Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law: Volume 2 2008 9781472565143, 9781849460644

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Preface Between the fourth and the sixth of September 2008, the Third Biennial Conference of the European Society of International Law (ESIL) took place at the Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg (Germany). The Conference was hosted by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. The theme of the Conference was ‘International Law in a Heterogeneous World’; a topic that reflects an idea which is central to the philosophy of ESIL. Heterogeneity is considered to be one of the pillars upon which Europe’s contribution to international law is built, and the subject was discussed in a number of panels as well as two keynote speeches and one concluding round table. Of the many interesting research projects that were presented, a selection is offered in this volume. The papers cover a wide range of topics, but focus on the main theme of the conference: heterogeneity. Hence, this volume covers the topics of migration and immigration, international law and religions, international organisations, legitimacy in international law, the multiplicity of the law-making process, international legal traditions, international environmental law, and several more. This volume is the second in the series of the ‘Selected Proceedings of the European Society of International Law’. The background to the ESIL conferences is the notion that European legal scholarship has always been at the heart of international law even if its legacy mingles with other influences. Theoretical works have long explored ‘the European tradition of international law’ and emphasised the unique character of this contribution. Some critics have, of course, scoffed at European aspirations to universality in this discipline, by arguing that Europe is essentially preoccupied with European interests which are not truly universal. Nevertheless, regardless of the perspective adopted, Europe’s historical contribution cannot be denied. European theorists have played a central role in the evolution of international law, while the promotion of the international rule of law continues to permeate European foreign policy. This special contribution of the European tradition of international law is highlighted throughout this volume and will hopefully continue to flourish in the future. We owe many thanks to Falilou Saw, Yvonne Klein and Marina Filinberg, who organised the conference. Furthermore, we would like to thank Klaus Zimmermann for his logistic support, and Dietmar Bussmann, Florian Finocchario and Michael Brück for their technical support. Last but not least, we would like to express our gratitude to the Max Planck Society and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation for their generous financial support of the conference.

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Avant-propos La troisième Conférence biennale de la Société européenne de droit international (SEDI) s’est tenue du 4 au 6 septembre 2008 à l’Université Ruprecht Karls d’Heidelberg (Allemagne), à l’invitation de l’Institut Max Planck pour le droit public compare et le droit international d’Heidelberg. La Conférence avait pour thème général «Le droit international dans un monde hétérogène», en écho à une idée qui est au cœur de la philosophie de la SEDI. L’hétérogénéité est l’un des piliers sur lesquels la contribution de l’Europe au droit international se construit et le sujet a été débattu tant au sein de divers panels, que par deux conférenciers prestigieux et dans le cadre de la table-ronde de clôture. Une sélection d’un certain nombre des projets de recherche présentés lors de la Conférence est offerte dans le présent ouvrage. Les contributions couvrent un large éventail de sujets, tout en restant centrées sur le thème principal de la Conférence, l’hétérogénéité. Ainsi, l’ouvrage touche-t-il des domaines aussi variés que l’immigration et les migrations, le droit international et les religions, les organisations internationales, la légitimité en droit international, la multiplicité des procédés d’élaboration du droit international, les traditions juridiques internationales, le droit international de l’environnement, et bien d’autres encore. Ce volume est le deuxième de la série des Actes de la Société européenne de droit international. A l’arrière-plan des conférences de la SEDI, il y a l’idée que l’Europe s’est toujours située au coeur du droit international même si son legs s’entremêle avec d’autres influences. Des recherches théoriques et historiques ont largement exploré “la tradition européenne du droit international” et mis l’accent sur le caractère sans équivalent de cette contribution. Bien sûr, certaines critiques ont moqué l’aspiration européenne à l’universalité en soutenant notamment que l’Europe se préoccupe avant tout des intérêts européens, lesquels ne sont pas vraiment universels. Quoi qu’il en soit, indépendamment de la perspective adoptée, la contribution historique de l’Europe peut difficilement être niée. Les théoriciens et philosophes européens ont joué un rôle central dans l’évolution du droit international et la promotion du règne du droit au niveau international continue d’imprégner la politique extérieure européenne. Cette contribution particulière de la tradition européenne du droit international est perceptible tout au long du présent ouvrage et continuera, peut-on espérer, à se développer à l’avenir. Nous tenons à exprimer notre gratitude à Falilou Saw, Yvonne Klein et Marina Filinberg, qui ont organisé la Conférence. Nous souhaitons également remercier Klaus Zimmermann qui a pris en charge l’aspect logistique ainsi que Dietmar Bussmann, Florian Finocchario et Michael Brück qui ont assumé les aspects techniques. Enfin et surtout, nous remercions très sincèrement la Société Max Planck et la Fondation Fritz Thyssen Foundation pour le généreux soutien financier qu’elles ont offert à la Conférence.

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Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner BRUNO SIMMA *

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

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KEYNOTE SPEECH at a conference on ‘International law in a heterogeneous world’ devoted to the ‘universality’ of international law might remind the listener, especially an audience like tonight’s, with, I am sure, a particularly high percentage of post-modernists, of frightened people whistling in the dark—for which there is no reason, I would submit right at the outset. But what the topic I have been asked to talk about certainly seems to evoke is a tension between the two notions of heterogeneity and universality. The choice of the topic suggests the idea (or the hope) that heterogeneity does not exclude universality, that in today’s world the continued existence and vitality of universal international law will be contingent upon its capacity to accommodate an ever-larger measure of heterogeneity. Therefore, my focus tonight will be on international rules and mechanisms (particularly judicial) and international institutions serving this very purpose—that is, the accommodation of heterogeneous values and expectations by means of international law. I am aware that my topic will necessarily engage a number of buzzwords in contemporary international law, but beyond juggling with these, my approach tonight will be characterised by two main features. First, I will treat my topic from the perspective of a practitioner. That is, I will deal with the huge amount of theoretical writing on the subject only when absolutely necessary, and instead concentrate on practical aspects, and thus demonstrate how the theoretical problems that I come across in my presentation play out in practice. In doing so, I will have to condense or summarise quite a few issues that we will encounter on our rather extensive journey together, but with which, I trust, most of you will be familiar.

* Judge at the International Court of Justice. This paper was originally presented as the Keynote Speech at the opening session of the Biennial Conference of the European Society of International Law in Heidelberg on 4 September 2008. I would like to thank Markus Benzing for his extremely valuable and inspired assistance. I have kept the paper in its original format and only added footnotes where absolutely necessary. Also, I have not updated the text with regard to developments, for instance in the case law referred to, but only indicated such developments and commented on them in the footnotes.

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As the second specific take on my topic, I will base myself as much as I can on my personal experience, that is, on insights gained through giving occasional advice to governments, by serving in a few legal teams before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), through membership in one of the UN’s human rights treaty bodies, namely the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, through my work in the International Law Commission, as an arbitrator, and ultimately in the ICJ.

THREE CONCEPTIONS (LEVELS) OF UNIVERSALITY

In the following, I will define what I understand the ‘universality’ of international law to mean. I will arrive at three different conceptions, or levels, each with its own range of implications and problems. I will then deal with these conceptions in turn, and select from among the clusters of problems which they encounter—which I will call ‘challenges’—as well as from the ways to cope with these challenges, the one(s) on which I hope I will be able to say something meaningful. Let me now turn to my three different understandings, or ‘levels’, of universality of international law. At a first, if you want, basic level, and corresponding to what I would regard as the ‘classic’ understanding of our notion, universality of international law means that there exists on the global scale an international law that is valid for and binding on all states.1 Universality thus understood as global validity and applicability excludes neither the possibility of regional (customary) international law nor that of treaty regimes creating particular legal sub-systems, nor the dense web of bilateral legal ties between states (I exclude constructs like ‘persistent objection’ from tonight’s analysis). But all these particular rules remain ‘embedded’, as it were, in a fundamental universal body, or core, of international law. In this sense, international law is all-inclusive. At a second level, a wider understanding of universality responds to the question whether international law can be perceived as constituting an organised whole, a coherent legal system, or whether it remains no more than a ‘bric-à-brac’, to use Jean Combacau’s expression2—a random collection of norms, or webs of norms, with little interconnection. This question is probably best termed that of the ‘unity’ or ‘coherence’ of international law; and strong connotations of predictability and legal security will be attached to such (in my terminology) second-level universality.3 International law has, of course, long been perceived as a legal system by international lawyers, most of them admittedly not much bothered by fine points of systems theory, while today many commentators see this systemic character threatened by a process of ‘fragmentation’, a challenge to which I will turn later. 1 RY Jennings, ‘Universal International Law in a Multicultural World’ in M Bos and I Brownlie (eds), Liber Amicorum for the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987) 39, 40–1. 2 J Combacau, ‘Le droit international: bric–à–brac ou système ?’ (1986) 31 Archives de philosophie du droit 85, 85. 3 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (United Nations, A/CN.4/L.682, 2006) 491.

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At a third level, universality may be taken to refer to an—actual or perceived— (changing) nature of the international legal system in line with the tradition of international legal thinking known as ‘universalism’. A universalist approach to international law in this sense expresses the conviction that it is possible, desirable, indeed urgently necessary (and for many, a process that is already under way), to establish a public order on a global scale, a common legal order for mankind as a whole.4 International law, according to this understanding, is not merely a tool-box of rules and principles destined to govern inter-state coordination and cooperation; rather it constitutes a ‘comprehensive blueprint for social life’, as Christian Tomuschat has called it.5 Universalism thus understood goes far beyond the addition of a layer of what Wolfgang Friedmann6 has called the ‘international law of cooperation’ to the body of the law. The concept implies the expansion of international law beyond the inter-state sphere, particularly by endowing individuals with international personality, establishing a hierarchy of norms, a value-oriented approach, a certain ‘verticalisation’ of international law, de-emphasising consent in law-making, introducing international criminal law, by the existence of institutions and procedures for the enforcement of collective interests at the international level— ultimately, the emergence of an international community, perceived as a legal community.7 Indeed, international law has undoubtedly entered a stage at which it does not exhaust itself in correlative rights and obligations running between states, but also incorporates common interests of the international community as a whole, including not only states, but all human beings. In doing so, it begins to display more and more features that do not fit into the ‘civilist’, bilateralist structure of the traditional law. In other words, it is on its way to being a true public international law.8 Just two quick remarks completing this point: first, and addressing concerns of certain voices coming from the Left, one can perfectly adhere to an universalist view as described without entertaining, or accepting, hegemonic second thoughts. And further, one can adhere to such a universalist approach without necessarily subscribing to the view that contemporary international law is undergoing a process of ‘constitutionalisation’. I will return to this issue at the very end of this address.

4 A von Bogdandy and S Delavalle, Universalism and Particularism as Paradigms of International Law (Institute for International Law and Justice/New York University School of Law, International Law and Justice Working Paper no 3, 2008) 1. 5 C Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century (General Course on Public International Law)’ (1999) 281 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9, 63. 6 WG Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (London, Stevens, 1964). 7 HEH Mosler, ‘The International Society as a Legal Community’ (1974) 140 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 1, 11–12. 8 B Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law (1994) 250 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 217, at 231–34.

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Bruno Simma CHALLENGES FACED BY UNIVERSALITY AT ITS VARIOUS LEVELS

After the preceding brief tour d’horizon of what ‘universality’ of international law may be taken to mean, let me describe the challenges which the notion faces, and the ways to cope with them, using as a point of departure the conceptions I have just developed. The understanding of universality of international law in the classic (level I) sense, that is, its global reach, has encountered many challenges, indeed attacks, from different quarters, both philosophical/theoretical and practical, for a long time. They embrace more aggressive strands of regionalism and related, more ‘innovative’, concepts like those of a ‘League of (liberal) democracies’ versus ‘pariah’ or ‘rogue’ states, designed to bypass the United Nations, cultural relativism in international human rights discourse, as well as what I would call ‘post-modern’ challenges stemming from Critical Legal Studies, Marxist theory, the theory of Empire and Feminist theory. Level II universality in particular has not only come under fire from a new species of Voelkerrechtsleugner (negligible intellectually, if they were not to teach at influential US universities), but has also come under more friendly, if ultra-theoretical, fire from a very specific sociological school, ‘global legal pluralism’, which sees many autopoietic functional systems emerge on a global scale to eventually substitute the state.9 Finally, to formulate a challenge of my own to level III universality, universalism as thus understood appears to me not as far advanced as many of its protagonists (want to) believe; it suffers from serious practical shortcomings, and is also being attacked by several post-modern theories. But let us now turn to tonight’s specials, so to speak, from among the menu of challenges to universality. As I indicated at the outset, my choice is determined by the topic assigned to me, namely the viewpoint of a practitioner, particularly of the humble practitioner in front of you. This specific point of departure leads me to turn to a range of problems which German international lawyers would regard as belonging to Voelkerrechtsdogmatik rather than genuine theory, but which, wherever they may belong, have also considerable practical relevance. Thus, the challenge to level I universality, which I have selected for discussion is that of the alleged fragmentation of international law; as my ‘favourite’ challenge to level II universality, I will take up the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, while I could not yet find a comparable buzzword to sum up the problems encountered by the common-legal-order-of-mankind approach embodied in level III universality. Let me emphasise that these are quite subjective choices. The links between the various understandings of universality and ‘their’ respective challenges are anything but mutually exclusive, and notions like ‘fragmentation’ and ‘proliferation’ are not separated by sharp dividing lines. For instance, I could have selected fragmentation as the principal threat to universality in the sense of unity and coherence of

9 A Fischer-Lescano and G Teubner, ‘Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999.

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international law, and many observers would regard the proliferation of international courts and tribunals as one aspect, or one prominent cause of, such fragmentation.

In Particular: The ‘Fragmentation’ of International Law The Phenomenon After these clarifications, I turn to the phenomenon of fragmentation, conceived as a challenge to the universality of international law in the sense of the latter’s global validity and applicability, and to the international legal responses developed to cope with it. Fragmentation has become one of the great favourites in international legal literature over the past years. Its connotations are clearly negative: something is splitting up, falling apart, or worse: bombs or ammunition can be designed to fragment and thus become even more destructive. In international legal parlance the term gained such prominence out of the fear that international law might lose its universal applicability, as well as its unity and coherence, through the expansion and diversification of its subject-matters, through the development of new fields in the law that go their own way, and that legal security might thereby suffer (remember that I will take up the proliferation issue separately). In particular, it is the appearance of more and more international treaties of a law-making type, regulating related or identical matters in a variety of, sometimes conflicting, ways and binding different but sometimes overlapping groups of states, that is a matter of concern.10 Indeed, there is simply no ‘single legislative will behind international law’.11 The Arbitral Tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case has spoken of ‘a process of accretion and cumulation’ of international legal obligations.12 The Tribunal regarded this as beneficial to international law, and I would agree in principle. However, if taken to the extreme, the question does of course arise whether this development might lead to a complete detachment of some areas of international law from others, without an overarching general international law remaining and holding the parts together. In arriving at this question, one would not have to go as far as suspecting that ‘[p]owerful States labour to maintain and even actively promote fragmentation because it enables them to preserve their dominance in an era in which hierarchy is increasingly viewed as illegitimate, and to opportunistically break the rules without seriously jeopardizing the system they have created’.13

10 K Oellers-Frahm, ‘Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdictions – Problems and Possible Solutions’ (2001) 5 Max Planck United Nations Yearbook 67, 71. 11 ILC, Report on Fragmentation (n 3), para 34. 12 Australia and New Zealand v Japan – Southern Bluefin Tuna case, Award (adopted 14 August 2001) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 23 UNRIAA (2004) 40, para 52. 13 E Benvenisti and GW Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 60 Stanford Law Review 595.

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In my view, to see such sinister motives at work behind our phenomenon is not justified. I prefer to offer a much more natural, or let me say, technical, explanation: the phenomenon described as ‘fragmentation’ of international law is nothing but the result of a transposition of functional differentiations of governance at the national to the international plane;14 which means that international law today increasingly reflects the differentiation of branches of the law that are familiar to us from the domestic sphere. Consequently, international law has developed, and is still developing, its own more or less complete regulatory regimes, which may at times compete with each other. International Law’s Ways to Cope with Fragmentation Institutional Aspects So much about fragmentation as a phenomenon. Now, what are the institutions and methods by which international law attempts to reconcile necessary functional differentiation with unity and coherence? This task places responsibilities on different international actors: First—and leaving aside the law-making activities of international organisations—states as the principal creators of international legal rules ought to be aware of the need for coherence of the international legal system as a whole, for instance when they negotiate new international agreements. Second, international organisations and courts, when they interpret and apply international law, need to bear in mind that they are acting within an overarching framework of international law, residual as it may be. Last but not least, national courts, which play an ever more relevant role in the application of international law, must also be aware of the impact that their activities can have on the development of a coherent international legal system. Staying with the institutional aspects for a second, I would submit that— especially from my perspective as a practitioner—both the International Law Commission and the International Court of Justice represent pillars of unity and coherence of universal international law. While the Court has to, and thus claims to, apply the law as it stands, the Commission is supposed to systematise and progressively develop it. It is not unimportant to note that the personal ties between the two organs are strong. Many ICJ judges have formerly served on the ILC (in late 2008: seven out of 15). This has led to an interesting complementary relationship between the two bodies. Specifically with regard to tonight’s topic, the Commission’s projects pursue the purpose of fostering universality at all the levels that I have introduced, with an emphasis on levels I and II; its work products aim to be applied as widely as possible, even though more recently the Commission has also drafted rules that are designed for concretisation at the regional, or even bilateral, plane.15 Neither is the Commission shying away from the elaboration of special regimes if necessary. A 14 M Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 1, 4. 15 See, eg, Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (adopted and opened for signature 21 May 1997, not yet entered into force) (1997) 36 ILM 700, UN ILC ‘Draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers’ (2008) UN Doc A/CN 4/L724, UN ILC ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities’ (2001) GAOR 56th Session

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case in point would be the accommodation of specific features of reservations made to human rights treaties that is currently under way in the context of the wider ILC project on reservations: even Special Rapporteur Alain Pellet has come to accept that leges speciales to serve that purpose are no threat to the unity of the law, but will lead to a more responsive regime, not ‘self-contained’ in any sense, and thus to a progressive development of international law. The most recent, and most direct, contribution of the ILC to the unity and coherence of international law is the 2006 (final) Report of Martti Koskenniemi’s Study Group on Fragmentation with its ‘tool box’ of ways and means to cope with the undesirable effects of our phenomenon.16 While this voluminous study has been criticised by some as merely stating the obvious, from my specific viewpoint it is of immense value as a piece of work which attempts to assemble the totality of international law’s devices available to counter the negative aspects of fragmentation. As to the role of the ICJ as a guarantor of the unity of international law, I will say a few words on this later, in the context of judicial proliferation. I now turn from the institutions to the methods developed in international law to sustain its unity and coherence in the face of expansion and diversification. Again, the 2006 ILC Report on fragmentation is a great source of inspiration in this regard. Methods Employed The first device to be mentioned here is the introduction of a normative hierarchy in international law, above all the development of peremptory limits to the making and administering of international law in states’ relations inter se. From a voluntarist point of departure, the idea of any hierarchical relationship between international legal rules is problematic. Nevertheless, we have witnessed the recognition of two types of norms that do imply superior status: jus cogens, or peremptory norms, and, possibly, norms leading to obligations erga omnes. As to the latter concept, it does not necessarily entail a hierarchically superior position; therefore I will categorise it as a method of sustaining coherence in its own right. Let me just mention at this point that, while the ICJ was not the first to use the notion of obligations erga omnes, it was the Court’s famous dictum in the Barcelona Traction judgment of 1970 that triggered the doctrinal fascination with the concept.17 Concerning jus cogens, and in rather surprising contrast, it was not until 2006, ie, no less than 36 years after the Barcelona Traction judgment, and 25 years after the blessing of the concept by the entering into force of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties with its Articles 53 and 64, that the ICJ could finally bring itself to issue an authoritative pronouncement. This was eight years after the ICTY had first explicitly mentioned jus cogens in its Furundz˘ ija judgment

Supp 10, 370, UN ILC ‘Draft articles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities’ (2006) GA 59th Session Supp No 10 (A/59/10). 16 See ILC (n 3). 17 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p 3, para 33.

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of 1998,18 five years after the European Court of Human Rights had done so in Al-Adsani,19 and three years after the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had followed suit.20 Better late than never, in its Congo v Rwanda judgment of 2006, the Court affirmed both that this category of norms was part of international law and that the prohibition of genocide belonged to it.21 A year later, the Court restated its recognition of jus cogens in the Genocide case.22 However, even though the existence and the relevance of jus cogens are by now almost universally accepted, ‘the car has remained in the garage’ (to use Ian Brownlie’s metaphor23) most of the time. This might actually be a good thing (no offence intended to British cars!), because in instances in which the concept, or rather its legal consequences, became operational, its application has met with considerable difficulties. This is exemplified by two rather recent cases that had to do with jus cogens in the field of human rights. In the first case, Al-Adsani, the European Court of Human Rights held that, even though the prohibition of torture had the character of jus cogens, the rules of state immunity were not trumped and set aside by it.24 In effect, the Court blocked a specific protection afforded to individuals (Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights) by interpreting the Convention in accordance with general international law on state immunity, resorting to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, on which later. The Strasbourg Court stated that ‘[t]he Convention, including Article 6, cannot be interpreted in a vacuum’; rather, the Court would have to take into account the ‘generally recognised rules of public international law on State immunity’.25 Against this stands the joint dissenting opinion of those judges of the Grand Chamber, which possessed maybe the strongest international law credentials on the Strasbourg bench at the time: while they did not question the majority’s method of interpreting (away) Article 6 of the European Convention, they were of the opinion that, under general international law, the rules on state immunity could no longer render a claim against a foreign state inadmissible in national courts where the claim was based on the peremptory prohibition of torture.26 But, as I said, this remained the view of the minority. The ICJ’s recognition of the status juris cogentis of the prohibition of genocide did not have much impact in the Congo v Rwanda Case either. The Court

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Prosecutor v Furundz˘ija (Judgment) ICTY IT-95–17/1 (10 December 1998) para 153. See Al-Adsani v UK (App no 35763/97) ECHR 2001-XI 79. 20 Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants (Advisory Opinion) IACtHR OC-18/03 (17 September 2003) paras 97 ff. 21 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application) (ICJ, 3 February 2006) (accessed 24 March 2009) para 64. 22 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (ICJ, 26 February 2007) (accessed 24 March 2009) para 161. 23 Which I remember from discussions in the International Law Commission. 24 Al-Adsani v UK (n 18), para 61. 25 ibid, paras 55–56. 26 ibid, Joint Dissenting Opinion Rozakis and Caflisch, joined by Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and Vajic´, para 3. 19

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emphasised that its jurisdiction remained governed by consent, irrespective of the jus cogens character of the substantive law involved. Lacking such consent on the part of Rwanda, which had excluded ICJ jurisdiction to rule on the Genocide Convention by way of a reservation, there was, in the circumstances of the case, no possibility for the Court to deal with the merits of the case.27 However, a joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma pointed out that it was ‘not self-evident that a reservation to Article IX (of the Genocide Convention) could not be regarded as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and we believe that this is a matter that the Court should revisit for further consideration’.28 The Opinion highlighted the role of decentralised enforcement of obligations under the Genocide Convention, with the states parties being the sole monitors of each other’s compliance (in contrast to later human rights treaties establishing treaty bodies with the competence of such oversight). According to the Opinion, this decentralised system can only function properly if states can bring a case before the ICJ concerning the alleged infringement of the Convention by another state. In conclusion of this point, the last word in this tug-of-war between old and new international law within the Strasbourg and Hague Courts may not yet have been spoken—as far as the ICJ is concerned, at present, it looks as if a new opportunity to probe jus cogens against state immunity might come its way.29 Another method of inserting hierarchy into international law, somehow related to the acceptance of jus cogens, has been embodied in Article 103 of the UN Charter, according to which the obligations of UN members under the Charter prevail over their obligations ‘under any other international agreement’. The ICJ has paid tribute, as it were, to Article 103 in the Lockerbie cases,30 followed by the European Union’s Court of First Instance in Yusuf and Kadi,31 while the respect shown to the Charter and the human rights regime established under its auspices by the European Court of Justice itself in its final Kadi decision32 has, deservedly or undeservedly, shrunk to a mere pro forma gesture—I will return to this development towards the end of my speech. Let us have a brief look at obligations erga omnes. For any observer capable of grasping the meaning of the Latin words involved, the relevance of this concept as

27

Armed Activities (n 20) para 67. ibid, (Joint Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Judge Kooijmans, Judge Elaraby, Judge Owada and Judge Simma) (accessed 24 March 2009) para 29. 29 What looked like a possibility in September 2008 turned into reality in December of the same year when Germany brought an Application suing Italy for breaches of international law committed by the Italian Corte di Cassazione through its refusal to accept the German plea to jurisdictional immunity for alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated by Germany in Italy and against Italian citizens between 1943 and the end of World War II. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy). 30 In the Provisional Measures phase of the Lockerbie cases: eg, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America) (Provisional Measures) [1992] ICJ Rep 114, paras 42–44. 31 Case T–306/01 Yusuf v Council [2005] ECR II-3533; Case T–315/01 Kadi v Council [2005] ECR II-3649. 32 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, [2008] ECR-II-3649. 28

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a means to secure the universal grip of fundamental values consecrated by modern international law is obvious (let me mention in passing that the intricacies of the Latin phrase involved were not the least of the reasons why the point of departure upon which the minimalist regime of ‘ce qui reste des crimes’ (that is, of notorious draft article 19 on ‘’crimes of states’) rests in the ILC Articles on State responsibility of 2001, was finally changed from breaches of obligations erga omnes to breaches of peremptory norms. Of course, jus cogens is also Latin, but this phrase has apparently lost its horror for the younger generation of international lawyers, having been around for half a century). While the concept of obligations erga omnes is certainly related to that of jus cogens, the fine points of their relationship are far from clear. Something resembling a regime of our obligations is in the making, but still finds itself in a very initial stage—let me refer to the ILC’s Articles on State responsibility, to the resolution of the Institut de droit international based on reports by Giorgio Gaja and adopted in Cracow in 2005,33 and to the monograph on the enforcement of obligations erga omnes by Christian Tams,34 as major doctrinal efforts in this direction. On the other hand, state practice has not (yet?) embraced the concept with any notable passion—in this sense I would still stick to what I wrote in 1993: ‘Viewed realistically, the world of obligations erga omnes is still the world of the “ought” rather than of the “is” ’ (this, of course, not in the Kelsenian sense).35 In view of this, the bold confirmation of the concept by the ICJ in its Wall Opinion of 2004 is remarkable,36 as, unfortunately, is the confusion about its use by the Court in certain commentaries on the Opinion. A further tool for coping with negative consequences of fragmentation is to be seen in the establishment of a regime around the lex specialis/lex generalis distinction, with the more specific norm setting aside a more general one. The rationale of this is that the more specific rule is more to the point, regulates the matter more effectively and is better able to accommodate particular circumstances.37 Turning to a specific aspect of lex specialis, let me make a short remark on ‘self-contained regimes’.38 In the wake of a problematic statement of the ICJ in the 1980 Tehran judgment, the international academic community has taken increasing notice of this phenomenon—a development that recently culminated in the profound analysis of ‘self-contained regimes’ by the ILC’s Study Group on Fragmentation. The Study Group’s final report identified three uses of the term, even though, as the report acknowledges, these might not always be clearly distinguishable from

33 Resolutions of the Institut de droit international, Rapporteur: Giorgio Gaja, Fifth Commission: Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law (Krakow, 2005). 34 CJ Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005). 35 B Simma, ‘Does the UN Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations erga omnes?’, in J Delbrueck (ed.), The Future of International Law Enforcement. New Scenarios – New Law (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1993) 125. 36 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, paras 155ff. 37 cf ILC (n 3) paras 65 ff. 38 B Simma and D Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self–contained Regimes in International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 483.

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each other: first, and perhaps most commonly, the term refers to primary rules coupled with special sets of secondary rules under the law of state responsibility; second, ‘self-contained regimes’ are said to consist of subsystems of international law, that is, sets of rules, not necessarily secondary in nature, that regulate specific questions differently from general international law; third, the concept is sometimes accorded an even wider meaning, denoting an entire area of international law allegedly following its own rules of interpretation and enforcement, such as international human rights law or international trade law.39 What there now seems to be agreement about is that all three categories of ‘self-contained regimes’ cannot, at least not completely, ‘contract out’ of, decouple themselves from, the system of general international law. It is a fact, however, that differing approaches to interpretation and application of such regimes have developed, for instance in international trade law, human rights, or environmental law. Each regime has thus established its separate epistemic communities of lawyers working in the field, institutions developing and applying the law, and courts and tribunals enforcing it. But this is not necessarily a development that threatens the unity and coherence of international law. The formation of specific methods of interpretation or enforcement is inherent in the set-up of such regimes, and the expertise that lawyers will accumulate by working within them, as well as bodies of case law of courts and tribunals mandated to interpret and enforce these regimes, will contribute to a growing and intensifying corpus of law that responds to the needs of the specific regime. In a positive light, these sub-systems of international law, more densely integrated and more technically coherent, may show the way forward for general international law, as both laboratories and boosters for further progressive development at the global level. The last method to which I turn in my ‘tour d’horizon’ of ways and means developed in international law to cope with the challenge of fragmentation is that of systemic integration of regimes inter se by way of interpretation. I think we can speak of a presumption that states, when creating new rules of international law, do not aim at violating their obligations under other, pre-existing rules, but rather intend to operate within this framework.40 This very general proposition can be complemented by the maxim that any legal rule should be read in context with other rules applicable to the parties. For the law of treaties, this idea has been encapsulated in Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The exact conditions for the application of this provision are far from clear, however. Article 31(3)(c) stipulates that, in interpreting a treaty, there shall be taken into account ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’. While it is now agreed that the ‘relevant rules’ within the meaning of the provision can be norms having their pedigree in any of the recognised sources of international law,41 it is still disputed whether the term

39

ILC (n 3) paras 128–9. In this sense RY Jennings and A Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law 9th edn (Harlow, Longman, 1992) 1275. 41 ILC (n 3) para 426; ECtHR, Golder v UK (App no 4451/70) (1975) Series A no 18, 17 (para 35); Al–Adsani (n 18) para 55. 40

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‘parties’ refers to all parties to, for instance, the treaty establishing the ‘relevant rules’, or whether it is sufficient that the parties to a particular dispute are bound by the rule in question. A WTO panel in the EC—Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products case42 has opted for the first approach, basing its reasoning on the principle of state sovereignty and the corollary principle of consent: ‘Indeed, it is not apparent why a sovereign State would agree to a mandatory rule of treaty interpretation which could have as a consequence that the interpretation of a treaty to which that State is a party is affected by other rules of international law which that State has decided not to accept.’43 As the ILC’s Study on Fragmentation rightly observes, such a construction of the term ‘parties’ ‘makes it practically impossible ever to find a multilateral context where reference to other multilateral treaties as aids to interpretation under Article 31(3)(c) would be allowed’,44 due to ‘the unlikeliness of a precise congruence in the membership of most important multilateral conventions’.45 If the Biotech approach were followed, the most important multilateral agreements could not be interpreted by reference to one another. On the other hand, interpreting ‘parties’ to mean only those involved in a particular dispute before a court or tribunal would risk divergent interpretations of one and the same rule even for multilateral treaties of the law-making type. Hence, it has been suggested that it would be sufficient for the purposes of Article 31(3)(c) that the parties in dispute are both parties to the other treaty (ie, the treaty informing the interpretation of the instrument in question), if this instrument is of a ‘reciprocal’, ‘synallagmatic’, or ‘bipolar’ type, whereas the rule adopted by the panel in Biotech should apply if the treaty to be interpreted is of the ‘integral’ or ‘interdependent’ type.46 While this solution takes into account different structures of international treaties, it has yet to be adopted by and applied in practice. What the discussion certainly shows is that the principle of ‘systemic integration’ is far from providing a panacea to fragmentation. Besides, as the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani demonstrates, Article 31(3)(c) may, if applied ‘strictly’, ‘solve’ norm collisions in a way that is at odds with other rules of international law, such as jus cogens. Let me conclude this sub-chapter with a brief look at fragmentation as a matter before the ICJ. In explicit terms, and contrary to some of its former Presidents, the Court has not yet raised its voice in the discourse about this challenge. However, certain recent judgments do offer insights into the Court’s perception of the coherence and unity of international law and the ways to preserve these qualities. Thus, the Court has used the tool of systemic interpretation in the Oil Platforms case, resorting to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

42 EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Panel Report (adopted 29 September 2006) WT/DS291/R; WT/DS292/R; WT/DS293/R, para 7.68. 43 ibid, para 7.71. 44 ILC (n 3) para 450. 45 ibid, para 471. 46 ibid, para 472.

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to place a specific bilateral treaty within the broader context of general international law.47 Although this approach has been criticised by some observers as getting dangerously close to a circumvention of the principle of consent delimiting the jurisdiction of the Court, it demonstrates that international law does provide us with tools that allow for a coherent conception of its rules. In the recent case of Djibouti v France, the Court again applied Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, this time to two bilateral treaties, and interpreted a Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 1986, whose alleged violation by France constituted the essence of Djibouti’s claim, in the light of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded between the two parties in 1977. This proved to be far less contentious than the use of our Vienna Convention Article in the Oil Platforms case, especially since the Court clarified that the earlier treaty, while having ‘a certain bearing’ on the interpretation and application of the later one, neither broadened the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, nor could it significantly alter the interpretation of the Mutual Assistance Convention of 1986.48

The ‘Proliferation’ of International Courts and Tribunals as a Challenge The phenomenon and its effects In the second part of my speech I now turn to the issue of the proliferation and growing diversity of international courts and tribunals (but not of the substance of international law itself), here conceived as a challenge particularly to what I have called ‘second-level universality’, that is, the systemic coherence of international law, but of course also to be seen as an accelerant of fragmentation. In recent years, maybe the last two decades, a growing number of international legal scholars, among them several Presidents of the ICJ, have become quite concerned by this development and the ensuing problems. The choice of the word ‘proliferation’ must have been born out of these concerns, because, like ‘fragmentation’, the term has all kinds of undesirable connotations and undertones, again stemming mostly from the military world. Returning to the concerns as such, they result in part from the fact that, quite naturally, the jurisdiction of most international tribunals is limited to the rules established by the treaty instruments that set them up, ie, that such tribunals are not normally mandated to apply ‘general’ international law, at least not in express terms. There is no doubt that international judicial dispute settlement is decentralised, without coordinated allocation of jurisdiction or hierarchy between different international courts. Some international courts and tribunals have explicitly

47 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (ICJ, 6 November 2003) (accessed 25 March 2009) para 41. 48 Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France) (Judgment) (ICJ, 4 June 2008) (accessed 25 March 2009) para 112.

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described themselves as ‘self-contained systems’,49 or as ‘autonomous judicial institutions’.50 International dispute settlement is indeed ‘insular’.51 On the other hand, some authors manage to see in the same picture the emergence of a system of international courts. Of course, this is a question of definition: Even those arguing for an ‘international court system’ or a ‘global community of courts’52—defined to comprise both international and national courts—recognise that ‘the international judiciary is an evolving, complex, and self-organising system’.53 Most of them would probably also agree that the international judiciary is ‘dancing on the edge of chaos’.54 But, irrespective of whether we are in the presence of an emerging system or an uncoordinated mess of diverse mechanisms, the fact is that the present state of affairs, characterised as an ‘explosion of international litigation and arbitration’, has not—yet?—led to any significant contradictory jurisprudence of international courts; such cases remain the exception and actually courts have gone to great lengths to avoid contradicting each other.55 The discussion also to some extent misconceives the mindset and professional ethos of international judges. In the words of Anthony Aust: ‘No wise judge (international or national) wants to reinvent the wheel’.56 Thus, most international judges fundamentally agree on the way the international legal system is structured; often, they have similar educational backgrounds. Furthermore, it will obviously add to the legitimacy of a judgment if an international court relies on the case law of other such courts, applies and maybe develops it, without, however, changing it fundamentally. Finally, quite a few international judges have moved from one court to another, thus also, more or less consciously, adding to the consistency of international jurisprudence.57 Rather than resulting in fragmentation, the emergence of more international courts, combined with an increasing willingness of states to submit their disputes to judicial settlement, has revived international legal discourse. This discourse has gained in frequency and intensity: courts nowadays have a greater say in it compared to doctrine. The more international courts apply a specific rule of international law in the same manner, the more legitimacy it will be accorded, and the more can we be certain about its normative strength. On the other hand, if

49 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic´ (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber) ICTY IT–94–1–AR72 (2 October 1995) para 11. 50 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law (Advisory Opinion) IACtHR OC–16/99 (1 October 1999) para 61. 51 Y Shany, The Competing Jurisdiction of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 109. 52 AM Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191, 191. 53 J Martinez, ‘Towards an International Judicial System’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 429, 443–44. 54 ibid. 55 B Simma, ‘Fragmentation in a Positive Light’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 845, 846. 56 A Aust, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: A Proliferation Problem?’ in TM Ndiaye and R Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes. Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Leiden, Nijhoff, 2007) 131, 137. 57 Martinez, ‘Towards an International Judicial System’ (n 49) 436.

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various international courts do disagree on a point of law, the ensuing judicial dialogue may possibly further progressive development of the law.58 Convergence and Divergence of International Jurisprudence Instances of Divergence Let me now illustrate the problématique of proliferation by telling you a few stories about divergence and convergence in international jurisprudence and the phenomenon of parallel proceedings, to provide you with a concrete picture of the actual weight of the problem. First, instances of divergence: let me state at the outset that these few cases can be explained to a large extent by reference to the specific functions of the courts involved within the sub-systems, in which they have been set up. The most prominent of all these cases is certainly the collision between the ICJ in Nicaragua59 and the ICTY in Tadic´.60 In the Tadic´ case, the ICTY—in what has been called an ‘aggressive attack’61— diverged from the ICJ’s holding in the Nicaragua case on the question of the level of control necessary for the attribution of acts of paramilitary forces present in one state to another state. Whereas the ICJ had decided that, for these acts to be attributable, the state in question had to exercise ‘effective control’ over such paramilitaries, the ICTY Appeals Chamber did not hold the Nicaragua test to be persuasive and proposed that a less stringent test, ie ‘overall control’, was sufficient.62 The ICJ used the 2007 Genocide judgment to give its response to Tadic´. It held that the argument in favour of the Tadic´ test was unpersuasive and did not reflect international law on state responsibility. In the Court’s view, the ‘overall control’ test suggested by the ICTY had: the major drawback of broadening the scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle governing the law of international responsibility: a State is responsible only for its own conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf.

The Court thus came to the conclusion that the ICTY’s reading of the rules of attribution in question had gone too far, stretching the connection between the conduct of a state’s organs and its international responsibility ‘almost to the breaking point’.63

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Simma, ‘Fragmentation’ (n 51) 846. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merrls, Judgment, ICJ Rep 1986, p 14. 60 Prosecutor v Tadic´ (Judgment, Appeals Chamber) ICTY IT-94–1-A (15 July 1999) paras 99 ff, in particular 115 ff. 61 RJ Goldstone and RJ Hamilton, ‘Bosnia v. Serbia: Lessons from the Encounter of the International Court of Justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 95, 101. 62 Prosecutor v Tadic´ (n 546). 63 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (ICJ, 26 February 2007) (accessed 25 March 2009) para 406. 59

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In an exercise of judicial diplomacy, the ICJ made it appear as if the ICTY had intended to limit its divergent test to the specific (jurisdictional) question of whether a conflict was internal or international. While Tadic´ can certainly be read in such a conciliatory way, a member of the ICTY Appeals Chamber that had decided the Tadic´ case, Nino Cassese, has recently stated quite bluntly that the Yugoslavia Tribunal actually did want to replace the Nicaragua standard developed by the ICJ at the level of general international law and posit two different tests or degrees of control leading to attribution: one for acts performed by private individuals, in case of which attributability would require ‘effective control’, and one for acts of organised and hierarchically structured groups, such as military or paramilitary units, in case of which ‘overall control’ would suffice. Cassese emphasised that—contrary to what the ICJ found in its Genocide judgment—the Appeals Chamber did in fact hold that the legal criteria for these two tests reflected the state of international law both for international humanitarian law and the law of state responsibility. The ICJ, Cassese suggested, should pay attention to state practice and case law, instead of simply and uncritically restating its previous views.64 As concerns the ICTY itself, it probably will not have much of a chance left to reply to the ICJ and thus initiate another round in what (with all due respect for my own Court) might be called a dialogue des sourds. But the International Criminal Court appears set to do so: quite recently, in the Lubanga case, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, about one month before the ICJ rendered its judgment in the Genocide case in early 2007, held—without discussing Nicaragua—that the overall control test as established in Tadic´ was also valid for the purposes of determining the nature of the conflict under the ICC Statute.65 A further example of divergent views on the same matter held by different international courts or human rights treaty bodies is provided by the question of the territorial scope of the application of human rights treaties. The European Court of Human Rights has developed its approach in this matter in a long line of case law, not without a little meandering, however. In the Bankovic´ case, concerning a complaint arising from the NATO bombing of a Serbian television station in April 1999, the Strasbourg Court held that the European Convention on Human Rights did not apply to acts of Member States of the Convention effected outside their territory, and stressed the ‘essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction’ under the European Convention.66 The Court distinguished the case from other situations where it had extended the applicability of the European Convention to extraterritorial acts, such as in Louzidou v Turkey and Cyprus v Turkey. In Loizidou, the Court had held that the responsibility of contracting states can be involved by acts and omissions of their authorities which produce effects outside their own territory. Responsibility could also arise when as a consequence of military action—whether lawful or unlawful—a state exercises effective control of an area outside its national

64 A Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadic´ Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia’ (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 649ff, particularly 657, 663 and 668. 65 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber 1),ICC-01/04–01/06 (29 January 2007) paras 210–11. 66 Bankovic´ v Belgium and others (App no 52207/99) ECHR 2001-XII 333, para 61.

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territory.67 In Cyprus v Turkey, the ECHR had found that, ‘[h]aving effective overall control over northern Cyprus, [Turkey’s] responsibility cannot be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support’.68 Extraterritorial acts would thus only exceptionally qualify as an exercise of ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, said the Strasbourg Court in Bankovic´, if the state, ‘through effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants . . . as a consequence of military occupation . . . exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government’.69 More recently, in Ilas¸cu v Moldova and Russia, and again in Issa v Turkey, the Court has confirmed this jurisprudence.70 The ICJ followed a somewhat more liberal approach in its Wall Opinion of 2004 with regard to the extraterritorial application of both UN Human Rights Covenants as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Court did so in a considerably less nuanced way, however. It stated simply that: while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory. Considering the object and purpose of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would seem natural that, even when such is the case, States parties to the Covenant should be bound to comply with its provisions.71

In an equally broad manner, the UN Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment No 31 [80] of the same year on the territorial scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, expressed the view that ‘a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.’72 While you will probably agree with me that the Strasbourg, Hague and Geneva views on the extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaties differ in rather subtle ways only, my next example is more robust. It concerns the characterisation of Article 36(1)(b) of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the one hand and the ICJ on the other. While the Inter-American Court, in an advisory opinion rendered in 1999, had held that a detained foreigner’s right to have his consular post notified was ‘part of the body of international human rights law’,73 the ICJ in the LaGrand judgment of

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Loizidou v Turkey (App no 15318/89) ECHR 1996-VI 2216, para 52. Cyprus v Turkey (App no 25781/94) ECHR 2001-IV 1, para 77. 69 Bankovic v Belgium and others (n 60) para 71. 70 Ilas¸cu v Moldova and Russia (App no 48787/99) ECHR 2004-VII 179, para 316; Issa and Others v Turkey (App no 31821/96) ECHR 16 November 2004, paras 68–71. 71 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (n 32), para 109. In its Order on Provisional Measures of 15 October 2008 in the case Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation) (ICJ, 15 August 2008) (press release, accessed 25 March 2009), the Court took the same view with regard to the territorial reach of CERD, see para 109. 72 HRC, General Comment no 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (Geneva, United Nations, CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 13, 2004) para 10. 73 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance (n 46) para 141. 68

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2001 saw no necessity to enter into this controversial question and contented itself with holding that Article 36 amounted to an individual right, without pronouncing on its human rights character vel non.74 A few years later, in the Avena case, Mexico unfortunately raised this issue again and squarely confronted the Court with a respective submission—which led a somewhat irritated Court to finally state that the characterisation of the individual Article 36 right as a human right found support neither in the text nor in the travaux préparatoires of the Consular Convention.75 This finding was not necessary for the disposition of the case; it has rightly been criticised as an unfortunate instance of deliberate divergence of jurisprudence76 as well as an unnecessary obstacle to the development of a new human right. (Much More Numerous) Cases of Convergence Let me now show you the other side of the coin and speak about convergence of international jurisprudence. In a major study on our topic published in 1999, Jonathan Charney concluded that ‘the different international tribunals of the late twentieth century do share a coherent understanding of [international] law.’77 A more recent analysis (published in 2002) came to the conclusion that ‘by a margin of 173 to 11, tribunals are much more likely to refer to one another in a positive or neutral way than to distinguish or overrule.’78 Rather than damaging the unity of international law, frequent cross-referencing between international courts has thus contributed to its strengthening and greater coherence. By way of example for this tendency, I will concentrate on reference made by specialised courts and tribunals to ICJ jurisprudence. Thus, the WTO Appellate Body has often referred to decisions of the ICJ (and other international courts), mostly with respect to the rules on treaty interpretation,79 but also with regard to procedural issues such as the allocation of the burden of proof.80 The European Court of Human Rights has also looked to the case law of the ICJ in interpreting its own procedural law. For instance, the ICJ’s judgment in LaGrand to the effect that the Court’s provisional measures were binding upon the parties, was referred to in the Mamatkulov case decided by the Strasbourg Court, which

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LaGrand Case (Germany v United States) (Judgment) (2001) ICJ Rep 466 paras 77–78. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) (Judgment) (2004) ICJ Rep 12, para 30. 76 R Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 791, 796. 77 JI Charney, ‘Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?’ (1998) 271 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 101, 161. 78 N Miller, ‘An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of “Precedent” Across International Tribunals’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 483, 495. 79 See, eg, US Standards for Reformulated Gasoline, Appellate Body Report adopted 29 April 1996 WT/DS2/AB/R, p 17; Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report adopted 4 October 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R, p 12; Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, Appellate Body Report adopted 14 December 1999, WT/DS98/ AB/R, para 81. 80 United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, Appellate Body Report adopted 25 April 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R, p 14. 75

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confirmed that its interim measures were equally binding.81 More recently in the Stoll case, the European Court of Human Rights has approvingly referred to ICJ case law on the interpretation of multilingual treaties, and in the Blecˇ ic´ case on the question of temporal jurisdiction.82 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has relied on holdings of the ICJ in numerous instances as well. Most importantly, it has looked to the Hague Court and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, with regard to questions of reparation83 or the standard of proof.84 The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea has made reference to the jurisprudence of the ICJ in the M/V ‘Saiga’, the ‘Grand Prince’ and more recently, in the Straits of Johor and the ‘Hoshinmaru’ cases,85 on issues as varied as the existence of a state of necessity, the power and duty of an international court to examine its jurisdiction proprio motu and the question whether international law required the exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations between states before they could turn to an international court. Among the tribunals vested with international criminal jurisdiction, the ICTY has made so ample use of ICJ jurisprudence that the divergence in the Tadic´ judgment has to be seen in perspective. For some more recent instances of favourable references, let me mention the Trial Chamber judgments in the Boškoski86 and Strugar87 cases, where the Yugoslavia Tribunal turned to the ICJ’s jurisprudence for the interpretation of Security Council resolutions and the customary law status of the Hague Regulations. As to the International Criminal Court, its Pre-Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case (already mentioned in another context) has favourably quoted the ICJ on the legal issue of when a territory is considered to be occupied under customary international law. It also took into account the factual findings of the ICJ with regard to the Ugandan involvement in the DRC in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case, and used it to qualify the conflict as international in character rather than internal, which had been the submission of the ICC Prosecutor.88 Concerning the ICC Appeals Chamber, it seems to have made only cursory reference to ICJ decisions so far.

81 Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic´ v Turkey (GC) (App nos 46827/99 and 46951/99) ECHR 2005-I 295, paras 116–17. 82 Stoll v Switzerland (GC) (App no 69698/01) ECHR 10 December 2007, para 59; Blecˇ ic´ v Croatia (App no 59532/00) ECHR 2006-III-51, para 47. 83 ‘White Van’ (Paniagua–Morales et al v Guatemala) (Judgment) IACtHR, Series C, No 76 (25 May 2001) para 75 (fn 19). 84 Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgment) IACtHR Series C, No 4 (29 July 1988) para 127. 85 ‘SAIGA’ (No 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) (Merits) ITLOS Case No 2 (1 July 1999) para 133; The ‘Grand Prince’ Case (Belize v France) (Prompt Release) (Judgment) ITLOS Case No 8 (20 April 2001) para 78; Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v Singapore) (Order) ITLOS Case No 12 (10 September 2003) para 52; ‘Hoshinmaru’ Case (Japan v Russian Federation) (Prompt Release) (Judgment) ITLOS Case No 14 (6 August 2007) paras 86–87. 86 Prosecutor v Boškoski (Judgment) ICTY-04–82-T (10 July 2008) para 192 (fn 779). 87 Prosecutor v Strugar (Judgment) ICTY-01–42-T (31 January 2005) para 227 (fn 775). 88 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (n 59), paras 212, 214–17, 220.

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Arbitral Tribunals in inter-state cases have relied on ICJ jurisprudence as a matter of routine.89 ICSID tribunals regularly quote decisions of the ICJ and its predecessor, in particular in relation to treaty interpretation or procedural questions, such as those related to jurisdiction and evidence, but also with regard to the protection of shareholders (Barcelona Traction), the assessment of damages and other matters. Interestingly, the jurisprudence of the ICJ, on its part, displays very little reciprocity, so to speak. The Court has until recently carefully refrained from referring to the case law of other existing international courts (while having no problems with citing old arbitral decisions and the like). (Un)fortunately this is not the place to speculate about the reasons for such abstinence. The Court’s attitude changed fundamentally in the Genocide case, in which the ICJ followed the jurisprudence of the ICTY on various fundamental issues as a matter of practical necessity. We will have to wait and see whether this new openness will spill over into other areas. Parallel Proceedings The Challenge Let me continue with some observations on the phenomenon of parallel proceedings, understood as the initiation of litigation in different international courts on what is essentially the same substantive dispute. The most prominent example to date is the Swordfish case.90 Chile had closed its ports to Spanish ships that—as Chile contended—had overfished swordfish in the high seas adjacent to Chile’s EEZ. While the EU regarded the case as predominantly trade-related, and consequently initiated a case in the WTO, Chile saw it as relating to the law of the sea, bringing proceedings before ITLOS in Hamburg. While the case has been suspended before both institutions, pending an amicable settlement, it demonstrates that multiple proceedings before several international courts and tribunals are a real possibility. A somewhat different situation occurred in the MOX Plant case, where the EU Commission initiated proceedings against Ireland in the European Court of Justice for breach of EU law committed through bringing a case against the United Kingdom under the Law of the Sea Convention. Here, it was not only the parties which initiated parallel proceedings (before ITLOS, an arbitral tribunal under the OSPAR Convention as well as an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS91), but also the

89 See, eg, The Kingdom of Belgium v The Kingdom of The Netherlands (Award) Permanent Court of Arbitration (25 May 2005) in: — The Iron Rhine (Ijzeren Rijn) Arbitration (Belgium-Netherlands) Award of 2005 (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2007) 37–142, paras 45 and 59. 90 Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile/European Community) (Order) ITLOS Case No 7 (20 December 2000); on the developments referred to above, see the Hamburg Tribunal’s Press Releases on the case. 91 See, ‘Mox Plant’ Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Order) ITLOS Case No 10 (3 December 2001); Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v United Kingdom and Northern Ireland), (PCA, 2 July 2003) (2003) 42 ILM 1118; Case C–459/03 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [2006] ECR I–4635.

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organ of a regional organisation which tried effectively to prevent the states involved from having their dispute settled by an independent arbitral tribunal outside the EU legal system. The most recent examples of parallel proceedings are probably the cases brought by Georgia against Russia in relation to the war in the Caucasus in 2008. Georgia initiated proceedings before both the ICJ and the European Court of Human Rights. The President of the ICJ issued an Urgent Communication to the parties (pursuant to Article 74(4) of the ICJ Rules of Court),92 while her Strasbourg counterpart indicated provisional measures (under rule 39 of the Strasbourg Rules of Court).93 As a state party to the ICC Statute, Georgia could also have made a state referral to the ICC under Articles 13(a) and 14 of its Statute. Possible Remedies There are several rules that might help solve the dilemma of parallel proceedings on the same dispute. The principle of lis alibi pendens requires a court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where the same parties have already instituted proceedings before another court on the same subject-matter. It has been argued that this principle forms part of international procedural law as a general principle of law in the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.94 And of course the principle of res judicata is relevant here, too. Another concept that has recently been resorted to in the case of parallel proceedings is the principle of comity, that is, of respect for the competence of other tribunals. In the MOX Plant case, the Hague arbitral tribunal suspended its proceedings in order to wait for the decision of the ECJ, invoking ‘considerations of mutual respect and comity which should prevail between judicial institutions’.95 An example to the contrary would be the stance taken by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its advisory opinion on the Right to Information on Consular Assistance. Here, the Court refused to suspend proceedings with a view to a case (albeit one that was contentious) on similar legal questions before the ICJ (Breard), insisting on its status as an ‘autonomous judicial institution’.96 These two opposed approaches show that the principle of comity can hardly claim to be firmly rooted in international procedural law, even though considerations of the good administration of international justice speak in its favour.

92 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (n 65); on 15 October 2008, the ICJ issued an Order on Provisional Measures directed at both parties to the conflict, http://www.icj–cij.org/docket/files/140/14803.pdf (last accessed 25 March 2009). 93 ECHR, Press Release 2008/581 of 12 August 2008. 94 A Reinisch, ‘The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural Tools to avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement Outcomes’ (2004) 3 The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 37, 48. 95 Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and Article 1 of Annex VII, of UNCLOS for the Dispute Concerning the MOX Plant, International Movements of Radioactive Materials, and the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Irish Sea, ‘MOX Plant’ Case (Ireland v United Kingdom), Order No 3 (Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures) (PCA, 24 June 2003) < http://www.pca–cpa.org/upload/files/MOX%20Order%20no3.pdf> (accessed 25 March 2009) para 28. 96 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance (n 46), paras 61–65.

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Other possibilities for preventing parallel proceedings before international courts are conflict clauses in international treaties (eg Article 292 of the EC Treaty, Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 55 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 282 UNCLOS). However, a survey of different provisions contained in jurisdictional instruments and treaties reveals a rather disorganised picture. Equally, a look at the practice of international courts and tribunals shows that the instruments described for the prevention of parallel proceedings are hardly coordinated or effective. Before I leave this point, let me mention the approach taken by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Iron Rhine case between Belgium and the Netherlands, in which the Tribunal saved its turf in matters of EC law vis-à-vis the European Court of Justice and MOX-type problems, by resorting to an analogy with the position of domestic courts in a preliminary ruling procedure according to Article 234 of the EC Treaty. The Tribunal proceeded to put itself in the shoes of a domestic court, as it were, and in so doing arrived at the conclusion that the questions of EC law arising in connection with the track of the Iron Rhine were not to be referred to Luxembourg because they were not relevant (entscheidungserheblich) for the decision of the case,97 and then went on to decide the case itself. The Challenge Posed to International Courts and Tribunals A Particular Task for the ICJ? Does the ICJ have a particular responsibility, and particular competence, to ease the undesirable consequences of the birth of so many brothers and sisters, as it were? The question of a role for the ICJ as a ‘guarantor of the unity of international law’ (to be distinguished from that of a ‘guardian of the ancien regime’ in international law98) has different aspects. In favour of such a function, it could be said, first, that the ICJ is the only court with general jurisdiction, and the principal judicial organ of the UN (Article 92 UN Charter). Moreover, the Hague Court constitutes a universal interpretative community, in the sense that all principal legal systems are represented on its bench. Article 9 of the ICJ Statute specifically mandates the General Assembly to take into account ‘that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilisation and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured’ when electing judges of the Court. Turning from institutional rules to their practical application, it has been suggested that in the discourse among international courts, the voice of the ICJ ought to receive particular attention. As a matter of course, findings by the Court on questions of general international law will as such counteract tendencies of fragmentation arising from the increase in the number of judicial ‘speakers’. The less ‘transactional’ the ICJ’s jurisprudence becomes,99 the more will it be able to unify and homogenise the law. 97

‘Ijzeren Rhine’ (n 83), paras 97–137. A von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany’ (2006) 47 Harvard Journal of International Law 223, 226. 99 cf, G Abi-Saab, ‘Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks’ (1999) 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 919, 929–30. 98

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On the other hand, as I have mentioned earlier, ICJ jurisprudence on its part has hardly ever openly referred to other international courts and tribunals, the Court’s reliance on the work of the ICTY in the 2007 Genocide judgment being the recent exception. One can surely regard this recent example as an instance of judicial dialogue, even though it took the ICJ quite a few years to reply to the challenge posed from about one mile away. What the Genocide judgment also illustrates is that international courts are entitled to respect for their interpretation of those areas of international law over which they have been given jurisdiction. In this sense, the ICJ stressed that the ICTY did not have jurisdiction ratione materiae over questions of state responsibility, and thus in the Tadic´ case did not have to decide the question of the proper test of control. On the other hand, the ICJ expressly stated that it attached utmost importance to legal findings made by the ICTY in ruling on the criminal liability of the accused, since this was the Tribunal’s proper area of jurisdiction.100 What I take from this is that judicial respect for the specialised jurisdictional regimes of other international courts could possibly be considered an emerging general principle of international procedural law. The possibility of divergence of views between international courts not only exists with regard to the law, but also with regard to the factual assessment of a situation. Until now, this aspect has not been of major significance, probably because many of the ‘older’ international cases have been decided on more or less undisputed factual bases. However, one recent example of two international courts looking at essentially the same set of facts is, again, the Genocide case. There, the ICJ referred to the ICTY not only with respect to findings of law, but also concerning findings of facts. Out of sheer necessity, it relied heavily on those findings, carefully distinguishing, however, between different forms of documents and decisions produced by the Tribunal (such as indictments, on the one hand, and judgments, on the other). The case is thus an example of how two international courts can avoid divergence in the determination of facts, while it is clear that the principle of res judicata does not apply here. The Task of Other International Courts Let me turn to the role of other international courts. As a rule, these courts, while being aware of their specialised character and their specific mandate to interpret the instruments under which they were set up, have recognised that the special rules which they have the jurisdiction to apply and interpret, are not detached from general international law. Thus, for instance, the WTO Appellate Body, early in its history, accepted that WTO law ‘should not be read in clinical isolation from public international law’.101 Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has held that ‘the principles underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. The Court must also take into account any relevant rules of international law . . ., although it must remain mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human rights treaty.’102

100 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (n 58), para 403. 101 US Standards of Reformulated Gasoline (n 73), 16. 102 Bankovic´ v Belgium and others (n 61), para 57.

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The perceived risk of divergent interpretations of international law and ‘forum shopping’ by states made possible by the remarkable increase in the number of international judicial bodies has led to a discussion on the need for some kind of hierarchical structure among international courts. It has been suggested, for instance, that it should be possible (or even mandatory) for other (specialised) international courts to refer questions of general international law to the ICJ for some kind of preliminary ruling.103 Some commentators have gone as far as suggesting that the ICJ should be turned into a constitutional court of the world community, or given appellate jurisdiction.104 However, apart from the question whether sufficient know-how and resources would be available at the Hague Court to tackle the highly complicated technical issues on the agenda of many of the specialised international courts and tribunals—and some psychological difficulties for the Alpha personalities involved—a direct reference by a specialised international tribunal to the Hague Court would require both an amendment to the ICJ Statute and an enabling provision in the treaty establishing the specialised court. Frankly speaking, another question that could—and should—legitimately be asked in this context would be whether it would necessarily always be a good idea for other international courts to look for guidance to, and defer to, the ICJ in all circumstances. The Court’s jurisprudence is sometimes infuriatingly ‘transactional’, and its reasoning sometimes more than sparse. Further, we have already come across instances where other, regional, international courts have taken desirable innovative steps and introduced more adequate solutions in ways that are far ahead of those of the ICJ. Let me remind you of the way in which the Court has for decades beaten around the bush concerning jus cogens, or its recent unnecessary negation of the character of the right to consular information as a human right. The Court has been rather timid, faced with the challenge of setting judicial limits to the powers of the UN Security Council.105 And if one compares the treatment of the issue of reparation in the 2007 Genocide judgment with certain decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the matter of reparation of violations of human rights obligations, or with the 2003 Decision of the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Selimovic (Srebrenica) cases,106 one could not be blamed for indeed regarding the Hague Court as a stubborn defender of certain ‘ancien regimes’ in international law. Returning to the issue of coordination and cooperation between international courts, such courts have explored other, less formal, cooperative mechanisms on their own initiative. For instance, more recently, meetings of judges of international courts also at the universal level have been organised upon the initiative of the ICJ, and are on their way to being institutionalised. Such meetings are certainly useful for the development of a common understanding of legal questions and for the fostering of mutual professional respect, but of course they cannot be a substitute 103 G Guillaume, ‘The Future of International Judicial Institutions’ (1995) 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 848, 848ff. 104 Charney, ‘Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?’ (n 71), 130–31. 105 In the Provisional Measures phase of the Lockerbie cases: eg, Lockerbie (n 28a), paras 42–44. 106 Ferida Selimovic & Others v Republika Srpska, (Decision on Admissibility and Merits) (Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 March 2003) Case No CH/01/8365.

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for a sound conceptualisation of overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions. It is also true that such meetings lack transparency. In conclusion of my remarks on the issues of fragmentation and proliferation: even critics of the idea of a coherent international legal system now seem to have conceded that international law can, and indeed does, form a system. For instance, Martti Koskenniemi recently agreed that ‘[h]ere is a battle European jurisprudence seems to have won. Law is a whole—or in the words of the first conclusion made by the ILC Study Group, “International law is a legal system” ’.107 As to fragmentation, it seems to me that many of the concerns about this phenomenon have been overstated. No ‘special regime’ has ever been conceived as independent of general law.108 And no master plan of divide et impera lies behind this development. Rather than couching it in terms of the ‘dangers’ of fragmentation, the phenomenon ought to be assessed in a much more positive way: the significance of international law has grown; it regulates more and more fields that before were left solely to foreign policy or domestic jurisdiction, like the protection of the individual, environmental concerns, or international trade. International law is dynamic, and globalisation calls for global legal solutions. As for the ‘proliferation’ of international courts and tribunals, I would submit that the debate on fragmentation has made international judges even more aware of the responsibility they bear for a coherent construction of international law. Nevertheless, the great increase in the number and subject areas of international courts has led to certain problems. The possibility of divergence between the jurisprudence of international courts does exist. Ultimately, from a very practical viewpoint, because of the ‘structural bias’ of specialised fields of international law and of the corresponding international institutions and courts, the real issue about fragmentation may be which court may be resorted to in order to decide a particular dispute. This choice will, in many cases, prejudge the outcome, given that a dispute may be conceived under different paradigms, for instance, as either a trade or an environmental dispute.109 Any international institution will necessarily be biased in its analysis of the dispute, depending on the specialised area which it has been designed to service. I thus agree with Martti Koskenniemi that, looked at from this angle, the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law, or proliferation of international courts and tribunals, essentially appears as the struggle of different international institutions, mainly international courts, for what he has called ‘institutional hegemony’.110 But, as I said, this struggle has hitherto been one among friends. It is being led with a sense of responsibility by all concerned. It has not been in the way of mutual respect, coordination and cooperation where necessary.

107

Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law’, 2007 (n 14), 17. ibid, 16. 109 ibid, 5 ff. 110 ibid, 8 and M Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197, 205–06. 108

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Related Responsibilities of National Courts: Two Brief Observations Let me add to my treatment of relations between international courts and tribunals a few observations on the relationship between international and national courts and the responsibility arising for the latter in the context of our topic. As I have already mentioned at the outset, the jurisprudence of domestic courts on questions of international law is gaining more and more relevance for the development of the law. But together with this, there also arises an increasing responsibility on the part of these courts to maintain the law’s coherence and integrity. It would be tempting to pursue this topic in more depth—today I can only touch upon it in passing and limit myself to two remarks that lead back to the issue of the relations between courts at the international and the national level. First, it is quite obvious that in these relations, mutual respect is as important as it is between different courts at the international level. As for the position taken by national courts towards the jurisprudence of their international counterparts, we come across remarkable varieties indeed. Just compare the professional respect with which the Israeli High Court of Justice has dealt with the Wall Opinion of the Hague Court on the legal questions of necessity and proportionality relating to the course of the wall (while disagreeing on the factual assessment by the ICJ),111 with the way in which US courts, including the Supreme Court, disposed of the domestic repercussions of the LaGrand and Avena judgments concerning the individual right to consular information enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the consequences of its violation spelt out by the ICJ;112 and compare this again with the position taken on the same matter by the German Federal Constitutional Court.113 With my second remark I refer to an article by Eyal Benvenisti in the American Journal.114 Benvenisti sees national courts engaging in what he calls a ‘globally coordinated move’ to constrain national governments caught in the ‘debilitating grip of globalisation’ from resorting to policies (for instance in the field of counter-terrorism, environmental protection, or migration), which the judiciary considers to lead to disproportionate infringements of civil and democratic rights. According to Benvenisti, governments have begun to react to this judicial move and attempt to pre-empt their courts from reviewing such sensitive decisions by setting up, or mandating, international institutions which are—presumably—immune from 111 Above all, Mara’abe and others v The Prime Minister of Israel and others,The Supreme Court of Israel (Jerusalem, 15 September 2005) [2005] IsrSC (not yet published, procedure no HCJ 7957/04), particularly paras 56 and 74. 112 B Simma and C Hoppe, ‘From LaGrand and Avena to Medellin – a Rocky Road Toward Implementation’ (2005) 14 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 7; B Simma and C Hoppe, ‘The LaGrand Case: A Story of Many Miscommunications’ in JE Noyes et al (eds), International Law Stories (New York, Foundation Press, 2007) 371. The developments described and evaluated in these two papers were then topped, as it were, by the decision of the Supreme Court of 25 March 2008 in Medellin v Texas, 128 S Ct 1346 (2008). 113 C Hoppe, ‘Implementation of LaGrand and Avena in Germany and the United States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a Uniform Interpretation of Consular Rights’ (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 317. 114 E Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 241.

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national judicial review (such as the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, or the EU apparatus in charge of legislating migration policy). Then the author touches the point which is directly relevant to us here: he views a ‘potential standoff’ between national and international courts. While national courts have, thus far, shown deference to international courts (the House of Lords in Jones v Ministry of Interior (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) for instance, saying that the claimants in that case were ‘obliged to accept’ the ICJ’s ruling in the Arrest Warrant case), this may change once national courts realise that their international counterparts are more acquiescent with respect to intrusive governmental action, less assertive in restraining governments, and that international courts are somehow dependent on them, for instance, when they look at national jurisprudence to ascertain customary international law, or when international decisions need to be enforced at the domestic level.

The Claims of ‘Universalism’ Facing the Reality of Recent International Decisions Eyal Benvenisti’s interesting ideas lead me directly to the third—and concluding— part of my speech. Up till now, I have dealt with the topic of universality linked to the two buzzwords of ‘fragmentation’ and ‘proliferation’ viewed from a practical angle. Let me, in the third and last part of my speech, make a few observations on a challenge encountered by what I have called the third-level universality of international law, that is, its ‘universalist’ understanding as a common legal order, not only for states, but for all human beings. Obviously, the idealistic traits of this conception face many problems, questions and doubts, even about its justification outside the philosophical world of the pure ‘ought’. But quite apart from any idealism, the application of international law in a multi-level system of international governance with manifold consequences for the individual is already a fact of life. This phenomenon has led to the creation of legal responsibilities for individuals and their being directly targeted by international acts or decisions. These acts or decisions may emanate from precisely the international regulatory mechanisms that Benvenisti has in mind when he speaks of the attempts of governments to pre-empt their courts from scrutinising human rights-sensitive policy moves.115 This brings us to the question of international remedies: individuals seeking judicial review of such decisions enacted against them turn to international or supranational courts with increasing frequency. Let us have a brief look at where they can go, and how far they can get. First, Yusuf and Kadi before the European Community courts. In these cases, the Court of First Instance of the EC had decided on an action for annulment of EU legislative acts implementing the UN Security Council regime for the suppression of international terrorism. The CFI declined to review these acts on the basis of EU law.116 Its main reason for doing so was that the EC was bound by the obligations

115 116

ibid. Yusuf & Kadi (n 286).

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under the UN Charter in the same way as its member states117 and that, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, decisions of the Security Council take precedence over any other obligations. Neither did the CFI see itself in a position to review the lawfulness of the Security Council resolutions indirectly,118 given that the Community did not have any discretion in implementing them by EC regulations. What the CFI did, however, was to test the Security Council Resolutions in question against international jus cogens.119 The CFI found no conflict in this regard. The approach thus described was remarkable—and markedly universalist, to say the least, given that a judicial organ of one entity (the EC/EU) undertook to review acts of an organ of another entity (the UN) against the standards to which that second entity is subjected (jus cogens, ie international law). The judgment of the CFI in the Kadi and Al Barakaat cases was appealed. In his identical Opinions on these cases of 16 January 2008, Advocate General Poiares Maduro recommended that the European Court of Justice take a different stand than the CFI, assert jurisdiction, review the EC regulation in question against higher EC law, and consequently annul the regulation.120 The Advocate General stressed that the Community legal order was autonomous, the EC Treaty having created ‘a municipal legal order of trans-national dimensions, of which it forms the “basic constitutional charter”.’121 However, according to the Advocate General, the relationship between the Community legal order and international law was not a completely detached one: ‘[T]he Community’s municipal legal order and the international legal order [do not] pass by each other like ships in the night.’122 While there was a presumption that the Community intended to honour its international legal commitments, it was the task of the ‘Community Courts [to] determine the effect of international obligations within the Community legal order by reference to conditions set by Community law’ (emphasis added).123 The case law of the European courts showed that, while respecting the international legal obligations of the Community, the Community’s Court of Justice, as a priority, had to preserve the constitutional framework established by the EC/EU Treaty. ‘The relationship between international law and the Community legal order is governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that legal order only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles of the Community.’124 A limit on permissible judicial review by the Community Courts could be derived neither from Article 307 of the EC Treaty nor from a ‘political questions doctrine’ à l’Américaine. ‘On the contrary, when the risks to public security are believed to be extraordinarily high, the pressure is particularly strong to take measures that disregard individual rights, especially in respect of individuals who

117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124

ibid, paras 243 ff. ibid, para 266. ibid, para 277. Yusuf & Kadi (n 286), Opinion Advocate General Poiares Maduro 16 January 2008. ibid, para 21. ibid, para 22. ibid. ibid, para 24.

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have little or no access to the political process’,125 and thus, the greater the urgency to provide these persons with a judicial remedy. Given the unavailability of state-of-the-art judicial review against the listing of the claimants in the case at the UN level, and the questionable legitimacy of the process of listing altogether, Advocate General Maduro certainly had a point. What he consequently proposed was that the Luxembourg Court assumes the role of protector of individual rights that Professor Benvenisti diagnoses at the level of domestic courts. Yesterday, the European Court of Justice rendered its judgment in the Kadi and Al Barakaat cases.126 The Court appears to have followed grosso modo the Opinion of the Advocate General, even though the jury still seems to be out on the question of just how determined the judgment was designed to be with regard to Mr Kadi’s human rights concerns.127 The judgment of the CFI was worrisome insofar as its approach would have rendered the actions of the Security Council immune to judicial review on any level, subject only to the rather indeterminate standard of jus cogens (which might in this context shrink from a car in the garage, to a fig-leaf). Such deference was problematic, given that no efficient judicial remedy exists at the level of the UN law and institutions administering the regime of smart anti-terrorism sanctions. From the angle of the universality of international law, what was also problematic about the CFI’s approach was that here, for the first time, a regional international court declared itself competent to directly review Security Council resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a power from which even the ICJ has hitherto shied away—remember its caution, if not deference, in the Lockerbie cases. Hence the danger that the universal application of international law might be hindered by a court that does not even belong to the institutional set-up of that (universal) international organisation. The ECJ’s judgment of yesterday declared that the CFI had no competence at all to engage in a review of this kind. The judgment of 3 September 2008 carefully abstains from reaching into the UN system in the way that the CFI did; rather, it adopts the opposite approach and stops –albeit half-heartedly128—the impact of this system at the EU’s legal borders, as it were, insofar as the UN system does not provide adequate protection of individual rights.129

125

ibid, para 35. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation (n 28c). In conformity with the policy that I set out at the beginning, I will not comment on Kadi beyond the few remarks that I made in my speech of 4 September, neither do I claim already to have a firm opinion on the judgment. What I have begun to realise, however, is that Kadi represents probably neither the ultimate step by which Community law emancipates itself from public international law, nor the principled high stand on the protection of individuals against Kafkaesque diplomatic bureaucracies. 128 See the preceding and the following footnotes. 129 Just how sincere the Court’s judgment actually is with regard to the purported aim of protecting Mr Kadi’s rights is another matter, and not for me to take up here. In light of the follow-up to the case I cannot avoid the impression that, maybe, once the dust has settled, the decision will share the reputation of quite a few ECJ leading cases of being grandiose on principles without being of much help for the individual claimant. 126 127

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From a strictly universalist viewpoint, neither the CFI solution, nor the Maduro approach, nor the solution ultimately adopted by the ECJ appears satisfactory. Such decentralised, either direct (CFI) or indirect (ECJ), judicial review of acts of the Security Council always involve the risk of divergent assessments by different courts and thus, fragmentation. However, I am not only a proponent of universality but also a moderate droit-de-l’hommiste in Alain Pellet’s classification. To repeat: for the individuals affected, no effective judicial review is being offered at the UN level. How should this dilemma be solved? It seems that here we really are between a rock and a hard place: As international institutional lawyers and defenders of universal, ie, UN law, we would have to argue that the European courts, just like national courts, overstep their jurisdiction if they review acts of the Security Council. On the other hand, as human rights lawyers, we will have to advocate the upholding of human rights review also under circumstances as those encountered in the fight against international terrorism. If, under such conditions, universal institutions like the UN cannot maintain a system of adequate protection of human rights,130 considerations of human rights deserve to trump arguments of universality. The only question is whether this effectively happened in the ECJ judgment of 3 September 2008. The decisions in Yusuf and Kadi thus also exemplify the difficulties faced by judicial review within a multi-level system of international governance: In the end, it is the individuals addressed by international measures that may get caught up in its wheels. The next two cases I have in mind are Behrami and Saramati, decided by the European Court of Human Rights. The applicants had sought relief against both actions and omissions by states contributing to UNMIK or KFOR in Kosovo. Behrami concerned a claim for compensation for the failure of troops of the French KFOR contingent to mark or defuse undetonated bombs or mines known to be present on a specific site. Two children had played on the site; one was seriously injured by the explosives, the other died. In Saramati, the applicant demanded compensation for extra-judicial detention. The Court declined jurisdiction in both cases, since the acts of both KFOR and UNMIK were not attributable to individual UN member states, but rather to the UN as an ‘organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective security mandate’.131 The Court concluded that reviewing acts or omissions of states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, which, however, had been acting on behalf of the UN would ‘interfere with the fulfilment of the UN’s key mission in this field

130 In my view, this was demonstrated with unfortunate precision by the Decision of the Human Rights Committee of 22 October 2008 on the individual communication by Nl Sayadii and P Vinck, Communication No 1472/2006, CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006. 131 Behrami and Behrami v France, Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (GC) (App nos 71412/01 and 78166/01) ECHR 2 May 2007, para 151.

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including . . . with the effective conduct of its operations’.132 The Strasbourg Court has since reiterated this reasoning in the cases of Kasumaj v Greece133 and Gajic´ v Germany.134 The European Court of Human Rights apparently did not consider it possible that the UN, NATO and the particular state in question could be concurrently liable (multiple attribution). Thirdly, Beric´ and others v Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here, the Strasbourg Court likewise declined jurisdiction to review acts of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under the Dayton Peace Agreement and the so-called ‘Bonn powers’. Between June and December 2004, the UN High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, had removed the applicants from all their public and politicalparty positions and indefinitely barred them from holding any such positions as well as from running for elections, for having personally contributed to obstructing the arrest and surrender of persons indicted by the ICTY in the Republika Srpska. When the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ordered the domestic authorities to make sure that an effective remedy against the removal from office was available, the High Representative reacted in a manner that the Court mildly characterised as ‘vigorous’, but which can more aptly be compared to the behaviour of an absolute monarch. He decided that: [a]ny step taken by any institution or authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to establish any domestic mechanism to review the Decisions of the High Representative issued pursuant to his international mandate shall be considered by the High Representative as an attempt to undermine the implementation of the civilian aspects of the [[Dayton] Peace Agreement] and shall be treated in itself as conduct undermining such implementation.135

The High Representative decided further that: for the avoidance of any doubt or ambiguity . . . it is hereby specifically ordered and determined, in the exercise of the . . . international mandate of the High Representative . . . that no liability is capable of being incurred on the part of the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . in respect of any loss or damage allegedly flowing, either directly or indirectly, from such Decision of the High Representative made pursuant to his or her international mandate, or at all

and that: it is hereby specifically declared and ordered that the provisions of the Order contained herein are, as to each and every one of them, laid down by the High Representative pursuant to his international mandate and are not, therefore, justiciable by the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina or its Entities or elsewhere, and no proceedings may be brought in respect of duties in respect thereof before any court whatsoever at any time thereafter.136 132 133 134 135

ibid, para 149. Kasumaj v Greece (App no 6974 /05) ECHR 5 July 2007. Gajic´ v Germany (App no 31446/02) ECHR 28 August 2007, para 1. Beric´ and Others v Bosnia and Herzegovina (App no 36357/04) ECHR 16 October 2007, para

19. 136

ibid, para 19.

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The Strasbourg Court held that the UN Security Council had ‘effective overall control’ over the High Representative and that thus his acts were attributable to the UN, rather than to individual member states.137 You will agree that the European Convention cases, I have presented, have the tendency, to put it mildly, to confirm Eyal Benvenisti’s point about the higher degree of ‘acquiescence’ on the part of even specialised human rights courts towards problematic policies of their government clientele.138 What these cases show is that the question of judicial review of the exercise of public authority by or at the behest of international institutions is of utmost topicality. Regional international courts such as the European Court of Human Rights have demonstrated their unwillingness to efficiently control the acts of the UN Security Council or its sub-organs, operating at the universal level. Such lack of protection at the regional level is, however, not compensated by any effective individual complaint mechanism at the UN level.139 And this brings me back to my principal challenge to third-level universality: as international law becomes more universal in the sense of directly regulating the behaviour of individuals, it is mandatory that this development is accompanied by judicial control through independent courts to which those individuals have access and which are ready to assume jurisdiction over acts of international institutions that directly encroach upon individual freedoms. If it were a regional court deciding that it was willing to provide for adequate judicial control, universality might suffer, but it would be a kind of universality which deserved to suffer.140

CONCLUSION

Thus far my review of the various conceptions of universality of international law, of the challenges that universality in its various appearances meets, and of the ways by which international law, especially the international judiciary, attempts to cope with them. I have exposed you to a veritable tour de force, also with regard to the amount of time I have been assigned to fill tonight. For this reason, I will desist from treating you to a typical German academic ‘conclusion’, ie, another 15 minutes of condensed wisdom, but only say the following: From the viewpoint of us practitioners, the universality of international law in all its variations is in relatively good shape. We may not always be aware of how thin the theoretical ice is on which we are moving, but what we keep in mind in very pragmatic ways is that we must handle the law, its reach, unity and coherence, in a responsible way. This is a state of mind whose presence, and dominance, I have personally experienced in Geneva at the sessions of the Committee on Economic, Social and 137

ibid, paras 27–30. Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy’ (n 108). 139 I am speaking of ‘regional international courts’ here so as to exclude the European Community’s Court of Justice, which in its Kadi judgment has indicated its own way out of what I would call a denial of international justice. Particularly in the ‘light’ of the follow-up to the Kadi judgment, I am not sure, however, whether the ECJ was really determined to go the whole way in this regard. 140 See the preceding note. 138

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Cultural Rights, during entire summers spent with the International Law Commission, and now in the Great Hall of Justice of the Peace Palace. The international judiciary in particular has developed a set of tools to cope with the undesirable aspects of both fragmentation and proliferation, and appears to employ it in full awareness of these challenges on a regular basis. Hence, there is among us practitioners no feeling of urgent need for a ‘constitutionalisation’ of international law—to finally introduce the third great buzzword to which German international lawyers in particular supposedly have to bow if they want to be ‘cool’. Personally, I could never get rid entirely of the suspicion that the great attraction that ‘constitutionalisation’ of international law seems to have for German colleagues must have something to do with the fact that most, if not all, of them also have to teach Staatsrecht and European Community law at their universities, compared to which public international law does indeed still look pretty dishevelled in many places. Thus, the desire to imbue international law with some of the orderliness and hierarchy that constitutions create in most of our countries in most instances most of the time. In the words of Goethe: ‘Legt ihr’s nicht aus, so legt was unter’.141 Take this as the statement of the practitioner which I am supposed to impersonate. And do not get me wrong: we practitioners are not hostile towards any of the features or developments on which the protagonists of ‘constitutionalisation’ rest their case. We are as happy about the ‘widening and thickening’ of international law, to use Rosalyn Higgins’ words,142 without, however, seeing the necessity of couching our happiness in misleading terms or forcing it into some Procrustean bed. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books WG Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (London, Stevens, 1964). RY Jennings and A Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, Volume I Parts 2–4, 9th edn (Harlow, Longman, 1992). Y Shany, The Competing Jurisdiction of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). CJ Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2005). Chapters in Edited Volumes A Aust, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: A Proliferation Problem?’, in TM Ndiaye and R Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes. Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Leiden, Nijhoff, 2007). 141 142

Zahme Xenien. R Higgins, ‘A Just World Under Law – Keynote Address’ (2006) 100 ASIL Proceedings 388, 389.

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RY Jennings, ‘Universal International Law in a Multicultural World’, in M Bos and I Brownlie (eds), Liber Amicorum for The Rt Hon Lord Wilberforce (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987). B Simma, ‘Does the UN Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations erga omnes?’ in J Delbrück (ed), The Future of International Law Enforcement. New Scenarios – New Law (Berlin, Duncker & Humbolt, 1993). B Simma, and C Hoppe, ‘The LaGrand Case: A Story of Many Miscommunications’, in JE Noyes, LA Dickinson and MW Janis (eds), International Law Stories (New York, Foundation Press, 2007).

International Documents Human Rights Committee, General Comment no 31 [80] – The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/ C/21/Rev 1/Add 13 (Geneva, United Nations, 2004). Institut de droit international, Fifth Commission: Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law – Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja, (Krakow, 2005). International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682 (United Nations, 2006).

Journal Articles G Abi–Saab, ‘Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks’ (1999) 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 919–33. E Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 241–74. E Benvenisti and GW Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 60 Stanford Law Review 595–609. A von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany’ (2006) 47 Harvard Journal of International Law 223–42. A Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadic´ Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia’, (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 649–68. J Combacau, ‘Le droit international: bric–à–brac ou système ?’ (1986) 31 Archives de philosophie du droit 85–105. A Fischer–Lescano and G Teubner, ‘Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999–1046.

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RJ Goldstone and RJ Hamilton, ‘Bosnia v. Serbia: Lessons from the Encounter of the International Court of Justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 95–112. G Guillaume, ‘The Future of International Judicial Institutions’ (1995) 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 848–62. R Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 791–804. —— –––– ‘A Just World Under Law– – Keynote Address’ (2006) 100 ASIL Proceedings 388–95. C Hoppe, ‘Implementation of LaGrand and Avena in Germany and the United States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a Uniform Interpretation of Consular Rights’ (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 317–36. M Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 The Modern Law Review 1–30. —— –––– ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197–218. J Martinez, ‘Towards an International Judicial System’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 429–530. N Miller, ‘An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of “Precedent” Across International Tribunals’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 483– 526. K Oellers–Frahm, ‘Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdictions – Problems and Possible Solutions’ (2001) 5 Max Planck United Nations Yearbook 67–104. A Reinisch, ‘The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural Tools to avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement Outcomes’ (2004) 3 The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 37–77. B Simma, ‘Fragmentation in a Positive Light’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 845–47. B Simma and C Hoppe, ‘From LaGrand and Avena to Medellin – a Rocky Road Toward Implementation’ (2005) 14 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 7–59. B Simma and D Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self–contained Regimes in International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 483–529. AM Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191–219.

Collected Courses JI Charney, ‘Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?’ (1998) 271 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 101–382. HEH Mosler, ‘The International Society as a Legal Community’ (1974) 140 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 1–320.

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B Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 250 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 217–384. C Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century (General Course on Public International Law)’ (1999) 281 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9–438.

Working Paper A von Bogdandy and S Delavalle, (2008) Universalism and Particularism as Paradigms of International Law (Institute for International Law and Justice/ New York University School of Law, International Law and Justice Working Paper no 3).

