Sociology in Europe: In Search of Identity [Reprint 2011 ed.] 9783110887440, 9783110138450

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Sociology in Europe

Sociology in Europe In Search of Identity Edited by Birgitta Nedelmann and Piotr Sztompka

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Walter de Gruyter Berlin · New York 1993

Birgitta Nedelmann, Professor Dr. phil. habil., Dipl. Soc., Institut für Soziologie, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, Germany Piotr Sztompka, Prof. Dr., Chair, Section on Theoretical Sociology, Jagiellonian University, Institut of Sociology, Krakow, Poland

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sociology in Europe : in search of identity / edited by Birgitta Nedelmann and Piotr Sztompka. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 3-11-013845-X 1. Sociology — Europe — History — 20th century. 2. Sociology. I. Nedelmann, Birgitta, 1941 — II. Sztompka, Piotr. HM22.E9S63 1993 30Γ094—dc20 93-15838

Die Deutsche Bibliothek — Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sociology in Europe : in search of identity / ed. by Birgitta Nedelmann and Piotr Sztompka. — Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter, 1993 ISBN 3-11-013845-X NE: Nedelmann, Birgitta [Hrsg.]

© Copyright 1993 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form — by photoprint, microfilm, or any other means nor transmitted nor translated into a machine language without written permission from the publisher. Printed in Germany. Converted by: Knipp Satz und Bild digital, Dortmund — Printing: Druckerei Gerike GmbH, Berlin — Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer-GmbH, Berlin — Cover Design: Johannes Rother, Berlin

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank the authors who contributed to this volume for making this project come true, a project which sometimes seemed to be too difficult to manage in spite of the fact that communication has become easier in Europe after 1989. It is only thanks to the intellectual generosity and patience of these authors that this book project could finally be realised. The editors are fully aware of the shortcomings and open questions of this book and take full responsibility for them. They hope these inadequacies will inspire other colleagues to continue the work started, but not completed, here. This book could not have been written without the help of patient collaborators. We wish to express our gratitude to Anna Bankowska (Edinburgh) and Professor Sabetai Unguru (Haifa) for their help in style editing. Peter Schneider M.A. (Johannes Gutenberg-University, Mainz) was a patient and skillful proof reader of the manuscripts. Without his charismatic talents in mastering the wordprocessing programmes we would not have been able to prepare the disks for conversion. We, therefore, wish to express our special gratitude to him. Last but not least, we wish to thank Dr. Bianka Ralle (Berlin) for her intellectual and technical support without which this book could not have been realised.

Mainz and Krakow, Summer 1992

Birgitta Nedelmann and Piotr Sztompka

Contents

Acknowledgements

V

Introduction

1

Birgitta Nedelmann and Piotr Sztompka

1 The Project 2 The Contributions 2.1 Part I: Is There a European Sociology? 2.2 Part II: Some National Traditions 2.3 Part III: Two Views from Afar References

1 5 5 9 20 23

Part I: Is there a European Sociology?

25

European Sociology: The Identity Lost?

27

Raymond Boudon

1 On the Identity of European Sociology in the Classical Age 2 Classical European Sociology: A Multidimensional Programme . . . . 3 Has European Sociology Preserved its Identity? References

28 37 39 43

The Contribution of German Social Theory to European Sociology

45

Richard Münch

1 2 2.1 2.2 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6

US Hegemony after the Second World War: The Americanisation of European Social Theory The Revitalisation of European Social Theory British Social Theory: Class, Solidarity, and Conflict French Social Theory: The Power of Structure German Social Theory: The Dialectics of Modernity Kant, Hegel, and Marx Simmel and Weber Critical Theory: Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas Systems' Theory: Luhmann The Critical Turn of Systems' Theory The Iron Cage of Systems' Theory: Is there any Escape?

45 47 47 48 49 49 50 51 51 52 54

VIII

Contents

4

The Dialectics of Progress: The Good and the Dangerous Life in Modern Society 5 Between Interrelated Diversity and Anglo-American Cultural Imperialism References

58 61 62

Towards a European Sociology Carlo Mongardini

67

1 Has there Ever Been a European Sociology? 2 Sociology and Modernity 3 Sociology in Modern Times 4 Present Trends 5 Tracing the Future of Sociology in its History References

67 68 71 72 74 76

Part II: Some National Traditions

79

The Changing British Role in European Sociology Martin Albrow

81

1 Britain versus Europe or Sociology as a Foreign Agent 2 The Anglo-European Rapprochement in Sociology 3 Universalism and the Two Continents 4 The New European Sociology References

81 85 88 90 95

A Marginal Discipline in the Making: Austrian Sociology in a European Context Christian Fleck and. Helga Nowotny

99

1

Early Cosmopolitanism without an Institutional Basis: From the Beginnings to the Second World War 2 The Advantages of Non-professionalism: Austrian Social Sciences in the Interwar Period 3 Emergent Professionalisation after 1945: Turning the Inward Look Outward? 4 What then Does Austrian Sociology Have to Offer? References

101 104 109 114 116

Scandinavian Sociology and its European Roots and Elements . . . Erik Allardt

119

1

119

The European Roots I: Concrete Social Research

Contents

2 3

IX

The European Roots II: Ethnology and Social Anthropology The European Roots III: The Logical Positivism of the 1920s and 1930s 4 The Institutionalisation of Sociology after the Second World W a r . . . 5 The Postwar Sociology up to 1970 6 Paradigmatic Changes 7 An Increase of Nationally Independent and Salient Contributions... References

121 122 124 126 130 132 135

Social Change and Research on Social Structure in Hungary . . . .

141

Tamas Kolosi and Ivan Szelenyi

1 2

Sociology and the Evolution of Civil Society Before Socialism Sociology, State Socialism, and Subsequent Attempts to Reconstitute Civil Society 2.1 The Stalinist Social Order: Sociology as Bourgeois Pseudoscience . . 2.2 The Post-Stalinist Quest for New Legitimacy: The Quest for Sociology as an Independent Discipline 3 The Study of Social Structure 3.1 From Class to Stratification (From Cooperation to Conflicts between Sociologists and Reform-communists) 4 Reform, Social Change, and Research on Social Structure 5 Sociology and the Transition to Post-communism References

Between Universal and Native: The Case of Polish Sociology . . . Wladyslaw

141 145 145 146 148 149 153 157 160

165

Kwasniewicz

1 Introduction 2 Transformations in Polish Society in the Twentieth Century 3 Stages in the Development of Sociology in Poland 4 The Changing Social Roles of Sociologists 5 Towards World Sociology 6 In the Service of Society 7 Conclusions References

165 166 168 172 177 181 184 185

Part III: Two Views From Afar

189

European Sociology and the Modernisation of Japan

191

Ken'ichi

1 2

Tominaga

Introduction Early Modernisation in Japan

191 192

X

Contents

3 3.1 3.2 3.3 4 4.1 4.2 5 6 6.1 6.2 7

European Sociology of the First Generation and Japan John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte Lorenz von Stein and Karl Marx in Japan European Sociology of the Second Generation and Japan The Influence of Emile Dürkheim in Japan Georg Simmel and Max Weber in Japan Early American Sociology in Japan European Sociology of the Present Generation and Japan The Americanisation of Postwar Japanese Sociology Talcott Parsons and Japan From Karl Mannheim's Theory of Ideology to Bell's End of Ideology 8 Summary and Conclusion: From One-way to Two-way Communication References

195 195 196 197 198 198 199 202 203 203 204

208 209

Europe and America in Search of Sociology: Reflections on a Partnership

213

206

Lawrence A. Scaff 1

Interrelation Between American and European Sociology in the Period of Formation 2 The Partnership in the Modern Era 3 Future of Sociology After the European Revolutions References

214 217 221 222

Notes on Contributors

225

Index of Names

229

Introduction Birgitta Nedelmann and Piotr Sztompka

1 The Project Sociology, like so many other things, is a European invention. It was an offspring of the turbulent, revolutionary nineteenth century in Europe. It provided self-understanding of the triumphant modernity and gave intellectual bearings to the experience of rapid and fundamental transition toward the entirely new economic, political and cultural order. At the close of the twentieth century, Europe is again in a period of transition. Part of this phenomenon is worldwide - the transformation of capitalist, industrial democracies into new forms of society labelled as "post-industrialism", "post-history", "post-modernity", or, more humbly, "high, developed modernity". But apart from that, there are dramatic changes centred mainly in Europe. Two symbolic dates signify the magnitude of historical novelty. 'The Autumn of Nations 1989' marks the expansion of 'ideological Europe' toward its widest geographical borders. The fall of Communism and the bid of Eastern and Central European countries to enter (or re-enter) Europe, understood as the symbol of freedom and prosperity, is the phenomenon of highest historical significance. But, perhaps, equally consequential is the persistent evolution of the European Economic Community into the first truly transnational political entity, with 1992 as the crucial threshold. The "European house", with its new institutional architecture is being constructed before our eyes; but, even more importantly, the "new European home" (Brzezinski 1989: 1-10), with common ideas, values, symbols, heritage, loyalties and bonds is slowly emerging as well. For better or worse, Europe clearly regains its role as a seat of 'hot' historical events, the place where the action is. Isn't it fair to expect that such a period of intensive and far-reaching change will demand new forms of social self-awareness? And, among them, new developments in sociology? With all due reservations concerning the dangers of predictions in the area of intellectual trends, we venture three hypotheses. It is our first hypothesis that the next decades will witness another Golden Era of European Sociology, comparable only to the outcrop of the classical nineteenth century; comparable, however, only in scope, not in substance, as it will finally terminate the nineteenth century's syndrome in sociological imagination, parting for good with the central ideas of classical consensus, like organic sys-

2

Introduction

tem, evolution, development, linear progress, historical necessity, growing rationalisation, etc.. It is our second hypothesis that the centre of the sociological enterprise will move back to its birthplace, to Europe. After a long detour to America, which dominated the sociological scene for many decades, the spirit of sociology will return to its craddle. The winds of change are already in the air, noticed by perceptive and impartial observers. The eminent American sociologist Neil Smelser concedes: There have been areas of theoretical ferment in Europe during the past two decades - as represented by names such as Jürgen Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, Alain Touraine, Pierre Bourdieu, and Anthony Giddens - that arguably have been more influential than American theoretical writers during the same period (Smelser 1988: 15).

Two years later, Smelser phrases this view even stronger: In fact, in the past 50 years, the center of gravity of general theoretical thinking has shifted from the United States to Europe. Much of current theoretical thinking in the United States stems from the influence of these figures on faculty and graduate students (Smelser 1990: 47-48).

This leads to our third hypothesis, namely that the traditionally dependent and peripheric geographical areas of European sociology will reaffirm themselves much more strongly, matching the achievements of the erstwhile centres, France, Great Britain, Germany. In particular, we expect new contributions from Eastern and Central Europe, reflecting their emancipation from the repressive, autocratic order, but also new ideas flowing from other parts of Europe, due to the general climate of revival and unification. If European sociology is really at the threshold of such fundamental changes, it seems a fairly good time for taking stock, for evaluating its present condition. This is the purpose of our volume. But such an enterprise can be conceived in many ways, and therefore our assumptions and goals require some clarification. First of all, is there any meaning to the notion of "European sociology"? Would it make sense to speak of "European mathematics", "European chemistry" or "European astronomy"? In the case of the natural sciences it would at most indicate the location of laboratories, the addresses, or national origin, of researchers; it would be significant for correspondence, or forming national chapters of academies, and not much more. But in the case of the social sciences it definitely means a great deal more. Sociology is a form of reflective selfawareness of societies, and as such it mirrors their concrete, particular experiences, their unique history, specific culture, local tradition. Nobody would doubt that European history, culture and heritage display some specificity. And, hence, it is a justifiable guess that sociology, reflecting European experience, will demonstrate some peculiarities as well. It obviously makes sense to speak of "European literature", "European music", "European painting", not only in the

1 The Project

3

trivial sense of art produced by European artists, but as a specific body of ideas, concepts, themes, styles. Similarly, it may be expected that European sociology will reattain in the future some specific substantive identity, too. In this respect sociology is much more akin to art than to nuclear physics. But here the second question immediately comes to mind: Is this European specificity to be found in some all-European consensus, a unified corpus of sociological thought, or is it rather a complex, emergent result of wide national and regional diversities? Sociology in Europe, like elsewhere, is still rooted in national contexts. But in a world undergoing rapid processes of integration, unification and globalisation - in the economic, political, cultural realms - such fragmentation cannot be sustained. In the effort to catch up with actual social processes, sociology is moving toward trans-national problematics and transnational consensus. As Martin Albrow observes: The changing nature of social life worldwide requires change in sociological analysis. Sociologists are adopting a global perspective we can say, precisely because globalisation means that they can no longer seek to explain processes within their own countries by reference only to internal conditions (Albrow 1990: 11).

This leads to the third query: Where is the specificity of European sociology primarily to be sought? Which aspects of sociological enterprises are most sensitive to the contextual influence of historical tradition, cultural milieu, symbolic discourses, political climates, whether continental, national or both? If we turn again to actual social processes, we shall notice that the contradictory pressures of unification and diversification produce different results in various areas of social life. Unification seems to be relatively easier to obtain at the level of economics, to some extent domestic politics, and international relations, whereas diversification seems to prevail or even to increase - as a corollary, or perhaps antidote - at the level of culture, literature, art, religion, ethos. To generalise, unification is most successful in the areas where pragmatic, utilitarian, instrumental criteria of efficiency reign (fiscal policy, tariffs, trade, money, military agreements). And diversification is most pronounced in the areas where axiological, cognitive, autotelic criteria are most important (art, culture, literature). To put it otherwise, unification occurs in the hard domain of the tangibles, diversification in the soft areas of intangibles. Applying this reasoning to the level of sociological thought, a parallel distinction can be drawn. The standardised research procedures, the Instrumentarium of sociological craft, the principles of empirical inquiry are slowly unified, turning into the universal canon. On the other hand the theories, models, images stay diversified, reflecting unique experiences of national societies, or particular continental social systems. Thus perhaps if there is anything like European sociology it must be sought in the realm of sociological theory. Finally, the fourth question refers to the forms in which the specificity and identity of European sociology manifests itself. More often than positively clari-

4

Introduction

fying what it stands for, European sociology affirms itself in the negative mood, by showing what it stands against. One line of opposition is geographical: The distinction is drawn against sociologies developed in other parts of the world, most importantly against American sociology, but also Far Eastern sociology, or Latin American sociology. Another link of opposition is disciplinary: The demarcation of sociology from other fields of social sciences is attempted. Here various national traditions make some specific borderlines particularly blurred and conflict-ridden: In Great Britain, the border with social anthropology, in Germany, with law, philosophy, and perhaps political science, in France, with humanities and art, in Scandinavia, with administrative sciences and statistics, in former socialist countries, with historical materialism. Again, contradictory processes seem to be operating: The tendency toward a clear-cut definition of the sociological field, providing it with legitimacy, and the tendency toward interdisciplinarity and fusion of several neighbouring disciplines. These are some assumptions and doubts that we encountered at the outset of this study. But the goal was not to state our own point of view, but rather to elicit foreseeably diversified responses from eminent representatives of European sociology; to seek for their self-definition of intellectual enterprises in which they all participate, even though in different capacities and at various locations. Apart from this vantage point of the insiders, we also wanted to unravel the point of view of the outsiders; to see how scholars from far-away countries perceive the phenomenon of European sociology. Both groups were approached with the same set of questions: 1. Is European sociology preserving its identity at the end of the twentieth century? Isn't there a recent tendency to claim some uniqueness, after a long period of uncritical Americanisation? Give some concrete illustrations for your diagnosis, the facts which would support it! 2. Can European sociology be distinguished against the background of an increasingly globalised canon of concepts, presuppositions, hypotheses? What is our European contribution to this canon, and what are we borrowing from it? In what does the European identity of sociology consist more specifically: Ideas, concepts, styles of thought, areas of research? 3. What have we done to our European heritage of the nineteenth century (Spencer's, Weber's, Marx', Durkheim's, etc.). Do we use it, build on the shoulders of its formulators, or simply add legitimacy to our writings by ornamenting them with their names? Which of the Masters are still potentially relevant, and which are obsolete? Who is alive and who is dead? Which traditions are at the focus of attention at the end of the twentieth century? Why these, and not others? 4. What are the bases of internal heterogeneity of European sociology: Historical (parts of Europe experiencing wars, conflicts and turmoils, as opposed to more peaceful areas)? Political (political blocks, ideological orthodoxies)?

2 The Contributions

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

5

Linguistic (German, French, English as three linguistic patterns clearly influencing the styles of thought, theoretical orientations, philosophical perspectives)? What contribution do you think your country made to establishing 'European' sociology? In what does it consist, more specifically? Which theoretical (methodological) perspectives, and which areas of research are dominant in your country at the end of the century? To what extent do different national traditions give distinct meaning to the same terms of the sociological vocabulary and prevent thereby any real dialogue and cumulation of sociological wisdom? Are we (the sociologists) living in separate and mutually impenetrable conceptual worlds? Is European social science peculiar with respect to its most likely interdisciplinary links (sociology with economics, or with history, or with philosophy, or with psychology, or with anthropology)? How do you think the way sociology is institutionalised in your country has contributed to 'European' sociology (universities, research centres, publishing, international cooperation etc.)? In which ways has the political system (and changing political situation) of your country influenced the institutionalisation of sociology, and its characteristic substantive emphases (theoretical, methodological, empirical)?

The scholars we approached were supposed to treat these questions as most general guidelines, and feel free to phrase the answers in their own, idiosyncratic way. In effect we received highly original, personal statements, with patently individual emphases, arguments and conclusions. At this meta-level of selfreflection about sociology, diversity has proved to be a rule. But some common 'leitmotifs' can be discovered as well. As could have been expected, the riddle of "European sociology" was not resolved, but the elicited clash of ideas seems to serve an important role in reclaiming the identity of our discipline in the European context. Or so we hope.

2 The Contributions 2.1 Part I: Is There a European Sociology? In Part One, Raymond Boudon, Richard Münch and Carlo Mongardini discuss the question of whether there has ever existed a sociology called European sociology, and, if yes, how could it be defined more precisely? The three authors approach and answer this question very differently, partly depending upon the different national backgrounds they come from (Boudon from France, Münch from Germany and Mongardini from Italy), partly resulting from their different theoretical orientations. This diversity can in itself be seen as an indication

6

Introduction

against the assumption from which the editors of this volume started, namely, that there is a minimal common understanding between contemporary European sociologists based on their common heritage of the classics of European sociology. The contributors to Part One of this book, however, demonstrate that this common heritage neither leads to the same evaluation of the legacy of the classics nor to the same judgements concerning the future of European sociology. The only point on which these authors agree (although for different reasons) is that contemporary European sociology is highly fragmented and heterogeneous. Münch coins the term of interrelated diversity to indicate that the fact of high internal heterogeneity and fragmentation does not automatically speak for the fact of a disintegrated European sociology. But let us introduce the arguments of these authors in more detail. When looking at what the classics of sociology, like Weber and Dürkheim, actually did in their sociological research rather than what they declared to do, Raymond Boudon comes to the conclusion that these, and other authors deserving to be called classics, share the same type of approach to sociological analysis: They have a common model of what sociology is about and how it should proceed. Boudon calls this common approach of the masters of European sociology the "puzzle-solving analysis". As an example of this type of analysis, Boudon discusses Dürkheim's work on magic and Weber's analysis of the Protestant sects in the US. In a ten point model he shows what precisely this puzzle-solving analysis consists of. In addition to this theoretical dimension of the work of the classics, Boudon distinguishes a second dimension, namely the "philosophy-ofhistory-dimension" or the "prophetic dimension" to which current textbooks usually are paying more attention than to the theoretical dimension, that is, to 'prophecies' such as "Entzauberung" (Weber), "increasing alienation" (Marx) or "increasing anomie" (Dürkheim). These dimensions together make up what Boudon then calls the Classical Mainstream Program, briefly, the CMP. It is exactly the CMP which, according to Boudon, constitutes the identity of classical European sociology. Our initial question of whether there has ever existed a European sociology with a clear-cut identity has thus been answered by Boudon in a very clear-cut positive way. As the title of Boudon's contribution already suggests, the author believes that the CMP has lost its influence in contemporary European sociology. Sociological analyses following the CMP today seem to Boudon "far from dominant now". Puzzle-solving analyses have been replaced by a strong trend towards "programmatic entropy". Among the numerous factors strengthening this trend Boudon mentions, first, intellectual factors, in particular the spread of dogmatic worldviews (such as vulgar Marxism and relativism); they have as an effect to destroy the distinction between puzzle and non-puzzle, between real puzzles and pseudo-puzzles. The main activities of contemporary sociologists who are caught in dogmatic worldviews mainly consist in defining away the problems which

2 The Contributions

7

puzzle, and could be solved by sociologists. Secondly, Boudon refers to institutional factors contributing to the decay of CMP. This set of factors has changed sociology into a pseudo-science, a "Kameralwissenschaft" (Schumpeter). The main activities of sociologists following this type of pseudo-science consist in gathering and analysing data. Thirdly, Boudon refers to morphological factors which are intrinsic to sociology as a community, namely increased division of labour, leading to increasing diversity, heterogeneity and even anarchy. One of the best indications of this development is the semantical anarchy. Boudon criticises the lack of a common understanding among contemporary sociologists on such basic notions like "theory". The conclusion Boudon draws from his analysis for contemporary (and future) European sociology is rather discouraging: The combination of these three sets of factors (the intellectual, the institutional, and the morphological) has turned sociology into a "Balkanised" sociology for which "barreness rather than fruitfulness" is the typical outcome. The importance of Boudon's contribution goes far beyond the limits of this volume. In his ten point model of the CMP, he presents clear-cut criteria for defining the identity of a genuine 'European sociology'. In extrapolating his reasoning, one could say that contemporary European sociologists have a chance in finding again a common identity only if they were prepared to follow the CMP in their everyday sociological activities. Richard Münch approaches the question of the identity of European sociology from the point of view of social theory. It is quite obvious that he stands for a different type of social theory than the one advocated by Boudon, thus proving Boudon's observation that there is no common understanding of the notion of "theory" among contemporary European sociologists. After giving a brief outline of the British and French traditions in sociological theory, Münch traces the traditions of dialectics in German social theory from its roots (Hegel and Marx) to the classics of German sociology (Weber, Simmel), to the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer and Adorno), to the theory of communicative action of Jürgen Habermas, to Niklas Luhmann's systems' theory and, finally, to the recent variants of systems' theory, i.e., the "critical turn of systems' theory", as Münch puts it, represented by such highly controversial authors as Ulrich Beck and Helmut Willke. Münch does not limit his contribution to presenting these different positions in German social theory, but also discusses their utility with reference to concrete social problems which have dominated the debates in German sociology before the unification in 1989, the problems connected to environmental and technological risks. Münch introduces the "prophetic dimension" (Boudon) into the debate on these social problems, when prophesying that the dialectics between "good and evil" will not be overcome in future, but rather replaced by a "cooperation between good and evil". His position reminds one of that advo-

8

Introduction

cated by Georg Simmel hundred years ago, when arguing that the dialectical nature of society can only be transformed in a socially productive way. In contrast to Boudon, Münch's outlook on the future of European sociology is rather optimistic. Paradoxically, it is exactly the disadvantages conventionally associated with European sociology, which, following Münch, will increase its chances to succeed in the competition with scholars from the US at the turn of the century: Its lower degree of differentiation, standardisation and professionalisation and its tighter connection with philosophical traditions of thought in terms of dialectics, contradictions and paradoxes. In addition, Münch expects a higher degree of exchange and communication between the different national sociologies, more cooperation and competition. When raising the issue of language barriers between European sociologists and their function for the future character of European sociology, Münch gives proof of his own way of dialectical thinking. The language barriers will contribute to preserving the peculiarities of the single national traditions of social thought when European sociologists from East and West, South and North will communicate more frequently with each other in future. The language barriers will function as a guarantee to stabilise the "interrelated diversity" which will be typical of European sociology at the turn of the twentieth century. Carlo Mongardini belongs to those scholars whose main activities in the last six years have consisted in 'constructing' contemporary European sociology. Together with other Italian sociologists and the Italian Association of Sociology, he has initiated the Premio Europeo Amalfi per la Sociologia e le Scienze Sociali, which not only aims at distinguishing outstanding European sociological works, but also, and perhaps more importantly, at building a European sociological community. The present book-project has grown out of the joint activities of European scholars working together on the scientific committee of the European Amalfi Prize initiated by our Italian colleagues. One could read Mongardini's contribution as a proof in itself of the high cultural diversity within contemporary European sociology. In contrast to other authors, he tends to an overall negative assessment of both the past and the future of a "united European sociology". According to his critical point of view, postwar European sociology was nothing but a collection of isolated experiences and national traditions. This national diversity which, as Mongardini admits, could be seen in itself as a sign of the wealth of European sociology, was the precondition for American sociology taking the lead after the Second World War. The "European revolutions", a self-evident point of reference for the reflections on European sociology of almost all authors, present a positive challenge to bring the different national sociologies together. The different national sociologies from West and East are confronted with a set of similar social problems,

2 The Contributions

9

the solution of which can only be brought about by a more intensified collaboration between the different national sociologies. Mongardini presents another idea, which is typical of the originality of his own way of thinking. In confining the future role of sociology to what he calls "explorative study", he proposes to substitute to the notion of "society" the notion of the "other". According to Mongardini, society is constructed on the basis of the image the individual has of the other. The advantages Mongardini sees in this conceptual change are connected to his hope that European sociology could reassume its critical consciousness of modernity, a characteristic it has lost, following Mongardini, in the last decades. 2.2 Part II: Some National Traditions Both the Polish sociologist Wladyslaw Kwasniewicz and our American colleague Lawrence A. Scaff ask critically in their contributions whether the search for national traditions in scientific disciplines is not a contradiction in itself. Like other sciences, sociology too is built upon universalism. The existence of national traits would therefore necessarily be an indication of deviance from the ideal of univeralism in science. On the other hand, the most fundamental sociology of science teaches us that disciplines develop under specific social conditions which necessarily leave their particularistic and national imprints upon the discipline. Universalistic and particularistic orientations in science are in continuous tension, thus stimulating scientific development. What we were interested in, when looking for national traditions in European sociology, in Part Two of our volume, was the dynamic interplay between national and universalistic orientations and the way in which this interplay shaped the sociologies of some selected European countries. We had to limit ourselves to only five different examples of national traditions in European sociology. Following traditional criteria of division between national sociologies, one could say that two examples stem from countries in which postwar sociologists had to struggle against the pressures of totalitarian regimes, and three examples from countries in which, at least in the last fourty years, postwar sociologists had the privilege of doing research under conditions of democratic government. A closer look at the history of sociology in these different European countries, however, shows that state control has been a decisive factor in all these countries, although in different degrees, to be sure. The cases presented in Part Two of this volume also show the importance of other factors in shaping the character of a national sociology, such as the size of the country, its geographical position and its situation within the overall network of communication in Europe. The first three cases already demonstrate that there is no simple relationship between these factors and the development of national sociologies. Martin Albrow presents the example of the development of sociology in what is conven-

10

Introduction

tionally called a major country, Britain. Christian Fleck, Helga Nowotny and Erik Allardt analyse examples from sociologies in so-called minor European countries, that is, Austria and the four Scandinavian countries. These contributions teach us that it is far from justified to adopt the geographical distinction between "minor" and "major" countries to characterise the single national sociologies as well. The cases of Austria and Scandinavia show convincingly that sociologies in (geographically) 'minor' countries can grow in inverse proportion to the size of their country. Being exposed to the intellectual products of the surrounding major countries and challenged to integrate them into the national boundaries of their discipline, sociologies in 'minor' countries are continuously stimulated to intellectual innovation and the production of specific 'national' contributions. This in turn may have a stimulating influence upon the sociologies of the 'major' countries. The first three examples all stand for those European countries in which postwar sociologists had the chance to develop their discipline under the conditions of democratic regimes. Two examples are presented from countries in which sociology had to struggle against the odds of politics, Tamäs Kolosi and Ivan Szelenyi on sociology in Hungary and Wladyslaw Kwasniewicz on sociology in Poland. It is perhaps only today, with the distance of some decades, that we can fully realise the paradoxical situation in which European sociologists from East and West found themselves. When our professional colleagues in the East fought for preserving sociology as an empirically oriented critical discipline, against the pressures of political regimes deriving their legitimacy from Marx, scholars sympathising with the student revolutions of the late sixties in the West fought for the introduction of Marxist sociology against a one-sided, and very often dogmatically oriented, positivistic sociology, practiced within the context of democratic regimes. It is only now, after the Iron Curtain has been torn away between East and West European sociologists, that this tragic irony in the development of European post-war sociology becomes fully visible. Before introducing the contributions of Part Two in greater detail, we wish to underline that these few examples are far from representative for the national traditions in sociology in past and contemporary East and West Europe. But it has never been our intention to edit a volume which could claim to be representative of European sociology in its entirety. Instead, we have preferred to select only a few, but 'rich' cases, rich in terms of their specific national traditions and connections to the scientific community outside of the boundaries of their own countries. There are obvious shortcomings connected with this decision. Thus, not only is there a relative lack of contributions from Eastern, but also from Southern European countries. We learn from Martin Albrow's contribution that there is a long-standing tradition in British sociology to identify "European" sociology with "continental" sociology. By definition, then, British sociology is excluded from European soci-

2 The Contributions

11

ology. Both types of sociology are usually taken to represent contrasting characteristics, British sociology being empirical, historical and individualistic, European sociology, on the other hand, standing for an orientation that is dominated by theory, speculation and collectivism. Albrow reports that it was, therefore, always with some amount of fear that British sociologists looked at European sociologists. The parallelism between this intellectual attitude and the corresponding political attitude is in itself, according to Albrow, an interesting instance of the tight connection between the development of the political regime and the British attitudes towards Europe in general and towards European sociology in particular. Today, British sociology has overcome this anti-European attitude and has assumed the role of intellectual avant-garde in the British social context. In its unique role of host of outstanding European theorists (such as Karl Mannheim, Norbert Elias, Gianfranco Poggi, Ralf Dahrendorf, Zygmunt Bauman, just to mention a few in the long list of theoreticians having been 'imported' into Britain) and new social theories, British sociology has become one of the leading producers of contemporary social thought. The innovative power it has shown in this field is rightly called by Albrow the "British revolution" in social sciences. There are two major events with which Albrow illustrates this 'British revolution', the "phenomenon Giddens" and the "phenomenon TCS", the success story of the journal Theory, Culture & Society. This journal was the first European sociological journal to focus on the importance of post-material values and to offer a forum for theorising about the transformations of mass culture and consumerism in the present period. Albrow believes that the revolutionary energy which has changed the political landscape of Europe in the last years will also reshape European sociology as a whole. A European sociology for the twenty-first century is likely to be very different from its nineteenth and twentieth century predecessors, as he foresees. There are two major points in Albrow's reasoning: First, Albrow argues like Mongardini for a conceptual change in sociology, because the core themes of classical sociology (class, state, individual) have lost their power. In contrast to the classical period of sociology, which dealt with class struggle and institutionbuilding, it is much more difficult nowadays, when minorities of all kind are trying to make their voices heard, to identify and define the "collective actor" of societal transformation. Surprisingly enough, Albrow comes back to Georg Simmel's concept of "web of group affiliation", when indicating the direction into which the conceptual shift might take place. Secondly, Albrow foresees a replacement of the core concepts of traditional sociology, such as "class" and "economic interest", by the concepts of "culture" and "value" respectively. Our observer from the US, Lawrence A. ScafF, comes to the same conclusion. According to both Scaff and Albrow, it is no longer the economic interests, but post-material values (affluence, comsumerism, environmental interests) which will mobilise people in future societies.

12

Introduction

Christian Fleck's and Helga Nowotny's analysis of Austrian sociology is written with a combination of auto-critical engagement and self-ironic distance, a mixture of attitudes frequently attributed to Austrian intellectuals. The authors give a fascinating outline of the history of Austrian sociology in its interplay with other European influences, distinguishing between three different stages. In the first one, they describe the beginning of Austrian sociology, before the First World War; in the second, the development of Austrian sociology in the interwar period, and in the third stage, the postwar development until 1989. According to the authors, there are striking similarities between Austrian sociology in the first stage and in the future fourth stage, after the revolutionary period in Europe following 1989: They both develop under the same productive conditions of high internal national diversity and social conflicts. The cosmopolitan orientation, typical of the first stage of Austrian sociology and lost afterwards, was stimulated by the innerstate conflicts and by the ethnical and social diversity of the Austro-Hungarian era. After a long period of what the authors selfironically call "alpine provincialism", characteristic of the second and the third stage, Austrian sociology may reassume its cosmopolitan orientation in the future: Like in the first stage of the Austro-Hungarian empire, it is now, after 1989, again confronted with problems of innerstate conflicts and social and ethnic diversity, resulting from the new political situation in "MitteP'-Europe. It is exactly the geographical position of Austria and its small size which expose it, more than any other country, to the need to respond to these new challenges. The authors hope these challenges will bring about an innovative push in future Austrian sociology. Fleck and Nowotny agree with many other authors in this volume that the new situation after the European revolution of 1989 constitutes not only a political, but also a scientific watershed, dividing 'old' and 'new' sociology in their development within the national boundaries and within the larger European context. There is a tacit assumption from which we, the editors, have started our enterprise. We believed that an increase in communication between national sociologies and the external European and international scientific communities have a positive effect upon the sociological productivity in the single countries. The case of Austrian sociology in the interwar period is a strong case speaking against this hypothesis. Austrian sociology in the interwar period was characterised by its isolation from external influences. At the same time, it was the most productive period in Austrian sociology! Fleck and Nowotny highlight the internationally pathbreaking work Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal as a "solitary invention" which was written without any contact with other European social scientists. The innovative potential of this study is explained by the authors as directly resulting from the isolation from the outside community. It was also in this interwar period, with all its unfavourable economic preconditions, that the intellectual milieu was created in which such a sociological 'giant' like Paul Lazarsfeld started his pathbreaking research. In contrast to the present genera-

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tion of sociologists, people like Lazarsfeld, Zeisel, Jahoda and others, published less, and, as the authors critically remark, "their publications were more refined, more complete. They did not have the current habit of 'recycling' over and over again even the most trivial ideas". One of the most dramatic events in the German and Austrian history of sociology, the forced emigration of Jewish intellectuals in the 1930s, has left a tremendous intellectual gap in both countries, which has not been filled up to now. In contrast to German Jewish emigrants, Austrian Jewish emigrants were younger and therefore much easier to integrate into the new academic systems of the host countries. As a result, the authors conclude, "more [Austrian] exiles were appointed to chairs in America than were ever appointed professors in Austria in the whole century". In the third stage after 1945, Austrian sociology shares many characteristics with other national sociologies in Europe in this period; the emergence of research institutes (very often financed with American funds, like the famous Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna); the increasing 'service-mindedness' of sociology and its change into a "Kameralwissenschaft", as Boudon (quoting Schumpeter) would call it; the rapid expansion of the university system in the 1970s and the occupation of academic positions by a generation which had not yet been fully trained as sociologists. The university structure of many European countries is still largely characterised today by the rapid expansion of the educational system, the negative effects of which will be felt even stronger in the future, when the first generation of the founding fathers of postwar sociology will retire and leave their positions to this semi-professionalised second generation of sociologists. The third stage of post-Second World War sociology was not only the phase of the expansion of the university system, but also the period in which the public image of sociology as a "revolutionary science" was created. Sociologists were identified with the critical generation of the 1968. As Albrow puts it: "It was as radical critics of society with unconventional lifestyles that sociologists acquired a public image". In many European countries, sociology "was a word to be uttered 'with terror or contempt or despair'" (Albrow quoting Annan). Austrian sociology was an exception in this respect. Fleck and Nowotny observe that sociological research on politically sensitive topics was rarely done in Austria in this period. Rarely, true, but not never. Helga Nowotny's own pioneering research on the discourse on nuclear energy (Nowotny 1979) is an excellent example of critical sociology on a highly 'politically sensitive topic', comparable in many ways to the pathbreaking work on Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal. Does Austrian sociology have something typical to offer to European sociology? The authors give two highly interesting answers to this question. First, they identify an "unintended complementarity" between sociology on the one hand and artistic and literary production in Austria on the other. Sociological and literary production stimulate each other not only in the selection of topics such

14

Introduction

as inequality, gender, environment and globalisation of culture, but also in the style of writing. Nowotny and Fleck speculate about Austria's pioneering role in shaping a European sociology as part of a "third culture" (in the sense of Wolf Lepenies' work). Secondly, they see specific advantages connected with Austria as a small nation and its geographical situation in the turmoil of present political developments. The rise of new ethnic, linguistic and other minority conflicts and the new waves of migration are likely to produce exactly the positive preconditions which turned out to be so fruitful for Austrian sociology in the AustroHungarian era: diversity and conflict. In spite of the authors' pessimistic attitude towards the past of their profession, they conclude with an optimistic outlook. They hope that Austrian sociology might profit professionally from the increasing diversity and conflict and assume a key role as analyst of the problems arising from the new "Mittel-Europa". Another example of the big scientific effects small countries can have upon their neighbouring 'major' countries refers to the influence the sociologies from the 'minor' Scandinavian countries have had on shaping postwar European sociology. Erik Allardt presents a unique analysis of past and present trends of sociology in the four Scandinavian countries, of their national differences and of their attitudes towards the sociological developments on the 'continent'. In spite of the striking differences between the sociological traditions in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and - last but not least - Iceland, these countries have a common root, namely, their strong traditional belief in sociology as an empirical science and in logical positivism as truly representative of a valuefree science. This tradition favoured the emergence of concrete social research on social problems in all Scandinavian countries already before the Second World War, but also the adoption of American positivistic sociology as a kind of sociological creed after the Second World War. Critically Allardt remarks that especially in Sweden this creed turned into a dogma. Allardt shows that the roots of Danish and Finnish sociology differ from those of sociology in the other Scandinavian countries. They have their origin in the traditions of ethnology and social anthropology. This tradition led to the foundation of arctic ethnology and sociology in Denmark, and to a comparatively early establishment of sociology as an academic discipline in Finland. There were already four chairs in sociology in Finland at the end of the Second World War. The early establishment of sociology in Denmark came about because of the forced emigration of Theodor Geiger from Germany. He held the first chair in sociology in 1938, followed by Kaare Svalastoga in the 1950s. The development of Danish sociology in the 1960s and 1970s is of special interest. Denmark is one of the few European countries (if not the only) which reacted to the academic turmoil following the students' revolt of 1968 by abolishing chairs in

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sociology altogether. Only now, in the beginning of the 1990s, efforts are made again to reestablish chairs in sociology in Denmark. Allardt's earlier concise description of the main characteristis of sociology in the four Scandinavian countries, written at the end of the 1960s, is still of considerable value thirty years later. According to Allardt, Danish sociology is mainly concrete and practical, Finnish sociology mainly macrosociological and quantitative, Swedish sociology mainly manifest and methodical, and Norwegian sociology mainly latent and qualitative. Concerning the last, such internationally well known names like Vilhelm Aubert, Sverre Lysgaard, Nils Christie, Johan Galtung, Stein Rokkan, and Jon Elster testify to the extraordinary high ranking of Norwegian sociology, both in respect of its originality and its high professional quality. The "watershed effect" of 1968 was felt especially strong in the Scandinavian countries. Among the effects Allardt mentions, the following deserve special attention: 1. The weakening of the strong dependence of Scandinavian sociology upon American sociology. More and more, European sociologists are read without the interpretative intermediation from the US. 2. The increasing provincialism of Scandinavian sociology. What Nowotny and Fleck already have observed for Austria is also observed by Allardt for the Sandinavian countries. The expansion of academic sociology in the 70s goes hand in hand with an increased inward look at sociology. The Austrian phenomenon of 'alpine provincialism' has its parallel in the North, and could accordingly be called the phenomenon of 'Nordic provincialism'. In the North, this tendency is strenghtened by the fact that "Scandinavian sociologists tend to stay at the same institution through most of their professional life". 3. The increase in theoretical pluralism. After 1968, especially Marxist approaches (like the ones developed by Göran Therborn) spread considerably in Scandinavian sociology. 4. The increase in fragmentation and loss of academic community. It is increasingly difficult to identify national traits in Scandinavian sociology. Instead, there is a plurality of different orientations and different scientific communities in all four countries. Increase in fragmentation, however, strengthens the tendency towards what Boudon calls academic anomie.1 What Allardt says for Scandinavian sociology, holds equally true for sociology in other European countries: "Sociologists of different persuasions and using different paradigms only rarely involve themselves in joint debates and discussion".

See also the analysis on academic anomie in German sociology made by Nedelmann (1992).

16

Introduction

Is there a special 'Nordic' contribution to European sociology? In answering affirmatively to this question, Allardt mentions the following fields: 1. The research on the welfare state and its combination with structural and political institutional analysis might be considered as a special Nordic sociological product, standing in the tradition of the classics of sociology, a research branch which has already proved itself an excellent field of genuine European cooperation. 2. The researches on power done in Norway and Sweden which could stimulate following up parallel studies in other European countries. 3. The pathbreaking researches in comparative political sociology of Stein Rokkan (and Erik Allardt himself, we might say). The institutionalisation of comparative political sociology in Europe is the result of the unique efforts made by these two pioneering sociological entrepreneurs and theoreticians. 4. Last but not least, Allardt highlights the strong efforts Scandinavian female researchers have done in the field of women studies. Tamäs Kolosi and Ivan Szelenyi present the ambitious project of writing a "sociology of Hungarian sociology". They analyse the intricate interrelationship between socio-economic development, change in political regimes and the shifting roles of sociology in Hungarian society. Although there are considerable differences between the history of sociology in different Eastern European countries (the special case of Polish sociology is treated below), the case of sociology in Hungary generates common insights into the extreme difficulties sociologists had to struggle with under shifting totalitarian regimes. The authors distinguish between two reform epochs, each of which had a positive influence upon institutionalising sociology as an autonomous discipline. The first one, initiated by the enlightened aristocracy in the middle of the nineteenth century, contributed to preparing the fertile soil for what Kolosi and Szelenyi enthusiastically call the "first and wonderful generation of Hungarian sociologists", represented by such outstanding scholars like Karl Mannheim, Georg Lukäcs, Karl Polänyi, and Arnold Hauser. As early as 1919 Karl Mannheim was appointed to the first chair in sociology at the University of Budapest. Ironically enough, this appointment occurred under the first communist regime in Hungary, the first and, at the same time, last to favour sociology as an independent scientific enterprise. It was due to the takeover of a right-wing government that the efforts of this first internationally highly recognised generation of Hungarian sociologists were brought to a sudden end. The image of Hungarian sociology changed and it became now identified as a cosmopolitan, leftwing, socialist and Jewish science. As Martin Albrow has already shown, the forced early emigration of some of the leading figures of this first generation of Hungarian sociology had unintended and positive effects not only for British sociology, but for European sociology in general. Perhaps, a less well known effect of the discrimination of soci-

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ologists during this early period is, according to Kolosi and Szelenyi, their refuge into 'belles lettres', their development of a unique style of writing and the selection of specific topics of research, which finally resulted in the Hungarian tradition of sociography. One could argue that the foundations for European sociology as a "third culture" (Fleck and Nowotny) have already been layed in this period. The fate of sociology under Stalinism is well known. It was defined as a bourgeois pseudo-science which had to be replaced by Marxism-Leninism. In Hungary sociology had the ambiguous task of reforming Marxism and at the same time being restricted in doing so by a political system deriving its legitimacy from Marxism. According to the authors, Marxist sociology contributed to paving "the road towards the type of pragmatism, responsiveness to real social forces, conflicts and processes which were the necessary foundations of the 'second reform epoch'" initiated in the 70s by the reform minded fraction of the nomenclature. The institutionalisation of the first independent sociological research unit, the Sociological Research Group, was a major step in this direction. One of the great merits of Kolosi's and Szelenyi's article is that they do not content themselves with giving this general historical outline of the history of Hungarian sociology. They go a step further, supplying a detailed account of how empirical social researchers, working in the field of social structural analysis, changed the famous "two-class-one-stratum" theory in relation to the political pressures they were exposed to during this period. This part sometimes reads like a thriller in which Kolosi and Szelenyi put themselves into the skins of detectives following the traces of the main actors, the sociological researchers on the one hand, and their persecutors, the political authorities, on the other. Such highly esteemed scholars like György Konräd, Istvan Kemeny, Andräs Hegedlis, the members of the Budapest school (Agnes Heller, Maria Markus and others) and, last but not least, the authors/detectives themselves risked their careers and, in some cases also their lives, when fighting official MarxismLeninism and trying to change the theoretical debate according to the results of their empirical research. "In one decade", (namely from 1960 to 1970), the authors summarise, "Hungarian sociology travelled a long way from the apologetic orthodox Marxist 'two-class-one-stratum' model, via the semi-critical, semiapologetical stratification theory to a new critical class theory of socialism". Konräd's and Szelenyi's book The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, written in 1974, in which Kolosi's major empirical contributions on social structure and mobility have been integrated, must be considered a milestone in the history of Hungarian sociology. It blends the works of the first sociological generation with the ones of the second reform period. There are two main reasons why the authors' concluding reflections about the situation of Hungarian socioloy after the revolutions of 1989 are of special interest. First of all, they frankly admit that they, in spite of their deep involvement in analysing social structure and political change in the past, did not foresee the

18

Introduction

collapse of the communist regimes in the East. After the change of the political regime, Hungarian sociologists find themselves in a deep intellectual and institutional crisis. Their inability to predict such a historically pathbreaking event like the revolutions of 1989 has undermined their self-security and left them in a theoretical and conceptual void. The second reason why Kolosi's and Szelenyi's concluding remarks deserve special attention is the hypothesis they present on the social structural changes likely to take place during the postrevolutionary transition period. Their discussion of this hypothesis disproves their own critical remark about the lack of sociological imagination among contemporary Hungarian sociologists. When speculating about what will happen to the members of the old cadre elite in future, Kolosi and Szelenyi suggest that they will convert into an economic elite by using the mechanism of so-called spontaneous privatisation. According to another hypothesis presented by the authors, there are some striking similarities between the structural features of the revolutions of 1989 and 1917. In both situations the "Bildungsbürgertum" claimed to revolutionise a social structure that did not exist yet. Quoting the Polish minister of industry who said, "I represent interests which do not exist yet", the authors bring to the fore the main issue in the present situation of transition to capitalism in the former communist countries: "Central Europe experiences in these years a curious revolution: It is a bourgeois revolution without a bourgeoisie, which is led by an intelligentsia aiming at creating a bourgeoisie". In conclusion, the authors argue emphatically against Hungarian sociology loosening its commitment as a critical science of civil society in the future. Under the conditions of changing political and social structure, Hungarian sociology has to change its role as well: It has to take a critical distance from itself and from civil society, a double role which it still has to prove of being able to manage within the new socio-political context. "Paradoxical" is a word frequently used by Wladyslaw Kwasniewicz when describing the dramatic development of Polish sociology. There are many paradoxes involved indeed in the struggle between what Kwasniewicz calls the "universal" and the "native" in Polish sociology. In comparison to sociology in other Eastern European countries, Polish sociology is a striking example of how this very tension led to scientific productivity. Perhaps there is no other European country, like Poland, that has produced so many outstanding sociologists who are equally recognised at home and abroad. Among the pioneers of Polish sociology one could mention Ludwik Gumplowicz who, as Kwasniewicz rightly mentions, is wrongly held to be an Austrian, simply because he taught at the University of Graz. Florian Znaniecki is another outstanding example of a Polish sociologist who successfully combined the native and the universal in his career. His name and reputation is linked to both the flourishing period of Polish sociology

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in the 1920s and to the one of American sociology in the 1940s and 1950s.2 Znaniecki's students Jan Szczepanski and Stanislaw Andrzejewski followed their master in terms of a double national and international career. The list of Polish scholars whose scientific reputation is equally strong at home and abroad could be continued with names such as Stanislaw Ossowski, Jerzy Szacki, Wlodzimierz Wesolowski and Jerzy Wiatr. These names stand for the highly influential postwar generation of Polish sociologists. To give yet two other examples of the Polish specialty of combining the principles of the 'universal' and the 'native' productively in their academic careers, one could mention Zygmunt Bauman, who, after his forced emigration from Poland in the late 60s not only became famous among British, but also among European sociologists at large. One has to keep in mind, however, that in most of the cases mentioned above the orientation towards unversalism was not a pure act of voluntary choice, but an alternative forced upon Polish scholars under duress. The long tradition of openmindeness characteristic of Polish intellectuals eased their transformation from academic locals into genuine cosmopolitans. Polish sociologists are, perhaps, the only ones among European sociologists to deserve fully being called cosmopolitans. Kwasniewicz gives an impressive account of another paradox in Polish sociology. One of the most productive periods in Polish sociology started with the workers' uprising in 1956. Whereas the conditions of political suppression proved to be stimulating both for empirical research and theory-building, the new conditions of political freedom after 1989 have left Polish sociologists in a situation of disorientation and passivity, a situation similar to the one described by Kolosi and Szelenyi for Hungarian sociologists. After having lost its main target, the socialist regime, Polish sociologists also seem to have lost their critical impetus and with it their main motivational drive for scientific productivity. As Kwasniewicz emphasizes, it was typical of Polish sociologists working under socialist governments to combine a double role in their professional self-image. They were both academic researchers and social activists, taking an active stance in transforming Polish society on the basis of their sociological findings. In this double role they participated in transforming the Polish society into a democratic one. Since 1989, however, they find themselves, like their Hungarian colleagues, in a social situation in which the performance of their serviceminded professional role has lost its most fundamental precondition, namely the demand from a help-seeking client, i.e., the Polish society. The professional paradox in which Polish sociologists find themselves after 1989 is expressed by yet another specialty they developed under socialism. Kwasniewicz reports that Polish sociologists who acted in public were masters in performing 'Goffmanian strategies' of separating between front stage and Even today his name attracts the international sociological community, as the volume written in honour of the centenary of his birth manifests. See Dulczewski (1986).

20

Introduction

back stage, of developing a double morality between fake activities and private commitments, of speaking in double codes and reading between the lines. This capacity helped them not only to survive professionally and to have a certain political influence under socialism, but it also helped them to escape the trap of dogmatism. Among the Eastern European countries, Poland is perhaps the only one where a dogmatic approach to Marxist sociology has been avoided. The so-called guillotine of ideological thought prevented believers in Marxism from becoming full-fledged dogmatic Marxists. On the one hand, Marxist sociologists were controlled by official orthodox Marxists, on the other they were socially controlled by their academic colleagues. Witch-hunting procedures and ceremonies of purge which swept over the social sciences in the former GDR after the reunification of Germany, are unknown in post-revolutionary Poland. As Kwasniewicz reports, Marxism in Poland today is in a desolated state both theoretically and institutionally. One can only speculate about whether the new societal conditions are more favourable than under communism for reconstructing Marxism as a differentiated and critical social theory. It is to be hoped that contemporary Polish sociologists will be able to solve another paradox in the future and to repeat under the conditions of a society in transition to democracy the success story they had under different socialist governments. Not only the new emerging Polish society is dependent upon the insights produced by Polish sociologists, but also European sociology at large. It is to be hoped that the richness Polish sociologists have produced in sub-fields such as the sociology of nation-building and national integration, rural sociology, political sociology, sociology of education, just to mention a few, does not belong to the history of Polish sociology yet. One can only expect that Polish sociologists reassume their traditional service attitude towards their society and present themselves as analysts of democracies in transition. As such they would also do a service to sociology in advanced Western democracies, which are confronted with a number of problems similar to the ones of democracies in transition. 2.3 Part III: Two Views from Afar In Part Three we have invited two 'external' observers to comment upon the relationship between the sociological tradition of their country and European sociology, one scholar from Japan, Ken'ichi Tominaga, and another from the US, Lawrence A. Scaff. Ken'ichi Tominaga starts his observations with the hypothesis that Japan looked at European social sciences as an aid to the process of modernisation. The selective use Japanese sociologists, and intellectuals in general, made of European sociology helped them to meet the needs of modernisation of their own country during different periods of historical development. Tominaga's analysis of this

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shifting process of selective reception of the European tradition of sociology shows also the influence American sociology had in this process. Whereas European sociology was dominating the intellectual discourse in Japan before the Second World War, American social sciences took the lead and contributed to "internationalisation, integration, diversification, systematisation, and tendency towards practical use and precision" after the war. Surprisingly enough, the interest in authors such as Theodor Geiger did not weaken in the first wave of enthusiasm for American sociology. The hot debates on structural-functional theory, the Vietnam war and the students' revolution weakened the interest of Japanese intellectuals in American sociology, which in turn helped strenghtening the prewar orientation towards European sociology. Tominaga concludes with the hypothesis that the era of one-sided reception is over and that we will experience a two-way exchange between Japanese intellectuals and their European counterparts in the future. It is upon us Europeans to get used to the idea that our Japanese colleagues will play a more active role in international sociology. Lawrence A. Scaff comments upon European sociology from the American perspective. Author of the by now famous book Fleeing the Iron Cage (Scaff 1989), Scaff represents the second postwar generation of American sociologists who have found a source of inspiration in re-reading the European classics, among them especially Max Weber and Georg Simmel, and integrating them into the current discourse on sociology of culture in the US. In his contribution, Scaff deals with a double task. At first, he investigates the interrelations between European and American sociology in the last century. In the second, he enquires about the politics of science in both continents in the modern era of professionalisation and institutionalisation of science. In conclusion, he presents some provocative hypotheses about the future development of sociology after the political revolutions in Europe. Concerning his first question, about the reciprocal influences and comparative formation of the disciplines in Europe and the US, Scaff differentiates the usual picture about the "domination" of European by American sociology. He stresses that depending upon the historical situation and the unit of analysis under consideration there are good reasons to argue both for the thesis of an American domination and for the one about an early Europeanisation of American sociology. ScafTs intimate knowledge of the history of sociology in both continents permits him to show briefly and convincingly the various instances of reciprocal dynamics of the exchange process between European and American sociology. As an example he mentions the influence Weber had on Parsons, and Parsons in his turn on both Luhmann and Habermas. Scaff argues that this reciprocal dynamic flow not only holds true for the classics of sociology, but also for the exchange of personnel and sociological themes. In the second section, Scaff starts from the observation that the definition of the field of sociology today is as pluralistic as it was at the turn of the century.

22

Introduction

Given this internal diversity of sociology, is it justified at all, Scaff asks, to introduce into the debate another dimension, namely the dimension of European versus American sociology? Like Kwasniewicz he raises the question of whether the introduction of these dimensions implies an attack on sociology understood as a science having a "universally valid body of knowledge with unconditional agreement on fundamental concepts and research problems", a position represented for example by Neil J. Smelser. On the background of this ideal (universalistic) model of sociology as a generalising science of human behaviour, speaking of sociology in geographical terms is equal to introducing a particularistic dimension and thus deviating from the "universalistic" ideal of sociology as a generalising science. As Scaff puts it briefly, it means taking the position of a "particularistic 'Kulturwissenschaft'" against a "universalistic" sociology. In a truly European manner Scaff presents two "speculative" hypotheses about the future development of European sociology, linking the recent political changes in Europe to the development of sociology as a science: First, as "national, regional and cultural political identities reemerge in the new Europe, so one can expect a challenge to dispassionate universalism in the name of a more engaged and less constrained scientific questioning". The advocates of the "universalist" position might condemn this development "as regression", the advocates of "Kulturwissenschaft" may "welcome [it] as a rebirth of historical consciousness and a renewal of intellectual innovation". Scaff s second hypothesis is as provocative as his first one: "As Europe emerges in the 1990s in an altered form, a recombination of the new and the old, so we shall witness the 'return of grand theory' in sociology and the social sciences. As a concern for 'method' and 'technique' declines, so will the American grip on sociology". More specifically, Scaff prophesies a resurgence of research traditions based on the sociological works of Weber and Simmel which he identifies as another contribution of European sociology to the sociology in the US. Referring to the European political revolution of 1989 Scaff asks in conclusion: "Have we arrived at the point where a scientific revolution, a major paradigm shift, is in progress?" He himself is prepared "to answer the question affirmatively, ä propos of my two hypotheses, if we understand by 'revolution' a renewal of historical consciousness, cultural analysis, and Weberian and Simmelian theory". Like Münch, Scaff does not predict a unified European sociology, but a plurality of different 'sociologies' which reflect the internal political and cultural diversity of the new Europe itself. One could only add a fourth speculative hypothesis to the three already presented by Scaff and speculate about the likelihood of the "recipocal influence" of an internally differentiated European sociology upon American sociology. If the latter is not prepared to open the iron curtain of its present "self-protective professionalism" (Scaff) and take the risk of letting itself influenced by "the richness of theoretical alternatives and an acute consciousness of history"

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(which according to Scaff are attributes of European sociology as seen by American sociology), then the chain of reciprocal flow of influences is broken. It would have been interesting to include other non-European scholars and give their opinion on the relationship between the sociology of their own country and European sociology. The limited space of this volume, however, did not allow us to accept more articles. But the thoughtful insights of these two 'outside observers' permit us to conclude that the type of influence between intellectual disciplines in different continents is very often beyond the reach of the producers of science themselves. Political events sometimes seem to have a stronger and longer lasting influence upon shaping this relationship than 'scientific events'. It remains to be seen how future European sociology will use the revolutions of 1989 to revolutionise not only the various European national traditions but also the relationships between the different sociologies within Europe and between Europe and other continents.

References Albrow, M. 1990. Introduction. In M. Albrow and E. King (eds.), Globalization, Knowledge and Society, pp. 3-13. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London, New Delhi: Sage. Brzezinski, Z. 1989. Toward a Common European Home. Problems of Communism 38: 1-10. Dulczewski, Z. (ed.) 1986. Commemorative Book in Honor of Florian Znaniecki on the Centenary of his Birth. Poznan: The University of Poznan Press. Nedelmann, B. 1992. Profane und heilige 'Soziale Welt'. Soziologische Revue 15: 139-152. Nowotny, H. 1979. Kernenergie: Gefahr oder Notwendigkeit. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Scaff, L. A. 1989. Fleeing the Iron Cage. Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. Smelser, N. J. 1988. Introduction. In N. J. Smelser (ed.), Handbook of Sociology, pp. 9-19. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London, New Delhi: Sage. Smelser, N. J. 1990. Sociology's Next Decades: Centrifugality, Conflict, Accomodation. Cahiers de recherche sociologique 14: 35-49.

Parti Is there a European Sociology?

