawn from a purposively selected text, The Fading Sun which offers profound and nuanced ways the female character’s body could be mapped upon the national discourse through metaphorisation and stylisation. In this way, the chapter conveys a common convergence zone between linguistics and literature (Short, 2000). Using descriptive purposive sampling method, we conscientiously picked snippets of narrative data based on their capacity to represent the female body and its metaphorised projection on the Zimbabwean national discourse.

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The Subject of Gender Politics in Contemporary Theoretical Debates It is true, according to the observation of Mavengano and Marevesa (2022, p. 235), that society has relegated women “as second sex, or second class” citizens. According to the Feminist Standpoint theory, the male writer is not strategically positioned to write about women because he is not part of the female embodiment (Harding, 1993; Lahji, 2015). Male authors’ fictional works are interpreted as a subtle perpetuation of female stereotypes and hence they cannot qualify as feminists (Lahji, 2015). Gubar (1980) opines that a male feminist views a woman as a ‘blank page’ which he endeavours to write on to complete her. Similarly, Gardiner (1980, p. 189) argues that it is always important to study identity when exploring feminist texts because reflections of gender differences resurface in fictional works since “being a man means being not like a woman.” In line with Gubar’s (1980) conception of women as ‘blank page,’ several scholars (see Lorde, 1984; Marfudhotun & Wiyatmi, 2021; Parpart, 2019) have valorised female silence as a form of revolution which in the expression of Bataille (1986) is ‘silent violence.’ In rare cases, however, some narratives construct revolutionary female characters which are in most cases antithetical to what exists in real society (Robbins, 2000; Williamson, 2001). This echoes Gayatri Spivak’s (1988) observation that women have been exposed to ‘double displacement’ at the hands of patriarchy and imperialism. Society has estranged women as constituting a strange sub-culture (Lorde, 1984; Mavengano & Marevesa, 2022). Women’s prejudice in the hands of men has been worsened by the incursion of the persistent phallocentric literary tradition in the contemporary world. In literature, most male writers have been labelled as unfit to impartially represent women as their attempt has been seen as either an underwriting or overwriting of the body politic of a female being for a reason that they do not constitute the same sex and, hence are bound to differ in perception, experience and appetite (Harding, 1993; Lahji, 2015). This view taboos the female body to an extent that the male feminist’s attempt to represent female corporeality amounts to the conception that such endeavours entail concealed gendered agendas. This deviation from representational reality culminates from an attempt to metaphorise the female body through a series of symbolic representation. This research

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undertaking conceives David Mungoshi as a contemporary male feminist attempting to fight for women. The manifest of the female character’s prejudice and misrepresented body have either artistically drawn through an application of injury on her body by her male counterpart or her unjust treatment resulting in exclusion and psychological harm. Some feminists are bent on interpreting any male attempt to represent the female body such as creative description of her harm or symbolic removal of any of her body parts as a move that de-sexualises female agency (Mills, 2005). Robbins (2000), Lange (2008), Lahji (2015) and Marfudhotun and Wiyatmi (2021) observe that as is it often the case, male writers tend to objectify women inadvertently through erotisisation of the female body which is in itself an attempt towards her commodification and objectification or thingification, as a sexual tool. Such scholars further argue that this distracts the readers and diverts their attention from analysing the original motivation of the writing. In the words of Marfudhotun and Wiyatmi (2021, p. 43), women’s bodies are men’s chattel since women lack ‘body autonomy’ as “from the subject-object position, the woman is the object.” This misconception results in the commodification of the female body by men in view, speech, writing and treatment (Lahji, 2015). Many feminist critics (such as Bataille, 1986; Benedicta, 2011; Lahji, 2015; Lorde, 1984; Marfudhotun & Wiyatmi, 2021; Parpart, 2019; Spivak, 1988 among others) observe that society has misconstrued a woman as constituting a gender sub-culture because “the woman cannot control her body. She does not have any autonomy on her body” (Marfudhotun & Wiyatmi, 2021, p. 44). Mills (2005), Hartsock (1997) and Lorde (1984) also argue that women have no access to their bodies as witnessed in their (women’s) perceived silence when exposed to trauma. Lahji (2015) and Benedicta (2011) concur that a woman is metaphorically ‘deaf and dumb’ before her man while Bataille (1986) calls women’s silence, ‘silent violence.’ To say, in the expression of Gubar (1980) women are a ‘blank page’ is a gross misconception. While some scholars relegate male feminism as under qualified to be fair feminism, this chapter revisits this conception by analysing male writing as part of feminist project in Zimbabwean literary oeuvre.

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The Genesis of Zimbabwe’s Socio-Economic and Political Distresses Barely a decade after the dawn of Zimbabwean independence in 1980, the then Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe’s evanescent dream towards one party state system made attempts to woo his opponent, Joshua Nkomo and his PF-ZAPU party to join ZANU (Muponde, 2004). Nkomo’s resistance culminated in the killing of an estimated 20 000 Ndebele speaking ethnic minority in Matabeleland and the Midlands Provinces in a violent wave dubbed Gukurahundi under the instigation of the North Koreantrained 5th Bridgade. To avoid much bloodshed, Nkomo soon capitulated to the co-optation, a gesture which yielded the 1986 Unity Accord and ZANU-PF. The backlash which also recorded countless injuries disturbed the internal population settlement of the country as some of the victims were forced to migrate locally and internationally (Raftopoulos & Savage, 2004). To date, the Gukurahundi holocaust memory still lingers in Zimbabwe’s political landscape as the perpetrators of such atrocious act remain arrogant. The damage has not been corrected by its perpetrators and this continues to be the country’s ethnic sore point (Moyo & Mavengano, 2021; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009). Few years later, in 1999, the Tsvangirai-led Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed out of disgruntling labour unions and some opposition formations. In the subsequent year, 2000, Zimbabwe held a constitutional referendum which resulted in a lot of the electorate voting ‘NO’ against ZANU-PF and in the opposition’s favour coupled with ZANU-PF’s near defeat by the MDC is the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections (Chikerema & Chikunda, 2014; Muchemwa, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020). The 2002 plebiscite saw MDC winning most of the urban seats than the ruling party and ZANU-PF introduced a raft of violent mechanisms to deal with the growing popularity of the opposition (Chikerema & Chikunda, 2014; Raftopoulos, 2009). Critics came to interpret the state’s successive operations and unstable change in policies, hereafter, as a registering of the ruling party’s ire against those who had voted for the opposition (Raftopoulos & Savage, 2004). Immediately after ZANU-PF’s near defeat in the 2002 polls, farm invasion under the fast track land reform programme began. Extensive land seizures resulted in vast expropriation of farms from white commercial farmers to appropriate them to black farmers most of whom were untrained and under-funded. This

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move which was under the pretext of land indigenisation resulted in the plummeting of agricultural production, retrenchments, closure of industries, increased poor livelihoods, generated scary levels of economic instability as well as the mushrooming of vending stalls in the city and small business centres (Mutingwende & Jakaza, 2022). The expropriation of land from white commercial farmers was carried out because the ZANUPF believed that white farmers were clandestinely sponsoring the MDC campaign aimed at regime change agenda (Muponde, 2004). It is this contextual background that gave birth to multiple socio-economic and political problems for the post-independent Zimbabwe. From as early as year 2000, the Zimbabwean citizens had been enduring economic hyperinflation, unemployment and poor living standards with a lot then forced to migrate out the country for greener pastures (Moyo & Mavengano, 2021). The 2008 elections resulted in MDC-T’s near win which informed the re-run the same year. The political campaign to the re-run saw many opposition supporters being subjected to state-sponsored violence. The subsequent win by ZANU-PF in the 2008 and 2013 controversial elections was interpreted as incredible as it recorded a lot of human rights abuses and suspected electoral malpractices. After 2013, President Mugabe’s governance system received a lot of local and international condemnation due to multifarious reasons such as the unrelenting skyrocketing of market prices, human rights breaches, and the visible abuse of state apparatuses as well as general poor salaries of civilians. Earlier then, a constellation of opposition parties co-habited into an alliance called the MDC-Alliance led by Morgan Tsvangirai who later died, leaving Nelson Chamisa to continue as the alliance’s leader. Out of the MDC-Alliance, a disgruntling splinter group MDC-T led by Douglass Mwonzora branched off as a stand-alone party. Cumulative vilification from local and international critics led Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party to introduce water-tight media publicity policies and stringent surveillance system to thwart dissent in order to effect political power preponderance (Muchemwa, 2010; Mungwari, 2019; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020). However, as an alternative, despite pockets of arrests and threats across the nation, information flow continued to find vents through citizen journalism and through web-based social media. A series of hashtag movements against state misgovernance continued to pressure the Mugabe administration to concede defeat and relinquish power. Later, this led to the deposing of the long-serving leader Mugabe in the

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November 2017 military intervention and his replacement by the current seating President, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa’s new republic was hailed with a lot of euphoria in anticipation for a new anti-Mugabe governance system, however, barely a year, civilians’ hopes turned into betrayed dreams (Moyo & Mavengano, 2021; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020). The 2018 post-poll skirmishes between the military and the civilians on the 1st of August 2018 saw the cold-blooded murder of six (6) civilians and thirty-five (35) casualties, a bloodthirsty move that virtually repeated itself in early January 2019. This dangerous precedent under Mnangagwa’s new republic was a test of the Zimbabwean state’s tampers when confronted with dissent. In these developments, the Nelson Chamisa-led MDC-Alliance suffered successive machinations from its splinter Douglas Mwonzoraled MDC-T group over the former’s party identity, legitimacy and party estate ownership. Mwonzora and his party were accused by critics working as ZANU-PF’s political stooge to destabilise Chamisa’s party. Apart from property confiscation, a lot of MDC-Alliance membership was recalled thereby creating vacancies which culminated in the 26 March 2022 by-elections plebiscite. At the eve of the 26 March by-elections, the MDC-Alliance party abandoned the name to form the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) party which, in spite of its youthfulness, won most of the urban seats and popularity in the country’s electorate. This triggered a reflex in the ruling party and, thus resulted in a series of violent attacks targeted at opposition supporters. Instances of this are the Kwekwe Mbizo murder a few days before 26 March 2022 and the 2022 kidnapping and mutilation of the CCC female activist Moreblessing Ali in Chitungwiza, among others including protracted incarceration of the CCC party supporters ahead of the impending 2023 harmonised elections.

The Position of Women in Zimbabwean Postcolonial Politics: A Perpetual Deceit During the liberation struggle, both black African women and men who were politically oppressed and suffered racial discrimination, together fought against the white oppressor. Mbuya Nehanda is one of the celebrated Zimbabwean heroine who fought side by side against white domination during the First Chimurenga. This speaks about how Zimbabwean women have been part of the national struggle alongside men. Yet, the prevailing political climate in Zimbabwe today, offers a constricted space

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for women’s participation in the making up of the nation. Zimbabwean women continue to suffer from what Gayatri Spivak (1988) terms ‘double displacement’ as they are pressed between the dictates of patriarchy and national politics. Recently, the efforts by the Zimbabwean government to implement the amended 2013 Constitution on regional gender protocols stated in Part (4) Section 124, a clause which encourages the appointment of other non-constituency female legislators as an attempt to uplift women in political decision making has not been fully done to date (Zimbabwe Constitution Amendment Bill No. 20) (Ngoshi, 2013). The Zimbabwean government is a signatory of various regional and international gender protocols such as the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, the Maputo Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, among many. Despite lip-service advocacy to these gender protocols, the government’s implementation strategies are slow and lack serious commitment. However, despite its perceived incapacitations, the Zimbabwean government has shown some efforts in implementing the SADC gender Protocol as some women representatives have so far been uplifted and encouraged to apply for seniority positions as Permanent Secretaries, Commissioners, Directors and so on in order to achieve the 50/50 gender parity as dictated by Section 120 (2) and 124 (1) (b) of the 2013 Constitution (Ngoshi, 2013). The unprecedented elevation of the first female representative to the position of vice president in 2013 including the four (4) female candidates who competed for the position of presidency in the 2018 harmonised elections provides evidence of the government’s effort in addressing gender issues. To restore the female voice and their self-representation, the government has also showed some commendable strides towards the reduction of discrimination of women in the media and is encouraging women to apply for seniority positions in media houses and train as chief editors, reporters and journalists. However, the Zimbabwean government is recommended to do more towards achieving gender parity as most women continue to suffer misrepresentations and exposure to political violence. The 2020 abductions and torture of female activists; Cecelia Chimbiri, Joanna Mamombe and Netsai Marova by suspected state agents including the harassment, torture and arbitrary incarceration of the novelist Tsitsi Dangarembga and a Zimbabwean female social

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comedian, Samantha Kureya, popularly known as Gonyeti speak about the continuity barbaric human rights violations or a toxic political culture (Moyo & Mavengano, 2021), which, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009), is called Mugabeism. The abduction, murder and mutilation in 2022 of the Chitungwiza Nyatsime female opposition activist Moreblessing Ali and the protracted incarceration of the deceased’s family lawyer, Job Sikhala, who stood to represent her voice is a clear show of the government’s lack of sensitivity towards achieving gender representation and also evident of the survival of Mugabeism after he is long gone.

A Synopsis of Mungoshi’s The Fading Sun (2009) David Mungoshi’s (2009) novel, The Fading Sun was published in 2009. It is a trilogy of an old retired school teacher Mary Maya, an ailing woman in her sixties. She lives with her husband, Cyril in one of the racialised colonial Rhodesian suburban location belonging to the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith. Cyril, whom Mary appropriates the pseudonym Manof-the house or simply Moth is a good-for-nothing wasteful husband who always spends days from home attending expensive parties and playing golf. The couple’s two children Darius and Mary the Third attend school at one of the colonial schools in the location, but both including many young students drop out of school in order to join the war of liberation, a move that most blacks call the result of inspiration by Nehanda, a medium spirit from the Zimbabwean Shona tribe. People become surprised at the courage of young female students like Mary the Third who volunteers to drop out of school and join the war. Before, in her youth, Mary the Third always refuses feminine games and dolls and prefers boys’ games like tree climbing and this gives her an in-built of courage. The following day, the school’s racist white headmaster calls Cyril and Mary to come and take their ‘treacherous’ children’s bags as they have gone beyond the Rhodesian borders to join the ‘terrorist’ war. Mary is afraid about whether her children would return or not as there are reports of people being maimed and mercilessly killed by white soldiers. She prays for the mothers whose children have gone to join the war just like her children. The protagonist fast loses her health as she begins again to think of the safety of her children in the war, the children she gave birth through caesarian section. In her old age, “her skin showed more wrinkles than she cared for and its complexion was going bad….Her complaints if catalogued would read like a litany of medical misfortunes” (p. 47). Mary

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is diagnosed with breast cancer and the removal of her breasts through radical mastectomy opens up to a number of other maladies and her body becomes a living host of a number of maladies. She is aware that “it was she who had the arthritis and she who wore the prosthesis” (p. 48). The doctor’s medical reports on the state of her body always cause her to become even more hopeless as she becomes “locked in a mortal combat with the rotten stench of her dead dream” (p. 66). The doctor would say “We have to do a mastectomy…the complete removal of your breast” (p. 50) and at one time again the doctor discovers that “Mary’s thyroid was not a common one…Hers grew sideways and inwards” (p. 58) vying to close up her airway and she enters a medical thyroidectomy. Apart from the removal of one of her ovaries, the operation of her appendix, amputation of one of her arms, she suffers from the pains of cancer therapy and chemotherapy. The radical mastectomy which necessitates the removal of her breast causes her to wear a prosthesis. She turns sorrowful to be wearing a prosthesis but to reassure her the doctor confides to her “You must understand that mastectomy has become fairly common in twentieth century Africa” (p. 59). Mary is also fast losing her sense of sight and we sympathise with her one day when she mistakes a snake for a green twig. To ease the agony, “she now needed a constant supply of pills” (p. 47) and “she couldn’t sleep either, regardless of all the antibiotics and painkillers” (p. 52). A stream of disturbing questions rush in her mind as she compares her painful present realities with her beautiful past. The two are totally the opposite: “Where had all the Mary in her gone? Mary of the dancing eyes and the radiant smile? Mary of the bobbing breasts and flexible hips? Where had Mary of the cooing voice and magical walk gone? Where had all the Mary in her gone? When would women ever learn? When would they learn that a woman died when she loved a man?” (p. 65). Abandoned by her husband and children, Mary spends her time on the garden chair and in a reverie of reminiscences about her childhood, adolescence and old age as escapism from present psychological and health agonies. Her interior monologue is a mixture of her beautiful and ugly past whose experience shatters her dream as a wife and mother. We get to know through Mary’s psyche that her school days as a school child are spend with the ambition of making her family happy and to fulfil her society’s expectations of a mother and wife. She remembers how her jocular rural and polygamous father Mudhara Bodzo entertains people with his jokes and folktales and how her mother uses to counsel her about life’s expectations and dangers. She also recasts her memories about their

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cross country picnic travels with Cyril and how he often tells her about his father’s loss of one of his legs in the colonial era as a patriot during a car accident. She cannot stand. The thoughts of Moth chiding her about her rural upbringing despite Mary’s assertion that she loves being a black African raised in the tradition and customs of her people. She would retort “Damn it Moth! I am still a lovely African woman, so take me…Moth I am sweeter than your wretched gold and your late Sunday afternoon shower…DAMN YOU…DAMN YOU!” (p. 18). Mary’s present psychological and healthy state is far too much incongruous to her state when she is a beautiful and hopeful adolescent. Her mind wonders to think of how at adolescence her shapely body and breasts use to attract many a male suitor and how finally she yields to Cyril with whom she later has a flamboyant wedding. Similarly, she reminisces that those adolescent years “Aunt Chenai has large bouncy breasts that still have an upward tilt…[a] spectacle of beauty” (p. 45).Their inception matrimonial days are good but turn most painful when Mary turns old age. In her mind she could see Moth gradually distancing himself from her though “she prefers to feel adored and wanted” (p. 21). Moth (Cyril) abandons his family and fails to give moral support to the children despite giving them financial support. She feels betrayed and she begins to question herself, it she “Mary for whom the sun was fading? Was her star fading?” (p. 37). Long after the ceasefire, Mary’s children fail to return and she thinks they perished in the war. Later, after more than two years, Darius who has long gone to war returns with a wife, Raviro and he assumes a position in the newly independent Zimbabwe as a secret police. Mary the Third also returns as an influential advocate of women emancipation. At the denouement of the narrative, Mary dies in Cyril (Moth’s) arms as “she gasped her farewell to the world” (p. 230) only having uttered to Moth, “It’s done.” Mourners come to attend the funeral only to see Moth falling upon his knees, whimpering with his mouth agape.

Analysis The chosen text, The Fading Sun offers a trilogy of the principal female character, Mary’s childhood, middle age and old age which the reader relives through Mary’s interior monologue triggered by the debilitating prejudices dictating her experiences of motherhood and womanhood. Her body turns into a living host of maladies and she succumbs to depressive neurosis which shatters her dreams as a woman and mother. In her old

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age “her vision was fading and so was the life in her” (Mungoshi, 2009, p. 193) and “[n]ow Mary was locked in a mortal combat with the rotten stench of her dead dream” (p. 66). This scenario is exacerbated by her Westernised husband, Cyril’s negligence whom she appropriates the pseudonym Man-of-the-house or Moth into whose hands she finally dies with a smile of perpetual love which invites emotionally charged questions; “when would women ever learn? When would they learn that a woman died when she loved a man?” (p. 65). Women, thus, are depicted as having an undying love though their mortal bodies succumb to death at the hand of their abusive men. Mary becomes increasingly pessimistic because “with each day that passes Mary withdrew more and more into the shell of abstinence forced upon her by Moth’s indifference” (p. 207). The polysemic title, The fading Sun suggests multiple meanings. It is appropriate to argue that the title functions as a striking metaphor, trope and motif of a sad end of the prolonged suffering Mary. Her precarity is a daunting spectacle captured through her body burdened by an avalanche of diseases and her depressed mental status. Her mournable body to use Tsitsi Dangarembga’s title also presents a profound parallel with the mournable conditions in the Zimbabwean national space. It is thus, irrefutable to read the metaphor of ‘the fading sun’ as making reference to both the troubling end of Mary’s life and the debilitating end of Zimbabwe’s status as the ‘Jewel of Africa’ (Mavengano & Marevesa, 2022). The end is painful and this pain is symbolically embodied in Mary.

Metaphorisation and Erotisisation of the Female Body; Symbolic Depiction of the Postcolonial Condition In this analysis, we find a national state drawn in a woman through artistic metaphorisation and erotisisation of the female protagonist’s body and experiences. The sensuality of such description and its capacity to arouse erotic desire is impressionistic as it is likely to stir an upsurge of feelings equal to the feeling of optimism of Zimbabweans during the 1980 independence. In this case, Mary’s body presents a symbolic composition through which to understand the national body politics of the Zimbabwean nation. In an African cultural milieu, the female body is tabooed as sacred, hence its sacrosanctity and prohibitions must be preserved and

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observed by members of her society (Parrinder, 1962). Her reproductive body parts must be properly covered according to the patriarchal society’s expectations of a virtuous woman (Robbins, 2000). The ability of a woman to reproduce just like land necessitates the conception of the land to be “animated by a female principle” bearing gendered terminologies such as ‘motherland’ or ‘Mother Earth’ (Parrinder, 1962, p. 48). In as much as the female body has capacity to receive a male seed during conception and carry a child in her womb, equally well, the land (nation) is able to produce and receive the dead ‘into her pockets’. In The Fading Sun, Mungoshi celebrates the dawn of Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 through the erotisisation of Mary and her aunt, Chenai’s bodies. The female protagonist is depicted as “Mary of the bobbing breasts and flexible hips” (p. 65) with “the soft bid eyes that excited many a man, the curvaceous body and shapely hips, the prominent but unobtrusive backside and the tantalising lips that had stunned many a suitor with their eloquence”. (p. 22)

In this artistic endeavour to stir up sensual feelings, Mungoshi subtly alludes to the bonfire of overwhelming hysterical celebration and optimism by the majority of black people at the birth of independence in 1980 as an unprecedented transition from protracted and stringent colonial rule (Raftopoulos & Savage, 2004). Metaphorically, Mary and Aunt Chenai’s pubertal and maturational changes when their bodies get transmogrified from tender age have the capacity to lure the male gaze are, thus, imaging this as Zimbabwean’s political phases from colonial rule to majority rule in 1980 which triggered bouts of hopes. The newly independent people’s love and attraction towards their newly born nation is metaphorised through Mary who catches a glimpse of “him [Cyril] stealing a glance at her exposed thighs as she raised her knees and rested her elbow” (p. 75). Emphatically, this image is continued through the expression: “Aunt Chenai has large bouncy breasts that still have an upward tilt ” (p. 45) as distinct from Mary’s supple breasts later in her old age. The writer tickles the readers’ mind by making them cast memories of lost heroes and heroines including ex-combatants who contributed to the birth of the 1980 independence. Therefore, this independence that later ensued must be treated with reference as it resulted in many blacks massacred including the maiming of fighters like Cyril’s

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(Moth) father whose leg was amputated following a fatal car accident during the guerrilla war. Through grand extended metaphor, Mungoshi critiques his country’s misgovernance through the artistic description of Mary’s body as a living host of cancer and other maladies. In as much as a disease has the capacity to sicken and kill the human body, country misgovernance through corruption, patronage politics, human rights breaches and committing crime with impunity may lead to national sterility and death. Mary tragically dies in the hands of her negligent husband, Moth. This gesture is accusative on country misgovernance by most father figures. This means that Mungoshi’s deliberate exaggeration of Mary’s pathological attack by cancer and other healthy infirmities as a literary trope points to the collapse of the socio-economic and political conditions of the nation. This unpleasant development also underscores post-independence political deceit by those in the corridors of power. Therefore, Mary’s pathologically colonised body is metonymic of Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political collapse. This becomes clear when Mary fast ages more than Cyril due to an arsenal of healthy problems bedevilling her once “curvaceous body and shapely hips ” (p. 22). Her present health condition is debilitating as metonymic of the socio-economic and political state in the postcolonial Zimbabwe which is in need of redemptive policy formulation and representation. It is quite worrisome that Mary does not recover from her multiple ailment which becomes a dystopian representation of the national problems which appear to have no solution at the moment. The Zimbabwean glorified past which punctuated the eve of the 1980 independence seems to vanish leaving behind grim pessimism in the citizens. This can be instanced by the statement: She now needed a constant supply of pills just to make it through the day. Her skin showed more wrinkles than she cared for and its complexion was going bad. There was now none of the smoothness and clarity of the past. And the migraines! Her complaints if catalogued would read like a litany of medical misfortunes. (p. 47)

Due to overwhelming agony inflicting the protagonist’s body, Mary feels the grave beckoning and “and more often than not, she couldn’t sleep either, regardless of all the antibiotics and painkillers ” (p. 52). Indeed, for

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individualised pursuit and greed, most nations experience socio-economic and political collapse. In as far as medical prescriptions offer remedy to the diseased human body, socio-economic and political crises as a result of misgovernance at the hands of corrupt politicians require informed rehabilitative and restorative blueprints and policies for change development. Epidemiologically, Mary’s skin succumbs to ageing wrinkles and her complexion turns unsightly having lost its original lustre. Mary’s ageing is not accompanied by cumulative wisdom because it is an offshoot of “a litany of medical misfortunes ” and psychological neurosis which translates to post traumatic depressive disorders. This element of causality upon the female body if mapped on the repercussions of misgovernance alludes to national collapse which graduates towards national sterility and death (Mutingwende & Jakaza, 2022). True to this, postcolonial Zimbabwe records rampant cases of human rights abuses, institutionalised violence and corruption which contribute to economic hyperinflation, unemployment, brain drain, poor livelihoods and abject poverty. Four decades after attaining independence, Zimbabwe could by now have matured in democratic principles and practices, that is, the aged wisdom, which is symbolically and metaphorically missing from the national body politics. The country’s polarised political climate is characterised by systematised state-sponsored violence on opposition supporters. Mary’s diseased body is metaphorically characteristic of her nation’s sense of disquiet and instability. The writers’ hyperbolic description of Mary’s loss of her body parts as a result of medical operations requires special emphasis. The dysfunctional of Mary’s essential body parts serves as a striking socio-political trope in the context of Zimbabwean politics. Just like Mary’s body, the significant political organs like the judiciary, the praesidium and the law are all metaphorically disease-infested. As a result, the national health is compromised. Mungoshi’s narrative is overstuffed with tongue-tying medical jargons perhaps to heighten readers’ feelings about the state of affairs of postcolonial Zimbabwe. The ridiculous and percussive statement “appendectomy plus thyroidectomy plus radical mastectomy is equal to emotional masturbation!” (p. 64) is allusive to the fact that an addition of corrupt tendencies by nation leaders point to the downfall of the nation. Interviewed in 2010 by the Journalist and Dramatist, Memory Chirere about his narrative and the unique portrayal of Mary as a cancer-wasted character, Mungoshi emphasised that he had embarked on a thorough research about breast and felt moved to write about it to tell the world.

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The projection of Mary’s pathological condition of her nation evinces that the cancer cells of corruption, institutionalised violence, contested electoral violence and legitimacy challenges are affecting the watershed state. Readers’ pathos is evoked in the following description; It was she who had the arthritis and she who wore the prosthesis. He had his health. She might even need hip replacement surgery. How she hated it when he fondles her serving breast. (p. 48)

The echoic repetition of the ‘she’ third person personal pronoun is a metaphorised referent to the Zimbabwean nation through Mary’s gender identity. The existence of the ‘he’ deixis in the above statement metaphorically points to corrupt politicians who destabilise national development as seen through Moth and his escapades on Mary’s body. Even if Mary has one surviving breast, Moth continues fondling it nonchalantly just like a politician who continues to corrupt an already crumbling nation. The mastectomy operation which results in the removal of one of Mary’s breasts including an operation on one of her ovaries means the virtual closure of Mary’s fertility. She had lost one of her ovaries early in life! Now she was losing the definitive feminine attribute. (p. 50)

Mary’s biological and reproductive body parts are constantly being chipped away piece by piece and replaced by artificial ones through successive medical surgeries. One of her breasts is completely removed including her appendix. This removal of the female body’s lactating part, the breast including the ovary is metaphorised to represent a lack of national productivity or development in as far as the mother’s child survives through colostrum from the mother’s lactation. A woman without breasts or ovary in African traditional culture is often regarded as a lack, an ancestral curse since it points to childlessness which is “one of the greatest curses to an African” (Parrinder, 1962, p. 60). Apart from the removal of the breast, ovary, appendix, arm ambulation; Mary’s sight is also failing to result in her wearing glasses. In a somewhat distorted biblical allusion to the Genesis narrative, Mary’s sight problem is worsened when a snake spits her eyes while in her garden and after mistaking it to be a green stick.

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To Mary’s surprise, the green stick felt cold and slithery and for some strange reason it was twitching…She lifted the stick to examine it and as she did so the furious hissing came loud and clear. Mary felt a spray of venom shoot into her pupils. (p. 194)

The metaphorisation of Mary’s failing sight points to a myopic national vision being gradually blinded by misgovernance. Her eyes which mistake a snake for a lifeless green twig symbolises the Zimbabwean nation’s retrogressive and unimplemented blueprints such as gender policies, for instance. For example, the efforts by the amended 2013 Constitution in implementing the regional gender protocols stated in Part (4) Section 124 which bears the clause that encourages the appointment of other non-constituency female legislators as an attempt to uplift women in political decision making has not been fully implemented to date (Zimbabwe Constitution Amendment Bill No. 20). Mary’s need to remedy the snake’s venomous spittle spurted in her eyes results in her calling her lactating maid and “seized one of the woman’s rounded breasts and short a warm jet of milk into each of her eyes ” (p. 194). The erotisisation of the female body in a woman’s show of free-will gift towards another metaphorically is a clear pointer to the fact that women also contribute in the making up of nations. Proverbially, women have capacity to campaign for their emancipation apart from male feminists’ contribution as seen in two female characters helping each other out. Breast milk represents growth, innocence and purity and the maid’s offer to Mary instead of Moth’s help is equally symbolic of oppressed women’s innocent suffering at the hands of patriarchal society. The need for female involvement in national politics is well illustrated by the masculinisation of some of Mungoshi’s female characters as captured in the following statements: Mary the third had always seemed to prefer boys’ games, wrestling and climbing up trees. She never played with dolls or played at being mother. So Mary the third, and other girls of similar bent, left the country and became girl soldiers. (p. 164)

In this narrative snippet, Mungoshi’s emasculation of Moth as an effeminate and Westernised model who has an insatiable desire for foreign trinkets is artistically compensated by his (the author’s) transgendered masculinisation of female characters like Mary the Third who volunteers

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to join the guerrilla bush war. Child play carries a plethora of signification in the narrative under study. Playing with dolls or playing mother is considered feminine according to gender ascriptions. Mary the Third refuses the dolls in preference to boys’ games such as tree climbing. This upbringing leads to the acquisition of masculine traits in her such as bravery which resulted in her joining the war of liberation and later to her becoming “a top civil servant and an ardent fighter for women’s rights ” (p. 188). The reference to the Shona Spirit Medium in the statement, “we are the bones that Nehanda said would rise up to continue the struggle,” (p. 167) by one of the male guerrillas during the Pungwe meeting points to the feminist gap that calls for the consideration of women in nationalist discourse. Even Aunt Chenai brags that her “beads lull her husband to sleep. When he fondles them with his hands, their feminine percussios touches his eyelids and makes them droop with heavy honey-sprinkled sleep” (p. 44). The beads stand as revolutionary charms used to emasculate oppressive husbands who instead of breasts fondles beads and dozes off. The rampant nature of national misgovernance across Africa is qualified by the doctor’s statement to Mary in both the pre-operative and postoperative counselling sessions: You must understand that a mastectomy has become fairly common in the twentieth century Africa. (p. 59)

The queer national set up requires collective bargaining, rehabilitative and operative nationalist strategies to heal the nation and this is depicted by the medical doctor declaring to Mary that her thyroid was “not the common one that made the patient’s neck swell and balloon in an unsightly way. Hers grew sideways and inwards ” and “two weeks later she had the thyroidectomy” (p. 58). The position of the swelling in the thyroid vies to close Mary’s respiratory tract and this possibly would kill her. This stands as a metaphorisation of the urgency in which the Zimbabwean socio-economic and political condition is in. The present Zimbabwean socio-economic and political scenario begs critical questions if compared with the state of the nation at the 1980 independence. Mungoshi bemoans a country brought to its knees due to misrule and greed. This comparison has been artistically achieved through collating of Mary’s adolescence and old age in which the two age groups run incongruous. The series of crises in postcolonial Zimbabwe trigger an in-rush of questions about the grim socio-economic and political state

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of affairs obtaining in the country as reproduced through Mary’s loss of feminine attractiveness, here metaphorised: Where had all the Mary in her gone? Mary of the dancing eyes and radiant smile? Mary of the bobbing breasts and flexible hips? Where had Mary of the cooing voice and magical walk gone? When would women ever learn? When would they learn that a woman died when she loved a man? (p. 65)

Moth’s act of deflowering Mary’s purity and her subsequent maladies point to a corrupted nation state system. His negligence of Mary is symptomatic of the nonchalance of nationalist leaders in running the Zimbabwean nation which contributes to graduation towards national sterility and death. This is qualified by the fact that he becomes alienated from Mary and his matrimonial home just to spend huge sums of money playing golf and falling in love with foreign trinkets.

Conclusion Literary writing is undergoing imperceptible change with traditional forms of creativity and criticism being gradually exfoliated and shed away. The metaphorisation of the female body in male feminist fictional works to represent national politics has become one of the less politically incorrect, inchoative and aesthetically informed gender and political satires. As has been shown, most standpoint feminists have criticised the metaphorisation of the female body as tampering with its inherent taboos and they label it as an act of underwriting and de-sexualising the female body’s worth. In spite of this criticism, this chapter has shown that the signification of national politics through the female body draws attention to readers and critics and this offers avenues for multi-layered series of metaphors which Michie (1987) calls ‘metatrope’ in order to comprehend national politics through the female body. Therefore, this chapter has reflected and re-written Zimbabwe’s postcolonial condition from a gendered perspective by re-scripting women’s conceived fragilities or vulnerabilities into a representational creative force. Therefore, the artistic construction of a female character especially by male feminists such as David Mungoshi is not in any way an infringement into the women’s bodies and their representation, but such feminist portrayal is a satiric and caustic irony of the need for a fair gender representation and inclusion of more women in the making up of nations. It has

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been metaphorised that artistic creation of female vulnerabilities and prejudices in a literary work is a liberative attempt by male feminists to include more women representatives in country politics. Equally well, the administration of rehabilitative services or acceptable treatment on the female body is a signification of the need by policy makers to implement effective blueprints that heal an ‘ailing’ nation. The co-habitation of feminism and national politics has been shown to be double-pronged; to attempt to address female misrepresentations and to garnish the socio-economic and political state of affairs obtaining in the Zimbabwean nation as means to bring restorative strategies through informed research. It is appropriate to argue that critics and researchers could gain new interpretive insights by acknowledging newer approaches such as stylistics. Apparently the national politics is undergoing transition and new methods of critical inquiry and creativity also need to be used in order to bring forth informed novel reflections on gender and political realities unfolding in an evolving context. It is a recommendation to future literary critics to acknowledge the insights of the stylistics framework in re-reading literary works as it yields refreshing avenues that suggest new meanings. The examined novel provides important stylistic and semantic clues that are essential for reading and understanding the interrelatedness of gender construction and national politics in contemporary Zimbabwe. The metaphor of the disease-risen female body as discussed above, symbolically reflects on the postcolonial failures that are mainly generated from the political domain. The pitiable body serves to underscore the precarious conditions of the ordinary people in postcolonial Zimbabwe. This depiction further illuminates postcolonial paradoxes and deceit of the masses. This is an ‘ailing condition’ that is figuratively portrayed by the novelist in The Fading Sun.

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CHAPTER 12

Politics of Deceit: Dynamics of Political Jingles in Postcolonial Zimbabwe Vimbai M. Matiza

Introduction Music and politics have always been interwoven since arguable, the beginning of human settlements. Songs were used to give guerrillas hope to win the liberation struggle (Matiza & Mutasa, 2020) and help to chart the way forward for the people who were liberating the country. As such, the connection between music and politics particularly in political expressions is evident in various cultures since music influences a nation’s political environment (Allen, 2004). Music can be used to legitimise or enforce the status quo as seen in the jingles by Mbare Chimurenga Choir during Mugabe era and Chief Hwenje in the ‘new dispensation’. Even though in Zimbabwe jingles only got popular during the Second Chimurenga, elsewhere particularly in the United States of America, political jingles had

V. M. Matiza (B) Department of Languages, Literature and Cultural, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_13

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existed from as early as the eighteenth century (Manyawu, 2013). In the case of America, Zelicof (2012, p. 34) argues that: In times of triumph and times of tribulation, music served as a powerful tool to inspire the American masses throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Music bolstered awareness about various economic and security issues, and celebrated American political and military victories.

