Russia and the Future of Europe: Views from the Capitals 3030956474, 9783030956479

Citation preview

The Future of Europe

Michael Kaeding Johannes Pollak Paul Schmidt Editors

Russia and the Future of Europe Views from the Capitals

The Future of Europe Series Editors Michael Kaeding , Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany Senem Aydin-Düzgit, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey Johannes Pollak, Webster Vienna Private University, Wien, Wien, Austria

The “Future of Europe” series consists of monographs and edited volumes analyzing topical European issues from the perspective of each EU Member State and neighboring countries, helping to understand the different aspects of the future of the European project. It aims at combining two goals: high quality research-based and/or informed contributions stimulating pan-European national and European, academic and non-academic discussions around the “Future of Europe”, involving preferably leading academic scholars and practitioners. The series provides an authoritative library on the Future of the European Union ranging, amongst others, from general conceptual texts to assessments of countries, regions, key institutions and actors, policies and policy processes. Books in the series represent up-to-date sought-after sources of information and analysis reflecting the most up-to-date research and assessments of aspects related to the Future of Europe. Particular attention is paid to accessibility and clear presentation for a wide audience of students, practitioners and interested general readers.

Michael Kaeding • Johannes Pollak • Paul Schmidt Editors

Russia and the Future of Europe Views from the Capitals

Editors Michael Kaeding Institute for Political Science University of Duisburg-Essen Duisburg, Germany

Johannes Pollak Webster Vienna Private University Vienna, Austria

Paul Schmidt Austrian Society for European Politics Vienna, Austria

ISSN 2731-3379 ISSN 2731-3387 (electronic) The Future of Europe ISBN 978-3-030-95647-9 ISBN 978-3-030-95648-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6 # The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.

Foreword

There is a great diversity of views on how, as Europeans, we should collectively respond to a more assertive Russia—a country that increasingly disregards international norms. From Athens to Zagreb researchers and policy experts are seeking to understand shifts in their countries’ positions towards Russia, positions that have often been deeply rooted in history, and the implications of these shifts on the future of Europe. This comprehensive and authoritative collection of articles on EU–Russia relations sums up well the discussion taking place around Europe. The divergence of opinions on Russia is a necessary part of deliberation in the public sphere. For political decision-makers however, this disparity poses a challenge. How are we to bridge the gaps between the varying views and forge a coherent European policy towards Russia? Especially when faced with the very concrete limitations of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy where most decisions require the agreement of all EU countries. What we first need to realise is that we are not dealing with a country looking to advance good neighbourly relations with the European Union. This goal is simply not shared by the current regime in Russia. Rather, the stated objective of Russia is to undermine the EU—a task it has engaged in with some success from supporting Brexit to strengthening anti-European political parties. Second, we need to think thoroughly about what kind of dialogue we should engage in with a state, run by a corrupt elite, which does not hesitate to violate international norms when it suits its interests. We need to be realistic on what can be achieved with dialogue and stand firm in defending Europe’s interests and values. The European Union has much self-reflection to do on how we ended up here. We have allowed ourselves to become dependent on Russian fossil fuels and our response to hybrid aggressions by Russia has been weak. The EU countries can only blame themselves for laying out the red carpet to corrupt Russian oligarchs and their ill-gotten wealth. The roots of the problem go all the way to Soviet times when the KGB set up secret bank accounts and transferred assets to Europe. More importantly, the system established back then came to benefit Putin and his inner circle until today. And yet until recently we have made the

vii

viii

Foreword

situation even worse with some EU member states selling golden passports to thirdcountry nationals without proper checks and transparency, throwing the door wide open to money laundering, tax evasion, and corruption. As many of the articles in this collection point out, the relationship between Europe and Russia is rooted in shared financial and business interests. This has led to vulnerabilities, perhaps the most current and concrete example of which are the rising gas prices in Europe linked to tightened Russian energy supplies. Many decisions taken, such as building the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline or starting the Fennovoima nuclear project in Finland, have bound EU member states more tightly to Russia. Both Nord Stream 2 and Fennovoima were introduced merely as economic projects despite their clear geopolitical and security aspects. Fennovoima is causing concerns because one-third of the firm is owned by a Russian state nuclear company Rosatom. Finally, 7 years after the decision in principle, the Finnish governments’ eyes have opened and Finland’s defence ministry has demanded a risk assessment of the nuclear project. Economic power is the strongest weapon in the EU’s toolkit, but member states’ short-term economic interests threaten to tie the EU’s hands in foreign policy. The current sanctions lack teeth and have failed to sufficiently deter Russia’s aggression. How can we be sure that member states are committed to tougher sanctions against Russia if these sanctions conflict with states’ economic interests? What is the price we are willing to pay for the EU’s credibility as an actor in foreign and security policy? All in all, Europe has been hesitant to take responsibility for its security. In Finland and Sweden, where NATO membership is a hot button issue, it has been politically convenient to call for EU defence policy. But the fact is that the EU is not about to become a defence union in the foreseeable future. NATO will remain a linchpin of European security. With the European security environment in flux, the EU will need to rethink its relationship with NATO, seek to deepen interinstitutional cooperation, and further develop EU capacity in crisis response. It has become abundantly clear that Russia poses a grave challenge to the established security order in Europe, an order that has its roots in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act that recognised the inviolability of post-World War II frontiers in Europe. The current Russian regime is seeking to rewrite history to justify its aggressions. This is most evident in the persecution of the human rights organisation Memorial which has had a crucial role in uncovering and documenting Soviet-era repression. Looking forward, not all that emanates from the EU’s eastern neighbour ought to be treated with suspicion, much less demonised. Undoubtedly the road to a mutual understanding is difficult but can be paved if people across the border can interact and communicate with each other. People-to-people contacts, twinning between independent organisations, supporting free media outlets, and cooperation amongst communities will not only de-escalate the tensions and rebuff hate speech and disinformation; it will also weaken enthusiasm for, and thereby the legitimacy of, any hostile actions.

Foreword

ix

This collection of views from the capitals offers a lot of food for thought for European decision-makers on how to make sense of the complex web of social, political, and financial relationships between Europe and Russia. It is an important and highly topical contribution to the ongoing debate on EU–Russia policy. European Parliament Strasbourg, France

Heidi Hautala

Keywords

EU–Russia relations; Future of Europe; Energy policies; Ties to Russia; EU security policies; Public perception towards Russia

xi

Why This Book?

Calling the relation between the European Union (EU) and Russia complex would hardly do justice to a relationship between powers that could not be more different in historical experience, political style, and global ambitions. If we just review the past two decades, in other words, the period when after a brief belief into the “End of History” geopolitics took over again, most Europeans would identify Russia’s use of the military to change internationally recognised borders in Georgia (2008), the annexation of Crimea (2014) and the ensuing war in the Donbas, strained energy relations (beginning 2009 up to NordStream 2021), and the Skripal (2018) and the Navalny (2020) poisonings as most contentious issues. Top this with almost daily news about the repression of NGOs in Russia, crackdowns on political opposition, the outrageous stoking of prejudices and fear against the LGBT community, ever more frequently orchestrated cyber-attacks, election interference, a peculiar “divide et impera” approach towards Europe, and the strategic support Russia lends to authoritarian regimes such as Belorussia and Syria. The future of the relationship looks indeed rather bleak. Europe wonders about the masculine portrait of the Russian president in the state media which goes hand in hand with a serious curtailing of media freedoms and tentative fraudulent elections; it wonders about the blatant violations of international law and the increasingly open bullying of its neighbours; and it is ever more concerned about the growing anti-liberal tendencies in Russia. Ultimately, it wonders about Russia’s obsession to claim world power status where its political, economic, and societal deficits are obvious. Russia, on the other hand, may wonder about the many bold announcements of the EU of how it intends to protect its borders, intends to get independent from a reliable energy provider, and ultimately, wants to develop from an economic giant into a political world power. Europe, whose phone numbers still lead to Paris and Berlin (“Normandy Four format”), is seen as an appendix to the USA, its international profile—as seen from Moscow— oscillating between lectures with raised index finger and powerlessness. However, is this really what defines the relationship between the two powers? Almost certainly, those perceptions are partly grounded in intentional misunderstandings, historically nourished prejudices, and politically opportune snapshots. With this volume, we want to dissect the European relationship with Russia by once again asking for reports and analysis from the capitals. 41 short xiii

xiv

Why This Book?

opinionated contributions allow us to better understand the national differences in the positions towards Russia. What this look reveals is an astonishing kaleidoscope of positions and at the same time certain threads that unite and divide Europe over the Russian topic. Most certainly, it shows that in too many areas there is still no unified European position despite the efforts of many to formulate one. The EU’s policy towards Russia is—one is tempted to say by necessity—the smallest common denominator between the member states. Moreover, since this book also assembles contributions from non-EU European states, the political, historical, and also cultural divisions often nurtured by short-sighted, one-sided economic interests become even more visible. Overall, a highly critical disposition towards Russia can be discerned. This critical position can be rooted in the specific historical experience (e.g. Estonia, Bulgaria); in more recent political events such as the ammunition warehouse explosion in 2014 in the Czech Republic for which Russia is made responsible or the war of 2008 in Georgia; or in a general negative perception by the public. The latter is the case in a large number of countries: Albania, Belgium, Estonia (with 25% of Russian speakers), France, Kosovo, Malta, Montenegro, Sweden, the Netherlands, Ukraine, and the UK. Then there are countries where one can find a negative attitude of the public but friendly overtures of governments. In Austria, public sentiments may be rather neutral towards Russia, but at the same time doubts about the effects of the sanctions, distorted historic experiences, economic interests, and the limited willingness to accept negative side effect for oneself are ubiquitous. This may be fueled by the importance Austrian businesses place on good relations with Russia. There are also countries where the perception of Russia is a kind of a mixed bag, depending on the age group, as in Romania where elderly citizens are more negative than younger ones, or in Poland where one seems to appreciate Russian culture, but is clearly opposed to the current Russian regime. In Germany, one also has to add the East/West divide, whereas in Bulgaria a historically fueled negative perception is slowly turning due to massive interference by Russian proxies and economic investment to create positive reports about Russia and its policies in the media. The same Russian interference is identified for example in Georgia, Kosovo, and Romania with its special case of Moldova. In Serbia, but also in countries such as Italy, Russia was quick to help with medical equipment at the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, a help, which was symbolic, yet strategically accompanied by well-organised social media attacks to fuel criticism against a slow-moving European Union and the West as such. Countries that show a positive attitude towards Russia are Greece, and Iceland where citizens see the USA as the bigger threat for the international order, and Italy where we find historical remnants of a strong communist party and strong economic ties. No doubt, such dispositions, perceptions, or attitudes are very much volatile; e.g. the German public was very critical of Russia during the Crimean crises, but today a majority advocates deeper relations, which in itself may be a reaction to the USA under former President Trump. Such a shift in the public mood is a phenomenon we can see in various countries.

Why This Book?

xv

There is also no lack of states whose governments think themselves uniquely placed to act as mediator between Russia and Europe. Austria, Greece, and Italy are the prime examples where the former two might also be accused of certain illusionary tendencies. However, such attempts can also be interpreted as a realist understanding of the world: Russia is not going away; thus, we have to come to an arrangement with it. For some countries, astonishingly, Russia is not high on the agenda at all: for Albania, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, Portugal, and Switzerland, Russia is one topic amongst others but certainly not the most important one. This places unique burden and opportunities on those countries. Switzerland’s neutrality might make the country look like closing its eyes to the obvious in the interest of business—certainly not a perception the country may want to evoke in the face of historical precedence. Indeed, Norway and Iceland are deeply rooted in the Arctic Council and thereby able to exploit another forum of cooperation with Russia, yet no EU member states could claim a mediating role given their pragmatic attitude towards Russia. Looking at the different contributions and diverse historical and cultural experiences with Russia one would conclude that Europe is indeed in dire need to develop a more comprehensive strategy towards Russia. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell’s visit to Russia in February 2021 became a wake-up call for rethinking EU–Russia relations. The EU needs to know its own strengths and weaknesses to successfully formulate a medium- to long-term joint strategic approach towards its big neighbour to the east. Such a strategy should include visionary concepts about how to involve a postPutin and post-fossil fuel Russia in the development of Europe. In addition, it needs to accept certain geostrategic facts: e.g. rejecting Albania’s EU membership bid led to the erosion of the highly pro-European attitude in the country. Without opening a valid and tangible European economic perspective to the countries of the Western Balkans the door is wide open for Russia to extend its political influence and further leverage instability. In Serbia and the Republica Srpksa, Russia is already highly successful under the disguise of pan-Slavik unity. The same holds true for Ukraine and Georgia. Increasing internal divisions within Europe will make it more and more fragile to challenges from the outside and provocations beyond its borders. Europe still needs to prove that it rises to the challenge. The more it succeeds to speak with one voice and the more consistent it acts in core policy areas, such as trade, digital tech, defence and security, energy, asylum, and migration, the stronger it becomes, however difficult this may be. If it wants to decide its own future, Europe shall learn from the past and transform its diversity into cohesion. Our volume talks about the different European experiences with and approaches to Russia, the way Russia is perceived by Europeans and political relationships evolve, and its overall importance for the future of Europe. It does so by addressing an audience far beyond an academic niche interested in European politics. The book is not a scientific textbook but rather a guidebook in our Views from the Capitals series through a tremendously dynamic and exciting political landscape of Europe.

xvi

Why This Book?

As a guidebook, it favours lexical purpose as much as comprehensive comparative reading. Students and teachers may find a score of questions, differences, and common ground to explore more deeply in seminar papers and theses. Practitioners will benefit from the short overview being presented on one of the big topical issues of our times, and for all of us who are interested readers, it demonstrates the breathtaking diversity that defines, divides, and in the end unites this continent. We would like to extend our special thanks to Tanguy Babel and Eva Ribera, Project Officers at the Trans European Policy Studies Association, for the editorial processing and their tireless efforts in making this project become a reality. December 2021

Michael Kaeding Johannes Pollak Paul Schmidt

Additional Note Due to Russia’s War in Ukraine

The invasion of the Ukraine by Russian forces on 24th February 2022 constitutes a blatant violation of International Law. Under the pre-text of de-nazification, demilitarization, and the protection of Russian minorities, the Russian army started to lay waste on the large cities in the East and Southeast of Ukraine and bombarded cities in Western Ukraine. The suppression of civil liberties in Russia has reached a new peak. At the time of writing, the military aggression is still going on, the human tragedy with thousands dying and millions fleeing the country is still unfolding. Russia is facing sanctions by a newly unified West crippling the Russian economy. As expected, the energy relations between Russia and the EU occupy centre stage. No one knows how this war will unfold, what the Russian objectives are, and what more tragic repercussions it will have. What we do know is that this is a caesura in the relationship, and that the overwhelming wish on the part of the EU for a constructive relationship with Russia under Putin has not been reciprocated. The whole of the relationship with Russia, including the constant Russian disinformation and propaganda, described in the country reports of this volume appears in a different light today. The latter remain nonetheless a valuable source of information. Above all, they are an invitation for resolute action on behalf of the European Union. The European values described in the preambles of the treaties need to be supported by deeds and a new and more realistic approach to international relations. The Editors Michael Kaeding, Johannes Pollak, & Paul Schmidt and Jim Cloos, TEPSA Secretary General March 2022

xvii

Contents

Part I

Member States

Making Friends with Russia: Austria as a Solid Backer of Russia in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gerhard Mangott Belgium-Russia Relations: Balancing Values and Interest . . . . . . . . . . . Marc Franco

3 7

Bulgaria-Russia Political Relations: Between Rethinking and Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hristo Panchugov and Ivan Nachev

11

Croatia’s Policy Towards Russia: To Be a Hawk for no Good Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hrvoje Butković

15

Cyprus and Russia: Strong Ties in a New Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Giorgos Kentas The Czech-Russian Relations: From Bridge-Building to Open Hostility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Petr Kratochvíl and Zdeněk Sychra

19

23

Wide Fluctuations in Danish-Russian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hans Mouritzen

27

Estonia and Russia: More Cooperation or Growing Tensions? . . . . . . . . Viljar Veebel

31

Finland: Reckoning with a More Assertive and Authoritarian Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Juha Jokela France: What was Behind the Macron Russia Initiative? . . . . . . . . . . . . David Cadier

35 39

xix

xx

Contents

(No) Wind of Change?: German-Russian Relations in the Post-Merkel Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Katrin Böttger and Nicolas Butylin

43

Greco-Russian Relations: The Two Faces of ‘Janus’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sotirios Karampampas and Dimitris Tsaknis

47

Hungary: More Business, Less Illiberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . András Deák and Csaba Weiner

51

Ireland: Reluctantly Re-thinking Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Andrew Cottey

55

Diplomatic Bridge But Hybrid Fist: Italy’s Possible Approach Towards Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Karolina Muti

59

Latvian-Russian Relationship Status: ‘It’s Complicated’ . . . . . . . . . . . . Karlis Bukovskis and Andris Spruds

63

Lithuania’s Approach: Push Back Autocrats and Engage Democratic Activists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ramūnas Vilpišauskas

67

Luxembourg: If You Cannot Tame the Bear, Talk to It! . . . . . . . . . . . . Guido Lessing

71

Malta–Russia Relations and the Libyan Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mark Harwood

75

Poland and Russia: Turbulent Relations and No Rapprochement in Sight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Magdalena Góra, Zdzisław Mach, and Natasza Styczyńska

79

Portugal: Two Women’s Legacy—A Bridge Forged to Russia from the Western Edge of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sónia Sénica

85

Romania Versus Russia: Black Sea Region Ambitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexandru Damian and Bianca Toma

89

Slovak–Russian Relations: A Challenging Big Brother Legacy . . . . . . . . Lucia Mokrá

93

Russians Are Welcomed in Slovenia: As Artists, Tourists and Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maja Bučar and Boštjan Udovič

97

Spain’s Relationship with Russia: Out of Sight, Out of Mind? . . . . . . . . 101 Ignacio Molina Swedish–Russian Relations: Distrust and Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Gunilla Herolf

Contents

xxi

The Power of Attraction (Rather than Persuasion): A Brief Enquiry into Dutch-Russian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Hugo Klijn Part II

EU Neighbours

Russian Influence: Is Albania the Odd One Out? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Romario Shehu and Besjana Kuçi Russia Vs The West: Global Competition in the Local Setting of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Vedran Džihić Caught in Between: Georgia’s European Aspirations Under Russian Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Irakli Sirbiladze and Elene Panchulidze Icelandic-Russian Relations: Trade Determined by the EU . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Baldur Thorhallsson (Un)Shielded: Russia’s Influence in the Western Balkans Through the Kosovo-Serbia Open Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Donika Emini Liechtenstein’s Relations with Russia: Too Small to Be Noticed . . . . . . . 137 Christian Frommelt A Hot and Cold Power Struggle for Influence: Russia-Montenegro Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Danijela Jaćimović and Filip Petrović North Macedonia and Russia: An Ambiguous Relationship . . . . . . . . . . 145 Irena Rajchinovska Pandeva Russia: Norway’s Best Frenemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Jakub Godzimirski and Pernille Rieker Serbia and Russia: Continuity in a Changing Context? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Marko Savković Switzerland: The Tedious Art of Bridging a Widening Gap . . . . . . . . . . 157 Frank Schimmelfennig Between Conflict and Compromise: Turkey-Russia Relations and the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Cana Tülüş Türk The Approach to Russia for a Post-Brexit UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Andrew Blick The Russian Shadow Over Ukraine’s European Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Yuriy Yakymenko and Mykhailo Pashkov

Part I Member States

Making Friends with Russia: Austria as a Solid Backer of Russia in the EU Gerhard Mangott

Russia and Austria have traditionally had friendly, sometimes even cordial, relations, these days drawn from largely financial and business interests. Neither the current nor previous governments have shown great interest in political issues, human rights and the rule of law. When President Putin visited Vienna in 2018, Austria’s Federal President even went so far as to say that there was no loss of trust and confidence between the EU, Austria and Russia. Moreover, he did not see any reason why there should be. This is remarkable, given the breakdown of trust between most EU countries and Russia, not only because of its military escalation of the Ukraine crisis but also the deepening authoritarian character of the country’s political system. The first coalition government of Conservatives and the Freedom Party (2017–2019) led by Sebastian Kurz had very cosy relations with Russia. The latter political party had even signed a cooperation agreement with the Russian government party, United Russia, in 2016. In this agreement both parties praised shared values and agreed on regular exchanges. During that time, Eastern European EU members privately called Austria the ‘Trojan Horse of Russia’ inside the EU. While Austria has always voted for prolonging the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, every government over the past 7 years has publicly spoken out against the sanctions. Most embarrassing was Foreign Minister Kneissl’s bow before Putin at her wedding in August 2018, a photograph which perfectly underscored Austria’s submissiveness towards Putin. Kneissl was a non-partisan minister, but had been nominated to her post by the FPÖ. The unusual invitation of Putin to her wedding was highly controversial among the political class. Austria also agreed with Russia on a regular dialogue forum—the Sochi Dialogue. As expected, though, this forum deals only with cultural, educational and scientific issues—politically sensitive topics are avoided completely. Allegedly G. Mangott (*) University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_1

3

4

G. Mangott

strong pressure by the USA and Germany made Kurz halt this honeymoon in bilateral relations with Russia between 2017 and 2019. Furthermore, the current government stresses its dedication to deep transatlantic ties.

Solid Trade and Investment Ties The trade volume between Austria and Russia in 2020 was at its lowest level since 2009, with total trade worth EUR 4.3 billion. Total trade was at its highest level in 2012 when Russian exports peaked. While Austrian exports continued to increase until 2014, Russian exports to Austria declined. Indeed with contraction of the Russian economy in 2014/2015, Austrian exports declined considerably. This was due partly to EU sanctions on Russia, but reflected more the Russian rouble’s devaluation, which considerably decreased the country’s purchasing power. The increase in Austria’s exports between 2016 and 2019, once the Russian economy had consolidated, proved to be short-lived. Both countries’ pandemic-stricken economies saw bilateral trade fall again significantly, with Austrian exports in 2020 back to the same level recorded in 2009. Except for 2013 and 2014, Russia had a trade surplus with Austria. Austrian imports consist mainly of fossil fuels and metals, while it exports machines as well as equipment for trains and cars, together with pharmaceutical products. Accumulated foreign direct investment by Austrian companies in Russia currently is almost EUR 5 billion (2020). More than 70% of Austria’s gas consumption relies on Russian supplies. This high-level dependency is more a sign of cordial relations, rather than resulting from Austria’s friendliness towards Russia. Austria’s OMV energy company has very close ties with Gazprom and both have shared assets. OMV is also one of Gazprom’s five European business partners in the Nord Stream AG. OMV has invested almost EUR 900 million in the business, so no wonder that the Austrian government has consistently been a strong backer of this project, rejecting any security concerns expressed by Eastern European EU members.

Austrian Public Opinion In a recent opinion poll, 11% of Austrian respondents stated that Russia is one of the two most important strategic partners—this is a higher score than that recorded for the UK and China. However, 68% see Putin as either rather or very negatively. Only 27% see him as either rather or very positively. As far as the EU’s restrictive measures are concerned, most Austrians have negative or sceptical views.

Making Friends with Russia: Austria as a Solid Backer of Russia in the EU

5

Mending Fences At the moment, both Russia and Austria are seeking to revive their relations which have somewhat deteriorated due to two spy scandals involving a hacker attack on the Austrian Foreign Ministry with Russian hackers most likely responsible. It is to be expected that ties will remain solid, but less cordial than during the first Kurz government. During the recent visit of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, his then Austrian counterpart Schallenberg publicly noted differences with Russia over Belarus, Ukraine and Russian human rights violations. However, this was more for public consumption than any noticeable change of attitude towards Russia. Russian disinformation efforts are not a real problem for Austria. Russia has no need to support particular parties or interest groups in Austria as all of them support good relations with Russia. While a different composition for Austria’s government would not really alter the overall policy on Russia, this does not imply that Russia is trying to influence public opinion here by making use of non-governmental organisations. If Austria should seek to alter its relationship with Russia, particularly in the case of sensitive political issues, this should be undertaken through bilateral discourse and the Sochi Dialogue should also be deepened. Any ideas of Austria acting as a bridge builder between the EU and Russia are baseless. None of the major countries inside the EU sees the need for Austrian mediation nor is there sufficient trust that Austria’s Russia policy will be unbiased. At EU level, the influence of Russophobic Member States on EU-Russia policy should be reduced. The fact that the German-French proposal to restart high-level summits with Russia was rejected in June 2021 by many EU members, particularly Eastern European countries, was a significant negative development. It is certainly true that dialogue needs two partners and real interest in improving relations. But Eastern European members’ push for Russia to be contained, deterred and isolated is not a promising approach. Finally, the EU should restart ambitious talks with Russia about visa liberalisation. We should open our countries for those Russians who are able to travel, to see on their own, how we live and work. Gerhard Mangott is Professor in Political Science at the University of Innsbruck, specializing in International Relations and Russian Affairs. He is also a member of the teaching staff of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. He serves as member of the board for the International Centre for Advanced and Comparative EU-Russia (ICEUR), The Austrian Society for European Politics (ÖGfE) and is a member of the EU-Russian Expert Network (EUREN). His main research focus are Russian domestic and international affairs, US foreign policy, strategic nuclear arms control and non-proliferation and EU gas security. The Austrian Society for European Politics (Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik) was founded in 1991 and aims to promote and support communication and analysis of European affairs in Austria. With its headquarters in Vienna, the Society is a non-governmental and non-partisan platform mainly constituted by the Austrian Social Partners and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The Society is also a member of TEPSA.

Belgium-Russia Relations: Balancing Values and Interest Marc Franco

From a Historical Perspective Historically, in the second half of the nineteenth century, industrialised Belgium was one of the main investors in the then developing Russian (heavy) industry and an advocate of strong Russian ties. These emerging economic relations ended abruptly with the October Revolution and its wave of nationalisations. With the emergence of a New Russia following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Belgium quickly began to improve relations. In the same period, as the EU was negotiating its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (signed in 1994) and Russia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme (1994), Belgium and Russia were concluding their Treaty on Understanding (1993), by way of cementing friendly relations and outlining a comprehensive programme for developing the bilateral relationship. However, formal initiatives to update this cooperation ceased following the 2014 Ukraine crisis.

From Political and Security Perspective Overall political relations between Belgium and Russia range from cooperation to conflict. Belgium’s general position is embedded within that of the EU and NATO, within which organisations the country defends a moderate and pragmatic stance. Belgium shows solidarity with those countries suffering from Russian aggression, but tends to avoid escalation of conflict situations and self-defeating impasses. On a bilateral level Belgium is keeping the dialogue lines open and continues to cooperate in areas of common interest, for instance economic and cultural spheres. Without being an active champion for sanctions and other forms of retaliation, Belgium M. Franco (*) Egmont Institute, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_2

7

8

M. Franco

faithfully applies measures decided at EU level. Belgium’s relatively diversified energy imports make it less dependent on Russian gas than many other EU Member States. Conflicting interests between its Member States have led to fierce debates, especially concerning the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which Belgium regards as a commercial venture serving German needs for gas imports. From a security point of view, Belgium’s NATO membership, along with its role as host nation to the organisation’s headquarters, makes the country an inherent part of policy making processes. By taking part in Baltic Air Policing and contributing forces to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, the Belgian military frequently operates within range of Russian missile systems. As with many other EU and NATO Member States, Belgium is frequently the target of cyberattacks that have all but officially been traced back to the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, the Belgian government has never officially directly attributed these attacks to Russia. While Belgium prides itself on an active propagation of human rights, multilateralism and the rule of law, it also maintains bilateral relations with countries that adhere to these values much less, if at all. Belgium diplomacy does align itself with EU positions and at a bilateral level the country also voices its criticism regarding diplomatic practice.

From an Economic Perspective Trade relations developed smoothly after the Soviet Union’s dissolution when liberalisation and opening up of the Russian market created trade and investment opportunities. The total trade (exports+imports) reached EUR 12 to EUR 14 billion in the years before 2014. Overall Russia is Belgian’s 12th largest trading partner outside the EU. The trade balance is overwhelmingly negative for Belgium: the value of imports (hydrocarbons and precious stones) being about double that of exports (chemical products, machinery). The introduction of sanctions after the annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine significantly affected the vibrant trade relations, but trade gradually picked up from 2017 to reach roughly pre-sanction levels. While the COVID-19 crisis in turn affected trade flow in 2019–2020, it is expected to reach the pre-pandemic level of about EUR 12 billion in 2021. Several major Belgian companies have invested in Russia since the late 1990s, contributing to the modernisation and diversification of the country’s economy. Overall, Belgian companies enjoy a good standing in Russia, with a number of these being led by Russian nationals. Major Belgian investments have been made in, inter alia, flat glass production, plastics and other chemical production and steel wire transformation. Despite sanctions against Russia, major companies have in essence maintained their stake in the Russian economy, although there have been only a few new major investments. A number of Belgian small- and medium-sized companies have over time also developed positions on the Russian market, either independently or in co-financing arrangements with Russian partners. This flow has almost completely dried up due to the sanctions as well as Russia’s negative image in the

Belgium-Russia Relations: Balancing Values and Interest

9

media, which is reflected in public opinion. Moreover, at least one case is known where a company with significant operations in the USA was actively discouraged from developing an operation in Russia. Belgium is not dependent on Russian gas supplies, but the LNG infrastructure in Zeebrugge has become an important transit hub for Russian gas distribution. The Russian company Lukoil is also a major investor in Belgium’s energy infrastructure.

From a more General Perspective Academic cooperation between universities is generally positive, albeit not well developed. There are active cultural exchanges, with the support of various Russian companies and appreciated by the respective cultural establishments. Relatively few people-to-people contacts between civil society organisations exist. On the diplomatic side, the Belgian Embassy in Moscow has a good working relationship with the Russian authorities and uses its standing for actively supporting Belgian economic operators in Russia. In the past, there have been some security problems, but it seems that they have been overcome. However, there is continuing friction regarding the accreditation of Russian diplomats to Belgium, which along with expulsions give rise to intermittent conflicts. Generally speaking, the Belgian media do not have a positive attitude towards Russia, a position matched in public opinion. Knowledge about Russia is patchy, with any interest that does exist being focussed on Russian cultural heritage. Present Russian domestic and external policies most of the time tend to feed negative views, with only extremist parties (right and left) pleading in favour of closer cooperation.

A Way Forward? So far, Belgium has not articulated a coherent policy towards Russia. However, political relations are in line with the EU’s overall position and can be summarised as “deterrence and détente”, the key concepts of the 1967 Harmel Doctrine. This dualtrack approach is now in need of a clearer articulated and updated form. Not only do present-day attitudes differ from the 1960s “Ostpolitik”, but bilateral and multilateral relations are also different from those of the late 1960s. While external aggression and internal repression justify continued “deterrence” (VP Borrell’s “push back and constrain”), there are many areas of common interest (VP Borrell’s “engage”). Cooperation on some of these issues should be more actively pursued: climate and pandemic, as well as more political issues such as Iran and Afghanistan. One other potential area is the intensification of cooperation between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, where to date only technical contacts have taken place. Clearly Belgium is only a small player, but nevertheless it can introduce these issues in the EU and NATO contexts.

10

M. Franco

Marc Franco is a Senior Associate Fellow at Egmont—the Royal Institute for International Relations and Commissioner General of EUROPALIA-Georgia 2021. He was Adviser for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Egypt (2012) and previously Ambassador, Head of the European Union Delegation to Egypt (2009–2012) and Head of the European Commission’s Delegation to Russia (2004–2009). Egmont—the Royal Institute for International Relations is an independent think-tank based in Brussels. Its interdisciplinary research is conducted in a spirit of total academic freedom. Drawing on the expertise of its own research fellows, as well as that of external specialists, both Belgian and foreign, it provides analysis and policy options that are meant to be as operational as possible.

Bulgaria-Russia Political Relations: Between Rethinking and Commitment Hristo Panchugov and Ivan Nachev

The Bulgarian-Russian relationship has been controversial and complicated. Deeply rooted and historically bound attitudes, enhanced by half a century of targeted propaganda, have clashed with a practical and interest-driven approach to Bulgarian-Russian relations. This conundrum usually fails to be solved, which favours Russia.

Historical Strings From a historical perspective, Russia played a significant role in the ‘liberation’ of Bulgaria in 1879, but has nevertheless also displayed open and undermining hostility towards the country’s independence. This has created a deep cleavage in support and opposition for Russia, which over time has given way to entrenched political movements. Following the Second World War in 1945, Soviet and communist propaganda created a narrative not only cultural, ideological, linguistic and historical bonds between the two nations but also of brotherhood, based on Russia’s role as a ‘liberator’. This narrative can also be traced after the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and set a pro-European, democratisation agenda against nostalgic, pro-Russian sentiments of former communist supporters, now the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Although a clear pro-Europe consensus was established, the Russian Federation continued to influence Bulgarian politics through its BSP ally as well as different economic and public instruments. The impact can be seen in, for instance, anti-NATO campaigns, the gas and oil market monopoly and the project to build a second nuclear power plant in Belene. Most recently, this influence is still apparent in the anti-immigration, anti-European sentiments of some Bulgarian parties (mostly BSP and Ataka), taking a position

H. Panchugov (*) · I. Nachev New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_3

11

12

H. Panchugov and I. Nachev

against the Istanbul convention and sanctions imposed by the EU on the Russian Federation.

Economic Relations: All About Energy The trade balance between the two countries has been dominated by Russian imports, largely energy resources. In 2020 the Russian Federation headed Bulgaria’s import market list, while it was at only 13th position on the export market list. This negative trade balance remains one of the key problems in Bulgarian politics—slim economic benefits but energy dependency and strong Russian political influence. Economic relations are largely linked to a number of energy projects. While some serve to diversify routes of energy supplies, none diversifies the sources of energy resources. The potential for political and economic problems stemming from such dependency was shown by the 2009 energy crisis. The Belene NPP and South Stream projects in particular serve as a test case for understanding Russian influence in Bulgarian politics. The Belene project had been frozen in 1991, but reopened in 2002 as the result of a feasibility study, resulting in close to EUR 1.5 billion being spent overall, plus EUR 750 million paid for Russian reactors. The ‘South Stream’ project saw controversy over the viability of the project and its impact on national security, but it was ultimately a decision by the EU Commission that stopped its development. Nevertheless, Bulgaria willingly took part later in the refurbished South Stream, retitled ‘Turkish stream’.

Public Sentiments Russian political influence in Bulgarian politics is largely due to economic influence (transformed in political pressure) and public sentiment, the latter having been supported by a targeted effort to undermine EU influence. A comprehensive study discovered that the annual number of Eurosceptic publications had increased by 16-fold between 2013 and 2016. Similarly, Anti-US and anti-NATO publications have increased by 34-fold, but 42- to 144-fold for pro-Russian topics. While these have not all been inspired by Russia, they clearly create a common pro-Russian discourse. In 2018, a study on Bulgarian attitudes towards Russia outlined a common trend—56% positive against 14% negative sentiments. While such influence does not challenge Bulgaria’s EU membership—58% national support—it can and has been supportive of practices that have become an issue, such as corruption and energy dependency.

Bulgaria-Russia Political Relations: Between Rethinking and Commitment

13

The Impact The spill-over effect can be observed in Bulgaria’s deviation from a coherent EU foreign policy as well as the hesitant and vague reaction of Borisov’s government to the idea of a common NATO fleet in the Black Sea, the ‘Skripal’ findings and suspicions of Russian involvement in the poisoning of a Bulgarian businessman. Furthermore, the project for a Bulgarian Security Strategy developed in 2018 to include Russia as a strategic threat was later diluted to state that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is a potential source of insecurity in the region. This hesitant policy towards threats in the Black Sea, dependence on Russia not just in the energy sector but also for the maintenance of some weapon systems, if not against, at least run in parallel to the efforts for the development of a unified NATO strategy.

Bulgaria, the EU and Russia Based on the future governmental configuration, there are three viable scenarios: 1. A ‘standstill’—public support of Euro-Atlantic values, but appeasement of Russian ambition by participation in some Russian projects. 2. A turn towards undermining (possibly seeking to lift) the sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU and continuation of the Belene NPP and other energy projects. 3. Reaffirmation of EU and NATO loyalties via new security commitments in terms of capabilities and rearmament. ‘Energy diversification’ and ‘independence’ are unlikely to be priorities even in this scenario. Some sort of balance between these three will be the most probable outcome. To overcome this conundrum, the perceived ambiguity of the EU politics towards Russia needs to be disproved, namely, the narrative that energy policy is applied only in peripheral cases and not if the interests of ‘old’ Member States are involved. A clear and common strategy towards the Russian Federation needs to be devised. Bulgaria’s chances lie with common EU actions and decisions in which it participates, such as the South Stream example clearly shows. Regarding energy policy, the Reference European Commission scenarios are to be used, as the source of a systematic approach and base for comparison. A comprehensive approach to communication with the Bulgarian general public is also desperately required. Understanding the local Russian-related narratives, attitudes and behaviour triggers is key to devising a strategy to overcome, change or separate the attitudes from political realities. Active engagement and understanding of Russian culture and political reality is pivotal. Society-to-society engagement and expertise-based decision-making, with regard to politics towards Russia, are to become the backbone of EU policy. Appeasing Russian aggression in the region will more likely fail as a viable political strategy.