European Sociology: The Identity Lost? Raymond Boudon

I had originally planned to organise this essay as an answer to the nine-question questionnaire initially devised by the promoters of the project on European sociology. But I realised quickly that the questions were so important and challenging, that it was hardly possible to deal even in a sketchy fashion with more than a few of them. Finally, I decided to limit myself to an answer to the first question (on the identity of European sociology), complicated enough as it is with its two components. The question assumes namely that European sociology once had an identity and asks whether or not it has kept it. On the implicit first question, my opinion is that it has had a strong identity in the sense that the writings of the great European sociological masters include - in spite of the many differences between them - a common model as to what sociology is about and how it should proceed. This point is of course not new and is tacitly assumed by usual expressions as "the masters of sociology". But I have often had the feeling, when reading books or textbooks on the history or supposed substance of sociology, that the common element between the masters was actually hard to perceive from what was said about them and consequently that the essence of sociology which was supposedly to be drawn from their writings was, as in the case of the Arlesienne, not associated with existence. I had this feeling very strongly when I read among others R. Aron's book on Les etapes de la pensee sociologique (Aron 1983). The title indicates that sociology would be one ("la pensee") and announces that it would have been constructed by a sequence of discontinuous but cumulative individual contributions ("les etapes"). The substance of the book suggests for its part, however, that what we call sociology should rather be seen, in the nominalistic mode, as a heterogeneous aggregate composed of the highly idiosyncratic and incommensurable views of a sequence of masters from Montesquieu to Pareto. I failed even being convinced by T. Parsons that there is much in common between Dürkheim, Weber, Pareto (and A. Marshall). His dream of integrating these writers as the pioneers of economics failed. Few sociologists would probably deny it today. Nor was I convinced by Nisbet (1966) when he writes about the (singular) sociological tradition. Nisbet's main point is that classical sociologists share a common, basically conservative, view of society. Though interesting, this inter-

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European Sociology: The Identity Lost?

pretation is highly partial in the sense that it pays exclusively attention to the social-philosophical views of the classical masters and devotes no consideration to their contributions to the explanation of social phenomena. Moreover, it is highly controversial. It is hard to contend, for instance, that Tocqueville and Marx had much in common from this viewpoint. With an amount of temerity I am aware of, I will try in a few paragraphs to suggest that the old European masters had actually something very important in common which can be identified and described in a clear fashion. In a nutshell, they wanted to make sociology a genuine science and agreed basically on the means to reach this objective. Then, I will go to the point as to whether this golden age of identity has been preserved in our iron time.

1 On the Identity of European Sociology in the Classical Age Rarely, textbooks succeed in extracting the essence of sociology at the classical age. Instead of considering what the masters have done and achieved, they focus on the masters' declarations of what they have done and achieved, or they concentrate on their proclamations about what sociology should look like. Now, if we consider what, for instance, Dürkheim and Weber said (what sociology is all about and along which paths it should proceed), we quickly come to the evident impression that they had incommensurable views. Probably, they themselves shared this impression of incommensurability, and perhaps this is the reason why they never quoted each other (Hirschhorn 1988). But as soon as we look at what they did rather than said, we gain a very different impression. What did they do? Many analyses from Dürkheim, Weber and the other masters could be sampled in order to answer this question. Not without some arbitrariness, I will briefly consider an analysis by Dürkheim which, it seems to me, can easily be considered as an important achievement, his theory of magic. Once we extract the implicit epistemological and methodological principles contained in this particular analysis (as well as in the other most impressive analyses by Dürkheim) we get a curious impression, namely, that these principles overlap only to a weak extent with the official rules of the sociological method Dürkheim developed in his famous handbook. Although the explanation of this contradiction is not immediate, it is not difficult either. But I will leave this point aside for a while. The theory of magic Dürkheim develops sketchily in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) not only appears to be far away from his basic methodological principles generally associated with his name; his methodology is also very close to Weber's.

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According to this theory, one should, firstly take the fact seriously, that those who believe in magic have no knowledge of a number of theories that Westerners have developed after centuries. Secondly, everyday action needs theories and magic is a theory which provides guidelines to the actor. According to Dürkheim, magical theories would be applied theories derived more or less directly from religious theories, exactly as many of our technical devices result from inspirations we got through scientific theories. But showing that magic is inefficient, requires the mobilisation of methods of causal analysis which were developed by science. Of course, as they are false, magical beliefs are often contradicted by reality. But, writes Dürkheim, don't we observe that scientists not unfrequently keep intact their faith in a theory, even when it appears as contradicted by facts? Anticipating very precisely the ideas developed by classical or modern philosophers of science, such as Duhem, Kuhn or Lakatos, Dürkheim suggests that scientists have good reasons of doing so. They can always hope that minor changes in the theory will make it compatible with the facts; they can also doubt whether the facts that contradict the theory are genuine facts or whether they rather are artefacts. Moreover, a long time will often elapse before it can be ascertained which of these typical situations is created by the discovery of facts contradictory to the theory. As a consequence, in most cases it is as rational to try to save the theory as to try to replace it. For the same reasons, magicians can keep confidence in their theories even though they do not always work. Exactly as scientists, they devise without much difficulty auxiliary hypotheses to explain why the theory has failed: The rituals have not been conducted in the proper way; some unknown factors have thwarted the influence of the rituals, etc.. On the other hand, even in our world, where methods of causal analysis are well mastered, lots of people, and, among them, many scientists, appear as believing in all kinds of unconfirmed causal relations. Thus, many people see a causal link between all sorts of practices and state of health or length of life. The reasons for these beliefs lie simply in the fact that in such cases collinearity is often so powerful that it is practically impossible to check seriously whether or not χ has really an effect on y. Thus, it has been discovered recently after many years that the idea according to which stress would be a main cause of stomach ulcers is literally a magical belief (i.e., a belief in a false causal reationship). This magical belief was endorsed by many people, however, including many scientists. Dürkheim adds to his demonstration an additional, particularly subtle argument. Ethnologists have observed that rain rituals are celebrated during the rainseason or fecondity rituals in the love time. So, says Dürkheim, the confidence of the primitive in the effectiveness of their rituals is reinforced by the fact that rain is actually more frequent in the period of the year when crops start growing and need rain, and when they, consequently, celebrate these rituals. In other

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European Sociology: The Identity Lost?

words, Dürkheim's hypothesis is that collinearity would - occasionally at least - reinforce the magical causal beliefs of the primitive, i.e., that their causal assumptions would be confirmed by genuinely observable correlations. On the whole, Dürkheim suggests that the magical beliefs of the primitive are of the same nature as many of our own beliefs, the difference being that, because of the development of science, a number of old beliefs have become obsolete in modern societies. As a consequence, when we see other people still believing in them, we have a strong feeling of irrationality. But as soon as we evoke the causal relationships in which we believe ourselves, for instance on such existential problems as health, we become conscious of the fact that magical and scientific knowledge coexist as easily in our societies as technical and magical knowledge coexist in primitive societies. Max Weber wrote on his side that, to the primitive, "the actions of the rainmaker are exactly as magical as the actions of the firemaker" (Weber 1964: 317). By this aphoristic statement he meant that the primitives have no reason to introduce the asymmetry between rain- and firemaking which we introduce ourselves: The process by which kinetic energy is transformed into thermic energy is familiar to us, but not to them. Consequently, they have no reasons to see a basic difference between fire- and rainmaking. In summary, Weber's as well as Dürkheim's implicit diagnosis on magic is that the primitive should not be considered as less rational than ourselves. When they are confronted with existential problems, they develop theories and conjectures which they derive from the body of knowledge available to them. They are eventually ready to forget them as soon as they are offered better theories. But as long as these alternative theories are not available, they have also good reasons to believe even in theories which repeatedly fail - just as scientists do. Moreover, reality can reinforce rather than contradict their beliefs, even when these beliefs are false, as Dürkheim has noted in one of the most brilliant parts of his analysis of magic. What are the features common to Dürkheim's and Weber's analyses of magic and also, as I will try to suggest, if not maybe to all, at least to many of these analyses of the masters which are considered as powerful and convincing achievements? I will content myself with listing and commenting these features briefly. 1. As far as the objective of the analysis is concerned, it has the evident status of solving a puzzle: "How is it possible to believe in such causal relationships?", is the typical reaction of any observer confronted with magical beliefs. Actually, the explanation on magical beliefs is one of the few topics with which all the great social scientists dealt with: Marx, Dürkheim, η

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1 On the Identity of European Sociology in the Classical Age

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false or even ridiculous, obviously is a puzzle: On the very fact that false beliefs can be observed, little doubt can appear; but the explanation of this fact is far from evident. It is so far from being obvious that many social scientists decided, as Wittgenstein and Beattie, to solve the puzzle by treating magical beliefs as an illusion: They would only exist in the head of the observer (Wittgenstein 1967, Beattie 1964).3 The primitives themselves would not really believe that rain rituals bring rain. As Wittgenstein (1967: 237) puts it: "Die Magie aber bringt einen Wunsch zur Darstellung; sie äußert einen Wunsch". The puzzle is evidently not a mere curiosity. It is important in the sense that solving it brings evidently a better understanding about essential questions as the influence of the social context on thought or the functioning of thought; is logic time and context-dependent? Is there one logic or are there several logics? Why do errors about the world come about? Is there a common human nature? Here are some of the crucial questions a good analysis of magic can contribute to disentangle. In other words, analysing successfully the puzzle of magical thought contributes to giving an original answer to age old problems which were raised in the framework of philosophy before classical sociology went back to them with its own tools. So far about the objectives. As to the means to reach them, Dürkheim starts from the view - definitely confirmed by modern anthropologists - that magical beliefs do actually exist and are not a mere illusion of the observer. In advance, he refutes the idea that magical beliefs should be interpreted as the symbolic expression of wishes rather than as statements about the world. He also feels in deep disagreement with Levy-Bruhl's explanation (LevyBruhl 1938, 1949, 1960, 1963) according to which the primitive would have beliefs different from ours because logic would be context-dependent, probably (this is at least my guess), because this explanation is easy, ad hoc and circular. In other words, sociology should learn to distinguish between good und poor theories. I shall elaborate briefly on this point. Such ad hoc and circular explanations are often used by common sense because they are indispensable in everyday life: "You believe χ (a statement which I find extravagant), because you are stupid". "You believe that rain rituals bring rain, because you follow a logic different from mine". But if sociology wants to make itself legitimate, it should break with such 'explanations'. They are ad hoc (the supposed logic I generously grant to the primitive as well as to my neighbour is a fictitous entity I forge to the effect of eliminating the puzzle raised by magical beliefs or by a behaviour which I perceive as strange), circular (how can I convince myself of the existence of this hypothetical logic if not by the magical beSee my discussion of theories of magic in L'art de se persuader

(Boudon 1990a).

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European Sociology: The Identity Lost?

liefs which it supposedly explains?). As his discussion with Levy-Bruhl shows, Dürkheim is well aware of the fact that such explanations are unacceptable in a scientific analysis. A crucial feature of his blueprint for sociology is: Sociology as any other discipline should eliminate explanations of the vis dormitiva type for instance. They can have a function in everyday life, but they are unacceptable in science. If sociology is to create genuine knowledge and to gain independence from common-sensical explanations, it has to repudiate them. 6. The previous point is negative. It says what a good theory is not. But Dürkheim's example contains also implicit principles as to what a good theory is. Apparently he considers that a good theory of magic is a theory which is able to detect the understandable ("verständlich" in Weber's vocabulary) good reasons as to why, contrarily to the appearances, the primitive (or ourselves on other subjects) believe in false causal statements. The beliefs in magic are collective. Far from accounting for them with the help of the vague and confuse notion of "collective consciousness" he uses elsewhere (a notion which can easily appear as profound, probably because it is difficult to associate a precise meaning with it), Dürkheim explains them, however, by the reasons why social actors have to believe in them. Modern scientists have good reasons, says Dürkheim, to believe in false statements. So have the primitive. These reasons are actually of the same nature and are produced by the same mechanisms in the two cases, while the content of the beliefs varies understandably with the context. 7. Going an epistemological step further, we draw from Durkheim's analysis the view that a good theory is a theory which makes a collective phenomenon, as here magical beliefs, the product of individual understandable behaviours. Apparently, magical beliefs are puzzling and strange, i.e., as inspired by no reasons. In contrast to this current common-sensical assumption, Dürkheim suggests that they can be understood in the precise sense where reasons can be retrieved behind the beliefs in question and considered as their cause. In a word, a good theory is a theory which sees the reasons of the actors as the ultimate cause of any collective phenomenon. Needless to say, these reasons are context-dependent. 8. The previous criteria are the main internal criteria of a good theory. I do not insist on the other often mentioned fact that Dürkheim attached a great importance to external (Popperian) criteria as well. In a nutshell, a good theory is a theory which is as far away as possible from adhoceity. While an ad /ioc-theory is a theory which explains only the phenomenon it is supposed to explain, a good theory is a theory which has the capacity of explaining an important number of facts, including facts yet unknown. In this sense, Durkheim's theory of magic can be considered as a great success. A contemporary work, such as K. Thomas' book on magic in England (Thomas 1973), can be held as a historical parametrisation, an illustration or an appli-

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cation of Dürkheim's theory. The importance attached by Dürkheim to the point of avoiding adhoceity has been well seen by the articles produced by the Columbia school on Suicide (see e.g., Selvin 1958). 9. On the whole, Dürkheim's analyses suggest that a social-scientific theory is good exactly for the reasons for which a natural-scientific theory is good. There is no difference in the set of criteria thanks to which their validity is appreciated. Of course, there is a basic ontological difference between the objects of the former and of the latter, since social actors should not be seen as determined in a naturalistic fashion (Dürkheim always insisted on their autonomy). But this does not imply that the scientific style should be different in the natural and in the social sciences. 10. According to his theory of magic, the content of the beliefs held by social actors varies with the context, not their form, less pedantically: Not the basic mechanisms responsible for the beliefs. So, Dürkheim's analysis includes a sophisticated view of determinism in the social sciences. Social actors do not choose their environment (e.g., they do not choose to be born in a society where physics in the Western sense is unknown). But they should be seen by the sociologist as having reasons, given the context, to do what they do or to believe what they believe. In spite of his evolutionism, Dürkheim considers, as has been well seen by Horton (Horton and Finnegan 1973), that if the social context of the primitive is different from ours, we are not different from them. The existence of a human nature, of a universal logic is responsible for the fact that we can 'understand' actors belonging to a different context. In a word, we discover behind Dürkheim's analysis three interrelated features: A reaction against a naturalistic conception of determinism, the postulate that behaviour is understandable, and the conviction that a main task of the sociologist is to understand the reasons behind the behaviours and beliefs of the actors. This is a basic metaphysical point: The social context should be considered as having the capacity of parametrising human nature, not of abolishing it. On this point, Dürkheim is as Weber, Kantian rather than Lockean. To summarise: Sociology has to solve puzzles (rather than to force open doors) thanks to models where the social actor is conceived as having reasons to do what he does and to believe what he believes. A major task of the sociologist is consequently to understand these reasons, while common-sensical sociology does not see any reasons behind behaviour and beliefs, and prefers obscure assumptions, for instance of the vis dormitiva type. With this principles in mind, the sociologist can build theories with a genuine cognitive value, exactly like those produced by any truly scientific discipline. To this effect, he will submit them to the set of external and internal criteria which are currently used by natural sciences. There is, on the whole, no specificity of the sociological criteria as to how a theory can be judged good or bad.

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Of course, this methodology is not the one which is presented in the Rules and which is commented in classrooms. The conception of sociology I have described is not the one Dürkheim advocated, but the one he practised effectively. Would it be the first time, however, that somebody does not do what he says, and does not say what he does? I am not saying that Dürkheim was unsincere. With him as with all of us, his self was rather multiple: When he wrote a treatise as to how sociology should be scientific, he took naturally his inspiration from the philosophers whom he respected most, A. Comte and J. Stuart Mill, and developed a narrow positivistic programme for sociology. In his major analyses however, he appears as epistemologically closer to Duhem and Weber and uses implicitly a much more sophisticated view of science. If one does not suppose that he had in mind, in a metaconscious fashion, this conception which I have tried to summarise by my ten points, it is hard to understand his rejection of the other major theories of magic (magical beliefs are a mere illusion in the head of the observer; they are the product of a supposed mentalite primitive). Probably because most of us have the same points in mind, we tend to consider Dürkheim's theory of magic as definitely better than its competitors. It is naturally used in the best theoretical (as Levi-Strauss') and empirical studies (as Thomas') about magic. It would be easy to show that the theory of magic, far from being an exception, is on the contrary typical of Dürkheim's work. I have attempted this exercise elsewhere (Boudon 1989). Thus, the correlation between the cycles of suicide and business cycles is well a puzzle: More suicides tend to be observed toward the peak of the cycle, when the economic situation is better. Whether this fact itself is controversial or not is another matter. But it is clear that the correlation goes against our expectations. Dürkheim shows that this collective phenomenon is the product of individual behaviours which can be explained by reasons. In a situation of risk and uncertainty, actors tend to look for devices to reduce uncertainty. Of course, these devices have to be accessible and as valid as possible. For this reason, extrapolation from the present to the future is currently used by actors. But such extrapolations lead to overoptimistic predictions and expectations in the second phase of the business cycle (while it leads to underoptimistic expectations in the first phase, before the inflection point). In its simplicity, this theory contains a spur of genius. But my point is that behind this analysis, one finds the model I described earlier with its ten idealtypical features. It is not necessary to spend much time to show, that this model is to be found in Weber's best analyses as well. There is much more congruence in the case of Weber than in the one of Dürkheim between what he said and what he did. The basic ten-point model can be found, for instance, in Weber's article on the Protestant sects in America (Weber 1920). At the occasion of a travel to the US, Weber wonders why Americans appear as so religious. The US are the most industrialised and modern nation. According to a law developed by most sociologists from Comte and Dürkheim to Tönnies, modernisation leads to an erosion

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of traditional religious beliefs. Now, this erosion has not occurred in the case of the US. The question appears as a puzzle: Finding a convincing answer to it, is far from evident. Weber's explanation can be summarised in the following fashion: 1. In many respects the US are different from modern European countries, such as Germany and France. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the stratification symbols are less codified and visible. This is simply the consequence of the fact that the US have never known a traditional legally enforced system of stratification. The first new nation has been impregnated by an egalitarian ideology and social mobility is moreover greater in the US than in Europe. At any rate, the myth according to which mobility is possible and should be aimed at is a powerful one in the US, while, as the nineteenth century European literature abundantly shows, mobility tends to be perceived in the old European nations as difficult and going against the natural order of things (see for instance Rubempre's figure in Balzac's and Sorel's in Stendhal's work). 2. From a religious viewpoint, France und Germany are characterised by the existence of a dominant incorporated church, the US by a proliferation of sects. This difference can also be easily explained by historical reasons. 3. As any other society, the US is a stratified society. For historical reasons which are easy to understand, the elites tend to be protestant. This results essentially from the fact that the earliest immigrants were protestant. 4. Impersonal exchanges are dominant in modern societies (in Parsonian language, universalistic exchanges are dominant). 5. For these exchanges to work smoothly, the exchange participants A and Β must know to which extent they can have confidence in one another. More generally, A and Β must have some representation and be able to have some anticipation of the other's behaviours, attitudes, etc.. In traditional societies, the exchanges are regulated by direct interpersonal knowledge. In modern societies, this resource is in most cases unavailable. In France or Germany (it must not be forgotten that we are at the beginning of the century), stratification symbols recommend themselves for this role of functional substitutes of direct knowledge, while these stratification symbols are less usable in the US. Because of the high correlation between rank in the stratification system and religious affiliation, religious symbols will then naturally play in the US the role played by stratification symbols in the European societies. 6. The fact that American protestantism is composed of sects generates a high level of competition between them. The sects understand that they are in a position of delivering certificates of honourability or of social 'importance' which can make the life of those who have them easier. For these reasons, the religious sects play a crucial role in everyday life.

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European Sociology: The Identity Lost?

In summary, the structure of Weber's theory is the following: Listing the relevant structural differences between the US on the one hand, and France or Germany on the other, showing that these differences generate differences in behaviour: The stratification symbols here, the religious symbols there, catalyse impersonal relationships; showing that impersonal relationships tend to generate the mobilisation of anticipations which can be regulated by direct knowledge, but is more likely regulated by impersonal knowledge in universalistic societies; showing that the structural variables place the religious sects in the position of suppliers of demanded symbolic goods and generate a process of competition between them. On the whole, this ingenious explanation has the same formal epistemological features as Dürkheim's example. It starts from an authentic puzzle: In the methodological parlance, the religiosity of the US is a deviant case. The theory explains the aggregate phenomenon by making it the consequence of good reasons from the part of social actors. The theory is not ad hoc, nor circular. It is good according to Laudanian-Popperian criteria. It is an excellent example where the natural spontaneous ad hoc and circular explanations, for instance, by the 'national character' are substituted by a genuine scientific explanation. I have taken these two examples to show that, in practise if not in theory, the masters use in their best analyses one and the same idealtypical epistemologicometaphysical model (metaphysical since it includes statements on human nature notably). I could as easily take many examples from Tocqueville (see the way he explains the underdevelopment of French agriculture at the end of the eighteenth century or the difference in the style of the intellectual production between France and England [Tocqueville 1955; Boudon 1981a]), from Pareto (see the way he explains why false arguments can normally be perceived as valid [Pareto 1968]), from Simmel (see the way - close to Durkheim's - in which he explains the diffusion of the notion of "soul" or in quite another context the devastating historical effects produced by the change in the mode of payment of the ground rent, or in intellectualisation of life by the diffusion of money [Simmel 1900]). Also, I could have taken Marx' analyses (see, e.g., his explanation as to how and why workers accept exploitation under capitalism, or of the breakdown of feudalism [Marx 1962, 1936]). Of course, I could also have borrowed many additional examples from Dürkheim and Weber. From Weber, I could have taken practically all his analyses in the sociology of religion. Thus, he explains why the cult of Mithra was popular among Roman, or free-masonry among Prussian civil servants using the methodology of the ten-point model (Boudon 1986, 1988). As I have scrutinised the examples from a methodological standpoint elsewhere, I will content myself to refer the reader to these analyses. An additional point should be added. In the explanatory-puzzle-solving part of their work, the pioneers of sociology had a sound idea as to what a scientific 'theory' is about. In modern language, their theories are "generative models", i.e., sets of acceptable interrelated statements from which consequences are prop-

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erly deduced which should be congruent with states of the world. All the theories I have just referred to are generative models in this sense. But "scientific theory" can also mean: General ideas or orientations facilitating the building of generative models. The notions of "anomie" or of "egoism" are theories in this second (broad) sense. They constitute a kind of red thread thanks to which Dürkheim has developed many fruitful theories (in the narrow sense). Thus, these notions led him to a convincing explanation as to why rates of suicide increase during economic and decrease during political crises - certainly a puzzling fact. In a word, the sociological classics had the same notion of what theorising means as, say, a Huygens (Pawson 1989).

2 Classical European Sociology: A Multidimensional Programme I recognise that, beside these puzzle-solving analyses, classical sociology contains other dimensions as well. Thus, a prophetic or, more precisely, a philosophy-of-history (in the German nineteenth century sense of this expression) dimension; this prophetic dimension is of course present in Marx, but also in Pareto, Weber or Dürkheim. The notions of "Entzauberung", of the "rationalisation" or of the "increasing anomie" of modem societies betoken the presence of this dimension in Weber's and Dürkheim's work. In most textbooks on Weber, Dürkheim and, evidently, Marx, the discussion of this philosophy-ofhistory dimension is the most developed; as though there was no distinction between philosophy of history and sociology; as though Weber, Dürkheim and Pareto had been social and historical philosophers before being sociologists. Textbooks are full of considerations about what "anomie" or "Entzauberung" really mean and whether anomie or rationalisation really increase, but they rarely offer detailed analyses of, say, Weber's article on the Protestant sects or on Dürkheim's theory of magic, in spite of the fact that these two pieces among others - solve big puzzles and have tremendously important philosophical implications. After all, Weber's analysis suggests that traditional religions can be at home in modern industrialised societies, a point which we have discovered recently against the traditional view according to which modernity and religion would be incompatible. On his side, Dürkheim (who was definitely an evolutionist) suggests against evolutionism in his analysis of magic that magical beliefs are not typical of primitive societies (Horton and Finnegan 1973) or that universal mental mechanisms can be detected behind beliefs in false causal statements. In a word, Weber's or Durkheim's (or Pareto's or Marx', etc.) works appear to me as philosophically more relevant by their scientific dimension than by their explicitly philosophical one.

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Though I do not want to introduce a hierarchy between the explanatory ("Erklärung") and the interpretative ("Auslegung") side of Weber's or Dürkheim's works, I think that, if these works were reduced to their views on modernity, they would be as forgotten today as the many essayists who have written on the same subjects along the same lines at the same time. In other words, the fact that the pioneers of sociology are discussed for their historical-philosophical writings should not obscure the fact that they are actually considered as important because of their many ingenious scientificexplanatory analyses on suicide, religion, authority and many other social phenomena. Their legitimacy comes from one dimension of their work, but their audience comes from another. Why? Simply because the essence of modernity is of direct immediate existential interest to many people, more than the reasons as to why the primitive believe in magic for instance. I know that many people would not accept the distinction between the scientific-explanatory-"Erklärung" dimension and the interpretative-"Auslegung" dimension which I introduce here. But on this point we can follow Simmel's lead. In his Problems of the Philosophy of History (Simmel 1977), he suggests rightly that, while some of the questions raised by historians and social scientists cannot possibly get an objective unique answer, others can. Thus, it is equally possible to interpret a given historical period as a period of decay or as a period of progress. An interpretation of this type can be more interesting or better conducted than another. In general, it will be impossible to prove or even to say that one of the interpretations is true while the other is false. On the other hand, however, questions such as, "Is χ a cause of _y?" can, at least in principle, get objective answers exactly to the same extent in sociology or history as, say, in physics. The fact that the textbooks on the sociological masters devote generally much attention to the interpretative side of their works, to their 'Weltanschauungen', explains also why they give so easily the impression that classical sociology has no real unity and that it is a mere rhapsody of idiosyncratic incommensurable worldview: That classical sociology would have the type of unity of presocratic philosophy rather than, say, of classical physics or economics. From a socialand historical-philosophical viewpoint, de Tocqueville and Marx are certainly as far away from one another as Permenides and Heraclit, while methodologically they are much closer. At any rate, these idiosyncratic worldviews should not lead us to forget that the classical masters have also begun to realise their explicit ambition: Establishing sociology as a scientific discipline, i.e., as a discipline following the same basic objectives and procedures as the natural sciences: Solving puzzles, preferably important and interesting ones, with the help of internally and externally valid generative models.

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3 Has European Sociology Preserved its Identity? My theses in the previous pages can be summarised by the following statements: 1. Classical sociology is multidimensional, including as well the ten-point programme (in the Lakatosian sense of this word) as others. 2. Among these other dimensions, the 'philosophy-of-history programme' was particulary important. 3. However, while it is dominant in the sociology of Comte, it is not with the other masters. 4. Other types of programmes which I have not evoked earlier could be evoked. I will briefly comment on this last point. Thus, as far as French sociology is concerned, Le Bon or Levy-Bruhl do not follow the classical mainstream programme (CMP) I have described. Le Bon's sociology is essayistic and literary. It had a great success, because it had the power typical, as L. F. Celine rightly said, of good literary products: to arouse emotions. The causes of Le Bon's success are similar to those explaining the success of a Elias Canetti in our time. Neither Le Bon nor Canetti have increased our knowledge about crowd phenomena nor about any social phenomena. But the works they have written about crowd and other types of social phenomena are able to create emotions. One could even go a step further about this distinction. While the main objective of scientific work is the growth of knowledge (contrarily to what a Feyerabend would like us to believe [Boudon 1990a]), a good literary work gives the reader or listener the feeling of teaching him what he had always known. The case of Levy-Bruhl (not the 'late', the Levy-Bruhl of the carnets [1949], but the 'early' one, the Levy-Bruhl of the mentalite primitive [I960]) is more complicated. There is a strong 'philosophy-of-history dimension' in his work. One reason of his large audience in his time came from the fact that he gave to many people the impression that he had demonstrated supposedly in a scientific fashion (i.e., with the help of ethnological hard facts) the validity of evolutionism in general and of the evolutionist theory proposed by Comte in particular. We can also note ironically that, after a period of purgatory, Levy-Bruhl has been rediscovered in the English-speaking world and is venerated today for reasons contrary to the reasons for which he was venerated in France in the early decades of the twentieth century. So, to a Needham, Levy-Bruhl is an important pioneer because he discovered that logic and the rules of thought, far from being universal, are context-dependent (Needham 1972), in other words, because he would be the father of relativism. Levy-Bruhl drew actually his inspiration from Comte's law of the three states and he had consequently no doubt that our logic is better than the rules constituting the "mentalite prelogique", as his very vocabulary betokens.

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What this discussion shows is that Levy-Bruhl's audience was due, in France in the early twentieth century as in the English-speaking world now, to its congruence with ideological views (positivism then, relativism now). However, he was seen in these two cases as having proved demonstratively or scientifically (with the help of hard facts) the truth of evolutionary positivism or alternatively of non-evolutionary anti-positivistic relativism. So, sociology in the classical period included many styles or programmes: The CMP, but also, as in the case of Le Bon, 'literary sociology' or, as in the case of the 'early' Levy-Bruhl, what I would call 'ideological sociology with the attributes of science', as well as still other styles. But there is little doubt that the CMP was dominant and that the list of pioneers on which there is a unanimous agreement today overlaps the list of those who contributed a great deal to the CMP, even though their work contains other dimensions. My final point will be to suggest in a tentative fashion that the CMP which was dominant during the classical era and common to all masters (with the exception of Comte, to whom Dürkheim felt so close, but from whom he was so far) seems to me far from dominant now. In fact, all styles and paradigms appear today as represented on a more or less egalitarian basis. On the side of the objectives, solving puzzles is far from being a dominant activity. This objective appeared probably as evident to Tocqueville as well as to Marx or Weber because of what can be called its tautological character. Explaining is the essential goal of any scientific activity. On the other side, it is evident that explaining what common sense can easily explain cannot be an objective for science and that the explanation of many social phenomena can very often be easily drawn from our common-sensical everyday social experience. Spencer wrote rightly in his four-volume work on basic sociology that the effects of social class on modes of behaviour are so evident that devoting more than five lines to this topic would be a waste of time. This trend of contemporary sociology toward what I would call programmatic entropy can be explained by a set of factors: intellectual factors (the popularisation of a number of diffuse philosophical and ideological worldviews); institutional factors; and morphological factors intrinsic to the sociological community. I will content myself with a sketchy devolopment on these points. As regards the intellectual factors, several more or less widespread ideological worldviews can be identified, which have inspired a number of sociological currents and contributed to the erosion of the CMP. Thus, an influent though declining ideological view, derived from a first degree reading of the first pages of The German Ideology sees common sense as basically impregnated by false consciousness. This view appears naturally as bizarre to many people. Personally, I always perceived it as strange. But diffuse vulgar first-degree Marxism

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has been so widespread among sociologists in the last decades that it was often perceived by them as a dogma.4 Now, this viewpoint has the evident consequence of destroying any distinction between puzzles and non-puzzles. Since common sense and common experience generate distorted pictures of all social phenomena, the sociologist is qualified to discover the truth about all social phenomena. He will likely, however, pay a particular attention to class domination, i.e., to the basic mechanism responsible for this universal distortion. As a consequence of the influence of vulgar Marxism, sociology became for a while and for one part not only strongly ideological - a point I need not to develop given its obviousness - but also unable to distinguish between real and pseudo puzzle. Following relativism, another widespread ideological view, knowledge and objectivity would be mere illusions. According to this view, the only true theory would be that there is no truth. This philosophy was advocated from Antiquity. But today, many sociologists appear as convinced that the contemporary sociology of science would have demonstrated scientifically that neither science nor any other type of knowledge can be objective, nor lead to any solid knowledge. This view leads to the obvious consequence that the very idea of explaining a phenomenon in a unique objective way is a mere illusion. Phenomena, as artistic works, could be interpreted, but not explained. Moreover, any interpretation should be considered as good, the only requirement addressed to it being a certain amount of coherence. Needless to say, this view is incompatible with the CMP. On the whole, these two examples suggest that several contemporary diffuse, but widespread philosophical and ideological views facilitate the production of sociological works, the basic objective of which cannot possibly be of gaining more genuine knowledge about puzzling phenomena. Beside these ideological views, other factors play a role in the relegation of the CMP programme and in increasing the diversity and possibly the heterogeneousness and anarchy of contemporary European sociological production. These factors can be called institutional, since they refer to global trends in institutions or quasi-institutions. One of these factors is the tremendous development of what Schumpeter (1954) christened the cameral sciences. Since the end of the Second World War, sociology has known an evolution similar to the one he so brilliantly described in the case of economics. The increase in the power of the state, in its need for prediction and regulation has tremendously enhanced its need for data. Hence, more and more demographers or economists spent more and more time gathering data. Data in this case are the means not of explanation,

Diffuse vulgar Marxism appears as vanishing in Western Europe after having been very popular, while it seems to remain to some extent fashionable in the US (see e.g., R. Collins' work).

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but of policy making. In other words, they are a means for policy-makers and a goal for cameral social scientists. As new sectors (such as education, welfare, deviance, public health, development of modern sources of energy, mass culture, etc.), traditionally covered by sociology, gained in socio-political importance, the same causes produce in this discipline the same effects as in economics: An increasing number of sociologists became increasingly involved in cameral or descriptive sociology. Explaining phenomena became to them a bed time activity, while they were essentially busy producing data. The intellectual influence of this cameral style of sociology can be measured by the fact that data analysis has taken the status of a full fledged discipline (institutionalised in curricula, with its specialists and textbooks). Now, data analysis is a purely descriptive activity. Thus, reorganising data in a factorial space helps mastering or summarising data, evidently not explaining phenomena. On the whole, beside the activity, basic in the CMP model, of explaining phenomena, we observe now in sociology the development of a socially probably more important activity, namely, analysing data. Naturally, 'data analysis' has little to do with the normal scientific activity when it is considered as self-sufficient. This point can be realised with the help of a simple mental experiment. Speaking of Huygens or Einstein as data analysts rather than scientists produces immediately a comical effect. When he wrote about the cameral sciences, Schumpeter evoked the idea of sciences oriented toward the satisfaction of the state's need for informations. The state is not the only social institution or organisation with an urgent need for data, however. Pressure and interest groups, voluntary associations, social movements, ideological groups, etc. have also a growing need for data. No 'serious' political debate can be held about crime, deviance, group preferences, inequality etc., without data. While not a long time ago protagonists being confronted with each other in a typical political debate used to exchange arguments, they have a tendency nowadays to exchange contradictory data. This trend has also increased the cameral dimension of the social sciences. A great part of their production is devoted to meeting the need for data not anly of the state, but also (to use Hegel's vocabulary) of the civil society. I will not spend much time on another institutional factor, namely, the influence of the media. It is evident that the media contribute to reinforce the cameral side of sociology (raw data are essential to the media, certainly more than theories or explanations) and also its aesthetic side (obviously a good movie on magic is more likely to attract a large audience than the most lively presentation of Durkheim's theory of magic). In this category of the institutional factors, I will also evoke rather than develop another important point: The increasing diversity of sociology on the one hand, its success in the media, the civil society and the state, its institutionalisation throughout the world, the quantitative increase of the sociological commu-

References

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nity on the other, make that sociology looks more solid and is certainly socially more visible now than in the heroic era of the pioneers. However, it is at the same time intellectually Balkanised. There are many indications pointing into this direction. One of them (which could lead to a long development of its own) is the semantical anarchy which characterises the use of many concepts in the sociological community. Even such a crucial concept as "theory" for instance, which in the natural sciences and in the CMP has a clear stable meaning, always more or less directly related to the basic notion of generative model, has an impressive number of heterogeneous meanings in sociology. The polysemy, which I cannot document here, is a precious indicator of the fact that contemporary European sociologists are socially well, but intellectually ill integrated (Boudon 1980, 1981b, 1988, 1990b, 1990c). Finally, I will content myself with mentioning an important morphological factor. The mechanical trend towards an always increasing division of labour is another important cause of this weak integration of modern European sociology. As well seen by Dürkheim, this trend can very well produce anomie rather than integration, barrenness rather than fruitfulness. While the classics belonged to no community, but had a common programme and project (the CMP) in spite of all their differences, modern European sociologists belong to a numerous community and have a definite community feeling, but no clearly-defined common programme and project. References Aron, R. 1983. Les etapes de la pensee sociologique. Paris: Gallimard. Beattie, J. 1964. Other Cultures. London: Cohen & West. Boudon, R. 1980. The Freudian-Marxian Structuralist (FMS) Movement in France: Variations on a Theme by Sherry Turckle. Revue Tocqueville 6: 5-24. Boudon, R. 1981a. The Logic of Social Action. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Boudon, R. 1981b. L'intellectuel et ses publics: les singularities fran^aises?. In J. D. Reynaud et Y. Grafmeyer (eds.), Frangais qui etes-vous?, pp. 465-480. Paris: La Documentation Franchise. Boudon, R. 1984. La place du desordre. Paris: Presses Universitäres de France. [English translation: Theories of Social Change. London: Polity Press 1986.] Boudon, R. 1986. L'ideologic. Paris: Fayard. [English translation: The Analysis of Ideology. London: Polity Press 1988.] Boudon, R. 1988. L'intellectuel et ses marches. In Encyclopaedia Universalis, pp. 331-334. Paris: Encyclopaedia Universalis. Boudon, R. 1989. Subjective Rationality and the Explanation of Social Behavior. Rationality and Society 1: 173-196.

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Boudon, R. 1990a. L'art de se persuader. Paris: Fayard. [English Translation: London: Polity Press. Forthcoming.] Boudon, R. 1990b. Les intellectuels et le second marche. Revue europeenne des sciences sociales 28: 89-104. Boudon, R. 1990c. Scienziati e intrattenitori. Gli intellettuali e il mercato della communicazione. II Mulino 39: 197-213. Dürkheim, Ε. 1912. Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse. Paris: Alcan. [English translation: The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. London: Allen & Unwin 1965.] Hirschhorn, Μ. 1988. Max Weber et la sociologie frangaise. Paris: Harmattan. Horton, R. and R. Finnegan 1973. Modes of Thought. London: Faber. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1938. L'experience mystique et les symboles chez les primitifs. Paris: Alcan. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1949. Les carnets de Levy-Bruhl. Paris: Presses Universitäres de France. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1960. La mentalite primitive. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1963. L'äme primitive. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Marx, K. 1936. The Poverty of Philosophy. New York: International Publishers. Marx, K. 1962. Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, vol. 1. In K. Marx, Marx-Engels-Werke, vol. 23. Berlin: Dietz. Needham, R. 1972. Belief, Language and Experience. Oxford: Blackwell. Nisbet, R. 1966. The Sociological Tradition. Glencoe, III.: Free Press. Pareto, V. 1968. Traite de sociologie generale. Geneva and Paris: Droz. Pawson, R. 1989. Measure for Measures. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Schumpeter, J. 1954. History of Economic Analysis. London: Allen & Unwin. Selvin, H. C. 1958. Durkheim's Suicide and Problems of Empirical Research. American Journal of Sociology 63: 607-619. Simmel, G. 1900. Philosophie des Geldes. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Simmel, G. 1977. The Problems of the Philosophy of History. New York: Free Press. Thomas, K. 1973. Religion and the Decline of Magic. Harmonds worth: Penguin. Tocqueville, A. de. 1955. Old Regime and the French Revolution. New York: Doubleday. Weber, M. 1920. Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des Kapitalismus. In M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionsoziologie, vol. 1, pp. 207-236. Tübingen: Mohr. Weber, M. 1964. Typen religiöser Vergemeinschaftungen (Religionssoziologie). In M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 317-488. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch. Wittgenstein, L. 1967. Bemerkungen über Frazer's The Golden Bough. Synthese 17: 233-253.

The Contribution of German Social Theory to European Sociology Richard Münch

1 US Hegemony after the Second World War: The Americanisation of European Social Theory World sociology has been dominated by American sociology since the Second World War. American sociology itself was shaped by the rise and fall of structural functionalism of the Mertonian and Parsonian type in the first two decades after the war (Merton [1949] 1968; Parsons [1937] 1968, 1951, 1967, 1977, 1978). Both of them drew upon European sources, Merton upon the British anthropologists Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown in addition to Dürkheim; Parsons upon Marshall, Pareto, Dürkheim, and Weber (for details see Münch 1987, 1988). In doing so, they assimilated European social theory to genuine American thought. Merton ([1949] 1968) revised the functionalism of the British anthropologists which was adequate for the closed and uniform systems of primitive societies in order to apply it to the pluralist and open nature of American society. This is why he replaced the postulates of functional unity, functional universalism and functional necessity by his model of the net balance of functions and dysfunctions of a social unit for the individuals and groups which participate in that unit and are affected by it in order to explain its existence. He also revised Dürkheim's theory of anomie which explained the breakdown of social order in the transformation of European societies from traditional structures to industrial dynamics. For Merton the permanently anomic state of American society, which proclaims wealth for anybody, but does not open up ways to that wealth for everybody, explains the highest rates of deviant behaviour in the lower class. Parsons ([1937] 1968) not only discovered but also constructed a synthesis of the European traditions of positivism and idealism in the works of Marshall, Pareto, Dürkheim, and Weber and integrated utility, power, norms, and ideas into one theoretical scheme (Münch 1987, 1988). The American idea of a society based on the consensus regarding the values of individual achievement, equal opportunity, voluntary association, and the rational mastery of the world lay at the bottom of his claim that it is value-consensus rather than individual utility or power which constitutes the basis of social order. In this process he

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narrowed down the variety of European social theory because his synthesis did not cover the whole range of possible social realities to which the diverging social theories in Europe were addressing themselves. When structural functionalism was attacked in the late 1950s and the 1960s the critiques drew upon the greater sharpness and distinctness of European social theories, but also upon genuine American sources, placing power and conflict, individual utility calculation, meaning-construction or symbolic interaction at the centre of social life. Coser (1956, 1967), Dahrendorf (1958a, 1958b), and later on Collins (1975) revitalised European conflict theory from Marx to Pareto, Weber and Simmel; Homans (1961, 1974) revitalised the economic theory of neo-classical thought; Garfinkel (1967) revitalised phenomenology by turning it into ethnomethodology; Blumer (1969) revitalised American pragmatism by developing symbolic interactionism from Mead's work; C. Wright Mills (1956, 1959), Gouldner (1971, 1980), and Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1984) revitalised Marxism by building up conflict theory and world systems theory. However, they all related this variety of theories to American thought and reality, which involved an Americanisation of European social theory similar to what Merton and Parsons had already carried out. Particularly the microsociological reaction against Parsons promoted by Homans' exchange theory, Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, Blumer's symbolic interactionism and Collins' conflict theory can be seen as a reflection of the American self-image in sociological theory. The social world is portrayed as being made up of the voluntary acts of negotiating and cooperating individuals which occur at every moment in life (see on this Münch 1986a). The Marxism of C. Wright Mills, Gouldner and Wallerstein is also adapted to American thought. Instead of dialectics and theories of developmental logic we see more empirical studies of the power elite in American society, of conflict in opposition to consensus and of the exploitation of Third World countries by the industrial superpowers. American sociology of these various types converges in its preoccupation with empirical studies according to approved quantitative or qualitative methods, and with not constructing theory for its own sake and in discursive relationship to other theories but for the sake of guiding empirical investigations. Theory develops in relatively close correspondence to empirical analysis. This is why Parsons' analytical theory-construction remained alien to the normal American sociologist and was adapted to the demands of empirical investigations by most of his students. Even he himself felt compelled to demonstrate the empirical relevance of his theory. In terms of content, American social theory is a reflection of American thought and its relationship to American reality, which do not correspond to the whole variety of thought and reality in the different European countries. The emphasis remains on the construction of the social world by more or less powerful individuals and groups. The greater convergence and lesser variety of methodologies, metatheories, and theories in American sociology is also due to the establishment of a unified national discourse, the differ-

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entiation of sociology from other disciplines and the professionalisation of sociology with well-equipped leading departments and journals. The effect is a high level of standardisation as demonstrated in an exemplary way by the uniform standard article published in the American Sociological Review. There is little space for the extraordinary, whether in the negative or in the positive sense.

2 The Revitalisation of European Social Theory European sociology is still less differentiated from other disciplines, particularly less differentiated from philosophy. Social theory develops with more pronounced relationship to philosophical ideas than to empirical sociology. This is particularly true of German social theory, and partly of French social theory which differentiates into philosophical and sociological theories of society. It is less true of British social theory. Furthermore, language barriers help to maintain different national discourses, and there is less professionalisation of the discipline. This all works against standardisation and encourages the maintenance of greater diversity. With Europe's rise to the level of one of three superpowers in the world, with the growing exchange and communication now taking place within Europe, and with the competition between its sociology and American sociology on a world market in the field, there will be pressures towards professionalisation and standardisation in European sociology. Because of its greater diversity it can be more creative than American sociology. It draws upon a greater variety of ideas. This gives European sociology a good chance of being able to challenge the American hegemony in world sociology at the turn from the twentieth to the twenty-first century. The question I want to ask in this situation is what characteristic contributions the various European traditions of social theory can make to the pool of ideas upon which European sociology will draw in its further development. For reasons of space I can give only an idea of the characteristically British and French contributions to social theory in order to contrast my interpretation of the characteristically German contribution to them (for more details see Münch 1986b, 1986c, 1988, 1992). 2.1 British Social Theory: Class, Solidarity, and Conflict The early liberalism, evolutionism and utilitarianism which shaped the emergence of British sociology in the work of Herbert Spencer ([1897-1906] 1975) did not last long into the twentieth century. Sociology was not established as a distinct discipline before the end of the Second World War. In the postwar period British sociology developed in correspondence with the labour movement. As such, social theory portrayed society as a class hierarchy and societal development as being shaped by class conflict and power. The power of a class is rooted

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in its solidarity and it is called forth in the struggle for its fair share in the prosperity of society. This power struggle goes on within the framework of the shared belief that each class within society has to have its proper share in it. A genuinely British Marxism emerged in this context which is, however, far removed from German dialectical Marxism as rooted in Hegelian philosophy. Scholars like John Rex (1961, 1981), David Lockwood (1958), John Goldthorpe (1968, 1980), Ralph Miliband (1982), and Anthony Giddens (1984) represent this British type of Marxist conflict theory. 2.2

French Social Theory: The Power of Structure

The emergence of French social theory in the nineteenth century was first shaped by Saint-Simon (1865-1878) and Comte ([1830-1842] 1969) and then by Dürkheim ([1893] 1973) at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. They wanted to rebuild modern society on the soil of traditional society as a hierarchically organised whole within which every class, group and individual was to perform a specific function for the whole society and at the same time to develop its individual capacities and well-being. The advancement of the whole and the advancement of the individual parts inevitably went hand in hand in this view of modern society. This view of the convergence of societal and individual progress did not survive in French social theory. After the breakdown of the Durkheimian school, French social theory re-emerged after the Second World War first in the marriage of Levi-Strauss' (1947, 1962) anthropological structuralism which was rooted in Dürkheim's sociology with Marxism as exemplified in the work of Althusser and Balibar (1968). From then on the different variants of poststructuralism and deconstructionism to postmodernism exemplified by the works of Foucault (1969, 1971, 1975), Derrida (1967), Lyotard (1979, 1983), and Baudrillard (1986) gave social theory its shape. In the view of this type of social theory, society is a structure which exerts its power on the individual and which develops through rationalisation towards ever more sophisticated forms of suppression. Here too, power is a central concept as it is in British class conflict theory. However, it is located not in the solidarity of a class, but in the structure, the texts and the accumulated knowledge of society. Liberation does not come from the struggle for one's fair share, but from discovering the hidden power in society's structures and from the revolutionary act against it. This is the basic message of French, philosophically inspired social theory. There is, however, also a variant of social theory which develops in closer correspondence to empirical sociology; it is the social theory of scholars like Michel Crozier (1964), Frangois Bourricaud (1976), Pierre Bourdieu (1979, 1984), Alain Touraine (1973, 1978), and Raymond Boudon (1977). Though different in their particular perspective, they share the view of society as being shaped primarily by its power structure. However, in distinction to the poststruc-

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turalist location of power in texts they locate power more concretely in typically French institutions like the centralised political system, the administrative elite and the sharply outlined class hierarchy. Power is not so much rooted in class solidarity as in the British view, but much more in class position within the hierarchy.

3 German Social Theory: The Dialectics of Modernity The permanent production and resolution of contradictions is the characteristic view of modern society and its development put forward by German social theory. Society proceeds according to a dialectical logic which is rooted in its culture and which is expressed in various forms in its social institutions. 3.1 Kant, Hegel, and Marx Kant (1956-1964) set the theme with his juxtaposition of reason and reality. He distinguished between the realm of freedom where the human individual as a reasonable being is able to find out what is universally valid, and the realm of necessity where the human individual as an organic being is under the power of natural laws, drives and particular interests. The historical development of human society is shaped by human efforts to apply the yardsticks of universal reason to what happens in reality with the effect that this reality can be moved towards the reasonable step by step, yet the gap between reason and reality, morality, and legality can never be closed. This is what was completely unsatisfying for Hegel (1964-1971), who tried to bridge that gap with his dialectics of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Theoretical work will cause reason and reality to gradually converge until they finally merge in absolute knowledge. The practical work of the state will bridge the gap between morality and legality and reconcile diverging particular interests under the authority of the general interest. It is the state's commitment to the idea of "Sittlichkeit" as safeguarded by the philosophers which allows this reconciliatory process to be carried out. The idea of "Sittlichkeit" also reconciles Kant's juxtaposition of morality and legality. Marx ([1843] 1956a, [1843] 1956b, [1867-1894] 1962-1964) revealed the particularistic nature of the Hegelian state as an agent of the dominating class and looked for another solution to the problem. For Marx the contradiction between reason and reality in modern society is rooted in the contradiction between collective production and private appropriation, and between labour and capital in the modern capitalist economy. The resolution comes about with the establishment of communism by the proletariat as the carrier of the very universal reason formulated in the Enlightenment and only partly established by the bourgeoisie.

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However, in the meantime we have learned that the Hegelian and the Marxian dreams of the synthesis between reason and reality were doomed to failure because it is the very unbridgeable gap between reason and reality which gives modern society its power to move towards greater reason. Their convergence can only occur in an ideal heaven or in a real hell where the powers of critical reasoning are suppressed by the total power of a ruling elite, as became a reality under the regimes of Nazism and real-world socialism. It is the tragedy of German social theory that its insights into the contradictory nature of modernity had to produce such unrelenting searches for synthesis which helped to establish the most extreme forms of totalitarianism in human history. 3.2 Simmel and Weber However, German social theory has also produced the deepest insights into the contradictory and paradoxical nature of modernity. One of these is Simmel's (1890, 1900, 1908, [1918] 1926) analysis of the dialectics of subjective and objective culture, of the paradoxical liberation of the human individual from the constraints of primordial groups and the extension of his/her freedom in market society whereas he/she at the same time becomes dependent on processes which go on far away from him/her and over which he/she has little influence. Another is Weber's ([1920-1921] 1971, [1920-1921] 1972a, [1920-1921] 1972b, [1922] 1972c) analysis of the contradiction between formal and substantial rationality which is rooted in the very nature of modern Western rationalism. This cultural contradiction expresses itself in the basic institutions of modern society. In the capitalist economy it is expressed in the fact that its technical rationalisation and growth has many effects which are irrational from the point of view of substantial values other than economic efficiency. In the legal system it is expressed in the fact that formal equality goes hand-in-hand with substantial inequality. In the bureaucracy it is expressed in the fact that its formal regularity produces substantial ineffectiveness and constraints. In science it is expressed in the fact that its advancement of knowledge at the same time leads to the disenchantment of the world (in its sense of the elimination of magic and superstition) and to the destruction of meaning. In the end modern man lives in an iron cage stripped of any meaning and freedom. Neither Simmel nor Weber continued the German search for synthesis. Instead, elements of Nietzsche's vitalism can be discovered in their work stressing the importance of the individual's own will power and decisions regarding his/her own life, and of conflict in collective decisionmaking. Critical interpretations of Weber have revealed a tendency towards arbitrary decisionism (Habermas 1973: 133-140) and towards a political model of plebiscitarian leadership democracy (Mommsen [1959] 1974). However, Weber also provided the ideas for an ethics of responsibility in modern times which has to be distinguished from an ethics of conviction and from Machiavellian power politics (Realpolitik). Furthermore, a model of society kept in balance by the

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mutual control of a plurality of institutions can also be discovered in his work (Schluchter 1971, 1972). 3.3 Critical Theory: Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas After Simmel and Weber, critical theory continued the German struggle with the contradictory nature of modern society by way of generalising Marx's critique of political economy to a critique of industrial technical civilisation. It is the victory of instrumental reason over the originally complete notion of "reason" formulated in Enlightenment philosophy which is responsible for the suppression of the human individual in modern society (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947). For Horkheimer (1967) the way back towards the full meaning of reason is the way out of the imprisonment of modern man. For Adorno ([1966] 1973), the problem is more complicated. He sees in any objectifying thought the beginning of the human being's suppression. What remains for him is aesthetic critique which saves the human individual's creativity, but has no binding character to serve as a model for society. Habermas (1971, 1981) tried to overcome Adorno's resignation by introducing his notion of "communicative reason". According to Habermas it was Adorno's inability to step beyond the traditional philosophy of consciousness which led him into his resignation. The philosophy of consciousness sees truth as a possession of the consciousness and becomes suppressive when it is applied to instrumental action. The theory of communicative reason sees validity as a momentary outcome of intersubjective procedures of discourse. The search for valid knowledge is an ongoing process which therefore maintains its openness and doesn't lead to the totalitarian suppression of everything which fails to conform to established standards. In Habermas' view it is the decoupling of the technical rationality of systems like the economy, law and polity from the procedures of communicative reasoning and their converse, colonising penetration into the realms of life-world communication which is responsible for the uncontrolled and harmful development of modern society. With his argument for recoupling the technical rationality of the economy, polity and legal system with the communicative rationality of discursive reasoning, he continues the German search for synthesis on the contemporary level of theorising. We will learn later on, however, that such a recoupling of the technical systems with communicative reasoning will not save us from the contradictions of modern society. 3.4 Systems' Theory: Luhmann This is the point at which Luhmann (1984, 1986, 1988) enters the scene with his modern systems' theory which can also be read in a dialectical way. According to Luhmann, modern society is characterised by its continuing functional differentiation into "autopoietic subsystems", i.e., subsystems which operate self-

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referentially according to their own codes. This is a liberation of the human individual from the constraints of hierarchical organisation in traditional society. In the positive sense, Luhmann's theory can be read as having rescued the individual from the suppression exerted by any attempt at guiding society from one centre, even from the centre of communicative rationality. A society without a centre is a really pluralistic society of checks and balances with the highest possible degree of freedom for everybody. Thus, Luhmann's explanation that no synthesis is possible in modern society is also an explanation of how individual freedom can be safeguarded. However, there is also the other side of the coin. The autopoietic systems produce external, often detrimental, effects for each other and leave it to the capacity of those other systems to solve the corresponding problems. This can lead to an uncontrollable growth of problems. Modern, functionally differentiated society permanently increases its problem solutions and problem production at one and the same time. This is the contradictory and unresolvable nature of modern society in terms of system's theory. Thus it is very much a continuation of German social theory's concern with the dialectical development of modern society. 3.5 The Critical Turn of Systems' Theory It has become fashionable in German social theory to give Luhmann's theory of modern society's functional differentiation into autopoietically operating systems a critical turn. The theory is taken to be a description of unloved reality. Ulrich Beck (1988: 166-174) has contributed an influential critical turn of systems' theory of this kind in his work on the risk-producing society. According to this view, the expanding technology of industrial society is producing growing risks. There is, however, no clear-cut responsibility with regard to the causation of such risks and with regard to keeping them under control or indeed avoiding them altogether. The reason for this 'organised irresponsibility' is the functional differentiation of society into autopoietically operating subsystems like the economy, polity, science or the legal system. These societal subsystems operate according to their own codes. They perceive what is going on in their environment, record events, process their data of events, define problems and solve problems according to a special code. The economy can only do what is rendered profitable in the language of prices, the polity can only do what allows its participants to win or maintain majorities, science can only do what advances knowledge independently of any resulting risks, the legal system can only define as right or wrong what appears as right or wrong in the perspective of its laws. It is Luhmann's claim that a society of such differentiated subsystems has indeed emerged in the process of evolution because it is able to solve increasingly more complex problems. However, it also produces increasingly complex problems at the same time. There again, it also continually increases its capacity

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both to solve problems and to produce new ones. Luhmann (1986) himself has shifted from a more positive account of the problem-solving capacity of the functionally differentiated society toward such a double-edged account in the face of the critical turn of his theory which began with Habermas (1981) and was continued by younger scholars like Willke (1983, 1989) and Beck (1986, 1988). For Beck, the example of "superdangers" resulting from technological development demonstrates that modern, functionally differentiated society is unable to solve the problems which it itself has produced. Therefore he looks for ways of reorganising responsibility in order to keep superdangers under control before they are made possible by the establishment of uncontrollable technology. In his search for such a reorganisation of responsibility, Beck (1986: 300-324) makes an observation which is in contradiction to Luhmann's theory of modern society's functional differentiation into autopoietic subsystems. He in fact sees a development going on in present-day modern society which works contrary to the established differentiation of politics and non-politics, as he calls them. Nonpolitics is particularly the sphere of private economic decision-making. The thematisation of the dangerous effects of economic and technological growth in contemporary public debates and the growing mobilisation of people who try to hold this development in check breaks down the established barriers of politics and non-politics. The headquarters of politics, economics and science lose authority and autonomy. Decison-making shifts to the zone of sub-politics where political, economic, scientific, technological and moral demands clash and interpenetrate. Beck puts his hopes in the expansion of this arena of sub-politics which he places in opposition to the traditional solutions of an unrestricted orientation toward economic growth in the name of progress or for the direct steering of societal development by the democratically legitimised central organs of politics. Beck is right in his observation of the emergence of new arenas of conflict and decision-making between the established headquarters of economics, politics and science and in his demand for their expansion and formal institutionalisation. It is the only way in which the conflicting demands in modern society can be coordinated. However, he does not take enough notice of the fact that he would be claiming something impossible, if Luhmann's theory of modern society's functional differentiation into self-referentially operating subsystems were right. The same is true of Willke's (1983, 1989) proposal to introduce discursive self-reflection with regard to the consequences of their own activities into the autopoietic subsystems. A self-reflexive economy, for example, is an economy and no more than that. The same is true of the polity, the legal system or science. Thus Willke's model of the decentralised steering of society sails under a false flag, because it falsely pretends to introduce a sense of the whole in all the parts of society. However, how can any part have a sense of the whole, if it sees the world only in the perspective given by its own code? This model fails simply

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because of its inconsistency. We cannot take Luhmann's theory and still believe in any chance of controlling societal development in other ways than those which are predetermined by the theory's perspective. Luhmann's theory explains the evolution of modern society's functional differentiation as a process which just results from the first differentiation of systems from their environment in a self-catalysing process without there being any chance for wellintentioned people to interrupt and redirect this process. Anything which occurs in modern society is forced inside the boundaries of autopoietic systems or it is simply treated as noise in the environment of such systems. Thus, new arrangements of decison-making between established systems create nothing but new autopoietic systems which operate according to their own laws and without any sense for the effects of their operations upon their environment. The coordination of conflicting orientations is not possible in direct interaction, communication and compromising, but only in the evolutionary process of the survival and extinction of systems. 3.6 The Iron Cage of Systems' Theory: Is there any Escape? Is there no escape from the iron cage into which German social theory - even including its most critically spirited protagonists - has been imprisoned by Luhmann? There is one: In order to find it we have to do away with the very premises of the theory. The fundamental mistake of Luhmann's theory is the conflation of analytical and empirical, conceptual and institutional differentiation. One can construct analytically the code and the corresponding meaning of economic, political, legal or scientific action, namely taking that action which is profitable, or which increases power, or which settles conflict, or which approaches truth. Action can be guided by such a code; however, it nevertheless always involves elements of other codes. The company which builds a new nuclear plant not only does so because it expects to earn a profit but also because it believes in the working of the technology based on many scientific studies, because it is supported by the power of political decision-makers who believe in its contribution to the advancement of the nation's wealth and because it is safeguarded against possible attacks from its opponents by the legal system. Thus the actual construction of a nuclear plant is an economic, scientific, political and legal act at one and the same time. The actors involved may have primary orientations as managers, scientists, politicians and legal experts, but they nevertheless have to produce a common act which involves the other orientations too. The collective action which takes place here and its product cannot be attributed to a single, autopoietic system; they are constituted by a multiplicity of actionorientations which can be separated analytically, but not concretely. There are collective actions with primary orientations, but here too secondary orientations constitute a necessary background. Any act of economic exchange entails primarily the mutual expectation of profit. Otherwise it would not occur.