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Democracy after the Fall of the Berlin Wall It has Come—It is Coming—Will it Come? REIN MÜLLERSON *

T

HE POST-Cold War globalisation includes, as its substantial components, the broadening of both market economy and democracy. Both have spread by way of borrowing from more developed societies what has worked there and made them successful, as well as by means of purposeful efforts to promote these ideas and practices. Often seen as God, motherhood and apple pie, markets and democracy have, however, been a mixed blessing: successful and beneficial in many cases, while rather destructive in other circumstances. Why has it been so? What factors have determined success in some states of affairs, and failure in others? Today, I will try to give some tentative answers to these questions. Democracy has certainly something to do with international law. Professor Thomas Franck in 1990 wrote of the emergence of the right to democratic governance.1 Some years later, Professor James Crawford, as a new Whewell Professor of International Law in Cambridge, gave his inaugural lecture entitled ‘Democracy in International Law’.2 However, notwithstanding optimistic views of distinguished professors (I myself at that time belonged to this category of optimists, and was even quoted by Professor Crawford) the right to democracy has hardly become universal because, first, its content is too general to be of much help in practice, and secondly, its practical implementation is not general enough to reflect universal normative values. Why is it so? Why do we have so many problems, setbacks and backlashes with democracy and democratisation in today’s world? There are many reasons for that, and in my short presentation I cannot even enumerate all the problems and difficulties. Therefore, I will concentrate only on some of them.

* Professor and Chair of International Law at King’s College, London; former Foreign Minister of Estonia, former member of the UN Human Rights Committee; Institut de Droit International, member. 1 T Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 46–91. 2 J Crawford, Democracy in International Law. Inaugural Lecture (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994).

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Rein Müllerson

What I have found in the process of researching for this problem, which was also the topic of my lectures, this summer, at the Hague Academy of International Law—a process that has included not only reading, reflecting and writing but also what may be called fieldwork in various capacities (participant, advisor, representative, monitor or simply interviewer)—is that in embarking on any study, one should keep his or her mind as open as possible. The point is that even when we start working on a new topic, we are never complete tabula rasa on the matter of our research. Usually we are already quite familiar with the new topic; otherwise we would not even know that we want to study it. However, this means that our minds are usually well (in a way, too well) prepared for the study of a new—or at least relatively new—problem; ie we are already biased; we often want to prove something we believe we already understand, we want to transform something that we feel intuitively into rational lines of reasoning, to find more eloquent and convincing arguments in favour of our views. This is natural—there is no way of completely avoiding this; what we can do is to recognise this inevitable bias and try to deal with it. To put it differently, if one is a great and unconditional fan of democracy, and believes that it is the best form of governance, we should be ready to come to the conclusion, as a result of our research (otherwise it would not be research), that democracy is not necessarily the best form of governance; that, say, some forms of authoritarianism may be preferable or at least better suited for some people, and so on. Therefore, instead of looking mainly for evidence that seems to prove our theories and points of view, we should concentrate more on facts and developments that would undermine our dearest convictions. Any serious researcher needs to follow Karl Popper’s recipe: the surest test of any theory is not trying to collect as much evidence as possible that supports one’s point of view (usually one can find lots of evidence); rather, it is necessary to look for facts that undermine one’s predilections, preconceived ideas and fears.3 This does not necessarily mean, and in most cases this does not mean, that as a result of our research we will have a complete change of mind, or that we will transform our world-view; though this may happen too, albeit rarely. What usually happens is that our views and understandings become more nuanced, hedged with various ‘ifs’ and qualified by ‘provided that’ and ‘other things being equal’ (which, at least in our field, they never are). Relative to the topic of my presentation today, this means that though personally preferring to live in a liberal democratic country, notwithstanding all of its problems and even unpleasant aspects, remaining persuaded that at least so far, democracy has given more to more people than any other form of governance, yet

3 Karl Popper divides all philosophers into ‘verificationists’ (or ‘justificationists’), who are looking for proofs supporting their theories, and ‘falsificationists’, who are interested in criticising or testing all, including their own, theories. He writes that ‘the rationality of science lies not in its habit of appealing to empirical evidence in support of its dogmas—astrologers do so too—but solely in the critical approach, which, of course, involves the critical use, among other arguments, of empirical evidence (especially in refutations)’ K Popper, Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London, Routledge, 1996) 229.

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believing that democracy’s potential is far from being exhausted, I have become a much more qualified, nuanced, cautious, contingent and contextual advocate of democracy. When we speak of the spread or promotion of democracy, we have to put at least three, probably even more, fundamental questions. The first of them is: do all societies, in the process of their evolution, have to go through the same stages; do they all, at the end of the day, evolve towards the same general model—in our case a democratic model? Even if we have sufficient grounds to believe that all or at least most societies indeed are generally following, in some important respects, the same historical path, and democracy in its various manifestations is one of the features that all societies sooner or later will share, we still have to ask whether societies that are ‘less developed’ can take short cuts in order to reach the image of their own future that they see in ‘more developed’ countries? The third question is to what extent can external support compensate for weaknesses of domestic democratic potential? Karl Marx, in one of his most deterministic statements, wrote about ‘tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results’, and he predicted that ‘the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’.4 A deterministic approach to history is not the domain of only Marx and Marxists. Many of those who promote democracy in today’s world, or who have done so in the past, also see the development of different societies as going through the same historical path. A century ago, American Baptists, for example, believed that ‘for Russia, sooner or later, there will be Runnymede and a Magna Charta, if not a Bunker Hill and Yorktown’.5 We can see the same in today’s world. Kishore Mahbubani has correctly observed that: [P]aradoxically, in the post-Cold War era, the West seems to have become an ideologically driven entity. The iconization of democracy – an unquestionably virtuous idea – became an ideological crusade that insisted democracy could be exported to any society everywhere in the world, regardless of its stage of political development.6

It is difficult to disagree with him. While criticising or even ridiculing such rigid historical determinism, it would be equally wrong to fall into another extreme and deny that there are some historical patterns and regularities. In that respect, it is important to note that what we see today in some developing, especially Muslim, countries, one could indeed have noticed in the Europe of some three hundred years ago (eg the attitude towards women, religious intolerance, etc). Though there aren’t any iron necessities, in a Marxian or Fukuyaman sense, in the social sphere, certain regularities still exist. Philip Allott has given, in my opinion, the best answer to the dilemma of voluntarism versus determinism:

4 K Marx, Das Kapital. A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, The Process of Capitalist Production (Preface to the First Edition) (Chicago, Charles H Kerr and Co, 1906) 3. 5 DS Foglesong, The American Mission and the ‘Evil Empire’ (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 38. 6 K Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York, Public Affairs, 2008) 6.

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It is as if an ingenious and inquisitive Creator had chosen to conduct an experiment in one small corner of the universe–an experiment in which a piece of matter would be given a certain measure of control over its changing states, a living organism would be given a special kind of choice over its own life. But two possibilities of control and choice would be withheld–the possibility of simply submitting entirely to the necessary order of the physical universe and the possibility of acting entirely independently of the necessary order of the physical universe.7

As freedom of choice is relative, so are the constraints both of the physical universe and of the existing social order. People are able, but only to an extent and often with disastrous side-effects, to change the order of the physical universe (think about environmental problems). People are also able to transform the existing social order, but many constraints exist that people neglect at their peril. The deterministic approach to history, being not only an outgrowth of the Enlightenment’s legacy but also being related to the Judeo-Christian world-view of progress, has its opposite—voluntarism—which stems from the same sources. A voluntaristic approach to promotion of democracy means that if one were to consider that democracy is the best, if not the only worthwhile, political arrangement for all and for every society, it would be possible and indeed necessary to export democracy to places like, say, Afghanistan and Iraq. Here, both deterministic and voluntaristic approaches in practice lead to the same result. From my point of view, the honest answer to the first question is: I don’t know whether at the end of the day all states become democratic. I doubt it, but there is no way of knowing it for sure. In any case, if the whole world will indeed some day be democratic, this will not necessarily be a Western-style liberal democracy. There will, probably, be a lot of aspects carrying labels such as ‘made in China’ (or in Russia, for that matter). To answer the second question about short cuts, I would like to tell a story that well illustrates the problem. In the 1770s, the royal physician to the Danish Court, Johann Friedrich Struensee, by a strange and fatal confluence of circumstances, became so close to the physically feeble and mentally unstable King Christian VII that, through this influence, he became the de facto prime minister of the country, issuing laws to effect, among other interesting and wonderful things, the abolition of serfdom and of subsidies to unprofitable industries owned by the nobility, while also permitting unrestricted freedom of expression and religious freedoms.8 Unfortunately, but quite predictably, such laws had little effect in eighteenth-century Denmark, and the only tangible result of the freedom of expression was that shortly everybody started to talk about Struensee’s love affair with the Queen. Soon the man, who was well ahead of his time, was executed and the Queen was sent into exile.9 As a reaction to

7

P Allott, Eunomia (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990) 55. See, eg PO Enquist, The Visit of the Royal Physician (New York, NY, Vintage, 2003); A Ross and O Espersen, Dansk Statsforfatningsret II, 3rd edn (Copenhagen, Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1980), 707. I am thankful to my former student, now a senior Danish diplomat, Kristina Miskowiak, who drew my attention to this interesting episode in Danish history. 9 This case is interesting and topical also because it allows one to distinguish between pretexts and reasons. The love affair for Struensee’s enemies served as a pretext, while Struensee’s reform attempts 8

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Struensee’s reform attempts, Denmark became even less tolerant and free than it had been before his attempts to put into practice some radical Enlightenment ideals. It was a very long time before these noble ideas became reality in Europe generally, including the Kingdom of Denmark. Such failures may be inevitable, since there is an issue of ‘democracy-readiness’. Thomas Friedman, a New York Times columnist, once put one of the most pertinent questions, which is also relevant for issues of democratisation, though he himself either did not know the answer or did not dare to formulate one. He asked: ‘Was Iraq the way Iraq was because Saddam was the way Saddam was, or was Saddam the way Saddam was, because Iraq was the way Iraq was?’10 The truth probably was that Saddam was the way he was because Iraq was the way it was, and vice versa. In some societies, unfortunately, the short or even middle-term choice would be between a secular dictatorship, religious totalitarianism, anarchy or civil war. In such cases the best scenario may well be an ‘enlightened dictatorship’ (a rare thing indeed) that may, but not necessarily will, gradually open up the way for democracy. Whether and to what extent outside forces can influence the democratic processes in a specific country depends on many circumstances, including, but not limited to, the relative strength of local pro-democratic forces, the presence and the level of material and cultural preconditions, the presence and the size of the middle class, the presence and nature of identity-based divisions (ethnic, religious, regional), the size and even geographic location of the country (eg, whether it is closer to Finland or Afghanistan), and many other variables. Some democracy experts do not consider such factors to be preconditions but rather core ‘facilitators or nonfacilitators’ that would make democratisation ‘harder or easier’.11 I would agree with such an approach if we were to add that some combinations of such ‘nonfacilitators’ make democratisation impossible, at least for the time being. External pressure for democratisation may indeed effect positive transformations, but usually only in small countries, and even then only when there is a confluence of favourable conditions. In their foreign policy such states practise bandwagoning, ie they are prone to joining stronger and more prosperous actors, accepting to a great extent the culture and way of life of those other states. Big countries, which due to their history, potential and size have great power ambitions, on the contrary resort to balancing, ie their response to outside pressure on questions of their foreign and especially domestic affairs is usually one of defiance and internal consolidation against external challenges. The post-Cold War experience has shown that pushing aggressively for a change in other societies is as dangerous and counterproductive as the rejection of changes whose time has come and which are called for by the people.

were the reason for his downfall. Today’s politics is full of such examples (eg, the attempts of US Republicans to impeach President Clinton over his affair with Monica Lewinsky, or the Khodorkovsky criminal case in Russia). 10

TL Friedman, ‘The big question’, The International Herald Tribune (New York, 4–5 March 2006), 6. T Carothers, ‘How Democracies Emerge: The “Sequence” Fallacy’ (2007) 18 Journal of Democracy 12, 24. 11

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Speaking of democratisation of non-democratic societies, one has to bear in mind what I would call the dialectical contradictions of democracy, ie contradictions between phenomena that on the one hand almost presume, but on the other hand also negate or at least constrain, each other. Democracy forms such contradictions with three other important social phenomena, and the resulting pairs of contradictions are: democracy and market economy, democracy and liberalism, and democracy and nationalism. The elements of these pairs are related to each other in their genesis, and historically they have supported each other while at the same time constraining each other and in some circumstances even violently clashing with each other. These contradictions have to be kept in mind and taken account of when one becomes involved in the processes of democratisation. Although market, ie economic freedom and political freedom are generally related in a positive sense (there has been no modern democracy without market economy, though there has been market economy without democracy), the parallel spread of market economy and democracy in practice has some serious problems. Firstly, the shock introduction of markets, especially unbridled markets, makes a few extremely rich while many become even poorer than they were under the previous system. As one of the central tenets of democracy (with some important qualifications, of course) is that the many count for more than the few, it should be clear that economic ‘shock therapy’ and political democracy are incompatible—one either has a shock or democracy; they do not come together. Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang goes even further than that: ‘Free market and democracy are not natural partners’,12 though it has to be emphasised that Professor Chang is not speaking of ‘market economy’ as such, but rather of ‘unbridled markets’, as advocated by Milton Friedman and his followers. One of the most persistent market-friendly advocates of political freedoms, Karl Popper, half a century ago wrote incisively: Even if the state protects its citizens from being bullied by physical violence (as it does in principle, under the system of unrestrained capitalism), it may defeat our ends by its failure to protect them from the misuse of economic power. In such a state, the economically strong is still free to bully one who is economically weak, and to rob of his freedom. Under these circumstances, unlimited economic freedom can be just as selfdefeating as unlimited physical freedom, and economic power may be nearly as dangerous as physical violence.13

Indeed, unbridled economic freedoms are as damaging for individual liberties as a complete lack of economic freedoms is in totalitarian states. It seems that capitalism and liberal democracy, phenomena that on the one hand presume each other, are at the same time also constantly in a kind of rivalry or competition. The freer a market is, the greater the economic inequality; the greater the inequality, the less would there be democracy, and vice versa. Strong democracy attained by curbing inequality almost inevitably also bridles market freedoms. 12 HJ Chang, Bad Samaritans. Rich Nations, Poor Policies & the Threat to the Developing World (New York, Random House Business Books, 2007) 18. 13 K Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume 2 Hegel & Marx (London, Routledge, 1996) 124.

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Economic inequality de facto and inevitably also increases political inequality, while political equality puts brakes on the widening of economic inequality. Democracy tries to make a society more equal, while an unbridled market increases inequality. The result of such constant balancing is that in Western European liberal democratic societies these two spheres—political and economic—while supporting each other, also constantly temper each other, softening each other’s impacts. There is another aspect of this dialectical contradiction between market economy and democracy. Professor Amy Chua, though over-generalising, in my opinion, on the negative role of so-called ‘market-dominant minorities’ (eg, Indians in East Africa, Lebanese in West Africa, Ibo in Nigeria, Tutsi in Rwanda, Chinese in many South-East Asian countries) in the processes of globalisation, nevertheless, makes a point that is highly relevant in specific contexts existing in quite a few societies. She observes that ‘[T]he global spread of free market democracy has thus been a principal, aggravating cause of ethnic instability and violence throughout the non-Western world’.14 The reason for such a pessimistic conclusion is that in some developing and post-Communist countries, there are indeed ethnic minorities, who are generally better educated, more entrepreneurial, own disproportionate acreages of land, maybe are even more hard-working or are otherwise more fortunate than the rest of the population. They usually gain immensely from the liberalisation of markets, while the majority benefits only marginally, if at all. A simultaneous introduction of democracy releases suppressed discontent that creates a combustible mixture ready to explode in xenophobia, ethnic cleansing or even acts of genocide. In such cases both markets and democracy stumble over nationalism or, as Professor Chua observes, there is either a market backlash or democracy backlash. In extreme cases, as she shows, at the end of the day, there is neither market, nor democracy. Therefore, she concludes that ‘the United States should not be exporting markets in the unrestrained, laissez-faire form that the West itself has repudiated, just as it should not be promoting unrestrained, overnight majority rule—a form of democracy that the West has repudiated.’15 With the correction that in the West, majority rule never came overnight but through sometimes centuries-long processes of trial and error, one has to take seriously Professor Chua’s advice. Professor Chua’s pertinent observation leads us to the issue of the relationship between democracy and nationalism. Democracy and nationalism are related in various ways. If democracy is almost an unquestioned good, nationalism, especially after the Nazi atrocities in Europe and the proliferation of inter-ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War world, as well as ‘cleansings’ in the name of ethnic purity carried out at the turn of the century in various parts of the world, is often considered as something wholly negative, dangerous and not fit for today’s post-modern world. However, the emergence and development of democratic governance in Western Europe was closely linked to the rise of nationalism and so-called Nation States. John Stuart Mill, one of the greatest

14 A Chua, World on Fire. How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (London, Arrow Books, 2003) 187. 15 ibid, 17.

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liberal thinkers, argued that democracy can only flourish where ‘the boundaries of government coincide in the main with those of nationality.’16 His argument in support of this contention was based on an analysis of the necessary conditions for a flourishing democracy: ‘Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the workings of representative institutions cannot exist.’17 Historically the emergence and development of democracy was, if not conditioned, then at least facilitated by the homogenous nature of societies, and if they were not homogenous enough, they had to be made such. As the Italian novelist and politician Massimo Taparelli d’Azeglio famously put it in 1861: ‘We have created Italy. Now all we have to do is to create Italians.’18 To put it otherwise, without a degree of homogeneity, d’Azeglio believed, the country would not stay together. Homogenisation facilitated not only state building, but also progress towards democracy and human rights. It is easier to carry out democratic reforms in a more homogenous society than in a less homogenous one. The violent conflicts that erupted regularly in different parts of the world in the 1990s are, to an extent, similar to some that were endemic in Western Europe hundreds of years ago (eg, the Anglo-Scottish wars, the wars of Italian unification or independence struggles of Christian territories of the Ottoman Empire). Then and now, many conflicts have nationalism, state building and also democratisation among their causes. However, there are also huge differences between nation building in Western Europe two or three hundred years back and current developments. In the era of the formation of Nation States in Western Europe, the use of violence either for the purpose of unifying separate political entities or assimilating those who spoke different languages or professed other religions was not only lawful, it was completely normal. Western Europe went through this process of homogenisation, through its ‘ethnic cleansing’, at the time when such practices were considered normal; not only international law but also public morality didn’t condemn them. There were no international human rights standards, and even those who rebelled against oppression usually did not fight for the freedom of everybody, but for their own freedom to oppress others. Does this mean that today, heterogeneous states have to pursue policies of assimilation or exclusion? An answer to this question depends on whether we consider plural societies in isolation (both temporal and spatial) or in a concrete context (again both temporal and spatial). Taken in isolation, some states in Eastern and Central Europe may indeed have to go through the same processes of homogenisation that their more advanced Western neighbours went through centuries ago. However, these states are not to be 16 JS Mill, Utilitarianism. On Liberty, Considerations of Representative Government (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1993) 394. 17 ibid, 392. 18 See S Tharoor, ‘E Pluribus, India: Is Indian Modernity Working?’ (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 128. India seems to be a significant exception to the requirement of homogeneity for democracy to be sustainable. That is why Robert Dahl called India an ‘improbable democracy’ (RA Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998) 159), while Amartya Sen spent pages explaining why democracy, notwithstanding all ‘non-facilitators’, has nevertheless survived in India (A Sen, The Argumentative Indian. Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity (London, Allen Lane, 2005)).

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taken in isolation (and they themselves do not want to be taken in isolation), out of their geographical and temporal context. The search for solutions to minority problems has to be put into a wider (international or regional) context. In Europe, this is the European context. The role of the world community, regional and universal international organisations is important in deciding what form the process of democratisation and the accompanying rise of nationalism takes in specific countries, though it is necessary to warn that even if the world community were able to speak with one wise voice (a rare commodity), external influence has always its limits. Extreme nationalists or those opportunistic politicians who use the nationalistic card for political purposes have done a lot to discredit any kind of nationalism. It is often seen as the absolute opposite, as a complete negation of democracy. However, many people’s nationalistic sentiments, like their religious allegiances, are extremely strong, almost primordial. Governments and the political and intellectual elites of states, especially if they are in a disarray of transformation, usually embark on the search for a national idea that would consolidate the people. Although an agnostic and cosmopolitan, I nevertheless believe that a war against nationalism, especially if one were to try to get rid of it once and for ever, would be as futile and even counterproductive as a war against religion as led, for example, by Professor Richards Dawkins. Extreme forms of nationalism that glorify one’s own nation while belittling other nations (or some specific nation) have to be countered by educational, political and legal means. Although today nationalism, even mild, can hardly support democracy, democracy can live and cope with non-virulent forms of nationalism. Although today there are very few states in the world that could be called Nation States in the true sense of the word (ie being composed more or less monoethnically), states where ethnic fault lines are distinct, where ethnicities have been forced by authoritarian governments to live together and where the culture of tolerance is lacking, are prone to disintegrate as soon as the country starts opening up. Suppressed secessionist sentiments gain new momentum, which is often unstoppable. The uti possidetis juris principle of international law, which declares that existing internal administrative borders, especially those of federal states, should become recognised as new international borders,19 may have given additional support to secessionist sentiments. Neither external pressure to force recalcitrant ethnicities to live together, nor separation along ethnic lines, are options that are conducive for democratisation. There are three reasons why politicians become involved in democracy promotion abroad, so to say, in far-away places: hypocritical, idealistic and pragmatic (realistic).

19 As the Chamber of the International Court of Justice in the Burkina Faso/Mali case noted, the essence of the principle of uti possidetis ‘lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. Such territorial boundaries might be no more than delimitations between different administrative divisions or colonies all subject to the same sovereign. In that case the application of the principle of uti possidetis resulted in administrative boundaries being transformed into international frontiers in the full sense of the term’ (Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) [1986] ICJ Rep 554, 566).

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Hypocrites do not give a damn about democracy, especially in far-away places, but nowadays it is politically incorrect and almost suicidal to reveal what the real interests behind lofty words are, they have to be seen to be concerned by the fate of democracy, human rights and development in far-away places. Oil, gas, the directions of pipelines and the safety of tanker navigation may be their higher interests, but these interests have to be expressed in terms of values such as democracy, human rights and development. A more general strategic goal for hypocrites, allowing them to reach various more specific known or even unknown objectives, is the maintenance and consolidation of existing hegemonic domination, or vice versa, the change of the existing status quo, which is unfavourable for them.20 If hypocritical approaches to world politics, which use lofty words such as democracy and human rights to conceal economic and military-strategic interests, are always to be deplored,21 idealism—though often naïve and sometimes even dangerous—may nevertheless serve as an engine of progress. Anthony Dworkin, in response to John Gray’s attempt to outlaw all utopian projects as dangerous, writes in defence of minor utopias: If realism is a necessary corrective to utopian idealism, it is equally true that unchecked realism is likely to lead to a narrowing political possibility. Without some appeal to universal values, there is no standpoint to challenge unjust practices that are widely taken for granted. To take two examples from the Enlightenment era, the slave trade would not have been abolished when it was, nor the use of torture banned in criminal investigations, if William Wilberforce, Cesare Beccaria and their followers had not clung to grand visions of human advance.22

Today too, idealism remains a tool of progress. However, in social affairs generally and in international relations specifically, idealism has to be tempered by realism. Social experiments are not carried out in laboratories; they directly affect the lives of millions. Failures of such experiments may be fatal and their disastrous consequences are usually irreversible. 20 If the United States today is a status quo power in the sense that it seeks to maintain and consolidate its dominant position in the world (notwithstanding that by exporting ‘democracy’, say to the Middle East, Washington is seeking to change the region), China in that respect may indeed be seen as a revisionist power. Of interest in that respect is an article by Chinese scholar Feng Yongping entitled ‘The Peaceful Transition of Power from the UK to the US’ (2006) 1 The Chinese Journal of International Politics 83–108, who ends his historical study with an unmistakable conclusion: ‘From the perspective of China, which can be considered in a similar state to the United States at that time [ie when Washington peacefully took over from London the reins of world politics], the example of successful transition undoubtedly holds deep implications and provides a source for inspiration’. One can be sure that such ideas do not inspire people in Washington. That is why, among other issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, Xingjian and the trade imbalance, references to China’s democracy deficit and human rights violations may be used as an instrument to stop or slow down the coming transition of power. Peaceful transfer of power in a balance-of-power world is somewhat exceptional. The US national security strategies of 2002 and 2006 were both based on the premise of American economic and military superiority, which should help the US shape the world and not to be shaped by it; no strategic competitor is allowed to rise. 21 Although there is a so-called hypocrisy trap, which means that in accepting or recognising hypocritically some obligations or values, one may later be forced to act upon them. 22 A Dworkin, ‘The case for minor utopias’ Prospect (London, July 2001) (a review of J Gray’s Black Mass) 44.

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Although hypocrisy is generally deplorable and hypocritical, use of concepts of democracy and human rights in diplomacy discredits these worthy aims, it is necessary to acknowledge that hypocrisy in politics and especially in international politics will remain with us for any foreseeable future. David Runciman is right that ‘hypocrisy, though inherently unattractive, is also more or less inevitable in most political settings, and in liberal democratic societies it is practically ubiquitous’ and therefore ‘hypocrisy is something we have to learn to live with.’23 And though it may sound strange, it is mostly the liberal-democratic countries with wide international interests, whose foreign policy cannot do without hypocrisy. Beijing, for example, does not feel so much need to justify, especially before its population, how it satisfies its economic interests in Sudan, Nigeria or any other country. Governments in Washington, Paris or London, on the other hand, have to demonstrate, especially to their domestic electorates, that their foreign policy in different parts of the world, if not entirely dictated by ethical and humanitarian concerns, at least takes into account these concerns. I do not think that Western leaders, when they raise issues of human rights and democracy, say, with Chinese or Russian leaders, are so naïve as to believe that these governments will change their policies, because of their preaching. They probably even understand that excessively strong public pressure on these issues may be counter-productive. However, raising human rights concerns, especially during summit meetings, is necessary because otherwise the opposition in parliaments, mass media and human rights NGOs would accuse the government of betraying values for the sake of money and security, though the same electorate would outvote any government that does not guarantee its financial or security interests. Although most people care mainly about their prosperity and well-being, they also want to feel and to be seen as virtuous. Moreover, there are certainly some Western leaders who quite sincerely care about democracy and human rights even in far-away places (though I do not think, for example, that the late Robin Cook’s ‘ethical foreign policy’ helped change the world for the better more than any other policy), conditions permitting and recipes being adequate, efforts to promote democracy and human rights may indeed have some positive effects. Not every politician who speaks of human rights and democracy in far-away places is necessarily a hypocrite; not every human rights activist who claims to know a remedy for a dire human rights situation in a distant country is inevitably ignorant or naïve; not even every autocrat who claims to have the support of the population is to be automatically considered wrong. However, it is always safer to doubt and double-check; in matters where practical interests and ideology intermingle, one can never be sure. Then, there are pragmatists, who may even be fond of the goals of idealists, but who think that these goals can be realised only in specific favourable conditions and usually attempts to put them into practice will be counterproductive to other foreign policy objectives. They also believe that before one enters a brawl, one should have a clear exit strategy, ie they usually concentrate so much on the means 23 D Runciman, Political Hypocrisy. The Mask of Power, from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008) 1.

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that they lose sight of the ends. Therefore, pragmatists are cautious, sometimes overcautious, when facing prospects of radical change (they may be suffering from a Burkean complex). They recognise the importance of oil and gas in the real world and see the inevitability of competition, if not conflicts, over access to these and other resources. Pragmatists are often cynical when dealing with issues of international politics, not necessarily because they are cynical by nature, but because such is the character of the subject matter they are dealing with. Now some concluding remarks. Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, in writing about why some developing countries have succeeded in their economic reforms while others have failed (none has succeeded, as he observes, when diligently following IMF and World Bank prescriptions), emphasises that ‘learning from other countries is always useful—indeed it is indispensable. But straightforward borrowing (or rejection) of policies without full understanding of the context that enabled them to be successful (or led them to be failures) is a recipe for disaster.’24 This insightful observation is as true, or maybe even truer, in the case of democratic reforms and promotion of democracy. Democracy, democratic institutions and values are more intimately related to and dependent on history and the culture of a society than economic and financial institutions. Learning, not borrowing, but at the same time not discarding the experience of other societies by self-servingly over-emphasising one’s uniqueness is the best way to proceed. Democratisation is more an art than a science, even if we have in mind only social sciences, which all contain, in different proportions, a degree of artfulness. Today, the issue is not so much whether democracy is, in principle, preferable to other forms of government. The most serious practical as well as theoretical issue in this field is: how to get there, how to transform a non-democratic society into a democratic one? Although a critical attitude towards promotion of democracy is necessary, one should be careful not to ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’. The fact that claims over some rights are made abusively should not mean that these rights or goods thereby become less valuable. Humans have enough intelligence and flexibility not only to confuse and mislead others, but also to differentiate between use and abuse, sincerity and deception.25 For outsiders, to help others promote democracy and human rights, it is necessary not only to be sincere and enthusiastic, but also to have quite a deep knowledge and understanding of other societies, as well as enough humility to be aware of the limits of the positive effect any outside interference may have. In the absence of these conditions, any outside meddling does more ill than good. However, when these conditions are met outsiders may contribute to a spread of democracy that indeed has both intrinsic as well as instrumental value.

24 D Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes. Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007) 4–5. 25 Nicholas Wade opines that religion coevolved with the emergence of language as a safeguard against deception that came possible through the use of language: ‘With the advent of language, freeloaders gained a great weapon, the power to deceive. Religion could have evolved as a means of defence against freeloading’ (N Wade, Before the Dawn. Recovering the Lost History of Our Ancestors (London, The Penguin Press, 2007) 165).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books P Allott, Eunomia (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990). HJ Chang, Bad Samaritans. Rich Nations, Poor Policies & the Threat to the Developing World (New York, Random House Business Books, 2007). A Chua, World on Fire. How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (London, Arrow Books, 2003). J Crawford, Democracy in International Law. Inaugural Lecture (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994). RA Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998). PO Enquist, The Visit of the Royal Physician (New York, Vintage Books, 2003). DS Foglesong, The American Mission and the ‘Evil Empire’ (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007). K Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York, Public Affairs, 2008). K Marx, () Das Kapital. A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, The Process of Capitalist Production (Preface to the First Edition) (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr and Co, 1906). JS Mill, Utilitarianism. On Liberty, Considerations of Representative Government (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1993). K Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume 2 Hegel & Marx (London, Routledge, 1996). K Popper, Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London, Routledge, 1996). D Runciman, Political Hypocrisy. The Mask of Power, from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008). D Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes. Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007). A Ross, and O Espersen, Dansk Statsforfatningsret, 3rd edn (Copenhagen, Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1980). A Sen, The Argumentative Indian. Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity (London, Allen Lane, 2005). N Wade, Before the Dawn. Recovering the Lost History of Our Ancestors (London, The Penguin Press, 2007). Journal Articles T Carothers, ‘How Democracies Emerge: The “Sequence” Fallacy’, (2007) 18 Journal of Democracy 12–27. TM Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 46–91. S Tharoor, E Pluribus, ‘India: Is Indian Modernity Working?’, (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 128–34.

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F Yongping, ‘The Peaceful Transition of Power from the UK to the US’, (2006) 1 The Chinese Journal of International Politics 83–108.

Newspaper Articles A Dworkin, ‘The case for minor utopias’, Prospect (London, July 2001) (a review of J Gray’s Black Mass). TL Friedman, ‘The big question’, The International Herald Tribune (New York, 4–5 March 2006).

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Jurisdictional Colonisation in the Spanish and British Empires: Some Reflections on a Global Public Order and the Sacred MÓNICA GARCÍA-SALMONES * AND LUIS ESLAVA ** INTRODUCTION

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PUBLIC LEGAL order that aspires to be global must involve the possibility of the sacred. The international legal system should thus be open to the sacred if it strives to create order among states in global governance.1 These claims arise from a reflection on international law in which we have tried to move beyond imperialistic conceptions of order and modern fears about the role of religion in international law. Here we examine the relation between religion and international law by applying a genealogical approach to two important legal international projects for ordering the world: one theological, the other humanist. Two imperial stories of universalism, redemption, conquest and conversion are recounted. The first occurred during the initial conquest of the New World, and its main characters are the Spanish Empire and the indigenous people of South America. The second story concerns the British Empire and European colonisation in North America. The aim of this article is to sketch some similarities, differences and lessons of the expansion of British and Spanish jurisdictions into the New World. While both these imperial projects relied on the deployment of their law throughout the Americas, the manner in which the exogenous law became implanted in the reality of the new lands and subjects was quite different, due to struggles between the divine and the terrestrial aspects of international governance in contemporary European political thought. Imperial authorities have always used law and space to establish power in a new land: new understandings of the nature of law that were formulated during the rise of modernity crucially affected the manner in which law was applied in the concrete spaces of colonisation and articulated in the daily life of * PhD Candidate, Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, The University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law. ** PhD Candidate, Institute for International Law and the Humanities, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Law School. 1 Since it is true that religion has no monopoly over ethics or morals, the sacred refers here to the most purely religious categories with no other equivalent in the secular world. See JHH Weiler, ‘La tradición judeo-cristiana entre fe y libertad’ in J Ratzinger et al, Dios salve la razón (Madrid, Ediciones Encuentro, 2008) 191. For other philosophical and moral teachings about world order, see for example, FT Chen, ‘The Confucian View of World Order’ in MW Janis and C Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (The Hague, Nijhoff, 2008).

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imperial subjects. In the Spanish Empire, order was produced through law founded in religious belief; for the British Empire, order was derived from the new liberal law of modernity. The decline of the Spanish Empire and the emergence of its British counterpart mark the transition between these two conceptions of law. As the Spanish Empire’s power and its theocentric interpretation of international law receded, the remaining competing jurisdictional systems—the British Empire and the Westphalian state system—responded with a secular conceptualisation of law and politics. Our current conception of international law is the legacy of a resistance by European leaders to conceive of a sovereignty that would not incorporate spiritual sovereignty.2 There is a certain parallel between the Westphalian moment at the beginning of modernity and the nascent era of global governance. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the scope of activities performed by empires and states had expanded profoundly, not only because of newly discovered territories and peoples, but also because recent acquisition of theological jurisdictions had brought forth substantive and transcendental matters that the theological encompassed. The key question at the beginning of modernity was how to impose a universal order on the relations between distinct territorial units, states and other international actors at a time when the universal language of Rome and its juridical apparatus were no longer valid. Arguably, it was the very posing of this question that inaugurated modernity, and the international legal system continues to be shaped by its structure and implications.3 Therefore, the enquiry and search for an order in international law (both in practice and theory) is as urgent as when it was first formulated.4 Current legal theorists have questioned classical positions on the question of public order, and claim that international law is intrinsically indeterminate.5 Other theorists regard classic international law as a type of basic constitution, since it supports a legal community of formally equal partners. Here the force of the normative self-understanding of modernity provides the foundation of a procedural constitution that promises order amongst de facto unequal sovereigns.6 A third line of inquiry has focused on how international law consolidates the status quo and

2 On the key position of the spiritual sovereignty in the negotiations of Münster for both the United Provinces and Spain, see generally, LM Baena, ‘Negotiating Sovereignty: the Peace Treaty of Münster, 1648’ (2008) 28 History of Political Thought 617. 3 cf S Felman, Jacques Lacan and the adventure of Insight (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1987) 103. 4 See especially, R Wolfrum and V Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law (Heidelberg, Springer, 2008). 5 M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006). For the fact that Koskenniemi’s book has often been cited but rarely challenged, see D Kennedy, ‘The Last Treatise: Project and Person. (Reflections on Martti Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia)’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal, 982. See also, M Garcia-Salmones, ‘The Ethos of the Rule of Law in the International Legal Discourse: Portrait of an Outsider’ (2008)10 International Community Law Review 29. 6 J Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2004) 131, 148, 192; B Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 599.

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thus perpetuates injustice, rather than promoting an emancipatory internationalism. On this view, a fair international order requires the return to international relations structured by national law and national interests.7 Since Cold War tensions have eased, the simple hard secular view of international law has been shown to be insufficient to address these critiques, and many theorists have demonstrated a new sensibility towards the ethical and the religious.8 This has been interpreted as a sign of a loss of faith in the secular project of modernity.9 The question of political agency has become a key issue in the future of international law, taking precedence over other problems such as the economic structure, the weight of history, the cultural origins and the power of the state.10 Moving beyond the positive legal materials, it is argued, international law must confront the political question in order to cope with present challenges. Nevertheless, international law as such seems to be endemically ambivalent, between universalism and empire. The duck-rabbit model of international law has been proposed as a way of capturing the sense in which international law contributes to a genuine desire in the powerful to avoid conflict and injustice.11 Finally, in an era of global governance, there is a need to rethink notions of democracy so that they might be meaningfully employed in the international legal system. Critical thought is most attuned to the legitimacy of international law when it is expected to establish a terrain between pure normativity and the pure politics of the powerful.12 This paper shares concerns about a de-territorialised international law with capacity to outlaw the powerless—a version of international law that resembles past imperial practices. We wish to interrogate this legal structure and in doing so take seriously the role played by colonial history in the formation of international law.13 The outstanding problems and critiques of international law have motivated us to transplant our reflections on global order in late modernity to the era of colonisation in South and North America through the Spanish imperial cities of God and the British rational jurisdictions. In the following two sections, we dissect the complexity of the public orders of the British and Spanish Empires with the purpose of making their imperial legal attributes visible. Following a review of

7 Wolfrum categorises this position as voicing Schmittian ideas. See R Wolfrum, ‘Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory Considerations’ in Wolfrum and Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law (n 4) 3; C Schmitt, Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes (Berlin, F Dümmler, 1926). 8 See especially, D Kennedy, ‘Losing Faith in the Secular: Law, Religion, and the Culture of International Governance’ in MW Janis and C Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1999) 311, 312. 9 ibid 316. 10 B Rajagopal, ‘Martti Koskenniemi’s “From Apology to Utopia: A Reflection”’ (2006) 7 German Journal of International Law, 1089, 1090. 11 For a similar use of this image in a legal issue see A Cockrell, ‘The South African Bill of Rights and the “Duck/Rabbit”’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 513. See especially the image of the duck-rabbit in L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Blackwell, 1978 [1953]) 194. See also, E Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International Law?’ (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 379. 12 JHH Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’ (2004) 64 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 547, 552. 13 R Falk, B Rajagopal, and J Stevens, ‘Introduction’ in R Falk, B Rajagopal and J Stevens (eds), International Law and the Third World (London, Routledge-Cavendish, 2008).

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the theological grounds that sustained the Spanish imperial project, we examine how the rise of the British Empire in the seventeenth century involved a complex matrix of theological, legal and political transformations. Several conceptual shifts that occurred during this process indelibly coloured the meaning of key notions such as sovereignty and common law, and revised the nature assigned to imperial subjects. The importation and violent application of the two European legal orders, with no previous topos in the new territories, required a conversion of new imperial subjects. Although the religious aspect of the British conquest has been largely glossed over, the Spanish and British imperial projects display a striking similarity in this regard.14 In particular, we consider the ways in which a secular order may become quasi-religious when it requires total allegiance of its subjects. In the final section, we reflect upon current visions of global public order, using insights drawn from our analysis of the Spanish and British imperial projects. These two legal histories of colonisation focus our attention on the role of the sacred in international law and global order.

THE IMPERIAL CITIES OF GOD

Inscribing the Spanish Empire in Land Unlike the era of settlement by British dissenters in the seventeenth century and its reliance on liberal interpretations of law and order, the nature of government, religion, and social relations appeared uncontroversial during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. After the Moors’ surrender on the Iberian Peninsula in 1492, the Spanish extended their Christianisation programme to the New World, with absolute certainty of the social propriety of their ways and the religious righteousness that justified their goals and means.15 The Catholic monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, conjoined Christianity and Spanish civilisation into a seamless cultural-moral complex that defined all political, religious or cultural alternatives as heretical and odious. Empire-building and social governance were pragmatic extensions of the eschatological narratives of Catholicism. This unity of sovereignty, governance and religion placed particular emphasis on the role of founding cities during colonisation. Cities were the administrative centres of the colony, the reproducers of capital, the seat of ecclesiastical power, and the space for all cultural activities: where education was received, history was written, and humanity advanced. In founding satellite cities, the major secular and theological foundations of the Spanish colonial enterprise came together:

14 For a summary of historiographical traditions of the British Empire, see A Webster, The Debate on the Rise of the British Empire (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2006). 15 MD Szuchman, ‘The City as Vision–The Development of Urban Culture in Latin America’ in GM Joseph and MD Szuchman (eds), I Saw a City Invincible: Urban Portraits of Latin America – Jaguar Books on Latin America 9 (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 1996) 2.

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humanism, Catholicism and a revitalised notion of jus gentium.16 Cities were ideal spaces for the sacred and the human to enter in a perpetual communion. In the foundation and planning of new cities, the Spanish imagination was thrilled by the encounter between divine and civil jurisdictions. Spatial explicitness rather than subtlety was the key mode of this project. The ordering of space according to law enabled an explicit coordination of the experience of being a subject. For both indigenous and European subjects, placement within or around jurisdictional urban clusters materialised their location in the Empire’s diagrammatic of power abroad and their positioning in a transcendental order that aimed to approach the sacred. In a pragmatic reading of Augustine’s topographic taxonomy of the world, Spanish colonisers realised that the city of man differed to the city of God.17 Despite Christianity’s designation as the official religion of the Spanish Empire, and the Church as the heart of the city of God, Augustine declared in De Civitate Dei that its message was spiritual rather than political. Christianity, Augustine argued, should be concerned with the mystical, heavenly City of Jerusalem (the New Jerusalem), rather than with Earthly politics. The city of man was therefore a platform for crafting the self in order to gain access to the city of God. On this view, the city of man should follow a ‘natural order’. Following this interpretation, the Spanish Empire sought to organise their cities according to ‘nature’, and thus connect Christian subjects (both conquerors and conquered) with a sense of proportion, which itself culminated in understanding the proportions of the greatest work of art: the godlike human body. This cosmology viewed all matter, including people, within a linear and hierarchical world—an order that should be reflected in the order of cities. In 1573, King Phillip II of Spain crystallised the natural/organic view of urban affairs and its role in the construction of the Spanish Empire in the Ordinances for the Discovery, New Settlement, and Pacification of the Indies (the Ordinances).18 The Ordinances are a paradigmatic piece of urban legislation in which it is possible to read how the Spanish Empire guided the foundation, construction, indoctrination and administration of its colonial communities.19 While the earliest voyages of 16 RM Morse, ‘Introducción a la Historia Urbana de Hispanoamérica’ in F Solano (coordinator), Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo,1983) 17. 17 St Augustine and J Healey (translator) The City of God (London, Dent, 1931). 18 The norms on urban foundation and planning were part of the Ordenanzas de Descubrimientos y Nueva Población y Pacificación de la Indias (1573). These are divided into 148 chapters: the first 31 chapters were dedicated to the discoveries, chapters 32 to 137 dedicated to new populations, and chapters 137 to 148 to the pacification of the Indies. Later in the colony, they were included in Titles V, VI, VII, VIII and XII of Book IV of the ‘Recopilación de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias’ (first published in 1681). See G Guarda, ‘Tres reflexiones en torno a la fundación de la ciudad indiana’ in F Solano (ed), Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo,1983) 89–96; and JE Hardoy, ‘La Forma de las Ciudades Coloniales en la América Española’ in F Solano (ed), Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1983) 318; J Kinsbruner, The Colonial Spanish-American City: Urban Life in the Age of Atlantic Capitalism (Austin, University of Texas Press, 2005). 19 Previous and subsequent legislation included the 1523 Charter by Charles V, and the Recopilación de las Leyes de las Indias (1680). However, the Ordenanzas de Descubrimiento y Población of 1537 is

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conquest to the Americas were marked by savagery, by the time of King Phillip’s Ordinances the official response was to adopt a soft yet combative adjudication of the New World and its people that fulfilled pragmatic and celestial requests—a combination that profoundly informs the Renaissance understanding of jus gentium. By 1573, the Italian Renaissance had taken hold in Spain, and Spanish humanists and royal advisers had become familiar with Roman urban organisations through the translation of Vitruvius’ De Architectura (translated into Spanish as Medidas del Romano).20 A normative approach to imperial expansion (grounded in the new interpretation of jus gentium) was thus married to a more technical concern with the role of spatial distribution in human affairs. Moreover, while the new norms allowed the conquerors to acquire effective material possession of colonial territories, they also resembled Aquinas’ prescriptions for the ideal King.21 According to Aquinas, the city was the natural vehicle for the fulfilment of Christian ideals, due to the possibility of mastering the self through the mutual dependence, intellectual and common surveillance proper to city life.22 Following Aristotle, Aquinas envisaged the city as the measure of one’s morality. Therefore, the King should be engaged in a constant mission to urbanise the world of man: founding a town was the royal equivalent of the creation of the world.23 Although his power could only be realised at the material level of the subjects, the King was a terrestrial juncture in a power relationship that extended far beyond human existence. In the Spanish imperial project, the definitive differentiation between the sacred and the secular that would come to characterise the British colonisation of North America and mark the emergence of a modern international law was a rhetorical partnership that allowed the conqueror to intervene in the world in order to achieve transcendence. The metaphysical dimensions of space and governance were intentionally made indistinguishable in order to achieve sovereign presence across the new lands and subjects. Importantly, the sovereign presence aimed to permeate the mundane and sacred dimensions of daily life.

still the most cited normative document in which Spanish planning ideas are found. See for a critical review of normative sources of colonial Spanish town planning in America, R Martínez Lemoine, ‘The classical model of the Spanish-American colonial city’ in J Madge and A Peckham (eds), Narrating Architecture: A retrospective anthology (London, Routledge, 2006). 20 The ordinances were inspired by the classical Roman treatise of Vitruvius De architectura, which was rediscovered by the Florentine humanist Poggio Bracciolini in 1414. The first known edition of Vitruvius was in Rome by Fra Giovanni Sulpitius in 1486. Translations followed in Italian (1521), French (1547), English, German (1543) and Spanish (1526) and several other languages. The Latin edition of Vitruvius’ book, published in 1582 was dedicated to Phillip II. See S Kostof, The City Shaped: Urban Patterns and Meaning Through History (New York, Bulfinch Press, 1991) 115. 21 Kostof, The City Shaped (n 20) 108–11. 22 T Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, discussed in RM Morse, ‘Introducción a la Historia Urbana de Hispanoamérica’ in F Solano (coordinator), Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1983) 10–53. 23 Kostof, The City Shaped (n 20) 111.

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Marking and circumscribing the sovereign presence The material nature of the city was regarded as a suitable instrument to discipline subjects through spatial positioning. Phillip II’s Ordinances were issued as part of the Crown’s desire to institute a systematic sovereign presence and transcendental authority in the Empire. It was a normative effort to make the colonial enterprise an intelligent carrier of a sovereign spatial economy. In this context, a ‘sovereign spatial economy’ conveys the sense in which a local jurisdiction acts as a spatial configuration of power, an instrument that expands and contracts in response to its capacity to develop individual subjects and their subjectivities. As such, the Ordinances articulated planning technologies as a pedagogical practice, while theological belief operated as the grounding narrative to approach space and subjects. An example of the triangulation between theological convictions, control of physical space and instruction of new imperial subjects can be delineated in the foundation of cities by the Spanish Empire, during which the performance of liturgical ceremonies materialised the divine and secular forces in the chosen site for a new city. Bogotá, for instance, was founded twice because legal prescriptions were omitted in the initial founding ceremony. Even though Jimenéz de Quesada, widely remembered as the city’s founder, established 12 huts on the site of present-day Bogotá in commemoration of the Apostles, and offered the city to the Lord on 6 August 1538, the legally recognised ritual was not completed until 29 April 1539.24 Here the formality of law ensured the teleological function of both space and subjects. The process of sovereign deployment through urban planning, and the relationship between these and the manifestation of the sacred in the everyday life of imperial subjects, may also be perceived in the selection and circumscription of land urban settlement, and the subsequent distribution of property rights. Ordering to possess and the localisation of subjects according to colonial rights and obligations were one of the fundamental roles of urban planning. The colonial purpose fostered through the Ordinances was not to dominate the land, nor to convert natives immediately to Christianity. Pacification by Catholic missionaries would ultimately complete the task of discovery and conquest initiated by urban planners.25 The purpose of planning was to arrange space in a way that Christianisation and its cosmological imaginary were visible on the landscape, a configuration that would be later confirmed in the interior self of the imperial subjects. There are many examples of how the process of selection, circumscription and distribution of land functioned, but here we would only like to mention the criteria that guided the process of land selection. According to the Ordinances, new cities 24 R Londoño, ‘En las nubes de Bogotá’ (2006) www.bogotacomovamos.org/scripts/ contenido.php?idCnt=1. See also, D Ramos Pérez, ‘La Doble Fundación de Ciudades y las “Huestes”’ in F Solano (ed), Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1983) 131–38; M Lucena Salmoral, ‘Bogotá y las tres Huestes: Estudio comparativo del reparto de oficios concejiles y encomiendas’ in F Solano (ed), Estudios sobre la ciudad Iberoamericana (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1983) 139. 25 See especially; MM del Vas Mingo, ‘Las Ordenanzas de 1573, sus antecedentes y consecuencias’ (1985) 8 Quinto Centenario 83–101.

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were to be founded next to indigenous towns, ‘populated by Indians and natives to whom we can preach the Gospels since this is the principal objective for which we mandate that these discoveries and settlements be made.’26 As noted above, the initial act of possession was formalised by the deployment of legal formulae in which a transcendental experience was married to an urban planning rationale that defined the urban space as Spanish in opposition to an indigenous fringe. The indigenous did not come initially to the colonial town; the colonial town came to the indigenous. The positioning of indigenous as cartographic outsiders was complemented by instruction in commerce and the distribution of urban land property. The distribution of land was straightforward: as the indigenous population were physically outside the city’s limits, they were excluded from the city’s internal distribution of property rights. Following the Roman use of the grid as the official urban order, the Ordinances specified a square central plaza where the main authorities were to be situated. The rest of the city’s chessboard was distributed according to social and religious importance, and citizens were permitted rural possessions in the same order and proportion to their properties in the city. The indigenous, from the point of view of the coloniser, were outside the city’s geography, and were thus both topographically and semantically the other, an object for instruction and exploitation. Forced labour was in this manner also organised around this relocation. During the first century of the colony, indigenous people were required to pay tributes in urban, rural, or mining form,27 which were enforceable due to the proximity of indigenous settlements to the cities. The spatial relationship between the city and the indigenous population obscured the original indigenous ownership of the land and made their place in the colonial economic structure explicit. Even as the indigenous people of South American became outsiders in their own land, they occupied a key role in the political economy of the colonial city. Indigenous bodies were understood to be capable of labour and silent carriers of God’s voice. As a result, the initial command of the Ordinances was pragmatic, yet also visionary. According to Article 5, conquerors were to ‘[l]ook carefully at the places and ports where it might be possible to build Spanish settlements without damage to the Indian population’,28 and if there was an unexpected encounter with natives, they should always use commerce and ransom, instead of combative preaching. Commerce and ransom were supposed to be intelligible to the Indians; the gospel, on the other hand, had to be administered once the indigenous body was immersed in the early capitalist system of the Empire. The revelation of the sacred in the Empire’s order was only achievable through the incremental cancellation of 26 A Mundigo and D Crouch (translators), ‘Ordinance for New Discoveries, Conquests and Pacifications’ (1573) Chapter 36; reprinted by The New City with permission from ‘The City Planning Ordinances of the Laws of the Indies Revisited, I’ (1977) 48 Town Planning Review 247–68, The University of Miami, School of Architecture www.arc.miami.edu/Law%20of%20Indies.html. 27 The indigenous forced labour was divided into rural work, mining work and urban work. In 1657, the required urban tribute amounted to one month every two years, mining to one year every three years, and term of rural work was between six months to one year every three years. See Pedro F Simón, Noticias Historiales de la Tierra Firme en las Indias Occidentales (Bogotá, Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1982). 28 Mundigo and Crouch, ‘Ordinance for New Discoveries, Conquests and Pacifications’ (n 26).

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the indigenous body and territory, which in turn required the reconfiguration of space and instruction in the normative premises of Spanish imperial law. The Ordinances, epitomising these laws, operated under the central tension of the Spanish colonial enterprise: how to ensure the Empire’s presence in the New World, how to guarantee a sufficient labour force for the colonial economy, and, at the same time, how to protect and Christianise the native population.

Cultivation of Subjectivities, the City, and the Emergent International Law The corporeality of the imperial subject (both indigenous and coloniser) and her subjectivity occupied the whole mind of the planner. The individual was a subject of the monarch not only because of her physical presence within the kingdom; she was also, and primarily, a subject of the monarch due to that inner space in which the natural symmetry between the monarch and God was identified and made real within the city. All the city’s inhabitants lived under this redeeming logic, and they were all the potential subjects of salvation. Here it is possible to see how the almost-human yet flawed nature of the indigenous subject, as theorised by Francisco de Vitoria, was accommodated into the urban order. The city was the place in which indigenous culture, its ideas of property and governance, was realigned with the Empire’s order—the embodiment of a universal natural law. Following Anghie’s critical reading of Vitoria, the indigenous personality was conceived along two axes by the Spanish Empire:29 ‘First, the Indians belong to the universal realm as do the Spanish and all other humans beings because … they have the facility of reason and hence a means of ascertaining jus gentium which is universally binding.’30 However, in Vitoria’s reading of the New World, ‘the Indian [is] very different from the Spanish because the Indian’s specific social and cultural practices are at variance with the practices [the normative foundations of jus gentium] which are applicable to both Indian and Spaniard.’31 In other words, focusing on the cultural practices of each society and assessing them in terms of the universal jus gentium, Vitoria demonstrated ‘that the Indians are in violation of universal natural law. Indians are included within the system only to be disciplined’ and to ‘save the Indians from themselves.’32 Jus gentium, the natural law that was supposed to regulate the relations between sovereigns and the recognition of reason in all human beings motivated the development of urban practices that would close the inconvenient cultural gap between the indigenous and Spanish populations of colonial cities. Phillip II’s pragmatic use of urban development law emulated Vitoria’s pragmatic take on jus gentium. Establishing an urban order based on the assumption that both indigenous and colonisers were ordered by a natural/sacred schema, Phillip II’s Ordinances reintroduced divine law in the governance of colonised territory as a technical 29 A Anghie, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law’ (1996) 5 Social & Legal Studies 321. 30 ibid 327. 31 ibid. 32 ibid 331.

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matter. The form of this reintroduction was, as Phillip II realised, more durable and effective than any kind of combative preaching. It was the promotion of a divine order through secular activities such as settling, travelling and trading. Following the foundation of a colonial city, urban planners aspired to synchronise the city with an ideal space in which subjects were industrious and politically compliant. Territory and inhabitants, land and human flesh, were the raw materials in the project to propel each city and its citizens towards the idealised space where the sovereign signalled. This space might even be described as Utopia, a politically commanding concept that means non-space but has nonetheless served as the transactional spatial totem around which the monopoly of violence is exercised. Utopia recreates, according to this argument, a sacred meta-space that fulfilled the application of authority with transcendence, salvation and development. The symbolic energies that lie behind the city were thus a symptom of a grand redeeming project of ‘bringing the marginalised into the realm of sovereignty, civilising the uncivilised and developing the juridical techniques and institutions necessary for this mission.’33 Characteristic of this early encounter between the nascent disciplines of international law and urban planning law is the existence of another, the indigenous, who requires the protection of a transnational sacred order. THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE’S SOVEREIGNTY: FROM PROVINCIAL LOCALISM TO EMPIRE

The Rule of Law in the Empire: Moving away from Theological Foundations In spite of the wilderness of the new spaces and the foreignness of the new cultures that they encountered, common law accompanied the British colonists on their journeys abroad. Common law offered the colonists protection and comfort, insofar as it was able to reproduce home without bringing the anxieties left behind. The colonists’ identity was, to a large extent, preserved by the guarantees of the rights and liberties of an Englishmen before the common law. Initially, the government of the colonies was founded on the basis and traditions of a common law territorial jurisdiction: this was a selective law that did not create legal spaces, but followed British citizens wherever they were. That the Empire was carried within the coloniser’s body had clear repercussions for the indigenous people encountered by the British, who were thus radically excluded from British legal and political institutions. The diagrammatic of power of the British Empire operated, in principle, in the subject’s conception of himself, i.e. in the internal space that made him subject to the common law. The province of New York, captured from the Dutch in 1664, provides an instructive example of how the British dominated their colonies in the North and defended them against competing European interests. The struggle for sovereignty between King and Parliament in England meant that the sovereign presence receded 33

ibid 333.

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into the background of the British management of colonial affairs. For a long period, the province of New York was thus allowed to remain provincial. This came to an end with the rise of the sovereignty of the British Empire (c 1688–1750), which was marked by a renewed universalism and a deliberate attempt to withdraw matters of interest to the metropolis, such as trade and security, away from local governments.34 Importantly, however, both the local and imperial models of British territorial administration lacked the ideal of the transcendental that characterised the Spanish imperial expansion in the South. In the imperial framework, the story of the provinces in the North concerns trade, European settlers, land grants, common law, the new rule of law and, finally, the way in which virtual imperial legislation stood hopelessly for the sovereignty of the British Empire in those territories. The juridical basis and external justification for the British Empire were a matter of argumentation and study among legal philosophers and politicians of the time. Agricultural arguments given in the seventeenth century were considered sufficient to justify the British dominium over the colonies,35 although they would not satisfy the justification of the imperium, with its distinctive system of public law and government.36 Due to its own rejection of the Pope’s authority to attribute to the Spanish Crown dominion over the New World—‘the gift of the empire’, as Hobbes called it—the British Empire realised that it would soon be ensnared by the same criticisms being levelled at the Spanish colonial expansion.37 When the Spanish Crown’s arguments for America’s colonisation were called into question even by Spanish subjects,38 the Protestant kings promptly took up and reformulated the discussion about the legality and legitimacy of colonial enterprises.39 The British desire to avoid the controversy surrounding Spanish colonisation is exemplified in a conciliatory debate of the Council of the Virginia Company in 1607–08, on the need to document the Company’s activities to reassure investors. According to the decision, it was more dangerous than not to produce such a report. One of the members of Company present at the Council summarised the recent experience of the Spanish Empire:

34 See generally, RN Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs’ (1989) 69 Boston University Law Review 329. 35 J Tully, ‘Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground’ (1994) 11 Social Philosophy & Policy 153. 36 D Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) 98. 37 T Hobbes, Behemoth or The Long Parliament (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990) 12. 38 The changing sequence of legislation and of language in Spain during the 16th century is attributed to a large extent to a perceived lack of legitimacy in the colonial expansion. See especially, J Medina Rivaud, ‘La invención de la ciudad Americana: Convenio entre la realidad y la imaginación. Lectura yuxtapuesta’ in IM Zavala (ed), Discursos sobre la “invención de América” (Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1992). Rivaud cites as an example a well-known text of the beginning of the colonisation by ‘el pedra Hontesions’: ‘With which right have you started an atrocious war against those peoples who lived peacefully in their terrritories? You killed them each day when you want them to bring their gold to you; and what is your care to instruct them in our religion? Are they not men? Do they not have reason, soul? Should you not love them as yourselves? Be sure that under the present conditions you do not have more possibilities of salvation than a Turk or a Moor’, 283. (translation by the authors). 39 Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (n 36) 94.

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When after 50 years his fryars [of the Spanish Crown] declyn’d him from that sever and unjust course and he labourd by men of all learning to provide himselfe of a more acceptable title, all y[e] reasons, which were prepared to him, by men of discourse, from y[e] Indians transgressing y[e] Law of Nature; from his Civilians for their denying commerce: from his Canonists by y[e] Donation: and from his Devines, by propagation of religion … can be gathered for him no title, of Dominions or Property, but only a Magistracy, and Empiry, by which he is allowed to remove such impediments, as they had against y[e]) knowledge of Religion.40

Despite their strong desire to avoid global censure of their colonial expansion, the British anxiously sought meaning and a constitution for their empire. By 1573, the Spanish had stopped using the term ‘conquest’ in the official language of imperial politics. In his Ordinances, Philip II presented the legal basis for colonisation and attempted to rationalise the imperial expansion, drawing on solutions offered by lawyers and theologians of the day. The primary aim of Spanish colonisation after 1573 was to found as many territorial asentamientos as possible. According to the text of the Ordinances, neither commerce nor conquest would be a priority for the Spanish Empire in the American colonies.41 Spatial presence, and the civility involved in the materialisation of this performance, became the public policy of the Empire. On paper, at least, the plan for the Spanish Empire was therefore clear: secular and theological aspirations were to be merged in the foundation of asentamientos and their pedagogical rationale. By contrast, the grounds of the British Empire were founded in Protestantism, and its commitments against the principle of medieval dualism of Church and government, and in commerce.42 The geographical spatiality of the British Empire and its physical materialisation were downplayed in order to condense the Empire’s presence in the identity of its subjects.

Englishmen in the Provinces and Later Ethnocentric Geo-Legal Spaces The British Empire bestowed its colonists in North America with one of the few certainties that had survived the tumultuous seventeenth century in Britain: the common law. While the colonists thus enjoyed the traditional rights and liberties of Englishmen, the British colonial enterprise lacked a uniform imperial design or public policy. Without a public policy, neither the British colonists, nor the Native Americans that they encountered, were capable of making transactions of this precious good.43 In particular, the status of indigenous people was described in the

40 DB Quinn ‘Reasons against the publishinge of the Kinges title to Virginia’ in DB Quinn (ed) New American World: A Documentary History of North America to 1612 (New York, Arno Press, 1979). Vol III 418–19; quoted by Armitage, (n 36) 93. 41 MM del Vas Mingo, ‘Las Ordenanzas de 1573, sus antecendentes y consecuencias’ (n 25) 84−94. 42 Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (n 36) 98. 43 To the high value attached by the colonists to common law, see generally DJ Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire. New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1644–1830 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press and American Society for Legal History, 2005) 104.

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colonial laws in different ways, since they were not automatically considered to fall under British sovereignty. According to Mark D Walters, friendly Indian nations were described as ‘being at “peace” or in “amity” with, “tributary” to, “allied” to, under the “protection” of, or “subjected” to particular colonial governments’. They were ‘either subjects of the Crown or alien friends’. Other Indian nations were termed ‘“strange,” “foreign,” or “remote,” or as enemies’.44 The structure of a typical North American province was based on an ancient system of territorial jurisdiction, the county palatine, with a proprietor as ‘the true Lord’ of the land.45 The particularities of the territory, density and heterogeneity of population shaped the peculiar features of the transplantation of common law. For instance, when the English arrived to New York, the original Dutch population was promised that they would be allowed to maintain their legal relations as they were at the moment of the conquest. A peculiar mixture of legal traditions emerged. When colonists invoked common law, they referred to a selection of British rights and liberties that suited their particular situation and to which they felt entitled.46 Empire was a subjective experience of rational membership, activated through the invocation of the common law. The spatial fragility of the British presence was thus compensated by the requirement for a colonist’s strategic self-recognition as a subject of the incoming British Empire. A liberal conception of imperial presence at the individual level became the conduit of the Empire in the overseas colonies. After the Calvin case, it was clear that only the English and Scots could have access to the protection of English jurisdictional courts.47 However, Hulsebosch cites a Member of Parliament concerned by the implications of the Calvin case: … it might give a dangerous example for mutual naturalizing of all nations that hereafter fall into the subjection of the king, although very remote, in that their mutual commonalty of privileges may disorder the settled government of every of the particulars.48

At this early stage, England used common law principles to protect herself from the cultural and political uniformity of a virtual empire that was physically remote and

44 MD Walters, ‘Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and Government in British North America’ (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 785, 793. 45 The British Crown employed two agencies in the work of colonisation: the corporation and the proprietor. See generally, HL Osgood, ‘The Proprietary Province as a Form of Colonial Government’ Part I (1897) 2 American Historical Review 644. HL Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (New York, Columbia University Press, 1904) Volume II Part III Chapter VI; HL Osgood, ‘The Corporation as a Form of Colonial Government’ (1896) 11 Political Science Quarterly 259. 46 They could not, however, invoke a precedent that was non-existent in the province. See for instance, E Moglen, ‘Settling the Law. Legal Development in Provincial New York’ (unpublished dissertation, 1998) http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/stl 19. 47 Robert Calvin, a Scot born after the accession of James to the English throne, sued for the recovery of land in England that he claimed to have inherited. The decision held that those Scots born after James became King of England were not aliens, despite the fact that they were not under the authority of English Parliament and they lived under separate law in Scotland. On the important consequences of the Calvin case for the colonies, see especially, B Black, ‘The Constitution of Empire: the Case for the Colonists’ (1976) 124 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1157. 48 DJ Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire. New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1644–1830 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press and American Society for Legal History, 2005) 21.

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detached from English traditions. Conversely, there was also a generally accepted ‘jurisdictional conception of law’ in the provinces, such that a New Yorker was always entitled to a local legal forum. Overseas common law constitutionalism offered further means for establishing a protected legal space, a defence against invasive legislation of the British Parliament.49 In contrast to Spanish colonisation of the South, the British did not aim to create legal geographical spaces as such. Nevertheless, both the British Empire and its colonies were ethnocentric in their aspirations.50 For example, the British Empire only intervened in legal or political conflicts with the Native Americans when they involved a British subject. There were exceptions to the legal exclusion of indigenous people. The Mohegan case originated in a dispute over land between the province of Connecticut and the Mohegan Indians. In 1704, through their English ‘guardians’, the Mohegan Indians petitioned the Crown that certain transactions regarding their land had been made illegally. In its defence, the province of Connecticut claimed that the Native Americans were subject to colonial law and colonial courts.51 The Crown established in this case a Royal Commission to decide over the dispute. For the Royal Commissioner, the Natives were a distinct people, thus subject to the law of nature and the law of nations. The hearing of such international disputes fell under the jurisdiction of Royal Commissions, and not of local courts.52 Evidently the solution on this particular question determined the extension of the autonomy of the provinces and therefore, neither the Crown nor the colonies wanted to deliver their legal position on it. Under common law, the King had the dominium of the land, and as such controlled every purchase of land from the Natives through the governors.53 This was particularly striking because, properly speaking, not only the territory belonged to the Native Americans, but culturally they belonged to the territory, and the

49

ibid 36. Clinton speaks of ‘the characteristic ethnocentric British failure to understand Indian political and legal structures’; although the British did not seek to govern the political structure of the Aboriginal people, ‘they nevertheless profoundly affected Indian life through trade and diplomacy’: Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 363. 51 In 1640 the Mohegan chiefs ceded to English settlers all their lands except a reserve for farming and hunting. In 1659 they ceded to Major John Mason the reserved land and his heirs in trust for the whole Mohegan tribe ‘as their Protector and Guard’. The next year Mason transferred the lands to the colonial government under the condition that it would reserve sufficient land to the Mohegan when open to settlement. The Mohegan claimed that the transaction was invalid because they had not participated in it. During almost a century, in successive appeals to the Crown the Mohegan and Mason’s heirs claimed that the latter held the reserved land in trust for Mohegan use. In 1705 the Crown through an appointed commission invalidated the transaction. After appeal by the colony in 1743, a commission of review overturned the decision of 1705. The Mohegan Indians appealed this decision to the Privy Council. In 1772, without written reasons the Privy Council reported to the Crown that the decision of 1743 be affirmed. In 1773 the Crown confirmed the decision of the Privy Council. See MD Walters, ‘Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and Government in British North America’ (n 44) 803−805. 52 Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 336. 53 DJ Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire. New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1644–1830 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press and American Society for Legal History, 2005). 50

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jurisdiction over it was and is held in trust by the chiefs.54 Despite ‘the strong self-interest of colonial government’, British law increasingly sought to assure the Native Americans of a continued right of occupancy of their lands.55 With the French in the north and west, and to a lesser extent the Spanish in the south, competing for trade, land and influence over the Native Americans, the security of the Empire—as reports of the Board of Trade show—was decisive in later efforts to protect Native Americans and to establish a uniform policy in relation to them.56 Aggressive settlers in the marshland were always on the verge of offending and violating the rights of the Native Americans, opposing the interests of the Native Americans and the Empire. Thus the delicate question of the legality of land grants or de facto settlements also divided the Empire and the provincials. The British in the metropolis were willing to acknowledge a de facto control of parcel and purchase of land by the Native Americans. The pace of settlement, much to the displeasure of the provincials, was thus determined by the geopolitics of the Empire.57 Following 150 years of British colonial experience in North America, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 established a boundary line ‘for the present’—that is, without prejudice for future unilateral changes—dividing the territories of Native Americans and the European Colonies. It was the first legal demarcation of the British exclusive settlement and of domains reserved exclusively for the occupancy of the western Native American tribes.58 These were now geographical legal spaces. But they retained their ethnocentric character: the geo-legal space created by the British, in which the Natives were cartographic outsiders, was to be governed by the imperial rule of law. The Native Americans were permitted certain selfgovernment within their temporal spaces, although the Crown contemplated the possibility of imperial agents living among them.59 The possibility of controlling the Native Americans from the inside was essential for the security of the Empire. However, the colonists did not respect the segregated spaces of the indigenous tribes and the Empire, and the Empire—concerned with other immediate interests than the Indigenous affairs after the peace with France—did not pursue an effective implementation of the Royal Proclamation.60 In less than 15 years, the War of Independence had begun.

54

J Tully, ‘Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground’ (n 35) 164. Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 331. In view of the dispute with France over control of trade with the Five Nations Iroquois Confederation, the Board of Trade reported to the Queen in 1709 that ‘it is absolutely necessary for the security of the Province of New York, and the rest of your Majesty’s Dominions in that part of America that the five Nations of Indians be preserved and maintained in their subjection to the Crown of Great Britain as formerly.’ Quoted by Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 337. 57 Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire (n 53) 100–101. 58 Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 356. 59 At different moments this was proposed by the imperial agents in the province of New York, for example by William Johnson, and contemplated by the Board of Trade in a report to the Crown in 1764; see Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763’ (n 34) 353, 358–59. 60 ibid 360. 55 56

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Who Is Sovereign? The Re-Design of an Imperial Order and the Dawn of Modernity in the British Realm The incoherent origins of the British Empire’s presence in North America were a reflection of England’s internal political strife. This was fuelled by the existence of two conflicting official versions of the constitutional theory of the British Empire: on the one hand, assertions of royal prerogative and, on the other, sovereign claims by the Parliament. Within the British Realm, the royal prerogative was evidently limited after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. However, this did not prevent the king from issuing royal proclamations for the colonies until the very last days before the revolution in North America (1775). Consciousness of a parliamentary sovereignty in the realm gradually increased during the eighteenth century. This was evident once the Crown became dependent on Parliament for its financial and military resources, prompting Parliament to exercise its rights to make law for the colonies.61 But whether the law was presented as royal or parliamentary, it was imperial, and thus increasingly identified with a new liberal imperial order. The outcome of the power struggle between King and Parliament would ultimately give Parliament absolute sovereignty over the British Empire. Among the strategies adopted by the Parliamentarians, characterising the common law as a law formed by a de-localised set of transcendental principles that nonetheless admitted change over time was especially favoured.62 Common law was transformed into a barrier against absolutism and also into a lingua franca of the Empire.63 Through their reasoning, lawyers would breathe life into and take custody of these fundamental laws.64 In the ancient legal and religious tradition of England, the claims of an absolutist king were not only illegal but also against God.65 While Philip II was crafting his godly cities for men in South America, the equally active Reformation was fragmenting this ideal in the northern European geography. Rather than entrenching power through cartographic presence, the British Empire inaugurated modernity and the mechanics of modern imperial expansion by unfolding law’s scope. From the reign of Henry VIII, the potential for legal challenges by external jurisdictions was nullified. Henry had denied the universal jurisdiction of the Pope, defying the summons to Rome because ‘the King may lawfully disobey the citation.’66 He instructed his agent in Rome to argue according to the principles of Roman law that no jurisdiction could be exercised over the king by an organ extra territorium: ‘a king who does not recognise a superior is free from any outside

61 E Moglen, Settling the Law. Legal Development in Provincial New York (unpublished dissertation, 1998) http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/stl.pdf 270. 62 See JGA Pocok, ‘Burke and the Ancient Constitution – A Problem in the History of Ideas’ (1960) 3 Historical Journal 125. 63 Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire (n 53) 29. 64 cf JGA Pocock, ‘Burke and the Ancient Constitution’, (n 62) 125. 65 ‘Ipse autem rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem’, which is the formula of Bracton’s conception of kingship. See E Lewis, ‘King Above law? “Quod Principi Placuit” in Bracton’ (1964) 39 Speculum 240, 265–67. 66 W Ullmann, ‘This Realm of England is an Empire’ (1979) 30 Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 186–87.

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jurisdiction.’67 The external battle against Rome was won, but the consequences of establishing independent jurisdiction and power over the political and the ecclesiastical were radical. By the mid-eighteenth century, the British Parliament acting in its legislative capacity had assumed the position of absolute sovereign.68

Hobbes and the Introduction of Self-interest Thomas Hobbes’s recommendation in Leviathan was that governments should not only tame the clergy, but also control the religious expression of citizens through law. The sovereign’s civil authority, the authority of the Leviathan, would rest in the citizens through the constitution of the commonwealth. According to Hobbes, the civil sovereign would be the authority in religious questions, and the authority in civil matters would, in turn, emanate from the citizens constituted in an assembly. In short, the complete jurisdiction over the divine is effectively transferred to the hands of the Leviathan: I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Morall Law, (that is to say, to the Law of Nature,) all subjects are bound to obey that for divine law, which is declared to be so, by the Lawes of the Commonwealth.69

Ahead of his time, Hobbes proposed a liberal system of the rule of law that united the previously separate theological and civil jurisdictions. His text was nevertheless attuned to the new post-revolutionary legal and intellectual environment of Interregnum England (1648–60), which was marked by a firm belief in the subordination of ecclesiastical authority to state power and by the promotion of religious tolerance and religious scepticism.70 A key issue for the transformations envisaged by Hobbes was the re-definition of the ‘relationship between the corporate church and the modernising English state.’71 Another concern was who or what would occupy the position left by a universal divine experience. In post-Restoration England, the Anglican Church would be safely identified with the English nation and thus with her political organisation. However, the first attempts at building a cosmopolitan Empire in which religious diversity—if only Christian diversity—prevailed, suggested that a greater free rein of authority was at the disposal of the rulers of the Empire than to the rulers of England. Indeed, in the absence of an imperial Church, the British Empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries embodied the ideal situation depicted in Leviathan, in which the temporal sphere dominates the

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ibid 187. Black, ‘The Constitution of Empire’ (n 47) 1210–11; Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire (n 53) 39. 69 T Hobbes, E Curley (ed) Leviathan (Indianapolis,Hackett Publishing, 1994) 199. 70 JR Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 48. 71 ibid 205; A Orford, ‘International law and the Making of the Modern State: Reflections on a Protestant Project’ (2008) 3 In-Spire: Journal of Law, Politics and Societies 5. 68

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former spiritual jurisdictions.72 Accordingly, the transcendental experience in legal formulae disappeared and law became a metaphysical, self-sustaining law. By rejecting the role of religious faith in government, Hobbes introduced a new dogma to political philosophy: the credo of self-interest.73 Following Hobbes, the notion appears as a foundational element in philosophical and political theory and in the practice of a commercial and secular Empire. Famously, Hobbes declared that a commonwealth is generated through a causality of interests. Building a commonwealth is the only way that human beings have to defend themselves against invasion by foreigners and attacks upon each other, and the only way to secure the production of industry and farming. The introduction of ‘that restraint upon themselves’, in which ‘we see’ human beings ‘live in Commonwealths’ is ‘the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby’.74 To protect their interests, they ‘may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will’.75 In a Hobbesian commonwealth, the reason to obey is protection. If protection ceases, the self-interest of the individual makes her free to turn to self-protection.76 Contrary to the opinion of Aristotle, who sustained that there are two regimes, one for the advantage of the ruler and another to the advantage of the subjects, Hobbes claimed that ‘all the advantages and disadvantages of the regime itself are the same for ruler and subject alike and are shared by both of them.’77 The ‘first and greatest advantage’ that Hobbes alludes to in this passage is ‘peace and defence, and it is the same for both’. In the specific question of taxes, to which tradition attributes the loss of the colonies in North America, Hobbes thinks that if the ruler extracts ‘only what the administration of government requires, that is equally advantageous for himself and the citizens for their common peace and defence.’78 The psychology of self-interest made Hobbes personally prefer the monarchy because private and public interests more easily coincide in the person of the monarch than in the members of an assembly: The King must be carefull in his politique person to procure the common interest, yet he is more, or no less carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the interest chance to crosse the private, he prefers the

72 Strong explains that the Anglican Church maintained a strict partnership with the state until the constitutional revolution of 1828–32. By the 1840s, the ‘fundamental Episcopalian identity for an imperial Anglicanism was more readily achievable once the Church of England had adopted a new self-directing identity, initiated at the metropolitan centre, and taken up also in the colonial peripheries, which no longer looked to the old paradigm of a partnership with the state, which had prevailed until then.’ R Strong, Anglicanism and the British Empire, c. 1700–1850 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 290. 73 About the position of Hobbes as part and leader of a tradition see A Cromartie, ‘Harringtonian Virtue: Harrington, Machiavelli, and the Method of the Moment’ (1998) 41 The Historical Journal 987. 74 Hobbes, Leviathan (n 69) 117. 75 ibid 120. 76 ibid 153. 77 S Moller Okin, ‘The Sovereign and His Counsellours: Hobbes’s Reevaluation of Parliament’ (1982) 10 Political Theory 49, 69. 78 T Hobbes, R Tuck (ed) and M Silverthorne (ed) On the Citizen – Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 116–17 (emphasis added).

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private: for the Passions of men are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced.79

What is remarkable about this passage is Hobbes’ substitution of theological language by a language of interests. By the mid-eighteenth century, the rule of law in the British Empire had already acquired one notably modern characteristic: representation was neither derived from the divine body of the king nor was it any longer conceived along traditional geographical principles. The new law was based in the abstract representation assumed to exist through de facto authority and the universality of self-interest.80 Its imperial dimension was not based on the peoples of the different territories, although England and its colonies did possess representative assemblies in the traditional sense. Rather, the representation of the Empire increasingly adopted the model proposed in the Leviathan:81 a covenant by which the English citizens of the Empire had entered the polity of the Empire for reasons of self-interest.82 In this way, the law was based on the authority of the sovereign and sovereignty was based on the law of the Empire. In spite of all the elaborate theories about the origin of the commonwealth by Hobbes and subsequent liberals, the subjects and society of this model have no telos. The earlier Christian and humanist language of perfection was replaced by an obscure secular version of transcendental order. Self-interest replaced the need to materialise perfection in spatial terms. Self-interest became the credo of a new civil religion and the new intangible, yet resilient, universal for the Empire. In the year of Leviathan’s publication, the laws that became the foundation of the commercial identity of the Empire were passed. The Navigation Acts, which aimed to control the Empire and its commerce, contained protective measures for fostering English shipping during times of peace: all the commerce of the colonies was required to pass through England and take place solely on English ships—a system that lasted until the nineteenth century.83 The issue was no longer sovereignty of the seas, but

79 Hobbes, Leviathan (n 69) 131; S Moller Okin, ‘The Sovereign and His Counsellours: Hobbes’s Reevaluation of Parliament’ (1982)10 Political Theory 49, 51–53. Like other supporters of popular rights in the 17th century, Hobbes did not claim sovereignty for the Parliament—something that, paradoxically, demonstrates signs of modernity in his doctrine. Cf J Neville Figgis, ‘Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century’, in AW Ward, GW Prothero and S Leathes (eds), The Wars of Religion (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1904) 748–49. 80 Q Skinner, ‘Hobbes on Representation’ (2005) 13 European Journal of Philosophy 155. 81 Black pinpoints the shift in theory through which the Parliament became supreme authority to the mid-eighteenth century, while Goebel, like many others, signals the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and some others to the Commonwealth Act of 1649. Black, ‘The Constitution of Empire’ (n 47) 1210–11. What we have tried to show here is that the seed was already planted by 1651, with the modern notion of law offered in the Leviathan and even in some of Hobbes’s previous works. 82 A fact, which might explain the loss of the North American colonies, since as Moglen explains, they and the Empire had strikingly opposed interests. See E Moglen, Settling the Law. Legal Development in Provincial New York (n 46). 83 RG Marsden, ‘Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England’ (1911) 26 The English Historical Review 34, 39.

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monopoly of trade and effective policing of the sea.84 What is remarkable is that the English Parliament inaugurated a legal system for all the territories of the Empire designed for times of peace with enforcement capability to prosecute offenders of any nation in violation of the Acts. Self-interest and absolute authority over divine and civil jurisdictions, embodied in trade and independence, provided the new coordinates for the order of the Empire.

REFLECTIONS ON EMPIRE, PUBLIC ORDER AND THE SACRED

Humanism, Empire and International Law An analysis of the legal and political projects of colonisation in North and South America reveals a desire by European sovereigns to create a new public order in the new continent. As is characteristic of imperial projects, both empires were compelled by a redemptive idea.85 In the complicated terrain of faith and governmentality in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spain and England each played a crucial role in the inauguration of modernity. For them, the New World was the revolutionary extension of the Old World’s territory, a place where it was possible to implement their political projects and to create the foundations of an international law that made sense of their world views and their ideas of order.86 In both the North and South, robbery, pillage, slavery and abuses of indigenous people and colonists alike were accompanied by the ideal of starting anew, of a governmental system that must improve on the existing systems in Spain and England. These new spaces were a great studio in which to experiment with new political ideas: in the South, godly cities for men; in the North, rational jurisdictions of liberty and commerce. The desire for renewal that inflamed European minds is evident in the way in which the colonisation of the New World took place. Although material goods typically flowed one-way from the colonies to Spain and England, the empires perceived a transaction to be taking place. In their view, the order brought to the colonial reality was a gift: precious knowledge that had been acquired painfully at home. Spain, in the midst of the counter-reformation, aimed to create godly cities of men. England, after bitter struggles for power between rival political and religious factions, transmitted to America the revolutionary ideal that worldly affairs should take precedence over ecclesiastical and religious matters. In both Spanish and British colonies, subjects participating in the new imperial order were obliged to convert. The indigenous people in the South and the Spanish imperial subjects that administered the colonies required a conversion to enter the 84 WG Grewe, Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1988) 343–45. See also, TC Wade, ‘The Roll De Superioritate Maris Angliae. The Foundations of the Stewart Claim to the Sovereignty of the Sea’ (1921–1922) 2 British Yearbook of International Law 99. 85 Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism’ (n 11) 383. 86 See on the role of colonies in the imperial persue of order, M Foucault, ‘Des Espaces Autres’ (1984) Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité 46 www.foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/ foucault.heteroTopia.en.html.

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city. In the North, the indigenous people had to give up everything they had previously owned—beliefs, culture and material goods—if they wanted to participate in the life of the British colony. British colonists who entered the new order of the Empire also had to convert to the new liberalism and commerce of the government. However, the necessity of conversion represents a weakness of the imperial orders, and of the law produced by them. The requirement for conversion makes it apparent that neither empire dominated the law. Neither the Spanish nor the British empires were masters of the law, in the sense that they were unable to craft a superior law that would accept the plurality of their imperial subjects. The Atlantic slave trade, an issue which connected the activities of the English and the Spanish from the mid-1500s,87 exemplifies the theoretical tensions and internal ambiguities of both imperial projects; or to put it in another way, the public order they created was sustained to a large extent by power, rather than by internal coherence. The Spanish Empire believed that order could be created through the design and construction of theological-legal spaces. Even though they were imagined as utopias, these spaces were also mundane arrangements to organise the economy that lubricated the Empire. The desire by the new English order to become absolute sovereign over the secular and the divine produced a liberal Empire under the rule of law. The rise of the English Parliament in the seventeenth century to sovereign of the Empire offered influential social groups the possibility of preserving their economic interests, and to promote free trade, even in human beings. For this reason, the Atlantic slave trade escalated dramatically in the early eighteenth century.88 The Spanish, for whom the slave trade conditioned to a great extent the pursuit of the Empire, were actively engaged in this commercial enterprise with the English.89 In dark contrast to the ideal of the imperial cities of God and to the pursuit of human flourishing through representation without subjection to a superior being, the slave trade demonstrates that both the Spanish and the British Empire denied the practicability of their own legal orders. Despite the theological tenor of the Spanish project, the British and the Spanish empires’ expansive territorial ventures heralded the great anthropocentric shift that occurred in the political philosophy of modern Europe. The antipathy towards the notion of considering God as an agent of human history is made explicit in the secularisation programme pursued by the British Empire.90 The absorption of the religious into the civil jurisdiction at the beginning of the British Empire eventually confined the religious to the private conscience, and erased all references to the sacred from the public sphere. As we have seen, there was some hesitancy about the way in which sovereignty would be implemented during the shift of authority’s locus from King to Parliament. From the outset, however, the British clearly

87 See generally, JA Rawley and SD Behrendt, The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A History (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 55. 88 See especially, WA Pettigrew, ‘Parliament and the Escalation of the Slave Trade, 1690–1714’ (2007) 26 Parliamentary History 12. 89 Rawley and Behrendt, The Transatlantic Slave Trade (n 87) 5. 90 C Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007) 270.

