Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran 9813347295, 9789813347298

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Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran Edited by Nikolay Kozhanov

Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran

Nikolay Kozhanov Editor

Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran

Editor Nikolay Kozhanov Gulf Studies Center Qatar University Doha, Qatar

ISBN 978-981-33-4729-8 ISBN 978-981-33-4730-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021, corrected publication 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Foreword

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a change in the dynamics of relations between Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) occurred which was due to the change in international and regional orders that took place when Russia, as a Soviet superpower, lost its status. At that time, the newly shaped Russia had not defined its interests, although it was still one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, while the United States had secured stability and security in the Gulf region. However, in 1992, Andrei Kozyrev, who served as the former and the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation under President Boris Yeltsin, visited the GCC states. This visit reflected, for the first time, Russia’s need for a collaboration with the Gulf and its interest in the region. Consequently, a few agreements were signed with a number of Gulf states, principally UAE and Oman. With war in Chechnya, Russia’s policy toward the GCC had shifted and inclined negatively mainly because Russia viewed GCC states as supporters of ‘terrorists’ in the Caucus. Until the end of the twentieth century, the United States maintained stability in the region. At the turn of the millennium, several changes have occurred in the Gulf region after the US shook the security architecture with its initiation of the war on terror in Afghanistan and its invasion of Iraq. These changes have coincided with the rise of Vladimir Putin to presidency in Russia and culminated to offer a platform of collaboration between Russia and the GCC. Both showed more interest in seeking political stability and security in the region, and Russia started acquiring v

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a pro-active role in political relations. Therefore, relations between the GCC and Russia have been embodied with a new character, implementing stability in the Middle East and re-imposing interest in the region. Hereby, Russia sought to reformulate its relationship with the GCC states, with an emphasis on economic ties in the first place through establishing agreement and projects fundamentally in the fields of energy, oil, and gas as well as other fields such as military, infrastructure, irrigation, civil construction, and agriculture. Therefore, intense communications have distinguished the first ten years of the twenty-first century between Russia and the countries of the GCC. With the outbreak of the Arab spring at end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the GCC countries became pro-active in regional disturbances and had opposing stances toward those uprisings. Russia was closer to countries who wanted to maintain the status quo. It supported Bahrain with arms to suppress the uprisings, which came in favor of the GCC states who fear an increased role for Iran in the region. Moreover, Russia stood with Bashar Al Assad’s regime and criticized the GCC states who supported the uprisings in Syria, as well as condemned Qatar for its role in Libya. There are other areas where both the GCC and Russia share a similar vision with regard to regional security, such as the Middle East peace process, where Russia hosted both Fatah and Hamas in a pledge of unity between Palestinian factions. Both the GCC and Russia had a cooperation against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and other organizations. In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, and Germany) together with the European Union. As a result, the GCC countries became less confident with the role of the United States in the region as a guarantor of their security. This move has caused the GCC states to reach out to Russia, who is close to Tehran. Through Russia, GCC states would maintain a diversified future and a hope that it would moderate Iran’s position in the region. This was suitable with Russia’s hopes to develop ties with the GCC states to secure its political and economic interests. Despite differences over the Arab Uprisings and the JCPOA, RussianGCC relations are at an apex and both sides share mutual interests and understandings. Moreover, Russia acts as a hub for GCC states’ investments. On the other side, Russia has taken a neutral stance toward the GCC crisis. It is seen that intervening and taking a side in an internal

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GCC rift is impractical and could officially endanger Russia’s energy interests especially that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are important energy partners for Moscow. Synthesizing the above, there rises an urgent need to study the complex relationship between Russia and the GCC. In light of this, this book offers an alternative narrative on GCC-Russia relations by digging into the deep roots of these relations to view, explain, and analyze how bilateral and collective relations have interwoven together. It also offers an analysis of the relation to study how domestic politics affect the foreign policy of Russia and individual GCC states, considering that relations reflect the changing course of the international order and how players are engaging in the outside arena. This book is one of a kind as it provides an updated narrative on the behaviors and policies of both sides. It is an added value to the field of GCC-Russia relations, which need extensive and intensive understanding of its dynamics and entanglements. Dr. Mahjoob Zweiri, Ph.D. Director—Gulf Studies Center Qatar University Doha, Qatar Acknowledgments The editor would like to thank all the authors involved in this book as well as those from the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University who supported this project and made it possible, particularly its director Mahjoob Zweiri and research assistant professor Luciano Zaccara.

Dr. Mahjoob Zweiri, Ph.D. is the Director of Gulf Studies Center. He is an Associate Professor in Contemporary Politics of the Middle East at Qatar University. Before joining Qatar University in 2010, Dr. Zweiri was senior researcher in Middle East Politics and Iran at the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. He was also a visiting professor to School of Government & International Affairs at Durham University. From March 2003–December 2006 he was a research fellow and then a director of the Centre for Iranian Studies in the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University. Dr. Zweiri has more than 60 publications in the areas of Iran and Contemporary Middle East History and Politics. In addition to Arabic, Dr. Zweiri is fluent in Farsi and English.

Contents

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Introduction Nikolay Kozhanov 1 Understanding Russia’s Relations with the GCC 2 About the Volume New-Old Key Player: What to Expect from Russia’s Growing Role in the Middle East Ian Parmeter 1 Introduction 2 Russian Relations with the Middle East from the Cold War to 2010 3 Crisis at Home, and Challenges Abroad 4 Russian Interest in the Middle East Revives After 2010 4.1 Russia’s Syrian Intervention 4.2 Public Support 5 Impact of Syrian Intervention on Russia’s Relations with Other Middle East States 5.1 Gulf Arab States 5.2 Iran 5.3 Israel 5.4 Turkey 5.5 Balancing Acts—Libya, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar

1 4 8 21 21 22 25 28 30 31 34 34 39 40 41 42

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6 7 8 3

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Trump’s Impact on Russian Policy Towards the Middle East Where the Russian Intervention Is Headed Conclusion

What’s Driving Russia’s Return to the Middle East? Irina Zvyagelskaya 1 Introduction 2 A Search for Self-Identity 3 Soviet Legacy 4 A Domestic Dimension 5 Russia’s Interests in the Middle East 6 A Burden of Partnership 6.1 Turkey 6.2 Israel 6.3 Iran 6.4 Saudi Arabia 7 The Middle East: A Window of Opportunity or a Trap for Russia? Russian Foreign Policy in the Gulf: A Quest for Regional Partnerships and Opportunities Nikolay Surkov 1 Introduction 2 Brief Overview of the History of Relations 3 Current Russian Interests in the Gulf 3.1 Russia’s Economic Interests in the Gulf 3.2 Political Interests 3.3 National Security, Counterterrorism, and Islamic Dimension of Russia–GCC Ties 4 Russia’s Potential Partners in the Gulf 5 Russian Arms Sales and the Collective Security of the Gulf 6 Conclusion Russia and the Gulf States: Between West and East Roland Dannreuther 1 Introduction 2 The United States, the West and the Gulf 3 The Gulf Pivot to the East

43 47 49 53 54 54 58 59 61 68 68 70 71 73 75 79 80 81 89 90 92 95 98 103 107 109 109 113 120

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Russia—Between East and West Conclusion

Trade, Investment and Politics: Prospects for Russian Economic Cooperation with the Gulf Duncan Allan 1 Introduction 2 Trade Relations 2.1 Bilateral Trade 2.2 Trade: Competition 3 Investment 3.1 Gulf Investment in Russia 3.2 Russian Investment in the Gulf 4 Russia & ‘OPEC−+’ 5 Conclusions Going Beyond Politics: Russian Energy Interests in the Gulf Region Mikhail Krutikhin 1 Forget the USSR 2 Friend or Foe? 3 Big Boys’ Nursery Games 4 Conclusions Russian-Iranian Relations: Impact on Persian Gulf Interests Ghoncheh Tazmini 1 Introduction 2 The Taxonomy of Russian-Iranian Relations 3 An Anti-hegemonic Alignment 4 Untangling Russo-Iranian Relations 5 “Russia is not a Fire Brigade” 6 Regional Theater 7 The Russia-Iran Partnership and Its Impact on Gulf Interests 8 Conclusion

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125 130 133 133 135 135 140 142 142 145 150 157 159 159 161 165 176 177 177 180 182 184 186 188 192 202

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Russia-GCC Relations and the Future of Syria: Political Process and Prospects for the Economic Reconstruction Anton Mardasov and Andrey Korotayev 1 Introduction 2 Background 3 Political Process and Prospects for the Syrian Economic Reconstruction 4 The Syrian Constitutional Committee 5 Russia, the GCC, and the Syrian Negotiation Process 6 Syrian Reconciliation Prospects 7 Current Economic Situation in Syria and Perspectives of the Syrian Reconstruction 8 Russia and the Syrian Reconstruction 9 Russia-Gulf Rapprochement and the Syrian Reconstruction 10 Conclusion

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205 205 206 213 214 216 217 219 224 225 227

Russian Presence in Syria: Gulf States Views Sinan Hatahet 1 Introduction 2 The Evolution of Confrontation 3 Pragmatism Primes Over All 4 A Geopolitical Reality Check 5 Conclusion

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Russia’s Policy Toward the War in Yemen Leonid Issaev 1 Introduction 2 Historical Background 3 After the Arab Spring 4 Arab Coalition and Russia’s Position 5 Russia’s Bilateral Efforts with Arab Gulf Parties Involved in the Coalition 6 Russia’s Interests and Aspirations of Expanding Its Influence in the Middle East 7 Conclusion

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Broker, Partner, or Troublemaker: Russian Involvement in Regional Conflicts and GCC Interests Ibrahim Fraihat and Yegor Lodygin 1 Introduction 2 The Potentials of Smart Power 3 Russia in the Gulf 3.1 Role Definition in Relations to the United States 3.2 Economic Cooperation 4 Russia’s Smart Power in Action 4.1 Access 4.2 Compartmentalisation 4.3 Quid-Pro-Quo 4.4 Shared Political Values 5 Analysis 5.1 Access, Neutrality, and Compartmentalisation 5.2 Process Obsession 5.3 Branding 5.4 Competitor or a Scarecrow 5.5 Energy: Partners or Foes 5.6 Smart Power: A Synergy Between Hard and Soft Power 6 Conclusion

Correction to: Trade, Investment and Politics: Prospects for Russian Economic Cooperation with the Gulf Duncan Allan Index

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271 271 273 275 276 278 279 280 281 282 283 285 285 286 287 288 289 290 290 C1

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Notes on Contributors

Duncan Allan spent more than 28 years in the Foreign Office’s Research Analysts cadre, working on the countries of what is now the former Soviet Union. He completed several full tours and spells of temporary duty at the British embassies in Moscow and Kyiv. He left the diplomatic service in November 2017 and set up an independent consultancy, Octant Research & Analysis Ltd, which offers assessments of political, economic, and reputational risk in the post-Soviet space. He is also an associate fellow on the Russia and Eurasia Programme of the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House). Roland Dannreuther is Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster. He was previously Professor of International Relations at the University of Edinburgh; International Fellow at the Tbilisi State University; Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; and Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His research interests include security studies, energy security, and his regional interests include Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Recent publications include Energy Security (Polity: 2017); Global Resources: Conflict and Cooperation (2013) (co-edited with Wojciech Ostrowski); International Security: The Contemporary Agenda (2013); China, Oil and Global Politics (2011) (co-authored with Philip AndrewsSpeed). ‘Understanding Russia’s Return to the Middle East,’ International Politics (2019); ‘Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counter-Revolution,’ Journal of European Integration, (2015); ‘Shifting xv

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Dynamics of the Insurgency in the North Caucasus,’ Ethnopolitics (2014); ‘Russia and the Middle East: A Cold War Paradigm,’ Europe-Asia Studies, (2012); Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism (2010) (coedited with Luke March). Ibrahim Fraihat is an associate professor in international conflict resolution at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. He previously served as senior foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution and taught conflict resolution at Georgetown University and George Washington University. His latest book publications include: Iran and Saudi Arabia: Taming a Chaotic Conflict (Edinburgh University Press February 2020), Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia Ater the Arab Spring (Yale University Press, 2016). Dr. Fraihat has published extensively on Middle East politics, with articles appearing in The New York Times, Huffington Post, Newsweek, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Al Jazeera websites. Fraihat received a doctorate in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University in 2006. He is the recipient of George Mason University’s Distinguished Alumni Award (2014) for his achievements in the field of conflict resolution. Sinan Hatahet is a senior fellow researcher at Sharq Forum and Omran for Strategic Studies. He is also a researcher in the War and PostConflict Syria Project of the European University Institute studying Syria’s national and local political economy dynamics. Sinan’s research interests include non-state actors, the Kurdish political movement, and emerging new regional order. Hatahet holds a Ph.D. in cyber security from the University of Technology of Compiegne, France. Leonid Issaev is Associate Professor in the Department for Asian and African Studies in the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Saint Petersburg. He is also Deputy Head of the Laboratory for Monitoring the Risks of Socio-Political Destabilization in HSE; and Senior Fellow at the Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies in the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Science and coordinator of the ‘Russian in the Middle East’ research project. He is a member of the Scientific Council of the Russian Political Science Association. He has published numerous monographs and journal articles, mostly in Russian and English. He is coauthor of Syria and Yemen: Unfinished Revolutions (2013), Revolutions and Instability in the Middle East (2016); Fight for the Middle East: Regional Actors in

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the Course of Middle Eastern Conflict (2019), among many others. He is a regular contributor to Al Jazeera News. Andrey Korotayev is a Russian Middle Eastern scholar, anthropologist, comparative political scientist, demographer, and sociologist. He is currently the Head of the Laboratory of Monitoring of the Risks of Socio-Political Destabilization at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, and a Senior Research Professor at the Institute of Oriental Studies as well as in the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In addition, he is a Senior Research Professor of the International Laboratory on Political Demography and Social Macrodynamics (PDSM) of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, as well as a Full Professor of the Faculty of Global Studies of the Moscow State University. He is an author of more than 200 academic articles and 20 monographs, including the recently published Great Divergence and Great Convergence. A Global Perspective (New York: Springer, 2015) and Islamism, Arab Spring, and the Future of Democracy. World System and World Values Perspectives (New York: Springer, 2019). His monograph Introduction to Social Macrodynamics (Moscow: URSS, 2006; in collaboration with Artemy Malkov and Daria Khaltourina) has brought him an award of the Russian Science Support Foundation in ‘The Best Economists of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ nomination. In 2012, he was awarded with the Gold Kondratieff Medal by the International N. D. Kondratieff Foundation. Nikolay Kozhanov is a Research Associate Professor at the Gulf Studies Center of Qatar University. Nikolay is also a consulting fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme of Chatham House where he leads a project on Russia’s policy in the Middle East and a non-resident fellow at the Center for Middle East Studies at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. His research focuses on the geopolitics of Gulf energy, Russian foreign policy in the Middle East as well as Iran’s economy and international relations. Nikolay recent publications include Russia and the Syrian Conflict: Moscow’s Domestic, Regional and Strategic Interests (Gerlach Press 2016); Iran’s Strategic Thinking: The Evolution of Iran’s Foreign Policy 1979–2017. (London, Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2018) and Russian Policy across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods (Chatham House 2018).

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Mikhail Krutikhin is a co-founder and leading analyst of RusEnergy, an independent consulting agency based in Moscow, Russia. A graduate of the Institute of Oriental Languages at the Moscow Lomonosov State University, he majored in Iranian philology in 1970, and in 1985 obtained a Ph.D. in modern history. Between 1972 and 1992 he worked at the TASS news agency on missions to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. Since 1993 he has been analyzing opportunities and specifics of investments in the energy industry in the ex-USSR—first with the US-based Russian Petroleum Investor Inc., and then with RusEnergy. Yegor Lodygin is an M.A. student in Conflict Management and Humanitarian Action at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. Anton Mardasov is a non-resident scholar in MEI’s Syria Program. He is also a non-resident military affairs expert at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) focusing on Syria, Iraq, and extremist organizations. Anton is the author of numerous articles in the Russian media, several studies and chapters of books on Russian strategy in Syria and the Syrian opposition, as well as Moscow’s relations with Iran, Lebanon, and Egypt. His articles and commentary have appeared in Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera, Asharq Al-Awsat, and others. In the past, Anton has been a consultant to the analytical departments of the security services of two oil companies. He is based in Moscow. Ian Parmeter was an Australian diplomat for 25 years, working within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia’s Foreign Ministry). His diplomatic postings included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Russia (as Deputy Head of Mission), and Lebanon (as Ambassador). From 2004 to 2015 he was with the then-Office of National Assessments (now Office of National Intelligence), the Australian government’s primary foreign policy analytical agency, within the Prime Minister’s portfolio. There he had a Senior Executive role as Assistant Director-General responsible for analyses of the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Since 2015 he has been a Research Scholar at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University, where he researches and lectures on Russian policy toward the Middle East in the Putin era. In 2019 he lectured and tutored also at the university’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. He has presented papers on Russia-Middle East and Australia’s Middle East policy at several other Australian universities and think tanks

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including the University of Melbourne, the University of Adelaide, Griffith University, the Australian Defence College, and the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He has published articles based on these papers in the Australian on-line journals Australian Outlook and The Interpreter. As part of his research he visited Iran and Russia in 2015, Russia and the UK in 2018, and Qatar in 2019. Nikolay Surkov is a Senior Research Fellow at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), an Associate Professor at the Chair or Oriental Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), and a Middle East Expert at the Russian International Affairs Council. He was also a staff writer and an editor in various Russian newspapers (such as the Rossiyskaya Gazeta and the Izvestia) covering foreign policy and military affairs. After a Master’s in Oriental Studies, Dr. Surkov did a Ph.D. on International Politics at the Institute of Asian and African Studies at the Moscow State University. His fields of interest include foreign and domestic policy of the Arab States, security situation in the Middle East, Russian, and US policy in this region. Dr. Surkov speaks Russian, English, French, and Arabic. Ghoncheh Tazmini is a Visiting Fellow at the Middle East Centre at the LSE. She is a political scientist, and while her formal training was in Russian studies, she has a special interest in Iranian politics. Dr. Tazmini obtained a degree in International Relations at the University of British Columbia and a Masters in Russian and Post-Soviet Studies at the London School of Economics. Holding a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Kent at Canterbury, she is the author of Khatami’s Iran: The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform (I.B. Tauris, 2009, 2013) and Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran: Politics and Modernisation in Post-revolutionary States (I.B. Tauris, 2012), Dr. Tazmini has written numerous book chapters, scientific articles and opinion pieces on Iranian and Russia affairs. Dr. Tazmini was formerly Iranian Heritage Foundation Visiting Fellow at the London Middle East Institute at SOAS—University of London. A former Associate Member of the Centre for Iranian Studies at SOAS, she was occasional lecturer for the Masters in Iranian Studies. Dr. Tazmini is regularly commissioned for ongoing consulting projects with NGOS, law firms and semi-governmental bodies. She is also Research Associate at ISCTECenter for International Studies, University of Lisbon, Portugal. As a

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British Academy grant-holder, she is currently conducting research on the Persian-Portuguese Encounter in Hormuz. Irina Zvyagelskaya is Head of Center for Middle East Studies at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. She is also a Chief Research Associate at the Institute of Oriental Studies. Irina Zvyagelskaya is a Professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Russian Foreign Ministry (MGIMO). Prof. Zvyagelskaya’s area of expertise includes contemporary history, conflicts, international relations, and security issues in the Middle East and Central Asia. Irina Zvyagelskaya is a member of IISS. She authored over 250 publications, including books, chapters, and articles.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction Nikolay Kozhanov

During the last five years, Russian relations with the GCC demonstrated a strong tendency for positive development. Even Moscow’s decision to leave the OPEC+ agreement and launch a price war with Saudi Arabia in March 2020 was unable to offset those achievements that were reached by the Russian diplomacy in the region. Russia’s policy toward the GCC is driven by a complex mixture of traditional factors—such as the ongoing confrontation with the West and the current deadlock—and new trends. All in all, Russia’s current approach to the region is determined by the Kremlin’s intentions to: • use the Middle Eastern agenda as leverage in its relations with the West, • secure its economic interests, and • ensure domestic security. First and foremost, the Russian leadership is keen to maintain Russia’s position as an influential external player in the Middle East, including

N. Kozhanov (B) Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_1

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the region of the Persian Gulf.1 However, Moscow is not confident that it would be able to respond effectively if forced into a reactive mode by other players in the region. The Kremlin therefore seeks to retain initiative and thus shape the regional agenda according to its needs and resources. This makes prediction of Moscow’s next moves in the region a challenging, but not impossible, task. Moscow’s involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, its close contacts with the Palestinian authorities and Israel, as well as attempts to maintain good ties with the warring sides in Yemen, help to demonstrate both to the regional players and the West Russia’s importance as a global player, thus compelling the GCC countries and their Western partners to further take Russia’s worldview into account and to keep communication channels with Moscow open. In other words, Russia’s presence in the Middle East advertises its capacity to project power and helps Moscow avoid international isolation. In this respect it considers its relations with the region as just another (albeit important) bargaining chip in its relations with the United States and the EU. The economic agenda, on the contrary, drives Russia’s decision-makers to treat the Middle East (and the Gulf per se) as important in and of itself and ensures they do not see the region solely through the prism of relations with the West. Russia’s economic goals in the region are twofold: First, it considers the GCC as an important source of investments and as a market for some of its industries (above all, arms manufacturing, agriculture, the nuclear sector, and oil, gas, and petrochemicals). Second, the dependence of the state budget on the exports of hydrocarbons and the Kremlin’s concerns about a potential fall of the oil price to below USD 40 per barrel (which would mean Moscow would be unable to put money into its reserve funds and sustain all budget needs) compels Russia to cooperate actively with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and its informal leader, Saudi Arabia. After decades of negligence, Russia declared its intention to develop closer relations with OPEC. This decision was driven by largely due to

1 The use of term ‘Persian Gulf’ in this book does not endorse any nationalistic agenda. The editor and authors use it following the most common practice to name the body of water that in some studies is also called ‘the Arabian Gulf.’ Moreover, in the book the preference is given to the shorten version of the geographical name—‘the Gulf’—in order to avoid sensitive and unnecessary political discussions.

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domestic political considerations. Fluctuations of the oil price immediately affect key Russian macroeconomic figures whereas it is important for the Kremlin to demonstrate a strong economic performance and to show that Putin is able to deliver on his promises of economic growth. Consequently, 2016–2017 was marked by the intensification of the dialogue between Russia and Saudi Arabia. Among all, Moscow and Riyadh managed to work out the common stance on the adoption and, later on, extension of the so-called OPEC+ deal, a 2016 agreement signed between the OPEC and non-OPEC members including Russia aimed to decrease their oil production in order to encourage the growth of oil prices on the international market. Finally, the Kremlin’s Gulf policy is also driven by concerns over radical Islamic movements in Russia and post-Soviet Central Asia. While between 2014 and 2016 these concerns centered on the infiltration of so-called Russian-speaking jihadists with battle experience in the Middle East returning to the post-Soviet space, now Russia is more worried about potential ideological and financial support provided by Middle Eastern elites to radical Islamists already in the country and its ‘near abroad.’ This has led to the intensification of attempts to persuade these elites to support ‘official’ Islam in Russia instead. The Kremlin has allowed more active contacts between the government-supported leaders of Russia’s Muslim community, including religious leaders and the local governments of the majority Muslim-populated republics of the Russian Federation—such as Chechnya, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, and Ingushetia—with the religious circles and political establishments of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. These contacts are supposed not only to strengthen Russia’s relations with the region and bring investments from the Muslim countries to religiously close regions of Russia, but to convince GCC elites that the rights of Muslims are not abused in the country. In order to expand its presence in the Gulf, Russia is trying to get more involved in regional diplomatic initiatives that do not require much material investment to demonstrate its importance, as well as to be more active in forming and developing regional alliances. For instance, 2019 was marked by numerous multi-level visits by Russian officials to the region. These were intended to show off Moscow’s leading role in the international arena. One ‘stand-out’ attempt at a Russian diplomacy has been the release in July 2019 of Russia’s ‘Concept of collective security in the Persian Gulf’ by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Kremlin believes

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that it too will be able to use this document not only in the Gulf, but further afield too—again to show that it plays an important international role. One new factor that can alter Russia’s approach to the GCC is the emergence of domestic actors who can affect the policy-making process on the region or individual countries there. Russian energy companies have a growing influence on policy decisions. The interests of hydrocarbon producers play a part in motivating the Kremlin to balance between key forces in the Gulf ensuring that Russia is not putting all its eggs into one basket. After Russia began its ‘return’ to the Middle East in 2012, it had to deal with numerous non-state and quasi-state structures. It was forced to use ‘parallel diplomacy,’ with formal and informal Russian structures that have no relations to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs used to develop ties in the region. For example, to be able to speak with different actors in the Gulf, Russia relied not only on the ministry but also on Russian individuals not openly associated with official agencies dealing with foreign matters. Such individuals’ personal views inevitably affect policy as they also try to push their own agenda. All these existing tasks, challenges, and opportunities will definitely push Moscow toward more active steps aimed at securing its positions in the Gulf region. As a result, we should expect Moscow to get more involved in different regional diplomatic initiatives to demonstrate its importance as well as be more active in forming and developing new and existing alliances. In certain cases, to demonstrate its key role, the Kremlin can even play a role of a troublemaker. Consequently, it is highly important to be able to predict the further moves of the Russian leadership in the Middle East.

1

Understanding Russia’s Relations with the GCC

Russia’s growing involvement in the Middle East created a bright plethora of authors looking into the different aspects of its regional presence. In their studies they inevitably addressed the issue of Moscow’s relations with the GCC. Thus, definitely, such authors as Mark Katz, Vitaly Naumkin, Theodore Karasik, Samuel Ramani, Anna Borshchevskaya, Leonid Issaev, Aleksandr Shumilin, and Irina Zvyagelskaya are to be followed. Their research publications offer interesting and deep insights into the Russian

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dialogue with the region from different angles.2 At the same time, the majority of the recently published studies on Russian presence in the Middle East are just touching upon Russia’s ties with the Gulf monarchies within the broader discussion of Moscow’s regional approaches without paying them sufficient attention.3 On the other hand, some papers, on the contrary, are too narrow: They either concentrate their attention on the analysis of Russia’s bilateral relations with a selected country/group of the GCC countries or focus on just one aspect of the Russia’s dialogue with the GCC.4 For instance, in his paper Better Than Before: Comparing Moscow’s Cold War and Putin Era Policies toward Arabia and the Gulf Mark Katz provides a very interesting comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet policy toward the Gulf during the Cold War with Putin’s vision of the region. The idea of the continuity of Moscow’s policies toward the region is often ignored by other scholars who rather begin their story of Russia’s relations with the Gulf from early 2000s forgetting about Moscow’s ties with the region during the 1990es and ignoring the fact the Arab part of the Gulf represented the interest for the USSR even in the absence of officially established diplomatic ties with the majority of them. Katz, on the contrary, examines both Soviet and Putin’s foreign policies and explores both what went well for Moscow and what did not, thus, offering an explanation of the Soviet gains and misfortunes in the Middle East. Yet, the historiographical approach and the need to show the interconnections and disruptions between Putin’s and Soviet approaches to the region obviously prevent the author from making more detailed account 2 Anna Borshchevskaya, Russia in the Middle East (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016); Mark Katz, Better Than Before: Comparing Moscow’s Cold War and Putin Era Policies toward Arabia and the Gulf (Durham: Durham University, 2018); Mark Katz, Support Opposing Sides Simultaneously: Russia’s Approach to the Gulf and the Middle East (Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2018); Samuel Ramani, “Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partnership,” in The Middle East Policy 27:1 (2020); Alexander Shumilin and Inna Shumilina, “Russia as a Gravity Pole of the GCC’s New Foreign Policy Pragmatism,” The International Spectator 52:2 (2017); Li-Chen Sim, “Russia and the UAE Are Now Strategic Partners: What’s Next?,” LobeLog, 7 June 2018, https:// lobelog.com/russia-and-the-uaeare-now-strategic-partners-whats-next/. Accessed 5 July 2020. 3 Such as Eugene Rumer, Russia in the Middle East: Jack of all Trades, Master of None (Washington: CEIP, 2019). 4 Michael Bradshaw and Richard Connolly, “Preparing for the New Oil Order? Saudi Arabia and Russia,” Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019).

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of the current state of relations between Russia and the GCC. Also the author discusses these relations as just one of the elements of Moscow’s ties with the Persian Gulf naturally paying attention to its dialogue with Iraq, Iran, and Yemen, thus, overshadowing the discourse on Russian relation with the GCC by the analysis of Russian connections with other regional players.5 Among all, Katz correctly demonstrates that while Moscow’s decisions obviously play a role in whether its Middle Eastern policies are been successful or not, sometimes Moscow’s successes or failures are affected by policies pursued by the United States, by Middle Eastern and other actors.6 This idea is further develop in the works by researchers like Samuel Ramani who pay a lot of attention to the geopolitical factor affecting Russian-GCC relations. Moreover, the analysis of these ties through the prism of Russia’s relations with the West and its ambitions to play the role of a global player at the international arena has, in general, become a very popular way to approach the issue.7 While definitely the Kremlin’s admissions as well as Russia’s relations with the West play a very important role in Moscow’s decision-making on the Middle East and the Gulf, the authors are often carried away by this explanations from discussing other important drivers of the Russian diplomacy in the region such as domestic or economic factors. From this point of view, works by Leonid Issaev represent a bright contrast. As opposed to the majority of authors, he is paying more attention to the domestic factors of Russia’s foreign policy toward the region.8 He traditionally argues that Russian foreign policy cannot be considered in isolation from the processes that occur within the Russian state. According to him, since the times of the Soviet Union Russia’s foreign policy has been a service function in relation to the needs of the current political regime. Unfortunately, this idea is often ignored by other authors.9 5 Katz, Better Than Before. 6 Ibid. 7 Samuel Ramani, “Russia’s Strategic Balancing Act in Yemen,” The Arab Gulf States

Institute in Washington, 1 May 2019, https://agsiw.org/russias-strategic-balancing-actin-yemen/, accessed 5 July 2020. 8 Leonid Issaev and Alisa Shishkina, “Russia in the Middle East: in Search of its Place,” in Political Narratives in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Wolfgang Muhlberger (London: Springer, 2020). 9 Ibid.

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Apart from domestic drivers of the Russian foreign policy toward the Gulf, scholars often ignore the economic drivers of Russia’s relations with the Gulf. Even Russia’s dialogue with Saudi Arabia on the OPEC+ is often considered within the framework of Moscow’s vision of the global energy markets rather than from the point of its meaning for the Russian dialogue with the region itself.10 Under these circumstances, studies by the UAE-based scholar Li-Chen Sim represent even greater interest as she actively positions Russia’s priorities in the oil and gas sphere as one of the pillars of Moscow’s diplomacy in the Gulf.11 At the same time, it is hard to argue with the majority of scholars that Russia’s foreign policy toward the Gulf is inseparable from its broader diplomacy in the Middle East. Since the beginning of Russia’s military deployment in Syria in 2015, Moscow importance for regional and non-regional players has been based on two pillars: military presence in the Middle East (first of all, in Syria, but also in Libya) and ‘pragmatic’ balancing between key regional players. The core set of priorities shaping Moscow’s approaches to the region and, consequently, the GCC remained unchanged. This list includes Russia’s ambitions to project power, Kremlin’s endless quest for economic profit, and Moscow’s domestic concerns. Yet, for the last five years, the nature of the impact of these factors on Russian strategic thinking has been uneven and constantly evolved adding new shades to the Kremlin’s approaches. Thus, since 2015, the influence of economic considerations on the Russian regional decision-making became much more obvious. In the geopolitical sphere, Russia’s leadership always looks at the Middle East and the Gulf through the lenses of its goal of project power globally and confronting the West, with its regional priorities playing a secondary role. Moscow’s involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, its close contacts with the Palestinian authorities and Israel, as well as attempts to maintain good ties with Iran, on the one hand, and the GCC, on the other, help to demonstrate to the United States and the EU Russia’s importance as a global player, thus compelling the West to further take Russia’s worldview into account and to keep communication channels with Moscow open. 10 Connolly Bradshaw, “Preparing for the New Oil Order? Saudi Arabia and Russia”. 11 Li-Chen Sim, “Moscow’s New Strategy in the Gulf,” About Energy, 27 August

2019, https://www.aboutenergy.com/en_IT/topics/topic-li-chen-eng.shtml, accessed 5 July 2020.

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From this point of view, Russia’s interaction with the GCC offers certain opportunities. For instance, another ‘stand-out’ attempt by the Russian diplomacy to confirm its importance for the Gulf has been the release in July 2019 of Russia’s ‘Concept of collective security in the Persian Gulf’ by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Kremlin believes that it too will be able to use this document not only in the Gulf, but further afield too—again to show that it plays an important international role. Russia’s diplomats believe that current tensions in the region mean that the international community will be ready to support its initiative. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also argues that the publication of the ‘concept’ is a response to attempts by Western actors to impose a ‘western solution’ on the region. The Kremlin believes that the emergence of a new security system in the Gulf is inevitable. Yet, given its ambitions to play a larger role in this part of the region and beyond, it does not want this new system to be established without its participation. There are no illusions in Moscow that the concept will be adopted by others as it is. However, it is intended to secure its position at the table in any discussion on the future structure of international relations of the Gulf. Yet, in order to be able to use the Middle Eastern issues to shape its relations with the West, the Russian leadership has to maintain Russia’s position as an influential external player in the region, including the Gulf. This means that Moscow also needs to demonstrate its importance for the regional players. Under these circumstances, Moscow’s active attempts to maintain good ties with the warring sides in Yemen, its support provided to general Khalifa Haftar (also supported by the UAE) in Libya, active cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the OPEC+ and readiness to open Syria for the economic presence of the GCC countries are, among all, aimed to make the Gulf monarchies to further take the Kremlin’s worldview into account and to keep communication channels with Moscow open. Moreover, Moscow is not confident that Russia would be able to respond effectively if forced into a reactive mode by other players in the region. The Kremlin therefore seeks to retain initiative and thus shape the regional agenda according to its needs and resources.

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About the Volume

The current collective volume offers insight into the motives behind Moscow’s behavior in the Persian Gulf, considering Russia’s growing role in the Middle East and its desire to protect national interests using

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a wide arrange of means. The volume targets the wide audience of readers with the aim to allow them to generate informed prognosis about Moscow’s moves in this area over the next five years. In contrast to most studies of Russia’s presence in the region, this publication considers the Russian involvement in the Gulf from two standpoints—the Russian and foreign. The idea of the monograph is to take several key problems of Moscow’s presence in the Gulf each of these to be covered by two authors—a Russian and non-Russian scholars—in order to offer the readers alternative visions of the Russian foreign policy toward the GCC countries. The book’s scope is not limited by the analysis of bilateral relations between Russia and the GCC. Instead, the study tries to look into the areas of divergence and convergence between Moscow and the GCC on the wide arrange of regional and international issues including but not limited to the Syrian civil war, Iran’s regional activities and Qatar’s blockade. The project analyzes global geopolitical risks affecting the Russia’s Gulf strategy, internal drivers determining Moscow’s behavior in the region, and economic aspects of Russia’s diplomacy. It assesses opportunities and challenges faced by Moscow in the Middle East that motivate the Russian government toward more active cooperation with the GCC. This book demonstrates that, apart from Russia’s confrontation with the West, wrongly acknowledged by analysts as the only key factor determining the context of Russia’s presence in the Middle East and Gulf, there are other no less important factors shaping Russian diplomacy in the region. These include new global challenges (such as the rise of radical religious movements or the evolution of global energy market) as well as Russian economic interests and domestic policies that push Moscow toward the greater interaction with the region. The top priority of this monograph is to fill the gap in the understanding of Russia’s foreign policy toward the GCC, its drivers and priorities caused by the overconcentration of current commentators on those topics and aspects of Moscow’s presence in the Middle East that draw most of public attention (such as Russian vision of the Syrian conflict settlement), thus, leaving the issues of Russia’s dialogue with the GCC in shadow. The study offers a comprehensive view of the drivers of Russian diplomacy and how their interplay shapes Russian approaches to the region. The book tries to demonstrate that while playing an important role in shaping Moscow’s approaches to the region Russian confrontation with the West should not be considered as the only factor

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determining Kremlin’s policy in the Gulf. The monograph shows that Russia’s domestic situation and economic matters are no less important. Many underestimate the influence of the political struggle for power inside Russia on Moscow’s behavior in the region and ignore the role of the Russian Muslim community. They also simplify the role of Russian energy corporations in the creation of sources for conflict and cooperation between Moscow and the GCC powers. While some authors present Russian oil and gas resources as just another lever through which Moscow exercises its influence in the region, this project will demonstrate that the heavy dependence of the Russian economy on the export of the hydrocarbons also shapes policy. In other words, the book argues that the Russian authorities and their energy corporations are mutually dependent: Moscow can dictate its will abroad through energy corporations whereas but the necessity to protect the interests of these same corporations compels the Russian government to adjust its foreign policy to their needs. The book begins with a Chapter by Ian Parmeter, a Research Scholar at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies of the Australian National University who argues that in order to understand how Russia is both a new, and an old, key player in the Middle East and what to expect from its return to the region, it is necessary to examine Moscow’s current Middle East strategy in its historical context and from the perspective of its domestic imperatives. Consequently, he looks back at the history of Russian relations with the Middle East and the Gulf trying to trace the continuity in the policies conducted by the current Russian leadership as compared with the strategies of the Soviet Union. Parmeter correctly notes that in the first half of the Cold War—the 1950s and 1960s—the region was a major theater of Soviet-US rivalry. This was most evident in US identification with Israel’s interests and the Soviet Union’s support for the Arab side, particularly Egypt. The Soviet Union also sought to cultivate Syria and Iraq, but regular military coups in both hindered a consistent policy until the 1970s. At that stage, Moscow was effectively shut out of most of the conservative Gulf Arab states by the Soviet Union’s doctrinal atheism, and from Iran because of the Shah’s partnership with the United States. The Soviet investment in Egypt failed disastrously after 1967, with the major Arab defeat in the ‘Six Day War,’ and the death in 1970 of proSoviet Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The definitive break was in 1972, with the decision by Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, to expel Soviet military advisers and turn to the United States for both material

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and diplomatic support. US-led negotiations between Egypt and Israel throughout the 1970s culminated in the Camp David Accords of 1978 and subsequent peace treaty. This was a major foreign policy win for Washington, but also a zero-sum loss for Moscow, as it confirmed the United States as the primary external actor in the Middle East. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused political, economic, and social upheaval in Russia for a decade. Hardliners in the West took advantage of this to expand NATO eastwards, right to Russia’s border, dashing the hopes of many in Russia and the West for a less adversarial relationship. Vladimir Putin, who had succeeded Russia’s first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin, in 2000, made clear his, and most Russians,’ anger over Western policies in his famous address to the NATO Security Conference in Munich in 2007: He accused the United States of an aggressive foreign policy aimed at establishing US control of a unipolar world, regardless of the views and interests of other states. In this environment the Middle East again became of Russian interest. The United States was vulnerable there as a result of poorly conceived and executed policies by successive US presidents—Bush, Obama, and now Trump—starting with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Through deft diplomacy across the region, and calibrated military intervention (Syria since 2015, and this year in Libya), Putin has been able to counter US policies and to develop productive relations with all states in the Middle East—the major Arab countries, Israel, Iran, and Turkey—despite their mutual antagonisms. When asking himself on what does Putin want to achieve from this position of advantage Parmeter emphasizes that the Russian president does not want to take over the United States’s role of regional patron. According to Parmeter, the Russian president appreciates that the Middle East is a graveyard of such ambitions—and he knows Russia’s global economic heft is too small. Moreover, the Middle East is a second-order international priority for Russia. The United States, the West broadly, and China form Moscow’s main geostrategic focus. Rather Putin wants to use Russia’s role in the region to undercut US objectives when he disagrees with them, as part of his broader ambition to counter US global strategy. That will require tactical adroitness and opportunism, as well as strategic focus, in order to capitalize on Western missteps—which Putin can rely on to keep coming. Parmeter also notes that the economies of Russia and several Gulf states depend on extraction and export of their hydrocarbon resources. They have a mutual interest in coordinating

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their production and pricing policies, and Russia wants to attract Gulf sovereign wealth funds to invest in development of Russia’s Arctic natural gas reserves. Another significant economic interest is Russian arms sales to the region. At present Middle East states import only 10% of their arms from Russia, but this is a growing market and Russia has scope for big ticket sales, such as its S-400 defensive missile system and other technologically sophisticated military hardware. This discussion is continued in Chapter 3 written by Irina Zvyagelskaya who is the Director of the Center for Middle East Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Science. According to her, Russia’s return to the Middle East, its new military, political and economic ties with the local countries reinforce a new image of Russia and accentuate its role as an important player in the international arena. The chapter by Zvyagelskaya allows the readers to explore Russian interests and strategic goals in the Middle East, instruments of its foreign policy, political gains and emerging complications from a Russian standpoint, thus, helping them to better understand Russia’s self-perception at the Middle Eastern arena. The subsequent chapter written by Nikolay Surkov, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations under the Russian Academy of Science, narrows the scope of the discussion to the Russia’s relations with the Gulf countries. According to the author, as Russia is reestablishing itself as one of the major external players in the Middle East it is looking for reliable and capable partners among the regional states. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies are considered by the Kremlin strategists to be the key power-brokers in the Arab world, thus, it is necessary to develop working relations with them. This approach is reflected in the official 2018 Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy which lists the continuation of the strategic dialogue with the GCC as one of the priorities. From the Russian perspective, the gradual American withdrawal from the Middle East creates a window of opportunity for expanding Moscow’s influence in the region, because the Gulf monarchies will be forced to diversify their foreign policy. Surkov correctly argues that post-Soviet Russia has a long record of attempts to build cooperation with the GCC. In the 1990s Moscow was focused on developing economic and defense ties with the Gulf countries, as they were seen as promising investors and potential importers of Russian weapons. When the conflict in Chechnya started it also became important for Russia to make sure that the Gulf states did not provide

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financial support for the separatists in the North Caucasus. However, in the 1990s the internal disputes, ailing economy and weak military did not make Russia an attractive partner for the Gulf. According to Nikolay, in the 2000s, Russia’s activity in the Middle East began to increase. Moscow engaged in the Palestinian-Israeli settlement, the Iraqi crisis, and the Iranian nuclear issue. All these issues required constant interaction with the Gulf states. Economic interests and cooperation in the world energy markets were also on the agenda. During this decade the UAE was seen as the main Russia’s partner among the Gulf states. Moscow was willing to offer the GCC its defense industry products and technologies, to establish closer cooperation in terms of oil and gas prices, and to mediate between the Gulf countries and Iran. The cautious rapprochement was interrupted by the events of 2011. The researcher points out that, after the Arab Spring broke out, Russia’s relations with the Gulf countries went through two stages. At the first stage, 2011–2016, a near-confrontation arose, since Moscow believed that certain Gulf countries provided support for numerous armed Islamist groups in Syria. Though even then Russia was looking for ways to cooperate with the regional players on the Syrian issue, e.g., through the Geneva process. The Gulf states support was needed to bring the opposition to the negotiating table. Finally, Surkov argues that, at the current stage that began in 2016, the interests of Russia and the Gulf began to coincide. Both parties were interested in restoring stability in the Middle East in general and in Syria in particular. Increasing mutual appeal resulted in intensive diplomatic contacts between Russia and the Gulf monarchies. There were also promises on behalf of various Gulf states to expand trade and investment cooperation which were seen in Moscow as an attempt to draw it out of presumed ‘pro-Iranian camp.’ According to the author, the actual economic outcome of this activity turned out to be very humble, but Russia is still optimistic about the future of cooperation with the GCC. Frustrated by the EU’s insistence on political transition as precondition to financial assistance Moscow started to look upon the Gulf countries as the key partners in rebuilding Syria after the conflict and bringing Damascus back to the regional stage. Russia is also willing to emphasize its new positive, peacemaking role in the Middle East by taking a more active stance toward the Iran-GCC stand-off.

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Chapter 5, however, allows readers to look at the Russian relations with the Gulf from a different perspective. Its author, Professor of International Relation at the University of Westminster Roland Dannreuther, is looking at the dynamics of Russia’s relations with the Persian Gulf countries from the standpoint of the Western countries. He correctly points out that Western states have enjoyed a near monopoly of external military, political and economic patronage of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states. The United States has been the dominant actor but the former imperial powers, the UK and France, have retained important strategic and economic assets in the region. The Soviet Union, and then the Russian Federation in the 1990s and 2000s, was either excluded or had minimal influence. During the 2010s, Russia made significant breakthroughs in developing closer economic, political, and security relations with the Gulf states. This has raised concerns in the West, particularly when seen in the context of a much increased economic presence of China in the region. Dannreuther’s chapter addresses what the causes are for this shift in the strategic orientation of the Gulf states. This is viewed from two axes: whether this is to be understood as a result of structural shifts in the global balance of power or whether it is more due to differing leaderships and personalities. The second axis is that of the role of ideas and ideology as against strictly material economic and strategic factors. In his chapter Roland tries to answer the question on whether the Gulf region is shifting toward a more ‘penetrated system,’ where multiple external powers vie for power and influence, or whether the continued Western dominance can be expected to be durable and long-lasting. In Chapter 6 by Associate Fellow of Russia and Eurasia Programme of Chatham House Duncan Allan readers are invited to discuss the economic drivers of Russia’s relations with the Gulf, factors that are often ignored by researchers. Meanwhile, Allan argues that Russia is again a significant external Power in the geopolitics of much of the Middle East. Yet its regional influence is often exaggerated. In reality, outside Syria, Russia’s regional presence is constrained by a combination of complex local circumstances and its own limited policy toolkit. Nor will the Kremlin overcome these constraints any time soon—as the prospects for Russian economic cooperation with the countries of the Persian Gulf illustrate. According to Duncan, Russia’s economic relations with the Gulf countries remain modest. The fundamental obstacle is that Russia’s economic offer to the region lacks appeal: The sides’ economic structures are noncomplementary (both are oriented toward the extraction and export of

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raw materials); Russian energy companies generally struggle to compete with their Western competitors as partners for Gulf projects; and Russia’s admittedly large manufactured sector (the world’s 10th largest in valueadded terms) is largely unattractive. This applies even to the few global industrial markets in which Russia can realistically compete—notably, arms and civil nuclear technology—although there are exceptions to this rule. Meanwhile, Russia is not perceived to be a safe or profitable destination for would-be Gulf investors. For this state of affairs to change, it will be necessary for the Russian authorities to embrace far-reaching domestic economic reform: to increase the productivity and competitiveness of its manufacturing industries; and to improve the investment climate in Russia. Neither is on the cards: The Kremlin has effectively ruled out reform as politically and socially destabilising. The subsequent chapter written by one of the Russian leading oil market analysts Mikhail Krutikhin continues the discussion started by Duncan Allan but focuses it solely on Russian relations with the Gulf in the oil and gas sector. The market expert argues that Russia is hardly a successor of the Soviet Union in its attitude toward the Gulf region. According to Krutikhin, the difference is obvious. In the Soviet Union, the domineering motivation was the expansion of the communist ideology under the aegis of the USSR and, consequently, the cold war confrontation with the West. The Soviet rulers spared no efforts and spent enormous government-controlled funds to buy allegiance of foreign governments, political parties, national liberation movements, etc.—almost without personal motivation. Today, Russia’s ruling elite is unwilling to continue that liberal spending for several reasons: The state funds are somewhat limited (and often regarded as personal property of decision-makers); and the ideological motivation has been abandoned. Mikhail believes that for the current Moscow rulers, political motivation is still a strong factor, but it is directed mainly inward, to persuade the population of their country that Russia is a great global power and a force to be reckoned with. Russia often positions itself as a spoiler of other countries’ moves—just to get recognized as an equal partner in tackling regional and international problems. On the other hand, this also explains the desire of Moscow to befriend everybody in sight—and everybody uses the Russian approaches as a pretext to get some gains from the United States or China. According to Krutikhin, in the Gulf region, as anywhere else, Russia is unable to compete with the West or China economically: Russia’s footprint in the international economy is microscopic: between

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1.7 and 2.7% of the global GDP and keeps shrinking. Technologically, it cannot contribute to any other country’s progress as it depends to a great extent on imported knowhow and equipment. Russia’s efforts in building economic relations on the big state level have been limited to a recent alliance with OPEC and the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, which, according to Mikhail, is little more that a consulting office rather than a cartel or real alliance. The emergence of LNG as the main driving force of the global energy market has made Russia to take a closer look at competitors in this business, such as Qatar and Iran. Russia is developing its own LNG facilities and hopes to become a major player on this market. Logically, it would be reasonable to expect some sort of dirty play in the Gulf region against the LNG export potential of these two countries. As to oil, Russian companies will hardly treat Gulf oil producers as competitors. They understand that Russia will soon see a peak of oil production (depletion of brownfields and prohibitively high costs of developing the remaining tight reserves). Instead, some Russian oil producers are willing to expand internationally, and the Gulf region is one of their targets. According to Krutikhin, for the Gulf state, the quality of wannabe Russian partners is a very important issue. Some companies, such as Lukoil or Gazpromneft, are commercially safe and sensible, pursuing business goals and focusing on maximization of profit and minimization of loss. Other Russian players, such as Rosneft or Gazprom, are often inefficient, corrupt, and too politicized to be regarded as viable partners. Moreover, some of them are under Western sanctions, which restrict their ability to cooperate. While the previous chapters were mostly focused on the bilateral issues of Russia-GCC relations, the study by Ghoncheh Tazmini is devoted to the study of the impact of Russian-Iranian relations on the dynamics of Moscow’s dialogue with the GCC. Tazmini argues that Russia has been steadily expanding its footprint in the region, while Iran remains centre stage. Increasingly, these two pivotal states are drawer closer together, and the pattern of engagement suggests that Russian-Iranian alignment is a permanent feature of the Middle Eastern political landscape. This alignment goes beyond strategic convergence, economic cooperation, and military coordination. The Russian-Iranian partnership is predicated on a similar geopolitical worldview that is defined by several enduring parameters. Moscow-Tehran alignment is firmly is anchored within a broader assemblage of shared principles and preoccupations. This chapter investigates how this partnership manifests in different conflict areas in the

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region and how it relates to the interests of Arab states. Ghoncheh argues that while Moscow and Tehran’s interests may converge, both states display disparate dynamics in the way they engage and interact with individual Gulf states. Russia and Iran remain aligned, despite diverging priorities in their dealings with the Gulf states. In general, Russia’s newfound role as mediator and stabilizing force in the region suggests that Moscow will apply a balancing acting in managing relations with Iran and the Arab Gulf states. The discussion of the regional dimension of the Russian-GCC relations was continued in Chapter 9 by Andrey Korotaev and Anton Mardasov who studied options for Moscow’s dialogue with the GCC countries on the future of Syria. The authors point at the fact that the Russian leadership believes that the Constitutional Committee (CC) is currently a key factor in a political settlement. Russia hopes that Western states, primarily the EU, adhering to the principle of ‘no reconstruction without a political process,’ will regard the launch of the CC as the beginning of this political process and increase humanitarian aid to Syrians living in governmentcontrolled territory. Russia’s position on this issue is different from the position of the Syrian government, nonetheless. A glimmer of hope could come from the point that recent events in northeast Syria have created a new reality that has objectively strengthened the position of the opposition in the CC, but neither Russia, nor Syria, are ready to recognize this reality. Russia could contribute to the implementation of European initiatives since the interests of Russia and Europe to stabilize Syria and the region coincide. More importantly, one of the goals of Russia’s intervention in Syria is to establish cooperation with the West to resolve the Syrian crisis. The official position of Moscow coincides with UN Security Council resolution 2254. So, it can be said that Russian views on the political process coincide with the views of all who agree with this resolution. In reality, the position of Russia is supported by the BRICS countries, partly it is shared by such countries of the region as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria, Iran. Russian diplomacy is actively working to convince the leaders of the MENA region states of the correctness of their position. Russian politics is even more convincing when the economic interests of Russia and the other state coincide. Korotaev and Mardasov argue that the Russian conception is to have Syrian refugees return as soon as possible; not just from the neighboring countries but also from across all the recipient countries. As such,

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Moscow openly demonstrates its desire to create conditions for returns. The Russian military have reconstructed a lot of sites across Syria, focusing on the reconstruction of key infrastructures, leading the demining efforts; and attempts to restore the enterprises and industry to provide jobs to the returnees. In this case Russia looking for cooperation with the West or Gulf countries. In this case GCC wants to see a political transition, a change of leadership, reconciliation. But there will be no real reforms in the current conditions, especially so while the GoS is under pressure from outside. This in turn significantly reduces the possibilities for dialogue between Russia and the Gulf on Syria. At the same time, Moscow continues to attempt to normalize relations between Syria, on the one hand, and the Gulf countries, on the other. An example of this is the resumption of the work of the embassies of the UAE and Bahrain to Damascus. In addition, Russia will continue its dialogue with the Gulf (primarily with Saudi Arabia) on the return of Syria to the Arab League, which could potentially help attract Arab money for the Syrian reconstruction. Chapter 10 by Sinan Hatahet continues discussion opened by Korotaev and Mardasov. Yet, it introduces readers to the regional perception of the Russian presence in Syria. The study attempts to evaluate Russia ability to pursue its Middle East grand strategy through its facilitator role in ending the Syrian conflict. It also looks at Moscow different maneuvers in appeasing Israel, Turkey, and GCC concerns in Syria while maintaining a working partnership with Iran and seeking tactical arrangements with the United States. The paper also studies the evolution of regional responses to the Russian intervention in Syria and its impact on broader foreign policy issues. Finally, it measures Moscow capacity to navigate through regional rivalries and the risk of getting caught in the complex net of conflicting interests in the country. In Chapter 11, Leonid Issaev looks at the points of convergence and divergence between Russia and the GCC member states in Yemen. He discusses that Russian (including Soviet) policies regarding Yemen have a rich history. The close ties established by the Soviet government with the Yemeni Mutawakkilite kingdom, and later with the republican authorities in both southern and northern Yemen, occupied an important place in the Middle East policy of the USSR. After the formation of the Republic of Yemen in 1990 with the dominance of northerners and the collapse of the Soviet Union the year after that, relations between the countries cooled. For the new Russian authorities, the foreign policy focus shifted toward

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integration with Western countries, while the authorities in Sana’a focused on strengthening foreign policy relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Russian policy toward Yemen since that time has been characterized by a non-interference in internal political processes in the country. Whether it was a civil conflict between North and South of 1994, the Saada wars in the 2000s or the events of the Arab Spring, in all cases, Moscow tried to distance itself from the conflict, focusing on maintaining relations with legitimate authorities. Even after the Russian sociopolitical discourse regarding anti-government demonstrations in general and the events of the Arab Spring, in particular, began to change starting in 2012, and Russia’s interest in the Middle East began to grow after the start of the Russian military operation in Syria in 2015, Yemen continued to occupy a peripheral place in Russian foreign policy. There are three reasons for this: the lack of serious economic interest for Russia, the illusory possibilities of strengthening the military presence there, and also the recognition of the dominant role of Saudi Arabia in the Yemeni conflict, relations with which began to rise again after the accession to the throne of King Salman in 2015. In turn, a serious problem for Moscow is the split within the Arab coalition in Yemen, primarily between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Each of these countries relies on its players in the Yemen conflict (the Southern Transitional Council in the case of the UAE and the Mansur Hadi government in the case of Saudi Arabia), with which Moscow is trying to maintain dialogue. In turn, the deepening of this split, just as it did in the summer of 2019, forces the Russian authorities not only to balance between the Yemeni actors, but already makes it part of the ‘Yemeni triangle’ along with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In other words, Russian involvement in the Yemeni crisis has its own limits, which are due to both domestic factors and the specifics of relations with the Gulf countries. The final chapter of the study is to a certain extent summarizing the discussion conducted by different authors of the book. Its authors Ibrahim Fraihat and Yegor Lodygin correctly conclude that Russia has been able to improve its positioning in the Gulf region and build stronger relationships with all GCC member states in addition to Iran. The adversarial relationships between Moscow and GCC capitals that once existed during the US-USSR Cold War have changed as well. Especially in the last ten years, economic relations between Russia and the GCC states reasonably improved, even in comparison with Moscow’s traditional allies in the region like Iran. For the first time in history, heads of states visited Russia,

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such as King Salman’s visit to the Kremlin in 2017. Russia’s smart power, the combination of soft and hard power, played a role in this relative improvement. Offering to arm as well as the ability to talk to all conflict parties within the GCC (Saudi-Qatar) and across the Gulf (Saudi-Iran) has been a factor contributing to the improvement in the relationships between them. However, this smart power strategy, and Russia’s role to keep good relations with all conflict parties, has prevented the establishment of strategic partnerships with the region. The relationship has therefore remained confined to the tactical, rather than strategic, level.

CHAPTER 2

New-Old Key Player: What to Expect from Russia’s Growing Role in the Middle East Ian Parmeter

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Introduction

This chapter analyses Russia’s, and the former Soviet Union’s, relations with the Middle East during and following the Cold War, but with particular emphasis on the approach of President Putin since 2000. It then examines the Russian domestic factors that influence Putin in his dealings with the Middle East, and the consequences of his Middle East policies for Russia’s relations with key regional countries—particularly the Gulf Arab states, Iran, Israel and Turkey—and for its ties with the West, especially the US. Finally, it seeks to forecast where Russia’s Middle East policies might be headed over the remainder of Putin’s current presidential term till 2024, and how Putin’s relations with the US could play into these policies.

I. Parmeter (B) Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_2

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This analysis seeks to demonstrate that the Middle East is a secondorder priority for Russian foreign policy. Rather than having strategic goals for the region, Putin’s aims are essentially tactical: • To use Russia’s involvement there as an adjunct to his broader opposition to the US global role • To benefit Russia economically by coordinating resource extraction and pricing policies with the region’s energy producers; encouraging their sovereign wealth funds to invest in Russian energy projects; and boosting Russia’s share of arms sales to this politically volatile region • To bolster Russian domestic security by preventing turmoil in the Middle East infecting Russia’s Muslim majority provinces. This analysis will show that Putin has been remarkably successful at avoiding US mistakes in the Middle East by wisely keeping Russian commitments there limited. It will also become evident that, in the Middle East, Putin has a methodology rather than a strategy. He seeks to sniff out and exploit opportunities as they arise. He is remarkably good at that, but his opportunistic approach to the region provides an additional level of analytical challenge.

2

Russian Relations with the Middle East from the Cold War to 2010

The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States endured from shortly after the end of the Second World War till the dissolution of the Soviet Union—1946–1991. For more than half that period—1947– 1973—the Middle East was a major theatre of US-Soviet rivalry. This was most evident in US identification with Israel’s interests from the later Eisenhower years, and the Soviets with the Arab side (though it’s often forgotten that when Israel was founded and into the early 1950s, the Soviet Union despite its hostility towards Zionism was supportive of Israel).1 The fact that each superpower had a veto through permanent 1 The Soviet Union was the first country to grant formal legal recognition to Israel, on May 17, 1948—see P. M. Brown, “The Recognition of Israel,” The American Journal of International Law, 42 (1948): 629–627. See also Alan R. Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East (New York; Syracuse University Press, 1991), chapter 2. For another interesting analysis of this period, see Gyoo-Hyoung Kahng, “Zionism, Israel and the

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membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) meant that no decisions of importance to the Middle East and requiring Security Council approval could be taken without the concurrence of both superpowers. The Soviet Union had three major interests in its approach to the Middle East during the Cold War.2 First of all, it wanted to safeguard its south-western security flank and to protect itself from US encirclement— this was the era of the US doctrine of containment of the Soviet Union. This included attempting to cultivate good relations at popular level in the Middle East in order to reduce the risk that the US would seek to use the region as a springboard to exploit Muslim populations of the southern Soviet republics and in the north Caucasus and Tatarstan within Russia itself.3 A second reason was that the Middle East with its strategic location, resources, and internal divisions and hatreds, including the deep schism from Israel’s creation, was a logical source of rivalry between the postwar superpowers with interests and ambitions spanning the planet. Other regions in which this rivalry played out were Africa, Central and South America, India, and parts of South-East Asia. The third goal was ideological, with Moscow seeing opportunities for proselytising among peoples emerging from a recent colonial past in which Russia had historically played little role, and where the Soviet Union could claim to have no territorial ambitions. This approach involved attempts at soft power enhancement through cultural programs and scholarships for promising Arab students and junior officials to study in Russia and in other Eastern Bloc countries.4 The US-Soviet rivalry was most intense in Europe, where the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, directly confronted the US-led Western military alliance, the North Atlantic Soviet Union: A Study in the Rise and Fall of Brief Soviet-Israeli Friendship from 1945 to 1955,” Global Economic Review 27 (1998): 95–107. 2 This account of Soviet aims in the Middle East draws on that set out in Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East, chapters 3 and 4. 3 In this context, my observation of Soviet diplomats while I was on diplomatic postings in the Middle East demonstrated to me their remarkable language expertise and understanding of local people and customs. These were highly trained professionals. 4 Seymour Rosen, “The USSR and International Education: A Brief Overview,” The Phi Beta Kappan 51 (January 1970): 247–250. See also Daniela Hannova, “Arab Students Inside the Soviet Bloc: A Case Study on Czechoslovakia During the 1950s and 60s,” European Scientific Journal (June 2014): 371–379.

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I. PARMETER

Treaty Organization (NATO). More than once, the opposed forces seemed on the verge of war, most notably at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and in 1983 when Moscow seems to have interpreted a NATO military exercise, Able Archer 83, as the start of a genuine offensive. In the Middle East it played out primarily in Egypt during the first half of the Cold War. Moscow also sought to cultivate Syria and Iraq, but regular military coups in both in the early Cold War period hindered a consistent policy. At that stage, Moscow was effectively shut out of the conservative Gulf Arab states by the Soviet Union’s doctrinal atheism, and from Iran because of the Shah’s partnership with the US. The Soviet investment in Egypt failed disastrously after 1967, with the major Arab defeat in the Six-Day War, and the death in 1970 of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had skilfully played off both superpowers before opting for the Soviets. The definitive rupture was in 1972, with the decision by Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, to expel Soviet military advisers. Egypt’s improved military performance in the 1973 war with Israel opened the way for skilful US diplomacy with both Egypt and Israel, culminating in the Camp David Accords of 1978. This was not only a major foreign policy win for the US, it was also a zero sum loss for Moscow as it confirmed the US as the primary external actor in the Arab-Israeli peace process, then the most important regional issue for Arab states and Israel. For practical purposes the US had won the Cold War battle for the region. Compounding this, Moscow’s focus on the Middle East reduced even further following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Through most of the 1980s, Afghanistan was the major Soviet preoccupation on its southern flank. Moreover, as the 1980s progressed, the growing internal strains of the weakening Soviet Union increasingly overshadowed Moscow’s broad foreign policy focus. In that confused environment Syria became Moscow’s sole Middle East ally almost by default. Despite having been badly burnt in Egypt, the Soviets gave their primary Middle East attention from the mid-1970s to Syria, which had become considerably more stable after the 1970 coup by Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez. They provided military and civil aid in return for permission to establish a naval resupply base at Tartus on the Syrian coast. Though modest, the base is now Moscow’s only naval facility outside the former Soviet Union (though the Soviet Union, then Russia, leased a naval facility at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam between 1979 and 2002). This led to a treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in

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1980. Subsequently, in 2015, Syria gave permission for Russia to establish an air base at Khmeimim, near Latakia, as part of Moscow’s assistance to Bashar during the civil war. The Soviet recourse to Syria was not without trepidation. Following the Camp David accords Moscow was unwilling to stake too much on Syria or any Arab state, especially as Hafez was fierce in asserting his independence. In any case, the 1980 treaty was strong on goodwill, but limited in terms of actual promises.5 After the fall of the Soviet Union and despite occasional frictions, Moscow maintained its interests in Syria through to the start of the Arab Spring in 2010. Yet, Syria represented a “sleeping” foreign policy asset for Russia while the US focused on the eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, Palestinian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace talks in the 1990s, then after 2001 on its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia played no substantive role in these issues. Moscow had more pressing priorities—coping with Russia’s abrupt transition to a market economy after 70 years of central planning and NATO’s aggressive expansion eastwards to Russia’s borders. As well, it’s reasonable to judge that during the 20 years following the demise of the Soviet Union, Middle East states saw Russia as peripheral to their primary foreign policy concerns, which were focused on US policy towards the region.6

3

Crisis at Home, and Challenges Abroad

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was largely focused internally during the 1990s and early 2000s. In this time it underwent political, economic and social turmoil as a result of its abrupt switch from autocracy to democracy and, in particular, from a command

5 See, for example, “Syria-USSR Relations,” Global Security, https://www.globalsec urity.org/military/world/syria/forrel-ussr-htm. Although the treaty reputedly had a secret protocol that detailed Soviet military obligations to Syria in the event of war with Israel, Moscow refused to endorse claims by outspoken Syrian Defence Minister Mustafa Tlass during the 1980s that the Soviet Union would dispatch troops to Syria if war broke out. 6 See Nikki R. Keddie, “The End of the Cold War and the Middle East,” Diplomatic

History 16 (Winter, 1992): 95–103. Keddie, writing in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, argues that the end of the Cold War meant Third World countries could no longer manoeuvre for benefits between two competing Great Powers. Instead they felt compelled to adjust to US policies in order to receive needed aid and benefits from the US that they could no longer hope to get from the Soviet Union, p. 96.

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economy to a largely unregulated free market. Russia’s real GDP declined by nearly 40% between 1991 and 1998, and the country suffered inflation that virtually wiped out the savings of Russian citizens.7 Moreover, it was not until the mid-2000s that Russian GDP per capita exceeded its 1989 level.8 At the same time, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact along with the Soviet Union left a strategic vacuum in Eastern Europe. NATO, led by the US, took advantage of this to expand its membership to include former Soviet Bloc states. Though opposed, Russia’s then-President, Boris Yeltsin, was powerless to prevent Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joining NATO in 1999. The subsequent accession to NATO in 2004 of the Baltic States, the first former members of the Soviet Union to join the Western alliance, further underlined for Russia its reduced status. Before NATO’s absorption of the Baltic States, in the early years of his first presidential term (2000–2004) Putin had shown interest in reaching accommodations with the US and the West more broadly. He was reportedly the first foreign leader to phone then-US President George W. Bush to express solidarity with the US after the 9/11 attacks in 2001.9 According to leading Russian analyst Dmitri Trenin, of the Carnegie Center in Moscow, Putin at that time wanted full partnership with the US and the West, including a role for Russia in a non-aggressive NATO.10 But when NATO expanded to Russia’s border in 2004, Putin seems to have decided that the US had spurned his outreach. And by 2005 during his annual State of the Union address he described the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the major geopolitical disaster of the century”—though it’s important to put that remark in the context of his following words: “As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots found themselves outside Russian territory.

7 Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, “A Normal Country: Russia After Communism,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (Winter 2005): 151–174. 8 GDP per capita (current US$)—Russian Federation / Data, http://www.worldb

ank.org. 9 This claim is made in a CNN analysis of the impact of the 9/11 attacks on US-Russian relations a year after the strikes: “9/11 a turning point for Putin,” September 10, 2002, http://www.CNN.com. 10 Dmitri Trenin, What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 38.

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Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself”.11 That said, Putin’s remark was widely interpreted as hostile in the West,12 and there seems little doubt that by that point he had made restoration of Russia’s lost international standing a primary foreign policy goal. Putin’s capacity to achieve this grew as his years in power progressed. He had improved Russia’s administrative discipline after the erratic Yeltsin years. More importantly, he and Russia were the joint beneficiaries of major increases in global resource prices in the first decade of the century. As President from 2000 to 2008, Prime Minister (and still de facto leader) from 2008 to 2012, and President again from 2012, he was able to refine and expand a patronage system established by Yeltsin that gave huge rewards to those around him, ensuring their loyalty. But there was enough of the resource bonanza left over to better the daily lives of most Russians, boosting their support for him to levels Western politicians could only dream of. He underpinned this by an increasingly nationalist foreign policy— giving it greater emphasis as high energy prices waned. In particular, he became steadily more assertive in defending Russia’s interests against what he and most Russians saw as US hostility. This growing nationalism was set out starkly in Putin’s address to the NATO Security Conference in Munich in 2007, in which he accused the US of an aggressive foreign policy aimed at establishing US control of a unipolar world, regardless of the views and interests of other states.13

11 “President’s State of the Union Address,” April 25, 2005, http://www.kremlin.ru. Putin repeated this qualification during his 2017 interviews with US film maker Oliver Stone: Oliver Stone, “The Putin Interviews,” 2017 Showtime Documentary Films, June 12–15. http://www.sho.com. 12 See, as one of many examples, comment by the former Republican politician and subsequent National Security Advisor to President Trump, John Bolton, to Fox News on 3 March 2014: “I think Putin knows that he has the high cards, militarily, economically and politically, and he’s prepared to use them. He gave us notice of this strategy seven or eight years ago when he said, in what is now one of the most frequently repeated quotes from his leadership in Russia: ‘The breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century’. It’s clear he wants to re-establish Russian hegemony within the space of the former Soviet Union.” http://www.foxnews.com. 13 Thom Shanker and Mark Landler, “Putin Says US Is Undermining Global Security,” New York Times, February 11, 2007. Full text of Putin address: “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” February 10, 2007 http://www.en.kremlin.ru.

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The renewed tension between Moscow and Washington came to a head over Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. It subsided briefly as then-US President Obama sought to “reset” US-Russian relations in 2009–2010, but flared again over Russia’s intervention in Ukraine through proxy militias from 2014, and annexation of Crimea in that year. Putin disregarded Western sanctions on Russia aimed at punishing his takeover of Crimea and support for the separatist movement in eastern Ukraine, a defiance that appeared to increase his popular support among Russians.14

4

Russian Interest in the Middle East Revives After 2010

In this environment the Middle East again became of Russian interest, particularly given opportunities presented by the Arab Spring upheavals that started in late 2010. Moscow’s Cold War goals set out above underwent some modification and were replaced by three objectives based on hard-core realism. Firstly, the Middle East was a region where Russia could counter US policies, providing a potential bargaining chip over US and Western policies in Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine. Broad Middle East dissatisfaction with the US over the failures of the 2003 Iraq invasion under President Bush had made the US vulnerable there. Moreover, with military, diplomatic and aid commitments in several Middle East states, the US could not easily cut and run from the region—something President Obama, who succeeded Bush in 2009, would dearly like to have done. Obama set out his frustration with what he saw as the US’s no-win role in the Middle East in his annual address to the UN General Assembly in September 2013: “The United States is chastised for meddling in the region, accused of having a hand in all manner of conspiracy; at the same time the United States is blamed for failing to do enough to solve the

14 His approval ratings in various Russian polls, never below 60% since 2000, rose from about 65% in 2013 to 80% the following year, and to nearly 90% in 2015. Source: http:// www.statistica.org. Though the accuracy of Russian polls is disputed, they—particularly the Levada poll—are generally accepted as dicative of trends in Putin’s popularity.

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region’s problems and for showing indifference toward suffering Muslim populations”.15 Secondly, Russia wanted to protect, and where possible expand, its economic interests in the Middle East, particularly armament sales, which had grown significantly in the Putin era. Russia is the world’s second largest arms exporter, but in the period 2015–2019 only 19% of its global arms sales were to the Middle East (where the US is dominant)— though that was a 30% increase on 2010–2015.16 With constant Middle East frictions, there is potential for this share to grow further, particularly given regional interest in technologically advanced weapons such as the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system. Moreover, in the past decade the need for close cooperation with Gulf energy producers on production and pricing has become increasingly evident in Moscow. With income from energy exports comprising around 60% of Russia’s export income,17 Russia suffered major collateral damage in 2014 when Saudi Arabia significantly boosted oil production in order to drive down prices with the aim of hurting the Iranian economy. Russian GDP fell by 3.7% the following year.18 Thirdly, Russia wanted to contain Middle East-based terrorism which, if not checked, could spur jihadist movements in Russia’s Muslim majority regions. With the development of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from 2013, Moscow like Western governments worried about the number of its Muslim citizens travelling to Syria to join ISIS—and particularly the risk that they would constitute a security threat on returning to Russia.19 A broad factor influencing Putin was that he clearly believed the Russian public would support a more assertive foreign policy opposed to an international order defined by the US. His instincts would have been reinforced by Pew polling showing that the proportion of Russians with a 15 “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly,” September 24, 2013, http://www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 16 “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2020. https://www.sipri.org. 17 “Russia Economic Report 42: Weaker Global Outlook Sharpens Focus on Domestic Reforms,” World Bank, December 4, 2019, https://www.pubdocs.worldbank.org. 18 “Russia Economic Report 35: The Long Journey to Recovery,” World Bank, April 6, 2016. http://www.worldbank.org. 19 See, for example, Anna Arutunyan, “ISIS Returnees Bring Both Hope and Fear to Chechnya,” International Crisis Group, March 26, 2018, http://www.crisisgroup.org.

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favourable view of the US declined from 57% to 26% between 2010 and 2018—despite a short-lived rise to 41% in the early stages of Trump’s presidency.20 4.1

Russia’s Syrian Intervention

Putin had shown little apparent interest in the Middle East during the first decade of his rule. But the Arab Spring from late 2010 gave him a reason and an opportunity to use the Middle East against the US. From Putin’s perspective, Washington was seeking to use changes in the region to US advantage. He believed the US and other Western states had abused Russia’s good faith when Moscow waived its veto power to allow the Security Council to adopt a “responsibility-to-protect” resolution in relation to Libya in March 2011.21 Though the Libya resolution envisaged limited military measures to protect civilians, there seems little doubt that NATO exceeded the terms of the resolution by providing military support to the rebel campaign, thereby facilitating Gaddafi’s overthrow. Putin could and did blame the Russian loss of face on Dimity Medvedev, who at the time was interim President between Putin’s two periods in office.22 But Putin was additionally infuriated because Russia had a range of arms sales and energy interests in Libya dependent on continuation of the Gaddafi regime.23 NATO’s overreach in Libya had consequences for Syria, with Russia under Putin subsequently opposed resolutely to responsibility-to-protect Security Council initiatives aimed at protecting Syrian civilians. Russia had been giving financial, intelligence and logistics support to Assad since 20 “Six Charts on How Russians and Americans See Each Other,” Factank, Pew

Research Center, October 4, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org. 21 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011. 22 In a rare example of public friction in the Russian leadership, Prime Minister Putin

described UNSCR 1973 as resembling “medieval calls for crusades” and “defective and flawed” as it “allows for everything”. Clearly stung, Medvedev responded that Putin’s claim was “unacceptable”. The spat was reported widely in Western media. See, for example, “Medvedev Rejects Putin ‘Crusade’ Remark over Libya,” BBC News, March 21, 2011, http://www.bbc.com. 23 Putin and Gaddafi had made reciprocal visits to each other’s capitals in 2008, with talks focusing on sales of Russian weapons to Libya and Russian investment in Libyan energy. See, for example, Tom Pfeiffer, “Gaddafi Visits Russia on Arms, Energy Drive,” Reuters, 30 October 2008.