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However, it is guided by power, trust and communication at the same time. I would not consent to an agreement, if the other party is not able to convince me of the truth-content of his/her claims. I would not agree, if I do not trust in his/her good intentions. However, I will agree to an unprofitable exchange if the other party has power over me. There is simply no such thing as pure economics in empirical terms. It is only conceivable in analytical terms. Luhmann's theory of autopoietic systems simply repeats the fallacy of misplaced concreteness committed by neoclassical economics. Many readers of Luhmann are misled because they conflate the institutional differentiation of the economy, polity, legal system and science with their analytical differentiation. The institutional differentiation of the economy is a historical process in which historical actors define the normative framework of economic action. This process involves economic calculation, power struggle, association and discourse. There would have been no modern economy without pioneering entrepreneurs accumulating wealth with profit-orientation, without the rising power of the bourgeoisie to enforce the rights to property and free enterprise, without the legal profession's formulation of a normative framework for economic action, and without the intellectuals' definition of the rights to freedom and property. It would not continue to exist without such non-economic powers at work. In the world of 'really existing socialism' those powers were defeated and therefore there was no longer any differentiation between the economy and other settings within society. The code of the modern economy is defined by non-economic powers of society in a never-ending process. Thus economic action is at the same time constituted by forces inside and outside the economy. Whether the economy maintains some institutional autonomy is not simply a question which can be answered in advance by claiming its self-referential character, but a question which has to be answered according to the various non-economic forces at work in a society. Entrepreneurs, politicians, scientists, legal experts and social movements struggle permanently with each other about the meaning and the scope of the economic orientation in concrete action. Whether the pollution of the environment is perceived as generating heavy costs or not, does not fall from heaven, but results from scientific investigations, public debates about them, political pressure and legal formalisation. In the process of such actions the view of the air we breathe turns from unlimited availability to a very precious public good which calls for collective action to restrict its pollution. It is remarkable that economic calculation is not restricted in this way, but is being extended more and more from the individual to the collective and right on up to the global level. The decision about how much the environment can be polluted without doing harm to the human being is no longer left to the single individual, but is transmitted to the collectivity. The meaning of economics changes from the liberal to the collective view. The liberal view takes the single individual as its unit of economic calculation with competition and exchange as devices to coordinate such individ-

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ual calculations collectively. The collective view takes the collectivity as its unit of economic calculation with collective decision-making by unanimous decision, compromise or majority rule as devices to coordinate diverging interests. The simple fact of growing activities of a growing number of people who make use of their individual rights leads to an explosion of cases where the use of such individual rights has harmful effects on a growing number of other individuals. This calls for an expansion of collective decision-making. Individual and collective decision-making, economy and polity expand at the same time. In these cases, too, both penetrate each other. The number of situations in which economic units (consumers, sellers and buyers, employers and employees) have to participate in collective decision-making in order to secure their economic interests is increasing, and the number of situations in which the units of collective decision-making (governments, parliamentary bodies, civil service administrations, parties, interest groups, social movements) have to calculate the available resources in economic terms is increasing too. This is reflected in the growing number of committees between state and society which are established in order to coordinate diverging orientations and include members who represent those orientations: Representatives of producers and consumers, employers and employees, governments, civil service administrations, parties, scientists, technicians, legal experts. A growing part of collective action is coordinated in such committees which do not work according to the code of a single subsystem of society. Money, power, influence and value-commitments, economic, political, legal and scientific views are confronted with each other and put together in order to define rules for action, for example in the regulation of levels of permissible air-pollution. The definition of normative limits for air-pollution is an economic, political, legal, scientific and moral act all at the same time. In this process each one of the societal subsystems has to give up some of its sovereignty but at the same time expands its influence on what is going on outside its institutional sphere. Such mutual penetration does not change the code of economics, politics, the law or science in the analytical and conceptual sense, but very much in the empirical sense. New limits for air-pollution do not change the business company's primary orientation toward profit nor its dependency on profit-making in order to survive in the market. However, such new limits determine very much what it really does. A business company is not only an economic unit but also a political, legal and scientific unit. Its concrete actions are determined by its economic competitiveness, its political power, its legal rights and its scientific equipment. It is therefore a fallacy of misplaced concreteness to conceive of its actions as determined by the laws of a self-referential economy only. Because there is a growing consciousness of the multiple constitution of a business company's actions, an up-to-date management acts intentionally not only in economic but also in political, legal, public, moral, and scientific terms. It explicitly relates to culture in defining its corporate identity, to the community in order to improve its

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social standing and reputation, to the polity in order to secure its political position, to the legal system in order to define its legal status, to science in order to advance its knowledge in a comprehensive and not only instrumentally economic way. The products offered by a company on the market, its marketstrategy and this success in the market are determined by all of these external relationships together. There is no such thing as purely economic action by a business company. Such a view is nothing but an ideology derived from neo-classical economics. It is remarkable that modern systems' theory has nothing different to offer at a time when the multifaceted character of economic action is becoming increasingly apparent. The theory is simply out of step with the times. It is very much part of what Luhmann likes to call old-European social theory. Certainly, we cannot ban economics from this world as long as there is scarcity on earth with regard to the many desires of people. However, how far and in which way the economic dynamics works also depends on non-economic views and decisions. The economy in the analytical sense consists of cost/profit calculation, the concrete action of economic units is, however, much more. The action of a business company is not simply a translation of external data into economic terms, but, on the one hand, active participation in producing such data in cultural discourse, communal association, political struggle and legal negotiations, and, on the other, active compromising of non-economic with economic views. What the company really does is mostly much less efficient in purely economic terms than would be possible if it were not involved in such compromising. It is not an autopoietic system with a single code, but a corporate actor whose actions result from a mixture of different codes with a primary orientation toward profit. Nor is the economy as a whole an autopoietic system. It is an institutional sphere composed of norms which define rights for individual and corporate actors to act in individually economic terms. However, the concrete acts of those actors are also determined by a number of non-economic norms anchored in non-economic institutional spheres. The economic institution has no sovereignty over the actions of economic actors. What really happens in economic production and consumption is therefore not under the guidance of one single autopoietic system, but constituted by a multiplicity of institutional complexes. How far the rights of individual and corporate actors to private property and the economic use of that property range determines the nature and scope of economic action, and defines the boundaries of the economic sphere in society. The definition of such rights and boundaries is itself multiply constituted and depends on the success of actual and potential property owners in securing such rights by cultural legitimation, public standing, political power, scientific expertise and legal formula. If there is anything approaching an autonomous economic sphere in society it is there not because of the self-referential powers of the economy but because of the success of those who want to maintain it in all those non-economic procedures of defining the boundaries of the economic sphere.

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4 The Dialectics of Progress: The Good and the Dangerous Life in Modern Society What goes on in the economic sphere of social life is therefore indeed open to external control. This insight leads us to a fundamental revision of the critical turn of systems' theory. We are no longer allowed to attribute the problems, risks, harms, superdangers and disasters produced by modern society simply to the self-referential working of autopoietic systems, particularly to the selfreferential working of the economy. In fact, it is completely the other way round. It is the cooperation of the economy with cultural reflection, solidarityexpansion and political decision-making which is the heart of modern society's production of dangers and disasters! It was erroneous from the beginning to conceive of the capital-labour relationship as an antagonism, as it appears to be in Marxist terms. It has always been a relationship of cooperation in which both sides participate in producing economic growth without looking at the harmful consequences of that growth for nature and for the human being. Capitalism expands mass-production because the entrepreneurs seek to make profit and because the workers seek to raise their living standards. The legal right to property, the cultural idea of progress, the constraints set by the market which mean that companies have to expand in order to survive, the global inclusion of workers in the sharing of the right to a good living, and the pressure of the labour movement to increase wages have always worked and still work together in advancing economic growth which unavoidably involves the growth of risks, dangers, damage, suffering and disasters. The 'superdangers' of modern society are all consequences of highly acclaimed ideas and values and not simply consequences of an uncontrolled economy. Moreover, this cooperation of good and evil is still going on unchecked. We are trying to stoke the economy of the provinces which came from the German Democratic Republic not because there is a self-referential economy, but because of such highly acclaimed values as the right of the Easterners to the same living conditions as those enjoyed by the Westerners, because the government is measured by this standard nearly every night in the nationwide news, because the trade unions are exerting pressure to increase wages, because market competition in the West leads companies to invest in the rising economy of the East, and because the idea of progress is celebrated even by those who otherwise are very critical of it. The churches, for example, warn against the growing danger of a complete addiction to material consumption, yet they also point to the many deficiencies in the material well-being of the people. They call for social services and welfare which themselves have to be economically produced by the surplus an expanding economy provides. The same is true when the Pope condemns the materialism of the industrial societies and calls for help for all the

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many hungry people all over the world. Only the surplus of economically expanding nations, however, can provide the help which is needed world-wide. In his work on the risk-producing society Beck (1986: 324-374) points to the cooperation of cultural values and economic-technological expansion in the production of risks and superdangers when he speaks of the consensus on progress which lay at the bottom of modern society's development well into the first half of this century. It was an unthematised, implicit consensus. As he argues, this consensus has now broken down because of the people's growing awareness of the global risks produced by economic and technological growth. However, the problems are much more deeply rooted in the very meaning structure and moral ideas of modern society. The awareness of the many negative effects of modernity's development does not resolve the contradictions and paradoxes which come with modernity per se. The idea of progress cannot be given up within modern society, but only outside it. Beck's search for new arrangements of risk-control is itself committed to the very idea of progress, to the idea of a society with better living conditions for all people all over the world. We do not, however, know all the effects which will be produced by any one of our best-intended measures in a world society with global interdependence. Thus, it is very much hope and not so much exact knowledge which even guides our best efforts to build a better and less dangerous, a more self-reflexive society. As modern chaos theory tells us, the world evolves by chance. A minute wingbeat of a butterfly here can produce a thunderstorm elsewhere on earth. As long as modern society exists, its very meaning-structure will multiply the chances for such far-reaching effects of the many individual actions it produces. We are in a much deeper dilemma in global society than the standard criticism of economic expansion and material progress would like to have it. It is becoming increasingly apparent that we cannot have God without His counterpart, the devil. In public debate speakers normally celebrate God or damn the devil, but they don't tell us that God and the devil are the same person in this instance. The celebrators of progress play down its dangers, the critiques of progress do not tell us what we would really have to sacrifice in order to save the planet. Any expansion of services in the areas of child-rearing, education, medical help, social welfare, science, culture, Third World countries, and housing is good and mostly welcomed by the critiques of progress, but it is part and parcel of that progress which cannot exist without its counterpart, economic growth. Any contrary statement is wishful thinking. In our times even the ecological movement is contributing to the race for progress. It sets the pace for an expanding industry for environmental technology, calls for growing expenditure in research on ecological technology, and sets pressures on the economy to meet the costs of ecological investment. All this calls for further economic growth. Only rich nations have the resources for ecological innovation. The inclusion of the whole world in the train of progress, however, does not leave very much room for such expenditure. For example, we celebrate the economic integration

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of Europe, as a great step toward a new Europe with equally high living standards for all and free travel all over the continent. However, this will only be accomplished alongside the dangers which accompany progress on this level. The campaign against nuclear energy is a good example of the consequences of this development. In West Germany the anti-nuclear movement turned the opinion of most West Germans against its use during the 1980s. Now, after reunification and with the coming of the single European market, we hear that it cannot be dispensed with in view of the enormous tasks of constructing a united Germany in a united Europe with equally high living standards everywhere. In West Germany the construction of motorways has decreased because of growing resistance by ecological movements. In East Germany the right of the people to better living serves as a welcome legitimation for reducing rights to object in order to push their construction forward in half the time needed under the previous legal conditions. Let us summarise: The dialectical and contradictory nature of modern society's development reaches much deeper than revealed thus far by the ordinary critique of capitalism, industrial society, technical civilisation, instrumental reason, functional reason, functional differentiation or even progress. The control of its risks and superdangers cannot be completely accomplished by the simple recoupling of the so-called autopoietic systems to cultural discourse as Habermas would like to have it or to some other form of cultural, public, political or legal control as others like Willke or Beck would like to have it. Modern society has long produced its progress and its dangers by the cooperation of the economy with cultural discourse, societal inclusion of more and more groups of people, and political decision-making. Cultural discourse permanently reveals deficiencies of society in the light of its great ideas of freedom, equality, rationality and progress. Before such deficiencies can be dealt with, we normally need an economic surplus first. The societal inclusion of more and more groups of people to equal rights calls for economic growth in order to serve their needs. The expansion of political decision-making and political services calls for a growing government income on the basis of economic growth. On the other hand the growth of culture, welfare and politics expands economic calculation right into their spheres. The billions spent on culture, welfare and politics and the growing cultural, welfare-oriented and political demands call for an economic allocation of resources. It is therefore no surprise that economics is entering the halls of universities, hospitals and public administrations to an ever-growing extent. This does not, however, mean that we live in a solely economic world these days. Culture, social welfare, politics and economics grow at the same time and penetrate each other. Economic action is shaped by culture, welfare and politics as it itself shapes culture, welfare and politics. In the modem world only business companies with good cultural, public and political standing can be successful. There is one question which finally arises from this elaboration of German social theory's preoccupation with the dialectical and contradictory nature of

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modern society's development: Is there any chance of escaping this paradoxical and fateful dialectic? The answer must ultimately be "no". We have no choice between God and the devil. We have to live with both of them, because God and the devil are one person here. The only way forward is a permanent struggle with the dangers produced by the benefits of an unrelentingly progressive modernity. Modern society tries to learn by its mistakes. However, this also means that it will go on making mistakes as long as it exists. The growing conflictual interpenetration of economics, politics, science, technology, discourses on meaning and morality and demands for inclusion and equal rights creates new arenas of collective action and decision-making between those institutional complexes and calls for new formal arrangements for coordinating the conflicting demands outside the established headquarters. This might lead to new chances of keeping the conflicting demands of modern society in balance. However, anything more than such a fragile balance cannot be expected. The balance is increasingly in danger because of the growing problems of coordination on the global level of world society (for more details see Münch, 1991).

5 Between Interrelated Diversity and Anglo-American Cultural Imperialism Admittedly, the above is a reconstruction of the characteristic contribution of classical and contemporary German social theory to the development of world sociology from the point of view of a German social theorist developed by contrasting it to what he sees as characteristic contributions of French, British and American social theory. There are exchanges and interpenetrations between the national traditions under consideration though. There are friends of German dialectics everywhere in the world, and there are friends of British conflict theory, French post-structuralism and American rational choice theory, symbolic interactionism, pragmatism and ethnomethodology in German sociology. There are also German traditions like phenomenology, hermeneutics and philosophical anthropology which have left their marks on German sociology. However, in the face of the great debates of grand theory and its preoccupation with the dialectical nature of modernity, they are more a background feature of German sociology, albeit important background features, because they are also alive in the works of those authors with whom we have dealt more explicitly in this context. What we can expect from the future of intensified exchange and communication within Europe, in addition to the thus far much more intensive EuropeanAmerican exchange and communication, are more cross-cutting approaches and products of interpenetration within the diversity of different traditions of social theory. Self-contained development, mutual disregard, misunderstanding and

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confrontation will be replaced by open development, mutual recognition, understanding, competition and cooperation. Hopefully, the different languages will nevertheless safeguard the characteristic national traditions of thought against levelling pressures of standardisation, so that we will move towards an interrelated diversity. The establishment of the English language as the international medium of interchanging ideas is, however, a danger to the diversity of European sociology. The other side of intensified communication could be the further sedimentation of Anglo-American cultural hegemony. This is just another aspect of the contradictory nature of modernity's development. German dialectics in English is only halfway dialectics, unfortunately.

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Hennis, W. 1987. Max Webers Fragestellung: Studien zur Biographie des Werks. Tübingen: Mohr. Homans, G. C. 1961. Social Behavior. Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich. Homans, G. C. 1974. Social Behavior. Its Elementary Forms, revised edition. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich. Horkheimer, Μ. 1967. Zur Kritik der instrumenteilen Vernunft. Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer. [English Translation: Critique of Instrumental Reason. New York: Seabury Press 1974.] Horkheimer, M. and T. W. Adorno 1947. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Amsterdam: Nijhoff. [English Translation: Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Seabury Press 1972.] Kant, I. 1956-1964. Werke in sechs Bänden. Frankfurt/Main: Insel. Lazarsfeld, P. F. and M. Rosenberg (eds.) 1955. The Language of Social Research. Glencoe, III.: Free Press. Levi-Strauss, C. 1947. Les structures elementaires de la parente. Paris: Mouton. [English Translation: The Elementary Structures of Kinship. New York: Basic Books 1969.] Levi-Strauss, C. 1962. La pensee sauvage. Paris: Librairie Plön. [English Translation: The Savage Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1966.] Lockwood, D. 1958. The Blackcoated Worker: A Study in Class Consciousness. London: Allen & Unwin. Luhmann, N. 1984. Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Luhmann, N. 1986. Ökologische Kommunikation. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. [English Translation: Ecological Communication. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989.] Luhmann, N. 1988. Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Lyotard, J.-F. 1979. La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir. Paris: Minuit. [English Translation: The Postmodern Condition. Α Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press 1984.] Lyotard, J.-F. 1983. Le differend. Paris: Minuit. Marx, K. [1843] 1956a. Zur Kritik der Hegeischen Rechtsphilosophie. Kritik des Hegeischen Staatsrechts. In K. Marx and F. Engels Marx-Engels-Werke, vol. 1, pp. 201-333. Berlin: Dietz. Marx, K. [1843] 1956b. Zur Kritik der Hegeischen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung. In K. Marx and F. Engels Marx-Engels-Werke, vol. 1, 378-391. Berlin: Dietz. Marx, K. [1867-1894] 1962-1964. Das Kapital. In K. Marx, Marx-Engels Werke, vol. 23-25. Berlin: Dietz. [English Translation: Capital. New York: International Publishers 1967.] Merton, R. K. [1949] 1968. Social Theory and Social Structure, enlarged edition. New York: Free Press.

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Miliband, R. 1982. Capitalist Democracy in Britain. London: Oxford University Press. Mills, C. W. 1956. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press. Mills, C. W. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press. Mommsen, W. [1959] 1974. Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920. Tübingen: Mohr. [English Translation: Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984.] Münch, R. 1986a. The American Creed in Sociological Theory: Exchange, Negotiated Order, Accommodated Individualism, and Contingency. Sociological Theory 4: 41-60. Münch, R. 1986b. Die Kultur der Moderne. Vol. 1: Ihre Grundlagen und ihre Entwicklung in England und Amerika. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Münch, R. 1986c. Die Kultur der Moderne. Vol. 2: Ihre Entwicklung in Frankreich und Deutschland. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Münch, R. 1987. Theory of Action. Towards a New Synthesis. Going Beyond Parsons. London: Routledge. Münch, R. 1988. Understanding Modernity. Towards a New Perspective Going Beyond Dürkheim and Weber. London: Routledge. Münch, R. 1989. Structures, Cultures and Knowledge: A Historical and Comparative Exploration. In H. Haferkamp (ed.), Social Structure and Culture, pp. 37-66. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. Münch, R. 1991. Dialektik der Kommunikationsgesellschaft. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Münch, R. 1992. The Discourse of Sociological Theory. Chicago: Nelson Hall. Parsons, Τ. [1937] 1968. The Structure of Social Action. New York: Free Press. Parsons, T. 1951. The Social System. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. Parsons, T. 1967. Sociological Theory and Modern Society. New York: Free Press. Parsons, T. 1977. Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory. New York: Free Press. Parsons, T. 1978. Action Theory and the Human Condition. New York: Free Press. Rex, J. 1961. Key Problems in Sociological Theory. London: Routledge. Rex, J. 1981. Social Conflict. A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis. London: Longman. Saint-Simon, C.-H. de 1865-1878. (Euvres de Saint Simon et d'Enfantin. Paris: E. Dentu. [English Translations: The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: an Exposition, first Year 1828-1829. Boston: Beacon Press 1958; Selected Writings on Science, Industry and Social Organisation. London: Croom Helm 1975; The Political Thought of Saint-Simon. London: Oxford University Press 1976; SaintSimon at Versailles. London: Hamilton 1980.] Schluchter, W. 1971. Wertfreiheit und Verantwortungsethik. Tübingen: Mohr.

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Schluchter, W. 1972. Aspekte bürokratischer Herrschaft. Munich: List. Simmel, G. 1890. Über sociale Differenzierung. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Simmel, G. 1900. Philosophie des Geldes. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. [English Translation: The Philosophy of Money. London: Routledge 1978.] Simmel, G. 1908. Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Simmel, G. [1918] 1926. Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. [English Translation: The Conflict of Modern Culture. New York: Teacher College Press 1968.] Spencer, H. [1897-1906] 1975. The Principles of Sociology. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. Touraine, A. 1973. Production de la societe. Paris: Seuil. [English Translation: The Self-Production of Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1977.] Touraine, A. 1978. La voix et le regard. Paris: Seuil. [English Translation: The Voice and the Eye. An Analysis of Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981.] Wallerstein, I. M. 1974. The Modern World System. Vol. 1: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press. Wallerstein, I. M. 1980. The Modern World System. Vol. 2: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600-1950. New York: Academic Press. Wallerstein, I. M. 1984. The Politics of the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weber, M. [1920-1921] 1971. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. 3. Tübingen: Mohr. [English Translation: Ancient Judaism. New York: Free Press 1952.] Weber, M. [1920-1921] 1972a. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. 1. Tübingen: Mohr. [English Translations in Two Parts: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1976; The Religion of China. Confucianism and Taoism. New York: Free Press 1964.] Weber, M. [1920-1921] 1972b. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. 2. Tübingen: Mohr. [English Translation: The Religion of India. The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism. New York: Free Press 1967.] Weber, M. [1922] 1972c. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen: Mohr. [English Translation: Economy and Society. New York: Bedminster Press 1968.] Willke, H. 1983. Entzauberung des Staates. Überlegungen zu einer sozietalen Steuerungstheorie. Königstein/Taunus: Athenäum. Willke, H. 1989. Systemtheorie entwickelter Gesellschaften: Dynamik und Distanz moderner gesellschaftlicher Selbstorganisation. Weinheim: Juventa.

Towards a European Sociology Carlo

Mongardini

1 Has there Ever Been a European Sociology? To answer the question of whether there ever has been a European sociology, we have to go back to the origins of sociological thinking. Sociology began in the middle of the eighteenth century 5 with European aspirations and no illusions about being a science in the modern sense. It was a limited study of interest to very few scholars, which on the basis of a comparative historical analysis, focused on the anthropological condition of man in society, the history and organisation of "civil society", its norms and the social positions of people within it. The first articles on "civil society" or on "social classes" were immediately translated and studied in many parts of Europe, so, for example, The Spirit of the Law by Montesquieu, Essay on Civil Society by Adam Ferguson, or John Millar's work on differences in rank. The idea of a "science of society" was still a long way off in this first phase of sociological thinking. That came later along with the idea that it was possible to change society through a knowledge of its mechanism and that it was possible to give it a symmetrical, rational constitution. The idea of a "science of society" and the aim of social manipulation that lay behind it produced divergent interests and researches in accordance with different national contexts. Thus, in Britain attention was turned to industrialisation and in France to the structural aspect of social phenomena. Italian sociology became predominantly sociology of law or political sociology and it was less concerned to set out a consistent general theory. The concept of "society" and its spread as the key concept in sociological analysis was indicative of a problem to solve rather than a desire for representation. It evidenced both the feeling of loss of control of a reality which was growing in complexity and a desire to reappropriate it. Hence the need for a "science of society" and the consequence that the concept of "society" became a concept of political struggle (cf. Mongardini 1990: 8) in that it was reduced to representing the various forms of control possible over a reality which was increasingly difficult to control. But because of this, the interest in sociology concentrated on the different national realities and on those problems that were most difficult to

On the various theories of the origins of sociology and on the reasons for placing the origins of sociology in the middle of the eighteenth century, see Sombart (1970).

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control. Contacts among the different European experiences remained very restricted. Even the great writers were only marginally known and then only indirectly in other national contexts. Think, for example, of the fate of the work of Weber in England, in France or in Italy, or of the fact that for many years the fortunes of Pareto were linked to his work as an economist rather than as a sociologist. Only American sociology gained from the diverse national interests, which gave it the ideal conditions for comparing the different experiences and using them as a solid basis for its own development. It was in contact with the classic sociological thinkers in a way that before the Second World War no European country was able to be. It was thus the acid test for European sociology and it testifies to the fact that until the so-called crisis of the 1970s what we call European sociology was still nothing but a collection of isolated experiences and national traditions.6 The individual cultures and the historical-political interests of the individual nations have had a determining influence on the definition of the selected objects for sociological research and on the prospectives from which forms of "society" have been considered. But now, the development of European society has brought about a decisive change. The emergence of similar social problems and cultural phenomena in different European contexts obliges sociologists to make more stringent comparisons of ideas and interpretations in modern cultural issues, thus encouraging the growth of a comparative analysis of different cultural experiences.

2 Sociology and Modernity Sociological thinking is associated with the characteristics of modern culture and the transformations it has imposed on collective life. Rationalisation has taken the direction of coordination and mathematical calculation with consequent limitations on the space for emotional life and non-economic considerations to the extent sometimes of threatening the very roots of the collective life these other considerations had generated. Knowledge itself has gone in this direction towards the simplification of social complexity and the transfer into terms of symmetrical and mathematical correspondences. Knowledge has thus become the ideology of rationalisation, confusing the real and the desirable. Hence, in the cognitive system used by the social sciences in recent decades the other is seen in his most simplified, exteriorised connotation as a number, a type of behaviour, a pattern. In this way, by definition, he is denied the liberty which is his prerogative and which in reality he maintains, thus becoming a problem for any form of cultural life or any system of representation in collective life. The other and the relationship with him represent the basic problem of modernity since For evidence of this see the interesting book by W. Lepenies (1985).

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abstract reason cannot give adequate representation to reality. The image of reality used to control its clashes with the multivarious forms of reality itself. While essentially the social link starts with the emotions and only subsequently forms the basis of the cultural fabric, modern rationality represents it only in terms of the constructs of economistic reasoning. Thus theoretically we know more and more about the other but in practice we know less and less. This is the obvious result of the typical modern tendency to translate into scientific or pseudo-scientific terms all forms of knowledge. Modernity has not known how to develop its conception of life without expanding this model of science, which has meant not only progressive objectification of all knowledge but also objectification of the control of forms of knowledge. This has seemed the only way to obtain a definitive control of reality, which is one of the first and most powerful instincts of man. This has seemed the only way to guarantee, in terms of modern reasoning, the hold on reality and its definition in a series of stable, predictable relationships. But the maintenance of this objectification of the control of reality presupposes a transformation of the individual that the individual is unable to make. He finds himself, it is true, in a network of stable, well-defined relationships with reality and this gives him the certainties he needs in a field of increasing complexity with the corresponding increase in pressure. But at the same time these certain relationships with reality are assured for him by external mechanism, by logical and practical chains constructed by others in the midst of which he is only a fragment and over which he has no control. Moreover, to maintain this network of certainties he has to surrender unconditionally to an impersonal power which nevertheless is still represented by men with their passions and personal interests. And so faith in the power of the subjective will with its accompanying element of inner spirituality has of necessity to give way to faith in objective reason with its accompanying rituals, order based on quantifying, coherence and synchronisation. 7 In line with this transformation, while real life goes on in the everyday relationships of individuals, the control of life crystallises, objectifies and grows more complex. But the image of science, as with any ideal construction, finally loses its power, while the practical side gradually becomes synonymous with technique. Thus, as Weber would have it, the creations of scientific thinking end up being a "subterranean world of artificial abstractions trying with their bloodless hand in vain to catch the sap, the blood of real life". (Weber 1968: 21-22) The key to the interpretation of the state

This signifies, as Weber saw, "the disenchantment of the world" and the peripheral importance of individuality. Not the eclipse of anything sacred but its diffusion and dispersion among the objects and practices of everyday. Faced with this objectification of the control of reality in increasingly complex and fleeting forms, individuality rediscovers its identity, its way to control reality and rediscovers sacred things which emanate from personal relationships in primitive forms of reappropriation of reality, such as in magical circles and in exclusive secret groups like the sect. See Mongardini (1983).

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of sociological knowledge in the last few decades is contained in this evolution of the idea of science in modernity. From its earliest origins sociology saw itself as an instrument for analysis, aware of a new, more complex reality emerging out of the development of the modern world: The reality of civil society as an autonomous sphere of relationships. The idea of sociology as science and especially as "science of society" came later and is the result of the growth of the myth of science in Europe and the development of the natural sciences, the idea that social experience could be expressed and contained in a concept of "society", as if it were a natural phenomena. The idea of sociology as science, therefore, and the comparison with the natural sciences took hold at the same time as the acceptance in Europe of the concept of "society" as a unifying concept around which to centre all sociological investigation. Although experience centred around social relationships and processes of interaction and socialisation, it was to the image of society that sociologists turned to construct the unitary coherent theory for the new discipline, (see in this connection Tenbruck 1981: 187 and passim). The concept of "society" served perhaps at the beginning both to free observation from theological or moral conditioning and to demonstrate the one-sidedness of approaches such as the economic or rationality of the modern world, there exist equally essential processes of subjectivisation by means of which individuals repossess the realities that they themselves created and take part emotionally in that reality. The fragmentation of these processes prevents sociological reasoning from forming a unified whole by means of which we can represent natural phenomena. The complexity and freedom of human beings cannot be represented by the determinist systems of the natural sciences. Between the natural order and the social order there is an incompatibility that cannot be resolved. Nature does not tolerate freedom of spirit and the spirit cannot tolerate the meaningless order of nature. The difference between sociological reasoning and natural science lies not only in the so-called Burke's theorem, where "a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing; a focus upon object A involves a neglect of object B" (Merton 1984: 264), but also in the fact that the elements we can consider in the analysis are certainly only a very limited number compared with the elements which go to make up the phenomenon. So the principle of non-contradiction is not applicable. Finally, because of the duality and ambivalence of social processes many of the elements we do not include for consideration are in opposition to our declared point of view. In short, our observation only manages to gather a segment of the reality and sociology is at best an 'exploratory study' of human realities, a 'cognitive experiment' that necessarily leaves ample room for those indeterminate conditions in which the freedom of the individual expresses itself (on these themes, see Mongardini 1985).

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3 Sociology in Modern Times Sociology sprang from the necessity to have a cognitive approach to a new reality, the civil society, which was increasingly encroaching on everyday life. It is the typical product of the modern spirit. In modernity it has found itself performing different functions which have often overlapped and been at cross purposes, have caused confusion and uncertainty, and have even changed for the worse that spirit of humanistic enquiry of which it was a part itself. In the first place, then, sociology represented a cognitive answer to the emergence of a new reality in collective life. It was an attempt at reappropriation and interpretation of that reality. A new way of producing and distributing goods, a different concept of "wealth", a growing interdependence amongst individuals, the increase in the density of social relationships, all helped to construct a new reality in which even old forms, such as the social classes, took on a new significance. This new reality had effect outside the old antinomy of the individual versus the state and absorbed them both. But to gather the significance of this it was necessary to adopt a different cognitive approach. And so the social sciences came into being, but right from the beginning the analytical prospectives were mixed up with the desire to control reality and manipulate it, existence was interwoven with obligation, the reality with the desirable. The tension towards control of reality, which was seen as the ultimate goal of the social sciences, forced nineteenth century sociologists to seek for a single formula which could represent social reality. The temptation to get power and use it has often led sociologists to invite belief that they possessed the unitary formula to represent society and that they knew how to direct its development. Thus, on the one hand the history of sociology has been the reflection and analysis of new realities in collective life. On the other hand it has again and again been the critical conscience of modernity or rather its ideology when in its guise as a science it has tried to be the instrument of modernity in the process of rationalisation and modernisation. In that situation, as has been rightly pointed out, it appeared as "la garante de l'hegemonie de la raison sur tous les aspects de la vie en commun", as the "science du probleme de la modernite" capable of instructing as on how to live, how to go from "la coutume au calcul, d'un passe encombre de symboles et d'institutions ä un avenir degage, fait de signes et d'organisation" (Moscovici 1988: 414-415). But the more the instinct for reappropriation of the complex reality that was developing in modernity expressed itself through the idea-image of society, the more sociology lost its purpose. It turned into a science in the most modern sense of the term, it passed from comprehension to explanation, from "I study" to "I know", and sociology finally lost that distance, that sense of the complexity of humanity that had given strength to its critical function and also to its ability to reflect on forms in social links. Rightly, therefore, many schools of thought in contemporary sociology have

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brought the focus back to common sense, to everyday experience where this cognitive interest originated. It is an appeal against losing the way in abstraction and simplification; it is an appeal on behalf of the importance of facing the complexity and the indeterminate boundaries of social life. In its ideological role, as seen in the ideal of society, sociology has accompanied the development and the decline of modernity, but at the same time, in its effort at comprehension, sociology has made one of the most significant contributions to the thinking of this century. Contrary to what some critics may think, European sociology has represented better than any other humanistic discipline the critical conscience of modernity in the goals and ideals modernity has set for itself, in the forms of its development, in the problems it has raised or left unsolved, in the cases of oppression, exploitation and emargination that modern life has created. In its various branches, schools of thought and national preoccupations, sociology has lived through the vicissitudes of modernity, its grand period of illusions, and now its process of decadence. It has many times taken on the role of ideology for modernity, it has even posed vital questions for the development of our culture. It has shared the faith in progress and the belief in the possibility of changing reality and of constructing man's happiness through politics, but it has also raised the problem of the development of capitalism, industrialism, and technological expansion. On the one hand, it has believed it was able to represent the reality of social processes and gain control over them through the ideaimage of society; on the other hand, it has put forward the problem of freedom in a world which is bureaucratically administered and controlled by a purely economistic model of rationality and by the images of the mass media. It has followed industrial development, mechanisation, automation, but at the same time it has demonstrated the dangers of exteriorising life and reducing the social actor to a mere mathematical expression in a world dominated by the market. It has been known to give way to intuition, to fashion, to let itself be carried away by the public opinion but at the same time it has repeatedly throughout its history raised the question of control of the social sciences.

4 Present Trends The essential characteristic of European sociology are here in this mix where knowlege has expressed the values of modernity, has tried to understand and criticise its culture and at the same time to get under control if not to manipulate the growing social complexity. If anyone complains about the theoretical uncertainties and the widespread divergencies of standpoints to be found in Europe (cf. Barbano 1989), he would do well to look at sociology's loss of direction as ideological guide in modernisation and at the failure of those expectations that saw sociology as an adequate instrument of control of social phenomena. Conse-

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quently, sociology today is suffering the effects of the decline of modernity and is discovering its own impotence to give a conceptual interpretation of the crisis of the modern spirit, the segmentation and the meaninglessness of those institutions on which modernity was built. This process, manifested in varying degrees all over Western Europe, has sparked off a reflection which may be fruitful even if it is seen as a phase in the so-called crisis of sociology. By way of this reflection sociological study is rediscovering the complexity of the social link as something not reducible to an economistic system8, the polyvalence of processes of interaction, the consistency of everyday life practices, (so different from the tabulations shown in synthesis of society), the value of emotional elements along with rational and normative elements in determining human behaviour (cf. in this connection Flam 1990a, 1990b), the incidence of preconditions and prefigurations for action in the decisions of the social actor, the margin of freedom and possibility for negotiation that the actor reserves for himself in interaction processes (cf. Mongardini 1989) and that baffle all predictions based on purely economistic systems of interpretations of social behaviour. The rediscovery of other dimensions, polarised or contradictory visions of society, along with a greater density of social relationships, produces a radical transformation of meaning in sociology and a review of its conceptual apparatus. It is clearly out of the question to represent and interpret society in terms of one system. The image of society may remain predominantly a concept of "political struggle" (cf. Mongardini 1990). But the reality of social life is swallowed up in a sensation of the objective existence of a totality on different levels (group, nation or humanity) and of different consistency, a totality which we can have only a partial knowledge of, or it emerges only in the awareness of forming a unity with the 'other'. It is an awareness that accompanies the social actor from the moment of his interiorisation of the image of 'other' and the consequent creation of a societas activa with the 'other', both in a conflictual and co-operative sense, which then of course corresponds only partially with his ongoing experience. Faced with this double dimension of social life, each with its effect in determining the conduct of the actor, our concept of "society" appears inadequate, partial, capable perhaps of interpreting a point of view or making an evaluation but not capable of serving as an instrument of analysis basic to the whole conceptual apparatus of sociology. Nowadays, trends towards the unification of the different national sociological cultures in Western Europe and trends towards concept revision and relativism seem to be running parallel with the exception of two types of thinking,

From this point of view Pareto's experience is revealing. In 1917, in a lecture given in Lausanne on the occasion of his jubilee, Pareto confessed that the transfer of his interests from economics to sociology had been due to the impossibility of explaning some phenomena and many human actions within the framework of economic thinking (cf. Mongardini 1973:20).

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the large-scale interpretative system whose aim is to reduce social life to a unitary coherent formula and the extreme relativism which completely abandons all rational structure and reduces sociology to comprehension of the feeling of the moment. Neither of these schools of thought seems to me likely to have much room for manoeuvre in the development of a European sociology; what Hegel originally said about the individual seems equally valid for the study of sociology. It loses itself if it tries to conquer the world in an effort to give it a unitary representation. It loses the world if it concentrates on itself in an effort to reduce all social life to a mere matter of the emotions. This illustrates in the present experience of European sociology the importance of a sociological humanism which does not perhaps give up scientific research undertaken in the accepted modern manner, fully aware of the instinct for control and power over reality that frequently accompanies this type of research; but neither will it forget the impossibility of determining the behaviour of the social actor and the complexity of social relationships if we accept that any social actor reserves for himself a margin of freedom of negotiation. Thus, sociology is left with the role of exploratory study, cognitive experiment, a far cry from the pretensions of scientific classification on the model of the natural sciences that sociology has claimed the right to for many decades.

5 Tracing the Future of Sociology in its History This confinement to a more modest exploratory role of social complexity may not please those who still see in sociology the instrument for controlling the social and political life of a group. But it is precisely in this exploratory role of the different social dimensions that sociology has made its greatest contributions to European thinking in this century. The history of sociological thinking confirms this estimate which European sociology today can draw on. Furthermore, the crisis of the ideological function of sociology in recent decades has witnessed the reinforcement of those trends, such as ethnomethodology and the sociology of everyday life, that reveal the effort to focus more on the subject of observation even at the cost of a diminished capacity for theoretical construction. The function of social exploration carried out through examination of everyday practices would seem to correspond perfectly with this adjustement of aim in contemporary sociology. However, it is also true that the weakness in theoretical construction that these branches of sociology reveal exposes the danger of confusing sociological discourse with common sense, which has its place in sociology but which is distinct from sociological practice precisely because sociology reflects on what is habitual and taken for granted and it questions what in everyday life is not normally questioned (Bauman 1990: 8 and passim). Where theoretical research is absent, even the sociology of everday life can be recog-

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nised as degenerate sociological study. This raises again the problem of control of the social sciences and their development. Besides, the theoretical question does not lend itself to any ready solutions today. The complexity and differentiation of collective life no longer leave the concept of "society" with the position of preeminence and the function of aggregation that it had until recent times. It has now become a question of transition from a 'coherent framework' constructed, often arbitrarily, from the image of society, to the multiplicity of relationships, often contradictory, which are formed in the process of interaction. Perhaps it is to the concept of "other" that we should give importance nowadays in our attempt at theory construction. It is a concept that can take on the central role in sociological discourse that the concept of "society" once played. Our attention should focus on the "other", his complexity and central role, the relationships of equality and difference that he sets up with us, the forms of control and reappropriation that we bring into being. In these terms the "other" may become one of the basic points of reference in sociological analysis. A concept which would take the place of the concept of "society", as we have said, if sociological analysis turns towards differentiation and the study of social processes; it is on the image of the "other" that in the strictest sense we build society first within ourselves and then in the forms that are expressed in everyday life. The dimension, the definition, the distance from the "other" - these are the bases for the construction of that societas activa that is firstly the product of our interior world and later the result of processes of interaction by means of which this world is put in its place and settles into the background. This entirely personal socialisation of the "other", expressed in both co-operative and conflictual forms, sparks off the ideas which produce and preserve collective life as we know it, transforms reality and gives depth and meaning to social action. One of the elements of crisis in modernity is precisely this that there has been a progressive superficialisation of the awareness of the "other" and yet on this awareness are based all the emotions that make up the fabric of social relations. Our experience with the "other" is first registered as emotion and only later as reason and norm. The economistic rationality, however, has reduced the "other" to a mere mathematical calculation or media image. This simplification has permitted more social relationships in quantitative terms but it has at the same time considerably weakened the roots of the social links. The consideration of the "other" and the dimensions we attribute to him in everyday encounters is therefore essential for understanding interaction relationships. The "other" is an image, the real and the ideal subject, in orientation to whom all behaviour is guided. In returning to consideration of these elements, in giving depth and complexity to the figure of the "other", European sociology may be opening up new paths to sociological understanding on a level with the integral humanism of origins.

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If in a European context sociological knowledge returns to reflection on the complexity of its subject, which goes far beyond the 'idea-image' of society, then a common work scheme could be put together, bearing in mind the national interests and traditions of the individual countries, which could develop a theoretically constructive comparative analysis of those social phenomena, institutions and cultural forms that have played a decisive role in modern times. I am thinking of institutions vital to modernity such as time, money, law, forms of representation, work and its transformations, mass communication and its effects, analysis of which might yield awarenesses of our historic epoch. On these and other themes typical of reflection on modernity as a European phenomenon one could and one should set up coordinated research and/or a comparative study for the development of knowledge. Far beyond the scope of schemes produced by economists and politicians for the rationalisation and globalisation of social relations, social experience maintains its own uniqueness, and presents a basic humanism that permits all experiences to be compared. It is in the very diversity of European culture that its wealth lies. Measurement of this diversity and comparison of the similarities of a common cultural experience could lead the way to a new phase in the development of sociological awareness, once again seen as critical consciousness of modernity.

References Barbano, F. 1989. La sociologia in Italia negli anni ottanta. Studi di Sociologia 4: 27-47. Bauman, Z. 1990. Thinking Sociologically. Oxford: Blackwell. Flam, H. 1990a. Emotional 'Man' I. Emotional Man and the Problem of Collective Action. International Sociology 5: 39-56. Flam, H. 1990b. Emotional 'Man' II. Corporate Actors as Emotion-Motivated Emotions Managers. International Sociology 5: 225-234. Lepenies, W. 1985. Die drei Kulturen. Soziologie zwischen Literatur und Wissenschaft. Munich, Vienna: Hanser. Merton, R. K. 1984. Socially Expected Durations: A Case Study of Concept Formation in Sociology. In W. W. Powell and R. Robbins (eds.), Conflict and Consensus - a Festschrift for L. A. Coser, pp. 262-283. New York: Free Press. Mongardini, C. 1973. Vilfredo Pareto dall'economia alia sociologia. Rome: Bulzoni. Mongardini, C. 1983. II Magico e il moderno. Milan: Angeli. Mongardini, C. 1985. Epistemologia e sociologia. Milan: Angeli. Mongardini, C. 1989. Saggio sul gioco. Milan: Angeli. Mongardini, C. 1990. Profili storici per la sociologia contemporanea. Rome: Bulzoni.

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Moscovici, S. 1988. La machine ä faire des dieux. Paris: Fayard. Sombart, W. 1970. L'Epoca della societä. Rome: Bulzoni. Tenbruck, F. W. 1981. Emile Dürkheim oder die Geburt der Gesellschaft aus dem Geist der Soziologie. Zeitschrift für Soziologie 10: 333-351. Weber, M. 1948. La scienza come professione. In M. Weber, Lavoro intellettuale come professione. pp. 5-43. Turin: Einaudi.

Part II Some National Traditions

The Changing British Role in European Sociology Martin

Albrow

Britain and Europe occupy the same one world. Britain not only has a relative autonomy within Europe, they both are exposed and related to that world in different ways. The result is a complex interweaving of their fates, following different courses, mutually influencing each other. The same is true of their sociologies. It could not be otherwise since sociology, expressing and depicting the society which bears it, in the long run always moves with the times. We shall take the long view in what follows. In the case of Britain we will find that sociology became an agent for the Europeanisation of her intellectual life as her historical sense of superiority in respect of both Europe and sociology gave way in the 1960s to an avid search for new ideas. In the case of Europe we will identify an equally profound break in the history of the discipline with the theme of culture supplanting the centuries-old dominant and characteristically European concern for class. The outcome of these two processes is a changed role for British sociology both in Europe and the world.

1 Britain versus Europe or Sociology as a Foreign Agent Sociologists have difficulty enough in recognising national boundaries in the construction of their discipline. It is all the more difficult then to identify the supra-national influence of an ill-defined area known as Europe. Socialist and conservative, Catholic and Protestant, French and German sociologies all compete for attention and inspire the adherents of our discipline, cross-cutting and obscuring any European identity in their production. The nature of Europe as a sociological entity is highly contestable.9 Nevertheless the European factor has always an identifiable dimension within British sociology and has never been far away as a reference point for studies which have sought to locate Britain within a wider social order. Indeed one 9

An example of such debate is contained in the recent exchange between Max Haller (1990, 1991) and Bernd Hamm (1991) where Haller affirms the usefulness of the nation-state as the basic unit for sociological analysis and Hamm calls for a recognition of the crossnational and incomplete nature of a European society.

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constant in the history of British sociology has been comparison with the neighbouring societies of Germany and France. Adam Ferguson's seminal Essay on the History of Civil Society (first published 1766) had no qualms about distinguishing the polished or civilised nations in Europe from the barbarous, savage or rude nations of the Arabs or Americans. The nations of Europe formed a group whose superior arts and discipline meant that "the Europeans have a growing ascendancy over the nations of Africa and America" (Ferguson 1782: 158). For Ferguson Europe was a group of nations in which weak states were preserved by the mutual jealousies of the strong (Ferguson 1782: 222) and where nations were distinguished as were private individuals by favourite ends and principal pursuits which resulted in differing manners and political establishments, a foreshadowing of the theory of comparative advantage. In general, however, what divided "the nation of Europe" (Ferguson 1782: 387), the polished nations, from the barbarous ones was far more important than the divisions between them. But we do find Ferguson alluding to a theme which was to be a constant refrain in the nineteenth century, namely the difference between the English and continental systems of government: Rome and England, under their mixed governments, the one inclining to democracy, and the other to monarchy, have proved the great legislators among nations. The first has left the foundation, and the great part of the superstructure of its civil code, to the continent of Europe: the other, in its island, has carried the authority and government of law to a point of perfection, which they never before attained in the history of mankind (Ferguson 1782: 278).

Quite apart then from any reflections on the character and institutions of France, Italy, and the German states in the nineteenth century, which were an inexhaustible topic for the travellers of the time, there was also a British as opposed to European dimension of debate which was reciprocated on both sides of the divide. It affected not just law and systems of government, but also philosophy and the practices of the arts and professions. The English were reputed to be pragmatic, empirical, used to self-government and individual freedom, respecters of tradition. Continental Europe worked from principles, rationalistic schemes which regularly infringed personal liberty. It was a refrain which coloured the initial reception of sociology in Britain. Its French origins were enough to make it open to suspicion for many, especially in so far as its ambitious claims for founding a new social order irritated the guardians of the existing state of Britain. It was a disdain which the proletarian Herbert Spencer was unable to shake. In the twentieth century the sense of superiority owned by the Victorians gave way to insecurity in the face of the growing power of the continental nations. Ferguson was one of those who earlier had addressed the issue of the decline of nations but in the nineteenth century the health of the nation-state became a

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standing topic for social scientific examination. At the end of that period the decline of Britain appeared to threaten as reality and came to dominate political discourse thereafter. This had a double significance for the reception of sociology. On the one hand intellectual traditions which were regarded as peculiarly vigorous and well founded in British culture were invoked to repel alien influences from Europe. Thus the widespread reception of German idealism before the First World War was stifled in the period afterwards. But Viennese positivism received a warmer welcome because of its perceived affinity with Hobbes, Hume and Mill. Some kinds of sociology, in particular theoretical work, were regarded as foreign and to be resisted. At the same time indigenous alternatives to sociology were promoted. Dürkheim, for instance, could be assimilated within social anthropology because his work harmonised with the British imperial expericence.10 Finally much work which in any other country would have been known as sociology and which continued traditions of social fact-finding for policy purposes and was associated with studies of conditions of the poor and disadvantaged was labelled as "social administration". On the other hand sociology as a foreign subject made headway with those who sought to arrest the perceived decline of Britain and to create a new social order after the destruction of the world wars. T. S. Eliot admired and supported the work of Karl Mannheim after his arrival in Britain in 1933 and it was this German refugee who founded perhaps the most extensive publisher's list of sociology in the world with Routledge's International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction. In the 1950s in the London School of Economics, which was to be the alma mater of academic sociology as it developed for the first time in Britain as an institutionalised discipline, the subject was experienced as a European and American product to be put to good use in creating a just society. Its foreignness became some kind of guarantor of new thinking. Max Weber and Talcott Parsons were enlisted in the cause of social engineering. It was then specifically as a 'modern' subject, representing advanced forms of social consciousness, capable of breaking the ingrained habits of generations that sociology finally made its big impact in Britain and it came with the support of a social democratic consensus on rational planning." Prime Minister Harold Wilson's famous "white heat of the technological revolution" encouraged not only the import of foreign goods. Foreign ideas found an equal welcome and sociology provided a cauldron of theoretical speculation such as Britain had not Wolf Lepenies has described how the guru of Cambridge literary studies, F. R. Leavis, argued that British society was far better understood through the novels of Jane Austen or George Eliot than through questionnaires but he was prepared to acknowledge the importance of good descriptive work in a cultural anthropological mode (Lepenies 1985: 181-186). For an account of the development of sociology in Britain after 1945 see Albrow (1989).

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experienced since the theological disputes in the middle of the seventeenth century. In this respect sociology did not deliver what had been expected. Rather than as trained social engineers, it was as radical critics of society with unconventional lifestyles that sociologists acquired a public image. The reaction to this kind of modernism came along with the political reaction in the 1980s to the consensus social democratic politics of the earlier period. Sociology was seen as a foreign, and now, as we shall see, largely European subject. It was also associated with the goals of leftist social reforms. Therefore it was on two counts antipathetic to the philosophy of Margaret Thatcher whose attachment to radical individualism was such that she famously declared on one occasion that "there is no such thing as society". It was Friedrich von Hayek rather than Karl Popper who became the favourite Austrian seer for the time. But he was employed to serve in the campaign against the bureaucracy of Brussels and the dream of a unified state of Europe. The parallelism between the fate of sociology in Britain, the character of the regime and the relationship with Europe, each changing with the other continues to the present. In the last months of 1990 British politics experienced an earthquake. The anti-Europeanism of Mrs Thatcher was a key factor in her enforced resignation and a new pro-European, ostentatiously listening form of government replaced her. The Times, still the voice of the Establishment, may be cited as witness to the corresponding change in the position of sociology. A leading article on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the British Sociological Association signals a new attitude: The warmed up Marxism which took hold during the 1960s was not so much a failing of sociology as a symptom of intellectual laziness and insecurity. It is now all but dead. British academic sociologists have failed to match the erudition and theoretical compass of the German-speaking exiles. A rare exception is W. G. Runciman whose recent Treatise on Social Theory owes much to Weber but little to Marx. Insofar as it ever offered a template for social engineering in Britain, sociology failed. As a tool of analysis, the study of social geography, or tribe and class, British sociology has hardly begun to realise its potential. No doubt some sociology departments are mediocre and riddled with social engineers. But reform not ridicule is the way to restore rigour to this branch of knowledge (The Times, 18.2.1991).

The significance of this is not the usual disparagement of the quality of sociological work, nor the reference to past failures. It is the recognition that sociology is here to stay. Moreover, its foreign inspiration is accepted, and foreign examples are even to be emulated. The reference to Runciman is equally significant. The Times goes on to suggest that he should be appointed by the government to conduct an enquiry into sociology. Certainly an outstanding scholar, Runciman (1983) has the added appeal to the Establishment that he is a member of the House of Lords and a businessman.

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In fact two month after this Times leader Runciman received a government appointment. He was named as Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Criminal Justice System which has been established in the aftermath of the freeing of the Birmingham six, the Irishmen wrongly imprisoned for fourteen years for a bomb outrage. No royal commissions were appointed during the Thatcher years and it would seem that the return to the British tradition of measured enquiries into the facts as a basis for legislation is now associated with sociology. It signals the end of an era for British politics, let alone for sociology. It makes a peculiarly appropriate juncture at which to assess the European character of the subject in Britain and the British contribution to a European sociology.

2 The Anglo-European Rapprochement in Sociology One historian of ideas, Noel Annan, who was both sympathetic to sociology and influential in its establishment in the 1960s has recalled how sociology was a word to be uttered "with terror or contempt or despair". The despair was "by those like myself who lamented that by dismissing sociology we showed deplorable insularity and impoverished numbers of kindred subjects such as history" (Annan 1990: 254-255). But Annan also points out that British scholars in fields akin to sociology have produced sociological work under other names and together they make a rich contribution. He instances Richard Hoggart for his Uses of Literacy (1957) or Raymond Williams' work on culture and society (1958), or Hugh Trevor-Roper's study of witchcraft (1978). He might have mentioned Edward Thompson on the working class (1963) or Joseph Needham on Chinese science (1954), even Bertrand Russell on power (1938), none of them professing sociologists, all enriching our understanding of society. Outstanding intellectuals all, but it is difficult to credit them with the kind of influence on European thought which their predecessors in the nineteenth century had. There is no one to compare with Mill or Spencer or Thomas Carlyle. In important respects indeed these scholars represent central aspects of a distinctive British tradition of intellectual life, fiercely independent, unwilling to become part of a school even when, like Williams, Thompson12 and Needham they are Marxists. What we find here is an evocation of the old English disregard for and suspicion of "theory", with that word conveying an overtone of Europeanism. The distinctive island tradition is felt to be more empirical, historical and individualistic.13 Yet British sociology has received theory in the period when it was supThompson, indeed has polemicised against a style of theorising, predominantly French, which he regards as antipathetic to the English humanism he advocates (Thompson 1978). Within sociology itself those traits are exemplified by Michael Young (e.g., 1960) who has probably captured a wider readership for empirically based community studies and social research generally than anyone else.

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posed to be engineering a new social order and as such has undergone a transformation in the last thirty years. In fact that reception of theory may prove to be the most significant aspect of the assimilation of British intellectual life to a common European tradition. The old contrasts between British empiricism and continental theory no longer hold especially since the reception of American empiricism into Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia in the post-1945 period. Britain has also received theorists, as opposed to their ideas only, which has immensely eased the reception of European theory. Karl Mannheim, Ralf Dahrendorf and Norbert Elias made a major impact on both British and European sociology while resident in Britain, and as the preeminent philosopher of social science, Karl Popper has made Britain a centre of intellectual pilgrimage. The vast expansion of sociology in the 1960s had to be staffed from somewhere and this provided opportunities for sociologists from a wide variety of European countries, from Poland Stanislav Andreski and Zygmunt Bauman, from Hungary Paul Haimos, from Czechoslovakia Viola Klein, from Italy Gianfranco Poggi, from Spain Salvador Giner, from Denmark John Westergaard, from Russia Teodor Shanin, and these are only some of the more senior figures. The British Department of Sociology is incomplete without its foreign members and in its cosmopolitanism is matched in Europe probably only by the Netherlands and perhaps Sweden. In the 1960s and 1970s British sociology became a battle field for differing theoretical perspectives. Max Weber was there from the beginning, as was American functionalism. Their influence was to be challenged by the rapid spread of Marxist and symbolic interactionist ideas. Distinct waves of French structuralism represented by Althusser and Poulantzas, Gramscian theory, Frankfurt School critical theory, Habermas and Foucault sustained the radical spirits. The Schutzian inspired work of Garfinkel and Cicourel set in train phenomenological research and enquiries which led to Husserl and Heidegger. More recently attention has moved to French psychoanalysis, literary theory, and the ideas of postmodernism, with Lacan, Derrida, and Baudrillard being the poles of attraction. None of this was what the proponents of democratic socialist planning in the 1960s had anticipated when they sponsored sociology and it was even further from the inclinations of the radical right which came to power in the 1980s. But it was precisely this oblique relation with political power, neither social engineering, nor voice of the Establishment, representing therefore an intellectual independence while absorbing the full weight of European intellectual movements, which finally shifted British social theory from its ousider position in European thought. In so doing it has prepared the ground for the fuller integration of Britain into Europe which is likely to be the dominant political thrust of the 1990s. The big argument is likely to be over whether this fundamental shift, which also affects disciplines such as philosophy, social psychology, political science,

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and the study of literature is itself a creative movement in its own right or whether it is merely an eclectic amalgamation of foreign ideas, a consumer taste for foreign products on a par with the British preference for foreign food and manufactures. For the right wing it represents a general deterioration in distinctively British ways, a collective identity crisis, for the left it signals the advanced state of postmodern culture where the lines of diverse historical and cultural traditions are encouraged to cross-cut and confuse each other as late-capitalism constructs new identities. For the centre, it could, like other absorptions of European methods, be regarded as the intimation of an emerging preparedness to take the leadership in the new Europe. There are several among the new wave of British theoreticians who can claim to have contributed to an emerging style of European theorising. They include what can be called the Lancaster school of sociology, including Nicholas Abercrombie (Abercrombie and Urry 1983; Abercrombie et al. 1986), Scott Lash (Lash and Urry 1987) and John Urry (1990). Bryan Turner of Essex University has often been associated with them and also been prolific in reinterpreting classic themes in new contexts (Turner 1984). All of them are equally at home in, and many have worked in continental settings as well and they address essentially a European audience. They have been closely associated with the journal Theory, Culture & Society, edited by Mike Featherstone of Teesside Polytechnic (Featherstone 1990a), one of the publishing success stories of the 1980s, seeking to theorise the transformations of mass culture, consumerism and political forces in the present period. Norbert Elias also inspired a number of British sociologists to follow his example in work within the general frame of the civilising process with its essentially Eurocentric world view. Stephen Mennell's studies of English and French cuisine (Mennell 1985) and Eric Dunning's work on sport (Elias and Dunning 1986) have to be seen as European products. Others have worked with Europeans, as much as with Britons, as their reference group. Tom Bottomore was one of the original founders of the European Centre of Sociology and the Archives Europeennes de Sociologie. Ernest Gellner (1983), Steven Lukes (1973), Margaret Archer (1979), and John Goldthorpe (1984) have been equally oriented towards Europe for intellectual stimulus and response. However, the real test of the thesis of the Europeanisation of British sociology and of any claim to be providing a new intellectual leadership must be contained in the evaluation of the contribution of Anthony Giddens who in the last twenty years has done more than anyone to provide a new brand image for British sociology. Over that period he has moved from re-examination of the European classics, through analysis of class and state, to exegesis of contemporary European theorists such as Gadamer and Habermas, and finally to an ambitious and extensive attempt to transcend the warring perspectives with his theory of structuration (Giddens 1984). The consistently high quality of his scholarship and astonishing productivity coupled with the evident continuous development of his

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thinking have made him the best representative of the new excitement in British sociology. He more than anyone else has absorbed the developments in European social theory of the last decades and his own construction is perhaps the best typification of European thought of the period. Is then the British mission destined to harmonise the discordant currents of European theory and to provide a new direction, in particular through Giddens' work? We will be in a better position to attempt an answer to those questions after hazarding an appreciation of the core features of European sociology.