In the same vein, various political parties in sub-Saharan Africa enjoy the use of songs and jingles to cement their political rule. ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe is not an exceptional in this. Jingles, however only became commonplace in the early twentieth century after the invention of the radio. The manifestation of political jingles thrived in the twentieth century due to the increase in the use of electronic media. Jingles in general were first used in the advertising industry, on which the use of political jingles was later modelled (Fallon, 2012). By way of definition jingles are referred to as a short song or tune used in advertising and other commercial uses. Jingles are more of sound branding and usually use advertising slogans. Political jingles are generally a top-down communication strategy which is used to promote political parties and their election candidates. This means that whatever is communicated in the jingles, is a brain child of the leadership in the party, thus their ideologies are cascaded down to the general public through these jingles. As seen in the jingles during Mugabe era, their main aim was to emphasise and campaign that Mugabe is in office or should be in office. For example, MuZimbabwe tererai tauya sure, tauya kuzosimudzira nyika yatakatora isu neusiku. Tozviziva VaMugabe vari kutonga… (Listen, in Zimbabwe we have come to develop the country that we have won through war. We know Mr Mugabe is in power). The same applies to the popular ED Pfee (ED is in) in the ‘new dispensation’. The effectiveness of political jingles is due largely to the fact that they are usually based on very popular simple songs derived from the folklore of the target audience. For instance, ZANU-PF jingles often draw from the popular revolutionary songs from the highly mythologized (Manyawu, 2013, 2014) Second Chimurenga with whose values many Zimbabweans of different political orientations readily identify. The familiarisation of political jingles in Zimbabwe became popular between 2000–2005 through the then Minister of Information, Jonathan Moyo who created a strategy after most Zimbabwean musicians were criticising

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the policies of ZANU-PF. To this effect, Sibanda (2004, p. 378) points out that: For the ruling ZANU-PF government, there was only one way out of the mess: revisit its publicity strategy during the liberation war of the 1970s when it used to record and broadcast music to promote its policies and keep the morale of the people high. The government’s strategy was first to blacklist songs that were against its policies and all those that talked about human rights abuse, corruption and the abuse of power by the establishment. These were to be ‘banned’ from the airwaves so as to pave way for those songs that preached the ‘true gospel’.

This clearly shows that the jingles during the Mugabe era were sung to emphasise the sole leader of the ZANU-PF party and also to celebrate the perceived success of land reform programme, thus rejoicing its policies. On the other hand, Chief Hwenje is preaching the other strategy and key policy of the ZANU-PF party in the ‘new dispensation’ through the jingle, Musangano wakasimba kumaSero (The party is strong at the cell level). It is crucial to note that many ZANU-PF political jingles came into play after the controversial Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) to convince and give people a sense of empowerment and hope that things are going to be well in Zimbabwe with the leadership of ZANU-PF. Even as the jingles are sung in the ‘new dispensation’ the ideology of the party remains the same; it strives to restore people’s hope in the party and its leadership especially after the fall of Mugabe. In light of that, this chapter seeks to interrogate music in form of jingles by Mbare Chimurenga Choir and Chief Hwenje in praise of their leaders to debate the deceitful nature of politics in postcolonial Zimbabwe.

Representation Frames in ZANU-PF Political Jingles Representation refers to the construction in any medium (especially the mass media) of an aspect of ‘reality.’ Such representations may be in speech or writing as well as still or moving pictures. The term refers not only to the process involved in construction, but also to the product and its reception by the audience. Representation is an attempt to interpret reality in order to make sense and meaning. Therefore, it is not necessarily a reflection of reality (Hall, 1997). In representation, the term

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‘reality’ is problematic. It is difficult to give an account of what is actually real because reality can be socially constructed through texts (images, photographs, illustrations, words, etc.) in language leading to different kinds of meaning (Ogenga, 2010). Reality is always represented, what we treat as direct experience is mediated by perceptual codes (Ferguson, 1998; Manning, 2001). There is potential for different kinds of meaning in media representation due to the polysemic nature of media texts. Every media form is a representation of someone’s concept of existence using a coded language that can be read by an audience. That is why when analysing jingles by Mbare Chimurenga Choir, they bring out different frames about Mugabe as a leader and Chief Hwenje’s jingles also speak high of Mnangagwa in terms of economic building, thus, cementing the idea that every media representation creates a different construction. In the case of ZANU-PF political jingles, the lyrics that are in the songs manifest an ideology set by the ruling party at a particular point in time. The media do not operate in a social vacuum but are part of the society and exist within a certain culture which cannot be divorced from the political and economic realities in that general public. Hall (1997) argues that representation does not entail a straight forward presentation of the world and the relationship in it. For Hall (1997), representation is not similar to reflection but is a deliberate attempt to make things mean through framing them rather than the transmission of a pre-existing meaning (Briggs & Cobley, 2002). All media texts (including news) are representations of reality, meaning that they are intentionally constructed and targeted to specific targets. They are entirely artificial versions of what is perceived as real, which is why they are sometimes called (mis)representations. However, the media broadens our perception of reality without which our perceptions will be very limited. Therefore, the media play a critical role in helping individuals come to terms with what they would want to consider real.

Research Methodology Data was qualitatively collected through content analysis of some selected political jingles from Mbare Chimurenga Choir and Chief Hwenje. The choice of the methodology is based on Denzin and Lincoln (2005)’s definition that qualitative research aims to gather comprehensive understanding of human behaviours and the resources that govern it. Thus, trying to understand how people of the same political party portray

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elements of pretence in their jingles is a noble cause. This visibly highlights that qualitative researchers study cases in an effort to make sense of or strive to interpret occurrences according to implications people afford them in their natural settings. More so, the choice of the research paradigm is necessitated by Creswell (2003, p. 35) who argues that a qualitative study is, ‘an inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem, based on building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants and conducted in a natural setting’ which is contrary to quantitative research. Content analysis of the selected political jingles of Mbare Chimurenga Choir during Mugabe’s time and Chief Hwenje in the ‘new dispensation’ is used in the study. The choice of the two historical epochs is necessitated by the fact that the same political party portrays elements of deceit where different loyalists to different leaderships of the same party create different jingles in praise of their leaders. This is a clear indication that the leadership is not genuine as they are the ones who are behind the ideologies that are sung by the musicians. Even though the ideology of the party to a large extent remains the same, hero worshipping which is a result of a culture of deceit cannot be overlooked.

Politics and Political jingles The chapter examines the dynamics of frames that come out of the political jingles that are sung by Mbare Chimurenga Choir during Mugabe era and Chief Hwenje in the ‘Second Republic’. It strives to show that each leader has his ideologies that are constructed and packaged in different manners by different musicians. The argument in the chapter is that ZANU-PF remains a revolutionary party which so far has been led by two leaders in post-independence Zimbabwe. In the ‘First Republic’, the ideology of the party was centred on celebrating the perceived success of the land reform programme. The same rhetoric cannot hold water anymore hence the change in the philosophy, that is, Nyika inovakwa nevene vayo (A country is developed by its citizens). This, therefore, brings out the importance and relationship between politics and political jingles. It illuminates how conceptions and constructions of power, patronage, memory, identity, entitlement and deceit expressed in song participate in framing legitimacy in the aftermath of a military-assisted hostile political transition.

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Manyawu (2014) examines texts of ZANU-PF songs from the liberation war and the FTLRP of the early 2000s. He uses the critical discourse analysis concept of identity to frame his textual analysis of the songs he examines. Manyawu notes that ever since Zimbabwe’s liberation war, ZANU-PF has used a song to develop its group identity. He further posits that, during the liberation war, choirs related to the party’s military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), sang in support of the party’s war effort. In that regard, ZANU-PF qualifies to be the party which liberated the country (Chimurenga). As such, most of their jingles are centred on emphasising and reminding people of their role in liberating the country hence their claim to an uninterrupted mandate to rule the country. While in Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF party continues to maximise the use of jingles during elections to garner support from the public, Zelicof (2012) notes the decline of the use of jingles in the United States of America. He notes that the Americans now only make use of background music for a prospective candidate’s live or recorded public appearance. Zelicof (2012) also takes note of the changes brought about by new media to facilitate presidential campaigns. This means that Presidential candidates can compose or select musical pieces associated with them and facilitate interaction between themselves and their fans. This is unlike the situation in postcolonial Zimbabwe. During campaign periods mostly praise singers who hero-worship their leaders compose songs in campaigning for their leaders. As such, postcolonial Zimbabwe has been led by ZANU-PF governments with two different executive presidents since 1980. More so, Sibanda (2004, p. 385), commenting on the use of political jingles and songs before independence argues that; Music, thus became central to its (ZANU-PF) war strategy. Indeed, even after black independence in 1980, a number of ZANU-PF choirs throughout the country continued to sing and record political songs. But with relative peace in the country and competition from secular musicians, most of these choirs gradually disappeared.

This means that music or jingles respond to the time in which these songs are created. Relating to Sibanda’s observation that most of the choirs which were there from 1980 disappeared means that they are different loyalists to different leadership. The bottom line being that they

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sing for the same party. Furthermore, Ndou (2012) sees ZANU-PF’s use of television jingles as part of its strategy to indoctrinate Zimbabwean youths. She avers that ZANU-PF uses the state-owned media to ‘reconstruct and reinvent Zimbabwean national identity as part of a strategy in the contestation, usurpation and closure of narrative space’ p. 34. She also notes that the use of newspaper articles by intellectuals such as Tafataona Mahoso, school textbooks and the media to package and distribute ZANU-PF ideology and hegemony entails rewriting history to get support from the target audience of the jingles. This therefore means that with two different praise singers for two different leaders, the ideology and hegemony entrenched in the jingles is determined by the leader themselves. For the two groups under study, Mbare Chimurenga Choir celebrated the land reform programme while Chief Hwenje laments the way Mnangagwa was embarrassed by the Mugabe government and then goes on to celebrate his successes in the ‘new dispensation’. Thus, the chapter is bent on illustrating how the ideologies of the party are constructed by a certain leader, thereby bringing out politics of deceit among the leaders as it is manifested by the jingles. Munhuweyi (2022) reconnoitres the way the ‘Second Republic’ embraced music as a form of hero-worship when the coup that disposed Mugabe was staged. Mnangagwa was praised in one of Jah Prayzah (Mukudzei Mukombe)’s songs, ‘Kutonga kwaro’ which partly goes ‘rasvika gamba, kutonga kwaro…gamba ramakajaira’ (the hero has arrived, that’s the way the hero rules…the hero you are used to.) This song was sung celebrating the rise of Mnangagwa and the fall of Mugabe and yet the two leaders were in the same government for almost four decades. The latter is trying to portray himself as a better leader which is a clear manifestation of politics of dishonesty in postcolonial Zimbabwe. The song’s composer was rewarded with much honour, and was even invited to perform in the presence of the then-designated President Mnangagwa. Therefore, music has always been a potent force in reflecting and influencing non-musical events in Africa and Zimbabwe in particular. The chapter consequently interrogates Mbare Chimurenga Choir’s selected jingles which were mainly sung in praise of Mugabe and Chief Hwenje’s which are sung in praise of President Mnangagwa. Additionally, Ngoshi and Mutekwa (2013) explore the way political jingles have been used as instruments to sustain the ZANU-PF government after independence. They examine Mbare Chimurenga Choir’s

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jingle, ‘Nyatsoteerea’ (Listen carefully). Focusing on the visual dimension of the television version of the jingle, their major concern is to assess the way the female body is objectified and used as a metaphor. Different from their scope, the current chapter is using the same song to interrogate and compare the deceitful character of the jingle as compared to those sung by Chief Hwenje in the ‘Second Republic’. The above authors note that political jingles as a genre emerged in Zimbabwe, the then Rhodesia, during the colonial times. They further aver that ZANU-PF in particular used political jingles to persuade the black people of Zimbabwe to support its nationalist cause. In support of this view, the authorities mention the contribution of Dick Chingaira (Chinx) and Thomas Mapfumo as singers in the colonial period who helped to unite the masses during the liberation struggle. Guzura and Ndimande (2015) carried out a critical analysis of music, political space and power in Zimbabwe. They argue that music and politics have a dialectical relationship which suggests that there is the ideological slant to music within society. This means that any music that is played in society has a message that it carries for the society. In support of the same view, Gramsci (1976) and Althusser (1971) declare that it is clear that music like any art form has an ideological use and is used mainly to support the status quo. Music serves to transmit ideas and that in itself makes it susceptible to being a tool for producing ideology and transmitting it to the populace. In a nutshell, music is not purely for entertainment, it has the ideological as well as political undertones either supporting the status quo or challenging it. One may submit that music serves to create political cohesion, support for the state, support for the ruling party, its ideology and version of reality, to garner support for its policies and to sway public opinion in order to ensure regime security (see also Gramsci, 1976).

Politics of Deceit in ZANU-PF Political Jingles Political jingles have always been the backbone of ZANU-PF from the struggle for independence, the likes of Maruza imi among others. The party used these jingles to give the masses direction and to charter out what they called and still label gwara remusangano (how the party should be run) in order to make people remain focused and know the expectations of the movement. In the same vein, after independence political jingles remained one of the forms of communication that the party would

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use among its supporters to persevere and exalting land reform. Jonathan Moyo, the then Minister of Information used to emphasise the issue of local content and it was during this time that the national radio would always be heard playing and promoting these political jingles. Tendi (2010, pp. 4–5) writes ‘catchy music jingles’ and albums, the majority of which was composed by the then Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, reworking liberation war songs and celebrating ZANU-PF’s role in liberation history, were aired on state-run national radio and stations hourly. Mazango (2005, p. 18) concurs with Tendi as he argues that extensive use of jingles was ‘…a central part of the patriotic history project…’ Jingles which were aired on air include ‘Kuri Kwedu Machembere, Sisonke, Our future, Siyalima, Mombe Mbiri Nemadhongi Mashanu, Uya Uone Kutapira Kunoita Kurima, Rambai Makashinga, Sendekera Mwana Wevhu’ which all addressed the issue of land and its redistribution (Sibanda, 2004). One observes that these jingles carried both an overt and covert message that ideologically expressed support for land reform which was the centre piece of ZANU-PF’s election campaign and selling point. It should be noted that whenever there is going to be an election in Zimbabwe, these political jingles take the centre stage in selling out the ZANU-PF party’s political manifesto through songs and at the same time praising the nominated leader to run the presidential race. This is the case with the Mbare Chimurenga Choir during Mugabe’s time and Chief Hwenje in the ‘new dispensation’. As Mnangagwa replaced Mugabe in both ZANU-PF and government, the ZANU-PF song entered a new phase in which it has emerged that its themes and priorities are still as anticipated as before. For example, in the ‘First Republic’ the issue of land was key in their manifestos and the same rhetoric is being used again in the ‘Second Republic’ through the pfumvudza/intwasa Presidential scheme. It is because of the predictable nature of the songs that the same old story is being preached and that manifests dishonesty among the politicians who tend to be after hero worshipping for their own gain. In this new phase, Mnangagwa replaced Mugabe as the subject of adoration in the ZANU-PF song. Yet Mnangagwa’s replacement of Mugabe in the ZANU-PF song could only be comprehensive if the voices that sang Mugabe’s praises were also substituted. With Mnangagwa’s rise to the helm of ZANU-PF and government, most artists and groups that were synonymous with the ZANU-PF song prior to Mugabe’s ouster found themselves archaic in the face of a new party leader whose ascendance they

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had not contemplated in their fixation with imagining Mugabe’s power as divine and eternal. As Hwenje replaced these artists and groups he also became the face of the ZANU-PF song in the ‘Second Republic’/‘New Dispensation’ Zimbabwe. With songs such as ‘Mnangagwa’, ‘Gandanga’ (Freedom Fighter) and ‘Pamangopinda’ (When you just entered) which stand out in large composition of songs in praise of Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF, Hwenje entrenched himself as the leading ZANU-PF song artist in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. His commitment towards ZANU-PF’s power retention priorities connects him to predecessors such as Mbare Chimurenga Choir, but it is his sense of obligation towards Mnangagwa’s presidency that sets him apart. Prior to the coup that deposed Mugabe, Hwenje concentrated on Christian and African spiritual/religious songs with occasional interests in the social. Mugabe’s ideology was centred on the land reform programme and was glorified along those lines while Mnangagwa is running away with ‘Nyika inotongwa igovakwa nevene vayo’ (A country is ruled and developed by its people) mantra, emphasising economic development. The manifestation of betrayal in politics of postcolonial Zimbabwe begins with these changes in ideologies by the leaders. It sounds as if they have changed the direction to take in terms of economic development but the truth is ‘Nyika inovakwa nevene vayo’ comes from the indigenization policy which came into place during Mugabe’s time. This is the policy that is used to cement that local people should be beneficiaries of their resources, land included, hence the rhetoric mantra in the ‘new dispensation’. The land reform frame might sounds to be outdated and praises are now constructed along becoming an upper middle economy by 2030. Mbare Chimurenga Choir’s jingles Nyatsoteerera, (Listen carefully) Muri musoja (You are a soldier) and Ndimi mega (You are the only one) among others were mostly composed during Mugabe’s tenure and the ideology of the jingles were guided by the experiences of the time thus, this type of representation manifests someone’s concept of existence using these jingles. In other words, the chapter argues that, the way Mugabe is represented in the jingles sung by Mbare Chimurenga Choir may be the same way that Mnangagwa is framed by Chief Hwenje. The only difference comes on the time these were constructed, as their composition also is determined by the environment in which they are created (Briggs & Cobley, 2002). As has been pointed out already, most political jingles are composed when the country is nearing an election. This is done as a way of

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reminding people why they have to vote for a particular party or emphasising on their candidates. For example, nearing the 2013 elections, the Mbare Chimurenga Choir composed a song in an analogue of a football match, matching the ZANU-PF campaign message “Bhora Mugedhi” (Ball in the Gate). The Mbare Chimurenga Choir song goes: Team team ndikustere team Haa ndikusetere team Pekutanga panga pana vaMugabe Pechipiri panga pana Mujuru Pechitatu panga pana vaNkomo Chimbotongai makadaro

(Team team, should I set a team? Haa set a team In the first place we have VaMugabe In the second place was Mujuru In the third position we have Nkomo Stay put for the time being).

In the song ‘Team’, which singles out the aforementioned ZANUPF leadership trio as the team at the helm of Zimbabwe’s leadership, and exhorts them: ‘Chimbotongai makadaro’ (You can rule like that for now). The visuals accompanying the song exploit the iconography of the Zimbabwean national football team—an iconography which invests the three leaders referred to in the song with the vitality, energy and youthfulness associated with soccer players. The setup of the song is to remind the electorate that no one is above VaMugabe. On the same note, Chief Hwenje upon nearing 2018 election has also composed the song in the same manner, giving a line-up of the leaders in their order. In the song ED Pfee, the praise singer is telling the electorate that Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa (ED) is the sole candidate for ZANU-PF presidency. Even to date the song is being used as the 2023 elections are around the corner. Tatambira shoko raVaChiwenga, baba Mohadi, Matemadanda ED Pfee machinda, munhu wese ED Pfee gore rino (We have received a word from VaChiwenga, father Mohadi, Matemadanda ED in power my men, everyone ED in power this year)

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The two songs are campaigning songs for ZANU-PF party for the periods 2013 and 2018 respectively. The mentioning of names to say on first position is VaMugabe, second this and third that is a sign of mistrust among the party members themselves. Mentioning of people with their positions and ultimately ‘Chimbotongai makadaro’ shows that they are other interested parties that are seen in the party who are pretending to be rallying behind the leadership of the party and yet they also want the positions. That is why issues of factionalism and allegiances are common in postcolonial politics. The same idea is also prevalent in the latter song by Chief Hwenje. The song also brings out some elements of mistrust and sarcasm in the way it is created. When the ‘Second Republic’ came into power, many perceived that Chiwenga and Mnangagwa were at loggerheads with regard to party leadership. The composition of the song therefore, suggests that it is Chiwenga himself who is advocating for Mnangagwa to rule thereby rending him powerless in his ‘ambition’. To make matters worse, the deceitful nature of these songs is manifested by the fact that when Mugabe was being campaigned for and put in the first position in the song Team, Mnangagwa was part of his government and now singing the song Ed Pfee shows that the position has been long awaited for. The rise of Mnangagwa to the helm has been necessitated by the army generals who declared that they were restoring the legacy of the party which had been captured by criminals around the President in the ZANUPF party. This means that, the fall of Mugabe was more of a planned thing especially to those who were on the side of team Lacoste (ZANUPF faction which was on Mnangagwa’s side). With Mnangagwa getting into power, that means the modus operandi changed from the praesidium to various posts within the government and the party. This did not spare even the musicians who used to sing for the party. In this regard, Chief Hwenje had a song to sing in praise of the new leader. The song goes; Mwana waMaromo uyo Shonhai, Mudiwa naMakwevho Wasimudza zita Wasimudza musha Mwana wenyu wadadisa musango Madhibha muka Uwone zvaita mwana Kuyambuka Runde Mapanzure muka

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Uone zvaita mwana Mwana wenyu wadadisa musango Mwana wenyu waunza mufaro mumusha Tiise maoko kuna Mambo Mapanzure NaSabhuku Madhibha (Behold the son of Maromo Shonhai, Mudiwa and Makwevho He has raised the family name high He has brought honour to the family Your child has scored a major victory Rise Madhibha See what your child has accomplished Crossing Runde River Rise Mapanzure So you can witness what your son has accomplished Your son has scored a major victory Your child has brought joy to the village And Headman Madhibha)

The composition is a long eulogy of the President thanking his ancestors for being with him through his journey to the presidency. The singer begins by acknowledging the ancestors for making it possible for him to be where he is. Reference to Maromo, Shonhai, Mudiwa naMaketo brings out the concept of African traditional religion where the ancestors are responsible for one’s success, hence their acknowledgement. The song goes on to say, Wasimudza zita // Wasimudza musha // Mwana wenyu wadadisa musango. These lyrics are presenting a scenario where the President had done so much to be where he is and yet most of the things were done by other while he was seeking refuge elsewhere. Praise is rendered where it is not due, a clear sign of political aggrandisement. The following day the same people who were scolding him as ‘mukorokoza’ before Mugabe’s meet the people rallies were the ones who were celebrating his ascension to power. This brings out a sign of pretence among politicians themselves, a clear demonstration of political glorification in postcolonial Zimbabwe where people are bent on hero worshipping someone to be given positions in the party. On the other hand, Mbare Chimurenga Choir has a song, Makorokoto matenderwa, (Congratulations, you have been allowed to rule) celebrating Mugabe’s victory in 2013 harmonised elections. The song goes like:

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Baba Mugabe makorokoto matenderewa makorokoto Makorokoto matenderwa makorokoto Mwana waBona makorokoto matenderwa makorokoto Makorokoto matenderwa makorokoto

(President Mugabe congratulations you gave been allowed to rule Congratulations you have been allowed congratulations Congratulations to Bona’s son, you have been allowed to rule Congratulations you have been allowed congratulations)

In the same vein, the way Mnangagwa is being praised in the preceding song above is the same way Mugabe is praised here. Mugabe came out to be a victor in the elections and to show support and celebrate his accomplishment, the song was composed. The only difference with Mnangagwa’s song is that Mbare Chimurenga Choir is acknowledging that it is the people who have voted him into power as seen in the lyrics, Makorokoto matenderwa makorokoto, (Congratulations, you have been allowed to rule). A clear sign that people may allow one into power or otherwise. The most interesting thing to note here is that the way the two leaders are framed in these songs is determined by the time and their ideology too. Furthermore, the same people who could sing praises for Mugabe could not come out into the open to sing for Mnangagwa but still in support of the same party, thus bringing out politics of pretence in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Reference to Mugabe as Mwana waBona is also seen in the song as a way of acknowledging the maternal spirits behind Mugabe’s rise just like what Chief Hwenje did by making reference to Mnangagwa’s ancestral lineage in the above song. Furthermore, the spirit of political aggrandizement and the battle for the hearts and minds continued to manifest in political jingles of the two groups under discussion. The Mbare Chimurenga Choir sang a song entitled ‘Nyatsoteerera’ (Listen attentively) shows that Bob (Robert Mugabe) is the one in office and the only one who can rule Zimbabwe. Nyatsoterera unzwe kutonga, haa muhofisi munaBobo nyatsotereera…

(Listen attentively, haa Bobo is in power listen).

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Women in the song wearing ZANU (PF) regalia with Mugabe’s face dance to the song showing their excitement and acceptance of the accomplishments of the then President. A group calling itself VaMugabe Chete Crew also emerged on the scene, the group’s name bears testament to where their allegiance lay and their jingle ‘Gushungo’ is in praise of Mugabe. The jingle eulogises Mugabe declaring that he is the best ever thing to ever happen to Zimbabwe. It goes on to suggest that those who do not follow him will suffer in perpetual poverty as the country’s prosperity is due to Mugabe leadership. Gushungo makaoma, aiwaiwa Gushingo muri vahombe Vachasara vachichema isu taenda kunovhota Vachasara vachichema isu taend nengoda Vachasara vachichema isu taenda nehupfumi Vachasara vachichema isu taenda neIvhu Vachasara vachichema, isu taenda nedzidzo Gushungo you are excellent, oh Gushungo you are wonderful

(We will leave them crying whilst we will go to vote We will leave them crying whilst we take diamonds We will leave them crying whilst we will be rich We will leave them crying whilst we take land We will leave them crying whilst we are educated)

One cannot help but notice the relevance of both Chomsky (2002) and Althusser (1971) as the media serves the interests of the elite and their desire to hold on to power at all cost. One also uncovers the politics of deception and benefaction as Mugabe is seen as the source of all good things and happiness. The representation of Mugabe as the hero behind the land reform in Zimbabwe is witnessed in most jingles that were composed during his time. In that regard, his (mis)representations were guided by the environment in which he was a leader. With the emergence of the ‘new dispensation’, the frames of representations have changed. Mnangagwa is represented differently in line with the politics of the time. While Mugabe was seen as the ultimate in economic development through the land reform, Chiadzwa diamonds among other issues as manifested in the song above, Mnangagwa is seen as the same through the new philosophy that the ruling party (ZANU-PF) crafted, Nyika inovakwa igotongwa nevene

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vayo, (A country is ruled and developed by its own people). Upon getting into office, Chief Hwenje has the song; Vakuru verunyararo Shasha dzerunyararo Vanogona kufambisa basa zvinhu zvimuke Ona kufara kwoita Gandanga shuwa kufara Ona raunza mufaro Gandanga shuwa mufaro Ona kufara kwoita vamwe Tarira shuwa mufaro Kwatabva kure Mambo Kwotoenda pava pedyo Chirega kuchema iwe Hwenje tifambe New dispensation warrior Chikara cherunyararo Anovhura mabasa Anopa mufaro

(He is the pacesetter at making peace Nobody matches him at peacemaking He is full of initiative, and things will change Behold the joy that he has engendered Joy courtesy of the freedom fighter The freedom fighter has ushered in joy Real joy courtesy of the freedom fighter Look at the joy that he has occasioned Behold real joy indeed We have come a long way my Lord Our destination is now within reach Cry no more Hwenje as we move forward He is the new dispensation warrior The beast that is synonymous with peace He makes jobs available And brings job)

In the same way that Mbare Chimurenga Choir portrayed Mugabe in their eulogies, Hwenje portrays Zimbabweans as a people who have been in bondage for too long Kwatabva kure Mambo and Mnangagwa

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as the antidote. He celebrates Mnangagwa and his colleagues as peacemakers (vakuru verunyararo/shasha dzerunyararo) and as leaders who are competent at initiating development projects (vanogona kufambisa basa) and seeing them to fruition (kwotoenda pava pedyo). The irony of the matter here is that the same leaders that Mnangagwa coopted are the same including himself as part of Mugabe’s colleague are seen as the best, thus portraying the nature of politics in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Postcolonial leadership is bent on fault finding while exalting the ‘same’ old narratives that are being presented in a different way. The song ‘MuZimbabwe’ talks of how ‘VaMugabe vari kutonga’ (Mugabe is in power) and ‘Tauya kuzosimudzira nyika yatakatora tose nehusiku’ (We have come/are here to develop the nation we fought for even in the darkness of night). The implication is that no one can speak of empowerment or development outside the framework of Zimbabwe’s nationalist struggles. The song goes; MuZimbabwe, tererai, tauya, tauya sure, Tauya kuzosimudzira nyika yaatakatora isu neusiku. Toita sei? Kubatana pamwe chete, toita sei, kubatana pamwe chete Zanu-PF takabatana. Munozviziva VaMugabe vari kutonga,

(In Zimbabwe listen, we have come, coming for sure. We have come to develop the nation we fought for even in the dark What do we do? Be united What do we do? Be united ZANU-PF we are united You know President Mugabe is ruling)

This is a clear manifestation of the deceitful nature of postcolonial politics in Zimbabwe. The same people who cemented and celebrated Mugabe’s rule claiming that ZANU-PF is ‘united’ were behind the downfall of the iconic leader and turned to support the President who rose to power through a coup. In this case ZANU-PF is referring to other party members and politicians who did not even change even after the fall away of Mugabe, they remained and are still there, thereby showing the nature of politics in Zimbabwe. A matter of appealing for political favour while misrepresenting issues. While Mugabe was referred to as ‘Ndimi mega

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Baba muri mukuru mukuru mukuru’ (you are the only President, you are uttermost), in the song Ndimi mega, Mnangagwa is being referred to as the overall again in the song Pamangopinda, which is a clear manifestation of deceitfulness through the jingles.

Conclusion The chapter is an exegesis of the jingles that were sung during Mugabe and the ‘Second Republic’ eras. The chapter demonstrates that the same narrative that was sung during the time of Robert Mugabe is the same that is being sung in the second republic. The difference is the praise singers only as they are cementing the Shona proverb ‘Ushe unokudzwa nevekwako’ (being a leader is supported by your own kinsmen). Mbare Chimurenga Choir praised Mugabe during his time bringing out the land reform frames as part of his achievements in the jingles. On the other hand, Chief Hwenje did the same with Mnangagwa and preaching a different ideology which suit the time. Equally important from the analysis is the fact that these narratives are the same and the way they are done are bringing out politics of pretence as the same ZANU-PF which glorified Mugabe is the same which is glorifying Mnangagwa. It is also noteworthy to emphasise the fact that these jingles respond to the politics of the day and the person in power. Mugabe’s songs were decorated with the statement, ‘Blair keep your England and I will keep my Zimbabwe’ referencing to the land issue and the Mnangagwa’s narrative has shifted to ‘Nyika inovakwa nevene vayo’, (A nation is developed by its own people) leaving no one and no place behind’. Thus, bringing out different frames of representations as they are offered by the environment.

References Allen, L. (2004). Music and politics in Africa. Journal of Social Dynamics, 30(2), 1–19. Althusser, L. (1971). Lenin and philosophy and other essays. Monthly Review Press. Briggs, A., & Cobley, P. (2002). The media: An introduction. Pearson Education, Longman. Chomsky, N. (2002). Media control: The spectacular achievements of propaganda (2nd ed.). Seven Stories Press.

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Creswell, J. W. (2003). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches (2nd ed.). Sage. Denzin, K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (2005). The Sage handbook of qualitative research. Sage. Fallon, K. (2012). The strange history of political campaign songs. The Daily Beast. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/24/the-strange-his tory-of-political-campaign-songs-video.html Ferguson, R. (1998). Reflection and representation. In R. Ferguson (Ed.), Representing ’race’: ideology, identity and the media. Arnold. Gramsci, A. (1976). Selections from the prison notebooks. International Publishers. Guzura, T., & Ndimande, J. (2015). Music, political space and power in Zimbabwe. International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, 6(3), 1–23. Hall, S. (1997). Representation: Cultural representation and signifying practices. Sage. Manning, P. (2001). News and news sources: A critical introduction. Sage Manyawu, A. T. (2013). The promotional discourse of liberation movements in Zimbabwe: A textual analysis of political jingles. Southern African Linguistics and Applied Linguistics Studies, 31(1), 71–88. Manyawu, A. T. (2014). The construction of Uhuru party group identity in Zimbabwe: A textual analysis of revolutionary songs in Shona. South African Journal of African Languages (SAJAL), 34(1), 63–78. Matiza, V. M., & Mutasa, D. E. (2020). War songs and hope during the 2nd Chimurenga in Zimbabwe: A critical discourse analysis approach. Southern African Journal of African Languages (SAJAL), 40(3), 351–357. Mazango, E. (2005). Media games and shifting spaces for political communication in Zimbabwe. Westminster papers in communication and culture, University of Westminster. http://www.wmin.ac.uk/mad/pdf/zim_art3.pdf Munhuweyi, K. T. (2022). Praising the Croc, despising Nero: The politics of hero-worshiping leaders through music and speech in Zimbabwe. Journal of Asian and Africa Studies. 00219096221080195. Ndou, D. (2012). Too young to remember: The framing of collective memory. Zimbabwe’s post–independent generation. http://www.academia.edu/ 2491146 Ngoshi, H. T., & Mutekwa, A. (2013). The female body and voice in audiovisual political propaganda jingles: The Mbare Chimurenga Choir women in Zimbabwe’s contested political terrain. Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies, 27 (2), 235–248. Ogenga, F. O. (2010). Misrepresentation of the Zimbabwean crisis by South African Weeklies, 2000–2008 (PhD Thesis). University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

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Sibanda, M. (2004). Music censorship in Zimbabwe. http://www.freemuse.org/ archives/38520. Accessed 23 January 2022. Tendi, B. (2010). Making history in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: Politics, intellectuals and the media. Peter Lang. Zelicof, C. G. (2012). Orchestrating the campaign: The sounds of American presidential elections. University of Pennsylvannia.

PART III

The Media, Conflict and a Culture of Deceit in Postcolonial Zimbabwe’s Politics (13–18)

CHAPTER 13

The Media, Conflict and Culture of Deceit in Postcolonial Zimbabwean Politics Takavafira Masarira Zhou

Introduction The chapter explores the role of the media in the generation, representation, the perpetuation of conflict and the peddling of falsehood in postcolonial Zimbabwean politics. A qualitative historical methodology, punctuated by rigorous analysis of public and private media framing, respect of ethics of journalism and amplified by voices of practising journalists, is used to examine the interconnectedness of media, conflict and culture of deception in postcolonial Zimbabwean politics. After giving theories that inform the framing and representation by the media, the chapter locates the media dynamics within a specific historical context of postcolonial Zimbabwean politics of conflict. It then delves into the gukurahundi period (1982–1987) reflecting the capture of the public media for Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANUPF)’s political supremacy. The period from the 1990s is analysed and

T. M. Zhou (B) Research, Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_14

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reflects how the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 further polarised the media, with the consequent coming to the fore of partisan coverage and peddled falsehoods by both the public and private media. The public media rallied behind the ruling party while the private media provided largely favourable coverage to the opposition, with the consequent arid, rigid, acidic and balkanised politics in postcolonial Zimbabwe. The transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa is analysed as nothing more than a change in continuity, as there was no change in media operation and political culture in Zimbabwe.

Framing, Indexing Norm and Self-Censorship Theories Several scholars (Bainbridge et al., 2011; Chari, 2008; Entman, 1993; Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996; McQuail, 2005; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) have postulated the framing theory as a way in which the media profile perceived reality through their depiction. According to Melkote (2009, p. 549) framing is “the ways in which news media organise, treat and present issues, events and news objects as newsmakers.” It is Melkote’s conviction that framing can encompass overlooking or modulating certain facets of an issue, fashioning an artificial balance in coverage, media and journalists, speaking with the voice of the government, exaggeration and lack of analysis of events and use of narrow selection of experts. Bennett (1990, p. 109) advances the indexing norm theory about the newspaper routine of relying upon political elites when defining and framing the news agenda. Madanhire (2019, p. 7) suggests a self-censorship theory as an “act of censoring or classifying one’s own work, out of fear of, or difference to, the sensibilities of others, without overt pressure from any specific party or institution of authority.” This research presents a fruitful collaboration of framing, indexing norm and self-censorship theories in presenting interpretations of events and items of fact, with divergent editorial approaches producing different news frames. However, while the theories are valid and crucial for this study, the researcher argues that different people see certain dimensions of issues in very different ways. Consequently, framing, indexing norm and self-censorship can also generate conflicts through the differing interpretations of disputes and disagreements over the importance of their component parts. In this study, the framing, indexing norm and self-censorship theories are used as conceptual tools for analysing how the state-owned and the privately

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owned media selected news articles, headlines and language in their representation of news, generation and perpetuation of conflict and deceit in postcolonial Zimbabwean politics.

Historical Background From the advent of independence in 1980, the ZANU-PF controlled the media, the Rhodesian style. The Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust was set up in 1980 to buy out the country’s five main newspapers while state control was exerted over radio stations and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). Nathan Shamuyarira, the then Minister of Information, remarked that the government was inspired by a “view to getting the right news through to the consumer” (Zhou & Makahamadze, 2012, p. 114). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012, p. 1) posits that ZANU-PF has sought to “inscribe a nationalist monological history in Zimbabwe in order to prop up its claim to be the progenitor and guardian of the postcolonial nation.” This hegemonic drive has always met a range of challenges such as disunity within ZANU-PF itself, counternarratives emanating from political formations such as the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in the 1980s, Movement for Democratic Party from 1999, Citizens Coalition for Change from 2022 and critical voices from the Zimbabwean populace. As such, a multifaceted conflict entrenched in postcolonial Zimbabwean politics emanating from ethnicity, regionalism, racialism and above all, power politics or the distribution of power and interests, cumulatively polarised the media. The polarisation of the media must further be understood in what Madanhire (2019, p. 8) calls ‘groupthink’ which is the practice of “thinking or making decisions as a group in a way that discourages creativity or individual responsibility … [and] the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome.” Zhou and Makahamadze (2012) argue that from 2000, the government of Zimbabwe, like Ian Smith’s post-Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI in 1965) regime, suffered from a crisis of legitimacy and entered a perpetual war to legitimise itself. In so doing, it adopted a media, and indeed, news routine based on the indexing norm, and the hostile environment forced many journalists to adopt self-censorship when defining and framing the news agenda. This defence mechanism and fitting into enclaves must be fully understood within the context of restrictive legislation such as the Access to Information & Protection Privacy Act

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(2002) and the banning of newspapers such as Daily News in 2003. The period 2000–2017 witnessed growing polarisation of the media, albeit a brief period of minor adjustment during the inclusive government (2009– 2013). Although there was a brief improvement in media polarisation soon after the 2017 coup, it soon became clear that the coup ushered nothing more than change with the continuity of Mugabeism—a situation that soon accentuated media polarisation with the consequent lack of accuracy, balance, fairness and relevance in media reporting. Contestation and polarisation continued, with the public media supporting the status quo and its assumed liberation legacy and the private media deploying democracy and human rights discourse to critique its perceived “parasitic and predatory militarized political elites aided by a bureaucratic bourgeoisie who raid and empty state coffers while speaking neo-liberal economic language” (Zhou, 2019, p. 75).