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shortly after the start of the uprising against him in 2011. However, Russia’s direct military intervention in September 2015 was a major step beyond this, given the risk of failure or becoming mired in the civil war if Assad’s position did not improve. It was forced on Moscow because the Assad regime was then at serious risk of being defeated by rebel forces.24 4.2

Public Support

Drawing a parallel with the US’s disastrous invasion of Iraq, most Western governments and analysts forecast that Russia would become bogged down in an apparently unending conflict and that the intervention would backfire on Putin domestically. But, to the contrary, the Syrian campaign had substantial public support,25 with the Putin administration spinning the intervention through a major media campaign. Public statements emphasised that the aim was to counter Middle East terrorism in situ before it could establish itself in Russia—so protection of the Russian public was the underlying goal. The real aim of preserving the Assad regime was scarcely mentioned. The media campaign also played to nationalism. The narrative was that the US and its allies had botched their 2014 intervention in Syria against Islamic State so Russian professionals were now doing the job.26 The Putin administration also emphasised for Russians, as well as foreigners, 24 Syrian government forces had suffered a series of defeats to both rebel forces and IS in the year before Russia’s intervention. Asked in an interview with the US television network CBS if his goal in intervening was “to save the Assad administration”, Putin responded, “You’re right.” See “Russia Joins War in Syria: Five Key Points,” BBC News, 1 October 2015, http://www.bbc.com. 25 This was clear to me while in Moscow in late 2015 shortly after the Russian intervention when I met and made records of conversations with a range of media and think-tank interlocutors. The views of these interlocutors were backed up by opinion polling at the time. See for example http://www.levada.ru/2016/10/31/sirijskij-konflikt/. Though, as already noted, the accuracy of Russian poll numbers is open to doubt, one of the reasons for Putin’s success as Russian leader has been his ability to harness public opinion in support of his actions. So he would have been unlikely to commit Russian forces internationally if he believed that doing so would imperil his popular standing. 26 Putin’s address to the UN General Assembly on 28 September 2015, shortly before

the start of the Russian air campaign in Syria, included stringent criticism of the US over the rise of Islamic State and chaos in the Middle East. The Guardian newspaper reported that the speech was broadcast live on Russian state television, where it was portrayed as another step towards Russia reclaiming its rightful place in the centre of the international stage. See Shaun Walker, “Syria? Ukraine? ISIS? Blame It All on the West’s

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that Russia’s action was in line with international law—it followed a formal request from the Syrian government—unlike the US-led intervention, which had no such legal sanction.27 The intervention had the added bonus of reducing public focus on the deteriorating Russian economy, which was then experiencing negative GDP growth because of the collapse of energy prices.28 The obvious question was, how long would this benign domestic climate last? Russian experts on Syria interviewed in Moscow in October 2015 by the author of this chapter made the point that there was no constituency in Russia for solving Assad’s problems. The Putin administration would certainly have been aware also that this fragile public mood could quickly turn sour if the campaign lost momentum, and particularly if Russian forces in Syria started to incur significant casualties. An announcement in March 2016 that the intervention had been successful and was being wound down29 was clearly aimed at pre-empting public reaction against the intervention. However, in reality the “mission accomplished” announcement was little more than words: despite some minor, and temporary, aircraft withdrawals, the Russian military campaign simply continued, and subsequently expanded to include Russian naval assets deployed to the eastern Mediterranean. In October 2016 a task group headed by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetzov took up station off the Syrian coast to assist Syrian forces attacking Aleppo.30 Putin also hit on the clever strategy of using mercenaries (the “Wagner Group”31 ) to provide dangerous on-the-ground support for Syrian and Rampant ‘Egotism’, Putin Says,” The Guardian, 29 September 2015. Full text of speech at http://www.en.kremlin.ru. 27 Sergei Ivanov, then Chief of Staff of Russian Presidential Administration, quoted in Al Jazeera: “Russia Carries First Air Strikes in Syria,” October 1, 2015, http://www.alj azeera.com. See also analysis of legal basis for US and Russian military interventions in Syria by Karine Bannelier-Christakis, “Military Interventions Against ISIL in Iraq, Syria and Libya, and the Legal Basis of Consent,” Leiden Journal of International Law 29 (Issue 3, September 2016): 743–775. 28 “GDP Growth (Annual %)—Russian Federation,” https://data.worldbank.org. 29 “Syria Conflict: Russia’s Putin Orders ‘Main Part’ of Forces Out,” BBC News, March

14, 2016, http://www.bbc.com. 30 Tim Ripley, “Russian Carrier Sails for the Mediterranean,” IHS Janes’s Defence Weekly, October 17, 2016. 31 The Wagner Group comprises about 6,000 private military contractors led by a former Russian Special Forces officer, Dmitry Utkin (whose “call sign” was Wagner,

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Iranian forces. These mercenaries included non-Russian (mainly Serbians, but also Ukrainians and Belarusians32 ) as well as Russian paramilitary personnel, thus reducing the risk of adverse domestic reaction to the intervention if official Russian military casualty numbers were to increase sharply. So far Russian military casualties have been low because the primary Russian role is through air power and logistics. A range of media estimates put the number at between 150 and 250 since the intervention started in 2015. A Russian newspaper report in late 2019 estimated Russian military deaths at between 112 and 175.33 This figure appears to be based on Russian Defence Ministry published casualty lists, the accuracy of which is difficult to confirm independently. The Russian government has an obvious interest in preventing the number of military deaths in Syria becoming an issue of public concern, so official figures may be understated. The number of Wagner Group casualties is even more difficult to estimate. This is because of the shadowy nature of the force, but also because it includes non-Russian personnel. A US analysis in 2018 quoted Wagner Force commanders as saying about 400 of their paramilitary personnel of various nationalities had been killed in Syria at that point.34 This is hence the name). The group is reportedly financed by a Russian businessman, Yevgeny Prigozhin, with close links to President Putin. However, it is assumed that at least some of the group’s funding and training is through the Russian Defence Ministry. They have been deployed in Syria, Libya and eastern Ukraine, acting with local forces to achieve Russian objectives and, when necessary, providing Moscow with plausible deniability. They have also reportedly performed contract para-military tasks in theatres as diverse as Venezuela and Mozambique. Their level of military competence is debated as they have occasionally suffered defeats at the hands of better organised and equipped opposition. See Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian PMCs in the Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond—War by Other Means: Russia’s Use of Private Military Contractors at Home and Abroad,” The Jamestown Foundation, December 18, 2019, http://www. jamestown.org. 32 Sergey Sukhankin, “Foreign Mercenaries, Irregulars and ‘Volunteers’: Non-Russians in Russia’s War—War by Other Means: Russia’s Use of Private Military Contractors at Home and Abroad,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 9, 2019, http://www.jamest own.org. 33 “Three Russian Soldiers Killed in Syria—Military Source,” Moscow Times, September 5, 2019. 34 Sergei Khazov-Cassia and Robert Coalson, “Russian Mercenaries: Vagner Commanders Describe Life Inside the ‘Meat Grinder’,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, March 14, 2018.

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probably a reasonable “ball park” estimate, given most of the dangerous ground fighting in support of the Assad regime is by Syrian, Iranian and Lebanese military and paramilitary personnel. Moreover, far from becoming bogged down in an unwinnable quagmire, by late 2019 it was evident that Russia’s intervention, in combination with Iran’s, had placed Assad on the verge of total victory in the civil war, with only the province of Idlib still to be retaken. President Trump’s precipitate withdrawal of US troops from north-eastern Syria in October 2019, which gave the green light for Turkey to attack Kurdish forces working with the US to contain ISIS, gifted Assad another swathe of territory for nothing.

5

Impact of Syrian Intervention on Russia’s Relations with Other Middle East States

Syria’s progressive descent into widespread anarchy as the civil war developed from 2011 alarmed neighbouring states, which feared spill-over that would affect their own security, especially when Islamic State emerged as a significant force in Syria and Iraq from 2014. As well, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey had to cope with huge numbers of Syrians displaced by the conflict. Most states in the region looked to the US for a solution, given Washington’s interventions in Middle East crises in the past. But President Obama, who had interpreted his initial election in 2008 as a mandate to extract US ground forces from Iraq, was reluctant to risk becoming involved in another Middle East war. In this context, Russia’s resolute, but carefully calibrated, intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015 provided a significant contrast to Obama’s inaction. All leaders in the region, including those with no brief for Assad, were impressed by Putin’s determination to support his Arab ally—a comparison with the US’s apparent abandonment of former Egyptian leader Mubarak in 2011 that was not favourable to Obama. 5.1

Gulf Arab States

The Gulf Arab states were formally opposed to Russia’s direct involvement on Assad’s side. The GCC position was that there should be a

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political solution to the Syrian conflict without foreign intervention.35 Saudi Arabia in particular criticised Russia, saying Russia’s initial air strikes had caused civilian casualties while failing to target Islamic State militants.36 The UAE on the other hand was more ambiguous, even conciliatory, with Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash cautiously supporting the Russian intervention.37 They both backed the US demand that Assad had to go.38 But this was counter-balanced by their anger with the US over what they saw as Washington’s tilt to Iran through the 2015 nuclear agreement (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed by Iran, the five Permanent Members of the Security Council and Germany, which lifted economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran’s curtailing its nuclear enrichment program). As well, like the Israelis, they worried about Obama’s inconsistencies and periodic dithering in his approach to the Middle East—as evidenced by his refusal to stand by his declared “red line” concerning Assad’s use of chemical weapons in 2013.39 With Saudi Arabia’s and its Gulf Arab allies’ confidence in the US shaken under Obama, they welcomed Putin’s outreach to them during Obama’s second term—not least because it was a way of showing their displeasure with Obama. However, they quickly saw Trump’s replacement of Obama in 2017 as positive—Trump made a big hit with the Saudis 35 William Maclean, “Gulf Arabs Oppose Russia Role in Syria, Still Bent on Assad’s Ouster,” Reuters, September 22, 2015. 36 “Saudi Arabia Demands Russia end Syria Raids, Criticises Iran,” Reuters, October 1, 2015. 37 In a statement on November 30 2015, Gargash said, “We agree that nobody will be upset by the Russian bombardment of Daesh or al-Qaeda, as it targets a common enemy”—ignoring Washington’s claims that more than 90% of Russian airstrikes in Syria did not target ISIS. See Samuel Ramani, “Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partnership,” Middle East Policy 27 (Spring 2020): 125–140. 38 See for example Ian Black, “Saudi Arabia’s Rare Criticism of Syria Reveals Their Underlying Antipathy,” The Guardian, August 9, 2011. The UAE has not been as hard line on Assad as has Saudi Arabia, but UAE Prime Minister Mohammad bin Rashid alMaktoum was reported in 2014 as saying that there could be no long-term solution to the civil war in Syria while Assad remained in power: “No peace as long as al-Assad stays, Mohammad says,” Gulf News, January 14, 2014. 39 See Yoel Guzansky and Asriel Bermant, “The Best of the Worst: Why Iran’s Enemies Support the Nuclear Deal,” Foreign Affairs, August 13, 2015, which provides detailed analysis of the Gulf states’ concerns over the Iran deal and what they saw as the Obama administration’s inconsistency in its approach to the Middle East.

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when Riyadh was his first overseas visit in May that year. But that did not deter Saudi King Salman from making a rare visit abroad to Moscow that October.40 Putin reciprocated this with a visit to Riyadh in October 2019.41 However, Russia’s ties with the Gulf Arab states have been limited and are likely to remain so. Putin’s interest in them primarily concerns working with them in an OPEC+ arrangement to manage oil production and prices. He also wants to encourage them to invest in massive natural gas projects in Russia’s Arctic region. He wants to increase Russia’s share of the lucrative Gulf Arab market for arms sales, on which the US has long had a monopoly. He took advantage of the strikes on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019 (which Washington and Riyadh blamed on Iran42 ) to comment that Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system would have prevented the attacks.43 As well, Putin seeks to avoid taking sides in the ongoing dispute between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt on the one hand and Qatar on the other. The dispute between Russia and Saudi Arabia in early 2020 over oil production cuts was quickly papered over in the context of the collapse in global energy demand caused by the Coronavirus pandemic. Demand, and the need to resume pricing and production coordination, can be expected to pick up as the virus is controlled and normal economic activity resumes. But the readiness of Moscow and Riyadh to turn on each other in order to protect their respective economic interests was indicative of the essentially transactional nature of their relationship. A possible exception is the Russia-UAE relationship. Putin visited Abu Dhabi following his Saudi visit in 2019, signing agreements reportedly worth $1.3 billion related to energy, technology and health. That projection could be more aspirational than realistic, given that two-way commerce between the two currently amounts to only $1.7 billion.44 Of 40 Leonid Issaev, “Decoding King Salman’s Visit to Moscow,” Al Jazeera, October 4, 2017. 41 “Putin Visits Saudi Arabia in Sign of Growing Ties,” Al Jazeera, October 15, 2019. 42 Michelle Nichols, “Exclusive: UN Investigators Find Yemen’ Houthis Did Not Carry

Out Saudi Oil Attack,” Reuters, January 9, 2020. 43 Adam Taylor, “For Saudi Arabia, an Oil Field Attack Was a Disaster: For Russia, It’s a Weapons Sales Pitch,” Washington Post, September 21, 2019. 44 “Russia’s Putin Signs Deals Worth $1.3bn During UAE Visit,” Al Jazeera, October 16, 2019.

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possibly greater interest was the signing of a Strategic Partnership Declaration by Putin and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan in Moscow in 2018.45 However, the declaration, like the trade agreements, is high on aspirations—covering joint security, economic and cultural interests and cooperation in humanitarian, scientific, technological and tourist areas—but limited on specifics. The declaration falls short of an agreement: it’s hard to see it causing sleepless nights in Washington, given long-standing US-UAE military cooperation arrangements (which the UAE clearly sees as an insurance policy against Iran), including some 3,500 US military personnel stationed at the al-Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi.46 Russia-UAE ties may bear more fruit in relation to Syria, where the UAE has gone out in front of other GCC states in seeking to bring Assad in from the cold. The UAE pleased Russia by re-establishing diplomatic relations with Syria, thus acknowledging Assad’s legitimacy as President, in December 2018. But whether this eventually translates into UAE funding for Syria’s post-war reconstruction—which Putin has lobbied governments around the world to invest in47 —remains to be seen. Russia and the UAE also worked together in support of Tobrukbased Libyan opposition leader Khalifa Haftar’s offensive against the UN-recognised Government of National Accord in Tripoli—though that military venture has now failed. Similarly, Russia has engaged diplomatically with the UAE-aligned Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, which seeks restoration of a separate administration for south Yemen.48 Given that Yemen is effectively a failed state, the end result of that venture is difficult to forecast. The reality is that, apart from cooperation on energy, the Gulf is a non-core area of foreign policy activity for Russia. Russia is interested in loosening Washington’s grip on the area, but it does not have the resources to take over the US security role there. Rather, it would like the

45 “UAE, Russia Forge Strategic Partnership,” Gulf News, June 1, 2018. 46 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States Has a Quiet, Potent ally

nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’,” Washington Post, November 9, 2014. 47 Samuel Ramani, “Russia’s Eye on Syrian Reconstruction,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Middle East Analysis, January 31, 2019, http://www.carnegieendo wment.org. 48 Ramani, “Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partnership,” 125–140.

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US security role to be diluted and shared with a number of extra-regional powers, including Russia. In that context, Russia announced a “Security Concept for the Gulf” in July 2019.49 It envisages a regional security cooperation organisation whose members would comprise the Gulf states (including Iran) and external stakeholders—Russia, the US, the EU, India and China. Moscow would have been disappointed with tepid initial reaction to the plan, though it could hardly have been surprised, given its impossibly broad nature. Nor was international reception of the plan boosted by the fact that it was announced by an official, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, rather than Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, suggesting relatively low foreign policy priority. It calls for expansive dialogue between Iran and all GCC states (assuming normalisation of the Saudi-Qatar freeze in relations) overseen by the UN, the GCC, the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The object would be establishment of an Action Group to prepare an international conference on security and cooperation in the Gulf area.50 Washington, even with Trump’s relatively benign approach to Russia, seems to see nothing of value for the US and is largely ignoring the idea.51 China has politely praised it52 but shows no sign of taking it further at this stage. The only Middle East states to have welcomed it are Russian regional partners Syria and Iran—which almost certainly rules out support from other Arab states.53 The intra-GCC dispute is a further barrier. Given these divisions, the timing for the Russian initiative was unpropitious.

49 “Presentation on Russia’s Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf Region,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, July 23, 2019, https://www.mid.ru. 50 Detailed explanations of the concept were left to relatively minor officials: For example, “Press conference by Charge d’Affaires of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Polyanskiy Russia’s Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf Region,” Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, August 8, 2019, http:// www.russiaun.ru. 51 Paul Saunders, “How Does Washington See Russia’s Gulf Security Concept?” Al Monitor, October 11, 2019. 52 “China Welcomes Russia’s Collective Security Concept for Persian Gulf,” Tass, October 8, 2019. 53 See, for example, Theodore Karasik, “Is Russia’s ‘Old’ Gulf Security Plan the Best It Can Do?” Arab News, July 30, 2019.

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39

Iran

Russian-Iranian relations are rooted in a troubled past that continues to haunt their contemporary ties. Neither trusts the other, and misunderstandings abound. They have a common interest in their mutual hostility towards the US and their desire to undercut the US role in the Middle East. But there is a fundamental mismatch in their perspectives. Russia’s focus is global, while Iran’s is regional. And Moscow has shown repeatedly that it is prepared to break undertakings to Iran when larger benefits to Russia are on offer.54 Moreover, Russia has other Middle East partners it is wooing, some of which are anathema or inimical to Tehran, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. This was evident in Moscow’s relatively mild reaction to the US assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. Foreign Minister Lavrov phoned US Secretary of State Pompeo to complain that the US action breached international law and was likely to destabilise an already fragile region.55 But that was it. Despite the vaunted closeness of Russian-Iranian ties, Putin held off from any stronger action that might have jeopardised relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which have benefitted from Soleimani’s removal and were pleased at the setback to the Iranian regime. Russia and Iran can work well together when they have the same objective—as now in Syria. But as their interests change, the incentives to maintain close ties will diminish. This is a tactical, rather than a strategic, relationship.

54 Several examples are set out in Witold Rodkiewicz, “Russia’s Middle East Policy— Regional Ambitions, Global Objectives,” Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Warsaw, 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl. Among them is a secret Russian agreement with the US in 1995, when Moscow under President Yeltsin was seeking US financial aid: Russia agreed not to export arms or military technology to Iran after 1999. (This agreement was abrogated by Putin shortly after he came to power—when it was evident that the US had no intention of launching a Russian “Marshall Plan”.) Another was Putin’s quid pro quo with Obama in 2009 as part of the “reset” of bilateral relations: Russia backed a new UNSC resolution imposing further sanctions on Iran, and then-President Medvedev expanded the ban to include S-300 surface-to-air missiles that Russia had contracted to sell Iran in 2007. 55 “Press Release on Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Telephone Conversation with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, January 3, 2020, http://www.mid.ru.

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5.3

Israel

Russian relations with Israel have shown the most dramatic improvement since Moscow’s intervention in Syria. Israel hates uncertainty—it essentially favours no change in its regional security environment that it doesn’t initiate.56 As well, Israel knows from long and bitter experience that, with so many moving parts in the Middle East, the scope for unexpected consequences from any intervention in the region is huge. At the start of the civil war in Syria, Israel was initially conflicted. A relatively peaceful transfer of power to a democratic system in Syria offered prospects of more benign and possibly pro-Western rule that could lead eventually to less hostile relations between Israel and Syria, and even a peace treaty along the lines of those with Egypt and Jordan. But Israel doesn’t believe in tooth fairies in the Middle East. Though Bashar al-Assad was an enemy, like his father, Hafez, he was a known one. The Golan border had been Israel’s quietest since Henry Kissinger, then US Secretary of State, had negotiated the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement with Hafez in 1974. Israel had been able to handle any potential concerns, such as Syria’s attempt to construct a nuclear reactor in the mid-2000s, through pre-emptive military action. Accordingly, Israel watched closely, ready to take action if the conflict began to spill over its border. But as the civil war developed between 2011 and 2015, it took a far more dangerous turn for Israel. In early 2015 hard line Islamists including Islamic State seemed headed towards overturning the Assad regime. If that were to happen, Israel would have a truly hostile, aggressive, implacable and unpredictable enemy on its north-eastern border. In that context, it’s been instructive to watch Israel’s reaction to Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict in September 2015. Israel initially made no public comment, but there was no doubt that Russia’s intervention, by reversing the negative trend of the conflict for Assad, was welcomed by the Netanyahu government. By comparison with Obama, Putin appeared to the Israelis to have a clear idea of what he was doing. And his upstaging of the US role in the region suited Israel just fine—particularly given the extraordinarily

56 Daniel L. Byman, “Israel: A Frosty Response to the Arab Spring,” in The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, ed. Kenneth M. Pollack et al. (Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 250–257.

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bad relations between Obama and Netanyahu. Though US-Israeli relations have improved out of sight since Trump became President, Prime Minister Netanyahu has continued to maintain strong ties with Putin— not least because Netanyahu has sought to woo Israel’s large Russianspeaking community as an electoral asset. Significantly, Netanyahu made brief visits to Moscow during the three Israeli election campaigns in 2019 and 2020 in order to demonstrate his closeness to Putin.57,58,59 That said, Israel won’t want Assad’s survival to involve a permanent presence for Iran in Syria. Both Netanyahu and whoever eventually succeeds him as Prime Minister will expect Russia to ensure that does not happen. That’s likely to be a future test for Israeli-Russian relations. 5.4

Turkey

Russian-Turkish relations have involved several ups and downs in the past decade. Turkey was unhappy with Russia’s success in supporting Assad. President Erdogan had staked a lot on helping the rebel campaign against the regime. Relations worsened after Turkey’s reckless shooting down of a Russian aircraft which strayed briefly into Turkish airspace in November 2015. But after a period of frostiness, Erdogan uncharacteristically apologised, enabling restoration of ties. With Erdogan angered by the Obama Administration’s criticism of his 2016 crackdown after a coup attempt linked to US-based opposition leader Fethullah Gulen, he tilted strongly towards Russia, making Moscow his first external visit after the brief uprising. Turkish-US ties have scarcely improved during Trump’s presidency. Though relations are correct, they are marred by the US’s continuing refusal to accede to Turkish demands for Gulen’s extradition, as well as by Trump’s periodic insensitivities towards Ankara. The fact that both

57 Before April 9, 2019, election: “Kremlin Confirms Netanyahu Will Pay Visit to Moscow for Brief Talks with Putin,” Tass, April 2, 2019. 58 Before September 17, 2019, election: “PM Netanyahu Meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi,” Media Release by Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 12, 2019. 59 Before March 2, 2020, election: “Meeting with Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu,” President of Russia Media Release, January 30, 2020, http://www.en.kremli n.ru.

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Trump and Erdogan have massive egos has not helped. Trump’s peremptory and undiplomatic letter to Erdogan concerning the Turkish invasion of northern Syria in early October 2019 (in which he chided Erdogan, “Don’t be a fool”) unsurprisingly infuriated Erdogan.60 The letter undercut US Vice President Pence’s effort to mediate with Erdogan. The Turkish leader made clear he preferred to work through Putin in order to reach an understanding with Syria on Turkey’s Kurdish problem. One of the consequences of the estrangement between the US and Turkey is that Turkey’s membership of NATO is strained. Erdogan’s willingness to buy Russian military equipment such as the S-400 missile system has precluded Turkish access to the US F-35 fighter, which is on order to most NATO countries. Though such tactical successes would be pleasing to Putin, the Russian relationship with Turkey is essentially one of convenience. Moscow welcomes problems in Ankara’s relations with the US and NATO. But Russia has many interests in the Middle East, some of which are not consonant with Turkey’s. 5.5

Balancing Acts—Libya, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar

One such Russian inconsistency with Turkey is now evident in Libya where Russia supports Khalifa Haftar’s rebel movement. Turkey backs the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Russia’s motive appears to be gaining a role in the exploitation of oil deposits in parts of eastern Libya held by Haftar. Moscow has gone so far as to provide military support to Haftar via the “Wagner Group”.61 In response, Turkey has deployed mainly Syrian mercenaries to provide military assistance to the GNA to repel Haftar’s forces.62 The problem for Putin’s Middle East policy is that though he is the only external leader on reasonably good terms with the leaders of all Middle East states, he is not “best friend” with any of them—apart from Syria and Iran, which have no one else to turn to. Moscow’s support for 60 Roland Oliphant, “‘Don’t Be a Fool!’ Donald Trump’s Letter ‘Binned’ by Turkish

President as Mike Pence Attempts to Broker Ceasefire,” Daily Telegraph, October 17, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk. 61 See for example “Libyan Officials Cite Evidence of Russian Mercenaries in war,” Al Jazeera, December 5, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com. 62 See for example “Turkey’s Erdogan Confirms Sending Syrian Fighters to Libya,” Al Jazeera, February 22, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com.

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Haftar does not endear it to Turkey and Qatar (which aligns much of its regional policy with Turkey). But Russia’s active intervention in the Libyan conflict wins kudos with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, which also back Haftar. Putin’s approach is thus to build regional relations where Russia and Middle East states have mutual interests. He is sufficiently canny to realise that no one approach can hope to straddle the region’s divisions. And his regional interlocutors seem to accept this. Despite Qatar’s and Russia’s differences over Libya, the Qatar Investment Authority has purchased 19% of Russia’s main oil producer, Rosneft, a massive investment of $11.3 billion.63 One already-evident benefit of Russia’s multi-faceted approach is closer military and arms ties with Egypt. The two have held joint naval and airborne military exercises since 2015.64 And Egypt has signed a $2 billion contract with Russia that includes progressive supply of Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets—in the face of US objections.65 Symbolically, when Putin visited Cairo in 2015, he presented his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, with a Kalashnikov assault rifle.66

6 Trump’s Impact on Russian Policy Towards the Middle East The election of Donald Trump as US President in November 2016 was a serious new factor for Russia to consider in framing policy towards the Middle East. Obama had made himself unpopular with all the Middle East states Russia wanted to cultivate: particularly Israel, the GCC states and Egypt. Trump, though displaying little evidence of understanding the 63 Theodore Karasik, “Why Is Qatar Investing So Much in Russia?,” Middle East International, March 8, 2017. 64 Anton Mardasov, “Russia, Egypt Look to Boost Military Ties,” Al Monitor,

November 7, 2019. 65 “Russia Secures $2 Billion Fighter Jet Contract with Egypt,” Moscow Times, March 18, 2019. See also “Will Egypt Heed US Threat of Sanctions for Russian Jet Deal?” Al Monitor, December 5. 2019. 66 Reid Standish, “Putin’s Kalashnikov Diplomacy Gets a Win in Egypt,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2015.

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region, seemed to work by a guiding principle of doing the opposite of his predecessor, which he soon began to apply to US Middle East policy. For Israel and conservative Arab states, that was a promising start, given their allergy to Obama. Adding further complexity for Moscow, it quickly became apparent that Trump’s policy towards the Middle East was far from a thoughtthrough strategy. His approach was more a set of instincts. He viewed the Middle East through the prism of international terrorism (hence his policy goal of restricting Muslim entry to the US). In that context he saw the Middle East as a region of endless wars that had sucked in US military forces to little discernible gain. He believed the US voting public overwhelming supported that view, so he saw electoral advantage in extracting remaining US forces from the region as soon as possible. In office, Trump showed what was arguably the strongest and most uncritical support for Israel of any US President since Israel’s founding— including relocating the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Moving the embassy had been promised by other US presidents when they were candidates, most recently Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. However, they eventually accepted that the status of Jerusalem should be left to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The embassy move, by alienating Palestinians, made it almost impossible for the US under Trump to play a mediating role in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations; despite that, his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, produced a long-awaited peace plan in January 2020. Though touted by Trump as “the deal of the century”, it made many concessions to Israel and scarcely attempted to address Palestinian ambitions. The plan’s most radical aspect was that it provided a pathway for unilateral Israeli annexation of settler blocks in the West Bank. It was accordingly dismissed by Palestinian President Abbas as a “conspiracy” and judged by independent observers to be dead on arrival.67 That was fine by Netanyahu and his supporters, who then used the plan as a prop in their 2020 election campaign, calling it “the opportunity of a century”.68 None of that prevented four Arab states distant from Israel—the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco—from ignoring Palestinian anger and establishing diplomatic ties with Israel. But the 67 See for example, “Steal of the Century: Trump Gives Israel the Green Light to Annex Occupied Lands,” The Economist, January 28, 2020. 68 “Netanyahu: Trump Middle East Peace Plan ‘Deal of the Century’,” BBC News, January 28, 2020.

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motives of each were mixed: the UAE and Bahrain seek to cement Israel as an ally against Iran; Sudan wanted its removal from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, which would unlock potential US aid and investment; and Morocco wanted US recognition of Rabat’s claim to sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Trump also displayed visceral hostility towards Iran, which assisted closer US ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab states—very much on display during Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2017. His cancellation in 2018 of US participation in one of Obama’s signature foreign policy achievements, the Iran nuclear agreement, won warm plaudits in Israel, Saudi Arabia and pro-Riyadh Gulf Arab states.69 Certainly, the US’s Obama-era interest in reaching out to Iran had ended. Though Trump recently said publicly that he was prepared to talk with Iran, his Administration’s “maximum pressure” policy—seeking to deprive Iran of all oil export revenue—made the prospect of such talks remote. That policy also won plaudits in Israel and conservative Arab states alike. A caveat over Trump’s polices in the Middle East, or any other region for that matter, was what became the hallmark of his governing style: unpredictability. Some US observers went so far as to describe this unpredictability as Trump’s foreign policy “doctrine” following his first missile strikes on Syria in April 2017, when he reversed his previously expressed reluctance to become involved militarily against the Assad regime.70 Trump was accordingly considerably more popular with Putin’s key Middle East constituencies than Obama had been with them. Israel was delighted at Obama’s departure—not least because, unlike most US presidents, Obama was prepared to confront Israel over settlements, whereas Trump showed no sign of doing that in any serious way. Whereas Obama’s personal relationship with Netanyahu was poisonous, the chemistry between Trump and Netanyahu was clearly excellent, as was been evident during personal meetings of the two. These included Trump’s willingness to provide effective support to Netanyahu’s reelection campaigns in 2019 and 2020, not least through Netanyahu’s 69 “World Leaders React to US Withdrawal from Iranian Nuclear Deal: Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain Join Israel in Applauding US President’s Decision to Pull Out of Iran Nuclear Deal,” Al Jazeera, May 9, 2018. 70 See for example Peter Baker, “The Emerging Trump Doctrine: Don’t Follow Doctrine,” New York Times, April 8, 2017.

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visit to Washington in January 2020 to participate in the announcement of Kushner’s peace plan in January 2020.71,72 Despite Trump’s closeness to Israel and moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, he remained on good terms with conservative Arab states as well. Egypt hated Obama’s carping over human rights, and the Gulf Arab states believed Obama was far too soft on Iran: Trump showed no sign of irritating Gulf Arab and Egyptian sensitivities on either account. Ironically, Trump’s hostility towards Iran was a boost for the country’s hardliners, who opposed President Rouhani’s reaching out to the US and the West through the nuclear deal.73 Trump’s withdrawal from the deal, imposition of punitive sanctions on Iran and assassination of Soleimani in January 2020 undercut Rouhani and any efforts the Iranian President might have made to improve ties with the West. So the US President’s actions almost certainly helped the hardliners score an overwhelming victory in legislative elections in February 2020 and to be well-placed to take back the presidency in 2021. All of this means the Middle East has become more complicated for Russia: Putin no longer has as deep a well of anti-US feeling among the region’s conservative states to exploit, as he had during the Obama presidency. Moreover, Joe Biden as President is unlikely to reverse the changes Trump has brought to US Middle East policy. Doing so would use up a lot of political capital with pro-Israeli US interests, and he will have other pressing priorities—dealing with Covid-19, restoring the US economy, and re-establishing ties with US allies whom Trump as alienated. Moreover, though Biden as presidential candidate has said little about the Middle East, it’s a reasonable bet that he shares the frustration with the region evinced by his former boss in Obama’s 2013 UN General Assembly address referenced above. It should be noted in this context that Putin judiciously stayed out of the Middle East during the first decade of his rule, happy to sit back and

71 Amir Tibon, “Trump’s Previous ‘Election Gifts’ to Netanyahu Didn’t Pay Off, but This One Could,” Haaretz, January 25, 2020. 72 Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “Trump, Netanyahu Turn White House into Election Campaign Stop: Trump’s New Middle East Peace Plan Is Primed to hep Netanyahu, Signalling to Israel Voters That They Should Rehire Him,” Foreign Policy, January 28, 2020. 73 Sanam Vakil, “By Ending the Nuclear Deal, Trump Has Handed a Gift to Iranian Hardliners,” The Guardian, May 9, 2018.

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watch (often we might presume with astonishment) as the US dug hole after hole for itself through the invasion of Iraq and subsequent eight-year campaign. Putin has entered the Middle East in the past decade because of the opportunities it presented for Russia. But he has been careful to avoid deep commitments—his support for Assad is limited in manpower and resources. He seems to understand the region’s pitfalls and is able to join the dots in a region notorious for unexpected consequences more precisely than successive US presidents have done.

7

Where the Russian Intervention Is Headed

In the light of the major shift in US foreign policy direction evident under Trump, where is Russia’s Middle East policy headed? Even before Trump’s election, Russia was well on the way to achieving several objectives of the intervention in Syria and also in the wider Middle East. It had saved the Assad regime from collapse at apparently low cost in casualties and expenditure.74 Importantly, though some Russian special forces

74 Six months into the military campaign (March 2016) President Putin is reported to have said that military operations there had cost $483 million (UPI, “The Real Cost of Russia’s Syrian Campaign,” UPI, March 6, 2017). This figure is broadly in line with Western estimates, including reports of US intelligence estimates, putting the cost at between $2 million and $4 million per day, making an annual cost of about $1.5 billion if one uses the upper figure (see, for example, estimate by IHS Jane’s, reported in “This Is How Much Russia’s War in Syria Costs,” CNBC Europe, October 21, 2015). This would of course vary during the campaign depending on the intensity of operations. But probably not by much, given that most Russian operations involve aircraft and their munitions, and more recently naval assets in the eastern Mediterranean and cruise missiles, with only a small number of Russian military personnel involved (as target spotters and advisers with Syrian and Iranian personnel doing the ground fighting). Moreover, the campaign is apparently being funded from within the overall Russian defence budget, estimated by SIPRI at about $60 billion annually. So the cost of the Syrian campaign is not particularly significant in this context, particularly when one considers the campaign would be providing valuable combat experience for the military. Moreover, the demonstration effect of the Russian campaign could boost Russian arms exports: Russian newspaper Kommersant has reported that Algeria, Indonesia, Vietnam and even Pakistan (normally an arms client of China and the US) are interested in buying Sukhoi fighter and bomber jets (see The Guardian, “Russia’s Campaign in Syria Leads to Arms Sale Windfall,” The Guardian, March 29, 2016). As well, the Russian government probably believes this is non-discretionary expenditure. Maintaining Russian influence in Syria is a foreign policy priority, and degrading ISIS is a national security priority given that ISIS’s growth risks impacting on Muslim-majority regions of Russia.

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are reportedly attached to Syrian military units,75 Russia has avoided becoming mired in a ground conflict. In doing so, Russia has preserved access to its naval facility in Tartus. Losing that might have embarrassed Putin—though Russian analysts who have visited the base argue that Tartus is not a significant strategic asset for Russia and was not in itself sufficient reason for the intervention.76 Importantly, Russia has used its activity in the Middle East to claim a seat at the international table when Middle East issues are on the agenda. Putin has no solution to any of the Middle East’s problems, but he can block initiatives he doesn’t like. Excluding him would risk imperilling the outcomes of such discussions. Russia’s helpful approach to the Iran nuclear negotiations in 2010–2015 was in line with this. The P5 + 1 negotiating forum provided Russia with a “top table” benefit, and Russia had self-interest in preventing Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Russia’s membership of the Palestine-Israel Quartet, established in 2002 to help progress Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations, also accords—despite the Quartet’s ineffectiveness—with Russia’s “top table” aspirations. Putin is aware of the importance of keeping Russia’s military involvement in Middle East conflict zones limited in order to restrict casualties. He is also conscious of the need to reassure the Russian population that Syria won’t be a long-term and burdensome military and financial commitment. In addition, he has stock denials prepared in order to distance Russia from atrocities and possible war crimes.77 It’s important to see the recrudescence of Russia’s broad relationship with the Middle East in context. What Russia is doing in the region does not suggest that Putin is trying to supplant US primacy there. He shows no sign of wanting to repeat the many errors and missteps the US has made in the region this century. Moreover, given the quagmire the George W. Bush administration made for itself in Iraq, Russia would be wary about becoming too involved in any Arab state. Putin’s first instinct if Assad’s Syria were to become a major obstacle to achievement of broader Russian objectives globally or in the Middle East would be to 75 Thomas Grove, “Russian Special Forces Seen as Key to Aleppo Victory,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2016. 76 Personal records of meetings in Moscow and St Petersburg in October 2015 and September 2018. 77 See, for example, “Putin: Claims Russian Jets Killed Civilians in Syria Emerged Before Airstrikes Started,” RT , October 1, 2015.

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abandon Assad, but probably not the Alawite regime. Instead he is more likely to seek to replace Assad with a leader Russia can work with. Moscow would also be aware that such a move would need to be coordinated with Iran, which has its own interests in continuation of the Syrian regime. Given the historic tensions in the Russian-Iranian relationship, that could be tricky. Moreover, Putin would know that the Middle East provides little scope for development of Russian soft power, with most regional youth oriented towards the West, and English their preferred second language. Pro-US Arab states, as well as Israel and Turkey, had clearly used their Moscow diplomacy under Obama to send messages of dissatisfaction to the US. That would have been satisfying to Putin, but he seems smart enough to know that doesn’t make them pro-Russian.78 Moreover, President Trump’s policies towards the region over the past four years, and the likelihood that Biden will leave them substantially intact, mean that those states are even less likely to abandon their primary relationship with the US for one with Russia.

8

Conclusion

Putin’s 20 years in power provide ample evidence that he is not trying to recreate the global foreign policy of the Soviet Union whereby the Soviets and the US vied with each other in cultivating rival clients in many parts of the world, including the Middle East. Russia simply cannot afford that—Russia’s GDP is less than a tenth of the US’s.79 Russian analysts interviewed in researching this chapter80 have been adamant that Putin has a realistic appreciation of Russian capabilities: he is not silly enough to believe Russia could match the foreign policy heft of the US. But, limited though Russia’s economic weight and soft power may be, Putin certainly has capacity to play a spoiling role in regard to US and Western foreign policy aims when he chooses to. That argues that Putin’s 78 Personal records of meetings in Moscow and St Petersburg in October 2015 and

September 2018. 79 The IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2019) estimates that in 2019 Russian GDP was $1.64 trillion. By comparison, US GDP was $21.44 trillion. https://www. imf.org. 80 Personal records of meetings in Moscow and St Petersburg in October 2015 and September 2018.

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actions in Syria and the broader Middle East are tactical, not strategic— that a major Russian role in the region is not an end in itself. Rather, Putin’s current interest in the Middle East seems part of a wider strategy of putting pressure on the US and the West more broadly. It is also a region from which Russia can derive economic benefits, particularly in relation to energy and arms sales. A side benefit for Russia has been the outflow of refugees from Syria into Europe, which was a significant factor in Britain’s Brexit vote81 — working directly to Russia’s interests in weakening the European Union. Putin’s duchessing of French far right presidential candidate Marine Le Pen should be seen in the same context. Even though she failed in her presidential bid in 2017, she is far from beaten as a political force and has already declared her candidacy for the 2022 presidential election. The stronger her influence becomes, the greater the impact she is likely to exert on French popular scepticism towards the EU and NATO. Russia’s apparent attempt to influence the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election, described by former US Director of National Security James Clapper as Russia’s most aggressive effort to do so in his 50-years of government service,82 was in the same vein. With the above in mind, the evidence of Putin’s involvement in the Middle East suggests he has three primary aims. Firstly, as part of his broader ambition to counter US global strategy, he wants to counter US objectives in the Middle East when he disagrees with them. Secondly, he seeks to benefit Russia economically, through coordination with the Gulf Arab states on oil and gas extraction and pricing policies; to encourage Gulf sovereign wealth funds to invest in Russian resources (where Russia’s domestic investment capacity is limited); and to take advantage of the region’s conflicts and frictions to sell Russian arms to all willing to buy them. Thirdly, for domestic security purposes, he needs to prevent the region’s turmoil infecting Russia’s Muslim majority regions. Thus the Middle East itself is a second-order priority for Russia in geopolitical terms: the region is a means to a larger end. The US, the 81 See, for example, Matteo Garavoglia, “What Brexit Means for Migration Policy,” Brookings Foreign Policy Update, September 26, 2016. 82 Personal note of Clapper’s remarks to a Vice Chancellor’s forum at the Australian National University, June 13, 2017. See also, “Top US Intelligence Official: Russia Meddled in Election by Hacking, Spreading of Propaganda,” Washington Post, January 5, 2017.

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West broadly and China form Moscow’s main geostrategic focus, a point made with force and eloquence by noted Russia analyst Bobo Lo in two recent publications.83 Lo argues that Putin would ideally see Russia, the West (principally the US) and China balancing each other and, crucially, having equal status. They would accept the need for legal justifications for international action (primarily through recourse to the UN Security Council) thus restricting the US’s capacity for unilateral behaviour as in Iraq and Syria.84 Such a change to the international system would also restrict Russia’s scope for unilateral action—but presumably that would be a price Putin would be willing to pay. (As noted, Russia argues that its intervention in Syria was legitimate in international law because it was at the request of the Assad government. Russia argues also that its annexation of Crimea was legitimised by the 2014 referendum there.) We can’t know if that is actually Putin’s game plan, and accomplishing something resembling it is obviously beyond Russia’s capabilities for now—particularly while the West remains as hostile towards Russia as it is. Moreover, Russia’s current economic weakness militates against its being accepted as a major power equal to the US and China—though Putin would almost certainly argue that Russia’s nuclear arsenal alone, which is on a par with the US’s and is currently being modernised,85 gives it major power status at least equivalent to China’s. Uncertainties associated with the Coronavirus pandemic, particularly the collapse in energy prices, render speculation about long-term Russian planning for the Middle East more than usually problematic. In this situation Putin is likely to fall back on the methodology described in the introduction to this chapter. He will probably bide his time and look for opportunities to advance Russia’s interest as they might arise. When he chooses, he will also seek to use Russian actions in the region to counter Western policies in order to make gains for Russia within the broader geostrategic framework through which he sees the world.

83 Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder, Kindle, 2015; and A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World, Penguin, 2017. 84 See, in particular, A Wary Embrace, 50 ff and 76 ff. 85 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation

of American Scientists, April 2020 Update, http://www.fas.org.

CHAPTER 3

What’s Driving Russia’s Return to the Middle East? Irina Zvyagelskaya

Russia’s policy in the region can be explained by its global goals as well. The Middle East, compared to such an irritant as Ukraine, where the developments led to an inevitable tensions between the Russian Federation and the West, was not an arena of ideological and political battles. Therefore, one could not exclude a possibility of Moscow cooperation with the US and Europe, at least in terms of containing common threats. The deployment of Russia’s Aerospace forces into Syria in September 2015 became a prologue to the strengthening of its role both at the regional and global levels. If Russia’s relations with the West leave much to be desired, Moscow managed to establish relations with all Middle East actors, including irreconcilable opponents. Russia’s specific tasks in the region cannot be reduced to countering threats and challenges; the goal of developing trade ties, obtaining investments, entering the arms market, and influencing oil prices has been no less important. Although

I. Zvyagelskaya (B) Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_3

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Russia is not perceived by everyone as a convenient partner, its policy has become an illustration of its reliability.

1

Introduction

Russia’s return to the Middle East was motivated by a number of cultural, historical, political, and economic factors that have driven its policy toward the region for centuries. As the legal successor to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited intrinsic foreign policy priorities that were the cornerstone of Soviet policies on the Middle East for decades. The Soviet period, while substantially different from the modern era, is still responsible for the formation of Russia’s image in the region. Russia’s success in the region can be explained not only by its ability to achieve its goals at a relatively low cost, but also by the desire of regional forces to greet Russia in the region as a counterbalance they have been lacking since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In other words, the Middle East has never been alien to Russia, but in the 2000s it presented Moscow with a window of opportunity, in which it came to Syria as a security provider and managed to strengthen or to establish ties with the main actors in the Middle East. Russia’s geostrategic interests reflect the country’s return to the world stage as a major power. The Middle East has provided an arena for Russia to demonstrate that it has overcome the weakness resulting from the collapse of Soviet Union and can project its newly acquired strength. This chapter examines the historical and cultural context of Russia’s Middle East policy, its search for a national identity, the role played by its Soviet heritage, and the current interests and objectives of the Russian Federation.

2

A Search for Self-Identity

In historical retrospection, Russia’s extended relations with the Middle Eastern countries cannot be attributed exclusively to its pragmatic desire for gaining the upper hand in the race for global influence. A vital role has also been played by Russia’s incomplete search for identity, as it is uniquely positioned between the West and the East. The centuries-long debate between Westerners and the Slavophiles can explain to some extent the duality of Russians’ self-perception. The two positions were prevalent in Russia in the nineteenth century, particularly during its second half. According to Geoffrey Hosking, Professor Emeritus of Russian History

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of the School of Slavonic & East European Studies, University College London, the Westerner’s point of view was based upon the premise that the best way for Russia to strengthen itself as a great power was to become more like European countries—that is to say, to move towards a constitutional and parliamentary regime, either a republic, or more likely in Russia’s case, a monarchy; to move towards becoming an industrialized nation-state, like France, Germany and Britain. The Slavophiles reacted by saying, ‘Well, no, Russia is not like any European state. It has its own distinctive political system, which is based on autocracy and the Orthodox Church, and Russia is an empire, it’s not a nation-state.’1

This debate was reflected in the writings of the giants of classic Russian literature, such as Fedor Dostoevsky, which were distinguished by a deep knowledge of the soul and psychology of the Russian people. Dostoevsky lived in the twentieth century, a period in which the Russian Empire was in the process of conquering Central Asia and gradually spreading its influence in the Middle East.2 Thus, Dostoevsky argued in his diaries that in any case, it is difficult to say whether our society was inculcated with a clear understanding of our mission in Asia and what Asia actually means to us and what it could continue to mean. Shrill voices proclaim: ‘why Asia, if we can’t even get ourselves in order and settled in Europe… We don’t need this Asia at all, if only we could just do away with it!’ These judgments can be heard even today among our wiseacres, because of their great minds, of course… Russia is not only in Europe, but also in Asia; Russians are not only European, but also Asian. Moreover, Asia may hold even more of our hopes than Europe. In our future destinies, perhaps Asia is our last refuge!3

1 Geoffrey Hosking, “Slavophiles and Westernizers in Russia”, 21 March 2012 https:// valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/slavophiles_and_westernizers_in_russia/ (accessed 10 June 2020). 2 It is important to mention that in Russian cultural thinking geographical term ‘Asia’ inevitably (and, sometimes, inseparably) comprises Asian and Middle Eastern countries. It is typical for nineteenth-century writers to speak about the Middle East as ‘Asia’ or just ‘East’. 3 Fedor Dostoevsky, Dnevnik pisatelya. Sobranie sochinenii [Writer’s Diary/Collected Works] (Saint-Petersburg: Nauka, 1995), Vol. 14, 504.

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This conclusion, formulated by one of Russia’s great writers, is hardly universal. But it certainly emphasizes the two-fold nature of Russia’s identity, determined by the historical features of Russian society. In Russia, the gap between the rulers and the ruled was not only socioeconomic, but also cultural. As Russian poet Alexander Pushkin put it, ‘the government is the only European in Russia.’ Russia and the Middle East have deep civilizational differences, but occasionally one can find similarities in their respective values. According to the leading Russian expert on the region, Vitaly Naumkin, these similarities are often reflected in their negative perceptions of the West. ‘Similarly to Russia…adherents of national and religious identities use the thesis of moral degradation of the West as a means to justify their rejection of Western cultural expansion.’4 However, motives for the rejection of Western values in Russia and in Oriental societies are different. Russia did not experience colonization by Western powers; the West did not impose its model of political behavior on Russia’s elite through education and financial instruments; the Russian aristocracy and the educated class were always a part of Western culture, no matter what modern Slavophiles and Eurasians write and say today. Russia’s anti-Westernism may be explained in terms of its bitter historical experience, by the rivalries that were brought on by the Cold War and the disappointments that followed it, and not by insurmountable cultural differences. Rather, this anti-Westernism can be construed as Russia’s reaction to the policies of Western countries that do not want to see Russia as an equal player in the international arena. It is also the result of growing domestic demand to restore Russia’s international status and splendor, in line with the presence of an authoritarian state, which relies on tradition, conservatism, and religion. Since the naissance of the Russian Empire, tsars and clergy alike were engaged in developing the idea of Russia’s greatness—that it has a special historical and spiritual destiny and is unlike any other country in the world. This beckons back to the old perception of Moscow as the Third Rome,5 which historically made the protection of all Orthodox 4 Vitaly Naumkin, “Problema tsivilizatsionnoi identifikatsii i krizis natsii-gosudarstv” [The Problem of Civilizational Identification and the Crisis of Nation-States], Vostok (4, 2014): 5. 5 The idea of ‘Moscow—the Third Rome’ was formed in the fifteenth–sixteenth centuries. In 1439, in Florence, the ecclesiastical Union was signed, which placed the

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Christians, extending a helping hand to the enslaved Slavs, and showing solidarity with the oppressed classes its manifesto. This is not a missionary idea in the modern sense of the word, but an incessant search for an ideal and a habit of thinking globally. Thus, according to Russian expert Sergei Kocherov, the Russian idea of salvation cannot simply be reduced to eliminating poverty, political liberation, the expansion of people’s rights and freedoms, which incidentally is very characteristic of the West; nor can it be attributed to some religious or mystical departure from the real world, or even to complete submission to the totality of an autocratic or theocratic state…. It finds adequate expression in metaphysical terms—such as salvation from universal danger and global threats.6

A long and ongoing search for a national identity has pushed Russia toward accepting its customary and historic global role. The translation of this acceptance into political practice has stressed the need to develop relations with the Middle East and, among other things, can explain Moscow’s activism in the region and its choice of regional partners. Russia’s significant experience in collaborating with regional forces arises from Soviet times. Not all of its elements are applicable to the current situation, but political and expert knowledge of the Middle East remains an important resource for Russia.7

Orthodox Church under the authority of the Pope. Byzantium agreed to this agreement, hoping for European military assistance in the fight against the Ottoman Turks. But in 1453 Constantinople, the Second Rome, fell under the attacks of the conquerors. Russia did not recognize the Florentine Union and considered the collapse of the Byzantine Empire a heavenly punishment for the betrayal of Orthodoxy. Moscow became the third Rome to preserve the Apostolic Orthodox Church and to show the world the light of Orthodoxy. 6 Sergei Kocherov, “Missiya Rossii v sovremennom mire kak platforma politiki «myagkoi sily»” [The Mission of Russia in the Modern World as a Platform for Policy of “Soft Power”], https://www.hse.ru/data/2016/03/03/1125938279/Missi%20Ross ii%20v%20sovremennom%20mire.pdf (accessed 8 April 2020). 7 Irina Zvyagelskaya and Nikolay Surkov, Russian Policy in the Middle East: Dividends and Costs of the Big Game (Moscow: RIAC, 2019), 4–5.

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3

Soviet Legacy

According to Nikolay Kozhanov, a Russian expert on the Middle East, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union Moscow had created a solid foundation for developing fruitful cooperation with the Arab world and Iran. After 1991, however, Russia largely neglected its potential to further develop these ties. Political and economic contacts were mostly scaled back, if not cut off completely. A mixture of material and ideological reasons brought about this situation. The domestic economic and political turmoil of the 1990s limited Russia’s export capabilities and was responsible for diverting the attention of the authorities from foreign to domestic policy issues. The loss of Ukrainian ports—the main trade gateways of the Soviet Union to the Mediterranean—also hurt business contacts with the Middle East. By the mid-1990s, Arab countries comprised just 1% of Russia’s annual trade.8 As the legal successor to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited intrinsic foreign policy priorities that were the cornerstone of Moscow’s Middle Eastern policies for decades. Reviewing the policies of the Russian Federation in the Arab world, one cannot lose sight of the Soviet period, which, while substantially different, is responsible for the formation of Russia’s image in the region. The Soviet Union predominantly came to the Middle East in the second half of the 1950s9 and gained a strong foothold there during the following two decades as the Arab national liberation movements were on the rise. The rise of Arab nationalism, revolutions and the collapse of colonial rule opened the door for the Soviet Union but also demanded Moscow sacrifice some of its most rigid ideological perceptions in place of more pragmatic considerations. Yevgeny Primakov, a Russian academic

8 Nikolay Kozhanov, Russian Policy Across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods (Chatham House: February 2018), 3. 9 Ties with local powers were established well before: Iran and Turkey played important roles in Russia’s foreign policy agenda as far back as the 1920s. There were also attempts to establish contacts with Saudi Arabia in the 1920s. However, in the 1950s, the geographic coverage, scale and intensity of Soviet Union’s relations with the Middle Eastern states increased markedly due to the success of national movements in the Arab world. Alexey Vasil’ev, Ot Lenina do Putina. Rossiya na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke [From Lenini to Putin. Russia in the Middle East] (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2018).

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and a renowned politician, explained the reasons behind the Soviet leadership’s decision to ignore some blatant ideological and political flaws of new regimes in these Arab states: The choice was made in favor of developing relations with revolutionary nationalists, and it seems that the main motive for this was not ideology, but politics…. the reality of this forced us to recognize the leading role of petty-bourgeois revolutionaries in the national liberation process. They did not recognize the proletarian dictatorship, the class struggle, or even the class composition of society….10

The military-political dimension assumed preeminence in Soviet policies in the Middle East during the Cold War, thus leaving ideology in its wake. After the fall of the USSR in 1991, the ideological component completely lost all relevance for Russia’s Middle East policies. The ideological difference between Soviet and Russian policies in the Middle East does not mean, however, that there is a total lack of continuity and consistency. Relationships with Arab partners were sustained even after the Soviet Union’s collapse, though Russia’s policies became more diversified: the country established relations with Israel, pursued closer ties with Turkey and Iran, and strengthened its contacts with Saudi Arabia and a number of non-state actors.

4

A Domestic Dimension

Russia’s ethnic and religious closeness to the Middle East can be traced back to its ethno-religious makeup. It was said in 2015 that, ‘the country’s Muslim population…is likely to be approaching (if not already exceeding) 16 million…. Adding the migrants from Central Asia and Azerbaijan would bring the total Muslim population of the Russian Federation up to roughly 20 million.’11 Russia’s Muslims belong to its autochthonous population, with the main ethnic groups Tatars, Bashkirs, 10 Evgeny Primakov, “Blizhnevostochnyi kurs Rossii: istoricheskie etapy” [The Middle East Policy of Russia: Historical Stages], Blizhnii Vostok, arabskoe probuzhdenie i Rossiya: chto dal’she? [The Middle East, Arab Awakening and Russia: What’s Next?] (Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies, 2012), 26. 11 Alexey Malashenko, “Islamic Challengers to Russia, from the Caucasus to the Volga and the Urals”, 13 May 2015, https://carnegie.ru/2015/05/13/islamic-challenges-torussia-from-caucasus-to-volga-and-urals-pub-60334 (accessed 12 May 2020).

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Chechens, and Avars. Most of these groups are settled in two major areas—the Volga region and the Caucasus, though a significant number of Muslims can also be found in the regions of Moscow, Chelyabinsk (the Urals), Orenburg (South Urals), and Tyumen (Siberia). Labor migrants from Central Asia and the South Caucasus are the major migrant groups within Russia. Interestingly, Muslims migrating from these regions to Russia do not consider it a foreign country, largely because they all share a long history of being in the same state (first the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union). Russian cultural expansion had a modernizing effect on these Muslim populations. It also introduced them to Western and other Asian cultures through literature, which was widely translated into Russian, along with numerous exhibitions, museums, and so on. Russian Tatars played a special role in spreading Islamic knowledge and education in Central Asia in the nineteenth century.12 This can be traced to a deliberate policy of the Russian Empire, which sought to prevent the spread of radical Islamic ideas from abroad. Modern Russia is recognized internationally as belonging to the Islamic world and occupies observer status in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. That said, Moscow is interested in further developing relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab States, which have traditionally paid a great deal of attention to their co-religionists. Due to the large number of Sunni Muslims in Russia, it is extremely important for the Russian leadership to prevent these populations from falling victim to the propaganda of terrorist and extremist groups. It is no secret that volunteers from Russia joined the ranks of the so-called Islamic State (IS). According to military intelligence data, about 4,000 Russian citizens fought on the side of the IS in Syria in 2017.13 These fighters are not the only matter of concern. There are also socalled sleeper cells of terrorists in Russia and in Central Asia that could

12 L. Murtazina, “Rol’tatar v razvitii prosveshcheniya narodov turkestana i kazakhskikh stepei (konets khikh – nachalo khkh v.)” [The Role of Tatars in Education of the Peoples of Turkestan and the Kazakh Steppes (Late XIX – Early XX century)], Vestnik TGPU [TSPU Bulletin] (№8 (185), 2017): 126–130. 13 Islam Today, “Putin Soobshchil Skolko Rossyan Voyuyet za IGIL [Putin Said How Many Russians Are Fighting in the IS]”, Islam Today, 24 February 2017, https://islamtoday.ru/novosti/2017/02/24/putin-soobsil-skolko-rossian-vouet-za-igil/ (accessed 10 April 2020).

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easily be activated.14 The physical border between Russia and Kazakhstan (the only Central Asian country bordering Russia) spans over 7,000 kilometers, a distance not easily guarded. So, the security situation in Central Asia will inevitably have an impact upon Russia’s decisionmaking concerning Middle Eastern matters, especially in those hotspots where Moscow has become directly involved in the fight against terrorist organizations.

5

Russia’s Interests in the Middle East

In addition to the factors discussed above, Russia’s interests in the Middle East are dominated by strategic concerns. Moscow’s policies have been formulated as a response to global transformations and to the swift changes affecting the region itself. The world has entered a period of high uncertainty; the growing discrepancy in how national sovereignty and territorial integrity are interpreted, the practice of regime change, and the increasing frequency of military interventions all pose new challenges for Russia. As stated in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, ‘the struggle for dominance in shaping the key principles of the future international system has become a key trend at the current stage of international development. Force is becoming an increasingly important factor in international relations amid escalating political, social and economic contradictions and growing uncertainty in the global political system and economy.’15 From Moscow’s point of view, the West has taken

14 So-called sleeper cells of various terrorist organizations exist in more than 60 countries, including Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), according to CIS Anti-Terrorism Center Head Vladimir Grigoryev. He said sleeper cells are particularly established by militants returning to their home countries from regions where military activities go on; ‘It includes not only militants’ return to their home countries but also the recruitment of people who had visited countries engulfed in armed conflicts.’ See Vestnik Kavkaza, “CIS Anti-Terrorism Center: Sleeping Terrorist Cells Exist in over 60 Countries”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 30 October 2018, https://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/CIS-Anti-Terrorism-Center-sleeping-ter rorist-cells-exist-in-over-60-countries.html (accessed 5 June 2020). 15 Foreign Policy Concept of The Russian Federation Approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016 https://www.mid.ru/en/for eign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 (accessed 17 January 2020).

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advantage of the Soviet Union’s voluntary dismantling of its empire and has opted to extend Western rule even to Russia’s own borders.16 The revival of international rivalry between nations after the collapse of the Soviet Union was not entirely surprising; instead, it was Russia’s assertiveness in protecting its interests that caught the West by surprise. According to British scholar Keir Giles, Russia’s assertive action in Ukraine and Syria did not denote a fundamental shift in Russian foreign policy…. Both long-standing aspirations and mounting security concerns have now been acted on by a much more assertive and confident Russia: assertive in defending its interests, and confident in the leverage and power that it enjoys to do so. These new characteristics resulted from the culmination of two important trends in the Russian view of itself and the world. These were, first, a greater and more urgent perception of threat, whether real or imagined, to Russia’s own security; and second, a recognition that Russia itself had regained sufficient strength, military and otherwise, to assert itself and counter this threat.17

Yet, Russia’s confrontational relations with the West (especially regarding Ukraine, since 2014 or even earlier) could only partially explain its activism in the Middle East. At first, Moscow was looking for collaboration with the Western coalition in the fight against the common terrorist threat presented by IS. Such a collaboration might have improved Moscow’s relationship with the West, but it was never realized in practice. Thus, in the most general terms, Russian policy in the region can be described as the need to contain instability on Russia’s doorstep. Any concentration of foreign armies, civil wars, armed conflicts, terrorist acts, or regime change policies capable of ruining states and their institutions are perceived in Moscow as a direct threat to its national security. The deployment of Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria in September 2015 was clearly the result of Russia’s frustration with developments on the global and regional stage.

16 Directorate-General for External Policies EU, Facing Russia’s Strategic Challenge: Security Developments from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Policy Department (Belgium: 2017), 5–6. 17 Keir Giles, The Turning Point for Russian Foreign Policy: The Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2017), 1.

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Russia’s geostrategic interests imply the idea of the country’s return to the world stage as a great power. The Middle East has provided an arena where Russia can demonstrate that it has overcome the weakness resulting from the collapse of Soviet Union and project its newly acquired strength and reliability. Russia’s interests in the Middle East also encompass the protection of Russian businesses in the area, primarily those operating in the field of energy resources and the military–industrial complex, which supplies weapons to the countries of the region. Moscow is also interested in developing trade ties with local states, attracting investments, and influencing oil prices. Russia’s return to the Middle East is also seen by foreign experts as an effort to fill the power vacuum created by US intentions to reduce its commitments in the region, with some stating that ‘[a]lthough President Trump’s policy choices may be seen as more ambivalent, his declared policy stance of “Making America Great Again” carries strong isolationist connotations and seems to continue the trend ushered in by his predecessor, President Obama, which resulted in a power vacuum that Russia has been more than eager to occupy.’18 This argument does not hold water. First, it is obviously premature to speculate about a power vacuum in the Middle East despite the local perceptions of America’s intentions. While the largest American bases remain in the region, an expectation that the US might lose interest in the Middle East will inevitably generate nervousness in the regional capitals. Even Israel, which has been enjoying unprecedented American support, receives little consolation from American reassurances. As Amos Yadlin, the ex-director of the Israeli Institute of National Security Studies, put it, ‘we are not in a panic, but we are concerned. We are slightly, slightly paranoid. The U.S. is leaving, disengaging from the Middle East and this is clear to all the players. And who is filling the vacuum? The bad guys: Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Assad. It is not good news. It is not good news.’19 Second, the US military presence in the Middle East, and in particular in the Gulf, regardless of the US policy of ‘de-engagement,’ and perhaps 18 Illimar Ploom, Vladimir Sazonov, and Viljar Veebel, “Russia’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East: Context, Strategy and Methods”, Sojateadlane. Estonian Journal of Military Studies. Cultural, Peace and Conflict Studies Series (V. IX:13, 2019), 16. 19 “The Future of U.S.-Israel Relations Symposium”, INSS, 2 December 2019, https:// www.inss.org.il/event/the-future-of-u-s-israel-relations-symposium/ (accessed 8 October 2020).

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in spite of it, remains impressive and it is unlikely that Washington will decide to seriously reduce its military personnel and equipment there. Having fought numerous wars in the Middle East since 2001—at an estimated cost of $6.4 trillion—the US has built up a massive military presence in the region in its own right. Presently, at least 60,000 troops are currently stationed around the Middle East, according to US Central Command. The list of the countries hosting American forces includes: • Bahrain (5,000 US forces, mostly Navy); • Iraq (about 5,200 US troops were in Iraq as of January. The number is likely to change soon, as the Iraqi military has said US troops are no longer allowed to stay in the country); • Kuwait (13,000 American troops, including those at the US Army Central Command’s forward headquarters); • Oman (the country has hosted US soldiers since 1980 and has assisted the US in combating IS); • Qatar (13,000 US soldiers are stationed in Qatar with plans to expand the number of bases); • UAE (5,000 US troops are stationed in the UAE); • Saudi Arabia (on November 19 that approximately 3,000 US troops will be deployed to Saudi Arabia to protect the region ‘against hostile action by Iran and its proxy forces,’ according to a press release); • Jordan (about 2,800 US troops were deployed to support operations against the IS); • Turkey (the actual numbers of American troops are not clear, but the country’s strategic location makes it valuable for transporting arms and people). There are also other US bases in the region, but their locations are undisclosed for security reasons.20 A US withdrawal from the Middle East is obviously not in the cards yet, but it no longer wants to continue its presence in various regions of the world to the extent it has previously, and the Middle East will be no exception. The prominent American diplomat Richard Haass asked, ‘is the perception of US withdrawal from the region correct? “Withdrawal” 20 Rashaan Ayesh, “Where U.S. Troops and Military Assets Are Deployed in the Middle East”, Axios, 8 January 2020, https://www.axios.com/where-us-troops-deployed-middleeast-5e96fdb2-c7ba-4f26-90b4-7bf452f83847.html (accessed 10 April 2020).

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is a bit strong of a word, because withdrawal sounds binary, like a switch. I think a better metaphor is a rheostat or a dial, that there’s a dialing down of U.S. involvement and presence in the region.’21 Third, it seems that in 2015, such a ‘dialing down of U.S. involvement and presence in the region’ was less evident, and Russia could not envision taking advantage of a changing American approach to the region. Witold Rodkiewicz, an expert from Poland who follows closely Russian interests in the Middle East, points out that ‘Moscow’s aim, however, was not to build a sphere of influence or create a network of client states (which was beyond its economic and financial capacity), but rather to establish a position for itself in consequence of which all the other actors would always have to take Russia’s interests into account, and the states in the region would see Moscow as a valuable partner.’22 Moscow is trying to develop a foothold in the Middle East, but it cannot functionally imitate Washington. Russia has neither the economic might nor the political potential to become a hegemon in the region. Its goal is more modest—to maintain a balance of power that can help it play the role of a key non-regional mediator. This argument can be applied to Russia’s launch of a military campaign in Syria in September 2015. The operation’s objective was to protect the statehood of Syria, the administration of President Bashar al-Assad, and to settle the conflict through coercion and diplomacy. According to Paul Saunders, a well-known American Middle East expert, ‘Western analysts have long generally believed that Russia’s goal in Syria has been to force a political settlement to the fighting that would guarantee President Bashar al-Assad’s continued rule, at least for the time being. This view builds upon Moscow’s known view that at present—and despite his shortcomings—Assad is the only leader who can keep Syria together, ensure that Damascus delivers on its commitments to Moscow, and suppress extremists.’23 One can add to this that the mission in Syria was instrumental to this goal—initially, Moscow hoped to coordinate its fight against the IS with the Western coalition to smooth global tensions in the process of engaging in a joint

21 INSS, “The Future of U.S.-Israel Relations Symposium”. 22 Witold Rodkeiwicz, “Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy: Regional Ambitions, Global

Objectives”, OSWM Studies, N. 71 (December 2017): 16. 23 Paul Saunders, “Who Will Pay to Rebuild Syria”, 12 March 2020, https://valdai club.com/a/highlights/who-will-pay-to-rebuild-syria/ (accessed 11 May 2020).

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struggle against a common enemy. However, this goal has never been fully realized. Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, summed up Russia’s interests and goals: Putin’s general objective in the Middle East is to establish Russia’s status and role as a major outside power in one of the world’s most volatile regions. Other key objectives include: • Containing and diminishing Islamist extremism and radicalism that might otherwise expand into Russia and its immediate post-Soviet neighborhood, thereby greatly enhancing the potential for Muslim extremism there; • Supporting friendly regimes and forces in the region, and building lasting geopolitical alliances with them; • Establishing a modicum of Russian military presence in and around the region; • Expanding Russia’s presence in the region’s arms, nuclear, oil and gas, food, and other markets; • Attracting investment into Russia, particularly from the richer countries of the Persian Gulf; • Supporting energy prices by coordinating policies with the principal oil and gas producers in the Gulf.24 However, not all objectives on this list look realistic, including the idea of forming lasting alliances in the Middle East. Even a modicum of Russian military presence in and around the region will hardly be achieved in the short term. But the other goals can safely be called the real drivers of Russia’s regional policy. A particular feature of Russia’s current policies is its greater orientation toward collaborating with local actors, which some analysts view through the lens of ‘regionalization.’ As Russia expert Ekaterina Stepanova noted: [T]he regionalization of Russia’s Middle East policy continues to evolve in three main directions:

24 Dmitri Trenin, Russia in the Middle East: Moscow’s Objectives, Priorities, and Policy Drivers (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 1.

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(1) A search for new types and areas for Russia to have more influence, in the region, especially in the economic sphere and in conflict management beyond Syria; (2) A qualitative shift from a primarily Western-centric to a more region-centric approach to the Middle East—a recent tendency distinct from (and more strategically significant than) the mere diversification of Russia’s regional contacts, which has been going on for many years; (3) The identification and more active pursuit of Russia’s own interests in regional partnerships in the Middle East—something that requires an actor to carry a certain weight in the region, which Russia has now acquired.25

These statements are unquestionably correct. At the same time, while the term ‘regionalization’ is quite applicable to Russia’s policies and signifies its turn toward relations with local powers, the manner of its application to the processes in the Middle East is still not entirely clear. In international relations, the term usually refers to phenomena such as the revival/rise of regional powers and the shaping of regional integration alliances.26 The rise of Middle Eastern powers is unquestionable. However, it has not happened against a backdrop of greater integration, but instead was provoked by the weakening of existing ties and organizations. Despite the changing balance of power, the weakening of some states, and the strengthening of others, the Middle East has maintained its established paradigm: inherent polycentrism, an incessant struggle for leadership, historical grievances, and traditional perceptions of political hierarchy. Regional organizations are relatively weak, integration processes are generally undeveloped, and there is no collective security system in sight. The special role that has been played by external forces has hindered the formation of regional leadership and further deepened fragmentation within the region. The traditional dependence of regional states on global powers and a plethora of armed conflicts have made the countries of the region more vulnerable and presented special opportunities for Moscow’s policy of regional activism. 25 Ekaterina Stepanova, “Regionalization as the Key Trend of Russia’s Policy on Syria and in the Middle East”, CAP Paper, N212, January 2019, 9. 26 A.D. Voskresensky and E.V. Koldunova, Sovremennye Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya [Contemporary International Relations] (Moscow: Aspect Press, 2012), 107.

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The collapse of statehood in Syria, Libya, and Yemen was not the result of some international conspiracy, but was caused by domestic deficiencies: a weakness of state structures and modern institutions, a lack of common civil values, and the persistence of numerous traditional identities (ethnic, confessional, tribal). That said, it is undeniable that outside forces have also been active in trying to leverage these local disturbances. The four regional ‘hegemons’—Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel—are all on the path toward defining regional order. Regional powers, while seriously in need of the presence of global states, are nevertheless actively competing with the latter in the region. It is believed that regional powers are trying to take revenge for the Cold War, but continue to use certain skills they acquired during that very period. The Cold War rivalry gave birth to a sort of political consumerism and to the habit of demanding the maximum from foreign actors while not giving much in return. More often than not, regional players are reluctant to consider the interests of their respective global partners. Their tendency for national selfishness and desire to use situations for their own interests are growing more and more pronounced. Tactics are often more important for regional players than strategy, which does little to fortify these alliances.

6

A Burden of Partnership

By the early 2000s Russia had reached a new level of relations with the leading regional powers. Moscow could hardly use its Soviet legacy in this case. Soviet relations with Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq have a long shared history, going back to the 1950–1970s. Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, however, were on the opposing side during the Cold War, leaving Russia with no choice but to build relations with some of these countries almost from scratch. 6.1

Turkey

Russia–Turkey relations reflect the current changes we see in the global system of international relations and in the domestic arenas of both countries. Russia and Turkey have become much more assertive in carrying out independent policies due to the strengthening of their respective political regimes. Such consolidation became particularly evident in Russia in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, while in Turkey this phenomenon

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arose in parallel with the gradual increase in popularity of Erdogan and his party, primarily in rural areas. The rapid growth of political contacts and trade and economic ties between Russia and Turkey, including large-scale projects in the energy sector, made clear that common interests indeed existed. However, these common interests cannot change the fact that the relationship remains well short of a real partnership, especially given the geopolitical and historical differences that divide Russia and Turkey.27 The political crisis that broke out in Syria in the spring of 2011 has contributed to Turkey’s taking a more assertive role in the Middle East. As it is believed by some researchers: Turkey, which claims to be a regional leader, tried to take advantage of the turmoil in the Arab world and to strengthen its influence in the region by spreading the ‘Turkey’s experience’ in democratization and liberalization. The Turkish leadership expected to assume the role of ‘coordinator’ of reforms in Syria and exerted increasing pressure on the government of Bashar al-Assad. We can say that Ankara has sacrificed its relations with Damascus in order to achieve its broader regional goals.28

Under these circumstances, Russia–Turkey relations became an uneasy and fragile alliance, as demonstrated by the 2015–2016 conflict. In November 2015, Turkish warplanes shot down a Russian SU-24M bomber on the border with Syria. President Putin described the incident as a ‘stab in the back’ committed by ‘accomplices of terrorists.’29 Political dialogue at the highest level was promptly halted and remained so for more than six months. Russia subsequently enacted a partial freeze of economic ties between the two countries, which led to a drop in bilateral trade turnover from $23.9 billion in 2015 to $16.8 billion in 2016. The game changer in finally overcoming this crisis was the failed attempt at a military coup in Turkey. No one can safely claim that Russian intelligence shared with Erdogan radio exchanges they had intercepted from conspirators, but Moscow’s sympathies were certainly on

27 Eugene Rumer, Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019), i. 28 Irina Zvjagel’skaja and Irina Svistunova, “Fragile Partnerschaft. Russland, die Türkei und der Krieg in Syrien”, OSTEUROPA, 2018 (68), 371. 29 “Turkey Shoots Down Russian Warplane on Syria Border”, BBC, 24 November 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34907983 (accessed 5 May 2020).