3 Universalism and the Two Continents The difficulty in characterising European sociology is that essentially it has only one competitor at its own level of development and that is closely related and intertwined with it, namely American sociology. To that extent there is certainly some artificiality involved in counterposing them. Would it not be easier to think in terms of the one discipline, perhaps with differing national traditions? Easier, possibly, but the difficulty of the attempt does not make it impossible to detect underlying differences of emphasis attributable largely to the differing historical and cultural contexts of the two continents.14 European sociology was characterised from its birth with the twin marks of industrialisation and imperialism. The world order was to be understood by confronting the diversity of cultures with the universality of a rationality which had its home in Europe, while, looking within, the key problem was the transformation of the class structure with its attendant problems of state instability and individual alienation. It is not too arid a generalisation to say that these concerns were common to Spencer, Marx, Dürkheim and Weber. Class, the state and the individual were thematised as the core structural themes. In the twentieth century as the welfare state developed in response to the nineteenth century problems sociology in Europe took the major part of its own agenda from the emergent problems of that historical formation. Class, the state and the individual concretely were represented in sociology through innumerable studies of mobility, voting, equality of opportunity in work, education, health, welfare, justice. No wonder the classic theorists were invoked so often and reworked in every sociological institute. Marx, Weber and Dürkheim, however different in their approaches all addressed the problems to which the welfare state developed as an answer and the welfare state took the parametres they defined as central to the structuring of industrial society; work, occupational status and property as the basis of according citizenship rights. They became the In an interesting discussion of the possibilities of distinguishing American and European social psychology Doise (1986: 18) argues: "We believe we can realistically speak of a European trend in social psychology".

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theorists of the twentieth century because more than any other figures they provided an intellectual representation of its problems, which were repeated, moreover, in every nation-state. It was not the same in the United States. In many respects nothing better illustrates the difference than the inspiration derived there from Simmel who far outdistanced any other European figure in influence and whose interest in class was minimal. The pragmatic inversion of Kant's ideas by G. H. Mead, the social transformation of religious belief which Weber noticed, and the structuralfunctionalist paradigm of Parsons left structure as a function of culture, marginalised questions of class, and invoked values rather than the state; the American dream rather than the welfare state. The boundaries of the state, the question of citizenship and rights paled into insignificance alongside the questions of the individual's involvement in American culture, the assimilation of ethnic minorities, and the building of the American personality. These had little to do in the consciousness of sociologists with the state and class. It was a modern culture raised above such structures and the old European identities, so that Americanism became even an alternative kind of universalism, exportable in the form of development aid and assistance for modernisation. As such it was a new kind of imperialism, resented of administered empires only to find them replaced by a more resilient and penetrating Americanisation in films, food, technology, and capital. This was a clash of Titans over-towering the older division between Britain and continental Europe. Many would have liked to claim some kind of mediating role for Britain between old and new worlds. However, as far as sociology was concerned the encounter between America and Europe took place without any special role accorded to Britain, at least until the advent of Giddens. British impact on American sociology has been minimal and the reconstruction of German sociology after 1945 with American help guaranteed a direct continental reception of transatlantic methods and problem settings. For a brief time in the 1950s there did indeed seem to be a danger of the Americanisation of European sociology but the rediscovery of Max Weber and the rise of Western as opposed to Soviet Marxism ensured that the encounter developed into one of limited exchange and enduring tension. Whatever else the development of American sociology has shown, it is that the European experience of sociology is special and local, and that, however universal the claims, the historical context even of a large group of nation-states can confine and channel the diversity of experience into an identifiable and limited version of sociology. European and American sociology have traced different sources for a very long time and neither can claim to have transcended its own social and cultural origins. It is moreover all the easier to see this the longer the time span we consider. The fads and fashions of particular periods can be set in perspective and the interplay of social structural features and long term themes becomes more obvious. From this point of view asking questions now of

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the future of European sociology comes at an extraordinarily fascinating historical juncture. The revolutions in Eastern Europe, the re-unification of Germany, and perhaps the single market of 1993 mark a watershed as significant as the French Revolution. The creation of supra-national entities and the claims of minorities are equally signs of structural change which may signal a coming decisive turning point for sociology too. A European sociology for the twenty-first century is likely to be very different from its nineteenth and twentieth century predecessors.

4 The New European Sociology Let us speculate then, but using the same kinds of analysis which permitted the retrodictive judgements of the previous pages, in other words concentrating on the major structural features and the sociological themes which might correspond to them. Class, the welfare state, social justice, individual and society, that cluster which I have argued characterises the classic foundations and development of European sociology are likely to decline in significance. A new cluster will emerge, and, because nothing comes from nowhere, I am going to suggest that its anticipations are already with us, and that its subterranean existence can be traced back a long way. The geopolitical changes of recent years have brought the issue of European unity into the foreground and within the new greater Europe which follows the end of the Warsaw Pact the thirteen nation-states who make up the European Community are ceding ever growing power to the commission in Brussels. The powers the commission exercises are those of a state; the nation-states which adhere to the Treaty of Rome are less than autonomous. Those states were never single nations, however nation is defined, homes for dominant ethnic groups to be sure, but not confined within state boundaries, and some groups such as the Basques, the Bretons or the Welsh have never attained statehood. Increasingly the state has to be seen, not as a bounded entity, but as a sub-set of the formal powers which are exercised globally by a host of agencies, claiming jurisdiction over people, activities and territories which are not coterminous with each other. Moreover those powers are hierarchically organised, sometimes explicitly so, as with the principle of subsidiarity, to deprive the nation-state of its privileged status. The interests of the higher level of the commission in Brussels are served by seeing states as an intermediate layer and it is consistent with this to promote the importance of regional and local levels of administration below the state. Implicit in these developments is the weakening of the assumption of a tie between state and nation and an encouragement for minorities, whether indigenous or immigrant to make larger claims for representation and resources.

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At first sight the opposite process is at work in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, namely, old supra-national structures are giving way to the claims of suppressed national identities which can lay claim to full statehood. In fact the groups which claim independence are never more than the majority group in a territorial area and their successful claim to statehood would only lead to a replication of the same problems in a larger number of smaller areas. The similarity between these cases and the Western European one is that the state/nation relationship has become even more problematical. The convergence is on a problem not a solution, and it is not one which will be resolved in the old way of redrawing state boundaries. The simultaneous merging and hierarchisation of state powers leaves minority groups struggling with each other for advantage, not in a market place, nor in an organised political forum but in a field of forces where the chance of taking control of the state recedes all the time. Nor is it only ethnic groups which struggle to maintain their identity. Affiliations of every kind, local, linguistic, religious, ideological, identities acquired through education, work solidarities of generation, gender, sexual orientation offer themselves to individuals as alternative foci for loyalty and group formation, cross-cutting each other and national and class boundaries. The process which was so brilliantly analysed by Simmel has intensified throughout the century to the point where the struggle to define and assert the collective actor appears to be the transformative social process supplanting the older process of parties, based on classes using political power for their own class interests. Now the green or women's movements can exercise such diffuse influence over markets and voting behaviour that businessmen and politicians become mood merchants, attempting to anticipate and respond to a collective opinion which knows no boundaries. Power has shifted from producers to consumers, tastes rather than needs reign supreme. Of course this process does not signify the end of classes or even the welfare state in Europe. Property, market position, control over the process of production remain salient features of the structuring of society in the twentieth century but they are no longer the engine room of history, or the engine room has at least been automated. The internationalisation of capital, coupled with its growing institutional control and the spread of property ownership in Western countries, has diffused and depersonalised the class struggle in Europe and shifted its locus to the international division of labour and to the North-South divide. This is a fateful division and it will be worked out on a global scale, in comparison with which Europe and its sociology have only local significance. But it is with Europe that we are concerned, and here the class struggle will recede as much into the background as it has done in the United States. Therefore we may anticipate some degree of convergence between American and European sociology to the extent that culture and values replace class and interests as the focus of attention. In both cases postmaterialist values associated with affluence, consumerism, the decentering of the state, the environment, worn-

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en's rights and issues of federalism, immigration and world-role provide a sufficiently similar list of agenda items to make convergence of sociological themes on a wider front likely (Inglehart 1990)15. It is a secular shift which underpins the recent insistence that analytically we must move beyond the conflation of culture and structure which has characterised so much of sociological theory (Archer 1988). However, this Western emphasis on autonomous cultural currents serves to highlight points of difference which are going to be the headline features of what will be seen as a specifically European sociology. This is where, despite a common emphasis on culture, Europe and America will retain destinctive sociological orientations. We can best explain what this difference is likely to be by turning to the consequences for analytical sociology of the historical peculiarities of American society. Sociology arose there within the framework of an already existing federal state in which the original religious faith of the settlers had been transferred to a collective mission and a belief in American values transcending ethnic origin or sectional interest. Whether in a symbolic interactionist or structural functionalist interpretation it was the fate of the American to acquire through other people a belief in the transcending moral order which was the United States. In both sociological paradigms values, roles and institutions guaranteed the effective socialisation of the American, and the social order arose out of their benign influence. In Europe on the other hand the nation-state has embodied administrative rationality, with management functions certainly, serving however a traditional status order, powerful families and the imputed bonds of common descent, atavistic forces all. Even the slogans of the French Revolution did not wrest the French state from Frenchmen and they were to become ideological weapons in the class struggle rather than common values creating a new nation. The American dream is a faith, to be sure, but it is more a commitment to transcendental values. In Europe the bonds of nationhood reside in no contract between men and God but inhabit darker recesses. Inchoate forces bond people and lead them to their destinies. God judges outcomes rather than steers the course of action. Nations are facticities rather than contracts between believers. Problematising the relation between nation and state destabilises the rational institutionalisation of passionate group action which the territorial arrangements of the Cold War guaranteed. The rationality of the European nation-states, once separated from the nationalism it served, cannot be transferred to a location in Brussels and retain a sacred legitimation. There has been no "Declaration of Independence" in which the shared experience and struggles of people in a New Inglehart argues that culture has become a crucial factor in advanced industrial society because scarcity has diminished and that the shift to postmaterialism is a generational shift of values.

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World could express their common commitment, only a treaty between states which established an interstate bureaucracy. So values will be talked of in the new Europe as in the United States but in the former they symbolise, rather than God and the American dream, the emergence of groups determined to assert their distinct identities. That can only be reinforced by developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. There is a new frontier where there was once an Iron Curtain, beyond which the countries of Western Europe will seek to expand their influence by competing for the energies and allegiances which the collapse of communism releases. Capitalism itself cannot structure those societies, any more than it is sufficient in any other part of the world. The market frame will be provided by whatever authority serves to bond people into regimes, and ethnic identity is likely to provide the most potent, and simultaneously most unstable source of that authority. But it is not only national or ethnic identity which will become a mobilising force in the coming period. The simple loosening of bonds between state and nation will free affective forces to find expression in a variety of settings. The power of consumers, with greater wealth at their disposal than ever before and greater discretionary income ensures the means for self-expression, but at the same time is less confined by the organisations of industrial capitalism. The sophistication of the market parallels the individualisation of life-style and makes the quest for personal identity more fraught than ever. Class position has ceased to provide the basis for social identity and the absorption of the greater part of the female population into the labour force has shaken patriarchy in the family and led many to find their identity in women's movement. When there are as many market positions as people, life chances may be bewilderingly diverse but class ceases to be an basis for mobilisation. The market still revolutionises society by its differential impact on, and capacity to disturb social relationships, but capitalism has moved beyond class society. These developments signal a profound break for European sociology. Until recently it has been dominated by class and the state as themes, in which individuals overcome their alienation through projects of collective actors aspiring to change the social system. The fact that such projects have not succeeded has had its theoretical repercussions in that the class/state theme and the individual/society theme have been conflated in the idea of recursive practices which overcome the structure-agency dichotomy and provide easily for social reproduction (Giddens 1984). The structuration of collective actors unites individual purpose and collective power struggle in ways which reproduce the social system. This is equally the thrust of Alain Touraine's project to reorganise sociological knowledge around the idea of the social movement which he defines as "the organised collective behaviour of a class actor struggling against his class adversary for the social control of historicity in a concrete community" (Touraine 1981: 77). But there is also an explicit recognition here that movements are no longer directed against the state, but against other adversaries. At another point

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he declares that society has disappeared leaving only economic fluctuations and the invention of personal culture.16 If Giddens marks the culmination of a theoretical direction, in Touraine we can see intimations of its dissolution. For the cultural currents and movements inspired by deconstitution of society cannot contain all the forces released by the separation of state from nation and affectivity generally. The new European sociology will seek to capture the character of these forces at their point of activation.17 This is not a complete break with the past, on the contrary it represents the resurgence of a side of European sociology which was repressed so long as Marxism set the agenda. One could call it the Nietzschean moment, but that narrows too greatly the broadly existentialist thrust of European sociological thinking which has placed the salvation of the individual at the centre of its concerns. Clearly it leaves Max Weber as the only classic figure who can do justice to both the class/state theme and the fate of the modern individual, but in recent times the most important contributions have been French, with Michel Foucault's the most prominent.18 Where will this leave the British contribution in the new European sociology? The image of a discipline concerned to register the emotive turbulence and new quests of an age of insecurity sits uneasily with many past stereotypes of British intellectuals, pragmatic, analytical and empirical. The new European sociology may not be grand rationalistic theory, but neither will it be modest empricism. In fact, however, as I have argued, British sociology has now been Europeanised and it will play a full part in the new European sociology. But to some extent it will now have a special role too. The new directions for European sociology do not come about because capitalism has come to an end. On the contrary, the globalisation of capital has simply shifted the focus away from Europe and the class struggles of industrial society towards the NorthSouth divide and the newly industrialising countries. Britain, with its experience of Empire, is strategically located to register these developments. It has become an entrepot for ideas, not just on a European scale but a world scale. In Europe only the Netherlands has been exposed to quite such a melange of diverse intel-

"La societe a disparu. Les situations et les conduites sont devenues des mondes etrangers l'un ä l'autre. D'un cote, on ne voit plus que l'economie en croissance ou en crise et des strategies internationales; de l'autre, nous ne reagissons qu'ä l'experience vecu, personelle, ä l'invention d'une culture. Entre le monde et le moi, entre la force et 1'expansion, il n'y a rien ou presque rien" (Touraine 1977: 7). Derrida's and Foucault's strategies of deconstruction have been preparatory for a new period in which repressed moments will find their own means of expression. In this sense deconstruction does not go far enough. For a critique of deconstruction from the standpoint of a present and active force, feminism, see Erica Burman (1990). For a British interpretation of the construction of subjectivity in the modern world where Foucault is the inspiration, see Nikolas Rose (1989).

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lectual currents and that culture has much greater difficulty in diffusing its own products. Britain has become the experimental theatre of the postmodern world, open through a world language to cultural imprints from anywhere, and as such well placed to give advance warning to her European partners of what a future global culture may portend. In spite, therefore, of concentrating and amalgamating so much of the diversity of European ideas in recent decades she retains still a relative degree of marginality, not just territorially but also culturally to Europe, while acting as a key interface on global issues. We thus can expect the British to continue to preach the need not to lose sight of the place of Europe in a wider world.19

References Abercrombie, N. and J. Urry 1983. Capital, Labour and the Middle Classes. London: Allen & Unwin. Abercrombie, N., S. Hill and B. S. Turner 1986. Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism. London: Allen & Unwin. Albrow, M. 1989. Sociology in the United Kingdom After the Second World War. In N. Genov (ed.), National Traditions in Sociology, pp. 194-219. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: Sage. Albrow, M. and E. King (eds.) 1990. Globalization, Knowledge and Society. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: Sage. Annan, N. 1990. Our Age: Portrait of a Generation. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Archer, M. S. 1979. Social Origins of Educational Systems. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: Sage. Archer, M. S. 1988. Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press. Burman, E. 1990. Differing with Deconstruction: A Feminist Critique. In I. Parker and J. Shorter: Deconstructing Social Psychology, pp. 208-220. London: Routledge. Doise, W. 1986. Levels of Explanation in Social Psychology. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press. Elias, Ν. and Ε. Dunning 1986. The Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process. Oxford: Blackwell. Recent examples include the special issue of Theory, Culture & Society entitled Global Culture (Featherstone 1990b). There was also a strong British contribution towards defining the theme "Sociology for One World: Unity and Diversity" for the 1990 World Congress in Madrid (see Albrow and King 1990: 1-13). A new venture is the series begun by Harvester Wheatsheaf Press entitled "Social Change in Global Perspective", edited by Leslie Sklair. For the first volume in this series see Sklair (1991).

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Featherstone, M. 1990a. Consumer Culture and Postmodernism. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: Sage. Featherstone, M. (ed.) 1990b. Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: Sage. Ferguson, A. 1782. Essay on the History of Civil Society. London: Cadell. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Giddens, Α. 1984. The Constitution of Society. Cambridge, GB: Polity Press. Goldthorpe, J. H. (ed.) 1984. Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon. Haller, M. 1990. The Challenge for Comparative Sociology in the Transformation of Europe. International Sociology 5: 183-204. Haller, M. 1991. Reply to Bernd Hamm's Critique. International Sociology 6: 117-121. Hamm, Β. 1991. Comparative versus Evolutionary Approaches to European Society. International Sociology 6: 111-115. Hoggart, R. 1957. The Uses of Literacy. London: Chatto & Windus. Inglehart, R. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lash, S. and J. Urry 1987. The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge, GB: Polity Press. Lepenies, W. 1985. Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press. Lukes, S. 1973. Emile Dürkheim: His Life and Work. London: Allen Lane. Mennell, S. 1985. All Manners of Food. Oxford: Blackwell. Needham, J. 1954. Science and Civilization in China. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press. Rose, N. 1989. Governing the Soul: Technologies of Human Subjectivity. London: Routledge. Runciman, W. G. 1983. A Treatise on Social Theory, vol. 1. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press. Russell, B. 1938. Power: A New Social Analysis. London: Allen & Unwin. Sklair, L. 1991. Sociology of the Global System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Thompson, E. P. 1963. The Making of the English Working Class. London: Gollancz. Thompson, E. P. 1978. The Poverty of Theory. London: Merlin Press. Touraine, A. 1977. La societe invisible: Regards 1974-76. Paris: Seuil. Touraine, A. 1981. The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press. Trevor-Roper, H. R. 1978. The European Witch Craze in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. London: Penguin. Turner, B. S. 1984. The Body and Society. Oxford: Blackwell. Urry. J. 1990. The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: Sage.

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Williams, R. 1958. Culture and Society: 1789-1950. London: Chatto & Windus. Young, M. 1960. Family and Class in a London Suburb. London: Routledge.

A Marginal Discipline in the Making: Austrian Sociology in a European Context Christian Fleck and Helga

Nowotny

This paper aims to trace the development of the main strands of sociological thought in Austria, to present characteristic research conducted by Austrian sociologists and to provide an answer to the question which European schools have influenced sociology in Austria and, if this is found to be the case, which Austrian ideas have possibly pervaded European sociology. The title and context of this essay give the impression that within the sociological discourse there is a clear definition of what the term "European" refers to. Even at the risk of being redundant we feel a few introductory thoughts and explanations concerning the term "European" are called for. Sociology is of course fundamentally a European endeavour whose cognitive origins are rooted in the philosophy of the Europe of the Enlightenment. Its founding fathers would hardly have begun to see themselves as sociologists (or, if this neologism had not been coined by Comte, or if it had been disregarded, under some other coextensional name) without the social impetus that was provided by the industrial revolution and required the treatment of the so-called social question. In this paper we are obviously less interested in the common origin that all sociologies can be traced back to, but rather in questions such as, "What common features do the sociologies in the different European countries share?", "How do they differ?", and, "How do they relate to non-European schools?" Yet, is not North-American sociology also rooted in the world of thought of the Enlightenment period and its concomitant, the 'bourgeois revolution'? And then, did not close and very close relations exist between the sociologists in Europe and overseas at the beginning of the twentieth century, as both sides were engaged in the struggle for the official recognition of their field and tried to secure a place in universities for the budding science? Yet, rather than drawing up an over-detailed and sophisticated 'Geistesgeschichte', our approach to this question of the European character of sociology and Austria's contribution to it will be restricted to a straightforward account of instances of cognitive exchange and institutional cooperation. If evidence of cooperation and mutual inspiration is found at this modest level one might then perhaps go a step further and investigate whether the European sociology thus constituted is distinct from the other sociologies in the world.

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This view also implies that we do not share the widespread opposition to the Americanisation (at least) of postwar sociological studies; the following explanations will show why we object to this position. If we agree to talk of "Austrian" sociology this means that we unthinkingly share the opinion that there is not only the scientific discipline "sociology" in Austria, but that it actually possesses distinctive features. As remains to be shown, such a tacit acceptance of this stance is problematic from a long-term historical perspective, even if it cannot be denied that Austrian sociology displayed, and still displays, a number of characteristics which could be considered specifically Austrian. If we apply the simple criteria outlined by Shils (1970) for the assessment of the degree of institutionalisation of sociology in the various countries and periods, such as university training opportunities, the availability of specialised publications, public demand for research projects and government subsidies for their implementation, then sociology in Austria is just a quarter of a century old. The first journal that can be regarded as a strictly sociological publication was founded in the early 1960s, approximately at the same time as postgraduate degrees and, a little later, undergraduate degrees, were instituted.20 The first chairs of sociology were not established until the mid-1960s.21 Public demand and funds for sociological research projects were first made available in the early 1970s. Prior to this date, research projects - if empirical studies were carried out at all - were financed by the Catholic church (from 1950), by local authorities (from the late 1950s) and foreign, especially US foundations (above all the Ford Foundation). This picture of normal scientific development is completed by adding some of the more outstanding events of the recent past. In the last few years the first generation of professors of sociology, who had in fact graduated in sociology, has been appointed to chairs22, and over the next few years their former teachers, most of whom had not received any formal training in sociology at university, will retire. On the account the most fundamental precondition for the discussion of Austria's contribution to a European sociology seems to be met: A scientific community indeed exists. A more critical look at the situation will show, however, that this consolidation at the national level was (and is) accompanied by increased provincialism and a twofold isolation from the international context: The journal Die Meinung was founded under the patronage of Lazarsfeld in 1961; in 1969 Angewandte Sozialforschung was first published, and in 1976 the journal Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie. The first course in sociology was set up in 1963 at the Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) (Institute for Advanced Studies); the first university degree courses were established in 1966. At the end of the 1960s nine chairs were founded or taken up; in 1990 fifteen full professors and six associate professors were teaching sociology in Austria. Even though usually only as associate professors.

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Austrian sociology is unknown outside the country; and Austrian sociologists care little whether they are intellectually represented and acknowledged abroad. No matter which indicators one chooses to apply (membership of editorial boards of foreign journals, translations into other European languages, recognition at least in the other German-speaking countries, editorships, contribution to journals, anthologies, encyclopaedias, awards, honorary doctorates, appointments as honorary or visiting professors, etc.) one will very rarely find Austrian sociologists whose activities would concentrate on interests abroad. The alpine provincialism that this isolation reflects is much less a consequence of the relative smallness of the country, its institutions, financial and personal resources, than a result of several waves of devastation which swept through Austria's intellectual world during the twentieth century. A closer look at the history of sociological thought and research in Austria should be able to reveal how the current situation came about. Moreover, we hope that such a review might inspire comparative studies, which could be of particular interest to those countries and societies which have experienced similar personal and/or intellectual discontinuities. At the same time this review will make evident that Shils' (1970) conditions might perhaps be significant indicators of the success of institutionalisation, yet they are rather arbitrary guides when cognitive productivity and intellectual creativity are to be assessed.

1 Early Cosmopolitanism without an Institutional Basis: From the Beginnings to the Second World War While sociology as institutionalised science, as the introduction showed, is a relatively recent development, its intellectual history has a much longer tradition. Sociology in Austria is generally said to have begun with Ludwik Gumplowicz. It seems reasonable to follow this approach here, especially as certain universally applicable features become particularly apparent in the work and life of Gumplowicz. Our interest in Gumplowicz is not so much engendered and justified by the cognitive content of his work - which clearly sets him apart from the so-called classic authors of the discipline - as by the fact that certain scientific and sociological insights can be traced in his oeuvre which merit our attention (Mozetic 1985). Contrary to his own claim to abstraction, i.e., that he had founded an ultimately non-instrumental, science-based sociology, the strongest impetus for his work came from his own personal experiences in the Polish national movement.23 His reputation as the original proponent of the conflict perspective in non-Marxist social theory derives largely from his discussion of the question of inter-ethnic conflicts which led him to postulate a model of His Polish origins and lifelong connection with Poland resulted in Florian Znaniecki portraying him as a "Polish sociologist" in 1931 (Znaniecki and Znaniecki 1932: 227).

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circularity of (the domination of) social groups. As professor of State and Administrative Sciences, a post he held for several decades, he developed in the provincial isolation of the University of Graz a sociological theory of the state which was based on two central concepts, the theory of superposition and an interclass model: Conquering ethnic groups (regrettably referred to as "races" by Gumplowicz, although he cannot by any means be accused of being racist) subject the local population to be subsequently subjugated by the this time neutral intermediate class. Following Gumplowicz, what starts out as regional ethnic mobility later develops into an innerstate conflict between dominant, ascending and dominated classes. The relatively limited impact and influence of Gumplowicz' work is ultimately due to social causes: His refusal to travel for family reasons drastically restricted intellectual exchanges; moreover, he found no followers or supporters amongst his colleagues and students, in fact, in later years he probably no longer tried to find any. Nevertheless, he received recognition (from colleagues abroad) and, as terrible autrichien, he won the respect of the international, i.e., at that time, the European sociological scientific community. One of the centres of this recognition was Rene Worms' Institut International de Sociologie, which elected Gumplowicz vice-president in 1895 and appointed him president in 1909, the year of his death. Incidentally a number of other Austrian social scientists also worked at this institute (Müller 1989: 3; Stölting 1986: 63-64). In the first decade of the twentieth century, the last years of Gumplowicz' life, it looked as if sociology in Austria had developed a firm basis (Fleck 1990). Despite all their differences over details, the founding fathers of Austrian sociology shared a common, taken-for-granted cosmopolitanism which was ultimately the result of their uncomplicated multilingualism and the fact that the number of sociologists that at the time made up the sociological scientific community in Europe was very limited. Nobody resorted to national isolationism, neither what concerns their social or political stance, nor their theoretical approach. At the turn of the century, Austrian sociologists fully participated in the international discourse of social scientists, which was conducted at the time in Europe, and their works were perceived and discussed abroad, even though - with the exception of Gumplowicz and two rather marginal authors, Albert Schäffle and Gustav Ratzenhofer - they never succeeded in constructing the same major systematic sociologies as Georg Simmel and Emile Dürkheim had (who in the first decade of the twentieth century were the most respected and renowned foreign sociologists in Vienna).24 There are several reasons why their ceuvre was rather limited; the principal reason was the rather delicate professional position of the

In 1907, Simmel gave the opening lecture at the founding meeting of the Viennese Sociological Society, and Dürkheim's Les Regies de la methode sociologique (1894) were first published in 1908 in German by the Philosophisch-soziologische Bücherei for which Rudolf Eisler worked as editor.

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majority of authors: Either they were typical private scholars (as for example Rudolf Goldscheid, Rudolf Eisler and the Austrian Marxists, Max Adler, Rudolf Hilferding, Otto Bauer) or they were forced to eke out a living by engaging in activities which had little to do with sociology or even scientific activity, and by teaching sociology as private lecturers at the University of Vienna, in departments which often were opposed to sociology (e.g., Ludo M. Hartmann and Wilhelm Jerusalem). These circumstances explain why productive authors never found the time to develop comprehensive theses which could have approached the model character of Kuhn's paradigms. A further characteristic of the first Austrian sociologists is their rather too early specialisation and concentration on applied fields of sociology. We have good reason to suggest that the beginnings of the sociology of knowledge, law, and finance can be traced back to the works of Austrian authors (Jerusalem, Eugen Ehrlich and Karl Renner, Goldscheid and Joseph Schumpeter). The First World War brought this founding era to an end; the war represented not just an external political break with the past, it destroyed the self-assured, even takenfor-granted confidence of a sociology which promoted and cognitively permeated social progress. The war effectively silenced most of its proponents, after they had tried - and this is a point which has to be emphasized in this context during the first two years of the war, to integrate war as a social phenomenon into their sociological doctrines, to control it intellectually, to comprehend it, as Jerusalem did, as an expression of the secular tendency towards individualisation (Jerusalem 1915). For the next five years Austrian sociology was to remain silent. If we try to summarise this first stage, the following aspects will probably have to be stressed: 1. As regards their status within institutions, the founding fathers of Austrian sociology were marginalised; Gumplowicz can almost be considered the epitomic 'marginal man'. 2. As regards their intellectual roots, they were influenced by evolutionary theory, interpreted in terms of social reform, although they never adopted racist, social-Darwinist doctrines. 3. A number of the pre-war sociologists achieved recognition outside the German-speaking area: Ehrlich and his sociology of law deserve mentioning here, as do Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer and Jerusalem. 4. As regards their theoretical approach, Austrian sociologists (with the exception of Gumplowicz) show a close affinity with Ernst Mach's philosophy, whose methodological principles, even though they were geared primarily to the natural sciences, might have been developed into a successful methodology for the social sciences. (The following are just a few aspects that could have served as a common basis: Mach emphasizes the common sense approach, the continuity of everyday and scientific knowledge; he adopts a

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residual concept of the "self' which is structurally similar to the self-concept of Symbolic Interactionism; the economy principle of explanation and his thesis that science had to describe as law-based explanations were unable to offer further knowledge [Haller and Stadler 1988].) Before the First World War, Austrian sociology was cosmopolitan to a degree which was never achieved again. But this exchange of ideas had no institutional consequences, and was rather one-way as fewer ideas were imported than exported. Although we must add that the ideas that were exported at the time rarely survived for long in their pure, undiluted form.

2 The Advantages of Non-professionalism: Austrian Social Sciences in the Interwar Period The First World War and the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had a major impact on social sciences in Austria (Fleck 1990). Financial and institutional restrictions soon induced the first brain drain in the 1920s.25 University posts went to proponents of an obscurantist social theory: Othmar Spann's blend of German Romanticism, organicism, a version of corporatism and fanatical political Catholicism supplanted all other social-scientific theories (even the long-established Austrian School of Economics lost ground). In the First Republic, sociological studies had to be conducted within the framework of other disciplines, or outside the universities. Two examples will suffice: After Karl Bühler took up his post at the University of Vienna in 1923, he (with the help of Charlotte Bühler and a ten-year grant from the Rockefeller Foundation) developed a managerial research structure which was completely new to the humanities and social sciences in Austria. Under the Bühlers and their assistant Egon Brunswik, their only collaborator whose salary was paid by the university, graduate theses were no longer isolated pieces of scientific writing but integrated contributions to a comprehensive, long-term research project. Close cooperation with the Vienna City Council facilitated psychological field and laboratory research. As a result of the excellent reputation that the Bühlers enjoyed and their frequent engagements as visiting professors in the United States, the Department of Psychology in Vienna developed into a centre of academic research (like psychoanalysis outside the universities). This was the environment in which Paul Lazarsfeld began his socialpsychological research before he became self-employed and established his own research institute (Österreichische Wirtschaftspsychologische Forschungsstelle).

Joseph Schumpeter, Emil Lederer, Carl Grünberg, Jacob Moreno, Karl Pribram and Hans Kelsen left Austria during this decade.

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Of lesser importance as regards the material results, yet equally remarkable as an institutional innovation, was the Department of Women's Affairs in the Chamber of Labour, which was headed by Käthe Leichter and which carried out a number of surveys concerning working women, a study of women in society, before such a concept existed. The weakness of these studies was that they lacked professionalism: Leichter had been a student of Max Weber, but later she was unable to keep up with the research and debates which were carried on in the field of social science. It is indicative that her fieldworkers were not students but factory workers and trade-union members who were eager to learn and acquire education. As a consequence, their studies show a high degree of familiarity with the field and thus escape the sterile abstruseness which characterises many contemporary scientific publications; on the other hand, however, they lack references to the theoretical discourse and take no account of methodological development. Even though aspiring social scientists were effectively barred from the one institution that under normal circumstances should be primarily responsible for this discipline, i.e., the universities, a younger generation of academics picked up the thread where it had been cut during the First World War, although they largely ignored the theoretical work of the pre-war sociologists (to give just one example: In the 1920s, Gumplowicz was in effect no longer read) and refrained from using the label "sociology" for their research. Although circumstances were far from favourable, their work covers a surprisingly wide range. Most of the authors of important sociological studies were forced to accept employment in unrelated professions in order to secure a living. The following are just a few examples of the range of posts they held: banker (Alfred Schütz), company manager (Felix Kaufmann), director of a museum (Otto Neurath), journalist (Karl Polänyi), lawyer (Max Adler), teachers in primary school (Marie Jahoda), secondary (Paul Lazarsfeld) and adult education (Edgar Zilsel). It is true, the consequences of this double footing in society were not all negative. However, the exclusion of the sociological discourse from the universities and its restriction to private circles proved detrimental, as they did not have the resources to provide the institutional structures that would have been necessary to successfully promote the transnational exchange of ideas. In this context it is important to note, though, that the interwar period saw a similar trend towards national isolationism in other countries as well (Wagner 1991). They were unable to reconstruct the fragile international network that had existed before the war. Their failure was probably also due to a growing tendency towards (political) nationalism on the part of the social scientists, who increasingly concentrated their efforts on the consolidation of their profession within the confines of the nation-state. It is indicative that drastically fewer translations of the writings of foreign sociologists were published, which was probably a result of the economic depression, yet had unintended consequences, as more recent works by the members of the international scientific community remained largely un-

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known outside their own language areas. A corollary of this development was the rise of the United States to the leading - because, already then, the wealthiest - scientific power. A telltale sign of this development was the great importance that was attributed to the fellowships of the Rockefeller Foundation. Many younger, and later often famous, social scientists took this opportunity and established the contacts which a few years later facilitated their emigration to the United States. Study visits, and the resultant exchange of ideas inside Europe seem to have played a less important role. The curricula vitae of this generation of sociologists no longer included references to periods of study at other German-speaking universities which for earlier generations had almost been unavoidable; and likewise, few longer visits to France or England seem to have been made, although the same applies in the other direction.26 However, the advantages of this non-professionality, at least from a historical point of view, outweigh the disadvantages: The mobility of sociologists through various professions and environments obviously benefited their work. In contrast to sociologists today, whose curricula vitae prove that they never ventured outside the academic world, and merely proceed from one position to another inside the educational system, the sociologists of the inter-war period were forced to concentrate on the development of their themes, i.e., to pursue long-term objectives in their work, which meant they published less, yet their publications were more refined, more complete. They did not have the current bad habit of 'recycling' over and over again even the most trivial ideas. Their practical experience is also reflected in their sociological work and professional practice: Just remember the striking clarity and power of expression that characterises the work of those writers who were also engaged in adult education or worked for the social democratic education centre. The most famous representative of this group is Paul Lazarsfeld, who realised this himself and summarised it in the aphorism that in later years he led all his research teams like a socialist youth group. The institutional changes, which we can only hint at here (and which have by no means been sufficiently researched, especially as regards the one aspect which is interesting from a point of view of the history of science, i.e., the funding of European social science through the Rockefeller Foundation), are reflected at the cognitive level in a two-fold manner. Relatively unaffected by this enforced movement towards localism were the contributions to sociological theories and methodologies; nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that relatively few publications dealt with sociological theory in its narrow meaning. The authors who today are generally considered the classics (Dürkheim, Weber, Simmel, Pareto, to name just the most important ones) were An exception were the foreign adherents and students of the Vienna Circle, of the Psychoanalytical Association and of Bühler's department; as far as we can trace, the largest number of students seems to have again come from the US.

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practically never featured in discussions.27 There are, however, two exceptions: One of these is Austro-Marxism which was able to maintain an uninterrupted debate despite the break brought about by the First World War, and which continued its admittedly inherently Marxist, yet undogmatic discourse after the war even though the majority of the authors who originally belonged to this school now were active politicians and rarely published purely sociological works (Mozetic 1987). The second exception is some of the work by Max Weber, whose methodology was further developed by Alfred Schütz in his Sinnhafter Aufbau der sozialen Welt (The Phenomenology of the Social World) (1932). It was only in the 1970s that Austrian sociologists began to acknowledge the work of Schütz, as they were introduced by American tributes to Schütz and his work during his years of emigration. In this context we should also mention Felix Kaufmann's Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften (1936) (Methodology of the Social Sciences, 1944) which emerged out of his intellectual exchange with the Mises Circle, of which he and Schütz were members, and the Vienna Circle where Kaufmann first heard of Otto Neurath's proclamation in favour of the unity of science. The best known Austrian work in the field of social research is Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal (Lazarsfeld-Jahoda and Zeisel 1933), which Lazarsfeld, Jahoda, and Zeisel wrote without having had any contact with other social scientists in Europe (Fleck 1990; Nowotny 1983). The authors had received their training in psychology under Bühler and in an intellectual environment which was dominated by Austro-Marxism. This ethnographic study of the life of the long-term unemployed (which they referred to as sociography without knowing of the efforts by German [Tönnies, Geiger] and Dutch [Steinmetz] sociologists, who had used the same label) was like their market research, which they also conducted, albeit to a lesser degree, influenced by American examples, if at all: Lynd and Lynd's (1929) Middletown and their market research. Yet even this influence should not be overstressed. Marienthal's originality derives from its concentration on content and its readiness to adopt a new methodological approach irrespective of what standard procedures were propounded by the sociologists in the academic world. The awareness of the problem stems from the integration of the young social psychologists in a (social democratic) social movement; the necessary methodological, argumentative and technical rigorism had been drummed into them by their mentor Karl Bühler, and their research was financed by the Vienna Chamber of Labour and the Rockefeller Foundation. This constellation - the feeling of belonging to a certain environment, cautious control by an older and experienced scientist, funds given by people who did not try to interfere, and innovative researchers - can hardly be thought of as a genThe level of discussion of this and other authors is highlighted in a book which was published after the death of most of them: Menzel, Adolf, Grundriß der Soziologie. (Menzel 1938).

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eral model, partly because it lacks a stable structural basis, but as a happy moment in the history of science. It is at least informative as it clearly shows what factors were responsible for the positive outcome - even though internationality was one of them only with the benefit of hindsight. The final result was, however, even at the time more widely discussed abroad than in Austria - not least because of the unfavourable political situation - and did not need to fear comparison with similar studies (Nowotny 1983). Unfortunately, fascism descended on Central Europe before this solitary innovation could have any institutional consequences. The forced emigration of the socialist and liberal Jewish intelligentsia from Europe in the 1930s ruined all the institutions and the discourse that the social sciences had by then achieved (Fleck 1987, 1988). Paradoxically, this emigration forced the exiles into academic careers to an extent which would not have been possible if the conditions of the interwar period had prevailed. More exiles were appointed to chairs in America than were ever appointed professors in Austria in the whole century. It is unlikely that so many would have been successful here, or that those exiles that were successful could have succeeded in a climate dominated by AustroFascism and National Socialism. The costs that those exiles who were unlucky had to bear, and the costs of the intellectual adaptation, which was required of those successful, are the reverse side of the coin. Summarising the second stage in the history of Austrian sociology we are presented with a rather disjointed picture: 1. The unfavourable economic situation during the First Republic resulted in the stagnation of all social scientific institutions. 2. During this period, exchanges of personnel and ideas were only with the United States, from where material and personnel was imported; the end of this period saw a reversal of this trend, when a massive, forced brain drain and emigration of European intellectuals to America occured. In retrospective, the debate conducted within the social sciences during the interwar period appears strangely provincial, isolated from historic or external references (although these existed in neighbouring disciplines, such as economics and psychology), refraining from an in-depth discussion of the works of the classic authors or the other founding fathers. Consequently, we find no professional sociologists in the interwar period, only researchers who were active in the social sciences. At the same time, a proliferation of publications can be noticed and originality flourished. There was no specialisation in certain fields, and no mutual exclusion. This unity of the sociological discourse was not real though, but a potential unity, analysable in retrospect. Just as the First World War had put an end to the discourse of evolutionism and social reform two decades earlier, the rising National Socialist movement destroyed the environments in which this predominantly young group of social scientists had conducted their first studies. Not least because the Austrian exiles

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were comparatively younger than, for example, the German emigres, many of them succeeded in making a new beginning in the United States.

3 Emergent Professionalisation after 1945: Turning the Inward Look Outward? After 1945, Austria set itself the task of political and economic reconstruction which was achieved within a decade, culminating in 1955 with obtaining its neutrality. Its cultural reconstruction took much longer. Too many of its most gifted intellectuals, scientists and other persons working in the cultural field had been forced to leave the country or had perished in concentration camps. The dark period which separated post-1945 Austria from its pre-fascist cultural heritage had engendered severe forms of discontinuities and was to cast its shadow, wrapped into a 'culture of (deliberate) forgetting' for a long time to come. At the universities, priority in reconstructing was accorded to the re-establishment of natural and engineering sciences. In the humanities a considerable number of professors who had been teaching during the fascist regime, and some of whom had been outspoken supporters of the fascist regime, were able to stay on. In the social sciences the situation was bleak. The overall situation was aggravated by the fact that no serious and systematic effort had been undertaken to recall at least a small number of the country's scientists in exile. In 1953 one of the first courses in sociology (which was not yet a 'course of study') was offered at the University of Vienna by Leopold Rosenmayr who had just returned from the US after a two-year Rockefeller fellowship. Slowly the most coveted sociological 'import article' from the US took root in postwar Austria: Empirical social research. First attempts were made to use the new methodology in research projects exploring family life, young people's attitudes and behaviour, urban life and housing and was supported financially by the Municipality of Vienna and other public bodies. The Catholic church also supported this brand of sociological inquiry by setting up a small research institute outside the university. The political parties showed the keenest interest of all and initiated research into public opinion. Election behaviour and other, related, attitude surveys figured among the prominent research topics which were to find their (institutional) home in special institutes which closely collaborated with the larger political parties. Market surveys were to follow. Other research groups were set up both inside and outside the universities, dealing with problems of aging, health provisions, social problems and social policy questions. But not all themes open to empirical investigation flourished equally. One contemporary witness of these early research developments remembers that certain themes were deliberately left out, namely all those considered "politically sensitive", such as questions of

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Austria's political culture or problems too closely related to labour and industry (Gehmacher 1988). In 1963, the only significant institutional innovation for a long time to come relevant to the development of Austrian sociology took place. Characteristically, it came from 'outside' and from 'above'. The former Austrian social scientists Oskar Morgenstern and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, both of whom had risen to great eminence in the United States, convinced the Ford Foundation to help set up an Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) (Institute for Advanced Studies) in Vienna. Despite its name, this was not a Princeton-type institution, but a post-graduate research and training institution of high quality, which was to follow the explicit mandate to introduce a young generation of economists, sociologists, political scientists and informatics students to quantitative methodology and related formal methods not taught at the time at Austrian universities. The IHS as it came to be called, not only provided greater visibility for the social sciences, including sociology. It also trained successive generations of young graduates who would subsequently move into new positions created during the phase of expansion of Austrian universities, or into the additional staff positions created inside ministries, banks and other administrative and political bodies. The establishment of the IHS coincided with the modernisation of Austria's political elites at the time - a new generation of political leaders and functionaries who were open to empirical methods and eager to use them as tools for analysis and wherever possible to 'steer' policies. They were ready to emulate the kind of pragmatic relationships prevailing in the United States between social science researchers, government and industry. In reality, however, the political hegemony weighing upon the social sciences and social science research, had not been cast off. The Board of the IHS was constituted along the lines of strict parity, meaning that it reflected in its composition and spirit the then dominant and highly praised model of Austrian "social partnership". In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Austrian university system underwent its phase of expansion which considerably benefited the social sciences. By breaking up the old philosophy and law faculties and setting up new ones for "socioeconomic studies" modernisation had finally reached the universities. This was accompanied by other major reforms in their structure and organisation. Sociology finally became a course of study in its own right with the possibility to graduate in sociology in 1966. In the University of Vienna sociology continued, however, to occupy departments in two faculties, with the difference lying less in content and orientation than in the recruitment of teaching staff. A number of other small institutes were set up outside the universities in the 1970s and following decades, leading to a rather incoherent mosaic of research sites for empirical projects. The situation within the universities was also characterised by incoherence and diversity in teaching programmes as well as little contact among university departments across the country. As the number of 'professionally' trained sociology graduates increased the simmering generation conflict - fuelled by

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diverging political outlooks and general world views - came to climax, when the Austrian Sociological Association was practically taken over by the younger generation in the mid-1970s. Summerising the main developments which characterised Austrian sociology in the period after 1945 the dominant picture appears to be one of inadequate coherence and the inability to build up the critical mass needed for a strong professional sociological community. At the same time empirical social research constituted a strong link, albeit one of dependency, with the politicaladministrative establishment and society at large. In particular, we note: 1. The late start of sociology inside the universities led to an unbalanced dispersal of empirical research outside the universities. There, sociological research found itself often dependent on political and administrative sponsors. With the exception of the IHS, most research institutes outside the university were and continue to be of extremely small size, which in turn increases their vulnerability to fluctuating variations in the amount of funding available. Their small size also prevents the better coordination of research. It helps to explain the lack of openness and failure to build up a 'communicative culture' of scholarly debate inside the country, since often researchers or research teams tend to be competitors, not so much as regards the quality of their work, but for funds or influence among sponsors. It also may help to explain why much of the work produced under theses circumstances tends to be of short-lived value, since no incentives exist to accumulate results or to build up long-term and more continuous lines of research and sociological inquiry. 2. Within the universities the situation is not much better, however. Due to the dominant conservative climate in the universities, especially in the first two decades after the war, the general recruitment policy was not always fortunate. The first generation of professors of sociology were no trained sociologists, but nevertheless held life-long appointments. No systematic training of highly qualified graduates or the formation of 'schools' as it exists in the natural sciences, could be observed (Nowotny 1989). In contrast to the economic sciences, sociology departments did not produce the critical number of sociologists - maybe as a deliberate attempt to prevent too many sociologists who would not find employment. The 'symbiotic groups' of policy advisors and politicians, so typical of economists, include few, if any, sociologists (Wagner 1985). An estimated third of the graduates in sociology finds employment in ministries, municipal and other public bodies (Haller 1987). There, they undoubtedly helped to reduce somewhat the traditional "juridical monopoly" held by civil servants trained in legal studies. They also helped to keep the funding of projects flowing and increased their quality and professionality over time in what also in Austria has been a Difficult Dialogue between Producers and Users of Social Science Research (Nowotny and Lambiri-Dimaki 1985).

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3. On the positive side the initial reception of empirical methods and the turn towards quantitative methods has led over the years to a certain consolidation in methodological terms and to a pragmatic mixture of more quantitative and qualitative approaches. No "Methodenstreit" nor any other controversies characterised Austrian sociology during this period. This may have been facilitated by the fact that apart from institutes engaged in public opinion research only one institute exists which de facto could afford to be engaged in long-term and quantitative handling of data while the majority of small-sized institutes are limited by their lack of infrastructure and funds to participate in building up data banks. Hence, work with quantitative data has often to be left to other disciplines or to non-university institutes. 4. In terms of content a certain eclecticism has prevailed within the universities as far as contributions to the theoretical understanding of society are concerned. (Thus, one could caricature the situation by pointing to the piecemeal nature of the ordinary diet in sociological theory: a bit of Parsons, intermingling with a bit of critical theory, a bit of structural Marxism and a bit of Bourdieu, followed by a more recent dose of Luhmann etc.. Of course, such an eclecticism could also be interpreted as related to the peripheral situation of the country. It has to be open to all major currents of ideas without being too selective ... .) In general, orientation in the past was strongly influenced by theoretical developments in Germany and/or the way that US sociological trends were received there. This can partly be explained by the small size of the country and the relatively few sociology courses available within the universities. It also reflects, however, a deeper intellectual division of work which will be dealt with below. 5. The relatively strong 'service orientation' of much of the sociological research carried out in the form of empirical research projects and the close ties to sponsoring bodies have also prevented sociologists taking a stand in public debates. Not only do 'politically sensitive' topics still tend to be absent from the official research agenda, but until recently, it was also difficult to find a public forum, e.g., in the media, for sociologists to participate in public debates. What then, in this situation, is characteristic of a small country that until 1989 found itself on the periphery of the current of international events and the flow of intellectual ideas? What, if anything, in such a situation can be termed "specifically Austrian" and what contributions can be expected from its sociology to a perhaps emerging "European sociology"? Many years ago the economist Simon Kuznets (1960) analysed the problems small nations experience with economic growth. His empirically grounded observations made it clear that the economic structure of small countries offered less room for diversification. Production factors and output were concentrated in a few industrial sectors. For small countries foreign trade played a larger role and

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enabled them to concentrate on those goods whose production offered comparative advantage. In many ways, however, they were disadvantaged compared to larger countries - and yet, as economic history shows, some of them succeeded. Kuznets believed that ultimately the strengths of small countries were their flexibility and their greater social cohesion. Their main advantage lay in their social institutions and the "quality" of the people, enabling those "social inventions" that gave effective compensation for the disadvantages they incurred because of size (Kuznets 1960: 31). What seems to hold for economic history also holds for the history of scientific achievements. Initially small size carries with it some obvious disadvantages. This is perhaps most pronounced in the natural and technical sciences, where the concentration of scarce funds in strategic areas, the structure of a country's industry and transfer links in technological knowledge may lead to what has become known as the "small country squeeze". Small countries are confronted with hard choices between offensive and defensive research strategies, between provincialism and concentrating on some pioneering research (Nowotny 1985). But does size matter in the social sciences and the humanities? What regulates the flow of ideas, the liveliness of scholarly debates, the contributions sociology can make both within its own field and in a wider context? In our analysis we emphasized the importance of structural and institutional factors as well as how individuals in certain positions behave. Yet, it is also important to see that these positions are part of a larger intellectual field which is structured according to major tensions between political elites and the intellectuals of a country. Given the history of major upsets and discontinuities which have often linked the fate of many of Austria's most brilliant intellectuals to political events beyond their control, the present 'docility' of its social scientists can also be interpreted as being part of a long term historical development pattern. In their own way and in the wake of their modernisation, political parties, the administrative establishment and other public bodies made use of whatever services were offered to them by sociologists. These, as Schumpeter used to say about economists, were eager to prove their "self-inflicted utility". Sociological institutes within the universities turned out to be structurally too weak to become the institutional centres for the pursuit of more long-term, basic research interests. Moreover, the prevailing eclecticism and the lack of coherence among institutes, often induced a predisposition also in their graduates for a highly individualistic style of work, which in turn fits well with the predominant "small niche"mentality individual research projects or small-size institutes offer. Many of the observed features are thus reproduced by the very structures described above and can in the end be linked to the failure in attaining a critical mass of sociological scholarship. Compared with the richness and originality of the sociological contributions that came from Austria during the interwar period, the postwar professionalisation of sociology appears as a mixed blessing. While some of the most promi-

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nent figures in former times had been trained in law, statistics, psychology or other disciplines while being auto-didacts in sociology, the present generation of professionally trained sociologists are often cut off from knowledge in disciplines other than a highly specialised sub-field of sociology. On the other hand, the general conditions at the Austrian universities, while they have many disadvantages, still offer opportunities for following courses other than those narrowly prescribed, provided students take the initiative.

4 What then Does Austrian Sociology Have to Offer? Even though no major theoretical or methodological development has occurred yet that led to an impact beyond its borders, a thematic concentration can be found in areas dealing with inequality, unemployment, health, social marginality, ethnic diversity and conflict, migration problems and a variety of other social and health policy issues. Work on such topics is not confined to an individual empathy with socially marginalised groups, but is also pursued in institutional settings. Due to the unbalanced distribution of more stable institutional resources and access to larger data bases, a certain methodological inventiveness can be found, for instance in the mixing of quantiative and qualitative methods already mentioned. Yet, it is also fair to say, that these 'Austrian themes' have remained very much bound up with the situation inside Austria. Compared to other small countries, e.g., the Nordic countries, little comparative work has been undertaken so far, which by design would put the situation in Austria in relation to other European countries. More recently a noticeable interest in the history of Austrian sociology has grown - a sign of its maturing cognitive as well as social identity (Langer 1988; Fleck 1990). An Austrian specificity can be discerned, however, when looking at how certain themes are anchored in the wider social field of intellectual production. What is remarkable here is the fact that a kind of 'substitution or overlap effect' can be observed between sociology on one side and artistic, and in particular, literary production on the other. Every society has to deal with themes related to questions about its identity, the way in which its past is being interpreted in relation to the present, which general orientation it is following or wishes to pursue, what are perceived to be some of its most pressing problems or which kinds of polarisations or tensions are threatening the social fabric. Which of these themes are addressed and analysed by the arts and which by the social sciences or humanities, and in which form, depends on factors which are too complex to be dealt with here (Wagner and Wittrock 1991). A number of leading themes - about identity, inequality, city-country relations, social isolation etc. - are dealt with in Austrian literature and sociology alike, thus producing an

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unintended complementarity. Although taking place outside of established academic institutions, literary production may indirectly stimulate and hence influence sociological production and vice versa. One should perhaps remember that sociology from its very beginning has been torn between a more 'scientific' direction, imitating the natural sciences, and tending towards a more literary heritage (Lepenies 1985). Based on such a history (which is different in different countries), sociology emerges as a discipline attempting to be something which is neither 'science' nor 'literature'. It aims at becoming a third culture in its own right showing substantial overlap with the other two cultures, without complete identification with either of them. Recent trends towards being more literary can be observed in sociology generally, in the style of writing as well as in content. Austrian sociology, given its links with a wider cultural and social field of intellectual production, and the prestige literary production enjoys in this country, may well have substantial contributions to make to a (European) sociology as part of an emerging third culture. Present auspices for sociology here as elsewhere in Europe have to deal with completely new challenges. The dramatic events of 1989, the demise of the Eastern block and the ideology which kept it under control and in isolation from the rest of the world, as well as the present processes of transformation which these societies have to undergo, present formidable challenges to the creativity, social inventiveness, and political maturity of the social sciences as a whole. An entire set of concepts which tells more about the societal conditions under which they originated than illuminating the present, let alone providing guidelines for the future, have to be re-thought, re-invented, and made operational in the very near future. Other challenges await the social sciences as regards the environment where the magnitude of human intervention, of individual and collective action as well as of how social institutions function, cannot be denied. Society and its individuals are the causes of environmental degradation, victims of its impact and yet at the same time, managers of a 'sustainable development'. Other challenges emanate from the relentless thrust towards globalisation and internationalisation, while, at the same time tensions of inter-ethnic and racial conflicts are mounting in many parts of the world. The last decade has also amply demonstrated the potential anger and risks associated with science and technology, necessitating a better understanding of the social conditions which shape them. From the formidable nature of these issues it is clear that it is indeed the social sciences as a whole, and not a single discipline like sociology, which are challenged. Nevertheless, as a cognitive field organised in the form of a discipline, sociology will have to find its specific mode of response. With the unexpected turn of world events Austria may find itself in an unexpectedly advantageous position to take up at least some of the challenging issues outlined above. Its geographical position as a neighbour to three former Eastern block countries, to whom it is linked through a common, conflict-ridden history which inspired some of the founding fathers of Austrian sociology more than

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one hundred years ago, may be one of the comparative advantages which accrue to a small country. But as Kuznets (1960) has reminded us, the real advantage comes only from such a country's 'social inventiveness'. Although many of our critical comments above may not point to an optimistic conclusion, Austrian sociology at the turn of this century may well receive another chance. This time, contrary to the situation it found itself in after 1945, it is invited to look outwards as well as inwards. And since no social science discipline evolves independently from the society in which it finds itself, this society will certainly undergo major transformations in its sense of national identity, ethnic composition and in the functioning and relative strength of its major political and economic institutions. Sociology as a discipline which originated in the era of the Austro-Hungarian empire owed much to the diversity and conflicts of that society. Austrian sociology at the threshold of the twenty-first century will lack neither. Contrary to their forerunners, however, Austrian sociologists will be able to draw upon a vastly increased stock of European social science knowledge. They will have the chance to become part of a network of scholars who are at work to transform the different national European traditions of their discipline into something which may be called European sociology.

References Fleck, C. 1987. Rückkehr unerwünscht. Der Weg der österreichischen Soziologie ins Exil. In F. Stadler (ed.), Vertriebene Vernunft. Vol.l: Emigration und Exil österreichischer Wissenschaft 1930-1940, pp. 182-213. Vienna: Jugend & Volk. Fleck, C. 1988. Vertrieben und vergessen. Ein Überblick über die aus Österreich emigrierten Soziologen. In J. Langer (ed.), Geschichte der österreichischen Soziologie, pp. 257-278. Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik. Fleck, C. 1990. Rund um Marienthal. Von den Anfängen der Soziologie in Österreich bis zu ihrer Vertreibung. Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik. Gehmacher, E. 1988. Aufbau der Soziologie in Österreich. In Paul LazarsfeldGesellschaft (ed.), Was wir zählen? Ein Rechenschaftsbericht über die 2. Republik, pp. 76-92. Vienna: Literas Universitätsverlag. Haller, M. 1987. Sozialforschung und Relevanz der Soziologie. Zeitschrift für Soziologie 3: 11-17. Haller, R. and F. Stadler (eds.) 1988. Ernst Mach. Werk und Wirkung. Vienna: Holder, Pichler, Tempsky. Jerusalem, W. 1915. Der Krieg im Lichte der Gesellschaftslehre. Stuttgart: Enke. Kaufmann, F. 1936. Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften. Vienna: Springer. [English translation: Methodology of the Social Sciences. London and New York: Oxford University Press 1944.]