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favoured a secular imperial public order. In the Spanish conquest, the rejection of divine agency was more subtle, but nonetheless apparent in the planners’ aim to supplant God’s role. The colonisation of the New World demonstrates that both empires drew strength from humanism. The notion of humanism invoked here embraces both transcendent humanism, which transferred the power of God to human beings as divine agents that would construct terrestrial cities of God, and immanent humanism that adhered to the new philosophy of self-interested universalism.91 This does not mean that humanism is a bad thing, or that humanism is equivalent to empire, but rather that the two imperial legal expansions examined in this article can be identified as humanist projects. As argued by Koskenniemi, the most imperialist aspect of international law is its humanist civilising mission.92 In a recent article based on a psychoanalytical interpretation of international law, Jouannet traces the long tradition of imperialist search for a universal in international law to the common view that locates human nature between passion and reason.93 This dualist interpretational grid of human nature has been a constant in Western philosophy dating back to Plato’s commitment to the attainment of our highest state in a condition beyond the body, which is viewed as a hindrance that must be controlled and disciplined in this life.94 Drawing on the work of Nathaniel Berman on the relationship of international law and the psychoanalytical study of human nature, Jouannet argues that the constitutive ambivalence of human identity is mirrored in the ways that international law has sought to mask the hegemonic passions latent in actions taken by the League of Nations and the United Nations: from Upper Silesia to Saarland, and more recently in places such as Kosovo, Palestine and Bosnia. On the other hand, the rational has more often appeared in the form of the authoritarian approach to a crisis, like the recent war of Iraq, with a claim to the objectivity of the rules of international law and the legal discourse deployed during the invasion.95 Jouannet’s analysis reflects important imperial tendencies of the past and current searches for order in international law, some of which we have identified in this paper. A Global Public Order? Teitel describes the increasing constructive international rule of law, which she identifies with the merger of the laws of war and human rights legal systems, as ‘a 91

cf with M Hardt and A Negri, Empire (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2000) 91–92. See for example, M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism’ (n 11) 403. 93 Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism’ (n 11) 403–407. 94 Taylor, A Secular Age (n 90) 276. See of Plato’s idealism and dualism, H Kelsen, ‘Platonic Justice’ (1938) 48 Ethics 367; For an explanation of Kelsen’s own legal theory in Platonic philosophy, see G Edel, ‘Kantianismus oder Platonismus? Hypothesis als Grundbegriff der Philosophie Cohens’ (1991) 1/2 Il Cannochiale. Revista di studi filosofi 59. 95 Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism’ (n 11) 403–405. See also, N Berman, ‘A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy, and the Limits of the Interwar Framework’ (1992) 33 Harvard International Law Journal 353. 92

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shift of paradigm in international law’.96 She claims that a depoliticised legalist language of rights and wrongs, which has gradually supplanted the previous discourse centred on state interests, consensus and deliberation, has been effectively extended by new bodies of the judiciary type through penetration of existing legal sovereign entities. This phenomenon can be compared with the situation under imperial law, when the law of nations understood itself as extraterritorial law, and assumed that it was capable of influencing or cancelling local politics. Beyond the recurrent appearance of hegemonic politics in the international order, there have been new sources of inspiration to rethink the concept of international law. Previous notions of the international legal system have shown how it is insufficient, unless it can be renovated by attempting to include deliberative democracy as a primary value in international governance. The argument that international law has moved beyond pure bilateralism is convincing.97 In this context, enhancing the legitimacy of international law means, for example, the strengthening of national parliaments’ influence over foreign relations, an area traditionally monopolised by heads of government.98 These arguments make clear that a public order, which aims to be global, and therefore not imperialistic, must incorporate a methodology and an ideology of democratic participation. In an era of globalisation, the aspiration for a public global order remains— despite doctrinal differences—an important common goal. We argue that the re-thinking of international law and of a global public order should not seek to revive redemptive imperial plans, but instead acknowledge the proliferation of pseudo-juridical relations on a global scale, all of them interacting in a state of quasi-anarchy. In the absence of a purposive common good in international society, with the political division of the world in more than 200 states, the very notion of a global public order may very well function as a common good.99 The attribute of commonness in this good is neither irrelevant nor incidental. The notion of commonness contains also an ideal of tolerance, of accepting something as common and consenting to something that may offend individual interests.100 In short, it means adopting the opposite attitude that the empires took in their creation of public order. The imperial position in the production of order was to silence (through action or omission) the dissenting voice. Today, it is hard to imagine even the skeleton of a global public order without a spirit of tolerance for diversity. Legal efficiency should also give way to an attitude of tolerance to what is idiosyncratic in the foreign. Von Bogdandy has noted that to postulate utopian ideas—that is, laws without a locus in space—as legal principles, harms the

96 See generally, RG Teitel, ‘Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics’ (2002) 35 Cornell International Law Journal 355. 97 B Kingsbury, The International Legal Order (NYU Law School, 2003, Public Law Research Paper No 01–04; IILJ Working Paper No 2003/1) http://ssrn.com/abstract=692626 or DOI: 10.2139/ ssrn.692626. 98 Wolfrum and Röben, Legitimacy in International Law (n 4) 23. 99 J Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law: Fuller’s Procedural Natural Law’ (2008) 5 No Foundations. Journal of Extreme Legal Positivism 84, 102 para 6. www.helsinki.fi/ nofo. In this regard, Wolfrum considers that international law has developed its own system of values: Wolfrum and Röben, Legitimacy in International Law (n 4) 24. 100 JHH Weiler, Una Europa Cristiana (Madrid, Ediciones Encuentro 2003) 136.

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normativity of law.101 To put it differently, tolerance of non-Western, non-secular principles that have a topos in large territories and communities would promote the strength of international normativity. As we have seen, the imposition of utopian ideals by force and the destruction of indigenous principle within colonised territories was the way for the British and Spanish Empires to protect their validity of law. In this regard, current critiques of the anti-pluralism of a supposedly international order are meaningful and rich: at present, there is a risk that important pieces of international legislation will remain insignificant speeches to the greater part of the world’s population, which does not share the liberal values and aspirations that are promoted by the prevailing international order.102 Along the same vein, there is an urgent need in global jurisprudence to give greater weight and consideration to international affairs that do not involve one of the superpowers: commonness means also common interest.103 Although there are several territorial international unions of states with an important level of interaction between their members, such as the African Union, the Commonwealth and the Organization of American States, there is also reason to encourage the study of publicness in the European Union experience. The European Union has produced a wealth of legal principles concerning the relationship between the Union and its member states, which could enrich the core of a global public order in international law. Moreover the European Union has often managed to organise and channel public authority over private interests and powers.104 However, it is suggested here that in two particular important features of a global public order, inspiration should be sought in other places. First, there should be a serious interrogation about the role of the sacred in the European public sphere, and secondly about the notion of reason on which the European Union normative tradition is based. In his exploratory essay Un’Europa Cristiana, Weiler highlights the importance of learning the spirit of tolerance, which was conspicuously absent in ‘the imperial constitutional politics’ that surrounded the drafting of the treaty for a Constitution of Europe.105 An important reason for this is that in the European constitutional tradition, the sacred has been judged by modern reason to lie outside rational discourse and therefore relegated outside the public sphere.106 The key expression in this latter sentence is ‘modern reason’, whose genesis lies in the consolidation of the Spanish and British Empires. We suggest that a broader notion of reason than the one offered by modernity may be

101 A von Bogdandy, ‘General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1909, 1913. 102 See H Charlesworth, ‘The Challenges of Human Rights for Religious Traditions’ in MW Janis and C Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1999). 103 cf, eg, the wealth of scholarly literature regarding the International Court of Justice’s decisions on Military and Paramilitary Activities and Oil Platform cases, where the United States was a party, to the scant attention received by Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda), B Kingsbury and J Weiler, ‘Preface: Studying the Armed Activities Decision’ (2008) 40 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 2. 104 von Bogdandy, ‘General Principles of International Public Authority (n 101) 1909, 1916. 105 Weiler, Una Europa Cristiana (n 100) 50. 106 JHH Weiler, ‘La tradición judeo–cristiana entre fe y libertad’ in J Ratzinger et al Dios salve la razón (n 1) 196.

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useful for the consideration of a global public order. Modern reason might at this juncture make room for a reason that is able to deal with the transcendental, a sacred order that does not cancel difference, diversity or dissent. In legal philosophy, modern reason has attempted to substitute the sacred by ideals embodied in reason, passions, economy and humanity.107 Each of these has been integrated in previous paradigms of international public law, even though each of them arises periodically in constant struggle with each other.108 A possible way to avoid legal absolutism is to admit a notion of reason that is free from the need to worship the inanimate. The global public sphere would be better represented by a broader conception of publicness in which the sacred is possible. This can occur only when the public order does not aim to integrate the civil and the theological jurisdictions into one. The experiences of the Spanish and British Empires demonstrate that integration results in one of the two jurisdictions thriving at the expense of the other: the English and the Spanish took an either/or position on this question, and used religion instrumentally as a legitimising or delegitimising factor of previous legal orders. In both cases, imperial subjects were required to convert in an un-free total acceptance or total rejection of the sacred in the public sphere. It is doubtful that similar imperialistic positions can be maintained today. Only a global public order that is open to the sacred (perhaps through dialogue as endless contingency) has resonances of what we would accept as truly democratic.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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107 J Milbank, ‘Geopolitical Theology. Economy Religion and Empire after 9/11’ 27, www.theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers.php. 108 Another way to put this idea is to refer to the fragmentation of International Law, see ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (United Nations, A/CN.4/L.682, 2006).

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B Rajagopal, ‘Martti Koskenniemi’s “From Apology to Utopia: A Reflection”’ (2006) 7 German Journal of International Law 1089–94. Q Skinner, ‘Hobbes on Representation’ (2005) 13 European Journal of Philosophy 155–84. RG Teitel, ‘Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics’ (2002) 35 Cornell International Law Journal 355–87. J Tully, ‘Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground’ (1994) 11 Social Philosophy & Policy 153–80. A von Bogdandy, ‘General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1909–38. TC Wade, ‘The Roll De Superioritate Maris Angliae. The Foundations of the Stewart Claim to the Sovereignty of the Sea’ (1921–1922) 2 British Yearbook of International Law 99–108. MD Walters, ‘Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and Government in British North America’ (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 785–829. JHH Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’ (2004) 64 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 547–62.

Working Papers B Kingsbury, The International Legal Order (NYU Law School, Public Law Research Paper No 01–04; IILJ Working Paper No 2003/1).

Websites Sources M Foucault, ‘Des Espaces Autres’ Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité 46–49 www.foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html. R Londoño, ‘En las nubes de Bogotá’ www.bogotacomovamos.org/scripts/ contenido.php?idCnt=1. J Milbank, ‘Geopolitical Theology. Economy Religion and Empire after 9/11’ www.theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers.php. E Moglen, ‘Settling the Law. Legal Development in Provincial New York’ (unpublished dissertation) http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/stl.pdf.

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Of Headscarves, Mosques and Occidental Values Does International Law Require a Culturally Neutral State?* NICOLA WENZEL **

INTRODUCTION

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ESTERN STATES HAVE had to cope with the cultural diversity of their populations, arising from migration, for some time.1 Claims of immigrants, who want to become part of the majority population without altogether abandoning central aspects of their cultural identity, have raised awareness of the fact that the public domain is not a culturally neutral sphere.2 Rather, the dominant national group uses the power instruments of the state to promote its cultural bonds. All public institutions and the whole public space are imprinted with a particular national identity: laws and regulations that seem at first glance to be culturally neutral are in fact culturally biased. Official language laws, a nationalised system of compulsory education with a curriculum focused on the dominant group’s language, literature and history, national cultural institutions, state symbols, national holidays, official dress codes, even street names are all evidence of ‘banal nationalism’3 that favours the majority culture and forces immigrants to abandon parts of their own culture and assimilate. This assimilation pressure has been met with an increasing assertiveness on the part of immigrants. They demand the recognition and accommodation of their cultural identity within the framework of the state. The answer to these claims has most often been what I will call identity politics: special norms or exemptions from

* This chapter was last updated in November 2008 ** Dr jur, Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Public International and Comparative Law, Heidelberg. I thank Viktoriya Bezdenezhnykh for her invaluable research assistance. 1 The term ‘culture’ is used here as describing a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and as encompassing, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs. See the preamble to the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2002) 41 International Legal Materials 57 et seq. 2 M Koenig/P de Guchteneire, ‘Political Governance of Cultural Diversity’ in M Koenig et al (eds), Democracy and Human Rights in Multicultural Societies (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007) 3, 4 et seq. 3 Billig uses the term to describe those ideological habits which enable established nations to be reproduced: M Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, Sage Publications, 1995) 6.

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generally applicable laws and regulations that are specifically designed to accommodate immigrants’ cultural identities. Examples include the exemption of Sikhs from wearing a helmet when motorcycling, placing a cemetery at the disposal of Muslims in which burials may take place according to Islamic rites, or dispensation from attending classes on immigrants’ religious holidays. The willingness of states to adopt such identity politics naturally varies. Whereas some states are rather hesitant, some traditional countries of immigration, namely Canada and Australia, have gone so far as to include the accommodation of cultural diversity as an element of national identity.4 In the wake of 11 September 2001 and the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, however, observance of multicultural standards for Muslim immigrants is dwindling. As intercultural conflicts over the building of mosques, the wearing of headscarves in public schools or the crime rate of immigrant youngsters worsen, even traditional immigrant countries are faced with calls for the end of the ‘preferential treatment’ enjoyed by this group of immigrants.5 More fundamentally, states are challenged to find ways to hold diverse populations together. To do this, states tend to rely on the majority population’s culture. The majority population’s cultural identity serves as basis for national unity and solidarity. Immigrants are expected to adapt to this culture.6 Symptomatic of this trend is the notion of Leitkultur, or ‘defining culture’, that has shaped the political debate in Germany. Legislators have followed suit. They have attempted to actively favour the majority culture in public life by adopting norms that are more or less openly culturally biased. With the aim of impeding women who wear headscarves from teaching in public schools, several German Länder have, for example, enacted laws that prohibit the wearing of religious insignia by teachers in public schools, while including exemptions for religious insignia that form part of the Christianoccidental tradition or that are expressive of Christian-occidental values.7 In the same vain, the province of Kärnten in Austria has been trying to prevent the building of mosques in rural areas, by obliging the competent authorities to refuse to grant a building licence if a newly created special commission considers the building project to differ considerably from ‘local building traditions’.8 Such norms are an expression of so-called inverse identity politics. In contrast to traditional identity politics, which are a means of accommodating immigrants’ cultural identities, inverse identity politics are directed against immigrants’ cultural

4 Both countries have labelled their efforts as multiculturalism policy; see the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988 and the 1999 New Agenda for Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity. 5 A good example is Quebec, where a Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences has been established in response to public discontent concerning the accommodation of immigrant identities. See http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/ (last accessed 22 April 2009). For an explanation of the reasons for the retreat from multiculturalism for Muslim immigrants, see W Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 92 et seq, 118 et seq, 124 et seq.. 6 S Ferrari, ‘Individual Religious Freedom and National Security in Europe after September (2004) 11’ Brigham Young University Law Review 357, 377. 7 For an overview of legislation in the different Länder see S Baer, ‘Staatliche Neutralität und Toleranz in der Christlich-abendländischen Wertewelt’ (2005) 58 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 243 et seq. 8 For information on the draft law see http://kaernten.orf.at/stories/252330/.

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identities and favour the majority population’s culture. Inverse identity politics have not gone unchallenged, and in many cases have been modified and tempered by national courts. Nevertheless, their accumulation in recent years warrants an exploration into the position of international law9 as to these issues. Does international law prescribe the accommodation of immigrant identities? Does international law impose limits on states’ promotion of their own cultural identities? Behind these questions about the need for identity politics and the legality of inverse identity politics lies a more general question which I will seek to address: does international law require cultural neutrality? At first sight, to ask such a question seems preposterous. After all, the formation and promotion of a national identity based on a nation’s culture is a matter so close to the core of statehood and sovereignty that the rule of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states unequivocally seems to apply. This first assessment is corroborated by the Friendly Relations Declaration, which explicitly acknowledges the applicability of the principle of non-intervention with respect to a people’s national identity.10 At the same time, the Friendly Relations Declaration, as well as Articles 1 ICCPR and ICESCR, include the right for all peoples to freely pursue their cultural development as part of the right of self-determination.11 Nevertheless, it is not implausible that international law regulates the way states deal with cultural diversity arising from migration. In fact, two international law regimes may help to answer the three questions on cultural neutrality: the emerging international law of cultural diversity and international human rights law. I will examine these two areas of international law in turn.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Recent years have seen the emergence of culture as a topic of international concern. The international community has propagated multiculturalism through the publication and promotion of best practices.12 UNESCO has taken up a strong stance on cultural diversity with the adoption of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on

9 European Union law is excluded from review. On the implications of EU migration law for national integration policies, see R Cholewinski, ‘Migrants as Minorities: Integration and Inclusion in the Enlarged European Union’ (2005) 43 Journal of Common Market Studies 695 et seq; G Toggenburg, ‘Who is Managing Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in the European Condominium? The Moments of Entry, Integration and Preservation’ (2005) 43 Journal of Common Market Studies 717, 727 et seq. 10 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970): ‘The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention.’ 11 On national identity as part of the right to self-determination, see D McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion – The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 290. 12 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys (n 5), 175 et seq.

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Cultural Diversity13 and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.14 This international law of cultural diversity,15 however, is only at its modest beginnings. This is true in particular for cultural diversity arising from migration. Insofar as multiculturalism is propagated through best practices, relations with indigenous peoples and ‘old minorities’ (in contrast to the ‘new minorities’) formed by immigrants are mainly targeted.16 The non-binding UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity has other shortcomings.17 The Declaration affirms cultural diversity as ‘the common heritage of humanity’18 and qualifies its defence as an ethical imperative. States may not deny the existence of cultural diversity and must take steps to ensure that all persons on their territory can live the cultural life of their choice. But the Declaration does not oblige states to follow the Canadian and Australian example and make the accommodation of cultural diversity an element of their national identity. Neither does it prevent states from protecting and promoting their own national culture. Because the concept of cultural diversity implies the equal worth of all cultures, it may be used to justify inverse identity politics. The argument goes as follows: the majority culture is under threat and has to be protected to prevent its disappearance. Therefore, when a state protects the majority culture through inverse identity politics, the state contributes to cultural diversity. From this perspective, the concept of cultural diversity lacks a countermajoritarian tendency. If the UNESCO Declaration, with its vague obligation to protect cultural diversity, on its own thus does not contain the answer to the questions raised above, it might yet be useful in the interpretation of the other international regime that I will now turn to, namely the regime of international human rights.

13 ‘UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity’ (2002) International Legal Materials 41, 57 et seq. 14 On the Convention see H Ruiz Fabri, ‘Jeux dans la Fragmentation: la Convention sur la Promotion de la Diversité des Expressions Culturelles’ (2007) 1 Revue Generale de Droit International Public 43 et seq. 15 See A von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as Situation, Executive, and Promoter of the International Law of Cultural Diversity – Elements of a Beautiful Friendship’, (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 241, 245 et seq. 16 See for example Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Rec 1735 (2006), para 16.4. An exception is the UNDP Human Development Report 2004 ‘Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World’. 17 The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was adopted to give member states a tool to address the tension between the protection of national cultural artefacts and the principles of free trade in services enshrined in the WTO system and thus is of little help. The Declaration is a precursor to the Convention and was adopted with the same aim in mind, but follows a much broader approach. 18 The concept of common heritage of mankind traditionally governs certain spaces and establishes rules for the management of resources; CC Joyner, ‘Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1986) 35 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 190 et seq. The implications of the qualification of cultural diversity as common heritage of humanity are as yet unclear.

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Nicola Wenzel INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

The international law of human rights does not give an outright answer to these questions either. Neither do pronouncements of the human rights treaty bodies reveal any explicit opinion on the question of cultural neutrality. International human rights law does not dictate to states the course to follow in the management of cultural diversity,19 but it does provide a legal framework for state action in this domain. The ensuing constraints limit political options and thus indirectly shape states’ integration policies. Examining the limits imposed by the international law of human rights thus may allow to answer the initial question by way of inference. One obvious consequence of the human rights approach has to be made clear from the beginning: Examining the question of cultural neutrality under human rights aspects necessarily implies that all state policies that have no implications for human rights are permissible. As a consequence, symbolic furtherance of the majority population’s culture in the national anthem, the flag or in the preamble to the national constitution are not prohibited by international law as long as they have no negative impact on the human rights of immigrants. I will now examine step by step the compatibility of identity politics and inverse identity politics with international human rights law.

Interference with the Right to Develop and Maintain a Cultural Identity When states refuse to adopt identity politics, or when they adopt inverse identity politics, they interfere with human rights. My first task will be to identify these rights. International human rights law acknowledges individuals’ right to develop and maintain a cultural identity.20 This right is either provided for explicitly or is inferred from other human rights provisions. Article 27 ICCPR, for example, guarantees for persons belonging to minorities the right to enjoy their own culture. In the opinion of the UNHRC, this provision also applies to aliens.21 The provisions on freedom of religion contained in all major universal and regional human rights conventions protect one aspect of individuals’ cultural identity, namely their religious identity. But the protection of cultural identities has also been inferred from the right for respect of private life contained in Article 8 ECHR, for example, which has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as including protection of a minority’s way of life.22 19 W Kälin, ‘Integration of Migrants’ in TA Aleinikoff and V Chetail (eds), Migration and International Legal Norms (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2003) 271, 273 et seq, 279. 20 Kälin, ‘Integration of Migrants’ (n 19), 282. 21 UNCHR ‘General Comment 23’ in Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 5 (1994), para 5.2. Most authors additionally require a certain stability and thus a certain length of residence, M Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn (Kehl, Engel, 2005) art 27, para 17. 22 Noack et al v Germany (App no 46346/99) ECHR 2000-VI 535 (550). See also Chapman v UK [GC] ECHR 2001-I 41 para 73.

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When states refuse to adopt identity politics, or adopt inverse identity politics, they not only interfere with these cultural human rights, they also interfere with international provisions on the prohibition of discrimination. Whereas measures of inverse identity politics are openly discriminatory, the discrimination inherent in a state’s refusal to adopt identity politics is more subtle. Although seemingly neutral state laws apply equally to all persons and thus do not formally discriminate against immigrants, nevertheless their application may result in indirect discrimination, in the event that it causes stronger disadvantages for immigrants than for the majority population.23 Justification That the refusal to adopt identity politics on the one hand, and the adoption of inverse identity politics on the other hand, interferes with immigrants’ human rights, does not make these measures outright illegal. Rather, interference with human rights protecting cultural identity may be justified if it is in pursuance of a legitimate aim and is proportionate. Discriminatory treatment is permissible if it is justified by reasonable and objective grounds and is proportionate.24 Aims Pursued by the State When states adopt inverse identity politics, their aim by definition is to protect the majority population’s culture. The grounds invoked by states for rejecting claims for identity politics by immigrants in contrast generally are different, and most often belong to the domain of public safety and order. The obligation for motorcyclists to wear helmets, while it interferes with Sikhs’ religiously motivated wearing of turbans, for example, is obviously imposed for security reasons and not with the aim of protecting a national culture. The protection of public safety and order is included in the limitation clauses of the different human rights conventions, and thus definitely constitutes a legitimate aim. With respect to the protection of the majority population’s culture through inverse identity politics, the appraisal is more difficult. Generally speaking, respect for cultural and historical traditions is an integral part of the international system for the protection of human rights. The international system for the protection of human rights operates within a context of a great variety of national cultures. International human rights are designed as minimal standards, but do not offer an integral value system that would allow the international monitoring bodies to develop new standards in controversial cases in 23 Kälin, ‘Integration of Migrants’ (n 19) 275. On the concept of indirect discrimination in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR see J Ringelheim, Diversité culturelle et droits de l’homme, Collection du Centre des Droits de l’Homme de l’Université Catholique de Louvain 5 (Brussels, Bruylant, 2006) 321 et seq. On the concept in the context of the ICCPR see Althammer et al v Austria (ICCPR-Communication No 998/2001), UNCHR UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/998/2001 para 10.2; Derksen v Netherlands (ICCPRCommunication No 976/2001) UNCHR UN Doc CCPR/C/80/D/976/2001 para 9.3. 24 Kälin, ‘Integration of Migrants’ (n 19), 277; W Kälin, Grundrechte im Kulturkonflikt (Zurich, NZZ-Verlag, 2000) 110 et seq.

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which opinions in the different member states vary widely.25 Rather, states are accorded certain latitude in the implementation of human rights norms in their cultural context. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation developed by the ECtHR26 is a particularly good example of the efforts of international human rights treaty bodies to address the inherent tension between affirming universal rights and respecting the diversity of human cultures.27 More specifically, a few decisions address interferences with human rights by states for the sake of protecting the majority population’s culture. The European treaty bodies have recognised that states pursue a legitimate aim when they protect the majority population’s culture. Most decisions concern specific aspects of a national culture. In a case concerning English authorities’ refusal to allow the wife of an immigrant already living in the UK to join her husband, on the grounds that the marriage was polygamous and the husband already had a wife settled with him in the UK, the European Commission of Human Rights held that the ‘preservation of the Christian based monogamous culture’ dominant in the UK constituted a legitimate aim in the context of Article 8 ECHR.28 More recently, the ECtHR has considered the protection of the national language to be a legitimate aim in the context of Article 8, acknowledging that ‘the official language is … one of the fundamental constitutional values in the same way as the national territory, the organisational structure of the State and the national flag.’29 Explicit references to national culture have remained isolated, however. But in recent decisions, the principles of denominational neutrality in schools30 and secularism as an organising state principle31 have been acknowledged by the Court to constitute legitimate aims.

25 PG Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 38, 58 speaks of ‘normative thinness’. 26 Handyside v UK (App no 5493/72) ECHR Series A no 24, 48; Casado Coca v Spain (App no 37928/97) ECHR Series A no 285-A, para 54; Fretté v France (App no 36515/97) ECHR 2002-I 345 paras 40 et seq; F v Switzerland (App no 11329/85) ECHR Series A no 128 para 33: ‘However, the fact that, at the end of a gradual evolution, a country finds itself in an isolated position as regards one aspect of its legislation does not necessarily imply that that aspect offends the Convention, particularly in a field—matrimony—which is so closely bound up with the cultural an historic traditions of each society and its deep-rooted ideas about the family unit.’ 27 See JA Sweeney, ‘Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era’ (2005) 54 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 459 et seq. 28 RB v UK (App no 19628/92) EComHR 29 June 1992. 29 Mentzen and Kuharec v Latvia (App nos 71074/01 and 71557/01) ECHR 2004-XII 301. In one case, however, the Court has expressed doubts as to whether the protection of a state’s cultural traditions and historical and cultural symbols may constitute a legitimate aim in the meaning of art 11 para 2: Sidiropoulos et al v Greece (App no 38178/97) ECHR 1998-IV 1594 para 38. 30 Dahlab v Switzerland (App no 42393/98) ECHR 2001-V 447. 31 Leyla Sahin v Turkey [GC] (App no 44774/98) ECHR 2005-XI 173 para 114 et seq; Refah Partisi et al v Turkey [GC] (App nos 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98) ECHR 2003-II 267 para 67.

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Proportionality The refusal of states to adopt identity politics, on the one hand, and the adoption of inverse identity politics on the other hand, result in the pursuit of different aims, and the proportionality of the interferences has to be judged separately. Identity Politics International human rights treaty bodies have been reluctant to oblige states to grant culture-based exemptions from generally applicable laws and thus adopt identity politics.32 The European Commission on Human Rights for example has decided that the obligation for a teacher to observe normal working hours, which he asserts clash with his attendance at prayers, was compatible with freedom of religion;33 the same applies to the obligation requiring a motorcyclist to wear a crash helmet, which in his view is incompatible with his religious duties.34 In the same vain, the UNHRC has held that the obligation for a Sikh to wear a hard hat as safety headgear during his work as maintenance electrician is justified under Article 18 paragraph 3 ICCPR, and does not constitute a prohibited discrimination in the meaning of Article 26 ICCPR.35 But some of these decisions date back as far as the 1970s, and it is unclear whether they would be upheld today, in the face of increased awareness of the need to protect cultural diversity. A hint that international human rights treaty bodies may become more assertive on culture-based exemptions from neutral state laws can be found in the decision by the ECtHR in the Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek case. In this case, the ECtHR held that French law that established an exception to the principle that animals must be stunned before being slaughtered to permit the religiously imposed practice of ritual slaughter gave effect to the freedom of religion provisions.36 To find out whether states’ refusal to adopt identity politics may be justified, the individual’s right to culture on the one hand and the objective pursued by the state on the other hand have to be balanced. In this balancing process, the international law of cultural diversity comes into play. The principles of the UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity may be used as a tool of interpretation in the context of human rights conventions. As has been stated before, the UNESCO Declaration calls on states to enable all individuals to live the cultural life of their choice. It thereby adds weight to the claims of immigrants for cultural accommodation in those cases in which cultural accommodation would have no negative impact on the majority population’s culture. The same is true for the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families37

32 In this sense see also Ringelheim, Diversité culturelle (n 23), 167, 169; S Stavros, ‘Freedom of Religion and Claims for Exemption from Generally Applicable, Neutral Laws: Lessons from Across the Pond?’ (1997) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 607, 622. 33 X v UK (App no 7215/75) EComHR DR 22, 27, 34 et seq;.See also Konttinen v Finland (App no 24949/94) EComHR 3 December 1996. 34 X v UK (App no 7215/75) EComHR DR 14, 234, 235. 35 Singh Bindher v Canada (Communication No 208/1986) UNCHR, UN Doc CCPR/C/37/D/208/ 1986 para 6.2. 36 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France (App no 27417/95) ECHR 2000-VII 231 para 76. 37 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families UNGA Res 45/158 (18 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/158; see art 31 in particular.

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and the UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they Live,38 which stress the right of immigrants to retain their own language, culture and tradition and the states’ obligation to respect their cultural identity. These international instruments may not be used to argue for a general immunity from general laws for immigrants in cases in which their human rights are affected by neutral state laws. But in my opinion, they severely restrict the state’s margin of appreciation. States will have to accommodate immigrants’ cultural identities in certain specific circumstances and will have to adopt identity politics.39 States will have to adopt identity politics in particular if no rights of others are in danger, if the costs are low and the organisational arrangements are possible without complications. Taking into account the reticence of international treaty bodies to impose cultural accommodation, however, it is probable that these bodies will deem the international consensus, on which these instruments are based, insufficiently concrete to impose a particular conduct on states.40 But international treaty bodies should at least use the international law of cultural diversity to impose a procedural obligation on states. States should be obliged to give special consideration to the needs of immigrants when they adopt and implement legislation.41 Thus they will not be allowed to pass lightly over cultural arguments, and will have to demonstrate a certain cultural sensitivity and flexibility. Because of its procedural nature, this obligation is limited. But, eventually, the international consensus on cultural accommodation will become more precise in the future. Then, international human rights treaty bodies may be ready to restrict states’ margin of appreciation in the way proposed above, and thus transform the procedural obligation into a substantive one. Inverse Identity Politics Inverse identity politics involve a clash between the individual’s right to culture and the state’s legitimate interest in protecting its own national culture. In this constellation, the UNESCO Declaration’s effects are neutralised, because it could be invoked on either side of the balance. With respect to inverse identity politics, the Declaration thus is not of much help. But there are decisions of international human rights treaty bodies that deal with measures states adopt to protect their own national culture. Admittedly, the jurisprudence is sparse. But inferences on the relevant aspects in the balancing process may be drawn from it, anyway. In a case concerning freedom of expression, the ECtHR has taken the position that just because a case touches on national symbols and national identity, states do not benefit from a wider margin of appreciation.42 Most pronouncements, however, 38 UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they Live UNGA Res 40/144 (13 December 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/144; see art 5 para 1(f) in particular. 39 See also Ringelheim, Diversité culturelle et droits de l’homme (n 23), 424 et seq for a different reasoning. 40 See, mutatis mutandis, Chapman v UK [GC] (App no 27238/95) ECHR 2001-I,41 para 94. 41 ibid para 96. 42 Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria (App nos 29221/95 and 29225/95) ECHR 2001-IX 693 para 107.

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concern state neutrality as one aspect of a state’s national culture. The ECtHR has accorded special weight to state neutrality in religious matters. The reason is that the Court sees state neutrality in religious matters as a means of managing religious diversity: ‘The Court has frequently emphasised the State’s role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this role is conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society.’43 In recent decisions in the context of religion, the ECtHR has even gone so far as to interpret the right to freedom of religion as requiring state neutrality in religious matters: ‘However, in exercising its regulatory power in this sphere and in its relations with the various religions, denominations and beliefs, the State has a duty to remain neutral and impartial.’44 The state’s duty of neutrality as conceived by the Court is an open concept; it does not embrace specific manifestations, such as secularism or laïcité, which are expressions of the historical evolution of church– state relations in member states. Rather, it is the consequence of the application of the individual right to freedom of religion, and as such is also inherent in Article 18 ICCPR.45 International freedom of religion provisions are thus no obstacle to a state church or an official religion.46 But this may not result in violation of the freedom of religion or in discrimination of persons who do not accept the official religion.47 Two conclusions may be drawn from this jurisprudence. First, inverse identity politics that are in conflict with the principle of state neutrality in religious matters are incompatible with freedom of religion. Inverse identity politics often use concepts of occidental values and culture to disguise privileges for the Christian faith. The laws in certain German Länder, mentioned before, which prohibit teachers from wearing religious insignia, yet provide for an exemption for symbols that are an expression of occidental values, are a typical example. The reference to cultural values only serves to disguise a privilege for the Christian religion that if it were accorded openly would unequivocally be in conflict with the principle of state neutrality in religious matters.48 Secondly, states’ human rights duty of neutrality in religious matters may not be generalised so as to deduce a general obligation to state neutrality in cultural matters from the international human rights provisions. Such a broad obligation to cultural neutrality would not only be a stranger to international law, which relies

43

Leyla Sahin v Turkey [GC] (App no 44774/98) ECHR 2005-XI 173 para 107 et seq. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v Moldova (App no 45701/99) ECHR 2001-XII 81 para 116. See UNCHR ‘General Comment 22’ in Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies. UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add 4 paras 9, 10. 46 Darby v Sweden (App no 11581/85) EComHR Series A 187 para 45; Ringelheim, Diversité culturelle et droits de l’homme (n 23) 84 et seq 47 Darby v Sweden (App no 11581/85) EComHR Series A 187 para 45; UNCHR ‘General Comment 22’ (n 45), paras 9, 10. See also Waldman v Canada Communication No 694/1996 UNCHR, UN Doc CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996, para 10.6: if a state decides to provide public funding to religious schools, funding has to be available to all schools without discrimination. 48 For a similar argument based on German constitutional law, see H Bielefeldt, ‘Menschenrechte in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft’ (transcript, 2007) 139 et seq. 44 45

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fundamentally on states’ ability to foster their national identity and culture. In addition, a duty for states to remain neutral in cultural matters would be an impossible obligation to fulfil. Nevertheless, what can safely be said is that policies of neutrality in cultural matters will more easily prevail over the conflicting cultural rights of immigrants. Put differently, if a national culture consists in a public sphere regulated by neutral rules that allow the accommodation of different cultures in the common public domain, it will be upheld more easily against conflicting rights to cultural identity. To use the vocabulary developed by Rawls, international human rights favour a public sphere based on a procedural consensus on what is right, rather than on a substantive consensus of what is good.49 When a state furthers the interests of the national culture and adopts inverse identity politics, its public sphere is based on a substantive consensus of what is good. Therefore, the threshold for justifying inverse identity politics is high. International human rights do not rule out the possibility for states to propagate substantive ethical values; states may promote their own national culture, but if this leads to interference with international human rights, such interference will be more difficult to justify.

CONCLUSION

States are not culturally neutral. Even if they do not pursue an active cultural policy, their public sphere is inevitably imbibed with the majority population’s culture. International law respects this fact. It does not require states to be culturally neutral. This preliminary conclusion, however, is subject to two qualifications. First, states must acknowledge and if necessary counterbalance the disadvantages for immigrants arising from the application of seemingly neutral laws that, in reality, are culturally biased, if the application of such laws impedes immigrants in the exercise of their human rights. To a certain extent, international human rights law obliges states to accommodate immigrants’ cultural identities by adopting identity politics. Secondly, international law limits states’ efforts to actively favour the majority population’s culture. In human rights sensitive areas, at any rate, inverse identity politics are not permissible without qualifications. Inverse identity politics that are in conflict with the principle of state neutrality in religious matters are incompatible with the international freedom of religion provisions. In all other cases, inverse identity politics have to overcome a high justificatory hurdle. In this perspective, it is safe to say that although international law does not require cultural neutrality, it favours it.

49 See J Rawls, Political Liberalism, The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy 4 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books H Bielefeldt, ‘Menschenrechte in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft’ (transcript, 2007). M Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, Sage Publications, 1995). W Kälin, Grundrechte im Kulturkonflikt (Zurich, NZZ-Verlag, 2000). W Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). D McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion – The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006). M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn (Kehl, Engel, 2005). J Rawls, Political Liberalism, The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy 4 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993). J Ringelheim, Diversité culturelle et droits de l’homme, Collection du Centre des Droits de l’Homme de l’Université Catholique de Louvain 5 (Brussels, Bruylant, 2006).

Chapters in Edited Volumes W Kälin, ‘Integration of Migrants’ in TA Aleinikoff and V Chetail (eds), Migration and International Legal Norms (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2003). M Koenig and P de Guchteneire, ‘Political Governance of Cultural Diversity’ in Koenig, M et al (eds), Democracy and Human Rights in Multicultural Societies (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007).

Journal Articles S Baer and M Wrase, ‘Staatliche Neutralität und Toleranz in der Christlichabendländischen Wertewelt’ (2005) 58 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 243–52. A von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as Situation, Executive, and Promote of the International Law of Cultural Diversity – Elements of a Beautiful Friendship’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 241–75. PG Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 38–79. R Cholewinski, ‘Migrants as Minorities: Integration and Inclusion in the Enlarged European Union’ (2005) 43 Journal of common market studies 695–716. S Ferrari, ‘Individual Religious Freedom and National Security in Europe after September 11’ (2004) Brigham Young University Law Review 357–84. CC Joyner, ‘Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1986) 35 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 190–99.

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H Ruiz Fabri, ‘Jeux dans la fragmentation: la Convention sur la promotion de la diversité des expressions culturelles’ (2007) 1 Revue Generale de Droit International Public 43–87. S Stavros, ‘Freedom of Religion and Claims for Exemption from Generally Applicable, Neutral Laws: Lessons from Across the Pond?’ (1997) 6 European HumanRights Law Review 607–27. JA Sweeney, ‘Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era’ (2005) 54 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 459–74. G Toggenburg, ‘Who is Managing Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in the European Condominium? The Moments of Entry, Integration and Preservation’ (2005) 43 Journal of Common Market Studies 717–38.

Websites Sources UNDP Human Development Report 2004 ‘Cultural liberty in today’s diverse world’ http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr04_complete.pdf.

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Coping with Multiculturalism through Cosmopolitan Law JESSICA ALMQVIST *

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REASONING

A

CCORDING TO CRITICAL strands of thought, international law and its interpreters tend to oscillate in a somewhat helpless manner—or at least in a way that is not independent—between different (and competing) political doctrines (idealism and realism) when seeking to resolve conflicts of direct relevance to international affairs. In order for international law to offer an answer to such conflicts and, thus, to overcome its indeterminacy, so the argument goes, its interpreters must align themselves with one of these doctrines in the interpretation of facts, provisions and principles. When Professor Martti Koskenniemi published his now widely read and celebrated book on this topic, From Apology to Utopia,1 it was appreciated, above all, because of its considerable revelation of the extent to which international law and politics and, hence, political doctrines, are closely intertwined with one another, and how this relationship bears upon, and explains the nature of, international legal reasoning in the field of international adjudication and conflict resolution more generally. The contention about the existence of a close relationship between law and politics as an unavoidable circumstance of international judicial life is brought to the forefront of interest in this study. But, instead of reflecting upon the way in which this reality risks encumbering the ability of international law and its courts to deliver justice in an independent and impartial manner in response to protracted conflicts that come before them, it focuses on a somewhat different enterprise: that of reflecting upon the comparative advantage of differing political doctrines in capturing what is at stake in conflicts and in terms of offering an adequate scheme of principles to govern their fair and peaceful resolution.2 Considering international law’s tendency to oscillate between opposing and conflicting doctrines (and, hence, the risk of ‘politicisation’), an argument about the comparative advantage of some * García-Pelayo Research Fellow, Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, Madrid. 1 M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006). 2 Thus, my claim is not about the need for ‘depoliticising’ international legal argument in relation to claims that accrue from conflicts in multicultural societies in the sense of seeking to be ‘neutral’ in relation to political doctrines. Rather, it assumes that the task of resolving conflicting claims about rights recognised in international law might need to consider the contributions in the field of theories about justice and fairness, which take seriously the reality of conflicting claims and offer an account of their fair resolution. See eg J Waldron, ‘Rights’ in RE Goodin and P Pettit (eds), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993).

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political doctrine in the context of conflict resolution cannot reasonably be a purely theoretical exercise, that is, an exercise in pure reason, at least not if that argument purports to have some practical utility here and now instead of in some distant future which could be set apart from, or fully ignore the ‘legal wisdom’ about the importance attached to a sense of unity in international law and its interpretation.3 That sense of unity is essential for international law to be able to claim authority by virtue of it being law (and not something else) quite regardless of what each of us holds to be the most attractive account of this or that fact, provision or principle to inform these endeavours. In other words, for it to make sense of thinking of international law as law in the first place, and not as being easily reducible to a set of conflicting moral or political views about right and wrong in international affairs, the promotion of a particular political doctrine in this context should not be ignorant of the prospects of some ‘common ground’ across differing international legal communities on the ‘reasonableness’ of the concepts and principles it sets forth.4 That being said, the idea about the relevance of common ground is not necessarily conservationist in nature and in spirit, at least not if one refrains from an understanding of the substance of common ground as settled, once and for all, but one whose nature is sensitive to changes in the social and political background conditions (stemming from eg emerging global transportation and communication networks). Thus, what is entertained in this study is an understanding of international law and its constitution as ‘living’ and in this sense as prone to adjustments and reinterpretations in the light of social and political changes.5 In other words, while not discarding claims about the utility of promoting a certain political doctrine in a given historical period, it upholds the view that social and political changes can generate the need for a different doctrine whose basic claims about relevant facts and principles are more truthful to the new conditions. What is favoured then is a dynamic or evolutionary interpretation of international law.6 At the same time, while the idea of common ground entails an aspiration towards moral agreement across differing legal communities, the spirit of this study is more cautious. While not ruling out that such an agreement might be an honourable objective, it hesitates about the prospects of reaching such an agreement in regard to the principles that are to govern conflict resolution in the international judicial context. The most to hope for instead is that principal adjudicators will think of the substantive claims set forth as ‘reasonable’.

3 See relevant documents of the International Law Commission on ‘Fragmentation of International Law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law’ (after 2000). 4 J Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1995). 5 Here I refer to the thrust of the claim about the ‘Living Constitution’. See B Ackerman, ‘The Living Constitution’ (2007) 120 Harvard Law Review 1737. 6 On evolutionary interpretation, see eg P van Dijk and GJH van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998) 77 et seq.

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THE RISE OF MULTICULTURAL CONFLICTS

The question about the role of international law and its contributions to the field of conflict resolution takes on renewed significance—and, as contended here, is brought into doubt—as a result of an ever-growing multiculturalism within and across societies and states. The ongoing processes whereby people of differing cultures are brought into physical proximity with one another—whether it is through migration, commerce, refuge from failing states and mass violence—have led to an increase in conflicts with an intercultural dimension in those states and societies which have become attractive destinations. People with different cultural backgrounds and attachments, in terms of language and religion as well as habits and traditions, are forced to ‘rub shoulders’ with one another,7 more now than ever before, and this fact has revealed that the condition of ‘living together’ in spite of these differences, which from an international legal perspective includes sharing a territorial space and a set of public institutions, is not necessarily an ‘easy’ undertaking, but one that requires a universal effort towards understanding and tolerance, not merely from governments and public officials, but from all subjects of the law. While the European experience in the post-war period entails considerable empirical evidence in support of the claim about the human ability of living together in peaceful ways in spite of cultural differences created by human mobility across borders, it also entails stories and events as well as political actions that bear witness to some of the challenges that might arise in multicultural contexts and which are of real concern. The headscarf affairs and the cartoon controversies provide important illustrations of conflicts with an intercultural dimension which remain unsettled. Another case in point is the legitimisation of a political discourse that capitalises on a looming discontent with ‘foreigners’ (in a legal and cultural sense) and which has facilitated the adoption of extraordinary measures to control, contain (detain) and deport those who have been classified as ‘illegal immigrants’ without any legal opportunities to challenge before court the decisions that affect them.8 A third example refers to the European anxiety to participate in the Global Fight against Terrorism, which requires the adoption of measures, several of which are directed against foreigners in a cultural sense (such as the UN Security Council’s blacklisting).9 Though the felt need to respond to the devastating terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London is understandable, the rapid deterioration of human rights protection in relation to those who have been identified as ‘terrorist suspects’ (and whose cultural and/or legal status is often that of foreigner) is not.10

7 J Waldron, ’Liberal: Political and Comprehensive’ in G Gaus and C Kukathas (eds), Handbook in Political Theory (London, Sage, 2004) 89. 8 Directive (EC) 2008/115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals [2008] OJ L348/98. 9 For the creation of a consolidated list, see UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267. The Consolidated List established and maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to Al-Qaida, Usama Bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, last updated 17 October 2007, www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/pdflist.pdf. 10 See eg Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (2 June 2008 ) UN Doc A/HRC/8/13, Section II.

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The conflicts between states and foreigners related to cultural differences can hardly be thought of as either trivial or parochial (ie domestic) from the standpoint of international law and its interpreters. For one thing, the interested parties to the conflicts are rarely confined to one particular domestic realm; rather, a civil or public action in a one place tends to provoke responses from governments and cultures in other places, including violent protests against, and condemnations of, the action held to affect the status of their populations and cultures (eg attacks against embassies). In this sense, their resolution raises concerns about the conditions of peaceful and amicable relations in international affairs, and whether these entail some sensitivity in relation to cultural differences across states and populations.11 Furthermore, since 9/11, some of these conflicts (in particular, those related to methods of deportation, control orders, freezing of assets and CIA flights), while regretted, have come to be seen as the inevitable consequence of meeting an international commitment to respond to the threat of international terrorism in an effective manner. Thus, from this perspective, the resolution of these conflicts raises matters related to international security.12 Finally, and at the heart of this study, the fact that the claims on the different sides of the conflicts in question tend to be articulated in the language of human rights, and have been brought before human rights courts, indicates the possibility of state failures to meet their international human rights obligations in relation to foreigners.13

A LIMITED UNDERSTANDING OF CULTURE

Notwithstanding several good reasons for understanding the conflicts in focus as endowed with international legal relevance—whether as a result of their transnational, human rights or security dimensions—the political doctrines that international law has hitherto tended to align itself with offer a meaning of culture that tends to marginalise a deeper reflection of the nature of these conflicts and, hence, of their peaceful and fair resolution. Indeed, both the idealist and realist doctrines that dominate the international legal debate unite in the contention that culture in the sense relevant to international law mainly refers to the nation. In other words, both doctrines unite in a primordial concern with conflicts with territorial and historical dimensions. The differences between the two sets of doctrines lie in their views on the main principles that govern the settlement of conflicts with a cultural flavour. Their divergence emanates from a disagreement about the worth and

11 The Office of the UN Secretary-General ‘Alliance of Civilizations – Report of the High-level Group’ (from 13 November 2006) www.unaoc.org/repository/HLG_Report.pdf. 12 While on a deeper level the conflict is between state and foreigners, in the public context the conflict is often played out between states and leading human rights NGOs. 13 By now, several cases of this kind have been dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights. Most of the complaints have been rejected. See eg X v Austria (App 1753/63) (1965) 8 Yearbook 174 (EComHR); X v UK (App 8231/78) (1982) 28 DR 5; Zeynep Tekin v Turkey (App no 41556/98) ECHR 29 June 2004; Leyla Sahin v Turkey (App no 44774/98) ECHR 2005-XI 173; Köse and 93 others v Turkey (App no 26625/02) ECHR 24 January 2006; Kurtulmus¸ v Turkey (App no 65500/01) ECHR 24 January 2006; Phull v France (App no 35753/03) ECHR 11 November 2005.

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quality that we may attribute to culture-related claims (such as their authentic nature or their relationship with human rights protection) and how to weigh them against other international interests. On one hand, and to put it in simple terms, the realist doctrines depict most culture-related claims as parochial, inauthentic, or in any case irrelevant from an international legal standpoint; on this account, only unmediated national claims about the right to independence and statehood ought to receive attention, but merely because of the potential threat to international peace and security that they pose, and the need to reaffirm respect for basic principles of international relations rooted in basic principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-intervention. The idealist doctrines, on the other hand, are more prone to endorse the worth and quality of culture-related claims. From their standpoint, such claims are not only relevant to international affairs, but may also be seen as revealing failures to respect the principle of national self-determination in relation to all nations.14 The cultural dimensions of the decolonisation process, the nationalist demands in the wake of the collapse of communism, and the rise of the indigenous peoples movement, bear witness to the need to strengthen the principle of national self-determination, whether it is in the form of independence or statehood (a radical reading), autonomous communities, federalism, or local self-government (a moderate reading).15 Still, while for the idealists each of these processes seemed to strengthen the need for a conceptual and practical separation of the notions of state and culture, none of them challenged any of the notions of such. In fact, the rise of international human rights law left the notion of the nation as representing something like the ‘archetype’ of culture from the standpoint of international law largely intact.16 In spite of a near-exclusive focus on ideas about the nation in understanding the significance of culture from the standpoint of international law, it must be noted that other meanings are being entertained, at least to some extent, in the field of international human rights law. However, these other meanings of culture are not treated in a coherent and unified manner, but crop up in different sub-fields of international human rights law (concerning migrants,17 minorities,18 women,19

14 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Art 1 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR) Art 1. 15 See eg M Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’ (1994) 43 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 241. 16 The assumed link between culture and nation is also reinforced in the political philosophical contributions that were advanced in response to contemporary nationalist movements. See for example C Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in A Gutmann (ed), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994) and W Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995). 17 UNGA International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families (adopted 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003) 30 ILM 1521 Art 17. 18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Art 27. 19 UNGA Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW) Arts 5(a) and 13(c).

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children,20 etc), and there is no clear sense whether each of them has common roots or share conceptual foundations. In its negative versions, culture is depicted as a barrier or obstacle that prevents individuals from benefiting from their human rights,21 and, at times, as a source of violence and, thus, of human rights infringement unless the state interferes through condemnation and criminalisation.22 In its more positive versions, in contrast, culture is depicted as something like a ‘common good’ that all individuals have a right to access, and benefit from.23 In this context, culture is sometimes seen as a truly universal good and sometimes, as a communal good that is valuable only for its members while not necessarily for others.24 The partial recognition of the relevance of other meanings of culture from the standpoint of international law and in particular related to human rights indicates that a nation-orientated interpretation of the notion of culture does not succeed in setting out a full-blown explanation of how culture is relevant to international law and its interpreters. Even so, although other meanings are entertained, until now, not much has been done in terms of advancing them, and, above all, of sorting out what seems to be a more complex relation between the individual and culture than a conventional focus on the nation seems to admit. Still, for international law to be able to offer a sound understanding of the nature of the conflicts with an intercultural dimension which now stands in need of more critical reflection, and even engagement, its interpreters must distance themselves from the nation, and consider the utility of alternative or complementary interpretations of culture.25 Especially urgent is the need to shift the focus onto conflicts with an intercultural dimension with their source in an increasing human movement across territorial borders whereby people of differing cultures are brought into proximity with one

20 UNGA Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC) Art 31 21 See eg UNGA Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW) Art 5(a). 22 See eg Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (adopted 23 February 1994 UNGA Res 48/104); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (adopted 9 June 1994, entered into force on 5 March 1995) 33 ILM 1534 (‘Convention of Belem Do Para’); Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa [final version] (adopted 13 September 2000, entered into force 25 November 2000) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/66.6; and African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (adopted 11 July 1990, entered into force 29 November 1999) (1992) 18 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1112 Art 21. 23 See eg International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR), Art 1; UNGA International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, opened for signature March 7 1966) 660 UNTS 195; UNGA Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC) Art 31. 24 See eg International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Arts 1 and 27; Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, UNGA Res 47/135 (18 December 1992) Art 1.1; UNGA International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (adopted 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003) 30 ILM 1521 Art 31. 25 A more detailed account of culture is provided further on in this paper.

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another, and the conflicts that arise as a result of this process, in an attempt to sort out not merely what is at stake, but also what are the basic principles to govern their resolution.

A COSMOPLITAN APPROACH

My proposal to turn to cosmopolitan doctrine when approaching these questions is not meant to be a ‘fantastic or exaggerated’ idea, but one that brings into the centre of international attention some basic sociological facts about the modern world. The first one is the fact of an ever-increasing human mobility across borders (quite regardless of state approval), brought about by a variety of factors including the advancement of global transportation systems. A second point is that the intercultural encounters resulting from this mobility are not necessarily peaceful, but generate new conflicts and quarrels that need to be settled. While acknowledging that cultural differences between states (natives) and foreigners are sources of antagonism, hatred and disagreement, the doctrine also stresses the possibility of living together in spite of such differences. Third, a classical reading of cosmopolitanism also encourages us to understand that tensions between states and foreigners (including how we respond to their cultural differences) are not insignificant, but constitute a main tug in the establishment or maintenance of peaceful international relations.26 Against this background it seems to make sense to reflect on the comparative advantage of the cosmopolitan doctrine in guiding our thought on these matters, including closer attention to the basic principles it sets forth. Instead of maintaining an international stance of deliberate ‘privatisation’ or ‘domestication’ of the questions at stake, the doctrine in question brings the main preoccupations related to human movement, including cultural quarrels, to the forefront of the international agenda in order to search for common solutions and frameworks. The first part of this section will be dedicated to two basic cosmopolitan principles as set forth by Immanuel Kant (who remains one of the most articulated cosmopolitans) to guide conflict resolution between states and foreigners. It then sets forth an account of the worth or quality of culture-related claims arising in the context of conflicts related to culture and how the two principles might guide us in resolving them.

26 But note the relevance of the long-standing principle of diplomatic protection, and the recent contributions of the International Law Commission towards the progressive codification of that principle.

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Hospitality In his discussion of ‘cosmopolitan right’,27 a main principle of the establishment of peaceful international relations, Immanuel Kant focused on the question of conditions of entry and stay for foreigners. In this context, he articulated a principle of hospitality (hospitableness), according to which an alien has the right ‘not to be treated as an enemy upon his arrival to another’s country.’28 While reckoning that more specific rights of foreigners (residence and naturalisation) were positivistic in the sense that states might choose to grant or not to grant them,29 in order to act in accordance with universal principles, states would need to respect the right to visit, to associate. This right, Kant contended, ‘belongs to all men by virtue of their common ownership of the earth’s surface.’30 Indeed, ‘natural right extends to the right to hospitality, ie the privilege of aliens to enter, only so far as makes attempts at commerce with native inhabitants possible.’31 Furthermore, while this right seems narrow, he defends a meaning of that right that under certain circumstances is broader than a right to political asylum, including protection from starvation and from fatal disease. He argues that the state is permitted to refuse a visitor only ‘when it can happen without his death’.32 From this perspective, Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan law contains several justifications for some of the refugee rights that have been established in international law.33

27 For a contemporary interpretation of this concept, see eg J Waldron, ‘What is Cosmopolitan?’ (2000) 8 The Journal of Political Philosophy 227. 28 I Kant and T Humphrey (translator), To Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1983) para 358. 29 ibid. Eg according to Kant, an alien may request the right to be a permanent visitor (which would require a special, charitable agreement to make him a fellow inhabitant for a certain period). 30 ibid. 31 ibid. 32 ibid. See also P Kleingeld, ‘Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany’ (1999) Journal of the History of Ideas 505, 513–15, citing H Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983) 260. 33 See UNGA Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 150. As of 31 October 2008, 140 states had ratified this Convention. For a most comprehensive account of the various definitions of the term ‘refugees’, see GS GoodwinGill, The Refugee in International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996). Goodwin-Gill explains that: ‘In ordinary language, it [the term “refugee”] has a broader, looser meaning, signifying someone in flight, who seeks to escape conditions or personal circumstances found to be intolerable. The destination is not relevant; the flight is to freedom, to safety. Likewise, the reasons for flight may be many; flight from oppression, from a threat to life or liberty, flight from prosecution; flight from deprivation, from grinding poverty; flight from war or civil strife; flight from natural disasters, earthquake, flood, drought, famine. Implicit in the ordinary meaning of the word “refugee” lies an assumption that the person concerned is worth of being, and ought to be, assisted, and, if necessary, protected from the causes and consequences of flight’ (p 3). The legal definition is much more restrictive and excludes ‘economic refugees’ and makes a distinction between victims of natural disasters and victims of conditions or disasters with a human origin (pp 3–4). Thus, according to Art 1(a) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, ‘the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who: … (2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’ In this paper, the term ‘refugee’ is used in its broader sense.

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Still, given the general nature of the Kantian claim, it might not seem helpful in seeking to advance a more detailed understanding of the rights of different categories of persons who move about in the world (whether refugees, migrants or adventure-seekers, etc), and the more precise basis for their rights of entrance and stay. Furthermore, although not advocating universal admission, it must be noted that, while on its face, the principle of hospitality, if applied to its fullest extent, might encourage the acceptance of some kind of mass invasion, Kant did not believe that this would occur. His understanding was that ‘nature wills otherwise’: it uses ‘two means to prevent people from intermingling and to separate them, differences in language and religion which do indeed dispose men to mutual hatred and to pretexts for war.’34 Whether it is reasonable nowadays to continue to insist on a natural ‘cultural filter’ that de facto limits human mobility across borders (significant technological developments having taken place since the time of Kant’s writings) is debatable. Nevertheless, a cosmopolitan approach insists that hospitableness ought to be the default position, and that any restrictions of that principle must make sense from the standpoint of cosmopolitan law. Thus, for example, the nationalist claim that this is our place and because of this we choose which rights to grant to those who do not belong here, is not an acceptable one (since for cosmopolitans, the surface of the earth is ultimately shared in common with all others and because other considerations related to the circumstances of the foreigners take precedence).35 Another problematic denial of entry for foreigners would be the nationalist response that a people have a right to protect their national culture. While recognising that cultural differences could provoke mutual hatred and even lead to war, Kant also held that the ‘the growth of culture and men’s gradual progress toward greater agreement regarding their principles lead to mutual understanding and peace.’36 However, the prospects of peaceful relations among individuals would be produced and secured through equilibrium of the liveliest competing powers.37 Thus, it would not be through cultural assimilation, deportation, or denial of the rights to visit and associate.

Equal Respect for Freedom While ‘cosmopolitan’ in the first instance centres on how to regulate the relationship between foreigners and the state at the ‘gate’, so to speak, an equal challenge facing international law is how to understand the relationship with individuals residing on territories of foreign states. There is a persistent temptation of states to delimit, in practice, the range of beneficiaries of human rights to nationals or citizens,38 or to simply assume that foreigners are not entitled to the same respect as nationals or citizens, but without attempting to offer sound and reasonable 34 35 36 37 38

Kant, To Perpetual Peace (n 28) para 367. ibid para 358 [the right to the earth’s surface … belongs to all men in common]. ibid para 367. ibid. H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951).

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justifications for these kinds of delimitations. In this context, international law’s alignment with political doctrines that centre on culture as the nation seems to give some sense to this delimitation with the consequent subordination of foreigners to nationals and citizens. In this light, the turn to cosmopolitan is meant as a simple reminder and reinforcement of the basic principles that sustain international human rights law: its universal scope of application, as well as its commitment to principles of non-discrimination and equal respect. Human equality is the default position; any imposition of restriction must be justified in relation to those who are most seriously affected as a result of that restriction.39 It is obvious that Kant’s account of rights in relation to foreigners does not seem to dwell on critical issues in immigration debates at the moment, such as the conditions of rights to residence as well as the acquisition of social and political rights.40 Had we had the opportunity to ask Kant about these matters, he might have told us that these kinds of questions would need to be addressed in the framework of the ‘coming cosmopolitan constitution.’ As he noted (in the passage following the articulation of the right to hospitality and the purpose of this right, ie commerce): In this way [through the establishment of transnational commercial relations] distant parts of the world can establish with one another peaceful relations that will eventually become matters of public law, and the human race can gradually be brought closer and closer to a cosmopolitan constitution.41

Thus, while not setting forth a comprehensive account of which kinds of freedoms such a constitution would recognise, the spirit of Perpetual Peace seems to reveal that it would be a constitution that would be capable of accommodating all of us, regardless of our cultural differences, in a spirit of equal respect. Whether we are still waiting for the establishment of such a constitution, or whether it is possible to detect several of its essential features in the many constitutions that are now in force, might be a question that reasonable people disagree about. Even so, to the extent that constitutions include a Bill of Rights that in principle extend to all human beings who happen to reside or live within their respective territorial jurisdictions, it does seem to make sense to speak of at least a partial establishment. While the question of the full range of freedoms is not agreed upon, the universal scope and nature of the civic freedoms (quite regardless of period of settlement, etc) in such a constitution seems uncontroversial. This seems to suggest that the most protracted conflicts that emerge at the moment can be pinned down to refusals to allow foreigners to benefit from the full range of

39 G Gaus, Social Philosophy (New York, ME Sharpe, 1999) 119. As Gaus explains: ‘any discriminatory act—any action that provides differential advantages or burdens—stands in need of justification; any unjustified discriminatory act calls for redress. See also J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain. Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) 220. According to J Raz, for authorities to be legitimate they must act for reasons and their legitimacy depends on a degree of success in doing so. 40 See eg J Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London, Routledge, 2001). For a constructive interpretation of cosmopolitanism to attend to these issues, see eg S Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006). 41 Kant, To Perpetual Peace (n 28) para 358 (emphasis added).

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freedoms. While by no means seeking to undermine claims about the importance of social and political rights to foreigners, this essay insists upon the continued relevance of the claim about the universal and unconditional nature of civic freedoms. Several of the most perplexing conflicts between states and foreigners in Europe at the moment (including those related to headscarves, cartoons, detention and deportation without access to court, blacklisting, etc), reveal an apparent disregard of what the principle of equal respect for civil freedoms, in fact, requires in a multicultural context.

A Complementary Account of Culture So far, my account of ‘cosmopolitan’ has been rather general, in that it has only referred to some of its basic principles. Much remains to be done in conceptual terms before it is reasonable to think of that doctrine as better equipped than others to aid international law and its interpreters to address and respond to conflicts in multicultural societies. In particular, what is missing is an account of culture that is able to explain what is at stake in these conflicts and the normative significance of cultural differences from the standpoint of human rights and the principle of equal freedom. This section aims to fill this gap. To begin with, it must be noted that cosmopolitans are inclined to endorse a vision of the relation between individuals and culture which, in a manner similar to realistic doctrines, diminishes the moral worth of culture-related claims arising as a result of human movement across borders from the standpoint of international law. For the most part, the cosmopolitan vision stresses the impure, intermingling and changeable nature of culture, and depicts the individual as a ‘freewheeler’ who is capable of moving about among differing cultures and benefiting from a diverse range of culture-specific goods and riches from different parts of the world. On this account, the individual is not tied to any culture in particular, neither does she see settlement in a new culture as negative, but as an adventurous and rewarding endeavour. It was in this spirit that Professor Jeremy Waldron set forth his account of culture in his essay on ‘The Cosmopolitan Alternative’ in 1992, that was meant to offer an important alternative to nation (or close-knit communities)-oriented understandings of the relation between individuals and their cultures.42 Still, we might ask: is the cosmopolitan stance able to offer a sound alternative or complementary meaning of culture? Particularly troublesome is that while the cosmopolitan account of culture explains how it is possible for people to move about in the world and settle in distant places, in spite of cultural differences, sometimes radical ones, it does less in terms of setting the stage for addressing the difficulties facing many travellers. This is so since the cosmopolitan account seems to focus on individuals who are prepared in linguistic and cultural terms to move

42 J Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’ (1992) 25 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 751. See also J Waldron, ‘What is Cosmopolitan?’ (2000) 8 Journal of Political Philosophy 227.

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about (as ‘citizens of the world’).43 It affords hardly any attention to those who are less prepared (or not prepared at all) in this sense but still move to foreign places, and this in spite of the plain truth that many migrants do not embark on their travels because of a curiosity about other cultures, but because of a (felt) need to escape unbearable conditions of violence or poverty (refugees in the broader sense).44 That being said, however, an apparent neglect of the circumstances of the less fortunate traveller does not mean that cosmopolitan doctrine has nothing to offer to conflict resolution in multicultural societies. Once cosmopolitans shift the focus onto the range of cultural obstacles or barriers facing individuals in foreign places in seeking to use their freedoms, the need for a more careful consideration of the nature of culture-related claims should become apparent. While upholding the claim about the possibility of moving about and of living together, including resolving matters of common concern, in spite of cultural differences, cosmopolitans cannot reasonably remain estranged from the painful truth that people are rarely prepared (or able) to leave their cultural baggage behind (and acquire new) when heading for what seem to be more secure and prosperous destinations for themselves and their families. Indeed, unless cosmopolitans engage in a more serious debate about the less glamorous dimensions of culture, their viewpoint might not be able to aid in conflict-resolution in multicultural societies where a sound alternative to the nation-oriented paradigm is most needed. A cosmopolitan account of culture is inextricably tied up with a set of deeper assumptions about the individual as the moral unit of concern; indeed, its ignorance of culture-related claims is due, at least in part, to a rejection of the nation or other collectives as constituting such units. Even so, more recent anthropological and sociological interpretations of culture do not understand the term culture as referring to collectives, but instead as denoting a set of ‘individualisable’ properties of each human being (such as cultural equipment, conduct rules, and ideological commitment) which inform and constrain individual action in social and public realms.45 The degree of cultural differences that pertain between any given individual (on the one hand) and the culture that dominate each of these realms (on the other) can be measured from the standpoint of these properties. In this context, the notions of foreignness, alienation and estrangement are often used to denote not mainly or only a legal status, as much as seeking to capture an individual sentiment that is produced in situations where significant differences prevail between the cultural attachment of an individual and the culture dominating the public institutions of a given setting. In what follows is an attempt to elaborate a more

43 M Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ in J Cohen (ed), For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism. With respondents. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1996) 3–17. 44 Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (n 33), 3–4. 45 See eg A Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’ (1986) 51 American Sociological Review 273. See also R Wuthnow, Meaning and Moral Order. Explorations in Cultural Analysis (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987) 337–38. Wuthnow understands culture not only as referring to inner states or feelings, but also as vehicle for individual utterances and actions.

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comprehensive account of two of these properties and their direct relevance to the aim of securing respect for human rights in multicultural settings.46 One of the more protracted conflicts with their source in cultural differences of the kind in focus are those depending on the fact that cultures represent differing settlements on matters of adiaphora.47 These are settlements that regulate the way in which we go about our day-to-day assignments and preoccupations, whether it is about diet, dress, child-rearing, caring for the elderly and sick, or about marriage, divorce, and much else. From the standpoint of cosmopolitan moral law, these are matters of ultimate moral indifference in the sense that none of us can say, for sure, which way is the best or right for all (even though most of us would insist on the universal nature of some basic outer limits). Even so, in spite of an apparent stance of moral indifference towards the way in which each conducts his social or civil affairs, most conflicts with an intercultural dimension that crop up in multicultural societies are precisely concerned with these matters. In fact, these conflicts tend to reveal an intense human interest and, not infrequently, opposition and condemnation of ways of dress, worship, child-rearing, marriage, etc that are different from one’s own. According to Kant, this is so because in this realm of human affairs, we fabricate morality.48 Thus, rather than assuming that humans follow a set of practices in a ‘blind-folded’ manner, if asked, each of us will in all likelihood find some explanation for our preference or for following one set of practices rather than another.49 The recognition of this link between thought (or conscience) and practice is not meant to refute the charge that by no means all who follow a given practice agree or endorse it, and that several cultural practices survive only as a result of instruction, social pressure (even threats of compliance), prejudice or myths, rather than independent thought. Neither is it meant to silence critics (whether outsiders or insiders) of particular cultural practices. At most, it is meant as a reminder of the range of reasons or explanations for a given cultural engagement, and the need to consider the possible worth of cultural attachments from the standpoint of those whose attachments they are.50 Quite regardless of whether we think of the settlements as representing differing conceptions of the good life, or simply matters of life (and in this sense connoting something like personal or social ‘infrastructures’),51 from the standpoint of cosmopolitan law, culture-specific claims about respecting them must be seen as raising questions about the nature and scope of individual freedom and how to secure equal respect for the freedom of every individual in multicultural societies. Furthermore, given that most domestic legal

46 For a more elaborate account of each of these properties, see J Almqvist, Human Rights, Culture and the Rule of Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005). 47 See eg I Kant, P Heath (ed) and JB Schneewind (ed) Lectures on Ethics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) 130 et seq. 48 ibid 362 and 363. 49 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999) 161. 50 See eg J Locke, ‘An Essay on Toleration’ in M Goldie (ed), Political Essays Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) 139–40. 51 C Taylor, ‘God Loveth Adverbs’ in C Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1989) 211. Taylor refers to Aristotle, Politics III 1280b.

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systems are not restricted to a set of prohibitions that outlaws violence, but entails considerable regulation of social matters (including education, health care, social security, dress codes, food preparation, slaughter regulations, marriage and divorce, drugs etc), and to the extent that the specific contents of these kinds of regulations tend to be shaped by the culture that dominates the public institutions of the state, the introduction of new cultures tend to raise claims about the need for legal revisions, accommodations, or abolitions of some of these regulations. In other words, from a cosmopolitan standpoint, the rise of antagonism and disagreement on matters of adiaphora is not regrettable as such; rather, the challenge for the state consists instead of how to secure equal respect and tolerance of the range of possible ways of making use of one’s freedom, whether it is understood as attending to ordinary life issues, or seeking to pursue the good life. What is important to emphasise in this context is that nationalist sentiments— whether secular or religious in spirit and content—have no prior or automatic right to place restrictions on the range of permissible ways on the sheer basis that it antagonises or offends the ways of others. Thus, it is not enough, at least not if we are committed to the principle of equal respect for individual freedom, to demand of foreigners and others who differ in cultural terms that they follow the way of the natives (ie to assimilate). While no culture can be assumed or be proclaimed as immune from influence or coercive measures (law and social pressure) in multicultural societies, whether in a majority or minority position, the starting point for thinking about restrictions of individual freedom is that no culture has a prior claim to domination, but that public institutions must give reasons or justifications for resisting accommodations of new cultures introduced into the state framework as a result of an impressive (and seemingly unstoppable) human mobility across territories. The main challenge to the provision of equal freedom is the rise of identity politics. As John Locke noted in his essay on toleration, the right to toleration, which includes toleration of dress, diet, and worship, etc, is not absolute, but may be restricted. The right is meant to be exercised in the spirit of duty, sincerity and out of conscience. Thus, it does not protect attempts to use religious habits, gestures and manners in an attempt to gain power and dominance and to force and compel others to be of one’s mind. However, Locke carefully pointed out that political ambition is not the fault of worship, but the product of depraved, ambitious human nature making use of all sorts of religions.52 Furthermore, in a sensitive context, a given cultural practice can become fraught with political significance quite regardless of the intention of the person whose practice it is. From the standpoint of freedom, the rise of identity politics is regrettable, because it undermines the conditions for its meaningful exercise. It politicises matters that ought to be of ultimate indifference.

52 J Locke, ‘An Essay on Toleration’ in M Goldie (ed), Political Essays: Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) 139.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has shed light on the unfortunate impact of the persistent alignment of international law and its interpreters to political doctrines that depicts culture as referring to the nation in international legal reasoning about facts and law. This alignment is regrettable, in that it fails to capture what is at stake in the conflicts that ravel at the moment generated by the fact that people are forced together in spite of their cultural differences and must establish ways of living together. In addition, it undermines the claim about a distinct cosmopolitan dimension of international law (international human rights law) and the acute importance of reinforcing the basic principles that are inherent in that dimension in the face of national policies that exclude or marginalise foreigners from the ambit of human rights protection. An unrelenting focus on the fate of the nations in a globalising world risk debilitating the cosmopolitan claim about the universal and unconditional nature of individual freedom, and the duty of states to secure equal respect for that freedom. The national responses to claims of new cultures bear witness to the standing temptation of states to reduce the scope of application of international human rights law to the nationals of this or that state, or to interpret that law as permitting the favouring of their culture-specific preferences and norms without any consideration of the hardships suffered as a result. Against this background, a reinforcement of the cosmopolitan roots of international human rights law together with the articulation of a cosmopolitan account of the relationship between the individual and culture seek to provide a basis for a more engaging role of international law and its interpreters in the field of conflict-resolution in multicultural societies. It also aims at empowering courts— whether regional or domestic—on matters of human rights at a time when such empowerment is much needed. Insofar as foreigners are excluded from taking an active part in political life and legislative debates in their place of living, courts— whether international, regional or national—represent unique public forums to which to turn with complaints against encroachments or unreasonable restrictions of civil freedom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books J Almqvist, Human Rights, Culture and the Rule of Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005). H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951). S Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006). J Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London, Routledge, 2001). P van Dijk and GJH van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998). G Gaus, Social Philosophy (New York, ME Sharpe, 1999).

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GS Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996). I Kant and T Humphrey (translator) To Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1983). I Kant, P Heath and JB Schneewind (eds) Lectures on Ethics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997). M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006). W Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995). J Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1995). J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain. Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994). J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999) H Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983). R Wuthnow, Meaning and Moral Order. Explorations in Cultural Analysis (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987). Chapters in Edited Volumes J Locke, ‘An Essay on Toleration’ in M Goldie (ed), Political Essays, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997). M Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ in J Cohen (ed), For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism. With respondents. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1996). C Taylor, ‘God Loveth Adverbs’ in C Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1989). C Taylor, (‘The Politics of Recognition’ in A Gutmann (ed), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994) J Waldron, ‘Rights’ in RE Goodin and P Pettit (eds), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993). J Waldron, ‘Liberal: Political and Comprehensive’ in G Gaus and C Kukathas (eds), Handbook in Political Theory (London, Sage, 2004). Journal Articles B Ackerman, ‘The Living Constitution’ (2007) 120 Harvard Law Review 1737– 812. P Kleingeld, ‘Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany’ (1999) Journal of the History of Ideas 505–24. M Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’ (1994) 43 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 241–69. A Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’ (1986) 51 American Sociological Review 273–86.

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J Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’ (1992) 25 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 751–94. J Waldron, ‘What is Cosmopolitan?’ (2000) 8 Journal of Political Philosophy 227–43.

Website Sources The Office of the UN Secretary–General ‘Alliance of Civilizations – Report of the High–level Group’(13 November 2006) www.unaoc.org/repository/ HLG_Report.pdf.

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Le Rôle du Droit International Privé Face au ‘Nouveau’ Modèle de Migration ‘Temporaire ou Circulaire’ La Technique de Coopération des Autorités et Quelques Questions Relatives au Statut Personnel des Étrangers Face au Pluralisme MARINA VARGAS GÓMEZ-URRUTIA*

INTRODUCTION

L

A PRÉSENTE COMMUNICATION a pour objectif de mener une réflexion sur le modèle de migration temporaire ou circulaire—promue dans différents forums internationaux1 comme une alternative possible à la gestion de l’immigration légale—et sur le rôle du droit international privé dans ce nouveau contexte migratoire. Conçue comme un nouveau mode de gestion de la circulation légale des personnes, la migration temporaire ou circulaire est définie comme ‘un mouvement de personnes qui ne modifient pas leur résidence habituelle et qui à aucun moment ne peut se transformer en migration définitive’.2 Ce mouvement temporaire de personnes présente plusieurs modalités, la migration circulaire et multidirectionnelle en étant l’une des formes les plus caractéristiques. On entend par migration circulaire et multidirectionnelle le ‘mouvement fluide des populations entre des pays

* Professeur Dr collaborateur Droit international privé—Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED-España). Ce travail est encadré dans le Proyect SEJ 2007/67381 – Derecho civil internacional: pluralidad e interacción de normas internacionales. Problemas de aplicación (Dr Miguel Gómez Jene, Main researcher). Mes remerciements à Paloma Abarca Junco pour son appui et ses commentaires précieux. Traduction : France Brousse. Toutes les erreurs sont de mon exclusive responsabilité. 1 OIM (Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations), La Migración Internacional y el Desarrollo: perspectivas y experiencias de la OIM (avril 2006), www.un.int/iom/ IOM%20Perspectives%20and %20Experiences%20Spanish.pdf. GFMD (Forum Mondial sur la Migration et le Développement), doc prép Bruxelles 2007. Commission européenne, Communication de la Commission au Parlement européen, au Conseil, Comité économique et social européen et au Comité des régions relative aux migrations circulaires et aux partenariats pour la mobilité entre l’Union européenne et les pays tiers (16.05.2007) COM/2007/0248 final. 2 K Newland, ‘Migración circular, tendencias empíricas y políticas’ conférence 15.2.2008 voir ibid ‘A Surge of Interest in Migration and Development’ (2007) Migration Information Source, www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=580.

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Le Rôle du Droit International Privé 113 … qui, lorsqu’il se produit volontairement et lorsqu’il est lié à des besoins de main d’œuvre des pays d’origine et de destination, peut être bénéfique pour toutes les parties concernées.’3 Sous une perspective différente mais dont la finalité pratique est elle aussi de réguler et d’ordonner les mouvements migratoires internationaux, l’Union européenne encourage la ‘circularité’ comme une incitation dans les politiques migratoires, en esquissant le modèle en fonction du cadre réglementaire communautaire actuel et naturellement dans le respect des compétences des États membres en matière de droit des étrangers et de l’immigration.4 Du point de vue de la politique législative, la Commission européenne considère nécessaire de faciliter la migration circulaire étant donné les avantages qu’elle présenterait en permettant un certain degré de mobilité licite entre le pays d’origine et le pays de d’accueil, parce qu’elle: permettrait d’offrir une alternative crédible à l’immigration irrégulière et, si elle était bien gérée, pourrait contribuer à assurer l’adéquation entre l’offre et la demande de main d’œuvre au niveau international et contribuer à une répartition plus efficace des ressources disponibles et de la croissance économique.5

Dans ce sens, la migration circulaire diffère de celle visée dans les accords bilatéraux classiques sur les travailleurs migrants, qui depuis les premières formulations à l’aube du XXe siècle6 puis dans leurs évolutions progressives, constituent encore le corpus international bilatéral le plus important de la réglementation et de l’ordonnancement juridique des migrations du travail.7 Face à l’ensemble de traités bilatéraux ayant trait aux travailleurs migrants, l’option juridique multilatérale— dont la nécessité a été soulignée à plusieurs reprises au sein d’instances, d’organismes internationaux8 et d’autres forums internationaux spécialisés9—reste en retrait. Elle ne doit pourtant point être condamnée à l’oubli et ceci, pour deux raisons principales. Tout d’abord, et d’un point de vue général, parce qu’elle est particulièrement utile lorsqu’il s’agit de créer des domaines de coopération internationale de plus grande envergure et portant sur des matières extrêmement diverses. En politique migratoire internationale, ces domaines de coopération permettraient, entre autres, la construction d’un cadre juridique (international) de référence pour réguler, canaliser et/ou faciliter les flux migratoires, coordonner les politiques d’État

3 P Levitt et N Nyberg Sorensen, ‘Global Migration Perspectives: The Transnational Turn in Migration Studies‘ (2004) 6 Global Migration Perspectives 1–13, www.gcim.org/gmp/ Global%20Migration%20Perspectives%20No%206.pdf. 4 COM/2007/0248 final (n 1) 1. 5 COM/2007/0248 final (n 1) 1. 6 M Lô Diatta, ‘L’évolution des accords bilatéraux sur les travailleurs migrants’ 135 Journal du droit international (2007) 101–31. 7 Voir OIT, 65 Estudios sobre migraciones internacionales (2004) Annexe I. 8 Le ‘Compromiso de Montevideo sobre Migraciones y Desarrollo’. Secretaría General Iberoamericana (SEGIB) – Foro Montevideo (Uruguay) – XVI Cumbre Iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno (nov 2006), http://www.xvicumbre.org.uy/pdf/xvi_compromiso.pdf (17.06.2009). 9 Voir Bureau permanent de la Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé, ‘Quelques réflexions sur l’utilité d’appliquer certaines techniques de coopération internationale développées par la conférence de La Haye de droit international privé aux questions de migration internationale (deuxième note de suivi)’. Doc prél no 6 (mars 2008), www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pd06f2008.pdf.

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rapprochant les divers régimes étatiques et harmonisant, dans la mesure du possible, la règlementation applicable à l’immigration ; mais aussi, et en cohérence avec ce qui précède, d’établir des normes juridiques d’application commune. Deuxièmement, et d’un point de vue spécifique, un cadre commun multilatéral reposant sur la coopération internationale serait particulièrement utile pour la mise en œuvre de la migration circulaire et il permettrait la confluence des politiques d’État concernant les éléments qui justifient ce type de migration, tout en assurant une tutelle plus efficace des objectifs et des intérêts en présence. En allant un peu plus loin, on peut dire qu’encourager la migration circulaire signifie mettre en œuvre une politique législative visant à éviter, dans la mesure du possible, l’installation définitive des migrants économiques et de leurs familles, et donc, en cohérence, qui essaie d’inverser la tendance à rester dans le pays d’accueil. Si le modèle parvient à se consolider, la réorientation et la modification de certains instruments réglementaires communautaires en vigueur et des lois nationales sur les étrangers semblent inévitables. Ainsi l’ont annoncé la Commission européenne et certains États membres, comme l’Espagne.10 On peut donc se demander si le modèle de migration circulaire doit conférer ou non un sens différent à l’intégration et quelles en seraient les conséquences, au regard du droit international privé, sur les règles régissant le statut personnel. Au vu de ce qui précède, on peut affirmer que nous nous trouvons face à une perspective nouvelle, mais point méconnue, du traitement des migrations internationales où il faut concilier politique migratoire et développement durable. La circularité apparaît comme une incitation politique et la coopération internationale multilatérale, au-delà des programmes bilatéraux, comme une nécessité. Dans l’Union européenne, la Commission explore actuellement la possibilité d’inclure la circularité comme partie intégrante de la politique migratoire communautaire, mais dans le cas de certains groupes d’immigrants seulement, si bien que des changements législatifs s’annoncent déjà (I). Pour une circularité efficace et sûre, la coopération internationale est nécessaire. En théorie, les traités multilatéraux semblent être un instrument adapté et utile pour créer des espaces de coopération internationale destinés à gérer certains aspects de la migration circulaire. Dans ce contexte, les techniques de coopération internationale des Autorités centrales développées par la Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé peuvent apporter des solutions viables pour la création et la gestion du modèle (II). Enfin, le concept de circularité inscrit dans ce modèle migratoire peut avoir une incidence sur l’idée d’intégration, nous invitant ainsi à une réflexion sur la revalorisation possible du critère de rattachement à la loi nationale face au rattachement à la loi du domicile comme principe régissant les relations familiales privées dans le système de droit international privé (III).

10 En Espagne, voir Secretaría de Estado de Cooperación Internacional, ‘Principales Líneas de Actuación en Migración y Desarrollo’ (Madrid, 3.12.2007), www.fiiapp.org/uploads/documentos/ f5deea2e185be22f5d21b067649b79ca.doc.