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his side. Since then, bilateral relations have been on the rise, and the remaining differences have had no serious impact on these relations. Turkey’s desire to demonstrate greater independence, even in NATO, and Turkey’s special relationship with Moscow, has led to an unprecedented step—Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense systems.30 To make this policy appear more balanced, following the purchase, Turkey made it clear that Russian technical personnel will not be given access to the S-400, though technological support and training were part of the initial agreement with the Russian Federation.31 The Syrian conflict has become a crucial factor in Russia’s relations with Turkey. These relations have evolved from being deep in crisis to eventual cooperation in the Astana format for the de-escalation process in Syria. Despite the latter, occasional tensions have occurred between the two countries, but both sides seemed to have learned lessons from these events. 6.2

Israel

Relations between the Russian Federation and Israel go beyond the scope of routine diplomatic, political, and economic ties. They testify to a radical turn in Russia’s Middle East policy and to Moscow having clearly rejected its Soviet legacy (from 1967 until 1990 there were no diplomatic relations between the two states). The Soviet Union’s negative attitude toward Israel was shaped by two main factors: Israel’s successful fight against the USSR’s Arab allies and its constant demand that Soviet Jews be allowed to freely emigrate to Israel. By focusing international criticism on a Soviet political system that prevented the free movement of people, Israel became a serious irritant for the Soviet leadership. The restoration of diplomatic relations became possible only after ‘Perestroika,’ Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of political liberalization. From 30 “Turkey Says S-400 Purchase from Russia a ‘Done Deal,’ Cannot Be Canceled”, Reuters, 4 April 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-usa-idUSKC N1RG2MF (accessed 2 May 2020). 31 “Ankara: Rossya Lishitsya Dostupa k Turetckim S-400 [Ankara; Russia Will Be Deprived of the Access to Turkish S-400s]”, Top Correspondent, 15 May 2020 https://topcor.ru/14652-ankara-rossija-lishitsja-dostupa-k-tureckim-s400.html?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fzen.yandex.com&utm_campaign=dbr (accessed 6 May 2020).

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the very beginning, renewed bilateral relations have been based on the convergence of several political interests. Israel has fully supported the Russian Federation on a number of major issues. For example, Israel responded with understanding during Russia’s much criticized war in Chechnya in 1990s. The growth of terrorist activity in Russia also showed that terrorist groups in the Middle East and in Russia were often funded by the same sources—Islamist extremist organizations. What’s more, Russia has always valued Israel’s recognition of the crucial role the Soviet army played in the defeat of Nazism. Israel occupies a principled position that pushes back against attempts by some East European countries to revise the history of World War II. The Russian community living in Israel continues to maintain ties with relatives and friends in the Russian Federation and promote Russian culture in their adopted country. Given that dual citizenship is allowed in Israel, there are many Russian citizens in the country for whom the Russian Federation still claims responsibility. Finally, there is a certain level of chemistry between Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu, which allows the two statesmen to successfully resolve disputes and overcome crises arising between the two states. 6.3

Iran

Russia–Iran relations have been developing despite there being a number of bitter historic experiences between the two countries.32 Nevertheless, a lack of trust between the two states has not prevented them from cooperating in areas of mutual interest. As Nikolay Kozhanov fairly notes, the Russia–Iran ‘marriage of convenience’ enables the two countries to smooth out bumps, but fails to address the root problem, and only offers delay until the question is unavoidable.33 According to Anna Borshchevskaya, another significant factor driving Russia’s cooperation with Iran in the 1990s involved Russia’s insecurities about Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moscow believed Tehran was interested in expanding into these regions and was unsure what impact

32 Oleg Yegorov, “Is Russia Iran’s Ally?” RBTH, 10 January 2020, https://www.rbth. com/lifestyle/331528-russia-iran-all (accessed 10 February 2020). 33 Nikolay Kozhanov, “A Marriage of Convenience”, Russia in Global Affairs, 2016 (3). http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Brak-po-raschetu-18143 (accessed 6 May 2020).

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Iran’s increased influence would have on Russia’s sizable Muslim minorities.34 There is little doubt that developments in Central Asia and in the Caucasus instigated or supported by outside forces could have had a direct impact upon Russia’s security, but the possibility of Iran increasing its influence on Muslim population was not perceived as a threat; there are very few Shiites in Central Asia and almost none in Russia. In the South Caucasus, interethnic differences between Iran and Azerbaijan prevent the two states from meaningful cooperation. Russia could not simply ignore the policies Iran was implementing in close vicinity to Russia’s own borders, but recent history has shown that Iran’s policy has become much more balanced. In the 2000s, certain hints appeared that suggested Iran might take advantage of certain local states’ attempts to diversify their ties. For example, Mohammad Hussein Bagheri, Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, stated in November 2016 that Iran, through the development of its ports, could change the geopolitical balance in the region by destroying Russia’s monopoly on Central Asia communications with the rest of the world, saying that ‘Central Asian States demand access to international waters through Iran.’35 While both states are ready to work with each other, there remain serious limitations. Russia may be willing to save Tehran from sanctions, but it is not ready to do this at its own expense. ‘Economic issues remain the weak point of our bilateral relations,’ admitted Mehdi Sanaei, Iran’s Ambassador to Russia 2013–2019, in an interview with the daily newspaper Kommersant before his resignation. ‘This can be partly explained by the fact that both Russia and Iran export energy. In such circumstances, it’s not easy to increase trade volumes.’36 That said the current state of affairs in the Middle East makes Russia and Iran very important to one another, at least politically (as Sanaei noted, presidents Vladimir Putin and Hassan Rouhani have met 17 times

34 Anna Borshchevskaya, Russia in the Middle East: Motives, Consequences, Prospects (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016), 24. 35 “Iran’s Top General Stresses Deterrent Effects of Overseas Naval Bases”, Tashimnews, 26 November 2016, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/11/26/1250918/ iran-s-top-general-stresses-deterrent-effects-of-overseas-naval-bases (accessed 26 November 2016). 36 Kommersant, 19 December 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4198440 (accessed 12 February 2020).

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over the last six years—they certainly have had a lot to discuss).37 Pragmatism and mutual dependence appear to be factors that will determine the scope of Russia–Iran cooperation for some time to come; but politically, the countries seem to have reached peak convergence.38 6.4

Saudi Arabia

The Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the independent Saudi state, the Kingdom of the Hijaz and Najd and its Dependencies, which was renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in 1932. The two states established diplomatic relations on February 19, 1926. In 1938, due to the complicated domestic and foreign policy situation in the Soviet Union, as well as Saudi Arabia’s foreign political orientation toward the West due to the discovery of oil, the Soviet diplomatic mission in Jeddah was closed and the diplomatic relations were de facto cut off.39 In 1990, the two countries agreed to resume diplomatic relations and reopen diplomatic missions. The Russian Embassy in Riyadh has been active since May 1991, and the Consulate General in Jeddah was open in April 1991. The Saudi Embassy opened in Moscow in December 1991, and on December 30, 1991, Saudi Arabia recognized the Russian Federation as the successor to the Soviet Union.40 Russia–Saudi relations intensified in the early 2000s. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the King of Saudi Arabia, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, in Russia in October 2017. It was the first state visit to Russia by a reigning Saudi monarch and marked a new level of relations between the countries. According to the Kremlin, the leaders considered joint steps to further develop bilateral cooperation in trade, economic, investment, and cultural–humanitarian areas. Following the meeting, the two countries

37 Yegorov, “Is Russia Iran’s Ally?” 38 Nikita Smagin, “Strategic Distrust: Why Russia and Iran Can’t Be Allies?” 4 June

2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79251 (accessed 6 April 2020). 39 Vitaly Naumkin, Nesostoyavsheesya partnerstvo. Sovetskaya diplomatiya v Saudovskoi Aravii mezhdu mirovymi voinami [The Failed Partnership: Soviet Diplomacy in Saudi Arabia Between the World Wars] (Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies, 2018). 40 “Russia-Saudi Arabia Relations: Facts & Details”, Sputnik, 5 October 2017, https://sputniknews.com/world/201710051057986313-russia-saudi-arabia-relati ons-factbox/ (accessed 20 May 2020).

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launched a joint energy investment fund worth $1 billion, to include investments in natural gas projects and petrochemical plants. Saudi state oil firm Saudi Aramco signed a deal with Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and gas processing and petrochemicals company Sibur to launch joint projects in the area of oil refining. The two countries also agreed to cooperate in nuclear energy, agriculture, information technology; trade, investments, and social development. Russia considered its relations with Saudi Arabia and its membership in OPEC+ a means to influence oil prices. However, initial trust within the OPEC+ coalition, especially between Saudi Arabia and Russia, has been eroded. A serious stumbling block has been the question of how to calculate the volume of oil production cuts. Officially, the Kingdom is interested in restoring stability in the oil market, but the KSA and its allies are also ready to take a tough stance. Saudi Arabia has been seriously preparing for a long-term price war, beginning with the appointment of Abdelaziz bin Salman as Oil Minister. The price war unleashed by the KSA was perceived in Russia as primarily a political step and not justified from an economic point of view. The decision to collapse the oil market in the early Spring 2020 was made by King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). MBS has generally shown that he is not afraid of confrontation, which was also reflected in his attitude toward the extension of the OPEC+ deal in March 2020. Perhaps Russia underestimated the readiness of MBS to go to extreme ends at that time. This attitude was later echoed in the criticism directed at President Putin by Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman.41 The April 2020 OPEC+ deal could hardly be called a success for Moscow. Members of OPEC and their allies, including Russia and Mexico, announced that they had agreed to cut production by 9.7 million barrels a day in May and June, the deepest cut ever agreed to by the world’s oil producers. After that, the agreement calls for the group to steadily ramp up production until it expires in April 2022.42 Alexander 41 Zaid Sabah, “OPEC+ Meeting Delayed on New Saudi, Russia Rift”, Bloomberg, 4 April 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-04/saudi-arabia-saysputin-s-comments-on-opec-deal-is-incorrect (accessed 2 May 2020). 42 Clare Duffy and Jill Disis, “OPEC+ Reaches Deal to Cut Oil Production by 9.7 Million Barrels Per Day”, CNN , 12 April 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/12/ energy/opec-deal-production-cut/index.html (accessed 2 May 2020).

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Novak, head of the Energy Ministry, said Russia agreed to reduce its oil production by 2.5 million barrels per day in May–June. The Minister also noted that 11 million barrels per day was adopted as the base of reduction for Russia.43 If Saudi Arabia was proceeding from the idea that it could squeeze Russia out of the main oil markets, this could have had a serious negative impact upon bilateral relations.

7 The Middle East: A Window of Opportunity or a Trap for Russia? Russia’s presence in the Middle East is subject to constant challenges that stem from the policies of local actors. In trying to boost their own standing, these states are attempting to pull Moscow to their side. Under assurances of ‘friendship’ and cooperation, they in effect continue to test Russia’s readiness to protect its own interests in the region. It is well-known that the Astana format paved the way for close and fruitful cooperation among its participants—Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Later, however, the situation around these relations became far less stable. Russia was facing more difficulties in Syria with the onset of clashes between the Turkish and the Syrian military over Idlib, while at the same time, Iran was expanding its influence in Syria (politically, militarily, and economically). It actively campaigned for people in al-Assad’s circle, created its own bulwarks in the secret services and military, purchased land, and set up military production. Even though Iran is a partner of Russia, it continued to move its military facilities closer to Russia’s base in Latakia, fully aware that this would complicate the situation. The consolidation of Iran’s positions in Syria, its support of Hezbollah, and the launch of military production were major sources of irritation for Israel. Accordingly, Israel continued its raids on Iran’s facilities, demonstrating Russia’s inability to close Syria’s airspace. Deliveries of S-300 surface-to-air missile systems were only a partial solution to the problem. Russia’s relations with Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad are also not without their issues. With Russia’s assistance, he succeeded in regaining control over the greater part of Syria. However, this military success did not create any incentive for the Syrian authorities to agree to the political 43 “Novak Raskryl Usloviya Novoy Sdelki OPEK+ dlya Rossii [Novak Revealed the Conditions of the NEW OPEC+ Deal for Russia]”, RIA Novosti, 12 April 2020, https:// ria.ru/20200412/1569939115.html (accessed 30 April 2020).

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compromises on which the settlement of the conflict was based. Alexander Aksenenok, a retired Russian ambassador, pointed out that today they triumph, believing they are the victors not only in the war against ISIS, but also in general, for over the last year President Bashar al-Assad has established control over the larger part of the Syrian territory. Therefore, they are not at all prepared to discuss the transition of power or major amendments to the constitution. The big question is whether the Ba’ath Party led by Bashar al-Assad, which used to be the only ruling power in Syria, is capable of accepting in deed as well as in word a multi-party system. Will it allow democratic elections to be held under the UN observation? There are serious doubts, particularly given the arrogant conduct of the current Syrian leadership.44

Yet Russia’s performance in the Middle East can be rated as no less than impressive. Moscow has managed to establish ties with all major states and non-state actors in the area. As Mark Katz, a well-known American expert on the Middle East, said: ‘Putin has built up good relations with every Middle Eastern government and opposition movement…What is especially remarkable is that under Putin, Moscow has been able to build and maintain good relations with all these Middle Eastern actors despite their many disputes with one another.’45 Moscow has become an important political and economic player and has demonstrated its ability to be a game changer. At the regional level, the growth of Russia’s militarytechnical and economic ties with Middle East states has acquired its own dynamic, and Russian weapons and technologies are in great demand. Due to its activities in Syria, Russia has acquired strategically important military bases on the Mediterranean coast. At the same time, Russia’s presence in the Middle East has not helped it to reach all of its initial objectives. The idea of coordination with the West, and especially with the United States, in the fight against international terrorism has not been realized. Despite this, one should not discount the informal deconfliction agreement reached between the Russian and American militaries to prevent incidents, the Geneva Process, as well as 44 Aleksandr Aksenenok, “Rossiya Vinovata v Samouverennosti Damaska [Russia Is to Blame for Damascus’s Self-Assurance]”, Kommersant, December 26, 2018 https://www. kommersant.ru/doc/3843268 (accessed 5 April 2019). 45 Mark Katz, “Not Getting Any Easier: Putin’s Middle East Balancing Act”, CAP Paper N212, January 2019, 13.

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the many meetings and discussions held. The fact that the West was very reluctant to have Russia on board limited the opportunities for cooperation in Syria. Regardless, Russia’s interaction with Italy and France in the Libyan conflict has been perceived as a positive development. Russia is committed to implementation of the agreements laid out in the final documents of the Berlin Conference on Libya, as approved by the UN Security Council. Moscow’s efforts even helped to make the conference more inclusive; according to Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, Moscow was very active ‘when this conference was announced and preparations began (it took four or five rounds of negotiation), no one was planning to invite Libya’s neighbors or the Libyan parties to Berlin. It was the Russian Federation that contacted the organisers—our German partners—and insisted that Libya’s neighbors also receive an invitation.’46 The ‘deal of the century’ made public by the US President at the end of January 2020 has become a challenge of sorts to Russia given its decades long support for the Palestinian cause. Moscow has been consistent in its commitment to the principle of ‘two states for two peoples,’ has facilitated contacts among various factions of the Palestinians, and has actively participated in international negotiations formats—but in the absence of collective peace efforts, Russia may not be able to fully meet the Palestinians’ expectations. An objective assessment of Russia’s policy in this area supports the conclusion that all factors and trends have been considered. Any attempt to evaluate Russia’s positions in the region must pursue a balanced approach. Further, ‘the idea that Russia is a new regional superpower, acting as it pleases in the region, and dictating terms of engagement to all regional players is as false as the previously widespread belief that Russia was an irrelevant player, driving at full speed into a quagmire. The truth is somewhere in between.’47

46 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at a Joint News Conference Following Talks with Foreign Minister of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria Sabri Boukadoum, Moscow, July 22, 2020”, https://www.mid.ru/en_GB/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_pub lisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4252080 (accessed 25 July 2020). 47 Nicu Popescu and Secrieru Stanislav, “Russia in the Middle East—From Surge to Quagmire?” Chaillot Paper N146, July 2018, 109.

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Russian politicians and academics believe that the country’s initial success in the Middle East should be converted into a new strategy that entails a positive and dynamic agenda. Sergey Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the National Research University Higher School of Economics and Honorary Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and his colleagues, presented a joint report on new ideas for Russia’s foreign policy in January 2020. The authors fairly point out that a significant resource can be tapped and an urgent need addressed by implementing a more modern and active policy of peace or peace-saving (new language is needed for a new era). They state that such a policy should combine strong deterrence with a rejection of direct threats, and be promoted by the slogan ‘Russia is the main provider of peace, a defender of sovereignty and freedom of choice for all countries and civilizations, a guarantor of a new non-aligned movement and the prevention of hegemonism.’48 Only time will tell how good these ideas are for the Middle East, but paradoxically, they are a result of Russia’s policy in a region where it is offering protection, partnership, and security. Such pragmatism, which is typical of present-day Russia, has allowed it to take advantage of the current political situation in the Middle East. Whether the Middle East will try to take advantage of Russia remains to be seen.

48 Sergei Karaganov and Dmitri Suslov, Zashchita mira, zemli, svobody vybora dlya vsekh stran: Novye idei dlya vneshnei politiki Rossii [Protection of Peace, Land, Freedom of Choice for All Countries: New Ideas for Russia’s Foreign Policy] (Moscow: HSE, 2020), 12.

CHAPTER 4

Russian Foreign Policy in the Gulf: A Quest for Regional Partnerships and Opportunities Nikolay Surkov

Post-Soviet Russia has a long record of attempts to build cooperation with the GCC. In the 1990s, Moscow was focused on developing economic and defense ties with the Gulf countries, as they were seen as promising investors and potential importers of Russian weapons. When the conflict in Chechnya started, it also became important for Russia to make sure that the Gulf states did not provide financial support for the separatists in the North Caucasus. However, in the 1990s the internal disputes, ailing economy and weak military did not make Russia an attractive partner for the Gulf. In the 2000s, Russia’s activity in the Middle East began to increase. Moscow engaged in the Palestinian-Israeli settlement, the Iraqi crisis, and the Iranian nuclear issue. All these issues required constant interaction with the Gulf states. Economic interests and cooperation in the world energy markets were also on the agenda. During this decade,

N. Surkov (B) Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_4

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the UAE was seen as the main Russia’s partner among the Gulf states. Moscow was willing to offer the GCC its defense industry products and technologies, to establish closer cooperation in terms of oil and gas prices, and to mediate between the Gulf countries and Iran. The cautious rapprochement was interrupted by the events of 2011. After the Arab Spring broke out, Russia’s relations with the Gulf countries went through two stages. At the first stage, 2011–2016, a nearconfrontation arose, since Moscow believed that certain Gulf countries provided support for numerous armed Islamist groups in Syria. Though even then Russia was looking for ways to cooperate with the regional players on the Syrian issue, e.g., through the Geneva process. The Gulf states support was needed to bring the opposition to the negotiating table. At the second stage, 2016–2019, the interests of Russia and the Gulf began to coincide. Both parties were interested in restoring stability in the Middle East in general and in Syria in particular. Increasing mutual appeal resulted in intensive diplomatic contacts between Russia and the Gulf monarchies. There were also promises on behalf of various Gulf states to expand trade and investment cooperation which were seen in Moscow as an attempt to draw it out of presumed ‘pro-Iranian camp.’ The actual economic outcome of this activity turned out to be very humble, but Russia is still optimistic about the future of cooperation with the GCC. Frustrated by the EU’s insistence on political transition as precondition to financial assistance Moscow started to look upon the Gulf countries as the key partners in rebuilding Syria after the conflict and bringing Damascus back to the regional stage. Russia is also willing to emphasize its new positive, peacemaking role in the Middle East by taking a more active stance toward the Iran-GCC stand-off.

1

Introduction

Russia’s global strategy under Vladimir Putin is strongly focused on establishing ties with the potential great powers of the emerging multipolar world. Russia also shows signs of a renewed interest in the Middle East, which has dictated a search for regional partners. Though since 2015 Russia’s main efforts have been focused on the Levant, Moscow is also seeking partners in the Gulf. This chapter examines the Russian policy toward the GCC states with a special emphasis on Russia’s interests and motivations.

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Existing literature on the current Russia’s policy toward the Gulf includes surprisingly few publications in English or Russian. Among the fairly recent publications is an article by Katerina Oskarsson and Steve A. Yetiv, ‘Russia and the Persian Gulf: Trade, Energy, and Interdependence,’1 which deals primarily with economic issues. Some Russian researchers study either the GCC as a whole or focus on bilateral relations with specific countries; these include E. C. Melkumyan, G. G. Kosach,2 T. B. Nosenko,3 L. V. Shkvarya,4 and M. M. Kourbanov.5 These researchers mainly concentrate on the Gulf states’ policy toward Russia. In this chapter, we will first offer a quick assessment of the dynamics of Russia–GCC relations, then focus on the issues that motivate the Kremlin to seek political and economic partners in the Persian Gulf, and conclude by examining the shared strategic interests that could become drivers for rapprochement between Russia and the GCC.

2

Brief Overview of the History of Relations

The USSR viewed Gulf monarchies as hostile, conservative pro-Western states, and relied on Iraq as its main partner country in the Gulf, since Baghdad formally adhered to a socialist orientation. However, there were 1 K. Oskarsson and S.A. Yetiv, “Russia and the Persian Gulf: Trade, Energy, and Interdependence,” Middle East Journal 67(3) (2020): 381–403, https://doi.org/10.3751/ 67.3.13. 2 G. Kosach and E. Melkumyan, “Possibilities of a Strategic Relationship Between Russia and Saudi Arabia,” Russian International Affairs Council, August 31, 2016, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/policybriefs/vozmozhnosti-dlya-strategiches kikh-otnosheniy-rossii-i-saudo/ (In Russian). 3 E. Melkumyan, G. Kosach, and T. Nosenko, “Rossiya vo vneshnepoliticheskikh prioritetakh Soveta sotrudnichestva arabskikh gosudarstv Zaliva posle sobytiy arabskoy vesny” [Russia in the Foreign Policy Priorities of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf After the Events of the Arab Spring], MGIMO Review of International Relations 4 (2017): 139–153. https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2017-4-55-139-153 (In Russian). 4 L. Shkvarya and D. Makarevich, “Vozmozhnosti i ogranicheniya razvitiya torgovoekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva Rossii so stranami Persidskogo zaliva v usloviyakh sanktsiy” [Opportunities and Limitations of Development of Trade-Economic Cooperation of Russia with the Countries of the Persian Gulf Under Sanctions], Ekonomika i Predprinimatelstvo [Economy and Entrepreneurship] 12–1(77) (2016): 183–186 (In Russian). 5 M. Kourbanov, “Torgovo-ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo Rossii i stran Persidskogo zaliva” [Trade and Economic Cooperation Between Russia and Persian Gulf Countries], Modernizacia, Innovacia, Razvitie 2(3(7)) (2016): 119–121 (In Russian).

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exceptions among the Gulf states. For instance, Kuwait established diplomatic relations with Moscow as early as 1963 while trying to diversify its foreign policy ties. There was an excuse for such a step—both countries had similar approach to various international problems—primarily the Palestinian issue, since the USSR and Kuwait both supported the Palestinians in their quest for a fair settlement of the conflict and the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine. Later, Kuwait contributed to the development of contacts between the USSR and other Gulf states. Kuwaiti efforts led Oman to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1985; an exchange of diplomatic missions between the USSR and the UAE in 1986; and diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and Qatar in 1988. The end of the Cold War reduced the ideological component of the Soviet foreign policy. Thus, Russia was no longer treated in the Gulf as an atheist, Communist state looking for ways to promote its revolutionary agenda. That development created favorable conditions for the further development of relations between Moscow and the Gulf monarchies. During the Kuwait crisis of 1990–1991, Moscow condemned Iraqi aggression and supported the international coalition. The USSR also froze arms deliveries to Iraq, despite its obligations under the agreement of friendship and cooperation signed in 1982. This step facilitated the establishment of contacts with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which promised financial support to the cash-strapped Soviet leadership. In May 1991, a Soviet embassy opened in Riyadh, and in the same year, Saudi Arabia provided the USSR with a $250 million loan.6 After the crisis, Russia received a $2 billion loan from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, with $750 million of this amount coming from Saudi Arabia.7 In the 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia was suffering from a severe economic crisis, caused by its rapid shift to the free market economy. This caused Moscow to be primarily interested in the financial resources of the Gulf states. Russia regarded these countries as a source of investment and a major market for arms sales. In 1991, 61% of deliveries of arms and military equipment by the former Soviet Union went to the 6 Political Relations, May 15, 2020, https://riyadh.mid.ru/ru/countries/bilateral-relati ons/political-relations/. 7 E. Melkumyan, “SSAGPZ v globalnykh i regionalnykh protsessakh” [GCC in Global and Regional Processes] (Moscow: Institute for the Study of Israel and Middle East, Institute of Oriental Studies, 1999), 115, http://book.iimes.su/?p=4564 (In Russian).

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Middle East.8 In 1992–1993, Gulf countries accounted for more than half of Russia’s official contacts with the Arab world. However, despite high diplomatic activity, trade and investment stalled. Procurements of Russian arms by the Gulf states were also much smaller than expected. In the middle of the decade, Russia–Gulf relations became strained due to political controversies.9 In December 1994, Saudi Arabia openly supported the separatists in Chechnya and called for international recognition of its independence,10 which became a serious obstacle to the development of Russian–Saudi relations. In January 1995, Russia summoned the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan to complain about alleged recruitment and financing of Muslim ‘mercenaries’ to fight the Russian army in Chechnya.11 An attempt by Saudi Arabia to initiate discussion of the Chechen issue at the UN in July 1995 was regarded by Moscow as interference in Russia’s internal affairs and a violation of its territorial integrity. The Saudi program of charitable assistance to Chechnya in 1995– 98, which was carried out without proper coordination with the Russian authorities and mostly benefitted the separatists, caused great distrust.12 In 1999, Russian media published an intelligence report that accused the Saudis of providing financial support to armed groups in Chechnya through Islamic charities.13 Further, Russian authorities claimed that

8 I. Anthony, Russia and the Arms Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 82, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI98An/SIPRI98An.pdf. 9 A. Aksenenok and O. Mahmood, “Russia—GCC Relations After the Signing of the JCPOA with Iran”, Russian International Affairs Council, March 15, 2017, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/Russia-GCC-Rel ations-After-the-Signing-of-the-JCPOA/. 10 “Chechnya (mezhdunarodnaya reaktsiya)” [Chechnya (international reaction)], Kommersant, №240 December 17, 1994, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/98077 (In Russian). 11 Russia Calls Muslim Ambassadors to Complain About Mercenaries, January 5, 1995,

https://apnews.com/5fc8073ec6e339707b9bf0f46fcdb126. 12 G.G. Kosach, E.S. Melkumyan, and A.O. Filonik, Russian-Saudian Political Interaction. MGIMO Review of International Relations 4(55) (2017): 127–138, https://doi. org/10.24833/2071-8160-2017-4-55-127-138 (In Russian). 13 “Den’gi yedut na voynu” [Money Goes to War], Kommersant-Vlast, №44 (9 November 1999): 28, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/16149 (In Russian).

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certain militant groups were headed by Saudi subjects.14 However, Moscow welcomed the reluctance of the Gulf countries to recognize the independence of Chechnya, despite the persistent requests of Chechen leadership in 1997–99.15 Another source of political tension was the position of the Gulf countries regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, where Saudi Arabia and its allies supported the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina,16 while Russia was more supportive of the Orthodox Christian Serb population.17 By the end of the 1990s, it became obvious that the Gulf states were not interested in trade or investment cooperation with Russia; furthermore, Russian officials viewed some of them as a source of covert support for separatists and extremists in the Caucasus. As a result, the Gulf was not among Russia’s foreign policy priorities. In 2000, the Russian Federation published its first Foreign Policy Concept, which prioritized development of relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet republics) and the West, while the Middle East was listed among the regions of secondary importance with Africa and Latin America. According to the Concept, the main objective of the Russian policy in the Middle East was ‘to achieve stabilization of the situation’ in the whole region, including ‘the Gulf zone.’ Russia intended to pursue a pragmatic policy in the region, aimed at ‘restoring and strengthening its position, especially economic, in this rich and important for our interests region.’18 Thus, priority was given to the economy. Initially, Moscow decided to focus on improving relations with smaller Gulf states, which seemed more

14 “Nayti i unichtozhit: kak spetssluzhby Rossii likvidirovali glavarey boyevikov” [Search and Destroy: How the Russian Special Services Liquidated the Leaders of the Militants], RIA Novosti, 16 June 2017, https://ria.ru/20170616/1496686613.html (In Russian). 15 A. Malashenko and D. Trenin, Vremya Yuga: Rossiya v Chechne, Chechnya v Rossii [The Time of the South: Russia in Chechnya, Chechnya in Russia] (Moscow: Gandalf, 2002), 209–210, http://library.khpg.org/files/docs/1398684640.pdf (In Russian). 16 G.N. Bardos, “Arabia Moves to Bosnia: The implications of the MiddleEastern influx into Central Bosnia,” American Center for Democracy, 30 November, 2016, http://acdemocracy.org/arabia-moves-to-bosnia-the-implications-of-the-middle-eas tern-influx-into-central-bosnia/. 17 R. Cohen, “U.S. Clashes with Russia over Bosnia,” The New York Times, May 18, 1994, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/18/world/us-clashes-with-russia-over-bosnia. html. 18 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Retrieved May 15, 2020, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm.

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enthusiastic about dealing with Russia. In 2000, President Putin sent a special representative to the leaders of Bahrain and Qatar with messages stating Moscow’s interest in broader cooperation. Russia began to increase its diplomatic activity in the Middle East and in the Gulf with a focus on the negotiated solution of the Iraqi WMD issue. In 2001, Moscow launched its first initiative aimed at normalizing relations between Iraq and the neighboring states. Russia proposed the creation of a ‘zone of peace and stability’ free of weapons of mass destruction in the Gulf19 and proposed a system of international agreements that would enhance mutual trust and guarantee non-interference in each other’s internal affairs among the countries of the region, as well as limit the growth of their military potential. Increased diplomatic activity sparked renewed interest in Russia among the Gulf monarchies, which fostered development of bilateral relations. In 2002–2003, a new stage of Russia–Saudi relations began, and diplomatic contacts intensified. In Moscow, this was widely perceived as the result of Riyadh’s interest in diversifying its foreign ties due to the deterioration of relations with the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.20 Other Russian researchers tend to view this growing enthusiasm as a recognition of a greater role that Moscow began to play in the international relations.21 As high-ranking Russian diplomat Oleg Ozerov puts it, ‘The most visible progress in Russian-Saudi relations began in the new millennium. This was facilitated by the serious changes that took place in the

19 “ZAYAVLENIYE MID ROSSII PO VOPROSU OB UREGULIROVANII SITUATSII VOKRUG IRAKA” [Statement of the MFA of Russia on the Question of the Settlement of the Situation Around Iraq], April 3, 2001, https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/ iq/-/asset_publisher/WizNA2SGNvS5/content/id/586446 (In Russian). 20 A. Neimatov, “Analiz sovremennykh rossiysko-saudovskikh otnosheniy” [Analysis of Contemporary Russian-Saudi Relations], MGIMO Review of International Relations № 4 (2011): 268–273, 268, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/analiz-sovremennyh-rossiyskosaudovskih-otnosheniy/viewer (In Russian). 21 E. Melkumyan, “Saudovsko-rossiyskiye otnosheniya v kontekste global’nykh izme-

neniy v sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy” [Saudi-Russian Relations in the Context of Global Changes in the System of International Relations], Vestnik Rossiyskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seriya: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1 (2006): 56– 61, 57, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/saudovsko-rossiyskie-otnosheniya-v-konteksteglobalnyh-izmeneniy-v-sisteme-mezhdunarodnyh-otnosheniy (In Russian).

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international arena - the emergence of common challenges and threats, to which common answers had to be sought.’22 Preliminary negotiations were conducted at the foreign minister level, and in 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah visited Moscow. The main issue for discussion was cooperation on counterterrorism and the financing of extremist groups, though Riyadh earlier revised its position on the Chechen issue.23 In an interview with the Russian media, Prince Abdullah said that Chechnya was an internal affair of Russia. The economic agenda included discussion of energy cooperation and high tech. During the visit of Crown Prince Abdullah, the first agreement on oil and gas cooperation was signed, which laid a foundation for the coordination of oil policy between the two countries.24 In 2004, Russia proposed a new collective security initiative for the Gulf, which centered around the stabilization of post-Saddam Iraq. The Iranian nuclear issue contributed to a further increase of interest in cooperation with Russia among the Gulf countries. Moscow became one of the principal international mediators negotiating with Iran, and in June 2007, the Russian security concept for the Gulf was revised, with a new emphasis on the Iranian issue.25 Moscow promoted the transformation of the Gulf region into a nuclear-free zone. Russian researchers assume that the Gulf states welcomed this initiative because they were interested in cooperation with Russia as a permanent member of the UN Security

22 O. Ozerov, “Rossiya i Saudovskaya Araviya: 20 let novykh otnosheniy” [Russia and Saudi Arabia: 20 Years of New Relations], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn [The International Affairs], 11 (2010): 25–37, https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/347 (In Russian). 23 “Sostoyalis peregovory Prezidenta Rossii s Naslednym printsem Korolevstva Saudovskaya Araviya Abdalloy ben Abdelem Azizom Al Saudom” [Talks Between the President of Russia and the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Abdullah bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud], September 2, 2003, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/29294 (In Russian). 24 Ibid. 25 A. Zasypkin, “Bezopasnost v Persidskom zalive” [Security in the Persian Gulf], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn [The International Affairs] 1 (2009): 1–11, https://interaffairs.ru/jau thor/material/94 (In Russian).

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Council.26 At the same time, the GCC states did not support the idea of including Iran in the regional security architecture. In 2007, President Putin visited the Gulf. This was the first-ever visit of a Russian head of state to the Gulf, and it was intended to bring bilateral relations to a new level. Before the tour, Putin told media that Russia was primarily interested in the financial resources of the Arab monarchies and viewed them as potential investors in the resurgent Russian economy. He reiterated that the goal of his trip was to find ways to develop relations in the economic sphere.27 He was warmly welcomed in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, but there was no breakthrough in Russia–Saudi relations, although Russian media and experts later mentioned the potential for major arms sales.28 In 2008, the GCC and Russia initiated the process of establishing a strategic dialogue. In November 2011, a memorandum of understanding was signed, providing for regular consultations between the member states of the Council and the Russian Federation. This positive trend was interrupted in 2011 by the Syrian crisis, which had a negative impact on Russia’s relations with the Gulf countries, since Moscow supported the Syrian government and cooperated with Iran. However, after the beginning of a Russian military operation in Syria in 2015, GCC contacts with Russia again intensified. The unexpected success of the Russian air campaign in Syria created a new reality. The leadership of the GCC states saw the increased role of Russia in the Syrian conflict and tried to influence the policy of Moscow. In 2015 and the first half of 2016, the leaders of Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain visited Russia. Visits by foreign ministers and other senior officials also took place. During talks, the main issue was the peace settlement in Syria. Despite the differences in their approaches Russia and the GCC found some common ground; for example, both sides 26 E.C. Melkumyan, G.G. Kosach, and T.B. Nosenko, Russia in the Foreign Policy Priorities of the Council of Cooperation of the Arabian Gulf States After Events of the «ARAB SPRING». MGIMO Review of International Relations 4(55) (2017): 139–153, 142 https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2017-4-55-139-153 (In Russian). 27 “Interv’yu mezharabskomu sputnikovomu telekanalu Al-Dzhazira” [Interview for AlJazeera Satellite TV Channel], February 10, 2007, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/presid ent/transcripts/24035 (In Russian). 28 N. Kalinina, “MILITARIZATSIYA BLIZHNEGO VOSTOKA: ROL ROSSII” [Militarization of the Middle East: The Role of Russia], 11 (203), vol. 12. November 2013, https://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/12/13841567450.pdf (In Russian).

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considered the communiqué signed during the Geneva-1 conference in June 2012 to be the framework of the Syrian settlement.29 The pragmatic position of Russia regarding the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen also contributed to the improvement of relations with the GCC. Moscow did not criticize this operation, although it advocated for a diplomatic solution. Russia did not veto UN Security Council resolution 2216, which condemned the Houthis and confirmed the legitimacy of President Hadi.30 In May 2016, the fourth meeting of the Russia–GCC Ministerial Strategic Dialogue was held in Moscow. In the final statement, both parties confirmed their determination to ‘strengthen and develop friendship and cooperation in the framework of the strategic dialogue.’31 The parties agreed to continue work to achieve further coordination of policies on international and regional problems, as well as to expand cooperation in the business and humanitarian spheres. The bilateral cooperation also included counterterrorism, nuclear control, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. After 2016, meetings in the framework of the Russia–GCC dialogue were suspended due to the beginning of a Qatar blockade by the Saudi

29 “Vystupleniye i otvety na voprosy SMI Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova v khode sovmestnoy press-konferentsii s pervym zamestitelem Predsedatelya Soveta ministrov, Ministrom inostrannykh del Kuveyta sheykhom S. As-Sabakhom i Generalnym sekretarem Soveta sotrudnichestva arabskikh gosudarstv Persidskogo zaliva A.L. Az-Zayyani po itogam tret’yego ministerskogo raunda strategicheskogo dialoga RossiyaSSAGPZ, g.El’-Kuveyt, 19 fevralya 2014 goda” [Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions During a Joint Press Conference with First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait Sheikh S. Al-Sabah and Secretary General of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf A.L. Az-Zayani Following the Results of the Third Ministerial Round of the Russia-GCC Strategic Dialogue, Kuwait City, February 19, 2014], https://www.mid.ru/ru/sovet-sotrudnicestva-arabskih-gosudarstv-persidskogo-zal iva-ssagpz-/-/asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/75670 (In Russian). 30 “Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian Federation Abstaining”, April 14, 2015, https://www.un.org/press/ en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm. 31 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at a

Joint News Conference with Saudi Foreign Minister and GCC Chair Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir Following the Fourth Ministerial Round of the Russia-GCC Strategic Dialogue, Moscow, May 26, 2016”, https://www.mid.ru/en/sovet-sotrudnicestva-arabskih-gos udarstv-persidskogo-zaliva-ssagpz-/-/asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/229 2674.

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and Emirati-led coalition in 2017. This made it impossible to gather all GCC members together. However, bilateral contacts continued. In March 2019, Sergey Lavrov toured the Gulf countries, visiting Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE. The Syrian issue became the main theme of negotiations during these meetings. Later, Lavrov pointed out that Russian position on Syrian settlement coincided with the positions of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states; both sides support counterterrorism efforts, creating conditions for refugee return and political transition through the mechanism of the Constitutional Committee.32 By 2020, Russia was looking at the Gulf monarchies as potential partners to solve the Syrian conundrum and expected to use their influence on the opposition forces.33

3

Current Russian Interests in the Gulf

Russia is seeking to develop cooperation with the Gulf countries on a very broad scale—not only economically, which was an initial goal in the 1990s, but also in the political, military, and even cultural domains. Strategic dialogue with the GCC is listed among Russia’s priorities in the current edition of the Foreign Policy Concept published in 2016. That document also states that ‘Russia intends to further expand bilateral relations with the states in the Middle East and North Africa.’ In it, Moscow declares its readiness to contribute to the stabilization of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa and to support ‘collective efforts aimed at neutralizing threats that emanate from international terrorist groups.’34

32 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions During a Joint News Conference Following Talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the State of Kuwait Sabah Al-Khalid Al-Sabah, Kuwait City, March 6, 2019,” https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/confli cts/-/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/content/id/3560767. 33 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions During the 56th Munich Security Conference, Global Disorder—Other Opportunities for a New Agenda, Munich, February 15, 2020,” https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_p olicy/international_safety/conflicts/-/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/content/id/404 3519. 34 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (Approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016),” https://www.mid.ru/en/ foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/254 2248.

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Moscow’s cooperation with the Gulf countries serves several purposes: to increase the prestige of Russia as a global power by showing that it has influence and respect in the Gulf; to enhance Russia’s national security through conflict prevention, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism; to develop trade and investment cooperation; and to develop relations with the Islamic world. Most importantly, Russia is not trying to challenge the dominance of Western countries in the Gulf, because it does not have the financial or military resources for this goal. Nonetheless, Moscow senses growing interest among the Gulf countries, caused by the increased risk of a major conflict and gradual reduction of the US presence. This is perceived by the Kremlin as a window of opportunity for establishing a closer relationship with the Gulf states. However, the leadership in Moscow realizes that strong political relations with the Gulf countries need a solid foundation, so another task is now set—to lay such a foundation by developing economic, scientific, and cultural ties. According to Russian officials, this could be achieved through an increase in trade and the development of joint projects in various fields. The use of soft power is being considered; Russia’s soft power tools include public diplomacy and cultural ties; participation in strengthening of the regional security and active mediation; development of investment and technological cooperation; shaping of positive public opinion; and a search for partners among local elites. Work is underway to facilitate travel between Russia and the GCC countries and ease visa requirements, which is expected to contribute to the further intensification of business exchanges and the development of tourism, cultural, and people-to-people ties. 3.1

Russia’s Economic Interests in the Gulf

Though Russia’s trade with the Gulf countries grew over the past two decades, in 2019, their share in Russia’s foreign trade was only 0.67%. According to the Russian Export Center, total trade between the GCC and Russia amounted to only $4425.6 million.35 The largest trade partners were the UAE ($1835 million), Saudi Arabia ($1667 million), and Kuwait ($554 million), and with Russia’s trade volume with the rest 35 “Rossiyskiy eksportnyy tsentr: Blizhniy Vostok” [Russian Export Center: Middle East], https://www.exportcenter.ru/international_markets/world_map/Arabia/ (In Russian).

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of the GCC did not exceed $500 million. Although the trade balance with the Gulf countries is always in Russia’s favor, they can hardly be considered valuable partners, since they primarily buy low-value-added goods—mainly raw materials, chemical products and agricultural products (though the share of manufactured products does increase in some years, which experts attribute to the sales of arms and military equipment). The volume of trade is highly dependent on the political situation. There was a strong downturn after the United States’ imposition of sanctions on Russia in 2014, which took five years to overcome. Small trade volumes do not mean that Russia has no economic interests in the Gulf. Since oil and gas make up approximately 60% of Russia’s exports,36 close cooperation with the Gulf countries in maintaining stable prices for these commodities is of great importance to Moscow. Russian companies are also interested in joint oil and gas production projects. For example, during a visit to the UAE in October 2019, President Putin mentioned the joint venture of Gazprom Neft and Mubadala Petroleum, which is developing fields in the Tomsk and Omsk regions of Russia. He also said that Lukoil had begun working with the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and had received a concession for the development of offshore oil and gas in the UAE.37 The most promising areas for cooperation between Russia and the Gulf countries could be oil refining; production of equipment for the petrochemical industry; nuclear, solar, and wind power generation; energy saving; aircraft and mechanical engineering; electric industry; and construction. New opportunities are opening up in digital technologies, telecommunications, logistics, transport, finance, and banking. For example, the Russian Direct Investment Fund and the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia were considering projects in manufacturing, energy,

36 “Federalnaya tamozhennaya sluzhba Rossii: import-eksport vazhneyshikh tovarov za yanvar-mart 2020 goda” [Federal Customs Service of Russia: Import-Export of the Most Important Goods in January-March 2020], http://customs.ru/press/federal/document/ 238135 (In Russian). 37 “Vstrecha s predstavitelyami delovykh krugov Rossii i OAE” [Meeting with Representatives of Business Circles of Russia and the UAE], October 15, 2019, http://www. kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61819 (In Russian).

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agriculture, infrastructure, transport, natural resources, and cutting-edge technology.38 The Gulf region is considered to be one of the most attractive potential markets for Russian agricultural products. The food security of a number of Middle East states is becoming increasingly dependent on Russian supplies, primarily due to the growing exports of Russian grain. At least six Middle Eastern countries are major importers of grain from Russia: United Arab Emirates, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Yemen, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the main importer of Russian barley; as of the 2017–2018 marketing season, barley export from Russia to Saudi Arabia exceeded 2.7 million tons. President Putin has said Russia is ready to provide the UAE with a steady supply of halal meat and grain.39 In addition to grain, Russia may also become a supplier of critical (e.g., nuclear) technologies. After the success of the Iranian nuclear program, many countries of the Middle East are considering development of their own potential in this area for reasons of prestige. In addition, nuclear power plants can become an important element of energy security and reduce dependence on hydrocarbons. Russian state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, is actively promoting its products in the region. In 2019, the head of the corporation, Alexei Likhachev, told Russian media that the Gulf countries were interested in creating floating nuclear power plants.40 3.2

Political Interests

The Gulf is one of the most significant regions of the world for Russia’s long-term interests. Russian leadership believes that the Gulf will play an important role at the geopolitical, economic, energy, and even civilizational levels in the emerging multipolar world. Consequently, the global influence of Russia depends on successful interaction with this region. 38 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview with the Asharq Al-Awsat pan-Arab Daily, October 3, 2019, https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/sa/-/asset_publisher/8mh fuWloeKqd/content/id/3829601. 39 “Vstrecha s predstavitelyami delovykh krugov Rossii i OAE” [Meeting with Representatives of Business Circles of Russia and the UAE], October 15, 2019, http://www. kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61819 (In Russian). 40 “Rosatom vedet peregovory po proyektu plavuchey AES so stranami raznykh regionov mira” [Rosatom Is Negotiating a Floating Nuclear Power Plant Project with Countries from Different Regions of the World], January 12, 2019, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/ 5992264?amp (In Russian).

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Even in 2002, Russian diplomats stressed that the GCC states possessed great financial, economic, and energy potential and enjoyed influence in both regional and world politics.41 Currently, the Russian leadership sees a window of opportunity to strengthen Moscow’s influence in the Gulf region. The Kremlin expects to use the disappointment of the Arabs with the United States’ Middle East policy, a consequence of the Iraqi invasion of 2003 and further unsuccessful attempts to contain Iranian expansion. As former highranking diplomat Alexander Aksenenok puts it, ‘diminishing confidence in the United States’ willingness to be the regional security provider has caused the GCC states to reach out to Russia, both as a diversification strategy, and with the hope that Russia might play a moderating role with respect to Iran.’42 Russian officials use every opportunity to publicly point out that current tensions in the Gulf are being ‘escalated artificially.’43 As head of the International Affairs Department of the Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly, Andrei Baklanov puts it in his op-ed for the Valdai Club, ‘the Americans are consistently aggravating the situation in the Gulf. The basis of their line of argument is the desire to maintain the current level of military supplies to the region, which amount to approximately 65% of total arms purchases by the Gulf countries. By virtue of this, Washington is torpedoing initiatives aimed to unblock conflicts and crises in the sub-region.’44 Russian observers assume that the Arabs see the shift of America’s attention toward the Asia-Pacific region and its declining interest in the Middle East. Under these circumstances, the Arab monarchies are

41 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Meets with Gulf Cooperation Council Secretary General Abdul Atiah, November 6, 2002, https://www.mid.ru/en/ sovet-sotrudnicestva-arabskih-gosudarstv-persidskogo-zaliva-ssagpz-/-/asset_publisher/ 0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/540520. 42 A. Aksenenok and O. Mahmood, “Russia—GCC Relations After the Signing of the JCPOA with Iran”, Russian International Affairs Council, March 15, 2017, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/Russia-GCC-Rel ations-After-the-Signing-of-the-JCPOA/. 43 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Greetings to the Organisers and Participants in the Conference the Middle East in a Time of Change: Towards New Stability Architecture, February 17, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/ asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4046745. 44 A. Baklanov, “Intensification of Tension in the Persian Gulf,” September 30, 2019, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/intensification-of-tension-in-the-gulf/.

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supposed to be looking for alternative partners that can become security providers or help maintain stability in the Gulf. The major European countries, Turkey, China, and Russia are considered possible alternatives. Russia is also concerned that terrorists and radicals will fill the vacuum that emerges in the Middle East as the US presence there decreases. Moscow believes that the irresponsible policy of the United States after 2003 has destabilized the Middle East, including the Gulf zone. The position of the Russian leadership was outlined by President Vladimir Putin in his speech at the UN General Assembly in 2015: ‘It is already obvious that the power vacuum that emerged in a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa led to the formation of zones of anarchy, which were immediately filled with extremists and terrorists […] Tens of thousands of militants are already fighting under the banners of the socalled Islamic State, including former Iraqi servicemen who were thrown into the streets as a result of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.’45 Thus, in the opinion of the Russian leadership, the United States has destabilized the Middle East, and now intends to gradually abandon it. At the same time, rivalries between Iran and the Gulf states strengthen demand for allies or mediators. This situation is perceived as a chance to raise the prestige and regional influence of Russia because it can provide military assistance or supply weapons when needed. In addition, the Kremlin is ready to increase its diplomatic activity and mediate between Iran and its Arab neighbors. This readiness is repeatedly stressed by the Russian officials. For instance, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, special presidential envoy for the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov said in 2017, ‘We have always told our partners in Saudi Arabia and in Iran that we are ready to provide both a platform for contacts and to act as a facilitator…, because a lot depends on their mutual understanding, and, hopefully, cooperation.’46

45 “Putin: vakuum vlasti na Blizhnem Vostoke zapolnili terroristy” [Putin: Terrorists Filled the Power Vacuum in the Middle East], RIA Novosti, September 28, 2015, https:// ria.ru/20150928/1288399408.html (In Russian). 46 “Rossiya gotova stat posrednikom v peregovorakh Irana i Saudovskoy Aravii” [Russia Is Ready to Mediate the Talks Between Iran and Saudi Arabia], RIA Novosti, October 11, 2010, https://ria.ru/20171011/1506617545.html (In Russian).

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National Security, Counterterrorism, and Islamic Dimension of Russia–GCC Ties

In the 1990s, Russian authorities were concerned with the growing activity of various non-government charitable organizations and large international pan-Islamic organizations, many of which were based in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. These organizations often ignored official Russian Muslim structures, and even violated Russian legislation. This concern was strengthened by the separatism that existed in some Muslim regions, especially in the North Caucasus. The war in Chechnya, which began in 1994, provoked criticism by Muslim countries and international organizations. Russia gained a reputation as a country where Muslims were persecuted and discriminated. Simultaneously, the Russian public and the political establishment were convinced that Muslim charitable foundations contributed to the spread of Islamic radicalism in Russia. By the end of the 1990s, Moscow set the goal of improving relations with the Muslim world. The Gulf was perceived by Russia as a bridge to the Muslim world, since Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries had considerable influence in the Organization of Islamic Conference and the World Islamic League. The Saudi authorities took Russian concerns into account and began to establish cooperation with official Muslim structures in Russia. However, the problem of private sponsorship of extremist groups remained, which became one of the priorities of the counterterrorism agenda in Russia–GCC interactions. With Saudi support, Russia was able to join the Organization of Islamic Conference as an observer in 2005. Broader cooperation with the global Muslim community was viewed by Moscow as a tool to ‘[build] a safe world and [solve] a number of international and regional problems.’47 Russian officials paid special attention to the issue of countering terrorism and the settlement of conflicts that foster it.48

47 “Alexander Yakovenko, the Spokesman of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers Russian Media Questions Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to Yemen and His Participation in the 32nd OIC Foreign Ministers Conference,” June 29, 2005, https://www.mid.ru/en/organizacia-islamskogo-sotrudnic estva-ois-/-/asset_publisher/km9HkaXMTium/content/id/434094. 48 “Statement by Alexander Yakovenko, the Spokesman of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regarding Announcement of Granting to Russia of Observer Status in OIC,” July

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Although Russia has no common border with any of the Gulf countries, it is widely believed that these states have a strong influence in a number of Central Asian countries, as well as in the Muslim regions of Russia. In the 1990s, Islamic charities had a serious negative impact on the situation in the Russian republics of the North Caucasus by spreading Salafi and Wahhabi ideology.49 Later, many Islamic charities that operated in Russia in that period were designated as terrorist organizations by the authorities.50 In the early 2000s, when the Kremlin started another campaign to reintegrate Chechnya, it was important for Russia to curb the support and financing of the separatists in the North Caucasus. It became obvious to the Russian authorities that the problem could not be solved without the cooperation of Gulf countries. Consequently, financing of terrorism and Islamic radicalism became one of the main issues in Russia’s dialogue with the GCC. In November 2002, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Alexander Yakovenko, on the eve of the visit of the GCC Secretary-General Abdul Rahman bin Hamad al-Ateyya, said that Moscow was ‘grateful to the leadership of those Arab states that are taking steps to cooperate with Russia through law enforcement agencies in order to block the channels for financing terrorist groups.’51 After the end of the second campaign in Chechnya, the terrorist threat to Russia diminished but did not disappear. Moscow is constantly aware of the risk of infiltration of radicals from abroad, since a number of militant groups with links to Al-Qaeda were discovered and destroyed in the 2, 2005, https://www.mid.ru/en/organizacia-islamskogo-sotrudnicestva-ois-/-/asset_pub lisher/km9HkaXMTium/content/id/433796. 49 Rozanov V. “Skhemy finansirovaniya islamskogo radikalizma v Rossii” [Funding Schemes for Islamic Radicalism in Russia], Kavpolit, May 23, 2017, http://kavpolit. com/blogs/vestnik/33742/ (In Russian). 50 “FSB opublikovala spisok iz 22 organizatsiy, priznannykh v Rossii terroristicheskimi”

[FSB Has Published a List of 22 Organizations Recognized as Terrorist in Russia], TASS, February 27, 2015, https://tass.ru/politika/1796857 (In Russian). 51 “OTVETY OFITSIAL’NOGO PREDSTAVITELYA MID ROSSII A.V.YAKOVENKO NA VOPROSY ROSSIYSKIKH SMI V SVYAZI S VIZITOM V MOSKVU GENERAL’NOGO SEKRETARYA SOVETA SOTRUDNICHESTVA ARABSKIKH GOSUDARSTV PERSIDSKOGO ZALIVA ABDERRAKHMANA ATYYI” [Answers of the Official Representative of the MFA of Russia A.V. Yakovenko to the Questions of the Russian Media in Connection with the Visit the Secretary General Secretary General of the GCC], November 2, 2002, https://www.mid.ru/ru/sovetsotrudnicestva-arabskih-gosudarstv-persidskogo-zaliva-ssagpz-/-/asset_publisher/0vP3hQ oCPRg5/content/id/540512 (In Russian).

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North Caucasus between 1992 and 2012.52 The insurgency in Iraq in 2005–2008 and the emergence of ISIS after the Arab Spring strengthened Russia’s concerns about potential migration of Russian-speaking militants from the Middle East and another wave of extremist propaganda.53 Therefore, Moscow supported the initiative to create a coalition in the Gulf to combat extremism and terrorism. From the geopolitical perspective, Moscow fears that armed conflicts in the Middle East or the Gulf would lead to chaos in the region, as happened in Iraq after 2003, and that this chaos might quickly spread to neighboring countries and eventually reach the territory of Russia. Wars in Syria, Libya, and Iraq created new terrorist hubs and escalated regional rivalries. A major military conflict in the Gulf might turn Iran into a failed state, which might have a negative impact on the situation in the South Caucasus. Accordingly, the settlement of conflicts in the Middle East and the Gulf would help reduce the threat to Russia’s vulnerable Southern borders. Regarding the military campaign in Syria, Russian leadership always points out that thousands of nationals of Russia and the CIS countries joined the terrorists and might later return to carry out terrorist attacks or to conduct other subversive activities. According to President Putin, the campaign in Syria ‘was about destroying—at distant approaches—the radicals who tried to create their own quasi-state caliphate in vast Middle Eastern territories.’54 Moscow considers the Gulf countries’ potential partners in ensuring peace and security throughout the Middle East, which is facing a new wave of instability caused by the Arab Spring. From the Russian perspective, the Gulf states are status-quo powers and they share Moscow’s desire for regional stability. They also have considerable financial resources and might become an alternative sponsor for reconstruction projects in Syria, which are badly needed for stabilization and deradicalization, but are 52 “Vse «odioznyye glavari «Al’-Kaidy» na Severnom Kavkaze unichtozheny” [All “Odious al-Qaeda Leaders” in the North Caucasus Killed], Forbes, October 4, 2012, https://www.forbes.ru/news/153544-vse-odioznye-glavari-al-kaidy-na-severnomkavkaze-unichtozheny (In Russian). 53 “Glava Antiterroristicheskogo tsentra SNG: do 30% boyevikov vozvrashchayutsya na rodinu” [Head of the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center: Up to 30% of Militants Return to Their Homeland], TASS, December 3, 2019, https://tass.ru/interviews/7241907 (In Russian). 54 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview with the Asharq Al-Awsat pan-Arab Daily, October 3, 2019, https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/sa/-/asset_publisher/8mh fuWloeKqd/content/id/3829601.

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unlikely to receive funding from the United States or the EU any time soon. Currently, Moscow is interested in joining efforts with the Gulf monarchies to resolve the crisis in Syria; the Gulf states might become primary donors for rebuilding the country and creating conditions for the return of refugees.55 However, that would require a more independent stance toward the United States, which is currently preventing any investment in areas controlled by the Syrian government.

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Russia’s Potential Partners in the Gulf

Russia’s relations with the Gulf countries are developing unevenly. Moscow’s long-term approach is focused on finding strategic partners, to create relationships that can offer major benefits. In this regard, two regional heavyweights—Iran and Saudi Arabia—are of the greatest interest to Russia. Close cooperation with these states would allow Russia to significantly increase its influence not only on the oil market, but also in international political processes. The Kremlin believes that Russia, with its balanced foreign policy, is the only world power that can deal with both Iran and Saudi Arabia.56 However, experience shows that size does not always matter—small states, rather than regional heavyweights, often become more promising partners. Moscow is well aware of the differences between the GCC countries and is ready to pursue a flexible policy. Meanwhile, Russian cooperation with both Iran and Saudi Arabia is developing in a very sluggish way. In the case of Iran, Moscow and Tehran managed to launch serious dialogue in several strategically important areas: nuclear energy, arms trade, and military cooperation. Both countries are actively supporting the Syrian government. However, despite Russia’s best efforts these relations lack strategic depth. Even in Syria, Russia–Iran cooperation is usually described as a tactical partnership rather than an alliance. Besides, this cooperation lacks any substantial economic foundation, since during the last ten years trade and investment cooperation

55 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Questions at the Masterclass Working Session Held as Part of the 2019 Paris Peace Forum, Paris, November 12, 2019,” https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/ asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/3896584. 56 “Rossiya gotova stat posrednikom v peregovorakh Irana i Saudovskoy Aravii” [Russia Is Ready to Mediate the Talks Between Iran and Saudi Arabia], RIA Novosti, October 11, 2010, https://ria.ru/20171011/1506617545.html (In Russian).

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have been on the decline: in 2008, the volume of bilateral trade reached $3.7 billion, and at the end of 2018, it fell to $1.7 billion.57 At the same time, Russia is trying to develop political and economic relations with Saudi Arabia,58 but so far without any real progress. There has been especially strong disappointment in the sphere of arms sales. According to Rostec Director General Sergei Chemezov, Saudi Arabia and Russia signed contracts worth $20 billion in 2012, but the deals were never carried out. Chemezov told the media that ‘Riyadh did not buy anything for a penny at that time… the Saudis simply played with us, saying: do not supply S-300 air defense systems to Iran, and we will take your weapons - tanks and other equipment.’59 Despite numerous statements and promises from the Saudi side, there are no major joint projects, though there were high hopes for contracts under the ‘Saudi Vision-2030’ plan. Trade was slowly growing in 2017– 2018 (in 2018 bilateral trade slightly exceeded $1 billion60 ), though investment cooperation was weak. Moscow believes that Saudi Arabia prefers cooperation with the United States and other Western countries, and Riyadh still distrusts Russia. The lack of real mutual strategic interests between Russia and Saudi Arabia outweigh the balance in favor of Iran. As rapprochement with Iran and Saudi Arabia is slow and complicated, Russia has become focused on establishing closer ties with the smaller Gulf monarchies, which already have a history of cooperation with Moscow and were less suspicious about the Kremlin’s intentions. After 2000, Russia established its closest relations among the Gulf states with the UAE. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which was cautious and inconsistent in its rapprochement with Russia, the Emirates began to develop

57 “Mezhgosudarstvennyye otnosheniya Rossii i Irana” [Relations Between Russia and Iran], RIA Novosti, September 16, 2019, https://ria.ru/20190916/1558666903.html (In Russian). 58 “Russian-Saudi Economic Council Meeting,” October 14, 2019, http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/news/61803. 59 “Rossiya i Saudovskaya Araviya zaklyuchili dogovor v sfere VTS na $3,5 mlrd” [Russia and Saudi Arabia Signed an Agreement in the Field of Military-Technical Cooperation for $ 3.5 Billion], Kommersant, July 10, 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3350874 (In Russian). 60 “Torgovlya mezhdu Rossiyey i Saudovskoy Araviyey v 2018” [Trade Between Russia and Saudi Arabia in 2018], https://russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2019-02/tor govlya-mezhdu-rossiey-i-saudovskoy-araviey-v-2018-g/ (In Russian).

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an active dialogue with Russia on political issues (e.g., on Iraq, Palestine, and Iran) in the early 2000s. It was important for the Kremlin that Russia was treated as a great power capable of influencing the situation in the region. The UAE’s interest in the procurement of Russian weapons and in the development of economic ties was also of great importance. Moscow began to consider the Emirates its principal Gulf partner, one which takes into account the interests of Russia, purchases weapons and nuclear technologies, and is ready to invest in the Russian economy. Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear corporation, supplies natural and enriched uranium for the Baraka nuclear power plant, and also has contracts to supply radioactive isotopes and equipment for a plant that will process hazardous industrial waste. Russia is also negotiating with the UAE cooperation in disposing of spent nuclear fuel from the Baraka nuclear power plant.61 In 2019, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov mentioned during a press conference that about 40 joint projects worth $2 billion were implemented by the Russian Direct Investment Fund and the Emirati fund ‘Mubadala’.62 The UAE quickly became Russia’s main trade partner in the Gulf. In 2013, bilateral trade reached its historical maximum of $2.5 billion. However, in 2015, due to the unfavorable situation and the depreciation of the ruble, this number dropped to about $1.2 billion. In 2019, bilateral trade exceeded $1.8 billion and the trade volume was more than $1 billion in the first quarter of 2020.63

61 “Mezhgosudarstvennyye otnosheniya Rossii i Ob”yedinennykh Arabskikh Emiratov” [Relations Between Russia and the United Arab Emirates], RIA Novosti, October 15, 2019, https://ria.ru/20191015/1559754132.html (In Russian). 62 “Vystupleniye i otvety na voprosy SMI Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova v khode sovmestnoy press-konferentsii po itogam peregovorov s Ministrom inostrannykh del i mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva OAE Abdalloy Ben Zaidom Al’ Nakhayyanom, Abu-Dabi, 6 marta 2019 goda” [Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at a Joint News Conference Following Talks with UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi, March 6, 2019], https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/ae/-/asset_publisher/Ok3dhLsWZsE7/ content/id/3561107 (In Russian). 63 “Vneshnyaya torgovlya Rossii s OAE (Ob”yedinonnymi Arabskimi Emiratami) v 1 kvartale 2020 goda” [Foreign Trade of Russia with the UAE (United Arab Emirates) in the 1st Quarter of 2020], https://russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2020-05/ vneshnyaya-torgovlya-rossii-s-oae-obedinennymi-arabskimi-emiratami-v-1-kv-2020-g/ (In Russian).

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In 2018, Russia and the UAE signed a strategic partnership declaration. This format implies regular contacts between the leaders, coordination of policies, and the creation of favorable conditions for economic cooperation. Russia is counting on support from the UAE for its quest to bring Syria back into the Arab League, and views it as a potential donor for that country’s reconstruction. In 2019, on the eve of his visit to the UAE, President Putin called the UAE a ‘very close and promising partner’, one with whom Moscow has established relationship of trust. At the same time, Saudi Arabia was only called a ‘friendly’ state.64 Relations between Russia and Kuwait did not reach as high a level as Russia–UAE, but they were always mutually respectful and developed without crises; even disagreements on Syria did not interfere with cooperation between the two countries. Moscow understands that the potential for developing cooperation with Kuwait is limited; however, it considers Kuwait a reliable partner that is influential in the Gulf in its own quiet way. In addition, Kuwait is important for Moscow as a customer for Russian weapons and a potential investor. The Russian Direct Investment Fund and the Kuwaiti Investment Agency are developing joint projects with a total value of nearly $200 million. Russian energy companies, including Gazprom, Novatek, and Zarubezhneft have plans for cooperation with Kuwaiti partners.65 Russia–Qatar relations have developed haphazardly. At the first stage of mutual rapprochement in 2005–2010, Moscow was attracted by Qatar’s growing influence in the Middle East and its investment capabilities. Russia was also interested in the project of the Forum of Gas Exporters, which could strengthen its status as an energy superpower. Neither investment nor the so-called gas OPEC became a reality, which led to disappointment. The war in Syria caused a rapid deterioration in relations. Though the Kremlin never openly accused Qatar, it was widely perceived as the main sponsor of the Arab Spring and regime change by 64 “Putin vystupil za razvitiye ekonomicheskikh svyazey Rossii s Saudovskoy Araviyey i OAE” [Putin Called for the Development of Economic Relations Between Russia and Saudi Arabia and the UAE], TASS, October 13, 2019, https://tass.ru/politika/6994147 (In Russian). 65 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions During a Joint News Conference Following Talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the State of Kuwait Sabah Al-Khalid Al-Sabah, Kuwait City, March 6, 2019,” https://www.mid.ru/en/maps/kw/-/asset_publisher/OZgDUWEplR7o/con tent/id/3560767.

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the Russian expert community and media.66 After 2014, Qatar began to reduce its support for the Syrian opposition and relations with Moscow gradually returned to normal, which was confirmed by the growing intensity of official contacts.67 The issue of expanding economic cooperation also entered the bilateral agenda. In 2015, a conference on economic relations between Russia and Qatar was held in Moscow and representatives of Qatari companies expressed interest in developing cooperation with Russia in the fields of energy and the petrochemical and agrochemical industries. However, none of these statements led to any immediate results. Russia also retained an interest in arms trade with Qatar. In the fall of 2017, Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu signed an agreement on military–technical cooperation during a visit to Doha, though no major contracts followed, apparently because Moscow took a strictly neutral stance with respect to the 2017 crisis and blockade, limiting itself to calls for dialogue and unity within the GCC. Qatar, invests more actively in the Russian economy than Saudi Arabia; for example, the Qatar Investment Authority bought shares of VTB Bank, Pulkovo airport in Saint Petersburg, and shares of state-owned oil company Rosneft. Qatari investments in the Russian economy reached $2.5 billion by 2019, and projects in infrastructure, agriculture, medicine, real estate, oil and gas, worth over $9 billion were reported to be under consideration. Moscow and Doha were also looking for ways to increase bilateral trade to $500 million.68 In 2021, Qatar will be a guest country at SPIEF, which might become a good stimulus for further development of economic ties with Russia.

66 “Vitaliy Naumkin: novyy krizis mezhdu Katarom i stranami Persidskogo zaliva ne prodlitsya dolgo” [Vitaly Naumkin: A New Crisis Between Qatar and the Gulf Countries Will Not Last Long], Interfax, June 9, 2017, https://www.interfax.ru/interview/566009 (In Russian). 67 “O vstrechakh v Dokhe spetspredstavitelya Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii po Blizhnemu Vostoku, zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii M.L. Bogdanova” [On the Meetings in Doha of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia M.L. Bogdanov], May 6, 2014, https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/qa/-/asset_publisher/629HIryvPTwo/content/ id/61770 (In Russian). 68 “Katar mozhet vlozhit’ v ekonomiku Rossii boleye $9 milliardov, zayavil posol” [Qatar Might Invest More Than $ 9 Billion in the Russian Economy, Ambassador Said], RIA Novosti, March 19, 2019, https://ria.ru/20190319/1551915571.html (In Russian).

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Russian officials have reiterated that Moscow seeks to develop relations with the GCC in a ‘strategic dialogue’ format, which should include regular consultations and coordination of policies to overcome the outbreak of instability that followed the Arab Spring. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said during a meeting with foreign ministers of countries of the Cooperation Council in September 2016 that ‘[w]e are interested in deepening the political dialogue with the GCC on key issues of international relations, and especially in the Middle East and North Africa.’ According to Lavrov, Moscow is interested in coordinating approaches to a number of conflicts to create conditions ‘for the transition from crisis to peace, stability and development’ in the Middle East. Lavrov also emphasized the importance of the discussions ‘on maintaining the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts’, primarily referring to stabilization in Syria.

5 Russian Arms Sales and the Collective Security of the Gulf Russia (so far) has no military presence in the Gulf and is not trying to become a security provider like the United States. Nevertheless, it has tools that allow it to directly influence the balance of power in the Gulf (i.e., arms sales). Since Gulf countries are known as the largest arms purchasers in the world, the Russian defense industry has been trying to enter this market since the 1990s. Russia’s first major contracts were signed with Kuwait and the UAE; these sales were paired with agreements on political consultations in case a threat arose to stability in the region. In 1994–1997, Kuwait acquired about 460 ‘Fagot’ anti-tank missile systems, 27 ‘Smerch’ MLRS, about 1250 ‘Bastion’ anti-tank guided missiles, 50 BMP-2 and 142 BMP3 infantry fighting vehicles from the Russian Federation. Cooperation continued after 2000, under a contract signed 2009, Kuwait’s ground forces received 70 modernized BMP3M.69 Under contracts signed in 1994–1995, the UAE received about 700 BMP-3 and armored repair and recovery vehicles. In August 2000,

69 “Voyennyye eksperty: Kuveyt mozhet zakupit’ u Rossii Su-35 i S-300” [Military Experts: Kuwait May Buy from Russia Su-35 and S-300], RIA Novosti, November 9, 2015, https://ria.ru/20151109/1317237932.html.

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the UAE signed a contract to develop and supply the ‘Pantsir’ (SA-22 Greyhound) anti-aircraft gun and missile system.70 From Russia’s perspective, it offers a number of advantages in comparison with other arms suppliers. Unlike the United States, it sells advanced weaponry without political preconditions. Russia offers arms at competitive prices, while guaranteeing tactical performance equivalent or superior to the products of other manufacturers—4++ generation fighters, highend air defense systems, advanced artillery systems, tanks, and armored vehicles. The states of the Middle East are particularly interested in Russian-made air defense systems. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have negotiated the purchase of the S-400 (SA-21 Growler) long-range air defense system. Russia also successfully sells short-range anti-aircraft systems such as ‘Pantsir’ and ‘Tor’ to the Middle East.71 It is also important that Moscow is ready to supply weaponry from its own military’s stockpiles, which ensures swift delivery in case of a crisis. Thus, it can quickly provide support to an ally or a customer in a critical situation, as was the case of Iraq, which in 2014 was immediately provided with Su-25 (Frogfoot) attack aircraft and artillery. The Russian Federation not only supplies finished products but is also ready to develop weaponry manufacture on the spot.72 The Russian defense industry found new customers in the Gulf after 2011. In 2014, Bahrain signed a contract to buy anti-tank missile systems (‘Kornet-EM’, AT-14 Spriggan) and small arms,73 and Russian small arms were also delivered to a number of units of the Qatari army. After 2017, Doha indicated interest in advanced air defense systems. The UAE bought

70 Rosoboronksport: Sotrudniqestvo s OA, http://roe.ru/export/oae/ (In

Russian). 71 “Rossiya poluchila boleye 15 zayavok na pokupku kompleksov Pantsir” [Russia Received More Than 15 Bids for the Purchase of Pantsir Complexes], TASS, November 17, 2019, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/7136779 (In Russian). 72 “Rostekh razvivayet VTS s Obyedinennymi Arabskimi Emiratami” [Rostec Develops Military-Technical Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates], Novosti VPK, November 19, 2013, https://vpk.name/news/100486_rosteh_razvivaet_vts_s_obedinennymi_arabsk imi_emiratami.html (In Russian). 73 “RF zaklyuchila krupnyye oruzheynyye kontrakty so stranami Blizhnego Vostoka i Severnoy Afriki” [Russia Has Signed Large Arms Contracts with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa], TASS, August 12, 2014, https://tass.ru/politika/137 4497 (In Russian).