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Kuznets, S. 1960. Economic Growth of Small Nations. In E. A. G. Robinson (ed.), Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, pp. 14-32. London: Macmillan. Langer, J. (ed.) 1988. Geschichte der österreichischen Soziologie. Konstituierung, Entwicklung und europäische Bezüge. Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik. Lazarsfeld-Jahoda, M. and H. Zeisel 1933. Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal. Soziographischer Versuch über die Wirkungen langdauernder Arbeitslosigkeit. Leipzig: Hirzel. [English translation: Jahoda, Μ., P. F. Lazarsfeld and H. Zeisel (eds.) Marienthal. The Sociography of an Unemployed Community. Chicago: Aldine 1971.] Lepenies, W. 1985. Die drei Kulturen. Soziologie zwischen Literatur und Wissenschaft. Munich and Vienna: Hanser. Lynd, R. S. and Η. M. Lynd 1929. Middletown. Α Study in American Culture. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Menzel, A. 1938. Grundriß der Soziologie. Baden: Röhrer. Mozetiä, G. 1985. Ein unzeitgemäßer Soziologe: Ludwig Gumplowicz. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 37: 621-647. Mozetiö, G. 1987. Die Gesellschaftstheorie des Austromarxismus. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Müller, R. 1989. Vergessene Geburtshelfer. Zur Geschichte der soziologischen Gesellschaft in Graz (1908-1935). Newsletter des Archiv für die Geschichte der Soziologie in Österreich 3: 3-25. Nowotny, H. 1983. Marienthal and After - Local Historicity and the Road to Policy Relevance. Knowledge 5: 169-192. Nowotny, Η. 1985. Zwischen Spitzenforschung und Provinzialismus: Gedanken zur österreichischen Präsenz im internationalen Wissenschaftssystem. In H. Fischer (ed.), Forschungspolitik für die 90er Jahre, pp. 486-498. Vienna and New York: Springer. Nowotny, H. 1987. Sozialforschung und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 3: 7-10. Nowotny, H. 1989. Vom österreichischen Aufbruch in die Internationalität. Eine Zusammenfassung. In H. Detter, R. Kneucker, P. Markl, H. Nowotny and N. Rozsenich (eds.), Aufbruch in die Internationalität. Exemplarische Forschungsleistungen in Österreich, pp. 201-216. Vienna: Edition S. Nowotny, H. and Lambiri-Dimaki, I. (eds.) 1985. The Difficult Dialogue between Producers and Users of Social Science Research. Vienna: Eurosocial. Schütz, A. 1932. Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie. Vienna: Springer. [English translation: The Phenomenolgy of Social Sciences. Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press 1967.] Shils, E. 1970. Tradition, Ecology, and Institutionalization in the History of Sociology. Daedalus 99: 760-825.

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Stölting, Ε. 1986. Akademische Soziologie in der Weimarer Republik. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Wagner, I. 1985. Interlinkages Between Social Science and Politics: the Case of Austria. In H. Nowotny and J. Lambiri-Dimaki (eds.), The Difficult Dialogue between Producers and Users of Social Science Research, pp. 39-47. Vienna: Eurosocial. Wagner, P. 1991. Science of Society Lost: On the Failure to Establish Sociology in Europe During the Classical Period. In P. Wagner and B. Wittrock (eds.), Discourses in Society. The Shaping of the Social Science Disciplines. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Wagner, P. and Wittrock, Β. (eds.) 1991. Discourses in Society. The Shaping of the Social Sciences Disciplines. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Znaniecki, E. and F. Znaniecki 1932. Gumplowicz, Ludwik. In: E. R. A. Seligman (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, p. 227. New York: Macmillan.

Scandinavian Sociology and its European Roots and Elements Erik

Allardt

It is true that American sociology after the Second World War had a strong impact and in fact inspired the development of sociology in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Nevertheless, there existed in the Scandinavian countries domestic traditions of social research and sociological reasoning. The traditions had a definite European origin. They were in fact prerequisites for the rapid development of sociology, and even for the adoption of American sociology after the Second World War.

1 The European Roots I: Concrete Social Research The social science tradition in the Scandinavian countries is strongly empiristic. In Scandinavia, there is a long tradition of scholarly academic work in problems, administration, and politics. A chair of Rhetoric and Statecraft was founded at Uppsala University as early as in 1622. Also the rise of social statistics in the eighteenth century was related to practical state policy making. Important influences came from Germany in particular but some crucial forms of statistical analysis of social conditions actually originated in the Scandinavian countries (Kuhnle 1989: 21-24). The first known comparative statistical description of social and economic conditions in different countries was published by the Danish historian and philologist Hans Peter Anchersen in 1741. The first census bureau in the world, the Swedish tabellverket (The Table Office), systematically compiling statistics and demographical data in both Sweden and Finland was founded in 1749. It was, however, toward the end of the nineteenth century and at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that studies aiming at descriptions and analyses of crucial social, economic, and political conditions began to proliferate. Academically the studies were mostly related to history and economics, but in their content they were what today would be labeled as sociology. Continental and British influences were crucial. Of particular importance was the Historical School of Political Economy with its centre in Germany, but with representatives in other leading European countries as well. Some of its leading names, such as Karl Knies, Wilhelm Roscher, Gustav von Schmoller and, as a latecomer in the group, Werner Sombart, are today known by sociologists mainly because

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Max Weber analysed and criticised their work. But during the first decades of the twentieth century they were better known in the Scandinavian countries than Max Weber himself. The studies of the Historical School of Political Economy were clearly aimed at facilitating the improvement of social conditions. Also the Scandinavian studies in the tradition had a strong bent of public and social policy. In Finland with its concentration on the social problems of the countryside, a large group of economists and historians, influenced by Gustav von Schmoller in particular, analysed the conditions of the landless agrarian population, of the tenant farmers and scrapholders. The German emphasis on the labour questions was in a sense only redefined as the agrarian questions (Alapuro et al. 1973: 84-88). In Sweden similar efforts led in 1907 to the initiation of a large study of the social factors behind the American emigration, the so-called emigrations-utredningen. One of its researchers was Ε. H. Thörnberg, who wrote several truly sociological descriptions of master trends in the Swedish society (Thörnberg 1913; Segerstedt 1987: 11-12). An early and influential social researcher was the Norwegian Ellert Sundt (e.g., 1855), a theologian by education and a conductor of several social and demographical surveys (Otnes 1977: 65-66). Concrete social and statistical research on the level of living and health conditions in the population became particularly strong in Denmark at the end of the nineteenth century. It influenced both social reforms and subsequent developments in sociology (Due andMadsen 1983: 117-118). The period between the two world wars was generally much poorer as regards studies with a sociological content than the first decades of the twentieth century. Yet, in all the Scandinavian countries some pathbreaking empirical sociological studies, formally related to adjacent, but established academic fields, were published. In Norway, Edvard Bull, a Marxist historian, analysed the differences in the labour movements in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Through its abbreviated German version Die Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung in den drei skandinavischen Ländern, Bull's work (1922: 329-361) had a substantial impact on the international literature on the working class movement. In Finland, Heikki Waris, a historian, who later was to become professor of social policy at the University of Helsinki, published an excellent study on the risk of the working class community and suburbs in Helsinki. Waris (1932) had studied at the University of Chicago, and his treatise also bore clear marks of influence from the Chicago school of the 1920s and early 1930s. In 1937, the Swedish political scientist Herbert Tingsten published a pioneering study, Political Behaviour, pointing to new possibilities in the analysis of electoral records and adducing a great variety of empirical evidences for some basic regularities in political sociology. In Denmark, some economists with a strong interest in social policy, notably Fr. Zeuthen and J0rgen Dich, started in the 1930s to conduct studies related to public and social policy on behalf of the Ministry of Social Affairs (Due and

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Madsen 1983: 124). Their activities were later institutionalised into The Danish Institute of Social Research which was to become an important unit for descriptive sociological studies. The activities of concrete social research were before the Second World War explicitly focused on social problems and on the social conditions of the new working class in particular. It can be added that even scholars with a clearly Marxist bent mostly conducted empirical studies. As in all European countries Marxist ideas became important and salient within the working class movements and the Socialist parties towards the end of the nineteenth century. Of equal importance as Marx and Engels were other theoreticians such as Karl Kautsky and Edvard Bernstein and even in some circles the British socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb. The crucial point, however, is that in all the Scandinavian countries concrete research of social conditions constituted a much stronger research tradition than the theoretical ideological reasoning around Communism and Socialism.

2 The European Roots II: Ethnology and Social Anthropology Whereas Scandinavian concrete social research got its foremost influences from Germany, ethnology and social anthroplogy received a strong British impact. Ethnology and social anthropology had developed partly as a response to colonial situations and Great Britain was the strongest colonial power. The relationship of ethnology and social anthropology to sociology was not the same in the different Scandinavian countries but there was some degree of affinity between the two fields in all the countries. The strongest ties between sociology on one hand, ethnology and social anthropology on the other existed in Denmark and Finland. Ethnology was a flourishing field in Denmark at the turn of the century and during the first decades of the twentieth century. Arctic ethnology and sociology was to an important extent founded and created by Danish scholars. Their studies of arctic populations did not cover only the Danish territory of Greenland but also arctic regions in North America. Two scholars were of particular importance. Knud Rasmussen (1929) was an arctic explorer and the first builder of an internationally network for the study of Eskimos and peoples in the arctic regions. Kaj Birket-Smith firmly established the ethnology of the Arctic and the Eskimos as a part of world ethnology (Birket-Smith 1946: 464-474). His studies of the Algonquian Indians (Birket-Smith 1918) were quoted in standard works of ethnology and his general textbook about the ways of culture (1941-1942) was translated to many languages, in German under the title of Geschichte der Kultur. Eine allgemeine Ethnologie (Birket-Smith 1946).

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When cultural sociology later became a distinct academic subject in Denmark and got a professorship at the University of Copenhagen in 1964, the arrangements partly built on the fame and goodwill for the study of Greenland and the Eskimos once created by Rasmussen, Birket-Smith, and their colleagues. The professor appointed in 1964, Werner Goldschmidt, had become known mainly for his excellent studies of conditions and patterns of change in Greenland (e.g., Goldschmidt 1956). In Finland, the early development of an internationally oriented social anthropology - in its days often labeled ethnosociology - led to a comparatively early establishment of sociology as an academic discipline. The leading scholar was Edward Westermarck who together with his pupils and colleagues concentrated on the evolution of social institutions. During several decades Edward Westermarck held simultaneously professorships both at the London School of Economics and at Finnish universities. Extensive field work was done by Westermarck in Morocco, by Rafael Karsten in South America, by Gunnar Landtman in New Guinea, and by Hilma Granqvist in Palestine. Their work was by no means entirely descriptive and devoid of general sociological interest. In his monumental work on the origin of the moral ideas, Westermarck (1906-1908) analysed the very foundations of the social order (Pipping 1984: 315-384), and Landtman's (1938) main theme was the sources and origins of social inequality. A book with an interest for the study of political systems, indicated for instance by its reprinting in France after the Second World War, was Rafael Karsten's (1957) study on the Inca State. In Norway and Sweden the rise of socioloy was not to the same extent related to ethnology and social anthropology as in Denmark and Finland. Yet, both in Norway and Sweden there existed a considerable ethnological and social anthropological research activity and it certainly confirmed beliefs of the possibility to study social and cultural forms empirically and concretely. Closely related to ethnology and anthropology was the study of comparative religion. It is a fact, however, that the many well-known Swedish and Norwegian ethnologists and scholars of comparative religion hardly ever were quoted by the new sociologists in their countries when sociology was established in Norway and Sweden in the second half of the 1940s.

3 The European Roots III: The Logical Positivism of the 1920s and 1930s When the research in ethnology and social anthropology unevenly and in different ways provided stimuli for the rise of sociology in the Scandinavian countries after the Second World War, the situation in the field of philosophy had a much more uniform impact. In Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, logical posi-

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tivism established itself as the leading brand of philosophy in the 1930s. Logical positivism also provided a climate fertile for an easy adoption of an empirically oriented sociology of the North American variety. In Denmark, Finland, and Norway the leading philosophers of the 1930s and 1940s had all been close to or members of the Vienna Circle with its emphasis on empiricism and logical analysis and its sharp reaction against metaphysics of any kind. In Denmark J0rgen J0rgensen and in Finland Eino Kaila were also leading scholars in the field of psychology but they both strongly emphasized psychology's biological foundations. In Norway, Arne Naess was clearly oriented towards social science and sociology. His so-called empirical semantics had definite sociological elements (Naess 1938). He also had a more direct and thorough influence on the sociologists of the first postwar generation than the leading philosophers in the other Scandinavian countries. Yet, both in Denmark and Finland important social scientists before the Second World War were close to the ideas of logical positivism. In Denmark, Svend Ranulf, a philosopher conducting sociological investigations (Ranulf 1964), worked in the positivistic tradition, and he summed up his methodological credo in a text on social science methodology published immediately after the Second World War (Ranulf 1946). In Finland, the ethnosociologist Edward Westermarck was in many senses a forerunner of the logical positivism and his approach to the study of ethics was explicitly sociological (Westermarck 1932). Sweden had its own brand of logical positivism in the so-called Uppsala school in the first decades of the twentieth century created by Axel Hägerström and Adolf Phalen. It did not have the same close relationship to the Vienna Circle as the philosophy in the other Scandinavian countries but its message and its strong rejection of metaphysical ideas were by and large of a very similar kind as the international logical positivism. The philosophical Uppsala school oriented the Swedish academic community of the 1920s and 1930s towards an emphasis on both conceptual analysis and empirical studies of human affairs and towards a conviction of the necessity to distinguish between statements of values and statements of facts. Among those many Swedish scholars who were influenced by the Uppsala school and Axel Hägerström was Gunnar Myrdal, the economist who later directed world-known sociological studies (1944) and who also was an important background figure when modern empirical sociological analysis was introduced in Sweden in the 1940s. Despite the national differences among the Scandinavian countries, positivism became the dominant philosophy of Scandinavian universities and the scientific community in the 1920s and 1930s. When the new and predominantly American sociology was introduced and institutionalised in the Scandinavian countries after the Second World War, it happened in an environment emphasizing empirical studies and conceptual analysis. The American sociology with its variable language, operational definitions, and belief in the rational probing into human affairs fitted very naturally into the Scandinavian academic milieu.

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The two main traditions of Scandinavian sociology, the concrete social research and the logical positivism of the period between the two world wars, are in some respects in a contradictory position. Concrete social research as it rose at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was strongly ameliorative and state-centred in its approach. This tendency was almost extremely visible in its main continental source, within the Historical School of National Economy and its organisational manifestation, the German Verein für Sozialpolitik. There the dominant group around Gustav von Schmoller adhered to a view of a strong state standing above class conflicts and able to introduce harmony in the society by social policy. It would be a fascinating task for social and political historians to analyse how much these ideas emanating in the influential Verein für Sozialpolitik actually contributed to the creation of the Scandinavian welfare state with its belief in the state as the guarantor of well-being. Here it may suffice to note that the school of logical positivism represented a very different tendency. It stood for a value-free science and it was, even if its representatives seldom discussed such matters, totally alien to state-centred thinking. Actually it was the combination of the tradition of concrete social research and logical positivism which made the adaptation of the American sociology easy and painless. The first mentioned tradition advocated for the importance of empirical data and the second emphasized a value-free and independent science.

4 The Institutionalisation of Sociology after the Second World War Despite some outstanding individual scholarly activities and occasional teaching in sociology at the Scandinavian universities during the first decades of the twentieth century only two of the countries, Denmark and Finland, had professiorial chairs in sociology at the end of the Second World War. In Denmark the German sociologist Theodor Geiger, formerly professor in Brunswick, who had to flee his country, was appointed professor at the University of Aarhus in 1938. He published an unusually learned and large (733 pages) Danish textbook in sociology in 1939, and he published as Danish professor several studies on central macrosociological topics such as the mass society, the intellectuals etc. (König 1955: 3-9; Geiger 1955: 10-79; Agersnap 1950: 80-81). However, when he died in 1952, his professorship was transferred to the field of economics (Due and Madsen 1983: 122-130). Soon afterwards a professorship in sociology was established in Copenhagen, but it meant that in Denmark teaching and training in sociology had to start anew on an entirely new basis. In 1955, Kaare Svalastoga was appointed professor and in 1958 sociology was established as an independent subject at the University of Copenhagen (Rudfeld and Webb 1977: 3-4).

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In Finland, sociology and professorial chairs in sociology existed at four universities and academic colleges at the end of the Second World War. The comparatively early establishment of sociology as an independent academic subject was due to the influence of Edward Westermarck. He had been appointed reader in sociology at the University of Helsinki already in 1890, and since that time teaching of sociology had been part of the duties of the professor in moral philosphy. Professors in sociology were appointed at the University of Turku in 1926 and the University of Helsinki in 1927. However, there was a re-orientation in the sociology taught and studied at the Finnish universities in the late 1940s. Veli Verkko who was appointed to the professorial chair of sociology at the University of Helsinki in 1948 was a criminologist and an international expert in criminal statistics (e.g., Verkko 1951). The concentration on ethnosociology was substituted by a focus on the industrial society, and the American sociology became the model for the development of the field. In fact the postwar development of sociology in Finland was similar to the development of sociology in the other Scandinavian countries. The first Norwegian university chair in sociology was founded in 1948 and the first sociological university institute was established in 1950 at the University of Oslo. Of crucial importance for the development of sociology was the creation of the Oslo Institute of Social Research (also in 1950) on the basis of private money from the shipping industry. It attracted from its very beginning many leading American sociologists as visitors. It seems fair to say that even if the sociologies in all the Nordic countries received strong influences from American sociology, the American impact was strongest in Norway. There is even a myth to support the tie to American sociology. According to the legend, American sociology was brought to Norway during the Second World War by a parachutist from the allied forces. He died because his parachute never expanded, but his body was found and George A. Lundberg's book Social Research in his knapsack was received by the Norwegian resistance movement (Bj0rklund 1990: 166-176). In Sweden, sociology had been taught as part of the teaching in moral philosophy since the 1930s, but as an independent academic subject sociology was established at the University of Uppsala in 1947 and at the University of Lund in 1948. The first Swedish professor in sociology was Torgny Segerstedt in Uppsala. He had been professor of moral philosophy, but in 1947 he was given the choice of continuing in philosophy or to resume the newly founded chair in sociology. He choose the latter. As in the other Scandinavian countries, American sociology clearly molded the teaching and research in the new subject. But it is important to realise that the American sociology also was interpreted and incorporated into the domestic traditions. Thus, Segerstedt's Uppsala School of Sociology strongly emphasized the role of language, values, and social norms as prime factors in social life (Segerstedt 1955: 85-119), an emphasis which had been central also to the Uppsala School of Philosophy in the 1920s and 1930s.

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In Finland, Norway, and Sweden, sociology continued to expand as an academic subject almost interruptedly between 1950 and 1990. Particularly in the 1960s new universities and new chairs in sociology and adjacent fields were founded. In each of Finland, Norway, and Sweden sociology is taught in 1990 at least at ten universities, business schools or regional colleges. The number of professors is not easy to count because there is a variety of titles and sociologyrelated special subjects. But to say that there are today at least twenty sociologists with professorial rank in each of the three countries is not to exaggerate. In Denmark, the situation has, in particular during the 1980s, been entirely different. Sociology is taught at several universities and colleges, but in the 1980s there did not exist any professorships in sociology at the Danish universities. In the beginning of the 1970s there were three such chairs at the University of Copenhagen, but when they became vacant because of death, retirement and move to another country, they were left vacant. A contributory factor to this predicament was probably that the Danish sociology students had been particulary active during the days of student rebellion at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s and that sociology departments in the 1970s became strongly dominated by Marxists. Now, in the beginning of the 1990s, a different intellectual and less conflict-ridden climate prevails and there are definite plans to reinstitute professorial chairs and sociology curricula of a less ideological kind at the Danish universities. The teaching of sociology in the fifth Scandinavian country, Iceland, started only in 1970 when it was established as an independent subject at the University of Iceland. Icelandic sociology has been shaped mainly by British influences and ideas. At the time of its foundation, the Icelandic sociology had hardly experienced any crucial Scandinavian influences. Nor were there any domestic antecedents (Thorlindsson 1982). As an Icelandic political scientist (Grimsson 1977: 48) has concluded: A department of social science was established in the autumn of 1970, enabling Icelandic students to obtain a B.A. degree in political science and sociology. The disciplines were, however, without any roots in the Iceland academic or social community: they did not even have acknowledged names in the Icelandic language.

Today Icelandic sociologists participate actively in the Scandinavian sociological congresses held every second year and contribute to the publication of Acta Sociologica, the journal of the Scandinavian Sociological Association.

5 The Postwar Sociology up to 1970 As emphasized, after the Second World War a rapid development of sociology occurred in all the larger Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. By combining European and national intellectual traditions with

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different specialities in American sociology, some clearly distinctive features developed within the sociology in the four countries. Despite the influence of European and domestic traditions, it cannot be denied that American sociology set the standard and defined what is important to study in the field of sociology after the Second World War. All leading Scandinavian sociologists of that time studied and stayed for some period at one or some American universities. Knowledge of the great European classical writers such as of Emile Dürkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Max Weber, and even Karl Marx was mainly imported from the US and conveyed by American theoreticians and interpreters. The student revolt at the end of the 1960s and its aftermath had substantial effects on the development of Scandinavian sociology. The dependence on American sociology weakened considerably although it did not totally disappear. Thus, the turn of the decades of the 1960s and 1970s forms a sort of a watershed in the theoretical and methodological development of Scandinavian sociology. Even when taking into consideration the Danish development, the student revolt at the end of the 1960s was not as violent in Scandinavia as in many continental countries or in the US and Japan. The student revolt did, however, occur also in the Scandinavian countries and it had some profound effects on the development of sociology. At any rate, the development before and after 1970 deserves a separate treatment. In a paper first published in 1967, the author of this contribution (Allardt 1967) described sociology in the four Scancinavian societies with some simple labels. Danish sociology was said to focus on the concrete and practical, Finnish sociology on macrosociology and the quantitative, Norwegian sociology on the latent and the qualitative, and Swedish sociology on the manifest and the methodical. Labels such as these can of course be criticised as being too general and therefore misleading. Yet, even in retrospect, they seem to have captured something essential of the sociology in each of the four countries up to the second half of the 1960s. Now, with hindsight, it is easy to see that some new tendencies, which later grew stronger, were already emerging in the early 1960s. Both the general tendencies noted above and recent hindsight merit some brief comments to allow understanding of the subsequent developments. The characterisation of Danish sociology as concrete and practical was based on the research orientations of the two main centres for sociological research in Denmark during the 1950s and early 1960s. These were the Danish National Institute of Social Research, under the direction of Henning Friis (1959), and the Institute of Sociology at the University of Copenhagen, with Kaare Svalastoga as professor and director. Whereas the former was built on Danish traditions of concrete social research, the latter was very much inspired by American ultrapositivist orientations developed by Georg A. Lundberg in particular. The main contribution of the Copenhagen Institute of Sociology to international sociology was a large-scale and thorough study of Danish social strata and mobility (Svalastoga 1959). In the midst of the 1960s, a revival of the Danish traditions in

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ethnosociology and cultural analysis became visible. In 1966, a professorial chair and in 1966, a new Institute for Cultural Sociology were founded at the University of Copenhagen. The interest in culture and cultural sociology has remained alive among Danish sociologists throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Due and Madsen 1983). In Finland in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a special interest developed in studying the structural bases for societal conflicts and cleavages (Allardt and Littunen 1964). It arose both out of structurally based political conflicts in the Finnish society and out of an academic tradition of studying the rise of the working class. There were studies aiming at specifying the dimensions of conflict in Finnish society (Eskola 1970: 259-265), thorough and large-scale analyses of social change and modernisation (Seppänen 1974: 222-253), and attempts to interpret the patterns of conflict and modernisation in terms of classical theories, such as Emile Dürkheim's ideas on the division of labour in society (Allardt 1978: 49-68). In the 1960s, Ralf Dahrendorf s (1959: 223-240) ideas about conflict regulation resumed a particular importance in that they were not only quoted by sociologists but by leading Finnish politicians as well. As already told, even if the universities in Finland had chairs in sociology prior to the Second World War, there was a reorientation in sociology taught and studied in the late 1940s. Finnish sociological studies became strongly quantitative and sociologists developed a special interest and skill in multivariate techniques. In particular, factor analysis was used and misused in a great number of studies. Much of the work on the development of multivariate statistical methods in sociology was conducted at the Finnish Research Institute for Alcohol Studies. Its substantial competence in the study of drinking and alcoholism outlived its strong emphasis on factor analysis and the institute became a leading international institution in its field (Bruun et al. 1975). When sociology developed in the Scandinavian countries after the Second World War, Norwegian sociology had an especially good start. Both inside and outside Scandinavia it was thought the most interesting and original of Scandinavian sociologies. The foremost Norwegian speciality was the unveiling of hidden and latent role expectations, role strains, latent solidarities, and group ties. Norwegian sociology was characterised as focussing on the latent and the qualitative, a tendency made manifest in the title The Hidden Society, one of Vilhelm Aubert's (1955) important books. Another good example is Sverre Lysgaard's study of what he called the worker's collectivity. He showed how workers in a factory are tied to each other by hidden bonds, often not clearly perceived. The workers form a collectivity that is clearly different from organised and formally acknowledged groups, such as the local trade unions, or from the formal hierarchy of the industrial shop (Lysgaard 1961). Focus on latent effects also characterised the best Norwegian studies in criminology such as Nils Christie's study (1960) of punitive treatments of alcoholics. Another important work from a sociological subfield was Yngvar L0chen's (1965) study of a psychiatric hospital.

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He contrasts the manifest and the latent or "ideals" and "realities" in psychiatric treatment. Although the foremost Norwegian speciality during the two first decades after the Second World War was qualitative analyses of latent social forms, advances in quantitative methodology can be observed during the 1960s (Galtung 1970). Some special forms of quantitative methodology were developed to facilitate research on centre-periphery relations, which have fascinated analysts of the Norwegian society. Internationally well-known theories about centres and peripheries were developed both within the field of peace research (Galtung 1978) and in political sociology (Rokkan 1970). During the subsequent periods both the substantial focus on centre-periphery relations and on quantitative methodology grew in importance within Norwegian sociology. Natalie Rogoff Rams0y (1965), with her background at the Bureau of Applied Social Research (Columbia University) and her experience in studying social mobility, began to influence Norwegian empirical research. The statement that Swedish sociology was centred on the manifest and methodological was based on the observation that Swedish sociology had quickly reached a high level of sophistication in theory and methodology, whereas it was fairly tame and non-committal in its substantive descriptions of the Swedish society. Swedish sociology in its formative years definitely owed very much to the style of the Uppsala School of Philosophy. The Swedish sociologists were more critical and sceptic in their tone than other Scandinavian sociologists and they abhorred exaggerations and speculative statements. Torgny Segerstedt (1948) at Uppsala University defined sociology as the study of social norms and uniform behaviour and this inspired many Swedish sociologists of the first generation to study the importance of language and verbal persuasion in social life. One of Segerstedt's early students, Hans L. Zetterberg, made a successful career in American sociology (Zetterberg 1965). Among the first Swedish sociology professors, Gösta Carlsson (1958) conducted an excellent study of social mobility, but its main contribution was methodological rather than factual information about Swedish society. Methodologically excellent studies with a critical bent in social ecology and the analysis of social strata were initiated by Carl Gunnar Jansson (1965, 1968) at the University of Stockholm in the 1960s. During the 1960s new tendencies clearly emerged in Swedish sociology. Ulf Himmelstrand (1970) gave the theory of social norms a new direction by focussing on political conflicts and studying situations in which social norms fail to function. Most explicitly, Joachim Israel emphasized a conflict-theoretical perspective by analysing the concept and the literature on alienation (Israel 1968), combining both Marxist and non-Marxist approaches. Edmund Dahlström was one of the first to study the life situation of women (Dahlström et al. 1962). On the whole, toward the end of the 1960s Swedish sociology was moving into a new phase.

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6 Paradigmatic Changes The effects of the student revolt and its aftermath on Scandinavian sociology are hard to pinpoint because they were both penetrating and small. The effects were small in terms of substance: Most types of now ongoing research have their roots in work in progress when the student revolt came. Yet, the changes are profound as regards some general and international orientations. These changes may be summarised in four main points: 1. The dependence on American sociology began to weaken. It did not wholly disappear, but the earlier tendency to take American sociology as a given model more or less disappeared. Citation studies have also shown that the number of references to American sources decreased. A more problematic feature is that, according to a Finnish study (Rautio and Suhonen 1981), the interest in sociology beyond the national boarders seems to have weakened. The citations of domestic sources are the ones that have increased. There are good grounds to assume that the tendency is much the same in the other Scandinavian countries. Nevertheless, the changes also brought about a clear tendency to Europeanisation (Stolte Heiskanen 1990: 101-102). European sociologists were much more than before read directly rather than through American sources. Some European sociologists, such as, at the present, Anthony Giddens from the UK, Pierre Bourdieu from France, and Jürgen Habermas from Germany became, so to say, household names for the Scandinavian sociologists. 2. At the same time, sociology in all Scandinavian countries has become much more pluralistic in its emphases and orientations. Marxist approaches, traditional American sociology, and influences from new schools, such as the French semiotics, offshoots from the critical Frankfurt School, and rational choice models exist side by side. 3. The differences among the sociologies of the different Scandinavian countries have become very difficult to trace. Rather than national sociologies, there are now different orientations and code systems more or less shared by different groups in all the four countries. At any rate, the events related to 1968 definitely erased the traditional differences between the sociology of the different countries. 4. Even within the tendencies to Europeanisation there have occurred new forms of differentiation. The new European impacts are not received only from the traditionally scientifically leading countries. Due to new forms of both European and international collaboration influences from countries such as The Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, and Poland have been on the increase. It is also obvious that there has been a clear increase in influences from France and French sociology. They should not be exaggerated but they have definitely increased. In spite of some exceptional individual cases of French intel-

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lectual impact, the main continental and European influences on Scandinavian sociology and its forerunners came in the past from either Germany or Britain. Of the four points mentioned above, the second one emphasizing pluralism needs more elucidation. It was said that the student revolt brought Marxism back into sociology. This was, as we know, an international phenomen, but it meant slightly different things in different countries. In the Scandinavian countries it meant that many sociologists indicated some interest in Marxist ideas and thoughts but that only a very few confined themselves to Marxism. In most cases it really meant an increase of pluralism. There have been a few systematic attempts to carry out research in terms of a consistent Marxist approach. Some of the best studies with this orientation were conducted by Göran Therborn, then at Lund, and now in Gothenburg. His doctoral thesis Science, Class, and Society: On the Formation of Sociology and Historical Materialism (Therborn 1974) is, as its subtitle announces, a Marxist study in the sociology of sociology. Among other Marxist studies, Jukka Gronow's (1986) doctoral thesis at the University of Helsinki on the relationship between Kautsky's and Marx's ideas deserves a special mention. The references to Marxism here should not be taken as an indication that Marxist orientations are particularly strong or that Marxist research is well developed within Scandinavian sociology. However, it cannot be passed over, because at the beginning of the 1970s a substantial part of the Scandinavian students came to believe that Marxism or, at least, a broad Marxist orientation was almost the only worthwile approach in sociology. As a rule, the Swedish and Norwegian Marxist sociologists were mainly inspired by influences from France, such as by Sartre, Althusser and Poulantzas, whereas their colleagues in Denmark and Finland were influenced by German Marxists. The Frankfurt School and particularly Jürgen Habermas had an influence in all the Scandinavian countries. In all these countries, Soviet Marxism was of minor, if any, importance. The best recent theoreticians in Scandinavian sociology are indeed very pluralist in their approaches. Typical are two important Norwegian theoreticians, Jon Elster and Dag 0sterberg. Jon Elster has combined analytical philosophy, Marxist approaches and modern modal logic to establish himself as a leading international methodologist of the social sciences. He has thrown new light on many of the core problems in sociological theory, such as on the nature of functionalism, the nature of unintended consequences, the contradictions of society, and the relationships between causality and intentionality (Elster 1978). Dag 0sterberg is in the Scandinavian countries mainly known for his excellent Norwegian textbooks in which he eludicates sociological traditions and concepts with great skill and understanding of the ideas behind them (0sterberg 1979). As a metasociologist he is in fact today one of the leading experts on the European heritage in

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sociology (0sterberg 1988). A recent methodological text is Gösta Carlsson's (1988) analysis of the logical and empirical relationships between aggregate mass responses and individual choices. It is indeed an all too rare attempt to analyse what kind of knowledge sociologists have accomplished. A deliberate attempt to emphasize the importance of combining different approaches was made by Ulf Himmelstrand at Uppsala University in his Paradigm project. The papers of the project were published in three volumes (Himmelstrand 1986, 1987) and included an almost equal share of international and Swedish contributions. Today, in the beginning of the 1990s, there is hardly any Scandinavian sociologists who could be described as a clearcut Marxist. Yet, as a part of the increased pluralism Marx' ideas are definitely better known by the Scandinavian sociologists today than they were before 1970. The changes in both sociology and the society has brought forward both new interpretations of the classical writers and also renewed interests in some hitherto neglected writers of classical texts. As one review essay in Acta Sociologica recently asked: "A Simmel Renaissance?" (Blegvad 1989). The increased pluralism and the loss of the unifying effect of the American sociology also have their liabilities. In all Scandinavian countries a loss of community can be observed within sociology. The sociologists used to form an academic community with shared knowledge, common aims, and a basic agreement about what constitutes good sociology. Today, there is a tendency to form factions that use a language of their own and that tend to develop their own particularistic code systems. Sociologists of different persuasions and using different paradigms only rarely involve themselves in joint debates and discussion. The fragmentation tends in some cases to lead to a real isolation because Scandinavian sociologists prefer to stay at the same institution through most of their professional life, as an international evaluation of Swedish sociology recently observed (S0rensen 1988: 70-72).

7 An Increase of Nationally Independent and Salient Contributions A positive consequence of the increased pluralism and the weakening of the dependence of American sociology has been a rise in the ability to tackle nationally relevant problems through sociological analysis. It is impossible to mention here more than a small fraction of good Scandinavian sociological texts and contributions. Some examples only can be presented here. An illuminating case are the studies of the welfare state. As a political model the Scandinavian welfare state was already being discussed in the 1930s. In comparison with the Scandinavian economics sociologists were late in focussing their interest on the special forms and attributes of the Scandinavian welfare

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state. This lag was probably due to a strong dependence on American definitions of what is worthwhile studying during the formative years of Scandinavian sociology. At any rate, toward the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, an emerging and rapidly enlarging interest developed in welfare research. A strong tradition arose of conducting surveys of how well individuals actually fare in the Scandinavian states. This research tradition has recently been described in The Scandinavian Model: Welfare States and Welfare Research, edited by Robert Erikson, Erik J0rgen Hansen, Stein Ringen, and Hannu Uusitalo (1987). Surveys of well-being have been continually refined, but during the 1980s the main focus of research was on defining the welfare state and its institutional arrangements rather than measuring individual well-being. At present, several comparative projects of social policy and the welfare state are being conducted. Of special weight is an international project, Growth to Limits. The Western European Welfare States Since World War II, led and edited by Peter Flora (1986) of the University of Mannheim. The first volume contains booklengthy and comprehensive chapters on Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, written by Lars N0rby Johanssen, Matti Alestalo, Hannu Uusitalo, Stein Kuhnle, and Sven Olson. A distinguishing feature of the new Scandinavian studies of well-being and the welfare state is that they clearly relate social policies to the overall social structure and to the political system. The ability and tendency to combine a structural and an institutional approach is in fact an important European sociological tradition created by the European founding fathers, such as Emile Dürkheim, Karl Marx, Vilfredo Pareto, and Max Weber. Especially the last one was a master of analysing structural and institutional patterns simultaneously. Two revealing examples of the integration of descriptions of the class structure with an analysis of how institutional arrangements in the welfare state mould the class structure may be mentioned here. The first is Gösta Esping-Andersen's (1980) pioneering comparison of class, politics, and welfare policies in Denmark and Sweden. The other is Matti Alestalo's (1986) study of Finland with the illuminating title Structural Change, Classes, and the State. Finland in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. Another example of the interest in combining structural and institutional analysis is the Norwegian power study, commissioned by the Norwegian government in 1972. On a descriptive level it gives an excellent account of a society based on negotiations between different actors representing a mixture of governmental, trade unionist, political, entrepreneurial, and generally private interests (Hemes 1978). On the theoretical level the Norwegian power study contains a thorough and in many respects innovative analysis of the exchange concept, using ideas not only from sociological theory but also from economics and political science (Hemes 1975).

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Also the traditional ties between studies of social stratification and political sociology have been rejuvenated and strengthened in recent decades. A leading unit for comparative political sociology in Scandinavia has been the University of Bergen with its Centre for Comparative Politics founded by Stein Rokkan. One of his creations was the useful and extensively used international ecological data archive at the University of Bergen (Brosveet et al. 1982). Before his death in 1979, Stein Rokkan constructed what he called "a conceptual map of Europe", a theoretically and empirically grounded multi-dimensional typology of the territorial structuring of Western Europe (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). The nation-building approach has been of special interest to Norwegian and Finnish researchers probably because Finland and Norway are among the newer European nations. The usefulness of a comparative approach in studies of a single nation is excellently demonstrated by Risto Alapuro's (1988) book State and Revolution in Finland. A useful textbook about analyses and theories of national development was presented by Oyvind 0sterrud as early as 1978. The increasing tendency to interdisciplinary work and the use of ideas from all the social sciences have also led to critical assessments of the present mixture of welfare research and political sociology. In critique of the present Scandinavian welfare research, Göran Therborn (1987) presents an interesting and unorthodox mixture of ideas from Marxism and the public choice schools as well as information about the welfare arrangements in other European states. As in many other countries, in the last decade the study of women in the Scandinavian sociologies developed into a very active field with a large number of researchers. Students who specialise in studying women in society and problems related to gender have been among the most motivated of sociology students. Leading sociologists in all the Scandinavian countries, such as Harriet Holter (1970) in Norway, Elina Haavio-Mannila in Finland, Drude Dahlerup in Denmark (Haavio-Mannila and Dahlerup 1985), and Rita Liljeström (1982) in Sweden have devoted parts of their research efforts to the sociology of gender. During the 1980s there has been an upsurge of interest in French structuralism, semiotics, and linguistic analysis. Foucault, Derrida, and Baudrillard have been popular examples. Yet, the interest in the new French semiotics has been visible mainly among the youngest generation of sociologists and graduate students, and it has as yet produced hardly any weighty research results. Nevertheless, it has produced some interesting attempts to redefine the tasks and objectives of sociology (Mortensen 1986). Also other attempts to redefine present objectives have been made. A thought-provoking one has been forwarded by Margareta Bertilsson (1990: 11) who starts from the idea that present-day sociology has yielded too much to the demands of social administration. At any rate, an increase in the interest in cultural analysis has been visible in all the Scandinavian countries. The importance of cultural dispositions and culturally determined interpretations of social forms has been stressed in many fields of study. A fashionable recent source of inspiration has been the French sociologist Pierre

References

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Bourdieu (Sulkunen 1982). Among other things, he has inspired analyses of the strong emphasis on higher education in present-day Scandinavian societies (Gesser 1985: 274-279) and also studies of the rise of a new middle class (Roos and Rahkonen 1985). Some of the sociologically most interesting cultural analyses have been produced by a group of Swedish ethnologists focusing their interest on how dominant cultural forms develop and how they relate to the class structure in society. Jonas Frykman and Orvar Löfgren (1979) have sharply and wittily analysed the rise of the bourgeois culture during the nineteenth century and its effects on commonly accepted views and perceptions. Some subfields have emerged and been considerably strengthened during the last decades. Among such fields in Scandinavian sociology one could mention the sociology of health and medicine, sociology of work, and sociology of science. The sociological study of environmental issues is emerging as a new field in Scandinavia as elsewhere. Although there are some excellent examples of Scandinavian research in these fields, space does not permit their mentioning here. In all fields, however, there are similiar tendencies to an increasing amount of European contacts, and especially to an increased variety in the choice of both theoretical schemes and international contacts. One aspect of the increased pluralism in the choices of sources of inspiration consists of a clear rise in interdisciplinary influences. Particularly in comparison with the 1950s and 1960s, sociologists are now less discipline-bound than they used to be.

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Bertilsson, M. 1990. Sociologins kärna - i förändring?. (The Core of Sociology - Is It Changing?.) Sociologisk forskning 27: 11-26. Birket-Smith, K. 1918. A Geographical Study of the Early History of the Algonquian Indians. International Archive for Ethnography XXIV. Birket-Smith, K. 1946. Geschichte der Kultur. Eine allgemeine Ethnologie. Zürich: Orell Füssli. Bj0rklund, T. 1990. 40-ärs jubileum og 50-ärs minne. (A 40th Anniversary and in Memory of Five Decades.) Tidskrift for Samfunnsforskning 31: 166-176. Blegvad, Μ. 1989. A Simmel Renaissance? Acta Sociologica 32: 203-209. Brosveet, J., B. Henrichen and L. Svaasand 1982. Building Infrastructures for the Social Sciences. Stein Rokkan and the Data-Archive Movement. In: P. Torsvik (ed.), Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures, and NationBuilding, pp. 39-47. Bergen, Oslo and Troms0: Universitetsforlaget. Bruun, K., G. Edwards, M. Lumio, K. Mäkelä, L. Pan, R. E. Popham, R. Room, W. Schmidt, O.-J. Skog, P. Sulkunen and E. Österberg 1975. Alcohol Control Policies in Public Health Perspective. A Collaborative Project of the Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies. The World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe and the Addiction Research Fondation of Ontario. Forssä: The Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies. Bull sr., E. 1922. Die Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung in den drei skandinavischen Ländern. Archive für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung 10: 329-361. Carlsson, G. 1958. Social Mobility and Class Structure. Lund: Gleerups. Carlsson, G. 1988. Mass Responses and Individual Choice. The Sociology of Behavioral Trends. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International. Christie, N. 1960. Tvangsarbeid og alkoholbruk. (Forced Labour and Excessive Drinking.) Oslo and Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. Dahlström, Ε., Η. Holter, S. Brun-Gubrandsen, P. O. Tiller, G. Dahlstöm and St. Thyberg (eds.) 1962. Kvinnors liv och arbete. (Women's Life and Work.) Stockholm: SNS. Dahrendorf, R. 1959. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Due, J. and J. S. Madsen 1983. Slip sociologin l0s. (Let the Sociology Loose.) Copenhagen: Hans Reizel. Elster, J. 1978. Logic and Society. Contradictions and Possible Worlds. Chichester and New York: Wiley. Erikson, R., E. J. Hansen, S. Ringen and H. Uusitalo (eds.) 1987. The Scandinavian Model. Welfare States and Welfare Research. Armonk and London: Sharpe. Eskola, A. 1970. Perception of the Basic Cleavages of Finnish Society. Journal of Peace Research 7: 259-265. Esping-Andersen, G. 1980. Social Class, Social Democracy, and State Policy. Copenhagen: New Social Science Monographs.

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Social Change and Research on Social Structure in Hungary Tamäs Kolosi and Ivan Szelenyi

The purpose of this paper is to offer a sociology of Hungarian sociology. We focus our attention on the evolution of sociology, and, in particular, on the study of social structure during the last thirty years. This development is interpreted against the socio-economic changes during this epoch. Our starting hypothesis is that the development of sociology as a profession is closely linked to the evolution of civil or bourgeois society. Thus, if the development of civil society is delayed or reversed, we anticipate that the development of sociology is likely to be blocked. This hypothesis holds true for the last century in general, but it may also be useful to explain the controversies in and around sociology during the last few decades, during the epoch of state socialism.

1 Sociology and the Evolution of Civil Society Before Socialism Sociology in Hungary does not have a long tradition. In this respect, it is comparable to the sociology in most of the other Central European countries with the exception of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Our initial hypothesis is a macro-sociological one that links the development of sociology as a profession to the evolution of the civil society. However, we do not ignore the impact of micro-factors, such as the role of individual scholars or the dynamics of institution-building. The 'exceptionalism' of Czech and in particular that of Polish sociology during the first half of the twentieth century is a case in point. During the interwar years the discipline flourished in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Czechoslovakia was certainly the most 'Western' country in Eastern Europe in the interwar period. It had the most complex civil society. Poland was at the same stage of development as Hungary. Thus, one can assume that the strength of Polish sociology can be related to the existence of exceptional personalities and to the dynamics of institution-building. Florian Znaniecki played a crucial role in this development. From his base at the University of Chicago he contributed to establishing sociology as a strong discipline in Poland, his native country. The institutions created during these interwar years were strong enough to survive even the worse years of Stalinism. The case of Polish sociology thus is an important case modifying our initial macro-sociological hypothesis.

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Sociology did not exist yet as an independent scientific discipline, when a few prominent Hungarian political theorists began to lay the philosophical foundations of a modern social science during the middle and late nineteenth century. In particular, it was Istvän Szechenyi (1830) and Jozsef Eötvös (1902) who wrote on strategies of capitalist transformation of feudal Hungarian social relations and on the possiblities of forming a liberal government. They were interested in social analysis, and in some of their writings they offered insights about the reasons and nature of backwardness of Hungarian society. The main purpose of their work, however, was to offer blueprints for a good society, a just government, and a rational, efficient economy. In this respect they resembled the French political theorists and the British political economists of the eighteenth century. Although both Szechenyi and Eötvös were aristocrats by birth (the former was a count, the wealthiest aristocrat at that time, and the later a baron) they were advocates of a cautious, gradual capitalist development. They were moderate critics of the feudal social order from the standpoint of civil society and capitalist economy. This classical Hungarian political theory was the product of the incomplete bourgeois transformation of the Hungarian society. During the 1830s the Hungarian parliament, a parliament of nobles, attempted to introduce reform measures. This was the first "reform epoch", as it was called at that time in Hungarian history. (We will refer to the 1970s and 1980s as the "second reform epoch". The first one was led by an enlightened aristocracy, the second one by the reform minded fraction of the nomenclature.) Half-hearted reforms from above, however, culminated in the revolution of 1848-1849 which eventually was defeated by conservative forces. By the end of nineteenth century, however, a major social change was under way in this part of the world. In 1867, Hungary reached an agreement with Austria and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was formed, which gave both economic development and the transformation of the Hungarian society into a bourgeois society a boost. A modern professional class emerged from the intelligentsia of the former gentry and from the sons and daughters of German and Jewish burghers (Hanäk 1983: 452-457). The class of proprietors was increasingly limiting the privileges of aristocracy of birth, the peasantry began to shrink in numbers, and the urban industrial proletariat grew (Hanäk 1983: 427-435). The rank order of the feudal society weakened and a society based on class stratification emerged (Hanäk 1983: 512-515). As a result, a new wave of social theorising started at the turn of the century which was closer to modern sociology than to classical political theory. The first 'workshop' of Hungarian sociology took place in the Society for Social Sciences (Tärsadalomtudomänyi Tärsasäg), the so-called Galilei Circle, and their members published in the journal Huszadik Szazad (Twentieth Century). Quite a few outstanding intellectuals were active in this circle, some of whom became known as the most formidable sociologists and social philosophers of their

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times. The most prominent scholars among them were Georg Lukäcs, Karl Mannheim, Karl Polänyi, Arnold Hauser, and Oszkär Jäszi (Litvän and Szücs 1973). The loss of the First World War and the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was a deep shock for the Hungarian economy and society. The dynamic capitalist development Hungary had experienced in the past was fuelled by the favourable strategic position it had gained in the region after the agreement with Austria in 1867. For decades, Hungary had the privilege of being the 'junior partner' of Austrian imperialism. After having lost this privileged position, Hungary experienced a crumbling of its economy, a flood of refugees, and massive unemployment which badly effected not only the working class, but also the professional class. The end of the First World War was accompanied by political radicalisation, first, during the fall of 1918 and the spring of 1919, towards the left, and then, after the fall of 1919, towards the right. Most of the scholars belonging to the emerging Hungarian social sciences were attracted by left radicalism. Many of them became sympathisers, if not active participants, of the first Hungarian communist regime during the spring of 1919. Georg Lukäcs was even a member of the first Hungarian communist cabinet. Karl Mannheim who, of course, was not a communist, was appointed as founding professor of sociology at Budapest University in 1919 (Ränki 1984: 248). When the right-wing turn took place, virtually all of them had to seek refuge in Western Europe. Georg Lukäcs went in exile to the Soviet Union. The right-wing, nationalistic, antisemitic regime of the interwar years looked at sociology with suspicion. It was regarded as a cosmopolitan, left-wing, socialist and Jewish science. Those who were interested in critical social analysis found refuge in "belles lettres" and developed a unique style of research which later became known as "sociography". In the 1930s, populist writers started a series of community studies (Belädi 1974) which almost exclusively focused on the problems of peasantry, rural poverty and of the dehumanising effects of the feudal latifundia system. Urban "sociographies", descriptive studies of the urban working class, were far less numerous, although there did exist quite a few (Tordai and Toth 1976; Litvän 1974). Official statistics had a good record already by the end of the nineteenth century; especially, Hungarian census was of extraordinary high quality. During the interwar years, the Statistical Office expanded its collection of social statistics. Hungary may have belonged to the first countries in the world that collected data on social mobility in the population census. As early as 1930, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office asked questions about the occupation of the father of the respondent (Thirring 1941). The sociography of the populist writers was somehow more acceptable to the right-wing authoritarian regime of the interwar years, than sociology.28 SociograAlso populist writers clashed with the regime. There were several lawsuits against writers

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phies were mainly descriptive; but nevertheless, many of them were masterpieces.29 Very often, they were highly critical of the existing order, but their criticism mostly stemmed from a romantic view of the peasantry, which somehow was experienced as less threatening by the nationalist authoritarian regime than the more rationalistic discourse typical of sociologists. There were some populist writers, however, who addressed theoretical questions as well. One of them, and perhaps one of the best, was Ferenc Erdei, who made major contributions to the study of social structure. In his work written in the late 1930s and early 1940s, he explored the social reasons for Hungarian socio-economic backwardness (Erdei 1988). The issue of retarded development and of underdevelopment (regarded as a consequence of retarded development) has been an issue of major concern for social theorists and historians during the interwar period both in Hungary and in other countries of Central Europe. These debates anticipated some of the important historical and sociological contributions made later in the West by scholars such as Alexander Gerschenkron, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Gunder Frank. In an unfinished essay written around 1941-1942, (published later as Hungarian Society Between the Two World Wars (Erdei 1988: 7-94)), Erdei offered a powerful sociological theory for the reasons of Hungary's peripherical position and for the repeated interruptions in its process toward becoming a modern bourgeois society. Erdei described the Hungarian social structure during the interwar years as a dual one in which the dominant rank order systematically blocks the evolution of the emergent class order. Erdei (1988: 9-10) wrote: Capitalism penetrated these societies from outside and above. ... At the same time, the structure of society has not been transformed. ... A s a result, the feudal forms of social structure survived. ... Thus, ... capitalists and workers ... had not been transformed into bourgeois social classes. ... [I]n the East European societies which have taken the road of capitalism ... the social structure ... [remained] ... partly feudal . . . .

Erdei's theory of "interrupted embourgeoisement" and of delayed development of civil society is the most complex sociological explanation for the backwardness of Hungarian society which also holds true for other Central European societies.

for "subversion" - the most renown case being the one against Imre Kovacs. Some writers, Ferenc Erdei, for instance, were even imprisoned. Thus sociography was far from welcomed by the Horthy regime, but in the last instance it was tolerated. Works like Gyula Illyis's (1936) A pusztak nepe (The People of the Puszta), Zoltan Szabo's (1937) A tardi helyzet (The Social Conditions in the Village of Tard), Geza Feja's (1937) Viharsarok (The Comer of Storm) are comparable in their power and beauty to the best of pre-Second World War American community studies, such as Street Corner Society or Middletowrt.

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2 Sociology, State Socialism, and Subsequent Attempts to Reconstitute Civil Society 2.1 The Stalinist Social Order: Sociology as Bourgeois Pseudoscience After the Second World War, another, but shorter, wave of 'embourgeoisement' took place. The ruling aristocracy of the interwar years lost its power. As a result of radical land reform, the remains of feudal large estates were dismantled. For a few years, Hungary was on its way to democratic transformation and emancipation of the civil society from the feudal rank order. The breakdown of the "dual structure" Erdei had written about, was under way. In this period, also sociology experienced a brief phase of expansion. A chair of sociology was established at the University of Budapest to which Alexander Szalai was appointed. An Institute of Social Research was created at the university at which a few empirical investigations were conducted (Toth 1987). But this phase of democratisation after the Second World War did not last long enough to allow the new generation of Hungarian sociologists to leave their intellectual mark. Nevertheless, in this brief period of time and sociological training a cohort of social scientists was created who later became distinguished and internationally recognised scholars,30 although they did not quite reach the fame and stature of the first and wonderful generation of Hungarian sociologists and social philosophers of the turn of the century. However, with the socialist transformation of the socio-economic order and the Stalinist turn in politics, the end of sociology as an autonomous scientific discipline started. The department and research centre was abolished, and Szalai was sent to prison for a few years. In 1956, he was re-installed for a short time, but only to be fired again when the revolt was crushed. Whereas the right-wing authoritarian regime of the interwar years was suspicious of sociology, the Stalinist and Marxist-Leninist rulers were openly hostile to the representatives of our discipline. Socialist politics aimed at eliminating civil society,31 replacing sociology as a discipline with the doctrine of MarxismLeninism, and at propagating for a "critique of civil society from the standpoint of socialised humanity" instead of social analysis. The first years of socialist transformation were years of revolutionary zeal. The aim was not to understand or interpret social reality, but, to put it into the words of Karl Marx, to "change The game theorist John Harsanyi, the criminologist Denis Szabo, the sociologist Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy, the historian Geza Perjes, for example, come to ones mind. They were all students of Szalai during these years, and in one way or another they were influenced by him. As early as 1946, Istvan Bibo, friend and collaborator of Erdei, wrote about the danger that the evolution of civil society, or "embourgeoisement", which got under way in 1945, can be blocked by a communist take-over, which may lead to the creation of a new "rankorder" of the communist type (Bibo [1946] 1982: 362).

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it". During Stalinism sociology was labelled a "bourgeois pseudo-science" and this for good reasons! From the point of view of revolutionary Marxism and the expansionist state socialist movement, scholars were not supposed to describe, how society works, but to ascribe, how it ought to function. This conflict between sociologists and representatives of Marxism-Leninism was to be expected; what requires an explanation, however, is why attempts were made later to reconcile Marxism-Leninism with sociology and to create something called Marxist sociology, which, in a way, is a contradiction in terms. The first cautious attempts to re-establish sociology as an independent discipline in Hungary were made in the early 1960s. They can be seen as a reflection of the legitimation crisis of the post-Stalinist social order and as an anticipation of the first important wave of socio-economic reforms, the beginning of what we here call the "second reform epoch" in Hungarian history. Although the question of the legitimacy of state socialist formations has been subject of some controversy, it is widely accepted that Stalinist regimes claimed charismatic legitimacy. This is especially true for the Stalinist regime in the former USSR in the years around the Second World War (Feher et al. 1983: 139-151). This claim of the Stalinist government to be recognised as an authority based on charismatic legitimacy coincided with the bureaucratic structure of this 'totalitarian' regime. In this type of society, ascent and descent in the hierarchy was almost exclusively defined by loyalty to the leader, by the possession of political capital. After the end of the Second World War and Stalin's death, this system of charismatic-bureaucratic authority was undermined and the bureaucratic authority was left without its charismatic leader. This change caused a deep legitimation crisis which, in the case of Hungary, erupted in a violent revolution in 1956. The revolution was suppressed by force, but the new elite did not (or could not) want to re-establish a long-lasting neo-Stalinist order. A neo-Stalinist rule came to power, but only for a few years, and as early as in the beginning of the 1960s the new Hungarian ruling elite was ready to compromise with different social forces within the society. It began to explore the possibilities of implementing a post-Stalinist socialist socio-economic order. 2.2 The Post-Stalinist Quest for New Legitimacy: The Quest for Sociology as an Independent Discipline In their search for a post-Stalinist socialist system of authority, the political elite believed sociology could play a significant role in this process - however, only under the condition that it would be practiced by 'reliable' people committed to the cause of reform socialism. The first generation of sociologists in the 1960s was recruited from different strata of the intelligentsia. In spite of their heterogeneous social origin, they had something in common. They were people in whom the elite, although for differ-

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ent reasons, trusted; who were partners in the post-Stalinist reform; and who were ready to join the ruling elite in their search for a type of socialism with a more "human face". Alexander Szalai, for instance, one of the leading figures of the newly established discipline, never was a member of the Communist Party (he was a member of the Social Democratic Party). But in jail he became acquainted with György Aczel. Aczel was appointed as the secretary of the CP and responsible for cultural affairs, and he developed a good working relationship with Szalai. Andras Hegediis, to take another example, the first director of the newly founded Institute of Sociology at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, was prime minister before the 1956 revolution, and in the beginning of the 1960s, he demonstrated his strong commitment to the cause of reform. The person succeeding him in this position in 1968, Kaiman Kulcsär, was prosecutor in the military tribunal before 1956. The process of re-establishment of sociology was supervised by Ferenc Erdei, who at that time was the secretary general of the Academy of Sciences. From having been a left-populist, he turned into a Marxist and became a loyal partner of Jänos Kädär with whom he collaborated on agricultural policy. All these people had passed the acid test and proved their loyalty and dedication for the sake of reform. Sociology proved to be an important vehicle in this search for new legitimacy. It turned into an important tool for reform communists to reject Stalinism and to begin rebuilding Marxism-Leninism into a doctrine open for reform attempts. The post-Stalinist Kädär regime turned to sociology in order to support its image as a pragmatic system, committed to "Realpolitik" and opposed to doctrinaire ideology. In the 1960s, Georg Lukäcs formulated the ideological programme for this revised Marxism. He called for a "renaissance of Marxism", which, according to him, would result in "a return to the original values of Marxism and to the respect of reality" (Lukäcs 1971: 598). The first battle which had to be fought by sociologists referred to the question of how much space the new government would be ready to concede sociology as an autonomous field of inquiry. This fight made it necessary to take over the intellectually not very stimulating task of challenging Marxism and, at the same time, remaining within the general framework of Marxism. The advocates of sociology wanted to show that sociology is not a 'bourgeois', thus, anti-Marxist science. The creation of a "Marxist sociology", they claimed, would not replace, but complement historical materialism. According to their definition, historical materialism was the philosophy of history of Marxism, and sociology a special field of social investigation dealing with "concrete social reality" from a Marxist perspective (Szalai 1962; Hegediis 1961). It is worth mentioning, that, whereas the first steps toward the economic reform did not begin before 1963-1964, this struggle between the representatives of sociology and revisionist Marxism against orthodox Marxism-Leninism was already fought two years before the reform discussions started. Sociology, defined now as a discipline dealing with "concrete social reality", was very important indeed in paving the road toward

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pragmatism, responsiveness to real social forces, conflicts and processes, that is, in supporting those conditions which proved to be necessary for the introduction of the 'second reform epoch'. In spite of some resistance from anti-reformist circles, the battle for sociology was soon won. In the spring of 1963, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences set up the first independent sociological research unit in the former 'satellite countries', namely, the Sociological Research Group. This was an important step, since it led to a series of empirical investigations. Some of these investigations were carried out by the Sociological Research Group itself. The establishment of sociology as a recognised academic discipline made it also easier to start empirical research elsewhere, primarily in the Hungarian Central Statistical Office32. We will now turn to reviewing the theoretical debates and empirical researches in one field, namely the study on social structure.

3 The Study of Social Structure In the struggle between the old Stalinist guard and reform-communists the redefinition of social structure proved to be crucial. For reform-communists it proved to be important to move away from the emphasis Stalinists had put on the notion of "class-struggle" and to develop a more pragmatic view of social stratification and inequalities. The concept of "class-struggle" was replaced by concepts such as "management of conflicts" and "social engineering". For some time, sociology proved to be a useful tool for these reform-communists, although eventually it turned into a double-edged sword. It was successfull in de-mystifying the apologetical character of the orthodox Marxist theory of socialist social structure, but, at the same time, it started to discover those social contradictions, which were difficult to manage within the framework of state socialism. Until the mid 1980s, the reform-communists hoped to find a 'half-way-house' between state socialist rank order and a full fledged civil society; some sociologists, however, began to go beyond this point.

