Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy 9781501717819

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Stopping the Bomb

a volume in the series

Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt A list of titles in this series is available at cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Stopping the Bomb The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy

N i c h ol as L. M iller

Cornell University Press Ithaca and London

Copyright © 2018 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2018 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Miller, Nicholas L., 1987– author. Title: Stopping the bomb : the sources and effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy / Nicholas L. Miller. Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017048061 (print) | LCCN 2017055323 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501717819 (pdf) | ISBN 9781501717826 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501717802 | ISBN 9781501717802 (cloth ; alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Nuclear nonproliferation—Government policy— United States—History—20th century. | Economic sanctions, American—History—20th century. Classification: LCC JZ5675 (ebook) | LCC JZ5675 .M55 2018 (print) | DDC 327.1/7470973—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017048061 Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

List of Abbreviations

ix

Introduction: The Proliferation Problem

1

Theorizing the Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy

10

2.

The Sources of US Nonproliferation Policy, 1945–1968

40

3.

The Sources of US Nonproliferation Policy, 1969–1980

69

4.

Nonproliferation in Action: The United States and Friendly Countries’ Nuclear Weapons Programs, 1964–Present

95

1.

5.

The Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy

123

6.

The French Nuclear Program (1954–1960)

148

7.

The Taiwanese Nuclear Program (1967–1977)

171

8.

The Pakistani Nuclear Program (1972–1987)

193

9.

The Iranian Nuclear Program (1974–2015)

217

Conclusion: Lessons from US Nonproliferation Policy

244

Notes

253

Index

307

v

Acknowledgments

My interest in international security and nuclear weapons coalesced when I was an undergraduate at Wesleyan University, where I was fortunate enough to take several excellent courses from Doug Foyle, Erica Chenoweth, and David Kearn. In addition to sparking my intellectual interests through their teaching, these three professors helped inspire me to pursue a PhD through their mentorship and example. Under Doug Foyle’s guidance, I wrote a senior thesis on US nonproliferation policy, which provided my first exposure to the topic that would become the focus of my dissertation and, ultimately, this book. My graduate school professors at MIT were instrumental in getting me to this point. I could not have asked for a more supportive and capable set of dissertation advisers. Taylor Fravel provided vital feedback and helped me tackle the complexity of US-China-Taiwan relations. Frank Gavin’s research on the history of US nonproliferation policy helped to stimulate my interest in the topic. He also helped connect me to the broader community of nuclear historians, whose work I admire and draw on. Vipin Narang was and continues to be an incredibly supportive mentor whose advice I regularly seek. His research on nuclear strategy and proliferation serves as a model of rigor and insight for junior nuclear scholars. Several other faculty members at MIT offered invaluable feedback and support at various points during graduate school, including Fotini Christia, Roger Petersen, and Stephen Van Evera. I am also grateful to many friends and colleagues I met in graduate school, who offered excellent feedback on my work and provided equally important camaraderie. I want to thank in particular Daniel Altman, Noel Anderson, Mark Bell, Chris Clary, Jeremy Ferwerda, Gene Gerzhoy, Brian

vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Haggerty, Chad Hazlett, Yue Hou, David Jae, Sameer Lalwani, Kai Quek, Rachel Whitlark, and Alec Worsnop. I transformed my dissertation into a book manuscript while I was an assistant professor at Brown University. During my time there, I benefited from the intellectual insights and support of many colleagues, including Jeff Colgan, Nina Tannenwald, Ed Steinfeld, Rick Locke, Wendy Schiller, Peter Andreas, Rose McDermott, and Peter Gourevitch. Brown was generous enough to fund and host a book workshop for me in December 2015, where I received exceptionally helpful comments from Scott Sagan, Robert Jervis, and Etel Solingen. This book project made it across the finish line while I was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard. I am grateful to the Stanton Foundation for their support and the Managing the Atom Project and International Security Program at Belfer for providing a stimulating intellectual environment. I am also thankful for the feedback and help I received in the publication process from the staff and editors at Cornell University Press, including Roger Haydon and the editors of the Security Affairs series. Portions of this book draw on previously published journal articles. I would like to thank Cambridge University Press, MIT Press, and Taylor and Francis for the permission to reprint this content. Long before I was an aspiring scholar of nuclear policy, I relied on the support of my family and close friends. My parents, Garth Miller and Ann LeSuer, provided unwavering personal support and encouraged my intellectual pursuits from a young age. My siblings—Matt, Emily, Rachael, Jacob, Nate, and Aidan—made sure I never became too full of myself. Two longtime friends, Jonathan Robinson and Kai Thaler, have helped keep me happy and sane over the years. Each of these individuals has helped make this book possible in his or her own way. I reserve my greatest gratitude for my wife, Eugenie Carabatsos, whose love and support has enriched my life immeasurably over the last nine years. I dedicate this book to her.

viii

Abbreviations

ACDA AEC CIA CENTO CEA DNSA EDC EU FRG FRUS HEU INER ICBM IRBM IAEA JCS JCAE JCPOA KMT MLF NIE NSA NSAM NSDM NSSM NSC

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Atomic Energy Commission Central Intelligence Agency Central Treaty Organization Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique Digital National Security Archive European Defense Community European Union Federal Republic of Germany Foreign Relations of the United States highly enriched uranium Institute of Nuclear Energy Research intercontinental ballistic missile intermediate range ballistic missile International Atomic Energy Agency Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Kuomintang Multilateral Force National Intelligence Estimate National Security Archive National Security Action Memorandum National Security Decision Memorandum National Security Study Memorandum National Security Council

ix

ABBREVIATIONS

NATO NNPA NPT NPG NSG PAL PNE PRC ROC ROK SACEUR SHAPE UAR UN UNSC WMD

x

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Nuclear Planning Group Nuclear Suppliers Group Permissive Action Link peaceful nuclear explosion People’s Republic of China Republic of China Republic of Korea Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe United Arab Republic United Nations United Nations Security Council Weapons of Mass Destruction

Stopping the Bomb

Introduction The Proliferation Problem

In the summer of 1945, the United States became the first country to develop, test, and use nuclear weapons in war. Having dragged the world into the nuclear age, US policymakers were immediately forced to confront the possibility that their nuclear monopoly would not long endure. Even before the United States tested its first weapon in New Mexico, a group of Manhattan Project scientists led by James Franck argued against immediately using nuclear weapons on Japan, warning that “nuclear bombs cannot possibly remain a ‘secret weapon’ at the exclusive disposal of this country for more than a few years.”1 Soon after the war ended, a government committee led by David Lilienthal and Dean Acheson came to similar conclusions about the likely spread of nuclear weapons. Contending that the basic scientific principles behind nuclear weapons “are well known to competent scientists throughout the world” and that “the incentive to other nations to press their own developments is overwhelming,” the committee recommended international control of nuclear technology as the best means to avoid proliferation and nuclear war.2 From this moment onward, the US government struggled with the question of how to prevent, delay, manage, or perhaps even accept or selectively promote the spread of nuclear weapons. As this book will demonstrate, it ultimately took more than thirty years for a firm nonproliferation policy to emerge. As the nuclear age progressed, analysts and policymakers became increasingly concerned that the spread of nuclear weapons would not be gradual but rather rapid and self-perpetuating, warning of nuclear cascades and domino effects and predicting exponential increases in the number of states pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons.3 In 1961, in negotiations with Nikita Khrushchev over a limited test ban treaty, President Kennedy predicted that “if no agreement is reached, then in a few years there might be ten or even fifteen nuclear powers.”4 That same year, as nuclear sharing with NATO allies was a matter of public debate, Albert Wohlstetter warned

1

INTRODUCTION

in the pages of Foreign Affairs of the “N+1” problem, in particular arguing that “it has always been clear . . . that the acquisition of nuclear military power by some of our allies can impel its acquisition by enemies. . . . The spread occurs in chain.”5 Two years later, Kennedy publicly warned that without effective policy interventions, the world could soon face a scenario with anywhere from fifteen to twenty-five nuclear-armed powers.6 These fears were strengthened immensely by China’s entry into the nuclear club in 1964. In the aftermath of China’s first test, the influential Gilpatric Committee warned, “The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.” The committee specifically predicted that India and Japan would be tempted to pursue nuclear weapons, and that this in turn could compel Pakistan, Israel, the United Arab Republic (UAR), West Germany, and other European states to follow suit.7 After India tested its first nuclear device a decade later, delivering a blow to the nascent nonproliferation regime, a government report sounded a similarly pessimistic note. The report judged that the effort to prevent proliferation “is now at a crucial stage . . . as a result of the Indian nuclear test, other non-nuclear weapons states may rethink their decisions regarding the acquisition of nuclear explosives.”8 Yet there is a significant problem with these repeated predictions of nuclear domino effects: They have proven spectacularly wrong. As Sagan has noted, the number of states with nuclear weapons has grown slowly and steadily, with no single instance of nuclear acquisition leading to a cascade of additional nuclear states. Meanwhile, the number of states actively pursuing nuclear weapons has actually declined in recent decades.9 Indeed, in 1985, a National Intelligence Council report observed that “the most striking characteristic of the present-day nuclear proliferation scene is that, despite the alarms rung for some decades by past National Intelligence Estimates, no additional overt proliferation of weapons has actually occurred since China tested its bomb in 1964.”10 While several countries acquired nuclear capabilities in this time period—namely, Israel, India, and South Africa—none of them declared their arsenal and openly stockpiled weapons. This apparent failure of nuclear domino predictions has motivated a large literature in recent years, producing a new consensus that holds the nuclear domino theory is invalid.11 In explaining the relatively slow pace of proliferation, recent scholarship has emphasized the role of leader identity conception, norms embodied in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), regional security environments, domestic regime type, and threats of force by the adversaries of potential proliferators.12 Other recent work has explored the role of foreign technological assistance in spurring proliferation.13 This book takes a different tack, emphasizing the role of US nonproliferation policy in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, a factor that

2

THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM

has received systematic attention from social scientists only in the last few years.14 Until recently, many adhered to Waltz’s assertion that “no country has been able to prevent other countries from going nuclear if they were determined to do so.”15 While there are several excellent historical works that explore the evolution of US nonproliferation policy over time, they do not theorize and thoroughly assess both the sources and effectiveness of US efforts.16 Specifically, this book argues for the importance of nonproliferation sanctions policies established by the United States in the mid-1970s, policies that were advocated by members of the US Congress and ultimately incorporated into US law. These policies credibly link nonproliferation with access to the vast economic and military resources of the United States and thereby dramatically raise the costs of proliferation for states in the US sphere of influence. I also offer a theory for the sources of US nonproliferation policies, arguing that heightened expectations of nuclear domino effects, greater government attention to nonproliferation, and political openings for nonproliferation advocates in Congress and the bureaucracy explain why US policy strengthened so dramatically in response to the Chinese and Indian nuclear tests of 1964 and 1974, leading first to the NPT and later the adoption of sanctions policies. Collectively, these two theories suggest the possibility that forecasts of nuclear domino effects have to a large degree been a self-defeating prophecy: US policymakers anticipated domino effects and put in place policies that may have effectively prevented them.17

Why Nonproliferation Matters The spread of nuclear weapons and the efficacy of efforts to prevent this spread are important topics for both theoretical and policy reasons. First, in terms of policy, nuclear proliferation is consequential since it affects both the risk of nuclear use and the likelihood and character of conventional interstate conflict. While theoretical arguments about whether nuclear weapons stabilize or destabilize international politics persist, a growing body of empirical work suggests that nuclear weapons may not deter conventional conflict to the extent previously thought, may provide bargaining advantages in crises, encourage greater resolve or aggression, or lead states to become more assertive in their foreign policies.18 Moreover, even the pursuit of nuclear weapons can cause regional instability and war. Fuhrmann and Kreps identify eight cases where nuclear programs were preventively attacked, in addition to ten other cases where states seriously considered preventive attacks.19 Most prominently, the mistaken belief that Iraq continued to pursue nuclear weapons was a significant motivation for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.20 Israel attacked

3

INTRODUCTION

an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007, and some have argued that the Soviets instigated the Six-Day War of 1967 in order to attack Israel’s nuclear program.21 There has likewise been widespread discussion of the possibility of an American or Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, with the threat of force publicly “on the table” for many years.22 While it is impossible to say definitively whether more nuclear-armed states would increase the risk of nuclear use, scholars subscribing to the “proliferation pessimism” school of thought generally argue that this is the case. This argument is plausible for two main reasons. First, there will simply be more opportunities for advertent or inadvertent use as the number of nuclear-armed states increases.23 A second perspective holds that nextgeneration proliferators are likely to be weaker, poorer, military-dominated states that lack the financial and institutional capacity to minimize the risk of accidental or intentional nuclear use.24 This topic is also important for theoretical reasons. First, the limited amount of proliferation is puzzling from the standpoint of several existing theories. Proliferation has not accelerated even as the technology to produce nuclear weapons has diffused and become easier to master. Moreover, from the perspective of realism, which assumes that states seek security and survival above all else and argues that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of a state’s survival, it makes little sense that proliferation has been so rare.25 After all, it is not as if all states with a potential motive and capability have proliferated. According to one recent estimate, there are currently fifty-six non-nuclear states with the basic technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons; moreover, many of these states have at least one nuclear-armed neighbor, generally thought to be the strongest motivation for nuclear proliferation.26 Second, while it is possible that norms associated with the NPT could explain the rarity of proliferation, this argument is problematic because the NPT itself and the decisions of states to adhere to it have often been a consequence of superpower interests and pressure.27 Finally, the role of sanctions in limiting proliferation that this book highlights is theoretically important since the majority of existing scholarship on sanctions argues that they are generally ineffective.28 Whether for reasons of theory or policy, is it crucial to understand the sources and efficacy of US nonproliferation efforts.

Patterns of Proliferation, 1945–Present Table I.1 below identifies the countries that have pursued nuclear weapons since 1945 along with the years they initiated their programs, acquired nuclear weapons, and/or abandoned their programs, according to Way’s updated codings.29 In order for a country to be coded as pursuing nuclear

4

THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM

Table I.1 Nuclear weapons pursuit since 1945 (data from Way and Weeks 2014)

Soviet Union United Kingdom France China Israel Australia India Egypt Taiwan South Korea Libya Pakistan South Africa Argentina Brazil North Korea Iraq Iran Syria

Program start

Acquire year

1945 1947 1954 1955 1958 1961 1964 1965 1967 1970 1970 1972 1974 1978 1978 1980 1982 1985 2000

1949 1952 1960 1964 1969

Abandon year

1973 1988 1974 1977 1978 2003 1987 1979

1991 1990 1990

2006 1995

weapons, they must “do more than simply explore the possibility of a weapons program. They have to take additional further steps aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons, such as a political decision by cabinet-level officials, movement toward weaponization, or development of single-use, dedicated technology.”30 In addition to a declining rate of nuclear weapons program initiation over time, there is a striking change in the type of countries that have pursued nuclear weapons in different time periods. Prior to the mid-1970s, proliferating states were often friends or allies of the United States—for example, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, and Pakistan. After the mid-1970s, by contrast, proliferating states have exclusively been states either with troubled, ambivalent relations with the United States (Argentina, Brazil) or states entirely outside the US sphere of influence (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria). This book’s theory aims to shed light on this changing character of proliferation in recent decades. It also seeks to explain why US nonproliferation efforts have failed against some countries—for example, Pakistan, North Korea, and India—while succeeding against countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Iraq.

