Studies on Ottoman Transformation 9781617199073, 1617199079

Citation preview

Studies on Ottoman Transformation

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

10

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

Studies on Ottoman Transformation

liber Ortayli

The Isis Press, Istanbul

preSS 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 1994 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

ISBN 978-1-61719-907-3

Reprinted from the 1994 Istanbul edition.

Printed in the United States of America

Ilber Ortayli. born in 1947, is a graduate of Ankara University, Faculties of Political Science and of Letters. He obtained a Master's degree from the University of Chicago and a Ph. D degree from the University of Ankara. Since 1989 Professor Ortayli has been teaching at the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University rtment of Administrative History. His published monographs include: Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Yerel Yonetim Gelenegi, Ankara 1974; Tiirkiye /dare Tarihi, Ankara 1979; Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Alman Niifuzu, Ankara 1980 and Istanbul 1982; Gelenekten Gelecege, Istanbul 1982; imparatorlugun En Uzun Yiizydi, Istanbul 1983 and 1987; IstanbuVdan Sayfalar, Istanbul 1984 and 1987; Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli idareler (1840-1878), Istanbul 1985.

PREFACE

Ottoman history is nothing if not the history of the third and last Roman Empire. But its historiography is lagging behind that of the other two as far as in-depth research and wealth of interpretation is concerned. In other words, there in no specialization in Ottoman history, either in spacial or in period terms. Out of necessity, the works of its most famed practitioners cover the whole geograph-ical area of the Empire and span the entire period of its existence. The Ottoman Empire, a traditional Mediterranean empire having encountered the Renaissance, faded into history because of its failure to come to grips with the issues raised by industrialization, nationalism and metropolitan economics. A historian doing research on 19th-century events and institutions has therefore to study their historical backgrounds and go further back in history. Furthermore, a scholar working in libraries and archives on a specific topic, quite naturally is tempted to wander around into unexplored territories and times. Paradoxically enough, the Ottoman nineteenth century has been less studied than the sixteenth century. One knows more about adm the sixteenth century than one does about the nineteenth century. The life and structure of religious communities in the nineteenth century is only a matter of conjecture, compared to the Classical Age. Therefore, a Turkish historian — and this also applies to his Balkan and Middle Eastern collegues — has no other option than to journey back and forth in space and time if he wants to fully grasp the history of his nation. This is the reason why our "speciality" is General Ottoman History. Articles collected in Ottoman studies lack the presence of long-lasting, perennial periodicals. We have no equivalent of the century-old Byzantinische Zeitschrift. Most of the journals in our field have been short-lived, ceasing publication after a few issues to disappear into oblivion unnoticed by researchers. The Turkologischer Anzeiger, launched over twenty years ago by Professor Andreas Tietze has to a certain extend contributed to ease the predicament of scholars. Still access to most of these journals is somewhat laborious and the Isis Press should therefore be commended for its "Analecta Isisiana" series, making available collections of articles that would otherwise be difficult to come by. I, personally, have started my career working on Ottoman urban and administrative history. I was attracted to the history of the Balkans. But m those years Turkish history — and Turkish diplomacy — was closed to that world. There was no possibility to visit these countries for the purpose of

6

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

research. The only access open to that area was through the Ottoman archives and the published works of our Balkan colleagues. In the 1970s I was move interested in the nineteenth century but I drifted into eighteenth-century studies as I discovered — thanks to Bulgarian historians — that transformation really had been initiated in that century. These two centuries kept me busy for a long while and I still feel that that the papers I published in Turkish in those years served the purpose of a kind of manifesto. Our Hoca,

Halil Inalcik had

pioneered fifteenth-century Balkan studies and his contributions will be longlasting. Many researchers are attracted to the Classical Age because of the nature of Turkish history teaching. So was I, and I am still under the effect of this attraction. Turkish historiography has neglected political and diplomatic history. Most social scientists have failed both to master the tools of this speciality and to understand its real import. Tempted to emulate Braudel, they may still look down on political history but it remains, nevertheless, one of the keys to our understanding of the past and I cannot but wish that future generations devote to it all the attention it deserves. When my own generation embarked on our studies, we were all affected by the currents that were remoulding social sciences. Barren speculations, sterile interpretations — shaped by the politics of the 60s — appealed to us. But the great masters of the craft, O. L. Barkan and H. Inalcik, succeeded in leading us back to the arduous but rewarding path of historiography. They urged on us the importance of studying the primary sources, of working in the archives. T h a n k s to their guidance a new school e m e r g e d , researching institutions of the Classical Age and of the later period. We owe it to these two masters if Ottoman history today is no longer a mere husk. Professor T. Z. T u n a y a has done a similar pioneering work in the field of political institutions, but the greatest task still lays ahead. Ottoman history has to be rewritten in the light of Byzantine and Slavic history. Political thought, the administrative and economic structures, cultural and social life have undergone extraordinary changes throughout the six centuries of the Ottoman Hmpire. The only constant fact is that its various national component have, over these centuries coexisted within the Pax O t t o m a n a , s o m e times conflictually but mostly p e a c e f u l l y . T h e r e f o r e , Ottoman history cannot be seen through a distorting national and parochial prism. Bona fide scholars ha\ c to take into account the various communities and the geographical distinctions making up the Ottoman Oikoumene.

The

7

PREFACE

papers collected in this volume reflect, it is hoped, the concern in these matters of the author. I personally, feel that we, Ottoman historians, have not yet succeeded in identifying the Ottoman reality. I view the history o f the Ottoman Empire — in contrast to the traditional interpretation o f rise and decline — as a politico-cultural substance that has shaped with its dynamics and inherent conflicts the contemporary eastern Mediterranean world. Finally I would like to thank my friends Halil B e r k t a y and Liisin Gokay who kindly undertook to translate some o f these articles ilber Ortayli

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The outlook of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the seventeenth century constitutes one of the most difficult topics in historical research. Central and provincial administration, financial-economic affairs, culture and social life were all undergoing rapid change in Europe at that time. Even the presence on stage of great generals in the early eighteenth century Europe is among the consequences of this evolution. The neighbouring Ottoman Empire was also subject to great transformations, and to understand this, it is necessary to have a good grasp of what was happening in Europe in the first place. Briefly put, in the late seventeenth century the Ottoman Empire was in social and economic chaos, and there is no doubt that practically all its institutions were moving towards collapse. But on the other hand, the rulers of the Empire were able to come up with brilliant and interesting examples of bureaucratic manipulation to cope with this imminent threat. The decline of the state did not mean cultural decline, of course. Ottoman society was in search of a new life-style, and a new art and social culture was emerging, which would come down through successive changes and evolutions to the present day. Turkish stories about «grandfathers who took part in the siege of Vienna» are more likely to refer to the first attempt of Soleiman the Magnificent than to the final and abortive one in 1683. The defeat of that year was only the logical consequence of given historical conditions, since the Ottoman Empire had been taken over by anarchy and severe economic shortage for the past century. In fact, how the Ottomans were able to undertake the second siege at all continues to pose a problem for the historians of Turkey to this day. The energy and material resources necessary to carry out a protracted war were probably primarily replenished by the drastic restoration of the Kopriilu era, while the general desolation caused by the Thirty Years' War must also have played a part in enabling the still well-organized Ottoman army to invade the heart of the Habsburg Empire. The final result of the long war, which started with the siege of Vienna in 1683 and ended with the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, enabled Austria to spread her commercial activity to the Danubian region and to bring the German principalities under its authority. A new epoch of prosperity

10

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

symbolized by the famous motto Austria est imperare orbem universum and based on flourishing manufactures, navigation and commerce then opened for Vienna, whereas the Ottoman Empire entered a period of rapid loss of its European possessions, of qualitative changes in its system of land tenure, and of upheaval even in the structure of its provincial administration, finances and management of international affairs. Finally the European part of the Empire became the stage for national revivals. Transdanubian Hungary but even more so Transylvanian Hungary, with their autonomous state system and autonomous church based on Hungarian cultural revival, could have been models for Ottoman society in its future modernization, but of course one important clause of the Karlowitz treaty ended all that also. Economic and social signs of backwardness or decay came to be gradually observed in Anatolia as well as Rumelia during the sixteenth century. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the share of Central Europe in international trade was diminishing not because of Ottoman conquest but basically as a side-effect of the rise of Western European manufactures and overseas commerce. In the first stage of the development of the modern world economy ( based on long-distance navigation), the progress of industrial activity in Europe and growing demand for agricultural products now marketable on favourable terms as a result of the «Price Revolution» had stimulated the agricultural economies of East Central Europe to increase their food and raw material production for the market 1 . Later, however, the opening of commodity exchange (food and raw material) between Western European countries and their new overseas colonies turned East-Central Europe permanently into a backward region. In similar fashion, Turkey's Anatolian provinces lost more markets for their handicraft products (textiles and other finished goods) with every passing day. These areas were eventually deprived of their once-primary roles in international trade and reduced to the level of sources of raw materials (Bursa for silk, Angora for mohair, etc.). Export of guild products from Anatolian cities ceded its place to raw material exports demanded by developing Western European manufactures. It is worthwhile to mention at this point the illicit traffic of which raw materials such as silk, cotton, metals and corn rapidly became a part. Continuous inflation made it impossible for the ruling class of the Empire to keep serving in the army or injudicial posts with fixed salaries. Bribery, oppression of the people and especially usurpation of each other's estates became common malpractices among timariots throughout the Ottoman domains.

^Zs. P. Pach, "Diminishing Share of East Central Europe in the 17th Century International Trade" Ada Histórica XVI(3-4) 1970. pp. 301-304.

THE E M P I R E AT THE END O F THE SEVENTEENTH C E N T U R Y

11

The war economy of the seventeenth century plunged the rural and urban population into poverty and anarchy. Though studies of the seventeenth century have so far concentrated mostly on the Rumelian provinces, the study of court registers, miihimmes (chancellery records) and ahkâm defterleri can in fact provide rich material for describing both pre-war Anatolia and Anatolia under war conditions. The collapse of the classical Ottoman military system meant a structural change in the economic and social institutions of the Empire. Late seventeenth century Ottoman society was cloaked in an aura of tragedy. The restorative work of the Kopriilii's aimed not to radically modernize the socio-economic and military structure but merely to rehabilitate the classical institutions. The defeat in Vienna then caused the decadence to accelerate. Chaos and anarchy in the provinces as well as in the capital did not escape the observing eyes of foreign diplomats, whose reports reveal the administrative apparatus in a process of dissolution. The scarcity of food and money in Istanbul and the robbery and oppression in the provinces are described in the reports of the French ambassadors, for example. One of them, Guilleragues, wrote in March 1684 about the continuous shifting and expulsions of high-ranking officials (vezirs-governors, defterdars and kadis) who sometimes could not keep their posts for even six months This strange spoil-system caused the destruction of executive authority throughout the Empire and deepened corruption and bribery, oppression, poverty and local revolts. The decline of the army was also carefully watched by these French diplomats ; «le miser et l'ignorance des Turcs sont inconuables, il n'y a point dans l'uni v e r s e . . . » wrote ambassador Guilleragues. Ottoman military technology was already obsolete. «The starvation of the inhabitants in Istanbul has almost reached the point of revolt ; they protest even the Grand Seigneur» noted ambassador Girardin in July 1686, adding that «the defterdar was unable to balance the budget in November 1687 because the revenues could not cover the war expenditures...» 1 The chaos in the Anatolian provinces had also reached its peak point. The land tenure system of the Empire in both Rumelia and Anatolia was in dissolution. The timariots, the tnutevellis of pious foundations (vakjs) and other officials kept usurping the miri (public) land and trying to dispossess each other of their fiefs illegally. They were flagrantly steeped in corruption; they neglected their duties and responsibilities of maintaining public order and collecting taxes with respect to due procedure; and they failed to fulfill their military obligations. Some governors who had been expelled from their posts and others, poor timariots, even joined large, roving bands of bandits and rebels as commanders (called Celalis)1. During the 'Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Paris, C.P. Turquie vol. 17, Nr : 168, p. 12 Pera 28 Mars 1684, ibid., fol 40v-43r. (9 Juin 1684) and fol. 283r (Juillet 1686) and fol. 325v., vol. 19 (Nov. 1687). Mustafa Akdag, Buyuk Celali Karq ikliklarimn Baçlamasi, Erzurum 1963.

12

STUDIES

ON

(i l l O M A N

TRANSFORMATION

long rule of the Kopriiliis, internal order was stabilized and anarchy prevented for a f e w decades through draconian measures. For maintaining public order and e n s u r i n g regular taxe collection, the Kopriiliis introduced a kind of decentralized provincial a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system w h e r e s o m e of the vezirs entitled muhassik were endowed with extraordinary financial powers and some local begs called miitesellims had to fulfill the duties of governors. T h e process of land concentration which had actually started in the sixteenth century m u s t have kept g a t h e r i n g m o m e n t u m t h r o u g h o u t the s e v e n t e e n t h . V a r i o u s cases might be cited in proof. A f t e r the death of a timariot, for example, his land would neither revert to the state nor be given to his orphan(s) but would be occupied illegally by neighbouring sipahis or by the beytiilmal emini. S o m e t i m e s even the lands of living sipahis who happened to be away at war were exposed to the same sort of usurpation. I .and and fields deserted by peasants fleeing before bandits or nomads or during other troubles were also seized and occupied by the same local authorities. Not rarely would a newly appointed sipahi holding a berat (timar berati) find the fief that he c a m e to take over already in the hands of such usurpers. T h e court registers of this period are full of such cases and complaints. A sultanic firman of the year 1098 H./November 1686 admitted that the lands of many sipahis w h o had fallen on the battlefield or of others w h o w e r e a w a y f o r a long time in H u n g a r y had been seized by local authorities and their revenues had been illegally collected by the same usurpers 1 . Even officials like the beytiilmal emini whose main task it was to protect and maintain such fiefs were involved in such plundering. T h e firman of the year 1686 mentioned above cites one beytiilmal emini w h o had not shrunk f r o m usurping the salary of a palace gavu$ (dergah-i mualla (avu.su) named Hasan to the tune of 16,000 aktches. Similar i n f r i n g e m e n t s were w i d e s p r e a d in the Rumelian districts as well. Another firman of 8 Ramazan 1097/July 1686 addressed to the kadi of Beograd orders that timariots whose fiefs and salaries had been usurped by others during their absence be compensated and their timars returned to them. Since the data f r o m the over-aged land registers had become completely unreliable, the central g o v e r n m e n t gave orders for new registration, but this m o v e only caused and hastened new usurpations 2 . Such new surveys (timar yoklamasi) intended to prevent abuses and restore order to land tenure inevitably led to further abuses and usurpations. T h e landholding system remained a mess f o r long d e c a d e s after the war of 1683-1699. A general firman issued in early February 1703 m e n t i o n s the b r o k e n - u p and u s u r p e d t i m a r s a n d o r d e r s in vain that they be returned to their legitimate holders after new surveys and registration 3 .

1 Ankara §er'iyye Sicili, Nr: 66, hükin 816 (1598 H/Nov. 1686) ibid., Nr: 66 hükm 814, ibid., Nr: 68, hükm 514. Kayseri §er'iyye Sicili Nr: 93 fol 229, (§evval 1095/Dec. 1683). 2 Ba§b. Ar§. Maliyeden Müdevver. Nr: 2933 (x Ramazan 1097) and (11 Muharrem 1097). 3

Ba§b. Ar§. M u h i m m e Nr: 114 (Evail-i ijevval 1114), p. 33.

THE EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

13

Firmans ordering several governors in Bosnia, Cyprus, Ankara and other places to prevent vagabondage and robbery or to put a stop to their own illegal practices of confiscating land and collecting oppressive surtaxes from the people (reaya) were also mostly disobeyed. During the long years peasants and townspeople were subjected to surtaxes and compulsory labour. First, the number of taxpaying house-holds (iavariz haneleri) was increased through new surveys. Second, the amounts of avariz charges were generally raised. In 1088/1677, for example, the avariz households had just been re-surveyed, but ten years later, in 1099 H./1687, a new survey was introduced and the tax amount increased again. In pre-war times, in Beograd in 1613, for example, every ten households had been asked to pay some lump sum of equipment tax (bildar bedeli)', in 1098 H./1686, these same households had to pay an increased amount of the same tax amounting to 50 kuru§. Other taxes such as niizul vergisi, cerahor, kurekqi bedeli (to pay for naval oarsmen) were also collected in large amounts. The required amount of capitation (cizye) was also increased. Pack animals were time and again demanded from every city and region, and skilled construction workers were forcibly mobilized in large numbers by the provincial administration for army service 1 . Greater and greater amounts of corn and other agricultural products were subjected to «compulsory marketing» (siirsat) to meet the needs of the army. Now and then authorities compelled local notables and merchants to "donate" large sums towards war expenses. Thus the notables of Kayseri had at one time to give 10,000 kuru§ (400 gold pieces) in this manner. On the other hand, firmans often rained threats on local financial authorities and rulers for keeping the collected tax money for themselves and not sending it on to the central treasury 2 . Chronic inflation even in the most autarkic provinces of the Empire reached high levels. In Ankara, the exchange rate for the gold ducat rose from 300 to 600 aktches within two years 3 . The miihimme records of the years, include some cases where the illegal and unusual confiscation of the vakf revenues reached almost to fifty percent of the legal shares. This illegal confiscation has been repeated later during the first world-war and caused the protests and resignation of the §eyhiilislam 4 .

^ a ç b . Ar§. Maliyeden tnudevver Nr: 2465 (1100-1101 of H/l 688-1689), p. 564; see also Ankara §er. sic. Nr: 68, hiikm 380 «excession of the avariz taxes». ^Ankara §er'iyye sicili Nr: 66, hukm 850 (1098 H/Nov. 1686), ibid., Nr: 66 hiikm 840, Kayseri Ser'iyye sicili Nr: 94, p. 109. ^Ankara §er'iyye Nr: 66, hiikm 840, Kayseri §er'iyye Nr: 97. Ankara §er'iyye Nr: 66, hukm 862 (Evail-i Zi'lkaade 1098) «Excession of bildartax». •^Ankara §er'iyye Nr: 66 hiikm 840 (1103 of H.) Kayseri §er'iyye Nr: 97 p. 81 the exchange rates of the year 1101 of H/i 689-1691); for the confiscation of vakf revenues, see: Baçb. Ar§. Miihimme Nr: 98, p. 67, see also H. Sahillioglu, «Sivi§ Year Crises», Studies in the Earn. Hist, of the Middle East, (ed.) M. A. Cook, p. 245, Silahdar II, p. 273, Raçid, I, p. 496.

14

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

A n o t h e r side of the story was that the m e m b e r s of the provincial timariot army and the janissary garrisons in the towns were using all kinds of excuses to avoid active s e n i c e — b e i n g o v e r - a g e d or untrained ( a c e m i ) or e n g a g e d in protecting the lowns (sefermande olduk deyu) w e r e the m o s t c o m m o n ones— or else they s i m p l y deserted to j o i n the r a n k s of the v a g a b o n d s and bandits. T h e central g o v e r n m e n t had to send specially authorized officers (surucii cavus) in order to try to re-enlist such people, but they were usually bribed, disobeyed, threatened or even killed 1 . A s mentioned above, large groups of bandits and rebellious peasants were sometimes headed by timariots and even by ex-governors. Gedik Pa§a, ex-governor of Sivas, was one of these vezirs. In January 1688, he started to mobilize all the forces under his c o m m a n d against the government. H e was subsequently j o i n e d by s o m e other officials. The central government took extraordinary m e a s u r e s against rebellious authorities and soldiers and the peasant bands, and appointed s o m e high-ranking vezirs with distinguished careers like Ali Pa§a, C a f e r Pa§a and Halil Pa§a as mufettis pa$as2 empowered to pursue the rebels relentlessly and to resort to extremely severe punitive measures against them. From this time o n w a r d s , miifetti§ pa§as b e c a m e a Turkish administrative m e a s u r e a l w a y s resorted to in times of e m e r g e n c y . Even in the Republican period, military commanders with extraordinary (judicial, military, administrative) powers were designated as mufettis charged with suppressing eastern revolts. For the first time in its history, the O t t o m a n Empire w a s f o r c e d to fight simultaneously on fronts as widely scattered as the Mediterranean, the D a n u b e , and the Crimea, and to have to overwhelm the revolt in the Caucasus besides. This greatly extended war created f o r the O t t o m a n s unpredictible p r o b l e m s of military technology and logistics. Ottoman war technology w a s no longer adequate, and an old-fashioned, inefficient bureaucracy proved itself u n a b l e to regularly provide the necessary s u p p l i e s f o r o p e r a t i o n s . T h i s incapacity w a s most manifest when it c a m e to restoring and consolidating several fortresses along the Danube, in the Crimean and Caucasian zones, in Crete and in Morea. In order to have a stronghold repaired, the c o m m a n d e r (,dizdar) of the fortress had first to ask the central government f o r permission; then, the central treasury and the grand vezir's office had to send an inspectorarchitect (bina limine vukuf ve §uuri olan bi-garez kimseler ve usta neccar\ax) to the place concerned; after an on-the-spot inspection and some calculations, this official had to submit a report to the Supreme Imperial Council (divan-i hiimayun) specifying the necessary amounts of money, number of artisans and w o r k e r s , etc. T h e local o f f i c e r s were left with n o initiative in all this. If discrepancies arose between t he calculations of the inspector and the real cost, ' Ankara §er'iyye sicili Nr: 66, hukm 814 (Hvail-i RA 1098 of H.) hukm 827, 862 hukm 830, ibid., (1095-1098 of H/1684-86) Kayscri §er'iyye sicili Nr: 93 (§evval 1096/ Oct. 1684) p. 229. ^ A n k a r a §er'iyye sicili Nr: 65, hukm 16, Kayseri §er'iyye Nr: 93, p. 132, Muharrem 1096 (January 1685).

THE EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

15

the whole thing had to be done over again. Only after the confirmation of this report were the money and the artisans sent to the place cited. This long and complicated procedure sometimes took several months. Comparison with information given by Pal Fodor concerning procedures for fortress repairs in Hungary in the seventeenth century, suggests a significant deterioration in the operations of the bureacracy with local commanders rendered passive, even powerless 1 . During the war years of 1683-1700, many fortresses from Camnits (Kamani§e) to Saloniki, from Smyrna to Caffa in the Crimea kept asking for urgent repairs and the central government could not meet their needs. At one point, the initial sum allocated on the basis of calculations by the inspector for repairs in Janina could not cover the actual expenses, while Siyavu§ Pa§a, the vezir governing Bosnia, pleaded continuously and in vain for repairs on several fortresses in his province 2 . Quite often, the salaries (mevacib) of the soldiers guarding distant fortresses were not paid in time or even not sent at all because of simple neglect 3 . Distribution of material and supplies to the fortresses was based on an inefficient spatial and bureaucratic organization. The ammunition required by Cretan castles had to be supplied by the military manufacturing centers in the Balkans. For example, it fell to the factory in Banje-luka in Bosnia to provide the cannon balls needed by the cast of Candia and Resmo 4 . On the other hand, some ship captains and merchants practised smuggling, selling gunpowder and guns to rebellions led by local feudal rulers in the district of Abhazia in Georgia in the Caucasus. Such illicit trade involved not only guns but also other strategic material and corn, which were transferred to French, English and Dutch ships for delivery. The war after 1686 was carried to large extend by auxiliary forces of the autonomous provinces (eyalet-i mumtaze). Not rarely firmans had been sent, ordering the equipment and mobilization of the eyalet soldiers or some tribes in Anatolia. Firmans were sent to mobilize the Egyptian forces (Misir kullari) or the navy of the Maghreb or eskinci yiiriikler or Turcoman and Kurdish tribes of Kilis (Turkmen ve Ekrad a§airinden sefere memur olan siivari asker). This was a new and chaotic aspect of Ottoman military history 5 . Ipal Fodor «Die Bauarbeiten der Türken in Ungarn im 16-17. Jahrhundert», Acta XXXV/1 p. 55-88.

Orientalia

2

Ba§b. Ar§. Maliyeden Müdevver Nr: 2933 (7 Sefer 1097/Dec. 1685) also, ibid (13 §aban 1097/July 1686) p. 166 the request of Siyavu§ Pa§a from Bosnia, Maliyeden müdevver ahkam ve jikayet defteri Nr: 2933 p. 18 fortress of Varna, Maliyeden müdevver-tamirat defteri Nr: 3922 d. 532. ^Bajb. A r j . Maliyeden Müdevver, Nr: 2933, p. 37 (Sefer 1097/Jan. 1686) the compUiate of soldiers in the fortress of Neve-i Cedid. 4

Ba§b. Ar§. ahkam defteri, Nr: 9860 (25 Receb 1095/July 1684) firman to the factory in Banje Luke. 5

Ba§b. Ar^. Mühimme Nr: 98 p. 29 (Muharrem 1100/first decade).

16

S T U D I E S

ON

O T T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

In some corners of the Empire, some peasants (reaya taifesi) began to wear janissary uniform and were actually employed illegally by fortress commanders in Bosnia, for example. In this way, many peasants who kept living in their own villages posed as janissaries and this was tolerated by corrupt commanders 1 . One consequence of this development was a strong tendency towards decentralization, since some towns and fortresses decided to look after their own defence. Chaos in Rumelian towns forced local people and notables to take the task of establishing public order in their own hands as the central government completely failed to do so. The local notables (ayan) and the local rulers who were now appointed as mutesellims

began to carry out

financial and administrative organizations and functions through their own efforts. In this way the towns acquired a kind of autonomy which their commercial activities and wealth would later consolidate. This administrative and financial decentralization was an adjustment on the part of the Empire to the new siege conditions 2 . Urban notables and clerics often met with Ottoman officials to solve financial and administrative problems, and this led to the existence of some local councils in practice. The eighteenth century can be described as the age of administrative decentralization in the Empire, which was trying to survive through prodigious bureaucratic manipulations. Ottoman society and culture entered an era of renovation In the Enderun (palace school) where previously dev^irme

children had been recruited and

trained and had gone on to take up the reins of central rule, this role was from the eighteenth century onward to fall more and more frequently to the Anatolians, those who in Ottoman terms had always been regarded as «crude Turks». The tastes and views of the new ruling elite led to an increase in the share and influence of the Turkish element and language in Ottoman life. As famous poets Sadi and Nabi put it poetic language had to be purified of Arabic and Persian vocabulary 3 . Ottoman architecture, decorative arts, daily life and attire were more and more influenced by European baroque. No wonder that the era after the second siege of Vienna is described as the Ottoman baroque age. The existence of a slow modernization or Europeanization process in Ottoman society became gradually visible.

l ß a § b . Ars. M ü h i m m e Nr: 114, (firsl decade §evval 1114/1703) to the kadi of Bosna and the governor. 2 H . Inalcik, «Saray-Bosna §er'iyye sicillerine göre Viyana bozgunundan sonraki harb yillarinda Bosna» Türk Tarih Vesikalari Nr: 2 Ankara 1943 (ii) pp. 1-3; see also, A v d o Suceska «Die Rechtsstellung der Bevölkerung in den Staedten Bosniens und H e r z e g o v i n a » Südosteuropa Jahrbuch München 1968/8, p. 84-99. 3 A . Sirri Levend, Türk Dilinde Ch'lisme ve Sadelejme Saßalari, T ü r k Dil K u r u m u , A n k a r a 1949, pp. 94-95.

THE E M P I R E AT THE END OF T H E SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

17

In this newly beginning age of Ottoman modernization, Transylvanian and Transdanubian Hungary, which had come into contact with Renaissance culture early in the fifteenth century, could have served as effective models. But these lands were annexed by the Habsburgs, and later, the constant revolts against their rule and the consequent Habsburg repression and colonization by German peasants further severed the links between Hungary and the Ottoman lands. Seventeenth century Transylvania (Erdel), was going through a national cultural and economic revival. In comparison with that part of Hungary which was in Habsburg hands even before the treaty of Karlowitz, the clerics and laymen of Transylvanian and Transdanubian Hungary had enjoyed perfect r e l i g i o u s f r e e d o m ' . The O t t o m a n s had not only tolerated H u n g a r i a n Protestantism but had also actually tried to manipulate it against the Catholic Habsburgs. Protestantism and autonomy had facilitated the development of Hungarian national culture, and this would later be a base for national revival under the Habsburgs. Agricultural i m p r o v e m e n t s in seventeenth century Transylvania had led to a rise in living standards in both urban and rural areas. M a n y young Hungarians studied in England, Germany, Italy and other European countries. In 1622 Bethlen Gabor, Prince of Erdel, f o u n d e d the C o m m u n a l A c a d e m y . Prince R a k o c z y I G o y r g y is another ruler w h o introduced and spread modern educational institutions from which even talented serf and peasant children could benefit 2 . The Ottoman Empire had f r o m its very beginnings been influenced by Hungarian culture, engineering, military technology and even cooking. Hungarian converts could be found in every section of Ottoman society. One example only: familiarity with the Hungarian language was an important element in the original style and deep learning of the famous historian Ibrahim Pe^evi, who had read some history books in Hungarian. Another one was Cafer Iyani f r o m Pecs, who wrote an history about Hungary (Tarih-i Cedid-i Ungarus). On the other hand, the Ottoman conquest bequeathed to Hungary well-known monuments, customs and other imprints in every aspect of sociocultural life. Thanks to the studies of Hungarian turcologists, we are quite well informed about the influence of both languages upon each other 3 . Although after the treaty of Karlowitz this cultural integration was interrupted for a few d e c a d e s , H u n g a r i a n e m i g r a n t s c o n t i n u e d to c o n t r i b u t e much to the modernization of Ottoman society and state and to the improvement of Turkish culture up to the mid-eighteenth century and then again especially in the nineteenth.

'Katalin Peter, «La vie de la société transylvanne dans la première moitié du XVIe siècle» Acta Histórica XXVII (1-2) 1981 pp. 7-9 and 22-25, see also, Andras Székely, Illustrierte Kulturgeschichte Ungarns, Budapest, Corvina 1978, pp. 89-106. 2 L. Benczédi, «Historischer Hintergrund der Preadigerprozesse in Ungarn in den Jateen \ 6 T \ 74» Acta Histórica XXXI (.'1-4) 1976. •3 S. Kakuk, «Les mots d'emprunt Turcs-Osmanli dans le Hongrois et les recherches...» Acta Orientalia 1955/V, p. 181-194 see also, J. Németh, Die türkische Sprache in Ungarn im siebzehnten Jahrhundert, Budapest, 1970.

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITIES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FOLLOWING THE SECOND SIEGE OF VIENNA

I. One unquestioned development in the Ottoman Empire following the second siege of Vienna is the clear-cut emergence of the problem of nationalities. Doubtless the causes of this go back to before the rout in which the siege ended; but it is also true that here at the end of the seventeenth century, it was demonstrated not only to the powers of Europe but also to the Balkan peoples living under the Sultan that the Ottoman might was capable of defeat and even debacle. This was a stimulus to them in organizing national movements; Ottoman Rumelia of the later seventeenth century was host to a very different dynamism than had existed before. Meanwhile thanks to the hastening — induced by the rout at Vienna — of the process of administrative change, the Turkish element within the Empire's Muslim population acquired a greater role in matters of government. Thus, though the overriding culture and the process of ruling were still Ottoman, Turkish Anatolia began definitely to come to the fore; with the net result that the traditionally structured Empire, until then "Ottoman" in character because cosmopolitan, as ancient Rome and medieval Byzantium had been cosmopolitan, was in actual fact ceasing to be Ottoman. By the time we reach the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Ottoman state has assumed all the earmarks of a political and social system in which the problem of disruptive nationalism is the predominant factor. Ottoman conquests in the Balkans during the fourteenth century in a way brought stability to the region. The throes of social change that tossed the Balkans throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were quelled with the restoration of stability and a feudal system. But inevitably, as Ottoman power reached its zenith in the sixteenth century, the beginnings of economic and social unrest began to make themselves felt, not only in Rumelia but, more particularly, in Anatolia as well. Coming up to the seventeenth century, we see an empire that has lost its former might and, carried inexorably forward by the stream of time, finds itself unable to adapt in a modern world of changing conditions; so much so. that it is still an unresolved question of historiography how the Ottoman armies managed, in 1683, ever to reach the gates of Vienna at all. The State's land tenure and bureaucratic structuring, and

20

S T U D I E S

ON

O I

TOMAN

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

most significantly the military chain of command, were rocked by one upheaval after another. In all likelihood, the fact that the siege actually took place, and even achieved initial success, is owing partly to the turmoil caused in Central Europe by the Thirty Years' War, partly to the waning but still felt superiority of the Ottoman troops, and in some measure to the failure of the Austrian lands to develop. We know that among the various religious and linguistic groups which came under the Ottoman sway, certain movements, or at least stirrings, that could be described in some cases as cultural, in others as national, began to make their presence felt in the sixteenth century. To call the events of 1789 the cause for national awakening in the Balkans cannot be an entirely prudent course for the historian to lake. The national consciousness of the Balkan peoples was a feature of their medieval heritage that survived the Ottoman period, with every community having its own schools, and its own guilds helping to regulate economic life. Thus national identity or, if one prefers, early nationalism has its roots, for the peoples of the Balkans, as far back as the Renaissance. It is no mere coincidence that the ideas put forward by Machiavelli in The Prince were greatly in vogue at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, among the intelligentsia in certain south Slavic communities. Furthermore the spontaneous peasant uprisings that occurred in the sixteenth century, or the hayduk movements 1 opposing local Ottoman authority, show that, to some extent at any rate, national identity in the Balkans had not completely disappeared. The nationalist movements of the Balkan peoples, and the way in which these movements developed, were quite different from those to be found in the various countries of western Europe. They are also different—I am speaking of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Balkans—from the nationalist movements of today's world. Under the socio-economic and legal order imposed by the Ottomans, the hereditary aristocracy in the Balkans ceased to develop, and nati\e aristocracy in existence before the fourteenth century had all but died out So it was that the nationalist movement of the Balkan Slavs developed, first and foremost, with the participation of the Church, to which starting in the eighteenth century was allied a rising commercial bourgeoisie and, in time, the peasantry. In opposition to nationalism stood "Ottoman- ness" (but not Ottomanism), a way of life and a social order, but not yet an ideology. Only after the eighteenth century would Ottoman-ness begin to evolve into an ideology, which in turn was to be altered by the influence of Balkan nationalism(s), until finally the Empire's

A. Cvetkova, "Problems of the Bulgarian Nationality and the National Consciousness in the X V - X V I I I century", Études Historiques 6 (1973) pp. 57-80; M. Janov, "Die Ereignisse in Südosteuropa am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts und die politische Tätigkeit der A n f ü h r e r der Befreiungsbewegungen in Bulgarien". Études Historiques 8 (1978) pp. 158-177.

NATIONALITIES

IN

THE

OTTOMAN

EMPIRE

21

Muslims too were caught up in the wave, clamoring f o r their own national existences. T h e Church conducted a campaign in which Christianity and nationalist ideology were at the very least conjoined, and in doing so played a highly active ideological role in the national movements of liberation. T h e very existence of the Church, and the process of its evolution, bore within them the seeds of dispute between the Ottoman rulers and the Orthodox believers; disputes which were naturally to affect the nationalist movement.

II. From the moment of its inception in the 14th century, and all through its spectacular rise for the following two centuries, the Ottoman Empire was in fact a Balkan empire. T h e Ottoman culture and way of life had, it would seem, long since received the stamp of the Balkan and Mediterranean cultures; with the corollary that an understanding of Ottoman society is hardly possible without a previous knowledge of medieval Byzantium and the structure of the Balkan states. In the middle of the 15th century, the peoples who owed allegiance to the Eastern Orthodox Church lived under Ottoman rule; the second Orthodox state was Czarist Russia. Mehmed II (the Conquerer) followed a deliberate policy of favoring unilateral rule in the Church. He appointed as Patriarch G e n n a d i o s , v i r u l e n t e n e m y of R o m e , and displayed t o w a r d s him a consideration greater than he had e n j o y e d during Byzantine times. T h e Patriarchs of Constantinople now enjoyed a position in the official protocol 1 . In addition, the Bulgarian and Serbian Churches had been deprived of their autocephaly, with spiritual, administrative, financial and judicial authority authority o v e r all Balkan O r t h o d o x y d e v o l v i n g on the Patriarch in Constantinople. In these circumstances, Greeks living in the Ottoman lands enjoyed prerogatives and a general prominence; f o r just as the Orthodox Church had autonomy and privilege, the Greek tongue under the empire, and greek education, were able to go their way unhindered. T o a certain extent, even Byzantine legal heritage continued to exist and be applied. At Bab-i all (the Sublime Porte), edicts were drawn up in Greek, which thrived as a semiofficial language. Over and beyond these distinctions, the Greeks were the sole non-muslim group to be employed in the bureaucracy and in chancellary service. In this respect the Greeks were better off than any other ethnic group, the Turks included. For until the 18th and 19th centuries the Turks, usually thought of as the heart of the empire, took only a limited part in governing, and the very n a m e of " T u r k " was used to mean "uncouth peasant lout". Authors of Ottoman times are insistent in saying that Turkish element must

' f . Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit, (München 1959), pp. 110-111.

