Post-Brexit Europe and UK: Policy Challenges Towards Iran and the GCC States (Contemporary Gulf Studies) 9811628734, 9789811628733

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CONTEMPORARY GULF STUDIES SERIES EDITORS: STEVEN WRIGHT · ABDULLAH BAABOOD

Post-Brexit Europe and UK Policy Challenges Towards Iran and the GCC States Edited by Geoffrey Edwards · Abdullah Baabood · Diana Galeeva

Contemporary Gulf Studies

Series Editors Steven Wright, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hamad bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar Abdullah Baabood, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

Salient Features: • The Gulf lies at the intersection of regional conflicts and the competing interests of global powers and therefore publications in the series reflect this complex environment. • The series will see publication on the dynamic nature of how the Gulf region has been undergoing enormous changes attracting regional and international interests. • The series is managed through Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, which has emerged as the leading institution within the Gulf region offering graduate degrees in Gulf Studies at both masters and doctoral level. Aims and Scope: This series offer a platform from which scholarly work on the most pressing issues within the Gulf region will be examined. The scope of the book series will encompass work being done on the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait in addition to Iraq, Iran and Yemen. The series will focus on three types of volumes: Single and jointly authored monograph; Thematic edited books; Course text books. The scope of the series will include publications relating to the countries of focus, in terms of the following themes which will allow for interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary inquiry on the Gulf region to flourish: Politics and political development Regional and international relations Regional cooperation and integration Defense and security Economics and development Food and water security Energy and environment Civil society and the private sector Identity, migration, youth, gender and employment Health and education Media, literature, arts & culture

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15318

Geoffrey Edwards · Abdullah Baabood · Diana Galeeva Editors

Post-Brexit Europe and UK Policy Challenges Towards Iran and the GCC States

Editors Geoffrey Edwards Pembroke College Cambridge, UK Diana Galeeva St. Antony’s College University of Oxford Oxford, UK

Abdullah Baabood School of International Liberal Studies Waseda University Tokyo, Japan

ISSN 2662-320X ISSN 2662-3218 (electronic) Contemporary Gulf Studies ISBN 978-981-16-2873-3 ISBN 978-981-16-2874-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: Fernando Tatay, shutterstock.com Cover design by eStudio Calamar This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

Britain’s unprecedented withdrawal from the EU presents a unique challenge both to the UK and the EU in defining their policies towards the countries of the Gulf, whether together, in friendly rivalry, or in less constructive competition. The regional dynamics in the Middle East, especially the challenges to the regional security posted by Iranian behaviour, and the world challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic that resulted in human and economic losses, and the crush of oil crises in March 2020, has increased the levels of uncertainty in which European policies will be played out. Both individually and collectively European states and the UK have been seeking to play a more critical role in the Gulf. Given Britain’s historical role played in the Gulf, it is not surprising that it has been seeking to reestablish itself as an influential actor, alongside and sometimes in competition with France. This relationship has developed while both countries are aware of the more unpredictable role of the United States and the growing interest of China and Russia in the region. It is possible, however, that, due to the challenges the UK is likely to face in the years following Brexit, it will lose its place in the region. Post-Brexit Europe and UK: Policy Challenges towards Iran and the GCC States identifies and explores the most urgent questions associated with this ambiguity both in relation to Britain and other European states as well as to the Gulf states themselves. Providing a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis, this book will find wide readership, especially among scholars and policy experts. Given the v

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uncertainty of the Brexit results for British and European politics, the book’s focus on how Brexit affects to relations with Iran and the GCC states will attract policymakers who follow these developments. Finally, the book will be a valuable resource for course adoption in undergraduate and post-graduate models which focus on British and European policies towards the Middle East. Oxford, UK March 2021

Diana Galeeva

Acknowledgements

The publication is the result of a workshop held at the Tenth Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), 15–18 August, 2019, which was organised by the Gulf Research Centre at the University of Cambridge. Our sincere gratitude is reserved to the Gulf Research Centre for the opportunity to conduct the workshop. In particular, we sincerely would like to thank all the people who believed in this project, and give thanks for their efforts and generous support for making the workshop possible (in alphabetical order): Aileen Byrne, Sanya Kapasi, Abdulaziz Sager and Oskar Zeimelis. Finally, it would have not been possible to conduct the workshop and complete this publication without the valuable expertise, farreaching perspectives on the studied topics, hard work and dedication of all contributors.

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Contents

Part I GCC and Post-Brexit Europe and UK 1

Introduction Geoffrey Edwards, Abdullah Baabood, and Diana Galeeva

2

Converging Diversification Concerns: Why Are the Europeans and Gulf States Looking for a Deepening of Relations? Nur¸sin Ate¸so˘glu Güney and Vi¸sne Korkmaz

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Rising Challenges to the US-Led Regional Security Architecture in the European Union and Gulf Shady Mansour and Yara Ahmed EU–Gulf Relations in Post-Brexit Environment Samuel Ramani

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Part II Iran and Post-Brexit Europe and UK 5

UK–Iran Relations and Brexit Nicole Grajewski

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JCPoA’s Destiny: Europe Between the US and Iran: For How Long? Alexander Shumilin and Inna Shumilina

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Assessing the Potential Impact of Brexit on the E3/EU’s Iran Policy Jacopo Scita

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Afterword Geoffrey Edwards, Abdullah Baabood, and Diana Galeeva

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Yara Yehia Ahmed is the Managing Editor and Political Researcher at Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS), an Abu Dhabi-based think tank. Yara has more than 5 years of experience in policy-oriented research. Her Research interest is the international relations of the Gulf, with special focus on GCC–EU relations. Yara holds a M.Sc. in Public Policy from University College London. Dr. Abdullah Baabood is Visiting Professor at Waseda University. He holds a Master in Business Administration (M.B.A.), a Master in International Relations (M.A.) and a Doctorate in International political Economy (Ph.D.) at Cambridge University. He particularly focuses on the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and their economic, social and political development as well as external relations. Dr. Geoffrey Edwards is Deputy Director Europe @POLIS; Reader Emeritus in European Studies, University of Cambridge; Jean Monnet chair in Political Science, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge; Emeritus Fellow, Pembroke College, Cambridge. Dr. Diana Galeeva is currently an Academic Visitor to St Antony’s College (Oxford University), having previously also been a Scholar-inResidence at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. She completed her Ph.D. at Durham University (UK), an M.A. at Exeter University (UK) and B.A. at Kazan Federal University (Russia). Her research interests xi

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include International Relations theory, Gulf Cooperation Council states’ foreign policies, and Russia and the Middle East. Nicole Grajewski is a doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford in the Department of Politics and International Relations, where her dissertation examines Russian and Iranian perspectives on international order. She is also a predoctoral research fellow at the Belfer Center’s International Security Program at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and an Associate Research Fellowship at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. Nicole received a M.Phil. in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford and a B.A. in International Affairs, Security Policy and Middle East Studies from George Washington University. Prof. Dr. Nur¸sin Ate¸so˘glu Güney is Professor of International Rela˙ tions (IR) in Istanbul based Ni¸santa¸sı University and a member of Turkey’s Presidential Security and Foreign Policies Council. She is President of CEMES, the Center of Mediterranean Security. She is a member of IISS. Prof. Guney has been part of many second track diplomacy initiatives. Her research interests cover energy politics, security issues, current world affairs, non-proliferation and disarmament, American, Russian and Turkish foreign policy. She is commenting on national and international broadcasting, writing analysis in daily newspapers and monthly political journals on a regular basis. She has published numerous scholarly books and articles, one of the latest is her edited book entitled New Geopolitical Realities for Russia, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Lexington Publishers (London, September 2019). Prof. Dr. Vi¸sne Korkmaz is Professor of International Relations (IR) ˙ in Istanbul based Ni¸santa¸sı University. She is vice-director of CEMES, Center of Mediterranean Security. Prof. Dr. Korkmaz has given lectures at the National Defense University of the Turkish Republic on current affairs and regional security issues in the Middle East, Russia and Caucasus. Her research interests cover IR theories, FP theories, regional security and security issues, Russian, American and Turkish foreign policy. She is the author of several books and has published a number of scholarly papers, chapters and articles on these issues, including newly launched chapters “New Russian Mahanism Failed: Futile Geopolitical Dreams in the Black Sea and Mediterranean” (with Nursin Guney) and “Russia and Turkey: Interdependence in the Time of Hybrid Mahanism” (with Nursin and

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Eda Guney), in New Geopolitical Realities for Russia, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Lexington Publishers (London, September 2019). Dr. Shady Abdel Wahab Mansour serves as Executive Editor-in-Chief of Trending Events Periodical and Head of Security Studies Unit in “Future for Advanced Research and Studies” (FARAS), Abu Dhabi. Previously, Dr. Shady worked at the “Information Decision and Support Center” (IDSC), the Egyptian Cabinet’s think tank. Research interests include MENA political and security affairs with a special focus on regional security and conflict management. Dr. Shady holds a Master and Ph.D. degree in Comparative Politics from the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University. Dr. Samuel Ramani completed his D.Phil. at the University of Oxford’s Department of Politics and International Relations. Based out of St. Antony’s College, his research focused on contemporary Russian foreign policy, Russia-Middle East relations and the international relations of the Persian Gulf. Samuel is a regular contributor to leading international publications and think tanks, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Foreign Policy, the Washington Post, the Middle East Institute, The Diplomat and Al Monitor. He is a regular commentator on Middle East affairs for Al Jazeera English and Arabic, the BBC World Service, CNN International and France 24, and has briefed the U.S. Department of State, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, NATO Intelligence Fusion Center and France’s Ministry of Defense on international security issues. Jacopo Scita is H.H. Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah doctoral fellow at the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University. Jacopo’s doctoral project explores the role(s) borne by China within Sino-Iranian relations from the 1979 Revolution to the 2015 JCPOA. His research interests include the international politics of the Middle East, with a specific focus on Chinese interests in the region, Iranian foreign policy and the analysis of nuclear policy in the MENA region. Dr. Alexander Shumilin holds Ph.D. in Political Science, Head of the “Euro-Atlantic—Middle East” Center, Chief Researcher of the Department of European Security at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Head of the Civilizational Conflicts Center at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of USA and Canada studies

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(2002–2018), Consultant of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (2013–2014), external consultant to the Japanese Government on the Middle East issues (2016), participated in international conferences in the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, UAE, Qatar, EU countries. Author of several monographs on the relationship within the triangle Middle East-Russia–US/EU. Dr. Inna Shumilina holds Ph.D. in Political Science. She is the senior research fellow at the Institute for the USA & Canada studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. She is author of a number of scientific papers and articles on the issues related to Political Islam in the Middle East and its repercussions in the Western societies. She has participated in international conferences in the United States, UAE, Qatar and EU countries.

PART I

GCC and Post-Brexit Europe and UK

CHAPTER 1

Introduction Geoffrey Edwards, Abdullah Baabood, and Diana Galeeva

1.1

Introduction

The UK withdrew from the European Union on 31 January 2020. Though the UK’s future relationship with the EU, both economically and in terms of foreign and security policies remains uncertain. One key unknown outcome of the UK’s withdrawal is its future relationship with EU-level security resources and institutions, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defend Policy (CSDP). This comes at a time of possible significant developments; especially for the latter with moves towards Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and closer collaboration on defence

G. Edwards Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK e-mail: [email protected] A. Baabood School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected] D. Galeeva (B) St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0_1

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equipment through the European Defence Agency. If there is progress, it means that the UK will not benefit from the advantages available to the EU27, at the same time as it loses the voice ‘magnification’ that EU membership has brought it. Moreover, a second unknown is the indirect consequences for the UK’s ability to pursue any grandiose policies independent of its erstwhile EU partners if the British economy suffers adversely from leaving the European market. Moves within the CSDP point also to a third unknown; the extent to which the EU itself sees and acts on the potential of better relations with the Gulf states. On the one hand, the economic relationship between the EU and the GCC might have reached stalemate despite some efforts by, for example, Chancellor Merkel to restart negotiations on a free trade agreement during her visit to the Gulf in 2017. Meanwhile German bilateral trade has been continuously improving. Both may well impact on the UK’s ability to sign any advantageous free trade agreements with either the GCC or individual Gulf states. On the other hand, France has for some time been seeking to establish itself, via, for example, its base in Abu Dhabi, as a key security actor in the region. A fourth unknown is the role of the US in the region under the Biden administration, and the relationships both the post-Brexit UK and the EU27 may seek to establish with it. The UK has always been at great pains to maintain its historical relationship with the US, which post Brexit may be of even greater importance given the former President Trump’s endorsement of the Brexit vote. This endorsement was symbolized in the reciprocation of official visits in January 2017 (former UK’s Prime Minister Ms. May’s visit to the US) and in July 2018 (President Trump’s visit to the UK). However, the UK, alongside the rest of Europe, faced a dilemma in its relationship with the Trump Administration. The former President’s unpredictability, his clear dislike of multilateralism whether expressed through NATO or the WTO, created tensions in the Atlantic relationship. The former President himself may not rue the loss of the UK as a diplomatic ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe but certainly past Administrations have seen it as useful. The British government may remain confident in the continuation of the ‘special relationship’ especially in terms of intelligence sharing, and yet US policies create difficulties for this relationship. One area of difficulty is uncertainty of the Biden administration further steps towards the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), and the US relations with Iran.

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The JCPoA epitomizes especially strongly contemporary tensions. As a member of the EU3, the UK worked hard to develop a better relationship with Iran. On the one hand, it was firm in supporting EU-level sanctions as part of the comprehensive strategy that, on the other hand, also included negotiations to bring Iran’s nuclear programme under control. The success of that strategy lay in the JCPoA of 14 July 2015. Boris Johnson, the current Prime Minister of the UK, during his Foreign Secretary appointment remarked: ‘I hope this will mark the start of more productive cooperation between our countries, enabling us to discuss more directly issues such as human rights and Iran’s role in the region, as well as ongoing implementation of the nuclear deal and the expansion of the trading relationship between both our countries’ (Gov.uk 2016a). The decision by then President Trump to pull out of the agreement in May 2018—despite, inter alia, Boris Johnson’s last minute efforts to persuade the Trump administration to the contrary—left the UK government at odds with the US and working with the EU27 in an effort, along with Russia and China, to save the agreement. The US decision places the UK in a particularly delicate position not simply in its relationship with the US but also with Saudi Arabia. The former British Prime Minister, Theresa May, during her visit to the Gulf in December 2016 wanted ‘to assure you that I am clear-eyed about the threat that Iran poses to the Gulf and the wider Middle East; and the UK is fully committed to our strategic partnership with the Gulf and working with you to counter that threat’ (Gov.uk 2016b). However, the Iran deal had considerable economic and financial potential that has had to be weighed against the existing significance of the relationship with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain especially. Considering the challenges to EU/US relations, and occurred tensions between the UK and Iran in summer 2019, post-Brexit policies towards Iran remain particularly uncertain. The GCC states are crucial partners for the UK, sharing deep-rooted relations in a number of contexts, including diplomacy, trade, military/security cooperation, culture, education, and relations between the royal families. Theresa May participated in the Gulf Cooperation Council of 2016, and discussed relations between the GCC states, highlighting the historical ties between the UK and the GCC; she stated her ambition ‘to build new alliances but more importantly, to go even further in working with old friends, like our allies here in the Gulf, who have stood alongside

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us for centuries’ (Gov.uk 2016c). Clearly the UK will be seeking agreements on a basis that may give it an advantage over the EU27, although the extent that is possible may well depend on the UK’s final agreement with the EU. The withdrawal agreement will also in part determine the extent to which the post-Brexit UK will retain its attraction as both a global financial hub and an attraction for inward investment from the Gulf. While there may be few challenges to the City of London as a financial centre in the immediate future, there are predictions of a movement of financial services towards other European centres. Whether the UK can remain the ‘eighth emirate’—to use the words of Tony Blair in 2006 and echoed by Boris Johnson a decade later—may well be of crucial importance given the levels of investment by the Gulf states, and not just the UAE. In part, for the UK, the importance of continued investment lies in whether it can persuade Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to invest beyond the London property market. It is also a question of whether the ambitious visions and plans of the Gulf states remain attractive to British capital, and of course, Germany and the other EU countries are also following such plans closely. Britain and the other EU member states have inevitably hedged their bets in the crisis over Qatar. Given the need to attract inward investment from both sides in the Gulf dispute, most European states have been supporting the mediation attempts of others, especially Kuwait. Furthermore, visits by the Saudi Crown Prince and the Qatari Emir to Paris, London and Berlin resulted in new commitments for investment and lucrative sales deals. However, the sales of arms and military equipment, while increasingly significance for both British and French manufacturers, have also exacerbated tensions for the war in Yemen and for human rights issues. In such circumstances, the extent to which Brexit reinforces the importance of Saudi purchases may create further embarrassment for the British government. On the other hand, Britain’s move to increase its physical presence in the Gulf has appealed to other sectors of the British polity; particularly as this might align with France’s physical presence enhances French support for the continuation of the concept of a Global France. Taking all of these factors into account, this book considers how these different tensions and unknowns may impact future relations between the post-Brexit UK, the EU and the countries of the Gulf including Iran. The authors of this book consider in different ways whether British and

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EU27 relations with the Gulf States may change or whether the traditions and the weight of their history reinforce the pre-existing patterns of these relationships. Ongoing changes in the Gulf, the present disputes and the trajectories economic reform will also influence these discussions. Our analyses will also include the changing positions of the US, China and Russia that are likely to impact on Europe’s interests. Finally, the book explores outcomes of ongoing world challenges, such as the COVID19 pandemic and the crash of oil prices, to further examine Post-Brexit Europe and UK policy challenges towards Iran and the GCC States. Recognizing Brexit as a unique moment in the development of UK and European politics that shifts foreign policy of the last 40 years, this book adds value by focusing on relations between the post-Brexit UK and the GCC and Iran. Most existing research into the aftermath of Brexit focuses on the future of UK–EU relations, or considers UK foreign policy elsewhere only generally. A very limited number of investigations explore UK foreign policy in the Middle East, and especially the Gulf. Taking into consideration the nature of their previous engagement in the Gulf, this publication will open a discussion about whether it will be possible for Britain to return to the Gulf as a global power, or if the UK’s future foreign policy will not play such a key role.

1.2

The Structure of the Book

The book is split into Two Parts and contains Eight Chapters, including the editor’s introduction. The First Part discusses Post-Brexit Europe and the UK’s relations with the GCC States, while Part Two of the book focuses on Post-Brexit Europe and UK–Iranian relations. In Chapter 2, Nur¸sin Atesoglu Guney and Vi¸sne Korkmaz evaluate structural and conjunctural factors complicating the EU/European–GCC relationship, despite the fact that diversified relations are an increasing need for both sides and that they have many reasons to look to each other in their search for diversification. The authors aim to underline that, apart from existing structural difficulties in EU–GCC relations, new post-2011 factors have continued to create more complexities—if not difficulties and obstacles—for the construction of inter-regional interdependence. Chapter 3, written by Shady Mansour and Yara Ahmed, argues that the European Union and Gulf Cooperation Council have had to deal with a series of internal crises for the past couple of years that have negatively influenced security cooperation. Yet despite the challenges, both regions

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have been dedicating efforts to establish regional security institutions. The chapter aims to analyse the extent of success of the American efforts to lead the security architectures in Europe and the Middle East. Particularly, this chapter proposes three interlinked arguments. First: the EU and some Gulf states are attempting to establish an autonomous security structure away from the US hegemony. Second: the US will resist these efforts, and aim to maintain its hegemony over the regional security, especially as both regions still lack the military capability that enables them to collectively defend their region, without the American umbrella. Third: both regions will try to avoid any clash with the US, while trying to develop an autonomous security architecture. In Chapter 4, Samuel Ramani, examines EU–Gulf relations in a postBrexit environment. The UK’s vote to withdraw from the European Union (EU) in June 2016 (‘Brexit’) prompted speculation about a major overhaul in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s relationship with Europe. One popular hypothesis was that the UK and EU would emerge as economic competitors in the post-Brexit order, which would force the GCC to engage simultaneously with and balance its relationships with the UK and EU. This scenario did not unfold, however, as EU–GCC and UK–GCC free trade agreements were not ratified, and intra-European discord created cleavages that often superseded the overarching UK–EU divide. This chapter analyses Europe’s evolving relationship with the GCC in the post-Brexit era. After briefly outlining the forays of major European powers, like France and Germany, into the GCC, this chapter will explore two overarching phenomena, which define post-2016 EU–Gulf relations. The first is the sustained dominance of bilateral, instead of EUGCC trade deals. The second is the hardened Franco-German divide on diplomatic and security crises involving GCC countries. France has periodically supported unilateral interventions by regional powers, such as the UAE, while Germany has tried to de-escalate the Qatar, Libya and Yemen crises. The chapter also explores future scenarios impacting Europe, such as a marked expansion of British trade links with GCC countries, the impact of US resistance to Chinese investment in the GCC on UK–Gulf and EU–Gulf relations, and how the trajectory of intra-GCC cleavages and a retrenchment of GCC countries from military interventions due to low oil prices, might ease the Franco-German divide. The Second Part of the book, which focuses particularly on Iran’s relations with Post-Brexit Europe and UK, starts with the chapter authored

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by Nicole Grajewski. This examines the evolution of Iran’s bilateral relations with the UK and the impact of Brexit on UK–Iran relations. Through its interpretivist approach, this chapter analyses the diplomatic practices, domestic debates, and exogenous factors that have influenced the evolution of the UK–Iran relationship. It employs a variety of Persian and English language primary sources including archival documents, official government statements, academic literature, and news reports in order to elucidate the salient issues in the bilateral relationship and better understand Brexit within the context of UK–Iran relations. The chapter begins by providing a broad historical overview of the main domestic, regional, and international factors that have shaped UK–Iran relations. Next, it locates Iran’s perspectives on UK foreign policy, tracing the salient cleavages in Iranian domestic debates about its relationship with the UK over the past two decades. In particular, Tehran’s shifting assessment of UK foreign policy from the 2016 Brexit referendum until 31 January 2020 concurrently illustrates the impact of the regional and international context in constituting and constructing Iranian foreign policy towards Britain. Therefore, the chapter proceeds to more closely examine the developments in the UK–Iran relations since the 2016 Brexit referendum with an emphasis on tensions in the Persian Gulf, Trans-Atlantic relations, and the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Finally, the chapter concludes with future projections about Brexit’s potential influence on UK–Iran relations. In Chapter 6, Alexander Shumilin and Inna Shumilina examine the Iranian nuclear deal and its potential outcomes. They argue that the US administration’s pulling out of the agreement signed by P5 + 1 with Iran in 2015 has not collapsed the «nuclear deal» (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—JCPoA) even though undermining it substantially. The EU countries, joined by Russia and China, condemned and resisted the Trump decision. Nevertheless, the capabilities of the EU to salvage the deal have been put into question. Europe itself has become a field of political and economic wrestling between the US and its Middle East allies (Gulf monarchies and Israel), on the one hand, and Iran, on the other. The former tried to convince the Europeans to reject the deal in the same way that the US did. The Iranian demarche of 8 May 2019— the announced suspension of a part of its commitments under the 2015 accord in response to the re-imposed US sanctions—pushed Europeans to gradually re-examine its previous attitude (one very favourable to the

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deal) while reproaching Tehran and distancing itself from it. Iran, nevertheless, opted to show its muscle by increasingly pressuring Europe by spectacularly reducing its commitments in the deal. The EU’s resistance policy to Trump in Iran has had few chances to be successful. Many European politicians have been trying to draw up a compromise to ease the tension with the US over the Iran issue while betting on Joe Biden’s presidency. They believe, with Biden in the White House the chance to bring the US back into the JCPoA would substantially increase. As well as the new mediation role of the EU to bring the US and Iran closer could be stronger. By contract, Jacopo Scita, in Chapter 7, looks at the potential impact of Brexit on the E3/EU’s Iran Policy and argues that the aim of the chapter is not to predict the future of UK–Iran relations or of the Nuclear Deal. Drawing on the role played by the E3 (Germany, France and the UK) in first approaching Tehran in 2003 and setting the framework for the EU involvement in Iran’s nuclear issue, the chapter argues that Brexit risks an abrupt interruption of the constructive path that began in 2003. In particular, the paper suggests three macro problems that Brexit may generate to the E3/EU agenda vis-à-vis the Iranian dossier: (1) the potential reemergence of mistrust and tensions between London and Tehran due to the volatile history of British–Iranian relations; (2) the effects of the growing transatlantic pressure on London’s effort to keep its Iran policy harmonized with the E3/EU; (3) the potential impact of Brexit on the process that has created and reinforced a distinctively European foreign policy identity vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear question. Finally, the book concludes with Chapter 8: Afterword. This chapter written by editors, looks ahead and offers final notes on how Brexit might affect relations between the UK, the GCC and Iran. This chapter acknowledges that Britain’s international standing will certainly be damaged immediately post-Brexit, however, offers positive scenarios for long-term perspectives. The final chapter argues and concludes that by developing foreign policies under the ‘Global Britain’ idea, the postBrexit Britain might develop further relations with the US, still keep relations with the EU states and strengthen its relations with the rest of the world. Under these partnerships the post-Brexit UK, along with challenges, also receives opportunities for further engagements with the Middle East states, especially developing further historical relations with the GCC states.

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References BBC News. (2018, 12 July), Donald Trump UK visit: What is going to happen during the trip?, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44786706 Accessed 14 September 2020. Gov.uk, Website. (2016a, September 5), UK upgrades diplomatic relations with Iran, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-upgrades-diplomaticrelations-with-iran Accessed 30 October 2019. Gov.uk, Website. (2016b, 7 December), PM: We are clear-eyed about the threat from Iran, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-we-are-cleareyed-about-threat-from-iran Accessed 30 October 2019. Gov.uk, Website. (2016c, 7 December), Prime Minister’s speech to the Gulf Cooperation Council 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/primeministers-speech-to-the-gulf-co-operation-council-2016 Accessed 30 October 2019. Khan, Taimur. (2017, 1 May), German chancellor Merkel arrives in Abu Dhabi, National, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/german-chancellormerkel-arrives-in-abu-dhabi-1.52396 Accessed 30 October 2019. Storer, Jackie and Bateman, Tom. (2017, January 27), Theresa May in US, BBC News, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-politics-38761165 Accessed 30 October 2019.

CHAPTER 2

Converging Diversification Concerns: Why Are the Europeans and Gulf States Looking for a Deepening of Relations? Nur¸sin Ate¸so˘glu Güney and Vi¸sne Korkmaz

2.1

Introduction

For the last couple of years, both European and Gulf states have felt the need to diversify their relations for different reasons derived from current geopolitical and geoeconomic fluctuations in the corresponding regions. Diversification is a strategy for the Gulf states to manage the risks and costs embedded in their traditional policies like bandwagoning to the US agenda. Diversification strategy is in harmony with the strategy of omni-enmeshment which is adopted by the GCC states to have contact and relations to great powers in the system as many as possible. For the European states, diversification is also important to manage increasing geopolitical and geoeconomical risks. From the European point of view, creating and promoting stable inter-regional interdependencies is a way of having solid diversified relations. However, diversification, especially when

N. A. Güney (B) · V. Korkmaz Ni¸santa¸sı Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0_2

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it couples with bandwagoning and omni-enmeshment strategies and especially in an environment where inter-regional interdependencies are not established extensively, may also carry its own risks. The most important risk is the risk of reinforcing strategic competition to have relative advantages and gain among the actors who have different priorities in the midst of current geopolitical ambiguities in both Europe and the Gulf. On the one side, Europe has been faced with the Russian assertive policies both in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Brexit has led to many other questions on the future of European security since the capability gap between EU security apparatuses and NATO is widening (Biscop 2020b). Even after Brexit, the EU27 has seemed to be divided on important foreign and security issues, including the EU’s Mediterranean strategy, relations with Turkey, and the future of Libya and Lebanon (Biscop 2020b). This internal division coupled with global ambitions of some European actors has led some EU members to reinforce their appearance in the neighbouring regions. Trump’s policies of ambiguity have also accelerated European concerns about the harmony in the Trans-Atlantic/Western Alliance. Trump seems to be adopting more protectionist and coercive economic policies—including in the fields of energy and defence economy (Dueck 2020). Hence, new American policies challenge the special relationship between Russia and leading powers of Europe like Germany, while also cracking inner-European harmony by offering special relations with the new European states like Poland. At the same time, Trump’s NATO rhetoric, his unilateralist tendency in decision making even on the issues related to European security, like the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or the Intermediaterange Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), or the future of American units in Syria, and his diplomatic style based on a continuous and inconsistent backwards–forwards approach has strengthened the European powers’ search for more independent manoeuvring space and room for strategic existence in the Mediterranean- Middle East- Gulf Axis. Moreover, the presence of real risks like a possible crisis in the Hormuz Strait or sudden fluctuations in oil prices in the case of a Saudi Arabia- Iran confrontation, also makes a strategic dialogue of European powers with the Gulf states a necessity. The questions here are: (1) whether European states will succeed in harmonizing their policies towards the Gulf states; and (2) whether European states/the EU will succeed in balancing their

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dialogue with Tehran and the Gulf states especially considering the independent factors (like Trump’s policies or inner-Gulf crisis) which affect this triangle. On the other side, the Gulf states search for a New Carter Doctrine or Gulf’s NATO, in which the US’s extended deterrence functions in a more strengthened fashion ended unsuccessfully (Brands et al. 2019). Although the US has good relations individually with Gulf capitals, both its attempted balancing in the inner-Gulf crisis as well as Trump’s ambiguous policies related to Iran, Syria and Yemen has led Gulf countries to think about diversification more seriously. And the Gulf states, like everyone else, are faced with many unknowns, like the results of upcoming US presidential elections in November 2020. In the case of a Biden presidency Gulf countries could be faced with a reinvention of Obama’s Middle Eastern policies including his legacy on Iran (Ibish 2020). Also, during the last couple of years, some of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, such as the UAE, have found themselves engaged—if not entrapped—at different levels of complex regional rivalries in not only the Middle East but also in the Mediterranean and Africa. Hence the rise in defence purchases on the part of Gulf states. Indeed, with their resources, money and energy, Gulf states have already started to diversify their relations, for example forming a kind of special dialogue with Moscow. Therefore, developing stronger relations with European capitals who have technology, know-how and arms, keeps its importance. Besides gaining European support on certain geopolitical issues, like restraining Iranian influence in the Gulf and Middle East and stability of Hormuz, is valuable for the Gulf states. The key question here is how the Gulf States will succeed in balancing these diversified relations with European states without alienating Washington DC and Moscow, and without strengthening an intra- EU-27 or EU-27 vs Britain rivalry (Stansfield et al. 2018) especially in the critical sectors. In this paper we will try to answer these questions after highlighting possible cooperation areas between European powers and Gulf states. In the first part of the paper we will focus on the question of why EU– GCC relations have been described as complicated and, given the mixed record since the 1988 Treaty despite of the fact that both sides have many reasons to improve their mutual relationship. We aim to underline that apart from existing structural difficulties in the EU–GCC relationship,

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new post-2011 factors have continued to create more complications—if not difficulties and obstacles—for the construction of inter-regional interdependence. In the second part of the paper we will focus on how the Trump era Gulf and Middle East policies and Brexit are affecting already complex relations.

2.2

Back to the Origins of EU/European–GCC Relations: A Complicated Story

For European states, especially EU members, GCC relations have been described as complicated even before the Trump Administration’s Middle East policy and Brexit, making the ground more complicated for interregional cooperation between EU and GCC member states (Colombo 2019). This emphasis on complexity does, indeed, mirror the nature of the EU–GCC relationship since it has both a positive and negative element. The logic behind the positive dimension is clear: both Europe and the Gulf are geopolitically important regions, and both have the potential and actual capabilities to affect the geopolitical and geoeconomical balance of power in the strategic landscape. Hence, it is not surprising to see a flourishing cooperation between the two regions when the economic and political needs of the respective parties are compatible. This potential for cooperation was recognized in the 1988 Cooperation Agreement which aimed to institutionalize cooperation in the fields of energy, industry, trade, investment, agriculture, science, technology and the environment. Over time, the energy sector has become the main driver of the relations. The Agreement, itself, was composed of interlocked economic and normative (/political) components and aimed to construct an interregional interdependence between Europe and the Gulf by strengthening sectoral cooperation which was expected to be institutionalized one day under a normative framework of the understanding of regional integration (EU 2019). That is why one of the ambitious objectives of the Cooperation Agreement was establishment of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the GCC and the EU. By offering a model of regional integration, eventually became a Custom and Economic and Monetary Union, and with regional agencies like Euratom, it was also no secret that the EU has seen its position as representing a kind of inspirational reference point for both construction of intra and inter-regional interdependencies since the Agreement was in force (Colombo and Committeri 2014). However,

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this normative framework and socialization dynamic to the negotiations tied the hands of the Europeans because—and as expected—their ability to use conditionality to persuade their Gulf partners has been limited because the GCC has a different existential logic from the EU (Ayadi and Gadi 2014). That is why the European states had to first wait for the emergence of the GCC Custom Union, which was only finalized after long negotiations and covert rivalries between the powers of the Gulf. Following this, in 2008, the GCC side suspended FTA negotiations with the EU when they saw that the distribution of power was changing to the benefit of the Gulf and there was therefore no need to make concessions while the Eurozone crisis paralyzed European politics (Ayadi and Gadi 2014). This short story of the failed FTA is enough to understand the kind of complexities that exist within the GCC and EU as well as in GCC–EU relations themselves. First and foremost, both regions have been divided—covertly or overtly—into different interests among the member states, as well as different interests of different sectors within the member states (Ayadi and Gadi 2014). But this is not the only factor which prevents GCC and EU members from realizing the actual potential of mutual, inter-regional cooperation which might have strengthened and made more symmetrical inter-regional interdependence that in turn might have had a more constructive impact on geopolitical and geoeconomical balances in the world. Within this framework we believe that since 2011 new factors have been added to the underlying structural factors which have led the two regions to grow apart.

2.3

Existing Structural Difficulties

The most important structural hindrance to the deepening of European– Gulf relations is related to the limited nature of constructed relations in which EU does not emerge as the security provider for the Gulf. The GCC, for a long time—more concretely until post-2011 differences reached a level that triggered the intra-GCC crisis (Köse and Uluta¸s 2017)—had maintained itself as a special security institution that gave leverage to the monarchies which assured regime security at home, balanced differences in the distribution of power among the small and big states of the Gulf, and legitimized the preference of individual states to rely on the US’ external deterrence against present and future threats. Some scholars argue that depending on the US as the main security

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provider of the Gulf is not even a choice among alternatives, since there is no other external power intending to play such a role (Ulrichsen 2019) This is not because of the neglect of importance of the security of the region for the stability of Levant, Europe and global energy markets but because of the limits in the capabilities—especially naval capabilities—to do so (Sim and Fulton 2019). Accordingly, for most of the EU, “east of Suez” is not known as one of the traditional areas of power projection since the UK is not being a member of the EU and France as a member of Union do see this region as an area of activity but only of a limited nature. Like the GCC states, EU members also seem to rely on the continuation of a US strategic presence in the region in order to insure the security of the Strait of Hormuz and fossil fuel exporting states. Bilateral relations between GCC/GCC states and some EU member states who can show their flag in terms of military capabilities (the UK has a military base in Bahrain, France has one in the UAE, and Germany is one of the arm exporters to the GCC members along with UK and France) seem to develop more strongly, and in some occasions at the expense of EU–GCC relations (Baabood and Edwards 2007). Indeed, preferring bilateral deals instead of deepening cooperation with the EU is in harmony with one of the general strategies of the GCC states, what we call “omni- enmeshment with bandwagoning”. The term “omni-enmeshment” refers to a strategy, named by Evelyn Goh, to describe East and South East Asian regional states’ strategy that is based on engaging with as many big powers as possible through their involvement in regional institutions and through bilateral arrangements between them and individual states of the region (Goh 2007). However, GCC states do not try to include all the various major external powers in the region’s strategic affairs on an unconditional basis. The first condition is related to the fact that the Gulf states’ understanding of balance of power has been based on complex calculations derived from the necessity of bandwagoning on the US agenda. Hence, practices and discourses of omni-enmeshment in the region have had to go hand in hand with dependency on US security guarantees. The second condition demands that the omni-enmeshed states should be prepared to be involved in the Gulf states regional agenda based on more and more struggle for influence and rivalry with others (for example with Iran) in the Greater Middle East. All in all, the omni-enmeshment strategy adopted by the Gulf states serves both to diversify and balance the needs of these states, and that is why, even on a bilateral basis, relations between GCC members and European

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states continue to be entangled, even during periods when Europe felt the necessity to diverge from the GCC agenda—for example, decreasing their dependency on Arab oil and gas and recognizing new investment opportunities in the new regional markets like Iran. In such circumstances GCC states have turned to Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi—and of course Washington, DC—for support. Although these structural factors create difficulties for strengthening inter-regional cooperation between the EU and the Gulf, there are other factors that keep the EU–GCC train on the right track. Apart from the importance of Gulf energy imports for the EU, albeit slightly reduced because the EU’s energy policy has been based on the objective of reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and the extent of the region’s energy reserves (almost 1/3 of the world’s crude oil, and 1/5 of the natural gas), the GCC continues to be an important market for European products. For example, EU–GCC total trade in goods in 2017 amounted to e143.7 billion. In 2017, EU exports to the GCC amounted to e99.8 billion. In the meantime, EU imports from the GCC accounted for only e43.8 billion, generating a significant trade surplus for the EU (Porcnik 2020). Therefore, keeping GCC as the trade partner of the EU is important and profitable for Brussels. However, this is not a one-way road. Europe’s green and nuclear technology market especially in clean energy and digitization of economies of Arab states (Bianco 2020) is also gaining importance for the GCC states while in recent years the energy sector has been changing both globally and in the Gulf. One of the important trends in the global energy market is the rise in demand for alternative energy resources in energy mixes. Though the continued importance of fossil fuel cannot be underestimated, mainly because of the Asianization of energy demand and the impact of new technologies and inventions like the shale oil and gas revolution in North America, this new search for alternative energy resources has had repercussions for both the demand and supply side of the energy market. Gulf region countries, as important resource-rich countries on the supply side, are not excluded from these consequences. In the past decade, intended and unintended interruptions, the invention of new technologies, and actors’ preferences to explore the connection between the economic market and political impact of economic pressures together accelerated the volatility of oil and gas prices in global and regional markets. Hence, elites in the Gulf countries, where revenues depend on the export of oil and natural gas, are aware of the increasing sensitivity of consumers

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and of consumers’ new appetite for the diversification of energy resources away from fossil fuel on the one hand, and on the other hand the diversification of sources as an insurance mechanism. This awareness in the Gulf countries, as supplier countries that are connected to changes in the market and to the impact of these changes on prices, is amplified by news related to the projected depletion of fossil fuels in the region, as well as the trend for excessive energy consumption in the GCC societies. According to some scholars though fossil fuels are destined to be depleted, there is no cause for hurry in the Gulf if we look at the region’s reserve to production ratio (El-Katiri 2013 and Nematollahi et al. 2016). The region’s aggregate reserve to production ratio for oil has remained relatively constant for the past ten years, despite a slight downward trend. With current estimates predicting that reserves will last for 80 years, the region is expected to produce oil comfortably into the next century at current rates of production. It is also estimated that known conventional Gulf reserves of natural gas will last for at least 157 years at current rates of production, and substantially longer for some of the region’s largest reserve holders, such as Qatar (El-Katiri 2013 and Nematollahi et al. 2016). However as recently witnessed increased hydrocarbon supply in the market and intensified competition among the producers has led to falling oil/LNG prices, and has affected energy revenues of the oil and gas producers of the Gulf region (Gavlak 2020). Indeed, the negative impact of the coronavirus crisis on the global markets has amplified the negative impact of the oil price shock in the Gulf economies and revived unpleasant memories of the late 1980s- early 1990s in another word, “the lost decade” (Cahill 2020). All these factors rang alarm bells for future economic security, in other words, the regime security of the GCC monarchies, prompting them to start very ambitious energy diversification programmes themselves, including a search for renewable and nuclear energy technology in the early 2000s (Güney and Korkmaz 2017). The EU has already started its energy security programme based on a diversification of sources, the search of alternative energy technologies, a strengthening of energy efficiency and the reduction of fossil fuel consumption and GHG emissions (European Commission 2013). Therefore EU has become a useful source of know-how not only of renewable but also nuclear technology and policy experience for the energy diversification programme of the GCC states. This convergence gave fruits within a short period of time and, following the joint GCC–EU MC meeting in 2010, the EU-GCC

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Network for Clean Energy (renamed as EU-GCC Clean Energy Technology Network in 2017) was established with the aim of “maintaining and strengthening the cooperation between the European Union and the GCC in the area of sustainable ‘clean’ energy and energy efficiency at the technological and political levels” (EU–GCC Clean Energy Network 2019). It is true that, most of the GCC countries have already favoured diversification of their energy mix, and in this way they aim to reduce their dependency on oil revenues. However, they continue to depend heavily on exporting oil and natural gas for economic development. As mentioned before, this situation naturally makes them vulnerable to the fluctuation in prices. According to Gawdat Bahgat, since most of the GCC states have created sovereign wealth funds/oil funds (SWF)—such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 1976, the Kuwait Investment Authority 1953, the Qatar Investment Authority 2005 and the Saudi Public Investment Fund 1971—these may prove lifesavers, in the short term financial crises, to stimulate GCC economies (Bahgat 2020). Bahgat also thinks that once Covid-19 is contained and when finally the economic activities around the world start to resume, then market forces will again balance supply and demand—which is expected to have a positive impact on oil prices (Bahgat 2020). Energy security has not been the only non-traditional security concerns for the GCC states. As recognized in 2012 Naval Drills in the Gulf, GCC states showed their readiness to strengthen maritime security capabilities along with air and naval capabilities. EU states—especially those exporting defence and security technologies—are the potential partners in this regard and the list is not limited to Germany, France, UK and Italy but also includes Netherland and Spain (SPRI 2019). Moreover the EU’s maritime security policies (European Commission 2020) have provided a good framework to initiate cooperation although the parties are not always on the same page especially on some issues such as passage rights (Ronzitti 2014). Without doubt, GCC states’ wish to show their flags in the seas of the Gulf as demonstrated by their membership to the US initiated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the search for new naval and air capabilities which are not only related to emerging concerns about piracy, marine pollution, refugees, human and drug trafficking and WMD terrorism. Balancing Iran, securing the Strait of Hormuz and guaranteeing an upper hand over the controversial islands like Abu Musa have

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always been in the minds of the Gulf states. Hence, engaging with European states and the EU, to change Europe’s general attitude of a balanced engagement with Iran and the GCC, and engaging with EU defence markets to manage the risk of abandonment by the US has gained greater importance especially after 2011.

