Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia (Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia) 3031062663, 9783031062667

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SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA

Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia Edited by Brendan Howe

Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia

Series Editor Brendan Howe, Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

This series focuses on the indissoluble links uniting security, development and human rights as the three pillars of the UN, and the foundation of global governance. It takes into account how rising Asia has dramatically impacted the three pillars at the national, international and global levels of governance, but redirects attention, in this most Westphalian of regions, to human-centered considerations. Projects submitted for inclusion in the series should therefore address the nexus or intersection of two or more of the pillars at the level of national or international governance, but with a focus on vulnerable individuals and groups. The series targets postgraduate students, lecturers, researchers and practitioners of development studies, international relations, Asian studies, human rights and international organizations.

Brendan Howe Editor

Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia

Editor Brendan Howe Graduate School of International Studies Ewha Womans University Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

ISSN 2947-5104 ISSN 2947-5112 (electronic) Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia ISBN 978-3-031-06266-7 ISBN 978-3-031-06267-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022, corrected publication 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

The original version of this book was revised: An acknowledgement section has been included in the frontmatter. The correction to this book is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_9

Acknowledgements

This project was supported by a Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI) grant on “Understanding Democratic Resilience: Social and Economic Elements” The authors would like to express their gratitude to the Palgrave Macmillan editorial team, to the reviewers for their very helpful and constructive comments, and to David Kim for his copy-editing and proofreading contributions.

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Contents

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Political Culture and Societal Exceptionalism: Challenges to Democracy? Brendan Howe Confucianism and Democratization in South Korea: A Comparative Perspective Baogang He Between the Internal Struggle and Electoral Rules Effect: The Challenges of Political Islam in a Democratic Indonesia Noory Okthariza

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Civil Society and Democratization in South Korea David Hundt

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NGOs and Democratization in Indonesia: From Co-optation to Collaboration Arya Fernandes

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From Poster Child to Poor Cousin? Expanding the Frontiers of Economic Democracy in South Korea Nancy Y. Kim and Hannah Jun

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CONTENTS

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Socio-Economic Conditions and Indonesian Democratic Support Puspa D. Amri

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The Societal Basis of East Asian Democracy Brendan Howe

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Correction to: Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia Brendan Howe

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Amri Puspa D. is Assistant Professor of Economics at Sonoma State University, and Research Associate at the Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies. Fernandes Arya is the Head of the Department of Politics and Social Change at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia. He Baogang is Alfred Deakin Professor and Personal Chair in International Relations at Deakin University in Australia. Howe Brendan is Dean and Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University, where he has worked since 2001. Hundt David is Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin University in Australia. Jun Hannah is Assistant Professor, and Director of Center for Global Social Responsibility, Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University. Kim Nancy Y. is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University. Okthariza Noory is Researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia. xi

Abbreviations

ABRI APBN ASN CCEJ CETRO CSIS CSO DPR EIU ELSAM FES GDP GEC GNI GNPF-MUI HTI IAIN ICEL ICMI ICW IHCS IMF JKN KCTU KKN

Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia Budget Openness State Civil Service Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice Centre for Electoral Reform Centre for Strategic and International Studies Civil Society Organisation Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives) Economist Intelligence Unit Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Gross Domestic Product Green Economic Caucus Gross National Income National Movement to Guard MUI’s Fatwa Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Islamic Religion Institutes) Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) Indonesian Corruption Watch Indonesian Human Rights Committee for Social Justice International Monetary Fund National Welfare Security Korea Council of Trade Unions Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism xiii

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ABBREVIATIONS

Komnas HAM KPK K-Pop KPPOD KPU LAN LAPOR LKPP LPSK LPSM MIP MPAS MPR MUI NGO NU OECD OGI OGP ORMAS PAN PB PBB PERDA PIB PID PKB PKI PKS PMB PNI PNU Pokja PP PPIIM PPP PR PSHK PSII PSPD PUI

National Commission Human Rights Corruption Eradication Commission Korean Popular Music Regional Autonomy Implementation Monitoring Committee General Election Commission State Administration Agency Aspiration Services and Online Complaints Procurement Policy Agency Witness and Victim Protection Agency Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat (Community Development Institutions) Most Important Problem Ministry of Public Affairs and Safety Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) Indonesian Ulama Council (Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) Non-Governmental Organization Nahdlatul Ulama Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Open Government Indonesia Open Government Partnership Law on Community Organizations Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) Participatory Budgeting Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party) Law on Producing Regional Regulations New Indonesia Party Democratic Islam Party Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) New Masyumi Party Indonesian National Party Nahdlatul Umat Party Security Sector Reform Working Group United Party Indonesian Islamic Political Party of Masyumi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) Proportional Representation Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy Studies Indonesian Islamic Union Party People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy Islamic Nation Party

ABBREVIATIONS

PUMI ROK SMEs TNI UNFREL WALHI WVS YLBHI

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Indonesian Muslim Nation Party Republic of Korea Small and Medium Enterprises Indonesian Armed Forces University Network for Free and Fair Elections Indonesia Forum for the Environment World Values Survey Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 5.1 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3

Parties’ electoral share from 1999 to 2019 election (list of parties represents the participants in 2019 only) Indonesia CSO sustainability index 2014–2019 Description of explanatory and control variables for the regression models Regression analyses of democratic support in 2019 Regression analyses of democratic support and inequality in 2019

43 96 134 137 140

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CHAPTER 1

Political Culture and Societal Exceptionalism: Challenges to Democracy? Brendan Howe

Abstract This chapter examines the role of society broadly defined in relation to democracy and democratization. It also considers the rise of alternative “Asian” conceptualizations and models of governance and their implications for democracy in practice. The three sections of analysis to be carried out in the main chapters of this volume are also introduced. These are, first, Confucianism, and Islam as communitarian challenges and implications for democracy. Second, the role of social movements. Third, socio-economic perspectives and distributive justice. Keywords Asian democracy · Indonesia · South Korea · Political culture · Society · Confucianism · Islam

B. Howe (B) Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, South Korea

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_1

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The Role of Society in Democracy The concept of democracy or “rule by the people” has assumed such a positive normative value and overlapping consensus among the members of the international community, that to be seen as criticizing its fundamental tenets (or being overtly “undemocratic”) is to be stigmatized as a social pariah. To be seen as deviating from its accepted tenets in practice is to invite the label of “rogue state” (Howe, 2020: 4). Indeed, democracy in general, and its liberal variant in particular, is almost universally proclaimed as the best form of governance. Lucian Pye (2010: 21) notes, therefore, that even the greatest enemies of democracy in practice, authoritarian governments, pay it the compliment of cynically labeling themselves as democracies, some as “people’s democracies” and others as “democratic republics” (or, we could add, the combined form of People’s Democratic Republic, which is of particular resonance in the Korean case). He asserts that this fact “is proof that in the modern world the legitimacy of governments depends upon an acknowledgement of the superior virtues of democracy” (Pye, 2010: 21). The Western liberal rights-based model of democratic governance has come to dominate globally. In part, this is due to the concentration of political and economic power in Western liberal democracies and because of the near hegemony of governance ideas that allowed Francis Fukuyama (1989) to declare an “end of history.” But it has also been due to the significant politics of convergence or the attractiveness of Western liberal democratic life to the peoples of other countries (Whitehead, 1996: 16). Nevertheless, as Pye has also pointed out, “while there have been no alternative visions of regime types to compete with democracy, the achievement of sustainable and genuinely liberal democracy has been difficult. The rhetoric of democracy has been easier to master than the practice” (Pye, 2010: 22). There are a number of challenges facing the implementation of the “ideal” Western liberal individualistic and rights-based model of democratic governance in practice. First, the focus on individual human rights leaves little room for the resolution of collective action problems required by modern governance. Suppose individual human beings are bearers of rights that “trump” all other considerations and must be jealously defended. In that case, as has been asserted by Ronald Dworkin (1977), this leaves little room for the necessary compromises in societal living.

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A second, related complaint is that the concept of rights is too onesided and individualistic, encouraging us to set ourselves apart from others and at odds with a society, state, or government that is constantly seeking to intrude upon or invade our rights, rather than recognizing the societal origins of rights, and the need to act virtuously with the good of the community in mind (Dagger, 1997: 3–4). This has been an ongoing concern and, as developed below, has been contested even within European polities since the times of Ancient Greece, in terms of the rights and duties of citizenship. The third criticism is that if we focus on these rights trumping all other considerations, it devalues those rights which are truly central to human existence, rendering a kind of normative fatigue on the one hand, and conceptual inflation on the other, where any issue must be framed in terms of inviolate human rights if the proponent wishes to be taken seriously. Thus, as Richard Dagger (1997: 4) says: “If everyone claims to have a right to everything, then the appeal to rights will become almost as meaningless as in Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature, in which everyone’s right to everything effectively leaves no one with a right to anything.” A fourth contestation is embodied in the claim that rights, rather than pre-existing societal arrangements, are actually socially constructed. Thus, each community generates a different concept of rights based on competing historical and cultural processes. This cultural relativism means that those from outside a community cannot judge the internal normative governance arrangements generated within. Civic virtue, under such conditions, amounts to abiding by the historically and culturally generated norms of the society, even if they go against one’s individual interests (Howe, 2017: 106). There are, therefore, both practical and normative shortcomings in systems of governance based on liberal individualism. In practical terms, collective living, actions, and governance require a degree of alienation of the individual autonomy championed by liberal individual human rights. As pointed out by Robert Audia (1998: 149): A democratic society cannot flourish if its citizens merely pursue their own narrow interests. If it is to do more than survive, at least a substantial proportion of its citizens must fulfill responsibilities that go beyond simply avoiding the violation of others’ rights.... The vitality and success of a democracy requires that many citizens—ideally all of them—contribute

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something to their communities and participate responsibly in the political process. The disposition to do these things is a large part of what constitutes civic virtue.

This concept of civic virtue as a prerequisite to the adequate functioning, or even survival of republican governance based on the collective will of the people, can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle championing political duties rather than rights. In medieval Europe, Thomas Aquinas influentially restated the Aristotelian concept of virtue as a good habit, which is a good quality of a person demonstrated by his actions and reactions over a substantial period. The rights versus duty debate was reborn during the enlightenment, and has perhaps reached its pinnacle in “republican” and “conservative” political movements and discourse in the Anglophone sphere of the world. For Aristotle, “The true student of politics, too, is thought to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws” [quoted in Ross, 2013: 1(13)]. For “one nation” Tories in England, all should strive toward the common good, sacrificing self-interest to it so that the nation as a whole can flourish in the face of international competition (Howe, 2017: 106). For American Republicans, the emphasis has been on stamping out individual greed and corruption, or “draining the swamp” to maintain a better-functioning polity. “Republican virtue” emphasizes the importance of educating citizens regarding the need to sacrifice a degree of self-interest to ensure the continuance of a political system that maximizes the collective good. Yet, given that the notions of “virtue” and “collective good” are both themselves inherently normative, it is not surprising that intellectual traditions emphasizing duties to one’s fellow man and to the collective have gone beyond the strictly practical, utilitarian, or even rule utilitarian demands of governance efficacy. Hence for Dagger (1997: 4), communities not only give meaning to our lives but also largely constitute our identities, and there is a danger that we become so preoccupied with our rights that we “lose sight of our responsibilities and the need to act virtuously, with the good of the community in mind.” Here then, we enter the realm of communitarianism. Communitarians address the necessity of attending to the demands of community alongside or prior to liberty and equality. In other words, we must pay attention to the shared practices and values within each society which constitute a

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distinct understanding of the common good, its generation, and its distribution, but also, society or community is itself a collective good which must at the very least be weighed against other rights. There are human rights, but due to the problem of the particularism of history, culture, and membership, the political community to which individuals belong, rather than uninformed external interference, is the best agency for their defense (Walzer, 1983: 5). For Michael Walzer (1985: 218), the political community (qua state) is the closest we can come to a world of common meanings as it is where language, history, and culture come most closely together to produce a collective consciousness. He (1983: 65) claims that: ...one of our needs is community itself: culture, religion, and politics. It is also only under the aegis of these three that all the other things we need become socially recognized needs, take on an historical and determinate form. The social contract is an agreement to reach decisions together about what goods are necessary to our common life, and then to provide those goods for one another.

The importance of societal considerations for the evaluation of and their relationship with democratic governance has a lengthy history. Aristotle differentiated between two forms of democracy, the perverted version being where the poor rules the state in their own interests. Polybius referred to this as “ochlocracy” or rule by the mob (Field, 1956: 279). John Stuart Mill (1972 [1861]: 277) was profoundly concerned that in replacing old elites with new democratic forms of government, we would merely replace one form of class rule with another; that of rule by the more numerous lower classes, perpetuating class conflict: The constitution would therefore still be liable to the characteristic evils of class government: in a far less degree, assuredly, than the exclusive government by a class, which now usurps the name of democracy; but still, under no effective restraint, except what might be found in the good sense, moderation, and forbearance of the class itself.

Even if the masses themselves are not perceived as undesirable or even evil rulers, there still exists the danger that the masses will allow the rise of undesirable or evil individuals. In particular, there is the perception that the gullible masses will allow themselves to be hoodwinked by unscrupulous demagogues. Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were both raised to

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power by essentially democratic means, and the ambition and ruthlessness of totalitarians soon subsumed the ideals of the French Revolution. Universal suffrage and a focus on individual rights-based governance can, ironically therefore, be seen as sowing the seeds of democratic calamity. Thus, for the Marquis de Condorcet (quoted in Baker 1975: 330), “[t]he equality of stupidity is not equality at all, for it does not exist between cheats and their dupes, and every society which is not enlightened by philosophers is deceived by charlatans.” Furthermore, he (quoted by Baker 1975: 334–35) seems to hold out little hope of the democratic process in itself being able to restrain such individuals through the rule of law, noting that the more that laws respect the rights of personal independence and natural equality, the more easy and terrible will they make the tyranny that ruse exercises over ignorance. These dire foretellings appear to be coming to fruition in some of the bastions of Western liberal democracy. The principles of democratic governance are increasingly seen as threatened by the rise of populism and radical right-wing political movements, as embodied by the election of Donald Trump in the US (and the toxic legacy of his defeat), the victory of Brexit campaigners in the UK, and similar political developments in Italy and Hungary (Rapoza, 2019). While Christian Lammert and Boris Vormann (2019) argue that the rise of populism in North Atlantic states is not the cause of a crisis of governance but its result, nevertheless, there is something of a consensus among notable scholars that Western liberal democracy faces unprecedented challenges (see inter alia Diamond, 2019; Toplišek, 2019; van Beek, 2019). Thus, even if there is a universal “ideal” of democratic governance, in practice there are trade-offs between normative and practical demands. There are also competing interpretations of implications for policy prescription, often determined by the political culture of individual polities. Finally, even in the Western tradition, the roles of civic virtue, individual duties, and the demands of the social and political community, maintain a vibrant counterpoint to the individualistic rights-based liberal tradition. Yet, as will be highlighted in the rest of this chapter, and further developed throughout this volume, the political culture of Asian polities has long been held uniquely resistant to Western liberal individualism. This resistance, or exceptionalism to an increasingly universal norm, is usually portrayed as being the result of community or society generated values. As will also be further developed, however, such resistance and exceptionalism has often been over-stated, and in any case does not

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preclude thriving democratic governance. Indeed, the chapters of this volume speak to the potential contributions to global democracy from polities in Asia as much as to the challenges democracy faces in the region.

Asian Alternatives Russian President Vladimir Putin has gone so far as to assert that so great are the challenges that Western liberalism is “obsolete” (BBC, 2019). Given his direct physical assault on the Ukraine in February 2022, as the latter tried to embrace Western liberalism, it seems that his antagonism toward this form of governance is deep-rooted and perhaps even pathological. Yet the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2021: 4) has noted that, while democracy has not been in robust health for some time, the global average score has now hit an all-time low. “The average global score in the 2020 Democracy Index fell from 5.44 in 2019 to 5.37” in large part, but not solely, as a consequence of government reactions to the COVID-19 crisis, and this is “by far the worst global score since the index was first produced in 2006” (EIU, 2021). In 2020, 116 out of a total of 167 countries evaluated (almost 70%) recorded a decline in their total score compared with 2019, with only 38 recording an improvement and the other 13 stagnating, with their scores remaining unchanged compared with 2019 (EIU, 2021: 5). Asian models of governance have long placed emphasis on the role of community, and upon the importance of civic virtue from the perspective of the duties citizens owe to one another and the wider society as a whole. Thus, traditionally, East Asia (including both the Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian subregions) has been viewed as a region where state prerogatives, as the definitive embodiment of political community and shared values, are seen to trump individual human rights. These characteristics can be seen as posing challenges to democracy, especially when conceptualization of the latter is formulated in accordance with liberal universalist principles. For example, Henry Nau (2002: 163) notes that the lack of full protection for civil liberties in Asia “reflects the significantly different traditions regarding the relationship of the individual to society. Nowhere in Asia is there a celebration of political individualism as we know it in the West, either in political thought or in historical events such as the Reformation or Enlightenment.” He further

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claims (2002: 164) that authority patterns “infuse all social relationships—in the family (Confucianism), in religion (Buddhism and Islam), and in the state (Shintoism).” Although perhaps no other region on earth is as culturally and socioeconomically diverse, opposition to Western liberal or universal cosmopolitan values emanating from East Asia has tended to be identified collectively as the challenge of “Asian values.” Broad resistance to encroachment upon state prerogatives does seem to be reflected in the day-to-day governance of the East Asian region (Khong, 1997). While the Asian values debate per se has run out of steam, and the paradigm defined as such has been discredited by association with authoritarian governments in Asia. Nevertheless, there remain clear differences in interpretation of governance principles (Howe, 2019: 184). Yet Asia has also been held up as a source of optimism for the future of the democratic project. According to Freedom House (2018), the Asia– Pacific region has been the only one, in recent years, to record steady gains in political rights and civil liberties: “Although it is home to China, where over half the world’s Not Free population lives, and North Korea, the least free country in the world, a number of Asia–Pacific countries have made impressive gains in the institutions of electoral democracy— elections, political parties, pluralism—and in freedom of association.” The EIU concurs (2021: 4 & 28), noting that the Asia and Australasia region has made the most democratic progress during the lifetime of the Democracy Index. Given that Australia and New Zealand have always been ranked as “Full Democracies,” this suggests that most of this democratic progress has been made in the Asian part of the grouping. The EIU (2021: 5) lists 11 changes of regime category globally, seven negative and four positive, with the only three countries (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) moving from the “flawed democracy” category to be classified as “full democracies” all to be found in the East Asian region as defined above. Asia gaining three new “full democracies” in 2020 and Western Europe losing two (France and Portugal) has been described as symbolic of the shift in the global balance of power from the West to the East, accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic (EIU, 2021: 6). Despite this optimism, however, democracy in the region still faces many challenges, often related to the exceptionalism of some of the societies within it and to political culture, broadly defined. Irrespective of the above-noted long-term progress, in its most recent incarnation, the

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Democracy Index, as applied to the region, actually fell by 0.05 (EIU, 2021: 4). When compared with the European region, Asia can still be seen as lagging behind the West in democratic terms, with only five “full democracies,” compared with Western Europe’s 13, and seven “authoritarian regimes” while Western Europe has none (EIU, 2021: 6). Indeed, with an average regional score of 5.62 in 2020 (the lowest level since 2013), it continues to lag behind North America (8.58), Western Europe (8.29), and Latin America (6.09), having declined significantly in 2017 and remained stagnant in 2018–2019 (EIU, 2021: 28).

Overview This volume, then, evaluates the interaction between society and democracy in two East Asian democracies, one from Northeast Asia, the other from Southeast Asia, in light of Nau’s assertions detailed above. First, South Korea is sometimes referred to as the most Confucian society on Earth (Korea Herald, 2012). Confucianism is seen as impacting all aspects of Korean society, maintaining a weighty relevance to all elements of human and social interaction in the country, from family, society, and language, to education, economic development, and national identity (Chung, 2015). As previously noted, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has recently regained recognition as a “Full Democracy,” and as such has outstripped the US, formerly seen as a democratic “shining light on a hill” but now merely a “Flawed Democracy.” Yet, it has done so just barely, being the lowest-ranked of the 23 full democracies (EIU, 2021: 9). Furthermore, the ROK has by far the lowest ranking on the political culture variable of any Full Democracy in the region, scoring noticeably lower on this democratic measurement criterion than on any of the others measured by the EIU (2021: 29). Second, we have the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, Indonesia. Despite perceived incompatibilities and a recent authoritarian past, Indonesia nevertheless, manages to maintain a young and flawed but vibrant democratic culture. A joint 64th in the EIU 2020 listing, Indonesia sits firmly in the middle of the pack of flawed democracies (EIU, 2021: 10). Yet global measurements and indexes often record a “two steps forward, one step back” progression of democracy in Indonesia, characteristic of Huntington’s warnings (1991) about the nature of democratic evolution, that every wave of democratization is followed by a more limited countering wave of authoritarianism.

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The World Values Survey (various years), for example, found that Indonesia fell into the category of ineffective democracy in the period of 2000–2006. From 2005 to 2013, Freedom House consistently rated Indonesia as a “free” country, yet in 2014 Indonesia was rated “partially free” (Freedom House, 2005 –2014). Indonesia also scores comparatively low on the political culture criterion. It is listed as having the joint-lowest score in this category among flawed regional democracies and a score dramatically lower than that achieved in all the other measurements (EIU, 2021: 29). Overall, democratization in the East Asian region is seen by some (often Western commentators) as a “grafting of democratic practices and institutions onto societies with an alternative cultural baggage, with different ways of organizing their economic life, with distinct answers to the question of who counts as ‘we the people’’’ (Bell et al., 1995: 2). Yet, as revealed in the chapters of this volume, even if regional polities have different conceptualizations of the relationship between society and democracy, this does not mean that East Asia is inherently antagonistic to the central tenets of democracy in practice. Although the political culture of regional polities can be seen as something of an exception to the liberal individualistic model that has come to dominate in the West, and through the extension of Western hegemony, in the wider “international community,” this does not mean that the region holds no promise for the furtherance of democratic governance. The book is divided into three sections comprised of pairs of chapters. The first section looks at how Confucianism interacts with democratic resilience in South Korea, compared with the societal role and challenge of Islam in Indonesian democracy. Confucianism (including neo-Confucianism) certainly plays a significant role in Korean society, but the relationship between Confucianism and democracy in the country is complex. Sungmoon Kim (2014: 2–10) notes that while democracy may, from a traditional Confucian communitarian perspective, be seen as the root of all “Western evils,” Confucianism and democracy are not mutually exclusive terms if one focuses on the political rather than philosophical perspective. Likewise, contemporary political Islam has at worst been seen as on a collision course with democracy with increased fundamentalism and radicalization, and at best as remarkably bound up with national boundaries and political communities rather than universal liberal principles (Esposito & Voll, 1996: 7). Yet Islamic parties played a major role in the democratic transition in

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Indonesia. That being said, Islamic parties themselves are also seemingly challenged by the forces of consolidation. The first pair of chapters, therefore, use a historical narrative approach to determine the extent to which Confucianism and Islam can be seen to represent antagonistic societal exceptionalism to democratic consolidation in, respectively, South Korea and Indonesia. They also consider the extent to which, however, fears concerning perceived antagonism are unfounded, and that these community characteristics can even be complimentary to democratic processes. The second section will conduct brief historical surveys of the role of civil society in Korean and Indonesian democratization and debates about the appropriate role for civil society after democratization. In particular, the various roles of civil society non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and popular movements will be highlighted in both countries. The underlying conception of democracy may, in fact, be reconstructed as comprising two interrelated processes: the struggles within institutions on the one hand and social movements on the other. In relation to these considerations, Wolfgang Merkel (2004: 35) has called for “meaningful democracy.” His concept of an embedded, constitutional democracy consists of “five partial regimes: a democratic electoral regime (A), political rights of participation (B), civil rights (C), horizontal accountability (D), and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of the democratically elected representatives (E)” (Merkel, 2004). Likewise, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (1989: 500) have attempted to reformulate the concept of civil society as the basis of democratic politics. On the whole, the findings are that due to a more robust history of participatory democracy, the relationship between civil society and the instruments of democratic governance is more complimentary in South Korea than it is in Indonesia where considerable distrust remains between the two sides. The final section looks at socio-economic conditions and distributive justice in relation to democracy in the ROK and Indonesia. The process of democratic transition itself is a source of considerable uncertainty and hardship. Some groups are bound to lose out, at least in the short term. Support for transition is only generated by the general optimism that ultimately all will benefit; the hope that even if this is not the case, then at least the majority will do so; and the common belief held by most, that they will form part of this majority.

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As pointed out by Geoffrey Pridham (1991: 5), such uncertainty may be exciting and creative, “but if it becomes too generally threatening, or if it lasts too long without fruitful outcome, then the chances of an authoritarian relapse becomes very great.” Stable democracy derives from roots in political culture but is shaped and nurtured, particularly in its early years, by the performance of the democratic regime (Diamond et al., 1995: 10). Despite dramatic regional economic success, there has also been an increase in economic inequality in many countries in East Asia, including the two case studies addressed in this book. Although the two chapters approach the central questions related to the relationships between democracy and economic performance from different methodological perspectives, and in relation to the different societal conditions in South Korea and Indonesia, the findings are complimentary. Namely that distributive justice, or rather lack thereof, challenges the support for democracy in both countries among those who perceive themselves to be among the lesser beneficiaries, while overall economic performance is correlated with support for those who govern regardless of their democratic credentials. Hence this volume addresses the unique political cultures of South Korea and Indonesia in terms of the extent to which they are supportive of or undermine democracy. It also, however, enquires about the extent to which they can be considered representative of Confucian and Islamic democracies, and more broadly, democratization in East Asia. While the volume finds that Asian communitarian perspectives as a whole, and specifically values associated with Confucianism and Islam are not perhaps the barrier to thriving democratic systems of government as commonly perceived, the overwhelming concern with economic development performance leads us to be less sanguine about support for democracy in the region.

References Audia, R. (1998). A Liberal Theory of Civic Virtue. Social Philosophy and Policy, 15(1), 149–170. Baker, K. (1975). Condorcet: From natural philosophy to social mathematics. University of Chicago Press. Bell, D. A., Brown, D., Jayasuriya, K., & Jones, D. M. (1995). Towards Illiberal Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan.

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Freedom House. (2013). Freedom in the World. https://freedomhouse.org/ sites/default/files/202002/Freedom_in_the_World_2013_complete_book. pdf Freedom House. (2014). Freedom in the World. https://freedomhouse.org/ sites/default/files/202002/Freedom_in_the_World_2014_complete_book. pdf Freedom House. (2018). Asia–Pacific. https://freedomhouse.org/regions/asiapacific Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18. Howe, B. (2020). Introduction: Democratic hopes challenges. Asian Affairs: An American Review, 46(2), 1–15. Howe, B. (2019). Human security, peacebuilding, and the R2P in East Asia. Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 7 (2), 183–218. Howe, B. (2017). Civic virtue: The rights and duties of citizenship. Philosophia, 18(1), 102–117. Huntington, S. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. University of Oklahoma Press. Khong, C. O. (1997). Asian values: The debate revisited. ‘Asian values’ and democracy in Asia. Proceedings of a Conference Held on 28 March 1997 at Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Japan. http://www.unu.edu/unupress/asian-values. html#DEBATE Kim, S. (2014). Confucian democracy in East Asia: Theory and practice. Cambridge University Press. Korea Herald. (2012, February 13). Does Confucianism have a role in Korea today? http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20120213001231 Merkel, W. (2004). Embedded and defective democracies. Democratization, 11(5), 33–58. Mill, J. S. (1972 [1861]). Of the extension of the suffrage. In H. B. Acton (Ed.) Utilitarianism, liberty, and representative government. J. M. Dent and Sons. Nau, H. R. (2002). At home abroad: Identity and power in American foreign policy. Cornell University Press. Pridham, G. (1991). Encouraging democracy: The international context of regime transition in Southern Europe. St. Martin’s Press. Pye, L. (2000/2010). Democracy and its enemies. In J. F. Hollifield & C. Jillson (Eds.), Pathways to democracy: The political economy of democratic transition. Routledge. Rapoza, K. (2019, January 9). Democracy in crisis: Has the west given up on democracy?” Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/ 01/09/democracies-in-crisis-has-the-west-given-up-on-democracy/#2fd9b0 681242

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CHAPTER 2

Confucianism and Democratization in South Korea: A Comparative Perspective Baogang He

Abstract The debates in the past have focused on the question of whether Confucianism is in conflict or compatible with democracy. In recent years there has been an attempt to go beyond these two conventional models and explore alternative ways of thinking. Sungmoon Kim, a Korean scholar has pushed the intellectual inquiry further in developing a hybrid model of Confucian democracy. This chapter examines the role of Confucianism in different stages of South Korea’s democratization and tests three intellectual models: namely, the conflictive, compatible, and hybrid approaches to the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. Of these models, special attention is given to Sungmoon Kim’s new theoretical hybrid model of Confucian democracy, followed

The author has used some materials from the previous two articles (He, 2010, 2020) with substantive revision, addition, and update. B. He (B) Deakin University, Geelong, VIC, Australia

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_2

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by my critique. While the chapter focuses on the case of South Korea, the discussion is framed and informed by a comparative perspective of Confucian Democracy to find and confirm general trends, as well as highlight patterns and political differences that the case of South Korea demonstrates. Keywords Confucianism · Democratization · South Korea · Confucian democracy · Hybridity

Introduction All major civilizations have confronted the challenge of democracy. To a certain extent, the connection between democracy and the main religious traditions is a testament to this. The connection is revealed through party platforms like the “Indonesian Islamic Union Party” and manifested on a grander scale with so-called “Islamic democracy.” Confucianism is no exception to this. In the last two decades, the term “Confucian democracy” has proliferated throughout South Korea and East Asia, with many books and hundreds of articles examining the multifaceted relationship between democracy and Confucianism (He, 2010, 2020). However, like Islamic democracy, the idea of a Confucian democracy is contested and subject to different definitions and interpretations in South Korea. In the political context of the failure of democracy in Iraq, Egypt, the Middle East, and Greece, the question of what is wrong with democracy has been vigorously discussed. In 2013, the National University of Taiwan organized a conference “A Symposium on Confucianism, Democracy and Constitutionalism: Global and East Asian Perspectives,” examining whether Confucian ideas and values could be a source of inspiration for reforming, improving, and enhancing Western-style liberal democracy. On May 14, 2014, the National University of Singapore organized a public forum where Professor Daniel Bell discussed whether Confucianism could save the world, whether China is rewriting meritocracy, and whether China’s promotion of Confucianism has a global impact. In contrast, Professor Joseph Chan held a pessimistic view that Confucianism itself must be saved first before it can save democracy. On November 20, 2015, Yale-NUS College organized a public debate on “How much democracy? How much meritocracy?” between Daniel Bell and Philip Pettit (2015).

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The debates in the past have focused on the question of whether Confucianism is in conflict or compatible with democracy. Huntington and many others work from a conflict model, holding that Confucianism is an obstacle to Chinese democratization. By contrast, scholars such as de Bary (1983), Nathan (1990), and Friedman (1994) have adopted a compatibility approach that points out elements in Confucian culture that are positive in relation to democracy. While both models are partially accurate, they are increasingly becoming inadequate when dealing with new political and social forces and new sets of questions concerning the relationship between democracy and Confucianism in South Korea. In recent years there has been an attempt to go beyond these two conventional models and explore alternative ways of thinking. Korean scholars (as well many other scholars from the US, China, and Singapore) have pushed the intellectual inquiry further. Sungmoon Kim, a Korean scholar, now teaching in Hong Kong, for example, has moved the debate on whether democracy is compatible with Confucianism to the new question: what “particular mode of Confucian democracy” is appropriate for East Asia (Kim, 2014: 247)? He also explores the question of what constitutes a hybrid model of Confucian democracy. The hybrid model accepts neither the conflict nor compatibility models and occupies a middle position. It examines how Confucianism and democracy can be hybrid at a normative level. It holds that the practice of democratization in South Korea is always a mix of Western and Confucian cultures (He, 2020). This chapter considers the role of Confucianism in the different stages of South Korea’s democratization and tests three intellectual models mentioned earlier: conflictive, compatible, and hybrid. Divided into three sections, the first section of the chapter offers an overview of the status of affairs of South Korean democracy and/or democratization. This provides an empirical foundation for subsequent discussions in Sects. 2.2 and 2.3. Section 2.2 describes the key characteristics of the three models with a practical test of each primarily in relation to South Korean democratization. Lastly, in Sect. 2.3, the discussion is focused on Sungmoon Kim’s new theoretical hybrid model of Confucian democracy. Here, I offer my critique and discuss ways to advance Confucian democracy studies. While the chapter focuses on the case of South Korea, its discussion of Confucianism and democratization in South Korea is framed and informed by a comparative perspective. This helps us understand the case of South

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Korea better, highlights patterns, and reveals critical differences between countries. South Korea is an exceptionally innovative society. Testament to this is the global reach of the Korean popular music genre and phenomenon known as “K-pop.” The groups such as Blackpink and BTS have amassed a large following in the West and won numerous international awards, currently making K-pop one of the most successful genres in the worldwide music market. We might say that South Korea’s achievement also comes to the fore with its theory and practice of hybrid Confucian democracy in the political arena. Other Asian countries, by contrast, have not fared as well in reviving or adapting Confucius traditions. Japan is highly conservative and inward-looking, and Confucianism even became taboo from 1945 to 2015. Vietnam has lost its Confucian legacy during the French colonization. Taiwan has downplayed Confucianism to reshape a new Taiwan identity despite the early call for Confucian “correction” of liberal democracy in the latter 1980s and early 1990s. Hong Kong has developed neo-Confucianism in the 1960– 1970s on the camp of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, but now its followers are only a few. In the 1980–1990s, Lee Kuan Yew promoted the Confucian idea of the philosophical sage who is capable of ruling. Now Singapore follows market principles to recruit top political leaders by offering public leaders the highest salaries in the world. Singapore’s promotion of Confucianism in the 1990s proved to be short-lived. In China, Mao Zedong rejected Confucianism in the 1960s; and even today Confucianism is not an official ideology despite many advocating Confucianism. China is now still under authoritarian control, which is clearly a constraint on theoretical innovation. Because the new theorization of South Korean Confucian democracy is such a standout case, it deserves special attention, as discussed in Sect. 2.3.

An Overview of South Korea’s Democracy In brief, South Korea has developed and practiced electoral, deliberative, and participatory democracy. These features afford us an opportunity to examine the role traditional Confucian culture has played in South Korean democratization. Democracy is commonly understood as a system of free and fair elections and majoritarian rule (Dahl, 1989; Przeworski et al., 2000).