22

STUDIES

ON

C) I T O M A N

TRANSFORMATION

not be allowed to meddle in the business of g o v e r n m e n t 1 . " T u r k " was an insulting epithet not only a m o n g the Ottoman meritocracy, but also a m o n g the Istanbul populace at large; for example, " B a b a H i m m e t " , the most idiotic, unlovable figure in all of Karagdz (the Turkish shadow theater), is constantly referred to as "the Turk". T h e Greeks were a sea-faring people, they had had relations with Italy and Central Europe since the Renaissance, and they were viewed with feelings of kinship by E u r o p e as a whole. It was then only natural that they would have nationalist sentiments f r o m a very early date, but this under European patronage. M e a n w h i l e Ottoman supremacy w a s m a k i n g it possible f o r the G r e e k Patriarchate to exert monolithic control over Orthodox Slavs in the B a l k a n s , which in turn e n c o u r a g e d the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of resistance and nationalist feelings in the latter. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Patriarchate was as u n w e l c o m e to the Bulgarians as was the Sublime Porte. T h e Bulgarian national m o v e m e n t strove f r o m the outset to establish an independent church, and succeeded in doing so during the second half of the nineteenth century. Ottoman rule was never a threat to the survival of Greek education and culture. From the seventeenth century on, schools were opened by wealthy Greek merchants not only in the Peloponnese and Epirus, but also in western Anatolia and on the Black Sea coast. This process continued in C y p r u s and Crete after they fell to the Ottomans. T h e positive contribution of E u r o p e to the Greek enlightenment came not only in these schools, but also thanks to the children of the commercial bourgeoisie who early on began receiving their education in Europe. A n o t h e r point w a s that the Ionian islands w e r e not beholden to the Sultan, and therefore c a m e under Italian and French cultural influence, on account of which the local Greeks were more exposed to classical G r e e k culture a n d modern numanism. T h e s e islands in turn exerted their cultural influence on all the Ottoman Greeks. On them there was wide-spread learning of French, Italian and English and classical Greek in its choicest f o r m was a m e d i u m of instruction. In the early eighteenth century, when Austria became commercially and politically more influential along the shores both of the Adriatic and the D a n u b e , a sizable n u m b e r of Greeks, having in view political, commercial or cultural aims, migrated to m a j o r Austrian cities f r o m Epirus, M a c e d o n i a and the Ionian islands, and there established their o w n churches and their own schools. Having been the first to establish contact with E u r o p e , the G r e e k s wasted no time in exerting a cultural and ideological influence over the other Balkan peoples.

See, B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford 2 1968) pp. 1-2; C. Cahen, In: Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization, ed. G. E. v. Grunebaum (1955) p. 330; also J. Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiche•> 1 (Pest 1827).

NATIONALITIES

IN

THE

OTTOMAN

EMPIRE

23

Undeniably, Bulgarian monks in their monasteries on M o u n t Athos made contact with the newly enlightened Greek culture 1 , and in the Balkans this culture j u s t as undeniably b e c a m e institutionalized. In 1694 Prince Constantin Brinceveanu set up for the Romanians the "Saint Savas A c a d e m y " where instruction was given in G r e e k 2 . B e f o r e long the B a l k a n s had established direct cultural ties with Western Europe. In fact, it would be a mistake to explain the emergence of the national problem in the Balkans entirely by the Greek Enlightenment or, as we said, by the French Revolution. A certain idea of irredentism or Slav unity can be seen among the Balkan Slavs as early as the sixteenth century. When Ottoman rule led to the b e s t o w i n g of all spiritual a u t h o r i t y on the Patriarch in Constantinople, the Balkan Slavs found themselves deprived of independence not only in religious matters, but equally in questions of language, law and education. Pushed by those adverse circumstances the Balkan Slavs turned early on to Russia, a sovereign power. It is possible that the first glimmerings of Slav irredentism were born f r o m the ideas of Machiavelli; engaged as they were in intense cultural and commercial relations with Renaissance Italy, it cannot be coincidence that Ragusan and Croatian thinkers make mention in their writings of a kind of Slavic unity and liberation. In 1626 the Ragusan poet Ivan GunduliC, in his lyric poem "Osman", speaks of liberation and the unity of the Slavs in a style reminiscent of Tasso's. It w a s GunduliC's belief that this historic mission could only be accomplished under the aegis of the Polish king 3 . One of the most striking instances of this phenomenon is the Croatian priest, philosopher and historian Juraj KriZaniC (1618-1683). Having settled in Russia, he proposed that all Slavs unite under the leadership of the Czar and a church of Catholic tendency to break away f r o m the Ottomans. T o accomplish this historic task, he recommended the modernization of Russia, a build-up of its might, and reform of its church and social system. Needless to say, his views were highly unpopular with clerics and conservatives, and were quickly forgotten 4 . An active role for Russia was one recurrent theme in the discussion of national awakening among the Balkan Slavs. Balkan historians, no less than those in Turkey, at one period laid great emphasis on the expansion of this Russian role; and nineteenth century European thought tended also to see Russia as the most active element in the "eastern question" 5 .

^G. Nesev, "Les Monastères Bulgares du Mont Athos", Études Historiques, 6 (1973) pp. 97-115. "A. Dascalakis, "Le Rôle de la Civilisation grecque dans les Balkans", Actes du premier Congrès International des Etudes Balkaniques, (Sofia 1969) pp. 109-110. Fischel, Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg, (Berlin 1919) pp. 19-20. 4 Fischel, Panslawismus, p. 20; H. Kohn, Panslavism—It's History, (Notre Dame Indiana 1953) p. 4; M. Petrovich, "Juraj Krtëanié a Precursor of Panslavism", The American Slavonic and East European Review, 6 (1947) pp. 75-92. Engels mentions in one of his articles in 1853, the maladroitness and ignorance of European diplomats, whereas he stresses the successful activities of Russian diplomats among Balkan-Slav circles, New York Daily Tribune Nr. 3748 (April 21, 1853).

24

STUDIES

ON

()1 T O M A N

TRANSFORMATION

Now, although there is no arguing with the fact that this role increased f o l l o w i n g the Treaty of Kii^iik K a y n a r c a (1774), it would nevertheless be w r o n g to c o n s i d e r the R u s s i a n role as t h e m o s t d o m i n a n t f a c t o r in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Balkan nationalism. In fact, as can be seen in the e x a m p l e of Kri2aniC. ideologically the Balkan Slavs were ahead of R u s s i a . R u s s i a ' s role b e c a m e m o r e i n f l u e n t i a l as s h e d e v e l o p e d a n d modernized. T h e westernizing process in Muscovite Russia began after the sixteenth century. T h e period of the R o m a n o v Dynasty in particular saw the establishment of permanent ambassadorial relations with the whole of Western E u r o p e , and Russian m e r c h a n t s w e r e f a m i l i a r with cities in S c a n d i n a v i a , G e r m a n y and Poland. T h e s e i m p r o v i n g political and c o m m e r c i a l relations could not but introduce into R u s s i a , h o w e v e r slowly, a western style of living. A n u m b e r of noblemen began f u r n i s h i n g their h o m e s in E u r o p e a n fashion, at the same time adopting Renaissance and Baroque ways along with G e r m a n c u s t o m s . Russian culture at this period began to be acquainted, t h r o u g h t r a n s l a t i o n , with E u r o p e a n l i t e r a t u r e a n d s c i e n c e . O n e such europeanized noble was K n c / Golitzin, favourite of the Regent Sophia. R u s s i a had long ago set h e r sights on b e c o m i n g the successor to Byzantium, and there were now many Balkan Slavs and Greek intellectuals and members of the church within her marches. These arrivals worked in libraries or in the palace printhouse. did translations f r o m Greek and Old C h u r c h Slavonic, or tutored the children of wealthy families; on their visits back to the B a l k a n s they took with them n u m e r o u s books of a religious, literary or political nature. About the middle of the seventeenth century we see in the Balkans the beginnings of a certain Russian political influence. O n e instance of this is the first printing press in the Moldavian city of Iasi, which w e n t into o p e r a t i o n in 1640 t h a n k s t o t h e good o f f i c e s of P j o t r M o g i l a , Metropolitan at Kiev 1 . A s time went by, Balkan Slavs were to follow more and more closely cultural developments in Russia. Russia's relations with the B a l k a n Slavs, unlike those of W e s t e r n Europe, c a m e not through the channels of trade but through the Church. From the s e v e n t e e n t h century on, S e r b i a n , M o n t e n e g r i n , R o m a n i a n and later Bulgarian priests were in contact with Russia. Between 1557 and 1766, the Ipek (PeC) Patriarchate in Serbia, which performed its function autonomously, experienced financial and administrative difficulties which m e a n t that the survival of Serbian m o n a s t e r i e s and c h u r c h e s was to s o m e e x t e n t only possible with the help of Russia. Each year Serbian priests carried to Russia a n u m b e r of manuscripts and icons. T h e s e priests, s o m e of t h e m admitted into M o s c o w , others turned back at the border with a gift of alms, began in the

1 Vsemirnaja lstorija |World history |, red. Zutis, Vejnstejn, Paylenko, ed. Akad. Nauk SSSR 5 (Moskva 1958) p. 182.

NATIONALITIES

IN

THE

OTTOMAN

EMPIRE

25

eighteenth century to bring with them lay publications as well 1 . The Russian Church made extensive use of Balkan priests and the manuscripts in Balkan monasteries, starting in the seventeenth century. As C. Rogel points out, "during the period of Russian church reforms in the mid-seventeenth century, requests f o r m a n u s c r i p t s and b o o k s were f r e q u e n t l y sent to Serbian monasteries. In 1655, for example, three Hilander monks carried to Moscow eleven handwritten books (seven Old Slavonic, four Greek) which had been specifically requested by the Russian patriarch Arsenii Sukhanov; they were to be used according to the official request to correct Russian religious books." 2 It was nevertheless true that compared to M o n t e n e g r o , WalachiaMoldavia and Bulgaria, Serbian monastic life after 1690 was to a certain extent culturally influenced by the Habsburg Empire. This was behind the choice m a d e by D. ObradoviC (1742-1811), best known of all Serbian clerics, to substitute secular f o r religious learning. A f t e r 1804 ObradoviC b e c a m e Karageorgi's secretary and superintendant of Serbian schools. The one most important factor in the persistence of church leadership in the Balkan national awakening was the ability of the clerics to adopt secular education and secular views. They were the first to pen popular works on subjects such as history and geography. Foremost among such priests were the Serbians Jovan RajiC (1726-1801) and the Romanians G. Sincai, Petru Maior, and Samuel Clain. Finally, Paissij Hilandersky, justly considered the father of Bulgar nationalism for his writing at the Hilander monastery on Mount Athos in 1762 of the first popularized Slavgan-Bulgarian history; and after him Sofronij VraCansky, are two typical e x a m p l e s of Balkan Slav church clerics contributing to the development of Bulgarian national feeling. Throughout the eighteenth century such men were busy translating works f r o m ancient Greek and Old Church Slavonic into c o n t e m p o r a r y t o n g u e s , and were thus instrumental in transforming the vernacular into a polished literary language. In this matter they were very different from the Greek priests, who persisted in the use of a language remote from the colloquial 3 . It is true that Balkan Slavs always had a xenophobic attitude towards the Roman church, but they were impelled by the presence of the Constantinople Patriarchate—which they viewed as more oppressive than their Ottoman rulers—into entertaining the idea of an alliance with the Catholic Church in order to obtain cultural and spiritual autonomy for the Slavic peoples. To some extent this idea was put into action. We know of active centers for Catholic propaganda in Bulgaria and Romania, not very successful enterprises which date back almost to the beginning of Ottoman

' C . Rogel, "The Wandering Monk and Balkan National awakening", in: Nationalism in a nonnational state, ed. W. Haddad (Ohio-Columbus 1977) p. 90. ^Rogel, "The Wandering Monk" pp. 85-86. Danova-Z. Markova, "Ideja zerkovnogo reformatorstva i balkanskoe prosvesCenie (XVIII—XIX vv)" [The idea of church-reform and Balkan enlightenment], Études Historiques 7 (1975) pp. 161-174.

26

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

rule in the region. T h e French e n v o y to Istanbul, G i r a r d i n , writes in his report of 13 F e b r u a r y 1686 that a Bulgarian o r t h o d o x priest had a p p r o a c h e d him with a petition directed to the F r e n c h k i n g , in w h i c h t h e B u l g a r i a n s a r e d e c l a r e d ready to c o n v e r t to C a t h o l i c i s m and to seek the protection and intervention of the king 1 . It should not c o m e as a great surprise to m e e t with s u c h a bid in t h e years i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g the rout at V i e n n a . T h e B u l g a r i a n historian B. C v e t k o v a s a y s that d u r i n g t h e w a r y e a r s t h e r e w a s an i n c r e a s e in t h e h a y d u k m o v e m e n t s a l o n g t h e b a n k s of the D a n u b e 2 . T h e petition sent in 1688 to C z a r Ivan IV and to Peter I by t h e V l a c h i a n ruler Serban C a n t a c u z e n is well k n o w n . It c o n t a i n e d a declaration of intent on the part of t h e S e r b i a n s , B u l g a r i a n s and M o l d a v i a n s to aid t h e R u s s i a n s if they a d v a n c e d to A k k e r m a n . T h e r o u t at V i e n n a , in t h e third century of O t t o m a n s w a y , had an accelerating e f f e c t upon this reaction.

III. O n e of the m o s t i m p o r t a n t o u t c o m e s of t h e s e c o n d siege of V i e n n a w a s the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the H a b s b u r g E m p i r e ' s politico-military p o w e r in central Europe, the B a l k a n s and the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n , and the i m p r o v e m e n t of its c o m m e r c i a l position. T h i s spreading c o m m e r c i a l i n f l u e n c e w e n t h a n d in h a n d with increased cultural i n f l u e n c e , while internally O t t o m a n E u r o p e e n t e r e d a t i m e of crisis, b r o u g h t on by the defeat, in w h i c h p r o l o n g e d d e f i c i e n c i e s in t h e military, administrative and e c o n o m i c m e c h a n i s m s led inevitably to a p r o c e s s of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n in the p r o v i n c e s . T h i s p r o c e s s w a s w i t n e s s e d not o n l y in the B a l k a n s but in Anatolia as well, and it m e a n t the b e g i n n i n g of m o m e n t o u s structural changes. Until t h e end of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , A u s t r i a n t r a d e , w h e t h e r f o r e i g n o r domestic, was not at a level to e n h a n c e tax r e v e n u e s . B e c a u s e of her lack of c o n t r o l o v e r the territories a l o n g the D a n u b e , A u s t r i a ' s r i v e r - b a s e d c o m m e r c e had also failed to develop. A n o t h e r barrier to the flourishing of trade on A u s t r i a n soil was the paucity of trade relations a m o n g the G e r m a n states b e l o n g i n g to t h e H o l y R o m a n E m p i r e . H a v i n g a l m o s t no a c c e s s to t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , A u s t r i a had not taken to the s e a w a y s to p r o j e c t h e r p o w e r a b r o a d . ( T h e "Orientalische H a n d e l s k o m p a g n i e " set u p by B e c k e r in

1667

1 Archives du Ministre des Affaires étrangères (Quai D'Orsay, Paris). C. P. T u r q u i e vol. 18 Ambas. Girardin, Pera 13 février 1686, fol. 102 v. ^B. A. Cvetkova, "To the History of the Resistance Against the Ottoman Feudal Domination in the Danube Region of Bulgaria", Études Historiques 4 (1968) pp. 221-223.

N A T I O N A L I T I E S

IN

THE

O T T O M A N

E M P I R E

27

declared bankruptcy after a brief struggle 1 .) Nor was it any help that roads in the country were terribly primitive, compared to those of Western Europe. One primary factor in the Ottoman defeat in 1683 was the deteriorated state of the road system in Niederosterreich. Following the treaties of Karlowitz and Passarowitz however (1699) and (1718), the Habsburg Empire moved into the Danubian basin, making possible inroads into Balkan commerce. The Balkans became a market and a source of raw materials. When in 1719 Karl VI opened Trieste as a major port to rival Venise, it meant the launching of Austria's career in the Mediterranean. During the eighteenth century she signed navigation acts with the Ottomans to secure safety of passage in their waters 2 . And thus, legal or illegal, trade was carried on throughout the Mediterranean and the Balkans. In the vanguard, with a fleet of 600 ships, came the Greeks. This burgeoning of commerce and Austrian manufactures facilitated the emergence in the Balkans of a commercial bourgeoisie. In the eighteenth century the growth of raw material and semi-manufactured goods oriented towards the demands of industry wrought changes in the cities of the Balkans 3 . To the Ottoman Empire's senior commercial people, the Greeks, were now added the Serbo-Croatians and Bulgarians. During the eighteenth century, cultural renovation at the national level developed parallel to the emergence of the commercial bourgeoisie among all the Balkan peoples. In the European cities of Livorno, Naples, Trieste, Venice and Vienna, and in certain cities of Russia, there appeared sizeable groups of merchants, religious clerics and students, as churches and cultural centers sprang up. It was in the wake of these events that the effects of the European enlightenment truly began to make themselves felt. Eighteenth-century philosophers such as Voltaire, Diderot, Herder and Lessing became known to the Balkan intelligentsia. Albanians in southern Italy, Serbs in the cities of central Europe, Bulgarians in Romania, all these groups enjoyed a culture and an education that was western in orientation 4 .

H. Hassinger, "Die erste Wiener Orientalische Handelskompagnie 1667—1683", Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftgeschichte 35 (1942) pp. 1-53; F. Tremel, Wirtschafts- und Soziaheschichte Österreichs (Graz 1969) pp. 232-235, 255 and 261-262. I. Ortayli, "1727-Osmanli-Avusturya Sözlejmesi" (Handelsvertrag zwischen Osterreich und Osmanenreich im Jahre 1727], Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi 28/3-4 (1975) pp. 97-109. Todorov, Balkanski Gorod XV—XIX vekov [Balkan city in the XV—XIX centuries| (Moskva 1976) pp. 194-222; V. Paskaleva, "Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der bulgarischen Gebiete mit Mitteleuropa im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert", In: Wirtschaftswege, Festschrift für H. Kellenbenz (Stuttgart 1978) p. 169. Traikov, Ideologiieski teieniya i programi v nazionalno-osvoboditelnite dviienija na Balkanite do 1878 godina [Ideological tendencies and programs during the national-liberation movements of Balkan countries until 1878] (Sofia 1978) p. 169.

28

S T U D I E S

O N

O T T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

Austrian influence in the B a l k a n s w a s particularly great d u r i n g the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. O n e f a c t o r in this w a s the cultural f l o u r i s h i n g of the western Slaves within the H a b s b u r g E m p i r e . T h e r e is increasing recognition of the importance to Balkan cultural d e v e l o p m e n t of Austrian and Hungarian baroque culture, literature, theatre and plastic arts 1 . Following the second siege of V i e n n a the Ottoman Empire's Balkan provinces were immediately thrown into turmoil, lawlessness and e c o n o m i c collapse. T h e heavy taxation necessitated by war and the attempt to enforce order brought on a similar collapse in Anatolia. T h e rout of the a r m y , the attrition of garrisons assigned to e n f o r c e order in the cities, the crumbling of the e c o n o m y , the disappearance of safety on the highways, and the fighting of wars that n e v e r s e e m e d to be o v e r , all spelled a virtual end to central g o v e r n m e n t control in the Balkans. T h e citizenry of Bosnia, f o r e x a m p l e , m a d e repeated appeals to Istanbul f o r f u n d s and military assistance, appeals which the central government was unable to answer. A s a result people in the cities had recourse to law-enforcement on their o w n 2 . From the beginning of the eighteenth century problems of security and finance in the Rumelian cities began to be solved by the people in concert with local notables. T h e ayans, w h o were local landowners and administrators of pious foundations (known as vakf), assumed surrogate authority in the cities. Peter Sugar has described in detail this c o m i n g to the fore of local authority in the cities and provinces of R u m e l i a . T h e M u s l i m bey$. w h o w e r e the d e s c e n d a n t s of minor B o s n i a n aristocrats w h o converted to Islam immediately after the Ottoman conquest, had, through the viziers and sandjak beys that they produced throughout the O t t o m a n reign, a l w a y s m a n a g e d to stay on good terms with the central a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . N o w , although r e m a i n i n g loyal to the Sultan, they w e r e impelled by the anarchy that follows long wars to take over the reins of local government. In the face of peasant uprisings and the specter of roving hayduk bands, Istanbul looked upon this new decentralization and shift of authority with benevolence. The local population of course preferred these new rulers, who, by language and tradition were Bosnian; and the governor was often nothing than an honored guest. It was the local lords who ran the province as they p l e a s e d 3 . T h e s a m e conditions could be said to have prevailed in the Albania-Epirus region.

W . Paskaleva, "Sredna Evropa i kulturno-prosvetnoto razvitie na Balgarite prez v a z r a i d a n e t o " [Central E u r o p e a n d cultural e n l i g h t e n m e n t and d e v e l o p m e n t in B u l g a r i a b e f o r e the Renaissance!, Istoriieski Pregled 3 4 (1977) pp. 116-117 and 136. inalcik, "Saray Bosna §er'iyyt Siciline Göre Viyana Bozgunundan sonra Bosna" ¡Bosnia a f t e r the siege of V i e n n a according to the Cadi-records of Sarajevo], Tarih Vesikalari 2/2 (Ankara 1943) pp. 1-3. F. Sugar, "Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule (1354—1804)", In: A History of East Central Europe 5 (London 1977) pp. 233-236.

NATIONALITIES

IN

THE

OTTOMAN

EMPIRE

29

The situation in the Anatolian peninsula was different only by nuance. T h e process of land concentration that had continued since the sixteenth century had led to the emergence of a new class of local landlords. The timariot system of military enfiefment had broken down, and troops could no longer be summoned to battle as in the past. The keeping of order in Anatolian towns and provinces at this period had been largely left to local power groups and representatives 1 . The people by now habitually sought protection with the local rulers, in the face of heavy taxation and the depredations of the everpresent hayduk. Decentralization had b e c o m e a fact of life. From the eighteenth century onward, the presence of this new governing class would lead to profound changes in the social and political structure of the Empire.

IV. In the year 1685, the sultan bestowed upon the bandit chieftain Yegen Osman the title of beylerbeyi or governor general. The decision to d o so was hardly an outpouring of generosity, f o r Osman had gathered around him a powerful force of rebellious peasants, stoic souls who had finally had enough of being plundered whenever their villages became the target of tax agents or imperial soldiers who had deserted. T h e central Ottoman power was weary, depleted by constant war with Venice, Poland and the Czar. There seemed no choice but to distribute titles, rank and honour to bandit chieftains in the hope of pitting them against robber bands and rebels 2 . A report drawn up by the French e n v o y G u i l l e r a g u e s in March of 1684 depicts a country in total disarray. "Highly placed commanders and functionaries are constantly being replaced, administrative authority is stricken with paralysis." 3 During the war years the timariots had raided and appropriated each other's holdings, thus increasing land concentration. There was more frequent seizure of land and local power in a fashion that simply bypassed the central government, as repeatedly shown by the official records of the time and in the edicts issued by the Sultan 4 . M e a n w h i l e armies of bandits, deserting troops and timariots heedless of their fealty added another dimension to the growing anarchy 5 . In these circumstances, with the central government unable to wield authority,

' i . Ortayli, "17. yiizyil Sonlannda Orta Anadolu Vilayetlerinin Toplumsal Ekonomik Durumu Uzerine" [On the Socio-economic conditions of central Anatolian provinces at the end of the 17th century], Toplum ve Bilim, 1981, Nr. 1 5 - 1 6 . Akdag, "Genel Çizgileriyle XVII. yiizyil Tiirkiye Tarihi" [General features of the history of Turkey in the 17th century |, Ankara Ùniversitesi DU Tarih Cografya Fakultesi Dergisi 416—1 (Ankara 1968) pp. 236-238. •'Archives du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères (Paris). C.P. Turquie, vol. 17, Nt. 168, p. 12. Pera 28 mars 1684. ^Ankara Çer'iyye Sicili [Cadi-records of Ankara] Register 66, Hiikm: 816 from year 1098 H/ November 1686. ^Ankara §er'iyye, Hiikm: 862 (Zilhicce 1098-0ctober 1687).

30

S T U D I E S

ON

O T T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

responsibility was assumed by local notables called ayans, who became, in place of the pa§as, administrators both in matters of government and in the originally cosmopolitan dev$irme (recruitment). During the long decades of turbulence, the government was to appoint to positions of responsibility army officers who had distinguished themselves in Anatolia, and local figures who had proven themselves capable of preserving order in their own territory. Replacing the valis, these local lords (known as miitesellims) represent an important change. For, where before one had dev$irme children recruited and trained in the Enderun (palace school), who went on to take up the reins of central rule, now, from the eighteenth century onward, this role was to fall more and more frequently upon the Anatolians, those who in Ottoman terms had always been regarded as "crude Turks" 1 . So it is that the renowned grand viziers and military commanders of the eighteenth century are mostly of Turkish extraction. Ibrahim Paga and Halil Hamid Pa§a, both reform-instituting grand viziers in the Tulip Age (Lale Devri), are typical examples of this new administrative class. This increase of the Turkish presence in administration lost little time in making itself felt in art and culture as well. In a feudal society the tastes and demands of the ruling class are bound to be carefully considered by artists of every stamp. The poets of the eighteenth century, when Divan poetry was the literature of the highest class, to some extent abandoned the tortuous locutions of an Arabic- and Persian-laden style in favour of purer Turkish. The language of poets such as Nabi and Nedim is far closer to the Turkish of the ordinary people of Istanbul than had been that of earlier poets. What is more, the content too of poetry became livelier and closer to reality, Sadi in particular, of the poets of this time, openly pleaded for the written word to reflect the spoken language 2 . As he put it: Nice TurkCdiniir ol £i'rekim her lafzunun halli lugader bakmaya muhtac ide mecliste yarani (If the audience for a poem has to look everything up in the dictionary. how can you call it a Turkish poem?) On the military plane, the rout at Vienna made speedy and efficacious reform a necessity. When imperial schools of military engineering were opened (Miihendishane-i Bahri-yi Hiimayun and Muhendishane-i Berri-yi Hiimayun) the very first piece of business was to translate textbooks from foreign languages. In doing so, every effort was made to see that the

'Akdag, "Genel Qizgileriyle" p. 238. A . Levend, Turk Dilinde Geli§me ve Sadele^me Sajhalari [The development and purification pases of the Turkish Language], ed. Turk Dil Kurumu Nr.031 (Ankara 1949) pp. 94-95.

2

N A T I O N A L I T I E S

IN

THE

O T T O M A N

E M P I R E

31

vocabulary was Turkish rather than Arabic or Persian, since most of the students were Turks of humble origin. Such scholars as §anizade and Ho5a ishak, although active in the fields of geography, medicine, chemistry and mathematics took their terminology from Latin, also did their best to find purely Turkish equivalents 1 . Eighteenth-century Turkish is still virgin terrain for the researcher, but one thing is clear: the language of bureaucracy, education and literature was brought closer to the spoken tongue, as the 'Arabate" and "Persified" jargon of Ottoman began to give way to a more Turkish idiom. The dominance of the Turkish ethnic element in government and culture was a platform from which Turkish nationalism could rise in the centuries to come, but for a time no more than that. In the eighteenth century it is still too early to speak of the emergence, within the Ottoman Empire, of a Turkish nationalism rooted in the Turkish ethnic element. The first unmistakeable examples of Turkish nationalism came in the 1860's, with a book (Les Turcs anciens et modernes) by Mustafa Celaleddin Pa§a, a Pole who had come to Turkey in 1849 as a refugee; and with the admonition directed by Ahmed Vefik Pa§a to a Syrian Christian member of the first Ottoman parliament (1877-1878): "If you know what is good for you", he said, "you will learn Turkish" 2 . Always the official language, Turkish was first proclaimed as such in the Constitution of 1876; and it would take until the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century for Turkishness to become the seed of a nationalism. Throughout the eighteenth century, nationalism in the Ottoman Empire was confined to the Balkans, as Anatolia witnessed no more than a strong process of purification. Because of this process, however, the Empire in the eighteenth century rapidly began to lose its centuries-old cosmopolitan character. With the loss of the central European eyalets (provinces) through the treaties of Karlowitz and Passarowitz, national developments all through the Balkans, and the beginnings of intervention by the European powers, a new Islamic ideology began to emerge in the Empire during the eighteenth century. For the first time in Ottoman history, fanaticism wound its way into religious life and thought. The institution and title of Caliphate took on a far greater importance. At the same time, of course, the threat posed to the Empire by Europe made it vital to modernize and become acquainted with developments in the West. At this period the report drawn up by the Sultan's ambassador to Berlin, Azmi Efendi, speaks in glowing terms of Prussia both as state and social order. It goes on to make various suggestions for Ottoman reform. Self-

^Levend, Turk Dilinde, pp. 89-91. 2

Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Ceridesi [Protocol-book of the Ottoman parliament 1877-1878-18781, ed. H. T. Us (40th session, May 18, 1877) p. 313.

32

S T U D I E S

ON

O T T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

e n c o m i u m , so long a hallmark of the Ottoman's, had clearly b e c o m e a thing of the past 1 . In architecture, central European influence had brought a n e w b a r o q u e style, visible in the eyalets as it is in the mosques, barracks and palaces of the epoch in Istanbul. In O t t o m a n painting as well, E u r o p e a n i n f l u e n c e w a s not restricted to I s t a n b u l . T h e n e w style a p p e a r e d also throughout Anatolia and the Balkans. There are grounds f o r the claim that this eighteenth century style was less refined then the classical Ottoman, but on the other hand there is a w e l c o m e infusion of m o v e m e n t and variety after the set, static f o r m s of the centuries that preceded. Contributions of the W e s t to eighteenth century Ottoman painting include perspective, landscape, and the depiction of the human f o r m - . There was n o aspect of daily life not touched in s o m e m a n n e r by the w a v e of modernization and westernization. T h a t this would hasten the process of turcification is only natural, if we consider that printing presses began at this period turning out works in T u r k i s h , thus making science and art available to a broader range of the people. There is an eighteenth-century canvas, an instance of Austrian folk art that d e p i c t s by m e a n s of s t e r e o t y p e s the n a t i o n s of Europe. B e s i d e the Spaniard, the F r e n c h m a n , the S w e d e and the M u s c o v i t e , we find the m o s t a n t i p a t h e t i c , evil p e r s o n a g e to be a t u r b a n e d f i g u r e w e a r i n g a c a f t a n . C u r i o u s l y , he is labeled Turk or Greek*. But this European i g n o r a n c e of Turkish affairs would soon give way to an interest that led to serious research. In the first half of the eighteenth century, a n u m b e r of students at the L y c é e L o u i s - l e - G r a n d in Paris began receiving instruction in Turkish, w h i l e in V i e n n a eastern languages were introduced into the curriculum of the Maria T h e r e s i a A c a d e m y . By the end of the century E u r o p e could boast of such f a m o u s Turcologues as Joseph von H a m m e r . As Turcology came into its o w n in Europe, a source of future inspiration f o r Turkish nationalism developed, in the f o r m of linguistic and historical inquiries. In the central E u r o p e a n countries, the eighteenth century marked the beginning of Balkanistic as well as Turcological studies, the effects of which were seen among both peoples. During that century all the nations of Europe were busy studying one another's history, language and ways; a pursuit that went hand in hand with the rise of nationalism. T o some extent the Turks too took part in this; so that the long war, with its consequent loss of territories, was in s o m e sense the beginning of a historical process that would result in the birth and further growth of a belated nationalism among the Turks.

' b . Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe (London 1982), 208. ^G. Renda, Batilila§ma Döneminde Türk Resim Sanati 1700—1850 ¡Turkish painting in the era of westernization 1 7 0 0 - 1 8 5 0 ] , (Ankara 1977). ^Österreichisches Museum für Völkerkunde, Inv. Nr. 30905.

DIE GESELLSCHAFTLICHEN UND WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN FOLGEN DER ZWEITEN BELAGERUNG WIENS FÜR DAS OSMANISCHE REICH

I Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens im Jahre 1683 markiert einen wichtigen Wendepunkt in der Geschichte Mitteleuropas. Militärhistoriker betrachten die Teilnahme Polens am Entsatz Wiens als ausschlaggebend für den Mißerfolg der Osmanen. Was wäre geschehen, wenn die Stadt in die Hände der Osmanen gefallen wäre? Die Bevölkerung der habsburgisehen Erblande war durch die eingetretenen Veränderungen in der sozialen Ordnung so weit geschwächt, daß sie den Osmanen keinen Widerstand mehr geleistet hätte. Ein Vordringen der Osmanen ins Herz Europas hätte aber zweifellos auch schwerwiegende Folgen für die sozioökonomischen und kulturellen Strukturen des Osmanischen Reiches haben müssen. Doch auch die tiefgreifenden Veränderungen im gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Leben des Osmanischen Reiches, die sich aus der Niederlage vor Wien ergaben, wurden bisher nicht in ausreichender Weise untersucht. Das unter den Türken damals wie heute weitverbreitete Schlagwort von den "Vorvätern, die bis vor Wien gezogen waren" heilt die Erinnerung an die erste vergebliche Belagerung Wiens im Jahre 1529 unter Süleymän dem Prächtigen wach. Die Niederlage von 1683 war nur eine historische Folge des Umstandes, daß sich das Osmanische Reich bereits seit einem Jahrhundert in Anarchie befand und verarmt war. Auf die Frage, wie es zur Entscheidung kam, eine neuerliche Belagerung zu riskieren, reicht das Argument jener türkischen Historiker wohl kaum aus, die darin das Resultat des Wiedererstarkens des Osmanischen Reiches unter des Restauration der Wesirfamilie Köprülü erblicken. Was die Osmanen 1683 tatsächlich zur Belagerung Wiens ermunterte, war eher die deutliche Schwäche des Habsburgerreichs, die sich aus den Veränderungen im Sozial gefüge Mitteleuropas und aus den Nachwirkungen der Zerstörungen des 30-jährigen Kriegs ergab. Aus diesem Blickwinkel ist der Sieg von 1683 für die österreichische Geschichte tatsächlich ein wichtiges Ereignis. Mit 1683 setzt die imperiale Epoche in der österreichischen Geschichte ein. Nach zwei Jahrhunderten unter dem politischen und militärischen Druck sowohl der europäischen Mächte als auch des Osmanischen Reichs begann man nun, hoffnungsvoll in die Zukunft

34

STIJDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

zu blicken. Die Devise «Austria est imperare o r b e m universum» bezeichnet eine neue E p o c h e f ü r d a s R e i c h , das seinen E i n f l u ß in den d e u t s c h e n Fürstentümern verstärkte und seine L a n d w i r t s c h a f t , sein G e w e r b e , seinen Handel und seine Kultur entwickelte. Das Habsburger-Reich stand am Beginn seines A u f s c h w u n g und sollte im Europa des 18. Jahrhunderts eine gewichtige Rolle unter den Mächten spielen.

II Die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Verfallserscheinungen, die die zweite Belagerung Wiens und ihr Mißerfolg in den osmanischen Gebieten verursachte, werden in der Literatur immer wieder erwähnt. Z w a r gibt es zu diesem T h e m a einige Studien, die sich auf die Balkanländer beziehen, nicht aber solche über Anatolien. Die Folgen der Niederlage vor Wien zeigten sich zuerst in den rumelischen Provinzen, die als erste in Unsicherheit und U n o r d n u n g versetzt wurden. Die Niederlage des Heeres, die A u f l ö s u n g der Garnisonen, die die Sicherheit in den Städten zu garantieren hatten, der wirtschaftliche Verfall, die mangelnde Sicherheit auf den Straßen und die folgenden Kriege beseitigten in diesen Provinzen j e d e Kontrolle durch die zentrale Verwaltung; z.B. verlangte die Bevölkerung Bosniens wiederhold finanzielle und militärische Hilfe aus Konstantinopel, aber die Zentralregierung war zu schwach, diesen Forderungen n a c h z u k o m m e n 1 . Deshalb ging die Stadtbevölkerung dazu über, selbst f ü r die nötige Sicherheit zu sorgen, aber auch im Bereich der Finanzen k a m es zu einer weitgehenden Selbstverwaltung. Meist waren es die sogenannten

ayan,

die lokalen Notabein und Gemeindevorsteher, die die Städte repräsentierten und nun die Autorität in ihren Händen konzentrierten. E s handelte sich um lokale Grundbesitzer, um Verwalter f r o m m e r Stiftungen oder auch um christliche G e i s t l i c h e . D i e L o k a l v e r w a l t u n g ging v i e l e r o r t s in die H ä n d e mütesellim

solcher

über. Sie hatten die Steuern einzunehmen und für die öffentliche

Sicherheit Sorge zu tragen. Man kann diese Entwicklung als den Beginn d e r örtlichen

Selbstverwaltung

in d e n

osmanischen

Städten

betrachten.

Insbesondere in Bosnien kam es nach der zweiten W i e n e r B e l a g e r u n g zur Entstehung einer solchen Lokalautonomie 2 .

^Halil Inalcik, Saray-Bosna §eriye Sicillerine göre Viyana Bozgunundan Ydlarinda Bosna, «Tarih Vesikalari» 2 (Ankara 1943) Nr. 11, 1-3.

Sonraki

Harb

^ A v d o Suceska, Die Rechtsstellung der Bevölkerung in den Städten Bosniens und der Herzegowina unter den Osmanen (1463-1X78), in: Siidosteuropa-Jahrbuch 8 (München 1968), 84-99.