2.4

New Complexities After 2011

Between 2011 and 2016, GCC states passed through five difficult years in terms of the level of fear of abandonment by the US. US security guarantees have never been institutionalized for the Gulf but based on the original golden deal between Saudi Arabia and US in the 1950s (oil for arms) and security practices and military deployments by the US in the Gulf since 1991. That is why the risk of abandonment has always been a possibility for the GCC states. It has become a more critical issue for discussion not only because of the Gulf’s continued dependence on the US and Washington’s unchanged interests in the Middle East but also because of the existing balance of power in the region. Hence when the Arab Spring movements began to have an impact in the MENA, GCC states felt that this created not only a risk to the regime security at home but could also alter the regional balance of power, to the advantage of their rivals. While Western reactions towards the Egyptian revolution were ambiguous and there was little reaction at all from the US as Mubarak was toppled, they decided to take the control over the developments in the region by directly involving in geopolitical and geoeconomic power struggles in the MENA. The GCC states’ impact on the course of “Arab Spring” inspired street movements, varied from economic coercion to the legitimization or delegitimization of existing regimes, from direct military intervention to using proxies to shape developments in the region. But overall the Gulf countries’ impact, which was highly effective over the course of the events in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, is obvious. Some GCC countries’ involvement to post-Arab Spring regional struggle proves that the increase in the power capabilities of the GCC states in the beginning of the 2000s was not a perception but a reality. Simultaneously, however, this process has also shown that a strengthening of intra-GCC rivalry as different states find different opportunities and risks in the changing geopolitical landscape in the MENA.

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The first signs of tension between UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar appeared before the embargo crisis but neither the US nor the Europeans contributed positively to any mediation efforts. The EU seemed rather to concentrate on individualistic and sometimes controversial interests of its member states in specific cases like in Egypt and Libya. Hence, while European states continued to function as omni-enmeshed powers, they could not use this time period when US–GCC relations were rather chilled to increase their space for manoeuvre and influence over the GCC. As is well-known, the intra-GCC crisis is not only related to the divergences among the GCC members towards the different Arab Spring movements, but to their different attitudes towards Iran. US under the Obama administration seems to have hopes related to a more moderate Iran in the post-JCPOA environment. Washington’s this optimistic expectation about reengagement of Iran after 2015 nuclear deal brought divergent position between Abu Dhabi and Riyad on the one hand, and Doha and Muscat on the other hand naturally deepened the intra-GCC gap. That is why Obama’s legacy in the Middle East, with his emphasis on off-shore balancing and engagement with Iran on nuclear issues,has been remembered bitterly in the Gulf. Since the Syrian conflict continued to provide opportunities for Iran, Tehran’s activities in Lebanon have strengthened via Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged in an almost lose-lose conflict in Yemen. Within this atmosphere, in the eyes of some GCC states, JCPOA represents a kind of reward given to Tehran because of all her efforts to change the balance of power in the region to her advantage whereas European states think that JCPOA is a great opportunity to solve dispute on Iranian nuclear programme. However, there are also other reasons for the discontent of the Gulf states. It is known that the JCPOA, which was rejected by Trump, has certain ambiguities. For example, Iran’s ballistic missile programme is not part of the deal, so this issue has continued to be of concern for the GCC states especially when Iran- GCC rivalry in the Gulf and Levant has been intensifying and while Iranian ballistic missile capabilities are increasing (Bahgat 2019). Besides, the Deal negates a zero-enrichment option for Iran, while the ambiguity related to the future of Iranian nuclear programme, when 10–15 years of the deal elapses, continues to affect the strategic thought of GCC states, who have their own nuclear ambitions. Hence, the GCC states, specifically the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, started to demand from the P5 +1 —in other words the US— what they have already offered to Iran -limited but 3.67 percentage of

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indigenous enrichment right. At the same time, Riyad recognized that it would be difficult to persuade US and her western friends anything beyond the famous 1-2-3 deal with the UAE (Güney and Korkmaz 2017). While the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone idea in the Middle East lost its attractiveness, and while Europeans were excited to have trade relations with Iran (Fiedleri 2018) EU had few things to say to the GCC and Riyad about these concerns. Therefore, the GCC states extended their omni-enmeshment strategy to cover Russia who returned to the Middle East/Mediterranean nexus through her military capabilities as in Syria and her charm offensive based on her defence and energy know-how market (foremost her air defence system and nuclear reactor technology). Of course, Russia and the GCC states have many divergences related to Russian support for the al-Assad Regime and Iran. Besides Russia, as one of the important gas and oil exporters has emerged as a natural rival of the GCC states, foremost for Riyad. But during the critical years, between 2015 and 2017, the GCC states that had difficulty with bandwagoning onto the American agenda in the Middle East, especially on the issue of Iran, chose to adapt a rather pragmatic approach to Moscow (Shumilin and Shumilina 2017). This new GCC pragmatism underlines the importance of economic and financial factors to different degrees especially as sometimes leverage in negotiations related to political disagreements, but it has a limited nature since Russians have also developed warm relations with Iran, Turkey and Israel. Nevertheless, during the last couple of years, Russia has succeeded in becoming one of the new centres of attraction in the GCC’s omni-enmeshment policy and so emerge as rivals of European states to satisfy the GCC states’ diversification concerns.

2.5 Trump’s Era: Further Complexities for EU–GCC Relations As part of Trump’s anti-Iran strategy, new alignments were formed between particular GCC countries including Saudi Arabia and UAE. These alignments were converged with Israeli’s new periphery alignment schemes covering Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, (Southern) Cyprus and Greece (Güney and Korkmaz 2020). Over time and dependent on the level of US attention, the target of these axis-like- rapprochement/partnership arrangements seemed to gain anti-Turkey colour especially in the Mediterranean (Güney and Korkmaz 2020), however, the US focus has always related to the perception of the Iranian, and newly

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emerged assertive Russian, threats in the region. However, US antiIranian rhetoric and policies have not prevented the continuing divisions among the six emirates of the Gulf on the Tehran issue. These divisions reached their climax when the UAE and Saudi Arabia decided to impose an embargo on Qatar, while criticizing not only Qatari-Iranian ties but also Qatar’s involvement in the Levant and the instruments of this involvement (Güney et al. 2021). In opposition to Washington’s newly sponsored cooperation belt against Iran, Qatar maintained its close relations with Tehran along with Oman and Turkey. Doha has also so far refused to ally with the Riyad-Abu Dhabi- Washington agenda in Syria. The Qatari crisis in 2017 surely helped to sharpen intra-GCC divide and until now this situation has not yet changed. Despite the Trump administration’s efforts to return the GCC states relations back to normal, many continue to believe that the deepening of the intra-Gulf crisis and divergences within the GCC, which also negatively affects the GCC’s functioning as well as its identity, is because of the Trump policies in the Middle East. Although some member states of the EU notably Germany, France and the UK are economically or militarily present in the GCC and while the UK and France have military bases in the region “unlike USA and Turkey” they failed to play an important role in both the eruption and evolution of the last-intra-GCC, namely the Qatari, crisis (Baker and Cok 2020). More importantly the EU, although it has the institutional framework and normative rhetoric related to peaceful resolution of conflicts, did not make any positive contribution to the mediation efforts of some regional states like Kuwait. Thus, the EU and important EU states seem to be paralyzed while this crisis keeps creating new complexities for the future of EU–GCC relations. The unilateral withdrawal of the US from JCPOA on May 8, 2018 and the re-implementation of sanctions on Tehran has certainly been welcomed by some of the GCC countries, most notably Saudi Arabia. However, the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear Deal was met with great concern by the EU. The EU High Commissioner, Mogherini, as well as most of the big states of the EU—particularly Germany, France and Great Britain, the so-called EU3—having felt the responsibility of keeping the 2015 Nuclear Treaty intact, have sought to persuade Tehran that they will do their best to maintain the sanctions relief that it has gained with the JCPOA of 2015, as long as Iran abides with the deal. They have launched certain measures in this regard to set up a trade channel with Iran so that they can bypass US sanctions. At the meeting

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of EU foreign and defence ministers in Bucharest, Romania in January 2019, the EU3 announced a “special purpose vehicle” (INSTEX). This instrument has ended up being limited to use for providing only food, medicine, and medical equipment from Europe to Iran (Divsallar and Otte 2019). The Europeans, by the time they launched INSTEX, have explained that they do not want Tehran to leave the 2015 Nuclear Deal and return to uranium enrichment. Hence, INSTEX was planned to be based in Paris and managed by a German banking expert with a supervisory board expected to be run from the UK (Brzozowski 2020). However, the planned INSTEX could not dissuade big European firms from leaving the Iranian market due to the probability of facing US sanctions and hence losing their share in the US market. Finally, the unwanted reality has come true when Iran very recently proclaimed that Europeans have not fulfilled their obligations related to the JCPOA whereas Tehran continued to abide with the agreement. Hence, Iranian media has reported recently that the Islamic Republic was seeking to pressure European countries to come to terms with Tehran’s demands under the JCPOA (Frantzman 2019). What is more interesting is that in mid-2019 Iran claimed that it is going to monitor European countries over the next 60 days to fulfil their commitments or Iran’s behaviour could become unpredictable (Geranmayeh 2019). If EU and Iran could not come to a point to satisfy each other soon the whole point of the agreement, that was to prevent Iran from enriching its uranium above a limit of 3.67 per cent and to sell off any additional enriched uranium over 300 kg together with other restrictions associated with 2015 Nuclear Deal, would be missed and GCC states’ concerns related to nuclear Iran will erupt again. As pointed out before, the GCC states concern regarding a nuclear Iran contains the logic of “what Iran has, we should also have”, so we may hear “nuclear dominos” rhetoric again in the Middle East. Tehran has been under the maximum pressure economically since the end of US waivers on the sale of its oil/petroleum to eight countries together with other sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. Therefore, she has been trying to bring a wedge between the US and EU, as well as remaining members of the UNSC, and hence force them to act against Washington’s efforts to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero. It is natural to expect countries on the producing side of oil/petroleum in the GCC to support Trump’s decision so that the threat emanating from Tehran and its proxies’ financial support would be curtailed. However, on the European side, the preference of keeping Tehran within the JACPOA

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does not match with some of the GCC countries’ concerns about the present fate of the 2015 Nuclear Deal- which is linked with the sanctions’ relief to the Tehran regime. From the perspective of sharing the global oil market it might be preferable for some GCC OPEC countries to see Tehran’s exports going down to zero. But on the other hand, they cannot be confident of Iran having after assuming the negative effects of Trump’s maximum pressure policy-be it economically or militarily- would at the end chose to leave the JCPOA, which in turn may have to bring negative security results for the Gulf region and even throughout the whole Middle East. In fact, in September 2019, the seeds of further instability could be seen in the Iranian/Houthi proxy attack on the Saudi Arabian oil sector—the ARAMCO attacks—causing a temporary rise in oil prices before business went back to normal. However, the concern of the Gulf as well as the West has not withered away because Tehran’s determination to destabilize the region via its capabilities remains as a response to the maximum pressure policy of the US. Even militarization of US pressure—killing of Soleimani and al-Muhandis in Iraq—did not hinder Iranian retaliation in the form of missile attacks to US bases in Iraq at the early days of 2020. Whether Iranian missile attacks were successful or not, which is still a debatable question, this escalation and Tehran’s muscleflexing has led to an increased level of concern in the Gulf states. That is why additional American military personnel have been sent to Saudi Arabia to prevent any future attack while the Europeans have remained militarily side-lined (Gibbons-Nef 2019). In dealing with Tehran’s situation, regarding the fate of JCPOA and the imposition of new sanctions by the Trump administration, Brussels and the GCC may now be seen to be on diverging sides. The EU seems to be attached to its political engagement policy with Iran via various diplomatic initiatives beyond INSTEX,for example Macron’s latest ambitious but failed attempt of bringing Trump and Rouhani to the negotiation table- to save the death of the JCPOA Deal (Al Jazeera 2019). Likewise throughout 2020, in both joint statements of several European states, such as UK, France and Germany, and in the official statements of Borell, the EU’s foreign policy chief, the Europeans have continued to reject the possibility of the imposition of snapback sanctions on Tehran by the US, since Washington is no longer party to the Deal (Al Jazeera 2020). However, some GCC states—foremost the KSA—seem to be puzzled by increasing American extended deterrence guarantees -especially after the latest attacks to ARAMCO oil sites and Iran’s missile attack to the

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American bases (Sofuo˘glu 2020)—and have continued to seek additional security assurances not only from the US but also from others. Hence the present divergence between the EU and the GCC, over which instrument (political/diplomatic vs military) should be used in dealing with Iran, continues to blur the future cooperation between the two parties. But, in the future we cannot be sure about how the two sides relations regarding Iran may develop. This also depends on how the US and the other nuclear haves in the UN as well as Iran may decide to act. At the time of writing this paper, the Trump Administration continues to back a policy of maximum pressure by containing partners and proxies of the Tehran regime in the region. While the European states, and sometimes the EU, seem not to oppose Trump’s policies in this regard. For example, the Syrian al-Assad regime complained about the EU’s extensions of its unilateral coercive measures on Syria in parallel with the US applying the Caesar Act (The Syrian Observer 2020). One of the objectives of the US Caesar Act seems to weaken Hezbollah’s position—read as Iran’s upper hand—in Lebanon and accordingly some experts argue that the Trump and Macron Administrations are adopting the “bad copgood cop” approach to reshape political dynamics in Lebanon after the Beirut blast (Abi-Habib and Chehayeb 2020). Although the EU remains committed to the two state solution, a similar supportive approach is also adapted by Europeans for Trump’s efforts to promote normalization of relations between some Muslim countries including some GCC states— like UAE—and Israel (Pollet 2020). However, this harmony between the European and the American Administrations can be seen as an exception. In the time of writing this paper, many European leaders did not hide that they are expecting a reset in Trans-Atlantic relations during the Biden presidency (Balfor 2020). Besides, it is not a secret that Biden emphasizes partnership and multilateralism in his foreign policy vision (CFR 2020). Hence, one can argue that the Europeans are trying to fill the vacuum in this transition period from one president to another by proving that European friendship will be beneficial for the future US Middle Eastern policy. It is also true that at the time of writing this paper not only most of the Europeans but also Tehran hopes to see Trump as a defeated party in the coming American elections. That is why Iran is acting moderately in its maximum resistance policy in order not to strengthen Trump’s hand. However, this moderate Iranian attitude just before the November 2020 elections does not mean that Iran does or

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will change her nuclear behaviour, or Tehran is or will be ready to renegotiate the 2015 Deal. Besides, the EU-27 continue to be divided over the European common security and foreign policy agenda, as one can witness with the EU’s /Europeans unsuccessful mediation efforts in the regional tensions of 2020 like between warring parties in Libya during the Berlin Summit or like between Athens and Ankara on the issues of maritime jurisdiction and de-militarization of islands in the Aegean Sea and in the Mediterranean (Güney 2020). Unsuccessful efforts of France and Greece to impose sanctions on Turkey because of her assertive policies in the Mediterranean as well as failure of European actors in deterring Turkey from her drilling activities also prove that the EU-27, leading states of the EU like France and Germany and the UK one of the actors who has military bases and naval capacities in the region are divided in terms of their Mediterranean /MENA policies (Güney 2020). Therefore, this conjunctural, exceptional and may be temporal harmony between the US and the EU rhetoric in the regional affairs can hardly satisfy security concerns of the GCC states. Besides since any prospect of harmonious western policy under Biden presidency indicates return to 2015 Nuclear Deal and improvement of Western Iranian relations, some GCC states have enough reason to worry. Despite these shortcomings, what is important for the Europeans/EU– GCC states relationship are oil prices. According to experts in energy, the dynamics of oil prices in 2019 depended in large part on OPEC’s effectiveness in implementing the cuts, balancing the market, and reinforcing the credibility of its signals (Ganti 2020). However, in efforts to balance the market, the US’ role in maintaining oil production (and prices?) is crucial. The world community witnessed a collective cut of 1.2 mb/d between OPEC and its allies, but with the high probability of supply losses, for example because of Iranian crisis along with other crisis in oil exporters, global oil demand then grew by 1.4 mb/d, therefore the market seemed to achieve a balance in 2019. Of course, the Trump Administration’s 6-month waiver for 8 countries who are importing oil from Tehran will further help in the stabilization of the global markets. Hence oil prices were expected to be between 60 and 70-dollar pb throughout 2019. However, at the time that this forecast was made no one was expecting the outbreak of Covid-19 virus to spread around the globe and hence affect the global oil market going out of balance. It is a reality that, at the beginning of 2020, one barrel of oil was sold for over 60 Dollars. However, the world community in mid-April 2020

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has witnessed how the price dropped to about 20 Dollars. Even though the price of oil per barrel has now reached 41 Dollars (Paraskova 2020), according to energy experts the future is still not certain. Without doubt, the EU, now, has to manage its relations with the GCC as usual but in a more complex and competitive environment. Although the GCC states retain bitter memories of the Obama Administration and although the Trump Administration acted very quickly to keep US–Qatari relations on good terms after the Qatar crisis and although President Trump kept voicing withdrawing from the Middle East the Trump era represents—showing American flag in the regional balance of power in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East more overtly (Güney and Korkmaz 2019). Of course many different political cover stories (ranging from new Middle East peace plans to stopping the Iranian threat) have been used to explain why the US is still in the Gulf and the Mediterranean (after the Shale revolutions and despite recurring complaints from Trump related to the cost of providing security for the Gulf by the US), however, the real cause of the American strengthening of its posture in the region seems to be the return of Russians to the Middle East and the Mediterranean with their own military and paramilitary forces as well as defence and technology transfer contracts, like S-400 and nuclear reactor deals with Riyad (Güney and Korkmaz 2019). Hence, the Europeans are recognizing that others (like Russia, Israel, Turkey etc.) also exist in the market to satisfy diversification concerns of the GCC states and the complexities created by Trump’s Administration also ease cooperative schemes between certain parties like Israel and some GCC states on the one hand, Turkey and Qatar; with UAE, Oman and Russia on the other hand. On this much more competitive basis, where parallel existence of omni-enmeshed regional and external powers in the regional security can be used by different GCC states to overcome unwanted political developments, like limitations on certain type of arm sales because of the on-going Yemen conflict etc., Europeans are faced with the bitter reality that they have to adopt a more pragmatic, less normative/institutionalist framework to deal with GCC states, as many European member states already do in their bilateral relations. However, this turn to more pragmatic ground is not easy since Brexit is creating enough problems for the EU in terms of its external relations.

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2.6 The Impact of Three Conjunctural Factors: Business as Usual in a Complex World It is not surprising to see that diversification concerns have recently increased both in the EU and in the GCC for different reasons. On the one hand, the Europeans have faced assertive Russian policies both in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Brexit has led to many other questions on the future of European security since the capability gap between EU security apparatuses and NATO is widening. As Sven Biscop says so, there is no lack of initiatives like PESCO, E2I etc., to further defence cooperation between European states, but there might be a lack of ambition. The Europeans those focused mostly on territorial defence during the Cold War now with the rise of the new security environment are facing the need of maintaining expeditionary forces. However, in this regard they are mostly challenging in the maintenance readiness, deployability and sustainability of their forces. This is due to several factors, like the abolished conscription in some EU states, reduced defence budgets and force sizes. Most of the units in EU tend to be available for homeland security. When it comes to expeditionary operations, only a few largest European states can deploy as a brigade abroad-even only then this was done with the US/NATO support (Biscop 2020a). Besides, Trump’s policies accelerated European concerns about harmony in the Trans-Atlantic/Western Alliance. Trump adopted a more protectionist and coercive economic policy, including in the fields of energy and defence economy, so the Europeans must think about other alternatives like PESCO, E2I etc., to promote a European security agenda in line with accomplishing 1999 Headline Goals as well as EU Global Strategy that aimed to achieve strategic autonomy. However, while they are also struggling to realize these new initiatives budgetary wise, while their commitments to NATO and Post-Brexit Europe are continuing (Biscop 2020a). Within this environment, thinking about a new version of ENP, diverting some resources for such kind of projects to design the neighbourhood will be difficult for the EU. That is why, although the EU needs diversification of her relations as well as playing a global role and though it recognizes the importance of GCC states’ potential, the EU seems to be stagnating in the existing bilateral relations between selected EU and GCC states. Here, bilateralism continues to be the preferred choice to bypass post-Brexit and post-Qatar crisis dilemmas, both by the EU and GCC states.

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On the other hand, although the US has maintained good individual relations with Gulf capitals during the Trump era, Trump’s ambiguous policies in relation to Iran, Syria and Yemen, and bitter memories of Obama’s Middle Eastern policies, has led Gulf countries to think about diversification more seriously. Europeans (both EU and European states) have been the centre of attraction for a long time because of their capacities, know-how, investment and technology in critical sectors such as alternative energy, infrastructure and defence. That is why after the 1988 Cooperation Agreement initiatives, networks and summits have been organized between the two sides. The major objective of these is the construction of mutual interdependence, so as to strengthen diversification for the EU (energy resource, economic diversification) as well as the GCC (less dependence to the US’s ambiguous and notinstitutionalized protection). First structural difficulties, then post-2011 complexities created barriers for forging expected returns in EU–GCC relations. However, both sides have continued to look at each other for improving relations since the logic of diversification and omnienmeshment as well as European aspiration to play a global role drives Europeans and Gulf states towards each other. Despite of this fact, the EU–GCC relations are still bound to three major conjectural factors which the EU has a limited capacity to affect: The first one relates to how the US–Iranian relations will evolve and how this will affect the EU’s and the GCC’s individual position towards Iranian nuclear issue as well as intra-GCC rivalry. Much depends on the result of the upcoming US presidential election in November 2020. The situation of limbo during the election period is not very promising for the GCC states since both Trump and Biden have quite different policy positions on the Iranian issue. As has been mentioned before, Obama’s Iran policy was one of the most problematic American policies for some of the GCC states and that is why they are critical of Biden’s possible thaw towards Iran, who proved that she has maximum resistance capacity at least. However, Trump’s discourse of reducing American forces in the Middle East—especially those forces in Iraq and Syria—is not satisfying for the needs of those GCC states that have been used to looking for strengthened security assurances from the US. Some observers argue that the normalization of relations with Israel can be a remedy for some GCC states’ security vulnerabilities and it is a balancing act in case of more aggressive rivalry in the region (Guzansky and Heistein 2020). However, normalization between Tel Aviv and the Gulf capitals still leaves a lack

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of alliance commitment and positive security assurances. Besides, this normalization has not yet provided the Gulf states with a free access to some critical technologies, either in defence industry, or in nuclear technology. Hence Washington’s future policy on Iran, and the GCC states’ search for partnership to balance Iran’s impact in the region continues to be the first key conjunctural factor in EU–GCC relations. The second factor is related to the question of how power competition among the great powers, the US, Russia and China, will evolve in the future on the strategic level and how this will be reflected in the Gulf and Levant region. Great power competition in the region is no longer similar to Cold War rivalry. It is difficult to talk about solid and strong alliance axes or rival ideological polarization. That is why the great power rivalry is resembling much more the pre-World Wars competition in which great power protection was not only the outcome of formal alliances but the end result of proxy relations between great and regional powers (Güney and Korkmaz 2020). It is true that proxy wars and rivalry via proxy-hybrid conflicts are realities in today’s Middle East, but, on the one hand, great power competition in the region is in a more controlled and restrained form, and proxies are generally used as insurances to restrain great power competition instead of galvanizing it. On the other hand, great powers chose to test each other’s sustainability via different forms of trade wars both on a global and regional basis. In terms of GCC states, they are financial centres, they are important consumers of global goods and services and they are producers, consumers and transit countries of energy resources. Hence it is not surprising to see that GCC capitals have been approached as potential proxies. Without doubt this creates a boosting impact for Gulf states’ bargaining power but at the same time great power overlay via either proxy policy or tariffs wars can limit omni-enmeshment capacity of the GCC states and accordingly can affect GCC–EU relations. The third factor is related to what role the US will play in stabilizing and destabilizing global oil markets. This is not only related to possible Riyad/OPEC response to the America’s role in the global markets but it is also linked to how OPEC-non-OPEC cooperation or competition (the possibility of either a GCC–Russia re-rapprochement or rivalry) will affect global markets and US interests in the region. As mentioned before, the price of oil reflects the balance between supply and demand. In the last year, the dramatic changes that came about due to the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic and hence its worldwide spread around the globe naturally negatively affected social and

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economic activities. This situation certainly pushed the global oil market out of balance. Before the outbreak of the pandemic, the oil market was in enough turmoil, first due to the OPEC + cut in crude oil production in an effort to prevent a glut as the US output rose, and, secondly, because in March 2020 both Saudi Arabia and Russia couldn’t agree on further curbs and have chosen rather to increase their share in the market. Of course, one cannot deny the negative effect of the trade war that was launched between China and US during the Trump administration and how this situation affected the price of oil. The stand-off that led to a price war between Riyad and Moscow continued until April 2020 when a new deal was reached to curb oil output - that finally came into effect from May 2020. It is well-known that US president Trump himself negotiated with Saudi Prince MBS to stop Riyad’s determination to continue the price war with Russia. It is true that, all the American administrations always worked for attaining low oil prices so that they can guarantee consumers to spend more money (Bahgat 2020). However, as Bahgat explains, the current low prices do not necessarily benefit American consumers because due to the Covid-19 pandemic most of the economic activities have temporarily been suspended. Besides, until the oil prices reached above 20 Dollars per barrel, the oil industry in Texas, Oklahoma, North Dakota and the rest of the country in the US continued to suffer. When President Trump saw that the oil glut, which coincided with the low prices, resulted in the situation becoming quite impossible for American oil companies to survive (Bahgat 2020), he decided to take action to correct the situation in the interests of the US oil industry. Currently, as post-pandemic lockdowns have started to ease all around the world, both the Saudis and the Russians hope to increase their oil production output, however the spread of the virus, especially the second wave in Europe and elsewhere, is now casting a shadow over their plans (Reed 2020). Moreover, as the 22nd Meeting of the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC) of OPEC which took place on 17 September 2020 via videoconference under the Chairmanship of HRH Prince Abdul Azi Bin Salman, Saudi Minister of Energy, and Co-Chair HE Alexander Novak, Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation, the Committee welcomed the performance in overall conformity for participating OPEC and non-OPEC countries with the Declaration of Cooperation which was recorded at 102 percentage in August 2020 including Mexico as per the secondary source (Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee 2020).

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CHAPTER 3

Rising Challenges to the US-Led Regional Security Architecture in the European Union and Gulf Shady Mansour and Yara Ahmed

3.1

Introduction

The European Union and Gulf Cooperation Council have had to deal with a series of internal crises over the past few years that negatively influenced security cooperation. Yet despite the challenges, both regions have been dedicating efforts to establish regional security institutions. One example in the EU is the recent call by the French president, Emmanuel Macron to establish a “true European Army,” independent from the American-led NATO, as he warned that Europeans could no longer rely on the US to defend them. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, as well as the UAE and Egypt established several independent security alliances, including the “Arab Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen,” and “Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition,” which aim primarily to counter the Iranian influence in the region.

S. Mansour (B) · Y. Ahmed Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS), Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0_3

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In the European case, EU efforts had previously been hindered by the UK, but with Brexit, one can consider it a double-edged sword for the EU. On the one hand, the British withdrawal from the EU has presented an opportunity to revive the hope for establishing unified European security institutions, autonomous of NATO’s umbrella. The most prominent of such calls included the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the need for closer collaboration in defence industries through the European Defence Agency. On the other hand, the UK is a key security player, as it retains strategic capabilities, not attained by other European countries, which gives it leverage in any form of defence and security cooperation with the EU. Such European efforts were heavily criticized by Trump’s administration, which favours NATO as the main security umbrella for Europe. Washington was “deeply concerned” that approval of the European Defence Fund and PESCO, dedicated to filling the gaps in Europe’s military power, would restrict the involvement of American companies in pan-European military projects, and create unnecessary competition between NATO and the EU (Chazan and Peel 2019). In 2017, the US called for the establishment of an American-led security alliance for the Middle East, known as “Middle East Strategic alliance” (MESA), commonly referred to as the Arab NATO. This alliance was assumed to include the six members countries of the GCC, along with Jordan, after the withdrawal of Egypt (Bayoumy et al. 2018). In both cases, the US attempts to retain its leverage and influence on the security architecture in both regions, whether through supporting NATO or by attempting to establish and lead the MESA. However, both the GCC (Dorsey 2020) and the European Union (Young 2018) have questioned the reliability of the US commitment for their defence, especially under the leadership of Trump. The main aim of the paper is to analyse the extent of success of the American efforts to lead the security architectures in both regions. This article proposes three interlinked arguments: first: the EU and some Gulf states are efforts to establish a security structure autonomous of the US hegemony; Second: the US will exploit European and Arab Gulf countries dependence over its power and try to maintain its hegemony over the regions’ security, especially as both regions still lack the military capability that enables them to collectively defend their region. Third: The American strategy to reorient its focus over East Asia to contain China, and its pressure over its allies in Europe and the Gulf region to play more

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role in defending their regions will result in Quasi alliances as a practical and flexible form of alliance between US and its allies in both regions. The paper will be divided as follows. First, it will shed light on “offshore balancing,” as the security strategy that US administrations embrace in order to protect American supremacy over regional security agreements in both regions, while reducing the defence burden bestowed on Washington. Second, the paper will analyse the European efforts to enhance their security integration after Brexit, and the American counter policies. Third, the American efforts to establish MESA, as the dominant security architecture in the region will be assessed. Finally, the paper will reach to a number of concluding remarks that attempt to evaluate the success or failure of American efforts in both cases. 3.1.1

Extra Regional Powers and the “Security Complex”

Great powers are concerned with enhancing their influence in the different regions of the World. In a Unipolar system, Washington assumed it could dominate different regions in the world. However, with the rise of China and its massive “Belt and Road initiative” (BRI), Washington started to perceive this initiative as an attempt to undermine the American influence worldwide. American efforts to enhance regional defence arrangements under its direction represented one of the measures that Washington has adopted to counter Chinese efforts. In this context, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt argued in 2016 that the US should resort to a strategy of “offshore balancing.” This strategy would preserve American dominance in the Western Hemisphere, and counter potential hegemons in Europe, Northeast Asia and the Arabian Gulf, while decreasing the security burden on Washington. According to both scholars, the US should encourage other countries in each regional order to play a leading role in containing regional threats, while the US would intervene only when necessary (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016). The US “should depend on regional allies’ forces as the first line of defense, letting them uphold the balance of power in their own neighborhood (Hoffman 2016); the US army would remain offshore as long as possible” (Roskin 2016). However, if the regional allies failed to uphold the balance, the American army would intervene militarily in limited operations, and withdraw as soon as possible (Gallagher 2016).

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The underlying assumption of this strategy is that the concept of the balance of power in the international order is a norm, rather than a hegemonic order. Accordingly, this strategy is recommended for the US in the emerging multipolar world, as the US could not stop the rise of new great powers such as China. The international order will therefore become increasingly more dangerous and costly for the US to maintain its control (Layne 1997). One can argue that the current Middle Eastern regional system is moving away from the American hegemony towards a multipolar system, where superpowers such as Russia and China are playing a more prominent role. This is evident through various indicators, especially Moscow’s support to the Assad regime, not only against armed opposition, but also in countering Washington’s interests (Brands 2019). Moreover, Russia has tried to mediate between Riyadh and Tehran. In addition, Russia is the second largest arms supplier to the MENA region during 2009– 2018, as Moscow accounted for 18% of the total volume of arms imports by MENA states. Algeria, Syria, Egypt and more recently Turkey have become the major importers of Russian weapon systems in the Middle East (Kuimova 2019). As for China, it has been enhancing its economic role through the Belt and Road Initiative, pledging 23 billion dollars to the Middle East (Fulton 2018). Beijing is, as well, gradually increasing its military footprint in the region, especially after it opened its first overseas naval military base in Djibouti. In addition, Middle Eastern states tend to utilize Chinese private security companies in protecting its economic investments in the region, which will also result in enhancing its security role (Lin 2017). A US offshore strategy would achieve several objectives; First, it would minimize the risk of American participation in a war against a future superpower. Second, it would augment America’s relative power in the international system (Layne 1997: 87). Third, it would shift the burden of checking hostile powers to regional allies. Such a realist strategy has been adopted by other great powers throughout history. The UK, for example, has consistently tried to get European powers to bear the burden of containing potential hegemons on the continent, while it remained on the sidelines for as long as possible, and intervened only in order to prevent a single state from dominating Europe. This was evident in the British security policy to thwart the French attempt to dominate Europe from 1792 until 1815 (Mearsheimer 2001).On the other hand, the UK did not intervene in

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neither the Austro-Prussian War (1866), nor the Franco–Prussian War (1870–1871), which led to the creation of a unified Germany, simply because the balance of power was maintained between the competing powers on the continent. However, when Germany replaced France as the potential hegemon in Europe from 1890 until 1930, the UK initially left the responsibility for containing Berlin to France and Russia. Yet, when it became evident that they couldn’t, Britain joined forces with them and established the “Triple Entente” between 1905 and 1907 (ibid. 2001). However, the “offshore” strategy for the US has been criticized. The assumption that regional powers share American interests has been challenged as well as whether they have the will and capacity to stabilize their regions in the face of a challenging power, like China in the South China Sea, Russia in the Black Sea, and Iran in the Arab Gulf. In addition, the fact that significant American withdrawals from different regions might alter the policies of US allies. Rather than seeking to counter the potential hegemon in their region, they might either acquiesces or bandwagon with it, thus jeopardizing American influence in that region (Hoffman 2016). Despite these criticisms, it could be argued that Donald Trump has adopted this strategy, as he proposed the establishment of the “Middle East Security Alliance” (MESA) (Mehta 2019). In addition, Trump sustained pressure on major European countries to increase their military spending under the NATO umbrella, to reach the recommended spending target of 2% of their gross domestic product (Kaim 2008). Both alliances are dedicated to countering aspiring hegemons, which is Iran in the case of the Arab Gulf countries, and Russia, in case of Europe, and ensure the American superiority and interests in both regions, in the face of other rising powers, notably China. From the perspective of regional powers, Great powers act like extraregional powers when coming to interfere in different regions or subsystems of the international system. Great powers can constraint or provide opportunities to the key players in the regional order. However, such a role should not be exaggerated, as even superpowers have limitations on their powers when coming to influence other regional orders (ibid. 2008). One example is the failure of US policy to achieve its goals in reaching a comprehensive peace agreement in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Another would be its inability to successfully establish a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” despite negotiating its formation for over a decade. Such instances of failure led Markus Kaim to suggest that “the United

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States is much weaker on the regional level of international relations than in the international system as such” (ibid. 2008: 1). Regional order could be defined as “the governing arrangements among the units of a system, including their rules, principles and institutions, which are designed to make interactions predictable and to sustain the goals and values that are collectively salient” (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). In a sense, it can be argued that the European Union can be perceived as a regional order, while the Arab Gulf countries lack such a regional order, due to the conflict among its principal players. While the Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla has conceived of the Arab Gulf states as a coherent regional system, this has been contradicted by scholars, like Michael Barnett and Gregory Gause III. They have argued that a “system” implied regulating processes and a form of cohesion that does not exist in the Gulf yet. Barnett and Gause pinpointed the existence of territorial disputes, ideological differences and divergent foreign policy orientation among its member states, as obstacles to the materialization of such security system. Rather than a regional order, Barnett and Gause argue that the Arab Gulf states should be described as a “Regional Security Complex” (Samaan 2017: 5–6) which is defined by Barry Buzan, as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan 2013: 141). This conception could be utilized to understand the security dynamics in the Gulf region, as tensions between its member states have risen, and there has been a growing perception that some member states’ actions are a direct security threat to the others.