Gukurahundi 1982–1987 and Media Sensationalism and Polarisation The media have analysed the post-1980 in terms principally of the political interests of ZANU-PF and ZAPU, Zimbabwe’s leading nationalist parties, or the South African state. The conflict started on 5 February 1982 following ZANU-PF alleged ‘discoveries’ of arms caches on ZAPU farms. On 17 February 1982, the government expropriated farms and other properties belonging to ZAPU and ordered a police raid on Harare ZAPU office (News Day, 12 August 2017). In an unbalanced coverage, inaccurate presentation of facts and marginalisation of ZAPU voices, The Herald (11 January 1980), a newspaper controlled by a governmentsponsored ‘Mass Media Trust’ highlighted in its editorial column that the ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo should be charged with treason and members of his party dismissed from the Cabinet. “Any revolt that might arise should be crushed ruthlessly”, The Herald (ibid.) reported. That the arms caches and raids coincided with ZANU-PF’s call for the oneparty state which ZAPU had turned down was inconsequential to the public media. At any rate, by mid-February 1982, Robert Mugabe, the then Prime Minister was comparing Joshua Nkomo to a “cobra in the house” and telling ZANU-PF supporters that “the only way to deal effectively with a snake is to strike and destroy its head” (The Sunday Mail, 17 January 1982; The Herald, 18 January 1982, ZBC News, 20.00 hrs,

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17 January 1982, Radio 2 News, 18.00 hrs, 16 January 1982). Consequently, he unleashed the North Korean trained crack force, 5th brigade, to crash ZAPU. Mugabe perceived ZAPU and Nkomo, respectively, as “the dissident party and their dissident father” that was “both destined not only for rejection but for utter destruction as well” (Nehanda Radio, 1900 hrs, 25 November 2022). Malunga (2021, p. 11) argues that the dissidents were in the then State Security Minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa’s words, “cockroaches and the Fifth Brigade was the DDT brought in to eradicate them.” The inflammatory and incendiary government narrative that was parroted in the state media aggravated conflict with the consequent killing of 20,000 civilians in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. Because of the indexing norm and self-censorship of the media, the conflict was represented as a product of an injudicious bid on the part of ZAPU to claim the triumph it had failed to gain through the ballot box, and as an attempt by apartheid South Africa to covertly stir tensions between ZAPU and ZANU-PF, whites and blacks, so as to leave its newly independent neighbour in disarray (Hanlon, 1986; Martin & Johnson, 1986). The private media (News Day, 4 July 2011, 12 August 2017; Nehanda Radio, 18 November 2012, 25 November 2022; Daily News, 17 February 2015) as well as former Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) combatants (Interview with ZIPRA Veterans Association spokesperson, retired colonel Baster Magwizi, 21 October 2020) have argued that gukurahundi was an inexorable and distrustful casus belli by ZANU-PF to decimate ZAPU that it perceived to be the real hindrance to its hegemonic authority. Doran (2017, p. 3) gives credence to the above assertion by positing that Mugabe and Mnangagwa had disarmed ZIPRA by mid-1981, stripping Nkomo of military protection and leaving the caches discovered after the second round of fighting at Entumbane in situ for rediscovery later, and stashing “hundreds of kalashnikov rifles … taken from Salisbury … on the ZAPU properties.” Ndlovu-Gatsheni (December 2012) and Mashingaidze (July 2020) posit that gukurahundi is ZANU-PF strategy of violence, thuggery and physical purging of rivals and opponents. There is consensus among historians (Alexander, 1998; Doran, 2017; McGregor & Ranger, 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Zhou & Makahamadze, 2012) that ZAPU and its military command structure never deployed dissidents. The return to arms by some dissidents was primarily a result of distrust that emanated from the integration of ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesia forces, and then repression by the

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newly formed Zimbabwe National Army systematically targeting former ZIPRA combatants. Zhou and Makahamadze (2012, p. 42) argue that some former ZIPRA combatants’ discontent emanated “from a defective integration process, and by 1982, mostly by the desire to escape persecution by Mugabe’s regime.” Alexander (1998, p. 151) argues that “dissidents had neither political leaders nor political support but the majority nonetheless maintained their loyalty to Zapu and tenaciously clung to their liberation war identity as Zipra guerrillas, thereby helping to contain South Africa’s destabilisation efforts and making the war’s rapid conclusion possible.” Unity talks without external intervention began in 1986 and on 22 December 1987, the Unity Accord was signed by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe thereby ending gukurahundi atrocities. That only 122 dissidents surrendered after the announcement of an amnesty (Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice [CCJP], 1997, p. 10) is an indicator that ZANU-PF and public media reports were sensationalised, deceitful and biassed. At any rate after 1987, the ‘dissident tag’ disappeared and as Vice President until his death, and founding father of modern Zimbabwean nationalism, Joshua Nkomo deservedly earned the title ‘Father Zimbabwe’ which has been broadly amplified by both public and private media (The Herald, 2 July 1999, 20 June 2018, 4 July 2019; ZBC, 2000 hrs news, 2 July 1999; Daily News, 7 July 2013, 10 November 2021; News Day, 6 July 2017, 6 May 2020). However, without public acknowledgement of past wrongs beyond Mugabe’s statement of ‘moment of madness’, minimum of retribution and redress and, above all, truth, reconciliation and durable peace that can foster national development, the gukurahundi will continue to generate conflict, state manipulation and peddled falsehoods, and through indexing norm polarised media along political affiliation and editorial policies and ethnic and regional origins of some journalists.

Media Polarisation, Confrontation and Crisis Under Mugabe, 1990s–2017 The early 1990s saw Zimbabwe adopting economic structural adjustment programme which never achieved its intended aims of industrial progress and creation of employment opportunities. The formation of the MDC under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai in September 1999 with a policy thrust on “democratic change, the rule of law, separation

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of powers, checks and balances, corporate governance and responsible leadership in government and civil society; free, fair and credible elections, respect for human rights values, the welfare and well-being of citizens,” was perceived as a challenge to ZANU-PF liberation legacy and democratic deficit (Zhou & Tandi, 2022, p. 325). The ZANU-PF defeat in the February 2000 Constitutional referendum was unexpected and taken as a personal rebuff for Robert Mugabe and a political triumph for the MDC. The defeat placed land acquisition and redistribution at the fore of ZANU-PF’s fight to retain political hegemony in the wake of the June 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections. Sylvester (2003, p. 29) contends that the loss of the referendum “culminated in ZANU (PF)’s long-time efforts to shape national memories to downplay its ambivalent and worsening governance record and play up its historic role as the founding party of Zimbabwe.” It is within this context that the media polarisation, conflict and peddled falsehoods must be understood during the period under review. As much as there was extensive coverage by public and private media, their representation of elections was radically different. The private media were doubtful about the prospects of free, fair and credible elections. They provided substantial attention to the use of similar strategy of violence, intimidation and electoral malpractice by ZANU-PF (through use of youths, war veterans and security forces) during parliamentary elections in 2000 and 20,005, presidential elections in 2002, and harmonised elections in 2008, with Morgan Tsvangirai pulling out of the second round of presidential election in 2008 because of the unprecedented quantum leap of violence (Daily News, 6 March 2000, 11 February 2002, 21 February 2002; The Standard, 7–13 March 2000, 23 March 2002, 12 April 2008). On the contrary, the public media projected the view that ZANU-PF was the ‘people’s party’ and Mugabe the candidate of choice. They claimed that ZANU-PF’s liberation war credentials appealed to the general populace and dismissed the opposition parties, particularly MDC, as puppets of British imperialism and reactionary white settlers who also engaged in subversive violence. These perceptions are well captured and represented in the following headings and language from the public media: “President Mugabe won’t sell the country” (The Herald, 23 March 2000); “ZANU-PF has never cheated; poised to win…” (The Herald, 2 March 2002); “Tsvangirai worst sell-out: Msika” (The Herald, 3 May 2008); “No to sell-outs: President” (The Sunday Mail, 15 June 2008); “France sponsored Tsvangirai’s trip” (The Herald, 19 November

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2008); and “Hidden hand behind MDC-T’s intransigence” (The Herald, 8 September 2008). The challenging Zimbabwean politics coincided with myriads of other socio-economic cataclysms that the media profoundly denoted and contributed to political conflict in Zimbabwe. The depiction reflected a correlation between the electoral politics, economic recession and social disturbances in Zimbabwe. While the private media constructed sanctions as ‘targeted’ measures, executed by the European Union, United States and later Australia, New Zealand and Canada on predatory ruling elite owing to gross human rights defilements (News Day, 18 January 2012), the public media accepted ZANU-PF’s common rhetoric and discourse that the opposition was a proxy of the Western powers and popularised the slogan, “Zimbabwe will never be a colony again” to belt up popular emotions (Willems, 2015). The private media used adverse stereotypes against President Robert Mugabe to explain his hold on to power despite increased dissenting voices calling for change. Mugabe was portrayed as a ruthless predatory dictator using a defective political system of sultanism, defective economic system of statism, patronage, lackeyism and clientelism to stay in power. Framing stories from interviews with critics of ZANU-PF, including former United States ambassador to Zimbabwe, Christopher Dell, it is understandable why headings like “Mugabe ruthless politician” (News Day, 18 July 2011); “Regime is beyond remedy” (News Day, 29 July 2016); and “Yes, Mugabe must be allowed to go home and rest” (News Day, 25 April 2011), became fashionable in private media to rally people against Mugabe and also to encourage him to give in than see his political life obliterated by winds of democratic change. Former Daily News reporter, Pedzisai Ruhanya (2023), argues that the paper became the mouthpiece for the MDC and human rights defenders opposed to Mugabe’s autocratic rule. It was the conviction of the private media that Mugabe’s warped policies led to Zimbabwe’s precipitous descent into economic, social and political chaos. Indeed, the campaign of violence in farms from 2000 and for the presidential run-off on 27 June 2008 claimed thousands of victims as the government at national and local levels actively, systematically and methodically targeted MDC activists and perceived supporters. Arguably, the private media, perceived ZANUPF as a representation of thuggery and thievery, and its replacement by MDC was encouraged as a conveyor belt to socio-economic and political recovery in Zimbabwe.

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Contrary to representation by the private media, the public media portrayed Mugabe as the only legitimate leader in both the party and government (The Herald, 23 March 2000). Collectively, The Herald, The Sunday News and The Sunday Mail amplified ZANU-PF’s flawed view that all the country’s challenges emanated from internal (white commercial farmers, industrialist, and MDC etc.) and external (British and American governments) enemies. Under the auspices of Jonathan Moyo, there was an emphasis on patriotic journalism that produced music and newspapers that defended any challenge to ZANU-PF and state with narrow and extreme patriotic rhetoric that amounted to deception (Ranger, 2005). The public media’s style of reportage echoed a predisposition towards the state and the ruling party, with the consequent failure to create an open platform to a variety of voices. Above all, the labelling of government supporters as patriots, sons and daughters of the soil; and critics as traitors, sell-outs and unpatriotic did/does not only demonstrate public media’s unethical approach, inaccurate presentation of facts and unbalanced coverage, but also their potential to promote conflict. By discarding impartiality, relevance and objectivity in reporting and entrenching ZANU-PF’s hegemony, the public media besmirched essential ethics of journalism. In deliberate falsification of the liberation history and in an attempt to emotionally mobilise the general populace to emasculate the whites in Zimbabwe, Nathaniel Manheru wrote in The Herald (18 September 2004), “From the point of view of our collective quest for liberation, Rhodesia bore no good white men, and that makes the whole lot complicit in colonial atrocities, the whole lot guilty, yes, fitting candidates for an African Nuremberg.” Conversely, the pervasive barrage of disparagement against the MDC for supporting targeted sanctions disregards ZANU-PF’s actions that impelled the restrictions, including gross human rights desecrations. The Herald enjoyed domination as a daily newspaper between 2003 and 2010, after the banning of the Daily News in September 2003. The public media were used by ZANU-PF as propaganda mouthpieces to disparage MDC, and its supporters. They became conduits for discharging acrimony and malice against the opposition who were portrayed as sellouts or enemies of the state. There was however, a minor adjustment to the representation of news by both the private and public media during the inclusive government (2009–2013) as ZANU-PF and MDC were forced by circumstances into a marriage of convenience. However, there was no sharing of power as the true locus of power lay unequivocally with

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Mugabe and militated against the smooth implementation of the government of national unity (GNU) (Matyszak, 2010; Zhou & Makahamadze, 2012). During the inclusive government media representation reflected conflict and deception over the implementation of the GNU. It is noteworthy that the new constitution making process was carried out from 2010 to 2013 and pushed the private and public media into antagonism advancing the MDC and ZANU-PF interests, respectively, thereby escalating conflict and deception. Private media’s representation that for any country to be called a democracy, its army had to observe strict political neutrality (News Day, 10 May 2012; Daily News, 18 July 2011) was not taken lightly by senior army commanders and the public media. Mugabe dismissed the MDC-T’s motion in parliament over the security sector’s reforms declaring that “As commander-in-chief of the security forces, I want to make it very clear that no one should meddle with the command” (Daily News, 18 July 2011). The then Brigadier General, Douglas Nyikayaramba, was less sympathetic calling the then MDC-T leader, Tsvangirai, “a major security threat. He takes instructions from foreigners who seek to effect illegal regime change in Zimbabwe…. Daydreamers who want to reverse the gains of our liberation struggle will continue daydreaming … President Mugabe will only leave office if he sees it fit or dies” (The Herald, June 23, 2011). As such, the private and public media actively participated and influenced political conflict by exacerbating fragile relations between ZANU-PF and opposition parties, a position that escalated during election periods as in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013. Both the private and public media actively contributed to political conflicts or framing of news in a manner that peddled falsehoods and exacerbated conflict during the period under review. The public media covered extensively factionalism and splits in the MDC in 2005, 2014 and 2015, while the private media (News Day, Studio7@voanes and Nehanda Radio) weighed in with limited coverage for different reasons which all the same divided the nation and wasted energy that could have been utilised to build the country. Indeed, the MDC split in 2005 when the then Secretary General, Welshman Ncube backed by many senior party leaders differed with Tsvangirai over participation in senate elections and formed another MDC (News Day, 3 April 2005). The second split occurred in 2014 when the then MDC-T secretary-general, Tendai Biti, and the then treasurer-general, Elton Mangoma called for leadership renewal and formed MDC Renewal. From 2015, there were fissures in the MDC-T

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pitting the then Deputy President, Thokozani Khupe and national chairperson, Lovemore Moyo on one hand, and Tsvangirai on the other (The Herald, 20 April 2015). Framing of the splits were tailor made to blame Tsvangirai as a leader, assert he was controlled from the West and whip emotions of Zimbabweans on the uselessness of supporting the opposition party. Such framing included, ‘2005 mass protest sought to divert attention from MDC split’ (The Herald, 24 October 2011); ‘MDC-T split engineered in the West’ (The Herald, 29 April 2014). The skirmishes between Tsvangirai and Khupe supporters led to public media framing that ‘MDC-T: A violent, intolerant party’ (The Herald, 12 November 2015). Using an MDC-T critic by the name of Reason Wafawarova, the public media (The Herald, 22 November 2016) argued that the opposition party was governed by failure and that its popularity was based on the “treacherous willingness of Zimbabweans making up the party to front the anger of the dispossessed white land owners and their allies in the imperial West.” What is lacking from public media is justification and efficacy of Senate, other than rewarding President Mugabe’s cronies, more so considering that in 2005, the economy could hardly support service delivery (Zhou & Tandi, 2022). It is also noteworthy that Ncube’s MDC went on to experience two splits in 2010 (led by Sikhala) and in 2011 by Arthur Mutambara following a contested congress. Similarly, the MDC Renewal split in 2015 with one led by Biti becoming the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and one led by Mangoma calling itself the Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe. The PDP further split in 2017 into two, with a new splinter group led by Lucia Matibenga (ibid.). Arguably, the splits in the MDC during the period under review cannot merely be reduced to Tsvangirai’s weaknesses as the public media would like us to believe. The private media extensively covered succession battles in the ruling party while the public media were silent until 2014 when Vice President, Joice Mujuru and her allies were jettisoned from ZANU-PF. The public media walked the ZANU-PF partisan agenda and initially denied the existence of factions within the party. The leadership fashioned the impression of a united and disciplined party because of the culture of fear which prohibited members to engage in free conversation on succession, as evidenced by the persecution of those who gambled to advise Mugabe to step down. After victory in the 2013 harmonised elections, President Mugabe was the first to acknowledge the existence of factions in ZANUPF, with the consequent extensive coverage of the intra-party conflict in

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the public media that ultimately led to the purging of Mujuru and her allies from the party (Mungwari, 2018). Using the indexing norm and merely regurgitating President Mugabe’s and the then First Lady’s accusations, the public media accused Mujuru of, interalia, attempting to illegally remove President Mugabe from power, corruption, conspiring with the party’s enemies (MDC, Mavambo, West) and sowing divisions in the ruling party. The accusations were amplified in stories titled, ‘Mujuru Hires Nigerian Sangomas (witch doctors) and Mujuru Linked to Mavambo, MDC’ (The Herald, 18 October 2014) and ‘US Exposes Mujuru Conspiracy’ (The Herald, 9 June 2015). The Herald blamed Mujuru for Mugabe’s loss to Tsvangirai in the first round of the March 2008 elections (ibid.). The intention was to whip peoples’ feelings against Mujuru and the opposition which was linked to the West. Quoting analysts sympathetic to Mujuru and those aligned to her, and hostile to ZANU-PF, the private media presented Mujuru as a victim of a rival faction (Lacoste) contesting to succeed Mugabe as leader of ZANU-PF and as a President of Zimbabwe. The private media suggested that Lacoste could have killed Mujuru’s powerful husband, retired Solomon Mujuru, in order to remove her from power easily. The stories ‘Ditch Zanu PF, Support Mujuru’ (Daily News, May 30, 2015) and ‘Mujuru Fears for her life’ (Daily News, April 28, 2015) suggest that Mujuru’s spouse might have been killed by the family’s partisan rivals in ZANU-PF who desired him out of the way in order for them to be able to get rid of his wife. Arguably, political news is fashioned by the media’s political agenda. By deliberately framing news through quoting analysts who support a preferred view point, media can create and worsen conflict, let alone turn facts upside down for political expediency. During the period under review, the public media negatively framed opposition parties, while the private media commiserated with them. There were no indicators that Mugabe was considering standing down, with many around him, particularly his wife Grace and the party’s Youth and Women’s Leagues, preferring that he would die in office (Mungwari, 2017). Depictions by the public media during his address of the Million-Man March (2016) signalled that Mugabe was “here to stay” (The Herald, 26 May 2016). Inter-party and intra-party conflicts generated and aggravated by public and private media, coupled with deceptions or peddled falsehoods for political expedience pre-occupied ZANU-PF and opposition parties thereby militating against service delivery and sustainable development.

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In the process, ZANU-PF leadership drearily failed to use its categorical win in 2013 to address the economic problems that have beset Zimbabwe since independence from colonial rule. By 2017, Zimbabwe was to use Astrow’s (1983) dictum clearly reminiscent of “a revolution that lost its way.” Not only had the revolution devoured its children but it had also devoured its fathers and mothers. Through divide and rule, media manipulation and deception, Mugabe had turned ZANU-PF into his personal project whereby expulsions were the modus operandi for him to remain in lifelong power. By and large, public media framing was influenced by ZANU-PF factionalism that pitted Mnangagwa’s Lacoste faction and Mujuru’s Gamatox aliened faction. The faction in control of the Ministry of Information—and, by extension, the public media—dictated state media content. The reportage and framing might change with time. The public media framing of the new factions, namely the generation 40 (G40) and Team Lacoste which emerged after the purging of Mujuru and her perceived allies changed over time. At first the public media were pro-Team Lacoste but anti-G40. Nevertheless, when Team Lacoste was under attack from Mugabe, the public media rapidly assumed a somewhat neutral approach in the reportage of events and issues. However, statecaptured public media maintained its anti-opposition stance. Arguably, the public media’s ideological and editorial policies may change to suit interests of those in power thereby compromising ethical reportage. The private media guided by neo-liberal ideology, human rights mantra and profiteering, maintained their anti-ZANU-PF and anti-Mugabe stance.

New Dispensation: Media Ethical Transformation or Change in Continuity: 2017–2023? The critical role of the media in society can only be impartially accomplished in an environment favourable to the free flow of information and ideas, and bereft of terror and bullying. Major General Sibusiso Moyo announced the seizure of power by the army on national television on 15 November 2017, and among other things, reminded everyone that “… the situation in our country has moved to another level”, that the army was “… only targeting the criminals around him [Mugabe] …” and the media should report “responsibly” (ZDF Statement on ZBC, 15 November 2017). The laden statement literally sent shivers down the

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spines of many media personnel and publishers with the consequent absolute self-censorship in the public and private media in Zimbabwe. The capture of the public broadcaster had an adverse effect on the reportage of the transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa, the July 2018 polls, and the aftermath of the elections, mostly in the wake of the killing of six unarmed civilians in the streets of Harare by soldiers on 1 August 2018. The ascension to Presidency by Mnangagwa on 24 November 2017 formally ended Mugabe’s 37-year rule in Zimbabwe. He enunciated a new political dispensation predicated, among other things, on good governance and deep-rooted democracy; peace and tranquillity, economic expansion and sustainable development grounded on agricultural growth, tapping and harnessing of natural and human resources for the “benefit of the general populace, and an end to corruption; infrastructural development, reconciliation, compensation of white farmers for the seizure of their land during Mugabe’s regime, engagement and trade with the international world” (Zhou, 2019, p. 75). There was speculative conjecture by both the private and public media for better things to come, possibly through a unity government. However, “with the growing chinhu chedu [it’s our thing] mantra within ZANU-PF elites, the hoped-for paradise evaporated with the gradual recurrence of polarisation between the public and private media” (Dube, 2023). While the public media dug in, to prop the military administration, the private media turned against it and started to refer to it more as the ‘junta.’ Arguably, this was a reversion to the Mugabe scenario of media polarisation which had in some respects ameliorated soon after the coup. The process of the 31 July 2018 elections is indicative of conflict and deception associated with polarised media in Zimbabwe. Aware of hazards and obstacles existent in Zimbabwe, just over six months after the military take over from Mugabe, editors and reporters tramped along in reporting the Zimbabwe electoral story. Objectivity became problematic for most journalists who imposed upon themselves some form of self-censorship and used indexing norms in framing their reportage during the elections, with the consequent misinformation in their reports. There is a general consensus among some journalists, such as Takaona (2023), S. Dube (2023), Pindai Dube (2023), Maunganidze (2023), and Deredza (2023) that some previously respected media employees “acted as political commissars of the two main contesting parties, ZANU-PF and MDC Alliance.” Ncube (2023) posits that it was “routine rather than episodic to see state media journalists and support staff clad in the campaign

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regalia of the main presidential candidates, particularly Zanu PF frontman Emmerson Mnangagwa”, plainly casting reservation on the professionalism of public media in Zimbabwe. Both the public and private media peddled devious or erroneous information in a fashion that amounted to deliberate deception. The public media, largely propping the status quo provided the impression that ZANU-PF rallies were always larger than MDC Alliance. On the contrary, the private media used ‘paltry’ to describe the former’s rallies, and ‘bumper’ to describe the latter. The organisation of the rallies was another major theme of election reportage. In a story, “Accidents, robberies expose MDC-T bussing”, The Herald (12 April 2018) reported that “the unfortunate incidents involving MDC-T supporters from various parts of the country continue to put paid to spirited denials by the opposition party’s leaders that they regularly bus supporters to rallies to create an impression that their president Mr Nelson Chamisa enjoys overwhelming support.” In another story, ‘Zanu PF supporters walk out on Mnangagwa’, the News Day (21 July 2018) reported that at a rally in Mutare, “Chiwenga had to order members of the national youth service to stop people from leaving and listen …” to Mnangagwa as many of them had forcibly been “bussed from as far as Chipinge and other areas across the province.” Evidently, the public media credited the massive crowds at MDC Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa’s rallies to the ‘bussing’ of supporters while the private media attributed Mnangagwa’s huge rallies to coercion. Certainly, there could have been more reasons behind the huge numbers than the reductionist speculative conjecture of reporters, who in the process failed to bring credence and balance to their reports. Routine headlines in the run-up to elections were: ‘Mnangagwa rally flops, Zanu-PF in panic mode’ (Business Daily, 21 March 2018); ‘MDC Alliance demo flops’ (The Herald, 6 June 2018); ‘Chamisa gets massive boost’ (The Standard, 8 April 2018); ‘Chamisa’s Masvingo rally to attract 50 000 people’ (News Day, 14 July 2018); ‘All confidence, no substance: Exciting journey to defeat’ (The Herald, 14 May 2018); ‘All set for Zanu-PF victory rally’ (The Herald, 28 July 2018). It is clear that private media found it politically viable to report favourably about the MDC Alliance and harmfully about ZANU-PF, while the public media also sought to report positively about ZANU-PF and negatively about the MDC Alliance. Attempts to influence the public about which political party had popular support underpinned the variance in reportage. This deception, sadly led to the loss of the substance of the messages put forward by party leaders at the rallies.

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Similarly, Madanhire (2019, p. 9) points that “when MDC-Alliance president Nelson Chamisa told his rallies that he would not accept election results in which he was not the winner, the private media did not censure him.” However, the same private media (Daily News, 20 May 2018; Nehanda Radio, 20.00 hrs, 25 May 2018) were swift to denounce ZANU-PF’s Terence Mukupe and Josiah Hungwe when they asserted that ZANU-PF that had staged a coup would not accept defeat only a few months after ceasing power. As much as the public media condemned Chamisa over his utterances, they were conspicuous by their silence, on Mukupe and Hungwe. Ruhanya (2023) and Moyo (2023) argue that both the public and private media reportage of 2018 elections failed to meet tolerable reporting canons in a democracy. Reporters, therefore, fell short of giving their audiences factual, truthful and balanced newscast and information in an objective way. Ultimately, the media deserted their central role of helping voters to make informed decisions and secretly and freely cast votes. In the words of Ncube (2019, p. 5) “Information about the electoral processes and the political environment was poisoned by partisanship and the polarized political environment.” As journalists became partisan participants or players, reportage on political parties, their contestants and manifestos, became biassed and the party-political intricacies at play were relegated to triviality. Although the 2018 harmonised elections were conducted in ways that fell short of international standards or best practices, there was relative calm and peace experienced on polling day. On 1 August 2018, opposition members marched against the inordinate delay in releasing Presidential results, resulting in violence and the deployment of the armed forces to police the protest. Zhou (2019) argues that the army indiscriminately fired live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, resulting in the death of at least 6 people, with scores injured. The reportage of this day reflects the polarisation and deception punctuating the public and private media in Zimbabwe. The private media stressed delay on the release of presidential results and death of six people and watered down preceding violence (News Day, 2 August 2018), while the public media (ZBC News, 20.00 hrs, 2018; The Herald, 2 August 2018; The Sunday Mail, 5 August 2018) selected the violent protests and damage of property and underemphasised the deaths. The declared Presidential results which gave the MDC Alliance presidential candidate, Nelson Chamisa 44.3% of the vote and incumbent president Emmerson Mnangagwa a narrow 50.06% of the vote, just enough to award him victory without the

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need for a Presidential run-off election, also became a subject of polarisation and contestation in the media and country. Private media using the indexing norm quoted opposition leaders dismissing the results as fake and challenging the vote-tallying process, and partiality on the part of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (News Day, 3 August 2018; Daily News on Sunday, 16–22 June 2019, Studio7voanesw.com, 1900 hrs, 3 August 2018). The public media on the other hand readily accepted the results and urged the opposition to accept defeat (The Herald, 4 August 2018), and dismissed irregularities raised in the European Poll Observer Report (2018) as “public camaraderie with Chamisa” (The Herald, 20 October 2018). Media polarisation and deceit have punctuated Zimbabwe from 2018 to the present day, with the consequent balkanisation of the Zimbabwean populace. The public media have described the main opposition MDC Alliance up to 2021, and the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) with effect from 2022, as arrogant and agents of regime change. The public media headlines like ‘Chamisa, Biti and CCC manifestly lack patriotism’ (The Herald, 6 December 2022); ‘CCC MPs revolt from Chamisa’ (The Herald, 6 December 2022); ‘CCC throwing Sikhala under the bus’ (The Herald, 6 January 2023) are tailor made to give an impression of a collapsing party whose relevance in 2023 elections is questionable. Other headline framing like, ‘Why CCC will not win 2023 elections’ (The Herald, 28 September 2022); ‘Chamisa scared of polls’ (The Herald, January 2023), are clear that the public media is already in election mode fighting for the status quo and against the main opposition party, the CCC. The private media has fought on the opposition’s side, arguing that faced with legitimacy challenge from Nelson Chamisa-led MDC Alliance emanating from the 2018 elections, President Mnangagwa used his judiciary capture to deflate pressure by causing a legitimacy challenge within the opposition party and weakening its voice in parliament, and therefore political landscape in Zimbabwe. The private media has also interpreted the prohibition of CCC meetings, arbitrary arrests, imprisonment and denial of bail for CCC supporters and leaders, particularly Job Sikhala, as an attempt by ZANU-PF to outlaw the CCC and opposition politics in Zimbabwe. Private media headline framing, such as ‘Chamisa’s CCC under siege as police block Marondera’ (News Day, 13 March 2022); ‘We are under siege, says Chamisa’ (The Standard, 10 July 2022); ‘Police crackdown on CCC, leaders arrested’ (News Day, 15 January 2023);

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‘Sikhala incarceration is political persecution’ (News Day, 24 August 2022) is reflective of their support for opposition and anti-ZANU-PF predisposition. Arguably, both public and private media have failed to live up to media ethics of reporting accurately, objectively, fairly and relevantly in order to build bridges between people and groups, improve governance, increase knowledge of complex issues, promote peace and harmony and ultimately foster sustainable development. By their unbalanced coverage, inaccurate presentation of facts and partisan alignment, both the public and private media have been guilty of selective forgetfulness and deceit in their framing of news with the consequent exacerbation of balkanisation of Zimbabweans along political affiliation. By their partisan alignment, and lack of analytical rigour, both the public and private media have renounced their responsibility as the fourth estate that always fights for objectivity, justice and truth on behalf of the general populace and offer positive criticism that nourishes leaders. A case in point is the issue of free education guaranteed in section 27 of the Zimbabwean Constitution (2013). Public media has been less analytic since 2013 peddling falsehoods of free education in Zimbabwe. The public media has not examined free education beyond mere rhetoric of ‘Government to introduce free education’ (The Sunday Mail, 23 December 2018); ‘Free basic education next year: President’ (The Sunday News, 10 July 2022); ‘ED underscores free education’ (The Herald, 18 February 2019); ‘Rollout of free education begins’ The Sunday Mail, 8 January 2023.’ The honest truth that the private media got right perhaps because they inquired from teacher unions is that ‘Government free education in false start’ (News Day, 17 January 2023). It is unfortunate that the media whose operational basis is hinged on providing objective and accurate presentation of facts has become so gullible to accept grandstanding, political expediency and homiletic bellicose year-in and year-out. With free education demanding US$75 per every child per term, and bearing in mind that we have 5.7 million students in public schools, free education entails providing US$427,500,000 to schools per term which is beyond the feat of the current government in terms of budgetary allocation.

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Conclusion By and large, the public and private media have been polarised and generating conflict, and a routine rather than episodic culture of deceit in postcolonial Zimbabwean politics. Polarisation, inaccuracy and deceit in the public and private media representation of events emanated from indexing norm, self-censorship, ideological inclinations, commercial factors and control and ownership patterns. The private media’ pro-underdogs stance, and defence of human rights, make them to be pro-opposition and anti-ZANU-PF. On the other hand, the public media’ pro-government posture largely supports the ruling ZANU-PF (though torn in between factions) and is anti-opposition. The underlying tasks of the media in a democratic society involve providing reliable information to support responsible public debate, hold officials accountable and inform the decisions of the electorate. However, this has been thrown in the dustbin by both public and private media in postcolonial Zimbabwe due to prejudice, narrow-mindedness and political proclivity. Conversely, the media’s core contribution to democracy and sustainable development is responsible, fact-based reporting; and prejudiced framing, indexing norm and self-censorship flies in the face of this. All in all, the media in postcolonial Zimbabwe must abstain from balkanised reportage, fuelling conflict, deception and half-truths and provide analytical rigour that can help Zimbabweans across the political divide to celebrate the multiparty system in Zimbabwe, unity in diversity, good governance, justice, accountability, equity and sustainable development.

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CHAPTER 14

An Analysis of the Nexus Between Media and Political Polarisation in Zimbabwe Gift Gwindingwe

Introduction and Background There has been an explosion of media choices in the post-political and economic liberalisation era across the tri-continent of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean (Klein, 2020; Sachikonye, 2003). In this explosion, the public sphere gets widened and the media become a real marketplace of ideas with multiple centres of truths (Nnanyelugo and Tuotamuno, 2009). In such a scenario, audience get the political media of their choices. This also fits well with the emerging and profound variances in political parties (Klein, 2020). These differences are identified by Klein (2020) as Ideological, Geographic, Demographic and Temperamental. In the context of this study, I put it that the Ideological coalition is realised in the Nationalists versus the Populists; the Geographic represents the Rural versus the Urban; the Demographic stands for the aged versus the youths and

G. Gwindingwe (B) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_15

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Temperamental stands for the Civil measured against the brutal/violent (Klein, 2020). Polarisation can be realised along these divisions. It has been noted that ‘the more political media people consumed, the more mistaken they were, about the other party’ (de-Wit et al., 2019; Klein, 2020). Further studies have revealed that “social networking sites are providing selective exposure to people because people are following those pages, celebrities and sources which are in line with their existing political thoughts and avoid those messages which have different arguments” (Ali et al., 2021, p. 35). The argument that this chapter takes is that eventually, it is the media that are at war with each other, having been driven by the political and economic controls. Therefore the political economy theory of the media helps immensely to discuss the link between media polarisation and political polarisation. The offline interparty hostilities translate to online uncivil discussions (Dahlberg, 2001) which inextricably further political disagreements (Ali et al., 2021, p. 34; Davis, 2009; Mutz, 2006). My approach in this study takes a different perspective from Ali et al. (2021, p. 38) argument that “when interpersonal political talk in general has become polarised, so it is possible that social media political talk also become political polarising”. This chapter argues that political polarisation and media polarisation invariably cause each other. The divisions and polarity in the political sphere correlates with the positions that media houses take, following the dictates of the owners, funders and controllers of such media institutions.

Social Networking and the Expression of off Field Political Positions The internet provides anonymity and is generally ungovernable to a greater extent. Social media users find unlimited opportunities to express themselves as they wish because offline media is restrictive. The legacy media has gatekeeping techniques and censorship. On the other hand, online platforms allow for fluidity of identities and offer anonymity. Against that background, “social networking sites and partisan news media” (Sunstein, 2017) become key drivers which cause social media users to be less tolerant and more politically partial (Ali et al., 2021, p. 35). Some studies have revealed that social media has afforded an opportunity for social networking which has naturally arranged ‘people into digital communities’ based on their political conflicts, (de-Wit et al., 2019). Therefore, people take their offline identities and regroup online

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where they select their preferred news sites and curate their social media accounts, thereby making it ‘easier to listen to groups or individuals who validate’ their own worldviews, (de-Wit et al., 2019). In the Zimbabwean context, this chapter argues that those who are pro-establishment naturally regroup online and form an online ZANU-PF digital community while those who are Citizens Coalition for Change also form their CCC digital community. The point of departure for this chapter is therefore that what transpires offline can have a replicating effect online. However, there is a possibility of identity fluidity online where some social media users may change their offline identities. In politically volatile contexts like the Zimbabwean one in which elections have been associated with violence, it is possible that some individuals who might have been pretending to support certain political parties can change their identities online and assume pseudo names for security reasons. Some can also adopt pseudo identities for spying purposes. Because of the assumed security offered on social networking sites, likeminded media has attracted like-minded individuals, thereby furthering polarisation (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021, p. 198). I therefore put it that online communities are a regrouping of already existing offline identities and it is offline polarisation that has migrated to online spaces that have expansive expressive spaces. While Mahoney (2022, p. 2) argues that “changes in media polarization effect changes in political polarization”, I also argue that it can be either way: political polarisation can also effect changes in media polarisation for the simple reason that the public can create the agenda for the media. The next section tries to unpack the concept of polarisation.