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Following this conceptualization of democracy, we have observed a deepening of democracy in Northeast Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Mongolia). However, democracy is in trouble in many parts of South and Southeast Asia. South Korea best represents the deepening and consolidation of democracy in Asia. Having gone through several election cycles, South Korea proves that the smooth transition of power is achievable. In 2017, the impeachment of then-president Park Geun-hye and the peaceful turnover of political power marked a successful story in South Korean democracy. Notably, the democracy index of South Korea is now above 8 (out of 10), belonging to the category of full democracy. Elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia, the situation is much grimmer. Elections have placed in power nationalist, populist, and military-backed regimes, and in many countries, human rights are under threat. In Malaysia, hopes that the 2018 election had heralded a new democratic era were dashed when the vanquished former Barisan Nasional coalition returned to power despite lacking a clear parliamentary majority. Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021 reversed democratic reform and perpetuated large-scale atrocities on Rohingya people. Thailand remains largely under military rule (even after elections), while Cambodia and Bangladesh have both used extrajudicial means to restrict opposition movements and predetermine election outcomes. The populist President Duterte of the Philippines has become well-known for state-sanctioned human rights abuses as part of his war on drugs. South Korea has also embraced deliberative democracy, an ideal or approach that emphasizes deliberation among equals, which induces reflection and results in binding and legitimate decisions. South Korea has gone to great lengths to develop and improve critical aspects of deliberative democracy. Take, for example, deliberative polling, which South Korea has undertaken at a national level since it organized its first nationwide Deliberative Poll on real estate policy in June 2005. They have since held three other nationwide or city-level deliberative polls: one on unification in 2011, one on spent nuclear fuel in 2013, and one on the Shin-Gori nuclear reactors no. 5 and 6 in 2017. Scholars and policymakers are looking to establish a National Public Deliberation Committee for Deliberative Polling to deepen and institutionalize deliberative democracy in South Korea. Furthermore, they have proposed that the National Statistical Office conduct random sampling in future polls (Park, 2021). A precursor to deliberative polling in South Korea was participatory budgeting (PB), a form of local participatory democracy adopted in

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South Korea from the late 1980s onward due to public frustration over governmental waste. An early example was the 1989 Citizen’s Watchdog Committee on Government Budget Waste, which ran concomitant to the demand for increased governmental transparency and accountability in the newly democratized country. Throughout the 1990s, NGOs’ monitoring of budget policy and allocation began to be taken more seriously by the government, with organizations like the Budget Watch Network and Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice playing an important role in pushing for civic participation and budgetary accountability (Choi, 2009; Lee, 2016). As a result, democratic consolidation in South Korea has witnessed the active citizenship and the political dynamism of civil society (Hundt, 2022; Kim, 2006). The National Audit Office’s criticism of pork-barreling and the election of President Moo-Hyun Roh in the early- to mid-2000s further emphasized the transition toward fiscal transparency and public participation. The first to do so, in March 2004, was Buk-gu in Gwangju City, but the practice spread widely among local governments thereafter (Choi, 2009; Lee, 2016). In 2005 the Local Finance Act was revised, with Article 39 providing a legal basis that encouraged the participation of citizens in the budgeting process. In 2006, the Ministry of Public Affairs and Safety (MPAS) provided local governments with a guideline named “standards for Participatory Budgeting Ordinance.” In 2010, MPAS offered three PB frameworks that local governments could use as references. In 2011, the Local Finance Act was again amended, mandating that local governments adopt and implement PB. It stipulated specific guidelines for the implementation of PB but allowed flexibility in the operational structures, processes, and decision mechanisms that local governments could employ (Kim, 2016). In 2014 an amendment was passed that made it compulsory for local governments to attach citizens’ opinions to the budget draft. A 2015 study of the diffusion of PB ordinances in Korea from 2004 to 2014 showed that 228 out of 229 local governments had enacted PB ordinances, thus highlighting the extent to which PB had become an established norm in local government in Korea (Kim & Lee, 2016).

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Empirical Testing Conflict Model Chinese neo-Confucianism was first introduced to and promoted in Korea by the Goryeo Dynasty (918–1392) and then later adopted as an official ideology in the Joseon Dynasty (1392–1910). Prior to democratization in the 1980s, South Korean military leaders, such as Park Chung-hee, actively promoted a form of Confucianism against democratization. As Kim (1991) demonstrates, two negative elements of Confucianism— orientations of authoritarian statecraft and collectivist hierarchical behavioral traits—have been used by the political elite in their effort to maintain authoritarian rule and arrest the process of democratization. The East Asia Barometer Survey conducted in South Korea during February 2003 revealed that attachment to Confucian values makes it harder to reject authoritarian rule than to embrace democracy (Park & Shin, 2006). Comparatively speaking, in modern China, Yuan Shikai (袁世凯) used Confucianism to suppress democratic movements in the 1910s and restored the imperial system. Chiang Kai-shek also employed Confucianism to contain the trend toward democratization in mainland China in the 1930–1940s and in Taiwan in the 1970s. Xi Jinping often has used the terms and phrases of Confucianism in his speeches. Confucianism has become a source of cultural conservatism and has played out the same “Beijing Opera” of inhibiting democratic movement in contemporary China. Take an example of the Chinese Communist Party’s ban on “factional” activities. This denies the existence of any form of factionalism, on Confucian philosophical ground that politicians represent the interests of the whole community and factions seek to articulate only their own narrow interests at the expense of the broader general interest. In addition, the Confucian-inspired aversion to competition makes the Chinese hierarchy even more distrustful of factionalism. This leads to a concern for removing the causes of factionalism, which leads to the inexorable destruction of liberty. The conflict model was further confirmed in Singapore in the 1980s and 1990s when Confucianism was used to argue for Asian values and against Western democracy. Confucian respect for authority is seen not to favor an opposition movement, which is interpreted as an attempt to undermine authority in Singapore.

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Compatible Model In the wake of Korean democratization, the contemporary development of Confucianism in South Korea has been associated with the establishment of liberal democracy. Friedman (1994) thus argues strongly that the democratic transition and consolidation of democracy in South Korea have proved the validity of the thesis of compatibility between Confucianism and democracy. Friedman’s compatibility argument can be viewed as a kind of color matching subject to normative and individual variation. Often it is easy to identify Confucian terms that seemingly look like the notion of liberty or social contract to argue that there is a Confucian source for democracy. Indeed, democracy can be established in Confucian societies; but the argument about this compatibility based on the existence of democracy in Confucian societies needs qualification and interpretation. A new interpretation of this seeming compatibility reveals the complex and subtle relationship between democracy and Confucianism in South Korea. At least three factors explain their apparent compatibility. First, Confucian society has undertaken a dramatic transformation. The most crucial issue is whether Confucian cultural and moral character can be attributed to Korean democratization. Regarding this, O’Dwyer regards South Korea as “more or less liberal” and questions whether South Korea and Singapore can be regarded as a Confucian society. O’Dwyer also claims that the modern transformation of, and the plurality and diversity within South Korea and East Asia, cast doubt about the Confucian ability to offer a meaningful normative prescription for East Asia (O’Dwyer, 2019: Chapter 7). In 2005, only 0.2% of contemporary South Koreans identified themselves as adherents of Confucianism, but 29.2% considered themselves to be Christian according to the 2005 census. During the democratic transition, Christian groups were more active than Confucian groups in demanding democracy in the 1980s. Moreover, liberal intellectuals who pushed democratization in both South Korea and Taiwan received their education in the West. In the mixed cultures of Confucianism, Buddhism, Western Christianity, and democratic culture in South Korea, comparatively speaking, Confucianism played a minor role in facilitating democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea. Second, one significant but less emphasized transformation is the retreat of Confucianism as a state ideology from political life. The success of democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea depends on

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the separation of Confucianism from politics. This means that Confucianism does not openly interfere in politics and that Confucianism has retreated from politics (Significantly, as a precursor to this, Korea was the first country in East Asia to abolish the Confucian examination system in 1894). When the core value of Confucianism receded, a Confucian personal ethic indeed helped to build democratic institutions. In this way, Confucianism does not conflict with liberal democracy directly, and the transformation of Confucianism has converged toward democracy. Therefore, contemporary Confucianism can constitute a lesser obstacle to democracy than, say, Islam, where it retreats from politics, where Islam is still very much part of the political machinery. The above explanation is, however, a sort of subjective interpretation. Contrarily, there is an objective and institutional approach to the compatibility question by asking whether there is a fit between a particular “key” (“Confucianism”) and a particular “lock” (“democracy”). It can be argued that Confucian institutions such as the centralization of power in the hands of emperors or kings (the “keys”) are much less compatible with democracy (the “lock”) than Confucian ideas. The fact that the positive, not negative, liberty of Confucianism has been mentioned and stressed indicates a lack of institutionalized liberty in the Confucian tradition. In other words, there are many more conflicts and tensions between liberal democracy and Confucianism in the area of institutions than that of abstract ideas. There are two ways of approaching this dilemma to make democracy and Confucianism institutionally compatible: it is necessary to either change the “lock” or cut a new “key.” Take the example of Confucian institutional arrangements under the top-down appointment method. In its long history, China’s top-down appointment system never allowed people to become chiefs in their local hometowns or provinces to tame localism. This institutional arrangement directly contradicts the democratic institutional arrangement, allowing local natives to be local chiefs. Moreover, it is often the case that this is sanctioned through elections. Historically, in Guangdong, native candidates became county heads through popular acclaim and informal elections during the early months of the Republic period. Such a development worried Republican authorities, who intervened and returned to the direct appointment system in Guangdong between 1913 and 1920 (Fitzgerald, 2021). In more contemporary times, the first direct town election in 1998 in Buyun, Sichuan Province, China, witnessed a local

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native being elected as the head of the township. Li Peng, the then President of the National People’s Congress, stopped the direct township election, fearing that it would enhance localism and undermine the central government’s authority (He & Lang, 2001). In recent years, Beijing has resisted the direct election of the chief executive in Hong Kong. With its Confucian legacy, South Korea faced a similar challenge. South Korea, however, sought an innovative solution to institutional incompatibility issues by allowing the central authority of its political party to retain the power of nominating candidates. Thus, unlike the Chinese solution to stop or suspend elections, South Korean politicians continue to hold elections and respect all the elections. However, the central authority can maintain political control through a nomination process regardless of whether the candidates are local or not. Clearly, the Confucian institutional arrangement of the direct appointment system is incompatible with the democratic institution. To address this incompatible question, while China has stalled elections, South Korea has found and implemented a real institutional solution: holding regular elections, but the center retains the power of nomination. Third, center–peripheral relations come into play. The South Korean version of peripheral Confucianism found it much easier to adapt to and then adopt the cultural and political changes than Chinese indigenous Confucianism. In South Korea, Confucianism can be more easily given up and discarded because such abandonment does not carry with it issues of national pride, Confucianism having been “borrowed” from China in the first place. Thus, Korea was the first to abandon the examination system in East Asia, and Korea is now taking the lead in synthesizing liberalism and Confucianism in East Asia. It has been much more difficult and slower for indigenous and orthodox Confucianism in China to accommodate democratic institutions than it was for the peripheral Confucianism of Korea. In summary, the compatibility argument does not disprove the conflict model at all. Instead, one may argue that the seeming compatibility is plausible simply because the core areas of conflict between democracy and Confucianism have been overcome by cultural transformation, the retreat of Confucianism into private life, and institutional innovation in South Korea. Therefore, the compatibility model supports some aspects of the conflict model at a deeper level.

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The Hybrid Model Early in South Korean democratization, scholars promoted a “bad” hybrid model of Confucianism and developmentalism. As Han and Ling (1998) pointed out, “authoritarianism takes on a hypermasculinized developmentalism that assumes all the rights and privileges of classical Confucian patriarchy for the state while assigning to society the characteristics of classical Confucian womanhood: diligence, discipline, and deference.” However, with the consolidation of the South Korean democracy, Korean scholars hold fresh insights into the mix of Confucianism and democracy. Sungmoon Kim discusses the new hybridity of political culture: a civic culture is “socially democratic yet (public-) culturally Confucian.” The former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung was known for using his Confucian moral principles to remonstrate authoritarianism, to espouse the Christian value of forgiveness, and to promote liberal social welfare policy. Kim Dae Jung, who challenged authoritarian rule and facilitated democratic transition in South Korea, serves as an example of a hybrid democrat in action. In the area of political culture, Confucian legacies have been mixed with a strong liberal rights culture. Korean citizens have constantly used liberal rights to fight against corrupt political leaders in large-scale public demonstrations. Public consultations and deliberative polling in South Korea demonstrate the hybrid practice of Confucianism with deliberative democracy. There is also a particular form of hybridity in national and local politics in South Korea; that is, national democracy co-exists with a strong local Confucian culture in Andong, the center of Confucianism since the ascent of the Joseon Dynasty. China has also been making persistent efforts to combine Confucianism with democratic values and systems in the past. Based on the Western idea of three divisions of power and drawing on Confucian traditions, Sun Yat-sen in the 1920s developed the idea of five divisions of power in his constitutional design adding the Examination Yuan which is responsible for the nation’s civil service system, and the Control Yuan which is the highest watchdog organization of the state exercising powers of impeachment, censure, and audit. Liang Shuming in the 1920–1940s attempted to integrate democracy into the program of village reconstruction and advocated the neo-Confucian model of democracy characterized by the combinations of Western notions of rights and liberty with the Chinese emphasis on responsibility and ethical education, and of Western

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majority rule with Chinese ethical rationality, while criticizing Western individualism and substituting it with advocacy of communitarianism (Ip, 1991).

New Korean Theorization of Confucian Democracy This section will examine the hybrid model of Confucian democracy further and offers an intellectual critique of the new Korean theorization of Confucian democracy. For this purpose, I use Sungmoon Kim’s intellectual work as a theoretical case study. While others might regard Kim’s work as not representative of Korean scholars because Kim has been living away from South Korea for an extended time and is now based at the City University of Hong Kong, I would like to provide the following: justifications. First, Kim was born and raised in South Korea, receiving a BA degree from Yonsei University. His Korean name, given by his grandfather, carried with it a strong Confucian heritage. Second, Kim’s writings have utilized his Korean experiences of democratization in developing his theory. To some extent, his theory reflects the Korean democratization process as a whole. His writings on public reason Confucianism and the importance of political participation and civil society in Confucian democracy, for example, have drawn on heavily from the case of South Korean democratization. Third, although he has been away for a considerable length of time, Kim has close contacts in South Korea; his research center has received generous funding from South Korea for its research on comparative political philosophy, particularly on Confucianism. There are two further reasons as to the choice of Kim’s theory of Confucian democracy. First, his work represents a new direction in Confucianism democracy studies principally. As he explains, he hopes to democratize Confucian doctrine by giving East Asian citizens (not just scholars) reason to rethink their Confucian heritage from a democratic perspective (Kim, 2018: 79). Kim’s theoretical position contrasts some Chinese scholars who push the Confucian-centric approach into an extreme position, arguing that the refusal of democracy is interpreted as a necessary way of defending a Confucian way of political life. Suppose China promotes a new political order primarily based upon a non-elected legislative body of Confucian scholars and the contested notion of Way as an alternate source of legitimacy. In that case, this might constitute a

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new source of civilizational conflict. Second, Kim’s books on Confucian democracy, together with the works by Tu Weiming, Daniel Bell, and many others, help promote the globalization of Confucianism. They are a part of global Anglo-American intellectual movements in which O’Dwyer (2019: xiv) “recommends Confucian thought as a source of global insight into moral and political philosophical problems beyond East Asia.” Sungmoon Kim has developed a systematic theory of Confucian democracy in his famous trilogy—Confucian Democracy in East Asia, Public Reason Confucianism, and Democracy after Virtue. In Confucian Democracy in East Asia, Kim criticizes Confucian communitarianism and Confucian meritocratic theory and offers his model of Confucian democracy, which is culturally relevant and socially practicable in South Korea and East Asia. He advocates “moral criticism and rectification of government” and is based upon a set of Confucian public reasons such as “filiality (xiaoti 孝悌), trustworthiness (xin 信), social harmony (he 和), respect of the elderly (jinglao 敬老), and respectful deference (cirang 辭 讓)” (Kim, 2014: 90, 284). The political philosopher Daniel Bell (2015) has developed a new political perspective about the ideal of Confucian democratic meritocracy to reconcile democracy and Confucian meritocracy. In contrast to Bell’s elitist model of Confucian democratic meritocracy, Sungmoon Kim argues strongly against “meritocratic elitism” because it is based on a cynical view of the ability of citizens to choose their leaders wisely. For him, pluralist societies need not only know how to establish moral leadership but how to accommodate “multiple moral goods” (Kim, 2014: 126). Beyond the Confucian elitist tradition, Kim advocates a citizenbased approach to democracy. Confucian political theory should aim to improve the public life of citizens in East Asia and should be “acceptable to citizens themselves” (Kim, 2018: 191–193). Kim argues that Confucian meritocratic theories need to reject the old-fashioned paradigm of ruling by virtuous leadership. Instead, Confucian democracy must rely on the actions of virtuous citizens, such as their capacity to exercise their rights through remonstration or protest. The previous discussion of the development of participatory democracy in South Korea lends empirical support for Kim’s position. In Public Reason Confucianism Sungmoon Kim departs from Joseph Chan’s moderate Confucian perfectionism and develops his theory of “public reason Confucianism.” He defines public reason Confucianism as “a Confucian way of life,” an embodiment of core Confucian values

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as filial piety and ritual propriety. It offers a normative vision and is the most attractive option for South Korean societies that are historically and culturally Confucian. It is also a particular style of Confucian democratic perfectionism. Its perfectionism is achieved through a distinctive form of public reason and an active role that the democratic state plays in promoting a Confucian way of life (Kim, 2016: 139–140). Drawing on the case study of traditional clan membership from the Korean Supreme Court, his theory of public reason Confucianism is deeply rooted in South Korean society. Moreover, the empirical case demonstrates the persistent influence of Confucian virtues and legacies in the Supreme Court. Additionally, regarding traditional clan membership that excludes the membership of women, Sungmoon Kim (2016) offers a normative guide to reconcile the traditional values of filial piety and the modern constitutional right of gender equality. In Democracy after Virtue, Sungmoon Kim aims to build a more robust moral and intellectual foundation and developing a normative theory of Confucian democracy. The book takes on the ambitious task of reconstructing pragmatic Confucian democracy, which integrates three components—political participation, the value of democracy, and procedure and substance (Kim, 2018: Chapters 1–3). Kim addresses the “shaky ground” upon which the works of Joseph Chan and Daniel Bell stand (Kim, 2018: 49) via criticizing Confucian theorists of meritocracy for understanding democracy simply in terms of elections while ignoring democratic political participation. He also criticizes Confucian perfectionists for “leaving important political decisions to few political elites” (Kim, 2018: 35). However, he understands political participation as a core value of democracy and integral to any robust theory of Confucian democracy. Kim’s conception of democracy reflects “the pragmatic institutional coordination of complex social interactions under the circumstances of modern politics” (Kim, 2018: 51–52); and it is on pragmatic grounds as it continues and sustains the Confucian civilization and successfully addresses the issue concerning moral pluralism in East Asia. Furthermore, Kim argues that the Confucian model of democracy “has and ought to have both instrumental and intrinsic values” (Kim, 2018: 16). Democracy was introduced as an instrumental value but was slowly institutionalized and internalized as a non-instrumental one when democracy was in the stage of consolidation in South Korea (Kim, 2018: Chapter 2). Kim’s synthesis of instrumental and intrinsic values can be

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understood well from his personal reflection of the democratization experience in South Korea. Kim also criticizes the Confucian perfectionist view of democracy for failing to establish a connection between substance and procedures (Kim, 2018: Chapter 3). Kim, therefore, develops a detailed argument about the intimate connection between Confucian substance (perfectionist ends like meritocracy) and democratic procedure (Kim, 2018: 17). Beyond Confucian virtue, “Confucian democratic rights” are understood both as an outcome of democratic procedure and as “perfectionist goods to be pursued by the Confucian democratic state” (Kim, 2018: 108). In other words, as the title suggests, Confucian democracy comes after virtue in the sense that it is beyond traditional Confucian virtue (Kim, 2018: 10). His theory of Confucian democracy is fully grounded in modern notions of equal citizenship, political participation, and democratic means of resolving conflicts of interests (Kim, 2018: 10). Kim’s theory of Confucian democracy also considers some practical issues like state coercion and criminal publishment, people’s sufficiency, and humanitarian intervention (Kim, 2018: Chapters 4–6). Kim provides a Confucian justification for why communitarian consideration on matters of punishment is needed (Kim, 2018: Chapter 4). When crimes undermine Confucian filial piety, ritual propriety, ancestor worship, and harmony, thus threatening the moral foundation of one community, this act “justifies enhanced punishment for such crimes” (Kim, 2018: 18). Kim also sees distributive justice in terms of the doctrine of sufficiency. In rejecting the thesis that “inequalities of wealth and income beyond the threshold of sufficiency do not matter if they reflect different degrees of deserts” (Kim, 2018: 18), he reconstructs a theory of Confucian democratic sufficiency to be understood as equal access and opportunity (Kim, 2018: Chapter 5). Ultimately, Kim discusses the justification of humanitarian intervention at both the domestic and international levels. Following Bell’s justification of the Confucian style of intervention in terms of being led by virtuous leaders and liberating the oppressed people under a tyrannical ruler, Kim adds that humanitarian intervention “must be justified to and widely endorsed by the members of a political community” (Kim, 2018: 180). Sungmoon Kim’s trilogy of Confucian democracy has promoted Confucianism as a global idea with a global audience (not necessarily assuming Korean audience) and addressing global issues. However, globalized Confucianism is not enough since it needs to tackle local problems and establish local connections. Therefore, Confucian democracy studies

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need to be sensitive to how the theories of Confucian democracy connect to national and local politics and identities. In particular, they should consider the tensions between local and global identities of Confucian democracy. Historically, China, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have long fought among themselves over the authenticity of Confucianism. Confucianism is now, however, increasingly seen to be the sole identity of mainland China, with Hong Kong and Taiwan recently in the process of de-Confucianization. Curiously, the last century also saw a decline in Confucianism across East Asia with the end of the domination of Confucian script in cultural life. However, Confucianism had been revived again in the latter part of the twentieth century to promote a common East Asian regional identity. Therefore, future studies should also investigate whether Confucian democracy at an institutional level can inhibit or promote regional identity in East Asia. One urgent question that Confucian democracy studies must address is how Confucianism can move out of the traditional role that has been used to justify the power of emperors so that it can avoid being an instrument of neo-imperial expansion. Furthermore, the future of Confucian democracy studies needs to take a problem-driven approach. One serious problem associated with Confucian democracy studies is the retreat into theory; it engages scholarly discussions on the theoretical issues of democracy regarding Western scholars and writings without addressing actual real-life problems in the relevant countries. No matter how impressive a theoretical synthesis might be, there is a deep reason for engaging practical issues: one immediately finds, for instance, that the main political actors, in South Korea, for example, seldom mention Confucianism; and surprisingly, a “Confucian democratic party” was absent in South Korea. The more scholars indulge in a purely theoretical framework without addressing real, local issues or problems, the less relevant Confucian democracy theories are to the concrete processes of democratization in South Korea and East Asia. Future Confucian democracy studies must also address a set of new practical challenges and issues. For example, how can a Confucian democratic meritocracy deal with the populist problems in Western societies? How can Confucian democracy studies adequately address the problem of electoral incompetence? How can Confucian democracy remedy the ineffectiveness of deliberative democracy? How can Kim address egalitarian problems in the West and deal with the challenge from Bell and Wang’s (2020) “just hierarchy” while they defend the principle of

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equality? Confucian democracy must answer these questions satisfactorily and pass empirical tests; otherwise, “Confucian democracy” will remain empty or, at best, an inspirational thought exercise. This brings us to the methodology of Confucian democracy studies. Kim’s advocacy of the empirical method should incorporate an institutional approach to the modern transformation of Confucian institutions, the institutional designs of Confucian democracy, and the institutional configuration or manifestation of Confucian democracy. Unfortunately, the term “institution” does not appear in Kim’s Democracy after Virtue. His works would have benefitted from developing an institutional approach to Confucian democracy. For example, if Kim had examined Confucian remonstration institutions concerning official and/or public deliberation, it would have enriched the debate on Confucian public reason (He, 2014). Kim’s theory of public reason Confucianism would have benefitted from a detailed examination of one particular issue: traditional Confucian hierarchical culture has inhibited the development of genuine deliberation in the practice of deliberative polling in South Korea. O’Dwyer also challenges Kim’s conception of Confucian public reason, a fundamental foundation of Confucian democracy. According to O’Dwyer, empirically moral psychological traits of Confucian public reasoning like “chong” (familial affectionate sentiment) or “uri” (weness) “may just as plausibly be construed as essentially contested concepts.” Moreover, as Kim’s conception of public reason requires, citizens must “vigorously and voluntarily embody the Confucian mores and habits” even if they are committed to diverse conceptions of the public good. Thus it “risks imposing morally taxing burdens” on these citizens (O’Dwyer, 2019: 225). Moreover, if Kim had examined the urgent issue in the recent decade of universal suffrage in Hong Kong, this would have provided an empirical basis for his new theory of pragmatic Confucian democracy. The ideas currently taking center stage in the philosophical imaginations of Confucian democracy must address issues in the real world. Therefore, any model of Confucian democracy ought to be empirically based, having at least one or more institutional mechanisms, and above all, having an institution-based platform.

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Conclusion This chapter has examined the complex relationship between Confucianism and democratization in South Korea by testing conflictual, compatible, and hybrid models of Confucian democracy theory through the case study of South Korea’s democratization. Each model reveals one relationship between Confucianism and democracy and plays different roles in the process of democratization, with advantages and disadvantages to each. Empirically, the conflict model is much more accurate than the other models. However, it is mainly valid and relevant today. It can even apply to the other two models; all models have some element of conflict or tension between Confucianism and democracy. The use of the conflict model emphasizes the tension, causing the rejection of Confucianism and defense of Western standards of democracy. The drive is to implement Western democratic ideas and institutions without compromise and distortion. Nevertheless, the conflict model overstates the negative role of Confucianism and overlooks the option of compatibility, consequently downplaying the likelihood of a Confucian contribution to democratization and blinding one to the prospect of a hybrid model. It is unproductive if one insists on conflict and argues for “giving up on” Confucianism. Instead, it could be productive if one treats conflict as a source of creation to find ways to manage and reduce conflicts. The compatibility model has its strengths: it leads us to look at the rich resource of Confucianism in favor of democratic enterprise, helps us create a constructive transformation of Confucianism, and lays down fertile ground for the hybrid model. However, it may “distort” both Western and Chinese democratic ideas in terms of subjective interpretations. While the compatibility model celebrates the seeming congruence, it takes for granted the assumption that Confucian culture will converge with Western democracy. The co-existence of democracy and Confucian society in South Korea has depended on the three conditions: cultural transformation, the retreat of Confucianism into private life, and institutional innovation in South Korea. In addition, under the seemingly smooth combination of democratic and Confucian elements, there are still subtle tensions in South Korea. The hybrid model goes beyond the conflict and compatibility models by examining the mixed practices occurring in the real world, describing

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and reflecting the complex reality adequately. The hybrid model aims to combine different elements of Confucianism and democracy to produce something suitable for national or local conditions. In this model, actors often interpret how best to devise and choose institutional embodiments for democracy according to national or local conditions. This is the creative aspect of this approach. Sungmoon Kim has pursued a variety of hybrids between Confucianism and democracy at a normative level; however, most hybrid models remain at the point of intellectual advocacy. Although his theorization of Confucian democracy represents a new effort to democratize Confucian discourse and globalize Confucianism, the hybrid model lacks clarity with respect to how different elements operate. It does not provide strong empirical evidence of the working mechanisms. Perhaps, the future Confucian democracy could consider the best proportion of the different ingredients from each culture, across different times and places, to meet the different needs of each localized society.We ought to ask what the best proportion of the different ingredients from each culture for different times and places is. Moreover, given the variety of hybridity, evaluating such diversity is a challenging intellectual enterprise. Perhaps, behind the hybrid, there are still some tensions between democracy and Confucianism. Future Confucian democracy studies require more empirical and institutional approaches to real-world issues. This empirical-based institutional approach must have a primary place in Confucian democracy studies. No matter how compellingly one idea of Confucian democracy presents itself, it must be subject to empirical and institutional testing. Sometimes an attractive idea is merely a reflection of wishful thinking. While a creative approach to Confucian democracy is indeed needed to develop new imagination ahead of the empirical world, in the end, it still needs empirical testing to find out whether such a desirable idea is feasible in real life.

References Bell, D. (2015). The China model: Political meritocracy and the limits of democracy. Princeton University Press. Bell, D., & Pettit, P. (2015). How much democracy? How much meritocracy? 20 November 2015. Accessed August 16, 2016. https://www.yale-nus.edu. sg/events/president-speaker-series/daniel-bell-philip-pettit-a-debate-on-howmuch-democracy-how-much-meritocracy/

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Bell, D., & Wang, P. (2020). Just hierarchy: Why social hierarchies matter in China and the rest of the world. Princeton University Press. Choi, H. D. (2009). Participatory budgeting in Buk-gu, Korea. Focus on Citizens: Public Engagement for Better Policy and Services (pp. 135–141). OECD Publishing. Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press. de Bary, W. T. (1983). The liberal tradition in China. Chinese University Press. Fitzgerald, J. (2021). Cadre nation: Territorial government and the lessons of imperial statecraft in Xi Jinping’s China. The China Journal, 85, 26–48. Friedman, E. (1994). Democratization: Generalizing the East Asian experience. In E. Friedman (Ed.), Politics of democratization: Generalizing the East Asian experience (pp. 27–28). Westview Press. Han, J., & Ling, L. H. M. (1998). Authoritarianism in the hypermasculinized state: Hybridity, patriarchy, and capitalism in Korea. International Studies Quarterly, 42, 53–78. He, B. (2010). Four models of the relationship between confucianism and democracy. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 37 (1), 18–33. He, B. (2014). Deliberative culture and politics: The persistence of authoritarian deliberation in China. Political Theory, 42(1), 58–81. He, B. (2020). Whither confucian democracy studies. Political Theory, 49(2), 9. He, B., & Lang, Y. (2001). China’s first direct election of the township head: A case study of Buyun. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 2(1), 1–22. Hundt, D. (2022). Civil society and democratisation in South Korea, to be included for this volume. Ip, H.-Y. (1991). Liang Shuming and the idea of democracy in modern China. Modern China, 17 (4), 481–487. Kim, K.-D. (1991). Social and cultural developments in the Republic of Korea. In T. W. Robinson (Ed.), Democracy and development in East Asia (pp. 37–154). AEI Press. Kim, S. (2006). Civil society and political action in democratized Korea: Revamping democratic consolidation from a participatory perspective. New Political Science, 28(4), 527–546. Kim, S. (2014). Confucian democracy in East Asia: Theory and practice. Cambridge University Press. Kim, Soonhee. (Ed.). (2016). Participatory governance and policy diffusion in local governments in Korea: Implementation of participatory budgeting. Korea Development Institute. Kim, Sungmoon. (2016). Public reason confucianism: Democratic perfectionism and constitutionalism in East Asia. Cambridge University Press. Kim, S. (2018). Democracy after virtue: Toward pragmatic confucian democracy. Oxford University Press.

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Kim, S., & Lee, J. (2016). Participatory budgeting adoption and diffusion in Korea. In S. Kim (Ed.), Participatory governance and policy diffusion in local governments in Korea: Implementation of participatory budgeting. Korea Development Institute. Lee, J. (2016). Participatory budgeting system in Seoul, South Korea. Participedia, 2016. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://participedia.net/en/ cases/participatory-budgeting-system-seoul-south-korea Nathan, A. (1990). The place of values in cross-cultural studies: The example of democracy and China. In P. Cohen, & M. Goldman, (Eds.), Ideas across cultures: Essays on Chinese thought in honor of Benjamin I. Schwartz (pp. 293– 314). Harvard University Press. O’Dwyer, S. (2019). Confucianism’s prospects: A reassessment. SUNY Press. Park, C.-M., & Shin, D. C. (2006). Do Asian values deter popular support for democracy in South Korea? Asian Survey, 46(3), 341–361. Park, J. (2021). Deliberative democracy in South Korea: Four deliberative polling experiments. In B. He, M. Breen, & J. Fishkin (Eds.), Deliberative democracy in Asia. Routledge. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Chiebub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and development: Political institutions and wellbeing in the world, 1950–1990. Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Between the Internal Struggle and Electoral Rules Effect: The Challenges of Political Islam in a Democratic Indonesia Noory Okthariza

Abstract While recent research on political Islam in Indonesia suggests the growing influence of Islamic political power, the contemporary development also exposes the rarely discussed shortcomings of political Islam. This chapter makes the case that the challenges Islamic political groups face come primarily from themselves. Although they managed to display a robust showing on some occasions, it is shown that the power of Islamic groups has largely been tamed and stagnated. It explores two possible outcomes: the hurdle in maintaining their organizational coherence and the involvement of party leaders in corruption scandals. Additionally, the applied electoral system has contributed to driving Islamic parties more at the fringe, although they maintain to play representative roles in a limited way.

N. Okthariza (B) CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_3

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Keywords Political Islam · Internal coherence · Corruption · Party system

Introduction As a country where nearly 90% of its population is Muslims, Indonesia will likely have a perennial problem finding a proper balance regarding the relationship between the state and religion. Although the Indonesian constitution does not explicitly adhere to any religions nor stipulate any specialties on Islam, several distinct religious-inspired aspirations have never disappeared within Indonesia’s political landscape. These conservative aspirations, at times, do not easily fit with the Indonesian democratic system. And when they do not, they may spur societal grievances at the very least. While the growing influence of Islamic political power has been evident in recent years, many studies have yet to qualify how strongly it will persist in the coming years. This is quite surprising given how often this issue arises in the debates about the place of Islam or political Islam within the democratic context. The subject of religious intolerance may serve as the focal point in this regard, but it contains various related issues around it, such as the controversies over the implementation of local religious law, discrimination and suppression toward religious minorities, smeared political campaigns in elections, up to systemic bigotry at schools (Sebastian & Arifianto, 2020: 1; Soedirgo, 2018: 195–197). This is undoubtedly not an exhaustive list, but I submit that we need a more practical understanding of the systemic and dormant threats concerning Islamic political power to gauge this issue more thoroughly. This chapter sought to understand the current dynamics of political Islam in Indonesia, which, for many, has regained its vigor. By situating the discussion with the past insights from pre-reformasi Indonesia along with some key occurrences in recent years, it argues that the true power of the Islamic movement remains tamed at best, despite having managed to display a sparse yet surprisingly strong showing on several occasions. As we will explore, the reasons for this subjugated performance largely came from the failing effort of Islamic groups to maintain their internal coherence, as well as several wrongdoings from Islamic party’s leaders

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that led to discredit their reputations and hurt their performance electorally. As it proceeds, this paper also accounts for the “two-sword” effects of Indonesia’s electoral system on the performance of Islamic political parties. The term “political Islam” here refers to the movement or concrete political practice representing mobilization and aspiration in the name of Islam, which is used in the modern political context (cf. Roy, 1994: viii). Therefore, we denote Islamic groups as those who employ electoral means such as political parties or the loosely organized methods as in social movements. However, more emphasis will be given to the former.