D I E F O L G E N DER Z W E I T E N B E L A G E R U N G

WIENS

35

III Die Epoche der Großwesire aus der Familie Köprülü brachte in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts im Osmanischen Reich ein Erstarken der Institutionen der klassischen Periode und eine vorübergehende Wiederherstellung von Sicherheit und Ordnung mit sich. Es kam aber nicht zu einer Modernisierung und zu einem strukturellen Wandel in der Verwaltung. Daher machte sich in den Jahren nach der Niederlage von Wien wieder die Anarchie breit, die am A n f a n g des 17. Jahrhunderts geherrscht hatte. D e r N i e d e r g a n g und die Wirren sollten aber am B e g i n n von tiefgreifenden Veränderungen im sozialen und administrativen Leben des Osmanischen Reichs stehen. Die chaotische Lage des Wirtschafts- und V e r w a l t u n g s w e s e n s im Osmanischen Reich entging natürlich nicht der Aufmerksamkeit ausländischer Diplomaten, die sich in der Hauptstadt befanden. Der häufige Wechsel der hohen Staatsbeamten und der militärischen Würdenträger, die Erschütterung der ökonomischen Situation der Städte, die Geld- und Lebensmittelknappheit und die herrschende Aufruhrstimmung sind die Themen, die beispielsweise in den französischen Gesandtschaftsberichten am häufigsten genannt werden. So berichtete im März 1684 der fransözsische Gesandte Guilleragues, daß der ständige Wechsel der hohen Militärränge, Wesire, Provinzgouverneure und Beamten, die meist nich länger als sechs Monate in einer Funktion verblieben, als Grund f ü r die Schwäche der Exekutive, für die Verbreitung der Korruption und f ü r die vielen Aufstände angesehen werden müsse 1 . Auch der Verball der Ordnung im Heer und die Rückständigkeit seiner Ausrüstung und Organisation entging der Aufmerksamkeit der Gesandten nicht, obwohl das osmanische Heer das Image seiner Überlegenheit und Unbesiegbarkeit zu bewahren trachtete. «Die Schwäche und Unwissenheit der Türken in der militärischen Technik ist unbegreiflich", sagt Guilleragues 2 . Der seit einem Jahrhundert andauernde Verfall der Heeresmacht erreichte einen kritischen Punkt und kam in der Niederlage vor Wien plötzlich zum Vorschein. Im Juli 1686 berichtete der französische Gesandte Girardin: «Die Bevölkerung von Konstantinopel, die sich an den Großherrn wendet um zu protestieren, ist jeden Augenblick zu einem Aufstand bereit. In Konstantinopel herrscht seit langem Hungersnot». 3 Im November 1687 meldete Girardin, der Defterdar hätte die Einkünfte längst verbraucht und könne die notwendigen Ausgaben nicht mehr decken und die Gehälter nicht mehr bezahlen. 4 Es besteht kein Zweifel, daß diese in der Hauptstadt belegten Erscheinungen in den anatolischen Provinzen des Reiches in noch t r a g i s c h e r e r F o r m m a n i f e s t w a r e n . D i e G e r i c h t s a r c h i v e der anatolischen Städte (§er'iye sicilleri) geben uns ein farbiges Bild von der ökonomischen und sozialen Lage in diesen Jahren. 1 Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris. C.P. Turquie, vol 17 Nr. 168 p 12 Pera, 28. März 1684. ^Ebenda, fol. 40v-43r (9. Juni 1684). ^Ebenda, fol. 283v. (Juli 1686). ^Ebenda, fol. 325v, vol. 19 (Nov. 1687).

36

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

IV Die europäische Welt, deren agrarische und industrielle Struktur sich seit dem Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts zu verändern begann, übte auf die soziale und ökonomische Lage des Osmanischen Reiches einen sehr starken Einfluß aus. Infolge einiger bekannter U m s t ä n d e wie Z u n a h m e der Bevölkerung, Mangel and Boden, Stagnation der Eroberungen und Geldentwertung wurden die anatolischen Provinzen von ähnlichen Verfallserscheinungen heimgesucht wie die Balkanländer. Es kam zur Usurpation von Grund und Boden durch die L e h e n s i n h a b e r , die V e r w a l t e r von S t i f t u n g e n o d e r d u r c h a n d e r e Verwaltungsbeamte und infolgedessen auch zu Bauernaufständen. Meist waren auch jene, deren Pflicht es war, die Autorität der staatlichen Ordnung zu wahren, an diesen Übergriffen bzw. Aufständen beteiligt 1 . Diese um die Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts verbreiteten sogenannten Ce/d/f-Aufstände konnten aber durch energische Maßnahmen und militärische Operationen niedergeworfen werden. Zur Zeit der Köprülü-Wesire wurde die innere Sicherheit des Reiches, wie sie im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert geherrscht hatte, von neuem gefestigt, wobei eine begrenzte Dezentralisierung eingeführt wurde. Aber nach der Niederlage vor Wien zeigte sich die Rückständigkeit des Osmanischen Reiches ganz offen. Die Unzulänglichkeiten im Agrar- und Steuersystem bildeten den Anlaß f ü r neue Aufstände, für die Verbreitung der Anarchie einerseits und die zunehmende Unterdrückung der Landbevölkerung andererseits. In diesem Zeitabschnitt beschleunigte sich der im 16. Jahrhundert einsetzende Prozeß der Konzentration d e s Grundbesitzes in bestimmten Händen. Beim Tod des Lehensinhabers wurde der Boden nicht dem Staat zurückgestellt, sondern regelwidrig von Privatpersonen usurpiert. Es kam aber auch vor, daß der G r u n d b e s i t z e i n e s im K r i e g b e f i n d l i c h e n L e h e n s i n h a b e r s von Vervvaltungsbeamten, Stiftungsfunktionären oder anderen Lehensinhabern widerrechtlich übernommen wurde. Auch Land, das durch die Flucht der Bauern herrenlos geworden war, w u r d e so usurpiert. Manchmal m u ß t e j e m a n d feststellen, daß das Gut, das ihm als liehen zugewiesen worden war, bereits in anderen Händen war. Die Gerichtsarchive sind voll von Belegen f ü r Prozesse in solchen Angelegenheiten. In einem ferman aus dem Jahre 1098 H./beg. Nov. 1686 ordnete der Sultan — freilich vergeblich — an, den Mißstand zu beseitigen, daß Lehen von Sipahis aus der Provinz Ankara unter dem Vorwand, der Inhaber wäre verstorben und das Lehen erledigt, usurpiert werden, während der rechtmäßige Inhaber ins Feld gezogen war; gleichfalls sollte verhindert werden, daß in solchen Fällen Aufschläge auf die Steuern berechnet würden 2 . Dies kam sehr h ä u f i g vor. In Kriegsjahren wurden oft Lehen mehrfach vergeben. Es gibt einen ferman des Sultans f ü r die Provinz Ankara, der sich

' Über die Unruhen, die als

celäli Jetreti

bekannt sind, siehe M u s t a f a A k d a g . Erzurum 1963 (Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayini 29). 2 A n k a r a §eri'ye Sicilli, Deft. Nr. 66. Hukm 816 (1098 H./beg. Nov. 1686).

Kari§ikhklarimn Ba^lamasi,

Büyük Celäli

DIE

FOLGEN

DER

ZWEITEN

BELAGERUNG

WIENS

37

auf solche Probleme bezieht. Selbst ein beytülmal emini (dieser Beamte war Aufseher und Buchhalter der Lehen) scheute sich nicht, die auf 16 000 akge berechneten Jahreseinkünfte eines Lehens, das einem der Tschauschen des Hofes namens Hasan verliehen worden war, zu unterschlagen. Die Gerichtsregister von Ankara vermelden diesen Fall im Monat Rebiyülevvel 1100 H./Dez. 1688-Jän. 1689 1 . Die chaotische Lage des Lehenssystems war natürlich mit ein Grund für den Verfall des anatolischen Heeresaufgebots. Entweder rückten die einberufenen Soldaten nicht ein oder sie flohen. Obwohl im Jahre 1099 H./beg. 1687 den Soldaten der Sandschaks von Sivas, Ankara und Eski§ehir mehrfach der Befehl erteilt wurde, sich am Feldzug zu beteiligen, wurde im selben Jahr der Wesir Ahmed Pa§a mit Sondervollmachten ausgestattet, um für den Feldzug nach Ungarn Soldaten aus Anatolien zu sammeln, die den Einberufungsbefehlen keine Folge geleistet hatten. Im ferman aus dem Rebiyülevvel 1098 H./Jän.-Feb. 1687 erfahren wir, daß sogar ständing dienende Soldaten wie z. B. Janitscharen oder Artilleristen in Anatolien sich nicht am Feldzug beteiligten, indem sie vorgaben, sie wären neu rekrutiert (acemi) pensioniert, zum Schutzdienst in den Städten beordert oder von der Teilnahme befreit 2 . Die Zentralregierung war zu schwach, die Lage zu bessern. Manche Offiziere und Beamte verschlossen ihre Augen davor, weil sie bestochen waren. Die Heeres- und Palastbeamten, die mit der Einberufung der Soldaten beauftragt waren (siirücii gavu§), wurden manchmal von Soldaten, die nicht in den Krieg ziehen wollten, bedroht und sogar getötet 3 . Einer der Gründe dafür, daß man keine Soldaten aufbringen konnte, war auch der Umstand, daß die Aufzeichnungen über das Lehensaufgebot der Provinzen veraltet waren. Die in diesem Zeitabschnitt meist in großer Eile vorgenommenen Registrierungen blieben ohne Folgen 4 . Da die durch fermane angeordneten neuen Registrierungen und Lehenverleihungen 5 nicht durchgeführt werden konnten, veränderte sich auch der Iststand des Heeres nicht. Es ist klar, daß die langen Kriegsjahre die Steuerlast f ü r die Landbevölkerung und die sonstigen Verpflichtungen außerordentlich vermehrt haben. Zur Zeit der Belagerung Wiens wurden in den anatolischen Provinzen die Steuern angehoben, die Fronarbeit wurde vermehrt, und ungesetzliche Praktiken häuften sich. Infolge des steigenden Bedarfs an Soldaten und Material wurden die Kriegssteuern nicht

' Ebenda, Nr. 66. Hukm 814. 68, Hukm 514; Kayseri §eri'ye Sicilli Nr. 93, fo. 229 (Gurre-i Sevval 1095 H./beg. Dez. 1683). Ankara §eri'ye Sicilli, Nr. 66, Hukm 814, fol. 301; Hukm 827; Hukm 830. Ebenda, Hukm 862 (Evail-i Zilhicce 1098 H./Mitte Oktober 1687); Hukm 30 (1098 H./beg Nov. 1686). ^Ebenda, Nr. 65, Hukm 618 ("Yeniceri, acemi oglan, tobci ve cebeci ve $alik [...1 esamüeri \ e yevmiyeleri ka? ak?a ise tashih olunmalan", 1095-1096 H./1684). — Hukm 697 «Sogar junge Männer, die Waffen besaßen, sollten registriert werden»; Kayseri Seri'ye Sicilli, Nr. 94 (1098 H./beg. Nov. 1686). 3

5

Kayseri §eri'ye Sicilli, Nr. 93, p. 229 (§evval 1095 H./Sept.-Okt. 1684).

38

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

nur vermehrt, sondern auch öfter eingehoben. Aus diesem Grund wurde auch die Zahl der steuerpflichtigen Haushalte vermehrt, denn die zehn bis zwölf Jahre zuvor erstellten Register entsprachen nicht mehr dem gestiegenen Bedarf. Gleicherweise wurde die von den Nichtmuslimen eingehobene Kopfsteuer (cizye) erhöht, und es wurde angeordnet, die Steuern nach der Zahl der Steuerpflichtigen Personen und Haushalte einzuheben 1 . Diese Steuern mußten meist in bar oder in Form von Vieh entrichtet werden. In der Regel wurden von den verschiedenen Sandschaks auch eine Anzahl von Lasttieren für den K r i e g g e f o r d e r t 2 . Die Regierung ließ diese Steuern sogar im voraus eintreiben 3 . Auch die von Zünften zu leistenden Abgaben, die Lieferung von Heu, Stroh, Getreide usw., wurden angehoben. Die Bauern hatten Schlachtvieh und Getreide für das Heer zu eigens festgesetzten niedrigen Preisen zu verkaufen ( s ü r s a t ) 4 . Manchmal mußte auch ein bestimmter Teil dieser Leistungen gleich in Bargeld entrichtet werden. Neben der Einhebung von Geld für Baumaterial zur Instandsetzung der Festungen und für die Ausrüstung der Soldaten (bildar bedeli) wurde auch das Ausmaß der nüzul vergisi genannten Sondersteuer erhöht 3 . Neben den Steuern hob der Staat auch in hohem Maß Zwangsanleihen von den Notabein und den Kaufleuten in den Städten ein. Die Beträge dürften sehr hoch gewesen sein. Beispielsweise wurde den Notabein und Kautieuten in Kayseri in dieser Zeit eine Zwangsanleihe von 10.000 kuru§ ( 4 0 0 G o l d s t ü c k e ) a u f e r l e g t 6 . Zu den A b g a b e n , die die Land- und Stadtbevölkerung drückten, gehörten auch die Kosten f ü r die ständing neu eingesetzten und wieder abgelösten Beamten, für die Einquartierungen und f ü r die Ausrüstungen. In Ankara gab es drei verschiedene Kadi innerhalb eines einzigen Jahres. Die Kosten für die Beherbergung und Verpflegung der auf Reisen befindlichen Paschas, die auch Güter requirierten und Soldaten aushoben, mußten gleichfalls von der Bevölkerung getragen werden, die regelrecht ausgeplündert wurde. Die große Zahl von Erlässen, mit welchen die Korruption eingedämmt werden sollte, spiegelt den Ernst der Lage 7 . Ein Beweis f ü r die Schwäche der Zentralregierung und f ü r die verbreitete Insubordination der Beamten liegt darin, daß die eingehobenen Steuern o f t unterschlagen wurden und nicht an die Zentralstellen weitergegeben wurden. Es gibt viele Akten, in d e n e n die Z e n t r a l r e g i e r u n g bei den örtlichen K o m m a n d a n t e n , den Kadis und den Steuerpächtern ausständige Steuern einmahnt 8 .

' A n k a r a §eri'ye Sicilli, Nr. 68, Hukm (Kvail-i Recep 1099 H./Anf. Mai 1688). 2

E b a n d a , Nr. 65, Hukm 692, 693, 696 (1095-1096 H./1684).

3

E b e n d a , Nr. 65, Hukm 715 (Muharrem 1096 H./Dez. 1684-Jänner 1685).

4

E b e n d a , Nr. 66, Hukm 850 (1098 H./beg. Nov. 1686).

^Ebenda, Nr. 66, Hukm 840. 6 7

K a y s e r i §eri'ye Sicilli, Nr. 94. p. 109.

A n k a r a §eri'ye Sicilli, Nr. 6 8 (auch hier w u r d e der gewechselt).; Nr. 65, Hukm 619-723: Nr. 66, Hukm 33.

Kadi

innerhalb eines Jahres dreimal

"Ebenda, Nr. 68 Hukm 3 6 6 J e r m a n \. (9. Ramazan 1099 H./8. Juli 1688).

D I E F O L G E N DER Z W E I T E N B E L A G E R U N G

WIENS

39

Da die Steuern z u n e h m e n d in Bargeld e i n g e h o b e n w u r d e n , der Geldbedarf aber stetig stieg, ergab sich eine Inflation von solchen Ausmaßen, daß sie die Bevölkerung nicht mehr ertragen konnte. Im Sandschak von Ankara stieg innerhalb von zwei Jahren der Kurswert eines Goldstücks nach den offiziellen Registern von 300 auf 600 akce]. Diese Inflationsrate schuf für die vorwiegend in der L a n d w i r t s c h a f t tätige B e v ö l k e r u n g s e h r schwierige Bedingungen. Die Produktion stagnierte, und die Last des wirtschaftlichen Zusammenbruchs hatte wieder die Bevölkerung zu tragen. Die Soldaten, die revoltierten, statt ins Feld zu ziehen, und die Bauern, die ihren Boden verlassen hatten, schloßen sich vielfach den zahllosen Räuberbanden an. Einer der Rebellen, die die Zentralregierung in große Schwierigkeiten versetzte, war im Jahre 1100 H./beg. Jän. 1689 Gedik Pa§a, der Generalgouverneur von Sivas 2 . Mit den üblichen Mitteln und den lokalen Beamten war dem Räuberunwesen nicht beizukommen 3 ; der Staat entsandte sog. müfetti§ pcqalar mit Sondervollmachten. Ihre Einheiten traf man in diesen Jahren allenthalben in A n a t o l i e n . A b e r j e n e , die d a s R ä u b e r u n w e s e n bekämpfen sollten, benahmen sich selbst auch nicht besser als die Räuber und scheuten nicht davor zurück, die Besitztümer der Bevölkerung zu plündern und schuldlose Leute zu bestrafen 4 . So hatte die Bevölkerung die dreifache Last der Steuern, der Räuber und der gegen die Räuber aufgestellten Einheiten zu tragen und entzog sich d e m oft durch den A n s c h l u ß an andere Räuberbanden. Hervorragende Generäle wie Ali Pa§a, Cafer Pa§a und Halil Pa§a 5 wurden zu dieser Zeit nach Anatolien entsandt, um die Räuberbanden einzudämmen, doch ohne jeden Erfolg. Die Städte und Dörfer waren daher gezwungen, ihre Probleme selbst zu lösen. Die örtlichen Notabein hatten dabei die führende Rolle inne. Seit dieser Zeit erfuhr der Begriff ayan auch offizielle Anerkennung, wenngleich die Institution als solche schon längst existierte. Die ayan

wurden von Amts

6

wegen mit manchen Aufgaben betraut . So begann in den Städten und Dörfern Anatoliens eine neue Klasse, die V e r w a l t u n g zu ü b e r n e h m e n (im 18. J a h r h u n d e r t bürgert sich auch die B e z e i c h n u n g mütesselim o s m a n i s c h e V e r w a l t u n g war zu einer w e i t g e h e n d e n

ein). Die

Dezentralisierung

gezwungen.

'Ebenda, Nr. 66, Hukm 840; Kayseri §eri'ye Sicilli, Nr. 97. ^Ankara ijcr'iye Sicilli, Nr. 68, Hukm 515 (Evail-i Rebiyülevvel 1100 H./Ende Dez. 1688). ^Ebenda, Nr. 68, Hukm 476, 481. ^Ankara §eri'ye Sicilli, Nr. 65, Hukm 650. ^Ebenda, Nr. Hukm 537, 820; Kayseri §er. Nr. 93, p. 132. 6 Ankara §er. Sic., Nr. 65, Hukm 715 (Muharrem 1096 H./Dez. 1684-Jan. 1685).

40

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

V Österreich, das sich nun als europäische Großmacht präsentierte, strebte f ü r seine Landwirtschaft und seine aufblühende M a n u f a k t u r nach den Märkten des B a l k a n s und nach den d o r t i g e n R o h s t o f f e n . Die E n t w i c k l u n g d e r L a n d w i r t s c h a f t zur Zeit Karls VI. und die E n t w i c k l u n g von H a n d e l und Industrie z u r Z e i t seiner Nachfolger zwang den Staat schon zu Beginn des 17. J a h r h u n d e r t s z u m Bau n e u e r L a n d s t r a ß e n und z u r I n t e n s i v i e r u n g d e r D o n a u s c h i f f a h r t s o w i e zum A u s b a u des F r e i h a f e n s von T r i e s t 1 . Im 18. Jahrhundert schränkten England, Frankreich und Holland ihre Handelsaktivitäten in der Levante zu Gunsten ihres Überseehandels mit den Kolonien ein 2 . Österreich erleichterte den Levantehandel in diesen Jahren durch den Abschluß verschiedener Handelsverträge mit dem osmanischen Reich. So gelang es den Österreichern, sowohl den offenen als auch den Schmuggelhandel mit den türkischen Gebieten an sich zu z i e h e n 3 . Im V e r e i n mit a n d e r e n ausländischen Handelsaktivitäten erleichterte die Blüte des österreichischen T ü r k e i h a n d e l s die E n t w i c k l u n g einer reichen b ü r g e r l i c h e n K l a s s e in den Städten des Donauraums, w o man das 18. Jahrhundert als den Beginn nicht nur d e r wirtschaftlichen W i e d e r g e b u r t bezeichnen k a n n 4 . Jene Ideen, die den verschiedenen Nationalbewegungen zugrunde lagen, breiteten sich aus, und im Osmanischen Reich entstand am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts — sowohl auf dem B a l k a n als auch in den asiatischen Provinzen — eine im V e r g l e i c h zur klassischen E p o c h e des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts v o l l k o m m e n neue M a c h t und Gesellschaftsstruktur.

' F e r d i n a n d T r e m e l , Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte Österreichs, G r a z 232-237, 2 4 2 - 2 4 5 ; W l a d i m i r A i c h e l b u r g , Kreigsschiffe auf der Donau, W i e n 1978 ( M i l i t ä r h i s t o r i s c h e Schriftenreihe, 37), 7-18. 2 R a l p h Davis, English Imports from the Middle East 1580-1780, in: Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, L o n d o n 1970-205; H e r b e r t H a s s i n g e r , Die erste Wiener orientalische Handelskompagnie 1667-1683, in: Vjs. f. Sozial- u. Wirtschaftsgeschichte 35 (1942), 1-53. Ilbert Ortayli, 1727 Osmanh-Avusturya seyrusefain sözlemesi, in: Ankara Üniversitesi Siy. Bil. Fak. Dergisi, 28 ( 1975) Nr. 3-4, 97-109. "^Nicolai T o d o r o v . 19. Yüzyilm ilk varismda Bulgaristan Esnaf Te$kilälmda hazi karakter degi$meleri, in: "Istanbul Üniversites Ikt. Fak. Mecm." 27 (1968), Nr. 1/2, 1-36; Virginia Paskaleva, Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der bulgarischen Gebiete mit Mitteleuropa im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, in: Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege, Festschrift für Hermann Kellenbenz, 1, Stuttgart 1978, 169.

OTTOMAN-HABSBURG RELATIONS 1740-1770, AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE OTTOMAN STATE

Although it witnessed changes so important as to herald a new era, the Ottoman eighteenth century cannot be said to have received due attention in research. Source guides for this period surveying available documents and summarizing archival acquisitions and classifications are rare, and not even the initial, indispensable paleographical and diplomatic studies have yet been undertaken. Work on the eighteenth century, of course, should be based not only on the Turkish but also on Balkanic and European archives as well as those of the monasteries and the Phanariot Greek Orthodox patriarchate, all of which can be combed only through teamwork. In this context, examinations of Austro-Ottoman commercial relations of the eighteenth century, for example, is obviously central f o r economic history but also and less obviously so for the political, diplomatic, administrative and cultural history of the two empires, while the events and transformations which have shaped the recent history of the Balkan nations may also be considered to have commenced in these hundred years. Balkan historians such as N. Todorov, N.G. Svoronos, B. Cvetkova, V. Paskaleva, A. SuCeska, T. Stoianovich therefore naturally dominate this field, and we must cite their work with gratitude. In Turkey, H. tnalcik and C. Orhonlu have led the way in creating interest in this area. Although among Austrian writers themselves, Hans Halm for one, has also contributed some valuable monographs to the study of Austro-Ottoman trade, it cannot be said that all in all, enough comparative and critical spadework has been done in the Ottoman archives in this respect. In the Istanbul archives of the Prime Ministry, for example, the 'Diivel-i Ecnebiyye Defterleri' as well as the 'Nem§e Ahkam Defterleri' and 'Ahidname M e c m u a l a n ' in the same series are important sources, while the '§eriyye Sicilleri' of the major ports should not be omitted. Ottoman foreign trade was undergoing structural change in the eighteenth century: despite what some maintain, the integration of the Empire into international trade was not the sudden product of the Anglo-Ottoman commercial treaty of 1838 but A c outcome of a slow development with its roots further in the past.

42

STUDIES

ON

O i l OMAN

TRANSFORMATION

II A f t e r the Treaty of Belgrade of 1739, the Ottoman Empire entered a period of relatively lasting peace vis-à-vis Austria, R u s s i a and Persia, its immediate neighbours. Prevailing until the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768, this phase of tranquillity left its mark on political, cultural and e c o n o m i c life. It w a s a time w h e n the g r o w i n g strength of the H a b s b u r g m o n a r c h y began during the reign of Maria Theresia to turn its attention f r o m Western Europe t o w a r d s O t t o m a n territories in the B a l k a n s , initially f o l l o w i n g there a moderate policy. T h e Ottoman E m p i r e of the sixteenth century had lived not so m u c h through peace treaties as through armistices; its f o r e i g n a f f a i r s were not m a r k e d by institutions of the E u r o p e a n type. In the eighteenth c e n t u r y , however, the Empire may be considered to have already joined the system of the period b e f o r e the C o n g r e s s of V i e n n a with respect to its d i p l o m a t i c relations and international legal institutions; a m o n g the latter adopted in those days, commercial and consular ties, f r e e choice of residence f o r missionaries, security of navigation, etc., stand out immediately. There is n o need here to dwell on the transformations of the landholding and military system of the E m p i r e and the decentralization of its urban and provincial administration in any greater detail. In Austria, (in the other hand, the eighteenth century was the epoch of Maria Theresia during which the monarchy underwent an important revolution in transportation and c o m m e r c e in the eastern Mediterranean, the M a g h r e b , and especially along the D a n u b e . By the mid-century, Theresian A u s t r i a w a s already a m e r c h a n t state a c t i v e in the B a l k a n s and

the

Mediterranean, and an entire series of social, cultural and political changes in the Ottoman Empire bears the stamp of this ascendancy. T h e supplementary conventions following the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 and those after the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739 opened a new era f o r practices such as security of navigation, flag and cargo rights in Ottoman waters, determination of consular status and tariffs, protection for merchants, e x c h a n g e of prisoners, etc. Just how the Ottoman bureaucracy and administration managed to adapt to these new developments constitutes an interesting topic f o r research. T h e sixteenth century system would not change immediately and thoroughly simply because a f e w treaties and supplementary conventions had been signed — that much is evident. Austria had relatively quickly seized the initiative in the Mediterranean and along the Danube, but just how was her activity carried out? T h e archive m a t e r i a l s w e have e x a m i n e d reflect through i n n u m e r a b l e e x a m p l e s that adjustment was slow and hard lo c o m e by.

OTTOMAN-HABSBURG

RELATIONS

1740- 1 770

43

III Eighteenth-century Europe, despite occasional wars, may on the whole be aptly called the continent of peace and prosperity. The monarchs, deputed by God to take care of order on earth, were the very images of wealth and splendour. T h e opulence of these states and their wordly outlook f o u n d expression in the magnificence and liveliness of baroque art. Europeans of the time were really becoming Europeans; the French, German and English intelligentsias were merging with one another. Although it was of course somewhat outside the general atmosphere, the Ottoman Empire also entered a phase of increasing European influence. Baroque art and the new, luxurious style of living began to manifest themselves not only in the Ottoman capital but even in the villas of the gentry ( a y a n ) and the merchants of the wealthier towns of the provinces. European manufactures f o u n d widening channels to Ottoman markets, and ambassadors at the Sublime Porte sought out the grand vizier and the

reis-ul-

kiittab not just for peace talks but also to demand protection and concessions for merchants of their nationality. Gaining in importance and undergoing a functional transformation, the reis-Ul-kiittab

became in this process a full-

f l e d g e d foreign minister responsible f o r listening to foreign d i p l o m a t s ; remonstrations c o n c e r n i n g trade, c o n s u l a r activity etc., and taking the necessary measures, and a high rate of turnover in this post may indicate an inability on the part of O t t o m a n bureaucrats to fulfill their n e w tasks. Provincial bureaucrats such as customs officials, of course, were also forced to change their ancient habits concerning navigation and supervision of trade which were holdovers from the 'classical' period. Austrian trade in the area stretching f r o m the D a n u b e to the Mediterranean was carried out not so much by G e r m a n and Bohemian merchants as those of northern Italy and Croatia. Traders and sailors of such newly conquered territories had by the fact of Habsburg annexation become 'Nemge

subjects' and passed into their service. This suddenly acquired

patronage of the ancient Mediterranean trade, the Habsburg Empire would cede first to France and then to England only in the early nineteenth century; meanwhile, the resurgent Austrian domination gave a new lease of life to some old hands like Tuscan, Lombard and Livornian sailors, merchants of the Levant, Croatian traders and seamen who once more obtained commercial security under the H a b s b u r g f l a g a n d whose activities in the eastern Mediterranean therefore witnessed a second renaissance.

44

S T U D I E S

ON

O T T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

IV That the Ottoman bureaucracy lost its efficiency of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries during the eighteenth has b e c o m e s o m e t h i n g of a commonplace; although this is not really a very meaningful phrase behind the observation would seem to lurk the problems faced by the bureaucracy in adapting to the new order. But the new treaties and their supplementary conventions on transportation and trade had rendered this adaptation inevitable. T h e status of ' m o s t favoured nation' acquired by the Habsburg Empire (Nem^e) 1 placed Austrian vessels and merchants (as well as, theoretically, their Ottoman counterparts) under the sort of mutual protection that had already become common practice in other polities of the Early M o d e r n era. The supplements to the Treaty of Passarowitz, which in legal f o r m were not commercial treaties but simply conventions of navigation, granted the subjects of the Caesar of ' N e m ? e ' (or Roma Cesari) the right to engage freely in trade on Ottoman soil, seas and rivers. In 1718 Charles VI declared Trieste and Fiume to be 'open ports' 2 (both, however, subsequently became part of the Austrian customs union under Maria Theresia). T h e O t t o m a n - H a b s b u r g commercial treaty of 27 July 1718 settled questions of consular status, navigation, overland trade and customs duties 3 . Another navigation convention of 1727 sought to guarantee Habsburg vessels against the official piracy from the Maghreb 4 , but this did not include formal rights of free trade in M a g h r e b ports, although the security of navigation it involved obviously made some commercial activity possible — this was mostly illicit traffic of the type carried out by England and the Netherlands in Spanish colonies. T h e following expressions f r o m certain firmans clearly indicate that Habsburg ships thereby also obtained flag and cargo rights and began to carry passengers from one Ottoman port to another: Kraligeye tabi vilayetlerin tiiccar ve reayalari memalik-i mahrusama kendti hallerinde gidip ali§ ve veri§ edib, bugiinedegin virilegelen gunruklerin verdiklerinden sonra bir diirlit rencide. verilmeye.. A Another firman dated April

' ß a f b . Ars. Düvel-i Ecnebiyye Defterleri Nemçe Ahkâm Defieri Nr. 58 (Evail-i Shevval, 1154, Evasit Safer, 1158): ve devlet-i Aliyyemde bulunan saCr mustemen taijesine, bahusus Françe ve ìngiltere ve Nederlande milletlerine olan müsaade Nemçe tüccarina mebzul ve meri olub bigûna munakCd ve emniyet ile müntefC ve emin olalar deyu ahidname-yi humayunum mestur olub... 2

E . Zöllner, Geschichte

Österreichs.

Wien 1970, p. 287.

3

B a r o n I. Testa, Recueil de Traités de ta Porte Ottomane avec les puissances étrangères, tome 9e (Autriche), Paris 1898 (28 Shaban 1130, 27 July 1718) pp. 82-89, (16 Zi 'lkaade 1130-10 Nov. 1718) p. 89 (26 C 1 137-12 March 1725) convention for the exchange of prisoners, pp. 89100, treaty of Belgrade (14 C. 1152-18 September 1739) p. 90. Ortayli, " 1 7 2 7 tarihli O s m a n ' i - A v u s t u r y a seyriisefaîn sozleçmesi" S B F Dergisi, vol. XXVIII/3-4, pp. 97-110. 5 Nemçe Ahkâm Defteri Nr. 60, p. 167 (Evail-i Shevval, 1176), Nr. 60, p. 117 (Evail-i Safer, 1177).

OTTOMAN-HABSBURG

RELATIONS

1740-1770

45

1763 and addressed to the vizier and kadis of the Morea also dealt with Austrian passenger and cargo service between Ottoman ports in these terms: Devlet-i aliyyeme tabi olan tticcar taifesi, devlet-i gasariyyeye tabi tiiccar sefinelerine siivar olup, e§ya tahmil ederlerse, lngiltere ve Frange ve Nederlande sefinelerine siivar olanlarin virdiikleri rusumu vireler. Local authorities must obviously have attempted to interfere in this traffic, but it was the policy of the center to prevent such interference. That this was in fact the attitude of provincial officials is also revealed by a firman of Evail-i Safer 1177/1764 addressed to the governor of Damascus and the kadi of Jerusalem 1 : the customs official (gumrtik emini) of Yafa had demanded two gold liras for each Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Ottoman pilgrim boarding 'Nem§e' ships, whereupon the captain—one Hanna Damiano— complained, in answer to which it was written that: Yafa giimriigi emini olanlar ez kadim avaid-i kulliye virilegeleni almaya kanaat etmeyib, Nemge sefafni kapudanlarina: sefinenize irkdb olunan ziyaretgilerden adem ba§ina iki§er altin sizden ahriz, siz dahi onlardan alinizVallah ziyaretgileri sefaininize irkabden men ederiz deyu, hilaf-i ahidnamem akge taleb... Let us only add that Austrian vessels quickly came to seize the major portion of the passenger traffic between Ottoman ports and kept this position until the end of the nineteenth century. Those hit hardest by this right of navigation were the so-called Garb Ocaklari, Algeria, Tunis and Tripoli. The Maghreb, raking in the profits of official piracy throughout the eighteenth century while participating in Mediterranean navigation at the same time, stood to lose the most from the concessions to Austria. This was in fact why the new regime of free navigation, faced with continuous violation of treaties and conventions, could not be immediately and fully implemented. Algeria and Tunis kept seizing some 'Nem§e' ships to confiscate their cargoes and capture those on board. Two firmans of July 1744 (Evail-i C. 1157) and 1741, on the other hand, the first sent to the beylerbeyi of Algeria and the second to that of Tunis, testify to the continuous efforts made by Istanbul to put things to rights. But apart from this, it would seem that foreign captains and merchants also strove to obtain special charters (berats) from the Sultan to additionally guarantee their safety on trips within Ottoman waters, as witnessed by four such berats granted to Graf Oelfeld at one time. Another firman of the year 1745 (Evail-i Safer 1158) 2 orders the beylerbeyi of Tripoli to release two nobles of ' N e n ^ e ' named Leopold and Strausold and a priest called Lorenco Custinyo (Giustinio) who had been aboard a seized Dubrovnik vessel. A similar example from later years is the firman which orders that Covani (Johann) of Praga and three others be released; apparently they had been captured by one Ahmed Farac Reis (captain) near the port of Dra§ (Durazzo).

]

Ibid, Nr. 60 p. 117 (1177 Evail-i Safer) Ibid, Nr. 60, p.156, and Nr. 58 (Safer 1158), Nr. 58, (Evail C 1157) to the Beglerbeyi of Cezairi -i Gharb) 2

46

STUDIES

ON

OITOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

As we have already noted, another original feature of the treaties and conventions of this period is the provisions thereby made for (a) securing borders, (b) preventing mutual raids and banditry, and (c) returning those criminals and rebels who sought to take refuge in each other's territory. We find these three themes reiterated in two firmans

of 1755 and 1769 addressed to

the governor of Bosnia, and one of January 1768 to the governor of Belgrad 1 ; this implies that border security and tranquillity was still only imperfectly achieved in T r a n s y l v a n i a and T r a n s d a n u b i a . A large collection of the documents in the Ottoman archives ( M a l i y e d e n Mudevver Defterler) includes a further convention, concerning the above mentioned situation of Bosnia and Durazzo, saying " . . . t h o u g h a treaty between the Ottoman-Porte and the Habsburg Empire has been signed, the merchants around the frontiers of Bosnia and Durazzo, are still not able to travel under secure conditions", devlet-i aliyye-yi

Osmaniye

He Qesariyye

mevcud oldugu halde, Bosna hududunda temin

edilmemi§

kilinmamis

ve tarafeyn

oldugundan

devleti arasinda

dostluk

muahadesi

ve Drag cihetinde emniyet ve asayi§in

tiiccarinin

selamet-i

murur

ve uburu

ifa

j i k d y e t l e . . . This convention was signed between

Ottoman authorities, namely Ahmed and ibrahim and dragoman O s m a n efendis, the vizir of Belgrad Serasker Kibti Ali pa§a and on the other part the commander of Tameshwar Veskid (?) in order to restore the maintenance and order within these areas 2 , in Ihe year of 1708-1709 (1120). This convention of 1708 and above-mentioned firmans

of 1755 and 1769 indicate to us the

continuous disorder and insecurity in these provinces. On the other hand, a firman

of 1760 (1174), drawn up at the request of the Austrian ambassador,

reminded the voivodas of Wallachia and Bessarabia that in accordance with the peace treaty an amnesty had been granted to boyars and commoners previously rebellious against the Ottomans; they should therefore be allowed to return to their l a n d s 3 . But all these measures notwithstanding, with the onset of national revivals guerilla warfare had entered a colourful period in the Balkans, even while the eighteenth century peace could hardly cope with the entire heritage of past wars all at once. Hence, for more than twenty years Istanbul had to keep sending countless firmans

to all corners of Rumelia and Anatolia

ordering captives to be released in exchange for moderate ransoms.

l

Ibid„ Nr. 5 8 (Evasit-i C, 1168) to Bosnia. Nr. 66 (Evail-i §aban, 1181) to Beograd p. 212 Nr. 66 (Evasit-i Ramadan, 1182) to Bosnia pp. 232-34. 2 B a § b . Ar§. Maliyeden Miidevver Nr. 4997, p. 92 (15 R 1122/June 1710) Mukaleme muhaberati mektub suretidir. ^Ibid., Nr. 60 p. 75

(Evasit-i Z. 1174) to the voivodas of Wallachia and Bessarabia.

OTTOMAN-HABSBURG

RELATIONS

1740-1 770

47

V One characteristic of eighteenth century Ottoman-Habsburg trade was that it no longer encompassed only luxury goods but gradually came to include manufactures, semi-manufactures and raw materials as well. In these, Balkan merchants who were Ottoman subjects secured the cooperation of Austrian customs officials and Austrian merchants that of Ottoman customs officials to carry on an illicit traffic, either paying less than the normal duties or engaging in direct smuggling 1 . The silk and cotton, either raw or in yarn form, demanded by Austrian industries were in large part supplied by Ottoman territories; the same was true of mohair. Around the middle of the century, Austrian manufactures began to flow through Venice to Egypt and other Ottoman markets. Austria was also the chief buyer and treater of Balkan tobacco, while Viennese and Bohemian chinaware for a long while remained unrivalled in the Turkish Empire. Products of other Germanic countries also came in over Austria and the Danube, with Slavic merchants of the Balkans serving as middlemen 2 . Once more provincial governors and kadis from Rumelia to Syria had to be warned time and again not to hinder merchants' free passage or to extract illegal payments from them, and the existence of numerous such firmans would seem to indicate that these abuses were in fact quite common. The official ruling was that 'Nem^e' traders (Nemgeli tiiccar) should pay a customs duty of 3 % once only; no doubt, Ottoman merchants operating on Habsburg territory were subject to the same status. It was hard to get Turkish governors and other provincial administrators to forego their accustomed revenues from the internal tolls; firmans announce that no other fee should be demanded of miistamen (coming in from the 'Dariilharb' under the grace of the Sultan) merchants and their servants who may come and go as they please by land, sea or river (bahren, berrcn ve nehren), but local authorities did persist in trying to impose multiple duties, and sometimes even claimed that miistamen merchants should pay the polltax, cizye, (for which religious law actually made only non-moslem subjects of the Sultan liable), such malpractices being most flagrant in the Danubian principalities and especially at the hands of the voivodas of Wallachia. Hence the firman ordering the kadi of Yerkoy to refrain from collecting cizye from miistamen merchants, and that ordering the kadi of Aleppo to prevent the local customs official (giimruk emini) from imposing

1 Ibid., Nr. 58 (Evasit-i CA, 1155) and (Evail-i C, 1155) Firmans to Rumelia and Hüdavendigar livasi; 20 years later, to Karaman (Evasit-i CA, 1176). 2 F . Tremel, Wirtschaft und Sozialgeschichte Österreichs, Graz 1969, pp. 270-71; H. Halm, Habsburgischer Osthandel im 18. Jahrhundert, München 1954, p. 177, V. Paskaleva, "Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der bulgarischen Gebiete mit Mitteleuropa im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert", Wirtschaftswege: Hermann Kellenbenz Festschrift, Klett-Cotta 1978, p. 169.