Polarisation The term polarisation generally implies division into two sharply contrasting groups or set of opinions or beliefs. The concept has gained more momentum in politics more than any other field. Ali et al. (2021, p. 34) have referred to “heated debates, and showing disrespect to opposing views and political party” as an extreme form of political polarisation. It has been concluded that political elites, elected officials and the general electorate are naturally polarised (Frimer et al., 2017; Hare & Poole, 2014; Heaney et al., 2012; Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). Political polarisation stems from political party loyalty. Westfall et al. (2015) and Ali and et al. (2021, p. 36) concur that (political) party loyalty is defined

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as the “strength of association or identification of an individual with a political party or partisan group”. This study looks at the nexus between media and political polarisation arguing that both media and politics feed from and into each other. Therefore, an expression in the media is an expression in the political sphere. This argument is rooted in the political economy theory that looks at media as instruments of the elite to further their ideas. Political parties have resorted to use of “social media to market their manifesto and activities to aware the new voters as well as to keep the loyalty of their supporters” (Ali et al., 2021, p. 36; Dabula, 2017). So I argue in this chapter that in order to strengthen their support base and maintain their positions, political parties feed their polarity into the media systems, thereby polarising the media themselves. The polarised views expressed in the media are funded and controlled by the owners and funders of the media outlets. At the end, “people who have extreme political ideology avoid those people who support opposite viewpoint and prevent themselves from having routine discussion (Ali et al., 2021, p. 34; Iyengar et al., 2012). Other researchers have suggested the existence of a mutual connection between media exposure and amplified political polarisation (Chang & Park, 2020; Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021, p. 194). This chapter examines how the five purposively sampled WhatsApp platforms are expressive of the polarisation that exists between ZANU-PF and CCC and the extent to which this media polarisation pose as a manifestation of politics of deceit in Zimbabwe. Wang et al. (2018) and Nikolov et al. (2019) concur that deceit has been seen to thrive on propaganda, disinformation and misguided dogmas via echo chambers that exacerbate violence, among other vices. These features are often social media indicators of media polarisation through cyberbullying or online violence. The next section contextualises the theories that frame these studies.

Theoretical Underpinning This section unpacks the theoretical foundations that underpin the relationship between media polarisation and political polarisation. To do this, I will explore the theory of political economy and how it affects media content, thereby arguing that the intersection between the economy and politics (or power) is a source of the quality of media content produced at any moment. Conversely, an analysis of the concept of selective exposure to news media helps to explain how media consumption

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exacerbates political polarisation, leading to widened and irreconcilable political antagonisms.

Political Economy Theory Political economy is “the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources (Mosco, 2009, p. 24). According to Mosco (ibid.), the “products of communication, such as newspapers, books, videos, films, and audiences, are the primary resources”. Therefore political economy deals with media production, distribution and consumption. Political economy revolves around specific sets of ‘social relations organized around power or the ability to control other people, processes, and things, even in the face of resistance’ (Mosco, 2009, p. 24). The political economy theory lays emphasis on the relevance of organisational structures accountable for the ‘production, distribution, and exchange of communication commodities’ and for the regulation of these structures’, and it has tended to ‘foreground corporate and state structures and institutions’ (Mosco, 2009, p. 133). “Through studies of ownership and control, political economists document and analyse relations of power, a class system and other structural inequalities (Wasko, 2005, p. 27). Mosco (ibid.) lays emphasis on power relations here. The theory also foregrounds commodification of content, which “involves transforming messages, ranging from bits of data to systems of meaningful thought, into marketable products” (pp. 134). In the context of this study, I adopt the political economy theory to show how (political) power relations influence production, distribution and consumption of media content and how this content has been commodified so that consumers have preferential choices of what to consume and what not to. This choice is determined by political influence and loyalty. Whether offline or online, media choice is traceable to what the public already conceive of as their favourite ideology. Wasko (2005, p. 39) argues that: “Interrelationships between media and communication industries and sites of power in society are necessary for the complete analysis of communication” and that “an important theme in political economic research has been tracking the relationships between political power and media power”. I want to further allude that political leadership as sites and/or sources of power can influence their followers even on their social media choices. As such,

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we increasingly live in online filter bubbles that only expose us to the ideas we already agree with. This is consistent with a broader psychological literature on confirmation bias, showing that we are more likely to seek out and agree with views that align with our pre-existing beliefs. (de-Wit et al., 2019)

This notion by de-Wit et al. (2019) links the political economy theory with the selective exposure concept of media content.

Selective Exposure In this section, I deal with the concept of selective exposure and try to unravel how it leads to both political and media polarisation. My focus is on social media polarisation and how it links with political polarisation. I also try to link selective exposure to the political economy theory to reveal how the two influence both media and political polarisation in my analysis of purposively selected WhatsApp group texts. “Politically motivated selective exposure is the act of preferentially selecting pro-dispositional media or media content for political reasons” (Barnidge et al., 2020, p. 83; Feldman et al., 2014). Further research has revealed that “selective exposure is driven more by a tendency to confirm prior beliefs” (Barnidge et al., 2020, p. 83; Garrett & Stroud, 2014). Furthermore, Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) and Wojcieszak and Garrett (2018) concur that selective exposure leads to biassed consumption, perception and retention of media content that leads to reinforcement of polarised attitudes. Motivations for selective exposure range from emotional states (Valentino et al., 2009), informational utility (Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2005), social identity (Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 2010; Stroud, 2011) to political preferences (Barnidge et al., 2020, p. 83). Strong partisans have been found to be strongly engaged or involved in selective media exposure. Research has revealed that many social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter have “become sites of ferocious political argument”. Some researchers contend that “we increasingly live in online filter bubbles that only expose us to the ideas we already agree with” (de-Wit et al., 2019). While the “range of media available in a local area helps to shape community narratives” (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001), this study argues that with the advent of unrestrictive social media,

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community narratives are shaped by both opinion leaders and individuals’ lived experiences. Thus, individuals carry with them to social media sites those political pre-dispositions that they already have from their political communities. To add to that, other researchers have explored how “news media shape people’s perception of polarization in the political system” (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2015; Rojas et al., 2016). Online media patrons are now both creators/producers and consumers of news, now commonly known as prosumers. Therefore, it may not only be news media that shape people’s perceptions but experiential factors that prosumers bring into online communities. For example, being a religious and loyal political party cadre can cause someone to bring their political pre-dispositions online. Selective exposure therefore leads to media polarisation. Of note in this study is my argument that selective exposure can be influenced by the political economy where the intersection between power and economy determines the production, distribution and consumption of media content. The commodified content results in the audience being selective due to their lived experiences and their ideological disposition. Basing on these two theoretical arguments, I argue that (social) media aids political polarisation in as much as social media consumption is determined by political polarisation. Antagonised media standpoints are therefore a reflection of media at war, an expression of participation as a site of ideological contestation.

Methodology This study is a qualitative research hinged on extracting meaning as enunciated by the interpretive research paradigm (Creswell, 2003; Willing, 2001). The focus is on the discursive practices of polarised WhatsApp group members whose divisions are fueled by both (social) media and political affiliations. Therefore, the research is both explanatory and descriptive as I investigate and analyse online interactions (Chibuwe, 2020). The research looked at five purposively sampled WhatsApp groups in which the researcher was a member. I was a participant observer in all the five groups though my intention to study polarisation in these groups remained a secret so as not to influence the online behaviour of the participants. I picked out debates of interest to my study by way of either taking screenshots using my smart phone or writing down the discussions in my note book. Because of the abundance of information from the groups

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(almost daily, there were political discussions in most of these selected groups), my data capturing intervals were irregular and at times spaced (even after a week or so). The ranges in the total number of members per group are a result of members who either exit the group for various reasons or are removed by administrators while new members are added. The groups, which became the units of analysis, were as follows: Politics and Sports: The group was created on 21 February 2018 and membership was decided by group administrators. The group comprised males and females. Members were of varied political backgrounds and there was no limit in numbers (some exit the group while others are added or join using group link). Total membership ranged between 140 and 160 members. Church WhatsApp group: This was a man only and one church denomination group with a membership of between 350 and 380 men. Group administrators added members; church (denomination members) were drawn from around the world. The group comprised pastors and congregants. The assumption is that the group focuses on church issues that mostly affect the male league in the church. Residents : This group was created on 15 December 2020 and it is composed of residents of fast growing rural shopping and residential area in Chivi district. Selection of group members was decided by group administrators and it included males and females of varying ages and various political affiliations. Membership was based on being a resident and ranged between 85 and 100 with occasional exiting and addition of members. The assumption is that the group focuses on issues that affect residents of their community (for example, service delivery by the RDC; security of residents and business etc.). News media: The group was created on 3 September 2016. Administrators decided and added members to the group and it comprised both males and females of various political affiliations. Membership ranged from 240 to 360. The assumption is that news updates are going to dominate the posts on the platform. Family (Clan) group: The group was created on 6 December 2017 and membership ranged from 70 to 100 participants. Only members of the clan, both males and females were included in the group. The assumption is that only posts to do with family issues would dominate the platform. I purposively selected those posts that antagonised the groups on political lines. As can be noted from the names of the groups, only Politics and Sports seemed to be overly a political online platform. In as much as political news/issues are inevitable, an online content analysis of debates that dominated the sampled groups aimed at identifying the extent of social

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media polarisation emanating from political polarisation and vice versa. The analysis also aimed to draw any similarities and differences among the sampled groups.

Findings I adopted a thematic presentation of the data obtained through virtual ethnography in which I was a participant observer. Themes were sourced from the emerging patterns that I observed from the five WhatsApp groups. Similar or related observations were grouped together and are discussed under one theme. The findings revealed the degree of polarisation in the following themes:

Political Polarisation: Decimating Identities Through Online ‘Debates’ Observations on all five WhatsApp groups showed that group members are politically polarised and are divided mainly according to two rivalry political parties, namely ZANU-PF and CCC. In each group, there are dominant voices who become opinion leaders, just like in offline situations. Another major observation was that there were profound differences between group members and the differences are chiefly ideological. Members strove to defend their political identities and destroy others’. Group members identified themselves as “patriots ” and others as “sell outs ”. Of critical importance is that except the Family group, the other four groups had both ZAUN-PF and CCC members claiming to be patriots and accused each other of being sell-outs. Perceived ZANUPF members in Sports and Politics, News Media, Church and Residents groups labelled CCC members in those groups sell-outs, accusing them of being Western surrogates. In contrast, members inclined to CCC accused those perceived to be ZANU-PF to be sell-outs as well, claiming they are selling out the country to the Chinese. Patriots are known for defending their sovereignty while sell-outs give away their territorial integrity. Interestingly, these political differences are also a manifestation of a global political polarity between the East and the West. These divisions reflect irreconcilable differences that are online manifestations of political polarisation.

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Another division was noted in attempts by one political identity to obliterate efforts by another political entity. For example, in the Politics and Sports, the News Media and the Residents groups, the “Nyika inovakwa nevene vayo” (A country is developed by its own people) mantra by the ruling ZANU-PF was contorted by the opposition CCC to “Nyika inoputswa nevene vayo” (A country is destroyed by its own people). Such autochthonous conflicts permeated the selected groups frequently and became fertile ground for analysis. Nyika inovakwa nevene vayo is a ZANU-PF motto that motivates citizens to take responsibility in the developmental issues of their country. However, perceived CCC members in the Politics and Sports, the News Media and the Residents groups presented counter discourse to the Nyika inovakwa nevene vayo mantra and argued that currently, Nyika inoputswa nevene vayo. This dictum connotes alleged massive corruption in the government. To support their argument, perceived CCC members in these three groups always refer to alleged corruption by Prisca Mupfumira who stood accused of syphoning US$95 million while Obadiah Moyo, a former Minister of Health and Child Care, was accused of misappropriating US$20 million meant for procurement of Covid-19 vaccines. The developmental identity of the ruling party is tainted by the corruption tag from the CCC. Name tagging and identity smearing were reflective of the identities and perceptions that the public takes with them onto social media platforms (Klein, 2020). Most significant to note is the fact that the social media are equally polarised just like the legacy media. The major difference is that with online platforms such as those selected for this study, polarisation is intra-group and felt more between group participants. This is unlike in legacy print media where gatekeeping and editorial policies sieve the information to accommodate only those ideas that satisfy the owners and funders of the media. Thus, the political economy theory weighs more in the legacy media content production than in social media where participants are prosumers responsible for the production and consumption of their content. Notable in social media platform is cyber bullying by dominant or opinion leaders who cow down others into silence or even into exiting the group. The Neumanian Spiral of Silence concept dominates social media platforms in conflicts where decimation of political/ideological identities is rife. Autochthonous conflicts in this study were observed as group members strove to legitimate their political relevance and obliterate the significance of their political competitors. One observation noted was how the launch

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Fig. 14.1 CCC logo

of CCC was received. In all the five selected groups, members appropriated religion in their cyber wars to either promote their identities or to symbolically annihilate their opponents. Those members who identified with ZANU-PF in all the five groups posted more the messages that linked the CCC logo symbol with Satanism while they posted messages that venerate the ZANU-PF leader. Below is the CCC logo (Fig. 14.1). On the other hand, CCC group participants in the Church and Family groups frequently posted this message: “No true Christian is holly as long as he/she supports ZANU-PF ”. This was based on the allegations of corruption and criminality levelled against the ruling party. Christianity and Satanism are extreme and antagonistic religions. The chasm between the two religions is symbolic of the chasm that exists between ZANUPF and CCC. This marks the degree of polarity in Zimbabwean politics which is expressed both offline and online. The perceived CCC group members in all the five groups also commented on the ZANU-PF logo that has a clinched fist. The most common phrases to refer to the clenched fist was “Bully”, “Undemocratic gesture” and the Church group referred to the clenched fist as Herod’s gesture while in the Family group it was referred to as “Svimbo yaPharaoh” (Pharaoh’s rod).1 The fist has been interpreted as a symbol of brutality against dissenting voices, rendering the party undemocratic (Fig. 14.2).

1 King Herod instructed that all male babies be killed after the Wise men from the East had misled him into believing they will tell him about the newly born King of Israel, (Mathew 1 verses 7–8) while Egyptian King Pharaoh ruthlessly dealt with the Israelites during their stay in Egypt (Book of Exodus).

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Fig. 14.2 ZANU-PF logo

While these differences are shared mostly on social media, the political leadership in both ZANU-PF and CCC formations are calling for dialogue, though under irreconcilable conditions.2 There are therefore elements of deceit in both offline and online experiences. Political leadership demands dialogue under irreconcilable conditions and this implicates futility in the whole exercise. Social media is awash with religious dogma and extremism, pointing to pre-dispositional political beliefs that members take with them onto social media platforms (Barnidge et al., 2020, p. 83). Selective exposure can be attributed to these pre-dispositional political beliefs which group members bring online (Garrett & Stroud, 2014). This points to the interconnectedness between media polarisation and political polarisation.

Social Media Polarisation, Cyber War and Denial This section discusses social media polarisation in the context of cyber wars. Cyber war refers to altercations and bullying on the virtual spaces such as the selected WhatsApp groups in this study. I purposively picked the following in the cyber war discourse: Use of a bin symbol/emoji to illustrate rubbish or stupidity of an argument; online violence through the use of insults and name calling (as opposed to rational debates); posting false information as a means of propaganda. In all the five groups sampled, participants frequently used a bin symbol to dismiss arguments put forward by perceived opponents. While “exposure to like-minded media increases polarization” (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021, p. 198), there are also tendencies that “the more political media you absorb, the more warped your perspective of the other side

2 ZANU-PF wants dialogue with all opposition political parties under Political Actors Dialogue (POLAD) while CCC dismisses POLAD as a circus and prefers to meet President Emmerson Mnangagwa separately from POLAD.

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Fig. 14.3 A bin emoji used to dismiss an argument on social media

becomes.’ (Klein, 2020). Therefore, the use of a bin symbol to counter an argument is reflective of a warped perspective by the sender of the bin emoji. Below is the commonly posted bin emoji that permeated all the five groups (Fig. 14.3). The use of such symbols as in Fig. 14.3 symbolises denial by a recipient of a message. At the same time, denial also insinuates rigidity in terms of political identity. It is also a reflection of the magnitude of hostilities that arise on social media platforms. In the context of political polarisation, Ali et al. (2021, p. 34) opine that “online discussions increase political disagreement, intergroup hostility, and political polarization”. Intergroup hostilities are also a reflection of the pre-dispositions that group members take with them onto social media platforms. It is worth noting that even the Family and Church groups had these hostilities ingrained in the ongoing discourses despite them being expected of focusing either on family matters or religious issues respectively. The digression to political matters also shows the ubiquitous nature of national politics and that everyone is indeed political. Cyber bullying or online violence was also rampant in all but the Family group. Online violence was very limited in the Family group probably because the group members were managing family relations. However, the Church group was also awash with online violence, disregarding the ethos of the group and the expectations of a church organisation. Use of terms such as “Vatengesi” (sell-outs), or “Ngochani” (Homosexuals) to refer to perceived CCC group members was very prevalent in all but the Family group. Homosexuality is a same sex practice most common in Western countries and references to it reinforces selling out our traditional values and beliefs in favour of foreign ones,

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thereby diluting our sovereignty. It is insulting in Zimbabwe t refer to someone as Ngochani. There was also the use of derogatory terms like “Mhondi” (Murderers), “Mabhinya” (Rapists/murderers) or “Mbavha” (Thieves) to refer to perceived ZANU-PF members. These insults alluded to the allegations of violence and corruption by ZANU-PF militia and the government officials respectively. Such online altercations would result in some members exiting their groups after being insulted. Such “uncivil” discussions and anonymity often lead the “social media users towards acrimonious debates” (Dahlberg, 2001). Online behaviours of such nature ended up converting online media platforms from rational virtual public arenas to fear inducing spheres (Chibuwe, 2020). Also to be noted is that resorting to insults and name calling is a form of denial by hardened political autochthons, in this case perceived ZANU-PF or CCC members.

Conclusion: Resistance and Misinformation as Forms of Deceit? This chapter has demonstrated the “relationships among political opinion extremity, selective exposure, and perceived media bias” (Barnidge et al., 2020). Offline partisan allegiance translates to online partisan loyalty as expressed through online polarisation. The owners, funders and controllers of the means of mental production have an immense influence on online content production, distribution and consumption. The heavy handedness of offline media in form of the gatekeeping powers of editors is also felt online as at times Whatsapp group Administrators demonstrated bias by reprimanding and at times removing perceived wayward and ‘unfavourable’ contributions from some group members. Thus, offline polarity translates to online antagonism. There has also been tendencies to demonstrate resistance in the face of open truth as a form of denial and deceit. Use of the bin emoji by participants in all the selected groups demonstrated this gesture of denial and political rigidity that has been translated onto social media platforms. In the face of the overlapping relationship between political and media polarisation, the questions that require further interrogation are: Will a road to political maturity based on tolerance and unity of purpose ever take shape? What role should journalists play to ensure a contestable political terrain prevails in an election in Zimbabwe?

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Cyber bullying has also been observed even in Church groups and this has also led to spiral of silence online just as it takes place offline. Dominant opinion leaders at times override and harass others online, resulting in some group members remaining passive on online platforms. Online media polarisation is likely to remain a permanent feature in the media industry. This chapter concludes that media are at war and chances of patriotic, nationalistic and healing journalism are slim in Zimbabwe especially in the face of rampant misinformation and resistance and violence is inevitable in future elections. Therefore, the Zimbabwean political landscape seems to remain polarised for the foreseeable future and this has ramifications for media ecology in Zimbabwe.

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CHAPTER 15

Citizen or Alien? Politics of Urban Control and the Dis(ex)tortion of Democracy in Zimbabwe Andrew Mutingwende

...a virulent, narrowed-down version of Zimbabwean history oversimplified and made rigid by its reliance on dualisms and binaries of insider/outsider, indigene/stranger, and landed/landless, authentic/inauthentic, patriot/sell out. The net effect of operating these binaries is the institution of othering as a permanent condition of political and cultural life where ‘difference’ translates unproblematically into ‘foe’. (Muponde, 2004, p. 176)

Introduction This article is an inward-looking examination of the challenges of the Zimbabwean state’s ambivalent positionality on the fundamentals governing urbanites’ citizenship rights within the city space during

A. Mutingwende (B) Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_16

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elections. The state’s generative violence and ineptitude in taming and yoking together existential political differences in the urban space have culminated in injurious urban vulnerabilities and dichotomies such as: “insider/outsider, indigene/stranger, landed/landless, authentic/ inauthentic, patriot/sell-out”, thus creating unharmonious (non)citizen dialectics (Muponde, 2004, p. 176). This politicisation of urban space especially during election times has transmogrified most of Zimbabwe’s cities into arenas of torture, displacement and general precarity due to escalations in the civic assault, exceptionalist evictions, clientelist patronage and impunity. Worst, party politics has weaponised and polarised the media adapting it to a diet of falsehoods and misinformation as a cover-up ideological move to muzzle the truth. For instance, the just ended 26 March 2022 by-elections trampled on fundamental rights and freedoms of the urban populace regarding some as clients and others as proverbial ‘non-citizens.’ This exceptionalist-clientelist project by the state machinery has been mostly achieved through violence and ideological manipulation. Collaboratively, state media, in particular, has grossly propagandised these developments to ideologically broom away and displace the opposition from urban spaces at the same time legitimising and repositioning the ruling party. The proliferation of electoral violence within the urban jurisdiction such as Kwekwe, Harare and Masvingo emanated from party scuffles over urban space mostly by the Emmerson Mnangagwa-led Zimbabwe African National UnionPatriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the Nelson Chamisa-led Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) and the Douglas Mwonzora-led Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-A). Early back, apart from the virtual swallowing of the Joshua Nkomo-led PF ZAPU in the mid-1980s, the ruling party’s intolerance of a pluralist state began from the 2000s, and from then Zimbabwe has been labelled a ‘party-state’ and especially its capital, ‘the city of glasses and smoke/teargas.’ This article critiques the ruling party’s retaliatory stance towards the opposition and its interference with state security apparatuses and the media to throttle dissent and peaceful civil disobedience. Through a bi-polar theoretical approach, it establishes that the media’s gross misrepresentation of electoral and urban control facts betrays the objectivity condition of journalism. The chapter, therefore, puts the state-owned (The Herald, Kwayedza) and private-owned (Daily News, NewsDay) news reports covering the by-elections to a critical test by deconstructing online media reports from a linguistic perspective

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and using two theoretical frameworks: The Genre theory as a classificatory criterion for media genres, and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) are used to analyse the taxonomised online media sub-genre and to expose reporters’ concealed ideological subjectivities and stance-taking against the objectivity/facticity or neutrality ideal of news reporting. The goal of the chapter is to expose that subjectivities and ideologies in news media help to catalyse urban space politics between political parties at the expense of urbanites.

Background The article casts cordons around three representative cities that are infamous battle grounds among the ZANU-PF, CCC and MDCT political parties. It examines urban space-control trajectories in a nation “renowned among scholars for having one of the continent’s most stringent and well-institutionalized urban planning bureaucracies” (McGregor & Chatiza, 2020, p. 6). State security apparatuses have been the ruling party’s stooges to coerce people to conceive ZANU-PF as the biggest and tabooed totem of the watershed. Those who take a detour from the mainstream party support are labelled ‘totem-eating’ malcontents who, at best, deserve ‘ritual cleansing’ by exposure to violence (Muponde, 2004). Among a catalogue of urban violence metaphorising the 1st of August 2018 pursuer-fugitive relations between the army and the victims, the advance-retreat see-saw dance in itself defines who, in that process, should or has the capacity to gain or lose the urban space. Zimbabwe’s socio-political urban crisis has a long history since independence. Climactic party tumults grew especially with “[t]he coming in of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999 [which] changed the political landscape and challenged the political narratives of the land” (Mungwari 2019, p. 277). In the subsequent February 2000 constitutional referendum plebiscite in which the MDC-supporting urbanites voted NO against the wish of ZANU-PF, the popularity of the ruling party dwindled dramatically. This “electoral clout by defeating ZANU (PF) in a constitutional referendum in early 2000 [and the] presidential elections in 2002” fuelled everlasting and superlative acrimony between the urbanites and the ZANU-PF party which began bankrolling state security apparatuses to thrash on the urbanites and their forms of livelihoods, especially in Harare (McGregor & Chatiza, 2020, p. 8). Thus, MDC’s “mass popular support marked the end of ZANU (PF)’s

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dominance of the capital” and “Harare thus became an embattled MDC stronghold, with an MDC council” (McGregor & Chatiza, 2020, p. 8). The subsequent brazen swoop on all forms of structural informality during Operation Murambatsvina or ‘Clean-up filth/trash’ also culminated in massive displacement, city vagrancy and abject poverty, apart from the punitive and exceptionalist driving of displaced masses to the capital’s peri-urban farms and rural areas (Mungwari, 2019). In Harare urban, suspected opposition supporters were interpreted as ‘strangers’ and were evicted from Dzivarasekwa, Glenview, Mbare, Mabvuku, Chitungwiza, Hatcliffe Extension and other surrounding areas (Muponde, 2004). Hammar (2002, p. 214) captures this exceptionalist stance by observing that “[t]he stranger ‘other’ is defined as a misfit in the social and symbolic conditions that the practice of the real belongingness of the belongers creates”. While other scholars attribute the victims of urban evictions as politically totemless for not voting and associating with ZANU-PF, the ruling party has a “psyche to render the idea of the nation a taboo and citizenship synonymous with totem” and as such “[t]otemless people have not only included city dwellers (who allegedly support the opposition party (MDC), white commercial farmers, foreign journalists (black and white) and the troubled farm laborers” (Muponde, 2004, pp. 176–177). The notion of (non)citizen dialectics is, thus, propagated through ZANU-PF’s exceptionalism since “anyone seen as opposing the regime becomes a non-citizen, an enemy, subject to violent attack”. The trashing or brooming off of the so-called ‘totemless’ or ‘totemeating’ opposition masses from the city space has continued through the years. It is synonymous with city cleansing in order to reward government officials and ZANU-PF party cardholders (McGregor & Chatiza, 2020; Muponde, 2004). The ruling party’s ‘vote-seeking behaviour’ and the “‘swallowing’, of opponents” (Muponde, 2004, p. 179) only exposes its clientelism and exceptionalism which also affected many urban spaces like Sakubva suburb and the formally licensed Green Market in Mutare except Chikanga that housed the junior Central Intelligence Officers (CIOs) (McGregor & Chatiza, 2020). ZANU-PF also used Chipangano, a youth militia policing Mbare vending “to take over the City of Harare district office building for Mbare – Carter House – and continued to surveil and police access along partisan lines, with backing from the CIO” (McGregor & Chatiza, 2020, p. 10). The state’s armed panoptic surveillance of cities exposes the mutation of its political DNA even further to the deposing of the long-serving

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leader, Mugabe during the November 2017 coup which marked dramatic power changeovers within the urban space. Equally, the 2018/2019 urban killings by the army also paint a picture of the urban space as an unsettling war zone over urban space occupation. During the skirmishes, apart from the ideology to thwart mass legitimacy and credibility protests, the military’s charge towards the fleeing unarmed civilians on the city space is the metaphorisation of the state’s ideology to create spaces for its clients after the ZANU-PF lost most urban seats to the opposition in the 2018 polls. Since the 2017 coup era, the ZANU-PF party has been using “a mix of ‘repressive’ and ‘generative’ strategies but these have been notably unsuccessful in winning back urban votes” (McGregor & Chatiza, 2020, p. 2). Equally, the killings that transpired towards and after the 26 March by-elections like the Kwekwe and the Nyatsime brutal murders among others are indicators of a bloodthirsty propensity to delegitimise the CCC opposition and dwindle its popularity in the urban locale. The by-elections were held amid a dearth of freedom of association, denial of free campaign spaces for the opposition, political abductions, torture and killings. This article casts shadows on such similar manifestations of the urban control power matrix between political parties during the 26 March 2022 by-elections. The goal, here, is to examine the reflections of such power dynamics that are reproduced through ‘reporter voice’ attitudinal subjectivities against the ‘objectivity/neutrality’ ideal of news reporting.

Media Regulations Trajectories in Post-independence Zimbabwe The dawn of independence in 1980 called for the restructuring of the Zimbabwean press system. From the colonial past, the main state newspapers were under the control of the Argus Media Group based in South Africa. The Zimbabwean state in January 1981 launched a Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) that was to oversee the operation of the Zimbabwe Newspapers Limited (Zimpapers) including the Zimbabwe Inter-African News Agency (ZIANA) (Saunders, 1999). The Zimpapers ran the state-owned newspapers: The Herald, The Chronicle, The Sunday Mail, Sunday News, Kwayedza and The Manica Post. These state-owned papers were seen to be publicising news in favour of the state and hence the credibility of Zimpapers dwindled as its independence was marred especially by the state’s political interference and ZANU-PF’s immunity

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to censure. In the process, those people critical of government like “editors and journalists were dismissed and others often threatened” (Willems, 2004, p. 5). Overwhelming criticism, civic disgruntlements and state corruption spurred the emergence of the private media like The Standard, The Zimbabwe Independence, The Zimbabwe Mirror and sundry which were all launched in the 1990s and this helped to make the voice of the subaltern heard more than before. The private media also worked to criticise the follies of the state and ruling party. A weaponry of stringent colonial media laws such as “The Official Secrets Act (1970), the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (1960)” continued and contributed to the shrinkage of the media expressive space in post-independence Zimbabwe (Willems, 2004, p. 5). Later, a private newspaper, the Daily News was launched in the late 1990s and particularly popularised itself in the parliamentary plebiscite polled in 2000. The Daily News ’s rising popularity and critical approach to the foibles of the government led to its successive bombings in April 2000 and January 2001 by suspected state agents and, in the process, “journalists, reporters and the editor of the newspaper were arrested and harassed on numerous occasions” (Willems, 2004, p. 6). In the 2000s, through the newly appointed Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, an arsenal of draconian media regulatory acts reminiscent of the colonial past was launched to monitor the coverage and expression of both state and private news. Such media legislative acts included the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). Both were meant to literally thwart the publication of information deemed invective to the state and President, notwithstanding their facticity or ‘truth value’ (Mungwari, 2019). The AIPPA, specifically, commanded the registration and accreditation of private news agencies with the Commission of Media and Information. Fear of arrest, torture and death forced news reporters, especially in the state-owned press to strictly self-censor information. This became a contradiction because the prime role of the media is to independently and impartially inform the public of newsworthy events, policies and views of people and events (Jakaza, 2016).

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Subjectivity-Objectivity Dialectics in Zimbabwean Media The aim of this chapter is to put to a critical test the nature of the reportage of the 26 March 2022 by-elections by both state-owned (The Herald, Kwayedza) and private-owned (NewsDay, Daily News) against the ‘objectivity/facticity’ or neutrality matrix. This is a litmus test for ‘reporter voice’ attitudinal and ideological stance-taking which flouts the news reporting facticity condition. To do this, I lean my analysis on two theoretical frameworks as stated earlier to linguistically screen and scrutinise online news reports around the by-elections looking at the politics of spatial urban dominance by three political parties, ZANU-PF, CCC and MDC-A This undertaking begs a critical question: how does a news reporter’s lexico-grammatical choice betray his/her objectivity/neutrality or facticity claims during election events? Indeed, the notion of ‘objectivity/facticity’ or ‘neutrality’ in news reporting as noted by Cunningham (2003) in Sabao (2013, p. 42) “…. is an elusive concept, far too hard to describe and define and subject to individual understandings of notions of ‘truth’, ‘fairness’, ‘balance’ and ‘facticity’.” Cunningham (2003, p. 2) bets, “Ask ten journalists what objectivity means and you’ll get ten different answers.” This proves that “the notion of ‘objectivity’ is a ‘theoretical ideal’ which remains a central concept to debate surrounding online journalism” (Sabao, 2013, p. 41;). The terms ‘(un)newsworthy,’ ‘objectivity/subjectivity’ are suspects for the existence of biases or ideologies in journalism as summed up by Willems, 2004) that: Newspapers decide which events they regard as important enough to report. A large number of events are not even referred to. Events are not newsworthy in themselves but only become ‘news’ when they are selected for inclusion in news reports. News is not simply that which happens but that which is regarded and presented by the media as newsworthy. (Willems, 2004, p. 3)

This observation by Willems (2004, p. 3) is true in as far as journalists’ tenacity or fixity to objectivity claims is often betrayed by media subjectivities or ideological leanings on certain political parties. This means that “100% agreement is not possible; there are ideologues in the world

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who will not concede to any presentation other than a forceful statement of their own point of view” (WeekNews, 2005, quoted in Sabao, 2013, p. 42). This means that apart from personal fears that might trigger motivations such as self-censorship, reporters are subjected to ideologies stemming from media regulations dictates by media houses and the state, of course. The dissolution of journalistic independence or freedom to express neutrality based on facts on the ground makes this article critical of propositions that conceive reporters as independent producers of information. I posit that a news reporter (state-owned or private-owned) is a mere insignificant stool pigeon or stooge whose faculties, though aware of truths, are configurations of dictations emanating from powerful external forces. The news reports manifest the externalisation of these powerful external forces and appetites other than theirs. Correspondingly, “‘objectivity’ is an elusive ideal” because its (un)attainability is determined by the reporters themselves who might be subject to certain media ideologies dictating their writing upon facts (Sabao, 2013, p. 39). Online news reports as a sub-genre under media reports are a construction of language and register. Indeed, the register configuration and structure of news reports “shield journalists from blame and legal action” (Mindich, 1998, p. 10) and this is possible due to the propensity for attribution by reporters in news construction (Sabao, 2013). It, therefore, becomes a critical issue and sore point requiring vaster space than here for a conceptual and theoretical visit in order to come up with implementable and restorative strategies to prevent further harm especially on the urban poor. As already intimated the gist of this chapter is to unveil subjectivities and to promote “the realisation of the ideal of ‘neutral point of view’ when a reporter/contributor posts a story” (Sabao, 2013, p. 42). The major significance of this undertaking, as evidenced in the analysis section, is to restore ‘objectivity/neutrality’ mired in reporter subjectivities through eliding aesthetic journalistic devices which might be potholes for falsehoods and ideological biases.

Research Methods and Corpora The article is a discourse-linguistic study that uses a descriptive qualitative approach to online news reports on the impact of election events surrounding the 26 March 2022 by-elections in the Zimbabwean cities of Harare, Kwekwe and Masvingo. The reason for this spatial delimitation is that these cities recorded a high level of urban space-control

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politics between political parties which amounted to astronomical levels of violence, exclusionary and clientelist politics. Through purposive sampling, the corpus for the analysis are online articles drawn from The Herald, Kwayedza (state-owned), NewsDay and Daily News (privateowned). Descriptive qualitative sampling was adopted for the effectiveness of its evaluative approach and flexibility to data analysis, in this case, of the precipitation of the by-election plebiscite. The researcher collected eight online articles (two for each paper) basing on their controversiality and capacity in covering events around the 26 March 2022 by-elections and randomly selected at least two representative reports per paper for analysis, reserving the rest for cross references. The by-election polls which ushered in the urban space precarity call for research urgency and invite innumerably weighty questions such as: Who or what perpetrates systems of urban violence and exceptionalism and who, in that process, benefits or becomes the victim of such violent and exclusionary practices? Why has this system replicated in a democracy such as Zimbabwe? Glimpsing at the reportage of the controversial 26 March 2022 by-elections, this article also aims to locate undercurrents of journalistic attitudinal and ideological subjectivities against the ‘objectivity/neutrality’ ideal in media discourse and hence pertinently searches for answers to: How do journalistic subjectivities and ideological leanings betray the ‘objectivity/facticity’ condition of news reporting and in what way do they perpetuate systems of urban exceptionalism and clientism? Towards finding lasting solutions that enforce inclusivity and accommodation of victims, a further question surfaces; how may news reporting trajectories be transformed to indirectly and positively influence electoral politics that cherishes credibility and inclusivity within the urban space? This chapter engages Martin and Rose’s (2008) Genre Theory as a classificatory method for the establishment of taxonomies for media subgenres, then Fairclough’s (2003) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) for the analysis of these sub-genres’ textuality and lexico-grammatical features in order to determine trajectories of ‘objectivity-subjectivity’ dialectics in news reporting. The findings are that online reports contain undercurrents of journalistic ideological and attitudinal subjectivities which betray the ‘objectivity/neutrality’ mandate of news construction and dissemination. It is this stance that tramples on truths and legitimises urban spatial hegemony, exceptionalist and clientelist styles among political parties visà-vis the urbanites. I, here, posit that most journalists are great scribes for partisanship, urban clientism and exceptionalist violence perpetuating

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the (non)citizen dialectics. In the analysis section, I have coded the data for easy reference, for example as C1, C2…C3 and so on.

Theoretical Grounding Media discourse has attracted innumerable scholars (Jakaza, 2013, 2016; Morecraft, 2012; Robinson, 2012; Sabao, 2013; Vo, 2011 and more) to critique journalists’ abidance to the truth value of facts on the ground. This large linguistic repertoire, in particular, evaluated news basing on their controversiality to ‘truth value’ semantics. Their approach to media discourse has emanated from varied theoretical angles as Genre Theory (see Raback-Schink, 2012; Sabao, 2014); CDA (Eisenlauer, 2013; Jullian, 2011; Machin & Mayr, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2015; Wodak, 2001); Pragma-dialectic theory (see Jakaza, 2013, 2016); Multimodal Discourse Analysis (CDA). This body of scholarship agrees that objectivity in news reporting is unattainable as reporters are subject to attitudinal and ideological biases. This analysis runs consonant to this proposition; however, no scholar so far has explored the contribution of the media in perpetuating spatial urban control polarities between political parties during the controversial polls from a journalistic point of view. Scholars like Jakaza (2013, 2016), Siebörger and Adendorff (2015) and others aid much focus on media discourse, stemming from parliamentary debates. They conclude that journalists’ coverage of such debates reflects vast ideological leanings. In this analysis, I change the scene from the parliament by adjourning debates and rushing people out to quell party tumults burning a nation’s cities marked by woe, rubbles, dust and blood. The tear-gassed city space has not only chased away peaceful demonstrators and informal traders, but also the truth from the media scribe’s nib. As such, this research undertaking casts lenses at the reflections of hegemonic urban control mechanisms by political parties in major cities like Harare, Kwekwe and Masvingo, especially looking at their reflections in private and public media. Plausibly, this article embarks on a mission to deconstruct state-owned and private-owned media reports on urban violence and urban spatial dominance using a linguistic-discourse paradigm to examine ideologies that motivate urban violence and exceptionalist politics.