5

INTRODUCTION

The Evolution of US Nonproliferation Policy, 1945–1980 This book also seeks to explain changes in US nonproliferation policy over time, which I argue is central to understanding the changing patterns of proliferation. There has been significant variation in US policy historically with respect to whether the US government has sought to impede proliferation across the board or has facilitated or acquiesced to it in particular cases. In this book, I focus on the period between 1945 and 1980 for two reasons: (1) it encompasses the most important shifts in US nonproliferation policy, including the negotiation and establishment of the NPT and development of strong export controls and sanctions policies, and (2) much of the book relies on declassified government documents, which are much spottier after 1980.31 The arc of US nonproliferation policy in this period will be discussed in detail in chapters 2 and 3, but a brief summary demonstrates the oscillations in US policy. After early efforts to restrain proliferation in the 1940s, namely the failed Baruch Plan and the Atomic Energy Act, which sought to limit national access to nuclear weapons and nuclear technology, policy in the mid-1950s became markedly more permissive. The Eisenhower administration sought to increase the control of NATO allies over nuclear weapons through the NATO stockpile plan and Multilateral Force (MLF), secured revisions of the Atomic Energy Act to allow the United States to provide aid to Britain’s nuclear weapons program, and launched the Atoms for Peace program, which promised to spread nuclear technology globally. While some of these initiatives can be interpreted as nonproliferation measures in the sense that they sought to dissuade fully independent nuclear programs and maintain a semblance of American control over the spread of nuclear technology, materially they resulted in increased access of states to nuclear weapons and technology. Moreover, Eisenhower himself was clearly open to selective proliferation, as chapter 2 will explore. Nonproliferation policy in the early 1960s was schizophrenic, with significant efforts to impede proliferation such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the installation of permissive action links (PALs) on US nuclear weapons in Europe, but also a refusal to give up the plan for the MLF in NATO and the decision to offer additional aid to the French and British nuclear weapons programs. From 1964 to 1968, US policy shifted strongly in favor of nonproliferation, most notably with the scrapping of the MLF and the conclusion of the NPT. After a down-weighting of nonproliferation from 1969 through 1973, which included a Nixon administration decision not to press for NPT adherence, from 1974 through 1980 US policy again shifted strongly in favor of nonproliferation with the establishment of strong supplier controls and sanctions policies.

6

THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM

The Argument This book advances theories to explain both the evolution of US nonproliferation policy over time and its effectiveness, which I argue sheds light on the changing character of proliferation. With respect to the sources of US nonproliferation policy, I argue that the Chinese and Indian nuclear tests (1) strengthened expectations of nuclear domino effects; (2) caused the US government to pay greater attention to nonproliferation; and (3) provided a political opening for nonproliferation advocates. Expectations of nuclear domino effects—the notion that proliferation in one state increases the probability of proliferation in other states—was crucial in leading US policymakers to prefer an across-the-board rather than a selective nonproliferation policy. More specifically, I argue that the consequences of proliferation for the United States and the costs of enforcing nonproliferation differ from state to state as a function of whether that state is an enemy, ally, or unaligned and therefore that an across-the-board nonproliferation policy makes sense only when nuclear domino effects are perceived to be strong, in other words when policymakers believe proliferation cannot be contained to individual cases of friendly states. The Chinese and Indian nuclear tests also played two subsidiary roles in causing the changes in US policy, namely by leading the US government to focus more attention on nonproliferation and creating political openings for actors with a strong stake in nonproliferation, for example arms control bureaucrats and members of Congress. While heightened expectations of domino effects helped change many policymakers’ preferences on nonproliferation policy, greater government attention and openings for nonproliferation advocates helped ensure the implementation of policy changes. The second theory explains how US nonproliferation policies—in particular the threat of sanctions established in the mid-1970s—have helped to limit proliferation and alter its character. As a global hegemon with unparalleled military and economic resources, the United States has long maintained important security and economic relationships with a large number of countries that provide leverage the United States can bring to bear in the nuclear realm. Specifically, by credibly threatening to cut off or weaken economic and military support to states that pursue nuclear weapons, the United States dramatically raises the costs of proliferation for states that depend on the United States and therefore has the power to deter states from pursuing nuclear weapons in the first place. This rationalist argument, where states calculate the risk of sanctions and refrain from proliferating if the threat is credible and the costs are too heavy to bear, implies that sanctions will succeed in compelling countries to give up ongoing nuclear weapons programs only when they underestimate the risk of sanctions. This could occur because they started their programs prior to the development

7

INTRODUCTION

of US sanctions policies or because they faced multilateral sanctions of unexpected strength. The deterrent effect of US sanctions sheds light on why US allies and friends have ceased pursuing nuclear weapons in recent decades, thus rendering nuclear proliferation an activity exclusively in the purview of “rogue states” like Iran, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea. It also helps explain why unilateral US sanctions have often failed—because they were targeted at countries with low dependence on the United States who were rationally undeterred—while multilateral sanctions have proven crucial at halting recent proliferators.

Roadmap for the Book The body of the book develops these two theories in more detail and then tests their observable implications using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. Chapter 1 begins by reviewing the literature on the causes of nuclear proliferation and US nonproliferation policy and then offers new theories on the sources and effectiveness of US policy. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 empirically assess the theory on the sources of US nonproliferation policy. In chapter 2, I draw on archival documents and secondary sources to trace the evolution of US policy from 1945 to 1968 as well as investigate the motivations for these changes. Chapter 3 conducts a parallel analysis for the 1969–1980 period. In chapter 4, I use declassified documents to explore how well the theory performs in explaining US policy toward individual countries pursuing nuclear weapons after 1964. In particular, I examine whether the United States did indeed oppose proliferation across the board in this time period, and I assess what motivated US nonproliferation efforts in these cases. Chapters 5 through 9 test the theory on the effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy. In chapter 5, I quantitatively assess the theorized deterrent effect of US sanctions policy, examining whether countries with higher degrees of dependence on the United States are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons after the development of credible sanctions policies. Chapter 5 also assesses the argument on when sanctions are likely to succeed at halting ongoing nuclear programs by examining the universe of cases where the United States threatened or imposed nonproliferation sanctions. Chapters 6 though 9 offer four in-depth case studies of the effectiveness of US nonproliferation efforts against countries with ongoing nuclear weapons programs. In chapter 6, I examine US policy toward the French nuclear program in the 1950s to assess whether US nonproliferation policy was indeed more permissive in this time period, thus providing openings for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The next two chapters examine US policy toward Taiwan and Pakistan, both of which had ongoing nuclear programs

8

THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM

and faced threats of sanctions when US nonproliferation policy tightened in the 1970s, thus allowing us to assess directly the effect of changes in US policy. In chapter 9, I assess US nonproliferation policy toward Iran from the 1970s to 2015, seeking to explain why Iran agreed to significant limits on its nuclear program in the late 1970s, resumed its nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, and then agreed to limits again in 2015. The final chapter concludes with a discussion of implications for theory and policy as well as avenues for future research.

9

chapter 1

Theorizing the Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy

How effective has the United States been at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons? And what explains the evolution of US nonproliferation policy over time? This chapter proposes theories on both the sources and effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy. On the sources of US policy, the theory emphasizes expectations of nuclear domino effects, the level of government attention to nonproliferation, and political openings for nonproliferation advocates, all of which can be heightened by tests by new nuclear states. Expectations of domino effects are crucial because they lead policymakers to prefer across-the-board rather than selective nonproliferation policies, since domino effects imply that proliferation cannot reliably be contained to friendly countries. Meanwhile, greater government attention to nonproliferation and political openings for nonproliferation advocates—generally members of Congress and arms control advocates in the bureaucracy—facilitate translating these preferences into actual policy changes. On the effectiveness of US policy, the theory emphasizes the credible threat of US sanctions, established through congressional action in the mid-1970s, in deterring states from pursuing nuclear weapons. Because of the United States’ preeminent economic and military power and its internationalist foreign policy, many countries depend on Washington for economic resources or for their security. By credibly threatening to cut off economic and security support, the United States can make proliferation so costly for countries with high dependence on the United States that it deters them from even starting nuclear weapons programs. Because countries highly dependent on the United States are likely to be rationally deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs by the threat of sanctions, those countries that seek nuclear weapons and endure the imposition of US sanctions are likely to have low dependence on the United States. As a result, they will be unlikely to concede since they have little to lose from

10

THEORIZING THE SOURCES OF US NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

the sanctions. This rationalist framework implies that sanctions are likely to succeed against ongoing nuclear programs only when states underestimate the risk of sanctions, for example because they started their nuclear programs prior to the establishment of US sanctions policies, or face unexpectedly stiff multilateral sanctions. In tandem, these two theories suggest that predictions of nuclear domino effects may to a large extent be a selfdefeating prophecy, as these predictions have motivated US officials to put in place policies that have succeeded in limiting the extent of proliferation. Before turning to the theories, this chapter begins by reviewing the literature on proliferation and nonproliferation. For organizational purposes, I divide the literature into (1) works that focus on the causes of US nonproliferation policy and (2) the much larger literature on the causes of proliferation and nuclear reversal.

Causes of US Nonproliferation Policy There are five main perspectives in the literature on the causes of US nonproliferation policy, each of which prizes a different motivational variable to explain US efforts. These explanations suggest that the US government pursues nonproliferation in order to (1) preserve its conventional power-projection advantages; (2) reduce the risk of nuclear war; (3) maintain influence over allies; or (4) selectively benefit its liberal, Western, or democratic allies while constraining its enemies. An additional theory holds that Democratic administrations support strong nonproliferation policies while Republican administrations do not. This section will discuss each explanation in turn, highlighting gaps in existing explanations that motivate a new theory of the sources of US nonproliferation policy. The first explanation for nonproliferation policy suggests that the United States strictly enforces nonproliferation—both against allies and enemies— in order to maintain the conventional military advantages derived from its unparalleled power projection capabilities. Kroenig argues that powerprojecting states incur high costs from proliferation, since it is more difficult for them to threaten force against nuclear-armed states and their offers of security guarantees are less valuable to nuclear powers. Moreover, proliferation is likely to trigger regional instability in areas that power-projecting states care about.1 In a related vein, Gavin notes that the United States has worried that nuclear states might become emboldened to act more aggressively, making them more difficult to deter or contain.2 This “power projection theory” is deductively compelling and certainly helps to explain why the United States and Soviet Union were two of the strongest advocates of nuclear nonproliferation: because they had so much to lose from its effects. What it cannot explain, however, is why

11

CHAPTER 1

there has been such temporal change in US nonproliferation policy— why it became so much stronger in the 1964–1968 and 1974–1980 periods. Nor can it explain why US policymakers at times perceived strategic benefits to proliferation in particular cases, or why the United States reacted strongly against proliferation even in countries where Washington had neither a strong alliance relationship nor any desire to use military force. The second explanation holds that US policy has been motivated largely by fears of nuclear war. Sokolski develops this explanation in its most systematic form, examining five specific US nonproliferation initiatives: the Baruch Plan, Atoms for Peace, the NPT, export control regimes, and military counterproliferation. According to Sokolski, each of these policies was a response to a feared nuclear war scenario.3 Gavin likewise argues that US officials have worried about accidental or intentional nuclear wars, including being entrapped in a nuclear war initiated by allies.4 Like a focus on power projection, the emphasis on fears of nuclear war contains an important element of truth: It is certainly the case that US officials have worried about proliferation increasing the risk of nuclear conflict, in addition to constraining America’s conventional military power. Just as with the “power-projection theory,” however, this explanation cannot account for why American nonproliferation efforts were particularly intense in the 1964–68 and 1974–80 periods, nor can it easily explain that the United States opposed proliferation even in countries where US officials did not perceive a significant risk of nuclear war. A third argument suggests that the United States became strongly committed to nonproliferation in 1960s because of the realization that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would allow US allies to become more independent. This argument, advanced by Coe and Vaynman, purports to explain both US and Soviet nonproliferation behavior. They argue that both superpowers originally saw the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a way to balance against the rival bloc. However, once they realized it could undercut their leadership of their respective alliance systems, they decided to cooperate and develop a nonproliferation regime.5 Unlike the arguments that focus on US power projection and fears of nuclear war, Coe and Vaynman usefully note that the United States did not always strongly support nonproliferation across the board. Instead, they identify an important turning point in the 1960s—the US experience with a nuclear France—which taught US policymakers that nuclear weapons make allies less pliable. This argument is not without its shortcomings, however. In particular, the historical evidence presented in this book suggests that it was Chinese (and not French) acquisition of nuclear weapons that was the key trigger for strengthened US nonproliferation efforts. Moreover, this argument cannot explain why the United States tightened

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THEORIZING THE SOURCES OF US NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

its nonproliferation policy further following the nuclearization of India, an unaligned country. A fourth explanation for US nonproliferation policy suggests that the motivation for US efforts is to protect the interests of its liberal, democratic allies while constraining its enemies. Chafetz, for example, argues that psychological in-group biases lead the US government to selectively enforce nonproliferation policies in a way that benefits friends of the United States while keeping US enemies down.6 Maddock offers a similar argument, suggesting that US nonproliferation policy has fostered a situation of “nuclear apartheid,” whereby NATO allies and Israel were allowed access to nuclear weapons while non-Western states were constrained.7 This explanation fits with what Peter Lavoy calls the “political relativism” approach to nuclear proliferation, which holds that proliferation is dangerous only when unfriendly or aggressive states undertake it. Or, as he puts it, “bad states do bad things; bad states armed with nuclear weapons will do dreadful things.”8 Hayes likewise makes the case that the United States has viewed the Iranian nuclear program as more threatening than the Indian nuclear program because Iran is nondemocratic whereas India is democratic.9 At first glance there may appear to be a correlation between alliance, regime type, and Western identity on the one hand, and the firmness of US nonproliferation policy toward particular countries on the other. However, the over-aggregation of distinct time periods confounds this correlation. The fact that US nonproliferation efforts toward adversary nations like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea are harsher than prior efforts toward France and the United Kingdom is not solely because the latter countries are US allies but also because they proliferated at different times. As this book will demonstrate, US nonproliferation policy was greatly strengthened in the late 1960s and 1970s. In other words, US policy toward the French and British nuclear programs was more lenient because these countries proliferated when US nonproliferation policy was weaker. Indeed, US allies that were engaged in proliferation after US policy tightened experienced quite harsh pressure, as subsequent chapters will document. A fifth and final explanation focuses on the political party of the president as a driver of US nonproliferation policy. Although preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has generally been considered a bipartisan endeavor in the United States, there is some face validity to the notion that Democrats have been stronger advocates for nonproliferation, at least during the Cold War. After all, Kennedy was the first president to strongly emphasize the issue, the Johnson administration concluded the NPT, and Carter made nonproliferation a top agenda item; meanwhile, Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, and Reagan have all been described as adopting laxer, more selective approaches that tended to be less stringent toward allies’ nuclear ambitions.10 Sokolski, for example, identifies “Reagan-era

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Hawks” as supporting at least some allies’ acquisition of nuclear weapons technology.11 This alternative explanation therefore overlaps with the selective enforcement argument but argues that it only holds for Republican administrations. While it may be the case than Democratic administrations have adopted more vigorous nonproliferation policies on average, one obvious limitation of this approach is that it cannot explain variations in policy within a given president’s administration. For example, the Chinese and Indian nuclear tests were followed by changes in nonproliferation policies within Johnson’s and Nixon’s presidencies. Moreover, the argument that Democrats are stronger on nonproliferation than Republicans risks conflating the preferred tools for achieving nonproliferation with the intensity of commitment to that goal. For example, much of the criticism of Nixon, Ford, and Reagan on nonproliferation stems from their preference for using inducements like security assistance and peaceful nuclear trade to induce nuclear restraint, in contrast to Johnson and Carter, who emphasized treaty commitments and sanctions.12

Causes of Nuclear Proliferation The much larger literature on the causes of proliferation explores both what motivates states to pursue nuclear weapons and what enables them pursue or acquire nuclear weapons from a technical perspective. Collectively, this literature suggests four factors that may affect a state’s nuclear decision-making independent of US nonproliferation efforts: the nature of the security environment, domestic regime characteristics, normative commitments, and the supply of nuclear technology. According to the security model of proliferation, states pursue nuclear weapons in order to ensure their survival against nuclear or overwhelming conventional threats, particularly when these states are isolated and lack allied nuclear umbrellas.13 Paul expands upon the security model, arguing that states pursue nuclear weapons for security reasons but may refrain from proliferating in order to prevent costly arms races.14 Debs and Monteiro argue that a severe security threat is a necessary condition for proliferation, but contend that whether a state successfully acquires nuclear weapons depends on the behavior of its patron (if one exists) and whether there is a credible threat of military force against its nuclear program.15 The quantitative literature on the determinants of proliferation has provided considerable support to elements of the security model. Studies have found that states in enduring rivalries, those with a recent history of militarized disputes, and those facing major conventional threats are more likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs.16 Nuclear rivals are associated with the pursuit of nuclear weapons in some studies but only the exploration of