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an anti-tank missile system (‘Kornet-E’) and negotiated the purchase of Su-35 (Flanker-E +) fighters for its air force.74 While GCC countries only buy certain systems, and in relatively small numbers, Iraq became one of the three major consumers of Russian weapons in the Arab world. There is a contract for several hundred main T-90S/SK battle tanks; the first deliveries took place in 2018. Baghdad was one of the first foreign buyers of heavy flamethrower TOS-1A ‘Solntspek’ systems; their deliveries began in 2014. Iraqi armed forces also purchased up to 500 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles and Pantsir-S1 for its air defense. Iraq became the first foreign state to acquire the latest Mi28NE attack helicopters (up to 15). Russia also supplied Iraq with (up to 28) Mi-35 M attack helicopters.75 However, arms deliveries have only limited importance for the Gulf monarchies unless they are accompanied by security guaranties, which is why the United States and Europe remain the region’s primary suppliers. It is highly unlikely that Russia will side with the GCC against Iran, which would cause chaos in Russia’s Southern neighborhood. Consequently, the Russian leadership tries to compensate for their lack of military clout in the Gulf by increasing diplomatic activity and positioning the country as a principal mediator/facilitator. The Russian leadership is calling for the creation of a new security architecture in the Gulf, which they feel is necessary to reduce tensions and the threat of a direct military confrontation. Moscow is aware that the GCC members consider Iran to be the main source of threat and this leads to escalation. Therefore, from the Russian perspective, instead of trying to isolate Tehran, it is necessary to establish dialogue and ensure maximum transparency, especially in the military domain. In 2001, Russia proposed the concept of security in the Persian Gulf with a focus on resolving the Iraqi issue and avoiding another crisis. In 2007, on the eve of President Putin’s grand tour of the region, the concept was updated with a focus on a new challenge—tensions around the Iranian nuclear program. The

74 “Rossiya i OAE prodolzhayut peregovory o postavkakh Su-35” [Russia and the UAE Continue Negotiations on the Supply of Su-35], RIA Novosti, November 17, 2019, https://ria.ru/20191117/1561036614.html (In Russian). 75 “Voyenno-tekhnicheskoye sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Iraka” [Military-Technical Cooperation Between Russia and Iraq], TASS, May 20, 2015, https://tass.ru/info/1981871 (In Russian).

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updated concept was approved by President Putin in the summer of 2007 and presented during a visit to the UAE in September 2007. One of the main principles of the Russian concept is a step-by-step approach. It did not contain specific recipes; instead, it proposed to arrange an international conference on security and cooperation in the Gulf, during which the features of the future system would be determined. However, Moscow suggested that the security system in the Gulf should resemble the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This initiative is based mainly on the experience of the Cold War and the perception that the Gulf is also witnessing a cold war, albeit on a regional scale. Currently, Russia pragmatically assumes that attempts to create a security architecture in the Gulf without the participation of the United States and the EU are unlikely to succeed. Therefore, Russia’s efforts are aimed at creating a security system, where Russia, along with the United States and the EU, would play a significant role. Another option acceptable to Russia would be to build a collective security system in the Gulf with the broad participation of other Arab states. In 2019, Russia once again offered the countries of the region to consider a collective security mechanism, similar to the OSCE in Europe, starting with the implementation of various confidence-building measures (e.g., inviting each other to military exercises). According to Sergey Lavrov, the Russian initiative is not simply about signing a non-aggression pact between Iran and the GCC countries, ‘it’s not just about not fighting with each other, but about being more open, to cooperate more actively. We believe that in addition to the Gulf countries—GCC plus Iran—five permanent members of the UN Security Council, EU, LAS, OIC should participate.’76 In early 2020, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that Russia is still seriously concerned about the situation in the Gulf. According to Lavrov, Russia held military exercises with China and Iran to analyze how it can ‘ensure the security of maritime traffic in this area, which is

76 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Questions at a Plenary Session of the Raisina Dialogue International Conference, New Delhi, January 15, 2020,” https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/ asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/3994885.

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extremely important for world trade.’77 These military exercises sparked speculation about a permanent deployment of the Russian navy, including nuclear submarines and air power in the Gulf. However, even if Iran accepted such a deployment, which is highly unlikely after its public criticism of the presence of Russian personnel at Hamadan Airbase, Russia would not send more than a symbolic squadron, since all available navy assets are currently deployed in Eastern Mediterranean.

6

Conclusion

By the early 2000s, Russia had exited the transitional period after the collapse of the Soviet Union and began to gradually restore its global influence. Its new foreign policy was based not on ideology, but on pragmatism. Geopolitical logic requires Russia to pursue an active policy in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Yet Moscow has objectively assessed the situation in the Gulf and is not trying to replace the United States and European countries, which remain major security providers and economic partners for the Arab monarchies. However, in the long run, Russia seeks to become an important player in the Gulf in order to increase its influence on a global scale. Currently, the Kremlin’s main efforts in that direction are focused on establishing political dialogue and expanding economic cooperation with the Gulf countries. Decision-makers in Moscow understand that common strategic interests constitute the main condition for the development of strong relations. In the political sphere, both parties are interested in resolving crises around Iran’s nuclear program and the conflict in Syria; however, their approaches to these problems are substantially different. Pursing the fight against terrorism and preventing the financing of radical groups is also of great importance for Russia and the Gulf countries. Of particular interest to Moscow is cooperation with the Gulf countries in terms of the arms trade, since it not only provides income, but also promises the establishment of long-term ties. In the economic sphere, Russia’s potential for cooperation is limited compared with that of the United States, the European Union, or China. 77 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Questions at a Plenary Session of the Raisina Dialogue International Conference, New Delhi, January 15, 2020,” https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/ asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/3994885.

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This is indicated by the relatively low volumes of bilateral trade between Russia and the GCC countries. However, Russia and the Gulf countries do have common economic interests, with the most important being their shared desire to coordinate policies on the hydrocarbon market to jointly control prices. Another important area for cooperation could be food security. Russia is also seeking to become a partner for the Gulf countries in the fields of science, technology, space exploration, and nuclear energy. To conclude, one can hardly expect that relations between Russia and the Gulf will reach the level held by the United States or the EU. However, if both parties assess each other’s capabilities objectively and avoid inflated expectations, successful and mutually beneficial cooperation will be possible on a number of issues of strategic importance.

CHAPTER 5

Russia and the Gulf States: Between West and East Roland Dannreuther

1

Introduction

One of the most striking shifts in the geopolitics of the Middle East in the twenty-first century is the return of Russia as a major external actor in the region. From the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was a marginal force in the politics of the Middle East for the two decades of the 1990s and 2000s. There was an attempt to revive Russia’s fortunes in the late 2000s, when President Putin made the first major tour of the capitals of the Middle East in 2007. But there was little sense then that Russia could break through the strategic dominance of the United States. It was only with the onset of the Arab Spring and the success of supporting the regime of Bashar al-Asad in Syria, most notably through direct Russian military intervention in 2015, that there was recognition that Russia was again a major external power in the region. Through this intervention,

R. Dannreuther (B) University of Westminster, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_5

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Russia demonstrated a purposefulness of action and a political will that the United States and its Western allies appeared to lack.1 It is particularly notable that this recognition of Russia’s strategic importance, and the associated need to engage directly with Moscow, has also included the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. This has involved a significant overcoming of traditional, deeply engrained distrust of Russia among the Arab states of the Gulf. The Soviet Union, even at the height of its power in the Middle East, never gained significant influence or had a substantial presence in the Arab Peninsula, with the exception of South Yemen. The Soviet Union was perceived to be an atheistic, anti-Islamic, revolutionary and anti-monarchical force which represented an existential threat to the conservative Islamic regimes of the region.2 With the emergence of post-Soviet Russia, the fear of Communist subversion dissipated. But the two Chechen wars in the 1990s and 2000s sustained the perception of Russia as repressing its Muslim population and having an anti-Islamic agenda. Much to the irritation of Riyadh, Russian discourse consistently portrayed home-grown fundamentalists and terrorists as ‘Wahhabis’, and Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states were seen as supporting, both ideologically and financially, the radicalisation of Russia’s Muslim communities.3 The subsequent support that Russia provided to the Assad’s regime in Syria during the Arab Spring, in cooperation with Iran, to repress the predominantly Sunni Muslim opposition only added to the perception that Russia has an anti-Islamic agenda, antithetical to the interests of the Arab Gulf states, and which moreover supports Shi’i Iran, the mortal enemy of Saudi Arabia, in its ambitions in the broader Middle East. Highly influential Gulf-based Islamic thinkers were critical, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who called on Al-Jazeera to

1 Dmitri Trenin, What Is Russia up to in the Middle East? (Cambridge: Polity, 2018); Nikolay Kozhanov, Russian Policy Across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods (London: Chatham House, 2018); Roland Dannreuther, “Understanding Russia’s Return to the Middle East,” International Politics 56:6 (2019): 726–742. 2 Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 232. 3 Roland Dannreuther, “Russian Discourses and Approaches to Islam and Islamism,” in Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism, ed. Roland Dannreuther and Luke March (London: Routledge, 2010), 17–19.

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boycott Russia which he claimed ‘was supporting the criminal Syrian regime with weapons supplies’.4 Despite all these historic obstacles and constraints, there has been a significant rapprochement between Russia and the GCC states. This was marked symbolically by the visit of King Salman in 2013 which was the first visit by the Saudi monarch to Moscow since the establishment of political relations in 1926.5 Putin reciprocated by making his own official visits to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 2019. The RussianGulf relations that have developed are multifaceted and wide-ranging. There is an important security and strategic dimension which has a strong focus on Syria but also includes the other critical conflicts in the region, such as Yemen, Libya and the internal GCC crisis over Qatar. While Russia’s policies in Syria continue to be controversial, its diplomatic and security engagement with the other conflicts is seen to be generally neutral and/or supportive of Gulf interests. There is an economic dimension with Gulf Arab commitments of significant economic investments into the Russian economy through the various state investment funds. Russia has also played an increasingly important role with OPEC, agreeing for the first time in 2016 to work with OPEC to agree production quotas through the OPEC+ framework. Although this temporarily broke apart in 2020, which resulted in a competitive price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia, the reality is that the two countries have closely entwined energy interests. In relation to Islam, Russia has gained the confidence of the GCC states, most notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE, through its strong opposition to the Muslim brotherhood. Saudi Arabia has reciprocated by confirming their support for Russia’s policies towards its indigenous Muslim communities.6 Security cooperation between Russia and the intelligence services of the Gulf states in relation to Islamist extremism is active and meets a critical Russian security interest. Overall, Russia has undoubtedly made significant progress in developing and enhancing its relations with the GCC states. These are major advances particularly when seen in the context of an absence of such 4 Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, “Life and Sharia Programme,” Al-Jazeera, 5 February 2013, http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/pages/8dd26065-1213-48fd-9ec3-40316262ce98. 5 Yury Barman, “Russia and the GCC: An Unlikely Partner,” LSE Blog, 2 May 2018, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/05/02/russia-and-the-gcc-an-unlikely-partnership/. 6 Rafael Daminov, “V Saudovskoi Aravii vysoko otsenili uroven religioznykh svobod v Rossii,” RIA Novosti, 21 January 2019, https://ria.ru/20190121/1549665385.html.

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relations through the Soviet period. However, the full substance and significance of these relations cannot be properly assessed without taking into account the presence and actions of other external actors. The aim of this chapter is to provide this broader regional and international perspective. This reflects the reality that the Gulf region is an exceptionally ‘penetrated’ region, in L. Carl Brown’s phrase, meaning that the region is characterised by the complex interplay of a variety of external regional and international actors.7 The prevalence of these external actors reflects, in part, the particular strategic vulnerability of the GCC states, their relative weakness in relation to their larger neighbours of Iran and Iraq, and the need for external security support. The interest of external actors is also drawn by the oil wealth of the Gulf states and the potential for lucrative business opportunities. But the Gulf states are not just the victims of the manipulation of external powers. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the other Gulf states are also actively seeking to gain maximum advantage through drawing in and playing off external powers and what has been described as a policy of ‘omni-balancing’.8 In addition, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a major Arab power in its own right, and arguably the major Arab power during the late 2010s as the traditional Arab power-centres, Syria, Iraq and Egypt have been critically weakened by their internal challenges.9 As such, the Gulf states are themselves the determinants of their own destiny as much as being at the mercy of external forces. The main focus of this paper will be to compare Russia’s current role, the particular place it has found in the politics and economics of the region, with those of its two major competitors (and partners)—the United States and China. The United States is the traditional hegemon of the region, as well as the Middle East as a whole, and the paper first assesses how and why the United States has lost at least some of its supremacy in the region which has provided an opening for Russia. The

7 L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Games (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 8 Kristina Kausch, “Competitive Multipolarity in the Middle East,” The International Spectator 50:3 (2015): 1–15; Elisheva Rosman-Stollman, “Balancing Acts: The Gulf States and Israel,” Middle East Studies, 40:4 (2004): 185–208. 9 Jeffrey Feltman et al., “The New Geopolitics of the Middle East: America’s Role in a Changing region,” Brookings Report, January 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/res earch/the-new-geopolitics-of-the-middle-east-americas-role-in-a-changing-region/.

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United States remains the dominant power in the Gulf region and Russia’s prospects for the sustained influence and engagement in the region is critically linked to the position of the United States and the West more broadly. This includes, for example, the roles of the UK and France who have sustained an independent presence among the GCC states which balances but also generally buttresses the strategic role of the United States. But the challenge for Russia is not just in relation to the West but also the rising power of the East. China has not, as yet, sought to define an active political and security position in the region but its economic presence and its economic dynamism are increasingly felt in the region. This more generally reflects the ways in which the economic orientation of the Gulf states is increasingly focused toward Asia where their critical economic interests, most notably the future growth in demand for their petroleum resources, is to be found. This chapter seeks, therefore, to situate Russia between West and East. There are a particular set of circumstances that have given Russia the opportunity to engage with the GCC states to an historically unprecedented degree. Russia has found a space between West and East. The key question is whether this presence and opportunity are a durable and long-lasting one or whether it is only likely to be temporary and intermittent.

2

The United States, the West and the Gulf

The United States as the dominant external actor among the GCC states must be the starting point for any analysis. There are few who believe that the United States will be dethroned from its position of primacy at any point soon or that Russia can hope to supplant the role that Washington has traditionally played. However, the nature and intensity of US interests in the region are not set in stone and there have always been tensions and differences about defining what those interests, and the balance of those interests, are. Michael Hudson defines three key US interests in the Middle East which underpinned US policy to the region up until the 1990s—Israel, oil and anti-communism.10 The heart of the US engagement with the Arab Gulf states has always been the oil interest, which goes back to the development of US relations with Saudi Arabia in the immediate aftermath of World War II. The Saudi-US relationship has 10 Michael C. Hudson, “To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy Towards the Middle East,” Middle East Journal 50:3 (1996): 329–343.

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been consistently viewed in Washington as the cornerstone of its ‘vital interest in ensuring the free flow of oil at reasonable prices from the oil fields of the region’.11 As historically the largest importer of oil and with Saudi Arabia as the largest exporter of oil and having the greatest oil reserves, there has been a consensus that the United States has critical interests among the GCC states which need to be protected. In addition, with Saudi Arabia’s role as the global oil ‘swing producer’ which gives it a unique capacity to influence oil supplies and prices, the strategic importance of Saudi-US relations is further strengthened. In relation to the other two primary US interests in the Middle East— Israel and anti-communism—the US position toward Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states is more complicated. While Saudi Arabia or the other Gulf states have not had the same level of hostility towards Israel as the radical Arab nationalist regimes, and at times have been willing to engage secretly with Israel, there has always been a reticence to be seen publicly to betray the Arab Palestinian cause or officially to support the US strategic relationship with Israel. Saudi Arabia has also always had a strong Islamic sensitivity over Israeli control over the third most holy Muslim site of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, where it has claims for custodianship.12 A significant source of irritation for the Gulf states has been the ways in which Israel has been able to influence the United States to limit or deny arms sales to the region. Indeed, one of the few times that the Soviet Union managed to penetrate the region was when Kuwait bought arms from Moscow to express its displeasure at Israel’s vetoing of the sale of US Springer missiles in 1984.13 In terms of anticommunism, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states have been favoured allies of the United States, both resisting communist encroachment on the Arab Peninsula as well as the various attempts to gain regional hegemony of the radical Arab nationalist regimes of Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

11 Martin S. Indyk, “US Policy Priorities in the Gulf,” in International Interests in the Gulf Region, ed. Emirates Center for Strategic Studies (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies, 2005), 107. 12 Adnan Abu Amar, “The Struggle for Jerusalem: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey and Morocco are all Vying for Authority over Islam’s Third Holiest Site,” Al-Jazeera, 11 May 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/scramble-jerusalem-190510200 333480.html. 13 Alexander J. Bennett, “Arms Transfers as an Instrument of Soviet Policy in the Middle East,” Middle East Journal 39:4 (1985): 763–764.

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However, the autocratic nature of the regimes of the GCC states has also been a source of embarrassment for the United States. The lack of democracy and human rights has exposed the strategic oil-based foundations of the relationship and the lack of shared values. The role that Saudi Arabia might have played, indirectly or directly, in the terrorist attacks of 9/11, remains a major source of controversy within the United States.14 Nevertheless, these tensions in US-Gulf relations did not translate into significant opportunities for the Soviet Union or for post-Soviet Russia to increase its presence and influence among the GCC states. The physical military and security presence of the United States in the Gulf region has also varied and changed over time. When the British government decided to withdraw its military forces from the Gulf in 1968, the United States did not seek to replace the British military presence but instead relied on its core allies in the region, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to act as proxies to resist Soviet and communist pressures. Moreover, during the 1960s and 1970s, the primary strategic interest of the United States was not centred on the Gulf but on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the broader inter-Arab ideological conflict between pro-Western and radical nationalist pro-Soviet forces.15 Indeed, for the smaller Gulf states, the transition from British to American tutelage was a period of considerable vulnerability with the Shah raising the longstanding Iranian claim to Bahrain and occupying the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in 1971 which were claimed by the UAE. It was only the combined effect of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which raised the threat of Soviet penetration and disruption of oil supplies, that led to a fundamental change to the US posture. The promulgation of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980 made clear that the United States was willing to use military force, if necessary, to defend its interests in the Gulf region. Over the next three decades, the US security and military presence expanded and intensified through the course of three wars: the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq 14 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaida’s Road to 9/11 (London: Allen Lane, 2006); Jeff Stein, “CIA and Saudi Arabia Conspired to Keep 9/11 Details Secret,” Newsweek, 28 August 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/cia-and-saudi-arabia-conspiredkeep-911-details-secret-new-book-says-1091935. 15 Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East (Boston MA: Beacon Books, 2009); William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005).

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war; the 1990–1991 First Gulf War to liberate Kuwait; and the 2003s Gulf War to overthrow the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. During this period, bilateral military agreements with the GCC states led to the US developing military bases across the region: Qatar became the forward headquarters of US Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT); the US Fifth Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain as well as the US Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT); and both Kuwait and the UAE host sizeable numbers of US forces, while there remains a significant capacity for a US military presence in Saudi Arabia, which is reserved for times of crisis.16 All of this military expansion occurred during a period when the United States appeared to be a ‘unipolar power’ and where there was limited countervailing balance; post-Soviet Russia was in this period was in the midst of a deep economic, political and military crisis and had limited ambitions in the Middle East. In retrospect, it can now be seen that the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq represented the zenith of US ambition. This intervention, in contrast to the 1990–1991 war, was a pro-active, rather than reactive, action which sought radically to refashion the politics of the region according to US preferences. It was a particular moment in time when the United States felt empowered by its strategic primacy in global politics while feeling uniquely threatened by transnational Islamist terrorism after the attacks of 9/11.17 The 2003 war sought not just to liberate Iraq from authoritarian autocratic rule but also to create a liberal democratic polity in Iraq. The aim was for Iraq to reduce US dependence on Saudi Arabia and thereby to build a more solid basis for US power in the region which would no longer need to rely on problematic Islamic monarchies who were seen to be as much a part of the problem as the solution of the ‘war on terror’.18 However, the failure of the invasion of Iraq to fulfil these ambitions over the following years heralded the start of the demise of US 16 “Factbox: US Forces in the Gulf and Iraq,” Reuters, 8 January 2020, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-usa-presence-factbox/factbox-u-s-forces-in-gulfregion-and-iraq-idUSKBN1Z72GF; Sun Degang, “The US Military Bases in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: Dynamics of Readjustment,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), 4:4 (2010): 44–63. 17 Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003); William Wohlforth, “The Stability of the Unipolar World,” International Security 24:1 (1999): 5–41. 18 David Frum and Richard Perle, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2003).

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primacy and exposed its political and military hubris. The United States suffered something similar to the Vietnam syndrome, a pervasive sense of defeat and an associated popular weariness and domestic political pressure for the United States to reduce its military commitments, particularly in the seeming endless quagmires of the Middle East and Afghanistan.19 It was notable that, during this period, Russia had a very different experience during the 2000s with a fast-growing economy, the effective overcoming of the internal insurgency in the North Caucasus, and a increased confidence to seek to assert a more independent foreign policy which would not be subordinate to US and Western interests. The coming to the Presidency of Barack Obama in 2009 heralded a major shift in the US strategic posture which reflected these domestic political pressures. Obama sought to reduce the US commitments to the Middle East through a proclaimed ‘pivot to the East’ and to Asia-Pacific. This reflected the growing sense in Washington that it was China’s rising power and influence, as well as the increasingly anti-Western posture of Russia, which were the most serious international challenges to the United States. At the same time, Obama promised in Cairo in June 2009 a ‘new beginning’ in US relations with the Muslim world which would shift from military force and confrontation to cooperation based on mutual respect and a striving for peace.20 Obama redirected attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict, seeking to promote peace between Israel and the Palestinians. He also generally welcomed the Arab Spring which started in 2010 and which led to the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The removal of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, a long-time ally of the United States, was sanctioned and facilitated by the US administration, leading to democratic elections later in the year that resulted in the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Libya, the US supported the decision by NATO to intervene militarily against Muammar Ghaddafi, which led to his overthrow, but notably did not take the lead on the military operation, devolving this to the UK and France. In Syria, there was 19 John Mueller, “The Iraq Syndrome,” Foreign Affairs 84:6 (2005); Anatol Lieven, “The Future of US Foreign Policy,” in US Foreign Policy, ed. Mick Cox and Doug Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 20 Barack Obama, “The President’s Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning,” https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/presidents-speech-cairo-a-new-beg inning.

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similar rhetorical support for the opposition struggling against the regime of Bashar al-Asad. However, the limits of this support were exposed in 2013 when the Syrian regime crossed a US ‘red line’ and used chemical weapons against the opposition. Obama threatened but did not ultimately retaliate through the use of military force.21 At the same time as these developments in Syria, the United States supported a pragmatic and diplomatic approach towards Iran, seeking to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions through negotiations, which resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015 agreed between Iran, the United States, Russia, the UK, France and Germany. The Obama Presidency is generally seen as a period of disengagement and relative decline for the United States in the politics of the Middle East.22 For the GCC states, there was more than just disappointment; there was a sense of abandonment by the United States. The US support for the removal of Mubarak appeared to demonstrate a lack of willingness to support long-term allies and that the US security guarantee for the regimes of the region could no longer be trusted. The willingness to seek an agreement with Iran also confirmed the fears that the United States refused to recognise what Saudi Arabia and other GCC states see as the existential, irredentist threat posed by Iran. Similarly, the failure to intervene effectively into Syria, and the perceived acquiescence in the face of war crimes committed by Bashar al-Assad only added to the sense of Gulf disillusionment with the direction of US policy. The growing weakness of US influence and power was also evident within the GCC states with the eruption of the bitter dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and its allies, notably the UAE, primarily over Doha’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. In the past, the United States had successfully managed the multiple sources of tensions between the GCC states. This time, however, US diplomatic efforts to support a reconciliation came to nothing. The fear that the United States could no longer be relied on to fulfil its security commitments to the region reflects the classic symptoms of the security dilemma. The behavioural symptoms are found in the behaviour 21 David Greenberg, “Syria Will Stain Obama’s Legacy Forever,” Foreign Policy, 29 December 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/29/obama-never-understood-howhistory-works/. 22 Fawaz Gerges, Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Andreas Krieg, “The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” International Affairs 92:1 (2016): 97–113.

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of those who are in an unequal alliance and where the fear of defection by the dependent power is intensely felt.23 West European states consistently had this fear of defection during the Cold War, despite the NATO alliance commitment and the presence of US forces. As with the European members of NATO, there has been no desire from the GCC states radically to change their fundamental security dependence on the United States. However, there has been a stronger determination to seek to diversify their security relations and to be more pro-active in promoting their security interests. This resulted in the Saudi-led intervention into the Yemen, and the development of an anti-Muslim Brotherhood axis between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt which has sought to support Khalifa Haftar’s attempts to gain control of Libya. For the first time, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states have played a substantive regional Middle Eastern role, filling the strategic gap left by the weakness of the traditional dominant Arab states. In terms of diversifying their security relations, the GCC states have opened themselves to a wide array of suitors. This has been the strategic opportunity for Russia to gain a presence in the region. Through its intervention into Syria, Russia demonstrated a military and political resolve which has been seen to be in contrast to the perceived ambivalence and vacillations of US policy. Although Russia’s support for the Assad regime was still problematic for the GCC states, there was no doubt that Russia was now a significant player in the determination of the Syrian conflict, while the United States remained an increasingly ineffective bystander. Russia also sought to bolster its profile and reputation in the region through its stalwart support for the conservative regimes in the region, supporting the opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, Russia has not been the only country to be courted. The GCC states have also turned to their traditional European allies, the UK and France, who have been quick to seize the opportunity to gain advantage, particularly in terms of their economic benefits, but also have been willing to enhance their military and security support. In 2015, Britain announced a Gulf Strategy which made Gulf security central to British national security interests and, in 2018, a Royal Navy base was opened 23 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30:2 (1978): 167–214; Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36:4 (1984): 461–495.

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in Bahrain which is home to the UK Maritime Component Command.24 There is similarly a French military force present in the UAE and a French ambition to expand its presence.25 But, increasingly, the GCC states have been looking eastwards for their economic and strategic support. It is China, in particular, which is the emerging power with the greatest potential to balance the United States and which has been the particular focus of Gulf strategic attention. Before assessing the potential for Russia to fill the vacuum left by US retrenchment, it is first necessary to assess China’s fast-developing relations with the GCC states.

3

The Gulf Pivot to the East

Unlike Russia, Britain and France, as well as the United States, China has had a relatively limited historical engagement with the Middle East. There was a brief moment, at the height of the Maoist revolutionary period, when China supported the most radical forces in the Arab world, including those in the Arab Peninsula in the 1960s seeking to liberate themselves from the traditional monarchies.26 But this radical phase quickly dissipated with the ascent to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and, from this time onwards, economic rather than ideological factors became the major drivers of Chinese foreign policy towards the Middle East. China can also boast of the fact that it has never extended direct imperial or colonial rule in the Middle East and is thus less tainted than the major Western powers. In the Chinese government’s first Arab Policy paper published in 2016, this relatively benign past record leads to a historically based narrative of mutual benefit and cooperation:

24 Gareth Stansfield, Doug Stokes and Saul Kelly, “UK Strategy in the Gulf and Middle East After American Retrenchment,” Turkey Insight 20:4 (2018): 231–247; David C. Roberts and Cinzia Bianco, “Great Britain-Gulf Relations: Ties that Bind,” in External Powers and the Gulf Region, ed. Jonathan Fulton and Li-Chen Sim (London: Routledge, 2019). 25 Jean-Loup Sarman, “French Policy in the Gulf: The Other Western Ally,” in External Powers and the Gulf Region, ed. Jonathan Fulton and Li-Chen Sim (London: Routledge, 2019). 26 Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy, 1949–1977 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Michael Dillon, “The Middle East and China,” in The Middle East’s Relations with Asia and Russia, ed. Hannah Carter and Anoushirivan Ehteshami (London: Routledge, 2004).

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Over two thousand years ago, land and maritime Silk Roads already linked their Chinese and Arab nations. In the long stretches of history, peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, learning from each other, mutual benefit and win-win results have always been the main theme of exchanges between China and Arab countries.27 The expansion of these mutual ties and relations between China and the Gulf states have been particularly dramatic since the 2000s onwards. It is a paradox that, as the United States declared its intention to ‘pivot to the East’, which has led to such disquiet in the region, so the GCC states have also increasingly focused their attention to the Asia-Pacific. This is, to some extent, a natural evolution as oil and gas increasingly move towards Asia, with trade and investment with China expanding exponentially. As a consequence, the geo-economics of the Gulf region has shifted increasingly from the West to the East.28 China’s economic model, which involves economic liberalisation and development, while sustaining authoritarian modes of governance, is also attractive for the Gulf monarchies. The China model and what Hvidt describes as the ‘Dubai model’ have increasingly converged as alternatives to the Western template of economic liberalisation requiring simultaneous political reforms and liberalisation.29 The scale and magnitude of China’s rapid emergence as a major economic force and presence in the Middle East cannot be underestimated. It is most strikingly illustrated through a comparison with the United States as the traditional dominant economic actor in the region. The United States has historically been the largest importer of oil from the Middle East. However, as shown in Fig. 1, China surpassed the United States in 2017 to become the largest importer from the region. The projections for demand in the future highlight an even more radical shift, though it should be noted that this was done prior to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. The International Energy Agency projected that China’s imports from the Middle East will increase from 4 million to 6.7 27 Chinese Government, Arab Policy Paper, January 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/

mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1331683.shtml. 28 Xuming Qian and Jonathan Fulton, “China-Gulf Economic Relationship under the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: The Political Economy of China-GCC Relations,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11 (2017): 12–21. 29 Martin Hvidt, “Economic and Institutional Reforms in the Arab Gulf Countries,” Middle East Journal 65:1 (2011): 85–102.

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Fig. 1 Annual US and China gross crude oil imports (2004–2017) (Source US Energy Information Administration [2018])

million barrels a day (b/d) by 2035; in contrast, US imports will reduce dramatically due to increased domestic production through the so-called shale oil revolution with imports from the Middle East projected to drop as low as 100,000 b/d by 2035. It is not only in the area of oil and gas imports that China’s economic presence has grown. Again, the United States has historically been the largest trading partner with the states of the Middle East. However, by 2014, China had significantly overtaken the United States and this trade advantage was not just in countries, like Iran, where the United States has imposed sanctions but also in traditional pro-US and proWestern states such as the Gulf states of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. China’s investments in the region have also grown rapidly and, in 2016, China invested $29.5 billion in the Middle East which represented 31 per cent of all investment in the region. Again, China took over from the United States the status as the largest investor in the Middle East. These Chinese investments have tended to be predominantly in the energy sector but have also extended to other economic sectors such as engineering, construction and infrastructure development. The economic presence of China in the Arab Gulf region not only surpasses that of the United States but completely dwarfs that of Russia. Russia’s trade with the Gulf states remains insubstantial, at $3.5bn in

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2017, which is roughly equivalent to Russia’s trade with Bulgaria.30 Even in the Middle East as a whole, where Russian trade has grown to $40bn, this is significantly less than China’s bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia alone. Nevertheless, when Western analysts and policy-makers assess the future prospects of Russia in the Gulf region, they often look at Russia and China as the new ‘non-Western’ entrants into the region and sense a certain unity of purpose as a result of the growing convergence in Sino-Russian relations.31 There is some justification to do so. Russia and China have held similar views about the broader geopolitics of the region, voting together in the United Nations Security Council against any UNmandated military intervention into Syria. They also have similar strategic interests in Iran and have worked together to seek ways to limit and reduce the impact of sanctions on their trading relations with Tehran. Both China and Russia have a common interest in opposing US hegemony in the Middle East and in developing a multipolar system which limits US ambitions and restricts intervention on humanitarian grounds. For China, there is in particular a certain strategic advantage for Russia to take the political flack for opposing US and Western interests in the Middle East, since it provides diplomatic cover for China, reducing US criticism of Chinese policy towards the region while also defending Chinese interests. There is, however, little direct evidence that there is a deliberate Russian-Chinese Middle East arrangement or compact, though there are clearly times when their policies converge. While there might be broader global geostrategic interests which they share, Russia and China having fundamentally different economic interests in the Middle East. For China, the Gulf region is critical for its energy security needs, with the Gulf states, the GCC states and Iran and Iraq, providing over half of its oil imports.32 30 Nikolay Kozhanov and Leonid Issaev, “Russian Influence in the Gulf Has Its Limits,” al-Jazeera, 5 April 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/russian-influencegulf-limits-190404133832327.html. 31 Paul J. Bolt and Sharyl N. Cross, China, Russia and Twenty First Global Geopolitics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Samuel Charap, John Drennan and Pierre Noel, “Russia and China: A New Model of Great-Power Relations,” Survival 59:1 (2017); Roland Dannreuther, “Russia, China and the Middle East,” in International Relations of the Middle East, ed. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2019). 32 Philip Andrews-Speed and Roland Dannreuther, China, Oil and Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2011); Xuewin Qian, “China’s Energy Cooperation with the Middle

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For Moscow, there is no such energy dependence as Russia is an oil and gas exporting country and has no need for supplies from the region. For Russia, the main economic interests are exports of goods, most notably arms and nuclear power, and in encouraging Gulf investments in the Russian economy.33 For China, the energy imports are balanced by a thriving export trade, which reflects the buoyant demand in the Gulf for Chinese manufactured and other goods. Overall, the economies of China and the GCC states are complimentary while Russia’s is more competitive. For example, despite the oft-promoted ambition to develop a gas cartel akin to OPEC, the reality is that Russia and Qatar are competitors in international gas markets, and Qatar has at times presented itself as an alternative to Russian gas supplies for Europe. As a consequence, China has a significantly higher level of vulnerability in the Gulf region which results in a more ambivalent and cautious stance towards the US military and security presence. The US admonition for China to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’ applies also to the Middle East with US leaders and diplomats reminding Beijing that China’s economic trade and investments, and most critically the security of its energy supplies, are ultimately assured by the US military presence in the region.34 China implicitly recognises this and understands, if not approves, of the value of the US security assurance to the region and that this secures Chinese interests as well.35 Pragmatically, also, keeping US troops and military hardware tied down in the Gulf region means that they cannot be moved to challenge China in the Asia-Pacific region. For

East Oil-Producing States,” Journal of Middle Eastern and islamic Studies (in Asia) 4:3 (2010). 33 Nikolay Kozhanov, Russian Foreign Policy Towards Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Bridging the Gaps (Doha: Guld Studies Center, 2019); Euegen Rumer, “Russia in the Middle East: Jack of all Trades, Master of None,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/31/russia-in-middle-east-jack-of-all-tra des-master-of-none-pub-80233. 34 Bates Gill, Dan Blumenthal, Michael D. Swayne and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “China as a Responsible Stakeholder,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11 June 2007, https://carnegieendowment.org/2007/06/11/china-as-responsible-sta keholder-event-998. 35 Jonathan Fulton, “Striking a Balance between Economics and Security: China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies,” in External Powers and the Gulf Region, ed. Jonathan Fulton and Li-Chen Sim (London: Routledge, 2019).

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Russia, there is no such overarching rationale for supporting the US military role in the region, given its limited economic interests, and Russia is therefore more free to be a more directly revisionist and challenging power. As such, China can be seen as to some extent caught between the United States and Russia, and generally prefers to remain neutral in any potential conflict between the two powers. In addition, with China’s economic-driven focus, and its reluctance to assume an overt political stance, China mainly acts as a competitive geo-economic power, seeking to gain economic advantage in relation to all other external actors, which includes Russia.

4

Russia---Between East and West

The analysis so far demonstrates how Russia’s engagement with the GCC states takes place in a highly competitive international context. The reality is that the Gulf states are attractive partners to a wide range of external actors due to their wealth and openness of their economies. With such significant economic stakes, there are limits to the cooperation between these extra-regional actors. While China might be considered geopolitically to be the closest Great Power ally of Russia, there is little evidence of substantive coordination over policies towards the Gulf. The Gulf states also follow the longstanding Middle Eastern tradition of seeking greater security and autonomy through bringing in, and where possible playing off, multiple external actors. As such, there are limits to how much influence and power any external actor can play in the region.36 Nevertheless, the cornerstone of the GCC’s military security and its political stability remains with the United States. Although there has been much discussion of US withdrawal or retrenchment from the region, feeding the anxieties of the Gulf monarchies as noted above, the continuing reality is that the US military presence remains substantial and has only marginally decreased. There are between 60,000 and 80,000 US troops in the US Central Command’s area of operations, which stretches from Egypt to Afghanistan, and between 30,000 and 40,000 of these are based in the GCC states and in Iraq. The cost of this US military commitment to the Gulf region is estimated to be between $50 and $90

36 Malcolm E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War (London: Routledge, 1996), 47.

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billion.37 This is a massive military and security presence and underpins the strategic reality that, for the GCC states, the United States remains the ultimate security guarantor for the region. What this means is that, if it came to resisting and responding to a Iranian or Iraqi irredentism or aggression, they would have no option but to rely upon the military support of the United States. Russia fully recognises that it cannot hope to compete with the United States in providing this degree of military commitment and has no ambition to do so. But the overarching regional hegemony of the United States has not constrained Russia from seeking strategic advantage where that can be achieved at acceptable costs. In practice, Moscow has specifically done this through showing the will to intervene in those conflicts which are considered as secondary and non-strategic in Washington. Where US retrenchment has had an impact is in the political will to intervene in conflicts which do not appear to impinge directly on US national security interests.38 This is why the Russian intervention into Syria was such a turning point in Russia’s fortunes in the Middle East. It was not just that Russia demonstrated a capacity and a will to intervene into the civil war in Syria. It was also that it did this in a way which highlighted the corresponding lack of will and resolve of the United States. In particular, the Russian military intervention contrasted with the failure of the United States to respond militarily to the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons in 2013, despite this being defined as a US ‘red line’ which would trigger a military response. The US failure to challenge directly the Assad regime meant that Russia’s became by default the sole major power interlocutor with the Assad regime. As such, Moscow gained a unique diplomatic and negotiating position over the Syrian peace process which highlighted the seeming exclusion and impotence of the US and its European allies. It was certainly Moscow’s privileged access to Assad’s regime that compelled Saudi Arabia and the other GCC state to swallow their criticisms of Russia and to seek to develop a more substantive political and diplomatic relationship. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the other GCC states had to acknowledge that pursuit of their interests in Syria now 37 Li-Chen Sim and Jonathan Fulton, “Quo Vadis: External Powers in a Changing Gulf,” in External Powers and the Gulf Region, ed. Jonathan Fulton and Li-Chen Sim (London: Routledge, 2019), 15. 38 Andreas Krieg, “The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” International Affairs 92:1 (2016): 112–113.

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required working with rather than against Moscow. In addition, confidence in Russian mediation grew when it became clear that Russia was also willing to include non-official Syrian opposition groups, including ones supported by the Gulf states, in the search for a peace settlement.39 The role that Russia also played in managing the other important regional Middle Eastern actors in the conflict, most notably Iran and Turkey, added to the strategic value for the GCC states of securing Russian engagement and support. Like Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE viewed Russia as a potentially moderating force in limiting Iran’s strategic ambitions. All of this meant that Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the other GCC states were willing to offer economic incentives to Russia, most notably the promise of substantial investments into the Russian Direct Investment Fund, to secure access to Russia’s strategic influence in Syria. While Russia’s support for the Assad regime continued to be an obstacle to enhancing relations, other aspects of Russia’s strategic outlook were more attractive to the GCC states. Indeed, the uncompromising support for Assad, while undesirable in itself, contrasted favourably with the United States failing to support Mubarak in Egypt. This support and loyalty to the ruling regimes was also evident over the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. Moscow provided immediate and unquestioning support to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman which contrasted with the ambivalence and criticism in the West.40 The Russian stance over the Muslim Brotherhood, which is a banned organisation in Russia, also converged with the anti-Muslim Brotherhood positions of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This contrasts again with the Gulf criticisms that other West European capitals, most notably London, have supported and abetted the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, Russia has developed an increasingly important relationship with the emergent counter-revolutionary anti-Muslim Brotherhood regional axis, led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is evident in the Russian support for the intervention favouring Khalifa Haftar’s uprising

39 Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russia and the Middle East; Adjusting to a New Political Vista,” in International Politics of the Arab Spring, ed. Robert Mason (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 110. 40 RIA Novosti, “Peskov ne vidit osnovanii ne verit Saudovskoi storone po povodu Khashukdzhi” (Peskov Does Not See Basis for Not Believing Saudi Arabia Over Khashoggi), RIA Novosti, 26 October 2018, https://ria.ru/20181026/1531538985. html.

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in Libya.41 Russia has been emboldened to offer itself as a mediator in a number of the conflicts of the region beyond Syria, most notably in Yemen and Libya. While Moscow’s offer to mediate between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states was not taken up, there have nevertheless been benefits of the schism for Russia’s overall position in the region. Qatar has been even more keen to preserve Russian support and to offer substantial economic and investment support. Russia’s relative strengths are, therefore, the seriousness and the commitment with which it has played a military, political and diplomatic role in the Middle East, and taking advantage of the strategic absence of the United States. Russia has prided itself on being a non-ideological and pragmatic power that is able to work with all of the major countries in the Middle East and without any particular favour or preference.42 This has led to the surprising capacity to have good relations with countries in the region who are in varying degrees of conflict with each other. But the flipside of this flexibility and pragmatism is these countries have limits to the amount of trust that they are willing to invest in Russia. This is certainly the case with the GCC states where Russia’s supportive relationship with Iran is a major source of suspicion and anxiety. In this regard, the more rigorous and ideological anti-Iranian stance taken by the United States is much closer to the world view of Saudi Arabia and the GCC states. In addition, the pragmatic business-like approach of Russia needs results if it is to be able to sustain itself. The key prize in this regard is the ability of Russia to engineer a peace settlement in Syria which reflects a compromise that meets the core interests of the neighbouring region. However, while Russia’s showed a capacity to influence the military course of the Syrian civil war, it is finding it much harder to deliver a lasting peace.43 Moscow’s credibility is even more stretched in conflicts where Russia is far less invested, such as Yemen or Libya.

41 Aleksandr Gostev, “Bolshaya Liviysakaya sdelka Kremlya. Kto kogo podderzhivaet v novoi voine” (Great Libyan Deal of Russia. Who Supports Whom in the New War), Svoboda, 10 April 2019, https://www.svoboda.org/a/29872791.html. 42 Irina Zvyagelskaya, “Russia, the New Protagonist in the Middle East,” in Putin’s Russia: Really Back? ed. Aldo Ferrari (Milan: Italian Institite for International Political Studies, 2016), 75. 43 W. Alex Sanchez, “The View from Syria’s Peace Talks,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 13 September 2019, https://fpif.org/the-view-from-syrias-peace-talks/.

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The underlying strategic problem for Moscow is that its military and security commitments are not matched by its economic interests in the region. As such, there is an inevitable fragility to a regional engagement which lacks a solid economic base. Certainly, the Gulf states have made substantial commitments to invest in Russia, with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) attracting over $40bn of Gulf capital since 2011. However, the reality has often fallen short of what has been promised. Of the $10bn commitment by Saudi Arabia in 2015 during the visit of Muhammed bin Sultan to Moscow, only a quarter had arrived by 2019. Similarly, the UAE has only invested $2bn of the $7bn promised in 2013. As the economic opportunities for Russian business have failed to materialise, there is evidence of fatigue among Russian business circles and a growing scepticism that there will be a substantive economic dividend from the costly Russian engagement in the region.44 As an oil and gas exporting country, Russia has an strong economic interest to cooperate with the GCC states over energy issues, in particular over oil with Saudi Arabia and over gas with Qatar. There has also been some significant progress in developing a stronger institutional framework for this, most notably with OPEC+.45 But, as the breakdown of this agreement in April 2020 demonstrated, Russia is also an economic competitor with the GCC states and there is the lack of complementarity which creates, for example, the depth and intensity of China’s economic engagement in the region. The reality is that Russia is not a particularly attractive site for Gulf investment and is at a disadvantage compared to other more favourable destinations. As a comparison, the UK, and London in particular, has been a magnet for Gulf investment, most of which has gone into longterm safe investments, such as high profile real estate and commercial property. This is reflected in the value of Britain’s exports to the GCC states which reached $20bn in 2019 which is greater than Britain’s 44 Nikolay Kozhanov and Leonid Issaev, “Russian Influence in the Gulf Has Its Limits,” al-Jazeera, 5 April 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/russian-influencegulf-limits-190404133832327.html. 45 Yuliya Deveeva, “Rossiya v Maye vypolnila na 95% sdelku s OPEK po sokrashcheniyu

dobychi Nefti,” Russia in May fulfilled 95% of its deal with OPEC over oil production reduction), Komsomolskaya Pravda, 3 June 2018, https://www.kp.ru/online/news/313 4373; “Strany ne-OPEK v yanvare vypolnili obyazatelstva po sokrashcheniu dobychi nefti na 25%” (Non-OPEC Countries Fulfil Commitments to Reduce Oil Production by 25% in January), Neft Rossii, February 2019, http://www.oilru.com/news/559771.

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exports to China and India. Russia also suffers from a serious cultural and soft power deficit among the GCC states. These countries have longstanding and close cultural and educational relations with the West, with many of the elite educated in the United States and Britain. The GCC states are also littered with American universities and Western cultural institutions, like John Hopkins in Qatar and the Louvre in Abu Dhabi. These reflect the longstanding relations between the Gulf states and the West. In contrast, Russia simply lacks any such cultural capital which exists, for example, in Syria and Iraq where the Soviet legacy still has a resonance.

5

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to contextualise Russia’s return to the Middle East, and its historic achievement of developing more substantive relations with the GCC states, within the broader regional and international context. The core argument is that Russia has found a particular niche or strategic area for action in the Middle East which fills a gap left by the other major external actors in the region. While the United States remains the most powerful external actor in the region, with a military capacity greatly surpassing that of Russia, the Presidencies of both Obama and Trump have consciously declined to get involved militarily in what are deemed to be secondary regional conflicts. This was particularly evident in Syria and Moscow’s willingness to take strategic advantage of this, by backing and sustaining the regime of Assad, has provided Moscow with a diplomatic leverage among the GCC states as well as across the Middle East more generally. Similarly, while China is the emergent superpower in the region, as evident in its economic interests, which are vastly greater than those of Russia, Beijing has not demonstrated a willingness to develop a serious military and security presence in the region which could be seen to challenge US hegemony. Russia can be said to have found a strategic gap between West and East. It has become the go-to interlocutor over the Syrian conflict and increasingly for other conflicts in the region. This has been due to an deliberate exercise of political will and to a commitment to engage with the Middle East that is currently absent in Washington and Beijing as well as other capitals, like Brussels, Paris and London. It seems unlikely now that Russia will lose its hard-won ambition to be treated as a serious actor in the Middle East, at least for the foreseeable future. However, there are

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significant areas of weakness and vulnerability in the long-term Russian position. There is the lack of an economic base to sustain its commitments. Economically, Russia is more a competitor than a complimentary economic partner for much of the region, including the Gulf states, which reduces the economic value and appeal of Russia. This also highlights the role that political will and commitment has played in supporting Russia’s return to the region and how that will need to be sustained into the future. But as other powers have found, it is much easier to get involved than to withdraw from the Middle East, which is precisely the reason why the United States has limited its interventionist impulses in the region. The key question that Russia faces is whether it can seize this opportunity of its ‘moment’ in the Middle East and bring about progressive developments, such as contributing to a more peaceful and prosperous region, which will cement its reputation and role in the region. The view from the capitals of the Gulf monarchies is one of scepticism but a willingness, at the moment, to give Moscow the benefit of the doubt.

CHAPTER 6

Trade, Investment and Politics: Prospects for Russian Economic Cooperation with the Gulf Duncan Allan

1

Introduction

Russia is again an influential participant in Middle Eastern affairs. Its leaders judge that it has reasserted its great power credentials and forced the main Western countries—first and foremost, the US—to treat

Defined, for the purposes of this chapter, as the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE)—Iran and Iraq. The original version of this chapter was revised: A paragraph of the abstract preceding the Introduction has been removed. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_13 D. Allan (B) Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House), London, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021, corrected publication 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_6

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it as an ‘equal’ with a right to be consulted over all major regional questions. Russia’s most striking action has of course been its use of military power to shift the course of events in the Syrian civil war. Otherwise, it has advanced its interests primarily through skillful diplomacy. It has developed ties with a broad range of regional interlocutors. It has balanced, in order to keep as many parts as possible of this increasingly diverse network in play. Where possible, it has built pragmatic relations at the leadership level (for President Vladimir Putin, personal ties are the foundation of effective bilateral diplomacy). As a respected Russian foreign affairs commentator has remarked: With relatively modest investments in blood and treasure, Moscow has managed to turn itself from an almost invisible, marginal player into a power broker of international stature with influence on most of the region’s actors. Russia has succeeded in making it near impossible to resolve many Middle East security problems without Moscow’s involvement.1

Even so, it is important to keep Russia’s resurgence in perspective. Its influence in most of the Middle East is still limited. Complex local circumstances often obstruct the accomplishment of its objectives. Other outside powers, including the leading Western countries, remain much more influential throughout most of the region even if they do not always use their advantages as well as they could or as adeptly as Russia has sometimes played its hand. Finally, Russia’s policy toolkit is rudimentary. As just noted, it relies heavily on its diplomatic prowess to advance its agenda. It would be a mistake to underestimate Russia’s capabilities in this regard, particularly when set against the policy failures with which Western countries have been associated in the Middle East in recent years. Yet no matter how adroit, geopolitical maneuvering can never fully compensate for Russia’s deficiencies. One of the most noteworthy of these is its small economic footprint across the region as a whole.

1 Andrei Kortunov, “The Astana Model: Methods and Ambitions of Russian Political Action,” in The MENA Region: A Great Power Competition, ed. Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019), 53.

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This chapter looks in greater detail at Russia’s trade and investment relationships with the countries of the Persian Gulf, and its involvement in the so-called OPEC+ arrangement. It argues that Russia’s modest economic profile in this part of the world is rooted in some of its own internal weaknesses. The limits to its influence in the Gulf are therefore attributable in part to a failure to address longstanding domestic policy challenges.

2

Trade Relations 2.1

Bilateral Trade

Trade between Russia and the countries of the Persian Gulf is a small fraction of their respective trade turnovers. In 2018, Russia’s trade with the region (excluding arms transfers) came to slightly more than $8 billion (bn), or 1.2% of its own trade turnover and about 0.5% of the Gulf countries’. Russia’s exports were worth an estimated $5.9bn, equal to 0.9% of its own total exports and marginally less than 1% of the region’s imports. Meanwhile, Russia’s imports from the Gulf totaled $1.9bn, just 0.8% of its own total imports and a tiny 0.2% of the Gulf countries’ exports. In sum, these are insubstantial trading relationships for all concerned. Three nuances are, however, worth noting. First, Russia’s trade with the region is heavily concentrated. In 2018, three countries took more than half of Russia’s non-military exports to the Gulf: the UAE, with imports from Russia totaling $2.2bn (mainly precious stones, grain, minerals and chemicals); Iraq, in second place, with $1.4bn (largely grain, fats and oil, and wood and wood products ); and Saudi Arabia, in third

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place, with $1.2bn (mainly grain, metals, minerals and fats and oils).2 Although still small, this concentration of trade does give the bilateral relationships concerned relatively more economic heft and substance than others in the Gulf. A second nuance is that, like the Soviet Union before it, Russia is a major arms exporter, reportedly delivering more than $7bn worth of weaponry and signing contracts worth another $9bn worldwide in 2018.3 It sells large quantities of arms to certain Gulf countries. Iran was the main buyer between 1992 and 2018, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), accounting for an estimated 46.9% of Russian weaponry sold to the region.4 One commentator has estimated that between 1995 and 2005 more than 70% of Iran’s arms imports came from Russia.5 Russian shipments since then have been interrupted by the imposition of multilateral and US sanctions on Iran. Iraq, a major recipient of Russian weaponry in the Soviet period and the 1990s, turned to US suppliers after 2003. In 2012, however, a landmark deal worth $4.2bn marked the start of a new influx of Russian arms.6 Iraq accounted for an estimated 25.9% of total Russian arms exports to the Gulf region from 1992 to 2018.7 By contrast, Russia has struggled to break into the lucrative GCC market. That may now be starting to change. The UAE, which imported small amounts of weaponry from Russia during the 1990s, has emerged as a large-scale importer in recent years, taking an estimated

2 Data from the World Bank World Integrated Solution database, https://wits.worldb ank.org/; and the Federal Customs Service of Russia database, https://customs.ru/. 3 “Rossiya v 2018 godu postavila za rubezh voennuyu produktsiyu na $7 mlrd [‘In 2018 Russia Exports Military Production Worth $7bn’],” Kommersant, 20 August 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3718889. 4 Data from the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/arm stransfers. 5 Anna Kassianova, “Russian Weapons Sales to Iran: Why They Are Unlikely to Stop,”

PONARS Policy Memo Series, No. 427 (2006), 1. 6 See Timofey Borisov, “Russian Arms Exports in the Middle East,” in Russia’s Return to the Middle East: Building Sandcastles? ed. Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Sicrieru (Chaillot Papers: Institute for Security Studies, 2018), 39–40. 7 Data from the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/arm stransfers.

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21.5% of total Russian arms exports to the Gulf from 1992 to 2018.8 In 2017, Saudi Arabia, which is the region’s biggest purchaser of arms but has never bought weaponry from Russia, agreed in principle to buy the S-400 air defense system, although uncertainty surrounds this deal.9 Third, several niche Russian export lines stand out. Insignificant in aggregate terms, they nonetheless generate sizeable revenues for individual Russian companies and the regions where they are located. In 2018 metal products worth an estimated $610.9 million (mn) accounted for 94.8% of Russian exports to Kuwait. The same year precious stones mined largely in the East Siberian republic of Yakutia and worth an estimated $562.8mn accounted for about 38% of Russian exports to the UAE.10 All told, however, Russia’s trade relations with the countries of the Gulf remain insubstantial. There are two main reasons why. One is a lack of structural synergy. The economies of Russia and the Gulf states are noncomplementary: all center on the production and export of commodities, primarily hydrocarbons. The other explanation is the uncompetitiveness of much of Russia’s manufacturing sector. It is often forgotten that Russia is a major industrial power. In 2013, the year before extensive Western sanctions were imposed on it following its invasion of Ukraine, it was the world’s eighth largest manufacturer in terms of value added.11 But nearly all this capacity serves Russia’s domestic market or the markets of neighboring post-Soviet countries, where certain Soviet-era legacy supply

8 Data from ibid. Most Russian arms deliveries to the UAE have taken place since 2000. In addition, since 1992 Russia has sold modest quantities of arms to Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. 9 “Saudovskaya Arabiya i Rossiya obsudili postavku S-400 [‘Saudi Arabia and Russia Discuss Delivery of S-400’],” Lenta.ru, 17 November 2019, https://lenta.ru/news/ 2019/11/17/s400/. Saudi Arabia was reportedly considering the purchase of other Russian weapons as well. 10 Data from the Federal Customs Service of Russia database, https://customs.ru/. 11 Richard Connolly, Russia’s Response to Sanctions. How Western Economic Statecraft Is

Reshaping Political Economy in Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 39.

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chains still operate.12 Put simply, Russian industry produces little that countries further afield, including those in the Gulf, want to buy.13 Changing this would require far-reaching reforms to tackle two longterm challenges. The first is to diversify the structure of Russia’s economy away from its current heavy dependence on hydrocarbon exports. The second challenge is to raise the competitiveness of Russia’s manufacturing sector through increased investment and higher productivity. It is, however, most unlikely that major reforms will be implemented in the foreseeable future. Russian policymakers have talked for years about the importance of diversification to reduce their country’s reliance on its oil and gas industries. Yet despite the movement toward decarbonization of the international economy and predictions that the world may be approaching peak oil demand during the next two decades (a shift that the COVID-19 pandemic has almost certainly accelerated), there is little evidence that the Kremlin intends to carry out the restructuring needed to bring this about.14 The same goes for the reforms necessary to raise the competitiveness of manufacturing industry. Decision-makers decided some time ago that these would endanger domestic political stability. They have therefore prioritized the preservation of the status quo.15 This aversion to potentially destabilizing change has been reinforced by the start of active planning for the end of Putin’s current presidential term in 2024, signalled by the announcement of constitutional changes in January 2020, and the numerous uncertainties that the COVID-19 pandemic has unleashed. Certain Russian exporters will no doubt continue to find niche market opportunities in the Gulf. Wheat is a recent example (Russia has been 12 For a review of Russia’s economic ties with the rest of the non-Baltic post-Soviet

space, see András Deák, “Adhesive and Centrifugal Forces in the Post-Soviet Economic Space,” in What Has Remained of the USSR. Exploring the Erosion of the Post-Soviet Space, ed. Arkady Moshes and András Rácz (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2019), 131–152. 13 For the competitiveness challenges facing Russian industry, see Julian Cooper, “Can Russia Compete in the Global Economy?” Eurasian Geography and Economics, 47:4 (2013): 407–425. 14 Michael Bradshaw, Thijs Van Der Graaf and Richard Connolly, “Preparing for the New Oil Order? Saudi Arabia and Russia,” Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019): 7–10. 15 Philip Hanson, “Russian Economic Policy and the Russian Economic System. Stability Versus Growth,” Chatham House Research Paper (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2019).

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the world’s number-one exporter of wheat since 2016–2017). In August 2019, Saudi Arabia, already the largest importer of Russian barley, announced that it would relax its strict insect-damage standards for wheat imports.16 This led to the first Russian wheat delivery to the country in April 2020.17 Another issue to watch will be Russia’s economic relations with Iran. On the surface, the outlook is inauspicious in the light of rising geopolitical tensions in the region. The reimposition of US sanctions on Iran, following the decision by the Trump administration to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, has already hit Russian companies. For example, in December 2019 TVEL, a subsidiary of Rosatom (Russia’s state-owned civil nuclear corporation), announced that it was suspending work to modernize Iran’s Fordow complex following a decision by the US the previous month to cease waiving sanctions on the facility.18 The reintroduction of US restrictive measures has also caused Russian oil companies to suspend their involvement in various projects in Iran, as will be discussed presently. That said, Russia has also indicated that it may oppose an extension of the restrictions on sales of military equipment to Iran imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2016 (scheduled to expire in October 2020, these permit arms exports to Iran if the UNSC approves them). Russia and Iran have hinted at the possibility of new arms sales should these restrictions be lifted.19 Renewed military-technical cooperation should not be discounted given the history of bilateral collaboration

16 “Russia Dominates Global Wheat Trade. Will Its Exports Continue to Grow?” S&P Platts Insight, 27 December 2019, https://blogs.platts.com/2019/12/27/russia-globalwheat-exports/. 17 “Rossiya nachala postavlyat Saudovskoi Aravii pshenitsu [‘Russia Begins to Supply Wheat to Saudi Arabia’],” Lenta.ru, 9 April 2020, https://lenta.ru/news/2020/04/09/ prodali/. 18 Polina Smertina, “‘Rosatom’ otdalyaetsya ot Irana [‘“Rosatom” Distances Itself from Iran’],” Kommersant, 5 December 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4181801. In May 2019, the US Treasury designated two Russian arms companies and a missile training centre for allegedly violating arms control restrictions imposed on Iran, North Korea and Syria under the 2000 Iran, North Korea and Syria Non-proliferation Act. 19 Marianna Belinkaya, “MID RF schitayet vozmozhnymi peregovory o postavkakh vooruzhenii v Iran [‘Russian MFA Considers Negotiations on Arms Deliveries to Iran Possible’],” Kommersant, 13 May 2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4343009.

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and reports shortly before the UNSC restrictions were imposed that Russia and Iran had been discussing a wide-ranging $8bn arms deal.20 However, in the absence of economic and political reform in Russia, it is unlikely that the overall picture described in this section will change much. For the foreseeable future, Russia’s trade relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf will almost certainly remain limited. 2.2

Trade: Competition

Indeed, trade competition between Russia and the countries of the Gulf, as exporters of hydrocarbons, will probably intensify, not least in an environment of low oil prices.21 This trend has been observable for some time in the shape of growing rivalry between Russia and Saudi Arabia for oil market share in China and India. Following the development of the East Siberia/Pacific Ocean pipeline, in 2016 Russia supplanted Saudi Arabia as the largest supplier of oil to China, although Saudi Arabia regained top spot in 2019. In 2018, about 27.5% of Russian oil exports went to China, accounting for over 15% of China’s imports of crude.22 In response, Saudi Aramco has been trying to circumvent Russia by building a position in China’s refining sector, buying equity in private refineries and aiming to establish itself as their main source of crude. Thus, it entered a joint venture to build the Huajin Aramco refinery and plans to supply up to 70% of its oil.23 Russia and Saudi Arabia are also competitors to supply oil to India. Following the drone attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in the summer of 2019, Indian refineries turned to Russian companies

20 Ivan Safronov and Yelena Chernenko, “Iran pritsenivayetsya k rossiiskomu voen-

promu [‘Iran Sounds Out Russia’s Military Industry’],” Kommersant, 15 February 2016, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2917271. 21 Even if Russia did commit to structural diversification, it would remain a major exporter of hydrocarbons. To that extent, the structures of the economies of Russia and the Gulf countries would continue to be non-complementary. 22 “Itogi raboty Minenergo Rossii i osnovnye rezultaty funktsionirovaniya TEK v 2018 godu [‘Results of the Work of the Ministry of Energy of Russia and the Main Results of the Functioning of the Fuel-and-Energy Complex in 2018’],” website of the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 5 April 2019, https://minenergo.gov.ru/system/dow nload-pdf/14461/95246. 23 Li Chen-Sim, “Moscow’s New Strategy in the Gulf,” We, 27 August 2019, https:// www.aboutenergy.com/en_IT/topics/topic-li-chen-eng.shtml#.

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to supply crude.24 In February 2020, Rosneft signed a contract to ship 2mn tonnes of crude to India Oil.25 Still more revealing was the breakdown of Russian/Saudi oil output co-ordination efforts in March 2020, an episode that is examined in greater depth later in this chapter. It is also likely that Russia’s position as the world’s largest gas exporter will face a growing challenge from the Gulf. The emergence of Iran, which holds an estimated one-sixth of global gas reserves, as a major exporter remains a distant prospect because of the reimposition of US sanctions. But there is already rivalry between Russian and Qatari LNG producers as gas markets become increasingly interconnected and competitive because of greater global LNG capacity, the gradual movement away from oil-indexed pricing and the changing structure of demand for gas in Asia.26 As a result of the oversupply generated by these developments, at the start of 2020 analysts were expecting significant downward pressure on LNG prices and more intense competition for share of the European LNG market.27 Since then, the collapse of oil prices caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has further vindicated these predictions.28

24 “Post Saudi Attack, India in Talks with Russia to Up Crude Supply,” The Economic Times, 17 September 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/ oil-gas/india-looking-to-raise-oil-imports-from-russia-after-saudi-attacks/articleshow/711 70304.cms?from=mdr. 25 ‘“Rosneft” podpisala kontrakt s Indian Oil na postavku v Indiyu 2 mln tonn nefti [‘“Rosneft” Signs Contract with Indian Oil to Deliver 2mn Tonnes of Oil to India’],” Rosneft website, 5 February 2020, https://www.rosneft.ru/press/releases/ item/199699/. 26 See Nikos Tsafos, The Era of the Gas Mega-Players (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/era-gas-megaplayers. 27 Stephen Stapczynski, Anna Shiryaevskaya and Naureen S. Malik, “Global LNG Poised for Terrible Year as Supply Floods Market,” Bloomberg Business, 24 January 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-24/from-texas-to-tokyo-glo bal-lng-poised-for-terrible-year. 28 Verity Ratcliffe and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Qatar Positioned to Risk an LNG Battle That Could Mimic Oil’s Plunge,” World Oil, 12 May 2020, https://www.worldoil.com/ news/2020/5/12/qatar-positioned-to-risk-an-lng-battle-that-could-mimic-oil-s-plunge.

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3 3.1

Investment

Gulf Investment in Russia

The Russian economy has languished since the financial crisis of 2008– 2009. Having ruled out structural reform as the means to achieve higher rates of GDP growth, the authorities attach considerable importance to the ‘national projects,’ a package of ambitious state-led investment programs announced by Putin shortly after his re-election as president in May 2018. These 12 initiatives aim to bring about, among other things, increased life expectancy, sustainable above-inflation growth of wages and pensions, improved housing conditions, poverty reduction, as well as support for innovation, digitization and higher levels of productivity.29 The need to reinvigorate growth has become even more pressing since the beginning of preparations for the end of Putin’s current term of office: the Kremlin sees a growing economy as essential to underpin political stability and widen the authorities’ options as they navigate this period. In these circumstances, the GCC countries appear attractive potential co-investors in state-primed infrastructure modernization and high-value commercial projects. Yet despite a lot of optimistic talk by Russian officials and the representatives of Russian corporations, the countries of the Persian Gulf have not been major sources of inward investment. A good illustration of this was the failure of Novatek, Russia’s LNG champion, to persuade Saudi Aramco to take equity in its flagship Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2 projects.30 The main obstacles to increased investment from the GCC are the same ones that inhibit other would-be foreign investors: an uncompetitive business environment, exemplified by the weak rule of law and endemic corruption; since 2014, Western sanctions (tellingly, Gulf energy corporations have not attempted to fill the technology gap left by Western oil and gas majors); and, because of these factors, more attractive and less risky opportunities elsewhere.

29 “Natsionalnye proekty: klyuchevye tseli i ozhidayemye rezultaty [‘The National Projects: Key Aims and Expected Results’],” website of the Government of the Russian Federation, 11 February 2019, http://government.ru/projects/selection/741/35675/. 30 Novatek’s partners are instead: as regards Yamal LNG, Total SA, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and the Silk Road Fund; and as regards Arctic LNG-2, Total, CNPC, China National Offshore Oil Company, Mitsui and Japan Oil, Gas and Metals Corporation.

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Again, it is important to note certain nuances. In recent years, an interesting dimension of Russia/Gulf economic relations has been the strengthening of ties between sovereign wealth funds (SWFs): the Russian Fund for Direct Investment (RFPI) and those of the GCC, which held an estimated $2.3tn of assets in 2018.31 The RFPI now has formal partnerships with UAE’s Mubadala Investment Company (MIC), Bahrain’s Mumtalakat Holding Company (MHC), the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), the Qatari Investment Authority (QIA) and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF).32 The most advanced of these relationships is that between the RFPI and the QIA. Since 2013, the QIA has taken equity stakes in several Russian blue-chip assets: VTB Bank (2.35% in 2013); Pulkovo and Vnukovo airports (25% each in 2016 and 2018, respectively); and, most eyecatchingly, the joint purchase (with Glencore, the commodity trading and mining giant) of 19.5% of Rosneft, Russia’s national oil champion, in 2016. Priced at almost $11.6bn, the latter transaction was reportedly the largest sale and acquisition in the global oil and gas sector that year.33 The RFPI is deepening its ties with other GCC SWFs as well, although these are less well developed. In 2017, the RFPI and Saudi Arabia’s PIF agreed to set up a joint investment fund, which claims to have $6bn of capital at its disposal, including $1bn for high-tech projects.34 In 2019, the fund announced its first venture, the purchase of a 30.7% stake 31 “Marmore: Gulf Cooperation Council Sovereign Wealth Funds Experience Asset Growth,” Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 6 April 2019, https://www.swfinstitute.org/ news/73342/marmore-gulf-cooperation-council-gcc-sovereign-wealth-funds-dominate-inasset-growth. 32 “Partnerstva RFPI [‘RFPI Partnerships’],” website of the RFPI, undated, https:// rdif.ru/Partnership//. 33 Aspects of the transaction remain exceptionally murky. It was subsequently alleged

that the QIA acted in part as a front for a Russian state-owned bank, which reportedly lent it $6bn. See Tatiyana Moronova, Oksana Kobzova and Dmitry Zhdannikov, “Exclusive: Russian State Bank Secretly Financed Rosneft sale After Foreign Buyers Balked,” Reuters, 9 November 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rosneft-privat isation-exclusive/exclusive-russian-state-bank-secretly-financed-rosneft-sale-after-foreignbuyers-balked-idUSKCN1NE132. 34 “Russia-Saudi Investment Fund,” website of the RFPI, undated, http://rsifund. com/; and “RFPI i PIF zayavlyayut o sozdanii Rossiisko-saudovskoi platformy dlya investitsii v teknologicheskom sektore [‘RFPI and PIF Announce Creation of RussianSaudi Platform for Investment in Technological Sector’],” website of the RFPI, 5 October 2017, https://rdif.ru/fullNews/2657/.

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in Novomet, an oil services company, which it bought from Rosnano, Russia’s state-owned nanotechnology corporation.35 In October 2019, the RFPI announced the opening of its first overseas office in Saudi Arabia.36 Earlier, in 2013 the RFPI and MIC established a joint investment platform worth $2bn.37 The highlight of this relationship so far was the decision in 2018 by a consortium of Mubadala Petroleum, a whollyowned subsidiary of MIC, and the RFPI to buy 49% of Gazprom-Vostok LLC, operator of 13 oil and gas fields in Siberia, from Gazprom Neft, the oil-producing subsidiary of Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas giant.38 The RFPI also claims to have signed a portfolio of projects worth $1.3bn with MIC during Putin’s visit to the UAE in October 2019.39 However, the outlook for GCC investment in Russia is not encouraging. Many of the deals that have been trumpeted by the Russian authorities either remain on paper or are yet to materialize in full. The joint fund established with Saudi Arabia’s PIF offers an instructive lesson. When the sides agreed to create the fund in 2015, it was claimed that the PIF would make $10bn available for investments in ‘attractive projects, including in the field of infrastructure and agriculture’ in Russia—nearly twice as much as the amount that was eventually announced two years later.40 Nor have investment projects been immune from the political 35 Timofei Dzyadko, ‘“Novomet” rasshiryaetsya do Blizhnego Vostoka [‘“Novomet” Expands to Middle East’]’, RBK, 14 October 2019, https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/ 2019/10/15/5da455699a794748c2621737. 36 “V Saudovskoi Aravii otkroyetsya pervyi zarubezhnyi ofis RFPI [‘RFPI Opens Its

First Overseas Office in Saudi Arabia’],” website of the RFPI, 8 October 2019, https:// rdif.ru/fullNews/4463/. 37 “Rossiiskii Fond Pryamykh Investitsii i suverennyi fond OAE Mubadala sozdayut

sovmestnyi investitsionnyi fond [‘Russian Fund for Direct Investment and UAE Sovereign Fund Create Joint Investment Fund’],” website of the RFPI, 20 June 2013, https://rdif. ru/fullNews/406/. 38 Mubadala Petroleum holds 44% of the equity, the RFPI the other 5%. 39 “RFPI primet uchastie v gosudarstvennom vizite Prezidenta V.V. Putina v Obedi-

nennye Arabskie Emiraty [‘RFPI Takes Part in President V.V. Putin’s State Visit to United Arab Emirates,” website of the RFPI, 15 October 2019, https://rdif.ru/fullNews/4452/. 40 “RFPI privlek v rossiiskuyu ekonomiku krupneishie investitsii iz Blizhnevostochnogo regiona – vklad suverennogo fund Saudovskoi Aravii sostavit $10mlrd [‘RFPI Attracts Large-Scale Investments into Russian Economy from Middle East—Saudi Arabia’s Sovereign Fund Contributes $10bn’],” website of the RFPI, 7 July 2015, https://rdif. ru/fullNews/1488/.

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tensions that continue to beset relations between Russia and the countries of the Gulf. For example, in March 2020 it was announced that the PIF had decided to put the Novomet deal on hold after the disagreement between Russia and Saudi Arabia over oil output quotas that brought about a temporary breakdown of the OPEC+ mechanism.41 The key point is that Russia will only attract large investment flows— from the Gulf and elsewhere—when it becomes a more appealing destination for foreign capital. The problem is that, as has already been noted, the Kremlin has decided not to carry out the reforms that might make this a reality. Russian officials and commentators frequently make the mistake of assuming that better political relations with the Gulf countries will automatically lead to an expansion of commerce. Yet despite the degree to which GCC parastatal companies and SWFs may operate according to political considerations, they ultimately function to generate returns on investments; in the final analysis, their decisions are driven by hardheaded business criteria. Accordingly, their asset portfolios are diversified and structured to manage risk.42 Consequently, it is unsurprising that their investments in Russia are small percentages of the total resources at their disposal and the total value of the assets that they manage. For sound commercial reasons, appreciably greater GCC investment in Russia is unlikely in the near future. 3.2

Russian Investment in the Gulf

Russian investment in the Gulf is concentrated in regional energy projects, particularly in Iraq’s oil industry and Iran’s civil nuclear sector. The presence of Russian oil companies in Iraq is partly the result of historical ties

41 Timofei Dzyadko, “Saudi Aramco priostanovila peregovory o pervoi investitsii v Rossii [‘Saudi Aramco Stops Negotiations Over First Investment in Russia’],” RBK, 16 March 2020, https://www.rbc.ru/business/16/03/2020/5e6f341d9a79475f20165e28. 42 In this connection, all prospective investors will have to weigh the probability that many of the restrictive measures imposed by the US on Russia since 2014 will be in place for many years. The main sanctions instrument, the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, ties the lifting of Ukraine-related restrictive measures to implementation of the 2015 Minsk Agreement and is subject to congressional review.