14

H. Panchugov and I. Nachev

Hristo Panchugov is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at the New Bulgarian University and also Executive Director of the Democratic Institute Foundation. He is a graduate of the Central European University (Hungary). The New Bulgarian University was established in 1991 with a resolution of the Bulgarian Parliament. Its mission is to be an autonomous liberal education institution dedicated to the advancement of university education by offering accessible and affordable opportunities for interdisciplinary and specialised education as well as high quality research. The University is also a member of TEPSA. Ivan Nachev is a Bulgarian political scientist and an expert on political integration of the European Union. His interests are in the fields of political theory and practice, European values, European integration theories, strategies and political practices. He is a member of the Bulgarian Association for Political Sciences, the Institute for Public Policies and Partnership, the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) and Team Europe at the European Commission. The New Bulgarian University was established in 1991 with a resolution of the Bulgarian Parliament. Its mission is to be an autonomous liberal education institution dedicated to the advancement of university education by offering accessible and affordable opportunities for interdisciplinary and specialised education as well as high quality research. The University is also a member of TEPSA.

Croatia’s Policy Towards Russia: To Be a Hawk for no Good Reason Hrvoje Butković

From Ascending to Descending Trajectory Croatia-Russia relations were officially opened on 25 May 1992 following the Russian recognition of Croatia as an independent state. In the 2000s and early 2010s consecutive presidents of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić and Ivo Josipović, made a number of official working visits to Russia. The accession of Croatia to NATO in 2009 and the European Union in 2013 limited possibilities for independent political cooperation with Russia, although there was still space for development of constructive bilateral relations at some stage. Indeed, it could be argued that until Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine during 2014 bilateral relations had generally been in the ascendancy. From a general perspective, the year 2014 represents a milestone in Western relations with Russia, which was immediately also reflected with a negative impact on Croatia-Russia relations. According to some estimates, the economic sanctions on Russia implemented since 2014 have halved Croatia’s exports there over the years since. Even in 2015 Croatia’s exports to Russia valued at EUR 195 million were already 29.5% less than they were in 2014, with Croatian agricultural producers being particularly hard hit. When in late 2016 still serving Prime Minister Andrej Plenković took control of the centre-right HDZ party, relations between the two countries deteriorated even further. Out of all Croatian PMs, Plenković is arguably the most ardent EuroAtlanticist. He is a strong supporter of Croatia’s NATO membership and seeks to integrate the country as closely as possible into all EU structures. Since 2017

This text was finalized prior to Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. H. Butković (*) The Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO), Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_4

15

16

H. Butković

Plenković has been implementing a programme which seeks fast integration of Croatia into the eurozone, possibly from 2023. In late 2016, relations between Croatia and Russia worsened after Plenković offered a model of peaceful reintegration as a possible solution for the rebel Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. In the second half of the 1990s such a process was successfully implemented by the UN in returning the Croatian Danube Region into the legal order of the country. In 2016 harsh words were exchanged between Moscow and Zagreb, especially because Plenković also talked about the return of Crimea to Ukraine. In July 2017 the PM’s attitude towards Russia resulted in the Foreign Affairs magazine referring to his government as “the West’s strongest ally against Russian expansion in the Balkans”.

Temporary Warming of Relations Due to Plenković’s position on Russia it came as somewhat of a surprise that two Russian banks Sberbank and VTB Bank played a key role in stabilising the badly shaken Croatian economy early in 2017. At that time the country’s biggest multibillion-euro company, Agrokor, received a government bailout to avert collapse. Agrokor specialised in the production and distribution of food, beverages with a retail operation and annual revenue of around EUR 7 billion, some 15% of the country’s GDP. The Croatian government’s bailout ended up granting Sberbank and VTB Bank a 47% stake in Agrokor. This temporary warming of relations could perhaps be explained with the existence of many solid links between Croatian and Russian businesses in the period prior to 2014. To a certain extent, good business relations survived 2014 as some Croatian exporters to Russia found new ways of routing goods through Serbia. Around the time of the Agrokor crisis, some improvement in Croatia-Russia relations was attempted by the then Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović. In mid-2017 Kitarović accompanied by the Foreign Minister Davor Ivo Stier officially visited the Russian Federation. However, Croatia’s firm position vis-á-vis Russia was reconfirmed in March 2018 when it joined the group of 14 EU countries that expelled Russian diplomats as a show of solidarity with the UK which had accused Russia of poisoning Sergei and Yulia Skripal. Last but not least, the hard stance on Russia manifested itself again in August 2021 during the Crimean Platform’s inaugural summit organised by Ukraine’s President Zelensky. On that occasion, Plenković repeated his 2016 offer to Ukraine in passing on Croatia’s knowledge and experiences with the process of peaceful reintegration, explicitly stating that Crimea is part of Ukraine.

What Could be Done? Some Recommendations While an uncompromising political stance towards Russia might be morally justified, it is questionable if for a country such as Croatia it is politically wise. One should not forget that on the European scale Croatia is a small country.

Croatia’s Policy Towards Russia: To Be a Hawk for no Good Reason

17

Moreover, unlike some other EU countries, Croatia does not share borders or difficult historic experiences with Russia. On the contrary, economic and political relations have traditionally been good and well developed. According to some analysts, Russia is seeking to prevent integration of the Western Balkans into the EU or NATO, which is clearly not in Croatia’s interests. However, such claims, especially in regard to the EU, seem a bit farfetched because Russia is in no position to offer a credible alternative to the region’s economic integration with the EU. Croatian membership of the Western alliances places certain restrictions on its foreign and economic policies. However, as shown from examples of EU governments that are more measured in their relationship with Russia, such as those from Italy or even Germany, there is still room for manoeuvre. The hard-line position towards Russia demonstrated by PM Plenković certainly impresses many of his European and US colleagues, but at the same time they leave a dilemma concerning possible implications on the country’s economy and security. In other words, it could bring about the dismantling of still existing economic cooperation and make Croatia a target for possible Russian cyberattacks. To sum up, it would be in Croatia’s economic and political interests to back away somewhat from the front lines of Western conflict with Russia and start building constructive relations with the Russian Federation, despite clear limitations. Hrvoje Butković works as a Senior Research Associate in the Department for European Integration at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia. He defended his PhD at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. His primary research interests include democracy in the EU and European industrial relations. IRMO is a public, non-profit, scientific research organisation located in Zagreb, with its main work organised through four departments. IRMO provides strategic support to decision makers and ensures the dissemination of its research results. IRMO is also a member of TEPSA.

Cyprus and Russia: Strong Ties in a New Context Giorgos Kentas

Cyprus-Russia relations are driven by interest, geopolitics and culture. Since the Republic of Cyprus’ founding, this relationship has been steadily growing, with some dramatic moments in the early 1960s to do with domestic intercommunal conflict and Turkey’s intention to change the status quo on the island. Russia saw in Cyprus a trustworthy non-aligned small state that should never come under NATO’s sphere of influence. Nicosia saw in Moscow a committed friend that would be able to thwart plans by foreign powers to divide the island. In the aftermath of Turkey’s 1974 military invasion, Russia supported the case of Cyprus in UN Security Council. Russia remains the major market for defence procurement in essential military equipment and supplies.

The Turning Point In the early 2000s, the drivers of bilateral relations changed when Russian moguls invested billions of euros in Cyprus for financing new business ventures, establishing offshore companies and even permanent settlement on the island. By 2012, Russian deposits and funds in Cyprus reached EUR 31 billion, far above national GDP of EUR 19.4 billion at the time, while Cyprus-based Russian companies held loans from Russian banks totalling EUR 30–40 billion. Thousands of Russian citizens acquired residency rights, with some also obtaining Republic of Cyprus citizenship. Today, 30,000–40,000 Russian nationals reside in areas controlled by the government of Cyprus and some 15,000 in areas controlled by Ankara’s secessionist entity. Cyprus’s total population is less than a million. G. Kentas (*) Cyprus Centre for International Affairs, Department of Politics and Governance, University of Nicosia, Nicosia, Cyprus e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_5

19

20

G. Kentas

The Russian diaspora is active, but not politically united enough to take advantage of its size and wealth. In 2017, a Russian-diaspora-affiliated political party was founded, named ‘I the citizen’. That party emerged in response to problems faced by Russian residents. However, it did not participate in the 2021 parliamentary elections and seems not to have advanced political capital capable of influencing sociopolitical developments in Cyprus. The influx of Russian money and citizens into Cyprus caused some concerns across EU countries which are critical of Vladimir Putin and his policies. The EU strives to form a common foreign policy towards Russia, but Member States also maintain bilateral relations with Kremlin at different levels. According to the President of Cyprus, Nicosia is one of those EU capitals that supports more dialogue and constructive engagement with Russia, instead of conflict and sanctions. However, at critical moments Cyprus has aligned its foreign policy with EU decisions on Russia.

Tipping the Scales Cyprus-Russia relations were tested in 2013 amid a great financial and sovereign crisis. In the context of an EU/ECB/IMF-sponsored bailout, Cyprus authorities were forced to impose a levy on Bank of Cyprus and Popular Bank depositors. In a crucial meeting of March 2013, President Anastasiades tried to persuade Eurogroup leaders to accept a levy on all depositors in Cyprus’s banking system so that financial implications will be shared in an equitable manner. Critics in the EU and elsewhere suggested that Anastasiades was largely concerned with the reaction of Russian depositors, some of whom were clients of his former legal office. Even though the Eurogroup accepted Anastasiades’s initial recommendation, the final decision was to abide by Union legislation that guarantees bank accounts, subject to a limit on each of EUR 100,000. As a result, thousands of Russian account holders suffered tremendous losses worth hundreds of millions of euros. Tens of thousands of accounts were closed within days and more than EUR 1 billion was instantly lost. Under a draconian adjustment programme, Cyprus was forced to repair its financial system by shrinking the banking sector, introducing stricter regulations for bank accounts and improving foreign funds’ inspections, in line with EU/ECB rules. Russian trust in Cyprus’s financial sector was damaged beyond repair and the government’s ability to guarantee its banking system was called into question. Conversely, the Kremlin saw this levy imposed on Russian depositors as the nemesis for those critics of Putin, who found safe havens in Cyprus for corporate activities, beyond the control of the Russian government. However, not all Russians who suffered the consequences of this new imposition were Putin’s enemies. The levy on Russian depositors was interpreted as an EU/US attack against the Kremlin. The Cyprus-Russia relationship suffered severe harm. By the end of 2019, Russian deposits in Cyprus banks had shrunk to EUR 6.87 billion. In 2020, Russian foreign direct investment (FDI) in Cyprus was EUR 143 million and Cyprus FDI to Russia was EUR 102.4 million. Service exports

Cyprus and Russia: Strong Ties in a New Context

21

and imports to/from Russia were worth EUR 1.8 billion and EUR 295 million, respectively. Trade volume in 2020 reached EUR 82.7 million (EUR 47.1 million exports and EUR 35.6 million imports).

Repairing the Relationship Anastasiades’s government made every effort to repair bilateral relations with Russia and restore trust in Cyprus’s financial sector. The two countries signed an agreement in 2015 allowing Russian ships to visit the ports of Cyprus. That agreement received criticism from some EU countries and the USA for being completed just a year after the annexation of Crimea. Cyprus’s foreign policy calculations are shaped by geopolitical developments, primarily by Turkey’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean and new momentum in the Kremlin-Ankara relationship. Nicosia has of late deepened its relationship with the USA, but it equally maintains the best possible ties with Russia. For instance, in September 2020 Anastasiades awarded Sergei Lavrov the Medal of the Grand Cross of the Order of Makarios III, the highest honour one may receive from the Republic of Cyprus. This was, in Anastasiades’s words, ‘gratitude for what the Russian Federation has offered to the Republic of Cyprus’. A thriving Russophile community in Cyprus is now making an impact. In 2017, a Russian-style majestic church with five gold domes, originally constructed in St. Petersburg, was founded in Episkopio. The Church and other facilities in the area, including the first planetarium in the country, are financed exclusively by a Russian tycoon. Russia features as a reliable country in Greek Cypriot grassroots. A survey in 2017 showed that Russia is a satisfactory and desirable potential security guarantor in the context of a settlement to the Cyprus problem by 53% of participants, compared to 26% for the USA and 13% for the UK.

Policy Recommendations The EU needs to have a common foreign policy on Russia. Member States’ national interests and special bilateral relationships with the Kremlin emerge as stumbling blocks for addressing key challenges. The EU needs to develop a better understanding of Cyprus in regard to specific interests and concerns, but Member States should also work harder to strengthen the Union’s foreign policy towards Russia. Nicosia needs to strike a better balance between national expectations from the Kremlin and foreign policy obligations emanating from EU membership. As a closing thought in this chapter, ultimately if Member States are not capable of forming common foreign policies on critical matters, the EU’s credibility on the world stage will wither away.

22

G. Kentas

Giorgos Kentas is Associate Professor in International Politics and Governance at the Department of Politics and Governance at the University of Nicosia. He is Director of a Master Programme in Public Administration. His research focuses on strategic management, politics and governance at national and European levels. He follows EU developments and studies their implications for Member States and world politics. He has recently published papers on Brexit and its implications for Cyprus and strategic planning in the public sector of Cyprus. The University of Nicosia is the largest private university in Cyprus. It offers more than 100 conventional and distance learning online programmes at Bachelor, Master and Doctorate levels. It hosts more than 11,500 students from all over the world and is also a member of TEPSA.

The Czech-Russian Relations: From Bridge-Building to Open Hostility Petr Kratochvíl and Zdeněk Sychra

Russia as a Marginal Topic in Czech History Despite appearances, Russia historically played a relatively minor role in Czech politics before the Second World War. The two countries never shared a border and any cultural exchange was limited to the romanticised notion of Russia as a ‘Slavic oak’ and the hosting of Russian emigrees following the 1917 Revolution. All of this changed dramatically with the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany and subsequent incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet bloc following the 1948 Communist coup. After the country’s democratisation in 1989, the Soviet Union/Russia once again became much less relevant for the Czech Republic, both politically and economically. Russia in turn retreated from public debate, becoming a symbolic representation of post-communist underdevelopment, from which the country tried to escape. Direct experience with Russia was thus relatively short, having been limited to about 40 years of Czech history. This is an absolutely essential point of understanding if we want to grasp both why the Czech public attitude to Russia can (and does) quickly change and why the Czech relationship with Russia is so starkly different from the Polish-Russian or Baltic-Russian stances. In other words, the Czech Republic does not share the heavy historical burden which often dominates the political agenda of its north-eastern neighbours nor does it see Russia as a liberator from the Ottoman/Islamic rule, as is the case with some Balkan countries. All Russia-related historical events that are a staple of Czech political debates are thus limited to four and a half decades from the 1940s to the 1980s, featuring the liberation of the country by the Red Army in 1945, Soviet support for the Communist coup d’état in 1948, the Stalinist oppression of the 1950s, the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968 and the ‘normalisation’ that followed. P. Kratochvíl (*) · Z. Sychra Institute of International Relations Prague (IIR), Prague, Czechia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_6

23

24

P. Kratochvíl and Z. Sychra

Communism and Anti-Communism as the Main Points of Reference Public attitudes to Russia are also not linked to any historical narrative of who the Czechs are as a political community, as it is the Germans who played the role of the historical ‘Other’. As a result, prevailing attitudes towards Russia can, without much exaggeration, be derived from those towards the Communist period. Any critique of Russia thus often provides a way of distancing from the East (‘We belong in the West’ is a common political slogan in the Czech Republic). Those who see Communist rule in a more positive light (around one in seven people, according to a 2020 opinion poll) also tend to have a friendlier attitude towards Russia, while those who are more critical of the period are also more distrustful towards Russia. Overall, Russia is seen negatively, with positive attitudes more prevalent amongst the less educated, senior and left-oriented citizens. Political parties in the Czech Republic fit this pattern: the right-wing parties such as ODS, TOP 09 or the Christian Democrats are distrustful of Russia, while the left is more accommodating (in particular the Communist Party, but also some Social Democrats). There are two notable exceptions to this classification: both the current President (Miloš Zeman) and his predecessor (Václav Klaus) can be counted amongst the country’s most pro-Kremlin politicians, with many personal and political ties to the current political leadership in Moscow. However, due to President Zeman’s deteriorating health and ex-President Klaus’ ever more extreme views, their influence is quickly becoming less relevant than it was some years ago. Moreover, the lingering influence of two prominent political figures may be distorting the picture regarding overall political attitudes towards Russia.

The Black Swan Scenario: Vrbětice Because there is only a weak link between Russia and national identity, a single event can substantially and quickly change opinions. The 2014 explosions at the Vrbětice ammunition warehouses and the Prime Minister’s subsequent 2021 public announcement that Russian secret service operators have been found responsible are a notable case in point. People’s feelings towards Russia deteriorated sharply after the announcement. While previously the general public was more worried about the indirect influence of Russia (in terms of energy dependence or misinformation), following Vrbětice, the majority of Czechs started to see Russia as a real security threat, with almost one fifth describing Russia as a huge threat. The Vrbětice scandal can thus be seen as a watershed: pro-Kremlin politicians (e.g. President Zeman) were severely weakened and even formerly neutral players (such as the then Prime Minister Babiš) started to criticise Russian activities openly. However, the repercussions became more severe: Russian company Rosatom was excluded from a tender to expand the Czech nuclear plant at Dukovany; the number of diplomatic staff at the Russian embassy in Prague was dramatically reduced; and relations hit an all-time low with the Czech Republic’s inclusion (alongside the United States) on

The Czech-Russian Relations: From Bridge-Building to Open Hostility

25

Russia’s official list of two ‘unfriendly countries’. Given the many general escalations of tension between Russia and the West as well as the frozen Czech-Russian relations specifically, it is difficult to envisage any improvement in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the Czech Republic will instead be considered by Russia as being only marginally better than the Baltic States. But perhaps even more importantly, Russia has no interest in de-escalating or even improving relations, as witnessed during the recent Russian election with the ‘perfidious West’ once again being one of the main topics. Russia is also becoming less and less important in economic terms. This is not only a consequence of the Vrbětice scandal, but also of generally worsening EU-Russian relations, including sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU. Today, only around 2% of Czech exports head to Russia, which corresponds to less than 1% of the country’s GDP, albeit even at this extremely low level the value of Czech exports exceeded imports by one third. Russian direct investments in the Czech Republic are also negligible as they constitute 0.6% of the total. Hence, Russia remains economically relevant only so far as the energy resources are concerned. Furthermore, given Czech energy sources’ level of diversification, Russia cannot claim any strong political position here. The combined consequence of these political and economic developments is that the Czech Republic, which not so long ago saw itself as a bridge between the EU and Russia, no longer serves in this role. If anything, the Czech Republic now belongs within the group of those who are strongly critical of Russia. The Czech stress on ‘hybrid warfare’ also means that the Czech Republic sees itself as a frontline state in the fight against Russian disinformation. This self-image resonates strongly with large parts of Czech political elites who believe that the country’s belonging to the West can be reaffirmed in this way.

Recommendations The accommodating approach to Russia, which is stressed by Italy and at times by Germany, is currently declining sharply in the Czech Republic. Reaction to the Vrbětice scandal shows that Russia is, at least for the time being, not interested in de-escalation. As this chapter has shown, any attempts at ‘constructive engagement’ will thus for the foreseeable future be rather one-sided. The EU should accept this state of affairs and act accordingly. While Russia sees the Union (including the Czech Republic) in adversarial terms, Russian influence should not be overestimated, in particular as far as the so-called hybrid warfare is concerned. Although Russia is clearly engaged in multiple disinformation campaigns, its resources are nevertheless limited and hence success is doubtful. The EU should instead focus on its own resilience and socio-economic stability.

26

P. Kratochvíl and Z. Sychra

Petr Kratochvíl is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague and a Member of the TEPSA Board. He is the author of dozens of monographs, book chapters and journal articles. His research interests cover theories of international relations, European studies, and the religion-politics nexus. The IIR is an independent public research institution which has been conducting scholarly research in the area of international relations since 1957. Originally founded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, the IIR also provides policy analysis and recommendations. It aims to form links between the academic world and public/international political practice. IIR is also a member of TEPSA. Zdeněk Sychra is a member of the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen. His academic interests include the issues of European politics, the Economic and Monetary Union, and political governance in the EU. As an author and co-author, he has published numerous articles and book chapters on European Union politics. University of West Bohemia is one of the most visible universities in the Czech Republic. It prepares students for graduation in many technical fields, humanities, and arts. The Department of Politics and International Relations of the Faculty of Arts is an academic institution offering a broad range of undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate study programmes and conducting research in political science, international relations, and territorial studies.

Wide Fluctuations in Danish-Russian Relations Hans Mouritzen

Danish-Russian relations have developed in waves through the years. Whereas most other European states are consistently either hawks or doves, the official Danish attitude towards Russia has fluctuated considerably in the post-Cold War era.

History Historically Denmark has been a de facto ally of Russia (vis-à-vis Sweden), the two countries never having been at war with each other. In modern times, as a frontline NATO state Denmark was always strongly in favour of détente in regard to the Soviet Union. However, as soon as Soviet troops left the Danish neighbourhood after the Cold War, Denmark heightened its foreign and security policy profiles. It defied Russia by working energetically towards NATO membership for the Baltic States, both out of small state solidarity and to safeguard an efficient buffer for itself against any future Russian aggression. Moreover, as Denmark allowed a Chechen World Congress to be hosted in Copenhagen, 2 weeks after the theatre hostage drama in Moscow (October 2002) and with general Zakayev as a speaker, Putin responded by cancelling his planned state visit a few weeks later. Danish-Russian diplomatic relations froze during the following years. However, notably with the acceptance of Nord Stream 1 through Danish waters in 2009, they started to melt again, following which mutual state visits and trade agreements were made. However, in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and events in the Donbass, Denmark has been a firm adherent of the sanctions’ regime against Russia, its profile being somewhere between those of Germany and the Baltic States/Poland.

H. Mouritzen (*) Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_7

27

28

H. Mouritzen

Compartmentalisation Danish Russia policy today can be regarded as geographically compartmentalised: a tough attitude in the Baltic arena (with about 200 Danish troops in NATO’s ‘forward defence’ position in Estonia) and a cooperative attitude in the Arctic (mainly in the Arctic Council). However, America’s renewed military interest in the Arctic and the fact that the American Thule Air Base in Greenland has recently come within reach of Russian bombers may complicate relations in the Arctic, albeit this is chiefly a matter of bilateral US-Russian military competition.

Trade and Nord Stream 2 Danish-Russian trade is modest in spite of the countries’ mutual proximity. Around 1.2% of Danish imports come from Russia, whereas 0.97% of Danish exports are sent to Russia (figures from 2020). Russia is ninth on the Danish export and import countries’ lists. Whilst there is no energy dependence on Russia, in that Denmark itself does not need to import natural gas, the issue of Nord Stream 2 has created dilemmas for Danish decision-makers in recent years, because its pipeline was planned to go through Danish waters (in parallel with Nord Stream 1). Denmark has found itself being squeezed between Germany’s wish to increase its import of Russian natural gas and the contrary wishes of the Baltic countries/Poland and the USA. As Nord Stream moved the pipeline from Denmark’s territorial waters to its economic zone, Denmark could no longer apply a veto and hence gave its low-level ‘environmental acceptance’ of the pipeline, albeit with considerable delay.

Opinion and Party Politics According to a 2019 survey, 45% of Danes think that EU sanctions on Russia are ‘not tough enough’, whereas only 3% think they are ‘too tough’. This places Danish opinion in the ‘tough top-3 tier’ among 14 surveyed EU countries. Danish media mostly exhibit a value-oriented approach to Russia, emphasising its democratic irregularities. There are (sub)conscious elements of Russo-phobia involved here and there. The spectrum of political parties is generally Russo-sceptic, although the Danish People’s Party is more oriented towards ‘Realpolitik’. However, in general terms there is no opportunity for Russia to interfere (by ‘divide and rule’, say) in Danish party politics, should it ever wish to do so.

NATO Is Top Priority NATO and the USA are axiomatic in Danish security and defence policy. For instance, as Denmark increased its defence budget in 2018 and extraordinarily again in 2019, it was due to American presidential pressure rather than any new

Wide Fluctuations in Danish-Russian Relations

29

and frightening steps taken by Russia. Furthermore, the Danish EU opt-out regarding defence has nothing to do with Russia, but rather popular fear of European integration. It was decided by a 1993 referendum (a referendum whether to abolish the opt-out will be held on 1 June 2022). NATO is trusted as the necessary and sufficient deterrent towards Russia.

In Sum In general, Denmark has considerable room for manoeuvre (external action space) in its Russia policy. There is no common border with Russia and no economic or energy dependency. Hence, Russia policy is not top priority and can be debated and decided upon without rush or pressure. This may sometimes result in a valueoriented approach, as displayed by the mentioned wave motions in Russia policy at the start of this chapter. There is also likely to be continued action space in the domestic arena. The future of Danish Russia policy is therefore likely to be determined mostly by any steps taken by Russia. The heavy sanctions against Russia after its military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is an example of this.

Recommendations With ample Danish action space, there should be opportunities to think in more global-systemic terms. Increased confrontation with China and Russia from the USA and NATO is likely to result in increased Sino-Russian cohesion and cooperation— short of an alliance proper. Such cooperation, based on Chinese economic power and Russian military power, can easily push back against further assertive steps by the West. Denmark and its allies should therefore think twice before converting low politics cooperation into geopolitics. In particular, a value-driven approach—trying to export Danish democracy into the Russian context—will have no effect, quite to the contrary. As seen in the past, Russian national prestige will prevail and no accommodation can be expected. Any ‘Western-style’ developments in Russian domestic politics will have to come from within. Hans Mouritzen , dr.scient.pol., is a senior research fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), where he is an editor of ‘Danish Foreign Policy Review’. He has developed theory about the autonomy of international organisations, small state foreign policy, how external danger affects domestic cohesion, and how historical memory impacts contemporary foreign policy decisions (‘presence of the past’). DIIS is an independent public research institution for international studies. It conducts and communicates multidisciplinary research. The institute carries out basic research, policy analysis and commissioned research.

Estonia and Russia: More Cooperation or Growing Tensions? Viljar Veebel

Estonia: A Russian Expert or Radically ‘Russophobic’ Country? As one of the few EU Member States that has both a land and sea border with Russia, Estonia is considered to be an experienced actor in Russian affairs, especially from a small-state perspective. Estonia’s contemporary strategic vision of Russia is influenced by Russia’s aggressive stance in recent decades, Estonia’s painful historical experience with Russia, the challenges of social segregation between Estonians and Russians and potential security threats emanating from Russia. Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and ongoing war in the Eastern Ukraine, Estonia has committed to using all of its diplomatic and media capabilities to warn Member States within the EU and NATO about Russia’s aggressive ambitions and activities. How does this anti-Kremlin radicalism influence Estonia’s position in the EU? While in the past this attitude has found more critics than sympathisers, following the Crimean annexation it is more readily accepted, even when there are many other Member States and interest groups that would prefer a softer and more cooperationoriented relationship with Russia. Russia’s vision of Estonia relies on a belief that it is part of the Western ‘Russophobic’ alliance, surrounding and threatening Russia by imposing a political and economic blockade. In reality, the impact of these sanctions also affects Estonia quite strongly. Furthermore, constant accusations and public statements from some Russian politicians and civil servants blaming Estonia for violating the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic countries aggravate this misunderstanding in Estonia still further. Estonians see Russia as a country that regularly violates international law and does not respect human rights. While at first these strong statements from Estonia were mostly ignored by Russia, by 2020 and into 2021 complaints were being raised in the Kremlin that Baltic States—including Estonia— V. Veebel (*) Estonian Foreign Policy Institute and Baltic Defence College, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_8

31

32

V. Veebel

do their best to spoil all cooperation and communication options between Russia and Western countries.

Painful History: From Occupation and Deportations to ‘Russian Minority’ Issue A painful history of Russian occupation and deportation of Estonians to Siberia in the 1940s has played a key role in strong anti-Russian positions both among political leaders and citizens. For example, the Soviet occupation alone caused Estonia to lose more than 20% of its population and around 15% of its territory. Relations with Russia have also been complicated since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 as the first Russian government led by President Boris Yeltsin enacted economic sanctions against Estonia early in the 1990s when Estonia refused to offer unconditional citizenship for local Russian speakers. Ongoing current fears related to a possible occupation by Russia have also produced visible effects in Estonia’s internal politics. For Estonians, it is a uniting factor which has made possible a unified defence and foreign policy, but also for a continuing soft discrimination against Russian speakers, who were sent to Estonia after the Second World War to replace the recently deported Estonians, still seen as occupants by many locals. While Russian speakers form around 25% of the Estonian population, they represent about 50% of the population in Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, and more than 90% of the populations of Narva and Kohtla-Järve, among the next five largest cities in Estonia. Additionally, there is a long-term citizenship issue with Russian speakers; they cannot apply automatically for Estonian citizenship despite being born in the country and having lived there for decades, not having any other form of citizenship. They first have to be successful in a combined exam on the topics of Estonian language and culture. Only after passing these exams can they then apply for citizenship. Altogether there are around 400,000 Russian speakers in Estonia, of whom 100,000 have Estonian (and EU) citizenship, 100,000 have Russian passports and 200,000 do not have any citizenship, only permanent residency status. How have relations with Russia progressed in recent years? High-ranking officeholders and politicians in Estonia have given mixed signals regarding their visions of how mutual relations between Estonia and Russia should develop in future. In 2019, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, Sven Mikser, firmly underlined that relations between Estonia and Russia depend primarily on Russia’s behaviour in the international arena, given that currently Russia neither fulfils its obligations nor accepts international law. However, the former President of the Republic, Kersti Kaljulaid, sees the situation differently. She visited Russia in April 2019 with the aim of enhancing mutual relations after many years without high-level visits between two countries. However, it took almost 2 years from the Estonian and Russian Presidents’ 2019 meetings in Moscow for the next direct top-level conversation to take place involving foreign affairs ministers which was

Estonia and Russia: More Cooperation or Growing Tensions?

33

seeking to bring current existing bilateral cooperation to the next implementable stage. Local Russian speakers see the logic of Estonian relations with the EU and Russia rather differently: Russia is seen as a normal neighbour (not positively, just regularly); the EU is a functional partner that gives out money; and NATO is a hostile anti-Russian organisation. According to a 2020 RAIT study, Russia is regarded as an aggressive and hostile actor by 70% of Estonian speakers, a view shared by only 20% of Russian speakers. Interestingly, the opinion of NATO is the opposite, with 80% of Russian speakers seeing NATO as a hostile and aggressive actor, while 75% of Estonians fully support NATO membership and its presence in the region.

Outlook for Improvements in Political and Economic Relations Politically, the country has always been tempted to be a ‘Russian specialist’ in trying to fix relations, efforts which most of the time have ended in a fiasco. In terms of future outlooks, there seems to be a political illusion in Estonia that when Putin leaves office, Russia will transform into a true democracy and take up a non-aggressive foreign policy. In terms of economic relations and cooperation between Estonia and Russia, circumstances depend on the eyes of beholders. From one side, current volumes and dependency are small and do not allow for any type of political or economic pressure. From the other side, memories of Russian ‘honey pots’ from trading energy carriers and metals are still recent. There have been times, even in recent decades, when Russia was responsible for one-fifth of Estonia’s foreign trade. However, any involvement of late has featured mostly money laundering scandals (Danske Bank and Swedbank in 2018–2020) and smuggling. Despite that, local businesspersons still see Russia as a reasonable transit partner for energy being received in one direction and Western machinery as return cargo. In terms of money laundering, though, activities have been impressive: Danske Bank succeeded in laundering EUR 200 billion and Swedbank EUR 100 billion through their Estonian branches. For comparison, the current Estonian GDP is only around EUR 28 billion.

What Would Estonian Politicians Recommend to the EU in Relation with Russia? The mantra has been that ‘Moscow must be destroyed’ with whatever tools are available, from economic sanctions up to and including nuclear deterrence. However, 7 years of sanctions have brought about meagre results in terms of bringing about change and Estonian politicians have even fewer alternative suggestions on how to create positive movement in EU-Russia relations. The main factor that spoils Estonian-Russian relations is that for both sides the demonstrations of strength for the internal audiences seem more important than cooperation. There is a slowly increasing awareness that this growing escalation and

34

V. Veebel

increased tension cannot replace a sustainable long-term strategy. Change is certainly needed, but no one even knows what would constitute a single mutually agreeable solution to any of these complex questions. To move Estonian-Russian relations along a more progressive path, normal political communication lines would first need to be re-opened. This would at least make it possible to search for strategic alternatives to current concepts of credible deterrence and normative power, which are both completely unacceptable not only for Putin’s administration but also to most of the Russian political elite. Viljar Veebel is a researcher at the Department of Political and Strategic Studies of the Baltic Defence College and a National Researcher for the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). He has worked as an Academic Advisor for the Estonian government in the European Future Convention and as a researcher for OSCE, SIDA, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute and Eurasia Group. His main research interests include European security and defence initiatives, use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool, EU-Russia relations and related sanctions. The Estonian Foreign Policy Institute (EVI) is an independent, non-profit foundation that research focuses on the interests of regional security, European Union integration and enlargement, as well as developments in Russia. EVI is a member of TEPSA.

Finland: Reckoning with a More Assertive and Authoritarian Russia Juha Jokela

The Ukraine crisis in 2014 sounded an alarm in Helsinki and powerfully manifested a notable change in the relatively stable security policy landscape of north-east Europe. This forced Finland to re-think its relations with Russia. In doing so, Helsinki has adopted a decisive position towards Russian aggression, yet at the same time has highlighted the need to find ways of lowering tensions. As a European Union Member State, it has done so from a much stronger and more stable position than previously. Given its history and geopolitical location, Finland is well positioned to contribute to and forge a unitary position among EU members towards EU-Russia relations.

Finland and Russia in History There is no escape from the fact that Finland’s destiny has been shaped by its great eastern neighbour and developments in Russia’s relations with Europe. Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia in 1809 as a result of Russia’s war against Sweden, driven by Russia’s peace pact with France in 1807. In the midst of the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Finland declared independence in 1917. It was first recognised by Lenin’s Russia and only then by other European powers. The Russian Revolution was in part carried over to the Finnish Civil War in 1918, and two decades later, Finland fought two costly wars against the Soviet Union. In the post-war era, the Soviet Union influenced Finland’s foreign and domestic policies significantly. Finland’s aspiration to embark on its policy of neutrality was largely motivated by an attempt to secure as much autonomy as possible in a geopolitically challenging Cold War environment. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Finland rejected its neutrality policy and filed an EU J. Jokela (*) Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland e-mail: Juha.Jokela@fiia.fi # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_9

35

36

J. Jokela

membership application in 1992. Three years later, it fully aligned with the Union politically and economically, yet decided to stay militarily non-aligned.

Financial, Trade and Political Relations In the economic sphere, Finland’s deepest recession during the early 1990s was connected to the loss of favourable trading arrangements between Finland and the Soviet Union as well as uncertainties related to the Russian economy’s prospects. Thereafter, trade and economic ties have developed positively despite Russian economic turbulence and re-emerging geopolitical contestation. EU and US sanctions against Russia imposed due to the Ukraine crisis in 2014, as well as Russian counter-actions, have impacted negatively on the Finnish-Russian trade volume. Yet the Russian rouble’s volatility and other economic challenges are understood to have impacted equally or even more on Finnish-Russian trading relations in recent years. In 2020, Russia’s share of Finland’s overall exports was 5.2% in goods and 2.9% in services. The share of imports from Russia to Finland was 9.9% in goods and 2.7% in services. The negative trade balance largely results from imports of hydrocarbons (oil, gas and coal). Some 60% of Finland’s energy imports come from Russia. While gas represents only 6–8% of Finland’s energy mix, 90% of Finland’s crude oil is imported from Russia and the Finnish oil industry is specialised in its refining and exporting. Around one third of other imported energy sources, such as coal, oil products, nuclear fuel and electricity, comes from Russia. Currently, the Russian Rosatom Corporation is engaged in the construction of a new nuclear reactor in Finland. Political relations between Finland and Russia have been on a more equal footing since the Cold War ended. As an EU Member State, Finland has been a strong advocate of unitary EU policy towards Russia, yet it has also aimed to retain wellfunctioning bilateral relations with Russia. Finland’s first EU initiative—the EU’s northern dimension in 1997—was aimed at facilitating cross-border cooperation in north-east Europe as well as highlighting that the 1995 enlargement had changed the ‘geography’ of the Union. In 1995, Finland’s 1340 km border with Russia became the EU’s external border. While Finland has highlighted a constructive engagement with Russia in EU policymaking, the Ukraine crisis and the unlawful annexation of Crimea sent shockwaves across Finnish society and politics.

Public Perceptions of Russia in Finland Accordingly, perceptions of Russia in the Finnish media have turned negative. Russia’s increased military activity in the Baltic Sea Region and a turn towards an authoritarian political system have been frequently covered in the Finnish media. Yet Russia has not been portrayed as a direct threat to Finland, despite nuanced expert views and political opinions on Russia being present in the media. To a large extent,

Finland: Reckoning with a More Assertive and Authoritarian Russia

37

public opinion seems to support a unitary EU position towards Russia, including EU sanctions, even if Russia’s counter-actions have hit some Finnish exports sectors relatively hard, such as the dairy industry. Public perception of Russia relations also accepts the importance of enhancing people-to-people connections during times of high political tensions. Moreover, the substantive Russian-speaking minority in Finland has been portrayed as having mixed views on recent developments in Russian domestic and foreign policies. The national broadcasting company has also increased news services in the Russian language in order to provide adequate and balanced information for the Russian-speaking minority in Finland.