48

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

on the gold earned by the same a second duty of 3 % ' . Faced with such violations, foreign traders usually called on their a m b a s s a d o r who then obtained for them passes of safe-conduct {gegq tezkiresi) and special guarantees (berat) of security. Names of foreign merchants that occur in the registers of complaints and decisions ( A h k a m ve §ikdyet defterleri) indicate that among the subjects of the Queen of the Magyars and the Czechs (or later, of the Roman Emperor) who c a m e to Ottoman territory to trade, Czech, Hungarian or G e r m a n merchants were not yet common; Serbians, Croatians or Bulgarians were in the majority. These Habsburg subjects were mostly those who had emigrated f r o m the Ottoman Empire in the first place, who t h e r e f o r e had good connections there and were familiar with its ways and customs. Those who operated in the eastern Mediterranean and Syria, on the other hand, were generally Italians from Tuscany and Genoa who had already settled and were doing business there when they came under Viennese sovereignty. T o come back to Slavic merchants in Transylvania, they probably got wealthier and wealthier with time, and a few Bulgarians and Armenians among them even bought their way into the nobility during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 2 , and some at least of their successors after receiving a protestant, secular education, would become harbingers of Slav nationalism in the future. A m o n g the many tricks invented by merchants to evade customs, bribery, packing more than the declared amount, or smuggling in/out contraband material together with legal goods ranked high. Habsburg imports f r o m the Ottoman Empire came to include even f o o d s t u f f s towards the end of the century; this new demand led to capital accumulation and the rise of large farms (gifiliks) in Rumelia. T o the increased commercial traffic in agricultural products, the food oils 'exported' in 1800-1801 (1215) by only three towns in Romania (Kalas, Ibrail, Ismail) bears eloquent testimony. These districts were basically responsible for supplying Istanbul, but only one-third of their deliveries actually reached the capital. In a typical month of 1800, f o r example, although 107,074 qantars of sunflower oil and animal fat went out f r o m these three cities in just one week, only one-third of this shipment arrived at the Galata customs''. It seems quite clear where all the rest went. In two months of 1783, on the other hand, the cotton, raw silk and sahtiyan (polished leather) that was exported to Austria through the Belgrade Pass was valued at 12,000 kuru§, but of course this was only the legally registered amount, and it is no coincidence that in Anatolia as well as in Rumelia and along the Danube many towns became rich through silk and leather production in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

x Nemse Ahkäm Defleri Nr. 60, p. 62 (Evail-i Zilhicce, 1173, and 1181 Evasit-i CA) p. 206 firman to Aleppo (Evahir RA, 1177). 2 Zs. Trocsanyi, "Das Schicksal der geadelten bulgarischen Familien in Siebenbürgen im 18-19. Jh." Bulgarian Historical Review 1981/1-2, pp. 125-134. 3 Ba§b. Ar§. - Kepeci tasnifi - Nr. 814 (1215 of H) and Nr. 789 (1198 of H)

OTTOMAN-HABSBURG

RELATIONS

1740- 1 770

49

By this time, Habsburg trade had spread over the entire area from Syria and Lebanon to Baghdad and Basra, as evidenced by the existence in circulation of the Maria Theresian thaler along the entire coast of the Gulf until recent times. An Imperial Charter (berat) orders that one Martino Masterelli be allowed free 1 , unmolested passage all the way from Aleppo to Baghdad and Basra 2 . This also confirms by the way what we have said above concerning activities of Italian merchants already settled in the Levant and now under Habsburg flag.

VI Early in the reign of Maria Theresia, Habsburg consular services in the eastern Mediterranean used to be delegated to consuls of other European states already established in the region 3 . In 1741 the vice-consulate of Aleppo, for example, was left in the care of the British consul there, and that of Paleopatras ( B a l y e b a d r e ) in the Morea was entrusted to the local Dutch representative. Elsewhere, notably in Egypt, Tuscan and Livornian merchants who were Austrian subjects were given consular power; thus, at one point, Giovanni Aitone of Alikorno (Livorno) was ordered to replace Gianni Francesco Marbone of Tuscany as the Habsburg consul in Alexandria. The Sublime Porte, on the other hand, did not officially appoint consuls to serve in Austrian territory: it was left to Ottoman merchants (of Slavic descent), operating there to elect one of themselves to serve in this capacity 4 . Under Maria Theresia, Austrian ambassadors and consuls generally employed local Christians and Jews as interpreters; when his first interpreter Jacob son of Karabet died, for example, the ambassador Baron Nepker, obtained permission to replace him with one Jacob Franz (son of Isaac Franz) who was a Jew of Salonica. These interpreters did not formally enjoy diplomatic immunity, but Austrian officials frequently attempted to extend their own legal privileges to try to cover the natives in their service also. A case in point is that of Argiropulo, the dragoman of the Habsburg consul in Salonica, who borrowed a certain sum from Haci Ianni in 1765 (1179). When the creditor then died, his widow was unable to make Argiropulo pay 5 , and the local authorities having

Kraligeye tabi Tuskana reayasi tuccarlarindan Martino Mesterelli'nin Haleb'den Bagdad ve Basraya varin'a vaki kadi ve naiblere tenbih edilerek; cizye, gumrtik bac gibi bahanelerle ahidnameye mugair zulmedilmemesi.. 2

Nemge Ahkam., Nr. 60 (Evahir-CA, 1169) to the vizir of Baghdad and Basra, Nr. 58 (Evail-i Receb, 1167) Nr. 60 (Evahir-i RA, 1177) to the kadi of Aleppo; "Iakob Velozef Pinyero nam Tuskana tiiccarindan Nem^elulardan usulsiiz gumrtik alindigi...." 3 Ibid. Nr. 60 (Evahir-i Safer, 1161) and (Evahir-i C, 1161) appointment of vice-consul to Aleppo and Paleopatras... ^T. Stoianovich "The conquering Balkan-orthodox merchants "Journ. ofEcon. Hist. 1960 (20/2) pp. 243-313. Nemge Ahkam, Nr. 60 (Evail-I Shavval, 1179) to the qadi of Saloniki.

50

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

been rendered powerless or unwilling to act as a result of the dragoman's claim of immunity, the Porte had to interfere and order the governor-pa§a (mutasarrif) and the kadi of Salonica to collect the loan from Argiropulo. Privileges and numbers of interpreters {dragomans) nevertheless continued to be abused by European diplomats throughout the eighteenth century. Transferred to miistemen status, these dragomans were exempted from certain taxes and services, and this motivated many merchants to bribe their ambassadors and consuls to have themselves registered as dragomans, thus swelling the ranks of the latter considerably 1 . Here the Habsburg Empire constitutes something of an exception in that its distrust of the Levantines and the non-Muslim Ottomans compelled it to train its own interpreters and achieve considerable success in this field, compared with, say Great Britain. The Academy of Oriental Languages founded in Vienna quickly supplied the Habsburgs not only with skilled interpreters but also some excellent Orientalists, enabling the Austrian Chancellery to post competent representatives in Egypt and other Ottoman lands capable of thoroughly familiarizing themselves with their surroundings to obtain important information; until World War I, the most extensive and successful consular network on Turkish soil belonged to the Habsburg monarchy. After the Treaty of Passarovvitz, Austrian representatives as well as those of other European states obtained full diplomatic immunities and exemptions in the Ottoman Empire. This immunity and exemption included consuls as well. Up to the Congress of Vienna (1815), the outlines of the system of diplomatic exemptions were as follows: the ambassador, f o r example, would be allowed to procure considerable amounts of meat, grain and vegetables from the region around Istanbul (extending as far as Filibe/Plovdiv) without paying any tolls or taxes. Thus a firman of October 1744 (§aban I. 1154) ordered the Janissary commander (aga) Hasan Pa§a and the Bostanciba^i to remind the voivoda of Galata also that no duties should be collected from Ambassador Nepker for the extensive purchases of grain, livestock, pigs and wine that he was making at the time 2 . The ambassadorial residence also benefited from a certain immunity, but permission was required for both the initial construction and later extension work. Despite their better training in Oriental languages and history, however, Habsburg diplomats were certainly lacking in general efficiency compared with their French, English and Dutch colleagues. Certain buildings including the houses of priests belonging to the church and colony in Galata which the

' c . O r h o n l u , " T e r c u m a n " islam Ans. pp. 177-181. A.Ì. Bagi§, Osmanli Gayrimuslimler, Ankara 1983, pp. 19. 26-28. 2

Nem(e

Ahk&m, Nr. 58 (§aban 1154 and Evahir-i CA, 1156).

Ticaretinde

OTTOMAN-HABSBURG

RELATIONS

1740-1 770

51

Ottoman chancellery registered as Padertrinite were burned down in December 1768 (I CA 1176) 1 . The ambassador applied for permission for repairs only in early May. What a hard winter it must have been for the poor clergymen! Such bureaucratic lethargy was peculiar to the Austrian foreign service whose degree of activity at the time can hardly be compared with that of its French counterpart. Treaties clearly permitted, for example, clerics to provide religious services for Habsburg subjects in the Ottoman Empire. There were complaints that the Franciscan monks in Chios were prevented from giving Mass to miistemen merchants visiting the island by the local Ottoman muhassil and kadis. The real reason, however, was probably that these monks clumsily engaged in religious propaganda vis-à-vis the natives beyond the services for their own co-religious nationals defined in the treaty, thus enraging the GreekOrthodox population While Catholic missionaries under French protection operated smoothly, the Austrian ones ran into trouble at every turn. A firman of February 1744 (1157) drew the attention of Ottoman authorities in Chios to the fact that in accordance with a treaty of 1095 (1649) and a previous imperial firman of 1718 (1131) Christian clergymen could serve travellers and consuls of their own nationality 2 , but the situation probably did not improve because six months later new firmans, had to be sent to Chios reiterating the same theme. With the success achieved by the French in spreading Catholicism in the East ever since the era of Colbert, the efforts made and results obtained in the same respect by the ambassadors and consuls of Her Apostolic Majesty stand poorly in comparison.

X

lbid, Nr. 60 (Evail-i CA, 1176) to the kadi of Galata (Evail-i Muh., 1182). Ibid, Nr. 58 (Evasit-i Muh. 1157) and (Evail-i CA, 1157) to the naib and muhassil of Chios.

2

LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE DES MISSIONS ÉTRANGÈRES À GALATA

Péra, qui fut successivement une colonie de la Méditerranée occidentale dans la capitale de l'Empire byzantin et une colonie de l'Europe occidentale dans la capitale de l'Empire ottoman, combinait en son sein les us et coutumes, les couleurs de l'Orient et de l'Occident (ou plutôt, l'Europe occidentale y devenait orientale), et présentait une structure politicoéconomique et un mode de vie quotidienne dont les caractéristiques rappelaient ce que furent jusqu'à une certaine époque Caffa (en Crimée) et Sloboda (à Moscou). Péra (ou Galata) qui est actuellement une zone de taudis et un centre d'affaires secondaire de la ville d'Istanbul, et dont la grande majorité des habitants est originaire de l'Anatolie orientale, a été une source d'inspiration de la littérature turque contemporaine. Mais si le quartier de Péra au XIX e et au début du X X e siècles suscite la nostalgie, on évoque fort peu la réalité folklorique et historique de ce quartier : le Péra dont on parle est plutôt imaginaire. Quant aux études scientifiques sur Péra, elles sont, pour le moins, insuffisantes. Pendant des siècles Péra prolongea la Renaissance italienne dans la partie orientale de la Méditerranée. Aux XVII e et XVIII e siècles Péra fut le centre du réseau commercial et diplomatique français dans cette région et un grand nombre de diplomates, d'ecclésiastiques, de commerçants y vécurent, d'une manière par ailleurs fort intéressante. À Péra la population "autochtone", qu'elle fût musulmane ou non, partageait une culture commune, s'opposant ainsi aux "étrangers", autrement dit, aux Européens. Aux XVII e et XVIII e siècles, en Méditerranée orientale existaient de nombreuses institutions culturelles, religieuses, commerciales appartenant aux Français ; elles furent très efficaces. À tel point que des problèmes tels l'héritage d'un commerçant français à Ankara, le cas de deux Juifs portugais faisant commerce avec un navire battant pavillon français, ou encore la construction de couvents et de maisons pour les Jésuites d'Erzurum et d'autres problèmes de ce genre occupaient tous les bureaux de l'administration ottomane. Les décisions des tribunaux, les archives des provinces, les registres des kadi, les cahiers des ordonnances et conventions concernant la France (.Françe Ahkâm ve Ahidname defterleri) aux Archives de Bab-i Âli ainsi que d'autres documents encore, sont remplis d'exemples de cet ordre.

54

STUDIES

ON

OIT O MAN

TRANSFORMATION

II est évident que Péra n'a pas connu l'Europe par l'intermédiaire de la France. Ce sont les Italiens qui l'ont "européanisé". Péra, appartenait avant tout à Gênes, qui y maintenait une colonie avant l'époque ottomane. Autrefois, aux temps des Byzantins, Gênes désignait pour une durée d'une année un Podestas Januensium in Imperio Romane pour Péra, qui avait à ses côtés, un Uffizio. La zecchina génoise circulait partout sous les O t t o m a n s . Des dynasties de commerçants célèbres c o m m e les Adorno, Campofregoso, Doria, Botteghe, Ocase... vivaient à Péra depuis plusieurs siècles. 1 La Magnifica Communita di Peyra (dont faisaient aussi partie des ressortissants de Pise et de Venise) jouissait d'un statut semi-indépendent. Le cantaro Genoese constituait la mesure commune de poids utilisée dans les marchés de Galata. Les palais du Podestà Genoa et du Bailo Venezia étaient les plus beaux de Péra. 2 Les mots italiens prédominaient dans l'argot cosmopolite de Péra. L'Italie vivait à Péra avec ses églises, ses missions cléricales. Elle surveillait l'Orient depuis Péra. Les Italiens établis dans l'Empire o t t o m a n f u r e n t la meilleure source d'information de la diplomatie européenne. La France est le premier pays ayant renoncé à se servir de l'Italie dans ce but. Jusqu'au X V I I I e siècle, c'est-à-dire j u s q u ' à l'adhésion de l'Empire ottoman au système du droit international laïque dont les principes avaient été définis c o n f o r m é m e n t aux traités de Westphalie, la vie quotidienne des missions étrangères de Galata était une question très importante. Le système de protocole des différentes missions étrangères et les luttes de préséance sont aussi intéressants que les rapports entre les diplomates étrangers et la Sublime Porte. Pour ne citer qu'un exemple, rappelons le conflit qui opposa Jacques Savary, Seigneur de Lancosmes, ambassadeur de France à Istanbul en 1587, au Docteur Bartholemeus P e z / e n qui f u t a m b a s s a d e u r de l'Empire germanoautrichien à Istanbul pendant la m ê m e p é r i o d e . 3 Représentant du Rex Christianissimus, du Roi Très-Chrétien, L a n c o s m e s n'était guère décidé à abandonner la prépondérance à son homologue autrichien: une lutte féroce s'engagea entre les deux hommes. À l'époque, San Francesco était l'église (catholique) la plus influente de Péra. Elle avait été f o n d é e par des ecclésiastiques italiens, c o m m e d'ailleurs San Giovanni del Ospedale, Santa Anna, Santa Maria della Misericordia, San Bastiani, San Pietro... D'après le Hadikat-iil Cevami, œuvre du chroniqueur ottoman, Hüseyin bin ismail Ayvansarayî, après l'incendie de 1697 une mosquée (Yeni Carni) fut construite à la place de cette église. Quant à Alphonse Belin, célèbre historien de Péra, il

' G e o Pistarino, " L a caduta di Constantinopoli: da Pera Genovese a Galata Turca", in La Storia dei Genovesi, vol. V, 1984, pp. " 7 -47. Louis Mitler, " T h e G e n o e s e in Galata 1453-1682", IJMES, 10 (1979) pp. 71-91. 2 T . Bertelè, Il Palazzo degli Ambasciatori di Venezia a Constantinopoli, 1931, pp. 40, 328. Köhbach, "Ein diplomatischer Rangstreit in Istanbul im Jahre 1587", Mitteilungen Staatsarchivs, 1983/86, pp. 261-268.

des

Ost.

LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE DES MISSIONS ÉTRANGÈRES À CALATA

55

prétend qu'elle f u t confisquée en 1697 pour être transformée en mosquée. 1 Il est difficile de savoir la vérité; toujours est-il que cette église gênait beaucoup l'administration ottomane. D'autant plus qu'elle avait été témoin d'une querelle scandaleuse entre les deux ambassadeurs dont nous avons déjà parlé. La querelle de hiérarchie protocolaire, remise à jour par le Dr. M . Kôhbach à travers les d o c u m e n t s des archives a u t r i c h i e n n e s , qui se déroula entre l ' e n v o y é plénipotentiaire des Habsbourgs et son homologue français, et digne d'intérêt de ce fait, 2 est relatée comme suit : l'Autrichien, Dr Pezzen, prétextant qu'il représentait l'Empereur romain, envoya ses serviteurs à l'église afin de faire dresser un baldaquin pour la messe du dimanche. Lancosmes affirmait que ni lui ni la Sublime Porte ne reconnaissaient son seigneur c o m m e Empereur, déclarant ainsi sa supériorité en tant qu'ambassadeur de France. Dès qu'il fut averti de la m a n œ u v r e de Pezzen, il fit détruire le baldaquin de l'autel. Le dimanche suivant il prit place dans l'église de très bonne heure, avec ses gardes, et se mit à attendre son rival. Apprenant l'occupation théâtrale de l'église, la population de Galata, formée de Juifs, de Grecs, d'Arméniens et de M u s u l m a n s , tous réunis devant l'église, s'apprêtait à assister au spectacle. Lorsqu'il f u t prévenu, Pezzen décida de se rendre plutôt à la chapelle de l'ambassade. Mais, par la suite, il déposa une plainte auprès du grand vizir contre son homologue (qu'il qualifiait d'insolent, voire de fou à lier). Dans une lettre datée de ramadan 995 qu'il adressa à l'Empereur qui se trouvait à Vienne, le grand vizir Siyavu§ Pa§a laisse apparaître son mécontentement devant les agissements de l'ambassadeur de France : "en agissant c o m m e un f o u , cela aurait été catastrophique : mais fort heureusement, il s'était comporté c o m m e un h o m m e sage et intelligent (haliyen gelen ilçiniz dahi—yUzii ak olsun— uslu ve akilli olmagla Françe ilçisine uymadi, eger uyup Françe ilçisi gibi divanelik ide idii, eyii olmazdi...)". Dix jours plus tard, lorsque le Dr Pezzen décida de retourner à l'église, l a n c o s m e s s'y précipita avec ses gardes avant lui. Mais sur les ordres du Voivode de Galata les portes de l'église avaient été fermées. Entendant les psaumes en latin des pères franciscains, Lancosmes se mit à donner des coups de pied et de poing aux portes, tout en hurlant qu'il fallait laisser entrer l'ambassadeur du Roi Très-Chrétien. La population de Galata assistait au scandale et s'amusait. L'on constate que cette querelle n'est pas mentionnée par Lancomes ni dans ses rapports, ni dans ses mémoires. 3 Dans les archives françaises nous n'avons pas trouvé nous non plus les versions f r a n ç a i s e s des d o c u m e n t s autrichiens relatés par M. Kôhbach. A p p a r e m m e n t c'est à la suite de cet é v é n e m e n t q u e l'église aurait été désaffectée. Les sollicitations du baile vénitien, qui f u t empêché de se rendre à l'église à cause de l'absurdité de ses homologues, n'avaient pas abouti. Les ambassadeurs étaient tenus de se conformer aux principes et aux lois de la Sublime Porte et du lieu.

' a . Belin, Histoire de la Latinité de Constantinople, Paris 1894, pp. 187-212. ^Kôhbach, art. cit., pp. 262-263. 3 AMAE de Paris, C.P., Turquie, vol. 2, pp. 10.

56

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

Les cérémonies religieuses où l'on jouait de l'orgue étaient un spectacle populaire et il arrivait que les gardes chargés de la protection de l'église soient obligés de dissuader des groupes de janissaires ivres qui voulaient s'y introduire afin d'écouter cette musique curieuse. On raconte même que Soliman le Magnifique aurait ordonné la célébration d'une messe et s'y serait bien amusé.' Nous ignorons jusqu'à quel point les résidences des ambassadeurs bénéficiaient d'une inviolabilité et s'ils y étaient vraiment à l'aise. Rappelons toutefois que l'ambassadeur de la reine Elizabeth I e r e à Istanbul, Edward Barton, qui avait loué une maison à Tophane et y organisait des orgies où des gens indécents faisaient du tapage, fut expulsé du quartier. 2 Pour protester contre ce mode de vie scandaleux, les habitants du quartier avaient en effet assailli la résidence de ce personnage dont ils s'étaient plaints auprès de la Sublime Porte. Un autre exemple que nous tenons à évoquer est celui du baile vénitien soupçonné d'espionnage, et qui fut empêché de se rendre dans son palais: il fut emprisonné à Çanakkale. Il fallut que l'ambassadeur de France intervienne pour qu'il puisse enfin retourner en Italie, au bout d'un an. Quant à son interprète, 3 il fut exécuté en août 1715. Disons un mot de ces interprètes. Ils étaient choisis parmi les Chrétiens et les Juifs "autochtones". La majorité d'entre eux faisait ce métier sans parler une langue étrangère et aussi bien l'administration ottomane que les ambassadeurs en étaient fort mécontents. A la fin du XVIII e siècle, ils furent remplacés par des drogmans européens formés au Lycée Saint-Louis ou au Theresianum (Vienne). Autrement dit par les futurs orientalistes européens de Péra, réputés pour leur curiosité et leur manie de s'introduire partout. Suite aux traités de Karlowitz et de Passarovvitz, l'Empire ottoman dut octroyer des privilèges et des exemptions aux ambassades et aux chancelleries. Les Européens n'avaient plus le statut harbfou miïsta'men, mais étaient considérés comme des étrangers (Français, Hollandais etc). Il serait cependant erroné de croire que les bureaucrates ottomans s'adaptèrent aussitôt au nouveau système ; bien au contraire, ils persistèrent dans une tradition byzantinoottomane. À tel point que, malgré les ordonnances (firmans) du Bab-i Âli et du Palais, ils continuaient à réclamer des droits de douane, à exiger le paiement de la capitation (cizye), à ne point respecter la liberté des religieux en matière de culte, de construction d'églises etc, si l'on en juge par le nombre de plaintes déposées par les consuls et les ambassadeurs européens. Les diplomates du XVIII e siècle ne sont donc plus de simples représentants de leur roi ou des

' l . Mitler, art. cit., p. 86; Luigi B u s s a n o , Costumi e i modi particulari della vita dei Turchi, MUnich 1963, p. 7 2 . 2 H a m i t Dereli, Kralle Elizabeth devrinde Türkler ve Ingilizler, Istanbul 1951, pp. 104-105. 3 M . K ö h b a c h " D a s S c h i c k s a l V e n e z i a n i s c h e r B o t s c h a f t s a n g e h ö r i g e r u n d Partei g a e n g e r im L e t z t e n V e n e z i a n i s c h - T ü r k i s c h e n K r i e g " , Müncher Zeitschrift ßr Balkankunde, vol. 2, 1979 p. 121-126.

LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE DES MISSIONS ÉTRANGÈRES À GALATA

57

fonctionnaires chargés de la protection du corps ecclésiastique : ils défendent avant tout les intérêts commerciaux de leur pays et ceux de leurs commerçants. Quant aux bureaucrates ottomans, ils essaient de se conformer, tant bien que mal, au nouveau type de rapports avec les étrangers. Le ravitaillement des missions étrangères était un problème important. Il fallait leur procurer des légumes, des céréales, et surtout du vin et de la viande de porc, en quantités suffisantes ; d'après les accords passés, elles devaient pouvoir s'approvisionner en vivres aux alentours d'Istanbul. Le corps diplomatique et les missions ecclésiastiques pouvaient s'adresser aux artisans et aux petits commerçants de Galata qui assuraient un commerce de détail mais cela leur revenait cher. Surtout que les ambassades étaient obligées de nourrir tout leur personnel. Selon les ententes, ces corps bénéficiaient d'exonérations de taxes, et, entre autres, de celle de l'octroi, sur la viande de porc et le vin achetés aux alentours d'Istanbul. C e p e n d a n t , les f o n c t i o n n a i r e s et les responsables ottomans continuaient à taxer ces produits illégalement. Le suba§i de Kapidagi était même allé une fois jusqu'à confisquer le vin et les nourritures qui venaient d'être achetés par une ambassade. C o m m e les missions étrangères déposaient régulièrement des plaintes, les fonctionnaires et les responsables locaux recevaient continuellement des avertissements à ce sujet.' Lorsque des ecclésiastiques français ouvrirent une boulangerie pour répondre aux besoins de la communauté française en pain et en galettes, les boulangers de Péra s'en plaignirent auprès de la Sublime Porte, essayant par ailleurs d'empêcher son fonctionnement, de peur qu'elle n'empiète sur leur clientèle. 2 Il faut croire que les activités économiques des commerçants, des ordres religieux et des dignitaires des ambassades étrangères suscitaient le mécontentement de tous les sujets ottomans, quelle que fût leur religion. Il arrivait fréquemment que les fonctionnaires réclament des étrangers la capitation ( c i z y e ) , que les kadi se mêlent des procès des commerçants qui étaient pourtant désormais du ressort des ambassadeurs, que les commerçants aient à s'affronter aux clients "autochtones" insolvables, qu'on réclame d'eux, contrairement aux ententes, une douane intérieure, alors qu'ils n'étaient tenus de payer qu'une douane extérieure (dont le montant était de 3%) à l'entrée du pays. 3 Les grands dignitaires des ambassades étaient constamment confrontés à ce genre de problèmes. C'étaient avant tout les Chrétiens de l'Empire ottoman qui s ' o p p o s a i e n t aux a c t i v i t é s r e l i g i e u s e s des p r ê t r e s c a t h o l i q u e s . Les Arméniens grégoriens et la Sainte Église orthodoxe supportaient mal les

f Ba§b. Ar§. Nemge Ahkàm defterleri, n" 58, ¡aban 1154 et cumadal ula l\56, Frange no. 28/3, p. 33 etc. ^Frange Ahkàm defteri, n° 28/3 fi evail-i 1103. 3 Nemge Ahkàm defieri, n° 60, p. 62 (Evail-i Z. 1173 et p. 206 Evail-i CaA 1181).

Ahkàm,

58

S T U D I E S ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

propagandes de ces hérétiques latins, et tout c o m m e les M u s u l m a n s , ils n'appréciaient guère les cérémonies religieuses bizarres (!) des étrangers à Galata. Il serait intéressant d'évoquer ici un décret (emirname) adressé au kadi de Galata en 1702 afin d'empêcher les ingérences des populations autochtones et des fonctionnaires dans les affaires des missions étrangères. 1 L'influence catholique avait du mal à pénétrer Péra, quartier où l'ivrognerie et la prostitution battaient leur plein. Il était impossible de célébrer publiquement des processions. De même, on n'éprouvait aucune sympathie à l'égard des c o m m e r ç a n t s étrangers. Ils avaient eux aussi des problèmes de logement. D'autre part, ils étaient toujours en conflit avec les corps de métiers locaux, les corporations d'artisans "autochtones". L'ambassadeur de France, le marquis Desalleurs ajoutait, à son rapport adressé à Paris le 17 mai 1711 2 , la traduction d'un firman du Sultan dont il était très satisfait : les commerçants français avaient loué des maisons aux alentours de la Mosquée Arabe (Arab camii) à Galata, en payant leur loyer d'avance. Malgré cela, les propriétaires, m u s u l m a n s , de concert entre eux, obtinrent un arrêt du Tribunal du kadi selon lequel des Chrétiens ne pouvaient pas vivre dans un quartier musulman. Ils en ont été donc expulsés. Mais sur l'intervention de l'ambassadeur le Sultan a ordonné au kadi d'arranger cette fâcheuse situation. Les missions étrangères possédaient des palais avec de beaux jardins, donnant sur la mer de Marmara : il s'agissait en effet de vrais palais tels le Palazzo Venezia, et le Palais de France. Au XVIII e siècle les résidences des a m b a s s a d e u r s b é n é f i c i a i e n t , c o m m e partout ailleurs, d'une i m m u n i t é (d'inviolabilité). En dehors des visites qu'ils se rendaient, les hauts dignitaires des ambassades collectionnaient toutes sortes d'objets d'art, de livres anciens et d'autres antiquités. Dans leurs mémoires, ils se vantent (presque tous) de leurs talents d'acquéreurs. Ils attiraient ainsi une masse de commerçants et autres personnes qui leur proposaient des pièces de valeur ; les bibliothèques européennes s'enrichissaient. C e p e n d a n t la vie m o u v e m e n t é e et t u m u l t u e u s e des E u r o p é e n s s'interrompait à la moindre rumeur de peste. En effet, les étrangers vivant à Péra craignaient cette maladie au point de s'enfermer chez eux dès qu'un cas douteux se présentait. Olivier décrit fort habilement cette peur qui mettait provisoirement un terme à la vie sociale des étrangers. 3 Outre leur talent de collectionneurs, les dignitaires des ambassades organisaient fréquemment des bals et des réceptions, où tout se passait a p p a r e m m e n t entre eux : les dirigeants ottomans n'appréciaient guère que ces Messieurs imposants et pompeux sautent et dansent avec des dames.

{

Françe Ahkâm defteri, n° 8/3, fi 1099 Ca et fi C 1099, p. 5.

^•AMAE de Paris, C.P., Turquie, vol. 51, pp. 25-26, marquis Desalleurs, 11 fevrier 1711. ^Olivier, Turkiye Seyahatnamesi,

trad. Oguz Gôkmen, Ankara 1977, pp. 117-126.

LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE DES MISSIONS ÉTRANGÈRES À GALATA

59

Ajoutons un dernier point. Le corps ecclésiastique avait des difficultés à obtenir des permis, aussi bien pour la réparation que l'agrandissement, le réaménagement et la rénovation des habitations ou des églises. Cette difficulté concernait aussi les autres groupes européens, et il fallait avant tout que l'ambassadeur s'adresse à la Sublime Porte. Lorsqu'en décembre 1768 l'église autrichienne Pater Trinité fut détruite à la suite d'un incendie, l'ambassadeur ne put obtenir le permis de construction qu'au mois de mai 1769 1 . En attendant, les malheureux pères passèrent l'hiver sans abri. Rappelons toutefois que les bureaucrates français et hollandais du XVIII e siècle étaient plus à même de résoudre ce genre de problème que leurs homologues autrichiens.

l

Nemçe Ahkâm defieri, n" 60, CA I, 1176.

UNE PROCLAMATION UNIVERSELLE DU KHANAT DE CRIMÉE DE JANVIER 1711

La guerre et la paix de Prut, en 1711, n'ont pas entraîné de modification importante de l'équilibre des forces entre la Russie et l'Empire Ottoman ; — plus justement, la paix de Prut a offert une occasion de compenser les pertes subies par l'Empire Ottoman au profit de la Russie lors de la paix de Carlowitz. Pourtant, la paix de Prut reste un événement qui représente un tournant important sur l'échiquier politique européen et l'équilibre des forces en Europe, et détermine la diplomatie à venir. À Prut le bloc constitué de la Suède et de l'Empire Ottoman, de la Pologne, et de l'allié naturel de cette alliance, la France, enregistre des reculs en Europe orientale au profit des Habsburg et de la Russie. En particulier, après la paix, l'influence et la force du khanat de Crimée comme celles de la Pologne commencent à reculer. De ses réactions, on comprend que le khanat de Crimée était au fait de ces développements historiques, et on le voit partisan d'une politique anti-russe plus radicale que celle préconisée par la Porte : dans un avenir proche, on le verra suivre dans ce domaine une politique différente de celle de la Porte. La géographie politique de l'Europe orientale au XVIII e siècle se présente ainsi : l'émergence de la Russie comme force, la modernisation en cours de l'Autriche par les Habsbourg, l'affaiblissement de l'Empire Ottoman, le recul de la Pologne et de Venise. Ce tableau est valable pour les aspects militaires et diplomatiques, et il serait difficile d'en dire autan en ce qui concerne les aspects culturels et économiques. Au début du XVIII e siècle la question de la succession au trône de Pologne est devenue une question européenne. Les candidats au trône intéressaient de près le bloc Romanov-Habsburg d'une part, de l'autre la France, son allié Ottoman et en particulier le Khan de Crimée. Au XVIII e siècle, la plupart du temps on constate un soutien réciproque entre la Pologne et le khanat de Crimée, dirigé contre la Russie : volens nolens, cette politique rapproche le khanat de Crimée de la France. Dès 1707, Kaplan Giray n'hésitait pas à dire que la Crimée comprenait mieux la diplomatie française que la Sublime Porte, et que cette politique française constituait pour eux-mêmes une voie parfaite. 1

^G. Veinstein "Les Tatares de Crimée et la seconde élection de Stanislas Leszyzynski", Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique XI/i, 1970, p. 40.

62

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

De fait, les représentants dépêchés par l'ambassade de France à Istanbul, et les m i s s i o n n a i r e s j é s u i t e s e n v o y é s au k h a n a t c o n t r i b u a i e n t à c e t t e identification du Khan à la politique française. G. Veinstein a étudié en détails ces relations : elles sont le signe de l'existence d'un échange d i p l o m a t i q u e d'idées et d'informations entre les deux parties. 1 Le khanat de Crimée voyait la R u s s i e se d é v e l o p p e r en Europe orientale, et avec le parti anti-russe en Pologne et les cosaques de Zaporozhie penchait pour une politique anti-russe plus subtile et plus active. Après la victoire de Pierre le Grand à Poltava, Charles XII s'était réfugié à Bender, en terre ottomane. Le basbug des cosaques qui l'accompagnait, le h e t m a n M a z e p a , m o u r u t à l ' a u t o m n e 1709, et Philippe Orlik f u t choisi c o m m e hetman à sa place. Il était évident qu'Orlik allait continuer la guerre et son alliance avec Charles XII. Un autre allié était aussi déterminé et appuyait la guerre avec la Russie : le khan de Crimée Devlet Giray. Aujourd'hui encore les connaissances dont nous disposons ne nous permettent pas de suivre les développements et le succès de la diplomatie et de la tactique politique suivies par Stanislas Poniatowski à Istanbul pour pousser l'Empire O t t o m a n à la guerre contre la Russie. Sur ce sujet H a m m e r et les historiens contemporains qui répètent ce qu'avait écrit Sumner dans ses recherches sur les relations entre la Russie et l'Empire Ottoman. En particulier il faut accueillir avec réserve des vues c o m m e celles qui mettent en avant le rôle influent de Poniatowski et du médecin juif du Palais Fonseca. 2 En novembre 1710 la déclaration de guerre à Pierre le Grand par A h m e d III apparaît avant tout c o m m e une victoire de Devlet Giray et de ses partisans. Pourtant le seul motif de la guerre n'est pas cette influence et cette pression. A p r è s Carlovviz la Porte est dans un état d'inquiétude e x t r ê m e face à l'alliance austro-russe. De fait, tout au long du X V I I I e siècle, l'existence de cette alliance c o n s t i t u a l'un des p r i n c i p a u x problèmes. À la veille de Prut c'est pour éviter le renouvellement de cette alliance que la guerre a été proclamée contre la Russie. Un autre facteur de cette déclaration a certainement été c o n s t i t u é par la politique de pénétration en M o l d a v i e de la Russie. D é j à en 1709 le g o s p o d o r e de M o l d a v i e M i c h e l R a k o v i t z avait été remplacé par le phanariote A l e x a n d r e M a v r o k o r d a t o . Quelques temps après, ce dernier f u t remplacé par le célèbre Dimitri Kantemir. La Porte n'était pas sûre de la Moldavie, et l'influence de la Russie dans cette région était l'une des raisons de la guerre. À la fin de 1710 l'unité delà politique m e n é e par le roi de Suède et le khan de C r i m é e se m a n i f e s t e c o n s t a m m e n t , et est illustrée lors de c h a q u e événement. Une fois la guerre déclarée, Devlet Giray Khan rentre d'Istanbul et arrive à Bender, où se trouvait Charles XII, le 10 décembre. Zinkeisen décrit ainsi son arrivée au c a m p :

' G . Veinstein "Missionaires jésuites et agents français en Crimée au début du X V I I I e siècle" Cahiers du Monde russe.. X/3-4, 1969, pp. 414-458. ^B. H. Summer, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Purgstall, Geschichte..., XIII, p. 21.'..

Empire.