3.2

Second: The European Quasi Alliances

Shifting stances on the global Geopolitical scheme have presented an opportunity for the European Union to re-evaluate the aims and ambitions of European defence policies. The American pivot towards West Asia, and its displeasure with the current European defence expenditure, accelerated the plans calling for European strategic autonomy. Brexit caused some turbulences, as there was no precedent of a country choosing to leave the European block, which leaves Brexit’s impact on the defence policies uncertain and ambiguous. Along with the changes in the security landscape, some security threats remained persistent in Europe. Michael

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Leigh listed a series of such threats or challenges include “continued Russian aggression in Ukraine” (Leigh 2019). Other threats include the rise of transnational terrorism accompanied by the influx of refugees from the Middle East. This context has revived the European calls for strategic autonomy and has driven multiple security initiatives to achieve it. 3.2.1

Shifting Security Landscape

During Donald Trump’s presidency, calls for European strategic autonomy grew louder. Trump’s “America First” policy emphasized unilateralism on the grounds that alliances are expensive liabilities. “US hegemonic leadership has been replaced with a much more transactional approach towards allies and partners,” with the result that Trump’s commitment to Europe’s defence has been questioned (Scheer 2019). The President has repeatedly criticized European allies for their low levels of defence spending and questioned why should the US “continue to protect free-riders if they don’t significantly increase their defence spending” (Birnbaum and Rucker 2018). He has insisted that the EU had to increase its commitments to meet the Alliance’s defence spending guideline of 2% of gross domestic product. Trump’s remarks were met by statements from German and French officials stressing the urgent need to pursue strategic autonomy, especially in the defence sector. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, warned that it was “no longer the case that the United States will simply just protect us” (Henley 2017). Her foreign minister, Heiko Maas, advocated a “new balanced partnership” with Washington, which will require “stepping up” when the US country “withdraws and forming an assertive European counterweight when the US crosses a red line” (Mass 2018). Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron argued that the “partner with whom Europe built the new post-world war order appears to be turning its back on this shared history” (Chrisafis 2018). Europe, thus, could not “rely on the United States only for its security. It’s up to us to meet our responsibilities and guarantee our security and therefore European sovereignty” (Corbet 2018). On the other hand, the EU feel threatened by the US withdrawal from several regions, accompanied by putting more pressure on its allies to play a more active role in the defence realms. A key indicator for this approach was the redeployment of US forces from Germany to Poland, Italy and Belgium. The US administration then further announced the

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relocation of the headquarters of the US Army V Corps from Germany to Poland, a sign of dissatisfaction with German’s current defence expenditure, Nord Stream 2, and the trade surplus (BBC 2020). This has left Germany, who was previously an advocate of NATO, to reconsider the French calls for reviving European strategic autonomy (Strategic Survey 2020). With Joe Biden’s recent election, Germans are still sceptical that transatlantic relation will go back to normal, as the US administration is expected to continue to exert pressure on Germany with regard to the previous mentioned issues (Puglierin 2020). With the rising tensions between the US and Iran, after President Trump opted out of the nuclear deal (the JCPOA), various attacks have been made on oil vessels in the Gulf, and Iran raised the rate of uranium enrichment, Europe has been attempting to conduct rounds of diplomacy to rescue the deal and avert any further escalation of conflict (Birnbaum and Noack 2019). Yet, the Europeans have found themselves unable to blunt US sanctions or rhetoric. Aiming to protect their interests, and in response to the American pressure to play a more active role in securing the Gulf, “the Governments of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, and Portugal politically support the creation of a European-led maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH)” (France Diplomacy 2020). President Trump’s rhetoric was not the sole cause that led to the calls for European strategic autonomy. The UK’s departure from the EU has also played a significant role in reviving those calls. The UK had played a contributing role in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations, in the past. After the advent of the Conservative-led government in 2010, the UK’s ambitions for CSDP were more limited, as it seemed less willing to engage in any significant way to CSDP military operations. It clearly perceived the CSDP as a complementary instrument for crisis management to that of NATO. Furthermore, the CSDP was not seen as a core component of the British security and defence planning; it was barely mentioned in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. The UK further opposed and vetoed reform proposals which would have strengthened the decision-making process of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP. The UK was also resistant to proposals to enhance the resources of the European Defence Agency and hindered its development. It further vetoed the creation of a permanent military EU operational headquarters (Whitman 2017). Thus, with Brexit

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taking place, there were many calls to awaken the Sleeping Beauty project of the EU; Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) being one. 3.2.2

Security Threats

Europe has continued to witness persistent security threats. The most prominent of which is Russia’s resurgence. From the European perspective, it became particularly alarmed over Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Western Official statements claim that Russia’s actions constitute a threat to regional and even global security (Averre 2016). The perceived Russian threat changed defence planning in several European countries, including the UK. European security threats were further aggravated with the rising geopolitical tensions between Russia and the US due to the withdrawal of both countries from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and the current disagreement over the renewal of the START treaty, which limits the number of nuclear warheads each may have (AP News 2020). Another factor, is the threat of Jihadist terrorism in Europe grew rapidly during the 2000s. ISIS singled out the United Kingdom, France, and especially Germany as its preferred European targets, and proved its capability to successfully carry on attacks in these countries (Michta 2017). Moreover, ISIS skillfully utilized social media propaganda to instigate “lone wolf” attacks inside Europe. This threat was often intertwined the migration crisis, especially in the media, which European governments have failed to deal with effectively, at the level of either policy or implementation. ISIS operatives are known to have proved capable of infiltrating the inflow of refugees, either through disguising as refugees (Reuters 2016) or recruiting them to carry out attacks inside Europe (The Guardian 2016). This is evident in the Libyan crisis, which turned into another Syria, especially after the Turkish intervention (Pack and Pusztai 2020), which facilitated the transfer of mercenaries and terrorists from Syria to Libya. As Libya has been one of the gateways of illegal immigration to Europe, this has exacerbated European concerns that the influx of migration might be infiltrated with terrorists. As a consequence, the European Union ramped up its efforts to enforce arms embargo and prevent illegal immigration through the launch of a new CSDP military operation, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI. The mission was tasked with the “implementation of the

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UN arms embargo, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016), through the use of aerial, satellite and maritime assets” (European Council 2020). 3.2.3

Revived Defence Initiatives

European efforts to develop PESCO have gone through various phases. Historically, EU efforts started with the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 CSDP, previously dubbed as the European Security and Defence Policy, was meant to provide the European Union with the capacity for autonomous action in the security realm, assisted by credible military forces, as envisaged in the 1998 Saint-Malo Joint declaration on European Defence (CVCE 1998). However, few member countries have been willing to allow CSDP the defence role assigned to it by various treaties. Thus, CSDP operations have mostly been civilian stabilization efforts, where any military input has seen soldiers act more as police forces or capacity builders rather than being combatants, with such operations requiring the approval of the hosting state. CSDP military operations were intended to project security outside the European Union, rather than defending its member states (Tardy 2018). In view of the turbulence in the MENA after the Arab Spring, President Trump’s assumption of office, Brexit, and resurgence of the Russian aggression, debates about developing defence issues have increasingly taken place in the European Council. France and Germany have taken the lead on endorsing those efforts (ibid. 2018). Brexit and the election of Trump were especially important in reviving efforts to enhance security cooperation under the umbrella of the European Union, that was previously vetoed by the UK. In light of a changing security environment, the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), launched only after the Brexit vote was known, proposed a process of closer cooperation in security and defence. In December 2017, EU Member States agreed to step up the EU’s work in the defence field, acknowledging the need for increased investment and more cooperation in developing defence capabilities through the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO). PESCO is a Treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU Member States who are capable and willing to do so. The aim is to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available

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for EU military operations. This will thus enhance the EU’s capacity as an international security actor, contribute to the protection of EU citizens and maximize the effectiveness of defence spending. (European Union 2019)

PESCO (to which 25 or the 27 members have agreed) includes two components: binding commitments and specific projects. The binding commitments are pledges made by member states in the field of defence spending, capability development and possible deployment of forces. In parallel, a set of projects have been accepted by PESCO members including surveillance systems, cybersecurity response teams, military mobility, and training facilities. The members are required to accept all the binding commitments and participate in at least one project (Tardy 2018). In parallel, the European Defence Fund was allocated by the European Commission 600 million euros annually until 2020, to be raised to 1.5 billion for technological research and technology. However, such initiatives have been facing challenges. The most prominent of which is PESCO members having different threat perceptions. In contrast to France, Germany and Italy, other, especially Eastern European countries still perceive Russia as an existential threat to their security especially in the aftermath of its intervention in Ukraine, and Russia’s use of hybrid warfare. Consequently, those countries remain primarily committed to US-led NATO, keeping the US “in” to keep Russia “out.” Poland, in addition to the Baltic states and Nordic members (Norway and Denmark) seek to preserve an increasing US engagement in the region (Scheer 2019). Another challenge is that the leading countries within PESCO have not yet developed a self-sufficient deterrent and warfighting capabilities to counter imminent security threats such as Russia. To further complicate the situation, European states have not agreed on collective defence arrangements similar to NATO. Along with the fact that PESCO have not yet developed the institutional frameworks to make decisions regarding prioritization of collective military operations. One example is the difference between German defence policy focusing mainly on Eastern Europe and stability in the Baltic states, while France is more preoccupied with Mediterranean and North African security issues (ibid. 2019). In order to further enhance European strategic autonomy, EU member states took additional steps, including the announcement of European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2017 to finance joint development and acquisition of defence materiel under the auspices of the EU Commission and the European

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Defence Agency. The EDF was initially planned that it would be able to “leverage some e13.6 billion (US$15.2bn) between 2021 and 2027” (European Strategic Survey 2020). A third challenge is how Brexit will complicate potential efforts to organize Europe’s strategic autonomy. The UK is a military power, and it possesses high-end capabilities not many Europeans have, such as ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance). On paper, the EU is losing the UK’s considerable military capabilities, which amount to about 20% of Europe’s overall capabilities (ibid. 2020). The UK is probably the only European power that could credibly take command of NATO maritime forces in the North Atlantic, given its comparative advantage in the relevant capabilities (Chalmers 2016: 39). The British are considered one of the most successful countries when coming to utilizing intelligence in preventing terrorist attacks. “In 2016 a total of 142 failed, foiled and completed attacks were reported by eight Member States. More than half (76) of them were by the UK,” according to the European Terrorism Situation and Trends Report (Europol 2017). Moreover, it is estimated that about 40% of the information going to Europol came from the UK and the European counter-terrorism strategy had been lifted almost word by word from that of the UK (MacAskill 2017). Furthermore, in 2016, the European Counter Terrorism Centre “introducing policy and organisational coherence to Europol’s support to the EU Member States’ fight against terrorism” (Europol 2017). This has accelerated intelligence information sharing among European countries to reach over 50% of all Europol Information System objects were related to terrorism (close to 750,000) (ibid. 2017). As we are approaching Brexit, while the UK may continue to give more importance to NATO, the UK will still need to cooperate including on intelligence sharing. In the case of a no-deal Brexit, the negative impacts would be felt immediately on both sides. On one side, Europe would lose the intelligence information that the UK acquire through the Five-eye intelligence group and the UK data that was held in EU systems could be deleted, while the UK would “instantly become disconnected from a range of databases and systems such as the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which shares data about prior convictions across all EU countries,” as Sir Julian King, the UK’s last commissioner in Brussels warned (Dan Sabbagh 2020).

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The UK may seek to cooperate with other European states through two approaches. The first of which, is the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) of President Macron, which aims to be: A flexible, non-binding forum of European participating states which are able and willing to engage their military capabilities and forces when and where necessary to protect European security interests, without prejudice to the chosen institutional framework (the EU, NATO, the UN or ad hoc coalitions). (French Government 2018)

Such a framework would allow the UK to benefit from the EI2 that focuses on interaction between the signatory states in four main fields, including “strategic foresight and intelligence sharing, scenario development and planning, support to operations, and lessons learned and doctrine” (ibid. 2018). In September 2019, Norway and Sweden joined the initiative, while the EI2 accepted the membership request of Italy, and an agreement was concluded on the establishment of a permanent secretariat based on a network of military liaison officers (Brzozowski 2019). Those have been recognized as indicators for a “steady advance” in Macron’s initiative. Given the EI2 is a defence initiative beyond the governance of the EU, the UK participation shall not be affected by Brexit. Yet, some pro-Brexit analysts raised their concerns that the initiative could involve Britain, in what they called “an embryonic European Army by the back door” (Daily Telegraph 2018), due to its interlinks with PESCO and other EU defence projects. Yet, it remains unclear how the EI2 will evolve in the long run, for to evolve, it would need to rely on “the continued political will of the participating states and whether it can exist alongside EU and NATO structures and complement their efforts, while avoiding duplication” (Mils 2019). Maxime Lebrun, a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security has also observed “until it is first tested in action, the EII will remain a paper tiger” (Lebrun 2018). The second approach that the UK is likely to rely on is maintaining bilateral relations with Europe’s most powerful states, especially France and Germany. Michael Leigh, former European Commission directorgeneral of enlargement, argued that the UK will look mostly towards France, as they are both nuclear powers and permeant members of the UK security Council, and are both involved in various conflicts beyond

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the EU, which enables them to deploy forces to Europe’s neighbourhood (Leigh 2019). Despite this rhetoric, there has been no evidence that indicates that the US is disengaging completely from Europe as the US attempts to maintain NATO as the sole umbrella for European security (Scheer 2019). There are some factors that emphasize this notion. First, there is the degree to which the US and its allies continue to share a common threat perception. Just as Europeans perceive Russia as a key threat to the regional security, so too did the US 2017 National Security Strategy which called Russia a “revisionist power” and stated that the US remained firmly committed to its European allies (White House 2017: 13). The strategy document also committed to strengthening deterrence and defence on NATO’s eastern flank, to protect the Europeans from any possible Russian aggression. Similarly, the 2018 US National Defence Strategy identified Russia as a strategic competitor and vowed to “fortify NATO” (White House 2017: 13). The second factor is that strong alliances depend on leadership provided by the hegemonic power. In this context, it is essential to note that Trump is not the sole actor determining the American commitment to NATO and European security. Congress and the Pentagon also play a key role in this process. The Pentagon, for example, requested further increase of the European Deterrence Initiative by $1.7 billion to a total of $6.5 billion to fund increased rotational presence of US forces on NATO’s eastern flank to keep Russian threats contained (ibid.). As for the Congress both parties, whether Democrats or Republicans, have remained defenders of NATO. This was evident both in the 2019 Munich conference and the later NATO Assembly, when a delegation was sent from both parties, to reassure the European allies of their support and commitment to their security under the umbrella of the NATO (Scheer 2019). Yet, the US is continuing to pressure European countries to play a more active security role. This development is expected to remain in place even after Joe Biden assumes the presidency. According to the French assessment, the relations between US and Europe will no longer return to the norm, regardless of whoever sits in the White House (Puglierin 2020). Accordingly, Europe has to pursue its plans to attain strategic autonomy. According to a recent IISS study, European NATO member states would need US$47bn yearly over a decade to compensate key US military capabilities in case of an American withdrawal from Europe (Strategic Survey 2020). Thus, the shadow of the Covid-19 is expected to sideline the European defence initiatives for a while.

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Third: The American–Led Security Alliances

The American efforts to build quasi alliances in the Middle East is directed to contain the security threats that emanate from Iran. Iran’s threat to the region is multifaceted, which could be categorized into three main categories; Tehran’s ballistic missiles and nuclear program, which represents a threat, not only to the Arab Gulf states, but also to Europe and the US; Iran’s quest to establish hegemony over several Arab states, and encircle Arab Gulf countries; Iran’s direct attacks against Arab Gulf states and American forces in the region, whether directly or through their proxies. The US, in return, attempted to counter threats through various measures, especially establishment of Quasi alliances. This could be detailed as follows. 3.3.1

Iran’s Regional Quest for Hegemony

Tehran adopted aggressive policies in the Middle East, despite the signing of the Iranian nuclear deal with the Obama administration, as it continued to pursue policies that aimed at establishing hegemony over several Arab countries. In addition, Tehran raised its aggressive policies after Trump’s withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal, due to the perceived loopholes in the treaty. In both cases, Tehran utilized its Shi’ite militias to safeguard its regional influence and retaliate against American sanctions, that targeted its energy sector, by trying to disrupt Arab Gulf oil exports, as evident in its attack against Saudi Aramco oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais in September 2019 (Nichols 2020). Tehran sponsored a number of militias in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. In Yemen, Iran backed the Houthis politically and militarily in an attempt to control Sanaa. In return, the Houthis, under direction from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), threatened Riyadh and launched various attacks utilizing Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. The rising Iranian influence was exacerbated after the American occupation of Iraq in 2003. Not only the US eliminated a rival regime that contained the Iranian influence in the region, but it also allowed a number of Iranian affiliated Iraqi Shi’ite political parties to dominate the political system after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Saudi officials warned Washington of the increased Iranian influence in post war Iraq, yet the US preferred to ignore such warnings for a while (Keynoush 2016).

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In Lebanon, Iran’s influence increased through supporting its affiliated Hezbollah militias. This was apparent in 2008, when Hezbollah invaded west Beirut, the stronghold of Sunnis in the capital, using Iranian weapons, and forced a government-allied satellite television station off the air and burned the offices of its newspaper affiliate. The crisis was only diffused when Hezbollah was granted, after Doha’s mediation, a veto power over major government decisions. Thus, Hezbollah translated its military influence into a political one, and consolidated the Iranian influence over Lebanon (Worth and Bakri 2008). In the aftermath of the turmoil that Syria witnessed in 2011, Tehran’s influence over Damascus has increased exponentially. The regime of Bashar al-Assad has been dependent on Tehran, then Moscow, in countering the military threat posed by opposition forces. This war provided Iran with the opportunity to allocate Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) units to Syria. As the war recedes, Tehran pursued to transform its military influence into a lasting economic influence, by directing Iranian companies to invest in key sectors including oil and gas, electricity, agriculture, tourism and real estate (Hatahet 2019). These developments alarmed Arab states, as King Abdullah of Jordan warned in 2004 about the emergence of a Shi’ite crescent from Beirut to the Persian Gulf, in reference to the Iranian dedicated efforts to sponsor a number of sympathetic Shi’ite governments and political factions in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon (Barzegar 2008). These efforts were further highlighted by Qais al-Khazali, the leader of Iraqi Shi’ite militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), sponsored by Iran, who claimed that his organization aims to establish a “Shi’ite full moon” not a “Shi’ite crescent.” He noted that “the Shi’ite force will include the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) in Iran, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi movement in Yemen, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and other Shi’ite militant groups operating in Syria and Iraq” (Majidyar 2017). Thus, Iranian efforts were not only directed to enhance its regional role, but also to encircle Gulf states through its allied militias (The Economist 2018), who were willing to act as its mere proxy. This threat perception was rather amplified by the Houthis targeting of Saudi Arabia with Iranian manufactured weapons, most notably ballistic missiles and drones that were able to reach the Saudi Capital and impose a significant threat to the oil infrastructure in the kingdom (DW 2018).

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American Counter Policies

In the wake of Iranian rising aggression, Washington tried to establish a quasi-alliance, to contain Iran’s regional influence. This alliance could be described as a coalition of the willing countries, that feels threatened by Iran, and willing to amass resources to counter its aggression. One of the coalitions in this context is “Middle East Strategic Alliance” (MESA), which was first announced during Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2017, as Trump sought to establish a new security alliance that is directed to counter Iran and its militias in the region. US proposed that MESA will be composed of the six Gulf Arab states, in addition to Jordan, after Egypt withdrawn from the alliance (Bayoumy et al. 2018). The idea of the alliance is in harmony with the American defence strategy, which emphasizes “expanding regional consultative mechanisms” and “deepening interoperability,” in an attempt to push American allies in the Middle East region to share the burden of protecting themselves, and ensure the protection of the American interests. Thus, this strategy is consistent with Trump’s resolve to reduce the American contribution to regional security in the Middle East and elsewhere (Farouk 2019). The utility of the alliance as a shield to protect Arab Gulf States against Iranian aggression was clearly pronounced in Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state, remarks after the Iranian attacks against the Saudi Aramco oil facilities on 14 September 2019. As one of the measures, that the US revealed to counter future Iranian attacks is revitalizing the MESA alliance. In September 2019, Mike Pompeo hosted the foreign ministers of the GCC and Jordan in New York to discuss MESA (Karam 2019). Since the inception of the idea of the alliance, its exact objectives have varied widely, from just building Gulf states’ capabilities to counter Iran, with American support, to include inter-alia addressing cyber concerns, attacks on infrastructure, and coordinating conflict management from Syria to Yemen (Farouk 2019). US announced that it would have declared such an alliance in mid-October 2018, before it was postponed several times through the course of 2019 and 2020. Such postponement reveals that the American proposed security alliance is facing resistance, which could be attributed to a host of factors. First, the US attempted to establish a NATO-like security alliance in the Middle East, yet those attempts were hurdled. Historically, most regional efforts to create an alliance have not materialized, whether under the umbrella of Arab League or any other sub-regional organization.

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Despite the signing of the “Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League,” on 17 June 1950, all the institutions responsible for enhancing military cooperation among Arab states were never materialized (Yale Law School 1950). In 2015, the Arab League Secretary General Nabil Al Arabi called for a unified multinational Arab fighting force, presumably to face the regional threats. However, the call did not gain any support from any Arab country (Gulf News 2015), despite the rising regional threat from the Houthis aligned with Iran in Yemen. The same situation applies to Arab sub-regional systems, like the Gulf Cooperation Council. During the last three decades, GCC summits annually confirm the commitment of its member states to establish a stronger regional defence organization, without much progress in this context (Samaan 2017). This may give a clear indication that MESA might witness the same fate. Secondly, the supposed members of MESA do not share a common threat perception. This is apparent in the fact that these countries have no unified position concerning Iran. Egypt and Jordan, while perceiving Iran as a threat, do not see it as constituting an existential threat to their national security, in the same way that Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain do. Iran has occupied the three Emirati islands; Abu Mussa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. In addition, Iranian officials have consistently made statements over the last four decades claiming Bahrain to be part of Iran (Bahgat 2009). Saudi Arabia’s conflict with Iran is multifaceted. Iran considers its revolution as a model that should be exported to other states, and that its true vision of Islam should be extended to other states, which is a direct threat to the Saudi legitimacy, which is regarded as the guardian/custodian of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina (Chubin and Tripp 2004). However, in practical terms, Tehran attempted to infiltrate Shi’ite communities in the Arab Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, a policy that exacerbated the threat perception of Iran. In addition, Tehran, as pointed out above, has a long history of supporting terrorist organizations inside Arab Gulf countries. Iran, along with the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iranian-supported, Hezbollah alHejaz were involved in the bombing of Khobar Towers, which killed 19 U.S. Air Force in Saudi Arabia in June 1996 (Soufan 2015). As for Egypt, the Houthi seizure of coastal city of Aden on 25 March 2015 represented a threat to the Egyptian national security, as it allows the

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Iranian affiliated militias to threaten the maritime traffic in Bab al-Mandab strait, and hence the Suez Canal traffic, which is one of the most significant revenue streams for the Egyptian government (Trager 2015). In this context, Cairo decided to send its navy and air forces, and join the Saudi-led campaign against Houthis in Yemen (Kirkpatrick 2015). In contrast, some Arab Gulf countries do not perceive Iran as a threat. Qatar and Oman, in particular, have utilized Saudi-Iranian competition to increase their independence and freedom of action in Gulf affairs. Both states fear the Saudi hegemony, and Washington’s recognition of Saudi Arabia as the leading country in countering the Iranian threat (Aarts and van Duijne 2009). Furthermore. Oman has a “unique relation with Tehran, and will never join any military pact against Iran” (Bakeer 2019). Despite the fact that Iran is seen as a threat by many Arab countries, because of its sectarian policies, and its tendency to establish local Shi’ite proxies, even in counties that are located beyond its direct neighbourhood, as evident in Nigeria, for instance. However, Egypt, a previously proposed member of MESA, has a different threat priorities, which perceives Israel and Turkey, as potential enemies, owing to the military power and geographic proximity of the former, and the hostile intentions and the intervention in Egypt’s neighbouring counties; Libya and Sudan by the latter. Iran’s threat to Egypt is rather marginal, and emanates mainly from threatening the maritime security near Bab-al-Mandeb strait through utilizing Houthis in Yemen. Egypt responded to this threat by participating in the Naval mission to secure the southern red sea (Jalal 2021), and establishing Barnis base, which is located in Egypt’s Southern frontier on the Red Sea coast, with the stated goal of “securing global navigation extending from the Red Sea to the Suez Canal and associated economic areas” (Ahram Online 2020). In addition to divergent threat assessments of the Iranian threats, still there are differences on how to counter these threats. Kuwait, despite perceiving Iran as a threat, still favours diplomacy over taking part in military alliances, to address Tehran’s policies in the region. In this context, Kuwait, while acknowledging the existence of several loopholes in the Iranian nuclear deal, and expressed its understanding of the American decision to withdraw from the deal, Kuwait still perceives the JCPOA as a main factor boosting regional security and stability (Xinhua 2018). A third reason that might contribute to the failure of MESA is that the policies of some Arab Gulf states clearly indicate that they have not

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regarded MESA as the appropriate defence umbrella for their security, and they seek alternative alliances. This is evident in the signing of Kuwait and Turkey a joint defence plan in October 2018, which aimed at enhancing military cooperation between the two countries (Daily Sabah 2019). This development came in the midst of rising tensions between Turkey and Riyadh, over the killing of the Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, on 2 October 2018, inside the Saudi consulate in Turkey, especially after Turkish insistence that he was murdered “on orders from the highest levels of the Saudi royal court” (Haltiwanger 2018). In addition, Qatar reached an agreement with Turkey in December 2015, according to which Doha will host Turkish bases. This development reflected the growing alignment and cooperation between both countries on regional issues (Decottignies and Cagaptay 2016). During the Gulf crisis of June 2017, and the American initial criticism of Doha for its support of terrorist organizations, Turkey expanded its military presence, and sent around 5000 troops to its bases in Qatar. One of the initial demands of the Quartet countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt), was to terminate the Turkish military presence in Turkey. Thus, the Kuwaiti and Qatari military cooperation with Turkey is a clear indication that while some countries, like Saudi Arabia and UAE perceive Ankara as a potential security threat, Kuwait and Doha considers them a security asset. In such context, any sort of military cooperation among Arab Gulf countries wouldn’t be meaningful, unless they agree first on what constitutes a security threat, and how to address these threats. The US has been a key mediator in the Gulf Crisis, as it perceived that the crisis hindered the American efforts to curb the Iranian influence in the region. In that sense, the US appointed a Special Envoy to the Gulf in August 2017, General Anthony Zinni, a former commander in the US Central Command (Ibrahim 2020). However, in January 2019, Zinni resigned from his post as sources claimed that his resignation was attributed to the fact that “he had reached a dead end, believing there was no forward movement on resolving the stalemate between Qatar and its Gulf neighbours” (Hansler and Atwood 2019). The US further relied on other officials including the former US Secretary of Defence James Mattis, yet none of the US mediation efforts to date materialized. Fourthly, inter-Arab rivalries could be considered one of the main challenges that face the effectiveness of any security architecture in the region. This is evident in the tensions between Arab Gulf countries, regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, and Iran (as mentioned previously), and the Gulf

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crisis. While some Arab countries perceive the Brotherhood as a threat, like UAE and Egypt, and to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia, other countries support them, as evident in the Qatari–Turkish support for the political partied affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (McElroy 2018). It is in this context, that the Egyptian decision to withdraw from MESA can be understood. Cairo conveyed its decision to the US and other participants in the proposed MESA in April 2019, and stopped sending delegations to the subsequent meetings, including the one hosted in New York in September 2019. Other reasons may be attributed to Egypt’s strategic calculation that this alliance might increase tensions with Iran (Kalin and Landay 2019). The fifth factor is power asymmetries. Arab states with powerful militaries are weak in economic terms, and vice versa. This made the regional Arab system lacks the “leading countries,” which are powerful in military and economic terms, and can initiate and support integration proposals. Therefore, most forms of defence cooperation among Arab countries failed. Yet, there are few exceptions where they allied against an ad hoc imminent threat to their national security, accompanied by an active participation of the US.

3.4

Conclusion

Both case studies reveal that the American security role in both Europe and the Middle East is indispensable, despite the American pivot to Asia, and its pressure on allies in both regions to contribute more to defence expenditures and play a more active role. As for European countries, given per the challenges that have been stated previously, one can argue that in the short-medium term, the status quo will be maintained, rather than changed. NATO will remain the key security umbrella for the European defence. European states might work towards achieving a more self-reliant role within the NATO context. However, to further develop their strategic autonomy, the European countries have to address several challenges that hinder their capabilities to become a more reliable security actor, notably enhancing their military capabilities and addressing the security concerns of smaller European countries, and acquiring such capabilities would require investment that is beyond the European financial capacity due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

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Simultaneously, major Arab Gulf countries depend on the American security umbrella to deter Iranian aggression. Yet, the US efforts to set up a NATO-like alliance in the region will not materialize, but given the ongoing Iranian escalation, it could be expected that the only feasible security arrangement would be ad hoc alliances formed to face changing imminent threats. Historically this was witnessed in the participation of several Arab countries in the American-led campaign to expel the Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, as well as the Arab coalition efforts in Yemen to restore the legitimate government control over Yemen. Thus, any permanent security structure in the region should first attempt to resolve the tensions among Arab countries, as well as trying to reach a consensus on what constitutes a security threat, and how to counter them.

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CHAPTER 4

EU–Gulf Relations in Post-Brexit Environment Samuel Ramani

4.1

Introduction

The United Kingdom’s vote to withdraw from the European Union (EU) in 2016, which was colloquially described as Brexit, was widely expected to be a liminal moment in the evolution of Europe–GCC relations. Prior to Brexit, the EU’s most powerful nations, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, possessed cordial relationships with the GCC countries, in spite of subtle distinctions in their willingness to engage with Iran or pressure Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the humanitarian costs of their military interventions in Yemen. Brexit promised to redefine the geopolitical landscape of Europe–GCC relations, as the United Kingdom and EU were expected to strike rival free trade agreements with the GCC. The much-anticipated UK–EU rivalry in the GCC did not materialize, however, as free trade negotiations stalled, the GCC fractured due to the June 2017 Qatar blockade, and intra-European rivalries took center stage. The principal locus of geostrategic competition

S. Ramani (B) University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0_4

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within the Europe–GCC relationship stemmed from conflicting bilateral trade agreements signed by European countries and a sharpening France– Germany divide over the optimal handling of security crises involving GCC countries. This chapter will begin by providing a brief contextual overview of foreign policies of the leading EU countries toward the GCC. It will devote particular attention to the orientations of France and Germany. This overview will enable a critical examination of the changes and continuities in European foreign policy toward the GCC resulting from Brexit. Once this synopsis has been laid out, the chapter will transition toward an in-depth examination of the two overarching trends in Europe–Gulf relations since 2016: the primacy of bilateral trade deals between EU and GCC countries and the Franco-German divide on crisis management. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the future trajectory of Europe–GCC relations. This section will consider how the COVID-19 pandemic, the official UK exit from the EU in January 2020 and countervailing U.S. pressure against China’s investments in the GCC might confirm or overturn existing trendlines in Europe–Gulf relations.

4.2 The State of Europe–Gulf Relations at the Time of the Brexit Referendum Heading into Britain’s referendum on European Union membership in June 2016, EU–GCC relations were characterized by a striking contradiction. Cordial bilateral relationships and rapidly expanding trade volumes did not translate into institutionalized economic cooperation. After the formalization of EU–GCC relations through the 1988 Cooperation Agreement, interpersonal relationships between European and Gulf elites improved through regular bilateral exchanges at all levels. (Koch 2014). Trade volumes between the EU and GCC increased by 53% from 2006 to 2016, with a particularly pronounced uptick occurring in 2013, due to increased oil prices (European Commission, May 2020). The GCC emerged as the EU’s fifth largest export market and the EU was the GCC’s largest trade partner, with 13.5% of its international trade. In spite of these rising trade volumes, free trade negotiations stalled. In June 2008, Abdulrahman al-Attiyah, the GCC’s Secretary-General, suspended negotiations on a free trade agreement with the EU, as European officials pressured their Gulf counterparts on democracy and human rights (Koch 2008). The GCC’s rejection of a new joint cooperation program

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with the EU in July 2013 heralded another blow to the strategic depth of its relationship with the EU. Ghanim al-Buainain, Bahrain’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, noted that this breakdown of trade cooperation restricted the potential for EU–GCC information sharing on issues ranging from finance to climate change (Arnold 2013). Although multilateral diplomacy between the EU and the GCC stalled, bilateral relations between European and GCC countries strengthened considerably in the lead-up to Brexit. France’s partnership-building efforts with GCC countries possessed particular strategic depth. In May 2015, President Francois Hollande launched France’s strategic partnership initiative with the GCC. GCC Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Negotiation Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg noted that Hollande was the first foreign leader to participate in a mid-year “consultative” GCC summit (Aluwaisheg 2015). France’s outreaches to the GCC produced mutually beneficial outcomes. The GCC countries regarded France as a crisis-proof Western partner and a country that they could turn to when the United States wavered in its support. This opinion was ensconced in November 2013 when France aligned with the Arab Gulf countries and rejected the Obama administration’s interim agreement on the Iran nuclear program. Rachid Chaker, a Gulf security expert at Universite Pantheon Assas in Paris, opined that France had become the “unofficial spokesman” of the Gulf countries in Iran nuclear negotiations (Chaker 2019). France also extracted considerable commercial benefits from its engagement with the GCC and could outflank the United Kingdom in sectors where Britain had traditionally maintained a comparative advantage, such as defense (Barnes-Dacey 2015). Even though France refrained from overtly taking sides in intra-Gulf disputes, such as the 2014–2015 rift between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain on one side and Qatar on the other, the UAE has cemented its position as Paris’s strongest partner in the GCC. In May 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy inaugurated France’s first military base in the Gulf, which stationed 500 French troops in the UAE, and pledged to “stand by the UAE in times of danger and help ensure the stability of the region” (Habboush 2009). To add a layer of commercial depth to its security partnership with the UAE, France marketed its flagship Rafale jets to the UAE’s Armed Forces. However, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed’s expressions of displeasure with the terms of this arms deal prevented a breakthrough contract (Financial Times 2011). In spite of this setback, France established a robust counterterrorism partnership

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with the UAE. In January 2013, Francois Hollande asked the UAE to supply warplanes or financial aid to Paris’s Operation Serval counterterrorism mission in Mali, which resulted in Abu Dhabi’s deployment of two C-17 Globemaster III transport planes to the Sahel. France also held joint military exercises with the UAE in March 2015, which focused on counterterrorism, and earned the UAE’s trust due to its open information flows on ISIS-related threats (Karasik 2015). Although Nicolas Sarkozy was initially welcomed in Saudi Arabia as he “stressed the importance of religion for civilization and human life” during his 2008 visit to Riyadh (Kuru and Stepan 2012, 107), his strained relationship with King Abdullah, perceived impulsivity and close ties with Qatar, prevented major strides in the France–Saudi Arabia partnership. France’s relationship with Saudi Arabia strengthened in the economic and security spheres under Francois Hollande, who traveled to Riyadh four times during his presidency (2012–2017). The April 2013 Saudi– French Business Forum in Paris opened the door for French cooperation with Riyadh in the civilian nuclear energy sphere. France also strongly supported the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, which began in March 2015, and co-sponsored UNSC Resolution 2216, alongside the United States and the United Kingdom, which condemned the Houthi coup d’etat in April 2015. In June 2015, Saudi Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Salman signed $12 billion in arms contracts with France, which included $500 million for 23 Airbus and 145 helicopters (Cafiero and Wagner 2015). The October 2015 Saudi-French Business Forum gave some of France’s most prominent companies, such as Airbus and Legrand, unprecedented access to Saudi Arabia’s domestic market. France’s relationship with Qatar has also been defined by elite-level interactions. Due to his cordial relationship with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, Nicolas Sarkozy played a crucial role in cementing France’s relationship with Qatar. Sarkozy’s enthusiastic support for the overthrow of Libyan dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad resonated in Doha. As Hollande drew closer to Saudi Arabia, frictions between France and Qatar surfaced. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, contends that Hollande’s victory led to a “sudden chill” in France–Qatar relations (Ulrichsen 2014). Allegations of Qatari financial links to Islamic extremists in Mali sowed mistrust with France. National Front leader Marine Le Pen asserted that France’s military intervention rankled Qatar because it targeted Doha’s “fundamentalist allies” (France

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24 2013). As Hollande’s presidency progressed, however, France–Qatar relations thawed, and French officials leveraged Qatar’s ambitious foreign policy to advertise the quality of their military equipment to other Gulf partners. In May 2015, France agreed to sell 24 Rafale jets to Qatar and Dassault, the company which oversaw the deal, bluntly acknowledged that its deal with Doha would facilitate Kuwait’s purchases of Rafale jets (Al Jazeera 2015). Although France’s engagement with Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman was of secondary importance to its foreign policy strategy toward the GCC, Paris nonetheless maintained positive relationships with these three countries. France suspended arms sales to Bahrain in February 2011, as the monarchy’s crackdown on Shiite demonstrators gained widespread opprobrium but did not join a Denmark-led proposal to impose an expansive Syria-style arms embargo on Manama (Matthiesen 2013, 79). Much like Britain, France gradually increased its security cooperation with Bahrain and faced criticism for its alleged involvement in the transfer of riot control weaponry to Bahraini security forces. Business France opened its first office in Kuwait in March 2015, and these commercial links facilitated the transfer of 30 helicopters worth 1 billion euros to Kuwait in August 2016. Although arms sales helped ensconce France’s partnership with Oman, as Paris is the third largest weapons exporter to the Sultanate, French officials also acknowledged the Sultanate’s unique diplomatic role. French Ambassador to Oman Robert Dubertrand stated on July 15 that “Oman has a special role holding mediation for rapprochement for countries having problems” and praised Oman’s diplomatic efforts on Yemen and Iran (Macdonald 2015). Francois Hollande was expected to travel to Oman in late 2015, in order to convert this goodwill into commercial leverage, but this trip did not take place. Germany’s relationships with the Gulf monarchies pale in comparison to the strategic depth of France’s partnerships, especially at the Germany– GCC bloc level, and the country is often regarded as a late-comer to the Gulf region. In spite of Germany’s track record of indifference toward the Gulf, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has invested considerable efforts in strengthening Berlin’s relationships with GCC countries. In 2007, Merkel’s trip principally focused on engaging GCC countries in the faltering Israel–Palestine peace process. During her 2010 trip, Merkel’s outreach to the GCC expanded into multifaceted cooperation on issues that included the Iran nuclear program, human rights challenges such as the treatment of women in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East peace

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process. The GCC’s economic potential also gained widespread attention in Germany, as the region’s growth rates exceeded 5%, even after the Dubai financial crisis of 2008–2009. German companies wished to profit from Saudi Arabia’s newly unveiled infrastructure and construction projects and avoid being outflanked by non-European competitors, such as South Korea (DW 2010). While German investments in GCC economic diversification initiatives varied over time, Merkel’s 2010 trip to the Gulf heralded a drastic uptick in arms sales. In spite of controversies surrounding the Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain, which was directly supported by the UAE and Kuwait, German arms sales to the GCC soared from 570 million euros in 2011 to 1.42 billion euros in 2012 (Global Times 2013). Saudi Arabia spent 1.237 billion euros on German military hardware in 2012, which made it the largest single destination of German military equipment in the world, and Qatar seized the advantage in early 2013 with 635 million euros in new arms purchases. The scale of Germany’s arms contracts with the GCC prompted a considerable domestic backlash, especially from left-wing politicians. The synchronous timing between Germany’s sale of 200 Leopard 2A7+ tanks to Saudi Arabia with its March 2011 abstention from UNSC Resolution 1973, which mandated a no-fly zone in Libya, fueled criticisms of Merkel’s perceived apathy toward human rights (Kundnani 2011). In spite of this pushback, Germany mirrored France’s military support for the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and maintained robust relationships with each GCC country. By late 2015, however, relations had cooled between Germany and Saudi Arabia, as Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel decried Riyadh’s provisions of financial support to Islamic extremism and the German BND intelligence agency condemned Saudi Arabia’s “impulsive” foreign policy (Reuters 2015). These accusations did not irreparably damage Germany–Saudi Arabia relations, even though they came on the heels of Merkel’s enthusiastic support for the JCPOA. However, they created a precedent for inconsistency in Germany–Saudi Arabia bilateral ties which persists to this date. Even though the individual impact of other EU member states on the overarching trajectory of Europe–GCC relations was decidedly more limited, their positions nonetheless deserve some attention. After the Arab Spring, Italy viewed the GCC as a potential long-term contributor to the stability of the Mediterranean region, as Gulf countries, except Bahrain, remained stable in the 2011–2012 period and possessed the economic

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largesse to contribute to the region’s development. As European influence in the Arab world faded and the credibility of the United States struggled to recover from the Iraq War, Italy tried to position itself as a bridge between the Gulf and Mediterranean regions (Colombo 2013, 130). While smaller European countries were constrained in their ability to add new strategic vectors to the EU–GCC relationship, they were nonetheless willing to draw attention to human rights abuses perpetrated by the Gulf monarchies. For example, Denmark stridently campaigned for the rights of Shia hunger striker Abdulhadi al-Khawaja in Bahrain throughout 2012 (Al Jazeera English 2012). The chasm between the EU’s smaller and great power members on human rights in the GCC has persisted into the post-Brexit era, as Norway has played an outsized role in opposing arms transfers in support of the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen since 2018.