Finland and Russia After the Ukraine Crisis in 2014 The Ukraine crisis in 2014 and Russia’s more assertive foreign policy have highlighted the EU’s role as a value and security community for Finland. This is understandable as a key driver of Finland’s EU membership was the perceived security policy benefits of membership in post-Cold War Europe. In recent years, Finland has strongly supported deeper EU defence cooperation and highlighted the mutual assistance clause’s (42:7 TEU) importance in the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, Finland has signalled that it is ready to consider applying for full membership of NATO, if its security policy environment deteriorates. Conversely, Finland has emphasised the need for selective engagement with Russia on matters of joint interest. In Helsinki’s thinking this requires compromises between those EU Member States which highlights tougher and softer positions reflected in policies towards Russia. In domestic debates, the Russia question continues to arouse political debate. Yet Russian actions, including violations of Finnish airspace and allowing around 1700 asylum seekers to enter Finland from the east during the height of the EU’s migration crisis in 2015–2016, have forged a national consensus on Russia. This entails decisive national and EU action to respond and counter potential Russian adversary actions, while at the same time keeping dialogue channels open at the highest political level. Functioning lines of communication are seen as especially vital during stormy political weather. However, negative developments with regard to democracy, civil society and the rule of law in Russia have all been seen to push Russia further away from Europe.

Recommendations Finland should continue to work towards stronger EU unity on Russian relations by highlighting the continual need to counter Russia’s adversarial actions, participate in selective engagement and stress the merits of dialogue. Helsinki should acknowledge the potential challenges related to its own energy dependency on Russia and acknowledge that the EU’s green transition opens up possibilities to reduce this in the longer run. Finland should also continue to highlight its dedication to, and expertise on, addressing hybrid threats. The Centre of Excellence on Countering

38

J. Jokela

Hybrid Threats based in Helsinki and serving its members, the EU and NATO, is a major resource. Helsinki should also further underline the utility of cross-border cooperation among communities, municipalities and regions in north-east Europe especially during the turbulent times in high politics. This also opens up some possibilities to advance people-to-people contacts within an increasingly difficult environment in which Russian civil society actors find themselves. Juha Jokela is Director of the EU research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). He is also a board member of TEPSA. His research interests include the political implications of Brexit, differentiated integration in the EU’s external relations, and the Europeanisation of foreign policy. The FIIA is a research institute whose mission is to produce high-quality, topical information on international relations and the EU. FIIA is part of TEPSA.

France: What was Behind the Macron Russia Initiative? David Cadier

Emmanuel Macron’s initiative for a renewed political dialogue with Moscow had raised eyebrows, if not alarms or outright criticisms, in a number of European quarters. As such, it invites some reflection on its rationale and determinants as well as, more generally, on the drivers of France’s policies towards Russia.

Beyond Traditional Economic and Historical Explanations It is customary to essentialise EU Member States’ positions towards Russia—that is, to consider them as fixed, given, inherent and generally reducible to one single factor or determinant, be it geography, history or energy dependency. In the case of France, economic relations and historic-cultural proximity are generally, and alternatively, invoked. The French business community in Moscow has certainly cultivated strong links within the French political class: meeting with its representative is a must for any French Minister travelling to Moscow, as Emmanuel Macron did in 2016 when he was Minister of the Economy. Similarly, historic-cultural references—from the epistolary correspondence between Voltaire and Catherine II to the Franco-Russian Normandie-Niemen WW2 fighting squadron—have been frequent in diplomatic meetings and communiqués. Yet, these economic and historic-cultural variables provide a context and texture for, rather than a major determinant to, France’s policies towards Russia, as testified by the fact that variations in the latter do not appear correlated with the former. In the 1990s and early 2000s, France’s trade relations with Russia were rather underdeveloped as compared to Germany’s or Italy’s, yet its diplomatic-politico

D. Cadier (*) University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands Sciences Po, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_10

39

40

D. Cadier

relations were probably stronger, as exemplified by President Chirac’s role in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Conversely, since the late 2000s and 2010s, French businesses have considerably strengthened their positions on the Russian market, having become the second largest European holders of FDI stocks (EUR 22.9 billion in 2019) and the biggest foreign employers in Russia today (156,000 employees). In parallel, political relations have considerably deteriorated, first and foremost over the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Indeed, it is worth recalling that France’s reaction to Russia’s 2014 intervention in Ukraine has been more determined and firmer than its Russia-friendly image in European debates would suggest. Paris cancelled a billion-worth armament contract with Moscow (the Mistral warships), suspended high-level political meetings with Moscow, brought decisive support to collective EU sanctions and deployed troops in the Baltic States as part of NATO’s strategic reassurance measures. Historic-cultural proximity and growing economic ties have not prevented such developments.

Between Geopolitical and Normative Considerations France’s Russia policy appears driven above all by its milieu goals in international affairs, as well as by French policy-makers’ interpretations of broader strategic evolutions and of their country’s role and interests in this context. Paris has long wished for the emergence of a strong and autonomous Europe in a multipolar world, while seeking at the same time to consolidate France’s own leadership and independence within Europe. In this regard, France had been reluctant to engage in a geopolitical struggle with Russia over its influence in the post-Soviet space, as the corollaries were not only the potential de-stabilisation of the continent but also the reinforcement of US hegemony in Europe. On the other hand, France has been striving to preserve the post-WWII international liberal order, where it enjoys a privileged position. Thus, it has regularly expressed concerns over, and condemned, Russia’s foreign policy actions that undermine this order and violate its core principles. Paris’ strong reaction to Russia’s annexation of Crimea is to be read in this light. This duality between geopolitical and normative goals in France’s policies towards Russia has been reflected in Emmanuel Macron’s approach. Upon entering office in 2017, he received Putin in Versailles with the declared intention of renewing political dialogue, while at the same time overseeing the adoption of a new French Defence White paper denouncing Russia’s ‘undermining of the security order’ and ‘recurrent strategic intimidations’. Similarly, the formalisation of his engagement strategy towards Russia as of 2019 had not prevented the French President from adopting collective retaliatory measures in response to the Salisbury attacks and the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, nor has it led Paris to withdraw its support for EU sanctions or to NATO air patrolling missions over the Baltic States. Yet this duality is not necessarily a contradiction. The Macron initiative was grounded in the dual Western approach of ‘firmness and dialogue’ towards Moscow, but proceeded from the conviction that the second pillar had not been sufficiently

France: What was Behind the Macron Russia Initiative?

41

developed. The goal of this initiative was thus to ensure that a space for diplomacy— that is, for de-escalation, difficult negotiation and delivering tough messages— remained open in troubled times. The hope was that creating constructive pockets of engagement might contribute to defusing some of the international and regional crises where French European security interests are at stake (such as in Syria, Ukraine or Libya). There was also a concern that the advent of a bipolar US-China confrontation would significantly constrain Europe’s (and France’s) room for manoeuvre in international affairs. Indeed, this initiative cannot be dissociated from the French President’s broader discourse on ‘European sovereignty’. Seen from Paris, the need for Europeans to define their policy choices and objectives strategically, based on their own interests and assessments, was made even more salient under Trump: US policy towards Russia found itself paralysed and over-politicised, while the Trump administration appeared ready to do away with some of the international liberal order’s building blocks. In that context, the Macron initiative on Russia was largely about triggering a discussion and a new dynamic at European level. The issue though is that it was precisely framed as an initiative, rather than a discussion, and that other EU states were not sufficiently consulted upstream, as French policy-makers themselves retrospectively acknowledged.

An Initiative Driven by the Elysée The form, content and delivery of this proposal have also been shaped to a significant extent by the personal style and political objectives of the French President. Typical of Emmanuel Macron and as he himself had stated, this initiative was very much a ‘work of ideas’: ideas that might not be fully and immediately implemented but that sought to question current thinking and potentially lay the groundwork for future change. This approach has led some commentators to dub him the ‘think tanker in chief’, and the somehow lukewarm reception (according to some reports in the press) of the Russia initiative by part of the French foreign policy establishment stemmed precisely from the fact that it fell upon diplomats to make it work in practice, while achieving meaningful results with the Russian diplomacy on these issues was difficult. Domestic political considerations behind the initiative have at times been exaggerated. Calling for a diplomatic outreach to Moscow is not necessarily rewarding as such with the French electorate. According to a Eurobarometer survey from 2016, only 22% of French citizens have a positive view of Russia (compared, for instance, to 72% in Bulgaria, 39% in the Czech Republic or 31% in Spain). A more recent survey conducted by PEW in 2020 found this number to be around 35%. Nor had this initiative received extensive or sustained attention in domestic public debates. In fact, mainstream media such as Le Monde were overtly critical and generally take a hard line on Russia. Where the diplomatic outreach towards Moscow might have been beneficial politically is that it allowed Macron to triangulate his main opponents in the 2022 Presidential race, namely, those from the

42

D. Cadier

far-right, right and far-left, who all tend to be more pro-Russian and who, for some, have received some political support from Moscow (as when Vladimir Putin received Marine Le Pen in the Kremlin just before the 2017 elections). In the previous campaign, they had all attacked François Hollande on his handling of the Ukraine crisis, accusing him of being blindly subservient to the USA and abandoning the French Gaullist foreign policy tradition. With his Russia initiative, Macron has propped up his Gaullist credentials and consolidated his stature as foreign policy chief, while staying much closer to the common European line than would any of his main political contenders. It remains that the Macron initiative revealed unable to produce immediate and ground-breaking results in terms of regional security, because other EU Member States appeared unconvinced or reluctant and because Russia seemed uninterested. Yet, while the medicine might not have been accurate in its dosage, the diagnosis was nevertheless correct. The collective European approach towards Russia must be more strategic in ensuring that ends and means align, and more political in defining achievable ends and using available means. On the one hand, EU countries should seek to enlarge the scope for statecraft in their approach towards Russia. This means enhancing, and better combining, both coercive instruments and diplomatic engagement. Both must be brought to bear if the objective is to influence Russia’s foreign policy behaviour, rather than just making a point about, or seeking to institutionalise a certain image of, Russia in European debates. On the other hand, EU Member States ought to have a discussion on the regional security order—first among themselves and then with the USA, the counties of the Eastern neighbourhood, and Russia. The first, intra-EU discussion needs to be about the desirable and possible and about building a consensus—or, more likely, a compromise—across the various national perspectives. The failure to do so would lead EU Member States to be further sidelined in talks about the security of their own continent. Paradoxically, while EU Member States were reluctant to seize President Macron’s proposal to have a collective discussion on the regional security order, such a discussion is now somehow forced upon them in terms defined by US-Russia dynamics. David Cadier is Assistant Professor of European Politics at the University of Groningen and Adjunct Lecturer at Sciences Po in Paris. Previously, he was a researcher at Sciences Po’s Centre for International Studies (CERI) and a teaching fellow at the London School of Economics. His research interests include EU–Russia relations and the foreign policies of France, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Sciences Po is the leading French research university in political science, international relations, and sociology. The Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, which was founded at Sciences Po in 2005, is a member of TEPSA. The research centre aims to fulfil three main missions: develop research on European questions at Sciences Po; facilitate Sciences Po’s insertion in European research networks; and foster European debate on the future of Europe.

(No) Wind of Change?: German-Russian Relations in the Post-Merkel Era Katrin Böttger and Nicolas Butylin

Relations Between Germany and Russia Due to its size, geographical location and history, Germany plays a special role in European-Russian relations. The past decade’s bilateral relations have been characterised by a selective, interest-driven foreign policy, coupled with a leading role among EU Member States to forge a common position towards Moscow. German-Russian relations cover in particular issues of energy supply (Nord Stream 2) and bilateral trade relations, which include an export focus on machinery, cars and electrical engineering. While after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 relations were said to be built on mutual values and goals, differences have become more apparent over time. Examples of this are the 2008 war in Georgia, annexation of Crimea in 2014, armed conflict in the Donbas region and open support for the Lukashenko regime following the Belarus protests of 2020. Moreover, incidents such as the August 2019 murder of a Chechen asylum seeker in Berlin, the poisoning of Alexei Navalny and subsequent destructive measures by the Russian authorities, as well as numerous cyberattacks on members of the Bundestag, have brought mutual relations to a new low point. Last but not least, the autumn of 2021 marks a possible turning point on the German-Russian agenda, as Angela Merkel’s term as chancellor runs out after more than 16 years of cooperative and confrontational policies with her counterpart Vladimir Putin. However, whether the new chancellor and coalition government will lead to a policy change towards Russia seems rather unlikely, given the relationship’s continuing oscillation between dialogue and confrontation.

K. Böttger (*) · N. Butylin IEP Berlin, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_11

43

44

K. Böttger and N. Butylin

Public Perception of Russia in Germany German public perception of Russia seems to have calmed down slightly from the public shock in Germany over the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The image of Russia in Germany in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis was significantly worse than it was in the 2000s. In a 2014 Allensbach poll, 55% of respondents considered Russia to be the main culprit of this crisis and 34% blamed the separatists, who are closely associated with Russia. Furthermore, a large part of Germany associated Russia with corruption and disregard for human rights. More recently, changes have been visible in 2021 according to a Forsa poll, in which just over 60% are in favour of deeper European-Russian relations. Regional differences are also evident, with people in the East of Germany, for instance, being more positive about Russia than people from the West. In recent years, the public has been more outraged about leaders in the USA or Brazil, with their being more in the centre of media coverage, except for reports about the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. All in all, though, there is still a negative trend regarding the image of Russia in Germany. When analysing this perception, the image differs between Russia as a country and culture versus Putin as a politician. Hence, Russian government policies are mostly seen as dangerous, while the country itself continues to be associated with positive values such as cultural traditions, an impressive nature and unique hospitality. In this regard, another discrepancy between East and West Germany becomes visible in attitudes towards Russia. We would argue that this is less due to historical ties, but instead more to do with economic dependency issues, in which the East German perception tends to be more positive. While both countries have been cooperating culturally, historically and academically in recent years, even this sensitive area of bilateral relations is marked by Russian reprisals, as the listing of three German NGOs in Russia as “undesirable foreign organisations” shows. From a political point of view, the Russian government is not a reliable partner for Germany and the EU, as international crises in Afghanistan, Mali, Ukraine and Belarus demonstrate. In addition, incidents such as a cyberattack on the Bundestag, which was aiming to strengthen Russia’s influence in German politics during the 2021 parliamentary elections, or coverage of the massively falsified Duma elections in September 2021 support the negative image of Russia among the German public. Although to a large extent German-Russian relations did not play an important role in the 2021 election campaign, it is clear that the vast majority of political representatives are critical of Russia, which could increase over the next parliamentary term, if, for example, the Greens take over the Foreign Ministry in the next government.

How German-Russian Relations Influence the EU The German government plays a crucial role in the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline, a project which has most seriously divided Europe. While EU Member States bordering the Baltic Sea opposed its construction, Germany has pushed it

(No) Wind of Change?: German-Russian Relations in the Post-Merkel Era

45

through under the motto: “Germany First!”. Germany’s approach to a more pragmatic policy with Moscow, though, has not always had the desired outcome for the German government. In the summer of 2021, Merkel and Macron’s proposal to hold an EU-Russia summit was rejected. Central and Eastern Europe partners and Scandinavian and Baltic State representatives did not want a meeting of leaders without preconditions and finally prevailed against Germany and France (and Italy). In this respect, it is important to maintain sanctions adopted in response to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. So far, the EU 27 has spoken with one voice on restrictive measures, but this is potentially at stake, as some German politicians repeatedly stress the costbenefit implications of sanctions. For the future, it can be assumed that Germany’s policies towards Russia could weaken within the EU if the partner countries mentioned above jointly pushed for a tougher policy towards Russia. This is a sensitive area that has grown historically and will continue to challenge the complex mix of European-Russian relations in the upcoming decade.

Future with Russia While Germany will likely have to deal with Vladimir Putin beyond 2024, the situation from a Russian perspective is completely different. The Russian view is characterised by ambiguity about the successor to Angela Merkel: Olaf Scholz is not a publicly known political figure to the Russian public. A serious improvement in relation with Russia for the moment remains rather out of the question, as does the German Left Party’s demand to dissolve NATO and create a security alliance with Russian involvement instead. There are also market-economical ideas coming from German businesses pledging for closer ties, such as the Lisbon-Vladivostok initiative, which advocates for a Eurasian free trade agreement. Nonetheless, the new government will probably continue the Merkel legacy of stability and reliability, which pursues a mix of willingness to engage in dialogue and rapprochement on the one hand and a tough, resilient alliance policy with its EU and NATO partners on the other.

Russia’s Influence in Germany As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the subject of Russia played only a minor role in the 2021 German election campaign. However, this is also currently in the interests of both governments, as Nord Stream 2 continues to emotionalise bilateral relations, creating potential for further divisions between the two countries. It is undisputed that should Nord Stream 2 ultimately be completed, Russia would have gained a remarkable influence on German and EU politics. Once this second pipeline in the Baltic Sea is operational, gas transport routes via European transit countries will be bypassed, thereby increasing dependency on Russia, which can also use several instruments to increase the gas price. This influence will probably take some years to be realised, which could then also produce knock-on effects in other areas of bilateral

46

K. Böttger and N. Butylin

relations, for instance security policy and economic matters. Russia may also try to destabilise the political culture in Germany, since Moscow increasingly sees Berlin as an adversary rather than a partner in international crises. A weak Germany would accordingly also weaken the EU and NATO, which will be one of the premises of Russian foreign policy in the 2020s.

Recommendations Russia’s influence in the world has increased over the last 20 years. International conflicts will not be resolved without the Kremlin in the near future. In terms of foreign policy, the EU must act more resiliently and decisively with its partners around the world to avoid repeating disasters such as the war in Afghanistan. To strengthen its own positions vis-à-vis Russia, it may be necessary to address the poorly diversified Russian economy and threaten to extend sanctions. Here, the Nord Stream pipelines could be brought back into play. Culturally and politically, cooperation with civil society actors in Russia should be further expanded, as well as support for the growing Russian diaspora in the EU, which is once again more noticeable following the January protests of 2020. Thus, combining economic cooperation with a liberal civil society policy inside the Russian Federation is necessary. Katrin Böttger is a Director at the Institut for Europäische Politik (IEP). Her research focuses mainly on European neighbourhood policies, EU enlargement policies, EU-Central Asia relations, and Euroscepticism. Since its founding in 1959, IEP has been a non-profit organisation dedicated to the study of European integration. It is one of the leading foreign and European policy research centres in Germany, serving as a forum for exchange between academia, politics, administration, and political education. IEP’s mission is to apply scholarly research to issues of European politics and integration, propose ways forward, and promote the practical implementation of its research findings. IEP is also a member of TEPSA. Nicolas Butylin is a project assistant at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP). His research focuses mainly on Belarus, EU–Russia relations, as well as sociopolitical phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe. Since its founding in 1959, IEP has been a non-profit organisation dedicated to the study of European integration. It is one of the leading foreign and European policy research centres in Germany, serving as a forum for exchange between academia, politics, administration, and political education. IEP’s mission is to apply scholarly research to issues of European politics and integration, propose ways forward, and promote the practical implementation of its research findings. IEP is also a member of TEPSA.

Greco-Russian Relations: The Two Faces of ‘Janus’ Sotirios Karampampas and Dimitris Tsaknis

Greek Perceptions of Russia While Russia’s image in the West has been traditionally negative since the Soviet era, Greece has been one of the few exceptions to the rule. Indeed, support for Russia has been recurrently high among Greeks, with 57.5% and 67% of the population, according to the most recently available data (2017), holding a favourable opinion of Russia and President Putin, respectively. Greeks’ peculiar Russophilia can be explained by the critical role that Russia played during the Greek War of Independence (1821–1829) and the cultural heritage that the two nations share due to their common Christian Orthodox faith. Greece’s special relationship with Russia has also been criticised within NATO and EU circles, as Greece was the first NATO country to purchase military material from Moscow (2007), provoking accusations of being Russia’s ‘Trojan horse’ within the EU.

Recent Developments Nevertheless, a deep rift has recently emerged in the two countries’ bilateral relations resulting from a series of issues. First and foremost, this involved the Prespa Agreement (2018), a treaty that resolved the long-standing name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia, thereby paving the way for the latter’s accession to the NATO alliance. It was the alleged Russian efforts to undermine this agreement, which led to NATO’s enlargement in the Balkans, that brought about the expulsion of two Russian diplomats and the subsequent banning of two other officials from entering Greece (July 2018). Another factor that caused a deterioration in bilateral relations was the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s decision to grant the status of S. Karampampas (*) · D. Tsaknis European Public Law Organization, Athens, Greece e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_12

47

48

S. Karampampas and D. Tsaknis

Autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (January 2019). This was recognised by Moscow as a NATO attempt to curb Russian influence in Ukraine with the Church of Greece’s support. Moreover, Greco-Russian relations suffered another blow after the strategic ‘rapprochement’ between Russia and Turkey in 2019, signified by the purchase of a Russian missile defence system by Turkey and the attainment of energy-related deals between the two countries. Hence, it was Moscow’s systematic investment in this strategic relationship of mutual benefits with Turkey that has led to the dissatisfaction of Greece, given the traditionally tense climate between the two neighbouring countries. Finally, ties with Russia came under further strain after the conservative government of New Democracy took office (July 2019), with a decision to align Greek foreign policy with its Western allies, NATO and the USA. However, it is in the best interest of both Athens and Moscow to restore bilateral relations to their pre-2018 status, or at least to reach a ‘win–not lose’ position. From a pragmatist point of view, it is clear that the balance favours Russia, especially since the Greek economy is highly dependent on Russian gas. In fact, Russia remains the basic supplier of natural gas to Greece with a share that amounts to 45.8% of total supply per annum. This dependency is expected to decrease gradually in future, but only after the MFF 2021–2027 and the NGEU fund takes effect. At the same time, Greece has been affected by the sanctions imposed by Russia as a countermeasure to EU sanctions following the annexation of Crimea. In particular, Russia banned all imports of fresh fruit and vegetables from EU countries, while Greek exports to Russia for 2019 accounted only for 1% of national exports.

Ties Between Greece and Russia Despite factors that strain bilateral relations, there still exist considerable cultural and religious ties capable of restoring the negative turn of this relationship. A recent communication between the Greek PM, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and President Putin regarding the provision of firefighting aircraft for extinguishing wildfires in southern Greece (August 2021) opens a new avenue for cooperation. Perhaps in the future it will become possible to establish a mutually beneficial collaboration in the areas of civil protection and climate action, areas in which the EU has also made significant progress with the introduction of the RescEU and the Green Deal, and in the fields of culture and energy supply. Furthermore, Greece should consider alternative means of promoting its bilateral relations with Russia, such as ‘cultural diplomacy’ that comprises a key element of a state’s public positioning. As a tool of ‘soft power’, the exercise of cultural diplomacy has the potential to focus on the common religious background and historical ties that the two countries share. In this way it should be possible to restore a credible level of ‘trust’ between the two sides and rebuild a mutually beneficial relationship. To do so, Greece and Russia should reshape their relationship, by taking into consideration not only short-term goals but also long-term foreign policy objectives.

Greco-Russian Relations: The Two Faces of ‘Janus’

49

Seeking to respond to the question why a small-size state—as Greece—can be useful to the Russian Federation, a power with revisionist aspirations, it can be said with certainty that Greece can play the role of ‘mediator’ between the EU and Russia in a series of matters that constitute part of Russia’s ‘strategic agenda’. Such issues are the visa status of Russian civilians, the ongoing Minsk negotiation process and the Russian support for the authoritarian regime of Lukashenko in Belarus. All have to be settled by initiating a drastic ‘carrot and stick’ mechanism, especially since the need for a ‘geopolitical Europe’ is being increasingly discussed in certain European circles. The EU has to be more assertive in its foreign policy, precisely because Russia’s ‘grand strategy’ directly undermines EU interests at its weakest point, namely, the crucially important Eastern Neighbourhood, thereby endangering the continent’s peace, stability and prosperity.

Recommendations Hence, it can be seen as necessary for the EU to redefine its relations with Russia by developing new and more efficient channels of communication and collaboration. Reviewing EU policy towards Russia as a whole, one possible conclusion is that Greece especially has a distinct mission to undertake, given its historical and cultural ties with Russia. Above all, it is high time that the EU found common ground on issues that concern its foreign policy. Indeed, as the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell once argued: ‘Europe must learn quickly to speak the language of power’. This is an effort that requires strategic planning, building consensus and undertaking particular roles from each member state in co-constituting EU’s foreign policy towards ally and rival countries alike, especially towards the Russian Federation. Sotirios Karampampas is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the GESIS – Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences and a Visiting Lecturer at the European Law & Governance School of the European Public Law Organization. His main research interests lie at the intersection of contentious politics, social movements, political behaviour, and political violence. GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences is the largest German infrastructure institute for the social sciences. It advises researchers at all levels to answer socially relevant questions on the basis of the newest scientific methods, high-quality data, and research information. Dimitris Tsaknis serves as Researcher at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (NKUA). His academic and research interests lie in issues of EU security policies, EU external relations, and matters of terrorism and radicalisation. The National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, officially founded on 14 April 1837, is the first University not only of Greece but both the Balkan peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Hungary: More Business, Less Illiberalism András Deák and Csaba Weiner

Historic, Political and Economic Relations Between Hungary and Russia Hungary has the typical national contours that feature in relations between Central and East European (CEE) EU Member States and Russia. Troublesome historical legacies, relatively minor and narrowing economic relations (except for energy) and sharp party divisions regarding the Russian nexus are generally shared features in CEE. What stands out within this setting are the inherently domestic policy patterns of bilateral relations, especially as far as interrelations between Viktor Orbán’s illiberal leanings along with Euroscepticism and Moscow’s foreign policy agenda are concerned. Viktor Orbán’s and Vladimir Putin’s mindsets partially overlap, creating some ideological foundations for an opportunistic relationship. In Hungary, negative historical experiences have not had a lasting impact on Russia’s public image. Besides the population’s general lack of interest in foreign policy, tangled memories regarding the West often overshadow grievances caused by Moscow. Unlike the Baltic States or Poland, the Hungarian public mood is not prohibitive towards pro-Russian sentiments. Moreover, historical and security arguments do not have an exclusive role on the political scene. Hungarian–Russian economic relations are inferior to those of Hungary with other countries. Mutual trade is characterised by a permanent negative balance due to large imports of Russian crude oil, oil products and natural gas, representing the

A. Deák (*) Institute of Strategic and Security Studies, National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] C. Weiner Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, ELKH, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_13

51

52

A. Deák and C. Weiner

core of economic ties. Most Hungarian exports to Russia historically consist of food, medicine, machinery and transport equipment. For these selected import and export products, Russian relations continue to be important, but the shares of Russian imports and exports in Hungary’s total imports and exports have decreased significantly, each amounting to only a few per cent according to current data. The negative effects of EU sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions are visible on the Hungarian export side, but the ruling majority in Hungary seemingly overestimates the adverse consequences of sanctions. Burdened by a couple of short-lived hostile takeover attempts involving Hungarian companies in the past, Hungarian–Russian foreign direct investment (FDI) activities are even less significant than trade. However, a few major transactions deserve attention, such as those in Hungary’s banking, metallurgy, natural gas and machinery industries as well as various investments connected to the Rahimkulov family in Hungary. Most Hungarian FDI in Russia has been made in banking, oil, pharmaceuticals, feed production and medical implant manufacturing. In energy relations, the key focus is on gas imports and, most recently, the future construction of a new Russian nuclear power plant in Paks (Paks II), agreed in 2014. While Hungary has diversified its natural gas pipeline network and has many suppliers, Russia’s state-controlled gas giant Gazprom has preserved its dominant role among partners, mainly due to affordability considerations. In addition to signing a new long-term gas supply contract in 2021, Hungary has also cooperated with Russia in constructing the Balkan Stream pipeline from Turkey, launched in 2021. Nonetheless, Paks II is the undisputed highlight on the bilateral agenda. The EUR 12.5 billion construction and related credit contracts with Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation and the Russian state, respectively, are exceptional in the EU CEE landscape and symbolise the close relations between Moscow and Budapest, albeit the permit process has not been concluded and construction has not yet begun. Meanwhile, most people in Hungary are against both the Paks II project and Russian participation.

Hungary’s Perception of Russia Until the mid-2000s, the Hungarian party system and Hungarian public shared these common dichotomist CEE patterns of Russia’s image: pragmatic, cooperative leftists co-existing with sceptical conservatives. After 2005, the emerging far-right Jobbik party evolved into a strong pro-Russian force as part of its anti-Western agenda and possibly influenced by alleged Russian financial support. After 2010, Viktor Orbán made a full turnaround as part of his ‘Eastern Opening’ and became one of the fiercest proponents of cooperation with Russia. Thus, by the mid-2010s, all Hungarian parliamentary parties but the tiny Greens had pro-Russian images. Since then, the parties’ views have started to differentiate again. In the opposition camp, Orbán’s regime is increasingly paralleled with Putin’s Russia and hence negative views on Russia and Orbán often overlap.

Hungary: More Business, Less Illiberalism

53

Public perceptions have largely followed the trends in party sentiment. While aggregate figures show relative stability, there has been a major swap between Orbán’s party Fidesz and leftist/liberal sentiments since Orbán returned to power in 2010. Currently, Fidesz voters are more supportive towards Russia, while others are less so. The main focus of relations remains on economy and energy. Military security threat perceptions are modest, but reservations about Russia have grown stronger in the political field.

Russia’s Influence on Domestic Politics and the Hungarian Position in the EU The influence of Hungarian–Russian relations on Hungary’s position within the EU is palpable, but not straightforward. EU–Hungarian relations are dominated by its inherent factors, most notably the Hungarian government’s anti-liberal and anti-EU sentiments expressed in its rhetoric. The bulk of EU–Hungarian tensions stem from intra-EU conflicts rather than external motivations. Viktor Orbán often acts as a consensus buster in symbolic issues, independent of whether it is about China, Turkey or Russia. Nonetheless, the government has not crossed any ‘red lines’. EU sanctions against Russia have been loudly criticised but never vetoed by Budapest. The trans-Baltic Sea Nord Stream 2 pipeline project between Russia and Germany was initially opposed by Budapest, even if criticism was not as loud as in other CEE countries. Intensive energy cooperation in natural gas and nuclear fields is accompanied by other measures pointing towards diversification, such as liquefied natural gas imports from Croatia or domestic investments in solar energy. Hungary’s illiberal tendencies and political campaigns (for instance, against Hungarian-born George Soros, migration, LGBTQ rights and the European Commission) make it seem as if strong interconnections exist between Russia and Hungary. While some hints of a learning process (imitation of Russia) can be traced in Budapest, these are driven not by Russian actors but by domestic Hungarian stakeholders. Orbán’s strong control over the media, the economy and public life makes it difficult for Moscow to initiate its own projects of influence.

Where Does This Lead? Despite the ideological overtones, Hungarian attitudes towards Russia are mostly about business. This extreme pragmatism is only complemented by the issue of partially overlapping mindsets, which dominate neither EU–Hungarian nor Russian– Hungarian relations. Although Hungary’s Russian-friendly and anti-sanction attitudes cause some damage at EU diplomatic levels and are unpleasant for the EU, they have no real impact on EU–Russia relations. Conversely, the Hungarian economy has not benefited much from such Hungarian actions. Hungarian–Russian economic relations roughly follow the trends observed on EU–Russian levels, including declining economic interest in the Russian market and serious questions

54

A. Deák and C. Weiner

about the long-term future of Russian energy imports. The loss of economic momentum is also felt at political levels in both EU–Russian and Hungarian–Russian relations. At the same time, sanctions no longer have a substantial effect on Russia. Focusing only on economic issues is a legitimate viewpoint, and Hungary is not alone in this in the EU, but its behaviour on Russian issues is unique and puts the country in a negative light, which should be avoided in the future. A transactionalist relationship, ‘something-for-something’ deals not linked to different visions, fits the Hungarian approach. However, the future of Hungarian–Russian relations largely depends on Hungarian domestic policy developments. Due to party differences and lack of consensus regarding Russia, a government change could have considerable effects on bilateral ties. András Deák is Head of the Research Group on Economics of Globalisation at the Institute of World Economics (IWE) of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and Security Studies at the National University of Public Service, both in Budapest, Hungary. His work focuses on EU and post-Soviet energy policy as well as foreign relations. IWE is an independent fully-fledged research institute dedicated to the analysis of policyoriented topics based on in-depth theoretical and methodological background. Its priority research areas include global economic developments and current and future challenges for the European Union, including the evaluation of accession processes, international relations, the role of foreign direct investments, and regional economic integration. IWE is also a member of TEPSA. Csaba Weiner is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics (IWE) of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies in Budapest, Hungary, which he joined in 2003. His main areas of research interest are the energy sector in Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union as well as foreign direct investment in and from Russia. He was János Bolyai Research Scholar of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences between 2016 and 2019. IWE is an independent fully-fledged research institute dedicated to the analysis of policyoriented topics based on in-depth theoretical and methodological background. Its priority research areas include global economic developments and current and future challenges for the European Union, including the evaluation of accession processes, international relations, the role of foreign direct investments, and regional economic integration. IWE is also a member of TEPSA.

Ireland: Reluctantly Re-thinking Russia Andrew Cottey

Ireland’s relations with Russia have been shaped by three factors: geography, the country’s neutrality and, since Ireland joined the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, EEC/EC/EU membership. Geographically, Ireland is one of the European states most distant from Russia, geo-strategically sheltered from Russia by mainland Europe and the United Kingdom. Consequently, Ireland has never had a strong sense of a Soviet or Russian threat. Geography also explains why Irish-Russian trade has been relatively limited in scale. Russia has never been central to the Irish economy and has no special economic leverage over Ireland. Ireland’s security policy of neutrality—which emerged during the Second World War and led to the rejection of possible NATO membership in 1948–1949—has, at the same time, meant that bilateral relations with Russia/Soviet Union have been free from problems arising from NATO-Soviet and now NATO-Russia tensions.

Engaging Russia In the 1990s and 2000s Ireland supported post-Cold War efforts to engage Russia, including those undertaken through a putative EU-Russia strategic partnership, NATO’s partnership programmes (which Ireland joined as a partner in 1999) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). During this period, Irish bilateral efforts to build relations with Russia aligned with wider EU/NATO/Western attempts. Such policies also fitted with long-standing Irish support for multilateralism, cooperative security and conflict resolution. This culminated in an official visit to Russia by then Irish President Mary McAleese in 2010, seeking to promote trade and investment between the two countries.

A. Cottey (*) University College Cork, Cork, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_14

55

56

A. Cottey

The end of the Cold War prompted some growth in Irish-Russia trade, but from what had been a very low base and to what remains a low level in the overall context of the Irish economy. Both Irish imports from Russia and Irish exports to Russia remain less than 1% of Ireland’s total imports and exports as of the late 2010s. Annual Irish exports to Russia were valued at approximately EUR 600,000 according to data from the late 2010s to early 2020s, with a trade surplus favouring Ireland. There is no detailed opinion poll data on Irish public views of Russia. However, a general assessment of the public debate on foreign/security policy in Ireland suggests that Russia has rather low salience, but there is a preference for engagement with Russia rather confrontation or sanctions (in line with the broader self-image of Ireland as a small, neutral, peace-supporting state).

Ukraine 2014: A Turning Point? As for the EU as a whole, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a turning point for Ireland’s relations with Moscow. Ireland supported the EU’s diplomatic and financial sanctions against Russia, in part through recognition of the need to counter Russia’s actions, but also with regard to the centrality of EU membership for Irish foreign policy and Ireland’s economy. Ireland has long been a good EU citizen, seeking to foster and maintain EU unity, while at the same time protecting specific Irish interests in areas such as corporation tax. On Russia, this implies that Ireland lies at the centre of the spectrum in regard to EU Member State positions and has always been willing to operate within agreed EU policy. Following Brexit, the other 26 EU Member States have strongly supported Ireland on the sensitive issue of Northern Ireland and this has in turn reinforced the logic that Ireland needs to show solidarity with other EU Member States vis-à-vis Russia. Ireland’s approach to Russia, though, has been nuanced, supporting EU unity and the need to respond to the Ukraine conflict, while retaining a wariness of antagonising Russia and seeking to expand economic relations (within the limitations of EU sanctions). Irish political leaders and official spokespersons have condemned Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, but have been reluctant to criticise Russia strongly (whether over Ukraine, human rights or other issues). Ireland has also argued for the necessity of engaging Russia in other contexts, such as the United Nations, where Ireland’s 2021–2022 term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council has resulted in dialogue with Moscow on issues such as humanitarian assistance to Syria. Despite the Ukraine conflict and EU sanctions, the Irish government has consistently sought to expand economic ties with Russia. An official Irish delegation visited Moscow in December 2014 to promote trade and economic ties. Bilateral Irish-Russian ties are also institutionalised via a Joint Economic Commission, an Intergovernmental Committee for the Development of Business Cooperation and an inter-parliamentary friendship group. After an initial fall in trade as a result of EU sanctions and Russian retaliatory actions, bilateral trade has grown since the

Ireland: Reluctantly Re-thinking Russia

57

mid-2010s. In 2018 direct Dublin-Moscow flights were re-established for the first time since 2003. While Ireland has continued to operate within the framework of EU sanctions, one can only conclude that Ireland has put economic interests ahead of concerns about Russian foreign policy actions along with backsliding on democracy and human rights.