Situating the Debate One of the most frequent themes arising in the aftermath of the fall of Suharto is how to best understand the prevalence of political Islam. Soon after Suharto’s stepped down, the discourse about the “return” of Islamic clout in Indonesia’s political landscape seemed quite evident. Many believe that the growing number of Islamic political parties in the first post-Suharto election in 1999 would bring serious ramifications for the future of the Indonesian state. Of 48 registered parties competing in the 1999 election, at least 20 were Islamic-oriented parties (Azra, 2004: 140). It is important to note that not all these parties formally adopted Islam as their parties’ base. Some just displayed their support for Islamic values substantively but not in legalistic terms. However, this number showed significant attainment for Islamic groups, given during the Suharto administration, there was only one Islamic party allowed to compete in the elections. This spike was also followed by the emerging discourse on the relationship between the state and religion. The idea to formally acknowledge the sharia law through the constitutional amendment, for instance, came once again to the fore. This debate originated in the early days of the founding of the republic in 1945. It was eventually resolved by what many considered a “vogue compromise” between the Islamist proponents and nationalist leaders (Elson, 2009: 113). Yet, throughout the country’s history since independence, such debate has episodically transpired. Nevertheless, the first post-reformasi election results seemed sufficient for observers wishing to foresee the Islamic political bearings. Taken together, all 20 Islamic political parties earned only 37.1% of votes in 1999. This is slightly less than the total votes attained by the two Islamic

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parties—Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)—in the country’s first election of 1955, which stood at 39.3%. The best Islamic party performer back in 1999 was PKB that mustered 12.6% of the vote, far less than what Masyumi achieved in the 1955 election with 21% of the vote. Moreover, the push to reassert the provision of sharia into the constitution was unsuccessful. Instead, the four constitutional amendments ratified in the early political transition have no bearing on religious matters. We followed the conventional wisdom in classifying Islamic political parties in Indonesia; there were at least two major ways to identify a party as “Islamic” (cf. Baswedan, 2004; Miichi, 2015). The first is parties that display strong Islamic appeals and openly state that Islam serves as their ideological base in their official documents. Currently, there are at least three parties that fit this definition well: PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), PPP (United Development Party), and PBB (Crescent Star Party). However, if we extend the period to the 1999 election, we find some other parties in this camp, such as the United Party (PP), the Indonesian Islamic Political Party of Masyumi (PPIIM), the Islamic Nation Party (PUI), and the New Masyumi Party (PMB) (Azra, 2004: 140–141). The second category is parties that retained Pancasila, the state ideology, as their parties’ base. Yet, they utilize Islamic symbols as their core identity and preserved their votes primarily among their Muslim electorates. These parties lean toward conservative policies regarding religious issues but only moderately support the implementation of formal Islamic law. To date, there are two parties that subscribe to this category, PAN (National Mandate Party) and PKB (National Awakening Party). But again, the earlier years of political transition in the late 1990s and 2000s saw the emergence of these types of parties such as the Democratic Islam Party (PID), the Indonesian Muslim Nation Party (PUMI), Nahdlatul Umat Party (PNU), and the New Indonesia Party (PIB). In the subsequent elections, the performance of Islamic political parties generally underwent stagnation, if not a downward trend. With the exception of the 2004 election, whose total votes hovered around 35%, the combined votes of the five parties (PKS, PPP, PBB, PAN, and PKB) consistently hovered around 29–31% (Table 3.1). However, if we disaggregate the votes between Islamist and Islam-inclusive parties, their vote percentages are quite comparable as well. The votes earned by both groups in the last three elections were approximately 15%. This suggests that both Islamist and Islam-inclusive parties may have roughly an equal number of supporters. Again, the exemption in 2004 was attributed

6.8 10.2 6.8 1.4 2.81 0.87

71.99 28.01 11.01

7.1 12.6 7.1 1.4 1.94 1.01

69.86 30.14 10.44

64.8 35.2 18.2

8.2 10.6 6.4 7.3 2.62 1.26

18.5 21.6 7.5

59.48 40.52 21.42

10.6 9.5 9.6 8.2 2 0.18

19.8 23.1 10.2

Seat (%)

71.11 28.89 14.99

5.3 7.9 6 7.9 1.79 0.90

14.0 14.5 20.9 4.5 3.8

Vote (%)

2009–2014

69.8 30.2 17

6.8 5.0 8.2 10.2

16.8 18.9 26.4 4.6 3.0

Seat (%)

68.64 31.36 14.76

19.0 14.8 10.2 11.8 5.3 6.7 6.5 9.0 7.6 6.8 1.46 1.91

Vote (%)

2014–2019

68.7 31.3 14.1

19.5 16.3 10.9 13.0 2.9 6.3 7.0 8.4 8.8 7.1

Seat (%)

Note Nationalist parties: PDIP, Golkar, Demokrat, Gerindra, Hanura, Nasdem, PKPI, Perindo, Berkarya, PSI, Garuda Islamic parties: PAN, PKB, PKS, PBB, PPP Islamist parties: PKS, PBB, PPP

30.6 24.0

33.7 22.4

Vote (%)

Vote (%)

Seat (%)

2004–2009

1999–2004

19.33 12.31 7.77 12.57 1.54 9.05 4.52 9.69 6.84 8.21 0.79 0.22 2.67 2.09 1.89 0.50 69.94 30.05 13.52

Vote (%)

2019–2024

70.25 29.74 12

10.26 3.30 10.09 7.65 8.70

22.26 14.78 9.39 13.57

Seat (%)

Parties’ electoral share from 1999 to 2019 election (list of parties represents the participants in 2019 only)

PDIP Golkar Demokrat Gerindra Hanura Nasdem PPP PKB PAN PKS PBB PKPI Perindo Berkarya PSI Garuda Nationalist Parties Islamic Parties Islamist Parties

Party

Table 3.1

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mainly to a dramatic increase of the PKS’ vote from 1.4% in the 1999 election to 7.3% five years later. Some credited this increasing vote to the efficacy of the party in changing its exclusive image to be a more inclusive appeal (Tanuwidjaja, 2012: 535), while others maintained that it has to do with a wide range of social and volunteerism activities that the party did in the lead up to the election (Hamayotsu, 2011; Machmudi, 2008). But since then, the PKS’ performance had stagnated within 7–8% of votes, whereas the other two Islamist parties have experienced a downturn. Along with the votes made by Islam-inclusive parties, this combination makes up the number of votes earned by Islamic parties since 2009 were approximately one-third of the total votes. To be sure, these seemingly stagnated votes coming out of Islamic parties are by no means to say that Islamic political clout has been restrained. In analyzing Islamic political phenomena, one might want to disentangle between what was seen on the ballot and what might be the actual embodiment of Islamic politics. Tanuwidjaja (2010), for instance, argues that the declining support from Islamic parties does not necessarily reflect the abating weight of Islamism. He explains that the voters might not find a clear difference between the Islamic-based and non-Islamic parties regarding their stances toward socio-religious policies. He illustrates this point by exposing the making of local regulations (Perda) at subnational levels. While the Islamic parties’ attitude on these regulations was predictable, in many instances, the initiator or the major proponents of such regulations turned out to be nationalist parties such as Golkar and Demokrat. Using Buehler’s term (2008: 256), this indicates the “changing patterns of power accumulation” at the local level wherein the local officials found the mechanism to exert and maintain their power through religious by-laws. Buehler’s (2016: 1) extensive research on this issue found that from 1998 to 2013, there had been at least 443 sharia-inspired regulations adopted at subnational levels in Indonesia. The tendency toward an increasing conservatism in the political realm draws parallels in recent anthropological and historical works. Van Bruinessen’s article on Indonesian Islam in the dawn of the twenty-first century (2013: 1) implies that there had been a break from the kind of “modernist and broadly supportive of the government’s development program” during the New Order to a more puritanical form of Islam nowadays. He labels this as the “conservative turn,” which suggests how recent developments on Islamism exhibit a number of stronger

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Islamic expressions happening in the public sphere. The most visible manifestations of these perhaps were the issuance of controversial fatwa (authoritative views on the matter of religious importance) by the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (MUI) and the MUI’s indirect roles in shaping up the term of debate over a wide range of legislation process, e.g., through the discourse on the laws on national education and on pornography. In addition, among the most problematic fatwa in early 2000s was, e.g., the fatwa against the teaching Muslim minorities of Ahmadiyah and the strong rejections to the ideas of liberalism, secularism, and pluralism. Another notable example was the contest between the NU and Muhammadiyah on the one hand—both were the two largest Muslim organizations—and the transnational Islamic movement as in Tarbiyah and Hizbut Tahrir on the other hand. The Islamist party of PKS was broadly known as the embodiment of the Tarbiyah movement. The more challenging contest, however, seemed to be happening between the Tarbiyah and Muhammadiyah communities. Van Bruinessen notes how the number of mosques associated with Muhammadiyah was slowly taken over by the Tarbiyah activists, making it possible for the latter to gradually change the tone of the sermons and provide the space for their own preachers (p. 9). From a historian’s point of view, we may also understand that this Islamizing tendency resulted from profound political, social, and cultural changes long before 1999. In his influential work on the history of Islamization in Java, Ricklefs (2012) argues that the distinction between abangan (a person who practices a syncretic version of Islam) and santri (the more orthodox Muslim), as mentioned by Geertz (1976), was barely found after Suharto took power in 1966. Or, at least it is clear that the number of abangan had dwindled to a small minority since the second half of the twentieth century. This is different from earlier periods, especially since the last decade of Dutch colonialism and more so in the late years of Sukarno’s presidency. Pre-independence Indonesia was filled with rivalries between at least three allies that competed for influence. They were Islamist, Marxist, and nationalist groups. Under the Dutch and Japanese colonial power, the inherent and stark differences between the three were left aside. However, they became highly politicized and politically contentious after the republic was born, as seen in the ideological configurations in the first 1955 election. The three core ideological cleavages were then translated into the country’s party

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system. The Masyumi and NU parties represented the Islamic proponents, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) represented Marxism, and the Indonesian National Party (PNI) represented the nationalist zeal, which was considered close to the abangan group. Yet, these ideological formations did not hold for long. The failed coup led by the PKI in 1965 paved the way for the state to purge leftist ideology and its adherents. This development allowed only two significant groups to remain, Islamic and nationalist groups. The general convention is that the former was considered to be widely repressed politically under Suharto’s rule. This view has some merit; the Suharto regime forced the four existing Islamic parties (NU, Parmusi, PSII, and Perti parties) to fuse under the umbrella of a new party, the PPP, without being allowed to have an Islamic name. But, as Ricklefs argues, it is under Suharto’s years, Islamic values and spirits flourished. Knowing that any palpable political activities might have been monitored by and invoked the regime’s harsh response, the network of Muslim advocates chose to concentrate their activities in more amenable areas. These include investing further in basic education amenities, publishing books, and cooperating or expanding their reach to other Islamic organizations both within and outside the country. For some, the process of Islamization in pre-reformasi has been propelled more at the societal level instead of at the state level (Effendy, 2003; Ufen, 2009). These dynamics ensued simultaneously with the growing expansion of state-run higher Islamic education called IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri or State Islamic Religion Institutes). During their embryonic phase in the 1960s, many of these institutes were part of Muslim education foundations at the local level. They were then transformed from private status to public under the orders of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Several other new Institutes were then built and experienced a rapid increase during the 1990s. In addition, some works also mentioned the influence of Suharto’s changing personal piety in strengthening the bargain with Islamic politics (Elson, 2001; Hasan, 2008). In 1991, Suharto and his family went on the pilgrimage to Mecca and began for the first time to refer to himself as Haji Muhammad Suharto. One anecdotal report noted that it was not until the 1990s Suharto began to start his speech with “Assalamualaikum.” In all Suharto’s 40 speech scripts archived at the National Public Library, it appeared that none of the transcripts put that Islamic greeting which otherwise has been the standard norm for officials these days.

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These dynamics sustained and even strengthened the stream of Islamic ideas and social practices in the later years of Suharto’s presidency. Although one could argue that the tangible effects of these developments are hard to measure (as is true of any multifaceted social and cultural changes), one may notice a perceptible adjustment in terms of the increasingly accommodative policies from the government’s side toward the rising Islamic aspirations. In this regard, we noted the kind of pivoting or policy change from the regime regarding Islamic ideals, most notably during the 1980s and early 1990s (cf. Liddle, 1996; Van Bruinessen, 1999). The examples to back up this policy change were many and well documented in the Indonesian studies literature. The most obvious example was the establishment of the state-led ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim or Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), an organization led by B. J. Habibie—the then Suharto’s most favorite protégé—that consists of several prominent officials and former officials “previously regarded as hostile to Islamic political movements” (Liddle, 1996: 613). Among those who hold ICMI’s leadership positions included the commander of the armed forces, Try Sutrisno, the former vice president Sudharmono, several sitting ministers, prominent Muslim intellectuals and activists, and leaders of the existing three political parties. ICMI thus was nothing less than a body of complex major factions from which the New Order preserved its power in the late years of Suharto’s regime. Although it should be noted once again that this pivoting policy might be best understood as gradualism, it was adjusted as the regime saw a discernable tendency toward a more religious society during the second half of Suharto’s presidency. These complexities laid the foundation for an even more expressive and vigorous manifestation of Islamism once the political transition took place in 1999. Hence, the sudden spike in terms of the number of Islamic parties in the 1999 election was just one indication of this new phenomenon. An extreme manifestation of this growing Islamism was the series of terrorist attacks throughout the 2000s, among which the Bali Bombing was the most devastating of all. The prolonged sense of injustice felt by many who live outside Java also appeared to have imminent consequences. Several districts underwent communal violence that was very much unlikely to occur under the authoritarian regime. Some of this violence took advantage of the new political system brought up by the transition. Law number 22/1999 obliged the central government to transfer many key mandates

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to local polities, including the right to govern and control some of their local resources. With that law, Indonesia transformed from a highly centralized state into a decentralized political system from which the number of religious-inspired regional aspirations started to gain ground.

Tracing the Sources of Islamic Groups’ Lackluster Performances Although their influence appeared to have gained ground as Indonesia entered the new era post-1999, this chapter contends that political Islam remains unable to come together as a single voting bloc. The are several arguments for this: from a well-known different interpretation of “Islam” among Muslims, the cooptation by the state power, to the rising rivalries between various Muslim groups competing for resources and followers. However, from the standpoint of contemporary development, this chapter would argue that a series of misfortune and failure to maintain internal coherence are why this muted performance lay at the heart of internal struggle within Islamic politics itself. In 2016–2017, there had been a series of momentous rallies in the capital against the backdrop of Jakarta’s gubernatorial election. This election was between the Chinese-descent incumbent candidate Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama and Anies Baswedan, the former minister backed by most Muslim voters. While campaigning, Ahok—widely known as the government’s favorite—was considered to have committed blasphemy against Islam by citing a verse in Koran to pander to Muslim voters. This incident invoked a wave of great anger among Muslims that led to a series of unprecedented massive rallies, presumably the biggest Muslim protest to date, that led to his defeat and imprisonment. While some lauded this success as the new height of political Islam, it does not take long to understand the inherent brittleness of Islamic political power. As a result, the populism of the group was short-lived, and it perhaps prompted an aversion for many Muslims to join such rallies in the future. In what was later called the “212 Movement,” the rallies themselves were quite promising initially. They managed to bring together hundreds of thousands of people—the large of them coming from outside Jakarta— and put constant pressure on the current administration on many issues other than Jakarta’s election. Under the National Movement to Guard MUI’s Fatwa (GNPF-MUI) leadership, they repeatedly said they were a moral movement with no political purpose. Nonetheless, as citizens voted

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in Jakarta’s election in April 2017 and the movement leaders geared up toward the incoming presidential election in 2019, the seeds of internal rift became apparent. The leaders disputed over the future path of the movement, especially when it came to picking the presidential candidates they should support. The two presidential candidates, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, each claim they won support from the ulama. Jokowi, in particular, was paired with the prominent cleric as well as the chairman of MUI, Ma’ruf Amin. The MUI was the lead in the tandem of the GNPF-MUI during Jakarta’s election, and Ma’ruf himself testified as a witness in the court against Ahok. It is believed that the decision of Ma’ruf to switch sides with the incumbent candidate aggravated the internal cohesion of the 212 Movement and contributed to its increasingly politicized image to the public. It should also be noted that some of these current dynamics took place due to the government’s typical responses to political opponents since at least 2016. Jakarta’s election has been the watershed in determining the course of action taken by the government in this regard. In responding to these protests, the government took controversial measures by criminalizing political opponents. The night before the largest demonstration on December 2, 2016, the police arrested and brought treason charges against several senior activists who were believed to be key personnel connected to the movement. A few weeks later, another criminalization plan followed suit. The police advanced the criminal cases against at least four most prominent movement leaders, including Rizieq Shihab— the movement’s de facto leader—with many charges unrelated to the demonstration (Mietzner, 2018: 275). The peak of this spectacle was the controversial banning of Indonesia’s branch of Hizbut Tahrir (HTI), one of the country’s largest Islamist groups, without any judicial process. With the pretext to defense Pancasila, Jokowi issued the government regulation in lieu of law or “Perppu” that changed the 2013 law on social organizations. With this new regulation, the government can one-sidedly outlaw the HTI and other social organizations considered “incompatible” with Pancasila. All of these measures undoubtedly contributed to the lackluster performances of Islamist politics in later years, although one may argue that the way government dealt might not eliminate the populist impulses within Islamist ideology. The harsh measures may reinforce the longstanding belief among the Muslim activists that their fates have been marred mainly by the state’s politicization and repression. We learned in the previous section how

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Suharto forced the existing Islamic parties to fuse under one party only. This is not to mention many state-led incidents such as the Tanjung Priok and Talangsari massacres and the silencing of critical Muslim activists during Suharto’s era. Before that, Sukarno banned the largest and most prominent Islamist party of Masyumi in 1960. Coupled with what happened since 2016, it seems reasonable when Muslims attributed many of their misfortunes to the government’s intrusion. However, such a claim is unwarranted as it assumes that Islamic political power would have flourished in the absence of government interference. In what follows, we will understand that many drawbacks within contemporary Islamic politics occurred even if no such intervention existed. One instance to look at is how Islamic parties struggle to maintain the internal cohesion of their organizations. In the last four years, at least three out of five Islamic parties underwent an internal split. It is believed that competition for the party’s chairmanship became the point of contention. Although it might have been normal for the presence of faction divisions within parties, particularly during a critical time such as a party’s national congress, it seems that Islamic parties tend to have less reliable mechanisms to address leadership succession issues than their nationalist parties counterparts. Several examples include: (1) the disputes over leadership succession in PAN that pushed its founder to create the People’s Party (Partai Ummat ), (2) the disputes among factions within PKS, led by its former leader, which led to one group to form another party with the same base called the Gelora Party, and (3) the disputes in PPP’s chairmanship ahead of the 2019 election that led the party to be divided into two camps where both claimed to be a rightful party leader. Let’s examine these succession problems in greater detail. Earlier in 2020, the national congress of PAN was marred with internal fraying between the supporters of two candidates for the party chairmanship, Zulkifli Hasan and Mulfachri Harahap. The former was the current leader seeking reelection. In contrast, the latter was a candidate who earned support from Amien Rais, the party’s founder and the longstanding pillar in the party. The decision of leadership succession in PAN has long resided in Amien’s hand. Yet Zulkifli, former speaker of the People Consultative Assembly (MPR), was reluctant to follow Amien’s request to step down and instead chose to mobilize the party’s resources to fight against him. This move sparked a stern reaction from supporters of both sides. Finally, in a humiliating congress tainted with a fight between PAN’s members,

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Zulkifli secured the chairmanship position. Amien and his associates disregarded Zulkifli’s leadership and decided to form a splinter party, the Ummat Party. Unlike PAN, the Ummat Party was designed to appeal to a much broader swath of Muslim voters. The party has yet to participate in the election, but it is poised to erode future votes for the PAN. The factionalism in PKS was even more surprising. For a long time, PKS has been known for its disciplined and cohesive organizational structure. It is a cadre-based party and presumably the most institutionalized party in Indonesia in terms of “value infusion,” as proposed by Randall and Svåsand (2002: 10). Yet after the 2009 election, there had been an ongoing tension between the more conservative group and the pragmatist one within the party regarding the extent to which the party should open up itself to enlarge its traditional Muslim electorates. Several moves made by then-party leader Anis Matta, such as endorsing the granting of “national hero” status for Suharto and recruiting and supporting nonMuslim candidates for elections, found strong rejections from within. For years, these differences have been kept under wraps. However, it was not until Sohibul Iman took the party’s leadership position in 2015 that the presence of factionalism became much more apparent. Soon after he took power, Sohibul removed many of Anis’ loyalists from the party’s key positions, including Fahri Hamzah, Anis’ closest protégé and the then deputy speaker of the House. Fahri brought his dismissal to the court and sued Sohibul and his associates. He finally won out. Yet, the relationship between him and the current leaders of the PKS has reached an irreconcilable point. In the lead-up to the 2019 election, the Gelora Party, splintered from the PKS, was formed with Anis Matta as the president and Fahri Hamzah acting as its secretary-general. This case shows that even PKS, a party with the most cohesive structure in the country, could not resolve its internal factionalism. In PPP, the cause of the split began much earlier, taking root during the campaign season in 2014. The party’s two chairman candidates supported different presidential nominees. In a seemingly one-sided move in April 2014, Suryadharma Ali, the then-party leader, sided with Prabowo Subianto. This move stirred up protest from within the party’s body, led by Romahurmuziy (Romi), Ali’s deputy, who is leaning toward Jokowi. Romi and his allies gained momentum when Ali was hit with a corruption scandal while serving as the Minister of Religious Affairs. After Jokowi got elected in 2014, Romi enjoyed the upper hand over Ali, and he started to mobilize the party’s members to pick him as the next

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leader of PPP. He was elected by acclamation in the party’s congress in 2016. However, this victory did not eliminate tensions within the party. Instead, it has led Ali’s faction to convene and form a counter congress to elect its own leader. This is when Djan Faridz, one of Ali’s closest protégés, won the support and declared himself the rightful leader of PPP. The rivalry created an irreconcilable dual leadership, causing both sides to bring the case to the court. Indonesia’s Ministry of Law and Human Rights recognized Romi’s claim and formally legalized their standing. But Djan challenged this decision and won the verdict at the Supreme Court. The dispute between the two lasted until at least 2019. In the last election of 2019, given the years of conflict, the PPP had the poorest showing since its inception in 1973, mustering only 4.52% of votes (only slightly above the parliamentary threshold of 4%). If we stretch the time period, another Islamic party of PKB has had similar issues as well. In the early 2000s, PKB split into two, claiming to hold the legitimate leadership. The schism was between the former president’s camp, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Matori Abdul Djalil. The failure of the party to settle its disputes was resolved in the courts. In the end, Wahid seemed to regain control. Yet, a similar conflict ensued again in the run-up to the 2009 election, this time between Wahid’s supporters and his nephew, Muhaimin Iskandar. The court annulled Wahid’s decision to sack Muhaimin, and the verdict reinstated Muhaimin as the party’s rightful leader. Only after Wahid passed away in December 2009 did this conflict end with Muhaimin gaining complete control of the party by harnessing the emotions of its Nadhlatul Ulama-affiliated members (Fionna & Tomsa, 2017: 19). Apart from the failure of Islamic parties to maintain their cohesive structure, many of these parties have been involved in a number of corruption scandals. This is the second argument of why these days we remain to see the lackluster performance of Islamic politics. Although corruption in Indonesia has been widespread and is not exclusive to Islamic parties, it is understandable if voters tend to punish the religiousbased parties more when they know Muslim politicians are involved in such disgraces. And the consequence of this is that one corruption scandal at times became more sensationalized than it should have been. This is precisely what happened when the former president of PKS, Luthfi Hassan Ishaaq, was charged as a suspect for corruption by the country’s anti-corruption agency (KPK) in 2013.

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Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (2004–2014) cabinet, PKS held three Ministerial positions. Among them was the Ministry of Agriculture whose minister was known to be Luthfi’s loyalist. Luthfi was accused of influencing beef import quota fixing at the Ministry. He was indicted for receiving kickbacks from a beef import company and sentenced to 16 years in prison. This case caught public attention because, apart from the incarceration of Luthfi, Ahmad Fathanah, Luthfi’s sidekick, happened to be the middleman for this corruption. Fathanah was hit with an adultery scandal when he was caught at the hotel with a female student whom he allegedly paid for a sex. The reports of Fathanah quickly became the media sensation amidst Luthfi’s central case, given Fathanah’s penchant for buying extravagant gifts for a number of women, including a well-known female model for a men’s magazine. The scandal became a public mockery for months and cost PKS votes in the 2014 election. As a result, the party saw its performance drop from 7.88% in 2009 to 6.79% in 2014, the lowest since 2004. Other corruption cases beset the leaders of PPP. Two former chairmen, Suryadharma Ali and Romahurmuziy, were charged by KPK for two different incidents. As mentioned earlier, Ali, the then Minister of Religious Affairs, was sentenced to 6 years in prison for embezzling the haj funds from 2010 to 2013. On the other hand, Romi was indicted for bribery in setting up job promotions at the same ministry. The Ministry of Religions Affairs for a long time carried with it a notoriously tainted reputation given its numerous corruption scandals, such as the fraud in the procurement of copies of the Koran, the corruption in the procurement of goods and services, and the misuse of the Ministry’s endowment fund conducted by another former Minister of Religious Affairs, Said Agil. All of these scandals do not help but deteriorate the “clean” and “caring” image that Islamic parties pursue. From the internal rifts to corruption, many of the setbacks could be attributed to, by and large, the parties’ own fault. While it may be true that it is hard to measure the exact consequences of these factors to Islamic parties’ electoral performances, from our contemporary perspective, these can be useful in turning upside-down the prevailing belief that the misfortunes of Muslim politics were caused primarily by the state’s intervention and political power.

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The Effect of Electoral Rules? In terms of size, most Islamic parties in Indonesia can be considered medium-sized parties. However, the fact that Islamic political parties in Indonesia have never won elections—not even close to winning—may raise the question of to what extent these parties contribute to the fragmentation of the party system. Currently, there are nine parties in the parliament, and four of them are Islamic parties. Are Islamic parties primarily responsible for creating a fragmented party system, or are they configured in such a way because the particular electoral system shaped them? In this brief section, it might be helpful to think about another factor that is rarely discussed in the literature of political Islam. There is the possibility that the existing electoral rules encourage the kind of fragmented Islamic parties we have seen. In its earliest experimentation with democracy in the 1950s, Indonesia adopted the multiparty with proportional representation (PR) system (Budiardjo, 1956: 19–22). Masyumi and NU parties were the largest Islamic parties at that time. But there existed other Islamic parties with insufficient votes to gain parliament seats, such as the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII, with 2.9%) and the Islamic Education Movement (Perti, with 1.3%). Under the provisional legislature before the first election in 1955, Masyumi controlled the parliament with the most seats, 49 out of the total 235, followed by the PNI with 36 parties (Budiardjo, 1956: 20). Despite the first election result of 28 parties with at least one seat in the parliament, the party system was less fragmented as the total votes from the top 4 parties, namely PNI, Masyumi, NU, and PKI parties, stood at 78%. The multiparty system was then disrupted under the New Order, as the competition was limited to three parties only. The multiparty system was revived in 1999. At first, it seems that the patterns of votes followed that of the 1955 election in which voters channeled their aspirations through the deep political divides (“politik aliran”) between Islamic and nationalist parties. The vote total received by the top 4 parties at that time stood at 76%. Yet as democracy proceeded, the total votes of the best four performers in the subsequent elections showed a steady decline. The total votes earned by the big 4 parties in 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 were 76, 59, 57, 56, and 54%, respectively, whereas the number of votes earned by mid-sized and small parties tended to increase over time. Additionally, forming entirely new parties or splinter parties

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was quite common in the run-up to every election. This phenomenon fosters the making of a more fragmented party system as a whole. How and in what ways does the current fragmentation link to the lackluster performance of Islamic political parties? First, it should be noted that the general convention in the electoral system literature is that the permissive electoral engineering such as the PR system tends to produce more parties as opposed to the majoritarian or plurality system (Colomer, 2007: 271; Neto & Cox, 1997: 155). This is partly because of the existence of inclusive apportionment methods, the chosen way to convert votes cast into seats in the PR system. In its elections, Indonesia adopted either the Hare quota or Sainte-Leaguë as seat conversion methods—the two of which are considered more benign for creating a multiparty system (Gallagher, 1992). Under these methods, it is hard to imagine one or two parties gaining enough seats that allow them to control an absolute majority. Since Indonesia’s adoption in 1999, it has been argued that multimember districts with a relatively inclusive district magnitude enabled Islamic parties to maintain their presence. In the 2009–2019 elections, the size of the district magnitude varied from 3 to 10 seats per district. These were smaller than the 2004 election that had 3–12 seats per district. With this inclusive district magnitude, parties did not need to win every electoral district to gain seats. Given the apportionment methods to share seats proportionally according to the number of votes each party gets, parties did not necessarily campaign to win the most votes; instead, they often tried to secure at least one seat in certain electoral districts. One may wonder why parties choose to participate in the election despite knowing that they stood no chance of winning. The answer lies in the fact that, within the Indonesian context, each Islamic party has its distinct constituencies. PKB and PAN are often dubbed as the moderate Muslim parties, much more inclusive than PKS. Nonetheless, these two parties speak to different electorates, the Nahdlatul Ulama’s members for PKB and the Muhammadiyah’s members for PAN. PKS supporters mainly from college-educated youth in urban areas with much less support for PBB, while PPP supporters come from a mix of older conservative groups, though it has certain affinities with the Nahdlatul Ulama. The number of Muslim electorates for each party may not be large enough to win the election, but they have enough seats in the game. By appreciating the fact that differences exist between Muslim parties, expectations for having one united Islamic party in the near

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future might be too far-fetched. Hence, the goal of these parties may not necessarily be to win elections, but instead, they may participate merely to speak for and be the representative of their limited Muslim electorates. The students of Indonesian politics will not fail to acknowledge these differences within Muslim communities. In the past, the distinction between Muslim groups was much more straightforward. The NU party itself, formed in 1952, was the splinter from the Masyumi party. Yet, both parties were broadly supportive of each other, as seen from their decision to form several governments together during Indonesia’s parliamentary democracy era in the 1950s. After all, the nature of inter-party competition between nationalist parties vs. Islamic parties at that time was relatively clear over many contentious issues such as the place of religion in the state (see Mietzner, 2008). In this regard, it should not be surprising that the electoral competition in the 1950s did not end up with a highly fragmented party system, despite the comparable PR system being applied. In contrast, the kinds of Islamic expressions adhered to by Muslims today are much more diverse. It is hard to imagine this diversity being channeled under one Islamic party or one Islamic social organization. Moreover, many Muslim aspirations clash with one another and at times differ in terms of means and strategies to achieve these goals. The presence of multiple Islamic parties, and Islamic organizations, therefore, seems inevitable. But these variations are hurdles that the groups must overcome to unify as a solid voting bloc.

Conclusion This chapter draws three conclusions from the past insights of Islamic political development before and after democratization and digs into recent dynamics. First, the enthusiasm that arose in the aftermath of Suharto’s stepping down did not translate into the better performance of Islamic political groups. Electorally, the total votes of Islamic parties tend to stagnate if it is not on a downward trend. Thus far, the power of Islamic parties electorally accounted for around one-third of the total votes. There was an occasion when the groups managed to have a strong showing, as demonstrated by Jakarta’s gubernatorial election. Yet, they have proven to be vulnerable to internal frictions that, in a way, significantly affected the efficacy of the groups in pursuing their conservatives’ goals. Secondly, these frictions can be seen on many fronts, such

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as internal quarrels among factions within Islamic political parties. The competition for party chairmanship most often becomes the contentious issue. It seems that Islamic parties have a less reliable mechanism to address their leadership succession agenda compared to their nationalist counterparts. Another point of concern is related to corruption cases. It is argued that when the leaders of Islamic parties are involved in corruption scandals, it negatively impacts Islamic parties more than nationalist parties. Voters take special note of the hypocrisy as their scandals directly conflict with their claims of higher morals. Finally, this chapter sought to make the case on how the current electoral system fosters party fragmentation in Indonesia. Islamic parties constitute a majority of this fragmentation. The permissive PR system tended to favor the presence of mid-sized parties and allowed the dispersion of votes. From 1999 through 2019, the votes for the top 4 performers have consistently declined, whereas the votes for mid-sized and small parties increased over time. The current system favors parties with distinct constituency cores, such as religious-based parties, as they do not necessarily aim to win elections but just remain relatively capable of facilitating and representing their conservative electorates. In this way, although they may find it hard to get the most votes, Islamic parties could remain everpresent and use their relative strength whenever possible for political gains.

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Effendy, B. (2003). Islam and the state in Indonesia (109). Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Elson, R. E. (2001). Suharto: A political biography. Cambridge University Press. Elson, R. E. (2009). Another look at the Jakarta Charter controversy of 1945. Indonesia, 88, 105–130. Fionna, U., & Tomsa, D. (2017). Parties and factions in Indonesia: The effects of historical legacies and institutional engineering. The ISEAS working paper series, 1, 1–26. Gallagher, M. (1992). Comparing proportional representation electoral systems: Quotas, thresholds, paradoxes and majorities. British Journal of Political Science, 22(4), 469–496. Geertz, C. (1976). The religion of Java. University of Chicago Press. Hamayotsu, K. (2011). The political rise of the prosperous justice party in post-authoritarian Indonesia: Examining the political economy of Islamist mobilization in a Muslim democracy. Asian Survey, 51(5), 971–992. Hasan, N. (2008). Reformasi, religious diversity, and islamic radicalism after Suharto. Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, 1(1), 23–51. Liddle, R. W. (1996). The Islamic turn in Indonesia: A political explanation. Journal of Asian Studies, 613–634. Machmudi, Y. (2008). Islamising Indonesian: The rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (p. 279). ANU Press. Mietzner, M. (2008). Comparing Indonesia’s party systems of the 1950s and the post-Suharto era: From centrifugal to centripetal inter-party competition. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (pp. 431–453). Mietzner, M. (2018). Fighting illiberalism with illiberalism: Islamist populism and democratic deconsolidation in Indonesia. Pacific Affairs, 91(2), 261–282. Miichi, K. (2015). Democratization and ‘Failure’ of Islamic parties in Indonesia. Southeast Asian Muslims in the Era of Globalization (pp. 127–144). Palgrave Macmillan. Neto, O. A., & Cox, G. W. (1997). Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties. American Journal of Political Science (pp. 149– 174). Randall, V., & Svåsand, L. (2002). Party institutionalization in new democracies. Party Politics, 8(1), 5–29. Ricklefs, M. C. (2012). Islamisation and its opponents in Java: A political, social, cultural and religious history, c. 1930 to present. NUS Press. Roy, O. (1994). The failure of political Islam. Harvard University Press. Sebastian, L. C., & Arifianto, A. R. (2020). TRaNS special section on ‘Growing Religious Intolerance in Indonesia’. TRaNS: Trans-Regional and-National Studies of Southeast Asia, 8(1), 1–5.