O x f o r d 1949, voir aussi H a m m e r -

U N E P R O C L A M A T I O N DU K H A N A T D E C R I M É E

63

tous ceux qui se trouvaient là (les cosaques et les soldats suédois) se portèrent à la rencontre du grand Khan avec des manifestations et des transports d'affection interminables et l'accompagnèrent jusqu'en présence du roi. Devlet Giray Khan et Charles XII eurent alors un entretien secret qui dura quatre heures. Des plans pour le développement de la guerre furent élaborés et les mesures nécessaire arrêtées. Le lendemain le Grand Khan rentra sans tarder en Crimée pour pouvoir donner les ordres nécessaires à son armée (horde dans le texte). Tout au long de l'hiver on dressa 20.000 Tatares contre Moscou. Les Princes d'Empire (les princes de l'Empire allemand) et tous ceux qu'inquiétait le bloc franco-suédois s'étonnaient de ce déploiement. Les Allemands en particulier craignaient que Charles XII allait utiliser ces forces contre eux. Pourtant il est connu que le roi de Suède concentrait son action contre la seule Russie. 1 Le roi de Suède écrivit à Bender un manifeste le 28 janvier 1711. 2 Ce manifeste est en fait daté du même jour que la déclaration universelle du Khanat de Crimée qui constitue notre sujet. Le roi y parle de la nécessité de sauver la Pologne de l'influence moscovite, en écartant du trône Auguste, et en y remplaçant son détenteur véritable Stanislas. Il annonce que "dans ce but il s'est allié au Sultan et au Grand Khan". En fait il faut dire que bien plus que la Porte c'est Devlet Giray Khan qui suivait une politique en harmonie avec celles du roi de Suède. La Porte n'avait pas une position aussi radicale que le khan de Crimée quant au soutien à apporter à l'un des partis en Pologne ou chez les Cosaques. Avant la guerre de Pologne, dans le cadre des préparatifs pour renforcer la flotte de la mer d'Azov, le tsar Pierre fit une tournée d'inspection de février à mai 1709 à Varonezh, Azov, Taganrog, et impressionna les assistants avec une démonstration navale en ordre parfait sur la mer d'Azov. L'ambassadeur ottoman y était. La réponse du sultan face à cette démonstration de la flotte est intéressante. Il interdit à Devlet Giray Khan d'aider le hetmán Mazepa et les cosaques de Zaporozhie, et enjoignit au khan de ne pas trop se compromettre avec les plans de Charles XII. 3 On se rend bien compte que la Porte n'était pas disposée à suivre une politique anti-russe aussi radicale que celle de la Suède, de la France ou du Khanat. C'est pour cette raison que le Khan de Crimée voulait imposer sa politique en matière de guerre et la déclarer, aux Polonais et aux cosaques de Zaporozhie d'abord, et en fin de compte à l'Europe entière. On trouve peu de référence dans la littérature à cette déclaration du khan de Crimée datée du 28 janvier 1711 : seul A. N. Kurat parle d'une telle proclamation universelle, rédigée en langue polonaise et précise qu'il s'agit d'un document ' j . Wilhelm Zinkeisen, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa, Gotha, 1857, vol. 5, pp. 407-408. 2

Ibid„ pp. 408-409, Lamberty, Mémoires, T. VI, p. 434. ^Sumner, ibid., p.25.

64

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

manifestant des sentiments de loyauté à Stanislas, en tant q u e roi du peuple polonais et ukrainien, et au hetman Philippe Orlik. 1 Pourtant le fait que des copies imprimées du d o c u m e n t en latin et en allemand aient circulé doit être l'expression d ' u n e p o l i t i q u e de plus g r a n d e e n v e r g u r e . Il e x p l i q u e les f o n d e m e n t s de la politique du khanat de C r i m é e et p r o b a b l e m e n t manifeste ainsi qu'il n'a aucune intention contre le Reich. La proclamation a été faite à Bender au nom du Grand Khan Devlet Giray par son fils M e h m e d Giray Khan. ( Universelle Benderam,

filli

nata minoris

die 38 Januarii

chane.

Tartarorum

— Datum

in castris

ad

1711) O n peut en résumer ainsi les principaux

points d'après l'une des copies imprimées: 2 "Nous, Sultan M e h e m m e d Giray, fils du Grand K h a n des peuples de Perekop, de Crimée Bucak déclarons que f a c e à ceux qui veulent mettre sous tutelle la république de Pologne et faire obstacle au roi Stanislas, qui a accédé au trône par des élections libres, et à ses soldats ; à ceux qui veulent faire des provinces des cosaques de Zaporozhie et de la petite Russie (l'Ukraine), toutes d e u x libres, des prisonniers de M o s c o u en les soumettant au pillage et au meurtre, nous nous dressons avec les unités du Bucak et du Nogay sous notre c o m m a n d e m e n t . D a n s la guerre proclamée par le Sultan, nous c o m b a t t r o n s jusqu'au bout contre l'ennemi c o m m u n . Par cette proclamation, nous déclarons que nous n'attenterons ni à la personne ni aux biens de ceux qui se mettent au service du roi Stanislas, du grand duc du Palatinat de Kiev Joseph Potocky et du c o m m a n d a n t en chef de l'armée de Z a p o r o z h i e et de la petite R u s s i e (l'Ukraine), Philippe Orlick, qui combat héroïquement pour son pays ; nous prenons ces personnes et ces biens sous notre protection. M a i s nous f e r o n s disparaître les traîtres à leur pays qui ne se soumettraient pas. C o m m e le puissant roi de Suède l'a lui m ê m e proclamé dans sa déclaration universelle, la guerre entreprise contre ceux qui sans que soit assurée la liberté et la sécurité de ces deux pays voisins (l'Ukraine et la Pologne), livrent leurs pays au roi Auguste et au tsar de Moscou, sera sans fin. C e manifeste de notre main sera publié, et nous ordonnons l'exécution de ses dispositions. Bender, 28 Janvier 1711".

Cette déclaration universelle d'appui à Charles XII, intéressante du point de vue de la chancellerie du khanat de Crimée, donne une idée de l'autonomie du khanat vis-à-vis de la Porte pour les questions de politique étrangère. 3 L e l

A. N Kurat, Prut Se/eri ve Barici, Ankara 1951, vol. I p. 195.

^Archives du Min. A f f . Etr. C.P. Turquie vol 51, 1711-1712 (suppl) Ferriol, des Alleurs-Duban consul en Crimée. ^Halil Inalcik "Yeni vesikalara göre Kirim Hanliginin Osmanli tabiligine girmesi ve ahidname meselesi". Belleten Nr. 30. vol. 8, l l U 4 , pp. 185-229.

UNE P R O C L A M A T I O N

DU K H A N A T DE C R I M É E

65

n o m de l'Empire Ottoman est mentionné deux fois, pour sa déclaration de guerre. Mais la politique annoncée dans la déclaration et les promesses qui y sont faites publiquement ne sont pas sous le patronage de la Porte : elles expriment la politique du khanat et ses propres engagements. Il s'agit là d'une source intéressante pour l'étude des relations de suzeraineté entre la Porte et le khanat, la prise de décision en politique extérieure, et la titulature employée en correspondance. Traduit du turc par Jean-Pierre Thieck

THE PORT-CITIES IN THE ARAB PROVINCES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (A study of the disintegration of the Arab World in the nineteenth century, with special reference to Basra).

Introduction In the nineteenth century important developments occurred in some port cities of the Ottoman Empire. Thessaloniki, Smyrna, Beyrouth and Basra were the first among these ones. The one which we will study here is Basra which connected Mesopotamia with the outside world. Likewise Alexandria, Beyrouth and Basra depended like Smyrna and Thessaloniki first of all on the transition from traditional to monocultural agriculture in the hinterlands of these cities, which aimed at providing the necessities of western European industry. Alexandria, which is one of these three port cities of the Arab world, was under British rule. Beyrouth was under the influence of the French and British; and finally all of the European great powers had concentrated their economic and cultural activities there. In the course of the nineteenth century Basra was to become the scene of conflicting interests of the German and British.

Basra in the Nineteenth Century The province of Basra is exposed to important alterations in the last century of Ottoman rule. This area was completely conquered by the Ottomans in 1534 and Basra was thus made a part of the Baghdad province. However, the Ottomans have not been very successful in definitely domineering over this area, so the uproars caused by the Bedouin tribes and local dynasties continued. The central government was therefore forced to allow these local dynasties to rule the area. For example, in the seventeenth century, Ali Pasa (1624) and his grandson Huseyin Pa§a (1650) who where descendants of Afrasiyab and his sons were recognized as rulers of this place. This local autonomy facilitated the access of Europeans and Portuguese, British, Dutch merchant fleets were very active in the commerce of the Persian Gulf to Basra and its waterways. This autonomy succeeded in surviving in the long range, even though there

68

S T U D I E S

ON

O T T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

were some interruptions caused by the efforts of the governors of Baghdad. 1 However, the centralized organization and reform activities that started in the 1830's could also be felt in the same region. Basra had primitive harbor facilities, was frequently plagued with diseases, especially malaria. Its importance in eastern c o m m e r c e continued against the demonstrations of Bedouins like the Muntefika tribe which interrupted public security. It is stated by some historians that in H. 1267/A.D. 1850 Basra was bound directly to Istanbul as a province. 2 But this status changed f r o m time to time. There were periods w hen Basra was left sometimes to autonomous administration or sometimes became a Sandjak of Baghdad. At this stage an i n c r e a s e in c o m m e r c e with E u r o p e and A m e r i c a and c o m m e r c i a l establishments can easily be observed. 3 T h e harbor was restored to some extent. A deep channel at the mouth of Shattal A r a b was dredged. 4 It must be pointed out that this visible modernization of the city was realized at the era of Midhat Pa§a's governership in Iraq. The city was thus transformed into an a s s e m b l y center which could be considered an i n t e r m e d i a r y b e t w e e n Mesopotamia and the external world. In the nineteenth century, the Basra province was composed of three subdivisions (sandjak). The central Basra Sandjak, Muntefika (or NasirTyye) and Necid. 5 T h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e D i v i s i o n s of B a s r a in t h e N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y :

Province BASRA

Provincial Center

Sandjak

Kaza

Nevahi (District)

Basra

Muntefika (Nasriyye)

Necid

Basra Kurna Kuweit Sukh'-ulsuyuk Shatara Hìye Hamar Katar Hüfuf Kalif

' r . Hartmann, B. Darkot, T. Gökbilgin, "Basra" islam Atisiklopedisi, Maarif Matb. istanbul 1943, pp. 320-327. Longrigg, "Basra" Ency. of hlan: N. E. vol. I pp. 1086-87 see also L. Bouvat, "Le Vilayet Baghdad et son Organisation Administrative" Revue du Monde Musulman 23 (1913) pp. 240267. 3 Hasan Muhammed Salman, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Iraq 1864-1964." Studies in the Economic History of the Middle Easte d. by M.A. Cook 1970 pp. 346372. The author states that the "Iraq economy was since the 1860s a foreign-trade oriented and dependent economy". ^Longrigg, ibid. pp. 1087. 2

^Hiiseyin, Memalik-i Osmaniyye'nin A.D.), pp. 15.

Ziraat Cografyasi Istanbul, Mihran Matbaasi, 1303 (1886

THE PORT CITIES

IN T H E A R A B P R O V I N C E S

69

After the 1870 s Amare was also organized as a Sandjak. Some of the townships were governed by officials elected f r o m among the local chieftains. However, with the new organization systems and reforms that followed the «Provincial Regulation» ( V i l a y e t Nizamnamesi) established in 1869, new officials were appointed from the center to replace these local feudal rulers. We know for a fact that Midhat Pa§a was the pioneer of such an arrangement during his governorship in Iraq (1869-1872). For example, the kaimakam of the Katif district (Nedjid Sandjak) Faysal, his family, and officers followed a policy of great restraint towards the Shiites of this region and asked for excessive taxes, but Midhat Pa§a chastised and expelled this independent family through military force. 1

Population

and

Cities

It is not possible to give an exact total population figure as related to this era of the Basra Province. Obviously this difficulty is due to the disorganization of the Ottoman land survey and census registrations. The population groups were classified and estimated according to religious congregations, rather than ethnic, sexual and age distinctions. Household (hane) was the basis of census. The census registrations pertaining to rural areas are old and not realistic. The written surveys that may have aided us in obtaining gross estimates on the figures of rural areas have not been subjected to research or publication. The population figures that exist in relation to the nineteenth century mostly concern urban centers. T h e O t t o m a n Almanac, of H. 1307 (A.D. 1880-1889 Salname-i Vilayet-i Basra) states that the population of Central Basra Sandjak was over 10.000. 2 The region that rated second in population gathering was Amare with a figure of 7.000. 30 % of the population of Basra was Sunni, 50 % Shiite, the remainder being either Christian or Jewish. The city of Basra reflects the functions of a developing harbour. There are official buildings such as the Municipality Office, Governor's Residence, Post-Office in the city; soldiers barracks in Dub, naval barracks in Menavi. Other than these, we can mention the printing house, iron foundry, customs offices and docks, hospital, one mekteb-i rugdiyye (junior high school), 4 ibtidaiyye (primary school), 13 mosques, medrese and quite a vast number of shops (apprx. 1500).

' y . Halasoglu, "Midhat Pa§a'nm Necid ve Havalisi ile ilgili birka? Layihasi" ist. Unv. Edeb, Fat Tarih Enst. Derg, sayi 3 Ekim 1972 pp. 160-162 see also, Moosa Matti, "The Land Policy of Midhat Pasha in Iraq 1869-1872" Islamic Quarterly (1968) pp. 146-159. 2 Salname-i Vilayet-i Basra, Vilayet matbaasi 1307 of H. (1889-1890) pp. 175.

70

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

The Supreme Council of the Province (Meclis-i idare-i Vilayet) was composed of the Vali, Defterdar (Financial Authority), Mektubgu (Chief Secretary), Mufti and Nakib. Apart from these members, there were two Moslem representatives elected from among the local dwellers and two other representatives who were non-Moslem; this ratio of representation demonstrates the economical and social influence that the non-Moslem groups have. There were British, French, German, American, Austro-Hungarian and Belgian vice consulates in the city. Commercial relationship increased the integration with the external world. Director Ali Bey's (who was the local manager of the Ottoman Debts administration) trip to this province coincides with the same period. According to his statements, there were ships that sailed directly to Suez when the date crop was gathered. However, as we are going to see later, most of Basra's communications with the Western world was carried out over the Indian subcontinent. This moist place was overflowing with malaria. 1 The disease, mostly seen among the military troops, was one of the biggest problems of the Ottoman administration. A cholera epidemic was added to this in Basra and its surroundings due to the increase in international naval traffic in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The Baghdad vice consul of the U.S.A. reports the cases of death in Kerbela, Nedjef, Hilla, Kule, Divaniye, Amman, Hosrabad and Samara through a period of 15 days, as of June 30th, 1904 (74 in Kerbela, 156 in Nedjef, 146 in Hilla). 2 The cholera epidemic could not be prevented in spite of the quarantine measures. This could be attributed to the Ottoman disorganization where sanitation was concerned and also to the indifferent and non-cooperating attitude of Britain who was the ruler of the most active transportation.

Transportation The Ottoman railway system was both under-developed and late in being established as compared to Europe and Russia. Thus at the end of the nineteenth century Basra was not only connected to Istanbul over Baghdad, but also had a cable system set up over the area named Far that reached India and Europe. A perfect mail system was also established between Basra-KurnaAmare and Kut-ul Amare-Baghdad. However, this service was very frequently 1 Ali Bey, (Director in the Duyun-u IJmumiye) Seyahat Jurnali (htanbuVdan Bagdad'a ve Hindistan'a min sene 1300 - ila sene 1304) Istanbul 1314 pp. 97, 98, 99. ^National Archives and Record Servire of U.S. Foreign Service - Post Record: 84, «American Consulate Baghdad» Nr. 220.

T H E P O R T C I T I E S IN T H E A R A B

PROVINCES

71

interrupted between Basra-Nedjid and Basra-Muntefika where the Bedouins dominated and there was no public security. Here, only letters could be delivered under police supervision (money orders were not accepted) 1 . Due to the flow of the tides in the rivers, the Basra harbour became accessible for the big ocean ships once every 15 days. In addition to this, transportation over the rivers from Basra to Shatr, Amare, Kut-ul A m a r e and Baghdad was possible; this transportation started to be carried on by modern ships in the nineteenth century. 5 ships belonging to the Ottoman Imperial Navigation Company named Musul, Firat, Rasafe, Baghdad, Meskene and two f r o m Britain, Lynch and Halife, operated on this line in 1307 of H. (1889 A.D) The local inhabitants participated in this river transportation using over 250 sailing boats. The riverside quays were connected to the inland centers with caravans of mules, camels and horses. This situation resembles the completion of the Izmir-Aydin railway network by camel caravans. 2 International trade already was interested in Basra since the fifteenth century. A branch of the East Indian Company was established in Basra since 1666. Practically the India-Basra cruise was under British monopoly. There were attempts made by the U.S. to participate in the Mesopotamian river transportation. 3 A direct ship connection was requested between America and Basra. In the meantime, another U.S. project concerning the building of a bridge on the Tigris river by the Pennsylvania Steel Company was cancelled due to financial disagreements. In general, it can be concluded that river transport and caravan systems were quite sufficient, whereas the Mesopotamian railway has always been an international problem of rivalry. It has not been possible to solve this problem even until the end of the Ottoman rule over the area. The unefficient Baghdad railway project suggested by the Germans was aimed at reaching Basra. However, the obstacle for the realization of this project was not only the resistance shown by Britain as a result of her own benefits in the Basra Harbour. First of all, the German capital was insufficient and the ambitions of the German General-Staff were not relevant to the attitudes of the German businessmen and rational technicians team. Thus, the Baghdad railway syndicate was placed in a very difficult position owing to the withdrawal of the British support f r o m the scheme. T h e German capital

1

Salname-i Vilayet-i Basra (sene 1307), pp. 95-97. Mubeccel B. Kiray, OrgUtle§emeyen Kent - Izmir, Sosyal Ilimler Dernegi Yay. A-l Ankara 1972, pp. 14-15.

2

3

U.S. National Archives, Dept. of State, «Correspondance of American Vice-Consul in Baghdad» Nr. 47 4/2/1897 and May 12, 1900 p. 159.

72

S T U D I E S

ON

O T T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

required an a c c o m p l i c e f o r this project, so Siemens and its group did not withhold f r o m partaking in a partnership with the British business circles. 1

The Revenues of the Vilayet Basra A c c o r d i n g to S a l m a n , 2 by the I860's, there existed approximately 150.000 doniims

of agricultural and cultivated land in Iraq. After the 1860's, cultivated

lands h a v e been extended. H o w e v e r , there is n o indication that shows any c h a n g e in technology. In the nineteenth century the region w a s a typical agricultural area. R e v e n u e s have been obtained in a large a m o u n t f r o m agricultural productions.

Expenditures of the Vilayet 1307 H. (1890 A.D.) Kuru§ 186.716

Para

Religious affairs

!>cr'iye

H o m e dept.

Dahiliyye

Justice

Adliyye

377.140

—

Finance Salaries

Maliye Vlaa§at-i

799.037

20

Gendarmery

Zabtiyye

Police

l'olis

Various

Miiteferrik

Total

~

1.361.006

zatiyye

160.380 338.531 945

—

20

— —

32.802 6.229.567

In 1307 H. (1890 A.I).) the revenues of the Vilayet Basra, totalled 1 7 . 8 4 4 . 3 7 3 O t t o m a n kuru$

(or 178.443 O t t o m a n liras). 3 T h e bulk of this

a m o u n t consisted of ushr, followed by resm-i

agnam

(sheep tax). T h e main

occupations of the population were agriculture and husbandry. Date, wheat, sesame and some citrus fruits were the main products, which also constituted the bulk of the exports. 4 ' Report from U.S. Legation in Constantinople to Mr. Leishman, Secretary of State, June 2nd 1903 Nr. 4 3 1 : Nat. Arch, of Unit. Stat. Turkey Koll 69 «The Syndicate placed in a difficult position owing to withdrawal of British support to the s c h e m e . . . » German documents also refer to same subject: — «Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes» Bonn; Türkei Bd. 2/3 134 adh «kaiserlich Deuts. Konsulat in Baghdad» Report of Richarz of 23 Mai 1899, A 7371: stating that «the T u r k i s h o f f i c i a l s are in f a v o r of B a g h d a d p r o j e c t to a v o i d t h e British i n f l u e n c e in M e s o p o t a m i a » ; see also for the attitude of Siemens groups f o r a collaboration with English businessmen: Bekir Sitki (Baykal) Das Baghdad-Bahn Problem 1890-1903, Druck Rudolf Goldschlag, Freiburg 1935, pp. 81-86. ^ M o h a m m e d Salman Hassan «The Role of Foreign Trade in the E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t of Iraq» p. 359. 3 Salname-i Vilayet-i Basra sene 1307 p. 102. 4

Salname-i

Vilayet-i Basra, 1320 scne (1903 A.D.) Vilayet Mtb.

THE PORT

CITIES

IN T H E A R A B

Revenues of the 1307 H. (1890

Vilayet A.D.)

Kunq Ushr Exemption tax from military service Sheep tax Bull tax Camel tax Ushr (collected in advance) Forestry tax timber, stamps Tax revenues from private possessions Court revenues Various dues Revenues from autonomous fiefs*

73

PROVINCES

(Açar vergüsti) (Bedel-i askerî)

438.881 11.788

(Agnam resmi) (Camus » )

1.792.153 187.350 194.704 10.399.333

(A§ar maktuu) (Orman kereste, pul) (Emlâk ve tapu) (Mehakim borçlari) (Rusum-u miitenevvie) (Hasilat-i miiteferrika)

Para 22 25 — —

—

10

1.400

—

23.227

—

54.200 1.338.955

—

118.138

—

—

Total 17.844.373 * (These fiefs were not subject to local authorities.)

The main components of the total expenditures of the vilayet in 1890 were dahiliyye and zaptiyye (police and home affairs). Expenditures involving investment expenditures such as naffa (construction) and maarif (public instruction) were only negligible amounts. T h e Ottoman state could be said to act as gendarmes for such countries as Britain, France and Belgium which were exploiting the Vilayet's resources. T h e remaining portion of the general income of the Vilayet (approximately 50 per cent) went to the central government. These revenues were, however, earmarked for the repayment of the Ottoman debts. In addition, customs duties and tobacco dues were directly collected by the Ottoman Debt Administration (Duyun-u Umumiye) and the Tobacco Regie, and are not, therefore, included in the list. Basra was a region of exploitation of the Atlantic economic system, not of the central Ottoman government. Measures to ensure technological modernization in agriculture could not be taken. It was only after the 1860's that the heavy ushr (i.e. 1/2 and 1/3) which was collected by the local feudal lords were decreased. 1 A certain degree of welfare must have been thus ensured. El Ucma - El Murre Urban ^See Matti I. Moosa, «The Land Policy of Midhad Pasha in Iraq 1869-1872» Islamic Quarterly 12 (1968) pp. 149-159 and I. E. Fadayeva, Midhat Pasha - Jm-i Deyatelnost, Akad, Nauk, SSSR Moskva 1977 pp. 45-66.

74

S T U D I E S

ON

0 1T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

(Bedouins), the Bedouins of the sandjaks of Necid and M u n t e f i k a did not pay their taxes regularly. In f a c t , the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t a l w a y s f a i l e d in collecting taxes regularly. A m o n g the factors a f f e c t i n g the local uprisings which broke out under the British mandate, after 1918, one may interalia cite regular collection by financially well-organized Britain of the taxes which constituted a heavy burden on the shoulders of the people.

German-British Rivalry in Basra T h e Basra Gulf was a subject of rivalry during the second half of the nineteenth century. Until the German Empire b e c a m e one of the big powers it was as if this part of the world was left to British influence. As a matter of fact the Ottomans could not be said not to have any claims on Bahreyn and the S h e i k h d o m s of the Basra Gulf. It is clear, however, that the Ottoman Empire, which was on the brink of bankruptcy, was incapable of effectively competing with Britain. T h e e m e r g e n c e of G e r m a n y as a big p o w e r brought Britain a serious rival. Besides, f r o m now on the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would begin to pursue an active policy in the region parallel to that of Germany. T h e Ottoman Empire claimed that Basra and Baghdad were within its frontiers, and it thus had s o \ e r e i g n rights over the Gulf S h e i k h d o m s and the Bahrein islands. In fact, a m e m o r a n d u m presented to Lord Granville by the O t t o m a n a m b a s s a d o r on l b July 1872 called f o r the recognition of the Ottoman sovereign rights. 1 However, these attempts failed to bring about an effective result. T h e British government saw the Basra Gulf as an inevitable c o m p o n e n t of its domination over the Indian subcontinent, E g y p t and the Suez Canal and desired to bring the region under its influence. T h e Ottoman government, on the other hand, failed even to collect taxes and could only control surplus p r o d u c t s , which barely s u f f i c e d to k e e p the p r o v i n c e a l i v e . In

these

circumstances, Germany's inclination was to bring the Basra Gulf under its control not by way of the sea, but by means of the Baghdad railway project, as a continuation of the Berlin-Basra corridor. Although the Basra railroad did not materialize, Germany attempted at establishing an influence by means of the Ottoman administration. T h e Baghdad railway project was a m o n g the plans of the conservative Disraeli Go\ ernment.

'ismail Hakki Tevfik, Basra Körjt:i pp. 9.

Meseksi,

Hariciye Vekäleti matb. Nr: 15, Ankara 1931,

THE

PORT

CITIES

IN

THE

ARAB

PROVINCES

75

Layard, the British ambassador in Istanbul who suggested a reform project to Sultan Abdiilhamid II, had also pointed out to some measures which could be taken for the development of the Crown lands. These measures consisted mainly of building water canals and highways around Basra, plus a railway that reached the province. (The conservative Disraeli governments have preferred to support the Ottomans as opposed to the liberal and anti-Turkish policy of the Gladstone era).' The British domination over this area had long been established. In 1871, Midhat Pasa, the Governor of Baghdad had joined Kuwait as a district (kaza) to the Sandjak of Basra and appointed Sheikh Abdullah el'Sabah to this kaza as kaimakam. However, at the end of the nineteenth century when Britain made her first attempts to rule Kuwait, Sheikh Mohammed ibnus Sabah of the same family recognized the British protectorate. At the end of the century Germany made her appearance and selected Kuwait as the end-point of the Baghdad railway. 2 As a result, the Ottoman Sultan announced his supreme rights over Kuwait with great emphasis. However, Sheikh Mubarek preferred to lead a two-sided policy between Britain and the Ottomans. The end of 1898 and beginning of 1899 was the period of military intervention at the area by the Turks and the Germans, but the result was the allowance of British protectorate on the region. However, even this solution could not prevent the disagreement that occured between the great powers such as Russia, Germany, Britain and the Ottoman Empire. It did not seem possible for Britain and the Ottoman Empire. It did not seem possible for Britain to be the one and only ruler over the area at the beginning of the twentieth century. The beginning of the twentieth century was also the period when the U.S.A. started more planned efforts of gaining influence over the area without getting too involved in the fights that were going on. An educational service and naturalization policy was directed towards the Christian minority in the area for this purpose. The vice-consul of the U.S.A. in Baghdad has left written statements on how lots of individuals applied to the State Department with the request of consular protection carrying genuine or false credentials and how this procedure continued for days until it reached serious dimensions. 3

1 Report of the British Amb. I .ayard: Baqbakanlik Ar$ivi, YildizEsas, Nr: 7-94. H . J . Philby, Arabia, London 1936 pp. 25-156-169 and see also G. L. Bondarevski, Baghdadskaya Doroga i Proniknoveniye Germanskogo Imperializma Na Blijni Vostok 18881903 G. I. Uzb. SSR, Ta§kent 1955, p. 156-199. ^ U.S. National Archives, Foreign Serv. Post Rec, 84 «Correspondence American Consulate Baghdad,» - D e c . 1892 to Febr. 1900» pp. 115 "To State Dept. February 10.1899" «The attention of the Department has been called, to the fact that there are more or less permanently domiciled in various cities of Turkey many natives of the country who claim American citizenship and frequently call upon our Consuls for protection. Some of these persons, it is alleged, come to the U.S. for a short time and by means of false affidavits obtain certificates of naturalization, while others without even visiting this country secure certificates of naturalization and passports by inducing friends to personate them.» Rudolph Hurner Vice Consul of U.S. Baghdad-Turkey. 2

76

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

As a result, we must say that the Mesopotamian area and Basra harbour w e r e u n d e r the n o m i n a l d o m i n a n c e of the O t t o m a n s at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century. E c o n o m i c goods were passed over to the western markets through Basra, a collecting center. 1 T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e served the p u r p o s e of a g e n d a r m e g o v e r n m e n t that secured the benefits and economic advantages due to disagreements a m o n g the major states. In reality, the financial status of the Empire was barely sufficient to carry on this fiction. O t h e r sources of i n c o m e were either provided by exterior financial groups or controlled through international organizations such as the Public Debt, and their representative.

Conclusion T h e A r a b w o r l d in the nineteenth c e n t u r y w a s in the process of disintegration like the whole of the Ottoman Empire. T h e Arab world which could conserve its administrative and cultural union within the Pax Ottomana till the b e g i n n i n g of t h e nineteenth c e n t u r y , entered d u r i n g this era a disintegration process, since the Western powers divided this area into several influence spheres. B e y r o u t h and Basra were b e c o m i n g t w o separate and important controlling centers of these divided areas. This disintegration of e c o n o m i c space prepared in the twentieth century the platform of political division. T h e falling of Syria and the Lebanon under the French and, Egypt and Mesopotamia under the British economic and finally political influences, caused the emergence of these areas as independent political units after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. These areas came under the rule of the British and the French and until our present times a reunification of the eastern A r a b world could not be effected.

' m . Salman Hasan, ibid pp. 348. « I he export trade of Iraq rose between 1864-71 f r o m 147.000 to 2.960.000.»

IOANINA AND ITS PORT-TOWN PREVEZA IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1864-1895)

The province of Ioanina during the last decades of Ottoman domination shows both a peripheral character in the Empire on the one hand and an international fringe point on the other. Ioanina and its port-towns Prevesa and Arta (Ottoman Narda) were two crosspoints in the eastern Mediterranean. Preveza, which had Venetian and Ottoman periods in its long history, is a good example of evolution in this area until the beginning of the Balkan wars in 1912. The sandjak Preveza has witnessed some of the most characteristic developments of the T'anzimat period. It had remained outside of the boundaries of the Hellenic Kingdom as it was established in 1829, but still was the closest contact point of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e with G r e e c e both f r o m commercial and geographical aspects. Until 1912 the Preveza sandjak was part of the Ionina province (Yanya vilayeti). Between 1864 and 1912 it included 3 subdistricts ( k a z a ) \ namely Preveza, Loros and Margiliij, (today Margariti). Parga was at first a kaza center and later remained as a nahiye (commune) within the kaza of Margili?. Parga was largely dominated by Muslim-Albanian land owners (agha) and kept this economic social feature till the end of the second world war. 36 villages and two communes (nahiye) completed the administrative structure of the Preveza s a n d j a k . 1 T h e nahiye had been established on the lines of the French "commune" model; but owing to its a u t o n o m o u s administrative status, specially in the Balkans, it was not favoured by the Ottoman administration. Population figures quoted by Ottoman sources usually repeat the figures of the official yearbook (saíname). As the census was not conducted in a very precise manner, these figures are only an approximation of the reality and they should be used to work out population estimates for nineteenth century Ottoman Europe. Population figures for 1895 based on an Ottoman source are as follows: 2 male female Greek-orthodox 5.168 4.840 Muslim 3.512 3.097

1 2

Salname-i Vilayet-i Yanya 1892, -Nr: 6, p. 211-214-216. Ali Cevad, Memalik-i Osmaniyenin Cografya Lugati Constantinople 1892 (1313 H) p. 238-240.

78

STUDIES

ON

OIT OMAN

TRANSFORMATION

A n o t h e r O t t o m a n s o u r c e gives the f o l l o w i n g f i g u r e s f o r the s a m e y e a r , (1894) b u t based this t i m e on households: 1

Preveza Loros (Margaritî) Margiliç

households male 2.306 5.556 2.780 6.137 5.224 12.576

female 4.504 6.507 11.379

(estimated) total population 10.060 13.654 23.955

It a p p e a r s that M u s l i m s w e r e in m i n o r i t y both in the s a n d j a k overall a n d in t h e m a i n t o w n . 2 5 y e a r s e a r l i e r ( 1 8 7 1 ) t h e British c o n s u l

Barker

m e n t i o n s 4 . 3 1 8 Christians, 1.724 T u r k s ( m e a n i n g M u s l i m s ) and 5 8 G y p s i e s 2 . Either t h r o u g h lack of i n f o r m a t i o n or b e c a u s e p e r h a p s a c o m m u n i t y h a d not y e t been e s t a b l i s h e d , C o n s u l B a r k e r d o e s not r e f e r to a J e w i s h p r e s e n c e in P r e v e z a . 8 y e a r s later, a n o t h e r B r i t i s h c o n s u l , B l a k e n e y g i v e s c o n f l i c t i n g f i g u r e s ; 1.200 M u s l i m s to 11.200 Christians, w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g a b r e a k - d o w n on ethnical lines. 3 But o n the o t h e r hand c o n s u l a r reports p r o v i d e valuable i n f o r m a t i o n on trade and agriculture. In 1864 a n e w provincial structure had been established in the R u m e l i vilayets

and this year the center of s a n d j a k w a s t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m

A r t a to P r e v e z a . T h i s n e w administrative set up had brought along an increase in the n u m b e r of provincial functionaries and in infrastructural expenditures. In 1864 P r e v e z a w a s c o n n e c t e d to l o a n i n a t h r o u g h t e l e g r a p h . S i m i l a r l y c a b l e s w e r e laid b e t w e e n Preveza on the one hand and P a r g a and on the other d u r i n g 1 8 7 8 . 4 P u b l i c security in the area w h i c h h a d , earlier, b e e n p r o b l e m a t i c a l s o i m p r o v e d a n d by 1884 the British consul c o u l d write that it w a s b e c o m i n g m o r e s a t i s f a c t o r y every y e a r , a l t h o u g h acts of b r i g a n d a g e w e r e o c c a s i o n a l y h e a r d of. E v e n in 1864, t h e British c o n s u l at l o a n i n a , S t u a r t r e p o r t s t h a t " b r i g a n d a g e , that used to be so rife h e r e , h a s f o r s o m e t i m e b e e n q u i t e r e p r e s s e d , and individual crime is certainly below the a v e r a g e of other y e a r s . " 5 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d the central g o v e r n m e n t also t o o k m e a s u r e s to p r e v e n t t h e m a l p r a c t i c e s of security o r g a n s and local civil servants, and tried to i m p o s e a legal rule and avoid oppression

l

Salname-i

Viläyet-i

6

Yanya Nr: 7, I «

(1311 of H) p. 37.

2

Parliamentary papers and accounts report of vice-consul Barker 'Prevesa 1872 2 8 January', pp.1353-1355. 3 Ibid., (vice consul Blakeney) Prev esa. February 13, 1880 p. 1032. However he mentions that "I am not aware that a census has ever been taken, but the population of the gaza of P r e v e z a cannot exceed 10.000 souls". 4

Ibid.,

(Vice-consul Blakeney) Prevesa. February 22, 1878, p. 886.

^Ibid., (Vice-consul Blakeney) Prevesa. March 1. 1884, p. 577, Consul Stuart, ibid., Janina, May 10, 1865, p. 462.

®B. A -irade-Dahiliye

1270 Nr: 18726.

IOANINA AND PREVEZA IN THE LATE OTTOMAN E M P I R E

79

The increase in the number of provincial civil servants introduced changes into everyday life in Preveza, which was till then a small sleepy backwater. This numerous group of highly-paid civil servants created a consuming class and new consuming patterns which in turn led to increased demands for imported goods. Since local products started to be exported, Preveza overtook Arta as the main trading center of the area. British consular reports for 1862-63 give the following data for commercial activities in Arta;

1862 1863

imp. 38.000 64.000

exp. 14.000 16.000

In the following year (1863-64) shipping to Preveza reached the following figures. Vessels British 1 Ionian 173 Greek 347 Ottoman 84 Austrian 8 Italian 1 Ditto steamers 26 Value of imports reached 29.750

Value of cargoes in -

8.559 2.667 2.000 1.445 -

5.049

Sixteen years later in 1880 the exports of Preveza reached 104.903 and imports 2 3 4 . 0 2 5 T h e shipping activities in the harbour of Preveza in the same year was such as below: 2 steam Austrian British Greek Italian Ottoman total

60 2 -

62

sail 5 -

3.252 17 1.108 4.382

Preveza still remained as a relatively small port in comparison to other Ionian and Thracian ports. Especially the annexation of Arta by Greece in 1881 caused a deterioration of the life of Preveza, since it remained a boundary town of the Empire. Certainly, there was no local industry worth mentioning in Preveza. In 1871 vice-consul Barker noted that "Preveza is a very small place and its commerce is limited and comparatively insignificant. The value 1 Pari. Accounts and papers (Great Britain) 1863-64: vol. 70, p. 111. ^¡bid, (Vice-consul Blakeney) Prevesa, February 19, 1881, p. 579.