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Le Rôle du Droit International Privé 115 LA MIGRATION CIRCULAIRE COMME NOUVELLE MODALITÉ DE GESTION DE LA MIGRATION LÉGALE

Le Forum mondial sur la migration et le développement, tenu à Bruxelles en juillet 2007, considère la migration circulaire comme un instrument efficace de développement et comme un objectif concret à incorporer aux législations nationales et aux projets bilatéraux mettant à l’épreuve la viabilité du concept. Dans ce sens, le concept de circularité connaît un regain d’intérêt dans la communauté internationale et ceci en raison de deux aspects fondamentaux : tout d’abord, parce que, pour les pays d’origine, il est considéré comme une mesure positive favorisant leur développement ; ensuite parce que, dans les pays d’accueil, s’il est bien géré, il permettra de répondre de façon efficace et avec souplesse aux demandes de main d’œuvre, d’améliorer la circulation légale des personnes et de lutter contre l’immigration irrégulière. Il ne s’agit pas d’un modèle inconnu. De fait, il est déjà appliqué dans le cadre de programmes bilatéraux sous les auspices de l’OIM, comme le Programme des travailleurs agricoles saisonniers du Canada avec le Guatemala et le Mexique11 ou les programmes MIDA de l’OIM et l’Union européenne (Migrations pour le Développement en Afrique) avec quelques pays africains.12 Dans le cadre des Nations Unies il y a le programme Tokten (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals).13 Les États européens ont également mis en œuvre des programmes bilatéraux qui se traduisent par des accords-cadres de main d’œuvre comprenant certains éléments caractéristiques de la migration circulaire.14 Néanmoins, il n’existe pas de véritable réglementation à l’échelle mondiale concernant le recrutement de main d’œuvre étrangère; une absence qui peut nuire à l’objectif de co-développement et qui, dans une grande mesure, facilite le recrutement de main d’œuvre hautement qualifiée et le déplacement des meilleurs cadres techniques à travers le monde (body shopping).15

11 OIM, ‘Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas Temporales de Canadá (2a evaluación)’ (mars 2008) 25 Cuadernos de Trabajo sobre Migración 3–48. 12 A Bustinduy, ‘La importancia de la implicación de los actores del Sur en el codesarrollo. Lecciones aprendidas del programa MIDA‘ (2008) 2 Revista virtual codesarollo–cideal.org, Análisis. www.codesarrollo–cideal.org/revista/02/analisis.pdf. 13 J Bellavista et V Renovell (éds), Ciencia, tecnología e innovación en América Latina (Barcelona, Publicaciones de la Universidad de Barcelona, 1999) 44 et seq. 14 En Espagne, il y a plusieurs accords: Acuerdo sobre mano de obra entre España y el Reino de Marruecos (BOE 226, de 20.9.2001). Acuerdos Marco de Cooperación en materia de Inmigración avec Mali (BOE 135, de 4.6.2008), Cabo Verde (BOE 39, de 14.2.2008), Mauritania (BOE 260, de 30.10.2007), Guinea Conakry (BOE 26, de 30.1.2007) y Gambia (BOE 310, de 28.12.2006); et, avec l’Amérique Latine sur la régulation et l’encadrement des relations de travail avec la Colombie (BOE 159, de 4.7.2001), l’Equateur (BOE 164, de 10.7.2001) et le République Dominicaine (BOE 31, de 5.5.2002). Avec le Pérou, il y a un Acuerdo para la cooperación en materia de inmigración (BOE 237, de 1.10.2004) qui facilite la coopération pour la formation de fonctionnaires, l’échange d’information et d’investigation policière. 15 Commission mondiale sur la dimension sociale de la mondialisation, Une mondialisation juste. Créer des opportunités pour tous (Genève, Bureau international du Travail, 2004) 107.

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Le Contexte de la Migration Temporaire ou Circulaire Il faut insister sur le fait que le modèle de migration circulaire temporaire s’efforce de concilier l’intérêt des pays hautement industrialisés souhaitant couvrir leurs besoins de main d’œuvre en souplesse, en ordre et en toute légalité, et les intérêts des pays en développement souhaitant pénétrer sur les marchés du travail plus riches, favoriser le transfert des connaissances et atténuer le risque de fuite des cerveaux.16 En effet, pour les pays en voie de développement, l’émigration peut présenter aussi bien des effets positifs que négatifs. D’une part, elle permet le départ d’un surplus de main d’œuvre entraînant ainsi une baisse du chômage et fonctionne comme un levier de soulagement de la pauvreté grâce aux envois de fonds des émigrants à leurs familles. D’autre part cependant, la perte définitive de personnes intelligentes et qualifiées peut annuler les perspectives de développement du pays concerné. On sait que la perte de personnel hautement qualifié dans le secteur santé suite à l’émigration dans les pays riches affecte gravement la gestion des services de santé dans certains États africains. Une tendance similaire est observée dans l’éducation. Il en découle une spirale négative de perte de capital humain. À l’inverse, ces pays obtiendraient d’importants bénéfices du retour des migrants qui apporteraient les connaissances, les compétences et les contacts acquis à l’étranger. De ce point de vue, les mesures favorisant la migration circulaire temporaire revêtent une importance capitale pour ces pays et seraient d’autant plus efficaces qu’elles reposeraient sur une conception commune de circularité sur la base d’une coopération entre les pays d’origine et d’accueil.

Formes de Migration Circulaire dans l’Union Europe´enne Suite au Conseil européen de décembre 2006, où a été affiché le besoin d’explorer ‘les moyens de faciliter la migration circulaire et temporaire’, la Commission a ouvert un processus de consultation et de débat visant à développer le concept de migration circulaire et son application pratique dans l’Union européenne. Dans sa Communication de juillet 2007, la Commission a proposé une définition du concept et des façons de mettre en œuvre la circularité de la migration dans l’espace communautaire, en insistant sur la nécessité d’adopter des mesures facilitant son application.17 Pour ce qui est de la définition, la migration circulaire est conçue comme une forme de circulation légale des personnes dont la gestion doit permettre un haut niveau de mobilité légale entre deux pays dans un sens et dans l’autre. Cette gestion peut adopter plusieurs formes ou modalités, les plus importantes dans le contexte de l’Union européenne étant les suivantes: (a) La migration circulaire des ressortissants de Pays tiers déjà installés dans l’UE. L’idée est de faciliter aux immigrants résidents légaux la possibilité de retourner

16 17

Forum Mondial sur la Migration et le Développement, doc prép (n 1) 4. COM/2007/0248 final (n 1) 9–10.

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Le Rôle du Droit International Privé 117 dans leur pays d’origine afin de s’y consacrer à une activité (de chef d’entreprise, professionnelle ou de toute autre sorte) tout en conservant leur résidence principale dans l’État membre où ils résidaient. Cette mobilité s’effectuerait à titre volontaire et ne s’appliquerait qu’à certains groupes d’immigrants déjà résidents. (b) La migration circulaire de personnes établies dans un pays tiers. Son objectif consiste à permettre l’entrée temporaire sur le territoire de l’Union afin de travailler, d’étudier ou de se former, ou de concilier ces trois situations, à condition de rétablir la résidence et l’activité principale des intéressés dans leur pays d’origine à la fin de ladite période. La circularité permettrait de conserver un certain degré de mobilité privilégiée pour voyager dans l’UE moyennant par exemple des procédures simplifiées d’admission. Cette catégorie comprendrait une série de situations visant certains ressortissants extracommunautaires. Il semble évident que l’établissement de politiques communautaires favorisant la migration circulaire va exiger des ajustements ou des modifications de la législation communautaire, et donc, des législations internes des États membres, même si – comme nous l’avons indiqué – certains de ces États disposent déjà de programmes bilatéraux qui encouragent une certaine circularité comme cela a été observé dans les accords-cadres de coopération en matière d’immigration.

Cadre Législatif Communautaire Facilitant La Migration Circulaire Il n’existera pas un cadre législatif harmonisé incorporant la migration circulaire dans l’Union européenne, sans que la Commission n’ait beaucoup avancé sur cette voie. Pour l’instant, les mesures envisagées pour encourager la circularité portent sur l’admission de certaines catégories d’immigrants, aussi bien par le biais de certains instruments réglementaires en phase de préparation que de certaines directives déjà pleinement applicables. Dans la proposition de Directive relative aux conditions d’entrée et de séjour des travailleurs hautement qualifiés, par exemple, les mesures d’incitation à la circularité consisteraient à faciliter les procédures d’admission des personnes ayant résidé légalement sur le territoire de l’Union pendant un certain temps (pour des raisons professionnelles, pour des études ou d’autres types de formation). Dans la proposition de Directive relative aux conditions d’entrée et de séjour des travailleurs saisonniers, la principale mesure prise pour stimuler la circularité serait l’introduction d’un titre de séjour pluriannuel qui permettrait de revenir plusieurs années de suite sans avoir besoin de refaire toutes les démarches d’admission. Enfin, dans la Proposition de Directive relative aux conditions d’entrée et de séjour des stagiaires rémunérés, la circularité pourrait permettre à ces personnes de revenir dans l’UE pour des périodes limitées afin de recevoir une formation supplémentaire ou d’améliorer la leur.18

18 Commission européenne, Communication de la Commission—Programme d’action relatif à l’immigration légale (SEC(2005)1680) (21.12.2005) COM/2005/0669 final.

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Quand aux instruments réglementaires déjà existants, ils consistent en trois directives qui pourraient incorporer des mesures de promotion de la circularité. Ainsi, dans la Directive 2003/109/CE relative au statut des ressortissants de pays tiers résidents de longue durée,19 qui prévoit la perte du statut de résident de longue durée en cas d’absence supérieure à 13 mois consécutifs, l’élargissement de la période jusqu’à deux ou trois ans est envisagée. Dans les deux autres directives relatives respectivement aux conditions d’admission des ressortissants des pays tiers à des fins d’études, d’échange d’élèves, de formation non rémunérée ou de volontariat (Directive 2004/114/CE20) et sur l’établissement d’une procédure d’admission spécifique des ressortissants de pays tiers aux fins de recherche scientifique (Directive 2005/71/CE21), les alternatives pour faciliter la circularité portent sur plusieurs aspects. Ainsi, l’établissement de permis multiples d’entrée permettant de s’absenter du territoire de l’Union européenne sans perdre les droits de séjour, la simplification générale des procédures d’admission des personnes ayant travaillé préalablement comme chercheur ou étudiant dans l’UE, à condition qu’ils retournent dans leur pays d’origine à la fin de cette période. Dans une optique plus large, la possibilité de lier les deux directives a été envisagée afin de permettre des procédures d’admission plus simples lorsqu’il s’agit d’étudiants qui, après avoir achevé leurs études, souhaitent rester dans le pays d’accueil comme chercheur. La condition du retour dans le pays d’origine peut ralentir le recrutement, ce qui permettrait aux États membres d’autoriser le changement de situation migratoire in situ; c’est-à-dire sans avoir à retourner dans le pays d’origine à condition que la demande de modification ait été présentée avant l’expiration du titre de séjour aux fins d’études, une situation déjà visée dans de nombreuses législations nationales, notamment l’espagnole, quoiqu’avec des limites importantes. Pour que ces mesures soient efficaces et sûres, elles requièrent une étroite collaboration avec les pays d’origine, non seulement dans le domaine de la migration mais aussi dans d’autres domaines liés à cette dernière comme l’emploi, la politique sociale, l’enseignement et la formation. Comme nous l’avons déjà indiqué, l’importance de la coopération au niveau multilatéral a été soulignée dans diverses instances et forums de débat. Mener une réflexion sur les techniques de coopération internationale des autorités développées par la Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé et sur la viabilité de leur application à la gestion de certaines questions de la migration circulaire s’avère donc pertinent.

19 Directive 2003/109/CE du Conseil du 25 novembre 2003 relative au statut des ressortissants de pays tiers résidents de longue durée. JO L 16 du 23.1.2004. 20 Directive 2004/114/CE du Conseil du 13 décembre 2004 relative aux conditions d’admission des ressortissants de pays tiers à des fins d’études, d’échange d’élèves, de formation non rémunérée ou de volontariat. JO L 375 du 23.12.2004. 21 Directive 2005/71/CE du Conseil du 12 octobre 2005 relative à une procédure d’admission spécifique des ressortissants de pays tiers aux fins de recherche scientifique. JO L 289 du 3.11.2005.

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Le Rôle du Droit International Privé 119 LA MIGRATION CIRCULAIRE ET LE ‘MODÈLE DE LA HAYE’ DE COOPÉRATION INTERNATIONALE

Depuis l’année 2006, la Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé a déclaré être disposée à entamer une réflexion sur la possibilité d’appliquer ses techniques de coopération internationale à certaines questions de migrations internationales. Une réflexion qui, tenant compte du rôle des Autorités centrales dans certaines conventions de la Haye et de l’expérience tirée de la pratique, aurait comme objectif de vérifier la viabilité du système de La Haye de coopération internationale dans la gestion des programmes de migration temporaire ou circulaire, y compris l’organisation du retour, le transfert de fonds et l’établissement d’un système d’accords et de réglementation des autorités intermédiaires.22 La note établie par le Bureau permanent en mars 2008 précise ces questions et révèle non seulement les relations des travaux de la Conférence de La Haye avec les questions migratoires internationales (1), mais aussi comment la technique de coopération des Autorités centrales (ci-après, le modèle de La Haye), faciliterait la mise en œuvre des traités de migration temporaire ou circulaire au niveau multilatéral23 (2).

Les Travaux de la Conférence de La Haye de Droit International Privé et Leurs Relations avec les Migrations Internationales Le lien ou la relation entre les travaux de la Conférence de la Haye et les migrations internationales est attesté par le fait que bien des questions apparues suite aux mouvements transfrontaliers relèvent du droit international privé. Ainsi, les mariages et les divorces internationaux, la protection juridique des enfants (y compris le transfert illicite ou ‘enlèvement international’) et d’adultes vulnérables (parmi lesquels figurent les migrants âgés, par exemple les ascendants dans le regroupement familial), les régimes matrimoniaux et de succession ou le recouvrement international d’aliments. La Conférence de la Haye a élaboré un important corpus de conventions multilatérales sur cette matière (les Conventions de La Haye24) et une ratification plus ample de ces dernières contribuerait à résoudre, avec ordre et sécurité juridique, bien des problèmes de trafic externe dans un environnement de forte pression migratoire internationale. Par exemple, la Convention de La Haye du 25 octobre 1980 sur les aspects civils de l’enlèvement international d’enfants est un traité multilatéral, qui tend à protéger les enfants des effets nuisibles de l’enlèvement et de la rétention au-delà des frontières internationales en prévoyant une procédure permettant leur retour rapide. La Convention de La Haye du 29 mai 1993 sur la protection des enfants et 22 Doc prél No 8 de mars 2006 sur les affaires générales et la politique de la Conférence. Voir aussi Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé, ‘Recommandations et Conclusions du Conseil sur les affaires générales et la politique’ (2–4 avril 2007) Conclusion no 6. 23 Bureau Permanent de la Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé, Quelques réflexions sur l’utilité d’appliquer certaines techniques de coopération internationale (n 9). 24 Toutes les Conventions : www.hcch.net/index_fr.php?act=conventions.listing.

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la coopération en matière d’adoption internationale protège les enfants et leurs familles des risques d’adoptions à l’étranger illégales, irrégulières, prématurées ou mal préparées. Cette Convention qui fonctionne également par l’intermédiaire d’un système d’Autorités centrales nationales, renforce la Convention des Nations Unies relative aux droits de l’enfant (art. 21). Elle a pour but de garantir que les adoptions internationales soient organisées dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant et en respectant ses droits fondamentaux, ainsi que de prévenir l’enlèvement, la vente et le trafic d’enfants. La nouvelle Convention sur le recouvrement international des aliments destinés aux enfants et à d’autres membres de la famille et son Protocole sur la loi applicable aux obligations alimentaires établit un système, d’application assez large, pour la reconnaissance et l’exécution de décisions en matière d’obligations alimentaires rendues dans les États contractants – combiné avec des procédures expéditives; un système de coopération entre Autorités centrales dans chaque pays afin de faciliter le traitement des demandes internationales; l’accès à des services virtuellement gratuits pour les demandeurs d’aliments, y compris, le cas échéant, une assistance juridique gratuite dans tous les États contractants; l’obligation de prendre des mesures rapides et efficaces pour exécuter les décisions provenant d’autres pays en matière d’aliments. Une attention toute particulière a été prêtée aux droits du débiteur, notamment aux procédures qui leurs sont accessibles pour modifier les décisions en matière d’aliments, qui bénéficieront également des services gracieux offerts par les Autorités centrales.25 Le succès des Conventions de La Haye réside non seulement dans le grand nombre d’États contractants26 mais aussi dans le constat empirique de résultats favorables.27 Il est dû tant à la qualité technique de l’œuvre de La Haye qu’à la création à partir de 1964, de véritables régimes de coopération permanente et institutionnalisée moyennant l’établissement, dans certaines conventions, d’Autorités centrales dans chacun des États parties.28 À partir de la naissance de ce système, et de son perfectionnement progressif, de graves problèmes de fond ont pu être évités sur lesquels il aurait été très difficile d’arriver à un accord comme on l’a

25 Convention du 23 novembre 2007 sur le recouvrement international des aliments destinés aux enfants et à d’autres membres de la famille. www.hcch.net/index_fr.php?act=conventions.text&cid=131. 26 Par exemple, la Convention du 25 octobre 1980 sur les aspects civils de l’enlèvement international de mineurs et la Convention du 29 mai 1993 relative à la protection de l’enfant et à la coopération en matière d’adoption internationale, avec 81 et 75 États parties respectivement. Sur Internet: www.hcch.net/index_fr.php?act=text.display&tid=10#family. 27 Par exemple, l’‘Espace Enlèvement d’enfants’ fournit des informations sur le fonctionnement pratique de la Convention, ainsi que sur les travaux de la Conférence de La Haye concernant la surveillance de la mise en œuvre de la Convention et la promotion de la coopération internationale dans le domaine de l’enlèvement d’enfants. Le site Internet : http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_fr.php?act=text. display&tid=21. Le ‘Guide des bonnes pratiques en vertu de la Convention de La Haye du 29 mai 1993’ recense les questions importantes relatives à la planification, à la mise en place et au fonctionnement du cadre juridique et administratif de mise en œuvre de la Convention : Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé, La mise en œuvre et le fonctionnement de la Convention de La Haye sur l’adoption internationale : Guide de bonnes pratiques, Guide No 1 en vertu de la Convention de La Haye du 29 mai 1993 sur la protection des enfants et la coopération en matière d’adoption internationale (Bristol, Family Law, 2008). Pour consultation : www.hcch.net/upload/adoguide_f.pdf. 28 GAL Droz, ‘La Conférence de La Haye et l’entraide judiciaire internationale’ (1980) 168 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 159–84.

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Le Rôle du Droit International Privé 121 observé dans le cas de la Convention sur l’adoption internationale de 1993. D’autre part, le rôle actif des autorités nationales facilite également l’obtention d’une solution rapide à d’importants problèmes humains sans avoir à faire appel aux juges, comme par exemple la Convention sur les aspects civils de l’enlèvement international d’enfants.29 Pour nous en tenir à l’objectif central de cette communication, il nous faut souligner le rôle actif que la technique de coopération internationale de La Haye attribue aux Autorités centrales et leur fonction de tutelle pour la défense des intérêts particuliers des requérants considérés comme la partie faible de la relation juridique.

Le Modèle de Coopération Internationale des Autorités Centrales de La Haye et son Application à Certains Aspects de la Migration Temporaire ou Circulaire Comme nous l’avons signalé, à partir de la création de la technique de coopération internationale des autorités, le système des Autorités centrales devient le modèle adopté par la Conférence de La Haye aussi bien pour les conventions sur la coopération procédurale internationale30 que pour les conventions règlementant des matières spécifiques (par exemple la protection internationale des enfants et des adultes in genere, l’enlèvement international d’enfants, l’adoption internationale ou le recouvrement international des aliments). Sans entrer dans l’analyse évolutive du fonctionnement et de la structure des Autorités centrales dans le système conventionnel de La Haye,31 il convient de souligner le caractère bilatéral de l’intervention de ces autorités et leur fonction de tutelle comme les éléments phares du modèle actuel de La Haye. Avant d’examiner le premier élément (caractère bilatéral de l’ intervention), il nous faut retenir que la technique de coopération internationale se construit autour d’une Autorité centrale créée dans chaque État contractant afin de centraliser et transférer les différentes demandes. En général, les conventions posent une série de prémisses sur le régime juridique de cette structure : il incombe à chaque État contractant de désigner son Autorité centrale et d’en notifier la désignation au ministère des Affaires étrangères des Pays Bas, soit au moment du dépôt de son instrument de ratification ou d’adhésion, soit ultérieurement. Les conventions n’imposent pas aux États l’obligation de créer un organisme ex novo, le rôle de 29 JD González Campos et A Borrás Rodríguez, Recopilación de convenios de la Conferencia de La Haya de Derecho internacional privado (1951–1993). Traducción al castellano (Madrid, Marcial Pons, 1996) 14. 30 Convention du 18 mars 1970 sur l’obtention des preuves à l’étranger en matière civile ou commerciale et la Convention du 25 octobre 1980 tendant à faciliter l’accès international à la justice, www.hcch.net/index_fr.php?act=text.display&tid=10#litigation. 31 GAL Droz, ‘Évolution du rôle des autorités administratives dans les Conventions internationales de droit international privé au cours du premier siècle de la Conférence de La Haye’ dans Études offertes à Pierre Bellet (Paris, Librairie de la Cour de cassation, 1991) 129–47. Doctrine espagnole, inter alia: A Borrás Rodríguez, ‘El papel de la autoridad central: los Convenios de La Haya y España’ (1993) 45 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 63–80; S García Cano, ‘Evolución de las técnicas de cooperación internacional entre autoridades en el Derecho internacional privado’ (2005) 112 Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado 75–109.

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l’Autorité centrale peut retomber sur n’importe quelle autorité déjà existante en droit interne et c’est à l’État qui la désigne qu’incombe son organisation. L’intervention bilatérale des Autorités centrales désignées par chaque État contractant prend la forme d’une double fonction, de réception et de transmission. L’Autorité centrale reçoit d’une part, les demandes adressées dans son État (par exemple, de demande de restitution d’un enfant ou de reconnaissance d’une résolution relative au droit de garde) et la transmet à son homologue dans l’État étranger. D’autre part, elle reçoit et transmet les demandes de son homologue étranger faisant appel à sa collaboration (par exemple, afin de faciliter la localisation et le retour d’un enfant ou afin d’obtenir la reconnaissance et l’exécution d’une résolution donnée).32 Du point de vue règlementaire, les conventions introduisent un ensemble de règles matérielles33 qui établissent comme prémisse l’obligation générale pour les Autorités centrales de coopérer entre elles et de promouvoir la coopération entre les autorités compétentes pour accomplir les objectifs de la convention (obligation globale de coopération ad extra et ad intra). Elles énoncent ensuite un ensemble d’obligations visant à atteindre l’objectif de la convention dans chaque cas concret (obligations spécifiques de coopération). Alors que, dans certains cas, ces obligations spécifiques sont attribuées exclusivement à l’Autorité centrale, dans d’autres cas, l’intervention d’autorités publiques voire de personnes ou d’organismes privés est admise, même si la responsabilité ultime d’exécution et du résultat retombe sur l’Autorité centrale désignée. Il est important de souligner que l’extension et l’amplitude de la capacité de prendre des décisions des Autorités centrales varie d’une convention à l’autre. Alors que dans la Convention de 1980 sur les aspects civils de l’enlèvement international d’enfants, l’intéressé peut ne pas faire appel à l’intervention de l’Autorité centrale34 et celle-ci, si elle a été requise, peut admettre ou rejeter dans certaines circonstances la demande, dans la Convention de 1993 sur la protection des enfants et la coopération en matière d’adoption internationale, les requérants ne peuvent pas passer outre l’intervention de l’Autorité centrale et par conséquent, une décision de rejet de la part de l’Autorité centrale de l’État d’accueil ne permettrait pas de faire jouer la Convention. Dans cette Convention sur l’adoption, l’intervention et la prise de décisions de la part des Autorités centrales ne s’achève pas lors de la première phase de la procédure, elle se poursuit tout au long de celle-ci. Si l’Autorité centrale de l’État d’origine considère que l’enfant est adoptable, elle s’assure que les consentements nécessaires ont été obtenus et évalue si l’adoption et le placement dans la famille 32

S García Cano, Evolución de las técnicas de cooperación internacional entre autoridades (n 31)

100. 33 Ces normes matérielles de Droit international privé ne règlent pas le fond mais le procédé ainsi que quelques aspects formels. Voir AP Abarca Junco (éd), Derecho internacional privado, tome 1 (Madrid Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2008) 109–25. 34 E Pérez Vera, ‘Conferencia de la Haya de Derecho Internacional Privado Envelement d’enfants. Rapport explicatif’ dans Colegio Universitario de Toledo, Excelentísimo Ayuntamiento de Toledo et Caja Toledo (éds), La sustracción internacional de menores (aspectos civiles), Ponencias, comunicaciones y materiales de trabajo de las Jornadas de profesores de Derecho internacional privado de Toledo (26 y 27 de enero de 1990) (Toledo, Patronato Universitario de Toledo, 1991) 164.

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Le Rôle du Droit International Privé 123 adoptive prévue sont dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. Si c’est le cas, l’Autorité centrale de l’État d’accueil est consultée afin qu’elle donne son accord pour poursuivre la procédure d’adoption internationale et pour qu’elle approuve la décision prise par l’Autorité centrale de l’État d’origine de confier l’enfant aux futurs parents adoptifs.35 Comme on peut l’observer, une intervention bilatérale de cette nature favorise, d’un côté, la collaboration directe et étroite des Autorités centrales étant donné qu’elles exercent, dans chaque État contractant, la double fonction de réception et de transmission. Les fonctions et les compétences étant identifiées et réunies en une seule structure administrative, on vise à simplifier la procédure et à éliminer la bureaucratie excessive qu’entraîne la multiplication des autorités administratives compétentes (en Espagne par exemple, trois ministères différents interviennent pour l’accomplissement des démarches d’autorisation d’entrée, de séjour et de travail). Du point de vue des particuliers, le système fournit une plus grande sécurité juridique tout en réduisant les coûts. Nous avions cité la fonction de tutelle des Autorités centrales comme deuxième élément caractéristique du modèle de coopération de La Haye. Comme dans le domaine de l’intervention, la portée de la fonction de tutelle s’avère différente suivant les objectifs des conventions. Alors que, dans les Conventions de la Haye relatives aux procédures civiles, la fonction de tutelle de l’Autorité centrale a pour objet de faciliter les procédures afin de garantir la tutelle judiciaire effective des particuliers, dans les conventions sur les enfants et les adultes et, en général, dans les conventions sur le droit de la famille, cette fonction vise à réaliser et à garantir des valeurs matérielles bien déterminées et concrètes ou bien la protection de l’adulte ou du créancier des aliments, en tant que partie faible de la relation juridique.36 La traduction juridique de cette fonction de tutelle dans le cadre de la coopération internationale diffère également selon les objectifs conventionnels et les intérêts en présence.37 Ainsi, dans la Convention relative à l’enlèvement international d’enfant, dont l’objectif est la réalisation de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant dans chaque cas concret, c’est-à-dire la présomption du retour nécessaire et immédiat de l’enfant déplacé ou retenu illicitement à l’endroit où se trouvait sa résidence

35 Le modèle de fonctionnement de la Convention de La Haye de 1980 a été adopté par la Convention du 23 novembre 2007 sur le recouvrement international des aliments destinés aux enfants et à d’autres membres de la famille (http://hcch.e–vision.nl/index_fr.php?act=conventions.text&cid=131). L’intervention et les fonctions de coopération et d’aide des Autorités Centrales sont plus limitées dans les Conventions de La Haye sur la protection générale de mineurs (1996) et sur la protection internationale d’adultes (2000). 36 A Borrás, ‘La protección internacional del niño y del adulto como expresión de la materalización del derecho internacional privado: similitudes y contrastes’ dans LI Sánchez Rodríguez et al (éd), Pacis Artes, Obra homenaje al Profesor Julio D. González Campos— Tomo II Derecho internacional privado, derecho constitucional y varia (Madrid, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid et Eurolex 2005) 1287 et seq. 37 Sur les fonctions des Autorités centrales et le bien juridique protégé dans les Conventions de La Haye, voir M Herranz Ballesteros, El interés del menor en los Convenios de La Haya de Derecho internacional privado (Zaragoza, Lex Nova, 2004) 205–25.

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habituelle immédiatement avant son déplacement ou sa rétention illicite,38 les règles qui régissent l’intervention et les fonctions des Autorités centrales, essaient de réaliser de façon satisfaisante cet objectif au cas par cas, l’Autorité centrale devant fondamentalement et comme représentant de l’enfant prêter assistance au demandeur de l’ordre de retour afin de préserver le droit de l’enfant à ne pas être objet de déplacement ou de retenue illicite.39 Dans la Convention de La Haye de 1993 sur l’adoption internationale, l’intervention des Autorités centrales répond à l’idée de la réalisation de l’intérêt du mineur en cohérence avec l’article 21 de la Convention de New York de 1989 sur les droits de l’enfant40 et avec la nouvelle approche de l’adoption internationale comme un droit fondamental de l’enfant qui doit être protégé et non comme un droit des adoptants. Par conséquent, le fondement de la tutelle dans l’adoption internationale réside dans le fait qu’elle se réalise avec toutes les garanties, sauvegarde et contrôles nécessaires. Les fonctions des Autorités centrales ne sont pas tant l’assistance aux futurs adoptants que de s’assurer que la procédure d’adoption internationale, à chacune de ses phases, soit réalisée conformément aux règles, sauvegardes et contrôles prévus dans le texte de la convention pour garantir l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant.41 Dans les Conventions relatives à la protection internationale des enfants (Convention de La Haye de 199642) et à la protection internationale des adultes (Convention de La Haye de 200043), la fonction de tutelle de l’intervention semble bien plus floue et est transférée en dernière instance aux autorités compétentes (judiciaires ou administratives) des États concernés. En effet, ces Conventions de La Haye, à caractère général, réglementent la protection internationale des catégories de personnes nécessitant une protection juridique spéciale (enfants et adultes) et leurs objectifs ne sont pas élaborés à partir de résultats concrets. Cette généralité oblige à confier aux autorités compétentes la plus haute responsabilité quant à la concrétisation de l’intérêt de l’enfant (ou de l’adulte) et les fonctions des Autorités centrales visent principalement à prêter assistance à d’autres autorités.

38 I Barriere–Brouse, ‘L’enfant et les conventions internationales’ (1996) 123 Journal du droit international 843–88. 39 Sur les obligations, les pouvoirs et les fonctions dans la Convention de La Haye de 1980, P-P Miralles Sangro, El secuestro internacional de menores y su incidencia en España (Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales, 1989) 153–56. 40 Sur le système conventionnel général de protection des droits de l’enfant et la Conférence de La Haye, M Vargas Gómez-Urrutia, La protección internacional de los derechos del niño y la la conferencia de La Haya de derecho internacional privado (México, Secretaría de Cultura del Gobierno de Jalisco, 1999) 25 et seq. 41 JHA, van Loon, ‘International Co-operation and Protection of Children with Regard to Intercountry Adoption’ (1993) 244 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 191–456. 42 U Calvento Solari, ‘Conferencia de La Haya de Derecho Internacional Privado: Convenio sobre protección de niños. Nota explicativa’ (octubre de 1997) 67 Infancia: Boletín del Instituto Interamericano del Niño-OEA 61 et seq. 43 A Bucher, ‘La Convention de La Haye sur la protection internationale des adultes’ (2000) 10 Revue suisse de droit international et de droit européen 37 et seq; E Pérez Vera, La protección de los mayores de edad en el umbral del siglo XXI (Reflexiones desde la perspectiva del Derecho internacional privado), Discurso de ingreso en la Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación (Granada, 2000).

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Le Rôle du Droit International Privé 125 Finalement, en matière d’obligations alimentaires, la fonction de tutelle des Autorités centrales de la Convention de La Haye de 200744 se rapproche de celle retenue par la Convention de La Haye sur l’enlèvement international d’enfants, mais à partir de l’expérience de la Convention de New York de 1956 sur le recouvrement des aliments à l’étranger.45 De notre point de vue, le modèle de La Haye pourrait être adopté dans un cadre multilatéral de migration temporaire ou circulaire. D’une part, les objectifs de la migration circulaire dans les programmes et les accords-cadres actuels n’assurent pas correctement la protection des droits des travailleurs migrants, notamment à cause de l’absence d’un contrôle auprès des entreprises privées. L’intervention des Autorités centrales garantirait le respect des droits des travailleurs migrants et contribuerait à la prévention de l’immigration irrégulière. D’autre part, le cadre juridique selon le modèle de La Haye permettrait d’incorporer l’obligation générale de coopérer et les procédures de recrutement pourraient être unifiées en fixant des obligations concrètes de collaboration et les domaines de décision des Autorités centrales. Le modèle de migration temporaire ou circulaire serait ainsi doté de plus de certitude et de garanties juridiques.

LA MIGRATION CIRCULAIRE ET SES CONSÉQUENCES POSSIBLES SUR LES MODÈLES D’INTÉGRATION ET SUR LA RÈGLE DE CONFLIT DE LOIS APPLICABLE AU STATUT PERSONNEL

Comme nous l’avons avancé au début de cette étude, encourager la migration circulaire signifie mettre en place une politique législative qui évite dans la mesure du possible l’installation permanente ou de longue durée des immigrants dans le pays d’accueil. Si le modèle finissait par être instauré, il faudrait se demander si, d’une part, les notions traditionnelles de l’intégration au sein des sociétés d’accueil sont valables dans le contexte de la migration circulaire (1) et envisager, d’autre part, la revalorisation éventuelle du rattachement à la loi nationale comme critère régissant les relations familiales privées (2).

Les Notions Traditionnelles d’intégration (des Immigrants) et la Migration Temporaire ou Circulaire L’OIM a déclaré: ‘Il convient de repenser les notions traditionnelles d’intégration des migrants au sein des communautés d’accueil dans un monde de plus en plus transnational’.46 Les tendances migratoires actuelles mettent en évidence la nécessité d’élargir les efforts d’intégration pour inclure le rôle des immigrants temporaires ou circulaires 44

Texte de la Convention: www.hcch.net/upload/text38s.pdf. Texte de la Convention: http://untreaty.un.org/French/sample/FrenchInternetBible/partI/ chapterXX/treaty1.htm. 46 OIM — L’agence des migrations, ‘Une mobilite mondiale accrue appelle a repenser les politiques d’integration’ (12.07.2006) www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/media/news-releases/newsArticleEU/cache/offonce/ lang/fr?entryId=8533. 45

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dans les sociétés d’accueil. Si l’on convient que l’intégration n’implique pas nécessairement une installation définitive, le respect de l’identité culturelle, surtout lorsqu’il s’agit d’immigrants originaires de pays où la religion joue un rôle essentiel, mais toujours sur la base d’un ensemble fondamental de valeurs permettant aux uns et aux autres de se sentir identifiés et de coexister de façon pacifique. En effet, lorsque les politiques en matière d’intégration reposent sur une conception unidirectionnelle des mouvements migratoires, la migration est conçue en termes d’installation définitive dans le pays d’accueil, souvent suivie par l’acquisition d’une nouvelle nationalité (modèle assimilationniste). Néanmoins, comme nous l’avons indiqué au point I, la migration internationale présente un aspect circulaire ou multidirectionnel qui confère un nouveau sens à l’identité individuelle. En effet, comme cela a été mis en exergue par la littérature scientifique, cette mobilité circulaire suscite chez les personnes qui émigrent un sentiment d’appartenance à plus d’un pays ou d’une société, ce qui, conjointement à la possibilité d’avoir deux nationalités ou plus, donne une nouvelle dimension à l’intégration. Les politiques communautaires sur l’intégration conçues par l’Union européenne dans son Agenda pour l’intégration des ressortissants des pays tiers s’attachent sur le plan théorique à promouvoir cette nouvelle dimension, mais les textes juridiques continuent à reposer sur l’idée de permanence et de stabilité sur le territoire communautaire. Ceci peut être constaté dans les mesures relatives au regroupement familial et au statut de résident de longue durée qui ont été adoptées.47 En effet, la Directive 2003/86/CE du 22 septembre sur le regroupement familial48 est l’un des instruments légaux les plus importants qui peut contribuer à l’intégration et la stabilité des immigrants dans le pays d’accueil. Le critère d’intégration dans les règles sur le regroupement familial y est visé dans son Considérant 4: Le regroupement familial est un moyen nécessaire pour permettre la vie en famille. Il contribue à la création d’une stabilité socioculturelle facilitant l’intégration des ressortissants de pays tiers dans les États membres, ce qui permet par ailleurs de promouvoir la cohésion économique et sociale.

Pourtant, dans un contexte migratoire circulaire qui ne favorise pas la permanence mais bien le retour, le regroupement familial va être fortement limité étant donné que les conditions imposées par la directive et par les législations nationales par rapport au temps de séjour et aux conditions d’hébergement ne se produiront pas dans le nouveau modèle. Quant à la résidence de longue durée, la Directive 2003/109/CE du 25 novembre relative au statut des ressortissants de pays tiers résidents de longue durée,49 vise à 47 AP Abarca Junco et M Vargas, ‘Un proyecto para encauzar la acción legislativa en la Agenda para la integración de los nacionales de terceros países en la Unión Europea’ (2007) Análisis del Instituto Universitario de Investigación sobre Seguridad Interior, www.iuisi.es/12_publicaciones/12_2007/ doc056–2007.pdf. 48 Directive 2003/86/CE du Conseil, du 22 septembre 2003, relative au droit au regroupement familial. JO L 251 du 3.10.2003. 49 Directive 2003/109/CE du Conseil, du 25 novembre 2003, relative au statut des ressortissants de pays tiers résidents de longue durée. JO L 16/44, de 23.1.2004.

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Le Rôle du Droit International Privé 127 octroyer un ‘statut européen’ aux résidents des pays tiers en situation de séjour régulier et ininterrompu pendant cinq ans sur le territoire des États membres. Cette directive considère comme critère principal d’intégration, la résidence légale et ininterrompue dans un État membre pendant une durée donnée (5 ans) car elle témoignerait de l’ancrage de la personne dans le pays. Toutefois, une absence prolongée du territoire (douze mois) peut entraîner la perte du statut de résident. Il est donc évident que le fondement de l’intégration repose sur des termes d’installation définitive et qu’il ne favorise pas la circularité. De ce point de vue, il serait nécessaire d’incorporer la nouvelle dimension d’intégration des immigrants temporaires. Pour ce faire, on pourrait mettre à profit le cadre de coopération internationale selon le modèle de La Haye expliqué au point II. D’une part, des séances d’orientation (obligatoires) préalables au départ devraient être prévues, permettant aux immigrants de connaître les valeurs essentielles de la nouvelle société d’accueil. D’autre part, des campagnes de sensibilisation dans les écoles, sur le lieu de travail et dans les médias des pays d’accueil pourraient contribuer à une meilleure préparation des sociétés d’accueil à l’arrivée des nouveaux immigrants. Mais la conciliation des exigences d’intégration des immigrants et du respect de leur culture d’origine suscite un autre dilemme relevant du droit international privé. En termes de loi applicable au statut personnel, l’idée d’intégration dans un contexte de migration temporaire ou circulaire permettrait peut-être de trouver de nouveaux arguments en faveur du critère de rattachement à la loi nationale face à ceux qui le considèrent comme un obstacle à l’intégration.

L’alternative Loi Nationale — Loi du Domicile face à L’intégration dans un Modèle Migratoire Temporaire ou Circulaire Comme nous venons de le voir, un changement du modèle d’immigration provoque un changement de l’idée de l’intégration, ce qui va être reflété dans le droit des étrangers mais également dans les règles de conflit des lois. Concrètement, dans le choix du critère de rattachement à la loi nationale ou de la résidence habituelle (du domicile) pour régir les relations privées de la famille. En effet, l’incidence du mouvement migratoire est un argument historique en faveur d’un critère ou de l’autre.50 Ainsi, les États qui connurent une forte émigration au XIXe siècle et dans la première moitié du XXe tendent à préférer l’application de la loi nationale, alors que les États récepteurs d’immigration donneraient la priorité à l’application de la loi du domicile.51

50 J Déprez, ‘Droit international privé et conflits de civilisations. Aspects méthodologiques (Les relations entre systèmes d’Europe occidentale et systèmes islamiques en matière de statut personnel)’ (1988) 211 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9–372, notamment 22–41. 51 Laboratoire d’études et de recherches appliquées au droit privé, Le droit de la famille à l’épreuve des migrations transnationales. Colloque du Laboratoire d’études et de recherches appliquées au droit privé, Université de Lille II (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1993) (avant-propos de F Dekeuwer-Défossez).

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Mais pour expliquer aujourd’hui la préférence pour l’un ou l’autre de ces critères de rattachement, on ne peut désormais plus se contenter de retenir les données d’autrefois, ni même les traits qui ont caractérisé les migrations économiques des années soixante, même s’ils restent sous-jacents (essentiellement, la demande de main d’œuvre étrangère de la part des pays développés et seulement de façon tardive, des efforts pour une intégration sociale et politique des étrangers afin de faciliter leur naturalisation). Les détracteurs du rattachement à la loi nationale dans un contexte de forte pression migratoire soutenaient qu’appliquer la loi nationale comme loi régissant les relations familiales était un obstacle à l’intégration des étrangers et se montraient donc partisans du rattachement à la loi du domicile (selon leur formule ‘loi du lieu d’accueil’) car il répondrait mieux à l’intérêt de l’État dans une politique d’immigration qui mettrait l’accent sur l’intégration pour éviter la fréquence avec laquelle le correctif classique de l’ordre public peut opérer dans le secteur de la loi applicable.52 Cela dit, dans un contexte de migration circulaire, l’argument précédent peut perdre de sa valeur compte tenu de deux éléments. Il convient tout d’abord de signaler que la loi nationale n’interdit en rien l’intégration dans la société d’accueil puisqu’il s’agit d’un fait indépendant du statut familial. Ensuite, en réalité, il n’existe pas de véritable opposition entre l’intégration de fait dans la société d’accueil et le lien avec le pays d’origine car, comme nous l’avons avancé, l’une des caractéristiques de la migration circulaire est le développement des relations personnelles et familiales dans la pluralité culturelle et ceci permet l’intégration simultanée au sein de plusieurs communautés sociales (transnationalité). La revalorisation du critère de rattachement à la loi nationale dans un contexte de migration circulaire gagne donc en intensité lorsqu’elle est évoquée en tenant compte de l’idée de l’identité nationale et culturelle de la personne.53 De nombreuses études doctrinales s’accordent à signaler que la loi nationale est plus respectueuse de l’identité culturelle de la personne dans la mesure où elle reflète la loi d’origine de l’individu, celle avec laquelle il possède un lien personnel plus étroit. Cela se traduit par le fait que le rattachement à la loi nationale supposerait une vocation de reconnaissance de la spécificité de l’étranger et de son appartenance à une communauté nationale différente de celle du pays d’accueil. La doctrine a souligné que si l’on poussait cette vision jusqu’à l’extrême, on courrait le risque de tomber dans une approche ‘déterministe’ de l’identité culturelle de l’individu et de son lien avec la patrie. Toutefois, dans un contexte migratoire circulaire, ces objections n’auraient pas lieu d’être, puisque la circularité serait un argument de poids pour conserver le critère de rattachement à la loi nationale qui s’accorderait davantage avec la situation migratoire de la personne et pour assurer la continuité

52 M Farge, Le statut familial des étrangers en France: de la loi nationale à la loi de la résidence habituelle (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2003) 83–97. M Vargas Gómez-Urrutia, La reagrupación familiar de los extranjeros en España. Normas de extranjería y problemas de derecho aplicable (Cizur Menor, Thomson-Aranzadi, 2006) 303–10. 53 E Jayme, ‘Identité culturelle et intégration: le droit international privé postmoderne. Cours général de droit international privé’ (1995) 251 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9–267, notamment 262–64.

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des relations juridiques personnelles. Une continuité qui devient désormais nécessaire puisque la permanence ou la stabilité dans le pays d’accueil tend à se diluer. Modifier la loi applicable aux relations familiales privées n’a donc plus de sens. CONCLUSIONS

(1) Depuis que le Forum mondial sur la migration et le développement a proposé à l’été 2007 de promouvoir la circularité comme une modalité de gestion migratoire, le concept et les objectifs de la migration temporaire ou circulaire sont placés à l’avant-garde du débat sur la migration et le développement. Sa définition fait référence au mouvement migratoire à caractère non permanent entre les pays, en fonction des besoins de travail des pays d’origine et d’accueil et pour le bénéfice de tous. Ce modèle essaie de conjuguer l’intérêt des pays très industrialisés qui doivent couvrir leurs besoins de main d’œuvre en souplesse, avec ordre et légalement, avec les intérêts des pays en développement d’accéder aux marchés du travail les plus riches, de favoriser les connaissances et de freiner le risque de fuite des cerveaux. (2) Dans l’Union européenne, cette alternative est en phase d’analyse. La tendance à la circularité dans le cadre communautaire se limite à sélectionner dans le pays d’origine des travailleurs saisonniers en fonction du marché européen ou bien des personnes à haute qualification qui viendraient sur le territoire de l’Union européenne pour une période de temps limitée, sans avoir la possibilité d’acquérir un statut de séjour durable (circularité appliquée aux non-résidents) ou à faciliter le retour dans le cas des résidents dans l’Union européenne possédant la capacité de démarrer en dehors du territoire communautaire une activité professionnelle ou une entreprise (circularité appliquée aux résidents). (3) Afin de faciliter cette nouvelle approche migratoire, la Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé propose de mettre à l’épreuve ses techniques de coopération internationales des Autorités centrales en les appliquant à la gestion de la migration temporaire ou circulaire. Le modèle conventionnel multilatéral de La Haye sera utile pour la gestion de ce modèle car il parvient, à travers la structure des Autorités centrales, à mettre en œuvre une coopération bilatérale efficace et à assurer la tutelle des intérêts en présence. (4) Dans un contexte de circularité, l’intégration doit être perçue de façon différente de celle qui a été considérée traditionnellement. En effet, il faudra partir d’une idée plus souple d’intégration puisque le nouveau modèle n’implique pas la permanence dans la société d’accueil. Il s’agit de conserver l’identité culturelle de l’étranger et de la conjuguer avec le maintien des valeurs fondamentales de la société d’accueil pour promouvoir une coexistence harmonieuse. Ce changement aura également des conséquences évidentes sur nombre d’aspects liés à l’intégration (regroupement familial, éducation, etc.) qui rendront peut-être nécessaire une révision de règles régissant les droits et les devoirs des étrangers, c’est-à-dire le droit des étrangers. (5) Depuis le début des migrations, considérées permanentes, deux théories ont toujours été confrontées, celle de la multiculturalité contre celle de l’intégration. La première préférait le rattachement à la loi nationale en ce qui concerne le

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BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Ouvrages AP Abarca Junco (éd), Derecho internacional privado, tome I (Madrid Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2008). J Bellavista et V Renovell (éds), Ciencia, tecnología e innovación en América Latina (Barcelona, Publicaciones de la Universidad de Barcelona, 1999). Commission mondiale sur la dimension sociale de la mondialisation, Une mondialisation juste. Créer des opportunités pour tous (Genève, Bureau international du Travail, 2004). Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé, La mise en œuvre et le fonctionnement de la Convention de La Haye sur l’adoption internationale : Guide de bonnes pratiques, Guide No 1 en vertu de la Convention de La Haye du 29 mai 1993 sur la protection des enfants et la coopération en matière d’adoption internationale (Bristol, Family Law, 2008). M Farge, Le statut familial des étrangers en France: de la loi nationale à la loi de la résidence habituelle (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2003). JD González Campos et A Borrás Rodríguez, Recopilación de convenios de la Conferencia de La Haya de Derecho internacional privado (1951–1993). Traducción al castellano (Madrid, Marcial Pons, 1996). M Herranz Ballesteros, El interés del menor en los Convenios de La Haya de Derecho internacional privado (Zaragoza, Lex Nova, 2004). Laboratoire d’études et de recherches appliquées au droit privé, Le droit de la famille à l’épreuve des migrations transnationales. Colloque du Laboratoire d’études et de recherches appliquées au droit privé, Université de Lille II (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1993). P-P Miralles Sangro, El secuestro internacional de menores y su incidencia en España (Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales, 1989). M Vargas Gómez-Urrutia, La protección internacional de los derechos del niño y la conferencia de La Haya de derecho internacional privado (México, Secretaría de Cultura del Gobierno de Jalisco, 1999).

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M Vargas Gómez-Urrutia, La reagrupación familiar de los extranjeros en España. Normas de extranjería y problemas de derecho aplicable (Cizur Menor, Thomson-Aranzadi, 2006).

Articles d’Ouvrages Collectifs A Borrás, ‘La protección internacional del niño y del adulto como expresión de la materalización del derecho internacional privado: similitudes y contrastes‘ dans LI Sánchez Rodríguez, JC Fernández Rozas, P Andrés Sáenz de Santa María, M Virgós Soriano, MA Amores Conradi, FJ Garcimartín Alférez et JJ Álvarez Rubio (éds), Pacis Artes, Obra homenaje al Profesor Julio D. González Campos — Tomo II Derecho internacional privado, derecho constitucional y varia (Madrid, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid et Eurolex, 2005). GAL Droz, ‘Évolution du rôle des autorités administratives dans les Conventions internationales de droit international privé au cours du premier siècle de la Conférence de La Haye’ dans Études offertes à Pierre Bellet (Paris, Librairie de la Cour de cassation, 1991). E Pérez Vera, ‘Conferencia de la Haya de Derecho Internacional Privado Envelement d’enfants. Rapport explicatif’ dans Colegio Universitario de Toledo, Excelentísimo Ayuntamiento de Toledo et Caja Toledo (éds), La sustracción internacional de menores (aspectos civiles), Ponencias, comunicaciones y materiales de trabajo de las Jornadas de profesores de Derecho internacional privado de Toledo (26 y 27 de enero de 1990) (Toledo, Patronato Universitario de Toledo, 1991) 164.

Articles de Périodiques I Barriere-Brouse, ‘L’enfant et les conventions internationales’ (1996) 123 Journal du droit international 843–88. A Borrás Rodríguez, ‘El papel de la autoridad central: los Convenios de La Haya y España’ (1993) 45 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 63–80. A Bucher, ‘La Convention de La Haye sur la protection internationale des adultes’ 10 Revue suisse de droit international et de droit européen (2000) 37–59. A Bustinduy, ‘La importancia de la implicación de los actores del Sur en el codesarrollo. Lecciones aprendidas del programa MIDA’ (2008) 2 Revista virtual codesarollo-cideal.org, Análisis. U Calvento Solari, ‘Conferencia de La Haya de Derecho Internacional Privado: Convenio sobre protección de niños. Nota explicativa’ (octubre 1997) 67 Infancia: Boletín del Instituto Interamericano del Niño-OEA 61–85. S García Cano, ‘Evolución de las técnicas de cooperación internacional entre autoridades en el Derecho internacional privado’ (2005) 112 Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado 75–109. P Levitt et N Nyberg Sorensen, ‘Global Migration Perspectives: The Transnational Turn in Migration Studies’ (2004) 6 Global Migration Perspectives 1–13.

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M Lô Diatta, ‘L’évolution des accords bilatéraux sur les travailleurs migrants’ (2007) 135 Journal du droit international 101–31. Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) ‘Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas Temporales de Canadá (2a evaluación)’ (mars 2008) 25 Cuadernos de Trabajo sobre Migración 3–48.

Cours J Déprez, ‘Droit international privé et conflits de civilisations. Aspects méthodologiques (Les relations entre systèmes d’Europe occidentale et systèmes islamiques en matière de statut personnel)’ (1988) 211 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9–372. GAL Droz, ‘La Conférence de La Haye et l’entraide judiciaire internationale’ (1980) 168 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 159–84. E Jayme, ‘Identité culturelle et intégration: le droit international privé postmoderne. Cours général de droit international privé’ (1995) 251 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9–267. JHA van Loon, ‘International Co–operation and Protection of Children with Regard to Intercountry Adoption’ (1993) 244 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 191–456.

Référence Internet AP Abarca Junco et M Vargas (2007) ‘Un proyecto para encauzar la acción legislativa en la Agenda para la integración de los nacionales de terceros países en la Unión Europea’ Análisis del Instituto Universitario de Investigación sobre Seguridad Interior, www.iuisi.es/12_publicaciones/12_2007/doc056–2007.pdf. K Newland, (2007) ‘A Surge of Interest in Migration and Development’ Migration Information Source, www.migrationinformation.org. Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) (2006) La Migración Internacional y el Desarrollo: perspectivas y experiencias de la OIM, www.un. int/iom/IOM%20Perspectives%20and%20Experiences%20Spanish.pdf.

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International Law and the Right to Have Rights ALISON KESBY *

I

N THIS PAPER, I examine how international law and international legal concepts can facilitate, and yet also impede, inclusion at the national level. The lens through which I examine the relationship between international law and states’ negotiation of pluralism is Hannah Arendt’s concept of ‘the right to have rights’. In the first section of the paper, I briefly discuss this concept. The second section then provides a more in-depth discussion of a context which raises the issue of the right to have rights, namely, the movement of people across borders. The third and final section explores the implications of the treatment of non-nationals at the border for equality and inclusion within states. By examining the right to have rights and its reinterpretation by the political theorist, Étienne Balibar, the paper aims to point to articulations of international law that facilitate inclusion and the negotiation of a diversity of interests within states.

THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS

As is well known, Arendt articulated the right to have rights as a response to the treatment of stateless people in the interwar period and the Second World War, who in being deprived of their nationality and of their citizenship, also lost their human rights. In Arendt’s account, human rights flow from membership of a political community, such that the right to citizenship is the right to have rights.1 Reversing most constitutional formulae, which found the rights of the citizen on the rights of man, and citizenship on humanity, for Arendt, human rights are not the foundation but the outcome of politics.2 According to Arendt, true human rights are based upon human plurality—that is, on the recognition of the distinctiveness of each person. In her view, this plurality can emerge and flourish only in the political sphere.3 She argued that human rights are those rights which are the product of the deliberations of a diverse group of people.4 Citizenship, being the status which * Research Fellow in Public International Law, St John’s College, Cambridge. 1 See H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism revised edn (New York, Harcourt Inc, 1973) ch 9. 2 See, eg, ibid 297–302. 3 This idea is developed by H Arendt in The Human Condition 2nd edn (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998) in relation to her conception of ‘action’. See also H Arendt, The Promise of Politics (New York, Shocken Books, 2005) 93–200. 4 Here I draw on Arendt’s conception of human rights as the product of politics and ‘human plurality’ as the condition of politics.

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permits participation in such negotiations, is thus the guarantor of human rights.5 On this analysis, to be excluded from a political community is to be excluded from the sphere of rights—to have no voice in their content and no chance of claiming their protection—and ultimately to become an ‘anomaly’ for which the law does not provide.6 Arendt’s work is not without its critics. We need not accept her thought in its entirety to recognise that it is a productive point from which to address the question of the role of international law in states’ negotiation of increased pluralism within their societies. In articulating the right to have rights, Arendt sought to highlight the link between participatory political communities founded on plurality, on the one hand, and protection against arbitrary deprivation of nationality and statelessness on the other.7 In her assessment, superfluity at the domestic level and superfluity at the international level go together; rights-bearing in national and international law are two sides of a single coin. It is this relationship between the national and the international which I seek to probe in this paper. Within the context of the present forum, we could frame the issue as follows: how might international legal concepts contribute to how citizenship is conceived within and beyond states? Here, I will focus on one international legal concept, the border (that is, national borders), and how conceptions of the border in international law may facilitate or hinder the negotiation of pluralism within states. The following section examines conceptions of borders in international law in the context of the movement of people. In the final section of the paper, I draw the connection between how borders are conceived in international law and the issue of inclusion within states.

BORDERS AND THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE ACROSS STATES

According to received accounts, whereas nationals have a right to enter their state of nationality under international law, and states a duty to admit them, the admission of non-nationals is subject to state discretion. Here, I examine the role of borders in the exercise of this discretion. In exploring these issues, I draw on the work of Étienne Balibar who has reinterpreted Arendt’s writing in the contemporary context. For Balibar, rethinking the border is the key to re-conceptualizing citizenship.8 On one conception, borders are lines which distinguish one sovereign territory from another. That is to say, they are conceived in geographical or territorial terms. Today, however, borders are increasingly taking more complex forms. In Balibar’s account, borders are plural and relational, in the sense that they do not have the same meaning for everyone.9 Whilst for a ‘rich person from a rich country’, borders 5

Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (n 1), 290–302, especially 300–01. See, eg, ibid 301. 7 ibid 300–02. 8 See, eg, E Balibar and J Swenson (translator), We, The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004) 101–14. 9 E Balibar and C Jones, J Swenson, J Turner (translator), Politics and the Other Scene (London, Verso, 2002) 81. 6

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signify a mere formality and the point at which their ‘surplus of rights’ may be exercised, for ‘a poor person from a poor country’, borders operate as discriminator and filter.10 In addition, the place at which borders are experienced may shift from group to group. For the members of one group, or for those members in one context, a national border may be described by the state’s territorial frontiers, but for another group, or for those members in another context, that same state’s border may take shape elsewhere. One of the means by which the discriminatory function of borders described by Balibar is achieved is by ‘exporting’ the border. National borders are being exported today by many governments and in many ways, such that entry into foreign states is negotiated from within would-be entrants’ state of nationality. Through this process, non-nationals may be prevented from leaving, and hence contained within their state of origin. For example, the UN Smuggling11 and Trafficking12 Protocols require states to adopt cooperative measures to prevent trafficking or smuggling and illegal entry into the territory of the state party.13 ‘Without prejudice to international commitments in relation to the free movement of people’, states parties are to ‘strengthen’ their border controls in order to prevent and detect trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling.14 In each case, sanctions are to be imposed on commercial carriers which fail to ensure that their passengers possess the travel documents required for entry into the receiving state.15 In light of the obligations which these Protocols impose on states, it has been said that international law permits, if not requires, states to prevent their nationals from departing their territory by unauthorised or irregular means.16 Here borders become a tool of international crime control: they are exported so as to impede the entry of non-nationals affected by such crime. A further context of the exporting of borders is the extraterritorial application of immigration laws. One well-known example of this practice is an agreement entered into in 2001 by the governments of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, permitting British immigration officers to grant or refuse passengers at Prague Airport leave to enter the UK before they boarded planes destined for the UK.17 The acknowledged object of the procedure was to stem the flow of asylum-seekers, especially Roma asylum-seekers, from the Czech Republic to the UK. In 2004, the House of Lords considered a challenge to these pre-clearance

10

ibid 83. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 28 January 2004) GAOR 55th Session Supp 49, 65. 12 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 December 2003) GAOR 55th Session Supp 49 Vol 1, 60. 13 See Art 11(1) of the Protocols (nn 11 and 12) and Art 7 of the COE ‘Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings’ (done 16 May 2005, entered into force 1 February 2008) CETS No 197. 14 ibid. 15 Art 11(2)–(4) of the Protocols (nn 11 and 12). 16 C Harvey and RP Barnidge, ‘Human Rights, Free Movement, and the Right to Leave in International Law’ (2007) 19 International Journal on Refugee Law 1, 14. 17 This section draws on A Kesby, ‘The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law’ (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 101. 11

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procedures by a number of Czech Roma who had been refused permission to leave Prague.18 Rejecting their claims under the Refugee Convention and the customary international law principle of non-refoulement, Lord Bingham did not consider that they had presented themselves at the frontier of the UK ‘save in a highly metaphorical sense’.19 Hence, there could be no argument that they were being returned to a country in which they had a well-founded fear of persecution. From another perspective, however, the Roma were in reality confronted with the ‘UK border’ while still in Prague. UK immigration rules applied extraterritorially to them. In continuing to articulate borders solely in terms of their territorial function, international law fails to address their socially discriminatory effects. In contrast to the situation just discussed in which non-nationals experience the border as a regime of exclusion and containment, international law may also support the right of non-nationals to reside within a state. Distinctions between nationals and non-nationals can be attenuated on the basis of a person’s family ties within a state and the protection of the right to respect for private and family life or exceptionally, by the potential ‘complementary protection’ to which the principle of non-refoulement (as articulated in international human rights law) may give rise. Here, I will briefly discuss the right to respect for private and family life. Several human rights instruments express the principle that states must respect the family life of those in their territory. Although respect for family life does not equate to a right of admission or freedom from expulsion, states parties to these instruments must respect the right to family life in exercising their discretionary powers of admission and expulsion. For example, whilst the European Court of Human Rights acknowledges that the right of a non-national to enter or remain in a country is not ‘as such’ guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, and that under international law, the entry of non-nationals into a state is a matter of state discretion, the Court has maintained that immigration controls must be exercised consistently with Convention obligations, including protection of the right to family life provided in Article 8.20 An interference with family life will only be justified within the terms of Article 8(2) where the state has struck a fair balance between the applicant’s right to respect for family life and the state’s pursuit of such legitimate aims as immigration control21 and the prevention of crime and disorder.22 The strength of a person’s family ties in the state, and the feasibility of transferring those ties to the state of origin, or a third state, are weighed against the public interest. In the case of expulsion, for example, the public interest often has to do with the commission by the individual concerned of a crime. Relevant factors include the nature and severity of the offence committed by the person, his or her family situation, such as the length of a marriage, and whether there are children, and the ‘seriousness of the difficulties’ the spouse and children are likely to face in

18 R (on the application of European Roma Rights Centre et al) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport & Anor (UNHCR intervening) [2004] UKHL 55; [2005] 2 AC 1. 19 ibid, para 26. 20 eg, Abdulaziz v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 471, paras 59 and 60. 21 eg, Gül v Switzerland (1996) 22 EHRR 93, para 38. 22 Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50, para 47.

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the country of origin.23 In recent case law, the Court has extended the application of Article 8 to the grant of residence permits.24 It has also required that immigration measures respect the right to private life of long-term residents.25 For example, the deportation of long-term residents may violate a person’s right to respect for private life where he or she is able to establish the requisite ‘network of personal, social and economic relations that make up the private life of every human being’.26 Well-established family and social ties may therefore mitigate the effects of a person’s status as a non-national and give rise to an intermediate category in which admission and the right to remain may be secured without the formal status of nationality being conferred. Here the focus of international law shifts from a person’s formal legal status being determinative of state action—and the border operating solely as discriminator and filter—to a situation in which the state has to take into account the effect of its actions on a person’s familial relationships within its borders and beyond. In this way, the right to respect for private and family life may prevent a person from being removed from the place in which his or her key relationships are located. Residence secured in this way may then be the gateway to political participation—what Balibar terms the right to reside with rights.27 The ‘minimal recognition’ that the person belongs to what he terms a ‘common sphere of existence’ forms the basis for the contestation of rights.28 By contestation of rights is meant here not just claims in relation to civil and political rights, but also welfare demands, engaging economic, social and cultural rights.

BORDERS, PLURALISM AND THE ENJOYMENT OF RIGHTS

Up until this point, I have been discussing the role of international law in facilitating admission to states in certain circumstances, and exclusion in others. In this section, I argue that the way non-nationals are treated at the border may also have consequences for the treatment of citizens, and more generally, for equality and inclusion within a state. Secondly, I point to a more relational understanding of national borders and of citizenship which may facilitate the extension of human rights to all who are present within a community. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt argued that statelessness precipitated the crisis of the nation-state: the inequality of status associated with it challenged the equality on which the nation-state was founded, for the inequality of treatment of the stateless eventually flowed over onto citizens.29 Drawing on Arendt’s analysis, Balibar examines the implications of the discriminatory character of 23

ibid, para 48. Sisojeva v Latvia (2007) 45 EHRR 33, para 91. 25 Slivenko v Latvia (2004) 39 EHRR 24. 26 ibid, para 96. 27 E Balibar ‘Strangers as Enemies: Further Reflections on the Aporias of Transnational Citizenship – Lecture delivered at McMaster University, 16 March 2006’ www.globalautonomy.ca/global1/ article.jsp?index=RA_Balibar_Strangers.xml, 14. 28 Balibar, We, The People of Europe? (n 8), 119. 29 See, eg, Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (n 1), 290. 24

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borders both for the equality of citizens and the inclusion of non-citizens within the community.30 The inequalities of the border may be internalised and undermine the prospects of politics within the community for citizens and non-citizens alike.31 According to Balibar, the construction of the stranger as the enemy at the border is the clearest sign of the modern-day crisis of the nation-state, and of the nation-state returning to a ‘lawless model of governance’.32 On Balibar’s analysis, institutions of the ‘rule of law’ ‘turn against themselves’ and come to produce and then reproduce illegality.33 For example, states block immigrants’ efforts to gain legal status, only to transform their illegal status into the raison d’être for repressive security measures.34 Balibar’s point is that this reproduction of illegality is not limited to the treatment of non-citizens. However, the very challenge that the undemocratic nature of the border poses to the equality of citizenship also presents an opportunity to re-conceptualise citizenship. As noted by Balibar, borders are paradoxical: they are indeed sites of state repression and at times violence, and yet their very conflictual nature can turn them into sites of politics.35 For Balibar, citizenship needs to be reconceived from the standpoint of the border.36 He maintains that confronting ‘the different modalities of exclusion’ is ‘the founding moment of citizenship.’37 Thus, Balibar re-articulates citizenship as an active process of the rightless asserting and claiming rights.38 In Balibar’s analysis, Arendt’s right to have rights becomes the universal right to politics:39 that each person has the capacity for, and the right to participate in, politics. He reconceives citizenship as an active process independent of formal status, such that the right to reside can become the right to have rights. Even before formal citizenship status is granted, there can be engagement in political struggles. Here citizenship is ‘a continuous process in which a minimal recognition of the belonging of human beings to the “common” sphere of existence … already involves – and makes possible – a totality of rights’.40 Thus the right to have rights becomes ‘a right of residing with rights’.41 In this re-conceptualisation, formal status is not a precondition for citizenship. Rather, citizenship is a matter of all those who happen to be present in the community—irrespective of their status— contesting rights. On this analysis, borders are ‘constitutive of being in the world’42 not simply in the sense of dividing global territory (as per their articulation in

30

See, for example, Balibar, We, The People of Europe? (n 8), 101–14. ibid. 32 E Balibar, ‘Cosmopolitics and Cosmopolitanism’, lecture delivered at Birkbeck College London, 6 November 2007. 33 Balibar, We, The People of Europe? (n 8), 62. 34 ibid. 35 ibid, 108–11. 36 See ibid, 101–14. 37 ibid 76. 38 ibid, 118–19. 39 See, eg E Balibar, ‘What is a Politics of the Rights of Man?’, in E Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx (New York, Routledge, 1994). 40 Balibar, We, The People of Europe? (n 8), 119. 41 Balibar, Strangers as Enemies (n 27), 14. 42 Balibar, ‘Cosmopolitics and Cosmopolitanism’ (n 32). 31

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international law) but in terms of the coming together of a plurality of people engaged in politics, who in so doing have the potential to ‘democratise’ borders and confer rights on themselves. Balibar’s analysis opens at least two divergent articulations of the relation between borders (and the regulation of the movement of people) and inclusion within states—that is, of who has the right to have rights in a community. On the one hand, when the border retains its undemocratic and socially discriminatory function, the exclusionary practices—and the inequality of relations—may turn inwards, such that citizenship internalises the inequalities of the border. Thus, the regulation of the movement of persons across borders may put in question the articulation of citizenship—and the democratic community per se—as the sphere of rights. But things need not be so. When the border is conceived as a political space in which rights are contested by both those possessing and those lacking formal citizenship status, the border becomes the means of re-conceptualising citizenship as active citizenship—as political participation—such that the participants by their very presence exercise the right to have rights. Balibar’s call to use the border as the means of re-conceptualising citizenship as an active citizenship of political participation is a challenge to international law to reconceive the border as a place where rights may be contested and instantiated and to reorient its norms and practices towards the realisation of rights for all, irrespective of status and wherever a person is located. His analysis invites us to enlarge our understanding of what constitutes national borders, and to examine the diverse ways in which they affect people’s lives today. At the same time, he shows how orienting international law away from formal status to the real, social relationships between people may facilitate the extension of human rights to all.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, revised edn (New York, Harcourt Inc, 1973). H Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd edn (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998). H Arendt, The Promise of Politics (New York, Shocken Books, 2005). E Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx (New York, Routledge, 1994). E Balibar, C Jones, J Swenson and C Turner (translator) Politics and the Other Scene (London, Verso, 2002). E Balibar and J Swenson (translator) We, The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004).

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Journal Articles C Harvey and RP Barnidge, ‘Human Rights, Free Movement, and the Right to Leave in International Law’ (2007) 19 International Journal on Refugee Law 1–21. A Kesby, ‘The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law’ (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 101–19.

Website Sources E Balibar, ‘Strangers as Enemies: Further Reflections on the Aporias of Transnational Citizenship – Lecture delivered at McMaster University, 16 March 2006’ www.globalautonomy.ca/global1/article.jsp?index=RA_Balibar_Strangers.xml.

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La Théorie Politique de l’État en Droit International Considérations Historiques à Partir de l’Étude de Grotius RÉMI BACHAND * INTRODUCTION

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OUT AU LONG du XXe siècle, plusieurs auteurs ont montré que les champs scientifiques n’évoluent pas uniquement selon des critères scientifiques mais qu’ils étaient aussi le résultat des relations sociales et notamment des relations de pouvoir dans la communauté scientifique autant que dans la société dans son ensemble.1 Les chercheurs et les académiques étant ainsi directement ancrés dans un contexte social particulier qui influence autant l’ontologie et l’épistémologie que les résultats mêmes de leurs recherches, il devient dès lors vain de continuer à étudier l’évolution des champs scientifiques au regard des seules ‘révolutions scientifiques’ ou en ne mettant l’accent que sur les influences intellectuelles desdits chercheurs.2 Ce qu’une telle perspective nous permet de comprendre, c’est que les concepts et paradigmes de ces champs sont intrinsèquement chargés de la ‘politisation’ historique et des relations de pouvoir qui en ont influencé la * L’auteur est professeur de droit international et directeur du Centre d’études sur le droit international et la mondialisation (Cédim) à l’Université du Québec à Montréal. Les recherches menant à cet article ont été menées lors d’un séjour postdoctoral au European Law Research Center de l’Université Harvard et l’auteur tient à remercier son directeur, David Kennedy, pour son soutien lors de ces recherches. Il tient aussi à remercier Louis Rousseau et Olivier Barsalou pour leurs précisions et commentaires. 1 Pensons notamment à P Bourdieu, ‘La spécificité du champ scientifique et les conditions sociales du progrès de la raison’ (1975) 7 Sociologie et société 91; M Horkheimer et C Maillard, S Muller (traducteurs) Théorie traditionnelle et théorie critique (Paris, Gallimard, 1974); RW Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’ (1981) 10 Millenium: Journal of International Studies 126 et D Kennedy, ‘The Twentieth-Century Discipline of International Law in the United States’ dans A Sarat, B Garth and RA Kagan (éds), Looking Back at Law’s Century (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2002) 386. 2 C’est d’ailleurs exactement pour cette raison que P Bourdieu parle de ‘champ’ plutôt que de ‘discipline’, concept que nous adoptons à sa suite: Pour P Bourdieu, ‘[d]ans un champ, les agents et les institutions luttent, suivant les régularités et les règles constitutives de cet espace de jeu (et, dans certaines conjonctures, à propos de ces règles mêmes), avec des degrés divers de force et, par là, des possibilités diverses de succès, pour s’approprier les profits spécifiques qui sont en jeu dans le jeu. Ceux qui dominent dans un champ donné sont en position de le faire fonctionner à leur avantage, mais ils doivent toujours compter avec la résistance, la contestation, les revendications, les prétentions, «politiques» ou non, des dominés’: P Bourdieu avec LJD Wacquant, Réponses. Pour une anthropologie réflexive. (Paris, Le Seuil 1992), 78.

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création et qui leur ont permis d’intégrer le champ scientifique en question. Lorsque ces concepts et paradigmes sont centraux au champ, ces relations sociales historiques en viennent à contaminer complètement celui-ci et à influencer implicitement toute proposition émancipatrice qui demeurerait à l’intérieur d’une stratégie de ‘résolution de problèmes’—ce qui est le cas pour la plupart de ces propositions— plutôt que d’adopter une posture inspirée des théories critiques.3 Une conséquence importante de ce constat pour les approches critiques concerne l’importance d’étudier l’histoire du champ afin d’identifier ces relations de pouvoir historiques qui continuent souvent à se cacher dans les interstices de son étude et de sa pratique. Cette tâche doit cependant être conduite d’une manière particulière: elle doit en effet se concentrer sur les paradigmes et concepts qui sont perçus comme étant scientifiques, c’est-à-dire incontournables et apolitiques, afin de montrer que leur soi-disant neutralité n’est en réalité qu’un voile pour le reconduction de relations de pouvoir historiques (qui peuvent cependant avoir pris des dimensions différentes, notamment en favorisant des groupes et des classes sociales qui n’existaient pas au moment de l’apparition des concepts et paradigmes). Une telle méthode peut permettre de montrer que le champ aurait pu être construit de façon complètement différente puisque ces concepts et paradigmes centraux ne sont pas le fruit d’une logique inévitable, mais bien le produit d’une contingence historique et sociale. Elle favorise aussi une critique qui dépasse le cadre des approches de résolution de problèmes dans la mesure où elle montre qu’il existe des possibilités dépassant ce monde ‘tel qu’il est’ qui sert de fondement aux solutions traditionnellement proposées par lesdites approches. En droit international, le concept le plus important est celui d’État. Les internationalistes ont bien sûr une théorie explicite et analytique de ce concept, où celui-ci est constitué d’un territoire, une population et un gouvernement, en plus d’un possible quatrième élément sur lequel la doctrine est encore à débattre et qui consiste en la reconnaissance de l’entité étatique de la part des autres États et que certains associent à la capacité de conclure des traités. Il s’agit d’une théorie analytique en ce sens que sa seule fonction est de déterminer avec ‘objectivité’ les entités qui sont des États et celles qui n’en sont pas. Cela dit, les internationalistes ont également ce qu’il conviendrait d’appeler une théorie politique de l’État qui consiste en ce que ceux-ci doivent implicitement penser du fonctionnement de l’État pour pouvoir écrire ce qu’ils écrivent, pour garder, autrement dit, la cohérence théorique de leurs écrits. Il s’agit donc d’une théorie politique de l’État qui est implicitement partagée par les individus impliqués dans la production scientifique du champ du droit international et qui sert de

3 Nous comprenons par une ‘théorie de résolutions de problèmes’ une théorie qui ‘prend le monde tel qu’elle le trouve, avec ses relations sociales, ses relations de pouvoir et les institutions grâce auxquelles il est organisé comme étant un cadre donné pour son action. Son objectif principal est de faire en sorte que ces relations et ces institutions fonctionnent tranquillement en s’attaquant de manière efficace à certains de leurs problèmes’ et une théorie critique comme une théorie qui ‘ne prend pas les institutions, les relations sociales et les rapports de domination pour acquis mais les remet en question en étudiant leurs origines ainsi que la pertinence et, le cas échéant, comment ils pourraient être dans un processus de changement’, Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders (n 1) 128–29 (notre traduction).

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fondement à l’ensemble de celui-ci. Si cette théorie n’est décrite nulle part, elle est néanmoins présente à peu près partout4 dans les travaux propres au champ du droit international. Pour comprendre la théorie politique de l’État intrinsèque au droit international, il importe de comprendre la chaîne causale qui unit la production normative à la sanction, chaîne causale propre à tout ordre juridique, et de remettre celle-ci en relation avec deux principes juridiques communs à la plupart des systèmes de droit contemporains. Cette chaîne a trois maillons qui sont: 1) le moment où l’‘État’, en vertu de la nature volontariste du droit international, s’engage à l’endroit d’une règle contraignante; 2) le moment où l’‘État’ prend une action qui deviendra un ‘fait international’ qui sera lui-même jugé au regard de la règle dans une analyse binaire utilisant les critères légal/illégal (ne considérons pas ici les problèmes de l’indétermination et de l’interprétation); 3) si l’action a été jugée illégale, des sanctions pourront être adoptées contre l’‘État’. Or, pour que cette chaîne puisse s’insérer avec cohérence dans une théorie du droit international, et considérant ces deux principes juridiques que sont le principe de l’individualité de la peine et celui selon lequel nulle peine ne peut être subie pour un délit commis par autrui, il sera nécessaire de s’assurer (ou de postuler implicitement) que les individus qui subiront concrètement les effets causés par les sanctions seront aussi factuellement (plutôt que juridiquement) responsables des actions commises à l’étape des deux premiers maillons. En d’autres termes, la ‘socialisation des effets de la responsabilité juridique’ implique la prémisse de la ‘socialisation de la prise de décision’. Or, ce que n’importe quelle analyse sociologique de l’État arriverait facilement à montrer, c’est qu’il existe encore des distinctions extrêmement importantes au regard de l’accès au processus décisionnel étatique entre les différents groupes de la population, groupes pouvant principalement être distingués en fonction de la classe, du genre et de la race. En fait, même à cette époque où les thèses marxistes semblent avoir été reléguées aux oubliettes, il se trouve encore plusieurs auteurs pour dire que cette ‘volonté de l’État’ s’emploie plus que jamais à défendre les intérêts du capital,5 que cette volonté de l’État, en d’autres termes, est d’abord et avant tout celle des classes et des groupes dominants de la société, bien qu’une relation de détermination absolue soit évidemment à rejeter.6 Bref, loin d’être l’universalisation

4 Évidemment, nous gardons à l’esprit le fait que certaines dimensions du droit international (comme l’ensemble du système des droits humains et le droit pénal international, par exemple) s’écartent passablement du schéma que nous cherchons à décrire. De la même façon, nous ne nions pas que certains chercheurs ou certaines approches théoriques ont une théorie de l’État qui s’écarte en partie de ce que nous sommes en train de décrire et critiquent le phénomène que nous qualifions ici de réification de l’État. Cela dit, ces exceptions ne sont pas suffisantes pour que l’on considère que le champ du droit international a abandonné, de manière générale, la théorie réifiée de l’État dont nous parlons ici. 5 Par exemple: S Sassen, ‘The State and Economic Globalisation: Any Implications for International Law?’(2000) 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 109; L Panitch, ‘The New Imperial State’ (2000) 2 New Left Review 5. 6 Rappelons à ce sujet l’opinion de M Kamto: ‘Pour représenter l’État, les organes étatiques ne sont pas nécessairement représentatifs et n’ont pas à satisfaire un critère de légitimité quelconque, qu’il soit démocratique ou non. … [À ce sujet, la CIJ] semble s’en tenir au principe de la neutralité voire de l’indifférence du droit international vis-à-vis de l’ordre interne de l’État, sauf exception prévue par le droit international’: M Kamto ‘La volonté de l’État en droit international’ (2004) 310 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9, 87.

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de la volonté de la population, la volonté de l’État demeure en réalité grandement influencée par les déséquilibres de pouvoir internes à celui-ci. Il s’agit, en d’autres termes, d’une certaine forme de privatisation du processus décisionnel (lors des deux moments: celui où l’État s’engage à respecter certaines règles et celui où il commet des actes susceptibles d’être évalués au regard de celles-ci) aux mains des classes et des groupes dirigeants de l’État, privatisation du processus décisionnel qui est donc contraire aux postulats que doit nécessairement adopter le champ du droit international pour garder sa cohérence théorique. Celui-ci doit, dès lors, réifier cette volonté de l’État, c’est-à-dire imaginer celle-ci comme étant quelque chose de concret davantage que le résultat d’une dynamique sociale complexe parce qu’autrement, il serait forcé d’admettre son incohérence au regard de cette chaîne à trois maillons dont nous parlions. Bref, étant donné que le droit international se trouve incapable de prouver l’identité commune des acteurs impliqués dans les trois étapes de ladite chaîne, il doit se contenter de la postuler implicitement, de faire ‘comme si’ cette identité commune existait véritablement. Or, force est d’admettre que bien souvent, l’identité entre ceux qui décident des actions qui sont attribuées à l’État et ceux qui subissent les conséquences des sanctions lorsque ces actions sont considérées comme étant illégales est différente. Cette opposition entre la privatisation du pouvoir décisionnel et la socialisation de la responsabilité juridique que cherche à cacher la théorie politique réifiée de l’État constitue ce qu’il convient d’appeler la contradiction fondamentale du droit international. Pourtant, malgré certaines remises en question épisodiques (c’est-à-dire lors de situations très concrètes), cette association implicite entre la population et l’État qui découle de cette théorie politique de l’État semble demeurer importante dans la ‘vision du monde’ partagée autant dans la doctrine que par les preneurs de décisions. On voit là l’aspect idéologique du droit: cette compréhension de l’État réifié qui voile la complexité des relations de pouvoir semble tellement dominante qu’on ne peut tout simplement pas imaginer que le droit international pourrait avoir une autre théorie de l’État. Cette contribution fait partie d’un programme de recherche qui cherche à comprendre la construction historique, dans la doctrine (et en particulier chez ceux que l’on qualifie à tort ou à raison de ‘Pères fondateurs’ du droit international/droit des gens) de cette théorie politique réificatrice de l’État. Nous chercherons ici à identifier les éléments contextuels d’origine économique, politique et sociale qui ont poussé Hugo Grotius à adopter, dans ses écrits qui ont le plus marqué l’évolution du champ du droit international, une théorie politique réificatrice de l’État qui voile les relations sociales et qui intègre conséquemment la contradiction fondamentale décrite plus haut et qui est, après lui, demeurée centrale au champ du droit international. La thèse qui sera soutenue est la suivante: lors de sa jeunesse marquée par la guerre que menait la République des Provinces-Unies à l’Espagne et par les luttes de pouvoirs entre les États-généraux de cette République et les états de Hollande, Huig de Groot7—qui était un plaideur et un politique avant d’être un

7 Afin de faciliter la distinction entre ses écrits de l’époque ‘néerlandaise’ et ceux réalisés en France, nous allons utiliser son nom néerlandais (Huig de Groot) pour parler de la première époque, et son nom latinisé (Hugo Grotius) pour parler de la seconde.

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théoricien—avait une théorie relativement ‘républicaine’ de l’État qui contraste à plusieurs égards avec celle adoptée (notamment dans Du droit de la guerre et de la paix) dans les travaux réalisés alors que Grotius était en exil en France et survivait grâce à une rente offerte par Louis XIII. La théorie de l’État adoptée par Grotius dans cette dernière époque semble en effet avoir été influencée par l’absolutisme qui émergeait à l’époque en France. Puisque les travaux de Grotius qui ont davantage marqué le champ du droit international sont ceux écrits à l’époque française, et que la théorie politique de l’État adoptée dans les travaux de cette époque semble préfigurer grandement celle qui prédominera dans le droit international jusqu’à ce jour,8 cette contribution suggérera que cette théorie demeure à ce jour influencée par une théorie absolutiste du pouvoir où la fin principale de la gouvernance est la reproduction de la cour et du régime monarchique.

LE CONTEXTE EN HOLLANDE À L’ÉPOQUE DE DE GROOT (JUSQU’À 1618)

La théorie de l’État qu’avait Huig de Groot ne peut être comprise en faisant abstraction du contexte politique dans lequel celui-ci œuvrait, d’autant plus que la plupart de ses écrits sont d’abord et avant tout des contributions (voire des plaidoiries) aux débats politiques de l’époque. Nous commencerons donc cette section en faisant un survol des principaux éléments de ce contexte avant d’expliquer sa théorie de l’État.

Le Contexte Politique de la Hollande au Début du XVIIe Siècle La compréhension des écrits de de Groot durant la période allant du début du siècle jusqu’à 1618, année de son emprisonnement, exige de comprendre au moins quatre éléments contextuels reliés à la vie politique de la nouvelle République des Provinces-Unies. Ces éléments sont: les différends religieux et ceux sur le niveau de tolérance à accorder aux adhérents des religions minoritaires; les différends concernant la séparation des pouvoirs entre les États-généraux de la République et les états9 des provinces; la guerre contre l’Espagne; et la nouvelle politique coloniale. Si les débats religieux ont d’abord opposé les protestants aux catholiques (débats au cœur de la guerre entre les Provinces-Unies et l’Espagne), c’est rapidement (à partir des années 1580) entre les Luthériens et les Calvinistes, puis entre les

8 Non pas que le champ du droit international gardera sans la modifier la théorie politique de l’État de Grotius mais plutôt qu’à sa suite, la théorie politique de l’État adoptée aura généralement tendance à réifier celui-ci et à occulter les relations sociales en son fondement, de la manière dont nous l’avons expliquée. 9 Afin d’éviter la confusion avec ‘État’ compris comme sujet de droit international, nous écrirons états avec un ‘é’ minuscule lorsque nous parlerons des corps législatifs des Provinces (estates), sauf lorsque ce concept apparaîtra dans une citation de langue française.

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Arminiens et les Gomaristes10 que ceux-ci eurent lieu.11 Ce qu’il est important de savoir ici, c’est que la population et l’élite de la Hollande, l’une des sept provinces de la République autoproclamée des Provinces-Unies, avaient la réputation d’être beaucoup plus tolérantes aux divergences religieuses que celles des autres provinces; et que le plus grand défenseur de la tolérance en Hollande aussi bien que dans la République était Jean Oldenbarnevelt qui était l’Avocat, c’est-à-dire le principal représentant de la Hollande aux États-généraux, et dont le principal conseiller n’était nul autre que de Groot. Certains écrits de de Groot font d’ailleurs état d’une grande implication dans ce débat, comme nous le verrons plus loin. Ces débats religieux eurent un impact sur la politique et des débats sur la distribution des pouvoirs entre la République et les provinces s’ensuivirent rapidement. Réalisant cette plus grande tolérance religieuse des Hollandais, Oldenbarnevelt, de Groot et les Arminiens défendirent bientôt une position franchement décentralisatrice, promouvant l’idée selon laquelle la République n’était qu’une union confédérative dans laquelle certains pouvoirs (parmi lesquels les questions religieuses ne figuraient pas) avaient été délégués aux États-généraux. Au contraire, Maurice d’Orange—stadhouder de cinq des Provinces (dont la Hollande et Utrecht)12—et les Gomaristes, sachant que les positions arminiennes n’étaient véritablement influentes qu’en Hollande, étaient plutôt en faveur de la centralisation des pouvoirs—argument appuyé par la pratique concrète des États-généraux qui n’avaient cessé d’étendre leurs domaines de compétences.13 La guerre contre l’Espagne constitue également un élément contextuel important. Rappelons que le point de départ de cette guerre était le désir de l’Espagne d’écraser la Réforme dont l’influence grandissait dans les Pays-Bas espagnols (en gros, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas actuels et le Luxembourg), et qu’elle se poursuivit à cause du désir de la puissance colonisatrice d’empêcher l’indépendance proclamée suite à l’Union d’Utrecht (1579) et à l’Acte de La Haye (1581). L’influence de la guerre sur les écrits de de Groot doit se comprendre en conjonction avec la politique coloniale de la République et avec la trêve conclue en 1609. Cette trêve, rappelons-le, fut loin de ne faire que des heureux et une partie importante de la population, menée par Maurice, demeurait favorable à la guerre tant et aussi longtemps que l’Espagne ne

10 Rappelons qu’alors que Gomar défendait le dogme calviniste de la prédestination selon lequel Dieu aurait déjà décidé qui sera sauvé et qui ne le sera pas, Arminius considérait que l’action individuelle avait, dans une certaine mesure, la capacité de permettre à l’individu d’être sauvé. 11 Sur les querelles religieuses de l’époque, voir: J Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) 365–94 et P Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, Vol 1 (New York, Barnes & Noble, 1961) 38–63. 12 Les stadhouders étaient au départ au nombre de trois (un pour les provinces de Friesland et d’Ommelands; un pour la Hollande et la Zélande; un autre pour les provinces d’Utrecht, de Gelderland et d’Overijessel), mais ce nombre est descendu à deux lorsque Utrecht, Gelderland et Overijessel ont convenu de se placer sous le stadhouder de la Hollande et de la Zélande (qui était à ce moment Maurice d’Orange). Le stadhouder était également le capitaine-général des provinces, c’est-à-dire qu’il était aux commandes de l’armée. Puisque l’armée pouvait difficilement être sous la direction de deux ou trois stadhouders différents, Maurice est rapidement devenu, en pratique, le capitaine-général de l’armée de l’Union. Cela dit, ses fonctions principales concernaient l’administration de la justice, ainsi que la supervision de la Réforme dans le clergé. À cause de ses fonctions, le stadhouder était généralement le plus grand défenseur de la centralisation des pouvoirs: Israel, The Dutch Republic (n 11) 300–06. 13 ibid, 446 et seq.