New Bilateral Problems with Russia Despite the Irish government’s general wariness of criticising Russia, since the early 2010s a number of developments have prompted growing concern over Russia. There have been persistent worries about intelligence activities/operations emanating from the Russian embassy in Dublin. In 2011, the Irish government expelled a Russian diplomat based in Dublin (the first such expulsion since 1983) following an investigation which found that the identities of Irish citizens had been stolen and used as cover for Russian spies working in the United States. In 2018, the Irish government again expelled a Russian diplomat, partly in solidarity with the United Kingdom in response to the Salisbury Novichok poisonings but also because of apparent concerns about espionage. In 2019 there were also reports of Russian intelligence services using fake Irish social media accounts to promote disinformation designed to destabilise the situation in Northern Ireland in the context of Brexitrelated tensions. The expanding scale of Russian military activities has also impinged on Ireland in recent years. In January 2015, two Russian ‘Bear’ Tu-95 bombers entered airspace close to Ireland, reportedly armed with nuclear weapons; thereafter, similar incidents occurred in 2017 and 2020. The Irish government has condemned such actions, but since the Irish defence forces are small, with only a tiny air force with no combat capability, there is little more Ireland can do. In such cases, the British air force escorts Russian aircraft out of the region. In the last decade, Russian submarine activity in the Irish Sea and other waters near to Ireland has also increased, including the presence of Akula-class nuclear-powered submarines. Again, the Irish naval service has no submarine forces and only very limited capacity for monitoring such activity. In May 2021, Ireland was also the target of a major cyberattack believed to have been undertaken by a criminal group (known as Wizard Spider) operating from Saint Petersburg. The ransomware attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) resulted in the shutting down of all health service computer systems. The attack was the largest cyberattack on an Irish state agency to date and the largest known attack against a health service computer system globally. Russia denied turning a blind eye to the attack. Given the nature of the Russian political system, though, the Russian authorities could easily suppress cyber-criminal groups if they wished. While the HSE cyberattack received very widespread media coverage, remarkably little political or media attention or criticism focused on Russia. The evolution of Irish policy towards Russia shows a strong preference for engagement and a reluctance for confrontation, with prioritisation given to economic interests. However, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the need to show solidarity

58

A. Cottey

with fellow EU Member States have resulted in Ireland standing fairly solidly behind the EU’s collective positions since 2014. Russian military activities in Ireland’s neighbourhood, intelligence operations in or impacting Ireland and the 2021 HSE cyberattack have added further problematic elements to bilateral relations, but have not greatly altered the overall trajectory of Irish-Russian relations. If Ireland is being forced to re-think Russia, it is doing so with distinct reluctance. In closing this chapter, it has to be said that Ireland’s approach to Russia has been based on a certain naivety about contemporary Russia and the prospects for meaningful engagement with Moscow. This approach certainly needs to be revised. This does not imply abandoning engagement or dialogue with Russia, but it does mean approaching Russia in a more realistic and hard-headed manner. Irish political and media leaders should encourage a more informed public debate on Russia. Irish political leaders should be more willing to criticise Russia, regarding both its foreign policy actions and its domestic situation relating to human rights and democracy. Ireland should also explore with fellow EU Member States the challenges it faces in relation to Russian military and intelligence activities as well as cyberthreats emerging from Russia, with the aim of building more robust national and EU means of countering Russian activities. Andrew Cottey is Professor and EU Jean Monnet Chair in the Department of Government and Politics, University College Cork, Ireland. An expert on European security, his publications include Security in 21st Century Europe (Palgrave Macmillan), The European Neutrals and NATO: Non-aligned, Partnership, Membership? (Palgrave Macmillan), and articles in journals such as Journal of Common Market Studies, International Affairs, British Journal of Political Science and International Relations, and European Security. University College Cork is one of Ireland’s oldest universities with a dynamic learning environment with a global outlook and makes a major contribution to Ireland’s economy and cultural identity.

Diplomatic Bridge But Hybrid Fist: Italy’s Possible Approach Towards Russia Karolina Muti

The Long-Lasting Ties Between Moscow and Rome Italy has traditionally enjoyed excellent relations and strong ties with Russia, especially when compared to other EU Member States. This is due to strong mutual economic interests, but also longstanding cultural and in part political ties. While this close relationship is viewed with suspicion from some capitals in Europe, it gives Rome an edge that could actually benefit EU-Russia relations. Italy is well positioned to be a mediator in EU-Russia relations, to help restore necessary dialogue and raise the level of trust. While doing so, Rome should be more aware and bolder in protecting its domestic civil society in its countering of non-conventional security threats coming from Moscow. History established the basis for two elements that have remained constant in Rome’s foreign policy. On the one hand, Cold War Italy was home to the largest Communist party in Europe, resulting in a positive outlook on the socialist model for a relatively wide section of Italian society and hence political ties with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, successive Italian governments led by the Christian Democratic party were firmly adherent to the Western bloc. Italy contributed to found both NATO and the EU, anchoring itself to Atlanticism and pro-Europeanism. Economically speaking, Italy is second in the EU, after Germany, with regard to foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Russia, notably in manufacturing, machinery and equipment. In 2018 for instance, Italian FDIs amounted to almost EUR 10.7 billion. Strong economic ties exist in tourism, banking sectors and exports of Italian products to Russia. In 2019, trade between Russia and Italy amounted to EUR 22.2 billion (7.9 billion exports and 14.3 billion imports). Globally, Italy is sixth in terms of the volume of economic exchanges with Moscow. Approximately 500 Italian companies are present in Russia on a permanent basis, together with 68 banks. In the K. Muti (*) Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_15

59

60

K. Muti

energy sector, according to 2017 data Italy imported 43% of gas and 15% of oil from Moscow, making it one of the most dependent European countries with regard to foreign supplies of energy. Economic interests contribute to shaping the Italian position towards Russia as less hard line than that of EU hawks. This is true across the whole spectrum of political parties, as Italian leaders are generally in favour of pursuing good relations with Moscow. Indeed, the NATO-Russia Council was established in Italy, as part of the 2002 Rome NATO Summit, which benefitted from the strong personal ties of former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in mediating with both Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush. Today, EU-Russia relations have dramatically worsened, as Moscow targeted Italy with disinformation campaigns even during the pandemic’s first wave, referring to topics such as migration or conspiracy theories and subjecting Italian systems to wide-ranging cyberattacks. In March 2021, the lowest point in bilateral relations was reached when two Russian officials were expelled from Italy after secret NATO documents were sold to the Russian military attaché in Rome by an Italian navy captain.

Beyond Ambiguity: A Foreign Policy Firmly Anchored in the Transatlantic and EU Bond Italian public opinion generally does not consider Russia’s behaviour to be a security problem for the country, despite the fact that Rome’s Foreign and Defence Policy is strongly adherent to transatlantic as well as European principles and values. The latter have not been as much as scratched even by the most anti-system and rightwing government, lasting from June 2018 to April 2019, led jointly by the League Party and the Five Star Movement, both strongly sympathetic to Russia at the time. The attention given by Italian party leaders to close relations with Russia has been at a high level right across the political spectrum, but it must be noted that ultimately on crucial matters Rome positions itself unequivocally in line with EU and NATO policies and strategy. This included voting repeatedly for economic sanctions on Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, condemning the illegal annexation of Crimea as well as deploying troops and equipment in support of Poland and the Baltic States under the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence on the Eastern border of the Alliance. This twofold approach is well represented by two opposite attitudes: on one side, the strong leader/macho posture of Vladimir Putin is emulated by Matteo Salvini (The League) whose party is accused of receiving illicit funding from Moscow, while on the other side, Prime Minister Mario Draghi left no doubts on the ‘transatlantic vocation’ and his government’s support for the EU. The image of Russia is influenced by Foreign, Security and Defence Policy being considered by the public to be something of a minor-league policy. This, coupled with a limited security culture and the overall complex ambiguity of the Russian hybrid strategy, makes it easy to underestimate some of the challenges posed by Moscow—including targeted campaigns spreading disinformation—on issues where Italy is still a long way off the pace: countering hybrid threats, critical entities

Diplomatic Bridge But Hybrid Fist: Italy’s Possible Approach Towards Russia

61

protection and cybersecurity. The massive cyberattack that hit the Lazio region’s information technology system in August 2021, blocking inter alia the capital’s entire vaccination appointments system, proved how easy it is to exploit vulnerabilities at regional and local levels. A 2020 Report prepared by the Italian Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic described the Russian and Chinese disinformation attempts across Italy. Accordingly, Russian ‘mask diplomacy’ during the pandemic’s first wave proved effective, with the majority of Italians perceiving that Russia was doing more than the EU to help.

Diplomatic Bridge and Dialogue: Grasp the Opportunity as a Dove Whereas some EU partners consider a milder attitude towards Russia as somehow naive, Italy is aware that a zero-sum game approach towards Moscow pursued by some Member States does not work either in the current context of chaotic confrontation on multiple levels, beyond the threshold of armed conflict and in the absence of proper dialogue. Most importantly, a destabilised Russia does not automatically mean more secure Baltic States and Poland or even Europe as a whole, notably considering how Vladimir Putin uses Foreign Policy for domestic purposes when his leadership is in trouble. With regard to who sits in the Kremlin, Europe has to be ready for a next decade of Putin as much as for a regime change due inter alia to his decreasing support. In the long run, with the United States concentrating its assets more and more on the Indo-Pacific, the EU should realistically assess how it wants to position itself in the rapidly changing international scenario, bearing in mind that strained relations with both Russia and China are simply unsustainable. Ultimately, Washington would likely provide support to the EU in the eventuality of increasing tensions with Moscow. However, a lack of dialogue with Russia coupled with ongoing revolution in military affairs, due to ever-faster technology innovation, and United States’ shift towards a different geographic priority area combine to lay the ground for a genuine risk of rapid and uncontrolled escalation. Against this backdrop, Italy has everything necessary to play a meaningful role in mediation between Moscow and Rome’s EU partners, acting as a diplomatic bridge for the sake of European security and stability. This is even more important at a moment when EU-Russian relations are at a historic low, with very limited contact and mutual understanding, even within the academic and research community. There is a long list of topics that would urgently require a structured dialogue, from emerging and disruptive technology regulation to space governance, climate change or non-proliferation and arms control.

. . . But Learn to Be a Hawk on Hybrid Threats Whereas a contribution to dialogue is the most important added-value that Italy can bring to the table, this should come in conjunction with ever stronger action to counter hybrid threats coming from Russia in line with the principles of deterrence

62

K. Muti

and dialogue. Italy’s attempts at a quality dialogue with Moscow have to be accompanied by a more assertive posture on hybrid activities targeting the country and Europe, in contrast to the current ‘shy’ attempts that are perceived as a liability. Rome and the EU need to think out of the box and act in a bolder way with different initiatives including cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, disinformation and energy. For instance, targeted offensive action in the cyber domain should not be excluded aprioristically. In parallel, awareness about the nature and origin of hybrid threats, including cyberattacks, disinformation and critical entities protection, should be widespread and not limited to a narrow community of experts and insiders, as it is at the moment. Education and awareness raising, for instance by teaching how to spot fake news, should be part of secondary school programmes throughout Europe. Such measures would increase civil society resilience to some of the sneakiest threats coming from Moscow, thereby limiting Russia’s ability to manipulate. Furthermore, being the promote of a viable strategy to counteract hybrid threats at EU level and more pro-activity on this topic could help Rome in building trust with those EU Member States that seem to be very distant from Italy in their stances towards Russia. Karolina Muti is researcher in the Security and Defence Programmes of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), an Italian think tank. She conducts research on European security and defence, NATO, EU critical infrastructures’ resilience, space, and military technology. She leads or contributes to international projects funded by European institutions and agencies, Italian ministries and industrial stakeholders, and NATO divisions. In 2020, she was selected as Pan European Fellow for the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation. She is a member of Women in International Security (WIIS)—Italy and ERGOMAS. She speaks Italian, Polish, English, Spanish, and Russian. IAI is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli, to promote awareness of international politics and contribute to the advancement of European integration as well as multilateral cooperation. IAI is also a member of TEPSA.

Latvian-Russian Relationship Status: ‘It’s Complicated’ Karlis Bukovskis and Andris Spruds

Historical Background Latvia has centuries-old complex and complicated relations with Russia and its political regimes. Only within the past century has Latvia fought and struggled for independence from both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russia continues to be a formative factor for Latvia’s own historical understanding as well as its foreign and domestic politics. Acknowledging that Russia and Latvia are and will continue to be neighbours, the state policy has been based on a mixture of protecting this small Baltic country against Russian security threats, whilst at the same time maintaining economic relations. Historical legacies, such as a common energy and transit infrastructure, an ethnic population, business investments, media space and so on, continue to be present in Latvia. Concerns that Russia may use such legacies as vulnerabilities to wage hybrid activities are still driving Latvia’s foreign and security policy considerations. Although it constitutes less than 10% of Latvia’s global trade, Russia remains one of its largest trading partners. In mid-2022 Latvia and Russia are still in the same BRELL electricity grid and Russia supplies all the natural gas consumed in Latvia. Latvia still hosts more than 50,000 Russian Federation citizens and almost half a million ethnic Russians. Russia was not seen as an immediate military threat until it commenced attacks on Ukraine in 2014. Since then, Latvia’s domestic and foreign policy has been aimed at balancing Russia’s influences as well as defending against conventional and non-conventional threats.

K. Bukovskis (*) · A. Spruds Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), Riga, Latvia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_16

63

64

K. Bukovskis and A. Spruds

Public Perception in Latvia Taking into account the long and complex interstate and inter-ethnical relations, Latvia must deal with a public attitude towards Russia that has always been divided. One traditional position to a large extent relies on collective memory perceptions and personal experiences. A high number of ethnically mixed marriages in Latvia and the popularity of Russian media and culture products are among the core aspects to be highlighted as influencing attitudes towards the Russian Federation. In combination with a lack of EU country language skills and missing personal links to the West, this part of the Latvian population registers positive feelings towards Russia and its policies. Differences in attitudes and sentiments within Latvian society in this respect are clearly reflected within voting patterns and the popularity of certain political parties. The Latvian party system has to a large extent been shaped by geopolitical concerns and attitudes towards Russia.

Latvia, Russia and the EU The complexity of this conundrum called Latvian-Russian relations can also be seen in the country’s positioning towards Russian-related EU issues. Latvia generally seeks to preserve economic relations and existing business structures with Russia which are seen as balanced. As Latvia is still among the poorest EU Member States, any influx of capital and business opportunities is regarded as worth exploring. Russia is still seen as an economic opportunity for trade with potentially high returns, albeit a volatile and risky market. However, Latvia has also been one of the staunchest supporters of sanctioning Russia for its violations of international norms. Conversely, Latvia is rather selective regarding structural and individual sanctions against its neighbour, with an overall foreign policy stance which prioritises deterrence. However, successive governments have traditionally understood the need for a nuanced approach on matters related to the ‘big neighbour’. This is visible not only in bilateral relations but also in the relations with Russia ‘via the EU channels’. The EU may in general be perceived as an instrument of political parity, counterbalancing Russian diplomatic, economic and political might. This approach is not expected to change in the near future, especially because of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine in February 2022. Possible changes in Latvian relations with Russia depend largely on domestic developments in the Russian Federation and its foreign policy regarding its neighbouring countries. Latvia continues supporting the Eastern Partnership and Central Asian countries in their willingness to be closer to the EU rather than Russia and will strongly condemn every violent Russian action taken anywhere in the world. The three decades of independence have shown that Russia is met by very cautious and critical attitudes from most of the Latvian population. Politicians seeking to be advocates of Russia and its actions are met with distrust, especially since the 2014 occupation of Crimea. War on Ukraine can be regarded as a watershed moment both in Latvian-Russian relations and for open political support

Latvian-Russian Relationship Status: ‘It’s Complicated’

65

for closer relations with Russia. Improving relations with the current Russian regime may be seen as naiveté in Latvian politics. Pro-Russian politicians and parties do not play a crucial role in Latvian politics today. Among the most cautious actors traditionally are businesses, especially in the transit and energy sectors. Understanding the public’s limited understanding of Putin’s regime, both state-owned and private businesses have lobbied to keep their operations going. Russia’s interests are present in politics via traditional lobbying processes that are characteristic of a democratic country. However, actors are less outspoken than they were before 2014. Despite Russia’s open aggression at that time, polling in 2016 revealed that less than half of the Latvian population see Russian foreign policies as among the most significant threats to the Baltic country. 2022 attack on Ukraine is likely to increase that number.

Recommendations In summary, the status of Latvian-Russian relations is asymmetric, politically loaded and strategically challenging. Improvements are not expected for the foreseeable future as the regime in Russia keeps consolidating its power. Meanwhile, there are several trends that both Latvia and the EU could be following in its relations with Russia. The first recommendation is tied to deterring Russia and its new potentially aggressive foreign policy. Relations should be based within the Euro-Atlantic dialogue framework with the United States being regularly updated and engaged to keep Russia and the Western world aligned. In short, Transatlantic deterrence should be as much as needed, whilst Euro-Atlantic dialogue should be as much as possible. The second recommendation is to keep the Russian diaspora living in the EU constantly engaged. Their support for democratisation of their home country is essential in both shaping the future of the politics in Russia and aligning themselves with the Western values and the European Union. Making the Russian diaspora a welcome part of the European Union and its Member States would advance their integration, language learning skills and understanding of Russian Federation politics as being unacceptable. Finally, the third recommendation is to continue supporting and promoting democratic aspirations and resilience in Russia’s neighbouring countries. The EU must start filling in the void and disappointment existing in those countries, especially among the youth. Meanwhile, the EU does not have the luxury to ignore and disregard the existing regimes and governments in Russia’s neighbourhood. Partnerships do not have to be built only on conditions and free trade agreements. They can also be built among equals recognising the current realities and patiently socialising for future changes eventually to materialise.

66

K. Bukovskis and A. Spruds

Karlis Bukovskis is Assistant Professor at Riga Stradins University, where he lectures on the global political economy, the international financial system, and the European Union. Since 2011, he has been Deputy Director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA). In 2021, Bukovskis was Fulbright Scholar at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). The LIIA is the oldest Latvian think tank that specialises in foreign and security policy analysis. This independent research institute conducts research, develops publications, and organises public lectures as well as conferences related to global affairs along with Latvia’s international role and policies. The LIIA is also a member of TEPSA. Andris Spruds is the Director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. He also holds the positions of Professor and Dean of the Faculty of European Studies at Riga Stradins University. Andris Spruds has been a visiting student and scholar at Oxford, Uppsala, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins University, as well as the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Japan’s Institute of Energy Economics. The LIIA is the oldest Latvian think tank that specialises in foreign and security policy analysis. This independent research institute conducts research, develops publications, and organises public lectures as well as conferences related to global affairs along with Latvia’s international role and policies. The LIIA is also a member of TEPSA.

Lithuania’s Approach: Push Back Autocrats and Engage Democratic Activists Ramūnas Vilpišauskas

Re-established Independence, Economic Decoupling Lithuania and Russia have a history of complicated relationships going back to the times of Late Middle Ages’ rivalry between the Grand Duchy of Moscow and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the eighteenth century resulted in occupation by the Russian Empire until 1918 and more recently Lithuania was occupied by the Soviet Union from the 1940s to 1990. Following Lithuania’s declaration of the re-establishment of independence on 11 March 1990, Moscow responded with an economic blockade in an effort to pressurise Vilnius into suspending its newly regained independence. The relationship’s nadir at that time was reached on 13 January 1991 when the Soviet authorities used force by sending tanks to a TV tower in Vilnius, which resulted in 14 people being killed. This period of tension ended in August 1991 following a failed coup d’état in Moscow. Domestic political and economic reforms in Lithuania, including external trade liberalisation, and a ‘return to Europe’ resulted in reducing economic ties with Russia, whilst new relations and growing interdependencies were forged with Western partners. Furthermore, the use of energy supplies by Moscow as a tool for exerting political pressure acted as a strong incentive for Lithuania’s political elites to reduce economic links. Russia’s strategic use of energy supplies as well as the funding of intermediaries was seen in Lithuania as an instrument of blackmail and corrupt influences in domestic politics. In addition to removing barriers to trade and investment with European countries, the US and other Western economies, successive governments in Lithuania mobilised efforts to continue reducing links with Russia, instead integrating into energy and transport systems of Northern and Central Europe, often with the R. Vilpišauskas (*) Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_17

67

68

R. Vilpišauskas

involvement of EU institutions and their funding. However, despite Lithuania’s accession to the EU and even after the introduction of EU economic sanctions which followed Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 as well as Russia’s countersanctions, Russia still remained one of Lithuania’s most important bilateral trade partners (first for exports and third for imports in 2020).

Short Period of Cooperative Relationship Ended by Authoritarian Turn in Russia In the early 1990s there was a short period of cooperation between Lithuania and the Russian Federation. Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin condemned the January 1991 killing of civilians in Vilnius and supported Lithuania in its efforts to re-establish independence, at the same time trying to increase his own autonomy vis-à-vis authorities in the Soviet Union before its final demise. Lithuania was seeking external support for its independence and emphasised the importance of democratic reforms in Russia. The Lithuanian–Russian Treaty on the foundation of inter-state relationships signed on 29 July 1991 was a manifestation of this cooperation. A good working relationship between Yeltsin and the Lithuanian leadership contributed to the withdrawal of Soviet troops by 31 August 1993, before similar withdrawals took place from other Baltic States and East Germany. However, later relations between Lithuania and Russia cooled down. Lithuania’s demands for compensation for the damage done to the country during the Soviet occupation were received with hostility in Moscow. Vilnius became increasingly worried by the military build-up in the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation—an enclave surrounded by Poland and Lithuania. Russian transit to the Kaliningrad region through Lithuania became one of the most important issues in Lithuania’s EU accession negotiations, eventually resolved after the introduction of a facilitated regime with the participation of EU institutions. It was only then in August 2003 that Russia finally ratified a border treaty with Lithuania, even though it had been signed back in late 1997. Bilateral relations deteriorated in particular once Yeltsin had been succeeded by Putin, who increasingly centralised control domestically and projected Russia’s influence abroad, especially in its neighbourhood.

Persistent Disagreements Regarding History and Current Issues Thus, since the early 2000s Lithuanian–Russian relations have been characterised by strong divergences in how both countries interpreted the recent past, especially the period since 1940, and current issues such as NATO and EU enlargement together with Russia’s behaviour in its neighbourhood. For Putin, the collapse of the Soviet Union represented the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century. For Lithuania, the Soviet Occupation (following the previous Nazi Occupation) is seen as the most tragic event, which led to many of its citizens being deported to Siberia, the killing of elites and economic deprivation. Regular Russian military exercises,

Lithuania’s Approach: Push Back Autocrats and Engage Democratic Activists

69

often jointly with Belarus, are another source of concern for Lithuania. For a number of years the Lithuanian authorities have pointed to authoritarian Russia as the most important external threat to the country’s security. At the same time, Lithuania has welcomed Russian democratic opposition activists, hosting regular conferences and other events. Bilateral relations deteriorated still further after the Russia–Georgia conflict in August 2008 and especially after the annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Lithuania has been one of the most vocal supporters of EU sanctions towards officials and economic sectors in Russia. These events have also led to the mobilisation of all major political actors in Lithuania to increase defence funding, whilst the population has shown strong solidarity with Ukraine (and more recently with opposition activists in Belarus). In any event, a key priority within Lithuania’s foreign policy has been support for the Eastern neighbouring countries in their domestic political and economic reforms as well as their closer relationship with the EU and NATO. Importantly, for Lithuania accession into the EU was not only about a symbolic return to Europe and the economic benefits of membership. It has also been important in distancing the country from Russia and indirectly increasing its security by integration with the EU. Since its accession, Lithuania has been actively trying to ‘Europeanise’ relations with Russia to reduce the asymmetry of bilateral power relations, for example, in disputes with Gazprom regarding its gas price setting policy. Geopolitics was also behind the importance attached by Lithuania’s elites to the country’s NATO membership and its strategic relationship with the USA. Lithuania’s population strongly supports membership in both the EU and NATO. Successive Lithuanian governments have been strong transatlanticists and therefore wary of EU defence cooperation initiatives which might weaken the role of NATO. This was illustrated by opposition to the initiative of Berlin and Paris in June 2021 to upgrade the EU’s relationship with Russia. Lithuanian officials consider that any attempts at high-level dialogue with an authoritarian Russia would be counterproductive as they would be understood by Moscow as a sign of weakness, thereby encouraging its aggressive policies against neighbours and attempts to undermine rules-based order.

Waiting for Democratisation in Russia? Geopolitical concerns play an important role in Lithuania’s policies both vis-à-vis authoritarian Russia and in driving its attempts to upload bilateral issues onto the EU. Previous attempts at a pragmatic dialogue with Russia initiated by Lithuania’s officials are considered a failure. Meanwhile Russia’s aggressive policies and violation of international norms are seen as a vindication of the country’s suspicious attitude towards authoritarian Moscow and expose some EU Member States’ naiveté. The dominant view is that only democratisation of Russia can reduce tensions and allow for any normalisation of political relations.

70

R. Vilpišauskas

This strategic approach of pushing back, containing authoritarian Russia and engaging the country’s democratic opposition, seems justified, but its effectiveness could be increased. Lithuania should more actively engage in coalition building with other EU Member States and be more attentive to their concerns. It should lead efforts in increasing the resilience of democratic societies, for example, against cyberthreats and disinformation, along with integration within the EU in areas such as energy and the digital market. It should assess the existing decision-making rules in the EU on issues such as sanctions and support for human rights with a view to making it more effective. Finally, Lithuania should be more active in outlining the future vision of a relationship with Russia, should it ever become a democratic country. Ramūnas Vilpišauskas is Jean Monnet Chair (2020–2023) Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science (IIRPS), in Vilnius University. From 2009 to 2019, he was Director of the Institute. In 2004–2009, he worked as Chief Economic Policy Advisor to the President of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus. His main research interests include the political economy of European integration, policy analysis of public sector reforms, and international political economy. The IIRPS at Vilnius University is one of the most prominent social sciences institutions in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region. The Institute is an academic institution specialising in social and political sciences. IIRPS is also a member of TEPSA.

Luxembourg: If You Cannot Tame the Bear, Talk to It! Guido Lessing

2021 marks the 130th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Russia and Luxembourg, Russia having been one of the first countries with which Luxembourg established permanent ties. However, these relations have been strained by Russia’s 2014 military occupation of Crimea and the ongoing armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, which started in the same year. The Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Asselborn, the longest serving of all his EU peers, is very outspoken when it comes to human rights violations, the suppression of free media, the violation of Ukrainian borders and more recently the arrest of Alexei Navalny, a fierce critic of President Vladimir Putin. As Asselborn put it in February 2021, after a Moscow court had sentenced Navalny to three-and-ahalf years in prison, “we have been in a severe crisis since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Unfortunately, we have not reached the bottom yet”. This analysis suggests that Luxembourg will continue to support targeted EU sanctions in future.

Bilateral Trade Mostly Unaffected For the moment, it is difficult for Luxembourg to gauge the exact impact of the EU’s economic sanctions. In any case, bans on trade in arms and dual-use goods as well as curtailing access to certain sensitive technologies and services for oil production are not of serious concern for the Grand Duchy. Available data on bilateral trade in goods suggest that relations between Luxembourg and the Russian Federation have remained mostly unaffected by the restrictive measures taken by the EU. Given the low volume of goods traded between the two countries, any fluctuations can be attributed to specific contracts between business partners. The share of imports from Russia in 2020 amounted to barely 0.13% of all imported goods and exports to the G. Lessing (*) Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_18

71

72

G. Lessing

Russian Federation represent less than 1% of Luxembourg’s total. As Luxembourg does not have any crude oil production or oil refining capacity, it is completely dependent on imports. Hence, oil products come exclusively from neighbouring Belgium, France and Germany, all of which to various degrees are dependent on imports from Russia. Thanks to the government’s policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, gas imports have been falling over the past decade. The share of imports from Russia has remained at roughly 25%, implying that in real terms gas imports from Russia are also declining. The major provider of gas remains NATO member Norway.

Luxembourg as a Major Investor in the Russian Economy It is not surprising that the stakes are higher when it comes to financial relations between the Luxembourgish dwarf and the Russian bear. Despite diplomatic tensions with the EU, Russia is still heavily reliant on European investment and accordingly as a financial hub Luxembourg has its role to play. In 2019, after a visit to Luxembourg by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian and Luxembourg governments announced the creation of an investment fund to finance the development of environmentally friendly technologies in Russia, making Luxembourg the fifth largest investor in the Russian economy. On that occasion, the then Luxembourg Deputy Prime Minister Etienne Schneider recalled that Luxembourg had even been among the top three investors in previous years. Converging interests and shared expertise in the field of space mining had already led to an agreement between the two countries in 2018. Good relations between the two countries prompted the US ambassador to Luxembourg to call on Luxembourg Prime Minister Xavier Bettel to take a stand against the annexation of Crimea vis-à-vis his Russian peer. Interestingly, the US ambassador used the national motto of Luxembourg, “We want to remain what we are,” to draw a parallel between the ambition of the Luxembourgish and Ukrainian peoples to remain independent— the latter being in a state of war with its Russian neighbour. Within the Luxembourgish three-party government, official statements with regard to Russia sometimes appear to be contradictory. While Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn, appreciated by large swathes of the Luxembourgish electorate for his straightforwardness, has expressed fears of an upcoming cold war between Russia and the liberal democracies in the West, Etienne Schneider, Minister of the Economy until 2020, placed more emphasis on common interests and long-standing excellent relations with Russia. It appears that strong economic ties with Russia also seem to pay on an individual level. As with Jeannot Krecké, his fellow party member and predecessor in the Ministry for the Economy and Foreign Trade, Etienne Schneider found lucrative jobs after resigning from the cabinet. Being members of the Board of Directors for the Russian conglomerate Sistema, they both maintain contacts previously established when in office. In that respect, Luxembourg decision-makers seem to be following a pattern that can also be observed in other EU Member States.

Luxembourg: If You Cannot Tame the Bear, Talk to It!

73

Support for the EU Sanctions On a political level, most of the political parties represented in Luxembourg’s parliament support the European regime of sanctions targeting specific sectors of the Russian economy and a well-defined list of individuals and entities. The most outspoken critic of the sanctions comes from the national-conservative wing of the political landscape, the Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR). This party holds 4 out of 60 seats in the Luxembourg parliament and represents roughly 8% of the electorate. Its most outspoken member, Fernand Kartheiser, has repeatedly called the sanctions pointless and counterproductive. He justifies the annexation of Crimea by the ethnic composition of its population, arguing that Russians represent the majority. The general stance of the ADR towards Putin’s Russia resembles the view of other right-wing parties in the EU that see Putin as the legitimate defender of Russian interests.

Define Common Interests Although the mainstream media is critical of the authoritarian Putin regime, this does not apply to the Russian people or the country as a whole. Real economic interests in Russia and security-related aspects allow political decision-makers to unite behind the mantra that Europe has to keep channels open to Moscow. If change cannot be reached by means of traditional diplomacy or political pressure, then economic, cultural and human contacts are needed. Hence, we should provide for generous funding of student exchange programmes, creating fora for discussion and debate. In areas where interests converge beyond ideological and geopolitical dividing lines, look for common projects. The fight against climate is such an area where the Luxembourg investment fund industry would be eager to help. But maybe Luxembourg already punches above its own weight when it comes to the honourable task of maintaining links between the EU and Russia through the channels of business and academia. Guido Lessing is a Research Assistant at the Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History (University of Luxembourg). He has many years’ experience teaching history and civics in secondary school and has also co-authored various history and civics textbooks. After working for the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Européennes Robert Schuman (CERE) in Luxembourg, he joined the C2DH in September 2017. His main fields of interest are European integration and the history of Luxembourg in the twentieth century. C2DH is the University of Luxembourg’s third interdisciplinary research centre, focusing on high-quality research, analysis, and public dissemination in the field of contemporary Luxembourgish and European history. It promotes an interdisciplinary approach with a particular focus on new digital methods and tools for historical research and teaching.

Malta–Russia Relations and the Libyan Civil War Mark Harwood

The benefit of being on Europe’s periphery is that other parts of Europe can seem extremely distant, as with Russia, but this does not preclude contact. Situated in the middle of the Mediterranean, Malta had no foreign policy before independence in 1964, although the islands had played host to Russian diplomats from the time of Peter the Great. On independence from the UK, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established in 1967 and it was in Malta that Bush and Gorbachev declared the Cold War at an end in 1989. As with most issues in Maltese political history, Malta’s two-party political system feeds on polarisation and after 1964 this saw the ruling Christian Democrats adopt a pro-Western foreign policy, while the Socialists advocated for neutrality, seeking to join the non-aligned movement. When the Socialists were elected in 1971, they took steps to move the country away from Western influence and declared the country neutral at the UN in 1980; while the Socialists had envisaged a network of foreign powers to guarantee Malta’s neutrality, it was only Italy, Libya and the Soviet Union who actually signed ‘friendship’ agreements around this time. In 1982 Malta opened its first embassy in Moscow but relations increasingly grew moribund, especially after the Christian Democrats were returned to power in 1987.

Bilateral Relations and the War in Libya In most areas of the economy, Malta–Russian relations are not significant. Tourism from Russia represents less than 1% of Malta’s total, exports to Russia less than 0.3%, while FDI from Russia is even smaller at 0.1% (in 2019). However, Malta is the most heavily dependent EU country on imports to generate energy (only 5% of energy consumption being generated by renewables); due to this need for oil, 22% of M. Harwood (*) Institute of European Studies, University of Malta, Msida, Malta e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_19

75

76

M. Harwood

all Maltese imports come from Russia, making Russia Malta’s largest import partner. However, while this may seem high, it is not comparable to the energy dependency of other EU states on Russia, and Malta’s import dependency has been alleviated by the EU-funded projects that link the country to Europe’s electricity grid (2015) and gas network (2024). While energy supplies are important for understanding bilateral relations, of far greater importance are Russia’s activities in Malta’s near-abroad, namely Libya. When the Socialists were elected to power in 2013, the new government declared that relations with Russia would be a priority. Soon a double taxation treaty was signed and bilateral relations began to flourish, but things quickly turned hostile as the second Libyan civil war began in 2014, with Malta and Russia finding themselves on opposing sides. For Malta, relations with Libya have been of importance for over 50 years; when the Socialists came to power in 1971, Qaddafi proved to be a key ally, supplying the country with cheap oil, and once migrant flows across the Mediterranean increased after 2002, Libya’s importance as a transit country grew with Malta eager to secure EU involvement in Libya to minimise migration. After the fall of Qaddafi and the start of the second civil war, Malta backed the internationally recognised government, while Russia sided with ‘Tobruk’, with the civil war exasperating Libya’s position as a transit country, just when irregular migration came to dominate Maltese foreign policy. With the Libyan civil war escalating after 2015, Malta denied entry to Russian warships heading to Syria in 2016, recalled its ambassador to Moscow in solidarity with the UK over the 2018 Salisbury attack and in 2019 seized over USD 1 billion worth of ‘counterfeit’ Libyan dinars which were heading from Russia to the Russianbacked ‘Tobruk’ government. Malta was increasingly accused by Russia of falling ‘victim to the West’s information war’, and in the 2017 Maltese general election, the then prime minister announced that he had been warned by Western intelligence of Russia’s potential interference in the election by way of retaliating for his pro-West stance; the 2017 election would go on to be dominated by allegations of corruption focused on the prime minister. These were found to have been instigated by a Russian whistle-blower working in a private bank, though the impact of these claims was debateable as the Socialists went on to win the biggest majority in Maltese political history. This outcome seemed to reflect the increased antipathy towards Russia amongst the general public and the Maltese media; a 2018 ECFR report indicated that the Maltese felt that Russia was interfering in domestic politics while the Russian Foreign Ministry was quoted as saying in 2019 that Malta’s media was ‘unprofessional’ and driven by an ‘anti-Russian hysteria’. Ultimately, for Malta, EU–Russia relations are about minimising Russian interference in Libya and the wider Mediterranean.

Malta–Russia Relations and the Libyan Civil War

77

Optimism in Future Relations Ten years after the death of Qaddafi, Libya saw the creation of a Government of National Unity in 2021 with a reorientation in Russia’s relations with Libya. That reorientation has brought about a thaw in Malta–Russia relations; Malta’s Foreign Minister met his Russian counterpart in April 2021, agreed to release the Libyan dinar seized in 2019 and also declared Malta’s willingness to collaborate more with Russia. While this could imply a renewed interest in cooperation, it is unlikely to be a government priority as little can be gained from making Russia a strategic partner in 2022. Whether popular sentiment or local media, as noted above, Russia is seen as autocratic and corrupt, which is problematic for Malta in two senses. The first relates to the country’s fight against allegations of being a tax haven (and having been grey listed by the FATF in 2021). The second relates to its ‘golden passport’ scheme, launched in 2013; while not targeted exclusively at Russians, they now represent the majority of successful applicants. This passport scheme has seriously dented Malta– EU relations with the Commission opening an infringement case against Malta in 2021, with some in the Commission specifically referencing their concern over the high number of Russian applicants. While Libyan stability has always been important for Malta (and with Malta and Russia now on the ‘same side’), resolving these two issues is of greater importance for the economy and neither are helped by too close an association with Russia. Moving forward, Europe needs to protect itself from Russia’s weapon of choice, namely, ‘cyber’ interference. Whether through strengthening of the ENISA or intergovernmental cooperation, the EU needs a reinforced capacity. Greater efforts are also needed to avoid compartmentalisation of issues at the EU level, especially as the EU’s political system tends towards compartmentalisation; Eastern countries may wish to prioritise Russian relations while caring little for Mediterranean calls for burden sharing, but, as we see in the case of Malta–Libya relations, these are related and hence carry great importance. More European fora for the discussion of horizontal issues are needed to avoid compartmentalisation of issues. Finally, Europe should start the discussion about a post-Putin Russia. By discussing such scenarios, Europe can help create the language of change which could then feed into Russian civil society and galvanise new political forces. Mark Harwood is Director and Associate Professor at the Institute for European Studies, University of Malta. Having previously worked for the European Commission as well as the Maltese Government, his area of research is the impact of EU membership on Malta. The Institute was founded in 1991 as a teaching and research institute within the University of Malta. Offering a full range of degree programmes up to PhD level, the Institute has over 1000 alumni. The Institute is also a member of TEPSA.