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nuclear weapons in others.17 In contrast to pursuit, exploration is defined by Singh and Way as a country “seriously consider[ing] building nuclear weapons, even if they never took major steps toward that end.”18 The evidence is similarly mixed with regard to the effect of alliances with nuclear powers.19 While extant research on the security model surely explains a significant portion of the variance in nuclear proliferation behavior, it does not tell the whole story. Put simply, security factors do not explain the changing character of proliferation over time: States dependent on the United States are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons after the mid-1970s even after one controls for measures of security threat, as shown in chapter 5. While Debs and Monteiro place a heavy weight on the threat of military force as a deterrent, which they argue should be credible against relatively weak states without allies, this cannot explain why countries like Libya, Iran, or Iraq were not deterred from pursuing nuclear weapons in the first place. Turning to the literature on the domestic sources of proliferation, Etel Solingen advances the most prominent argument. Solingen argues that since the NPT was signed in 1968, inward-looking nationalist regimes with few ties to the international economy have been more likely to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons when compared to their internationalist counterparts. For regimes that rely on integration with the international economy, the costs of nuclearization are prohibitive because of the potential for international sanctions, the inflationary effect of excessive military spending, and the general air of instability nuclear caused by proliferation, which may deter investment. Meanwhile, for inward-looking regimes, these costs are lower; indeed, these regimes may benefit from the strengthening of bureaucratic interest groups and nuclear weapons may bolster nationalist myths that leaders can exploit for domestic purposes.20 More recent work on domestic political motivations for proliferation finds that personalist regimes and leaders with rebel experience are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons.21 Solingen’s work is a crucial contribution to the literature in that it highlights important disincentives for proliferation and recognizes that these have not been constant over time. However, there are a couple ways in which these disincentives could be more precisely specified, a step this book aims to take. First, Solingen argues that proliferation has had negative consequences for regimes integrating into the international economy after 1968, but this book argues that this has only been the case since the United States instituted sanctions policies in the mid-1970s. Moreover, this has not applied equally to all internationalizing countries, since regimes without major ties to the United States have little to lose from these sanctions, even if they are integrated into the global economy. Second, by focusing on the economic dimension of global integration, Solingen underplays the important security dimension—pursuing nuclear weapons threatens not only

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regimes that depend on the United States economically but also those that depend on United States for security purposes, even if they have closed economies. Moreover, if the goal is to understand why some countries pursue nuclear weapons while others do not—one of the main aims of this book—we must move beyond Solingen’s work, which examines only countries that did explore or pursue nuclear weapons at one time or another. The normative model of nuclear proliferation argues that states may pursue nuclear weapons as a way of garnering prestige or of fulfilling particular conceptions of national identity.22 Hymans offers the most developed work in this tradition, arguing that only leaders with “oppositional nationalist” identity conceptions—those who see the world in “us vs. them” terms and view their nation as higher or at least equal in status to their primary reference nations—are likely to undertake pursuit of nuclear weapons.23 With respect to the efficacy of the nonproliferation regime, Hymans argues it is effective only against leaders with “subaltern” identities: those who perceive their nation as lower in status and power than their relevant comparison nations.24 A second strand of the normative literature focuses on the role of antinuclear norms, particularly those embedded in the NPT, in stigmatizing proliferation and reducing the probability that states pursue nuclear weapons.25 According to Rublee, these norms have played a major role in several countries’ decision to forsake nuclear weapons.26 Muller and Schmidt similarly tout the importance of the norms propagated by the NPT and argue that nonproliferation norms act most strongly on democratic or democratizing states.27 Walsh finds that “regime commitments [to the NPT] appear to strengthen or consolidate a decision to forgo nuclear weapons” and in some cases “induce a renunciation decision.”28 In a related vein, Tate argues that the nonproliferation regime established a norm against proliferation and that this norm can “account in large part for the failure of the dire predictions about nuclear devolution to materialize.”29 Indeed, Fuhrmann and Lupu find that membership in the NPT significantly reduces the odds that a country will pursue nuclear weapons.30 However, there are both theoretical and empirical shortcomings in the normative literature on nuclear proliferation, both with respect to the leader identity argument and the NPT-centered theories. First, a leader-centric approach cannot explain empirical variation in nuclear decision-making within individual leaders’ tenures—for example Qaddafi’s decision to pursue and then abandon nuclear weapons efforts or Park Chung-hee’s similar transformation in South Korea. Second, it is possible that oppositional nationalist leaders may be more likely to emerge in countries that are relatively insulated from the United States, which makes pursuing nuclear weapons less costly from the point of view of retaliatory sanctions. This could create a spurious correlation between leader identity types and nuclear outcomes.

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Turning to the literature on NPT norms, too little attention is paid to the role of the United States (and the Soviet Union) in propagating these norms and coercing and inducing resistant client states that were interested in nuclear weapons to sign on to and ratify the NPT, for example West Germany, Taiwan, and South Korea.31 In other words, a global norm against nuclear proliferation did not spontaneously emerge with the introduction of the NPT; many states were quite resistant to the norm, and the United States utilized its considerable leverage to gain compliance from states, which in turn suggests that much of the norm may be epiphenomenal to US (and Soviet) hegemonic pressure. For example, despite emphasizing the importance of norms, Tate notes that the nonproliferation regime derives much of its power from the linkage between nonproliferation and material benefits, since the decision to proliferate and defect from the regime would most likely lead to “serious economic and other sanctions.”32 This again suggests that adherence to the norm is often a function of threats and inducements offered by more powerful states, not any deep moral principle. Several recent works do not fall neatly into the security, domestic politics, or normative camps and instead focus on the role of superpowers in working to prevent proliferation, in a similar vein as this book. In addition to arguing that states dependent on the superpowers will be less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance, Kroenig finds in some quantitative models that states dependent on the United States—measured by voting similarity at the United Nations (UN)—are less likely to acquire, but not pursue, nuclear weapons.33 However, this measure of superpower dependence may simply be due to shared interests and thus would not directly measure the resource flows that cause the client state to be dependent. Moreover, Kroenig does not incorporate the fact that US nonproliferation policy has changed over time. Gibbons similarly finds that states more satisfied with the US-led international order (also measured using voting alignment at the UN) are more likely to make nonproliferation commitments, such as signing the Additional Protocol or ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.34 Another strand in the literature focuses on the supply of nuclear technology, finding that states with greater economic development, greater industrial capacity, or greater latent nuclear capacity are more likely to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons.35 Fuhrmann finds that states that receive peaceful nuclear assistance (measured by nuclear cooperation agreements) are more likely to pursue and successfully obtain nuclear weapons, particularly when this coincides with recent militarized disputes, while Kroenig concludes that states that receive sensitive nuclear assistance (defined as aid in plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or bomb design) are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons.36 Brown and Kaplow find that states that receive technical cooperation from the IAEA on the fuel cycle are more likely to pursue nuclear

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weapons.37 Hymans provides an exception to this line of argument, using a case study of Yugoslavia to establish that international civil nuclear cooperation may impede a country’s proliferation efforts by leading scientists to drag their feet or giving them outside career options.38 In a related vein, Kemp argues that the effect of foreign assistance on aiding proliferation is overstated, and that the A. Q. Khan network in particular may have hindered nuclear weapons programs by spreading a suboptimal centrifuge enrichment method.39 Aside from the reverse causality problems with this literature—states will often develop nuclear capacity or seek foreign assistance when they are motivated to pursue nuclear weapons, rather than the other way around—there is another important limitation with this body of work, namely the insufficient attention to the changing volume and quality of foreign nuclear assistance over time. Prior to the development of strong US nonproliferation policies in the 1970s, sensitive nuclear assistance in particular was more available, with multiple Western suppliers often competitively bidding for contracts in order to grow their domestic nuclear industries or gain access to natural resources like oil.40 After the strengthening of US policy, including the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the mid-1970s, foreign provision of sensitive nuclear technologies has been much harder to come by, as it is now generally provided illicitly, in piecemeal fashion, and often from states and nonstate actors outside the US sphere of influence that have more limited technical proficiency.41 All in all, this suggests both that (1) the character of foreign assistance has changed over time, and (2) these changes are largely an outgrowth of US nonproliferation efforts.

Causes of Nuclear Reversal A second, smaller strand in the literature focuses on why states that embark on nuclear weapons programs subsequently do or do not give them up. Some of the literature cited above also contains explicit or implicit predictions for nuclear reversal: For example, states will be more likely to give up nuclear weapons programs when a leader rises to power that is not an oppositional nationalist, when the domestic regime changes and adopts a more liberal economic model, or when their security environment improves. Compared to the literature on the causes of nuclear proliferation, the literature that solely focuses on nuclear reversal is somewhat less developed. To the extent that there is consensus, it is that offering inducements that improve a state’s security or economic situation best brings about nuclear reversal. Sanctions and military force, while potentially useful, are generally deemed ineffective except under limited conditions. One important exception to these trends is Gerzhoy’s recent work, which suggests that a

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patron’s threat of military abandonment can cause states to abandon nuclear weapons programs when they are dependent on the patron and are assured that the threat will not be carried out if they comply.42 Another exception is work by Lanoszka, who argues that when junior allies pursue nuclear weapons, they are more likely to reverse their programs when they are dependent on their patron.43 Many scholars highlight the importance of offering inducements that improve a proliferating state’s security, for example providing credible security guarantees to allies, resolving regional conflicts, offering negative security assurances to adversaries, and dropping policies of regime change.44 A recent edited volume concludes that security assurances often play a useful (but not decisive) role in convincing states to reverse their nuclear ambitions, particularly when bilateral military consultation makes such assurances credible.45 Levite argues that an improved security environment is a necessary but insufficient factor for explaining nuclear reversal, which often requires “domestic regime change and the availability of external incentives,” often offered by the United States.46 In a similar vein, Mehta finds that inducements in the form of economic and military aid are most useful at bringing about nuclear reversal, particularly when a new leader comes to power in the proliferating state.47 When it comes to sanctions, a variety of scholars suggest that they tend to work best in tandem with economic or political inducements.48 Others are more generally pessimistic about sanctions. In an analysis of US efforts to prevent its clients from going nuclear, Kogan finds that punitive sanctions are relatively ineffective, arguing that Washington has been most successful when it adopts a strategy of coercion by denial, whereby the client is prevented from acquiring sensitive nuclear technology or forced into intrusive inspection regimes.49 Ninic argues that neither sanctions nor inducements are a silver bullet in producing nuclear reversal.50 A 2012 edited volume concludes that nonproliferation sanctions tend to fail, partly because recent proliferators were relatively insulated from their effects.51 A final tool that might be used to bring about nuclear reversal is military force. In the most comprehensive study on this issue, Kreps and Fuhrmann analyze the sixteen documented cases of attacks against nuclear facilities and find that attacks are more likely to succeed in peacetime than in the context of an ongoing war, and that attacks are more successful against relatively undeveloped nuclear programs.52 While the literature on nuclear reversal may help explain why some states that have pursued nuclear weapons have not ultimately acquired them, it does not directly address the effect of nonproliferation policies on whether states initiate nuclear weapons programs, an important question this book explores. Indeed, drawing conclusions about the overall efficacy of policy tools like sanctions only from cases where they are

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applied against ongoing proliferators may be dangerously misguided because of the likelihood of selection effects, whereby states strategically decide whether to pursue nuclear weapons based on factors that also affect the probability of subsequent nonproliferation tools succeeding.53 For example, if states expect that sanctions are likely if they pursue nuclear weapons, those particularly vulnerable to their effects are likely to abstain, leading only insulated states to become the targets of imposed sanctions, thereby rendering the observed success rate low despite the success of sanctions at deterring states. Indeed, this is precisely what this book argues occurred with respect to the changing character of proliferators after the strengthening of US nonproliferation policies in the 1970s. The remainder of this chapter develops new theories of the sources and effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy, theories that explicitly take into account this type of strategic dynamic.

Theorizing the Sources of US Nonproliferation Policy This book argues that the full character and timing of US nonproliferation efforts are explicable only when expectations of nuclear domino effects and bureaucratic factors are placed at the center of the analysis. Specifically, and most fundamentally, expectations of nuclear domino effects are necessary to explain why US policymakers settled on a strategic preference for enforcing nonproliferation universally rather than selectively. A selective nonproliferation policy is tenable only if policymakers believe that they can contain proliferation to cases where it is beneficial or relatively harmless. If proliferation in one state strongly influences the odds of proliferation in other states, a selective nonproliferation policy would likely spiral out of control. Meanwhile, two bureaucratic factors—high-level government attention to nonproliferation and political openings for nonproliferation advocates—are necessary to explain how these preferences are translated into actual policy changes. The US government constantly confronts a range of policy challenges, and time and bureaucratic resources are scarce. Major changes in policy are therefore more likely when there is sustained high-level government attention and political pressures from Congress or elsewhere help to overcome the inertia that favors status quo policies. I argue that tests by new nuclear states, while not the only possible trigger, tend to generate all three of these conditions simultaneously: increasing expectations of domino effects, prompting greater government attention to nonproliferation, and offering an opening for nonproliferation advocates to push their case. The theory, visualized in figure 2.1, therefore aims to explain how and why the Chinese and Indian nuclear tests caused the dramatic tightening of US nonproliferation policy in 1964–68 and 1974–80.54

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Higher expectations of domino effects

Nuclear test

Higher government attention

More universal nonproliferation policy

Political openings for nonproliferation advocates Figure 1.1. The sources of US nonproliferation policy

Before expanding on the theory, it is important to note that this theory does not reject the importance of existing motivations for nonproliferation identified in the literature and discussed above. Rather, it argues that these motivations are insufficient: Power projection capability, influence over allies, nuclear war risks, and a desire to benefit friendly states are not equally relevant in all cases of potential proliferation and therefore cannot explain why the United States ultimately adopted an undifferentiated, across-theboard nonproliferation policy. Moreover, many of these variables are slowmoving and therefore cannot explain the sharp temporal shifts in policy that we observe. The argument therefore is that expectations of nuclear domino effects and bureaucratic factors explain the decision to apply nonproliferation policies universally and explain significant temporal changes in US policy, not that expectations of nuclear domino effects or bureaucratic factors are the basic driver of US opposition to proliferation. Indeed, as I will explain below, the theory offered in this book concurs with existing explanations in that the ultimate aim of US policies is maintaining a favorable geopolitical position. I now turn to developing each component of the theory in detail.

e x pectati o ns o f n u clea r d o mi n o effe c t s I define a nuclear domino effect as a situation where proliferation in one state (state A) causes a significant increase in the probability of proliferation in a second state (state B). While the concept of nuclear domino effects has historically been associated with a realist, security-centered model of proliferation where states pursue nuclear weapons to balance against a rival state’s nuclear arsenal, this is only one of several possible mechanisms by which the nuclear domino theory can operate.55 A more exhaustive list of mechanisms compatible with the nuclear domino theory is below. These mechanisms are not meant to be mutually exclusive;

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indeed, the more mechanisms that are anticipated to operate simultaneously, the higher a policymaker’s expectations of domino effects are likely to be in a particular case. 1. Security: State A’s proliferation causes its rival, State B, to pursue nuclear weapons to balance against State A’s nuclear capabilities. This is the traditional “security model” of proliferation and has been used to explain Soviet, British, Chinese, and Pakistani nuclear programs, among others.56 2. Prestige: State B pursues nuclear weapons to emulate the prestige garnered by State A’s proliferation. It has been speculated that Yugoslavia revived its dormant nuclear program in response to India’s nuclear test since the two countries were in competition to lead the nonaligned movement.57 3. Domestic: State A’s proliferation strengthens domestic actors in State B that were already pro-nuclear for bureaucratic reasons, tipping the decision-making balance in their favor. In India, for instance, the civilian nuclear establishment favored developing nuclear weapons prior to China’s 1964 test. The test, however, shifted the domestic debate in favor of a nuclear weapons program.58 4. Supply-Side: State A acquires nuclear weapons and then offers sensitive nuclear assistance to State B, easing the path to a nuclear arsenal. This sort of technological aid has played a role in many successful cases of proliferation, for example Israel and China.59 When China first tested in 1964, this led Indonesia to expect Chinese support in its own nuclear weapons effort.60 The chairman of the committee tasked with reassessing US nonproliferation policy following China’s test likewise worried that Pakistan would turn to China for assistance in a nuclear weapons program.61 5. Political Viability: State A’s proliferation reduces the perceived political costs of proliferation in State B by showing that nonproliferation barriers are surmountable. For instance, when India tested in 1974 and did not face stiff sanctions, this led decision-makers in South Africa to conclude that proliferation would result only in “diplomatic protests” and nothing more.62 6. Demonstration of Technical Feasibility: State A’s proliferation demonstrates that countries with a given threshold of economic and technological capacity can successfully acquire nuclear weapons, increasing the probability that states with equal or higher capacity proliferate due to an increased perception of technical feasibility. Hussein Kamel, the head of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, is reported to have backed a centrifuge program partly because, as he put it, “surely if the Pakistanis can develop such a thing, then so can we. Iraq is at least as advanced as Pakistan.”63