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Soedirgo, J. (2018). Informal networks and religious intolerance: How clientelism incentivizes the discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. Citizenship Studies, 22(2), 191–207. Tanuwidjaja, S. (2010). Political Islam and Islamic parties in Indonesia: Critically assessing the evidence of Islam’s political decline. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29–49. Tanuwidjaja, S. (2012). PKS in post-reformasi Indonesia: Catching the catch-all and moderation wave. South East Asia Research, 20(4), 533–549. Ufen, A. (2009). Mobilising political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia compared. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 47 (3), 308–333. Van Bruinessen, M. (1999). Global and local in Indonesian Islam. Japanese Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37 (2), 158–175. Van Bruinessen, M. (Ed.). (2013). Contemporary developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn”. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

CHAPTER 4

Civil Society and Democratization in South Korea David Hundt

Abstract This chapter identifies and analyzes two overlapping accounts of the role of civil society in South Korea’s democratization. These accounts both portray civic organizations as productive partners of the state in pursuit of the common goal of further consolidating democratic society, rather than as antagonistic opponents of an anti-democratic state. However, they reach quite different judgments about the roles of the state and civil society in recent political history. Despite these differences, the chapter shows, bringing the two accounts into conversation with each other enriches the study of democratization in South Korea: it shows that political development is a process involving both the state and civil society. Keywords South Korea · Democratization · State · Civil society · Democratic transition (1987)

D. Hundt (B) Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_4

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Introduction South Korea is ranked in the upper echelons of democratic development by most conventional measures (e.g. Economist Intelligence Unit, 2021: 5; Freedom House, 2020). It is generally agreed that civil society plays a vital role in transitions to democracy as well as in established democratic societies, but there is little consensus about how it does so. This chapter seeks to address this question by closely examining and engaging with two overlapping accounts of civil society in South Korea’s democratization. These accounts are both modernist in their understanding of civil society: they generally portray civic organizations as productive partners of the state in pursuit of the common goal of further consolidating democratic society, rather than as antagonistic opponents of an anti-democratic state. Despite their commonalities, however, this chapter argues that the two accounts arrive at quite different judgments about the meaning of South Korea’s democratic transition in 1987, and by extension, the roles of civil society and the state both before and after that transition. The “perfectionist” account tends to see 1987 as a singularly important turning point in South Korean political development insofar as it launched an era in which political legitimacy lies wholly or solely with the democratic state and elected political leaders. By contrast, for the “work-in-progress” account, 1987 represents a pivotal point in a decades-long struggle, but not the end of a longer quest toward an ideal democratic society. This account envisages a vital role for civil society even after democratization. This chapter explores three aspects of civil society and illustrates how and why these accounts reach such different judgments. The first is that if civil society is interpreted as a network of political activists , scholars tend to emphasize its role (if any) in transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy (Huntington, 1991). In the case of South Korea, there is general agreement that a coalition spanning the middle and working classes, and including organizations such as trade unions, student groups, and churches, played a role in the transition to democracy, however, the two accounts differ in the relative credit they give to each constituent of that coalition. The second interpretation of civil society is that it can play a monitory role as a check on the power of even democratic states. Accounts that see democratization as a singular, irreversible turning point in political development tend to see little such role for non-state actors in monitoring state power. In contrast, accounts that see democratization as an ongoing and never-ending process envisage a place for civil society

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in improving the quality of democracy over time. The third interpretation of civil society is that it serves as a public sphere (Habermas et al., 1974). Democracy should be understood not only as a political system constituted of a specific set of individual rights and freedoms but one in which those rights are actively put into practice, sometimes collectively. A defining feature of democracy in South Korea, Sungmoon Kim argues, is its participatory character and “the vibrancy and dynamism integral to democracy as a way of life” (Kim, 2006: 529, emphasis in original). The two accounts, the chapter argues, arrive at different judgments about the role of civil society in promoting popular engagement in politics. There is a substantial degree of overlap between these accounts; they generally draw on the same set of facts and are not mutually exclusive. However, their points of disagreement are significant because they emphasize some aspects of democratization more than others and therefore reach quite different judgments about the roles of state and civil society in recent political history. Conservatives tend to prefer the “perfectionist” account, emphasizing civil society as a set of political actors in the transition to democracy in 1987. Progressives prefer the “workin-progress” account, emphasizing all three roles and envisaging a crucial place for civil society in a democratic South Korea. Despite these differences, the chapter shows, both accounts enrich the study of South Korean democracy.

Two Interpretations of Civil Society in South Korean Democracy The “perfectionist” account emphasizes the singular importance of 1987 in South Korea’s political history and casts the transition as a source of pride for all citizens. In this view, the conditions for democracy were uniquely ripe in the late 1980s, when a nascent middle class had evolved. In keeping with modernization theory (Engerman et al., 2003; Park, 2001), South Koreans were ready for and demanded democracy by this time. They had “strong middle-class social aspirations” and wanted “a political structure that aims to achieve both economic prosperity and political democracy” (Ahn, 2001: 457). As South Korea recovered from the war of the early 1950s and the state oversaw an economic miracle from the late 1960s, most citizens had achieved a level of prosperity that is usually associated with the middle class. Partly thanks to the support

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of its great-power ally, the US (Brazinsky, 2007), South Korea had developed the trappings of a capable and sophisticated polyarchic society (Dahl, 1961), including bastions of middle-class interests such as clubs, schools, and hometown associations. As a result, a coalition of interests came together and called for an orderly and gradual political transition (Ahn, 1993: 96). Unlike other “critical junctures” in South Korean history, the US sided with the forces that were campaigning for political change rather than the authoritarian government (Brazinsky, 2007: 251). The coalition’s determined and yet measured campaign convinced the government, then led by former generals such as Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-woo, to start a transition to democratic rule. This was an instance of “transplacement” (Huntington, 1991: 582), or a negotiated exit from power by the old regime and its orderly transition to a new polity in which remnants of the old regime would compete with their erstwhile opponents from the cross-class coalition. Roh’s victory in the free and fair election for the presidency in 1988 thus marked the start of an era of conventional democratic politics, during which power has alternated between identifiable coalitions of conservatives and progressives. During this era, there is much less demand for independent civil society organizations to serve as a check on power or give voice to public concerns because democratically elected politicians, by definition, reflect the will of the people. Civil society’s role in politics is thus much reduced. The perfectionist account emphasizes and celebrates what it sees as the outstanding achievements of South Korea’s democratization. It is a “glass half full” (if not “full-to-the-brim”) view of political development in South Korea. The work-in-progress account, by contrast, presents South Korean political history in rather different terms. It is a picture of a glass half empty, or still filling up. It sees democratization as far from inevitable or irreversible and situates South Korea’s achievements in the broader context of East Asia’s “illiberal” (Jones, 1998) or “unconsolidated” democracies. South Korea, in this view, has long been typified by a “contentious society” and a strong state, with the actual agents of democracy in recent decades being students and workers rather than the middle class (Koo, 1999: 55). It is a political history replete with struggles for justice, which can be traced back to the colonial and pre-colonial periods, rather than merely the decades immediately prior to 1987. This account links these struggles to a rich tradition of popular uprisings and even outright rebellions (Jackson, 2016) and a widespread intolerance for corruption in

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government (Morriss, 1997). Rather than democratization being a single moment or event, it is depicted as a prolonged struggle fought on many fronts. Conflicts with the state in the 1970s and 1980s strengthened crucial segments of civil society such as trade unions (Koo, 2001). Their shared experience of repression helped build creative coalitions across South Korean society and thereby created consensus about the need for political change. Some of these disputes were of direct national significance and attracted widespread support. Others were fought on smaller and local scales (Abelmann, 1996). This account presents 1987 not so much as an endpoint but rather as a significant phase in an incomplete project. There is a disconnect between “an immensely grotesque mixture of a democratic hardware, on the one hand, and persistent authoritarian software, on the other” (Kim, 2006: 528), so it remains essential for civil society to play a monitory role. There is much less certainty that democracy is “the only game in town” (Diamond, 2015) and that political freedoms and civil rights have been secured. Authoritarian political structures persist in South Korea’s “topdown democracy” (Mobrand, 2019), including within its political parties. The power of the executive branch of government outweighs not just civil society but also the legislature and the judiciary (You, 2014) and draws support from a “bureaucratic mafia” (Lee, 2014). So civil society remains crucial to the health of South Korean democracy. It needs to “outmaneuver and neutralize the power of the state,” or else there will be only “limited gains within the existing power structure” (Choi, 1993: 28). Even nominally progressive governments, such as those led by Kim Daejung and Roh Moo-hyun, have co-opted civil society (Hundt, 2015). The democratic state could “engulf” civil society (Choi, 2010) and thereby threaten its monitory role. A final feature of the work-in-progress account is that it advocates for the “participatory” interpretation of civil society, wherein ordinary citizens are expected to be active participants in the politics of a robust democracy. Some South Korean governments, especially on the left– progressive side of politics, have tried to harness the ethos of participation: Kim Dae-jung explicitly referred to “participation” in the title of one of his books (Kim, 1985) and Roh Moo-hyun included the term in the official name of his government (Jeong & Oh, 2010; MOFE, 2006). There is also recent evidence that South Koreans aspire to an active role in politics: As many as 17 million people took part at least once in rallies in favor of the resignation of then-President Park Geun-hye in late 2016 and early

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2017. Millions more took part in online debates about Park’s proposed impeachment (Lee et al., 2017), which would indicate that South Koreans remain willing to involve themselves in politics. These two accounts highlight different aspects of South Korea’s experience in democracy, democratization, and civil society. They agree to a certain degree about the general thrust of South Korea’s political development but emphasize different aspects of civil society in doing so. Therefore, rather than giving analytical privilege to one over the other, I draw on both accounts to sketch the key features of civil society’s contribution to the democratic development of South Korea, and especially since the events of the late 1980s.

The Road to 1987: Four Decades of Struggle Almost from South Korea’s founding as the Republic of Korea, following the peninsula’s liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, civil society activists were agitating for democracy, albeit with limited success. The capacity of civil society to play a decisive role in political transitions went beyond merely the events of 1987 and extended to the uprising in 1960 that brought a repressive regime to an end. Civil society also presented itself as a necessary check on the power of the authoritarian state and an amplifier of public sentiment. Civil Society in the Early Cold War Era In advocating for political change, civil society found itself in conflict with a powerful state that had the support of a powerful patron in the US, as well as the remnants of the political and commercial class that had prospered during the colonial era. A clique of political and business elites who had worked closely with the colonial authorities remained in positions of power after liberation (Choi, 1993; Eckert, 1991; Lim, 1999), retarding the prospects for democracy. Owen Lattimore, an American diplomat and Korean specialist, noted in 1950 that “chief power is concentrated in the hands of people who were collaborators of Japan” (cited in Cumings, 1990: 115). However, for the most part, the US supported a series of anti-democratic regimes in South Korea. Despite a nominal commitment to promoting democracy, the US prioritized the stabilization of the anti-communist regime in South Korea. The Korean Peninsula was divided and jointly occupied at the end of

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WWII and became a frontline in the Cold War. Preventing the peninsula from being reunited under communist control became an overriding imperative of the US. It intervened to repel a communist takeover of South Korea in the early 1950s and commenced a military presence and formal security alliance that continues in the twenty-first century (Harrison, 2002). The US acquiesced to the installation of an authoritarian and repressive regime, initially led by Syngman Rhee. For Lattimore, this set a bad precedent for democracy in the region: “the kind of regime that exists in southern Korea is a terrible discouragement to would-be democrats throughout Asia… Korea stands as a terrible warning of what can happen” (cited in Cumings, 1990: 115). The US supported the Rhee regime and inhibited viable competitors to Rhee and other favored political forces. The US refused to recognize leftist parties in South Korea, which had strong popular appeal. A significant part of this appeal stemmed not from the ideological leanings of these parties but instead from their insistence that collaborators from the colonial era be prosecuted and barred from politics. By contrast, the rightist ruling party, led by Rhee, included many collaborators. Trade unions, which Rhee’s government and his US backers suspected of sympathizing with the communist regime in North Korea, were targeted for repression. The government suppressed the activities of several large and popular unions, as well as other civil society organizations (Cumings, 1990: 187– 188). The scope for political activity by civil society and non-conservative political forces was thus severely restricted. Oppression and Resistance Under Park By the end of the 1950s, American strategists realized that some degree of political and socio-economic development would be required to achieve their goals in the region. In developing this perspective, the US found common cause with some of the regime’s domestic opponents. South Korea was by some measures one of the poorest countries in the world by 1960, in part due to Rhee’s mismanagement of the economy. After a student-led popular uprising toppled Rhee in 1960, the US opted not to defend him. A short-lived democratic experiment ended the following year, and the US supported—or at least chose not to oppose—the military coup that brought Park Chung Hee to power. The US chose to support the regime rather than use its influence to elicit political change (Brazinsky, 2007: 251). What temporary commonality of perspective that

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had developed between the great-power ally and domestic opponents thereby ended. Under Park’s “developmental autocracy,” South Korea achieved the goals of socio-economic improvement implicit in the modernization agenda favored by successive US administrations (Brazinsky, 2007: 5). However, it also preserved a repressive political system that allowed for only limited freedoms. The limits set for political activity were tightened even further in December 1971, when Park issued an emergency decree purportedly aimed at thwarting attacks from North Korea but which he used to suppress the increasingly influential, effective, and combative opposition movement. Kim Dae-jung, the presidential candidate for the New Democratic Party, had come much closer than expected, defeating Park in the election held earlier that year. The formal opposition had developed effective collaborations with various elements of civil society, including academics, lawyers, journalists, and the student movement (Valence, 1973: 79). American efforts to build the institutions of civil society, especially schools, the public service, and the media, should be acknowledged. South Korean intellectuals and young people were attracted to the ideals of democracy and modernization that the US espoused (see Brazinsky, 2007: Chapters 6 and 7). Nonetheless, the civil society tradition in Korea predates the programs initiated by the US in the 1960s and includes, for instance, a prominent place for students as leaders of uprisings against repressive governments. Students have been referred to as “the conscience of the nation” and have been implicated in numerous such events, both before and since the founding of South Korea (Brill, 1987). From the late 1960s, students began to play a crucial role in rebuilding the labor movement, which Rhee had repressed. Students worked as organizers and helped educate workers about the need for both industrial and political democracy (Valence, 1973: 84). The revitalization of the union movement provided anti-state forces with a critical mass of support in their quest for political change. Progressive unions, who would later form an independent federation known as the Korean Council of Trade Unions (KCTU), were part of the coalition that played a significant role in the transition in 1987 (Kim, 2007: 213–214).

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The Breakthrough of the 1980s The transition to democracy required a remarkable degree of coordination and cooperation among various segments of South Korean civil society, and this did not come about by chance. In the decades before the formal transition, key elements of civil society developed habits of cooperation and built trust between core constituencies (Hundt, 2008). In the 1970s, students, religious groups, and artists had played a crucial role in building class consciousness among workers (Koo, 2001; Lee, 2007; Ogle, 1990: 72–75; Wells, 1995). This was built upon in the 1980s when students and trade unionists took part in a long-running campaign to secure land rights for small tenant farmers whose livelihoods were threatened by real-estate developers (Abelmann, 1996). Although 1987 is rightfully known as a momentous year (or moment) in the history of South Korea’s democratization, the roots of the transition go back much further and need to be understood in the context of the ongoing campaigns of civil society. The decades prior to 1987, as noted, witnessed a series of struggles between a powerful state and a formidable and diverse coalition of oppositional forces. The political transition was not preordained, and indeed there were several moments at which a transition might have occurred, including the months between Park’s assassination in October 1979 and the Gwangju Massacre of May 1980 (Brazinsky, 2007: Chapter 8). South Korean civil society demonstrated a capacity to contribute to the building of pressure for democratization, but it could not enact that change by itself. This required a change of thinking within the regime, which occurred during 1987, and which finally ushered in a democratic polity.

Civil Society in the Wake of Democratization The broad cross-class coalition that played a pivotal role in South Korea’s democratization began to dissolve into more partisan groupings in the years that followed the momentous events of 1987. The components of the coalition, such as the churches, student groups, and organized labor, were not monolithic, so this dissolution perhaps was not surprising. However, conservative politicians and media encouraged the splintering of civil society by depicting students and the KCTU as dangerous radicals and criticized what they saw as a propensity for violent protest and support for dialogue with North Korea (Jee, 1997: 151–152). Therefore,

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some of the erstwhile partners in the pro-democracy project had begun to see each other as enemies. This reduced the possibility of South Korean civil society playing the same type of role in forming a national political consensus as it had prior to 1987. Politics and Partisanship in Civil Society In keeping with the growing partisan divide in South Korean civil society, the campaigns by activists such as trade unions were interpreted as being antithetical to the interests of conservatives, who were politically close to the large chaebol conglomerates. Conservatives viewed the chaebols as proud symbols of South Korea’s economic miracle from the 1960s to the 1980s and were sympathetic to the complaint that the wage increases that the KCTU had secured for its members were harming South Korea’s competitiveness. In response, the Kim Young-sam government passed a raft of amendments to the Labor Relations Law in late 1996, with the aim of making it easier for firms to dismiss workers. Unions strongly opposed the removal of employment protections, which they saw as part of the democratic rights of workers. For the first time, the state-aligned federation joined the KCTU to defend labor rights through a series of strikes to repeal the rollback of protections. Under pressure to end the strikes, the government agreed to repeal the most restrictive elements of the new legislation. Finally, in March 1997, a compromise was reached whereby unions acceded to limited job security in return for greater freedom to organize. The government also granted pay increases to both public and private sector workers (Vandenberg & Hundt, 2012: 476–477). Ultimately, what unions presented as a campaign to promote (industrial) democracy was interpreted by conservatives as hostile to their interests. Another development in this era was the emergence of new civic groups focusing on issues such as human rights, the environment, and gender equality. Some groups specialized in specific issues such as migrants’ rights and gender equality, while others defined their mission more broadly. Most of these new actors in civil society were closer to the progressive end of the political spectrum than the conservative one. However, they generally tried to avoid positioning themselves in partisan terms. In particular, “comprehensive citizens’ movements,” such as the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), tried to avoid partisan politics and used moderate tactics, even if their concerns were closer to

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the progressive than the conservative end of the spectrum (Jee, 1997: 151–152). These organizations did not want to be seen as partisan, given the tendency for civil society to take on a more openly partisan tinge since democratization, as was evident in transnationally oriented civil society organizations. Those that have worked with their Chinese and Japanese counterparts in the early 2000s to produce a regional history of East Asia (He & Hundt, 2012), for instance, were mainly progressive in political outlook. Meanwhile, numerous NGOs focused on human rights in North Korea have tended to identify as either progressive or conservative in outlook (Reidhead, 2018: 31). These civic groups eschewed violence as a tactic, accepted the basic framework of the new democratic political system, and defined their work as contributing to the development of public policy (Kim, 2000) and being a check on executive power. For the PSPD, founded in 1994, the primary focus of its activities was the “monitoring of power” (Yoon, 2001: 69), such as when it released a report about what it alleged were violations of the law by the government in 2008 in respect to assessing the health risks of importing beef from the United States (PSPD, 2008). The stated goals of the CCEJ, meanwhile, were economic justice and procedural democracy. The themes of participation, accountability, and transparency guided its projects to monitor the attendance and activity of National Assembly members, raise standards of corporate governance, and protect consumer rights (Vandenberg & Hundt, 2012: 475–476). Civil society groups have impacted national politics by exposing corruption and other misdeeds by government officials and public servants, as well as business leaders (Lee, 2005), and campaigning for their punishment. Co-Optation and Partial Incorporation Some governments, especially the progressive ones led by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moon-hyun, claimed that they were committed to enhancing the participation of ordinary citizens in national governance. Under Roh in particular, the use of public commissions significantly increased, and citizens were offered opportunities to shape the government’s thinking about issues such as sustainable development and transgenerational justice (Jeong & Oh, 2010; Lee & Lim, 2006; MOFE, 2006). Civil society organizations also played a role in these processes. Such initiatives, however,

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were pursued solely at the discretion of a given leader and were not institutionalized as permanent features of a democratic culture. Just as the state had initiated these opportunities, so too could it curtail them or change their terms. A prime example of the capacity of the state to set the terms for inclusive governance came during the recovery from the Asian financial crisis in 1998. To ease the implementation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s rescue package, the Kim Dae-jung government invited trade unions to partake in tripartite talks. A pact between labor, government, and business expanded basic labor rights, allowed for the formation of a teachers’ union, and allowed laid-off workers to join a union. Unions won the right to establish a political party, and the KCTU was formally recognized as a peak body. The government established a multi-billion-dollar fund to compensate workers for job losses resulting from restructuring, but the pact largely removed the expectation of job security (Vandenberg & Hundt, 2012: 477). Unions emphasized the symbolism of the talks, and Yoon Young-mo of the KCTU argued that: “Labour could now be included and recognised as a pillar of the society, as a value in itself as an organised progressive force. In this way you could philosophically change the way in which labour was perceived in society” (cited in Neary, 2000: 4). The pact, however, placed the brunt of the burden for reform on workers. With their constituents opposed to the proposed model of restructuring, some union leaders saw no option other than to return to strikes and protests to protect the interests of workers. As a result, the government reverted to coercive means, such as the violent suppression of strikes and the arrest of union leaders, to end industrial disputes (Vandenberg & Hundt, 2012: 478). Trade unions achieved some important symbolic goals, such as their recognition as legitimate political actors and establishing a rudimentary welfare state, but state elites have retained the upper hand in relations with civil society (Hundt, 2015: 468). A Tale of Two Impeachments Despite the limits on the capacity of civil society to challenge the prerogatives of the state, there have been several instances of concerted mobilization against national leaders at the highest levels since 1987, especially in reaction to perceived wrongdoing by national leaders. Compared to their conservative counterparts, progressive social movements have been more

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prominent in mobilizing public support and channeling it into political action. One of the most potent symbols of progressive social movements were candles, which featured in protests against the deaths of two schoolgirls in the summer of 2002, in an accident involving an American military vehicle (Kang, 2012), and in protests against the resumption of beef imports from the US in 2008 (KCTU, 2008). Candles were also prominent in the campaigns to remove two presidents via impeachments, as the remainder of this section explores in detail. The first campaign for impeachment took place in early 2004 when conservative political parties used their legislative majorities to vote to remove Roh Moo-hyun as president. They claimed that Roh had improperly used his position to campaign in favor of his political party (Uri Yeollin-dang , Our Open Party) and sent articles of impeachment to the Constitutional Court. Roh temporarily stood aside from his duties, pending the outcome of the trial. In the short term, the incident ended in catastrophic defeat for the conservatives and a victory for Roh: the court ruled in May 2004 that the charges did not reach the standards for removal from office, and Roh was returned to power (Hahm, 2005). Furthermore, anti-impeachment sentiment powered Roh’s party to victory over the conservatives in the legislative elections of April 2004. In the longer term, however, the attempted impeachment of Roh contributed to the building of conservative citizens movements in South Korea (Shin, 2006). Conservatives were concerned that their progressive opponents were developing an unmatched capacity to attack and delegitimize symbols of conservative power, such as the US alliance and the chaebols, by mobilizing public opinion. In response, conservative activists founded their own civil society organizations, which matched their progressive counterparts with energy, if not numbers. These new organizations, which were often grouped under the broad label of the “new right,” attracted disaffected progressives as well as traditional bastions of conservatism in South Korea, such as attendees of protestant churches and older citizens. During the remainder of Roh’s term in office, they campaigned successfully to prevent progressives from achieving some symbolic goals, such as the repeal of the National Security Law, controls on the operation of private schools and media organizations, and a continuation of the Sunshine Policy of gradual rapprochement with North Korea. These new conservative social movements generated enthusiasm for a return to conservative rule, and they were rewarded when Lee Myung-bak won the 2007 election, followed by Park Geun-hye in 2012.

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Conservative activists thereafter supported Lee and Park from both inside and outside of government. The inauguration of the Lee and Park governments, in turn, sparked counter-mobilization from progressive activists. Within months of being elected to office, Lee’s government faced massive protests due to its decision to reintroduce imports of beef from the US, which had been halted due to mad cow disease (KCTU, 2008). The protests died down in 2009, but progressive elements of civil society demonstrated a renewed willingness to cooperate with like-minded forces in the interests of political change. Some of the old pro-democracy alliances were reconstituted during the Lee and Park presidencies, although with narrower bases than prior to 1987. Trade unions and progressive civil society organizations were crucial to building a public consensus that Park was unfit for office (Cheon, 2017). South Koreans were shocked by the loss of more than 300 lives, most of them schoolchildren, in the sinking of a ship off the southwestern coast in early 2014, and even more so by what critics claimed were the failed attempts by the Park government to rescue survivors (Chang, 2017; Kim, 2017). However, it was accusations that Park had allowed her long-term confidante, Choi Soon-Sil, to exercise undue influence over national affairs that sparked a society-wide consensus in the need for political change. An innovative and effective tactic on the part of organizers was to promote the rallies in favor of impeachment as “festivals,” which enabled them to overcome the onerous conditions that the police placed on securing permits for strikes and most forms of political protest (Amnesty International, 2016). A surge of popular support for the rallies resulted in a relentless increase in attendance (Lee, 2017). The National Assembly voted almost unanimously to impeach Park and send the charges to the Constitutional Court for adjudication, and Park temporarily vacated the presidency. In March 2017, the Court ruled that Park’s abuse of power had reached the Constitution’s standard for impeachment, namely a “grave violation of the law” and thus demonstrable unfitness for office (Yun, 2017). Park was removed from office, and a new election for the presidency was held two months later. Some conservative activists claimed that Park’s impeachment was unconstitutional and refused to recognize the legitimacy of her successor, Moon Jae-in. What became known as the national flag-carriers movement drew on some of the same networks that helped bring Park and Lee to power in the 2000s (Han & Hundt, 2021) However, this was a

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minority position, and most conservatives appeared to accept the basic facts surrounding Park’s impeachment. Moreover, the belief that she had committed wrongdoings worthy of removal from office crossed traditional ideological divides: in December 2016, at the height of the campaign to remove Park, 84% of South Korean conservatives said that Park “was not performing her duties” well and should resign (Gallup Korea, 2016).

Conclusion This chapter has traced the changing role of civil society in South Korea, before, during, and since the transition to democracy in 1987. It has illustrated the variation in civil society’s contributions over time, namely as political activists, monitors, and a public sphere. Civil society in South Korea has demonstrated a capacity to articulate a case for political change by highlighting wrongdoing by the government (monitoring), effectively mobilizing support for change (participation), and helping to engineer political change itself (political activism). The interconnectedness between these three roles was evident during the momentous events of 1987 (the transition to democracy) and 2016/2017 (Park’s impeachment). The chapter has illustrated the value of disaggregating political change and examining it in terms of more and less significant events. The two accounts of civil society and its relations with the state illustrate that no single event has been more consequential to South Korean political history than the transition of 1987, but also that appreciating the significance of this event need not come at the expense of other developments in the decades on either side of that year. When analyzed from the perspective of long-run political development, the accounts are complementary rather than contradictory. Indeed, they are two sides of the same coin: one account provides a history of democratic development centered on the state, while the other places society in the starring role in the long march to democracy, along the lines of a “people’s history” (see e.g. Zinn, 2003). If the consensus between the two accounts is generally strong in terms of the events of 1987, it is less so with respect to 2016/2017. Whereas proponents of both accounts could agree that civil society organizations had played a vital role in helping South Korea achieve its democratic transition in the late 1980s, the legacy of Park’s impeachment three decades

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later has yet to achieve a similar degree of consensus. In an age of political polarization, populism, and the rampant spread of misinformation via social media and other means, there is greater skepticism that civil society organizations are or can be an altruistic force for good that is committed to the betterment of democratic society rather than partisan causes. If civil society is to preserve its vital role in South Korean democracy, it will need to guard against perceptions that it is seeking partisan advantage. Despite these disputes about the meaning of civil society, this chapter has illustrated that South Korean democracy appears robust when seen in a comparative context. In particular, the participatory nature of its democracy sets South Korea apart from most comparator societies, including Indonesia. A substantial proportion of South Koreans have direct memories of the democratization movement of 1987, and a significant number have been directly involved in political activity in recent times. Civil society will continue to play a vital role in enabling citizens to play a part in their democracy and hold their government accountable when necessary. Acknowledgements I am grateful to the Editor, Professor Brendan Howe, and a peer reviewer for valuable feedback and thoughtful suggestions for improving this chapter.

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CHAPTER 5

NGOs and Democratization in Indonesia: From Co-optation to Collaboration Arya Fernandes

Abstract This chapter addresses two questions: What factors influence NGOs’ approaches and strategies to become more inclusive in collaborating with policymakers? Why are there still NGOs that are reluctant to collaborate? This chapter also elaborates on the responses, attitudes, and accommodations made by policymakers. This chapter shows that the democratization process affects the relationship between government and NGOs. In the post-reform period, the government became more accessible and positioned NGOs as partners due to the great need to reform governance, elections and political parties, and the military. NGOs’ transformation is encouraged by changing their internal strategic approaches to participate in the policymaking process. It also influences the need to survive because of changes in global funding schemes for NGOs in Indonesia and high competition among NGOs to access international funds. Besides, internal capacities such as human resources, networks,

A. Fernandes (B) Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_5

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and strategic planning are the significant factors that determine NGOs’ success in collaborating with the government. From the government side, there are also initiatives to collaborate by strengthening public participation and increasing the allocation of research funds to external research institutions. However, there are still limitations in collaborating. There is still a long and complicated bureaucracy and the low utilization of research results for policymaking. Meanwhile, there are still limitations in producing knowledge in terms of reliability and quality related to the government needs from the NGO side. Keywords NGOs · NGO–government relations · Democratization · Policymakers · State · Collaboration · Indonesia

Introduction Since the 1998 reform, Indonesia has successfully implemented significant electoral and political institutions reforms in the last two decades. Indonesia has held five democratic elections from 1999 to 2019, with an average voter turnout rate of 81.03% in the legislative elections. From an institutional perspective, the MPR/DPR made several significant changes in four constitutional amendments between October 1999 and July 2002 on the demands of a transition to democracy, which emphasized the separation of powers principle (Ellis, 2002: 37). One of the essential articles that were amended was the method of selecting the president/vice president. Before the amendment, according to the 1945 constitution, the president was elected by the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat or MPR) for a five-year term and could be re-elected without term limits. In the constitutional amendments, the MPR made some articles to strengthen the presidential system by implementing direct elections by the people, using a fixed tenure of office, and setting up a presidential impeachment mechanism (Aritonang, 2010: 396–397). In the first amendment in 1999, the MPR amended article 7 of the 1945 Constitution by restricting a maximum presidential term of ten years. The president can also now submit a bill to the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR). In the third amendment in 2001, the MPR amended article 6 on presidential elections

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to article 6A. As a result, the president and vice president are elected directly as a pair by the people. Besides strengthening the president’s position, in the third amendment of 2001, the MPR also tightened the impeachment procedure strictly from submission, examination, and political decision-making. After the third amendment to the constitution, in the 2004 elections, people could elect the president/vice president directly for the first time. In 2004, a retired general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was elected president after defeating incumbent President Megawati Soekarnoputri in two rounds. Yudhoyono was re-elected in the 2009 elections for a second term. In the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, Joko Widodo was elected president after beating Prabowo Subianto in a very competitive election. The transition to democracy allowed many civil society movements and NGOs to establish rights, institutions, and mechanisms of accountability, which were controlled during the New Order era and not to be listened to by the government New Order era (Antlöv et al., 2005: 2). The New Order regime’s fall increased public discourse on good governance, accountability, and transparency of public institutions (Antlöv et al., 2005: 5). Most of these policy discourses were driven and initiated by civil society and NGOs. NGO activists encouraged institutional reform, freedom of opinion and organization, reform of the electoral system and voter participation, and encouraged the process of decentralization and decreasing corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN). To build a better government, both NGOs and policymakers were interested in collaborating on many crucial issues. Putnam (1993: 4) emphasized the importance of trust, norms, and networks to strengthen social capital. Moreover, success in collaboration depends on connections and trust. In Indonesian cases, the transition from authoritarianism to democracy has changed many things in Indonesia’s political life, especially the rise of civil society organizations. Amid the diversification of issues and advocacy, the civil society movement has become relatively consolidated and collaborated with the government. Besides, there is also a growing trust between civil society and policymakers to collaborate. After more than two decades of reform, Indonesia’s democracy has declined and regression (Power, 2018; Power & Warburton, 2020). Data released by the Freedom House and The Economist Intelligence Unit

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(EIU), for example, showed a decrease in Indonesia’s score in democracy performance compared to the previous year. Based on the freedom score, Indonesia’s score fell from 61 in 2020 to 59 in 2021 (Freedom House, 2021). Indonesia’s status also did not change as a “partly free” country from 2014 to 2021. However, Indonesia was categorized as a “free” country from 2006 to 2013. The 2021 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) report also showed a decline in Indonesia’s score from 6.48 in 2020 to 6.30 in 2021. Indonesia is still categorized as a “flawed democracy” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2021). Diamond (1994: 7) argued that civil society’s important role in consolidating democracy has two dimensions: to monitor democratic state policies and democratize authoritarian states. According to Diamond, a vibrant civil society is essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy. However, as Diamond (1994: 11–12) noted, not all civil societies have the same potential to contribute to democratic development. This potential is determined by several things, such as the internal structure and characteristic, organizational institutionalization, internally democratic character, the more pluralistic civil society, and the public opportunities to participate in multiple organizations. This chapter examines NGOs’ internal conditions and government policies to support the collaboration between government and NGOs. NGOs’ transformation and collaborative approach with policymakers and private sectors are expected to become a characteristic feature of Indonesia’s NGOs in the next few years. This chapter wants to answer two essential questions: what factors explain NGOs’ transformation to collaborate with policymakers? What is the response and adaptation of policymakers to collaborate with the NGO?

Transformation Diamond (1994: 16) argued that the relations between civil society and the government would influence the democratic level, and civil society plays a significant role in building and consolidating democracy. He stated: the more active, pluralistic resourceful, institutionalized and democratic is civil society, and the more effectively it balances the tensions in its relations with the state-between autonomy and cooperation, vigilance and loyalty,

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scepticism and trust, assertiveness and civility--the more likely it is that democracy will emerge and endure.

Boulding (2014: 23) argued that the context of democratic quality would shape the type of NGOs’ political participation from voting to protest. Boulding stated that NGOs tend to promote political participation in weakly democratic countries where democratic institutions are present but not working well. In Indonesian political situations that have changed to become more democratic after the 1998 reformation, NGOs’ position has become an essential factor in pushing for policy change. It can be seen from several NGO activists’ vital role in campaigning many issues on good governance reform, transparency, accountability, and strengthening democratic institutions. In the early post-reform phase, NGO activists played an essential role in encouraging the formation of new institutions (state auxiliary agencies), such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman, the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK), the Judicial Commission, and other institutions. In the next phase, some NGO and civil society activists participated in designing and played a significant role in increasing institutional capacity. After that, some NGO activists became members and leaders of many state commissions. For example, Sukma Violetta, the former Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law (ICEL) activist, was elected as a commissioner of the Judicial Commission in 2015–2020 and was elected again in 2020–2025. Amiruddin, a commissioner of Komnas HAM 2017–2022, was previously a prominent activist in several NGOs like ELSAM and YLBHI. Furthermore, Robert Na Endi Jaweng, a commissioner of the Indonesian Ombudsman 2020– 2015, previously served as Executive Director of KPPOD (Regional Autonomy Implementation Monitoring Committee) and many others. In the early times of the reform, policymakers’ desire to adopt NGOs’ input was relatively strong. It was influenced by at least two things: the high need for policymakers to ensure good and clean governance and support for a political environment that fosters. The change in approach also occurred from the NGO side. Several NGOs saw an opportunity to encourage policy changes by responding to some policymakers’ products. As a result, NGOs are no longer fully positioned as the government’s “watchdogs” but transformed into the government’s strategic partners.