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that predate the US-led invasion in 2003 and partly because of opportunities that have opened up during the last decade.43 By early 2019, aggregate Russian investment in the sector was estimated at more than $10bn.44 The leading Russian investor is LUKoil, Russia’s largest private oil company, which since 2009 has acquired a 75% position in the West Qurna 2 consortium under the terms of a 25-year contract. Production there, which began in March 2014, accounts for about 9% of Iraq’s oil output and 12% of its oil exports.45 More controversially, in February 2017 Rosneft signed an agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government for $2.1bn of pre-paid oil. This was followed later in the year by agreements to explore for oil and, shortly before a scheduled independence referendum in Kurdistan, to build a gas pipeline there.46 There was a great deal of speculation at the time about Rosneft’s motives. Given the legal uncertainties and political sensitivities associated with these deals, as well as the extra debt that it assumed to make them happen, the long-term benefits for Rosneft remain unclear.47 Since 2012, one of Rosneft’s subsidiaries, Bashneft, has also been operating in Iraq as the majority shareholder in a consortium conducting test drilling in the Southwest of the country.48

43 For background, see Vera Mironova and Muhammed Hussein, “The Future of Iraqi’s Oil Is Russian,” Foreign Policy, 15 November 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/ 11/15/trump-keeping-iraq-oil-russia-leading-middle-east/. 44 “Russia’s Oil and Gas Investments in Iraq Exceed $10 Billion,” Neftegaz.ru, 28 February 2019, https://neftegaz.ru/en/news/russia/406419-russias-oil-and-gas-inv estments-in-iraq-exceed-10-billion/. 45 “LUKoil v Respublike Iraka [‘Lukoil in the Republic of Iraq’],” LUKoil website, undated, http://www.lukoil.ru/Company/BusinessOperation/GeographicReach/Asia/ LUKOILinIraq. 46 “‘Rosneft’ razvivayet proyekty v Irakskom Kurdistane [‘“Rosneft develops projects in Iraqi Kuridstan’],” Rosneft website, 18 September 2017, at https://www.rosneft.ru/ press/releases/item/187709/. 47 For example, see Mariya Petkova, “What Did Russia Get from Its KRG gamble?” Al Jazeera, 15 April 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/russia-krg-gamblerosneft-iraq-kurdistan-190409123038460.html. 48 D. Savosin and O. Bakhtina, “‘Bashneft v 2019g. namerena proburit 2-yu poiskovuyu skvazhinu na Bloke 12 v Irake’ [‘Bashneft Intends to Drill Second Exploratory Well in Block 12 in Iraq in 2019’],” Neftegaz.ru, 14 December 2018, https://neftegaz.ru/news/drill/196175-bashneft-v-2019-g-namerena-proburit-2yu-poiskovuyu-skvazhinu-na-bloke-12-v-irake-khotya-ne-eto-lyub/.

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Other Russian energy companies are present in Iraq’s oil industry. Since 2014 Gazprom Neft, through its Gazprom-Badra subsidiary, has been involved in the development of the Badra field in East Iraq, producing 13.5mn tonnes of oil by August 2019.49 A less prominent Russian operator is Stroitransgaz, which in September 2019 concluded a 34-year contract for exploration and construction in Anbar province.50 The second major focus for Russian investment in the Gulf is Iran’s civil nuclear industry. In the teeth of considerable US opposition, Rosatom completed the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which came online in 2011; Iran assumed operational control of the facility two years later.51 In 2014, Rosatom signed a contract with the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran to build two new units (reactors) for the second phase of the Bushehr project—it agreed to provide fuel and equipment ‘throughout the entire life cycle’—with an option for six units more at other sites in Iran.52 Construction of Bushehr-2 officially began in November 2019.53 For many years, greater Russian involvement in Iran’s economy has been stymied by sanctions and a bilateral relationship that, although cooperative on several levels, is still difficult for the Kremlin to manage. Following the signing of the JCPOA in 2015, the lifting of international sanctions seemed to unlock fresh possibilities for Russian companies. LUKoil was again to the fore: signing a deal to explore for oil and gas in Khuzestan in 2016; becoming (via Litasco, its marketing and trading subsidiary) one of the first foreign companies to buy Iranian crude; and

49 “‘Gazprom Neft’ dobyla na mestorozhdenii Badra v Irake 100-millionnyi barrel nefti

[‘“Gazprom Neft” Extracts 100-Millionth Barrel of Oil from Badra Deposit in Iraq’],” Gazprom Neft website, 15 August 2019, https://badra.gazprom-neft.ru/press-center/ news/51215/. 50 Mironova and Muhammed Hussein, “The Future of Iraqi’s Oil Is Russian”. 51 For background, see Ali Vaez and Karim Sadjapour, Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey. Costs and

Risks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013). 52 “Podgotovka gruntov na meste AES “Busher-2” (Iran) idet s operezheniem grafika [‘On-Site Soil Preparation at the “Bushehr-2” Nuclear Power Station Ahead of Schedule’],” Rosatom website, 25 September 2018, at https://www.rosatom.ru/journa list/smi-about-industry/podgotovka-gruntov-na-meste-aes-busher-2-iran-idet-s-operezhen iem-grafika-rosatom/. 53 A. Ignatiev, “Rossiya i Iran nachali stroitelstvo 2-go energobloka AES Busher [‘Russia and Iran Begin Construction of Second Power Unit of Bushehr Nuclear Power Station’],” Neftegaz.ru, 11 November 2019, https://neftegaz.ru/news/nuclear/505277-rossiya-iiran-nachali-stroitelstvo-2-go-energobloka-aes-busher/.

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(with Rosneft) voicing interest in selling oil and oil products in the Gulf along swap channels.54 Russia and Iran also agreed an ‘oil-for-goods’ program in August 2017. Designed to offset Iran’s lack of hard currency, this envisioned the exchange of Iranian oil for Russian machinery and investment. Russian Railways was at the center of a major infrastructure project to build a rail line connecting Turkey with Iran via Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In 2018, the reimposition of US sanctions put these initiatives on hold for the time being. In the meantime, Russia indicated a readiness to invest up to $10bn in the Iranian oil industry and barter ‘stranded’ Iranian crude, which it would process and export, thus freeing up its own crude for sale abroad.55 It is unclear whether these were serious proposals or whether they were designed first and foremost to signal solidarity with Iran in the face of US pressure—another attempt by Russia to present itself to the leadership in Tehran as an ‘honest broker’ and Iran’s partner of choice among the major powers. The activities of Russian oil and gas companies elsewhere in the Gulf have been desultory. In 2015, Gazprom and Kuwait LNG signed a Memorandum of Understanding.56 In October 2019, LUKoil and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) acquired 5% of the Ghasha gas concession in the UAE,57 the first time that a Russian company

54 “LUKOIL priostanovil realizatsiyu planov v Irane iz-za ugrozy sanktsii SShA [‘LUKOIL Stops Implementation of Plans in Iran Because of Threat of US Sanctions’],” Neftegaz.ru, 30 May 2018, https://neftegaz.ru/news/companies/201136-lukoyl-priost anovil-realizatsiyu-planov-v-irane-iz-za-ugrozy-sanktsiy-ssha/. 55 Alex Vatanka, “Iran and Russia: A Tale of Unfulfilled Potential,” Middle East Institute, 17 March 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-russia-tale-unfulfilledeconomic-potential. Russia also offered to facilitate sales of Iranian oil if the EU’s Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (Instex) payment platform, designed to circumvent US sanctions and enable companies to continue trading with Iran, did not come on stream. The first Instex transaction was completed on 31 March 2020. 56 “Gazprom podpisal memorandum o sotrudnichestve v neftegaze s Kuveitom [‘Gazprom Signs Memorandum on Cooperation in the Oil and Gas Sector with Kuwait’],”, Neftegaz.ru, 10 November 2015, https://neftegaz.ru/news/partnership/226 001-gazprom-podpisal-memorandum-o-sotrudnichestve-v-neftegaze-s-kuveytom/. 57 “LUKoil vkhodit v proekt po dobyche uglevodorodov Gasha v OAE [‘LUKoil Enters into Project to Extract Hydrocarbons at Ghasha in UAE’],” LUKoil website, 15 October 2019, https://lukoil.ru/PressCenter/Pressreleases/Pressrelease?rid=395172.

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had bought a UAE-based upstream asset. ADNOC has signed framework agreements with Gazprom Neft58 and the Russian Energy Agency.59 Once more, it is unclear what, if anything, some of these agreements will deliver in practice. Outside the hydrocarbons sector, various Russian state and parastatal corporations have been linked with the Gulf. Besides its presence in Iran, Rosatom has shown a growing interest in the UAE, which is the location of its regional office for the Middle East and North Africa.60 Since 2015, it has supplied enriched uranium for the UAE’s first nuclear power plant at Barakah.61 In October 2019, it signed a cooperation memorandum with the UAE Atomic Energy Corporation on possible future joint work.62 Rosatom also claims to be in discussions with Saudi Arabia, which has announced plans to build 16 nuclear reactors by 2032. In 2017, the corporation opened an office of its Rosatom-Overseas subsidiary in Riyadh.63 In October 2019, Russian Railways and Saudi Railways signed a cooperation agreement covering the sale of railway equipment as part of Saudi 58 “‘Gazprom Neft’ i ADNOC dogovorilis o strategicheskom sotrudnichestve v neftegazovoi sektore [‘Gazprom Neft’ i ADNOC Reach Agreement Over Strategic Cooperation in Oil and Gas Sector’],” Gazprom Neft website, 16 October 2019, https://www.gazprom-neft.ru/press-center/news/gazprom-neft-i-adnocdogovorilis-o-strategicheskom-sotrudnichestve-v-neftegazovoy-otrasli/. 59 “Rossiiskoe energeticheskoe agentstvo Minergo Rossii i ADNOC Upstream podpisali ramochnoe Soglashenie o sotrudnichestve [‘Russian Energy Agency of Ministry of Energy of Russia and ADNOC Upstream Sign Framework Agreement on Cooperation’],” website of the Russian Energy Agency, 15 October 2019, http://rosenergo.gov.ru/cur_news/ 2019-10-15/473/. 60 “Rosatom – Mezhdunarodnaya Set [‘Rosatom—International Network’],” Rosatom website, undated, https://www.rosatom.ru/about/international/rusatom_international_ network/. 61 “‘Rosatom’ osushchestvit pervuyu postavku obogashchennogo urana na AES Baraka OAE v 2016 godu [‘“Rosatom” to Make First Delivery of Enriched Uranium to Barakah Nuclear Power Station in UAE in 2016’],” Oilcapital.ru, 15 October 2015, https://oilcapital.ru/news/markets/15-10-2015/rosatom-osuschestvitpervuyu-postavku-obogaschennogo-urana-na-aes-baraka-v-oae-v-2016-godu?ind=18556. 62 “‘Rosatom’ i korporatsiya po atomnoi energii OAE dogovorilis o sotrudnichestve [‘“Rosatom” and Atomic Energy Corporation of UAE Agree to Co-operate’],” RIA Novosti, 15 October 2019, https://ria.ru/20191015/1559813771.html. 63 “Rosatom otkryvaet filial v Saudovskoi Aravii [‘Rosatom Opens Subsidiary in Saudi Arabia’],” Rosatom website, 10 June 2019, https://www.rosatom.ru/journalist/news/ros atom-otkryvaet-filial-v-saudovskoy-aravii/.

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Arabia’s Vision 2030 program of economic modernization and diversification.64 In 2017 Sibur, Russia’s largest petrochemicals producer, formed a consortium with Sabic, Saudi Aramco’s chemicals subsidiary, and Total to construct a synthetic rubber plant in Saudi Arabia. In October of the same year Sibur, the RFPI, Saudi Aramco and Sabic appeared to deepen their commitment to the project, signing memorandums of understanding and cooperation.65 After the project was repeatedly delayed, however, in early August 2020 Sibur announced that it was withdrawing from it, citing insufficient commercial attractiveness.66 All said, significantly greater Russian investment in the Gulf region looks improbable. In the hydrocarbons sector, Iraq is likely to remain the main area of activity for the time being. As regards Iran, the key factor will be US sanctions, the swingeing nature of which will almost certainly keep would-be Russian investors away, although Rosatom appears committed to further work. A key challenge for Russian energy companies is whether they can offer potential Gulf partners modern, competitive technology and know-how. This will be particularly important in an era of low oil prices, which will squeeze capital budgets and put an even larger premium on value for money. In the meantime, the region may well continue to offer various ad hoc investment opportunities, in the hydrocarbons and other sectors.

4

Russia & ‘OPEC−+’

Russia’s cooperation with the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—‘OPEC+’—originated in the collapse of oil prices in late 2014. Caused by slowing global growth and rising global oil supply, brought about in particular by increased US tight oil production, 64 “RZhD gotovy predlozhit Saudovskoi Aravii svoi uslugi [‘Russian Railways Prepared to Offer Its Services to Saudi Arabia’],” Ria Novosti, 30 September 2019, https://ria. ru/20190930/1559266364.html. 65 “Sibur, RFPI, Saudi Aramco i Sabic podpisali memorandumy o vzaimoponimanii i po vozmozhnomu sotrudnichestvu v RF i Saudovskoi Aravii [‘Sibur, RFPI, Saudi Aramco and Sabic Sign Memorandums on Mutual Understanding and Potential Cooperation in the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia’],” Sibur website, 5 October 2017, https:// www.sibur.ru/press-center/news/SIBURRFPISaudiAramcoiSabicpodpisalimemorandum yovzaimoponimaniipovozmozhnomusotrudnichestvuvRFiSaudov/. 66 Olga Mordyushchenko, “Sibur ne poidet v Araviyu [‘Sibur Not Going to Arabia’],” Kommersant, 4 August 2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4442475.

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this halted Russia’s stuttering recovery from the 2009 financial crisis and pushed the country into recession. A sharp fall in the value of the ruble triggered a jump in domestic inflation. The Russian authorities reacted by moving from exchange-rate targeting to inflation targeting, allowing the ruble to depreciate and raising interest rates. They also enacted an austerity package, slashing public expenditures.67 In 2017, they introduced a ‘fiscal rule’: revenues from oil above $40 per barrel would not be available for government spending but would be paid into the National Welfare Fund; if oil prices fell below this level, the authorities would be allowed to draw an equivalent sum from the Fund. This weakened the link between oil prices and budgetary revenues, and contributed to macroeconomic stability.68 In terms of oil production policy, Russia’s initial response to lower prices was to maximize market share. By early 2016, however, with oil prices down to roughly $30 per barrel, policy shifted toward shoring up prices. Russia opened negotiations with OPEC over possible co-ordinated output restrictions. This led, in December 2016, to an agreement to cut production by 1.8mn barrels per day (mbpd), with Russia’s quota set at 300,000 bpd (benchmarked against the October 2016 output level). Implemented from January 2017, the reduction helped to bring prices back to the $60–70 per barrel bracket by the end of the year. OPEC+ then agreed to extend the cuts to June 2018, by which time prices had risen further to approximately $80 per barrel. In December 2018 output restrictions were relaxed, to 1.2 mbpd. Russia’s quota this time was 228,000 bpd, again based on the previous October’s production figures. This agreement was extended in June 2019. 69 The OPEC+ agreements were unpopular with sections of Russia’s oil industry—Igor Sechin, CEO of Rosneft, was vocal in his opposition70 —on the grounds that they slowed the development of new oil

67 The World Bank in the Russian Federation, Russia Economic Report No. 33. The Dawn of a New Era? (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 2015). 68 The World Bank in the Russian Federation, Russia Economic Report No. 38. Russia’s

Recovery: How Strong Are its Roots? (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 2017), 20–25. 69 For background, see Nicholas Trickett, Russia-Saudi Arabia Oil Cooperation: The Rise of OPEC+? (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2018). 70 For example, Vitalii Petlevoi, “Sechin: soglashenie OPEK+ stalo strategicheskoi ugrozoi dlya rossiiskoi neftyanoi otrasli [‘Sechin: OPEC+ Agreement Has Become

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fields and ceded market share to foreign competitors, notably US tight oil producers, which needed higher prices to cover their narrower margins.71 In the end, however, Russia’s companies broadly did what they were told and cut production, aware that the Kremlin had made its wishes clear (and also, no doubt, because they gained from higher and more stable prices).72 From the viewpoint of Russian policymakers, the OPEC+ mechanism had two benefits. Most obviously, it helped to put a floor under global oil prices. This eased the short-term pressure on Russia’s economy and public finances, which recovered impressively. In January 2020, the Kremlin felt confident enough to readjust policy, shifting the emphasis to kick-starting GDP growth by rejuvenating the national projects.73 The other benefit of OPEC+ was geopolitical. For Russia, making the mechanism work entailed strengthening relations with Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s de facto leader. This accorded with the Kremlin’s strategy of broadening its regional ties: building relationships with a diverse range of interlocutors while at the same time avoiding where possible taking sides in the Middle East’s numerous conflicts. Russia therefore sought to compartmentalize its relationship with Saudi Arabia, putting differences

Strategic Threat to Russian Oil Sector’],” Vedomosti, 8 February 2019, https://www. vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2019/02/08/793700-sechin-soglashenie-opek. 71 A further complaint was that from 2016 to 2019 Russia’s OPEC+ quotas included crude oil and gas condensate, whereas the quotas for OPEC members only covered crude. This disadvantaged Russia, whose production of condensate has grown in recent years because its major gas fields operate at deep levels, which contain large volumes of ‘wet’ gas. In December 2019, it was agreed that Russia’s OPEC+ quota would apply to crude oil alone. See James Henderson and Vitaly Yermakov, The New Deal for Oil Markets: Implications for Russia’s Short-Term Tactics and Long-Term Strategy (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2020), 19. 72 In a further attempt to demonstrate its reliability as a partner for OPEC, Russia helped to broker a reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran that had threatened the initial production agreement at the end of 2016. See Carole Nakhle, “Russia’s Energy Diplomacy in the Middle East,” in Popescu and Sicrieru, Russia’s Return to the Middle East, 32. 73 This seems to have been a key reason for the enforced resignation on 15 January

2020 of the Medvedev Government, which was widely perceived to have made insufficient progress with the projects. Since then, however, the renewed focus on the projects has been overtaken by the far more pressing need to address the economic dislocations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, the Russian authorities have put back the date for delivery of the projects from 2024 to 2030.

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(for example, over Syria, Iran and Yemen) to one side in the interests of pragmatic cooperation.74 Additionally, by aligning with OPEC, Russia reiterated its broader claims to be developing relations with nonWestern partners, thus presenting itself as part of a movement away from a Western-centric international order and demonstrating to the leading Western powers that it had strategic options. In July 2019, it agreed to the semi-institutionalization of OPEC+. The 14 members of OPEC and the 10 members of the Non-OPEC Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee signed a Charter of Cooperation Within OPEC+ .75 However, in March 2020 the OPEC+ arrangement—and the Russia/Saudi axis at its core—broke down spectacularly. The proximate cause was a difference over oil production policy. Russia wanted the quota package of 1.7 mbpd, agreed in December 2019 and scheduled to expire on 1 April, to run for another quarter. Saudi Arabia demanded an additional cut of 1.5 mbpd, to run to end-2020; Russia would take 300,000 bpd of this (doubling its quota). Russian officials questioned whether such a reduction would lift prices given the uncertain impact of COVID-19 on the global economy. They advised sticking with the existing quotas, arguing that it would be preferable to allow the market to settle rather than risk a further output reduction that might have to be reversed, thus adding to price volatility.76 When Saudi Arabia threatened to press ahead with a unilateral output increase, Russia decided to call its bluff. Three factors shaped the Kremlin’s response. First, a determination not to lose face—a crucial consideration for Russia’s leaders. Second, as already mentioned, leading Russian oil companies were opposed to the OPEC+ arrangement in principle. Sechin’s anti-US mood would have been further darkened by the decision of the US authorities, in February 2020, to impose sanctions on a Rosneft subsidiary for dealing in Venezuelan crude.77 Lastly, the assessment of

74 For background, see Eugene Rumer, Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019), 26–29. 75 Nicola Pedde, “Russia’s Strategy Toward Iran and the Gulf,” in Mezran and Varvelli, The MENA Region, 138–140. 76 Derek Brower, Anjli Raval, David Sheppard and Gregory Meyer, “Eight Days That Shook the Oil Market—And the World,” Financial Times, 13 March 2020. 77 Ivan Tkachev and Lyudmila Podobedova, “SShA vvel sanktsii protiv “dochki” “Rosnefti” iz-za Venesuely [‘USA Sanctions “subsidiary” of “Rosneft” Because of Venezuela’],”

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Russian decision-makers was that their country’s public finances could cope with a period of low prices. In December 2019, Finance Minister Siluanov said that Russia would be able to fulfill its budgetary commitments for three years if oil prices fell to $25–30 per barrel.78 Russia also judged that it was in a better place than Saudi Arabia to cope with a low oil price environment: its 2020 budget was originally calculated to balance at an oil price of $42.4, whereas Saudi Arabia’s balanced at about $80.79 Moreover, Russia’s oil industry seemed to be well positioned to cope with lower oil prices. Again, there were three reasons why. First, Russia’s sliding tax system offers producers a shield. When oil prices are high, the state takes most of the revenue windfall; when prices are low, the tax take decreases. Second, a floating exchange rate means that falling oil prices normally lead to ruble depreciation, reducing oil companies’ costs in dollar terms. Finally, because of limited debt exposure (the consequence of deleveraging since the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014), most Russian oil producers had solid balance sheets.80 Moscow did not give up on the OPEC+ mechanism, which had earlier served its interests. Although Russia accepted Saudi Arabia’s challenge and boosted oil production in early March, Energy Minister Novak emphasized that ‘the doors aren’t closed’ to future cooperation.81 Russia’s calculation appeared to be that it could weather several months of low prices, grind down Saudi Arabia’s resolve and damage the US tight oil industry along the way. If all this happened, the thinking went, Russia

RBK, 18 February 2020, https://www.rbc.ru/business/18/02/2020/5e4c00769a7947c 7810542e9. 78 “Siluanov: rezervov RF khvatit na tri goda pri padenii tsen na neft do $25-30 za barrel [‘Siluanov: Russia’s Reserves Will Suffice for Three Years If Oil Prices Fall to $25–30 per Barrel’],” TASS, 24 December, 2019, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/7417071. 79 Davide Barbuscia and Darya Korsunskaya, “Russia vs Saudi: How Much Pain Can They Take in Oil Price War?” Reuters, 9 March 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-opec-oil-policies/russia-vs-saudi-how-much-pain-can-they-take-in-oil-price-war-idUSKB N20W21S. 80 Henderson and Yermakov, New Deal for Oil Markets, 14–19. See too Henry Foy and David Sheppard, “Why Russia’s Oil Groups Are Well Positioned for a Price Crash,” Financial Times, 30 March 2020. 81 “‘Dveri ne zakryty’. Novak dopustil vozmozhnost Rossii poiti na popyatnuyu v istorii s OPEK+ [‘“The Doors Aren’t Closed”. Novak Allows for Possibility That Russia Will Reverse Course Over OPEC+’],” Interessant, 10 March 2020, https://www.interessant. ru/economics/dvieri-nie-zakryty-och.

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and Saudi Arabia might strike a fresh production co-ordination deal later in the year but with both now enjoying larger market share. However, Russian policymakers badly underestimated the devastating impact of COVID-19 on the global economy, particularly the unprecedented collapse in demand for oil that it triggered. This would have been a problem for Russia in any context. What made it especially troubling was that it coincided with the heightened political sensitivities associated with the beginning of planning for the end of Putin’s current presidential term. This put renewed emphasis on the maintenance of domestic political stability, a key element of which, for the Kremlin, has always been a healthy economy. Growing economic uncertainty worried the Kremlin’s political managers, who were concerned that they had limited time in which to prepare for 2024. Russia was offered a way out by US President Donald Trump’s eagerness to stabilize global oil markets for US internal political reasons. A new OPEC+ output agreement, agreed on 12 April and effectively brokered by Trump, represented a significant climbdown by the Kremlin. Russia undertook to slash output by 2.5 mbpdin in May and June 2020. This would then taper down: to 2 mbpd from July (later postponed until the start of August) to end-December; and to 1.5 mbpd from January 2021 to end-April 2022.82 These reductions dwarfed anything that Russia had been prepared to assent to only a few weeks earlier. Given the seriousness of the crisis, the Kremlin wasted no time implementing the terms of the new deal. The Ministry of Energy announced that it had reached agreement with Russia’s oil companies to share the country’s OPEC+ quota.83 Sechin was reportedly unhappy because this implied that Rosneft would have to reduce production by about 40%, although his position as one of Putin’s closest associates seems to have won the company compensation in other potentially lucrative spheres, for

82 Anjli Raval, Derek Brower and David Sheppard, “What Does the US-Backed Opec+ Deal Mean for the World?” Financial Times, 13 April 2020. 83 D. Savosin, “Minenergo dogovorilos s neftyanymi kompaniyami o sokrashchenii dobychi nefti na 20%? [‘Has Ministry of Energy Agreed with Oil Companies to Reduce Oil Extraction by 20%?’],” Neftegaz.ru, 21 April 2020, https://neftegaz.ru/news/ dobycha/543945-minenergo-dogovorilos-s-neftyanymi-kompaniyami-o-sokrashchenii-dob ychi-nefti-na-20.

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example as one of the state’s commercial partners in genetic research.84 In the meantime, the technical challenges involved in delivering the initial quota were considerable. Temporarily shutting oil wells risked doing permanent damage to the mature fields that are the backbone of Russia’s industry but which would usually be obvious candidates for cutbacks on grounds of relative efficiency and profitability. Lower output also threatened to affect regions and related industries dependent on the oil sector.85 By the time of writing, the OPEC+ production cuts had helped to stabilize oil prices at roughly $40 per barrel. It was, however, uncertain how sustainable this correction would prove to be. Much still depended on the future impact of COVID-19 on the global economy, in particular whether there would be further spikes of the pandemic. These events underline the importance of viewing OPEC+ in perspective. In reality, the arrangement was never quite what it seemed. Although it was a factor behind the recovery and stabilization of oil prices after 2017, its influence was always contingent on wider global trends. As one analyst perceptively argued in 2018: Even if Russia continues to coordinate production with OPEC in the long term, this so-called OPEC+ will likely face the same market challenges that OPEC has faced since the 1980s, with shifts in price, demand and nonOPEC+ production affecting the market. Oil prices are likely to remain volatile, creating a boom-and-bust cycle for oil markets and Russia-Saudi ties.86

It follows, second, that the underlying Russia/Saudi relationship was not as substantive and solid as the OPEC+ mechanism suggested and as the Kremlin liked to claim. In the final analysis, OPEC+ was an arrangement forced on Moscow and Riyadh by economic circumstances. As has already been pointed out, the sides’ geopolitical interests do diverge—sharply so in some cases—despite the Kremlin’s efforts to keep the bilateral relationship on an even keel. Oil output co-ordination enabled Russia and 84 “Rosneft stala partnerom v krupnom rossiiskom geneticheskom proyekte [‘Rosneft Becomes Partner in Major Russian Genetics Project’],” BBC.com, 8 June 2020, https:// www.bbc.com/russian/features-52470990. 85 Henderson and Yermakov, New Deal for Oil Markets, 20–24. 86 Trickett, Russia-Saudi Arabia Oil Cooperation, p. 1.

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Saudi Arabia to paper over their differences but did not eliminate them. Indeed, these geopolitical tensions will continue to put a ceiling on the further development of bilateral ties, particularly when, outside the OPEC+ arrangement, the economic component of the relationship is so small. Third, in any case Russia’s long-term commitment to the OPEC+ mechanism was in doubt before the events of March as its companies faced the prospect of diminishing output at their main oil fields, starting in the middle of the current decade. According to one analysis, production at Russia’s brownfield sites was projected to fall on average by 2.3% per year, possibly by more, during the period to 2030, dropping from 11 to 11.25 mbpd to about 10 mbpd. By adding to pressure to find new greenfield assets and enhance the performance of existing fields, this might well complicate future attempts at oil production co-ordination.87 Lastly, it is worth remembering why Russia entered into the OPEC+ arrangement in the first place: its exposure to swings in global oil prices. From the outset, therefore, the OPEC+ mechanism was an implicit acknowledgment of one of Russia’s enduring vulnerabilities as much as an emblem of its new-found geopolitical strength.

5

Conclusions

Russia’s economic ties with the countries of the Persian Gulf are thin. Trade between them is a fraction of their respective trade turnovers. Investment flows are small. At the same time, the long-term significance of Russia’s alignment with OPEC—the so-called OPEC+ format—is less than meets the eye despite its record since 2017 of exerting shortterm influence over global oil prices and boosting cooperation between Moscow and Riyadh. Russia needs to implement far-reaching internal reforms if it is to diversify, and raise the competitiveness of, its economy. If it does not do this, its economic offer to the Gulf will remain underwhelming. Yet, as has been mentioned at several points in this chapter, structural reform is most unlikely to happen under Russia’s current leaders, who see it as a direct threat to political stability and regime security. By defending the domestic status quo so resolutely, they are preventing the creation of a 87 James Henderson and Ekaterina Grushevenko, The Future of Russian Oil Production in the Short, Medium and Long Term (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2019).

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more competitive economy and denying themselves a tool that would help them to conduct a more effective foreign policy. As long as its external economic power is so underdeveloped, Russia will have to rely disproportionately on its ability as a geopolitical operator to protect its interests in the Middle East (and other parts of the world). Western policymakers would be well advised not to disparage the skill of Russian diplomacy. But Russia’s modest economic footprint in the Persian Gulf is a reminder that its re-emergence in the region has its limits—and should therefore be assessed with a cool and balanced mind.

CHAPTER 7

Going Beyond Politics: Russian Energy Interests in the Gulf Region Mikhail Krutikhin

1

Forget the USSR

The Russian Federation is hardly a successor of the Soviet Union in its attitude toward the Gulf region and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) area. The difference is obvious. In the Soviet Union, the domineering motivation was the expansion of the communist ideology under the aegis of the USSR and, consequently, the cold-war confrontation with the West. The Soviet rulers spared no efforts and spent enormous government-controlled funds to buy allegiance of foreign governments, political parties, national liberation movements, etc.—almost without personal motivation. Today, Russia’s ruling elite is unwilling to continue that liberal spending for several reasons: the state funds are somewhat limited (and often regarded as personal property of decision makers); and the clear-cut ideological motivation has been abandoned. For the current Moscow rulers, political motivation is still a strong factor, but it is directed mainly inward, to persuade the population of

M. Krutikhin (B) RusEnergy, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_7

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their country that Russia is a great global power and a force to be reckoned with. Appearances and pompous domestic propaganda, rather than actual achievements, play the principal role. Russia often positions itself as a spoiler of other countries’ moves—just to get recognized as an equal partner in tackling regional and international problems. It explains the desire of Moscow to befriend everybody in sight—and, cynically enough, everybody uses the Russian approaches as a pretext to get some gains from the United States or China. In the Gulf region, as anywhere else, Russia is unable to compete with the West or with China economically: Russia’s footprint in the international economy is microscopic: between 1.7 and 2.7% of the global GDP and keeps shrinking. Technologically, it cannot contribute to any other country’s progress as it depends to a great extent on imported know-how and equipment. Russia’s efforts in building economic relations on the big state level have been limited to a recent alliance with OPEC and the impotent Gas Exporting Countries Forum, which is merely an impotent consulting office rather than an influential cartel or real alliance. There have been speculations in the media about Russia’s desire to prevent some imaginary projects in the Gulf region, such as gas pipelines from Qatar and Iran reaching Europe by way of Syria or Turkey. Some observers even suggested that Gazprom’s interests were behind the warfare in Syria. The allegations have not been supported by an analysis of commercial and logistic potential of such pipeline projects. The emergence of LNG as the main driving force of the global energy market has made Russia to take a closer look at competitors in this business, such as Qatar and Iran. Russia is developing its own LNG facilities and hopes to become a major player on this market. Logically, it would be reasonable to expect some sort of dirty play in the Gulf region against the LNG export potential of these two countries. As to oil, Russian companies will hardly treat Gulf oil producers as competitors. They understand that Russia will soon see a peak of oil production (depletion of brownfields and prohibitively high costs of developing the remaining tight reserves). Instead, some Russian oil producers are willing to expand internationally, and the Gulf region is one of their targets. For the Gulf nations, the quality of wannabe Russian partners is an important issue. Some companies, such as Lukoil, Tatneft, or Gazprom Neft, are commercially safe and sensible, pursuing business goals and focusing on maximization of profit and minimization of loss. Other

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Russian players, such as Rosneft or Gazprom, are often inefficient, corrupt, and too politicized to be regarded as viable partners. Moreover, some of them are under Western sanctions, which restrict their ability to cooperate. In all cases, meticulous due diligence efforts are required to accept or reject a Russian partner.

2

Friend or Foe?

It would be oversimplistic to believe that Russia is interested in the Gulf only because its government regards the oil-and-gas-rich area from the angle of competition on the global energy market. Indeed, Russia is one of the world’s three largest producers of oil (together with Saudi Arabia and the United States) and the second largest producer of natural gas after the United States. In the current situation, when the world is witnessing an abundance of oil supply and an overabundance of gas on the market, it would be reasonable to assume that decision makers in Moscow care about maintaining and expanding market niches for the national production of hydrocarbons—and do what they can to prevent Gulf competitors from winning this race. Allegedly, the methods might vary within a very wide range, from temporary cartel agreements to provoking unrest in the Gulf area with an aim of decreasing the area’s oil producing potential. In fact, Russia’s motivation in this respect is not so straightforward—particularly where oil production and exports are concerned. Oil producers in the Gulf area cannot be considered as direct competitors with Russian oil exports, for several reasons. To begin with, their market niches are, in most cases, different. The principal recipients of Russian crude oil and refined products are refineries in Europe, which have long ago adapted their equipment to specifics of the Russian Urals blend, in terms of density and sulfur content, and contracts with these refineries with fixed volumes form the backbone of Russian oil exports. In the east, China absorbs almost all Russian crude that goes to Asia, and the flow is stable and undisturbed by any competition from other suppliers.1 When the European and Chinese refineries that usually consume Russian oil receive deliveries from the Gulf area, it is a rare occasion that does not disturb the usual balance. 1 Mikhail Krutikhin, “Russian Oil Exports to China: Restricted Prospects”, Geopolitics of Energy, 40, Issue 9, 10 October 2018.

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Moreover, Russia faces an approaching peak of oil production in 2021– 2022 before a steady decline of crude oil output because of depletion of ongoing projects’ reserves and shortage of new discoveries. About 70% of remaining oil reserves in the country are officially recognized as hard-to-recover and commercially non-feasible, while the reserves that are relatively cheap to produce are mostly scattered in the middle of nowhere in very small reservoirs without adequate infrastructure. According to Minister of Energy Alexander Novak, Russia may lose 44% of its oil production potential by 2035.2 The anticipation of the decline explains why Russia focuses on efforts to maintain the current level of production for as long as possible rather than expanding to new markets currently occupied by other suppliers. Russia is hardly a competitor for oil producers in the Gulf area. On the government level, rather than on the level of specific Russian oil companies, Russia has openly positioned itself as an ally of OPEC and a participant in joint efforts to restrict production for the sake of preventing downslide of global oil prices.3 After the formation of OPEC+, the contribution of Russia to these efforts became significant in volume, even as Russian companies pursue their independent plans of operations. The cooperation within the framework of OPEC+ has not been free of conflicts, and even ‘wars’ between Russia and Saudi Arabia,4 and the overall effect of this cooperation may not be long lasting.5 As far as the natural gas market is concerned, it is too early to look at Russia as a major competitor for Gulf countries or a party interested in access to gas assets in the area even though the situation may change after a while.

2 “Novak Sprognoziroval”, Interfax, 18 September 2018, https://www.interfax.ru/bus iness/629677. 3 Mikhail Krutikhin, Indra Overland and Dag Harald Claes, “OPEC and Russia: A Happy Pro Forma Marriage”, in Handbook of OPEC and the Global Energy Order (London: Routledge, 2020). 4 Isabelle Khurshudyan, “Moscow Got Itself into a New Price War”, The Washington Post, 10 March 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/moscow-got-its elf-into-an-oil-price-war-with-saudi-arabia-a-major-gamble-for-russias-economy/2020/03/ 10/94c01bca-6226-11ea-8a8e-5c5336b32760_story.html. 5 Georgi Kantchev, “Russia’s Ageing Infrastructure Threatens Oil Output Pact”, The Wall Street Journal, 29 April 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-aging-infrastru cture-threatens-oil-output-pact-11588173252.

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Until recently, Russia focused on those gas markets that could be reached with pipes and kept building huge transportation systems in firm ground and across seas to access potential customers. Costly pipeline projects necessitated long-term sales contracts as guarantees for obtaining investment funds. Simultaneously, the government in Moscow prioritized such infrastructure projects as means of political leverage over the countries on the far end of the pipelines as they became dependent on Russian gas supply and therefore politically vulnerable.6 This strategy and this policy left no room for Moscow decision makers to become really interested in distant gas producing or gas consuming countries where it was impossible to build a pipeline to, as the pipeline had to begin at Russia’s main gas fields in the north of Western Siberia thousands of miles away. Occasionally, media publications and social networks assumed that Russia was doing something suspicious in the Middle East to prevent Gulf gas competitors from reaching Gazprom’s markets in Europe or in China. E.g. various speculations appeared around reports of a gas pipeline, which either Qatar or Iran were allegedly going to build from the Gulf toward Europe by way of either Turkey or Syria.7 Some Russian bloggers even claimed that the warfare in Syria and Iraq had been instigated by Gazprom agents to prevent such projects. It took industry observers quite a lot of effort to dispel those allegations.8 The Russian gas industry’s indifference vis-à-vis the Gulf area’s gas producers and exporters started to fade away when the political leadership of the country faced a new reality. The capacity of the markets Russia could access with pipelines turned out to be grossly insufficient for absorbing the amount of natural gas Russian producers were ready to offer. The combined capacity of the pipelines going from Russia to 6 “Gazprom as a Geopolitical Instrument”, 6 May 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil. org/event/gazprom-as-a-geopolitical-instrument/; “Energy as Tool of Foreign Policy of Authoritarian States, in Particular Russia”, April 2018, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603868/EXPO_STU(2018)603868_EN.pdf. 7 Charis Chang, “Is the Fight Over a Gas Pipeline Fueling the World’s Bloodiest Conflict?”, News.com.au, 2 December 2015, https://www.news.com.au/world/middleeast/is-the-fight-over-a-gas-pipeline-fuelling-the-worlds-bloodiest-conflict/news-story/74e fcba9554c10bd35e280b63a9afb74. 8 Mikhail Krutikhin, “Bez Nefti, Gaza i Rublia”, Snob, 1 October 2018, https:// snob.ru/entry/166385/; Mikhail Krutikhin, “Who Needs a Gas Pipeline from Qatar to Syria”, Forbes, 5 October 2015, https://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/mir/301965komu-nuzhen-gazoprovod-iz-katara-cherez-siriyu.

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Europe—even without taking into consideration such new projects as the Nord Stream and South Stream (later renamed Turk Stream)—was much more than Gazprom, Russia’s gas export monopoly, could hope to deliver.9 The EU’s determination to develop renewable sources of energy, to go ahead with energy saving and energy efficiency plans, to diversify supply sources, and, finally, to focus on decarbonization efforts, added to the problems Russian gas exports were facing. In the east, the Chinese were unwilling to buy Russian natural gas at all, and it took the Russian government and Gazprom over ten years of very hard negotiations to persuade China to accept one pipeline project, the Power of Siberia as a single cross-border route for gas supply with the ultimate throughput capacity of 38 bcm a year.10 It is still open to speculations whether the planned capacity target can actually be achieved. The bleak prospects of the European and Chinese markets for Russian gas sales did not stop impressive and expensive governmental plans of building more export pipelines. These extra-capacity infrastructure projects could be explained either by political considerations (such as punishing Ukraine by depriving it of Russian gas transit) or, cynically, by the need to make ‘government-friendly’ pipeline contractors richer. Then, an understanding came to the decision makers in the Kremlin that new pipelines, regardless of their number and capacity, could not help them monetize available gas reserves. In 2014, Gazprom was able to produce 650–670 bcm of gas but sold, domestically and internationally, only 444 bcm.11 The remaining capacity was ‘stranded gas’: available but impossible to sell because of a shortage of buyers’ potential. The only solution would be to sell the surplus of gas in a liquefied form, by sea, all over the world. In 2019 Russia was already producing LNG at the annual rate of 28 million tonnes, about 8% of global production, and President Vladimir Putin announced that the volume would be as high as 120–140 million tonnes a year by 2035.12 This prospect is probably wishful thinking, as the draft Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation Through 2035 9 Archipelago Gazprom, EEGA, https://eegas.com/fsu.htm. 10 Mikhail Krutikhin, “A ‘Historic’ Showing-Off”, Fontanka.ru, 2 December 2019,

https://www.fontanka.ru/2019/12/02/130/. 11 Natalia Borzenkova, “Gazoprovody Rossii”, Molodoy Ucheniy, Issue 13 (117), 1 July 2016, https://moluch.ru/archive/117/28923/. 12 RIA Novosti, 2 October 2019, https://ria.ru/20191002/1559357675.html.

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shows. The document, submitted in December 2019 by the RF Ministry of Energy to the Cabinet of Ministers for consideration and approval, says that Russia might be able to produce between 70 and 82 million tonnes of LNG annually by 2035.13 It means that Russia intends to occupy approximately 20% of the global LNG market in the future. Naturally, the Gulf nations that were already producing and exporting LNG came to the attention of Moscow as competitors and possible allies. One, and only, attempt of establishing an alliance of gas producers has been totally unsuccessful. The Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) was initially conceived by Russia and Iran, two most ardent promoters of the cooperation idea, in 2001, and now comprises 11 members (Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela) that in 2009 were together estimated to control about 70% of global gas reserves. Conceived as a price-setting cartel (and referred to by Russian government-associated media as ‘a gas OPEC’14 ), the GECF has become little less than a bureaucratic consulting body with no real authority and no global weight as an organization. Today, the Russian government regards LNG producers in the Gulf area as competitors, as the future of Russia’s gas industry and its development depends almost exclusively on conquering and maintaining market niches for Russian LNG. This is where Russia, theoretically, may be tempted to employ political methods to promote its LNG interests. This attitude contrasts with the attitude of Moscow vis-à-vis oil trade where Russia has no real reason to behave like a competitor with anyone, considering the fixed markets of Russian crude and dubious prospects of maintaining the current oil production level in Russia.

3

Big Boys’ Nursery Games

The Russians’ attitude is different if we examine interests of Russian oil and gas companies in the Gulf area rather than the Russian government’s strategic and politicized mindset.

13 Draft Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation Through 2035 (Version of December 18, 2019), Russian Ministry of Energy, https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/1920. 14 “Gas OPEC”, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 20 April 2010, https://rg.ru/sujet/3993/.

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Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil producer, accounts for approximately 41% of Russian oil production (and claims it produces 5% of global oil). Rosneft is already participating in upstream (exploration and production) projects on the continental shelf in Venezuela, Egypt (Zohr), Vietnam, and Mozambique; and holds equity stakes in refining enterprises in Germany, India, and Belarus. The government-controlled company is pursuing some interests in the Gulf area. It has to be mentioned that cooperation with Rosneft might involve some risks because the company is regarded, just like Gazprom, one of political instruments of the Kremlin. On March 20, 2014, the US government sanctioned Rosneft DEO Igor Sechin in response to the Russian government’s role in the aggression against Ukraine. The sanctions include a travel ban to the United States, freezing of all assets of Sechin in the United States and a ban on business transactions between American citizens and corporations and Sechin and businesses he owns.15 As of today, Rosneft has abandoned all its projects in Iran since late 2018 because of the international sanctions against the Islamic Republic. In early November 2017 Rosneft and National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) signed as roadmap to jointly perform a series of ‘strategic’ projects in Iran. According to Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, the projects could have been worth up to $30 billion and might have been able to produce 55 million metric tonnes of oil annually (over 1 million bpd). The Russian company was targeting participation on the Yaran, Azadegan, Kupal, and Marun projects.16 In Iraq, Rosneft is exploring Block 12 in the Najaf and Muthanna provinces and in the spring of 2018 discovered a large oil deposit there, named Salman. The license to explore had been inherited from another Russian company, Bashneft, after its takeover by Rosneft in 2016. In October 2017, Rosneft signed an agreement with the regional Kurdish government in Iraq to jointly carry out an oil infrastructure project and a general agreement for cooperation in oil and gas projects. In 2017– 2019 Rosneft was planning to buy oil from that region under a contract 15 “Executive Order—Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine”, The White House—Office of the Press Secretary, https://obamaw hitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/20/executive-order-blocking-propertyadditional-persons-contributing-situat. 16 Neftegaz.ru, 13 December 2018, https://neftegaz.ru/news/partnership/196249-ros neft-ukhodit-iz-irana-bez-finansovykh-poter-no-vse-ravno-nepriyatno/.

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with the Kurdish government and even made a prepayment of $1 billion. The deal, however, was off when political events made it impossible to maintain such level of production in Kurdistan. The company said it was interested also in five potentially productive projects in the Kurdish region.17 The Iraqi government said it might award upstream licenses near Kirkuk to Rosneft if it agreed to work there jointly with BP.18 In 2016 Kuwait said it was not excluding participation in privatization of Russian petroleum companies such as Rosneft, but no Kuwaiti investors acted on those opportunities.19 In September 2019 Rosneft announced it was going to sign a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia’s Sabic to cooperate in the development of Nayara Energy (formerly Essar Oil), a refining company in India. Rosneft holds 49.13% in that company after obtaining it in 2017 jointly with a group of international investors including Trafigura and Russia’s UCP.20 The project needs $6.7 billion of investment. No MoI has been signed so far. Instead, Saudi Arabia and UAE are reportedly planning to jointly build up their own refining business in India.21 In 2010 Rosneft entered a project with Crescent Petroleum in the United Arab Emirates to explore and develop a gas project in Sharjah obtaining 49% in the joint venture. In 2015, however, the Russian partner abandoned the project after deciding it was not commercially attractive; it had stopped all operations there in 2011.22 In 2016, Qatar’s sovereign investment fund QIA bought 19.5% of Rosneft jointly with Swiss trading giant Glencore (also partially owned by Qatar) for $12.2 billion during the Russian company’s partial privatization. In 2017, however, the duo agreed to sell a 14.16 stake in Rosneft to CEFC China Energy in a $9.1 billion. Observers in Russia noticed 17 Interfax, 6 April 2018, https://www.interfax.ru/business/607200. 18 Kommersant, 28 February 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3560349. 19 Reuters, 22 April 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-kuwait-privatisa tion/kuwait-not-ruling-out-taking-part-in-rosneft-bashneft-privatisations-tass-idUSL5N17 P4WG. 20 Vedomosti, 24 September 2019, https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2019/ 09/25/812007-rosneft-mozhet-privlech-sabic. 21 Al-Jazeera, 29 October 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/saudi-ara bia-invest-india-downstream-oil-gas-projects-191029165934148.html. 22 The National, 26 May 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/business/rosneft-consid ers-exiting-jv-with-crescent-in-sharjah-1.116393.

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that the deal was not entirely transparent and looked like a conspiracy of Rosneft managers and their Qatari counterparts. The idea apparently was to prevent a takeover of a large equity stake of Rosneft by an ‘undesired’ portfolio investor and keeping this stake in the hands of the current management headed by Igor Sechin.23 Despite this reputational ‘stain,’ Qatar says it intends to expand relations with Rosneft and other Russian companies.24 Lukoil, Russia’s second largest oil producer (2.345 million bpd in 2018), demonstrates an acute interest in projects in the Gulf area.25 For operations in this area, the company employs its branch, Lukoil Middle East Limited. In the second half of 2012 Lukoil moved its international operations arm, Lukoil Overseas, from Moscow, to Dubai. The company sells a significant amount of marine lubricants in Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and other countries in the Gulf keeping trade offices throughout the area. The company has been working in Iran since 2003 when it joined Norway’s Norsk Hydro to jointly explore the Anaran block in the west of the country and next year opened an office in Tehran. The Azar oil field (2 billion bbl) was discovered by the Russian-Norwegian alliance in 2005. In 2010, however, Lukoil had to drop its operations in Iran because of international sanctions until the sanctions were lifted in 2015. In June 2019 Lukoil suspended its Iranian operations again due to a new wave of sanctions. Prior to this freeze, the Russian company had aimed to take part in exploration and development of two projects, Mansouri and Ab-Teimur, in Iran, and had submitted a work plan for the projects to NIOC.26 In 2016, Lukoil was planning to sign a long-term contract to buy Iranian crude oil for its refineries in Italy, Romania, and The Netherlands, but by October 2018 had to terminate all purchase contracts with Iran because of the sanctions. Lukoil has also been a major trader in petroleum products in Iran, In the Caspian area, it supplied gasoline and kerosene to Iranian companies. 23 “Kro vyigral”, 8 December 2016, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/66387. 24 “Qatar Seeks More Russian Deals”, Bloomberg, 11 March 2019, https://www.blo

omberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-11/qatar-seeks-more-russia-deals-after-great-rosneftinvestment. 25 “Lukoil Eyeing Series of Joint Projects with UAE, Kuwait, Sudan”, TASS, 13 November 2017, https://tass.com/economy/975383. 26 RNS, 20 June 2019, https://rns.online/energy/Lukoil-zamorozil-peregovori-po-pro ektam-v-Irane-iz-za-sanktsii-2019-06-20/.

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In Iraq, Lukoil has been operating a large oil project in the south, West Qurna-2 (14 billion bbl of reserves), since December 2009 in an alliance with Norway’s Equinor (former Statoil).27 Lukoil’s interest equals 75%. A supplement agreement to the contract was signed in January 2013 that outlined the target contractual production (1.2 million bpd) for a target production period of 19.5 years, and a 25-year extension of the contract term. On March 29, 2014, commercial oil production began at the field. Lukoil is reportedly unhappy about cooperation with the Iraqis on this project. According to the financial terms of the contract, Iraq compensated the operator’s costs at the average rate of 19% of the value of sold oil if the price was $100 per bbl, but the compensation increased to 48% if the price fell to $40 per bbl. When the oil price dipped in 2015, Iraq started delaying payments and its debt to Lukoil amounted to $1.5 billion by March 2016. Lukoil, however, has not stopped work and keeps drilling. It expects West Qurna-2 oil output to reach 480,000 bpd in 2020.28 In March 2019 Lukoil announced a discovery of oil reserves in Iraq’s southern Muthanna province’s area 10.29 In 2017 Lukoil CEO Vagit Alekperov said the company was negotiating a project in Kuwait to develop viscous oil reserves, but no progress has been made in these talks so far.30 In that Gulf country, Lukoil remains a major supplier of marine lubricants to Kuwait Oil Tanker Company.31 In Saudi Arabia, Lukoil obtained 80% in 2004 in an exploration venture with Saudi Aramco and discovered some important gas reserves. In October 2019 the Russians decided to leave its stake in its joint project to the Saudi partner—reportedly because of disagreement over prices and

27 “West Qurna-2”, Lukoil web site, https://www.lukoil.com/Business/Upstream/Ove rseas/WestQurna-2. 28 “Lukoil Begins Drilling New Production Wells”, 7 February 2019, https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-29/lukoil-seeks-middle-east-oil-projects-for-gro wth-as-iran-opens https://www.lukoil.com/PressCenter/Pressreleases/Pressrelease?rid= 326308. 29 Kurdistan 24, 16 October 2018, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/09e533cf783e-4204-870a-f3dca105f5b1. 30 “Lukoil Seeks Middle East Oil Projects”, Bloomberg, 30 January 2017. 31 “Lukoil Subsidiary Renews Deal”, OilandGas.com, 12 June 2019, https://www.oil

andgasmiddleeast.com/products-services/34179-lukoil-subsidiary-renews-deal-to-supplykotcs-tanker-vessels-with-marine-lubricants.

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the price volatility on the global market. The companies said they would cooperate in other projects in Africa and in Uzbekistan.32 In October 2019 the Abu Dhabi Government and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) awarded Lukoil a 5% stake in the Ghasha ultra-sour gas concession. The concession comprised the Hail, Ghasha, Dalma, and other offshore sour gas fields in Abu Dhabi.33 The project is expected to produce over 1.5 billion standard cubic feet per day (bscfd) of natural gas by 2025, plus more than 120,000 bpd of oil and condensate. Lukoil and Qatar Petroleum signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate in the oil and gas business in 2007, but no specific projects have been targeted in Qatar by this Russian company yet. Gazprom Neft is officially a unit of the large Gazprom group but conducts business independently. The company has demonstrated its interest in energy projects in the Gulf more than once. In the summer of 2017 Gazprom Neft signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran’s Oil Industries’ Engineering and Construction (OIEC) confirming both companies’ mutual interest in combining forces in the preliminary assessment and investigation of the geological potential of oil fields located in the Islamic Republic of Iran34 and later presented a development plan for the Azar and Changuleh projects to NIOC.35 Actual work, however, has had to be stalled because of sanctions. In Iraq, a consortium of Gazprom Neft, Kogas (Korea), Petronas (Malaysia), and TPAO (Turkey) won the Iraqi government’s contract for the development of the Badra field located in the Wasit Province in the eastern part of the country in late 2009. Gazprom Neft, as the project operator, holds a 30% stake in the project, Kogas—22.5%, Petronas— 15%, and TPAO—7.5%. The Iraqi government, represented in the project by the Iraqi Oil Exploration Company (OEC), holds a 25% stake. The 32 “Russia’s Lukoil to Abandon Saudi Arabia Gas Project”, The Moscow Times, 23 October 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/23/russias-lukoil-to-aba ndon-saudi-arabia-gas-project-a67867. 33 “UAE’s ADNOC Awards”, Gulf News, 15 October 2019, https://gulfnews.com/ uae/uaes-adnoc-awards-russias-lukoil-5-stake-in-gas-concession-1.67151153. 34 Gazprom Neft website, 28 July 2017, https://www.gazprom-neft.com/press-center/ news/gazprom-neft-signs-memorandum-of-understanding-on-collaborating-with-iran-soiec/. 35 Reuters, 13 December 2017, https://de.reuters.com/article/russia-iran-energy-ros neft-oil/update-1-russias-gazprom-neft-irans-nioc-agree-iranian-oil-field-studies-idUKL5 N1E82D1.

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field development lifecycle is 20 years with a possible five-year extension. The project investments are estimated at some $2 billion. In December 2013, Gazprom Neft produced first oil from Badra, and commercial production started on May 31, 2014, when the construction of a 165kilometer oil pipeline linking the field to the Iraqi pipeline system was completed. Commercial oil shipments began on September 1, 2014.36 Apart from Badra, Gazprom Neft holds a participating interest of 40% in the Garmian block and 80% in the Halabja and Shakal blocks in Iraqi Kurdistan. The licensed blocks are being explored.37 Gazprom Neft signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Aramco in October 2017. The companies said they intended to cooperate in various areas, including drilling and well workover technologies, improvements to pumping systems, and development of large-diameter non-metal pipes. The parties also planned to discuss perspectives for collaboration in research and development and experimental engineering works, as well as options for applying innovative solutions to a wide range of technological challenges. A separate area of collaboration could include employee training at both companies’ production facilities. They also expressed willingness to collaborate on the production of equipment for oil and gas field development, by localizing production either in Russia or Saudi Arabia.38 No actions have followed apart from another similar MoU in the fall of 2019.39 A strategic cooperation agreement between Gazprom Neft and UAE’s ADNOC was signed in October 201940 ‘to explore new opportunities for collaboration.’ Tatneft, another integrated petroleum company, operates mainly in Tatarstan, an oil-rich Russian region with large Muslim population. It has also shown significant interest in projects in the Gulf area. In early

36 Gazprom website, https://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/deposits/ iraq/. 37 Ibid. 38 Gazprom Neft website, https://www.gazprom-neft.com/press-center/news/gazpromneft-signs-memorandum-of-cooperation-with-saudi-aramco/. 39 “Aramco, Gazprom Neft Sign Joint-Study MOU”, Oil & Gas Journal, 15 October 2019, https://www.ogj.com/general-interest/article/14068647/aramco-gaz prom-neft-sign-jointstudy-mou. 40 “UAE’s ADNOC and Russia’s Gazprom Neft Sign Strategic Agreement”, Gulf News, 15 October 2019, https://gulfnews.com/uae/uaes-adnoc-and-russias-gazprom-neft-signstrategic-agreement-1.67151540.

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October 2016 Tatneft and Iran’s IOC signed an agreement, which allowed the Russian company to develop the Dehloran license in western Iran with estimated reserves of five billion bbl, and Tatneft announced it would open an office in Tehran.41 In 2018 Tatneft said it was also ready to cooperate with another Russian company, Zarubezhneft, in the development of the Shadegan oil field in Khuzestan in southern Iran.42 A memorandum of understanding with National Iranian South Oilfields Company (NISOC) has been signed for carrying oilfield development studies on Shadegan. In Iraq, Tatneft had been engaged in several projects well before the 2000s, although its involvement was mainly as a service provider rather than an independent operator or an equity partner. The company was drilling wells for Zarubezhneft at the Saddam and Bei Hassan projects and helped explore West Qurna for Lukoil. Tatneft supplied equipment and trained personnel for quite a few Iraqi projects. E.g., it performed seismic acquisition jobs in the Hamada basin under a contract with Iraq’s National Oil Corporation (NOC). In December 2019 it contracted Arab Geophysical Exploration Services Company (AGESCO) to conduct seismic acquisition for block 4/82 at the Ghadames Basin, in order to complete a seismic survey program which had been suspended in 2014.43 Zarubezhneft, a state-controlled company (and Russia’s first company to get real practical experience of managing offshore projects abroad, in Vietnam), is present in the Gulf area as well. The company claims a history of international oil and gas projects all over the world. Large oil and gas facilities have been built, national oil producing enterprises have been commissioned, a large volume of geologic exploration works and engineering and geological surveys have been completed, programs for complex development of oil industry have been prepared in such countries

41 “Tatneft Signs Agreement”, TASS, 9 October 2016, https://tass.com/economy/

905129. 42 “Official: Russia’s Tatneft Ready to Help Iran Develop Oilfields”, Iran Daily, 27 January 2018, https://www.iran-daily.com/News/208894.html. 43 “Tatneft Resumes Activities in Hamada Basin”, Panorama Insurance Brokers, 11 December 2019, https://www.panorama-insurance.com/tatneft-resumes-activities-in-ham ada-basin/.

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as Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria, Vietnam, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Syria.44 In the spring of 2018, during a period between two waves of international anti-Iranian sanctions, Zarubezhneft signed a $4-billion deal in Iran. In an alliance with Iran’s privately owned Dana Energy it subscribed to a task of boosting production from the Aban and Western Paydar oilfields in the Ilam province from 36,000 to 48,000 bpd.45 In October of the same year, Zarubezhneft sold its stake in the project to another Russian state-controlled firm, Promsyryeimport, before new US sanctions became effective in November. Promsyryeimport is the operator of the ‘oil-for-goods’ program resumed by Russia and Iran in 2017. This arrangement was hammered out during the previous round of anti-Iran sanctions. The oil purchased from Iran is used for being resold on other markets, with Tehran spending the earnings to purchase Russian technologies and goods. The issue was about volumes of 100,000 bpd, or 5 million tonnes per year.46 In Iraq, a number of key oil and gas facilities have been built with participation of Zarubezhneft, including the North Rumaila development (phases I, II, and III), field operations at the Lukheis and Nahr Ben Umr fields, water injection facilities at North Rumaila, the first phase of West Qurna, and a number of wells in southern Iraq. Cooperation with Iraq lasted for 35 years but due to the commencement of warfare the work in this country has been suspended, the company says.47 In Kuwait in 1991 experts of Zarubezhneft arranged and performed works to extinguish fires at oilfields after the end of war with Iraq. In 2007 the Russian company tried to win a contract for oil exploration off Bahrain but lost. Gazprom, Russia’s giant gas monopoly, has been present in the Gulf area for quite a while. In an alliance with France’s Total and Malaysia’s Petronas it carried out a contract for development of Phases 2 and 3

44 Zarubezhneft website, https://www.zarubezhneft.ru/en/about_company/history/. 45 “Iran Signs $4 Billion Oil Deal with Russian Firm”, Radio Free Europe, 15

March 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-signs-4-billion-dollar-oil-development-deal-rus sian-firm-zarubezhneft-/29100944.html. 46 “Zarubezhneft Bucks Sanctions”, TASS, 31 October 2018, https://tass.com/eco nomy/1028775. 47 Ibid.

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of the huge South Pars project in 1993 with a 30% share in the international consortium. After that, Gazprom’s presence in the area has been demonstrated mainly in the form of various memoranda of understanding. As of November 2018, before the second wave of US sanctions against Iran, Gazprom had signed several MoUs with NIOC, without any practical measures to follow the documents. On December 14, 2017, they signed a roadmap for implementation of projects in Iran and a memorandum of understanding for cooperation on an LNG project in Iran. However, Gazprom admitted it had ruled out an earlier plan to build a gas pipeline from Iran to Oman (Iran and Oman reached an agreement to construct a gas pipeline in 2015).48 In November 2017 Gazprom and Iran’s state-run investment fund IDRO signed an initial agreement (actually, a memorandum of understanding) to cooperate in unspecified oil, gas, and energy projects.49 Despite the sanctions, Gazprom still hopes to resume and expand its operations in Iran and has formed a joint coordination committee with Iran to consider possible projects in the future.50 In 2015 Gazprom signed a MoU with Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and later, in 2017, indicated an interest in supplying LNG to that country.51 Gazprom and Saudi Aramco agreed to establish a joint coordinating committee in April 2018 for future cooperation in the gas business.52 Apart from Russia’s oil producing companies, smaller firms occasionally get contracts for supplying Gulf countries with equipment and services. Such firms are not numerous because very few of them can really provide hi-tech assistance to energy projects outside Russia, which still heavily depends on imported know-how, technologies, and equipment. Still, it happens—although in some cases the selection of a Russian supplier may be explained by

48 “Russia’s Gazprom Considers Projects in Iran”, Offshore Technologies, 4 June 2019, https://www.offshore-technology.com/comment/gazprom-and-iran-2019/. 49 Reuters, 5 November 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-gazpromiran/russias-gazprom-iran-fund-in-initial-deal-agency-idUSKBN1D50TW. 50 “Gazprom Still Considering”, TASS, 28 May 2019, https://tass.com/economy/106

0471. 51 “Gazprom to Cement LNG Ties with Kuwait”, Neftegaz.ru, 27 March 2017, https://neftegaz.ru/en/news/Transportation-and-storage/408994-gazprom-to-cementlng-ties-with-kuwait/. 52 Gazprom 8406/.

website,

https://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2018/april/article41

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political considerations. For instance, in January 2020, Saudi Aramco contracted Russia’s Novomet company to supply some Russia-designed and Russia-made equipment (downwell pumps) and was reportedly negotiating another similar, but larger, contract.53 Earlier, Saudi Aramco bought a 20.5% stake in Novomet. Companies from the Gulf area are penetrating Russia’s energy sector as well, albeit on a much smaller scale than their Russian counterparts do in the Gulf. Upon finalization of the shady privatization deal with Rosneft, Qatar Investment Authority has officially retained an 18.93% stake in this state-controlled Russian company after its attempt to sell the bulk of this equity state to China’s troubled CEFC Energy Company failed.54 Mubadala, a sovereign wealth fund of UAE, has opened an office in Moscow and reportedly considers opportunities in the energy sector55 although it has not ventured into such deals yet. Saudi Aramco was also reported to negotiate a role in a few Russian projects, including an LNG project in Arctic, but has not made it to a full commitment. A cautious approach to investing in Russia is not limited to companies from the Gulf area. All international investors a wary of two main problems associated with Russia’s business environment. Firstly, there are risks of tightening sanctions against this country, its state-controlled companies and banks, as well as against foreign firms that cooperate with sanctionsstricken organizations and persons. Secondly, the investment climate in Russia is unpredictable.56 Tax rules are altered too frequently, government officials are corrupt and may exert pressure for taking over foreign investors’ business—legal protection of ownership right does is all but non-existent in this country. It is hardly possible to expect any improvement of conditions for foreign companies’ operations in Russia without a radical change in the Russian government’s attitude.

53 TASS Report, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/7582381. 54 “Qatar Seeks More Russian Deals”, The Business Times, 11 March 2019, https://

www.businesstimes.com.sg/energy-commodities/qatar-seeks-more-russia-deals-after-‘greatrosneft-investment. 55 Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) website, https://rdif.ru/Eng_fullNews/ 4455/. 56 “Investing in Russia: A Risky Game?”, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/ articles/basics/11/investing-in-russia.asp.

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4

Conclusions

Russian companies—both private corporations and state-controlled giants—are certainly interested in doing business in the Gulf area, and regard energy projects as priorities in their efforts to expand internationally. However, the footprint of Russian investors in the area is still somewhat insignificant in comparison with activities of other foreign companies. Reasons of this underperformance are obvious: • Russia today has ceased to be a great world power economically, and its wealth is much smaller than the economic weight of the late Soviet Union, both in perception and objectively. Russia’s share of the global GDP is estimated between 1.7 and 2.7%. The market capitalization of all shares that are traded at the Russian stock exchange does not exceed $750 billion57 (as of late January 2020). In comparison, Google alone is worth $309 billion. • Apart from the relatively weak financial potential, Russia cannot contribute advanced technologies to foreign projects. The country is 93% dependent on imports, especially in its requirements of equipment and technologies.58 • Russian partners and investors tend to be too politicized and dependent on political moods of the Kremlin. Gazprom’s practices in its approach to Ukraine and EU gas consumers are a vivid example of risks. Such partners or suppliers cannot be regarded as fully reliable. To make it even worse, the Russian government insists that domestic laws and regulations take precedence over international laws and norms, thus adding to the risks of dealings with Russian companies. • And, finally, there are international sanctions against Russian government-controlled and government-friendly companies. Any agreement or contract with a Russian entity may become toxic if the sanctions are tightened. All these factors will remain valid in a foreseeable future, and Russia’s participation in energy projects in the Gulf area will evidently be limited to occasional instances rather than a growing trend. 57 Finmarket, https://www.finmarket.ru/shares/news/5112642. 58 Data from Russian Academy of Economy and State Service, https://ktovkurse.com/

rossiya/ne-poluchilos-zavisimost-rossii-ot-importa-vyrosla-do-93.

CHAPTER 8

Russian-Iranian Relations: Impact on Persian Gulf Interests Ghoncheh Tazmini

1

Introduction

Russia’s political maneuverings with Iran have been inconsistent, wavering between cooperation and conflict. This incongruity has left the debate over Iran’s role in Russia’s regional calculus widely contested. However, as substantiated in this chapter, Moscow and Tehran’s strategic differences do not impinge on their partnership. This chapter posits, that despite inconsistency in the partnership, Russian-Iranian alignment is likely to be an enduring feature of the Middle Eastern political landscape. Their different approaches to interacting with the key actors on the Arabian Peninsula demonstrates the adaptability and dynamism of this partnership. We argue that while these two states often collide in different conflict zones, and in their engagements with regional state actors, they share a similar narrative of the international order, which cements their partnerships.

G. Tazmini (B) LSE Middle East Centre, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_8

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The nature of Moscow-Tehran relations has been characterized as everything from a “random partnership,” to a “circumstantial alliance,” to a “marriage of convenience.”1 This reveals the importance of using accurate terminology when it comes to qualifying bilateral relations. According to Michael Ward, “much written work uses the three different orientations – alliance, alignment, and coalition – as though they were identical.”2 The use of these categories interchangeably has created ambiguity in determining the parameters of the Russian-Iranian relations. As such, the first task of this chapter is to establish a working definition or categorization that qualifies the nature of the Russian-Iranian partnership more accurately. The second strand of analysis is concerned with identifying the ideational synergies that bind Russia and Iran. Despite occasional friction, Russian-Iranian alignment is firmly anchored within a broader assemblage of shared principles. The source of cohesion between these two pivotal states is a similar geopolitical worldview. This outlook is defined by some enduring parameters, including historical experience, geopolitical realities, cultural-civilizational peculiarities, normative values, and a similar discursive genealogy in relation to the West. This sui generis historicalcultural genotype informs Russian and Iranian ideological worldview, which fundamentally clashes with Atlanticist normative standards in the international system.3 Both states are aligned in their opposition to the universalist normative aspirations of the international system. Moscow and Tehran are committed to a more pluralistic vision of the international system by opposing liberal interventionism and by subscribing to the principle of sovereign internationalism. The essence of this alternative alignment is not that it repudiates the rules and norms of the top-level international society, but it denies that this top level in any way “belongs” to the US-led

1 See, for example, John W. Parker, “Russia-Iran: Strategic Partners or Competitors?,” James A. Baker Institute III Institute for Public Policy, 2016; “Rouhani and Putin: Iran and Russia Are ‘Strategic Partners’,” Tehran Times, November 1, 2017; Vladimir Zashin, “Strategic Partnership Between Russia and Iran at a New Phase: What Can the Two Countries Offer Each Other?,” The Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies, January 12, 2018. 2 Michael D. Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics (Denver: University of Denver, 1982), 14. 3 See Ghoncheh Tazmini, “To Be or Not to Be (Like the West): Modernisation in Russia and Iran,” Third World Quarterly 39 (2018): 1998–2015.

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order. It is an anti-hegemonic rather than “counter”-hegemonic alignment in that it opposes the very idea of a single state or constellation of states being able to impose its particular values and power structures as universal. In other words, it is not simply a movement established in opposition to the international order known traditionally as “the West,” instead, it seeks to transcend the idea of contesting orders to create a more cooperative order.4 We argue that Russia’s goal is to advance Trine Flockhart’s “multiorder” in which different “inter-orders” of sovereign states are nested within an overall international system.5 In this pursuit, Tehran has been a reliable partner: Iran and Russia are firmly ensconced as an “inter-order” within this emerging “multi-order” international system. In this emerging “multi-order world,” the liberal order will continue, and may even be strengthened internally, but its global reach will be a thing of the past, according to Flockhart. The challenge in a “multi-order” world will be to forge new forms of partnerships between composite and diverse actors across complex lines of division and convergence. As we shall discuss, Russia and Iran are committed to building an anti-hegemonic alliance by fostering alternative integrative networks, and multilateral institutions on a regional level in order to create a counterweight to US unipolarity. The third strand of analysis addresses Russian and Iranian interests in various regional theaters. The chapter examines their respective positions in light of recent events, including the US decision to reduce its military entanglements. With the US scaling back its overseas commitments, what is the impact of Moscow-Tehran alignment on the region and on Arab interests? By examining some of these interactions, we are in a better position to gauge the impact of Russian-Iranian priorities on the Arab states. The two states have marked differences in the way they interact with the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. However, these asymmetries do not have a significant bearing on bilateral relations. Strategies of cooperation and contrasting agendas on the Arabian Peninsula do not impinge on bilateral relations.

4 Richard Sakwa, “Beyond the Impasse,” November 2, 2018, https://doc-research.org/ 2018/11/beyond-impasse/. 5 Trine Flockhart, “The Coming Multi-order World,” Contemporary Security Policy 37 (2016): 5.

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The Taxonomy of Russian-Iranian Relations

Our first task is to determine the nature of Russian-Iranian relations, which can help us assess the parameters and boundaries of the partnership. On the one hand, Russia has been accused of using Iran as leverage or as a provisional counterweight against the US and Western Europe. In these accounts, Iran is portrayed as lacking agency and as serving as a disposable pawn on Russia’s regional chessboard. On the other hand, alarms were raised in 2016 over growing “military cooperation” between Moscow and Tehran. Iran, for the first time since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, allowed Russian bombers and strike fighters to use the Shahid Nojeh Airbase, near the western Iranian city of Hamedan to bomb targets in Syria.6 There was similar consternation over what was portrayed as a “budding military alliance” in 2019 when Russia, along with Iran and China, carried out naval drills in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.7 These examples demonstrate how challenging it is to demarcate the boundaries of Moscow-Tehran relations. What is clear is that the partnership is fraught with inconsistencies. However, as we substantiate in this chapter, RussianIranian strategic alignment, while inconsistent, is a dynamic and enduring one. The challenge of conceptualizing the nature of this complicated partnership is exacerbated with the haphazard usage of inaccurate terminology. All too often, in the discipline of International Relations, the term “alliance” is thrown around rather loosely in defining bilateral relations. This has been the case with Russia and Iran, particularly by analysts inclined toward painting a more alarmist picture of the rise of two recalcitrant states that have merged together in the pursuit of their nefarious regional agendas. As Bruno Tertrais explains, the conventional “alliance” archetype, suggests traditional military alliance paradigms, such as “coalitions of the willing,” “security communities,” and “strategic partnerships.”8

6 “Russia ‘Showed-off’ Over Use of Iran Airbase for Syria Strikes,” August 22, 2016,

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37154043. 7 “Putin and Xi Test a Budding Military Alliance in the Pacific and Step Up Confrontation,” July 23, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/23/asia/putin-xi-military-fly over-japan-korea-hodge-intl/index.html. 8 Bruno Tertrais, “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,” The Washington Quarterly 27 (2004): 148.

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A more accurate descriptor of the nature of Russian-Iranian engagement is “alignment,” a category that is closer in line with the contemporary security environment, which is characterized by multiple forms of “alignment,” and not just alliances, in their many guises.9 While alliances have been pervasive features in both the theory of international politics and in the practice of foreign policy, as Parag Khanna contends, we now live “in a world of alignments, not alliances.”10 As Thomas Wilkins notes, the geopolitical landscape has undergone remarkable transformations since the end of the Cold War, and this has been accompanied by a conspicuous change in the very nature of “alliance.” Wilkins explains that the formal military alliances on the preWorld War I and the Cold War paradigm have now ceased to represent the prevailing standard for security cooperation.11 Instead, as Stewart Woodman points out, since the early 1990s, “there has been a shift away from formal alliance structures based on military force.”12 Bearing this geopolitical evolution in mind, Moscow-Tehran alignment cannot be considered an “alliance,” particularly considering Glenn Snyder’s definition in his landmark study, Alliance Politics. Snyder specifies that “alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.”13 Russian and Iranian cooperation is not defined militarily—it is not based on a pact or a formal pledge to deploy military force or military resources against a specific state, or states in specified circumstances.14 It is more accurate to say that Russia and Iran are aligned, which signifies that they have a shared agreement or understanding on one or more

9 Thomas S. Wilkins, “Alignment, not Alliance—The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment,” Review of International Studies 38 (2012): 53. 10 Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order (New York: Random House, 2008), 324. 11 Wilkins, “Alignment, not Alliance,” 54. 12 Stewart Woodman, “Beyond Armageddon? The Shape of Conflict in the Twenty-First

Century,” in The New Security Agenda in the Asia–Pacific Region, ed. D. Roy (London: Macmillan, 1997), 81. 13 Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 2. 14 Robert E. Osgood and John H. Badgley, Japan and the US in Asia (Baltimore: John

Hopkins University Press, 1968), 17.