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Expectations of nuclear domino effects are likely to be especially heightened when a state conducts its first nuclear test, since this is likely to activate all six mechanisms outlined above. Acquiring a nuclear capability in the absence of testing (1) does not as clearly threaten security since the capabilities are not demonstrated; (2) garners uncertain prestige; (3) is less likely to influence other states’ domestic politics because the capability is not on the public agenda; (4) implies a lower capacity on the nuclear state’s part to provide sensitive assistance on weapons design; (5) has a less overt effect on the perceived political viability of proliferation; and (6) leaves significant ambiguity about technical feasibility. Proliferation without a test creates uncertainty about both capability and intent and allows the nuclear issue to remain under the radar politically. By contrast, conducting a nuclear test demonstrates both the capability and intent to develop nuclear weapons and forces the issue onto the public agenda. The Chinese and Indian nuclear tests were likely especially powerful, when compared to the prior tests by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France, for two reasons. First, they occurred in regions (East Asia and South Asia) that were previously non-nuclear, meaning that key states in the neighborhood might be incentivized to go nuclear themselves for reasons of security, domestic politics, and prestige. Both China and India had regional adversaries that might be especially tempted to seek a balancing capability—for the former, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and India; for the latter, Pakistan. Second, as poor countries, China and India dramatically increased the perceived technical feasibility of proliferation. By contrast, when the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France tested, their main adversaries already had acquired nuclear weapons. Moreover, as great powers with well-established economic and technological capacity, their nuclear tests would not make proliferation appear feasible to the vast majority of weaker, poorer states. One important implication of this argument is that the United States should seek to prevent tests by new nuclear states from occurring—even if that state has already developed nuclear weapons covertly—precisely in order to limit the odds that domino effects materialize. It is not just that policymakers view nuclear tests as a public setback and embarrassment for nonproliferation policies but also that there are rational reasons for believing that they are more likely to engender further proliferation when compared to an opaque nuclear capability. It is important to note that the explanatory variable here is the expectations or beliefs about nuclear domino effects held by policymakers, not their objective potency.64 While I believe that domino effects are real and were more common than recent literature suggests, their empirical prevalence and strength is outside the scope of this book.65 Moreover, this argument is not primarily intended to explain variation across individuals in their baseline beliefs in nuclear domino effects—variation that surely does exist

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and may be tied to ideology, prior experiences, or other idiosyncratic factors. Rather, it is a rationalist argument that holds that tests by new nuclear states cause policymakers to revise their views of the likelihood of nuclear domino effects based on new information from the environment. While not all individuals will respond to the environment in identical ways, the overall trend will be toward greater expectations of nuclear domino effects, which will lead to a preference for stronger, more universalistic nonproliferation policies. Put differently, many (but not all) policymakers will estimate that domino effects are significantly more likely after a test by a new nuclear state; very few will view domino effects as less probable. I argue that the extent to which policymakers expect nuclear domino effects is crucial to explaining whether they prefer (1) a selective, tailored nonproliferation policy that opposes proliferation in some cases and allows or even aids it in others, or (2) a strict, across-the-board nonproliferation policy where proliferation is opposed in all cases. This argument rests on a few assumptions. First, I assume that policymakers generally perceive a significant degree of political efficacy—in other words, they believe that proliferation is not totally inevitable and stands a reasonable chance of being prevented or at least limited by US efforts.66 Second, I build on existing literature by Kroenig and Coe and Vaynman and assume that US policymakers’ attitudes toward nonproliferation are driven primarily by a desire to protect and strengthen America’s dominant geopolitical position. In this sense, the theory is fundamentally realist, at least when it comes to characterizing policymakers’ preferences.67 However, I argue that proliferation, and efforts at nonproliferation, have different potential effects on this goal, on average, depending on whether the nuclear aspirant is a friend or ally of the United States, an adversary, or unaligned. The type of relationship the potential proliferator has with the United States not only plays a major role in determining the geopolitical consequences of proliferation, it also affects the geopolitical costs of enforcing nonproliferation for the United States. Given the assumption that the US aim is to maintain or strengthen its geopolitical position, it is easy to see that an adversary acquiring nuclear weapons is a substantial and unalloyed bad for the United States: It drastically limits the ability of the United States to use force against that country, raises the risk of the United States becoming directly involved in a nuclear war, and may embolden the newly nuclear adversary to act more aggressively. Regime change is likely to be entirely off the table as a policy option for the United States, and costly additional commitments to US allies in the adversary’s neighborhood may be necessary as well. While efforts to enforce nonproliferation may be costly against adversary states, whether involving sanctions, military strikes, or inducements, these costs are likely to be outweighed by the potential benefits given the grave strategic consequences of proliferation. Moreover, because the nuclear aspirant is already

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an adversary, coercive nonproliferation measures will not change the fundamental geopolitical dynamic. However, I argue that it is far less clear that proliferation by a friendly state is a net negative for the United States geopolitically, if it can be contained. While proliferation may make an allied state more autonomous and could theoretically embroil the United States in an unwanted nuclear conflict or a preventive war launched by an adversary, this risk is potentially balanced or outweighed by three factors: (1) strengthened deterrence against a shared adversary; (2) the ability for the United States to free up conventional or nuclear resources that were previously devoted to the ally’s defense, which could in fact reduce the risk of the United States becoming entrapped in a conflict; and (3) the likelihood that the very act of enforcing nonproliferation against an ally is costly, potentially significantly damaging the relationship between the United States and its ally or requiring the United States to extend costly new security commitments. The costs of enforcing nonproliferation are less likely to be outweighed by the strategic consequences of proliferation in these cases, given that these consequences are mixed. It is similarly unclear what the optimal geopolitical response to an unaligned state pursuing nuclear weapons would be for the United States, if such proliferation could be contained. This is the case for four reasons: (1) the state may directly threaten or come into conflict with the United States but is less likely to do so than an adversary; (2) its unaligned status means the United States is giving up little influence over the state when it acquires a nuclear arsenal; (3) the state may in fact share an adversary with the United States, as with India vis-à-vis China during the early part of the Cold War; and (4) successful efforts to prevent the state from acquiring nuclear weapons are likely to require substantial US resources, such as security commitments, which may increase the probability of the United States becoming involved in unwanted conflicts. In sum, while it is clear that an adversary’s pursuit of nuclear weapons should elicit strong opposition from the United States, it is far less clear for allies and unaligned states—at least when proliferation can be contained to those cases. When nuclear domino effects are perceived to be weak or nonexistent, this argument predicts policymakers to prefer a tailored, case-by-case nonproliferation policy. Policymakers would oppose proliferation in enemy states consistently but prefer a more varied approach toward allied or unaligned states: opposing in some cases and aiding or allowing in others, depending on the mix of the above factors that weigh for or against nonproliferation. Conversely, when nuclear domino effects are perceived to be strong, this argument predicts that policymakers would prefer a strict, across-the-board nonproliferation policy. Proliferation in enemy states would be opposed regardless of expectations of nuclear domino effects, as would proliferation in friendly and unaligned states with a particularly

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dangerous balance of the factors identified above. However, when it comes to unaligned and allied states where proliferation is neutral or positive for the United States, the belief in nuclear domino effects would tip the balance in favor of nonproliferation. The potential benefits of proliferation and costs of nonproliferation efforts in these cases would be outweighed by the possibility that allowing these states to acquire nuclear weapons would ultimately lead other states that do pose great strategic risks to the United States to acquire nuclear weapons. g r eater gover n men t atten ti o n In addition to making domino effects appear more likely, which affects policymaker preferences about nonproliferation policy, tests by new nuclear states also serve two subsidiary bureaucratic roles in translating these changed preferences into actual policy shifts. First, tests are likely to produce greater high-level government attention to the issue of nonproliferation, thus making policy change more likely after a test even if policymakers could rationally anticipate domino effects prior to the test. The US government and its foreign policy apparatus have finite time and resources and must deal with many distinct issues simultaneously. This is especially true at the level of the president, who crucially shapes foreign policy but must spend most of his time on domestic policy. As Wood and Peake put it: “The president is governed by an economy of attention in which competition exists for scarce resources. . . . In order to prioritize issues, presidents rely on cues from their environment regarding the relative severity of the problem, as well as political benefits and costs.”68 It is well established that one important type of cue from the environment is a salient public event or crisis, which can catalyze high-level government focus and help determine what gets on the foreign policy agenda. In a broad sense, Andrade and Young find that salient international events lead presidents to place larger emphasis on foreign policy.69 Wood and Peake find that there is a high degree of inertia in terms of what receives foreign policy attention, but that exogenous events or crises can alter this dynamic.70 Based on an analysis of presidential agenda setting, Edwards and Wood conclude that “most of the time the president reacts, responding primarily to fluctuations in media attention and world events,” especially when it comes to foreign policy.71 Birkland argues for the importance of “potential focusing events” in determining what gets on the agenda and providing an opening for policy change. Potential focusing events are “sudden” and “relatively rare,” are perceived as harmful or raising the risk of future harm, and are “known to policy makers and the public virtually simultaneously.” Such events provide an opening for policy change, not only by increasing attention to an issue but also by “dramatically highlighting policy failures.”72 Tests by new nuclear states clearly meet this definition:

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They are sudden, rare, generally perceived as harmful, and are known to policymakers and the public at roughly the same time. p o li ti ca l open i n gs fo r n o n pro li ferat i o n a d v o c at e s Second, and relatedly, tests by new nuclear states are likely to elevate the role of actors in the policy process that have a stake in stronger nonproliferation policies. Such focusing events “lead to near immediate attention to the problem, giving change-oriented groups and leaders an opportunity to mobilize by pointing to the event as an exemplar of what is wrong with existing policy.”73 Birkland places significant weight on the role of policy entrepreneurs, political leaders, or technical experts who “lead groups and coalitions that seek to use focusing events for their symbolic potential, thereby advancing issues on the agenda.”74 In the context of nonproliferation, these actors are likely to emerge from Congress, which has a long history as Washington’s nonproliferation watchdog, or bureaucratic entities like the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which had technical expertise and a mandate devoted to nonproliferation and arms control. Congress has played a crucial role in tightening US nonproliferation policy since the beginning of the nuclear age. Congressional intervention ensured that the 1946 Atomic Energy Act established a highly restrictive US nuclear export policy, which forbade the transfer of sensitive nuclear information or technology to foreign countries.75 The Atomic Energy Act also created the extremely powerful Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) to oversee the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).76 In addition to having “exclusive jurisdiction” over legislation related to nuclear issues, the committee was given “exclusive access to information upon which its highly secretive deliberations were based,” which conferred on the JCAE “tremendous power in its area of expertise.”77 Even outside the nuclear realm, there is a long history of congressional “foreign policy entrepreneurs” exerting major influence on policy.78 As Lindsay argues, Congress can influence foreign policy not just through legislation but also through “anticipated reactions, changes in the decision-making process in the executive branch, and political grandstanding.”79 The ACDA, meanwhile, “did nothing else but work on arms control and non-proliferation challenges,” thus giving it a bureaucratic stake in more expansive nonproliferation efforts.80 Such actors that have a bureaucratic or political interest in increasing the scope of nonproliferation efforts are likely to view tests by new nuclear states as an opportunity to push their agenda. It is important to note that for these particular actors, expectations of nuclear domino effects may not causally influence their views and instead may simply be used rhetorically in an effort to spur stronger nonproliferation policies. For these actors, a nuclear test provides a political opening to act on preexisting preferences, and

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forecasts of nuclear domino effects may simply be used as cudgels in political debates. Nonetheless, that these policymakers turn to dire warnings of domino effects in their political advocacy suggests that they are deemed effective at convincing others who do not have preexisting bureaucratic stakes in strong nonproliferation policy.81 Observable Implications on the Sources of US Policy The above argument suggests four observable implications: Implication 1: US nonproliferation policy should significantly strengthen after the 1964 Chinese and 1974 Indian nuclear tests, moving from a selective to more universal approach, and policymakers should emphasize heightened expectations of nuclear domino effects as motivating their preference for stronger nonproliferation policies. Implication 2: The Chinese and Indian nuclear tests should cause greater government attention to nonproliferation and lead to greater involvement in the policy process by nonproliferation advocates, facilitating the move toward a stronger policy. Implication 3: After the adoption of a stronger nonproliferation policy, the United States should oppose proliferation even in friendly or unaligned states. Policymakers should consistently cite expectations of nuclear domino effects as a motive for opposing proliferation in these states. Implication 4: After the adoption of a stronger nonproliferation policy, the United States should work to prevent first nuclear tests by states that have already achieved a nuclear weapons capability, largely because of the expectation that these tests would spark nuclear domino effects.

Theorizing the Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy Turning to the effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy, this book highlights the role of sanctions in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. By leveraging its superior power position and threatening to withdraw economic and military support from countries seeking nuclear weapons, I argue that the United States has reduced the demand for proliferation among countries dependent on the United States by dramatically increasing its security, domestic political, and normative costs. The theory thus adopts a multi-causal approach, incorporating the three motivational pathways identified in the literature on the causes of proliferation. More specifically, the argument is that leaders rationally consider the security, domestic, and normative costs of pursuing nuclear weapons before they do so and that a credible threat of sanctions will often succeed in deterring states from seeking nuclear weapons if they are highly dependent on

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the United States.82 Countries with high economic and security dependence on the United States have a lot to lose from US sanctions, while states with little dependence face low costs. Consistent with the rationalist literature on sanctions, the argument emphasizes that vulnerable target states are likely to concede in the face of a credible threat, rather than defying the threat and absorbing the costs of sanctions.83 As Schelling rightly argues, in order for such coercive threats to be effective, they must be coupled with a credible assurance.84 In other words, the potential target of sanctions must believe that US military and economic support will be maintained if the state complies and does not pursue nuclear weapons. Research on coercion and deterrence suggests that threats of sanctions are likely to be credible to the extent that the United States (1) has both the interest and capability to carry out the threat; (2) communicates the threat clearly; and (3) signals its commitment by adopting hand-tying mechanisms that generate domestic audience costs.85 As will be discussed in chapter 5, these three conditions were only collectively met starting in the mid-1970s as a result of congressional legislation, which tied the president’s hands and publicly committed the United States to nonproliferation sanctions. This rationalist framework—where leaders rationally consider the likelihood and costs of sanctions before starting a nuclear weapons program— implies that a selection effect is likely to be present when analyzing the effectiveness of sanctions imposed against ongoing nuclear weapons programs. Namely, because vulnerable states are likely to be deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place once the threat is credible, sanctions that are actually observed against ongoing nuclear weapons programs are likely to fail, since they will be disproportionately targeted at countries that are relatively insulated from the United States. The theory therefore suggests that if we only analyzed the effectiveness of sanctions against ongoing nuclear weapons programs, we would seriously understate their success. According to this rationalist framework, the threat or imposition of sanctions is likely to succeed in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs only when the proliferating state underestimated the probability and/ or costs of sanctions when they initiated the effort.86 For example, a state might be dependent on the United States but not anticipate sanctions, perhaps because they started their nuclear program before the United States adopted a credible sanctions policy. Alternatively, a country with low dependence on the United States might have been willing to endure US sanctions but unexpectedly face potent multilateral sanctions, perhaps due to successful US efforts to build an international coalition.87 In either of these scenarios, a country might rationally abandon an ongoing nuclear weapons program due to sanctions. As noted above, sanctions can affect nuclear decision-making through three pathways: security, domestic politics, and norms.