4.3 Brexit and the Anticipated UK–GCC and EU–GCC Competition Even though EU–GCC relations were strengthening on a variety of levels prior to Brexit, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU prompted concerns about a UK–EU competition for influence in the economic sphere. The scale and nature of this contestation polarized opinion within the GCC. One contention was that the UK and EU would temporarily try to one-up each other in the race for a free trade agreement, as the EU hoped that a delayed British withdrawal would buy time for a pact and the United Kingdom saw a swift exit as a means of seizing the initiative. Ultimately, an EU or UK free trade agreement would act as a prototype for the other, and the GCC would emerge from Brexit with two comprehensive deals with Europe (Gulf Center for Strategic Studies 2019). Another contention was that the UK and EU would enter a more sustained state of contestation. This state of competition would be harder to ameliorate due to the EU’s struggles to secure a free trade agreement with the GCC, Gulf disunity and lingering questions about the UK’s economic prospects in a no deal Brexit environment (Freer 2019). As the UK and EU both possessed a distinct set of structural advantages and strategic ambitions, this protracted competition scenario became increasingly plausible with time. Power disparities between the UK and EU ensured that their competition in the Gulf would be asymmetric. Nevertheless, Britain still had

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some valuable cards to play in the competition for trade deals and investments. One advantage stemmed from the greater flexibility of Britain’s post-2016 approach to Middle East affairs. A June 2016 Chatham House report predicted that a post-Brexit UK would deepen its trade relations with GCC countries and would redirect diplomatic resources from North Africa to the Gulf region (Kinninmont 2016). This pivot might have been more difficult to achieve if Britain had remained an EU member state, as the United Kingdom would have been forced to pay more attention to MENA-wide collective security challenges. As GCC investments in British companies were undergirded by bilateral, rather than EU-level engagement, British officials hoped that the UK could strike a free trade agreement with the GCC more quickly than the EU (Bianco 2016). In addition, British officials were reluctant to castigate Saudi Arabia’s increasingly intense repression of dissent, as they focused on Riyadh’s contributions to counterterrorism. The UK’s exit from the EU meant that it no longer needed to consider the plurality of opinions within Europe on human rights in the Gulf and could weather domestic condemnations of arms deals with GCC countries on economic grounds. The technological capacity of British companies to assist Gulf diversification initiatives ensured that the EU’s expectation of a wait-and-see approach did not pan out (Mahdi 2016). Even though the structural foundations for the UK–EU rivalry for influence in the GCC were crystallized in the months following Brexit, neither the temporary nor protracted competition scenarios came to fruition. Neither the EU nor the UK to achieve a first-mover advantage in the pursuit of free trade with the GCC. Some EU officials were concerned about the GCC’s willingness to maintain export tariffs on manufactured goods, as these stipulations would weaken the competitiveness of small businesses in Europe. These tariff uncertainties were especially salient, as Brexit was swiftly followed by the election of U.S. President Donald Trump and escalating trade tensions between the United States and Europe. As a result, the EU focused its attention on securing free trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand immediately after Brexit and was hesitant about swift reengagement with the GCC. The UK–GCC free trade agreement was prevented by similar challenges. In a January 2017 speech, Theresa May declared that the Gulf states had expressed interest in upgrading their trade relationship with post-Brexit Britain and believed that this engagement would continue in tandem with the UK’s outreaches to Brazil and China (Government of

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the United Kingdom 2017). In spite of May’s assurances that signatureready trade deals would be negotiated ahead of Brexit, uncertainties about the timing and nature of Britain’s departure from the EU caused GCC business leaders to view a free trade agreement with Britain as a risky proposition. DP World chairman Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem was a particularly vocal critic of May’s handling of Brexit. In a February 12, 2019 speech, bin Sulayem declared that “our problem is the indecisiveness of the government,” and noted that Emirati businesses were more concerned about ending uncertainty than the nature of the UK’s withdrawal (McElroy and Prentis 2019). As the United Kingdom aligned with France and Germany’s support for the JCPOA after May 2018, no major UK–EU competition erupted in the security sphere. The absence of this rivalry resulted in the intensification of Europe–Gulf bilateral trade relations in the post-Brexit era.

4.4 The Dominance of Bilateral EU–GCC Trade Deals in a Post-Brexit Environment As the prospect of successful intra-bloc free trade negotiations between the EU and GCC receded from view, European countries paid greater attention to enhancing bilateral trade relations with individual Gulf monarchies. Since Brexit was viewed as a harbinger for a broader upsurge in right-wing populism and protectionism in Europe, concerns grew within the GCC about the trajectory of European economic policy. France’s presidential elections, which were held in May 2017, were regarded as a litmus test for Europe’s future economic direction. Due to her overt support for protectionism and conciliatory attitude toward Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Marine Le Pen was widely regarded as the least desirable victor for GCC countries. Francois Fillon’s pro-business outlook was viewed more favorably within the GCC, as he was expected to open up France’s economy to Gulf investments, but doubts continued to swirl about his accommodating attitude toward Moscow and Damascus (Almeida 2017). Emmanuel Macron was the candidate of choice for GCC officials and his election was met with praise throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Ohan Balian, Chief Economic Advisor at the Office of the Director General of the Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce, highlighted this pro-Macron perspective in a May 9, 2017 interview with Gulf News, by stating that it was very comforting that protectionism “remains a dream after the election of Emmanuel Macron” (Rahman 2017).

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Once it was clear that Brexit would not result in a sweeping reorientation of European attitudes toward free trade, bilateral trade relationships between Europe and the GCC countries continued to grow. As Europe’s largest economy, Germany played a commensurately important role in enhancing commercial links between Europe and the GCC. From April 30 to May 1, 2017, Angela Merkel traveled to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as part of a broader effort to shore up Germany’s trade partnerships ahead of the July 2017 G20 summit in Hamburg. Merkel’s visit to Riyadh took the form of an economic rescue mission, as Germany’s exports to Saudi Arabia fell by 25% in 2016, with notable declines in machinery exports (22%) and vehicles (53%) (DW, April 28, 2017). During her visit to Saudi Arabia, Merkel was accompanied by the CEOs of leading German companies, who strongly supported economic diversification, and scheduled a meeting with Saudi businesswomen (Al-Shihri and Batrawy 2017). While her trip was short on specific deals, German representatives present in Riyadh told Saudi newspaper Okaz that “Saudi Arabia was a strategic and commercial ally,” and that Berlin was committed to enhancing the Kingdom’s geopolitical standing in the Middle East (Al-Hamed 2017). Germany’s enthusiastic support for Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism efforts, confronting the threat posed by Iran and engaging with Riyadh on ending the wars in Syria and Yemen, underscored its belief in the mutually reinforcing impact of synthesizing diplomacy and commercial deals. This multifaceted cooperation also rectified the strategic deficit within Germany–GCC relations, which prevented Berlin’s relationships with the Gulf monarchies from reaching the level of comprehensiveness that France achieved in the pre-Brexit period. Angela Merkel’s subsequent visit to the UAE was not aimed at reversing the course of their trade relationship, as Germany–UAE commercial links had increased by 0.3% in 2016, but on taking their already strengthening economic partnership to new heights. Prior to Merkel’s visit, Sultan bin Saeed al-Mansouri, the UAE’s Ministry of Economy, had emphasized the commercial value of Germany’s strong industrial sector for the UAE’s diversification efforts. Emirati media outlets also emphasized Germany’s rising assertiveness in the Middle East since 2015 (Khan 2017). Much like her trip to Saudi Arabia, Merkel’s visit to the UAE resulted in a few major contracts. However, she continued to advance Germany’s ensconced policy of synthesizing diplomatic cooperation on issues, such as refugee repatriation and Libya, with commercial

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outreaches, as this approach facilitated the creation of well-rounded partnerships. The outbreak of the Qatar crisis just one month after Merkel’s visits to Saudi Arabia and the UAE tested Germany’s economic outreaches in the Gulf, but Berlin was ultimately able to straddle both sides of the intra-GCC divide. The Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani noted that Germany–Qatar relations experienced a slight dip in 2017 due to the aftershocks of the Saudi-led blockade but recovered in 2018, as new projects began in Qatar and the total number of German companies operating in the country rose to 300 (Gulf Times 2018). In September 2018, Qatar’s investments in Germany reached 30 billion euros. German companies were especially active in the infrastructure sector, as they played a key role in the construction of the Doha Metro and developing Qatari tunnel technology (Al-Sharq 2018). In spite of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed’s instrumental role in isolating Qatar, Germany’s economic relations with the UAE strengthened in tandem with its outreaches to Doha. In June 2019, Ali Abdullah Al-Ahmed, the UAE’s Ambassador to Germany, noted that 30% of German trade with the Arab world passed through the UAE. AlAhmed emphasized the transactional dimension of their trade partnership by stating that Germany supplies the UAE with cars and aircraft, while the UAE supplies Germany with aluminum and petrochemicals (McElroy 2019). Germany has also emphasized the UAE’s leadership in progressing beyond a fossil fuel dominated economy, and green energy has emerged as a potential sphere of collaboration between Berlin and Abu Dhabi (Khaleej Times 2019). Although Germany’s bilateral trade relationships with GCC countries have been broadly ascendant in the post-Brexit period, Berlin’s 2017– 2018 dispute with Saudi Arabia bucked this trend. After Sigmar Gabriel obliquely deplored “adventurism” in the Middle East in November 2017, Saudi Arabia froze leading German companies, such as Siemens Healthineers and Bayer, out of the health care sector (Bayouny et al. 2018). Overall trade between Germany and Saudi Arabia fell by 5% in early 2018. Saudi Arabia reportedly urged its companies to scale back as many nonessential links to German companies as possible (Freer 2018 in Al-Jaber and Neubauer, 161–162). Some Saudi commentators justified Riyadh’s aversion to trade with Berlin by claiming that Germany was indifferent to Mohammed bin Salman’s social reform agenda and that Merkel acted as a “European lawyer for the Iranian regime” (Al-Arab 2018).

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These sentiments sparked concerns that German manufacturers, such as Thyssenkrupp AG and Daimler, would also face commercial restrictions in Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, the Berlin–Riyadh diplomatic standoff ended in September 2018 and Saudi Arabia’s trade relationship with Germany began to mirror that of the UAE and Qatar once again. However, German policymakers became acutely aware of the political risks associated with bilateral trade with the GCC, which could conceivably be mitigated if an institutionalized EU–GCC free trade bloc existed. After Emmanuel Macron’s ascension to power, France’s bilateral trade relationships with GCC countries mirrored Germany’s trajectory of growing strength. Unlike Germany, which synthesized bilateral engagement with calls for a EU–GCC free trade agreement, France has focused almost exclusively on its bilateral relations with the Gulf countries, and has managed to avoid a rift comparable to the Germany–Saudi Arabia dispute. The only area of consistent friction between France and the GCC in the economic sphere was Macron’s efforts to pressure the Gulf countries on their above-average contributions to climate change, but this disagreement did not spread into other spheres (Al-Ubaydli 2019). France’s trade links with Saudi Arabia have strengthened considerably in recent years and are forward-looking in nature. In July 2020, Saleh alTayar, the head of the Franco-Arab Chamber of Commerce, stated that Emmanuel Macron’s visits to Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Salman’s arrival in Paris helped “consolidate” the France–Saudi Arabia relationship, and emphasized that both countries have “extraordinarily complementary economies” (Al-Kinani 2020). In contrast to Germany’s circumspect view of Mohammed bin Salman’s signature reform agenda, France has consistently supported the Saudi 2030 diversification program. French companies operating in Saudi Arabia employed 10,000 Saudi workers. France was the third largest investor in the Saudi economy with $15 billion in total investments by 2020, and French capital has supported Saudi Arabia’s vision of creating a tourism hub in AlUla (Talass 2020). Reflecting the greater strategic depth of France’s partnership with the UAE, Franco-Emirati economic relations under Macron were characterized by an intensified two-way exchange of commerce and capital. One crucial post-Brexit development in France–UAE trade relations was the expansion of cooperation between French energy giant Total and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc). In addition to its 100% stake in the Abu Al Bukoosh oil field, Total embarked on a major gas exploration deal with Adnoc in November 2018 and has also facilitated the expansion

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of the UAE’s solar energy projects (Townsend 2019). Cordial relationships between Mohammed bin Zayed and French Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire, who visited Abu Dhabi in January 2019, and DP World’s bin Sulayem and French officials, facilitated France–UAE trade relations and revenue from French sources to leading Emirati ports, such as Jebel Ali in Dubai. In exchange for its support for the UAE’s diversification, France courted Emirati investments outside of the real estate sector. Mubadala Investment Company, an Abu Dhabi-based company with $127 billion in assets, was the dominant force in this initiative, as it pledged 1 billion euros in new investments in France in late 2017 (Kassem 2017). The success of these investments caused Mubadala to target 10 billion euros in additional capital investments to the French economy in February 2020. France carefully navigated the Qatar crisis to avoid disruption to its commercial interests, and Macron was able to prevent a repetition of the tensions in Paris–Doha relations that occurred during Hollande’s tenure. In December 2017, Emmanuel Macron signed a series of highprofile commercial deals during his visit to Doha, such as a twenty-year venture to maintain and operate the Doha Metro and Lusail rail networks (Ulrichsen 2020). In order to establish a positive foundation for future trade deals, Macron highlighted France’s commitment to Qatar’s security by authorizing the sale of 12 French Rafale fighter jets from Dassault Aviation. Qatar’s extensive investment presence in France, which had reached $22 billion prior to the blockade, allowed Paris to replicate the two-way exchange which defined its economic relationship with the UAE. By December 2018, Qatar’s investments in France had topped 30 billion euros, which included real estate, telecommunications, sports and financial services companies, and Qatar Businessman Authority chairman Sheikh Faisal bin Qassim al-Thani boasted that Qatar was the “very first investor” in France among GCC countries (Alagos 2018). Although France and Germany’s subtle transition in focus from securing an EU–GCC free trade agreement to enhanced bilateral partnerships in the Gulf revolved principally around their commercial relationships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, Europe’s two largest economies also made overtures toward the rest of the GCC. France’s economic outreaches to Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait, have yielded more noteworthy contracts in the post-Brexit period than Germany’s overtures. Much like Total’s deals with Adnoc, the French oil giant signed a pact

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with Bahrain’s Tatweer Petroleum in April 2019, which was the centerpiece of $2 billion in new France–Bahrain commercial contracts (Reuters 2019). France has supported the Kuwait 2035 diversification initiative, and closer French security cooperation with Kuwait, which included antiISIS drills, has been linked to overall trade topping the $1 billion mark in 2018. Although France and Germany are the largest economic stakeholders in the Gulf, the depth of Italy’s trade partnerships with the Gulf monarchies ensures that it should receive brief attention before this subsection concludes. In contrast to concerns that were raised about France’s business-friendly atmosphere, Saudi Arabia noted the ease of conducting business in Italy. This advantage, combined with Italy’s popularity as a tourism destination for Saudis, strengthened trade links (Rasooldeen 2017). Despite this expansion, Italy’s most significant trade partnership in the GCC is with the UAE. In 2019, the UAE made up 80% of Italy’s trade surplus with the GCC and 7% of Italy’s global trade surplus (Gibbon 2020). Memorandums of understanding signed between Italy and the UAE on joint commercial opportunities in October 2018, which focused on agriculture, and April 2019, which focused on start-up development, suggests that Italy is a key European partner in the UAE’s quest for a knowledge economy.

4.5

The France–Germany Divide on Regional Security Crises Involving the GCC

As the much-anticipated competition between the UK and EU did not materialize, the growing conflict between France and Germany’s patterns of engagement with GCC countries created a new source of intra-European tensions. In spite of broad areas of synergy in their Gulf policies, such as their support for the JCPOA and an end to the Qatar blockade, France is much more willing to support the foreign policy assertiveness of GCC states, such as the UAE; while Germany is much more circumspect about the regional power ambitions of GCC countries. This clash between French adventurism and German restraint originated prior to Brexit but has intensified in the post-2016 period. The trajectory of France and Germany’s policies toward Syria underscored this contrast. In September 2013, France argued that arms provisions to Saudi Arabia and Qatar-aligned Syrian rebel groups should be increased (Reuters 2013b). However, Germany argued that providing military support

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for Syrian opposition groups could trigger a “regional conflagration” (Reuters 2013a). As GCC countries either acquiesced to Assad’s retention of power or ceased military support for his overthrow, Syria waned as a wedge issue between France and Germany, but new points of discord emerged in the post-Brexit era. The principal areas of tension related to the management of intra-Gulf conflict and addressing emergent instabilities in the eastern Mediterranean. On these points of contention, France and Germany carved out independent agendas, which created two poles within Europe, and the remaining EU states positioned themselves somewhere along the pendulum or more rarely, in direct alignment with one pole. Italy’s eastern Mediterranean balancing strategy suggests that it might emerge as a future third pole in EU–GCC relations, which could synthesize elements of France and Germany’s approaches, but this policy has not crystallized in other spheres of Italy–Gulf relations. On intra-Gulf conflicts, France and Germany adopted subtly different positions on the Qatar crisis and Saudi Arabia–Iran rivalry and more pronouncedly divergent policies toward the Yemeni civil war. As France’s Hollande-era tensions with Qatar were a distant memory by 2017, French officials strongly opposed the Qatar blockade. Hours after the Qatar blockade was announced, Emmanuel Macron positioned himself as a possible mediator of the crisis and engaged with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman and Qatar’s Sheikh Tamim on a speedy resolution of the crisis. Germany similarly urged the U.S. and GCC countries to swiftly resolve the Qatar crisis, but did not emulate France’s offer to mediate the crisis. The largest discrepancy between France and Germany’s approaches to the Qatar crisis stemmed from their tone on the actions of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. With the notable exception of its public condemnation of travel restrictions on “binational families” in Qatar on July 15, 2017 (Euronews 2017), France refrained from condemning Saudi or Emirati unilateralism, or refuting Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s criticisms of Qatar’s alleged support for terrorism. Germany’s Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel passively acquiesced to Qatar’s claims that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had violated international law and reiterated his past concerns about Saudi support for extremist movements (Reuters 2017). Gabriel also called for Germany’s intelligence agencies to cooperate with Qatar on assessing the veracity of Saudi and Emirati terrorism sponsorship allegations. This response underscored a level of implicit trust in Doha’s intentions that France lacked.

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Although France and Germany have both opposed U.S. unilateral sanctions against Iran, both countries have embraced distinct approaches to Saudi Arabia’s allegations about Tehran’s destabilizing role in regional affairs. This divergence originated with the policies of both European powers during the JCPOA negotiations. In mid-2015, France countered tentative commercial outreaches to Iran with hawkish rhetoric about Iran’s destabilizing conduct in the Gulf region. During the latter stages of the JCPOA negotiations, France was widely viewed as the toughest bargainer on Iran nuclear talks, which earned Saudi Arabia’s respect (Riedel 2015). This hard edge to France’s Iran policy persists, as French Foreign Minister Jean Yves Le Drian stridently criticized Iran’s destabilizing activities on August 25, 2020, which dovetailed with Saudi Arabia’s opt-repeated rhetoric. In spite of the German Foreign Ministry’s criticism of Iran’s support for proxy militias in Iraq in December 2019 and agreement with France on Iranian responsibility for the September 2019 attack on Aramco’s Abqaiq facility in September 2019, Merkel has generally confined her remarks to succinct criticisms of Iranian conduct and support for a restoration of multilateral diplomacy. Due to Germany’s tendency to follow the Western consensus or confine its most strident criticisms of Iran’s proxy wars to crisis moments, Saudi Arabia views France as more receptive to its hardline opposition to Iran than Germany. Although both France and Germany supported the 2015 Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, the approaches of the EU’s two most powerful countries to that conflict have sharply diverged in the post-Brexit period. The divergent attitudes of France and Germany on Saudi Arabia’s complicity in Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is intriguing. Both countries supported the imposition of sanctions on 18 Saudi officials after Jamal Khashoggi’s murder in October 2018 and have actively supported diplomatic initiatives to end the Yemeni civil war. Since 2016, France has resolutely provided material support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s military intervention in Yemen, while Germany has been more circumspect about arms transfers for use in Yemen. In spite of Le Drian’s description of the Yemen conflict as a “dirty war” in May 2019, France has continued to supply arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE for use in Yemen. These arms shipments increased by 50% from 2018 to 2019 (Irish 2019). France’s sales of naval patrol boats to Saudi Arabia were met with particular criticism, as these ships were implicated in the blockade of Hodeidah, which had amplified Yemen’s acute food shortages. France has also provided military support for the UAE’s intervention in southern Yemen on behalf

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of separatist Security Belt militias. This support extends beyond military equipment to ground forces, which French officials claim are used to help the UAE fight al-Qaeda (The New Arab 2018). In pointed contrast to France’s expansion of arms sales to the Saudiled coalition under Macron, Germany announced its cessation of arms sales for use in Yemen in January 2018, and this decision was praised by human rights watchdogs, such as Amnesty International, as a precedent for France to follow (Al Jazeera 2018). Germany’s freeze in arms sales to Saudi Arabia was formalized as a long-term policy in late 2018, in part due to backlash against Khashoggi’s murder. The translation of these directives into German policy toward Yemen has sparked controversy. In spite of repeated assurances to the contrary from German officials, DW uncovered the continued transfers of German military technology to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in February 2019 (Deutsche Welle 2019), and Germany has continued to provide military training for Saudi troops, which participate in the Yemen war. Notwithstanding these contradictions between rhetoric and policy, Germany’s military involvement in Yemen pales in comparison to France’s, and Berlin’s approach to the Yemeni civil war differs sharply from its human rights-blind approach to the Arab Spring. With the exception of Norway, which joined Germany in suspending arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in early 2018, most European countries have aligned more closely to France’s position on the Yemeni civil war. As the Eastern Mediterranean has emerged as a flashpoint for contestation between Turkey on the one end and Greece, Egypt and the UAE on the other, France and Germany have staked out contrasting positions toward the Gulf monarchies. France aligned with the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s view that Turkey’s exploration research in the Mediterranean and security pact with Libya violates international law. In May 2020, the Turkish Foreign Ministry accused France of being the “patron of an axis of malice” in the Mediterranean, which includes the UAE (Reuters 2020). Spiraling tensions inspired military coordination between France and the UAE against Turkey on August 26, as France carried out naval exercises with Greece and Abu Dhabi deployed F-16 jets to highlight its solidarity with Athens. France–UAE military cooperation against Turkey in the Mediterranean is poised to intensify, as Greece purchased 18 Rafale fighter jets from France on September 12 and hosted the Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces Lieutenant General Hamad al-Rumaithi on September 24 (The National 2020).

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In contrast to France’s willingness to support adventurist conduct from the UAE in the eastern Mediterranean that is aimed at restricting Turkish influence, Germany has positioned itself as a voice of restraint. While Germany has backed the UAE’s concerns about provocative Turkish energy exploration in the eastern Mediterranean which violates Greece’s sovereignty, Berlin has confined its conduct to verbal warnings and spearheaded efforts to achieve a multilateral “European solution” to the region’s security crisis. Most other European countries have remained detached from this dispute, but Italy has carved out a middle ground between the polar contrasts offered by France and Germany. Italy has participated alongside the UAE in Greece-led joint military exercises and signed an agreement with Greece on an exclusive economic zone, which mirrors France’s position (Dorsey 2020). However, Italy’s longterm goal is to preserve strategic stability in the Mediterranean, which involves engagement with all major economic players in the region, and this balancing strategy is considerably augmented by German multilateral diplomacy (Gasco 2020). On Libya, the division in perspectives between France and Germany has been especially pronounced, and other European countries have embraced positions, which either align with or fall between these two extremes. France’s resolute support for the UAE’s military intervention on behalf of Libya National Army (LNA) chieftain Khalifa Haftar is perhaps the most striking example of its tolerant attitude toward the foreign policy assertiveness of GCC states. In a May 2019 article, Anwar Gargash noted that French Foreign Minister Jean Yves Le Drian agreed that Islamist militias aligned with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) have an “ambiguous attitude” toward jihadism (Gargash 2019). French and Emirati officials regularly consult on the Libyan crisis, and France issued a joint statement with the UAE in May 2020, which condemned “Turkey’s military interference in Libya” (Reuters 2020). While France’s blockage of a UAE tanker shipping oil to the LNA on May 29 represented its potential to deviate from Abu Dhabi’s position in order to entrench its influence within the EU, the France–UAE axis endures. In spite of Haftar’s hegemonic position in eastern and southern Libya, France’s pro-LNA stance has gained comparatively few European backers. Only Greece and Cyprus reliably align with Paris, as tensions in Libya continue to spike. In contrast to France’s willingness to support the LNA’s military ambitions and use diplomacy as a tactic to bolster Haftar’s leverage or deflect

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from the most criticized aspects of its Libya policy, Germany has embraced the role of a restraining force in Libya. While Germany has consistently balanced between Turkey and the UAE in Libya, it struggled to replicate this equidistant position among GCC countries. Even though the GNA strongly supported Qatar’s inclusion in the January 2020 Berlin Conference, as Doha was a leading backer of the 2011 revolution against Muammar al-Gaddafi, Germany excluded Qatar from the talks. This decision caused controversy, as Turkey allegedly considered boycotting the Berlin Conference (Alsaa24 2019). After the UAE reportedly pressured Haftar to reject a ceasefire in Libya, in spite of a Germany–UAE joint statement calling for de-escalation (Hava and Kremer 2020), Berlin’s position departed from France’s as it pressured the UAE on its proLNA stance and simultaneously embraced Qatar as a partner in Libya. On August 19, Heiko Maas urged the UAE to transfer the diplomatic flexibility that undergirded its normalization with Israel to Libya, emphasized Abu Dhabi’s ability to apply pressure on Haftar and warned that “only those that participate in the political process (Berlin Process) will be part of Libya’s future” (Duz 2020). Two days earlier, Maas had met with Qatar and Turkey’s defense ministers in Tripoli, in order to discuss a peace settlement in Libya, but notably made no normative statement about Ankara and Doha’s cooperation with GNA-aligned militias. While the EU consensus appears to align more closely with Germany than France on UAE actions in Libya, the implications of Italy’s strategy in Libya on its relations with GCC states deserves some attention. At the start of the LNA’s offensive against Tripoli in April 2019, Italy’s support for the GNA translated into an informal alignment with Qatar, which extended beyond Germany’s officially neutral, but privately anti-Haftar, stance. On April 3, Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte and Sheikh Tamim Hamad al-Thani Qatar emphasized their agreement on the need to “maximize stability in Libya,” and to hold swift elections, as a delayed vote could result in military escalations (Alwasat 2019). Italy’s engagement with Qatar during the early stages of the LNA’s military operations was panned by pro-UAE media outlets, which viewed Conte’s meeting with al-Thani as an indicator of Italian support for Qatar-aligned extremists in Libya (Al-Arab 2019). As 2019 progressed, Italy’s strategy in Libya shifted from an overt pro-GNA position to a more balanced strategy which allowed for engagement with Haftar. This balancing strategy eased concerns in the UAE about Italy–Qatar cooperation in Libya, but also prompted alarm in Italy that Abu Dhabi might view Rome’s moderation

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on Haftar as a display of weakness (Varvelli and Villa 2019). As the GNA strengthens and Italy’s concerns about Turkey’s hegemonic aspirations in western Libya grow, Rome could carve out a third path for EU–GCC relations in Libya. This path is not doggedly aligned with one side, like France is with the UAE, but is also more willing to flexibly balance the UAE and Qatar’s interests than Germany’s stringent neutrality permits.

4.6 The Future of Europe–GCC Relations in a Post-Brexit Era Although Europe–Gulf relations strengthened in the economic, diplomatic and security spheres, in spite of periodic disruptions, the COVID19 pandemic has created new challenges and opportunities for relations between EU and GCC members. COVID-19 resulted in sweeping overall declines in trade between EU and GCC countries, as well as plunging European countries into recession and forcing the Gulf monarchies into severe austerity regimes. In March 2020, Europe became a front in the Russia–Saudi Arabia oil price war, as Saudi Arabia pumped its flagship Arab League crude oil to Rotterdam at a $25 per barrel price, in order to squeeze Russia’s Urals crude oil out of key European markets (Blas and Su 2020). In spite of these economic complications, the pandemic fostered goodwill between Europe and the GCC as countries in both regions cooperated against a common threat. Jorg Ranau, Germany’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, argued that Lufthansa’s ability to keep open flight paths to Riyadh and the treatment of German patients by Saudi physicians, showcased the depth of their bilateral partnership (Ranau 2020). Italian Foreign Minister Luigi di Maio similarly noted that the UAE’s swift supply of medical aid to Italy in April 2020 illustrated “solidarity between the two countries,” and memories of Emirati COVID-19 assistance could cause the Italy–UAE relationship to extend beyond purely transactional elements (Kumar 2020). Once the COVID-19 pandemic abates, two long-term geopolitical scenarios that could impact the trajectory of Europe–Gulf relations should be considered. The first scenario is that the completion of Brexit in January 2020 and the United Kingdom’s uncertain economic relationship with Europe results in the United Kingdom becoming a first mover on free trade with the GCC. The rapidly growing appeal of British technology in the GCC, which was evidenced by desalinization company Solar Water’s ability to sign multimillion-dollar contracts with Saudi Arabia in

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just nine months, could herald a sudden breakthrough in UK–GCC free trade talks (Euronews 2020). Anwar Gargash’s calls for a swift free trade agreement with the United Kingdom in February 2020 suggests that Britain could sign bilateral free trade agreements (Khaleej Times 2020), if GCC-level talks stall. Despite this momentum, COVID-19 could restrict advantages that the UK possesses in the commercial sphere. A May 2020 article in Okaz by Saudi commentator Khaled Faisal al-Faram noted that many Gulf elites believe that COVID-19 will reduce support for globalization and free trade agreements (Al-Faram 2020). In that scenario, Europe’s GDP advantages could give it an advantage over the United Kingdom. If this spike in protectionism in the Gulf proves ephemeral and pandemic dependent, France, Germany and Italy could leverage low barriers to entry in the non-oil sectors of GCC economies to mitigate any competitive disadvantages to the United Kingdom. The second scenario is that U.S. discontent with China–Gulf relations encourages GCC countries to partially divest from Beijing and expand trade with other international partners, such as Europe. In order for Europe to benefit from the risks associated with China–GCC relations, it needs to counter the image within the Gulf that is a declining force. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg argued in October 2019 that EU member states have been “losing out to their Asian competitors,” but expressed hope that Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Borrell’s ascendancy could result in a turnaround of Europe’s trajectory (Aluwaisheg 2019). An August 2020 report from the Emirates Policy Center, a leading Abu Dhabibased think tank, noted “the great variation in the policies of countries of the European Union towards the region,” and viewed China, along with Russia, as the principal beneficiary of U.S. disengagement (EPC 2020). Within Europe, there is greater optimism about the EU’s ability to profit from a GCC divestment from China, but a recent Istituto Affair Internazionali report warned that “competitive European bilateralism” must be overcome for the EU to actualize its ambitions (Kamel 2020). If GCC countries shun Huawei and the competition over ports between China and the UAE intensifies, Europe could indirectly benefit. However, it is likely that Gulf countries will regard Europe and China as two essential power blocs within a multipolar world order, as intra-GCC rivalries persist and the EU struggles to crystallize a coherent regional strategy.

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4.7

Concluding Thoughts

Although Brexit promised sweeping changes to EU–GCC relations, the much-expected rivalry between the UK and EU in the Gulf failed to transpire, and pre-2016 trends have largely persisted through to the current day. The most notable shifts in the post-Brexit period are an intensification of European bilateral trade deals with GCC countries, which has also resulted in an expansion of Gulf investment in Europe, and the deepening of discord between France and Germany on handling the GCC’s increasingly assertive foreign policy. Britain’s final exit from the EU in 2020 could increase the presence of UK–EU competition in the GCC and the France–Germany divide could ease if economic constraints on the GCC countries cause them to embrace more inward-looking foreign policies. However, the COVID-19 pandemic could postpone these outcomes. While the future of Europe and the Gulf remains an open question, continued disunity within the EU and GCC will likely mean that bilateral relationships, instead of bloc-to-bloc partnerships define regional interactions for the foreseeable future.

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many-says-eu-right-not-to-arm-syria-rebels-risks-too-high-idUKBRE9260Z 620130307. Reuters, “France Suggests It Is Ready to Give Weapons to Syria Rebels,” September 20, 2013b https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-france/ france-suggests-it-is-ready-to-give-weapons-to-syria-rebels-idUSBRE98I18 620130920. Reuters, “German Vice Chancellor Warns Saudi Arabia Over Islamist Funding,” December 6, 2015 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-germany-idU SKBN0TP0H720151206. Reuters, “Germany Urges Diplomatic Solution to Qatar Crisis,” June 9, 2017 https://de.reuters.com/article/uk-gulf-qatar-germany-idUKKBN19011K. Reuters, “Bahrain Signs Deals Worth $2 Billion with French Companies,” April 29, 2019 https://www.reuters.com/subjects/aerospace-and-defense/article/ us-bahrain-france-deals/bahrain-signs-deals-worth-2-billion-with-french-com panies-idUSKCN1S51WE. Reuters, “Turkey Says UAE Spreading Chaos in the Middle East,” May 12, 2020 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-turkey-emirates-idU SKBN22O2CF. Riedel, Bruce, “From Putin to Paris: Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Busy Solidifying Saudi Friendships,” Brookings Institution, June 24, 2015 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/06/24/from-putinto-paris-deputy-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-busy-solidifying-saudifriendships/. Talass, Rawan, “How France Played a Role in Promoting Saudi Arabia’s AlUla,” Arab News, July 14, 2020 https://www.arabnews.com/node/1704621/ saudi-arabia. The National, “UAE’s Military Chief Visits Site of Exercises with Greece,” September 23, 2020 https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/uae-s-militarychief-visits-site-of-exercises-with-greece-1.1082072. The New Arab, “French Special Forces Working with UAE in Yemen,” June 17, 2018 https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/6/16/frenchspecial-forces-working-with-uae-in-yemen. Townsend, Sarah, “Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and French Economy Minister Discuss Trade Ties,” The National, February 9, 2019 https://www.thenat ionalnews.com/business/economy/abu-dhabi-crown-prince-and-french-eco nomy-minister-discuss-trade-ties-1.823609. Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates, “Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2014 https://carnegieendowment.org/files/qatar_arab_spring. pdf. Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.

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Varvelli, Arturo and Villa, Matteo, “Italy’s Libyan Conundrum: The Risks of Short-Term Thinking,” Italian Institute for International Politics Affairs, November 26, 2019 https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/italys-lib yan-conundrum-risks-short-term-thinking-24469.