During the 1960s, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office was an important workshop for sociological research. Zsuzsa Ferge began her work here. In the early 1960s, she directed a major study on time-budget. Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy also worked here and did path-breaking research on suicide. Under the direction of Mod and Zsuzsa Ferge the first major stratification survey was also carried out by the Office in 1964. Rudolf Andorka and Istvan Kemeny joined the distinguished team of researchers by the mid 1960s.

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3.1 From Class to Stratification (From Cooperation to Conflicts between Sociologists and Reform-communists) As a consequence, the first major debate and the first serious set of empirical investigation focused on the question of social structure. According to the doctrine of official Marxism-Leninist as it was codified during the 1930s, socialism is still a class society. This thought was expressed in the called two-class-onestratum model. It was claimed, that there are two forms of socialist property, state property and cooperative property. Around these two forms of property two types of classes are formed. They are non-antagonistic, since they both are based on collective forms of ownership, but unequal, since the cooperative form of ownership temporarily is an inferior form. This theory also tried to locate professionals and/or bureaucrats in this structure without emphasizing their selfinterests. Intellectuals and bureaucrats are not linked to any special form of property. Thus, they cannot constitute a class, they are only a stratum. In Poland, the two-class-one-stratum theory became the first target of the newly reborn sociology right after 1956. The dean of Polish sociology, Stanislaw Ossowski, launched his attack against this theory as early as 1957 in Amsterdam at the World Congress of the International Sociological Association. According to Ossowski, class stratification based on differences in ownership was replaced by occupational stratification in socialist countries, where private ownership was eliminated. To some extent, Ossowski claimed, this holds even true for the societies in the West, where economic development had pronounced differences in occupation. The Hungarian debates about social structure which were held in the 1960, were inspired by these ideas of Ossowski. Andräs Hegedüs, who emerged as the most influential personality of Hungarian sociology in the early 1960s, challenged the two-class-one-stratum theory in one of his very early articles (Hegedüs 1964). His first article on this subject is still rather cautious. He emphasized that the working class is far from being homogeneous, and that it is the task of empirical social research to explore the internal stratification and/or fragmentation of the working class. According to this article, it is not sufficient to acknowledge the class differences, based in property relations. One has to complement such a type of analysis with those facts of social stratification, which stem from the differences in the division of labour. (Thus, in this article, Hegedüs still accepts the class character of socialist society and the property based definition of classes.) Within two years a full-fledged debate took place on the questions of social structure (Hegedüs 1966a, 1966b; Ferge 1966), in which Hegedüs and Ferge took one more decisive step. In the debate of 1966, they suggested more than the refinement of the two-class-one-stratum model; they rejected the Stalinist theory of social structure altogether. According to them, socialism is the process of gradual reduction of social inequalities. In this process the socialist countries

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have already eliminated the class differences based on property rights, but the stratum inequalities based on the differences of the division of labour were still existent. This thesis, which is the re-statement of Ossowski's proposition, was vehemently attacked by orthodox Marxists. The Central Statistical Office, however, conducted a survey in 1964, which offered massive empirical support for the theory of social inequalities based on differences in the division of labour or occupational stratification (Ferge 1969). At first glance, the emergent stratification theory was not altogether that critical. In one respect it appeared to be even more apologetical than the two-classone-stratum model. According to the new stratification theory, the actually existing socialism was already classless. This approach was scorned by orthodox Marxists, because it began to describe a realistic picture of social inequalities and conflicts under actually existing socialism. The supporters of the new stratification theory did not call these social differences "class structure", but they described a social hierarchy, which had at its peak high bureaucrats and professionals and unskilled industrial and agricultural workers at its bottom. Empirical analysis proved that, while the two-stratum-one-class model explained only about 5% of the variance of income distribution, housing and cultural stratification, the hierarchical model of occupational stratification explained about 20-50% of that variance. This explains why the seemingly innocent stratification analysis was perceived as subversive, or dangerous by orthodox Marxists. It identified those, who genuinely benefited from the system of actually existing socialism, namely, the high bureaucrats and professionals. In this way, it undermined the claims that this regime is a "workers's state" or "dictatorship of the proletariat". By the late 1960s and the early 1970s, both empirical research and theoretical generalisation began to move somewhat beyond this important insight of stratification research. The basic premise of stratification research, as advocated by Hegedüs and Ferge by the mid 1960s, was that, while actually existing socialist societies are unequal, their inequalities are the result of technological and economic backwardness. By implication, the supporters of stratification theory anticipated that these inequalities would disappear as the material conditions improve. Social inequalities were explainded by them as either being products of backwardness or being inherited from the capitalist past, by the still surviving market forces.33 Finally, since the existence of classes was denied, conflicts within society were not regarded as antagonistic or fundamental.

Zsuzsa Ferge's work on education reached different conclusions. Inspired by Bourdieu, Ferge demonstrated how social inequalities are reproduced through the educational system. In this analysis, the trends towards reproduction were not explained by inheritance from capitalist past or by market forces (Ferge 1972, 1980: 97-281).

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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, empirical researches began to put some of these assumptions into question. Those scholars conducting empirical work began to notice that the existing inequalities could not be attributed to "inheritance", but that at least some of those inequalities and social conflicts were the products of the very socialist nature of the East European societies. In their research on housing allocation, George Konräd and Ivan Szelenyi (Szelenyi and Konräd 1969; Szelenyi 1972) found that housing inequalities in socialist Hungary were produced by administrative allocation and that underprivileged social groups benefited from the markets. Their research implied that socialist inequalities are not inherited from the past market economy, but that they are the results of the new socialist economic system. Therefore, they are likely to exist and generate conflicts as long as the socialist system of economic reproduction operates. Istvan Kemeny arrived at analogous conclusions in his work on the stratification of the Hungarian working class (Kemeny 1972). He found the emergence of a "new working class". According to him, a new stratum of workers was created as a result of socialist industrialisation. These were the first generation of industrial employees, who maintained their rural place of residence and sustained some agricultural productive activities in their spare time. Kemeny showed that this new working class, while being forced to live in backward rural conditions, can use its roots in the non-socialist market sector of the economy for its advantage, and as a bargaining chip in the bureaucratic world of labour. Csaba Mako and Lajos Hethy arrived at similar conclusions in their work on Hungarian industrial firms (Hethy and Mako 1978). According to Hethy and Mako, workers practiced shop-floor bargaining in those firms they studied: They learned how to use transactive or market-like strategies of withholding production in order to force management to offer them decent wages and working conditions. In the early 1970s, these empirical studies culminated in new ways of theorising about social structure. In his first book, Kolosi (1974) began to formulate some of the theoretic implications of this empirical work, foreshadowing the possibilities of a new, and this time, critical theory of socialist class structure. At that time, when Kolosi's book was published, it was read by some people as a conservative critic of the stratification theory formulated by Hegedüs and Ferge. (And indeed, it emphasized the limitations of descriptive stratification research and called for a study of social structure, thus implying potentially a return to class theory.) But in fact, the book formulated quite a few important and radical theoretical propositions. Kolosi was the first scholar who suggested that the elimination of private property does not invalidate the study of social structure and that is does not have to be replaced with a functionalist stratification theory. His key claim was that, in studying social structure, one has to focus on the process of expropriation of surplus. Kolosi's work was foreshadowed by Hegedüs' writings on bureaucracy. In one respect, Hegedüs moved beyond Ossowski and Ferge already in his stratifi-

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cation theory. In his book, written in 1966, on the multi-dimensional stratification scheme, he uses "control" over one's own work and "control" over the work of others as a dimension of social stratification (Hegediis 1966b: 66). In the late 1960s, Hegediis published several articles extending this idea and exploring the nature of bureaucracy under socialism. While he accepted the necessity of bureaucracy under socialism, his analysis pointed to the irreconcilable conflict between bureaucracy and society (Hegediis 1976). Hegediis (1969) even makes an attempt to link the question of bureaucracy to property relations. Kolosi was politically cautious enough not to develop a new class theory on the basis of his important insight into the fundamental conflict between those social groups that appropriate and dispose with surplus and those that produce it. His book was an important inspiration for Konräd and Szelenyi. In 1973-1974, they attempted to draw the theoretical conclusions of their earlier empirical work, and by the fall of 1974, they completed a manuscript published later in English as The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (Konräd and Szelenyi [1974] 1978). Konräd and Szelenyi rediscovered Karl Polänyi's theory of economic integration. They applied Polänyi's notion of "redistributive economy" to the study of the socialist society. Polänyi used the concept of "redistributive integration" in order to describe archaic economies, such as the economic systems of Ancient Egypt or traditional China. In such economies, imperial power first concentrated all surplus in a central hand before it was redistributed for purposes such as construction of irrigation networks, defense systems or "bureaucratic prestige consumption", like building of pyramids. According to this analysis, the state socialist economic system can be understood as a modern version of redistribution: Socialist bureaucracy, justified by technocratic demands, concentrates all means for extended reproduction in the central state budget and redistributes it in the name of accelerated socialist industrialisation. This reconstruction of Polänyi's theory was combined with insights from the book of Kolosi. Polänyi's work served as the basis for theory on the new political economy of state socialism (thus, a rationalised, rather than a traditional form of redistribution); Kolosi's work contributed with insights about the development of class theory (i.e., his distinction between those who dispose with surplus - redistributors - and those who produce it - working class). Konräd and Szelenyi returned to a class theory: They described a class conflict in the socialist redistributive economy between redistributors and producers. With this theory they intended to achieve a synthesis of the class theories of Karl Marx and Max Weber: It was Marxist to the extent that it identified classes as having a key position in the system of economic reproduction, but it was Weberian to the extent that it rejected property as the basis of class and rather tried to locate classes in the system of authority and legitimation. In one decade, Hungarian sociology travelled a long way from the apologetical orthodox Marxist two-class-one-stratum model via the semi-critical, semi-apologetical stratification theory to a new critical class theory of socialism.

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This development put sociology on a collision course with the political regime. In the early 1960s, sociology emerged as an ally of reform-communism. But in the late 1960s and early 1970s, this cooperation began to collapse. The first clash that occurred between sociologists and the representatives of the establishment was more political and ideological than professional. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Andräs Hegediis was fired as the director of the Institute of Sociology, and his close collaborators, members of the so-called Budapest School created by Georg Lukäcs, Anges Heller and Maria Markus, were reprimanded for their public protest against the invasion. In 1973, this conflict escalated to the level of ideology. Hegediis and most of the members of the Budapest school were fired from their jobs at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for "revisionism", basically, for offering a New Left inspired ideological critic of actually existing socialism for not being able to deliver the real promises of socialism. However, by the early 1970s, critically minded sociologyists were reaching theoretical conclusions from their empirical research which were unacceptable for the regime at that point of time. Police actions were taken against some of the more critically minded sociologists, others decided not to engage in theoretical generalisations, but to remain on the more solid grounds of empirical research and middle-range theorising, which remained acceptable for the Hungarian Communists. After a few setbacks, the enlighted members of the nomenclature tried to stay on a reform course. For this purpose, they needed sociology, which provided them with reliable empirical information on social processes.

4 Reform, Social Change, and Research on Social Structure As critical sociology moved from a sociology for planning towards a sociology of planning,34 some sociologists and representatives of the regime clashed in the early 1970s. The political scandal, which erupted in 1974 around the book The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power can be interpreted this way. This book was a critical self-reflection of the intellectuals of the reform movement of the 1960s.35 Konräd and Szelenyi linked the process of formation of a new dominant class around the position of redistributor to the success of the reform of state socialist redistributive economy. In the spirit of Weber and in harmony with the analysis of Erdei and Bibo, they regarded the Stalinist social structure as a rank order, a "Stand", rather than a class-stratified society. The technocratic reform is a step towards modernisation and rationalisation, but instead of being an indication of emancipation, it is a transition from a rank order to a new class See for this distinction the introduction of the book Social Planning and Sociology (Szelenyi 1973). See Ivan Szelenyi's (1986-1987) 'auto-critique'.

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order, that is, from one form of domination to another. Thus, while the book was pro-reform, it was anti-Stalinist. It foreshadowed a critic of the social structure which may evolve, if and when attempts of reform were successful. 36 This analysis was irritating not only to the orthodox Marxists, but also to the reform communists, and even to many, if not most, of the dissident intellectuals. This group agreed with the reform communists, that a change from above was needed; but they disagreed with them on the question of the content, extent and speed of this change. The decade from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s resulted in new developments in Hungarian society, which had far-reaching implications for sociology and research on social structure. The economic reform unfolded in a rather different way than the one intended by the reformers of 196837, or anticipated by Konräd and Szelenyi. By the mid-1970s, it became obvious that the old-line bureaucracy38 was not ready to give up power easily and pass it on to the technocratic intelligentsia. This old-line bureaucracy fought a bitter war against technocratic reform in the USSR and Eastern Europe. While the old-line bureaucracy was the weakest and the reform communists and the technocratic opposition were the strongest in Hungary in the whole region, the conservatives still delayed and obstructed reform in this country as well. Even if Konräd and Szelenyi were right, that the reform unleashed the process of transition from Stalinist rank order to a new type of class stratification, certainly no 'new class' gained power by the mid-1980s. In spite of the half-heartedness of technocratic reform, far-reaching changes began to take place in the Hungarian economic system. These changes were not 'designed' by reformers, but rather the results of pragmatic concessions given by the elites to pressures 'from below'. While the old-line bureaucrats proved to be less willing than expected to share power with the technocracy, they compensated by being more prone to concessions towards the second enonomy. Private activities were first allowed, later, within limits, even encouraged in agriculture, service industries, or in industries proper. While the statist sector of the economy changed relatively little, market-like forces began to operate from 'below' and 'beside' this state sector. After hours in moonlighting activities, people produced in private work organisation goods and provided services which were sold on markets. The incomes generated in this way helped the maintenance of living standards when the statist sector was sliding into a crisis and had difficulties in

During the early 1970s, Hungarian society was not regarded as a class society yet by Konräd and Szelenyi. They wrote about the process of class formation and a new dominant class in statu nascendi. This was the year, when Hungary implemented the first far-reaching economic reform in Eastern Europe. They introduced what at that time was called the new economic mechanism. Here we use Alvin Gouldner's (1979) term.

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maintaining real wage levels. Hungarian peasants, workers and professionals earned incomes outside their official jobs. Hungarian research on social structure responded to these changes. Different authors, however, did so in strikingly different ways, for they produced quite different diagnoses. There were at least three major, different responses to the social impacts of reforms. Andorka and his collaborators (reinforcing the analyses of leading Western stratification researchers on stratification of state socialist societies) did not see major changes in the stratification system or patterns of social mobility. Kolosi and, in somewhat different way, Szelenyi saw farreaching and fundamentally positive changes in the social structure. Ferge, finally, saw some change, but she emphasized the socially undesirable implications of the increased importance of market forces. Andorka (1982) continued the stratification and mobility research, which was started by Mod and Ferge in 1964. He directed two major new surveys at the Hungarian Central Statistical Office in 1973 and 1983. Under the influence of Blau and Duncan (1967), and in continuation of the early work of Ferge, he used occupation as the major indicator of the position in the social structure. With cautious and sophisticated statistical analysis he came to analogous conclusions as Treiman (1977), Featherman, Jones, and Häuser (Featherman and Hauser 1978). Andorka found the major cleavages among occupational categories. These cleavages were between high bureaucrats, professionals and the rest of the society on the one hand, and between skilled and unskilled workers on the other. Andorka also found that these cleavages stubbornly resisted social changes. He noted some variations over time and across nations both in terms of social cleavages and patterns of mobility. His major findings, however, reconfirmed the results of Treiman, Featherman and Hauser. These American researchers pointed to the similarity of occupational cleavages and prestige over time and across countries. Andorka also found little difference in social mobility, or to be more precise, in social fluidity. While he saw some changes in inequalities with the introduction of market mechanism, these changes appeared to him to be rather unimportant. Kolosi represented a strikingly different approach. He was head of the Department of Sociology at the Institute of Social Sciences, and in this capacity he directed the most complex sociological investigation on social structure in the history of Hungarian sociology. Influenced by Gerhard Lenski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (Lenski 1954; Wesolowski and Slomczynski 1978), Kolosi launched a research project which tried to measure social stratification (Kolosi 1984), inequalities (Bokor 1985) and social mobility (Robert 1986) in a multi-dimensional way. The underlying theory was that there is a strong tendency towards status inconsistencies in the different dimensions. Kolosi attempted to locate these inconsistencies historically and tried to link them to macro-social and economic change (Kolosi 1986). In doing so, he used the distinction, introduced earlier by Konräd and Szelenyi, between redistributive and market coor-

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dination. Unlike Andorka, Kolosi suggested that, as a result of economic transformations from the late 1960s, major changes in social structure took place. The redistributive hierarchy was complemented by a market mechanism and, as a result, social structure was also altered. From a simple hierarchy it was transformed into an L-shaped system (Kolosi 1986). In Kolosi's L-model, the vertical dimension measured redistribution, while the horizontal one described differences created by the market. Szelenyi (1986-1987) reached an analogous conclusion. Influenced by Erdei, Szelenyi suggested that a dual social structure is re-emerging as a result of the gradual strengthening of market forces and private economic activities. Kolosi used his L-model to explain the character of status inconsistencies. Szelenyi was inspired by the dual social structure theory of Erdei. He suggested that two different logics of social stratification, a dominant state socialist rank order and an emergent petty bourgeois class order begin to compete with each other (Szelenyi 1988). The major difference between Kolosi's and Szelenyi's approach is, that, while the former emphasized the amorphous nature of social structure, the forces pointing towards status inconsistencies, the latter emphasized status crystallisation. According to this later approach, the disintegration of state socialism cannot be described by increased status inconsistencies. Instead, it is shaped by processes of class formation and by an intensifying struggle between the logic of social stratification based on rank and class. There is little disagreement between Kolosi and Szelenyi as far as the positive effects of market reforms are concerned, although for the latter the emergence of market economy, if followed by class formation, is a socially positive outcome. As the previously monolithic and more archaic rank order is weakened by the evolution of classes, society is modernised and rationalised. Zsuzsa Ferge is more sceptical about the social consequences of market reform. She never accepted the usefulness of the concept of "redistributive economy", as proposed by Konräd and Szelenyi. Ferge always challenged their claim that state socialist redistribution generated inequalities (Szelenyi 1978). Instead she argued, that redistribution39 (Ferge 1979) always had an equalising effect on social structure. She also claimed that the growth of markets during the 1980s contributed to an increase in inequality, and she repeatedly defended the redistributive mechanism. There was a difference how the term was used by Ferge and Konräd-Szelenyi. For Ferge, redistribution refers to what the welfare state does, a re-allocation of incomes from rich to poor, whereas Konräd-Szelenyi wrote about a redistributively integrated economy, in which not simply personal incomes are redistributed, but the functioning of the economy is regulated in this way. As a result, capital goods are not allocated on competitive markets, but channeled through the state budget. This notion of "redistribution" differs considerably from welfare redistribution of incomes, and it is analogous to what Kornai called bureaucratic coordination (Kornai and Matits 1987).

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By the mid 1980s, Szelenyi modified his earlier position about the genesis of inequalities under state socialism. He now acknowledged that market forces beyond a certain point will not compensate for the inequities created by the dominant redistributive mechanism, but instead, that they may add a new, second dimension of inequality (Manchin and Szelenyi 1987). Pointing to the danger of accumulation of inequalities, Manchin and Szelenyi began to believe that the management of social conflicts may necessitate the creation of a separate sphere of "welfare redistribution". This thought brought the two positions slightly closer, but it did not reconcile the conflict. In her critique, Ferge (1986) restated the importance of redistribution to fight social inequalities, and she resisted the idea of separating the welfare sphere from the basic economic processes. The sharpest controversy was between Ferge and Kolosi. After all, Ferge and Szelenyi agreed upon that inequalities are increasing; they only debated about the importance of market and redistribution in this process, and they had somewhat divergent views about how to manage the resulting conflicts. Kolosi, on the other hand, claimed that inequalities were not increasing during the 1980s. Kolosi and Ferge disagree about the facts of social change over the last decade.

5 Sociology and the Transition to Post-communism It is too early to judge, how Hungarian sociology will adapt to the changes connected with the transition to post-communism. But it is obvious, that this period of transition represents a major challenge to Hungarian sociologists, both intellectually and institutionally. No matter whether they played the role of critics or of social engineers in the reform epoch - sociologists did not anticipate the collapse of socialist socioeconomic order. This failure creates a situation of intellectual crisis. Critical sociologists primarily developed their analyses from the standpoint of civil society. They criticised the statist order for delaying the development of civil social order. Will this approach turn into apologia, as private economy and civil society become hegemonic? Will such a change also necessitate a major change in the orientation of research? Those sociologists, who regarded themselves as social engineers in the past, tried to reform socialism. What role can they play after socialism has been dismantled? Sociology is also in a situatioin of institutional crisis. In the past, most sociologists made a living from research activities funded by the government. Today, sociologist have to learn how to live under the conditions of a market environment, when government funding will be much scarcer, and when teaching will be considered more important than research. Sociologists have to face a long and difficult process of adaptation, both intellectually and existentially, to a market capitalist economy.

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The changes in social stratification in the transition to post-communism remain of key importance. The social structure, or, to use Bourdieu's terminology, the nature of social spaces, which shapes social structure, has undergone dramatic changes. The social structure of the Stalinist epoch could be described with a single rank hierarchy, in which ascent and descent was exclusively determined by loyalty to the party or the boss, that is, by possession of 'political capital'. The Kädärist reform epoch produced a social structure in which this single hierarchical order was complemented with an alternative one, based on market and transactive social relations. In the post-communist era, we witness the making of new social spaces, in which the former 'political capital' is devalued, meritocratic criteria of ascent are emphasized, and 'economic capital' begins to play a major, and, eventually, decisive role in defining who is at the top, and who at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The most fascinating question for sociologists is to figure out how society will adapt to these dramatic changes; how the process of re-structuring will take place, and how this will effect intraand inter-generational social mobility. Elemer Hankiss and Erzsebet Szalai have formulated some thoughtprovoking hypotheses about the processes of social restructuring (Hankiss 1989; Szalai 1990). In many ways their ideas are similar to the ones formulated by Jadwiga Staniszkis (1991). According to Hankiss, the old cadre elite is likely to convert its bureaucratic privileges into economic wealth. It will use the mechanisms of so-called spontaneous privatisation to transform itself from state managers of public firms into private owners. It is on its way to becoming a big bourgeoisie. Erzsebet Szalai formulated an analogous, although more complex argument. According to Szalai, the ruling communist elite became fragmented in the 1980s. A new elite emerged, which could not, and did not, want to rule in the the old ways. This new, technocratic elite decided to move towards a capitalist transformation, and - this is the point where the analyses of Szalai and Hankiss converge - it attempts now to transform itself into a propertied class. Szalai's analysis is more complex than Hankiss' in two respects. First, she notes the intense struggle between the old and new elite. It is not the whole of nomenclature, which becomes a big bourgeoisie. The old elite loses power and privilege, it may even be downwardly mobile. Second, in her follow-up article on the subject, Szalai noted that the communist new elite did not win its struggle. It was politically defeated and with the collapse of state socialism a "new elite" grasped the power. According to Szalai, for the time being it is not decided yet, whether the "old new elite" will be defeated, or whether it may reach some compromise with the "new new elite". Jadwiga Staniszkis reaches analogous conclusions. According to Staniszkis, the post-communist epoch can best be characterised as political capitalism, in which the old nomenclature now uses its office power to become proprietors. Staniszkis has claimed, that by the end of 1990 about 20% of the national wealth has been passed into the hands of the old communist nomenclature.

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Konräd and Szelenyi (1991) are somewhat more sceptical about the ability of the old elite to reproduce themselves. Understandably enough, they argue that they, after all, were quite right in their The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power - even if they were right for the wrong reasons. They claim, that in the current phase of post-communist transition the new elite is composed of those social groups that have "cultural" rather than "economic capital". The old nomenclature, especially those, who did not have much 'cultural capital', are likely to experience great difficulties and sharp downward mobility. It is unclear, how long the new elite, whose power is based on cultural capital, can retain its hegemony. It is quite possible, that it eventually will have to pass its power to the propertied bourgeoisie. In this context, Konräd and Szelenyi point to a curiously Central European feature of this process. In the German language one can make a distinction between "Bildungsbürgertum" (cultural bourgeoisie, or educated middle class) and "Besitzbürgertum" (propertied bourgeoisie). In North America, or in Western Europe, the development of capitalism and its accompanying 'bourgeoisification' was usually led by the "Besitzbürgertum". In Central Europe, however, this process was different. In this part of the world, the development of the propertied bourgeoisie has been delayed and the bourgeois transformation of the society was often led by the educated middle class. History may now repeat itself. Central Europe experiences in these years a curious revolution: It is a bourgeois revolution without a bourgeoisie, which is led by an intelligentsia which aims at creating a bourgeoisie. In her book, Jadwiga Staniszkis (1984: 334) quotes the Polish minister of industry as telling the Sejm, the Polish parliament: "I represent interests which do not exist yet". It is the irony of history, that in this respect the revolutions of 1989-1990 resemble the revolution of 1917. In 1917 too, an intelligentsia in an agricultural country without a proletariat claimed to conduct a proletarian revolution in order to create a proletariat. The fascinating political and theoretical question is, whether this time the current Central European "Bildungsbürgertum" will be more successful than it was in its attempt to promote capitalist development during the late nineteenth century or to lead a proletarian revolution in 1917? Konräd and Szelenyi agree with Hankiss, Szalai and Staniszkis that the former nomenclature will make a desperate attempt to retain at least some of its privileges and convert as much of its devalued political capital as possible into economic capital. They see, however, the rise of a new elite of intellectuals, the possessors of cultural capital. This intelligentsia is likely to detest the attempts by the old momenclature to become a propertied bourgeoisie and they may be joined in this by populists, the emergent new domestic petty bourgeoisie, and by the working class which is expected to pay the price of market transition. The intellectuals may eventually even lose their enthusiasm for the propertied bourgeoisie altogether. Sociology is just in as a painful period of transition as the societies of Eastern Europe are. Its old research agenda is outdated. In order to remain committed to

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a critical project, sociology has to transform itself from having been a discipline criticising the socialist hierarchy from the point of view of civil society into a discipline critically reflecting the civil society itself, if indeed the capitalist transformation of Eastern Europe will take place.

References Andorka, R. 1982. A tarsadalmi mobilitds vdltozdsai Magyarorszdgon. (Changes in Social Mobility in Hungary.) Budapest: Gondolat Kiado. Andorka, R. and J. Hies 1976. A nemzedekek közötti tarsadalmi mobilitas vältozäsai. (Changes in Intergenerational Social Mobility.) Statisztikai Szemle 10: 933-950; 11: 1045-1055. Andorka, R. and A. Simkus 1983. Az iskolai vegzettseg es a szülöi csaläd tarsadalmi helyzete. (Education and Social Background.) Statisztikai Szemle 6: 592-611. Belädi, M. 1974. A nepi irok mozgalma. (The Populist Writers.) In M. Belädi, Erintkezesi pontok (Points of Connections), pp. 55-92. Budapest: Szepirodalmi Kiado. Bibo, I. [1946] 1982. A magyar tärsadalomfejlödes es az 1945 evi vältozäs ertelme. (The Evolution of Hungarian Society and the Significance of the Changes of 1945.) In I. Bibo, Collected Works, vol. 2, pp. 351-362. Bern: Europai Magyar Protestäns Szabadegyetem. Blau, P. and O. D. Duncan 1967. The American Occupational Structure. New York: Wiley. Bokor, A. 1985. Deprivdcio äs szegenyseg. Retegzödes-modell vizsgdlat VI. (Deprivation and Poverty. Examination of Stratification Models VI.) Budapest: Tärsadalomtudomänyi Intezet. Eötvös, J. 1902. A XIX. szdzad uralkodo eszmeinek hatdsa az dlladalomra. (The Influence of the Dominant Ideas of the Nineteenth Century on the State.) B6cs-Pest: Revai. Erdei, F. 1988. Selected Writings. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado. Featherman, D. L. and R. Hauser 1978. Opportunity and Change. New York: Academic Press. Feher, F., A. Heller and G. Markus 1983. Dictatorship over Needs. Oxford: Blackwell. Feja, G. 1937. Viharsarok. (The Corner of Storm.) Budapest: Atheneum. Ferge, Z. 1966. Tärsadalmunk retegzödese Magyarorszägon. (Social Stratification in Hungary.) Valosdg 10: 23-36. Ferge, Z. 1969. Tdrsadalmunk retegzödese. (Social Stratification.) Budapest: Közgazdasägi es Jogi Könyvkiado.

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Ferge, Ζ. 1972. Α tärsadalmi strukture es az iskolarendszer közötti nehäny összefügges. (Interrelations between Social Structure and Educational System.) Szociologia 1: 10-35. Ferge, Z. 1979. A Society in the Making. White Plains: Sharpe. Ferge, Z. 1980. Tdrsadalompolitikai tanulmdnyok. (Studies in Social Policy.) Budapest: Gondolat. Ferge, Z. 1986. Zsörtölödö megjegyzesek. (Critical Comments on the ManchinSzelenyi Article.) Medvetänc 2-3: 113-126. Gouldner, A. 1979. The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hanäk, P. 1983. Magyarorszäg tärsadalma a szäzadfordulo idejen (Hungarian Society at the Turn of the Century.) In P. Hanäk (ed.), Magyaroszdg törtenete, 1890-1918 (History of Hungary, 1890-1918), pp. 403-515. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado. Hankiss, E. 1989. Kelet-europai alternativdk. (Eastern European Alternatives.) Budapest: Közgazdasägi es Jogi Kiado. Haraszti, Μ. 1977. A Worker in a Worker's State. London: Penguin. Hegedüs, A. 1961. A marxista szociologia tärgyärol es helyeröl a tärsadalomtudomänyok rendszereben. (The Role and Place of Marxist Sociology within the System of Social Sciences.) Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 2: 166-183. Hegedüs, A. 1964. A szocialista tarsadalom strukturälis modellje es a tärsadalmi retegzödes. (The Social Structure of Socialist Society and Social Stratification.) Valosdg 5: 1-15. Hegedüs, A. 1966a. Tärsadalmi strukture es munkamegosztäs. (Social Structure and Division of Labour.) Valosdg 8: 20-31. Hegedüs, A. 1966b. A szocialista tdrsadalom strukturdjdrol. (The Social Structure of Socialist Society.) Budapest: Akademiai Kiado. Hegedüs, A. 1969. Adalekok a tulajdonviszonyok szociologiai elemzesehez. (A Contribution to a Sociological Analysis of Property Relations.) Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 6: 1121-1147. Hegedüs, A. 1976. Socialism and Bureaucracy. London: Allison & Busby. Hethy, L. and C. Mako 1978. Munkdsok, erdekek, erdekegyeztetes. (Workers, Interests, Bargaining.) Budapest: Közgazdasägi es Jogi Könyvkiado. Illyes, G. 1936. Pusztdk nepe. (People of the Puszta.) Budapest: Nyugat. Kemeny, I. 1972. Α munkäsosztäly retegzödese. (The Stratification of the Working Class.) Szociologia 1: 36-48. Kolosi, T. 1974. Tdrsadalmi struktura es szocialiszmus. (Social Structure and Socialism.) Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiado. Kolosi, T. 1984. Stdtusz es reteg. Retegzödes modell vizsgdlat III. (Status and Strata. Examinations of Stratification Models III.) Budapest: Tärsadalomtudomänyi Intezet.

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Kolosi, T. 1986. Strukturälis csoportok es a reform. (Structural Groups and the Reform.) Valosdg 7: 19-32. Kolosi, T. 1987. Tagolt tdrsadalom. (Stratified Society). Budapest: Gondolat Kiado. Konräd, G. and I. Szelenyi 1971. A kesleltetett värosfejlödes tärsadalmi konfliktusai. (Social Conflicts of Under-urbanisation.) Valosdg 12: 19-35. Konräd, G. and I. Szelenyi [1974] 1978. Az ertelmiseg utja az osztdlyhatalomhoz. (The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power.) Bern: Europai Magyar Protestäns Szabadegyetem. Konräd G. and I. Szeleny 1991. Intellectuals and Domination in PostCommunist Societies. In P. Bourdieu and J. Coleman (eds.), Social Theory for a Changing Society, pp. 337-361. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. Kornai, J. and A. Matits 1987. A vdllalatok nyeresegenek biirokratikus ujraelosztdsa. (The Bureaucratic Redistribution of the Profit of Enterprises.) Budapest: Közgazdasägi es Jogi Könyvkado. Lenski, G. 1954. Status Crystallization - a Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status. American Sociological Review 19: 405-413. Lit van, G. (ed.) 1974. Magyar munkdsszociogrdfidk. (Hungarian Sonographies of Workers.) Budapest: Kossuth Kiado. Litvän, G. and L. Szücs 1973. A szociologia elsö magyar miihelye. (The First Workshop of Hungarian Sociology.) Budapest: Gondolat. Lukäcs, G. 1971. Utam Marxhoz. Vdlogatott filozofiai tanulmdnyok. (My Road to Marx. Selected Philosophical Studies.). 2 vols. Budapest: Magveto. Manchin, R. and I. Szelenyi 1987. Social Policy under State Socialism. In: G. Esping-Anderson, L. Rainwater and M. Rein (eds.), Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy, pp. 102-139. White Plains: Sharpe. Ränki, G. (ed.). 1984. Magyarorszdg törtenete, 1918-1919; 1919-1945, vol. I.. (History of Hungary, 1918-1919; 1919-1945, vol. I.) Budapest: Akademiai Kiado. Robert, P. 1986. Szarmazds is mobilitds. Retegzödes-modell vizsgdlat VII. (Social Background and Mobility. Examinations of Stratification Models VII.) Budapest: Tärsadalomtudomänyi Intezet. Staniszkis, J. 1984. Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Staniszkis, J. 1991. The Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe. Berkeley: University of California Press. Szabo, Z. 1937. A tardi helyzet. (The Social Conditions in the Village of Tard.) Budapest: Cserepfalvi. Szalai, S. 1962. Modszertani megfontoläsok a marxista szociologiai kutatäs egyes idöszerü kerdeseiben. (Methodological Questions of Contemporary Sociological Research.) Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 5: 663-692; 6: 825-880. Szalai, E. 1990. Gazdasdg es Hatalom (Economy and Power.) Budapest: Aula Kiado.

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Szechenyi, I. 1830. Hitel. (The Credit). Pest: Trattner es Kärolyi ny. Szelenyi, I. 1972. Lakäsrendszer es tärsadalmi struktura. (Housing System and Social Structure.) Szociologia 1: 49-74. Szelenyi, I. 1973. Tärsadalmi tervezes es szociologia. (Social Planning and Sociology.) Budapest: Gondolat Kiado. Szelenyi, I. 1978. Social Inequalities in State Socialist Redistributive Economies. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 10: 63-67. Szelenyi, I. 1986-1987. Prospects and Limits of the New Class Project in Eastern Europe. Politics and Society 2: 103-144. Szelenyi, I. 1988. Socialist Entrepreneurs. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Szelenyi, I. and G. Konräd 1969. A lakotelepek szociologiai problemai. (Sociological Problems of Housing Developments.) Budapest: Akademai Kiado. Thirring, G. 1941. Tanulmdnyok az 1930. nepszamlalds köreböl. (Essays on the 1930's Population Census.) Budapest: Staphaneum. Tordai, Z. and S. Toth (eds.) 1976. Korunk. Antologia. (Our Times. Anthology.) Budapest: Magvetö Kiado. Toth, P. P. 1987. Tärsadalomtudomänyi Intezet (1946-1949). (Institute for Social Research, 1946-1949.) Mozgo Vildg 8: 63-76; 9: 67-75; 10: 73-87; 11: 105-112. Treiman, D. 1977. Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective. New York: Academic Press. Wesolowski, W. and K. Slomczynski 1978. Reduction of Social Inequalities and Status Inconsistency. In Polish Sociological Association (ed.), Social Structure - Polish Sociology 1977, pp.103-121. Warsaw: Ossolineum.

Between Universal and Native: The Case of Polish Sociology Wladyslaw

Kwasniewicz

1 Introduction The question about the identity of European sociology incorporates the question about the identity of national sociologies developed within the framework of particular European states. In Poland this problem became apparent for sociologists already at the beginning of the twentieth century. Jan Stanislaw Bystron (1892- 1962) was asking, is the term 'Polish sociology' justified, as science is universal and does not know state or national borders. One and the same problem must be recognised anywhere as either academic or non-academic; one and the same method is valid for all countries (Bystron 1917: 189).

However, his answer (1917:190) was affirmative: Depending on an organisation of intellectual life, academic tradition, a coincidence, finally - elusive likes and dislikes ..., academics of a given nationality deal with some problems more often, those of other nationalities deal with different problems.

Bystron added that social sciences do not serve exclusively the disinterested desire for knowledge, but on their basis the plans are built reaching far into the future. Depending on such plans, answers to specific questions are primarily sought in social sciences. Therefore, of necessity, differentiation of problems in various social groups must be unequal, and proportionally greater in those sciences than in any other discipline of knowledge. When we turn our attention to Polish sociological theories, one cannot fail to notice ... that they were evoked by other needs and other problems that required a different theoretical answer than in Western science (Bystron 1917: 190).

Bystron noticed therefore a regularity in development of sociology as science. It manifested itself in specific dialectics of universal tendencies in world sociology and specific determinants present only in particular countries. I will attempt to look more closely into this problem, taking Poland as an example, especially after the Second World War when sociology in this country developed under the political influence of socialism. This task is both gratifying and difficult. Self-analysis of one's discipline, its social roots and theoretical affiliations, as well as the social functions of socio-

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logical research became favourite topics for all generations of Polish sociologists. As a result a huge literature on this subject has appeared, which cannot be dealt with exhaustively in this paper. Hence a danger of oversimplification. At the same time some problems, especially those concerning the 1980s and the collapse of socialism in Poland, have not been sociologically fully understood yet. Some conclusions presented here, hence, referring to the recent past, must of necessity be treated as tentative. It is not easy either, to strike a balance between data (necessary to understand the situation in Polish sociology) and their theoretical interpretations. Our starting point for an analysis of universal and particular trends in the formation of sociology in Poland is a short glance at the historical circumstances which shaped Polish society in the twentieth century. Against this background the sequence of stages in the development of Polish sociology will be outlined. The next issue will be the changing social roles of sociologists. Finally, their links with world sociology on the one hand, and native Polish intellectual tendencies on the other hand, will be analysed.

2 Transformations in Polish Society in the Twentieth Century The evolution of Polish society in the last two centuries took a different course than in the advanced countries of Western Europe, not to mention the United States.40 It was a society in which many economic and socio-cultural features characteristic of feudalism were preserved for a long time. Entering the twentieth century, Polish society was dominated by an economy based on agriculture and farm-related production. Rural population prevailed over town population (as late as 1938 72.6% still lived in villages). The leading social classes were also represented in the countryside - on the one hand, great land proprietors (aristocracy and land-owners), on the other hand, peasants (small farmholders, landless rural proletariat). The petty bourgeoisie was relatively numerous but devoid of much influence. The high bourgeoisie played a much smaller role in Poland than in Western Europe. The main factor which hindered the economic development of the country in the nineteenth century was a lack of political sovereignty. Divided in 1795 between three occupying powers, Austria, Prussia and Russia, the country remained in stagnation for many decades. As a result, the general standard of living, especially of peasants was very low. There was a strong need for native investment capital, and the occupying powers were not interested in investing in Poland. Hence the low level of industrialisation and the small number of workers. The poor economic condition of the country was also a result of the costs For an instructive insight into the history of Poland, see J. Szczepanski (1970) and N. Davies (1982).

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human and material - of persistent struggle fought by the landowners for Polish independence (e.g., during the Napoleonic wars, the national uprisings in 1830 and 1863, etc.). In this context it should be added that in the second half of the nineteenth century there appeared a new social class, peculiar to Polish society, and to some extent to other East-European societies, the intelligentsia. It consisted of educated people who earned their living as a hired labour-force in white-collar occupations. In the prevailing situation of political dependence the intelligentsia consciously took up the role of a representative of ethnic and cultural continuity of the Polish nation. The turning point for Polish society came in 1918. The collapse of Austria, Prussia and Russia was the basic prerequisite for Poland's regaining of its independence. The building of an independent state after 123 years was performed in a still difficult economic situation. Nevertheless, the years 1918-1939 were of great significance for the integration of Polish society and for its capacities to achieve modern nationhood. This was to manifest itself soon in Poland's collective struggle and resistance during the Second World War, expressing the persistent will to regain independence, lost once more. The Second World War ended for the Poles in a way that was far from their expectations. Finding itself in the orbit of Soviet military and political influence, Poland faced the necessity to make a radical constitutional change, in line with the Stalinist model of so-called people's democracies. This change can be treated as a social experiment imposed from above, carried out against the will of the majority, and taking no notice of social and economic costs. As a result of this, Poland became a kind of a sociological laboratory in a vicious Stalinist project. Another result of the Second World War was a considerable reshaping of Poland's borders: They were moved by about three hundred kilometres from the East to the West.41 This caused vast migrations of population. Among them one should mention the repatriation of Poles, who had been forced to work in Germany and of those who lived, or were imprisoned, within the new borders of the Soviet Union. Return of many smaller groups of Poles who had emigrated in the past to France, Belgium, Romania and Yugoslavia also belongs to this category. In this new historical situation, the years 1948-1956 were particularly difficult. The decisive influence on the course of events in Poland was exerted by openly pro-Stalinist forces, which were taking no notice of Polish reality and attempted to shape Polish society according to ideological models imposed by the Kremlin. The workers' heroic protest in 1956 was of great significance. The The new territories (about one third of the whole country), which reached the Oder-Neisse line, were granted to Poland according to the Potsdam treaty in compensation for the territories lost in the East to the Soviet Union. These new territories, previously called Regained Territories, were called Western and Northern Territories after 1970 .

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moderate wing of the Communist Party headed by Wladyslaw Gomulka came to power and liberalised former policies in many spheres of social life. However, attempts to improve the situation in the economic sector were not successful. Equally unsuccessful were similar efforts of subsequent governments, including the West-oriented, pragmatic regime of Edward Gierek. Hence the violent workers' protests in 1970, 1976 and 1980, which brought about the final collapse of socialism and the ascent to power of the Solidarity movement, after the Round Table Talks and the general elections of 1989. As can be seen from this brief overview, the dominant feature of the evolution of Polish society in the twentieth century was incessant, deep change. The corollary of this was a lack of continuity in economic and social development. The period of so-called real socialism was particularly rich in consequences. It left its mark on the whole society. First, because it brought about changes of fundamental character. All aspects of social reality underwent profound transformations. Second, under socialism Polish society lost most of its characteristics as a rural society and entered the path toward an industrial society, with its various social and cultural consequences (urbanisation, mass culture, anomie, etc.). Third, due to the application of varied, spontaneous adaptation strategies and to the persistent protest and open opposition, this society reduced the totalitarian system to a form considerably milder than in other countries of the socialist block. Thanks to this unique situation, there was a chance to utilise the intellectual potential of Poland, which was also reflected in the dynamic development of sociology. On a scale which was unprecedented in other socialist countries, Polish sociologists took advantage of the opportunity to study empirically a wide range of social changes. And, thus, the continuity of sociology, which has had a relatively long tradition in Poland, was preserved.

3 Stages in the Development of Sociology in Poland The development of sociology in Poland shows many analogies to trends typical of other countries that played a leading role in its development, i.e., France, Germany and the United States of America. This was true in spite of the specific conditions in which Polish society lived in nineteenth and twentieth centuries, marked by economic and social backwardness, uprisings, wars and relatively numerous changes in political and economic systems. Roughly, four basic stages can be distinguished in the development of sociology in any country. The first is the period of the pioneers. In the second period, which can be dated between 1880-1918, sociology gradually entered the universities making it necessary to determine more precisely its subject matter and its relations to the other social sciences. The third period, which lasted from the First World War till the 1950s, was the time of turning sociology into an empiri-

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cal science, and at the same time, of the conscious departing from 'grand' theory, especially of speculative character. Finally, in the fourth stage, which can be treated as contemporary, sociology has achieved its present intellectual and institutional shape. It is a discipline deeply rooted in the institutional structure of science, embracing a wide range of social processes and aspiring to create a certain balance between empirical research and theoretical explanations of social reality. The origins of sociological research in Poland, although delayed in comparison with Western Europe by about 25 years, are connected with the names of scattered enthusiasts of sciences about society in the 1860s and 1870s. From that period came the first Polish reviews and commentaries on classical works, among others, by Comte, Spencer, Marx. Only in the next two periods did there appear a relatively numerous group of intellectuals who approached sociology in a more systematic and creative way (Bystron 1917; Chalasinski 1946; Ε. M. Znaniecki 1945; Kloskowska 1966; Dobrowolski 1972; Sowa 1983; Sztompka 1984; Kwilecki 1988; Kwasniewicz 1989; Szmatka 1991). Among others, two names deserve being mentioned here, Ludwik Krzywicki42 (1859-1941) and Edward Abramowski 43 (1868-1918). Working for many years outside academic institutions and publishing only in Polish, they did not gain the international standing they deserved. Three other Poles, lecturing outside of Poland, enjoyed an international recognition: Ludwik Gumplowicz44 (1838-1909), professor of law at the University of Graz, Leon Winiarski45 (1865-1915), professor at the University of Geneva, and Leon Petrazycki46 (1867-1931), professor of law at the University of Petersburg. All of them were full members of the International Sociological Institute in Paris (several other Polish sociologists were to become associate members of this Institute; see Kwilecki 1989). In the early twentieth century, sociological thought was already so popular among intellectuals in Poland that at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, one

The work of Krzywicki has been discussed by Szacki (1979: 380- 382) and Kozakiewicz (1984). Abramowski was one of the founding fathers of Polish psychology, which also influenced Polish sociological thought. See Flis (1984). Gumplowicz was one of the outstanding representatives of social Darwinism (Sorokin 1928: 480-487; Timasheff and Theodorson 1976: 47-49; Szacki 1979: 280-286). He is usually considered to having been an Austrian sociologist. He was, however, a Pole and maintained strong links with Poland until the end of his life. A new light is shed on the Polish connections in Gumplowicz's sociological work by Praglowski (1990). He has been known as one of the most outstanding representatives of the so-called mechanistic school in sociology. See Sorokin (1928: 23-29). Petrazycki represented the psychological orientation in sociology of law (see: Sorokin 1928: 700-706; Gorecki 1975; Podgorecki 1981; Palecki 1984). After the revolution in Russia, Petrazycki moved to Warsaw and took the chair of sociology offered to him by the department of law at the University of Warsaw. However, he did not teach students of sociology.

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of the two universities with Polish as the language of instruction, there was an attempt to create a chair of sociology. This attempt was unsuccessful because of the conservative attitudes of the majority of the professors (Kwasniewicz 1989: 21-22). It is, however, significant, that in the period preceding the outbreak of the First World War, in spite of the absence of a specialised chair of sociology in the Department of Philosophy, such famous scholars as Florian Znaniecki (1882-1959) (Ph.D. thesis in 1910) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) (Ph.D. thesis in 1912; see Kubica 1988) obtained their education in social sciences at the Jagiellonian University. The regaining of independence by Poland in 1918 opened a new period in academic life. This was reflected in the gradual institutionalisation of sociology at Poznan University (1920: F. Znaniecki; see Kwilecki and Ziolkowski 1981), at the Free Polish University in Warsaw (1923: Stefan Czaraowski), at Warsaw University (1930: S. Czarnowski) and at the Jagiellonian University (1930: J.S. Bystron). Those chairs supplied the sociological curriculum at university level (Krasko 1984). In addition, the first specialised research institutes came into being: The Institute of Social Economy in Warsaw (1920) headed by L. Krzywicki, and the Institute of Sociology in Poznan (1921, renamed as Polish Institute of Sociology in 1927, headed by F. Znaniecki). Sociological quarterlies were initiated: Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny (Legal, Economic and Sociological Journal) (1925) and Przeglad Socjologiczny (Sociological Review) (1930). From 1938 the "Sociological Library", a specialised series of sociological publications, started to appear. In 1930 the nation-wide association of sociologists was set up (Polish Sociological Association). It organised two congresses of Polish sociologists in the interwar period (1930, 1935). There were only about thirty professional sociologists (university professors and researchers at institutes); to this number we should add several dozens representatives of other social sciences, who showed certain inclinations towards sociological problems. All of them undertook active empirical studies, which resulted in numerous publications. Some of them can be treated as classical contributions to the development of Polish sociology. In this way the process of institutionalisation of sociology was accompanied in Poland by the development of empirical sociological studies. The productive interwar years were interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War. In inhuman and threatening living conditions created by both invaders, the Nazis and the Soviets, official academic life disappeared, and only occasionally (Warsaw, Krakow) it went underground. Polish society welcomed the end of the war in 1945 with great relief and anxiety. The unknown factors included the intentions of the new authorities who came with the Soviet army: Would they try to make another Soviet republic out of Poland, or would perhaps some form of limited state sovereignty be granted? It turned out that the second option was chosen. This allowed to revive, among others, pre-war academic institutions, including universities.

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This opportunity was used by sociology, in spite of severe human and material losses incurred during the war.47 The capital of this discipline became the city of Lodz, where a university was created and to which several professors from the totally destroyed Warsaw moved. A large and representative group of Polish sociologists gathered there around Stanislaw Ossowski (1897-1963) and Jozef Chalasinski (1904-1979). In Lodz, as well in Krakow, first degree sociology courses were started. In 1946, the first volume of the Sociological Review after the war was published, followed by the publication of some books. The coming to power of the Stalinist leaders of the Communist Party dramatically influenced sociology in 1948. It was eliminated from the list of official academic disciplines, as bourgeois, anti-socialist knowledge about society. University courses in sociology were abolished and sociological research was practically forbidden. Professionally active sociologists either were suspended (like S. Ossowski) or forced to change their academic disciplines. Some of them switched to ethnographic research, others took up research on contemporary history of Polish culture, etc. The turning point in the life of Polish society, brought about by the first large scale working class protest in 1956, was also strongly reflected in sociology. It may seem paradoxical, but at that time sociology entered the period of prosperity. Classical theoretical works were studied intensively, and empirical research was undertaken on an unprecedented scale. A lot of attention was devoted to applied research. A favourable factor for the further development of Polish sociology was the presence of two outstanding intellectual leaders, namely, Stanislaw Ossowski (see Mucha 1984) and Jozef Chalasinski (see Jerschina and Bochenska-Seweryn 1984). This was also the period when the academic and administrative talents of Julian Hochfeld (1911-1966) (Chalubinski 1991; Jasinska-Kania et al. 1992) and Jan Szczepanski (born 1913) became fully revealed. At the same time, there began also the fruitful academic careers of Antonina Kloskowska (born 1919), Zygmunt Bauman (born 1924), Boguslaw Galeski (born 1921), Jan Lutynski (1921-1988), the prematurely deceased Andrzej Malewski (1926-1964), Wladyslaw Markiewicz (born 1920), Aleksander Matejko (born 1924), Stefan Nowak (1925-1989), Adam Podgorecki (born 1925), Adam Sarapata (born 1921), Magdalena Sokolowska (1922-1989), Jerzy Szacki (born 1929), Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (born 1929), Jerzy J. Wiatr (born 1931), and many others. Remarkable achievements, at that time, were due to the group of sociologists in Warsaw, where they worked not only at the university but also in some newly created research institutes (especially the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences). Apart from Warsaw and the still influential Polish sociology became depleted not only through the loss of scholars, who died or were killed during the war, but also through emigration, as many of the emigres, including F. Znaniecki, decided to never return home.

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group in Lodz, other centres of sociology emerged in Krakow, Poznan and Lublin. Later they were joined by smaller sociological communities in Katowice, Wroclaw, Szczecin, Gdansk and Torun. As a result of this, one can at present major in sociology at ten universities. At all other university-type schools, there are at least selected courses in sociology. Apart from university institutes of sociology, there are also institutes of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Revived again in 1958, The Sociological Review found new competitors: Studia Socjologiczne (Sociological Studies), Kultura i Spoleczenstwo (Culture and Society), The Polish Sociological Bulletin and some other periodicals. Since 1956 the Polish Sociological Society has been very active.48 Out of a discipline which before the war still played a rather peripheral role, after 1956 sociology became one of the leading social sciences in Poland. Relatively well entrenched in institutional structure, it is now a discipline with considerable influence on intellectuals and the educated public.

4 The Changing Social Roles of Sociologists Polish sociology was created by several generations of intellectuals. They differed in their socio-cultural background and particularly in the views on their social role of sociologists. This was important in shaping the identity of the discipline in Poland (Szczepanski 1968). The beginnings of sociology in Poland were due to the activity of a small group of people, who attempted, usually independently from one another, to transplant Western European thought into the Polish conditions. Those people, who were born in the class of intelligentsia or sometimes landowners, represented a wide spectrum of political orientations, including the socialist one. The generation of pioneers of sociology in Poland was oriented not so much toward research goals as towards popularisation, that is, promotion of "a kind of philosophy for the people" (Chalasinski 1949: 12). They usually undertook such efforts side by side with their strictly professional activities (Szczepanski 1968). Between the world wars the sociologists' participation in the political life of their country clearly decreased, as sociology became established at the universities and other institutions of higher learning. Academic style research became the main social role of sociologists. According to Chalasinski, this was connected with the new situation of science and the intellectual circles in Poland under the conditions of newly regained independence. It was a point of honour for the Polish intelligentsia to

At present it has about thousand members. This is approximately a seventh part of all sociology graduates in the postwar period.

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create intellectual centres on the highest European level. Close links with the intellectual spheres of Europe were sought after. The ambition to be part of Europe was the main feature of Polish intellectuals in the period between the world wars (Chalasinski 1949: 13).

This was particularly salient at the newly established University of Poznan, whose sociology professors, including Znaniecki, "all belonged to the same class of Polish Europeans. They had all been educated abroad and were all liberals of Franco-English type. None of them had any closer connections with social movements" (Chalasinski 1949: 14). The situation was slightly different in the sociological milieu of Warsaw. Most of its members sympathised with the political left but - like in Poznan - they did not participate in political life directly. The view of the function of sociology as consisting, first of all, in empirical studies, and the tendency to stay away from social movements or political parties, correlated with a certain unfriendly attitude toward theory understood as intellectual speculation. This took the form of scepticism not only about contemporary philosophical doctrines but also about the great theoretical orientations in sociology inherited from the past. The model of science that became widespread among Polish sociologists between the wars was therefore close to the conceptions of neopositivistic sociology (for more details, see Mokrzycki 1989: 94-95). Such a model favoured an empirical approach towards social reality, and limited generalisations to those based on empirical data. There was also a parallel tendency to ignore the problems of the philosophical or metatheoretical foundations of science. The situation of Polish science, including sociology, after the Second World War did not facilitate the restoration of the model of science described above. Although those sociologists who had survived the war wanted to assume their academic roles as soon as possible, it was clear to everybody that it would not be possible to come back to the pre-war patterns. In an altered historical situation Polish society faced an unprecedented challenge which made practical participation of scientists necessary. Hence, the vision of sociology formed during that period consisted of three elements: 1. the fastest possible reconstruction of research facilities destroyed during the war; 2. the emphasis on areas of vital importance for society; and 3. the avoidance of an intellectual confrontation with Marxism as the ideological foundation of the new system. No sociologists of any rank supported Marxism politically, for instance, by joining the Communist Party. On the contrary, some sociologists became activists of the opposition. All that made the authorities treat sociology with utmost distrust, which resulted, as has already been mentioned, in the closing of sociology departments at the universities in 1949. When in 1956 in the wake of liberalisation, sociology returned to the universities, the question of the social role of sociologists came back to the agenda. The

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model of a sociologist who concentrated entirely on his or her research had given way to that of a sociologist who "actively participated in social life", to use the cliche of that period. This resulted from several factors, the most important of which was the political breakthrough of October 1956. It stirred up considerable hopes among the intelligentsia for a transformation of socialism in Poland toward democracy (the so-called Polish Road). Sociologists generally believed that an essential part in that process was to be played by sociological diagnoses and forecasts, which were all the more important since Polish society had undergone in the meantime far-reaching transformations under the impact of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation. Numerous research projects were launched which revealed a new sociological picture of Poland. The idea of applied studies, or social engineering, was developed, which was to become a kind of Polish specialty in sociology. One must not forget that the political profile of sociologists had been changed. A new generation of sociologists came on the scene, most of whom were recruited among Marxist philosophers who had received their university education during the years of Stalinism. They took advantage of the changed situation after October 1956 and extended their interests beyond philosophy, onto problems of sociology, which seemed closer to life. Those sociologists were as a rule Communist Party members, treated by the authorities as a kind of internal guarantee of maintaining the party's political control over sociology, a control then rapidly developing in Poland. At the same time many graduates in sociology, who had begun their studies after 1956, also entered the party. Apart from sheer opportunism, one reason might be that some of them, being of peasant or working class origin, perceived liberalised socialism as the main factor contributing to the social advancement of the plebeian masses, with which they felt an emotional bond. Others sought opportunities for a more meaningful and influential role in society. In that way the party gained not only a considerable proportion of sociologists as its members but also unquestioned political influence. That period was also marked by the division of the academic community of sociologists - like in other branches of science - into party members and nonparty members. This had serious implications for the life of that professional group. The existence of a privileged category of party members precluded democracy. Not everybody had equal access to the decision-making bodies, which in turn led to favouritism towards one category of academics at the expense of the other, regardless of the moral and academic standards they represented. Furthermore, the domination of party members resulted in a lack of openness in academic life. As a result, the human relations were dominated by the existence of narrow interest groups or even coteries. This gave rise to double morality and hypocrisy. Cases in point are the huge gap between the opinions expressed in public and in private, and the so-called fake activities undertaken in order either to hide real intentions, or to cover up stagnation (Lutynski 1990).

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There are many reasons, however, why the division of sociologists into party members and non-party members should be seen rather as ambiguous than clear-cut. For one thing, orthodox Marxists, linked to the party-"nomenclature", did not manage to gain any significant influence on the public opinion, although they often held the decision-making positions in the highly bureaucratised structure of science. The opinion leaders were usually politically independent scholars who had a high academic prestige. A huge opinion-making role was also played by the Polish Sociological Association - one of those learned societies in Poland which managed to retain a high degree of intellectual autonomy. Another reason for ambiguity was that part of the orthodox Marxists, on whom the party relied to protect the purity of the doctrine, relatively quickly moved to 'revisionist' positions, to use a phrase popular in the party language during that period. Significantly, in the second half of the 1960s some of them left the party and those of Jewish background chose to emigrate after the outbreak of party-sponsored antisemitism in 1968.49 It is also true that the majority of the sociologists avoided, like before, venturing into the dangerous ground of discussions about the philosophical foundations of Marxism. Therefore, it was relatively rare that serious discussions about this orientation and its relationship to other intellectual trends took place, and that happened mostly in the second half of the 1950s and in the 1960s.50 One must not forget either that there were also quite numerous scholars who endorsed so-called open Marxism. They professed the need to broaden the field of study of Marxism, embracing those phenomena of modern world which the founding fathers of Marxism for obvious reasons could not predict. In the 1970s some of those sociologists took up the attempt to confront and partly reconcile Marxism with leading schools of Western sociology, such as functionalism, conflict theory, system theory and others. This led to a much more analytic and non-dogmatic understanding of Marxism itself. In addition, those sociologists who considered themselves to be Marxists very often treated their doctrine selectively. They concentrated on aspects that were intellectually close to them and avoided getting into politically more sensitive areas. This explains the considerable popularity of studies concerned with the methods used by K. Marx, rather than with the substantive implications of his work. Academic Marxism and ideological Marxism were sharply dissociated (for more details, see Mokrzycki 1989: 96-102). One should add that some elements of Marxism as a sociological doctrine, and also of socialism as a political system, had gained a certain degree of apThis happened especially after the 1968 student riots. One can mention here for instance the debate between Andrzej Malewski and Jerzy J. Wiatr about the empirical validity of Marxism (1958), the discussion provoked by Adam SchafFs paper on questionnaire-mania in Polish sociology (1962) or the debate between Andrzej Werblan and J.J. Wiatr about the place of social stratification issues in Marxist sociology (1967).