80

STUDIES

ON

O i l OMAN

TRANSFORMATION

of imports exceed three-fold that of exports, rendering these countries always indebted to Europe while it proves that the system of government in Turkey as yet d o e s not e n c o u r a g e native industry". But on the other hand B a r k e r mentions that Preveza had the lowest mortality rate and was the most healthy place in the region, free f r o m epidemics and contagious diseases. 1 Industry was limited to a f e w small workshops, processing local agricultural products (see the list in A p p e n d i x 1). In the 1880s there were 2 4 olive oil presses, 5 flourmills and 3 soap factories. Tax returns indicate the presence of 104.000 olive trees and 5 0 0 0 fruit trees. Basic export products in 1884 was consisting of wheat, barley, fish, tobacco and soap. But as Consul Stuart mentions "in this country neither machinery, nor the wheeled carriage is employed in aid of labour. The ox is used f o r ploughing and the pack-horse f o r transport. Both are falling off as well in quality as in numbers. During the British protectorate over the Ionian islands, the f a r m e r s here used to obtain supplies of large V a l l a c h i a n oxen t h r o u g h the c o m m i s s a r i a t contractors. T h i s they can no longer do. T h e Vallachian ox has almost completely disappeared f r o m Epirus; and all the ploughing is now done with the country ox, which is small, light, and of feeble draught power. But even of these the breed is declining." Worse than that f o r the d e m a n d s occasioned by the Crimean War, some good amount of horses were exported. T h e deficiency this created has never been supplied; and f r o m that time dated the deterioration of the breed, which every year becomes more observable... T h e value and approximate quantity of main crops given by Consul Blakeney f o r the year of 1883 is listed below: 3 quantity

value in £

20.000 15.000

4.181 4.163

oats

19.800

1.080

wool

20.000

1.090

120.000

5.454

wheat (kilo) barley

"

fish (okkas) c h e e s e (in skins)

31.000

1.536

tobacco

15.000

2.045

butter soap sheep and goat-skins/piece olive-oil

(barrels)

3.000

272

100.000

3.181 2.209

40.000 8 . 6 0 0 (in

1880)

626

^Ibid., (Vice-consul Barker) Prevesa. January 28, 1872, p. 1355 gives a mortality rate of 43 per 2000. 2 Parliamentary Accounts and Pap?r\ (Reports by Consul Stuart on the present state of Epirus) Janina April 24, 1871. p. 816. 3 Ibid., (Blakeney) Prevesa, March I. 1884. p. 571.

IOANINA AND PREVEZA IN THE LATE OTTOMAN E M P I R E

81

In this very same year, Blakeney still reports the existence of some bands of brigands. But these events have been concentrated mostly in the internal districts of Epirus and the international trade of Preveza has not been much affected by it. However in 1882 he had reported a recession of the e c o n o m i c activities following the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 and the transfer of Arta to Greece: "the cession of Arta to Greece has produced a great convulsion in the trade of this port and that of Salabora; but this is not the case, for the fertile plain of Arta still remains to Turkey, so that only the imports to Arta f r o m foreign countries no longer pass through Preveza. The prices of the various commodities of life have since the late Russo-Turkish war risen about 50 percent". 1 In town there were eleven Greek Orthodox churches, one R o m a n Catholic church, two mosques, (Ali Pa§a and Ahmed A g h a Dino) and two tiirbe. These figures give a fair image of the religious life of the town. As the t o w n and s a n d j a k of P r e v e z a h a d a c o s m o p o l i t a n c o m p o s i t i o n , the administrative council of the sandjak (Liva idare meclisi) was composed by the clerical heads of the different communities and besides two elected Christians and two Muslim members. Ottoman administrators ( m u t a s a r r i f of Preveza) of the Tanzimat era were usually enthusiastic builders and were instrumental in developping the provinces. However the governors (vali) and subgovernors ( m u t a s a r r i f ) of the Danubian region (Bulgaria) were more successful in comparison to those of Morea. After the independence of the Kingdom of the Hellens, Morea could not enjoy a development similar to western Anatolia, western Thrace and the Danubian province. Taking the example of Preveza, the mutasarrifi required long tenures to develope their sandjak and instruct some reforms, but this was not the case. T h e y often had to c h a n g e their posts. T h e relatively high turnover of local administrators prevented continuity in policies and slowed down construction activities. The official Ottoman yearbook of Ioanina vilayet for the year 1311 H. (1894) gives the list of the sub-governors ( m u t a s a r r i f ) of Preveza since 1864. 2 The first mutasarrif appointed after the promulgation of the famous "decree of provincial administration" in 1864 (Idare-i umumiye-yi vilayet nizamnamesi) was Hasan §evki Pa§a (1 March 1864), followed by Selim Pa§a and later by Timur E d h e m Pa§a. Timur Edhem Pa§a, was again appointed to Preveza after Reshid Pa§a, izzedin Sir Pa§a, and Fikri Efendi for a second time. He then was followed by Selahaddin Bey, Kazim Bey, Abdiilrefi Efendi and Hadi Ahmed Ferid Pa§a (a total of eleven mutasarnfs within a period of 30 years).

' Prevesa, February 16, 1882, p. 1161.

2

Salmme-i Vilayet-i Yanya 1894 (1311 of H) p. 78.

82

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

It would appear that part of the local population was opposed to cession of the region to Greece. Local notables informed the Palace, that if Preveza, Narda and Ioanina should be ceded to Greece, they would oppose such a move by rising in arms. In February 1881 (1298 H) the King of the Hellens toured Preveza and Narda, which caused some protests of the local Muslims. 1 A similar event in the past also indicates the sensitivity of the local Muslims, namely a short visit of the General of the Ionian Republic (Ceyazir-i Seba cenerali) to Preveza and Parga which was a subject for careful observation by the Ottoman authorities. 2 Formerly in March 1879 telegrams to Yildiz Palace claimed that the cession of Preveza, Arta and Ioanina to Greece would spell disaster for the Albanians.-' In fact it seems that Albanian nationalism was rampant among local Albanians. A new mutasarrif was appointed to Preveza f r o m Argiri (Ergiri) to curb the agitation caused by one Abdul Bey and his confederate, in Ioanina. 4 Albanian elements in those years seem to be deeply anxious. However, even a study of the issues of the provincial newspaper Yanya in these years, indicates that s o m e e c o n o m i c and social c h a n g e s are intervening; estates are put on sale, bankruptcies and distraints were fairly frequent. Some sets of documents in the Turkish archives also are a proof of this evolution. 5 However the highest percentage of the agricultural tithes, such as a§ar and aghnam (sheep and husbandry tax) in provincial budgets, indicates that the economic structure of the sandjak Preveza remained based for a long time on agricultural activities, (see Appendix 2).

APPENDIX I Report by Vice-Consul Barker on the Trade of Prevesa for the year 1871, (Prevesa January 22 1872) Parliamentary accounts and papers, pp. 1355-56. Habitations, houses and huts Shops Drapers Cooking-shops Butters Fishmongers Coffee-shops Greengrocers Ship-chandlers and grocers

1.163 283 (total) 14 7 6 5 9 7 235

'BA-Yildiz-Hususi-165/145 15-2-1297 of H (1880 A.D.) BA -irade-Hariciye Nr: 4118, 29 CA 1268 of H (1851-52 A.D.)

2 3

BA -Yildiz 16 9/2 (15-11-1297 of 11 ( 1880). BA-Yitdiz - 160/72 - 25 Receb 1298 of H (1881. A.D.) 5 BA -Yilzid-lts ns: 25-5-1296 Nr: 161/26 set the collection of the newspaper Yanya of the year 1873.

4

IOANINA AND PREVEZA IN THE LATE OTTOMAN E M P I R E Stores 88 Caravanserailles 6 Flour-mills 5 Military hospitals 2 Soap manufactories 3 (about 127.000 lbs. of this article is fabricated during the year) Gil-presses, wood-screw pressure (the approximate value or cost of one press is 220 £) Schools

21

(two for males, two for females, 3 being public schools supported by private contributions) Court of Justice (building) Government civil offices (building where the Police-station is held, 42 men engaged for police service in town) Metropolitan house 1 Churches (Greek Orthodox) Cathedral (ditto) Chapel (Roman Catholic) Mosques (Mohametan) Mahometan Monasteries (probably tekke)

10 1 1 2 2

Vapour bath 1 Quarantine office (Building 7 persons employed) Forts (Usual garrison, Artillery 260, Infantry 680 men) Drinking Fountains (Turkish ge§me) 5 2 Harbours (one inner harbour, where the Venetians had their Arsenal)

APPENDIX 2 Population of the Sandjak of Preveza in the year of 1893 Salname-i Vilayet-i Yanya 1311, p. 37. Male

Female

Total

5.556

4.504

10.060

6.137

6.507

12.644

12.576

11.379

23.955

Preveza district household: 2.306 Loros district household: 2.780 JVfarguli^ district (Margariti) household: 5.224

84

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

Financial portrait of the sandjak of Preveza in the year of 1894 (same source p. 310-1 1) Incomes (in Ottoman kuru§) Emlak temettii (property and profit tax) Bedel-i asken (military tax) A§ar (agricultural tithes) Agnam ve canavar (sheep and husbandry tax) varldat-i saire (other revenues)

732.344 666.1 18 1.948.376 1.172.459 782.355

Public Expenditures (in Ottoman kuru§) §er'iyye (religious courts and bureaucracy) Dahiliyye (home-office) Adliyye (Justice dept.) Maliye (finance office) Maa§at-i zatiyye (salaries) Zabtiyye (police)

56.544 280.960 163.324 210.704 22.602 26.122

OTTOMANISM AND ZIONISM DURING THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD, 1908-1915

From several important perspectives the position of Ottoman Jewry presented a unique case in the social and political history of the late Ottoman Empire. When the Second Constitutional Period (Me§rutiyet) was inaugurated in 1908, the socio-political situation of the Jewish community was similar, in some respects, to that of the Muslim Turks. Within the community there were some who actively supported the constitutional government. While others were staunch sympathizers on the highest leadership and administrative levels of the community. The most significant and widely known incident reflecting this dichotomy, was the resignation of the Acting Chief Rabbi Moshe Levi (Halevi) upon the deposition of Abdiilhamid II, following the 31 March event. It appeared as if the old leadership had opted to relinquish its power to the party which supported the Young Turks, without provoking any kind of incident. T h e general situation of O t t o m a n Jewry during the Second Constitutional Period may be summarized as follows: Geographically the Jews were the most widely spread group in the empire. They lived throughout most of the Arab provinces and in Anatolia. Their presence was particularly noticeable in Izmir and in almost every other urban center in western Anatolia. In the European provinces in addition to the important cities of Istanbul, Salonica, Edirne, and Gelibolu, Jewish communities were found in the urban centers of Bosnia, southern Bulgaria and Macedonia. Ottoman Jewry was also the most culturally diverse ethnic group. In the European and Anatolian provinces the Judeo-Spanish speaking Sephardim predominated. However with the increased recent immigration of east European Jews, primarily from Russia and Romania, Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazi groups became increasingly noticeable. In addition, in the large port cities of Istanbul, Izmir, and Salonica there existed congregations of Italian Jews. Elsewhere in the empire there were Jews who spoke Arabic, Kurdish and even Aramaic. Indeed there was no other ethnic element as polyglot as the Jews. These two factors, great physical dispersion and cultural and linguistic diversity, could not become easily conducive to the emergence of a nationalist Jewish movement as in the case of other ethnic groups.

86

STUDIES

ON

() I I O M A N

TRANSFORMATION

It is possible to state that T u r k s and J e w s were two groups within the Empire which were a m o n g the least exposed to nationalism. Ottoman Jewry became exposed to European culture only in the second half of the nineteenth century, later than any other n o n - M u s l i m minority. For this reason it w a s slow to accept nationalism as an abstract notion to be applied in practice. On the other hand, the Balkan nations, and especially the Christian elements, had been i n f l u e n c e d by, and had s u p p o r t e d , each other in their nationalistic aspirations since the end of the eighteenth century. T h e Greek rebellion owed much to the Serbian; Bulgarian nationalism owed much to the Greek Hetairia; and the role played by Bulgarian volunteers in the G r e e k rebellion is well known. H o w e v e r , it was not possible f o r the Ottoman J e w s , w h o remained outside the pale of Christian brotherhood and w h o generally were in economic competition with the Christian elements of the Empire, to feel an interest in, and sympathy for, these m o v e m e n t s . In short, at the end of the Empire, the o b j e c t i v e conditions which would draw Ottoman J e w r y to the intellectual currents of contemporary nationalism appear to have been absent. It would seem that Ottomanism—that is, a modern political theory advocating Ottoman patriotism, which was a p r o d u c t of the nineteenth century —held greater promise f o r Jewish needs and aspirations. Ottoman Jewry entered the modernization period under the guidance of western Jewish educational and charitable organizations whose primary concern was to prepare young Jews to b e c o m e useful and productive m e m b e r s of the general society in which the> lived. T h e most active organizations in the Ottoman Empire were the Alliance Israélite Universelle (established in 1860), and the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden (founded in 1901 ). T h e ideology of t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s was p r i m a r i l y a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t and a n t i - n a t i o n a l i s t , although by their structure and curricula they m a d e it easier f o r y o u n g Jews trained in their institutions to assimilate into western, rather than O t t o m a n society. T h e r e are, however, significant n u m b e r s of y o u n g J e w s , especially a m o n g t h e l o w e r classes, w h o f o r e c o n o m i c reasons a t t e n d e d O t t o m a n secondary schools, where a liberal system of financial aid was in existence. A significant number of those later went on to study in Ottoman institutions of higher learning, such as the Faculty of Law and the Medical School. This, in turn, led to the e m e r g e n c e of an O t t o m a n i z e d J e w i s h element within the Jewish elite and also within the Ottoman buraucratic elite. Although no J e w ever attained the office of minister, ambassador, or governor, the number of J e w s in the upper levels of the various ministries, and in particular in the financial and medical administration b e c a m e significant toward the empire's end. 1

'Avram Galante, Turkler ve Yahudiler (Istanbul, 1928), pp. 128-136.

OTTOMANISM

AND

ZIONISM

87

In addition there was a growing number of Jewish intellectuals (as was the case with the other ethnic minorities of the Empire) who were truly bilingual, speaking Turkish as one of their native tongues. Indeed by that time Turkish language instruction had been incorporated into all Jewish schools, which also added courses on Turkish history and geography. Several Jews began to assume a role in Turkish journalism. Moise Fresco published in Izmir Ustad, a Turkish newspaper written in Hebrew characters. Nissim Masliah published the newspaper ittihad and Moise Cohen published the iktisadiyat Mecmuasi from 1915 to 1918. Avram Galante who had attained prominence during this period was also a member of this bilingual group. 1 Finally there were Jewish political activists who supported the constitutional movement and who had been in contact with the Unionists since the days of Abdlilhamid. This group overlapped to some extent with the previous one and included Nissim Masliah, Albert Ferid Asseo, Albert Fua and the Megveret newspaper group in Paris, the famous Emmanuel Carasso, Nissim Russo and Avram Galante. Galante had been a member of the Misir Cemiyet-i israiliyesi (the Jewish Society of Egypt) which had been in contact with the Young Turk leader Ahmed Riza and had supported him during the opposition years. These Ottomanized Jewish intellectuals were genuinely staunch supporters of the ideals of the Second Constitutional Period. 2 Their support was not "tactical" and should not be regarded as a national "compromise," as was the case with the position of some of the intellectuals of the Balkan ethnic groups. It was rather a direct result of their Ottoman patriotism. Unlike the Bulgarians, the Greeks and the Armenians who entered the elections with their own nationalist agendas, the Jewish delegates did not exhibit such tendencies. Moreover, unlike the Albanian and the Arab delegates, they did not even establish their own national cultural clubs. In spite of this, in the parliaments of the Second Constitutional Period, the Jewish delegates were represented effectively due to their active support of and participation within the Committee of Union and Progress. It should be added, however, that in spite of the lack of "objective" conditions for the rise of a Jewish nationalism, as described above, Esther Benbassa has demonstrated that as of 1908. 3 Zionism became a considerable force within the Jewish community, especially at the grassroots level. Its success derived mainly from the growing politicization of the community and it was able to draw adherents from the camps of its ideological adversaries,

^Idem, Histoire des Juifi de Turquie (Editions Isis, Istanbul, 1987), vol. VIII, pp. 89-93. Ibid„ vol. VIII, pp. 54-59, 187-188. • Hasan Kayali, "Jewish Representation in the Ottoman Parliament", and Esther Benbassa, "Associational Strategies in Ottoman Jewish Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", in A. Levy, (ed.), The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, forthcoming, The Darwin Press, Princeton, N.J. 2

88

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

both the traditionalist religious groups and the assimilationist Alliancists. It should be pointed out, however, that Ottoman Zionists generally supported the principle of the state's territorial integrity and focused primarily on activities aimed at Jewish cultural revival. Their political activities were conducted almost exclusively within the internal level of the community, aiming at controlling or at least influencing the community leadership. During the Second Constitutional Period, Ottoman Jewry was represented and governed by the Chief Rabbi Haim Nahum who personified a new type of an Ottomanized Jewish intellectual. Nahum, a native of Manisa, received in his childhood a traditional religious education. He then attended and graduated from a government high school in izmir and continued to study law at the Faculty of Law in Istanbul. From 1893 to 1897 he studied at the rabbinical seminary in Paris, where he received his ordination as a rabbi. He also studied Semitic languages at the Collège de France. While in Paris Nahum established a relationship with Young Turk leaders then in exile. 1 It was this relationship that propelled him to the position of Acting Chief Rabbi, in 1908, and then Chief Rabbi, in 1909. The following appointment decree dated 12 July, 1909 (23 Cemaziyelahir, 1327), is noteworthy: The Imperial Ni§an states: I, the Sultan, give this imperial Berat (diploma), in which the old provisions concerning the confirment of the Chief Rabbinate are mentioned, to Haim Nahum, leader of the Jewish community, who had been elected by the electorate organized in accordance with the regulation |of the Jewish nation), to the vacant position of the Chief Rabbinate of Istanbul and its dependencies, and whose office has been reported by the Ministry of Justice and Sects and confirmed by the Privy Council of Ministers, and I order that: The aforesaid Haim Nahum Efendi be the Chief Rabbi of the nation of the Jews of Istanbul and its dependencies, and the Rabbis and community chiefs and all the Jews, of high or low status in my wellprotected territories recognize him as their Chief Rabbi, to apply to him for their affairs within the responsibility of the Chief Rabbinate; let them act in cooperation and agreement with him, and not fail in obeying and submitting to him according to their religion and customs.... 2 The government yearbook of the same year (1327/1909), 3 refers to Nahum as Hahamba$i and to the other chief rabbis of twenty-seven major urban centers, as Ba^haham. The term Istanbul ve tevabii Hahamba$m (Chief ]

A v r a m Galante, Histoire

des Juifs d'Anatolie,

vol. II (1939), p. 98.

1

Ba^bakanlik Arçivi (Prime Minister's Archives, Istanbul; h e n c e f o r t h : BA), Gayri Muslim Cemaatlere ait Defterler (Henceforth: CMC), vol. 18 (Yahudi ve Karai Defierleri), pp. 38-42. ^ 1327 Salname-i

Devlet-i Aliyye-i

Osmaniyye,

Istanbul, 1327/1909. N o pagination.

O T T O M A N I S M

AND

Z I O N I S M

89

Rabbi of Istanbul and its dependencies) had been used since the office was first established in 1835 in the reign of Mahmud II. 1 But chief rabbis of other important towns had also been known until then by the title of Hahambaçi, and the chief rabbi of Istanbul was regarded merely as first among equals. Technically there is no difference between the title hahambagi and baçhaham. Both mean chief rabbi. Nevertheless the distinction now made between the Hahamba§i of Istanbul and the Baçhahams of all other cities was intended, no doubt, to further stress the primacy of the former over all other rabbis in the Empire. Indeed following his appointment as Chief Rabbi, Haim Nahum was referred to in semi-official and official documents and in the press, as: "The spiritual head of the Jewish nation of the well-protected Ottoman territories, Chief Rabbi, the exalted Haim Nahum Efendi...." 2 In other words, he was regarded as Chief Rabbi of the Ottoman Empire. This reflects two important tendencies on the part of the Unionists. First it reveals their personal confidence in Haim Nahum. In addition, however, it represents an attempt to establish for Ottoman Jewry a more centralized administrative organization, something which ran counter to the grain of the Unionists' policies regarding other ethnic groups. It is therefore a reflection of the Unionists' confidence in the political loyalties of Ottoman Jewry as a whole. Haim Nahum was awarded the highest Mecidiye order and was held in high esteem in official circles. As a matter of fact, it has his influential position that made him a favourite target of other non-Muslim groups within the Empire. Zionism, although a national movement, was perceived by Ottoman Turkish intellectuals and officials as something different. In the Ottoman mind the familiar forms of separatist nationalism were those of the Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians and the ethnic groups in Macedonia, with their underground committees and armed struggle. Due to this, the activities of the Zionist movement, invariably conducted in diplomatic, political and economic terms, did not elicit significant reaction, contrary to what is generally believed. Some Ottomans even viewed Zionism with sympathy as a reaction against European domination and Christian culture. This is how, for example, Dr. Lichtheim, the Zionist representative in Istanbul, had correctly assessed the attitude of Ahmed Agaoglu who was sympathetic toward the Zionist cause. 3 It is true that among Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals there were some who had been affected directly or indirectly by European anti-Semitism. In general, however, it would appear that educated Ottomans did not have a prejudiced attitude vis-à-vis Judaism or Zionism. The policies of the provincial and central Ottoman authorities toward the Zionist settlers have not been studied in

'See the contribution by Avigdor Levy in Levy (ed.) The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, op. cit. BBA, GMC, vol. 18, pp. 38-42. ^Richard Lichtheim, Rückkehr—Lebenserinnerungen aus der Frühzeit des deutschen Zionismus (Stuttgart, 1970), p. 188. 2

90

S T U D I E S

ON

O T T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

adequate depth to render an accurate picture. The few examples which emerge make it impossible to categorically state the position of any official body or forum on the subject of Ottoman policy toward Zionism. Nevertheless, the preliminary general impression is that policies and administrative strategies were neutral vis-à-vis Zionism. This may be due to the basic fact that during the last ten years of the Empire, Zionism had simply not been in a position to aspire to more than some limited administrative and cultural autonomy, as opposed to an independent or even autonomous state within defined boundaries. Hence it did not pose a real threat to the state. Finally, Ottoman administrators must have been impressed with Zionist support for Ottoman causes during the Tripoli War and the Balkan Wars. The efforts of Zionists to form a group which would join the Ottoman army to offer medical assistance during the Balkan Wars, and to mobilize volunteers to assist Ottoman units during the First World War were also well known. Indeed, it became clear that on the eve of the world war and during its initial stages, Zionist groups viewed the continued existence of the Ottoman state as most desirable for their future plans in Palestine. For this reason the Zionist organization even offered to make a contribution toward the construction of the Hijaz railroad. 1 It appears that for these reasons, some government circles were less annoyed by the Zionists than they were by some of the other minority groups who sought the protection and intervention of the Great Powers. In spite of all this, relations were too complex to be easily categorized. It is often repeated that in 1907, the former governor of the district of Jerusalem, Ekrem Bey, convinced the Minister of the Interior, of the necessity to prevent the immigration of Jews, particularly Russian Jews, whom he considered as a "dangerous element" for state security. 2 His successor, Subhi Bey, however, followed an entirely different policy while stationed in Jerusalem, and did not implement the recommended measures. This is one example which demonstrates why Ottoman policy toward Zionism cannot be easily categorized. 3 Ottoman officials were, generally speaking, xenophobic on the subject of Zionism. Still they recognized the usefulness of the Zionist organization and benefitted by maintaining contacts with its representatives. Levontin 1 Central Zionist Archive, J e r u s a l e m (eited as CZA), 39-A II a2, 40-A II a3, 4 1 - A II a', " S y m p a t h i e a k t i o n e n der Z i o n i s t i s c h e n O r g a n i s a t i o n der T ü r k e i in t ü r k i s c h - i t a l i e n i s c h e n K r i e g e — E n t w u r f von Dr. M. Nordalu, 5 October, 1911. Same as A l l d/z2, donation of the Zionists for the construction of the Hijaz Railway. 2

C f . Isaiah Friedman, Germany, Turkey and Zionism, 1897-1918 (Oxford, 1977), p. 141; also CZA, A 19/7 f r o m Jacobson to Wolfssohn, 10 September, 1908. ^ F r i e d m a n , ibid., p. 142. Also M. Kemal Öke, Osmanh fmparatorlugu, Siyonizm ve Filistin Sorunu (Istanbul; Üsdal Ne§riyat, 1982). pp. 92-93.

OTTOMANISM

AND

ZIONISM

91

reported to Herzl on 3 May, 1904: "The governor summoned me in haste and asked me to loan him 3,000 sterlings more, after he received a telegram f r o m the Ministry of Finance." It appears that the governor had regularly received such loans f r o m the Zionist leader when he was in need for his office because of financial crise. Levontin adds: "This year's tax on sheep (resmi-i agnam) will be good. I don't see any hindrance in providing this amount as well." 1 What is interesting here, is that these debtor-creditor relationships between Ottoman officials and the Zionist Organization, which were due to difficulties in the Ministry of Finance, have been represented in the literature on this subject as the f a u l t of only the local o f f i c i a l s . 2 D u r i n g the S e c o n d Constitutional Period, we see that various individuals including Talat Pa§a and other leaders of the C o m m i t t e e of Union and Progress, observed and recognized that the Zionist colonies w e r e a f a c t o r contributing to the development of Palestine and hence to the increase in tax revenues. On the other hand, however, it is this period which also witnesses a deterioration in Arab-Jewish relations and Ottoman attempts to curb the conflict. At this time the Ottomans have also made efforts to prevent the Zionists f r o m obtaining land, fearing increased Great Power intervention. It was particularly for this last reason that Talat Pa§a insisted that the Russian Jewish settlers become O t t o m a n citizens. On another issue, when the request of the Zionist organization for cultural autonomy and participation in local government— which they expressed with the terms öffentlich-rechtlich (publicly and by law)—was criticized in the Ottoman parliament as a move toward colonization and independence (particularly by Cosmidi Efendi, a Greek-Ottoman deputy), the Grand Vezir Hakki Pa§a stated that preventive measures would be adopted against the Zionist goals. Subsequently, W o l f s s o h n , one of the Zionist leaders, wrote a letter, dated 10 August, 1911, to Hakki Pa§a who was a jurist. He began by stating: "Your highness does not need lengthy explanations to understand ...the term öffentlich-rechtlich..." He nevertheless went on to explain that the term did not express a request for m o r e than publicly recognized civil rights. 3 In the press, Ebüziyya Tevfik had adopted an anti-Semitic and antiZionist attitude. On the other hand, A h m e d Agaoglu and Celal Esad were described by Jacobson, the Zionist representative in Istanbul, as "Friends of Zion." However, his successor Lichtheim who was less effusive in evaluating these matters, wrote that they appeared more prepared to support Jews and Zionists against the British and against other separatist national movements, rather than being true Friends of Zion. 4 Dr. Abdullah Cevdet was a l

CZA, Zl/531 from Levontin to Herzl, Jaffa, 3 May, 1904. Cf. Öke, ibid., p. 90. J CZA, Z2/1, pp. 401-410, "Türkische Parlamentsangriffe auf der Zionismus," from Dr. Wolfssohn to the Grand Vezir Hakki Pa§a, Cologne. 10 April, 1911. ^Lichtheim., Rückkehr, p. 188. 2

92

S T U D I E S

ON

O i T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

sympathizer of Judaism and the Zionist movement. Riza Tevfik, an opponent of the Unionists, was an intellectual who was a sympathizer of Zionism. Ali Kemal, the editor of ikdam, which was considered an anti-Semitic publication, was apparently not so personally. He had opposed Zionism because it seemed to him that foreign powers were manipulating the movement. In fact, it was common knowledge in Istanbul during this period, that the German embassy, which included several outspoken anti-Semites, among them Ambassador Wangenheim, supported Zionism solely with the expectation that it would advance German interests in Palestine. It was also obvious that Russia, the champion of official anti-Semitism at home, was not opposed to Jewish settlers in Palestine bearing Russian passports. 1 For this reason, it appears that support of, or opposition to, Zionism did not reflect a particular political line. For the most part, government officials knew little or nothing about Zionism. Which was a reflection of their general lack of interest in the movement. Arthur Ruppin who was taken to court due to the anti-Zionist measures implemented by Cemal Pa§a during the war years, recorded in his memoirs: "The Turkish officers who functioned as judges, did not have the slightest idea of Zionism, and things were not better with the civil judges who prepared the charges.. .." 2 During the war, Cemal Pa§a and his assistant Bahaddin had a hostile attitude toward the Zionist settlers. However, Cemal and Bahaddin followed the same rigid attitude toward the Arabs. This can be explained by a desire to ensure peace in a region not far from the front through the administration of strict measures, avoiding thereby conflicts between Arabs and Jews. Bekir Sami, the governor of Beirut, was a sympathizer of Zionism. In the capital, Talat, Cavid and Haci Adil were leaders who had implemented policies against Zionist immigration. But their opposition to Zionism was tempered by the latter's economic contribution. Haci Adil even stated, in January 1912, that "they were friends of Zionism, but opposed to immigration" 3 Moreover, it is well known that the wartime policies of the German Ambassador Wangenheim and the U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau, who were both opposed to the expulsion of Zionists, were not rejected by the government. The leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress accepted a Jewish presence in Palestine stipulating, however, that the settlers become Ottoman subjects. 4

^CZA, Z3/51, 8 February. 1915, Telegram of W a g e n h e i m to Lichtheim. CZA, Z3/49, pp. 243244, f r o m Jacobson to Tschlenow. information about a conversation at the Russian Embassy, 21 May, 1914. 2 A r t h u r Ruppin, Tagebücher, Brie/t, Erinnerungen, Jüdische Verlag, Athenäum, 1985, p. 264. 3 4

C Z 4 , Z3/43-00186, dated 4 January. 1912.

l l b e r Ortayli, Osmanli ¡mparatorlugunda Alman Nüfuzu [German Influence in the O t t o m a n Amtes, E m p i r e ! (Istanbul, Kaynak Yayin. 1983), p. 127. based on Archiv des Auswaertigen Türkei 195, bd 5, telegram no. 3, February 1915.

OTTOMANISM

AND

ZIONISM

93

In this period, we are able to observe a m o n g the Ottoman Jews, a cautious attitude toward Z i o n i s m . A l t h o u g h , as s o m e a u t h o r s h a v e demonstrated, the Zionists encountered a groundswell of popular support within the community, their relations with its official representatives and spokesmen were uneasy and even hostile. For example. Judge H a m m o n , an Ottoman Jewish resident of Jerusalem, had been encouraged by Jacobson to become a candidate for the Parliamentary elections. Jacobson had considered him as someone who could represent the Zionists. On 11 November, 1912, he wrote about Hammori: "Although not a Zionist, he has an understanding in this matter; he is an honest and well-known young j u d g e . " 1 Apparently, Hammon was one of those who believe that "silence is golden" and refused to cooperate. In Istanbul the Zionist representatives were often in disagreement with the eminent Jewish deputies Emmanuel Carasso and Nissim Masliyah. T h e o n e individual w h o m J a c o b s o n and L i c h t h e i m were m o s t disappointed in, and whom they later came to hate, was Chief Rabbi Haim N a h u m . N a h u m is a historical figure w h o had been misrepresented in the literature on this subject. 2 Just as Cavid, the Minister of Finance, Talat Pa§a, the Unionist leader, and even Musa Kazim Efendi, the §eyhulislam, were sometimes depicted as Zionist sympathizers, so was Nahum included in this category. On 16 February, 1912, Lichtheim says of Nahum, "Our aim should be to overthrow Nahum and to keep the secular council." 3 In reality, Nahum was a m e m b e r of the francophile and anti-German group in Istanbul. H e continued following this line also after the Ottoman Empire entered the war as Germany's ally. On 14 December, 1914, Jacobson reported f r o m Istanbul on a meeting between Nahum and Wangenheim in the German Embassy. According to this report, Nahum had told the ambassador that while being francophile he was not germanophobe. When Lichtenheim evaluated his own conversation with Nahum following this meeting, he commented that Nahum was not very fond of Zionists and added: "In his stupidity, he told me this himself, that he had somewhat slandered the Zionists on this occasion, because after all he hates us." 4

!

CZ4, Z3/43-0014, 11 November, 1912, from Jacobson to Auerbach. Öke, ibid., p. 105. 3 CZ4, Z3/43d, 16 February. 1912, from Lichtheim to Auerbach. 4 CZA, Z3/50, 2 December, 1914, Lichtheim's report. 2

THE GREEKS AND OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION DURING THE TANZIMAT PERIOD

Even though the Greek Revolt was not the first successful national revolt, it had a shock effect on the Ottomans. The Serbian Revolt had paved the way for the other Balkan peoples to revolt and had increased their hopes for national revival; but the Greek Revolt directly accelerated the Balkan nationalist movements. After the foundation of the Kingdom of the Hellenes, the Greek nation all at once faced structural problems and elicited great hope and despair. After the Greek Revolt, the Ottoman Empire developed a consciousness of decline, and immediately tried to change its administrative, educational and military structures. Even though Austria and Russia had favoured Greek Independence for a while they soon gave up their Hellenophile policy out of fear of unrest from their own national minorities, namely, the Hungarians and Poles, who had a rich past. One of the most striking consequences of the Greek Revolt was that the Ottomans began to eliminate Greeks f r o m important positions in the bureaucratic and social structure of the Empire. As is well known, the Phanariot dragomans in the Sublime Porte were replaced either by converted Christians like Bulgarzade Yahya Efendi or by Armenians such as Sahak Abro Efendi. Some of the Phanariots however, remained faithful and favored subjects of the Empire (with exceptions like Mavrokordato and Ypsilanti.) 1 For example, Musurus Pa§a was sent as the first ambassador to Athens in 1840 and was hated intensely by Greek nationalists who attempted to assassinate him. As a result of this attempt on his life, he suffered permanent injury to his left hand. 2 Photiadi Bey, his successor too as ambassador to Athens, Kalimaki Bey, the ambassador to Vienna, and Sava Pasha (who compiled a still favoured manual of Islamic law) are other prominent figures in the Ottoman administration. But these men are the exceptions. In fact, Greek supremacy in the Ottoman Empire was in decay. The Ottomans took measures in order to prevent further revolts of Greek subjects in Rumelia and the islands.

] See for the origin of Phanariot families, M. D. Sturdza, Grandes Familles de Grèce, d'Albanie et de Constantinople (Dictionnaire historique et généaogique) Paris 1983. 2 Sinan Kuneralp, "Kostaki Musurus Pa§a" in TTK Belleten 1970/3 Ankara, pp. 421-35.

96

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

In the following decades, the Ottoman administrative apparatus showed two features: reforms and grants of concessions to the Greek communities, on the one hand, and distrust and inspection, on the other hand. O n e of the most remarkable cases of counter-measures taken to prevent a nationalist revolt was in Samos. T h e Sublime Porte granted a u t o n o m y to this island by a special concessional decree (imtiyaz fermarli) issued in 1832, and named it "Sisam Emareti." T h e islanders almost gained a constitutional structure. T h e waves of revolt had forced the Ottoman administration to create such a concessional status. A Greek Orthodox subject of the Porte was appointed as the governor of S a m o s ( S i s a m Beyi), and elected representatives f r o m a m o n g the notables formed a meclis which was responsible for taking decisions on matters related to navigation, tax collection, construction, school instruction and even church affairs. T h e Ottoman army evacuated the island, (except a small c o r p s of gendarmes) and public maintenance and security functions were left basically the islanders. Sisam had to pay a certain annual tax to the Sublime Porte.' In 1861, Miltiadi Bey Aristarchi was granted a n e w ferman which regulated the f u n c t i o n s of the meclis, d e f i n i n g the legislative period and matters of tax collection and the budget of the ernaret. T h e annual tax was set at 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 O t t o m a n kuru§ and had to be paid to the S u b l i m e Porte in two portions. However, the Ottomans retained the right to keep a small body of gendarmerie, consisting of twenty men with their c o m m a n d e r . A s jurisdictional authority, a j u d g e had to be appointed by the Sublime Porte, w h o then would have to work with a court whose members were elected f r o m a m o n g the local notables. T h e first provincial n e w s p a p e r in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , Vilayet ceridesi, was probably published in Sisam before that of the Danubian province. T h e issue must have been in two languages: Greek and Ottoman Turkish. However, even though I found an irade in the archives, 2 I h a v e not yet been able to locate a copy of this issue. T h e constitutional status of S a m o s challenged, in a way, the Ottoman Constitution, since it remained in force even after 1878, together with Mount Lebanon, Crete and Eastern Rumelia. On the other hand, fear of revolutionary activities abroad as well as in the Greek K i n g d o m caused a certain recession of the Greek e l e m e n t in the Empire, and Greeks were subjected to greater control than in the past. T h e affairs of the Patriarchate became a quite controversial issue. This institution was criticized by the Greeks in the K i n g d o m as too conservative and was suspected by the Sublime Porte of being a spiritual and national center. Russia, on the other hand, had an a m b i v a l e n t attitude t o w a r d s the patriarchate, supporting it as it did formerly and yet hesitating because of the ' I s m a i l Hakki, Hukuk-u ¡dare first publication 1328 H / 1 9 1 0 Konstantiniye, p. 369-74. A correspondance of Grandvizir of 9 RA 1310 (1 Oct. 1892) clearly describes the limits of the authority of this small corps. B. A. Y. A. Hus. Nr: 266-53. 2 B A, irade-Meclis-i-Vald. Nr: 910=5 (II L 1268/February 1852).