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NGO and policymakers’ initiatives to collaborate have already appeared since the beginning of the reformation. Mietzner (2013: 34–42) showed three successful pro-democracy activists in influencing policies related to defense and security reforms, women’s rights, and labor issues. In military reform, civil society groups have succeeded in pushing for reform and professionalism of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and initiated eliminating the dual function of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI). The activity was led by the Security Sector Reform Working Group (Pokja), coordinated through the NGO ProPatria in October 1999. The working group consisted of Rizal Sukma, Munir, Cornelis Lay, Ikrar Nhusa Bhakti, Fajrul Falaakh, and Andi Widjajanto. According to Mietzner, ProPatria collaborated with the Ministry of Defence and members of the DPR. Meanwhile, women’s NGOs’ performance in pushing policy change could be traced with the acceptance of implementing a 30% quota of women’s representation in the party structure and the quota of nominations in the legislative elections. Finally, in terms of the labor movement, NGO activists succeeded in forming trade unions’ organizations to represent the workers’ issues. Before the 1998 reform, most NGO activists perceived a collaborative approach as a way for the government to control and co-opt the NGO activities. As a result, several NGOs took a very confrontational position with the government. From a regulatory perspective, the government has extensive control over NGO activities. The government could limit and freeze NGOs’ activities through the Law on Community Organizations (Ormas) Number 8/1985. Article 13 stated that the government could freeze the Ormas, which is considered to have broken the public order and received foreign assistance without government approval. The government can disband the Ormas without an appeal process in the court. To solve the problem, several NGOs transformed into self-reliant community development institutions, or Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat (LPSM), to survive with access to government programs and avoid intimidation and restrictions by the New Order regime. For example, Bina Swadaya in agricultural development and Yayasan Suluh Desa emphasized community empowerment (Gordon, 1998: 4–5). In the last five years, the government and NGOs have become increasingly interested in collaborating on public policymaking. However, while improving NGO–government relations, some NGOs are still reluctant to collaborate. Some of them still have concerns about being co-opted,

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subordinated to the state, and fear being not independent anymore in expressing their opinions.

Collaboration This section describes the patterns of NGO–government relations and the factors that influence NGOs’ collaboration with the government. This section also describes the best practices of NGO–government collaboration in many policies. Lee and Arrington (2008: 75–81) argued that civil society’s historical development and organizational characteristics affect their relationship with the government. His research results were based on NGOs–government relations in South Korea and Japan. According to Lee & Arrington, NGOs in South Korea tend to be significantly politicized compared to Japan. Since the beginning of the Kim Young-sam administration, the president had recruited former NGO activists into the public service to legitimize his major political reforms. However, Young (2000: 168) found that government–non-profit sector relations are multilayered, dynamics and the model of supplementary, complementary, and adversarial relations have changed over time. In Indonesia, the change of NGO approach to collaborate with the government was driven by four main factors. First, there is the need to survive amidst tight competition among NGO organizations in accessing international donors’ funding which becomes limited. The change in Indonesia’s status from lower-middle-income to upper-middle-income affects the donor funding schemes for Indonesia. Now, Indonesia has a GNI per capita is around $ 4046 to $ 12,535, which was categorized as the Upper-middle income by the World Bank, compared to the lowermiddle-income status with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of $ 1036 to $ 4045 (The Jakarta Post, 2020, 2 July). Second, the increase of more credible and competent NGOs’ internal capacity and resources have driven them to be more involved in the public policymaking process. Third, the political opportunities in terms of regulation and funding allowed more NGOs to collaborate with the government. Fourth, the policy environment of the government that became accessible and more responsive from the outsider opinions. These changes have occurred due to the increasing need for policymakers to produce policies quickly and reliably.

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This study found that NGO organizations’ internal capacity and the ability to adapt to policy changes will affect NGO relations with policymakers. Another factor that will contribute to the motivation of collaboration is the process of institutional transformation. This research seeks several NGOs’ collaborative approaches in different fields, for example, NGOs in electoral reform, empowerment and social policy, law enforcement, and corruption eradication. Several NGO activists had interviewed in this study indicated their openness to collaborate with policymakers. However, in general, NGOs who successfully transform and have the institutionalized organizational capacity (human resources, networks, and strategic planning) tend to collaborate efficiently. Meanwhile, NGOs with internal problems, such as a leadership crisis, stagnant regeneration, and unclear strategic planning—tend to find it challenging to collaborate. NGOs in the electoral sector have been actively collaborating with stakeholders since the beginning of the reformation period. They have a long tradition of building connections with the government and the DPR. For example, CETRO (Centre for Electoral Reform), founded in August 1999, advocated electoral and constitutional reform. CETRO was founded by prominent UNFREL (University Network for Free and Fair Election) activists, such as Emil Salim, Todung Mulya Lubis, Ichlasul Amal, Daniel Dhakidae, Prof. Miriam Budiardjo, Natalia Soebagio, Smita Notosusanto, Ani Sucipto, and Hadar Navis Gumay (Gumay, interview with author, 2020). According to Hadar Gumay, several electoral reform ideas were successfully pushed by CETRO in the 1999–2004 period. Such as the amendments to the constitution, which proposed direct presidential elections in 2004, applying a 30% quota for women candidates, and the independent status of KPU members from political parties. In the early years of reform, CETRO built good relations with several young and reformist-oriented DPR members to promote political and electoral reform in the election law. Some of the DPR members approached included Ganjar Pranowo (PDIP), Ferry Mursyidan Baldan (Golkar), Agus Purnomo (PKS), and Andi Yuliani Paris (PAN). CETRO also initiated the civil society network called Coalition for a New Constitution to advocate the reform agenda. Several political experts and constitutional law researchers participated in the regular meetings, including Mahfud MD, Malik Fajar, Denny Indrayana, Bambang Widjojanto, J. Kristiadi, Marwan Mas, and Saldi Isra. Another organization that is very active in advocating electoral and party system reforms is the Association for Elections and Democracy

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(Perludem). In 2016, together with a coalition of NGOs in the electoral sector, Perludem established a Joint Secretariat to encourage the Election Law’s draft codification. The Joint Secretariat proposed the codification of five laws and several Constitutional Court decisions, such as Law Number 32/2004 and Law 12/2008 on Regional Government, Law Number 42 of 2008 on Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections, Law 15/2011 on General Election Organizers, and Law Number 8 of 2012 on Legislative Elections (Perludem, 2016). Two years before the 2019 election, the DPR adopted the Election Law codification proposal in Law Number 7 of 2017 on General Elections, which combined three election laws. Perludem is also actively collaborating with election organizers, both the General Election Commission (KPU) and the Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu), to evaluate the implementation of election stages and the formulation of KPU Regulations (PKPU). According to the electoral agenda, Perludem has also submitted a judicial review of the Election Law to the Constitutional Court, asking the Constitutional Court to abolish the number of presidential thresholds, abolish the number of parliamentary thresholds, and separate national and local elections. However, according to the Executive Director of Perludem, Titi Anggraini, some NGOs think several agendas have not been accommodated in the Election Law. Among them are the party system reforms, political parties’ democratization, political funding, and abolishing the presidential nominations’ requirements (Anggraini, interview with author, 2019). In another field, Perkumpulan Prakarsa has successfully collaborated with policymakers to strengthen the production and dissemination of knowledge. Prakarsa succeeded in making two essential changes within the organization: changing the advocacy approach into collaboration and engagement with multi-stakeholders and changing the research approach from the issues related to strengthening participation and democratization to technical and applied issues, like policy evaluation benchmarking, monitoring, and policy promotion (Maftuchan, interview with the author, 2019). Several policy changes were successfully encouraged by Prakarsa, for example, the policy on the National Welfare Security (JKN) program, establishing the index on the 2015–2018 Indonesian Multidimensional Poverty Index that would be useful for the government in reducing the poverty rate across the country. Prakarsa also initiated the Green Economic Caucus (GEC) in the DPR and other policy research. Prakarsa

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has produced a policy brief, working papers, and books that focus on three main areas: fiscal policy, social policy, and sustainable development. The model of collaboration with policymakers on other issues is carried out by the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW). As an NGO, ICW is active in promoting democratic governance, eradicating corruption, and promoting an equal economic, social, and gender status. ICW has collaborated with the Government Procurement Policy Institute (LKPP) to develop the Open Tender application. This application helps identify the potential frauds in the procurement of goods. It can involve public participation in overseeing the process of procuring goods and services. In general, according to Adnan Topan Husodo, ICW Coordinator, in terms of activities approach, ICW is very flexible between research-based approach, advocacy-based, and development studies or collaboration with policymakers (Husodo, FGD with author, 2019). Meanwhile, to strengthen advocacy with the NGOs in the same issues, ICW established anti-corruption NGO networks in Indonesia’s major cities. Through this network, ICW has succeeded in monitoring the National Corruption Prevention Strategy (Stranas PK) implementation with collaboration with the KPK in 2019. The monitoring was done in 10 regions and focused on two aspects, namely: professionalism in the procurement of goods and services and an integrated criminal justice system. ICW is also actively monitoring the deliberation process of laws related to eradicating potential corruption, such as the KPK Law, the Witness and Victim Protection Act, the Public Information Disclosure Law, the Election Law, and the Money Laundering Act. At the local level, to encourage policy changes with the local government, ICW collaborates with regional heads strictly selected (Husodo, FGD with author, 2019). Adnan said ICW was very selective in collaborating with regional heads by asking for regional heads’ commitment to the corruption eradication agenda. ICW will conduct internal research to identify the lead character, integrity, innovation, and commitment to cooperation. In the last ten years, the collaboration among NGOs based on a particular issue and policy focus has increased. The Joint Secretariat of the Codification of the Election Law is one model that has been relatively successful in driving electoral policy change. Other collaborations that have appeared within NGOs are on social ecology issues. The Indonesia Forum for the Environment (WALHI), for example, is seen as an NGO that is influential in assessing government policies in the forestry and

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environmental sectors. WALHI is also interested in collaborating and conducting policy interventions. In 2019, for example, WALHI provided several policy recommendations on the effectiveness and implementation of social forestry policies. WALHI thinks the need to intervene in the policy is to ensure that the social forestry regulations provide certainty for the local communities to manage forest areas legally (WALHI, 2019). WALHI also successfully consolidated several NGOs in 28 provinces in Indonesia with different characteristics, advocacy issues, and ideologies to encourage policy change in the forestry sector (Khalid, FGD with author, 2019). There is indeed a very diverse range of NGOs’ issues and characteristics in the environmental sector based on the issues that have been advocated. Even though it was very diverse, Darsono (2011) found no internal conflicts among environmental NGOs due to the strong friendship and kinship spirit. WALHI is one of the respected organizations that has become the anchor of environmental issues. WALHI has been able to survive and influence environmental policies since its establishment in 1980. However, according to Darsono’s assessment, the forestry sector campaign encouraged by WALHI has not been entirely successful because the forestry policies have not been fully synchronized with the government. Meanwhile, to control the DPR performance, there is a collaboration from a network of young people who founded the WikiDPR (Jejak Parlemen) in 2014. WikiDPR actively engages with the member of parliament and fills the gap in lacking open and transparent information about the DPR (Hatherell, 2018). In monitoring the DPR performance, another more senior coalition was driven by the Forum Masyarakat Peduli Parlemen (Formappi). A new collaboration model with the private sectors has been provided by many NGOs while there are still infrequent and very segmented issues. Two of the NGOs mentioned below are experienced in collaboration with private sectors: ELSAM (the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy) and KPPOD. According to ELSAM Research Director Adzkar Ahsini, ELSAM has built good relations with government and private sector collaborations in recent years. For example, the collaboration is aimed to encourage the policies formula to adopt the perspective of Human Rights in regulating the internet content and the Personal Data Protection Bill. ELSAM also advocates for the Bill on Cyber Security and Resilience. In the last seven years, ELSAM has succeeded in shifting priority issues from their “traditional” issues, such as resolving past human rights violations,

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to the actual issues, such as the internet and human rights. In 2013, for example, ELSAM published a Policy Paper on Internet Control versus Freedom Policy (ELSAM, 2013). In other ways, KPPOD has produced research on the ease of doing business in the region. For example, the study on the implementation of Online Single Submission (OSS) and evaluations related to licensing regulations in the regions was supported by Knowledge Sector Initiative and collaborated with many cities and regencies in Indonesia (KPPOD, 2019). In general, KPPOD focuses on several clusters of issues: business regulatory reform, licensing bureaucratic reform, decentralization, fiscal management, and priority economic sectors (industry, trade, and tourism). Amid the increasing trend of collaborative NGO approaches with policymakers and corporations, NGOs still face challenges in judicial monitoring and (especially) law enforcement collaborating with policymakers. Muhammad Isnur from the YLBHI said the police were not given access to NGOs to obtain information and advocate sensitive legal cases. According to Isnur, law enforcers are unwilling to give NGOs access to advocate for legal cases that attract public attention (Isnur, interview with author, 2019).

Government Initiatives Government initiatives to collaborate are determined by the power relation between the government and NGOs. Haque (2002: 419–421) showed the changing balance of power relations between the Bangladesh government and NGOs due to NGOs’ increasing autonomy and power. Haque identified several indicators that showed Bangladesh NGOs’ expanding power and autonomy. Such as the spread power of NGOs in providing basic services and micro-financing, increasing membership of NGOs mainly dominated by women that will be influential in election outcomes, the increasing role of NGOs in political education, and finally, the expanding of profit assets of NGOs. According to Coston (1998), the government’s resistance or acceptance of institutional pluralism from symmetrical to asymmetrical power relations influences the pattern of NGO and government relations. Coston (1998: 377) stated that the government and NGOs’ relations should share the same potential mutual benefit.

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In Indonesia’s case, the government’s policy to collaborate is motivated to increase policy approval and ensure an evidence-based policy approach due to the growth of credible resources in NGOs. According to Davies et al. (2000: 2), the increasing use of the evidence-based practice in public policy making is influenced by the growth of educated and informed public, the availability of data and information technology, the increasing number and capacity of the research community, increasing productivity and international competitiveness, and increasing government accountability. This section explains the government’s need to collaborate with NGOs. From the government’s perspective, the desire to collaborate is influenced by three important things. First is the need to encourage public participation in the policymaking processes. It is supported by some regulation that has required public participation in the policymaking process. At least two laws ensure public participation in the policymaking process: Law Number 12 of 2011 on the Formation of Legislative Regulations and Law Number 23 of 2014 on Regional Government. For example, article 5 letter g in Law 12/2011 explains the principle of openness in forming laws. Moreover, article 96 describes public participation in-laws through public hearings, work visits, socialization, and seminars. Based on Law Number 23 of 2014 article 354, in producing the Regional Regulations (PERDA), the government should ensure public participation in planning, budgeting, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating regional development policies. The public can also participate in managing regional assets and natural resources and the delivery of public services. Second, the government needs to develop the internal human resource capacity of research agencies in the ministries/agencies. The government policy to improve the quality of policy products shows by increasing organizational capacity, professional human resources, and strengthening the State Administration Agency (LAN). Sherlock and Djani (2015: 2–3) found many government policies that have been created to support the strengthening capacity in the policymaking process. These policies include strengthening LAN’s position to conduct training in public policy analysis, providing performance allowances for the State Civil Service (ASN), establishing the Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP) to manage research funds to civil society organizations, and increasing the number of expert staff from two to five people for each DPR member and the establishment of the DPR Expertise Body.

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The government also created a significant policy to assure the sustainability of NGO organizations by providing financial support. The government issued Presidential Regulation (Perpres) number 16 of 2018 on the Procurement of Goods/Services (PBJ). The Perpres supports government and community partnerships through Type III Self-Management (Swakelola Tipe III) with Community Organizations. This budgeting scheme encouraged NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) to participate in the development process (AKATIGA, 2019). However, if we compare South Korea’s financial support program to NGOs, the Indonesian government program to finance the NGOs is relatively late. In South Korea, it was released after the transition process in 1987. It was followed by a government initiative to fund NGO activities that began during Kim Young Sam’s administration (1993–1998) (Kim, 2009: 879–880). According to Kim, under Kim Dae Jung’s (1998–2002) government, the government expanded government support by creating the Law on Promotion of Non-profit Civil Organizations. Third, the need for proclaimed transparency and good governance, especially at the global level. This was affected by the emergence of the Open Government Partnership (OGP). This initiative has encouraged the policymaking process to be more transparent and accountable. Since 2011 the Indonesian government has been an initiator and a member of the OGP. The Indonesian government’s participation in this global initiative has influenced policymaking at the national and local levels. To support the OGP initiative, the Government of Indonesia has established a National Secretariat for Open Government Indonesia (OGI) coordinated by Bappenas. During the seven years since Indonesia joined the OGP, the Indonesian government has implemented several bureaucratic reforms and new policy initiatives. Among them, the Budget Openness (APBN) policy, One Indonesian Data, Public Consultation Forum, One Map Policy, and Aspiration Services and Online Complaints (LAPOR) in 2011 (Open Government Indonesia, 2017). In making the OGI Action Plan for 2018–2020, the government has collaborated with ministries/agencies and NGOs/CSOs. A total of 21 ministries/agencies and 12 CSOs/NGOs participated in the program. The action plan has 14 commitments with 50 achievement targets. This collaborative initiative has encouraged increased transparency in public budgets and services. In promoting the openness of election data, this joint initiative has won the Silver Award from the Open Government Partnership at the Global Summit in Paris on 7 December 2016. Perludem

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received the award in the category of open election data on the Election API application platform (The Jakarta Post, 2016, 9 December). However, from the implementation side, MediaLink (who was appointed as CSO-OGP Indonesia’s Secretariat) showed that several things need to be evaluated in government commitment and policy implementation (MediaLink, 2020). According to Medialink, the central and regional governments’ commitment to collaborate with NGOs occurred only at the action plan formulation stage and not yet at the program implementation stage. Research by The Policy Lab University of Melbourne and the Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy Studies (PSHK) highlighted the significant role of NGOs in collaborating with policymakers in developing policy such as agenda-setting, policy analysis, and policy formulation and has limited collaboration in policy evaluation and monitoring (Blomkamp et al., 2018: 27–29).

NGO Challenges to Collaborate This section discusses the factors that determine the success of the collaboration between NGOs and the government. The performance and internal capacities of the NGO, such as professionalism, transparency, and reliability of research reports, will be a determinant factor that will influence the tendency to collaborate. Meanwhile, the government’s interest in collaboration was influenced by their perceptions and trust with NGOs and their research collaboration experience. NGOs’ capacity to produce knowledge in a fast, realistic, and highquality manner will be seen as the indicator that will influence collaboration quality. It can also be seen in the level of competence and quality of research results produced by NGOs. At the national level, ministries are most likely to choose reputable NGOs for collaboration. However, it is hard for the government to find credible and competent NGOs to collaborate at the local level. Most local activists are interested in developing their careers in Indonesia’s capital city and joined the sustainable NGOs in Jakarta. Another challenge is there was a negative perception of local NGOs. For example, local NGOs’ growth is not followed by the expanding good corporate NGOs and maintaining the institutional capacity. In the last ten years, the rise of local NGOs has been characterized by monitoring corruption and law enforcement activities. However, some of them are incompetent and not credible, and at the same time, they

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did not improve or invest in developing knowledge and networking. In some cases, these NGOs use corruption issues to gain political or financial incentives to pressure policymakers. It ultimately affects the emergence of a bad image toward NGOs considered as extortionists (Susilo, interview with author, 2019). The uneven improvement of the NGOs and government has produced different modes of power relations. The government’s ability to create policies based on evidence and scientific data is getting stronger. Moreover, the government’s quality of human resources, especially policy analysts, is better now than in previous years. However, in the last six years, Indonesia’s CSO Sustainability Index has only slightly improved based on USAID’s CSO Sustainability Index in 2019 (USAID, 2019). The index counts from a score of 1 to 7. The numbers 1 to 3 indicate an enhanced sustainability index, numbers 3.1 to 5 (evolving sustainability index), and numbers 5.1 to 7 (impeded sustainability index).

From 2014 to 2019, the average score of Indonesia’s NGO sustainability was characterized as an evolving sustainability index. Overall, the scores in each indicator were stable from 2014 to 2019. Of the seven indicators measured, the highest score of Indonesia NGO is the dimension of advocacy, and the lowest score is financial viability (see Table 5.1). The high achievements in advocacy capacity may be influenced by the traditions and approaches that most NGOs chose in Indonesia in New Order regimes. Table 5.1

Indonesia CSO sustainability index 2014–2019

CSO Sustainability Legal environment Organizational capacity Financial viability Advocacy Service provision Sectoral infrastructure Public image

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

4.1 4.3 3.8 4.5 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.3

4.1 4.3 3.8 4.5 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.3

4.1 4.3 3.8 4.5 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.3

4.0 4.4 3.8 4.5 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.2

4.0 4.4 3.8 4.4 3.3 3.7 4.1 4.1

3.9 4.4 3.9 4.3 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.1

Source 2019 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index for Asia, USAID

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Based on USAID (2019) report, compared with 9 Asian countries, Indonesia’s score of 3.9 in 2019 is the same as Bangladesh (3.9). However, Indonesia’s score is still below the Philippines (3.5) and Timor Leste (3.5), the two best countries in the region. Under Indonesia, there were Thailand (5.0); Sri Lanka (4,6); Cambodia (4.6); Burma (4,6); and Nepal (4,3). Another collaboration challenge comes from some NGOs holding negative attitudes toward any NGO that have chosen to engage with the government. Some NGOs have even been stigmatized for collaborating with the government. According to Sherlock and Djani (2015: 29), most knowledge providers still perceived collaboration in the policymaking process as less productive, potentially suffering from corruption, and, in the end, just frustrating. In general, the policy collaboration between NGOs and the government shows an improving trend. Both have developed good initiatives and cooperation. Although on several issues such as electoral reform, the agenda of eradicating corruption, and social policies, not all NGO policy proposals are readily accommodated by policymakers. For example, with the Election Law revision, policymakers did not fully embrace several policy proposals related to strengthening political parties and electoral reforms. These issues include the presidential thresholds, parliamentary thresholds, and district size and magnitude. However, on other issues that do not affect the political survival of parties and candidates, the government and the DPR are more open to new ideas, which can be discerned from policymakers’ accommodations in accepting campaign regulations, election administration, and voting rights for groups with disabilities.

NGO Sustainability This section describes the internal conditions of NGOs that would affect their sustainability in collaborating with policymakers. Currently, NGOs face challenges in improving internal democracy and strengthening organizational capacity. Lehnardt (2005: 1–2) reckon the factor contributing to the decrease of NGO core of legitimacy, such as the lack of internal democracy, professionalism, transparency, and accountability. Lehnardt measured the lack of democracy by seeing the internal democratic processes in the membership base, election for board members, and consensus on projects and issues or lacking NGO representation on issues

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rising in society and community and the public agreement on issues that already rose by NGO. In terms of leadership and internal democracy, many NGOs that have collaborated with policymakers are characterized by democratic NGOs seen by the regular leadership succession, implementing transparent policies, and audited financial reports. Meanwhile, some NGOs that are not currently collaborating with policymakers are characterized by a very dominant personal leadership model, no regeneration, lack of experience, and virtually no improvement of their human resources. It also showed the absence of certainty in career paths for former heads of NGOs. NGO Sustainability is also influenced by institutionalization and organizational capacity. Organizational capacity is measured by adopting a democratic decision-making process, formulating strategic planning, and improving internal accountability and transparency (Antlöv et al., 2005: 9). Amid tight competition for NGOs to access funding, capacity building and professionalism must be seriously considered by NGO activists. It happened due to the increasingly stringent standardization of fund receipts from the international grantor. In the future, NGOs’ encouragement to become more professional by using evidence-based policies must become the identity and characteristic of Indonesian NGOs. It is the best way to survive and collaborate with policymakers and the private sector. Sustainability should also be a concern for NGO leaders during the increasingly limited funding challenges ahead. NGOs think less about sustainability, while funding is getting smaller— because Indonesia has entered the G-20. There are a few NGOs who think about sustainability, including ICW through fundraising and endowment because ICW has succeeded in getting high public support in the issue of eradicating corruption. (Interview with Susilo Zumrotin, 7 October 2019)

This study finds that funding problems can affect the survival and sustainability of NGOs in Indonesia. Currently, most NGOs in Indonesia still rely on funding from international donors. The amount of funds received from international donors is more significant than domestic funds. The results of an analysis of financial reports published by Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), one of Indonesia’s prominent NGOs in fighting against corruption, showed a high gap between funds received from grantors and funds from fundraising activities. ICW’s

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annual financial statements audited by public accountants from 2007 to 2020 showed a downward trend in funds received from grantors in the last five years. In 2014, ICW received IDR 16,551 billion from the grantor and decreased every year. The peak of the decline was in 2017. In 2017, ICW only received 6,096 billion IDR from the grantor. In 2018, funds from grantors increased to 17,473 billion IDR, then dropped drastically in 2019 to 7,777 billion IDR and 7,396 in 2020 (Perkumpulan Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2020). Before 2014, ICW receipts from grantors generally showed an upward trend. In 2007 ICW received grantor funds of 5,172 billion IDR, which then peaked at 16,551 billion IDR in 2014 (See Graph 5.1). In general, there has been a significant decline and change in allocating funds from international donors to NGOs in Indonesia. This change occurred because of Indonesia’s status as a developing and democratic countries. In terms of funding mechanisms, international donor agencies have also changed the government’s disbursement scheme. Simultaneously, the reduction in funding from large donors has made others donor institutions, which were previously grant funders, donor institutions now also seek funding from more prominent donors and take the role of implementing agency. To address this issue of shrinking funding, several Fund from grantor

Fundraising

17,473 16,551

13,299

10,080 8,575 7,777 7,396

7,404

7,188

6,478

6,264

6,096

5,172 4,126 2,399 2,545 231

2007

2008

642

2009

1,333 111

2010

2011

458

2012

790

2013

858

2014

558

2015

648

2016

832

2017

1,015

1,263

2018

Graph 5.1 Fund from grantor and fundraising (in billions IDR)

2019

2020

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NGOs initiated open public fundraising for organizational activities. ICW is one of the NGOs that since 2007 has opened public donations. ICW’s published financial statements showed an increasing trend in public donations. For example, in 2007, ICW only received fundraising of 231 million IDR and reached an increase of around 1000% in 2020, which reached 2,545 billion IDR (see Graph 5.1). Several ICW veterans made a breakthrough by establishing Visi Integritas (Vision of Integrity). Visi Integritas is designed to help business and public sectors uphold transparency, accountability, and anticorruption culture. Another goal is to support the funding and sustainability of ICW activists—amidst the decreasing trend of donations from the grantor. Several senior ICW researchers resigned and joined the Vision of Integrity, including Ade Irawan, Emerson Yuntho, Firdaus Ilyas, Sely Martini, and Danang Widoyoko. Limited funding for NGOs in Indonesia also occurs because not many domestic philanthropists are interested in supporting NGO sustainability. Some philanthropists are only interested in issues with a high level of public awareness, such as corruption, even though donations are minimal. To increase donations and collaboration with private sectors and philanthropies, the government could change the tax policy and provide tax incentives to philanthropists for donations to NGOs (Bakija, 2013: 578). Amid complex challenges, many NGO activists became active in political activities. Many NGO activists transitioned from NGO activists to join political parties, some even running for office (Mietzner, 2013; Perdana, 2015). The transition of NGO activists started to increase in the first and second terms of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In 2009–2014, many NGO activists served on central party boards or ran for legislative candidates from the Democratic Party. Among them were Ulil Absar Abdalla, Ikhsan Modjo, Rachlan Nasidiq, Kastorius Sinaga, and others (Viva.co.id., 2013, 6 March). In the last two elections, the model has changed from being a party member to volunteering for the presidential campaign team or being in presidential circles, such as Teten Masduki, Abetnego Tarigan, Usep Setiawan, Iwan Nurdin, and others (www.kumparan.com, 2020, 24 February).

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Final Notes In the past 20 years, NGOs and policymakers have been interested in collaborating to make a better policy outcome. Joint initiatives in several policies have been implemented successfully to changing approaches by both NGOs and policymakers. Policymakers are open to collaborating, and there is always the need to make prudent policies. NGOs are interested in collaborating due to the need to survive, be sustainable, and contribute to a better policymaking process. Collaborative initiatives are sometimes initiated by multi-stakeholders, either from the government, DPR, NGOs, or private sectors. However, amid this changing approach, NGOs face unresolved internal problems, such as internal democratization and regeneration, sustainable funding, and the lack of organizational capacity and human resources. Acknowledgements The writer wishes to thank Fayren Chaerunnissa and Salsabila Fitristanti for their help with this project. Both are interns at CSIS at the time of the writing of this chapter.

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https://ogi.bappenas.go.id/storage/files/report/JaPuAtBFPc1EuYYoMfoR4 DjJfNzkKikdIouXdc1e.pdf https://www.kppod.org/backend/files/laporan_penelitian/Evaluasi%20Seta hun%20OSS-KPPOD.pdf Indonesia now upper-middle income country, the World Bank says. (2020, 2 July). The Jakarta post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/ 09/indonesias-perludem-wins-3rd-open-government-award-at-ogp-summit. html. Indonesia’s Perludem wins 3rd open government award at OGP summit. (2016, 9 December). The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/ 2016/12/09/indonesias-perludem-wins-3rd-open-government-award-atogp-summit.html Kim, E. (2009). The limits of NGO-government relations in South Korea. Asian Survey, 49(5), 873–894. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2009.49.5.873 KPPOD. (2019). Evaluasi Setahun Online Single Submission: Studi Pelaksanaan PP No. 24 Tahun 2018 di Daerah. Jakarta. Lee, S.-J., & Arrington, C. (2008). The politics of NGOs and democratic governance in South Korea and Japan. Pacific Focus, 23(1), 75–96. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2008.00005.x Lehnardt, R. L. (2005). NGO legitimacy: Reassessing democracy, accountability and transparency. Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers. Paper 6. Mietzner, M. (2013). Fighting the hellhounds: Pro-democracy activists and party politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 43, 28–50. Open Government Indonesia. (2017). Laporan Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Open Government Indonesia Tahun 2017. Orang-orang Jokowi: Kisah Aktivis Masuk Istana [Jokowi’s People: The Story of Activists Entering the Palace]. (2020, 24 February). https://kumparan. com/kumparannews/orang-orang-jokowi-kisah-aktivis-masuk-istana-1su2OV pLufI/full Perdana, A. (2015). The politics of Civil Society Organization (CSOs) PostReformation 1998.” LabSosio. Pusat Kajian Sosiologi FISIP-UI. https://www. antikorupsi.org/sites/default/files/dokumen/audit_keuangan_icw_2020.pdf Perkumpulan Indonesia Corruption Watch. (2020). Financial Statement, 2 June 2021”. Jakarta. Perludem. (2020). Naskah Akademik dan Rancangan Undang-Undang Versi Masyarakat Sipil [Academic Manuscripts and Draft Laws Version of Civil Society]. http://perludem.org/2020/01/01/naskah-akademik-dan-ran cangan-undang-undang-pemilu-versi-masyarakat-sipil/. Power, T. P. (2018). Jokowi’s authoritarian turn and Indonesia’s democratic decline. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 54(3), 307–338. https:// doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918

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Interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) Anggraini, Titi. (2019). Interview with author, 24 September, Jakarta. Gumay, H. (2020). Interview with author, 5 March, Jakarta. Husodo, A. T. (2019). Focus Group Discussion with author, 16 March, Jakarta.

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Isnur, M. (2019). Interview with author, 14 October, Jakarta. Khalid, K. (2019). Focus Group Discussion with author, 16 March, Jakarta. Maftuchan, A. H. (2019). Interview with author, 25 September, Jakarta. Susilo, Zumrotin (2019). Interview with author, 7 October, Jakarta.

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CHAPTER 6

From Poster Child to Poor Cousin? Expanding the Frontiers of Economic Democracy in South Korea Nancy Y. Kim and Hannah Jun

Abstract In this chapter, we investigate the relatively less-explored dimension of economic democracy. The Korean paradox of authoritarianled inclusive development in the 1960s–1980s has given way to a reverse paradox of democracy and economic insecurity since the late 1990s. Growing dissatisfaction with democracy in Korea is a serious concern for democracy’s proponents, and the acceleration of economic inequality during the recent COVID-19 pandemic may bring these concerns to a tipping point. This chapter proposes that Korean elites have embraced a thin, neoliberal version of economic democracy which fetishizes economic liberalization, and further argues that there are alternative notions of economic democracy that can usher a fair(er) social compact in Korea that aligns with strong, egalitarian notion of economic democracy.

N. Y. Kim (B) · H. Jun Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, South Korea

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_6

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Keywords Democratic resilience · Economic democracy · Political culture · South Korea

Introduction From political and social (civil society) aspects of democracy in South Korea (hereafter, “Korea”), this chapter turns to the relatively lessexplored dimension of economic democracy. Of the three dimensions of democracy (political, social, economic), economic democratic outcomes arguably preceded political and social democratic ones in Korea. They were, in fact, used by military dictator Park Chung-hee to justify his coupinstalled authoritarian regime, and Korean workers—with their demands for a more equitable share of Korea’s development success—were key contributors to the democracy movement. At the same time, economic democracy is now the most contested of the three democratic dimensions and has fared the worst during Korea’s ongoing period of democratic consolidation since its democratic transition in 1987. While Korean citizens seem to embrace a strong, thick, egalitarian understanding of economic democracy, narrow elite (both conservative and progressive) conceptions of economic democracy limit policy discourse and options. In addition, poverty, income equality, vulnerable employment, and other indicators of economic insecurity have steadily increased over the past three decades. Although these challenges are not unique to Korea, COVID-19 has further exposed Korea’s large economic democratic deficit, which threatens to pose significant obstacles to further democratic consolidation. For years touted as the poster child among developing nations for its rapid and equitable development, Korea is now looking more like a “poor cousin” among developed countries. Moreover, because economic conditions have deteriorated alongside Korea’s democratization, affected citizens are increasingly dissatisfied with democracy writ large. This chapter investigates the idea of economic democracy in Korea and its potential in contributing to greater democratic consolidation. At the forefront, we suggest that Korea’s current elite-driven, neoliberalinfluenced focus on economic liberalism may provide a weak base for democratic consolidation. Without greater attention to more robust, thicker economic democracy, the entire democratic project is at risk.