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s e curi ty First, states dependent on US troops, security guarantees, or military aid are likely to think twice about proliferating if it threatens to jeopardize these important resources. Thus, while states may desire nuclear weapons in order to ensure their security against nuclear or conventional threats, they may be unwilling to accept the window of vulnerability that would occur if they started a nuclear weapons program and lost American troop commitments and military aid shortly thereafter. After all, the average time to completing a nuclear weapons program (among those that succeeded) is not short: about twelve years since 1945.88 This lag time makes the threat of a weakened security relationship a potent source of leverage. There are good reasons for states to worry about the loss of US military support. Theory and evidence suggests that alliances, for which troops and military aid are often the material trappings, serve as signals that can effectively deter aggression.89 Troop deployments play a particularly important role in signaling commitment and, by extension, deterring aggression. As Schelling famously put it in the Cold War context, even a relatively small number of US troops can serve as an effective tripwire, since in the event of war, “They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there.”90 Although less potent than troop commitments, military aid can be similarly valuable to states for security reasons. Indeed, while Walt is generally skeptical of the ability of military aid to provide leverage for dominant partners in an alliance, he does note that “providing aid—especially military aid—usually commits the donor’s prestige to the fate of the recipient,” that military aid “strengthens the recipient’s position,” and that it “can make an existing alignment more effective.”91 In other words, military aid both serves as a signal of commitment and directly strengthens deterrence by improving the junior partner’s defense. There is also some empirical evidence that dependence on foreign arms transfers can restrain a recipient state’s behavior.92 More broadly, the literature on alliance management suggests that allies often fear abandonment, particularly when they are relatively more dependent on their partner, and that they will make strenuous efforts to avoid this outcome.93 Walt concurs about the importance of relative dependence in providing leverage.94 In a similar vein, Pressman notes that the stronger state in an alliance has a bargaining advantage when seeking to restrain an ally’s behavior, particularly when it uses pressure or inducements that “mobilize its power resources” rather than focusing “solely on rhetoric and persuasion.”95 In sum, there are strong theoretical reasons for believing that credibly threatening to withdraw US troops, security guarantees, or military aid

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would be a powerful deterrent for states considering initiating a nuclear weapons program. Even if a state desires a nuclear deterrent for longterm security reasons, its security may be irreparably harmed in the short term by transgressing US nonproliferation policies and triggering sanctions. dom esti c po liti cs Second, in terms of domestic politics, Solingen’s research has highlighted how regimes whose ruling coalitions depend on the international economy are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons since it poses risks to their grip on power.96 The threat of sanctions is of course relevant here: Ruling coalitions that rely on trade or foreign aid from the United States are likely to oppose a nuclear program in order to avoid costly trade embargos or aid cutoffs that may threaten their political survival. Alternately, nuclear scientists and bureaucrats whose work is advanced through international nuclear cooperation may oppose the initiation of a nuclear weapons program since it jeopardizes this assistance.97 More generally, as Dai observes, “Within a country, some actors gain while others may lose if the government does not comply with an international agreement. When those who are victimized by noncompliance have crucial leverage over the government, compliance can be rational even if the country as a whole pays for it more than benefits from it.”98 This mechanism builds on the growing body of theory and evidence in the last few decades suggesting that leaders’ foreign policy behavior is often driven by the desire to maintain domestic power. When deciding whether to initiate or join a war, leaders consider not just geopolitics but also the likely effects of the war on their prospects for domestic political survival.99 Similarly, the audience cost mechanism proposed by Fearon and extended by others is largely based on the notion that democratic leaders will be wary of backing down in crises due to the fear of losing power domestically.100 Research suggests that the desire to maintain domestic power shapes the foreign policy behavior of nondemocratic leaders as well. In order to avoid losing power and suffering additional punishment thereafter, leaders in mixed regimes may “gamble for resurrection” and extend losing wars longer than would otherwise be rational.101 Even leaders in autocratic systems are vulnerable to audience costs and domestic punishment as a consequence of backing down in crises.102 There is thus strong reason to believe that leaders condition their foreign policy behavior—even in the gravest decisions involving crisis or war—on their desire to maintain domestic power. This strongly suggests that in the realm of nuclear proliferation—clearly a foreign policy decision of the highest order—a threat of sanctions that could endanger the political survival of ruling groups would help to deter proliferation.

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norm s Finally, the threat of US sanctions is likely to be important in the normative domain as well. Much of the international relations literature has focused on the moral, ideational, and sociological sources of norms.103 However, there is also a diverse literature that argues that norms derive much of their power from sanctions that serve as enforcement mechanisms, and that powerful actors are often able to propagate norms that reflect their material interests. First, with respect to the importance of sanctions for norm development, Finnemore and Sikkink note that socialization is the primary mechanism of a norm cascade and that this “involves diplomatic praise or censure . . . which is reinforced by material sanctions and incentives.”104 Goertz and Diehl observe that even if norms become internalized, the fact remains that “in virtually all cases of functioning norms, there seem to be some sanctions.”105 Based on simulations, Axelrod found that the level at which a norm is violated is inversely related to the probability of punishment.106 Drawing on this research, we should expect that the credibility of and vulnerability to sanctions should strengthen norms against proliferation, helping to deter nuclear pursuit. Second, theory and evidence suggests that norms are often the product of efforts by powerful actors to spread and enforce patterns of behavior that reflect their interests, even if the norms ultimately become internalized. Laitin describes how in Nigeria, British colonial authorities successfully worked to “shape and manipulate social myths so that the social order they created would seem legitimate.”107 In an international relations setting, Ikenberry and Kupchan describe how “elites in secondary states buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon’s notion of international order.” Importantly, this socialization process “is distinct from, but does not occur independently of, power manifest as the manipulation of material incentives.”108 In a similar vein, Gilpin notes how hegemonic states achieve compliance “in part because they [client states] accept the legitimacy and utility of the existing order. . . . Empires and dominant states supply public goods (security, economic order, etc.) that give other states an interest in following their lead.”109 In his work on international hierarchy, Lake likewise describes the existence of a “social contract” between patron and client, whereby the client generally accepts the legitimacy of the patron’s rules in exchange for the benefits it receives. When a client state violates the rules, the patron uses sanctions to enforce discipline and deter others from following suit.110 One example of this process of hegemonic norm development is the international norm against assassination, which was fostered by great powers in order to protect “the position of great powers relative to other

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states and nonstate actors.”111 The norm against proliferation is arguably analogous in the sense that major powers—with the United States and Soviet Union leading the charge—worked to delegitimize the development of military technology that could help equalize the power imbalance vis-àvis weaker states. This sort of norm, once created or sponsored by a major power, is more likely to spread to and be accepted by countries that have important ties with the hegemon, that is, states in their sphere of influence. Focusing on nonproliferation norms and drawing on insights from social psychology, Rublee argues, “When a norm transmitter is similar to us, or is someone with whom we desire a good relationship, we are more open to normative influence from that source.”112 Taken together, the literature on norms and their relationship to material power provides a strong basis for believing that a hegemonic state has the ability to transmit norms—which are often self-serving—and that these norms should have the most constraining influence on states that rely on the hegemon for material benefits. Observable Implications on the Effectiveness of US Policy The theoretical argument outlined above suggests three observable implications: Implication 1: States dependent on the United States economically and militarily should be significantly less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs, but only when the threat of sanctions is credible. Implication 2: Due to selection effects caused by effective deterrence, unilateral US sanctions against ongoing nuclear weapons programs should be largely ineffective. Implication 3: States should be likely to abandon ongoing nuclear weapons programs due to sanctions only if they underestimated the probability or cost of sanctions when they initiated their nuclear weapons program and subsequently face a credible threat or imposition of sanctions. Specifically, states dependent on the United States that had ongoing nuclear weapons programs when the United States first adopted credible sanctions policies should be likely to concede to US threats, while countries that face unusually strong multilateral sanctions should be likely to concede as well. s c ope co nd iti o n s a n d po ten ti a l co unt e r a r g u m e nt s Having elucidated the theory’s observable implications on the effectiveness of US sanctions, it is important to make clear what this book is not arguing. It is not suggesting that a credible threat of sanctions and dependence on the United States are the only factors determining states’ proliferation behavior. Rather, the claim is that high dependence on the United States and a credible threat of sanctions will reduce the likelihood of a state pursuing

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nuclear weapons, all else being equal. Because the argument is probabilistic and recognizes that other factors matter for proliferation decisions, it is not intended to provide a complete explanation for every country’s behavior. Chapters 5 through 9 will explicitly address alternative explanations that may affect proliferation behavior, such as the characteristics of a state’s security environment or domestic politics. Relatedly, this book is not arguing that sanctions are the only useful tool that the United States can bring to bear in the service of nonproliferation. For example, the United States may turn to inducements, such as arms sales, security guarantees, economic aid, or nonaggression pacts. To some extent, this is indirectly captured by the theoretical argument, since inducements in a prior time period feed into a country’s level of dependence on the United States in a subsequent period. In other words, countries that receive security guarantees or economic aid will have higher levels of dependence on the United States. According to this book’s theory, this gives them more to lose from sanctions, thus reducing their likelihood of proliferation when they face a credible sanctions threat. However, it is possible that inducements may matter independently of any threat of sanctions—for example, an entirely new inducement might be offered to a country already seeking nuclear weapons. This is an important alternative explanation that will be explicitly addressed in the case study chapters. This book is also not arguing that the United States has only limited proliferation and never provoked it. After all, given that the United States was the first country to acquire nuclear weapons, used them on Japan, and subsequently relied heavily on the threat of nuclear use in its Cold War defense strategy, Washington arguably unleashed the proliferation problem. Indeed, US nuclear policies generated incentives for the Soviet Union and China to develop nuclear weapons, which ultimately put pressure on other non-Communist countries such as Britain, France, and India to follow.113 What this book argues is that once these incentives were generated, US nonproliferation efforts—particularly the development of sanctions policies in the 1970s—played a crucial role in limiting the further spread of nuclear weapons. In other words, the counterfactual world where the United States emphasized nuclear weapons in its own policy in the early Cold War but then did not adopt a strong nonproliferation policy would have seen substantially more proliferation. It is also important to address potential counterarguments to the theory. First, one could argue that the United States cannot credibly threaten to sanction clients to which it is heavily committed for geostrategic reasons.114 However, this argument overlooks several important factors. As Gerzhoy notes, “Even if the client believes that its patron is likely to remain committed, the catastrophic consequences of abandonment mean that the slightest possibility that the patron will renege on its promises has disproportionate effects on the client’s calculations.”115 Moreover, the

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hand-tying mechanisms imposed by Congress, discussed in subsequent chapters, can make threats of sanctions credible even if the president and his administration oppose cutting off ties. Finally, because of the US power position and the imbalance in capabilities between Washington and its clients, the client needs the United States more than the other way around, which lends US decision-makers a great deal of leeway and aids the credibility of US threats.116 Second, one could make the case that dependence on the United States in the present matters only to the extent that there are no alternative patrons available. Otherwise, states could realign toward a patron that is more permissive toward their nuclear ambitions. The problem with this argument is that US clients—especially during the Cold War—often have had no realistic realignment options, as the only alternative superpower was generally their enemy or allied with their primary enemy. South Korea, for instance, could not realistically realign with China or the Soviet Union. Moreover, both during the Cold War and after, the United States has generally been a very attractive great power ally for reasons of geography and perceived intentions.117 Finally, even if it were desirable or possible for a US client to realign toward the Soviets during the Cold War, or toward China today, this would be unlikely to remove constraints on the client’s nuclear program. After all, the Soviets were firm opponents to proliferation at least since the 1960s, and China has moved in that direction in recent decades as well.118 As Kroenig points out, opposition to proliferation may in fact be an inherent preference of great powers, which want to preserve their advantages in power projection.119 Third, one could argue that dependence and a credible threat of sanctions may not deter if proliferators think they can hide their program, avoid the sanctions, and present a fait accompli. Indeed, autocratic states, which are presumably better at keeping secrets, have been more likely to violate the NPT.120 Moreover, Narang shows that a covert “hiding” approach is a common proliferation strategy, particularly for countries vulnerable to economic or military coercion.121 However, there are several weaknesses with the argument that the possibility of hiding will prevent deterrence from operating. Perhaps most importantly, one cannot point to a single case where a country developed nuclear weapons without its program being detected beforehand. As Montgomery and Mount have found, US intelligence agencies have tended to overestimate rather than underestimate nuclear weapons programs.122 Moreover, while Narang is certainly correct that hiding may at least shorten the window of vulnerability for countries vulnerable to coercion, he examines only countries that at least explored nuclear weapons and thus does not speak to the possibility of sanctions deterring the onset of a program. If this counterargument were correct, we would expect countries with high dependence on the United States simply to shift to hiding strategies after the development of sanctions policies in the mid-1970s. In

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fact, what Narang’s data show is that after the mid-1970s, only two “hiders” have been US clients (Pakistan and Taiwan), both of whom started their weapons programs before US sanctions policies.123 Finally, the association between authoritarian regime type and NPT violation may be spurious and have nothing to do with the ability to hide. The countries in question—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria—have also been countries outside the US sphere of influence with little to lose from US sanctions. Authoritarian countries that do depend on the United States have not systematically violated their NPT obligations despite threatening security environments, for example Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Research Design The remainder of this book empirically tests the theories offered on the sources and effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy. The basic principle guiding this book’s research design is simple: A researcher should test as many observable implications of a theory as possible and should adopt the method that is best suited to assessing each particular implication. As King, Keohane, and Verba argue, testing more observable implications “will allow more tests of the theory with more data and a greater variety of data, will put the theory at risk of being falsified more times, and will make it possible to collect data so as to build strong evidence for the theory.”124 Because some of the observable implications are naturally suited to qualitative tests, while others are best suited to quantitative assessments, I adopt a mixed-methods approach. For example, observable implications about decision-making processes and motivations of policymakers are naturally suited to qualitative and process-tracing approaches, whereas implications about the probabilities or frequencies of certain events occurring are better suited to statistical methods. In the portion of the book that relies on qualitative analysis, I rely on primary and archival sources where possible, drawing on hundreds of declassified documents. In both qualitative and quantitative tests, I assess the theory not just on its own merits but also in comparison to (or accounting for) alternative explanations drawn from the existing literature. Chapters 2 and 3 assess the first and second observable implications on the sources of US policy, exploring the evolution of US nonproliferation policy from 1945 to 1980 and the impact of the Chinese and Indian nuclear tests. In chapter 2, I process trace the evolution of US policy from 1945 to 1968. I assess how the theory offered in this book performs relative to alternative explanations, which focus on US worries about nuclear war, protecting US power projection capabilities, maintaining influence over allies, selectively enforcing nonproliferation to benefit allies or the political party of the president. I find that expectations of nuclear domino effects triggered

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by the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, combined with increased government attention to nonproliferation and an elevated role for nonproliferation advocates, was instrumental in the US government decision implement stronger policies that enforced nonproliferation across the board. Chapter 3 conducts a parallel analysis for the 1969–1980 period and comes to similar conclusions in explaining the shift in US nonproliferation after India’s 1974 test. Chapter 4 tests the third and fourth implications on the sources of US policy, examining US policies toward individual nuclear weapons programs and the motivations for these policies, as well as whether the United States has worked to prevent tests after states have achieved nuclear weapons capabilities. The findings suggest that the United States has consistently opposed proliferation even in allied and unaligned states since 1964, that anticipated domino effects have been an important motivation for these efforts, and that the United States has worked to prevent tests even after a state has crossed the nuclear threshold, at least partially as a means of staving off domino effects. Chapter 5 evaluates the three observable implications on the effectiveness of US policy, showing that states dependent on the United States have been significantly less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs since the development of credible US sanctions policies in the 1970s, even when controlling for other factors that affect a state’s proliferation decisions. This chapter also shows that due to selection effects, unilateral US sanctions have usually failed against ongoing nuclear weapons programs, since they tend to be targeted at states with little dependence on the United States that were not deterred by the threat of sanctions. Sanctions were likely to succeed against ongoing nuclear weapons programs only when the proliferator underestimated the probability or cost of sanctions when they began pursuing nuclear weapons. This chapter relies primarily—although not exclusively—on quantitative methods, analyzing the relative probability of proliferation across countries and time periods as well as the success rate of US nonproliferation sanctions under different conditions. Chapters 6 through 9 offer four in-depth case studies of the effectiveness of US nonproliferation efforts against countries with ongoing nuclear weapons programs: France, Taiwan, Pakistan, and Iran. These chapters assess the second and third observable implications on the effectiveness of US policy in more fine-grained detail, tracing the policies of the United States and the behavior of the proliferator in response to US nonproliferation efforts (or lack thereof). In contrast to the quantitative analysis in chapter 5, these case studies allow us to move beyond correlations and assess more directly whether the theory’s causal logic is operating. As table 1.1 below illustrates, I select cases in order to ensure wide variation on the key explanatory variables the theory identifies as determining the effectiveness of US nonproliferation efforts, both within and across cases: (1) the level of dependence on the United States; (2) the credibility of sanctions threats; and (3) unilateral vs. multilateral sanctions.