Poland and Russia: Turbulent Relations and No Rapprochement in Sight Magdalena Góra, Zdzisław Mach, and Natasza Styczyńska

Difficult History Turns into Troubled Present Poland is well-known in Europe for its difficult relations with Russia, which often lead into what seems to be prejudices and biases. Yet, the long and difficult history of relations between Poland and its Eastern neighbour provides a good deal of substance in understanding why such a distrustful approach exists. For centuries Poland was threatened by Russian imperial aspirations and indeed the eastern part of Poland was part of the Russian empire. Poles in their historically constructed national identity have two main “significant others”, nations that constitute the main point of reference in the Polish self-image: Germany and Russia. In both cases the relations are asymmetrical. Poles always think about Russia when they think about themselves in Europe and their history therein. Such feelings are mainly negative. Poles fear Russia, its military power and imperialistic tendencies, but at the same time feel contempt for what they see as a barbaric Eastern power, lacking Western high civilisation. This image was created particularly at the time of wars against Bolshevik Russia and later when Soviet Russia invaded Poland in the Second World War. Poles take particular pleasure in repeating jokes based on Russian ignorance about the basics of modern culture. There is also another ambivalence in the Polish popular attitude to Russia: Poles tend to see Russian people as being from the same family of Slavs, with whom they share their virtues and vices. They often feel comfortable with Russians, as they do not suffer from an inferiority complex towards them, as is the case regarding Westerners. Yet, more Poles declare that they dislike Russia, while those who like Russia are in a minority. A poll in March 2020 showed that 26% of Poles expressed a positive attitude towards Russians, while 42% expressed dislike. Negative attitudes were particularly strong in the 1990s, but improved once Poland had joined the EU, M. Góra (*) · Z. Mach · N. Styczyńska Jagellonian University, Kraków, Poland e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_20

79

80

M. Góra et al.

which may be interpreted as an indication of more security and self-confidence. Negative feelings about Russia increased after Law and Justice (PiS) came to power in Poland, which may be connected with the rise of Polish nationalism but are also linked to the Ukrainian crisis. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 caused a radical change in the Polish public perception of Russia. Seven years later, Poles’ attitudes towards Russians have stabilised, although still only 21% of respondents indicate Russia as being friendly towards Poland, while 79% describe its attitude as unfriendly. It is worth noting that 64% of respondents assess the attitude of Russians generally as friendly. Hence, we are observing a different perception of the attitude of the Russian state and the Russian nation (so-called ordinary Russians) specifically towards Poland. At the same time, Poles are very critical of Vladimir Putin’s activities, with 60% of respondents evaluating his activities negatively. These perceptions significantly worsened after the Russian agression on Ukraine in February 2022.

The EU Is an Answer? Building a Polish foreign policy towards Russia after 1989 as the Soviet Union was collapsing was not an easy task. One can argue that from the difficult beginnings of dealing with the heritage of Soviet domination, issues to do with Soviet soldiers, property and mutual debt, relations only became worse over time. The significant mounting crisis in mutual relations largely reflected Poland’s massive support for the Ukrainian Orange Revolution during the 2004/2005 electoral crisis. For Russia it was not only that Poland supported Viktor Yushchenko but that it also used all its abilities to sway the EU’s position towards the crises and successfully so. It resulted in a food embargo on Polish exporters imposed by Russia, followed by Poland’s veto in 2006 on a mandate for the European Commission to negotiate the next Strategic Partnership between the EU and Russia. Poland developed a strong and clear preference within the EU’s foreign policy to build a uniform policy towards Russia, by way of strengthening its own and other Central and Eastern European capitals’ positions. Additionally, strong support for European Neighbourhood Policy and its regional format of Eastern Partnership (EaP) pursued successfully by Warsaw and Stockholm in 2008 contributed to the image of Poland becoming a significant foreign policy EU player with the goals of undermining Russian aims. Poland preferred to present itself as an actor understanding Russia and hence a selfannounced leader in the EU’s Eastern policy. But that was often contested by other Member States citing the damaged condition of Polish-Russian bilateral relations. The situation was even further complicated by the tragic airplane crash with Polish officials led by President of the Republic Lech Kaczyński in 2010. Nowadays, the key issue in EU-Russia relations from the perspective of Warsaw lies with attempts by the latter to undermine the EU’s common stance. A good example was Nord Stream 2, perceived as a strategic weakening of the region and especially of Ukraine, the current key natural gas transit country. In response the RussianGerman agreement motivated creation of countermeasures such as the Three Seas

Poland and Russia: Turbulent Relations and No Rapprochement in Sight

81

Initiative proposed by Poland and Croatia, which focused on strategic infrastructure. Poland strongly supported Ukraine when Russia attacked the country in February 2022 and again became one of the leaders of common and unequivocal support for Ukrainian leadership and society within the EU and in transatlantic community. Since Poland and Russia are neighbours, trade also plays a significant role. Recently, while most Polish trade exchange is with the EU countries, the big Russian market’s proximity was perceived as a great opportunity for Polish exporters. However, in 2014 the Kremlin imposed an embargo on fresh Polish produce, causing the collapse of Polish exports to Russia. It had also been the case in previous years that Russia was imposing politically motivated restrictive economic measures on countries in Central and Eastern Europe including Poland, which clearly makes trade with Russia more unpredictable. Before the Russian agression on Ukraine, indicators have been rising, to the extent that trade was recently approaching levels witnessed before the annexation of Crimea. Currently however, under conditions of Russian aggression, most of attention is focused on imposing severe sanctions against Russia and mitigating the disrupted fossil fuels imports from Russia.

Radical Right-Wing Parties and Russia Diplomatic relations since the Smoleńsk crash in 2010 became turbulent and even more difficult as the issue became a tool for fuelling domestic political conflict that was used and abused by anti-establishment and populist parties, which are pro-Russian and Eurosceptic. Since 1989 Polish foreign policy has been characterised by very high political consensus among all mainstream parties as regards pro-Western directions (including NATO). Interestingly, there is no significant pro-Russian party in Poland although it seems that some of the major right-wing political actors have been recently fitting into Vladimir Putin’s political playbook. While a critical approach to Russia has been the consensus view among the political mainstream since the fall of communism, we can nevertheless see Russia’s growing indirect impact within the Polish political arena. Links between the Polish radical right-wing parties and Russia are not straightforward, albeit similarly to the other EU Member States one can observe the connection between activities of Russia and right-wing, anti-EU forces. This aimed at undermining society’s support for EU membership and promoting ultraconservative values. It means that Poland does not need to have an openly pro-Russian political party to behave in a way that can be regarded as meeting Russia’s interests, such as destabilisation of the EU. Officially, the current ruling coalition, led by the PiS, voices concerns over the limitation of press freedom and civil rights in Russia, actively engages in all forms of support (including military) for attacked Ukraine and supports EU sanctions. By contrast, over the last decade, the PiS party has instrumentalised Russia-linked issues for the sake of domestic politics, accusing the leader of the opposition and former European Council’s president

82

M. Góra et al.

Donald Tusk of plotting against Poland and the Smolensk plane crash. Meanwhile, most opposition parties point out that the governing coalition is drifting towards “Polexit”, which would further destabilise the EU and hence totally in Russia’s interests. The recent agreement signed by PiS with several other right-wing parties across Europe, some of which openly express admiration for Putin, only serves to intensify those fears. Similarly, the current migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border is perceived as a Russian managed attempt to destabilise the situation in Poland and fuel disagreement between EU Member States.

Recommendations It seems that the Polish case demonstrates the significance of Russian tactics to sow disagreements among Member States and fuel domestic political conflicts. The EU should firmly uphold its principles and values because what Russia wants most of all is to weaken and divide the Union, so supporting (often indirectly in a clandestine manner) nationalism, phobias and Euroscepticism is very much in its favour. This is clearly possible even in societies within which the majority of people express scepticism and caution towards Russia. Yet in the new era of disinformation and in grounds made fertile by social media and fake news, such tactics certainly work and no society is immune. The EU should build common policy focusing on combating disinformation, regulating the operation of social media and securing domestic resistance to disinformation effects. This is even more timely in the context of Russian agression on Ukraine. Moreover, the old Polish foreign policy motto in regard to Russia—together we are stronger—should be repeated as a mantra by the EU, which needs to work towards achieving as uniform a position as possible towards Russia. This also concerns strategic infrastructure and requires more cooperation, as the long crisis surrounding Nord Stream 2 has demonstrated. The EU’s position, hence the stability and security of all its Member States not just those on Eastern peripheries, would be strengthened if the bloc spoke with one voice. This is also the case for issues such as energy security or migration, which recent crises in the Baltic States and Poland have clearly shown. Magdalena Góra is Associate Professor of Political Science and European Studies at the Institute of European Studies of the Jagiellonian University. Her research deals with legitimacy and contestation in external relations of the European Union, EU’s actorness in international relations, especially in EU’s close neighborhood, as well as changes in collective identification in the EU. She has worked and taught in a number of academic institutions worldwide. She participated in several research projects, and currently, she is a co-leader of WP on Future of Europe Debate within Horizon 2020 funded project EU Differentiation, Dominance and Democracy (EU3D). She has published several peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, and co-edited volumes. The Institute for European Studies is part of the Faculty of International and Political Studies at Jagiellonian University—the oldest and leading university in Poland. The Institute is famous for its interdisciplinary approach that combines the perspectives of anthropology, economy, cultural studies, political sciences, history, law, and sociology.

Poland and Russia: Turbulent Relations and No Rapprochement in Sight

83

Zdzisław Mach is Professor of Sociology at the Jagiellonian University, Krakow, specialising in social anthropology and European studies. He has held visiting professorships and fellowships at many academic institutions in important European and American universities. He led several international research projects dealing with European integration, democracy and collective identity, transnationalisation of social movements in Europe in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and attitudes towards European integration in Polish society. Currently, he leads Horizon 2020 funded project EU Differentiation, Dominance and Democracy (EU3D) and Populist rebellion against modernity in twenty-first-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism (POPREBEL). He has published and edited 16 books and numerous articles. The Institute for European Studies is part of the Faculty of International and Political Studies at Jagiellonian University—the oldest and leading university in Poland. The Institute is famous for its interdisciplinary approach that combines the perspectives of anthropology, economy, cultural studies, political sciences, history, law, and sociology. Natasza Styczyńska is an assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies of the Jagiellonian University. Currently, she is a researcher in two H2020 projects: Populist rebellion against modernity in twenty-first-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism (POPREBEL) and EU Differentiation, Dominance and Democracy (EU3D). Her academic interests include transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe, party politics, nationalism, populism, and Euroscepticism in the CEE region and the Balkans. The Institute for European Studies is part of the Faculty of International and Political Studies at Jagiellonian University—the oldest and leading university in Poland. The Institute is famous for its interdisciplinary approach that combines the perspectives of anthropology, economy, cultural studies, political sciences, history, law, and sociology.

Portugal: Two Women’s Legacy—A Bridge Forged to Russia from the Western Edge of Europe Sónia Sénica

From Lisbon to Vladivostok, with Love The 240th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Lisbon and Moscow, celebrated in 2019, was made possible through the efforts of two very important women with great political vision, Catherine II, Tsarina of the Russian Empire, and Queen Mary I from the Portuguese Empire. Portugal with its Atlantic vocation and Russia with its continental vocation began a long-lasting friendly relationship until an enforced break in 1917 which lasted until 1976. Following the Cold War, as the Soviet Union was collapsing in 1991, the new Russian Federation was focused on its own domestic path through an extensive transition period, whilst Portugal was initiating necessary development in the wake of Salazar’s long dictatorship through European integration. The beginning of this democratic period showed that Portugal had three very specific objectives being implemented in terms of foreign policy, none of them regarding Russia: (1) Atlanticist with NATO, (2) European with the European Union and (3) “Lusophony” (native-speaker links) with Portuguesespeaking countries and former colonies of the Portuguese-Speaking Countries Community (CPLP). Even with some common matters in the shared international political agenda, such as the fight against international terrorism after 9/11 in 2001, particularly since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, this began in what it is considered as the tensest period in relations between the West and the Russian Federation. Hence, it is totally understandable to find that Portugal not only as a NATO ally but also as a European Union Member State today appears to be distancing itself from the Russian Federation. As the former Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs Martins da Cruz said after the Skripal affair, “Russia is not at the top of the Portuguese political agenda” since it is not a priority in terms of Portuguese foreign policy and despite maintaining

S. Sénica (*) Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI), Lisbon, Portugal # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_21

85

86

S. Sénica

cordial bilateral relations with successive Portuguese Governments, whether left- or right-wing parties are in power. Portugal always seems aligned with American and European allies regarding Moscow, usually advocating for a position of compromise. These always friendly bilateral relations with Russia were once again perceived useful when the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Augusto Santos Silva, went to Russia on an official visit on 1 June 2021. Portugal at that time held the chair of the Council of the European Union, trying to keep communication channels open between Russia and the European Union at a time of great scepticism and criticism. Despite best efforts, Silva was left with the words of Minister Lavrov saying that the “European Union was not a reliable partner”. Nevertheless, for Russia the bilateral relationship with Portugal “was very much appreciated”. For the vast majority of Portuguese civil society, Russia belongs to that section of foreign affairs that seems to be distanced from the realities of daily life routine in this part of the world and is well below fields of concern such as the European Union, NATO, Lusophony or in more recent years Portuguese Communities abroad.

People’s Perceptions: Dos and Don’ts The national media focus much more on those matters of more immediate concern and interest for the Portuguese audience. Russia appears in the news only in regard to specific events such as the annexation of Crimea, war in Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Syria, the Navalny incident or an official visit between the two countries. In this regard, it is right to stress that from Lisbon’s perspective, any concerns for Portuguese security posed by Russia’s threat differ radically from those of neighbouring countries like Finland or the Baltic States. All these different sensitivities inside the European Union may justify the difficulties encountered in trying to agree a common position. Indeed, one of the frequent critiques towards the European project is the difficult task of reconciling all the different positions and interests of Member States. Moreover, in terms of a policy and a strategy regarding Russia from the European side, Portugal has mantain its atlantic and european vocations and concertation position with the European Union and NATO. The war in Ukraine as provoqued a massive change in the public’s opinion perception towards Russian due to this illegal and unprovoked war and Portugal has alined with Western partners in condening Putin’s decision. These long and lasting diplomatic relations between the two countries have created a near-perfect atmosphere within which to strengthen the commercial ties of bilateral trade and improve the internationalisation of both economies, an advantageous situation especially after the 2008 economic crises affecting Portugal or the Western sanctions imposed on Russia in recent years. According to the Portuguese National Statistical Institute, Russia occupies the 35th place in the export ranking of Portuguese products in 2019 and the tenth place for imports. Between 2015 and 2019, a growth was verified in annual exports (of 5.9%) as well as imports (of 1.4%),

Portugal: Two Women’s Legacy—A Bridge Forged to Russia from the. . .

87

even though the trade balance of goods was unfavourable to Portugal, presenting a deficit of EUR 900 million. However, after the invasion of Ukraine a recent episode brought Russia into the spotlight after the so-called Medina case in 2021, the Setúbal case, where ukrainain refugees were welcomed by russian citizens that worked with the local autorities and suppostly had close ties with Moscow. This raised important questions that are dear to the Portuguese public, who are used to the spirit of a democratic system that includes human rights and individual freedom, aspects that need to be protected by the state. As in the “Medinagate”, this arose the portuguese public’s attention as well as contestation towards the central and local autorities. The “Medinagate” ended with a public apology being made by Medina and a confirmation that an enquiry would be opened to verify all the circumstances of this leak. From the Russian side, the Embassy pointed out that this information was not going to be used in any way and that Russia “had other priorities”. The “Setubalgate” arose a huge public debate condemning the local aproach chosen. Since Portuguese foreign policy is always aligned with its Euro-Atlantic dimension, the public perception regarding Russia is that it is a country very much on a centralised path domestically and takes an assertive and now militarised line regarding its foreign policy. Even though the concern differs from Russia’s neighbourhood countries, from Portuguese civil society’s point of view there is a clear difference in terms of type of regime, international policy and even values.

Final Remarks Having this particular relation between the two countries in mind, three final considerations seem to be relevant in closing this chapter and may give some ideas for better use of all the potential behind this relationship. Firstly, since Russia is seen by the West, especially the United States, again as a threat, Portugal stands amoung the countries considered by Russia hostiles and the bilateral relation is therefore in question. Secondly, since Russia has destabilized the European security architecture, wich made not only NATO stronger, but also the West more united, the normalization of West-Russia relations seems difficult to be overcomed in the next years. Thirdly and finally, the European Union changed the policy regarding Russia and assumed a more securitized dimension spcecially supportig Ukraine. In order to have a stable European security environment, all Member States, as Portugal, should contribute in equal share to a more extensive defence policy and commit itselfs to a new world order. The two women’s legacy is now in question and the bridge constructed seems in danger of collapsing.

88

S. Sénica

Sónia Sénica is Research Fellow at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI). She holds a PhD in International Relations from the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities of Universidade NOVA de Lisboa. She was coordinator of a research project at the Luso-American Development Foundation (2016). Participant in the course “Diplomatic Protocol” of the École Nationale d’Administration in Paris (2008). She is a postgraduate in “Theory and Diplomatic Practice” at the Lusíada University of Lisbon (2004), participant in the course “Russia and the contemporary world” of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow (2003), and guest lecturer in several Portuguese universities and has regular participations in national and international media. The Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI) is a research unit of NOVA University, Lisbon, dedicated to advanced studies in political science, international relations, and European integration. IPRI is also a member of TEPSA and ECPR.

Romania Versus Russia: Black Sea Region Ambitions Alexandru Damian and Bianca Toma

A difficult historical relationship between Romania and Russia has left Moscow ever-present in the collective memory of Romanians. This is especially true for the generations in their 40s and 50s, due to more than four decades of a communist regime imposed by Soviet troops. For older generations, Russia is even more frightening, with many issues still fresh in the memory: loss of family members, seizure of property, deportation, torture of political prisoners as well as a lack of fundamental rights and freedoms. Two other major historical events impact on this: the loss of Bessarabia (currently territory of the Republic of Moldova, part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP)) lost through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939 and confiscation of the Romanian National Bank’s treasury—handed over to Russia for shelter in 1916 due to the advance of the Central Powers, according to the National Bank. The Romanian treasure has still not been fully recovered to this day.

Communism and Soviet Influence After the Second World War, under Russian influence, Romania witnessed an active communist movement. Historians mention that many Soviet agents infiltrated both the party and the labour unions. In the spring of 1945, with installation of the first pro-Soviet government, the Communist Party experienced a significant increase in membership. More than 40 years of communism followed, while Romania remained economically dependent on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the USSR initiative started as a response to the Marshall Plan. Abusive measures were taken, most of them Soviet-inspired or USSR-led, such as arrest of key leaders of the historical political parties, nationalisation of factories and A. Damian (*) · B. Toma Romanian Centre for European Policy, Bucharest, Romania e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_22

89

90

A. Damian and B. Toma

property, collectivisation of agriculture, subordination of the Orthodox Church and banning of other religions. Romanian communism during the dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu, after 1965, slowly moved the country away from Soviet grip, with a Chinese and later North Korean communist model becoming the main inspiration.

Current Diplomatic Relations with Russia Bilateral relations with Russia cooled after the fall of communism in 1989 and are currently in deadlock. Negotiations for a new Romania-Russia political treaty failed due to Moscow’s refusal to condemn the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. In 2003 after 10 years of negotiations, only a treaty of friendly and cooperative relations could be agreed and signed. High-level meetings were very few and far between and bilateral dialogue is limited. Vladimir Putin’s last and only appearance in Bucharest was in April 2008 at the Russia-NATO Council on the margins of the NATO summit. In recent years, especially after the crisis in Ukraine (2014), bilateral contacts have decreased even more. The installation of a United States Ballistic Missile Defence Site at Deveselu Air Base in Romania (May 2016) attracted even more aggressive rhetoric from Russia towards Bucharest. Not only is dialogue limited politically, but Romania’s trade with Russia is also very modest. Its value decreased by almost 30% in 2020 compared to the previous year, which had been around USD 3.3 billion according to official MFA data. Romania’s energy independence being one of the EU’s net energy producers ensures in theory a more stable position and a larger influence in the Black Sea region. Nevertheless, Romania still needs Russian gas imports to meet national needs (8% of domestic consumption in 2020). The energy crisis of 2021 and the stalling of offshore gas extraction from the Black Sea have boosted gas imports from Russia, thereby increasing Romania’s dependency.

Romanians’ Attitudes and Perceptions Towards Russia 61.7% of Romanians believe that, over time, Russia has done more harm than good to Romania, while 19.1% believe that it has done more good than harm, according to the latest opinion poll by the Strategic Thinking Group, which has analysed perceptions of influence from the USA and EU vs Russia. According to this demographic analysis, those over 60, with a higher level of education, and inhabitants of the big urban areas are to a greater extent of the opinion that Russia has done more harm to Romania over time. A trend which needs further analysis, though, shows that the new generation, those aged under 30, with only primary education, lower incomes or (blue-collar) public servants, believe largely that Russia has had a positive influence on Romania over time. One of the explanations is that these generations were born after the fall of the USSR and their exposure to relevant information about what communism and Soviet influence meant for the society and individual freedoms is limited, with school

Romania Versus Russia: Black Sea Region Ambitions

91

history or social sciences treating this era simplistically. The families of these generations have had a better stability and predictability of life compared to those at the time of transition to capitalism. However, in the opinion of those surveyed by the Strategic Thinking Group, positive influence on Romania is recorded as 71% from the USA and 55.8% from Western countries, but only 17% appreciate Russia’s contribution.

Russia’s Interests and Influence in the Region: The Case of the Republic of Moldova Moscow’s narratives rarely find echo or support in Romania. However, there is a growing risk that these narratives are used by certain politicians (far-right, but also from mainstream parties) to undermine EU solidarity in Romania. Moscow’s propaganda related to Romania features a number of favourite themes, which are repeated especially through media channels such as Sputnik: conspiracy theories (George Soros, immigration and LGBT rights), ‘protecting’ Orthodox traditional values compared to the ‘decadent’ West and anti-Westernism presenting Western Europe as a colonial power (the Schengen case in Romania, the fight against corruption and the scandal of inferior quality products for Eastern Europe). However, it is the Republic of Moldova, with a significant Romanian-speaking population, where Romania’s interests truly clash with those of Russia. Through its activities in Moldova, Russia is trying to influence behaviour in Romania. Moldova’s immediate rapprochement with the EU and its integration into the European community are top priorities in Romania’s foreign policy. Russia on the other hand uses its propaganda instruments in Moldova to undermine the country’s EU aspirations and portray Romania as an ‘enemy’, especially for the Russianspeaking communities. Art graphs published by the pro-Russian Socialist party in Moldova with the message ‘Romanian gendarmerie will not be our master’ were key messages during the Moldovan elections in an attempt to scare anti-Russian communities. Russian propaganda uses similar messages both in the Republic of Moldova and Romania, but it does not have the same vehicles to promote them in the latter, such as mass media controlled by local pro-Russian oligarchs, representatives of the Orthodox Church and pro-Russian political parties. Russian propaganda in Moldova is intense and usually ‘denounces’ European and Romanian ‘interventionism’ in Chisinau. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Moldova was faced with an overabundance of disinformation. Two main narratives dominated the disinformation campaign: the widespread promotion of COVID-19 conspiracy theories and use of the health crisis by Russia to promote its own agendas and undermine European solidarity. This disinformation campaign took its toll as the vaccination campaign in Moldova is limited (with a vaccination rate of only 23%).

92

A. Damian and B. Toma

Brussels (and Others) Should Demonstrate More Ambitions Towards EaP Countering Russia’s influence in the Black Sea Region and ensuring energy security, there are the two key directions where Romania is expecting stronger and/or hard power tools from the EU. Recently, with European financial support, essential interconnections for energy and natural gas have been finalised by Romania with the Republic of Moldova, a country completely dependent on Russian gas. Connecting these pipelines to the EU energy market is essential for the region’s security. Hence, a more ambitious approach for the Eastern Partnership states, with political allies among EU Member States, is another direction in which Romania can work much more intensively with Brussels. Finally, in closing this chapter, the involvement of several Central and Eastern European leaders in the decision-making process related to the EU-Russia relationship would be desirable. Alexandru Damian is Researcher at the Romanian Centre for European Policies (CRPE). He has been working for over 7 years on projects on good governance and civic activism and promoting the transparency of public authorities in Romania and the Republic of Moldova. He is interested in the European path of the Republic of Moldova and the Eastern Partnership countries and often writes on these topics. CRPE is one of the leading Romanian think tanks specialising in EU affairs, with more than 10 years’ experience in implementing European and regional projects. The Centre’s mission is to promote Romania as an influential leader in the development of EU agendas and policies. Another key objective is to advance the Europeanisation processes in Romania and promote European citizenship by providing expertise in various fields and initiating or participating in public debates. Bianca Toma is Programme Director at the Romanian Centre for European Policies, with expertise in good governance, European policies, justice, and anti-corruption. She coordinated projects in Romania, the Republic of Moldova, and the Western Balkans. Before joining the Romanian Center for European Policies (2013), she worked as journalist, deputy editor in chief for the mainstream Adevarul, and Brussels-based correspondent for Romanian media. CRPE is one of the leading Romanian think tanks specialising in EU affairs, with more than 10 years’ experience in implementing European and regional projects. The Centre’s mission is to promote Romania as an influential leader in the development of EU agendas and policies. Another key objective is to advance the Europeanisation processes in Romania and promote European citizenship by providing expertise in various fields and initiating or participating in public debates.

Slovak–Russian Relations: A Challenging Big Brother Legacy Lucia Mokrá

Slovak–Russian Relations: The Beginning of a Story After its foundation in 1993, the Slovak Republic maintained certain economic relations with Russia. Although some Slovak companies left the Russian market, especially at the end of 1990s, ongoing relations were mainly focused on energy supplies and related commodities, as with other countries in region. Bilateral relations had been regulated by the Agreement on economic and scientific-technical cooperation between Slovakia and the Russian Federation, but relations between the contracting countries were not equal. Following the signing of a bilateral agreement in 2005, the deficit of international trade between Slovakia and Russian Federation was SKK 73.333 billion (approximately EUR 2.43 billion). Although economic relations between Slovakia and Russia are influenced by the EU’s economic sanctions against Russia, the Slovak Republic is profiting more from the economic exchange of Central and Eastern European countries (CEE), with 19.6% share in 2019 and 17.0% share in 2020, the fifth highest throughout the European Union both in 2019 and 2020.

Breakthrough in Relations The Slovak Republic as an EU member since 2004 is bound by international treaties signed by the European Union. Relations with Russia could be characterised as becoming slightly colder up to 2014, but this turned to a complete freeze with Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Slovakia made its position clear by supporting the UN General Assembly Resolution calling upon all States not to recognise changes in the Crimea region’s status. Slovakia considered Russia’s behaviour as a gross L. Mokrá (*) Comenius University Bratislava, Bratislava, Slovakia e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_23

93

94

L. Mokrá

violation of international law. However, strong support for EU sanctions against Russia was not always perceived positively in Slovakia, as one of the countries considered to have a very strong public perception of Russia as the ‘good big brother’ and strong economic leader, as confirmed by 11% of participants in a 2020 Globsec survey in 2020, which is the second highest support between CEE countries. Russia is perceived as an important strategic partner according to 42% of respondents. As some experts argue, this perception is misleadingly based on a historical legacy from times when Russia was a regional leader and counterpart to Western economies. However, in 2020 according to a public opinion survey, 60% of Slovak people still view Russia in a positive way, again the second highest positive perception in the Central European Region. As argued by the analyst Duleba: ‘Slovaks used to have their own vision of Russia due historical legacy and a priori expectations of positive relations’, especially due to their cultural and/or religious proximity and even common Slavic heritage, as confirmed by the 2020 Globsec survey.

Slovak–Russian Relations Today: Cyberattacks, Espionage Affair, Sputnik V Vaccine and Energy Security This positive attitude towards Russia based on the ‘image of big brother’ providing a helping hand is constantly endangered by different affairs, when Russia and its authorities are not respecting the sovereignty of other states. The cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns that have been identified by the Slovak authorities led to three Russian diplomats being expelled as personae non gratae in October 2020, after the Slovak Information Service published a report on such activities. The other example of failure in the Slovak–Russian relations was the Sputnik V vaccine, which became a political tool in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. Although not recognised by the EMA, prime minister Igor Matovič signed a contract to buy two million doses, much against the wishes of his coalition partners. This led to his replacement as head of government in March 2021. The Sputnik V vaccine arrived in Slovakia shortly thereafter and was used from June to August 2021, for approximately 10,500 people, before the rest of this delivery was repurchased by Russia at cost. Contemporary relations between Slovakia and Russia are following EU policy goals, although the Slovak Republic, along with other CEE countries, does not strongly support the building of Nord Stream 2. This will connect Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea region and thereby bypass the CEE transit region, with consequent negative implications especially for Slovak energy security. The Nord Stream 2 project is perceived as a practical implication of Russia’s ambition to impact European policies by using gas supplies.

Slovak–Russian Relations: A Challenging Big Brother Legacy

95

Recommendations The accession of Slovakia to the EU underlines democratic orientation and related values as well as respect of sovereignty in international relations. The previous ‘postCommunist legacy in the region, which constitutes the dependence and transit energy identities’ as presented by Russia today should therefore be considered as the past project. Contemporary relations should therefore be built in conformity with an EU approach which respects international law. Political declarations and concrete actions of national representatives should clearly respect not only obligations from their EU and NATO memberships, but also common values. Russia by its inappropriate attacks is aiming to destabilise and expand its influence. Lucia Mokrá is Associate Professor of International and European Law at Comenius University in Bratislava, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences. She is also a visiting professor at other universities in Europe and chairperson of the TEPSA board. Her research interests include human rights, external relations, institutional settings, and enforcement in international and European law. The Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences is an integral part of Comenius University in Bratislava. Academics and researchers provide expertise in different fields of social science for national decision-makers, running research, and popularisation projects in Slovakia and abroad. The faculty’s foreign professors, students from abroad, and European research projects give it a truly international feel. In the last decade, it has earned a reputation as one of the best social science faculties in Slovakia. The Institute is also a member of TEPSA.

Russians Are Welcomed in Slovenia: As Artists, Tourists and Investors Maja Bučar and Boštjan Udovič

Overall, Slovenia enjoys good relations with Russia and hence most Slovenians find it hard to understand why a problematic relationship exists between the European Union and the Russian Federation. However, it must be borne in mind that to date Slovenia has not faced any directly threatening issues with Russia, as is the case with many Central and Eastern European countries.

Historic Connections Initial contacts between today’s Slovenia and Russia can be traced back to the nineteenth century, as part of the Panslavic movement. These links became stronger after the First World War when Russians who had decided to emigrate due to the October Revolution received asylum in Slovenia. In 1917, Russian prisoners of war were building a new road through a high mountain pass at Vršič. A mid-winter avalanche caused many casualties amongst these road workers with a number being killed. As a monument to this accident, a Russian Chapel (Ruska kapelica) was built, which today stands as a symbol of friendship between Slovenians and Russians. Since Slovenia’s independence in 1991, the Russian Chapel has become an important meeting point for Slovenian and Russian politicians, with the memorial being visited by top Russian politicians, sometimes including President Putin, during the last weekend of July each year.

M. Bučar (*) · B. Udovič Centre for International Relations, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_24

97

98

M. Bučar and B. Udovič

Economic and Cultural Relations Form the Basis Not only because of the positive relations from the past is Russia perceived as good partner and friend. Russians are also important investors in the Slovenian economy. In 2019, their FDI stock amounted to 2% of all inward FDIs. By contrast, Slovenian outward FDI in Russia amounted to 6% of the country’s total outward FDI. The trade situation is similar, with exports from Slovenia to Russia amounting to between 3% and 4% of total export trade. Hence, Russia is an important trading partner for a number of major Slovenian corporations (pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, machinery, etc.). Russian tourists are welcome in Slovenia since they are known as extravagant and generous spenders. In addition, cultural cooperation between Slovenia and Russia is strong. This is reflected in the annual Ljubljana Summer Festival, traditionally hosting top-notch performers from Russia. For instance, in 2021 the Ljubljana Summer Festival was opened by the Mariinsky Theatre and Valery Gergiev. Furthermore, there are also monuments in Slovenia that illustrate the good relations that exist between the two countries. As well as the Russian Chapel on Vršič, there is a monument to the Red Army in Murska Sobota together with a monument to unknown soldiers at the Ljubljanske žale (Ljubljana cemetery). Also becoming popular is the Ruska dača (Russian dacha) now a cultural monument, where concerts and gatherings are organised. Although privately owned, this is also open to the public. All these monuments and events confirm that Slovenians largely perceive Russia and Russians as friends and not foes.

More Turbulent Political Attitudes However, in the political sphere the situation is different. Generally speaking, the more pro-USA centre-right parties claim that any left-wing parties in power always choose Russia over the USA. Sometimes this is supported by the visits of top-level political figures, either American or Russian depending on which party is in power, but in official terms Russia is not granted any beneficial or special status in Slovenian foreign policy. In the current official Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia on Foreign policy, adopted by a large majority in 2015, it is written that Slovenia will encourage “a long-term joint commitment to shared European values, ensuring respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all post-Soviet states”. The definition is vague, so it allows different activities to promote relations between Slovenia and Russia. That Russia is an important factor in Slovenian policy, regardless of domestic centreright, centre-left agenda, has been via facti also supported by the visit of the Slovenian foreign minister, Anže Logar, to Moscow in May 2021, not long before Slovenia’s presidency of the EU Council.

Russians Are Welcomed in Slovenia: As Artists, Tourists and Investors

99

Common Slavic Roots Slovenia has never understood Russia as being an enemy or foe, as stated earlier in this chapter, but as a kin-nation, with which Slovenians share some values (Slavic language, common culture, etc.). Accordingly, Slovenians may in some way still perceive Russians through a nineteenth-century romantic vision, where all Slavs should stand together against the brutal Germans and Latins. Such romanticism vanished early in the first half of the twentieth century, only to be re-established by Slovenians at the outset of the Cold War. At the time, the country had to choose between the USA and Russia. Following the split with Stalin in 1948, though, the then Yugoslavia (and within it Slovenia) chose the USA. However, but as soon as it was possible, following the route of history attention once more reverted back to Russia, where Slovenian goods were entering the market with less difficulty than they were in the West. Because Slovenia was never part of the USSR, the country avoided Soviet brutality and thus a Slovenian view of Russia remained somewhat idealised. Russia remained an important trade/economic partner after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, despite this politically implying support for the Milošević regime. Nowadays Russia is still seen by some as a warrior against American supremacy. Hence, one can conclude that particularly for the older generations of Slovenians, Russia is often romanticised and understood within a Cold War context, within which the aggressor was not so much Russia (Soviet Union) but the West, the USA in particular. The dividing line in the Slovenian psyche of being pro-Russian or inclined towards Russia is nowadays nothing more than a Cold War legacy. Older Slovenians are more pro-Russian, because they are anti-American (in some polls Slovenia is in seventh place as an anti-American country, for no logical reason!). Thus, some Slovenians are not pro-Russian, but perceive Russia as a friend since it opposes the USA’s hegemony. Slovenian–Russian relations are therefore in part determined by America and its politics/policies. What does this mean for Slovenian behaviour in regard to major issues, such as the Crimean annexation, human rights violations and so on? Not much. Slovenia officially adopted a position that Crimea should be part of Ukraine, but at the same time it avoids the word annexation. Years ago, when EU countries expelled Russian diplomats because of the Skripal poisoning, Slovenia did the opposite, with our ambassador being called home for consultations. However, maintaining good relations with Russia does not influence Slovenian votes in the EU, since Slovenia supports without question action being taken by the European Union against Russia.

Pragmatism Determines Policy All in all it could be concluded that relatively good relations with Russia are not based on ideology, but more on mutual pragmatism. As an EU member state, Slovenia has neither strongly opposed nor strongly supported Russia, but rather taken a neutral line, maintaining good economic relations as well as close cultural

100

M. Bučar and B. Udovič

ties, but at the same time not wanting to stand out as a pro-Russian in EU decisionmaking processes. Being a small country, this is in many ways an optimal policy for the moment. Maja Bučar is a professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana. In her research work she focuses on research, development, and innovation strategies and policies at the global, European, and national level as key determinants of national socio-economic development. She has participated in numerous international, European, regional (Central and Eastern Europe, Western Balkan), and national research and consultancy projects in the area of science and technology policy, national and regional innovation system analyses, as well as country assessment of implementation of development strategies. The Slovenian article in this publication is a result of the research programme “Slovenia and its Actors in International Relations and European Integrations (P5-0177)”. CIR conducts interdisciplinary research in the fields of international relations, international economics and international business, politics of international law, diplomacy, human rights, international organisations, and European integration. The Centre is a long-standing and active member of TEPSA as well as several other international networks. Boštjan Udovič is an associate professor in Diplomatic Studies at the University of Ljubljana. His research and teaching revolve around current issues in diplomatic studies and international political economy. He was a member of different national consultative bodies. As an external expert, he has been assisting the JRC of the European Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology, and several other governmental and non-governmental associations. Along with publishing more than fifty scientific articles, he is the (co-)author of four books in the field of diplomatic studies. The Slovenian article in this publication is a result of the research programme “Slovenia and its Actors in International Relations and European Integrations (P5-0177)”. CIR conducts interdisciplinary research in the fields of international relations; international economics and business; politics of international law; diplomacy; human rights; international organisations; and European integration. CIR is a long-standing and active member of TEPSA as well as several other international networks.