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proval also among sociologists who either considered themselves as representatives of other theoretical orientations, or who approached sociology in a more or less eclectic way. Thus, the differences in the intellectual and ideological images of party and non-party sociologists were hardly ever clear-cut. This was visible in the way the social role of sociology was construed. The fact that the Marxists promoted the idea of sociology committed to social problems followed directly from the doctrine. But a similar standpoint was taken by many non-party sociologists who tried to reconcile the status of an intellectual with the active participation in various aspects of social life, which called for the intellectual intervention of a sociologist. Thus, for instance, there were regular attempts to provide diagnoses of the state of Polish society and the tendencies of its development. Interminable discussions about the social functions of sociology in socialist Poland were carried out. It was also quite often that the state of the discipline was assessed in terms of the adequacy of the research practices for the description of the social transformations then going on (for more details, see Sicinski 1981 and Misiak 1988). The sociologists' involvement in tracing and reflecting on social transformations, so clearly visible after 1956, was also expressed through the involvement in the mass media. Regardless of their political sympathies, many sociologists took a public stand on various social problems. Of course, the existence of censorship meant that not all topical problems could receive equal attention.51 It was also necessary to use certain adaptational strategies which made it possible to move on the slippery ground of social pathology and social problems.52 One of the strategies consisted in the use of a special language, full of euphemisms and metaphors but nevertheless transparent for educated readers who were accustomed to reading between the lines. The sociologists' presence in the media made some of them quite popular among the educated groups of society. This contributed to the enhancement of the social prestige of sociology among other social sciences. That was clearly demonstrated by the fact that, when in August 1980 the workers went on strike, established the independent trade union Solidarity, and brought the government to the negotiation table, they were the first to invite sociologists as their experts, which induced the government to do the same. There can be no doubt that the agreements of Szczecin and Gdansk, signed at that time, owed much of their final shape to sociologists.

The taboo subjects included, among other things, the attitude of various groups of Polish society to socialism and the Soviet Union, problems of social inequality, pathology in the functioning of the state institutions etc.. For instance, for many years it was not possible to study such an important problem as alcoholism.

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Many sociologists were also deeply involved in the subsequent events of the 1980s in Poland. It turned out, however, that with the escalation of tensions between Solidarity and the government, emotions started to win over arguments and consequently the importance of sociologists as experts began to fade out. Never again did they play such a significant role in dealing with social conflicts as they did in August 1980. And yet it might seem that under the conditions of a deep system transformation, which Poland entered in 1989, there should be a growing demand for sociological diagnoses and theoretical reflection. However, this is not the case. As the new political elites do not show much interest in sociological analyses, many sociologists are giving up their public activity. There is a climate of disenchantment and pessimism. This is true not only of the former Communist Party members but also of Solidarity sympathisers. This situation results in the waning importance of the social role of an intellectual who at the same time respects the professional ethos of the academia and is involved on behalf of well-defined political forces, social movements, or political parties. Whether they like it or not, sociologists have now become confined to their research offices, assuming the roles of detached observers, and no longer actors on the public scene.53 If this trend continues, this may bring a complete reversal of the situation typical of Poland after 1956. A strange paradox indeed.

5 Towards World Sociology Although the achievements of Polish thinkers of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment do have their due place in the intellectual history of Polish society, no native tradition of reflection on social life had come into being in Poland before the nineteenth century. Therefore, the interest in sociology that began in the second half of the nineteenth century was not a product of strictly Polish intellectual trends but rather a reflection of Western European thought. Today, thanks to numerous historical studies, we know how concepts of Comte, Marx, Spencer and other creators of nineteenth century sociology found their way to scientific and popular literature in Poland. It may be a little surprising that already at that early stage there appeared Polish intellectuals who exerted a certain influence on European sociology, like Gumplowicz, Winiarski or Petrazycki. In the period between the world wars there was also a vivid interest in the trends of Western sociology. This is easy to explain, taking into account the inspiration to raise intellectual life in Poland up to European standards. At the same time a new interest in American sociology (owing to Znaniecki's work) A different phenomenon is that of some Solidarity sociologists, sometimes fairly renowned ones, decided to give up academic activity and to begin professional political careers.

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comes to the fore. Polish sociological thought was marked by the pluralism of theoretical orientations (Chalasinski 1946), and analytic studies concerning various trends of Western sociology were published quite often. Of course, the influence of native theoretical thought, especially of Krzywicki and Znaniecki, was also very strong. The Second World War completely ruined everything that sociology in Poland had achieved between the wars. In particular, all its international connections were severed. They were restored, only to a very modest extent, during the first years after the Second World War. In 1949 they were cut off again. In that way the period during which Polish sociology remained isolated from world sociology was extended even further. Only after 1956, that is, after an interval of seventeen years, did it become possible again to get a more profound and systematic knowledge of those theoretical and methodological trends that had been developing since 1939, especially in the United States. Besides, many direct links with Western partners were established. Polish sociology was at that time the only sociology in socialist countries that cooperated with world sociology on such a scale.54 As a result, Polish sociologists fell under unprecedented influence of Western, and in particular American, sociology. This concerns particularly theoretical thought. This is not the place to reconstruct fully either the process of reception of particular trends, or the fluctuations of interest in them. At any rate, one can say that 1. all the more important theoretical orientations in world sociology have been part of the core curriculum in sociology departments at Polish universities; 2. most of these orientations have their dedicated followers in Poland (for more details, see Mokrzycki 1989); and 3. none of these orientations has attained an exclusive or dominant position. This was symptomatic of the paradoxical situation of Polish sociology. Although Marxism-Leninism was the official doctrine in socialist Poland, it coexisted in fact with a broad spectrum of other theoretical orientations. The official Marxist doctrine neither dominated the whole of theoretical thought, nor did it even lead to the formation of a special jargon, so typical of certain other countries. To be sure, also after 1956 the freedom of expression of sociologists' was restricted by the ruling party and various forms of harassment were used against scholars who went 'too far'. 55 In other words, the professional activities of sociolA spectacular confirmation of the high international position of Polish sociology was the election of Jan Szczepanski to the office of President of the International Sociological Association (ISA), a position he held in the years 1967-1970. Polish sociologists received at that time many foreign scholarships, particularly from American universities. Some Polish sociologists were also visiting professors at foreign universities. Invitations to international conferences were numerous too. In addition, there took place many bilateral seminars, as for example the Finnish-Polish (see Allardt and Wesolowski 1978) or CanadianPolish (see Breton et al. 1990) ones. Sometimes, the consequences were bitter. Suffice it to say, for example, that J. Chalasinski's right to lecture was suspended for several years in 1958, or to mention the deplorable treatment of academics of Jewish origin, many of whom felt compelled to emigrate after

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ogists were located between two poles, the pole of relative autonomy of scientific activity and the pole of control imposed by the state ruled by the Communist Party.56 Another paradox consisted in the fact that, as a matter of fact, Marxists did not have favourable conditions to develop their theoretical ideas. There were two factors contributing to this. The first was connected with the fact that "the guillotine of ideological orthodoxy" (Mokrzycki 1989: 96) affected Marxists and NonMarxists alike. This can be illustrated by the example of two Marxist orientations in Poland which tried to develop the theory in a creative way. I have in mind here the sociological school of Hochfeld, which produced a group of outstanding researchers, and the so-called Poznan school, consisting mainly of philosophers and historians. They both made a significant contribution to Marxist theory recognised also in the West, but at the same time remained under constant attack from orthodox Marxists, and their right to exist in science was on many occasions jeopardised. The second factor was the ever-present reluctance with which non-Marxist intellectuals treated even the most creative and open representatives of the Marxist orientation. Marxists were often isolated in academic circles. In the 1980s this took sometimes the form of ostracism. With the approaching decline of socialism in Poland the activity of Marxist-oriented social researchers began gradually to decrease, their scientific morals became shattered, and some well-known Marxists changed their orientation. Today Marxism is in a state of an intellectual crisis and in total institutional disarray. But to the credit of the Polish intellectual community as well as post-communist authorities, it must be emphasized that no purges or revenges against former Marxists occurred, and all of them are continuing in their academic jobs. Summing up, there was no monopoly of Marxism-Leninism as a doctrine defining the shape of theoretical reflection and empirical studies in Poland, which was so characteristic of the former socialist countries. What is more, one could hardly talk about an intellectual domination of Marxist thought. A full account of the role of Marxism in post-war Polish sociology has yet to be written. Even now, however, it can be said that some elements of Marxist theory have been relatively widely applied. This concerns, for instance, the tendency to analyse social reality in terms of contradictions and conflicts. The pluralism of approaches - although not always clearly articulated, for reasons of censorship - has been a characteristic trait of Polish sociology since 1956. Another of its characteristic features was the openness to new theoretical ideas, both those originating at home and abroad. This is why such great importhe student riots of March 1968. A separate problem is connected with the restrictions imposed on some sociologists involved on the side of Solidarity under martial law and later. This formulation was taken from the book edited by Kojder and Kwasniewski (1992).

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tance was attached to the cultivation of the broadest possible international academic contacts.57 It is also noteworthy that in their thinking about the discipline, Polish sociologists always expressed the concern to avoid isolation from theoretical trends in world sociology. This was a typically recurring motive in discussions on the state of sociological reflection in Poland. Sociologists interested in theory put the greatest emphasis on the adaptation of particular theoretical concepts to the Polish realities, rather than on their further analytic development. Thus those ideas are used first of all in conceptualisation of research and interpretation of findings, and only secondarily as an object of study per se. Focus on theoretical reflection is still a relatively rare phenomenon among Polish sociologists, like in the period before the Second World War. Nevertheless, in each postwar generation of sociologists one can point at researchers who concentrate mostly on sociological theory.58 It was in the methodology of sociological research that the orientation towards Western sociology is clearly visible. The research procedures applied by Polish sociologists before the war did not depart from Western European standards. Polish sociology did, however, have particular features, consisting in the preference for two empirical procedures, namely, the monograph method (case study) in the research of local, particularly rural, communities, and the method of "personal records" (biographical method), first introduced by William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in their classic monograph The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. Both could be considered a kind of Polish sociological specialty. It was also on these methods that the research undertaken immediately after the Second World War was based. Contacts with Western sociology, reestablished after 1956, resulted in methodological innovations being imported to Poland. Their reception went through two stages. First, immediately after 1956, there was a strong preference for research that took the standardised questionnaire as the main basis of gathering empirical data. Polish sociologists were quick to apply this technique in their research, with good results, which was quickly noticed abroad and brought favourable comments.59 This procedure was used so widely that other ways of doing research in sociology became marginalised for many years. However, the lack of competition from other techniques resulted in fossilisation of the ques-

One can gain an idea about their scale from the honourary doctorate acceptance speech of Robert K. Merton, given at the Jagiellonian University on May 22, 1990 (Merton 1990). It is also noteworthy that the sociologists' interest in theory is often linked to social anthropology (see Tarkowska 1991). One can quote here the opinion of Paul F. Lazarsfeld from the year 1958: "The Polish tradition in logic, combined with thorough acquaintance with American technical literature, seems to have led to a level of methodological intelligence higher than anything I have seen on the European continent" (unpublished manuscript). I would like to thank Prof. Antoni Sulek for pointing this out to me.

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tionnaire technique. There were hardly any stronger innovative tendencies in the field of the accompanying statistical analysis either. In this context, it should be noticed that there were two centres, one linked to S. Nowak, and another one to J. Lutynski, which consciously tended towards improvement of the methodological tools of the research process. Polish sociology owes many important methodological solutions and technical instructions to both of them. Unfortunately, they have not received the attention they deserved. It was only at the beginning of the 1980s that a strong reaction against the monopoly of the questionnaire technique became visible. This second stage of reception of Western procedures in sociology was marked by widespread use of other, 'unconventional', research techniques. Generally speaking, however, one must say that the attitudes of Polish sociologists towards their research methodology were fairly conservative. New empirical techniques were only rarely sought after. Nevertheless, in comparison with the state of methodology of sociological research in other countries of the former communist block, Polish empirical studies were conspicuous by their relatively high standard.

6 In the Service of Society Ambitions to keep in step with changing standards of world sociology have always been accompanied by a strong urge to support intellectually our own society to solve its essential problems. What is more, this idea of service to society, as it was called, has always been present as a component of a sociologist's role-model. It can be said that performing two roles, i.e., the role of a research worker and that of an active citizen, was one of the peculiarities of Polish sociology. A particularly visible manifestation of this idea can be found in research preferences on the one hand, and in the focus on applied research, on the other. It is quite easy to show that in each of the stages of Polish sociology, there were certain specific research interests. Thus, before 1914, i.e., at the time when prospects of maintaining the national unity of a society split between three occupants were unfavourable, attention of Polish sociologists turned to problems of the nation. Those problems were tackled quite often, and sociology of the nation became some sort of Polish specialty (Bystron 1916). They were also developed, although with less intensity, later, and also in the socialist period.60 Specific research preferences manifested themselves also in the period between the world wars. One can point to two fields of sociological research in which outstanding results were achieved. First, in the situation when Polish sociDue to the lack of space it is impossible to present the whole relevant literature on the subject; this remark refers to all further examples.

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ety regained its own sovereignty and the issue of keeping the nation together seemed to be solved, one of the most important problems became an effective system of national education. In this context, interest in the sociology of education with its many outstanding works is self-explanatory. Unfortunately, published only in Polish, these works did not have the wide impact they deserved. The second field in which contemporary Polish sociologists had outstanding achievements was the sociology of peasantry (usually called rural sociology). Peasants, who were the most numerous group of Polish society at that time, were in a dramatic economic situation and in many regions their life seemed to be a direct continuation of the feudal period. For the progressive intelligentsia, including many sociologists, the problem of overcoming the economic and social backwardness of rural life had a great significance from the point of view of creating more democratic relations in Poland. Hence numerous empirical studies were produced, with Chalasinski's monumental Young Generation of Peasants as the prime example. The impact of socialism on Polish society was obviously reflected in the research preferences of sociologists. At the turn of the 1950s the attention of many sociologists turned to four types of problems. In the first place - processes of integration of Polish society in Western and Northern territories.61 That society consisted of many heterogeneous elements: Repatriates from the Soviet Union, returners from various parts of Europe, settlers from overpopulated regions of central Poland, and, finally, native inhabitants of Polish origin living in Silesia, Warmia and Mazuria, who had become germanised to a considerable extent. Processes of adaptation of those groups to new political conditions, and to one another, and the emergence of new systems of social ties fascinated many sociologists. Second, a lot of effort was put into an analysis of abruptly occurring processes of industrialisation and urbanisation. Third, research on macrostructural transformations flourished as well. Apart from traditional interest in peasantry, an intensive research was carried out on the formation of a new working class and the intelligentsia. In this context, a lot of attention was devoted to problems of higher education. Last but not least, research on cultural transformations, especially among plebeian masses, i.e., peasants and workers, and the emergence of mass culture was also emphasised at that time. Later these preferences were losing their importance. It was, for instance, apparent at the end of the 1960s that the vivid interest in the Western and Northern Territories, or in processes of industrialisation, was dying out. Many other sub-disciplines of sociology appeared which had not been represented in Poland until then, such as, for example, sociology of law, sociology of medicine, and sociology of women. Simultaneously a growing number of sociologists specialised in narrowly defined research areas. For example, sociology of education split into sociology of family, sociology of youth, sociology of school, etc.. The 1970s brought surveys 61

See note 41.

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on representative, nationwide samples. Thus, thanks to the efforts of sociologists, Polish society at that time was among the better known in Europe. In the late 1970s there started a process to which sociologists were unable to devote enough attention because of political constraints and pervading censorship. The economic crisis broke out that resulted later in the workers' protest in August 1980. Although there appeared some studies showing pathological aspects of institutions typical of the socialist system, there was no possibility to carry out proper research on the growing dissatisfaction of the society and on the first attempts of open political opposition. However, there were many discussions about the possible social consequences of the worsening economic and political situation.62 The workers' protest in August 1980 released a great interest in the course, origins and social consequences of social movements. There appeared dozens of diagnostic and prognostic studies, and attempts to grasp the ongoing processes theoretically. For obvious reasons this pushed other sociological sub-disciplines into the background. There was a characteristic phenomenon of strong politicisation of opinions. It became even stronger after June 1989 and the collapse of the socialist system after the popular elections. It is obvious that the collapse of socialism in Poland in 1989 has meant a radically new situation for the social sciences. This has been manifested in the abolition of censorship. For the first time for years, there has been full freedom of expression. In this situation, research preferences in sociology have been crystallising anew. At present it can be supposed that the interests of sociologists will be directed, on the one hand, to the unveiling of all aspects of the structure and functioning of society in the socialist system, and, on the other, to grasping current processes of system transformations. However, it is an open question which shape the role-model of "service to society" will take under the changed conditions of social life in Poland. After 1956 the above-mentioned efforts to grasp empirically different aspects of Polish social life were accompanied by a tendency toward the use of sociology in social praxis. A spectacular expression of this tendency was the establishing, as early as 1957, of two institutes of public opinion research (Public Opinion Research Centre associated with Polish Radio in Warsaw and Centre for Press Research in Krakow), which have been working until the present day. Through more than three decades they were the only institutes of this kind in socialist countries. The dynamic development of the sociology of work is to be mentioned in this context as well. A great interest in this field originated in the deep conviction that it would bring important practical results, an expectation, which unfortunately, proved a failure.63 These discussions were called later the spoken sociology. Nevertheless, owing to the sociologists' efforts, in the early 1970s, about four hundred state enterprises, mainly industrial ones, employed sociologists as staff consultants.

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Another characteristic expression of the tendency toward applied sociology was the so-called sociotechnics, a sociological sub-discipline which met with wide interest among social researchers, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. But to be useful, sociology must be used! Unfortunately, the economic crisis that became apparent in Poland in the late 1970s and developed into an open social conflict in August 1980 had an unfavourable impact on the innovative attitudes of decision-makers in economy and political life. Their interest in applied sociology gradually disappeared. Under the circumstances of violent political struggle, the disappearance of applied sociology went together with decline in sociological research in general, as expressed by public opinion. As a result, this led to a temporary crisis of sociological research, developing so successfully in Poland until then. Thus, it is a certain paradox that under the totalitarian system of 'real socialism', Polish sociologists were not only able to find some possible areas for applied sociology but were quite successful in this kind of research. It is difficult to make any predictions at present how this type of sociological research will develop in future. Pessimists believe that a hard economic situation may last longer in Poland than initially predicted. Therefore, unfavourable attitudes towards science, especially towards the social sciences, will not be improved soon. This means that the probability for a renewal of interest in applied research is not very high. Optimists, on the contrary, assume that, together with processes of political and economic transformations and the gradual calming down of emotions, there will come the time of more rational attitudes towards problems of present-day Polish society. And this would mean a return to the focus on applied sociology and the renewal of this trend of sociological research, so deeply rooted in the intellectual tradition of Polish sociology.

7 Conclusions The arguments presented above lead to an observation of paradoxical character. On the one hand, the history of Polish sociology up to the present explicitly testifies to the fact that it has become deeply rooted in European and world sociology. Due to this fact, it represents in Polish intellectual life certain universal values typical of the general sociological insight into social reality. On the other hand, we cannot fail to notice many peculiarities that distinguish the research activities of Polish sociologists from those undertaken in other countries. In this way, Bystron's observation concerning the coexistence of universal and native aspects in the development of social sciences, made seventy-five years ago, remains just as valid today. The problem which was not noticed by Bystron is the transformation of traits specific to a national sociology into universal features of world sociology. It

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seems that the impacts of Polish sociology on world sociology was greater in Znaniecki's and Malinowski's times than after the Second World War. It is only with the new phenomena of the vast, social transformations in the aftermath of the decline of socialism that a renewed opportunity to draw to itself the attention of world sociological community opens up before Polish sociology.

References Allardt, E. and W. Wesolowski (eds.) 1978. Social Structure and Change: Finland and Poland in Comparative Perspective. Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers. Breton, R., G. Houle, G. Caldwell, E. Mokrzycki and W. Wnuk-Lipinski (eds.) 1990. National Survival in Dependent Societies. Social Change in Canada and Poland. Ottawa: Carleton University Press. Bystron, J. S. 1916. Pojecie narodu w socjologii polskiej. (The Notion of Nation in Polish Sociology.) Rok Polski 15: 33-48. Bystron, J. S. 1917. Rozwoj problemu socjologicznego w nauce polskiej. (Development of the Sociological Problem in Polish Science.) Archiwum Komisji do badania historii filozofii w Polsce 1: 189-260. Chalasinski, J. 1946. Zasadnicze stanowiska we wspolczesnej socjologii polskiej. (The Main Orientations in Polish Sociology.) Przeglad Socjologiczny 8: 4-39. Chalasinski, J. 1949. Trzydziesci lat socjologii polskiej. (Thirty Years of Polish Sociology.) Przeglad Socjologiczny 10: 1-54. Chalubinski, M. 1991. Polityka i socjologia. Studium koncepcji Juliana Hochfelda. (Politics and Sociology. On Julian Hochfeld's Concepts.) Warsaw: Wydzial Filozofii i Socjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Davies, N. 1982. God's Playground. New York: Columbia University Press. Dobrowolski, K. 1972. Socjologia. Czesc I do r. 1939. (Sociology. Part 1 until 1939.) Polska Akademia Umiejetnosci 1872-1952. Nauki Humanistyczne i Spoleczne, pp. 101-133, Breslau: Ossolineum. Flis, A. 1984. Edward Abramowski's Social and Political Thought. In P. Sztompka (ed.), Polish Masters of Sociology, pp. 27-52. Breslau: Ossolineum. Gorecki, J. (ed.) 1975. Sociology and Jurisprudence of Leon Petrazycki. Urbana, Chicago and London: University of Illinois Press. Jasinska-Kania, Α., W. Wesolowski and J. J. Wiatr (eds.) 1992. Demokracja i socjalizm. (Democracy and Socialism. A Tribute to Julian Hochfeld.) Breslau: Ossolineum. Jerschina, J. and M. Bochenska-Seweryn 1984. Jozef Chalasinski: History Nation - Culture - Personality. In P. Sztompka (ed.), Masters of Polish Sociology, pp. 225-248. Breslau: Ossolineum.

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Kloskowska, A. 1966. Socjologia w Polsce w drugiej polowie XIX w. (Sociology in Poland in the Second Half of 19th Century.) Studia i materialy ζ dziejow nauki polskiej Series A, 9: 195-221. Kojder, A. and J. Kwasniewski (eds.) 1992. Miedzy autonomia a kontrola. Studia i szkice poswiecone Adamowi Podgoreckiemu. (Autonomy and Social Control. Papers in Honour of Adam Podgorecki.) Warsaw: University of Warsaw and Polish Sociological Association. Kozakiewicz, H. 1984. Ludwik Krzywicki. Sociologist and Activist. In P. Sztompka (ed.), Masters of Polish Sociology, pp. 53-65. Breslau: Ossolineum. Krasko, N. 1984. Historia instytucjonalizacji socjologii w Polsce. (History of Institutionalisation of Sociology in Poland.) Studia Socjologiczne 1: 231-249. Kubica, G. 1988. Malinowski's Years in Poland. In R. Ellen, E. Gellner, G. Kubica and J. Mucha (eds.), Malinowski Between Two Worlds. The Polish Roots of an Anthropological Tradition, pp. 89-104. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press. Kwasniewicz, W. 1989. Geneza i formowanie sie uniwersyteckiego osrodka socjologicznaego w Krakowie (do 1970 r.). (The Origin and Formation of the University Sociological Centre in Krakow [until 1970].) In W. Kwasniewicz (ed.), Uniwersytecki osrodek socjologiczny w Krakowie. Tradycja i wspolczesnosc (Sociology at the Jagiellonian University. Traditions and the Present Day), pp. 9-66. Krakow: Polish Scientific Publishers. Kwilecki, A. 1988. Tradycje socjologii polskiej. (Traditions of Polish Sociology.) Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 50: 237-262. Kwilecki, A. 1989. Kontakty polskich uczonych ζ Miedzynarodowym Instytutem Socjologicznym w Paryzu. (Polish Scholars' Contacts with the International Institute of Sociology in Paris.) Studia Socjologiczne 3: 243-268. Kwilecki, A. and J. Ziolkowski 1981. Socjologia w Poznaniu w latach 1920 1980. (Sociology in Poznan between the Years 1920 - 1980.) In A. Kwilecki (ed.), 60 lat socjologii poznanskiej (Sixty Years of Poznan Sociology), pp. 7-54. Poznan: Mickiewicz University Press. Lutynski, J. 1990. Nauka ipolskie problemy. Komentarz socjologa. (Science and the Polish Problems: A Sociologist's Commentaries.). Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy. Merton, R. K. 1990. Remarks on Becoming Honorand of Jagiellonian University: Social Time and Socio-Cognitive Networks. International Sociology 5: 5-10. Misiak, W. 1988. Ο zadaniach badawczych socjologii. (On the Tasks of Sociology.) In A. Kwilecki and K. Doktor (eds.), Stan i perspektywy socjologii polskiej (State and Perspectives of Polish Sociology), pp. 69-75. Warsaw and Poznan: Polish Scientific Publishers. Mokrzycki, E. 1989. Polish Sociology of the Eighties. Theoretical Orientations, Methods, Main Research Trends. In R. Scharff (ed.), Sozialwissenschaften in

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Part III Two Views From Afar

European Sociology and the Modernisation of Japan Ken 'ichi Tominaga

1 Introduction The concept of "modernity" was shaped through the spiritual movement of the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In many respects, sociology, like political science and economics before it, became the heir to the Enlightenment. "Modernity" is thus primarily a European concept, and Japan's access to it was through European sociology. The aim of the present essay is to describe the reception of European sociological thought in Japan. European sociology has had a considerable influence upon the development of Japanese sociology, but the reverse has not been the case. One explanation for this is the fact that the impetus for modernisation in Japan has always come from the West (Tominaga 1990: 39) and was seen as inimical to the retention of traditional Japanese culture. This move towards the West was formalised in 1855, when the Tokugawa government established the Institute of Foreign Research which became the University of Tokyo in 1877. Among the students dispatched to Europe was Amane Nishi, who later introduced Auguste Comte to Japan. The basic ideas behind sociology, developed first by Saint-Simon and Comte and then by Emile Dürkheim in France and Herbert Spencer in England, are summed up in the phrase "self-comprehension of the civil society" (Shinmei 1954: 49). In Germany, where idealism was the substitute for the Enlightenment, the sociological tradition was somewhat different. One need only compare the work of Georg Simmel and Max Weber with that of Emile Dürkheim. Nevertheless, one can still detect traces of the Enlightenment in the work of Simmel and Weber. Simmel's Über sociale Differenzierung and Weber's concept of "rationalisation" are good examples of this. Japanese scholars turned to sociology in order to throw some light on the concept of "modernity". "Modernisation" is a multi-dimensional concept. It can be subdivided into four distinct elements: 1. economic modernisation (industrialisation); 2. political modernisation (democratisation); 3. societal modernisation (realisation of freedom and equality; and 4. cultural modernisation (the move towards rationalism). The areas which are of greatest interest to sociology are 3 and 4, 1 and 2 being merely of peripheral interest.

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We shall attempt to trace the process of modernisation in Japan and determine the impact of European sociology upon the situation in that country.

2 Early Modernisation in Japan Fifteenth and sixteenth-century Europe was marked by the age of discovery. Gradually Europe began to open up to new influences and to move towards the modern era. The Reformation in the sixteenth century and the scientific revolution in the seventeenth had liberated Europe from the domination of the Catholic church. The way had thus been prepared for the democratic revolutions, the Enligthenment and the Industrial Revolution. But what was happening in Japan during this period? As Tetsuro Watsuji pointed out, the age of civil wars in Japan between 1467-1573 marked the period of transition to the modern era (Watsuji [1950] 1963). This period of Japanese history has previously been described in extremely negative terms as a dark age in which the common people were subjected to inordinate suffering. It has recently been acknowledged, however, that it was in fact during this time that the real impetus towards modernisation began. The age of civil wars was a period of social change and expansionism. Daimyos encouraged the cultivation of new rice fields and the development of new irrigation systems, mines and industries. Productive power increased and there was a marked increase in commercial activity. This led to the development of merchant towns. It was during this period that Daimyos invented the castle town, to which warriors as well as merchants moved from the countryside. Trade links were established between Japan and Ryukyu, Korea, China and Southeast Asia in this period. Contact was established with merchants and missionaries from Spain and Portugal. As a result, Francis Xavier came to Kagoshima in 1549 and began Christian missionary work for the first time in Japan. In the early seventeenth century, Japanese merchant ships visited Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Java, the Philippines and Macao, and Japanese settlements were established in Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and the Philippines. All this came to an end when the Tokugawa government came to power in 1603. Japan was effectively sealed-off from all foreign influences in 1635 and all movement towards modernisation abruptly ceased. Christian missionary work had been permitted under the feudal lords. Kagoshima (Shimazu), Yamaguchi (Ouchi) and Bungo (Ohtomo) had given permission to Xavier to engage in missionary work in 1549-1551. And when Luis Frois visited Nobunaga Oda in Kyoto, Nobunaga gave him a licence to conduct his missionary work in Japan. Hideyoshi Toyotomi also accepted Christianity, although mainly in the interest of maintaining vital trade links. The tide turned under Ieyasa Tokugawa. In 1611

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he exiled missionaries from all the cities under the control of the Tokugawa government and destroyed churches in these cities. After his death, the third Shogun Iemitsu effectively closed off the country in 1635 by limiting the entry of foreign ships to Nagasaki and by prohibitting travel and foreign correspondence. As a result, Japan was cut-off from Western influences for over two hundred years. Under the Tokugawa regime, Japan was effectively cut-off from developments in the West in all the natural and social sciences with the exception of medicine and astronomy. Confucianism became the official teaching. As the moral element of Confucianism was founded upon the maintenance of the traditional patriarchal family system and the feudal status hierarchy, it was hardly a force for dynamic social and political change. The situation changed again after the Meiji Restoration, when Japan opened up once again to Western influences. After the Meiji Restoration, Japanese intellectuals shunned Confucianism and turned towards the West. They discovered that the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution had wrought great changes in Europe, and that it was much further down the road of modernisation than Japan. The Japanese resolved to catch up. Yukichi Fukuzawa, the father of the Enlightenment in Japan, advocated "aiming at Western civilisation". He distinguished between "outer civilisation" (food, clothing, housing, technology and the law) and "inner civilisation" (intellectual and spiritual development). The former was easy to acquire, he argued, while the latter presented much more of a challenge (Fukuzawa [1875] 1959b: 16-22). European sociology provided a key to Western 'inner civilisation'. What Comte, John Stuart Mill, Spencer, Tönnies, Dürkheim, Simmel and Weber had in their different ways been describing was how modern society and culture differed from premodern society and culture. This provided the Meiji Enlightenment thinkers with what they needed, and the introduction of European sociology into Japan was a way of capturing the elusive 'inner civilisation' of the West. As we have already pointed out, it was Amane Nishi who introduced Comte to Japan. It is interesting to note, however, that Spencer proved more popular, and was in fact introduced before Comte. Spencer's main works were rapidly translated into Japanese because they met the needs of the burgeoning Liberal Democratic Movement in early Meiji. J. S. Mill's work on liberty and equality was also of intense topical interest during this period. Comte, although he predated the others, came into his own in Japan when the Meiji government was consolidating its power and the National Diet had been established. The compatibility of "order and progress", the main focus of much of Comte's work, was clearly an issue during this period. Lorenz von Stein's work was of interest to the Meiji bureaucrats because it concerned organisation 'from above'. It is interesting to note that another contemporary of Comte, Mill and Spencer, namely Karl Marx was not introduced to Japan by the Meiji Englightenment

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thinkers. This can partially be explained by the fact that he was regarded as a subversive. This probably has more to do with the fact that the Meiji intellectuals were more interested in the process of modernisation itself than in its consequences. The first generation of European sociologists, which includes Saint-Simon, Comte, Mill, Spencer, Stein and Marx, was firmly situated outside university academicism. In contrast, those who comprise what we shall call the second generation, namely Dürkheim in France, Tönnies, Simmel and Weber in Germany, and Small and Giddings in the United States, drew sociology into the university system in the late ninteenth and early twentieth centuries. They made efforts to enhance the level of specialised knowledge and to establish sociological methodology. At this stage it was German sociology that had the greatest influence in Japan. Above all it was Simmel's advocacy of "formal sociology" that marked the divide between the first and second generation. Opinion became polarised between Simmel's "specialised" sociology and Comte and Spencer's "synthetic" sociology, with Simmel gaining the upper hand. Max Weber first came to be known in Japan in the 1920s, firstly through his thesis of the "spirit of capitalism" and later through such concepts as the "ideal type" and "interpretative sociology". It was only after the Second World War that Weber's contribution to sociology began to be understood in all its complexity. It was not until after the war that Weber's theory of social action, and his contribution to economic sociology, the sociology of domination and the sociology of religion and law began to have wide currency in Japan. Interest in Dürkheim also dates to the 1920s. The prime focus of interest in Dürkheim was on his ideas on modernisation ("from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity") and on his rules of sociological method. After the war, his work on morals, anomie, the sacred versus the profane and the study of socialism began to attract attention. There was comparatively little interest in the heirs to Spencer, such as Bagehot and Hobhouse and their contemporaries in British sociology. American sociologists, such as Sumner, Ward, Small and Giddings, attracted some interest in prewar Japan. After the Second World War, the development of sociology in Japan was greatly influenced by what was happening in America. For a time, the name of Talcott Parsons was almost synonymous with American sociology. Parsons' legacy was explored in more depth in Europe than in America, with the result that Japanese sociology turned once more towards Europe in the 1980s. It is sociologists such as Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann that are attracting interest in contemporary Japan. The European tradition has maintained a foothold in the face of overwhelming Americanisation in that Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and of ideology has continued to attract the interest of sociologists in postwar Japan. The situation is changing once again, now that the

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'end of ideology' is upon us in the wake of the ebbing tide of Marxism and the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe. In the following sections, we shall examine in more detail the impact of these three generations of European sociologists upon the development of the discipline in Japan.

3 European Sociology of the First Generation and Japan 3.1 John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer The publication of Yukichi Fukuzawa's An Exhortation to Learning in 1872-1876 marked the beginning of the Englightenment in Japan. Although it did not explicitly refer to Montesquieu, Rousseau, J. S. Mill or Spencer, Fukuzawa's social thought represented a radical departure from the ideals of Confucianism. Fukuzawa considered human beings equal by nature; they all had civil rights and laws were made by the people themselves under democratic government. Fukuzawa drew heavily upon the less well-known American Wayland's theory of natural rights in eighteenth-century Europe (Fukuzawa [1872-1876] 1959a). In Fukuzawa's view, the Meiji government was despotic and the majority of the Japanese people starved of knowledge. He set out to remedy this lack of enlightenment and develop the idea of natural rights. In 1874 Taisuke Itagaki, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Movement, had demanded the establishment of a National Diet. This fuelled an interest in liberty, equality and natural rights among the intellectuals of the period. The publication of translations of J. S. Mill's On Liberty and Spencer's Social Statics, the fruits of earlier contacts with Europe, did much to foster these developments. Spencer was translated and read more widely than Mill, principally because of the research interests of the first professor of sociology at the University of Tokyo, Shoichi Toyama. Spencer's Social Statics, first published in translation in 1881-1884, has been described as the "textbook of the Liberal Democratic Movement", such was its importance for the development of democracy in Japan. Much of the book's appeal can be attributed to Spencer's critique of Bentham, which greatly appealed to its Japanese readership. The chapter "The Right to Ignore the State" captured the imagination of an oppressed people. Spencer himself was consulted on a number of occasions with regard to the drafting of the Japanese constitution. Spencer expressed doubts as to the ability of the Japanese to throw off the yoke of despotism. It is interesting to note that Spencer was held in equally high regard by the Meiji government itself and by its democratic opponents. The Japanese sociologist Ikutaro Shimizu commented that this was because Spencer had "two souls" (Shimizu 1936: 64). It is perhaps closer to the truth to say that Japan had one.

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After the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 and the establishment of the Diet in 1890, the radicalism of the Liberal Democratic Movement waned. Itagaki, its former leader, became Vice Prime Minister in 1898, but Spencer was forgotten.

3.2 Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte If Spencer was the heir to the Enlightenment in Britain, Saint-Simon and Comte were its heirs in France. Saint-Simon and Comte were, however, received very differently in Japan. Saint-Simon, like Robert Owen and Francis Fourier was for a long time dismissed as an "Utopian" socialist. It was not until the Japanese sociologists Hisatoshi Tanabe and Keiichi Sakamoto took up his idee de progres and his views on "industrialism" respectively that he began to grow in popularity. Hiroshi Mori's recent translation of Saint-Simon collected works has given further impetus to Saint-Simon's scholarship in Japan (Mori 1987-1988). Tanabe started from the study of Dürkheim, and from there moved back to Comte, from Comte to Saint-Simon. From Saint-Simon he passed to Condorcet and the Encyclopedists, and from there to Montesquieu, Pascal and Descartes. It was, in his view, the rampant individualism of the Encyclopedists that had undermined the social solidarity of French society, although it had succeeded in dismantling the power of the ancien regime. According to Tanabe, Saint-Simon and Comte provided an ideal counter to this trend by coming up with ways of rebuilding the social order. Sakamoto saw Saint-Simon as the driving force behind the Industrial Revolution in France. He played down the socialist element in Saint-Simon's thought. According to Sakamoto, the main thrust of Saint-Simon's argument was that industrialisation had resulted in the transference of political power from the landed aristocracy and owners of capital to scientists and industrialists. Sakamoto emphasized the essential connection between the work of SaintSimon and Comte (Sakamoto 1961: 61-180). As I have pointed out elsewhere (Tominaga 1965b: 16-66), many American theorists concerned with industrialisation and modernisation have drawn directly on Saint-Simon, although they have not always acknowledged their debt to the man who advocated industrialism in France one hundred and fifty years ago. It was Tongo Takebe who was largely responsible for introducing the work of Auguste Comte to Japan. He pointed out the parallels between Comte's conception of the social organism and Confucianism, and between Comte's social dynamics and Japan's imperial regime (Takebe 1904-1918). It is interesting to compare Takebe's approach with that of his predecessor at the university of Tokyo, Shoichi Toyama. Toyama's lectures on Spencer evinced the influence of the European Enlightenment upon Japanese intellectual life during the earlier part of the Meiji era. Takebe's approach, on the other hand, reflected the grow-

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ing influence of the nationalism which had developed in the wake of the SinoJapanese and Russo-Japanese conflicts from the mid-1890s until around 1910. It has often been claimed, although without foundation, that Takebe's conservatism reflected Comte's (Saitoh 1976: 222). This is, however, not the case. Saint-Simon and Comte were certainly conservatives in that they sought to restore order after the turmoil wrought by the French Revolution. But their vision was republican rather than royalist. Takabe, on the other hand, sought a return to the status quo, the ancien regime of traditional Japan. There are three well-known studies of Comte in Japanese: Shinmei (1935); Honda (1935); Shimizu (1978). I shall refer here only to the most recent. Shimizu argues that Japanese intellectuals intent on modernising Japan regarded the French Revolution and the Enlightenment as providing the real impetus for change in their country. Later, in the wake of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Marxist view prevailed, and both revolutions were seen as expressions of the class struggle. According to Shimizu, Japanese intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s were so strongly influenced by the Comintern that they rejected Comte, who had criticised the French Revolution and distanced himself from the Enlightenment. Shimizu argues that Comte, and thus sociology as a whole, were viewed as antagonistic towards Marxism (Shimizu 1978: 53-70, 107-119). 3.3 Lorenz von Stein and Karl Marx in Japan German sociology was first introduced to Japan through the work of Lorenz von Stein. The Meiji government looked to Stein for a way of institutionalising state power in Japan. Government bureaucrats were dispatched to Vienna to attend Stein's lectures, translations of which were published by Nagao Aruga in 1889. The element in Stein's work that attracted most attention in Japan was the distinction between state and society. The state was regarded as an organism comprising the King as "self', the Diet as "will" and the government as "action" (Saitoh 1976: 209-211). Marx only became known in Japan around the turn of the century, well after Mill, Spencer, Comte and Stein. The first socialist party in Japan, the Social Democratic Party, was founded in 1901 on the model of the German SPD of the 1890s. It was promptly prohibited by the government of the day. As Marx's and Engels' work was not yet available in translation, Kohtoku's two studies of socialism, published in 1901 and 1903, provided an introduction to their work. The work of Marx and Engels was not introduced to Japan by sociologists. This does not mean, however, that sociologists did not engage with socialist theory. Kohtoku had explained the development of socialism in terms of the law of social evolution, which the Japanese had become familiar with through the work of Spencer and Nagao Aruga. Indeed, the Japanese sociologist Kishimoto had insisted that the aspirations and values of socialism should be studied as part of sociology. Sociology, socialism and social problems were inextricably bound

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together in Meiji Japan at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Sociology was thought to be the theory of social evolution, and social evolution was seen as a way of solving the social problems produced by capitalist development (Kawamura 1973-1975, I: 185-199; Akimoto 1979: 97-99). The success of the Russian Revolution in 1917 meant that Leninism became the orthodoxy of the International Communist Movement. Non-revolutionary socialism and social reformism were excluded from that orthodoxy. As the focus of debate switched towards Marxist economics, sociology began to be viewed as a peripheral domain in Meiji Japan. Despite this change in emphasis, Japanese sociology still maintained its links with Marxism. In 1929 a Japanese translation of Bucharin's Historical Materialism appeared and was widely read. The connections between historical materialism and "Marxist sociology" were re-established, although this link was hotly disputed among Japanese sociologists in the 1930s. Shimizu argued that the two were fundamentally incompatible, and came out firmly in favour of historical materialism (Shimizu 1933). It is interesting to note that Shimizu never ceased to describe himself as a sociologist. He changed his position in the 1950s, admitting that contact with American social psychology had changed his attitude towards Marxism (Shimizu 1950). After the Second World War, sociology and Marxism ceased to be regarded as fundamentally inimical. Many Japanese sociologists began to describe themselves as Marxists. There was even an attempt to construct Marx's theory as "social theory" (Hosoya 1979). However, Marxist sociologists in Japan tended to devote themselves to critical exegesis rather than empirical studies of socialist societies. Consequently the influence of sociology began to wane in the wake of the introduction of perestroika in the Soviet Union and the democratic reforms that swept Eastern Europe in 1989.

4 European Sociology of the Second Generation and Japan 4.1 The Influence of Emile Dürkheim in Japan Emile Dürkheim, like Max Weber, enjoyed a great reputation among Japanese sociologists. As his interests were largely theoretical, he never became a symbol of a democratisation movement like Spencer or of political conservatism like Comte. Dürkheim was taken as the representative of "sociological thinking" in Japan. His work was introduced by Tanabe ([1965] 1979) and Kurauchi ([1958] 1978). Tanabe traced the origins of Dürkheim's thought back to the work of Comte, Saint-Simon, Condorcet, Pascal and Descartes. Unlike Shimizu, who emphasized Comte's antagonism towards the French Enlightenment, Tanabe

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saw a line of continuity between the Enlightenment right through Comte to Dürkheim. He maintained that the rationalistic character of positivism lay behind both the French Revolution and Saint-Simon's and Comte's advocacy of the re-ordering of post-revolutionary society. Dürkheim was regarded as the natural heir to this tradition. This means that Tanabe, unlike Shimizu, accepted the common element of conservatism running through the work of Saint-Simon, Comte and Dürkheim. According to Kurauchi, the group mentality of the Japanese meant that Japanese culture was particularly receptive to Dürkheim's ideas. In Kurauchi's view, the key to psychological stability in Japanese culture lay in the life of the group, which transcended the individual. The individual's scheme of moral values was conditioned by the attitudes of the group to which he belonged. Kurauchi believed that the social actions of the Japanese could adequately be explained by applying Durkheimian models (Kurauchi [1958] 1978: 385-386). The work of Eitaro Suzuki is a further example of the influence of Dürkheim upon Japanese sociology. Suzuki argued that the social norm of the feudal "natural village" was the "spirit" of the Japanese farmers. He conducted empirical studies of ostracism, the traditional form of private sanction in Japanese rural villages in the 1930s, and explained them in terms of Dürkheim's concept of "collective consciousness" (Suzuki [1940] 1968: 118-126, 445-453). Yasuma Takata's "sociological view of history" was a development of Dürkheim's idea of social morphology. In the De la division du travail social, Dürkheim had argued that the division of labour was the result of the breakdown in social order brought about by population growth and concentration. In Takata's view, there had been two types of explanation for the driving force of modernisation. The first one, developed by Mill and Comte, was in terms of the human spirit. The second, based upon material productive power, was developed by Marx. Takata believed that neither could provide a sufficient explanation for the dynamics of history. In Takata's view, the human spirit or consciousness was a product of society, the individual being subject to socialisation. The development of productive power, on the other hand, was to be explained in terms of the endeavour to overcome the pressure of population growth. Takata thus agreed with Dürkheim that it was population growth and concentration that provided the impetus for development (Takata [1922] 1950: 315-22; 1925: 157-267). Dürkheim has continued to arouse interest in Japan and recently Dürkheim scholarship has made considerable advances (see, for example, Miyajima 1977; Naka 1979). 4.2 Georg Simmel and Max Weber in Japan During the Meiji Enlightenment, it was mainly British and French social thought that was introduced to Japan. German theorists were less well known. This can partly be explained by the fact that the process of industrialisation started rela-

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tively late in Germany, not until the middle of the nineteenth century. Social theory too was relatively underdeveloped. The publication of Ferdinand Tönnies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft in 1887 was a landmark in the development of German sociology, and Tönnies was rapidly followed by Simmel, Weber, Sombart, Vierkandt and von Wiese. Japanese sociology was heavily influenced by German sociology in the prewar period, as is demonstrated by the publication of works by Takata (1926) and Shinmei ([1928] 1979; [1929] 1979). It was Georg Simmel who aroused most interest among Japanese sociologists in the 1920s. It was his focus on human interaction at the level of individuals (seelische Wechselwirkungen) that attracted most attention. Takata led a spirited defence of Simmel's micro-sociological approach against the charges of social realism by claiming that psychic interactions transcend the level of the individual. They are societal in the sense that they are also interindividual phenomena. Takata rejected Simmel's notion of "formal" sociology. He did not accept the posited distinction between interaction as the "form", and economy, religion or art as the "content". He preferred the term "relational sociology" (Takata 1926: 7-28, 240-256). Shinmei also welcomed Simmel's emphasis on psychic interactions, but doubted their power to explain the workings of society on a macro-level. In his view, the social structural analysis based on formal sociology could not be anything but a mosaic (Shinmei [1928] 1979). After the Second World War, symbolic interaction theory began to supplant interest in micro-sociology in Japan. Simmel's work still continued to arouse some interest, but this was mainly restricted to the study of small groups, conflict theory, analysis of domination and to Simmel's observations on culture, the city and money (Atoji 1979, 1985). Max Weber was an important figure in the development of sociology in Japan, although it was among economists rather than sociologists that he first aroused interest. Economics in prewar Japan was strongly influenced by the German historical school, of which Weber was a representative. It is also due to the influence of economists that Weber's name is more frequently linked with that of Marx than of Dürkheim (see, for example, Uchida 1972; Takashima 1975). Weber's influence was much wider than Durkheim's, and his work attracted the attention of economists, jurists, political scientists and historians as well as sociologists. The growth of interest in Weber coincided with the establishment of Marxist economics in Japan during the 1920s and 1930s. The Weber of the protestant ethic was viewed by some as a critic of the one-sidedness of historical materialism. Weber, like Ludwig von Mises of the Austrian neo-classical school had argued that the socialist economy could function because it lacked market freedom. However, after the Second World War, Marx and Weber began to be regarded as mutually compatible. The point of contact was the concept of "civil society" enshrined in the work of both men (Uchida 1965: 112). "Civil society" was something the Japanese aspired to during the period of

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the Meiji Constitution. Patriarchal family structures and feudalism effectively blocked all movement towards a modern industrial society. Marxist economics and Weberian sociology were considered to provide the way forward. Weber scholarship took off in Japan after the Second World War. The focus of Aoyama's interest in Weber was on the problem of the structure of modern society in relation to the modern capitalist economy (Aoyama 1950). Other Japanese sociologists expressed interest in the ideal type, interpretative sociology (verstehende Soziologie) and value-free judgement (Fukutake 1949; Odaka 1950). Kaneko focused on Weber's methodology in relation to the logic of historical causal attribution (Kaneko 1957). Weber's work on methodology marks his transition from the economics of the German historical school to sociology. Japanese sociologists focused on his methodology in an attempt to understand this shift in interest. The celebration of Weber's centenary in Japan in 1964 marked the beginning of another intense period of Weber scholarship and further examination of Weber's move towards sociology (Ohtsuka et al. 1965; Hayashi 1970; Atoji 1976; Kohtoh 1977; Orihara 1988). In Atoji's view, Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft starts from the formulation of the theory of social action and then proceeds to the sociological analysis of particular domains such as the economy, political domination, social stratification, the traditional family and kinship, ethnicity, religion and law. Weber's theory of social action presents the point of view of interpretative sociology. The ideal type was in Weber's view necessary in order to be able to attribute causal relationship. In this sense sociology, as an empirical science that investigates the general rules of human action, is to be distinguished from the "dogmatic sciences" such as jurisprudence, ethics and aesthetics which are concerned with "right" and "valid" meaning. It is also, however, to be distinguished from history, which seeks causal relationships between particular cultural phenomena. According to Atoji, Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft represents an attempt to grasp many diverse cultural spheres systematically and integratively from the point of view of interpretative sociology (Atoji 1976: 1-42). Weber differs from Dürkheim in that he focuses on aspects of the subject such as ethos and motive, aspects which can, however, be recognised by others and which thus transcend the individual. Unlike Simmel, who was primarily interested in "sociation", Weber's uniqueness lies in his attention to the interpretation of subjective meaning. Both Simmel and Weber differed from Comte and Spencer in that they focused on the individual. Weber's specific contribution was the theory of action. Both Dürkheim and Weber developed theoretical frameworks for integrating specialised fields such as economic sociology, political sociology, the sociology of law, the sociology of religion, and so on. Although all of these theorists exerted a considerable influence in Japan, it is perhaps Weber who proved the most influential figure in the long run.

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5 Early American Sociology in Japan Before the Second World War, American sociology had less impact than its European counterpart in Japan. However, even then Japanese sociologists were aware of the difference in focus, and of the American emphasis on social psychology. It was Shokichi Endoh who was largely responsible for the introduction of American social psychology into Japan. Endoh translated Giddings's Principles of Sociology into Japanese and introduced Ward and Ross's theory of social forces. Endoh maintained that social forces were not the product of a societal organism which transcended the individual, but of individual needs and interests (Akimoto 1979: 123-129). Shinmei's critic of Simmel paved the way for the second phase of the acceptance of American sociology in Japan. According to Shinmei, human subjectivity was reduced to social relations in Simmel. In his view, Simmel's sociology of social relations must proceed to the "sociology of social action". This led to an interest in the psychologial or "behaviouristic" sociology of Ward, Small, Giddings, Park, Burgess, Thomas, Mead and Ross. However, Shinmei was too heavily influenced by German neo-Kantian thinking to accept American behaviouristic sociology wholeheartedly (Shinmei [1939] 1976, [1942] 1976). After the Second World War, Shimizu demonstrated a renewed interest in sociology, having abandoned it during the 1930s to pursue an interest in Marxism. Shimizu attributed his change of heart to the influence of American sociology. Shimizu contrasted American and European sociology and summarised the differences as follows (Shimizu 1950: 122-174): 1. Sociologists in America, who were far greater in number than in Europe, enjoyed considerable influence. The number of sociological publications was also far greater, and the status of sociologists higher. Government and business administration in the US were far more disposed to take on board sociological findings than their European counterparts. 2. While historical thinking dominated in European sociology, psychological thinking dominated in American sociology. The theory of human nature, which flourished in the eighteenth century but disappeared in the nineteenth in Europe survived in the twentieth in the US. Unlike instinct theory, the dominance of behaviourism tended to emphasize the existence of society as it recognised the importance of personality formation through learning. 3. Unlike in Europe, social research was widely practiced in the US. This was the result of the empiricist tradition and of the development of statistical techniques. The fact that there was almost as much interest in social research as in sociology could be regarded as the realisation of Auguste Comte's ideal of positivism.

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4. The development of sociology in the US was closely linked to the development of democracy in that country. This was in contrast to the situation in Germany before the Second World War, when democracy was not yet institutionalised. At that time it was possible for Max Weber to describe politics as a sphere of irrationality. In the US, politics was based on public opinion, and was therefore reduced to social research. American pragmatism gave sociology a high status as an useful field of knowledge for politics. Shimizu linked American social psychology with European classical modernisation theory (Shimizu 1951). He saw the consequences of modernisation in terms of 1. differentiation; 2. expansion; 3. mechanisation. He schematised the types of social psychological phenomena corresponding to these three aspects as a) helpless individuals under the state of anarchy; b) "social narcotism" under the "violence" of mass communication, and c) the "new crowd" in the bureaucratised organisations like huge machines. Shimizu's diagnosis of the decline of American culture as a result of modernisation was firmly based in the techniques of social psychology. The influence of European sociological thought can, however, be detected in the background.

6 European Sociology of the Present Generation and Japan 6.1 The Americanisation of Postwar Japanese Sociology American culture became extremely influential in Japan after that country's unconditional surrender at the end of the war in the Pacific. American English became dominant in the schools and on the streets. Sociology was regarded as an "American science", and Homans replaced Dürkheim, Simmel and Weber on students' reading lists. It was above all the works of Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton that were most enthusiastically read in the 1950s and 1960s. These authors presented a very different picture of American sociology from the one put forward by Shinmei and Shimizu in the 1930s and 1940s. They had presented America as the country of behaviourism and pragmatism. What Parsons and Merton brought to Japan, on the other hand, were the concept of "social system" and the vocabulary of functional analysis. German sociologists of the postwar generation had also been greatly influenced by developments in American sociology, and were left to rediscover Tönnies, Simmel and Weber at a later date. Interest in these authors had never waned in Japan, as sociological research was never interrupted during the war as in Germany. The work of Karl Mannheim and Theodor Geiger, who had been forced to emigrate during the Nazi period, were known and read in postwar Japan. In contrast, those like Helmut Schelsky and Otto Stammer who came to the fore after the war and helped put German sociology back on track, were

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comparatively little known in Japan. The American bias also meant that Heinrich Popitz and M. Rainer Lepsius did not become known in Japan until the 1960s. According to Kunio Odaka, sociology as a discipline in the 1940s and 1950s was characterised by the following six factors: internationalisation, integration, diversification, systematisation, a tendency towards practical use, and a tendency towards precision. In his view, individual differences between the approaches adopted in different countries were beginning to disappear. Odaka (1958) attributed this to the diffusion of American sociology. This was taken as a reflection of the fact that Japan was very much oriented towards the US as far as international relations were concerned. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, America's influence began to decline. This was partly due to the bitter internecine racial conflict that was dividing America, the rise of the new-left student movements and the impasse of the Vietnam war. The world proceeded to an age of multipolarity, and this change in world politics certainly had an influence upon Japanese sociology. In the following we shall attempt to trace the impact of the changing international environment upon Japanese sociology through two cases. The first is the acceptance of the sociology of Talcott Parsons in Japan and its fusion with European sociology. The second is the locus of Karl Mannheim's theory of ideology in Japan. 6.2 Talcott Parsons and Japan When Parsons' The Structure of Social Action appeared in 1937, it attracted relatively little notice in Japan as few Japanese sociologists were familiar with Parsons' work. However, works such as The Social System and Toward a General Theory of Action aroused greater interest and led to a re-evaluation of the importance of The Structure of Social Action. The fact that The Structure of Social Action focused upon the work of Marshall, Pareto, Dürkheim and Weber bore witness to the European orientation of Parsons' work. Parsons, who was developing his own voluntaristic theory of action, set out to compare utilitarianism as the central stream of the British Enlightenment in the seventeenth to the nineteenth century with the neo-Kantian philosophy of value as the successor to German Idealism. The project met with the approval of Japanese intellectuals. Parsons' theory of action rejected American behaviourism. Its basic categories were derived from Weber. The dichotomous category of "motivational" versus "value" orientation of action which Parsons developed in The Social System had its origins in Weber's twin concepts of "Interesse" and "Idee" presented in the introduction to Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen (Weber [1920] 1971). Furthermore, Parsons' conceptualisation of "affectivity" versus "affective neutrality" in the first pair of "pattern variables" is derived from Weber's concept of "affektuelles Handeln" as the third

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category in the classification of types of action. The Weberian elements in Parsons' theory of action were on the whole favourably received in Japan. This was, however, not the case with Parsons' theory of the social system. Parsons defined the social system as the boundary-maintaining system composed of human actions. In his view, socialisation and social control function as the mechanism of integration of the social system. Many Japanese sociologists criticised Parsons' notion that the deviant behaviour generated in the social system is removed by these mechanism which restore it to its initial state of equilibrium. According to his critics, it was precisely for these reasons that Parsons' theory of structural-functionalism could not explain social change. For Nishimura, Parsons' theory was essentially a theory of order and harmony that could not account for antagonism and conflict. This was because it dealt only with those cases in which an institutionalised norm is established. Even if the equilibrium is disturbed by deviant behaviour, this behaviour will sooner or later be removed (Nishimura 1957). Nishimura's critic of Parsons was in many respects similar to Dahrendorfs, although the two were written independently. The inadequacies of Parsons' structural-functional theory as an explanation for social change were thus well-established both in Japan and abroad. I have argued that such critic is based upon a misunderstanding of the structural-functional theory, for which Parsons himself is partly responsible. As we shall see, an appropriately formulated structural-functional theory can provide an explanation for social change (Tominaga 1965a, 1976, 1986). Social change is generally taken to refer to a change in the social structure. Unlike physical structures, which tend to remain stable after completion, social structures are subject to constant modification by human actors within the framework of a set of structural rules. For example, the organisational structure of a company can be altered to accommodate changes in the external or internal environment. Similarly, during the Meiji Restoration the institutional structure of feudalism which had prevailed in Tokugawa Japan was altered to be more in keeping with the demands of a modern industrial society. Whether or not these structural changes succeed, depends upon the extent to which the system is more able to attain the functional requirements under the newly-created social structure than under its predecessor. The rise of deviant behaviour is a measure of people's dissatisfaction with the old social structure. In Parsons' theory of deviance, the emphasis is on socialisation and social control as mechanism for managing deviant behaviour. However, deviance can only be absorbed in this way when the existing institutional structure remains stable. When it is no longer able to guarantee the stability of the system in the face of external or internal pressure for change, structural change becomes a necessity. A point of no return is reached when it becomes impossible to return to the original structure. Parsons' theory on deviance and social control did not sufficiently explain the process of arriving at a new equilibrium through structural change. However, the analysis of social change in terms of the relation

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between structure and function provided an interesting way of explaining social change. Despite Parsons' American origins, his thought was deeply rooted in the European tradition, a factor which explains his broad appeal in Japan. After his death in 1979, Parsons' theories were developed further by European sociologists such as Habermas and Luhmann. In his Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981), Habermas developed his own view of Parsons under the rubric "paradigm competition between action theory and systems' theory" (1981: 303). According to Habermas, the tendency to divorce action theory and systems' theory originated in Europe after Hegel and Marx. Dilthey, Husserl and Weber were associated with the theory of action, whereas analysis of the market mechanism in economics was in the realm of systems' theory. For Habermas, Parsons represented the midpoint between these two poles, the idealist tradition on the one hand, and the positivist one on the other. For Habermas, the social system was a subsystem of the action system (Habermas 1981: 299). Niklas Luhmann also examined the relation between action theory and systems' theory in his Soziologische Außlärung III. In Luhmann's view, action theory and systems' theory were still distinct in the age of Dürkheim and Weber. By Parsons' time, however, it was no longer possible to distinguish between them. Following on from Parsons, Luhmann conceptualises action and system in "Konstitutionszusammenhang" (Luhmann 1981: 50-66). Phenomenological sociology is another area in which the fusion of Parsons' theory with European sociology is apparent. Its main exponent in Japan was Kazuta Kurauchi. Interest in phenomenological sociology has a long history in Japan. Although Vierkandt and Geiger, and later George Gurvitch, were widely read, it was perhaps Alfred Schütz who proved the most influential figure. Schütz was rediscoved in the 1970s, long after the publication of his influential book Der sinnhafie Aufbau der sozialen Welt (1932). In the 1980s, the term "action theory" which had hitherto been used in relation to Parsons, began to be used to describe Schütz' work. The effect of phenomenological thinking extends to Habermas and Luhmann. It is thus possible to consider the work of Parsons, Schütz, Habermas and Luhmann as being closely interrelated. It is also true to say that the resemblances between the phenomenological theory of action and the voluntaristic theory of action promote the exchange of ideas between European and American sociology.