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From Poster Child to Poor Cousin Among the three dimensions of democracy—political, social, and economic—economic democracy (or at least democratic economic outcomes) was arguably the first to develop in Korea. Park Chung-hee’s developmental state (1960–1979) state envisioned from the outset that national economic development should benefit the entire society, albeit via a trickle-down, business-first process. This was evident in Park Chunghee’s personal commitment to eradicating poverty (Kim, 1997: 101), and was continued by his successor Chun Doo-hwan’s statements that “economic stability is the very core of welfare” and that “a system of welfare… should be based on stable economic growth and equal job opportunities for all people” (Chun, 1984). These were not just empty promises by the developmental state. It delivered handily on poverty alleviation, reducing the poverty rate from 60–70% in the mid-1960s to under 4% in the mid-1990s (Henderson et al., 2002). It invested “renowned levels…in human capital” (Evans, 2014: 102–103) and achieved universal primary and secondary education by 1960 and 1980, respectively (Ministry of Education, 2015). It increased health care coverage from 0.06% in 1970 to 92% in 1989 (Economic Planning Board, 1990) and extended life expectancy from 16 years below the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average in 1960 to two years above the average today (OECD, 2020a). Moreover, and counter to global trends, Korea’s spectacular economic growth was for many years accompanied by relatively equal income distribution compared to other countries (Kim et al., 2011; Siddiqi & Hertzman, 2001: 331). In part due to post-colonial, post-war land reforms, of 41 countries for which data were compared, Korea had among the lowest levels of land and income inequality in 1960 (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994 in Rodrik, 1995). Indeed, it was lauded as one of a few exceptional success stories in achieving “growth with equity” (World Bank, 1993). Against this backdrop, Korea is often portrayed as the poster child among developing nations for achieving rapid and broad-based development. However, since its dual transition of democratization and economic liberalization in 1987, Korea has experienced growing economic inequality and insecurity. Korea’s disposable (post-tax and -transfer) Gini coefficient has steadily trended up from 0.25 in 1992 to 0.32 in 2009 and 0.35 in 2017 (Choi, 2014; OECD, 2021). Another indicator of

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inequality—labor share of income (adjusted to include the labor income of self-employed)—is estimated to have declined more than 10 points from 1995 to 2017 (An et al., 2021; Lee, 2015; Pak et al., 2019). Among OECD countries, in 2017, Korea had the fourth highest (90:10 ratio) income inequality (OECD, 2021a); fourth highest relative poverty rate (17%; OECD, 2021b); highest old-age poverty rate (44%; OECD, 2021b); third highest incidence of low-paid workers (22%; OECD, 2021c); and fourth highest proportion of temporary (i.e., potentially precarious) workers (24%; OECD, 2021d). Given these trends, Korea is beginning to look less like a poster child for development and more like a “poor cousin” among developed nations. Moreover, this deterioration of economic security since Korea’s democratic transition casts a shadow over prospects for democratic consolidation. We explore these dynamics in the sections below.

Democratization and Economic Liberalization: Dynamic Duo? The decades following South Korea’s first democratic election in 1987 are commonly characterized as a period of dual transition to democracy and a free market. This “dynamic duo” (Kalinowski, 2007) has been portrayed and promoted by neoliberal countries (including the US, the reigning world hegemon) and global governance institutions (e.g., International Monetary Fund [IMF], World Bank, World Trade Organization) as natural complements (Chang, 2007; Kalinowski, 2007). Buying into the narrative that “there is no alternative” (as purported by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher), from the early 1990s, democratically elected Korean regimes began liberalizing the economy. The Kim Young-sam regime (1993–1998) started with financial liberalization as part of its bid to globalize and join the OECD (Dent, 2003: 263; Lee, 2002: 15; Lee & Lee, 2015: 131). Economic liberalization then accelerated and deepened under the Kim Dae-jung government as part of Korea’s IMF-led recovery from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Kim, 1997; Song, 2013). Economic liberalization, however, has not delivered on the promise of ever-increasing growth and prosperity—at least not for all segments of society. The broad-based, equitable growth of the latter half of the twentieth century has given way to duality and inequality in the twentyfirst century. Whereas the developmental state’s planned economy ensured that labor obtained a more equitable share of national economic gains via

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full employment and corporate welfare, such trickle-down effects have dried up under the democratic state’s liberal economy. Broadly speaking, economic liberalism has liberated business to pursue growth and to hoard a larger share of financial gains at the expense of labor. Economic liberalism’s insistence on labor market flexibility has created labor market duality and inequality. Liberated (from labor market regulation) companies are increasingly replacing regular workers with non-regular workers, e.g., dispatched workers, fixed-term workers, part-time workers (Jung & Cheon, 2006; Shin, 2013). The proportion of non-regular workers has steadily and significantly increased since economic—and particularly since labor market—liberalization. According to the officially agreed-upon definition of non-regular workers by tripartite agreement in Korea, the proportion of non-regular workers grew from 27% in 2001 to 36% in 2020 (Ha & Lee, 2013; KNSO, 2020a). By a broader measure that considers some permanent workers (those that have less job security and/or fewer benefits) to be non-regular, the proportion of non-regular workers rises to above 50% (Ha & Lee, 2013). That this large (by either measure) group of non-regular workers is indeed a “precariat” is illustrated by the gap in earnings and social security between non-regular and regular workers. Non-regular workers earn less than half the average monthly wage of regular workers (MOEL, 2019). And while almost all regular workers are enrolled in employment insurance, health insurance, and the national pension scheme, only 74%, 64%, and 61% of non-regular workers are covered by employment insurance, health insurance, and the national pension scheme, respectively (MOEL, 2019). These disparities contribute to Korea’s high incidence of relative poverty and working poor—17% (fourth highest in the OECD) and 22% (third highest in the OECD), respectively (OECD, 2021b, 2021c). In 2010, the Korea Labor Institute estimated that non-regular workers accounted for 45% of the poor—a more significant share even than unemployed workers, which accounted for 33% of the poor (Lee et al., 2010; Shin, 2013). Given these conditions, it is not surprising that non-regular workers have lower marriage and fertility rates. Those with children cannot afford the increasing amounts of private spending on education, perpetuating the cycle of socio-economic inequality (OECD, 2016). Economic crises—the increasing incidence of which some attribute to economic and mainly financial liberalization (Chang et al.,, 1998)—have

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further accelerated the trend of socio-economic inequality. During periods of economic crisis, companies push for and take advantage of labor flexibility to preserve profits through layoffs and/or replacing regular workers with lower-cost non-regular workers. Each of the economic crises since Korea’s dual transition—1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 2007 Global Financial Crisis, and 2020 COVID-19 Pandemic—has provided an opportunity for business to squeeze labor in this manner. That more and more of the risks and negative impacts of economic downturns are being borne by labor is illustrated by not only the increasing proportion of non-regular workers (27% in 2002 to 35% in 2020) but also by the distribution of income across classes. The capital share of national income increased by more than 10 points from 1996 to 2010 (Lee, 2015), while the labor share of national income declined by more than 10 points from 1995 to 2017 (An et al., 2021; Pak et al., 2019). The middle class has shrunk from 53% of the population in 1996 to 45% in 2010 (Koo, 2021). Over this same period (1996–2010), the share of national income commanded by the middle-income and lower-income groups declined by 14% and 1%, respectively (Koo, 2021). The high-income group, in contrast, increased its income share by 15% during this same period (Koo, 2021). This trend of socio-economic polarization has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Already disadvantaged irregular and small and medium enterprise (SME) workers and small business owners have been disproportionately affected by the pandemic-induced economic crisis. According to Statistics Korea, as of the second quarter of 2020, yearon-year, those in the top (wealthiest) income quintile group saw their incomes increase, while all other income quintile groups experienced income declines, with the lowest income quintile group experiencing the largest decline (KNSO, 2021). Preliminary data indicates that job losses as well have been much more pronounced for irregular workers than for regular workers. A survey conducted in March 2021 found that five times as many non-regular workers (35.8%) suffered job loss compared to regular workers (7.2%) (Yonhap News Agency, 2021a). This phenomenon is being referred to as a K-shaped economic recovery due to its differential (and inequality enhancing) recovery pattern—a robust V-shaped rebound for the well-off and protracted, inverted V-shaped contraction for already-hard-pressed segments of the population. Research has shown that a country’s degree of openness (economic liberalization) is positively correlated with the level of social protection, as states find it necessary to compensate the losers of globalization (Rodrik,

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1995). Korea has not been immune to such pressures. Peng describes welfare state expansion as a quid pro quo for economic liberalization (and particularly labor “flexibilization”) in the aftermath of the AFC (Peng, 2014: 397). Some describe the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) as the turning point in Korea from productivist, residual welfare provision to a universal, inclusive welfare state (Kim et al., 2011; Peng, 2014; Song, 2003: 415–425). Social spending grew from 1.3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1997 to 3.3% in 2001 and 12.2% in 2019 (Kim et al., 2011: 130; OECD, 2022a). This enabled expansion of employment insurance coverage, consolidation of the National Pension, consolidation and near-universal coverage of the National Health System, and adoption of the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (social assistance to the poor to enable a basic minimum standard of living) (Kim et al., 2011; Peng, 2014; Song, 2003). Despite these advances, we argue that Korea’s welfare system remains strongly productivist. Korea’s continued low level of social spending (12.2% of GDP in 2019 compared to the OECD average of 20%) supports this view (OECD, 2021e). Moreover, productivist welfare relies less on redistributive transfers, thus requiring relatively lower social spending levels. Rather, productivist welfare states expect and facilitate people to meet their welfare needs through employment income and employer-provided benefits (Holliday, 2000; Rudra, 2007). Such an approach relies on full and decently paid employment so that workers can contribute to the broader economy and provide for themselves and their families. Unfortunately, in Korea, this model is breaking down given the increasing prevalence of non-regular work, which is precarious, low-paid, and/or does not ensure access to social security. While the Korean precariat have for some time been absorbing more and more of the socio-economic risk from which business has been liberated—taking on multiple jobs and working long hours to enjoy the same or lower standards of living—the latest COVID-19-induced economic crisis may be pushing the situation to a boiling point. With job losses for non-regular workers estimated at 36% (five times greater than for regular workers) (Yonhap News Agency, 2021a)—and many non-regular workers not eligible for employment insurance or employment stability (job protection) subsidies (KLI, 2020)—the precariat have exhausted the options for sustaining their livelihoods. Non-regular workers that remain employed face other challenges. Many work in the service sector, e.g., restaurants, hotels, delivery companies (KNSO, 2020b), making them

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especially vulnerable to contracting COVID-19. And given the instability and low pay associated with these jobs, many non-regular workers work excessive hours. In the past year, the media has reported at least 17 cases of delivery workers dying from exhaustion; the same media reports indicate that it is typical for delivery workers to work more than 70hrs per week (Korea Joongang Daily, 2021; Yonhap News Agency, 2021b). Faced with such widespread economic insecurity, the government has had to take extraordinary social protection measures, as it did in the aftermath of the AFC. In addition to emergency relief funds which were provided to all households, the government provided an Emergency Employment Stability Subsidy to non-regular workers who are excluded from the Employment Insurance system (ILO, 2020). The government is also considering various options for enrolling all excluded workers in the Employment Insurance system by 2025 (ILO, 2020). The combined forces of a large and growing precariat, COVID19-induced economic contraction, and weak automatic stabilizers are exerting expansionary pressures on Korea’s social protection system. In the short run, the government exhausted its fiscal space and went into deficit (from a surplus in 2019) to address welfare needs as part of a more comprehensive economic stimulus package (OECD, 2020b). As the country moves forward into the post-COVID-19, Fourth Industrial Revolution-powered future, the time is ripe for a re-negotiation of the social compact to ensure the welfare of all segments of society even in low(er) growth and less-than-full employment scenarios. As we discuss in the next section, failure to address the concerns and demands of the precariat poses a real risk to Korean democracy.

Dissatisfaction with Life, Dissatisfaction with Democracy In Korea’s case, public expectations for the government to act as the primary guarantor of economic well-being began as early as the 1960s. The April Revolution of 1960 sprung from public opposition to President Rhee Syngman’s management of the economy and later revelations of election rigging, with an activist of the time noting that “neither freedom nor bread was possible under Rhee’s government” (Yang, 1973: 56). While this led to the election of Chang Myon as Prime Minister of Korea’s Second Republic, Chang’s inability to implement economic reform, overcome political factionalization, and address pressing economic needs

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eventually led to his removal and paved the way for a military coup led by Park Chung-hee. Thus, early in Korea’s history, we see that poor socioeconomic outcomes resulted in disillusionment severe enough to topple regimes—even democratically elected ones. The pivotal role of the government in securing economic stability and propelling growth strengthened during the tenure of President Park Chung-hee. Economic planning and reform were centralized in the Economic Planning Board. A slew of five-year economic and social development plans continued through to the mid-1990s—well after democratization and direct presidential elections took place in 1987. We can argue that this legacy of the firm-handed role of government in economic affairs has been extended to the present, as citizens look to the presidential office to provide for national economic well-being and welfare. Thus, in Korea’s democracy, the legitimacy of the democratic political system hinges on the ability to deliver on its economic promises. In Korea, three decades of “economic growth with equity” under authoritarian regimes have been followed by three decades of economic insecurity and inequality under democratic regimes. Satisfaction with Korean democracy has been eroding in line with economic conditions. Dissatisfaction with how democracy works in Korea has increased from 18% in 1996 to 38% in 2003 and 36% in 2015 (Korea Democracy Barometer and Asian Barometer Survey in Kang, 2015: 497). The percentage of citizens dissatisfied with democracy as a political system increased from 16% during the period 1994–1998 to 30% during the period 2017–2020 (World Values Survey, 2021). This is not only the largest deterioration among Asian democracies surveyed but also positions Korea as the Asian country that is least satisfied with democracy. Research suggests that dissatisfaction with economic inequality is a significant determinant of dissatisfaction with democracy in Korea. Kang (2015) finds that among a variety of political and economic variables traditionally correlated with satisfaction with democracy, in Korea, “citizens’ concerns about rapidly increasing inequality and dissatisfaction with the welfare regime were significantly related to their level of satisfaction with democracy.” This finding further supports the correlation between dissatisfaction with economic inequality and dissatisfaction with democracy. Koreans—more so than those in other Asian countries—consider economic equality to be an essential property of democracy (Asian Barometer Survey Phase 2 in Shin & Cho, 2010: 32–33). Similarly, in response to the 2009 International Social Survey Survey, over 75%

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of Koreans responded that the government should ensure economic equality (Kang, 2015). Of course, unlike authoritarianism, democracy is seen as offering a pressure valve that is absent from other forms of governance. Unpopular or ineffective governments can be democratically removed and replaced through elections without systemic upheaval (Pei & Adesnik, 2000). However, the perennial challenge is that these transitions do not always produce economic and social security. For systems in which economic well-being has been a longstanding cornerstone of government priority and policy, this can lead to even greater disillusionment. Indeed, this democratic pressure release valve of electorally determined regime change has been tried and found wanting in recent years in Korea. Three conservative and three progressive regimes have been elected since the democratic transition: Kim Young-sam (1993–1998, center-right); Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003, left); Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008, left); Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013, right); Park Geun-hye (2013–2017, right); Moon Jae-in (2017–present, left). Economic insecurity and inequality have increased throughout this period, irrespective of regime, albeit with some minor fluctuations and reversals. Thus, following more than three decades of deteriorating economic security under six democratically-elected regimes, some Koreans seem to be losing faith in the idea that ultimately all (or at least most) will benefit from democracy (Shin et al., 2003; Howe, 2020). This fatalism is evident in perceptions of social mobility. Whereas more than 60% of parents surveyed in 1994 expected their children to fare better than themselves, this figure declined to less than 40% in 2013 (Kim, 2021: 3–4). Responses to a similar World Values Survey question regarding “standard of living compared to parents” indicate significant social stratification. Fourteen (14), 6, and 0% of low-, middle-, and high-income respondents, respectively, believe that they will be worse off than their parents (WVS, 2021). Taken to an extreme, socio-economic insecurity may be contributing to Korea’s high (highest in the OECD in 2018) suicide rate (OECD, 2022b). Researchers have found that relative income deprivation is associated with higher rates of suicide fantasy, planning, and attempts (Pak & Choung, 2020). Finally, disillusionment and dissatisfaction with democracy are manifesting as nostalgia for authoritarian regimes and those regimes’ ability to deliver socio-economic security (Kang, 2016). According to the 2010 Korean Democracy Barometer Survey, more than

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one-third (35%) of respondents rated the authoritarian, military coupinstalled Park Chung-hee regime as the best government since the 1960s (Kang, 2016: 52). Indeed, some attribute the election of President Park Geun-hye in 2013 to nostalgia for the broad-based economic benefits delivered by her father, Park Chung-hee (Kang, 2016: 52). These developments should raise the alarm for proponents of democracy. They support the notion that “democracy will be undermined if it cannot deliver the goods in the economic sphere” (Elster, 1993: 268). For Koreans, it seems that one of the most desired economic “goods” is economic equality. In the next section, we explore this egalitarian conception of democracy and how it can be pursued through economic democracy.

Expanding the Frontiers of Economic Democracy In this section, we unpack and refute the perceived (by a growing share of the Korean public) causal link between democracy and economic inequality. We argue that economic inequality in Korea is a result of democratic deficit rather than democratic transition. Democratic deficit is particularly wide in the economic sphere. Economic democracy is still underdeveloped in Korea, as it has been limited by an elite notion that economic democracy is analogous with economic liberalism. Given Korean citizens’ much broader, egalitarian ideas of democracy and democratic economic outcomes, the time is ripe to expand the debate on economic democracy beyond narrow elite contestations. In fact, this is critical to the process of democratic consolidation in Korea. Reflecting the global neoliberal hegemony of the past several decades, economic liberalism has been pursued by Korea’s political elite alongside political and social democratization. Since the early 1990s, both progressive and conservative regimes have sought to deepen economic liberalization. Conservatives have emphasized the deregulation aspect of economic liberalization—seeking to extend democratic rights (i.e., right to operate businesses without excessive state interference) to the private sector, including chaebol, via deregulation (Doucette, 2015). Progressives have split into two camps. One camp of progressives pursues chaebol regulation as the core of economic liberalization—advocating for greater regulation of chaebol monopolies to even the playing field for SMEs (Doucette, 2015). Another camp of progressives—perhaps better described as welfare capitalists than economic liberals—sees redistribution

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as the key to economic democracy; and is willing to accept a leading role for strong national champions (i.e., chaebol) in exchange for greater redistribution of chaebol profits to fund a more comprehensive welfare system (Chang et al., 2012). While the above-described economic policy prescriptions are varied and vigorously debated by their elite proponents, they share a “capital-centric” core (Doucette, 2015; Jeong, 2010). They put business (whether chaebol or SME) interests first. At best, they promise that a strong, enabled private sector will deliver a certain minimum level of economic well-being for all. At worst, they prioritize private sector rights over societal rights; and provide no guarantee of economic well-being for all. While the current visions of economic democracy vary regarding the degree of responsibility (for societal well-being) imposed on the private sector, they all assume the primacy of private sector rights—in particular, the right of the private sector to prosper. It seems, however, that the Korean elite’s embrace of “thin” economic democracy focused narrowly on liberating the private sector is misaligned with Korean society’s “thick” or “strong” conception of economic democracy. The appropriate mix of liberty and equality in a democracy has been much debated and indeed should continue to be debated by each democratic society. Democratic Korea has missed out on much of this debate, its elites having adopted wholesale the “dynamic duo” of democratization and economic liberalization during the neoliberal era. Thus, while economic liberalization (with its prioritization of liberty) dominates Korean elites’ understanding of economic democracy, Korean society, in part drawing on communitarian and/or Confucian roots, demands that democracy deliver equality of economic process and outcomes (Shin, 2011). Koreans expect from democracy not only liberty (the right to pursue one’s interests) but also, and perhaps more so, equality (the right to a fair share). The idea that democracy must prioritize economic liberalism above all limits the democratic policy toolkit. It requires the state and society to make democratic concessions to economic actors (i.e., allow them to operate unfettered) without imposing democratic responsibilities on economic actors. In this thin conception of economic democracy, already powerful economic actors benefit more (from liberalization) than they contribute (to equality). Drawing on Barber’s (1984) conception of “strong” political democracy, we call for strong economic democracy. Strong economic democracy

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seeks to subject the economy to democratic principles. Malleson rightly questions why so many economic decisions—e.g., wages, working hours, public investment, monetary policy—are made undemocratically, even in democracies (2013: 87–88). After all, “if democracy is justified in governing the state, then it must also be justified in governing economic enterprises; and to say that it is not justified in governing economic enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing the state” (Dahl, 1985: 111; Malleson, 2013: 88). Substantive expansion of democracy to the economic sphere must also be accompanied by wider participation. Cho (2010, 2012) calls for “de-monopolization” of the economy so that “diverse subaltern groups” (irregular workers, women, elderly, youth, minorities, etc.) can participate in and benefit from the economy. At the very least, there is a need to strengthen legitimate representative bodies such as labor unions and cooperatives (Doucette, 2015; Jeong, 2009a, 2009b; Malleson, 2013). We also draw on Barber’s (1984) idea of strengthening democracy through “talk.” We call for more discussion and debate on the version of economic democracy that is acceptable to Korean society. In Korea, vigorous democratic debate may lead the country to attempt chaebol-led, redistributive welfare capitalism; or demand even more economic powersharing; or prefer a return to Confucian family welfare made possible by full and decent employment; or other visions may emerge. The key is that more economic issues (not just those deemed relevant by the elite, presumably because they do not threaten the status quo) need to be on the table for consideration and negotiation by all of society (not just by the elite and their representatives). Democratic “talk” can help restore the balance of power between socio-economic classes (Lee, 2012a, b), as demanded by Koreans’ strong, egalitarian conception of democracy.

Conclusion The Korean paradox of authoritarian-led inclusive development in the 1960s–1980s has since the late 1990s given way to a reverse paradox of democracy and economic insecurity. Deteriorating economic conditions, particularly for a large and growing precariat, is tarnishing Korea’s record of “growth with equity” and fomenting a backlash against democracy. More than one-third of Koreans are currently dissatisfied with democracy, and more than one-third of Koreans are nostalgic for the authoritarian Park Chung-hee regime. This is cause for concern for proponents of

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democracy. Not because democracy has been tried and has failed; but because democracy has failed to truly be tried. In particular, democracy has not been sufficiently applied to the economic sphere. Instead, Korean elites have embraced a thin, neoliberal version of economic democracy which fetishizes economic liberalization. Thin economic democracy has produced unacceptable levels of inequality and insecurity; and, in turn, has produced among the highest levels of dissatisfaction with democracy in Asia. To insist at all costs on preserving this system, the dynamic duo of democracy and neoliberalism, is a crisis of democratic imagination. We have shown that there are other, stronger notions of economic democracy. We propose that these and other visions be robustly debated as part of the process of negotiating a fair(er) social compact in Korea, one that is more in line with Koreans’ strong, egalitarian notion of economic democracy. After all, the one thing that we have hopefully learned from the neoliberal “Washington Consensus” era is that there is no one-size-fits-all model of development. Different countries and societies may choose to arrange their economies and democracies differently. But by any measure of democracy or good governance, the economy should serve society, not vice versa (Polanyi, 2001).

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CHAPTER 7

Socio-Economic Conditions and Indonesian Democratic Support Puspa D. Amri

Abstract This chapter investigates the extent to which socio-economic conditions affect support for democracy in Indonesia, using an econometric analysis of a national pre-election survey fielded in March 2019. Among existing studies of public support for and satisfaction with democracy, economic arguments have been especially influential, particularly in new democracies where citizens tend to associate democracy with economic performance. This chapter extends the literature by (1) testing whether the relationship between economic satisfaction and democratic support depends on the salience of economic issues to the respondents and (2) disaggregating economic performance into four different areas: economic growth, inflation, unemployment, and income inequality. The analysis demonstrates that the Indonesian case is consistent with

P. D. Amri (B) CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia Sonoma State University, Rohnert Park, CA, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_7

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a comparative finding across countries: citizens translate a worsening of economic conditions into critical attitudes toward the political system. Keywords Democratic support · Economic conditions · Government performance · Income inequality · Public opinion

Introduction Over the past decade, we have seen a worrying trend in the health of democratic regimes globally. Not only are elites reverting to authoritarian practices (e.g., repressing their opposition and curbing free speech), but we also see more and more of the public turning away from supporting democracy (Foa & Mounk, 2016). Despite significant achievements since 1998, Indonesia only recently appears to be catching up with this global trend, according to comparative indexes produced by Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Varieties of Democracy project (Fossati & Martinez i Coma, 2020: 171; Power, 2018: 308). The practice of democracy in Indonesia has faced challenges such as violence and discrimination against minorities, as well as arbitrary use of blasphemy and defamation laws to curb free speech (Amri & Intan, 2020). Developments that have unfolded in 2020 since the outbreak of COVID-19 appear to reinforce this trend. This is shown by attempts to silence those criticizing the government’s response to managing the COVID-19 pandemic (Rakhmat, 2020). It is imperative to understand the reasons behind this democratic decline. For democracy to flourish at the country level, its society needs to be steady in its commitment to democratic principles (Chang et al., 2007: 66). A populace that tolerates illiberal practices by the state opens the window to the possibility of an authoritarian reversal. Therefore, it is important to study factors that can sustain (or weaken) public support for democracy among the electorate (Graham & Svolik, 2020). Much of the scholarly work on this question highlights political factors that lie within the system’s input-side, such as the degree of representation (Dahlberg et al., 2015; Norris, 2011). A separate point of view focuses instead on studying economic discontent (including growing income inequality) as a source of declining support for democracy, especially among newer democracies (e.g., Daoust & Nadeau, 2020; Krieckhaus

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et al., 2014; Quaranta & Martini, 2016; Wu & Chang, 2019). The reason is straightforward: worsening economic situations and growing income disparity can elicit strong political backlash, which can quickly and easily breed discontent with democracy. Moreover, populist political entrepreneurs often use income disparity to mobilize voters (Carreras, 2012), which deepens polarization and, in turn, worsens democratic quality. Expanding on this growing literature, this chapter brings the Indonesian case into the conversation with a rich survey literature on determinants of public support for democracy (e.g., Clarke et al., 1993; Krieckhaus et al., 2014; Norris, 2011; Wu & Chang, 2019). I investigate the extent to which socio-economic conditions affect support for democracy in Indonesia, using statistical analysis of a national pre-election survey fielded in March 2019. Some of the existing literature on democratic support and the economy focus exclusively on Indonesia. Arguing that support for democracy is contingent on the ability of the regime to deliver good economic performance, Mujani et al. (2018: 16–19) found that favorable perceptions of government performance (which they argue is positively correlated with economic performance) lead to more positive attitudes toward democracy. Muhtadi and Warburton (2020) investigate whether sharpened perceptions of income disparity have led Indonesians to be less supportive of democracy. However, what exactly does “economic performance” mean—performance in which areas? The first way in which this chapter departs from related work is by disaggregating economic performance into four different areas: economic growth, inflation, unemployment, and income inequality. Second, I test whether the relationship between economic satisfaction and democratic support depends on the salience of economic issues to the respondents. I expect that individuals who think of the economy (e.g., inflation, lack of jobs) as the most critical problem facing the nation are more likely to blame democracy for a lousy economy than those who attach less salience to economic issues. Lastly, this chapter also tests whether perceptions of income inequality, conditional on citizen evaluation of government performance in reducing income inequality, are related to lower democratic support. It stands to reason that studying the relationship between economic dissatisfaction and democratic support is particularly important for Indonesia, where the vast majority of citizens (approximately 70%) believe that the economy is more important than democracy (Pietsch, 2015: 38).

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This suggests that many Indonesians think of democracy simply as an instrument to achieve welfare rather than a system that protects civil liberties (Fossati & Martinez i Coma, 2020: 166). Such a narrow mass understanding of democracy can be harmful if society becomes tolerant of authoritarian practices from the elites for the sake of improving welfare (Fossati & Martinez i Coma, 2020; Muhtadi, 2020). The rest of the chapter proceeds in the following structure. The next section summarizes democratic progress and economic development in Indonesia since 1998. Section ‘Literature Review: Democratic Support and Economic Satisfaction’ overviews the relevant literature and formulates the research question, while Sect. ‘Data and Methodology’ discusses the survey data set, explains the methodology, and presents the statistical findings. A summary, conclusion, and suggestions for future research will be given in the last section.

Democratic Progress and Economic Development Since 1998: A Brief Overview Indonesia’s democracy has come a long way since 1998, and in several important ways, it has exceeded expectations (Hicken, 2020: 43). Like many other countries going through a democratic transition, the first few years were quite rocky, marred by violent ethnic conflicts and threats from Islamic terrorist groups (Diamond, 2010; Tadjoeddin, 2012). Despite these challenges, the political situation slowly stabilized over the next few years. In 2004, the country held its first direct presidential election. In 2005, voters directly elected their governors, mayors, and local representatives. From 1999 to 2008, data compiled by institutions such as Freedom House document continuous democratic improvements, citing notable progress in political rights and participation, freedom of expression, as well as government accountability (Freedom House, 2009). Most observers can also agree that a notable part of Indonesia’s democracy is the active and vibrant civil society (e.g., Yazid & Pakpahan, 2019: 82). Unfortunately, this relatively successful first decade of democratization did not translate into a more consolidated democracy in the decade that followed. Rather, it has gradually become less democratic since reaching its peak in 2005–2008 (Fossati & Martinez i Coma, 2020: 171). A large part of that decline is attributed to setbacks in the area of protection of civil liberties, although Indonesia continues to be rated favorably in terms of its electoral democracy (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019).

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On the economic front, the democratic transition in 1998 was in part triggered by the economic consequences of the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis. At the peak of the crisis in 1998, the consumer price level grew by 77%, while Gross Domestic Product fell by 13% (Statistics Indonesia). Nevertheless, Indonesia’s economic recovery and performance have been quite impressive (Basri & Hill, 2020). Not only has Indonesia steadily grown at a fast clip (averaging 5.4% per year between 2002 and 2018 according to data from Statistics Indonesia), but it also has the world’s most stable economic growth rate over the same period (Burke & Siyaranamual, 2019). Indonesia has also had great success in bringing down inflation rates. Thanks to prudent macroeconomic management, including the establishment of an independent central bank, over the past five years annual inflation rate has hovered around 3–4%, which is substantially lower than the figures recorded in the 2000s (inflation averaged 8.6% per year from 2000 to 2010, per Statistics Indonesia). However, after six straight years of growth above 6% from 2007 to 2012 (except a slowdown in 2009 due to the Global Financial Crisis), the Indonesian economy began to decelerate during the second presidential term of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (McLeod & Rosdaniah, 2018: 282). Although GDP growth has remained at about 5% per year since 2014 (with the exception of 2020 due to COVID-19 effects), this is notably below the level demanded by popular aspirations (Hamilton-Hart & Schulze, 2016: 266). On top of this growth slowdown, many observers have pointed out that there has been a dramatic increase in inequality since the early days of democratization (Muhtadi & Warburton, 2020). Indeed, Indonesia’s Gini ratio has increased from 0.32 in 2002 to 0.38 in 2019 (Statistics Indonesia). Income inequality is increasingly becoming a politicized issue (Muhtadi & Warburton, 2020), consistent with trends in other parts of the world (Wu & Chang, 2019). Incumbent President Joko Widodo even campaigned on income inequality in 2019, and social redistribution and welfare programs were a key part of his first term in office (Hoy et al., 2019: 2). Meanwhile, the opposition candidate Prabowo Subianto made income inequality a central theme of his campaign and consistently attacked the economic performance of incumbent Widodo (Warburton, 2018). The observed decline in Indonesia’s democracy score since the late 2000s occurred at roughly the same period of a slowdown in economic growth and a quick uptick in income inequality; however, I recognize

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that correlations do not necessarily imply causation. Still, why is lack of economic progress (or worse yet, declining economic opportunities) detrimental for the continued resilience of democracy? I discuss this in the next section.

Literature Review: Democratic Support and Economic Satisfaction It is widely acknowledged that public support for democracy in most countries tends to fluctuate over time (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Quaranta & Martini, 2016: 165). Two camps have been particularly influential among the many theories that explain changes in public attitudes toward democracy. One argues that democratic support depends on the degree to which political institutions and politicians themselves truly represent people’s interests (Norris, 2011). For example, suppose people living in democracies think that existing political parties’ positions are not well-represented. In that case, they might feel let down by politics and would thus be discontent with the overall political system, perhaps even turning their backs against mainstream parties (Van Egmond et al., 2020: 2), as has been the case in many multiparty European democracies over the past few years. Another view contends that support for democracy is more readily explained by the actual performance of the government (Rogowski, 1974), which very often is measured by economic performance (Clarke et al., 1993). Therefore, if the economy is perceived to be improving, society is more likely to be supportive of democracy, as the effects of economic performance on democratic support “pass through individual attitudes and perceptions” (Dahl, 1971, as cited by Cramer & Kaufman, 2011: 1209). Empirical evidence supports this. Using survey data in eight African countries, Doorenspleet (2012: 290) found that perceptions of government performance are one of the most dominant determinants of democratic discontent, which was also the conclusion of a study by Dahlberg et al. (2015: 28) in more than 20 countries in the U.S., Latin America, East Asia, and Oceania, and Eastern Europe. Similarly, Quaranta and Martini (2016: 169) found that throughout 1973–2013, individual-level satisfaction with democracy in 28 European democracies is significantly related to both objective country-level indicators and subjective perceptions of the economy. That said, individual-level democratic support is also greatly impacted by country-level economic variables

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such as inflation, rising unemployment, and rising inequality (Clarke et al., 1993; Di Tella et al., 2003; Frey & Stutzer, 2000; Krieckhaus et al., 2014). The tight connection between economic grievance and democratic dissatisfaction is not surprising given the prediction of modernization theory (Lipset, 1959), which reveals a close link between economic development and socio-economic conditions ripe for democratization. Moreover, economic development is arguably the most important predictor of whether a democracy can be sustained (Mainwaring & Bizzarro, 2019; Przeworski et al., 2000). Modernization theory has also found empirical support in Indonesia (Amri & Pasha, 2020; Tadjoeddin, 2012). Seen in this light, economic development (or perceptions thereof) matters for democratic support because citizens’ attitude toward democracy is a “rational response to the (economic) outputs of the system” (Torcal & Montero, 2006, as quoted in Quaranta & Martini, 2016: 165). Thus, people become more critical toward the political system (and possibly even blame democracy for the worsening of the economy) as the concept of democracy goes hand in hand with better living standards (Thomassen, 1995). While not all citizens in all countries view democracy in such a highly instrumental term, there is increasing evidence that such is the case for Indonesia (Mujani et al., 2018; Pietsch, 2015) along with many other younger democracies. Indeed, studies have found that economic perceptions worsen democratic support more in low-income and newly democratic countries than in more mature democracies (Daoust & Nadeau, 2020). It is not difficult to see why support for democracy is particularly volatile in young democracies. While the onset of democratic transitions had citizens full of optimistic thoughts regarding the prospect of an improved standard of living, during periods of democratic growth and consolidation, political and economic reforms often stagnate due to gridlock and other institutional constraints, which can breed widespread disappointment. When citizens no longer believe that the early promise of democratization (e.g., to improve welfare) can be met, they turn their back on democracy (McLeod & MacIntyre, 2007: 5). Although the body of scholarly work connecting economic assessment and democratic attitudes is increasing, the results are often contradictory. Quaranta and Martini (2016) contend that the disagreement can be explained by differences in model specification, sample countries, and

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time periods. It is quite rare to find studies on the economy and democratic support based on survey data from Southeast Asia (Quaranta & Martini, 2016). Recent work on this question by Indonesian studies scholars (Fossati & Martinez i Coma, 2020; Kilavuz & Sumaktoyo, 2020; Muhtadi & Warburton, 2020) is, therefore, valuable additions that will enlarge the sample and become the basis to draw more comprehensive conclusions. This chapter seeks to enrich the existing literature on economic and democratic assessments in new democracies. Indonesia is an instructive case and an important sample in studies of democratic support, especially since recent data in 2020 suggest that perceptions of economic deterioration moved in tandem with the slump in perceptions of democratic performance (Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2020). In the following section, I discuss the methodology used to test the effects of economic perceptions on public support for democracy in Indonesia. As stated in the introduction, this chapter asks whether there are heterogeneous impacts of views of the economy on democratic support between citizens who think of the economy as the most pressing political problem, vis-à-vis those who consider issues other than the economy to be most important. The statistical work will also address whether voters distinguish between different areas of economic performance (economic growth, price stability, and unemployment) and whether this distinction has any implications on their support for democracy.