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reconnaîtrait pas l’indépendance des Provinces-Unies.14 Une coalition aux intérêts divers se créa ainsi contre le camp de ceux qui avaient mené et soutenu les négociations. Comme le fait remarquer Geyl: D’inévitables intérêts matériels étaient mélangés à ces considérations de plus haute nature. Certains groupes puissants considéraient qu’il était à leur avantage de poursuivre la guerre. D’abord les militaires; ensuite les corsaires qui étaient grandement préoccupés par les activités commerciales de la Zélande à travers le monde; aussi bien que ceux qui étaient de près ou de loin impliqués dans les activités martiales de tous genres. Finalement, il y avait aussi ceux qui, depuis un certain temps, avaient travaillé à la fondation de la Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, un projet qui était directement dirigé contre le territoire colonial espagnol en Amérique, et qu’Oldenbarnevelt avait, aussitôt les négociations commencées, cherché à empêcher.15

C’était ainsi un nombre non négligeable de commerçants d’Amsterdam qui s’étaient opposés à la trêve négociée par Oldenbarnevelt parce que celle-ci risquait de nuire à leurs activités commerciales coloniales. Cette politique coloniale et la guerre contre l’Espagne, faut-il le rappeler, furent centrales dans les écrits de de Groot dans la mesure où l’un de ses principaux écrits de l’époque, le De Jure Praedae,16 cherchait justement à défendre la prise d’une caraque portugaise (rappelons que les couronnes portugaises et espagnoles étaient alors unifiées) par un navigateur hollandais lors d’une expédition coloniale. Ces deux personnages que sont Oldenbarnevelt et Maurice d’Orange en vinrent donc à personnifier ce conflit multidimensionnel qui finit par coûter la vie au premier et à forcer de Groot à l’exil. En effet, et les détails ne sont pas importants pour notre propos,17 le conflit continua de s’envenimer entre les Remontrants (comme on en était venu à appeler les Arminiens) et les Contre-Remontrants (c’est-à-dire les Gomaristes), jusqu’au point où, en 1618, Maurice et ses troupes en vinrent à mettre Oldenbarnevelt, de Groot et certains de leurs collaborateurs sous arrêt. Le premier sera condamné à mort et décapité en 1619, le second condamné à la prison à vie. Il réussit néanmoins à s’évader en 1621 et trouva refuge en France où il vécut pour la plus grande partie du reste de sa vie.

L’État chez de Groot Huig de Groot a été extrêmement influencé par les débats politiques et religieux de son époque et l’ensemble de son œuvre est transcendé par ceux-ci du fait que plusieurs de ses écrits étaient en fait des prises de position adoptées dans le cadre de ses fonctions politiques, voire des plaidoiries dans des affaires juridiques dans lesquelles il était impliqué. Comme le fait remarquer Harm-Jan van Dam qui croit fermement qu’il était un plaideur plutôt qu’un philosophe ou un théoricien: 14

Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century (n 11) 251 et seq. ibid, 252 (notre traduction). 16 H Grotius et GL Williams, WH Zeydel (traducteurs), MJ van Ittersum (éd), Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Jure Praedae) (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 2006). 17 On renverra le lecteur à Geyl (n 11) 58–62. 15

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[l]e point de vue qu’il exprime et les arguments qui sont donnés comme preuve ne sont valides que dans le contexte du travail dans lequel ils apparaissent, avec un but et dans un domaine bien précis, ce qui fait en sorte qu’ils varient en fonction du temps, des circonstances, des sujets traités et de l’auditoire. Il cherche à marquer des points plutôt qu’à soutenir un point de vue.18

Comme on l’a vu, dès son plus jeune âge, de Groot a été très près d’Oldenbarnevelt au point d’accompagner celui-ci lors son périple en France en 1598—il n’avait alors que quinze ans—où ils étaient chargés de convaincre Henri IV de ne pas conclure de paix avec l’Espagne, ce qui aurait permis aux Espagnols de concentrer leurs forces sur les Provinces-Unies. À partir de ce moment et jusqu’à leur condamnation en 1619, leurs deux noms allaient être au centre des conflits politiques et religieux de la nouvelle République, de Groot et Oldenbarnevelt défendant sans relâche les pouvoirs des états de la Hollande contre les tendances centralisatrices des Étatsgénéraux menés par Maurice d’Orange, ainsi que la tolérance religieuse, luttes qui allaient les mener, comme nous l’avons vu, à prendre le parti des Remontrants contre le dogmatisme des Gomaristes. Ces luttes allaient marquer—le mot est faible—le destin des deux, menant Oldenbarnevelt à l’échafaud et Grotius à l’exil en France.19 L’élément qui allait marquer le plus les écrits de de Groot unissait toutefois celui-ci et Oldenbarnevelt à Maurice et ce, malgré certains désaccords sur les stratégies à adopter. Cet élément, c’est la guerre contre l’Espagne et c’est d’abord et avant tout la tentative de de Groot de justifier la guerre que mène la République contre son ennemi, qui donnera corps à sa théorie de l’État. Le point de départ de la stratégie d’argumentation de de Groot à ce sujet—et il s’agit d’un élément qui sera aussi central dans la théorie de l’État qu’aura Grotius dans sa période française—concerne une sorte de théorie contractualiste qui est au fondement historique de l’État. Cette théorie de l’État est centrale dans la stratégie qu’utilise de Groot pour justifier la guerre que mènent alors les Provinces-Unies contre l’Espagne et c’est dans le De Jure Praedae20 que sa vision de l’État et de l’origine de celui-ci est la plus pleinement développée. À cet endroit, de Groot cherche à justifier la prise, dans le détroit de Malacca, d’une caraque portugaise par un navigateur néerlandais œuvrant pour le compte de la Compagnie des Indes

18 H-J van Dam, ‘Introduction’ dans ibid (éd) et H Grotius, De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra. Critical Edition with Introduction, English Translation and Commentary, Vol I (Leiden, Brill Academic, 2001) 5 (notre traduction). Voir aussi Waszink donnant son opinion sur Grotius, The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic: ‘Même si nous avons soutenu qu’il n’y a aucune raison pour douter de la sincérité de Grotius et de ses croyances sur la vérité de l’exemple Batave, l’exposé historique qu’il fait dans [The Batavian Republic] n’est pas complètement dépourvu de manipulation, et notamment en ce qui concerne l’histoire ancienne de la Hollande’ J Waszinck, ‘Introduction’ dans ibid (éd) et H Grotius, The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic (Assen, Van Gorcum, 2000) 20 (notre traduction). 19 Sur la vie de Grotius, la meilleure bibliographie, qui est à la fois complète et objective, nous semble être la suivante: H Vreeland, Hugo Grotius the Father of the Modern Science of International Law (New York, Oxford University Press, 1917). On pourra aussi consulter l’excellent résumé de J Basdevant, ‘Grotius’ dans Pillet, (éd), Les fondateurs du droit international: leurs oeuvres, leurs doctrines (Paris, V Giard & E Brière, 1904) 125, 127–54; ainsi que E Dunbauld, The Life and Legal Writings of Hugo Grotius (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1969) et V Hély, Étude sur le droit de la guerre de Grotius (Paris, F Pichon, 1875) 5–9. 20 Grotius et Williams, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (n 16).

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orientales.21 Cette justification se fera en développant une théorie du droit naturel dont les premières lois concernent les droits de défendre sa vie et ses biens, ces deux lois ayant aussi comme conséquence qu’il est injuste de permettre à autrui de faire du mal ou de saisir les biens légitimement acquis par un innocent, et qu’il sera juste de corriger le mal fait par le délinquant et notamment de saisir des biens lui appartenant, jusqu’à une quantité proportionnelle à ce qui a été volé. C’est sur cette base que de Groot établira les critères relatifs à la cause matérielle22 de sa théorie de la guerre juste dans De Jure Praedae en ce sens qu’il considère qu’une guerre sera juste si elle est menée conformément aux lois de droit naturel permettant l’autodéfense, la défense de ses biens, afin d’obtenir le remboursement d’une dette ou découlant d’un contrat ou afin de punir une injustice commise avec une intention injuste.23 Après avoir défendu l’existence d’une guerre juste et possédant ainsi la plupart des éléments ‘substantiels’ pour justifier la guerre des Provinces-Unies contre l’Espagne, mais également la prise de la caraque, de Groot faisait face à un autre problème. Pour plusieurs qui n’avaient pas encore reconnu l’indépendance de la République, les Provinces-Unies se trouvaient encore sous la souveraineté de la couronne espagnole et n’avaient aucun droit de résister à ses armées, et encore moins de lui faire la guerre comme elles le faisaient depuis plus de deux décennies, guerre qui allait éventuellement permettre de justifier également la prise de la caraque portugaise. C’est donc afin de contrecarrer ce type d’arguments que de Groot développera sa théorie de l’entente originelle par laquelle les individus sont rassemblés afin de se défendre plus facilement contre les délinquants (et ainsi faire respecter leurs droits découlant du droit naturel) et afin de mettre en commun le travail de chacun, entente qui sera à l’origine de l’État. Celui-ci est donc, pour de Groot, le fruit de l’accord explicite (lorsque cette volonté est exprimée au moment même de la formation de l’État) ou implicite (une fois qu’il est formé) des individus qui s’unissent et qui en deviennent des citoyens (cives), les dirigeants de celui-ci, qu’ils soient des magistrats ou un prince, sont par conséquent contraints par cette

21 Robert Feenstra résume mieux que quiconque le contexte de l’écriture du De Jure Praedae: ‘En 1603 une caraque portugaise est capturée par des navires hollandais dans le détroit de Malacca. La compagnie des Indes Orientales, qui venait d’être fondée en 1602 et à laquelle ces navires appartenaient, exerce le droit de prise. Il y a des actionnaires qui, sous l’influence de motifs religieux, doutent de la légitimité en droit de cette prise; il y en a d’autres qui craignent que leur réputation n’en souffre ou que le profit qu’ils en tireront pour le moment ne soit suivi d’un dommage dans l’avenir. Les directeurs de la Compagnie veulent les rassurer et, en 1604, ils demandent à Grotius d’écrire une justification qui pourra convaincre ces actionnaires, notamment sur la question du droit. Grotius accepte cette tâche et s’en acquitte en composant un long traité sur le droit de prise: De Jure Praedae. Il y remonte aux principes premiers du droit afin d’en déduire toutes les conséquences favorables à la thèse présentée. Quand l’ouvrage est terminé, en 1606, les directeurs ne paraissent plus en avoir besoin et Grotius le tient en portefeuille.’ R Feenstra, ‘Mare Liberum, Contexte historique et concepts fondamentaux’ dans A Dufour, P Haggenmacher et J Toman (éds), Grotius et l’ordre juridique international (Lausanne, Payot, 1985) 37, 37–9. 22 Notons au passage que Grotius énonce également des critères qui relèvent de l’identité du sujet, de la manière d’entreprendre la guerre et du but visé par celle–ci, critères qui sont nécessaires à faire d’un conflit une guerre juste. Pour un bon résumé, voir: Basdevant, Grotius (n 19) 162–68. 23 Grotius et Williams, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (n 16) 102–04.

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entente d’origine et peuvent, comme nous le verrons, être dépossédés s’ils outrepassent les prérogatives que celle-ci leur accorde.24 C’est cette analyse qui permet à de Groot de tenir ce propos révolutionnaire pour l’époque: ‘le prince existe par et pour l’État; ce dernier n’existe pas par et pour le prince’.25 À d’autres endroits que dans De Jure Praedae, cette thèse permettra à de Groot de montrer que, puisque les Bataves—qui seraient les ancêtres des Hollandais—ont, depuis dix-sept siècles, joui de la liberté politique et ont continuellement eu une forme relativement semblable de gouvernement ayant une forme aristocratique où la souveraineté résidait dans les états—il s’agirait donc là d’une preuve que l’entente historique au fondement de la Hollande revêt une forme décentralisée—le fait que certaines prérogatives aient été accordées à un prince (espagnol) ne fait pas en sorte que celui-ci ne soit pas quand même lié par certaines règles qui le contraignaient et qu’il est obligé de respecter. Or, selon de Groot, puisque les princes espagnols ont dépassé les prérogatives qui leur étaient attribuées, la guerre que leur menaient alors les Hollandais était nécessairement légitime.26 La conséquence de cette analyse du point de vue d’une théorie de l’État, c’est que la souveraineté ne se trouve pas toujours entre les mains du prince, mais qu’elle se trouve dans certains cas (selon ce qu’en dit l’entente originelle) dans les mains des états (ce qui était le cas en Hollande27) qui peuvent, dans certaines situations, accepter de céder certaines prérogatives à un prince, qui est néanmoins tenu de respecter l’entente par laquelle ces prérogatives lui sont cédées et ne peut les outrepasser. Lorsque le prince excède ces compétences, les états peuvent légitimement lui faire la guerre.28 C’est d’ailleurs précisément ce type d’argument qui était utilisé par de Groot et Oldenbarnevelt lors du différend avec Maurice portant sur l’instance devant décider de la tenue d’un synode pour régler le différend religieux entre les Arminiens et les Gomaristes, les premiers considérant que, puisque les questions religieuses ne faisaient pas partie des prérogatives accordées par les provinces aux États-généraux de la République, ceux-ci n’étaient nullement justifiés d’organiser un synode national.29 En fait, la correspondance entre la situation prévalant entre la République et l’Espagne, d’une part, et entre la Hollande et la

24 Notons toutefois que dans un texte écrit en 1614 et qui, dans le contexte du débat sur la prédestination et le niveau (celui des états–généraux de la République ou celui des états de la Hollande) auquel un synode devait se tenir, cherchant à convaincre que l’État doit avoir le contrôle sur l’Église, Grotius affirme que le pouvoir suprême n’est pas contraint par le droit positif, c’est–à–dire par les lois qu’il a lui–même adoptées: H Grotius et H–J van Dam (éd), De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra. Critical Edition with Introduction, English Translation and Commentary, Vol I (Leiden, Brill Academic, 2001) ch 6 § 14. 25 Grotius et Williams, Zeydel, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (n 16) 414 (notre traduction). 26 H Grotius et J Wasnick (éd), The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic (Assen, Van Gorcum, 2000). 27 Notons que de Groot cherche à cet endroit à justifier la guerre que mène la Hollande (et non la République) à l’Espagne. 28 H Grotius et P Borschberg (ed), Commentarius in Thesis X. An Early Treatise on Souvereignty, the Just War, and the Legitimacy of the Dutch Revolution (Bern, Peter Lang, 1994). Ce livre est une discussion sur la décentralisation des pouvoirs décidée par l’entente originelle, ainsi que sur la possibilité de céder, à certaines conditions, certaines parties de la souveraineté à des princes étrangers, à qui on peut toutefois légitimement faire la guerre s’ils ne respectent pas lesdites conditions. 29 Waszinck, Introduction (n 18) 5 et seq.

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République, d’autre part, laisse à penser que de Groot était autant influencé par les conflits internes à la République que par la guerre contre la couronne espagnole au moment d’élaborer sa thèse sur l’origine de l’État. Ce droit de résistance qui est accordé aux états dans The Antiquity et dans le Commentarius se trouve élargi dans le De Jure Praedae. En effet, de Groot fait d’une part remarquer que, même si ces entités internes que sont les états ne pouvaient être considérées comme étant des États, la guerre pourrait quand même être lancée à cause de la possibilité qu’ont les peuples de s’opposer aux dangers qui ont comme origine les agissements du Roi, et notamment lorsqu’il ne défend pas son peuple adéquatement. Pour défendre son argumentation, de Groot rappelle les écrits de Covarruvias selon qui ‘les peuples ont gardé les pouvoirs leur ayant été conférés par le droit naturel, et peuvent s’en prévaloir lorsque le roi lui-même ne fait pas usage de son propre pouvoir’.30 Il estime également que, lorsque le Prince cause un préjudice aux magistrats inférieurs, ceux-ci ont le droit de lui déclarer la guerre,31 et laisse entendre à plusieurs endroits que le peuple lui-même peut révoquer un prince lorsque celui-ci outrepasse les pouvoirs lui ayant été accordés ou se comporte comme un tyran. Ainsi … le pouvoir qui a été accordé à un prince peut être révoqué, et particulièrement lorsque le prince excède les limites définissant ses tâches, étant donné qu’en de telles circonstances il cesse, ipso facto, d’être regardé comme un prince. Puisque celui qui abuse du pouvoir souverain devient indigne de la souveraineté et cesse d’être un prince, ces actes ont comme conséquences de le transformer en tyran.32

Puis, plus loin: Nous n’avons pas non plus besoin d’arguments pour prouver que le nom de tyran peut être attribué non seulement aux individus qui usurpent le pouvoir souverain qui ne leur appartient pas par la violence, mais aussi à ceux qui abusent de la violence dans l’exercice légal de la souveraineté. En d’autres termes, ce terme est applicable dans les cas où la faute réside non seulement dans le titre du pouvoir mais aussi dans son exercice en tant que tel.33

Ce passage est extrêmement important dans la mesure où, contrairement à ce que Grotius écrira éventuellement dans Du droit de la guerre et de la paix, il signifie implicitement que le contrat à l’origine de la formation de l’État peut en tout temps être révoqué si le souverain se comporte comme un tyran (même en respectant le domaine des pouvoirs lui étant accordés) ou s’il outrepasse les pouvoirs qui lui ont été cédés. Et enfin: Par conséquent, même si nous ne pourrions dire que l’autorité souveraine du prince peut être mise de côté de manière imprudente ou que n’importe quel tort causé suffit pour

30 31 32 33

Grotius et Williams, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (n 16) 394. ibid, 394. ibid, 399 et seq (notre traduction). ibid, 413 (notre traduction, nos italiques).

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justifier des actions d’une telle importance, nous devons néanmoins rejeter fermement l’idée selon laquelle toute personne qui aurait rejeté l’autorité du prince devient coupable du crime de rébellion.34

Ainsi, bien qu’il cherche à justifier la guerre que mènent les Provinces-Unies et la Hollande à l’Espagne, position qui aurait pu être défendue par un argument minimaliste selon lequel les états de la Hollande ou les États-généraux de la République, en tant qu’institutions politiques, étaient en droit de mener une telle guerre, de Groot évoque à plusieurs reprises l’idée selon laquelle ce droit appartiendrait aux peuples en tant que tels, nous donnant ainsi l’impression que, selon lui, le peuple hollandais aurait pu se révolter et déposséder les magistrats des états de la Hollande s’ils avaient agi en tyrans. Cette théorie est importante au regard d’une théorie politique de l’État et se distingue grandement, comme nous le verrons, de la façon dont Grotius théorisera plus tard ce concept. Outre cette théorie de la résistance, cette théorie de la volonté des individus au fondement de la création de l’État a une autre conséquence importante pour notre propos qui est qu’elle permet aux individus de transférer au prince ou à des magistrats certains pouvoirs décisionnels que celui-ci (ou ceux-ci) pourra (pourront) exercer en leur nom. La plus importante de ces prérogatives concerne le pouvoir d’entreprendre des guerres. L’autorité d’entreprendre des guerres publiques appartient aussi aux magistrats. Ainsi, une fois que l’État a transféré sa volonté entre les mains de la magistrature, tout ce qu’il était permis de faire à l’État de son propre chef est désormais permis aux magistrats au nom de l’État. Le terme ‘magistrat’ devrait ainsi être compris, bien sûr, comme se référant à celui à qui a été accordé le mandat d’entreprendre la guerre.35

Ou, comme il l’explique à un autre endroit: Les princes, d’un autre côté, ne sont investis d’aucun pouvoir qui ne soit pas dérivé de l’État grâce à des élections désignant, soit des dirigeants individuels, soit des dynasties, de telle sorte que le droit d’entreprendre une guerre n’appartient au prince que dans la mesure où il agit pour l’État et qu’il a reçu un mandat lui permettant d’agir ainsi.36

Cela étant, dans certaines circonstances, des magistrats de rang inférieur pourront engager la volonté de l’État et entreprendre une guerre. En effet, et s’appuyant sur Vitoria pour faire une telle affirmation (rappelons-nous en pour la suite), de Groot croit que: lorsque le prince est absent ou négligeant et lorsque aucune loi n’empêche expressément cette alternative, le magistrat qui le suit dans la hiérarchie peut sans aucun doute exercer les pouvoirs nécessaires, non seulement à la défense de l’État, mais aussi pour faire la guerre, pour punir les ennemis et même pour mettre à mort les malfaiteurs.37

Dans un tel cas, nous explique de Groot, la question se pose de savoir si une telle guerre menée par un magistrat de second rang peut être considérée comme étant

34 35 36 37

ibid, ibid, ibid, ibid,

414 (notre traduction). 97. 393 (notre traduction). 98 (notre traduction).

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quand même une guerre publique. Selon lui, il en est ainsi dans la mesure où ‘de telles guerres sont supportées par la volonté de l’État’.38 Cette volonté de l’État (et rappelons-nous que de Groot définit l’État comme étant une association d’hommes), qui demeure si importante dans les théories contemporaines de droit international, se trouve ainsi ‘dé-constitutionalisée’ dans la mesure où elle peut être engagée par des magistrats n’ayant pas été formellement habilités par la constitution ou n’ayant pas reçu les titres de plénipotentiaires en vertu de celle-ci et ce, principalement parce qu’elle n’est pas la volonté d’une institution mais plutôt celle d’une association d’hommes. Ainsi, ce que nous appelons aujourd’hui la responsabilité de l’État peut se trouver engagée par des gestes posés à l’encontre de l’organisation formelle de l’État, c’est-à-dire de manière manifestement contraire à sa constitution. Une question importante découle de ce constat: si la responsabilité de l’État peut être engagée par des gestes posés à l’encontre de la constitution sous prétexte d’un désaccord important entre des magistrats inférieurs et le prince, voire entre le peuple et ses magistrats, quel sera au contraire l’effet sur cette responsabilité lorsque le prince agira de manière contraire à la volonté des magistrats inférieurs ou lorsque les magistrats agiront de manière contraire à la volonté du peuple? Dit d’une autre manière, les individus qui se sont associés et qui ont, du fait de cette association, accordé certains pouvoirs à un prince ou à des magistrats, pourront-ils être juridiquement responsables pour les actions posées par le prince ou les magistrats lorsque ceux-ci ont manifestement outrepassé les prérogatives qui leur ont été accordées ou qu’ils agissent tels des tyrans? La réponse à cette question exige que nous nous attardions sur les conséquences juridiques des actions illicites. En premier lieu, soulignons que cette ‘déconstruction’ de la volonté de l’État ne semble malheureusement pas suffisante pour en éviter toute réification et de Groot se questionne—après avoir affirmé que l’un des critères pour qu’une guerre soit juste est qu’elle doit avoir été engagée volontairement—sur la façon de joindre la volonté des magistrats à ceux des sujets qui feront la guerre pour eux. Il répond à cette interrogation de la façon suivante: ‘la volonté des sujets est régie par la volonté de ceux qui sont aux commandes’39 et ce, pour la simple raison que les sujets (tout comme les esclaves par ailleurs) n’ont qu’une raison partielle qui les empêche de bien distinguer la justice de l’injustice. Cette subsomption de la volonté des sujets à celle de ceux qui commandent a comme principale fonction, dans l’argumentaire de de Groot, de justifier la saisie de la cargaison d’un navire propriété d’un sujet portugais afin de compenser la Compagnie des Indes orientales (VOC) pour des pertes subies dont le responsable était le roi espagnol—rappelons que les couronnes espagnoles et portugaises étaient à l’époque unifiées. En effet, après avoir justifié la guerre aux yeux de ceux qui refusaient de reconnaître l’indépendance de la République, de Groot œuvre à expliquer la légalité de la saisie des biens d’un particulier portugais par un navigateur de la VOC. Cette justification exigera de lui qu’il fasse le lien entre les intérêts des particuliers et ceux du souverain afin que les actes illégaux de ce dernier puissent permettre la saisie des biens des premiers. 38 39

ibid, 98 (notre traduction). ibid, 114 (notre traduction).

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Le point de départ de l’argumentation de de Groot est ce constat selon lequel: En ce qui concerne les dettes encourues, les théologiens ont déclaré, de la manière la plus admirable et sur la base de l’équité naturelle, que toutes les personnes qui ont, d’une manière ou d’une autre, contribué aux causes de l’inégalité, sont sous l’obligation de contribuer à la cause de l’égalité. Par ailleurs, il a aussi été soutenu qu’une contribution à l’inégalité a été faite, non seulement par les individus qui ont personnellement commis l’action consistant en une saisie ou une détention violente, mais aussi par ces autres individus qui ont donné des commandements, des conseils, leur consentement ou leur travail permettant la commission de l’action illégale, ou qui ont fait obstruction à la restitution.40

Ainsi, c’est sur la base de cette analyse qu’il en vient à dire que ‘l’équité naturelle’ fait en sorte que, ‘puisque nous profitons des avantages découlant de notre association dans la société civile, nous devrions de la même façon souffrir de ses désavantages’.41 En d’autres termes, si l’on a cédé certaines prérogatives à un prince ou à des magistrats et que ces pouvoirs sont utilisés afin de causer du tort à autrui, on devient responsable de ces actions et l’on peut être forcé à verser une compensation à celui qui en a été victime.42 À la suite de cette analyse permettant a priori de prendre n’importe quelle action contre les sujets du souverain à l’origine du tort causé, de Groot cherche quand même à imposer certaines limites afin de protéger les individus contre la violence non nécessaire aux fins du droit naturel. Ainsi, bien qu’il soit d’avis qu’il est possible d’attaquer n’importe quel sujet de l’ennemi qui résisterait lors d’une guerre, il suggère aussi que certaines personnes doivent être épargnées (les femmes, les enfants, les déserteurs, les fermiers qui n’ont pas pris les armes, etc.) dans la mesure où elles ne représentent pas de menace au rétablissement de la paix. Par contre, la propriété de ces sujets peut être saisie si leur État a commis une injustice ou a une dette à rembourser. Ainsi, si: un État … agit mal à notre égard ou … nous doit une dette, il n’y a évidemment rien pour empêcher la prise de biens appartenant aux sujets en guise de paiement …. Par conséquent concluons-nous que tous les sujets sont, à tout moment, passibles d’être spoliés, mais pas nécessairement de perdre leur vie pour une telle raison. … Ou, si nous choisissons de prendre la question du point de vue des droits des créditeurs, nous pourrions trouver que les biens des sujets, mais pas leur personne, sont susceptibles d’être engagés pour la dette de l’État et que, par conséquent, dans les cas de prises, les prises de propriété sont également permises mais les attaques corporelles sont interdites.43

L’analyse que fait de Groot des effets juridiques sur les sujets des actions contraires au droit commis par l’État est un peu difficile à suivre du fait d’une apparente contradiction entre les principes au fondement de l’analyse et les conclusions qu’il en tire. En fait, on en vient, nous semble-t-il, à des résultats différents selon que l’on fait une interprétation que nous pourrions qualifier de ‘textuelle’ de ces conclusions ou que l’on fait une interprétation qui tienne aussi compte du contexte général de 40 41 42 43

ibid, ibid, ibid, ibid,

155 158 155 165

(notre traduction). (notre traduction). et seq (notre traduction). et seq (notre traduction).

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ses explications. En effet, de Groot en vient d’une part à la conclusion que les biens de tous les sujets en toutes circonstances peuvent être saisis pour compenser un tort commis ou afin de rembourser une dette due. Pourtant, cette conclusion ne semble pas totalement conforme aux principes et aux explications sur lesquels elle est fondée, à savoir que la responsabilité est ainsi socialisée du fait des prérogatives qui ont été cédées. En effet, si la ‘socialisation de la responsabilité’ découle du fait que les peuples ont cédé à l’État certains droits et certains pouvoirs qui étaient les leurs en vertu du droit naturel et que le souverain peut être dépossédé de ses fonctions s’il outrepasse les pouvoirs cédés, il semble normal que ces mêmes peuples ne soient pas responsables des actes du souverain outrepassant les pouvoirs ainsi cédés. On est aussi en droit de se questionner sur la situation qui prévaut lorsqu’un peuple est en rébellion contre son souverain, ou que des états sont eux-mêmes en guerre contre un prince, surtout dans la mesure où de Groot soutient que ‘[l]’État peut exister séparément du prince; mais le prince ne peut être créé que par le consentement général de l’État’.44 Lorsque le consentement vient à manquer, peut-on conclure que les agissements du prince deviennent sans valeur? Par exemple, qu’est-ce que de Groot aurait à dire sur la saisie éventuelle de biens appartenant à un Hollandais par un État n’ayant pas reconnu l’indépendance des Provinces-Unies sous prétexte d’un droit à être compensé de dommages causés par les Espagnols? Bref, vue d’une manière globale, cette analyse de de Groot nous semble manquer un peu de cohérence mais, de manière générale, elle demeure quand même assez loin de la théorie réifiée de l’État que fera Grotius au moment où il sera influencé par l’absolutisme émergent de Louis XIII. De manière générale, si l’on cherche à résumer la théorie de l’État qu’avait de Groot, on peut dire ceci. Pour lui, l’État, c’est le peuple. Ce concept ne représente en effet rien d’autre que la réunion consensuelle des individus d’un territoire donné.45 Du point de vue de ce que nous appelons aujourd’hui le droit international, ce sont les agissements de cet État qui créent le fait international susceptible d’engager sa responsabilité internationale pouvant éventuellement se traduire par la saisie des biens des individus membres de l’État. En se choisissant un souverain, c’est-à-dire un prince ou des magistrats, l’État (le peuple en d’autres termes) cède à celui-ci les prérogatives juridiques de sa volonté. Par conséquent, le souverain ne peut pas outrepasser les pouvoirs qui lui sont ainsi octroyés parce que de cette manière, la volonté qui se trouve matérialisée dans cette action en vient à ne plus représenter la volonté du peuple et de l’État. Autrement dit, la volonté à l’origine du fait international est celle du peuple et le souverain n’agit donc qu’en tant que

44

ibid, 415 (notre traduction). On peut noter ici que plusieurs auteurs qui se sont attardés davantage sur la période néerlandaise de de Groot qu’aux travaux de l’époque française de Grotius ont considéré celui-ci, de façon générale, comme un penseur républicain. S’il est pertinent de souligner cet élément, c’est que les auteurs qui, au contraire, ont surtout travaillé à partir du Droit de la guerre et de la paix ont parfois dit de lui qu’il était un penseur de l’absolutisme. Nous évoquerons ces dernier auteurs dans la partie portant sur la période française de Grotius mais pour des auteurs qui perçoivent de Groot comme un républicain, voir: R Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993) et M van Gelderen, ‘From Domingo de Soto to Hugo Grotius: Theories of Monarchy and Civil Power in Spanish and Dutch Political Thought, 1550–1609’ dans G Darby, (éd), The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt (London, Routledge, 2001) 151. 45

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représentant ou de médiateur de celui-ci. On perçoit donc une séparation claire entre le souverain et l’État. Le souverain, chez de Groot, n’est pas l’État; il le sert. Cette théorie de l’État, on le rappelle, avait comme principaux objectifs de défendre une décentralisation des compétences en direction de la Hollande mais aussi de légitimer la guerre (et les différentes actions prises lors de celle-ci, telle que la capture de la caraque portugaise) que menaient cette province et la République des Provinces-Unies à l’Espagne. Cette légitimation de la résistance n’est donc pas un élément parmi tant d’autres comme chez certains autres auteurs de l’époque: c’est non seulement l’élément le plus important de sa théorie, c’en est même son point de chute, c’est-à-dire que la majorité de ses écrits cherche à convaincre de l’existence d’un tel droit de résistance à la tyrannie. Conformément à cet objectif, les deux caractéristiques principales de sa théorie de l’État concernent donc la légitimation de la résistance active face au pouvoir illégitime et une ‘désabsolutisation’ du pouvoir, c’est-à-dire une décentralisation de celui-ci.

L’Influence de l’Absolutisme dans la Théorie de l’État de Grotius Cette théorie de l’État subira des transformations substantielles chez Grotius et ces changements semblent être explicables du fait que Du droit de la guerre et de la paix a été écrit en France (où l’État absolutiste était en pleine émergence), où Grotius s’était exilé et où il recevait une pension (très irrégulière toutefois) de Louis XIII. Nous commencerons cette section en soulignant quelques éléments importants de l’absolutisme avant d’expliquer la théorie de l’État de Grotius, ce qui nous permettra de mettre en exergue quelques distinctions significatives entre cette théorie et celle de de Groot. L’Absolutisme Nous n’entrerons pas dans les débats qui concernent la périodisation exacte de l’absolutisme en France, surtout parce que l’établissement d’un État absolutiste dans ce pays est le résultat d’un long processus et peut difficilement être associé à une date précise. Ce qui est certain, c’est que lorsque Grotius y arrive en 1621, le processus de centralisation des pouvoirs est entamé et qu’on peut déjà parler au moins d’un ‘absolutisme relatif’,46 ou encore d’un ‘absolutisme émergent’.47 La compréhension du De Jure Belli ac Pacis requiert que nous soulignions un certain nombre de points qui concernent la configuration des relations sociales caractérisant l’absolutisme en Europe continentale de manière générale, et en France de façon plus particulière. Outre la centralisation progressive des pouvoirs entre les mains du roi et de ses proches, un premier élément à se rappeler est que les décisions concernant les 46 En fait, Le Roy Ladurie parle déjà d’absolutisme relatif pour parler de la période de la régence de Marie de Médicis (officiellement de 1610 à 1614, mais de facto jusqu’à 1617): E Le Roy Ladurie, L’ancien régime—tome 1 1610–1715 (Paris, Hachette, 1991) 38. 47 WG Grewe et M Byers (traducteur), The Epochs of International Law (Berlin, de Gruyter, 2000) 173 et seq.

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relations interétatiques n’étaient pas prises en fonction de soi-disant ‘intérêts étatiques’ mais visaient d’abord et avant tout les intérêts dynastiques, et plus particulièrement la reproduction d’une hiérarchie socio-politique à l’avantage des ‘preneurs de décisions’. La politique européenne (et notamment les guerres) n’était donc pas constituée de relations inter-nationales autant que de relations entre souverains. Si cette ‘personnalisation’ de la politique est particulièrement visible lors des guerres, elle affecte de manière générale l’ensemble de la vie politique, l’exemple le plus frappant demeure le vœu de fidélité, non pas envers l’État mais envers le roi lui-même, que devaient faire les officiers au moment d’entrer en fonction.48 Ainsi, et comme le fait remarquer Roelofsen en parlant du siècle séparant la Paix d’Augsbourg (1555) et la Paix de Westphalie, ‘[l]es Monarques comme Henry VIII, François I ou l’Empereur Charles V ne se considéraient pas comme étant les représentants des intérêts de leurs États’49 mais assuraient la gouverne de leur royaume dans le seul objectif d’asseoir leurs intérêts et ceux de la cour. En second lieu, on doit souligner certaines particularités des relations sociales de propriété dans la France de l’époque. La principale caractéristique de celles-ci était que les paysans demeuraient de facto en possession de leurs terres, ce qui diminuait la quantité de travail susceptible d’être appropriée et réinvestie dans les moyens de production et constituait subséquemment une limite importante à la croissance économique. Ce type de relations sociales de propriété se distinguait de celui qui commençait à prédominer en Angleterre où le capitalisme agraire, apparu au XVIe siècle et qui entraînait la prolétarisation des paysans et la transformation des lords féodaux militarisés en propriétaires capitalistes assujettis aux règles du marché, avait permis une augmentation importante de la productivité économique, augmentation qui mettait par ailleurs une pression certaine sur ses rivaux de l’Europe continentale qui se devaient de trouver une manière d’égaler les revenus de ce pays.50 On doit également dire deux mots sur les offices vénaux, institution par laquelle le roi attribuait certaines de ses fonctions juridictionnelles en échange d’une somme d’argent devant lui être versée.51 Cette façon de nommer les officiers faisait que les fonctionnaires n’étaient ni manipulables, ni révocables et venaient à entretenir, d’une certaine manière, une relation symbiotique avec le roi qui ne pouvait plus gouverner en faisant totalement abstraction d’eux. En d’autres termes, l’absolutisme avait beau être un régime de gouverne politique où le décideur, le roi, était d’abord et avant tout préoccupé par la reproduction de sa dynastie et de ses intérêts, il s’agissait néanmoins d’un régime qui était favorable aux intérêts d’une

48 B Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations (London, Verso, 2003) 181. 49 CG Roelofsen, ‘Grotius and the Development of International Relations Theory: “The Long Seventheenth Century” and the Elaboration of a European States System’ (1997) 17 The Law Review Association of Quinnipiac College School of Law 35, 37. 50 Sur le développement de cette thèse: Teschke, The Myth of 1648 (n 48) 167–93. 51 Sur les offices vénaux, voir: R Mousnier, Les institutions de la France sous la monarchie absolue (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1974). 609–38.

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classe dominante plus large, à savoir la noblesse qui avait réussi, grâce à la vénalité notamment, à investir les lieux du pouvoir politique. Ce besoin constant d’être légitimé par les officiers et la noblesse (dont certaines parties étaient en tout temps susceptibles de se soulever), mis en conjoncture avec la faible productivité économique faisait alors en sorte, selon Teschke, que la royauté était dans l’obligation d’adopter des comportements agressifs en matière de politique étrangère afin d’assurer la croissance économique nécessaire, à la fois pour éviter les révoltes populaires, mais aussi pour entretenir cette noblesse et éviter d’attiser son mécontentement qui aurait pu déstabiliser le régime. En effet, les carences du mode de production féodal à l’égard de la capacité d’assurer la croissance nécessaire pour calmer ces possibles soulèvements forçaient les monarques à accumuler les richesses grâce à différentes stratégies, et notamment grâce à des conquêtes militaires. En d’autres mots, l’accumulation géopolitique était une nécessité pour la reproduction personnelle des classes dirigeantes au sommet de la société organisée autour du monarque qui figurait au plus haut niveau de la hiérarchie sociale.52

Il n’est donc pas surprenant de voir Grotius écrire un livre sur le droit de la guerre après son arrivée en France. Deux derniers éléments s’avèrent importants pour comprendre les écrits de Grotius. D’abord, après avoir vu leurs deux derniers rois se faire assassiner—en l’espace d’à peine plus de vingt ans—les Français ont, de manière générale, été pris d’aversion pour les thèses tyrannicides dont certains Jésuites (dont Francisco Suarez) se portaient défenseurs.53 Cette répugnance pour ces thèses mais aussi le danger de troubles civils et de conflits politiques majeurs qui étaient toujours présents lors de l’assassinat d’un souverain auraient été à l’origine de la demande du Tiers-état de décréter ‘l’inviolabilité de la personne royale et sa supériorité à toute instance humaine’ lors des États-généraux de 1614.54 Ensuite, on ne saurait passer sous silence le fait que l’arrivée de Grotius en France coïncide avec une légère recrudescence des conflits religieux entre les catholiques majoritaires dans le pays et les huguenots, ainsi qu’avec une série de trois ‘guerres de religion’ que mènera le jeune Louis XIII de 1621 à 1627 contre ces derniers.55 Ainsi, et bien que l’époque, perçue au sens large, se caractérise par une politique étrangère agressive, ce sont surtout les conflits internes et la résistance politique qui inquiètent le nouveau pourvoyeur de Grotius au début des années 1620. Bref, le contexte politique, économique et social dans lequel Grotius a écrit De Jure Belli ac Pacis est celui d’un État français dominé par un mécanisme décisionnel de plus en plus centralisé mais qui n’avait d’autres choix que d’intégrer les revendications de la noblesse et de contenter celle-ci, nécessités qui passaient, à cause de la faiblesse structurelle de l’économie, par une politique étrangère agressive

52 B Teschke, ‘Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism’ (2002) 8 European Journal of International Relations 5, 12 (notre traduction). 53 Voir notamment Y–M Bercé, La naissance dramatique de l’absolutisme (Paris, Le Seuil, 1992) 42–44. 54 ibid, 64. 55 ibid, 98–110.

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et de nombreuses guerres. Il s’agit donc d’une privatisation du mécanisme décisionnel (entre les mains du roi) au profit d’une classe de privilégiés, proche du pouvoir. De manière plus conjoncturelle, l’époque se caractérise aussi par un désir d’éliminer la résistance (religieuse ou autre) qui représentait jusqu’à un certain point une menace pour le régime, pour la dynastie voire, comme le montrait l’histoire récente, pour la vie du roi.

L’ÉTAT CHEZ GROTIUS

L’analyse que faisait de Groot au moment où il cherchait à justifier la guerre menée par la Hollande et la République à l’Espagne, ainsi que le maintien des pouvoirs aux mains des états de Hollande face aux tendances centralisatrices de la République a subi d’importantes modifications dans l’œuvre majeure de Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix, écrite en France alors que Grotius survivait grâce à une pension de Louis XIII. La première définition qu’il offre de l’État demeure néanmoins relativement proche de celle de de Groot. Selon Grotius, l’État est ‘une réunion parfaite d’hommes libres associés pour jouir de la protection des lois et pour leur utilité commune’,56 hommes qui se sont principalement réunis afin s’assurer une protection commune contre les dangers de l’isolement.57 Cet État, faut-il mentionner, est distinct de la souveraineté ou de la puissance souveraine et Grotius utilise une analogie pour faire comprendre la relation entre cette association humaine (l’État) et le souverain exerçant le pouvoir dans celle-ci. Voyons donc quel est le sujet de cette puissance suprême. Il est commun, ou propre. De même que le sujet commun de la vue est le corps, et que son sujet propre est l’œil, ainsi le sujet commun de la souveraineté est l’État, que nous avons défini plus haut une association parfaite,58

alors que ‘[l]e sujet propre sera une personne unique ou collective, suivant les lois et les mœurs de chaque nation’.59 Grotius distingue donc les trois éléments que sont l’État, la souveraineté et le peuple, conformément à ce qu’écrivait de Groot. Autre point en commun, l’origine de l’État demeure une sorte de contrat social, dont l’organisation politique (c’est-à-dire la détermination de l’exercice concret de la souveraineté) se trouve enracinée dans les lois ou les mœurs de la nation ainsi créée. On se rend néanmoins rapidement compte des différences lorsqu’on en vient aux conclusions que tire Grotius quant à la signification de la souveraineté et au droit de résistance dont peuvent jouir les sujets par rapport au souverain. Grotius s’interroge d’abord sur la signification politique de cette ‘association d’hommes libres’ et se demande si celle-ci revient à donner un droit d’auto gouvernance au peuple, idée contre laquelle il s’insurge sévèrement, prenant soin de:

56 H Grotius et P Pradier-Fodéré (traducteur), D Alland, S Goyard-Fabre (éds), Le droit de la guerre et de la paix (Paris, Presses universitaire de France, 1999) Livre I Ch I § XIV (1). 57 ibid, Livre I Ch IV § VII (3). 58 ibid, Livre I Ch III § VII (1). 59 ibid, Livre I Ch III § VII (3).

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rejeter … l’opinion de ceux qui veulent que la souveraineté réside partout, et sans exception, dans le peuple, de telle sorte qu’il soit permis à ce dernier de réprimer et de punir les rois toutes les fois qu’ils font un mauvais usage de leur pouvoir.60

En effet, selon lui, [i]l est permis à tout homme de se réduire en esclavage privé au profit de qui bon lui semble, ainsi que cela ressort de la loi hébraïque et de la loi romaine. Pourquoi donc ne serait-il pas permis à un peuple ne relevant que de lui-même, de se soumettre à un seul individu ou à plusieurs, de manière à leur transférer complètement le droit de le gouverner, sans en réserver aucune partie?61

On perçoit donc dans ce passage deux distinctions importantes par rapport à l’analyse que faisait de Groot. D’une part, le vocabulaire pour expliquer le phénomène de cession de la souveraineté, c’est-à-dire des droits (découlant du droit naturel) qui appartenaient aux individus dans la période précédant l’association politique, signifie désormais la ‘soumission’ des peuples au souverain alors que les écrits de de Groot nous permettaient de déduire qu’il s’agissait plutôt là de la délégation de pouvoirs qui pouvaient être repris si le souverain outrepassait ses pouvoirs ou agissait comme un tyran. Cette différence de vocabulaire n’est pas fortuite et a d’importants effets sur la théorie de la souveraineté de de Groot et de Grotius. En effet, alors que pour le premier, comme nous l’avons vu, le prince n’existe que pour l’État (et subséquemment pour le peuple) plutôt que l’inverse, Grotius rejette l’idée que le peuple puisse s’autodéterminer, c’est-à-dire, qu’il ait une quelconque fonction dans le processus décisionnel de l’État à un autre moment que celui de l’association des individus, au fondement historique de l’État.62 Une seconde distinction est tout aussi significative. Pour Grotius, le pouvoir d’auto-détermination de cette réunion d’hommes libres devient, contrairement à ce que nous avons déduit des écrits de de Groot, confronté à une contrainte temporelle dans la mesure où il ne peut, au mieux, être exercé qu’au moment même où se fait l’association civile ou politique, moment au cours duquel il est possible d’établir certaines limites aux pouvoirs que pourra exercer le sujet propre de cette puissance souveraine. Mais une fois ces limites établies, la possibilité de déposséder le souverain de ses fonctions n’existe plus, sauf en de rares exceptions. Grotius fait en effet remarquer que: la société civile ayant été établie pour maintenir la tranquillité, l’État acquiert d’abord sur nous et sur ce qui nous appartient, une sorte de droit supérieur, autant que cela est nécessaire pour cette fin. L’État peut donc, pour le bien de la paix publique et de l’ordre, interdire ce droit commun de résistance et il ne faut pas douter qu’il ne l’ait voulu, puisqu’il ne pourrait autrement atteindre son but.63

Autrement dit,

60

ibid, Livre I Ch III § VIII (1). ibid, Livre I ch III § VIII (1). 62 Voir E Jouannet qui remarque que le souci de Grotius est de faire apparaître le sujet propre de la souveraineté comme étant ‘le lieu exclusif de la souveraineté’: E Jouannet, Emer de Vattel et l’émergence doctrinale du droit international classique (Paris, Pedone, 1998) 262. 63 Grotius et Pradier-Fodéré, Du droit de la guerre et de la paix (n 56), Livre I Ch IV § II (1). 61

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en matière de chose publique, ce qui est sans contredit le plus important, c’est cet arrangement dont j’ai parlé, et suivant lequel les uns commandent et les autres obéissent. Il est incompatible avec la liberté que chaque particulier aurait de résister.64

Ce droit—et il s’agit là du retournement le plus spectaculaire de Grotius!—est même refusé aux entités internes et aux autorités inférieures. Il s’est rencontré dans notre siècle des hommes certainement instruits [Grotius semble alors parler de lui-même avant qu’il se soit forcé de fuir la Hollande], mais qui, trop asservis aux temps et aux lieux, se sont persuadés à eux d’abord — je le crois, en effet, ainsi —, puis ont persuadé aux autres, que ce qui vient d’être dit n’avait lieu qu’au regard des personnes privées, mais ne touchait pas les autorités inférieures, qu’ils considèrent comme fondées en droit à résister aux injures de celui qui tient dans ses mains le pouvoir souverain. Ils pensent même qu’elles se rendraient coupables d’une faute, si elles s’abstenaient de résister. Cette opinion ne doit pas être admise.65

Cela dit, et pour être honnête avec Grotius, celui-ci dresse ensuite une liste d’exceptions au principe de l’illégalité du droit de résistance. Trois de ces exceptions—qui sont possiblement les trois plus susceptibles de se produire—nous rappellent directement la situation qui prévalait en Hollande avant son exil. Spécifiquement, ces exceptions concernent les cas où: les princes qui sont subordonnés au peuple — soit qu’ils aient dès le principe reçu le pouvoir dans de telles conditions, soit que tel ait été le résultat d’une convention ultérieure, comme cela a eu lieu à Lacédémone —, si ces princes viennent à violer les lois et à se rendre coupables envers l’État, non seulement on peut leur résister par la force, mais, au besoin, on peut les punir de mort;66

où ‘le roi … n’a qu’une partie de l’autorité souveraine, et que l’autre portion appartienne au peuple ou à un sénat’;67 ou encore les situations où ‘au moment où le pouvoir souverain est déféré, il a été stipulé que dans certaines éventualités il sera possible de résister au roi’.68 Grotius semble aussi accorder, après une longue analyse, le droit de résistance dans ‘les cas d’extrême nécessité’69 sous prétexte que, puisque l’association a pour but de défendre sa vie, il serait illogique de ne pas accorder le droit de résistance à ceux qui font face, à cause de leur union à cette association civile, à une mort certaine. Cela dit, le droit de résistance n’est pas accordé par Grotius lorsque le souverain ne règne que pour assurer la survie ou la reproduction de son régime et Grotius écrit à une autre occasion que le fait de maltraiter des personnes innocentes ne fait pas perdre son titre au prince70. En résumé, les dimensions les plus importantes du droit de résistance qui est accordé par Grotius se réfèrent à ladite entente originelle et cette dimension s’explique possiblement par le fait que Grotius ait cherché à ne pas trop se distancer des écrits de de Groot. Cela dit, un élément significatif doit être souligné en ce qui 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

ibid, ibid, ibid, ibid, ibid, ibid, ibid,

Livre Livre Livre Livre Livre Livre Livre

I Ch IV § IV (5). I Ch IV § VI (1). I Ch IV § VIII. I Ch IV § XI. I Ch IV § XIV. I Ch IV § VII (1). II Ch I § IX (2).

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concerne ces exceptions: le droit de résistance, dont la justification était l’objectif premier de de Groot, se retrouve, chez Grotius, confiné au rang d’exception. Une autre distinction entre de Groot et Grotius concerne la capacité de représenter la volonté de l’État. Nous l’avons vu précédemment, de Groot considérait que la capacité qu’ont les souverains ou les magistrats d’engager la volonté de l’État n’existait que du fait que ce pouvoir leur avait été délégué et que, par conséquent, ce pouvoir pouvait être exercé par des magistrats inférieurs ‘lorsque le prince est absent ou négligent’.71 Grotius, à l’inverse, fait du caractère public de la guerre l’une des conditions pour qu’une guerre soit solennelle. Ainsi, lorsque nous investiguons sur le ‘fonctionnement’ de l’engagement de la volonté de l’État, c’est vers la déclaration de guerre qu’il faut se tourner. Or, tout en donnant certaines exceptions rares et relativement restrictives,72 Grotius insiste pour dire que, puisque ‘la guerre fait péricliter tout un État, il est pourvu par les lois de presque tous les peuples, à ce qu’aucune guerre ne soit entreprise que par l’ordre de celui qui a la puissance souveraine dans l’État’:73 par conséquent, la guerre publique doit être déclarée par le souverain pour être solennelle.74 Dès lors, les exceptions que l’on pouvait trouver chez de Groot sont-elles disparues, Grotius allant jusqu’à affirmer que: Francisco de Vitoria a osé donner aux habitants d’une ville le droit de faire la guerre pour venger les injures dont le prince néglige de poursuivre la réparation. Mais son opinion est avec raison rejetée par d’autres auteurs.75

Rappelons que de Groot s’appuyait justement sur Vitoria pour soutenir que les magistrats inférieurs pouvaient faire la guerre lorsque le prince était absent ou négligent.76 De manière générale, les différences remarquées entre de Groot et Grotius sont le reflet d’un passage important dans la construction évolutive du champ du droit international. Alors que le premier avait une théorie qui était relativement décentralisée de la prérogative d’engager la volonté et la capacité d’action de l’État, Grotius en arrive à une théorie véritablement ‘constitutionalisée’ de celle-ci, c’est-à-dire où le seul critère utile pour déterminer qui peut agir pour l’État est le respect de l’entente originelle, c’est-à-dire, dans les mots de notre époque, le respect de la constitution. Dans le contexte de l’émergence de l’absolutisme où les pouvoirs étaient de plus en plus concentrés entre les mains d’un souverain qui dirigeait de manière à assurer la reproduction de son régime, on peut facilement percevoir que

71

Grotius et Williams, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (n 16) 98 (notre traduction). ‘Car, en premier lieu, on ne doit pas douter qu’il ne soit permis à un magistrat préposé à une fonction, de contraindre par le moyen des agents de son autorité un petit nombre de rebelles, toutes les fois qu’il n’est pas besoin pour cela de plus grandes troupes, et qu’il n’y a pas de péril qui menace l’État. En second lieu, si le danger est tellement imminent que le temps ne permette pas de consulter celui qui possède le suprême pouvoir dans la nation, cette nécessité fera encore ici une exception’: Grotius et Pradier-Fodéré, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix (n 56) Livre I Ch III § IV (3). 73 ibid, Livre I Ch III § IV (2). 74 ibid, Livre I Ch III § V (1). 75 ibid, Livre I Ch III § IV (3). 76 Grotius et Williams, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (n 16), 98. 72

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la signification de ce glissement est une privatisation de la capacité à engager l’État dans des actions créatrices de faits internationaux.77 Ce lien qui est ainsi établi entre le souverain et les gouvernés a des conséquences importantes pour ces derniers en ce qui concerne ce que nous appelons aujourd’hui la responsabilité étatique pour faits illicites. Grotius, c’est bien connu, passe pour être l’un des premiers à avoir établi des normes de ‘droit humanitaire’. Ces règles sont développées dans son livre 3. Ce livre, le dernier du Droit de la guerre et de la paix, a une structure particulière qu’il vaut la peine d’exposer, au moins en ce qui concerne ses 14 premiers chapitres (sur 25). De manière générale, les huit premiers chapitres (mais plus particulièrement les chapitres IV à VIII) expliquent les différents droits que fait naître la guerre. Ces droits, qui émanent du droit volontaire humain (c’est-à-dire du droit des gens) puisque les exemples sont puisés dans la pratique répétée des belligérants, sont notamment ceux de tuer l’ennemi et ses sujets, de piller et d’acquérir les biens de ceux-ci, de faire de ces derniers des esclaves et de se rendre maître des individus vaincus.78 La pertinence de ces chapitres pour notre propos réside dans l’explication qui est donnée par Grotius de ce droit envers les peuples ennemis: pour lui, la guerre déclarée à celui qui a le pouvoir souverain sur un peuple, est censée déclarée en même temps, non seulement à tous ses sujets, mais à tous ceux qui pourront se joindre à lui en qualité d’alliés, comme étant une dépendance de lui-même; et c’est là ce que disent les jurisconsultes modernes, que, lorsque le prince est défié, ses adhérents sont défiés.79

Cette responsabilité a aussi des répercussions sur les dettes engagées par les souverains et même si ‘[s]uivant le pur droit de nature, personne n’est tenu du fait d’autrui, si ce n’est celui qui succède dans les biens’,80 Grotius est néanmoins d’avis que les individus sont engagés par les dettes du corps politique (qu’il appelle la

77 Cette domination du roi sur la détermination de la guerre et de la paix est d’ailleurs suffisamment importante pour qu’un de ses plus grands exégètes estime que, pour Grotius, la guerre n’a pas encore pris le caractère ‘d’État à État’ mais demeure une relation entre les souverains, ce qui n’est d’ailleurs pas surprenant du fait qu’il s’agissait en réalité d’un reflet de la société européenne de l’époque, comme nous l’avons souligné précédemment: P Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1983) 542. Roscoe Pound ne dit pas autre chose, rappelant que, dans son système, les ‘obligations étaient les obligations des souverains personnels en tant qu’individus et ses règles étaient imposées à la capacité humaine de ces souverains. Il était alors un corpus de règles s’appliquant aux souverains qui gouvernaient de façon personnelle; s’appliquant aux souverains parmi lesquels Louis XIV est devenu le prototype’. Il ne faut d’ailleurs pas s’étonner de ce constat, nous rappelle le doyen Pound, puisqu’en évoquant ces obligations, il ne fait que reproduire l’état de l’organisation du monde à son époque: R Pound ‘Philosophical Theory and International Law’ (1923) 1 Bibliotheca Visseriana dissertationum ius internationale illustrantium 71, 74–76, la citation 74. Martin Wight apporte toutefois un son de cloche légèrement différent, soutenant que les règles du droit international, selon Grotius, ‘lient plutôt les peuples, mais plus particulièrement encore leurs dirigeants. Le droit de la guerre lie la conscience individuelle afin que les sujets qui croient que la cause d’une guerre est injuste ne devraient pas servir militairement’, M Wight et G Wight, B Porter (eds), Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 53 (notre traduction). 78 Grotius et Pradier-Fodéré, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix (n 56) Livre III Ch V, VI, VII et VIII. 79 ibid, Livre III Ch III § IX. Voir aussi: ‘Suivant le droit des gens, tous les sujets de celui qui commet l’injustice, qui sont tels à titre permanent, soit indigènes, soit venus d’ailleurs, sont soumis au droit de représailles’: ibid, Livre III Ch II § VII (2). 80 ibid, Livre III Ch II § I (1).

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société civile) et par son chef,81 ce qui n’est pas surprenant compte tenu de la lourde taxation qui était imposée (principalement aux paysans) à cause des aventures guerrières des rois français de l’époque, comme nous l’avons vu précédemment. Les chapitres suivants (X à XVI) constituent le corps des temperamenta, c’est-à-dire des limites qui sont imposées aux belligérants au moment de faire la guerre, et qui relèvent du droit naturel. Dans le premier de ces chapitres, qui est en fait un chapitre introductif à ces tempéraments, Grotius ‘retire à ceux qui font la guerre presque toutes les choses dont [il] peu[t] paraître les avoir gratifiés’.82 À partir de là, il revient sur les énoncés prononcés en début de livre et affirme que ‘si la cause de la guerre est injuste, … tous les actes qui en naissent sont injustes’83 et apportent des limites relativement importantes au droit de tuer, de détruire ou de prendre les biens de l’ennemi, au traitement des prisonniers, à l’acquisition de la souveraineté suite à une victoire militaire, ainsi qu’au comportement à adopter par rapport à des choses qui sont dépourvues de Postliminium.84 La relation entre ces deux parties, à savoir les chapitres IV à VII et les chapitres X à XVI est loin d’être claire et ces ambiguïtés ont généralement été, à tort ou à raison, interprétées d’une manière extrêmement favorable à Grotius.85 Pour la plupart de ceux qui se sont penchés sur la question, considérant que le droit naturel, chez Grotius, semble avoir priorité sur le droit volontaire,86 le vrai droit serait celui des tempéraments et non pas ces règles tirées de la pratique humaine qui permettent aux belligérants de faire tout ce qu’ils veulent.87 Mais quoi qu’il en soit, cette prédominance possible du droit naturel ne modifie en rien la relation existant entre l’État, le souverain et ses sujets et l’affirmation selon laquelle la guerre qui est déclarée au souverain est aussi déclarée à son peuple est possiblement ce qui permet de comprendre la véritable articulation entre les deux parties du livre. En effet, il 81

ibid, Livre III Ch II § I et II. ibid, Livre III Ch X § I (1). 83 ibid, Livre III Ch X § III. 84 ibid, Livre III Ch XI–XVI. 85 ‘C’est peut-être là la partie la plus personnelle, la plus intéressante et assurément la plus humanitaire de l’œuvre’: Basdevant, ‘Grotius’ (n 19) 210. ‘C’est là dans l’œuvre de Grotius une partie véritablement humaine qui lui fait honneur. Elle vient couronner une doctrine qui toute entière, a pour but d’atténuer les méfaits et les horreurs de la guerre. Grotius a compris qu’au–dessus du droit, il y a la charité’: J Joubert, Études sur Grotius (Paris, Domat-Montchrestien, 1935) 95. 86 Selon plusieurs auteurs, l’une des difficultés de la théorie des sources de Grotius est qu’il ne hiérarchise pas les trois types de droits (naturel, volontaire humain et volontaire divin) de son système (voir par exemple M Bourquin, ‘Grotius est-il le père du droit des gens? (1583–1615)’ dans: Faculté de Droit de Génève (ed), Grandes figures et grandes œuvre juridiques (Génève, Georg & Cie SA, 1948) 77, 86–93 qui estime que même si, a priori, on peut être d’avis que Grotius donne primauté au droit naturel, cette analyse est plus difficile à défendre lorsqu’on fait une lecture plus poussée de Du droit de la guerre et de la paix). On doit toutefois noter que, concernant la relation entre le droit naturel et le droit divin, il affirme que ‘[l]e droit naturel est tellement immuable, qu’il ne peut même pas être changé par Dieu ‘ (Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix (n 56) Livre I Ch I § X (5)). Ce qui nous laisse sur l’impression qu’au contraire, selon lui, le droit naturel a une certaine priorité sur les deux autres types de droits. 87 Contra: PP Remec, The Position of the Individual in International Law According to Grotius and Vattel (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1960) 107–22 (qui semble croire que les règles découlant du droit des gens ont priorité sur les tempéraments, notamment du fait de certaines incohérences dans l’élaboration de ceux-ci). Voir aussi les bémols que met E Jouannet pour qui Grotius établit une distinction entre les droits parfaits, qui peuvent justifier une guerre juste, et les droits imparfaits, qui ne le peuvent pas. Selon elle, les tempéraments feraient partie des droits imparfaits: Jouannet, Emer de Vattel (n 62) 174 et seq. 82

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semble que la meilleure interprétation du troisième livre soit la suivante: étant donné ce qui a été dit précédemment concernant la nature de cette ‘union d’hommes libres’ qu’est l’État, il est normal que les individus, qui jouissent des bénéfices de cette union, souffrent également de ses désavantages. Par conséquent se trouvent-ils être liés au souverain qu’ils ont ‘choisi’ et c’est ainsi qu’on doit comprendre la relation qu’ils entretiennent entre eux et avec ce souverain comme créateur d’un ‘tout organique et unitaire’ appelé l’État. Cette relation fait en sorte que l’individu est responsable des agissements du souverain, puisque ces agissements ont été, du fait de son association expresse ou implicite à l’entente originelle et à l’État, indirectement pris en son nom. Cela dit, la guerre ne permet pas que l’on fasse subir n’importe quel supplice aux parties individuelles du tout qu’est l’État. Ces tempéraments ne remettent donc jamais en question le fait que l’individu est toujours responsable des agissements du souverain: ils ne font qu’‘adoucir’ un peu les effets de cette responsabilité socialisée. Si l’on compare cette analyse à celle que faisait de Groot, on peut constater certaines distinctions significatives pour notre propos. Pour ce dernier, la socialisation de la responsabilité découle, comme chez Grotius, de l’entente originelle. Cependant, l’interprétation que nous avons faite de ses écrits nous a permis de dire que ce lien entre les individus et le souverain, relation médiatisée, si l’on veut, par l’État, est relativement friable et que les individus ne peuvent probablement pas être tenus responsables des décisions prises par le souverain lorsque celui-ci a outrepassé les prérogatives qui lui ont été accordées, ou qu’il se comporte comme un tyran et qu’une résistance lui est de ce fait opposée. Enfin, on le répète, le droit de résistance accordé aux peuples contre un pouvoir illégitime ou ayant outrepassé les termes de l’entente originelle est l’aspect principal de la théorie. Chez Grotius, cette analyse ne peut plus être faite à cause de la relégation au rang d’exception extrêmement rarissime du droit de résistance qui permettait implicitement de ‘rompre’ le consentement donné aux actions décidées par le souverain, ainsi que de l’importance accordée par lui au maintien de la stabilité de l’État qui permet à ce dernier d’imposer l’ordre et la paix publique. En fait, si les limites imposées par de Groot au droit de la guerre venaient principalement d’une telle ‘déconstruction’ de la relation individus—État—souverain, chez Grotius, elles découlent au contraire du fait que nonobstant le caractère unitaire de l’État, on ne peut, sous prétexte d’une guerre menée contre le souverain, faire subir n’importe quelles souffrances aux parties individuelles (c’est-à-dire aux individus) de ce tout unitaire qu’est l’État. Ainsi, et même s’il n’est peut-être pas faux de dire, comme certains auteurs l’ont proposé, que Grotius n’envisageait pas encore l’État du point de vue de la personnalité juridique88 et que le système juridique qu’il décrit se caractérise principalement par des relations entre souverains, n’en demeure pas moins que ce

88 Par exemple PP Remec qui affirme que ‘[l]’association qui est représentée dans l’État n’est pas, selon Grotius, un organisme possédant une personnalité pleine, mais plutôt une relation juridique spéciale existant entre les membres de cette association afin de mieux réguler les intérêts qui leur sont communs’: Remec, The Position of the Individual in International Law According to Grotius and Vattel (n 87), 72 (notre traduction); et P Haggenmacher pour qui, chez Grotius, ‘[l]e belligérant public n’est donc pas, ici, un État souverain en tant que sujet du droit international, mais un organe souverain en tant que maître suprême dans l’État’: P Haggenmacher ‘Grotius et le droit international – le texte et la

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système implique nécessairement une version réifiée de l’État où celui-ci est perçu comme étant un tout unitaire qui sert de relais pour transmettre à l’ensemble du peuple (le principe de socialisation de la responsabilité) les effets des décisions prises par le souverain (qui préfigure le principe de la privatisation du processus décisionnel).

CONCLUSION

Les historiens du droit international ont généralement travaillé à partir d’une approche que l’on pourrait qualifier d’idéaliste (bien que de plus en plus d’exceptions commencent à émerger), c’est-à-dire qu’ils ont bien souvent cherché à décortiquer l’histoire du champ en analysant les écrits de ceux qu’on qualifie de ‘Pères fondateurs’ du droit international en insistant sur les filiations intellectuelles existant entre eux. Cette approche exige de faire une interprétation très serrée, si l’on veut, et de rechercher quelle était la véritable intention de l’auteur au moment d’écrire ses traités. Cette approche est certainement pertinente d’une perspective critique parce que, et un peu comme on le fait en science politique lorsqu’on étudie les auteurs classiques libéraux, elle nous permet de comprendre l’évolution historique et philosophique des arguments utilisés pour justifier et légitimer un ordre de domination et ses relations de pouvoir, que ce soit l’ordre politique libéral ou l’ordre juridique international. Ce que cette contribution postule toutefois, c’est qu’une telle approche n’est pas suffisante et qu’une approche matérialiste peut aussi s’avérer d’une grande pertinence pour faire la critique du champ du droit international. Une analyse matérialiste et critique du droit international peut prendre deux orientations différentes. Dans la première, plutôt que d’analyser les écrits des ‘internationalistes’ (qu’on nous permette cet anachronisme), on cherchera plutôt à comprendre comment l’état des relations sociales et des relations de pouvoir a permis l’émergence de règles et d’institutions et comment celles-ci ont été utilisées par les différents acteurs afin d’en arriver à leurs fins. Dans la seconde, on fera un retour aux ‘Pères fondateurs’ mais on cherchera à comprendre les éléments politiques, sociaux et économiques les ayant influencés plutôt que de comprendre leur influence intellectuelle. Cette méthode nous permet de comprendre comment les relations sociales ont influencé, non plus le droit international en tant que pratique sociale mais plutôt en tant que champ scientifique. Elle demande moins de faire une déconstruction très pointue des textes, comme on a souvent eu l’habitude de le faire, que de rechercher la façon dont les textes ont été reçus et interprétés (que cette interprétation ait été la bonne ou non). C’est dans cette seconde perspective que cette contribution se situe, même si elle s’est contentée de souligner les éléments contextuels des écrits de l’auteur étudié, l’espace nous ayant manqué pour en analyser la réception historique. légende’ dans A Dufour, P Haggenmacher et J Toman (eds), Grotius et l’ordre juridique international (Lausanne, Payot, 1985) 122. Voir aussi: P Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (n 77) 542.

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Une analyse de la ‘théorie politique’ de l’État dans les différentes époques de la vie de Huig de Groot/Hugo Grotius nous permet de bien illustrer la pertinence de cette approche dans la mesure où, plus peut-être que n’importe quel de ces soit-disant ‘Pères fondateurs’, Grotius a été influencé par les luttes politiques et sociales auxquelles il a assisté, voire auxquelles il a participé directement, et le résultat de ces contextes différents est une théorie de l’État qui évolue sensiblement au cours de sa vie: d’une théorie ‘républicaine’ de son époque hollandaise, il finit par adopter une théorie ‘absolutiste’ après qu’il ait été accueilli par Louis XIII en France. L’importance de ces changements vient du fait qu’alors que Le droit de la guerre et de la paix a grandement marqué le champ du droit international, le reste de ses écrits, outre l’un des chapitres du De Jure Praedae qui a influencé le droit de la mer mais qui est relativement silencieux sur une quelconque théorie de l’État, a été d’une influence marginale, voire complètement nulle sur le droit international.89 Or, il appert que la théorie adoptée dans Le droit de la guerre et de la paix est une théorie qui réifie beaucoup plus l’État que celle de ses écrits précédents, occultant ainsi presque totalement les relations sociales nationales, et qu’à la suite de Grotius, le champ du droit des gens/droit international adoptera de plus en plus une théorie qui, justement et comme nous l’avons expliqué en introduction, réifie l’État, ce qui fait en sorte qu’on y conçoit le droit international comme un ordre juridique qui gère les relations entre les États (et uniquement eux) sans vraiment considérer le fait que ceux-ci ne sont rien d’autre que la somme des relations sociales et des relations de pouvoir internes aux sociétés ‘nationales’. Est-ce à dire que le champ aurait évolué différemment et aurait une théorie politique de l’État différente et, considérant l’importance de la théorie de l’État sur l’ensemble du droit international en tant qu’ordre juridique, une structure différente si c’eurent été les écrits de de Groot qui avaient joué le rôle qu’ont joué les travaux de Grotius? Il est difficile de répondre à cette question mais ce qui est certain, c’est que Grotius a joué un rôle important dans l’évolution du champ du droit international, ne serait-ce qu’à cause de l’influence qu’il a lui-même eue sur Vattel dont le livre principal90 a été de loin le traité de droit des gens le plus lu au cours du XVIIIe siècle et qui fait constamment référence au traité du juriste hollandais.

89 Parmi les travaux de de Groot dont nous avons parlés, rappelons que le De Jure Praedae et le Commentarius in Thesis XI ont été retrouvés en 1864 et publiés quelques années plus tard seulement. Bien sûr, l’un des chapitres du De Jure Praedae était connu depuis les années 1610 et a eu à l’époque une influence importante sur le droit de la mer, mais n’inclut pas les dimensions sur les plus importantes de l’œuvre générale en ce qui concerne la théorie de l’État de de Groot. Par ailleurs, des œuvres telles que The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic et De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra n’ont eu, à notre connaissance, aucun impact sur le développement du droit des gens. 90 E de Vattel et J Brown Scott (éd), Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains, tome 2, réédition (Washington D.C., Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916 [1758]).

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Ouvrages Y-M Bercé, La naissance dramatique de l’absolutisme (Paris, Le Seuil, 1992). P Bourdieu avec LJD Wacquant, Réponses. Pour une anthropologie réflexive (Paris, Le Seuil, 1992). E de Vattel et J Brown Scott (éd), Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains, tome 2, réédition (Washington DC, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916 [1758]). E Dunbauld, The Life and Legal Writings of Hugo Grotius (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1969). P Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, Volume 1 (New York, Barnes & Noble, 1961) WG Grewe et M Byers (traducteur), The Epochs of International Law (Berlin, de Gruyter, 2000). H Grotius et P Borschberg (éd), Commentarius in Thesis XI. An Early Treatise on Souvereignty, the Just War, and the Legitimacy of the Dutch Revolution (Bern, Peter Lang, 1994). H Grotius et Pradier-Fodéré, P (traducteur), Alland, D, Goyard-Fabre, S (éds), Le droit de la guerre et de la paix (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1999). H Grotius et J Wasnick (éd), The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic (Assen, Van Gorcum, 2000). H Grotius et H-J van Dam (éd), De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra. Critical Edition with Introduction, English Translation and Commentary, Volume I (Leiden, Brill Academic, 2001). H Grotius, GL Williams, et WH Zeydel (traducteurs), MJ van Ittersum (éd), Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Jure Praedae) (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 2006). P Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1983). V Hély, Étude sur le droit de la guerre de Grotius (Paris, F. Pichon, 1875). M Horkheimer et C Maillard, S Muller (traducteurs), Théorie traditionnelle et théorie critique (Paris, Gallimard, 1974). J Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995). E Jouannet, Emer de Vattel et l’émergence doctrinale du droit international classique (Paris, Pedone, 1998). J Joubert, Études sur Grotius (Paris, Domat-Montchrestien, 1935). E Le Roy Ladurie, L’ancien régime – tome I, 1610–1715 (Paris, Hachette, 1991). R Mousnier, Les institutions de la France sous la monarchie absolue (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1974). PP Remec, The Position of the Individual in International Law According to Grotius and Vattel (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1960).

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B Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations (London, Verso, 2003). R Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993) H Vreeland, Hugo Grotius the Father of the Modern Science of International Law (New York, Oxford University Press, 1917). M Wight, et G Wight, B Porter, (éds), Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). Articles d’ouvrages collectifs J Basdevant, ‘Grotius’ dans Pillet, (éd), Les fondateurs du droit international: leurs oeuvres, leurs doctrines (Paris, V Giard & E Brière, 1904). M Bourquin, ‘Grotius est-il le père du droit des gens? (1583–1615)’ in: Faculté de Droit de Génève (éd), Grandes figures et grandes œuvre juridiques (Génève, Georg & Cie SA, 1948). R Feenstra, ‘Mare Liberum, Contexte historique et concepts fondamentaux’ dans A Dufour, P Haggenmacher et J Toman (éds), Grotius et l’ordre juridique international (Lausanne, Payot, 1985). P Haggenmacher, ‘Grotius et le droit international—le texte et la légende’ dans A Dufour, P Haggenmacher et J Toman (éds), Grotius et l’ordre juridique international (Lausanne, Payot, 1985). D Kennedy, ‘The Twentieth-Century Discipline of International Law in the United States’ dans A Sarat, B Garth et RA Kagan (éds), Looking Back at Law’s Century (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2002). H-J van Dam, ‘Introduction’ dans HJ van Dam (éd) et H Grotius, De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra. Critical Edition with Introduction, English Translation and Commentary, Volume I (Leiden, Brill Academic, 2001). M van Gelderen, ‘From Domingo de Soto to Hugo Grotius: Theories of Monarchy and Civil Power in Spanish and Dutch Political Thought, 1550–1609’ dans G Darby (éd), The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt (London, Routledge, 2001). J Waszinck, ‘Introduction’ dans ibid (éd) et H Grotius, The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic (Assen, Van Gorcum, 2000). Articles de périodiques P Bourdieu, ‘La spécificité du champ scientifique et les conditions sociales du progrès de la raison’ (1975) 7 Sociologie et société 91–118. RW Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’ (1981) 10 Millenium: Journal of International Studies 126–55. L Panitch, ‘The New Imperial State’ (2000) 2 New Left Review 5–20. R Pound, ‘Philosophical Theory and International Law’ (1923) 1 Bibliotheca Visseriana dissertationum ius internationale illustrantium 71–90.

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CG Roelofsen, ‘Grotius and the Development of International Relations Theory: “The Long Seventheenth Century” and the Elaboration of a European States System’ (1997) 17 The Law Review Association of Quinnipiac College School of Law 35–59. S Sassen, ‘The State and Economic Globalisation: Any Implications for International Law?’ (2000) 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 109–16. B Teschke, ‘Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism’ (2002) 8 European Journal of International Relations 5–48.

Cours M Kamto, ‘La volonté de l’État en droit international’ (2004) 310 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9–428.

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Réception et Application du Droit International Moderne par le Japon: Son Attitude Évolutive de 1858 à 1945 NISHIUMI MAKI *

INTRODUCTION

A

UJOURD’HUI, plusieurs internationalistes européens s’intéressent à la clarification du caractère ‘européen’ du droit international moderne et à la manière dont leurs prédécesseurs à la fin du XIXème siècle ont vu le processus de colonisation qui se déroulait à cette époque à l’échelon mondial.1 J’aimerais me joindre à cette tendance et présenter sur ce sujet un point de vue non-européen.2 Les historiens et juristes des pays d’Asie, dont le Japon, s’intéressent à leur tour au processus par lequel le droit international moderne a été reçu et appliqué par ces pays.3 Cet article a pour but de clarifier l’attitude du Japon à l’égard du droit international moderne depuis le moment de son ouverture, c’est-à-dire de la deuxième moitié du XIXème siècle, jusqu’à la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale. L’attitude du Japon à l’égard du droit international moderne n’a pas été cohérente, mais au contraire évolutive et ambivalente. Elle ressemble, me semble-t-il, à celle d’un japonais qui se positionne par rapport à l’Europe. D’un côté, il l’adore et l’accepte volontiers, mais de l’autre, il la conteste et même la rejette.4 * Professeur à l’Université Chuo, Japon. 1 Par exemple, E Jouannet, ‘Structure intellectuelle de la pensée internationaliste classique et colonialisme européen’ Rapport lors de la Conférence inaugurale de la SEDI à Florence, 2004, publié sous le titre: ‘Colonialisme européen et néo-colonialisme contemporain (Notes de lecture des manuels européens du droit des gens entre 1850 et 1914)’ (2006) 6 Baltic Yearbook of International Law 49; M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: the Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002). 2 Parmi les internationalistes qui s’intéressent à ce sujet, on peut énumérer entre autres: A Anghie, ’Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 19th Century International Law‘ (1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1; Y Onuma, ‘When was the Law of International Society Born?’ (2000) 2 Journal of the History of International Law 1; Y Matsui, ‘Kindai Nihon to Kokusaiho(1)(2)’ (‘Japon moderne et droit international’) (1974) 13, 14 Kagaku to Shiso (Science et pensée) 87–97, 344–59. 3 Ainsi, Higashi Ajia Kindaishi Gakkai (la Société de l’histoire moderne d’Asie orientale) a publié successivement les numéros spéciaux suivants, intitulés: ‘Higashi Ajia ni okeru Bankokukoho no Juyo to Tekiyo’ (‘Réception et application du droit des gens dans l’Asie orientale’) (mars 1999) 2 Higashi Ajia Kindaishi (Histoire moderne d’Asie orientale); ‘Ajia ni okeru Kindaikokusaiho’ (‘Droit international moderne dans l’Asie’) (mars 2000) 3 Higashi Ajia Kindaishi. Plusieurs historiens et internationalistes japonais et coréens y ont contribué sur ces sujets. 4 On peut bien voir cette mentalité dans l’essai de 1914 de S Natsume, ‘Watashi no Kojinshugi’ (‘Mon individualisme’) (Tokyo, Kodansha, 1978) ou dans le roman de S Endo, Ryugaku (Faire ses études à l’étranger) (Tokyo, Shincho Bunko, 1965) etc.

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Dans cet article, je considèrerai successivement: (1) Le milieu international à l’époque où le Japon a été obligé de recevoir le droit international moderne en tant que tel; (2) L’attitude apparemment contradictoire du Japon à l’égard des puissances occidentales et à l’égard des pays voisins tels que la Chine et la Corée, dans l’élaboration des traités bilatéraux; (3) Le caractère discriminatoire du droit international moderne et la signification de l’attitude du Japon à l’égard de ce droit; (4) Le projet de Daitowa-Kyoeiken (La zone co-prospère de la grande Asie orientale) et les attitudes des internationalistes japonais à son égard. LE MILIEU INTERNATIONAL À L’ÉPOQUE OÀ LE JAPON A ÉTÉ OBLIGÉ DE RECEVOIR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL MODERNE EN TANT QUE TEL

L’année 2008 marque le 150ème anniversaire de l’établissement des relations diplomatiques entre le Japon et cinq pays occidentaux: la France, les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, la Russie et les Pays-Bas. En 1858, le Japon a conclu ou, plus précisément, a été obligé de conclure avec ces pays des traités de paix, d’amitié et de commerce.5 Vers le milieu du XIXème siècle, ces pays occidentaux avaient alors accompli, à travers leurs propres expériences de la révolution industrielle, un processus rapide de modernisation. Ils se lançaient alors à la recherche de nouveaux marchés, amorçant également leur expansion vers l’Asie. Par ces traités, le Japon a ouvert les ports d’Hakodate, Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Niigata et Hyogo, promettant à ces pays occidentaux un libre commerce.6 Antérieurement, le Japon avait adopté une politique d’isolement, qui s’appelait en japonais ‘Sakoku’, par laquelle il était interdit au peuple japonais de sortir du Japon et aux étrangers d’entrer au Japon. Les relations diplomatiques et de commerce extérieur étaient limitées à quelques pays comme les Pays-Bas et la Chine. La raison principale de cette politique était d’empêcher l’évangélisation catholique qui, selon la pensée du gouvernement de cette époque, le Shogounat, menaçait son autorité. ‘Sakoku’ a duré plus de deux cent ans et favorisé, en raison de l’état de la paix, un développement de la culture, de l’industrie et des finances japonaises. Mais, depuis la fin du XVIIIème siècle, au fur et à mesure du développement du capitalisme mondial mis au point par les pays occidentaux, des pays comme la Russie et les États-Unis ont demandé au Japon d’ouvrir ses frontières et son marché 5 Précisément, le Japon avait conclu depuis 1854 des traités d’amitié avec les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, la Russie et les Pays-Bas. Ces traités ont été transformés en traités de paix, d’amitié et de commerce en 1858. 6 ‘Les villes et ports de Hakodate, Kanagaoua et Nagasaki seront ouverts au commerce et aux sujets français, à dater du 15 août 1859, et les villes et ports dont les noms suivent le seront aux époques déterminées ci-après . . .’ (article 3 du Traité entre la France et le Japon, signé à Yedo, le 9 octobre 1858. Ratification échangée à Yedo, le 22 septembre 1859, dans Teimei kakkoku Joyaku Ruisan – Treaties and Conventions concluded between Empire of Japan and Foreign Nations (Tokyo Nisshusha, 1874) ; ’Dans tous les ports du Japon ouverts au commerce, les sujets français seront libres d’importer de leur propre pays ou des ports étrangers, et d’y vendre, d’y acheter et d’en exporter pour leurs propres ports ou pour ceux d’autres pays, toutes espèces de marchandises qui ne seraient pas de contrebande . . .’ (article 8 dudit traité).