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Table 1.1 Case selection

France, 1954–1960 Taiwan, 1964–1978 Pakistan, 1972–1987 Iran, 1974–2015

Level of dependence

Credibility of sanctions threats

Type of sanctions threatened or imposed

High High Low→High High→Low

Low Low→High Low→High→Low Low→High

None Unilateral Unilateral Unilateral→Multilateral

In chapter 6, I examine US policy toward the French nuclear program in the 1950s to assess whether US nonproliferation policy was indeed more permissive in this time period, thus providing openings for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Consistent with the argument, I find that the United States put no pressure on France to halt its nuclear weapons program, that Washington strongly considered aiding the French program, and that this allowed France to acquire nuclear weapons without paying any serious political cost, despite its high dependence on the United States. Indicative of the fact that France did not perceive a firm US nonproliferation policy, its leaders repeatedly asked for US aid to its nuclear weapons program. The next two chapters examine US policy toward Taiwan and Pakistan, both of which had ongoing nuclear weapons programs when US nonproliferation policy tightened in the 1970s. This allows us to hold many casespecific factors constant to assess whether the increasing credibility of US nonproliferation sanctions threats allowed the United States to succeed in its nonproliferation efforts. In line with theoretical expectations, chapter 7 shows that Taiwan responded to credible US sanctions threats in the late 1970s by abandoning its nuclear weapons program due to its high dependence on the United States. Although Pakistan appears to be an outlier in that it succeeded in building a bomb in spite of being a US ally targeted by a credible threat of sanctions, chapter 8 shows that the case is in fact consistent with the theoretical logic: Pakistan initially was not highly dependent on the United States and therefore had little to lose from US sanctions. Once Pakistan became dependent due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and increased need for aid, the United States undermined the credibility of its threats by waiving sanctions and continuing to provide massive amounts of aid despite Pakistan’s nuclear advances. In chapter 9, I assess US nonproliferation policy toward Iran from the 1970s to 2015. In addition to providing variation on the level of proliferation activity (exploration in the 1970s vs. pursuit from the 1980s onward) and allowing us to trace the effect of changes in US policy over time, it also allows us to assess the effect of changing dependence on the United States, as Iran shifted from a US client in the 1970s to a country isolated from the United States after 1979. Finally, the Iran case lets us examine whether multilateral

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sanctions can induce nuclear restraint among states not dependent on the United States. I find that threats of sanctions succeeded in slowing the Iranian exploration of nuclear weapons when Tehran was dependent on the United States in the 1970s but that US sanctions failed to deter or compel Iran to halt its nuclear weapons pursuit in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Only when unprecedented multilateral sanctions were imposed in the 2010s, which Iran could not have anticipated when it started its nuclear weapons program, did Tehran agree to significant limits on its nuclear program. The book concludes with a discussion of implications for theory and policy, as well as avenues for future research.

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chapter 2

The Sources of US Nonproliferation Policy, 1945–1968

What explains how US nonproliferation policy has changed over time? More specifically, why did US nonproliferation policy tighten so dramatically from 1964 to 1968? Consistent with the first and second observable implications of the theory on the sources of US policy, I find that the Chinese nuclear test of 1964 drove this policy shift by (1) increasing expectations of nuclear domino effects, thus causing a preference for across-the-board rather than selective nonproliferation policies; (2) increasing government attention to nonproliferation; and (3) elevating the role in the policy process for congressional and bureaucratic actors already committed to nonproliferation. While expectations of domino effects helped shift preferences toward a more universal nonproliferation policy, greater government attention to nonproliferation and political openings for nonproliferation advocates are crucial to explaining how this preference was translated into actual policy change. As a result of these factors, by 1968 the United States had dropped plans for selective proliferation schemes in NATO and negotiated and signed the NPT. As suggested in chapter 1, existing explanations help explain why the United States opposes proliferation in a general sense, for example to preserve its dominant geopolitical position and to reduce the risks of nuclear war. But these explanations cannot successfully account for the sharp temporal shift in policy after 1964.

Selective US Nonproliferation Policies, 1945–1963 From 1945 until the Chinese nuclear test of 1964, US nonproliferation policy is best characterized as selective, opposing, favoring, or acquiescing to proliferation on a case-by-case basis, with a general bias toward countenancing allied proliferation. While official US policy opposed proliferation across the board since 1945, in reality nonproliferation only began receiving

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THE SOURCES OF US NONPROLIFERATION POLICY, 1945–1968

serious, prolonged attention in the US government in the early 1960s.1 The most important nonproliferation initiatives in the immediate postwar era included the failed Baruch Plan, which would have empowered an international agency to manage all fissile material and prevented any country from acquiring a nuclear arsenal, and the Atomic Energy Act (or McMahon Act) of 1946, which prohibited the United States from sharing sensitive nuclear information or technology with foreign countries.2 The selective and relatively lax nature of US nonproliferation policy in this period is illustrated by the fact that the United States did not actively pressure the United Kingdom over its nuclear weapons program. Although the Truman administration refused to provide technical support to the program, it continued to provide Britain with extensive military and economic support.3 After Eisenhower entered the White House in 1953, US policy grew significantly more liberal with respect to nuclear proliferation and sharing nuclear technology. Eisenhower believed that US allies in Europe should acquire nuclear weapons, since this would allow them to provide for their own defense and ultimately facilitate the withdrawal of US forces from Europe.4 In 1954, the US government amended the Atomic Energy Act in order to make it possible to cooperate on nuclear weapons technology with Britain and to share peaceful nuclear technology more broadly.5 With respect to Britain’s weapons program, Eisenhower told Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1956, “the more we can give, the better.”6 Soon thereafter, Britain was given access to US nuclear weapons.7 When the JCAE sought to delay the provision of nuclear reactors for submarine propulsion to Britain in 1957, Eisenhower ignored the committee and secretly provided the technology anyway.8 This trend of nuclear sharing was broadened with the NATO stockpile plan of the same year (discussed in greater detail in chapter 6), under which “NATO allies were given effective control over American nuclear weapons” in Europe, although the weapons would nominally remain in US custody.9 Eisenhower also supported the provision of ballistic missile designs to NATO allies, which could serve as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons.10 As Maddock puts it, “Eisenhower valued NATO solidarity more than nonproliferation and displayed a willingness to attenuate U.S. nuclear hegemony in order to strengthen its dominance within the alliance more broadly.”11 In 1958, the legal restrictions on sharing nuclear technology in the Atomic Energy Act were further weakened to allow greater cooperation with the British nuclear weapons program. The president was now given the authority to aid other countries’ nuclear weapons programs “provided that such nation has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons.”12 Although this language was designed to apply to Britain only, Wohlstetter observed three years later that the law perversely seemed “to offer incentives to our other allies to demonstrate a nuclear capability of their own, and so to become eligible for help.”13 Indeed, as chapter 6 will

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illustrate, this was certainly the French view of the law. 1958 also marked the beginning of Irish efforts at the UN to achieve a nonproliferation agreement, which would ultimately lead to the “Irish Resolution” of 1961 that laid the initial groundwork for the NPT. The Eisenhower administration initially opposed Irish efforts since they cut against the US policy of dispersing nuclear weapons in Europe.14 In addition to a liberal attitude on sharing nuclear weapons, the Eisenhower administration oversaw the initiation of the Atoms for Peace program in 1953, which led to the large-scale sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. To help safeguard this technology and provide technical assistance, the Eisenhower administration also spearheaded the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. While in some sense these policies laid the foundation for the nonproliferation regime by offering nuclear technology contingent on the acceptance of safeguards, Atoms for Peace was primarily motivated by Cold War propaganda aims as well as a desire to restrain the Soviet nuclear buildup by diverting fissionable material to peaceful purposes.15 Indeed, by spreading dual-use nuclear technology, as Sokolski notes, this program arguably “made the acquisition of such [nuclear weapons] capabilities more likely.”16 While some administration officials did advocate for nonproliferation, for example head disarmament negotiator Harold Stassen, they tended to lose out in internal debates. For example, the White House authorized Stassen to discuss a nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviets starting in 1955, which would involve a test ban, cutoff in fissionable material production, and pledges by non-nuclear states not to develop nuclear weapons. However, these discussions never amounted to anything, partly due to resistance from the Defense Department, the State Department, the AEC, and US allies.17 As part of these discussions, US officials considered whether the IAEA should require member states to refrain from developing nuclear weapons, a pledge that would later be required in the NPT. Ultimately this was rejected in favor of a more limited approach, whereby no broader pledge was required and only IAEA-provided technology and materials would be safeguarded.18 Over the course of these internal debates, it became clear that the administration’s commitment to nonproliferation was limited, at best. As Secretary Dulles put it in 1956, “it would be difficult for nations to forego permanently their right to make nuclear weapons while the U.S., USSR and U.K. continued to make them.”19 The following year, Dulles recommended that the United States remove a nonproliferation pledge from its disarmament proposal under discussion with the Soviets.20 Meanwhile, President Eisenhower believed that “Russia has more to fear than we from fourth nation development of nuclear arms.”21 The JCS concurred, arguing that “the fourth power problem is of far greater concern to the USSR” and that “nuclear weapons [in] the hands of our Allies should strengthen our alliances.”

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This position was endorsed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles, who wrote to Dulles, “the danger posed by the ‘4th country’ problem is not of such immediate import as to be controlling in any current formulation of United States disarmament policy.”22 Even Stassen came to embrace a selective approach to nonproliferation, floating an idea he termed “atoms-for-police,” whereby an international nuclear force would be used to deter aggression globally.23 Alongside this scheme, according to Stassen, the United States would arm NATO with a few “elementary nuclear weapons of a type that would not compromise our best weapons designs.”24 In 1957, the United States and its allies agreed to a more limited disarmament proposal, which would involve a two-year test moratorium and ban on producing fissile material for weapons; however, it was quickly rejected by the Soviets.25 The following year, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to a suspension of nuclear tests, although this was not connected to any broader nonproliferation agreement.26 As will be discussed in detail in chapter 6, the Eisenhower administration seriously considered providing aid to France’s nuclear weapons program. The president felt that future proliferation was inevitable and that “we were sticking our heads in the sand when we talked about continuing to keep our nuclear secrets from falling into the hands of other parties.”27 Epitomizing a selective approach to nonproliferation, Eisenhower stated at a 1959 National Security Council (NSC) meeting that he “felt there was a great difference between NATO countries and other countries,” when it came to proliferation, noting that he favored aiding NATO’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities. Eisenhower even entertained the notion of helping West Germany acquire its own nuclear weapons, declaring in the same 1959 meeting, “We might consider giving Germany nuclear information thus enabling the Germans to develop nuclear capabilities for themselves. . . . Germany had been his enemy in the past, but on the principle of having only one main enemy at a time, only the U.S.S.R. was now his enemy.”28 While West Germany already had access to US nuclear weapons under the NATO stockpile plan by this point, Eisenhower was floating something even more radical: aiding Bonn in the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability. As a result of these NSC debates, the Eisenhower administration adopted a statement of “Basic National Security Policy” in August 1959, which explicitly enshrined a selective, flexible approach to nonproliferation. According to the statement, general US policy should “discourage” the further spread of nuclear weapons. However, “Whenever the President determines it is in the U.S. security interests to do so . . . the United States should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by the exchange with them or provision to them as appropriate of (1) information; (2) materials; or (3) nuclear weapons, under arrangements for control of weapons to be determined.”29 It is important to note that this policy statement reflected

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a departure from the corresponding document on national security policy produced the previous year, which held out the possibility of developing a NATO nuclear force but not bilateral aid to allies’ nuclear capabilities.30 In 1959, the Irish Resolution at the UN was revised so that it no longer called for nuclear states not to “supply” nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states and instead simply called for them not to cede “control” of their weapons. This change, which was deemed consistent with current US nuclear arrangements in NATO, allowed the United States to support the resolution.31 Nevertheless, Eisenhower’s views on the merits of selective proliferation remained unchanged. In a press conference on February 3, 1960, Eisenhower publicly declared his support for providing allies with nuclear weapons. When asked whether he supported “changing the law so that you could provide allies with custody of [atomic] weapons,” Eisenhower stated, “from the very beginning . . . I have always been of the belief that we should not deny to our allies what the enemies, what your potential enemy already has. . . . I think that it would be better, for the interests of the United States, to make our law more liberal.”32 Congress and the JCAE responded aggressively to these comments, warning Eisenhower that he did not have the legal authority to unilaterally transfer custody of US nuclear weapons.33 In the closing days of his presidency, Eisenhower unveiled a plan for a sea-based Multilateral Force (MLF) for NATO, whereby European allies would have joint control over nuclear-armed missiles. From Eisenhower’s perspective, this was meant to pave the way for “an independent and ultimately purely European nuclear force, whose use would not be subject to an American veto.”34 As will be explored below and in chapter 6, some US officials viewed the NATO stockpile plan and MLF as nonproliferation tools that might prevent European states from acquiring fully independent arsenals. However, the historical evidence detailed above suggests that Eisenhower’s own views differed and that he was open to allies having independent control over nuclear weapons. Moreover, as will be discussed shortly, the Soviet Union viewed the MLF as a form of proliferation and as a major impediment to a treaty on nonproliferation. In 1960, in order to protect the MLF, the Eisenhower administration reverted to opposing the Irish draft resolution at the UN, which had been revised to forbid nuclear states from transferring information relevant to producing nuclear weapons.35 Consistent with this book’s theory, the selective US nonproliferation policy under Eisenhower corresponded with a belief that nuclear domino effects were relatively weak. A 1957 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that only France, Sweden, and Canada had the capability to build nuclear weapons in the near future. While a nuclear-armed France would cause West Germany to be interested in nuclear weapons as well, the Germans would find a NATO nuclear force preferable to an independent nuclear capability. Moreover, China and Japan would probably consider nuclear weapons ultimately “regardless of developments in Europe.” Likewise, a

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nuclear France or Sweden “would not necessarily spark immediate nuclear weapons production efforts in other Western European states.”36 After an intelligence estimate the following year came to similar conclusions, a September 1960 estimate coming on the heels of France’s first nuclear test likewise concluded that future proliferation would be limited.37 Noting that only France and China appeared to have ongoing nuclear weapons programs, the estimate judged that “West Germany, Sweden, Japan, and India could initiate such programs but are unlikely to do so in the next several years unless there is a dramatic shift in the international situation.” Even with a nuclear France now an established fact, West Germany would be reluctant to pursue an independent nuclear capability, preferring a joint approach with the US or NATO. Reflecting the lack of a strong US nonproliferation policy at this time, the estimate suggested that Italy, Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Switzerland would be unlikely to seek their own nuclear arsenal, partly because “they probably do not exclude the possibility that a nuclear capability may be obtained, in time, more cheaply and easily from a major ally or friendly power, either by transfer or direct purchase.” Why did France’s first nuclear test not spur strong expectations of nuclear domino effects, thus causing a preference for a stronger nonproliferation policy like the later tests by China and India? As discussed in the previous chapter, this likely reflects the fact that France’s main adversary (the USSR) was already nuclear-capable at the time and that France’s status as wealthy, great power meant that its nuclearization would not meaningfully increase the perceived feasibility of proliferation for the majority of states. Indeed, while not expecting strong domino effects from France, the 1960 NIE did warn that if China tested a nuclear bomb, it could lead several of its neighbors to seek nuclear weapons.38 When John F. Kennedy entered the White House in January 1961, he brought with him a strong personal commitment to nonproliferation. According to the former head of the US AEC, Glenn Seaborg, nuclear proliferation was President Kennedy’s “private nightmare.”39 Kennedy understood that the increasing availability of nuclear technology made the problem of nonproliferation more urgent, was concerned about the potential effects of a looming Chinese nuclear capability, and was convinced that West Germany should not have nuclear weapons because of the potential for increased instability on the front lines of the Cold War.40 While the Cuban Missile Crisis bolstered Kennedy’s support for nonproliferation, this commitment was longstanding and predated the crisis.41 In 1963, Kennedy famously warned that without preventive action, the United States would soon face a world with up to twenty-five nuclear powers.42 This high-level commitment was translated into several important policy shifts in favor of nonproliferation. In April 1961, Kennedy approved recommendations from Dean Acheson that called for a major break from Eisenhower’s selective proliferation policies. Under the new policy, “National