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Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) The term Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) first appeared in the publications by Fairclough and was later used by van Dijk, van Leeuwen (2015), Wodak (2001) and many more. CDA offers a method to textual analysis and it views language as a social semiotic medium that expresses power dynamics in a context where communication takes place between interactants. It has to do with how language functions “in creating, maintaining and legitimating inequality, injustice, and oppression in society” (van Leeuwen, 2015, p. 1). Wodak (2001) quoted in Acosta (2018:60), opines that CDA relates to “the concept of power, history, and ideology, as key elements in every critical discourse analysis.” Therefore, every text or discourse produced in a specific context entails hidden ideologies and power dynamics. Indeed, “Critical Discourse analysts focus on a particular problem of power abuse through language and take therefore the convenient methodology to elucidate those signs of social injustice”. It exposes undemocratic agendas enshrined in ideological text communicated in context. Dolan et al. (2006) quoted in Infante (2015–2016, p. 5) observe that “social and historical context play an important role in CDA. In fact, discourses are not produced without contexts and hence cannot be interpreted without them.” CDA provides an assortment of analytical mechanisms and methodologies to discourse with the purpose of unveiling power relations, ideologies and social inequalities. The idea of social context means that any text, spoken or written, may be critically deconstructed to account for hidden dimensions. The article discourse-linguistically analyses the reflections of power dynamics between the political parties over the urban space and how such phenomena are reflected in the reporter voice.

Genre Theory The meaning of ‘genre’ can be traced back to Latin to mean a ‘class’ or ‘kind’ (Chandler, 2000). In linguistics, the term alludes to an identifiable or classifiable text type. Bhatia (1993, p. 13) defines genre as “a recognizable communicative event characterized by a set of communicative purpose(s) identified and mutually understood by the members of the…community in which it regularly occurs.” This paper uses the Genre Theory which offers tools for finding a rudimentary taxonomic or classificatory criterion for media texts and their segmentation into

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specific generic classes. However, there is a steaming controversy from three schools of thought over the best criterion of theorising genre: New Rhetoric Genre Studies (NRGS), English for Specific Purposes (ESP) and Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). While New Genre Studies conceives genre as recognised by a recursive situation which is later usualised or systematised by a discourse community, ESP, as propounded by Swales (1990) states that genre is known for its compositionality of communicative series of events that carry a coded specific communicative purpose known to speakers in a context. The SFL school as proposed by Halliday (1984) conceives ‘genre’ “as a staged, goal-orientated, and purposeful social activity that people engage in as members of their culture”. Both Martin (1984) and Swales (1990) agree that a genre is recognised by context, content and a coded series of communicative stages towards a goal. This, therefore, means that “communication is impossible without the agreed codes of genre”. In the case of this article, the media genre which Swales (1990) conceives as the ‘supra genre’ houses a portmanteau of sub-genres that can be discretely truncated or chopped into unitary sub-genres using the criteria established by the three schools of thought above. Accordingly, “[m]edia discourse is also recognised as a genre/supra-genre, containing within itself genres which also contain within themselves subgenres and subsubgenres” (Sabao, 2013, p. 13). Such generic units encapsulate hard news, feature stories, online reports and so on. According to Bhatia (1993), media genre is recognised by an inverted pyramid schematic structure in which events are reported from the most important to the least important (Bhatia, 1993; Martin, 1997). Indeed, an online news report possesses an inverted pyramid schematic structure but is shared via web-based platforms to reach its audience. While acknowledging the theoretical contribution of NRGS and ESP as classification criteria, this article conceives SFL as offering the best criterion as it is an effective way of saying “sensible and useful things about any text, spoken or written” (Halliday, 1984, p. xv) due to its conception of genre as a functional-semantic approach to online media text with emphasis on context, staged and goal-orientedness of communicative events between interactants. Media reports, thus, have a usualised structure constituting the headline; introduction that introduces, the who, when, how, what and why of the news; the body that expands the intro; some authoritative comments and reference to similar occurrences in the past.

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The context for my corpus which stems from online news reports is the 26 March 2022 by-elections and their impact between political contestants as well as the generality of urbanites. Special focus is given to the media reportage on the precipitation of events on the plebiscite in order to determine its adherence to the ‘objectivity/facticity’ condition of news reporting. The online reports selected target political parties and their supporters as major participants examining ideological slant in both public and private media on such coverage in the context of a hotly controversial 26 March 2022 poll. The online reports are goal-oriented and possess a staged communicative and linguistic structure since they are meant to communicate the by-elections events and their impact on the audience. Drawing from SFL, the context contains register/language and its ideologies since “no text is free of ideology…to use language at all is to use it to encode particular positions and values” (Eggins, 2005, 11). Having theorised media discourse genre, the analysis section interprets online media reports as a truncated daughter sub-genre of media discourse.

Analysis Through the lens of Genre Theory and CDA frameworks, this section ribbons the cordons around the violent-riven and heavily policed cities of Kwekwe, Harare and Masvingo in order to give an incisive glimpse into the manifestations and repercussions of the 26 March 2022 by-election violence in the urban space and the nature of its coverage in the Herald, Kwayedza (state-owned), News Day and Daily News (private-owned) papers.

Critical Discourse Analysis of the Daily News ’ Coverage of the By-elections The Daily News online report publishes the ZANU-PF generic comment on the need to quell violence two days after the Kwekwe brazen murder of Mboneni Ncube at Mbizi 4 shopping centre where the CCC campaign rally was held. The publication came just three weeks before the 26 March 2022 by-elections. Therefore, this undertaking attempts a post-mortem analysis on three critical issues; the spatio-temporal contextualisation of the reportage, ideological party (dis) placement on the urban space and the positioning of the ‘generated’ violence at Mbizo 4.

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For the purpose of comparison, I have purposively selected the last line (C2) of the report to collate with the headline (C1). C1: C2:

ZANU-PF Calls for Free, Fair Polls. Chamisa and MDC President Douglas Mwonzora recently also called for peaceful polls.

Above, the Daily News reporter has deliberately buried “Chamisa and MDC President Douglas Mwonzora” and their call to stop violence, but has proceeded to front or foreground ZANU-PF’s (see C1). Despite the two statements communicating the same subject, their structural placement or positioning is ideological and subjective. Accordingly, “[s]ince headlines are usually read more frequently than the articles themselves, they are a powerful way to convey a particular ideological view” (Willems, 2004, p. 4) in this case to sanitise the ruling party. The reporter tries to give more weight and credibility to ZANU-PF than to the opposition. The see-saw bar of impartial party media representation diagonally defies balance and, hence is an ideology to displace the opposition from Kwekwe urban and associate it with violence. Conversely, though the Daily News has long been conceived “to be more sympathetic towards the opposition party” (Willems, 2004, p. 15), this time the reporter’s structural and linguistic choices are mired in ideological subjectivities in favour of the ruling party. The linguistic autopsy is also on a spree to question the positioning of the murder (as ‘generated’/deliberate) and the Daily News reporter’s dualistic ideological dusting of ZANU-PF and the soiling of the CCC party. The murder suspect deliberately killed the victim by “stabb[ing] Ncube with a sharp object thrice on the back” (Herald, March 2, 2022) on a mission, perhaps, to tarnish the CCC party image and to sanitise that of ZANU-PF ahead of the forthcoming by-elections (see C4). C3:

Recently scores of people were injured and one killed in Kwekwe after the Citizen Coalition for Change rally was disrupted by gangs of thugs.

The statement in C3 above has been unburied from the body of the report to unveil its subtleties and structural positionality. This is two days

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after the murder mystery and before even the deceased was buried, the report is already writing an epitaph to seal the case. The reporter contravenes the journalistic genre structure by inverting the inverted pyramid model of news reporting in which White (1998) quoted in Sabao (2013, p. 27) argues that in news reports “material is determined by the key claims that ‘the structure of news reports [must be] directed by ‘importance’ - what is ‘important’ and ‘relevant’ must come first, with the story then moving progressively through layers of decreasing ‘significance’” In this case, the reporter mentions second in importance the murder case, and first in importance the generic notion of violence. This syntactic readjustment is manipulatively set to shield the ruling party as an active agent abhorring violence and advocating for peace, and the CCC party as a chief suspect spurning violence and killings in cities. Apart from denying the CCC party a media authoritative comment and giving it only to ZANU-PF’s Political Commissar to sanitise his party as in C4, the reporter associates urban violence with CCC written in full name (see C3) to serve as banner promoting violence. C4:

Addressing media in Harare yesterday, Zanu-PF political commissar Mike Bimha said…that it was a misfortune that there had been violence… “but as a party we don’t condone violence from whatever quarter or province.”

One of the subjective stances by the reporter voice is manifested through lexical associations such as “Citizen Coalition for Change rally…disrupted by gangs” (C3), “the thugs and the CCC leader Nelson Chamisa’s supporters” (C5), “ZANU-PF…Free, Fair” (C1), “CCC official…ordered their youths to retaliate” (C5) and so on. This is discursively done to lure the audience to conceive violence as the CCC’s DNA as attested in C5 below. C5:

This led to violent confrontation between the thugs and the CCC leader Nelson Chamisa’s supporters.

Subjective and ideological leanings of the Daily News have also been shown through “up/down scaling of verbal processes by means of ‘grammatical’ intensifiers” (Martin & White, 2005, p. 145). These have the capacity to raise the emotional effect of the audience as manifested in C5.

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C6:

Matters were made worse after one of the CCC official apparently ordered their youths to retaliate, a move which led to more violence.

The reporter attempts to ideologically sensationalise the report by upscaling the audience’s emotions against the CCC party through probing the audience’s mind to conceive CCC party as the perpetrator and promoter of violence. In the statement in C6 the action agent is the “CCC official [who] ‘apparently ordered’ their youths to retaliate” and who instigated the CCC supporters “to retaliate a move which led to more violence.” Above, the Daily News reporter plays the ZANU-PF’s public relations officer in face of the by-elections ahead, distancing it from the Kwekwe killing and violence. This so as a result of the ruling party’s hegemony on both state and private media houses. Apart from ideological (dis)placement of tussling political parties over urban space occupation, the Daily News reporter’s lexico-grammatical choice and generic structure of the news report reveal that the Mbizo 4 violence and murder were deliberated. Agreeably, “[t]he choice of vocabulary also constructs particular ideological representations of events. Apart from their descriptive function, words express views and attitudes. The selection of specific words rather than others has clear ideological implications because it often reveals the underlying beliefs of journalists about actors and events” (Willems, 2004, p. 4).

Analysis of the Herald Online Report The Herald report informs the audience on the arrest and trial of five of the sixteen gangsters who were involved in ‘Mbongeni Ncube’s murder’ during the Mbizo 4 CCC campaign rally in Kwekwe. The violent gang has been labelled ‘people’ who, in addition to “stabb[ing] Ncube with a sharp object thrice on the back”, also “threw stones, spears, knives, homemade petrol missiles and used sjamboks and catapults to inflict bodily harm to people who were at CCC campaign rally.” This, in addition to the headline in C7, is a default mode of reportage that is meant to dislocate the audience from the known murder suspect. C7:

Five in court over Kwekwe rally murder.

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The Herald reporter assumes a seemingly neutral approach as it subtly distances the state and ZANU-PF from the violence and murder. In C8, the violent gang/thugs (see C3, C5) are generically referred to as ‘people’, ‘persons’ with no party links. C8:

Five of 16 people…were arrested for the March 2022 murder of 35-year-old Mbongeni Ncube.

Contrarily, the NewsDay report accuses the state and ZANU-PF as chief suspects of violence as highlighted in its headline (C9) and in C10 below. C9: C10:

Kwekwe rally murder: 11 out, State Security Agents “hijack” funeral The ZANU-PF youths who are reportedly linked to the AlShabaab militia group, later stormed the funeral gathering and chased away CCC supporters (News Day March 02, 2022)

The reticence of the Herald at the accused murderers’ release is quite revealing. Foucault (1978) quoted in Willems (2004, p. 3) observes that “silence is very much part of any discourse.” While the paper sanitises the state through its(state’s) tenacity to prolong the accused persons’ custody, contradictorily, the NewsDay report informs that “ELEVEN out of 16 youths who” murdered “a Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) supporter” have been released amid reports that suspected state agents had ‘hijacked’ the funeral.” The term ‘hijacked’ is in quotes thus the audience’s attention is drawn to ponder at the state’s chicanery and misdemeanor on the deceased’s body, perhaps to hide evidence and exposure which leaves a clue as to which party might have perpetrated the murder. Apparently, the report sympathises with the CCC party as a victim of “suspected ZANU-PF supporters” but blames ZANU-PF, despite “Police Spokesperson Assistant Commissioner Paul Nyathi profess[ing] ignorance on the release of the suspected ZANU-PF supporters when contacted for comment last night” (News Day report, March 2, 2022) As proof the News Day also quotes the Zimbabwe NGO Forum lawyer, Darlington Marange, who reveals that “the police did not explain the release of the accused

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persons on such a serious crime.” Towards achieving objectivity, the news report quotes a multiplicity of authoritative voices ranging from the Police Commissioner to the NGO lawyer as a means to permit the audience to sieve truth on their own. Thus, the NewsDay accuses the state “suspected Intelligence Organisation (CIO) operatives hijacked the funeral of the slain CCC supporter and chased away former Mbizo legislator Settlement Chikwinya” and that “the incident came a day after Vice President Constantino Chiwenga threatened to ‘crush’ the CCC.” Agreeably, this violent and exceptionalist stance was punitive “anyone seen as opposing the regime becomes a non-citizen, an enemy, subject to violent attack”. Urban control politics was also instanced in Marondera.in Marondera. Both the Herald and the Daily News outlandishly show their attitudinal stances in support of ZANU-PF following the Marondera CCC campaign rally ban by the state days before the 26 March by-elections. Commenting on the masses that gathered at St Mary’s ZANU-PF rally in Chitungwiza the Herald online article under the headline: ‘By-elections: The morning after’, stated hyperbolically that the scene had an overflow of gatherers so huge that “even the blind could see and feel.” The report also ironically hero-worshipped Robert Mugabe Junior and Mnangagwa Junior who, being friends “made a dramatic appearance at the rally” to grace it. The publicisation of the two’s friendship is the Herald reporter’s strategic manoeuvring to erase the political scuffles between the Grace Mugabe G-40 party and ZANU-PF which ruptured into the political coup that deposed the former’s father. Ideologically, the reporter repositions ZANU-PF in Harare urban despite it being a CCC-controlled area. In the same manner, under the headline: ‘Senior CCC members praise ZANU-PF’ the Daily News covering the ZANU-PF rally at Radhaka Stadium in Marondera on 26 February 2022 quoted former Harare Deputy Mayor, Mr. Emmanuel Chiroto suggesting that “ZANU-PF should take [lost urban constituencies) back, not only in Marondera but even in Harare” since “a lot of people…are realizing that there is nothing in CCC…except empty promises.” The Daily News reporter paints a bleak picture that CCC is losing urban support due to violence.

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The reporter’s Voice on Mashonaland Central and Masvingo Urban Space Politics The Herald and the Daily News papers have grown to thingify and bastardise the CCC party, thus ideologically displacing it to give place to ZANU-PF in, especially, Marondera, Harare and Masvingo urban. The report’s evidence that in Harare and surrounding areas as Marondera, the CCC party is being denied freedom of association and free campaign spaces while both ZANU-PF and the rest of opposition parties like the MDC-T are being granted such opportunities. So, who has the supreme or ultimate rights to urban space and for that matter who suffers such during the urban space tussles? The News Day online reports display their growing sympathy towards the CCC party as seen, for example in its coverage of the CCC rally held at Mucheke stadium in Masvingo and the ruling party’s machinations. The itinerary domination of the state and ZANU-PF over the urban space and operations of the opposition also led to the near-ban of the CCC by-election campaign rally in Masvingo. With just two days remaining towards the by-election polls distractive diversions were dictated that ZANU Party also had scheduled its meetings at the same Mucheke Stadium were CCC party campaign rally was supposed to be held. Subsequently, after the rally, some CCC supporters were allegedly witch-hunted that night and tortured for attending the rally. Thus, ZANU-PF’s practices of urban dominance vie to deny at all costs the CCC party, its political opponent. The News Day report commented on Masvingo urban as a growing epicentre of violence (News Day, March, 2, 2022).

Analysis of Kwayedza Online Reports The Kwayedza paper remained reticent and evasive about the urban byelection violence that was publicly treated as newsworthy to attempt a cover-up on the ruling party’s alleged involvement in the killing. Prominent political issues of national significance are not covered by the paper. This might be so because “[v]ernacular (Shona and Ndebele) newspapers largely dwell on the reporting of developmental issues and rarely dwell on political issues” (Sabao, 2013, p. 318). Accordingly, Foucault (1978) quoted in Willems (2004, p. 3) enunciates that “silence is very much part of any discourse.” As such, by not informing the expectant audience about such fatal violence, the Kwayedza paper ideologically treats such

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incidences as not newsworthy, thus carrying away the audience’s minds to think of something else.

Conclusion The state conceives opposition formations, particularly, the CCC supporters as proverbial ‘totemless’ or ‘totem-eating’ people who refuse to be yoked with ZANU-PF and as a result are constant victims of, violence, ideological and physical exclusion from the urban space (Muponde, 2004). The weaponisation of state agents to destabilise peace in urban spaces has not been objectively covered by both private and state media. This status quo invites more effective and implementable research to quell further harm through the ruling party’s interference into independent bodies like the media and state apparatuses. All the three newspapers, the Herald, Daily News and Kwayedza flouted the ‘objectivity/neutrality’ ideal of news reporting by propagandising the byelection developments, except the NewsDay that quoted a plurality of voices from the three political parties. The Kwayedza paper was totally reticent despite the fatal violence, intimidation and denials of party rights rocking the urban space. Albeit this, van Dijk (1991) quoted in Willems (2004, p. 4) points out that “the analysis of the ‘unsaid’ is sometimes more revealing than the study of what is actually expressed in text. By choice, information is both excluded and included.” Indeed, “this polarisation of attitudes might lead to more divisions on the issue within society whereas a lively public dialogue could potentially contribute to a final solution” (Willems, 2004, p. 16).

References Acosta, M.F.C. (2018). A multimodal discourse analysis of childish Gambino’s music video “This is America”. Open Journal for Studies in Linguistics, 1(2), 57–72. https://doi.org/10.32591/coas.ojsl.0102.04057a Bhatia, V. K. (1993). Analysing genre: Language use in professional settings. Longman. Chandler, D. (1997/2000). An introduction to genre theory. Accessed on 16 March 2010, from http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/intgenre/int genre.html Cunningham, B. (2003). Rethinking objectivity. Columbia Journalism Review, 42(2), 24–44.

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Dolan, P., Pinkerton, J. & Canavan, J. (2006). Family support: From description to reflection. In P. Dolan, J. Canavan, J. Pinkerton (Eds.), Family support as reflective practice. Jessica Kingsley. Eggins, S. (2005). An introduction to systemic functional linguistics (2nd ed.). Continuum. Eisenlauer, V. (2013). A critical hypertext analysis of social media: The true colours of Facebook. Bloomsbury Academic Publishing. Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical discourse analysis. Longman. Halliday, M. A. K. (1984). Language as code and language as behaviour: A systemic-functional interpretation of the nature and ontogenesis of dialogue. In R. Fawcett, M. A. K. Haliiday, S. M. Lamhand, A. Makkai (Eds.), The semiotics of language and culture: Language as social semiotic (pp. 3–35). Pinter. Jakaza, E. (2013). Appraisal and evaluation in Zimbabwean parliamentary discourse and its representation in newspaper articles (PhD thesis). Stellenbosch University. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/79951. Jakaza, E. (2016). Subjectivity in newspaper reports on ‘controversial’ and ‘emotional’ debates: A multi-theoretical approach. Language Matters, 47 (1), 3–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/10228195.2025.1060513 Jullian, P. M. (2011). Appraising through someone else’s word: The evaluative power of quotations in news reports. Discourse and Society, 22(6), 766–780. Machin, D., & Mayr, A. (2012). How to do critical discourse analysis: A multimodal introduction. Sage Publication. Martin, J. R. (1997). Analysing genre: Functional parameters. In F. Christie & J. R. Martin (Eds.), Genre and institutions: Social processes in the workplace and school. Continuum. Martin, J. R., & Rose, D. (2008). Genre relations: Mapping culture. Martin, J., & White, P. (2005). The language of evaluation: Appraisal in English. Palgrave Macmillan. McGregor, J., & Chatiza, K. (2020). Geographies of urban dominance: The politics of Harare’s periphery. University of Manchester. Mindich, D. T. Z. (1998). Just the facts—How “objectivity” came to define American Journalism. New York University Press. Moorcraft, P. (2012). Mugabe’s war machine. Jonathan Ball Publishers. Mungwari, T. N. A. (2019). Social media and political narratives: A case of Zimbabwe. Sociology International Journal, 3(3), 277–287. https://doi.org/ 10.15406/sij.2019.03.00187. Muponde, R. (2004). The worm and the hoe: Cultural politics and reconciliation after the Third Chimurenga. In B. Raftopoulos & T. Savage (Eds.), Injustice and political reconciliation. Published by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation: Rouwkoop Cape. Available at www.ijr.org.za Raback-Schink, B. R. (2012). The influence of media bias perception on space publication. University of North Dakota.

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Robinson, A. (2012). In theory Bakhtin: Dialogism, polyphony and heteroglossia [Online]. Available: http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-bakhtin-1/. 20 March 2012. Sabao, C. (2014). Towards the theory of genre? Reflections on the problems and debates on theorising ‘genre’. Sabao, C. (2013). The reporter voice and objectivity in cross-linguistic reporting of controversial news in Zimbabwean newspapers (PhD thesis). Stellenbosch University. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/79939. Saunders, R. (1999). Dancing out of tune: A history of the media in Zimbabwe. Edwina Spicer Productions. Siebörger, I., & Adendorff, R. D. (2015). Resemiotising concerns from constituencies in the South African parliament. Southern African Linguistics and Applied Language Studies, 33(2), 171–197. https://doi.org/10.2989/ 16073614.2015.1061892. Van Leeuwen, T. (2015). Critical discourse analysis. The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction. https://doi.org/10.1002/978111 8611463/wbielsi174 Vo, D. D. (2011). Style, structure and ideology in English and Vietnamese Business HardNews Reporting—A comparative study (unpublished PhD thesis). University of Adelaide. Willems, W. (2004). Peasant demonstrators, violent invaders: Representations of land in the Zimbabwean press. World Development, 32(10), 1767–1783. ISSN 0305-750X. Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51153/ Wodak, R. (2001). What CDA is about—A summary of its history, important concepts and its developments. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis (pp. 1–13). Sage.

Newspapers Bengure, E. (2022, March 2). Five in court over Kwekwe rally murder. Herald. https://www.herald.co.zw/2022/02/five-in-court-overkwekwe-rally-murder/ Mangwana, M., & Buwerimwe, S. (2022, March 2). Kwekwe rally murder: 11 out, state security agents “hijack” funeral. NewsDay. https://www.newsday. co.zw/2022/02/kwekwe-rally-murder-11-out-state-security-agents-hijackfuneral/ Mashaya, B. (2022, March 18). ZANU-PF calls for free, fair polls. Daily News, 2022/zanupf-calls-for-free-fair-polls.

CHAPTER 16

Power, Politics and Public Media Deceit in Zimbabwe, 2000–2023 Pedzisai Ruhanya and Bekezela Gumbo

Introduction Public media play an inexorable role in safeguarding and sustaining public interest and democratic accountability in Africa. They are more significant in contexts where civil society and the opposition political parties are weak due to the overreach of the state in public affairs. However, news media ought to remain viable and independent from the control of the state to serve the public interest. This research focuses on how the Zimpapers 1980 editorial charter has been influenced by different individuals; ministers, editors, boards and government officials as they come in and leave during the Zimbabwe crisis from 2000–2023 and attendant deceit. Zimpapers owns “The Herald, The Sunday Mail, Chronicle, The

P. Ruhanya (B) Department of Creative Media and Communication, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] B. Gumbo Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_17

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Sunday News, Manica Post, Business Weekly, Kwayedza, UMthunywa, H Metro, B Metro, Suburban, Star FM, Diamond FM, Capitalk FM, Nyaminyami FM and Zimpapers Television Network” (Zimpapers Editorial Charter, para. 2). The Zimpapers Editorial Charter states among other things that the board of directors of Zimpapers acknowledges the responsibility of journalists, artists and photographers to report and comment on the affairs of the city, state, nation and the world fairly, and accurately and regardless of any commercial, personal or political interests including those of any shareholder, director, manager, editor of staff member (para. 3). It also stipulates that the editors shall be responsible to the appointed management and shall always carry out their duties in a way that will preserve and ensure the independence and integrity of all the publications under Zimpapers stable (Zimpapers Editorial Charter, para. 5). Most significantly it stipulates that in exercising their judgement, the editors shall consider national interests, public benefit and that Zimpapers are family newspapers which have to respect Zimbabwean morals and values (Zimpapers Editorial Charter, para. 6). All this belabouring serves to highlight the extent to which the applicable law forbids deceit and streamlines promotion of the public interest at Zimpapers.

Methodology and Objectives Being a qualitative comparative research, the study combined an analysis of published data on news papers articles and 13 interviews with research participants among them a government official, Zimpapers board member, editors and senior journalists from Zimpapers and media rights groups were purposively sampled for interviews as key informants. The respondents were chosen because of their experience, strategic positions and willingness to freely volunteer information. Denscombe (2003) notes that in these types of interviews, respondents’ answers are open-minded and they give opportunities for the interviewee to elaborate on points of interest based on their experiences. Interviews in social science research are understood as special conversations which enable “collecting empirical data about the social world of individuals by inviting them to talk about lives in great depth” (Liamputtong, 2009, p. 42). Actual talk and gestures are some of the raw materials of analysis in qualitative studies (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). However, Jones cautions that in carrying out the interviews, ambiguity should be avoided (1985, p. 47). The overriding objective was to understand how the institution of Zimpapers has

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been influenced by different individuals, ministers, boards editors and bureaucrats as they came and leave the organisation and attendant media deceit. Questions inquired were: how did the power and succession struggles in ZANU-PF impact Zimpapers editorial policy and how was the public interest protected during the periods of crises?

The Public Media and the Public Interest Approach This study used the public interest approach to understand the impact of the changes at Zimpapers as a public media institution to the service of its various publics. Downs (1962) argues that in any society, a government policy for instance cannot be in the public interest if it contradicts the elements of the minimum structure that define that society as captured in the legal statutes of that country. This is arguably so because in a democracy anyone who desires the continuance of a democratic society, and therefore participates in the minimal consensus concerning rules of individual and public behaviour, must have an intra-system concept of the public interest, even if he advocates change in specific social policies. Downs (1962) also observes that every citizen in a democratic society has at least an implicit conception of the public interest, that is, detailed specification of how the government ought to carry out its functions in a society. For the government to fulfil its mandate, the media plays its watchdog role hence there is an arguably close relationship and interplay between media and democracy in the pursuit and service of the public interest. Regardless of how one evaluates the functions and performance of the media, it is advanced that media institutions have become the major platforms and the privileged scenes of political activities (Dahlgren, 2009, p. 35). Discussions about media and democracy are usually framed by notions of the public sphere which emphasise that the media must provide citizens with information, ideas and debates about current affairs to ensure that the public are informed as they participate in democratic political processes (Dahlgren, 2009, p. 34). Habermas’ idea of the public sphere, defined as a metaphorical space where access to information affecting the public good is available, where discussion is ideally free from domination, and participation is on equal basis, is part of the critical role that the media play in a democratic society (Curran, 2002). The media facilitate the formation of a public sphere by providing an arena for public

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debate and by reconstituting private citizens as a public body in the form of public opinion. McNair (1999, p. 21) views the surveillance of the state by the media as an important function in a democratic society. The media should also provide a platform for public political debate, facilitating the formation of public opinion and feeding that information to the public, where it came from and also that the media in a democratic society serve as channels through which to air and advocate divergent political views by political parties and civic actors. To ensure the public interest in power-politics and political contestations, the media should give a fair and ‘objective’ coverage of all candidates in a national election and serve as a watchdog against the abuse of state or government power (Curran, 2000; Moyse, 2009; Willems, 2012; Wondwosen, 2009). To put it more succinctly, Wondwosen (2009) emphasises that when it comes to power contestation through elections, the media plays the role of: …educating the electorate about the electoral system; reporting the election campaign; serving as a platform for the information flow from the parties to the public and from the public to the political parties; serving as a debate forum for political parties, and monitoring the vote counting and the reporting of election results. In order to effectively perform their duties there has to be media freedom, which is one of the corner stones of “free and fair” elections. (p. 85)

In Zimbabwean power-politics and/or contestations, coverage of elections by the media has been conceived as a core function that makes it the fourth estate of power (Chibuwe, 2019; Chuma, 2008). However, Nyamnjoh (2005) is quick to caution that while the media have an enormous potential to play such a significant role in providing information, they can also be a vehicle for uncritical assumptions, beliefs, stereotypes, ideologies and orthodoxies that may blunt vital awareness and impinge on participatory democratisation. He argues that only when the media empower individuals and communities and contest decisions that are made in their purported interest by powerful individuals and institutions in society can the media promote democratisation (Nyamnjoh, 2009, p. 62). This is a plausible proposition as access to the media is not a given in any society, especially in developing contexts. The media are owned by powerful elites and big companies with various interests to promote and protect.

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The ‘Art of Media Deceit’ in Power Politics---A Textual Analysis Media deceit can come in various strands and depths including direct lying, misleading, self-misrepresentation, tip toeing around the truth among others (Black et al., 1995). In media studies, deception has been aptly summarised as, “a distortion with an intention to mislead users, analysts, organizations, etc. A distortion can be about content, source, identity, age, sex, or location, among many…” (Liu et al., 2014, p. 1). Govaert et al. (2020, p. 697) refer to media deceit as “embellishing news stories with fabrications”. Two key defining tenets of media deception identified in Liu et al. (2014), Black et al. (1995) and Govaert et al. (2020) are: (i) distortion and/or manipulation of the truth, and (ii) intentional lying to achieve a predetermined end. Based on these definitions, this study asserts that media deceit in power politics entails distortion of the truth with the intention of securing and maximising political power. It is public media deception for political gain. Thus, media deceit in this study entails the deployment of the above strands of deception by the public news media to achieve political aims. Govaert et al., (2020, p. 697) note that media deceit constitutes “a serious breach of contract between journalists and the public, undermining trust in the news and ultimately its vital role in democracy”. The ‘safeguarding public interest’ purpose of public media is negated when news created are objectified to safeguard the political interest of the ruling elite. Bok (1978) stresses that analysis of media deceit should focus on two areas: (i) intention of the liar, and (ii) the intended outcomes of deceit. Thus, deceit can be detected by either examining the intention of a lie or falsehood or examining the outcome of falsehoods on consumers of that falsehood. For instance, Brennen (2017, p. 181) notes that to Bok (1978): The moral question of whether a person or a news report is lying is not settled by merely establishing the truth or falsity of what is said or reported. To fully answer this question, we must know whether the individual or the report intends to deceive us. In our complex world, many things can misinform us, but only some of them are intended to deceive us. If I give you inaccurate information but have no intention to mislead you that is not deception. Deception is a person, news report, or video that intentionally deflects, withholds, or distorts information.

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From the above extract, it can be observed that media deception is centred on the intention of the lie than the lie itself. This means falsely labelling unintentional falsehoods given by a political opponent as deceit becomes media deceit as well. Bok (1978) as reviewed by Brennen (2017) highlights four key outcomes of deceit that can be used as an analytical framework in unpacking media deceit in politics and these are: (i) adding to the power of the liar and reducing the power of those citizens and/ or interested parties who have been deceived by altering their choices; (ii) eliminating some of the objectives of the citizens and/or interested parties by making certain objectives seem unattainable or no longer desirable; (iii) eliminating necessary alternatives or leading citizens and/or interested parties to believe that there are more alternatives than there really are and, (iv) leading to citizens’ and/or interested parties’ loss of confidence in the best alternative. This chapter posits that when the above four are examined in the conduct, structuring and institutionalisation of public media, detection of deceit becomes very practicable. This study derives four key observations on the nature and extent of deceit from reviewed studies of falsehoods (Black et al., 1995; Bok, 1978; Brennen, 2017; Govaert et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2014) which makes up a fourpronged analytical framework of power politics media deceit proposed by this study (Fig. 16.1.).

II. Deliberate omission of certain truths I. Deliberate Publication of Politically Calculated Falsehoods

III. Deliberate monopoly to prevent the truth & perpetuate falsehoods

Powerpolitics Public Media Deceit

IV. Deliberate misuse of state media against ethical and legal obligations

Fig. 16.1 Four-pronged analytical framework for studying power politics media deceit

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Deliberate Publication of Politically Calculated Falsehoods Deceit can be in form of deliberate publication of politically calculated falsehoods and/or false political narratives to retain and maintain power. This captures Liu et al.’s (2014) view that deceit constitutes “a distortion with an intention to mislead users, analysts, organizations, etc.” (p. 1). Three main areas of analysis to determine this kind of media deceit are: (i) evidence of ‘deliberate’ moves or commission of falsehoods, (ii) evidence of calculation that is politically ordained in those falsehoods and (iii) the evidence in (i) and (ii) is reasonably connectible to actual desire for power. These three have the capacity to produce key deceitful outcomes among consumers such as leading to citizens’ and/or interested parties’ loss of confidence in the best alternative and eliminating necessary alternatives or leading citizens and/or interested parties to believe that there are more alternatives than there really are, as argued in Bok (1978). In power politics, this form of media deceit can be done through propaganda news that seek to prop-up the image of the ruling elite and tarnish the image of real and anticipated opponents. It includes exaggeration of achievements of the ruling elite and shortcomings of the opponents, false branding of the opponents among others. In the heat of power-politics in 2000 when ZANU-PF hegemony faced new threats from labour-backed opposition in a constitutional referendum campaign, the Zimpapers repeatedly reported the case of a young man in Harare allegedly beaten to death by supporters of the No campaign which was proven to be falsehoods when the police found that the dead man had died in a traffic accident (MMPZ, 2000). The intention was to brand the opposition as a terrorist organisation that should not be supported by the citizens in its bid to stop ZANU-PF’s proposed authoritarian constitution. The general agreement among researchers has thus been that Zimpapers has failed to play the ideal role of media in a liberaldemocratic society due to its use as a ZANU-PF mouthpiece and a tool for character assassinating opponents in power contestation (Chibuwe, 2019; Chuma, 2008; Moyse, 2009). As Moyse (2009, p. 49) argues, Zimpapers has been used in “previous elections since the turn of the millennium, to disseminate hate messages, often racist, threatening and insulting against those considered to be ‘enemies’ of the state”.

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Deliberate Omission of Certain Truths Media deceit can come in form of deliberate omission of some truths about the opponents, the ruling elite, policies or programmes that are necessary in informing public choices. Three main areas of analysis to determine this kind of media deceit are: (i) evidence of ‘deliberate’ omission of certain truths needed for public choice and interests, (ii) evidence of calculation that is politically ordained in those omissions of truths and (iii) the evidence in (i) and (ii) is reasonably connectible to actual desire for power. Zimpapers Media deceit has been very evident during elections as journalism has been turned into what Nyamnjoh termed “an exercise in turning a blind eye to the shortcomings of political allies, while exaggerating the weakness of political opponents” (cited in Chuma, 2007, p. 26). It has been very instrumental in fighting opponents from within ZANU-PF and without through a ‘selection and silence’ lens, giving some issues the status of ‘sacred cows’ while excluding others from scrutiny. The earliest evidence of ZANU-PF’s capture of Zimpapers and use to promote omission of certain truth was the removal of the Chronicle news editor, Geoff Nyarota through ‘demotion by promotion’ after unearthing the Willowvalle scandal in the early years of independence where ministers looted the government car plant project (Mlotshwa, 2019). Despite then Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe’s dismissal of ministers involved, Nyarota was removed from the editorship of the Chronicle. This was not a surprise, the Chronicle newspaper, was among government-controlled newspapers that chose to be silent about Mugabe government’s Gukurahundi mass-killings of opposition supporters in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands provinces from 1983 to 1987 (Ncube, 2021). The dismissal of Nyarota through a promotion that removed him from the editorial of news agency soon after exposing government corruption is interpreted as punishment for departing from the ZANU-PF party stance and a lesson to other journalists to always cover the party in good light. The deliberate omission of truth regarding political alternatives was evident in the 2000 constitutional referendum contestation, the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ, 2000) revealed that Zimpapers through the Harald covered 17 editorial articles favouring the Yes vote and not a single one for a No vote whereas all the 38 opinion articles published across the Zimpapers titles favoured a Yes vote. It is noteworthy that this Yes vote was the ZANU-PF stance in the contest. In

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2014 internal struggles to succeed the ZANU-PF leader that led to the dismissal of former Vice President Joice Mujuru was not given a platform to express her views for citizens to make a choice, instead Zimpapers was used to portray her as an insubordinate leader plotting to remove President Mugabe from power through assassination and witchcraft. In the run-up to the 2018 presidential elections, where 76% coverage was given to ZANU-PF whereas President Emmerson Mnangagwa took up 80% of the space (Media Monitors, 2018), the Zimpapers had this to say about the main leader of the opposition: “Although chances are very slim that Chamisa will be the President of Zimbabwe in his life-time, it is important for the people need to be enlightened on the dangers of electing a puppet President who is remote controlled from Washington” (Chronicle, February 19, 2022). The intention in all the cited cases has been to deceive the voters, evoke the historical colonial hatred among citizens and use it to de-campaign the opponents. Thus, deception through deliberate omission of certain truths is politically calculated to prevent right decisions from being taken by citizens which might not be in sync with the vested power interests of the ruling elite. This kind of deceit misleads citizens to make wrong choices due to insufficient information to inform their decision making. This creates a deceitful outcome identified by Bok (1978) such as: adding to the power of the liar and reducing the power of those citizens and/or interested parties who have been deceived by altering their choices; eliminating some objectives of the citizens and/or interested parties by making certain objectives seem unattainable or no longer desirable; eliminating necessary alternatives or leading citizens and/or interested parties to believe that there are more alternatives than there really are and, leading to citizens’ and/or interested parties’ loss of confidence in the best alternative.