Data and Methodology This study uses original data from a national public opinion survey carried out by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia. The survey sampled 1960 respondents (with a margin of error of 2%) in all 34 provinces of Indonesia. Respondents were chosen through a multi-stage proportional random sampling method. The number of respondents sampled per province is proportional to the adult voting population in that province. Respondents were interviewed at their homes by a network of local enumerators from March 10–22, 2019, three weeks to prior April 7 General Election. The survey used a structured questionnaire with closed-ended responses. Members of the CSIS survey team verified 20% of the interviewees to confirm that interviews took place. To measure attitudes toward democracy (the dependent variable), I use an item in the above survey question which asks respondents to

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choose whether (1) they think that democracy is the best system, (2) non-democratic systems should be considered in certain situations, or (3) whatever political system we adopt, it makes no difference. This item is commonly found in the democratic support survey literature (e.g., Doorenspleet, 2012: 283; Krieckhaus et al., 2014). It is crucial, however, to acknowledge that this is only one of several possible ways to measure democratic support (Quaranta & Martini, 2016). It does not, for example, measure how satisfied are Indonesians with the performance of democracy in their country at that moment in time. Although the data is a one-time snapshot (March 2019), our survey result is consistent with past studies: support for democracy is very high in Indonesia (Mujani et al., 2018). In 2018, 71% of Indonesians surveyed prefer democracy over other systems of government (Muhtadi & Warburton, 2020: 51). In the CSIS 2019 survey used in this paper, 66.22% of the respondents prefer democracy, while only 6.68% would consider authoritarian regimes under certain situations. However, a sizeable minority (20.11%) is indifferent to a democratic or an authoritarian system and thinks that the regime type made no difference. Therefore, following a similar situation found in Duch (2001: 899), I use an ordered logit estimator in my regression analysis (see Long & Freese, 2006 for an exposition of this method). Effectively, respondents indifferent between democracy and authoritarian systems are treated as a middle category between support for democracy versus autocracy. The explanatory variables for this study are grouped into two: economic and political variables. The economic variables capture individual perceptions on whether national economic conditions have improved compared in the past year, following Daoust and Nadeau (2020). As societies often judge their political system based on what it can deliver, their perceptions of government performance on managing the economy might also affect democratic support. However, existing studies show mixed results about which aspect of the economy (unemployment rate or Gross Domestic Product) best explains voters’ attitude toward democracy (see Quaranta & Martini, 2016 for a summary). I thus include a breakdown of economic performance in four areas: growth, jobs, price stability, inequality, and additive index of all four (see Table 7.1). As there are differences in voters’ attachment to economic issues, I separate analysis based on voters who think the economy is the most important problem versus those who do not rate the economy as the number one problem in the country.

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Table 7.1 Description of explanatory and control variables for the regression models Variable Economic factors National econ

Economic performance: growth, jobs, price stability, inequality

MIP (Most important problem) dummy variable

Political variables Voted for government party

Support for incumbent

General incumbent performance

Categories

Over the past year, the national economic situation has: (1. worsened substantially, 2. worsened, 3. not changed, 4. improved, 5. improved substantially) On a scale of 1–4, how would you rate the economic performance of the incumbent in the areas of economic growth, job creation, price stability, and reducing income inequality? 1 is most successful and 4 is least successful This variable is coded as 1 for respondents who list stable prices or availability of jobs or real income (purchasing power) as the most important problem faced by the country. It is coded 0 for respondents who list other issues such as healthcare, education, the environment, and corruption If the legislative election were held today, which candidate political party would you vote for? Coded 1 if the interviewee plans to vote for the president’s party If the presidential election were held today, which candidate would you vote for? Coded 1 if the interviewee plans to vote for the incumbent president In general, how do you evaluate the general performance of the incumbent president and vice president? [1. very unsatisfied, 2. quite unsatisfied, 3. quite satisfied, 4. very satisfied]

(continued)

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Table 7.1 (continued) Variable

Categories

Party identification

How close are you to the political party you plan to vote for in the 2019 national legislative election? (Recoded into + for very close and close, 0 for not close and not close at all) Have you ever heard of the economic platform of the presidential candidates? 1-yes, 0-no

Political interest

Control variables (Socio-economic) Education (educ2)

Age

Gender Urban–Rural Monthly family income

(1) No schooling and completed primary school, (2) Completed middle school, (3) Completed high school, (4) completed an associate degree, college, or graduate degree (1) Less than 19 years, (2) Between 20–29, (3) Between 30–39, (4) Between 40–49, (5) More than 50 years Male respondents (1), female respondents (0) Lives in a city (1), lives in a village (0) (1) Under 750 thousand IDR, (2) Between 750 thousand and 1 million IDR, (3) 1–1.7 million IDR, (4) 1.7 to 2.5 million IDR, (5) Above 2.5 million IDR

The political factors are chosen based on what existing studies have found to be significant political factors that predict democratic support, both cross-country studies (Dahlberg et al., 2015; Krieckhaus et al., 2014) and those that focus on Indonesia (Fossati & Martinez i Coma, 2020; Muhtadi, 2020; Muhtadi & Warburton, 2020; Mujani et al., 2018). These variables are intention to vote for the government party, intention to vote for the incumbent president, political efficacy (measured by partisan identification or Party ID, and the level of voter interest and engagement). Next, I focus on the level of voter interest in economic issues. Specifically, I ask whether respondents have heard of the respective presidential candidates’ economic platforms and key programs during the campaign season (see Table 7.1). Citizens who know the campaign messages are more likely to be interested in economic issues.

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The regressions also contain socio-demographic variables potentially linked to assessments of democratic preference (e.g., Krieckhaus et al., 2014: 145). Therefore, I add control variables for gender, income level, rural–urban domicile, religion, and following Muhtadi & Warburton (2020: 52), a dummy variable for the island of Java.

Findings The most powerful empirical finding is that the economy matters for democratic support, but only for those who think the economy (as defined by stable prices, availability of jobs, and purchasing power) is the number one political issue. For those who believe otherwise, political variables such as party ID play a more important factor in explaining democratic support. In other words, the relationship between economic perceptions and democratic support depends significantly on whether voters attach the highest degree of salience to the above-mentioned economic problems. I will elaborate on this notable result (Table 7.2, columns 1 and 2). The more favorably voters think of the national economy, the more likely they are to support democracy (compared to the authoritarian alternatives or feeling indifferent toward democracy). This is supported by the positive and significant sign on the “nat econ” variable (note: higher values indicate more favorable rating), for a sub-sample of respondents who consider the economy the most salient political issue. However, the “nat econ” coefficients are not significant among respondents who do not view the national economy as the MIP (Table 7.2, column 2). It should also be noted that when the economic perception variable has a significant effect on support for democracy, so does the variable “vote-incumb.” Compared to voters who plan to vote for the opposition presidential candidate, supporters of the incumbent are more likely to support democracy, a result that is consistent with the findings in Muhtadi (2020) and Muhtadi and Warburton (2020). This fits within a more extensive set of literature that found more positive democratic attitudes in “electoral winners” (Han & Chang, 2016). Supporters of the incumbent tend to be biased and view both the political system and the economy more favorably. This chapter’s finding suggests that this winnerloser gap could be affected by how much importance citizens attach to economic issues. I leave an in-depth investigation of such issues for future work. By contrast, among voters who do not think of the economy as

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Table 7.2 Regression analyses of democratic support in 2019 (1) The economy is the MIP

(2) The economy is not the MIP

(3) The economy is the MIP

(4) The economy is not the MIP

1.091* (0.581) 1.053* (0.572) 1.050* (0.584) 0.557 (0.718) 0.0633 (0.194) 0.0774 (0.185) −0.206 (0.210)

−0.794 (0.849) −0.824 (0.827) −0.735 (0.818) −0.0682 (0.940) −0.0947 (0.183) −0.145 (0.184) 0.0922 (0.176)

−0.0714 (0.0482) −0.182 (0.236) 0.128 (0.208) 0.434** (0.182) 0.179 (0.176)

0.418* (0.237) −0.316 (0.217) 0.143 (0.195) 0.527*** (0.189)

−0.144 (0.237) 0.161 (0.208) 0.432** (0.182) 0.190 (0.176)

−0.212 (0.240) −0.135 (0.240) 0.328 (0.375) 0.0776 (0.0755) −0.0771 (0.317)

0.258 (0.247) 0.483** (0.237) 0.308 (0.383) −0.0743 (0.0883) −0.589 (0.389)

−0.157 (0.241) −0.122 (0.242) 0.334 (0.380) 0.0782 (0.0756) −0.102 (0.318)

National economy (baseline: nat econ = 1 worse) Nat econ = 2 1.098* −0.759 (0.575) (0.826) Nat econ = 3 1.070* −0.833 (0.567) (0.810) Nat econ = 4 1.095* −0.766 (0.580) (0.798) Nat econ = 5 0.629 −0.0876 (0.714) (0.921) Performance_price Performance_jobs Performance_growth Performance_econ (all) Vote for incumbent

0.00544 (0.0536) 0.458** (0.230) Vote for govt party −0.306 (0.215) Party ID 0.157 (0.195) Political interest in 0.528*** econ (0.188) Education [baseline = 1, completed elementary school] Education = 2, 0.279 middle school (0.245) Education = 3, high 0.500** school (0.236) Education = 4, 0.325 college/postgrad (0.381) Age −0.0697 (0.0883) Muslim −0.603 (0.387)

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued)

Gender Urban Java Income Observations

(1) The economy is the MIP

(2) The economy is not the MIP

(3) The economy is the MIP

(4) The economy is not the MIP

−0.0406 (0.187) −0.0896 (0.204) −0.127 (0.213) −0.0961 (0.144) 581

−0.0582 (0.171) −0.471** (0.185) −0.518*** (0.193) 0.0193 (0.135) 734

−0.0414 (0.188) −0.0707 (0.206) −0.129 (0.214) −0.0969 (0.145) 581

−0.0479 (0.170) −0.460** (0.184) −0.515*** (0.193) 0.0231 (0.135) 736

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

the most important problem, the variables considered to be significantly associated with support for democracy based on our sample are party ID. Second, the results do not show that the government’s economic performance, whether it is the aggregate performance or the performance in different areas (economic growth, unemployment, and price stability), has any significant impact on the likelihood of having a more supportive attitude toward democracy. The results hold whether or not the subsample considers the economy the most critical problem (column 3 and column 4 in Table 7.2 both show no significance on any economic performance variables). A third notable finding regarding economic variables is that the level of political interest in economic issues is positive and significantly associated with support for democracy but only when voters consider the economy to be the most important problem. The socio-demographic control variables which have a significant coefficient are “urban” and Java. The negative signs on the estimated coefficients suggest that urban areas and areas outside of Java are less likely to support democracy, but only if voters do not consider the economy the most important problem (columns 2 and 4).

Income Inequality and Democratic Support Given the growing importance of income inequality as a political issue (Wu & Chang, 2019), including in Indonesia (Muhtadi & Warburton, 2020), this chapter also tests whether perceptions of income inequality,

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conditional on citizen evaluation of government performance in reducing income inequality, are related to lower democratic support. Dahl (1971) recognized the importance of distributional issues for democratic support by arguing that a democracy that is unable to address economic inequalities leads to “resentments and frustrations which weaken allegiance to the regime” (1971: 103). This is confirmed by an extensive array of surveybased research in the 1990s and 2000s, which found that inequality breeds regime dissatisfaction (Krieckhaus et al., 2014; McKlintock, 1999). Krieckhaus et al. (2014: 149) found that one standard deviation increase in economic inequality (Gini index) is associated with lower democratic support of about 0.5 points. A poll by Pew Research Center conducted in 24 countries in 2018, including Indonesia, suggested that those who are economically dissatisfied are on average 36% points more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy, compared to those with favorable views of the economy (Wike et al., 2019). To answer the question of income inequality and democratic support in Indonesia, I replicate the regression methodology outlined in the previous section, with two modifications. Instead of having perceptions of the national economy as central explanatory variable, I use an item in the CSIS national survey asking respondents to answer on a scale of 1–4 whether they think the level of income distribution in Indonesia is “highly unequal” (1) to “highly equal” (4). In other words, this variable captures the perceived fairness of the income distribution in Indonesia. The regressions also control for individual ratings of how well the incumbent has performed in mitigating income inequality specifically (“performance_ineq” in Table 7.3). This is related to but different from Muhtadi & Warburton (2020: 52), who control for the degree of satisfaction with the overall performance of President Joko Widodo as the incumbent, rather than his performance on making income more evenly distributed in Indonesia. Results are presented in Table 7.3. Similar to the previous section, the correlation between perceptions of income inequality and democratic support varies depending on whether voters think the economy is the most important problem (MIP). Compared to voters who view income distribution in Indonesia as highly unequal, those who see inequality as highly equal are significantly more likely to prefer democracy over other systems (Table 7.3, column 1). The significance of the inequality perception coefficient disappears when we run results on the sub-sample of respondents who think the economy is not the MIP (Table 7.3, column 2).

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Table 7.3 Regression analyses of democratic support and inequality in 2019 Variables

(1) The economy is the MIP

Inequality perception (baseline:1-highly unequal) Inequality perception = 2 0.432 (0.328) Inequality perception = 3 0.0491 (0.351) Inequality perception = 4 1.476** (0.669) performance_ineq. 0.137 (0.158) Vote for incumbent 0.593*** (0.217) Vote for govt party −0.234 (0.218) Party ID 0.185 (0.200) Political interest in econ 0.460** (0.189) Education [baseline = 1, completed elementary school] Education = 2, middle 0.368 school (0.246) Education = 3, high 0.455* school (0.235) Education = 4, 0.301 college/postgrad (0.391) Age −0.0531 (0.0898) Muslim −0.442 (0.377) Gender −0.0571 (0.187) Urban −0.107 (0.203) Java −0.210 (0.218) Income −0.0657 (0.147) Observations 583

(2) The economy is not the MIP

0.253 (0.277) −0.307 (0.297) 0.0925 (0.477) −0.349** (0.150) −0.201 (0.220) 0.127 (0.210) 0.470** (0.185) 0.225 (0.178) −0.107 (0.238) −0.0866 (0.237) 0.345 (0.375) 0.0802 (0.0754) −0.170 (0.316) −0.0871 (0.173) −0.457** (0.189) −0.527*** (0.192) 0.0211 (0.132) 726

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

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However, it should be noted that in column 2, the coefficient of the “performance_ineq” is negative and significant at the 5% level. Given the way the variables are measured (Table 7.1), this is interpreted as follows: the more dissatisfied the respondents are with how the government is managing income inequality, the less likely they are to be supportive of democracy. This finding is consistent with past cross-country studies by Wu and Chang (2019: 1486). However, in this chapter, this particular finding is only statistically significant for the sub-set of respondents who do not consider the economy to be the MIP. It should be noted that other than economic issues (high prices and lack of jobs) the set of possible answers for MIP include poverty, income inequality, healthcare quality, educational quality, environmental issues as well as corruption. A notably high proportion of respondents (26%) chose poverty and inequality as the MIP.

Conclusion In finding a positive relationship between economic perceptions (including perceptions on income distribution) and support for democracy, this chapter shows that the Indonesian case is consistent with a comparative finding across countries and over time: citizens translate a worsening of economic conditions into critical attitudes toward the political system (Quaranta & Martini, 2016). This can be both good news and bad news. On the one hand, this connection between economic conditions and support for democracy suggests that voters demand strong economic performance and good governance from their leaders. In other words, it helps establish electoral accountability, a key factor in a democracy. However, it is well-established that the ups and downs of the national economy are not within complete control of the government. Elected politicians often get blamed for bad luck (such as a global financial crisis) rather than bad policy (Campello & Zucco, 2016). Without knowing whether voters also become less likely to give electoral support to the incumbent, it might imply that poor economic performance is not attributed to the government but to the political system. Rather surprisingly, the comparative effects of different macroeconomic variables (perceptions of economic growth, price stability, and unemployment) were not significantly correlated with public support for democracy in Indonesia; separating economic factors into these three

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indicators also did not generate any meaningful differences. As noted previously, perceptions of the incumbent economic performance in these three areas may be subject to endogeneity. Therefore, for future research, it may be valuable to alternate with objective country-level indicators of GDP, inflation, and unemployment rates. In addition, these variables are arguably more reliable explanations for predicting the likelihood of voting for the incumbent, rather than variables that could explain support for democracy. This chapter is a small contribution toward developing a deeper understanding of sources of democratic support among the citizenry in Indonesia. However, support for democracy cannot perfectly be measured using information for only one time period; ideally, we need several years of survey data to compare. Another extension of this research could be to explore further whether a society’s understanding of democracy itself has different implications for the relationship between economic perceptions and democratic support. That is, one could test whether voters who think of democracy in instrumental terms (e.g., as a way to advance the economy) rather than in liberal terms (e.g., as a system that guarantees civil liberties) are more likely to blame democracy when the economy sours. Answering this question is essential to guard against the perception that a bad economy lowers support for democracy similarly across all individuals.

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Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2019). Southeast Asia’s Troubling Elections: Nondemocratic pluralism in Indonesia. Journal of Democracy, 30(4), 104– 118. Badan Pusat Statistik—Statistics Indonesia. Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 2020. Retrieved from https://bps.go.id Basri, C., & Hill, H. (2020). Making economic policy in democratic Indonesia: The first two decades. Asian Economic Policy Review, 999, 1–21. Burke, P. J., & Siyaranamual, M. D. (2019). No one left behind in Indonesia? Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 55(3), 269–293. Campello, D., & Zucco, C. (2016). Presidential success and the world economy. The Journal of Politics, 78(2), 589–602. Carreras, M. (2012). The rise of outsiders in Latin America, 1980–2010: An institutionalist perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 45(12), 1451–1482. Chang, Y.-T., Chu, Y.-H., & Park, C.-M. (2007). Authoritarian nostalgia in Asia. Journal of Democracy, 18(3), 66–80. Clarke, H. D., Dutt, N., & Kornberg, A. (1993). The Political economy of attitudes toward polity and society in Western European democracies. The Journal of Politics, 55(4), 998–1021. Cramer, B. D., & Kaufman, R. R. (2011). Views of economic inequality in Latin America. Comparative Political Studies, 44(9), 1206–1237. Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy. Yale University Press. Dahlberg, S., Linde, J., & Holmberg, S. (2015). Democratic discontent in old and new democracies: Assessing the importance of democratic input and governmental output. Political Studies, 63(S1), 18–37. Daoust, J.-F., & Nadeau, R. (2020). Context matters: Economics, politics and satisfaction with democracy. Electoral Studies: 102133. Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R. J., & Oswald, A. J. (2003). The macroeconomics of happiness. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85 (4), 809–827. Diamond, L. (2010). Indonesia’s place in global democracy. In Mietzner, Marcus & Aspinall, Edward (Eds.), Problems of democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, institutions and society. ISEAS Publishing. Doorenspleet, R. (2012). Critical citizens, democratic support and satisfaction in African democracies. International Political Science Review, 33(3), 279–300. Duch, R. M. (2001). A developmental model of heterogeneous economic voting in new democracies. American Political Science Review, 95(4), 895–910. Foa, R. S., & Mounk, Y. (2016). The danger of deconsolidation: The democratic disconnect. Journal of Democracy, 27 (3), 5–17. Fossati, D., & Martinez I Coma, F. (2020). How popular conceptions of democracy shape democratic support in Indonesia. In Thomas Power and Eve Warburton (Eds.), Democracy in Indonesia: From stagnation to regression? ISEAS Publishing.

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Muhtadi, B. (2020). Electoral losers, democatic support and authoritarian nostalgia. In Power, Thomas & Warburton, Eve (Eds.), Democracy in Indonesia: From stagnation to regression? ISEAS Publishing. Muhtadi, B., & Warburton, E. (2020). Inequality and democratic support in Indonesia. Pacific Affairs, 93(1), 31–58. Mujani, S., Liddle, R. W., & Ambardi, K. (2018). Voting behavior in Indonesia since democratization. Cambridge University Press. Norris, P. (2011). Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited. Cambridge University Press. Pietsch, J. (2015). Authoritarian durability: Public opinion towards democracy in southeast Asia. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, 25(1), 31–46. Power, T. P. (2018). Jokowi’s authoritarian turn and Indonesia’s democratic decline. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 53(3), 307–338. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950–1990. Cambridge University Press. Quaranta, M., & Martini, S. (2016). Does the economy really matter for satisfaction with democracy? Longitudinal and cross-country evidence from the European Union. Electoral Studies, 42, 164–174. Rakhmat, M. Z. (2020). Indonesia’s poor COVID-19 response take a toll on its global image. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/indonesiaspoor-covid-19-responses-take-a-toll-on-its-global-image-150939 Rogowski, R. (1974). Rational legitimacy. A theory of political support. Princeton University Press. Tadjoeddin, M. Z. (2012). Electoral conflict and the maturity of local democracy in Indonesia: Testing the modernisation hypothesis. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 17 (3), 476–497. Thomassen, J. (1995). Support for democratic values. In H.-D. Klingemann & D. Fuchs (Eds.), Citizens and the state. Oxford University Press Torcal, M., & Montero, J. R. (2006). Political disaffection in comparative perspective. In M. Torcal & J. R. Montero (Eds.), Political disaffection in contemporary democracies: Social capital, institutions and politics. Routledge. Van Egmond, M., Johns, R., & Bradenburg, H. (2020). When long- distance relationships don’t work out: Representational distance and satisfaction with democracy in Europe. Electoral Studies 66, 102182. Warburton, E. (2018). Inequality, nationalism and electoral politics in Indonesia. Southeast Asian Affairs, 135–152. Wike, R., Silver, L. & Castillo, A. (2019). Many across the globe are dissatisfied with how democracy is working. Pew Research Center, 29 April. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/many-across-theglobe-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/

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CHAPTER 8

The Societal Basis of East Asian Democracy Brendan Howe

Abstract This chapter examines the relationship between society and democracy from the perspectives of universalism, relativism, and cosmopolitanism. In doing so it draws together the findings of the three analytical and comparative sections of the volume, wherein pairs of chapters address the supposed authoritarian social structures of Northeast and Southeast Asia, the role, and interactions of civil society with democratization, and socio-economic democratic considerations in South Korea and Indonesia. The findings are first, that the liberal individualistic model of democracy is not as universal as might be supposed. Second, that while East Asian differences may be challenging, they do not preclude democratic consolidation. And third, that perhaps a cosmopolitan understanding of democratic principles featuring an overlapping consensus from competing epistemological perspectives, and a Wittgensteinian recognition of familial resemblance between functioning democratic societies in

B. Howe (B) Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, South Korea

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_8

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the East and West, offers more hope for future democratic resilience and consolidation. Keywords East Asia · Indonesia · South Korea · Political culture · Society · Confucianism · Islam

Universalism and Democratic Principles This concluding chapter evaluates the dynamics of universalism versus Asian exceptionalism in the context of a social construction of democracy. In doing so it draws together the findings of the three analytical and comparative sections of the volume, wherein pairs of chapters address the supposed authoritarian social structures of Northeast and Southeast Asia, the role, and interactions of civil society with democratization, and socio-economic democratic considerations in South Korea and Indonesia. The findings are first, that the liberal individualistic model of democracy is not as universal as might be supposed. Second, that while East Asian differences may be challenging, they do not preclude democratic consolidation. And third, that perhaps a cosmopolitan understanding of democratic principles featuring an overlapping consensus from competing epistemological perspectives, and a Wittgensteinian recognition of familial resemblance between functioning democratic societies in the East and West, offers more hope for future democratic resilience and consolidation (Wittgenstein, 1953). Universalism is the concept that some ideas have universal application, or applicability, or refer to a universal value-set. As such it differs from the concept of cosmopolitanism, which can be seen as more of a synthesis of a variety of epistemological traditions into a cosmopolitan whole through mutual respect of this divergence (Howe, 2022: 1). Hence a universal approach to democracy may be conceptualized as the recognition of a single, and thus, universal truth, about its nature and applicability. As discussed in Chapter 1, this is the position taken by the chief proponents of the Western liberal and neoliberal narrative, culminating in Fukuyama’s claim regarding the end of history, as there is no viable alternative model of governance and collective action (Fukuyama, 1989). Such has been the dominance of this narrative, striving for universal

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political and economic modernization, industrial, trade, and technologydriven development, that the instruments of global governance have also adopted neoliberal policy ideologies in their guidelines and policy prescription for national polities. Hence, an international institutional perspective on governance and development, derived from major international donor frameworks, refers to efficiency in the provision of services and economic competitiveness, comparing ineffective economies or political bodies with viable economies and political bodies (Agere, 2000: 1). For instance, historically, “the IMF’s main focus has been on encouraging countries to correct macroeconomic imbalances, reduce inflation and undertake key trade, exchange and other market reforms needed to improve efficiency and support sustained economic growth” (IMF, 1997). Likewise, the World Bank has emphasized that overall economic growth is crucial in generating opportunity and that market reforms can be central in expanding opportunities for poor people, assuming adequate mechanisms are in place to create new opportunities and compensate the potential losers in the transitions. “Access to market opportunities and to public sector services is often strongly influenced by state and social institutions, which must be responsive and accountable to poor people” (World Bank, 2000: 7). This model can, nevertheless, be problematic from the perspective of vulnerable individuals and groups, and owes more, perhaps, to economic libertarianism than to the distributive justice models of political liberalism. As pointed out by David Simon (1998: 596), however, “one of the central paradoxes of post-World War II development(alism) has been the enduring hegemony within official discourses and policies of variants of modernization theory, despite the many trenchant critiques… brought to bear over the years.” In a more positive interpretation, Christian Welzel (2021: 132) claims that modernization theory is proving correct, as economic development brings expanding levels of education, information, travel, and other experiences that enhance human knowledge, awareness, and intelligence. It is this “cognitive mobilization” which “inspires and empowers people to act with purpose and think for themselves, rather than accept received authority and wisdom” that holds promise for democratic transition (Welzel, 2021: 138). Hence, from this interpretation, the differences between Asian and Western populations over emancipative values and liberal democracy appear to be gradual, not categorical. Thus, Welzel (2011: 1) has further

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noted that “the forces of modernization that gave rise to emancipative values and a liberal notion of democracy in the ‘West’, are doing the same in the ‘East’, confirming a universal model of human development rather than Asian exceptionalism, or any other form of cultural exceptionalism.” And yet, the universal applicability of liberal political and economic principles of governance, perceived as at least originating in the West, continues to be debated in the non-West, especially in, and regarding East Asia. Throughout this book, divergent principles of and prescriptions for governance have been manifested. Even if the democratic “ideal” is widely accepted, its application in governance practice reflects a different understanding of the relationship between those who govern, and the societies they govern, based to a large extent on the dominant political culture. Hence societal constructs of public value play a key role. The next section addresses how East Asian societies form a key intervening variable between democratic ideals and governance realities. It further draws attention to how the very different societies of South Korea and Indonesia suggest a case for at least bounded regional exceptionalism on governance theory and practice.

East Asian Governance Exceptionalism and Societal Values Societal or public values differ from value privately held. It is only when an individual’s value hierarchy is externalized to impact on others that values become a matter of public concern. Thus, societal values concern the regulation of competing private values or interests as they manifest in the public sphere through the process of governance (Howe, 2021). The first consideration relates to the public impact of private value hierarchies, or as Michael Laver (1997) has described it, “Private Desires, Political Action.” This is essentially an amoral rational choice-focused understanding of the mechanics of the externalization of private values. A second implication of this value-neutral (normatively unencumbered) understanding of value refers to efficiency in the aggregation of competing private values in the public arena. A pragmatic governance question of how best we can reconcile conflicting interests. In contemporary governance discourse, there is something approaching a universal consensus that conflicting interests can only be reconciled through a degree of alienation and transference of individual prerogatives from those who are governed to those who govern, but also that this alienation

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should be voluntary, with those who govern being held accountable to those who are governed. This is the foundation of the social contractual basis of democracy. A third conceptualization of this transition from the private to the public is, however, explicitly norm-laden and contested. This is when governance policy prescription is based on consideration of the morally right course of action. This, then, is where we get the greatest divergence based on competing epistemological traditions, and where we see the beginnings of regional divergence from (contested) supposed universal public values and their implications for good governance prescription. This divergence holds implications for national governance policy prescription (that is to say, what course of action a government should pursue in order best to reflect the public value as generated by the epistemological traditions of the community they represent). It is even more important to address divergence at the level of international or global governance, where the conflicting imperatives of competing epistemological traditions need to be reconciled in the generation and protection of public value. James Hollifield and Calvin Jillson (2010: 17) have found that “each region of the globe (if not individual states within regions) has taken a rather specific pathway to democracy, depending upon preexisting social, political, and economic conditions.” Likewise, researchers such as Leonardo Morlino et al. (2011: 491) have found the nature of democratic governance and the relationships between related variables to be qualitatively different in Asia. Asian models of governance may be characterized by two distinguishing and salient sets of characteristics: the importance of economic development, and the nature of political culture and societal constructs. A recent research project supported by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), examining the regional interdependencies of democratization in Asia, concluded that the primacy of the state in Asia affects the understanding both of good governance and the obligations laid upon those who govern, along with policy making by governance elites. Either StateEconomy or State-Society is identified as the prime interdependency nexus in Asia whereas, for Western democracies, Society-Economy was the primary variable, reflecting the prevalence of social democracy and concepts of distributive justice (Howe, 2020). Kenneth Christie and Denny Roy (2001: 5) claim that the prioritization of economic development “has assumed cult-like status” in East Asia. Meanwhile, Barry

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Buzan and Gerald Segal (1998: 103) coined the term “econophoria” to describe the belief among many in East Asian governments that economic development and growth are the panacea for all of society’s ills. Samuel Huntington (1993) famously described this clash of values between East and West as part of wider “clash of civilizations.” Likewise, Gan et al. (2012) refer to an Asian model which includes countries such as China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam “based on the distinctive cultural zone, which is influenced by the Confucianism teaching.” Ian Holliday (2000: 709) has described many examples of East Asian governance (including South Korea) as fitting a “productivist welfare capitalism” model wherein a growth-oriented state requires the subordination of all aspects of state policy, including social policy, to economic objectives. Essentially the Asian values debate poses a communitarian epistemological challenge to liberal individualism and solidarism. Even when Asian governments and government models are being praised, such as (for the most part) regarding the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, this praise is faintly damning. The notion that social trust and cohesion (hence the value of community) is inherently higher in East Asia, allowing a greater degree of alienation of civil liberties than is possible in Western democracies beset by polarization and populist backlash (Fisher & Cho, 2020) is part of a well-worn trope that the people of the region are less individualistic, more communityoriented, and more willing to sacrifice for the greater good (Park, 2020). For instance, Barry Buzan and Gerard Segal (1998) claim that because East Asian political culture has never had an enlightenment, Asian politics leans toward authoritarianism. Broadly speaking, the Asian challenge to solidarism can be seen in cultural, economic, and political terms. Culturally, it asserts that the Western liberal or universalist approach ignores the specific cultural traditions and historical circumstances of Asian societies, whose interpretations of human rights are different from those in the West. Economically, it maintains that the priority of developing Asian societies must be the eradication of poverty. Politically it calls into question the motives of the West accusing them of using human rights merely as an instrument for advancing Western economic or security interests and hence nothing more than power politics in disguise, a shallow pretense for the use of force against regimes which stand up to Western neo-imperialism (Thompson, 2004).

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The conceptualization of the “natural tendencies” of Asian and other non-Western societies toward authoritarianism and other forms of communitarian value-prioritization, can, however, also be significantly challenged. As we have discovered in the chapters of this book, South Korea and Indonesia are neither inherently authoritarian nor naturally resistant to universal democratic principles. Instead, more attention must be paid to the social construction of political culture. It is the interaction between universal principles and the societies within which they are being implemented that is important.

East Asian Communities and the Social Construction of Governance Values Despite his statements rejecting exceptionalism, Welzel indirectly references the social construction of public value. What alienation of individual human rights in the name of public value is acceptable is determined by the collective experience of the body politic of that epistemological community. To the extent that all modern societies have shared experiences, we can deduce that at least in certain areas there can be an overlapping consensus on core (and inalienable) rights, as well as, potentially, responsibilities toward the body politic (Rawls, 1987). Hy V. Luong (2022) has demonstrated empirically that the family focus of East Asian societies is distinct to them, owing nothing to capitalism, Marxism, or neoliberalism. He points out that state policy makers and agents are also societal members, with the state embedded in society. Nevertheless, he also emphasizes that this family focus is socially constructed rather than in any way an “innate” feature of East Asian societies (Luong, 2022). Instead of the neoliberal or productivist models discussed above, he proposes the concept of a familialist welfare regime based on local sociocultural conceptualizations of governance and provision of the common good. In Chapter 2, Baogang He interrogates both the conflict model and compatibility model of the relationship between Confucianism and democracy, introducing a hybrid model in which there are different types of Confucian democracy in both theory and practice, and good governance principles involve selecting the right model for a particular polity. That is to say, a socially constructed model and relationship, with varieties of democracies within which the core areas of conflict between democracy and Confucianism have been overcome by cultural transformation.