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significant issues. Russian-Iranian “alignment” was made clear during the second Iran-Russia Joint Supreme Committee for Parliamentary Cooperation. Majlis Speaker, Ali Larijani called for expanded ties between the two states in order to counter “international dictatorship” while State Duma Chief, Vyacheslav Volodin expressed that Iran and Russia were two partners that were committed to non-interference in each other’s affairs.15 Alignment’ theorists such as Stephen Walt and Stephen David define “alignment” as “a relationship between two or more states that involves mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future.” This is a useful definition— according to our study, Russian and Iranian interactions are based on the calibration of strategic, geopolitical, and economic priorities that are informed by similar perceptions of a Western-dominated political order. Both states place a premium on state sovereignty, denouncing Western interventionism, and color or democracy-promotion revolutions—seeing them as a way for the Atlantic ideological and power system to advance the self-interest, influence, and security of Western states. Russia’s engagement with Iran is based on new and more elastic and versatile constellation of security alignments, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Just days after the Iranian regime fired retaliatory missiles at military bases in Iraq following the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, Russian Foreign Minister, Lavrov reiterated that Moscow supported full membership for Tehran in the Eurasian security bloc. Speaking at a geopolitics forum in New Delhi, Lavrov noted, “Iran is an observer and we are supportive of the Iranian request for full membership,” adding that “most of the [SCO] countries support this request and I’m sure this would be satisfied.”16

3

An Anti-hegemonic Alignment

This brings us to deeper patterns of convergence between the Kremlin and Tehran. We argue that it is an oversimplification to assume that Russia is guided by revanchist foreign policy goals with Iran as a pawn 15 “Larijani Calls for Iran-Russia Cooperation to Counter U.S. Dictatorship,” January 27, 2020, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/444641/Larijani-calls-for-Iran-Russia-coop-to-counter-U-S-dictatorship. 16 “Russia Supports Iran Joining Moscow-Beijing Security Bloc,” January 17, 2020, https://cnsnews.com/article/international/patrick-goodenough/ignoring-us-callsisolate-iran-russia-supports-iran.

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in its regional calculus. There is a long-standing failure to appreciate the multiple influences on Russian and Iranian foreign policy, and how they play out in different political theaters. This chapter argues that the post-Cold War world order that saw American hegemonic posturing has rendered a strategic alignment between Moscow and Tehran somewhat inevitable. Russia and Iran are fundamentally aligned in the sense that they are both anti-hegemonic, opposing the idea of a single state or constellation of states (an “order”) being able to impose particular normative values and power structures as universal. The chapter begins this discussion with a timeline that begins in 1991, when Russia and the West ended the Cold War, but then entered the era of “Cold Peace.” Cold Peace was characterized by the failure of Western security organizations to transcend Cold War institutions and habits at a time when Russia had demonstrated openness to adapting to Western norms and institutions. Instead, Russia was shut out of negotiations over the creation of a Cold War security order in Europe as NATO and the EU saw matters in terms of enlargement of their own existing structures, and not as the creation of something new in dialogue with Russia.17 From the perspective of Western powers, and Russia’s neighboring states, it was Russia that was unwilling to jettison its imperial mindset, and to become a modern nation-state capable of interacting more effectively both with its neighbors and the wider world.18 From the Russian perspective, the West sought to continuously limit Russia’s freedom, sphere of influence and markets, while expanding its own, thus giving rise to Cold Peace geopolitics. The goal in Russia’s view should have been the development of a strategic concept that could manage their differences within an emerging multipolar world. Here there is convergence with Iran, a country has been contained by sanctions, diplomatic isolation, threats of threats of military action and regime overthrow efforts. Labeled everything from a “pariah” to a “rogue” state on an “axis of evil,” the Iranian regime has a deepseated existential fear.19 This fear is warranted given how close the US and Iran came to the brink of war in the summer of 2019, during the 17 Richard Sakwa, Russia and the Rest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 18 See Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (Baltimore, MD: Brookings

Institution Press, 2017). 19 Donette Murray, US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations Since the Islamic Revolution (London: Routledge, 2009).

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tanker and drone crisis, and then later in 2020 during the Soleimani debacle. Defying easy characterization as a hybrid theocracy-democracy, the Islamic Republic does not fit neatly within the rubric of existing political categories. Like their Kremlin counterparts, Iran’s revolutionary elite strongly believe that prevailing international law and norms are based on hypocrisy, and that they are designed to perpetuate the hegemony of Western powers. This mindset informs Iran’s foreign policy culture, its national narrative, and its strategic preferences. While Russia was spared the label of pariah, the US National Security Strategy Document of December 2018 ranked Russia alongside the “rogue powers of Iran and North Korea” and “transnational threat organizations, particularly Jihadist groups.”20 The previous edition under Obama listed Russia as a threat alongside the Ebola virus and ISIS.21 Thus, both countries are outsiders, unaccommodated in the existing world order. These are some of the common discursive and normative threads that bind these two states and gives their partnership longevity despite areas of sharp divergence.

4

Untangling Russo-Iranian Relations

With these conceptual considerations in mind, we are in a better position to determine how Iran features on Russia’s regional chessboard. This has been a challenge given accusations that Moscow uses Iran as a provisional counterweight vis à vis the US and Europe. Moscow’s delays in the construction of the Bushehr power plant, and its stalling in the delivery of coveted surface to air missiles (SAMS) are frequently cited as evidence of Russia’s duplicity vis à vis Iran. In 1995, Russia’s state contractor signed a contract with Iran’s Atomic Organization to construct a light-water reactor in Bushehr. With Washington sparing no diplomatic effort to persuade foreign subcontractors to walk away from the project, Moscow delayed construction.22 The commissioning started a decade later, with the plant becoming operational in September 2013. The drawn-out process generated suspicion on the Iranian side, which

20 Sakwa, “Beyond the Impasse,” 4–5. 21 Ibid. 22 Anton Khlopkov and Anna Lutkova, “Why Did the Bushehr Power Plant Take So Long?,” Centre for Energy and Security Studies, August 21, 2010.

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gained more traction with Russia’s stalling on the delivery of the Russian S-300 SAMs. In 2007, Tehran signed a $800 million contract with Moscow for the purchase of sophisticated missile systems. In 2010, the contract was put on hold by Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev (2012–2020) who flagged up the three sets of international sanctions (Resolutions 1696, 1737, and 1747) to justify postponing the delivery.23 This decision coincided with the signing of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between US president, Barak Obama and Medvedev, and cancellation of the Pentagon plan to deploy elements of the US’s anti-ballistic missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. In 2015, Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov underlined that Moscow’s voluntary embargo on S-300 deliveries was no longer necessary due to the progress in talks on Iran’s nuclear program.24 Russia began delivery of the S-300 system to Iran in April 2016, with both parties confirming fulfillment of the contract in October 2016. These transactions are commonly referenced by analysts to support the argument that Russia uses Iran as leverage against the US. For example, Michel Eisenstadt and Brenda Shaffer, analysts from the Washington Institute, argue that when US-Russian relations were promising, Moscow held back from supplying weapons to Iran. They add that in periods of tension, such as in early 2015 over the Ukraine conflict, Russian announcements or press reports regarding plans to supply the S-300 resurfaced. When Moscow sensed that the US was infringing on Russia’s strategic interests, Iran drew closer into the Russian orbit.25 This position was echoed by Iranian analyst, Mohammad Ali Hozhabri, who contends that Moscow follows a “zigzag policy,” and a “run with the hare and hunt with the hounds” approach toward Iran.26 Hozhabri argues that Putin’s oil diplomacy with

23 At the time, United Nations sanctions against Iran over its nuclear dossier did not include the sales or the transfer of conventional defensive weapons at the time, a detail that raised the ire of the Iranians. 24 Alexander A. Pikayev, “Why Russia Supported Sanctions Against Iran,” June 23,

2010, https://www.nonproliferation.org/why-russia-supported-sanctions-against-iran/. 25 Michael Eisenstadt and Brenda Shaffer, “Russian S-300 Missiles to Iran: Groundhog Day or Game-Changer?,” The Washington Institute, September 4, 2015. 26 Mohammad Ali Hozhabri, “Iran-Russia Relations Within the Framework of Prisoner’s Dilemma,” July 3, 2019, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/147137/Iran-Russia-relationswithin-the-framework-of-Prisoner-s-Dilemma.

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Saudi Arabia is an example of Russia’s tendency to resort to the “Iranian card” only when it suits its interests.27 In June 2019, Russian and Saudi Arabian leaders met on the side lines of the G20 meeting in Japan, agreeing to the extension of crude output cuts for nine months. Iran’s oil minister, Hamid Zanganeh, explained that he did not take issue with the extension of the production cuts but that he opposed the “unilateralism” of the decision. Zanganeh took issue that the agreement was reached at the G20 Summit (of which Iran is not party to), rather than in Vienna, Austria where OPEC members were due to meet.28 At the OPEC meeting that followed in Vienna, Moscow and Riyadh signed a charter, formalizing “OPEC+”—a new group of twenty-two OPEC and non-OPEC nations working to buoy falling oil prices.29 Zanganeh’s response was that “OPEC might die,” and that the future of OPEC was in jeopardy over the growing dominance of Saudi Arabia and Russia in the cartel’s affairs.30 He cautioned that the Saudi-Russia agreement was sidelining traditional members.31 While Russia’s initiative can be explained by practical concerns such as plunging oil prices, rapid growth in US shale oil production, combined with worries about slowing demand growth, Iran’s concern was Russia’s growing fraternization with Saudi Arabia, its traditional rival. However, these uncomfortable interactions do not impinge on Russia and Iran’s strategic partnership, which is grounded in deeper lines of convergence.

5

“Russia is not a Fire Brigade”

All of this complicates the task of determining the nature of the RussianIranian partnership. Putin’s comments concerning the abrogation of the 27 Ibid. 28 “Iran Warns Unilateralism Between Saudi Arabia and Russia Could Lead to the Death of OPEC,” July 1, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/01/iran-warns-unilateralismcould-lead-to-the-death-of-opec-oil-minister.html. 29 Javier Blas and Jack Farchy, “Saudi-Russian Romance Blossoms Thanks to Oil,” July 3, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/oil-lubricates-saudi-russian-romance190703121230580.html. 30 “Iran Warns OPEC Might Die Due to Russia-Saudi Domination,” Financial Times, July 1, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/6f8ce486-9bda-11e9-b8ce-8b459ed04726. 31 “Russia and Saudi Arabia Hold Catholic Marriage with Poem and Badges, Form Enormous Oil Cartel,” Newsweek, July 3, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-saudiarabia-opec-oil-catholic-marriage-poem-1447301.

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nuclear deal are emblematic of complexity of this relationship. Following the announcement that Tehran would cease abiding by some of the provisions of the JCPOA in response to increased US sanctions, Putin urged Iran to abide by the agreement. In Iran’s defense, he warned that “as soon as Iran takes its first reciprocal steps and says that it is leaving, everyone will forget by tomorrow that the US was the initiator of this collapse. Iran will be held responsible, and the global public opinion will be intentionally changed in this direction.”32 At the same time, the Russian president aired his frustration with expectations from Moscow to save the landmark agreement, stating that Russia was not a “fire brigade.”33 While President Putin is keen to present Russia as an advocate of diplomacy by criticizing US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, he is at the same time, projecting his own opposition to American unilateralism and arbitrariness. Iran is a useful partner in this capacity as it mirrors some of Russia’s deeper vulnerabilities vis à vis the US and Europe. Thus, despite inconsistencies, Russia has spoken in Iran’s defense, even if it is a projection of its own insecurities. The fact that Russia has shielded Tehran in the face of international acrimony is a source of warm regard for Iran. At the Valdai Group discussion in June 2019, Iran’s ambassador to Russia, Mehdi Sanai, emphasized that the two states pursued a distinctly strategic and not “tactical” path based on mutual interests.34 Indeed, over the past two decades, Russia has acted as a critical bulwark against Iran’s political and economic isolation. Iranians have also been forthcoming: during both Chechen wars in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, Tehran helped to mute criticism in the Islamic world toward what was perceived as excessive use of force by Russia against Muslims. Despite the criticism, with Iranian assistance, Russia was granted observer status to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In the mid-1990s, Tehran helped to end a bloody civil war in Tajikistan—the newly independent central Asian state with close religious and linguistic affinity with Iran—by playing a key role 32 “Putin Says Iran Should Stay in Nuclear Deal,” May 15, 2019, https://www.voa

news.com/world-news/middle-east/putin-says-iran-should-stay-nuclear-deal. 33 “Putin: Russia Regrets Seeing Iran Nuclear Deal Unravel,” May 15, 2019, https://www.presstv.com/detail/2019/05/15/596048/putin-russia-fire-brigaderegret-iran-nuclear-deal-unraveling. 34 “Opening of the Third Russia-Iran Dialogue,” June 26, 2019, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=mVKB7Sils4o.

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along with Russia in negotiating peace along the warring factions. Russia and Iran also cooperated closely in supporting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Taliban, well before they became the major opponent of the US-led coalition in the country. As mentioned earlier, more recently, Russia’s use in 2016 of an Iranian air base to bomb targets across Syria marked a significant upgrade in relations. The decision to allow Russians to operate from Iranian territory signaled a new level of cooperation and coordination between Iran and Russia.

6

Regional Theater

The Kremlin understands that Tehran’s expeditionary capacity and carefully crafted regional bulwark fall within the framework of its security doctrine. However, in various regional theaters, there are cases where the two states clash. Syria has become a theater for deeper Russian and Iranian cooperation where military and political exchanges have contributed to a greater understanding of the contours of cooperation. Both states support Bashar al-Assad’s rule, and both espouse the shared goal of preventing regime change. When the Syrian civil war broke out in 2015, the Iranians supplied the manpower on the ground by mobilizing a steady flow of paramilitary forces that took on Syrian rebels in some of the war’s most strategic battles, while the Russians provided much-needed air cover that ultimately turned the tide in favor of Damascus. The strategic stakes were too high for both Russia and Iran to let foreign-backed Sunni Islamists topple Syria’s Baathist order, so the civil war led to unprecedented convergence of interests between the two countries on regional security. However, with the Syrian government consolidating its gains, Moscow and Tehran’s asymmetrical agendas, and sometimes conflicting interests have become apparent. Tensions have brewed over reconstruction and investment opportunities. In January 2017, the Syrian and Iranian governments signed several memoranda of understanding that included the rights to mine phosphate in the Sharqiyah field near Palmyra. A few months later, the Syrian government awarded a Russian private company an exclusive contract to annually extract and to sell 2.2 million tons of phosphate for a period of 50 years from the same mine, with 30 percent of the revenues reserved for the Syrian state. While Moscow viewed this as strictly business, on the Iranian side, it supported the view that Russia preys on Iran’s political misfortunes. Impaired by tough sanctions, Iranian-Syrian agreements

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often fail to materialize into binding contracts.35 All the same, Russia’s economic activities in Syria lag behind Iran in terms of scale and scope. Being engaged in a wide range of sectors—from construction and real estate to manufacturing industries—Tehran has played a major role in the Syrian economy after 2011. While there are opportunities for Russian companies, many are reluctant to engage out of fear of Western sanctions and uncertainty over returns on any investment. Russia and Iran also have divergent visions of post-conflict Syrian governance and state-building. Moscow and Tehran aim to elect candidates sympathetic to their interests to key positions in the Syrian military and security forces. While Moscow has been committed to strengthening Syria’s formal security and military institutions, Tehran is more concerned with strengthening the position of Iran-backed militias in Syrian state structures, which has displeased the Russians. Iran is interested in securing clout and leverage with local partners—Syrian nationals sympathetic to Iran’s strategic goals—while maintaining its influence over Assad. Iran aims to incorporate its Syrian local allies into state functions including those that manage security, governance and the economy. Ensuring the relevance and status of local partners, either on their own or within state institutions, constitutes a guarantee for Iran’s future interests in Syria and in the region.36 Russia’s objective is to institutionalize its influence by supporting a friendly and centralized autocratic regime that exercises a monopoly over governance, the military and security apparatus, and public service provisions. Despite close cooperation in Syrian war, there was tension between Russia and Iran following Israeli air strikes attacks on military facilities with IRGC and Hezbollah forces in southern Syria. Iran reported that seven Iranian soldiers were killed in the attack.37 The Iranians felt that the Russians had not done enough in providing aerial protection for Iranian

35 Sinan Hatahet, “Russia and Iran: Economic Influence in Syria,” Chatham House Programme Research Paper, March 2019. 36 Michel Duclos, “Russia and Iran in Syria—A Random Partnership or an Enduring Alliance?,” Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, June 2019. 37 “Iran Says Seven Soldiers Were Killed in Suspected Israeli Strike,” April 10, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/7dc06864-3cc4-11e8-b9f9-de94fa33a81e

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forces in Syria.38 While Russia has close cultural and economic ties with Israel (which amounted to $5 billion in 2019), it has not ceded to Israeli demands to rein in Iran. Again, this is in line with Russia’s strategy of balancing adversaries and rivals in the region. Israel is a close ally of the US and the European Union, and this gives Russia a certain degree of leverage toward the West after it was isolated for its role in the Ukrainian war and the annexation of the Crimea. Russia’s regional policy is a delicate balancing act, which it has managed to sustain without upsetting or tilting the scales. As we shall discuss below, this applies to its interactions with Arab states of the Persian Gulf, some of which have deep antipathy toward Iran. Another conflict area in which we can assess the scope of Russo-Iranian relations is Iraq. Iran has long used the long, porous border with Iraq, its long-standing patronage network, its ties with key Iraqi politicians, parties, and armed groups, and its soft power in the economic, religious, and informational domains to expand its influence, and to establish itself as the key external power broker in Iraq. The critical role of Iranianbacked paramilitaries in defeating the so-called Islamic State has generated much local support for Iran, although recent protests in Iraq indicate that there are elements calling for independence from both Iran and the US. However, following the US-ordered assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, the US has become an even more unwelcome guest, with the Iraqi parliament calling for the removal of US troops. There is much speculation that Iran is poised to fill the power vacuum created by the US’ imminent withdrawal from Iraq. While the US has made it clear that it wants to reduce foreign entanglements, Washington threatened to impose sanctions on the Iraqi government should it insist on US troop withdrawal. In this scenario, US sanctions on Iraq could significantly bolster Iran’s economic clout in the region. Tehran is a critical supplier of natural gas and electricity to the Iraqi power grid, with Iranian exports responsible for as much as a third of the country’s capacity. These exports are critical to the Iraqi economy, justifying their waiver under the current sanctions package aimed at Iran. Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,

38 See Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russia’s Difficult Balancing Act Between Iran and Israel,” February 1, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/russia-difficult-balanc ing-act-iran-israel-200129193640167.html.

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largely supported by Iran, already compete with Baghdad in the provision of security and, over time, could also rival the state in the provision of other public goods, including welfare services or infrastructure.39 Amid strained relations with the US, it has been reported that Iraq has been seeking greater military cooperation with Russia There are also reports that Russia is stepping up efforts to sell the S-300 or S-400 air defense systems to Iraq. Trade has also expanded between Moscow and Baghdad: trade has grown reaching nearly $2 billion, with Russian investments in Iraq totaling more than $10 billion, mainly in oil and gas.40 Russia has signed agreements to expand ties with Iraq in electricity generation, agriculture and transportation and, in 2019, inaugurated a command center in Baghdad under an intelligence-sharing agreement that includes Iran and Syria.41 Both Tehran and Moscow have a mutual interest in managing interstate and intra-state conflict. Putin’s approach entails cooperation with all existing governments (supporting the largely authoritarian status quo) while avoiding taking sides in their various disputes (such as Israel vs. Iran; Saudi Arabia and the UAE vs. Iran; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates vs. Qatar). In states where there is ongoing internal conflict, and where the central government is weak, Moscow also strives to maintain a balanced stance. For example, in Libya, Moscow recognizes the UN-sponsored government in Tripoli, but also supports its opponent, General Khalifa Haftar. In Yemen, Moscow has good relations with the Saudi-backed Hadi government but also with the Iranian-backed Houthis and the UAE-backed southern separatists. In Iraq, for instance, Moscow maintains good relations with both the Baghdad government and the Kurdish Regional Government.42

39 “The Effect of US Sanctions on the Iran-Iraq Alliance,” January 16, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-effect-of-us-sanctionson-the-iran-iraq-alliance/. 40 “Russia’s Oil and Gas Investments in Iraq Exceed 10 Billion USD,” February 27, 2019, https://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-02/27/c_137854984.htm. 41 “Russia Consolidating its Position in Iraq Amid Anti-Iran Sanctions,” April 30, 2019, https://www.shafaaq.com/en/world/russia-consolidating-its-position-in-iraq-amidanti-iran-sanctions/. 42 Frederick Kempe and Giampiero Massolo, “Preface,” in The MENA Region: A Great Power Competition, ed. Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli (Milan: Ledizioni Ledi Publishing, 2019), 11.

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7 The Russia-Iran Partnership and Its Impact on Gulf Interests As discussed above, after 25 years in the geopolitical wilderness, Russia re-emerged in the Middle East with the goal of establishing itself as a rare arbiter between feuding parties. Russia’s diplomatic outreach on the Arabian Peninsula has been guided by this principle with Moscow playing the role of reliable mediator between adversaries. It is within this framework that we should assess Russia’s balancing act between rivaling members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). We conclude that the highs and lows of Russia’s interactions with the Arab monarchies do not impinge on its alignment with Iran, and on the other side of the coin, nor do expanding ties with Iran encroach on relations with GCC states. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (with support from Bahrain and Egypt), the self-proclaimed “anti-terror quartet,” imposed an economic and diplomatic blockade on Qatar. From the Kremlin’s vantage point, the diplomatic row came out of the blue. In 2016, and for years before, Moscow routinely accused both Saudi Arabia and Qatar of sponsoring terrorism and promoting Islamic extremism across the Arab world, chiefly in Syria, as well as in southwestern Russia.43 Thus, the eruption of the crisis in the Arabian Peninsula, in which Saudi Arabia justifies its actions against Qatar largely on the basis of Doha’s alleged patronage of terrorist groups, surprised the Russian leadership. Long before the June 5, 2017 blockade, the Kremlin was unquestionably aware of the GCC’s internal divisions, underscored by the March–November 2014 diplomatic spat, yet the decision of three Council members to take such unprecedented action against a fellow GCC state shocked officials in Moscow. The Kremlin quickly and carefully crafted a balanced response that avoided damaging Moscow’s relationship with either the “quartet” or with Qatar. To Moscow, all feuding parties in the Middle East are potential sources of foreign investment, markets for Russian weapons and potential partners in the oil and gas sector. As Sergei Chemezov, chief of the powerful state industrial holding Rostec, said in February 2015, “As for the conflict situation in the Middle East, I do not conceal it, and everyone understands this, the more conflicts there are, the more they [clients] buy weapons 43 Giorgio Cafiero and Theodore Karasik, “Qatar and Russia: What Do They See in Each Other?,” Middle East Policy Council, October 11, 2017, https://mepc.org/com mentary/qatar-and-russia-what-do-they-see-each-other.

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from us. Volumes are continuing to grow despite sanctions. Mainly, it is in Latin America and the Middle East.”44 The decision to impose the blockade was long in the making. For many years, the two powerful GCC states had regarded Qatar as an undisciplined and insubordinate upstart. As far back as the early 1990s, the view in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi was that Qatar was seeking to step overstep Saudi dictates and to adopt a more pragmatic response to regional developments. Over the years, Qatar’s willingness to engage in cordial relations with Iran, radical Palestinian groups and the Muslim Brotherhood had raised the ire of Saudi and Emirati leaders. What enraged the Saudis and the Emiratis even more was the output from the Doha-based Al Jazeera satellite television channel, giving airtime to individuals and groups despised by the authorities in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Tensions had been brewing for a while but with Trump in the White House, Riyadh assumed a more assertive approach. Having chosen Saudi Arabia as the destination for his first foreign trip, the US president appeared to give a green light for Qatar to be targeted, prompting Riyadh to impose the blockade. Quickly adapting to the emergency of land borders and air corridors around it being closed, Qatar resumed normal life, refusing the conditions put forward by the four blockading states, including shutting down the news channel.45 The crisis afforded Moscow an opportunity to rehearse its role as a diplomatic actor. A couple of months after the blockage, in late August 2017, Lavrov engaged in shuttle diplomacy with his visit to Doha, Kuwait City and Abu Dhabi. By going to one GCC state on each side of the rift—in addition to Kuwait—Moscow underscored its balanced response to the crisis and its role as an impartial broker. Qatar and Russia remain major competitors in the global gas market and have serious differences over Assad’s regime. However, Doha has been keen to boost its overseas portfolio seeing investment in Russia as a means to acquire both political and economic dividends. Doha has nurtured business ties with Moscow by investing in diverse sectors of the Russian industry. Even if 44 “Glava Rostekha Soobshchil of Roste Prodazh Chem Bol’she Korose Prodazh,” Newsru.com, February 23, 2015, https://www.newsru.com/russia/23feb2015/che mezov.html; as quoted in Borshchevskaya, “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East.” 45 See Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis (London: Hurst & Company, 2020).

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the Saudi-led blockade were lifted, underlying tensions between the GCC and Doha will persist, meaning that the emirate will continue to bolster relations with other actors, and Russia, as it happens, stands foremost among them.46 Determined to weather the blockade, Doha has had little choice but to strengthen its relations with Iran across a host of domains from aviation and food security to tourism and diplomacy. The siege of Doha has only pushed Qatar closer to Iran with Tehran playing a key role in helping Qatar maintain its independence. Since the boycott began, Qatar has been using Iran’s airspace and shipping routes to circumvent the blockade with trade relations expanding since 2017. Qatar has also cooperated with Iran in the energy sector significantly, as the two countries have been working together to preserve the North Dome/South Pars gas field, which they share and which is the world’s largest gas reserve. The weekend after the Trump-ordered assassination of General Soleimani, Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani traveled to Tehran to express condolences to President Rouhani. Like the other GCC members, Doha favored restraint and de-escalation between its close ally, the US and its regional friend, Iran.47 While Iranian-Qatari relations have reached new heights, it is unclear to what extent the two states can further deepen their ties. Qatar, as the host of the largest US military installation in the Middle East, does not always align with Iran, which sees the US military presence in the region as a grave threat. The current sanctions regime against Iranian banks prevents the exchange of currencies, while rigidities in the Iranian market—such as the failure of domestic companies to adapt to evolving market demand and high tariffs—are obstacles to greater economic activity. Ultimately, Qatar’s perspective on Iran is similar to the Kuwaiti leadership’s understanding of the Islamic Republic. Both Persian Gulf emirates believe that it is prudent to collaborate with and accommodate Iran, yet Doha and Kuwait City also have concerns about Iran filling more regional power vacuums in a manner that stokes sectarian conflict. Given Doha’s current state of relations with the blockading GCC member-states, the Qataris will likely maintain its partnership with Iran. The odds are good 46 Ibid. 47 “Qatari Foreign Minister Offers Condolences to Iran’s Rouhani for Soleimani Death,” January 4, 2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2020/01/04/Qat ari-foreign-minister-offers-condolences-to-Iran-s-Rouhani-over-Soleimani-death.html.

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that Iranian-Qatari ties will continue to strengthen even if Tehran and Doha agree to disagree on certain issues such as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s legitimacy. For Qatar, a major foreign policy challenge will be to continue its cooperative and pragmatic partnership with Tehran while remaining on good terms with the Trump administration. Thus far, Doha appears to be adroit in skillfully balancing Washington and Tehran’s interests off each other without drawing the ire of either side. For the blockaded emirate, joining either an anti-US or an anti-Iran coalition in the region is not a viable option. Qatar simply places too much value on good relations with the US, which is the emirate’s security guarantor, and its Persian neighbor. Ultimately, these dynamics leave Doha with a strong incentive to help mitigate tensions between the US and Islamic Republic by serving as a backchannel between US and Iranian officials. Doha’s tentative role as broker between Washington and Tehran was on display in May 2019 when Qatar and Iran’s chief diplomats exchanged visits. What remains to be seen is whether Qatar’s leadership can serve as an effective diplomatic bridge.48 The UAE is also a significant GCC player with shifting interests and positions in regional conflicts, and Moscow has displayed adaptability in its relations with Abu Dhabi. In June 2018, Moscow ratified a strategic partnership agreement with the UAE, which laid the groundwork for Putin’s visit to Abu Dhabi in October 2019—resulting in $1.3 billion in new bilateral trade deals. The positions of Russia and the UAE toward regional security crises have converged in a similar manner. In December 2018, the UAE reestablished diplomatic relations with Syria and recognized Assad’s legitimacy. Since April 2019, Russia and the UAE have lent material support to Libya National Army (LNA) chieftain Khalifa Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli, and Russia has engaged diplomatically with the UAE-aligned Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen. Moscow has also expressed its wishes to cooperate with Abu Dhabi on the construction of a more stable collective security architecture for the Persian Gulf.49 Russia’s approach calls for expansive dialogue between

48 “GCC Dispute Pushes Iran and Qatar Closer but With Caveats,” June 17, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/gcc-dispute-pushes-iranand-qatar-closer-but-with-caveats/. 49 Samuel Ramani, “Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partnership,” Middle East Policy, 27 (2020): 125–140.

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Iran, the GCC states and other regional stakeholders that would be overseen by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the GCC and the Arab League. Russia also views a normalization of relations between Qatar and the “quartet,” of which the UAE is a key partner, as an essential precondition for a stable regional order.50 However, the UAE’s support for Trump’s maximum pressure campaign toward Iran and its leadership role in the isolation of Qatar differ drastically from Russia’s collective security vision. Although the overarching strategic visions of Russia and the UAE on Persian Gulf security differ, common ideas on preserving regional stability provide a source of cohesion. These ideational synergies, which include a shared opposition to a pre-emptive military strike against Iran and a desire for multipolar engagement on Persian Gulf security, are overlaid by shared geopolitical interests and could cause Persian Gulf security to emerge as the third pillar of the Russia-UAE strategic partnership. Abu Dhabi has recently tried to reassure the international community of its desire to avoid war with Iran. Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed’s July 2019 visit to Moscow provided one of the earliest indicators of the UAE’s policy re-evaluation, as he distanced himself from US allegations that Iran perpetrated the May 2019 oil tanker attacks. Russian officials like Foreign Minister Lavrov viewed Sheikh Abdullah’s decision to visit Moscow as evidence of the UAE’s willingness to de-escalate tensions.51 The UAE’s calls for “wisdom and political solutions” to prevail over “confrontation and escalation” in the aftermath of the killing of Soleimani further aligns Abu Dhabi with Russia’s collective-security vision.52 Russia-UAE relations have strengthened in spite of Russia’s pursuit of closer ties with Iran and Qatar. As indicated above, this is in line with Russia’s policy of pursuing a balancing act in the region. On the UAE side, some analysts speculate that expanding cooperation with Russia is mainly transactional, and that the UAE is hedging against US disengagement from the Middle East or using Russia as a bargaining chip to secure sophisticated US weaponry such as the F-35 fifth-generation fighter jets.

50 Ibid., 134. 51 Mariana Belenkaya, “Why Did UAE Foreign Minister Go To Russia Following His

Meeting with Pompeo?,” Al-Monitor, July 1, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2019/06/russia-uae-us-iran-egypt-peace-plan.html. 52 Ramani, “Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partnership,” 134.

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As discussed above, the Kremlin and Tehran both support Assad’s leadership. While there are geopolitical motives behind this support, both states maintain that they are upholding the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty. This common policy line has an impact on RussianSaudi relations given the latter’s staunch opposition of Assad’s regime. Saudi Arabia has been pushing for Assad’s expulsion, as his downfall would mitigate Iran’s regional influence, which is perceived as a threat by the Arab monarchies. Russian-Saudi relations are primarily based on energy geopolitics with the Kremlin nurturing closer trade and investment ties. While many world leaders began distancing themselves from the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, after his alleged involvement in the 2018 murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, human rights violations and the war in Yemen, Putin embraced the Saudi leader in various international gatherings. A year later, Putin paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, the first by a Russian leader in more than a decade.53 The two top oil producers toasted their partnership in OPEC+ and signed several memoranda of understanding in the fields of energy, petrochemicals, transport and artificial intelligence.54 To Russia, it is “business as usual” as new investments are essential for the embattled Russian economy, which continues to suffer under sanctions related to the country’s military engagement in the Ukraine and the low price of Russia’s key export, oil. However, the Russians and the Saudis have treaded lightly around the issue of Iran. There was controversy following Putin’s statement that there was no evidence that Iran was responsible for the attack on Abqaiq and Khurais, the site of two Saudi oil facilities in September 2019.55 While Putin condemned the attack, he defended Iran by saying that there was no proof that Tehran was involved in the Houthi-led attack, which briefly reduced Saudi Arabia’s oil output by half. The Saudi position became more tenuous with Trump’s reluctance to retaliate against Iran for its alleged involvement. 53 Ibid. 54 “Putin Visits Saudi Arabia in Sign of Growing Ties,” October 14, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/putin-visits-saudi-arabia-sign-growingties-191014171206513.html. 55 “Russia’s Putin Says No Proof Iran Was Behind Saudi Attacks,” October 2, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-attacks-putin/russias-putin-saysno-proof-iran-was-behind-saudi-attacks-idUSKBN1WH196.

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What became clear was that the relationship between the Saudis and the US was confined to a narrow partnership on select issues. The debacle exposed the myth of a special Saudi-US partnership. The Saudis would have to take stock and reimagine interests and relationships in the region, and to perhaps hedge their bets by fostering deeper economic ties with Russia. Instead, Riyadh found itself in an even more complicated position with the outbreak of the Russian-Saudi price-cutting war in early March 2020. Saudi-Russian courtship came to a grinding halt when Mohammed bin Salman failed to persuade Moscow that deep supply cutbacks were needed to deal with the loss of demand from the coronavirus pandemic. Putin vehemently rejected a proposed oil production cut of 1.5 million barrels a day. Seeking to either change Russia’s mind, or at least defend its share of a shrinking market, Riyadh propelled output to a previously unseen 12 million barrels a day in early April—a move that sent prices spiraling.56 Oil prices fell thirty percent in a day with the ruble losing ten percent of its value against the dollar. The standoff came to an end a month later with a deal that ended the disastrous five-week price war. The debacle was awkward for Putin, who not only had to back down, but also had to acquiesce to Trump’s efforts to broker an agreement. According to the agreement, Russia would cut crude-oil production by nearly one-quarter in May and June 2020, a much deeper reduction than the one Moscow rejected when Saudi Arabia proposed it in early March. Trump’s involvement reinforces the notion that Riyadh leans first and foremost toward the US. In other words, it is firmly ensconced in the US orbit. The trends and patterns suggest that while the Saudi-US partnership is a reluctant one, Riyadh is in the US camp. This has a bearing on Russia’s choice of partners. When it comes to Iran, Russia’s relations are exclusive, and with little or no risk US playing a role that could encumber or hamper that partnership. Overall, the Russian-Saudi price war revealed the volatility of energy diplomacy and the limits of Moscow-Riyadh relations. It was only six months prior to the oil production dispute that the Saudi energy minister

56 Grant Smith, “OPEC Output Hit 30-Year High During the Saudi-Russia Price War,” World Oil, May 1, 2020, https://www.worldoil.com/news/2020/5/1/opec-output-hit30-year-high-during-the-saudi-russia-price-war.

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called their courtship a “death do us part” union.57 The price cutting war even called into question whether Russian-Saudi brokered OPEC+ was a viable partnership with analysts speculating that the price war would undo months of quiet diplomacy between Moscow and Riyadh. On the Iranian side, Saudi Arabian rivalry has become an intrinsic part of the geopolitical constellation. Saudi Arabia has fears that the Trump administration may be a fickle friend when it comes to defending the kingdom in case of an Iranian attack. Although the Trump administration has deployed thousands of troops to the kingdom, the Saudis still felt vulnerable. This is why, within a month of the attack on the Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities, the Saudis were exploring indirect talks with Iran, with the help of intermediaries in Iraq, Oman, Kuwait and Pakistan, to try to reduce tensions by initiating reconciliation talks. In mid-October 2019, the Pakistani prime minister, Imran Khan traveled to Iran and Saudi Arabia to discuss ways to reduce regional tensions. After the meetings, the rival countries indicated a willingness to meet for talks, which would be hosted and mediated by Pakistan.58 On the night of his assassination, General Soleimani was apparently on his way to deliver Iran’s response to an Iraqi-brokered initiative to reduce tensions with Saudi Arabia. In October 2019, the United Arab Emirates announced that it had released $700 million in frozen funds to Iran—another sign of a thaw.59 In the same month, President Rouhani stated there had been positive contacts between Iran and the UAE. The statement followed a secret meeting between Iranian officials and Tahnoun bin Zayed, the Emirati national security adviser, who travelled to Tehran for high-level discussions. Iran has proposed several multilateral regional security pacts to deescalate tensions. Its latest “HOPE” initiative (Hormuz Peace Endeavor) proposes the creation of a collective security system in the West Asia region, stretching from Pakistan to Turkey. It asserts rhetoric that security

57 “Behind the Russia-Saudi Breakup, Calculations and Miscalculations,” March 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/world/europe/russia-saudi-oil.html. 58 “Pakistan’s Imran Khan in Tehran to Facilitate Iran-Saudi Talk,” October 13, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/pakistan-imran-khan-tehran-facilitateiran-saudi-talks-191013144217969.html. 59 “UAE Releases $700 Million in Frozen Iranian Funds,” October 20, 2019, https:// www.alaraby.co.uk/english/News/2019/10/20/UAE-releases-700-million-in-frozen-Ira nian-funds.

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ought to be guaranteed by respecting principles such as non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, respect for territorial integrity, and respect for borders. Above all, however, the system is based on mutual trust rather than arms races and the presence of foreign military bases. It would entail jettisoning the practice of what the Iranians referred to as “buying security.”60 Iran has stressed that the project is open to all, and that it is willing to discuss it with Saudi Arabia. At a recent forum in Tehran, the political deputy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Abbas Araghchi went so far as to compare “HOPE” to European integration or to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), adding that the countries of the region could also benefit from cooperation on such levels as nuclear energy. Given that the Iranian nuclear program is a bone of contention, this was a relatively symptomatic statement.61 Iranian professor, Foad Izad, is skeptical about the viability of such projects. The problem, according to Izad is that “the Saudis are not interested.” He argues that Iran’s foreign minister has proposed to visit Saudi Arabia several times but to no avail. According to Izad, “Saudi Arabia is a neighbor and Iran has been trying to improve relations, especially since President Rouhani came to power.” Izad blames the US for pursuing a “divide and rule policy” for creating tension between neighboring countries. Moreover, he argues that the Saudis “play with the price of oil” to put pressure on Iran by over-exporting in order to harm Iran’s economy.62 Banafsheh Keynoush is more optimistic, explaining that small multilateral steps could perhaps be backed by workable solutions to accommodate Saudi Arabia and Iran, particularly in conflict zones such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. However, as Keynoush notes, Iran’s hardliners are suspicious of any mediation by third countries that are allied with the US. Keynoush maintains that any mediation between Riyadh and Tehran is meaningless if it is predominantly centered on US influence and interests in the

60 “Aggression or Collective Security: HOPE, Another Face of Iran,” May 18, 2020, https://warsawinstitute.review/issue-2020/aggression-or-collective-security-hopeanother-face-of-iran/. 61 Ibid. 62 “Iran Does Not Consider Saudi Arabia as Enemy,” February 9, 2020, https://www. tehrantimes.com/news/444993/Prof-Iran-does-not-consider-Saudi-Arabia-as-enemy.

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region. She also argues that bilateral talks will fall apart if the US or American organizations, or staunch US allies, attempt to take charge.63 This is something to consider given the Trump administration’s decision to narrow its scope of engagement in the region, and the Arab monarchies growing sense of insecurity. Considering the strength of Russian-Iranian partnership, Moscow could explore the role of regional mediator, without compromising its own priorities or forsaking Tehran. With relatively positive relations with the Arab monarchies (save the recent spat with the Saudis), Russia is poised to play a more constructive role in mitigating geopolitical discord between Iran and its regional rivals. Russia took steps in this direction in July 2019 when it floated the idea of an inclusive and collective security dialogue focusing on the Persian Gulf by presenting “Russia’s Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf Region.” The initiative was presented by Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov at the Russian Foreign Ministry for representatives of Arab states, Iran, Turkey, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the European Union, the Arab League and the BRICS countries accredited in Moscow. Laying out Russia’s ideas on how to stabilize the Persian Gulf region, Bogdanov emphasized that only an inclusive regional security system could ensure stability in the region. Enshrined in the concept are principles of incrementalism, multilateralism and strict observance of international law, primarily the UN Charter and the Security Council resolutions. To date however, no viable, concrete steps have been taken to implement the concept.64 The idea of collective security in the Persian Gulf depends on transGulf security cooperation, and as we have indicated above, there are sharp intra-state and inter-state differences within the GCC itself. Another impediment to collective security is the dependence of the GCC states on US security. An alternative security arrangement would entail the weaning off of US dependence, which has not diminished despite rhetoric of a

63 Banafsheh Keynoush, “Why Mediation Between Saudi Arabia and Iran Keeps Failing,” January 27, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/why-mediation-bet ween-saudi-arabia-and-iran-keeps-failing/. 64 “Russia’s Security Concept for the Gulf Area,” July 23, 2019, https://www.mid. ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/conflicts/-/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/ content/id/3733575?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_xIEMTQ3OvzcA&_101_INSTANCE_ xIEMTQ3OvzcA_languageId=en_GB.

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Middle East draw down. With a plethora of bases in on the Arabian Peninsula (and beyond), the US underwrites the GCC states’ security while funneling to them massive amounts of sophisticated weaponry. All the same, the China-backed Russian proposal for collective security has the merit of signaling Moscow’s readiness to play a more active regional role.

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Conclusion

This chapter has provided an assessment of the foundation upon which Moscow and Tehran have built their partnership. We have explored the idea that this strategic partnership is informed by an ideational synergy that binds the two states despite clashes and discord. We have outlined some of the more contentious cases that have suggested that Russia is a fickle friend that uses Iran as leverage against the US. That is, Moscow is willing to discard Tehran when it is experiencing an uptick in bilateral relations with Washington. We have also dismissed the hypothesis that Iran is a provisional counterweight or a dispensable pawn on Russia’s regional chessboard. In crafting an anti-hegemonic counterweight to US unilateralism, the Kremlin needs Tehran as much as Tehran needs the Kremlin. Both states are internationally isolated and in need of nurturing their partnership, despite flows and ebbs, peaks and troughs. Embedded in a shared narrative of the international order, Russian-Iranian alignment will likely persist despite asymmetries in different conflict zones. In relation to the GCC states, Russia’s bilateral relations with Iran’s rivals or adversaries do not impinge on the durability of Tehran and Moscow’s strategic partnership. Since making its debut on the Middle Eastern political theater, Russia has adopted a delicate balancing act, which is very much in line with its professed role as arbiter and dealmaker between feuding parties in the region. In the future, the impact or influence of this partnership on the Arab Peninsula can prove to be positive with Russia ready to project its desired role as mediator and broker. With Russian-Iranian alignment a permanent feature of the regional constellation, and the Kremlin’s relatively constructive relations with the GCC states (assuming that Moscow and Riyadh mend the current rift), Russia could be enlisted to act as an arbiter by smoothing tensions between Iran and the Arab monarchies. It can also spearhead an integrative and collective security architecture once the littoral Arab states begin weaning themselves off of US dependence. Iran has proven that it

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is prepared to engage in such a dialogue if the Arab states demonstrate an interest in assembling an alternative security arrangement free from US influence. Tehran has enough confidence in Moscow to know it will not forsake its interests if it decides to take the lead in brokering such an initiative. Russia would midwife the Arab monarchies to independence and would end decades of rivalry between Persian Gulf neighbors.

CHAPTER 9

Russia-GCC Relations and the Future of Syria: Political Process and Prospects for the Economic Reconstruction Anton Mardasov and Andrey Korotayev

1

Introduction

In this chapter, we consider the Russia-Gulf relations in the context of the Syrian negotiation process. The recent rapprochement between Russia and the Gulf has been a subject of substantial research. In this chapter, we

This article is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2021 with support by the Russian Science Foundation (Project Number 19-18-00155). A. Mardasov Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] A. Korotayev (B) National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_9

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shall try to analyze its implications for the issue of the economic reconstruction of Syria. In the first section, we review the Russia-Gulf relations against the background of the Syrian crisis. In the second section, we consider a sort of “international normative scenario” that implies the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254, political dialogue, adoption of a new constitution, and free elections leading to a regime change followed by the provision to the new regime of the funds that are necessary for a full-scale Syrian reconstruction on the part of the West and the Gulf. The third section analyzes recent attempts to revive it through the Syrian Constitutional Committee and causes of their failure. The fourth section regards the Russia-Gulf interaction in the context of the Syrian negotiation process. In the fifth section, we consider the Syrian reconciliation prospects, and specify grounds for out pessimistic assessment of them. The sixth section assesses the current economic situation in Syria against the background of the perspectives for its reconstruction. Among other things, we discuss the perspectives of the US participation in the Syrian reconstruction, as well as the point why Russia is not likely to be able to pull out investments into Syria from Europe for the return of refugees. The seventh section analyzes the Russian participation in the Syrian reconstruction and demonstrates its limited potential. In the eighth section, we consider the perspectives of the Gulf countries participation in the Syrian reconstruction against the background of the Russia-Gulf rapprochement, demonstrating that, Saudi Arabia, and especially the UAE, might indeed be inclined to provide substantial reconstruction investments (among other things, to counteract the influence in Syria of the Turkish-Qatari alliance, on the one hand, and the Iranian influence, on the other), but they are unlikely to do this in the foreseeable future in a fear of the American sanctions. The ninth, concluding, section sums up the main findings of this chapter.

2

Background

The interest on the part of Russian academic circles in the Syrian conflict, as well as Russia-GCC relations, has grown markedly since the start of the Russian Air-Space Force operation in Syria. This event has significantly updated the discussion about Russian interests both in relation to Damascus and in the entire region of the Near and Middle East. In particular, Dmitry Trenin from the Carnegie Moscow Center sees the main goal of Russia in the Middle East under Vladimir Putin as raising the status of

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Russia and securing her the role of a significant external force in one of the most unstable regions of the world.1 Among the important tasks, he also highlights the provision of Russia’s military presence in the region and on its borders, expansion of the Russian presence in regional arms markets and maintaining energy prices through coordination with key oil and gas suppliers.2 Alexei Malashenko draws attention to the fact that the deterrence and weakening of Islamist extremism (the influence of which can extend to the territory of Russia and its neighbors from among the republics of the former USSR) play an important role in Russia’s foreign policy.3 From his point of view, the rise of Islamism has resonated with the Russian Muslim population and encouraged the development of radical Islamist opposition movements within this community.4 The official line in Moscow is that the Arab Spring—and perhaps also those Western powers that have helped advance it—has stirred up dissent among Russia’s own Muslim community. Farid Salman, head of the Council of the Ulema of the Russian Federation, which is loyal to the authorities, said that the “Arab revolutions are having a negative influence on Russia’s Islamic community.”5 In keeping with the official ideology, he said he considers religious Muslim dissidence something stirred up by “Russia’s geopolitical adversaries and by agents of influence at work in the Muslim community under various masks.”6 Nikolay Kozhanov of Chatham House also draws attention to the fact that one of the circumstances affecting Russian politics in the Middle East (after the events in Ukraine in 2014 and the deterioration of relations between Russia and its main trade and economic partners in the European

1 Dmitry Trenin, Russia in the Middle East: Tasks, Priorities, Political Incentives [Rossiya

na Blizhnem Vostoke: zadachi, prioritety, politicheskie stimuly] (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2016). 2 Trenin, Russia in the Middle East. 3 Alexey Malashenko, Russia and the Arab Spring (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center,

2013). 4 Malashenko, Russia and the Arab Spring, 1. 5 Malashenko, Russia and the Arab Spring, 20. 6 Interfax, “The Arab Revolutions, Are Having a Negative Impact on Russia’s Islamic

Community,” Interfax, March 4, 2013, www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=interview& div=371&domain=3.

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Union) was the attraction of investments to Russia primarily from the monarchies of the Gulf.7 Nevertheless, the common denominator of discussions in the Russian academic community regarding the Russian presence in the Middle East came down to one important thesis. In the 2010s, the trend finally took shape for the Russian leadership to pursue a more pragmatic and even opportunist policy in the Middle East.8 Russia managed to finally abandon any ideological component, which, however, does not solve other important problems: the lack of a long-term strategy, the management of situational interests, as well as serious limits within the country, which determine the temporary nature of the Russian presence in the region. At the same time, the operation of the Russian air-space forces in Syria has become one of the most important constraining factors for the development of relations between Russia and the Gulf countries. At the same time, as the Russian presence in Syria began to be perceived by regional actors (including the GCC countries) as an objective reality, and the chances of success of the Syrian opposition in the confrontation with Bashar al-Assad tended to zero, the dialogue between the Gulf and Russia started to be filled with a constructive agenda. On the one hand, the GCC countries began to perceive Moscow as an important actor for resolving regional issues, trying not to bring the situation to direct confrontation (an example is the Russian-Arabian dialogue on Libya and Yemen). On the other hand, the Russian leadership, realizing the limitations of its own resources, was interested in using the dialogue with the Gulf to activate economic and energy projects with the Arabian monarchies. Aleksey Vasiliev in his book Russia’s Middle East Policy: From Lenin to Putin notes albeit small but positive changes in relations between the Gulf countries and Russia. The author proceeds from the fact that it is precisely cooperation in the economic sphere that should underlie Russian-Saudi relations, which in turn makes Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries the coveted partners for Russia. However, large investments from the GCC 7 Nikolay Kozhanov, Russian Policy Across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods (London: Chatham House, 2018). 8 See, e.g., Yuri Barmin, From Ideology to Pragmatism: How Putin Changed Russia’s Focus in the Middle East (Istanbul: Al Sharq Strategic Research, 2017); Irina Zvyagelskaya, “Russia in a Changing Middle East,” RIAC, December, 2015, http://old.russiancouncil. ru/en/inner/?id_4=6978#top-content.

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countries did not come to Russia, which is largely explained not only and not so much by disagreements on political issues (including Syria), but by problems of an economic and even institutional nature.9 Elena Melkumyan believes that relations between Russia and the Gulf countries in the 2010s were undergoing yet another test of strength. In her opinion, problems such as the Syrian crisis and the conflict in Yemen, along with different views on the fight against the “Islamic State,” were a serious obstacle to the development of relations between Russia and the GCC countries. Melkumyan notes that not only the Gulf had cause for concern about the Russian military operation in Syria. The Russian leadership extremely negatively assessed the policies of the Arabian monarchies regarding the situation in Syria, especially as regards Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which were referred to in the Russian media and expert community by the derogatory term “Wahhabi tandem.”10 Gregory Kosach considers Russian-Saudi interaction as a history of ups and downs, which are directly influenced by the regional and international situation. In his opinion, the rapid evolution of the system of international relations, as well as the changing understanding of the role and place of Russia and Saudi Arabia in the modern world “does not create significant prerequisites for a positive transformation” of relations between the two countries.11 From Kosach’s point of view, the operation of the Russian air-space forces in Syria has become one of the factors that negatively affected the Russian-Saudi dialogue. Commenting on the situation in Syria, the columnist of Asharq Al-Ausat wrote that Russia’s actions “only in alliance with Assad” would cause an “outbreak of inter-religious wars.”12 The visit of Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Sochi on October 11, 2015, where he met with Vladimir Putin, did not change this situation. The Saudi press quoted the words he said to the Russian president: “Your

9 Alexey Vasiliev, Russia’s Middle East Policy: From Lenin to Putin (London: Routledge, 2018). 10 Elena Melkumyan, A Political History of Relations Between Russia and the Gulf States (Doha: Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, 2015). 11 Gregory Kosach, “Russia and Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Relations [Rossiya i Saudovskaya Araviya: evolutsiya otnosheniy],” Svobodnaya mysl (2015): 129–142. 12 Kosach, “Russia and Saudi Arabia”, 139.

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intervention in Syria is unacceptable.”13 Mark N. Katz also notes that “Saudi-Russian relations deteriorated when the ‘Arab Spring’ spread to Syria, and Moscow and Riyadh found themselves on opposite sides with Russia defending the Assad regime while Saudi Arabia (among others) supported Sunni Arab opposition forces fighting against him.”14 This, of course, affected similarly relations between Qatar and Russia.15 At the same time, the fact that Russia began to play a dominant role in Syria pushed Riyadh, albeit to a forced, but still a dialogue with Moscow. And not only on Syrian, but also on Yemeni, Libyan, and Palestinian issues. Some researchers note the importance of the oil price factor in the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Russia.16 Indeed, with respect to the oil price issue the two countries are likely to remain strategic allies in the forthcoming future. Both countries prosperity is heavily dependent on the oil prices,17 and the events of the recent years demonstrated this in a rather salient way. The precipitous decline of the oil prices in 2014– 2015 resulted in a pronounced economic recession in Russia, but it also caused substantial financial and economic problems in Saudi Arabia as well. In December 2014 that time Saudi oil minister Ali al-Naimi claimed that Saudi Arabia would not cut oil production even if the price of oil

13 Kosach, “Russia and Saudi Arabia”, 139; see also Mark Katz, Better Than Before: Comparing Moscow’s Cold War and Putin Era Policies Toward Arabia and the Gulf (Durham: Durham University, 2018), 15. 14 Katz, Better Than Before, 15. He also notes that “what especially bothered Riyadh was that Moscow’s actions in Syria were enabling Iran to maintain influence in that country” (Ibidem). 15 Katz, Better Than Before, 18. 16 See, e.g., ‘Abdullah bin’ Abd al-Muhsin al-Faraj, Al-istratijiyyah al-Rusiyyah fi-l-

Sharq al-Awsat [Russian Strategy in the Middle East] (Riyadh: Center for Research and Intercommunication Knowledge, 2017), 112–119; Gregory Kosach and Elena Melkumyan, “Ihtimaliyyat al-‘alaqat al-istratijiyyah li-Rusiya wa-l-‘Arabiyyah al-Sa’udiyyah [Possibilities of Strategic Relations Between Russia and Saudi Arabia],” Tikrit Journal For Political Sciences 10:3 (2017): 150–157. 17 E.g., Peter Turchin, “Scientific Prediction in Historical Sociology: Ibn Khaldun

Meets Al Saud,” History and Mathematics 2 (2006): 9–38; Theodosios Perifanis and Athanasios Dagoumas, “An Econometric Model for the Oil Dependence of the Russian Economy,” International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 7:4 (2017): 7–13; Bradshaw, Michael, Thijs Van de Graaf, and Richard Connolly, “Preparing for the New Oil Order? Saudi Arabia and Russia,” Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019): 100374.

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fell to $20 a barrel.18 However, already in 2015, well before the oil price reached $30, Saudi revenues fell dramatically; as a result Saudi Arabia ran a deficit of 367 billion riyals ($97.9 billion) or 15% of gross domestic product, and had to cut expenses rather seriously,19 which affected its socioeconomic dynamics in a rather painful way. As a result, in 2016 both Saudi Arabia and Russia opted to reduce finally their oil production in order to stabilize the oil prices—a move, from which both countries benefited very substantially. On the other hand, the 2014–2016 oil price crises demonstrated in a rather salient way that the behavior of Saudi Arabia and Russia is actually the major determinant of the global oil price levels. Indeed, the decline of the global oil prices was only stopped when in 2016 Saudi Arabia and Russia came to the agreement on the oil production control, which was supported enthusiastically by the OPEC and some other oil exporting countries, resulting in the rather effective OPEC+ agreement. In this respect, the 2014–2016 events demonstrated quite clearly that the economic prosperity of both countries is heavily dependent on the effective coordination of actions of the both countries at the global oil market. This was only confirmed by March 2020 crisis in Saudi-Russian relations that resulted in a catastrophic decline of the oil prices. Indeed, it was only after Saudi-Russian reconciliation that OPEC++ managed to return the oil prices to a level that was more or less acceptable for the oil producing countries. The idea of a forced partnership and the need to revise the nature of relations between Russia and the Gulf after the Russian invasion of Syria is also traced in the works of Eugene Rumer and Andrew Weiss from Carnegie. “Using its success in Syria as a springboard, Russia has transformed old relationships throughout the region and forged new ones. The Kremlin has raised its profile among Persian Gulf Arab states. Moscow is showing the region’s rulers that it can be a reliable partner, unlike the United States, which cut ties with former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak at the slightest sign of trouble—after a partnership of more than three decades. In contrast, the Kremlin has done business with Syria’s 18 Anjli Raval, “Opec Leader Vows Not to Cut Oil Output Even If Price Hits $20,” Financial Times, December 22, 2014. https://www.ft.com/content/63c7786c89bc-11e4-8daa-00144feabdc0. 19 Angus McDowall and Andrew Torchia, “Saudi Plans Spending Cuts, Reforms to Shrink Budget Deficit,” Reuters, December 28, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-saudi-budget-idUSKBN0UB10D20151228.

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Assad family for over fifty years and has stood by its man.”20 Mark N. Katz also notes that “the Saudis seem to have accepted Moscow’s logic that if they truly fear Iran in Syria, then Riyadh is better off if Russian forces are there to constrain Iran than if they are not.”21 A particular significant rapprochement has been observed between Russia and the United Arab Emirates, which even allowed some analysts to speak about strategic partnership between these two countries.22 Among the most salient manifestations of this rapprochement one may mention Moscow’s June 2018 ratification of a strategic partnership agreement with the UAE. “This agreement laid the groundwork for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Abu Dhabi in October 2019. Putin’s trip resulted in $1.3 billion in new bilateral trade deals.”23 However, in the context of this chapter the most significant manifestation was that in December 2018, the UAE reestablished diplomatic relations with Syria and recognized Assad’s legitimacy. Incidentally, Samuel Ramani quite convincingly identifies a sort of ideological (“ideational”) basis for this rapprochement, noting that “the leaderships of both countries share an aversion to popular revolutions and hostility toward grassroots Islamist movements.”24 Ramani also notes that “similar assessments by Russia and the UAE of the Arab Spring’s destructive legacy for regional security—more frequently repeated after ISIS’s emergence—culminated in a direct expression of solidarity against the Islamist threat at the August 2016 Grozny Conference. This international conference on Sunni

20 Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, “A Brief Guide to Russia’s Return to the Middle East,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 24, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/24/brief-guide-to-russia-s-returnto-middle-east-pub-80134; see also Katz, Better Than Before, 28; Majid bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Turki, Al-Sa’udiyyah wa-Rusiya: bawa’ith al-‘alaqat wa-tahaddiyatu-ha [Saudi Arabia and Russia: Motives and Challenges of Relations] (Riyadh: Center of Information and Arabian-Russian Studies, 2017), 119–120. 21 Katz, Better Than Before, 15. 22 Li-Chen Sim, “Russia and the UAE Are Now Strategic Partners: What’s Next?”

LobeLog, June 7, 2018, https://lobelog.com/russia-and-the-uae-are-now-strategic-par tners-whats-next/; Samuel Ramani, “Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partnership,” Middle East Policy 27:1 (2020): 125–140. 23 Ramani, “Russia and the UAE,” 125. 24 Ramani, “Russia and the UAE,” Middle East Policy 27:1 (2020): 126.

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Islam, co-organized by the Abu Dhabi-based Tabah Foundation, identified Wahhabism, Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood as ‘misguided’ interpretations of Islam, much like the Islamic State.”25 Thus, the recent rapprochement between Russia and the Gulf has been a subject of substantial research. In this chapter, we shall try to analyze its implications for the issue of the economic reconstruction of Syria.

3 Political Process and Prospects for the Syrian Economic Reconstruction With respect to the issue of the Syrian reconstruction, at present we observe the nominal prevalence of what may be called a sort of “global business plan.” This global “Normative scenario” is officially supported by the West (US, EU, UK), the Saudi alliance, and the Qatari-Turkish alliance. This scenario implies the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254,26 political dialogue, adoption of a new constitution, and free elections leading to a regime change followed by the provision to the new regime of the funds that are necessary for a full-scale Syrian reconstruction on the part of the West and the Gulf. We do not think anybody believes that this normative scenario is realistic anymore. The regime believes it has won the civil war militarily and is not ready to make any serious concessions. This is not likely because the military/security leaders whose influence increased dramatically during the civil war would do their best to block any serious political process

25 Ramani, “Russia and the UAE,” Middle East Policy 27:1 (2020): 130. 26 The plan for the political process in Syria was outlined by the UN Security Council

Resolution 2254 (adopted on 18 December 2015), which, in turn, closely echoes the Geneva communiqué of June 30, 2012, which includes such criteria as introducing a ceasefire, creating a transitional government, and holding free and fair elections— see, e.g., Magnus Lundgren, “Mediation in Syria: Initiatives, Strategies, and Obstacles, 2011–2016,” Contemporary Security Policy 37:2 (2016): 273–288; Muriel Asseburg and Khalid Yacoub Oweis, “Syria’s Reconstruction Scramble,” Syria Studies 9:2 (2017): 15– 30; Osaretin Idahosa and Harrison C. Ajebon, “As the Beat Goes on in Syria, Is There an Exit Route?” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 8:6 (2017): 53–62; Mohd Javed and Faisal Mahmood, The Role of the UN in the Syrian Conflict: Success or Failure (Patiala, India: Madaan Publishing House, 2017); Maria Khodynskaya-Golenishcheva, “International Lega– Basis for Syrian Settlement,” Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya 62:5 (2018): 80–87.

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of national reconciliation that would involve such things as transitional justice, which they would like to avoid at any cost. As Mark Katz notes, “it is not just that Moscow cannot get Syrian opposition groups to accept the Assad regime (even though they have been largely defeated), but it cannot get the Assad regime to make any meaningful concessions to the opposition.”27 On the other hand, it may be noted that Russia is not ready to apply any serious energy to persuade the regime to make such concessions. Russian officials have shown strong formal commitment to the above-described political solution scheme, but in reality, they mimic the political process and manipulate the Resolution 2254 in order to put the regime and the opposition into an unequal position. For this purpose, the opposition was initially fragmented by deescalation zones and weakened by operations against a backdrop of specially created delays. The Constitutional Committee, in fact, is assigned the role of a transitional government. However, it achieves not a national reconciliation, but the preservation of the Assad regime almost without any changes, but in the context of the general fatigue of internal and external players from the war in Syria.

4

The Syrian Constitutional Committee

The Syrian Constitutional Committee was created in early 2018 (after the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi) with the aim of developing a new Constitution, and after almost two years it began to work in Geneva under the auspices of the UN.28 The previous dialogue in Geneva between the opposition and the regime failed. The delegation from Damascus deliberately delayed negotiations and refused to be in the same room with opponents. Therefore, the UN representatives had to talk with each side separately.29 This made it possible for Moscow to take

27 Katz, Better Than Before, 31. 28 Barbara Bibbo, “Long-awaited Syria Constitutional Committee Meets for First Time,”

AlJazeera, October 30, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/long-awaitedsyrian-constitutional-committee-meets-time-191030151424363.html. 29 Arab News, “UN Brings Syria Talks Under One Roof, Not Yet into One Room,” Arab News, December 1, 2017, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1201846/middleeast.

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control of the political settlement process: firstly, by organizing negotiations in the Astana format, and then by organizing the Congress in Sochi, at which the formation of the Constitutional Committee (CC) was announced. The committee consists of 150 members30 : 50 are the opposition representatives, 50 are the government representatives, and 50 are civil society representatives. Officially, problems arose with the representatives from the civil society group, because Damascus tried to include the Baathists into this group, and refused to compromise, notwithstanding the objections of the former UN Special Envoy for Syria Italian diplomat Staffan de Mistura. Staffan de Mistura resigned before a final decision on the creation of the Constitutional Committee had even been reached. After de Mistura, the Norwegian politician Geir Pedersen took over the Italian diplomat’s successor mandate. And although he managed to broker an agreement on the final list of delegates and start the work of the Committee in Geneva on October 30, 2019 under two co-chairmen (head of the governmental delegation Ahmad Nabil al-Kuzbari and head of the opposition delegation Hadi Al-Bahr), but Pedersen’s plan, in fact, failed. Amal Yazigi, the first head of the governmental delegation,31 was replaced by Damascus at the very last moment because of fears that she is not loyal enough.32 And already after the first meetings, opposition media sources found that several people on the government delegation’s list were not only associated with the secret services,33 but had also directly engaged in arrests and torture in the past. On the eve of the 30 Almohrar Midea, “Ta’arruf ‘ala qa’imat al-asma’ al 150 al-kamilah lia’da’ lajnati ta’dil al-dustur fi Suriya,” Almohrar Midea, September 25, 2019, 31 Qasioun News, “Syria: Regime Released the Names of Its Representatives in the Constitutional Committee,” Qasioun News, September 24, 2019, https://www.qasiounnews.com/public/en/news/show/195402. 32 Sabhi Faranjiya, “Al-dusturiyyah: Al-Nizam istabdala Yazigi bi-l-Kuzbari. Liannaha abdat hamasah za’idah! [Constitutional Committee: The regime replaced Yazigi with alKuzbari, because she showed excessive enthusiasm!],” Almodon online, October 19, 2019,

. 33 Syria Call, “Intelligence Officer in the Regime’s Delegation to the Syrian Constitu-

tional Committee: Swiss TV Channel,” Syria Call, November 9, 2019, https://nedaasy.com/en/news/16815?fbclid=IwAR0Zqe06XxS8AeMP02Tk1xG9ErdQZ8jMCEieyPew D8lMwiIAhrwyvL9GYME.

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first meeting, three representatives left the civil society agreed list.34 It is known that two of them motivated their decision by fears for the safety of their relatives living in Assad-controlled territories. This fact remained almost unnoticed by the Western and even more so Russian media, and the UN quickly found the replacements, without showing off this incident. According to some reports,35 the Syrian secret services are trying to put pressure on all members of the civil society list, seeking their loyalty by threats of seizure of their relatives’ property. It is significant that the plane in which the Committee members flew from Damascus to Geneva in October 2019 carried not only 29 members of the civil society delegation, but also seven opposition negotiators: three members were from the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB) and four members were from the Moscow Platform.36 This is a controlled opposition (regarding NCB this can be said with some reservations, but it has its headquarters in Damascus) associated with the Syrian government’s intelligence services.

5

Russia, the GCC, and the Syrian Negotiation Process

The puppet opposition gained a high political influence in November 2017, when on November 22 the three-day conference Riyadh-2 opened in Riyadh, and which was organized simultaneously with the first ever one-day summit between Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Then Russia for the first time officially welcomed the efforts of Saudi Arabia to unite the Syrian opposition in order to participate in the political negotiations in Geneva and to develop a new constitution of Syria. The delegation

34 Enab Baladi, “Bi-l-’asma’… Qa’imat al-mujtama’ al-madaniyy fi al-lajnah aldusturiyyah [With names… The list of civil society representatives in the Constitutional Committee],” Enab Baladi, October 10, 2019, https://www-enabbaladi-net.cdn.amppro ject.org/c/s/www.enabbaladi.net/archives/281210/amp?fbclid=IwAR3EExCV5WGRE die40l9XJyCN-c8mv1mPLi3m_6Cw645tMkRnd8DzI-Bl44. 35 Sabhi Faranjiya, “Li-madha yakhafu al-nizam min al-lajnah al-dusturiyyah [Why Is the Regime Afraid of the Constitutional Committee],” Almodon online, October 10, 2019,

. 36 Mazin Jibur, “Iltaqa al-Kuzbari faura wusuli-hi…[Al-Kuzbari Met Immediately After

His Arrival],” Al-Watan, October 29, 2019, https://alwatan.sy/archives/218176.

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from the Russian Federation, headed by the president’s special representative for Syria Alexander Lavrentyev, even took part in this conference. Moscow’s interest in the meeting in Riyadh, in our opinion, is explained37 by the fact that Saudi Arabia then not only removed the opposition associated with Qatar (Riyadh’s blockade of Qatar has already begun but that time), but, being immersed in the Yemeni crisis, the Kingdom agreed that those opposition representatives who were most zealously defending position “Assad must leave” left the meeting. Russia took advantage of its status of a country that was able to preserve the Syrian institutions of power and impose its own rules of the game in the absence of Washington clear agenda on Syria, the Saudi-Qatari crisis, and general internal problems in the Gulf region. As a result, the Syrian Negotiating Committee (this is an opposition group of 36 people, which was formed as the results of Riyadh-2 for negotiations in Geneva, that is, even before the Constitutional Committee was formed) included five members of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB), several independent members loyal to Damascus, and also four representatives of the “Moscow” and “Cairo” platforms, that is, those opposition groups that from the very beginning were very friendly toward Moscow and the Syrian regime. Even then, it was clear that such persons were able to block the opposition’s delegation decisions that were inconvenient for the Syrian regime (taking into account the decrease in the number of representatives of the armed opposition to 7). Thus, Russia managed to arrange certain cooperation with the KSA even as regards the Syrian negotiation process (note that Qatari concerns here were partly accommodated by Russia through the RussianTurkish rapprochement and the Astana process due to a very close alliance between Qatar and Turkey).

6

Syrian Reconciliation Prospects

After the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi was held, which gave a start for the Constitutional Committee creation, it finally became clear: Moscow’s goal is to enter the political track with the unequal position of the regime and the opposition. In order to reach this goal, the 37 Anton Mardasov, “Syrian Opposition Can Win, as Long as it Agrees to Lose,” AlMonitor, November 29, 2017, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/11/ syria-opposition-meeting-geneva-assad-russia.html.

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opposition was sequentially fragmented within the Astana format by deescalation zones and weakened by operations against the background of protracted pauses between rounds of negotiations. As a result, the role of the opposition at this meeting in Sochi was actively portrayed by puppet organizations, such as Qadri Jamil’s “Moscow Platform,” Randa Kassis’ Astana Platform, the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB), etc., whereas the participation of a number of tribes (which was made possible due to the position of a Syrian opposition member Ahmad Jarba and his contacts with Russia) allowed Moscow to report on the participation of all denominations and ethnic groups. During the meeting in Sochi delegates announced the Constitutional Committee formation, which, in fact, was assigned the role of a transitional government. Thus, in fact, the UN Resolution 2254 can be circumvented. However, Turkey was able to push real opposition persons (22 people) into the delegation, but many of them lost their authority a long time ago, since their political factions and groups do not control anything on their own in Syria, and if they have some control, these are only those zones that Turkey received through barter exchanges with Russia. It is clear that in this situation, we are not talking about real reform, but about preserving the Assad regime with virtually no changes and in conditions of the general fatigue of internal and external players from the war in Syria. The repressions against the repatriates continue, and the representatives of the opposition, who agreed to “reconcile” with the regime, but refused to be included to the 5th Assault Corps (for some time, the corps was directly controlled by a Russian general and Russian officers at various levels of command), are charged for fictitious criminal cases. There are hardly any hopes that, with this approach, the Syrian regime can be reformed from the inside, through the gradual expansion of Moscow’s influence among the military-political elite and by putting Iran back. At the same time, Moscow has the opportunity to make the “decorative” reforming of Syria look a bit more real. That is why the Assad regime is trying to sabotage the Constitutional Committee, even in its current form, because the Syrian regime fears any reforms and opposition participation in the country’s political life. However, given the upcoming presidential elections and economic problems, it is possible that Assad will agree to some compromises with the Russian Federation and imitate democracy in order to make the election process not as marginal as it was in 2014.

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The Kremlin-approved creation by Turkey of another security zone in the future will strengthen the position of the Syrian National Army, a pro-Turkish structure, which has united almost all the remaining units of the moderate opposition under its wing. The return of Syrian repatriates from Turkey to these territories will give the Syrian National Army (SNA) a serious argument in political negotiations. In this case, the work of the Constitutional Committee will no longer be an empty formality, and the voice of the opposition in this committee will rely on real resources concentrated in security zones along the western and eastern banks of the Euphrates. At the same time, Turkish actions not only fit into the process of returning Syrian repatriates, which Russia is actively lobbying for, but also help to eliminate ethno-confessional imbalance and reduce the degree of radicalism due to the fact that Turkey is reconstructing the areas, which are under its control, and concluding long-term contracts for the construction of infrastructure in those zones. However, Damascus and the Kremlin would like to weaken any real opposition; therefore, any contradictions among the delegates and the attempts of the KSA and the UAE to oppose Turkey will be used to weaken Assad’s opponents. At the same time, in our opinion, the situation in Syria makes it possible for another development of events if regional actors have a desire to seek a real compromise and protect related tribes.