Spain’s Relationship with Russia: Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Ignacio Molina

Spain’s relationship with Russia is marked by distance. Madrid as a national capital is second furthest away from Moscow within Europe. This remote geographical reality in combination with the foreign policy of both countries over the last two centuries has given rise to important consequences. Spain is, for example, the only European country that has never been either an ally or an enemy of Russia ever since the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815. There is not even a legacy connected to the Iron Curtain years. Unlike the rest of Western Europe, which had maintained diplomatic relations with the USSR since the 1940s, Spain did not formally re-establish contact until 1977, during the country’s transition from Franco’s dictatorship to democracy. Paradoxically, the dictator’s hard anti-communist stance and Soviet Union’s policy at that time of welcoming thousands of Republicans (mostly children) in exile meant that no particular feelings of hostility existed among democratic forces. Furthermore, the range of nuclear-armed SS Missiles was barely enough to reach Spain, which consequently helped to reduce bilateral tensions in the Cold War’s final phase.

Economic Ties Accordingly, for better or worse, Spain’s relationship with post-Soviet Russia was founded on quite weak ties. The lack of shared political or social interests was also reflected in a continuing poorly developed economic dimension. For instance, in 2020, Spain was Russia’s 35th largest customer and 19th largest supplier, while Russia was Spain’s 26th largest market and 24th largest supplier. At EU level, despite being the fourth largest economy among the 27, Spain was Russia’s 11th largest supplier and tenth largest customer. The Spanish trade balance shows a traditional deficit due to the (not particularly high) purchase of hydrocarbons and I. Molina (*) Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_25

101

102

I. Molina

it is thus quite influenced by the fluctuation of oil and gas prices (-EUR 1.426 billion in 2019 and -EUR 698 million in 2020, respectively). The coverage rate was 58.97% in 2019 and 72.86% in 2020. In contrast to most other European countries whose gas comes mainly from Russia, Spain’s main gas supplier is Algeria with two closer and cheaper gas pipelines directly connecting the country with North Africa (Russian oil and gas imports normally account for less than 10% of the total energy imported by Spain). FDI figures are also modest. According to the latest available data, Russia is 36th in the ranking of countries where Spain invests, with a stock of just EUR 1.021 million and Russia is 41st in the ranking of investors in Spain, with a stock of only EUR 643 million.

The Perception of Russia Vladimir Putin is portrayed in the mainstream media, whether conservative or leftwing, as an aggressive tyrant. Among the public, this open hostility is tempered by a dominant disinterest, albeit evolving for the worse over time. The prevailing public perception of Russia was not particularly negative in the early 2000s when Spaniards responding to a poll rated the country similarly to the USA and clearly above Israel. In 2004 another survey found that 62% of respondents even said that Russia should join the EU and in 2006 Putin’s personal rating (4.1) was higher than Berlusconi’s (3.3) and George W. Bush’s (2.4). Since 2008 (war in Georgia) and especially 2014 (Crimea and Ukraine), trust in Russia has deteriorated sharply. An opinion poll after the annexation of Crimea concluded that Russia was rated at 3.8 (in contrast to China at 5.3, the USA at 6.0 and Germany at 6.2). However, in the most recent surveys, conducted in 2020, Putin scores better (3.3) than Trump (2.1). In addition, Spanish evaluation of Morocco and Venezuela is even worse, which also indicates where Spaniards identify their foreign concerns. According to the same survey, only 20% of Spaniards know that the EU’s relations with Russia are bad and the vast majority could not identify why sanctions had been imposed since 2014 (only 12% mentioned Ukraine when asked). Nevertheless, more than half of the respondents agreed that these sanctions should be maintained despite the wording of the questionnaire, which was: ‘following the EU sanctions, Russia decided to ban imports of agricultural products grown in Spain’. This apparent mismatch between the lack of knowledge about the sanctions and their support, regardless of the negative consequences for Spain, shows the great trust of Spanish citizens towards the EU and also the low actual impact of Russian counter-measures on Spanish farmers, tourism or real estate.

From Dis-Interest to Opposition? Spain’s position towards Russia within the EU has traditionally been influenced by this context of remote geography, distant history and a non-interdependent economy. Perhaps for this reason, Spanish diplomacy has sometimes tried to present itself as a

Spain’s Relationship with Russia: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?

103

facilitator of reconciliation with Russia. Even in the 2014 External Action Strategy it was proposed that measures be found ‘to promote the return of Russia, which should be NATO’s most important strategic partner, towards the principles that shape the architecture of European security’ and it was stated that ‘Spain has always been and is still party to a relationship which allows to exploit the enormous potential for mutual benefit since Russia has the capacity to contribute in a positive manner to solving many international problems’. Moreover, this official government document downplayed the seriousness of Crimea’s annexation as an ‘action that made it hard to truly realise the full potential of relations between two neighbours as important as Russia and the European Union’ adding that Madrid ‘inevitably understands and incorporates Russia’s special sensitivity which derives from diverse factors such as the strategic value that Ukraine has for Russia’. However, the growing perception since then that the Kremlin supports almost any political development that could destabilise the West (Brexit, Trump’s election, Europhobic candidacies, disinformation campaigns, etc.) and Russian aggressiveness in Ukraine, Belarus or domestically has in recent years reinforced a much less naive view of what Putin represents. Russia’s interference in the Catalan independence conflict -with a great deal of evidence linking Moscow to the most radical sector of Catalan nationalism around the former regional president Carles Puigdemont- has helped this process to take place more quickly than might have been expected. Despite, or perhaps because of, Russia’s involvement in the serious Catalan territorial crisis of 2017, Russia’s presence in Spain’s domestic politics is currently limited. Unlike the Eurosceptic populist right in other countries, the ‘Vox’ party is far removed from Russia. Vox MEPs have even stated that Putin is unreliable and does not respect human rights; hence, the EU must be firm and united, but it must also be remembered that Europe will need Russia for the future when Putin is no longer president. More support to Moscow comes from the Spanish radical left. ‘Izquierda Unida’ (a party associated with ‘Podemos’ which participates in the current left-wing coalition government with the socialists) has criticised NATO’s alleged expansionism and EU interference in Belarus. However, Pedro Sánchez’s foreign policy rests exclusively with the socialist party. Spain does not currently have a specific policy towards Russia, but what there is has been developed within the framework of the European Union and NATO (where, by the way, it is actively involved in air policing in the Baltics). The main recommendation is, therefore, to take this relationship more seriously within the Euro-Atlantic framework of strengthening security in Eastern Europe and help seek a balanced common Western position that combines condemnation of violations in international law and human rights with dialogue on topics such as climate or terrorism. The distance from Moscow to Madrid will still be 1000 km further than the distance between the Russian capital and Brussels, Paris or Rome; twice as far as Berlin or Vienna; and three times as far as Stockholm or Warsaw. Nevertheless, Spain is sufficiently strong enough as a Member State to play a more prominent role by using this distance to strengthen European unity rather than propose unlikely imaginative reconciliations. Interestingly, the 2021 version of the External Action Strategy no longer suggests trying to regain the official cooperation, but rather

104

I. Molina

strengthening ties with Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian civil society. This is the most promising way of improving direct contact and mutual understanding, thereby raising awareness among Spaniards. Ignacio Molina is Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute and a Lecturer at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the same university. He is the author of many publications, including books, chapters in comparative volumes, articles in academic journals, and policy papers. He has served as an external expert or consultant to several institutions. His areas of interest and expertise include the foreign and EU policy of Spain and Europeanisation of Spain’s politics and government. The Elcano Royal Institute is a Spanish think tank for international studies. It is based in Madrid and was created in 2001 as a private foundation. The goal is to foster the creation and exchange of ideas in a plural and independent environment, with a stable and multidisciplinary team of analysts and a wide-ranging network of associated experts. The Elcano Institute takes its name from the Basque navigator who completed the first world circumnavigation five centuries ago.

Swedish–Russian Relations: Distrust and Tensions Gunilla Herolf

Historically a string of wars, not unusual among neighbouring countries, has characterised relations between Sweden and Russia. However, peace has prevailed between the two since 1809, albeit never leading to a close relationship, unlike the situation with other neighbours. During Soviet times, relations were particularly strained. The repression of its own and other peoples was part of the reason, as was the arrest and disappearance in 1944 of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg while he was saving Jews in Budapest. Moreover, submarine incidents in the Swedish archipelago were a constant issue, as in 1981 when the Soviet U-137 ran aground close to a naval base.

Economic Relations Swedish trade with Russia is less than trade with many other European countries and has little political significance. In 2019 Swedish exports to Russia, which amounted to EUR 2.02 billion, consisted primarily of machinery, vehicles and pharmaceuticals. Imports of EUR 3.49 billion consist mainly of raw materials and above all crude oil, which in 2019 accounted for as much as 27% of Swedish oil imports. However, since Sweden buys its oil on the open market, it is not dependent on one seller. Moreover, much of the imported Russian crude oil is refined and then re-exported.

G. Herolf (*) Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_26

105

106

G. Herolf

Political Relations Following the end of the Cold War, relations improved with Russia participating in cooperation throughout the Baltic Sea Region. However, as the Russian behaviour has become increasingly aggressive, both vis-à-vis Sweden and over a wider geographic area, relations have deteriorated. The one incident that more than any other influenced Sweden’s view on Russia and Swedish threat perceptions was when Russian bomber planes in 2013, from positions just outside Swedish territory, made mock attacks towards Stockholm and southern Sweden. According to many this showed that Russia saw Sweden as a potential enemy. Large-scale military exercises in the vicinity initiated without prior notice, provocations against aircraft and ships as well as other hostile acts led the Parliamentary Defence Commission of 2017 to conclude that a Russian military attack against Sweden cannot be excluded. Aggression against Ukraine in 2014 reinforced this negative opinion of Russia. It was seen as an unacceptable violation of international law and hence Sweden was a strong proponent of continued sanctions until the Minsk agreements were met. The government sees Russian ambition being realised in attempts to control as much of the former Soviet Union as possible. Moreover, Russia is prepared to break international rules of law, agreements and established European principles to reach its goals. Based on this new situation, Swedish military forces are now undergoing considerable strengthening, focusing on territorial defence. Typical for the bad relations is that Russia has hinted that Sweden was responsible for the Skripal attacks, claiming that Sweden produced Novichok. The Swedish response to this attack was to expel a Russian diplomat, whereafter Moscow reciprocated similarly. After the Navalny attack, the Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOI) identified the poison as Novichok, which led to sanctions against a FOI director. Moreover, Russia has repeatedly threatened Sweden for being too close to NATO, stating that a Swedish NATO membership will have consequences. In spite of all this, as declared by Prime Minister Löfven, it is important not to heighten tension and therefore in issues of common interests Sweden and the EU should cooperate with Russia. A good example of fruitful cooperation, he stated, is that which takes place within the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS).

Public Perception In general terms Swedes are very negative towards present Russian policies. With 83% having an unfavourable opinion, Sweden is the most negative in a recent survey including 14 countries. Newspapers often report on Russia spreading fake news and ridiculing Swedish accusations of submarine intrusions and so on. No political party defends Russian activities or promotes closer cooperation with Russia and all see the need for strengthening Swedish defences, although the Left Party less strongly so.

Swedish–Russian Relations: Distrust and Tensions

107

Some people, though, have greater understanding for Russia and believe that EU sanctions are responsible for its increased nationalism. For a short while between 2017 and 2021 the very negative view of President Trump made criticism less focused on Russia.

Russia’s Effect on Sweden in the EU While Sweden has no trade dependence on Russia, it does see Nord Stream 2 as harmful for the EU in this regard and for preventing an EU energy union. An EU security policy would need to consider this worsened security situation in the Baltic Sea region. For Sweden the island of Gotland is particularly vulnerable, which is where Russia through Nord Stream 1 gained access to the Slite harbour. Such an extremely negative view of Russian policy makes any direct Russian influence on EU positions very unlikely. The same goes for domestic influence. However, it cannot be excluded from considerations that the persistent Russian flow of fake news may eventually weaken Sweden through diminished trust in authorities and democracy in general.

The Future In the short term, changes in this relationship are unlikely. Sweden will most probably continue its close cooperation with NATO, a major reason for Russian threats and provocations, but some areas of positive cooperation, such as the CBSS, may remain. In a post-Putin perspective, Sweden will be eager to start on a new and positive track.

Some Recommendations for the EU and for Sweden The EU needs to form a common and coherent policy towards Russia. This is difficult but also very much necessary. Sanctions must be kept in place for as long as the reasons for introducing them continue to exist. Any abandoning now would only serve as encouragement for Russia to continue its aggressive policy in Ukraine and elsewhere. Other tasks could be fulfilled both by the Union and its Member States. The EU and Sweden should, for example, seek suitable areas of common concern for cooperation with Russia such as the environment and arms control, or regional cooperation such as the CBSS. Furthermore, both the EU and Sweden should seek friendly contacts with the Russian people. Russia is part of the Eurovision Song Contest—why not build on this and extend contacts in music and culture for young people.

108

G. Herolf

Gunilla Herolf is Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA/UI) and Member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences (Vice-President 2010–2014). She was also previously Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The SIIA/UI is an independent institute for research, analysis, and information, founded in 1938 as well as being a member of TEPSA.

The Power of Attraction (Rather than Persuasion): A Brief Enquiry into Dutch-Russian Relations Hugo Klijn

Once Upon a Time. . . The Netherlands boasts long historical ties with Russia. Commercial links go back to medieval times, but it was especially during the long reign of Tsar Peter the Great (1682–1725), who established Russia as a European power, that relations intensified. This process was spurred by the visit of Peter and his retinue, or ‘Grand Embassy’, to the Dutch Republic in 1697, as part of a European tour to forge a coalition against the Ottomans and draw inspiration from modern societies. Peter invited Dutch scientists and shipwrights to Russia and Dutch Admirals would go on to command the Tsar’s naval forces in battles against the Swedes. Allegedly, Peter even wanted to introduce the Dutch language in schools. After the Napoleonic wars, ties between the House of Orange and the Romanovs were sealed by the marriage of the victorious Tsar Alexander I’s sister Anna Pavlovna to the future king William II. However, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and particularly the assassination of Nicholas II and his family were abhorred by the Dutch and financiers who had to that point been investing heavily in Russia’s growing economy were appalled when the Bolsheviks started defaulting on state bonds and declared shares in Russian companies as null and void. The Netherlands would later be among the last European countries to recognise the Soviet Union formally, with the exiled wartime government doing so only in 1942, when the Soviets were fighting Nazi Germany.

H. Klijn (*) Clingendael, The Hague, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_27

109

110

H. Klijn

The Cold War and Its Aftermath After the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, a détente document containing provisions about the protection of human rights, Dutch interests in the dissident movement within the Soviet Union gained traction. During the early 1980s, Moscow would launch a covert campaign to support the massive protest movement in the Netherlands against deployment of nuclear weapons as part of NATO’s response to the stationing of Soviet SS-20 missiles. When Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power and propagated his perestroika and glasnost agendas, his popularity ratings in the Netherlands trumped those of his American counterpart Ronald Reagan. Following the Soviet Union’s demise in 1991, the Netherlands reached out to the Russian Federation with a range of assistance programmes in the field of agriculture, water management, democracy building and cultural cooperation (in the latter framework a branch museum of the famous Hermitage in Saint Petersburg was opened in Amsterdam in 2009). At the same time, Dutch business expanded its trade and investment volumes.

‘Bizniz’ The latest International Trade Centre figures show that, after China, the Netherlands counts as Russia’s second export destination (predominantly mineral resources shipped into the Port of Rotterdam). For Dutch exports, Russia holds 13th position on the charts (primarily chemical products and capital goods). As far as foreign direct investment in Russia is concerned, the Bank of Russia and UNCTAD apply different calculation methods, but both rank the Netherlands as a top five source. Energy giant Royal Dutch Shell has been a long-time investor in projects such as Sakhalin-2 (oil and LNG production) but also in the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline between Russia and Germany that is scheduled to become operational in 2022.

Dual-Track Policies The combination of democratic concerns and economic interests has resulted in an overall pragmatic, two-pronged Dutch approach towards Russia, partly within the EU’s framework, on the one hand exerting pressure through targeted Ukraine-related sanctions and on the other trying to maintain channels of communication as well as looking for possibilities to cooperate, despite dire political circumstances. In practice, this has often boiled down to siding with other pragmatist member states such as Germany and France, while steering clear of the sometimes more vocal positions of some Eastern European countries.

The Power of Attraction (Rather than Persuasion): A Brief Enquiry. . .

111

MH17 and Public Opinion It goes without saying that the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 on 17 July 2014 over eastern Ukraine, when 196 Dutch nationals lost their lives, constituted a cardinal moment in relations with the Russian authorities who, against all odds, deny any involvement and continue to present spurious theories for the crash. Yet pending investigations the Dutch government manoeuvred cautiously and waited until 2018 to declare Russian liability. In 2020 it brought Russia before the European Court of Human Rights for its role in this tragedy, while a Dutch court is handling the criminal case against a number of Russian individuals. Recent opinion polls show that Dutch respondents’ perceptions of Russia are changing, in the sense that the spreading of false information and economic espionage are now deemed greater threats than the more traditional concerns about military conflict. At the same time there is an interest in cooperating on a number of issues: fighting climate change, developing anti-terrorism strategies and seeking ways of ‘stabilising Europe’. However, a significant number of respondents feel that they lack sufficient information about Russia and hence are eager to learn more.

The Future. . . Well. . . Lies Ahead of Us To a large extent, Russia’s behaviour is informed by recent historical perceptions and thus it seems that a post-Putin leadership (whenever that may come to pass) will not necessarily be all that different. Ultimately, domestic developments will probably have a greater impact on Russia’s future course than international agency. In terms of Western countries’ relationship with Moscow, the most likely scenario seems to be a ‘muddle through’ variant, provided that (inadvertent) escalations can be avoided. In the longer term, the ongoing geopolitical transition phase may lead to a new calibration of power balances and clear the way for better ties. But then again, it may not.

What Is to Be Done? All this being said, what would an advisable course for the Netherlands to manage relations with Russia look like? Obviously, the Hague should keep insisting on Russian cooperation in the MH17 case. Primarily in its capacity as a NATO member, the Netherlands should also promote meaningful dialogue on European security, arms control and risk reduction arrangements. In the framework of the EU, it should stay firm on sanctions, but at the same time offer the prospect of easing measures whenever certain conditions are met. On the other hand, the country should try to engage Russia in common interest themes such as climate change and international terrorism, as well as capitalising on relatively favourable ratings in Russian opinion polls by promoting society-tosociety contacts. Importantly, it should understand that Russian elites do not aspire

112

H. Klijn

to Western-style democracy. Meanwhile, the Netherlands (and the EU as a whole) is well advised to look after its own democratic institutions, lest the power of attraction it holds for interested Russian citizens diminish. [NB: this article was written well before Russia launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine in February 2022. It goes without saying that the ongoing war fundamentally changes Western-Russian relations, and the prospects for future cooperation will depend heavily on the outcome of this crisis.] Hugo Klijn studied contemporary history and works as a Dutch diplomat. He is currently seconded to the Clingendael Institute of International Relations in the Hague. He specialises in security policy and Eastern Europe. His foreign assignments include postings in Moscow, Belgrade, Brussels, and Vienna. He writes this chapter in a personal capacity. The Netherlands Institute of International Relations (“Clingendael”) is a think tank and diplomatic training institute situated in The Hague. Clingendael’s location—in a park with all the ministries at a short distance—is well chosen to support international exchange and facilitate interactions between practitioners, academia, and media.

Part II EU Neighbours

Russian Influence: Is Albania the Odd One Out? Romario Shehu and Besjana Kuçi

Diplomatic relations at embassy level between the Republic of Albania (then People’s Republic of Albania) and the Russian Federation (then Union of Socialist Soviet —USSR) were established for the first time in 1956, a year after Albania became a founding member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Settled times between the two countries lasted only 5 years, as in 1961 their diplomatic relations came to an end, albeit Albania maintained support for the Warsaw Pact, not formally withdrawing until 1968. Three decades later, in 1991, diplomatic relations between the two countries were reinstated, when pluralist Albania recognised the Russian Federation as rightful heir to the USSR. In broad terms, relations between the two countries have been kept at a basic level, with no exchange of top-level delegations between the two countries for a considerable number of years. Moreover, Albania has not ratified the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Russia. Since 2009, Albania has been a Member State of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a European Union (EU) candidate country from 2014 and a country where citizens trust NATO, the United Nations (UN) and the EU more than their domestic institutions. This staunch pro-Western attitude is overwhelmingly reflected by the politicians, thus making Albania’s official policy towards Russia almost entirely dictated by its straight alignment with the foreign policy of the main Western countries and organisations. This was manifested in 2018 when Albania joined the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United States and Canada in a coordinated response against Russia, following the “Skripal case”. More recently in 2020, Albania became one of six countries (Montenegro, Iceland, Norway, Ukraine and Georgia) that aligned themselves with the EU Council decision to extend sanctions against Russia over the annexation of Crimea. Being attentive to Russia’s activities in the country, the Assembly of the Republic of Albania adopted the resolution On Foreign Interference in Election Processes and R. Shehu (*) · B. Kuçi Institute for Democracy and Mediation, Tirana, Albania e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_28

115

116

R. Shehu and B. Kuçi

Disinformation in National Democratic Processes in 2019, which was focused particularly on Russia. Albania has also expelled three Russian diplomats over the last 4 years and more recently opened criminal investigations against Russian citizens for their alleged espionage during the US-led military exercise DefenderEurope 21 held in Albania during 2021. Additionally, USD 18.2 million of US Government (USG) assistance from 2018 to 2020, provided through the Countering Russian Influence Fund, was committed to improving the Albanian Ministry of Defence’s cyber defence capabilities.

Perceptions and Realities of Russian Influence Besides the Euro-Atlantic perspective, Albanians consider Russia to be an actor that is not sympathetic to their interests. Albania’s Security Barometer 2020 indicates that Russia is perceived by Albanians as the country with the most negative influence in Albania, with almost 80% of respondents perceiving Russia’s influence on Albania’s security as negative or very negative. Additionally, results from Balkan Barometer 2021 indicate similar negative trends even in terms of economic cooperation, as only 20% of Albanians believe their country should improve trade and investment with Russia compared to the Western Balkan (WB) regional average of 35%. Indeed, economic relations between Albania and Russia are at a very low level, with no Russian company currently operating in the country. Data from the Albanian Institute of Statistics indicate that Russian exports to Albania during the period 2018–2021 (measured by January of each year) have varied from 0.14% to 0.30% of total Albanian imports and Albania has not exported anything to Russia during the same period.1 Economic ties between the two countries have been consistently low and show no signs of improving, partly due to Albania’s decision to impose sanctions against Russia following the annexation of Crimea and the conflict with Ukraine. Moreover, in contrast to some European countries, Albania is not dependent on Russia for gas because of its natural resources, albeit the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) transports natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe via the country. Regardless of overall poor relations, Russia has featured in Albania not only by way of social, cultural and tourism exchanges, but also provision of education scholarships and occasional investment in media, such as the Albanian section in Russia Today. Should Russia ever display increased geopolitical interest in Albania, there is considerable room to exploit local vulnerabilities such as the unconsolidated democracy and fragile institutions as well as the country’s unstable economic development.

1

The only exception is January 2020, when Albania exported ALL six million (Albanian lek) to Russia, out of the total ALL 23.012 million Albanian exports in that month.

Russian Influence: Is Albania the Odd One Out?

117

Conclusions In the post-communist period, Albania’s foreign policy has been explicitly aligned with the United States and the EU. Regardless of Russia’s soft diplomacy in Albania, there are no viable indications of stronger ties developing between the two countries in the future, as Russia is unable to offer Albania an alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration. Albania’s EU narrative and framework provide the impetus for strengthening the rule of law, economic growth and the right push for deep reforms in the country. However, slow-paced enlargement leaves room for potential foreign influences that might disrupt the consolidation of democracy in the country. Accordingly, as this chapter has shown, it is crucial that the EU remains invested in Albania, thus also responding to Albanian citizens’ expectations and aspirations. Romario Shehu is a project coordinator and researcher focusing on security-related issues. His research centres on radicalisation and violent extremism, but he also works on topics related to organised crime and building community resilience. Mr. Shehu holds an MSc in International Relations from the University of Tirana and a BA degree in Political Science and International Relations from Epoka University. IDM is an independent think tank established in Tirana in 1999, working on good governance, security sector reform, civil society development, and EU integration. Besjana Kuçi works as a project coordinator and researcher at the IDM. Ms. Kuçi holds an MSc in Political Theory and a BA degree in Political Science from the University of Tirana. Over the last five years, Ms. Kuçi has successfully managed projects on police integrity, strengthening of civil society, and public sector approach to anti-corruption. Ms. Kuçi’s areas of interest include public institutions transparency and anti-corruption policies. She has extensive experience in youth training on civic engagement activities through online platforms. She is a member of the Swedish Institute Alumni Network. IDM is an independent think tank established in Tirana in 1999, working on good governance, security sector reform, civil society development, and EU integration.

Russia Vs The West: Global Competition in the Local Setting of Bosnia and Herzegovina Vedran Džihić

During yet another deep political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Croatian minister of foreign affairs, Vesna Pusić, published an article in a November 2021 edition of Foreign Policy entitled ‘What Russia really wants in the Balkans’. Her answer is straightforward: ‘The Kremlin is destabilizing Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuit of broader strategic goals’. This finding became more than obvious in the autumn and winter of 2021 when Milorad Dodik, the Serb member of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tripartite presidency and leader of the governing SNSD party in the Republika Srpska, has doubled down on his threats to break up Bosnia, announcing many pieces of legislation that he envisages will be needed to withdraw Republika Srpska from Bosnia’s central government and form its own parallel institutions. From the very beginning of this newest political crisis in Bosnia, Russia has been lending Dodik its full support, expressing a readiness for open opposition of Western policies in the region. The publicly visible showdown came at a recent meeting of the United Nations Security Council. The EU and the USA wanted to renew the mandate of the military mission in Bosnia, yet Russia has been threatening the nonrenewal of the EUFOR mission asking for explicit concessions by removing from Bosnia any international executive presence, most notably the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and its new German leader Christian Schmidt. Whilst a compromise was eventually reached, Russia did manage to make extension of EUFOR’s mandate conditional on removal of references to the high representative from the annual resolution on Bosnia before the Security Council. Many experts interpreted this step not only as a sign of the West’s weakness but also as a point scored for Russia, hence Dodik, in their strategy to weaken and ultimately render the OHR institutions irrelevant prior to shutting them down altogether.

V. Džihić (*) Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_29

119

120

V. Džihić

Russia Against the Western Consensus in Bosnia and Herzegovina These recent events show that Russia is no longer ready to follow the Western consensus when it comes to Bosnia, including EU enlargement and the general orientation towards liberal democracy. Following the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 and during the 2000s, Russia was a comparatively weak international power. Accordingly, the West, headed by the USA and the EU, was able to establish itself as the dominant factor in Bosnian politics. At this time, the process of EU enlargement was underway, with certain improvements in terms of democracy and functionality of the state being achieved. However, the last 10–15 years have seen Bosnia stagnating in terms of Europeanisation efforts and effectively backsliding in terms of the rule of law as well as the functionality of democracy and institutions. In parallel, Russia has regained part of its previous geopolitical power status and under Putin has not only turned away from liberal democracy, but also been transformed into a full-fledged autocracy, increasingly able to exercise influence on other parts of the world. The Western Balkans is one such region where Russia has increased its economic and political investments, but also managed to combine ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power to strengthen its influence. In terms of its economic influence, Russia made larger strategic investments in the energy sector (oil and gas) within the Republika Srpska. In general, Russian economic and infrastructural investments are lower than those of the EU and even smaller than investments from individual states. In terms of FDIs, Russia invested between EUR 450 million and EUR 500 million between 2009 and 2015, only to reduce its investments to EUR 400 million in 2019 and further to EUR 300 million in 2020. Among the most significant investors, Russia has committed less than Austria, Croatia, Serbia, Germany, Slovenia and Great Britain taken individually. However, Russian presence is dispersed unequally in the country’s two entities, with the bulk of investments and support flowing to Republika Srpska.

Divergent Public Perceptions of Russia The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are very much divided in their assessment and perception of Russia’s role in the country. Whilst in Republika Srpska the media scene that is close to the governing SNSD underlines the intricate relationship of Serbs to Russia and portrays Putin in a positive way, the media in the Federation BiH are far more critical. In the part of Bosnia mainly populated by Bosniaks, Russian interference in Bosnian internal affairs is viewed very negatively and moreover Russia is regarded as a direct ally of the Serbs, particularly Milorad Dodik and his clique. The country’s deep ethnic polarisation that characterises almost all spheres of political and social life in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also replicated in public perceptions and stances towards Russia. The population in the Republika Srpska holds similar views to those present in Serbia. That also became obvious during the COVID-19 pandemic. At the outset when the EU was rather slow in reacting to the crisis, Russia together with China managed to present themselves as reliable partners

Russia Vs The West: Global Competition in the Local Setting of Bosnia. . .

121

and helping hands for Serbia and the Republika Srpska. Supplies of the Sputnik V vaccine were accompanied by an intensive PR campaign praising Russia and Putin. Despite the levels of economic and financial support from the EU by far exceeding that from Russia and China, public perceptions tell a different story. In the recent Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group’s (BiEPAG) survey from autumn 2021, 51% of Serbs in Serbia regard Russia as having been the country that delivered most help. When it comes to the country that is expected to provide most support for Serbia in future, trust in Russia with 56% is very high. Another significant finding is that in Serbia Putin is by far regarded as the most positive and popular political leader (66%). In Bosnia and Herzegovina overall 35% of respondents claimed the same. Given that sympathies for Putin among the countries’ majority population, Bosniaks, are extremely low, we can conclude that that Putin’s popularity in Republika Srpska must be enormous. These returns together with investments from Russia in building up and maintaining cultural as well as religious ties to all Serbs in the region as well as using its own media outlets (such as Sputnik) all serve to demonstrate that Russian ‘soft power’ is indeed strong.

An Emerging Geopolitical Marketplace What we see in Bosnia and in the wider region of the Western Balkans is an emergence of a new geopolitical marketplace, where besides formerly dominant actors such as the EU and the USA, Russia, China, Turkey as well as Arab states are increasingly becoming involved. This has become even more obvious with the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Collateral damage from the geopolitically divided world on smaller and more fragile nations and states such as Bosnia is becoming increasingly obvious. The showdown at the Security Council in late 2021 offers a worrying outlook for the times ahead. What we witness today is on one side a global competition between the liberal democratic West with various internal dilemmas and challenges against on the other side new authoritarian competitors such as Russia and China. This increasingly fierce competition has its trickle-down and spoiler effects on previous arrangements and power constellations in specific regions of the world, as exemplified by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia simply wants to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from joining NATO and the EU at any price. Putin also aims at discrediting Western liberal democracy and exploiting its weaknesses in semi-peripheral regions of Europe where the EU’s appeal has been significantly reduced over the last couple of years. The rise of EU scepticism in Serbia and also the Republika Srpska in Bosnia has of late been significant. Furthermore, Russia relies on the dysfunctionality and lack of coordination displayed by the EU and to an extent the USA in regions such as the Western Balkans. Finally, Russia also relies heavily on the partnership with Serbia, which according to all independent studies has developed into an autocracy with strong man Aleksandar Vučić, the Serbian president, at its top. Vučić’s visit to Putin in late November 2021 and Dodik’s visit a week or so later send strong signals to the USA and the EU that Russia will be standing close to its regional allies in the Balkans and continue protecting its

122

V. Džihić

interests more aggressively than at any time over the last three decades. Following the war in Ukraine Serbia is pressured by the West to align its foreign policy with the EU and introduce sanctions against Russia, which Serbia so far (May 2022) refused to do. Given these circumstances, it is up to the USA and the EU to show renewed strong commitment to the region, embrace fully the responsibility that they have for Bosnia emerging from the Dayton Accords along with EU enlargement and finally offensively argue for deepening and strengthening the EU and also NATO integration of Bosnia. Such a renewed approach would need to include further action in Bosnia and Herzegovina to stop the increasingly secessionist rhetoric of Milorad Dodik including potential stronger economic and political sanctions against Dodik and his cronies. It is only by counteracting Russia and Dodik’s campaign against the OHR that the West can regain ground in Bosnia. By further strengthening Military presence of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) the West would send a strong message to Putin and Russia that it stands behind its partners and will strengthen its support to a unified, multi-ethnic, functional and democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course, this includes offering a concrete vision for the future of the country within the EU and NATO. Vedran Džihić is Senior Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP), Co-Director of the Centre for Advanced Studies, South East Europe, and Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Political Sciences, University of Vienna. He is a non-resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations (SAIS), John Hopkins University, Washington DC. Dzihic is the author of 4 monographs and editor/co-editor of 15 edited volumes/books. He is also the author of numerous book chapters and scholarly articles. OIIP is a Think Tank founded in 1979 and committed to fundamental research in the field of international politics. It is Austria’s leading institute on international politics at the juncture between academic and policy-oriented research.

Caught in Between: Georgia’s European Aspirations Under Russian Influence Irakli Sirbiladze and Elene Panchulidze

Historical, Political and Economic Relations with Russia Georgian-Russian relations have historically been hierarchic due both to evident differences in state capabilities and Russia’s expansionist foreign policy aimed at subjecting smaller neighbours to its power. Considering Georgia as part of its privileged interest, Russia disregards Georgia’s sovereign right to determine its own foreign policy path. Contemporary Georgian-Russian relations start with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which allowed Georgia to regain the independence that it lost to the Soviet Red Army in 1921. Political relations had been relatively stable after Georgia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993, only to deteriorate as the country sought to increase its ties with the USA, NATO and the European Union. The Rose Revolution in 2003 further worsened relations as Russia deemed colour revolutions as a threat to its national interests. Moreover, in this way Georgia made it clearer that its Western integration aspirations constituted an irreversible policy path. The two countries’ diverging interests led to the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, which registered a new low in relations with Georgia cutting diplomatic ties and leaving the CIS, not only in protest at Russia’s military aggression but also to recognise the statehood of Georgia’s breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The experience and consequences of the 2008 war continue to render Georgian-Russian political relations irreparable. Although in 2012 Georgia’s new government initiated a partial reset in its links with Russia, there have been no significant breakthroughs in political terms. However, slight progress in economic and cultural dealings has been made, albeit Georgia continues to see Russia as a threat to its sovereignty, territorial integrity and Western aspirations.

I. Sirbiladze (*) · E. Panchulidze PMC Research Center, Tbilisi, Georgia e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_30

123

124

I. Sirbiladze and E. Panchulidze

While economic relations are certainly affected by political and security developments, they have remained significant except for the period from 2006 to 2012 when Russia imposed energy and trade sanctions. Although Georgia has now considerably diminished its dependence on Russian energy resources, its economy still relies heavily on Russia mainly through foreign trade, remittances and tourism. Since 2014, Russia has been Georgia’s third-largest trading partner, second-largest export market and a significant source of imports.

Public Perception and Media Coverage of Russia in Georgia Following its military aggression in 2008, public perception of Russia as a threat to Georgia’s national security has been gradually reinforced. Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence and its formal attempts to integrate breakaway regions into its economic and security structures, coupled with the so-called borderisation practices, have further strengthened anti-Russian sentiments among the Georgian public. Public opinion polls demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of Georgians consider Russia as an ultimate political and economic threat. Although some Georgians are in favour of continuing relations with the Russian Federation, Russian interference and openly pro-Russian politics are predominantly perceived in a negative light by the general public. This was amply exhibited by the anti-occupation protests in Tbilisi during 2019, triggered by a Russian MP’s visit to the Georgian Parliament. The Georgian media landscape is characterised by plain political parallelism, in other words ties between the media and political actors. Yet, reports about Russia mostly mirror widespread public attitudes. While the tone is generally similar, there are differences in terms of coverage between government-backed and pro-opposition media channels. Although limited in number, some pro-Russian media channels cover Georgia-Russia relations in a positive light, often spreading anti-Western disinformation narratives.

Georgia-Russia Relations Impacting Georgia-EU Relations In view of the two countries sharing an almost 900 km border, Russia regards Georgia as being part of its sphere of influence. Georgia’s sovereign aspirations for integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures, especially the prospect of NATO presence near its border, fuel Russia’s coercive policy towards Georgia. Georgian-EU relations have been evolving since 1996, with a breakthrough coming in 2009 as the EU initiated its Eastern Partnership programme. The deterioration in relations with Russia further intensified Georgia’s EU integration efforts. Along with Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia signed an Association Agreement (including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area) in 2014 and since 2017 Georgians have also been able to enjoy visa-free travel.

Caught in Between: Georgia’s European Aspirations Under Russian Influence

125

Under the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, Georgia is committed to converging with the EU’s foreign and security policies, including common security and defence. By 2020, Georgia’s alignment rate with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy had reached 62%; furthermore, Georgia continues its participation in the EU-led civil and military crises management operations. Meanwhile, the EU condemns Russia’s coercive policy towards Georgia, openly supporting the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU is increasingly investing into the conflict resolution process as co-chair of the Geneva International Discussions and through the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and civilian monitoring mission to Georgia. Yet, Russia remains an important factor causing divergences between Member States and disencouraging the Union from enthusiastically responding to Georgia’s EU membership aspirations.