PART II

Iran and Post-Brexit Europe and UK

CHAPTER 5

UK–Iran Relations and Brexit Nicole Grajewski

5.1

Introduction

The 2016 Brexit referendum occurred against the backdrop of the measured normalisation in Anglo-Iranian relations following the restoration of diplomatic relations and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Rather than inciting a fundamental shift in bilateral relations, the trajectory of the UK’s relations with Iran after the Brexit vote remained entangled in regional alliances in the Persian Gulf, transatlantic divisions over the Iranian nuclear deal, and historical legacies which hinder the improvement of Anglo-Iranian relations. This chapter begins with an overview of the main domestic, regional, and international factors that have shaped UK–Iran relations over time. Iran’s historical grievances towards British interference during the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties have persisted as sources of distrust, frequently complicating present-day Anglo-Iranian relations. Although widespread distrust towards the UK has exacerbated tensions in the bilateral relationship, Anglo-Iranian relations have been sensitive to the shifts in regional

N. Grajewski (B) Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0_5

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order as in the cases of the UK withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iran–Iraq War, and the 2003 US–UK invasion of Iraq. The globalised nature of the Persian Gulf has transposed wider conflicts on the region and the UK–Iran relationship itself. Despite the UK’s alignment with the US during the Iraq War, Britain’s role as in the E3 along with France and Germany rendered critical for the JCPOA in 2015. After providing an overview of the bilateral relationship, the chapter focuses more closely on Iran’s perspectives on UK foreign policy. Tehran’s assessment of UK foreign policy after the Brexit referendum reveals much about the salient cleavages in Iranian domestic debates about its relationship with the UK. Additionally, the nature of London’s relations with Tehran after the Brexit vote highlights the fluctuations in British foreign policy which vacillated between a Washington-oriented policy in the Persian Gulf and unified alignment with Brussels on the JCPOA. Therefore, the chapter proceeds to more closely examine the developments in the UK–Iran relations since the 2016 Brexit referendum with an emphasis on tensions in the Persian Gulf and the schisms in transatlantic relations that arose following the election of US President Donald Trump in November 2016.

5.2 Historical Development of Anglo-Iranian Relations Throughout the history of Anglo-Iranian relations, Great Britain earned a reputation as predatory Imperial power due to the recurrent instances of British interference in Iranian internal affairs and Persian concessions (imtiy¯ az¯ at ) associated with economic capitulation and the loss of sovereignty. Anglo-Iranian relations extend back to the Safavid Dynasty during which Britain sought to establish a trade presence in Persia around its southern ports. The relationship rose in prominence under the Qajar Dynasty as Britain’s imperial interests in India and its competition with European powers drove Britain to establish a presence in Persia. Following the Napoleonic Wars, Russian and British rivalry for influence in Persia often begrudged the country of its sovereignty over its political and economic affairs and ingrained the popular notion of the “deceitful English” (Ingil¯ıs-i pur-tadl¯ıs ) “ominous Russia” (R¯ us-i manh¯ us ). Despite widespread discontent over the Reuter and Talbot concessions and territorial losses in the Treaty of Paris, the British maintained a substantial

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presence in Persia through local consular influence in the south and, later, through its control over the British Imperial Bank of Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. With the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, Persia was effectively divided into British and Russian spheres of influence—further depriving the country of their independence and right to exercise national sovereignty (Dab¯ır¯ı 2007, 39–47). During World War I, the joint British and Russian occupation of Persia under the pretext of Ottoman aggression induced famine and economic hardship in Persia. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution precipitated the withdrawal of Russian forces, allowing Britain to assert its preponderance in Persia. However, the Bolshevik disclosure of a secret 1915 Russian and British agreement to dismember Persia after World War I sparked backlash and contributed to the rejection of 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement that many equated to reducing the country’s status to that of a British protectorate (Ansari 2007, 28–30). Despite the British failure to solidify its political dominance in Iran through the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement, the perceived role of the British in Reza Shah’s 1921 coup influenced the widespread notion that any major political event or upheaval in Iran was “planned and executed by foreign powers through their Iranian agents” (Katouzian 1995, 7). Consequently, the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 and the subsequent Allied occupation of Iran during World War II were seen as part of an elaborate British scheme to maintain influence in the country. Although the period from 1946 to 1978 was characterised by a decline in British influence in Iran, the obsession with the British hidden hand (dast-i pinh¯ an) grew following the American and British 1953 coup d’etat of Mohammed Mossadegh who attempted to encourage Iranian independence through the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The UK and US role in Mossadegh’s coup imbedded the discourse of “28Mordadism”, a reference to the date 1953 coup on the Persian calendar, characterised by the fear of “foreign intervention, colonial domination, imperial arrogance, domestic tyranny, [and] an ‘enemy’ always lurking behind a corner” in Iran (Dabashi 2017, 72). The hidden hand of the British was captured by the satirical novel My Dear Uncle Napoleon whose main motif was that the eponymous character’s obsession with the idea that the English were behind all of Iran’s misfortunes (Behravesh 2011). Across the Iranian elite and popular discourse, Britain’s historical grievances towards Tehran have coloured the assessment of UK foreign

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policy. The persistence of the Iranian narrative about British involvement in Iran has contributed to the present-day inclination to afford an outsized influence on UK foreign policy. Yet, Tehran’s tendency to attribute domestic misgivings to external interference in itself denies the very agency that post-Revolutionary Iran has sought to assert in its foreign policy. 5.2.1

Anglo-Iranian Relations After Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez

The 1968 decision to terminate Britain’s established treaty relations with the Trucial States in the Gulf elevated the importance of the UK’s relationship with Iran. The successful implementation of the British withdrawal by 1971 involved settling Iran’s claim to Bahrain and the dispute between Iran and two Trucial States, Ras al Khaimah and Sharjah, over the Gulf islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa (Mobley 2003). Although Iran relinquished its claim to Bahrain in the spring of 1970, the Shah threatened to oppose the creation of the United Arab States via its influence over the ruler of Dubai until its conditions over the islands were met (FCO 17/1518 1971). Archival documents further attest to the importance the UK attached to the settlement of the dispute over the Islands which the UK viewed as essential for the formation of the United Arab States. The FCO attempted to serve as an intermediary between Iran and the Trucial States though by autumn of 1972 shift to coordinating the timing of the Shah’s occupation of Tunbs with Iran and supporting Iran’s agreement with Sharjah on Abu Musa which effectively placed the islands under Iranian control (FCO 8/1598 1971; FCO 8/1604 1971). In the aftermath of Britain’s withdrawal from East of the Suez, London’s interests in the region became closely tied to its relationship with the Shah who emerged as the regional hegemon through the military and political support of the West. In the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution, the London and Tehran maintained close ties through lucrative defence contracts and investment in Iran which were predicated on the UK’s close relationship with the Shah. The British withdrawal of military forces from the Persian Gulf prompted the Shah’s rapid expansion and modernisation of Iran’s armed forces. Between 1971 and 1976, the Shah purchased naval craft, air defence equipment, and tanks from the UK including 1500 Chieftain

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tanks and armoured vehicles. The emphasis on maintaining close relations with the Pahlavi monarchy, however, led Briton to overestimate the personal popularity of the Shah in Iran and uncritically assess the Shah’s policies (FCO 8/4029 1981). Consequently, due to Britain’s emphasis on its economic and defence ties with the Shah, the UK was slow to respond to the upheaval across Iran in 1978 (Ali 2018). In February 1979, the UK recognised Mehdi Bazargan’s government based on the assessment that Bazargan was likely to continue to have “profitable political and commercial relations” with London (FCO 8/3279 1979, 7). However, following the November 1979 US Hostage Crisis, the UK moved to downgraded its formal diplomatic relations with Iran and maintained a reduced presence through the British Interests section of the Swedish Embassy. Throughout the 1980s, the UK position on the Iran–Iraq War and the subsequent strengthening of British naval presence in the Persian Gulf contributed to the tensions in Anglo-Iranian relations which were compounded by the issue of British hostages in Iran and Lebanon. During the Iran–Iraq War, despite its official policy of neutrality, British foreign policy in the Iran–Iraq War was perceived as unequivocally in favour of Saddam Hussein by the new leadership in Tehran (Chipman 1989, 219– 220; Razoux 2015, 96). Although the UK suspended and terminated its military contracts with Iran including the Shah’s purchases of Chieftain tanks, the UK sold 29 of these Chieftain tanks to Iraq via Jordan during the Iran–Iraq War. Moreover, many in Iran viewed the UK and France as privy to “Iraq’s aggression by not demanding an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal” and during the tanker wars, the UK’s increasing naval presence in “Persian Gulf as part of the shipping protection policy that was seen by Iran as helping Iraq” (Halliday 1994, 312). In August 1988, Iran’s acceptance of the ceasefire for the Iran–Iraq under UN Security Council Resolution 598 was accompanied by Tehran’s shift away from revolutionary calls to export the revolution. After the Iran–Iraq War, Iran’s domestic situation prompted Iranian engagement with the international community for economic development and reconstruction. In September 1988, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati met with his British counterpart Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe at the UN General Assembly which paved the way for the November 1988 agreement to re-establish diplomatic relations between Tehran and London. The embassy briefly reopened with a chargé d’affaires for three months before the Iranians broke diplomatic relations over Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses in March 1989. The

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fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini calling for the assassination of Salman Rushdie impelled all European member states to withdraw their Heads of Mission from Tehran (Rundle 2008, 96). Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait provided the impetus for the UK and Iran to re-establish diplomatic relations and re-open the British Embassy with a chargé d’affaires until 1999 with the full restoration of relations at the ambassadorial level.

5.3 Iran, UK, and Europe: From Critical Dialogue to Comprehensive Engagement The European dimension of British foreign policy towards Iran enhanced London’s ability to pursue dialogue with Iran. Throughout the course of engagement with Iran, the UK “found it necessary not only to work in harness with other leading European states, but also at times to draw on the procedures and resources of the European Union” (Hill 2019, 73) In areas such as terrorism and narco-trafficking, “Britain maintained a strong bilateral focus, but combined this with EU action and dialogue” (Dryburgh 2010, 267). Britain’s role in European diplomacy with Iran displays the interplay between the UK’s multilateral and bilateral approaches to Iran—the former of which evolved into an semi-institutionalised mechanism under the E3. In December 1992, the European Council formally adopted the policy of “critical dialogue” with Iran during the Edinburgh Summit. The core premise of “critical dialogue” reflected the notion that, given Iran’s regional importance, “a dialogue should be maintained with the Iranian Government” while continuing to address “concerns about Iranian behaviour” pertaining to human rights, the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, and terrorism (European Council 1992). As an alternative to negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) with Iran, the critical dialogue was a means of establishing ties with Tehran with the underlying assumption that closer relations with Europe would lead to improvements in Iranian behaviour (Posch 2006, 101). The most important vehicle was the biannual meetings between Iran the European troika consisting of the UK, France and Germany through these meetings devolved into empty rituals due to the absence of a unified policy among the troika (Reissner 2000). The EU’s policy “critical dialogue” came under constant scrutiny from the US, especially after the inception of Clinton’s dual containment strategy. Washington’s opposition to dialogue with Tehran posed

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an impediment to progress for Europe. The divergences between the European and the American response to Iran were not only in the area of dialogue but also in sanctions policy as the EU opposed the Clinton Administration’s comprehensive trade and investment ban on Iran. The EU threatened to challenge the legality of the 1996 Iran–Libya Sanctions Act in the WTO over the extraterritorial application of US law that imposed sanctions to foreign companies investing more than $20 million in Iran’s oil and gas sector (Davidson 1997). As part of a broader campaign to limit the impact of US extraterritorial sanctions, the EU also introduced the Blocking Regulation to protect EU businesses from third parties which would late become and a crucial area of UK united with Europe after Brexit. Eventually, the dispute was resolved in May 1998 during the British EU Presidency which managed to secure a US pledge to waive the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act for EU companies in Iran’s oil and gas sector (PRES/98/162 1998, 8–9). Although US opposition to Europe’s outreach to Iran complicated the transatlantic relations, it was the April 1997 German court ruling that implicated the Iranian leadership in the assassination of Kurdish dissidents which led to the termination of critical dialogue and the removal of European heads of mission from Iran. In May 1997, the election of Mohammed Khatami in Iran and the election of the first New Labour government in Britain offered the context for the re-evaluation of policy towards Iran. Khatami’s drive for investment and discourse about the “dialogue of civilisations” further contributed to the EU’s decision to revise its policy towards Iran and to explore grounds for further dialogue with Iran, beginning with the return of EU heads of mission to Iran in November 1997. Starting in January 1998 during the UK presidency, the EU formulated the policy of “comprehensive dialogue” towards Iran to encompass a broad range of regional and functional issues including Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Israel–Palestine, narco-trafficking, energy, trade, investment, and, for the first time, non-proliferation. The restoration of “EU dialogue with Iran was re-established very much under British initiatives” that resulted in a series of meetings starting in 1998 (Dryburgh 2010, 269). Like critical dialogue, comprehensive dialogue was envisaged to facilitate the exchange of views through series of biannual meetings between Iran and the troika (Posch 2006, 100). However, in addition to expanding the scope of interaction, comprehensive dialogue

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offered the British government with a vehicle to seek a rapprochement in relations. The exchanges between Iranian and British representatives under the auspices “comprehensive dialogue” and through backchannel contacts were positively impacted by the Iranian government’s rebuke of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi proclaimed that the dispute over the fatwa on Rushdie belonged to the past and expressed Iran’s readiness to continue cooperation with the EU. The September 1998 meeting between Kharrazi and his British counterpart Robin Cook at the UN General Assembly provided the basis for the re-establishment of relations at the ambassadorial level one year later. Tehran and London to reach several agreements on cooperation in narcotrafficking and refugees while a series of parliamentary and high-level delegations in 1999–2001 contributed to the growing pattern of bilateral contacts. Multilaterally, between 2002 and 2005, Iran and the EU held negotiations for a non-preferential TCA alongside parallel negotiations on Political Dialogue and Counterterrorism which continued until the resumption of Iranian enrichment under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Although EU–Iran technical working groups dealing energy, drugs, trade, and investment fostered common understandings, comprehensive dialogue did little to resolve outstanding issues relating to human rights or Iran’s nuclear activities. The experience of E3 diplomacy, however, rendered crucial for the future nuclear negotiations with Iran following Britain’s break with Europe during the Iraq War. 5.3.1

Iran and the US–UK Special Relationship: Afghanistan and Iraq

The September 11th attacks led to an unprecedented level of contacts between the UK and Iran, starting with Tony Blair’s phone call with Mohammed Khatami as he flew across the Atlantic to meet President Bush. Prior to the attacks, the British Embassy in Tehran helped supplement US and Iranian backchannel discussions primarily based in Geneva. After 9/11, however, the status of the UK as an intermediary grew in importance “to reinforce a security and intelligence relationship for the US-led coalition to invade Afghanistan, which was in the early stages of being assembled” (Straw 2019, 289–290). Within months of heightened cooperation between British and Iranian diplomats on Afghanistan, relations progressively deteriorated with the Bush Administration’s Axis of

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Evil speech and the disclosure of Iran’s covert enrichment facilities. Rather than serving as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran, the UK became entangled in the decades-long conflict between Iran and the US. Starting in 2002, the UK–Iran relationship devolved with a series of bilateral disputes that was worsened due to London’s special relationship with Washington. Iran rejected the nomination of David Reddaway as the UK ambassador in Tehran who the Conservative Iranian press labelled as a Zionist spy (Hollis 2010, 120–125). Iran’s rejection of the ambassadordesignate appeared as a reaction to London’s support for Washington’s increasingly assertive stance towards Iran led by the Conservative elements in the Iranian leadership. In August 2003, the UK arrested and detained a former Iranian diplomat Hade Soleimanpour—suspected of involvement in the attack on a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires in 1994—for extradition by the Argentina. After the US–UK invasion of Iraq, British foreign policy became closely associated with that of the US. The US–UK campaign in Iraq placed British forces in direct conflict with Iran as in the cases of Iran’s detention of British sailors in June 2004 and in March 2007 as well as Iran’s alleged support for attacks on British forces in Basra via its Shi’a militias. The British Embassy in Tehran would experience protests over issues such as the presence of UK troops near holy cities in Iraq while the UK position on the Lebanese war in 2006, the Israel’s attacks on the Gaza Strip, and its tougher policies towards Iran’s nuclear programme were subject to vocal condemnations by Iranian officials and media. NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan and, later, the US–UK invasion of Iraq made Anglo-Iranian relations particularly sensitive to US foreign policy. Sir Richard Dalton, former UK ambassador to Iran from 2003 to 2006, noted that the UK “had to mediate” Iranian concerns through the US which often failed due to “the limitations in the UK ability to get leverage on the United States’ decisions with respect to Iranian behaviour” (Transcript of Sir Richard Dalton and Sir Geoffrey Adams Hearing 2010, 54–55). British support for the US invasion of Iraq caused many in Iran to overstate the US–UK special relationship and the importance of the Anglo-American axis in British foreign policy. For example, in Iran’s leading foreign policy journal, it was argued that US–UK special relationship is the most important factor shaping British foreign policy towards Iran, which imposes constraints on the development of bilateral relations (Hosseini-Matin 2007, 631).

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5.4

Anglo-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era

Following the 2002 revelations of covert proliferation activity at Natanz and Arak, Iran engaged in a series of negotiations with the E3 to avoid referral to the UN Security Council. The E3 spearheaded negotiations with Iran which led to the Tehran Declaration in 2003 and the Paris Agreement in 2004 (Alcaro 2018). Despite close US–UK relationship in the Blair and Bush years, the British government shared the French and German position on using negotiations with Iran as a means of avoiding a pre-emptive military intervention. Until the breakdown of negotiations under Ahmadinejad in 2005, the E3 provided a diplomatic forum to pursue a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear programme and laid the basis for the eventual P5+1. Additionally, the E3 negotiations resulted in Iran’s temporary suspension of enrichment activities due to the incentives provided by the EU and the additional protocol. Throughout 2005, the situation surrounding the E3 and Iran quickly unravelled. The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2005 set Iran on a collision course with the international community that was worsened by Tehran’s disengagement from negotiations and resumption of uranium conversion activities in August 2005. As a result, in February 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors decided to refer the Iranian nuclear case to the UN Security Council where the UK assumed a prominent role in drafting numerous draft resolutions with France and Germany under the auspices of the P5+1 or E3+3. From 2006 to 2010, the EU adopted a series of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran and eventually moved to adopt multiple EU sanctions against Iran starting in 2010. Although Iranian hardliners continue to blame the failure of the 2003– 2005 nuclear talks between Iran and the E3 on Britain’s reluctance to diverge from the US, Seyyed Hossein Mousavian—Iran’s former nuclear negotiator—contented that the UK’s close relationship with the US was an asset for Iran. Negotiations proceeded along the London–Washington and Paris–Berlin axes which “acted differently and in some ways complemented each other” as the Paris–Berlin axis “strove for international convergence within the framework of the European Union” while the London–Washington axis guaranteed the “external links between the European Union and the United States, given traditional and strategic ties between Britain and the United States” (Mousavian 2012, 90). Others have also noted that Britain’s “dual policy” allows the UK to pursue

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the policies of US against Iran through interference and sanctions while following the EU position of using diplomatic leverage, public diplomacy, and multilateral engagement with Iran (Rahbar and Sahihonnasab 2012, 235–237). The view of UK as a link or balance between Europe and Washington contrasted the state-led narrative propagated by Ahmadinejad to absolve his regime of domestic criticism through the revival of the trope of British interference. The historical legacy of British interference in Iran’s internal and foreign affairs is apparent in the hostility towards the London’s foreign policy intentions across the political spectrum in Iran. With intensification of international scrutiny over the Iranian nuclear programme and allegations of fraudulent elections in 2009, “Ahmadinejad’s vocal exploitation of anti-British sentiment tapped into a latent Anglophobia that enjoyed deep roots in Iranian political culture” (Ansari 2013, 380). Ahmadinejad embraced aspects of Iran’s post-revolutionary foreign policy discourse including historical victimisation and the perpetuation of the West, in particular the UK and the US, as the country’s external other (Adibzadeh 2008). International pressure on Iran allowed Ahmadinejad to respond by “appropriating Mosaddeq helped foster the narrative…that the nuclear crisis was his ‘oil crisis’” and during the Green Movement “the narrative of the coup of 1953 ultimately segued nicely into the narrative of ‘Velvet Coup’ of 2009, with the British once again the villain of the piece” (Ansari 2013, 381). The Iranian official response to Green Movement protests over Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s contested re-election in 2009 was saturated with allegations over Western a “soft war” (jang-i narm) against Iran. Prior to the election, the UK’s explicit commitment for “closely monitoring developments in the presidential elections in June 2009” in the FCO’s 2008 Human Rights Report added fuel to state-led narratives about external interference (Annual Report on Human Rights 2008 2009, 144). The Iranian media contained numerous reports accusing organisations like BBC Persian of propagating fallacious allegations of electoral fraud and to foment internal discord and disunion in society (Dimashqee 2009; Tabnak 2009; Safari 2010). During the Green Movement, nine Iranian employees of the British Embassy in Tehran were detained and later released by Islamic Republic security forces on charges of assisting rioters and protesters. The overt hostility towards the British and its ambassador increased with frequent condemnations and accusations of British interference by

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Iranian officials and in the media (Jam-i Jam 2010, 1). In November 2011, the UK coordinated with the US and Canada to adopt unilateral sanctions that ordered all British financial institutions to halt business with Iran and Iran’s Central Bank in response to an IAEA report on Iranian nuclear weapon designs. A number of Iranian officials and members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly called for the expulsion of the British ambassador from Tehran and the reduction of political relations. The Majlis voted to downgrade links with the UK to the level of chargé d’affaires which empowered students and Basij forces aligned with the hard-line factions in Tehran to storm the British Embassy compounds. Previously, Gholhak Garden and the British Embassy in central Tehran were targeted for periodic demonstrations orchestrated by the Iranian hardliners. However, the November 2011 “exemplified the vehement animosity against Britain that continues to exist in segments of Iranian society” (Mousavian 2016, 85). Although the storming of the British Embassy involved hard-line elements, the UK’s scrutiny over Iran’s internal affairs and human rights abuses and its silence over human rights violations among the GCC states have been used by moderates to highlight the explicit hypocrisy in London’s foreign policy.

5.5

Iran, UK, and the JCPOA

The election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013 paved the way for an improvement in Iran’s relations with the UK and the international community. A prominent message advanced by Rouhani was that Tehran’s foreign policy should build confidence and trust with the international community through constructive negations on the nuclear issue in order to lift sanctions and to resolve the country’s economic crisis (Jami and Firoozabadi 2017). The broader political context also contributed to the path towards normalisation, particularly the Obama Administration’s willingness to engage with Iran through backchannel discussions in Oman during the last months of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. The combination of the Obama Administration’s outreach efforts and the election of Rouhani established the foundation for the P5+1 nuclear talks. Shortly after Rouhani’s election, Iran and the UK began exploring paths for potential normalisation of relations. In June 2013, David Cameron sent the newly elected president a letter expressing London’s desire to improve relations on “step by step” approach (Jam-i Jam 2013, 10). This was followed by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s meeting

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with Foreign Secretary William Hague on the sidelines of the UNGA in September. One month later, during the nuclear negotiations in Geneva, Iran and the UK announced the appointment of non-resident chargé d’affaires “tasked with implementing the building of relations, including interim steps on the way towards eventual re-opening of both our embassies, as well as dialogue on other issues of mutual concern” (UK Policy Towards Iran 2014). Tehran’s primary interest in resuming dialogue with the UK was connected to its broader approach to foreign policy that aimed to build amicable relations with the international community while focusing on the mutual economic benefits of UK investment in Iran (Khalouzadeh 2014). As nuclear negotiations progressed with the November 2013 Interim Geneva Agreement, the UK and Iran also increased their bilateral consultations on the Islamic State and Syria. The UK announcement of its intention to re-open its embassy in Tehran was followed by President Rouhani and Prime Minister Cameron’s meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly—the first meeting between an Iranian president and a British prime minister since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The JCPOA marked a high point in international diplomacy, attesting to the benefits of the UK’s multilateral engagement with Iran and its unified position with Europe. Less than a month after the JCPOA, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond attended a high-level ceremony to inaugurate the re-opening of the British Embassy in Iran (Golpour 2015, 12). As the first British foreign secretary to visit Iran since Jack Straw in 2003, Hammond hailed the “symbolic importance” of reopening the embassy as “the logical next step” after the JCPOA “[to] build confidence and trust between two great nations”. The Foreign Secretary maintained that despite “big deficit of trust” with Iran and “fundamental differences of view” on major issues, “Iran is, and will remain, an important country in a strategically important but volatile region”. The deficit of trust and the fundamental issues that thwarted the development of closer relations in the past did not dissipate in the period after the JCPOA. In fact, many of the Iran and Britain’s divergences in the Persian Gulf and internationally persisted as sources of conflict.

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5.6

Iran and Brexit

The results of the 2016 Brexit Referendum neither instigated a radical shift in Iran’s view of the UK nor contributed to any fundamental changes in the nature of bilateral relations. Iranian assessments of Brexit broadly coalesced around Anglo-Iranian relations, Iran’s relationship with Europe, UK foreign policy in the Persian Gulf, and the US–UK special relationship. In fact, many of the debates and analyses of Brexit and British foreign policy reflected the persistent themes within the Iranian elite and popular discourse towards the UK. 5.6.1

Iranian Responses to Brexit Referendum

The initial Iranian responses to Brexit assessed the referendum through the prism of Iranian foreign policy and the impact of changes in AngloIranian and EU–Iran relations on Tehran’s national interests. Those who viewed the UK’s withdrawal from the EU as beneficial for Iran either accentuated the potential economic and political partnership between Tehran and London in a post-Brexit world or the improvement in Iran’s relationship with the EU through the removal of the UK’s traditionally anti-Iranian stance. Similar themes were accentuated in the more ambivalent or negative projections about Brexit. One argument highlighting the benefits of Brexit on Iran was that Britain would seek to establish relations with countries like Iran to compensate for the decline in economic ties with Europe. In such circumstances, Iran would have greater leverage to negotiate with a weakened Britain that was no longer constrained by EU regulations on trade yet lacked the economic power of the EU. This was also seen as advantageous for the development of Iran’s energy sector with potential investment by BP and Royal Dutch Shell (Duny¯a-yi Iqtis.¯ad 2016a, 5). Brexit was seen as beneficial for moderating the EU’s policy towards Iran since the UK was considered a leading sponsor of anti-Iranian policy in the EU, which London allegedly pursued directly or on behalf of the Washington. As Seyyed Mousavian notes during nuclear negotiations, “it had become clear that the EU’s position was heavily influenced by the UK and that Iran could not have a meaningful economic relationship with the EU if it continued to have poor relations with Britain. One implication of an EU without the UK is that British, and by extension American, influence on EU–Iran relations will be diminished” (Mousavian 2016,

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86). Brexit would allow European countries to distance themselves from the Anglo-American coalition and to adopt an approach more independent from America and “Iran, in the post-nuclear deal atmosphere, will potentially have better chances for interaction with European countries” (Qanadi 2016). For advocates of Tehran’s relationship with Europe, Brexit created favourable conditions for the development of Iran’s relations with European countries beyond the E3. Khorosan lauded the “historical opportunity” created by Brexit to pursue Iran’s Second Europe or Europe-II policy (Rezakhah 2020, 2). Previously, Khorosan published a special issue on the Europe-II strategy for Iran which advocated for closer ties with European countries outside of the E3 that could serve as a bridge to improve Iran’s with Europe including Spain, Italy, Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands (Ur¯ up¯ a-yi Divvum 2014). Though EuropeII proposed a parallel commitment to reaching an understanding of the Iran nuclear issue, many argued that the nature of negotiations limited Iran’s diplomatic apparatus to the UK, France, and Germany. Until the election of Donald Trump, few in Iran considered Brexit a negative development in international relations. The more ambivalent analyses centred on the weakening of the EU and Britain’s adoption of a US foreign policy. Though Iran’s financial and business coverage focused on the disastrous economic consequences of the Brexit for the British economy, many economic analyses looked favourably on the opportunities for Iran (Duny¯ a-yi Iqtis.¯ ad 2016a, 5; 2016c, 1). Early sceptics such as Alireza Akbari, founder of the Tasnim Strategic Studies Centre, lamented that “Britain’s decision to leave the EU…will restrict the course of Iranian foreign policy” since a weakened EU is “fundamentally not in Iran’s interest” due to Europe’s traditional balancing role between Iran and its adversaries (Akbari 2016, 12). In anticipation of the 2016 US election, there was speculation that Brexit would push London close to Washington which would be determinantal to Iran especially “if the next US administration’s policy changes course and is tougher on Iran’s national interests” (Mojahedi 2016). Accordingly, in the Middle East, Britain’s proximity to US policy was expected to increase (Khajouei 2016, 8). A report by Iran’s Institute of Strategic Studies suggested that UK foreign policy will follow the traditional goals of previous Conservative governments in the Middle East which aimed to establish a military bases, sell a significant amount of arms, increase economic exchanges, and overlook human rights abuses in the Gulf monarchies (Ali Vand 2016, 47).

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After the election of Donald Trump in November 2016, the pessimistic outlook of Anglo-Iranian relations dominated the elite discourse towards Brexit and ultimately reflected the regional and international realities constituting both Iran and the UK. 5.6.2

UK–Iran Relations After the Brexit Vote

In the aftermath of the May 2016 Brexit Referendum, the UK initially viewed its relationship with Iran as a potential case for its goal of straddling the transatlantic divide between continental Europe and the United States. This was especially true after the election of Trump, and the fractures between US and European policy on Iran, which surfaced in 2017 and ruptured in 2018. Britain distinguished itself from the US by supporting a blend of cautious engagement on the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile issues yet diverged from Europe by opting for harder line of deterrence on maritime threats. In reality, the UK departed from US objectives and Europe without finding its own vision. This failure was due to domestic cleavages, especially within the ruling Conservative Party, and reflected the deep fissures between pro-EU (doves on Iran and in line with European goals) and hard-line Eurosceptics (more hawkish on Iran and closer to some of the US goals) over Brexit. The Iranian perception of British foreign policy after Brexit shifted substantially following the November 2016 US Presidential elections. In particular, the election of US President Donald Trump strengthened the view in Iran that, in light of the anticipated UK withdrawal from the EU, British foreign policy would face no other alternative that closer alignment with the US. At the regional level, the narrative that the UK would assert its presence in the Persian Gulf at the exclusion of Iran grew in prominence as the UK’s continued its outreach to the Persian Gulf Monarchies. Britain’s close alignments with Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also hurt the UK–Iran relationship, especially with the UK arms sales to Yemen, and these actions have allowed Iranian media discourse to perpetuate old narratives about the aggressive nature of British foreign policy. Notwithstanding the measured normalisation of diplomatic relations, UK–Iran relationship remained beholden to historical mistrust, regional entanglements, and alliances. The following section evaluates the trajectory of Anglo-Iranian relations in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, focusing on the bilateral relationship including the challenges of dual nationals, financial ties, and legacies of interference; the impact of Brexit

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on the UK, Iran, and the Gulf; the European dimension of UK foreign policy with the JCPOA; and the internationalisation of crisis in the Persian Gulf.

5.7

Bilateral Challenges

The re-opening of Embassies and the JCPOA in 2015 offered a basis for a gradual improvement in UK–Iran relations, however, recurrent impediments over issues such as dual nationals, economic ties, and human rights precluded the realisation of closer relations. Bilaterally, Iran’s arbitrary detention of dual nationals including the April 2016 arrest of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe emerged as a central point of tension that became embroiled in a decades-long dispute over outstanding British debt to Iran. After the JCPOA, Britain’s economic ties with Iran faced significant barriers to completing legitimate banking transactions for trade purposes since British banks remained hesitant to handle direct transactions with Iran. Britain’s condemnations of Iran’s handling of human rights and domestic unrest compound these challenges. Yet, schisms in the UK–Iran bilateral relationship after the Brexit vote were propelled by extant divergences rather than emergent conflicts arising from Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. One year after the re-opening of their respective embassies in Tehran and London, Iran and the UK upgraded their bilateral relationship to the ambassadorial level in September 2016. The improvement of Tehran– London relations was considered an important step in Iran’s reappearance as a responsible actor in the international community (Khalouzadeh 2014, 2; Shargh 2016a, 4). Despite the lifting of U.N. sanctions on Iran in January 2016, American primary sanctions against Iran continued to thwart the growth of British-Iranian financial ties after the JCPOA. Much to Iran’s chagrin, British banks remained circumspect over facilitating banking transactions with businesses connected to Iran—a problem that only accelerated with the Trump Administration’s unilateral sanctions on Iran. The Iranian government’s arbitrary detention of Nazanin ZaghariRatcliffe and other dual nationals remained a central issue during both Theresa May and Boris Johnson’s Premierships. Since Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s arbitrary arrest in April 2016, the UK faced significant challenges due to Iran’s non-recognition of dual citizenship and refusal to provide consular access. Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s previous employment as a member of

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the BBC World Serve chimed with the narrative that she participated in an extensive foreign network aimed to overthrow the Islamic Republic (Ebrahimian 2017, 15). The case was complicated by comments made by Boris Johnson during his tenure as Foreign Secretary which insinuated that Zaghari-Ratcliffe had been teaching journalism while in Iran. In late 2017, members of Iran’s judiciary and media reports began linking the issue of dual nationals to the British government’s payment of hundreds of millions of pounds in debt for the Shah’s Chieftain Tanks (Isma’ili 2017, 3). Though the UK and Iran denied numerous reports that the detention of dual nationals was linked to outstanding British debt to Iran, there were reports that Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s release was delayed because the UK and Iranian governments disagreed on the precise interest rate to be paid by Britain to settle 450 million pounds of debt (Jam-i Jam 2017, 1). Britain’s decision to award Zaghari-Ratcliffe with diplomatic protection in March 2019 inflamed criticism by Iranian officials who described it as an act of interference, alluding to the long history of British involvement in Iran’s internal affairs (Ma’sumi 2019a, 5). As in the past, Britain’s emphasis on human rights and response to protests in Iran were points of contention. The Foreign Ministry’s decision to accept the UK ambassador was censured by hardliners who described it as an “illegal” violation of the 2011 Majilis Bill that provided a pretext for spies to operate out of the embassy (Shari‘atmadari 2016, 2). In any major news story involving the UK, the Iranian media continued to invoke a litany of grievances against Britain including the UK’s assistance for Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq War, support for separatist groups, use of media networks such as the BBC to overthrow the Iranian government, and imposition of sanctions on Iran (Karami 2016; Qanadi 2016; Fahri 2019). While the UK’s response to domestic unrest in 2018 and 2019 appears as extensions of a wider US–UK policy that aimed at producing regime, the British Ambassador’s presence at a vigil turned a protest over the downed Ukrainian airlines flight in January 2020 reanimated narratives about the hidden British hand in undermining regime stability. The traditional areas of frictions in Anglo-Iranian relations extended to the regional level, especially surrounding the UK’s relations with the GCC and the Iran–Saudi Rivalry.

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The UK, Iran, and the GCC

Despite the measured improvement of Britain’s relations with Iran under Rouhani, the fundamental differences in the UK and Iran’s approaches to the Persian Gulf security and conflicts in the Middle East posed significant challenges to the bilateral relationship. The UK’s criticism of Iran’s support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria, its use of proxy forces across the Levant, and domestic ballistic missile programme have been accompanied by Iran’s condemnations of the British naval presence, double standards with human rights, and arms sales in the region. The UK government’s attempt to forge closer relations with the states of the Persian Gulf came under increasing scrutiny following critical remarks made by British Prime Minister Theresa May and Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson on Iran’s regional policy. In December 2016, at the GCC summit, Theresa May condemned “Iran’s aggressive regional actions” and declared the UK “will make a more permanent and more enduring commitment to the long-term security of the Gulf” to counter “Iran’s destabilising and threatening behaviour in the region” (Faghihi 2016). Theresa May’s comments were followed by Boris Johnson accusations directed towards Iran and Saudi Arabia of “abusing religion to puppeteer proxy wars in the region”. In response, Iran summoned the UK ambassador as Ayatollah Khamenei blasted Theresa May for “shamelessly” describing Iran as a regional “threat”, adding that “Britain has been the source of evil and misery for the nations” in the Persian Gulf (Jam-i Jam 2016). The remarks provoked a strong reaction across the spectrum in Iran, prompting a slew of analyses about British intentions in the Persian Gulf. Shargh condemned May’s comments as a demonstration that “the conservative administration of the United Kingdom wants to separate itself from the European Union and seeks to pursue a policy of confronting Iran” akin to the US (Shargh 2016b, 2). Johnson’s comments about Iran and, the UK’s close partner, Saudi Arabia were considered as indications of the many contradictions arising from Brexit which also compelled London “to attract the attention of sheikhs of the region” as “compensation for the UK’s economic problems resulting from their exit from the EU” (I‘tim¯ ad 2016, 1). The UK was also accused “playing the Iran card” by instilling fear of Iran with the purpose of convincing Arab monarchies to conclude economic, business, and military agreements as compensation for losses from Brexit (Karami 2016, 2).

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The official responses and critiques towards British foreign policy in the Middle East that surfaced in the Iranian media in late 2016 were consistent with the long-held assumptions about the role of the UK in the Persian Gulf. Many Iranian assessments of the UK illustrate the inherent tension between overestimating the strength of British foreign while reducing the guiding factors in UK policy to bandwagoning with the US or maintaining paternalistic ties with its clients in the Persian Gulf. As an extension of Tehran’s aversion to the presence of extra-regional powers in the Persian Gulf, Iran has frequently rebuked British foreign policy in the region for contributing to the intensification of the arms race and reducing incentives for cooperation among neighbouring countries (Ali Vand 2016, 50). The December 2014 announcement that Royal Navy would re-establish its permanent presence in the Persian Gulf in Bahrain generated additional anxieties about Britain’s desire to contain Iran, which grew after Donald Trump’s election in 2016 (Izadi 2016). Moreover, British arms sales to Iran’s neighbours to curtail Tehran’s regional power and its support for sanctions that limit Tehran’s economic relations have been interpreted as part of a wider strategy designed to negatively affect Iran’s national security (Nataghpour and Vaez 2016, 101–104). Certainly after the Islamic Revolution, Britain considered it necessary to limit Iran’s control and influence in the Persian Gulf as a means of expanding its own influence and control in the region (Sahebi 2012). By late 2016, Britain’s weakness and loss of influence after Brexit became identified as the primary factors determining the UK’s efforts to cultivate close political, military, and economic ties with the Gulf monarchies (Izadi 2016). Nasratollah Tajik, a former Iranian diplomat in the UK, observed that Britain’s attempt to adopt a more independent strategy in political and economic matters from Europe raises the importance of London’s relations with Arab states in the post-Brexit era (Tajik 2017, 1). The conflation of Iran as a threat and the beating of “the drum of Iranophobia and anti-Iranism” became associated with the failure of the “hasty and contradictory policies of London and Riyadh towards Iran” and attested to “the effectiveness and success of Iran’s regional and international policy” (Tafreshi 2017, 6). A report by Iran’s Strategic Research Council found that Brexit was both a symptom of and a factor accelerating Britain’s decline as a global power which could only be salvaged by strengthening the UK–US special relationship. The report forecasted that Britain’s relationship with Iran will be hindered by the UK’s unwillingness

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to jeopardise relations with the Gulf for Iran, the absence of overlapping interests in regional crises, conflicting visions of maritime security in the Persian Gulf, and the pervasive distrust in Iranian society towards the UK (Izadi 2016). Iran’s negative assessment of UK foreign policy in the Persian Gulf contrasted its measured realism towards the country’s support for the JCPOA which demonstrate an implicit recognition of the UK’s compartmentalisation of its policy towards Iran.