7 Current Economic Situation in Syria and Perspectives of the Syrian Reconstruction Since the revolution began in 2011, the Syrian pound (SYP) has fallen sharply: the Syrian pound, which traded at 47 SYP to the US dollar in early 2011, overcame a critical level on June 8, 2020 and was trading at 3,000 SYP to the US dollar. Reasons of this are: Lebanon crisis, Western sanctions, quarantine during the COVID-19 epidemic, and the intra-elite conflicts. It is believed that the rapid fall of the Syrian pound was triggered by the Lebanese political crisis and imposing by the Lebanese authorities the withdrawal restrictions, which hit the deposits of the Syrians, who keep money in Lebanese banks, and also affected the economy of Lebanon in general (the Syrian businessmen used contacts in Beirut to make deals, to finance import contracts and the organization of bilateral exports [in 2018 it reached about $132 million, excluding numerous

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smuggling transactions]).38 And the fall of the Syrian pound was aggravated by the expectation of the US Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (Caesar Act) that came into force on June 17, 2020 and that tightens sanctions against those who trade with Damascus. However, we have reason to believe that the depreciation of the Syrian national currency is not directly related to this law (only indirectly, since it increases uncertainty) and depends not only on the crisis in Lebanon (after all, in January 2020, one USD costed 975 SYP per): The Syrian regime is under sanctions since 2011, and it has built a system of smuggling deals involving a sufficient number of players who are already under various sanctions, and the current law only closes the gaps that have remained from previous restrictions. The problem of the current fall is the confrontation between Bashar al-Assad and his maternal cousin Rami Makhlouf, who owns in addition to “white” assets many “shadow companies” both inside Syria and beyond.39 Thus, Makhlouf has more Syrian pounds than the Syrian Central Bank has, so he can manipulate exchange rate. Whatever it was, the Syrian regime is trying to profit, because it forces the Syrian citizens to buy the national currency at the rate of 550– 600 SYP per one USD. Thus, it can manage currency difference of more than 2400–2500 SYP, taking it as a profit. If nothing radical happens (e.g., Russia’s giving Syria a certain amount of hard currency), the decline will continue or remain at the same level. According to the recent UN estimates, 9.3 million Syrians, and it is a half of the civilians, who have remained in Syria, are already experiencing severe food shortages, and another 2.2 million are living in extreme poverty. Due to a sharp jump in the currency exchange rate, there are problems with food, essentials, as well as medicines availability in stores throughout the country. In many cities, sellers close their stores and shops, expecting new prices for goods from their suppliers. The average salary in the Syria was fluctuating at $20–30 in June 2020. Expectations of a serious recovery after the quarantine and lockdown is lifted may not come true not only due to uncertainty due to Caesar Act,40 38 Rohan Advani and Walid Al Nofal, “Economic Crisis Looms as the Syrian Pound

Plummets to an all-time Low,” Syria Direct, November 26, 2019, https://syriadirect. org/news/economic-crisis-looms-as-the-syrian-pound-plummets-to-an-all-time-low-4/. 39 For example, the Mahlouf-sponsored Saraya al-Areen militia, involved in oil smuggling, do not feel any pressure. 40 Aliqtisadi, “Al-hukuma tadrus aliyyat al-ta’amul ma’ ‘uqubat Sizar litakhfif hiddati-ha [The Government Studies Mechanisms of Interaction with

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which will work to increase the cost of smuggling operations and trade with third countries, but also because of the policies of the Kurds who in the current situation are in a better position, having oil and wheat crops.41 Against the backdrop of a price war, it is unlikely that the Kurds will sell to the Assad regime the 2020 wheat crop, grown on the territory under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces. They are already stopping smuggling attempts,42 so it is possible to predict a shortage of bread in the territories, controlled by the Syrian regime. All this is already provoking protests not only in southern Syria (in Suweida),43 where the citizens can express their claims more freely due to an agreement with the regime, the guarantor of which is Russia, but also in a number of municipalities of Damascus. The only way for Damascus in these situation is to negotiate behind the scenes with businessmen, including Makhlouf, about more or less free functioning of shadow smuggling schemes with, however, serious taxation of “white” (official) assets, as well as to intensify contacts with the Kurds, which have a growing negotiating position and make attempts to abandon carefully explicit “Ocalanism.”44 The fall of the Syrian currency rate affects the least the territory under the SDF’s control due to more active dollarization processes, but also it has a negative effect on the areas controlled by the opposition: Now they are hastily trying to switch to the Turkish Lira.

the Caesar Sanctions to Alleviate Their Acuteness],” Aliqtisadi, June 2, 2020, . 41 Step News, “Al-nizam al-Suriyy wa-l-Quwwat al-Suriyya al-Dimuqratiyyah yatasabaqani ‘ala shira’ al-qamh min al-fallahin…[The Syrian Regime and SDF Are Racing to Buy Wheat from Farmers],” Step News, May 31, 2020, . 42 Enab Baladi, “Al-idarah al-dhatiyyah tusdir ta‘limat “li-l-hifaz ‘ala al-kamh” fi manatiq saytarati-ha [Autonomous Administration Issues Instructions “to Preserve Wheat” in its Areas of Control,” Enab Baladi, June 6, 2020, https://enabbaladi.net/archives/390899. 43 The National, “Syrian Currency Woes: Demonstrations Break Out in Druze Heartland,” The National, June 7, 2020, https://www.thenational.ae/world/syrian-currencywoes-demonstrations-break-out-in-druze-heartland-1.1030268. 44 Abdullah Ocalan is the founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). On the developments within the Kurdish forces see Helbast Shekhani, “News of Alleged Agreement Between Assad, Kurds Followed by Removal of YPG Flags in Syrian North,” KURDISTAN24, July 3, 2018, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/959575d0-12034153-95bd-7126691870ae.

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Before Turkey’s military operation to the east from the Euphrates and the optimization of the US presence, representatives of the UAE and Saudi Arabia45 repeatedly visited the territory under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces.46 So, Saudi State Minister for Gulf Affairs Thamer al-Sabhan met with Kurdish leaders, tribal sheikhs, as well as Deputy Assistant Secretary Joel Rayburn and the US envoy to the International Coalition William Robak.47 However, that time uncertainty remained regarding the US position, which forced the allies of the Syrian Sunni groups to look at alternative Damascus-centered political architecture, whereas now the situation has changed. Firstly, Trump’s chances of being re-elected in 2020 due to the US protest wave, which the Democrats (US) use as a political technology tool, have significantly decreased. The Democratic Party headed by Joe Biden have not such a radical opinion about the US presence in the southeast and northeast of Syria. In addition, as recent months have shown, even Donald Trump, inclined to shocking behavior, has changed his attitude toward the US presence in Syria. However, the optimization of the US presence has only laid the ground for the conflict potential, which Russia has to resolve during negotiations with Turkey, Damascus, and the Kurds. Secondly, the fall of the national currency, cereal deficit in Damascus, and the removal of the Kurds from the Caesar Act, more than ever, strengthened the negotiating position of forces in the east of Syria. Against this background, YPG is trying to consolidate its position and in several stages to get closer to the Kurdish National Council (KNC, which is close to Turkey),48 and even to allow it to manage the territories (but 45 Middle East Monitor, “Saudi-UAE-Kurdish Military Meeting in Northern Syria,”

Middle East Monitor, May 31, 2018, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180531saudi-uae-kurdish-military-meeting-in-northern-syria/. 46 Middle East Monitor, “Saudi Arabia, UAE send troops to support Kurds in Syria,” Middle East Monitor, November 22, 2018, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/201 81122-saudi-arabia-uae-send-troops-to-support-kurds-in-syria/. 47 Lamar Erkendi, “Damascus vies with Saudi-Kurd Union for Tribal Support,” Al-Monitor, July 1, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/06/syriadeir-ez-zor-saudi-arabia-kurds-arab-tribes.html. 48 Amberin Zaman, “Turkey Targets US-backed Syrian Kurdish Peace Talks,” AlMonitor, May 12, 2020. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/turkeytarget-syria-kurdish-peace-talks.html?fbclid=IwAR3UMQHcLdJvXsSq6nV4Jbu5XfRsNs7 oHO5ypSmcOYOgSmTNV0u_cX4Xm6o#ixzz6MKJWjsUd.

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without creating independent combat units, which would be autonomous from YPG). On the one hand, this relieves tension from Turkish forces and specific figures associated with the National Intelligence Organization that can work more actively in the east of Syria; on the other hand, it strengthens the international image of the Kurds and contributes to their more consistent support by such actors as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, France, the UK, Israel. Given Turkey’s involvement in the sale of Syrian oil through Iraqi Kurdistan and the strengthening of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (NES) position,49 the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Europe may well provide some kind of guarantee that the SDF military-political project will be continued to exist and Arab members will be included there50 even in the case of a negative scenario: the US withdrawal from these regions (which Washington is not going to do so far). We can confidently predict that in the near future Russia will try to intensify efforts to draw up a road map in order to reconcile the Assad regime with the eastern territories and will try to stimulate the opening of border crossings—as it happened in the case of the opening of the international highway M4, which connects Aleppo and Hasakah.51 Syrian propaganda has already begun to use Assad’s appointment of the new governor of Hasakah, Ghassan Halim Khalil, to foster dialogue with the Kurds and imitate compromise.52 At the same time, one can expect intensified subversive activities of Syrian intelligence in eastern Syria, masking as the activity of the Islamic State (IS), and attempts of the Syrian TransEuphrates operational group, which was created by the Russian command not so long ago, to move slowly into this region. It is possible that a new 49 Anton Mardasov, “Will Russia Accept Turkey’s Proposal to Split Syria’s Oil?” AlMonitor, March 13, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03/rus sia-turkey-syrian-oil.html. 50 Omran for Strategic Studies, Al-insihab al-‘askariyy al-Amrikiyy min Suriya. Taqdir mawqif [American Military Withdrawal from Syria. A situation analysis] (Istanbul: Omran for Strategic Studies, 2018),

. 51 Enab Baladi, “Russian Gains from Activating M4 al-Hasakeh-Aleppo highway,” Enab

Baladi, June 5, 2020, https://english.enabbaladi.net/?p=59748#ixzz6OruWiz5w. 52 Al-Masdar News, “New Syrian Governors of Homs, Daraa, Hasakah, Quneitra Announced,” Al-Masdar News, June 2, 2020, https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/ new-syrian-governors-of-homs-daraa-hasakah-quneitra-announced/.

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wave of hostilities in the Idlib province south from the M4 highway will contribute to this and in combination with the Libyan track, Moscow can continue to put pressure on Turkey to stimulate the activity of Syrian troops or groups, controlled by Ankara, in eastern Syria. The assumption that Russia will be able to pull out investments from Europe for the return of refugees is not true, and the Kremlin’s trump cards regarding migration and repatriates appear to be outdated, because Europe has already coped with the refugee crisis. Thus, one should take into account the following points: (a) the European Union has already more or less coped with the refugee crisis; (b) West European countries have earlier supported the opposition (in particular, Germany expresses interest in financing construction of infrastructural objects in the buffer zones controlled by Turkey if those zones are institutionalized); ( c) West European countries do not succumb to the blackmail of the Russian Federation and perceive the political process proposed by Russia as a fiction. That is why the hopes for Europe’s investments in the reconstruction of the Syrian Arab Republic are illusory. The US traditionally sparingly invests in reconstruction and can only contribute to enhancing the dialogue of the friendly regime with potential investors, but in the case of Syria this scenario looks totally unrealistic.

8

Russia and the Syrian Reconstruction

Russia makes rather limited investments in the Syrian reconstruction. At present, the Russian participation in the reconstruction of Syria is formalized through the so-called road map on collaboration in the area of industry and commerce till 2021.53 It involves Russian participation in investment and economic projects in Syria. This document was approved at the 11th meeting of the mutual Russian-Syrian Intergovernmental Commission. According to this “road map” Russia and Syria agreed on 30 projects that can be nominally divided into several clusters. First of all, there is an industrial part (consists of 8 projects). The most promising project of this cluster is the project on construction of a new cement plant in Muslimiyyah in Aleppo. Apart from this, there are two projects concerning professional training, which help the employees to expand their possibilities in the industrial sector and are aimed at supporting 53 SANA, “Syria, Russia Sign Protocol of Joint Syrian-Russian Commission’s 11th Session”, SANA, December 14, 2018, https://www.sana.sy/en/?p=153494.

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various technology development research. Also, there are projects in higher education, environment, culture, etc. In particular, the Russian university STANKIN and al-Baath University have agreed on personnel retraining.54 However, it is clear that such projects are not sufficient at all to secure a real reconstruction of Syria, and it is clear that the Russian investments in the Syrian reconstruction will remain rather limited, since Russia already finances Syrian state institutions sufficiently, and the potential return on investment in the construction industry is so long-term that Russian companies simply cannot afford to wait 10–15 years.

9 Russia-Gulf Rapprochement and the Syrian Reconstruction Against the background of the recent rapprochement between Russia and the Gulf analyzed in the first section of this chapter, Russia appears to have had some hope to attract some of the Gulf monarchies (first of all the UAE and the KSA) to the Syrian reconstruction. Theoretically speaking, some Gulf countries might provide substantial investments to support the Syrian reconstruction. These are Saudi Arabia and, especially, the UAE. These countries seem to be inclined to provide such investments to counteract the influence in Syria of the Turkish-Qatari alliance,55 on the one hand, and the Iranian influence, on the other. In this regard, Samuel Ramani notes that “as the UAE’s position on Syria has aligned more closely with Russia’s perspective, Moscow has attempted to add an economic vector to its cooperation with the UAE against Islamic extremism. Russian officials insist that investments in an Assad-led reconstruction process are necessary for Syria’s long-term stability. In spite of the recent arrival of Emirati business delegations to Damascus, Mohammed Baharoon, the director of the Dubai-based Bhuth

54 Leonid Issaev and Hamidreza Azizi, “Russian-Iranian Economic Interests in Syria,” Aziya i Afrika segodnya 8 (2009): 15–20. 55 Alexey Vasiliev, Timur Khayrullin, and Andrey Korotayev, “Qatari-Turkish Alliance Challenge for Regional Leadership,” Aziya i Afrika segodnya 10 (2019): 2–9; 11 (2019): 2–8. https://doi.org/10.31857/s032150750006519-2.

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Institute, contends that UAE officials will not sanction state-led investments in Syria until they receive assurances about the country’s stability and security.”56 In fact, a possible Russia-Gulf cooperation in the Syrian reconstruction appears to be effectively blocked by the Caesar Act, as both Emiratis and Saudis do not appear to risk the US sanctions. Financial impulses have repeatedly come from the UAE, which in 2019 received a delegation of Syrian businessmen representing various sectors of the economy. However, the Emirates so far are only expressing interest and are trying to find a response from Assad so that he makes real efforts to contain Iran and Turkey. The process is greatly complicated by the strengthening of US sanctions: Large Arabian companies are simply afraid that they will be removed from the US financial system if they suddenly make full contact with the Syrian government, especially since no one knows how tough Caesar’s Law implementation will be. There are no real investments in the Syrian Arab Republic yet from the KSA either. In May 2020, two Saudi investors founded the Al-Mubeirik company, which should trade, supply building and lining materials, food, electrical appliances, electronics, and cars.57 In addition to importing permitted products, Al-Mubeirik will also take part in tenders. 95% of the shares are owned by Saudi entrepreneur Jafar Abdullah al-Mubeirik, while the remaining 5% is in the hands of Abdullah Jafar al-Mubeirik. The foundation of Al-Mubeirik was interpreted by some observers as a significant step, which means that other businessmen from the Persian Gulf will be willing to invest in the reconstruction of the Syrian infrastructure. However, there are great doubts about this. So, in May 2018, the Syrian authorities approved the activities of the Kuwaiti Tahhan Global Company, which is engaged in real estate investment, and in 2019, the Al-Anwar Masia al-Mahduda company, which specializes in tourism, hotel services and investments in this area.58 Last year, one of the Kuwaiti

56 Ramani, “Russia and the UAE,” Middle East Policy 27:1 (2020): 133. 57 ALSOURIA NET, “First Saudi Investment in Syria After 8-Year Rupture,” The

Syrian Observer, May 5, 2020. https://syrianobserver.com/EN/news/57793/first-saudiinvestment-in-syria-after-8-year-rupture.html?fbclid=IwAR01dLJl7EwQ3arQVpBAPxgJ2 WFQMZStS1mGonDgo5w40YBN65oHlzUhVvw. 58 Enab Baladi, “Three Kuwaiti Investors Started Company in Syria,” Enab Baladi, December 14, 2019, https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2019/12/three-kuwaiti-inv estors-started-company-in-syria/.

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companies Al-Humaidani Group, which offers equipment for oil wells, entered into two contracts with Syrian fuel companies at the International Exhibition of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (Serpetro) in Damascus. This inspired Syrian observers with the hope that the Arabian monarchies would unilaterally break through Syrian isolation. True, in fact, the owners of companies that came to the Arab Republic were either Kuwaiti citizens of Syrian descent or Shiites.59

10

Conclusion

The Russian military intervention in Syria in 2015 first of all cased a rather negative reaction on the part of the main Gulf powers involved in the Syrian conflict—the KSA and Qatar. On the other hand, the fact that Russia began to play a dominant role in Syria pushed the Gulf powers, albeit to a forced, but still a dialogue with Moscow. A certain role in the Russian-Saudi rapprochement was also played by the formation in spring 2016 of a strategic alliance between the RF and the KSA in the field of the oil prices. The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Russia on the Syrian track further strengthened when Riyadh recognized that this rapprochement may help it to counteract the influence in Syria of the Turkish-Qatari alliance, on the one hand, and the Iranian influence, on the other (this was even more relevant for the UAE leadership that appears to have always preferred the secular authoritarian regime of Assad to any possible alternatives—especially, Islamist ones—but had to join originally the GCC anti-Assad stance in order not to break the GCC alliance discipline). Russia managed to arrange certain cooperation with the KSA even as regards the Syrian negotiation process (note that Qatari concerns here were partly accommodated by Russia through the RussianTurkish rapprochement and the Astana process due to a very close alliance between Qatar and Turkey). However, our analysis suggests that there are still very serious obstacles as regards the possible cooperation between Russia and the Gulf with respect to the reconstruction of Syria. The “normative business plan” of Syrian reconstruction (implying the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254, political 59 Fu’ad Abd al-Aziz, “Sharikat al-‘Aqilah li-l-ta’min al-takafuliyy… shi’iyyah, bi-‘ama’im sunniyyah [Al-Aqeelah Insurance Company… Shiite, with Sunni “turbans”],” Eqtsad, December 5, 2019, https://www.eqtsad.net/news/article/28403/.

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dialogue, adoption of a new constitution, and free elections leading to a regime change followed by the provision to the new regime of the funds that are necessary for a full-scale Syrian reconstruction on the part of the West and the Gulf) is not viable anymore, because the regime believes that it has won the civil war militarily and is not ready to make any substantial concessions that would satisfy the West. Russia is not ready to apply any serious energy to persuade the regime to make such concessions. Russia makes rather limited investments in the Syrian reconstruction. However, it is clear that Russian-sponsored reconstruction projects are not sufficient at all to secure a real reconstruction of Syria, and it is clear that the Russian investments in the Syrian reconstruction will remain rather limited. Against the background of the recent rapprochement between Russia and the Gulf, Russia appears to have had some hope to attract some of the Gulf monarchies (first of all the UAE and the KSA) to the Syrian reconstruction. Theoretically speaking, some Gulf countries might provide substantial investments to support the Syrian reconstruction. These are Saudi Arabia and, especially, the UAE. These countries seem to be inclined to provide such investments to counteract the influence in Syria of the Turkish-Qatari alliance, on the one hand, and the Iranian influence, on the other. However, a possible Russia-Gulf cooperation in the Syrian reconstruction appears to be effectively blocked by the Caesar Act, as both Emiratis and Saudis do not appear to risk the US sanctions.

CHAPTER 10

Russian Presence in Syria: Gulf States Views Sinan Hatahet

1

Introduction

Russia’s initial diplomatic support to Assad was motivated by the need to preserve its international status after NATO’s perceived betrayal in Libya, but Moscow involvement grew as it identified the Syrian conflict as an opportunity to redefine its role as a power broker in the Middle East. The Russian military intervention in September 2015 came in a crucial time when the Syrian regime was on the verge of collapsing, its air forces were not only decisive in preventing the Syrian opposition groups from overthrowing Assad, but it was also instrumental in altering the landscape of the regional stance vis-à-vis regime change in the war-torn country. Russia has mainly benefited from its position as an outsider to the region to place itself above regional competition and rivalries. Using a mix of diplomacy and military force, Russia portrayed itself as a seemingly more robust and reliable substitute to the unresponsive and retreating of the USA. Frustrated with Washington’s indifference toward their geopolitical and security aims, US traditional allies in the MENA region sought Moscow instead to appease their concerns in Syria.

S. Hatahet (B) Omran for Strategic Studies, Istanbul, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_10

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Nevertheless, Moscow does not wish to take over the challenging job of stabilizing Syria solely. The Russian mission in Syria is best described as the establishment of a strong foothold in the Middle East at a minimum cost. To achieve this goal, the Russian leadership is open to accommodate some of the regional powers demands in Syria but only in exchange for burden-sharing in owning the Syrian problem while recognizing Russia’s new role in the MENA. Moscow’s predisposition to engage others in Syria political and security new order is thus further encouraging the region’s capitals to recalibrate their policies toward Assad. More than ever, Russia seems to be the force to negotiate within Syria. Academia has produced a large body of literature studying Russian– Gulf relations from either an economic point of view1 or from a comprehensive regional framework,2 but only a few studies have explored them through the premise of the Syrian conflict. The analysis of this relationship evolution would allow the experts’ community to identify the areas of convergence and diversion between the two, as well as the nature of what this unconventional collaboration could yield to. This paper attempts to evaluate Russia’s ability to pursue its Middle East grand strategy through its facilitator role in ending the Syrian conflict. It also looks at Moscow’s different maneuvers in appeasing GCC concerns in Syria while maintaining a working partnership with their regional foes. The paper also studies the evolution of the Gulf countries responses to the Russian intervention in Syria and its impact on broader foreign policy issues. Finally, it measures Moscow’s capacity to navigate through regional rivalries and the risk of getting caught in the complex net of conflicting interests in the country.

2

The Evolution of Confrontation

Moscow had not invested heavily in Syria since the fall of the Soviet Union. Its naval base in Tartous, even though deemed extremely valuable, 1 L.C. Sim, “Russia-Gulf Relations: A Case Study of North-South Relations Within West Asia,” Insight, Middle East Institute: Singapore (2019). T. Karasik, “Russia’s Financial Tactics in the Middle East,” Russia in the Middle East 10 (2018): 240. 2 Mazin Musabah Almaqbali, and Vladimir Gennadievich Ivanov. “Russia’s Relations with Gulf States and Their Effect on Regional Balance in The Middle East,” RUDN Journal of Political Science 20:4 (2018): 536–547; A. Borshchevskaya, “Russia’s Goals Go beyond Damascus,” Middle East Quarterly (2018); D. Trenin, What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East? (John Wiley & Sons, 2017).

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was very rarely used and was not maintained, and no significant financial transactions had taken place between Russia and Syria apart from occasional arms sales.3 Before the war, Assad had been arguably shifting in the direction of the EU and had made efforts to make amends with the West; his foreign visits had included Paris and other European capitals, but not Moscow.4 Nevertheless, when Assad regimes came under threat from the Arab Spring popular movements, Russia became alerted and viewed the Syrian uprising as a conspiracy plotted in the USA to target its policy in the region, threatening its security needs in the foreseeable future.5 The Russian objective in Syria can be described as a threefold mission; first, the eradication of the Islamist terrorist threat in its cradle and the prevention of its spread to the northern Caucasus. This objective is particularly important in order to preserve Russia’s external threat narrative in the eyes of Russian citizens.6 Second, the establishment of a strong foothold in the Middle East at a minimum cost. Propelled by the seeming withdrawal of the USA from the region, Russia identified an opportunity to position itself as a power broker in the MENA.7 Third, strengthening Russia’s geopolitical positions against the USA primarily in the Middle East region, given the divergence of views between Moscow and Washington. Russia’s initial diplomatic support to Assad was motivated by the need to preserve its international status after NATO’s perceived “betrayal” in Libya.8 In Syria, the Russian Foreign Ministry has long argued that the Gulf monarchies “are trying to achieve their geopolitical goals at the expense of

3 Filiz Katman and Elvin Aghayev, “Historical Background and the Present State of the Russian-Syrian Relations,” European Researcher 10 (2012). 4 European Union’s Critical Engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic, The. Francesco Cavatorta and Arantza Gomez Arana, European Foreign Affairs Review 15 (2010): 629. 5 Alexendar Shumilin, The American Policy in the Middle East in the Context of the Arab Spring (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 2015). 6 Alexander Shumilin and Inna Shumilina, “Russia as a Gravity Pole of the GCC’s New

Foreign Policy Pragmatism,” The International Spectator 52.2 (2017): 115–129. 7 Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Russian Strategic Goals in the Middle East,” in Russia’s Policy in Syria and the Middle East, ed. Marlene Laruelle (Institute for European and Eurasian Studies, 2019), 7. 8 Mark Katz and Va Fairfax, “Russia and the Arab Spring,” Russian Analytical Digest 98:6 (2011): 4–6.

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the blood and suffering of the Syrian people.”9 The role of Saudi Arabia and Qatar in financially and militarily supporting the Syrian opposition to oust Assad was primarily viewed as part of the US anti-Russia plan by supporting and fueling the Arab Spring.10 Moreover, Saudi Arabia was also perceived and often portrayed by the Russian authorities as instigators of terrorist attacks against Russia during the buildup and the beginning of the Syrian conflict. For instance, Saudi-backed religious centers were accused of plotting and financing the attacks on Moscow Metro and Domodedovo International airport. Even more direct, the two suicide bombings in the city of Volgograd on the New Year’s Eve of December 29 and 30, 2013, were publicly perceived by Russian media as a reaction to the Saudi intelligence chief failure to convince Putin to back down on Assad.11 Moreover, Russia feared an increase in turbulence in the Caucasus as the result of the Arab Spring. The ideological impact of a political Islam “triumph” and the social impact of Chechen and Circassian diasporas participation in the protests and conflicts could revive revolutionary sentiments back home, and could also retrigger a Saudi involvement with Salafists.12 To Moscow, it was not clear what the limits of Riyadh and Doha ambitions are. In the other camp, some GCC countries perceived the Russian opposition to the Arab spring as a manifestation of a deep mistrust in an “Arab Renaissance.”13 The Arab Muslim prevalent discourse viewed Moscow’s support for Assad as another “holy war” waged by Russians against

9 Maxim Suchkov, “Why Russia’s Mideast Agenda Doesn’t Appeal to GCC,” AlMonitor, 21 June 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2015/06/rus sia-middle-east-agenda-gcc.html 10 Almaqbali, “Russia’s Relations with Gulf States and Their Effect on Regional Balance in The Middle East.” 11 F. Lukyanov “Russia’s Syria Policy Linked to Chechnya, Terrorism,” www.al-mon itor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/terror-russia-bombing-sochi-caucus-volgograd.html# (2014). 12 Serge Korepin and Shalini Sharan, “What Does the Arab Spring Mean for Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus?” Center for Strategic & International Studies (September 2011). 13 Al Jazeera, “Why Russia Supports Assad?” (in Arabic), 11 February 2012, https:// www.aljazeera.net/news/presstour/2012/2/11/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0% D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8% A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF.

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Muslims,14 and part of a broader coalition between Christians and Shia to persecute Sunnis and their demands for freedom and dignity.15 Even though careful not to officially own this rhetoric, media often drew the parallel between the Afghan war and Syria, and the fantasy of a new Russian defeat in the face of simple armed men is often evoked in the popular discourse and narrative.16 Furthermore, Russia’s interest in Syria was also believed to be fueled by oil geopolitics and by Moscow’s fear of the GCC potential to compete with its gas and fuel production in the European market through the Syrian gate.17 Nonetheless, the Gulf monarchies have attempted to convince Russia of halting their support for Assad. The GCC’s primary tool to appeal to the Russian was promises of investment in the Russian economy and arms deals. In August and December 2013, the Head of Saudi intelligence, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, visited Moscow intending to strike a deal with Moscow over Syria.18 Additionally, Riyadh was reported to have offered to buy Russian arms for an estimated billion dollars in return for a shift in Russia’s approach to the Syrian conflict.19 However, the Gulf countries’ “economic benefits versus political shifts” approach failed at easing Moscow to abandon its geopolitical concerns in Syria. Instead, Putin insisted on his vision for the end of the conflict, a roadmap that starts with defeating all forms of insurgency against the incumbent regime,

14 Agnus McDowell, “Saudi Clerics Call for Jihad in Syria,” (in Arabic) Reuters, 5 October 2015, https://ara.reuters.com/article/topNews/idARAKCN0RZ1Q120151005. 15 Al Jazeera, “The Shii Russia and the Arab Revolution in Syria,” (in Arabic), 31 March 2011, https://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions/2012/3/31/%D8% B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9% 8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1% D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9. 16 Ahmad Boudistour, “Russia and the Slide into the Syrian Quagmire,” (in Arabic), Al Watan, 12 September 2015, http://alwatan.kuwait.tt/articledetails.aspx?id=448668& yearquarter=20153. 17 Al Arabiya, “Russian Fears of Losing Gaz Revenues in Europe,” (In Arabic), 27 June 2012, https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/27/223026.html. 18 Rani GEHA, “Russian President, Saudi Spy Chief Discussed Syria, Egypt” (2013). 19 A. Evans-Pritchard, “Saudis Offer Russia Secret Oil Deal If It Drops Syria,” The

Telegraph, 27 August 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/ oilandgas/10266957/Saudis-offer-Russia-secret-oil-deal-if-it-drops-Syria.html.

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then a Syrian-led “reconciliation” process with no preconditions on Assad departure from the government. The chemical deal between the UN and the Syrian regime in 2013, brokered by a Lavrov-Kerry agreement, is often referenced as a turning point in the US-GCC relations over Syria.20 Upset at Obama’s policies on Iran and Syria, the Saudis threatened a rift with the USA could take the alliance between Washington and Riyadh to its lowest point in years. To further demonstrate its dissatisfaction with the turn of events, Saudi Arabia gave up its membership as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council in June 2013.21 The initial Gulf monarchies’ reaction was to increase the deliveries of weapons to rebels fighting against Assad, fearing further Washington-Moscow entente over Syria, or even worse US negotiations with Iran over de-escalation in the Levant and the Middle East at their expense. However, the GCC enthusiasm was quickly curbed by two significant events; first, the emergence of the Islamic State in the Levant and Iraq (IS) in 2014, and the direct Russian military intervention in the Syrian conflict in 2015. On June 29, 2014, IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced the establishment of a caliphate stretching from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq.22 For over a year before, the terrorist organization expanded its control over the majority of eastern Syrian provinces, seizing control of Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor, parts of Aleppo and Homs and closing in Damascus from the Syrian desert. In less than a year, the group overrun both the mainstream Syrian opposition groups as well as the regime and effectively controlled vital part of the Syrian economy and strategic assets such as the Euphrates dams and all the majority of the oil and gas fields on its banks. A few weeks later, the USA announced the establishment of an international coalition to tackle IS’s financial and economic infrastructure and to prevent the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and Iraq. This announcement has two significant effects on the GCC policies in Syria; first, it permanently shifted the US-Syria policy on defeating IS away from 20 Anner Barnard, “Syrian Rebels Say Saudi Arabia Is Stepping Up Weapons Deliveries,”

New York Times, 12 September 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/world/ middleeast/syrian-rebels-say-saudi-arabia-is-stepping-up-weapons-deliveries.html. 21 Erik Voeten, “Why Did Saudi Arabia Reject a UN Security Council Seat?” The Washington Post, 18 October 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/ wp/2013/10/18/why-did-saudi-arabia-reject-a-un-security-council-seat/. 22 Tara John, “Timeline: The Rise of ISIS,” Time, October 9 (2015).

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Assad; second, the coalition efforts to crack down on IS support networks also put the GCC support to the Syrian rebels under scrutiny in fear of arms smuggling to the terrorist organization. Meanwhile, a political vacuum over the UN-sponsored peace talk was induced by the breakdown of the Geneva-2 process in 2014.23 Negotiations between the opposition and the regime were blocked and each party pursed military actions to overrun the other. Taking advantage of the US new mission in Syria as well as the absence of a conducive political dialogue, in September 2015, Russia officially intervened on behalf of Damascus. The Russian Air Forces mission declared mission was “fighting terrorist groups” and “reinforcing Bashar al-Assad’s position as a partner in the fight against terrorism,”24 but instead it shifted the balance of power on the battlefield in favor of the regime and attacked the Syrian mainstream opposition leading to a series of strategic victories against the rebels. Supported by the Russian military, Assad regained control of Aleppo, northern Homs, eastern Ghouta, and Daraa. Deprived of US political support and buy-in, the GCC saw their allies losing control of strategic areas, and their political stance further weakened by the initiation of a Russian-led parallel peace track in Astana in 2017 with the inclusion of Iran and Turkey as critical guarantors of the new process.25 Meanwhile, new realities emerged in the Arabian Peninsula, King Salman bin Abdelaziz rose to power in Saudi Arabia in January 2015, and one of his first act of authority was waging against the Houthis Yemen in March 2015, effectively delegating Syria as a second order of priority and opening a new venue for diplomacy and pragmatism in the region’s politics.

23 The deadlock in the UN-sponsored negotiations instantly fueled the military standoff in Syria. The Syrian political opposition felt vulnerable for its decisions to support the talks, and armed groups took control of the initiative henceforth. This resulted in a divided front against al-Assad and Jihadi groups exploited this structural weakness to expand. 24 Andrew Osborn, and Phil Stewart, “Russia Begins Syria Air Strikes in Its Biggest Mideast Intervention in Decades,” Reuters, 30 September 2015. 25 Opinions of Saudi scholars expressed during a closed dialogue held in Beirut, 2018.

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3

Pragmatism Primes Over All

The Russian military intervention coincided with the peak of the GCC frustration with the US policy in the Middle East. Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy resulted in an evident disengagement from the region’s rivalries and competition. Wishing not to get sucked in the Syrian quagmire, Washington implemented a policy of containment coupled with a remote warfare strategy consisted of training and equipping local nonstate actors to overcome terrorist organizations such as IS and al-Qaeda with minimum US boots on the ground. The Gulf monarchies viewed this pivot as a main deterministic factor in creating a void for Russia to fill.26 Additionally, Obama efforts to conclude a nuclear deal with Iran before the end of his mandate was also perceived as an additional destabilization factor on the detriment of the GCC security concerns and aspirations, especially in Syria where a general belief that Tehran was given a carte blanch to expand in exchange for its cooperation to achieve the JCPOA deal.27 In this particular context, the Gulf countries sought four principal objectives in confronting the changing regional order. First, the re-establishment of the pre-Arab Spring status quo. Except for Qatar, the GCC support for the Syrian uprising was mostly motivated by their rivalry with Iran. The democratization of the Arab Spring countries has thus far challenged the regional order built and sustained by the Gulf monarchies since the end of the cold war, and most importantly, it brought political Islam to power, a direct competitor for popular legitimacy with their incumbent authoritarian regimes. Contrary to Obama, Putin has portrayed Russia as a firm upholder of the status quo in the

26 Al Jazeera, “Will America Release Putin’s Hand to Commit Atrocities in Syria?” (in Arabic), 16 November 2016, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/presstour/2016/11/ 16/%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A% D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9% 86-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%81%D8%B8% D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B9. 27 Omar Koch, “The ‘Nuclear Agreement’ and Its Impact on the Syrian Crisis,” (in Arabic) Al Jazeera, 27 July 2015, https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2015/7/26/% D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86% D9%88%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%AB%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9% 84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9.

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region, and also seemed more consistent and reliable in his policies that the reluctant US administration.28 Second, the rehabilitation of Arab autocrats on the global political scene. Starting from 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain allied to back counter-revolutionary forces in Egypt, Libya and even Tunisia. The GCC sought similar support within the international community to legitimize or at least turn a blind eye to new authoritarian regimes put in place. In comparison with the EU and the US lack of enthusiasm for another wave of dictatorships in the region, Moscow maintained good relations with the internationally recognized governments in each of the Arab Spring countries, but also with some of their principal antagonists like Sisi in Egypt, Haftar in Libya, and the Houthis in Yemen. The pragmatic Russian approach to the ongoing counter-revolutionary movements was more appealing to Saudi Arabia and the UAE than the “principled” Western stance.29 Third, re-establishing deterrence with Iran. With the lack of efficient means to restrain Tehran, the Gulf Arab monarchies chose to encourage Russia to adopt a balancing act with Iran. If Russia is willing to support a country while maintaining a working relationship with its rival, then there is room to offer incentives for Moscow to undercut its relations with Iran or at least to contain it and to prevent it from harming Russia’s good relations with the GCC beyond repair.30 Fourth, diversification of weapons and partnership in security cooperation. Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, as well as Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey, all came under pressure from the US’ lack of commitment to provide them with needed weapons for their respective wars. In comparison, Russia demonstrated an enormous appetite to sell them weapons regardless of their human rights issues or other political concerns. The Russian willingness to provide alternative gears and ammunitions allowed GCC governments to get around potential American restrictions on arms

28 S. Ramani, “Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partnership,” Middle East Policy

27:1 (2020): 125–140. 29 Roland Dannreuther, “Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counterrevolution,” Journal of European Integration 37:1 (2015): 77–94. 30 Mark N. Katz, “Not Getting Any Easier: Putin’s Middle East Balancing Act,” in Russia’s Policy in Syria and the Middle East, ed. Marlene Laruelle (Institute for European and Eurasian Studies, 2019), 7.

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sales over the same concerns. In this particular context, improving relations with Russia was also viewed as a means to motivate greater US support in fear of losing multi-billions of deals.31 Russian intervention in Syria created a new opportunity for Moscow to engage the West over counter-terrorism, but for the GCC, it presented an opportunity to introduce a new global power broker. The Gulf monarchies jumped on the occasion to engage Russia in their issues and security concern, but each at its own pace and separately from the other. In 2015 and early 2016, the leaders of Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain visited Moscow, and the bulk of their discussion revolved around Syria, in addition to fields of economic collaboration. Oman and Kuwait were among the first to show particular enthusiasm toward Russia’s approach to settle the Syrian conflict. On October 26, 2015, Yusuf bin Alawi, the Omani Minister of Foreign Affairs of Oman, held a meeting with Assad. The later expressed its gratitude toward the sultanate’s support for the regime’s efforts in defeating terrorism and its commitment to preserving the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.32 Kuwait, on the other hand, developed a unique attitude toward Syria by assuming an intermediary role between Saudi Arabia and Russia.33 The election of Donald Trump, despite advocating for a stanch antiIran policy, did not reverse these tendencies. The inconsistency of his Syria policy did not challenge the mainstream course of events on the ground. More so, his initial decision to withdraw US special forces from northeastern Syria in 201834 just confirmed the decline of American interest in Syria and further comforted the GCC countries choice in engaging Russia over their security and political concerns in the country. Meanwhile, Trump’s Syrian policy allowed Turkey to boost its footprint in

31 Anna Borshchevskaya, “8. The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” RUSSIA IN THE (2018): 183. 32 “

,” CNN Arabic, 26 October 2015, https://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2015/10/26/ syria-crisis-oman-assad 33 Almaqbali et Al, “Russia’s Relations with Gulf States and Their Effect on Regional Balance in The Middle East.” 34 Mark Landler, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt, “Trump to Withdraw US Forces from Syria, Declaring ‘We Have Won Against ISIS’,” The New York Times 19 (2018): 12.

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Syria, perhaps giving a decisive incentive to the normalization of relations between Damascus and the Gulf. In 2016, the UAE proposed normalizing ties with Damascus as part of a plan to push Assad away from Iran.35 Washington rejected the proposal, but the Emiratis eventually reopened their embassy in Damascus, two years later on December 27, 2018.36 In the same context, Anwar Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, criticized the decision to suspend Syrian membership of the Arab League, noting “it meant we had no political leverage at all, no open channel, we could not present an Arab prism to how the Syrian issue should be resolved.”37 Bahrain, on the other hand, has been seeking rapprochement with Russia since 2012, after the US sanctions on arms sales following the crackdown on Shia uprising earlier in 2011.38 Following the steps of Abu Dhabi, Manama reopened its embassy on December 28, 2018, justifying the decision as a step toward strengthening “the Arab role and activate it in order to preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and prevent the risk of regional interference in its affairs.”39 The Saudi and Qatari responses to the Russian approach, on the other hand, were much more reserved. For once, both countries have invested the most in support of the Syrian opposition.40 Politically, they were the most active countries leading Arab initiatives to isolate Assad further. Military, their financial backing to the rebels far exceeded the engagement of

35 “Syria: Assad Has Decisively Won His Brutal Battle,” The Guardian, 30 December 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/30/syria-year-cemented-assad-vic tory-trump-us-troops. 36 “UAE ‘to Reopen Syria Embassy’ as Gulf States Warm up to Assad,” Al Araby, 13 November 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/11/13/uae-to-reopensyria-embassy-amid-warming-assad-relations. 37 “Dr Anwar Gargash: Solving the Qatar Crisis Must Involve Tackling the ‘Trust Deficit’”, The National, June 2018, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/dr-anwargargash-solving-the-qatar-crisis-must-involve-tackling-the-trust-deficit-1.737701. 38 “As U.S. Shifts Toward Iran, Bahrain Turns to Russia for Arms”, World Tribune, 5 November 2014, https://www.worldtribune.com/archives/bahrain-ready-russian-arms/. 39 “ ,” Bahrain News Agency, 28 December 2018, https://www.bna.bh/ForeignMinistryWorkcontinuingatBa hrainsembassyinSyria.aspx?cms=q8FmFJgiscL2fwIzON1%2bDpJd6bmSnJozVZTwMRm dYPU%3d. 40 Yehuda U. Blanga, “Saudi Arabia’s Motives in the Syrian Civil War,” Middle East Policy 24:4 (2017): 45–62.

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their neighbors.41 Thus, both Riyadh and Doha, even though at odds in supporting which opposition factions in Syria, maintained a similar stance toward Russia policies in Syria till the fall of Aleppo at the end of 2016.42 The improvement of their relations with Russia in the following months has remained contained in economic collaboration and attempts at persuading Putin in abandoning his support to Assad. The closest the two countries came to the Russian position was during the Arab-Russian Forum held in Abu Dhabi on February 1, 2017. The final declaration praised the UNSC resolution 2336 and Russian-led Astana peace process, despite the Iranian opposition to their participation in the meeting. Additionally, the communique failed to explicitly mention Assad’s departure as a precondition to a successful political transition in Syria.43 Russia succeeded in underlining the US inconsistency in Syria, and since its intervention in 2015, Moscow has made a case of accommodating US allies such as Turkey and the GCC countries’ security concerns. However, its margin of maneuver in Syria was restrained. Cornered between its strategic choices of backing Assad and maintaining a working partnership with Iran on the one hand, and its need to improve its economic relations with the GCC on the other meant that Russia needed a different framework to approach the resolution of the Syrian conflict. To attempt to ease the Gulf monarchies and Turkey’s stance toward Assad, Moscow opted to deal with their basic security needs in Syria. For the Turks, it meant cooperation in containing the Democratic Union Party PYD,44 and for the GCC, it meant cooperation in re-enforcing Damascus autonomy from Iranian influence.

4

A Geopolitical Reality Check

There is little doubt around the Russian dominance over the Syrian regime. Both Tehran and Moscow can indeed claim victory in preventing 41 Young, Karen E., “The Emerging Interventionists of the GCC,” London School of Economy, December 2013. 42 Alexander Shumilin, and Inna Shumilina. “Russia as a Gravity Pole of the GCC’s New Foreign Policy Pragmatism,” The International Spectator 52:2 (2017): 115–129. 43 “ ”, Al Bayan, 2 February 2017, https://www. albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2017-02-02-1.2846070. 44 The PYD is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey for its relation with the Kurdistan Workers Party PKK.

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the fall of Assad, but it is ultimately the Russian Air Forces and diplomatic efforts to coarse regional actors into a collaboration that made Assad survival possible. This perceived role of Russia in the Syrian conflict has persuaded several experts, regional and international actors, to think of Moscow as a potential counter-power to Iran in Syria and ultimately as a possible partner to oust it. The expansion of Iranian influence in the Levant, the ever-growing drift with Qatar and Turkey, and the perception of a Russian victory in Syria have all encouraged the Saudis and Emiratis to rethink their strategy in the country. Doubtful of Assad’s willingness to abandon his relationship with Tehran, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have demonstrated a restrained appetite to explore the possibility of engaging Russia in containing Iran in the country. Aware of these deep-rooted security concerns, Moscow has led the Gulf monarchies to believe in its capacity to curtail Iran’s role in Syria. However, the reality of the Russian-Iranian entente in Syria is much more complicated. Albeit the deep Russian animosity toward Islamists governments and ideologies, Moscow has maintained a close alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Likewise, despite the Iranian leaders’ political discourse, equally distancing Iran from the West and the East, they have nourished continuously close ties with Moscow. Similarly, despite substantive differences in interests and approach, the two countries have also managed to achieve consensus on a number of security issues, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, instability in Afghanistan and the Caucasus, and the presence of nonregional forces in Central Asia and the Caspian.45 Additionally, both oppose the US democratization policy in the Middle East in large, and they equally refuse its expansion eastward. The Syrian conflict has thus far demonstrated how well the RussianIranian connection could work. Mutually engaged in blocking all attempts in regime change, Moscow and Tehran supported Assad with arms, air cover, money, fuel, and even men. However, the two partners do not necessarily share the same tactics. Iran has primarily delivered the majority

45 Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russia’s Relations with Iran Dialogue Without Commitments,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (June 2012).

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of its assistance to local and foreign militias,46 whereas the primary beneficiary of Russian assistance was and still is the Syrian state.47 Two primary considerations motivate the Russian choice of betting on the Syrian Army. First, the belief of having a broad constituency of Russian-trained officers. Second, the lack of necessary knowledge to command and communicate with Syrian grassroots movements. Thus far, Russia and Iran have operated in a compartmented fashion, where the former intervenes more within the Syrian Army Forces and provides air cover for ground troops, and the latter intervenes within the local militias and on the battlefield. There exist some minor divergences between Iran and Russia in their approach to the Syrian conflict, but they have not exceeded the standard friction to any coalition.48 The postwar phase in Syria, however, could oppose the two as they each seek different objectives. Russia’s primary objective as the regime is closing in the last bastion of the opposition in Idlib is the rehabilitation of Assad rule both domestically and internationally. To normalize the regime relations with the West, Russia opted to play the refugees and counter-terrorism cards for bringing Europe into initiatives that constitute de facto working with Assad.49 Internally, the Russians are striving to achieve two objectives, the reconsolidation of the Syrian state authority over the myriad of militant groups and the lifting of sanctions on the economy. However, Tehran’s strong presence in the country is preventing Moscow from getting the needed regional and international buy-into achieve these goals. Taking into consideration the complicated Russian and Iranian relationship in Syria, the ability of Moscow to constrain Tehran would be as effective as its ability to dismantle the latter complex nets of influence in the country. Thus, it would be safe to assume that a large party of future

46 W. Fulton, J. Holliday, and S. Wyer, 2013. Iranian Strategy in Syria. AEI’s Critical Threats Project. 47 Sinan Hatahet, “Russia and Iran: Economic Influence in Syria,” Chatham House, 8 March 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russia-and-iran-economic-inf luence-syria. 48 Chris Kozak, “The Strategic Convergence of Russia and Iran,” Institute for the Study of War. Available at http://googleweblight.com/i (2017). 49 Anchal Vohra, “Russia’s Payback Will Be Syria’s Reconstruction Money”, Foreign Policy, 5 May 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/05/russias-payback-will-be-syr ias-reconstruction-money/.

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Russia engagement in Syria is to prevent Iran from gaining massive sway over the state. Moreover, in order to achieve such an objective Russia requires foreign funds to leverage its authority over Damascus, a demand that seems extremely difficult to convince the West without a significant concession from Assad. Henceforth lie the Russian dilemma and the Iranian opportunity to maintain its presence in Syria. Restrained by domestic economic difficulties and its public indifference toward the Middle East affairs in general,50 Moscow relies on the good intentions of regional actors to play along. Beyond the occasional use of deterrence to dissuade “rogue” behavior, Russia does not wish to confront any actors in the region. In this particular context, Iran seems to be the most immune regional actor in Russian probes. Indeed, Iran has a considerably higher spoiler potential in Syria than any other regional actor. Unlike Turkey, whose influence is restricted within the shrinking and contained opposition armed groups, or Israel and the GCC who have limited or no influence on local dynamics, Iran is the only other regional power which commands and control forces intertwined with the regime in Syria. The election of Trump and the return of US engagement vis-à-vis the GCC and Israel to contain Iran could have potentially further complicated Putin’s mission in exploiting the later security concerns. However, this scenario has not played out yet. For once, Putin is still viewed as more consistent and reliable in his policies than the unpredictable Donald Trump. Moreover, the fear of a rogue Iranian reaction toward the USA and its allies in the regions has further propelled the Russian potential mediator role. Additionally, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 18, 2018,51 has grown Tehran more dependent on Moscow to relieve itself from the crippling US imposed sanctions over its economy. The resulting shift in the balance of power between the two allies has forced the Iranians to be more sensible to Russians’ imperatives.

50 Maria Petkova, “Do Russians Care About Syria?” Al Jazeera, 30 September 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/09/russians-care-syria-170928 110745906.html. 51 Mark Lender, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned,” The New York Time, 8 May 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/ trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html.

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In May 2017, negotiations were initiated between Washington, Moscow, and Amman to establish a de-escalation zone in Daraa.52 Saudi Arabia and the UAE previously in charge of supporting the Syrian opposition in southern Syria, observed the possible outcome of the negotiations to measure Russia’s intent in dealing with Iran. The negotiations led to an agreement between Trump and Putin on the sidelines of the Hamburg summit.53 It was later re-affirmed at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vietnam, in November the same year.54 Nonetheless, one year later regime forces under Russian air cover assaulted the region in a final attempt to push the opposition out of the Jordanian borders. On May 29, 2019, Russia and Israel reached an unprecedented arrangement by which Assad’s forces would regain control over all the province as long as Iranian fighters do not participate in the conquest.55 The Israeli-Russian deal guaranteed to hold back Tehran-backed militias 15 km from the occupied Golan Heights. In return, Tel Aviv will not oppose the return of the Syrian regime along the Israeli and Jordanian borders. Despite Russian guarantees to honor its commitment toward Israel and indirectly the Gulf countries, Iranian-backed armed groups including Hezbollah managed to expand their influence in the province and established new headquarters and checking points facilitating the linking of Daraa with the Iranian corridor extending through Homs and the Syrian desert to Iraq. In response, the IDF since 2017, has on

52 Ibrahim Humaidi, “US Wants to Keep Iran out of Southern Syrian,” Al Sharq Al Awsat, 27 May 2018, https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1281586/us-wantskeep-iran-out-southern-syrian. 53 Josh Lederman, “US, Russia Announce Syria Cease-fire After Trump-Putin Talks”, AP News, 8 July 2017, https://apnews.com/eaa310ccb6e04e0580759d4ce36e778b/ US,-Russia-announce-Syria-cease-fire-after-Trump-Putin-talks. 54 Chris Baynes, “APEC Summit: Donald Trump and Putin Sign Joint Statement on Syria Crisis After Exchanging Brief Comments in Vietnam”, The Independent, 11 November 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/ apec-summit-donald-trump-vladimir-putin-joint-statement-syria-crisis-vietnam-a8049381. html. 55 Josie Ensor, “Russia and Israel ‘Agree Deal’ to Hold Back Iranian Militias so Assad can Take Border Region”, The Telegraph, 29 May 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2018/05/29/russia-israel-agree-deal-hold-back-iranian-militias-assad-prepares/.

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multiple occasions, targeted Iranian assets in Daraa, Quneitra, and the Syrian desert.56 Russia has always acknowledged Israeli security concerns and has thus far turned a blind eye to Israeli airstrikes against Iranian-backed militants. Moreover, Moscow has attempted to curb Israeli actions through communications with the IDF, as well as relaying their messages to the Iranian leadership in hopes of containing any possible exchange of fire. However, the equilibrium sought by Moscow is dangerous and sensitive, since no one can predict what a sustainable Iranian threat on Israel or Saudi Arabia can produce. Russia’s potential role in limiting Iran overreach in Syria is not the only type of collaboration the GCC is seeking in Syria. The halt of their financial and military support to the Syrian rebels in the aftermath of the Russian invasion has indirectly allowed Turkey to control the opposition armed groups. Engaged in a grand competition over regional hegemony with Ankara, the Saudis and Emiratis viewed the Turkish incursions in northern Syria as a potential risk for their influence over Arab Sunnis in the Levant. Anwar Gargash has justified the restoration of diplomatic ties with Damascus not as a step toward countering Iran, but Turkey too.57 The Saudi, Emirati, and Bahraini hostility toward Turkey, however, is not a common stance among the GCC members. Qatar has thus far demonstrated unanimous backing for Erdogan’s actions, most probably in exchange for Ankara’s support for the Emirate in the ongoing crisis with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Similarly, Kuwait, too, has distanced itself from its neighbors’ policies and has thrived to adopt a more moderate and pragmatic relationship with Turkey. To thwart Turkey’s plans in Syria, the Saudis and Emiratis have taken advantage of the US patronage to fund the PYD. On July 12, 2018, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Adel al-Jubair, pledged a $100M in support

56 “Golan Heights and South/West Syria,” International Crisis Group, 13 January 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-us-trigger-list/flashpoints/golan-hei ghts. 57 Hurriyet Daily News (2018), ‘UAE Reopens Damascus Embassy After Seven Years,’ 28 December 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/uae-reopens-damascus-embassyafter-seven-years-140077.

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of the SDF.58 This financial backing was also matched by the political promotion of the group in media, and visits of Saudis high-ranked official to Raqqah and Qamishli.59 Following the “Peace Spring,” Turkish military operation in northern Syria against the PYD-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Saudi and Emirati foreign ministries described the offensive as blatant aggression on Syrian sovereignty.60 Weirdly enough, their position for once corresponded with the Iranian reaction.61 The Peace Spring military operation has inadvertently unblocked the deadlock on SDF-Assad negotiations. It is still too early to predict the potential outcome of such negotiations, taking into consideration the US decision to remain in the area. However, contrary to its approach in dealing with Turkey-backed Arab armed opposition groups, the regime does not dismiss a political arrangement with the PYD, and the latter’s need for Russia’s commitment to protecting it has considerably weakened its stance toward Damascus. The desire of the Saudis and Emiratis to preserve the SDF forces could create a case for further rapprochement with Moscow over Syria. However, once again, Russia will have to walk a tight rope between preserving its entente with Turkey in the form of the Astana/Sochi process and collaborating with the GCC over their desire to foil Erdogan’s plans in Syria.

58 Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Saudi Arabia to Invest $100 million in SDF-held Northeastern Syria”, Kurdistan 24, 17 August 2018, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/ b51aa096-797d-4e2e-95b2-9dd3b1286003. 59 “Saudi Minister Visits North Syria for Raqqa Talks”, Reuters, 19 October 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-coalition/saudi-minister-vis its-north-syria-for-raqqa-talks-idUSKBN1CO2HG. 60 “ BBC Arabic, 10 October 2019, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/trending-50001865. 61 “ ,” Anadolu Agency, 19 November 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84% D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8% A7%D9%85/%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%A8% D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8% AF%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-% D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A% D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9% 82%D8%A7%D9%84/1619604.

,”

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247

Conclusion

Putin’s policy of accommodating all regional actors involved in the Syrian conflict despite their antagonism toward each other has thus far succeeded. The success of Russian foreign policy, however, is only partially the result of Moscow’s willingness to assume a more prominent role in the Middle East, it is also primarily due to the Gulf monarchs’ pragmatism and their inclination to explore alternatives to the USA after a series of deceptions in handling the Syrian case. Principally built over good intentions, this rapprochement has not yielded any of its promises yet and could unravel if tensions between regional rivals increase and Russia is cornered in making cutting-edge decisions. The balancing act upon which Putin built his Middle East strategy has exploited Obama’s reluctance in backing the US traditional allies. The UN-Syrian chemical deal and the JCPOA have both created a sense of abandonment among the GCC. Prone to resist their consequences at first, the Gulf states then opted to follow Moscow lead and to attempt a different approach in dealing with Iran. In exchange for a softer stance toward Assad’s future in ruling Syria, as well as the halt of financial support to his opponents’ military actions, Russia would offer to contain Iran and counter its influence over the regime. This arrangement faces many challenges that could lead to a return of a confrontation between the two. First, the election of Donald Trump has signaled the return of hard policies toward Iran. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA, the ensuing imposition of new economic sanctions on Tehran, and the assassination of Qassim Soleimani have all demonstrated Washington renewed appetite to coarse the Iranian regime into making significant concessions in the region. Trump’s attitude toward firmly backing his allies against Iran, albeit its financial cost, appeals to the GCC leadership and lessens their dependency on Russia’s presumed capacity to contain Tehran. Second, Trump Middle East policies could trigger a rogue Iranian reaction. Cornered and left with only a few undesirable options, Tehran might retaliate against the USA and its allies in the region. Indeed, the drone attack on Aramco on September 14, 2019 and the ballistic missiles strike on Ayn al-Assad airbase and Irbil have thus far been contained, but there are no guarantees that such actions if reiterated will not escalate into a wider confrontation. The purpose of Putin’s last visit to Damascus on January 8, 2020, was explicitly to warn Assad of the consequences of any

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Iranian reaction against US assets from Syrian soil. In the case of further escalation, if Russia responds by actively supporting Iran, it would lose influence with the Gulf Arabs. Alternatively, if it tries to remain neutral while the US supports Iran’s adversaries, Russia’s usefulness to Iran would also be significantly lower. Third, the emergence of a third Turkish-Qatari axis in the region’s politics is also considerably complicating Moscow’s balancing act. While the Saudi-Emirati axis is fully engaged in funding and supporting counterrevolutionary forces, the former is battling in preserving the last of their remaining influence within the Arab Spring countries. Putin has thus far shown an apparent inclination toward the re-establishment of the status quo in the Middle East, backing the choice of strong autocrats over nascent, fragile democracies or unknown Islamist rebels. Nonetheless, there is a limit to which Russia can support these actors without endangering its vital economic interest with both Ankara and Doha who are, respectively, the biggest trading partner in the Middle East and the largest investor in Russia petrochemical companies. Fourth, by aligning itself with status quo forces, Russia is actively alienating the forces seeking change. The ongoing uprisings in Iraq and Lebanon have both demonstrated once again that the people do not always remain suppressed. The Russian strategy of re-enforcing the Syrian state authority could unravel if Assad fails to win the peace and bring back stability to both the security and the economy of the country. Demonstrations in previously neutral Syrian communities against the poor economic conditions, such as in Suwayda lately, are a precursor of new challenges Moscow will face in the postwar arrangements. Failure of Russian policy in the Levant could trigger old rivals to seize the opportunity and to contradict it once again. Indeed, the instability and volatility of the emerging regional order offer no guarantees for Putin to maintain his balancing act indefinitely. The Gulf states have high expectations around what Russia could do or offer, and its failure to fulfill them would eventually cause the reemergence of geopolitical concerns over cooperation. A clear tendency among the same actors who proved most reactive to Russia’s attention since its military intervention in Syria in September 2015. If Russian foreign policy does not prevent uncontrollable conflicts in the region, then Putin’s current approach could cause to the decline of fragile Russian influence in GCC.

CHAPTER 11

Russia’s Policy Toward the War in Yemen Leonid Issaev

1

Introduction

Although the Russian “return” to the Middle East was perceived ambiguously in the region, it still had an impact on the intensification of Russia’s relations with the Arab countries. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries were no exception. Russia’s relations with the monarchies of the Gulf can be described in terms of a bargaining strategy. From the one hand, Russia is interested in building up stronger economic cooperation with the GCC member states, drawing bigger volumes of investments from the Gulf to Russia’s broken economy. On the other hand, Russia is trying to underline its importance and relevance to the GCC by putting forward diplomatic and political initiatives. One such example is the Yemeni crisis. Although Russia is not directly involved in the conflict in Yemen, it still has an indirect influence on it as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In addition, after the Russian invasion of Syria, as well as the indirect presence in Libya (primarily Russian private military companies), the point of view was repeatedly expressed about the possibility of Russian participation in

L. Issaev (B) National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_11

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the Yemeni crisis.1 In this regard, within the framework of this chapter, we will consider the role of the Yemeni crisis in contemporary Russian politics, as well as its place in Russia’s relations with the GCC. Russian policy in Yemen has traditionally been characterized by working relations with all political actors historically involved in the political and legal field. This was common in both the 1990s and 2000s when Russian diplomatic offices in Yemen maintained contacts with all political forces in Yemen to a certain extent. This, by the way, was confirmed by quite trustful relations that Russian ambassadors in Yemen had with the local political elite. At the same time, despite the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the influence of Russia in Sanaa diminished markedly, yielding not only to the American (and Western in general), but also to the Saudi influence (since the last decade of the twentieth century, Riyadh, thanks in large part to Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz, occupied a strong niche as a key “broker” in resolving disputes between Yemeni political and tribal forces), Russian diplomats were often asked to help in settling disputes This fact is attributable to at least two major factors. First, it was due to the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union Moscow’s interest in Yemen has noticeably decreased, which is reflected in the Kremlin’s neutral position on the events in this country. This, in turn, took Russia beyond various conspiracy theories that were traditionally present in Yemen in relation to external forces and helped establish trusting relations with Moscow. Secondly, Russia remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which represents, from the perspective of Yemeni forces, a very important mechanism to influence the situation inside Yemen. Despite the rather archaic political structure of Yemeni society, which has preserved rather obvious elements of the tribal structure so far, all political forces in Yemen, as well as the Yemeni regime itself, have an interest in maintaining their legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. In this regard, Russia as a permanent member of the UN Security Council continues to 1 See, e.g., Samuel Ramani, “The Russian Role in the Yemen Crisis,” in Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis, ed. S. Day and N. Brehony (Cham: Springer, 2020); Alexander Rybin, “Yemeni Bases Await Russians,” Gazeta.ru, August 23, 2016, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/08/23_a_10154303.shtml; Maxim Suchkov, “Moscow Handling Yemen Dilemma,” Russian International Affairs Council, April 1, 2015. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/moscow-handlingyemen-dilemma/.

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play a significant role for Yemenis, despite the fact that Moscow does not have any real levers of influence on the situation inside that country. The situation has changed markedly since the events of the Arab Spring, when the Russian government either did not know how to respond to mass protests against the incumbent political authorities or changed their position at all regarding the possibility of a violent overthrow of the incumbent regime. Yemen has also been addressed by this challenge to varying degrees. Thus, before the start of mass protests in Moscow on Bolotnaya Square in the winter of 2011–2012, the Russian leadership2 believed, that the events of the Arab Spring were a natural response of Arab societies to the stagnation of Arab political regimes and their inability to address pressing socioeconomic and sociodemographic issues. Therefore, although the Russian Foreign Ministry recognized the legitimacy of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, it nevertheless considered it necessary to take into account the demands of the opposition. In this regard, throughout 2011, Moscow maintained contacts with the Yemeni authorities as well as with their opponents, both Southern separatists and members of Al-Islah party. Moscow benefited from the fact that, with the direct involvement of Saudi Arabia, it was possible by the end of 2011 to sign the GCC Initiative, which at that time put an end to the armed confrontation between the authorities and the opposition and also allowed to form a transitional government for a two-year term. Hence, up to the first half of 2014, the Russian authorities maintained their usual neutral position, supporting the work of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) when necessary. The situation for Moscow drastically changed after the negotiations in the framework of the National Dialogue Conference deadlocked. Consensus on at least four of nine GND working groups (“the Saada issue,” “the South issue,” “Transitional justice,” and “Statehood”) failed to be reached.3 The new Constitution was not adopted and all the deadlines for the transition period set by the GCC Initiative had long

2 See, e.g., official statements by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov or Russian Ambassador to Cairo Mikhail Bogdanov: “Processes in the Arab World Do Not Yet Have a Direct Impact on Russia’s Position in the Region,” Interfax, July 5, 2011. https:// www.interfax.ru/interview/197814. 3 Sergey Serebrov, “ Yemen: National Dialogue and the Problem of Separatism of the South,” Ratings and Ideas: Bulletin of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences 1 (2014).

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expired. The greatest benefit from another political crisis was gained by the Houthis who, in an alliance with Ali Saleh’s General People’s Congress, entered Sanaa in September 2014,4 after which Prime Minister Basindwa resigned his position and all the leadership of Al-Islah party, including the influential Al-Ahmar family, fled to Saudi Arabia. Six months later Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi also escaped the country. The seizure of power by the Houthis in September 2014 put the Russian leadership in an awkward position. Firstly, with the growing conflict between intra-Yemeni forces, Moscow was forced to support someone’s side. This, in turn, deprived the Russian leadership of the ability to maneuver between the interests of the main political forces. Secondly, Moscow was faced with the problem of recognizing Ansar Allah as the real power in Sanaa. However, recognition of this fact would contradict the position of most countries of the international community, which was undesirable for the Kremlin against the background of the confrontation with the West that began in 2014. Finally, the Russian authorities had to decide whether or not to recognize the very possibility of overthrowing Mansour Hadi’s failed regime by force. And here the Kremlin’s sympathies after the Bolotnaya Square protests were no longer on the side of the Houthis, but rather on that of the deposed President Hadi. This may explain the fact that in the end Russia refused to support the Houthis, and also recognized Mansour Hadi as the legitimate president of Yemen even after his escape from the country.5 In addition, given the start of the military operation in Yemen by the Arab Coalition in March 2015, the Russian Foreign Ministry was at that time fully confident that it would end within a few months, and power in the country would return to Hadi and his supporting party Al-Islah. The situation only began to change by 2017, when, after the failure of the Golden Spear military operation to seize the Red Sea coast, the leadership of the Arab Coalition, as well as the Russian leadership, realized that it was not possible to achieve the expulsion of the Houthis from Sanaa by military means. By that time, the Russian Foreign Ministry realized that it was not sensible to rely exclusively on Mansour Hadi, who is unlikely to 4 Vitaly Naumkin and Vladimir Baranovskiy, eds., Middle East in a Changing Global Context (Moscow: Oriental Institute, 2018). 5 Leonid Issaev, “Endless War, or Again About Yemen,” Neprikosnovennyi Zapas. Debaty o politike I kylture,” 6 (2016): 238–248.

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return to Sanaa as the real president. In addition, by 2017 it became clear that the side effect of the Arab Coalition’s actions in Yemen was the aggravation of the humanitarian situation in the country, which also made it undesirable for Moscow to focus too much on the Hadi government. All this led to a diversification of contacts on the part of the Russian authorities with other parties to the Yemeni conflict, including representatives of Ansar Allah, negotiations with whom had previously been conducted mostly in an ultimatum form. One indication that Russia was returning to its policy of maneuvering between Yemeni forces was Moscow’s reluctance to agree on Yemeni ambassador to Moscow within a year after Hassan AlRai left the post in summer 2016. During the year, Russia rejected several candidates proposed by the Hadi government, as well as failed to agree on a new ambassador proposed by the Yemeni Foreign Ministry based in Sanaa. As a result, it was not until the summer of 2017 that the Russian Foreign Ministry accepted the candidacy of Ahmed Al-Waheishi, who can be considered the most moderate candidate for the office.

2

Historical Background

Russian relations with Yemen have a long history. The Soviet Union was one of the first states to recognize the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen and to establish bilateral relations with it. After the first official contacts between Yemen and the Soviet Union in Ankara in 1928, the parties signed the Treaty of Friendship and Trade. By the way, it should be noted that after the Treaty came into force, a Soviet trade representative was sent to Sanaa; it was Karim Hakimov (later Ambassador of the USSR to Riyadh).6 In addition, in the port of Hudaydah in Yemen the representative office of the export-import bureau “Blizhvostgostorg” was established, the functions of which included the sale of goods of the Soviet republics in the markets of the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the purchase of local goods. As a result, thanks to trade with the USSR, the Yemeni market became more attractive for trade with other countries of the Red Sea area, and the port city of Hudeydah became a major wholesale center. In addition, Soviet trade practices in Yemen undermined the existing monopoly of foreign firms, largely due to the actions of the Soviet

6 “Foreign Trade of USSR (from 1928 till 1933),” in USSR Statistical Review (Moscow: Vneshtorgizdat, 1933).

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Oil Syndicate, which sold oil and petroleum products.7 Already by 1929 the share of the USSR had reached 21% of the total import of oil products in Yemen.8 This, by the way, led to stabilization of the situation on the domestic oil market of Yemen, and also forced large Western monopolies to revise the range of their own products, significantly improving their quality. After the September 1962 revolution and the overthrow of the monarchy, the USSR was the first major state to recognize the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR).9 In 1964, during the visit of President Abdullah al-Sallal to the USSR, a friendship treaty and agreements on economic and technical cooperation were signed. During Al-Sallal’s administration the relations between the Soviet Union and the YAR appreciably strengthened, that proceeded up to 1967 when on his way to the USSR Al-Sallal was sentenced to death penalty in absentia in Yemen. However, the defeats of the main allies of the USSR, Egypt and Syria, in the war against Israel in 1967 and the subsequent withdrawal of Egyptian troops from North Yemen, as well as the weakening of left-wing forces in the country led to the deterioration of relations between the USSR and the YAR, which was observed during the reign of President Abdul Rahman Al-Eryani.10 At the same time, on November 30, 1967 another state appeared on the political map of the Arabian Peninsula - the People’s Republic of South Yemen. The USSR recognized it already on December 3, 1967, and during the visit of President Qahtan Al-Shaabi to the USSR in 1969, agreements on economic and technical, trade and cultural cooperation were signed, and air communication between Moscow and Aden was restored. At the same time, the left wing of the ruling National Liberation Front (NLF) in the People’s Republic of South Yemen insisted on the early restructuring of the South Yemeni army and on abandoning British military advisers in favor of closer cooperation between the USSR and South Yemen. As the balance of power in the South Yemen leadership changed in favor of the left wing of the NLF (which was perceived in the USSR as the joining of the South Yemen to the path of socialist 7 G. Djirkvelov, “Our Trade with Yemen,” in USSR Trade with the East 3–4 (1931). 8 Foreign Trade of USSR, 55. 9 Evgeny Primakov, Evgeny Lebedev, and Vitaly Naumkin, Recent History of the Arab Countries of Asia (Moscow: Nauka, 1988). 10 Elena Golubovskaya, Political Development of the Yemen Arab Republic 1962–1985 (Moscow: Nauka, 1989).

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orientation), relations between the USSR and South Yemen became even stronger. In its turn, the leadership of South Yemen declared a course toward expanding and strengthening the relations of friendship and cooperation with the socialist camp, first of all with the USSR.11 In this way, the People’s Republic of South Yemen (since 1970, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen) proved to be the most politically favored country in the Arabian Peninsula region for the Soviet Union, both in terms of ideological proximity and in terms of strategy (the port of Aden, the Socotra Island, and Perim Island in the heart of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait belonged to South Yemen). At the same time, quite good relations were also maintained with “capitalist” North Yemen, even despite the frequent changes of power in the YAR in the 1960s. This was explained by the Soviet leadership’s desire to support the republican authorities in Sanaa against the monarchists and those from the Arabian monarchies and the United States. In the 1970s, one of the important forms of interstate cooperation between the USSR and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen was close cooperation in the field of ideologies. It was assumed that the most important condition for the successful development of the revolutionary process in South Yemen was the establishment of an avant-garde socialist party, which became the National Liberation Front, transformed into the Yemen Socialist Party in 1978.12 And with active assistance from the Soviet side and direct participation of Soviet specialists, Higher Party Schools and Schools for Youth Personnel were established in Aden. In their turn, specialists from the USSR assisted in the creation of the Institute of Political and Party Personnel in the armed forces of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and security agencies. Thus, by the 1980s, the cooperation and ideological unity between the leadership of the USSR and the People’s Democratic Republic was so close that even the change of power in South Yemen in 1980 from Abd Al-Fattah Ismail to Ali Nasser Muhammad did not lead to any deterioration of Soviet-South Yemeni relations. This, however, was not surprising, as the Soviet Union and “socialist” countries accounted for almost 80% of all foreign aid to the Republic.

11 Primakov, Lebedev, and Naumkin, Recent History. 12 Primakov, Lebedev, and Naumkin, Recent History.

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At the same time, the open-doors policy pursued in the first half of the 1970s by the YAR President Al-Eryani led to the diversification of foreign policy relations of North Yemen and, consequently, to the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia and Western countries. As a result, in the 1970s, the leadership of the YAR followed the course of maintaining good relations with both the countries of the socialist bloc and the capitalist world. When Ali Abdullah Saleh came to power in the YAR in 1978, this trend only intensified. The North Yemeni authorities endeavored to maintain as friendly relations as possible with both the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus, in 1981 the USSR and YAR signed a new agreement on economic and technical cooperation, and three years later the parties signed another Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and North Yemen and agreed to establish a permanent intergovernmental commission on economic and technical cooperation and trade. Summing up the above, it should be noted that for Yemen (both South and North) relations with the USSR have to a large extent served as a source of strengthening national statehood. While for the Soviet side, they were in many ways a tool for expanding their presence in the Arab world. Samuel Ramani remarks that “in tandem with its broader detachment from Middle East affairs, Russia disengaged itself from Yemen’s internal affairs after the end of the Marxist state of South Yemen in 1990.”13 As is noted by Alexey Vasiliev, “after the collapse of the Soviet Union, or rather, on the eve of the collapse, Yemen was left to its own destiny. Marxist South Yemen was forced to unite with North Yemen on 22 May 1990. What emerged was the Republic of Yemen, which was dominated by the northerners. A military attempt by the southerners to secede again failed. The country maintained relations with Russia, but on a strictly pragmatic basis.”14 On December 30, 1991, the Republic of Yemen declared its official recognition of the Russian Federation as a legal successor of the USSR. In 1994, the former Soviet military base was finally evacuated from Aden. Some attempts to improve the Russian-Yemeni relations were still undertaken already in the 1990s. For example, in 1998 governments of the Russia and the Republic of Yemen signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation.

13 Ramani, “Russian Role,” 182. 14 Vasiliev, Russia’s Middle East, 378.

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There was a certain activization of the Russian-Yemeni relations in the 2000s. The first meeting between Vladimir Putin and Ali Abdullah Saleh took place in September 2000 in the framework of the Millennium Summit in New York. President Ali Abdullah Saleh visited Russia in 2002, 2004, 2009, and 2010. The main outcome of the 2002 visit was the signing of the Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Yemen.15 They also signed agreements on encouragement and mutual protection of capital investments, as well as cooperation in the field of culture, science, education, sports, and tourism. In 2005, an agreement between Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Yemen was signed. The same year the Russian-Yemeni Business Council was established. There was some growth of the volume of trade between Russia and Yemen (especially, as regards the importation of the Russian wheat). However, the Russian-Yemeni relations by 2011 remained rather limited.16

3

After the Arab Spring

After the beginning of the Arab Spring, Russia distanced itself from a brewing civil conflict and took a position of non-intervention. In one of the first statements by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the situation in Yemen in March 2011, the Russian leadership expressed “on-duty” fears about the situation in the country, but emphasized that “Yemenis are able to overcome numerous socio-economic difficulties

15 “Statement Following Talks with President Ali Abdallah Salih of the Republic of Yemen,” Kremlin, December 17, 2002. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transc ripts/21815. 16 See, e.g., Mukbel Araf, “The History of the Russian-Yemeni Relations,” Vestnik Rossiiskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seriya: Istoriya 5 (2009): 64–71; Alisa Shishkina and Valeria Fedotova, “Historiography of Russian-Arab Relations at the End of the XXBeginning of the XXI Century (on the example of Yemen, Syria and Tunisia),” Bulletin of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia—Series: International Relations 4 (2016): 755–767; Abdoulhamad Mohamed, “The Main Areas of Cooperation of the Republic of Yemen and the Russian Federation,” International Relations 4 (2018): 49–59.