THE G R E E K S AND OTTOMAN

ADMINISTRATION

97

conflict with the nationalist demands of the Bulgarian Church movement. In spite of this, Russia spent much effort to keep its representative functions and its protective role of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Empire. For instance, it became customary around this period for members of the Romanov family to visit the O t t o m a n E m p i r e about e v e r y o t h e r y e a r , and s t o p in Constantinople and Jerusalem, kissing the hands of the Patriarch in the presence of the public. Grand Duke Constantine's visit to Jerusalem in 1859 is a striking example of this. Russia continually sponsored the Greek Orthodox schools, defended the rights of Greek subjects, and turned some cases of conversion into a diplomatic issue. 1 A f t e r the draft of the general educational law, Greek schools, like others, were put under the control of the Ministry of Education. T h e books used in these were subject to scrutiny. Occasionally, even some Greek subjects informed the Porte by a petition of the harmful contents of these books. Such a case took place in 1860. This petition stated that some schoolbooks brought from foreign countries to be used in these schools contained harmful material, and was signed by Ottomans belonging to different millets,,2 including Greeks. They demanded that these books be rewritten and corrected. The decision of the Sublime Porte was that the history books had to contain the lives of the Apostles. These petitioners, mostly, muallims (school teachers), asked for twelve years to rewrite these books. T h e y suggested Biblical history f o r primary schools, and ancient Greek history, general history together with Ottoman history and hagiography for secondary schools. Others, such as a clerical professor named Filippaki f r o m the Seminary of Halki (Heybeli), informed the Sublime Porte that the professors in the Seminary were teaching the students harmful ideas. Filippaki was sent to Europe with a salary of 300 francs. 3 Also, the newly founded Ottoman high schools (like Mekteb -i Tibbiye, Medical School, Mtilkiyye Mektebi, Imperial School of Administration, Veterinary School etc.) granted a quota of 33 percent to non-Muslim students of Ottoman nationality. That quota caused both rumors and a struggle among different non-Muslim communities. In 1857, the M e d i c a l School, f o l l o w i n g a petition f r o m the A r m e n i a n community, reduced the number of Greek candidates to 5 0 f r o m 55, to the benefit of Armenian candidates. That case indicates a general trend in the Tanzimat period, when the Greek element in the Empire started to lose its former privileged status among other non-muslim communities. 4 ] B A, irade-Hariciye. Nr: 4028, 21 S. 1268/December 1851, after the death of a former Christian (named Ali), two of his daughters (who probably kept their faith) took asylum in the Greek consulate in Adrianople. 2 B A, irade-Meclis-Vala. Nr: 914. The petition is dated 6 Receb 1288/October 1869 where the corresponding trade is dated 2 Receb 1288/September 1872. The procedure covered a period of two years. 3 4

B A, irade-Hariciye. B A, irade-Hariciye.

Nr: 10276, 12 Safer 1277/August 1860. Nr: 7140, 12 N 1273/May 1857.

98

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

Certainly the reaction of the elite Ottoman Greeks indicates a different c h a r a c t e r . S o m e of the P h a n a r i o t s d u r i n g this era tried to i m p o s e a confederative administrative structure, f o r the safety of the E m p i r e and their o w n c o m m u n i t y . O n e of them, A n d r é C o r o m è l e s proposed a T u r c o - G r e e k empire and suggested that the Sultan should have the title of "Sultan of the T u r k s and K i n g of Greeks." A n o t h e r , S t e f a n o s X e n o s , e m p h a s i z e d "the c o m m o n interests of the T u r k s and Greeks in the Empire" during the days of the Bulgarian revolt and anti-Turkish d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in L o n d o n . Another, Pitzipios Bey suggested in his book, the adaptation of Byzantine institutions, equality of two religions and the coronation of Sultan Abdiilmecid as Emperor of the B y z a n t i n e s . 1 T h e Church had to fight on the one side against the secularist tendencies of s o m e modern Greeks, and on the other side to o p p o s e the d e m a n d s of the Bulgarian nationalists, w h o sought to have a national independent Bulgarian church. T h e Ionian Islands, a joint protectorate of the Ottoman and Russian Empires and later of Britain, on the one side, and Crete on the other, were strictly controlled by the O t t o m a n s . W h e n e v e r the General of the Ionian Islands ( - C e z a f r - i Sab'a Generali-) visited cities like Preveza on the continent, the Sublime Porte was informed by agents. 2 And the missionary activities of the British Protestants in the islands were stopped by a cooperation of the Sublime Porte, the Greek Patriarchate and Russia. An irade of 1839 is a very clear and precise illustration of that. 3 A report of the Ottoman ambassador Musurus Pa§a in London informed the Sublime Porte that the Greek K i n g d o m enlisted the local people of Crete for the Greek army (28 March 1861). M u s u r u s Pasha learned a b o u t this f r o m his agents in London and met with Lord John Russell, and the S u b l i m e Porte pressured Great Britain to prevent the Greek Kingdom f r o m doing this. S o m e C r e t a n s , registered in the islands belonging to the Greek K i n g d o m , had b e c o m e Greek subjects. Musurus Pa§a d e m a n d e d , however, that they should not be entitled to claim Greek citizenship if they had migrated to one of the O t t o m a n D o d e c a n e s e islands or A n a t o l i a . 4 A c t u a l l y , the small H e l l e n i c K i n g d o m w a s in need of p o p u l a t i o n and m i g r a t i o n f r o m t h e O t t o m a n continent and islands. It w a s not rare, nevertheless, that m a n y of these i m m i g r a n t s tried to go back to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . T h e Ottoman government, favouring this movement, exempted them f r o m the

' A n d r é Coroméles, Réforme prati.-able en Turquie, Athènes 1853, p. 30 and Stefanos Xenos, Union or Dismemberment of Turkey, London 1876, p. 11. and J. G. Pitzipios Bey, L'Orient, les Réformes de l'Empire Byzantin, Paris 1858. 2

B A, ¡rade-Hariciye. 1853. 3 B A, irade-Hariciye. 4

B A, iratle-Hariciye.

Nr: 4 1 1 8 . 1268 of H/1852, Îrade-Hariciye.

Nr: 4697, 6 C 1269/March

Nr: 120,29 C'a 1255/August 1839. Nr: 10214. "Musurus lo Ali Pa§a" 28 March 1861.

THE GREEKS AND O T T O M A N

99

ADMINISTRATION

capitation tax or cizye for 8 - 1 0 years, and sometimes subsidized them in agriculture. In May 1850 alone, 90 families came from Greece, back to their home. 1 During these years even the regulation of tithe (agar nizamnamesi) was translated into Greek language. 2 Armenians, Jews and Maronites were favoured to the detriment of Greeks in officialdom. In fact, Greek intellectuals had been suffering slowly f r o m a brain drain, though in special professional branches of the army, officers and sailors of Greek origin were employed. At Easter the navy had to anchor in certain ports because of the Greek crews. 3 Therefore at the Naval Academy (Mekteb-i Bahriyye-yi §ahane) the Greek language was instructed to all of the students. In 1858 a certain Kostaki Bey was appointed to the Academy as instructor of Greek. 4 During these years, it would be hard to claim that the Ottoman political mind could evaluate the essence of Greek nationalism. Nationalist movements and the activity of bands are usually cited as e$kiya and eterya e§kiyasi,

and

5

countermeasures which had to be taken were not achieved on the spot. Both official documents and Ottoman historiography contain little knowledge of the political background and character of this movement and their contacts or position towards other Balkan nationalisms. The activities of Greek nationalist bands spurred Ottoman authorities to take some drastic countermeasures. In Thessaloniki alone, five leading persons were arrested in 1852. Therefore merchants and priests coming f r o m Greece to Ottoman ports were subjected to investigation. Suspected of subversive activities, some Greek neighbourhoods in Istanbul, such as Tatavla and Pangalti were subjected to military control in January 1854 and Izzet Pa§a was appointed as military-commander of B e y o g l u . 6 In the same year even in Beirut, the Greek colony of the town was put under strict control. Nationalist ideas spread widely among the Greeks of the Empire, leading the authorities to control every booklet and newspaper from Greece.

'B A, irade-Hariciye. Nr: 4000, selh-i Muh. 1268/October 1851, iracle-Hariciye. Nr: 3209 selh-i Receb 1266/May 1850. 2 B A, irade-Hariciye. Nr: 10 308, 25 Zilhicce 1277/July 1861. 3 B A, irade-Hariciye. Nr: 8997 14 R 1264/March 1848. 4 B A / D Nr: 27954-22 C. 1275/January 1859. 5 B A, irade-Hariciye. Nr: 3188, 12 Receb 1266/May 1850. irade-Dahiliye. Nr: 18295 selh-i Ca 1270/January 1854. See also Yunan Defteri. Nr. 236. 6

B A, Yunan Defteri. Nr: 238 of the year 1270 H/I854 and /rade Dahiliye. Nr: 18295 selh-i Ca 1270/January 1854 for the case of Beirut, Irade-Dahiliye. Nr: 18691, 1270 H/1854.

100

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

Greeks in the A e g e a n region and T r e b i z o n d e n j o y e d an e c o n o m i c renaissance. K y d o n i a (Ayvalik) and i z m i r w e r e t r a n s f o r m e d into cultural centers of Hellenism in Asia Minor, and a rich merchant class as well as rich G r e e k f a r m e r s emerged in small towns like P h o c e a (Foca). G r e e k s were represented in provincial councils (Meclis-i idare-i Vilayet and Meclis-i idare-i Liva), but now they had to share this new privilege with other non-Muslim millets. At times they were subjected to abuse by Muslim m e m b e r s of these councils, which raised protests f r o m the Patriarchate.' T h e bureaucracy of the Tanzimat period, especially in the provinces of R u m e l i a , had a cultural fringe. A good number of them had a k n o w l e d g e of G r e e k and Bulgarian. A s A h m e d Mithat E f e n d i , a f a m o u s writer of the Hamidian era mentions in one of his books, "European children have to learn f o r e i g n languages in school, but Ottoman children, T u r k s , A r m e n i a n s and G r e e k s of Istanbul pick u p their languages by playing with each o t h e r . . . " 2 A so-called book "Tuhfet'ul U§§ak-A Present f o r Children" by FevzT teaches Greek vocabulary in a poetic form to the T u r k s : Nam-i Hudadir Teos, a d e m e de antropos Dervi§e der asketis, evliya adi ayos (The n a m e of the God is Theos, and man is anthropos Dervish is askhetis, and evliya is agios)}

]

B A, irade Meclisi-Vala.

Nr: 226, 9 Za 1256/January 1841.

^Ahrned Midhat, Ana babamn evlad iizerindeki hukuk ve vezaifi. Dersaadet 1317/1899, pp. 724. A h m e d Midhat, Cocuk melekat-i uzviyye ve ruhiyyesi Dersaadet 1317/1899. ^Fevzf, Tuhfet'ul U^ak, f r o m A. S. I.evend, Divan Edebiyati, Istanbul 1943, p. 637.

LA PRESSE BULGARE À ISTANBUL ENTRE 1845 ET 1875

La presse bulgare parue dans l'Empire Ottoman mérite notre intérêt ; mais, curieusement, le fait n'a été qu'insuffisamment étudié par les Bulgares et il a été omis par les Turcs. Dans l'Empire, la presse s'est d'abord concentrée à ìzmir et à Istanbul. Ce n'est que plus tard que nous la voyons fleurir dans les provinces européennes, puis en relation avec les mouvements révolutionnaires roumain et serbe, enfin en Bulgarie même, où la presse ottomano-bulgare publiée sous l'égide de la Sublime Porte devient, en un mot, la presse officielle. A cet effet, l'importance de cette presse bulgare réside dans le fait qu'elle a été le pionnier du nationalisme naissant et le moteur du développement de la culture nationale. L'attitude de l'Empire Ottoman à cet égard présente aussi de l'intérêt. La presse en tant qu'institution est née sous la forme de Gazette, que lancèrent ici comme ailleurs, d'abord les commerçants. Mais en réalité les presses bulgare, grecque et arménienne sous l'Empire Ottoman, servirent aussi, au-delà du pur commerce, à révéler un phénomène linguistique, à donner les premières informations nationales et à poser les bases d'une histoire propre. En 1793 parut, à Vienne, le premier journal grec. Mais il fallut attendre longtemps avant que les Bulgares se lancent dans l'aventure, car, jusqu'au XIX e siècle, la bourgeoisie bulgare se considéra avant tout comme grecque. C'est en 1842 que parut à Izmir le premier journal Ljuboslovje publié par Konstantin Fotinov. Son titre même nous montre l'étendue de ses intérêts : histoire, géographie, agriculture, hygiène, etc. Ce journal fut teinté d'un ottomanisme bulgare modéré, ce que l'on constate à plusieurs endroits. Le style et les idées du quotidien de Fotinov ont une ressemblance remarquable avec ceux des hommes de lettres musulmans dans la périphérie de la Russie Tsariste au XIX e siècle. De la même manière, M. F. Ahundov en Azerbaïdjan et les djedidis en Crimée et en Asie centrale se concentrèrent sur l'éducation, la culture, l'histoire et la langue plutôt que sur la propagande politique et ont promu la civilisation contemporaine.

102

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

A première vue, le dé\ eloppement de l'éducation nationale est le sujet le plus important. Fotinov proclame dan> son premier numéro 1 : "toute nation se réveille, vit avec le savoir et prend sa place dans l'histoire de l'humanité. Q u e peuvent savoir ou apprendre nos frères bulgares ? Ils vont apprendre la géographie pour connaître leur pays, la g r a m m a i r e pour connaître leur langue, l'histoire pour connaître leur glorieux passé et leur avenir prometteur". Fotinov f u t suivi à deux ans d'intervalle par Ivan B o g o r o v d o n t le nationalisme apparaissait plus facilement dans son Bulgarski Orel. C e journal b e a u c o u p plus libéral avait p o u r devise : "CîraZdanstvo i s v o b o d n i e " ou "citoyenneté et administration libre et démocratique". Bogorov quitta Leipzig pour Istanbul, où il vint faire paraître en janvier 1848 le premier n u m é r o du fameux Tsarigradski Vestnik. Neofit Bozveli et Ilarion Makariopolski, luttaient alors à Istanbul pour une église bulgare indépendante. D'autre part, les artisans et les c o m m e r ç a n t s bulgares étaient déjà organisés. Bogorov arriva et travailla p o u r leur église indépendante. Son j o u r n a l , rédigé en langue vernaculaire, était i m p r i m é en ancien alphabet slavon 2 . Dès lors, Istanbul devint le siège incontestable de la presse bulgare. Quand Bogorov partit s'installer en Roumanie, deux autres écrivains bulgares, Hristos Topçilesçov (ou Topçipliste sur les d o c u m e n t s ottomans 3 ), et Kyros Petro (Slaveikov), d e m a n d è r e n t l'autorisation de f a i r e paraître un n o u v e a u journal : en 1862, ils publièrent Gaida. Ils adoptèrent un ton m o d é r é car ils craignaient l'Ambassade de Russie qui avait une attitude hostile au Patriarcat grec-orthodoxe, lequel ne voulait à aucun prix de l'indépendance de l'église nationale bulgare. Entre-temps, la publication des journaux en bulgare s'accrut dans les années 1847-50. Nous retrouvons dans les archives quelques demandes de patentes d'imprimeries bulgares 4 . Un des aspects particuliers de la presse bulgare réside dans le fait que, m ê m e si les rédacteurs des journaux étaient des spécialistes de l'ancien slavon, ils utilisaient dans leurs j o u r n a u x la langue vernaculaire bulgare c o m m e langue littéraire. "Écrivez comme vous p e n s e z . . . " , selon la célèbre m a x i m e des Slaves des pays balkaniques f o r m u l é par V u k Karaciç. Au contraire, les Cirées ont méprisé le parler quotidien et ont créé une langue néoclassique, c'est-à-dire le katarevousa...

1

Georgi BorSukov, la texte en bulgare Istorija na Bdlgarskata Zurnalistìka, Sofia, Nauka i Izk., 1976, h. 36. 2 Ibid„ pp. 61-63; Vi. N. N a i o v , Carigrad kato kulturen centarza BSlgarite do 1877 g., Sofia, S. BAN- 1925, XIX. + 200 p. 3 B a ? b . Ar ? . Ìrad-Har. 15 Safer 127') (12-VIII-1862) Nr: 11050. 4

B a § b . Ar§. Ìrad-Har. Nr: 2 4 6 2 année 1265 (1849) "Bazi B u l g a r i a n « tab'haneler ku§adina ruhsat istidasinda bulunduklarina dair tezkire-yi aliyye".

THE GREEKS AND OTTOMAN

ADMINISTRATION

103

En ce qui concerne la presse bulgare en Turquie, un autre événement eut une certaine influence, quoique passagère : ce fut la parution du quotidien Bulgarija édité par Dragon Tsankov. Le premier numéro est daté du 28 mars 1859. Tsankov croyait que la lutte contre l'église greco-orthodoxe n'était possible que par une église catholique quasi-indépendante de Rome, comme c'était d'ailleurs le cas des catholiques orientaux. On a d'un autre côté l'impresion que l'idée que le support de la France pouvait être obtenu par l'intermédiaire du catholicisme en Bulgarie est assez ancienne. 1 En effet, Tsankov lui-même avait obtenu l'appui des Bénédictins de Galata. A cet effet, la coopération avec un Polonais nommé Czaikowsky peut avoir une certaine importance. Bulgarija était le principal organe de propagande du mouvement catholique bulgare qui comptait quelques milliers de partisans vers la fin de 1860, à Thessalonique, Edirne et Istanbul ; il eut une influence décisive dans le recours à Rome que firent quelques milliers de Bulgares qui croyaient que, par des manifestations de rue à Istanbul, l'église et la culture bulgares réussiraient à récupérer leur indépendance. Tsankov coopérait de près avec la mission catholique à Istanbul. Cependant la diplomatie française n'a pas beaucoup apprécié ce mouvement, et, par conséquent, ne l'a pas supporté. 2 Il ne faut cependant pas nier l'influence de ce quotidien, plus spécialement à Istanbul, Edirne et en Macédoine. Dans les villes comme Istanbul, ìzmir et Edirne, le mouvement nationaliste bulgare, dans les années 1840-1860, se concentrait plutôt sur l'ouverture des écoles, sur l'indépendance de l'église et sur le service rendu par la presse à la culture nationale. Nous n'avons pas de détails sur les localités et la manière dont les quotidiens étaient publiés pendant cette période. Notre savoir se limite au fait que le Tsarigradski

Vestnik était imprimé dans une

imprimerie du Balkapamhan. Très probablement, cette imprimerie fut d'une importance capitale et le Tsarigradski

Vestnik

fut le phénomène le plus

important de la vie de la presse bulgare avant l'indépendance. Mais le quotidien défendit des opinions qui évoluèrent selon ses différents rédacteurs et propriétaires. A tel point qu'il y eut des moments où ce quotidien, qui servait au début la cause de l'église bulgare, a été amené à défendre des vues compatibles avec celles du Patriarcat du Phanar.

Ortayli, "Dejateljnost Bolgarskoj KatoliCeskoj Cerkvi", Pervi MeZdunaroden Kong, po BMgaristika, Sofia, 1982. vol. I, p. 66; Arch. M. Aff. Etr. C. P. Turquie, Amb. Girardin, 13 février 1686, vol. 18, p. 102. Engelhardt, Türkiye ve Tanzimat, trad: Ali Re§at, Istanbul, 1328, p. 159 ; M. Macdermott, A History of Bulgaria of Bulgaria, London, 1962, p. 158.; Borsukov, ibid., pp. 132-136.

104

S T U D I ES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

Cependant il faut avouer qu'il a accompli une fonction historique importante dans la promotion de la langue, de la culture et de l'histoire bulgares à Istanbul qui devint un centre important de diffusion de la culture bulgare à l'époque ottomane. Alexandre Ekzarh (Bayoglu) fut le rédacteur le plus connu de ce quotidien pendant et après la guerre de Crimée. Cet organe eut des opposants aussi bien au Patriarcat que parmi les Bulgares. Il y eut un autre quotidien bulgare qui parut dans les débuts des manifestations bulgares à Istanbul (lztocno Vreme). Comme on peut le déduire de son nom même, celui-ci fut une version bulgare du Levant Times édité par Hanley. Publié sous l'égide du Levant Times, il était édité dans le but de promouvoir la politique bulgare de la Grande-Bretagne. Le Progrès d'Orient avait fait l'annonce de sa parution dans son numéro du 8 septembre 1874 et, à l'occasion de cette parution, M. Elliot, ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne, déclarait dans son exposé du 10 septembre 1874 : "J'ai pu obtenir la permission de l'édition en langue bulgare de cet quotidien malgré la répugnance de la Sublime Porte. C'est suite à ladite permission que Mr. Hanley (propriétaire du Levant Times) a entrepris cette expérience" 1 . I.e rédacteur du quotidien semble avoir été Petko Sandov. Bien que l'expansion hors du territoire impérial de la presse bulgare soit au-delà de notre domaine immédiat, il est à souligner qu'elle fut très intéressante et qu'elle présenta un caractère tout à fait original. Cette période se termina avec le quotidien bulgare publié officiellement par l'administration ottomane, opposée à ladite presse. Nul n'ignore que Rakovski lança en Serbie Dunavski Lebed. En 1850 parut à Vienne Mirozrenie

(ou Weltanschauung,

un terme très utilisé par les

révolutionnaires nationalistes de l'Empire). Ce journal était slavophile sous la direction de Ivan Dobrovsky. Une presse donc, négligée par les historiens, prit son essor : vers 1860, parut le premier des journaux macédoniens marqué d'une idéologie macédonienne. En Roumanie paraissaient les journaux de Karavelov et Botev, de tendance radicale. Entre 1844 et 1870 parurent successivement environ 70 journaux.

' P R O -F 0: 78, Nr: 3197, report of amb. Elliot to Lord Derby ; 10 Sept. 1874, "The Porte although rather unwillingly in c o n s e q u e n c e of m y representations consented to allow the Bulgarian edition of the paper to be published...".

THE G R E E K S AND O T T O M A N

ADMINISTRATION

105

En face de toutes ces activités de la presse bulgare en Serbie et en Roumanie, Midhat Pa§a, alors gouverneur de la province du Danube, fit paraître un journal officiel, le Tuna-Dunav qui ne fut soumis à aucune étude jusqu'à ce jour. Son but était l'ottomanisme et non pas le nationalisme turc, ce qui reflétait l'idéologie de l'Etat même. Les informations régionales étaient importantes mais on y sentait quand même la marque de la culture bulgare et du patriotisme ottomano-bulgare. Par détour, la presse bulgare regagnait la Bulgarie. C'était les prémisses du recouvrement de l'indépendance bulgare qui se réalisa après le Congrès de Berlin.

LE TANZÎMAT ET LE MODÈLE FRANÇAIS MIMÉTISME OU ADAPTATION ?

Le mot Tanzimat correspond à la «réorganisation» dans l'esprit bureaucratique moderne de même que dans le langage ottoman. Pourtant, on voit que ce terme était conçu et employé par des juristes de l'époque dans le sens de «législation». Par exemple, Young est, entre autres, l'un des auteurs qui l'a employé dans cette acception 1 . En effet, il apparaît que ce terme, dans celle qu'il avait à l'époque, recouvre une série de réformes administratives destinées à renforcer le centralisme par le moyen d'un mouvement de codification plutôt qu'une réorganisation simple et ordinaire du régime politique dans des domaines comme l'éducation, la vie culturelle et l'économie. Mais on ne peut pas dire par là que le but des réformes ottomanes appelées Tanzimat était de mettre en place un régime politique ouvert à la participation des sujets. Il consistait plutôt à prendre des mesures, appelées garanties, en faveur des individus, comme la légalité des impôts, la lutte contre le gâchis des deniers publics, l'inviolabilité de la vie et de la propriété. Par ces moyens, on voulait adoucir les inconvénients d'un régime despotique. 11 s'ensuit d'ailleurs que le Tanzimat était qualifié par d'aucuns de «despotisme éclairé», à l'instar du régime de Frédéric le Grand. Il convient de souligner d'autre part que les politiques de l'époque étaient enclins à adopter le modèle administratif européen préconisé par Metternich 2 . Ils annonçaient comme but des réformes entreprises la sûreté, la propriété et la liberté du commerce et de l'industrie. L'édit célèbre du 3 novembre 1839 et les écrits des hommes politiques témoignent de ces idées. On peut citer comme exemple les idées de Sadik Rifat Passa (1807-1857) diplomate et homme d'État célèbre de l'époque du Tanzimat : Pour nous, la question fondamentale est l'accroissement de la population, la reconstruction du pays et le maintien de l'ordre public. En Europe, nul gouvernement ou administration n'ose jamais agir malgré et contre les lois. Le recrutement des inscrits se fait en respectant les limites légales, l'impôt de même. La poursuite des affaires dans les administrations ne donne jamais lieu à la corruption, la

^G. Young, Corps du droit ottoman, I, Paris, 1905, p. 1. Î . Ortayli, «Tanzimat biirokratlari ve Metternich», Fehmi Yavuz Armagam, 362 sq. 2

Ankara 1983, p.

108

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

nomination des fonctionnaires se fait selon leur aptitude et la procédure disciplinaire empêche la correction illégale. L'éducation est considérée comme très importante, car les sujets d'un État qui ne savent ni lire, ni écrire n'ont pas le droit d'exister à ce titre. Dans ces pays l'inviolabilité des domiciles et la liberté de voyage sont des droits reconnus. Comme le remarque Hrciiment Kuran, Sadik Rifat Pa§a fut le premier dans la littérature politique ottomane à souligner le principe de «la soumission du souverain aux droits de la nation». Dans la théorie de l'Islam on ne voit jamais de tel principe, à part «la soumission à la Chariat (§eriat-i garra)» qui s'est développée dans la période classique 1 . On peut dire par là que, dans l'esprit des bureaucrates de l'époque du Tanzimat se dessinait progressivement l'idée de l'adoption du droit moderne. Le contenu et les limites de cette adoption et le problème de l'adaptation des structures constitue un vaste sujet soulevant des débats divers qui doivent éclairer ce tournant décisif de l'histoire de la Turquie. Cependant, il est certain que l'Empire s'était engagé dans la voie de réformes en vue d'établir un centralisme renforcé. A la fin du dix-huitième siècle, d'une part la structure décadente du régime qu'on constatait à travers le système économique basé sur le fief militaire amena sur le devant de la scène des autorités locales rebelles et, d'autre part, les mouvements nationalistes brûlants dans les Balkans causèrent de sérieuses préoccupations aux bureaucrates de la Sublime Porte. Us croyaient fermement qu'un mouvement de ré-organisation juridique ei administrative s'imposait pour faire face aux difficultés menaçant la vie de l'Empire. En outre, la réussite du soulèvement grec et la rebellion de Mehmed Ali Pa§a d'Egypte constituaient deux problèmes redoutables. L'administration centrale éprouvait vivement le besoin de procéder à une série de réformes tendant à empêcher la dissolution de l'Empire, à renforcer les finances publiques pour répondre aux besoins de l'armée moderne qui remplaçait le corps des janissaires aboli et dissous en 1826, enfin à remédier aux carences des services publics qui s'aggravaient de plus en plus. On peut dire en bref qu'on envisageait le changement des institutions en fondant celles-ci sur le principe du centralisme et que, pour centraliser, il fallait mettre en place des lois pouvant être rendues effectives sur l'ensemble du territoire. Cette idée du centralisme accompagné de la légalité n'impliquait nullement l'idée de la liberté et ce n'était pas par hasard que les réformistes du Tanzimat admiraient Metternich. S'ils optèrent pour le modèle du centralisme français, c'est que la France faisait survivre l'héritage de l'Ancien Régime dans la voie du centralisme. Ce mode de réflexion, qui n'est pas sans rappeler celui d'Alexis de Tocqueville dans L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution, était aussi celui des bureaucrates de la Sublime Porte qui considéraient la Révolution 'Erciiment Kuran, «Osmanli imparatorlugunda Insan Haklari ve Sadik Rifat Pa§a», Turk Kongresi VIII/2, Ankara 1981, pp. 14.52-53.

Tarih

LE

T AN Zi M AT

ET

LE

MODÈLE

FRANÇAIS

109

française et l'idéologie républicaine comme les deux choses les plus haïssables, mais le centralisme était tout autre, faisant partie de la tradition de la m o n a r c h i e . A leurs yeux le c e n t r a l i s m e était le principe m o t e u r des institutions à renouveler. Ainsi peut-on leur donner raison, puisqu'on admet de nos jours que le droit administratif moderne propre à la France est, en fait, le produit du centralisme français 1 . Et ce n'est pas une simple coïncidence si le centralisme ottoman du milieu du dix-neuvième siècle adopta un système proche de celui de la France dans les domaines du droit pénal, du droit de police et du droit administratif. Les officiers ottomans s'étaient même habillés à la française. Comment peut-on expliquer ce phénomène ? Pour d'aucuns, c'était l'imitation pure et simple du système français. En effet, l'influence française sur les réformes du Tanzimat, si on la prend en tant que facteur dominant, est en quelque sorte un mythe assez, voire trop répété par nombre d'historiens turcs. On peut ajouter également que les diplomates français du dix-neuvième siècle n'y ont pas moins contribué. Il ne f a u t pas non plus oublier les contributions à ce sujet des autres diplomates en poste en Turquie à cette époque. On voit abondamment dans les mémoires et rapports envoyés aux capitales européennes que les vertus de l'Occident ont j o u é beaucoup dans la construction de la nouvelle société ottomane. Citons un exemple, entre autres, remarquable de ce point de vue, celui de l'ambassadeur britannique Stratford Canning, qui marque le comble de l'exagération. En effet, à le lire, on croirait que c'était lui qui avait modernisé l'Empire ottoman. Quant au ministre plénipotentiaire de France, Edouard Engelhardt, il estimait pour sa part que c'était la France qui orientait le mouvement du Tanzimat, ainsi qu'il l'écrit dans son ouvrage La Turquie et le Tanzimat. A j o u t o n s tout de suite que les diplomates étrangers en question ne sont pas parvenus à de telles convictions de manière spontanée, pour ne pas dire ex machina. Les compliments des bureaucrates de la Sublime Porte, souvent loins d'être sincères, les incitaient à écrire de la sorte. En effet, le pacha du Tanzimat ne se souciait guère de dire à son interlocuteur étranger, qu'il fût français, anglais ou autrichien, que «c'était son système qu'on suivait». Pour l'homme d'État ottoman, c'est en cela que consistait la finesse de l'art diplomatique. En réalité, on était peu conscient du fait qu'on pratiquait l'astuce orientale. Parfois, les témoins célèbres de l'époque, c o m m e Engelhardt, eurent recours à des mensonges innocents pour corroborer leur point de vue. Par exemple, à en croire ce dernier, Metternich aurait dit, dans une dépêche envoyé à l'ambassadeur autrichien, que «le Tanzimat était de l'intrigue française». De ce fait, il n'hésite pas à le ranger parmi les détracteurs du Tanzimat. En fait, ni la dépêche en question, ni son destinataire, ni la date ne paraissent correspondre à la réalité. C o m m e le montre l'étude du Prof. Cemil Bilsel, contrairement à ce qu'on dit, Metternich était sympathisant du Tanzimat, il l'approuvait pleinement 2 . On peut se demander ce qu'Engelhardt

^André Deraichel, Le droit administratif, Paris, LGDJ, 1978, p. 13. Cf. Cernii Bilsel, «Harici Siyaset», Tanzimat, I, Istanbul, 1940, p. 667.

2

110

S T U D I E S

ON

() I T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

voulait obtenir avec un tel scénario. On l'ignore. Peut-être voulait-il mettre en valeur la diplomatie française, fût-ce en induisant en erreur ses supérieurs et quelques historiens de nos jours. Cependant, on ne peut pas nier l'importance d e l'influence française sur le T a n z i m a t , mais la d i f f i c u l t é est d e m e s u r e r sa portée réelle. Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas un p r o b l è m e p r o p r e au cas o t t o m a n . En e f f e t , les g r a n d s systèmes administratifs adoptés en bloc par les pays dont l'histoire enregistre un tel p h é n o m è n e p o u r la p r e m i è r e f o i s est une question qui p r é o c c u p e toujours les «administrativistes». M. G e o r g e s L a n g r o d a étudié ce p h é n o m è n e sous le nom de « m i m é t i s m e administratif» en ce qui concerne les j e u n e s pays africains. Il en ressort q u e le m i m é t i s m e administratif consiste à «opter pour un m o d è l e étranger, paraissant se prêter le m i e u x aux besoins réels du pays d é t e r m i n é » 1 . M a i s le j u g e m e n t sur l'adéquation du s y s t è m e i m p o r t é aux réalités du pays en question est é m i s par un n o m b r e restreint d ' h o m m e s politiques. C'est là q u e réside le caractère souvent illusoire des r é f o r m e s qui y sont entreprises. A partir de ce cadre théorique peut-on avancer que, dans le cas o t t o m a n é g a l e m e n t , il s'agit à la fois de m a c r o et m i c r o - m i m é t i s m e s ? En effet, on peut y voir dans certains secteurs le m o d è l e français, tandis que dans d'autres se fait sentir l'influence allemande ou anglaise. Mais il convient de se d e m a n d e r si, d a n s le c a s o t t o m a n il s'agit r é e l l e m e n t d e m i m é t i s m e ou d'imitation ou si l'on peut dire qu'il s'agit plutôt de l'adaptation d e s structures e x i s t a n t e s . N o u s p e n c h o n s pour le s e c o n d point de vue et p e n s o n s qu'il convient de réfuter la thèse du mimétisme. D a n s les études historiques, si l'on s'attache fidèlement aux termes d'un c a d r e t h é o r i q u e tracé a v a n t d ' a f f r o n t e r l ' a n a l y s e d e s d o n n é e s , il d e v i e n t inévitable de changer ou de rectifier le cadre conceptuel choisi auparavant, car les données de la recherche obligent de le faire pour que celle-ci aboutisse à des résultats concordants avec ce qu'on sait par ailleurs. Dans le cas du T a n z i m a t , la m ê m e chose se produit si on regarde de près les réformes ottomanes du dixn e u v i è m e siècle. M ê m e si I on part de la thèse d e l'imitation, on arrive à la conclusion que les h o m m e s d'État de l'époque tenaient c o m p t e de conditions politiques et é c o n o m i q u e s particulières et forgèrent leurs idées en fonction de leur époque. 11 faut évaluer le rôle du système français dans ce contexte. Pour eux, le m o d è l e français comportait trois particularités attirant leur attention. P r e m i è r e m e n t , la langue française était de portée universelle. D e u x i è m e m e n t , le système juridique français avait réalisé des codes modernes enviables. Enfin, la F r a n c e était d o t é e d'un s y s t è m e a d m i n i s t r a t i f c e n t r a l i s é m o d e r n e . En particulier, il f a u t souligner l'importance de la codification. En adoptant celleci à l'instar de la France, le centralisme revivifié de l'Empire ottoman devait

^Georges Langrod, «Genèse et conséquences du mimétisme administratif en Afrique». Internationale des Sciences Administratives, 1973, 1, p. 120.

Revue

LE

T AN ZI M AT

ET

LE

MODÈLE

FRANÇAIS

111

acquérir un caractère compéhensible, tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur, face au monde occidental. Prenons quelques exemples pour démontrer que ce processus se déroula par étapes progressives avec des tâtonnements. En 1838 sous M a h m u d II, deux ordonnances ( k a n u n n a m e ) f u r e n t promulguées. Il s'agissait de la mise en place des lois pénales relatives à la fonction publique. En fait, ces ordonnances en forme de charte (ferman) n'avaient pas juridiquement qualité de lois. Autrement dit, la forme ancienne étant gardée, on tentait de renouveler le contenu. En effet, le premier texte prévoyait pour la première fois une procédure pénale pour les fonctionnaires. Le deuxième était relatif à l'abolition de la confiscation arbitraire appliquée jusqu'alors sur les biens de ceux-ci. Ces deux textes peuvent être considérés c o m m e les prémisses de la grande charte du Tanzimat qui proclama ces garanties pour l'ensemble des sujets ottomans. En mai 1840 f u t promulguée une loi interdisant à l'ensemble de l'exécutif, y compris le Sultan et les vizirs, de prononcer des peines à l'égard des individus. La nouveauté principale en ce domaine f u t réalisée le 9 août 1858 avec la promulgation du code pénal ottoman, élaboré lui-même d'après le code pénal français de 1810. Ce code, basé sur l'égalité sans distinction de religion, était alors l'unique exemple à suivre. Cependant, le code ottoman fit une exception au principe laïque du modèle original. On y reconnaît en effet au parti plaideur le droit de porter la procédure devant la cour de l'ordre de sa religion, et cela malgré la compétence exclusive de l'ouverture de la procédure reconnue au ministère public. L'influence française sur le droit pénal continua longtemps. En 1879, on adopta un code de procédure pénale calqué sur le code français de 1808. L'adoption d'un code de procédure moderne nécessitait la création d'autres institutions voisines c o m m e le ministère public, la profession d'avocat et le notariat, et cela ne tarda guère. La m ê m e année f u t adopté également le code de procédure civile d'après le modèle français de 1807. Le principe de l'égalité devant la loi, pour être applicable dans une société réunissant presque toutes les religions, nécessitait l'adoption d'un modèle laïque qui était celui de la France de cette époque. En réalité, il faut souligner que les bureaucrates ottomans du dixneuvième siècle étaient assez au courant des mouvements de codification en Europe pour ne pas prendre uniquement tel pays c o m m e modèle. Ce f u t un principe s c r u p u l e u s e m e n t

suivi non s e u l e m e n t lorsqu'il

s'agissait

de

l'élaboration de codes, mais aussi pour des mesures de moindre envergure, comme un règlement de sapeurs pompiers. Il convient de préciser à ce propos que Je règlement des services d'incendie municipaux fut préparé sur le modèle de celui qui était alors en vigueur en Hongrie.