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nuclear forces were to be avoided and control was to be concentrated in American hands,” even to the point of opposing independent British and French arsenals.43 In line with Acheson’s recommendations, Kennedy sought (and failed) to convince de Gaulle to give up France’s nuclear weapons program.44 Partly in response to pressure from the JCAE, Kennedy sought to rein in Eisenhower policies that had given Europeans effective control over US nuclear weapons, ordering that permissive action links (PALs) be installed on all nuclear weapons deployed in Europe to prevent unauthorized use.45 Following a similar logic, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara delivered a speech to the NATO Council in Athens in May 1962 that outlined US nuclear doctrine and emphasized that small nuclear forces invited instability, a not-so-subtle dig at France, Britain, and other potential NATO proliferators.46 Moreover, the MLF plan under Kennedy was reconceived: Rather than serving as a precursor to an independent European nuclear force, as Eisenhower intended, the MLF would now have a firm American veto and would be aimed at preventing national proliferation, particularly in West Germany.47 In September 1961, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the first government agency solely devoted to arms control, was established via congressional legislation. The creation of the ACDA redressed what had previously been a disorganized approach to arms control in the US government and served to “elevate the arms control perspective to the highest decision-making levels of the government.”48 Three months later, the US delegation offered its support for the Irish Resolution at the UN, which was unanimously approved and called on nuclear states to pursue an internationally verified nonproliferation agreement.49 Kennedy’s most notable nonproliferation accomplishment occurred in late 1963 when the United States and the USSR concluded and ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited all nuclear tests except for those underground. The treaty was at least partially meant to prevent additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons. As Kennedy put it during negotiations with Khrushchev in June 1961, “If no agreement is reached, then in a few years there might be ten or even fifteen nuclear powers.”50 However, as even Kennedy acknowledged, the treaty would not provide an airtight check on proliferation, as states could test underground.51 Nevertheless, despite these important policy changes that advanced the aim of nonproliferation, it is crucial to note that Kennedy did not fully give up the selective approach to nonproliferation followed by Eisenhower. As Trachtenberg notes, Kennedy’s nonproliferation policy was not “applied to all prospective nuclear powers in a more or less undifferentiated way” but was focused primarily on preventing China and West Germany from going nuclear.52 For example, Kennedy seriously considered using military force to prevent China from acquiring nuclear weapons.53 Worried that Bonn would gain access to nuclear weapons via cooperation with France, he also

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hinted to West German leaders that the US security commitment could be in jeopardy if they aligned too closely with Paris.54 However, Kennedy’s attitude toward proliferation by NATO or by allies other than West Germany ultimately proved to be more permissive. Following the spirit of the Irish Resolution, the Kennedy administration commenced negotiations with Moscow on what would eventually become the NPT.55 However, it refused to give up plans for the MLF, which the Soviets repeatedly made clear was the critical obstacle preventing them from agreeing to a treaty. The Soviets were particularly concerned that the MLF would give West Germany control over nuclear weapons, even though that was not Kennedy’s intent. As Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin told Secretary of State Dean Rusk in August 1962, “Germany is the number one problem” for the USSR with respect to the MLF and a nonproliferation treaty.56 Even more pointedly, in February 1963 Dobrynin informed Rusk that his government considered the MLF a form of proliferation and warned that “if the US Government actually proceeds with proliferating nuclear weapons to other states participating in NATO,” Moscow would “see to it that appropriate countries friendly towards the USSR will receive nuclear weapons.”57 Despite these strong protestations and the impossibility of reaching a nonproliferation agreement while the MLF plan persisted, the American position from 1961 to 1963 did not budge, as the administration perceived high political costs to dispensing with the MLF and adopting a firm nonproliferation policy. Despite the president’s private position that the MLF would have a firm US veto, the Kennedy administration in discussions with NATO allies maintained that the weapons would be multilaterally controlled, although what exactly that meant was left vague, a confusion that extended to allied capitals.58 For example, in April 1962, Kennedy approved National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 147, which authorized US officials to communicate openness to establishing an MLF. The memo directed officials to indicate that current US law precluded the transfer of control over US nuclear weapons but also to communicate that the United States was “willing to consider any proposal [for control] which is put to us by a clear majority of the alliance.”59 The issue of nuclear sharing with NATO even came up in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the attorney general, Robert Kennedy, intervened in an NSC discussion to ensure that any presidential statement on the crisis would not “preclude us from giving nuclear weapons to Western Germany, West Berlin, and France in the event we decided to do so.”60 In May 1963, NSAM 240 ordered that MLF negotiations with Britain commence and directed the State Department to “prepare the political case for the MLF.”61 As the undersecretary of state for political affairs, W. Averell Harriman, prepared to leave for negotiations in Moscow in July 1963, Rusk underlined the high costs of enforcing nonproliferation, noting that if the

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MLF was abandoned, “we would cause great confusion among our allies and wreck NATO.” At the same time, President Kennedy told Harriman that he “wished to avoid any clause which would prohibit us from giving weapons to France if we so desired.”62 Even though Kennedy believed that the MLF was “a facade” and of little military value, he deemed it crucial for maintaining Germany’s non-nuclear status.63 This point underlines the inherent ambiguity of the MLF: Whereas to the Soviet Union it looked like proliferation, to many US policymakers it was viewed as a substitute for purely independent arsenals. Even outside Europe and the MLF, a variety of US policymakers in the Kennedy administration saw benefits in selective proliferation, as Eisenhower had previously. A February 1961 Air Force study on US strategy toward a future nuclear-armed China suggested nuclear sharing in Asia to contain the Chinese threat. Once China had achieved the capability to directly threaten the United States, the study recommended efforts “to persuade selected Asian nations, particularly Japan and India, to consider equipping themselves with defensive nuclear weapons.” Moreover, “negotiations should be commenced to indicate US willingness to provide Australia with an offensive nuclear capability.”64 In September 1961, George McGhee, then director of policy planning for the State Department, recommended to Rusk that the United States help India develop its own nuclear weapons since “it would be desirable if a friendly Asian power beat Communist China to the punch.”65 At the time, Secretary Rusk opposed these selective proliferation schemes, arguing, “to assist some other country, even for important political or psychological reasons, would start us down a jungle path from which I see no exit.”66 A year later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) voiced opposition to a nonproliferation agreement that forbade the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states partially because “the measure prohibits transfers which the US itself may wish to make.”67 The JCS also favored aiding France’s nuclear weapons program.68 As Maddock explains, the JCS believed further proliferation was “inevitable,” and therefore “the United States should not forgo nuclear alliance relationships that could possibly strengthen Western defense.”69 By the end of 1962, Kennedy himself had overturned a key element of Acheson’s nonproliferation recommendations, deciding that the United States should help Britain and France develop their nuclear capabilities.70 This was facilitated by his belief that nuclear domino effects could be contained in this particular case and that French and British nuclear forces would not inevitably lead West Germany to follow.71 In line with the theory, low expectations of nuclear domino effects facilitated the adoption of selective rather than across-the-board nonproliferation policies. In mid-1962, Washington agreed to provide France with the jet tankers they needed to extend the range of their nuclear bomber force.72 As part of the Nassau Agreement of December 1962, Kennedy then offered

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to provide Britain with Polaris missiles, which would become the basis of their nuclear deterrent. While the agreement required Britain to commit these nuclear forces to NATO and a future MLF and thus established a significant degree of US control, the agreement allowed Britain to abrogate this portion of the agreement if “supreme national interests are at stake.”73 In an effort to repair strained French relations with NATO and the United States, Kennedy next authorized US officials to make the same offer to France, overturning years of American refusal to aid the French program, which will be discussed in chapter 6. In January 1963, Secretary Rusk instructed the US ambassador to France to “impress on the French that the decision to offer them the Nassau proposals represents a major turning point in United States policy. It implies a willingness to recognize France as a nuclear power and to bring substantially to an end the exclusive quality of the US-UK relationship.”74 This offer, which like the British agreement was conditioned on France committing these missiles to a future MLF, was rejected by Charles de Gaulle, even after he was assured that “for the future there could be absolutely no certainty that it had to be an American commander” in control of the force.75 De Gaulle was uninterested despite acknowledging that the agreement would allow France to assume unilateral control of the weapons if her national interests required.76 The French leader also rejected a US offer of nuclear aid and data on nuclear tests in exchange for French adherence to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.77 At the end of the day, as Maddock notes, under Kennedy “nonproliferation continued to be subordinated to alliance relationships and Cold War competition.”78 Meanwhile, like under Eisenhower, intelligence analyses during the Kennedy administration were relatively sanguine about the likely extent of proliferation. A 1961 National Intelligence Estimate on free world nations judged that West Germany was unlikely to seek its own nuclear weapons despite France’s test, although it noted that India or Japan might be tempted to do so if Communist China acquired a nuclear capability.79 A 1962 State Department report the following year concluded that no additional NATO state was likely to seek nuclear weapons. Although West Germany might be interested in acquiring nuclear weapons, opposition from the United States and the USSR would likely dissuade them, even if the MLF failed to materialize in an acceptable form.80 In June 1963, a National Intelligence Estimate came to similarly optimistic conclusions. The report identified eight countries with the technical means to build nuclear weapons but noted that only China seemed to be working to do so. Moreover, regardless of whether China detonated a nuclear device, the report concluded that proliferation would remain rare: “India probably would not embark on a nuclear weapons program on the basis of a Chinese detonation of a nuclear device. . . . Japan also would feel an increased sense of pressure, but would be more reluctant than most other countries to develop a weapons capability.”

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Likewise, Germany was expected to remain non-nuclear.81 These relatively optimistic views about the future of proliferation would soon be altered as a nuclear-capable China became more imminent.

The Chinese Test and Its Effects on US Policy, 1964–1968 As 1964 began, US policy under the newly inaugurated Johnson administration remained much the same as it had been under Kennedy. In fact, Johnson was more committed to the MLF than Kennedy, which put a major roadblock in the way of a nonproliferation treaty.82 In April, Johnson publicly touted the value of the MLF to the press, which was soon followed by the creation of a State Department task force devoted specifically to the MLF, headed by Gerard Smith.83 On the sensitive issue of control over the weapons, the Johnson administration was vague, suggesting that the United States would initially have a veto on the use of the weapons but that NATO allies could potentially gain control later on, consistent with Eisenhower’s views. Indeed, while he was still vice president, Johnson had stated, “Evolution of this missile fleet [MLF] toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded.”84 It was not just the Soviets who viewed such plans for a “European option” as contrary to nonproliferation. The British too felt that the MLF would increase the odds of additional nuclear weapons states in Europe.85 Even many experts within the United States believed that an MLF would eventually allow for European control over nuclear weapons or would encourage West German proliferation.86 In April 1964, Johnson ordered in NSAM 294 that “effective controls be established immediately” to ensure that the United States would not assist the French nuclear weapons program. At the same time, though, the nonproliferation exception for the MLF was explicitly maintained. As the opening paragraph of the memo bluntly declared, “It is the policy of this government to oppose the development of nuclear forces by additional states, other than those whose forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force, targeted in accordance with NATO plans and, except when supreme national interests were at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the Alliance.”87 Further illustrating the continued ambivalence toward nonproliferation at the outset of the Johnson administration, in June 1964 Rusk inquired in a meeting of top defense and foreign policy officials “whether the Government has seriously looked at the problem of giving India nuclear weapons in the event that China had such a weapon. . . . He pointed out that no Government position exists as to whether we would oppose other nations having nuclear weapons once China obtains them.”88 However, partly in anticipation of China’s first nuclear test, and particularly in its aftermath,

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US policymakers began advocating more serious steps in favor of nonproliferation. This shift was driven by three factors: (1) most importantly, heightened expectations of nuclear domino effects, which led many officials to prefer an across-the-board nonproliferation policy; (2) increased government attention to nonproliferation sparked by the test; (3) the political opening for nonproliferation advocates, such as members of Congress and the ACDA, created by the test. In August, the ACDA completed a position paper that argued that an imminent Chinese nuclear test demanded a stronger nonproliferation policy, warning that domino effects were likely: There are today at least three or four states in addition to the nuclear powers which could make a national decision to produce nuclear weapons with assurance that they have the national capability to support this decision. . . . The detonation of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists will place great pressure on these countries to make a national decision to develop nuclear weapons in some cases for reasons of security, and in other cases for reasons of prestige. Because of regional rivalries a national decision by any of these countries may force other countries perhaps technically less qualified to make a similar national decision to engage in an all-out effort to acquire nuclear weapons either by development or by other means. Once this process starts it may be impossible to halt. . . . If we do not solve this problem—either because of mistake or because of delay—we will soon be faced with a world in which there are ten and then possibly twenty states having national nuclear capabilities. This would be a world of the greatest danger and insecurity.

In view of these dangers, the paper recommended that the United States strengthen its efforts to prevent further proliferation. The report suggested (1) bilateral efforts to dissuade states from pursuing nuclear weapons; (2) restrictions on the export of sensitive nuclear technology; (3) a nonproliferation treaty with the USSR; and (4) increased political advocacy for such an agreement so that states would be deterred from pursuing nuclear weapons even before a treaty was concluded. With respect to the MLF, the paper recommended assuring the Soviets in writing that the MLF would not result in additional states having control of nuclear weapons and that the United States would seek commitments from NATO allies that they would not acquire their own nuclear deterrents.89 These recommendations were consistent with ACDA director William Foster’s prior statements to President Johnson, including a comment in April 1964 that “if you go ahead with this MLF you must recognize it’s going to make my chances of negotiating a nonproliferation treaty harder.”90 Indeed, Foster had been advocating stronger nonproliferation measures for several years prior to the Chinese test.91 Skepticism about the MLF extended to the US Congress, where a group of eight Senate Democrats advised the

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White House to defer establishing an MLF until the plan could be vetted by legislators.92 In late August, Rusk tasked Llewellyn Thompson to lead a committee that would develop a nonproliferation plan in preparation for China’s imminent acquisition.93 The day after the committee was commissioned, Thompson sent a memo to Rusk noting his disagreement with key portions of the ACDA paper. While admitting that “the ACDA draft position paper marks a substantial step forward,” he raised several problems, most notably the “decision now to place sharp constraints and conditions on the MLF.”94 In other words, there remained disagreement on whether aspects of the MLF should be sacrificed in favor of a broad nonproliferation agreement. In fact, throughout the debate in the Johnson administration, opposition to stronger nonproliferation policies tended to be associated with officials who strongly backed the MLF and wanted to retain the possibility of selective proliferation to NATO allies. These officials worried that abandoning the MLF would cause great damage to Washington’s relations with its European allies, in particular West Germany. The first Chinese nuclear test of October 16, 1964, greatly increased the perceived urgency of nonproliferation within the US government. Within a week of the test, a new National Intelligence Estimate on proliferation warned that domino effects were likely without a stronger nonproliferation policy. The estimate judged that “the chances are better than even” that India would soon seek nuclear weapons and warned that “the types of pressure which the USSR and the US have been willing to use to date against potential proliferators would probably not be successful” against determined nuclear aspirants.95 This greater concern about proliferation extended to the White House. According to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, President Johnson felt that “we should get a higher-level, harder look at the problem of nuclear spread.” The result was the creation of the Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, a group of private citizens headed by former deputy secretary of defense Roswell Gilpatric, which became known as the Gilpatric Committee.96 This committee largely took over for Thompson’s group, which began writing papers for Gilpatric’s committee.97 Having testified in favor of founding the ACDA, Gilpatric had a track record of favoring arms control.98 As expected by the theory, the Chinese test elevated the role of actors interested in stronger nonproliferation efforts. Two days before the Committee was officially appointed, Secretary Rusk argued in a meeting of high-level foreign policy officials that the United States should favor nonproliferation but also said that “he could conceive of situations where the Japanese or Indians might desirably have their own nuclear weapons.” Rusk raised the idea of a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile,” which he had tasked a committee to explore.99 On November 25, the White House issued NSAM 320, which formally authorized