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themselves and … determine their future through mutually respectful dialogue.”17 In their desire to distance themselves from the events in Yemen in 2011, the Russian authorities at the same time supported outside initiatives to normalize the situation in the country. Moscow commended the mediation initiatives proposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, primarily Saudi Arabia.18 At the same time, the Russian authorities did not express any support either to the Yemeni authorities, led by Ali Saleh, or to the opposition, urging the parties to renounce violence and use of force as a means to achieve political goals. Six months after the start of the protests in Yemen, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement regarding ways to resolve the conflict. “The only reasonable way out of the emerging realities is a direct dialogue between the authorities and the opposition in the light of the decree of the President of the Republic Ali Saleh of September 12, 2011 on empowering Vice President Mansur Hadi with powers to negotiate the transfer of power, as well as existing agreements on the GCC’s initiative,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement.19 Thus, the Russian authorities only once again made it clear that they consider Yemen as a zone of responsibility of the GCC and do not intend to intervene in the civil conflict on any side. The very fact of signing the plan for the peaceful transfer of power in Yemen proposed by the GCC, on November 23, 2011, was no less positively received. Russia described it as an “important milestone” on the path to achieving reconciliation in Yemen. Not wanting to be the main sponsor of the Yemeni political settlement, Russia was quite content with

17 “On the Situation in Yemen,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, March 11, 2011. https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/conflicts/-/ asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/content/id/215702. 18 “On the Development of the Situation in the Republic of Yemen,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, April. 2011. https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/internati onal_safety/conflicts/-/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/content/id/212362. 19 “On the Situation in the Republic of Yemen,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, September 19, 2011. https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/ye/-/asset_publisher/d2s b7D5vI2YJ/content/id/195094.

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the status of a “witness country,”20 which was provided by the abovementioned GCC peace initiative. Further actions of Moscow on the Yemeni issue until the start of hostilities of the Arab Coalition in March 2015 generally fit into the logic of non-interference in the internal affairs of the country, endorsement of the actions of the government of Muhammad Basindva and support of dialogue with all participants in the National Dialogue Conference. From 2012 to the beginning of 2015, Russia primarily focused its efforts on Yemen at work within the framework of the created in 2010 “Group of Friends of Yemen” and the “Group of Ten” (the so-called guarantor states of the peace process). In this regard, Moscow has repeatedly focused on cooperation with the GCC, the UN Security Council and the European Union for the implementation of the Inter-Yemen agreements on the peaceful transfer of power.21 The completion of the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen in early 2014 was very optimistically perceived by the Russian authorities. Russian ambassador to Yemen Vladimir Dedushkin in an interview with the Yemeni newspaper Al-Thaura in February 2014 noted that the NDC participants “in accordance with the GCC initiative and UN Security Council resolutions 2014 and 2051 were able to lay the foundation for stabilization and further development of the Republic of Yemen.”22 Moreover, the format of the relationship of external forces that developed around the Yemeni crisis, and where Russia was by no means assigned a primary role, suit the Russian authorities much more than the nature of the interaction of external actors in Syria. Moreover, it was the Yemeni experience of resolving the conflict that Russian diplomats proposed to borrow to normalize the situation in Syria, describing it as “the best way to resolve international crises that will go down in world history.” And the important role, according to Moscow, was given to 20 “On Signing a Plan for a Peaceful Transfer of Power in Yemen,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, November 24, 2011. https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/ye/-/ asset_publisher/d2sb7D5vI2YJ/content/id/181446. 21 “Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding the Start of the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, March 18, 2013. https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/kommentarii_predstavitelya/-/asset_ publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/118342. 22 “Interview with Ambassador of Russian Federation to Republic of Yemen,” Al Thawra, February 10, 2014. https://www.mid.ru/documents/10180/73007/Interv .pdf/19a136fa-7170-45f2-9016-d8f45ff0d14d.

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the international consensus, which was achieved within the framework of the “Group of Friends of Yemen,” but which was impossible within the framework of the “Friends of Syria Group.” Such a position fits well with the logic of the Kremlin’s actions in the Middle East as a whole and in Yemen in particular. From the beginning of the Arab Spring to the present, Russia has never been ready to play a leading role in the region. Of course, Russia was able to play a decisive role in Syria, but only in Syria. If to speak realistically, one should admit in advance that, in general, in the Middle East, due to, above all, economic circumstances, it cannot play the first violin, let alone be a conductor. Among the countries of the region, the main areas of economic cooperation are still directed toward the United States, Western Europe, China, and rising India.23 Russia in the economic field will remain in the region in the second and third roles. Therefore, the desire to find common ground with the West remains an essential vector of its policy. Apparently, the most favorable outcome of the Yemeni conflict for Russia was its completion in accordance with the results of the National Dialogue Conference. Albeit insignificant, but the intensification of Russian-Yemeni relations related precisely to the second year of President Mansour Hadi and the period between the completion of the NDC and the “September revolution” of 2014.24 During this period, the work of the Bilateral Interstate Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation was continued. And in 2013, a Russian business mission led by Deputy Minister of Economic Development Alexey Likhachev visited Sanaa, which was supposed to prepare a list of documents for adoption within the framework of the above commission. As part of the meetings, the parties identified oil and gas, electricity, industry, financial and banking, water, health care, and education as priority areas for Russian-Yemeni economic cooperation.25 However, the meeting of the co-chairs of the permanent RussianYemeni Intergovernmental Commission in Moscow in May 2014 did not lead to any progress, except for declarations on the need to strengthen 23 Vasiliev, Russia’s Middle East. 24 Leonid Issaev and Andrey Korotayev, “Unknown Revolution and International

Conflict, “World Economy and International Relations 8 (2015): 71–81. 25 “Deputy Minister Likhachev Heads a Business Mission in Yemen,” Ministry of Economics of Russia, June 11, 2013. http://old.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/ foreigneconomicactivity/cooperation/economicaa/doc20130610_11.

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relations. Moreover, during the meeting, it was noted that trade and economic relations between Russia and Yemen should be built today on a new basis and be based primarily on the principles of business benefits for both sides. At the same time, the risks of Russian business coming to Yemen should be offset by a serious potential benefit.26 The subsequent seizure of power in Sanaa by the Houthis in September 2014 and the military operation of the Arab Coalition, which began in March 2015, made it impossible to continue negotiations.

4

Arab Coalition and Russia’s Position

After the Coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched the military operation “Decisive Storm” on March 25, 2015, Russia once again first de facto and then de jure supported the actions of Riyadh. It is noteworthy that, being very categorical in assessing the actions of the United States and NATO in relation to Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, the Russian authorities tried to avoid direct criticism of the actions of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, despite the absence of sanction from the UN Security Council. Only at the very beginning of the conflict Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed his disappointment that “the operation was launched even without any consultations at the UN Security Council or through bilateral channels and that our partners [GCC - author’s note] only retroactively came to the UN Security Council and began to ask, again, retroactively to approve what they started to do.”27 Afterward, Russia tried to avoid a legal assessment of the actions of the Arab Coalition in Yemen, limiting itself to calls for an early cessation of hostilities, as well as blaming the escalation of the conflict not only on the GCC, but also on their opponents in Yemen in the person of the Houthis and the General People’s Congress. The most indicative here is the April 14, 2015 vote in the UN Security Council on Resolution 2216, which never mentioned the actions of the Arab Coalition, but at the same time blamed the situation primarily on the Houthis. Then the Russian delegation abstained from the vote, which 26 “Co-Chairs of the Permanent Russian-Yemeni Intergovernmental Commission Held a Meeting in Yemen,” Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of Russia, May 26, 2014. https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/31336/. 27 “Sergey Lavrov: The US Is Trying to Restrain Relations of All Countries with Russia,” Russia Today, April 6, 2015. https://ria.ru/20150406/1056972507.html.

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was tantamount to supporting the actions of Riyadh, and gave the green light to the Saudi leadership in its actions in Yemen. At the debate in the UN Security Council on April 14, 2015, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, substantiated the Russian neutral position by the fact that the project proposed by Jordan, France, the United States, and Great Britain was imperfect and needed additions that were submitted by the Russian side but rejected by the countries-sponsors of Resolution 2216. In particular, the following points were discussed: Firstly, the requirement for all “parties to the conflict” (Resolution 2216 refers to the “Yemeni parties”) to cease fire as soon as possible; secondly, the establishment of “mandatory and regular humanitarian pauses”; finally, the “inadequacy of the sanction component” which has a pronounced one-sided orientation. However, already in February 2016 and 2017, the Russian delegation supported the vote in favor of the new Resolutions on Yemen proposed by the United Kingdom, 2266 and 2342, respectively. Each of them continued the logic of Resolution 2216, while they did not take into account any of the above-mentioned proposals by Vitaly Churkin, which had not lost their relevance yet. Nevertheless, for Russia this was no longer so crucial. The Yemeni issue was on the periphery of Russian politics in the Middle East, while by 2016 the OPEC+ format was formed,28 which became one of the central issues in Russia’s relations with the Gulf countries. After the start of “Operation Decisive Storm,” the Russian position on the Yemen conflict largely continued the logic that preceded the actions of the Arab Coalition. Despite the fact that since 2015, Russia began to intervene in Syria, and then indirectly through its private military companies indicated its presence in Libya, the Russian leadership continued to occupy an equidistant position regarding Yemen. In this case, Moscow was quite satisfied with the status of one of the “sponsoring states” of the peace process, which did not impose any responsibility on it, but at the same time made its voice heard. That is why Moscow supported any

28 “OPEC, non-OPEC Agree First Global Oil Pact since 2001,” Reuters, December 10, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting/opec-non-opec-agree-firstglobal-oil-pact-since-2001-idUSKBN13Z0J8.

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attempts at an Inter-Yemeni dialogue, be it negotiations in Kuwait or consultations under the auspices of the UN in Geneva or Stockholm.29 The consultations that Russia continued to conduct with all parties to the conflict in Yemen should be evaluated from the same point of view. At the beginning of 2018, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov received in Moscow the former deputy prime minister of Yemen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country, Abd Al-Malik Al-Makhlyafi. In December 2017, the special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East and African countries, Mikhail Bogdanov, met with the top leadership of Yemen in Riyadh. No less actively Russia interacts with the opposite camp. Thus, the delegations of the Yemeni parties from Sanaa and Aden were repeatedly received at the Russian Foreign Ministry by Mikhail Bogdanov. However, their nature allows us to speak more about their formal character than about the existence of any alternative plan for Moscow to resolve the Yemeni conflict or ambitions regarding Yemen. In 2018, in an interview with TASS, ambassador Dedushkin reacted negatively to the question of whether Russia could become an intermediary in resolving the crisis in Yemen by initiating a process similar to Astana in Syria. “In Syria and Yemen, everything is completely different. Both the interests of the parties to the conflict and the interests of external players vary. In this regard, I am inclined to proceed from the fact that we need to find a way to a settlement in Yemen, moving along the beaten track, without reinventing the wheel, that is, relying on UN Secretary-General Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Martin and I had an excellent professional dialogue. The Russian side fully supports the special envoy” said the Russian ambassador.30

29 “About the Meeting of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vershinin with the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for Yemen Griffiths,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, January 11, 2019. https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/ye/-/asset_publisher/ d2sb7D5vI2YJ/content/id/3471206. 30 “The Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Yemen. There Were Cases When It Was Necessary to Rescue People from Prisons. It Turned out,” TASS, August 10, 2019. https://tass.ru/interviews/5446521.

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5 Russia’s Bilateral Efforts with Arab Gulf Parties Involved in the Coalition In general, it can be noted that at the official level the Russian leadership tries to refrain from excessive criticism of the Arab Coalition’s actions in Yemen. The Russian Foreign Ministry has repeatedly stated that it shares the position that the continuation of hostilities, as well as the worsening humanitarian situation in Yemen, is the fault of not only the Arab Coalition, but also the opposing forces within Yemen. However, there is a number of fundamental points that should be taken into account when analyzing Russia’s relations with the Arab Coalition for Yemen. Firstly, Russia stresses the possibility of achieving a political solution through the mediation of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths. Sergei Lavrov, in recent consultations with the UN official in June 2019, stated that he was generally satisfied with his work and considered criticism of him premature.31 In turn, the Russian Foreign Ministry is ready to provide him with all possible support. In addition, Russia considers it necessary to implement the Stockholm agreements on the situation in Hudaydah, as well as to extend the work of the UN mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement. Also, from Moscow’s point of view, the success of the Stockholm agreements is the first and most important step toward a comprehensive peace agreement on the situation in Yemen. Last consultation of Mikhail Bogdanov with the Ambassadors of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in Moscow, 26 June 2019,32 as well as on 15 and 19 August 2019, confirmed Russia’s position on this issue, despite the fact that Arab diplomats are skeptical about the results achieved by Martin Griffiths and about the possibility of implementing the Stockholm agreements. Secondly, Moscow’s limited influence on Ansar Allah is one of the problematic elements in negotiations between Russia and the Arab Coalition. The Arab Coalition assumes that Russia has sufficient leverage to influence the Houthis, both directly and through dialogue with Iran.

31 “Deputy Foreign Minister Discusses Situation in Country with Delegation from Yemen,” RIA Novosti, March 20, 2019. https://ria.ru/20190320/1551956823.html. 32 “Deputy Foreign Ministers Discuss Yemeni Issues with Ambassadors of Yemen, UAE and Saudi Arabia,” RIA Novosti, July 26, 2019. https://news.rambler.ru/middleeast/ 42564544-zamglavy-mid-rf-obsudil-yemenskuyu-problematiku-s-poslami-yemena-oae-i-sau dovskoy-aravii/.

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However, this position is not entirely correct. Indeed, Russia is one of the few external forces that has maintained a dialogue with Ansar Allah, as confirmed by periodic meetings between the Houthis and Russian diplomats. However, relations with the Houthis have been significantly undermined by the Russian government’s very skeptical views of the movement in 2014–2015, which has resulted in a lack of trusting relations with the group and, consequently, makes it much more difficult for Moscow to put pressure on them. In addition, repeated negotiations with the Houthis have revealed another problem, which lies in the fact that, from the point of view of Ansar Allah, Moscow is not in a position to provide sufficient guarantees for the Houthis to take into account their interests when trying to force the Houthis to make concessions. Thirdly, the division between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh is the most problematic issue in the relations between Russia and the Arab Coalition. This, in turn, forces the Russian government to maneuver between the interests of the KSA and the UAE, and sometimes to distance itself from the Yemeni issue in order not to spoil relations with one side.33 From Russian point of view, the closest position is that of Abu Dhabi for at least two reasons. Firstly, the forces inside Yemen on which the UAE relies are ideologically the closest to Moscow, as they follow secular views and do not share radical religious ideas. In this regard, interaction with President Hadi and his supporting Al-Islah party and the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood is less comfortable for Moscow. Secondly, throughout the Yemeni conflict, starting in 2011, Moscow had the most stable relations with the southern political forces (including the Yemeni Socialist Party, the Al-Hirak movement and, subsequently, the Southern Transition Council (STC), which had not experienced any noticeable declines or upsurges, unlike the ones with Ansar Allah movement. And even the strong anti-Houthi policy of the Southern Transitional Council is very positively perceived in Moscow. It should be noted that the South has practically no problems with access to Mikhail Bogdanov.34 And this is a very good indicator, because the level of Deputy Foreign Minister is the limit for all Yemeni delegations visiting 33 Alexander Gostev, “Putin is Asked to Help: Russia May Intervene in Another War,” Radio Svoboda, July 23, 2018. https://www.svoboda.org/a/29385183.html. 34 “Lavrov Praised the UN Efforts to Resolve the Crisis in Yemen,” RIA Novosti, July 1, 2019. https://ria.ru/20190701/1556081360.html.

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Moscow. Moreover, the Russian government feels quite comfortable in the talks with representatives of the Southern Transitional Council. Here, however, it is worth keeping in mind that the STC itself is a very eclectic structure, composed of different political forces and different views on the political future of Yemen. In this regard, the focus on the head of the STC Aidarus Al-Zubedi fits well with the logic of Moscow’s choice of partners in the region. He is a representative of the military bloc, his associates are mostly former members of the Yemeni Socialist Party who feel “nostalgic for the Soviet-Yemeni friendship,” and with a number of Yemeni members of the STC Russian diplomats still have personal contacts that help the South to achieve trusting relations with the Russian Foreign Ministry. In addition, Russia is clearly impressed by the assessment of the Russian presence in Syria, which is given by representatives of the Al-Zubeiri community (many of them once lived in Syria).

6 Russia’s Interests and Aspirations of Expanding Its Influence in the Middle East As for Russian interests in Yemen in general and the Yemeni conflict in particular, the following points should be noted. There are almost no economic interests in Yemen on the part of Russia. Even before the events of the Arab Spring Yemen was not very attractive for Russian business. By the way, the economic benefits of Soviet cooperation with both YAR and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen were also minimal. Practically the entire industrial infrastructure of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen was built by the CMEA countries on a non-repayable basis or through loans that were later withdrawn. Until 2011, the level of trade turnover between Russia and Yemen almost never exceeded $0.5 billion, fluctuating around $200–400 million. In 2018, the share of Yemen in the total foreign trade turnover of Russia was only 0.03% (which, by the way, is lower than in 2017—0.05%). At the same time, 85 percent of all Russian-Yemeni trade comes from the export of Russian wheat to Yemen.35 And the main problem here is the weak attractiveness of the Yemeni market for Russian business (with the exception of coffee, seafood, and a limited range of construction materials, Yemen is unlikely 35 Foreign Trade of Russia. “Foreign Trade of Russia with Yemen,” http://russiantrade.com/reports-and-reviews/2018-11/vneshnyaya-torgovlya-rossii-s-yemenom-za-9mesyatsev-2018-g/.

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to be of any other interest to the Russian economy). The same applies to the Yemeni oil sector. As for the Russian large oil and gas business, the volume of the Yemeni oil market seems insignificant for it. In the case of private Russian oil companies, the costs of entering the Yemeni market (in particular, the possibility of the Russian oil and gas sector participating in the exploration of new fields has been considered, oil reserves there have yet to be assessed, and the likelihood of their subsequent recovery is not so high) and related primarily to security issues, the need to rebuild destroyed infrastructure, and unresolved disputes between the various forces within Yemen. In addition, the capacity of the Yemeni Government to pay has so far left much to be desired. In turn, the Russian leadership, in view of the difficult financial and economic situation inside the country, in recent years has tried to refrain from economically inexpedient contracts and trade on credit, unless it leads to any significant political dividends, which are not visible in the Yemeni case. The illusory nature of Russian economic interests in Yemen is indirectly confirmed by Russian diplomats. Thus, in his interviews, the Russian ambassador to Yemen Vladimir Dedushkin largely reduced the answers to questions about the state of Russian-Yemeni relations to the statement of long-completed facts from the history of relations between North and South Yemen with the Soviet Union. Even the fact that 80% of weapons used in Yemen were around 2014 Russian is a consequence of Soviet rather than Russian politics. Speaking about the role of Russia in Yemen at present, even the official Russian position boils down to the fact that it is very modest. In fact, in addition to humanitarian assistance, as well as providing quotas for the education of Yemeni students in Russian universities (currently about 1000 Yemenis are studying in Russia) and training for the Yemeni army, there is nothing more to highlight.36 Also the options for establishing Russian military bases in Yemen are not even being considered by the Russian leadership. To a large extent, talks about Russian military bases in Yemen are provoked by various Yemeni political forces wishing to gain Moscow’s favor, usually in the runup to negotiations with the Russian side.37 Later on, these statements are often picked up by Russian political actors to promote Russian influence 36 “Interview with Russian Ambassador to Yemen Dedushkin,” Al Yemen, September 1, 2014. https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/ye/-/asset_publisher/d2sb7D5vI2YJ/ content/id/1548330. 37 Rybin, “Yemeni bases.”

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in the region, becoming an instrument of polemics with the West. At the same time, the Russian leadership does not feel the need to deploy its military bases in Yemen for several reasons. Firstly, due to the high cost of the project and its poor impact. The current state of the military bases on the mainland Yemen will require significant financial expenditures from Russia for their modernization, which is undesirable for the Russian leadership. At present, the need for financial expenditures to modernize the Russian military base in Tartus remains a contentious issue. In this regard, additional military commitments to modernize the military bases in the far abroad seem unjustified. As far as Socotra is concerned, the creation of a full-scale military base there now seems to be a very expensive project, since it requires considerable investment in its development practically from the ground up. Even the Soviet government in the 1970s and 1980s abandoned the project to create a base for nuclear submarines on Socotra due to its high cost.38 Secondly, presence of military bases in the Red Sea, as well as on the Gulf of Aden coast can only be justified if the Russian Navy is permanently based there. However, the size of the Russian Black Sea and Pacific Fleets (the most relevant for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden) does not allow for the necessary forces to be deployed off the coast of Yemen. Especially due to the need to periodically base part of the Black Sea Fleet in the waters of the port of Tartus in Syria. Today, however, there is no economic or political need to implement long-term forms of military presence in Yemeni ports in both the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Finally, the countries of the Arab Coalition (primarily Saudi Arabia and Yemen) already deploy personnel in Yemen’s military bases, and therefore there is practically no possibility of their expulsion by Russia. Moreover, according to Saudi Vision 2030 strategy, the Red Sea region is given a key role in turning Saudi Arabia into a global trade hub and transport and logistics center. In this regard, the most important facilities in and around the Red Sea region (ports of Hudaydah, Moha, Midi, Aden, and Pirim Island) are likely to remain under the control of the Arab Coalition. As for the Russian presence in Yemeni ports on the Red Sea, primarily in Hudaydah and Mocha, the need for this in Moscow is not yet evident. Russia is certainly interested in maintaining security and stability in the Bab Al-Mandeb strait zone, if only because it uses this route for trade with 38 Vladimir Agafonov, “Does Russia Need a Military Base on the “Island of Bliss?” Vremya Novostei 210 (2008).

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China. However, Moscow currently has neither political nor economic feasibility of marking its presence in Yemeni ports in the Red Sea. It should also be kept in mind that at present the Red Sea region plays almost no significant role in the oil pricing issue (if only a scenario of a full-scale military conflict that could completely paralyze shipping in the region is excluded, but this scenario is almost unbelievable), which hypothetically could increase its importance in the eyes of the Russian authorities. Also most of the oil from the Gulf region goes to Europe via the southern maritime route around Africa, rather than through the Suez Canal. Thus, being interested in establishing the safety of navigation in the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait zone, Moscow hardly needs to mark its presence in Yemeni ports of the Red Sea. This is also confirmed by the fact that Moscow is sympathetic to the initiatives of UN SecretaryGeneral’s Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths to settle the situation in Hudaydah, who, unlike much more radical Mansour Hadi and the Arab Coalition, sees no quick solution to the situation around Hudaydah and proposes not to resort to extreme measures.

7

Conclusion

Summing up, it should be noted that after the collapse of the USSR and up to the present time, Yemen has been assigned a peripheral place in Russian foreign policy. At the same time, the Russian leadership in the 1990s and 2000s was characterized by maintained friendly relations with this country. Moscow tried to pursue a similar policy after the Arab Spring. Over the past 30 years, the Russian leadership has tried to distance itself from the internal Yemeni conflicts, adhering to a policy of non-interference in Yemeni internal affairs. After the start of anti-government demonstrations in Yemen in 2011, Russia, although it took part in the work of various structures to overcome the Yemeni crisis (e.g., “the Group of Ten,” etc.), however, did not strive to play “the first violin.” In other words, it was in the context of the Yemeni crisis that the Russian leadership felt most comfortable. On the one hand, Moscow felt an interest in itself on the part of domestic Yemeni and regional actors. On the other hand, it did not play a primary role in resolving the Yemeni crisis, practically did not bear responsibility for what was happening there. Moreover, as the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen has shown, Russia has sought to avoid

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attempts to drag its conflict on anyone’s side by adhering to a balancing strategy. At the same time, when talking about Russian policy in the Arabian Peninsula, Moscow proceeds primarily from the importance of maintaining relations with the Arabian monarchies, rather than with Yemen. Moreover, the experience of recent years shows that the Russian leadership is trying to exchange its political assets in the region for agreements on economic, energy and investment cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are important for Moscow. This explains Moscow’s very restrained position on the Yemeni crisis. Thus, given that Russia has no strategic interests of its own in Yemen, the Kremlin is trying to use its loyalty to the Arab Coalition’s policy in Yemen during the talks with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi on bilateral agenda issues.

CHAPTER 12

Broker, Partner, or Troublemaker: Russian Involvement in Regional Conflicts and GCC Interests Ibrahim Fraihat and Yegor Lodygin

1

Introduction

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that once actively participated in the Cold War (1946–1991) against the Soviet Union now appears for the Kremlin as a prospective area for intervention, business, and future collaboration. Russia has its reasons to believe it can be a serious partner to countries on both sides of the Gulf, as it possesses a unique political capital of soft power that other superpowers lack. Indeed, Moscow has access to all parties of the different conflicts of the Gulf region such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain. Not even the United States has this range of access, for instance when it comes to Iran. Even in Iraq, where governments generally swing between

I. Fraihat (B) · Y. Lodygin Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] Y. Lodygin e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_12

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being friendly with the United States or Iran, Russia is able to engage with any government in Baghdad regardless of the direction its government takes with outside allies. Adopting an approach of neutrality and pragmatism, Moscow has therefore distanced itself from polarisation within Gulf conflicts and has made itself available to be the third party that could facilitate talks among the different disputants. Access, neutrality, mediation, and pragmatism all have become important features of Russia’s soft power where Moscow aspires to secure a spot for Russian influence in the Gulf region. Furthermore, Russia has other forms of political capital that traditional neutral mediators like Switzerland and Norway do not have. Russia has sophisticated military equipment such as air defense systems S-400 and S-300, T-90 main battle tanks, striking helicopters, and nuclear technology, which it has made available to other regional players like Iran and Turkey. In other words, Russia has also the hard power that is vital for a region engaged in a vicious arms race, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that after the drone attack on the world’s largest oil processing facility in Abqaiq,1 for which the Houthis claimed responsibility, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly offered Saudi Arabia to purchase S-400 s to “protect any infrastructure objects … effectively”2 during the summit with Turkish and Iranian presidents in Ankara in September 2019. This combination of soft power and hard power is known as “smart power”.3 With its established smart power in the Gulf region, Russia distinguishes itself from all other intervenors in the region’s conflicts and in its ability to engage with all parties regardless of where they stand, offering them both neutral intervention and S-400 s: neutral intervention that engages with all parties without taking sides to support peace negotiation and S-400 s to support their arms race when they decide to escalate.

1 “Major Saudi Arabia oil facilities hit by Houthi drone strikes,” The Guardian, September 14, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/14/major-saudiarabia-oil-facilities-hit-by-drone-strikes. 2 Henry Meyer, “Putin Offers to Sell Saudis S-400 Missiles to Bolster Defenses,” Bloomberg, September 16, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0916/putin-says-ready-to-help-saudi-arabia-defend-itself-with-s-400. 3 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (2009): 160.

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This chapter focuses on examining the extent to which Russia’s smart power has been able to transform its relationship with the countries of the Gulf region and build collaborations that meet the interests of both sides. Additionally, the chapter will discuss how GCC countries see Russia’s capacities as a broker in Gulf conflicts (e.g. with Iran) and with other regional ones like that of Syria and Libya.

2

The Potentials of Smart Power

Power has historically played a critical role in shaping international relations and remains a key factor in a state’s ability to convince others to accept its position. In Joseph Nye’s words, “power is one’s ability to affect the behavior of others to get what one wants”.4 However, power is a very fluid concept that takes different forms, and on many occasions it is the context that determines what constitutes power and in what shape. Because power is fluid and takes different forms, there are different ways where the state can convince others to accept its position. According to Nye, this can be done through “coercion, payment, and attraction. Hard power is the use of coercion and payment. Soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction”,5 or persuasion.6 To be able to attract or persuade others to change their behaviour, states must have the right resources to claim the possession of soft power, which enables them to engage in attracting others. Nye lists three major resources that are necessary for a state to have effective soft power: its culture (as it becomes attractive to others), its political values (the statement commitment to those values on both domestic and international levels), and its foreign policy (when perceived as legitimate with moral authority).7 The need for soft power in international relations has become more essential these days compared to the past. This is particularly true given that the use of military force has become very costly for all parties involved. However, the use of military force remains vital “when the 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ernest J. Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 114. 7 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 11.

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survival of states is clearly at stake, but in much of modern world politics, physical survival is not the most pressing issue”.8 For this reason, traditional interstate warfare has decreased in the last few decades, and global competition is carried out in other means. As a result, “[c]ommunications, organizational and institutional skills, and manipulation of interdependence have become important”.9 However, one should be careful about jumping to conclusions thinking that hard power is becoming less important in international relations today and that only soft power can achieve a state’s objective. Soft power is never sufficient on its own to secure a state’s interest unless backed by some sort of hard power. The mere existence of hard power, even though it is not used frequently, helps in deterrence and in supporting soft power to achieve certain objectives. The relationship between hard and soft power is very complex, and the ability to combine both enables a state to act strongly. It is the right combination of both hard and soft power is what became known in international relations as the smart power. Ernest Wilson defines smart power as “the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently”.10 For smart power to be effective, Wilson suggests that it should be built on important considerations like the target of soft power, as well as a clear understanding of one’s goals and capacity, regional and global context, and the tools to be employed.11 Nevertheless, Joseph Nye accentuates that determining how to combine hard and soft power will be one of the main challenges for actors in international politics in the twenty-first century.12 This tells us that the mere possession of elements of soft power and hard power does not necessarily translates to effective smart power. It is ultimately the interplay of a number of factors that Wilson lists as resources and the ability of the actor

8 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 157. 9 Ibid., 157–158. 10 Wilson, 115. 11 Ibid. 12 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Jack Landman Goldsmith, “The Future of Power,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 64 (2011): 46.

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to build the relationship between soft and hard power and to be able to mobilise smart power as a tool in international politics. There is no doubt that Russia possesses elements of both soft power, such as access to all GCC member states and Iran, and hard power given its ability to supply the arms race in the Gulf and beyond if requested. Nevertheless, there should be a distinction between the mere existence of smart power and its ability to transform relationships or to have impact. The following parts of this chapter will discuss whether Russia has been successful in using smart power to make an impact in the Gulf.

3

Russia in the Gulf

Driven by the vision of President Vladimir Putin (first elected as a Russian president in 2000), in addition to other domestic factors, Russian foreign policy began to treat the Middle East with special importance. Russian leaders Boris Yeltsin (1991–1999) and Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) believed in the multipolar world, but only Putin believed that the Middle East plays an important role in it.13 Understanding the importance of the countries of the GCC as critical actors in regional affairs,14 Russia decided to change the antagonistic relationship it once had during the Soviet Union’s times with the Gulf monarchies and become deeply involved in Gulf affairs. In 2007, the Russian government put together a framework for its involvement in the Gulf region in a document called it the Concept for Ensuring Security in the Region of the Persian Gulf. The document emphasised a number of principles including: “the settlement of conflict situations solely by diplomatic means; the conduct of peacekeeping military operations only in accordance with UN resolutions; the participation of all sides involved in emerging issues in a decision-making process, and the implementation of agreements achieved by the regional countries in strict compliance with international documents regulating relations in the

13 Nikolay Kozhanov, “Putin’s Turn to the Middle East after 2012,” in Russia and the Syrian Conflict: Moscow’s Domestic, Regional and Strategic Interests, ed. Nikolay Kozhanov (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 27. 14 Maxim A. Suchkov, “Russia and the Arab Spring: Changing Narratives and Implications for Regional Policies” (paper presented at the ACRPS Russo-Arab Relations Conference, Doha, May 23–24, 2015).

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region of the Gulf”.15 Russian intervention in the Gulf region has been driven by a number of factors, most importantly defining Moscow’s role in the region in relation to US influence and crafting new territories for economic cooperation. 3.1

Role Definition in Relations to the United States

Russian involvement in the GCC is generally viewed as one additional territory where Moscow cannot necessarily compete with the United States but at least show its presence for possible future collaboration with Washington. In other words, Russian presence in the Gulf can be seen as part of the larger complex of relationship between Moscow and Washington; successful Russian influence in the Gulf could serve as leverage to respond to challenges with the United States and the West in general in other places. This traditional wisdom of Russia trying to compete with the United States in the Gulf is opposed by experts on Russian foreign policy like Mahmoud Hamza, researcher in Arab-Russian relations, who argues that Russia will not create any alliances against the United States in the GCC. Even if it wanted to, it would not be able to do, he explains.16 By the same token, Nikolay Kozhanov, associate professor at Qatar University, argues that the relationship between Russia and the West in the Middle East, and the Gulf specifically, is more complicated than it seems. This complicated relationship led “the Kremlin to reject its previous vision of the region as a chessboard for its games with the West and to become more deeply involved in Middle Eastern affairs”.17 In other words, Russia is not trying to challenge the domination of the West in the Gulf, but rather wants only to be visible in the Gulf, to establish a basis for its return to the region. In fact, the relative improvement in the relationship between Russia and the Gulf states after the end of the Cold War, and particularly in

15 Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russia and the Gulf: the Main Principles of the Political and Economic Dialogue,” In Asia-Gulf Economic Relations in the 21st Century, ed. Tim Niblock and Monica Malik (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2013), 109. 16 Author’s interview and discussion with Mahmoud Hamza, February 2020. 17 Kozhanov, “Putin’s Turn to the Middle East after 2012,” 30.

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the beginning of the 2000s,18 is determined by political developments in the region, especially with regard to the American role, rather than as being created in a proactive approach on Russia’s side. In particular, over the course of the Obama years (2009–2017), the administration’s policy of relative disengagement from Middle East politics and pivot towards East Asia reinforced the belief that the United States is withdrawing from the region, which potentially created new opportunities for Russia to fill in the gap that a US withdrawal would create. This dynamic, as well as the election of the unpredictable Donald Trump in 2016, led to the first ever visit of the King of Saudi Arabia to visit Russia in 2017 which was seen as a sign on “shift in global power structures”,19 and an indicator of Saudi concerns about US reliability, which “left the kingdom looking to diversity into wider set of alliances”.20 In Moscow, King Salman (2015– present) indicated a new era of cooperation could begin with Russia but demanded that Iran “an ally of the Kremlin, end its interference in Middle East politics”.21 Equally important for GCC leaders is Russia’s modelling of how a “reliable friend” can be when it comes to defending their allies. That is, Russia demonstrated the extent to which it was willing to fight in Syria to protect its ally, Bashar Assad (2000–present), compared to Obama abandoning Mubarak (1981–2011) in Egypt as soon as protests broke out against him in Cairo in January 2011. The American position on Mubarak created deep scepticism among GCC countries about the reliability of the United States, especially during the Obama administration and made the Russian model more appealing to them.22

18 Katerina Oskarsson and Steve A. Yetiv, “Russia and the Persian Gulf: Trade, Energy, and Interdependence,” Middle East Journal 67, no. 3 (2013): 383. 19 Patrick Wintour, “Saudi King’s Visit to Russia Heralds Shift in Global Power Structures,” The Guardian, October 5, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ oct/05/saudi-russia-visit-putin-oil-middle-east. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ilan Goldenberg and Melissa G. Dalton, “Bridging the Gulf: How to Fix U.S. Relations With the GCC,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2015, https://www.foreig naffairs.com/articles/middle-east/bridging-gulf.

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Table 12.1 Russia’s trade with the GCC (mln USD) [Ibid.]

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates Total

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2.5 132 13.3 14.6 366

5 357 39.3 54.6 852

13.9 83 42.1 40 1359

15.8 34 59.4 41.4 1078

20.1 48.2 87.7 53 1133.1

12 406 106 31 926

53 480 120 59 492

10 700 115 73 920

59 640 157 79 1000

15 554 239 83 1670

1019

1489

1487 2516

1970

1246 1244 1630 1690 1840

1547.4

2796.9

3025

3312.1

2727

3.2

3744.6

2448

3448

3625

4401

Economic Cooperation

A major function of state policies is to ultimately serve its economy. By getting more involved in Gulf politics, especially with regard to helping to ease tension within GCC member states or with Iran, Russia aims to strengthen its economic collaboration on multiple levels. On this note, Russia has in fact been successful, though its success is still limited, in increasing its trade volume with some Arab Gulf states. The following chart shows how Russia succeeded in raising its trade volume with the GCC states since 2010, while the volume significantly decreased with a traditional ally like Iran from $3.7 billion in 2011 to $1.58 billion in 201923 (Table 12.1) Furthermore, Russia has significantly altered its relationship with Israel over the past decade, with the trade volume between the sides having decreased from $2.84 billion in 2011 to $2.25 billion in 2019.24 In contrast, trade relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia almost doubled during those years with volume jumping from $0.85 billion in 2011 to $1.67 billion in 2019. Nevertheless, and despite the increase in trade volume between the two sides, Russia’s trade with a country like Algeria is almost the size of Moscow’s trade with three GCC states altogether. Moreover, as it is seen from the table above, the dynamics of trade turnover between Russia and the GCC states (excepting Oman) has not

23 Russian Foreign Trade, 2020, https://russian-trade.com. 24 Ibid.

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been stable over the course of the last decade—the growth gave way to the sharp falls. This trend suggests that, despite the improvement Russia was able to make with its economic relations with the Gulf, there is still a long way to go for Moscow. Moreover, one of the major business relations that Russia aspires to develop with the Gulf region is nuclear partnership. Given the tension between Iran and the Arab Gulf states, developing nuclear capacity has become at the centre of this tension, even if it is used for peaceful reasons only. Russia aspires to be the partner of GCC member states in developing nuclear capacity. Saudi Arabia aspires to build 16 reactors in 2032, and in 2016 Riyadh and Moscow discussed promoting nuclear cooperation between the two countries; if successful, Russia could be engaged in developing Saudi’s nuclear infrastructure.25 Russian business aspirations in the Gulf extend to the gas field as well. Initially proposed by Iran, Russia repeatedly promoted the idea of creating what is called Gas Exporting Countries Forum, the Gas Troika, that involves regular trilateral consultations between Russia, Iran, and Qatar.26 Through close engagement with Gulf countries, Russia is trying to cultivate business relations in other similar areas, not only nuclear and gas sectors. For example, since 2016, it has been cooperating with OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) and oil producers led by Saudi Arabia in their efforts to influence the crude oil market.27

4

Russia’s Smart Power in Action

Smart power, the combination of soft and hard power, is the approach that Russia uses to achieve its objectives in the GCC, whether through redefinition of its relationship with the United States in the region or strengthening business collaboration in the different areas (e.g. arms sales, nuclear capacity, gas). In a joint press conference with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Putin commented on the attack on Saudi oil installations in September 2019: “We are ready to help Saudi Arabia protect their people…They need to 25 Yury Barmin, “Russian Energy Policy in the Middle East,” Insight Turkey 19 (2017). 26 Kozhanov, “Putin’s Turn to the Middle East after 2012,” 35. 27 Stanley Reed, “Russia and Others Join OPEC in Rare, Coordinated Push to Cut Oil Output,” The New York Times, December 10, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 12/10/business/russia-opec-saudi-arabia-cut-oil-output.html.

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make clever decisions, as Iran did by buying our S300, as Mr. Erdogan did by deciding to buy the most advanced S400 air defense systems”.28 While Putin publicly boasts about Russia’s hard power capacity in managing relations with the Gulf and Turkey, offering the advanced S-400 air defence systems, Russia also employs several soft power methods that complement the role of hard power and together create the effect of Russia’s smart power in the Gulf. These aspects include, but not limited to the following: 4.1

Access

Russia is one of the very few countries that is able to offer hard power and at the same time enjoys access to all conflict parties within the GCC states (for instance the Saudi and Qatari conflict), and with Iran. On the one hand, Russia can provide the advanced S-400 air defense missiles, and on the other hand directly has access to all Gulf capitals, something the United States obviously does not possess given its historically tense relations with Iran. Nikolay Surkov, senior research fellow at the Russian Academy of Science, argues that Russia achieved major success by managing to grab the attention of the Gulf states and begin negotiations on a number of topics. He claims that the cautious manner of Russian foreign policy makes it attractive for playing a facilitating role in a region where a neutral player is badly needed.29 Maria KhodynskayaGolenischeva, senior advisor of the foreign policy planning department at the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, has a similar opinion, arguing that “Russia’s bloc-free foreign policy mentality” makes it an eligible actor in the Middle East, as this policy, for example, has already “allowed it to

28 In September 2019, the Houthis in Yemen claimed responsibility for the drone attack on Saudi state-owned Aramco oil facilities in the Eastern part of Saudi Arabia, Abqaiq and Khurais. The attack caused major disruption to oil production in Saudi Arabia, which represents the backbone of the Saudi economy. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Putin Says Saudis Should Buy Russian Missiles, to Laughter From Iran,” The New York Times, September 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/world/middleeast/putinsaudi-iran.html. 29 Author’s interview and discussion with Nikolay Surkov, February 2020.

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take part in all multilateral efforts of Syrian settlement – from the ISSG to Astana”.30 In this respect, Russia has the potential to broker regional conflicts, such as Saudi-Iranian confrontation and the Qatar crisis. In the first case, Russia has already played into Saudi hands in Syria by balancing Iranian influence, and in Yemen and Bahrain, backing Saudi policies.31 Moreover, Russia has unique relations with Iran and leverage as a result, which can potentially be useful for Saudi Arabia. In the Saudi-Qatar rift, Russian neutral position and equal access to both states create for Moscow a potential to intervene in the conflict. In fact, Russia offered its services by backing Kuwaiti efforts in conflict settlement.32 Nevertheless, Russian intervention remains limited in this crisis, taking forms like carrying messages between the parties and backing existing mediation efforts like that of Kuwait. This is primarily because the United States remains heavily involved in the crisis and the parties rely on Washington in their tendency to escalate or de-escalate in this crisis. To ensure they maintain this privilege of having access to Gulf capitals, Russian officials are cautious to pay visits to all countries including Iran and other Gulf states. In addition, Russian officials also ensure these visits do not provoke the United States as the Gulf region has been historically treated as one of their areas of influence. 4.2

Compartmentalisation

As there are many contradictions, conflicts, and sub-conflicts within the Gulf region, including with Iran, Russia managed to develop bilateral relations with each country individually, not allowing conflicts between them affect what Russia claims to be its neutral role. That is, compartmentalisation of Gulf conflicts has been used as a strategy by Moscow to survive

30 Maria Khodynskaya-Golenischeva, “How Bloc-Free Mentality Helps Russia Be a Welcome Foreign Actor in the Middle East,” Valdai, July 25, 2019, https://valdaiclub. com/a/highlights/how-bloc-free-mentality-helps-russia/?sphrase_id=950871. 31 Ellie Geranmayeh and Kadri Liik, “The New Power Couple: Russia and Iran in the Middle East,” European Council on Foreign Relations, September 1, 2016, 8 https:// www.ecfr.eu/publications/pr/iran_and_russia_middle_east_power_couple_7113. 32 Nikolay Kozhanov, “Why Russia Seeks to Stay Neutral in Saudi-Qatar Rift,” AlMonitor, September 1, 2017, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/08/ russia-neutral-saudi-arabia-qatar-rift-gcc-lavrov-kuwait.html.

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in a region full of conflicts. As Yury Barmin, expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, puts it, “Despite the ongoing fight with Saudi Arabia and Qatar for leadership in the energy market, Russia has managed to compartmentalise its relationship with them and pursue joint energy projects”.33 Three months after the crisis broke out between Qatar and its neighbours (Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain) in June 2017, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov travelled to the region for meetings in Qatar and UAE but made sure to first visit Kuwait, the mediator in this crisis. From Kuwait, Lavrov made the position of his country clear on the crisis: “We strongly believe that Kuwait’s initiative deserves the support of all those who can generate a positive impact on this situation. We are ready to provide this support in any mode that will be acceptable to all participants in this situation”.34 4.3

Quid-Pro-Quo

Russia is careful not to repeat the ideological rhetoric that the former Soviet Union once used. Pragmatism35 is a core feature of Russian approach to managing relations not only with Gulf states but the entire Middle East as a whole. To be pragmatic, one needs to be driven by deal making and outcomes rather than taking principled positions or taking sides with one party over the other, which is what Russia aims to achieve in the Gulf. Moscow’s quid-pro-quo policy was mainly used to bargain with the Gulf states on positions in regional conflicts. In this regard, Moscow resorted to deal making in regional conflicts to align with Gulf states’ interests in exchange for certain benefits. Kozhanov explains that by mid2017 Russia agreed not to raise any objections regarding Saudi policies in Yemen. In return, Saudi Arabia helped Moscow launch dialogue with the Syrian opposition supported by Riyadh and it “gave its silent consent

33 Barmin, 133. 34 “Russia ‘not seeking to vie with anyone’ to settle Qatari quandary, vows Lavrov,”

TASS, August 28, 2017, https://tass.com/politics/962266. 35 Author’s interview and discussion with Julia Roknifard (assistant professor at the University of Nottingham Malaysia), February 2020.

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regarding Bahrain and the UAE intentions to re-open their embassies in Damascus”.36 4.4

Shared Political Values

As explained earlier, shared political values are generally considered a major feature of soft power in international politics. The Russian government and Gulf regimes share many political values that could bring them closer, and thus give a key entry point to Russia into different Gulf countries. Indeed, some Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have more political values in common with Russia than with their traditional ally, the United States. Russia and some Gulf regimes have taken a strong position against the Arab Spring uprisings and seem to have adopted a counter-revolutionary approach to responding to calls for change in the Middle East and North Africa.37 This could be seen in Egypt’s Sisi, Libya’s Haftar, and even to a certain extent in Syria’s Assad as well. Furthermore, both sides, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, alongside Russia, are committed to authoritarianism and highly centralised political systems where regimes show a strong hold of power against oppositions. Both sides not only embraced authoritarianism at home but also supported it beyond their own borders. In this regard, Russia’s support of their ally in Syria grabbed the attention of some Gulf countries seeing Putin as a reliable partner, while being disappointed by American neglect of its allies Mubarak in Egypt and Ali Abdullah Saleh (1994–2011) in Yemen.38

36 Nikolay Kozhanov, Russian Foreign Policy towards Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Bridging the Gaps (Doha: Gulf Studies Center, 2019), 16. 37 Samuel Ramani, “Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partnership,” Middle East Policy 27 (2020): 126–127. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12479 38 Goldenberg and Dalton.

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In Egypt, Russia has good relations with the authoritarian regime of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Moscow has been actively promoting cooperation with this country in economic39 as well as military spheres.40 This approach coincides with the support coming in different forms to the Cairo from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait City, though the GCC support seems to be more valuable than Russian, at least economically. It includes direct financial help (e.g. $12 billion budgetary aid after the Mursi’s ouster in 2013), military cooperation, and diplomatic support (e.g. Saudi mediation in Egyptian-Qatari rapprochement in 2014).41 In Libya, in the war between the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Prime Minister al-Sarraj in Tripoli and Libyan National Army (LNA), Russia as well as Saudi Arabia and UAE support Khalifa Haftar, the leader of LNA. Each side acts unilaterally. Russia provides unofficial military support to Haftar through forces of private military contractor Wagner Group,42 while officially maintaining connections with both sides. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also prefer to avoid official direct military involvement in the conflict but limit their efforts to providing material support to the LNA43 and backing Egypt’s military intervention on the international arena.44 Russian intervention in Libya and in supporting the LNA was particularly instrumental after the signing of the Turkey-Libya (GNA) maritime boundaries agreement in November

39 Samuel Ramani, “Sochi Summit Highlights Growing Russia-Egypt Ties,” Middle East Institute, November 5, 2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/sochi-summit-hig hlights-growing-russia-egypt-ties. 40 Anton Mardasov, “Russia, Egypt Look to Boost Military Ties,” Al-Monitor, November 7, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/11/russiaegypt-military-drills-arms-sales.html. 41 Elie Podeh, “Saudi-Egyptian Relations in Historical Perspective: The Foundations of a Solid Entente,” in Egypt and the Gulf: A Renewed Regional Policy Alliance, ed. Robert Mason (London: Gerlach Press, 2017), 52–53. 42 “Russian Group’s 1,200 Mercenaries Fighting in Libya: UN Report,” Al Jazeera, May 7, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/russian-military-group-dep loyed-1200-people-libya-report-200507113646940.html. 43 Samuel Ramani, “Saudi Arabia Steps Up Role in Libya,” Al-Monitor, February 24, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/saudi-arabiarole-liyba-gna-hifter.html. 44 Mohamed Al-Shamaa, “Saudi Arabia, UAE Support El-Sisi’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’ in Libya War,” Arab News, June 22, 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1693381/ middle-east.

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2019.45 The agreement was followed by heavy Turkish military intervention that defeated LNA’s forces in the entire Western area of Libya rebalanced power on the ground. To stop the GNA’s expansion toward the East, Russian military support and solid intervention helped the camp of UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia rebalance with the West again. In addition, Russia and some Gulf regimes are wary of political Islam and thus have taken a serious position to fight it in the region. While Russia explains its intervention in Syria is intended to fight “terrorism” abroad, countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have classified the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group and fought against them in several places in the Middle East and North Africa.46

5

Analysis

Russia’s smart power-driven foreign policy in the Gulf region is challenged in a number of ways. 5.1

Access, Neutrality, and Compartmentalisation

Smart power is not always smart. It is true that neutrality and compartmentalisation policies help Russia retain access to all disputants, unlike other players like the United States, but “being good” with everyone has limits and could ultimately lead to losing everyone. In this regard, Ian Parmeter, research scholar at the Australian National University, accentuates, “the main principle of Russia in the Middle East is taking no sides. Therefore, there are no strategic relations with anyone but tactical. This is shown as well in the lack of serious resources committed to the region be Russia”.47 To maintain good relations with all parties in a highly polarised region is likely to lead to suspicions by some, if not all, about the level of sincerity of that so-called neutral party. Maintaining good relations with Iran and 45 Daren Butler, “Turkey Signs Maritime Boundaries Deal with Libya amid Exploration

Row,” Reuters, November 28, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-libyaidUSKBN1Y213I. 46 Ramani, “Russia and the UAE,” 129–133; Diana Galeeva, “How Shared Islamic Identities Boost Russia-Gulf ties,” Arab News, January 8, 2020, https://www.arabnews. com/node/1610121. 47 Author’s interview and discussion with Ian Parmeter, February 2020.

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Saudi Arabia at the same time could create trust and concerns about credibility. Mistrust is a dangerous mechanism that damages one’s interests in international politics. In this context of Russia trying to foster ties with countries on both sides of the Gulf, parties will exert all types of pressure to bring the neutral third party to their side. When/if they fail, they could either abandon or become less committed to building strategic relationships with him. In Suchkov’s words, “… the notion that Moscow is more sympathetic toward Tehran is another source of contention between Russia and the Gulf States. The shared interests between Russia and Iran add yet another layer of complexity to understanding Russia-Gulf relations”.48 5.2

Process Obsession

Russia’s conflict intervention in Gulf and Middle East conflicts seems to be concerned with processes, not necessarily with the resolution or outcome of the conflict. It is important for Russia to be part of the process, so it is positioned to make instant gains rather than engaging in long-term commitment that leads to making difference in these conflicts. In other words, “Russia does not have any clear long-term strategy in the Middle East. It has situational interests, and the desire to take advantage of the current political moment, but it lacks a coherent, long-term vision of what a new regional order should look like”.49 It is of course legitimate that Russia pursues its interests in the Gulf, but to be effective, situational interests will have to be linked to long-term vision about what role it could play in the Gulf. Being part of the process allows one to do both, negotiate situational interests—like what Moscow does in the Gulf and Middle East—and at the same time think strategically by helping the parties achieve outcomes to their conflicts. Gulf countries will ultimately be asking what added values have the Russian role given to the region. Because of its soft power access, Russia has serious leverage with Iran—something the United States lacks—and can help in de-escalating the conflict between Iran and its Gulf neighbours. Obsession with being part of the process will help neither Russia nor Gulf 48 Suchkov, “Russia and the Arab Spring.” 49 Ibrahim Fraihat and Leonid Issaev, “Russia doesn’t solve conflicts, it silences them,”

Foreign Policy, June 12, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/12/russia-doesntsolve-conflicts-it-silences-them/.

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countries in the long run, however. The bottom line is that the Kremlin will have to deliver somehow in the Gulf, in terms of outcomes, so that conflict parties can engage more seriously, and Moscow achieves tangible outcomes. 5.3

Branding

One of the major challenges Russia’s soft power faces is in branding or lack of a clear identity. What does post-Cold War Russia stand for? The United States and the West’s leading role in the global order has been historically supported by claims of representing so-called universal norms like democracy, human rights, etc. Regardless of whether they really defended these norms or used rhetorical support for political reasons, they still branded themselves as adopting and defending moral values like democracy and human rights. This is not the case with Russia, as people in the Gulf and Middle East struggle to understand Moscow’s branding and what it represents, so they can relate to what it has to offer. Russia has been unable to communicate clearly with the region, and the messages coming from it are mixed and unclear. Even China has managed to deliver a very clear branding to the that being commercial identity. China has become known to represent mostly trade and manufacturing, but much less politics. Russia does not represent either democracy and human rights or economics, which makes Moscow’s close engagement with the region more particularly challenged due to its obscure branding. However, with the advent of the Arab Spring and the political positions that Russia took across the region, it became known for a new branding: dictatorships, brutality, and violence. Russia became known to be the reliable partner of dictatorship and ruthless leaderships like Assad in Syria, Qaddafi (1969–2011) in Libya, and more recently Khalifa Haftar in Libya. As a result, Russia has been branded for standing against people’s call for change and democratisation across the Middle East. As Kozhanov explains, “by the end of 2012, Russia had become closely associated with all things the Arab Spring was supposedly confronting: violence, dictatorship and bloodshed”.50 Especially in one of the bloodiest civil wars in the 50 Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russia and the GCC Countries: Hard to Be Friends but Impossible to Remain Foes,” In The Arab States of the Gulf and BRICS: New Strategic Partnerships in Politics and Economics, ed. Tim Niblock et al. (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016), 132–133.

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world—Syria—Russia lost whatever political capital it had in the region, pushing it into a serious moral deficit in the eyes of the people across the Middle East. It will take Russia leaps in the future to recover from this deficit. Russia should not confuse the support it finds within some Gulf countries, like Saudi Arabia, for dictatorships in the Middle East with their position on Syria. While they support authoritarianism in Egypt, for example, Syria for the GCC states is their chance to limit Iranian intervention in the region, and Moscow prevented them from this chance to rebalance with Iran. As Suchkov explains, “when the dust from the Arab Spring settled, Russia found that its image in the Gulf region was negative. That was due to the rhetoric of the Gulf monarchs accusing Russia as the main troublemaker in Syria, while on its part Russia was accusing the monarchies in using conflicts in the Middle East for reaching their geopolitical goals”.51 5.4

Competitor or a Scarecrow

Does the hard power part of Russia’s smart power in the Gulf qualify Moscow to be a competitor to the United States? Whether it cannot or is not willing to be, Russia has not been able to prove itself to be a serious competitor or a legitimate alternative to the United States in the Gulf. Though Russia aspires to sell S-400 air defence system and nuclear energy like it does with Iran, that does not qualify Moscow to challenge the decades long US security role in the region. The dependence of GCC militaries on US weapons makes it very challenging to shift to a different military technology. Despite the shaky relationship between the GCC countries with the United States during the times of the Obama administration (which came to a nadir after their disappointment about the United States signing the Iran nuclear deal) and the occasional threats of Trump to withdraw from the Gulf, the shift to Russia as a security vendor remains elusive in the near future. As Mikhail Krutikhin (leading analyst at RusEnergy) explains, Gulf nations do not necessarily take the relationship with Russia as a serious competing partner to the United States. Being “friends” with everyone and negotiating with all sides allows multiple parties to use Russia as a scarecrow in the relations with the United States.52 Duncan Allan

51 Suchkov, “Russia and the Arab Spring.” 52 Author’s interview and discussion with Mikhail Krutikhin, February 2020.

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(associate fellow at Chatham House) goes a step further to explain that economies of Russia and the Gulf are structurally non-complimentary: Russia has unfriendly environment, and it suffers from Western sanctions.53 By the same token, Suchkov clarifies that “there is little reason to presume that anyone in Moscow and Riyadh seriously believes that the Saudis are going to pivot to the Russians from Americans. Diversifying its foreign policy, arms exporters and expanding a bit in economic ties with Russia is no match for a decades-long security guarantees, regime stability, investment projects and lucrative business opportunities that Americans can offer”.54 5.5

Energy: Partners or Foes

Being of the top producers of oil and energy in the world, Russia and Saudi Arabia could turn this to be a threat through competition or an opportunity through partnership. Historically, Saudi Arabia has been the largest producer of oil in the world but in May 2016 Russia exceeded in output (11.2 million barrels a day to 10.6 million).55 Krutikhin explains that, due to this oil rivalry between Russia and Saudi Arabia, there is no economic interest in one another, given that both parties are producers of crude oil and that Russian minister of energy has no tools to influence the oil producers in OPEC.56 But probably the strongest manifestation of Russia-Saudi oil rivalry has been the clash during the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020 when Russia refused to reduce oil production to fix the fall of oil prices, leading Saudi Arabia to respond by increasing its production to its maximum capacity, from 10 million to almost 13 million barrels of oil daily.57 Of

53 Author’s interview and discussion with Duncan Allan, February 2020. 54 Maxim Suchkov, “Contemporary Russia-Saudi Relations: Building a Bridge of Coop-

eration over the Abyss of Discrepancies,” Iran & the Caucasus 20, no. 2 (2016): 244. 55 Barmin, “Russian Energy Policy in the Middle East,” 125–136. 56 Author’s interview and discussion with Mikhail Krutikhin. 57 Rania El Gamal and Dmitry Zhdannikov, “Saudi, UAE Gear Up for Long-Term Oil

Market Fight with Capacity Plans,” Reuters, March 11, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-saudi-aramco-output-capacity/saudi-uae-gear-up-for-long-term-oil-market-fightwith-capacity-plans-idUSKBN20Y0PO.

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course, this resulted in the lowest oil prices in the history with barrel oil prices even going into the negatives.58 5.6

Smart Power: A Synergy Between Hard and Soft Power

For smart power to be effective, it has to have a suitable interplay between soft and hard power supported by the institutional, economic, and cultural adjustment. Halperin and Kanter explain “a rational foreign policy based on smart power means recognizing and reforming a variety of institutional forms and relationships across a plethora of existing agencies, offices, bureaus, and departments, all of which have their own norms, values, and rigidities”.59 Obviously, Russia has important elements of hard power (S-400, oil) and soft power (access, neutrality, pragmatism). However, it is still unclear to what extent Russia has been able to create this consistency between the different elements of its hard and soft power. For example, to what extent can the business environment in Russia be considered welcoming for foreign investment? Furthermore, Russia is still heavily dependent on the exports of raw material60 such as oil. Gulf countries have that already and need to import other. Moreover, for hard power (arms sales), for example, to work well with “access” (soft power), GCC countries need to trust the Kremlin which is seen as allied to Khamenei in Iran, an issue that raises great concern for the GCC countries.

6

Conclusion

Russia has been able to improve its positioning in the Gulf region and build stronger relationships with all GCC member states in addition to Iran. The adversarial relationships between Moscow and GCC capitals that once existed during the US-USSR Cold War have changed as well. Especially in the last ten years, economic relations between Russia and the GCC states reasonably improved, even in comparison with Moscow’s

58 Stanley Reed and Clifford Krauss, “Too Much Oil: How a Barrel Came to Be Worth Less Than Nothing,” The New York Times, April 21, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2020/04/20/business/oil-prices.html?searchResultPosition=4. 59 Wilson, 116. 60 Kozhanov, “Russia and the Gulf,” 118.

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traditional allies in the region like Iran. For the first time in history, heads of states visited Russia, such as King Salman’s visit to the Kremlin in 2017. Russia’s smart power, the combination of soft and hard power, played a role in this relative improvement. Offering to arm as well as the ability to talk to all conflict parties within the GCC (Saudi-Qatar), and across the Gulf (Saudi-Iran) has been a factor contributing to the improvement in the relationships between them. However, this smart power strategy, and Russia’s role to keep good relations with all conflict parties, has prevented the establishment of strategic partnerships with the region. The relationship has therefore remained confined to the tactical, rather than strategic, level. Smart power is not always smart. In a world of high polarisation, one would have to choose between parties of conflict or risks losing all of them. Heavy US presence in the Gulf and monopoly of security services has complicated Russia’s entry to the Gulf region. However, Russia does not present itself as a competitor to the United States in the Gulf. It seems sufficient, at least for the time being, for Russia to have a presence in the Gulf and just be part of the process, not necessarily leading to specific outcomes. Obsession with the process, where the United States is a major player, has been a foreign policy pattern for Russia not only in the Gulf, but the rest of the Middle East, such as Palestine-Israel conflict. Nevertheless, it seems that the efficiency of Russia’s smart power lies for the time being outside the Gulf, especially in the MENA region’s various conflict zones, rather than inside the Gulf region itself. Some Gulf states look at Russia’s smart power with special significance in countries like Libya, Syria, and even Yemen where both soft and hard power can present a potential area for future collaboration. In Libya, they look at Russia’s hard power to help them balance with the serious heavy Turkish intervention in the Western part of Libya. With Moscow’s support to Haftar in the Eastern part of Libya, they can stop the march of the forces of the Tripoli government towards the city of Sirte and Al-Jafra military base. Moreover, Saudi Arabia counts on Russian leverage to influence the Iranian strong presence in Syria. Russia enjoys good relations with Iran and possesses significant leverage that could potentially use to impact Iranian’s position on Syria. Even in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE coalition count on Russia not precluding their efforts in the Security Council with regard to resolution and other forms of diplomatic efforts

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regarding Yemen. In fact, it seems that Russia accepted to refrain from any diplomatic intervention in Yemen for certain returns in Syria. Russia-GCC collaboration outside the Gulf extends beyond deal making to include an unwritten ideological alliance. Dictatorships, autocracy, counter-revolutions, and the fight against calls for change, democracy, and freedom in the larger MENA region have formed a ground for Moscow, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi to work together and collaborate in a number of contexts. Finally, a major obstacle to Russia’s effective integration in the Gulf and beyond will always remain the struggle with its branding. That is, while Russia was able to score a military victory in Syria, it will take decades to be able to recover, if any, from the moral deficit it received as a result of its heavy involvement in bloody civil wars like that of Syria. With a record of brutal civil war and heavy bombardment of Syria for several years, Russia’s attempt to build effective soft power in the Gulf and rest of the MENA region is likely to be an elusive objective.

Correction to: Trade, Investment and Politics: Prospects for Russian Economic Cooperation with the Gulf Duncan Allan

Correction to: Chapter 6 in: N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_6 The original version of Chapter 6 was inadvertently published with the second paragraph of the abstract preceding the Introduction. The paragraph has been removed from the chapter.

The updated version of this chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_6 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_13

C1

Index

A Abdelaziz bin Salman, 74 al-Assad, Bashar, 24, 65, 69, 75, 76, 118, 188, 195, 208, 220, 235 Algeria, 17, 47, 68, 165, 173, 278 Arab countries, 11, 58, 121, 249 Arab League, 18, 38, 101, 196, 201, 239 Arab nationalism, 58 Arab Spring, 13, 19, 25, 28, 30, 80, 81, 97, 101, 103, 109, 110, 117, 207, 210, 212, 231, 232, 236, 237, 248, 251, 257, 260, 266, 269, 283, 287, 288 B Bahrain, 18, 36, 82, 85, 87, 104, 115, 116, 120, 133, 137, 168, 173, 192, 237–239, 271, 278, 281–283 Biden, Joe, 46, 222 Bogdanov, Mikhail, 38, 94, 102, 201, 251, 263–265 Bush, George W., 11, 26, 28, 44, 48

C Camp David, 11, 24, 25 Central Asia, 3, 55, 59–61, 71, 72, 241 Chechnya, 3, 12, 71, 79, 83, 84, 86, 95, 96 China, 11, 14, 15, 38, 47, 51, 94, 106, 107, 112, 113, 117, 120–125, 129, 130, 140, 160, 161, 163, 164, 175, 180, 260, 269, 287 Cold War, 5, 10, 19, 21–25, 28, 56, 59, 68, 82, 106, 119, 181, 183, 236, 271, 276, 290 Constitutional Committee (CC), 17, 89, 206, 214, 215, 217–219 Crimea, 28, 51, 68, 190 E Egypt, 3, 10, 11, 17, 24, 36, 40, 42, 43, 46, 68, 112, 114, 117, 119, 125, 127, 165, 166, 173, 192, 223, 237, 254, 277, 283–285, 288

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Kozhanov (ed.), Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4

293

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INDEX

Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 41, 42, 69, 245, 246, 279, 280 European Union (EU), 2, 7, 13, 17, 38, 50, 80, 98, 106–108, 164, 176, 183, 190, 201, 208, 213, 224, 231, 237, 259

G Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), 16, 160, 165, 279 Gazprom, 16, 101, 144, 148, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 170, 174, 176 Gazpromneft, 16 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 1–10, 12, 13, 16–20, 34, 37, 38, 43, 79–82, 87–90, 93, 96, 98, 102, 103, 105, 106, 108, 110–116, 118–121, 123–130, 133, 136, 142–145, 192–196, 201, 202, 208, 209, 227, 230, 232–238, 240, 243, 245–251, 258, 259, 261, 271, 273, 275–280, 284, 288, 290, 291

H Hadi, Mansur, 19, 88, 191, 252, 253, 258, 260, 265, 269 Haftar, Khalifa, 8, 37, 42, 43, 119, 127, 191, 195, 237, 283, 284, 287, 291 Hezbollah, 75, 189, 244

I India, 23, 38, 130, 140, 166, 167, 173, 213, 260 Iran, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 16–19, 21, 24, 34–39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 58, 59, 63, 64, 68, 71, 72, 75, 80, 83, 86, 87, 92–94,

97–100, 105–107, 110, 112, 115, 118, 122, 123, 127, 128, 136, 139–141, 145, 147–150, 153, 160, 163, 165, 166, 168, 170, 172–174, 177–202, 210, 212, 216, 218, 226, 234–245, 247, 248, 264, 271–273, 275, 277–281, 285, 286, 288, 290, 291 Iran-GCC, 13, 80 Iranian nuclear issue, 13, 79, 86 Iraq, 6, 10, 11, 24, 25, 28, 31, 34, 47, 48, 51, 64, 68, 81, 82, 85, 86, 94, 97, 100, 104, 105, 112, 114–116, 123, 125, 130, 135, 136, 145–147, 150, 163, 166, 169, 170, 172, 173, 182, 190, 191, 199, 200, 234, 244, 248, 261, 271 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 29, 34, 76, 97, 184, 212 Islamic State (IS), 31, 34, 35, 40, 60, 62, 64, 65, 94, 190, 209, 213, 223, 234, 236 Islamists, 3, 13, 40, 66, 71, 80, 111, 116, 188, 207, 212, 227, 231, 241, 248 Israel, 2, 7, 10, 11, 18, 22–24, 39–41, 43–46, 48, 49, 59, 63, 68, 70, 71, 75, 113, 114, 117, 127, 190, 191, 223, 243–245, 254, 278, 291

K Khmeimim, 25 Kissinger, Henry, 40 Kushner, Jared, 44, 46 Kuwait, 25, 64, 82, 87, 89, 90, 101, 103, 114, 116, 133, 137, 148, 167–169, 173, 193, 199, 238, 245, 278, 281, 282

INDEX

L Latakia, 25, 75 Lavrov, Sergey, 38, 39, 77, 88, 89, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 100, 103, 106, 182, 185, 193, 196, 251, 261, 263, 264, 282 Libya, 2, 7, 8, 11, 30, 33, 42, 43, 68, 77, 97, 111, 117, 119, 128, 165, 173, 191, 208, 229, 231, 237, 249, 261, 262, 273, 284, 285, 287, 291 LNG, 16, 141, 142, 160, 164, 165, 174, 175 Lukoil, 16, 91, 146–148, 160, 168–170, 172 M Middle East, 1–14, 18, 22–25, 28–31, 34, 35, 38–40, 42–51, 53–59, 61–67, 69–72, 75, 76, 78–80, 83–85, 89, 92–94, 97, 101, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 112–114, 116–118, 120–124, 126, 128, 130, 134, 149, 152, 158, 159, 163, 168, 192, 194, 196, 201, 202, 206–208, 229–231, 234, 236, 241, 243, 247–249, 256, 260, 262, 263, 275–277, 280, 282, 283, 285–288, 291 Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), 74, 127, 209 Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan, 37 N Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 10, 24 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 41, 44, 45, 71 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 11, 24–26, 30, 42, 50, 70, 117, 119, 183, 229, 231, 261 Novak, Alexander, 75, 154, 162

295

O Obama, Barack, 11, 28, 34, 35, 39–41, 43–46, 49, 63, 117, 118, 130, 184, 185, 234, 236, 247, 277, 288 Oman, 64, 82, 92, 133, 168, 174, 199, 238, 278 OPEC, 162, 186, 197, 199 OPEC+, 1, 3, 7, 8, 36, 74, 111, 129, 133, 135, 145, 150–157, 211, 262 Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 38, 60 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 2, 3, 16, 74, 111, 124, 129, 133, 150–153, 156, 160, 162, 165, 186, 211, 279, 289 P Palestinian-Israeli, 13, 25, 48, 79 Putin, Vladimir, 3, 5, 11, 22, 26–37, 39–43, 45–51, 66, 69, 71–74, 76, 80, 85, 87, 91, 92, 94, 97, 101, 105, 109, 111, 134, 138, 142, 144, 155, 164, 185–187, 191, 195, 197, 198, 206, 209, 212, 232, 233, 236, 240, 243, 244, 247, 248, 257, 272, 275, 279, 280, 283 Q Qassem Soleimani, 39, 46, 182, 184, 190, 194, 196, 199, 247 Qatar, 3, 16, 36, 43, 64, 82, 85, 87, 89, 101, 102, 104, 111, 112, 116, 118, 124, 126–130, 133, 137, 160, 163, 165, 167, 168, 170, 191–196, 209, 210, 217, 227, 232, 236, 238, 241, 245, 271, 278, 279, 281, 282

296

INDEX

Qatar Investment Authority, 43, 102, 175 Qatar’s blockade, 9, 88, 192, 217 Quartet, 48, 192, 196 R Rosneft, 16, 43, 102, 141, 143, 146, 148, 151, 153, 155, 161, 166–168, 175 Rouhani, Hassan, 46, 72, 194, 199, 200, 279 Russia-GCC relations, 6, 16, 17, 206 Russian-Iranian relations, 16, 39, 178, 180 S Sadat, Anwar, 10, 24 Saddam Hussein, 116, 172 Saudi Arabia, 1–3, 7, 8, 12, 14, 17–19, 29, 35, 36, 39, 43, 45, 59, 60, 64, 68, 73–75, 82–84, 87, 89–92, 94, 95, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104, 110–116, 118, 119, 122, 123, 126–129, 133, 135, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144, 149, 150, 152–154, 157, 161, 162, 167, 169, 171, 186, 191–193, 197–200, 206, 208–210, 216, 222, 223, 225, 227, 228, 232, 234, 235, 237, 238, 244, 245, 251, 252, 256, 258, 261, 264, 268–272, 277–279, 281–286, 288, 289, 291 Saudi-Iran, 20, 291 Saudi-Qatar, 20, 38, 281, 291 Security Concept, 38, 86, 201 South-East Asia, 23 Soviet Union, 5, 6, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 22–27, 49, 54, 57–60, 62, 63, 68, 70, 71, 73, 82, 84, 107, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 136,

159, 176, 230, 250, 253–256, 266–268, 271, 275, 282 Syria, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17–19, 24, 25, 30–34, 37–42, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 60, 62, 65, 67–70, 75–77, 80, 87, 97, 98, 101, 103, 107, 109–112, 114, 117–119, 123, 126, 128, 130, 153, 160, 163, 173, 180, 188, 189, 191, 192, 195, 200, 206, 208–225, 227–231, 233–236, 238–249, 254, 259–263, 266, 268, 273, 277, 281, 283, 285, 287, 288, 291, 292 Syrian civil war, 9, 34, 128, 134, 188 T Trump, Donald, 11, 27, 30, 34, 35, 38, 41–47, 49, 63, 130, 139, 155, 193, 195–199, 201, 222, 224, 238, 243, 244, 247, 277, 288 Turkey, 11, 18, 34, 41–43, 49, 58, 59, 63, 68–70, 75, 92, 94, 127, 148, 160, 163, 170, 199, 201, 216–219, 222–224, 226, 227, 235, 237, 238, 240, 241, 243, 245, 246, 272, 280 U Ukraine, 28, 33, 53, 62, 137, 164, 166, 176, 185, 197, 207 Unipolar world, 11, 27 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 3, 5, 8, 13, 17–19, 35–37, 43, 64, 80, 82, 87, 89–92, 99–101, 103, 104, 106, 111, 115, 116, 118–120, 122, 127, 129, 133, 135–137, 144, 148, 149, 167, 175, 191, 192, 195, 196, 199, 206, 212, 219, 222, 223,

INDEX

225–228, 237, 239, 244, 264, 265, 269–271, 278, 282–285, 291 United Nations (UN), 38, 83, 185, 196, 214, 216, 220, 234, 262–264, 275 United States (US), 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22–31, 33–51, 53, 63, 64, 76, 85, 90, 91, 93, 94, 98, 99, 103–110, 112–128, 130, 131, 134, 136, 139, 141, 145, 147, 148, 150, 152–155, 160, 161, 166, 173, 174, 179, 180, 183–187, 190, 191, 193–196, 198, 200–202, 206, 211, 213, 222–224, 226, 228,

297

229, 231, 232, 234–241, 243, 245–248, 255, 256, 260–262, 271, 276, 277, 279–281, 283, 285–288, 291

W WMD, 85

Y Yeltsin, Boris, 11, 26, 27, 39, 275 Yemen, 2, 6, 8, 18, 37, 68, 88, 92, 110, 111, 119, 128, 153, 191, 195, 197, 200, 208, 209, 235, 237, 249–270, 281–283, 291