112

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

En bref, il s'agissait toujours d'adapter en tenant c o m p t e de facteurs déterminants et, selon le cas, on choisissait la législation de tel pays. Parfois on apportait des modifications essentielles au texte pris c o m m e modèle. Il en f u t ainsi pour le texte de la loi foncière de 1858. C e texte, rédigé selon les principes du droit romain, était entièrement ottoman quant à son contenu 1 . A u moment où le m o n d e ottoman s'ouvrait vers l'extérieur, on pouvait s'attendre à ce qu'on se réfère au droit anglais, du fait de la prédominance anglosaxonne dans le c o m m e r c e extérieur. Mais le droit anglais se prêtant mal à une adoption telle quelle à cause de son caractère empirique, on dut prendre c o m m e modèle le code de c o m m e r c e français de 1807. En 1850, avec la promulgation du code de commerce ( K a n u n n a m e - i Ticaret), des innovations c o m m e l'intérêt et les sociétés commerciales impliquant des pratiques interdites par le droit islamique amenèrent la création des tribunaux de commerce chargés de résoudre des conflits surgis de ces nouveaux types de relations. En conséquence, on mit en vigueur également un règlement de procédure commerciale. Conjointement à cette évolution, en 1863, on mit au point sur le modèle français un code de c o m m e r c e maritime. Précisons que ce dernier n'était pas une traduction littérale du texte français, car il contenait des dispositions diverses provenant des textes anglais, espagnol et hanséatique. La raison pour laquelle le Tanzimat f u t dit «à la française», injustement à nos yeux, doit être recherchée dans le fait qu'à première vue, la réorganisation administrative en donnait l'impression. L'organisation des affaires extérieures en est un exemple frappant. Pourtant, si on regarde de près, l'organigramme du ministère conservait en grande partie la structure ancienne en usage à la S u b l i m e Porte. D e plus, il convient d'admettre qu'en ce d o m a i n e l'influence française était prépondérante partout en Europe. Si on veut résumer, le goût et la tendance au centralisme des réformistes ottomans ont été à l'origine de ce qu'on c r i t i q u e a u j o u r d ' h u i i n j u s t e m e n t c o m m e une imitation g l o b a l e de l'administration française. En vérité, les efforts de centralisation débutent bien avant le T a n z i m a t et le centralisme qu'on tentait de renforcer avait des traits c o m m u n s avec celui qu'essaya au dix-huitième siècle la Russie de Pierre le Grand. Si on revient aux r é f o r m e s du dix-neuvième siècle, sous le règne de M a h m u d II f u t créé un conseil chargé d'élaborer les lois, de juger les fonctionnaires et de résoudre les litiges administratifs. Il s'appelait «Haut conseil des décisions j u d i c i a i r e s » (Meclis-i Vala-yi Ahkâm-i Adliye). En 1854 un autre conseil f u t créé sous le n o m de «Haut conseil du Tanzimat» (Mectis-i Âli-i Tanzimat), qui était chargé de l'élaboration des lois. En 1868, deux hautes juridictions virent le j o u r . La première qui s'appelait «Cour des décisions judiciaires» ( D i v a n - i Ahkâm-i Adliye) était chargé de la cassation civile. L'autre, le «Conseil d'État» (§ura-yi Devlet), ressemblait au Conseil d'État français. Ce dernier fonctionna jusqu'à la fin de l'Empire.

' c . Ûçok, A. Mumcu, Türk Hukuk Tnrthi, Ankara, 1976, p. 324.

LE

TA NZÍ

M AT

ET

LE

MODÈLE

FRANÇAIS

113

Pour l'organisation des services extérieurs de l'administration centrale, un règlement de 1864 créa trois échelons de circonscriptions administratives : vilâyet, Uva et kaza. Vilâyet et kaza peuvent être considérés c o m m e équivalents de «département» et «arrondissement». Bien que le modèle fut le système français basé sur le département, il s'agissait en fait du renouvellement du système ottoman classique qui comprenait une telle division tripartite, fortement centralisée. C'est ce caractère qui facilita l'adoption du système français. En 1871, on étendit la nouvelle organisation des services extérieurs à l'ensemble du territoire ottoman par un règlement modifiant et complétant en détail l'organisation de 1864. Ainsi se trouvèrent créés dans les vilâyets et les autres circonscriptions des conseils d'administration mixtes formés par des fonctionnaires et par des élus locaux. Principalement chargés des affaires consultatives, ces organes avaient le rôle de juridiction pénale pour ce qui relevait du droit pénal des fonctionnaires, et administrative pour ce qui est du droit administratif appliqué dans les litiges entre l'État et les particuliers. Ce système des services extérieurs ainsi mis en place paraissait conforme à l'exemple français, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les pouvoirs du contrôle hiérarchique reconnu aux préfets. Mais, dès le principe, le système différait beaucoup du système communal français, car l'administration communale ottomane était entièrement centralisée, ne permettant pas l'exercice des libertés locales. Le seul élément de liberté locale était l'élection du dirigeant de la commune rurale (kôy) qui s'appelait muhtar. Sauf pour son élection, le muhtar ne ressemblait en aucun point au maire français. Comme en milieu rural, le système communal n'était pas appliqué non plus dans les villes. L'administration des villes fonctionnait par le biais des commissions municipales nommées et contrôlées par le gouvernement. Les villes, en tant que municipalités, n'étaient pas non plus dotées de personnalité morale. Ce n'est qu'après 1876 qu'une loi les reconnut comme personnes morales, mais leur autonomie financière et administrative était très restreinte. Le despotisme éclairé évitait soigneusement la participation politico-administrative et la liberté locale qui étaient pourtant dans la logique du système pris comme modèle. L'un des exemples montrant la tendance autoritaire du régime ottoman est la loi de police de 1845 qui fut rédigée en partie d'après le texte de l'ordonnance de police du 12 Messidor An VIII (1 e r juillet 1800) 1 . A côté de l'autoritarisme, les raisons de cette inspiration peuvent être expliquées par le fait que l'administration ottomane voulait renforcer son centralisme et que la France en était le meilleur exemple. La logique du système otoman consistait à renforcer le pouvoir central. L'interdiction de la grève, qui n'avait pas grand sens pour le pays ottoman où la classe ouvrière ne s'était pas encore affirmée,

Ici. à ce propos M. Giilmez, «Polis Órgütüniin Ilk Kurulus ve Kaynagi», Amme Idaresi Deruisi, Cilt 16, Sayi 4, Aralik 1984, pp. 3-15.

114

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

prouve l'attitude autoritaire de l'administration. Tandis que le texte français contenait les garanties d'habeas corpus juxtaposées aux prérogatives de la police, le texte ottoman n'\ faisait même pas allusion. L'existence de la censure sur la presse était une autre caractéristique de l'administration ottomane du dix-neuvième siècle. Balbie, soulignant ce caractère, ajoute qu'il était normal que les administrations des pays de l'Orient comme l'Empire Ottoman et la Russie impériale donnent place à cette institution 1 . En fait, au lieu de rechercher et de mesurer l'influence de tel ou tel pays sur le Tanzimat, il convient de placer celui-ci dans un contexte qui dépasse ce niveau. C'est l'adoption du système du droit romain qui créa un problème de dualisme au sujet du droit appliquable dans un pays imprégné du droit islamique. 2 Avant tout dans les affaires civiles, la société ottomane gardait encore ses structures juridiques anciennes. Pour mettre fin au dualisme qui consistait à appliquer le droit islamique en tant que droit privé et le droit romain dans le domaine du droit public, le grand vizir Âli Pa§a proposa en 1860 l'adoption du code civil français. Cette proposition se heurta aux rudes oppositions des milieux conservateurs. Par la suite, on adopta comme réforme dans ce domaine le projet, préparé par Ahmed Cevdel Pa§a, de la codification des règles existantes diverses. Il s'agissait plutôt d une compilation des règles de droit privé, excepté le droit de la famille, sous le nom de Mecelle-i Ahkâm-i Adliye (Code de droit judiciaire). Cette loi, qui n'awiit pas réellement un caractère de codification car la théorie du droit islamique n'admet jamais la modification de la jurisprudence, est restée en vigueur dans quelques pays islamiques jusqu'à nos jours. Quant au domaine du droit de la famille, les efforts de modernisation ne purent y toucher. Les Jeunes-Turcs lentèrent, en 1917, de mettre en vigueur une ordonnance du droit familial (Hukuk-u Aile Kararnamesi), mais ce texte à caractère éclectique ne fut pas mis en application. Après l'instauration de la République, on voulut adopter en 1926 le code civil français. Auparavant, on avait pensé au code civil allemand, mais on choisit finalement le texte français du code civil suisse. La prédominance du français en tant que langue utilisée pour l'étude des législations étrangères, la formation francophone des juristes turcs, leur référence à la jurisprudence française et l'admiration qu'ils lui portaient jouèrent sans doute un rôle dans cette évolution. L'intellectuel du Tan/imat avait une conception éclectique. Parfois, cet éclectisme allait jusqu'au point de confondre les systèmes divers en un tout. Il admettait, par exemple, qu'on pouvait concilier le parlementarisme et le régime ' a . Batbie, Traité théorique et pratique de droit public et administratif, 2' édition, Paris, 1885, p. 187. 2 Ü l k ü A z r a k , «Die Entstehung des modernen R e c h t s w e s e n s in der Türkei» éd. Pia Göktürk, Werdegang der modernen Türkei, 1983, pp. 38-39.

LE

TANZiM

AT

ET

LE

MODÈLE

FRANÇAIS

115

constitutionnel européen avec les institutions islamiques, car, à ses yeux, l'Islam embrassait tout ce qui était moderne. Pour l'esprit ottoman, le parlementarisme n'était pas autre chose que le principe «mashawaraconsultation» islamique, pourtant, on méconnaissait par là que le mashawara était conçu pour les musulmans et que, pour les non-musulmans, il n'en était pas question. On méconnaissait également le fait que l'Islam n'admet le principe de l'égalité que lorsqu'il s'agit de rapports juridiques entre musulmans. Midhat Pa§a, considéré comme le père de la Constitution de 1876, expose franchement cette conception des choses dans un texte rédigé pendant son exil : Il est notoire que le principe de l'islamisme est fondé sur la base de la démocratie et de la liberté. Or, le système du gouvernemennt ottoman est conforme à ce principe ; de là, la liberté individuelle et l'égalité devant la loi de tous les sujets ottomans. C'est en vertu de ce même principe que toutes les religions ont, de tout temps, joui en Turquie de la sécurité ainsi que de la plénitude de leur liberté, soit pour exercer leur culte, soit pour gérer à leur gré les intérêts de leurs communautés respectives 1 . L'incohérence dans la logique de ces idées propres à l'intellectuel ottoman du dix-neuvième siècle, et qui n'ont jamais été discutées alors, n'est pas de nature corrigible, même par le fait de la représentation des nonmusulmans au Parlement ottoman à côté des députés musulmans. Le perfectionnisme de l'Islam était un sujet hors de discussion. Il était courant chez les intellectuels ottomans, sauf chez quelques partisans radicaux de l'occidentalisation comme Abdullah Cevdet, de relier l'européanisation à l'Islam et de trouver l'explication de l'adaptation dans les valeurs et dans les institutions traditionnelles ottomanes. Cette attitude et ce mode de réflexion valent aussi bien pour les libéraux-progressistes que pour les conservateurs hostiles à l'occidentalisation. Par exemple, on connaît bien l'hostilité de Cevdet Pa§a, qui qualifiait Midhat Pa§a de «nuisible à l'État et à la religion», envers la Révolution française et les institutions qui en découlent. 11 était pourtant admirateur de l'évolutionnisme parlementaire anglais et avait consacré un chapitre à l'évolution des parlementarismes anglais et français dans son ouvrage sur l'histoire de l'Europe 2 . Cependant, l'intellectuel ottoman n'avait pas étudié intensivement la théorie politique ni la philosophie juridique qui ont donné naissance au droit anglo-saxon et à ses institutions. Par contre, il se sentait proche du système continental européen, en particulier du système français dont il avait étudié l'origine et les théories juridiques et, en conséquence il adopta progressivement la pensée politique française. On peut dire que l'intellectuel ottoman du dix-neuvième siècle, volontairement ou non, 1 2

Midhat Pacha, La Turquie, son passé, son avenir, Paris 1901, p. 13. Cevdet, Tarih, Vol. 1, p. 220.

116

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

ancra dans la littérature des idées politiques f r a n ç a i s e s . C e v d e t Pa§a, qui connaissait Rousseau et les autres mi par lecture, mi par ouï-dire, ne leur épargne pas ses critiques. Quant à Abdullah Cevdet, il allait jusqu'à parler de «la France, mère spirituelle». Pour ce qui est de la France, on peut a f f i r m e r que, des Saint-Simoniens jusqu'aux positivistes, ses intellectuels n'ont cessé de s'intéresser au sort de l'Hmpire o t t o m a n 1 . L'influence française peut être e x p l i q u é e à travers la formation de l'intellectuel ottoman. M ê m e le Prince Sabahattin et ses adeptes, qui f u r e n t adversaires farouches du centralisme, avaient forgé leurs idées décentralisatrices non pas en se référant directement à la l i t t é r a t u r e a n g l o - s a x o n n e ,

m a i s p a r le biais des m i l i e u x

français

anglophones. L ' e x e m p l e le plus significatif de l'adaptation est la Constitution de 1876 qui resta en vigueur jusqu'à la fin de la monarchie. La commission des travaux préparatoires avait passé en revue toutes les constitutions européennes. Said Pa§a, maintes fois premier ministre sous Abdiilhamit II jusqu'à l'époque des Jeunes-Turcs, y déposa un projet qui était, en fait, la traduction des lois constitutionnelles françaises de l'époque. D a n s le texte, la monnaie était m ê m e laissée en francs. Mais, en revanche, les termes «République» et «président de la République» étaient rayés. Pourtant, le texte adopté n'était nullement une reproduction d e s textes belge ou prussien, c o m m e d'aucuns le prétendent. C o m m e le remarque à juste titre le professeur T u n a y a : «La Constitution de 1876 était à cent pour cent ottomane, jusqu'au célèbre article 113 qui donnait au Sultan le pouvoir d'envoyer en exil quiconque lui paraissait suspect 2 ». Le P a r l e m e n t créé sur la base de cette constitution n'avait pas de r è g l e m e n t intérieur écrit, mais les t r a u i u x parlementaires s'y déroulaient a v e c rigueur grâce aux f o r m u l e s traditionnelles, issues des conseils a d m i n i s t r a t i f s des provinces. Pour conclure, on peut dire qu'il s'agissait réellement d'un m o u v e m e n t authentique de réformes, d'une réorganisation selon le modèle français. On peut dire également que la pensée politique française s'introduisit et fut accueillie dans l'Empire Ottoman en suivant la voie des réformes juridiques. Ceci paraît le plus intéressant processus des réformes ottomanes.

1 Marcel Emerit, «Les Saint-Simoniens en Grèce et en Turquie», Revue d'Etudes du Sud-Est Européen, Bucarest, 1975, XIII/2. pp. 241-251. Voir également liber Ortayli, «Mustafa Reçit, Midhat Pa§a ve Pozitivistler», Tarin ve Toplum, 1985/14, p. 102 sq.

^T. Zafer Tunaya, «1876 ve Turkiye'de Anayasa Gelenegi», Tanzimattan Ansiklopedisi, I, p. 28.

Cumhuriyete

Tttrkiye

FROM THE OTTOMAN EXPERIMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL PARLIAMENT OF 1876-77

It would be an exaggeration to speak of a rich tradition of local government, reaching deep down into the past, in Turkish history. The ability of urban or rural communities to undertake autonomous action and to set up their own organs of government was a relatively recent phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire, as indeed in many other countries (with the very limited exception of certain parts of medieval Europe). Nevertheless, some authors have made much of, for example, the say that craft guilds had in urban administration, or the fact that the city of Ankara was run by the Akhis until the fifteenth century — to the point of arguing that religious orders like the Akhis represented a certain tradition of local government. It is difficult to regard such claims as resting on careful study of the available documentation, which reveal no evidence of any institutionalization nor hence of any continuity in local government. It is not on craft guilds or religious orders but on economic and financial autonomy that local government should be based, and it should be capable of sustaining itself by incorporating local resident as citizens into that institutional framework. But such processes were very late in setting in under Ottoman administration. 1 Pretty much the same holds true for the non-Muslim millets, it is worth noting, for Ottoman society incorporated a number of self-enclosed religious communities that were saddled with certain legal, financial and administrative responsibilities, and which organized among themselves to take care of education or social welfare. Consequently, this millet system, too, has been regarded as constitutive of a certain tradition of local government, with much attention centering on the autonomy of the Greek or the Armenian patriarchate. On balance, however, the millet system represented no more than an organizational model based on the compartmentalization engendered through the over-whelmingly religious definition of social identity, while local government is a society of free citizens in embryonic form and hence also the beginning of the transition out of communitas. Yet in the Ottoman Empire, no Christian ethnicity or region coming under the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate enjoyed any financial-administrative nor for that matter any cultural autonomy, for from the Christians of the Arab provinces to the

' t . Ortayli, Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Yerel Yonetim Gelenegi, Istanbul 1985, p. 15-18.

118

S T U D I E S

ON

O T T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

Serbian, Bulgarian and Albanian Orthodox Christians of the B a l k a n s , the Patriarchate itself was the only Christian c o m m u n i t y that was recognized as a c o m m u n i t y and accorded autonomy. Subordinate groups or c o m m u n a l units did not possess any secular organisations other than the patriarchate; the Eastern Church, moreover, did not leave any scope f o r the parish or Pfarrtum to exist as a lower unit of organization. It w a s only the administrative r e f o r m s of the T a n z i m a t era, therefore, that prepared the ground for the e m e r g e n c e of local government in territories held by the Ottoman Empire. The top bureaucrats of this period did not appear to be interested in f o s t e r i n g political d e m o c r a c y or in i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g mechanisms of popular participation; they were, instead, only concerned about creating an administrative structure and e n v i r o n m e n t that would be based on legality, function well, and induce economic prosperity and development, we have noted elsewhere. 1 And to that end they took as their model not British parliamen-tarianism

or French

republicanism,

but

probably

a

more

authoritarian system of successful administration, such as that represented by Metternichian Austria. It is safe to say, hence, that it was only in context of efforts at financial reform that the central bureaucracy e m b a r k e d upon its first e x p e r i m e n t s in local government. T h u s when Istanbul tried to abolish the iltizam system of tax-farming, this initially led them into an attempt to have taxes collected not by the miiltezims, which were a kind of contractor, but the officials in each sancak, w h o would be helped in this regard by the local people. A d e c r e e ordered so-called councils of muhassih (or collection councils) to be set up, composed of an appointed muhassil (tax-collector) and his deputies as well as the local j u d g e , mtiftii, top military c o m m a n d e r and religious leaders plus six local notables elected by the said notables themselves f r o m a m o n g their o w n ranks. Their method of election was described in the following way in the first paragraph of the regulations drawn up by the Meclis-i Ahkam-i Adliye, t h e Legal Decisions and A p p e a l s Council, c o n c e r n i n g the f o r m a t i o n of t h e collection councils: Candidates would first register at the court, and then stand forth before the gathered electors, w h o would step to one side or the other d e p e n d i n g on whether the) were for or against the candidate in q u e s t i o n . Candidates who got a majority of the votes would be considered elected, while lots would be drawn among those for whom yeas and nays were split equally . This procedure was clearly not very conducive to ensuring the participation of a broad stratum even in principle 2 , but neither w a s it implemented properly and everywhere. Those who ended up on the collection councils, contemporary ' O r t a y l i "Tanzimat Burokratlari ve Metternich" in A. U. Siyasal Yavuz'a Armagan, Ankara 1983. pp. 361-367. 2

Bilg. Fak. Dergisi

Fehmi

B A. Cevdet -Dahiliye, Nr: 16602. 23 Scfer 1256 (26 April 1840) s a m e found Nr 3269, 17 Safer 1256 (20 April 1840) A. Vefik Tekdhf Kavaidi vol II, pp. 30-31.

F R O M T H E G O V E R N M E N T TO

PARLIAMENT

119

observers noted, were either those appointed by the top local administrator, or those selected by n o n - M u s l i m clerics f r o m a m o n g their r e s p e c t i v e congregations, or else local notables who had successfully curried the favour of high officials. 1 C e n t r a l i z a t i o n was the f u n d a m e n t a l aspect of the T a n z i m a t in administration, determined not only by the w o r l d - v i e w , objectives and achievements of the bureaucracy but also by technological progress. New centers of urban growth and the changing spatial hierarchy around them, the eclipse of certain provincial seats and the resurgence of others, necessitated modifying the Empire's provincial divisions accordingly. Furthermore, since Russia and Austria demanded a decentralized status of autonomy for national minorities and subject peoples or regions in the Balkans, the Tanzimat elite reacted to this threat by imposing a centralized model of provincial administration — and it was in this concrete context that our tradition of local government c a m e into being, under the pressure of a sudden international crisis over Lebanon. This whole area (except for Beirut) had been granted an a u t o n o m o u s status, on the basis of congregational representation, through the Cebel-i Lubnan Nizamnamesi of 9 June 1861, which was intensely disliked by the Porte since it tended to transform the Empire into a mosaic of autonomous provinces. Ahmet Cevdet Pa§a, whose approach to law and administration was one of enlightened despotism, Fuat Pa§a and the liberal-minded Midhat Pa§a then set about drafting new statutes for the provinces, and the system of provincial organization, revolving around the sancak or liva as the basic unit, that was subsequently set up through the Regulations of 7 November 1864 embodied an attitude of "taking the different characteristics of each province into account," in the words of Ahmet Cevdet. Hence, too, these regulations were first put into effect in the Province of the Danube (where Midhal: Paga was governor) as well as in Aleppo, Edirne, North African Tripoli and Bosnia, with encouraging results. T h e explanation Ahmet Cevdet Pa§a provided for making elected bodies of local representatives part and parcel of provincial administration echoed paragraph 14 of the Reform (.Islahat) Edict of 1856 as drafted by Âli Pa§a: "Implementing the basic rule about ensuring popular participation in governing the country is designed to relieve the absolutist tendencies of the current practice of centralism." 2 But did they truly and genuinely mean this, one might well wonder. It could have been due in part to a desire to temporize in the face of external pressure, combined with the fundamental determination to achieve administrative rationalization. The regulations of 1864 ostensibly imitated the French system of 1

Hatil inalcik, "Tanzimatin Uygulanmasi" in TTK Belleten 1964, p. 633.

2

vol XXVIII N o 109-112, A n k a r a

G. C. Scalieri, La Décentralisation et la réforme administrative 1911,p. 121, Ortayli Tanzimattan sonra Mahalli fdareler, p . 4 1 .

en Turquie,

Constantinople

120

S T U D I E S

ON

O T T O M A N

T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

départements while actually going much further along the road to centralization, with the opposite alternative rendered virtually unthinkable by the reformers' prevailing outlook. All in all, between Âli Papa's centralist inclinations and Cevdet Papa's cautious conservatism, there was hardly any scope for greater autonomy in provincial administration. There were, however, some practical problems which transcended such principles or ideological preferences, in that the leading core of the Tanzimat had suffered from a shortage of trained personnel from the very beginning: There simply were not enough administrative, legal and financial cadres to carry through the necessary reforms in central and provincial administration; long after the Tanzimat had been promulgated indeed, provincial governors lacked the staff to handle even routine work. That was why the later Islahat generation, too, could not radically reorganize the entire system on the lines of hundred percent centralization, and had to have recourse, volens nolens, to more classical methods as well as to local notables in their provincial rearrangements. (All was not well, however, for relations between the members of various congregations were already deteriorating, with the various Christian millets vying for priority with one another, while the Muslim members of the local councils were behaving in an insulting and overbearing manner toward their non-Muslim counterparts — as the Greek patriarch was quick to lodge a complaint about. 1 Nevertheless, the practical requirements in question led to some partial and hesitant moves towards complementing an essentially centralized framework with a limited degree of local govenment, which however was to prove quite inadequate when it came to undertaking the transition to a modern municipal system. Underneath it all, perhaps, was a different historical tradition from that of Western Europe in the Middle Ages, where some towns, at least, gradually acquired political autonomy from loci of feudal power that were essentially concentrated in the rural areas. In the Near East, in contrast, terms like belediye or sehrdari were not really equivalent to commune. Rat or Gemeinde : the Near East was where a civilization of towns and cities first arose, but this also meant that states and their ruling elites were always concentrated in, and had a tight grip on, those same cities 2 , so that it would be a mistake to regard the brilliant examples of urban administration provided by the history of this region as making up a communal tradition of local government. (This was also the ease, of course not only outside Europe but in large areas of Central and Eastern Europe.)

*B A ¡rade Medis i Vaia 19 ZA 1256/14 Jan. 1841, Nr: 226 Ortayli, Tanzimattan Sottra Mahalli idareler, p. 25. 2 A S noted by Fuat Kopriilii in his "Ortazaman T ü r k Islam Feodalizmi" in Belleten vol. 19 Ankara 1941, pp. 319-34, with references to a number of earlier authors.

FROM

THE

GOVERNMENT

TO

PARLIAMENT

121

In the nineteenth century, on the other hand, Ottoman cities in general, and particularly those ports and coastal towns that served as the hub of developing relations with the outside world, were undergoing major structural transformations, and it was this chain of country-wide economic, social and administrative change that also built up procedure for reforming traditional urban administration and municipal organization: It was no longer possible for the port cities of the Eastern Mediterranean to cope with the requirements of the vortex of European trade that they were increasingly drawn into without creating a whole new network of infrastructure and services comprising, for example, adequate lodgings as well as harbour and quarantine facilities for commercial navigation, plus public health facilities and more orderly urban transport. For Europeans, Oriental ports were no longer so exoticallv distant and inaccessible, but a vital area of economic activity and income, which was why they needed to develop new municipalities capable of providing the requisite urban services. Thus it was at the time of the negotiations over the Aydin railroad concessions that British merchants initiated the eventually successful attempt to set up a municipality in Izmir. 1 Without going into its details, let me only note that in Istanbul, too, the first municipal organization set up through government initiative coincided with the Crimean War, and that the European-style Sixth Municipal District (Altinci Daire-i Belediyye) that came into being in Pera (Beyoglu) was also an embodiment of the objectives of urban sanitation and prosperity necessitated by the advent of urbanization. This, then, is the basic context for assessing the rise and enracination of Ottoman municipalities which represented neither urban self-government nor an autonomous corporate identity ( p e r s o n n e morale). Instead, the municipality ( b e l e d i y e ) simply meant the sum total of urban tasks and services: it was no more than an organ saddled with responsibility for the physical upkeep of the city, its lighting and its sanitation. That was the way the enlightened bureaucrats of the Empire conceived of municipal organization — as a mere instrument of infrastructural development — and it was an extension of the central administration that they were also taken over by the Republic, so that it has taken more than a century to go beyond that original conception, with many politicians still unclear about what a municipality is or should be after nearly fifty years of pluralism. But the real tragic insolubility, of course, derives from the attitude of citizens themselves to municipal life. Even a partial screening of the period's press, for example, suffices to reveal the sort of public opinion that had already sprung up in the second half of the nineteenth century around municipalities — an atmosphere that was not

'Orhan Kurmus, The Role of British Capital in the Economic Development of Western unpublished PhD Thesis 1974 p. 88.

Anatolia

122

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

marked, unfortunately, by any great degree of democratic maturity, nor by any propensity to assume responsibility for popular participation and control. As in all authoritarian societies, citizens have kept demanding urban services from the municipality while showing absolutely no organizational initiative or activity of their own. The other side of the coin was, and has been, that the municipality is the only organ people are willing and not afraid to criticize, even to abuse, at every opportunity. If people are discontent with their material or cultural environment, it is at the door of the mayor's office that they lay their bill — this is another by-product of authoritarianism. It is as if Ottoman municipalities were set up solely for the purpose of providing slim urban services and then getting blamed for everything under the sky. 1 Despite all such draw backs, however experiment in local government initiated by the Tanzimat era may be said to have played a very important role, eventually in the formation of the first Ottoman parliament. At the very least, it was in the Provincial Administrative Councils (Vilayet ¡dare Meclisleri) and municipal councils that the deputies who converged on Istanbul from all corners of the Empire on 19 March, 1877 had acquired whatever experience they had in the way of parliamentary work — a learning process that had apparently had its negative as well as positive aspects, since, for example, it was rather in the grand manner of a provincial governor presiding over such local councils that Ahmet Vefik Pa§a chaired the sessions of the first parliament. That body itself, moreover, appeared at first sight to be more ethnically colored than social-class-based, and neither did it have any organic connections with a whole constellation of non-parliamentary institutions or mass organizations, as a result of which its debates and deliberations were often left hanging in the air, or tended to revolve not around national but mostly local demands and issues. Although the narrowest kind of parochialism was eventually superseded as the more learned and enlightened deputies from the richest and most populous provinces in particular came to take stock of broader social realities, such progress was both gradual and partial, and on balance the Ottoman parliament was not on a par with other, contemporary multinational empires, including the 1906 Duma in Tsarist Russia, from the point of view of struggles waged to realize organized class interests or over problems of an ethnic or national nature. It is not correct to speak of the Ottoman parliament as having witnessed dangerous nationalist rivalries; there is no strong evidence for this claim, while there are a good many more examples of a common Ottoman patriotism rising to the fore. But equally it would be wrong to say that at least with regard to its creation, composition and procedures, this first Ottoman constitutional assembly was a purely artificial and rootless institution: Granted that it was a national assembly brought forth by a non-industrialized country exhibiting a low degree of social

' S e e for example Sabah 22 Muharrcm 1307 and 28 Muharrem 1308 issues.

F R O M T H E G O V E R N M E N T TO

PARLIAMENT

123

integration, it still had behind it s o m e thirty years' f a m i l i a r i t y with representative politics and debate at the local level — which was probably why it was able, in its very first act of legislation, to produce a technically perfect text as the Law of Provinces and the Municipality of Istanbul (Vilayetler ve Istanbul Belediye Kanunu) after deliberation that also set relatively high standards of learning, maturity and poise. T h e deputies to the Assembly of 1877, indeed, had acquired their mandate not through general elections held for the purpose, but by first being confirmed as elected members of provincial councils and then being also accorded parliamentary status. Thus on the negative side, "governors conferred the title of M e m b e r of Parliament on their own men, on the civil servants and a§ar tax-farmers under their wing," comments Engelhardt. 1 Nevertheless, they knew about things like speaking in turn, voting and making points of order —and they even considered themselves superior to members f r o m Istanbul in this regard. Deputies like Salim Efendi (Kastamonu), Nufel Efendi (Syria) and Rasim Bey (Edirne) shone brilliantly in parliamentary debates; "We are f r o m the provinces, w e have been voting since the beginning of the Tanzimat. Istanbul, however, has encountered elections only this year," boasted the latter. 2 And the insistence of the Ottoman parliament on confining electoral rights to the propertied classes in proportion to the amount of taxes paid also reflected what such notables had long been accustomed to in the provinces. They were not entirely alone, though, for the top echelon of imperial bureaucrats had also acquired a certain experience in debate and negotiation at central bodies like the Tanzimat Council, which was why the Senate (Ayan Meclisi) was able to claim a certain maturity of its own. But unfortunately, only an incomplete edition of the minutes of the first Ottoman parliament is available (which we owe to the efforts of H. Tarik Us), and w e are still in the dark concerning the activities of the provincial councils as well as their members' biographies. It is only through the f u r t h e r development of late Ottoman historiography that such gaps in our knowledge can be disposed of.

'Engelhardt, Tiirkiye ve Tanzimat, trans. Ali Re§ad, Istanbul 1328, pp. 354-55. Hakki Tank Us, Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Ceridesi, 17 April 1877 session, pp. 84-85.

2

DIE EINFLÜSSE DES SPÄTOSMANISCHEN BÜROKRATISCHEN SYSTEMS AUF DIE REPUBLIKANISCHE BÜROKRATIE

Der Verwaltungsapparat ist seinem Wesen nach ein konservatives, besser gesagt ein sich Veränderungen widersetzendes, soziales Phänomen. Selbst eine große Errungenschaft der menschlichen Geschichte, ist er eher ein Fall f ü r Evolution als für Revolution, durch Revolutionen wechseln die Anschauungen des Lebens und der Welt, wechseln Normen, Moden — der Werwaltungsapparat aber bleibt übrig, der Manierismus der Bürokratie und, als wichtigstes, seine Struktur. Die Französische Revolution änderte eine Reihe von Sitten, das Rechtswesen, in gewisser Hinsicht die Gesellschaftsstruktur, die Weltanschauung der Intelligenzija, sogar den Alltag — aber der Verwaltungsapparat der Landes blieb ohne bemerkenswerte Verkanderungen. Doch handelt es sich nicht nur um ein modisches Thema der zeitgenössischen Geschichtsschreibung in frankreich, sondern schon damals gab Alexis de Tocqueville präzise Analysen über das Verwaltungserbe der Monarchie im postrevolutionären Frankreich in seinem berühmten Werk „L'ancien régime et la révolution" 1 . Selbstverständlich beobachtet man diese Tatsache auch nach der bolschewistischen Revolution in Rußland: Die Grundinstitutionen wie Ministerien, Akademie der Wissenschaften, Universitäten und die Hauptzweige der Zentral- und Provinzialverwaltung sind, von ihren Bezeichnungen abgesehen, strukturell unverändert geblieben. Es ist eine Tatsache, daß während der stalinistischen Periode eine Verordnung den Sowjetführern (Gubernatoren) verbat, mit ihrer eigenen Mannschaft in ihre Provinz zu reisen und eine Art von Spoilsystem auszuüben. Diese soziale Gesetzmäßigkeit gilt auch f ü r den republikanischen Verwaltungsapparat der Türkei. Wir wissen, daß die Republik sich weigerte, die kader der monarchie zu entlassen. In einemArtikel vom Mete Tuncay „Heyet-i mahsusalar" (Die Spezialkomitees [für die Entlassung der Kader]) 2 wird gezeigt, daß die Republik trotz ihrer radikalen Haltung die erfahrenen Kader der Monarchie verschonte. So fragt man zu Recht, wie und wann die Struktur der Verwaltung des klassischen Reichs, der wir schon zur Zeit der Belagerungen Wiens begegnen, sich änderten. Die Antwort Muß lauten: nicht durch eine Revolution der Türken, sondern durch die Reformen der Osmanen im 19. Jahrhundert. (Dies nimmt nicht wunder, da man doch auch für Rußland von Verwaltungsrevolutionen erstens mit Bezug auf die petrinische Ära und zweitens mit Bezug auf die Ära von Nikolaus, 1. zu sprechen pflegt.)

l

A. de Tocqueville, L'ancien regime et la révolution. Paris: Gallimard 1967. Mete Tuncay, Heyet-i Mahsusalar 1923—1928. Bilinecegi Bilmek. Istanbul 1983, S. 137.

2

126

STUDIES

ON

OTTOMAN

TRANSFORMATION

Der Verwaltungsapparat und das System der Türkei erlebten zwei große Veränderungen: Erstens die Reformen des 19. Jahrhunderts und zweitens die A n n a h m e der V e r f a s s u n g von 1961. Die strukturelle M o d e r n i s i e r u n g beschleunigte sich dank der Reformen des 19. Jahrhunderts, aber erst in den f ü n f z i g e s und sechziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts nahm die Türkei den Character einer bürgerlich-demokratischen Gesellschaft an. Jede dieser zwei Perioden ist auf besondere Weise charakterisiert. Die Reformen der ersten Phase, also uter osmanischer Herrschaft, bemühen sich um eine H e b u n g der Leistungsfähigkeit der Bürokratie, die der zweiten, republikanischen, Phase sollen die Festigung des Rechtsstaates bewirken. Beide Reform-prozesse sind bis heute nicht abgeschlossen. Die erste Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts ist die Epoche der wichtigsten Reformen. Bekanntlich wurde ja die A b s c h a f f u n g der traditionellen A r m e e durch b e s t i m m t e R e f o r m e n ergänzt. Dies war auch dem o s m a n i s c h e n Staatsmann Bewußt. Nehmen wir ein Wort des Historikers und Justizministers Ahmed Cevdet „So wie die Strelitzen einen T u m o r im Rückgrat Rußlands bildeten, so waren die Janitscharen ein Geschwür im Herzen des Osmanischen Reiches. Die A u f h e b u n g der Janitscharen ein G e s c h w ü r im Herzen des Osmanischen Reiches, die A u f h e b u n g der Janitscharen war die Ursache f ü r eine Reihe von institutionellen Reformen. Was Rußland anlangt, so blieben die Reformen auf das Heer beschränkt. Sowohl in Rußland als auch bei den Osmanen was es die Monarchie, die die Reformen durchführte." Die offizielle Ideologie der Zeit war antijanitscharisch, oder besser gesagt, in Regierungskreisen herrschte eine gut getarnte antimilitaristische Tendenz. Die Erziehung der Zivil- und der Militärbürokratie wurde im Zuge der R e f o r m e n laisiert, das heißt außerhalb der medrese

neu

organisiert.

Medizinschule und Militäringenieurakademie, die in der Z u k u n f t Zellen revolutionkarer Ideen im Reich werden sollten, entstanden jetzt. Wichtig f ü r unser T h e m e ist, daß diese säkulare Bürokratie die Schlüsselstellungen innehatte und die macht übernahm, indem sie die ilmiyye,

die Klasse der

gelehrten Kleriker, beiseite schob. Darin zeigt sich ein wesentlicher Unerschied etwa zu Persien: Auch dort brachten ähnliche Reformen im 19. Jahrhundert eine Modernisierung des Er/.iehungswesens mit sich; diejenigen aber, die diese Erziehung genossen und die Macht in der Hand hatten, waren die sogenannten muctehid,

eine Klasse, die w ir heute als Mullahs kennen.

' T a r i h - i Cevdet. Istanbul 1309 H 217-219.

Bd. I, S. 241, und Tezakir, ed. Baysun, Ankara 1963, 40, S.

DIE E I N F L Ü S S E DES B Ü R O K R A T I S C H E N

SYSTEMS

127

Die osmanische Zivilbürokratie war keinesfallsmit einer bestimmten sozialen Klasse zu identifizieren, was auch heute noch ein Wesenszug der türkischen Bürokratie ist. Im Gegensatz zu den Verhältnissen in Rußland waren die osmanischen Bürokraten weder Abkömmlinge einer adeligen Schicht, noch waren sie Mitglieder einer aufsteigenden bürgerlichen Klasse. Uns ist bekannt, daß die führenden Staatsmänner jener Epoche Kinder aus unteren Schichten der Gesellschaft waren, erzogen in der Kanzlei, wo sie nach der Mode der Zeit der Mahmudiyye-Reformen Fremdsprachen (Französisch) studierten. Dies trifft etwa auf Mustafa Re§id Pa§a, Ali Pa§i und Ziya Pa§a zu; Fuad Pa§a war ein säkularer Bürokrat, wiewohl er einer i/m;vy