5.9

The E3 and the JCPOA

Despite the withdrawal from the EU’s common foreign and security policies after Brexit, the UK has retained a unified position with France and Germany with respect to the Iranian nuclear deal (Brattberg 2020). The transatlantic divisions on the Iranian nuclear deal that arose after the election of Donald Trump elevated the importance of E3 diplomacy which was mostly “insulated from the complexity and politics of the Brexit process” (Billon-Galland et al. 2020, 5). Brexit’s impact on the JCPOA and European diplomacy with Iran are explored with greater detail in subsequent chapters by Alexander Shumilin and Inna Shumilina, Jacopo Scita, and Vladimir Kukushkin. Still, Britain’s commitment to the JCPOA has significant implications both for its relations with Iran and with Europe. Throughout the course of nuclear negotiations, the UK was viewed as a significant bridge between continental Europe and the United States (Khalouzadeh 2014; Tarami and Moradi 2014). After the Brexit referendum, the Iranian press questioned the referendum’s negative consequences for the JCPOA though seldom questioned whether London would remain a party to the nuclear agreement (Duny¯a-yi Iqtis.¯ad 2016b, 2; irdiplomacy.ir 2016). Britain’s commitment to the JCPOA was cast into doubt after the election of Donald Trump as many anticipated London’s progressive shifts towards Washington (Javadi 2016). Despite clear tensions in the Persian Gulf, Theresa May’s emphasis on the UK support for the JCPOA during her meetings with Trump in January 2017 and Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu in February 2017 provided early indications to Iran’s elite on Britain’s intentions with nuclear deal (Sadatian 2017). Britain’s diplomatic efforts to salvage the nuclear deal prior to the Trump Administration’s withdrawal helped quell Iran’s anxieties over Brexit’s implications for the JCPOA. While criticising British

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support for the Saudi military campaign in Yemen and its ties with Washington, the Iranian discourse accentuated the UK’s opposition to US unilateralism through its commitment to the JCPOA. Following the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, the British government worked closely with the E3 to salvage the JCPOA. In response to the reimposition of extraterritorial sanctions on Iran, the EU updated the Blocking Regulation that was originally introduced in 1996 to protect EU businesses from the Iran, Libya Sanctions Act. In addition to transposing the EU Blocking Regulation into UK domestic law, the UK worked with France and Germany to establish the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), special purpose vehicle, to facilitate trade between European businesses and Iran. The UK also took over the joint US–China project for the modernisation of the Arak heavy water reactor, which was part of the JCPOA to redesign the reactor and to make isotopes for medical and agricultural use rather than weapons-grade plutonium. As an indication that the UK intended to diverge from Washington, “Britain’s role in this tripartite effort is crucial” to save the JCPOA as it shows that London can be a reliable partner for the EU despite Brexit (Ma’sumi 2018, 2). The transatlantic schisms over the JCPOA also provided sustenance to the notion that London would maintain its European dimension in foreign policy (Hatamzadeh and Ali Vand 2018, 181–182). Former Iranian chargé d’affaires in the UK Seyed Jalal Sadatian argued that London’s interest in strengthening economic ties with Iran has been an important factor underlying British support for the Iranian nuclear deal despite US opposition. After Boris Johnson’s election, it was speculated that the new prime minister will try to strike a balance between the JCPOA, the oil tankers, and Nazanin Zaghari-Radcliffe rather than aligning completely with the US (Fahri 2019).

5.10

Maximum Pressure and Stena Impero

Throughout 2019, the UK became entangled in rising tensions between the US and Iran which devolved into a diplomatic crisis between Tehran and London over the detention of Grace I off the coast of Gibraltar and Stena Impero in the Strait of Hormuz. As part of the Trump Administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran, the US terminated sanctions waivers for countries purchasing Iranian oil in May 2019, thereby, severing a crucial economic lifeline for Iran. Iran responded by

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increasing its attacks on commercial oil tankers and disrupting global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. London sought to minimise the transatlantic divide between US and European policy on Iran, however, the UK found itself increasingly unable to formulate a comprehensive foreign policy and vacillated between the US and European positions on Persian Gulf security. By late June, Anglo-Iranian relations had become visibly strained after the UK indicated that Iran was “almost certainly” responsible for the attacks on two oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Deputy Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araqchi admonished the UK’s position and claimed that “the British government’s entanglement with the predicament of Brexit has prevented it from having a correct understanding of the global realities”. Araqchi also warned that London’s “immature support for the bully-style measures of Washington will result in nothing but an increase in the Iranians’ historical aversion to the UK policies” (Tasnim 2019). In early July 2019, Gibraltar with the help of the Royal Navy impounded Grace I which was suspected of carrying Iranian oil to Syria in violation of EU sanctions. Khamenei called the seizure of the oil tanker by an act of “piracy” and vowed to retaliate while Zarif scolded the UK for “helping the United States to impose its illegal oil sanctions against Iran”. The UK was also accused of becoming “America’s colony in foreign policy” and attempting “to hold Tehran responsible for the tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf region in order to play a role in the US-intended coalition in this region” (I‘tim¯ ad 2019, 5). In apparent retaliation, Iranian forces seized the British-flag tanker Stena Impero while transiting through the Strait of Hormuz on 19 July 2019 (Iran 2019, 2). Iran’s seizure of Stena Impero occurred against the backdrop of the Conservative Party’s leadership contest which culminated in Boris Johnson’s replacement of Theresa May as prime minister in late July 2019. The Iranian press extensively commented on Boris Johnson’s premiership, focusing on the possible impact of his new political role on the future of Tehran–London relations and the tanker crisis. There was concern that Johnson would adopt a foreign policy more closely aligned to that of the Trump Administration than his predecessor due to Johnson’s campaign promise to leave the EU. The UK’s decision to abandon the prospects of joining the EU-led naval force in favour of the US-led maritime security concept was seen as a clear indication of Boris Johnson’s break from his predecessor’s foreign policy in the Gulf. Days prior to his dismissal and replacement by

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Dominic Raab, Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt sought to rally support for a European-led maritime protection mission to “support safe passage of both crew and cargo” in the Strait of Hormuz (BBC News 2019). Previously, Hunt lobbied against accepting Trump’s proposal for the UK to join a US-led maritime force after the IRGC shot down a US drone in June. Although the UK’s presence in the Persian Gulf increased with the official opening of the Royal Navy base at Mina Salman in Bahrain in April 2018, Britain lacked the capability to spearhead a naval mission without the US or European support. The UK initially adopted a position close to most European governments, including Germany and France, and declined to join the US-led coalition over concerns of antagonising Iran by aligning with the US “maximum pressure” campaign (Ma’sumi 2019b, 5). However, in early August 2019, the UK opted for the USled International Maritime Security Construct over the European naval protection force. By doing so, the UK abandoned its efforts of attempting to protect British shipping without associating itself too closely to the Trump Administration and yielded to pressure from Washington. Following the release of Grace I and Stena Impero, Iran’s Centre for Strategic Research January 2020 report postulated that the UK would continue to expand its ties with Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in addition to providing significant arms assistance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in attacking Yemen (Rahim Bayazidi 2020). Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Security Council Kamal Dehghani Firoozabadi echoed the concerns that British foreign policy will continue to follow those of the Trump Administration and suggested that Iran should seize the opportunity to strengthen its cooperation and bilateral relations with European countries that want to improve ties with Iran such as France, Italy, and Germany. Despite Johnson and Trump agreeing and even likening the British prime minister’s policies to those of the US president, observers noted that he has been able to pursue relatively independent policies on the Iranian nuclear deal (Fahri 2019).

5.11

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, London’s relationship with Tehran remained enmeshed in the regional dynamics of the Persian Gulf and affected by long-held historical distrust. Iran’s initial optimism over the potential economic and political opportunities accrued from UK’s

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exit from the EU faded as the impact of the Trump Administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign overshadowed any prospects of improvement. To an extent, the oscillations between the various vectors of the UK’s engagement with Iran speaks to the complications arising from Brexit. Yet, there is not a single British foreign policy towards Iran but multiple which manifest in their various bilateral, European, and transatlantic dimensions. The ability of the UK to retain a unified position with the E3 attests to the compartmentalisation of the UK’s policy towards Iran.

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Jam-i Jam. 2013. R¯abit.ah¯ı kih shug¯ un nid¯ard [A relationship that does not have a good omen]. Jam-i Jam, October 13. Jam-i Jam. 2016. Jin¯ayat-i Riy¯az.. z¯ır-i S¯ayah-i Landan [Riyadh’s Crimes under the Shadow of London]. Jam-i Jam, December 21. Jam-i Jam. 2017. Janj¯al-i 450 M¯ıl¯ıy¯ un P¯ und¯ı [450 Million Pound Scandal]. Jam-i Jam, November 18. Jami, Morteza Damanpak, and Jalal Dihghani Firoozabadi. 2017. d¯ıplum¯as¯ı-i iqtis.¯ad¯ı-i Jumh¯ ur¯ı-i Isl¯am¯ı-i ¯Ir¯an dar ¯asiy¯a-yi markaz¯ı [Economic Diplomacy of ¯ a-yi the Islamic Republic of Iran in Central Asia]. Fasln¯amah-i Mut¯ala‘¯at-i Asiy¯ Markaz¯ı va Qafq¯az 22: 25–66. ¯ ¯ ık¯a va Bir¯ıt¯aniy¯a Javadi, Mahmoud. 2016. Ayandah-i v¯ızhah-i Rav¯abit.-i Amr¯ dar Partaw-i brigz¯ıt va riy¯asat-i jumh¯ ur¯ı Tr¯amp [The future of US-British special relations in light of Brexit and Trump’s presidency]. Tehran: Markaz-i Tah.q¯ıq¯at-i Istir¯atizh¯ık. Karami, Kamran. 2016. Imt¯ıy¯az’g¯ır¯ı-I Ingil¯ıs¯ı ¯az A‘r¯ab b¯a k¯art-I ¯Ir¯an har¯as¯ı [England Scoring Points from the Arabs with the Iranophobia Card]. Duny¯a-yi Iqtis.¯ad, December 11. Katouzian, Homa. 1995. Problems of Political Development in Iran: Democracy, Dictatorship or Arbitrary Government? British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 22. Taylor & Francis, Ltd.: 5–20. JSTOR. Khajouei, Mahmoud. 2016. Khur¯ uj-i Ingil¯ıs va Miy¯anah [England’s Exit and the Middle East]. Ris¯alat, June 25. ud rav¯abit.-i ¯Ir¯an b¯a Ur¯ up¯a va Khalouzadeh, Seyyed. 2014. Bir¯ıt¯aniy¯a pal-i Bihb¯ ¯ ık¯a [Britan is a step to improve Iran’s relations with Europe and America]. Amr¯ Duny¯a-yi Iqtis.¯ad, September 24. Khur¯as¯an D¯ıplum¯at¯ık. 2014. Ur¯ up¯a-yi Divvum [Second Europe]. 1. Siy¯asat-i Kh¯arij¯ı va Um¯ ur-i Bayn al-Milal. Tehran: Khur¯as¯an. ¯ ık¯a [Europe’s Ma’sumi, Sara. 2018. jang-i siy¯as¯ı-i Tam¯am-i ‘Ayy¯ar-i Ur¯ up¯a b¯a Amr¯ full-scale political war with America], September 16. Ma’sumi, Sara. 2019a. Girah-i T¯azih dar Rav¯abit.-i Tihr¯an-Landan [New Knot in Tehran-London Relations]. I‘tim¯ad, March 9. ¯ ık¯a [Not to the America’s Ma’sumi, Sara. 2019b. Nah bih I’til¯af-i z..idd¯Ir¯an¯ı-i Amr¯ anti-Iranian coalition]. I‘tim¯ad, July 24. Mobley, Richard A. 2003. The Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands: Britain’s Perspective. Middle East Journal 57. Middle East Institute: 627–645. JSTOR. Mojahedi, Mohammad Mehdi. 2016. Khur¯ uj-i Ingil¯ıs az Ittih.¯ad¯ıyah-i Ur¯ up¯ay¯ı: zam¯ınah h¯a, pay¯amad h¯a, va furs.at h¯a [Britains Exit from the EU; Background, Consequences, and Opportunities]. Duny¯a-yi Iqtis.¯ad, June 26. Mousavian, Seyyed Hossein. 2012. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis [Electronic Resource]: A Memoir. Ebook Central. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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Mousavian, Seyyed Hossein. 2016. EU–Iran Relations After Brexit. Survival 58. Routledge: 83–94. Nataghpour, Mehdi, and Mehdi Vaez. 2016. Ta’s¯ır-i siy¯asat-i kh¯arij¯ı-i Ingl¯ıst¯an bar amn¯ıyat-i mill¯ı-i Jumh¯ ur¯ı-i Isl¯am¯ı-i ¯Ir¯an [The impact of British Foreign Policy on the National Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran]. MajallahiSiy¯asat-i Dif¯a‘¯ı 24. Posch, Walter. 2006. The EU and Iran:: A Tangled web of Negotiations. Iranian Challenges. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). JSTOR. PRES/98/162. 1998. 2097th Council Meeting. Press Release. Brussels: European Commission. uj-i Landan a¯z Ittih.¯ad¯ıyah-’i Ur¯ up¯a Qanadi, Ali. 2016. ¯Ir¯an va hamah purs¯ı-i khur¯ [Iran and London’s Referendum to Leave the European Union]. Javan, June 25. Rahbar, Abbasali, and Seyd Javad Sahihonnasab. 2012. Bar ras¯ı-i ch¯alish h¯a-yi siy¯asat-i kh¯arij¯ı-i Jumh¯ ur¯ı-i Isl¯am¯ı-i ¯Ir¯an va Ingilist¯an dar Khal¯ıj-i F¯ars [A Survey of the Foreign Policy Challenges of the Islamic Republic of Iran and England in the Persian Gulf]. Mut.¯ala¯at-i rav¯abit.-i bayn al-milal 5: 213–250. Rahim Bayazidi. 2020. Brigz¯ıt: pay¯amad h¯a va sinaareeuu ha’yi dar sut.u¯ h.-i up¯a) va Bayn al-Milal¯ı [Brexit: Consed¯akhil¯ı-i Bir¯ıt¯aniy¯a, mant.aqah¯ı (Ur¯ quences and Scenarios for the UK at the Regional (European) and International Levels]. Tehran: Markaz-i Tah.q¯ıq¯at-i Istir¯atizh¯ık. Razoux, Pierre. 2015. The Iran-Iraq War. Harvard University Press. Reissner, Johannes. 2000. Europas „kritischer Dialog“ mit Iran. In Die Europäische Union als Akteur der Weltpolitik, ed. Klaus Schubert and Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 173–186. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-93219-8_10. Rezakhah, Ali Reza. 2020. “Brigz¯ıt” furs.at¯ı bar¯a-yi Istir¯atizh¯ı-i Ur¯ up¯a-yi Divvum [Brexit an Opportunity for the ‘Second Europe’ Strategy ]. Khur¯as¯an. http:// www.khorasannews.com. Accessed September 29. Rundle, Christopher. 2008. Iran–United Kingdom Relations since the Revolution: Opening Doors. In Iran’s Foreign Policy: from Khatami to Ahmadinejad, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, 1st ed, 89–104. Reading, Berkshire, U.K: Ithaca Press. Sadatian, Seyyed Jalal. 2017. d¯u hadaf-i “J¯ans¯ un” az safar bih iran [Johnson’s two reasons for traveling to Tehran]. Iran, December 9. Safari, Akbar. 2010. nig¯ah¯ı bih rôle Ras¯anah h¯a-yi b¯ıg¯an’ah dar ightish¯ash¯at-i Saal 88 [A look at the role of foreign media in the riots of the year 88]. Kayh¯an, June 9. Sahebi, Muhammad. 2012. Rav¯abit.-i ¯Ir¯an va Bir¯ıt¯aniy¯a, ch¯alish h¯a-yi Guzashtah va H . ¯al [Iran’s Relations with Britain, Past and Present Challenges]. Fas.ln¯amah-i siy¯asat-i kh¯arij¯ı 26: 421–436.

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Shargh. 2016a. h.amlah-i bih sif¯arat h¯a, samm-i Iqtis.¯ad [Attacks on Embassies, Poison to the Economy]. Shargh, February 1. Shargh. 2016b. Ingil¯ıs dar S.af’A‘r¯ab [England in the Ranks of the Arabs]. Shargh, December 8. Shari‘atmadari, Husain. 2016. ¯In hamah-i J¯as¯ us dunb¯al chih hastand? [What Are All the Spies Looking For?]. Kayh¯an, September 7. Straw, Jack. 2019. The English Job: Understanding Iran and Why It Distrusts Britain. Biteback Publishing. Tabnak. 2009. B¯ıb¯ıs¯ı dar ¯Ir¯an bih Dunb¯al Ch¯ıst? [What Is the BBC Searching for in Iran?]. Tabnak, January 14. Tafreshi, Majid. 2017. Gustarish-i rav¯abit.-i Landan b¯a Am¯an va R¯ı¯az.. dar shar¯ayit.I pas¯a-Brigz¯ıt [Expansion of London’s Relations with Aman and Riyad in Post-Brexit Conditions]. Jam-i Jam, April 4. Tajik, Nasratollah. 2017. P¯ ul-i A‘r¯ab,Vasvasah-i Landan [Arabs’ Money, London’s Temptation]. Iran, December 11. ur¯ıTarami, Kamran, and Iraj Moradi. 2014. Bar ras¯ı-i siy¯asat-i kh¯arij¯ı-i Jumh¯ i Isl¯am¯ı-i ¯Ir¯an b¯a Ittih.¯ad¯ıyah-’i Ur¯ up¯a dar sih dahah-i akh¯ır [Study of the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the European Union over the Past Three Decades]. Mut.¯ala¯at-i rav¯abit.-i bayn al-milal 7: 133–166. Tasnim. 2019. Spokesman Raps British Minister’s Anti-Iran Comments—Politics News. Tasnim News Agency. June 24. Transcript of Sir Richard Dalton and Sir Geoffrey Adams Hearing. 2010. Iraq Inquiry Committee Hearings. House of Lords. UK Policy Towards Iran. 2014. Foreign Affairs Committee. House of Commons.

CHAPTER 6

JCPoA’s Destiny: Europe Between the US and Iran: For How Long? Alexander Shumilin and Inna Shumilina

6.1

Introduction

Amid the claim about its nuclear program to be for peaceful purposes, Iran reached in July 2015 a deal with six countries—the P5 + 1 (the US, France, the UK, China, Russia, and Germany). Under the agreement Tehran assumed commitments to limit the enrichment of uranium, which is used to make reactor fuel but also nuclear weapons; redesign a heavywater reactor being built, whose spent fuel would contain plutonium suitable for a bomb; and allow inspections by a global watchdog. In return, the World community agreed to gradually lift the previously imposed sanctions, allowing Iran to resume oil exports—the government’s main source of revenue. A. Shumilin (B) Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] I. Shumilina Institute of the USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0_6

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On May 8, 2018, the US President Donald Trump officially abandoned the deal, saying it was “horribly one-sided” and needed to be renegotiated, and began reinstating sanctions (White House 2018). The leading European powers—Germany, France, and Britain—have been and remain under enormous pressure from Washington to follow its example to withdraw from the JCPoA. Donald Trump has warned that those who help Tehran circumvent sanctions “will not be doing business with the United States”. The US move has been strongly supported by its Middle East allies—the Gulf Arab monarchies and Israel as well. Thus, a very serious core of negative impact on many sensitive nodes of world politics was created. Among them—there appeared an additional factor to complicate the transatlantic partnership (between the US and the European Union); new problems arose in the EU’s relationship with most Arab countries and Israel, which had fully justified the deeds of the Trump administration; instead of partnership (before the US left the JCPoA), the EU’s relations with Iran became more problematic and contradictory, as Tehran tried to put pressure on Brussels in order to drive a wedge into the American-European alliance.

6.2

The European Arguments in Favor of the Deal

In the course of the year—between May 2018 and May 2019—the EU, nevertheless, remained resistant to the Trump’s approach to the JCPoA. The reason for this seems to lie to a large extent in European fears of the security and economic implications of the JCPoA’s collapse. One of the EU arguments says that there had been no significant reason nor even a pretext for such a harsh American move (withdrawal) given that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the global nuclear watchdog, had repeatedly given Tehran a clean bill of health. Iran had actually been living up to its part of the bargain. Moreover, in the eyes of the Europeans, the JCPoA remains valuable even in the aftermath of the US withdrawal in May 2018 for a number of reasons. The JCPoA is the product of more than a decade of negotiation between Iran and the World Community. And this despite Western worries and fears that Iran’s expanding nuclear program could pose a major nuclear proliferation risk. Especially for Europe, there was concern over the possibility that the US, Israel, or both would launch military attacks on a country of 80 million people. After the invasions of

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Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and amid the protracted Syrian crisis, Europeans have sought to avoid further instability in their southern neighborhood (Lange et al. 2016). All signatories (except Russia) recognize openly that the JCPoA is not perfect for everyone. But it does focus on a political compromise that addresses the core concerns of both Iran and the P5+. According to US estimates, the JCPoA increased from two or three months to roughly one year the period it would take Iran to create a nuclear bomb—its “break-out time”. In return, Tehran received relief from UN, EU, and US nuclear-related sanctions. Under the JCPoA, Iran shipped out 98 percent of its enriched uranium; capped its level of uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent; removed two-thirds of its installed centrifuges; agreed to convert the Fordow enrichment plant into a research facility; redesigned the Arak heavy-water reactor; and provided international inspectors with broader access to its nuclear facilities (Laub 2019). In addition to all this is something no less important, namely, the fact that the JCPoA created a political opening for the West and Iran to gradually ease their mutual hostility on the nuclear issue—and to perhaps work toward eventually normalizing their relationship. As analysts specializing in Iran have noted, this very normalization is something the Iranian hardliners (hawks) have been concerned about (Geranmayeh 2019). The hawks prefer to benefit from the hostilities with the Sunni neighbors and the Western world alike. Any normalization of Iran’s relations with the West has also been perceived as a negative scenario by Iran’s foes in the Middle East. Thus, Israel and Saudi Arabia have stepped up their efforts to precipitate the collapse of the JCPoA. The United States’ withdrawal from the deal and “maximum pressure” campaign—as Trump has called it—is a gift to both those camps (internal and external ones). It is important to emphasize that the EU’s Iranian strategy has been elaborated as a part of a wider European strategy in the region—to maintain balance between Shia Iran and its Sunni foes. Beyond the JCPoA, the EU’s interests pertaining to Iran are (1) to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf region, which continues to be vitally important for global oil supplies and prices; (2) to resolve the conflicts in the Middle East, not least in order to prevent further refugee movements toward Europe in the wake of instability and failing states; (3) to diversify its energy supplies by increasing Iranian imports and reducing Europe’s significant energy

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dependence on Russia; and (4) to boost exports of its industrial goods by expanding economic relations with Iran at a time of weak European growth rates over the past decade. In its dealings with the Gulf region, the EU’s Global Strategy, published a year after the signing of the JCPoA, advocates a balanced engagement: the EU will continue to cooperate with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and individual Gulf countries. Building on the Iran nuclear deal and its implementation, it will also gradually engage Iran in areas such as trade, research, environment, energy, anti-trafficking, migration, and societal exchanges. It will deepen dialogue with Iran and GCC countries on regional conflicts, human rights, and counterterrorism, seeking to prevent contagion from existing crises and to foster the space for cooperation and diplomacy (EU Global Strategy 2016). Contrary to the Trump’s line of the “maximum pressure” on Iran, many European policymakers believe that engaging in trade and rapprochement with Iran should contribute to facilitating change there. The strengths of Europe’s relationship with Iran lie in the central role it has played in the modernization of Iran’s industrial infrastructure in the 1960s–1970s, in the good reputation it enjoys across the Islamic Republic’s political spectrum, and in its substantial role in helping Tehran improve its standing in the international system (Fathollah-Nejad 2018). The process of Britain’s exit from the EU, which began in March 2017, also contributed to maintaining a positive image of Europe in the eyes of the Iranian leadership. Note that in the wake of another crisis in Iranian-British relations in December 2016 Ayatollah Khamenei called Great Britain a “source of evil and misery” in the Middle East region (Khamenei condemns 2016). Against this backdrop, Europe faces growing pressure from the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to downgrade its ties with Iran at all levels and jump onto the “maximum pressure” bandwagon. In an attempt to drive a wedge between Europe and Iran, the US and Poland (with a full support of Israel and Saudi Arabia) convened the so-called Summit on the Middle East in Warsaw in February 2019. It was essentially designed to build a political and psychological wall between Europe and Iran to distance them from each other. It failed to meet the expectations of its organizers due to the relatively low level of the European representation: at that time most European politicians remained inspired by the idea to do their best to salvage the deal with Iran and establishing a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) designed to facilitate trade with Iran.

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6.3 INSTEX---A Way to Pay Without Crossing Iran’s Borders The mechanism (SPV), launched by Britain, France, and Germany to ease non-dollar business deals with Iran, is aimed at circumventing US trade sanctions against Tehran after President Donald Trump withdrew from the 2015 international pact aimed at curtailing Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The targets of the sanctions range from the oil industry to the central bank in Tehran. The SPV—entity is registered in France with German governance (it’s headed by Per Fischer, a German banker) and funded by all three mentioned above countries to insulate international trade with Iran from the impact of US sanctions, which impose harsh penalties on entities trading with the country. The SPV is a company called INSTEX—short for Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges— and had the support of all 28 EU members. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini commented it in the following way: “The establishment of the Special Purpose Vehicle, is, I believe, a step to create mechanism that will allow legitimate trade with Iran to continue as foreseen in the nuclear agreement. So full support from our side” (Mogherini 2018). A central idea of the financial mechanism is to oversee a so-called mirror image transaction system. This would replace potentially sanctionable international payments between Europe and Iran with payments that did not cross Iran’s borders. How is it supposed to work? Under this model, a European fuel trader buying Iranian oil could be matched with a European manufacturer selling machinery to an Iranian company. The European oil buyer would not pay the Iranian seller but would instead send its payment to the European manufacturer. At the same time in Iran, the Iranian machinery buyer would not pay the European seller but would instead send its money to the Iranian oil seller. The system would require Iran to set up its own equivalent of INSTEX—a process that might face both logistical and political obstacles. On March 31, 2020 INSTEX has successfully concluded its first transaction to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to the pandemic-hit country. INSTEX is the focus point of the European efforts to persuade Iran to stay in the nuclear deal, despite the US pulling out. The question,

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however, is—what is more in this European approach’s motivations—politics or economics? Both are on the table, of course, but the economics seem to prevail. The EU has sought to preserve the economic benefits that came from the lifting of sanctions in 2016 and were crucial to Tehran agreeing to curb its nuclear program under the JCPoA. The creation of the SPV came a year after the EU year set up a “blocking statute” to forbid European companies from complying with the re-imposed US sanctions—and threatening legal action against them if they did. Even European diplomats say the financial benefits of the much-delayed SPV are likely to be modest, as most big companies with US business interests will not want to risk antagonizing Washington. Only smaller European companies with no significant ties to the US are likely to risk using INSTEX. Doing so, however, the Europeans likely hope to promote a weighty political argument, as INSTEX shows Tehran—and the US—that the Europeans are serious about the nuclear deal (Peel 2019). Another side of the story: how important is INSTEX to Iran? Iran has welcomed INSTEX as a “long overdue first step” in European efforts to maintain the nuclear deal’s economic benefits. The European move has bolstered Tehran, allowing it to present itself as holding the moral high ground by staying in the accord in the face of the US withdrawal. INSTEX and other European measures to rescue the nuclear deal also feed into Iran’s internal power struggles. President Hassan Rouhani and his allies have staked their credibility on the agreement and its economic benefits. The collapse, or withering away, of the agreement would empower President Rouhani’s hardline foes who opposed it from the start. And yet, in the second half of 2019, opponents of the JCPoA in Tehran began to gain the upper hand over its supporters. The authorities publicly announced their steps taken in violation of the deal, viewing them as an instrument to pressure the EU countries (Iran stops 2019). On January 5, 2020, Iran announced its fifth breach, stating that its nuclear program “no longer faces any operational restrictions”. But it didn’t mean at all the death of the deal—the Rouhani’s team voiced its willingness to “fully cooperate” with IAEA. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s statement implied that Tehran intends to abide by the additional monitoring and verification measures put in place by the nuclear agreement. He also reiterated Iran was willing to return to compliance with the accord if its demands on sanctions relief are met.

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The third side of the story: what was the US response to INSTEX? Quite clear and one-sided: Washington has condemned the E3’s proposed mechanism. A spokesman for the US embassy in Germany said Trump “has made clear entities that continue to engage in sanctionable activity involving Iran risk severe consequences that could include losing access to the U.S. financial system and the ability to do business with the United States or U.S. companies” (Bredemeier 2019). Since the setting up of the SPV, the US has given no immediate sign that it will try to sanction it or the institutions and individuals linked to it. One of the reasons for the US’s being so cautious was that while it doubted that INSTEX could be effective, especially, given the American campaign of putting maximum economic pressure on Iran, this approach could change if the European countries decided to extend SPV’s range and allow it to be used by third countries, particularly India, China, and Russia. Such a scenario could even undermine the entire American campaign against Tehran considering that Beijing and New Delhi have historically been big buyers of Iranian oil, while Moscow helps to trade it. China and Russia are also signatories to the nuclear deal. But any failure in the US policy of financially squeezing Tehran could also play into rising tensions between Washington, on the one hand, and Moscow and Beijing, on the other. As for Russia, during the last decade, it has almost steadily been on the Iranian side politically. It was not, though, totally wedded to economic ties and trade. For many years the impression has persisted that RussiaIran trade is substantial. In fact, it is not impressive, and Chinese trade with Iran outstrips that of Russia by a factor of 25 to 1 (Sazhin 2016). The Russian government encouraged new business involvement in Iran while the P5 + 1 nuclear negotiations with Iran were ongoing. However, Russian business did not like the risks of running foul of Western and particularly American sanctions on doing commerce with Iranian entities. Even Russian advocates of moving toward a “strategic partnership” with Iran conceded that, while Russia-Iran economic cooperation had serious potential, there were no serious achievements because of internal opposition on both sides to moving ahead (Parker 2019).

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6.4

China’s Manoeuvring Over the JCPoA

China played an important role in the negotiations leading to the deal, and together with Russia and the three European signatories has tried to save it after the American withdrawal. Iran-China relations have in recent decades been more trilateral than bilateral, as the UShas imposed its presence to shape those ties one way or another. Washington’s pressure on Beijing has placed restrictions on relations with an ambiguous outcome—shared concerns about US foreign policy have also brought Iran and China closer together, creating grounds for further cooperation (Shariatinia 2019). Chinese expansion in the Middle East as part of the “Marching West” strategy has been significant. Back in the 2000s Chinese engagement with the Middle East was apparently confined to two main priorities. The first was the sale of arms to weapons-hungry client states in the region (especially to Iran). The second was the purchasing of regional energy resources to fuel the ongoing expansion of the Chinese economy (Liangxiang 2005). It is quite reasonable to believe that the energy needs were at the origin of the Beijing’s military strategy in South Asian region since the middle of 1990s. China’s then military concept was shaped by the main objective of ensuring the sustainability of oil supplies from the leading Middle East producers through strengthening its presence in those countries by inter alia delivering arms to both rivals in the Gulf—Saudi Arabia and Iran. To ensure the safe supply of the oil the military protection of the transport sea lines stretching from Chinese seaports to the Persian Gulf region and the Horn of Africa was required. It was soon enough that the correlation between China’s naval power expansion and the rise in its oil import dependency came to surface (Salman and Geeraerts 2013). It was a strategy that allowed Beijing to improve its competitive ability in any potential military dispute with the US. Nowadays the Middle East is more essential than ever for China whose energy consumption has soared with more and more of it coming from the Middle East. The country’s import of crude oil, which accounts for more than 50 percent of total Chinese energy usage, jumped from nearly 6.2 million tons in 2014 to more than 9.25 million tons in 2018, and nearly 40 percent of that total now originates in the Middle East (CEIC 2019). China’s interest in the region is also connected to the Belt and Road initiative (BRI), which seeks to link China to Europe via the

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shortest possible routes, including the Middle East. Any violent conflict in the Middle East might seriously damage this initiative and lay waste an enormous investment. The growing importance of the Middle East in the calculus of Beijing was reinforced in the 2010s in a spate of high-level contacts between Chinese leaders (Berman 2019) and heads of state in the region.1 Whereas in 2008, direct Chinese investments in the region amounted to about $12B, starting from 2014 they have spiralled upwards reaching $28B in 2018 (Murphy 2019). Most of the investments are channeled to infrastructure facilities like ports and airports (as in Oman or the UAE) and civil construction (Algeria, Egypt). Chinese investment in UAE infrastructure, for example, has meant that, reportedly, about two-thirds of all Chinese export to EMEA (Europe, the Middle East, and Africa) transit through these seaports. China has invited the Middle East countries to become founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Ten countries in the region have consequently joined (Egypt, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates), and the promise of bankrolling of infrastructure and development has entered into the calculation of some regional countries when they engage with China in the latter’s peace-seeking efforts (Chaziza 2019). The special interests of Beijing have been clearly observed in its interaction with Riyadh: in February 2019 Saudi Arabia signed more than 30 economic cooperation agreements with China worth a total of 28 billion US dollars at a joint investment forum in Beijing (The Belt and Road News 2019). The multi-billion-dollar deal covers a vast range of sectors, including marine transportation, manufacturing, energy and finance, with the most eye catching of the agreements one that would create the largest ever joint venture between China and a foreign country. To note only one project which is worth more than 10B US dollars—a joint development by Saudi Arabia’s Aramco and Chinese Norinco of a refining and petrochemical complex (located in the Chinese city of Panjin) to produce a 300,000 barrel-per-day refinery. The Saudi producer will have a 35

1 Perhaps the most visible of these was the visit to Beijing of the King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud in 2017, during which the Saudi monarch inked a memorandum of understanding with Chinese president Xi Jinping to explore a staggering US$65 billion in joint ventures. Equally significant were President’s Xi’s 2016 visits to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt, and his subsequent jaunt to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) last year.

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percent interest in the new firm, while China holds the rest. This joint megaproject is expected to be launched in 2024 (Workman 2019). One factor that has led Riyadh to be so responsive to China’s policy has been that the Belt and Road Initiative is very much in line with the Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 program. The last one’s aiming at economic reforms introduced by Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to reduce the kingdom’s dependence on oil through diversifying its economy and reforming other public service sectors such as education, culture, infrastructure, and tourism. Following its above-mentioned priorities in the region (access to sources of oil, navigation safety and now the BRI project), Beijing has been relying on the strategy summarized as “keeping footprint in both rivalling camps economically and politically”—in the Arab monarchies (Saudi Arabia first) as well as in Iran. While sharing the same concerns with the US over the navigation stability in the Gulf, Washington (under Trump) and Beijing differed strongly on the way to ensure it. If Washington aimed at implementing an offshore balancing strategy against Iran by relying on its Gulf allies and Israel, China turned more to an inclusive definition of “security architecture”, moving closer to the Russian vision, which aims to make both Iran and the Arab Gulf countries key pillars for regional stability (Perteghella 2020). Guided by “we don’t mix business with politics” slogan, the Chinese have been aggressively strengthening their position in the Iranian market as well: whereas in 1996–2014 Chinese investments in Iran were a mere $110M, in the period from 2014 to 2018 they reached $2.3B. The trade turnover between the two countries also rose sharply in 2016–2018 (up to $50B per year). However, once Donald Trump resumed anti-Iran sanctions in May 2018, China dramatically limited its cooperation with Iranian partners (Chinese exports to Iran fell from an average of $1.6B/month in previous years to $428M in February 2019). This is a clear indication of Beijing’s unwillingness to face additional obstacles in its already turbulent relationship with the US because of Iran. Another proof of a specific Chinese approach to cooperate with Iran was related to the roadmap document defining the framework of the comprehensive strategic partnership signed in January 2016. In the aftermath of the Trump’s withdrawal from JCPoA, Beijing delayed its implementation until Tehran insisted on relaunching negotiations in August 2019. Iran’s foreign minister M. J. Zarif visited Beijing to present to his Chinese counterpart the first draft of the 25-year comprehensive agreement. Beijing has reacted positively

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to Tehran’s initiatives, as 2019–2020 years were marked by increased trade and economic clashes between the US and China. In this context, preventing the degradation of relationship with Iran under the impact of US sanctions has become a significant task of Chinese strategies aimed at confronting Washington at the global level. The mentioned reducing Iran’s oil exports could be associated with other political and security implications as well, among them anticipated fresh tensions in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Any disruption in the transit of crude oil there would cost Beijing dearly. Additionally, in the worst-case scenario, possible unrest in Iran as a result of US pressure could harm Chinese interests. It could also alter the power balance in the Middle East against China, while affecting Beijing’s dividends from its international BRI megaproject. In these circumstances, China remains keen to balance its relations with the regional powerhouses. China is taking steps to maintain stability and reduce tensions by creating links between the two conflicting streams within Islam—Shias and Sunnis. It is promoting joint Shiite-Sunni initiatives, such as the natural gas pipeline that passes through Iran and Afghanistan, which give both sides a common interest in minimizing conflict. Beijing has taken similar action elsewhere, too, for example by linking the Xinjiang province of northwest China with Shiite Tehran via a high-speed train that passes through the Central Asian Sunni states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Talking about the so-called “China model” of control of its own people through surveillance, censorship, monitoring, and repression, prominent Middle East analyst Daniel Pipes emphasizes that the model itself has become an important export commodity for China especially in the Middle East. He calls it “Hi-tech dictatorship”. The model seems to work. For example, some Chinese companies have helped Iran’s mullahs to stay in power since the outbreak of the Green Movement in 2009. They have taken over nearly all of Egypt’s tele communications, giving President Sisi vast controls to stifle his population. They are also worryingly active in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia (Pipes 2019). In this move, China is obviously jeopardizing the American interests and clout in the Middle East. Much more, by the way, than Russia does in this region. It is not surprising that officials in Washington are increasingly alarmed over China’s growing penetration of Israel’s high-tech sector. After years of systematic investments, they say, the Chinese now directly

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control, or have influence over, as much as one-quarter of Israel’s total tech industry, including defense contractors at work on sensitive projects jointly being developed with the US (Yablonko 2018). They also intimate that, unless it is properly regulated by the Israeli government, China’s growing stake in the country could end up adversely affecting joint projects between the two countries (Abrams 2018). No less senior an official than the US national security advisor John Bolton personally delivered this message when he met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other top Israeli officials for consultations in Jerusalem in early 2019. So, it looks more and more as arm-wrestling between two global powers (US versus China) where Iran is unlikely to play out the card of divergences between those giants in the Middle East. Tehran only makes up 1 percent of Beijing’s total foreign trade, while the US is China’s leading business partner, dominates the global financial system, and remains the world’s biggest market. That’s the reason why the Trump administration’s pressure on any player ready to cooperate with Iran has proven to be working with Chinese companies.