Prospects of Georgia-Russia Relations and the EU’s Role Structural factors are constraining any prospects of amicable relations between Russia and Georgia in the short and medium terms. On the one hand, Russia continues to oppose Georgia’s pro-Western foreign policy, maintains a military presence in Georgian territories and recognises these territories as independent states, while on the other, Georgia extends its efforts to join Western political, security and economic institutions. Although Georgian-Russian economic and cultural relations have continued to improve since 2012, political-security relations remain contested. In recent years, Russia has invested heavily to strengthen its influence in Georgia. The military presence is strategically reinforced by sustained disinformation efforts as well as pro-Russian political and civil society actors. Openly pro-Russian politics attract less support in Georgia today, but nevertheless the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia Party with its Russian affiliations has secured mandates in the country’s legislative body at the last two parliamentary elections. While the influence of pro-Russian actors on the country’s position at EU level is relatively limited, their efforts to undermine Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration persist. While political elites in Russia continue to shape the country’s foreign policy direction, any future domestic developments in Russia are unlikely to change Russia’s long-term aim to block Georgia’s NATO membership and generally weaken its increasing ties with Western institutions, including the European Union. To this end, the EU and Georgia should engage with Russia to ensure it remains committed to the rules-based international order, particularly in refraining from the use and threat of force and respecting the sovereign choices of its smaller neighbours, including Georgia. In response to security challenges stemming from the existing conflict with Russia, the EU should invest more in strengthening Georgia’s capacity to respond to security threats, including hybrid methods. Furthermore, Georgia should strengthen state and societal resilience to Russian interference while at the same time increasing convergence with the EU in foreign and security policies that would enhance stability both in Georgia and Europe more generally.

126

I. Sirbiladze and E. Panchulidze

Irakli Sirbiladze is Affiliated Researcher at the PMC Research Center and holds an MA degree in International Relations from Queen Mary University of London. He has published on Georgian foreign policy with a focus on Georgian-Russian, Georgian-Western, and Georgian-China relations as well as on the issues of disinformation and propaganda. His broader research interests include sovereignty and self-determination norms and the theory of hegemony. Founded in 2010, the PMC Research Centre undertakes studies in the fields of economics, politics, energy, good governance, and social security. By combining global and local expertise, the Centre elaborates research-based policy options focused on economic development and accountable and transparent democratic governance. Through international cooperation, research, and advocacy activities, PMC brings together representatives of academia, CSOs, government, and industry. The Centre is also a member of TEPSA. Elene Panchulidze is Affiliated Researcher at the PMC Research Center and an Affiliated Policy Analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP). She holds an MA degree in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies from the College of Europe (Bruges), where she has worked as Academic Assistant. Her main research interests include European Integration, Eastern Partnership, EU democracy support, and peace mediation policies. Founded in 2010, the PMC Research Centre undertakes studies in the fields of economics, politics, energy, good governance, and social security. By combining global and local expertise, the Centre elaborates research-based policy options focused on economic development and accountable and transparent democratic governance. Through international cooperation, research, and advocacy activities, PMC brings together representatives of academia, CSOs, government, and industry. The Centre is also a member of TEPSA.

Icelandic-Russian Relations: Trade Determined by the EU Baldur Thorhallsson

Historical Trade Relations Iceland has a solid trade relationship with Russia in spite of some current confrontations. In the period from 1952 to 1956, the Soviet Union provided Iceland with a vital trade link during a landing ban on Icelandic fish in British ports during the Proto Cod War, thereby saving Icelanders from economic hardship. Later in the 1950s, the USSR market became Iceland’s most important export outlet for goods, providing the country with a market share of 18.2%. During the Cold War, trade with the Soviet Union remained relatively stable, but then exports to Russia collapsed in the early 1990s. In the first half of 2010, exporting to Russia recovered and increased substantially. By 2014, export of marine products to Russia accounted for around 10% of all marine exports by value. Diplomatic relations between Iceland and the Soviet Union were established in 1943. The Icelandic Communist Party, later labelled the Socialist party, was one of the strongest Communist/Socialist Parties in Western Europe and kept close ties with the Kremlin until the 1960s. Considerable cultural ties also existed between the countries, with the Cultural Association of Iceland and Russia (MÍR) being the most important body through which contact was maintained. In the wake of Iceland’s economic collapse in October 2008, a Russian bailout was considered when traditional allies were not willing to provide the country with sufficient assistance to deal with the economic crisis. Indeed, an IMF rescue package was being blocked due to the so-called Icesave dispute. Some sources indicate that negotiations with Russia had reached an advanced stage, while others point to Iceland’s experience in playing the ‘Russian card’. Whatever the situation might have been, in reality the loan never materialised.

B. Thorhallsson (*) Institute of International Affairs, Reykjavík, Iceland e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_31

127

128

B. Thorhallsson

Arctic and Regional Collaboration Iceland’s closest cooperation with Russia takes place within various regional organisations. Conflicts regarding the illegal annexation of Crimea and any resulting EU(EEA)/US sanctions against Russia and subsequent Russian countersanctions have not influenced the relationship between Iceland and Russia in the Arctic Council. The Icelandic government is hopeful that the current Russian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council will create a platform for further business opportunities to develop, particularly within the sector of geothermal energy. During Iceland’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2019–2021), it offered to host an Arctic Summit, which would incorporate talks on security aspects in the region, as the Finnish Chairmanship had done before. The Russian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council has continued to push for an Arctic Summit, but regional security talks have remained sensitive due to Russia’s strained relationship with Western states. Iceland has been particularly active in the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), whose focus is to maintain regional identity, so as to foster sustainability and prosperity in a safe and secure region. Iceland also works with Russia within the Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), whose objective is to foster sustainable development. Moreover, Iceland is a member of the Northern Dimension, which is a joint venture involving Iceland, Russia, the EU and Norway. Its policy aim is to encourage practical cooperation between the partners via its four thematic partnerships, namely, environment, transport and logistics, culture as well as public health and social well-being.

Confrontations Iceland did not hesitate to take part in the sanctions against Russia in 2014. Originally, Russia did not include Iceland on its list of countries facing countersanctions. In 2015 when Russia decided to place Iceland on the list, Iceland re-evaluated its policy following intensive pressure from the hard-hit fishing industry, the most powerful lobby in the country. However, Iceland gave in to pressure from the USA and continued to be part of the Western pack. Due to the sanctions, Icelandic exports to Russia are now only approximately 0.5% of Iceland’s total exports. When it comes to foreign direct investment (FDI) between Iceland and Russia, investment is minimal. Iceland takes part in most of its allies’ statements regarding worries about human rights and democracy in Russia, along with increased Russian military activity within the Arctic. This increased Russian presence in the region has played a role in restoring US interest in Iceland, due to Washington’s interest in the Arctic. Iceland would thus have a role to play as a US ally if the USA decided to increase its military activities in the region. Russian posture around Iceland has consisted mainly of submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and anti-submarine patrol aircraft. Nevertheless, bilateral relations between Iceland and Russia have improved of late. For instance, the Russia-Iceland Economic Council (RUIS) was created in

Icelandic-Russian Relations: Trade Determined by the EU

129

2019, with over 40 Icelandic companies expressing interest in participating. Mutual national parliamentary visits have also increased over the last few years. Equally, Russian tourist numbers have also been on the rise in Iceland, since a direct flight was established between Reykjavík and Moscow in 2018.

Public Perception Media coverage on Russia in Iceland mainly revolves around international politics, security and human rights issues. Most recently, coverage on the annexation of Crimea has slowly started to fade, although one can occasionally find articles about the topic. A recently published poll on Icelander’s views on international cooperation shows that the Icelandic public perceives there to be only a low level of threat from increased tensions with Russia. In fact, Russia is perceived as less of a threat to Iceland than the USA, where 25% of respondents consider growing US influence to be a threat, albeit only 12% believe that increased tensions with Russia pose a threat to Iceland. Instead, just under 60% of the Icelandic public regards economic relations with Russia to be of more importance than taking a hard political stance against Russian authorities, for which merely 16.5% of respondents were in favour. There have been no publicly known incidents of Russia attempting to interfere and influence Icelandic domestic politics.

Recommendations Firstly, Iceland’s alignment with EU foreign policy is determined in political dialogue as provided for under the EEA Agreement. That said, Iceland is most often notified of EU foreign policy statements without any previous political dialogue regarding the policy. Accordingly, Iceland needs to set up proper channels of political dialogue on foreign affairs with the EU in order to have a voice and opportunities to shape the statements/policies that will determine its relations with important trade partners, such as Russia. Secondly, Iceland needs to ensure that the tension between its Western allies and Russia will not affect work in the Arctic Council and other regional organisations. It needs to emphasise this policy in its dialogue with the EU. Thirdly, Iceland must step up its efforts to prevent militarisation of the Arctic and align itself with likeminded states. Iceland can use its voice in the Arctic Council, the Nordic Council and NATO to remind its Western allies of this policy.

130

B. Thorhallsson

Baldur Thorhallsson is Professor of Political Science as well as Programme and Research Director at the Centre for Small State Studies, the University of Iceland. His research focuses primarily on small state studies, European integration, and Iceland’s foreign policy. The Institute of International Affairs (IIA) is a research, teaching, and service institute in the field of international relations and European integration at the University of Iceland. IIA is also a member of TEPSA.

(Un)Shielded: Russia’s Influence in the Western Balkans Through the KosovoSerbia Open Dispute Donika Emini

Russia in the Western Balkans De-Constructed The Western Balkan region has long been a ‘chessboard’ for geopolitical games between Russia and the West. A prolonged EU membership process for the region and current enlargement fatigue provide a unique opportunity for Russia to strengthen its position in the region still further, thereby undermining EU and NATO roles. As such, the Western Balkans remains a vulnerable region on the periphery of Europe where Russia can extend its influence, strengthen alliances with specific countries, gain supporters and maximise its leverage, even to the point of competing with the West. While Russian economic investment cannot compete with EU investments and funds dedicated to the region, Russian propaganda media outlets in some countries (for instance, Serbia) portray the EU as weak, inefficient and politically unable to deliver in the Western Balkans. This propaganda campaign has been highly effective due to the EU’s inability to be more vocal in its promotion of assistance provided to the Western Balkans. Data shows that the economic presence of Russia is more prominent in Montenegro where Russian foreign direct investment (FDI) forms 30% of the country’s GDP, followed by Serbia with 10%, Bosnia and Herzegovina with 9.8% and North Macedonia with 1%. In Kosovo, this presence is barely evident due to Russia’s stance towards the country’s independence. The sectors in which Russia’s presence is more pronounced are energy, gas, oil and the metal industry. Russia’s economic presence in the Western Balkans has decreased because of the economic recession and international sanctions over the annexation of Crimea. However, its political presence has increased due to its solid cooperation with Western Balkan autocrats.

D. Emini (*) University of Westminster and CiviKos Platform, London, UK # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_32

131

132

D. Emini

(Un)Shielded: How Does Russia Influence Kosovo? Among all countries in the Western Balkans, Kosovo is perceived as shielded from Russian influence. This perception derives from the fact that Kosovo has traditionally been excluded from any alliances that Russia has developed with other Western Balkan countries. This lack of diplomatic recognition by Russia means that no conducive environment exists within which Kosovo can develop communication and bilateral cooperation with Russia. However, this does not guarantee the accuracy of any assumption that Kosovo is shielded from Russian influence. In October 2021, the President of Kosovo has ordered the expulsion of two Russian diplomats for supposedly ‘endangering national security’. Furthermore, she accused Russia of trying to destabilise the region. Building alliances with local corrupt political leaders—rising autocrats—is one of the main Russian instruments being used to extend its regional influence. In this regard, Serbia is recognised as one of Russia’s closest allies in the Western Balkans. Aligning with Serbia in not recognising Kosovo provides an opportunity for Russia not only to maintain instability in the region, but also confront and challenge the West directly. With Montenegro and North Macedonia joining NATO, the operational space for Russia has gradually been decreasing. Thus, Russia has viewed Kosovo and Serbia through the prism of its complicated relations with the West. As such, the ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia not only represents the biggest opportunity for increased Russian meddling with the West, but it also increases the potential for instability which will positively contribute to the overall Russian agenda in the Western Balkans. The enlargement status quo and current instability have created a conducive environment within which Russia can strengthen its position in the Western Balkans. Russia has been utilising and exploiting the Kosovo dispute with Serbia as a weakness, thus engaging proactively in preventing EU and NATO enlargement.

The Kosovo–Serbia Dialogue: A Favourable Environment for Russian Meddling The open issue between Kosovo and Serbia has turned the region into a fertile ground for instability and a geopolitical arena where the clashes between the EU, and the U.S., and Russia come to play. The issue of Kosovo has been used strategically by Russia to create international pressure on the EU as facilitator of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, and the U.S. being the main supporter of Kosovo’s independence but also of the EU led Dialogue. Russia’s destructive role has provided Serbia with solid leverage over the EU as it is widely used as a tool for political pressure towards the EU. The open issue between Kosovo and Serbia has created not only gaps for extended Russian influence but also obstacles in the EU integration process for Kosovo and Serbia by directly obstructing the democratisation and reform process as part of the EU membership conditionality.

(Un)Shielded: Russia’s Influence in the Western Balkans Through. . .

133

By backing Serbia in relation to Kosovo, Russia represents one of the biggest political challenges in the international arena for Kosovo. Russia’s role in international politics, given its permanent position and veto power in the UN Security Council, continues to play a detrimental role in Kosovo’s positioning in the international arena, especially UN membership. On the other hand, Putin has continuously used the NATO military intervention in Former Yugoslavia (1999) to justify its invasion of Ukraine. While Russia uses the Kosovo-Serbia dispute to gain access to the Western Balkans and meddle with the West, Serbia utilises Russia to block Kosovo in the international arena (the case of Interpol in which Serbia has been actively supported by Russia in joining forces against Kosovo’s membership and the de-recognition campaign against Kosovo). Conversely, Russia is being used by Serbia to leverage the EU and as a bargaining chip in the EU integration process. Keeping close ties with the Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić, offered unique opportunities for Russia to extend its influence in Kosovo through the Lista Srpska, a Serbian party part of the Government of Kosovo. Having access to the most security vulnerable part of Kosovo, its northern part inhabited by the Serbian community, Russia has managed to penetrate the society deeply through solid cooperation with far-right parties, which were already established due to tense inter-ethnic relations. Russia has further increased its popularity among local Serbs using its propaganda machine by producing news in Serbian through tabloids. This has been effectively done through disinformation, fake news and generating panic among population fearing yet another crisis as well as fear of instability. Russia has often shown support to the Serbian army and gendarmerie in many isolated incidents in the northern part of Kosovo. An incident over the car plates’ agreement between Kosovo and Serbia has sparked ethnic-related incidents in the northern part of Kosovo, the latest taking place in September 2021. This issue had been regulated in 2011 with an agreement signed in the framework of the Brussels Dialogue. However, Kosovo began applying new reciprocal rules on vehicles with Serbian licence plates entering the country in not accepting car registration plates issued by Serbia and parallel Serbian institutions in Kosovo. The escalation of this situation mobilised Serbian gendarmerie and military forces. Furthermore, the Russian Ambassador in Serbia visited the border between Kosovo and Serbia where the tensions escalated, sending messages that Russia would back Serbia should there be military intervention in Kosovo. Additionally, three Russian diplomats in Kosovo have been dismissed by the President of Kosovo following the event in the northern part of Kosovo. Hostility of Russia is not new for Kosovar citizens; the hostile approach of Russia has been reflected in citizens’ perceptions from 2018 in which around 80.4% perceived Russia as a very hostile country towards Kosovo. Another very sensitive issue featuring in Russia’s pro-Serbia activities is the Orthodox Church. Fear is largely being generated over dangers related to Orthodox Monasteries in Kosovo not being preserved and by offering unequivocal diplomatic support for Serbia in its mission and campaign to prevent Kosovo from being granted UNESCO membership.

134

D. Emini

Conclusions and Recommendations The assumption that Kosovo is being shielded from Russian influence is incorrect. While direct communication and cooperation between political elites in Kosovo and Russia do not take place and Kosovo has rejected Russian COVID-19 vaccines, the indirect influence of Russia through Serbia has a detrimental impact on the country’s external and internal functioning. While the EU continues to produce limited results in the region with regard not only to enlargement but also peacebuilding concerning Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, Russia will continue to enhance its status and gradually position itself as one of the key regional players. This will turn the region into a geopolitical arena in which the clashes of the titans—the EU, USA and Russia—will take place, thereby bringing about further destabilisation and further jeopardising the democratisation process which is already very fragile. The Western Balkans will remain an important area in Russia’s geostrategic interests. The region’s distant EU integration perspective and instability deriving from unsolved bilateral disputes provide a unique opportunity for Russia to continue its damaging presence in the Western Balkans. As such the following steps should be undertaken to start diminishing Russia’s regional role: The Western Balkans EU enlargement process should be re-energised and the current fatigue should be overcome by taking proactive steps from both the EU and Western Balkans side. As such, accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia should be opened and visa liberalisation with Kosovo should be unblocked. Both processes will increase the EU’s leverage in the region and gradually limit the possibility of Russia tightening its grip any further; NATO enlargement should continue— although among the last remaining countries, Serbia does not express any wish to join NATO, but nevertheless is part of the partnership for peace, while Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have serious obstacles in their NATO membership process: Kosovo, in not being recognised by all NATO Member States, and BiH due to internal complexities; Russia is striving to maintain instability in the region and thus the EU should put more efforts into solving bilateral regional disputes, especially the Kosovo-Serbia issue which is currently being facilitated by the EU. Russia will try to undermine the Dayton Peace Accord and Western efforts to date to solve the Kosovo issue. Russia’s biggest political ally in the region is Serbia and hence Russia utilises Serbian conflicts with its neighbours (mainly Kosovo) to fuel greater friction; Russia, largely through Serbia, is contributing to destabilise the region by maintaining frozen conflicts and causing/supporting tensions through propaganda and disinformation. Moreover, Russia is leading a hybrid war against the West in Montenegro and North Macedonia. In the case of Kosovo and BiH, Russia does this by supporting Serb separatism, paralysing the internal functioning of both countries and constantly generating conflicts. The EU should develop a serious plan on how to respond to Russia’s propaganda in the region.

(Un)Shielded: Russia’s Influence in the Western Balkans Through. . .

135

Donika Emini is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster, London. She is leading the CiviKos Platform. She holds a master’s degree in public policy, specialising in public and non-profit management as well as international relations. She previously worked at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and was also Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Paris Office HQ. Other experience includes work at Transparency International in Berlin, the Balkan Policy Institute (IPOL), and the Consulate General of the Republic of Kosovo in New York. She is country analyst, Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group; Country Analyst (Kosovo and Albania), Freedom House; Senior Security Expert on CyberSecurity in the Eastern Partnership Region.

Liechtenstein’s Relations with Russia: Too Small to Be Noticed Christian Frommelt

Relations between Russia and Liechtenstein are not particularly close. There are no bilateral agreements between the two states and not even a free trade agreement. The bulk of diplomatic exchange is mainly within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but overall this is very little, albeit diplomatic relations do exist. Indeed, the former prime minister of Liechtenstein, Markus Büchel, used to be Honorary Consul for Russia. This function is currently held by Klaus Tschütscher, also a former Liechtenstein prime minister. In view of Liechtenstein’s otherwise little-developed political relations with Russia, this apparently close contact of Russia with parts of Liechtenstein’s political elite is surprising. There is also a Russian Consular Centre in the country’s capital Vaduz. Liechtenstein does not have a representation in Russia; however, its citizens may make use of the Swiss representation for all consular questions.

The Case of the So-Called First Russian National Army Historically, there is an interesting case which connects Liechtenstein and Russia in a peculiar way. When Nazi-Germany capitulated in 1945, the so-called First Russian National Army under count Boris Smyslovsky, which fought on Hitler’s side against the Soviet Union, fled to Liechtenstein, where all the soldiers were initially interned. Both the Prince and the government of Liechtenstein tried to move them out as quickly as possible, fearing retaliatory action from the Soviet Union. By the end of July 1945, about half of the 494 internees had left Liechtenstein for repatriation in Austria, with a further 104 leaving in the summer of 1945 in line with a Soviet repatriation commission. However, around 130 Russians, including some 20 women, resisted any return to the Soviet Union and moreover the Liechtenstein C. Frommelt (*) Liechtenstein Institute, Gamprin-Bendern, Liechtenstein e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_33

137

138

C. Frommelt

government refused to extradite them. By 1948 they had all emigrated to Western countries, mainly Argentina, although some of them later lived in Liechtenstein again. The Russians repatriated from Liechtenstein most likely ended up in Stalin’s labour camps. However, in Liechtenstein an undifferentiated myth emerged according to which this was the only country that defied Stalin and did not extradite the First Russian National Army.

Little Economic Cooperation but Some Cultural Exchange Only little data is available on economic relations between Liechtenstein and Russia. The balance of trade and the volume of trade between the two states are rather modest in comparison with the USA, Germany and China, for example. Since the 1990s, though, Russia’s relevance as an exporting country has increased. While the country was ranked as low as 23rd among Liechtenstein’s most important export countries in 1995, it is now up to 12th. Liechtenstein’s exports to Russia are significantly larger than its imports, the country being strongly dependent upon energy imports. The proportion of self-produced energy to total energy consumption is 13%. However, due to the Customs Union with Switzerland, there is no detailed data available from where Liechtenstein imports its energy. Quite recently (2019), Russia has removed Liechtenstein from a list of non-cooperative states relevant in the tax area, albeit there are no data available about foreign investments. Tourism from Russia also features very little in Liechtenstein’s economy, quite in contrast to nearby Switzerland. In a nutshell, economic relations between the two countries are not very pronounced and clearly this has something to do with the small size of Liechtenstein and the geographical distance to Russia. By contrast, there is a fair amount of cultural cooperation between the two states. In recent years, for example, there have been several exhibitions of Russian artists at the Liechtenstein National Museum. There have also been exhibitions of Liechtenstein stamps in Russia. The accumulation of exhibitions of Russian artists has even led to public astonishment and displeasure in letters to editors of the Liechtenstein daily newspapers. However, beyond that Russia features very little in Liechtenstein’s public sphere and any media coverage that exists is mostly based on German press agency reports.

Politics and More Liechtenstein supported the EU sanctions against Russia related to the annexation of Crimea and was consequently also affected by the counter-sanctions imposed by Russia. Generally speaking, when it comes to whether sanctions should be supported or not, Liechtenstein orients itself mostly to Switzerland due to the customs treaty with its neighbour. Meanwhile, Switzerland is often rather hesitant about sanctions against other states due to its tradition of neutrality.

Liechtenstein’s Relations with Russia: Too Small to Be Noticed

139

Although Liechtenstein is very small, it has a voice in international organisations such as the UN General Assembly. Accordingly, in recent years a growing interest in Liechtenstein has been observed in regard to the two great powers, the USA and China. This is expressed, for example, in regular diplomatic visits, but also in the attempt to establish some exchange with civil society. No similar strategic behaviour can be observed on the part of Russia, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that Liechtenstein is not in the focus of Russian politics. In closing this chapter, one can summarise by stating that there are some general features of Liechtenstein, which also affect its triangular relationship with Russia and the EU. As a small state, Liechtenstein attaches great importance to compliance with international law which is why the country took a clear stand against Russia in the Ukraine crisis. However, due to its limited human resources for foreign policy, this remains very selective and thus limited to individual topics and states. Liechtenstein’s scope for action, in particular in terms of sanctions and other political measures, is further reduced due to its very close ties with Switzerland and both countries’ tradition of neutrality. Overall, relations between Russia and Liechtenstein may not be particularly close, albeit as mentioned earlier Russian connections with Liechtenstein’s political and cultural elite are somewhat suspect. Hence, it is all the more important that the EU should insist on European non-EU states also supporting EU sanctions against Russia. In this way, any possibility of EU sanctions being circumvented via non-EU members can immediately be ruled out. Christian Frommelt has been Director of the Liechtenstein Institute in Bendern, Liechtenstein, since 2018 and a research fellow in Political Science at the Institute since 2010. He holds a PhD from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich and a Master’s degree from the University of Innsbruck. His research focuses on the European Economic Area (EEA) and integration policies of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Member States. He was previously Director for Brexit Studies at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Culture of Liechtenstein from 2017 to 2018. The Liechtenstein Institute was founded in 1986 as a research institute for scientific research in the fields of history, politics, law and economy relating to Liechtenstein, organised as a non-profit association and state-subsidised. It is also a full member of TEPSA.

A Hot and Cold Power Struggle for Influence: Russia-Montenegro Relations Danijela Jaćimović and Filip Petrović

The relationship between Montenegro and Russia represents an extremely complex challenge, that Montenegro, as a small country, has been faced with over a significant period of time. From 1997, after the ruling party split, the leadership of Montenegro decided to start orienting itself more towards the West, gradually moving in favour of national independence as opposed to any form of state union. Montenegro’s foreign policy priorities were defined in 2006: securing its position as a sovereign state, ensuring a European perspective, securing a reliable alliance within NATO and promoting stable cooperation with countries in the region and key world players.

The “New” Beginning After Montenegro’s independence, the “hot” phase of mutual relations was officially established, as Russia was the first among the most significant world powers that recognised Montenegro’s independence, following its 2006 referendum. This move was not widely expected, because of Russia’s traditional closeness to Serbia. The establishment of good political relations between Russia and Montenegro was followed by economic cooperation, which led to Russian investors literally overrunning Montenegro. Exports increased (both goods and services), while signs and symbols of the close relationship with Russia were everywhere, notably in the form of bridges and monuments. According to the Central Bank of Montenegro’s official data, the total value of investments from Russia was about EUR 1.3 billion or 30.9% of total GDP in the period from 2005 to 2014. The largest inflow of money came in 2005 when a Russian businessman, Oleg Deripaska, bought the Aluminium Plant of Podgorica D. Jaćimović (*) · F. Petrović Faculty of Economics, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, Montenegro e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_34

141

142

D. Jaćimović and F. Petrović

(KAP) and the Bauxite Mines in Niksic. KAP was very significant for the Montenegrin economy, as it represented over 50% of total exports and contributed about 15% of total GDP. The global economic crisis affected the aluminium industry and over time KAP was unable to fulfil its part of the privatisation agreement; thus, after a number of traumatic episodes, KAP went bankrupt in July 2013. This had a serious economic impact, with KAP’s workforce shrinking from 2400 people in 2010 to 700 today. Another significant investment flow went into Montenegro’s real estate market, mostly along the country’s coast. It is speculated that as many as 70,000 properties are owned by Russian citizens, while the estimated number of Russian citizens permanently residing in Montenegro ranges between 1000 and 15,000. Intensive trade relations in the period from 2006 to 2015 resulted in the removal of the EUR 36 million deficit that had been present in 2006. At that time, the most important imported goods were gas, oil and steel, while the most important exports were wine, other alcoholic beverages and stone-based products. Over time the deficit decreased, with lower import volumes, but evidently with a strong increase in the export of wine to Russia (85% of total exports) and a large increase in the volume of Russian tourism (30% of the total). Thus, the Russian market became a key element of Montenegrin tourism. A joint fostering of positive ties with both Russia and the West continued successfully up until around 2013.

Cooling Relations Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Montenegro had to choose between two geopolitical camps and hence relations with Russia entered an ice-cold phase. Montenegro joined the EU in imposing sanctions on Russia, something that also caused political and bilateral relations to deteriorate. During 2014, inappropriate statements made by Russian officials were part of everyday political life in Montenegro. With NATO’s invitation to Montenegro to join the Alliance in December 2015, the rhetoric became even harsher when Alexander Chepurin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Serbia, described the Montenegrin ambition to become a member of the Alliance as “monkey business”, while the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called NATO enlargement in the former Yugoslavia “a mistake, even a provocation” against Russia. The deterioration of political relations also had an effect on economic activity between the two countries. Russian companies stopped importing agricultural products from countries that supported the sanctions and in 2017 Russia’s food safety regulator barred the import of certain Montenegrin wines. Officials and pro-Kremlin media discouraged tourism to Montenegro, but Moscow did not revoke the visa-free regime in place for Montenegrin citizens. Even though Podgorica and Moscow have had a difficult political relationship of late, Russia’s economic footprint in Montenegro remains relatively large, not only in terms of trade but also through Russian investment and land ownership.

A Hot and Cold Power Struggle for Influence: Russia-Montenegro Relations

143

Montenegro joined the NATO Alliance in 2016. Although Russia did not succeed in preventing this, Russian officials clearly indicated that Moscow was not planning to give up so easily in their efforts to influence Montenegro. Russia has shown that its political footprint is going to remain influential in Montenegro, with the help of Montenegro’s own political divides, especially through the pro-Serbian parties. Russia has used its religious ties as well and over time has built very close ties with the Orthodox Church, as well as the main pro-Serb party in Montenegro, the Democratic Front. During the opposition protests against Milo Djukanovic and NATO in October 2015, opposition leaders were publicly accused of receiving millions of dollars from Russia to organise their protests and later in 2016 to support their parliamentary election campaign. During the Montenegrin election day in October 2016, Russian citizens together with certain individuals from Serbia and Montenegro allegedly plotted to assassinate the former Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic and overthrow his pro-Western government. Despite the fact that its citizens have been prosecuted in Montenegro in absentia, Russia denied the allegations of involvement on 16 October 2016. At the same time, Montenegro has been exposed to numerous cyberattacks.

What Can Be Done? Some Recommendations Russia is quite aware of its limited options in Montenegro, but it is very interested in generating political capital to use in its geopolitical game with the EU, using it as a serious threat to wider EU integration in the region. Russia has historic, religious and economic roots on the ground and hence enjoys some support. By contrast, the most recent surveys suggest that around 80% of Montenegrin citizens support closer integration with the EU. Montenegro as a small country is a price and a policy taker in a globally polarised world and thus should have a constructive as well as cooperative dialogue with all major global players, including Russia. It is important to note that sanctions against Russia were introduced not because the country is anti-Russian, but because it is pro-European. As a first option, melting the ice-cold relations with Russia is desirable, strengthening existing mutual economic cooperation in a way that does not conflict with the country’s European perspective. These economic interests are most obvious in the fields of tourism, economic development, air transport, culture and education. The second option is for the EU to strengthen its important role in Montenegro by increasing its economic and political footprint in the country. Such a move in this geopolitical chess game, where Russia likes to exploit domestic political instability, socio-economic crisis and nationalism, is not only helpful but also vitally necessary.

144

D. Jaćimović and F. Petrović

Danijela Jaćimović is Professor at the Faculty of Economics, University of Montenegro. Her fields of interest include International economics and European integration. The University of Montenegro is a public higher education institution and as such is the oldest in Montenegro. The Faculty of Economics, as one of the most important educational and research institutions in the country, is also a member of TEPSA. Filip Petrović is a PhD candidate and a holder of a Doctoral scholarship awarded by the Ministry of Science of Montenegro, interested in Economy of Innovations and Competitiveness. The University of Montenegro is a public higher education institution and as such is the oldest in Montenegro. The Faculty of Economics, as one of the most important educational and research institutions in the country, is also a member of TEPSA.

North Macedonia and Russia: An Ambiguous Relationship Irena Rajchinovska Pandeva

North Macedonia is a small, landlocked country, situated in a troublesome Balkan region, spread across important corridors connecting not only West and East, but also North and South resulting in its long-standing legacy of being in between and at a crossroads, both in temporal and spatial terms. Its history, and especially its political history, is charged with foreign involvement, interference and influence. Consequently, Macedonian political discourse was and is heavily dependent on foreign intervention. Following its independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia pursued a balanced approach to both West and East, although its aspirations to join the European community and NATO were set as strategic goals and primary objectives of subsequent governments. From the outset, the Republic had to face challenges that aimed to question, problematise or dispute its sovereignty and independence, which hence have affected much of its development and progress. For that reason, recognition of the then Republic of Macedonia, under its constitutional name, by Russia in 1992 as the first permanent member of the UN Security Council, has contributed to the establishment of good bilateral relations. Furthermore, Moscow has been repeatedly stating its support for the stability and unitary character of North Macedonia. Despite the proclaimed relationship of the two “friendly countries and brotherly nations”, the lack of strategic determination and interest to commit to alliance beyond customary good relations has contributed to a certain level of estrangement of both countries from one another. Russian actions were aligned predominantly with its aspirations to exert influence over and dominate the Balkan region in political terms, but then again North Macedonia has never been as high on the Russian agenda as other countries in the region. In effect, North Macedonia has been

I. R. Pandeva (*) Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, North Macedonia # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_35

145

146

I. R. Pandeva

going on and off the Russian radar, depending on developments in the global balance of powers, problems of regional context and severe internal distress.

Economic Liaisons The economic cooperation between both North Macedonia and Russia has in fact suffered due to their ambiguous relationship. Hence, Russia has a very low economic impact in North Macedonia since FDI, development aid, services, manufactures, primary goods and remittances are limited and/or minimal. Recent data shows that the EU is currently North Macedonia’s largest trade and investment partner; it is also amongst and top 10 countries on the list, apart from EU Member States along with China and the USA, but not Russia. By contrast, Russia is still North Macedonia’s main supplier of natural gas—the country also has extensive dependency on Russian fossil fuels, thus ranking the energy impact much higher than other elements of economic relations. Whilst repetitive statements from officials of both countries have been issued on the need to enhance economic ties and improve mutual cooperation, cooperation in this area remains limited in scope and diversity.

Russian Involvement in the Political Arena Much like its economic footprint, Russia’s involvement in the Macedonian political arena is rather low and incidental. However, research shows that Russia’s political presence has increased over time and especially during the last decade by initiating a number of influential campaigns (support for Gruevski, anti-NATO, against the name change and most specifically the 2018 Referendum as well as the Prespa Agreement). Accordingly, recent Macedonian history testifies that Russian involvement and interference has been sporadic and more or less inconsequential, apart from the instances when Moscow reacted to events and developments that were valued as potential Macedonian alignment with the West. This reactive policy goes in line with a constant replay of the blame game with the West over dominion of Macedonian political discourse and country’s strategic course, NATO and EU integration in particular. Even though in reactive mode, Moscow’s rhetoric has found a fertile ground in anti-Western, anti-reform and authoritarian forces and even gave support to the initiation of “Edinstvena Makedonija” political party—it is insignificant in extent and low by impact. Conversely, the use of soft power tools along with direct interference in highly sensitive matters that tackle the foundation of Macedonian national identity makes Russia a potent external factor in North Macedonia. These include issues such as the name of the country, recognition of the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the interethnic balance. Russia appears to have developed a habit of stepping up as the big brother every single time that Macedonian prospects were questioned either by

North Macedonia and Russia: An Ambiguous Relationship

147

inner or exterior influences. These endeavours were always centred upon the common Slavic and Orthodox heritage, so references to the friendly and brotherly relations are often incited. Moscow does not show constraint in sending outright political messages when needed, yet overall and by comparison with the prodigious presence of Western representatives, the Macedonian public sphere has witnessed a very modest and mostly reactive appearance of Russian officials. The latter demonstrates Russia’s tendency to keep or promote a rather low profile, responding only to intercept counter-allegations or defend Russian interests in the country and/or region when threatened by other factors, most notably Western.

Diplomacy Successive Macedonian governments have had a distinctly irresponsible diplomatic policy vis-à-vis important international actors and immediate neighbours, by not sending representatives to key political centres in times of its greatest need—Berlin, Beijing, Tokyo, Ottawa and many others along with Moscow, just to name a few. Hence, the absence of a Macedonian representative in Moscow for certain periods on a number of occasions has gravely affected communication and exchange between both governments and has resulted in rather low and modest cooperation. Continuing expulsion of diplomats (on numerous occasions by both sides since 2018 and most recently in the summer 2021) has overshadowed the proclaimed dedication to further relations by both countries. The expulsion of Russian diplomats from North Macedonia has been implemented by the Government without a clear public statement being provided to explain why and by doing so North Macedonia joined the club of several other European countries that have taken the same line. The Russian side has responded by declaring North Macedonian diplomats as personae non gratae in a retaliatory move. Needless to say, such moves will additionally burden the mutual relationship.

The Way Ahead As a country literally on the crossroads, North Macedonia has neither the possibility nor the luxury to redirect the roads (in whatever format) away from crossing across its territory. Aligning with the West has been a longstanding and strategic determination for North Macedonia. Accordingly, cooperation with Russia should not be regarded as an alternative but rather as complementary, in the case of small nations. There is ample room for improvement in trade links and much can be done to boost economic relations. Until recently, North Macedonia and Russia had not had a direct airline connection for over two decades. In the name of shared heritage and good relations, both countries have to mend their relations (when and where they are broken) and improve cooperation, not just in terms of politics and security but in other highly important areas of cooperation, such as education and exchange, culture and trade. This endeavour will need delicate political manoeuvring on both sides and

148

I. R. Pandeva

acceptance of key prerogatives, such as Macedonia’s strategic alignment with NATO and potentially the EU. Before the latest 2021 fiasco, which came about after repeated attempts to open negotiation talks and move forward the EU accession process, national leaders have rarely used “the East” wild card in response to Western closed doors. This card, of course, also incorporates development of closer and strategic relations with China and Russia. The latest occurrence came after the Bulgarian veto for the opening of EU accession talks and was loudly articulated by key political figures in North Macedonia, not only as an outright threat to the EU to fulfil its promise of integration, but also because it resonates with the increasing segment of North Macedonia’s population, which is either disappointed or tired, yet most significantly anxious and eager to move forward after 30 years since the Republic was established. This shift away from the EU as a strategic goal will not be effortlessly implemented or accepted, but it will provide a different perspective and potential progress other than waiting to be accepted by the West. Then again, if Russia does aim to establish closer and enhanced cooperation with North Macedonia, it must rethink the geopolitical importance of the country and stop considering it as unimportant part of the global battleground with the West. Irena Rajchinovska Pandeva is Associate Professor in Political Science at the Iustinianus Primus Law Faculty at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, and teaches several courses at undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral level. She is alumna of the Fulbright, CEEPUS, ERAMUS, and OEAD programmes, local coordinator of the CEEPUS network “Ethics and politics in European context”, director of the Refugee Law and Migration Summer school at UKIM, and member of the TEPSA Board. The Iustinianus Primus Law Faculty, Skopje, is the oldest institution of higher education in the country offering legal studies programmes and is part of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje and the first public University in North Macedonia. The faculty houses five different types of studies at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels: law, political science (in English and Macedonian), as well as journalism and public relations. These subjects form the focus of research projects at the university.