Deliberate Misuse of State Media Against Ethical and Legal Obligations Third variant of media deceit constitutes a deliberate misuse of state media against its set values, ethics and legal framework to push a political agenda. To establish this form of power politics media deceit, three main areas of analysis should be targeted: (i) evidence of ‘deliberate’ moves or commission of state media misuse, (ii) evidence of negation of legally binding ethics and obligations and (iii) the evidence in (i) and (ii) are reasonably connectible to actual desire for power. Adherence to explicit rules and

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regulations, shared social cognitions, and social norms which constrain and shape organisations is a key defining feature that makes any entity an institution (Peters, 1999; Suddaby, 2013). The variant of media deceit is evident when media institutions deviate from set norms, ethics and code of conduct for political gain and still purport to serve the raison d’etre of the institution. This kind of deceit includes populating public media bureaucracy with staunch conduits of the ruling elite to push their political agenda regardless of set rules of the media concerned, recruitment of journalists who are politically aligned to the ruling elite, use of partisan processes to recruit human resources in public media and employment of propaganda gurus to serve as gatekeepers in a public media. The historiographical analysis of Zimpapers gives evidence of the variant of media deceit discussed in this subtopic. At independence in 1980, the Ministry of Information clearly reflected both the repoliticisation of the inherited Rhodesian Front (RF) bureaucracy by the ruling ZANU-PF party, and the closeness of the connection between the party’s internal structures and those of the public media (Saunders, 1991). At the Ministry of Information, Nathan Shamuyarira, a central committee member and the party’s Secretary for Information in the political bureau, became the Minister of Information. Below him, a hierarchy of party members filled the state bureaucracy that had been left vacant by the departing whites. ZANU-PF’s new media policy, according to Saunders, marked not just a departure from the censorship and manipulation of the RF but also a continuation of what he described as “defeated hegemonic strategies” (1991, p. 58). By 1984, ZANU-PF’s invasion of the Ministry of Information and the media had reached an extent to which even Minister Shamuyarira could not claim that there was a distinction between the aims and goals of the ruling party, on one hand, and those of the public media, government and the state, on the other. The government created the ZMMT to harness a short-termed consensual political solution which both appeased the conservative white interests of foreign and domestic capital and allowed future room for the interference of the ruling party in its instrumental use of the media under public control (Saunders, 1991). The role of the ZMMT in creating a buffer between the government and, mainly, with Zimpapers was undermined from the onset by the appointment of senior ZANU-PF party officials to lead the boards of both the Trust and Zimpapers. Despite the safeguards established by the ZMMT to protect the public print media from political

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control, the inherited culture of media supervision, together with challenges to ZANU-PF’s social and consensual hegemonic leadership from civil society, led to new attempts by the political party leadership to impose its own order on the media (Ronning & Khupe, 2000; Saunders, 1991). At this level, power-politics is identifiable in deceitful metamorphosis of Zimpapers from a public media to a proverbial ZANU-PF political party media affairs bureau. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Zimbabwean government started tightening its grip on the news media as it tried to retain its political influence and dominance during the Zimbabwe crisis, a period of sustained economic and political hardships, which impacted news producers and buyers. ZANU-PF defended and projected its messages “both at home and in the Diaspora, as well as among its critics abroad” (Chiumbu & Moyo, 2009, p. 180). Zimpapers was the means to this political power pursuit. In this period, there were serious contestations over what constituted and caused the crisis (Hammar & Raftopoulos, 2003; Raftopoulos, 2003). There were also contestations over what qualified to be characterised as “of national interest”. The Zimbabwe government adopted a mainly nationalist and anti-Western perspective. Following a disputed presidential election outcome of June 2008, a Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 between ZANU-PF and two opposition formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) ended in 2013 when ZANU-PF returned to its one-party government. However, power struggles ensued in ZANU-PF which resulted in the firing of the then Vice President Joyce Mujuru in 2014 and later Vice President Mnangagwa in November 2017. The subsequent effect of intraparty power struggles was a military coup d’état that toppled Mugabe on 21 November 2017. During these power struggles, Zimpapers became a site of contestation for power in both party and state as presented in Table 16.1. Whoever controlled Zimpapers at the political and bureaucratic level in the ruling party and state had the ability to influence public opinion over the power struggles in ZANU-PF and broader state politics.

Deliberate Monopoly to Prevent the Truth and Perpetuate Falsehoods The last form of deceit is deliberate monopoly of the news space regardless of constitutional law stipulating freedom of access to information and media freedom. To establish this form of power politics media deceit,

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three main areas of analysis should be targeted: (i) evidence of ‘deliberate’ moves or commission of state media monopoly despite prohibition by law, (ii) evidence of reactionary and/or preventative acts to dissuade the truth and (iii) the evidence in (i) and (ii) are reasonably connectible to actual desire to perpetuate falsehood narratives. This form of deceit enables the ruling elite to capture or dominate the media in order to push a one-party political narrative in the public sphere to prevent the truth from coming out. It is deceit in the sense that the intention of the monopoly is to limit choices of consumers and cushion the ruling elites’ political narratives from possible opponents and dissenting voices from independent media. This deceit subverts normal institutional operation principles posited by institutional theorists such as Peters (1999) and DiMaggio (2012) who stipulate that the existence of rules in any institution ultimately benefits all participants, and perhaps also society in that institutions can produce some predictability and regularity of outcomes that benefits all participants in an institution, and also clarifies the probable range of decisions available to societal actors not directly involved in the process of any particular organisation. Rather, the kind of conduct enabling deliberate monopoly of the news space to prevent the truth and perpetuate falsehoods is deceitful in that it eliminates necessary alternatives or leads citizens and/or interested parties to believe that there are more alternatives than there really are (Bok, 1978). Monopoly can be overt, that is, through enactment of laws that prohibit alternative media, independent media and criminalise dissenting voices. A good example of this in Zimbabwe is the twice bombing and eventual September 2003 closure of The Daily News, an independent newspaper committed to exposing government corruption. The Daily News was closed after its refusal to register with the government’s Zimbabwe Media Council (ZMC) setup in terms of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). It can be covert through victimisation, persecution and imprisonment of those with dissenting voices in media or those who give coverage to such opposing voices. At the time of writing, the government owned 51 per cent of shares at Zimpapers while the remaining 49 per cent were owned by corporates and private individuals. Before 1980, public print media was dominated by the Rhodesia Printing Publishing company, a subsidiary of Argus which operated from South Africa where it runs a media empire. To control the mainstream print media, the new government bought Argus shares to the

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tune of $5 million dollars in 1981, using money donated by the Nigerian government. The government established the ZMMT to manage the chain of newspapers under the newly created Zimbabwe Newspapers (1980) stable. The ZMMT was supposed to create a buffer between the state and government-controlled newspapers with a view to safeguarding editorial autonomy and public interest. This study revealed that the regulatory framework under the ZMMT deed of trust was destroyed to allow control of Zimpapers by ZANU-PF politicians and their appointees at Zimpapers. ZANU-PF managed to consolidate and maintain state power by harnessing the operations of the public media through the control by the minister of information and government bureaucrats. Data obtained from senior Zimpapers officials and media watchdogs such as the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Zimbabwe chapter, Media Center, Media Alliance of Zimbabwe and Media Monitors suggested that ‘death’ of the ZMMT which holds the majority shares at Zimpapers on behalf of the government allowed illegal government interference. The study exposes the lack of distinction between the aims and goals of the ruling ZANU-PF party, on the one hand, and those of the public media, government and the state, on the other. This conflation is revealed during periods of intense and vicious intra-party succession politics between August 2014 and the fall of former President Robert Mugabe in November 2017. Columns with pseudonyms were run mainly in The Herald and The Sunday Mail Newspapers to demonise factions in ZANU-PF and the opposition. Table 17.1 gives an overview of sampled political contestations and how Zimpapers helped to front political agendas. As shown in Table 16.1, Zimpapers has been very blatant in its role as a ZANU-PF news handle in power contestations. Three observations from Table 16.1 are noteworthy. First is that Zimpapers has been consistent in painting opposition visits and/or relations with the United Kingdom or the United States as acts of ‘selling-out’ or ‘puppetry.’ Second is that Zimpapers has been very consistent in painting ZANU-PF visits and/or relations with the United Kingdom or the United States as acts of patriotic diplomatic engagement. Lastly, Zimpapers has been very consistent in siding with the powerful factions against the weak in power struggles within ZANU-PF and between the ruling party and the opposition. The generic implication is that news have been crafted to deceive consumers to think that the powerful is right. In line with the findings of the study is Moyo’s (2010) analysis of media policies in Zimbabwe and the dearth of

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Table 16.1 Power-politics and Zimpapers Deceit Sampled power contestations

Zimpapers Deceit

ZANU-PF vs MDC contestations

“President Mugabe won’t sell the country”. The Herald 28 March, 2000 “Opposition going into elections in bad faith”. The Herald 22 May, 2000 “Tsvangirai worst sell-out: Msika”. The Herald 3 May, 2008 “Chamisa takes a dig at ‘guilty,’ ‘afraid’ Tsvangirai,” by Tichaona Zindoga. The Herald, 4 November, 2015 “Zim Opposition Politics now in the mortuary”. By Susan Chipanga. The Herald, 12 May 2015 ‘Resign Now’ The Herald 24 October, 2014 “US, VP Mujuru plot to oust President”, The Sunday Mail, 20 October, 2014 “Mnangagwa must Go - First Lady”, The Herald, Novemebr, 6 2017 “Live from HARARE: Solidarity rally against President Mugabe”, The Herald, 18, November 2017 “More endorsements for ED Presidency”, The Herald, June 22, 2018 “President Mnangagwa’s UK visit reflects progress in re-engagement”, Herald, September, 21, 2021 “President Mnangagwa-Blair Meeting sets tone for future Zim-UK relations”, Herald, September 8, 2022

Internal ZANU-PF succession (Mnangagwa vs Mujuru)

Internal ZANU-PF succession (Grace Mugabe vs Mnangagwa)

Post-2017 Coup ZANU-PF vs Opposition

public debate, highlighting that official nationalism continues to influence media policy positions and directions through which media are censored, silenced or co-opted to the vanguard into defending the national interest as understood and articulated by the ruling class elites.

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Public Media as a Tool to Consolidate Power 2000–2023 The study observes that rather than serving the public interest, the Zimpapers publications served the ruling forces’ political interests at the height of Zimbabwe’s political and economic crises from 2000 to 2023. As observed by Mano (2009, p. 147), the new government’s priorities were to consolidate state power, safeguard the national independence of the country and reconcile the various social forces, among them racial groups, political and socio-economic forces. The findings confirm earlier studies on the use of public print media to consolidate power. Saunders (1991, p. 207), in his analytic study of the ruling party’s use of the public print for hegemonic projects in Zimbabwe in the first decade of independence, argues that as early as the late 1980s, Mugabe’s regime came to see the public media as being important tools in consolidating its political authority against political opposition organised under the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZAPU), led by Zimbabwe’s late Vice President, Joshua Nkomo. The situation became more acute at the turn of the twenty-first century due to the economic crisis following the imposition of sanctions by Western government and power struggles in ZANU-PF. A vibrant privately owned press and a political opposition in the labourbacked opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which threatened a near defeat of the ruling ZANU-PF party in the 2000 elections, made government to deploy Zimpapers to defend its hegemony, a government bureaucrat in the ministry of information, publicity and broadcasting said in an interview in Harare on 30 September 2018. The bureaucratic argued that the ruling ZANU-PF party was faced with: the possibility of losing power because most social forces among them labour, students and civil society were getting unfettered publicity from the domestic private press and international media to challenge government narratives during periods of crisis following the land reform programme. We had no option but to use the public media to inform both domestic and international audiences on government policies and party agenda. (Government bureaucrat in the ministry of information, publicity and broadcasting services, Interviews, Harare, 30 September 2018)

Perhaps, the government’s recruitment of the public print media to protect its hegemony on the state is arguably merited although the public interest role of such news media is questionable. Lichtenberg (1990, p. 1)

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argues that it is undeniable that the media are agents in the political process and “not simply observers it provides one important reason for rethinking the traditional prerogatives and responsibilities of the press”. The view is that the news media can take a position especially during periods of crises. A senior editor with Zimpapers’ leading daily newspaper, The Herald, submitted that there is no pretence about the control and influence of the minister of information, publicity and broadcasting services and bureaucrats in the ministry. The editor pointed out that all senior journalists are appointed directly by the minister and the permanent secretary and are ordered to promote the policies of the ruling ZANU-PF party (Senior Herald editor, Interview, Harare, 18 October, 2018). This view was supported by a Zimpapers board member: It should be known that the Zimpapers board is appointed by the minister who is a ZANU PF central committee and political bureau member in most cases. Worse still, the board has party officials whose role is to serve the party interests. We are told to make sure that Zimpapers titles promote the position of the party and government. The president of the party and country is covered positively in the newspapers. The policies of the opposition parties must be ignored or criticized because they work with adversaries of the ruling party to invite sanctions for their political benefit during election times, (Interview with a Zimpapers board member, September 13, 2018).

This was corroborated by a senior editor of The Herald who submitted that a former information minister and permanent secretary for a decade used to write the now defunct Nathaniel Manheru column in The Herald every Saturday (Interview with senior editor of The Herald in Harare on 12 October 2018). The column was removed in 2017 before the November 2017 military coup after former Minister of information, publicity and broadcasting services publicly, Jonathan Moyo confessed he used to co-author it with former permanent secretary in the ministry, George Charamba. The two had fallen out during the power struggles in ZANU-PF when bureaucrats used it to attack Moyo when he was re-assigned to the ministry of higher education in 2015. The column has now morphed into IGomombe published by the same paper every Saturday. The Herald runs another column called The Radar while The Sunday Mail publishes one called Bishop Lazerous. The Herald editor submits that these columns are used to demonise political opponents of

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the incumbent minister and public bureaucrats along political factional lines. Often, hate speech such as ‘enemies of the state,’ ‘enemies of the party,’ imperialist puppets’ and ‘sell-outs of the revolution’ are used to describe opposition leaders and internal ZANU-PF party members opposed to the faction in charge at Zimpapers (Interview with The Herald editor in Harare, September 20, 2018). While one Zimpapers manager agrees that the ministry of information, publicity and broadcasting services interferes in the operations of Zimpapers, the official disputed accusations that the government directly gets involved in every day management of the publishing house. The officials submitted that Zimpapers’ role is to promote the policies of the ruling party which is the government in power (Interview with Zimpapers manager in Harare on 9 October 2018). This position is disputed by an official of media watchdog, the Media Alliance of Zimbabwe (MAZ) an advocacy media organisation that brings together most media organisations in Zimbabwe. The MAZ official noted they have received complaints from Zimpapers editors of direct dismissal of editors and senior journalists each time a new minister is appointed. The MAZ noted that: We know about one minister who brought his own editors when he was twice appointed as minister of information in 2000 and in 2014. The editors told us the minister would order editors on what to write about, who to support and vilify in ZANU PF, the opposition and the corporate world. This minister would actually write stories in the newspapers attacking the opposition, civil society and his rivalries in both government and the state. The permanent secretary in the ministry would do the same. These two run columns in public print media especially The Herald and The Sunday Mail newspapers using pseudonyms. (Interview with Media Alliance of Zimbabwe in Harare, November, 13, 2019)

A Zimpapers senior journalist justified government interference in the publications arguing that it was in the national and public interest for the public media to promote and support the policies of the ruling party because as an elected government, it also served the public interest. The journalist noted that the public media’s role is to promote the policies of the government of the day through dissemination of information. He however, agreed that one minister used the public media to promote

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personal political interests and that was done through direct appointments of board members of Zimpapers and editorial staff. He argued that the behaviour of one minister should not be generalised as government policy (Interview with senior Zimpapers journalist).

Deceit and ‘Death’ of the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) From the information obtained in this research, ZMMT was made dysfunctional by the Ministry of Information, which took over its functions around 2000. The ministry now directly runs government media through directives on editorial appointments, content and outputs of the newspapers to reflect the position of the ruling ZANU-PF during periods of deepened crises from 2000 to 2017. An official with the Media Centre, a media group that promotes freedom of expression in Zimbabwe submitted that from 2000 through news coverage of the land reform programme, the 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013 and the 2018 elections, Zimpapers publications protected the interests of ZANU-PF by writing uncritical stories about human rights violations. The newspapers compromised objectivity, fairness and balance to reflect the public interest of its various publics as they parroted the hegemonic interests of ZANU-PF said the official (Interview with Media Centre official in Harare, December, 12, 2018). This could have been avoided if the ZMMT was operational, he observed. A senior journalist with Zimpapers’ weekly, The Sunday Mail, opined that the government take-over is illegal and challenged media watchdogs to approach the courts for redress. The journalist submitted that, in terms of ZMMT’s Deed of Trust, the minister and the ministry of information, publicity and broadcasting services have no legal standing to run affairs of Zimpapers pointing out that: As it stands since 2000 to date, all the boards at Zimpapers are illegal because they are appointed by the minister and not by the ZMMT. It should be remembered that ZMMT is private media vehicle set up with funds donated by the Nigerian government to the people of Zimbabwe to buy of shares of a private South African media interests, Argus Press in Zimbabwe in order to support de-racialization of the media and democratize it at independence in 1980. (Interview with The Sunday Mail senior journalist in Harare, October, 10, 2018)

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The journalist argued that politicians with political power and interests to protect can hardly serve the broader democratic public interest because of partisanship. This view is supported by a senior manager with Zimpapers who submitted that in the absence of ZMMT, Zimpapers’ charter of editorial independence is impotent. He submitted that he worked under four ministers of information from 2008 to 2018 but under one minister, “Zimpapers editors routinely troop to Munhumutapa Building, the ministry’s head office to get editorial directives and content for publications. Zimpapers’ charter of editorial independence, therefore works well in the presence of ZMMT to avoid government public media control and abuse” (Interview with senior Zimpapers manager in Harare, 9 October 2018). A senior reporter with The Herald newspaper narrated that because of the ‘death of ZMMT,’ sometime in 2009, then minister of information, publicity and broadcasting services Webster Shamu, a veteran of the liberation struggle took the unprecedented decision to appoint retired and serving senior soldiers in all boards of public media such as the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ), Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH), Transmedia and Zimpapers. The reporter felt the decision was meant to intimidate journalists into self-censorship and to promote the interests of ZANU-PF in the public media. Under such circumstances, the watchdog role of the media is compromised. It is arguably the legitimate role of the press to fulfil the role of the opposition in the sense of presenting another point of view where necessary, that is to say criticising government decisions which are not in the best interests of the people, denouncing abuses of power and defending human rights. Zimpapers has worked contrary to Ansah (1988, p. 12) who notes that the press in its watchdog role should expose and criticise bureaucratic incompetence, corruption, abuses of power and the violation of human rights. This role could not be exercised by the public media under Zimpapers in the absence of ZMMT and in circumstances where ruling party politicians and public bureaucrats have hijacked the public print media.

Public Media and State Security Agenda A government bureaucrat in the ministry of information, publicity and broadcasting services submitted that after the imposition of sanctions in 2002 by the United States government and the European Union over the land acquisition policy and allegations of human rights abuse in

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disputed parliamentary 2000 and 2002 presidential elections respectively, the country’s national security was under threat. He opined that: When foreign countries fund, mobilize and organise the political opposition against an incumbent government including pouring money in the opposition media to overthrow the government, the state had to be extra vigilant. We had to use all our resources including the public media to defend the security of the ruling party, the government and the state. You should know that ZANU PF forms the government that runs the state, so all these institutions had to be supported by the public media that we controlled. We have no apologies to make, (Interview with a government bureaucrat in the ministry of information, publicity and broadcasting in Harare, October, 10, 2018).

However, a senior journalist with The Herald Newspapers suggested that, perhaps as the Zimbabwe crisis continued, the internal contradictions in ZANU-PF over the succession of former President Mugabe informed the stranglehold of the government on Zimpapers publications. The journalist submitted that: We were told to ignore any semblance of autonomy from the party, government and the state and promote the national interest against counter revolutionaries. In August 2016, the then minister of information told all public print media editors that the security of the state was under threat from party members who wanted to overthrow Mugabe. We were directed to demonize all people who supported and sympathised with now President Emmerson Mnangagwa. He was seen a national security threat. We implemented the directive although we knew it was factional and false, (Interview with The Herald senior journalist in Harare, September, 18).

A senior editor with The Herald observed that the security of the state was conflated with that of the party and individual party members. As a result, each time this happened this will spill into the newsrooms of Zimpapers as politicians use the media to protect personal political interests. The editor submitted that the insecurities were not limited to individual party members but transcend to the newsrooms. The instability in ZANU-PF party and their factional battles play out in the public media to the extent that each time a new minister is appointed, the newsrooms of the public media catch cold (Interview with senior Herald editor in Harare). The senior editor further submitted that:

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Political dynamics and insecurities at ZANU PF headquarters affect the public interest role of the media as the institution is controlled by politicians who are interested in power retention schemes. Zimpapers is used by politicians not for the national security interest because that is not the role of the public media but the security apparatus. As a result, Zimpapers is an instrument of political power to promote personal and factional interests of the incumbent minister. That’s why in the majority of cases a change of minister consequently entails change of editors, board and management at Zimpapers. It has nothing to do with the national security interest of Zimbabwe. (October, 13, 2018)

But a senior editor of The Sunday Mail noted that after realising that Zimpapers’ charter of editorial independence which states that in exercising their judgement in news coverage, editors shall take into account the national interest and public benefit, the publication started to defy party orders based on factional positions of the incumbent minister. The Sunday Mail senior editor said journalists at his publication started to define the national interest as articulated in the preamble of the Zimbabwe constitution and its founding values (Interview with senior Sunday Mail editor in Harare). The editor said during the 2014–2017 power struggles in ZANU-PF, Zimpapers editorial policy was under serious threat from two factional ministers who argued the security of the state was under threat when in fact it was their factions losing control in ZANU-PF. He said there was a cost to their defiance: We had to make a decision between national security interests and factional interests. As a paper, we took a national interest position as articulated in the constitution. For the first time in many years, we opposed the sitting president’s factional position. By the time the coup took place on 15 November 2017, we were as good as fired. The military coup actually served us from dismissal. We had cleared our desks. New factional editors were on way to replace many editors. We were accused of not supporting then First Lady Grace Mugabe. (Interview with senior Sunday Mail editor, 19 October 2018)

The preamble to the Zimbabwe Constitution calls upon Zimbabweans to unite in their diversity and common desire for freedom, justice and equality and resist to colonialism, racism and all forms of domination and oppression to serve the national interest of defending the country’s independence. In an interview in Harare on 12 October 2018, the

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Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA), Zimbabwe chapter senior official observed that the transgression at Zimpapers requires an overhaul of media regulation in Zimbabwe not just at Zimpapers in order to safeguard the national public interest. In this regard, Media Monitors, another media watched in Zimbabwe calls upon journalists to lobby the government and parliament to enact a statutory self-regulation media body to advance ethical and professional standards in the media industry in Zimbabwe. The Media Monitors official argued that having a single statutory body that governs the ethical conduct of both the public and private media was the best way to retain the defunct ZMMT and cushion public media from state interference (Interview with Media Monitors official).

Conclusion From the foregoing analysis and the data obtained from the interviews, there is an implicit suggestion that the public interest which Zimpapers is supposed to serve as a normative concept plays an important role in a democratic society. The concept should, therefore, serve as a guide to check on public officials who are faced with decisions regarding public policy to serve the public good. However, in circumstances where the media is controlled by political authorities, it becomes an enormous task for the public media to play its democratic role of making public officials accountable. This has a huge implication for the role of the media in developing contexts with weak opposition and civil society. It is believed that news should provide full and fair information so that citizens can make informed political choices. The media can also investigate the concentrated powers of the elected representatives. It can also interpret events with a view to assisting citizens to understand complex issues in their societies. Journalists can also tell people about the lives of the less privileged in communities so as to create empathy, and to create a forum for citizens’ dialogue from diverse perspectives, as well as acting as advocates for specific political programmes and mobilising citizens to act in support of those activities. Such public service roles by the media cannot be realised in developing contexts such as Zimbabwe where the public media which is supposed to serve the public interest advances and protects the interests of powerful public political elites. The media plays a critical watchdog role against those in public and powerful positions in the society. This role is especially crucial in new and fragile

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democracies in Africa unlike in more mature democracies in the West. The watchdog role of the media is particularly vital in emerging democracies where opposition political parties are weak or non-existent owing to state repression. By exposing the conflation between the ruling party, government, the state and the public media, this study arguably contributes to new insights in media and communication studies on how undemocratic regimes abuse the public media to undermine its public interest role. Overall, the four indicators of public media deceit conceptualised in this chapter help in establishing the extent to which public news media serve their intended purpose faithfully. Conversely, the four-pronged media deceit analytical framework proposed in this study helps in categorising typical deceitful media in power politics.

References Ansah, P. A. V. (1988). In search of a role for the African media in the democratic process. Africa Media Review, 2(2), 1–16. Black, J., Steele, B., & Barney, R., (1995). Doing Ethics in Journalism: A handbook with Case Studies. Allyn and Bacon. Bok, S. (1978). Lying: Moral choice in public and private life. Vintage Books. Brennen, B. (2017). Making sense of lies, deceptive propaganda, and fake news. Journal of Media Ethics, 32(3), 179–181. Chibuwe, A. (2019). Media coverage of the Zimbabwean elections: An analysis of trends from 2013 to 2018. Journal of Communication and Media Research, 11(2), 133–145. Chiumbu, S & Moyo, D. (2009). Media, politics and power: Re-gearing policy and propaganda in crisis Zimbabwe. In K., S. Orgeret & H., Ronning, (Eds.), The power of communication, changes and challenges in African Media. Oslo Academic Press. Chuma, W. (2008). Mediating the 2000 elections in Zimbabwe: Competing journalisms in a society at the crossroads. Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies, 29(1), 21–41. Curran, J. (2000). Rethinking Media and Democracy. In J. Curran and M., Gurevitch. (Eds.), Mass media and society. Arnold. Curran, J. (2002). Media and power. Routledge. Dahlgren, P. (2009). Media and political engagement, citizens, communication and democracy. Cambridge University Press. Denscombe, M. (2003). The good research guide for small scale social research projects. Open University Press.

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DiMaggio, P. (2012). Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory. In R., Greenwood, et al. (Eds.), Library in business and management: Institutional theory in organization studies, Vol. 3. Sage. Downs, A. (1962). The public interest: Its meaning in a democracy. Social Science Research, 29(1), 1–34. Govaert, C., Lagerwerf, L., & Klemm, C. (2020). Deceptive journalism: Characteristics of untrustworthy news items. Journalism Practice, 14(6), 697–713. Hammar, A., & Raftopoulos, B. (2003). Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: rethinking land, state and nation in Zimbabwe’s unfinished business, rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crisis.Weaver Press. Jones, S. (1985). Depth interviews. In R. Walker (Ed.), Applied quantitative research (pp. 45–55). Gower. Liamputtong, P. (2009). Qualitative research methods. Oxford University Press. Lichtenberg, J. (1990). Democracy and the mass media. Cambridge University Press. Lindlof, T., & Taylor, B. (2002). Qualitative communication research methods. Sage. Liu, H., Han, J., & Motoda, H. (2014). Uncovering deception in social media. Springer Journal Social Network Analysis and Mining, 4(162). https://doi. org/10.1007/s13278-014-0162-z McNair, B. (1999). An introduction to political communication. Routledge. Mano, W. (2009). Three decades of public television and political power in Zimbabwe: 1980–2009. In O, K. Skare. and R, Helge. (Eds.), The power of communication, changes and challenges in African media. Oslo Academic Press. Mapuva, J. (2017). Zimbabwe’s economic interventionist policies: Critical issues and perspectives. African Review, 44(2), 9–49. Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe. (2000). A question of balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum. MMPZ. https:// aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/me/annex/case-studies/mey_zw/mobile_bro wsing/onePag Media Monitors. (2018). Reporting on Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections: A post-election Analysis. Media Monitors. Mlotshwa, K. (2019). In the service of press freedom or the imperial agenda? negotiating repression and coloniality in Zimbabwean journalism. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 14(1). https://doi.org/10.16997/ wpcc.306 Moyo, L. (2010). The dearth of public debate: policy, polarities and positional reporting in Zimbabwe’s news media. In Chuma, W & Moyo, D. (Eds.), Media policy in a changing Southern Africa, critical reflections on media reforms in the global age. Unisa Press.

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Moyse, A. (2009). The Media Environment leading up to Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections. In E. Masunungure (Ed.), Defying the winds of change (pp. 43–60). Weaver Press. Ncube, B., & J. (2021). Excited by the killings: How the chronicle newspaper covered Gukurahundi Genocide In Zimbabwe. African Journal of Rhetoric, 13(1), 100–119. Nyamnjoh, B. (2005). Africa’s media, democracy and the politics of belonging. Zed Books. Peters, G. (1999). Institutional theory in political science —The New “Institutionalism”. Printer Raftopoulos, B. (2003). The State in Crisis, Authoritarian Nationalism, Selective Citizenship and Distortions of Democracy in Zimbabwe. In A., Hammar et al. Zimbabwe’s unfinished business, rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crisis. Weaver Press. Ronning, O., & Khupe, T. (2000). The dual legacy of democracy and authoritarianism: The media and the state in Zimbabwe. In J. Curran & M, Park. (Eds.), De-Westernizing media studies. Rutledge. Saunders, R. (1991). Information in the interregnum: The press, state and civil Society in struggles for hegemony in Zimbabwe [PhD thesis]. Suddaby, R. (2013). Institutional Theory. In E., Kessler,. (Ed.). Encyclopaedia of Management Theory, 1(1), 379–384, Sage. Schudson, M. (2008). Why democracies need an unlovable press. Polity Press. Sparks, C. (2009). South Africa in transition. Journal of African Media Studies, 1(2), 191–193. Ungar, S. (1990). The role of a free press in strengthening democracy. In J. Lichtenberg (Ed.). Democracy and the mass media. Cambridge University Press. Willems, W. (2012). The ballot vote as embedded ritual: A radical critique of liberal-democratic approaches to media and elections in Africa. African Studies, 71(1), 547–563. Wondwosen, T. B. (2009). Media and multi-party elections in Africa: The case of Ethiopia. The International Journal of Human Sciences, 6(1), 84–111.

CHAPTER 17

Modelling Electoral Integrity on Political Campaigns in Zimbabwe: The Problems of Deception and Lying During General Elections Gift Masengwe

Introduction Campaigning during general elections must adhere to the Code of Conduct. Unfortunately politicians know the law and can avoid its penalties because they do not seek for its intention. This calls for a religious sanction and the use of Ubuntu philosophy. The content and quality

G. Masengwe (B) Department of Education, University of Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] Institute of Religious Studies and Theology, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa The Office of the Vice Chancellor, Zimbabwe Open University, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_18

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of campaign materials and messages are determined by the quality and content of the candidates seeking office and this affects the behaviour of the electorate being addressed because such messages create and shape how potential voters think and behave. This is why the 2008 presidential rerun in Zimbabwe was referred to as a ‘dog’s breakfast’ due to the violence it adopted to scare away MDC-T supporters. Former President Robert Mugabe gave himself to politics and lost his professional training as a teacher. Zimbabwe’s fall from prosperity to poverty in forty years of independence where Christians claim to be eighty-five per cent of the population makes Christians some of the most deceitful liars from among the religions of the book. This influences political outcomes, hence this chapter’s concerns with honesty, respect and transparency during the campaign processes. Campaigns influence political outcomes, but this chapter is concerned about democratic intentions in campaigns rather than democratic outcomes, hence the question: Is it possible that potential voters can purposefully choose deceitful candidates knowingly to achieve their intended political outcomes? For a religious electorate like Zimbabwe, Ubuntu in regulating electoral campaigns improves electioneering through trust, transparency and accountability. Ubuntu philosophy on electoral campaigns improves the quality of candidates, independent institutions like ZEC and electoral experience. Campaigns can be done through print, voice and online media, but improved content materials and effective communication and delivery establish trust in the democratic processes. This literary study of campaign is arranged in three parts, namely (i) the influence of campaign materials on general elections, (ii) the provision of rational materials during campaigns and (ii) the establishment of a value system on general elections. Ubuntu as an ethical philosophy has been picked to address lying, deception and misinformation during campaigns. Campaigns use adverts, speeches and utterances by politicians that must respect the constitution and the people’s bill of rights. A code of conduct can go a long way to enforce accountability if false pretences and wilful violations or breaches warrant written warnings, reprimands and even dismissals.

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The Importance of Promotional Materials for Electoral Candidates Zimbabwe is supposed to hold general elections in the year 2023, between July 27 and August 26, with a reported number of many new comers who probably lack values and ethical norms on campaign speeches (Mataire, 2023; Santolin, 2019). General elections call for the sovereignty of the masses in choosing leaders democratically (Akbar et al., 2021). For a successful general election, candidates’ promotional materials must be honest, ethical and truthful. Interestingly the electoral code for candidates says everything in detail concerning campaigning and the conduct of candidates and their agents but says nothing about the promotional materials that carry the day. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe’s Fourth Schedule (Sects. 40B, 46, 133G, 160A and 191) of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] and the Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Candidates and Other Stakeholders [Act No. 6 of 2018] do not say anything about candidates’ promotional materials. It needs to be noted that there is a fast-tracking proposal before the 2023 general elections on the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] in the Electoral Amendment Bill that was gazetted on 18 November 2022. This chapter deals with the existing Act and Code of Conduct. The purpose of the Code of Conduct is only stated as ‘to promote conditions that are conducive to free and fair elections and a climate of tolerance in which electioneering activity may take place without fear or coercion, intimidation or reprisals.’ Unfortunately, ‘threat of violent reprisals, underwritten by memories of the violence of elections’ (Gallagher, 2001, p. 28) cannot be avoided without values in electioneering. The statement does not have any impact upon the behaviour of candidates and their agents with regard to the development and communication of promotional materials during elections. With increased deceit and lies by candidates and their agents today, this chapter is concerned about how promotional materials are developed and communicated to the public verbally, and through digital and print media (Santolin, 2019). Candidates are often concerned about winning votes and less about ethical conduct in the messages they develop. Promotional materials go a long way in informing how candidates address the electorate during outreach campaigns, social network and public media, that is, radio, television and newspaper channels). Online networks such as social networks (i.e. WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook), image sharing networks (i.e. Instagram and Snapchat), video sharing networks (i.e.