6.5

The EU’s Resistance in Decline

In the middle of May 2019, there were signs emerging to suggest that the effectiveness of the INSTEX might be questioned. Especially with big European companies, most of which pulled out of Iran after the US renewed sanctions in 2018, remain unwilling to risk doing business with Tehran (Wald 2018). First transactions of the mechanism (in particular, medicaments supplies in March 2020 amounting to 500,000 Eur) were criticized by the Iranians. “INSTEX, which is more about politics than economics, has no clauses for the trade of oil, export of which from Iran are supposed to reach ‘zero’ as per the ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions. EU’s fruitless efforts to salvage the JCPOA and the three European economies’ failure on their pledge to protect the Iranian economy, has forced Iran to scale back its JCPOA commitments”,—wrote the leading Iranian newspaper TehranTimes (Parviz 2020). With the limited commercial impact, any decision on whether to open it up to other countries such as China and Russia would be colored by EU states’ own disputes with those countries. The EU’s calculations have grown more complicated because its relations with Iran in other spheres have become more fraught. Recently some leading EU countries imposed their own first sanctions against Tehran since the nuclear deal

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was signed, and that over alleged Iranian involvement in plots to murder political opponents living in France and Denmark. Tehran has denied the claims (Rettman 2019). The EU doesn’t conceal its concerns about Iran’s ballistic missile program and its role in conflicts in countries including Syria and Yemen (Rasheed 2019). In the meantime the renewed US sanctions have triggered an economic crisis in Iran; the currency lost more than 60 percent of its value against the dollar in 2018. Iran’s economy, which shrank by 3.9 percent in 2018, could plummet by another six percent, the International Monetary Fund said. That estimate preceded the latest round of US sanctions on Iranian oil. “The Europeans have betrayed the Iranians because they signed up to a nuclear deal and they gave verbal support, but in reality, they have abided by the dictates of the US president”, said Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran University who was part of the nuclear deal negotiations in 2015. As some prominent analysts believe, the European Union has never had a coherent policy for dealing with the Iranian issue. In fact, the EU had a coherent policy, and it was clearly expressed, for example, in a statement by the leaders of France, Great Britain, and Germany on January 12, 2020. European leaders criticized Iran’s “destabilizing activity” in the region, the destruction of Ukraine’s civil aircraft, and Tehran’s departure from its commitments under the JCPoA. At the same time, the Europeans reaffirmed their commitment to the nuclear deal, inviting Tehran to come back into the agreement (E3 statement 2020). Due to the US sanctions, Iran’s trade turnover with the EU declined significantly in the second half of 2018. According to the European Commission’s official figures, the 28-member union exported e8.9 billion to Iran in 2018, about 17.6 percent less than 2017, while their imports from Iran declined 4 percent year-on-year to e9.72 billion (Khatinoglu 2019). The additional statistics from the above-mentioned source indicate that Iran’s exports to the EU started to plummet in mid-2018, as most European clients stopped buying oil from Iran. The EU’s exports to Iran also dropped in November and December 2018. The statistics indicate that oil and petroleum products constitute about 90 percent of Iran’s total exports to the EU. During the previous round of international sanctions (2012–2016), Iran-EU trade decreased dramatically, but it began to rise again after the sanctions were lifted. Trade with Iran constitutes only about 0.5 percent

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of the EU’s total foreign trade, but the EU has a more than 20 percent share in Iran’s total imports. It is not only the EU that has suffered in trade with Iran due to the US sanctions. China, Iran’s biggest trade partner and oil importer, also decreased trade with Iran during the final months of 2018 (Khatinoglu 2019).

6.6

The EU Becomes Disenchanted with Iran

The information and PR-campaign, launched by Tehran since the summer 2018 within a framework of Soft Power aimed at persuading Europe to resist to the American withdrawal as well as to drive a wedge between EU and the USA. It seems not to have reached its goals. On May 8, 2019, Iran informed signatories to the JCPoA nuclear deal that it no longer planned to adhere to certain “voluntary commitments” made in the accord. The main theses of the new Iranian approach should be enumerated here: • Iran would stop curbing its stocks of enriched uranium and the “heavy water” needed by certain types of reactor to ensure that nuclear fission could take place; • Iran said it would start resuming high-level uranium enrichment if, after 60 days, the signatory states failed to protect Iran’s oil and banking sectors from sanctions; • The country would stay within the terms of the 2015 nuclear treaty, but would revive some nuclear activity that had been halted. The Iranian statement and position were resolutely rejected by the European signatories of the JCPoA. It was countered by the EU’s High Representative and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the UK who expressed “great concern” and strongly urged Iran to “continue to implement its commitments under the JCPoA in full as it has done until now and to refrain from any escalatory steps”. While proclaiming Europe’s “full commitment” to preserving and fully implementing the JCPoA, the ministers confirmed their “rejection of any ultimatums” and their readiness to assess Iran’s compliance on the basis of Iran’s performance regarding its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPoA and the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). In this respect, we recall the key role of IAEA (International

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Atomic Energy Agency) in monitoring and verification of the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments. At the same time, the European ministers expressed “regret of the re-imposition of sanctions by the US following their withdrawal from the JCPoA” (Gov.UK 2019). The constraints on the EU adhering to the deal with Iran are numerous. Among them are those written in the text of the Agreement. They are as follows: in the year 2020, the U.N. ban on Iranian arms imports and exports was to be lifted; in 2023, the U.N. ban on assistance to Tehran’s ballistic missile program expires, while Iran would be able to restart manufacturing advanced centrifuges; in 2026, most restrictions on the nuclear program will end, and five years later, all of them will be lifted. At each of these stages, given the ongoing US–Iran conflict of which the nuclear crisis was merely a symptom, an international crisis could be triggered anew. On the other hand, enough time has passed to allow for an assessment of the impact of the deal on Iran’s foreign policy, most notably its ballistic missile program and its regional interventions (in Syria, Iraq, Yemen)— issues that had been sidelined in the negotiations in 2015. Despite the political difficulties of successfully addressing many of those issues during the talks, their omission has borne the potential for future conflict, jeopardizing the viability of the agreement. “The opportunity was missed to effectively use the JCPoA as the start of a process to address larger issues of concern in Iranian–Western relations, rather than as an end-game in itself, as the EU has preferred to view it”—underscores the author of the Brookings report on the issue (Fathollah-Nejad 2018). One of the rationales behind the JCPoA was the idea that trade and political rapprochement would be beneficial to contributing implicitly to an opening in the Islamic Republic. In Germany in particular, and in Europe in general, the renewal of economic and political ties with Iran has been rationalized in the public policy sphere as part of a policy of “change through trade and rapprochement” (CTTR). The CTTR approach originated in the context of then-German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s policy. This strategy has often been invoked in the EU’s relations with autocratic regimes. At least in the public policy sphere, Europe expected that the JCPoA deal would have a positive effect on Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. However, a sober assessment reveals that change has not materialized in any sphere—neither in the human rights situation, nor in the consumption and redistribution of the JCPoA’s economic dividends as had been

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expected to empower the reform-minded middle class, and ultimately to cultivate a gradual process of democratization. “Europe has succumbed to the fallacy of extrapolation by assuming that the constructive engagement policy, which led to the JCPoA, would translate into similar changes in Iran’s regional policies”—concluded Fathollah-Nejad’s report for Brookings (Fathollah-Nejad 2018). European analysts and policy-makers prefer, however, a much more complicated prism to compare with their American colleagues to consider and perceive the Iranian issue through. But, a military option seemed ever more possible after May 2019 in the Persian Gulf, due to the American strike force deployment—one regarded in Europe as an alternative which should be avoided by any means, despite the limitations of JCPoA.

6.7

Conclusion

Despite the enormous PR-efforts launched by Tehran to drive a wedge between the Transatlantic allies (the US and the EU), the fact is that the Islamic Republic has not succeeded much in facilitating effective and sustainable cooperation with Europe. Iran itself has resisted calls to implement the requirements of the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. At the same time, Tehran-affiliated agents have tried to carry out assassination and bombing plots on European soil even despite Trump’s pullout, damaging any political and diplomatic efforts to build constructive ties between Iran and Europe. Many pundits have tended to conclude that Europeans seem to be less concerned about a nuclear Iran per se than are about the consequences of a possible military attack against Iran launched by the US or Israel and its Arab allies. The paradox is largely that the EU’s political strategy to resist the Trump’s policy toward Iran has been jeopardized by most of the major European companies’ preferences to opt for their presence in the American and international markets rather than to insist to remain in Iran. The EU’s Blocking statute enacting seems to be a remedy only for minor and small business companies in Europe. Given that many of the European politicians—while formally resisting Trump’s approach to Iran—were trying to draw a compromise formula to ease the tension with the US over this issue. President Biden’s intention to come back to the nuclear deal gives hope that the Europeans will be able to get rid

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of the ambiguity in their position on Iran that characterized their behavior during the Trump era. The restoration of mutual understanding and allied relations between Brussels and Washington under Biden increases the value of the EU in the eyes of Tehran, primarily as a mediator between Iran and the US. Judging by the latest steps, the Iranian leadership is ready to move away from its previous conditions of returning to a dialogue with the US (“first, Washington lifts the sanctions, after which Tehran is taking reciprocal steps”). Now the Iranian Foreign Ministry offers the European Union to synchronize the steps of both sides toward each other. According to Zarif, the head of European diplomacy J. Borrell could become “sort of choreograph the actions that are needed to be taken by the United States and the actions that are needed to be taken by Iran” (Iran 2021). With Biden in the White House, Europeans are entering a new state of affairs regarding their relations with Iran—this is not only a chance to part with the aforementioned ambiguity of their policy in this direction, but it is quite likely to end disillusionment with earlier expectations that Iran’s constructive engagement with the West would translate into the moderation of its regional policies. In reality, President Rouhani’s policy of moderation toward the West and on the nuclear issue has been effectively undercut by an increasingly assertive and expansive Iranian regional policy run by the IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s Office. Expectations of moderation in Iran’s domestic politics and regional policy have not come about. That was one of several reasons why the European reaction to the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, Al-Quds (IRGC) commander in January 2020 proved to be so moderate—even perceived by some Iranians as pro-American. Angered, Tehran threatened the EU with ignoring the JCPoA. The UK, France, and Germany have, in their turn, triggered the agreement’s dispute resolution mechanism. That caused more tension in the relationship between the two sides. In addition, the EU proved to be supportive of the normalization agreements signed by the UAE and Bahrain with Israel in September 2020. This process of rapprochement between the Gulf monarchies and Israel is widely believed to be aimed at confronting Iran. In Iran, the human rights situation and socioeconomic conditions have even worsened. Economically, the Islamic Republic’s elites benefited from the JCPoA process, while most Iranians did not. Disillusionment spread among Iranians, ultimately paving the way to the 2017–2018

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revolt. Externally, Iran has pursued its goal of retaining and expanding its regional power with more intransigence. This policy, in turn, has fueled the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and helped escalate tensions with Saudi Arabia and Israel, two important EU partners. The balancing act between maintaining the EU’s close relationships with these partners and simultaneous rapprochement with Iran has created a tension that risks turning into open confrontation, putting the EU in a difficult position. It cannot be ruled out that a first Iranian strike would be targeting Israel, to which it would certainly respond. “Things are heating up” in the Gulf—such as the recent assessment of the situation in the region by some members of the Israel cabinet. Trade and efforts at rapprochement toward Iran have not set the stage for change. In fact, the EU’s Iran policy has had more similarities with other policies toward maintaining stability with other authoritarian states, similar to those pursued over the last decades with other autocracies in the Middle East and North Africa region. The EU, nevertheless, remained resistant to the Trump’s approach to the JCPoA. Why, then? The answer seems to lie to a large extent in European fears for the security and economic consequences of the JCPoA’s collapse. The advent of Joe Biden to the White House is the main source for optimism in this regard.

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Liangxiang, J. (2005) China and the Middle East: Energy First. Middle East Quarterly, Spring, pp. 3–10, https://www.meforum.org/694/energy-first. Accessed September 14, 2020. Murphy, D. (2019, April 29) The UAE Signed a Massive, $3.4 Billion Deal with China—And That ‘Isn’t a Surprise. CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/ 2019/04/29/china-uae-trade-deal-on-belt-and-road-isnt-a-surprise-wef-pre sident.html. Accessed August 15, 2020. Parker, J. (2019) Between Russia and Iran: Room to Pursue American Interests in Syria. Washington, DC, INSS Strategic Perspectives 27, https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1723239/between-rus sia-and-iran-room-to-pursue-american-interests-in-syria/. Accessed August 21, 2020. Parviz, S. (2020, July 29) INSTEX: Europe’s fragile muscle flexing. Tehran Times, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/450640/INSTEX-Europe-s-fra gile-muscle-flexing. Accessed March 21, 2021. Peel, M. (2019, February 4) Can Europe’s New Financial Channel Save the Iran Nuclear Deal. FT , https://www.ft.com/content/bd5a5046-27ad-11e988a4-c32129756dd8. Accessed July 15, 2020. Perteghella, A. (2020, March 10) Is China a Security Force for the Persian Gulf? ISPI , https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/china-sec urity-force-persian-gulf-25358. Accessed March 16, 2021. Pipes, D. (2019, September 10) How China Disrupts the Middle East. The Washington Times, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/ sep/10/how-china-disrupts-the-middle-east/. Accessed May 12, 2019. President Donald J. Trump Is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal (2018, May 8) The White House, https://www.whiteh ouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-sta tes-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/ . Accessed August 15, 2020. Rasheed, Z. (2019, May 10) ‘Dangerous Game’: US, Europe and the ‘Betrayal’ of Iran. Al-Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/game-eur ope-betrayal-iran-190508204815694.html. Accessed August 29, 2020. Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council. EU (2018, December 10), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/55182/rem arks-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-press-conference-fol lowing_en. Accessed July 16, 2020. Rettman, A. (2019, January 9) Iran Blamed for Four Terror Plots in EU . EUobserver, https://euobserver.com/foreign/143854. Accessed August 12, 2020. Salman, M., Geeraerts, G. (2013) The Impact of Strategic Hedging on the Foreign Politics of Great Powers: The Case of Chinese Energy Strategy in the Middle East. Bremen, Germany: Jacobs University.

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Sazhin, V. (2016) “Iran–Russia Strategic Partnership at the New Stage: What Could We Propose to Each Other?” in the “Russia–Iran Partnership: An Overview and Prospects for the Future”, edited by Igor Ivanov. Moscow: RIAC. Shariatinia, M. (2019, May 13) Will China Play a Role in Lessening US Pressure on Iran? Al-Monitor, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/ 05/iran-china-jcpoa-nuclear-deal-oil-imports-trump-sanctions.html#ixzz64 QenRBPL. Accessed August 18, 2020. Wald, E.R. (2018, June 6) 10 Companies Leaving Iran as Trump’s Sanctions Close In. Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2018/06/ 06/10-companies-leaving-iran-as-trumps-sanctions-close-in/#db1149ac90ff. Accessed May 9, 2020. Workman, D. (2019, October 6) Top 15 Crude Oil Suppliers to China. World’s Top Exports, http://www.worldstopexports.com/top-15-crude-oil-suppliersto-china/. Accessed July 9, 2020. Yablonko, Y. (2018, October 30) Chinese Take Growing Slice of Israeli Tech Investment. Globes, https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-chinese-take-growingslice-of-israeli-tech-investment-1001258499.

CHAPTER 7

Assessing the Potential Impact of Brexit on the E3/EU’s Iran Policy Jacopo Scita

7.1

Introduction

More than 4 year after the June 2016 referendum, Brexit is still an unresolved issue. While the long-term effects of leaving the European Union are hard to be predicted, it appears clear, though, that Brexit is likely to become a major puzzle for British foreign policy. London’s participation in the external activities of the EU will decrease in influence and weight substantially, although the new independence will open a complex process of policy redefinition (Chalmers 2017). As the first step, the United Kingdom is likely to focus on regions and countries with which it shares historical links. The Persian Gulf is certainly among them (Kinninmont 2016). But regarding Iran, history shows a bitter, intricate, seesawing relationship. When it comes to international politics—and to social sciences in general—predictions often, if not always, tend to fail. Complex events are hard to be controlled and thus predicted because they are the result

J. Scita (B) Durham University, Durham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0_7

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of multiple variables, unexpected turns, non-predictable choices and the interplay of often contradictory interests. For all these reasons, the aim of this paper is not to predict the future of UK-Iran relations or of the Nuclear Deal. Vice versa, drawing on the role played by the E3 (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) in first approaching Tehran in 2003 and setting the framework for the EU involvement in Iran nuclear issue, the present work argues that Brexit risks to represent an abrupt interruption of the constructive path that has begun in 2003. What follows is divided into two major parts. Part one explores the role that the E/3EU had in the 12 years of seesaw negotiations that led to the 2015 JCPoA. From the initial activity of the E3 to the formation of the P5 + 1, the role of the Europeans in engaging Iran has evolved in its scope and actions. Along this evolutionary process, contrasts have emerged between Brussels and Washington (Cronberg 2017: p. 251). Britain has been crucial in the path of building and strengthening the joint European effort to promote a constructive, internationally agreed solution of the Iran nuclear issue. This was mostly imputable to the success of the E3 as a “contact group” (Alcaro 2018) and as a trigger of EU engagement. Thus, the first section starts by addressing the genesis of the E3 group, while the following one explores the distinctive approach took by the Europeans in dealing with Iran. Finally, the last section of part one builds upon the previous two to define how the effort of the E3, through its distinctive approach, became part of EU foreign policy identity. Part two considers the effects that Brexit may have in undermining the European effort to keep the JCPoA alive. The perspective here builds on what emerged from the previous sections of the paper, suggesting three macro problems that Brexit may generate to the E3/EU agenda vis-à-vis the Iranian dossier. London’s role should be understood in the context of a broader political construction, which has in today’s active role of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, its ultimate manifestation. Undermining this process may reverberate on the role played by Britain in future diplomatic activities between the EU and Iran. Thus, the first section of part two considers the volatile history of British-Iranian relations, considering it as a potential obstacle in the post-Brexit scenario. Then, the following section examines the effects that the interplay between Brexit and a growing transatlantic pressure may have on London’s effort to keep its Iran policy harmonised with the one of the E3/EU group. Finally, the

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last section addresses the potential impact of Brexit on the process that has created and reinforced a distinctively European foreign policy identity vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear question.

7.2

Building a Joint European Strategy Towards Iran

On May 4, 2019 the European External Action Service (EEAS) issued a joint statement signed by the High Representative of the European Union, Federica Mogherini and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The statement complained about the ‘decision of the United States not to extend waivers with regards to trade oil with Iran’ (2019). Notably, the declaration began with the world “we”, exactly as the August 2018 joint statement in which the E3/EU group ‘deeply regret the re-imposition of sanctions by the US, due to the latter’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’ (European External Action Service 2018). The same formula was once again adopted on September 2019, when, in the context of the annual United Nation General Assembly, the E3 issued a joint statement condemning Iran for the attacks on the Saudi territory on September 14. Even in that occasion, France, Germany and the United Kingdom reaffirmed their commitment to the JCPoA, urging Tehran to accept negotiations on a long-term framework for its nuclear programme as well as on issues related to regional security, including its missiles programme and other means of delivery. (United Kingdom Prime Minister’s Office 2019)

All these statements reflect a language of unity among the European signatories of the Iran Deal, as well as a strong interest in opposing Washington’s decision of withdrawing from the agreement and re-imposing secondary sanctions on Iran unilaterally. In more practical terms, the E3/EU commitment to the JCPoA was demonstrated—despite the transatlantic pressure—by the creation of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to be used as a payment channel for European firms to avoid Washington’s sanctions. Jeremy Hunt, the former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, declared that INSTEX (Instrument of Support of Trade Exchange) “is a clear, practical demonstration that we [the E3/EU] remain firmly committed [to the Deal] for as long as Iran

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keeps implementing it fully” (Erlanger 2019). Despite being an important and welcomed step, INSTEX seems intended as an initial step for small European companies trading in humanitarian goods only. The E3/EU effort to keep the JCPoA alive is rooted in the long and complex process that began in 2003—when the E3 firstly engaged the Islamic Republic in nuclear talks—and resulted in the 2015 Deal between Iran and the P5 + 1. In 12 years, the process has evolved, the actors involved changed in number and scopes, it suffered long and dramatic halts and has shown the distance between the EU and the United States. But the European footprint remained clear all along with the negotiations and the role of France, Germany and the United Kingdom crucial.

7.3

Engaging Iran: The Genesis of the E3

The E3 is a quintessential example of the EU lead groups. According to Riccardo Alcaro, ‘EU lead groups are an informal crisis management practice involving a limited number of member states supported by EU institutions’ (2018: p. 23). As emerge from this definition, lead groups are not strange in respect of EU foreign policy—they are directly or indirectly welcomed and supported by EU institutions—but, at the same time, they maintain a certain degree of autonomy and unicity. The support of EU institutions gives to lead groups both a degree of legitimacy—as supranational subjects part of an established political actor—and a defined perimeter of action—the set of values, norms and practices that defines the European foreign policy. The E3 group emerged as an attempt by the Europeans to engage Iran and avoid a potential crisis without being stuck into the complex and often inefficient mechanisms of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (Bassiri Tabrizi et al. 2018: p. 2). The trigger was ‘the heated atmosphere’ (Alcaro 2018: p. 62) generated by the revelations made by an Iranian dissident group, the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), of the existence of covert nuclear facilities in Tehran (Axworthy 2014: p. 382). Tensions rose quickly at the point that a US or Israel-led attack against Iran’s facilities was a concrete option (Keller 2003). Interestingly, despite its nature as the contact group, the E3 format remained in place for more than a decade, continuing to act in concert with the High Representative even after the approval of the JCPoA. Despite its remarkable longevity—which may be understood as a sign of strong unity among the members—the E3 group was not originally

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thought to include the United Kingdom. According to the incumbent French ambassador to the United States Gerard Araud, the idea of establishing direct contacts with Iran came from France. However, Paris’ intention was to drag into the initiative Germany and Russia. Eventually, Russia was excluded in favour of the United Kingdom with the objective ‘to have the British as a sort of bridge toward the Americans’ (Davenport and Philipp 2016). Ambassador Araud’s explanation appears more than plausible. London’s special relationship with the US at that time was particularly firm, reinforced by the good relation between Tony Blair and George W. Bush. The British Prime Minister, indeed, actively supported the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Tripp 2010: p. 273) and remained aligned with Washington’s Iran hawks even after the end of his office, suggesting the use of force as a possible option to halt Tehran’s nuclear programme (Tran 2010). Therefore, London acted as a bridge between the two shores of the Atlantic, in virtue of both the special relationship and the clear convergence between Bush and Blair on the use of force as an option to resolve crises in the Middle East. This attitude coexisted, however, with the strong interest of the British to increase their influence in the European Union. A strong working relationship with France and Germany, the two most powerful European actors, was a precondition to achieve that result (Alcaro 2018: p. 102). London’s role within the E3 was and remains the most interesting and complex. Without a channel with the United States—and ultimately without the external approval of Washington—it would have been unlikely that any contact between the Europeans and Iran could have led to achieving significant results. However, as will be explained in more detail later, the British special relationship with Washington was, and still is, problematic for Tehran and the E3/EU group itself. Therefore, the inclusion of the United Kingdom in the E3 was possible and successful because of the mitigation role played by France and Germany. In other words, the success of the E3 in engaging Iran can be attributed to its novel nature of interest-driven contact group. The French Ambassador Araud is helpful in clarifying what triggered the European interest in negotiating with Iran after the 2002 leaks:

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For us, the issue of Iran nuclear power was twofold. First it was regional. We were convinced that Israel wouldn’t accept the prospect of a nuclear Iran, and that would lead to a military option, with all the political consequences of the region. Secondly, even without an Israeli military operation, it would mean the end of nonproliferation system. [...] There was a strong risk that the neighbors of Iran would follow and become nuclear powers. That would have been the end of the nonproliferation system. (Davenport and Philipp 2016)

A strong commitment to avoid another military conflict in the region and the need for safeguarding nonproliferation pushed France, Germany, the United Kingdom and, more broadly, the Europeans to take an active stand on Iran nuclear issue. Europeans demonstrated their support for a rule-based, peaceful interpretation of the international order. Such an approach found interest ears among Mohammad Khatami’s moderate government, which defended the right of pursuing a peaceful nuclear program under the rules of the NPT but who was also prone to establish a dialogue with the West. A more detailed account of the motivations of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom can be done. Alcaro finds at least three areas in which Tehran’s nuclear ambitions collided with European interests: security, normative definition, and economy (Alcaro 2018: p. 100). The risk of proliferation in the Middle East seemed concrete and particularly dangerous for regional security. France and Germany, which both condemned the US-led invasion of Iraq, were worried about the possibility of another major regional conflict in the region. On its side, London ‘had understandable worries that an open conflict with Iran would put British troops deployed in southern Iraq […] in jeopardy’ (ibid.). As clarified by Ambassador Araud, the risk of a spill-over effect generated by Iran nuclear programme that would have blown the non-proliferation regime in the region and beyond appeared concrete and potentially uncontrollable. On the other side, the Europeans did find some potential opportunities in the crisis. Germany and France had relevant economic interests in Iran and, more broadly, continental Europe has always shown the will of doing business with the Islamic Republic (Mousavian 2016: p. 83). Finding a positive solution to the nuclear issue would have put the Europeans in a favourable position vis-à-vis the potentially lucrative Iranian domestic market and Tehran’s oil. This was proved after the approval of the JCPoA

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when the EU-Iran trade increased substantially (see BBC 2018b; CiminoIsaacs et al. 2019). Moreover, the crisis was a good occasion for the Europeans to reassert the EU ambition of becoming an effective global player and bolstering internal unity (see L˘as¸ an 2015: p. 11; Cronberg 2017: p. 246; Alcaro 2018: p. 101). To sum up, the E3 group was formed as a direct response to the risk of conflagration following the revelation of Iran’s covert nuclear activities. It was shaped within the normative boundaries of the EU foreign policy but, initially, acted independently, avoiding the pitfalls of the CSFP. However, the main virtue of the E3 was in its capability of promoting a distinctively European approach to the resolution of Iran nuclear issue. That approach brought together the EU commitment to a rule-based international system with the necessity of keeping the connection with Washington alive. This was possible thanks to the bridging role of the United Kingdom. However, that approach has remained distinctively European despite the pressure coming from the United States. Effective multilateralism is discussed in the following section.

7.4

A Distinctively European Approach Despite Transatlantic Differences

In a powerful article published in The Nonproliferation Review, Tarja Cronberg explores, with reference to the negotiation that led to the Iran Deal, the existing juxtaposition between the concept of effective multilateralism—as articulated by the European Security Strategy after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq—and the assertive multilateralism adopted by the United States (Cronberg 2017). Cronberg’s argument is particularly interesting because it traces the foundation of the E3/EU effort to engage Iran back to a specific vision of multilateralism, something that, in its principles, even preceded the urgency of the issue itself. This vision was shaped by a strong dissatisfaction towards Washington vision and policies: Effective multilateralism was an explicit critique of the US behaviour in Iraq. Iraq was a case of ineffective unilateralism. In the view of the EU, at least, the US should have left the IAEA finish their work with inspections and consult the UN. My preference is that there always is a legal framework. (ibid.: p. 244)

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Those words came from an interview collected by the author with a former senior EEAS official. In Summer 2002, the NCRI revealed the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Tehran. The leak triggered the inspections of the IAEA, but also increased the level of the confrontation between Iran and Washington. Evidence of Tehran actively pursuing nuclear weapons would have ‘possibly, if not eventually, lead to a US or a coordinated US-Israeli bombing campaign’ (Alcaro 2018: p. 101). The context was boiling. In early 2002 George W. Bush pronounced the infamous “Axis of Evil” speech in which he declared that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were the main threat to the peace of the world (Bush 2002). Then, in March 2003 the coalition led by the United States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq. Notably, the US decision to invade Iraq was not supported by a mandate of the Security Council. This lack of international, multilateral recognition was, as stated by the official interviewed by Tarja Cronberg, the trigger for articulating an alternative European approach to international crises. Despite having been part of the coalition that invaded Iraq, United Kingdom embraced the newly articulated EU foreign policy vision and eventually became part of the E3 group that engaged Iran diplomatically in late 2003. As demonstrated by the articulation of a distinctively European vision of multilateralism after the US invasion of Iraq, the EU has shown a remarkable commitment to the rule of law in the international context, empowering the role of the United Nations Security Council as ‘the indispensable authority’ (Cronberg 2017: p. 245) and demonstrating concern for the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, divergences with the United States were not new and can be traced back to 1992 when the EU adopted ‘a strategy of “constructive engagement” vis-à-vis Tehran (Harnisch 2020). In other words, the trauma of the US unilateral invasion of Iraq, as the threat of a similar campaign in Iran, reinvigorated the European self-awareness of being an actor committed to a peaceful, rule-based, and diplomacy-based vision of international relations. Therefore, one of the main goals of the E3/EU groups was ‘to make “multilateralism effective” again’ (ibid.) as an instrument to resolve a potentially disruptive regional crisis. Some have deemed this position as weak (see Everts 2001; Kagan 2002), but it marked a fundamental difference from Washington’s attitude (Fiedler 2018: p. 295). Arguably, without the European distinctive approach, engaging Iran constructively would have been much harder.

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Despite a remarkably divergent approach, during the long path towards the approval of the JCPoA European and American interests ‘fluctuated between complete opposition to cooperation’ (Cronberg 2017: p. 253). To overcome, or at least control, these differences, the E3/EU group took the leadership of the nuclear negotiations with Iran, approaching Tehran first, setting the agenda and then adapting its own role to the different phases of the process. Different voices, even from the former US administration, have spoken in favour of the EU’s role in the negotiations, stating that, without the EU, ‘there would today be no deal’ (ibid.: p. 254). This may be ungenerous in respect of the role played, for instance, by the Obama administration during its second term or the ones played by Russia and China (see Esfandiary and Tabatabai 2018; Garver 2018). But what is substantially undeniable is the distinctively European character of the JCPoA. That European character emerges from at least three distinctive features. Firstly, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was endorsed by the Resolution 2231 of the United Nations Security Council. Besides the Deal, Iran agreed to implement an Additional Protocol discussed with the IAEA and in accordance with NPT (Center for Arms Control and NonProliferation 2015). Arguably, these are clear indicators of the success of the European strategy of regulating the Iran nuclear question through the existing relevant multilateral institutions and treaties. Secondly, the Iran Deal was a success of patience and diplomacy. The E3/EU group designed its approach towards Iran in accordance with the principle of effective multilateralism, which, as already stated, was to a large extent a direct response to the aggressive, unilateral approach adopted by the United States to confront Iraq in 2003. European diplomacy-oriented approach was relevant in avoiding a military confrontation between the Islamic Republic and the US. Europeans showed remarkable strength in taking distance and directly opposing Washington when the attitude of the latter conflicted with the principles of effective multilateralism. Considering that ‘no other regions of the world are as closely connected in economics, security and politics as Europe and the US’ (Riddervold and Newsome 2018: p. 505) and that one of the members of the E3 was part of the coalition that invaded Iraq, this is even more remarkable. Lastly, Europeans were able to approach Tehran through the alternative format of the E3 (Alcaro 2018: p. 4), signalling a potentially interesting and innovative pattern in which the European foreign policy

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is pushed and led by subgroups and then reinforced in its formal dimension by the direct involvement of the European Union CSFP. The duality between the E3 framework and the EU is the object of the following section.

7.5 From the E3 to the EU: A Case of Positive Spill-Over After the approval of the JCPoA, the EU has claimed it a major success of European diplomacy (Schwammenthal 2018: p. 218). This claim acquires validity in consideration of the fact that the Iran Deal is the product of twelve years of negotiations in which the E3/EU group has proved to be a source of credibility and continuity (Rózsa 2018: p. 3). The E3 originally engaged Iran with a clear intent of establishing a constructive dialogue with Tehran and resolving the nuclear issue peacefully and in accordance with the rule of the international community. In that sense, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom showed an interesting internalisation of the effective multilateralism earlier discussed, especially considering that the E3 action ‘was not the result of a predetermined calculus’ (Alcaro 2018: p. 108), nor an initiative directly organised by the EU. The first success of the E3 group, almost immediately after engaging Iran for the first time, was the sign of the Tehran Declaration in October 2003. Contextually, the Islamic Republic negotiated an Additional Protocol with the IAEA and halted uranium enrichment voluntarily. Despite acting independently, the E3 group regularly exchanged information with the EU. Eventually, in late 2004 the High Representative Javier Solana joined the contact group officialising the EU involvement in the process. The formal inclusion of the EU in the negotiations led to the approval of the Paris Agreement in November 2004, through which Iran accepted to fully suspend its enrichment programme in exchange for the EU recognition of Tehran’s right to pursue a civilian nuclear programme. The formal involvement of the High Representative in the negotiations was in many respects an important step. Remarkably, it did not substitute the activity of the E3. Vice versa, the contact group and the EU harmonised their effort to increase the credibility of their Iran policy: while ‘the E3 de facto maintained its centrality in the decision-making process’ (Bassiri Tabrizi et al. 2018: p. 2), the involvement of the High

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Representative was a powerful signal of EU clear interest in being part of the negotiations as an effective diplomatic actor. In a 1982 article, Hedley Bull wrote that ‘“Europe” is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one’ (Bull 1982: p. 151). In 2004 Europe not only became an actor directly involved in negotiating one of the most controversial political and security issues of the XXI century, but it was able to give its distinctive imprinting—a rulebased, multilateral approach—to the whole process, dragging into these constructive pattern actors with different views and diverging foreign policy goals. Interestingly, the EU involvement was generated by an effect of positive spill-over. The E3 succeeded in engaging Iran constructively because the approach of the group was peaceful, alternative to the one of the United States and aimed to trigger a trust-building process based on the mutual respect of international rules. That approach was intimately coherent with the EU’s effective multilateralism. Therefore, the involvement of the High Representative was the formal application of the European Security Strategy (EES) and WMD strategy to a case—the Iran nuclear issue—in which the successful activity of the E3 had proved the efficacy of effective multilateralism as a tool to de-escalate potential conflicts in contested regions. In the course of the negotiations, which took more than ten years from the 2004 Paris Agreement to the JCPoA, the role of the E3/EU changed and evolved.1 Notably, in 2006 the platform of the negotiations was enlarged to officially involve the Security Council: that was the beginning of the P5 + 1 (Cronberg 2017: p. 248). The enlargement came because of one of the many backlashes caused by the antagonistic and aggressive posture adopted by the new Iranian administration guided by President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. However, Europe remained on the driver’s seat even in this delicate phase. Arguably, triggering the involvement of the Security Council was perfectly coherent with the EU rule-based, multilateral approach. Then, despite the differences and contrasts with the United 1 Both Tarja Cronberg and Sebastian Harnisch divide the EU/E3 involvement in the nuclear negotiations with Iran in phases that reflect the different roles occupied by the Europeans in respect of the United States. The former finds four phases (roles): The E3 as autonomous negotiator (2003–2005); The EU as a coordinator (2006–2010); The EU as sanctions enforcer (2010–2013); and The EU as a facilitator (2013–2015). Harnisch’s division is tripartite: Disagreement over NPT Obligations and UN involvement; Transatlantic Convergence and Collective Bargaining (2005–2012); and Transatlantic “divisions of labor” and the JCPOA (2013–2017).

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States that existed during the negotiations, the E3/EU group was able to harmonise its efforts with the Obama administration. In fact, in the years between 2010 and 2013, the EU followed the United States and the UN developing its own regime of sanctions in response to the backlash in the negotiations. Then, after the election of Hassan Rouhani in August 2013—whose administration adopted a more conciliatory posture—the E3/EU group reshaped its role acting as a facilitator between Washington and Tehran.

7.6

Three Problems of Brexit

After the June 2016 referendum, British government has periodically reaffirmed its support to the JCPoA. In an official statement on the second anniversary of the Deal, Boris Johnson, at the time the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Office, affirmed that: Iran nuclear deal has helped to make the world a safer place […]. It’s an example of what can be achieved when the international community works together. Britain will continue to join the rest of the international community to ensure the implementation of the agreement is a success and delivers real gains for global security and nuclear non-proliferation, along with tangible benefits for the Iranian people.’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2017)

London’s commitment remained strong even when, in May 2018, President Donald Trump announced the US withdrawal from the Deal (see BBC 2018a; Effer 2018). Speaking at UN General Assembly in September 2018, the former Prime Minister Theresa May defended the agreement and its spirit addressing directly to President Trump: Mr President, it was collective engagement by states across the globe that produced the counter-proliferation framework. Even the most powerful recognised that investing in collective rules-based restraint was the only effective way of addressing national security interests and avoiding unilateral recourse to force. (Foster 2018)

Moreover, as shown at the beginning of the first section of this paper, the UK government continues to support and harmonise its actions with the E3/EU group. Undoubtedly, this is a clear sign of the success of the E3 framework, confirmed by ‘a strong consensus among the E3 countries

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that the format shall and will be maintained regardless of Brexit’ (Bassiri Tabrizi et al. 2018: p. 4). Despite the clear objective of maintaining— and eventually improving—the status quo reached through the Iran Deal negotiations, both the JCPoA and the peculiar spirit of E3 are under a great pressure from President Trump’s Iran policy. Brexit is not likely to have a direct impact on the survival of the JCPoA, but it risks provoking the re-emergence of historical tensions and mistrust between London and Tehran, jeopardising the constructive pattern initiated by the E3 since 2003.