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intérieur. Et ‘Sakoku’ s’est achevé, en 1858, avec la conclusion des traités de paix, d’amitié et de commerce mentionnés ci-dessus.7 Au Japon, on dit souvent que ces traités étaient ‘inégaux’. Ils étaient considérés tels pour trois raisons principales: d’abord, l’absence du pouvoir de fixer librement les tarifs douaniers ; le Japon n’avait pas le droit de fixer unilatéralement et souverainement ces taxes. À cette époque-là, l’OMC n’existait pas(!) et chaque pays souverain avait donc a priori le droit de décider les taux de droits de douane. Mais le Japon était obligé, par ces traités, de consulter préalablement ses partenaires et ne pouvait fixer ses taxes qu’après avoir obtenu leur consentement.8 C’est la première raison de qualification d’‘inégal’. La deuxième raison concerne la juridiction consulaire ; le Japon n’avait pas juridiction sur les ressortissants-accusés des pays étrangers. Ainsi, les criminels des pays européens, qui avaient commis des crimes ou délits sur le territoire du Japon ou les commerçants-débiteurs de ces pays européens étaient tous jugés, en application des lois de leur pays d’origine, par les consuls de chaque pays qui résidaient au Japon.9 La troisième raison est une clause de la nation la plus favorisée non réciproque ; le Japon a été obligé par ces traités d’admettre une clause de la nation la plus favorisée non réciproque. Selon elle, seuls les pays partenaires jouissaient des avantages liés à cette clause, tandis que le Japon ne pouvait en profiter.10 Bref, le Japon n’était pas considéré, dans ces traités, comme un pays civilisé, c’est-à-dire un pays pleinement souverain.11

7

Revue officielle du 150ème anniversaire des relations Franco-Japonaises 1858–2008, 24–25. Les articles réglementant le commerce ont été annexés audit traité. D’après l’article IX dudit traité, l’agent diplomatique français au Japon, de concert avec les fonctionnaires qui pourraient être désignés à cet effet par le gouvernement japonais, avaient le pouvoir d’établir les règlements qui seraient nécessaires pour mettre à exécution les stipulations des articles réglementant le commerce. D’ailleurs, la classe IV des règlements commerciaux dit que ‘cinq années après l’ouverture du port de Kanagaoua, les droits d’importation et d’exportation pourront être modifiés, si l’un ou l’autre des deux Gouvernements de France et du Japon le désire‘. Il s’avère donc que le Japon n’a pas eu le droit souverain de décider unilatéralement les taux de droits de douane. 9 ‘Tous les différends qui pourraient s’élever entre français au sujet de leurs droits, de leurs propriétés ou de leurs personnes, dans les domaines de Sa Majesté l’Empereur du Japon, seront soumis à la juridiction des autorités françaises constituées dans le Pays.’ (article V dudit traité); ‘Les sujets français qui se rendraient coupables de quelque crime contre les Japonais ou contre des individus appartenant à d’autres nations, seront traduits devant le Consul français et punis conformément aux lois de l’Empire Français.’ (article VI dudit traité); ‘Tout sujet français qui aurait à se plaindre d’un Japonais, devra se rendre au Consulat de France et y exposer sa réclamation. Le Consul examinera ce qu’elle aura de fondé et cherchera à arranger l’affaire à l’amiable . . .’ (article VII dudit traité) ; ‘[S]i quelque sujet français se cachait frauduleusement ou manquait à payer ses dettes à un Japonais, les autorités françaises feraient de même tout ce qui dépendrait d’elles pour amener le délinquant en justice et le forcer à payer ce qu’il devrait.’ (article XVIII dudit traité). 10 ‘Il est expressément stipulé que le gouvernement français et ses sujets jouiront, librement, à dater du jour où le présent traité sera mis en vigueur, de tous les privilèges, immunités et avantages qui ont été ou qui seraient garantis à l’avenir par Sa Majesté l’Empereur du Japon au Gouvernement ou aux sujets de toute autre nation.’ (article XIX dudit traité). 11 Il y a un autre article qui est lui aussi révélateur d’une relation franco-japonaise asymétrique. Il s’agit de l’article XXI. D’après cet article, toute communication officielle adressée par l’agent diplomatique français aux autorités japonaises sera écrite en français. Cependant, pour faciliter la prompte expédition des affaires, ces communications seront, pendant une période de cinq années, accompagnées d’une traduction japonaise. C’est une inégalité linguistique qu’on n’a pas relevée expressément, me semble-t-il, jusqu’à aujourd’hui. 8

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C’est pourquoi la modification de ces traités inégaux a été l’un des buts diplomatiques principaux du Gouvernement Meiji.12 Pour réaliser ce but, il fallait que le Japon soit reconnu par les pays occidentaux comme pays civilisé. Cette reconnaissance était également indispensable pour que le Japon puisse maintenir son indépendance et éviter d’être colonisé par ces pays. Le Japon s’est donc mis à se moderniser en introduisant intensivement les technologies et industries modernes, les institutions politiques économiques et militaires, et les cultures occidentales, y compris le droit et, bien sûr, le droit international. Lors de la négociation du traité de paix, d’amitié et de commerce avec les États-Unis, les représentants japonais ont avoué naïvement et franchement à leurs partenaires américains qu’ils ne connaissaient pas le droit international diplomatique.13 Cela signifiait que le droit international moderne était tout à fait étranger pour le Japon en ce temps-là. Le Shogounat a néanmoins envoyé de jeunes boursiers aux Pays-Bas. Il s’agissait de Shusuke Nishi et Shin’ichiro Tsuda. Ils ont fait leurs études de droit international à Leiden et, après leur retour au Japon en 1866, ils ont commencé pour la première fois au Japon à donner des cours de droit international à l’Institut d’État à Edo (Tokyo), en se fondant principalement sur la doctrine de Simon Vissering, Professeur de l’Université de Leiden.14 Mais le Japon, à la fin de l’époque d’Edo, ne maîtrisait pas encore le droit international, à cause de la montée de la xénophobie dans le débat politique interne. Le nouveau Gouvernement Meiji a proclamé en 1868, juste après son établissement, que les relations diplomatiques devraient être régies par le droit des gens et par les traités conclus antérieurement par le Shogounat.15 D’ailleurs, ‘Elements of international law’,16 l’ouvrage de Henry Wheaton, internationaliste américain, a été traduit d’abord en chinois, en 1864, et ensuite en japonais, l’année suivante. Cette traduction s’est avérée précieuse. Beaucoup d’intellectuels et praticiens japonais de cette époque ont lu cet ouvrage et été influencés considérablement par lui.17

L’ATTITUDE APPAREMMENT CONTRADICTOIRE DU JAPON À L’ÉGARD DES PUISSANCES OCCIDENTALES ET À L’ÉGARD DES PAYS VOISINS TELS QUE LA CHINE ET LA CORÉE DANS L’ÉLABORATION DES TRAITÉS BILATÉRAUX

La guerre Sino-Japonaise (1894–95) et la guerre Russo-Japonaise (1904–05) ont été de bonnes occasions pour montrer que le Japon était devenu un pays civilisé, qui observait pleinement les règles du droit de la guerre. Pour cela l’armée de terre et la 12 Nous adoptons un calendrier japonais (Gengo) qui a été institué au VIIème siècle, à l’instar du calendrier chinois. On le fixe lors de l’intronisation d’un nouvel empereur et le révise lors de sa succession. Le Gengo à cette époque était Meiji. Le Gengo actuel est Heisei. 13 T Harris et ME Cosenza (éd), The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris, First American Consul General and Minister to Japan (New York, Doubleday, 1930) (traduit en Japonais par S Sakata Harris Nihon Taizaiki (1)(2)(3) [Tokyo, Iwanamibunko, 1954] 97–98, 120–21 de (3)). 14 F Ito, ‘Kokusaiho‘ (‘Droit international’) dans J Aomi(éd), Kindai Nihonshi Taikei (Système de l’histoire du Japon moderne) (Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1979) 461–62. 15 Déclaration du Gouvernement Meiji du 8 février 1868. 16 H Wheaton, Elements of international law with a sketch of the history of sciences (Philadelphia, Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1836). 17 Ito, ‘Kokusaiho’ (n 14) 463 et seq.

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marine ont fait accompagner leurs opérations par des internationalistes célèbres à titre de jurisconsultes, pour faire face aux divers problèmes survenus lors des conflits armés. Il s’agissait de Nagao Ariga (armée de terre) et Sakue Takahshi (marine). Tous les deux ont fait leurs études à Berlin, Vienne (Ariga) ou Londres (Takahashi) et, après leur retour au Japon, ils sont devenus professeurs de droit international à l’Université de l’Armée de Terre (Ariga) et à l’Université Impériale de Tokyo. Ariga a publié deux ouvrages en français: La guerre sino-japonaise au point de vue du droit international18 et La guerre russo-japonaise au point de vue continental et le droit international.19 Ces deux ouvrages ont été appréciés20 et contribué à montrer que ce nouveau pays d’Asie observait bien les règles du droit de la guerre. D’ailleurs, ces ouvrages ont été cités fréquemment dans les ouvrages publiés en Europe. Quant à Takahashi, son ouvrage Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War21 comporte une préface écrite par TE Holland et une introduction écrite par J Wastlake. Ces deux internationalistes éminents y ont affirmé que le Japon avait bien observé les règles du droit de la guerre et avait déjà bien rempli les conditions nécessaires pour être qualifié de pays civilisé.22 La méthode de rédaction de leurs ouvrages consistait à admettre d’abord le caractère avancé de la civilisation européenne et à insister ensuite sur l’intégration du Japon dans cette civilisation.23 Ils étaient plutôt malins! Mais leurs perspectives étaient en vogue parmi les intellectuels et les élites politiques japonais à cette époque. Le développement industriel remarquable et le succès militaire ont permis au Japon de devenir une puissance importante d’Asie. La modification des traités inégaux s’est achevée à la fin du XIXème siècle et au début du XXème siècle.24 Et à la conférence de la Paix qui s’est tenue à Paris après la Première Guerre mondiale, le Japon était présent au rang des vainqueurs, à côté de la France, des États-Unis, de l’Angleterre et de l’Italie. Depuis la fin de période d’Edo, le gouvernement japonais avait l’intention de faire ouvrir la Corée. Cette intention a été mise en œuvre lors de l’affaire de Kanfado (Kokato en japonais). En 1875, un vaisseau japonais qui naviguait sur le rivage Ouest de la Corée, sous le prétexte d’explorer la voie maritime, en ignorant la contestation exprimée par le gouvernement coréen, a vu son canot attaqué par une batterie située sur l’île Kanfado. Ce vaisseau a réagi et a détruit la batterie. Cette affaire a donné au Japon une bonne occasion pour conclure un traité d’amitié

18

N Ariga, La guerre sino-japonaise au point de vue du droit international (Paris, Pedone, 1896). N Ariga, La guerre russo-japonaise au point de vue continental et le droit international (Paris, Pedone, 1908). 20 Surtout dans le monde académique français. 21 S Takahashi, Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1899). 22 TE Holland, ‘Préface’ dans S Takahshi, Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (n 21) vi,; J Westlake ‘Introduction’ dans ibid xvi. L’autre ouvrage de S Takahasi, International Law applied to the Russo-Japanese War with the Decisions of the Japanese Prize Courts (London, Stevens and Sons, 1908) a été également très apprécié en Europe. 23 S Yamauchi, ‘Meiji Kokka niokeru Bunmei to Kokusaiho (Civilisation et droit international dans l’État Meji)’ (1996) 115 Hitotsubashi Ronso 19, 29–31. 24 Le Japon a réussi successivement à modifier les traités inégaux avec les États occidentaux d’abord en 1894 dans le domaine de suppression de la juridiction consulaire, et ensuite en 1911 dans celui du rétablissement du droit de fixer les droits de douane. 19

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avec la Corée. Dans la négociation, le Japon a utilisé une politique de menace. Il a notifié au gouvernement coréen que si la Corée n’acceptait pas ce traité, les troupes japonaises débarqueraient sur le territoire coréen. Il a à cet effet fait retirer une fois son plénipotentiaire en déclarant que la négociation avait échoué. Enfin, le Japon a réussi à faire admettre toutes ses exigences et le traité d’amitié entre le Japon et la Corée a été signé en 1876.25 Ce traité appartenait parfaitement au type du traité inégal. Il stipulait l’ouverture des trois ports, l’établissement des ressortissants japonais et l’envoi de consuls du Japon à ces endroits et la juridiction consulaire. Certes, ce traité stipulait le libre commerce entre ces deux pays et l’exonération d’impôts pour exportation et importation des marchandises. Entre eux, apparemment, cette disposition était équitable et égalitaire. Pourtant, les importations de soja, riz et d’or au Japon depuis la Corée ont été très importantes pour le développement du capitalisme japonais. Cette exonération était donc d’abord et surtout favorable aux intérêts du Japon. Pour la Corée, ces exportations vers le Japon ont entraîné une hausse des prix des grains due à ces flux vers le Japon. Cette disposition a donc contribué à situer la Corée comme marché de marchandises, et terrain de fourniture de ressources alimentaires au bénéfice du capitalisme japonais.26 L’attente que les puissances occidentales avaient à l’égard du Japon d’obtenir l’ouverture de la Corée a donc bien été satisfaite. Après la conclusion de ce traité avec le Japon, la Corée a dû conclure successivement des traités de même type avec les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, l’Allemagne, l’Italie et la France. A travers ses expériences avec les pays occidentaux, le Japon a bien appris le sens et le résultat du libre échange pour les pays moins développés économiquement, basé sur le traité inégal. Au moment où il commençait justement à modifier ces traités inégaux par obtention d’une capacité autonome de fixer les tarifs douaniers, le Japon a obligé la Corée à conclure un traité inégal.27 Tout en demandant aux pays développés occidentaux un statut international égalitaire, le Japon imposait une dépendance aux pays moins avancés d’Asie. En 1896, juste après la guerre sino-japonaise, le Japon a également conclu un traité inégal de commerce et navigation avec la Chine, où était stipulée également la juridiction consulaire, et qui subsistera jusqu’en 1943. La méthode employée par le Japon à l’égard de ces deux pays était tout à fait identique à celle des pays européens à l’égard du Japon! Pourtant cette attitude du Japon apparemment contradictoire n’était que révélatrice du contenu même du droit international moderne. LE CARACTÈRE DISCRIMINATOIRE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL MODERNE EUROPÉEN ET LA SIGNIFICATION DE L’ATTITUDE DU JAPON À L’ÉGARD DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL MODERNE

Le droit international moderne européen est né et s’est développé, basé sur le mode de production capitaliste, dont le sujet était un pays civilisé européen (ou un pays 25 26 27

Matsui, ‘Kindai Nihon to Kokusaiho’ (2) (n 2) 346–48. ibid. ibid.

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du continent américain qui avait les mêmes compositions sociales et structure économique). Le but principal de ce droit était d’assurer l’ordre minimum, la prévisibilité et la stabilité qui permettraient à ces pays de déplacer au-delà de leur frontière des hommes, marchandises et capitaux.28 Les internationalistes du XIXème siècle ne doutaient pas que les sujets du droit international étaient limités aux seuls pays civilisés. Comme l’a écrit WE Hall dans son ouvrage A Treatise on International Law,29 le droit international est un produit de la civilisation propre de l’Europe moderne. Il constitue un système hautement artificiel qui ne pourrait pas être compris par les pays appartenant à une civilisation différente. Il est donc évident que seuls les pays européens, successeurs de la civilisation européenne, peuvent être considérés comme y obéissant.30 Ce caractère discriminatoire du droit international moderne est remarquablement montré, entre autres, dans l’ouvrage de J. Lorimer, Professeur à l’Université d’Edimbourg, intitulé The Institutes of the Law of Nations.31 Lorimer y affirmait que l’humanité se compose de trois catégories: l’humanité civilisée, l’humanité barbare et l’humanité sauvage. D’après lui, les pays d’Europe et d’Amérique du Nord et du Sud constituaient l’humanité civilisée. Ces pays jouissaient d’une pleine reconnaissance politique et donc de la qualité plénière de sujet du droit international. Des pays tels que la Chine, la Turquie, la Perse, le Japon et le Siam constituaient l’humanité barbare. Ces pays ne jouissaient que d’une reconnaissance partielle et donc n’étaient que sujets partiels du droit international. Les pays civilisés concluaient avec eux des traités inégaux, comme évoqué plus haut pour le Japon. Le reste du Monde où habitent l’humanité sauvage étaient pour les pays civilisés un espace terra nullius, auquel on pouvait appliquer la théorie de l’occupation, et était par conséquent destiné à être colonisé par ces pays.32 De fait, si on se met à faire l’analyse historique du droit international moderne, on ne peut pas nier que ce droit est un droit de domination par les pays capitalistes d’Europe et d’Amérique à l’égard du reste du Monde. Comme Röling l’écrit, dans tous les droits positifs se cachent des éléments de puissance et d’intérêt. Le droit ne peut pas être assimilé à la puissance ou aux intérêts, mais il reflète un rapport de force existant. Il a tendance à servir les intérêts des forts. Le droit international européen, c’est-à-dire le droit international classique, n’est pas une exception. Il a servi les intérêts des pays riches.33 Le Japon est devenu le premier pays non européen à obtenir la pleine reconnaissance comme nation civilisée, sujet plénier du droit international. Mais ce n’était que la victoire de la civilisation européenne, de l’hégémonie du droit international moderne. Au lieu de défier la structure de domination et de dépendance du droit international moderne européen, il a obtenu le statut de pays dominant en sortant de celui de pays dépendant. En 1896, le Japon a réussi à obtenir un statut privilégié

28 OJ Lissitzyn, International Law Today and Tomorrow (Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications, 1965) 3 et seq. 29 WE Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1880). 30 ibid, 34 et seq. 31 J Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, Vol 1 (Edinburgh, Blackwell, 1883). 32 ibid, 101–03. 33 BVA Röling, International Law in an Expanded World (Amsterdam, Djambatan, 1960) 15.

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en Chine en concluant un traité de commerce et navigation avec elle. Lors de la négociation de ce traité, le plénipotentiaire chinois, Hung Chang Li (Ri Kosho), a protesté auprès du Premier ministre du Japon, Hirobumi Ito, en disant que ce n’était pas une attitude cohérente de demander à la Chine d’abaisser davantage les taux de droits de douane tout en demandant aux pays occidentaux de permettre l’augmentation des tarifs douaniers. Notre Premier ministre a répondu imperturbablement que ce n’était qu’une parole ridicule et mélancolique!34 Après la Restauration de Meiji, le Japon a toujours montré une attitude obéissante vis-à-vis du droit international moderne. Il en résulte qu’à la fin du XIXème siècle, la plupart des manuels de droit international publiés en Europe évaluaient positivement ce pays en disant qu’il avait non seulement observé attentivement le droit international, mais contribué à son développement. Mais, au revers de cette obéissance quasi automatique, sans esprit critique quant au contenu de ce droit, il y a eu, me semble-t-il, une pensée de négation du droit international et une croyance dans la politique de puissance. Ainsi, Yukichi Fukuzawa, un des penseurs représentatifs de l’époque Meiji, qui insiste sur l’importance que le Japon devienne une grande puissance moderne afin de maintenir son indépendance vis-à-vis des puissances européennes, a exprimé un point de vue très nihiliste dans son article.35 D’après lui, le droit international n’est qu’une apparence cérémonieuse. Les relations entre les États sont au fond en quête de la satisfaction des intérêts et de l’hégémonie de chaque pays. Cent volumes d’ouvrages de droit international ne peuvent l’emporter sur quelques batteries. Les traités de paix ne peuvent l’emporter sur quelques munitions. Les canons et munitions n’ont pas pour but de maintenir et protéger la raison existante mais de créer des déraisons.36 Cette manière de pensée était présente non seulement chez quelques penseurs mais aussi dans les comportements du Gouvernement Meiji lui-même. En ce qui concerne l’acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire pour un différend juridique, le Gouvernement Meiji a toujours été réticent, même pour une juridiction très limitée. Il a apparemment montré sa fidélité envers le droit international. Mais, en réalité, on pourrait dire qu’il a graduellement mais sûrement accumulé une méfiance ineffaçable envers ce droit.37 Ce courant souterrain apparaîtra dans les années 1940.

LE PROJET DE LA DAITOWA-KYOEIKEN (LA ZONE CO-PROSPÈRE DE LA GRANDE ASIE ORIENTALE) ET LES ATTITUDES DES INTERNATIONALISTES JAPONAIS À SON ÉGARD

Après les expériences mentionnées ci-dessus, l’attitude du Japon à l’égard du droit international moderne va changer radicalement. Dans les années 1940, après la 34

M Mutsu, Kenkenroku (Mémoire de fidélité) (Tokyo, Iwanamishoten, 1895) 231 et 233. Y Fukuzawa, ‘Tsuzoku kokkenron’ (‚Droits de l’État désacralisés’) (1878) dans Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu (collection Fukuzawa Yukichi) tome 4 (Tokyo, Iwanamishoten, 1959) 637 36 ibid. 37 Y Ishimoto, ‘Meijiki ni okeru chusai saiban’ (‘Arbitrages internationaux in Meiji période’) (1963) 9 Hogakuzasshi 168, 182 et seq. 35

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création de la Mandchourie et le déclenchement de la guerre contre la Chine, a commencé le projet de construire Daitowa-kyoeiken (la zone co-prospère de la grande Asie orientale). C’était un projet de construire, sous la direction du Japon, en Asie orientale et du Sud-Est, une zone ou un nouvel ordre co-prospère, afin de libérer cette région de la domination coloniale des pays occidentaux.38 Ce projet a été inspiré par la notion de Großraum de Carl Schmitt.39 En réalité, c’était un slogan et une idéologie lancés par le Gouvernement japonais pour mener à bien la guerre Daitowa (la guerre du Pacifique et celle contre la Chine). Ce projet visait la création d’une communauté économique constituée principalement par le Japon, la Chine et la Mandchourie, en faisant de l’Asie du Sud-Est un terrain de fourniture de ressources au bénéfice du Japon. Plusieurs internationalistes ont participé activement à ce projet en essayant de proposer une nouvelle théorie du droit international de la grande Asie orientale et de modifier le droit international moderne au fur et à mesure.40 Ces trois internationalistes sont: Kaoru Yasui, Masatoshi Matsushita et Shigejiro Tabata. Kaoru Yasui, professeur de l’Université impériale de Tokyo, a présenté soigneusement la théorie du droit international du Großraum de Carl Schmitt. D’après lui, l’Asie orientale se situait à la périphérie du monde européo-centriste et le droit international de l’ancien régime s’y était élaboré en conséquence, comme le régime de traités inégaux le montrait. Le droit international du Großraum européen est proposé en opposition à l’universalisme de l’Empire anglais. L’importance historique de ce nouveau droit international consiste en ce qu’il accélère de l’intérieur la

38 La construction de cette zone a commencé par l’établissement de la Mandchourie que le Japon a reconnue par le Protocole entre le Japon et la Mandchourie de 1932. Le Japon a fait établir le Gouvernement Wa¯ng Zhàomíng à Nanjin et l’a entériné par le Traité des relations fondamentales entre le Japon et la Chine du 30 novembre 1940. Ce même jour, a été proclamée une déclaration commune du Japon, de la Chine et de la Mandchourie dans laquelle étaient affirmées ‘les idées communes de construire un nouvel ordre basé sur la morale dans l’Asie orientale’. Le 26 juillet 1940, le Conseil des ministres a adopté une décision intitulée ‘points essentiels des politiques fondamentales d’États‘. Cette décision indiquait ‘la politique du Japon, afin de réaliser la paix mondiale, consiste à construire un nouvel ordre de Daitowa au centre duquel se trouve le Japon, basé sur l’alliance du Japon, de la Chine et de la Mandchourie.’ Aucune étendue précise ni fondement propre n’ont été définis pour Daitowa. Elle s’est formée au fur et à mesure de l’élargissement de la guerre d’agression par le Japon. Néanmoins, les dirigeants japonais de cette époque étaient communément conscients de ce que l’‘ancien régime’ était caractérisé par l’agression des puissances occidentales vis-à-vis des pays d’Asie dont le Japon. La conscience commune de victimes de l’agression occidentale et la pensée de libération des nations d’Asie qui en découle ont abouti quasi nécessairement à la pensée qu’il fallait prendre l’hégémonie en Asie au lieu de l’impérialisme européen. Voir Y Matsui, ‘Gurobarukasuru Sekainiokeru Fuhen to Chiiki – Daitowa Kyoeikenron niokeru Fuhenshugihihan no Hihantekikento’ (‘L’universel et le régional dans le monde mondialisé – considération critique de la critique de l’universalisme dans la théorie de Daitowa kyoeiken’) (2004) 102 Kokusaiho gaiko zassi 567–588. 39 C Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte, Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrrecht (Berlin, Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1939) (traduit par I Okada, ‘Ikigai rekkyo no kanshokinshi wo tomonau kokusaihotekikoikichitsujo – Kokusaihojo no reich gainen heno kiyo‘, dans Nazis to Schmitt [Tokyo, Bokutakusha, 1976]). 40 La Société japonaise du droit international a entamé en 1942 des recherches communes qui ont pour but d’étudier la problématique qui se traduira dans le processus de construction de Daitowa, d’accélérer la mise au point de son régime de droit international et de contribuer à l’établissement d’un nouvel ordre mondial ainsi qu’à l’amélioration du droit international mondial. Dans ce but, a été publié Daitowasosho (collection du droit international de Daitowa) à laquelle ont participé quatre internationalistes dont Yasui et Matsushita.

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fin de la domination mondiale du droit international européen. Dans cette perspective, le Japon se libère d’abord du droit international de l’ancien régime, puis se met à émanciper toutes les nations de l’Asie orientale. L’Asie orientale sera constituée comme zone de co-prospérité indépendante au centre de laquelle se situera le Japon. Le droit international de Daitowa y sera créé et régira désormais les relations externes et internes de la zone, conformément aux idées propres du Japon, leader de cette zone. Yasui ne traitait pas du contenu même de ce nouveau droit international. Il a étudié le droit international du Großraum ainsi que celui du marxisme, toujours en tant que critique contre la théorie du droit international libéral. Se prononcer pour ou contre ces deux droits internationaux, celui du Großraum ou du marxisme, était au-delà de sa pensée. Quoi qu’il en soit, sa pensée était cohérente au sens où il s’agissait de démanteler l’ancien ordre anglo-saxon afin de libérer les nations d’Asie.41 Masatoshi Matsushita, professeur de l’Université Rikkyo, a soutenu que la nature juridique de Daitowa-kyoeiken ne peut être expliquée ni par des relations conventionnelles ni en tant que prolongement des États. La zone co-prospère n’est pas un ensemble formel d’États égaux mais une association organique d’États inégaux. Cette zone serait qualifiée d’association de droit de vivre des États (une association qui assure le droit de vivre de chaque État membre), une association de destin au-delà des volontés spontanées. Par conséquent chaque membre de cette zone ne pourrait pas s’en retirer, mais il aurait une certaine liberté sous réserve des limites dues au droit de vivre. D’où la nécessité de recomposer la notion de souveraineté en droit international. Selon lui, l’État directeur est à la fois à l’intérieur et au-delà de cette zone. Dès lors, pour constituer juridiquement le statut de l’État directeur, il a rejeté le principe d’égalité des États en disant que ce principe n’était pas fondé parce qu’il essaye d’appliquer la théorie de l’égalité à ceux qui sont en réalité inégaux. Il a donc substitué au principe d’égalité celui d’équité, c’est-à-dire ‘sorezore ni sono tokoro wo eshimuru’ (procurer à chaque nation le statut qui lui est adéquat).42 ShigejiroTabata, professeur de l’Université impériale de Kyoto, a insisté sur le fait que le droit international moderne ne consistait pas en un ordre vraiment unifié mais en des ordres pluralistes qui présupposaient des valeurs et des idées diverses. D’après lui, le droit international du Großraum constitue un pas important qui justifie la pluralité des ordres juridiques internationaux, parce que la notion de Großraum y était considérée comme une entité historique et politique, unifiée et concrète et pas un donné naturel tel que la race ou le peuple. D’ailleurs, il soulignait combien la direction dans la zone était incompatible avec le principe traditionnel d’égalité des États. Il a mené des recherches historiques pour retracer la genèse de ce principe. Il en a conclu qu’une égalité entre États dans la zone ne serait pas une égalité absolue mais une égalité relative qui se reconnaîtrait seulement selon le critère objectif des valeurs et idées de la zone, qui sont: procurer à chaque nation le statut qui lui est adéquat. Il en a déduit qu’une égalité absolue devait être rejetée. Il

41 K Yasui, Oshu koikikokusaiho no kisorinen (Les idées fondamentales du droit international du Großraum de l’Europe), tome 1 de Daitowasosho (Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1942). 42 M Matsushita, Daitowa Kokusaiho no Shomondai (Problématique du droit international de Daitowa) (Tokyo, Nihon Hori Kenkyukai, 1942).

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doit plutôt s’y réaliser une égalité relative c’est-à-dire que toutes les nations qui ont la même capacité doivent être traitées tout à fait égalitairement.43 Il y a certes eu une contestation qui reste encore légitime aujourd’hui et qui réside dans leur dénonciation de l’européo-centrisme dans l’histoire mondiale ; ils ont mis en relief que le droit international moderne a servi les intérêts impérialistes des pays oligarchiques occidentaux ; ils ont soutenu l’idée d’une construction pluraliste de l’ordre juridique international susceptible de réceptionner des valeurs hétérogènes. Ils ont remis en cause de la notion d’égalité des États. Mais ils ne regardaient guère la réalité de ce projet, ce que l’armée japonaise a fait en Chine, en Mandchourie, aux Philippines, en Birmanie et en Indochine etc. Ils ont soutenu, consciemment ou inconsciemment, l’agression de ces pays par le Japon. Il leur manquait de façon très évidente un point de vue auto-critique: ils étaient très critiques envers l’impérialisme européen, mais ne l’étaient pas envers l’impérialisme japonais lui-même.44

CONCLUSION

J’ai essayé d’offrir un point de vue comparatif pour apprécier le droit international moderne et son influence sur les pays non-européens, en l’occurrence, le Japon. Ce pays ou mon pays est difficile à situer dans un schéma manichéen, c’est-à-dire la domination des pays d’Europe et des États-Unis sur les pays d’Asie. Le Japon a dominé et envahi des pays voisins, en évitant habilement mais aussi avec beaucoup d’efforts, d’être colonisé par des puissances occidentales. Le Japon s’est parfaitement adapté au droit international moderne et a par conséquent été qualifié de nation civilisée. Dans les années 1940, afin de justifier la guerre de Daitowa, les internationalistes japonais ont contesté le droit international moderne et ont vainement tenté de créer un nouveau droit international de la grande Asie orientale, en se fondant sur le droit international du Großraum de Carl Schmitt et en remettant en cause l’ordre juridique international et le principe d’égalité des États, etc. Ce que je ne peux pas trancher, c’est la responsabilité des internationalistes engagés intensivement dans cette entreprise. Il y a eu des discours d’ultranationalisme, mais ils n’étaient pas nombreux. La plupart des articles sur le projet de Daitowa-kyoeiken rédigés par les internationalistes japonais étaient, contre toute attente, objectifs et académiques. Ils étaient sérieux et honnêtes à leur manière, poursuivant la réalisation de ce projet, c’est-à-dire pour eux une émancipation des nations d’Asie contre la domination des pays occidentaux. Comme je l’ai dit plus haut, ce projet revêtait une idéologie qui dissimulait l’agression par le Japon des pays voisins d’Asie. C’est pourquoi les travaux des internationalistes afin de contribuer à ce projet ne sont plus guère pris en considération aujourd’hui. Pourtant

43 S Tabata, ‘Kokusaiho Chitsujo no Tagenteki Kosei’ (‘Composition pluraliste des ordres juridiques internationaux’) (1942/1943) Hogakuronso Vol 47–3 382–402, Vol 48–2 349–75 et Vol 48–6 908–34; ibid, ‘Kindai Kokusaiho niokeru Kokkabyodo no Gensoku nitsuite’ (‘Sur le principe d’égalité des États dans le droit international moderne’) (1944) 50–3 Hogakuronso 218–40. 44 Matsui ‘Gurobarukasuru Sekainiokeru Fuhen to Chiiki’ (n 38) 578, 587.

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je me demande si on doit rester sur une appréciation catégorique leur reprochant d’avoir consciemment ou inconsciemment soutenu l’agression japonaise sur le plan théorique du droit international. N’y aurait-t-il pas pour autant un certain mérite à reconnaître à leurs thèses, tel que la critique du droit international européen, la composition pluraliste de l’ordre juridique international, ou la remise en cause du principe d’égalité des États? Il nous est impossible de connaître tous les éléments d’une période quelconque. C’est une limite intrinsèque des êtres humains vivants.45 L’appréciation des faits sociaux est nécessairement polyédrique. Si on a fait de son mieux dans sa vie dans cette limite inhérente aux êtres humains, il y aurait place pour accepter ou évaluer ces travaux plutôt positivement. Mais on doit bien sûr supposer qu’il y a une différence de point de vue, côté agresseur et côté agressé. Ce que je peux faire pour le moment, c’est seulement souligner l’importance de conserver un esprit critique vis à vis des discours énoncés par le gouvernement. Comme scientifiques, nous internationalistes devons aussi prendre une responsabilité sociale.46

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Ouvrages N Ariga, La guerre sino-japonaise au point de vue du droit international (Paris, Pedone, 1896). N Ariga, La guerre russo-japonaise au point de vue continental et le droit international (Paris, Pedone, 1908). S Endo, Ryugaku (Faire ses études à l’étranger) (Tokyo, Shincho Bunko, 1965). WE Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1880). T Harris et ME Cosenza (éd), The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris, First American Consul General and Minister to Japan (New York, Doubleday, 1930) (traduit par S Sakata, Harris Nihon Taizaiki (1)(2)(3) [Tokyo, Iwanamibunko, 1954]).

45 Après la guerre, Yasui a été obligé de quitter l’Université de Tokyo par décision du Ministre de l’éducation nationale. Il a alors publié un essai intitulé ‘science et liberté de conscience’ dans un journal de cette université où il a écrit comme suit: ‘La position du Japon à l’égard de l’Asie orientale a eu un double aspect: libération et agression. Comment résoudre cette contradiction, la tragédie des nations? C’était une mission urgente qui s’est offerte à moi. Motivé par une revendication intérieure irrésistible de mon cœur, j’ai essayé d’établir scientifiquement les idées de libération de l’Asie orientale, tout en sachant la limite de ma capacité intellectuelle. Cet effort n’a pas abouti à cause de la grande vague de cette époque, je l’admets. Mais ce serait à l’encontre de la liberté de conscience, si on assimilait mon discours à une coopération à la guerre d’agression, et si on me stigmatisait comme militariste ou ultranationaliste. Je ne peux pas m’exonérer de ma responsabilité. Je regrette profondément que mes ouvrages aient comporté une lacune aussi grave. J’ai déjà réfléchi plusieurs fois sur moi-même, mais à cette occasion, je réfléchis encore plus sévèrement sur moi-même.’ K Yasui ‘Gakumon to Ryoshin no Jiyu’ (‘Science et liberté de conscience’) (avril 1948) publié dans Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun (Journal de l’Université de Tokyo) dans K Yasui, Michi – Yasui Kaoru Sei no Kiseki (la vie de Yasui Kaoru) (Tokyo, Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1983) 44–47. 46 Matsui ‘Gurobarukasuru Sekainiokeru Fuhen to Chiiki’(n 38) 587–88.

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M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: the Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002). OJ Lissitzyn, International Law Today and Tomorrow (Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications, 1965). J Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations a treatise of the jural relations of separate political communities,Volume 1 (Edinburgh, Blackwell, 1883). M Matsushita, Daitowa Kokusaiho no Shomondai (Problématique du droit international de Daitowa) (Tokyo, Nihon Hori Kenkyukai, 1942). M Mutsu, Kenkenroku (Mémoire de fidélité) (Tokyo, Iwanamishoten, 1895). S Natsume, ‘Watashi no Kojinshugi’ (‘Mon individualisme’) (Tokyo, Kodansha, 1978 [1914]). BVA Röling, International Law in an Expanded World (Amsterdam, Djambatan, 1960). C Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte, Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht (Berlin, Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1939) (traduit par I Okada, ‘Ikigai rekkyo no kanshokinshi wo tomonau kokusaihotekikoikichitsujo – Kokusaihojo no reich gainen heno kiyo’ dans Nazis to Schmitt (Tokyo, Bokutakusha, 1976)). S Takahashi, Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1899). S Takahashi, International Law applied to the Russo-Japanese War with the Decisions of the Japanese Prize Courts (London, Stevens and Sons, 1908). H Wheaton, Elements of International Law with a Sketch of the History of Sciences (Philadelphia, Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1836). K Yasui, Oshu koikikokusaiho no kisorinen (Les idées fondamentales du droit international du Großraum de l’Europe), tome 1 de Daitowasosho (Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1942).

Articles d’Ouvrages Collectifs TE Holland, ‘Préface’ dans S Takahshi, Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1899). Y Fukuzawa, ‘Tsuzoku kokkenron’ (‘Droits de l’Etat désacralisés’) dans Fukuzawa yukichi Zenshu (collection Fukuzawa Yukichi), tome 4 (Tokyo, Iwanamishoten, 1959 [1878]). F Ito, ‘Kokusaiho’ (‘Droit international’) dans J Aomi (éd), Kindai Nihonshi Taikei (Système de l’histoire du Japon moderne) (Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1979). J Westlake, ‘Introduction’ dans S Takahshi, Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1899). K Yasui, ‘Gakumon to Ryoshin no Jiyu’ (‘Science et liberté de conscience’) publié dans Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun (Journal de l’Université de Tokyo) dans Yasui, K (1983) Michi – Yasui Kaoru Sei no Kiseki (la vie de Yasui Kaoru) (Tokyo, Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, avril 1948).

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Articles de Périodiques A Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 19th Century International Law’ (1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1–80. Y Ishimoto, ‘Meijiki ni okeru chusai saiban’ (‘Arbitrages internationaux in Meiji période’) (1963) 9 Hogakuzasshi 168–83. E Jouannet, ‘Colonialisme européen et néo-colonialisme contemporain (Notes de lecture des manuels européens du droit des gens entre 1850 et 1914)’ (2006) 6 Baltic Yearbook of International Law 49–77. Y Matsui, ‘Kindai Nihon to Kokusaiho (1)(2)’ (‘Japon moderne et droit international’) (1974) 13, 14 Kagaku to Shiso (Science et pensée) 87–97 et 344–59. Y Matsui, ‘Gurobarukasuru Sekainiokeru Fuhen to Chiiki – Daitowa Kyoeikenron niokeru Fuhenshugihihan no Hihantekikento’ (‘L’universel et le régional dans le monde mondialisé – considération critique de la critique de l’universalisme dans la théorie de Daitowakyoeiken’) (2004) 102 Kokusaiho gaiko zassi 567–88. Y Onuma, ‘When was the Law of International Society Born?’ (2000) 2 Journal of the History of International Law 1–66. S Tabata, ‘Kokusaiho Chitsujo no Tagenteki Kosei(1)(2)(3)’ (‘Composition pluraliste des ordres juridiques internationaux’) Hogakuronso (1942/1943) Vol 47–3 382–402, Vol 48–2 349–75 et Vol 48–6 908–34. S Tabata, ‘Kindai Kokusaiho niokeru Kokkabyodo no Gensoku nitsuite’ (‘Sur le principe d’égalité des États dans le droit international moderne’) (1944) 50–3 Hogakuronso 218–40. S Yamauchi, ‘Meiji Kokka niokeru Bunmei to Kokusaiho’ (‘Civilisation et droit international dans l’Etat Meji’) (1996) 115–1 Hitotsubashi Ronso 19–40.

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Legal Problems Arising from the Dissolution of International Organisations The Case of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO): Dissolution de facto or Hibernation? KI GAB PARK *

INTRODUCTION

I

NTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS MAY pass through several stages during their existence, similar to human beings and states: creation, transformation and extinction.1 The dissolution of an international organisation may be caused by, inter alia, achievement or completion of its purpose or by extraordinary circumstances which fundamentally prevent the achievement of the purpose. Dissolution may also be occasioned by changes in or from the member states, ranging from non-existence of member states to consensus of member states.2 Today, as in the past, the dissolution of an international organisation is a significant event in the international community, sometimes causing serious liquidation problems among member states. * Professor, Faculty of Law/School of Law, Korea University 1 ‘Dissolution’ has been defined as follows: ‘Dissolution is generally not defined in the text books, but relates to a cessation of the existence of an organization and in that sense is the counterpart of the creation or establishment of an organization’: RA Wessel, ‘Dissolution and Succession: the Transmigration of the Soul of International Organizations’, in J Klabbers (ed), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming in 2009); ‘Liquidation technique, avec la disparition de la personnalité juridique et du capital de l’Organisation. Liquidation au sens du vocabulaire commun, c’est-à-dire une disparition “sans phrases”’: P Daillier, ‘La dispariton de la CECA le 23 juillet 2002: des problèmes de succession d’organisations internationales?’ in J Andriantsimbazovina et al (eds), Les Dynamiques du droit européen en début de siècle: études en l’honneur de Jean-Claude Gautron (Paris, Pedone, 2004) 19. 2 Eg, Convention pour l’établissement d’une organisation européenne pour la recherche nucléaire (signed 1 July 1953) Article XIV: ‘L’Organisation sera dissoute si le nombre des Etats Membres se réduit à moins de cinq. Elle pourra être dissoute à tout moment par accord entre les Etats Membres. Sous réserve de tout accord qui pourrait être conclu entre les Etats Membres au moment de la dissolution. L’Etat, sur le territoire duquel se trouvera le siège de l’Organisation à ce moment, sera responsable de la liquidation et l’actif sera réparti entre les Etats Membres de l’Oragnisation au moment de la dissolution, au prorata des contributions effectivement versées par eux depuis qu’ils sont parties à la presente Convention. En cas de passif, celui-ci sera pris en charge par ces mêmes Etats au prorata des contributions fixées pour l’exercice financier en cours.’

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The complete dissolution of an international organisation is a rare phenomenon. In most cases, dissolution is accompanied by the reassignment of part or all of the organisation’s functions to other existing or new organisations, a form of succession. The dissolution of certain organisations also means the cessation of their functions.3 In this context, types of dissolution and succession of international organisations may be classified as:4 a) dissolution pure and simple, which terminates the organisation without succession;5 b) replacement of one organisation by another;6 c) absorption of one organisation by another;7 d) merger of two pre-existing organisations into a single entity;8 e) separation of a former organ of an organisation into a new organisation;9 and f) transfer of specific functions by one organisation to another.10 Due to ever-increasing activities of many international organisations with other entities, such as contracts with private corporations or agreements with states or other international organisations, the probability of legal disputes arising from the activities of an international organisation is higher today than in the past, as external innocent third parties may be affected adversely. In this context, a controversial question is, when an international organisation commits a wrongful act, does the blame fall on the international organisation only, or do the member states of the international organisation also shoulder the responsibility in one way or another?11 It follows that, should an international organisation be dissolved, legal problems arising due to such dissolution will be more complicated.

3 See P Sands and P Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) 526–27; HG Schermers and NM Blokker, International Institutional Law (The Hague, Nijhoff, 2003) 1033–70; JM Sorel, Droit des Organisations Internationales (Lyons, L’Hermès, 1997) 52–54; CF Amerasinghe, Principles of the International Law of International Organizations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996) 467–81. 4 See also PR Myers, Succession between International Organizations (London, Kegan Paul International, 1993) 15. 5 eg, East African Community (1977), COMECON and the Warsaw Pact (1991), the International Bureau for Informatics (1991). 6 eg, the International Commission for Air Navigation, ICAO (1944). 7 eg, the absorption of the International Bureau of Education by UNESCO (1969). 8 eg, European Space Research Organization + European Organization for the Development and Construction of Space Vehicle Launchers = European Space Agency (1975). 9 eg, UNIDO (1979). 10 eg, the transfer of the social and cultural functions of the WEU to the Council of Europe (1960). 11 The litigation surrounding the insolvency of the International Tin Council (ITC), launched by the ITC creditors, proceeded in England and other countries: Maclain Watson & Co Ltd v International Tin Council (1988) 3WLR 1033; Western Helicopters Ltd v Arab Organization for Industrialization et al (1984) 23 ILM 1071. In 1995, the Institut de droit international adopted a resolution entitled the ‘Legal Consequences for Member States of the Non-fulfillment by International Organizations of their Obligations toward Third Parties’. Session of Lisbonne (1995) 66-I Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international 249; Accountability of International Organizations Committee, ‘Accountability of International Organizations – Final Report’ in International Law Association Report of the Seventy-First Conference (Berlin, 2004) (International Law Association, London, 2004) 164; Draft Article 29 of ‘Responsibility of International Organizations’ which was adopted provisionally by the ILC stipulates as follows: ‘1. Without prejudice to draft article 25 to 28, a State member of an international organization is responsible for an internationally wrongful act of that organization if: (a) It has accepted responsibility for that act; or (b) It has led the injured party to rely on its responsibility. 2. The international responsibility of a State which is entitled in accordance with paragraph 1 is presumed to be subsidiary.’: ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 58th Session’(1 May–9 June and 3 July–11 August 2006) UN Doc A/61/10.

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Legal problems which may arise in the event of the extinction and dissolution of an international organisation are, for example: a) how and where to transfer the functions taken by the dissolved organisation, which may include finding an adaptable institution among existing organisations to fill in the gap or substitute for the mandates carried by the organisation; b) how to minimise the side effects which may impact an international society; c) how to protect the vested interests of member states and the archives and documents of the organisation; d) how to deal with potential disputes between member states, possibly entailing formulation of plans for a dispute-resolution procedure; e) how to deal with credits and debts in relation to the organisation’s financial obligations, including matters in regard to disposal of property and real property; and f) the status of personnel and payment of pensions. If the international organisation has engaged in business, additional legal problems may include: g) how to implement incomplete contractual obligations and terminate contracts or transactions with relevant corporations; and h) how to retrieve the investment and come up with relevant procedures for the liquidation of the organisation. In cases where the constituent instruments have no specific provisions regarding dissolution or liquidation of an international organisation, finding suitable procedures for the dissolution may also be questioned. Moreover, if there exist injured individuals in third-party states, matters related to finding appropriate reparation would raise complicate legal disputes regarding the recognition of the ‘subjective legal personality’ of an international organisation by third parties.12 What makes the problem more complicated is that the extent to which rules governing state immunity, inter alia the distinction between acta jure imperii versus acta jure gestionnis, may also apply with regard to international organisations in the case, in which legal disputes with third parties have not been ascertained. Consequently, we should try to find reasonable solutions for those innocent third parties who deal with dissolving international organisations that are presumed to be protected by judicial immunity. Although there have been a few instances of international organisations dissolving recently, the termination of the major activities of KEDO in North East Asia provides a good and interesting example for international lawyers. Thus, major issues in relation to KEDO will hereafter be examined in this article. CHRONICLE OF KEDO

Features of KEDO The principal features of KEDO can be described as follows. First of all, KEDO can be classified as a regional international organisation whose mission was to realise ‘the project of light water reactors (LWR)’ in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The relationship between the DPRK and KEDO was framed in 12 Concerns regarding the ‘subject legal personality’ of an international organisation will be discussed in detail later in this paper.

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reciprocal and mutual obligations of freezing and ultimately dismantling the nuclear programme in the DPRK, in return for the construction of two LWRs; thereby realising the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of North East Asia by preventing the development of nuclear weapons in the DPRK. Secondly, KEDO, which was based in New York, was joined by member states, some of which constituted the Executive Board that holds authority on decisions, with other member states supporting the purpose of the organisation and offering assistance with activities undertaken by KEDO.13 Thirdly, membership in KEDO was also offered to international organisations, and thus EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community) participated in the Executive Board of KEDO.14 Fourthly, KEDO conducted commercial business (acta jure gestionnis) through designated subcontractors, ie construction of nuclear energy facilities including the provision of financial support.15 Fifthly, KEDO was created in 1995, but unfortunately it officially terminated its function in May 2006 without achieving its goals, due to the emergence of the DPRK’s secret nuclear weapons development programme.

Birth of KEDO Until the 1970s, there were a number of states categorised as ‘divided states’, including Germany and Vietnam as well as Korea. In the twenty-first century, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the DPRK in the Korean Peninsula remain the only divided states, which share the same culture and language. Following the historical gaining of independence following Japanese occupation, in 1945, two divided governments were established in the Korean Peninsula—two Koreas— characterised by extremely opposed features, not only economically, but also in military terms.16 During the 1990s, the DPRK’s ambitions to develop nuclear weapons brought about a series of nuclear crises, especially with South Korea, 13 Executive Board states: EU, Japan, Republic of Korea, USA. Member states: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Indonesia, New Zealand, Poland, Uzbekistan. 14 ‘Agreement on terms and conditions of the accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization’ [1998] OJL 070 pp 0010–22 (KEDO-EU Accession Agreement). 15 The Executive Board members of KEDO adopted in 1998 a resolution on cost-sharing for the LWR Project. A budget estimated for the project was agreed at $4.6 billion. With regard to specific funding for the LWR Project, South Korea has agreed to provide 70% of the project’s actual cost, while Japan has agreed to contribute 116.5 billion yen (approximately $1 billion). The EU has agreed to contribute 75 million euros equally over five years to help fulfil KEDO’s financial needs, and the US has reconfirmed its commitment to seek funding for the supply of heavy fuel oil to DPRK and for other KEDO needs, as appropriate. For the Japanese government’s cost-sharing, KEDO concluded a 116.5 billion yen loan agreement with Japan Bank for International Cooperation on 31 January 2000. 16 During the 1980s, South Korea turned from authoritarianism to democracy and a market economy with burgeoning high-tech industries. Today South Korea ranks 13th in the list of GDP and has membership of the OECD. Comparably, in the DPRK, decades of isolation under communist regimes have left millions of North Koreans impoverished and the DPRK is now recognised as one of the ‘failed states’ in the world, while its serious situation of human rights violations as well as economic failure is notorious.

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Japan and the United States. Consequently, the first Agreed Framework adopted in 1994 between the DPRK and the United States framed the comprehensive resolutions for this issue.17 Consequently, KEDO was established in 1995 for the purpose of freezing and ultimately dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear programme. The following table describes the relevant events surrounding the establishment and the works of KEDO, in chronological order. Year

Events

Jan 1992

Safeguards Agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA.18

Jan 1992

South Korea-DPRK, Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: ‘Not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons’.19

May-June 1993

Announcement by the DPRK regarding its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), followed by agreement not to withdraw from the NPT in June 1993.

Sept 1993

Reports from the IAEA inspection team to the United Nations on the impossibility of determining whether the DPRK was complying with the NPT, due to the government restrictions placed on its inspectors.

Oct 1994

Agreed Framework between USA and the DPRK.20

Mar 1995

Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).21

Dec 1995

Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project (Supply Agreement) between KEDO and DPRK.22

Dec 1999

Turnkey Contract between KEDO and the Korean Electric Power Company (KEPCO).23

Oct 2002

DPRK’s public acknowledgement of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme.24

Oct 2002

KEDO’s suspension of shipments of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK.

17 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (signed 21 October 1994) 34 ILM 603. 18 Agreement between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (signed 30 January 1992, entered into force 10 April 1992) IAEA Doc INFCIRC/403 www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf403.shtml (Safeguards Agreement). 19 North–South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula(North Korea—South Korea) (signed 20 January 1992, entered into force 19 February 1992) IAEA Doc GOV/INF/660; 33 ILM 569 20 The Agreed Framework (n 17) had four main points: (1) the DPRK would agree to replace its graphite-based nuclear reactors with light-water reactors (LWR); (2) the DPRK would remain a party to the NPT; (3) the parties would work toward eventual diplomatic representation in their respective capitals; and (4) the United States would give some form of security assurance to the DPRK. 21 ibid. 22 ‘Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (16 October 1995) www.kedo.org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf. 23 A turnkey contract is an agreement under which a contractor agrees to complete a product so that it is ready for use when delivered to the other contracting party. 24 The DPRK acknowledged its secret HEU programme when Mr James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of

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Jan 2003 Nov 2003 Nov 2004 Jan 2006 May 2006 Oct 2006

DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT and expulsion of IAEA inspectors.25 KEDO’s suspension of the LWR Project from 1 December 2003 (Decision of the Executive Board, Nov 21, 2003). KEDO’s renewed decision to suspend construction of the LWR for an additional year (Decision of Executive Board, Nov 26, 2004). KEDO’s withdrawal of all workers from DPRK. KEDO’s termination of the LWR Project (Decision of the Executive Board, May 31, 2006). DPRK’s testing of a nuclear weapon and missile tests and Security Council’s resolution (UN SC Res 1718).

Measures Taken by KEDO KEDO began constructing two light-water reactors in the DPRK in 1997 under the terms of the Agreed Framework (1994) and Supply Agreement (1995). Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) was designated as a principal subcontractor of the LWR Project; consequently, it subcontracted a ‘turnkey contract’ for the construction of two LWRs in the DPRK, which was signed between KEDO and KEPCO on 15 December 1999.26 Thereafter, implementation of the contract was suspended in 2003 after revelations that the DPRK had started a secret uranium enrichment programme in 2002. In this context, KEDO took a series of actions, including suspension and termination of LWR Project.27 Analysis and evaluation of measures taken by KEDO should be grounded on the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations (1986 VC), which has not yet entered into force.28 For the most part the provisions articulated in the 1986 VC reiterate clauses of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969 VC), which again reflects customary international law.29 Accordingly, the failure of the DPRK to comply with the agreement obligations amount to the ‘material breach’ the US Department of State, visited Pyongyang in October 2002. This led to the second North Korean nuclear crisis. The US has persistently demanded complete, verifiable and irreversible dismenantlement (CVID) of the DPRK nuclear programmes, both plutonium and HEU-based. 25 The DPRK issued a statement on 10 January 2003 declaring an automatic, immediate and effectual withdrawal from the NPT on which it declared a moratorium. This text was sent to Mohamed El-Baradei, Director General of the IAEA. The DPRK joined the NPT in 1985. 26 See general information provided by the official KEDO website at www.kedo.org/. 27 Total amount invested in the LWR Project by 1 December 2003 was $114.6 million and $41 million, by South Korea and Japan respectively, out of the total amount of $157.5 million. The construction progression as of of 31 May 2005 was 34.5%. Y Takeda, ‘KEDO Adrift’ (2005) 6 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 123. 28 ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations’.(done on 21 March 1986, not yet in force) Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations II (United Nations Publication, Sales No E 94 V 5) (1969 VC). 29 See PE Boehm, ‘Decennial déjà vu: Reassessing a Nuclear North Korea on the 1995 Supply Agreement’s Ten-Year Anniversary’ (2006) 14 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 81.

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articulated in the 1986 VC, which justifies the termination or suspension of the operation of treaty on that ground.30 Moreover, countermeasures recognised in ‘the law of the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ may be adopted in the case of international organisations;31 this has generally been suggested in the context of current discussions of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations at the International Law Commission (ILC).32 Even though the ILC’s draft articles concerning countermeasures taken by an international organisation has not yet been drafted (as of 2007), there is no doubt that the wrongfulness of an action by an international organisation is precluded if it constitutes a countermeasure taken against the internationally wrongful act of a state.33

CURRENT STATUS OF KEDO

Termination of Essential Activities: ‘Hibernation’ of KEDO The Executive Board of KEDO decided on 31 May 2006 to terminate the LWR Project. KEDO proclaimed that taking the decision was inevitable because of the continued and extended failure of the DPRK to perform the steps that were required in the Agreement Framework between the United States and the DPRK, which was a foundation of the Supply Agreement between KEDO and the DPRK in 1995. The legal basis of this decision can be found in Article XI(c) of the KEDO Establishment Agreement, which stated: This Agreement may be amended, terminated, or suspended by written agreement of all Executive Board Members, or, if such agreement is not achievable by written agreement of a majority of the Executive Board Members.34

The decision was also based on Article XVI(a) of the Supply Agreement allowing that actions may be taken in the event of non-compliance, which stated:

30 See 1969 VC (n 28) Article 60 (Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach) (1) ‘A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part’. 31 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, (28 September 2001) UN Doc A/56/49(Vol I)/Corr 4; see Part Two fContent of the International Responsibility of a State, and Part Three Implementation of the International Responsibility of a State, eg Chapter II for the countermeasures. 32 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 56th session’ (3 May–4 June and 5 July–6 August 2004) UN Doc A/56/10 chp IV E1. 33 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 59th session’ (7 May–8 June and 9 July–10 August 2007)UN Doc A/62/10 191; up to a discussion in 2007, Article 19 for “Countermeasures” has been postponed its discussion. See in detail, ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 58th session’ (1 May–9 June and 3 July–11 August 2006)UN Doc A/61/10, commentary of Article 19, 268. 34 ‘Agreement on the Establishment on the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization’ (signed 9 March 1995) www.kedo.org/pdfs/EstablishmentKEDO.pdf (KEDO Establishment Agreement).

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KEDO and the DPRK shall perform their respective obligations in good faith to achieve the basic objectives of the Agreement.35

According to the decision taken by the Executive Board of KEDO, KEDO would maintain its minimal existence so long as it should be necessary to settle financial and legal obligations stemming from the termination of the LWR Project, including, in particular, those related to the termination of the Turnkey Contract for the supply of the LWR Project to the DPRK. Therefore, KEDO currently maintains an executive office in New Jersey which is represented by a single Secretary-General delegate who conducts the remaining business.36 His main activities are: a) preparing the eventual claim for compensation against the DPRK (KEDO is of the view that the LWR Project has been suspended as a result of the breach of agreements, especially the LWR Supply Agreement, by the DPRK); b) maintenance of the rights of possession over the assets within the Kumho site in the DPRK (KEDO continues to demand the return of the assets, such as heavy construction equipment and other movables, which the DPRK has resisted); and c) management of documents, etc.37

Conclusion of a Termination Agreement between KEDO and KEPCO As mentioned earlier, KEPCO entered into a subcontract arrangement, the ‘Turnkey Contract’ with KEDO on 15 December 1999 to construct two LWRs in the DPRK. Following the KEDO Executive Board’s decision on the termination of the LWR project, KEDO and KEPCO negotiated a Termination Agreement.38 The process of the negotiation proved a difficult one, lasting for six months, but finally the Agreement was concluded on 12 December 2006. Japan and the European Union (EU), which took the view that a lump sum payment would excessively benefit KEPCO, questioned several legal issues at the drafting stage of the Termination Agreement: for example, eventual claims by KEPCO’s business partners, future use of mechanical equipment which remained both inside and the DPRK and elsewhere, and disposition of KEPCO’s eventual excessive interests, if any.39 Especially Japan, which was a member of the KEDO Executive Board and was not ready to shoulder additional expenses of the liquidation process, stressed that KEPCO’s liquidation expenses and claim management by KEPCO’s business partners should be administered in an open and clear manner. It was further noted that KEDO should be involved in the claim

35

Supply Agreement (n 22). The operating expenses for the executive office are financed by the interests from the Security Funds (a total amount of $19,000,000) that had been offered by Japan at the preliminary stage of the LWR Project. 37 Supply Agreement (n 22). 38 Here ‘termination’ does not mean a termination of Agreement on the Establishment of the KEDO (1995) but a termination of Turnkey Contract (1999). 39 Also it was underlined that KEDO should be able to take care of the excessive interest, if ever, in case the liquidation process leaves KEPCO with the disposition of mechanical equipment which originally cost more than $700 millions. 36

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management process of KEPCO, and the final result should only be drawn on the basis of a ‘Common Understanding’ between KEDO and KEPCO. On the other hand, KEPCO, a principal subcontractor of the LWR Project, didn’t agree on KEDO’s initial proposition concerning claim management and disposition of mechanical equipment. KEPCO brought up the need for a balanced text which would also take into account the possibility of KEPCO’s excessive losses. KEPCO continuously stated that an unfairly drafted text could not be acknowledged for it would need the consent of its board of directors, including outside directors, internal and external auditors and stockholders. Under these circumstances, the government of South Korea came up with an arbitration which considered both KEDO and KEPCO’s positions. According to the Termination Agreement, which was concluded in December 2006, KEPCO mainly accepted all the rights and obligations related to the LWR Project outside of the DPRK from KEDO. In exchange, KEPCO waived the right to claim any expenses incurred and any potential claims by subcontractors to KEDO. At the same time, KEPCO was obliged to report its disposal or reuse of the LWR equipment, to negotiate with KEDO for the settlement of the disposal profit occuring. Also, in the event of KEPCO earning more than double the liquidation cost borne by KEPCO by disposing of mechanical equipment, KEDO and KEPCO would mutually address the issue. The following is a summary of six major points of the Termination Agreement of the LWR Project. General Obligations

1) KEDO assigns to KEPCO all the rights and duties concerning mechanical equipment of the LWR project which are outside the territory of the DPRK. 2) KEPCO waives all the expenses and claims, except for the unpaid maintenance expenses (for between August and November, 2005).

Claim Management Procedure and Reporting Procedure

1) KEPCO may agree with business partners on claim, without KEDO’s recognition on the scale of it. If KEDO decides that the final scale of claim is appropriate, it confirms the fact for KEPCO. 2) KEPCO periodically reports to KEDO on the use of mechanical equipment. If, as a result, KEPCO’s interest exceeds two times of liquidation expenses, that should be further negotiated.

Ownership of Construction Site Asset

KEPCO assigns to KEDO the ownership of KEPCO and its business partners’ facilities and assets situated in Kumho Area, DPRK.

Responsibilities and Duties pertinent to Mechanical Equipments

1) KEPCO assumes KEDO’s ownership of and Responsibilities and Duties to mechanical equipment. 2) KEDO and KEPCO understand that Executive Board Members take appropriate measures according to export control statute for mechanical equipment to be transferred overseas.

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Ki Gab Park 1) KEPCO accords KEDO immunity from any third party’s request for compensation arising out of KEPCO’s violation of duty of care relevant to the Termination Agreement and Turnkey Contract. 2) KEPCO accords KEDO immunity from a third party’s request for nuclear liability and compensation. 1) KEDO accords KEPCO immunity from a third party’s claim towards KEDO (except for the claims related to Turnkey Contract or cooperation contracts). 2) KEPCO accords KEDO immunity from a third party’s claim towards KEPCO (except for the claims raised by KEDO’s creditors, DPRK or KEDO’s contractors).

KEPCO’s Obligation to Exempt and Nuclear Indemnity Responsibility Responsibility for the Third Party

REMAINING QUESTIONS

Subjective Legal Personality of KEDO Fortunately, to date, no legal conflicts or claims have arisen with respect to terminating the work of KEDO among relevant entities: KEDO, member states and subcontractors. Reasons for this could be found in the ‘equitable and fair’ features of the Termination Agreement between KEDO and KEPCO, as well as close political cooperation among the member states of KEDO concerning the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the DPRK. Nevertheless, potential legal problems should not be excluded from our discussion. This doubt increased when we considered the fact that KEDO had terminated its essential project abruptly due to the impossibility of fulfilling the reciprocal obligation as well as the fact that KEDO itself had engaged work which demanded vast amount of investments in constructing the LWR.40 Therefore, in due course of liquidation, there still remains a certain necessity to consider potential disputes among related entities.41 Hypothetical legal problems may arise in regard to the contention of the ‘objective/ subjective legal personality’ of KEDO. KEDO proclaims its ‘internal legal personality’ and ‘international legal personality’ as may be necessary for achieving the purposes and the functions of the organisation in Article III of the KEDO Establishment Agreement.42 This Agreement articulates the immunity of member states in Article XIII(b), which states:

40

Supply Agreement (n 22). One of the outstanding legal issues at the beginning stage of LWR Project was the question of liability and compensation for nuclear damage. A purely hypothetical scenario is as below: ‘suppose KEDO’s LWR Project came to a successful end; an accident occurs while DPRK operates one of its LWR, and it causes damage to neighbouring countries. Due to its economic woes, DPRK may not be able to pay appropriate reparation. Would it be possible, then, for the injured parties to claim reparation vis-a-vis KEDO? Also, should South Korea, Japan, and the United States, and the EU and other member states of KEDO, be jointly and separately liable?’ See KG Park, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations’ (2007) 2 Korea University Law Review 67, 68. 42 KEDO Establishment Agreement (n 34) Article III: ‘In carrying out these purposes, the Organisation may do any of the following: (a) Evaluate and administer projects designed to further the purposes 41

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No Member shall be liable, by reason of its status or participation as a Member, for acts, omissions, or obligations of the Organization.43

Therefore, in the case of KEDO, certain legal problems related to reparation and compensation for certain damages resulting from its activities may be invoked toward KEDO itself, rather than the member states, as the agreement exempts member states from responsibility.44 However, the immunity of member states obstructed in relation to this matter may still raise controversy regarding the ‘objective legal personality’ asserted by KEDO itself. Indeed, when an international organisation has not reached universality in its existence, by reason of having a small number of members, or being limited to act on regional matters, the validity of granting ‘objective legal personality’ to the organisation would be in doubt. An international organisation which has a subjective legal personality holds rights to claim toward its own member states, non-member states and other entities that have recognised its existence, even though it has not reached the point of having universal legal personality or opposability towards all other third parties. However, of the Organization; (b) Receive funds from members of the Organization or other states or entities for financing projects designed to further the purposes of the Organization, manage and disburse such funds, and retain for Organization purposes any interest that accumulates on such funds; (c) Receive in-kind contributions from members of the Organization or other states or entities for projects designed to further the purposes of the Organization; (d) Receive funds or other compensation from the DPRK in payment for the LWR project and other goods and services provided by the Organization; (e) Cooperate and enter into agreements, contracts, or other arrangements with appropriate financial institutions, as may be agreed upon, for the handling of funds received by the Organization or designated for projects of the Organization; (f) Acquire any property, facilities, equipment, or goods necessary for achieving the purposes of the Organization; (g) Conclude or enter into agreements, contracts, or other arrangements, including loan agreements, with states, international organizations, or other appropriate entities, as may be necessary for achieving the purposes and exercising the functions of the Organization; (h) Coordinate with and assist states, local authorities and other public entities, national and international institutions, and private parties in carrying out activities that further the purposes of the Organization, including activities promoting nuclear safety; (i) Dispose of any receipts, funds, accounts, or other assets of the Organization and distribute the proceeds in accordance with the financial obligations of the Organization, with any remaining assets or proceeds therefrom to be distributed in an equitable manner according to the contributions of each member of the Organization, as may be determined by the Organization; and (j) Exercise such other powers as shall be necessary in furtherance of its purposes and functions, consistent with this Agreement.’ 43

KEDO Establishment Agreement (n 34). The legal personality of international organisations had already been recognised in terms of having rights and duties under international law in the 1949 advisory opinion, ‘Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations’ [1949] ICJ Rep 1949, 174, 185. Accordingly, an international organisation may have certain responsibilities per se. This is even supported by customary international law and also stipulated in several international legal instruments. For example, the agreement that Belgium, Switzerland, Greece, Luxembourg, and Italy each has concluded with the UN for the damage resulting from the UN Peacekeeping operations in Congo; and UN Office for Legal Affairs, ‘Question of the responsibility of the United Nations for activities conducted by one of its organs in the territory of a State’ (UN Juridical Yearbook, 1975, 153 et seq); Convention on International Responsibility for Damage Caused by Space Objects (opened for signature 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972) 961 UNTS 187 Art 22, para 3; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 396 Art 263; and the ECU’s own system of responsibility for reparation. See Park (n 26), 91–93; Indeed, the issue of responsibility of member states has been discussed in the ILC, and Art 29 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisation sets forth several criteria that can be considered when a member state’s responsibility for the organisation’s internationally wrongful act is not clearly stipulated in the constituent charter. Therefore, it would primarily be considered whether the constituent charter has explicit clauses for the responsibility of member states. 44

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we should note that some scholars consider that a distinction between ‘subjective legal personality’ and ‘objective legal personality’ is not meaningful in reality.45 As has been seen, KEDO is not a universal international organisation and has a small number of participating states.46 Therefore, if certain wrongful acts are undertaken by KEDO, and an injured third-party attempts to invoke responsibility upon the member states, this would raise problems regarding the international legal personality of KEDO. In this situation, even the immunity clause of members in Article XIII as stipulated in the Establishment Agreement may not be effectively applied toward third parties, ie non-member states of KEDO. There is still ongoing discussion over whether the immunity from contentious jurisdiction should be granted to all international organisations; the existence of an obligation under general international law to grant immunity to international organisations has been asserted by several domestic courts, while the scope and conditions have varied. Whether an organisation may be granted absolute immunity or conditional immunity, and whether the determination should be based on the general principle of international law or special agreements are controversial issues and still discussed at the ILC.47 In the case of KEDO, unfortunately, we cannot yet find meaningful implications for studying the matter in this regard. However, analysing and implementing the ‘Termination Agreement’ of the LWR Project, we can assume eventual potential disputes arising in the process of liquidation between KEDO, DPRK, member states, third-party states, KEPCO and other subcontractors. Also, matters of responsibility and immunity of member states of KEDO provide a useful area for discussion; and it certainly is an interesting issue to be considered in the context of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations. Rethinking the Meaning of the Decision taken by the Executive Board of KEDO As has been mentioned, the Executive Board of KEDO terminated the LWR Project in May 2006. This was a clear decision, but ironically gave rise to some complicated questions. According to the announcement of the Executive Board, the intention of the decision was to terminate the LWR Project, while the Supply 45 Eg, D Akande explains: ‘In practice, no recent instances are known of a non-member State refusing to acknowledge the personality of an organization on the ground that it was not a member State and had not given the organization specific recognition. [Amerasinghe (n 3) 86]. Furthermore, domestic courts of non-member states do acknowledge the international personality of international organizations.’ D Akande, ‘International Organisations’ in M Evans (ed), International Law, 1st edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 276. 46 There are 13 members which participated in KEDO, including four Executive Board members and nine member states; see n 14. 47 The Report of the ILC considered as a relevant issue ‘a study on the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations would not simply involve ascertaining the extent to which rules governing State immunity may also be applied with regard to international organizations. Immunity of the latter has to be studied in the context of remedies that are available for bringing claims against an organization, according to the rules of that organization or to arbitration agreements. However, there is a need to avoid the risk of a denial of justice.’ ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 58th Session’ (1 May–9 June and 3 July–11 August 2006) UN Doc A/61/10 Annex B: Judicial Immunity of International Organizations 455–56 para 4–7.

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Agreement would continue to exist.48 This would be grounded on the fact that the Supply Agreement had not been abrogated by either party, the DPRK or KEDO. Nevertheless, one who considers the LWR Project as an essential part of the Supply Agreement may still ask for clarification whether the decision of termination restricted itself to the LWR Project, or whether KEDO terminated ipso facto the Supply Agreement as a whole. In this respect, we can consider KEDO to be in a stage of ‘hibernation’. Indeed, two essential pillars of KEDO—the LWR Project, and providing heavy fuel oil to the DPRK as an alternative energy supply—have collapsed. Also as a result of the failure of the DPRK to fulfil its obligation to freeze and ultimately dismantle the development of its nuclear weapons programme, KEDO has lost its raison d’être. This in turn reflects the failure of the establishment of KEDO in its mandate and functioning. Therefore, we can see the current status of KEDO as a state of hibernation and in a process of proceeding towards dissolution, and consequently, the Supply Agreement has also terminated de facto. Indeed, the current activities of KEDO are limited to those for liquidation and aforementioned activities, including the maintenance and exercise of the right to claim for compensation to the DPRK and the maintenance of the right of possession of assets within the Kumho site in the DPRK. All facts considered, we can predict that the Executive Board states will convene in the near future to shut down KEDO definitely and de jure.49 However, this conclusion may indeed be seen as a mere formality, since de facto dissolution of KEDO and termination process of the essential parts of the agreements has already been completed. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper has briefly examined the creation, transformation and termination of the LWR Project, which was a vital mandate of KEDO. The existence of KEDO presents us with various interesting legal questions. Notable features of KEDO include the participation of the European Union as a member of the Executive Board, a series of treaties that were concluded between the DPRK and KEDO,50 and problems that may arise in the process of liquidation between KEDO, states 48

Supply Agreement (n 22). See KEDO Establishment Agreement (n 34) Article XIV: (c) This Agreement may be amended, terminated, or suspended by written agreement of all Executive Board Members, or, if such agreement is not achievable by written agreement of a majority of the Executive Board Members. 50 There are six main Agreements and eight Protocols: ‘Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization’ (signed 18 December 2001) www.kedo.org/pdfs/EURenewal.pdf (KEDO–European Union (EU) Renewal Agreement); KEDO–EU Accession Agreement (n 14); Supply Agreement (n 22); ‘Joint US–DPRK Press Statement’ (Kuala Lumpur, June 13 1995) www.kedo.org/pdfs/KualaLumpur.pdf; KEDO Establishment Agreement(n 34); Agreed Framework (n 17); ‘Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Quality Assurance and Warranties for the Implementation of a Light-Water Reactor Project’ (signed 3 December 2001) www.kedo.org/pdfs/ProtocolQAW.pdf; ‘Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Training for the Implementation of a Light-Water Reactor Project’ (signed 20 October 2000) www.kedo.org/pdfs/ ProtocolTraining.pdf; ‘Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and 49

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and other entities which participated in the project for KEDO’s purposes. This brief presentation shows that KEDO merits a hypothetical case study, considering relevant questions on the completion of responsibility of an international organisation. Moreover, we should ask ourselves whether the general theory of state responsibility and state immunity might apply to the relations between states and international organisations. However, we should admit that the efforts undertaken by KEDO for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons of the DPRK came to nothing, consequently there is no further raison-d’être for KEDO. Even though the Executive Board of KEDO declared its minimal existence, there seems little chance of resuscitating KEDO in the near future. While no legal disputes have been raised from terminating the mandate of KEDO so far, it is still necessary to consider the potential possibility of legal disputes in the foreseeable future. Hence, this paper reviewed related issues such as the subjective personality of KEDO and the meaning of the decision taken by the Executive Board of KEDO. In doing so, a noticeable difference has been identified in the case of KEDO, compared with those used to be seen in the general types of dissolution of international organisations. Consequently, we can temporarily conclude that KEDO presents an exceptional stage for the dissolution of an international organisation, which might be described as ‘hibernation’ or de facto dissolution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books CF Amerasinghe, Principles of the International Law of International Organizations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996). PR Myers, Succession between International Organizations (London, Kegan Paul International, 1993).

the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the Event of Nonpayment with Respect to Financial Obligations’(signed 24 June 1997) www.kedo.org/pdfs/ProtocolNonPayment.pdf; ‘Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Site Take-Over, Site Access and Use of the Site for the Implementation of a Light-Water Reactor Project’ (signed 8 January 1997) www.kedo.org/pdfs/ ProtocolSiteTakeover.pdf; ‘Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Labor, Goods, Facilities and Other Services for the Implementation of a Light–Water Reactor Project’ (signed 8 January 1997) www.kedo.org/pdfs/ProtocolLabor.pdf; ‘Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the Juridical Status, Privileges and Immunities, and Consular Protection of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (signed 11 July 1996) www.kedo.org/pdfs/ ProtocolPrivImmun.pdf; Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Communications for the Implementation of a Light-Water Reactor Project’ (signed 11 July 1996) www.kedo.org/pdfs/ ProtocolCommunications.pdf; ‘Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Transportation for the Implementation of a Light-Water Reactor’; thus 14 legal instruments made by KEDO.

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P Sands and P Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001). HG Schermers and NM Blokker International Institutional Law (The Hague, Nijhoff, 2003). JM Sorel, Droit des Organisations Internationales (Lyons, L’Hermès, 1997).

Chapters in Edited Volumes D Akande, ‘International Organisations’ in M Evans (ed), International Law, 1st edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). P Daillier, ‘La disparition de la CECA le 23 juillet 2002: des problèmes de succession d’organisations internationales?’ in J Andriantsimbazovina et al (eds), Les Dynamiques du droit européen en début de siècle: études en l’honneur de Jean-Claude Gautron (Paris, Pedone, 2004). RA Wessel, ‘Dissolution and Succession: the Transmigration of the Soul of International Organizations’, in J Klabbers (ed), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Chichester, Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming in 2009).

International Documents International Law Association (2004) Accountability of International Organisations (Final Conference Report Berlin) www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/ index.cfm/cid/9.

Journal Articles PE Boehm, ‘Decennial déjà vu: Reassessing a Nuclear North Korea on the 1995 Supply Agreement’s Ten-Year Anniversary’ (2006) 14 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 81–126. KG Park, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations’ (2007) 2 Korea University Law Review 67–105. Y Takeda, ‘KEDO Adrift’ (2005) 6 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 123–32.

Website Sources Joint US-DPRK Press Statement (Kuala Lumpur, 13 June 1995) www.kedo.org/ pdfs/KualaLumpur.pdf.

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Countermeasures by International Organisations: The Decentralised Society in the Heart of the Institutionalised Society FRÉDÉRIC DOPAGNE *

INTRODUCTION

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IKE STATES, though to a lesser extent, international organisations resort to countermeasures with a view to ensuring the cessation (and reparation) of internationally wrongful acts committed by other subjects of international law. This paper aims at providing some insight into that specific practice and the main legal issues it raises. In the first section, I will make a few remarks about the very concept of countermeasures taken by international organisations. In the second section, I will concentrate on the question of the standing of international organisations to adopt countermeasures in the face of a breach affecting the interests of the international community as a whole. Drawing upon that, I will conclude that countermeasures by international organisations highlight the persistence of the decentralised international society.

THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERMEASURES TAKEN BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Countermeasures Countermeasures are usually referred to as acts that are intrinsically contrary to international law, whose wrongfulness is nevertheless precluded as they constitute a reaction to a previous violation of international law.1 Their purpose is to ensure the cessation of this previous violation as well as, where appropriate, the reparation of the injury, which the latter may have caused.2 In that sense, countermeasures amount to a form of decentralised sanction, or, to put it differently, to an instrument of implementation of international responsibility. * Lecturer in Public International Law, University of Louvain (UCL). 1 See ILC Articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, annex to UNGA Res 56/83 (12 December 2001) UN Doc A/RES/56/83, Art 22. 2 See ibid Art 49 para 1.

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To date, countermeasures have been dealt with by scholars—and codified by the International Law Commission (ILC)—in interstate relations only.3 It is submitted here that there is no reason why international organisations (endowed with an international legal personality distinct from that of their members) should not be allowed, as a matter of principle, to take countermeasures within the above meaning.4 Indeed, in their capacity as subjects of international law, they seem to be entitled to partake in the general mechanisms of international responsibility, in the same way as states.5 This is underpinned by the ICJ advisory opinion in the Reparation for injuries case with respect to the invocation of responsibility.6 Arguably, this also encompasses the adoption of countermeasures, for countermeasures are the necessary complement of the invocation of responsibility. In sum, as soon as international organisations are capable of possessing rights under international law, they must be deemed to have access to the coercive means which, within the international legal order, are designed to protect those rights.7

Against Non-Member States International organisations can resort to countermeasures against non-member states. In this regard, the bulk of the relevant practice is to be found in the so-called ‘restrictive measures’ adopted by the EU/EC in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to the extent that they do not merely purport to implement UN Security Council resolutions.8 Indeed, some of these measures, while infringing the international obligations incumbent upon the EU/EC, are expressly justified by the alleged unlawful conduct of the targeted state.9

3 See especially B Dzida, Zum Recht der Repressalie im heutigen Völkerrecht (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 1997); D Alland, Justice privée et ordre juridique international. Étude théorique des contre-mesures en droit international public (Paris, Pédone, 1994); C Focarelli, Le contromisure nel diritto internazionale (Milan, Giuffrè, 1994); L Boisson de Chazournes, Les contre-mesures dans les relations économiques internationales (Paris, Pédone, 1992); L-A Sicilianos, Les réactions décentralisées à l’illicite. Des contre-mesures à la légitime défense (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1990); OY Elagab, The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988); E Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures (Dobbs Ferry, NY, Transnational Publishers, 1984). 4 See generally P Klein, La responsabilité des organisations internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et en droit des gens (Brussels, Bruylant, 1998) 396–409. 5 See C Dominicé, ‘La personnalité juridique dans le système du droit des gens’ in J Makarczyk (ed), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century. Essays in Honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996) 162. 6 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 1949 ICJ Rep 174, 177–79. 7 For the assumption of a legal capacity to take countermeasures ‘inherent’ to the international legal personality, see F Dopagne, Les contre-mesures des organisations internationales (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Brussels, Anthémis, 2010), forthcoming. 8 See generally E Paasivirta and A Rosas, ‘Sanctions, Countermeasures and Related Actions in the External Relations of the EU: A Search for Legal Frameworks’ in E Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002) 207–18. 9 See eg Council Common Position 98/326/CFSP of 7 May 1998 OJ L 143/1 and Council Regulation (EC) 1295/1998 of 22 June 1998 OJ L 178/33 imposing the freezing of funds held abroad by

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Or Against Member States Countermeasures can be taken against member states as well. At first glance, this hypothesis may seem more bewildering. It should not however be ruled out. The special relationship between (personified) international organisations and their members can also be seen as a mundane relationship between independent subjects of international law. In that sense, that relationship remains governed by general and particular international law. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) pointed out, international organisations ‘occup[y] a position in certain respects in detachment from [their] members.’10 Indeed, international organisations and their members conclude international agreements. Likewise, they enter into relations akin to diplomatic relations. Against such a backdrop, there is no reason why the rules on international responsibility, including the circumstances precluding wrongfulness (and notably countermeasures), should not be applicable to the relationship between international organisations and their members. Such a conclusion is buttressed by contemporary practice. Several instances of countermeasures adopted by international organisations against their members can indeed be discerned. For example, the Universal Postal Union expelled South Africa in 1979, without any legal basis in the rules of the organisation: the exclusion was predicated on the determination that the apartheid policy was contravening both the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of the Union.11 By the same token, in 1982 the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference rejected the credentials of the Israeli delegates, in the aftermath of Israel’s bombing raid on the Osiraq reactor in Iraq:12 there again, the Agency could not rely upon a special provision in its Statute (an attempt to resort to Article XIX.B of the Statute, which contemplates the suspension of the privileges and rights of membership, had failed previously). In the same vein, and once more in the absence of an express authorisation stemming from the rules of the organisation, Myanmar was deprived of the International Labour Organisation’s technical cooperation in 1999 as a result of its continuous violation of the Convention concerning forced labour.13 In each of these instances,14 it turns out that an international organisation reacts to an alleged wrongful act of a member state, and that, in so doing, failing an appropriate sanctioning power flowing from its internal rules (see hereinafter as regards statutory sanctions), this international organisation breaches its own international obligations (in the examples cited, either its obligation not to affect the membership the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia: the freezing infringes the FRY immunity of execution, but in the opinion of the European institutions it is justified by the human rights violations committed by that state. 10 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 1949 ICJ Rep 174, 179. 11 UPU, ‘Expulsion of the Republic of South Africa from the Universal Postal Union’ Resolution C 6 [1979] UNJY 90. 12 IAEA, Resolution GC (XXVI)/RES/404 (24 September 1983) Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference (26th Regular Session) 11. 13 International Labour Conference (87th session) Resolution on the Widespread Use of Forced Labour in Myanmar (Geneva, 17 June 1999). 14 Further examples could be cited: see Dopagne (n 7).

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and the privileges linked to it, or its obligation to supply certain forms of assistance to the member states). In sum, in each of the above cases, it turns out that an international organisation has taken countermeasures against one of its member states. Different from Statutory Sanctions Countermeasures taken by international organisations should not be conflated with statutory sanctions, namely the specific sanctions against member states that are normally provided for in the constituent instruments of international organisations (suspension of privileges, etc). As long as the conditions set out in the rules of the organisation are fulfilled, the adoption of such statutory sanctions is indeed per se lawful. Having said this, countermeasures and statutory sanctions need to be adequately articulated, when both are likely to be triggered by the initial wrongful act. In this respect, there exists arguably no self-contained regime stemming from the presence of statutory sanctions within the legal system of international organisations (of regional economic integration):15 although statutory sanctions enjoy priority, the reacting organisation may always fall back upon countermeasures, if the statutory sanctions have been duly adopted and have proved inefficient.16 Different from Treaty-Based Sanctions Countermeasures taken by international organisations cannot be put in the same category as treaty-based sanctions either. Provided that the conditions laid down in the treaty are met, these sanctions are, again, per se lawful. For example, the measures of ‘suspension of concessions or other obligations’ adopted by the EC in the WTO framework17 are not countermeasures, despite the misleading terminology which at times is used by the EC itself. Quite to the contrary, they merely represent the implementation of what the contracting parties have agreed on.18 Once more, the core question rather relates to the proper way of joining such 15 See generally B Simma and D Pulkowski ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’ (2006) European Journal of International Law, 483. 16 See Dopagne, Les contre-mesures des organisations internationales (n 7). 17 See the WTO case, United States—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations (30 August 2002) WT/DS108/ARB; Council Regulation (EC) 2193/2003 of 8 December 2003 establishing additional customs duties on imports of certain products originating in the United States of America OJ L 328/3, and another WTO case, United States— Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (31 August 2004) WT/DS217/ARB, Council Regulation (EC) 673/2005 of 25 April 2005 establishing additional customs duties on imports of certain products originating in the United States of America OJ L 110/1. 18 See Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes, Annex 2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (15 April 1994) Art 22, especially paras 2, 5 and 6. In this respect, it makes little sense to speak of ‘special countermeasures’ on the basis of a lex specialis (see ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (n 1) Art 55): a ‘special countermeasure’, corresponding to what the parties have agreed on, is no longer a countermeasure, but a treaty-based sanction.

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sanctions and possible countermeasures when both are likely to be triggered by the initial wrongful act. On this point, the aforementioned solution should, in my opinion, apply:19 the treaty-based sanctions enjoy priority, but the possibility of a fall-back on countermeasures must be preserved in case the treaty-based sanctions prove inefficient.