7 From Karl Mannheim's Theory of Ideology to Bell's End of Ideology The continuing interest in Karl Mannheim in postwar Japanese sociology is a good illustration of the pervasive influence of the most 'European' element in

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European sociology, namely the sociology of knowledge. Japanese interest in Mannheim dates back to the publication of Shinmei's Phases of the Sociology of Knowledge in 1932 (Shinmei [1932] 1977). There were several translations of Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie into Japanese. Indeed, Mannheim is one of the rare Western sociologists whose collected works are published in Japanese. What explains Mannheim's popularity in Japan? It seems clear that it was primarily an interest in historicism and Marxism, and particularly the latter, that triggered the interest of his readers. While there have been many books that have interpreted the contents of Marxism, Ideologie und Utopie was the only one that conceptualised the function of Marxism as a thought in its entirety, and analysed it as an "ideology". Its supporters agreed with Mannheim that the character of a "particular" ideology was elevated to that of a "total" ideology by Marxism. Its critics, on the other hand, agreed that Marxism as a total ideology attacked its opponents' view as ideology, but refused to recognise Marxism itself as an ideology. They also refused to accept that the sociology of knowledge only became possible when one accepted the need to adopt a relativist perspective. Japanese intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s were profoundly ambivalent towards Marxism. During the Cold War period, there was a polarisation between pro- and anti-American ideologies in Japan. As a result, interest was focused on the functional analysis of ideology and the related problem of the role of intellectuals (Hidaka 1960). Mannheim was not without his critics in Japan. Criticsm was in the main directed against his assumption that the intelligentsia was the bearer of what he termed "general" as opposed to "special" ideology, or the sociology of knowledge. His critics argued that the intelligentsia was merely an element of the middle class, and thus could not be a 'free flying' transcendental class as Mannheim supposed. Regarding the intelligentsia in this way would, they argued, lead to facism. Shinmei was the first of many in Japan to criticise Mannheim in this way, although he later withdrew his criticism in the preface to his Collected Works (1976). It is interesting to note, however, that both Marxists and their critics expressed interest in Mannheim, and that there was considerable support for his theories in Japan. However, the march of history was to take a quite unpredicted turn, towards what Daniel Bell described as The End of Ideology (1960). In fact the decade after the publication of Bell's book was marked by an upsurge in ideology rather than its demise. The anti-Vietnam war feeling ran high and the student unrest was widespread. Bell was laughed out of course by Japanese committed to the New Left. However, the truth of Bell's theory was soon amply demonstrated in the Japanese context. The Japanese Red Army, one of the factions of the New Left in Japan, lost support completely as the result of the Asama mountain villa outrage in 1972 and many other violent incidents and became completely disorganised. Fewer and fewer students read Marx, particularly after Gorbachev introduced perestroika in the Soviet Union in 1985 and after the democratic revolu-

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tions in Eastern Europe. It was in fact the end of the Cold War that brought about the end of ideology. As Shimizu (1966: 258-259) points out, Bell's use of the word ideology has no negative connotations. When Mannheim spoke of the "particular ideology", it was meant as an attack on his opponent's assertion. This is not the case for Bell, who says "that what the priest is to religion, the intellectual is to ideology" (Bell 1960: 394). If this is the case, then the end of ideology means that there is no longer any need for intellectuals, just as the end of religion means that there is no need for priests. This brings us back to our starting point. Our initial thesis was that Japan looked to European social science as an aid to the process of modernisation. Japanese intellectuals played a key role in this, introducing new ideas to Japan and interpreting them. The leaders of the Liberal Democratic Movement in the early Meiji era translated Mill and Spencer. Bell's thesis of the end of ideology also had its interpreters in Japan. Just as Mannheim's thought was a form of ideology, so were the ideas of the Liberal Democratic Movement, the Taisho Democracy, the spirit of capitalism, the notions of "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft" and "industrialism". The new European ideology of modernisation was imported into Japan in various stages. Those primarily responsible were Nishi and Fukuzawa in the Meiji era, Takata, Shinmei and Tanabe in the Taisho and Showa eras and Shimizu and Kurauchi in the postwar years. And despite the much heralded end of ideology, it appears that intellectuals still have an important role to play in Japan.

8 Summary and Conclusion: From One-way to Two-way Communication As we have seen, there are four dimensions to the process of modernisation: the economic, the political, the societal and the cultural. None of these aspects featured in the traditional thought of Tokugawa Japan. It was only when Japan became involved in an international crisis at the end of the Tokugawa era that a decision was made to open up to the modernising influences of the West. Sociology was primarily concerned with the societal aspect. For the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Movement, the principles of modern society, such as freedom and equality, were enshrined in the works of J. S. Mill and Spencer. The Liberal Democratic Movement turned to Saint-Simon and Comte when nationalism became the dominant issue. Japanese intellectuals made selective use of Western thinkers to meet the needs of the evolution of social thought in their own country. Later on, the type of empirical analysis pursued by Tönnies, Dürkheim, Simmel and Weber was to replace the more abstract work of Comte and Spencer. Tönnies' distinction between "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft", Dürkheim's theory of the division of labour, Simmel's theory of social different!-

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ation and Weber's theory of the spirit of capitalism all fitted in with the increasing demand in Japanese society for societal and cultural modernisation. Marxism too met a similar need. Japanese interest in American social psychology was also linked to the process of modernisation and industrialisation in Japan, and, furthermore, to the problem of capitalism versus socialism. It is in this light that Japanese interest in the work of Talcott Parsons must be interpreted. Interest in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge was kindled by the implications of the elevation of Parsons' structural-functional approach to the level of ideology. Now that Japan has caught up with the advanced nations of the West, it might be reasonable to expect a two-way exchange between Japan and Europe. It might be argued that the intense interest expressed by Japanese sociologists in Western intellectual movements was at the expense of the development of native sociological theory. There is undoubtedly some truth in such a view. It should, however, be pointed out that Japanese intellectuals saw it as their prime responsibility to help their country towards societal and cultural modernisation. They looked to the West to provide them with the means of achieving this. The way is now clear for the development of two-way communication between Japanese sociologists and their Western counterparts. It is time for Japanese scholars to play a more active role in the international sphere than was hitherto possible for the reasons we have outlined above. This does not mean to say that the task of introducing Western ideas to Japan is at an end. It is merely a question of re-assessing priorities as Japan moves further and further into the modern era.

References Akimoto, R. 1979. Nihon Shakaigakushi. (History of Japanese Sociology.) Tokyo: Waseda University Press. Aoyama, H. 1950. Max Weber no Shakairiron. (Social Theory of Max Weber.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Atoji, Y. 1976. Weber Shakaigaku no Shiken. (Overview of Weber's Sociology.) Tokyo: Keiso Shobo. Atoji, Y. 1979. Simmel Shakaigaku no Hoho. (Methodology of Simmel's Sociology.) Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo. Atoji, Y. 1985. Simmel no Shiten. (Viewpoint of Simmel.) Tokyo: Keiso Shobo. Bell, D. 1960. The End of Ideology. New York: Free Press. Fukutake, T. 1949. Shakaikagaku to Kachihandan. (Social Sciences and Value Judgement.) Tokyo: Shunjusha. Fukuzawa, Y. [1872-1876] 1959a. Gakumon no Susume. (Exhortation Toward Learning.) In Y. Fukuzawa, Collected Works, vol. 3, pp. 21-144. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

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Fukuzawa, Y. [1875] 1959b. Bunmeiron no Gairyaku. (An Outline of the Theory of Civilisation.) In Y. Fukuzawa, Collected Works, vol. 4, pp. 1-212. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Habermas, J. 1981. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Hayashi, M. 1970. Weber Shakaigaku no Hoho to Koso. (Method and Conception of Weber's Sociology.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Hidaka, R. 1960. Gendai Ideorogii. (Ideology Today.) Tokyo: Keiso Shobo. Honda, K. 1935. Comte Kenkyu. (A Study on Comte.) Tokyo: Shiba Shoten. Hosoya, T. 1979. Marx Shakairiron no Kenkyu. (A Study on Marx's Social Theory.) Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. Kaneko, E. 1957. Max Weber Kenkyu. (A Study on Max Weber.) Tokyo: Sobunsha. Kawamura, N. 1973-75. Nihon Shakaigakushi Kenkyu. (A Study on the History of Japanese Sociology.) Tokyo: Ningen no Kagakusha. Kohtoh, Y. 1977. Weber Shakairiron no Kenkyu. (A Study on Weber's Social Theory.) Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. Kurauchi, K. [1958] 1978. Nihon to Dürkheim no Shakaigaku. (Japan and Durkheim's Sociology.) In K. Kurauchi, Collected Works, vol. 1, pp. 378-398. Nishinomiya: Kwansei Gakuin. Luhmann, N. 1981. Soziologische Aufklärung. Vol 3: Soziales System, Gesellschaft, Organisation. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Miyajima, Τ. 1977. Dürkheim Shakairiron no Kenkyu. (Α Study on Durkheim's Social Theory.) Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. Mori, Η. (ed.) 1987-1988. Saint-Simon Chosakushu. (Collected Works of SaintSimon.) Tokyo: Koseisha Koseikaku. Naka, H. 1979. Dürkheim no Shakairiron. (Social Theory of Dürkheim.) Tokyo: Sobunsha. Nishimura, K. 1957. Shakai Taikeiron. (On the Theory of Social System.) Tokyo: Sakai Shoten. Odaka, K. 1950. Shakaikagaku Hohoron Josetsu. (An Introduction to the Methodology of Social Sciences.) Tokyo: Shunjusha. Odaka, K. 1958. Gendai no Shakaigaku. (Contemporary Sociology.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Ohtsuka, H. (ed.) 1965. Max Weber Kenkyu. (Studies on Max Weber.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten Orihara, H. 1988. Max Weber Kiso Kenkyu Josetsu. (An Introduction to the Foundation of Max Weber Study.) Tokyo: Miraisha. Saitoh, S. 1976. Nihon Shakaigaku Seiritsushi no Kenkyu. (A Study on the History of Formation of the Japanese Sociology.) Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan. Sakamoto, K. 1961. France Sanguo Kakumei Shiso no Kenkyu. (A Study on the Thoughts of Industrial Revolution in France.) Tokyo: Miraisha. Schütz, A. 1932. Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Vienna: Springer.

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Shimizu, I. 1933. Shakaigaku Hihan Josetsu. (An Introduction to Criticism of Sociology.) Tokyo: Risosha. Shimizu, I. 1936. Nihon Bunka Keitairon. (On the Forms of Japanese Culture.) Tokyo: Sairensha. Shimizu, I. 1950. Shakaigaku Kohgi. (A Lecture on Sociology.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Shimizu, I. 1951. Shakai Shinrigaku. (Social Psychology.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Shimizu, I. 1966. Gendai Shiso. (Modern Thoughts.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Shimizu, I. 1978. Auguste Comte. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Shinmei, M. [1928] 1979. Keishiki Shakaigakuron. (On Formal Sociology.) In M. Shinmei, Collected Works, vol. 4, pp. 1-387. Tokyo: Seishin Shobo. Shinmei, M. [1929] 1979. Doitsu Shakaigaku. (German Sociology.) In M. Shinmei, Collected Works, vol. 4, pp. 389-519. Tokyo: Seishin Shobo. Shinmei, M. [1932] 1977. Chishikishakaigaku no Shoso. (Phases of the Sociology of Knowledge.) In M. Shinmei, Collected Works, vol 6, pp. 1-329. Tokyo: Seishin Shobo. Shinmei, M. 1935. Auguste Comte. Tokyo: Sanseido. Shinmei, M. [1939] 1976. Shakaigaku no Kisomondai. (Basic Problems of Sociology.) In M. Shinmei, Collected Works, vol. 2, pp. 1-253. Tokyo: Seishin Shobo. Shinmei, Μ [1942] 1976. Shakai Honshitsuron. (Essential Quality of Society.) In M. Shinmei, Collected Works, vol. 2, pp. 255-521. Tokyo: Seishin Shobo. Suzuki, E. [1940] 1968-1969. Nihon Noson Shakaigaku Genri. (Principles of Japanese Rural Sociology.) In E. Suzuki, Collected Works, vol. 1-2. Tokyo: Miraisha. Takashima, Z. 1975. Marx to Weber. (Marx and Weber.) Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten. Takata, Y.[1922] 1950. Shakaigaku Gairon. (Principles of Sociology.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Takata, Y. 1925. Kaikyu oyobi Daisan Shikan. (Social Class and the Third View of History.) Tokyo: Kaizosha. Takata, Y. 1926. Shakaikankei no Kenkyu. (A Study of Social Relations.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Takebe, T. 1904-1918. Riron Futsu Shakaigaku. (Theoretical Common Sociology.) Tokyo: Kinkodo. Tanabe, H. [1965] 1979. France Shakaigaku Seiritsushi. (A History of the Formation of the French Sociology.) In H. Tanabe, Collected Works, vol. 1. Tokyo: Miraisha. Tominaga, K. 1965a. Shakaihendo no Riron. ( A Theory of Social Change.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Tominaga, K. 1965b. Sangyoshugi to Ningenshakai. (Industrialism and Human Society.) Konnichi no Shakai Shinrigaku 1: 1-200.

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Tominaga, K. 1976. Growth, Development, and the Structural Change of the Social System: A Model and its Application to Japan. In J. J. Loubser, R. C. Baum, A. Effrat and V. Meyer Lidz (eds.), Explorations in General Theory in Social Science, vol. 2, pp. 681-712. New York: Free Press. Tominaga, K. 1986. Shakaigaku Genri. (Principles of Sociology.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Tominaga, K. 1990. Nihon no Kindaika to Shakaihendo. (Modernisation and Social Change in Japan.) Tokyo: Kodansha. Uchida, Y. 1965. Nihon Shisoshi niokeru Weber-teki Mondai. (Weberian Problems in the History of Japanese Thoughts.) In H. Ohtsuka (ed.), Max Weber Kenkyu (Studies on Max Weber), pp. 77-149. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. Uchida, Y. 1972. Weber to Marx. (Weber and Marx.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Watsuji, T. [1950] 1963. Sakoku. (Closing the Country.) In T. Watsuji, Complete Works, vol. 15. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Weber, M. [1920] 1971. Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Einleitung. In Μ. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. I, pp. 237-275. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.

Europe and America in Search of Sociology: Reflections on a Partnership Lawrence A. Scajf

This essay investigates a double theme. In one sense it is concerned mainly with the rich tradition of relations between sociology and the social sciences in Europe and in America over the last century. In a second respect it also addresses the complicated and varied politics of science on both continents in the modem era of professional specialisation and the institutionalisation of disciplines. Both themes are necessarily present as important and complementary aspects of an attempt to understand the identity, direction, and potentiality of the body of thought some would refer to as "European sociology". In considering the first theme I shall be interested in commenting on identity, historical patterns of reciprocal influence, and the comparative formation of disciplines in this century. "Identity" and "influence" in the sciences are surely ambiguous notions that need to be approached with caution. In these pages they are a kind of shorthand expression for the complex processes of the generation, dissemination, and reception of ideas - their 'flow' through space and time, and their 'anchorage' in particular social and intellectual environments. As an aspect of these processes the 'politics of science' refers to the factors extraneous to knowledge in and of itself that condition the manifold ways ideas are understood, interpreted, and given the imprimature of authority. A sceptic might even insist that misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and error are as important as their opposites in reconstructing a narrative of the growth of knowledge in science. As in many fields, the hypothesis is at least worth entertaining as we consider the relations between European and American sociology. It would be mistaken to suppose that the following comments offer a systematic history or an comprehensive analysis of my subject. They are intended only as a brief exploration of several important themes and a reflection on the most significant and consequential partnership for sociology - one that has shaped an entire modern discipline and will surely continue to do so as we approach the next century of the science of society.

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1 Interrelation Between American and European Sociology in the Period of Formation As a starting point to our enquiry, one should note that the discipline of sociology, especially as it became institutionalised in universities, has found a home principally in Europe and North America. Over the last hundred years the most important sociological research contributions have developed in both of these cultural-political spheres, and major problematics have often seen a crossfertilisation of ideas. Both the word "sociology" and the subject matter for instruction under that name were simultaneous inventions of the European and American nineteenth centuries. At first glance, then, strong historical reasons argue for a basic affinity and shared outlook in the discipline's European and American variants. Numerous instances from the 1880s onward illustrate the case for similarity. Consider the well-known theory of social action (or "soziales Handeln" in Max Weber's terminology), perhaps as close as one can come to a widely acknowledged traditional core to the discipline. As a category in the introductory sections of Weber's Economy and Society, intended as a general contribution to the handbook Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, the notion of "social action" was removed from its original 'social economy' context and elaborated by Talcott Parsons in the 1930s and 1940s as a general, unified "theory" of social action. Based on a rereading and synthesis (and some would say misconstrual) of several European classics - Dürkheim, Weber, and Pareto - Parsons offered an influential schema that developed a life of its own as a part of contemporary disciplinary history. For the post-Second World War European generation then to produce in Niklas Luhmann a serious rereading of Parsons' ideas serves to reemphasize the reciprocal dynamics of the exchange. Or even in the case of Jürgen Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action, a work emerging from a quite different 'critical' philosophical tradition, the reintegration and critique of Weberian and Parsonian themes offers a timely reminder of the extent to which European and American thinkers from quite different generations and orientations have relied on a common core of knowledge. Why have European and American contributions supplemented each other and achieved such dominance across the subfields of sociology? Why has there been such strength in the axis that seems to run through Europe and North America? One reason has to do with the growth in social importance and prestige of the universities on both continents beginning in the late nineteenth century, following the Franco-Prussian War and unification of Germany in Europe, and the end of the Civil War in the United Staates. Simply put, the possibilities for a systematic exchange of thought and the perpetuation of research traditions from generation to generation increased dramatically with the new institutionalisation of knowledge.

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Every history of the subject has noted, for example, the magnetic attraction English, German, and French universities held for the budding American professoriate before the First World War, precisely in the decades that witnessed the institutionalisation of the social sciences. The definitive recent study of these developments in sociology in the United States, Vidich and Lyman's American Sociology (1985), has shown how heavily the American discipline's most important founders, such as Robert Park at the University of Chicago, relied on European thinkers, models and guidelines. In some cases, such as that of Hugo Munsterberg at Harvard, a European professor directly shaped the course of scientific discussion. Moreover, in this regard the situation of intellectual life changed hardly at all in the interwar years and afterward. With the migration of 'Weimar intellectuals' to the United States - major figures like Reinhard Bendix, Leo Löwenthal, and Herbert Marcuse - the modern discipline of sociology in the United States received another strong infusion of categories and problems growing out of powerful theoretical and scientific traditions rooted in the intellectual traditions of Europe. And following 1945, the flow of ideas and personnel in both directions has created a disciplinary matrix that is, in some respects, hardly distinguishable by criteria external to the international community of scholarship. Another equally significant factor in the formation of the European-American partnership can be found in the way in which sociology arose and prospered simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic. For the new disciplines of social enquiry emerged in connection with a common set of practical problems created by modernisation and its effects. The 'practical problems' I have in mind cover the full range of overlapping topics and issues that have formed the core of sociological research in this century: urbanisation, industrialisation, stratification, ethnicity, nationality, religion and secularisation, ideology, traditionalism, mass society, group formation and disintegration, social welfare, social movements, labour relations, and so forth. The terms used to identify these problemareas have changed continuously, and in American sociology today subfield identity may seem overly rationalised, but for the most part the actual content of research fields has remained remarkably constant. One of the especially notable features of sociology, viewed internationally, is that during its inception at the turn of the century there was thus relatively stable agreement about its major research interests. Taking two celebrated instances, when Max Weber journeyed to America in 1904 his attention focused expectedly on topics like the "social question", the social dynamics of capitalism, or the effects of sectarian religion in the New World - precisely the range of problems addressed by American progressive scholars such as Thorstein Veblen or Richard Ely. Or on the same occasion Werner Sombart formulated the now classic question - "Why is there no socialism in the United States?" - and proceeded to delve into a series of considerations regarding class, status, and social mobility that the Americans themselves had begun to ponder.

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This common thematic core is, of course, still very much intact in both European and American sociology. Indeed, certain aspects of it, such as ethnicity and nationality, seem now to be resurfacing as major problems in a late twentiethcentury world that in some obvious respects is beginning to resemble the pre-1914 era of social conflict. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the first two meetings of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie in 1910 and 1912 devoted considerable attention to such problems under the general heading of "culture", while in the last few years the American Sociological Association has seen a burgeoning movement toward a "sociology of culture" and cultural analysis. In contrast to "society" or "civilisation", "culture" has been a watchword for difference and anthropological variation in the social sciences, a term that in Norbert Elias' words embodies "the gesture of self-isolation, the accentuation of the specific and distinctive" (Elias 1978: 21). Carrying a vaguely old-European aura about it, "culture" has now burst into view as the latest in the parade of issues set loose by modernisation, and thus as a topic for the avant-garde. With the furious transatlantic debate over modernity and postmodernity proceeding at full tilt, one can expect that it also will remain in place as a commonly perceived 'problem' that reaches well beyond arbitrary political or geographical boundaries. Despite the record of intellectual exchange and shared perspectives, one might still ask whether in sociology the cross-fertilisation of ideas has worked to the particular advantage to either side of the partnersphip: Is there any sense in which sociology has been alternately 'Europeanised' and 'Americanised'? Taken as an historical question, the record is undoubtedly mixed: Before 1914 and perhaps before 1933 the edge in influence should probably be credited in general to the European partner because of the major contributions to theory and research paradigms emanating from Europe. But in the decades following the Second World War the centre of attention in professional sociology has undoubtedly shifted toward the United States. American doyens of the discipline, such as Neil Smelser, have thus been bold enough to proclaim "that sociology has been and remains a subject dominated by this country, if numbers of professionals, resources available, and degree of institutionalization in the academy are used as measures" (Smelser 1988: 15). This list of criteria is significant, for the high degree of professionalisation of sociology in the United States has indeed created a highly segmented and articulated discipline with relatively impermeable boundaries. It may well be, however, that today even in the United States this 'model' of the discipline can no longer be sustained, as universities prepare for the next wave of educational reform, born, in part, of dissatisfaction with selfprotective professionalism. There are, of course, other possible 'measures' for judging prominence, such as the quality and significance of contributions to different parts of the field. Despite such qualifications, however, it is certainly correct to say that among the sources and influences lying outside Europe those in America offer the most fertile ground for understanding the situation of sociology in our time. More

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strongly stated, it is only in the transatlantic context of comparisons and relationships that the idea of a 'European' identity can gain credence at all. Aside from the utility of comparative generalisation, this must be the case because of reciprocal historical and social relations that have bound together the fate of Europe and America in a working partnership.

2 The Partnership in the Modern Era Specifying the relationship is complicated, however, by the fact that from its inception on both sides of the Atlantic, sociology has been an elusive and contested subject. The classical European founders of the discipline proposed various formulations. For Comte sociology promised the benefits of a "positive" science having nomothetic rigor. Dürkheim saw in his version a moral science based on knowledge of a category of social things existing sui generis. In Simmel's hands sociology revealed the kinds and forms of human interaction and sociation, while his compatriot, Max Weber, laboured manfully to align the new science with the interpretive understanding of subjectively meaningful action. In America, George Herbert Mead extended sociology's reach in the direction of behaviourism and social psychology. Everywhere, it seems, the subject produced as many definitions as it had claimants to authority. In this particular respect - the operative definition of the field - the situation remains very much the same today. Even a brief glance at the leading European and American journals of sociology, or a survey of the latest handbooks, will suggest a healthy plurality of perspectives, problematics, methodologies, and theories. The essential question of the terms in which "method" or "theory" should be debated is often itself at the centre of our most current discussions. From the American side, for example, the latest Handbook of Sociology illustrates in its first two articles just how contested the terrain is. One author struggles gamely to articulate a "disciplinary matrix" (Wallau 1988) for sociology that is beyond reproach, while another tries to bring order to current confusions by postulating a metaphorical "movement" of thought advancing in the direction of "truly multidimensional theory" (Alexander 1988: 78). As the latter writer, a leading advocate of "general theory", must admit, in the field as a whole "the significance and even the validity of general theory is subject to constant dispute" (Alexander 1988: 93) - a tough-minded acknowledgement that one's colleagues are always ready to challenge the significance of one's lifework. In a discipline notable for such concerns about intellectual boundaries and 'legitimacy' of one's work - is it really serious sociological research? - one should not expect uncontested claims to the nature of the field. To introduce the prospect of distinctively 'European' or 'American' variants of sociology into such a context of disagreement may thus appear remarkably

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shortsighted, or, at the very least, unhistorical. For how could this most modern of disciplines be supposed to have developed a regional, geographic, historic, quasi-national, ideological, or cultural identity when so little agreement on fundamentals has prevailed even in the most closely bound communities of science? There is surely sociology in different guises practiced in Europe, as there is in America and elsewhere, just as there is sociology produced by Europeans, Americans, and others. But a European sociology is another possibility altogether. What can we or should we mean by such a category? What can such a claim imply? What, indeed, does it mean to speak of "Europe" in relation to a scientific discipline? Approaching these questions in the analytic mode, Neil Smelser has recently suggested that the issue really lies between the actualisation of a central, unified scientific ideal for sociology, and centrifugal tendencies, produced by social and national forces, that threaten to split sociological knowledge into antagonistic fragments. "The ideal for sociology", he intones, "as with all bodies of knowledge that characterize themselves as science - would appear to have a body of theory and a body of methodology for the conduct of empirical research that have an universal quality, cross-cutting national and cultural boundaries" (Smelser 1988: 15; italics added).

In this view sociology should be understood like other sciences, such as mathematics and physics, as a universally valid body of knowledge with unconditional agreement on fundamental concepts and research problems - a science possessing or aiming to achieve "paradigmatic" status, in Thomas Kuhn's well-known terminology. The claim to universality need not be entirely fanciful. For, with the 'internationalisation' of sociology after 1945 the unity of science ideal can be said, in the broadest sense, to have gained a certain credence. But on the other hand, Smelser admits, as any perceptive sociologist would, that in the real world of sociology there are national, ideological, political, institutional, and social structural factors which distort the ideal and lead to notable differences in intellectual commitments and disciplinary orientations. Perhaps such distortions have to do in part with sociology's unavoidable engagement with socially and political sensitive issues, or with structures of domination and inequality, in contrast to a science like physics, where disinterested investigation of 'objective nature' seems within easier reach. Whatever the reason for differences among the sciences, the situation in Smelser's view is a disciplinary dynamic in sociology best described as "a constant and unresolved struggle between the ideals of science and scholarship on the one hand, and the national, political, and ideological obstacles to realizing these ideals on the other" (Smelser 1988: 17).

From such a perspective the question, "What is European sociology?", may well be worth posing, but to ask it in the first place is already to reveal the possibility

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of the discipline's fall from scientific grace into the nether regions of politics and subjectivity. One response to such a dialectical model of the intellectual field poised, as it were, between universalism and particularism, would be to suggest how characteristic the model seems of American sociology with its penchant for ahistorical abstraction and methodological coherence - in a word, for scientism. There is an obvious preference in Smelser's account for the ideal of a unified science, combined with latent worries about potential disorder resulting from particular cultural and historical demands placed on sociology. As with the paired Parsonian "pattern variables" borrowed for this analysis, the former seems fully modern and progressive, while the latter smacks of old world traditionalism and unenlightened backsliding inappropriate for a science. Sociology, in other words, ought to be a generalising science of human behaviour, and not a particularising Kulturwissenschaft. According to this prescription the fact that it can be (and is) both only reveals the confusions surrounding sociology's unrealised scientific potential. The long-standing and by now tiresome debate over what it means to speak of a "science" of society is hardly an exclusive invention or property of American preoccupations, however. Another response is to caution that the much-discussed internationalisation of a discipline like sociology is really a shorthand expression for the 'Americanisation' of the field, in terms of both approach and institution-building. One could then propose that the pax americana of sociology, with its unwavering belief in scientism, is about to fade away as the force of history reasserts itself beyond American shores. Smelser's analysis is congruent with the thought that I shall offer as my first hypothesis: As national, regional and cultural-political identities reemerge in the new Europe, so one can expect a challenge to dispassionate universalism in the name of a more engaged and less constrained scientific questioning. What the universalist might then condemn as regression, the culturalist can welcome as a rebirth of historical consciousness and a renewal of intellectual innovation. If an analytic approach leads to this kind of conclusion, then what might be gained for understanding our questions through the alternative of historical analysis? In her history of the American social sciences, to take a recent example, Dorothy Ross (1991) has suggested that at its beginning American sociology, along with other social sciences, was derived from a European intellectual base, but that in the course of intellectual and institutional development it became increasingly detached from its specific point of origin. As the differentiation of disciplines proceeded in the late nineteenth century, differences of a certain kind began to emerge between American and European social enquiry. In Ross' view the characteristics that began to appear had to do with ideals of science: adherence to a "natural science model" of enquiry, belief in experimental methods, confidence in practical or applied knowledge, and adherence to the liberal credo of progress through science. Unlike its European counterpart, American social

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science also tended to be unhistorical, or at least uninspired by the promise of historical knowledge. In the final analysis Ross attributes such differences to the ideology of American exceptionalism, namely the notion that "American social science owes its distinctive character to its involvement with the national ideology of American exceptionalism, the idea that America occupies an exceptional place in history, based on her republican government and economic opportunity" (Ross 1991: XIV; see especially 1991: 22-50 for her extended discussion of American exceptionalism).

One can respond that 'exceptionalism' as a political and economic reality, if it ever did exist, has now at the very least become increasingly irrelevant in our century. The sense of Ross' comparative thesis is to suggest, however, that the mythology and cultural perceptions of 'difference' are capable of creating their own reality and thereby influencing even the nature of a science and its characteristic discourse. We might, therefore, refer to variations having to do with the 'spirit' of a scientific practice. Such variations are often conditioned and reinforced by institutional conventions in the broadest sense - that is, by patterns of action as determined by unique social formations. With respect to the prospects for a European sociology this double-track argument - roughly, the spirit of intellectual enquiry, plus institutional adaptation seems to motivate some depictions of a distinctive intellectual-cultural type. Consider Charles Lemert's (1981) presentation of French sociology, for example. In his analysis the French version of the field is characterised by such unique and varied elements as the determining presence of the Parisian milieu (i.e., the trend-setting literary culture of tout Paris), the mechanisms of a champ of intellectual combat, the power of the university "cluster" dominated by a Napoleonic academic patron, and the cultivation of "style as a medium for the individualization of general modes" (Lemert 1981: 10). Such factors are, of course, primarily political und national in the French case, and they extend well beyond sociology to the intellectual culture of France generally. The point, however, is that such a level of analysis can reveal what is distinctive, peculiar and powerful in a mode of scientific thought and action. It can allow us to state the case for a European 'spirit' of sociology: If French contributions can be characterised in these terms, then what of Europe? From the American perspective 'European sociology', when symbolically reconstructed, has stood for a richness of theoretical alternatives and an acute consciousness of history, both of which have been reinforced by political and cultural experience. In America one turns to the European classics - Marx, Weber, Dürkheim, Simmel - for the great world-historical alternatives, for the possibility of a critique of the present and a different kind of self-understanding. For the generation of the 1890s and thereafter the sociology produced in Europe has always served that function. The home-grown discipline in America, by contrast, has been characterised by methodologically self-consciousness, technical expertise, and an

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empirically articulated 'presentness'. 64 In the twentieth century so-called Americanisation of the field has always involved the extension of such instrumentalities into science. This kind of contrast provides grounds for my second speculative hypothesis: As Europe emerges in the 1990s in an altered form, a recombination of the new and the old, so we shall witness the 'return of grand theory' 65 in sociology and the social sciences. As a concern for "method" and "technique" declines, so will the American grip on sociology. Of course, we may then wonder what kind of grand theory we can expect, and what will replace the instrumentalism of technical expertise? With the current decline of Marxism's prestige, the way is opened for the innovative development of other research traditions in sociology, especially those based on the work of Weber and Simmel, in addition to the unpredictable originality of the coming generation. Such developments promise to become the next contribution of European sociology.

3 Future of Sociology After the European Revolutions In the preceding discussions I have considered some reasons that oppose and some reasons that support the idea of a distinctive European sociology. A plausible case can be made for general similarities and a contrasting case for general differences between European and American sociology, arguments dependent in part on historical situations and the choice of an appropriate level of analysis. Is it possible in light of this argumentation to construct a convincing case for radical divergences in orienting perspectives that may increasingly separate European from American sociology as the next turn of the century approaches? Surveying the state of sociology in Europe today, a hundred years after its first struggles toward academic respectability, I am tempted to say that its condition as a science reflects the rapidly changing political landscape of the emerging world order: Uncertain, fragmented, groping for a new clarity. The break-up and redefinition of Europe as it has existed for most of our century suggests we have arrived at that "moment when the atmosphere changes", in Max Weber's The classic statement of the American approach to knowledge comes from a European source, the opening pages in Alexis de Tocqueville ([1835] 1969: 429-430), Democracy in America, where he notes: "Of all countries in the world, America is the one in which the precepts of Descartes are least studied and best followed. ... The Americans never read Descartes's works because their state of society distracts them from speculative inquiries, and they follow his precepts because the same state of society naturally leads them to adopt them . . . . So the Americans have needed no books to teach the philosophical method, having found it in themselves". The title of Quentin Skinner's (1985) edited volume, The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, a work that discusses eight 'theorists' and one school of thought, seven of which are European and two American.

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words, and "the light of the great cultural problems moves on" (Weber [1904] 1949: 112). As in politics, so also in science: Have we thus arrived at the point where a scientific revolution, a major paradigm shift, is in progress? I am prepared to answer the question affirmatively, ä propos of my two hypotheses, if we understand by "revolution" a renewal of historical consciousness, cultural analysis, and Weberian and Simmelian theory. Let us also say that when viewed from the comfortable distance of America, the intellectual life now set in motion from the English Channel to the Urals, as defined by an institutionalised discipline, appears headed in any number of directions that may or may not achieve coherence. Perhaps sociology and its practitioners in the universities will continue on the path of a critical empiricism that is opposed to the idols of nationality and particular cultural identities. Maybe sociologists and their problematics will be swept up in a return to the partisan struggles among schools and orientations so characteristic of the social sciences everywhere before the First World War. Possible sociology in Europe will become the exclusive province of theoretical insight and provocative alternatives to the dull empiricism of normal sociological research. Or 'internationalisation' of the profession over the last four decades may give sociology the kind of autonomy that encourages a selfdefinition beyond the shifting fortunes of a Europe des patries. Moreover, whatever the directions pursued into an unpredictable future, we should speak with candor not of a unified, first-order, or exclusively "European" sociology as the twentieth century comes to a close, but of various "sociologies" whose European origins and character, and whose extra-European influences are indeed, as always, open to investigation. Historians of the future may look back on the experience of our century as one framed by two relatively similar fin-de-siecle debates in Europe and America over science and the modern world, debates set apart but also brought together by the seventy-five year war ending in 1989. Sociology has participated importantly in the course of these events. For its current advocates on both sides of the Atlantic to be among those now given a second chance to address the problems of a common modernity is an extraordinary turn of history. It represents an opportunity that deserves to be used for the reformation of sociology's most consequential partnership.

References Alexander, J. C. 1988. The New Theoretical Movement. In N. Smelser (ed.), Handbook of Sociology, pp. 77-101. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: Sage. Elias, Ν. 1978. The Civilizing Process. Vol. 1: The History of Manners. New York: Pantheon.

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Lemert, C. 1981. Reading French Sociology. In C. Lemert (ed.), French Sociology: Rupture and Renewal Since 1968, pp. 3-31. New York: Columbia University Press. Ross, D. 1991. The Origins of American Social Science. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press. Skinner, Q. 1985. The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press. Smelser, N. 1988. Introduction. In N. Smelser (ed.), Handbook of Sociology, pp. 9-19. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: Sage. Tocqueville, A. d. [1835] 1969. Democracy in America, vol. 2. Garden City: Anchor. Vidich, A. J. and S. M. Lyman 1985. American Sociology: Worldly Rejections of Religion and Their Directions. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wallace, W. L. 1988. Toward a Disciplinary Matrix in Sociology. In N. Smelser (ed.), Handbook of Sociology, pp. 23-76. Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: Sage. Weber, M. [1904] 1949. Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy (1904). In E. Shils and H. Finch (eds.), The Methodology of the Social Sciences, pp. 50-112. New York: Free Press.

Notes on Contributors

Martin Albrow, born 1937 in Norwich, England, Professor of Sociological Theory, University College, Cardiff, 1976, Emeritus Professor of the University of Wales, 1990, teaches at the Roehampton Institute, London. A former President of the British Sociological Association, he is founding editor of the International Sociological Association's journal International Sociology, and sociology adviser to the British Universities Funding Council. Recent works include Max Weber's Construction of Social Theory (1990), and (edited with E. King) Globalization, Knowledge and Society (1990). Erik Allardt, born 1925, Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Helsinki 1953, Research Assistant at the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University 1954, Professor of Sociology at the University of Helsinki 1958-1991, Vice President of the European Science Foundation since 1990, Chancellor at the Äbo Akademi University since 1992. Major research interest: Comparative political sociology. Publications: Drinking Norms and Drinking Habits (1957); (with Stein Rokkan) Mass Politics (1970); About Dimensions of Welfare (1973); Implications of the Ethnic Revival in Modern Industrialized Society (1979); (with S. Lysgaard and A. B. S0rensen) an evaluation of Swedish sociology, Sociologin i Sverige (1988). Raymond Boudon, born 1934, is Professor at the University of Paris, Sorbonne (Paris IV). He is member of the Institut de France (Academie des Sciences morales et politiques), of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and of the Academia Europaea. He has published notably: Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality (1974); The Logic of Social Action (1981); The Unintended Consequences of Social Action (1982); Theories of Social Change: A Critical Appraisal (1986); The Analysis of Ideology (1989); (with F. Bourricaud) A Critical Dictionary of Sociology (1989); The Art of Self Persuasion (1990). Christian Fleck received his Ph.D. in philosophy and sociology from the University of Graz (1979). He is Associate Professor at the Institute for Sociology of the University of Graz and Director of the Archiv für die Geschichte der Soziologie in Österreich (AGSÖ) (Archive for the History of Sociology in Austria) since 1987. His recent publications are in the field of the history of sociology in Austria: Rund um 'Marienthal'. Von den Anfängen der Soziologie in Österreich bis zu ihrer Vertreibung (1990). He is co-author (with H.G. Zillian) of Die verborgenen Kosten der Arbeitslosigkeit (1990), a sociological field research on unemployment.

226

Notes on Contributors

Tamäs Kolosi, born 1946 in Budapest, received his Ph.D. in 1974, and became a doctor of Sciences in 1985 at Eötvös University, Budapest. He is Professor of Sociology at Eötvös University and Director of The Social Science Information Centre (TARKI). His numerous publications include: (with M. Haller and P. Robert) Social Mobility in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Class Structure in Europe (1990); recent articles: "Stratifikation und Lebensbedingungen in Ungarn" (1990); (with R. Andorka and G. Vukovich) "Social Report 1990". Wladyslaw Kwasniewicz is Professor of sociology at the Jagiellonian University of Krakow, Poland. His main fields of research include social stratification and mobility, migration, urban and rural sociology. He has held numerous important positions in the Polish sociological community. He was Chair of the Sociological Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences, member of editorial boards of different Polish sociological journals and has served as government expert on several occasions. His current main research interest is: The role of the intelligentsia in the period of post-communist transition. He has published extensively, mostly in Poland, but also in some foreign journals. Carlo Mongardini is Professor of sociology at the University of Rome (La Sapienza). His research interests are in the field of the history of sociology; sociological theory; political sociology; and the sociology of culture. He is head of the scientific committee of the Premio Europeo Amalfi per la sociologia e le scienze sociali. His recent publications include Saggio sul gioco (1989); llfuturo della politica (1990); Profili storici per la sociologia contemporanea (1990). Richard Münch, born 1946, is Professor of sociology at the Heinrich-HeineUniversity of Düsseldorf. Several times he served as Visiting Professor at the University of California, Los Angeles. His recent publications include Theorie des Handelns (1982, 1986); Theory of Action (1987); Understanding Modernity (1988); Die Struktur der Moderne (1984, 1992); Die Kultur der Moderne (1986); Dialektik der Kommunikationsgesellschaft (1991). Birgitta Nedelmann is Professor of sociology at the Johannes GutenbergUniversity of Mainz, member of the Academia Europaea and of the scientific committee of the Premio Europeo Amalfi per la sociologia e le scienze sociali. She held academic positions at the University of Lund, Sweden, the European University Institute in Florence and has been a Fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg of Berlin. Her research activities are in the field of comparative political sociology; sociological theory; and the sociology of Georg Simmel. Her publications include: Zur Parteienentstehung in Schweden (1866-1907) (1971); Rentenpolitik in Schweden (1982); and numerous articles on Georg Simmel. Helga Nowotny is Professor and Head of the Institute for Theory and Social Studies of Science at the University of Vienna and since 1992 Permanent Fellow at the Collegium Budapest. She obtained her Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia

Notes on Contributors

227

University, New York, and holds a doctorate in law from the University of Vienna. Main research activity: Social studies of science and technology; sociology of time; social sciences in Europe. Most recent publications: (with A. Evers) Über den Umgang mit Unsicherheit (1987); Eigenzeit (1989); (with W. Krohn and G. Küppers) Self-Organization - Portrait of α Scientific Revolution (1990). More than 100 articles in scientific journals. Lawrence A. Scajf received his Ph.D. at the University of California at Berkeley, and he is currently Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at Pensylvania State University. He has written extensively on social theory and political thought, and he is the author of Fleeing the Iron Cage: Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber (1989). His current work focuses on the history of modern social theory and the politics of the intellectuals. Ivan Szelenyi is Professor and Chair of the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Corresponding Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He is co-author (with G. Konräd) of The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (1979), author of Urban Inequalities under State Socialism (1983) and Socialist Entrepreneurs (1988). The last book was cowinner of the 1989 C. Wright Mills award. He has published articles in the American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, Theory and Society, Politics and Society, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, and in other journals. Piotr Sztompka is Professor of sociology at the Jagiellonian University of Krakow, Poland. He has been a visiting professor at numerous foreign universities, including Columbia, UCLA, Ann Arbor, Bologne and Rome, and has held fellowships at Berkeley, Harvard, Oxford and Uppsala. He is member of the Academia Europaea, of the Polish Academy of Letters and Sciences (PAU) and of the scientific committee of the Premio Europeo Amalfi per la sociologia e le science sociali, and co-chair of the Research Committee on Theory (RC 16) in the International Sociological Association. His books include: System and Function (1974); Sociological Dilemmas (1979); Robert K. Merton: An Intellectual Profile (1986); (with J. Alexander) Rethinking Progress (1990); and Society in Action (1991). Ken'ichi Tominaga, born 1931 in Tokyo, graduated from the University of Tokyo, where he also got his Ph.D. He was Lecturer (1962-1966), Associate Professor (1966-1977), and Professor (1977-1992) at the University of Tokyo. Presently he is Professor at Keio University. His fields of research are: Sociological theory; modernisation and social change; economic sociology; and empirical studies of social stratification. His publications (in Japanese) include: A Theory of Social Change (1965); Dynamics of Industrial Society (1973); Economic Sociology (ed. 1974); The Structure of Social Stratification of Japan (ed. 1979);

228

Notes on Contributors

Positivism and Idealism in Social Sciences (1984); Principles (1986); Modernisation and Social Change in Japan (1990).

of

Sociology

Index of Names

Abercrombie, Ν. 87 Abramowski, Ε. 169 Aczel, G. 147 Adler, Μ. 103, 105 Adorno, T.W. 7,51 Alapuro, R. 134 Albrow, M. 3,9-11,13,16 Alestalo, M. 133 Allardt, E. 10, 14-16 Althusser, L. 48, 86, 131 Anchersen, Η. P. 119 Andorka, R. 148, 155-156 Andreski, S. 86 Andrzejewski, S. 19 Annan, N. 85 Aoyama, H. 201 Archer, M. 87 Aron, R. 27 Aruga, N. 197 Atoji, Y. 201 Aubert, V. 15, 128 Austen, J. 83 Bagehot, W. 194 Balibar, E. 48 Balzac, H. 35 Baudrillard, J. 48,86,134 Bauer, O. 103 Bauman, Z. 11,19,86,171 Beattie, J. 31 Beck, U. 7, 52-53, 59-60 Bell, D. 207-208 Bendix, R. 215 Bentham, J. 195 Bernstein, E. 121 Bertilsson, M. 134 Bibo, I. 145, 153

Birket-Smith, K. 121-122 Blau, P. 155 Blumer, H. 46 Bottomore, T. 87 Boudon, R. 5 - 8 , 1 3 , 1 5 , 4 8 Bourdieu, P. 2, 48, 112, 130, 135, 150, 158 Bourricaud, F. 48 Brunswik, E. 104 Brzezinski, Ζ. 1 Bucharin, Ν. I. 198 Bull, E. 120 Bungo 192 Burgess, E. W. 202 Burke, E. 70 Bühler - C . 104 - K . 104,106-107 Bystron, J. S. 165,184 Canetti, E. 39 Carlsson, G. 129, 132 Carlyle, T. 85 Celine, L. F. 39 Chalasinski, J. 171,182 Christie, N. 15, 128 Cicourel, A. 86 Collins, R. 46 Comte, A. 34, 39-40, 48, 99, 169, 177, 191, 193-194, 196-199, 201-202, 208, 217 Condorcet, A. 196, 198 Coser, L. A. 46 Crozier, M. 48 Cseh-Szombathy, L. 145, 148 Dahlerup, D.

134

230

Index of Names

Dahlström, Ε. 129 Dahrendorf, R. 11, 46, 86, 128, 205 Daimyos 192 Derrida, J. 48,86,134 Descartes, R. 196, 198 Dich, J. 120 Dilthey, W. 206 Duhem, P. 29, 34 Duncan, O. D. 155 Dunning, E. 87 Dürkheim, Ε. 4, 6, 27-34, 36-38, 40, 42-43, 45, 48, 83, 88, 102, 106, 127-128, 133, 191, 193-194, 196, 198-201, 203-204, 206, 208, 214, 217, 220 Ehrlich, Ε. 103 Einstein, Α. 42 Eisler, R. 102-103 Elias, Ν. 11,86-87,216 Eliot - G . 83 - T . S. 83 Elster, J. 15,131 Ely,R. 215 Endoh, S. 202 Engels, F. 121,197 Eötvös, J. 142 Erdei, F. 144-145, 147, 153, 156 Erikson, R. 133 Esping-Andersen, G. 133 Featherman, D. L. 155 Featherstone, M. 87 Ferge, Z. 148-151,155-157 Ferguson, A. 67, 82 Fleck, C. 10,12-15,17 Flora, P. 133 Foucault, M. 4 8 , 8 6 , 9 4 , 1 3 4 Fourier, F. 196 Frank, G. 144 Friis, H. 127 Frois, L. 192 Frykman, J. 135

Fukuzawa, Y.

193, 195, 208

Gadamer, H.-J. 87 Galeski, B. 171 Galtung, J. 15 Garfinkel, H. 46, 86 Geiger, T. 14, 21, 107, 124, 203, 206 Gellner, E. 87 Gerschenkron, A. 144 Giddens, A. 2, 11, 48, 87-89, 94, 130 Giddings, F. H. 194, 202 Gierek, E. 168 Giner, S. 86 Goldscheid, R. 103 Goldschmidt, V. 122 Goldthorpe, J. 48, 87 Gomulka, W. 168 Gorbachev, Μ. 207 Gouldner, A. W. 46 Granqvist, H. 122 Gronow, J. 131 Grünberg, C. 104 Gumplowicz, L. 18,101-103,105, 169, 177 Gurvitch, G. 206 Haavio-Mannila, E. 134 Habermas, J. 2 , 7 , 2 1 , 5 1 , 5 3 , 6 0 , 86-87, 130-131, 194, 206, 214 Haimos, P. 86 Hamm, B. 81 Hankiss, E. 158-159 Hansen, E. J. 133 Harsanyi, J. 145 Hartmann, L. M. 103 Hauser - A . 16,143 - R . 155 Hayek, F. v. 84 Hägerström, A. 123 Hegedüs, A. 17, 147, 149-153 Hegel, G. F. W. 7, 42, 49, 74, 206

Index of Names

Heidegger, Μ. 86 Heller, Α. 153 Heraclit 38 Hethy, L. 151 Hilferding, R. 103 Himmelstrand, U. 129,132 Hobbes, T. 83 Hobhouse, L. T. 194 Hochfeld, J. 171, 179 Hoggart, R. 85 Holter, Η. 134 Homans, G. C. 46, 203 Horkheimer, Μ. 7,51 Horthy, Μ. 144 Horton, R. 33 Hume, D. 83 Husserl, E. 86, 206 Huygens, C. 37, 42 Inglehart, R. 92 Israel, J. 129 Itagaki, T. 195-196 Jahoda, M. 13, 105, 107 Jansson, C. G. 129 Jäszi, O. 143 Jerusalem, W. 103 Johanssen, L. N. 133 Jones, 155 J0rgensen, J. 123 Kagoshima 192 Kaila, E. 123 Kaneko, E. 201 Kant, I. 33, 49, 89 Karsten, R. 122 Kaufmann, F. 105, 107 Kautsky, Κ. 121,131 Kädär, J. 147 Kelsen, Η. 104 Kemeny, I. 17, 148, 151 Klein, V. 86 Kloskowska, A. 171 Knies, K. 119

231

Kolosi, T. 10,16-19,151-152, 155-157 Konräd, G. 17,151-156,159 Krzywicki, L. 169-170, 178 Kuhn, Τ. S. 29,103,218 Kuhnle, S. 133 Kulcsär, K. 147 Kurauchi, K. 199, 206, 208 Kuznets, S. 112-113,116 Kwasniewicz, W. 9-10, 18-20, 22 Lacan, J. 86 Lakatos, I. 29 Landtman, G. 122 Lash, S. 87 Lazarsfeld, P. F. 12, 13, 100, 104-107, 110 Le Bon, G. 39-40 Leichter, Κ. 105 Lemert, C. 220 Lenski, G. 155 Lepenies, W. 14 Lepsius, M. R. 204 Levi-Strauss - C . 48 - L . 34 Levy-Bruhl, L. 31-32,39-40 Liljeström, R. 134 Locke, J. 33 Lockwood, D. 48 Löfgren, Ο. 135 Löwenthal, L. 215 L0chen, Y. 128 Luhmann, N. 2, 7, 21, 51-55, 112, 194, 206, 214 Lukäcs, G. 16, 143, 147, 153 Lukes, S. 87 Lundberg, G. A. 125, 127 Lutynski, J. 171,181 Lyman, S. M. 215 Lynd, R. S. 107 Lyotard, J.-F. 48 Lysgaard, S. 15, 128

232

Index of Names

Mach, Ε. 103 Mako, C. 151 Malewski, Α. 171 Malinowski, Β. 45, 170, 185 Manchin, R. 157 Mannheim, K. 11,16, 83, 86, 143, 194, 203-204, 206-209 Marcuse, H. 215 Markiewicz, W. 171 Markus, M. 153 Marshall, A. 27, 45, 204 Marx, K. 4, 6-7, 10, 28, 30, 36-38, 46, 49, 51, 84, 88, 121, 127, 131, 133, 145, 152, 169, 177, 193-194, 197-200, 206-207, 220 Matejko, A. 171 Mead, G. H. 89, 202, 217 Mennell, S. 87 Merton, R. K. 45-46, 203 Miliband, R. 48 Mill, J. S. 83, 85, 193-195, 197, 199, 208 Millar, J. 67 Mills, C. W. 46 Mises, L. v. 107, 200 Mongardini, C. 5,8-9,11 Montesquieu, C. d. S. 27, 67, 195-196 Moreno, J. 104 Morgenstern, O. 110 Mori, Η. 196 Munsterberg, Η. 215 Münch, R. 5-8, 22 Myrdal, G. 123 Naess, A. 123 Needham - J. 85 - R . 39 Neurath, O. 105, 107 Nietzsche, F. 50 Nisbet, R. 27 Nishi, A. 191, 193, 208

Nishimura, K. 205 Nowak, S. 171,181 Nowotny, H. 10, 12-15, 17 Odaka, K. 204 Olson, S. 133 Ossowski, S. 19, 149, 151, 171 0sterberg, D. 131 0sterrud, O. 134 Owen, R. 196 Pareto, V. 27, 30, 36-37, 45-46, 68, 106, 127, 133, 204, 214 Park, R. E. 202, 215 Parsons, Τ. 21, 27, 35, 45-46, 83, 89, 112, 194, 203-206, 209, 214 Pascal, Β. 196, 198 Perjes, G. 145 Permenides 38 Petrazycki, L. 169, 177 Phalen, A. 123 Podgorecki, A. 171 Poggi, G. 11,86 Polänyi, K. 16, 105, 143, 152 Popitz, H. 204 Popper, K. 84, 86 Poulantzas, N. 86, 131 Pribram, Κ. 104 Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. 45 Ranulf, S. 123 Rasmussen, K. 121-122 Ratzenhofer, G. 102-103 Renner, K. 103 Rex, J. 48 Ringen, S. 133 Rogoff Rams0y, N. 129 Rokkan, S. 15-16, 134 Roscher, W. 119 Rosenmayr, L. 109 Ross - D. 219-220 - Ε. A. 202 Rousseau, J. J. 195

Index of Names

Runciman, W. G. Russell, B. 85

84

Saint-Simon, C. H. d. R. 48, 191, 194,196-199, 208 Sakamoto, K. 196 Sarapata, A. 171 Sartre, J. P. 131 Scaff, L. A. 9,11,20-23 Schaff, A. 175 Schäffle, A. 102 Schelsky, H. 203 Schmoller, G. 119-120,124 Schumpeter, J. A. 7,41-42, 103-104, 113 Schütz, A. 105, 107, 206 Segerstedt, T. 125, 129 Shanin, T. 86 Shils, E. 100-101 Shimizu, I. 195, 197-199, 202-203, 208 Shinmei - 1 . 207 - M. 200, 202-203, 207-208 Simmel, G. 7-8, 11, 21-22, 36, 38, 46, 50-51,89,91, 102, 106, 191, 193-194, 200-203, 208, 217, 220-221 Small, A. 194, 202 Smelser, N. J. 2, 22, 216, 218-219 Sokolowska, M. 171 Sombart, W. 67,119,200 Sorel, G. 35 Spann, Ο. 104 Spencer, Η. 4, 40, 47, 82, 85, 88, 169, 177, 191, 193-198, 201, 208 Stammer, Ο. 203 Staniszkis, J. 158-159 Stein, L. v. 193-194, 197 Steinmetz, S. R. 107 Stendhal 35 Stuart Mill, J. 34 Sulek, A. 180

233

Sumner, W. G. 194 Sundt, E. 120 Suzuki, E. 199 Svalastoga, K. 14, 124, 127 Szabo, D. 145 Szacki, J. 19,171 Szalai - A. 145, 147 - E . 158-159 - S. 145 Szczepanski, J. 19,171 Szelenyi, I. 10, 16-19, 151-157, 159 Szechenyi, I. 142 Takata, Y. 199-200, 208 Takebe, T. 196-197 Tanabe, H. 196, 198-199, 208 Thatcher, M. 84 Therborn, G. 15, 131, 134 Thomas - K. 32, 34 - W . I . 180,202 Thompson, E. P. 85 Thörnberg, Ε. Η. 120 Tingsten, Η. 120 Tocqueville, A. d. 28, 38 Tominaga, Κ. 20-21 Touraine, A. 2, 48, 93-94 Toyama, S. 195-196 Tönnies, F. 34, 107, 193-194, 200, 203, 208 Treiman, D. 155 Trevor-Roper, H. 85 Turner, B. 87 Urry, J. 87 Uusitalo, H.

133

Veblen, T. 215 Verkko, V. 125 Vidich, A.J. 215 Vierkandt, A. 200, 206 Wallerstein, I.

46, 144

234

Index of Names

Ward, L. F. 194, 202 Waris, H. 120 Watsuji, T. 192 Webb - B . 121 - S . 121 Weber, M. 4, 6-7, 21-22, 27-28, 30, 32-38, 45-46, 50-51, 69, 83-84, 86, 88-89, 94, 105-107, 120, 127, 133, 152-153, 191, 193-194, 198, 200-201, 203-204, 206, 208-209, 214-215, 217, 220-221 Werblan, A. 175 Wesolowski, W. 19, 155, 171 Westergaard, J. 86 Westermarck, E. 122-123, 125 Wiatr, J. J. 19,171,175 Wiese, L. v. 200

Williams, R. 85 Willke, H. 7, 53, 60 Wilson, H. 83 Winiarski, L. 169, 177 Wittgenstein, L. 31 Worms, R. 102 Xavier, F. Yamaguchi

192 192

Zeisel, H. 13, 107 Zetterberg, Η. L. 129 Zeuthen, F. 120 Zilsel, Ε. 105 Znaniecki - Ε . Μ. 169 -F. 18-19,141,170-171,177-178, 180, 185