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TikTok and YouTube), discussion forums (i.e. Reddit ad Quora) and bookmarking networks (i.e. Flipboard and Pinterest) for heavily skewed young voters have excessively replaced public media. Social networks are not included as a source of information and communication in the Code of Conduct, but they effectively share live-stream messages, documents, images and comments in real time. Social media, published by the end user, has been heavily abused because it is employed by the end user. Its strongest benefit to society is its weakest link with a possibility of politicians manipulating it to convey messages that are not real. Besides engaging voters, social media reopens closed discussions such as the constitutional reform that happened in Zimbabwe during the 2009– 2012 Government of National Unity (GNU). Our biggest concern is the deception and lies involved in use of social media that may influence voters wrongly. In Zimbabwe, candidates use printed materials that potential voters touch and feel. These materials can include flyers, postcards, leaflets, business cards, open letters, posters, stickers, badges, caps, scarves, t-shirts, pens, writing pads, water bottles, roller banners and election flags. Some campaigns went as far as distributing party regalia and outfits, wheelbarrows, ploughs, scotch-carts, agricultural seeds and fertilisers, food, solar-powered radios and gardening project support. All these are persuasive efforts to lure potential voters during a campaign. This study also suggests that candidates can meet potential voters at their campaign tables such as a gazebo to air out their concerns. This produces information that can be remembered so that voters can hold winning candidates accountable for their own words. The deceptions carried by various materials that are distributed are that they impersonate opponents, which is of concern in this study. If candidates distributed materials that have their names, parties’ logos, parties’ flags and candidates’ pictures, names, visions, missions and political strategies, they do not only positively influence results but connect voters to the elected official (Santolin, 2019). Less focus on campaign messages have seen candidates, their teams and agents violating some of the concerns addressed by both the Electoral Act and the Code of Conduct such as violence, intimidation, cohesion, bribery, reprisals, forced choices and open balloting. Former President Mugabe, who was the darling of West when he took over power in 1980 (Africanews, 2019), but when he fell out of favour began to use adversarial statements that bundled all opposition candidates as surrogates of Western interests and puppets of regime change agendas. He

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was also careless with words that he once likened Simba Makoni to ‘a frog trying to inflate itself up to the size of an ox’ just because he opposed him as a presidential candidate (Al Jazeera News, 2008). Former President Mugabe’s ‘vote for the [clinched hand] fist’ renditions was interpreted by Simba Makoni saying: ‘the fist has become a hammer smashing the country’ in reference to ZANU-PF militancy. Former President Mugabe’s purposeful misquoting of former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s stress for peaceful conduct confirmed Simba Makoni’s interpretation when Mugabe in Nyanga District on 27 March 2008 said: ‘Just dare try it. We don’t play around while you try to please your British allies. Just try it and you will see. We want to see you do it’ (Sapa-AFP, 2008c). He was supported by his Commissioner of Police, Augustine Chihuri, on 28 March 2008 who warned Tsvangirai to desist from violence because it ‘is a monster that can devour its creator, as it is blind and not selective in nature’ (AFP, 2008b). Tsvangirai had also begun to return similar venom that former President Mugabe and ZANU-PF ‘belong[ed] to the past’ and have ‘run out of ideas,’ and that Makoni’s candidacy was like putting patches to old clothing following dissent in ZANU-PF (Maphala, 2008). Mugabe also referred to this dissent saying ‘the British had identified people within ZANU-PF to work with in causing divisions in the party because it realised the ruling party was a united revolutionary liberation movement that had to be destroyed from within’ (IOL, 2008). Scolding has become the business of electioneering in Zimbabwe, especially if the challenger is too strong for the incumbent. Makoni did not say much to spite his contestants, but only received supporters from ZANUPF party (AFP, 2008a). President Mnangagwa while deputising former President Mugabe, in his first debut speech made infamous statements [‘witty and hillarious rants’] recorded on YouTube saying: ‘Vanenge vasingadi, vachagara vachingovukura, vachingoukura; Icho chitima cheZANUPF chichingoinda, tichingotonga, tichingotonga’ [Those who refuse, will continue to bark and bark; while the ZANU-PF train continues to go, while we rule and rule] (Chimininge, 2019, p. 38). These speeches have been repeated in many gatherings. President Mnangagwa also stated, in reference to Kudzai Chipanga, former ZANU-PF youth leader, and later on when he was spiting opposition politics by former members of ZANUPF like Didymus Mutasa on YouTube, said: ‘Kana wangobuda mumusangano weZANU-PF hupenyu hwako hunotanga kuwunyana seshizha rabva pana mai varo’ (When you are chucked out of ZANU-PF, your life will start wilting (shrinking), like a leaf cut off from its mother)

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(Mpofu, 2017). Former President Mugabe was also infamous with such inflammatory speeches [‘witty and hilarious rants’] at his rallies (Mpofu, 2017). Former President Mugabe was also infamous with such inflammatory speech [‘witty and hilarious rants’] at his rallies (Mpofu, 2017). What boggles the mind with these speeches is not the scolding but the truths contained in the speeches. When one examines the degree at which opposition parties are accused for dining and wining with their Western sponsors yet the ruling party is doing the same with the Chinese and Russians in its ‘Look East Policy’ to recover the economy that was built by Western efforts and destroyed by them boggles the mind (Valy, 2008). Look East Policy was to give Zimbabwe lessons on economic policies by an Asiatic country that also learned and was funded by the West. The church, at the height of these conflicts, had developed a statement which said: ‘As church, we neither look East-wards nor West-wards but heavenwards.’ The statement indicated that each person has to have a strategic partner from outside their community if they can overcome their challenges. In like manner, candidates can develop their campaign materials to inform, incite and empower voters. Such materials can be presented at public rallies, through public media, or online publications. The Code of Conduct should also specify the kind of messages uniformed forces and courts should publish during elections. This chapter would like to comment the efforts of former Prime Minister Tsvangirai when he dealt with realities in his campaign records such as the national constitution and land reform that was hijacked by ZANU-PF to be used as its campaign strategy. ZANU-PF candidates are rational people, but the fear of reprisals for the corrupt allocation of land to their cadres has affected how they view power and politics using the fear of the reversal of the land reform by opposition parties as a trumpcard to canvass for easy votes from among all the beneficiaries of the land reform and mining concessions. Taken seriously, it is foolhardy for a new President to start meddling with the principle of land redistribution but to emphasise on productivity. While ZANU-PF has won with the view that any strong opposition leader was a surrogate of the Western regime agenda, the claim is ZANU-PF’s weakest tool (Sapa, 2008). Most civil politicians have quit the race like Simba Makoni, because his upbringing could not match that of former President Mugabe who scolded like a member in a family of a polygamous father. He gave due respect to former President Mugabe for his place in the history of Zimbabwe in line with Ubuntu philosophy in African culture, yet the elderly leader uttered

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venom from his retributive memory as he had ‘a lot to answer for’ (SapaAFP., 2008a, 2008b). Thus as an academic, Dr. Simba Makoni could not continue as a politician but go back to his career. This calls for Ubuntu in developing and communicating electoral materials if serious people can enter politics. In the 2023 general elections, candidates have messages all must be concerned with such as ZANU-PF’s liberation struggle stance with the ‘Nyika inovakwa navene vayo’ [A nation is built by its owners], against the CCC’s purported adversarial stance against the liberation struggle saying ‘Ngaapinde hake mukomana’ [Let the young man enter] (Mataire, 2023). The owners of Zimbabwe being referred to are ZANU-PF officials, and the building of the country refers to those officials carrying out the mandate to rule the country. Similarly CCC follows the same personality cult trends by epitomising the male dominance in entering into power. Both messages need interrogation, as they personalise national leadership. Fadzai Mahere has further stated that ‘Zanu-PF can never win a free and fair election in Zimbabwe. So, we remain focused on the fight to win Zimbabwe for change’ (Mavhunga, 2022). ZANU-PF is emphasising indigenisation to modernise Zimbabwe, while the CCC says it sees the future in young people though accused of emphasising on foreign support to develop the country. Interestingly, 2023 general elections are going to be contested by presidential candidates of mixed races, which many view as a ZANU-PF strategy to justify presence of democracy in Zimbabwe. These messages are sometimes spiced with biblical passages. While both messages are true, they are equally untrue because indigenous resources have value when Zimbabwe receives foreign direct investment. It is also untrue that charity can develop Zimbabwe, because outsiders’ charitable benevolence or ‘all weather friends’ have their own interests which nationals must manipulate rather than manipulate through honest trade (Mataire, 2023). In both cases, the electorate needs to be protected from half messages, as Zimbabweans can build Zimbabwe, but nationals do not live as islands in the community of nations. So, there is association between nationals and foreigners that can build the nation, while on the other hand it is foolhardy to depend on foreigners as a political strategy because foreign support is not always free. Unfortunately, ZANU-PF and CCC strategies are the same when it comes to foreign support. ZANUPF uses its grip on power to give mining concessions to their donors from the East while CCC promises its Western donors to receive the same yet

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voters are not given full information on the half truths each of the two contending parties have in their campaign strategies and messages. The focus of ZANU-PF and CCC, especially on each other’s campaign messages as rallying points, has created simultaneous resentment of each other, negative energies and poor engagements during campaigns. ZANU-PF, one of the longest serving ruling parties in Africa after independence, has an articulated liberation war ideology to guide in its elections. Unfortunately, it uses the security sectors to ensure that it retains power, which is emasculating the development of national politics into a fully fledged democracy. This securitisation of national politics has run down urban councils and their water provision services, degraded road networks and created urban squatter camps in almost half of the nation’s urban areas (Mataire, 2023). In a WhatsApp video from Matabeleland South, in the Maranda area, a ZANU-PF youth proudly claims that the party gave them an ambulance in the form of a scotch-cart that needs donkeys to be driven. But still people in that area who have lost relatives due to inadequate transport will still vote for ZANU-PF in most constituencies there because of their fear of ZANU-PF’s rough end of the stick if they may fall victim to the militarised hard stance of ZANUPF by not voting their party, because the Army General vowed not to salute any other President but one with a military background. The most puzzling statement to hear was that of a Doctor of Philosophy denying the norms and values for which he fought in the liberation struggle saying the army will ‘not support or salute sell-outs and agents of the West before, during and after the presidential elections’ (Ndlovu, 2008), or a retired Major General saying that he had ordered his officers to vote for former President Mugabe (BBC News Online, 2008; Reuters, 2008). While the utterances depicted an abrogation of the Code of Conduct and its related regulations for a free and fair election, ZEC could not produce a statement to warn, reprimand or threaten the ruling party for what its agents and members were saying. In fact, it was attested in the 2008 rerun that a disproportionate 600, 000 ballots were ascribed to the armed forces, yet both police and army were barely close to 60, 000, a tenth of the ballots which is an extra nine-tenths of the actual number (CNN, 2008). Members of the opposition, similarly, did not produce a statement of dissent or litigation against such officers. This has prompted the writing of this chapter to motivate for a redress of the truthfulness of electoral messages, and especially their compliance with the Code of Conduct or even the need to adjust its elaboration.

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The Provision of Rational Materials During Campaigns The provision of rational materials for general elections is premised on the thinking that voting is a rational choice that a potential voter must make during voting (McGann, 2016). Rational choice is a theory that separates the academic approach from the numbers on the voting day. It is interpreted sociologically and statistically in empirical axiomatic models of voter choices. Rational choice is normative in that it combines rationality and popularity in democratic senses. In political science, rational choice assumes rational action deduced from rational behaviour by actors resulting in attainment of what statistical models call numbers. It addresses the central concerns of politics by use of mathematical notations. It is an approach that distinguishes individual choices (at microlevel) from collective choices (at macro-level) in relationship to electoral results. Usually collective models yield more results compared to individual models, the reason mobilisation has remained a useful approach to campaigns. Rational choice normatively refers to the instrument used to make a choice and to the quality of such a choice (McGann, 2016). It assists in rank ordering one’s choices in view of the utility function of each choice. The ordering may follow consistent patterns if they are rational, using what is called ‘logistic regression and probit [or the multinomial versions of these techniques] to study the effect of various factors on vote choice’ (Luce, 1959; McGann, 2016). The reason to choose someone on voting day (instrumentality) is a result of interpretations of actions using methodological rationalism in comparing your options (Weber, 1978). This section discusses individual and collective choices on voting: Individual (Non)Rational Choices in Voting and Collective (Non)Rational Choices in Voting. The first aspect in this discussion, Individual (Non)Rational Choices in Voting focuses on how any individual choice is consistent with the influences voters receive from their candidate promoters. Voters may choose entities that advance their interests. Voters have an idea of what is more favourable in their own interests. These interests maybe resulting from ideologies that were created by Zimbabwe’s history, culture or political institutions, such as the colonisation story, the second Chimurenga (liberation struggle) and the black empowerment programs, among many (McGann, 2016). The logic on preference of ideological models by voters

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uses closeness to one’s position to the party of choice. This may be irrational but practical. Zimbabwe, in 2007, made choices on the basis of political party performance but it was thwarted by the army (Chitando & Togarasei, 2010). Voters’ expectations that MDC-T could perform better than ZANU-PF economically by installing a corrupt-free and competent cabinet led many to prefer opposition as seen in the 2009–2012 Government of National Unity (GNU). The logic in political models for voter preference use valence where choice is based on delivery. Further, choice of individual candidates during voting maybe both rational and irrational, but this is influenced by ideology on one side, and by performance on the other, hence individual positioning and valence (Schofield & Sened, 2005), like voting for ‘my’ party but it also has desirable economic policies or outcomes (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007). Performance can be prospective or retrospective using past performance or preferred alternative. Voting choices are done strategically for a better eventuality in electoral or personal outcomes. At one time in Zimbabwe, voting for ZANU-PF was done to avoid wasting one’s vote because there was no other preferred alternative. Strategic voting puts votes into line with their own preferences, even where such preferences come from outside forces (Abramson et al., 2010). The idea of rationality dismisses the affective criteria in that voter cognition prefers elaborate personality traits in candidates. The affective paradigm, often than not, has been used by voters to achieve government ‘affability’ rather than desired ends. In this case, individual voting choices may have been used to achieve group affinities. This deep sense of identity (belonging) is entrenched into an individual’s life through early socialisation (from birth). If embraced, it determines choice without rationalisation, hence some ZANU-PF party members in Zimbabwe used to say ‘even if we say our President is a donkey you all going to vote for him.’ In this case, voters are forced to make a choice against their own will because of their membership with the political party or community where most members are ZANUPF. A political party is some form of identity that excels a candidate’s political career. One’s membership in a political party makes his/her alternative choices unacceptable and, hence undermines their rationality as identity is considered to be more important than political outcome (Adams et al., 2005). The socialisation of African political parties undermines rationalisation, hence members have to update such memberships by acquiring new memberships in parties that advance their ideologies or perform better. Irrational voting is class-based, as voters support people

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who advance their class interests rather than better political outcomes (McGann, 2016). In all, individual voting choices are empirical despite their being rational or not. While voters change their preferences, this requires that governments become accountable to voters, if they can vote with any degree of rationality. This means voters can be able to assess government performance, to use it to revote it into power or remove it from power. This can also include its ideology. Voters who can make informed decisions are rational and can ask for accountability (Dalton, 1988). This can be used to judge the value of democracy. The second aspect, Collective (Non)Rational Choices in Voting are choices that provide better electoral results because they influence numbers rather than ideas only. Numbers link individual preferences to collective policy or ideology in what the French have developed in politics called the left–right metaphor (Black, 1971). This relates to the concept of the median vote, wherein divergent preferences are resolved by using the preferences of a medial legislator. The approach, unfortunately, cannot be applied in multiple cases, where the majority can enact their own preferred positions. Majority decisions can defeat a preferable condition with dire consequences for democracy, especially where policies are reduced to party competition (Downs, 1957). In voting where competition rules the game, voters have no choices but to simply follow the right-left dimensions because no party will position itself at the preference of a medial voter. In essence, parties that converge to the position of the median voter usually win elections, hence has consequences for voter preferences and choices (Black, 1971; Downs, 1957). Parties anticipate on voters’ choices leaving individual voters with no choices. This is not to suggest that parties converge at the median because multi-party democracy may involve more than two parties (McGann, 2016) where candidate quality (valence) and spatial positioning are used (Schofield & Sened, 2006). Convergence may thus affect a less popular candidate, which can only be salvaged by the distinctness of their party ideology shared together with voters. Collective choices have also to consider the liberalism-populism tension because voting concerns are also with funders and activists above and beyond voters (Riker, 1982). In other words, the concept of majority rule is just an illusion that does not matter to anyone (Arrow, 1963; McKelvey, 1976). Results do not reflect real-world realities but statistical

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‘curiosity’ (McGann, 2016). In fact, when the majority wins, it is overlapping majorities winning rather than one majority. With overlapping policy positions, experimental voting is experienced (Bianco et al., 2006). This can include ‘agenda setting, strategic voting, or arm-twisting’ (Bianco et al., 2004). In other cases the affective model applies (Schofield & Sened, 2006). Collective choices deal with the social choice theory that is compatible with the theory of democracy. In the end, it is possible that individual and collective voter preferences drive out political outcomes. The move in public opinion may substantially and eventually affect outcomes. In a fair voting system, the eventual outcome becomes a result of a ‘balance of opinions.’ That Zimbabwe has multiple parties, though most are insignificant, affect how ZANU-PF and CCC enter the contest because any tie would be resolved by coalitions to enable one party to govern. Small parties are unfortunately easy to coalesce in this rule of possible majorities, to assist the incumbent to continue ruling. This does not disregard the negotiating roles of foreign governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in any multi-party system, the reason why the United States elections are purported to have been rigged by the Russians. Majoritarian rule uses checks and balances in decision making where social choice has multiple dimensions towards policy-making (Krehbiel, 1998). Thus, in this way, collective choice depends on the overall distribution of public opinion, making voting a more rational decision at the level of collectivities rather than a personal decision. If the public is poorly informed, public opinion becomes an aggregate of existing information (Erikson et al., 2002). Still the components of rationality and irrationality aggregate towards democratic accountability because the social choice model follows public mood informed by individual preferences. In conclusion, the provision of rational campaign materials in this section can effectively foster the rational choices of potential voters during elections, and thus crucially contribute towards the independence in voter choices. Rationality in choosing political leaders or any other leaders is a theory that can be used in making individual or collective decisions. In both cases, the effects of the choices are seen in social choice models found in empirical results. Rationality as a theory of making choices results in logit and probit, to test voting behaviour, because it is only when voters are rational that they can hold politicians accountable for their behaviour in a principle of political equality and collectivity like democracy. Equality

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is only possible if representatives are chosen rationally, because the electorate has cognitive capabilities to meaningfully decide individually and collectively their preferred political outcomes. Majoritarian rule herein does not mean it is the majority who rule, but that there are multiple parties and overlapping majorities not in power who influence processes and consequences of the voting models as found in empirical results.

The Establishment of a Value System on General Elections Claims to criminality in Zimbabwe’s general elections since 1980 cannot persuade us to ignore the need for an ethical values system in regulating political campaigns. Violations have reportedly been caused by the ZANU-PF party without any reprisals from independent institutions because the ZEC is a partisan institution that cannot create a level playing field if its commissioners were chosen to run the commission along the ideals of ZANU-PF party. In the 2013 general election, thirteen dimensions of unfairness were observed by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), the largest independent election observer in Zimbabwe that the first was ZEC’S weakness to carry out its mandate (Matchaba-Hove, 2013). Elections administration and results aggregation have recently been an issue, making campaign messages a trivial matter as shown in the Electoral Act and the Code of Conduct. Every country’s laws on elections follow the behaviours of politicians there, hence the need for Zimbabwe to develop a value system in its Code of Conduct that guides aspiring candidates the quality of messages they must develop for their promotional materials (Akbar et al., 2021). For a democratic society, high morals are required if sovereignties of voters are to be upheld (Akbar et al., 2021). General elections in Zimbabwe have always been coloured with bloodshed and criminality that began with campaigns and messages that incite violence with total disregard for human rights and the law. The presence of the Electoral Act and the Code of Conduct is good starting point in this study that needs to be explored for further beneficiation with regard to the development of campaign materials. In the Code of Conduct, it begins by saying: ‘The purpose of this Code is to promote conditions that are conducive to free and fair elections and a climate of tolerance in which electioneering activity may take place without fear or coercion, intimidation or reprisals.’ Unfortunately, unprofessional and irresponsible but ‘witty and hilarious rants’ (Mpofu, 2017) of Presidents

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at their rallies, that are themselves without truth or substance undermine rather than advance democratic thinking (Akbar et al., 2021). The ZEC in Zimbabwe carries out presidential, parliamentary and council elections; herein harmonised general elections using the Electoral Act. It is Zimbabwe’s general elections organiser with high expectations for its efficiency, independence, openness, fairness, orderliness, legality, professionalism, confidentiality, effectiveness and proportionality to be representative of all political, legal and social interests on matters of elections. Candidates seem to disregard the Code of Conduct, and ZEC has been accused of incompetence such as its inability to clean up the voters’ roll like the presence of Desmond Lardner-Burke, a Rhodesian Minister of Law and Order, who died in the 1990s to allow ZANU-PF’s rigging tricks has been viewed as incapacitation because all commissioners are political appointees (Shaw, 2008). In 2018, ZEC faced lawsuit from the then Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance (MDC-A), now the CCC over presidential results. This pointed towards lack of moral, ethical and philosophical obligations to apply the Code of Conduct in its execution of the general elections. The very accusations are an indicator of the independent commission’s own lack of independence from ZANU-PF control. This allows ZANU-PF to get away with any lies it tells the electorate during campaigns as the judiciary and ZEC are both emasculated. Unfortunately, the very conduct of elections is integral to statehood and nationhood that unites citizens. The inclusion of a value system, herein Ubuntu, which is both a spiritual and philosophical principle into the Code of Conduct goes a long way into bringing discipline into the campaign messages of candidates whose irresponsible behaviour may be used to warn, reprimand or even disqualify them from the competition. A value system enables the use of the Code of Conduct in carrying out democratic elections (Akbar et al., 2021). ZEC’s claims to be partial have not been heeded because of the problems it created by its poor handling of campaign processes and electoral results (Masengwe et al., 2021). The problem is not in lack of laws to regulate the smooth running of general elections but the absence of values in the system, which amounts to nullifying the effects of the Code of Conduct that ZEC must use to guide candidates on how to develop campaign messages and the conduct of campaign as that part is silent in the Code of Conduct and the Electoral Act. Lack of values to support the execution of the Code of Conduct

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and the Electoral Act has led many to link ZEC’s inability to tame political parties as institutional incompetence, compromising the integrity of independent commissions as surrogates of the ruling party. This chapter submits that the purpose of the Code of Conduct, though it sounds short, contains adequate guides on how candidates must conduct themselves especially with regard to the messages they pass on to the electorate. What lacks in Zimbabwe is not the absence of legal parameters or guidelines but the spirit in which those parameters can be effectively implemented (Akbar et al., 2021). In fact the Code of Conduct should align the ethical, moral and philosophical positions of candidates with expected national norms of behaviour contained in the national philosophy of Ubuntu. This study was couched with the belief that candidates’ campaign messages go a long way in affecting the whole process of electioneering in Zimbabwe. In this way, the Code of Conduct needs to cover the types of speeches and messages to be used by candidates in the same way actions are stipulated in both the Electoral Act and the Code of Conduct on the conduct of democratic elections in Zimbabwe. The Code of Conduct should also be able to be used to punish offenders or violators, for instance, where inflammatory speeches are used and party members use violence in the campaigns in the short or long run. The presence of a value system can help candidates contain the actions of their members as sanctions from ZEC could disqualify their members from participating in an election. If ZEC is empowered to enforce compliance to the Electoral Act and the Code of Conduct, actors, afraid of penalties, will adhere to the provisions of the law and its value system. Such sanctions could be provided for through written warnings, reprimands or dismissals of irresponsible potential public officers with specific demands for candidates to provide truthful campaign messages rather than lies and deceit. This chapter subscribes to the thinking that a credible electoral process considers both the ‘intention’ and ‘influence’ of the campaign process because campaigns are important for enhancing electoral performance during voting, which is defeated by having irresponsible candidates. These speeches of former President Mugabe and the incumbent, President Mnangagwa, have been described as ‘witty and hilarious rants’ (Mpofu, 2017), but one would regard them as irresponsible public statements that do nothing but create a scenario where candidates enter into a ‘war of words.’ The value system is something that must be nurtured into the nation if politicians begin to be civil rather than just having a deep understanding of the law. Mpofu (2017) was short of saying the Presidents

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present an unprofessional public behaviour that lacks fatherliness and care for the citizens. Presidential ‘rants,’ which are forbidden by the law, have violated both the Act and the Code of Conduct that forbids the coercing of voters using a violent tone, unspecified threats, materials to woo voters and reprisals against their opponents. Elsewhere where electoral laws are also codes of ethics or value systems, the Code of Conduct “concerns election participants, the candidates, and the successful team of the candidates; for that, the future enforcement of understanding related to the code of ethics are encouraged to improve the organizers and the side of the election participants” (Akbar et al., 2021, p. 29). The problems of formerly colonised states seem to be the same when it comes to elections, but the situation of Zimbabwe seems to supersede all of them because of the involvement of public institutions in ZANU-PF party affairs. This makes it difficult for independent institutions to provide sanctions against ZANU-PF whenever it violates the public good in general elections. This chapter was concerned on enforcing the spirit and letter of the Electoral Act and Code of Conduct by developing the electoral process to deal with the type of campaign messages candidates develop and communicate in order to prevent violations to the law during the electoral process. With a value system like Ubuntu, candidates have an ethical regulatory framework to limit their violation of the electoral process, the electorate’s rights and responsibilities as well as attaining a credible electoral process whose results receive the goodwill of the nation.

Conclusion This chapter was inspired by campaigns between ZANU-PF and CCC in the 2023 general elections of Zimbabwe that are always couched in reprisals against the express prohibitions in the Code of Conduct. Reprisals by the ruling ZANU-PF on opposition parties as surrogates of American and European interests have not been publicly disputed by independent institutions like the Parliament, Judiciary, ZEC itself or the opposition that could also examine how ZANU-PF couches the Chinese and the Russians as a surrogate for such foreign interests. This repertoire is without its religious or spiritual value system contained in the national philosophy of Ubuntu because such messages affect the humanity and spirituality of listeners in the short and long run. The chapter was concerned with the deceit and lies contained in political campaign messages that influence political outcomes but destroy the

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national ethical system of values of honesty, chastity, transparency and respect because the way votes are acquired includes ‘ranting’ bouts. The application of the Electoral Act and the Code of Conduct to achieve their democratic intentions rather than just outcomes can be successful if candidates consider how deceit and lies affect the aftermath of their supporters’ lives. The chapter also subscribes to the thinking that Zimbabwe is a secular state with a populous Christian religious fervour. Ubuntu philosophy as the founding principles of Zimbabwean elections, given that it is acknowledged in the national educational system, goes a long way in acknowledging the national religiosity contained in the Christian presence in Zimbabwe. A value system improves candidates, independent institutions and voters’ electoral experience. The communication of electoral messages can be done using public or social media other than public address systems. Good messages however can be transmitted through print, speech and online platforms and the effects remain the same if elections are done following a value system that respects the Electoral Act and the Code of Conduct. This chapter looked at the essentiality of the development of campaign materials, regard for the autonomy of voters and the establishment of a value system to support the law. This chapter has picked Ubuntu with its philosophical and ethical connotations to deal with deception and lying by candidates, their agents and teams during campaigns. A value system respects voters’ bill of rights by producing responsible adverts, speeches and utterances as enforced in the Electoral Act and the Code of Conduct. Candidates’ accountability even as they fear warnings, reprimands and dismissals goes a long way in addressing false pretences and wilful violations that breach the integrity of elections that affects the quality of political outcomes and electoral integrity in Zimbabwe.

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CHAPTER 18

“Sanctions Are the Source of Our Suffering”: Of ZANU-PF’s ‘Exhausted’ Rhetoric and Blame-Gaming Tactics as Hegemonic Preservation Collen Sabao

Historicising the ‘Sanctions’ in Zimbabwean Politics and the 2002 Elections This section historically contextualises the manners in which the ‘sanctions’ debate plays out on the Zimbabwean political landscape, specifically as it manifests within ZANU-PF’s political hegemonic rhetoric. On the eve of the highly contested and violence-marred harmonised Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 2002, the United States of America (U.S.A or U.S) and Europe at large “imposed ‘sanctions’ (which in essence were restrictions, travel and trade) on named individuals within

C. Sabao (B) Department of Humanities and Arts, University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9_19

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the ranks of governance in the country (largely from ZANU-PF) as well as named entities they control” (Sabao, 2018, p. 111). Those affected by the ’sanctions’ were broadly speaking, the then (and now late) President of the Republic, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, his immediate family and close relatives as well as his political allies (a group largely constituted of his ministers—including the incumbent Zimbabwean President—Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa, heads of security agencies, that is, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the Police, the Army and the Prisons Services as well as their immediate families) (Sabao, 2013). The ‘illegal sanctions’, which were largely travel and trade restriction on the named individuals forbade United States nationals to ‘do business with [these named persons], these designated entities or with other entities they control.’ This translates thus, to the ‘sanctions’ also affecting named corporations and organisations run by the embargoed individuals. As Sabao and Visser (2020, p. 180) observe, The embargo was largely a culmination of alleged “observed gross human rights violations” by the Robert Mugabe led ZANU PF government. Other crimes of the Mugabe led ZANU PF included ruling with impunity and utter disregard of the rule of law, violence against political opponents, gross maladministration of the Zimbabwean economy and graft, among others.

The official position of the U.S.A governments, then and now, on the reasons for the ‘sanctions’ is that they were imposed in a bid to ensure that the country respects human rights and the rule of law. They argue that, “Illegal western sanctions” is now one of the most popular clichés in Zimbabwe’s national conversation. The U.S. Embassy would like to dispel five myths about the United States’ position on Zimbabwe by stating clearly the real U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe...The United States does not maintain sanctions against the people of Zimbabwe or the country of Zimbabwe. U.S. sanctions target individuals and entities that have undermined democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe. More specifically, U.S. sanctions target individuals who, among other things, are senior officials of the Government of Zimbabwe, have participated in human rights abuses related to political repression and/or have engaged in activities facilitating public corruption by senior officials of the Government of Zimbabwe. U.S. sanctions also target entities owned or controlled

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by the Zimbabwean government or officials of the Zimbabwean government. Unless a transaction involves a blocked individual or entity, U.S. persons may, and are encouraged to, conduct business in, and trade with, Zimbabwe and its people.

The United States has consistently maintained that the ‘sanctions’ were imposed on specified Zimbabwean nationals and not the country and that they are a result of an observed high prevalence of gross human rights violations by the Zimbabwean ruling elite (specifically ZANU-PF). They argue that the ‘sanctions’ were meant to ‘force’ the Zimbabwean ruling elite to implement reform(s) towards democratisation. The ZANU-PF governments under both Mugabe and Mnangagwa have politically exploited the imposition of the ‘sanctions’, blaming them for Zimbabwe’s ever deteriorating economy. The United States has refuted such political propagandistic rhetoric from ZANU-PF, and intimated that the ‘sanctions’ were in response to human rights and election-related abuses perpetrated between 2001 and 2008, which had forced them (the United States and EU) to adopt a variety of measures designed to promote reform. The argument they proffer is that these measures were not national sanctions but merely targeted at specific individuals (for example, through asset freezes and travel bans). The sanctions on Zimbabwe were introduced in response to political violence, human rights abuses and rule of law violations, as well as deteriorating democratic standards that followed the violent election processes in 2000 and 2002. In many respects these core problems remain. Political parties and civil society groups alike continue to refer to ongoing concerns about political violence, repression and reform deficits. The sanctions are neither comprehensive nor illegal, as often suggested by ZANU-PF. They include a set of “restrictive measures” introduced and modified over the last decade by the U.S., EU and other countries targeting specific individuals and entities. In addition, an arms embargo by these countries prevents the sale of weapons and other items that could be used for internal repression.

The ZANU-PF governments’ responses to these charges by the United States and EU has been one of hostility and aggression—one that challenges the legitimacy of the ‘sanctions’ as well as the sincerity and intent of especially Britain to the cause of democracy and good governance in Zimbabwe. The then (and now late) President of the Republic and

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the First Secretary of ZANU-PF, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, is on record making this position clear on several occasions, both in his capacity as ZANU-PF leader as well as Zimbabwe’s President. For example, responding to threats of possible indictment at the International Criminal Court for these alleged human rights violations that were the alleged reason for the ‘sanctions’ on Cable News Network’s (CNN) Amanpour, on the eve of his address to the United Nations General Assembly to appeal for the repulsion of the sanctions, he made the following remarks which question the sincerity and intent of Britain in imposing ‘sanctions’ against Zimbabwe, I am not concerned about the International Criminal Court. I am concerned about Zimbabwe and I am concerned about the lives of the people of Zimbabwe. And don’t forget it was my party that brought democracy to the country and not the British. We had to fight the British for democracy.

Mnangagwa, who succeeded Mugabe in 2017 through a military-aided ‘soft coup’ has also continued with this ‘sanctions are hurting us and are the cause of our problems’ mantra of Mugabe’s. It is important to note at this stage that, despite calls for the removal of the ‘sanctions’ by both ZANU-PF and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), soon after the 2008 Presidential Elections in Zimbabwe, regarded as the most violent elections in the history of the country, and in which there were observed irregularities in the administration of the elections—notably, the refusal by the ZANU-PF government to accredit independent observers (especially from the European Union (EU)), as well as the unprecedented and yet unexplained delay in announcing election results and the subsequent one man run-off pitting Mugabe alone after opposition political parties withdrew from the election citing violence and intimidation on its supporters as well as allegations of election theft by ZANU-PF—the US and EU announced a further extension/reaffirmation of the ‘sanctions’. This position, the extension of the ’sanctions’ was further reaffirmed again by the United States in March 2011, March 2012 and recently in March 2023, on grounds that ZANUPF was still exhibiting political intolerance and was obstinate to fully implement political and electoral reforms. To that effect, the US, through President Barack Obama announced that the ‘sanctions’ were to remain in force and for the same initial reasons that they had initially been imposed.

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… I have sent to the Federal Register for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency with respect to the actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons to undermine Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions is to continue in effect beyond March 6, 2011.The crisis constituted by the actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons to undermine Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions has not been resolved. While some advances have been made in Zimbabwe, particularly on economic stabilization, since the signing of the power-sharing agreement, the absence of progress on the most fundamental reforms needed to ensure rule of law and democratic governance leaves Zimbabweans vulnerable to ongoing repression and presents a continuing threat to peace and security in the region and the foreign policy of the United States. Politically motivated violence and intimidation, and the undermining of the power-sharing agreement by elements of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front party, continue to be of grave concern. For these reasons, I have determined that it is necessary to continue this national emergency and to maintain in force the sanctions to respond to this threat. The United States welcomes the opportunity to modify the targeted sanctions regime when blocked persons demonstrate a clear commitment to respect the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. The United States has committed to continue its review of the targeted sanctions list for Zimbabwe to ensure it remains current and addresses the concerns for which it was created. We hope that events on the ground will allow us to take additional action to recognize progress in Zimbabwe in the future. The goal of a peaceful, democratic Zimbabwe remains foremost in our consideration of any action.

The continued alienation of the country, especially by the western world, who constituted the larger part of the country’s donor community as well as by multilateral institutions, resulting from the ‘sanctions’, culminated in an unprecedented economic meltdown which saw inflation in Zimbabwe soaring to 231 000 000% and virtually all her citizens living way below the poverty datum line. The ZANU-PF leadership, once described as obstinate and reluctant, bowed down to pressure, both internal and largely from SADC through the mediation of then South African president, Thabo Mbeki (and subsequently his successor, Jacob Zuma) to consider the formation of a coalition government with the opposition political parties as a solution to the political impasse existing in the country then. In July, 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) providing a framework for a negotiated arrangement for power

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sharing, which later translated to what came to be known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA)—a document giving birth to a Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe—was signed by ZANU-PF’s Robert Mugabe and the leaders of the two MDC formations, Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Professor Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M) (Hove & Ndawana, 2016; Mukuhlani, 2014; Sabao, 2013, 2016). The immediate implementation of the GPA however was hindered by failures to compromise on the part of all the political parties, especially with regard to the ministries that each of the parties was to assume, with the then two opposition parties (MDC-T and MDC-M) accusing ZANUPF of playing ‘the big brother’ because of its insistence on clinging on to the most powerful ministries, that is, Defence, Finance, Home Affairs (which controls the police too), Mining and Agriculture. After prolonged dialogue and mediation, “[t]he Inclusive Government was finally established in February 2009, and in March SADC called for the removal of ‘all forms of sanctions,’ arguing that their continuation would ‘undermine (Zimbabwe) and SADC efforts to normalise the situation’” (Sabao, 2013). The final signing of the MoU that gave birth to the GPA was on February 9, 2009. The GPA provided for the inclusion of all the three parties involved in the negotiations in an inclusive cabinet, which in essence meant a sharing of ministerial and deputy ministerial portfolios among the three political parties on the basis of their poll percentages. The biggest provision in the GPA entailed a change in government structures, which saw a division of powers between the leaders of the three political parties through the creation of new administrative offices, a development which saw Mugabe maintaining the presidency, Tsvangirai assuming the office of Prime Minister while Mutambara was sworn in as Deputy Prime Minister.