COUNTERMEASURES BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND GENERAL INTEREST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

On the whole, countermeasures by international organisations, as they have just been briefly defined, are subject to a legal regime very similar to that relating to countermeasures by states. This is particularly reflected in the Sixth Report of the ILC Special Rapporteur on responsibility of international organisations,20 as well as in the Draft Articles on countermeasures that the ILC Drafting Committee has provisionally adopted on 16 July 2008.21 Indeed, these Draft Articles provide for conditions and limits quite analogous to those of the corresponding provisions of the Articles on State responsibility (obligations not affected by countermeasures, proportionality, prior sommation and notification, suspension of countermeasures pendente lite, etc). As regards the standing of international organisations to resort to countermeasures, the Draft Articles nonetheless depart, to some extent, from (what seems to be) the regime applicable to state countermeasures. It is worth dwelling somewhat on that point as it is undeniably one of the thorniest issues the Commission is currently facing. It may confidently be asserted that, like states,22 an international organisation is entitled to take countermeasures when it is injured by the initial wrongful act, and that it can be considered injured when (a) the obligation breached is owed to it individually, or (b) the obligation breached is an erga omnes (partes) obligation and the breach specifically affects the organisation.23 19 In that sense, see also M Garcia-Rubio, ‘Unilateral Measures as a Means of Forcible Execution of WTO Recommendations and Decisions’ in L Picchio Forlati and L-A Sicilianos (eds), Les sanctions économiques en droit international/Economic Sanctions in International Law (The Hague, Nijhoff, 2004) 469–70. 20 UNGA ‘Sixth Report on the Responsibility of International Organizations, by Mr Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur’ (1 April 2008) UN Doc A/CN4/597. It must be stressed that, as such, the topic addressed by the ILC is confined to countermeasures taken by international organisations or states against international organisations and that countermeasures against states are accordingly not covered. See, however, the Draft Article 19 submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr Giorgio Gaja, in UNGA ‘Seventh Report on the Responsibility of International Organizations’ (27 March 2009) UN Doc A/CN4/610. 21 UNGA ‘Responsibility of International Organizations—Addendum’ (16 July 2008) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.725/Add.1 (Draft Articles 54–60). The ILC has ‘t[aken] note’ of these Draft Articles on 4 August 2008 (ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 60th session’ (5 May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2008) UN Doc A/63/10, para 134). 22 See ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (n 1) Art 42 and 49, para 1. 23 See ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 60th session’ (5 May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2008) Doc A/63/10, para 165 Draft Art 46 adopted by the ILC and UNGA ‘Responsibility of International Organizations—Addendum’ (16 July 2008) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.725/Add 1 Draft Art 54, para 1, provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee.

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The situation of non-injured international organisations is more controversial. In particular, one may wonder whether non-injured international organisations are allowed to adopt countermeasures when a breach of an erga omnes (partes) obligation occurs.24 As is well-known, the rules on countermeasures by states are themselves far from being clear in this respect.25 These uncertainties should however not be overstated. The problematic ‘saving clause’ in Article 54 of the ILC Articles on state responsibility, and its confusing reference to ‘lawful measures’, must henceforth be read in conjunction with more recent developments, namely the Resolution on ‘Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law’ adopted by the Institut de Droit International at its 2005 session.26 It is noteworthy that, unlike Article 54, Article 5(c) of that Resolution does not shy away from speaking of countermeasures when stating the action that non-injured states may take following a ‘widely acknowledged grave breach’ of an erga omnes (partes) obligation. Arguably, this sheds new light on the right of non-injured states to adopt countermeasures in the face of infringements of erga omnes (partes) obligations.27 In this regard, the required ‘gravity’ of the breach seems to be consistent with the practice of states.28 Turning to non-injured international organisations, it must be underlined that, according to the Draft Articles provisionally adopted by the ILC Drafting Committee, a non-injured international organisation is entitled to take ‘lawful measures’ to respond to a breach of an erga omnes obligation upon the condition that ‘safeguarding the interest of the international community underlying the obligation breached’ is included among the ‘functions’ of that organisation.29 The problem, here, is not the reference to ‘lawful measures’: it is posited that, once again, such a saving clause must be read in conjunction with the Resolution of the Institut on erga omnes obligations. The problem is rather that, assuming that the Draft Articles refer to genuine countermeasures, the right of non-injured international organisations to take these countermeasures is limited through the invocation of the functions of the reacting international organisation.

24 Another issue concerns the right of non-injured international organisations to take countermeasures when the obligation breached is owed individually to one of their member states. In this respect, see UNGA ‘Sixth Report on the Responsibility of International Organizations, by Mr Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur’ (1 April 2008) UN Doc A/CN4/597 Draft Art 57, para 2, proposed by the Special Rapporteur. 25 See generally C Hillgruber, ‘The Right of Third States to Take Countermeasures’ in C Tomuschat and J-M Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (The Hague, Nijhoff, 2006) 265–293; M Dawidowicz, ‘Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and their Relationship to the UN Security Council’ (2006), British Year Book of International Law 333. 26 Institut de Droit International, ‘Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law’ (27 August 2005) www.idi–iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_01_en.pdf. 27 See C Dominicé, ‘À la recherche des droits erga omnes’ in N Angelet et al (eds), Droit du pouvoir, pouvoir du droit. Mélanges offerts à Jean Salmon (Brussels, Bruylant, 2007) 365. 28 See eg CJ Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 231 and 250. 29 UNGA ‘Responsibility of International Organizations—Addendum’ (16 July 2008) UN Doc A/CN 4/L 725/Add 1 Draft Art 60 provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee, referring to ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 60th session’ (5 May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2008) UN Doc A/63/10 para 165 Draft Art 52 para 3, adopted by the ILC.

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This restriction had been advocated by several states30 and some international organisations,31 in their comments relating to the work of the ILC on the responsibility of international organisations. In that sense, it is no surprise that it was endorsed by the ILC. Such a conception is, however, not convincing. By my account, it rests on a confusion of the legal standing of the organisation to resort to countermeasures— which is a question of general international law—with the competence of the organisation to take a particular countermeasure—which is a question pertaining to the rules of that organisation. There can be no doubt that every international organisation must comply with its own ‘internal’ rules when adopting countermeasures, and that the subject of the countermeasures (ie the very content of the sanction) has hence to come within the limited scope of competence afforded to the reacting organisation. It is nevertheless submitted that the latter’s standing to resort to countermeasures is independent from the rules governing competence. For example, it would make no sense to contend that a (non-injured) international organisation may take countermeasures to respond to violations of human rights only if that organisation is competent in the field of human rights protection. This parenthetically would be at odds with established practice. As the few instances cited above demonstrate, (non-injured) international organisations not entrusted with specific functions or competence in the field of human rights (notably certain UN specialised agencies) have indeed not refrained from taking countermeasures following violations of human rights. To all appearances, the fact that an erga omnes obligation was at stake, and the membership of the reacting organisations of the international community as a whole, were regarded as a sufficient basis.

THE PERSISTANCE OF THE DECENTRALISED SOCIETY

This being said, non-injured international organisations should not be allowed to resort to countermeasures in the event that an erga omnes obligation is infringed, unless the breach is ‘grave’. This is required by the Resolution of the Institut with respect to countermeasures by non-injured states. In the light of the aforementioned practice, where undisputedly the breaches were ‘grave’, it seems that this also applies to countermeasures by non-injured international organisations. Basically, there is no reason why (non-injured) international organisations might take countermeasures dedicated to the safeguarding of common interests under conditions less stringent than those binding upon (non-injured) states.32 30 See the intervention before the Sixth Committee of the delegates of Argentina (A/C6/62/SR18, para 64), Denmark, on behalf of the Nordic countries (ibid, para 100), Italy (A/C6/62/SR19, para 40), Japan (ibid, para 100), the Netherlands (A/C6/62/SR20, para 39), the Russian Federation (A/C6/62/SR21, para 70) and Switzerland (ibid, para 85). Not all these interventions however relate specifically to the adoption of countermeasures. 31 See the observations made by the OPCW and the EU Commission, UNGA ‘Responsibility of International Organizations—Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations’ (31 March 2008) UN Doc A/CN 4/593. Only the latter’s observations relate specifically to the adoption of countermeasures. 32 See generally Dopagne (n 7).

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Admittedly, some authors have pinpointed alleged peculiarities of the decisionmaking process and functioning of international organisations (objectivity, coordination, centralisation, etc), which, they posit, water down the justice privée nature of countermeasures by international organisations, and accordingly provide these countermeasures with an enhanced legitimacy.33 Against this backdrop, international organisations would be in a better position than states to react to breaches affecting the interests of the international community as a whole. It is however submitted that, notwithstanding the way they are portrayed in the mainstream literature, international organisations should not be cast too quickly as the embodiment of some kind of institutional order doomed to ultimately replace the traditional inter-subjective society.34 Quite to the contrary, the proven existence of countermeasures taken by international organisations tends arguably to highlight the persistence of the decentralised pattern in contemporary international law, in the very heart of the activity of these entities. Moreover, this is probably the most interesting conclusion that can be drawn from a study on the topic of countermeasures taken by international organisations. In the light of the mainstream conception of international organisations, usually referred to as an instrument of centralisation and sophistication of the international legal order, one might have expected a strong ‘allergy’ of international organisations to countermeasures, since countermeasures constitute by their very nature a salient feature of the traditional ‘anarchical’ society. Nevertheless, a careful survey of contemporary practice shows that, basically, international organisations are open to countermeasures, on the same footing as states. In this respect, countermeasures against members are particularly striking, as normally international organisations have statutory sanctions at their disposal in order to deal with breaches within their internal legal system. Not even in the vertical relationship with their member states do international organisations qualify as genuine ‘institutions’ truly estranged from the decentralised international society. Definitely, there are good times ahead for the latter.

33 See É Cujo, ‘Les réactions décentralisées à l’illicite de l’Union européenne’ (Thesis, Paris X, 2002) 635–37. 34 For the view that the international legal order is in a process of ‘constitutionalization’, see generally C Walter, ‘International Law in a Process of Constitutionalization’ in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 191–215 ; E de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51; A Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function of Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structure’ (2006) Leiden Journal of International Law 579; C Tomuschat ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century. General Course on Public International Law’ (1999) 281 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 13.

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Books D Alland, Justice privée et ordre juridique international. Étude théorique des contre-mesures en droit international public (Paris, Pédone, 1994). L Boisson de Chazournes, Les contre-mesures dans les relations économiques internationales (Paris, Pédone, 1992). É Cujo, ‘Les réactions décentralisées à l’illicite de l’Union européenne’ (Thesis, Paris X, 2002). F Dopagne, Les contre-mesures des organisations internationales (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Brussels, Anthémis, 2010), forthcoming B Dzida, Zum Recht der Repressalie im heutigen Völkerrecht (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 1997). OY Elagab, The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988). C Focarelli, Le contromisure nel diritto internazionale (Milan, Giuffrè, 1994). P Klein, La responsabilité des organisations internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et en droit des gens (Brussels, Bruylant, 1998). L-A Sicilianos, Les réactions décentralisées à l’illicite. Des contre-mesures à la légitime défense (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1990). CJ Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005). E Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures (Dobbs Ferry, NY, Transnational Publishers, 1984).

Chapters in Edited Volumes C Dominicé, ‘La personnalité juridique dans le système du droit des gens’ in J Makarczyk (ed), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century. Essays in Honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996). C Dominicé, ‘À la recherche des droits erga omnes’ in N Angelet et al (eds), Droit du pouvoir, pouvoir du droit. Mélanges offerts à Jean Salmon (Brussels, Bruylant, 2007). M Garcia-Rubio, ‘Unilateral Measures as a Means of Forcible Execution of WTO Recommendations and Decisions’ in L Picchio Forlati and L-A Sicilianos (eds), Les sanctions économiques en droit international/Economic Sanctions in International Law (The Hague, Nijhoff, 2004). C Hillgruber, ‘The Right of Third States to Take Countermeasures’ in C Tomuschat and J-M Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order : Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (The Hague, Nijhoff, 2006).

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E Paasivirta, and A Rosas, ‘Sanctions, Countermeasures and Related Actions in the External Relations of the EU: A Search for Legal Frameworks’ in E Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002). C Walter, ‘International Law in a Process of Constitutionalization’ in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007).

International Documents Institut de droit International (2005) Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law, www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_01_en.pdf. International Law Commission (2001) Articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, Annex to UNGA Res 56/83 – UN Doc A/RES/ 56/83 (United Nations).

Journal Articles M Dawidowicz, ‘Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and their Relationship to the UN Security Council’ (2006) British Year Book of International Law 333–418. E de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51–76. A Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function of Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structure’ (2006) Leiden Journal of International Law 579–610. B Simma, and D Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’ (2006) European Journal of International Law 483–529. C Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century. General Course on Public International Law’ (1999) 281 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 13–438.

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Meeting the Challenges of Global Governance Administrative and Constitutional Approaches EUAN MACDONALD * AND ERAN SHAMIR-BORER **

INTRODUCTION

T

HIS PAPER CONTRASTS, very briefly, two approaches to global regulatory governance—those of global administrative law and global constitutionalism—and makes the claim that the former is better suited to meeting the challenges raised by the shift of regulatory power and authority from the state to extra-state norms and processes. While both approaches share the goal of subjecting public power exercised outwith the state to public control, we argue here that global administrative law is better calibrated to confront the conditions of radical institutional, structural and normative plurality and fragmentation that currently characterise global regulatory governance. We evaluate global administrative law and global constitutionalism from the perspective of three fundamental challenges presented by the currently prevailing conditions of global governance. The first is the institutional diversity that characterises this field. While previously regulation was reserved to national regulatory bureaucracies, it is increasingly carried out today at the global level, through a myriad of institutional forms and actors, ranging from national regulatory bureaucracies, through networks of national regulators and inter-governmental organisations, to hybrid public-private and even purely private bodies. A second challenge is that of the radical fragmentation of global governance, characterised by a heterarchical multiplicity of sites in which regulatory (ie public) power is exercised. Lastly, in the absence of broad global agreement over values and moral norms, the value diversity of global governance presents a third challenge. With respect to each of these challenges we argue that global administrative law ultimately provides a better framework— functionally, conceptually, and normatively—than that offered by global constitutionalism in any of its varied forms.

* Lecturer, Univeresity of Sydney. E-mail: [email protected] ** Doctor of Juridical Science (JSD), New York University School of Law. E-mail: [email protected]. The authors would like to thank Eyal Benvenisti, Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard Stewart for helpful comments and criticisms on the larger paper of which this paper is a summary, and the participants in the Third Biennial Conference of the European Society of International Law and the Hauser Globalization Colloquium at NYU School of Law at which this paper was presented.

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From a global administrative law perspective, much global governance appears as ‘administrative action’, a significant—and increasing—amount of which is organised and shaped by principles, mechanisms and practices of an administrative law character. Put simply, in viewing the institutions of global regulatory governance as public administrative actors, global administrative law puts the focus immediately on the ‘second order’ rules and principles that constrain and guide their activities, in particular by ensuring that they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, rationality, accountability and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions that they make.1 Global administrative law is thus concerned with the governance of global governance. Far more challenging, indeed scarcely possible, is to define clearly the contours of a ‘global constitutionalist project’, given the diversity of global constitutionalist literature and the terminological ambiguity that more often than not characterise it.2 The terms ‘constitutionalism’ and ‘constitutionalisation’ are often used both descriptively, for instance to analyse the structural changes in inter-governmental organisations, and normatively, as a strategy to enhance the legitimacy of international law and inter-governmental organisations; and their scope of application has ranged from the entire global domain to specific types of international institutions, primarily inter-governmental organisations or regimes (mainly the UN, WTO and EU). We do not, however, seek to discuss in detail the entire body of global constitutionalist literature here; rather, we focus primarily on that strand of global constitutionalism that is truly ‘global’ in scope, advocating a single constitutional framework for the exercise of public power within the entire global community. This community, whose membership varies according to different scholars but includes primarily states, inter-governmental organisations and to a certain extent private individuals, is characterised by a relatively high level of consensus on basic normative, political and economic issues. Effective mechanisms to enforce these shared values are critical. Broadly speaking, among the prominent scholars who understand global constitutionalism in this way we can include Bardo Fassbender,3 Erika de Wet,4 and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann.5

1 B Kingsbury, N Krisch and RB Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15, 17. 2 On the diverse use and ambiguity of the terms ‘constitutionalisation’ and ‘constitution’ in the international context, see, eg, DZ Cass, ‘The “Constitutionalization” of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm–Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 39, 40–41, 47–49; T Cottier and M Hertig, ‘The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 261, 271–82; B Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’ in N Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Models (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 307, 309, 311. 3 See, eg, Fassbender, ibid; B Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter As Constitution of The International Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529. 4 See, eg, E de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51; E de Wet, ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 611. 5 See, eg, EU Petersmann, ‘How to Reform the UN System? Constitutionalism, International Law, and International Organizations’ (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 421.

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There are good reasons to compare—and contrast—global constitutionalism and global administrative law. Both approaches have developed against the background of increasing globalised interdependence, and the subsequent shift of previously governmental functions to the global level. They share the concern over the resulting erosion in the effectiveness of domestic public law control mechanisms, and purport to offer both a general framework of analysis for responding to the challenges posed by the increasing exercise of public power in the global setting, and a set of conceptual and practical tools for doing so. The goal of correcting the legitimacy deficit from which global regulatory governance suffers is a recurring theme in both approaches; and both rely upon discourses and institutions of public law developed at the national level and seek to translate them into the global setting. It is therefore perhaps no wonder that these approaches have been regarded as interrelated, even as engaged in the same basic enterprise, which has led some to assume that they will progress by the same means to the same ultimate ends. Moreover, it has been assumed by some that global administrative law will ultimately develop towards a unified and coherent system, as part of the more general project of global constitutionalism in which administrative law elements are a necessary complement. As this paper seeks to show, however, the relations between the two approaches are decidedly more complex than such accounts seem to suggest. These similarities aside, there are also a number of important structural, conceptual and rhetorical differences between global administrative law and global constitutionalism that require us to distinguish between the two, and, as we argue in this paper, render the former better suited to meeting the challenges of contemporary global regulatory governance. We discuss these differences in the following sections. The second section makes the claim that global administrative law enjoys functional superiority over global constitutionalism, as it takes better account of the entire range of forms, actors and practices that together constitute global regulatory governance. Next we argue that the constitutional and administrative approaches radically depart, both conceptually (third section) and normatively (fourth section), in their perception of—and vision for—global governance. While global constitutionalists espouse the ideals of unity, hierarchy and coherence, the framework of global administrative law acknowledges the structural and normative pluralism of global governance. Rather than the single international community recognised (or envisioned) by global constitutionalism, a global administrative legal framework acknowledges—and accommodates—the multiplicity of heterarchically structured sites in which public power is exercised, and provides tools for enabling the relatively stable interaction between them and with national and regional administrative bodies, without seeking to synthesise them within an overarching constitutional framework. In this sense, together with its emphasis on formal and procedural rather than substantive norms, global administrative law pays greater respect to the legitimate—and radical—value diversity that currently characterises the global realm. The concluding section briefly highlights some of the limitations and dangers of a global administrative law perspective.

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INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The Institutional Topology of Contemporary Global Governance Any attempt to formulate a general framework capable of regulating global governance must take account of the full range of institutional forms and actors through which public functions are exercised at the global level. More specifically, such a framework must take into consideration three elements that characterise contemporary global governance. The first is the (increasing) institutional diversity evident amongst global regulatory bodies themselves. In general terms, and drawing on the typology outlined by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart in their article that framed and launched the global administrative law project,6 we can identify four main types of global regulatory bodies through which public power is exercised at the global level. Firstly, there is administration by formal inter-governmental organisations. Examples include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its work in carrying out refugee status determinations7 and the World Bank setting ‘good governance’ standards for specific developing countries as a condition for financial aid. Secondly, we can identify administration based on collective action by transnational networks of cooperative arrangements between national regulatory officials. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which operates as a vehicle for policy coordination and standard-setting outwith any formal treaty structure, provides an example in point,8 as do the networks of regulators brought together under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).9 Thirdly, a number of important administrative functions are today carried out by hybrid intergovernmental–private arrangements, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),10 the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)11 and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA).12 Lastly, there are also a wide range of formally private bodies that perform public governance functions, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC),13 and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).14 6

Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (n 1). See, eg, M Pallis, ‘The Operation of the UNHCR’s Accountability Mechanisms’ (2005) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 869. 8 See, eg, M Barr and G Miller, ‘Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 15, 25. 9 See, eg, J Salzman, ‘Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 189. 10 See, eg, B Carotti and L Casini, ‘A Hybrid Public–Private Regime: The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the Governance of the Internet’ in S Cassese et al (eds), Global Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, Issues (Rome, Institute for Research on Public Administration, 2008) 29 www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/GALCasebook2008.pdf. 11 See, eg, E Shamir-Borer, ‘The Evolution of Administrative Law-Type Principles, Mechanisms and Practices in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)’ (paper presented at the Viterbo II Global Administrative Law Conference, June 2006) www.iilj.org/GAL/ViterboII.asp. 12 See, eg, L Casini, ‘Hybrid Public–Private Bodies within Global Private Regimes: The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)’ in S Cassese et al, Global Administrative Law (n 10), at 37. 13 See, eg, ibid, 37–39. 14 See, eg, E Meidinger, ‘The Administrative Law of Global Private–Public Regulation: the Case of Forestry’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 47. 7

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A second, related, element is the use of traditional bodies for novel purposes. Certainly, this is in evidence in the extended scope offered to inter-governmental organisations—an often-discussed example is the use of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions upon specific individuals, rather than entire states.15 It is at its clearest, however, when we consider the new role that domestic state agencies play in administering global regimes.16 The best example of this is given by the international trade regime, which is overseen by the WTO but which requires—as many global regimes do—the use of state administrative actors as intermediaries for its effective implementation. It is worth stressing here that there exist almost no developed global governance regimes that do not implicate—at some stage at least—the traditional administrative agencies of nation-states. Lastly, any attempt to furnish a general framework for comprehending and regulating global governance must also be able to account for the complex and myriad interactions between the diverse forms and novel activities outlined above. On occasion, these appear to be fairly straightforwardly hierarchical: there are by now innumerable examples of national administrative actors that are bound to follow rules established by global regulatory regimes, and whose activity is then reviewed for compliance by the oversight bodies of those regimes (a central example here is, of course, the WTO; others can be found, for instance, in areas as diverse as the UNESCO World Heritage Convention17 and the Aarhus Convention on decision-making in environmental matters, and their respective compliance committees). However, instances of less clearly vertical interactions than this abound: take, for example, the reference in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) to the standards generated by external bodies such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission or the International Office of Epizootics, and their role in establishing a presumption of WTO-compatibility in the adoption of trade-restrictive measures; not to mention the myriad other cases in which the norms of one institution or regime have an impact or influence that is not formally constituted upon the activities of another. Here, we want to argue that, because the concept of global administrative law better confronts the three elements outlined above—the diversity and novelty of, and interactions between, institutional forms and activities—it provides a general framework that is, functionally speaking, relatively well calibrated to achieving the goal of subjecting public power exercised outside the state to public control.

15

See below for further discussion. This is, in essence, the category referred to by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (n 1) as ‘distributed administration’, at 21–22. 17 For detailed case-studies of the WTO controversy surrounding genetically modified organisms involving the EU and the US, and of the Baikal and Cologne Cathedral affairs before the World Heritage Committee, see generally S Battini, Amministrazioni nazionali e controversie globali (Milan, Giuffrè, 2007). 16

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Global Governance as Administration A central insight of the global administrative law approach is that much of global governance can be understood and analysed as administrative action: rule-making that is not strictly legislative in nature, administrative adjudication that is not strictly judicial, and other forms of regulatory and administrative decision and management.18 It is suggested that these regulatory and adjudicative processes are now both widespread and dense enough to conclude that the basic object of a global administrative law—global administration, however fragmented and variegated—is already largely in existence: Trade, finance, the environment, fishing, exploitation of marine resources, air and maritime navigation, agriculture, food, postal services, telecommunications, intellectual property, the use of space, nuclear energy, and energy sources are all subject to global regulation. But global regulation involves many other sectors as well, such as the production of sugar, pepper, tea, and olive oil. It can be said that there is no realm of human activity wholly untouched by ultra-state or global rules.19

Admittedly, the task of identifying administrative action at the global level is not without its conceptual difficulties. In the domestic setting, administrative action is often defined by the organisational identity of the actor (an administrative agency or another arm of the executive branch), or in the negative, as public acts that are neither legislative nor judicial in character. The idea of separation of powers at the global level is, of course, at best only loosely applicable. This notwithstanding, however, it can clearly be argued that, in addition to traditional international law-making (by states, and legitimated by their status as representatives of sovereign peoples) and judicial decision-making (by judges, arguably legitimated by their independence and adherence to the norms of judicial reasoning and propriety), there is now a third—and hugely important—category for the exercise of public power at the global level; a category that cannot plausibly draw on the same putative sources of legitimacy as the other two. As in the domestic sphere, then, global ‘administrative’ action (whether decision-making, rule-making or adjudicatory) can be identified as the residual category for those sites of public power that are neither legislative nor judicial in nature.20 However, even if accepted, this negative definition—public, but not legislative or judicial—only carries out half of the task; particularly for a framework that seeks to encompass certain private actors, a robust definition of ‘administrative’ would require also drawing a line between what is properly viewed as public action, even when carried out by private actors, and what remains within the private sphere (eg,

18

Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, (n 1) at 17. S Cassese, ‘Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation’ (2005) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 663, 671. 20 For instance, the determination of applicable standards for refugee status determination proceedings by the UNHCR can be distinguished from functions of legislative nature in the form of inter-state negotiations over amendments to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol; just as the actual conduct of such proceedings by the same organisation can be distinguished from the dispute settlement functions carried out, for example, by the International Court of Justice. 19

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how should the generation of private standards for eco-labelling, which have no government endorsement but still generate important trade-distorting effects, be conceptualised?).21 These definitional problems are important, and will have to be confronted sooner rather than later; nonetheless, they are beyond the scope of this paper, and the existence of these ‘hard cases’ should not blind us to the fact that much of global governance would be entirely uncontroversially regarded as administrative in nature were it to appear within a purely national context. The existence of hard cases at the periphery need not distract us here from the existence of a relatively unproblematic core.

The Institutional Inclusiveness of Global Administrative Law Having acknowledged that significant portions of global governance can be accurately understood as administration, it can be further observed that such global administration is often organised and shaped by principles of an administrative law character. The shift of public power to the various global administrative bodies has given rise to concerns as to their legitimacy, accountability, and responsiveness to different societal and private interests. These concerns are often framed in administrative law terms, and are thus often countered through the application of administrative law-type mechanisms, such as increased requirements of transparency, consultation, and participation; a requirement to furnish reasoned decisions; and the establishment of review mechanisms, either administrative or judicial in nature.22 To adopt a global administrative law perspective is to affirm that the pattern that is emerging, although still embryonic and not (as yet) coherent, should be understood as part of a common, growing trend towards the use of administrative law-type mechanisms for ensuring that global regulatory governance is responsive to the interests upon which it impacts, and holding it to account in that regard.23 The capacity of global administrative law to apply to such a broad range of regulatory forms and actors—whether public or private, formal or informal, rooted at the domestic, international, or transnational levels—is exactly where its functional virtue lies. The emergence and increasing importance of administrative law mechanisms and procedures can be empirically verified—to varying degrees in different contexts, admittedly—in relation to all four types of global administrative bodies outlined above. It is neither surprising nor particularly controversial to affirm that such is the case within traditional inter-governmental organisations: a

21 See, eg, SR Gandhi, ‘Voluntary Environmental Standards: The Interplay Between Private Initiatives, Trade Rules And The Global Decision-Making Processes’ (paper presented at the Viterbo III Global Administrative Law Conference, June 2007) www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/Ghandienvironment.pdf. 22 B Kingsbury, N Krisch, RB Stewart and JB Wiener, ‘Foreword: Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 1, 2. 23 B Kingsbury and N Krisch, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 1, 1–2.

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large number of these have, for example, reasonably long traditions of administrative tribunals ensuring review of internal staff disputes;24 and more recent innovations, such as the World Bank Inspection Panel,25 take this a stage further. Even within the informal setting of transnational networks, however, such mechanisms are beginning to emerge: the Basel Committee, for example, instituted a rudimentary ‘notice and comment’ procedure in the process of formulating its recent Basel II Accord;26 and even within the OECD networks, a range of different administrative law models have been employed.27 Lastly, some hybrid and private bodies already display highly developed use of administrative law principles and procedures: the WADA Anti-Doping Code, for example, contains detailed provisions ensuring that athletes suspected of drug use have the opportunity to be heard and to contest any decision taken against them, and to have such decisions reviewed by an independent body;28 whilst ISO’s own Code of Ethics proclaims explicitly that ISO Members are committed to ‘ensuring fair and responsive application of the principles of due process, transparency, openness, impartiality and voluntary nature of standardisation’.29 While important questions can undoubtedly be raised as to the specifically legal nature of particularly the last of these examples, what it does serve to demonstrate well is the in-principle applicability of this type of framework to that type of institution. Moreover, a global administrative law framework provides us with the necessary conceptual tools to grasp the novelty of many of the activities in which traditional administrative actors are now implicated. Conceiving global governance as a novel form of public administration enables us to account, at least descriptively, for the new role accorded to state agencies in administering global regimes and to global bodies in taking decisions that directly affect individuals, in ways that the traditional conceptual categories of international law seem ill-equipped to emulate. In this regard then, global administrative law is first and foremost pragmatic, acknowledging and confronting the currently prevailing realities of globalisation. It recognises the structural nature of global governance ‘as is’, and seeks to work from within. In doing so, however, it also accommodates the flexibility necessary in global governance if we are to capture the regulatory gains that have accompanied the rise of new institutional forms and techniques. The use of informal means of regulatory coordination (such as the Basel Committee) or formal but non-legally binding institutions (such as the Financial Action Task Force, which sanctions violations by specific countries of its anti money-laundering policies) is often presented as the source of the success of these forms of global administration in

24 A Reinisch, ‘The Immunity of International Organizations and the Jurisdiction of Their Administrative Tribunals’ (Institute for International Law and Justice/New York University School of Law, International Law and Justice Working Paper—Global Administrative Law Series no 11, 2007) www.iilj.org/publications/2007–11Reinisch.asp. 25 See, eg, M Circi, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel: The Indian Mumbai Urban Transport Project Case’ in S Cassese et al (n 10) at 129. 26 See Barr and Miller, ‘Global Administrative Law’ (n 8). 27 See Salzman, ‘Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’ (n 9). 28 See Casini, ‘Hybrid Public–Private Bodies within Global Private Regimes’ (n 12). 29 ISO Code of Ethics (2004) www.iso.org/iso/codeethics_2004.pdf.

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terms of efficiency and effectiveness. The same is true for global administration through hybrid public-private or purely private bodies (such as the FSC, a private body that relies on the market for the effectiveness of its standards for sustainable forest use). Whether or not such claims are, in fact, true must of course be established in each individual case. The framework provided by global administrative law is relatively well calibrated to respect this structural diversity without significantly compromising its effectiveness.30 Global administrative law thus has a modular quality: it provides a toolkit that allows us to pick and choose the mechanisms that best suit the particular regulatory structure in question. In addition to its pragmatism and flexibility, global administrative law is capable of encompassing those sites of administrative action that are largely beyond the reach of national administrative law. The advisory warnings issued by the World Health Organization (WHO), which can have grave economic consequences for states involved, are a case in point. Domestic administrative law is simply incapable of guaranteeing that all those potentially affected by such warnings are provided a fair opportunity to be heard, and national courts have no jurisdiction in terms of which they could find the WHO negligent and order compensation.31 Global administrative law can also be important in cases in which domestic administrative law is insufficient or could have distorting effects because it addresses only segmented parts of the whole administrative process.32 The litigation in domestic courts and before the European Court of Justice of decisions of the UN Security Council to freeze assets of individual suspects illustrates this point.33

The Institutional Bias of Global Constitutionalism In contrast to the elements of global administrative law outlined above, global constitutionalist discourse—even when explicitly decoupled from its traditional association with the nation-state and applied to the field of global governance— tends to focus on a relatively limited range of public actors (largely, if not exclusively, those structured around basic statal forms) and overlooks, or at least 30 This assertion regarding the structural flexibility of global administrative law should, however, be qualified in at least two respects. Firstly, it may be that its effectiveness in subjecting public power to public control will vary between different types of global administrative practices. Administrative law as we know it from the domestic context seems to function more effectively in formal institutional environments; and the adoption of a global administrative law framework does carry some risks of exerting pressures on, or creating incentives within, the institutions of global governance towards greater formalisation. Secondly, we do not ignore the fact that, on occasion, the move to non-traditional forms of regulation is motivated precisely by the desire of the participants involved to evade public control, to ‘pass below the radar screens of international [and domestic] law’. E Benvenisti, ‘“Coalitions of the Willing” and the Evolution of Informal International Law’ in C Calliess, G Nolte and PT Stoll (eds), Coalitions of the Willing: Avantgarde or Threat? (Cologne, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2007) 1. Informality and ‘soft’ mechanisms should not always be celebrated; and the application of elements of global administrative law can, in principle at least, also assist in countering this phenomenon when appropriate. 31 B Kingsbury, ‘Omnilateralism and Partial International Communities: Contributions of the Emerging Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 104 Journal of International Law and Diplomacy 98, 105. 32 Ibid, 106. 33 Ibid,106–107.

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downplays, the reality that significant portions of global regulatory governance are carried out through non-traditional institutional forms. What represents only one form of relevant administration from a global administrative law perspective—that carried out by inter-governmental organisations—seems to largely exhaust the landscape of global governance for global constitutionalists. Bearing in mind that both global constitutionalism and global administrative law share the basic goal of subjecting public power to public control, the former appears to neglect many of the important sites in which public power is exercised. The sites offered as putatively concerning ‘constitutionalisation’ are almost exclusively intergovernmental organisations (primarily the UN, the EU and the WTO).34 To the extent that the notion of international or global community has been developed, the evidence adduced in favour of such a claim remains thoroughly statist in nature, focusing on recent developments in, or proposed changes to, the structures of inter-state relations and/or major inter-state institutions.35 The common emphasis on the UN and its Charter as the cornerstones of the international constitutional order,36 or at least as the main connecting factor of the international community,37 also illustrates the central place that state and inter-governmental structures occupy within global constitutionalist framework. Moreover, it is not only that current global constitutionalist discourse does not take account of the entire range of global administration, but also that what global constitutionalists most often conceptualise as evidence for or elements of constitutionalisation simply could not be found in many important sites of global governance as currently instituted. There is, of course, no single list of indicators of constitutionalism or constitutionalisation. The number of such lists found in the literature is (at least) equal to the number of authors writing in the field. But it could be plausibly argued that the various indicators used by global constitutionalists are largely irrelevant to many, if not most, global administrative bodies. As a result, this approach falls short of the capacity—even at an abstract level—to subject many of the forms of global administration to public control. De Wet, for

34 This is, indeed, readily evident when we consider the ‘post-national’ variant of global constitutionalist discourse (referring only to the constitutionalisation of particular organisations or regimes, and not of global governance in its entirety), which focuses very heavily on European arrangements and the WTO. Amongst a great many possibilities, see, eg, N Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317, 334; N Walker, ‘The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001) 31; JH Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998); and Cass, ‘The “Constitutionalization” of International Trade Law’ (n 2). For a critical recent look from the WTO perspective, see J Dunoff, ‘Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s “Constitution” and the Discipline of International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 647. 35 See, eg, de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (n 4) at 55. Fassbender seems to espouse a broader membership of the international community, as encompassing ‘all subjects of international law’, but admits that the UN Charter, which he holds as the constitution of that community, appears incomplete, as no community members but sovereign states are considered. Fassbender, ‘The UN Charter as Constitution’ (n 3) at 532, 562–64, 577. 36 See Fassbender, ibid; Petersmann, ‘How to Reform the UN’ (n 5); PM Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’ (1997) 1 Max Plack Yearbook of United Nations Law 1. 37 De Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (n 4) at 54, 56.

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instance, conceives of the global constitutional order as standing on the three pillars of an international community, an international value system, and structures for its enforcement (referring primarily to structures that fulfil and protect the ‘international value system’, such as the UN organs, international tribunals, states, and national and regional tribunals).38 Fassbender identifies a set of features of an ‘ideal constitution’ that appear to have been selected on the basis of their conformity to the characteristics of the UN Charter, rather than the other way around (which include such criteria as a ‘constitutional moment’; an ‘aspiration to eternity’; the drafting of ‘a Charter’ and the existence of a ‘constitutional history’; and the establishment of a hierarchy of norms).39 For Petersmann, on the other hand, basic constitutional principles include such principles as the rule of law and primacy of constitutional rules, separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’, human rights and market freedoms, necessity and proportionality of governmental restrains, democratic participation in the exercise of public power, and social or redistributive justice.40 To put the point even more generally, it seems difficult to overstate the importance of the development of effective and compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms to the emergence of a plausible postnational constitutional discourse. It is extremely doubtful whether these notions would have gained the academic currency that they have today without the advent of the ECJ and the ECHR in Europe, or the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding; neither the European Coal and Steel Community nor the pre-1994 GATT were characterised as ‘constitutional’ regimes. Only if sites of global governance were to re-organise around specific institutional characteristics—powerful review courts, clearly defined legislative capacities, hierarchies of norms and separation of institutional powers— might they manifest signs of emerging constitutionalisation. Yet, this might be at the expense of losing their idiosyncratic form and associated virtues. It is questionable whether, for example, an informal network of public regulators, or a hybrid governance partnership such as that of the Global Fund, could develop such mechanisms whilst retaining the comparative advantage that its original structure bestowed. Therefore, even if a global constitutionalist approach is adopted, the institutional bias of the discourse means that something more, something at the very least complementary, is required if global constitutionalism is to confront the general task of subjecting public power to public control in the currently prevailing conditions of global governance. Regardless of the progress made by constitutional approaches to the challenges of global governance in the years and decades to come—and barring a radical rewrite of the concept itself—something like a global administrative law, capable of encompassing the institutional forms to which constitutional discourse is effectively blind, must figure as a necessary complement to the constitutionalist project, in a manner largely analogous to the way in which administrative law complements its constitutional counterpart domestically.

38 39 40

Ibid, 64–71. Fassbender, ‘The UN Charter as Constitution’ (n 3) 573 et seq. Petersmann, ‘How to Reform the UN’ (n 5) 425–37.

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FRAGMENTATION, UNITY AND PLURALISM IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Fragmentation and Unity in Global Constitutionalist Discourse Global governance—or what we are contending here is best viewed as global administration—is currently characterised by conditions of profound fragmentation, both functionally (manifested in a plethora of different sectoral regimes), institutionally (manifested in a wide range of different bodies now exercising recognisably public governance functions in the global sphere), and across different levels of governance (from genuinely global, through inter-, trans- and supranational, regional and finally domestic and even local spheres). A central element of the notion of ‘constitution’, however, appears to be its need for unity, with ‘constitutionalisation’ almost always representing a tendency, or a drive, towards such unity. As Fassbender openly affirms, [t]hose who oppose the relevance of constitutionalism to international law correctly note that the concept is meant to describe or promote a legal integration of states which is more intense than the traditional one … The idea of a constitution is summoned as a symbol of (political) unity which eventually will be realised on a global scale.41

Global constitutionalist discourse thus postulates a dichotomy between fragmentation, on one hand, and (constitutional) unity on the other. This putative dichotomy is presented as essentially exhausting the possibilities of debate, and then used to inscribe the audience within a particular progress narrative, in terms of which any evidence of a move away from fragmentation is ipso facto a move towards constitutionalism. Within such a framework, when the abandonment of fragmented modes of governance can be presented as a part of a general trend, then the suggestion that a constitutional unity is emerging can begin to appear both plausible and, indeed, almost inevitable (not to mention desirable—an issue that will be dealt with in the next section). This style of argumentation is bolstered by one of what might be termed the ‘constitutive ambiguities’ of the term ‘constitution’ itself: the fact that it can be—indeed, often is—used to refer to both a thing (existing in space) and a process (developing over time). When combined with a rhetoric of ‘emergence’, it allows the idea of a ‘global constitution’ to function, as it does, as at once premise and telos in the work of each of its proponents. This, in turn, has at least two main consequences. Firstly, it enables those writing in the field to set a relatively low standard of proof in identifying whether or not it already exists. In this regard, those many aspects of current global governance that do not support their thesis, where they are addressed at all, can be dismissed as merely evidence of the ‘rudimentary’ or ‘embryonic’ nature of the global constitution; they are usually not confronted as possible proof that such, be it thing or process, does not exist.42 Secondly, not only can potential counter-elements be ignored, they can actually be criticised in the light of their non-conformity with the 41

Fassbender, ‘The UN Charter as Constitution’, (n 3) 552. See Fassbender, ibid, for perhaps the most pronounced example of this form of argumentation at work. 42

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idea of the global constitution qua telos, as obstacles that must be overcome if we are to move away from the (clearly undesirable) conditions of radical fragmentation. Aspects of global governance that could easily have been considered as empirical evidence against global constitutionalism are presented as normatively or logically flawed because of it.43 Towards a Genuinely Pluralist Approach to Global Governance? We suggest, however, that the original framing dichotomy postulated by global constitutionalists is false, and the progress narrative that it encourages misleading. Instead, adopting a global administrative law perspective opens up new possibilities for conceiving of the whole of global governance in a manner that escapes the poles of fragmentation and unity. It allows us to imagine, and indeed bring about, a genuine and sustainable pluralism at the level of global regulatory governance, characterised by relative stability of legal norms and relations, founded both on a willingness to pursue pragmatic accommodation between overlapping sites of public power and on the general application of certain formal (and largely procedural) legal principles.44 If the pluralism of global administration is to be distinguished from fragmentation on the basis of its capacity to maintain relatively stable relations between competing sites of public power, then global administrative law can play a key, indeed crucial, role in fostering the conditions under which this is likely to occur. It is in this sense, indeed, that—referring back to the tripartite institutional topology outlined at the outset—global administrative law demonstrates most clearly its capacity to account not merely for the diverse institutional forms and novel administrative activities in contemporary global governance, but also for the manner in which these interact with each other. In particular, if there can be established a relative homogeneity of administrative law principles in each of these sites, then the processes of inter-site cooperation and accommodation will be facilitated and thus progressively stabilised, as actors in one regime become increasingly prepared to recognise the decisions of another where they acknowledge that proper procedures have been followed, and all relevant interests taken into consideration. These principles and rules of the emerging global administrative law may be complemented—where appropriate—by constitutionalist frameworks for analysis, either in the ‘thick’ sense of political community (such as states, and 43 This technique is, again, undoubtedly most clear in Fassbender’s work. For example, he considers the judgment of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case to be simply wrong, on the basis that, if the UN Charter is properly viewed as the constitution of the international community, there cannot be a body of law (‘customary constitutional international law’) that runs parallel to the Charter, deals with the same issues, but is not exhausted by it. Fassbender goes so far as to simply assert that ‘there is no parallel existence of customary constitutional rules and Charter rules’, and that the ICJ was only able to decide to the contrary because it ‘[overlooked] the special case of constitutional rules expressly or implicitly codified in the Charter’. Ibid, 586–88. 44 For a reading of the European human rights regime in precisely these terms, see N Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 183; see also N Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 247.

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perhaps the EU), and in the ‘thinner’ sense justifiable in relation to certain ‘partial’ communities that display the key indices of ‘post-national constitutionalism’ (such as the WTO).45 The most striking illustration of the ways in which global administrative law can foster and sustain relative stability of global governance is, we think, to be found in what Stewart has defined as ‘bottom-up’ approaches to global administrative law;46 particularly as expressed in the increasingly prevalent adoption by national and regional courts of variations of what might be termed the ‘Solange stance’.47 In essence, this stance is adopted wherever a court is prepared to either accept the decisions or apply the rules of a global administrative body (or recognise as legitimate a domestic decision implementing these) only where and to the extent that the body in question provides certain administrative law protections (typically things like participation rights, reason-giving and transparency obligations, and rights to impartial hearings and review) ‘equivalent to’ those guaranteed by the legal system within which they operate. An example in point is the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) recent judgment in the Kadi case.48 This case involved a challenge to the legitimacy of an EU measure implementing a UN Security Council Resolution, itself passed on the basis of a decision of the Sanctions Committee to list the appellants as suspected of funding terrorist groups, and thus to freeze all of their assets. In his Opinion on the case, Advocate General Maduro made plain his view that the Court should adopt a Solange stance in the case: Had there been a genuine and effective mechanism of judicial control by an independent tribunal at the level of the United Nations, then this might have released the Community from the obligation to provide for judicial control of implementing measures that apply within the Community legal order. However, no such mechanism currently exists.49

In broad outline, the Court agreed, conducting a brief examination of the delisting procedure currently in place with regards to the Sanctions Committee, and finding it wanting in particular due to the fact that it ‘didn’t offer guarantees of judicial protection’; that the procedure was diplomatic, rather than a matter of individual

45 See N Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in JHH Weiler and M Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 27. 46 See generally RB Stewart, ‘US Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 63. 47 This is a reference to the Solange judgments of the German Constitutional Court (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) [Solange I]; Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft BVerfGE 73, 339 (1987) [Solange II]) in which it effectively held that the transfer of powers by Germany to the EC was constitutional ‘as long as’ (‘solange’) European institutions provided the same level of individual rights protection as did the German Basic Law. 48 Joint Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, [2008] ECR-I-00000. 49 Opinion of the Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C-402/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (16 Jan 2008), paras 51, 53. For a reading of this as analogous to the Solange position, see A Sandulli, ‘Rapporti tra diritto europeo ed internazionale. Il caso Kadi: un nuovo caso Solange?’ (2008) 5 Giornale di diritto amministrativo 1.

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right; that the Committee’s own guidelines make it clear that the suspect may not invoke any rights of defence during the procedure; and that there is no requirement to provide either reasons or evidence for the decision to list an individual, nor to give reasons as to any decision to refuse delisting.50 This case is of real relevance here for a number of reasons. First, in conducting the above evaluation of the UN procedure, the Court was clearly intimating that improved rights protection at that level could lead it to adopt a more deferential attitude towards Community implementing legislation—the very essence of the Solange stance. Second, and relatedly, the Court’s focus on the administrative law rights, combined with its open invitation to the Security Council to improve its procedures, can—and, we suggest, should—be read as an attempt to establish an inter-jurisdictional dialogue in the language of global administrative law, which, if reciprocated, would allow for a more accommodating, less conflictual result in any future controversy. It is thus illustrative of the way in which the application of global administrative law can help create the conditions in which different, overlapping sites of public power can begin to form relations based on cooperative dialogue rather than simple ignorance or intransigent belligerence, and thus help in the formation of an order that is pluralistic rather than fragmented. Finally, the Kadi case demonstrates how global administrative law provides us with a framework in which we can contemplate the subjection of public power to public control at the global level as a realistic possibility; indeed, in many cases, the rules and mechanisms are already in place, or at least are under serious discussion. By comparison, global constitutionalism fares rather badly. Unlike global administrative law, which already has an object—global administration—to which it can attach, most accept that there is as yet no equivalent, fully-formed global constitution—and nor is any concerted political will to create one apparent.51 Indeed, the Kadi judgment itself represents a significant blow to those who would maintain that the UN Charter is the ‘constitution’ of the global legal order. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND VALUE PLURALISM

The previous section sought to sketch, at a conceptual level, a way to problematise the idea that the dichotomy between fragmentation and unity implied by global constitutionalism, and the progress narrative leading from the former to the latter, exhausts the field of possibilities for responding to the challenges posed by global regulatory governance. Here, we want to further cast doubt on the claim that— under current conditions at least—the type of unity presumed in much global constitutionalism is a normatively appropriate response to the fact of widespread and irreducible disagreement over ethical and moral norms. Global administrative law, even as it is better suited to a plurality of sites of public power (a functional and conceptual advantage), appears also better adapted to confront and respect 50

Kadi (n 48) at paras 322–26. Even Fassbender, who is perhaps the boldest of all global constitutionalists in proclaiming that such is already in existence, accepts at points that it is as yet only rudimentary. See Fassbender, ‘The UN Charter as Constitution’ (n 3) at 576, 607. 51

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value pluralism (a normative advantage). We argue that the pluralism facilitated by global administrative law framework is, under current conditions, a normatively preferable alternative to the type of unity implied in global constitutionalist discourse.

Global Constitutionalism’s Appeal to Universal Values The importance of a set of substantive values—in particular jus cogens and human rights—that are shared universally to most current conceptions of global constitutionalism, and in particular to the (often implicit) assumption that their preferred telos is an ethically justifiable one under current conditions, cannot really be doubted. Fassbender, for example, argues that the ‘universal recognition of fundamental human rights, including the dignity of the individual human being’ is a ‘cornerstone of constitutionalism’.52 De Wet goes so far as to define ‘constitutionalism’ as entailing: a system in which the different national, regional and functional (sectoral) constitutional regimes form the building blocks of the international community (‘international polity’) that is underpinned by a core value system common to all communities and embedded in a variety of legal structures for its enforcement.53

The appeal to universal values is—when successful—one of the most powerful ways in which an author can seek to gain the adherence of her audience to her claims.54 The abstract agreement over universal values lasts, however, ‘only so long as we remain on the level of generalities’; instead, the moment that we begin to concretise and apply these values, they become immediately controversial.55 Consider, for example, the following suggestion from Petersmann, which illustrates well the move from the accepted general to the contested particular: The limitation of all government powers through inalienable fundamental rights has become the foundation stone of constitutional democracies … The limitation of government powers through legal guarantees of freedom and non-discrimination is also the major purpose of the international GATT/WTO and IMF guarantees of liberal trade in goods and services and of non-discriminatory conditions of competition.56

52

Ibid, 554. De Wet, ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems’ (n 4) at 612. 54 The philosopher Chaïm Perelman defined such values as those that are the subject of agreement in the ‘universal audience’, normally because their abstract desirability is included in the definition of the word itself: terms such as, for example, ‘good’, ‘beautiful’ and ‘just’. See Chaïm Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and Its Applications, (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1979) 26–27. 55 Chaïm Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning (Dordrecht, D Reidel Publishing Company, 1980) 66. 56 Petersmann, ‘How to Reform the UN’ (n 5) at 428. Indeed, the very idea that the global trade regime is a simple instantiation of international human rights norms would be surprising to most; however, it is precisely this impression that Petersmann seeks to convey time and again, in particular through the frequent equation of human rights to trade norms: ‘From a citizens perspective, international guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination and rule-of-law (eg in human rights conventions, 53

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If, as seems to be the case, agreement on a core set of substantive values is presented as central to the existence of a global constitution, then it seems plausible to suggest that some authoritative mechanism for interpreting and applying those values in concrete situations is required. It is useful, in this regard, to refer back to the European setting: it is difficult to imagine that the constitutionalist discourse would have emerged at all in that setting without the compulsory and binding jurisdiction of both the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ in dealing with human rights controversies. However, a comparable authoritative interpretative body or mechanism for concretising the putatively ‘universal’ values expressed in human rights norms is conspicuous only in its absence at the global level. And this, moreover, should not be taken as merely another rendition of the time-honoured ‘unenforceability’ lament so common to international lawyers; it is much more important than that. The absence of authoritative interpreters points strongly to the absence of the unitary ‘interpretative community’57 of the type presented as necessary to the existence of a constitutional polity. The fact that neither such bodies nor the will to create them exists (outwith the regional setting) points strongly to the fact that agreement on ‘core values’ remains confined to generalities that can be imbued with a vast array of different and very often opposing contents, thus undermining the claim that they are ‘common’ in any concrete sense. Nonetheless, global constitutionalists accept the existence of widespread agreement at the most general level as sufficient: [T]here is a significant overlap in content between the international and domestic value systems. This is particularly the case in the area of human rights norms where most modern constitutions in various parts of the world—and notably those drafted by democratically elected constitutional assemblies—contain human rights standards closely resembling those of the international and regional human rights instruments. The fact that this overlap exists despite the lack of democracy on the international level, would defy arguments that a representative value system can only be produced within a democratic process.58

Here, the fact that the vast range of different possible interpretations of these norms and ways of balancing between them has not yet been entrusted by states to a single body with universal jurisdiction is treated as simply proof of the ‘embryonic’ nature of the international or global constitution; and the existence of an ever-increasing plethora of regional and sectoral tribunals and other ‘compliance’ mechanisms, each with its own—often overlapping—sphere of jurisdiction and competence, is enlisted in support of, rather than considered as contrary to, this position. It is in this sense that simple affirmations of widespread agreement on a set of basic rights seem inadequate to the task of confronting the very real, indeed apparently irreducible, value pluralism that characterises the global sphere; and it is thus in this sense that the spectres of cultural imperialism and of hegemonic

GATT/WTO law and IMF law) serve ‘constitutional functions’ for extending and protecting individual freedom and non-discrimination across frontiers’. Ibid, 442–43. 57 58

Fassbender, ‘The UN Charter as Constitution’ (n 3) 597. De Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (n 4) 74.

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domination continue to loom large over the global constitutionalist project. Consider, for example, Petersmann’s proposal that the UN Charter should be renegotiated from scratch, following the example set by the development of the WTO, with all of those not prepared to sign up to the new obligations eventually barred from any Charter protections.59 These are to become not global, but rather ‘club’ benefits,60 with this itself functioning as one of the main ‘carrots’ to encourage reluctant states to sign up to the new regime.61 Moreover, Petersmann insists, it is the wealthy Western states that must, as with the reform of the international trading system, take the lead in forcing through—and directing—the negotiations on a new Charter. Why we might trust these states to do so in a manner that reflected the interests of all, rather than merely entrenching their own already-dominant positions over others (a criticism that has, of course, been frequently levelled at Petersmann’s model, the WTO), is left largely unaddressed. Within global constitutionalist discourse, then, the putative ‘consensus’ on a set of shared substantive values appears to be largely discursively created rather than empirically verified at the level of practice; and the desirability of that discursive act is ultimately justified only by reference to the desirability of the outcome—a global constitution—itself. It is extremely doubtful, however, whether this type of essentially circular argumentation is sufficient to the task of overcoming value pluralism in the name of unity, however central to the overall project that might be. The key point here is that, as things currently stand, global constitutionalist rhetoric ultimately enacts an image of community in which fundamental differences are elided and hidden, rather than confronted and respected.

Contrasting Global Administrative Law As we illustrated in the previous section, global administrative law contains no inherent tendency to unity (at least in the strong sense implied in constitutionalist rhetoric). Indeed, unlike global constitutionalism, the ends of global administrative law are not contained within its own discourse; rather, it can be harnessed to a whole host of different—and not always compatible—projects. In this sense, global administrative law is best viewed as essentially instrumental; it can, for the most part, only be as ‘good’ as the ends it is intended to serve, be they constitutional, democratic, rights-based or, indeed, efficiency-enhancing. From this perspective, in ideal terms at least, global administrative law provides both a site and a language for active and ongoing political contestation in each and every site of global governance over which interests should be represented to what extent, and to the degree of responsiveness thereto required of the regulatory body in question. In addition, global administrative law can provide sets of procedural rules for constraining and directing the interactions of global administrative bodies with each other, and with national and regional administrative agencies. This, in turn, 59 60 61

Petersmann, (n 5) 451–52, 455–56. Ibid, 468. Ibid, 456.

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can contribute to the creation of a regulated pluralism of public sites, in which the dangers of fragmentation, such as the potential for individual bodies to ‘overreach’ or to ‘underachieve’ in the fulfilment of their respective mandates,62 can be confronted through the use of different mechanisms that encourage cooperation and coordination between the relevant sites. This is not to suggest, of course, that the establishment and application of global administrative law principles, rules and mechanisms is in itself entirely devoid of normative content; or that it cannot have unforeseen effects that either enhance, or detract from, some other goals. Global administrative law presupposes some values of its own: the desirability of accountability, participation, transparency, even the rule of law itself—these are all normative questions, the answer to which is simply assumed within the global administrative law project. By remaining only very lightly sketched in the abstract, however, and rejecting the conceptual necessity (or practical desirability) of anything like an ‘Administrative Procedures Act’ at the global level,63 the particular configuration of these in each concrete governance sector (trade, security, environment, etc) remains very much up for grabs. Furthermore, global administrative law—for the most part at least—focuses largely on formal and procedural, rather than substantive, requirements. These are intended not to definitively condition any substantive regulatory outcome, but rather to ensure, to the greatest degree possible, that all affected by public power have a say in the manner in which it is exercised, and that no interests—and in particular those of weaker or more marginalised actors—are disregarded in the process.64 Having said that, global administrative law does contain the conceptual space for more substantive requirements to be developed (through, for example, the application of standards of reasonableness, fairness, equity and proportionality) should they be appropriate to the particular governance regime in question. The current, general focus on procedural rules is emphatically not, however, intended as an expression of any crude hope that they can function in a manner somehow ‘objective’ or ‘apolitical’; and neither is it based upon any kind of crude version of Habermasian proceduralism in which the creation of proper formal rules and structures will automatically generate substantively ‘good’ outcomes. In many ways, it is much less ambitious than either, justified instead on the basis of an ethical (and thus never absolute) commitment to proceduralism in law as one realistically available means of increasing the (public) legitimacy of global regulatory governance while responding to the stark realities of value pluralism in an age of ethical post-foundationalism.

62

See Kingsbury, ‘Omnilateralism and Partial International Communities’ (n 31) 98. For an account rejecting a move towards a global Administrative Procedures Act, see DC Esty, ‘Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1490. 64 As a number of scholars have pointed out, however, there are no guarantees that procedural mechanisms will alone be equal to this task; a constant vigilance is thus necessary. See, eg, BS Chimni, ‘Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 799; C Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 187. 63

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CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOME LIMITATIONS AND DANGERS OF A GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FRAMEWORK

Having discussed in the foregoing the potential virtues of a global administrative law framework, a few words of caution are in order with respect to both the conceptual limitations of global administrative law as well as its normative dangers. Global administrative law is, of course, no simple panacea to the complex and difficult challenges posed by contemporary global governance . It is, for example, limited to administrative activity, and so cannot speak to the vitally important issue of how to regulate the behaviour of states when they act, in negotiating treaties or in formulating custom, in their primary capacity as international legislators. It is here, indeed, that the potential complementarity between global administrative law and an eventual global constitutionalism presents itself most clearly. However, excepting discussion of a relatively vague and heavily circumscribed set of jus cogens norms, constitutionalist discourse does not yet appear to confront this issue in any great detail. Contrary to the national setting, administrative law at the global level is preceding any constitutional counterpart; and, moreover, will continue to operate even if the latter does not—ever—materialise. Nor is global administrative law any kind of a normatively unproblematic solution. Its basic instrumentality and procedural nature, which we have underscored in support of its relative normative desirability in the face of the apparently irreducible value pluralism of global governance, also create an—at least—equal potential for harm: its very advantages of flexibility and adaptability themselves imply that it can be flexed and adapted in thoroughly inappropriate—not to mention unethical—ways. The risks are many, and readily evident: that, for example, the focus on procedural rather than substantive rules may well be insufficient to compel the powerful to respect the interests of the marginalised; and that providing a legitimating discourse to institutions that are already structured around vast inequalities in wealth and power may only serve to entrench existing relations of domination, rather than providing a means for subverting them.65 In this sense, global administrative law might simply provide new tools for the pursuit of hegemonic interests. Moreover, before embracing the plurality of different sites of public power, we should bear in mind that often the move to non-traditional forms of regulation is motivated precisely by the desire of powerful actors to evade public control,66 and that it may grant the powerful more opportunities to shop for a forum that will best further their own interests.67 These two important caveats—the conceptual limitations and the normative dangers—must be constantly borne in mind by those seeking to advance and to

65

These first two critiques, amongst others, can be found in Chimni, ibid. See n 30. 67 On this point, see generally E Benvenisti and G Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 60 Stanford Law Review 595. 66

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operationalise the emerging global administrative law. The former seem unavoidable if we are to approach realistically the task in hand; the latter speak to the extremely hard, but equally unavoidable, task of moving from the abstract yet contingent potential of global administrative law to a normatively justifiable practice. In this sense, the really hard work has only just begun.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books S Battini, Amministrazioni nazionali e controversie globali (Milan, Giuffrè, 2007). JH Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998). C Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and Its Applications (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1979). C Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning (Dordrecht, D Reidel Publishing Company, 1980).

Chapters in Edited Volumes E Benvenisti, ‘“Coalitions of the Willing” and the Evolution of Informal International Law’ in C Calliess, G Nolte and PT Stoll (eds), Coalitions of the Willing: Avantgarde or Threat? (Cologne, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2007). B Carotti and L Casini, ‘A Hybrid Public-Private Regime: The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the Governance of the Internet’ in S Cassese et al (eds), Global Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, Issues (Rome, Institute for Research on Public Administration, 2008), available at www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/GALCasebook2008.pdf. B Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’ in N Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Models (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007). N Walker, ‘The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001). N Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in JHH Weiler and M Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Journal Articles E Benvenisti and G Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 60 Stanford law Review 595–631.

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DZ Cass, ‘The “Constitutionalization” of International Trade Law: Judicial NormGeneration as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 39–75. S Cassese, ‘Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation’ (2005) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 663–94. BS Chimni, ‘Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 799–827. T Cottier, and M Hertig, ‘The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 261–328. J Dunoff, ‘Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s “Constitution” and the Discipline of International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 647–75. PM Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’ (1997) 1 Max Plack Yearbook of United Nations Law 1–33. DC Esty, ‘Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1490–562. B Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter As Constitution of The International Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529–619. C Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 187–214. B Kingsbury, ‘Omnilateralism and Partial International Communities: Contributions of the Emerging Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 104 Journal of International Law and Diplomacy 98–124. B Kingsbury and N Krisch, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 1–13. B Kingsbury, N Krisch and RB Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15–61. B Kingsbury, N Krisch, RB Stewart and JB Wiener, ‘Foreword: Global Governance as Administration – National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 1–13. N Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 183–216. N Krisch, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 247–78. E Meidinger, ‘The Administrative Law of Global Private–Public Regulation: the Case of Forestry’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 47–87. M Pallis, ‘The Operation of the UNHCR’s Accountability Mechanisms’ (2005) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 869–918. EU Petersmann, ‘How to Reform the UN System? Constitutionalism, International Law, and International Organizations’ (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 421–74.

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J Salzman, ‘Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 189–224. A Sandulli, ‘Rapporti tra diritto europeo ed internazionale. Il caso Kadi: un nuovo caso Solange?’ (2008) 5 Giornale di diritto amministrativo 513–20. RB Stewart, ‘US Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 63–108. N Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317–59. E de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51–76. E de Wet, ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 611–32.

Working Papers A Reinisch, ‘The Immunity of International Organizations and the Jurisdiction of Their Administrative Tribunals’ (Institute for International Law and Justice/ New York University School of Law, International Law and Justice Working Paper no 11, 2007).

Websites Sources Gandhi, SR (2007) ‘Voluntary Environmental Standards: The Interplay Between Private Initiatives, Trade Rules And The Global Decision–Making Processes’ (paper presented at the Viterbo III Global Administrative Law Conference) www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/Ghandienvironment.pdf. Shamir-Borer, E (2006) ‘The Evolution of Administrative Law-Type Principles, Mechanisms and Practices in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)’ (paper presented at the Viterbo II Global Administrative Law Conference) www.iilj.org/GAL/ViterboII.asp.

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The Rapprochement between the Supremacy of International Law at International and National Levels ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER *

INTRODUCTION

I

N THIS PAPER, I will review whether domestic courts can duly refrain from giving effect to an international obligation, on the ground that performance of that obligation would contravene a fundamental right, recognised by the domestic law of that state. The problem that is considered here can be illustrated by the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Kadi v Council of the European Union.1 The ECJ refrained from giving effect to Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000) on the ground that performance of the obligations contained in the Resolution would conflict with fundamental rights under EU law. While the first reactions to the judgment suggest that many international lawyers feel compelled by the Court’s resolution of the conflict, the question is whether and how international law can accommodate such challenges. Non-performance of international obligations with reference to fundamental rules of national law, or internal rules of international organisations, sits uneasily with the supremacy of international law. While claims that domestic law should be supreme are by no means unusual, such claims have received a new impulse due to the nature of modern international law-making. Two developments in particular are critical: the dynamics of international law-making and the internal focus of much of modern international law. First, challenges to the supremacy of international law in the performance of international obligations are especially likely to occur when an obligation acquires, through dynamic interpretation, a meaning that differs from the meaning as it was

* Professor of Public International Law and Director, Amsterdam Center for International Law, University of Amsterdam. Parts of earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Law of the Future Conference, The Hague, 26–27 October 2007, the Jean Monnet Conference The European Union at 50: Assessing the Past: Looking Ahead, Macau, 27–28 May 2008, and at the ESIL 2008 in Heidelberg. I thank Catherina Brölmann, Jean d’Aspremont, Tom Eijsbouts, Warda Henning, Hege Kjos, Jan Herman Reestman for comments on earlier drafts. 1 Joint Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, [2008] ECR-II 3649.

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understood by states at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, or when treaties are embedded in institutional structures that lead to normative development beyond the initial consent.2 Second, as international law becomes more regulatory in nature, and more directly governs domestic matters, including legal rights and obligations of private persons,3 domestic actors will expect it to conform to equivalent standards of rule of law and protection of fundamental rights that apply at the domestic level.4 It is a plausible argument that international law should, in those areas where it prescribes or supervises domestic law, be sensitive to domestic (constitutional) law.5 The criterion of equivalent protection in the ECHR’s judgments in cases such as Bosphorus6 is just a manifestation of a much wider phenomenon. As long as that standard cannot be met (both in terms of the applicability of human rights protection against acts of international institutions and in terms of procedural remedies against such acts), backlashes at the domestic level are likely to emerge. It is against this background that this article will review whether, and on what basis, international law can accommodate challenges to the supremacy of international law based on the protection of fundamental rules of domestic law.7 I will first

2 See eg T Gehring, ‘Treaty-Making and Treaty Evolution’ in D Bodansky et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 466–99. See for an example of domestic resistance to the domestic legal force of decisions of international institutions after the expression of the initial consent: Natural Resources Defense Council v Environmental Protection Agency et al Appeal Judgment 464 F3d 1; ILDC 525 (US 2006); 373 US App DC 223; 63 Environment Reporter (BNA) 1203; 36 Environmental Law Report 20181 (DC Cir 2006); ILDC 525 (US 2006), 29 August 2006 (holding that decisions by the parties to the 1987 Montreal Protocol were not judicially enforceable in the United States). 3 See generally on the increasing role of international law in this area: JHH Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law: Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’ (2004) 64 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 547; M Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 907. 4 J Crawford, ‘International Law and the Rule of Law’ (2004) 24 Adelaide Law Review 3, 10. Cf D Bodanksy, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 596, 606 (noting that the more international law resembles domestic law, the more it should be subject to the same standards of legitimacy). 5 J Crawford, ‘International Law and Australian Federalism: Past, Present and Future’ in BR Opeskin and DR Rothwell (eds), International Law and Australian Federalism (Victoria, Melbourne University Press, 1997) 325, 333; Crawford, ‘International Law and the Rule of Law’ (n 4); A Bianchi, ‘International Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revealed’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 751, 781. 6 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim S¸irketi v Ireland (App no 45036/98) ECHR 2005-VI 107. 7 The prime focus of the article is the principle of supremacy of international law over domestic law. To some extent, the analysis will also apply to the relationship between international law and the internal law of international organisations; the Kadi case (n 1) is a case in point. See generally on this relationship: G Arangio-Ruiz, ‘International Law and Interindividual Law’ in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide between International and National Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 15, 39–43. However, in several respect the latter category raises distinct questions, a full analysis of which lies beyond the scope of this article. In its work on responsibility of international organisations, the International Law Commission (ILC) recognised the different nature of these issues; see eg ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 55th Session’ (5 May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2003) UN Doc A/58/10, paras 9–10 of the Commentary to draft Article 3.

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summarise the principle of supremacy and its formal nature that prevents international law from accepting domestic challenges to international obligations. I then discuss whether a solution may be found in the international nature of fundamental rights that are invoked as justification for non-compliance with an international obligation. The last section contains brief conclusions.

THE FORMALITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPREMACY

Gerald Fitzmaurice wrote that the principle of supremacy is ‘one of the great principles of international law, informing the whole system and applying to every branch of it’.8 In general terms, the principle of supremacy of international law seeks to subordinate the sovereignty of states to international law.9 One of its specific manifestations is that international law is supreme over, and takes precedence in the international legal order, over national law.10 In the event of a conflict between international law and domestic law, international law will have to prevail in the international legal order, domestic law being considered a fact from the standpoint of international law. This aspect is at the heart of the law of treaties11 and the law of international responsibility.12 The principle of supremacy of international law thus is key to the international rule of law, which, if anything, requires that states exercise their powers in accordance with international law, not domestic law.13 Allowing states to prioritise fundamental rules of domestic law over international law would undermine the efficacy of international law and indeed the international rule of law as such. It even can be said that the principle that international law is supreme over domestic law, and the international rule of law,

8 G Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law’ (1957) 92 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 1. 9 ibid 6. 10 See for a comprehensive treatment of this aspect of the principle of supremacy: D Carreau, Droit International, 8th edn (Paris, Pedone, 2004) 43–97; Fitzmaurice, The General Principles (n 8) 68–94. See also C Santuli, Le Status International de L’Ordre Juridique Étatique (Paris, Pedone, 2001) 427. 11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (signed 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 Arts 27 and 46. 12 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, annex to UNGA Res 56/83 (12 December 2001) UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (Articles on State Responsibility) Arts 3 and 32. The Articles are reproduced in J Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002). A comparable principle is contained in Art 35 of the Draft Articles of the ILC on the Responsibility of International Organizations, UN Doc A/CN4/L270. On the other hand, the Draft Articles of the ILC on the Responsibility of International Organizations do not contain an Article comparable to Art 3 of the Articles on State Responsibility; see discussion in ILC ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 55th Session’ (5 May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2003) UN Doc A/58/10 paras 9–10 of the Commentary to draft Art 3. 13 I Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs. International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1988) 213–14. See also G Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice Vol II (Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 1986) 587 (noting that the principle is generally accepted as ‘a sine qua non of the efficacy and reality of international obligation’).

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have a common denominator as there cannot be any rule of law without the precedence of some principles over others deemed of a lesser importance.14 Of course, the principle of supremacy of international law does not mean that international law is insensitive to domestic law. Such sensitivity may be reflected in the substance of the law, in the fact that many international obligations contain a renvoir to domestic law and in use of a margin of appreciation by supervisory mechanisms.15 However, it is one thing to say that primary rules or supervisory mechanisms should reflect particular sensitivities of domestic law, and quite something else that international law should accept a general exception to the principle of supremacy in the international legal order based on the protection of fundamental norms of domestic law. In principle, defects in terms of rule of law quality of international law do not affect the application of the principle of supremacy. After all, the principle is a formal one. It requires that international law prevails over domestic law, whatever the contents of international law and whatever the nature of the decision-making process through which international obligations have come into existence. Whether or not a particular rule that would be set aside because of the principle of supremacy is a fundamental rule does not make a difference. It is for this reason that Sir Arthur Watts noted that the supremacy of law is not, by itself, a sufficient indication of what the rule of law involves. He wrote that since the law which is to enjoy supremacy may itself be unjust and oppressive, ‘the supremacy of such a law is not what is meant by the rule of law.’16 Supremacy is, as a formal principle, blind to substance and effect—the rule of law, bare in its most minimalist definition, is not. Indeed, it is difficult to see how, without further benchmarks, it is possible to qualify the general principle of supremacy without fundamentally undermining the cause of international law. Notwithstanding many common elements in national constitutions, there are significant differences in constitutions across the world. Allowing rules of domestic (constitutional) law, without further qualification, to justify non-compliance with international obligations could fundamentally undermine the effectiveness of international law. Limiting this power to an undefined category of ‘fundamental constitutional norms’ will not help, as what is fundamental will differ from one state to another. This may be different, however, in the EU context. In Europe, there is wide support for the proposition that supremacy of EC law should not be understood as

14 Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International Law’ (n 8) 69 (equating the principle that the sovereignty of states is subordinated to the supremacy of international law with the rule of law in the international field). See also (more critically) A Watts, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1993) 36 German Yearbook of International Law 15, 22–23; 15 E Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ (1999) 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 843; Y Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’ (2006) 16 European Journal of International Law 907, 912; cf Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law (n 3) 927. 16 Watts, The International Rule of Law (n 14) 22–23.

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blind precedence over fundamental constitutional rules of the member states.17 The relative homogeneity arguably would make it possible to accept an exception on the principle of supremacy.18 Among European states there is some unanimity on what the fundamental constitutional norms are—especially since most of them have been enshrined in EU law—and there would accordingly be less controversy as to the situations where courts could decline to give supremacy to international law for incompatibility with these standards. At the international level, such an exception would be much more difficult to accept as the risks for instability in treaty performance would be much greater. Allowing states to escape compliance with their obligations based on fundamental rules of domestic law would entail serious risks. Recognition, at the international level, of a power of states (or international organisations like the EU) to prioritise domestic law over binding international obligations might obliterate boundaries of legality, and ‘might reinforce perceptions of international law as non-law (or quasi-law) – i.e., a loose system of non-enforceable principles, containing little, if any real constraints on state power.’19 Of course, the fact that international law will be unable to accept an exception to the principle of supremacy at the international level by allowing states a right to invoke fundamental rules of domestic constitutional law does not mean that states will change their practice at the domestic level. As indicated above, the number of instances in which states (or courts) may give priority to domestic law can be expected to increase rather than to decline. The result may be that in terms of descriptive analysis, we may well see an increasing collision between the international and the domestic legal order, with neither system recognising the internal effects of the claim to supremacy of the other legal order. At the same time, however, both systems in some respects can complement defects in rule of law protection of the other system.20 The European Court of Human Rights, or other international courts, may compensate for defects in the rule of law at domestic level, by determining a violation of the Convention and obliging the state to cure the defect. On the other hand, domestic courts may provide redress against decisions of international organisations where no such redress is available at international level. However, the descriptive and perhaps explanatory power of the model of two colliding yet sometimes complementary systems does not easily translate into a norm that international law can accept.

17 eg C Joerges, ‘Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy’ (2005) European University Institute Working Paper Law No 2005/12 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=838110. 18 L Besselink, A Composite European Constitution (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2007) 10–11 (arguing on the basis of Art 5 of the Treaty on the European Union that ‘European acts which do no respect … fundamental values do not take precedence over national rules and acts which express that national identify and the common values of the democratic rule of law.’). 19 Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation (n 15). 20 A von Bodgandy, ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 397. See for the notion of complementary between international and national legal orders A Nollkaemper, ‘Multilevel accountability in international law: a case study of the aftermath of Srebrenica’ in Y Shany and T Broude (eds) The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy, and Subsidiarity (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008) 345–67.

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André Nollkaemper SUBSTANTIVE QUALIFICATIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPREMACY

It may be possible to take a narrower approach and to identify a more specific criterion for qualifying the principle of supremacy. This criterion is the conformity of a rule of domestic law to international law. Decisions to refrain from giving effect in domestic legal orders to international law may be based on rules of domestic law that conform to or give effect to another rule of international law. In effect, they thus may protect values that international law itself seeks to protect as well. For instance, where domestic law gives effect to international obligations for the protection of fundamental rights, it is not obvious that an international obligation, particularly when adopted in a forum with limited accountability, should always prevail over such a domestic law. Domestic constitutional, legislative and judicial challenges21 to the full application of international law need not then be characterised as nationalistic reflexes that seek to undermine the international rule of law. Rather, they may be seen as legitimate responses that are necessary to preserve the rule of law—not only at the domestic level but also at the international level. The larger point here is that the distinction between these two levels cannot always easily be made. This approach shows similarities with what in European law has come to be known as the Solange II doctrine,22 as well with the approach adopted by the ECtHR in regard to its relationship to other international courts.23 It is equally relevant to the relationship between domestic law and international law. There are a seemingly increasing number of cases in domestic courts that may be explained and justified from this perspective. One example is the Görgülü decision, in which the German Bundesverfassungsgericht declined to give effect to a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights which would have restricted the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights under the Constitution. The Court held that, while it normally should give effect to a judgment of the European Court, that would not be so when to do so would ‘restrict or reduce the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights under the Constitution.’24 The Court noted that the commitment to international law takes effect only within the democratic and constitutional system of the Basic Law. Significantly, it referred in this context to a joint European development of fundamental rights.25 As to the effects on third parties, it stated that it is the task of the domestic courts to integrate a decision of the ECtHR into the relevant partial

21 Of course, the effect of (a lack of) legitimacy of international law is not only or not even primarily a matter for appreciation by the courts. A perceived lack of legitimacy will manifest itself primarily in decisions of (constitutional) legislatures to disallow their courts to apply international law. 22 Solange II, The German Constitutional Court (Karlsruhe, 22 October 1986) [1986] 37 BVerfGE 3. See on comparable cases in other states: A Peters, ‘The Globalization of State Constitutions’ in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide between International and National Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 266–67. 23 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim S¸irketi v Ireland (App no 45036/98) ECHR 2005-VI 107. 24 Görgülü, The German Constitutional Court (Karlsruhe, 14 October 2004) [2004] 111 BVerfGE 307, para 32 (emphasis added); see also para 62. 25 ibid, para 62.

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legal area of the national legal system by balancing conflicting rights, and that the ECtHR could not aim to achieve such solutions itself.26 Likewise, challenges in domestic courts of decisions of the Security Council Sanctions Committee that impose restrictions on individual human rights, which would score low on most indicators of the international rule of law, may be seen as justifiable attempts to preserve individual rights, and indeed the rule of law.27 In some respects this also holds for the Kadi judgment of the European Court of Justice. The Court protected fundamental rules of Community law, which in substance overlapped and indeed were informed by international (ECHR) standards.28 It might be argued that in at least some of these cases, courts do not and indeed cannot present the conflict in terms of a conflict between two international norms. In ‘dualistic’ states like Germany or Italy, the conflict will generally be phrased in terms of a conflict between two domestic (often constitutional) norms, or between a domestic norm on the one hand and a competing international obligation on the other. An example of the former approach was the Von Hannover case;29 examples of the latter are the judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Görgülü and the judgment of the Court of Justice in Kadi. Also courts in monist states may phrase such questions in terms of an international–domestic law conflict or, as a middle way, as a conflict between an international obligation and international public policy. An example of the latter is a decision of the French Court of Cassation in a dispute pertaining to the immunity from suit of the African Development Bank. The Court of Appeal of Orleans had denied the immunity, on the ground that no administrative tribunal had been established by the Bank; allowing the Bank to rely on immunity would be in breach of the right of access to court under Article 6 of the ECHR.30 Though France is a ‘monist’ state, like the Netherlands, and thus could have referred to international law, the Court of Cassation held that granting immunity would violate the right to a court which, in France, is part of the international public order.31 However, while in such cases, it may be said that at the domestic level we are concerned with a conflict between international law and domestic law, at the international level a parallel conflict may exist between two international norms. For the domestic law in question might be nothing else than the implementation of

26

ibid, para 58 E de Wet and A Nollkaemper, ‘Review of Security Council Decisions by National Courts’ (2002) 45 German Yearbook of International Law 166. 28 Kadi v Council (n 1). In para 283 the Court recalled that ‘according to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. In that regard, the ECHR has special significance.’ 29 Von Hannover v Germany (App no 59320/00) ECHR 2004-VI 1. 30 P Callé, ‘L’acte authentique établi à l’étranger—Validité et execution en France’ (2005) 94 Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 377, 405. 31 African Development Bank v Mr X (25 January 2005) Appeal No 04–41012 ILDC 778 (2005). 27

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an international obligation, or even a domestic norm that pre-existed and separately exists from an international obligation, yet in substance is largely identical. In such cases, the conflict between an international and a domestic norm may, at the international level, be transformed into a conflict between two international norms. An example of such a transformation of domestic constitutional rights into international rights is provided by Von Hannover v Germany, decided by the ECtHR.32 Princess Caroline of Monaco had brought a claim against the publication of certain photos in newspapers, arguing before the Bundesverfassungsgericht that there had been an infringement of her personality rights under Article 2(1) of the German Basic Law. The Bundesverfassungsgericht found that Germany had violated the rights of Princess Caroline, in regard to some photos, but dismissed the claim in regard to other photos, based inter alia on the principle of freedom of the press in Article 5(1) of the Basic Law.33 When Princess Caroline petitioned the ECtHR, the parties and the Court construed the legal issue in terms of a conflict between Article 8 and Article 10 of the European Convention. The conflict between these two rights thus is resolved (in this case, in favour of the applicant) at the international level. Likewise, though in cases such as Görgülü and Kadi the conflict was not exclusively expressed as a conflict between international obligations, the international dimension of the constitutional principles that were invoked lurked in the background. In the hypothetical situation where the state (or organisation) that allegedly fails to comply with an obligation is required to justify itself at the international level, it may well build its defence in such terms. It may be that the Court of Justice in Kadi understated its case, and perhaps limited its acceptability at the international level, by not putting more emphasis on the commonality between the European standards it sought to protect, on the one hand, and the human rights standards under the UN Conventions and customary law that were relevant to the exercise of powers by the Security Council, on the other.34 The approach proposed here thus is based on a substantive overlap between international law and domestic law and a commonality of constitutional values at the international and the domestic level.35 That commonality presents us with a criterion to distinguish these cases from, say, Medellin or from challenges to international law based on sharia.36

32

Von Hannover v Germany (n 29). Caroline von Monaco II, The German Constitutional Court, (Karlsruhe, 15 December 1999) [1999] 101 BVerfGE 361. 34 Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI Article 24(2); see further discussion in De Wet and Nollkaemper, Review of Security Council Decisions by National Courts (n 27). 35 See further discussion in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper, ‘Beyond the Divide’ in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide between International and National Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 341–60. 36 Though obviously not all such challenges would necessarily violate international law, see discussion by J Rehman, ‘The Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and International Human Rights Law: Examining the Theory and Practice of Polygamy and Talaq’ (2007) 21 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 108–27. 33

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For that reason, a distinction should be drawn between attempts to prioritise domestic law that conforms to international obligations and other justifications for non-performance of obligations. A hard core, and a relatively safe common ground, seems to be international human rights law. Indeed, the cases cited above (Görgülü, IPGRI and Kadi) all revolve around human rights. It also is not insignificant that many states restrict the precedence of international law in domestic legal order to cover solely international human rights treaties.37 There thus may be reciprocity between, on the one hand, states’ acceptance of domestic supremacy for fundamental human rights and, on the other hand, the acceptance that states may restrict the application of international law where to do so would violate such fundamental human rights. It is doubtful whether the international legitimacy endowed on qualifications of the principle of supremacy advocated here should go much beyond this category of fundamental human rights. At a global scale, international law could for instance not accept the argument that international decisions suffer democracy deficits that would justify non-compliance.38 It is in respect to those domestic values that correspond to international law that, at the domestic level, the supremacy of international law does not need not be understood as blind formalism, but can be construed in substantive terms. It cannot be presumed; it has to be earned on substance. The strength and persuasive power of the principle of supremacy at the domestic level depends on its ability to conform to rule-of-law requirements and to the values that international law itself proclaims.39

SUPREMACY AND CONFLICTS OF NORMS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

It may be said that the issue need not be presented as a conflict between international law and domestic law, but can be construed as a conflict between international legal obligations that can be wholly dealt with at the international level. The usual rules governing conflict between international norms then may lead to the priority of one norm, without any question of supremacy arising.40 However, a conflict between an international obligation and a competing fundamental right cannot always be resolved at the international level—at least not in a manner that would conform to the way that domestic courts would solve the problem. Even if a domestic court were to view a dispute in terms of a conflict between two international norms, its solution would not necessarily be identical to the solution that an international court would propose. For one thing, a domestic 37 Peters, The Globalization of State Constitutions (n 22) 260, 269–70. But see the Görgülü case (n 24), in which the BVerfG said that ECHR only enjoys the rank of a federal act and needs to be applied within the confines of the Basic Law (para 30, 35). 38 T Cottier and D Wüger, ‘Auswirkungen der Globalisierung auf das Verfassungsrecht: Eine Diskussionsgrundlage’ in B Sitter-Liver (ed), Herausgeforderte Verfassung: Die Schweiz im globalen Konzert (Freiburg,Universitätsverlag, 1999) 263–64; cited in Peters (n 22) 267. 39 ibid. 40 See ILC, ‘Report of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, finalized by Martti Koskeniemmi’ 56th session (3 May–4 June and 5 July–6 August 2004) UN Doc A/CN4/L628.

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court might seek to balance two obligations binding on the forum state (such as the ECHR and an extradition treaty), whereas an international court might not have that power, for instance because one of the parties before the international court was not a party to the ECHR. Consider the example of the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Short v Netherlands. The Court had to resolve a conflict between an obligation under a bilateral extradition treaty and the ECHR, arising from the fact that the US had requested extradition of a US soldier who might have faced the death penalty in the United States.41 The Court found that the obligation under the ECHR prevailed on the basis of a balance of interests. A similar approach was taken by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in respect of an extradition request from Thailand.42 If such a conflict were to be adjudicated by an international court that only had jurisdiction in respect to the extradition treaty, the outcome obviously might be different. Moreover, even if an international court were to have jurisdiction in respect of all relevant treaties, it might apply a different conflict rule than a domestic court would. The weighing of interests and obligations applied in the Dutch and Czech extradition cases referred to above, does not easily conform to international principles for the reconciliation of competing obligations.43 The same would hold for a hypothetical scenario where an international court reviewed the international responsibility of member states of the EU following the Kadi judgment.44 An international court might for instance find that it could not, like a state, give precedence to international human rights law, in view of the effects of Article 103 of the Charter at the international level—a principle that would not come into play domestically.45 Indeed, the ECtHR decisions in Behrami and Saramati46 show that that the European Court is likely to arrive at a different balance of interest. The few hierarchies that international law does establish, such as Article 103 of the UN Charter, need not be recognised domestically. Conversely, domestic courts may establish a hierarchy of norms (with fundamental rights on top), or come to a balance of interests, that international courts need not follow. This situation is significantly different from the situation addressed by the traditional principle of supremacy, which, in its practical manifestations, means that a state cannot plead provisions of domestic law as a ground for nonobservance of international obligations. If the reason for non-observance is a rule of domestic law that conforms to an international obligation, the conflict is not

41 CDS v The State of the Netherlands Netherlands Supreme Court, (The Hague, 30 March 1990) [1991] 22 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 432 42 Recognition of a Sentence Imposed by a Thai Court, Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (Brno, 21 February 2007), I ÚS 601/04, International Law in Domestic Courts 990. 43 See the various principles governing the conflict of norms discussed in ILC, Report of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, finalised by Martti Koskeniemmi (United Nations, UN Doc A/CN4/L628, 2004). 44 Kadi v Council (n 1). 45 Unless it would find that the Council would have acted ultra vires; see de Wet and Nollkaemper (n 27) 375, or the Council would have violated a rule of ius cogens; see A Orakhelsashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 465. 46 Behrami and Behrami v France (App no 71412/01) and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (App no 78166/01) ECHR 2 May 2007.