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“The hybrid model aims to combine different elements of Confucianism and democracy to produce something suitable for national or local conditions. In this model, actors often interpret how best to devise and choose institutional embodiments for democracy according to national or local conditions.” As such, many different representations of the relationship between Confucianism and democracy can be seen to bear a “familial resemblance.” Likewise, in Chapter 3, Noory Okthariza takes a socially constructed approach to the relationship between political Islam and democracy, noting that while much work has been done on the supposed threat posed by the former to the latter, there is a dearth of literature on the reverse conceptualization. The interaction between electoral rules and the agents participating within them has a particularly constructivist flavor, with the changes in the electoral framework and regulations both empowering and constraining different actors within the Indonesian polity. Thus, again, the political culture of Indonesia has a recognizable character, but also one that is constantly changing and evolving. Again, it may be very different from that to be found in Western countries, but can nevertheless be found to belong to the same democratic family. Chapter 4, written by David Hundt, further expands on this familial resemblance conceptualization of democracy in South Korea by contrasting a “perfectionist” account with a “work-in-progress” account. According to the “perfectionist” account, the 1987 democratic transition represented a defining watershed or moment in South Korean political development, “insofar as it launched an era in which political legitimacy lies wholly or solely with the democratic state and elected political leaders.” The “work-in-progress” account, however, again sees more of a social constructivist perspective, wherein there is still much work to be done, and envisages a vital role for civil society even after democratization. In this chapter, Hundt concludes that there is an element of truth to both approaches, in that civil society was extremely important in getting to the 1987 moment, but remains important in today’s “participatory” democracy, and will continue to help shape the form and substance of democracy in South Korea going forward. Arya Fernandes points out, in Chapter 5, not only that there is still important work for civil society organizations (CSOs) to carry out in Indonesia, but also that there is even more suspicion and lack of trust between those who govern (the political elites), and the representatives of civil society than there is in the South Korean case. Indonesian

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democracy is, therefore, even more of a “work in progress.” That being said, Fernandes also references the considerable achievements to date. The socially constructed nature of democratic transition and transformation is once more noted, with the past 20 years, witnessing increased efforts by both NGOs and policymakers to collaborate in order to ensure better policy outcomes, but also changing approaches by both NGOs and policymakers to facilitate this improvement. Chapters 6 and 7 both address the relationship between the economy and democracy identified above as being of singular importance in East Asian polities. In Chapter 6, Nancy Kim and Hannah Jun bemoan the extent to which economic democratization is lagging behind other measurements in South Korea. They note that “Korean elites have embraced a thin, neoliberal version of economic democracy which fetishizes economic liberalization” which in turn has produced unacceptable levels of inequality, leading to a high level of dissatisfaction with democracy. Yet there is no real appetite for any other form of government, where the populace has effectively been socialized to the extent that it is the “only game in town” (Diamond, 2015). Kim and Jun conclude that the one thing that we have hopefully learned from the neoliberal “Washington Consensus” era is that there is no one-size-fits-all model of development, and that different countries and societies may choose to arrange their economies and democracies differently. So again, social construction and familial resemblance are important. In Chapter 7 Puspa D. Amri points out that in Indonesia, as with many other states and the findings of research programs devoted to them, citizens translate a worsening of economic conditions into critical attitudes toward the political system. Indonesia has faced serious economic shocks in recent years, with the most severe being the COVID-19-induced global financial crisis. Again, Indonesian democracy is described as something of a work in progress, but also again, while it may not be perfect, it has achieved a great deal, and perhaps more than is generally recognized. In both countries, in fact, the authors have restated the importance of the economy, not only in the support for democracy, but also in terms of the governance indicator considered most important by the citizens. With 70% of citizens considering the economy to be more important than democracy, those who govern democratically in Indonesia must pay particular attention not only to efficiency in economic governance, but also to the distribution of the collective good, focusing on distributive justice to make sure that the benefits trickle down to the people. As

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pointed out by Kim and Jun, referencing Polanyi (2001), by any measure of democracy or good governance, the economy should serve society, not vice versa. Thus, this book has demonstrated that there are indeed different “flavors” of democracy which have evolved to suit different “tastes.” As there is no perfect model of democracy in practice, with pragmatic trade-offs required by all forms of government, we must recognize significant deviations from the ideal as nevertheless belonging to the democratic “family.” A cosmopolitan approach which recognizes the social evolution of polities with different characteristics, but which share the same core democratic values is surely the way to go. Not only in recognition of the significant progress made by emerging democracies, but also because of the mutual aid and support democratic governments can give to each other, and to global consolidation of the core principles represented by this overlapping consensus.

References Agere, S. (2000). Promoting good governance. Commonwealth Secretariat. Buzan, B., & Segal, G. (1998). Rethinking East Asian security. In M. Klare, & Y. Chandrani (Eds.), World security: Challenges for a new century (pp. 96–112). St. Martin’s Press. Christie, K., & Roy, D. (2001). The politics of human rights in East Asia. Pluto Press. Diamond, L. (2015). Facing up to the democratic recession. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 141–155. Fisher, M., & S. H. Cho. (2020, March 23). How South Korea flattened the curve. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/world/ asia/coronavirus-south-korea-flatten-curve.html Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, 16(Summer), 3–18. Gan, S., Bomhoff, E., & Lee, G. (2012). Family ties and civic virtues: A comparison between the East and the West. Proceedings of 19th International Business Research Conference. Melbourne. Holliday, I. (2000). Productivist welfare capitalism: Social policy in East Asia. Political Studies, 48(4), 706–723. Hollifield, J., & Jillson, C. (Eds.). (2010). Pathways to democracy: The political economy of democratic transition. Routledge. Howe, B. (2021). Public value and human security. Korean Journal Public Value, 1(1), 13–22.

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Howe, B. (2020). Introduction: Democratic hopes challenges. Asian Affairs: An American Review, 46(2), 1–15. Howe, B. (2022). Universal public values and regional divergence. Korean Journal Public Value, 1(2), 1–14. Huntington, S. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22–49. International Monetary Fund. (1997). Good governance: The IMF’s role. http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm Laver, M. (1997). Private desires, political action: An invitation to the politics of rational choice. Sage. Luong, H. V. (2022). Local culture of global neoliberal ideology? Reflections on a shifting intellectual landscape. Presidential Address: Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference. March 25, Honolulu, HI. Morlino, L., Dressel, B., & Pelizzo, R. (2011). (2011), “The quality of democracy in Asia-Pacific: Issues and findings.” International Political Science Review, 32(5), 491–511. Park, S. N. (2020, April 2). Confucianism isn’t helping beat the coronavirus. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/02/confucianism-southkorea-coronavirus-testing-cultural-trope-orientalism/ Polanyi, K. (2001). The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time. Beacon Press. Rawls, J. (1987). The idea of an overlapping consensus. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7 (1), 1–25. Simon, D. (1998). Introduction: Rethinking geographies of North-South development. Third World Quarterly, 19(4), 595–606. Thompson, M. (2004). Pacific Asia after ‘Asian values’: Authoritarianism, democracy, and ‘good governance.’ Third World Quarterly, 25(6), 1079–1095. Welzel, C. (2011). The Asian values thesis revisited: Evidence from the World Values Surveys. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 12(1), 1–31. Welzel, C. (2021). Why the future is democratic. Journal of Democracy, 32(2), 132–144. Wittgenstein, L. (1953) [1991]. Philosophical investigations. John Wiley & Sons. World Bank. (2000). World development report of 2000/2001: Attacking poverty. Oxford University Press for World Bank.

Correction to: Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia Brendan Howe

Correction to: B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4 The original version of this book was inadvertently published without an acknowledgement section, which has now been included in the frontmatter of the book. The book has been updated with the change.

The updated version of the book can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-031-06267-4

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4_9

C1

Index

A Abangan, 45, 46 Abelmann, Nancy, 65, 69 Adesnik, Ariel D., 116 Agere, Sam, 149 Ahmadiyah, 45 Ahn, Chung-Si, 63, 64 Ahsini, Adzkar, 91 AKATIGA, 94 Alesina, Alberto, 109 Ali, Suryadharma, 51–53 Amal, Ichlasul, 88 Amien, Rais, 50, 51 Amin, Ma’ruf, 49 Amiruddin, 85 Amnesty International, 74 Amri, Puspa D., 126, 131, 155 Ancestor worship, 31 Ancient Greece, 3 Anderson, Christopher J., 130 Andi, Widjajanto, 86 Andong, 27 Anggraini, Titi, 89

Anis, Matta, 51 An, Sungbae, 110, 112 Anti-corruption, 52, 90, 100 Antlöv, Hans, 83, 98 April Revolution of 1960, 114 Aquinas, Thomas, 4 Arato, Andrew, 11 Arifianto, A.R., 40 Aristotle, 4, 5 Aritonang, Dinoroy Marganda, 82 Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI), 86 Arrington, Celeste, 87 Article 6, 82 Article 6A, 83 Article 13, 86 Asian Barometer Survey Phase 2, 115 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), 72, 110, 112–114, 129 Asian values, 8, 23, 152 Aspinall, Edward, 128 Aspiration Services and Online Complaints (LAPOR), 94

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Howe (ed.), Society and Democracy in South Korea and Indonesia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06267-4

159

160

INDEX

Assalamualaikum, 46 Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem), 89, 94 Audia, Robert, 3 Australia, 8 Azra, A., 41, 42

B Baker, Keith, 6 Bakija, Jon, 100 Bali Bombing, 47 Bangladesh, 21, 92, 97 Barber, Benjamin, 118 Barisan Nasional, 21 Basri, Chatib, 129 Baswedan, A.R., 42, 48 Beijing, 26 Beijing Opera, 23 Bell, Daniel A., 10, 18, 29–32 “Just hierarchy”, 32 Bill on Cyber Security and Resilience, 91 Bina Swadaya, 86 Bizzarro, Fernando, 131 Blackpink, 20 Blomkamp, Emma, 95 Bomhoff, Eduard, 152 Boulding, Carew, 85 Brazinsky, Gregg A., 64, 67–69 Brexit, 6 Brill, Julie, 68 British Broadcasting Company (BBC), 7 BTS, 20 Buddhism, 8, 24 Budget Openness (APBN), 94 Budget Watch Network, 22 Budiardjo, Miriam, 88 Budiardjo, M.S., 54 Buehler, M., 44 Buk-gu (Gwangju), 22

Burke, Paul J., 129 Burma, 97 Buyun (Sichuan), 25 Buzan, Barry, 152

C Cambodia, 21, 97 Campello, Daniela, 141 Carreras, Miguel, 127 Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO), 88 Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 132, 133, 139 Chaebol, 70, 73, 117–119 Chang, Eric C.C., 136 Chang, Ha-Joon, 74, 110, 111, 118 Chang, Myon, 114 Chang, Yu-Tzung, 126, 127, 129, 138, 141 Chan, Joseph, 18, 29, 30 Cheon, Byung-you, 111 Cheon, Sanghun, 74 Chiang, Kai-shek, 23 China, 8, 18–20, 23, 25–28, 32, 152 Chinese Communist Party, 23 Chinese University of Hong Kong, 20 Cho, Hee-yeon, 115, 119 Choi, H.D., 22 Choi, Jang Jip, 65, 66 Choi, Kyungsoo, 109 Choi, Soon-Sil, 74 ‘Chong’ (familial affectionate sentiment), 33 Cho, Sang-Hun, 152 Choung, Youngjoo, 116 Christianity, 24, 27 Christie, Kenneth, 151 Chun, Doo-Hwan, 64, 109 Chung, Edward Y.J., 9 Citizen’s Watchdog Committee on Government Budget Waste, 22

INDEX

Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), 22, 70, 71 City University of Hong Kong, 28 civil liberties, 7, 8, 128, 142, 152 Civil Society Organization (CSO), 64, 67, 71, 73, 83, 93–96, 154 Clarke, Harold D., 127, 130, 131 Cognitive mobilization, 149 Cohen, Jean, 11 Collaboration, 87 Colomer, J.M., 55 Communitarianism, 4, 28 Community Organization, 94 Compatible model, 24 Conflict model, 19, 23, 26, 34, 153 Confucian communitarianism, 29 Confucian culture, 19, 20, 27, 34. See also Confucianism Confucian democracy, 18–20, 28–35, 153 Confucian democratic meritocracy, 29 Confucianism, 8–12, 18–20, 23–35, 152–154 Confucian meritocratic theory, 29 Constitution, 5, 42, 82, 83, 88 Constitutional Court, 73, 74, 85, 89 Contentious society, 64 Control Yuan, 27 Co-optation, 71 Cornelis, Lay, 86 Corruption, 4, 51–53, 57, 64, 71, 88, 90, 95–98, 100, 134, 141 Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism (KKN), 83 Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), 52, 53, 85, 90 Coston, Jennifer M., 92 COVID-19, 7, 8, 107, 108, 112–114, 126, 129, 152, 155 Cox, G.W., 55 Cramer, Brian D., 130 Cumings, Bruce, 67

161

D Dagger, Richard, 3, 4 Dahlberg, Stefan, 126, 130, 135 Dahl, Robert A., 20, 64, 119, 130, 139 Daoust, Jean-François, 126, 131, 133 Darsono, Febryandi, 91 Davies, Huw, 93 de Bary, William Theodore, 19 de Condorcet, Marquis, 6 De-Confucianism, 32 Deliberative democracy, 21, 27, 32 Deliberative polling, 21, 27, 33 Democracy, 9, 10 varieties of, 126 Democracy Index, 7–9 Democratic governance, 2, 5–7, 10, 11, 90, 151 Democratic transition, 10, 11, 24, 27, 62, 75, 108, 110, 116, 117, 128, 129, 131, 149, 154, 155 Democratization, 9–12, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 56, 62–66, 69, 71, 76, 81, 82, 89, 101, 108, 109, 115, 117, 118, 128, 129, 131, 148, 151, 154, 155 Demokrat Partai (Democratic Party), 43, 44, 100 De-monopolization, 119 Dent, Christopher, 110 Developmental autocracy, 68 Development(alism), 27, 149 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR/House of Representatives), 82, 86, 88, 89, 91, 93, 97, 101 Dhakidae, Daniel, 88 Diamond, Larry J., 6, 12, 65, 84, 128, 155 Distributive justice, 11, 12, 31, 149, 151, 155 Di Tella, Rafael, 131

162

INDEX

Djalil, Matori Abdul, 52 Djan, Faridz, 52 Djani, Luky, 93, 97 Doorenspleet, Renee, 130, 133 Doucette, Jamie, 117–119 DPR Expertise Body, 93 Dressel, Bjeorn, 151 Duch, Raymond M., 133 Duterte, Rodrigo, 21 Dworkin, Ronald, 2 Dynamic duo, 110, 118, 120

E East Asia, 8 East Asia Barometer Survey, 23 Eckert, Carter J., 66 Economic democracy, 108, 109, 117–120, 155 Economic growth with equity, 115 Economic Planning Board, 109, 115 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 7–10, 62, 83, 84, 126 Econophoria, 152 Effendy, B., 46 Election API, 95 Election Law, 89, 90, 97 Election Law codification, 89 Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu), 89 Ellis, Andrew, 82 Elson, R.E., 41, 46 Elster, Jon, 117 Emergency Employment Stability Subsidy, 114 Employment insurance coverage, 113 Employment Insurance system, 114 Engerman, David C., 63 Enlightenment, 7 Esposito, John L., 10 Europe, 4, 9, 130 Evans, P., 109

Examination Yuan, 27 F Fahri, Hamzah, 51 Fajar, Malik, 88 Fajrul, Falaakh, 86 Fathanah, Ahmad, 53 Fatwa, 45 Fernandes, Arya, 154, 155 Field, Guy C., 5 Filiality (xiaoti), 29 Filial piety, 30, 31 Fionna, U., 52 First amendment, 82 Fiscal policy, 90 Fisher, Max, 152 Fitzgerald, John, 25 Flawed democracy, 8, 84 Foa, Roberto Stefan, 126 Forum Masyarakat Peduli Parlemen (Formappi), 91 Fossati, Diego, 126, 128, 132, 135 Fourth Industrial Revolution, 114 France, 8 Freedom House, 8, 10, 62, 83, 84, 126, 128 Freese, Jeremy, 133 Frey, Bruno S., 131 Friedman, Edward, 19, 24 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), 151 Fukuyama, Francis, 2, 148 G G-20, 98 Gallagher, M., 55 Gallup Korea, 75 Gan, Sue, 152 Geertz, C., 45 Gelora Party, 50, 51 General Election Commission (KPU), 88, 89

INDEX

Gini coefficient, 109, 129, 139 Global Financial Crisis, 112, 129 Global Summit, 94 Golkar party, 43, 44, 88 Gordon, Joshua, 86 Goryeo Dynasty, 23 Government Procurement Policy Institute (LKPP), 90, 93 Graham, M.H., 126 Greece, 18 Green Economic Caucus (GEC), 89 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 113, 129, 133, 142 Gross National Income (GNI), 87 Gumay, Hadar Navis, 88 Gwangju Massacre, 69

H Habermas, Jürgen, 63 Habibie, B.J., 47 Ha, Byung-jin, 111 Hahm, Chaibong, 73 Haji Muhammad, 46 Hamayotsu, K., 44 Hamilton-Hart, Natasha, 129 Han, Gil-Soo, 74 Han, Jongwoo, 27 Han, Sung Min, 136 Haque, M. Shamsul, 92 Hare quota, 55 Harmony, 31 Harrison, Selig S., 67 Hasan, N., 46 Hatherell, Michael, 91 He, Baogang, 5, 17–19, 26, 33, 71, 153 Henderson, Jeffrey, 109 Hertzman, C., 109 Hicken, A., 128 Hill, Hal, 129 Hitler, Adolf, 5

163

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), 45, 49 Hobbes, Thomas, 3 Holliday, Ian, 113, 152 Hollifield, James, 151 Hong Kong, 19, 20, 26, 32, 33, 152 Howe, Brendan M., 2–4, 8, 116, 148, 150, 151 Hoy, C., 129 Human Rights, 91 Hundt, David, 22, 65, 69–72, 74, 154 Hungary, 6 Huntington, Samuel, 9, 19, 62, 64, 152 Husodo, Adnan Topan, 90 Hybridity, 27, 35 Hybrid model, 19, 27, 28, 34, 35, 153, 154 I IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri/State Islamic Religion Institutes), 46 ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim/Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), 47 ICW Coordinator, 90 Ikrar, Nhusa Bhakti, 86 Ilyas, Firdaus, 100 Impeach, 74 Park’s impeachment, 74, 75 Impeachment, 21, 27, 66, 73, 74, 82, 83 Indikator Politik Indonesia, 132 Indonesia, 9–12, 40–42, 44, 45, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54–57, 76, 82–84, 87, 90–94, 96–100, 126–129, 131–133, 135, 138, 139, 141, 142, 148, 150, 152–155 post-reformasi, 41 pre-reformasi, 40, 46

164

INDEX

Indonesia Corruption Watch, 99 Indonesia CSO Sustainability Index 2014–2019, 96 Indonesia Forum for the Environment (WALHI), 90, 91 Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), 86 Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law (ICEL), 85 Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy Studies (PSHK), 95 Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), 46, 54 Indonesian constitution, 40 Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), 90, 98–100 Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (MUI), 45, 49 Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII), 18, 54 Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), 85, 92 Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas), 94 Indonesian Multidimensional Poverty Index, 89 Indonesian National Party (PNI), 46, 54 Indonesia’s Secretariat, 95 Indrayana, Denny, 88 Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM), 85, 91, 92 Intan, Rocky, 126 Internal coherence, 40, 48 International Labour Organization (ILO), 114 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 72, 110, 149 2009 International Social Survey, 115 Ip, Hung-yok, 28 Irawan, Ade, 100

Islam, 8, 10–12, 25, 40–42, 44, 45, 48 Islamic democracy, 18 Islamic Education Movement, 54 Islamic party(ies), 10, 11, 40–44, 46, 47, 50, 52–57 Democratic Islam Party (PID), 42 Indonesian Islamic Political Party of Masyumi (PPIIM), 42 Indonesian Muslim Nation Party (PUMI), 42 Islamic Nation Party (PUI), 42 Masyumi, 42, 46, 50, 54, 56 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 42, 45, 46, 54–56 Nahdlatul Umat Party (PNU), 42 New Indonesia Party (PIB), 42 New Masyumi Party (PMB), 42 PAN (National Mandate Party), 42, 43, 50, 51, 55, 88 Parmusi, 46 Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party), 42, 43, 52, 55 PBB (Crescent Star Party), 42, 43, 55 Perti, 46, 54 PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), 42–45, 50–53, 55, 88 PPP (United Development Party), 42, 43, 46, 50–53, 55 PSII, 46 United Party (PP), 42 Isnur, Muhammad, 92 Isra, Saldi, 88 Italy, 6 J Jackson, Andrew David, 64 Jakarta, 48, 49, 56, 95 Japan, 8, 20, 21, 32, 66, 87, 152 Java, 45, 47, 136, 138, 140

INDEX

Jee, Joohee, 71 Jeong, Moon-Gi, 65, 71 Jeong, Seong-jin, 118, 119 Jillson, Calvin, 151 Joint Secretariat of the Codification of the Election Law, 89, 90 Jones, David Martin, 64 Joseon Dynasty, 23, 27 Judicial Commission, 85 Jung, Ee Hwan, 111 Jun, Hannah, 155, 156

K Kalinowski, Thomas, 110 Kang, Jiyeon, 73 Kang, Woo-jin, 115–117 Kaufman, Robert R., 130 Khalid, Khalisah, 91 Khong, C.O., 8 Kilavuz, M. Tahir, 132 Kim, Dae-jung, 27, 65, 68, 71, 72, 94, 110, 116 Kim, Euiyoung, 94 Kim, Eun-mee, 109, 110 Kim, Hisam, 116 Kim, Hyuk-Rae, 68, 71 Kim, Jin-pyo, 74 Kim, Kyong-dong, 23 Kim, Nancy, 155, 156 Kim, Soonhee, 22 Kim, Sungmoon, 10, 19, 22, 27–33, 35, 63, 65 Confucian Democracy in East Asia, 29 Democracy after Virtue, 29, 30, 33 In Public Reason Confucianism, 29 Kim, Taekyoon, 109, 113 Kim, Young-sam, 70, 87, 94, 110, 116 Knowledge Sector Initiative, 92 Komnas HAM, 85

165

Koo, Hagen, 64, 65, 69, 112 Korea, 23 Korea Democracy Barometer and Asian Barometer Survey, 115 Korea Herald, 9 Korea Joongang Daily, 114 Korea Labor Institute (KLI), 111, 113 Korea National Statistics Office (KNSO), 111–113 Korean Council of Trade Unions (KCTU), 68–70, 72–74 Korean Democracy Barometer Survey, 116 Korean popular music (K-pop), 20 Korean Supreme Court, 30 Korea’s Second Republic, 115 KPK Law, 90 Krieckhaus, Jonathan, 126, 127, 131, 133, 135, 136, 139 Kristiadi, J., 88 L Labor Relations Law, 70 Lammert, Christian, 6 Lang, Youxing, 26 Latin America, 9, 130 Lattimore, Owen, 66, 67 Laver, Michael, 150 Law 15/2011 on General Election Organizers, 89 Law Number 12 of 2011 on Formation of Legislative Regulations, 93 Law number 22/1999, 47 Law Number 23 of 2014 article 354 on Regional Regulations, 93 Law Number 23 of 2014 on Regional Government, 93 Law Number 32/2004 and Law 12/2008 on Regional Government, 89

166

INDEX

Law Number 42 of 2008 on Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections, 89 Law Number 7 of 2017 on General Elections, 89 Law Number 8 of 2012 on Legislative Elections, 89 Law on Community Organizations (Ormas), 86 Law on Promotion of Non-profit Civil Organizations, 94 Lee, Byeong-cheon, 119 Lee, Byung-Hee, 110–112 Lee, Chung H., 110 Lee, Grace, 152 Lee, J., 22 Lee, Jiho, 22, 74 Lee, Kangkook, 110 Lee, Keun, 110 Lee, Kyung Tae, 110 Lee, Myung-bak, 73, 74, 116 Lee, Namhee, 69 Lee, Sangheon, 111 Lee, Sook-Jong, 87 Lee, Yeonho, 71 Lee, Yeonok, 66 Lee, You-il, 110 Lee, Young-jack, 65 Lehnardt, Rana Lehr, 97 Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat (LPSM/Community Development Institutions), 86 Liang, Shuming, 27 Liddle, R.W., 47 Lim, Timothy C., 66 Lim, Yoo-Jin, 71 Ling, L.H.M., 27 Li, Peng, 26 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 131 Local Finance Act , 22 Article 39, 22 Long, J. Scott, 133

Lubis, Todung Mulya, 88 Luong, Hy V., 153 Luthfi, Hassan Ishaaq, 52, 53

M Machmudi, Y., 44 MacIntyre, Andrew, 131 Maftuchan, AH., 89 Mahfud MD, 88 Mainwaring, Scott, 131 Malaysia, 21 Malleson, Thomas, 119 Mao, Zedong, 20 Martinez i Coma, Ferran, 126, 128, 132, 135 Martini, Sely, 100 Martini, Sergio, 127, 130–133, 141 Marxism, 46, 153 Masduki, Teten, 100 Mas, Marwan, 88 McKlintock, Cynthia, 139 McLeod, Ross, 129, 131 MediaLink, 95 Meritocratic elitism, 29 Merkel, Wolfgang, 11 Mietzner, Marcus, 49, 56, 86, 100, 128 Miichi, K., 42 Mill, John Stuart, 5 Minimum Living Standard Guarantee, 113 Minister of Religious Affairs, 51, 53 Ministry of Defence, 86 Ministry of Education, 109 Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL), 111 Ministry of Law and Human Rights, 52 Ministry of Public Affairs and Safety (MPAS), 22 Ministry of Religions Affairs, 53

INDEX

Ministry of Religious Affairs, 46, 53 Mobrand, Erik, 65 Modernist , 62 Modjo, Ikhsan, 100 MOFE, 65, 71 Money Laundering Act, 90 Mongolia, 21 Monitory role, 62, 65 Montero, Jose Ramon, 131 Moon, Jae-in, 74, 116 Morlino, Leonardo, 151 Morriss, Peter, 65 Most Important Problem (MIP), 133, 134, 136–141 Mounk, Yascha, 126 212 Movement, 48, 49 Muhaimin, Iskandar, 52 Muhammadiyah, 45, 55 Muhtadi, Burhanuddin, 127–129, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139 Mujani, Saiful, 127, 131, 133, 135 Mulfachri, Harahap, 50 Multiple moral goods, 29 Munir, 86 Mussolini, Benito, 5 Myanmar’s military coup, 21

N Nadeau, Richard, 126, 131, 133 Nadhlatul Ulama, 52 Nasidiq, Rachlan (Nashidik, Rachland), 100 Nat econ, 136, 137 Nathan, Andrew, 19 National Assembly, 71, 74 National Audit Office, 22 National Corruption Prevention Strategy (Stranas PK), 90 National Health System, 113 Nationalist party(ies), 43 Berkarya, 43

167

Demokrat, 43 Garuda, 43 Gerindra, 43 Golkar, 43 Hanura, 43 Nasdem, 43 PDIP, 43, 88 Perindo, 43 PKPI, 43 PSI, 43 National Movement to Guard MUI’s Fatwa (GNPF-MUI), 48, 49 National Pension, 113 National People’s Congress, 26 National Public Deliberation Committee for Deliberative Polling, 21 National Public Library, 46 National Security Law, 73 National Statistical Office, 21 National University of Singapore, 18 National University of Taiwan, 18 National Welfare Security (JKN), 89 Nau, Henry R., 7, 9 Neary, Michael, 72 Neo-Confucianism, 10, 23 Nepal, 97 Neto, O.A., 55 New Constitution, Coalition for, 88 New Democratic Party, 68 New Order, 44, 47, 54, 83, 86, 96 New right, 73 New Zealand, 8 Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), 11, 22, 71, 83–101, 155 Norris, Pippa, 126, 127, 130 North Korea, 8, 67–69, 71, 73 Notosusanto, Smita, 88 Nurdin, Iwan, 100 O Oceania, 130

168

INDEX

Ochlocracy, 5 O’Dwyer, Shaun, 24, 29, 33 OGI Action Plan, 94 Ogle, George E., 69 Oh, Soo-Gil, 65 Okthariza, Noory, 154 Ombudsman, 85 One Indonesian Data, 94 One Map Policy, 94 Online Single Submission (OSS), 92 Open Government Indonesia (OGI), 94 Open Government Partnership (OGP), 94, 95 Open Tender, 90 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 109–111, 113, 114, 116

P Pak, Mathilede, 110, 112 Pakpahan, Aknolt K., 128 Pak, Tae-Young, 116 Pancasila, 42, 49 Paris, 94 Park, Chong-Min, 23 Park, Chung-hee, 23, 67, 68, 108, 109, 115, 117, 119 Park, Geun-hye, 21, 65, 73–75, 116, 117 Park, Jieun, 21 Park, Tae-Gyun, 63 Partial incorporation, 71 Participatory Budgeting (PB), 21, 22 Parties’ electoral share (1999–2019), 43 Berkarya, 43 Demokrat, 43 Garuda, 43 Gerindra, 43

Golkar, 43 Hanura, 43 Nasdem, 43 PAN, 43 PBB, 43 PDIP, 43 Perindo, 43 PKB, 43 PKPI, 43 PKS, 43 PPP, 43 PSI, 43 Pasha, Mochamad, 131 Pei, Minxin, 116 Pelizzo, Riccardo, 151 Peng, Ito, 113 People Consultative Assembly (MPR), 50, 82, 83 People’s Party (Partai Ummat ), 50 People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), 70, 71 Perda, 44 Perdana, Aditya, 100 Perfectionist, 62–64, 154 Performance_ineq., 139–141 Perkumpulan Prakarsa, 89 Perppu, 49 Personal Data Protection Bill, 91 Pettit, Philip, 18 Pew Research Center, 139 Philippines, 21, 97, 152 Pietsch, Juliet, 127, 131 Polanyi, Karl, 120, 156 Policy Paper on Internet Control versus Freedom Policy, 92 Political activists, 62, 75 Political culture, 6, 8–10, 12, 27, 150–154 Political Islam, 10, 40, 41, 48, 54, 154 Politik aliran, 54 Polybius, 5

INDEX

Poor cousin, 108–110 Pork-barrel, 22 Portugal, 8 Poster child, 108–110 Power, Thomas P., 83, 126 Pranowo, Ganjar, 88 Precariat, 111, 113, 114, 119 Presidential Regulation (Perpres) number 16 of 2018, 94 Pridham, Geoffrey, 12 Procurement of Goods/Services (PBJ), 94 ProPatria, 86 Proportional Representation (PR), 54–57 Przeworski, Adam, 20, 131 Public Consultation Forum, 94 Public Information Disclosure Law, 90 Public sphere, 63, 75 Purnama, Basuki Tjahaja (“Ahok”), 48, 49 Putin, Vladimir, 7 Putnam, Robert, 83 Pye, Lucian, 2 Q Quaranta, Mario, 127, 130–133, 141 R Rakhmat, Muhammad Zulfikar, 126 Randall, V., 51 Rapoza, Kenneth, 6 Rawls, John, 153 Reformation, 7 Regional Autonomy Implementation Monitoring Committee (KPPOD), 85, 91, 92 Regional Regulations (PERDA), 93 Reidhead, Jacob, 71 Republican, 4

169

Republican virtue, 4 Republic of Korea (ROK), 9, 11, 66 Respectful deference (cirang), 29 Respect of the elderly (jinglao), 29 Rhee, Syngman, 67, 68, 114 Ricklefs, M.C., 45, 46 Ritual propriety, 30, 31 Rizal, Sukma, 86 Robert Na Endi Jaweng, 85 Rodrik, Dani, 109, 112 Rogowski, Ronald, 130 Rohingya people, 21 Roh, Moo-hyun, 22, 65, 71, 73, 116 Roh, Tae-woo, 64 Romahurmuziy (Romi), 51–53 Rosdaniah, Sitta, 129 Ross, Sir David, 4 Roy, Denny, 151 Roy, O., 41 Rudra, Nita, 113

S Said, Agil, 53 Sainte-Leaguë, 55 Salim, Emil, 88 Santri, 45 Schulze, Gunther G., 129 Sebastian, L.C., 40 Security Sector Reform Working Group (Pokja), 86 Segal, Gerald, 152 Setiawan, Usep, 100 Sharia, 41, 42, 44 Sherlock, Stephen, 93, 97 Shihab, Rizieq, 49 Shin, Doh Chull, 23, 115, 116, 118 Shin-Gori nuclear reactor, 21 Shin, Kwang-yeong, 73, 111 Shintoism, 8 Siddiqi, A., 109 Silver Award, 94

170

INDEX

Simon, David, 149 Sinaga, Kastorius, 100 Singapore, 19, 20, 23, 24, 152 Siyaranamual, Martin D., 129 Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), 112, 117, 118 Social harmony (he), 29 Social policy, 88, 90, 152 Societal exceptionalism, 11 Society, 72, 74 Society-Economy, 151 Soebagio, Natalia, 88 Soedirgo, J., 40 Soekarnoputri, Megawati, 83 Sohibul, Iman, 51 Song, Hae-yung, 110 Song, Ho Keun, 113 Southeast Asia, 9, 21, 132, 148 South Korea, 8–12, 18–24, 26–34, 62–70, 73, 75, 76, 87, 94, 108–120, 148, 150, 152–155 Sri Lanka, 97 Standards for Participatory Budgeting Ordinance, 22 State Administration Agency (LAN), 93 State Civil Service (ASN), 93 State-Economy, 151 State-Society, 151 Statistics Indonesia, 129 Statistics Korea, 112 Stutzer, Alois, 131 Subianto, Prabowo, 49, 51, 83, 129 Sucipto, Ani, 88 Sudharmono, 47 Suharto, 41, 45–47, 50, 51, 56 Sukarno, 45, 50 Sukma, Violetta, 85 Sumaktoyo, Nathanael Gratias, 132 Sunshine Policy, 73 Sun, Yat-sen, 27 Supreme Court, 52

Susilo, Zumrotin, 96, 98 Sustainability index, 96 Sustainable development, 71, 90 Sutrisno, Try, 47 Svåsand, L., 51 Svolik, M.W., 126 T Tadjoeddin, M. Zulfan, 128, 131 Taiwan, 8, 20, 21, 23, 24, 32, 152 Talangsari massacre, 50 Tanjung Priok, 50 Tanuwidjaja, S., 44 Tarbiyah, 45 Tarigan, Abetnego, 100 Thailand, 21, 97 Thatcher, Margaret, 110 The Jakarta Post, 87, 95 The Policy Lab, 95 Third amendment, 82, 83 Thomassen, J., 131 Thompson, Mark, 152 Timor Leste, 97 Tomsa, D., 52 Top-down democracy, 65 Toplišek, Alen, 6 Torcal, Mariano, 131 Transgenerational justice, 71 Trump, Donald, 6 Trustworthiness (xin), 29 Tu, Weiming, 29 Tverdova, Yuliya V., 130 Type III Self-Management (Swakelola Tipe III), 94 U Ufen, A., 46 UK, 6 Ukraine, 7 Ulil Absar Abdalla, 100 Ummat Party, 51

INDEX

United States (US), 6, 9, 19, 64, 66–68, 71, 73, 74, 110 Universalism, 148 Universal suffrage, 6, 33 University Network for Free and Fair Election (UNFREL), 88 University of Melbourne, 95 ‘Uri’ (we-ness), 33 Uri Yeollin-dang (Our Open Party), 73 US Agency for International Development (USAID), 96, 97 V Valence, David, 68 Value infusion, 51 van Beek, Ursula, 6 Van Bruinessen, M., 44, 45, 47 Vandenberg, Andrew, 70–72 Van Egmond, Marcel, 130 Vietnam, 20, 152 Visi Integritas (Vision of Integrity), 100 Vogue compromise, 41 Voll, John O., 10 Vormann, Boris, 6 W Wahid, Abdurrahman, 52 Walzer, Michael, 5 Wang, Pei, 32 “Just hierarchy”, 32 Warburton, Eve, 83, 127, 129, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139 “Washington Consensus” era, 120, 155 Wells, Kenneth M., 69 Welzel, Christian, 149, 153 Whitehead, Laurence, 2 Widjojanto, Bambang, 88

171

Widodo, Joko (“Jokowi” ), 49, 51, 83, 129, 139 Widoyoko, Danang, 100 Wike, Richard, 139 WikiDPR (Jejak Parlemen), 91 Witness and Victim Protection Act, 90 Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK), 85 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 148 Work in progress, 154, 155 World Bank, 87, 109, 110, 149 World Trade Organization, 110 World Values Survey (WVS), 115, 116 Wu, Wen-Chin, 127, 129, 138, 141 X Xi, Jinping, 23 Y Yale, 18 YangYang, S.C., 114 Yayasan Suluh Desa, 86 Yazid, Sylvia, 128 Yew, Lee Kuan, 20 Yonhap News Agency, 112–114 Yonsei University, 28 Yoon, Hyo-won, 71 Yoon, Young-mo, 72 You, Jong-sung, 65 Young, D.R., 87 Yuan, Shikai, 23 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 53, 83, 100, 129 Yuntho, Emerson, 100 Z Zinn, Howard, 75 Zucco, Cesar, 141 Zulkifli, Hasan, 50, 51