The 2008 Elections, the GPA, GNU and the ‘Sanctions’ Debate Zimbabwe was thus, between 2009 and 2013, under the political administration of a Government of National Unity (GNU), a development that, as demonstrated in the previous section, culminated from a political crisis arising from the heavily disputed and violence-marred 2008 Presidential Elections. Following heavy contestations of these elections and their condemnation by independent observers, the US and the EU as having been ‘not free and fair,’ through mediation sanctioned by the

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Southern African Development Community (SADC) and facilitated by the then South African President, Thabo Mbeki, the country’s major political parties agreed to a ‘unity government’ established through a statutory instrument known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA) (Hove & Ndawana, 2016; Mukuhlani, 2014; Raftopoulos, 2013; Sabao, 2013, 2016). In line with the observations made in the introduction section regarding this ‘complex’ nature of the Zimbabwean political landscape especially so in light of this political dispensation characterised by this power sharing agreement between the country’s three major political parties (ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M), this section focuses on the imagined impact, or lack of thereof, of the US and EU imposed ‘sanctions’ on the country’s contemporary economic challenges. This is a very pertinent and controversial issue in the context of Zimbabwean politics as it has had manifestations of divisiveness along political lines, which subsequently filter down to the polarity of the Zimbabwean population on both ideological and political lines. It is on public record that during the election campaigning period preceding the 2008 elections, the ruling party, ZANU-PF, incessantly made public intimations that the country was suffering, especially economically, due to ‘sanctions’ that had been called for by the MDC formation led by Morgan Tsvangirai. The arguments, made at both political and official platforms by Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF, as both government and a political party, were to the effect that the MDC was a Western-funded political party, an attempt by the West to enforce regime change in the country and reversing the gains of independence. References to the MDC as “Western Puppets”, “British funded” and so on, are evidence of this stance. On the other hand, the MDC insisted that the country was ‘on its knees’ due to ZANU-PF’s, ineptitude, corrupt activities as well as its repressive tendencies disguised in liberation war history political exhortations. It is also on record that when the ‘sanctions’ were imposed on the country ZANU-PF expressly made proclamations that the ‘sanctions’ were a British and European agenda to ‘punish’ Zimbabwe (in particular, the then totally ZANU-PF constituted Zimbabwean government) for the ‘infamous late 1990s and early 2000s violent land grabs,’ politically framed within ZANU-PF political rhetoric as well as ratified through the Land Acquisition Act (a law promulgated only after the forced land/farm evictions and seizures as a means to ratify them), as the Agrarian Land Reform Programme or the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. This was a programme in which hundreds of large-scale

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commercial farmers were forcibly evicted from their farms (Sabao, 2013). The ‘sanctions’ thus allegedly became the new ZANU-PF scapegoat for its continued hegemonic repression. It is also important to note that, because of ZANU-PF’S stance that the MDC-T was responsible for the imposition of sanctions, it was its political belief that the incorporation of the two MDC factions into government would culminate in their calling for the removal of the ‘sanctions’, which in ZANU-PF rhetoric are “illegal” (Hove & Ndawana, 2016; Mukuhlani, 2014; Sabao, 2013). Scholarship (Chakawa, 2022; Hove & Ndawana, 2016; Masaka, 2012; Mukuhlani, 2014; Sabao, 2013), in light of the fissures that continuously threatened the survival of the GNU, especially arising from claims that ZANU-PF was adamant to implement some of the reforms entrenched in the GNU, argues that the ‘sanctions’ then became the scapegoat for ZANU-PF’s reluctance to enforce democratic reforms. It is argued that ZANU-PF manipulates the issue politically and propagandises it as part of its efforts to frustrate reform and mobilise against perceived internal and external threats to national sovereignty. ZANUPF argued that reform was contingent on the removal of sanctions and accused the MDC wing led by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (MDCT) of reneging on GPA commitments to facilitate this. The MDC-T counter-argued that it had no control over sanctions, and that there would be a stronger basis for their removal if GPA violations ended and ZANU-PF did not block reforms. Mugabe’s party conflated the various measures, including restrictions from multilateral institutions, arguing that the “sanctions” were centrally responsible for the poor economy. The MDC-T contended that the measures were relatively narrow and targeted, and it is ZANU-PF that had destroyed the economy. The United States has continually refuted these allegations and has reiterated officially and in line with the foregoing thesis that the ‘sanctions’ are merely a ZANU-PF bluff and are not ‘real’ sanctions, but mere restrictions and are targeted at named individuals, and not the nation (Sabao, 2013). The US government argued that the ‘sanctions’ were used as a propaganda tool by ZANU-PF as a political party, as well as a party to the inclusive government, to preserve its political hegemony and to stall on implementing both political reforms as well as provisions of the GPA. Sanctions have given ZANU-PF, which presents itself as a victim of external machinations, a propaganda narrative that reinforces its anti-imperialist rhetoric. A resolution at its December 2009 congress instructed the party leadership and negotiators to prevent movement

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on the concerns of the MDC formations without corresponding and simultaneous redress of ZANU-PF’s concerns such as the illegal Western sanctions, Western-funded pirate radio broadcasts and Western interference in Zimbabwe’s internal politics through the funding of parallel government structures and the sponsoring of political activities of NGOs as a force multiplier for the MDC formations. The two MDC formations are also on record purveying the view that ZANU-PF was insincere to the fight for the removal of ’sanctions’, arguing that ZANU-PF incessantly uses the sanctions rhetoric as some form of political power play/tactic in a bid to continue to have political relevance. For example, Professor Welshman Ncube, leader of the then MDC-N is on record as having intimated, after the renewal of sanctions by both the EU and the US, that ZANU-PF overplays the sanctions issue to remain relevant on the country’s political landscape. He further revealed that his party would not aid ZANU-PF in the ‘fight’ against the sanctions as this would be tantamount to helping ZANU-PF regain political relevance. The ZANU-PF governance on the other hand continues to insist that the ‘sanctions’ are illegal and unjustified. They also claim that the sanctions are real and affect the nation as a whole. For example, in an interview on CNN’s Amanpour just before addressing the United Nations General Assembly to call for the removal of the sanctions, President Robert Mugabe reiterated ZANU-PF stance with regards to the sanctions by remarking that, The sanctions are unjustified, illegal and they are meant for regime change to address that illegal principle… The United States sanctions are real sanctions, economic sanctions. Have you looked at them? Look at them and you will satisfy yourself that they are real sanctions that prevent any companies from having dealing with us. They prevent any financial institutions from also not having relations with us.

He further remarked that, The land reform is the best thing that ever happened to an African country…You don’t leave power when imperialists dictate that you leave. There is regime change. Haven’t you heard of regime change programme by Britain and the United States which is aimed at getting not just Robert Mugabe out of power, but Robert Mugabe and his party out of power? And that naturally means we dig in, remain in our trenches?

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Meanwhile, the MDC-T’s position regarding the ‘sanctions’ was that the imposition of the sanctions was a result of ZANU-PF’s machinations, which are characterised by political intolerance and running down of the economy through corruption and the gross violations of human rights. The MDC-T, as far as this research has established, did not made any official pronunciations of their position regarding the ‘sanctions’. In a casual interview, one MDC-T legislator, Settlement Chikwinya, explained that there was no position documentation from the MDC-T regarding the ‘sanctions’. In fact, he said, it was the position of the MDC-T that, contrary to ZANU-PF’s claims that they are responsible for calling for the imposition of the sanctions by the US and the EU, they did not. And because of this, the MDC-T had made a decision to not involve itself in the ‘sanctions’ debate (and blame games) but instead, let the US and the EU (the imposers) and ZANU-PF (the affected) deal with each other directly. Because of the established ZANU-PF’s official position regarding the ‘sanctions’, President Robert Mugabe, at the behest of ZANU-PF, on Wednesday, 2 March 2011, launched a National Anti-Sanctions Petition Campaign in which the party sought 2 million signatures to present to the US and the EU as evidence of a national consensus against the ‘sanctions’, that is, as proof that the ‘sanctions’ were not just affecting the named embargoed individuals only, but the nation at large. Acquiring the 2 million signatures, the party believed, would send a message to the US and the EU that the call for the lifting of ‘sanctions’ was a national consensus, and that this would hopefully convince them to reconsider and lift the embargo. Given the power politics within the GNU, the idea of, and execution of this campaign was not without political divisions and ideological differences. This is in light of the context provided above, that examines the political ideological standpoints of the parties to the inclusive government, as well the US and the EU, with regard to the sanctions.

The ‘sanctions,’ the ‘New’ Constitution Making Process and the 2013 Elections Roadmap The section analyses the ‘sanctions’ debates within Zimbabwe’s new constitution making exercise—a vital and contentious component of a framework of reforms aimed at paving way for the holding of a fresh round of elections in accordance with the provisions of the GPA. One

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of the most ‘controversial’ issues in the 2013 political dispensation in Zimbabwe was the holding of ‘fresh’ elections. Zimbabwe was set to hold elections before June 2013. As has been explained previously, Zimbabwe’s political governance was then characterised by a GNU arising from the heavily contested presidential elections of 2008 (Hove & Ndawana, 2016; Mukuhlani, 2014; Sabao, 2013, 2016). Part of the agreements made in the MoU establishing the GPA was that the initial lifespan GNU was to be a period of 18 months (subject to extension), after which period the country would hold fresh elections under a new constitution (Sabao, 2013). The eighteen-month time frame would be used for the drafting of the constitution, the holding of a referendum and its possible subsequent promulgation as the country’s supreme law. The GPA provided, in this regard, for amendments to the 1979 constitution that would see the ultimate replacement of the 1979 constitution with a new constitution which, according to the agreement, would be implemented, at the latest, by March 2010. In other words, the new constitution would also incorporate electoral law reforms that would guide the new elections. The then constitution of Zimbabwe was the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution, drafted on the eve of Zimbabwe’s independence, and which made political concessions to protect the interests of the former colonial masters as well as the new black leadership of the country (Sabao, 2013). The need for a new constitution for Zimbabwe was well summated in the following background to the process: Zimbabwe’s current constitution was crafted in 1979 under the Lancaster House agreement and has succumbed to a record of 19 Amendments to date. Attempts to craft a new constitution in the year 2000 were rejected by the people of Zimbabwe in a referendum. Various interlocking factors help to explain the “no vote”. Amongst them was the lack of wider consultation with the responsible committee alleged to be purely elitist (500 members comprising mostly MPs) and a perception that it was a ZANUPF attempt to smuggle a Constitution of its liking. Thus, the search for a viable, acceptable and a credible constitution in Zimbabwe continues as evidenced by Constitutional Amendment number 19 which legalised the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of 2008. Amongst other things, the GPA stated the need for a people driven and people-oriented constitution in Zimbabwe. As such, since June 2010 the country has embarked on a drive towards the constitution making process.

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The GPA thus, espoused that the desire to draft a new constitution arose from the acknowledgement that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves. The process of making this constitution was supposed to therefore, according to the GPA, as a matter of necessity ‘be owned and driven by the people and must be inclusive and democratic.’ This vision for the constitution was necessitated by the recognition that ‘the [then] Constitution of Zimbabwe made at the Lancaster House Conference, London in 1979 was primarily to transfer power from the colonial authority to the people of Zimbabwe.’ The then Zimbabwean constitution was a product of a compromise agreement reached at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 between the outgoing colonial government and the incoming nationalist government at the end of the war of liberation. The Constitution was widely regarded as inadequate and as having numerous shortcomings that needed to be addressed, despite it having been amended a record 19 times. The need for a new constitution as also ‘driven by a determination to create conditions for Zimbabweans to write a constitution for themselves, mindful of the need to ensure that the new Constitution deepened the nation’s democratic values and principles and the protection of the equality of all citizens, particularly the enhancement of full citizenship and equality of women.’ A condition to the GPA was that elections were to be held under a new constitution, one that would create an environment to hold free and fair elections. The new constitution-making process was guided by Article VI of the GPA signed by ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations in September 2008. The two years, (2010–2012), thus witnessed an exercise to draft a new constitution. This process, as has been discussed previously, was spearheaded by COPAC.

‘Stumbles’ in the ‘New’ Constitution Making Programme: Towards the 2013 ‘Fresh’ Elections in Zimbabwe The process towards the drafting a new constitution and the subsequent holding of fresh elections in Zimbabwe was one characterised by ‘controversial’ twists and turns. The controversies surrounding these two important national issues were largely grounded in differences that were largely political nature, between the principal parties to the GNU,

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specifically the MDC-T and ZANU-PF. Part of the agreement to the constitution clause in the GPA was that all three parties to the agreement would participate in the new constitution making process in order to ensure transparency. This arrangement accounted for the composition of COPAC which had equal representation from all the three political parties who were party to the GNU. Because of the political tension that characterised relations between the political parties prior to the signing of the GPA, conflicts of interests and controversies continued to arise in the process, with each party seemingly wanting to protect its own political interests and agendas. In light of this political diatribe, we can observe that during the period under review, there were numerous setbacks in the constitution making exercise, most of which were political in nature. Several controversial issues derailed the constitution making process at one point or another, topical among them; inadequate funding, disagreements between the parties in the data collection mechanisms, disagreements with regards to technical issues, such as the content of the provisions of the new constitution. The first draft of the constitution was only completed and made public in July 2012, two years behind schedule. Because the constitution making process took longer than it had originally been planned for in the GPA, ZANU-PF became impatient and began questioning and challenging the legitimacy of the continued existence of the GNU. ZANU-PF thus, on numerous occasions, officially made indications that elections would be held in 2012 with or without a new constitution and that it would ‘soon withdraw from the dysfunctional inclusive government’. A case in point is when the President of the Republic, Robert Mugabe went on record making pronouncements of such a position, exemplified below: President Robert Mugabe has said this year [2012] he will exercise his power and call for elections resulting in another government with or without a new constitution. Addressing the media on the occasion of his 88th birthday President Mugabe who is also the First Secretary and President of ZANU PF said the constitution—making process was supposed to take only 18 months from the time of the inception of the inclusive Government but those involved in the process were deliberately moving at a snail’s pace.

It is significant to note that the new constitution making process and the holding of free and fair elections was also a condition tied to the

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EU and US imposed ‘sanctions’. As part of the conditions that the EU and the US stipulated for the lifting of ‘sanctions’, Zimbabwe was to hold free and fair election in an environment that fostered the proliferation of political freedom and political tolerance. With regard to this, the US expressed that it would only consider debt relief, financial assistance and technical support for Zimbabwe when: (a) the rule of law has been restored, (b) free and fair elections are held, (c) the government exhibits a commitment to transparent land reform, (d) the government fulfils terms of agreement to end war in DRC and (e) the military and national police subordinate to civilian government. The drafting and subsequent promulgation of the new constitution is thus seen as pertinent to the creation of an environment for free and fair elections. These United States of America objectives are explicitly expressed in the conditions for the lifting of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA, P.L. 107–99, 21 December 2001) which stipulates under Sect. 19.4 (d) (1–5) that sanctions against Zimbabwe will only be lifted after the issuance of a; (d) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION THAT CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED—A certification under this subsection is a certification transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees of a determination made by the President that the following conditions are satisfied: (1) RESTORATION OF THE RULE OF LAW—The rule of law has been restored in Zimbabwe, including respect for ownership and title to property, freedom of speech and association, and an end to the lawlessness, violence and intimidation sponsored, S. 494— 3 condoned, or tolerated by the Government of Zimbabwe, the ruling party, and their supporters or entities. (2) ELECTION OR PRE-ELECTION CONDITIONS—Either of the following two conditions is satisfied: (A) PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION—Zimbabwe has held a presidential election that is widely accepted as free and fair by independent international monitors, and the president-elect is free to assume the duties of the office. (B) PRE-ELECTION CONDITIONS—In the event the certification is made before the presidential election takes place, the Government of Zimbabwe has sufficiently improved the pre-election environment to a degree consistent with accepted international standards for security and freedom of movement and association.

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(3) COMMITMENT TO EQUITABLE, LEGAL AND TRANSPARENT LAND REFORM—The Government of Zimbabwe has demonstrated a commitment to an equitable, legal and transparent land reform program consistent with agreements reached at the International Donors’ Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1998. (4) FULFILLMENT OF AGREEMENT ENDING WAR IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO—The Government of Zimbabwe is making a good faith effort to fulfil the terms of the Lusaka, Zambia, agreement on ending the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. (5) MILITARY AND NATIONAL POLICE SUBORDINATE TO CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT—The Zimbabwean Armed Forces, the National Police of Zimbabwe and other state security forces are responsible to and serve the elected civilian government. The ZANU-PF position regards the holding of elections, as discussed in the previous section, was tied to their established position with regard to the continued existence of the EU and US-imposed ‘sanctions’. The argument expressed by ZANU-PF was that as long as ‘sanctions’ remained in effect, they saw no reason to appease the demands of the EU and the United States for political reform. On the other hand, the two MDC formations maintained the position that they were ready for elections as long as there were major legislative and political reforms that represented visible guarantees for free and fair elections, characterised by the proliferation of an even political playing field and political tolerance, that is to say, an end to the intimidation of their supporters and an end to the use of state security agencies to intimidate voters to vote for ZANU-PF.

The ‘Sanctions’ Before and After the 2018 Zimbabwean General Elections In November 2017, Mugabe’s former and most trusted lieutenant, Emmerson Dambodzo Mnangagwa assumed office as President of Zimbabwe after a military-backed ‘soft coup’ of Mugabe (Melber & Southall, 2021; Moore, 2018; Sabao, 2018; Southall, 2018).

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Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa (Mugabe’s historically trusted lieutenant), ascended to the presidency through a military backed coup that ousted Zimbabwe’s monolithic leader, Robert Mugabe, who had been in power for 37 years. True to the ZANU PF historical way of doing things, Mnangagwa also went on a rampage accusing others, especially the West for their sanctions which he claimed were hurting ordinary people and the Zimbabwean economy. (Sabao & Visser, 2020, p. 180)

The ‘sanctions’ continued to be overplayed as part of ZANU-PF propagandistic ideological rhetoric. From the time of his swearing in, Mnangagwa continued with the Mugabean era’s political rhetoric of blaming the ‘sanctions’ for the challenges that Zimbabwe was facing economically. Mnangagwa’s political stance was no surprise as in the immediacy of his swearing-in, he made moves that signalled a continuation of the ZANU-PF political hegemony under Mugabe. In this regard, for example, Southall (2017, p. 81) observes thus, that. …the military-assisted ousting of Robert Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe and his replacement by Emmerson Mnangagwa was widely welcomed by Zimbabweans. However, hopes of significant change were dashed by the nature of his cabinet appointments, which indicated greater continuity than change vis-à-vis the Mugabe era.

In a clear testimony to the old adage that ‘the more things change, the more they remain the same,’ it would seem that there was much, in the transition from Robert Mugabe’s First Republic to Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Second Republic, to suggest continuity rather than change in the ideological political positioning, the will for economic change management and diplomatic relations. Mnangagwa did not just inherit the country from Mugabe, but also its problems, whose nascence he was complicit to. And in continuation of Mugabean political grandstanding, he also continued to blame the sanctions for the problems Zimbabwe was facing, deliberately underplaying the role that the ZANU-PF government, that he has been a party to since before Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, had played in creating the quagmire Zimbabwe contemporarily finds herself in. As such, …[t]he Zimbabwean government under President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was inaugurated on November 24, 2017, blames the sanctions for the country’s economic meltdown—Zimbabwe is currently facing foreign

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currency and cash shortages, an inflation rate of 288.5% from October 2018 to October 2019, and excessive utility costs and low wages resulting in drastically decreased demand for goods and services. Most citizens are now subjected to extreme poverty. The Zimbabwean government has made multiple attempts to rally anti-sanctions sentiment, but sanctions have largely been maintained. (Ndakaripa, 2021, p. 95)

Despite having played the ‘agent for change’ card expressed in the excerpt below, Mnangagwa’s rule has failed to live up to the spirit and letter of his verbalisations. Through the engagement and re-engagement policy, we are opening a new chapter in our relations with the world, underpinned by mutual respect, shared principles and common values. We look forward to playing a positive and constructive role as a free, democratic, transparent and responsible member of the family of nations. (Mnangagwa, 2018, p. 8–9)

Mnangagwa’s Second Republic’s foreign policy was thus, seemingly initially characterised by an overtly expressed need to ‘re-court and reengage’ with Europe and to some extent, the United States of America, with a view to securing the removal of ‘sanctions’ and encouraging direct investment from the western world—hence his mantra in the immediacy of the ascension to power was “Zimbabwe is open for business”. In these endeavours, Zimbabwe received the unparalleled support of both the African Union and the Southern African Development Community. Sadly, during the run-up to the 2018 elections especially, “the violence of the Mnangagwa regime ... reinforced the reluctance of the West to remove sanctions, and Zimbabwe ... even begun to test the patience of its neighbours” (Southall, 2021, p. 234). In fact, because of the failure of the Mnangagwa regime to effect the minimum changes required for the west world to entertain the lifting of the sanctions (Chakawa., 2022), the United States under President Joe Biden renewed the ‘sanctions’ in March 2023. In extending the sanctions, President Joe Biden is quoted as having written that. “President Emmerson Mnangagwa has not made the necessary political and economic reforms that would warrant terminating the existing targeted sanctions programme” (Nyathi, 2023). Disillusioned from such failures, rooted in insider corruption and despotic tendencies, Mnangagwa’s government continues to blame the ‘sanctions’ for Zimbabwe’s problems, and use them as an excuse to repress any dissenting voices within the country—especially opposition

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political parties such as the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC)— formerly the Movement for Democratic Change, under Morgan Tsvangirai and Movement for Democratic Change Alliance, under Nelson Chamisa—who they accuse of being Western puppets who call for sanctions against Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government thus, in true fashion to the Mugabean era’s diplomatic politics, has placed renewed faith in the ‘Look East Policy’, courting Chinese ‘investment.’ However, the downside of this has been the exploitative nature of the Chinese entry into Zimbabwe (and Africa at large) through which China seems to seek to match her investments with control of especially the natural resources of the nations she ‘invests’ in, a situation that has degenerated into the economic plunder of many African states.

The Renewal of Sanctions and the Impending 2023 Zimbabwean General Elections On Friday the 3rd of March 2023, the United States extended ‘sanctions’ against Zimbabwe by another year, citing continued repression and despotic tendencies as the basis for the extension. US President Joe Biden has extended sanctions against Zimbabwe, saying on-going repression by the country’s government “presents a continuing threat to peace and security in the region”. President Biden’s move to renew the two-decade-old sanctions came a few days after the European Union (EU) decided to extend by another year its own arms embargo against the Southern African country. In a message to the US Congress dated March 1, 2023, Biden said Zimbabwe had not made any reforms to warrant the lifting of the sanctions that were first imposed in 2003 for alleged human rights violations and electoral fraud. (Nyathi, 2023)

As the country heads towards the 2023 harmonised general elections, slatted for 23 August 2–23, the ZANU-PF government, under the leadership of Mnangagwa continues to exploit the ‘sanctions’ debate as a cover for gross government ineptitude. In the current dispensation, dubbed ‘Zimbabwe’s Second Republic’, the incumbent President, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa “has continued to reiterate the ZANU-PF mantra that the sanctions must be lifted—soliciting even the backing of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to challenge the ‘illegality’ of the sanctions” (Sabao & Visser, 2020, p. 181).

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Mnangagwa has been incessantly insistent that the political and economic challenges that Zimbabwe faces today are because of external factors— largely the ‘sanctions’. While seemingly attempting to re-court the West through proposed re-engagement, Mnangagwa has also been seen to be diplomatically moving away from the United States and the West, seeking instead news allies through a chiefly ‘Look East’ policy reminiscent of the last decade of Mugabe’s presidential tenure. Of course, whilst the Zimbabwean government has previously managed to mobilise support, from especially the ZANU-PF grassroots structures to campaign against the sanctions—as demonstrated by its launch of the Anti-Sanctions Campaign in 2011, the flopped proposed one million men march against sanctions in 2013, and the revived AntiSanctions Campaign of 2022—it would seem that the national population at large has awakened to the realisation that the ‘sanctions’ might not after all necessarily be the cause of their suffering (Moyo-Nyede, 2021). In October 2019, even the SADC leaders voted for a move to assist Zimbabwe in campaigning for the lifting of these US and EU ’sanctions’ on the firm belief that they were the cause of the instability of Zimbabwe’s economy whose collapse also adversely threatens the economies of other nation in the region (Human Rights Watch, 2020). It has emerged over the years that critics of the ZANU-PF governance structure in both the First and Second Republics believe that the governments (under both Mugabe and Mnangagwa) have been using the ‘sanctions’ as a scapegoat for the economic collapse caused by its own mismanagement of the country, characterised by corruption as well as the pillaging and plunder of the little resources that Zimbabwe has (Magaisa, 2019; Mutongwizo, 2019; Sabao & Visser, 2020). As the Zimbabwean nation braces herself for what seems to be yet another violence and irregularities-marred general election on 23 August 2023, and as has become historically typical of ZANU-PF, the ‘sanctions’ continue to be a campaign tool and a scapegoat for the repression of all forms of political dissent. The grandstanding behind the smokescreen that the ‘sanctions’ are, continues to be overplayed as a ploy to subvert the realities of ZANU-PF’s ineptitude in addressing the challenges that the Zimbabwean nation-state faces politically and economically. As Chakawa (2022) observes, it would seem prudent to assume that the ZANU-PF governance structures, under both Mugabe and Mnangagwa, are not interested in implementing the barest minimum of reforms necessary for the removal of ‘sanctions’. There seems to be a deliberate ploy to overplay

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the ‘sanctions’ mantra within ZANU-PF as it protects and perpetuates its political relevance and hegemony. The regime[s] of former president Robert Mugabe and that of his successor Emmerson Mnangagwa controversially remained unmoved despite these restrictions. The ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), deliberately failed to meet benchmarks for the removal of sanctions. To understand the relationship between sanctions and targeted regime endurance, use was made of the game theory. The study found that ruling party political elites have circumvented the effects of sanctions at a heavy cost to the populace. (Chakawa, 2022, p. 1)

In this context, it thus becomes fathomable that the ruling party, ZANU-PF, deliberately faulters in implementing the required reforms for the United States of America and the European Union to lift the ’sanctions’. This is done for political expediency in order to ensure that the political status quo in Zimbabwe, which favours ZANU-PF in the skewed manner that it is, remains. ZANU-PF gains political clout and relevancy as long as the ‘sanctions’ remain. In the run-up to the 2023 general elections, it thus comes as no surprise that the ‘sanctions’ form a critical selling point in the ZANU-PF campaign strategy as demonstrated by the failed attempted relaunch of the Anti-Sanctions Campaign in November 2022 in Zimbabwe’s second largest city, Bulawayo. It thus remains to be seen whether the electorate, who many have argued to have woken to the realities that Zimbabwe’s problem are as a result of Zimbabwe-internal issues and ZANU-PF political machinations will still buy into the ‘sanctions are the source of all our problems’ mantra as propagated by ZANU-PF in its quest to preserve its hegemonic hold over Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans.

Conclusion: ‘Sanctions’ or ZANU-PF’s Ineptitude? Questions abound regarding the real source of Zimbabwe’s social, political, and especially economic problems. The ZANU-PF government continues, to this day, to propagate the propagandistic political stance that the US and EU ’sanctions’ imposed on Zimbabwe in the early 2000s are to blame. There is thus, a deliberate ploy within ZANU-PF and which also characterise the tenures of both presidents in the First and Second Republics (Mugabe and Mnangagwa, respectively) that seeks to debunk the role played by ZANU-PF political policies in creating

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the Zimbabwean Crisis. A multiplicity of factors, prior to the imposition of the so-called ‘sanctions,’ for example, had already contributed to the degeneration of the economic standing of the Zimbabwean nation-state. The general collapse of state affairs in Zimbabwe was a result of a diverse number of factors, chief among them despotic political tendencies by the ruling party, disregard of the rule of law, hyperinflation, political intolerance as well as the violent land grabs of 1999. The combination of these factors resulted in a complete political and economic meltdown. (Sabao, 2018, p. 111)

Also to blame for the Zimbabwean Crisis were “ZANU PF’s ineptitude, corrupt activities as well as its repressive tendencies disguised in liberation war history political exhortations” (Sabao, 2013, p. 206). ZANU-PF is also on record as claiming that the ‘sanctions’ were imposed on the country as a British and European agenda to ‘punish’ Zimbabwe (in particular, the then totally ZANU-PF constituted Zimbabwean government) for the ‘infamous land grabs,’ politically framed within ZANU-PF political rhetoric the Fast Track Land Reform Programme as well as the Land Acquisition Act (a law promulgated after the forced land/farm evictions as a means to ratify them). The sanctions thus, allegedly became the new ZANU-PF scapegoat for the continued repression of Zimbabwean peoples. In clear perpetuation of Mugabe’s political hegemonic rhetoric, and having worked so closely with Mugabe over the years (as his most trusted lieutenant and ally until his unceremonious expulsion from government and the ZANU-PF party in 2017), Mnangagwa was complicit in the mess he was inheriting from Mugabe, and thus continues with the ‘sanctions are to blame’ tirade as a face saving strategy.

References Chakawa, J. (2022). Why sanctions have not worked: Zimbabwe’s experience from 2001–2021. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 1–14. Grebe, J. (2010). And they are still targeting: Assessing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe. Africa Spectrum, 45(1), 3–29. Hove, M., & Ndawana, E. (2016). Regional mediation strategy: The case of Zimbabwe. African Security Review, 25(1), 63–84. Human Rights Watch. (2020). World Report 2020. World Report 2020: Zimbabwe | Human Rights Watch (hrw.org). Accessed 7 March 2023.

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Magaisa, A. (2019). BSR: The potency of propaganda. Big Saturday Read 18 October 2019. BSR: The potency of propaganda - Big Saturday Read (bigsr.africa). Accessed 7 March 2023. Masaka, D. (2012). Paradoxes in the ‘sanctions discourse’ in Zimbabwe: A critical reflection. African Study Monographs, 33(1), 49–71. Melber, H., & Southall, R. (2021). Zimbabwe’s foreign policy under Mnangagwa. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 56(2), 234–250. Mnangagwa, E. (2018) Inauguration speech by the incoming President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Comrade Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. National Sports Stadium, 26 August.. https://irp-cdnmultiscreensite.com/ ff7b7050/files/uploaded/HE%20INAUGURATION%20SPEECH.pdf. Accessed 3 March 2023. Moore, D. (2018). A very Zimbabwean coup: November 13–24, 2017. Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 97 (1), 1–29. Moyo-Nyede, S. (2021). Zimbabweans blame government, not Sanctions, for Country’s Economic Meltdown. Afrobarometer, Dispatch No. 485 | 29 October 2021, pp. 1 – 11. Mukuhlani, T. (2014). Zimbabwe’s government of national unity: Successes and challenges in restoring peace and order. Journal of Power, Politics & Governance, 2(2), 169–180. Mutongwizo, L. (2019). Gvt says no to human rights unless sanctions are lifted. 263 Chat August 2019. Gvt Says No Respect To Human Rights Unless Sanctions Are Lifted | 263Chat. Accessed 7 March 2023. Ndakaripa, M. (2021). Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown: Are sanctions really to blame? The Washington Quarterly, 44(2), 95–120. Nyathi, K. (2023). US extends Zimbabwe sanctions, cites growing repression. The East African March 4 2023. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/restof-africa/biden-extends-zimbabwe-sanctions-4144840. Accessed on March 7 2023. Raftopoulos, B. (2013). The 2013 elections in Zimbabwe: The end of an era. Journal of Southern African Studies, 39(4), 971–988. Sabao, C. (2013). The reporter voice and objectivity in cross-linguistic reporting of controversial news in Zimbabwean newspapers: An appraisal approach (Doctoral dissertation, Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University). Sabao, C. (2016). ‘Shades of the GNU in Zimbabwe (2009–13): Linguistic discourse analyses of representations of transitional politics in Zimbabwean newspapers’. In Political Discourse in Emergent, Fragile, and Failed Democracies (pp. 306–327). IGI Global. Sabao, C. (2018). Hegemonising Zimbabwe? The polity of Mbare Chimurenga lyrics in perpetuating Mugabe’s and ZANU-PF’s rule. Muziki, 15(1), 109– 130.

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Sabao, C., & Visser, M. (2020). Sanctioning an Anti-sanctions campaign? comparing the textuality of news reports in Zimbabwean newspapers on the anti-sanctions campaigns in Zimbabwe’s first republic. Journal of African Languages and Literary Studies, 1(3), 179–203. Southall, R. (2017). Bob’s out, the Croc is in: Continuity or change in Zimbabwe?. Africa Spectrum, 52(3), 81–94.

Index

A Action research, 84, 86, 96 Adversary, 56 Ambivalence, 18, 135, 136, 140, 143 Autoethnography, 18, 84, 86

B Belonging, 18, 60, 91, 106–108, 111, 112, 123, 143, 180, 196, 236, 330 Betrayal, 2–6, 10, 37, 48, 54, 64, 66–71, 77, 78, 119, 128–130, 133, 137, 144, 145, 149–151, 153, 157, 158, 162, 165, 168–173, 177–183, 220

C Camouflage, 48 Citizens for Coalition for Change (CCC), 4, 5, 31–33, 37, 48, 52, 57–59, 73, 78, 79, 84, 194, 235, 249, 257, 258, 263–268, 274,

275, 277, 279, 285–292, 327, 328, 332, 334, 336, 360 Citizenship, 106–108, 111, 112, 114, 123, 155, 273, 276, 354 Conflict, 5, 34, 43, 88, 93, 128, 133, 135, 136, 139, 140, 233–244, 246, 251, 256, 264, 326, 355 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 10, 17, 128–130, 145, 216, 275, 281–283, 285

D Deceit, 2–5, 47, 48, 57, 58, 63, 64, 66, 68–76, 78–80, 83, 84, 86, 88–91, 93, 96, 107, 113, 122, 128–130, 133, 137, 153, 159, 162, 201, 207, 215, 235, 249–251, 258, 266, 268, 295–297, 299–306, 317, 323, 335–337 Democracy, 11, 16, 22, 38–40, 47, 50, 54, 59, 63, 74, 78, 80, 87, 155, 236, 242, 246, 248, 251,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Mavengano and I. Mhute (eds.), Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35323-9

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368

INDEX

281, 297, 299, 327, 328, 331, 332, 345–347 Digital community, 257 Discourse, 3, 9, 11, 12, 32, 49, 56, 80, 83, 84, 86–88, 93, 96, 106–109, 111, 113, 114, 119, 122, 129, 130, 134, 135, 137, 139, 143–145, 155, 157, 170, 188, 189, 205, 236, 240, 264, 266, 267, 280, 282–284 Distancing and proximation, 20

E Economic, 2, 4, 5, 10, 16, 20, 22, 23, 27, 29–32, 35, 40, 41, 44, 48, 53, 64, 68, 71, 85, 87, 92, 93, 107, 112, 114, 115, 122, 123, 129, 133, 149–151, 153, 156, 157, 159–165, 178, 181, 193, 201, 202, 205, 207, 212, 214, 220, 225, 236, 238, 240, 245, 246, 255, 256, 259, 305, 309, 326, 330, 347, 349, 351, 358–363 Electoral integrity, 337

F Feminism, 191, 207 Fragility, 188, 206

G Gender, 17–19, 89, 114, 150, 168–170, 175, 183, 188–191, 195, 196, 200, 203–207 General elections, 11, 13, 15, 38, 43, 77, 79, 321–323, 327, 329, 333, 334, 336, 360–362 Genre Theory, 275, 281–283, 285 Gullibility, 133, 176, 184

H Hegemony, 24, 43, 57, 73, 108, 118, 129, 131, 151, 172, 217, 239, 241, 281, 288, 301, 309, 350, 358, 362

I Ideology, 24, 52, 71, 112, 135, 213–215, 217, 218, 220, 224, 228, 245, 258, 259, 277, 283, 285, 286, 328, 330, 331 Imagined nationhood, 108, 118 Internet, 23, 49, 256

J Judas culture, 64, 65, 70–75, 77–80, 128, 129, 133, 168–171, 177, 178, 183, 184

L Lies, 51, 76, 78, 79, 132, 134, 323, 324, 334–337 Linguistic and political betrayal, 80

M Mango idiom, 48, 57 Media discourse, 281, 282, 285 Metatrope, 206

N National language, 34 ‘New dispensation’, 18, 74, 87, 174, 211–213, 215, 217, 219, 220, 225 Notion of deceit, 1

INDEX

O Opposition politics, 4, 63–65, 77, 78, 80, 87, 111, 249, 295, 317, 325, 347, 360

P Performativity, 188 Polarisation, 73, 154, 155, 165, 235, 236, 238, 239, 246, 248, 249, 251, 256–261, 263, 264, 266–269, 292 Political campaign, 16, 33, 193, 333, 336 Political jingles, 211–220, 224 Political transition, 215 Politics of deceit, 75, 79, 80, 217, 218, 258 Postcolonial, 2–5, 10, 18, 19, 44, 65, 66, 85, 88, 92, 107, 109, 110, 113, 122, 131, 132, 143, 168, 170, 171, 206, 207, 222, 227, 235 Postcolonial deceit, 60 Postcolonial theory, 48–50, 85, 128, 131, 132 Postcolonial Zimbabwe, 5, 19, 44, 83, 84, 86–88, 96, 170, 187, 201, 202, 205, 207, 213, 216, 217, 220, 223, 224, 227, 233–235, 251 Post-independence, 5, 29, 31, 51, 59, 110, 122, 128–131, 133, 134, 138, 144, 145, 149, 151, 155, 159, 165, 168–172, 174, 183, 184, 201, 215, 278 Poverty, 49, 50, 129, 150, 152, 160, 161, 163, 164, 202, 225, 276, 322, 347, 359 Power politics, 235, 299–301, 303, 305, 317, 352

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Propaganda, 47, 54, 89, 92, 93, 96, 134, 135, 140, 176, 241, 258, 266, 301, 304, 350 Public media, 233, 234, 236, 238–251, 282, 295, 297, 299, 300, 304, 305, 307, 309, 311, 313–317, 323, 324, 326

R Reclamation, 15, 20, 133, 168, 183 Rhetoric, 12, 24, 33, 34, 40, 44, 49, 93, 129, 134, 138, 139, 141, 145, 215, 219, 220, 240, 241, 250, 343, 345, 349–351, 358, 363 Rituals, 34

S Sanctions, 31, 240, 241, 309, 310, 313, 335, 336, 343–347, 349–352, 356–363 Scholarship, 3, 65, 66, 83, 84, 93, 96, 97, 282, 350 Siege, 83, 93, 97, 249 Social media, 5, 193, 256–261, 263, 264, 266–268, 324, 337 Stylistics, 188, 189, 207 Subaltern, 108–110, 114, 119, 120, 122, 132, 278

U Ubuntu, 133 Ubuntu, 128, 132, 133, 321, 322, 326, 327, 334–337 Urban control, 274, 277, 282, 290

V Vachingovukura, 48, 50, 52, 56, 325 Vachingovukura, 58

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INDEX

Victimisation, 306 Victor, 38, 224 Violence, 2, 5, 10, 11, 13, 15–18, 22–24, 31, 36–40, 42, 57, 65, 87, 109, 110, 123, 131, 144, 153–156, 158, 165, 172, 184, 193, 195, 202, 203, 237, 239, 240, 248, 257, 258, 266–269, 274, 275, 281, 282, 285–292, 322–325, 333, 335, 343–348, 356, 359, 361 Voicing, 10

W WhatsApp, 258, 260–263, 266, 268, 323, 328

Z Zimbabwe’s political landscape, 192 Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 2, 5, 10–17, 20–24, 28–33, 36–39, 41–43, 48–55, 57–59, 64, 73–79, 84, 87, 88, 93–96, 111, 112, 118–120, 152, 154–159, 192–194, 212–222, 225, 227, 228, 233, 235–251, 257, 258, 263–266, 268, 274–277, 279, 285–292, 297, 301–305, 307–315, 325–328, 330, 332–334, 336, 343, 345–355, 357, 358, 360–363 Zimbabweanness, 107, 112 Zimbabwean politics, 17, 52, 64, 71, 118, 119, 155, 157, 202, 240, 265, 269, 343, 349 Zimpapers, 277, 295–297, 301–316