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the creation of the Gilpatric Committee, to whose work “the President assigns great importance.”100 In line with the theoretical argument, the test caused the government to pay greater attention to nonproliferation. Even though some policymakers had anticipated domino effects prior to China’s test and had begun recommending stronger nonproliferation policies, it was the test itself that provided the bureaucratic opening for a fuller reassessment of US policy. In other words, China’s test was necessary to seize President Johnson’s attention, break the bureaucratic inertia, and provide the impetus for policy change. At the same time, as described below, it created an opening for actors like Gilpatric, the ACDA, and certain members of Congress to push preexisting nonproliferation preferences. Three days after the Gilpatric Committee was established, Thompson reiterated his position on the MLF in a memo to the acting ACDA director, warning that placing restrictions on the MLF “would block any possibility of an Asiatic MLF before such an institution has been seriously examined.”101 Indeed, in the opening meeting of the Committee, Gilpatric noted, “The question has been raised within the Government whether nuclear proliferation may not be inevitable and in some cases even desirable.”102 As Gavin has documented, the Committee considered four broad options for US nonproliferation policy: (1) “permissive or selective proliferation,” which assumed that further nuclear spread was either impossible to halt or beneficial in certain cases; (2) the current “prudent” policy that opposed proliferation on a case-by-case basis when it was relatively cheap to do so; (3) an enhanced nonproliferation policy that involved accepting “substantial costs and risks” for the sake of preventing proliferation; and (4) a radical shift that would make nonproliferation the highest priority of US foreign policy, including efforts to roll back existing arsenals.103 From the beginning of the deliberations, Gilpatric favored a strong nonproliferation policy, which he deemed essential in order to prevent domino effects. He made a forceful argument against the United States aiding or allowing proliferation in any country for precisely this reason, contending that “to make exceptions in special cases would frustrate the entire objective of such a policy.” Gilpatric warned that allowing India to proliferate could cause Pakistan to do the same, which in turn could spur Egyptian and then Israeli proliferation. Permitting a Japanese arsenal, meanwhile, could cause Germany and Italy to go nuclear. On the problem of the MLF, Gilpatric noted that “to make any headway against the further spread of nuclear arms, the MLF must either become a fait accompli, be abandoned or be shelved indefinitely.”104 ACDA officials concurred with this position, arguing that the MLF must be sacrificed to achieve a nonproliferation treaty.105 Soon thereafter, a State Department draft paper argued that a “a nuclear decision taken somewhere is necessarily felt everywhere.” Echoing Gilpatric, the paper predicted that an Indian bomb would cause a Pakistani

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nuclear program, while Indian and Japanese arsenals would lead to Indonesian and Australian bomb programs. These decisions would then reverberate and cause proliferation in the Middle East and Europe.106 Around the same time, several dozen congressmen sent a letter to Secretary Rusk, informing him that nuclear proliferation “is emerging as an important public question” whose importance has been “sharpened by the Chinese test.” The congressmen urged Rusk to defer any decision to establish an MLF until January in order to allow Congress time to consider the implications of such a move, including for nonproliferation.107 In December, President Johnson expressed his newfound commitment to nonproliferation to the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, remarking that “we were anxious to avoid a situation where others might follow in the footsteps of the Chinese.”108 In contrast to this developing nonproliferation position, Under Secretary of State George Ball backed the ideas of Secretary Rusk when he met with Gilpatric on December 14, strongly supporting the MLF and suggesting a similar arrangement for Asia. Ball was skeptical of the overall value of a nonproliferation treaty, did not believe that the MLF would threaten nonproliferation, and raised the possibility of a “pool of nuclear weapons which could be drawn upon by India or Japan for use by their dual-purpose delivery vehicles,” mirroring arrangements in NATO. In emphasizing the importance of the MLF, Ball argued, “We cannot make the Germans into second-class citizens. We cannot subject them to a discriminatory state of original sin.”109 Ball’s claim that an MLF would not promote proliferation is a bit difficult to accept, since according to his memoirs, he hoped that the MLF would be a precursor to a nuclear force controlled by a united Europe, just as Eisenhower had hoped before him.110 While less enthusiastic about the MLF, Secretary McNamara also expressed support to Gilpatric for an Asian multilateral nuclear force.111 John McCloy, a member of the Gilpatric Committee, former government official, and chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, warned that abandoning the MLF could have high costs, causing the West Germans “to look East and deal with the Soviets on their own.” McCloy argued that the MLF was necessary for the strength of NATO and to prevent national proliferation.112 Walt Rostow, the director of the State Department’s Policy Planning staff, joined the pro-MLF chorus, advocating to the Gilpatric Committee “a country-by-country approach to nonproliferation, including a renewed push for the MLF, an increased commitment to the defense of Southeast Asia, and possibly even an Asian MLF designed to satisfy nuclear ambitions among US allies in the Pacific.”113 By mid-December, Johnson had begun to move toward the position of the nonproliferation advocates with respect to the MLF. In NSAM 322, Johnson directed US officials to refrain from seeking “a binding agreement” for the time being, consistent with the request that the congressmen had made of

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Secretary Rusk. He further emphasized that any MLF agreement “must be a reinforcement to our basic policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.” Ideally, the MLF would be designed in order to “lead the U.K. out of the field of strategic deterrence . . . greatly reduce the danger of any separate nuclear adventure by the Germans; and . . . advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defense, as against the proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents.”114 December also saw the disbanding of the State Department MLF task force.115 Consistent with the theoretical argument, actors predisposed to favor strong nonproliferation policies became more vocal in the wake of the Chinese test. By the end of 1964, Congress had made clear that it did not support the MLF, largely on nonproliferation grounds.116 As Schrafstetter and Twigge describe, “Johnson was aware of the growing opposition within Congress against multilateral plans. This opposition was further increased with news of the first Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, which increased the support for those within the Johnson administration who favored an immediate NPT against all MLF plans.”117 Around the same time, in order to head off the MLF, Britain proposed an alternative Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), which would provide a firmer veto for the nuclear-armed European powers, would explicitly foreclose a “European option,” and would absorb all British nuclear forces in order to encourage nonproliferation. In the context of growing opposition to the MLF within the US government and congress, President Johnson responded positively to the proposal.118 In early January, a Gilpatric Committee internal paper outlined a “philosophical framework” for the third policy option: the significantly enhanced nonproliferation policy that the Committee would ultimately recommend. The paper warned that “a multipolar nuclear-armed world will be both more complex and less stable politically and militarily, fragmenting the massive US-Soviet confrontation that has hitherto inhibited violent and revolutionary change.” In a proliferated world, “ambitious and insecure nations will be tempted to play off each other and the major powers, in the hope of expanding their influence while escaping retaliation.” Highlighting the risk of nuclear domino effects, the paper continued: “When Nation A (India) gets nuclear weapons, its neighbor (Pakistan), will feel it must get them; Nation C (Germany) will be unable to exist without them. As political restraints on acquisition evaporate, the ability of the US to provide security for nations now under its umbrella will decline, aggressive new nationalisms will assert themselves, and we will live in a volatile, unrestrained world, ripe to indulge its hostilities against the US and its allies and ultimately capable of doing so.” Noting that the United States and the USSR both have “much to lose” from further proliferation, the paper proposed a “Twentieth Century version of the ‘The Concert of Europe’ . . . in which the US, Europe, and the USSR reach agreement on a limited objective—their common interest in

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preventing the turmoil of the non-European world from threatening their security.” The Soviets, according to the paper, had a strong interest in avoiding “simultaneous encirclement” by a nuclear-armed China and West Germany, while the United States needed “a way to strengthen its deterrent of China and maintain European stability.”119 A few days later, Secretary Rusk and several other high-ranking officials met with the Gilpatric Committee to discuss policy options. Rusk held firm to his position that US interests were best served by providing other countries with access to US nuclear weapons. As he put it, “It is easy for the US to speak out against proliferation, but the Prime Minister of India or Japan must look on the question quite differently. The problem of alternatives to national nuclear proliferation arises. . . . An Asian nuclear defense community, perhaps with a US nuclear stockpile available for it to draw upon, may be one solution.” In response to a question from Gilpatric, Rusk—backed by George Ball—argued that in the absence of the MLF, West Germany would likely seek its own nuclear arsenal, or a joint Franco-German nuclear force. Making his point more forcefully later in the meeting, Rusk stated that “non-proliferation is not the overriding element in US relations with the rest of the world.” Raising the problem of nuclear domino effects, Gilpatric responded by wondering “how we can approach the problem on a case-by-case basis when each case has so much impact on others.”120 Breaking ranks with Rusk, Ball, and his own previous position, Secretary McNamara gave a briefing on the same day that strongly endorsed Gilpatric’s strict nonproliferation stance, calling for a nonproliferation treaty, a comprehensive test ban, efforts to limit the size of the US arsenal, and security assurances to countries that might be interested in nuclear weapons. Like Gilpatric, McNamara’s position was largely based on his commitment to averting nuclear domino effects. He had determined that “‘selective proliferation,’ as he characterized the MLF, would prove impossible to control,” as “others would follow the example” of a German nuclear capability, multinational or otherwise.121 The following day, Gilpatric reiterated his desire for an across-the-board nonproliferation policy, arguing that it was “implausible that additional proliferation could be compartmentalized, quarantined, or regionalized and comparing the consequences for the world [to] the Sarajevo incident.” Gilpatric worried that proliferation in Asia could ultimately draw the United States into a nuclear war involving China, Japan, or India.122 The following day, John McCloy sent a letter to Gilpatric expressing his support for the positions of Rusk and Ball. He argued that the United States would pay a stiff price if it abandoned the MLF and that “the risks we run on that score, at least equal, if they do not exceed, those that we risk with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” Asserting that the US government “has lost sight of the deep significance of the [NATO] Alliance and of the concept of collective security for the Atlantic World,” McCloy argued that the increasingly lukewarm US attitude toward the MLF had reinforced de

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Gaulle’s independent stance, undermined West German resolve, and increased the odds of a West German nuclear arsenal, with the ultimate result that “the possibility of confronting the Soviets and the Chinese with a convincingly solid Western front . . . is diminishing with every day that goes by.” Echoing Ball, McCloy warned that “the Germans must be given a position of equality with the other Western powers if they are not, in due course, to go off on another nationalist adventure.” The letter concluded that the United States should finalize the MLF or else risk “losing both the essence of the Alliance and non-proliferation.”123 As the Committee was wrapping up its work, President Johnson signaled his growing commitment to nonproliferation by asking Congress to approve greater funding for the ACDA, seeking roughly $14 million a year, a significant increase over the $8.25 million annual funding it had received in the previous two years. In justifying the funding, Johnson referenced the need for a nonproliferation treaty, which, as The New York Times reported, “has emerged as the most immediate, principal objective of the Administration’s disarmament policy” in the wake of the Chinese nuclear test.124 On January 21, 1965, the Gilpatric Committee completed its report and presented its findings to President Johnson and his close advisers. In contrast to the positions of Rusk, Ball, and McCloy, the report strongly endorsed a stricter US nonproliferation policy, largely in line with ACDA and Gilpatric’s preferences. As Bundy wrote to President Johnson, “The committee comes down hard on one side of this tough question, and at least one of your advisers—Dean Rusk—has real doubts about its recommendations.”125 According to Brands, the late briefing by McNamara proved decisive in convincing the Committee to adopt this position.126 The core thrust of the Committee’s findings, stated in the report’s second paragraph, were as follows: As a result of our study . . . the Committee is now unanimous in its view that preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is clearly in the national interest despite the difficult decisions that will be required. We have concluded, therefore, that the United States must, as a matter of great urgency, substantially increase the scope and intensity of our efforts if we are to have any hope of success. Necessarily, these efforts must be of three kinds: (a) negotiation of formal multilateral agreements; (b) the application of influence on individual nations considering nuclear weapons acquisition, by ourselves and in conjunction with others; and (c) example by our own policies and actions.

The specific policies the Gilpatric Committee recommended included a nonproliferation treaty negotiated with the Soviets, a comprehensive test ban treaty, regional nuclear-free zones, efforts to limit the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, and the use of security guarantees and sanctions to influence the calculus of states considering nuclear weapons

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development. Perhaps more controversially, the committee recommended opposing the French nuclear arsenal, limiting any MLF plan to ensure a US veto over any use of nuclear weapons, emphasizing to the Soviets that a NATO nuclear force would preclude proliferation among NATO members and may result in the United Kingdom giving up its independent deterrent, and communicating to West Germany that a decision to go nuclear would lead the United States to withdraw its troop commitments. The committee also recommended that the United States downgrade the role of nuclear weapons in its own defense posture, on the grounds that this would decrease the perceived importance of nuclear weapons and thereby reduce the incentives for additional countries to acquire them. The rationale for the Gilpatric Committee’s strong stance on nonproliferation was threefold: (1) nuclear proliferation threatened the United States geopolitically; (2) the increased likelihood of nuclear domino effects stemming from the Chinese test made it essential to act quickly and apply nonproliferation policies evenly to all countries; and (3) a strong US effort was necessary to limit proliferation and had a good chance of succeeding, particularly with the cooperation of the Soviet Union and other like-minded countries. On the first count, the committee judged that further proliferation, whether by friends or foes, would “add complexity and instability to the deterrent balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, aggravate suspicions and hostility among states neighboring new nuclear powers, place a wasteful economic burden on the aspirations of developing nations, impede the vital task of controlling and reducing weapons around the world, and eventually constitute direct military threats to the United States.” The spread of nuclear weapons was expected to undercut US “diplomatic and military influence” and lead to calls “to retreat to isolation to avoid the risk of involvement in nuclear war.” Second, the committee determined that the risk of nuclear domino effects following the Chinese test made it essential to act quickly and prevent proliferation even in countries that were allies or shared enemies with the United States. In discussing these dangers, the report identified multiple mechanisms by which these domino effects could occur. As suggested in chapter 1, the Chinese test was viewed as particularly likely to trigger domino effects because of China’s specific characteristics, which differed from prior proliferators like France: It had many rivals that lacked nuclear arsenals, and it had very limited economic capacity, making proliferation seem feasible even to impoverished countries. As the report put it: The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. . . . The recent Chinese Communist nuclear explosion has reinforced the belief, increasingly prevalent throughout the world, that nuclear weapons are a distinguishing mark of a world leader, are essential to national security, and are feasible even with modest industrial

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resources. The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program has brought particular pressure on India and Japan, which may both be approaching decisions to undertake nuclear weapons programs. Although one might be tempted to accept Indian or Japanese nuclear weapons to counterbalance those of China, we do not believe the spread of nuclear weapons would or could be stopped there. An Indian or Japanese decision to build nuclear weapons would probably produce a chain reaction of similar decisions by other countries, such as Pakistan, Israel and the UAR. In these circumstances, it is unrealistic to hope that Germany and other European countries would not decide to develop their own nuclear weapons. We are convinced, therefore, that energetic and comprehensive steps must be taken in the near future to discourage further acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities or an accelerating increase in the number of nations engaged in nuclear weapons programs will occur—possibly beginning within a matter of months.

Finally, the committee determined that strong US efforts stood a good chance of success, in no small part because the Soviet Union and other states were similarly threatened by proliferation. This justified a major US effort, since “the rewards of long-term success would be enormous; and even partial success would be worth the costs we can expect to incur.”127 While the documentary evidence on the Gilpatric Committee demonstrates qualitatively the high-level government attention given to nonproliferation in the wake of the Chinese test, it is also possible to examine quantitatively whether nuclear issues received more attention in the government in this period. To do so, I systematically examined the daily intelligence briefs prepared for President Johnson in the one hundred days before and after China’s nuclear test on October 16, 1964. In each of these recently declassified documents, I coded the total number of intelligence items, the number devoted to nuclear topics, and the number of items with any redacted text.128 As figure 2.1 demonstrates, nuclear issues received much more attention in the period after the Chinese test, with an average of 0.49 nuclear items per day in the hundred days after the test, compared to 0.21 items per day in the hundred days prior to the test. This difference is statistically significant (p