7.7

The Burden of History

Relations between London and Tehran have been described as “volatile” and substantially negative (see Abedin 2018; Razak 2018). This lack of mutual trust, particularly strong from the Iranian side, roots back to the pre-Revolutionary epoch. As Seyed Hossein Mousavian points out: Nearly every Iranian bitterly recalls incidents such as the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 […]; the engineering by the British of Reza Khan’s (later Reza Shah Pahlavi) ascension to the throne in 1925; Britain’s opposition to nationalisation of Iranian oil; and its infamous 1953 plot with the CIA to oust prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh. (Mousavian 2016: pp. 83–84)

Mousavian claims might be exaggerated but they are a good account of the British troubled past with Iran. The 1953 coup that toppled the nationalist government of Mossadeq has been a huge trauma in Iran’s pre-Revolutionary history. Although ‘the events of the summer of 1953 are still much debated’ (Axworthy 2014: p. 56) and complex, the coup deeply affected the relations between Iran and both Washington and London. Mossadeq became very popular among Iranian—despite he was opposed by some clerics—especially because of his policy of nationalising the oil industry. Britain, which through the AIOC (Anglo Iranian Oil Company) was the main exploiter of Iran’s oil, suddenly opposed Mossadeq nationalisation and imposed an oil blockade that affected Iran’s economy badly. The government of ‘the future national hero for many Iranians’ (Abrahamian 2008: p. 103) remained in place for only two years before Operation Ajax, despite a

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troubled implementation, removed Mossadeq from his post as Prime Minister and restored the full authority of the Shah. Washington saw in the nationalist government of Mossadeq, supported by the Tudeh Party, a potential backlash in midst of the Cold War. London welcomed and supported the operation—known in Britain as Boot. After the coup, the interference of the United States and the United Kingdom became a permanent scarf on Iran’s perception of the West. Mossadeq was generally well-liked by Iranians and the widespread perception after the events of 1953 was that Iran was denied the chance to manage its most valuable natural resource. Michael Axworthy, with his beautiful and unique capacity of understanding the sentiments generated by politics, went even far: ‘this perception [that the US and the Shah were not friends of Iran] was important in the attitude that led to 1979 Revolution’ (Axworthy 2014: p. 56). Unsurprisingly, Britain was not excluded from the resentment towards foreign powers generated by the 1953 coup. The 1979 Revolution has been the result of contrasting forces and radical ideas. One of them was the rejection of the socio-political interdependence between Iran and the West—the base on which the revolutionary vanguard built its external projection. Although not being directly attacked by revolutionaries—as happened to the American one— the British embassy in Tehran ‘has been the scene of almost constant protests’ (Benedictus 2014) since the Revolution, which dramatically culminated in the kidnap of a senior British diplomat in 1987. Suspicious and hostile relations between the newly established Islamic Republic and the United Kingdom remained constant for all the ’80s. In May 1980 the so-called Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of the Arabistan attacked the Iranian embassy in London, seizing hostages and killing one of them. Iran’s government initially ‘accused Britain of having organized the occupation of the Embassy’ (Axworthy 2014: p. 199), boosting anger and mistrust. Then came the Rushdie affair. In 1988 the British writer Salman Rushdie published The Satanic Verses, a controversial novel that, after being circulated in Iran, generated the anger of Ayatollah Khomeini. The Supreme Leader issued a disturbing fatwa against Rushdie in which he urged all the Muslims to ‘execute [him] quickly’ (ibid.: p. 298). Indignation towards Iran spread all over the West and London broke off its diplomatic relations with Tehran. However, a certain optimism, along with a gust of rapprochement, emerged during the Khatami presidency. Elected as President for the first time in 1997, Mohammad Khatami presented himself as a reformist.

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His unprecedented ambition was particularly evident in foreign policy where Khatami promoted the idea of the Dialogue of Civilizations—in clear contraposition with Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations — and pushed for a general improvement of relations between Iran and the world. His distinctive attitude reached the British when in 1998 he officially took distance from Rushdie fatwa (ibid.: pp. 338–339). Infact, it was under the Khatami presidency that the E3 and Iran firstly engaged each other in 2003. Nevertheless, a new low in UK-Iran relations was reached in 2011 when, after the imposition by the US and its allies of a new round of sanctions on Iran nuclear programme, Tehran expelled the British ambassador. As reported by Mousavi, this action was ‘the result of years of increasingly louder calls in Iran to downgrade relations with Britain’ (Mousavian 2016: p. 85). The cause of this resentment was, once again, the accusation against London of having melted with Iran’s domestic affairs. On the 2009 post-election protests, Iranian authorities arrested nine local British embassy staff with the accusation of having played a ‘significant role’ in orchestrating the protests. As expected, ‘[t]he British government vigorously denied the charges’ (ibid.). Then, the day after the bill that expelled the UK Ambassador was issued, a group of Iranian protestors set on fire the British embassy in Tehran. As retaliation, London broke again its diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic. Eventually, the UK embassy reopened in 2015—after the approval of the JCPoA. As this brief account of British-Iranian relations in the post-WWII era should have shown, the encounter between London and Tehran has been mostly dominated by mistrust and lack of reciprocal reliability. Rapprochements and ruptures have been the norm, while the fundamentalism brought in by the 1979 Revolution has produced more tensions and isolation—as demonstrated by the Rushdie case. Britain’s special relationship with the United States has contributed to jeopardise the level of trust between Iran and the United Kingdom further. From the Iranian side, mistrust dates back at least to the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mossadeq and, to some extent, represents an element of strong continuity between Shah’s Iran and the Islamic Republic. Again, the words of Seyed Hossein Mousavian offer good insights. Talking about when he was the spokesman of Iran nuclear negotiation team, he wrote:

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However, London’s nuclear negotiator, John Sawers, would ultimately turn the offer in my talks with him, telling me that Washington would not tolerate even one centrifuge sinning gin Iran. This episode served as a striking example of America’s hold, through Britain, on the foreign-policy decision making of other EU states. (ibid., p. 84)

It is likely that not many ordinary Iranians see Britain as Mousavian did: a puppet in the grip of the United States. But this image, which came from a former government official, reflects the prejudice that informs Iran’s dialogue with London. The volatile nature of British-Iranian relations is due to mistrust, prejudice, and bitter history. However, the approval of the JCPoA seems to have positively undermined that vicious circle. One of the unspoken objectives that preceded, accompanied, at some points halted, and then reopened the negotiations was triggering a trust-building process between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the West. The power and credibility of the E3 group as a trustworthy interlocutor was not the consequence of previews successes of EU foreign policy—which, accordingly to Riccardo Alcaro, have been modest (Alcaro 2018: p. 3)—nor of the history of its members as privileged partner of Tehran—Germany and France had better relations with Tehran than the UK, but nothing close to an established partnership. Conversely, the group was successful in engaging Iran because it promoted a form ‘effective multilateral crisis management’ (ibid.) that overcame ideological distance and historical prejudices, triggering a trust-building process brought forward for 12 years not without difficulties and backlashes. Rather than following the historical path of mutual mistrust, the E3 approach to Iran nuclear issue was novel and thus successful. After Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPoA in May 2018, the constructive engagement pushed by the approval of the Nuclear Deal had a strong halt. However, since then the E3/EU group has shown a strong will of remaining committed to the Deal—an important message of credibility and trustworthiness. Iran, by its side, has initially remained compliant to the JCPoA, at least until it started a multi-phased, progressive reduction of its commitment in May 2019 (Hafezi 2020; Wintour 2019a). Without the trust-building process that accompanied the negotiations, there would have been no deal. But this process, because of its novelty and its thin bedrocks, was not completed and resolved with the approval of the JCPoA.

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History is a heavy burden. In the case of British-Iranian relations, this is even truer. Therefore, if after Brexit London fails to ‘parallelize its Iran policy with that of EU member’ (Batmanghelidj 2019) and thus to keep the trust-building process alive, the concrete risk is the re-emergence among Iranians of that historical prejudice that sees Britain as a puppet in the hands of the United States.

7.8

The Pressure of the Special Relationship

Relations between continental Europe and the Islamic Republic have been somewhat better and amicable. Frameworks for dialogue existed long before 2003 and Europe remains Iran’s most important trading partner in the West. Therefore, it should not surprise that Tehran’s reactions to the Brexit vote have been of many extents positive, as a Tweet by President Rouhani’s deputy chief of staff for political affair calling the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union a historical opportunity for Iran shows (Batmanghelidj 2016). The echo of the special relationship between London and Washington, and the nuanced-but-not completely resolved mistrust it generated among Iranians, resounded in the words of Rouhani’s deputy. Naively, in Iran Brexit was welcomed as the end of UK influence in EU politics and thus, by extension, a major halt to US influence in Europe. What the Iranians missed, however, was that any major dispute or deal that concern Iran will inevitably involve the United States. In other words—and the nuclear negotiations have proved it clearly—Europeans can act independently to engage Iran and avoiding the use of force against it. They can even lead the dialogue within a framework that involves the members of the Security Council, giving the negotiations a distinctively European footprint. But, at some point, they will have to harmonise their effort with Washington. France pushed to include the United Kingdom rather than Russia in the E3 exactly because the latter would have not been helpful in building a strong contact point between the European initiative and the United States. While Donald Trump was making his first appearance in front of the UN General Assembly in September 2017, calling for the cancelation of the Iran Deal (Scita 2017), France signalled its will to work with Washington to add to the JCPoA new clauses aimed to monitor Iran’s regional activities. At the beginning of 2018, the E3

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discussed the possibility of imposing new sanctions on Tehran as a punitive measure against its missile programme and regional policies (Tertrais 2018: p. 2). Exactly because of its strong will to keep the JCPoA alive, the E3/EU group tried to appease the United States. The response from the E3/EU group to Trump’s decision to decertify the JCPoA in October 2017, as shown before, has been compact. Amid the incertitude of Brexit, the United Kingdom is demonstrating a clear will to continue to work along with its European partners. However, London’s position is in open disagreement with Washington (see Faulconbridge et al. 2019). Since ‘trying to mollify Trump has been a lost cause’ (Niblett et al. 2018), Europe is facing growing direct and indirect pressure from the US Administration to change its Iran policy. Due to its special relationship with Washington, and the resulting role as a bridge over the Atlantic, London’s position in this confrontation is the most delicate. President Trump, who has openly shown support for Brexit (Levin 2016), has recently anticipated the possibility of a “large scale” trade deal with the United Kingdom once the country effectively leaves the European Union (Reuters 2019). If Brexit is not a direct threat to the JCPoA, it risks becoming leverage in the hands of Washington that may reverberate on E3/EU Iran policy negatively. When the E3 was formed in 2003, the UK position was peculiar, divided between supporting the US-led invasion of Iraq and the desire of avoiding a conflict with Iran. This ambiguity made London’s bridging role between Europe and the United States politically interesting and effective. Two years later, in 2005, the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged the E3 efforts to engage Iran (Cronberg 2017: p. 252). Therefore, despite being distant in their views of multilateralism and interventionism, the E3/EU group and the United States found a compromise and, arguably, the active participation of the United Kingdom in the European contact group was a tacit part of it. In a postBrexit scenario, the renewed leverage of the transatlantic relationship will encounter an unprecedented level of confrontation between Washington and Brussel, with President Trump ‘challeng[ing] some of the core principles underlying [relations between Europe and the US]’ (Riddervold and Newsome 2018: p. 505). Presumably, this will affect the constructive process initiated by the E3 and spilled over to the EU, jeopardising the chance of success of future European initiatives concerning Iran.

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7.9 The Brexit Impact on the EU Foreign Policy Identity Making As developed in a previous section of this paper, the formal involvement of the EU in the negotiation process was a consequence of the success of the E3 in bringing Iran to the table in 2003. Nevertheless, the E3 group was not dissolved by EU involvement. Indeed, it has lasted all along the twelve years of negotiation, working in parallel with Brussel and the other parties involved. Consequently, ‘it is not surprising that the group continues to be perceived as key in guaranteeing the survival of the nuclear deal’ (Bassiri Tabrizi et al. 2018: p. 3). The will of keeping the E3 alive despite the pressure coming from Brexit and the United States seems clear in all its members. Nevertheless, the involvement of the EU was not an independent event in the course of the negotiations but was part of an incremental process, began with the spontaneous formation of the E3 group and continued through the formalisation of a European common approach to the Iran nuclear question. In that sense, despite renaming an effective and potentially replicable format, the E3 was: Constructed in the European Union [and not externally] as enabling wider engagement with the rest of the world, amplifying [France, Germany and United Kingdom] influence in the pursuit of national foreign policy objectives, and more effectively promoting shared norms and values. (Alcaro 2018: p. 218)

Once again, the E3 emerges as a vivid expression of a distinctively European character and set of norms. The members of the E3 internalised their European identity and, consequently, expressed it through the creation of a framework that more than the sum of the single foreign policy identities of France, Germany and, the United Kingdom was the mise en pratique of the effective multilateralism articulated by the European Security Strategy. Therefore, despite the will of keeping the E3 group active, Brexit poses questions on ‘the degree to which a collective European position will actually hold over’ Brexit itself (Chatham House 2018). Therefore, the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union is one factor that may weaken the EU collective strength vis-à-vis the Iran nuclear issue. Remainers have shown a strong internalisation of EU identity as part of UK external projection (Kerr 2016). Most notably, David Cameron

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acknowledged that the EU led the negotiations with Iran, ‘with Britain playing a central role’. According to the former Prime Minister, this was a clear example that ‘making Britain’s actions count for far more means working with other countries in the EU’ (United Kingdom Prime Minister’s Office 2016). Even Barack Obama ‘used very similar arguments to Cameron […], again mentioning the Iran case as a testimony that, as an EU member, the United Kingdom was better able to pursue its interest and spread its values’ (Alcaro 2018: p. 219). The negotiations on Iran nuclear programme, therefore, have been internalised by Britain as a relevant part of the UK external identity, signalling the power and successfulness of a European approach to crises management, non-proliferation, and multilateral diplomacy. The internalisation, however, was reciprocal: in many respects, the participation of the United Kingdom in the E3 reinforced its effectiveness as an expression of the EU’s effective multilateralism. London was embedded in the spill-over effect that transformed the action of the contact group into part of the European Union process of reinforcing its foreign policy identity. That was possible because the United Kingdom became part of the E3 as a state member of the EU, sharing with the other members the same approach vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear issue. The success of the E3 framework is clear. For this reason, and regardless of Brexit, the framework has been enlarged in 2018 to include Italy and form the E4/EU (see Bassiri Tabrizi et al. 2018: p. 5; Alcaro 2019). The new group’s objective is to establish a “structured dialogue” to discuss with Iran other issues apart from the JCPoA. It is hard to foresee what will be the practical impact of Brexit on this new initiative. However, what is undeniable is that Britain has approached the E4/EU as a country in the process of leaving the European Union. Therefore, the risk is that Brexit will halt the reciprocal process of internalisation and positive spillover that was increasing the EU’s capability of successfully promoting its foreign policy approach.

7.10

Conclusion

In the summer of 2019 tensions between Iran and the international community escalated quickly. In response to US “maximum pressure”, Tehran triggered a step-by-step reduction of its compliance with the JCPoA (The Guardian 2019). Contextually, Iran began a series of operations in the Gulf of Oman. After a series of attacks towards foreign-owned

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tankers, on 20 June, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shot down a US drone alleged to have violated the Iranian air space. Then, in September, a coordinated drones-cruise missiles attack hit two oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. As stated before, the E3 group unanimously condemned Iran for the attack. The United Kingdom was directly involved in the tensions. On July 4, a combat force of 30 Royal Marines seized the Iranian tanker Grace 1 while it was making a technical stop in the vicinity of Gibraltar. Grace 1 was accused of violating the EU sanctions for Syria—as it was due to deliver its oil to the Syrian port of Baniyas (Ratcliffe et al. 2019). The episode triggered Iran’s retaliation, which culminated in the seizure of the British-flagged tanker Stena Impero. The resolution of the diplomatic crisis that followed was complicated by the direct involvement of the United States, which issued a warrant to seize the Grace 1 while it was still blocked in Gibraltar. However, the United Kingdom and Gibraltar’s authorities resisted Washington’s pressure and freed the tanker (Bourse and Bazaar 2019a). On September 27, Iranian authorities released the British-flagged tanker Stena Impero. Interestingly, on October 14, 2019, a team of British experts guided by Professor Robin Grimes arrived in Tehran to begin modernisation work on the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor (Bourse and Bazaar 2019b). The reconfiguration of the Arak reactor, to be achieved with the help of the other signatories, is part of Iran’s JCPoA-related commitments. Amid the incertitude of the Brexit era, the United Kingdom has shown a quite consistent attitude vis-à-vis the EU’s Iran policy. London keeps coordinating with France and Germany in the effort of saving the Iran Deal and, as shown by the Arak project, it remains committed to its JCPoA-related duties. Even in the case of the maritime security force in the Gulf proposed by Jeremy Hunt in July, the United Kingdom presented it as a European-led initiative (Wintour 2019b). London’s continued alignment with the E3/EU has been confirmed even in the troubled course of 2020. In December 2019, the UK general election resulted in a large Conservative majority, with Boris Johnson confirmed as Prime Minister. Two months later, the country entered the 11-month transition period, which will finally lead to the completion of Brexit. Yet, despite the newly empowered Leaver-camp, the E3 has passed the most recent test of unity in August 2020. In fact, the three European signatories of the JCPoA have jointly rejected the attempt of the US administration to activate the snapback mechanism in response to Iran’s

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five-step plan to reduce its commitment to the agreement consequent to the reimposition of US sanctions, claiming that, after the withdrawal from the deal on 8 May 2018, Washington ‘ceased to be a participant to the JCPoA’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2020). This final attempt to preserve the Iran Deal until the US election in November testified the E3/EU strong and unchanged support to the JCPoA. Recently, Josep Borrell, who succeeded Federica Mogherini in December 2019, declared that the agreement is ‘a key pillar of the architecture of the world system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and by comprehensively addressing Iran nuclear programme, it contributes to regional and global security’ (Wintour 2020). Borrell’s position appears very much consistent with that of the E3. That said, the question about how much the United Kingdom will be able to harmonise its post-Brexit Iran policy to that of the E3/EU remains open.

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CHAPTER 8

Afterword Geoffrey Edwards, Abdullah Baabood, and Diana Galeeva

Although most of the chapters of this book demonstrated that unprecedented Britain ‘divorce’ with the EU presents more questions and uncertainty, this concluding chapter acknowledges that Britain’s international standing will be damaged immediately post-Brexit, but also suggests positive scenarios for the long term. The chapter accepts the future of Britain’s policies under the idea of ‘Global Britain’, which the UK’s policy-makers and state stakeholders expect post-Brexit UK to be based on. Advocates of the idea of ‘Global Britain’ suggest that Global Britain is about linking with ‘old friends and new allies’, in order to find ‘a new place for itself in the world’ outside of the EU (May 2016). This view is supported by

G. Edwards Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK e-mail: [email protected] A. Baabood School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan D. Galeeva (B) St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0_8

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the argument that Britain’s international standing has never been dependent on EU membership. Britain’s policies have been based on three main bridges through its relationships with the US, the EU, and the rest of the world (RUSI 2019). The idea of Global Britain has received criticism at home and abroad. For example, Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee stated that ‘Global Britain’ is at risk of being simply a ‘slogan’ devoid of ‘substance’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Global Britain 2019). A UN report also states that ‘there is still no clarity on what Global Britain might mean, even from a UK perspective’ (Gifkins et al., 2019). As Oliver Daddow (2019), Assistant Professor in British Politics and Security at the University of Nottingham suggests, there is a level of confusion around the idea of Global Britain because ‘it involves an account of what Global Britain is trying to be as a point of departure for thinking about Britain’s future role in the world’, he also continues by pointing out that ‘Global Britain’ is undoubtedly still in a work in progress.

Considering the scepticism on the idea of Global Britain, it seems it is important to acknowledge that, along with the Brexit process, the future perspectives of Britain foreign policies under a Global Britain agenda are also in progress and it might take time to identify clear strategies for cooperation. At the same time, along with the challenges, the idea of Global Britain also provides a number of opportunities for the UK to develop relations with the rest of the world, specifically with states in the Middle East. For this reason, this chapter considers the future of Britain’s policies under the idea of Global Britain. Specifically, possible challenges and opportunities in relations between the UK, the GCC, and Iran will be in focus. The first question, or challenge, for a post-Brexit UK is connected to its future cooperation with EU member states. Given that Britain might lose institutional links with the EU post-Brexit, the question arises of how Britain can build, or renew, links to key partners in Europe such as France and Germany in the next 20–30 years. Given the focus of the chapter, how these links will assist the UK to deal with some important issues in the Middle East is another challenge. Addressing these, one might expect Britain to engage with so-called ‘informal groupings of countries’ (RUSI 2019). Despite expectations during the acceptance of the Lisbon Treaty

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in 2009, that establishment of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and security Policy, together with the European External Action Service (EEAS) (2016), might assist further coherence in EU foreign policy. In reality, the EU shifts from a single community of practice to ad hoc groupings, which are smaller, informal groupings, known as ‘the likeminded’ (Bicchi 2011). These ad hoc groupings are examples of ‘soft alliance’ with no formal contract, no decision-making procedure, and no enforcing mechanisms. However, they work through mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion, coordination and knowledge exchange. Despite their informality in the EU, their importance has grown, and these states and their collaborations have been involved in the so-called Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) (Bicchi and Aggestam 2019). Additionally, an informal grouping of countries also can appear between EU member states and other countries to tackle specific subjects. Countries might be united within an informal grouping; however, these ‘partners’ might not have deep and close diplomatic relations with each other (RUSI 2019). An example of such informal grouping is the E3+3, where Russia and China partnered with the US and European nations (France, the UK, Germany), while the UN led the negotiations (Keating 2009). Using this as a model for such cooperation, Britain might choose to deal with climate change issues in the Middle East, especially in the Arab region. The region is characterised by a fragile desert environment, which is among the most vulnerable to potential climate change (Tolba and Saab 2009). The Gulf states face a number of climate change challenges, such as desertification, water scarcity, biodiversity loss, and sea level growth. The region is categorised as having high temperatures, humidity, and arid lands and this results in degradation of soil and land injury, challenging food security (Al-Olaimy 2018). The recent trends on climate change in the region are alarming: the annual warming is increasing in the Arabian Peninsula, such as between 1980 and 2008, in Oman up to 1.03 °C, 0.81 °C in the UAE, 0.65 °C in Qatar, 0.57 °C in Kuwait. Additionally, in Kuwait, Dubai, Riyadh, and Doha, the surface temperature over land regions is 1.5–3.5 times higher than the worldwide land mean surface temperature (Al Sarmi and Washington 2011). Importantly, the economy of GCC states, as rentier states,1 mainly relies on oil export revenues. As 1 A rentier state is a state in which a large proportion of income is generated from rents (specifically from oil and gas revenues) or externally-derived, unproductively-earned payments.

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such, the GCC states are highly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change (Al-Sarihi 2018). Thus economic diversification strategies form one of the recommendations for the GCC states’ climate change mitigation. As Britain’s security is dependent upon Gulf security (RUSI 2019), Britain can also become active in developing such informal groups with other European states, especially its key partners, France and Germany. These groupings can collaborate with the GCC states to deal with this challenge. Opportunities for closer involvement in the GCC diversification strategies as the part of the climate change initiatives might occur for ‘soft’ alliances between the UK and other European states. In other words, post-Brexit Britain may leave the EU, but not Europe. Therefore, post-Brexit Britain still might develop European foreign policies based on informal groupings. In general, the UK’s collaborations with its key European partners and the GCC states and Iran within ‘informal groupings’ might be used for solving other issues in the Middle East. Given the contradictory policies of the GCC states within itself and between the GCC and Iran, Britain and its European partners might form informal groups to serve as mediators in the Middle East. While being a part of the European Union, Britain was a bridge between the EU and the US. Post-Brexit Britain expects to be closer to its traditional ally—Washington. While it is uncertain what this partnership might look like, among expectations are a possibility of the US-UK trade and investment collaboration (Financial Times 2019). With regard to the Middle East, especially towards the Gulf, it seems the US and the UK are already developing ‘special’ relationships. The UK even became involved in the Crisis in 2019, which started with the US withdrawal from the Iran’s nuclear deal, which led to tensions between the US and Iran. This has continued with Trump administration-imposed sanctions to undermine the Iranian economy, while Tehran has taken a variety of steps to scale back commitments given in 2015 (Al Jazeera 2019). When the US accused Iran of detaining the crew of one of two oil tankers attacked in the Gulf of Oman in June 2019 (Wintour 2019), and the US also blamed Iran for drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019 (BBC News 2019), both accusations were, notably, also supported by the UK government (BCC News 2019). The UK has been involved even further, following US officials’ policy of ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran (Daragahi 2019). An Iranian oil tanker was captured by the UK’s Royal Marines in the Strait of Gibraltar under the claims that it was shipping oil to Syria in violation of European Union sanctions in August 2019. In response, a

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UK-flagged oil tanker was held by Iran in September 2019. On the one hand, such a ‘special’ partnership with Washington suggests that the postBrexit UK will have a close partnership with a global power. Even despite uncertainties of the US-UK relations under the Biden administration, the historical relations and that the UK, while being in the EU, served as a bridge between the US and Europe, indicates that relations will still be close in the future. At the same time, it provides challenges; due to this ‘special’ partnership, the UK expects to always play a role in tensions or conflicts with US opponents in the region. In other words, the challenge of post-Brexit Britain is that it will adapt its policies mainly in order to follow Washington’s objectives in the region. As the third part of the Global Britain strategy, such as a post-Brexit Britain deal with the rest of the world, the UK might further develop relations with the Gulf states. The first possibility is that the UK will conclude a free trade deal with the GCC states (Naji and McElroy 2018). The working group was already established in December 2016, based on the Singapore-GCC trade deal as an example of such a future pattern. Though it ‘made good progress’, the talks were paused due to the Gulf Crisis of 2017. At the same time, predictions of a fall in the value of the British pound can be another possibility for closer cooperation. It will provide the GCC dollar-pegged investors to purchase commercial properties to take advantage of a ‘Brexit discount’ (Gearon 2016). Moreover, the GCC diversification programmes provide opportunities for further cooperation for the post-Brexit UK, such as Saudi Vision 2030. Challenges remain though, such as rising political opposition to the sale of UK armed equipment to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen. For example, in June 2019, the UK Court of Appeals ruled that these specific arms sales are unlawful because there is ‘clear risk’ as these weapons can be in ‘serious violation of international humanitarian law’ (BBC News 2019). Additionally, with the rise of other powers, especially from Asia, and uncertainty of the British place on the global map, there are challenges for a post-Brexit UK to keep these close relations with the GCC states. As Courtney Freer, Assistant Professorial Research Fellow at LSE, highlights, hopes that the Saudi Aramco IPO could be housed in the City of London and this strengthen the UK-Saudi relationship seem to have been dashed due to Brexit and general political uncertainty. Saudi Arabia is now said to be looking to list it in Tokyo instead.

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Additionally, as part of the diversification of the GCC relations with the rest of the world based on interests, David Wearing also clarifies that because China is set to become the largest gas and oil importer by 2020, and India the second-largest by 2035, there may be a general recalibration away from Europe, towards states where there is a greater and growing energy demand (Wazir 2018). Overall, this chapter demonstrates that despite the uncertainty of Brexit, the UK has already suggested the idea of ‘Global Britain’ that might characterise post-Brexit UK foreign policies (House of Commons 2021). Although this comes with challenges, this model suggests opportunities for a post-Brexit UK. Along with developing the ‘divorce’ plan with EU, the idea of ‘Global Britain’ is also in progress. This chapter provided potential ways that Brexit might affect relations between the UK, the GCC, and Iran. At the same time, it also provided opportunities for further engagement for post-Brexit with the GCC states in particular. Under the idea of ‘Global Britain’, post-Brexit might develop relations with European partners, and build ‘informal groupings of countries’ which could assist in solving Middle Eastern issues, such as climate change, or conflict resolution. Post-Brexit Britain may also continue developing ‘special’ relations with the US, which would mean that it would follow Washington policies, especially with regard to its actions against its opponents. Also, deepen relations with a post-Brexit UK and the GCC states are expected, as part of the strategy of developing relations with the rest of the world under the idea of ‘Global Britain’. Despite challenges, it is more expected that the post-Brexit UK will continue its historic deeply rooted relations with the GCC states.

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Al-Olaimy, Tariq. “Climate Change Impacts in GCC.” EcoMENA Echoing Sustainability in MENA. May 29, 2018. https://www.ecomena.org/climatechange-gcc/. BBC News. “Johnson Blames Iran for Saudi Arabia Oil Attacks.” September 23, 2019. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-49792997. BBC News. “Saudi Oil Attacks: US Blames Iran for Drone Strikes on Two Sites.” September 15, 2019. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-497 05197. BBC News. “UK Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia Unlawful, Court Rules.” June 20, 2019. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48704596. Bicchi, Federica. “The EU as a Community of Practice: Foreign Policy Communications in the COREU Network.” November 21, 2011. Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 8. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/ 13501763.2011.615200?journalCode=rjpp20. Bicchi, Federica and Aggestam, Lisbeth. “How Informal Groupings of LikeMinded States Are Coming to Dominate EU Foreign Policy Governance.” August 7, 2019. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/08/07/how-inf ormal-groupings-of-like-minded-states-are-coming-to-dominate-eu-foreignpolicy-governance/. Daddow, Oliver. “The Real Meaning of ‘Global Britain’: A Great Escape from the EU.” Accessed November 24, 2019. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europp blog/2019/04/05/the-real-meaning-of-global-britain-a-great-escape-fromthe-eu/. Daragahi, Borzou. “British Ship Seized by Iran Free to Leave, Official Says.” September 23, 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/british-ship-iran-seized-us-tanker-latest-a9116561.html. Financial Times. “EU Foresees a US-UK Axis After Brexit.” Accessed November 24, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/e9fb41e6-dad1-11e9-8f9b-77216e be1f17. Gearon, Patrick. “GCC Opportunities in a Post-Brexit Britain.” September 21, 2016. https://www.gulf-times.com/story/514576/GCC-opportunities-in-apost-Brexit-Britain. Gifkins, Jess, Jarvis, Samuel and Ralph, Jason. “Global Britain in the United Nations.” Accessed November 24, 2019. https://www.una.org.uk/file/ 13085/download?token=cl0pgYF-. House of Commons. “Global Britain.” 6 January 2021. Accessed January 6, 2021. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-20210002/. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Global Britain. “Sixth Report of Session 2017–19.” Accessed November 24, 2019. https://publications.parlia ment.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/780/780.pdf.

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Keating, Joshua. “You Say P5+1, I Say E3+3.” September 20, 2009. https://for eignpolicy.com/2009/09/30/you-say-p51-i-say-e33/. Naji, Noor and McElroy, Damien. “Post-Brexit Talks between UK-GCC to Resume ‘Soon’, Says Minister.” May 16, 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/ world/europe/post-brexit-trade-talks-between-uk-gcc-to-resume-soon-saysminister-1.731161. Official EU Website. “About the European External Action Service (EEAS).” March 2, 2016. Accessed November 24, 2019. https://eeas.europa.eu/hea dquarters/headquarters-homepage/82/about-european-external-action-ser vice-eeas_en. RUSI. “The UK in the Middle East: Strategy in a Changing Region.” July 2, 2019. Accessed November 24, 2019. https://www.politicshome.com/news/ uk/political-parties/conservative-party/news/79518/read-full-david-davisspeech-conservative. Tolba, Mostafa K. and Saab, Najib W. “Arab Environment: Impact of Climate Change on Arab Countries.” Report of the Arab Forum for Environment and Development, 2009. http://www.droughtmanagement.info/literature/ AFED_climate_change_arab_countries_2009.pdf. Wazir, Burhan. “How the Gulf’s Petrodollars Lubricate the British Economy.” September 12, 2018. https://www.newstatesman.com/AngloArabia-WhyGulf-Wealth-Matters-Briatin-David-Wearing. Wintour, Patrick. “UK Joins USS in Accusing Iran of Tanker Attacks as Crew Held.” January 14, 2019. https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls= en&q=Us+accussed+Iran+to+attcak+tankers&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8.

Index

A Abu Dhabi, 4 Adnoc, 80, 81 Afghanistan, 109 alliances, 41, 43, 45, 47, 54, 55, 59, 60, 62 Aramco, 55, 57 Asaib Ahl al-Haq, 56 the Assad regime, 44

B Bab al-Mandab, 59 Bahrain, 5 Bahrain-France Relations, 82 Bahrain Protests in 2011, 73 the balance of power, 43–45 Biden, Joe, 146–148 Blair, Tony, 108 Blocking Regulation, 107, 122 Brexit, 42, 43, 46, 48, 50, 52, 53, 69–71, 75–78, 82, 88, 90, 102, 114–116, 119–124, 153–155, 164, 165, 169–173

2016 Brexit Referendum, 101, 102, 114, 116 Iranian response, 114 Britain, 132, 134, 135 Bush, George W., 108, 110

C Cairo Egypt, 41, 42, 44, 57–59, 61 China, 5, 7, 9, 42, 44, 45, 70, 76, 89, 131, 137–142, 161, 183, 186 climate change, 183, 184, 186 Common foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 3 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 3, 48–50 contact group, 154, 156, 157, 162, 170, 172 COVID-19 pandemic, 70, 88, 90

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 G. Edwards et al. (eds.), Post-Brexit Europe and UK, Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2874-0

189

190

INDEX

E E3, 106, 110, 115, 121, 122, 154–157, 159–163, 169, 171, 173 role of the US, 102 effective multilateralism, 159, 161–163, 171, 172 EU3, 5 EU27, 4–7 EU-GCC Relations 1988 Cooperation Agreement, 16, 32 diversification, 13, 15, 20, 21, 24, 30–32 GCC-EU MC meeting, 2010, 20 impact on, 22–24 post-2011 complexities, 31–34 Trump Era Complexities, 13–34 EU-Iran, 108 European Commission, 51, 53 European Defence Agency, 4 European Defence Fund (EDF), 42, 51 European Deterrence Initiative, 54 European Intervention Initiative (EI2), 53 European single market, 4 European Union (EU), 41, 42, 47, 48, 50–54, 153–157, 159–163, 168–173, 181–186 High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 154, 156, 162, 163 Europe-Iran relations comprehensive dialogue, 107 critical dialogue, 106 Europol, 52 EU security, 3 EU’s Global Strategy, 134 extra-regional powers, 45

F France, 4, 6, 8, 45, 48–51, 53, 182–184 Free trade agreement, 4, 8

G Gabriel, Sigmar, 74, 79, 83 Gargash, Anwar, 86, 89 GCC, 42, 57, 58, 112, 118, 119, 134 Germany, 6, 8, 45, 47–51, 53, 182–184 Global Britain, 181, 182, 185, 186 Great powers, 43–45

H Hezbollah, 56, 58 Hollande, Francois, 71–73, 81

I informal groupings of countries, 182, 186 INSTEX, 26, 27, 122, 135–137, 142 Iran, 45, 48, 55–61, 69, 73, 78, 84, 101–104, 106–124, 131–135, 137, 138, 140, 143, 146, 147 Green Movement, 111 Mahmoud, Ahmadinejad, 110, 111 Mohammed, Khatami, 107 Iranian Nuclear Negotiations, 2003–2013, 110 Iranian nuclear program transatlantic divide, 123 Iranian nuclear programme, 110, 111 Arak, 110 E3 diplomatic efforts, 102 Natanz, 110 UN Security Council, 110. See also JCPOA Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 55, 56

INDEX

Iraq, 102, 106, 107, 109 Islamic Republic, 134, 145–147 Israel, 28, 30, 32, 132–134, 140, 147, 148, 158 J JCPOA, 4, 5, 10, 14, 23, 25–27, 48, 59, 74, 77, 82, 84, 101, 102, 112, 113, 117, 121, 122, 132–134, 136, 140, 142–148, 154–156, 158, 161–163, 165, 167–170, 172, 173 K Kuwait, 59, 60, 62 L Le Pen, Marine, 72, 77 Libya, 74, 78, 85–88 M Macron, Emmanuel, 41, 47, 77, 80, 81, 83, 85 maximum pressure, 172 Mediterranean, 74, 83, 85, 86 Merkel, Angela, 47, 73, 74, 78, 79, 84 MESA, 42, 43, 45, 57–59, 61 Middle East, 41, 42, 44, 47, 55, 57, 61 Moscow, 44, 56 N NATO, 41, 42, 45, 48, 51–54, 61 nuclear, 131–137, 142–147 O Obama, Barack, 55

191

oil prices, 14, 20, 21, 27, 29, 34 omni-enmeshment, 13, 18, 24, 32, 33

P P5+1, 131, 137 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 3, 42, 49–51, 53 Persian Gulf, 102, 104, 105, 107, 113, 119–121, 123, 124

Q Qatar, 6, 8, 59, 60 Qatar blockade, 69, 82, 83 Qatar-France Relations, 72, 73, 82, 87 Qatar-Germany Relations, 79 Qatar in Libya, 87 Quartet countries, 60

R regional order, 43, 45, 46 Riyadh, 44, 55, 60 Russia, 5, 7, 9, 14, 24, 30, 33, 34, 157, 161, 169 assertive policies, 14

S sanctions, 107, 111, 112, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123 Iran-Libyan sanctions, 107 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 71, 72 Saudi 2030, 80 Saudi Arabia, 5, 6, 41, 56–61, 116, 119, 124 ARAMCO attacks, 27 GCC crisis, 17, 23 relations with Iran, 24, 32 relations with Israel, 24 relations with Russia, 24

192

INDEX

relations with USA, 24 Saudi-France Relations, 72, 80 Saudi-Germany Relations, 74, 82–84 Saudi-Russia Oil Price War, 88 special relationship, 157, 167, 169, 170 Stena Impero, 122, 123 Strait of Hormuz, 122–124 Strategic autonomy, 46–48, 51, 52, 54, 61 Syria, 78, 82, 83 T Tehran, 44, 55, 56, 58, 59 Terrorism, 47, 49, 52 Trump, Donald, 45, 47, 48, 50, 54, 55, 57, 115–117, 120–125 ambiguous policies, 15, 32 anti-Iran strategy, 24 economic policies, 14 maximum pressure policy, 27 Middle East policies, 16, 25 unilateralism, 14, 25, 28 Turkey, 44, 59, 60 U UAE, 5, 6, 8 UAE-France Relations, 80–81, 86 UAE-Germany Relations, 79 UAE-Italy Relations, 82, 88 UK foreign policy, 102, 104, 114, 117, 121 Boris Johnson, 118, 119, 122, 123 Theresa May, 117, 119, 121, 123 UK-Iran relations

1953 Coup, 103 arms sales, 116 David Cameron, 112 diplomatic representation, 101, 105, 111, 115, 116, 118, 121, 122 Iran-Iraq War, 102, 105, 118 Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, 117, 122 Pahlavi dynasty, 101 Qajar dynasty, 101 Rouhani-Cameron meeting, 113 Salman Rushdie, 105, 106, 108 UK role in nuclear diplomacy. See Iranian nuclear programme unilateralism, 47 United Kingdom (UK), 42, 44, 45, 48–50, 52, 53, 101, 102, 104–124, 153, 155–160, 162, 166, 169–173 UK-Iran relations, 154, 167 United States (US), 4, 5, 8–10, 41–49, 51, 54, 55, 57, 60–62, 155–157, 159–161, 163, 164, 166–171, 173, 182, 184–186 US foreign policy Barack Obama, 112 Donald Trump, 102, 116, 120, 121 maximum pressure, 122, 124

W Washinton-London, Paris-Berlin axis, 110

Y Yemen, 69, 72–75, 78, 84, 85