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between international law and domestic law, but between a (possible) international determination of how a conflict between two obligations should be resolved and a domestic determination of how such a conflict should be resolved. It is debatable whether this conflict should be construed in terms of the principle of supremacy. On the one hand, it may not be a problem of supremacy in the narrow sense of the term, as for instance codified in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). On the other hand, if we use the concept of supremacy in a broad meaning, as referring to the subordination of the sovereignty of states to international law, it still may be possible to construe such a conflict between an international and a domestic interpretation as a problem of supremacy. The subordination of the sovereignty of states to international law may be said to include the supremacy of international over purely domestic decisions on how to reconcile two competing obligations. In either case, the normative conflict discussed here is of an essentially different nature to traditional international law–domestic law conflicts. First, there is a difference of principle. Rather than seeking to prioritise domestic law over international law, states seek to contribute to the effective performance of international obligations. We are thus not concerned with nationalistic solutions that undermine the cause of international law, and that for this reason are principally rejected at the international level. Rather, courts seek to give effect to what they perceive as (domestic translations) of fundamental rules of international law. It seems that the international legal order should treat such cases differently to attempts to prioritise domestic law over international law. Second, the fact that a state seeks to justify non-compliance with an international obligation by reference to another international obligation, rather than to a rule of domestic law, changes the parameters of the dispute. Rather than being analysed in a black and white manner (domestic law can never trump international law), the conflict is now subjected to rules of international law pertaining to conflicts between two or more international norms.47 While these rules do establish some parameters, they are much more flexible and the outcome is much less straightforward than the application of the principle of Article 27 of the VCLT. The difference may be illustrated by the proceedings instituted by Germany against Italy for failing to respect the jurisdictional immunities of Germany.48 The dispute may be framed as a conflict between the rights of jurisdictional immunity vis-à-vis the Italian argument that in cases of international crimes, no such right exist. If the conflict were to be presented purely in terms of a dispute ofinternational law versus domestic law, Germany’s argument could be endorsed by the court by simple reference to the principle of supremacy and to Article 3 of the Articles on State Responsibility. If however the conflict is presented, as seems likely, in terms of two opposing rules of international law, that argument would be immaterial. The question then becomes one of interpretation of the law of

47

See the comprehensive discussion of conflict rules in ILC (n 43). See Respect of the Jurisdictional Immunity as a Sovereign State (Germany v Italy) (Pending) ICJ Press Release 2008/44 www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/14925.pdf (last accessed 24 May 2009). 48

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immunities and the rules governing the resolution between competing international obligations—a question that leaves room for a wider analysis. It is true that in those rare instances in which a case reaches an international court, such as the case now brought by Germany against Italy, this court eventually would have to come up with a single answer as to which interpretation should prevail. In the event of the international court not accepting the hierarchy of norms as interpreted by the state, the outcome might be identical to the situation where the state relies on domestic rather than international law. An international court is likely to reject the attempt of a state to justify non-performance by reference to a fundamental obligation that is not recognised as being hierarchically superior.49 However, two qualifications are in order. First, there is a good argument to be made that domestic decisions on balancing of international obligations are entitled to a deference that gives states a wide margin of appreciation in the definition, interpretation and balancing of fundamental rights. That obviously is true in cases concerning a conflict between two norms, each covered by the ECHR and the ICCPR, as was the case in the von Hannover case.50 In that respect also Article 53 of the ECHR is relevant, providing that ‘Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.’51 Arguably it also may apply when a domestic court balances a fundamental right with a substantive right of another state. For the question would be which state should incur the costs of normative ambiguity caused by the conflict between two international norms.52 Leaving no deference to the state in question ‘marks a questionable policy preference for inaction (i.e., the prevailing status quo), even when action is legitimized by international law.’53 In effect, it would freeze the law, precisely in an area where emerging practice at national level can change hierarchies at the international level. Second, in the majority of cases, no claim is brought to an international court. In such cases the situation will be that a domestic court, which in a normative ambiguous situation prioritises fundamental rights over other state rights, will have a credible claim of legitimacy. The case of Short is illustrative. Even though the

49 This is indeed suggested by the Judgment of the ECHR in Al-Adsani v the United Kingdom (App no 35763/97) ECHR 2001-XI 79. 50 Von Hannover v Germany (n 29). 51 See for an application: Decision regarding the scope of the fundamental right to protection of personality rights pursuant to Article 2.1 in conjunction with Article 1.1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz—GG) in respect of photographs of celebrities within the context of entertaining media reports concerning their private and everyday life,Bundesverfassungsgericht (26 February 2008) 1 BvR 1602/07 para 52 (holding that ‘Gewährleistungen der Konvention und die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte dienen darüber hinaus auf der Ebene des Verfassungsrechts als Auslegungshilfen für die Bestimmung von Inhalt und Reichweite von Grundrechten, sofern dies nicht zu einer - von der Konvention selbst nicht gewollten (vgl Art 53 EMRK) - Einschränkung oder Minderung des Grundrechtsschutzes nach dem Grundgesetz führt’). 52 Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’ (n 15) 925. 53 ibid.

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choice to abide by the ECHR, and not the extradition treaty, caused the Netherlands to violate an international obligation towards the United States, few would contest the legitimacy of the balance struck by the Dutch court.54 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

With the increase of decisions of international organisations and perhaps also treaty obligations that may not satisfy requirements that have been set at domestic level in terms of protection of the rule of law and fundamental rights, we seem likely to witness a growing reluctance of domestic courts to give supremacy to international law in their domestic legal order. From one perspective, this leads to international law and domestic law complementing each other in the protection of the rule of law and fundamental rights. However, without further benchmarks, international law will not be able to accept domestic challenges to the performance of international obligations based on a conflict with domestic law, and will assert the supremacy of international law. The benchmark on which acceptance by international law may be based can only be found in international law itself. In a substantial and probably increasing number of cases, challenges based on domestic fundamental rights overlap with and thus can also be based on international norms. The substantive overlap and interdependence between international law and domestic law leads to a qualification of the principle of supremacy as states may acquire more power to assert domestic/international norms to justify non-performance of international obligations. This is not necessarily an apologetic move that sacrifices the normative ideals of international law and its supremacy. Paradoxically, by bringing the (application of the) principle close to domestic practice, the ideals of international law may be better served. Recognising a substantive qualification of supremacy may help solve the opposition, and resulting paralysis, between the supremacy of international law and the supremacy of domestic law. States may be more willing to allow international law into their domestic legal orders, if they can be relatively certain that they will have a final check that international law does not upset their fundamental rights. This would be in line with the practice of states that allows for domestic precedence of international human rights law.55 It has the advantage of bringing the principle of supremacy at the international level and the principle of supremacy at the domestic level closer together.56 A related asset of this perspective is that it allows us to recognise the role that domestic courts can play in upholding the international rule of law by scrutinising whether international acts (in particular acts of international organisations, but also treaties) are compatible with fundamental rights. Determining whether or not such international acts of law-making conform to fundamental rights ideally would be a 54

CDS v The State of the Netherlands (n 41). Peters (n 22). 56 cf for a similar argument in the context of EU law Besselink, A Composite European Constitution (n 18). 55

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task of international courts. But in the absence of such courts with adequate jurisdiction, national courts can provide the missing link by assessing international acts against fundamental rights, either ‘as international norms’ or in the form of domestic constitutional rights. Rather than seeing domestic filters as an unwarranted barrier to the full effect of international law, such filters may be complementary to the ambitions of international law itself. Rather than being faithful but blind enforcers of international law, domestic courts may have to fulfil a role as a safety-valve or ‘gate keepers’.57 Thereby, they also can put pressure on international decision-makers to get it right, much in the same manner as the Solange case law in Germany put pressure on decision-makers in the EC to recognise and protect fundamental rights. Similarly, the Kadi case may put pressure on the Security Council to adjust the procedures, assuming that the Council is concerned about the effects of its resolutions in the European Union and that the defects in terms of rule-setting cannot be resolved at the European level. The substantive approach to supremacy advanced here does not at all solve or prevent normative conflicts—it just may relocate them. The approach advanced here also is not entirely risk-free. But it is grounded in attempts to give effect to international obligations, rather than to deny such effect. Whatever concerns remain, may be outweighed by the defects in the rule of law quality of international law, which needs to be solved at the international level.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books L Besselink, A Composite European Constitution (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2007). I Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs. International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1988). D Carreau, Droit International, 8th edn (Paris, Pedone, 2004). J Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002). G Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice Vol II (Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 1986). A Orakhelsashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006). C Santuli, Le Status International de L’Ordre Juridique Étatique (Paris, Pedone, 2001). 57 F Kratochwil, ‘The Role of Domestic Courts as Agencies of the International Legal Order’ in R Falk, F Kratochwil and S Mendlovitz (eds), International Law, A Contemporary Perspective, Studies on a Just World Order 2 (Boulder, Westview, 1985) 237; Peters, ‘The Globalization of State Constitutions’ (n 22) 267.

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Chapters in Edited Volumes G Arangio-Ruiz, ‘International Law and Interindividual Law’ in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds) New Perspectives on the Divide between International and National Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). T Cottier and D Wüger, ‘Auswirkungen der Globalisierung auf das Verfasungsrecht: Eine Diskussionsgrundlage’ in B Sitter-Liver (ed), Herausgeforderte Verfassung: Die Schweiz im globalen Konzert (Freiburg, Universitätsverlag, 1999). J Crawford, ‘International Law and Australian Federalism: Past, Present and Future’ in BR Opeskin and DR Rothwell (eds), International Law and Australian Federalism (Victoria, Melbourne University Press, 1997). T Gehring, ‘Treaty-Making and Treaty Evolution’ in D Bodansky et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). F Kratochwil, () ‘The Role of Domestic Courts as Agencies of the International Legal Order’ in: R Falk, F Kratochwil and S Mendlovitz (eds), International Law, A Contemporary Perspective, Studies on a Just World Order 2 (Boulder, Westview, 1985). J Nijman and A Nollkaemper, ‘Beyond the Divide’ in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide between International and National Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). A Nollkaemper, ‘Multilevel accountability in international law: a case study of the aftermath of Srebrenica’ in Y Shany and T Broude (eds) The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy, and Subsidiarity (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008). A Peters, ‘The Globalization of State Constitutions’ in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide between International and National Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). International Documents International Law Commission (2001) Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Annex to UNGA Res 56/83 – UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (United Nations). International Law Commission (2006) Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN 4/L 682 (United Nations). Journal Articles E Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ (1999) 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 843–54. A Bianchi, ‘International Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revealed’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 751–81.

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D Bodanksy, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 596–624. P Callé, ‘L’acte authentique établi à l’étranger—Validité et execution en France’ (2005) 94 Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 377–412. J Crawford, ‘International Law and the Rule of law’ (2004) 24 Adelaide Law Review 3–12. E de Wet and A Nollkaemper, ‘Review of Security Council Decisions by National Courts’ (2002) 45 German Yearbook of International Law 166–202. G Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law’ (1957) 92 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 1–227. M Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 907–31. J Rehman, ‘The Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and International Human Rights Law: Examining the Theory and Practice of Polygamy and Talaq’ (2007) 21 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 108–27. Y Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’ (2006) 16 European Journal of International Law 907–40. A von Bodgandy, ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 397–413. A Watts, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1993) 36 German Yearbook of International Law 15–45. JHH Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law: Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’ (2004) 64 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 547–62.

Working Papers C Joerges, ‘Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy’ European University Institute Working Paper Law No 2005/12 (2005) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=838110.

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Natural Law and the Possibility of Universal Normative Foundations BEBHINN DONNELLY-LAZAROV *

INTRODUCTION

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UR WORLD IS heterogeneous; its cultures differ, its territories and their resources are unevenly formed and, fundamentally, each of its individual citizens is unique. Unsurprisingly, the normative orders that regulate these aspects of being, not just discretely but as interacting phenomena, differ too. Legal systems exist in what may be shifting territories with shifting cultural populations, unstable natural resources, against the challenges of political and popular pressure, and in evolving international normative structures. The role of international law is a particularly complex one; normatively to represent and/or reconcile heterogeneity where it is legitimate to do so. There is not much in this picture that appears to be universal, fundamental, or unshifting, and in seeking to determine which norms should be recognised universally, if any, it seems that there is little in the world of fact to assist. The analysis that follows will propose that certain norms are based on universal grounds and deserve universal recognition. Despite heterogeneity, it will be suggested that the world of fact, in particular our specifically human nature, can inform our account of what these norms may be. The suggestion is not that there are norms that should apply without exception and without consideration for their impact on other norms (universality at the level of norm application is not argued for) but, rather, that certain features of human nature give rise to rights that should be recognised universally.1 A natural law perspective will be used in an attempt to ascertain how grounds for universal norms may be discerned in a heterogeneous world.

* Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Swansea University 1 The task here may usefully be distinguished from the task that Bogdandy and Dellavalle set themselves in recent work. Their aim is meticulously to analyse the paradigms of universalism and particularism as responses to the question ‘how far truly public order can reach.’ ‘Is it confined to the borders of the homogeneous political community (particularism) or does it potentially include all societies and human beings (universalism)?’ See A von Bogdandy and S Dellavalle, Universalism and Particularism as Paradigms of International Law (Institute for International Law and Justice/New York University School of Law, International Law and Justice Working Paper no 3, 2008) 1. Here the aim is to consider whether there are norms that warrant universal recognition. There is little attempt to discern whether global public order is the appropriate legal mechanism to secure such recognition, though the issue is touched upon.

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Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov WHAT MAKES NATURAL LAW, NATURAL ‘LAW’?

According to natural law, all entities, including human beings, have ends or goods that fulfil and govern their nature; to become an oak tree, for example, is an end for an acorn; it is the fulfilment of its capacity to grow and it is the only end that the growth ultimately can lead to. Whilst human beings are deemed to have ends, just like the acorn, there are, of course, important ways in which human beings differ, normatively, from other entities. These differences are attributable to our possession of reason. The acorn, by nature, just becomes or fails to become an oak tree; it does not have any choice in the matter. The absence of choice can be seen to have two implications. First it establishes that non-rational entities, in so far as they are active at all, must (rather than ought to) pursue their ends. Second it can be said that an entity without a rational nature must pursue its ends. The acorn cannot, at least without very substantial human intervention, grow to become a sycamore tree, for example. To have ends, then, is first to be compelled to pursue one’s own nature and second to be constrained by that same nature; natural law is natural law in that entities are deemed to be governed by their nature. Our possession of reason substantially complicates this story. Reason, unlike growth, does not simply happen or fail to happen; rather, it is constituted by deliberative qualities like, reflection, analysis, prudence, principle, coherence and consistency. In a way, therefore, reason is precisely the opposite of a ‘natural’ quality. However, in the natural law account, the ability to pursue our nature in these reason-based ways is precisely our nature and the aspect of our being that makes us moral. Like the acorn, we are constrained by our nature—we cannot be other than the (human) entity that we actually are—but, because reason defines our nature, we are to work, morally, at becoming fully who we are, in a way that the acorn does not. The burden of morality arises, in the natural law schema, precisely because this specifically human type of action is capable of being comprised of consciousness and does not merely happen.2 Human goods can of course be pursued in a number of ways; through irrationality, through desire and animalistic qualities, or through arbitrariness. Yet, the possibility of pursuing our ends in an unreasoning way (the possibility of the ‘unnatural’) is precisely the context that allows the natural lawyer to claim that man ‘ought’ to pursue his ends. Morality arises from man’s ability to pursue his ends according to reason and from the lack of necessity in the same. A key natural law insight emerges from the interaction that is to occur between reason and other ‘essential’ elements of human nature which is that the dissonance between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ at the origins of normativity disappears. Fundamentally what we ought to be and do, by this account, derives its meaning and its force from the ‘is’, from the kind of being that we are. 2 Korsgaard acknowledges that for human beings, natural ‘law’ takes on a peculiar meaning: ‘According to the teleological ethics of the ancient world, to be virtuous is to realize our true nature, to be the best version of what we are. So it is to let our own nature be a law to us.’ C Korsgaard, ‘Reflective Endorsement’ in C Korsgaard (ed), The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996) 66.

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In the somewhat idiosyncratic interplay that occurs between nature and reason, natural law can be seen to appeal for existential reflection to accompany the deliberative process that is central to many accounts of the foundation of human rights. This is where the specificity of natural law is most clearly evidenced; deliberation is to take place against a context that is given, ie, our nature as human. The deliberative process will involve not merely a forward thinking account of what values human beings should pursue and how, therefore, but this same account in the context of a reflective consideration of who we are; by discovering who really we are we bring rights to the deliberative table and deliberation thenceforth is not about what rights there should be but about how the rights that ‘are’ (and hence ‘are’ universal) by nature, should be pursued. Proper pursuit will no doubt produce an important role for heterogeneity at the level of norm application but never to the extent that recognition of certain basic rights is denied.

UNIVERSALITY AND DIFFERENCE AS NON-CONTRADICTORY ‘CARRIERS’ OF VALUE

From a natural law perspective, the apparent tension between universality and difference is not a basic tension but a representation of the more fundamental apparent dichotomy between ‘ought’ and ‘is’. At this fundamental level, difference makes no difference for the questions are not those of relativism: ‘does cultural context determine in part what ought to be?’; ‘does the concept of nationhood have a special role?’; ‘what is the role of individuality and how can it be reconciled with communality?’ Rather there is a single question that forms the basis of these and many others, namely ‘how does what “is” relate to what “ought to be”?’ This question is an unavoidable one in understanding normativity (and consequently in beginning to understand the grounds of law and its legitimacy), but it is important for two incidental reasons that bear upon the grounds of legitimacy of international law: (1) it encourages us to worry about who I am/we are as much as about who ‘the different is’ (to consider not only whether a particular normative tradition should set the standard for other cultures but also whether ‘we’ are setting our own standards well) and (2) by respecting the individuality of natures as such (the ‘is’), it may allow a clearer understanding of the role of difference as a ‘carrier’ of value to emerge. Any attempt to understand the normative relevance of difference and universality and the relationship between the two by considering just these concepts will prove fruitless. In the abstract, we may think it is a good thing to value ‘difference’ for example, but a bad thing to validate what ‘is’ just in virtue of its ‘being’; to value difference for the sake of difference. The abstract attempt very quickly produces norms that point in opposite or at least different directions. This is unsurprising for the value of an action or a practice is found in its nature as such and in the implications it has and rarely, if at all, in its nature as different or universal. For example, a language will be worth protecting, because it assists in preserving the identity of a particular culture or because we can learn something about the history of human evolution through studying its historical development but hardly just

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because it is different to some other language. Likewise, the fact that a particular practice is universal—imagine that a certain form of torture comes to be commonplace—is hardly the reason either to prohibit or allow it. What should matter in the legal response to the act is that it amounts to torture, not that it is universal. Assuming one law-maker, difference and universality are not the point, the point is whether and how the law-maker is to censure, permit and protect certain actions and practices. There is another sense in which difference of itself seems to be relevant which relates precisely to the question of whether there should be one ‘law-maker’. If value judgements are to be made about human actions and practices, then maybe certain groups are better equipped than the law-maker to determine what those judgements should be; at least those groups should be in a position to insist that the law-maker modifies its norms to suit the particular group.3 In this sense, normative autonomy represents the entitlement of the ‘different’ to set its own values relative to its context. But again, here it may quickly be seen that the value of normative autonomy is not in virtue of the group’s difference to other groups but, say, in virtue of its ability most effectively to meet or mirror the particular needs, expectations and traditions of its members and to represent the features that contribute to the group’s sense of its own value. Difference is a condition of much of what may be good about normative autonomy here, but it is not the reason for it being good. One could not, for example, easily sustain the claim that people with brown hair deserve an element of normative autonomy; there would be negligible value in that, other than difference itself. For just the same reason it would be nonsensical to argue that we all ought to be subject to the same rules all the time, just because we are all human, and to give a value to universality itself. The value in difference, like the value in universality, both at the level of practices and norm-setting comes from what these conditions offer human beings not from the conditions alone. Difference and universality may be seen as carriers of value rather than values in themselves. What needs to be determined is whether it is a good thing for certain norms to be recognised universally—whether there is value for human beings in the same—and

3 Assuming an international legal order, it may be supposed, for example, that the state is nonetheless best positioned to posit certain aspects of its citizens’ normative entitlements and duties. Bogdandy and Dellavalle note that it is the particularist paradigm which reflects this vision of nationhood at its strongest: ‘In the traditional understanding the nation State is seen as the highest form of realisation of a people bound in solidarity. It is the source of all law and the foundation and framework of the national economy. Only through the nation State can the national language, the national literature, the national system of science and arts, the national culture in general realise their full potential.’ See Bogdandy and Dellavalle, Universalism and Particularism as Paradigms of International Law (n 1) 12. Interestingly, the notion of realising potential as the ‘thing’ in question is in keeping with the natural law position which seeks fulfilment of the ‘is’ within moral confines. However, natural law does not, of necessity, lead to particularism. Its premises suggest that the form of order that does in fact better instantiate the fulfilment of the individual, the culture, the state, etc, is the form of order that should be preferred. It may turn out that over a certain realm of human affairs, global public order is to be preferred to an exclusively national order. A degree of fusion of national realms may, by this understanding, be desirable, although it may be considered unlikely that global law could ever be capable of being adequately attuned to, or sufficiently flexible to accommodate, all (legitimate) appeals to normative-distinctiveness.

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according to natural law there is. The natural law perspective also tends to suggest that the universal norms that are capable of possessing such value do not have the effect of creating homogeneity and do not pose a threat to the benefits that may accrue to human beings from difference. Indeed, using a natural law model, the role of universality is not to universalise. It is rather to allow any form of existence to pursue its fulfilment as such (this is entailed by the normative foundations of natural law) albeit within the confines of universal, definitive boundaries that themselves are taken to contribute to individual fulfilment. Universality at this normative level and in this sense does not stand in contradiction to difference; rather it will, inter alia, contain the criteria to determine the extent to which heterogeneity in human action should be mirrored at the level of norm-application. It is not, of course, that natural law argues against any substantively universal norms, but rather that the type of substantively universal norms that are argued for are sufficiently receptive to difference in human affairs to permit an appropriate degree of heterogeneity at the level of norm application.

‘UNIVERSAL’ NATURES

If normativity is understood to be conditioned by our essential nature, it follows that we need to reflect on ‘who essentially we are’ in order to know ‘how we ought to be.’ Recognition of our unique possession of reason and an understanding of reason’s uniquely normative force did not, of itself, establish, for natural lawyers, any substantive principle of action. Indeed a key natural law claim is that neither the ‘existence’ of normativity nor our knowledge of it can be attributed to pure reason alone. Instead it was the attachment of reason to the creature in which reason belonged that was of crucial importance; to recognise reason’s authority was to recognise in the first place that there is an entity, the human being, in which reason belongs, whose specific nature is formed by reason. Other essential elements of the nature of the being in which reason existed defined how reason could be applied to it and in effect what reason could mean practically in that world. Aquinas makes clear the sense in which nature has a priority to ‘reason’ in determining human norms: The will is master of its actions, and its proper mode of causing is over and above that which goes with nature, in which there is a determinism to one effect. All the same, because it is grounded on nature, it needs must share in the natural working of its subject, and to this extent, that an element which belongs to an early causal stage of development remains in a later stage. Basically we are what we are by our nature and accordingly act as we do, and that comes before our voluntary acting.4

Pure reason, in so far as it can bear upon my action, is, after all, my pure reason; it is attached to me and ‘I’ am something. This is why natural lawyers understood that to act in accordance with reason just was to act in accordance with nature.

4 T Aquinas and T McDermott (ed) Summa Theologiae (Notre Dame, IN, Ave Maria Press, 1989) 1a2ae 10, 1.

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There are ends that constrain my reason as practical, by virtue of its attachment to me, and these ends in natural law formed the substance of the laws which govern us naturally. The other ends which are taken to constitute the basis of our essential natures are surprisingly simple, and the authoritarian caricature of natural law should fall away in this light. We are to act according to reason in pursuit of the natural ends of reason itself, life and community.5 These fundamental ends are taken to correspond to the natural law, because they do not depend on being chosen; they make me what I am, whether I want them to or not. The goods of reason, life and community are to be the foundation for legal norms; most immediately it is rights doctrines by which we may expect to recognise the force of these three basic human goods which, by a natural law understanding, are the source of the legitimacy of human rights. It is not surprising that the conditions that establish our normative nature are central to an understanding of the substantive principles of normativity; take these conditions away (or to put it substantively, breach these ends), and the basis for believing that there is any sense to normativity—anything normative to inquire into—falls away too. Kant’s analysis of the moral status of suicide reflects the necessity of certain essentials to normativity; ‘to annihilate the subject of morality in one’s own person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world’.6 Korsgaard makes a similar point about the implications for normativity of rejecting life: If value is the fact of life, then a rejection of all value takes the form of a rejection of life. The most straightforward expression of complete practical normative scepticism would therefore be a form of suicide.7

In keeping with these insights, traditional natural law takes the condition of life to be essential to morality but it is essential alongside, community and reason too. These three were the conditions that, for natural lawyers, made man moral and to deny any one was to annihilate the subject of morality and to deny morality any place in the world. There is, of course, much dispute about whether natural law does identify human goods well and certainly in new natural law a different set of such goods is identified. Finnis identifies (by a markedly different methodology) life, knowledge, friendship, practical reasonableness, play, aesthetic experience and religion. There is

5 There are many ways to conceptualise the ends of traditional natural law theory. Those referred to here represent an interpretation of the Thomistic laws of nature presented in Summa Theologiae. 6 I Kant and M Gregor (translator and ed), The Metaphysics of Morals, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996) 547. 7 Korsgaard points out that of course not every act of suicide has this meaning: ‘I believe that there can be good reasons for committing suicide. … Most people would rather die than completely lose their identities, and there are various ways to do that. Violating your own essential principles, failing to meet your deepest obligations, is … one, but there are others over which we have less control. The ravages of severe illness, disability and pain can shatter your identity by destroying its physical basis, obliterating memory or making self-command impossible. Suicide, in such cases, may be the only way to preserve your identity, and to protect the values for which you have lived.’ Korsgaard, ‘Reflective Endorsement’ (n 2) 161.

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a strong kinship with the scholastic origins, however; along with Grisez and Boyle, Finnis claims that the basic goods are ‘aspects of the fulfilment of persons’ that ‘correspond to the inherent complexities of human nature’.8 The substantive goods that emerge from a particular natural law perspective may be thought to provide a sound basis for universal recognition of certain human rights; these goods are to represent our nature as human, a nature that we share, whoever we are, whatever we have become. Where a connection to this essence is missing in the justification for rights provisions we ought to question whether the rights at issue are really rights at all and ought to be particularly wary of imposing such ‘rights’ (particularly with a high degree of universality in application) in heterogeneous contexts. Likewise where specific human activities, however commonplace, appear to offend basic rights, we ought similarly to be careful not to validate what ‘is’ in virtue of its being. In this way, we are encouraged to trust our account of the ‘right’ above any value we may tend to give an activity or practice in virtue of it being universal.

UNIVERSALITY AND LAW’S REACH

From a natural law perspective, the overriding normative requirement that underlies human existence is to pursue humanity to its most complete extent. For the individual, this translates into a requirement to do so in the manner befitting his capabilities. This is true of the individual as an individual and as a member of groups. As an athletic, artistic Christian, John, for example, is to be these things well, and that means relative not only to the goods specific to athleticism, art and Christianity, but also in pursuit of the overriding goods of reason, community and life. In the natural law tradition, becoming good involves a narrowing of the gap between incomplete and complete forms of actuality, whatever type of actuality is in question, but always for the overriding complete actuality of humanity itself. As soon as we, at an individual level or through our societies and institutions, enter into relationships or develop the potential to have relationships with others, these others are part of our normative world,9 and the capacity to perfect these normative relations (which may sometimes, but need not, mean creating institutional legal norms) becomes one that, according to natural law reasoning, we ought to act upon. To fail to do so is to fail to fulfil our nature as normative for it is to leave the good of community in a stage of actuality which our potentiality, in respect of how best to satisfy evolving needs, has surpassed. As Luhman observed some time ago, the world is fully globalised; the potentially relevant normative context for ‘complete actuality’ is a global one.

8 G Grisez, J Finnis and J Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends’ (1987) 32 American Jorunal of Jurisprudence 99, 107. 9 Plato, Aristotle, the Old Stoics, Aquinas and Grotius represent a tradition in so far as each takes the natural evolution to institutions and institutional laws as being founded on man’s nature as sociable/communicative. The concept of man as a political animal represents the most celebrated account of this evolution.

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The fact that normative relations are global does not of necessity mean that such normative relations are best ‘perfected’ by global legal practices. The good of community may be breached by the failure at least to conceive of the global in a consideration of how far law’s domain legitimately may extend. Such a failure may at some point leave the community in a stage of development that falls far behind our capacity and/or need to provide for, recognise and protect each other’s needs, interests and values. However, this is not the place to provide a full account of whether and to what extent an element of globality in law is legitimate or desirable. The argument could be made, for example, that although, as suggested here, certain rights ought to be recognised universally, the proper mechanism for such recognition and the most effective way to secure rights globally, is via state law or through cosmopolitan legal orders.10 Here, the more modest suggestion is that in so far as law does operate at the global level (or at any other level, for that matter) it ought to do so in pursuit of and through protection of basic human goods/rights that warrant universal recognition.

AUTONOMY AND TOLERANCE IN UNIVERSALITY

Global normativity is not, of course, a movement to sameness. Should it come to be the case that rights, which warrant universal recognition, receive such recognition at a global level, it must, of course, be understood that at the level of norm application a significant variation should be permitted. Indeed, it may be expected that the more global law’s reach, the greater the need will arise for variation, flexibility, and discretion at the level of norm application to secure the effective implementation of universal, highly abstract and general rights in obviously and necessarily heterogeneous contexts. Laws protect basic human goods, but for the benefit of those whose goods these are, ie individually constituted human beings whose institutions and cultures are unique. The governing requirement of natural law is that all things ought to be what they are; ‘I’ am not only a member of the community (most widely constituted in the entirety of global existence). I am first an individual; I am also a member of a culture, a religion, a sporting organisation, a nation etc. The individual and the associations to which they belong will seek self-creation according to their own natures. These forms of being ought not to act against the goods that warrant universal recognition, but we may consider that in pursuit of basic goods they ought to have the autonomy that befits their natures. Finnis emphasises the respect for individual autonomy in the Thomistic tradition, found in the concept of the common good: So, although there is no [type of] virtue the acts of which cannot be prescribed by law, human law does not make prescriptions about all the acts of all the virtues, but only about those acts which are relatable {ordinabiles} to the common good, whether immediately (as when things are done directly for the common good) or mediately (as when things are 10 See HP Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) for an account of how such legal orders may be thought possible.

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regulated {ordinantur} by the legislator as being relevant to the good education {perninentia ad bonam disciplinam}) by which citizens are brought up to preserve the common good of justice and peace.11

In the natural law scheme, the personal and the political are best reconciled where, so far as there is no impact on the community, the choice of how to be active remains with the individual. By analogy, in the international context, the choice of how to be constituted as a culture or in any other way should remain with that culture so long as the wider goods of the international community are not infringed and so long as the goods of those subject to the individual culture (ie individual members of the international community) are respected too.12 There is a multitude of ways to seek to secure/protect basic goods and the choice of how to secure human rights in a particular context should be an autonomous one. In addition, room for error should be allowed; no state can ever reach ends that by definition are perfective; it can only, at best, seek to do so. It follows that the basic natural law principle that all things ought to be what essentially they are, in fact contains a fundamental contradiction. Human beings, and their institutions, are necessarily imperfect; to ask us to attain perfection is actually to contradict the principle that each thing ought to be what essentially it is. Imperfection is an essential element of the thing that we are. Since the attainment of the perfective end is impossible, it can represent a conceptual end only. This brings into view the important role not only of autonomy but also of tolerance; tolerance, in this sense, asks us to accept that it may be appropriate to respect autonomy even when the opportunity for human fulfilment is not as advanced in one context as it is in another. Western liberal democracies may be expected to exhibit, in their legal systems, a level of protection for human rights that many other societies have not yet attained. Yet it cannot be assumed either that all states, given their particular circumstances and restraints, should be expected to have a similar level of protection now or that Western liberal democracies are doing enough. The question that naturally arises, from framing the debate in this way, is, ‘how far must any form of existence go toward reaching its conceptual end?’ We can say with certainty that human beings and their institutions can go no further than their capacities allow; the most we can do is: seek absolutely to attain the conceptual end. This commitment represents our real as opposed to our conceptual end. Part of the pursuit of conceptual ends will include overcoming circumstances that operate as restraints on one’s capacities, but it remains true that not all states,

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J Finnis, Aquinas (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998) 225 This latter qualification is important for the community of people is affected not only when a state directly offends the goods in an international context but also when it offends the goods of its own citizens. The normative context is international; each individual citizen is a member of a global normative order and ought to be able to command protection at the outermost reaches of that order where only a globally instituted level of protection is sufficient to secure human rights. Rights are claimed not in virtue of our individuality as some sort of discrete phenomenon (if such a notion could be sustained at all), but only in virtue of the actual and potential effects of mutual existence both for the individual and groups of individuals. Such mutual existence takes place now at a global level. It may follow that protection for basic human rights may be adequate only at that same level. 12

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cultures and institutions will have the capacity to secure human goods in advance of conceptual ends to the same degree as others. The notion of self-defence can illustrate how it may be legitimate to allow a particular action even where the conceptual end (say life) is missed completely. A system of law that permits a defence of self-defence recognises that there are real limits on our ability to protect life as a basic good. One significant limit is that others, for whatever reason, will in fact actively aim to take life away. That negative aim will impact on our ability to meet the target good of preserving life because it may necessitate a response of self-defence that results in depriving the offender of his life. The point of importance is that by killing in self-defence, the deliberative response to life as a good has not altered; the respect for life as a basic good has not been diminished. By killing in these circumstances, it is undeniable that we have factually missed our conceptual target of preserving life. The miss may be legitimised by law, however, in recognition of the existence of a factual/real barrier to achieving the end of life. Finnis attributes a similar type of reasoning to Aquinas: Have I then no right to resist the vicious or insane killers attack? On the contrary, I can rightly resist the attack, preserving myself (or one or more others) by using whatever means are reasonably necessary for, and part and parcel of, repelling it. I do not lose this right just because I can foresee that these means will probably or even certainly have as their side-effect the assailant’s death. For in doing what I do, I need not – and must not – be intending to kill (or indeed to harm). I can – and should – be intending and choosing no more than to do what it takes to stop the attack {repellendi iniuriam}. That is the object {obiectum: finnis} or purpose of my acting; and the effect on my assailants life is a sideeffect, outside the intention {praetor intentionem} or set of intentions from which the action gets its per se character as a morally assessable act.13

A self-defence analogy may be useful in the context of international intervention and in making a contribution to debate over the justification for war. Where the international community responds to a breach of basic rights, it should do so only after careful consideration of whether the permissible level of discretion has been breached. For this to occur, it will minimally be necessary that the offending action is either (a) deliberately contrary to a conceptual end (ie where the offender aims against a conceptual end and breaches a real end therefore) or (b) represents an inadequate attempt at reaching the conceptual end given the particular and general context in which the action takes place (ie where the offender aims in advance of a conceptual end but does so inadequately and breaches the real end therefore).14 Once it is determined that a permissible level of discretion has been breached, only a proportionate response to the breach occasioned is, by this account, legitimate. Finnis indicates the importance of proportionality: … If my assailants attack, though utterly unjust, threatens only some rather slight injury or invasion of my rights, and I respond with lethal violence, I may well be violating the

13

Finnis, Aquinas (n 11) 276. None of this considers the further complication of incommensurability (in values within, and among traditions) that will need to be considered in determining precisely how any conceptual end can be pursued and in seeking the accommodations that are necessary to facilitate the problem of competing ends. 14

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Golden Rule even if I have no motive of hatred or revenge and so no intent to kill or even to harm: my response will not have been proportionate to its legitimate purpose, its proper intention {portionatus fini}.15

It will be rare that killing is a proportionate response to any act, as really only the threat of imminent death will risk depriving us of goods in such a way and to such an extent that only killing can preserve them. In the international context, it will be rare that anything other than imminent, direct aggression (to citizens internally or externally) will be a barrier to the ability of the responder itself to preserve life. Even if there is such aggression, there is no barrier to life preservation, if the aggression can be halted by means other than the taking of life. The natural law tradition as evidenced in elements of Platonic thought through to the present day provides a limited justification for war. Hans Kelsen, because of his unwillingness to admit a distinction between ‘non-contingent’ natural truths and the entirety of the empirical world, wrongly concludes that natural law reasoning leads us to validate all war: The moral systems which are at the basis of the positive legal orders of our time recognise war as a legitimate action and, hence, do not pre-suppose that the life of human beings belonging to the enemy ought to be preserved and promoted. If all these social orders are or have been actually effective, how could they be considered to be against human nature, if human nature is taken as it actually is and manifests itself in the social life of men; and where else could human nature manifest itself if not in the way the overwhelming majority of men actually behave in their mutual relations, and in the way they morally evaluate their behaviour.16

Traditional natural law seeks to show that the contingent world is escapable and that what remains after contingencies are stripped aside determines our nature as normative. In the essentials of our nature, there can be discerned goods (conceptual ends) that can and ought to be pursued to the maximum of our capacities. War can be said to be valid only when it is entered into to as a consequence of real barriers to man attaining his conceptual end (eg where there is an imminent threat to life that necessitates the taking of life as a response) and only in so far as conceptual ends are missed by no more than the degree represented by that barrier. CONCLUSION

The analysis here is no more than a framework to suggest (a) that certain rights deserve universal recognition, (b) that such a level of universality must allow for varying degrees of heterogeneity in norm-application, and (c) that heterogeneity in application will involve sensitivity to context. Central to this framework is a challenge to see the problem of the legitimacy of international law as not being one of heterogeneity versus universality. Difference itself is not significant; what is significant is the general determination of how what ‘is’ bears upon what ‘ought’ to be. Whether the ‘is’ relates to ourselves and to 15 16

Finnis, Aquinas (n 11) 227. H Kelsen, What is Justice? (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957) 197.

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traditions that we are comfortable with, or to the unfamiliar and culturally specific, makes no difference. Difference or universality are to be respected and protected (most fundamentally via norms that warrant universal recognition) in so far as they carry value and are capable of better securing goods for human beings than alternative arrangements. Very difficult and substantive questions about whether and how such a standard can be satisfied become unavoidable.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Aquinas, T and McDermott, T (ed) Summa Theologiae (Notre Dame, IN, Ave Maria Press, 1989). J Finnis, Aquinas (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998). HP Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). I Kant and M Gregor, (trs and ed) The Metaphysics of Morals, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996). H Kelsen, What is Justice? (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957). Chapters in Edited Volumes C Korsgaard, ‘Reflective Endorsement’ in C Korsgaard (ed), The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Journal Articles G Grisez, J Finnis and J Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends’ (1987) 32 American Jorunal of Jurisprudence 99–151.

Working Papers A von Bogdandy and S Dellavalle, ‘Universalism and Particularism as Paradigms of International Law’ International Law and Justice Working Paper 2008/3 www.iilj.org/publications/2008–3Bogdandy–Dellavalle.asp.

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Legitimacy, Blind Spots and Paradoxes of Personality RUSSELL A MILLER *

INTRODUCTION

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ERDI’S ROMANTIC tragedy La Traviata tells the story of the doomed affair between Violetta Valéry and Alfredo Germont.1 It is clear from the start that their romance is ill-fated: could anything but calamity await ‘a courtesan, dying of tuberculosis’ and a ‘young poet’? And, indeed, it all goes terribly wrong. Violetta forswears the lavish but indifferent conditions in which she is kept by the Baron Duophol, risking her secure position as the Baron’s mistress on Alfredo’s earnest expressions of love. But Alfredo’s father wrecks the young couple’s bliss. In a secret visit to Violetta, during which he demands that she end the affair because of the ruin it is bringing to the family’s reputation, the senior Germont explains that ‘the youth whom my daughter loves dearly, and who loves her so much in return, was disgusted by all of this scandal, and has cancelled the marriage.’ Desolate and powerless, Violetta obliges Alfredo’s father and leaves Alfredo to return to the Baron. No doubt, La Traviata has much to teach us about illegitimate love. But I find myself reflecting on the opera because it also is a useful window onto questions relevant to international law’s legitimacy. The tragedy of La Traviata, after all, is imposed on Alfredo and Violetta by unseen forces, by a character that never makes an appearance in the drama. Certainly Alfredo’s father is to be condemned for giving voice to the prevailing mores of the day,2 but ultimately it is the sharp edge of the social code of mid-nineteenth century France, enforced by Alfredo’s sister’s fiancé, that dooms the affair.3 Herein lay the questions that fuel this essay. First, * Associate Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law. Co-Editor-in-Chief, German Law Journal (www.germanlawjournal.com). This essay draws on my contribution to the book Progress in International Law (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Press, 2008). 1 See G Verdi, La Traviata (EMI Classics, 1982). 2 ‘How outrageous are Gorgio Germont’s demands, really? Well, can there be any doubt that the marriage he is anxious to see take place between his daughter and the youth she “loves dearly, and who loves her so much in return” is a marriage he has arranged for strictly financial reasons? I have no real evidence to support this theory, except to point out that in the 1840s love matches between children of upper-class families in France were virtually unknown.’ P Zweifel, La Traviata, by Giuseppe Verdi (Notes by Paul Zweifel www.pzweifel.com/notes/laTraviata2001.htm. 3 As Paul Brians explains in a review of a Zeffirelli-directed film of the opera, ‘The story is a quintessential romantic attack on conventional bourgeois morality, arguing that a good heart is more important than propriety, that the social distinctions which split the beau monde (high society) form the demimonde (the world of illicit sex) are cruel and hypocritical, and that true love must triumph over all. … In mid-19th-century France, almost as much as in England, sexual hypocrisy was widespread.

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there is the question of the legitimacy of a social code that has been so thoroughly assimilated that it operates beyond the characters’ critical inquiry. Their blind spots and biases, it turns out, evade even the searching power of love! Second, there is the question of the legitimacy of the authority to enforce the paradigm. In the opera this power is wholly spectral, inanimate and assumed; we are never given the chance to confront Alfredo’s sister’s fiancé on stage. But who is he to wield such authority? How does his power displace the power of the other characters? These interlocking concerns have equal force in international law and they demand our attention if we truly hope to maximise the field’s legitimacy: What ‘routine blind spots and biases’4 cast a shadow over international law, and who do they empower to dictate international law’s unfolding narrative? In this essay I argue that international law’s legitimacy is undermined by a powerful, unexamined bias against business interests. This has had the paradoxical effect of privileging non-governmental organisations as participants in international law, while marginalising and excluding transnational corporations (TNCs). To establish these broad claims about international law, I rely on an example from the discrete sub-field of human rights law. Hope for international law’s enhanced legitimacy, I argue, first requires us to become aware of this blind spot. Doing so will allow us to pursue broader inclusivity, which is necessary to greater legitimacy. Moving beyond this critique, I offer a model for this more inclusive international law that draws on an adaptation of Habermas’s discourse theory of democracy as exemplified by the International Labor Organisation’s tripartite corporatism.

THE PARADOX OF NON-STATE ACTORS’ STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

Exposing International Law’s Anti-Business Bias An anti-business bias seems to have gained such currency in scholarly consideration of globalisation that it has shaped international law’s nexus with globalisation.5 Prostitution and gambling were extremely popular and widespread even as they were being publicly condemned on every hand. Men were expected to have mistresses whom they supported financially; but they were expected to conceal that fact, and they were not to fall in love with them. … Any woman who slept with a man before marriage was thought to be “ruined” (i.e., rendered unfit to be wed), and should be shunned as a social leper.’: P Brians, Study Guide for Giuseppi Verdi (1813–1901): La Traviata, http://wsu.edu/~brians/hum_303/traviata.html. 4

D Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue xviii (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004). ‘There has been strong resistance to including entities such as transnational corporations in a discussion about the subjects of international law, and, until recently, it was hardly ever suggested that corporations have international legal personality.’ A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 76. Clapham noted that DA Ijalaye made the following appeal as early as 1978: ‘Since the participation of private corporations at the level of international law would now seem to be a fait accompli, international lawyers should stop being negative in their approach to this obvious fact. They must realise that as a result of these new arrivals in the international scene, the commercial law of nations, more than ever before, now constitutes a formidable challenger to international and comparative lawyers alike.’ Ibid 76–77 fn 69 (quoting DA Ijalaye, The Extension of Corporate Personality in International Law (Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publishing, 1978) 245). 5

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Has international law been enlisted to the service of the following, constructed narrative: behind the scenes of political, social and economic globalisation, while ever-diminishing states continue to ‘strut and fret their hours upon the stage’,6 profit-mongering transnational corporations are dictating the world’s fate with the direst consequences for human rights and the environment?7 Josselin and Wallace suggested that international lawyers across the spectrum of political and theoretical views are in the service of this narrative, explaining that: ‘Realists and Idealists come together in their ambivalence about transnational economic actors – banks and multinational companies (MNCs) ….’8 Larry Backer also worried that international humanitarians had been ideologically captured. ‘[A]cademics and segments of global culture’, he argued, embraced ‘Marxist’ and other ‘progressive’ ideologies which were, at their heart, anti-capitalist/consumerist and which saw the [transnational corporation] as the latest stage in the march toward monopoly capitalism or as the vanguard of capitalist consumerism.9

Backer concluded that this is not a perspective only advanced by the extreme left, but also by ‘high-status Western academics.’10 The dark view of the informal but insidious global influence of transnational corporations widely shared among international lawyers has its roots in two facts about the contemporary international order. The first fact is that ‘many multinational corporations have become at least as powerful as some of the states in which they function.’11 This has allowed them to evade or manipulate the regulatory authority of states in the relentless pursuit of profit. The second confounding fact is that ‘the principal subjects of international law are nation states.’12 Thus, multinational corporations often operate beyond the control of domestic and international law.13 Do these facts mandate the marginalisation and vilification of multinational corporations in international law? Is the present doctrinal landscape, which largely

6 W Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act 5, sc 5, ln 32. See F Hoffmann, ‘In Quite a State: The Trials and Tribulations of an Old Concept in New Times’, in R Miller and R Bratspies (eds), Progress in International Law (Leiden, Nijhoff, 2008) 263. 7 ‘If we turn to another category of [non-state actor], that of business enterprises, then the picture is equally mixed. It is easy to write the history of contemporary international relations in terms of activities of business groups – you do not have to be a Marxist to do so. … Thus, Susan Strange has argued, in the area not only of growth and investment, but of standard-setting and legal change, banks and other commercial enterprises are making the running.’ F Halliday, ‘The Romance of Non-State Actors’ in D Josselin and W Wallace (eds), Non-State Actors in World Politics (Houndsmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 21, 31 (citation omitted). 8 D Josselin and W Wallace, ‘Non-state Actors in World Politics: A Framework’, in Josselin and Wallace (eds), Non-State Actors in World Politics (n 7) 1. 9 LC Backer, ‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law’ (2006) 37 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 287, 315. 10 ibid. 11 F Johns, ‘The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law & Theory’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 893, 903–904. 12 MN Shaw, International Law, 5th edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 1. 13 ‘Social change advocates have a particularly difficult time addressing the transboundary problems created by multinational corporations, as these entities operate in a largely unregulated space at the

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excludes transnational corporations from international legal personality, a consequence of international humanitarians’ anti-business bias? As always, the task of answering these questions requires self-reflection and criticism; what David Kennedy termed ‘analytic vigilance and scepticism about the forms [our] purposes have come to take.’14

International Personality Brownlie summarised the classic definition of a subject of international law, and the classic criticism of that definition. ‘A subject of the law’, Brownlie explained, is an entity capable of possessing international rights and duties and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims. This definition, though conventional, is unfortunately circular since the indicia referred to depend on the existence of a legal person.15

This looping definition has almost exclusively referred to states. States have these capacities and immunities, and indeed the incidents of statehood as developed under the customary law have provided the indicia for, and instruments of personality in, other entities.16

Thus, using the state-template for personality, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognised that some international organisations may also be subjects of international law.17 But Brownlie could only conclude that ‘[i]t is states and organisations (if appropriate conditions exist) which represent the normal types of legal person on the international plane. … [And] it is as well to remember the primacy of states as subjects of law.’18 This state-centric model no longer matches our international reality.19 International Relations scholars have proved better able to describe and theorise the pluralistic and transnational globalised landscape.20 ‘We live in a messy world,’ James Rosenau said, further explaining that: World affairs can be conceptualized as governed through a bifurcated system – what can be called the two worlds of world politics – one an interstate system of states and their international level.’ J Mertus, ‘Considering Nonstate Actors in the New Millenium: Toward Expanded Participation in Norm Generation and Norm Application’ (2000) 32 New York University Journal of International Law & Policy 537, 549. 14

Kennedy, The Dark Side (n 4) xxi. I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 57. 16 ibid. 17 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 179. 18 Brownlie, Principles (n 15) 58. 19 ‘Only the most determined “Realist”, however, would deny that the balance between states and non-state actors has shifted, over the past 30–40 years – at least within the community of advanced democracies.’ Josselin and Wallace, Non-state actors (n 8). 20 PJ Spiro, ‘Nonstate Actors in Global Politics’ (1998) 92 American Journal of International Law 808, 811. 15

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national governments that has long dominated the course of events, and the other a multicentric system of diverse types of other collectivities that has lately emerged as a rival source of authority with actors that sometimes cooperate with, often compete with, and endlessly interact with the state-centric system.21

The state’s emboldened rivals include the apparent authority exercised by global market forces, by private market institutions engaged in setting of international standards, by human rights and environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), by transnational religious movements, and even by mafias and mercenary armies in some instances.22

It has become clear that, if international law is to enjoy its much-hoped-for legitimacy, then it must make room for these established and emerging international actors as well as international organisations, individuals and terrorist movements. In recognition of this changed reality, international lawyers have raised normative challenges to international law’s state-centric tradition. Christoph Schreuer was an early advocate for a ‘functionalist’ approach to international legal personality. ‘[W]hat matters,’ Schreuer argued, ‘is not the formal status of a participant (province, state, international organization) but its actual or preferable exercise of functions.’23 Schreuer’s work stirred considerable attention to the rising influence of non-state actors after the end of the Cold War. An impressive conference was held on the subject in Kiel, Germany in 1998.24 The American Society of International Law (ASIL) convened a plenary panel at its 1998 Annual Meeting around the topic ‘The Challenge of Non-State Actors.’25 Both efforts, however, seemed able to do no more than conclude that ‘ritualized models of state-to-state interaction will no longer do. The new maps may still place non-state actors on the periphery, but if so, hic cave dragones!’26 Among others, Philip Alston,27 Andrew Clapham,28 Jan Klabbers,29 Jessica Mathews,30 Julie Mertus31 and Peter Spiro32 have taken up the

21 JN Rosenau, ‘Governance in a New Global Order’ in D Held and A McGrew (eds) Governing Globalization (Oxford, Blackwell, 2002) 70, 72–73. 22 RB Hall and TJ Biersteker, ‘The Emergence of Private Authority in the International System’ in RB Hall and TJ Biersteker (eds) The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) 3, 4. 23 C Schreuer, ‘The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law’ (1993) 4 European Journal of International Law 447, 453. 24 R Hofmann and N Geissler (eds) Non-state Actors as New Subjects of International Law: International Law – From the Traditional State Order Towards the Law of the Global Community (Berlin, Dincker & Humblot, 1999). See M MacLaren, ‘Book Review – Like Blind Men Feeling an Elephant: Scholars’ Ongoing Attempts to Ascertain the Role of Non-State Actors in International Law’ (2002) 3 German Law Journal www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=201. 25 Plenary Theme Panel, ‘The Challenge of Non-State Actors’ (1998) 92 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 20. 26 ibid 36. ‘[T]he participants were essentially unable to agree on how the legal norms governing the interaction between international actors, old and new, are being renegotiated in light of globalization.’ MacLaren, Book Review (n 24) para 39. 27 P Alston (ed), Non–State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). 28 Clapham, Human Rights Obligation (n 5). 29 J Klabbers, ‘The Concept of Legal Personality’ (2005) 11 IUS Gentium 35. 30 JT Mathews, ‘Power Shift’ (Jan/Feb 1997) Foreign Affairs 50. 31 Mertus, Considering Nonstate Actors (n 13). 32 Spiro, Nonstate actors (n 20).

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challenge. Building on this earlier work, Guido Acquaviva offered his ‘power-based analysis’ of personality as a response to the ‘uncertainties … posed by those entities that do not fulfil the traditional criteria of “states” but nevertheless act in the international arena with all the rights and duties they effectively possess.’33 Acquaviva’s solution, with an obvious debt to Schreuer’s functionalism, was to acknowledge that ‘the main feature of subjects of international law has been their ability to assert that they are not subordinates to other authorities’.34 Acquaviva argued that sovereignty and ‘effective authority’, not legal formalisms, have always and now more explicitly should determine whether an entity is a subject of international law. This approach might free us to understand that ‘[t]he addition of new subjects to the international community … even if true, would be only an “environmental change,” not a “systemic change”’.35

The Paradox of Personality: The Norms While international law has been slow to adapt to the emerging multiplicity of actors in an increasingly privatised global order, this hesitance has been neither uniform nor unyielding. Particularly in the field of human rights, international law has begun to flirt with, if not fully embrace, discrete non-state actors as subjects or quasi-subjects of international law. Most prominently, NGOs play an ever-greater and more formalised role in the formation and enforcement of international human rights norms. Paradoxically, a parallel development in the field has been to seek to bring international human rights norms to bear on the actions of TNCs as objects of international human rights law, while denying them the status of independent subjects or quasi-subjects enjoyed in some degree by NGOs.36 This paradox, at least partly a product of international humanitarians’ bias against business interests, is at its plainest when international law enlists one non-state actor—NGOs—to the cause of forming and enforcing human rights norms against another non-state actor—TNCs. This is precisely the case with respect to the abandoned United Nations ‘Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (‘the Norms’). The Norms were promulgated with great fanfare by the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the summer of 2003.37 They were intended to bind TNCs within the framework of international human rights rules. Since 2003, however, the Office of the High 33 G Acquaviva, ‘Subjects of International Law: A Power-Based Analysis’ (2005) 38 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 345, 386. 34 ibid 380–81. 35 ibid 387. 36 The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law notes that the transnational corporation, while an established feature of international life, ‘has not yet achieved special status in international law.’ Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 213(f) (1986). 37 United Nations Economic & Social Council [ECOSOC]/Sub-Committee on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Doc E/CN 4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev 2, Aug 13, 2003) (hereinafter ‘Norms’).

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Commissioner on Human Rights has significantly eroded and downgraded the status of the Norms to little more than another among the Commission’s ‘existing initiatives and standards on business and human rights, with a view to their further consideration’.38 Still, I agree with Larry Backer that, ‘whatever the immediate fate of the Norms, it is unlikely that the ideas represented by the Norms, as originally submitted, will disappear.’39 For my purposes, it is most relevant that NGOs feature prominently, over and against TNCs, in the history of the formation of the Norms and in the Norms’ enforcement provisions. The Norms Introduced The Norms are the most recent manifestation of a decades-long effort by states, international organisations and NGOs to regulate the power of TNCs. This effort grows from a concern that TNCs wield vast power, and often do so in a fashion that violates international human rights standards. Fleur Johns, in her survey of the question, concluded: TNCs have shown themselves to be able and willing to violate individuals’ … right to work (and to do so in just and favourable conditions); to form and join trade unions; to life and to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.40

Thus, there has been a steady roll-out of codes-of-conduct, guidelines, declarations and compacts since the 1970s.41 This proliferation of international instruments produced little in the way of concrete results. Most spectacularly, the Norms were meant to succeed where these previous efforts had failed because they sought to impose binding, as opposed to voluntary, duties on TNCs.42 Human rights NGOs played a not insignificant role in the formation of the Norms, and it should be no surprise that the Norms assign NGOs a not 38 United Nations Economic & Social Council [ECOSOC]/Sub-Committee on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises With Regards to Human Rights, P 52(d) (UN Doc E/CN 4/2005/91, Feb 15, 2005). 39 Backer, Multinational Corporations (n 9) 332. 40 Johns, The Invisibility (n 11) 909. 41 ‘Prior to the Sub-Commission’s action in August 2003, several other prominent international bodies had considered these issues in either unsuccessful or voluntary initiatives. For example, the United Nations unsuccessfully attempted to draft an international code of conduct for businesses in the 1970s and 1980s. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) undertook a similar effort in 1976 when it established its first Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to promote responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws. In 1977 the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted its Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises, which calls upon business to follow the relevant ILO conventions and recommendations. Further, in January 1999, the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed a “Global Compact” of shared values and principles at the World Economic Forum … These various initiatives, however, failed to bind all businesses to follow minimum human rights standards.’ D Weissbrodt and M Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 901, 902–903. 42 ibid 903 (‘the Norms represent the “first nonvoluntary initiative accepted at the international level.’); CF Hillemanns, ‘UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’, (2003) 4 German Law Journal 1065, 1068 (‘[T]he Norms overturn two paradigms that have to date dominated the discourse on corporate social responsibility: namely that all initiatives should be voluntary …’).

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insignificant role in their enforcement scheme. This combination of competences— norm creation and enforcement—is central to any assertion of international legal personality and they are fundamental characteristics of a subject of international law.43 NGOs and the Formation of the Norms It has been asserted that the ‘process leading to the adoption of the Norms was inclusive and the consultation was broad.’44 David Weissbrodt served as a member of the Sub-Commission’s working group tasked with considering ‘the working methods and activities of transnational corporations,’45 and he prepared the initial draft of the Norms. In his report on the Norms (with Muria Kruger) in the American Journal of International Law’s ‘Current Developments’ from October 2003, Weissbrodt echoed this claim: [M]embers of the working group organized a seminar in March 2001 at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The participants included members of the working group; representatives of NGOs interested in corporate responsibility, human rights, development, and the environment; representatives of companies and unions; and several scholars.46

However, as the working group’s efforts advanced, the broad and balanced constituency in place in 2001 gave way to the paradoxical prioritisation of NGOs over TNCs. Weissbrodt reported that, by March 2003, the process had come to be dominated, if not captured, by human rights NGOs. Ultimately, NGOs were afforded a unique opportunity to influence the final shape of the working group’s draft: Several NGOs organized a seminar in which they provided the working group’s members with detailed comments on the Norms. During that seminar, the working group received and responded to each issue raised by the NGOs in attendance. Immediately following the seminar, meeting in a private session, the working group considered all the comments received from the seminar …. The working group then agreed on a draft of the Norms to present at the fifty-fifth session of the Sub-Commission in July-August 2003.47

The NGOs then brought their influence to bear on the Sub-Commission as it considered the adoption of the working group’s proposal: At the 2003 meetings of both the working group and the Sub-Commission, many NGOs and others made public statements in support of the Norms, including Amnesty International; Christian Aid; Human Rights Advocates; Human Rights Watch; the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights; the Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Hommer; Forum Menschenrechte (Human Rights Forum); Oxfam; the Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum; World Economy, Ecology and Development; and the World Organization Against Torture. Additionally, Amnesty International submitted a 43 44 45 46 47

Shaw, International Law (n 12) 176, 245. Hillemanns, UN Norms (n 42) 1069. Weissbrodt and Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations (n 41) 904. ibid. ibid 906.

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list of fifty-eight NGOs confirming their support for the Norms, and Forum Menschenrechte presented another list of twenty-six NGOs joining its statement of support.48

This quasi-formal involvement of NGOs in the formation of international law, whether as the suppliers of technical expertise or in the more blunt form of lobbyist or pressure group, is a hallmark of the increasing power of NGOs.49 The role of NGOs in the drafting of the Norms resembles the nearly determinative role NGOs played in the negotiation of the Framework Convention for Climate Change and the Convention Prohibiting Landmines.50 As Jessica Mathews noted regarding the former effort: NGOs set the original goal of negotiating an agreement to control greenhouse gases long before government were ready to do so, proposed most of its structure and content, and lobbied and mobilized public pressure to force through a pact that virtually no one else thought possible when the talks began.51

NGOs and Enforcement of the Norms Where the involvement of NGOs in the formation of the Norms was substantial but informal, the Norms formally integrated NGOs in the process of enforcement. Besides requiring TNCs to adopt ‘internal rules of operation in compliance with the Norms’,52 implementation of the Norms was to be achieved by: periodic monitoring and verification by United Nations, other international and national mechanisms already in existence or yet to be created, regarding application of the Norms. This monitoring shall be transparent and independent and take into account input from stakeholders (including non governmental organizations) … 53

This is a remarkable parenthetical. It formally incorporates NGOs in the enforcement of the Norms against TNCs, codifying the monitoring and reporting role NGOs have assumed in many international human rights regimes. The Commentary on the Norms, which was recognised in the Preamble to the Norms as a ‘useful interpretation and elaboration of the standards contained in the Norms,’54 disposed of any qualification on the enforcement authority of NGOs that might be asserted because they are mentioned only in a parenthetical. Indeed, the commentary to paragraph 16 urged the Sub-Commission and its interested working group to rely 48

ibid. Mathews, Power Shift (n 30) (‘Increasingly, NGOs are able to push around even the largest governments.’). 50 As well as, inter alia: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (Banjul Charter); the COE ‘European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (concluded 26 November 1987, entered into force 1 February 1989) 1561 UNTS 363; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3; and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (Rome Statute). See MT Kamminga, ‘The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-State System?’, in P Alston (ed) Non-State Actors and Human Rights (n 27) 93, 101–104. 51 Mathews, ‘Power Shift’ (n 30). 52 Norms (n 37) para 15. 53 ibid para 16 (emphasis added). 54 ibid, preamble. 49

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upon information received from NGOs in their monitoring and development of best practices regarding the Norms.55 Furthermore, the commentary to paragraph 16 encouraged NGOs to ‘use the Norms as the basis for their expectations of the conduct of the transnational corporation or other business enterprise and monitoring compliance.’56 It is as if the parentheses were meant to underscore the important, rather than the marginal, role NGOs were expected to play, among the relevant ‘stakeholders’, in the enforcement of the Norms.57 To facilitate, and further formalise the enforcement function that the Norms cede to NGOs, the Sub-Commission subsequently issued a Resolution ‘calling for the creation of a mechanism for NGOs and others to submit information about businesses that are not meeting the minimum standards of the Norms’.58 This is reflective of the enforcement capacity explicitly extended to NGOs by other human rights regimes,59 some of which grant NGOs standing before interpretative and enforcement bodies, including both commissions and courts.60 The message was not lost on NGO advocates of human rights. David Weissbrodt reported that: immediately upon adoption of the Norms, many … NGOs … issued a press release welcoming the Sub-Commission’s action. A few NGOs have already indicated their intent to begin using the Norms as standards for reporting on the human rights activities of businesses.61

55 United Nations Economic & Social Council [ECOSOC]/Sub–Committee on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (United Nations, UN Doc E/CN 4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev 2, Aug 13, 2003) ¶ 16 (hereinafter “Commentary”). 56 ibid. 57 S Deva, ‘UN’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Transnational Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?’ (2004) 10 ILSA Journal of International & Comparitive Law 493, 516. 58 Weissbrodt and Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations’ (n 41) 906. 59 ‘On the contrary, in an apparent acknowledgement of the importance of NGO input, the conventions often provide NGOs with a formal role in their implementation and follow–up.’ Kamminga, The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law (n 24) 93, 105. 60 See, eg Art 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted April 11, 1950) 213 UNTS 222 (‘The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto’); American Convention on Human Rights (signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123 (Pact of San José). (‘Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party.’) 61 Weissbrodt and Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations’ (n 41) 906–907. See eg, Human Rights Watch, Nongovernmental Organizations Welcome the New U.N. Norms on Transnational Business, http://hrw.org/press/2003/08/un-jointstatement.htm#ngos; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, The UN Norms: Towards Greater Corporate Accountability (Sept 30, 2004), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/09/30/global9446.htm; Amnesty International USA, UN Norms for Business: Taking Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights to the Next Level!, www.amnesty usa.org/Business_and_Human_Rights/Legal_accountability/ page.do?id=1101637&n1=3&n2=26&n3=1243.

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Critiquing the Paradox International humanitarians typically justify their preference of NGOs over TNCs,62 and consequently the different status these non-state actors are accorded in international law, by arguing that TNCs are capable of violating human rights and, at the same time, are unaccountable for the exercise of their power. The first point is beyond doubt. As for the second claim regarding the accountability of TNCs, two criticisms emerge. First, TNCs, although formally denied international personality, nonetheless use their great power informally and sometimes illegally in order to manipulate states in a fashion that advances their interests at the expense of the state. Of course, NGOs also exercise their influence in a similarly informal manner. This criticism, thus, may be a matter of degree rather than of form. Second, the more familiar refrain in the context of globalisation commentary is that, by their nature, TNCs transcend any single state and are able to evade the control of states and popular accountability by moving their management and production centres to more favourable locations. In this wholly undemocratic fashion, TNCs influence the normative landscape by shopping for preferred regulatory environments.63 Without exploring the complexities of these criticisms, but with a view more narrowly towards the paradoxical preferencing of NGOs over TNCs in human rights regimes, it is important to note that similar questions about an accountability deficit have been raised around NGO activities. Out of a generalised concern for the importance of accountability and transparency in international governance Paul Wapner has raised fundamental questions about the increasing authority of NGOs. Wapner explained that: [c]ritics are right to point out the lack of legitimacy, undemocratic character, and weak responsiveness of NGOs. NGOs deserve such critical scrutiny and … will benefit from it … [as do] all institutions of political organization, including the state.64

The central elements of this view are the simple facts that there are many NGOs that pursue abhorrent goals; that the basis on which NGOs purport to understand/ embody global public interest is unclear; and that the constituencies to which NGOs are accountable are often narrow (issue-oriented), intransparent and selfselecting. Thus, Wapner concluded that ‘Global civil society [unlike States] has no formal, cross-cutting institutional checks on activity, nor do the internal dynamics of NGOs express clear democratic characteristics.’65

62 Paul Wapner captured the generally positive view of NGOs among international humanitarians in these terms: ‘most people like most NGOs most of the time.’ P Wapner, ‘Introductory Essay: Paradise Lost? NGOs and Global Accountability’ (2002) 3 Chicago Journal of International Law 155, 156. 63 See A Sinden, ‘The “Preference for Pollution” and other Fallacies, or Why Free Trade Isn’t “Progress” Absent Harmonization of Environmental Standards’ in R Miller and R Bratspies (eds) Progress in International Law 771 (Leiden, Nijhoff, 2008); R Bratspies, ‘Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Progress Toward Sustainable Development’, in ibid. 64 Wapner, Paradise Lost (n 62) 159. 65 ibid 157.

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David Held endorsed Wapner’s concern about democracy and accountability in describing a kind of market failure in civil society. NGOs’ representative character can be questioned, he concluded: when background conditions prevent access to such associations or when they are ordered internally in a manner which systematically distorts opportunities or outcomes in favour of particular sectional interests or groups.66

In fact, most NGO leaders are appointed, and, if elected, only by the narrow membership base of the organisation. To the degree that checks, like advisory committees and boards, exist, their authority is often subverted by the fact that these watchdog institutions regularly share the viewpoint of the respective NGOs they monitor. Held explained that organisations can: take on a ‘life of their own’ which may lead them to depart from the wishes and interests of their members. Such may be the case when they generate oligarchic tendencies ….67

Finally, there are only weak international checks on NGOs. Consultative status at the UN, for example, is conditioned on the soft requirements that NGOs support and respect the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and provide an audited annual financial statement. The question of NGO accountability led to a charged exchange between Peter Spiro and Phillipe Sands at the 1998 ASIL plenary panel dedicated to ‘The Challenge of Non-State Actors.’68 Spiro questioned the accountability of Sands’ NGO named FIELD,69 particularly in its representation of small island states in standard-setting institutions. Spiro concluded: ‘This leads to the question of whether that organisation is fully accountable to the governments of the small island states or whether FIELD may have agendas of its own.’70 Anne-Marie Slaughter, moderating the panel, followed up by asking: ‘Professor Sands, are you accountable?’71 To this, Sands exclaimed: ‘Absolutely I’m accountable!’72 But how, and to whom or what, Sands did not explain. That silence on the part of NGO advocates, and the reality that such silence suggests, led Kenneth Anderson to conclude that ‘[i]t is no exaggeration to regard … international NGOs … as not merely undemocratic, but as profoundly antidemocratic.’73 It is not necessary for me to go so far. The point of an NGO accountability deficit is made only to suggest that they may suffer, to some degree, from the same pathologies that international humanitarians regularly invoke when justifying the denial of international personality to TNCs.

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

D Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995) 181 ibid. Plenary Theme Panel (n 25) 30. Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development. Spiro, ‘Nonstate Actors in Global Politics’ (n 20). Plenary Theme Panel (n 25) 30 ibid. Wapner, Paradise Lost (n 62) 157–58.

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Besides the accountability critique, one might also question NGOs’ lack of independence from states, a concern that is embedded in the much more complicated challenge confronting the traditional notion of a public/private divide in the law. At a superficial level, it is important to note that NGOs are closely linked to states, whose aid initiatives they increasingly facilitate and serve. The Economist reported in 2000 that ‘[a] growing share of development spending, emergency relief and aid transfers passes through [NGOs]. … [W]estern governments have long been shifting their aid towards NGOs.’74 The affinity that should develop from such synergies has been exacerbated by direct government subsidisation of NGOs. ‘[T]he principle reason for the recent boom in NGOs’, The Economist explained, ‘is that western governments finance them.’75 This trend had only deepened several years later when The Economist reported on the dependency that has emerged between the European Commission, EU member states and NGOs: ‘Many of the NGOs that Brussels likes to consult,’ The Economist explained, ‘are directly financed by the commission itself.’76 Involving large amounts of money, The Economist summarised the perversity of the situation in these terms: The spectacle of organizations that receive EU money using their money to campaign for more EU money is only one example of this looking-glass world. It is a world in which so-called NGOs are actually dependent on government for cash; and one in which the European Commission, itself directly financed by Europe’s national governments, finances ‘autonomous’ organizations that campaign for more power and money to be handed to the commission itself.77

Delving more deeply than shared financing and expertise, David Held concluded that: there is a profound sense in which civil society and civic associations are never separate from the state; the latter, by providing the overall legal framework of a society, to a significant degree constitutes the former.78

At a more theoretically complex level, the dependency between states and NGOs is symptomatic of an epochal shift in our jurisprudence. Peer Zumbansen described the broader phenomenon of dependency as the ‘hybrid interaction of public and private actors’ or the ‘contractualization of public governance’ in his insightful critique of the stubborn formalism of ‘public’ and ‘private’ legal spheres.79 For him, the hybridisation was occurring across the public boundary between states and both non-profit and for-profit non-state actors in equal measure. The paradoxical international treatment of NGOs and TNCs, it seems, is justifiable only if the

74 ‘Sins of the Secular Missionaries’, The Economist (London, 27 June 2000), www.economist.com/ world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_NSGJPT. 75 ibid. 76 ‘A Rigged Dialogue with Society’, The Economist (London, 21 October 2004), www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_PPDRJRG. 77 ibid. 78 Held, Democracy (n 66) 181. 79 P Zumbansen, ‘Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and International Law’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 197, 201.

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ever-less persuasive distinction between the two as non-profit and for-profit entities is sustained. In practical terms, as the reporting of The Economist makes clear, sustaining that distinction is difficult. On the one hand, NGOs are … looking more and more like businesses themselves. … Now a whole class of them have, even if not directly backed by businesses, have taken on corporate trappings. Known collectively as BINGOs, these groups manage funds and employ staff which a medium-sized company would envy.80

On the other hand, Corporations are governments. … They exercise power in a political sense [in that they have the] capacity to make or influence decisions that shape the values of others. … [T]he corporation has effective control over much of the routine affairs of human governance.’81

What if, as these circumstances suggest, the distinction between the public and the private itself is unsustainable? In describing Claire Cutler’s work, Zumbansen concluded that, in the face of the increasing illogic of the traditional public/private distinction in law, ‘the dividing lines … between public and private,’ like the line which lies at the heart of my critique, ‘can only be drawn by an act of paradox.’82 As early as 1971, Arthur Selwyn Miller agonised over the perpetuation of the public/private formalism in the face of the great power wielded by TNCs. Presciently, he wrote about the emerging global economy, fully recognising the challenges it would pose for the state-centric tradition of international law and the public/private dogma on which it depended. At the centre of these challenges to the accepted dogma, Miller explained, was the ‘age of international production, the instrument for which is the global corporation’.83 The challenge TNCs posed to states’ traditional dominance, for Miller, was so thorough as to undermine tired distinctions of public and private law. ‘All law is public law’ he declared.84 He went on: Is GM private or public? How about IBM? Or Standard Oil of New Jersey? Or Olivetti? Or Unilever? Surely one is hard put to determine where the private character of Lockheed—the largest defense contractor—leaves off and the public character of the Department of Defense begins. … What is being suggested is that, when one views the giant corporations, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ascertain where the line between public and private is to be drawn.85

The foregoing points merely serve to cast light on the possibility that bias and ideological acculturation explain the paradoxical treatment these non-state actors are given in human rights regimes. Certainly, the reality of the role played by TNCs in international affairs and foresighted shifts in jurisprudence that are sensitive to that reality, make it difficult to justify the distinction.

80

Sins of the Secular Missionaries (n 72). AS Miller, ‘The Global Corporation and American Constitutionalism: Some Political Consequences of Economic Power’ (1971/72) 6 Journal of International Law & Economics 235, 240. 82 Zumbansen, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries (n 77) 206. 83 Miller, The Global Corporation (n 81) 236–37. 84 ibid 243. 85 ibid 244. 81

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DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY AND AN INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO PERSONALITY

If TNCs are as powerful as is feared by international humanitarians, then the continued efficacy, relevance and legitimacy of international law depends on the exposure and correction of the paradox I have identified. As Jordan Paust explained: the efficacy, predictability and stability of international law ultimately rest upon real processes of power and authority in which all participate, however indirectly. When all the various voices are heard or represented, it is more likely that the law will be effective, predictable and more stable.86

Paust’s argument for an inclusive approach to personality, with some adaptation, resonates with Habermas’s discourse theory of law. Collective Discursive Democracy Habermas’s discursive democracy typically characterises the conditions for just relations between individuals; leading to the creation of governing institutions and the norms those institutions apply. But, with some adaptation that embraces the social identity theory,87 it may be possible to extend Habermas’s theory of discursive democracy to interactions between collectives like TNCs, NGOs and states. Thus, the interactions between collectives would be held to the standard of Habermas’s discursive democracy, consisting of a complementary relationship between political actors—here TNCs and NGOs as collectives, on the one hand, and the interested states, on the other. This would be a relationship characterised by discourse and guided by a consensual ideal of the common good that comes to define the norms of justice. This application of Habermas’s discourse theory to collectives is an innovation I have urged elsewhere with regard to indigenous people’s self-determination claims against states.88 Focused as he is on the primacy of individual autonomy, I suspect that Habermas would reject the transposition of his principles of discourse theory to the interactions between collectives such as TNCs.89 In fact, Habermas wrote to challenge the moral and legal validity of group rights, focusing on their illiberal potential for 86 JJ Paust, ‘The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International Legal Process’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 1229, 1246. 87 See, eg W Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); A Buchanan, ‘The Role of Collective Rights in the Theory of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights’ (1993) 3 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 89; RN Clinton, ‘The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights’ (1990) 32 Arizona Law Review 739. 88 RA Miller, ‘Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self-Determination’ (2007) 31 American Indian Law Review 341. 89 Habermas builds his theories of communicative action and discursive democracy on assumptions of individual intersubjectivity: ‘If we construe the universalist claim of the moral principle intersubjectively, then we must relocate ideal role taking, which, according to Kant, each individual undertakes privately, to a public practice implemented by all persons in common.’ J Habermas and W Rehg (trans), Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, Polity, 1996) 109–10. The discourse principles are meant to be applied by citizens for themselves. Ibid 126. Habermas aligns himself with the ‘Classical liberalism,

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limiting individual self-realisation in the broader society.90 Habermas disparagingly refers to institutions like states (and probably TNCs) as ‘systems’,91 by which he means vacuous structures, remote and detached from the ‘life world’ of the individual and the autonomous expression of her will in society.92 Collectives, he argues, are artificial constructions, unable to justify an inherent interest in their own will.93 For Habermas a collective entity is less than the sum of its parts. In a variety of legal contexts, however, we accept that collectives are capable of expressing will and invoking rights.94 Most prominently, in the United States, corporations are credited as legal persons. Of equal relevance to this discussion is the fact that international lawyers generally accept that states, acting in the international legal order, address matters of their ‘will’, ‘interest’ and ‘rights’, and are responsible for duties.95 And, central to the paradox I have identified, there is the impulse from international humanitarians to attribute personality to another collective, namely, NGOs. going back to Locke,’ which, he argues, sought to use ‘the mechanisms and concepts of modern law to tame political power and put it at the service of the pre-eminent goal of protecting the pre-political freedom of the individual member of society.’ Habermas concludes that ‘[t]he core of a liberal constitution is the guarantee of equal individual liberties for everyone.’ J Habermas, ‘Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism’ (2005) 13 The Journal of Political Philosophy 1. 90 Habermas begins by suggesting that ‘… collective rights are not suspicious per se. … [T]he principle of equality is not violated as long as member are not barred from showing their dissent by exiting the group or mobilizing couter–forces within the organization itself.’ Habermas, Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism (n 89) 19. But, he goes on to explain that ‘[a] potential oppression internal to the group is sheltered by collective rights that strengthen a group, not only in the service of the cultural rights of its individual members, but also directly serving, over their heads, the continued existence of the cultural background of the collective.’ Ibid 21. Habermas particularly notes that collective rights particularly expose women and children to the risk of losing their individual liberties. Ibid 19. 91 ‘The process that has brought the communicative rationalization Habermas identifies has, at the same time, produced a state and economy that operate on other principles—and in ways that may be dysfunctional for what Habermas calls the lifeworld.’ H Baxter, ‘Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy’ (2002) 50 Buffalo Law Review 205, 234. 92 ‘In interpreting their situations and pursuing their plans, [Habermas] says, communicative actors in “lifeworld” situations proceed consensually. Their actions presuppose, or are directed toward establishing, ‘common situation definitions.’ Ibid 224 (citing J Habermas and T McCarthy (trans), Theory of Coummunicative Action: Lifeworld and System (Cambridge, Polity, 1987) 121, 127. 93 ‘A culture is not suited to be a legal subject as such, because it cannot meet the conditions for its reproduction with its own power; instead, it depends upon the constructive appropriation by autonomous interpreters who say “yes” or “no”.’ Habermas, Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism (n 87) 22. 94 Martin Blanchard argues: ‘An implicit premise of [Habermas’s argument against collective rights] stipulates that the soundness of holding a right is determined by the ability of its holder to justify its own interests. This premise is plainly false. For instance, business corporations hold rights, but no one would argue that they are able to justify their own interests. A “legal person” is a legal fiction that enables certain rights for business entities. This fiction is justified regarding its aims: it confers legal status to a collective actor for reasons that are (arguably) justified in our society; that is, in our interest. Another example of rights–holders that do not possess the ability to justify their own interests are infants and seriously handicapped persons; yet I do not believe Habermas would argue that they do not possess rights.’ M Blanchard, Recognition and the Case of Indigenous Reparation: A Habermasian Critique of Habermas (Centre de recherché en éthique de l’Université de Montréal (CREUM)) – Working Paper, www.creum.umontreal.ca/IMG/pdf/Habermas_and_Recognition.pdf 4. 95 See JL Goldsmith and EA Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 6 (‘By state interest, we mean the state’s preferences about outcomes. State interests are not always easy to determine, because the state subsumes many institutions and individuals that obviously

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Habermas, in his writings on the federalist dynamic in the evolution of Europe, seems to concede that states might be will-forming collectives.96 And Habermas has written to endorse the will-forming impact and potential of broad cultural movements, sometimes loosely referred to as ‘civil society’. In this sense, he too may be susceptible to favouring ‘civil society’ groups over others, like business interests. Indeed, Habermas may have recognised the relevance of his discourse theory for ‘intercultural’ relations between collectives. Tensions between such groups, he explained, are the result of: distortion in communication, from misunderstanding and incomprehension, from insincerity and deception. . . . The spiral of violence [between cultures as between individuals] begins as a spiral of distorted communication that leads through the spiral of uncontrolled reciprocal mistrust, to the breakdown of communication.97

The matter is undoubtedly more complicated when addressed to groups. Habermas noted that: cultures, ways of life, and nations are at a greater distance from and, thus, are more foreign to one another. They do not encounter each other like members of a society who might become alienated from each other through systematically distorted communication.98

But, if the source of dissonance, whether between individuals or more remote cultures and groups, is the same erosion of genuine discourse, Habermas explained that ‘it is possible to know what has gone wrong and what needs to be repaired.’99 In that spirit, I propose that international humanitarians might hold collectives, like TNCs and NGOs, to the same standard of discourse that Habermas prescribes for individuals. Nayef Samhat also urged the application of the principles of Habermasian discursive democracy to the interactions between collectives. In mapping the discursive democratic potential of regimes, Samhat noted that ‘international regimes are the means through which state and non-state actors regulate areas of global life ….’100 He regarded non-state actors operating in this capacity as ‘group oriented’101 and referred specifically to ‘global civil society actors such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements ….’102 In answering scepticism about the ability of NGOs and social movements to function as will-forming entities in Habermasian democratic discourse, Samhat explained that ‘NGOs and social movements can be representative agents … in world politics,

do not share identical preferences about outcomes. Nonetheless, a state – especially one with well-ordered political institutions – can make coherent decisions base upon identifiable preferences, or interests,’). 96

J Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’ (2001) 11 New Left Review 5. G Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2003) 35. 98 ibid. 99 ibid. 100 NH Samhat, ‘International Regimes and the Prospects for Global Democracy’ (2005) 6 The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 179, 180. 101 ibid. 102 ibid 182. 97

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implementing tasks and aggregating interests and voices for segments of the global polity ….’103 TNCs are an obvious parallel to the kinds of collectives that interest Samhat. They, too, are non-state groups, exercising a definable will in relationships with states as relevant social agents.104

Discursive Democracy Applied between states, TNCs and NGOs as the basis for ascribing international personality, Habermas’s discourse theory of democracy conceives of: an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision making. Democratic procedure, which establishes a network of pragmatic considerations, compromises, and discourses of self-understanding and of justice, grounds the presumption that reasonable or fair results are obtained insofar as the flow of relevant information and its proper handling have not been obstructed.105

The resulting system is one in which: [T]he only regulations and ways of acting that can claim legitimacy are those to which all who are possibly affected could assent as participants in rational discourses. In light of this ‘discourse principle,’ citizens test which rights they should mutually accord one another. As legal subjects, they must anchor this practice of self-legislation in the medium of law itself; they must legally institutionalize those communicative presuppositions and procedures of a political opinion- and will-formation in which the discourse principle is applied. Thus the establishment of the legal code, which is undertaken with the help of the universal right to equal individual liberties, must be completed through communicative and participatory rights that guarantee equal opportunities for the public use of communicative liberties. In this way, the discourse principle acquires the legal shape of a democratic principle.106

The theory is dependent on Habermas’s expansive claims for the normative potency of communicative action, which maximises the effective force of reason by procedurally limiting the influence of the elements of strategic action, including wealth and power.107 Simone Chambers has explained: Discourse is an idealized and formalized version of communicative action. In communicative action participants search for mutual understanding by offering arguments that could command assent … in communicative action, participants are interested in bringing about a genuine understanding.108

103

ibid 186. Habermas, Theory of Coummunicative Action (n 92) 95. 105 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (n 89) 296. 106 ibid at 458. 107 ‘Communicatively acting subjects commit themselves to coordinating their action plans on the basis of consensus that depends in turn on their reciprocally taking positions on, and intersubjectively recognizing, validity claims. From this it follows that only those reasons count that all the participating parties together find acceptable.’ Ibid 119. 108 S Chambers, ‘Discourse and Democratic Practices’ in SK White (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Habermas (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995) 233, 237. 104

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The success of the theory, indeed, of democracy itself, is measured by the discourse promoting quality of the institutionalised procedures and conditions of communication operating between the relevant subjects,109 in this case between TNCs, NGOs and states as collectives. Thus, Habermas demands that legal subjects become the democratic authors of their legal order via ‘[b]asic rights to equal opportunities to participate in processes of opinion- and will-formation in which [subjects] exercise their political autonomy.’110 Habermas favourably invoked Robert Dahl’s five postulates for an appropriate democratic procedure,111 but insisted that, in its essence: … the principle of democracy should establish a procedure of legitimate lawmaking. Specifically, the democratic principle states that only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation …’112

Habermas’s ‘more open and dynamic conception of democratic deliberation’ could resolve even such latent and pervasive discursive dissonance as international humanitarian’s anti-business bias. Extending personality to TNCs would, in this theory, strengthen the international normative regime. Valdez explained that Habermas: Maintains that the range