Russia: Norway’s Best Frenemy Jakub Godzimirski and Pernille Rieker

Norway’s policy towards Russia has so far been guided by three ideas—reassurance, engagement and deterrence. This approach has been determined by four structural factors. The first is the geographical proximity—the two countries share a 198 km long border in the High North. The second is the obvious disparity of potentials—in territorial terms Norway is a mid-size, European country with 5.4 million inhabitants, while Russia’s territory stretches over 10 time zones and its population is almost 30 times bigger than Norway’s. The third is historical experience shaping perception of Russia. Russia is viewed as both an important regional partner with whom one needs to work together in addressing common challenges and a possible source of strategic threat to Norway. Fourth and finally, the economic relationship is also influenced by the fact that both countries are important energy producers and exporters, which puts some limits on their trade, despite the geographical proximity. While the first two factors are undeniable facts, the next two may change, although they have proved to be relatively stable. In the following chapter we will reflect over current trends in both the political and economic relationships between the two countries as well as the perceptions of Russia among Norwegians.

The Ambiguous Past: Russia as a Potential Threat and an Impossible Partner? For Norway, Russia is viewed as a lasting element in the strategic environment, and it was therefore important to conduct a policy that would contribute to lowering the level of strategic tension. Hence, the policy of reassurance resulted, the aim of which was to convince policymakers in Moscow that the Norwegian territory would not be used as a launching pad in any military operations targeting Russia. The idea of J. Godzimirski (*) · P. Rieker Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_36

149

150

J. Godzimirski and P. Rieker

engaging Russia as a neighbour with whom Norway had to cooperate to address common challenges in neighbourhood was also an important driver of the policy towards this neighbour in the East, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is often argued that Norway is the only neighbouring country that has never been at war with Russia and this may have resulted from its long tradition of applying a balanced policy towards its neighbour to the east. However, having in mind the obvious asymmetry of strategic potentials and the fact that Russia has traditionally used military instruments to pursue its goals in the neighbourhood, Norway also needed to strengthen its deterrence potential and decided therefore to join NATO in 1949 to achieve this specific strategic objective. Norway’s historical approach to Russia can therefore be described as vacillation between viewing Russia as both a possible strategic partner in the neighbourhood and a potential source of strategic threat. While this latter perception prevailed during the Cold War, the postSoviet period provided a time of hope that Russia could one day become a fullfledged democracy and an important partner in the High North. However, the way Russia decided to act in Ukraine during 2014 changed the mood again and by 2021 Russia is perceived as a potential source of strategic threat. Russian intervention in Ukraine made Norway re-examine its policy towards Russia: issuing an unambiguous condemnation of Russian actions, joining the Western sanctions, increasing the level of defence spending and tightening security cooperation with its main NATO allies, including the USA.

Economic Interactions Norway and Russia are neighbours and hence one could imagine that this would facilitate trade. However, both economies are ‘dominated’ by the petroleum sectors and energy resources are the main export commodity, which consequently puts some structural limits on any trade exchange. According to Russian Customs Service data, between 2011 and 2020 Russia had a USD1.097 billion surplus in trade with Norway. Russia’s decision to introduce a ban on food imports from the West in 2014 had huge implications for the volume and structure of trade between Norway and Russia. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), in 2013 exports from Norway to Russia totalled USD1.65 billion, which represented 1.04% of all exports. Export was dominated by sea products (fish, etc.) at 67.2%. However, by 2019 the value of Norwegian exports to Russia had shrunk to USD405 million, or 0.37% of the total, with sea products down to a negligible level. In the same period Russia increased the value of its exports to Norway from USD937 million in 2013 to more than USD3 billion in 2019. In 2013 slightly more than 1% of all imports to Norway came from Russia, while by 2019 this share had increased to almost 3.5%. Strangely enough, mineral fuels, oils and resultant products represented more than 70% of all imports from Russia.

Russia: Norway’s Best Frenemy

151

Public Perceptions of Russia According to a Norwegian public opinion poll in 2019, quoted by newspaper Dagbladet on 30 July, 67% of respondents, 10% more than in December 2018, felt that Putin’s Russia posed a threat. Two years later, a poll conducted by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) revealed a shift in public opinion. While Russia is still perceived as a threat, less than 40% see Russia as the main threat. Other threats perceived as more important are cyberattacks, some from Russia according to Norwegian authorities; epidemics; China’s growth; and migration. But scepticism towards Russia remains, with 50% of respondents wanting less cooperation with Russia and 48% wanting Norwegian government to adopt a tougher stance towards Russia. Yet, 30% still prefer more cooperation and 52% would prefer good economic relations to be given priority. These different views may reflect the Norwegian tradition of searching for a balanced relationship with its Russian neighbour. Nevertheless, looking at the media coverage of Russia in Norway, a negative perception dominates. The mainstream media is in general very critical of Russia’s actions, especially in the areas of foreign and security policy as well as human rights. Only a few marginal groups call for a deep revision of the country’s policy towards Russia.

The Uncertain Future of Relations with Russia There are three possible scenarios for how relations between Norway and Russia will develop in the future: The first implies that Russia will democratise and become a constructive member of a regional, European, global community and therefore be a less problematic neighbour for Norway; the second is that Russia will develop in an even more authoritarian direction and will embark on a more challenging and aggressive foreign policy, even towards its close neighbours that are part of NATO. But a third scenario suggests that relations with Russia will remain almost the same as they are today. While we cannot be certain, the third scenario is perhaps the most likely, in which case there will be some cooperation in areas that both Russia and Norway see as important. However, there will also be periods of increased tension when Russia, for various reasons, will choose to adopt a more assertive policy, with a consequent negative impact on any climate of cooperation in the High North. The probability today of deep democratisation in Russia seems rather low, but Russia’s potential move in an even more authoritarian direction certainly cannot be excluded. The most probable, at least in the short to medium term, is therefore the ‘muddling through scenario’, in which Russia will be viewed as an important but difficult neighbour—a perfect frenemy.

152

J. Godzimirski and P. Rieker

Policy Recommendation to the EU: Norway’s Balanced Approach to Russian Relations as an Example to Follow? For Norway as an associated, allied yet non-member of the EU, a policy towards Russia based on a combination of reassurance, engagement and deterrence has functioned quite well over the years. Hence, as a final thought for this chapter, while Norway is a relatively small country when it comes to overall potential and the EU is a much more powerful global actor with various types of power at its disposal, there might still be something to learn from the Norwegian approach. However, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine would require a complete rethinking of both the Norwegian and the EU approach to the question of how to interact with Russia. Jakub M. Godzimirski is Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and member of the NUPI’s Research Group on Russia, Asia and International Trade (RAIT). He has been working on various aspects of Russian foreign and security policy at NUPI since 1995. Currently, he leads the RUSMENA project, examining Russian policies towards the Middle East and North Africa. NUPI is a leading centre for research on international issues in areas of particular relevance to Norwegian foreign policy. As such, the Institute communicates research-based insights to the Norwegian public as well as wider international audiences, being committed to excellence, relevance, and credibility. NUPI has three main pillars of research and expertise: war and peace; economy and development; and diplomacy and global governance. NUPI is also a member of TEPSA. Pernille Rieker holds a position as Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and a part-time full professor at the Inland University College (INN). Rieker is part of NUPI’s research group on security and defence and is responsible for NUPI’s Center for European Studies (NCE). Her research interests are the EU and European foreign and security policy with a special focus on France and the Nordic countries. NUPI is a leading centre for research on international issues in areas of particular relevance to Norwegian foreign policy. As such, the Institute communicates research-based insights to the Norwegian public as well as wider international audiences, being committed to excellence, relevance, and credibility. NUPI has three main pillars of research and expertise: war and peace; economy and development; and diplomacy and global governance. NUPI is also a member of TEPSA.

Serbia and Russia: Continuity in a Changing Context? Marko Savković

What is Russia to Serbia? Is the country a centuries-old friend, an ally and honest mediator? Or is this in truth a subversive actor and someone who has selfish motives? The relationship between Serbia and Russia has been through phases of cooperation and reliance, but also distancing, when Belgrade was looking for allies in the West. Over the past 15 years, in the context of resolving the status of Kosovo with EU-mediated dialogue (2011–), Serbia’s political representatives have increasingly relied on Moscow’s political support and to some extent military backing, with Russia using this as leverage over Serbia’s political elites. The tension that was transferred from Russia’s relations with the West (Ukrainian crisis, sanctions regime, war in Syria, political crisis in Belarus) Belgrade had tried to overcome, facing less and less understanding in its relationship with the EU. Yet, at a time of increased international competition and confrontation, Serbia remains a country open for cooperation with Moscow. One sentiment that has persisted across the centuries is that of Russia as the ‘Slavic brother’ and ‘protector’ of Serbs. Historically, Serbia’s rulers have been calling on and counting on Moscow’s help in times of crisis. Their Russian counterparts responded only when it was in their national interest. Despite periods of misunderstandings and distancing, most significantly the 1948 ‘split’ with Stalin, this perception has been carefully nurtured by domestic elites. It ties in well with the traditional old image of Serbia as a country between ‘the East’ and ‘the West’. When in the 1990s Serbia became a pariah state and an outcast, it was Moscow that communicated demands from the West, persuading former President Slobodan Milosevic to make concessions necessary to end the hostilities. The search for allies at a time of another crisis, the status of Kosovo, once again brought Belgrade and Moscow closer. Russia’s unyielding support for what Belgrade interprets as preserving international law (and order) was secured by the sale of Serbia’s oil industry, a

M. Savković (*) Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, Belgrade, Serbia # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_37

153

154

M. Savković

strategic asset in any country. Since then, over the last decade support for Russia in international fora has been both internalised and normalised as an aspect of Serbia’s (foreign) policy. Moscow by contrast has been using the Kosovo argument both to justify its actions abroad and as a ‘door’ to the region.

Russia’s Appeal Is Inter-generational Russia’s appeal is even better understood when one takes into account the attitude towards the West. The majority of citizens (68% according to the ISAC FundGLOBSEC study published in November 2021) think that Western countries promote a ‘morally corrupt and decadent lifestyle, thinly veiled behind civil liberties’. 55% of respondents believe that EU integration ‘threatens democracy and traditional values’. They are sympathetic to Russia’s international standing and believe that Moscow is being ‘provoked into action by NATO’. What is more, they believe that the power and significance of Russia (and China, for that matter) has increased over the last 5 years. An overwhelming number of young Serbs do not see Russia as a threat to Serbia. Older respondents readily affirm that Russia is Serbia’s traditional Slavic sister nation. They represent a sizable voting bloc, as voter turnout among older voters, as in many democracies, tends to be higher and will reward political parties that share their views (which are generally pro-Russian or at least Eurosceptic).

Four Levers of Russia’s Influence Over Serbia: Energy, Defence Industry, Soft Power and (Dis)Information The first concerns energy. Thanks to a favourable arrangement brokered by politicians and the ‘Turkish Stream’ project (in which Serbia took part after the collapse of ‘South Stream’), amidst rapidly rising prices of natural gas, Belgrade pays up to four times less than some of its neighbours. Furthermore, because of Gazprom’s dominant position in Serbia’s market, up to 90% of fuel sold at petrol stations is imported from Russia. Needless to say, such a privileged position comes with a price tag, namely, not to align with policies directed against Moscow. Russia is the fourth largest exporter of goods to Serbia (behind Germany, Italy and China) and fifth most important export market (following, again, Germany, Italy as well as Romania along with Bosnia and Herzegovina). Russia exports to Serbia up to twice as many goods in value than Serbia to Russia. Energy—oil and related products (36%), natural gas (27%)—makes up the bulk of these exports. Serbia’s exports to Russia are a bit more varied and include fruit, textile products, tyres, medicine and copper products. Fruit producers in the country have benefited greatly from the free trade agreement, which has been in place since 2000. Furthermore, Serbia joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), signing an agreement on 10 July 2021. However, this agreement will no longer be valid once Serbia joins the EU.

Serbia and Russia: Continuity in a Changing Context?

155

The second ‘lever’ is cooperation in the field of defence, more precisely, procurement of weapons and military equipment, which to a significant extent takes place in cooperation with partners from the East, primarily Russia (but also Belarus). Some of the most powerful weapons in Serbia’s arsenal are procured from Russia’s defence industry, including fighter aircraft (surplus MiG-29s that were then refurbished), tanks (T-72M) and air defence systems (Pantsir and Buk). As the third ‘lever’, Russia has learnt and mastered the art of soft power. Despite the assistance it provides being dwarfed by the EU’s potential, Russia enjoys a much more positive image, as Moscow invests more strategically and is far less, if at all, concerned with the country’s democratic transformation. One example concerns Gazprom’s financing the finishing of work on St. Sava’s Temple, a matter of great national pride for Orthodox Serbs, being one of the symbols of faith and attachment to the Church. Moreover, following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia has assisted Serbia by sending teams of biological chemists and personal protection equipment, as well as engaging in vaccine diplomacy, firstly by exporting its ‘Sputnik V’ vaccine (even before it was available to all Russian citizens) and then by agreeing on joint production of the vaccine at Belgrade’s Torlak Institute. The fourth ‘lever’ is the flow of information from the Sputnik news agency outlet in Serbia. Observed uncritically as a trustworthy source, Sputnik provides news services and syndication at no cost to local media, on different platforms. Because these organisations are often dependent on government support and are in no way sustainable on their own, they readily accept offers of high-quality free content.

Moscow’s Narrative and Positions Are Reflected by the Ruling Political Option Yet Russia’s influence and appeal would not be as strong if it were not for successive Serbian governments. The current coalition government, elected in October 2020, comprises the Serbian Progressive Party, SNS; the Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS; and the Serbian Patriotic Alliance, SPAS. All parties conform to pro-Russian views. Since 2012, President Aleksandar Vucic (SNS) has enjoyed broad support and has secured six consecutive victories. The largest support for SNS/Vucic comes from those aged 66 and above, people with high school education or less and citizens living outside the capital. They are most likely to be informed by watching television, typically the state broadcaster RTS, and private media stations that are owned by SNS supporters and affiliates. These networks present Russia in a mostly if not completely favourable light, rarely criticising its actions. Russia’s influence in Serbia is set to stay and will certainly not disappear overnight. There is such a wide acceptance among citizens of Russia as an ally, for historical and cultural reasons as well as a perception of its power in international relations. Because Russia has largely distanced itself from the West and has set itself in a position of confrontation, this will continue to be a source of tension in Serbia’s relations with the EU, as evident from its relations with Ukraine, Belarus or Syria. Nevertheless, no major change can be expected as long as Moscow’s narratives,

156

M. Savković

values and positions are reflected by domestic elites and ruling political options. Only if the long-awaited ‘moment of decision’ over Kosovo finally arrives and Belgrade is finally pressurised into making a critical policy decision, at the cost of regime popularity, can we expect to see any change in policy. However, with the passage of time and ties with Russia growing stronger, this seems less and less likely. Marko Savković is Executive Director at the Foundation BFPE for a Responsible Society (BFPE), in charge of the programme of the Belgrade Security Forum. From 2013 to 2015, he was directing the Regional Academy for Democracy. Previously, Marko worked for 7 years as a researcher in the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), specialising in the fields of defence reform, civil-military relations, and Euro-Atlantic integration. While working in BCSP, he co-authored the first Dictionary of European Security published in BHS languages, followed by a pioneering study in Serbia’s and Western Balkans’ civilian capacities for peace operations. Marko holds a PhD from the Belgrade Faculty of Political Science, with a thesis written on privatisation of peace-building efforts worldwide. The BFPE is a non-governmental, non-partisan, and non-profit organisation founded in Serbia in 2003. For the last decade, it has been providing education as well as training to Serbian political and civil society leaders active in various sectors and engaged in reform processes. Starting from March 2022, Marko is part of the Team for Population Issues within the Prime Minister’s Office, working as a Senior Advisor for Human Development.

Switzerland: The Tedious Art of Bridging a Widening Gap Frank Schimmelfennig

Switzerland has a unique position in the geopolitics of Europe. Whereas it is firmly anchored in the Western, liberal-democratic international community, the country is not a member state of either the European Union or NATO. Since the Congress of Vienna in 1814/1815, ‘permanent neutrality’ has been a core principle of Swiss foreign policy, enjoying broad public support. This neutrality is not passive, but combined with humanitarian engagement and good offices aimed at strengthening cooperative security.

Weak Economic and Political Ties Switzerland’s relations with Russia follow these fundamental lines. Economic ties between Switzerland and Russia are comparatively weak. Russia’s share of Swiss foreign trade is less than 1%; in 2019, Russia ranked 23rd among Swiss trade partners. Switzerland exports pharmaceutical, chemical products and machines, as it does to the rest of the world, and imports raw materials from Russia. Energy imports comprise only 9% of total imports. Even though Nord Stream 2 is incorporated in Switzerland and Russia provides half of Switzerland’s natural gas imports, the share of gas in Switzerland’s energy consumption is only at 14%, roughly half the German figure. Foreign direct investment plays a more important role in bilateral relations: Russia is among the ten most important sources of direct investment in Switzerland—and vice versa. Still, Russian FDI accounts only for just over 1% of all FDI in Switzerland, whereas Switzerland’s share of FDI in Russia is between 3 and 4%. Yet, according to data from the Russian Central Bank, Switzerland is by far the prime destination for private money transfers out of Russia. In this context, F. Schimmelfennig (*) ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_38

157

158

F. Schimmelfennig

Swiss authorities have regularly drawn criticism, for instance from the United States and Alexei Navalny, for facilitating money laundering and cosying up to Russian oligarchs. The same combination of friendly, but rather loose ties applies to political relations. In 2007, both sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding in order to broaden and intensify their contacts along with cooperation across a variety of policy areas. Switzerland has not been in the focus of Russian disinformation campaigns and, in contrast to other Western European countries, is portrayed positively in Russian media. Except for a few marginal representatives of the right-wing populist Swiss People’s Party, there are no relevant supportive ties between Swiss political parties and the Russian political establishment.

Neutrality and Cooperative Security In the multilateral domain, Switzerland has sought to remain neutral in the growing polarisation of Russian-Western relations, while at the same time providing good offices and promoting mediation. Since the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, which ended bilateral diplomatic relations between the two countries, Switzerland has represented their mutual interests under a ‘protecting power mandate’. Most recently, the Swiss government rejoiced in demonstrating its bridgebuilding services when Presidents Biden and Putin held a summit in Geneva during April 2021. Swiss diplomacy is particularly active in the context of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It regards the OSCE as unique among the European international organisations in sharing and supporting the Swiss interest in preserving a pan-European, cooperative vision of security on the continent and in fostering a multilateral dialogue and building bridges across the growing East-West divide. Swiss officials were particularly active in OSCE efforts to defuse the Ukraine crisis, which coincided with Switzerland’s OSCE Chairmanship. As one of few OSCE Member States combining high diplomatic capacity with a reputation of impartiality, Switzerland clearly punches above its weight in the organisation, but permanent leadership is constrained by the rotation of offices. The issue of sanctions against Russia after the invasion and annexation of Crimea has proven to be a hard test for Swiss efforts to reconcile neutrality and equidistance, on the hand, with support for international order, on the other. Switzerland condemned Russia’s actions as a breach of international law and stopped its training missions with Russian forces. Yet, it has not formally joined EU declarations and sanctions, in contrast to other EFTA countries, which typically align themselves almost completely with EU sanctions against third countries. Then again, Switzerland has vowed to make sure that the country would not be used to circumvent Western sanctions against Russia. In effect, this policy has largely led Switzerland to shadow and follow EU sanctions. Deteriorating relations between Russia and the West have also strained Switzerland’s participation in NATO-led cooperation schemes. Switzerland joined

Switzerland: The Tedious Art of Bridging a Widening Gap

159

the Partnership for Peace in 1996 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997, at a time when these institutions appeared to be designed mainly to promote international legal norms, a multilateral dialogue and collective security. Its position became more difficult and isolated when NATO returned to prioritising collective defence; its cooperation with non-members then became more bilateral and operative, particularly when the other West European non-members, with which Switzerland had been affiliated as the ‘West European Partners’ (WEP-5) since 2012, began to cooperate more closely with NATO institutionally and militarily after the Ukraine crisis.

Narrowing Options and Delicate Choices Switzerland is spared direct conflicts with, and dependencies on, Russia. It is also in a more favourable geographic location than other Western European non-aligned countries such as Finland and Sweden. Yet, Russian assertiveness and aggression and NATO’s new focus on deterrence and defence, together with the return of geopolitical and ideological conflict between Russia and the West, all present Swiss foreign policy with narrower options and delicate choices. Neutrality, cooperative security and a value-based stance have become more difficult to reconcile than was the case in the post-Cold War era, limiting Switzerland’s room for manoeuvre in regional security governance. There is currently no need, though, for Switzerland to ease the tension by aligning itself more firmly with the Western organisations. Switzerland should continue to use its uniquely strong and credible non-alignment for maintaining diplomatic channels for exploring avenues of conflict management and security cooperation with Russia. At the same time, as an open and interconnected society, Switzerland must remain alert to criminal threats emanating from Russia, ranging from shady businesses and money laundering to cyberattacks. As the Pandora Papers have revealed, Swiss lawyers, trustees and real-estate agents continue to operate in a grey zone requiring tighter regulation. Frank Schimmelfennig is Professor of European Politics at ETH Zurich. He is also a member of the Swiss National Research Council, an associate of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Chairman of the Scientific Board of Institut für Europäische Politik Berlin, and a member of the Board of the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA). His research focuses on the theory and development of European integration. His most recent books on the EU are Ever Looser Union? Differentiated European Integration (Oxford University Press, 2020, with Thomas Winzen) and Integration and Differentiation in the European Union: Theory and Policies (Palgrave, 2021, with Dirk Leuffen and Berthold Rittberger). The Centre for Comparative and International Studies (CIS) is a joint research centre of political scientists at the ETH Zurich and the University of Zurich, offering a joint master’s programme (MACIS). CIS is also a TEPSA member.

Between Conflict and Compromise: Turkey-Russia Relations and the West Cana Tülüş Türk

Relations between Turkey and Russia can be thought of as a pendulum swinging from conflict to compromise and back, depending on their colliding or overlapping interests on different issues. Historically, the two countries have been strategic partners in terms of their military, economic and political interests, especially after the Cold War, but never close allies. While current relations are stronger than ever, they have been transactional, compartmentalised and asymmetrically in favour of Russia, more highly personalised than institutionalised. Hence, relations have been assessed as ‘adversarial relationship and cooperation’, ‘cooperative or strategic rivalry’ and ‘competitive cooperation’. Yet, despite all the conflicts they have faced, Turkey and Russia have learnt to find ways of solving disputes and continue being partners when their interests overlap. Despite the historical rivalries and clashing interests inherited from memories of the two empires, many opportunities for cooperation and new perspectives in relations between them emerged during the Republican era. Relations were conflictual for five decades during the Cold War, since Turkey preferred being part of the Western bloc and became a member of NATO in 1952. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the rapid increase in economic cooperation created a new phase in relations. Yet, while economic cooperation worked well in specific areas such as energy and trade, cooperation has been limited on some political issues. As such, bilateral relations over the last two decades have followed the strategy of ‘compartmentalisation’, in which the two countries focus on areas of possible cooperation and leave conflictual issues untouched. Economic cooperation is the driving force behind relations, based on energy, agriculture, tourism, housing and construction. Between 2002 and 2021, Russia’s FDI in Turkey has been USD6.234 billion. While Russian investments in Turkey were damaged quite seriously during 2015 and 2016, Russia had the third highest C. Tülüş Türk (*) Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_39

161

162

C. Tülüş Türk

FDI in Turkey between 2002 and 2016. They have been continual bilateral trade partners, with Russia being Turkey’s third largest import and tenth largest export partner. The main components of Russian exports to Turkey are refined and crude petroleum along with wheat. Turkey imported 46.2% in 2010 and 33% in 2020 of its natural gas consumption from Russia, making Russia the largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey. Russia is one of the top three countries whose citizens visit Turkey every year. Between 2015 and 2021, Russian citizens bought 14,618 houses in Turkey, ranking third after Iraqi and Iranian citizens. However, economic relations are termed as asymmetric, since they are mostly one-sided with the balance very much towards the Russian side. Another indication of developing relations is the close political dialogue between Erdoğan and Putin. From all the conflicts in the last two decades, the two leaders have found ways to solve bilateral issues through personal decisions and initiatives despite having different objectives. For example, Syria was a crucial test case in Turkey-Russia relations. Even if the conflict escalated from military to political and then economic levels, the Astana Process in December 2016 and Sochi Talks in January 2018 initiated by Erdoğan and Putin are an indication that if the two leaders prefer cooperation, there is a solution. Yet, as the most important difference between Turkey’s relations with the West and with Russia, no institutional basis exists in Turkish-Russian relations. This transactional and not institutionalised cooperation still has limits when the conflict comes to regions close to Russia, such as the Black Sea or the South Caucasus. For instance, when the issue is Ukraine, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, the two countries prefer following their interests reflecting their regional ambitions and the issue remains as it is. Personal rapport has its limits, leaving ambiguity in the future of the post-Putin era. Furthermore, the lack of institutionalisation in bilateral relations and personal decision-making processes bring volatility to the relationship, as well as trust problems and scepticism, which prevent the two countries from becoming close allies. Ideational preferences of the ruling elite are also indicative of how Turkey tries to ‘balance relations’ in international affairs. Those elites try to reframe Turkish foreign policy into that of a ‘regional security actor’ with improved strategic autonomy and proactive foreign policy. As a result, Eurasianism has been on the rise among the ruling political elite who search for alternative realignments such as Russia and China because of the stalled accession negotiations with the EU. Yet, for Turkey the policy of ‘countering Western dominance’ and the search for ‘alternative realignments’ bring more costs than gains, most notably US sanctions imposed under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) after Turkey purchased the Russian-made S-400 missile system in 2017. Public perceptions in Turkey show how the relationship with Russia affects Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the EU. In 2021, 28.6% of Turkish citizens believe that strategic cooperation with Russia can be an alternative to Turkey’s EU membership. According to the study ‘Public Perceptions on Turkish Foreign Policy’ published in mid-June 2021, the Russian Federation is the second country after the United States that Turkish citizens think Turkey should cooperate with while implementing its foreign policy. Approximately 50% of respondents believe Turkey is in cooperation

Between Conflict and Compromise: Turkey-Russia Relations and the West

163

with Russia, with the most important areas of cooperation between Turkey and Russia being energy, tourism, cooperation against ISIS and trade. Recently, Turkey has tried to find a balance in its foreign affairs, alternatives for easing its economic and political dependence and new ways to overcome its ‘asymmetric interdependence’ as well as its vulnerability to Russia. In economic relations, Turkey has sought to diversify its natural gas resources and hence Russian gas imports have been declining over the last 2 years. In politics, Turkey’s good relations with Ukraine and its position in the Georgian conflict can also be seen as a strategy to counter Russian dominance in part of the EU’s neighbourhood.

What Can Be Done? Some Recommendations While its resentment of the West has been the driving force behind current rapprochement with Russia, it is likely that future relations between Turkey and Russia will be limited to areas in which their interests overlap. The crisis in Ukraine and the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia have shown the limits of Turkey-Russia cooperation and the strategic importance of Turkey for the West. Turkey’s geostrategic importance as the EU’s neighbour, especially in the Black Sea region, gives Turkey an important ‘balancing role’ that the West needs in its energy and security agenda. Lastly, Turkish foreign policy should not be formulated in response to the West based on short-term ambitions, as indicated by political elites, but in consideration of long-term policy calculations. Cana Tülüş Türk is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Istanbul Bilgi University and Research and Administrative Affairs Coordinator of the Istanbul Policy Center. Founded in 2001, Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) is a global policy research institution that specialises in key social and political issues ranging from democratisation to climate change and transatlantic relations to conflict resolution and mediation. The IPC offers policymakers, academics, and young researchers a unique platform where sound academic research in social sciences shapes hands-on policy work.

The Approach to Russia for a Post-Brexit UK Andrew Blick

Whilst the UK and Russia lack a common border, they nevertheless have a long history of interaction, often tense or hostile in nature, dating back as far as the imperial era when interests clashed over the Ottoman Empire and India. Following the Second World War, having fought alongside the Soviets from 1941, the UK became a key ally of the USA in the Cold War. Its end with collapse of the Soviet Union was a moment of optimism for a renewed relationship with Russia, but regrettably the difficulties soon returned. The UK has frequently objected to Russian intelligence activities, as well as being critical of its human rights record, an increasingly authoritarian political system and hostile activity in its region. The Litvinenko (2006) and Skripal (2018) poisonings were particularly harmful to relations.

Economy During the current year to the end of the first quarter 2021, Russia has been the UK’s 21st largest trading partner. It accounted for 1.1% of UK trade in total. It was the 26th largest UK export market (0.8% of the total) and 18th largest import market (1.3% of the total). Leading export goods were manufactured items, with the main imported items being raw materials. Whilst there was an overall trade deficit for the UK, it did produce a surplus in the services sector.

A. Blick (*) King’s College London and The Federal Trust, London, UK # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_40

165

166

A. Blick

Media Depictions Media coverage of Russia, its domestic environment and its external impact are largely negative. The Russian authorities’ perspective is conveyed via an outlet in the UK, Russia Today. Subjects covered include the Putin regime’s internal suppression and role in various controversial incidents; its alleged, suspected or possible interference in political processes, including in the UK itself; and conflict in Ukraine. The extent and tone of coverage varies somewhat according to the nature of the outlet involved. Higher-quality journals are more likely to take a continual interest in matters such as human rights abuses. But an incident such as the supposed skirmish in the Black Sea of June 2021 generated wider and, in some cases, exaggerated comment.

The EU Dimension The UK is not as dependent on Russia for commodities including gas as large EU Member States such as Germany. In this sense it is, at least theoretically, more able to advocate firm action against Russia, such as meaningful sanctions. The UK left the EU in January 2020 and hence its official position towards Russia is as an advocate of not only bilateral but also multilateral action against abuses. For instance, in its section on Russia, the 2020 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office Human Rights and Democracy Report referred to the roles of the European Court of Human Rights, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the general desirability of Russia complying with international human rights standards. This report made no mention of the EU, unsurprisingly. Were the UK still a member, it would surely be seeking to utilise the EU as a vehicle for securing improvements in the conduct of Russia (though how successful it would have been is a separate question).

Future Prospects The UK finds itself in a general position of uncertainty in the world, which applies to its relationship with Russia. It has departed voluntarily from the EU, the largest economic bloc in the world. This initiative was driven principally by domestic political considerations, but those executing it have sought to package it in a supposed external policy strategy labelled ‘Global Britain’. This approach entails the UK independently asserting itself as a force for free trade and democracy in the world. The recent experience in Afghanistan has served to emphasise the practical limitations that apply to such aspirations. The idea of the UK as a major autonomous force for a set of values or even its own narrow interests is difficult to sustain. Rather, the UK seems to have isolated itself from its nearest neighbours, which would otherwise be its most natural allies. Indeed, the same political imperatives that drove exit from the EU seem to be leading the UK government to behave in a

The Approach to Russia for a Post-Brexit UK

167

way—most notably with respect to the Northern Ireland Protocol—that will make the aftermath of departure as acrimonious as possible and maximise divergence from the EU. The prospects for the UK in helping convene an international coalition of democratic states obliging modified behaviour upon Russia seem yet more slight than they were prior to Brexit. In a post-Putin era, the UK might have found a more stable and credible position for itself. But until such an improvement has been achieved, the chances of concerted action aimed at improving the relationship with Russia will be materially reduced. Even given a more coherent and viable UK stance, history suggests that the elimination of underlying tensions is a difficult task.

Interference The influence of Russian intervention is difficult to establish with certainty. But there is credible evidence to suggest that surreptitious activity played a part in the 2019 General Election campaign (though what difference, if any, it made to the outcome is difficult to discern). There is also evidence of Russian finance of various kinds being channelled towards people and groups of political influence, though once again there is uncertainty about the precise ends and outcomes. Those who might have been influenced are found across the political spectrum. Brexit itself can certainly be seen as a success from the point of view of Russian objectives, in that it has contributed to disruption within and between the established democracies. It has brought to power a government under Conservative Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, the behaviour of which has exacerbated such tendencies. Yet the contribution Russian interference made to the result of the 2016 referendum is a further area of uncertainty. It is notable that an enquiry by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament found that the UK intelligence agencies failed to investigate the possibility of Russian interference in the referendum, on grounds of political sensitivity. The UK government effectively prevented the publication of this very report for a prolonged period, before it was finally published in July 2020.

Recommendations The UK could enhance its moral authority and therefore its soft power with regard to Russia through correcting aspects of its recent post-Brexit policy posture. In particular, it should cease asserting its own exceptionality and displaying a willingness unilaterally to abrogate treaty commitments it has undertaken with respect to departure from the EU. For similar reasons, the UK should adopt a more supportive attitude towards the European Convention on Human Rights as it applies to itself and not merely to other powers. To enhance its material power and help strengthen coordination between the developed democracies more generally, the UK should take rapid steps to repair its relations with the EU. The UK should recognise that its actions—driven by domestic political dynamics—have been the primary source of

168

A. Blick

difficulties in its dealings with the EU. This course of action could bring about a general improvement in the quality and effectiveness of UK external policy, including in its Russian dimension. Andrew Blick is Professor of Politics and Contemporary History and Head of Department of Political Economy, Kings College London. He is the author of numerous publications, including 11 books, for seven of which he is the sole author. He is presently writing for Oxford University Press Democracy in the UK, an historic reassessment of democratic development in the UK, conceived of as a contribution to a revaluation of models of international democracy promotion. King’s College London is an internationally renowned university delivering exceptional education and world-leading research.

The Russian Shadow Over Ukraine’s European Choice Yuriy Yakymenko and Mykhailo Pashkov

Since the restoration of Ukraine’s independence in 1991, relations between Moscow and Kyiv had never been easy, but at least they were peaceful until February 2014. Today, it is very much a case of an aggressor and its victim, with 78% of Ukrainians convinced that a state of war exists between Russia and Ukraine. The main problem is that the Kremlin has viewed Ukraine as a ‘rebellious province’ and hence a zone where, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, its ‘privileged’ interests should apply and thus any attempts to ‘re-integrate’ Ukraine represent a totally justifiable project. When Ukraine ‘dared’ to choose another integration vector, namely, European and Euro-Atlantic, the emphasis changed. The current Russian government describe(d) Ukraine as a ‘failed state’, arguing that no ‘Ukrainian people’ as distinct from Russian people have ever existed and Ukraine was created at the cost of territories which are historically Russian. Armed aggression and occupying parts of Ukrainian territory are therefore totally validated. This hybrid war continues in all spheres, from the economy to cyberspace. The Azov-Black Sea water area is blocked, with the Russian military presence growing along Ukraine’s borders. Amidst massive human rights violations in the occupied territories, there is a total Russification and militarisation of the population. Under such circumstances, the Russia-Ukraine relations have been shrinking rapidly since 2014. In particular, the volume of foreign trade between two countries decreased from USD48.6 billion in 2011 to just USD7.2 billion in 2020. The import of energy resources from the aggressor country, including coal, oil products and nuclear fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power stations, has been the key source of Ukraine’s vulnerability to date. About 60% of Ukraine’s nuclear fuel comes from the Russian TVEL company and another 40% from Westinghouse. However, Kyiv is doing its best to break free from Russia’s ‘energy hook’. Unfortunately, another such ‘hook’, in the shape of Nord Stream 2, was swallowed Y. Yakymenko (*) · M. Pashkov Razumkov Centre, Kyiv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] # The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Kaeding et al. (eds.), Russia and the Future of Europe, The Future of Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95648-6_41

169

170

Y. Yakymenko and M. Pashkov

by Berlin. The war has inflicted enormous losses on Ukraine, but also helped gain an unprecedented experience of confronting an aggressive nuclear empire, which is becoming increasingly important for the collective West.

Ukraine-Russia: ‘Mental Watershed’ Ukrainian society’s perception of Russia has changed radically over recent years. This shift is best described by the poem of the Ukrainian poetess Anastasia Dmytruk: ‘We will never be brothers’, written shortly after the war erupted. In public discourse, Russia is now referred to as an aggressor. New patriotic symbols and senses become a part of the modern socio-cultural mainstream, with many contemporary works of art of various genres united by the theme of protecting Ukrainians from the Russian invasion and defending Ukraine’s European choice. In Ukraine, military issues have become a common element of everyday life, which can be difficult to understand for people in many other European countries. The war unleashed by the Kremlin created a deep ‘mental watershed’ between Ukraine and Russia, affecting Ukrainian citizens’ foreign policy preferences. Three important conclusions can be made in this regard. Firstly, any priority afforded to relations with Russia can be said to have virtually disappeared from public consciousness. If in 2002, equal shares of Ukrainians prioritised relations with Russia and the EU (at 31% for each), then in 2021, the European vector is a priority for 52% of Ukrainians, in contrast to 10% prioritising the Russian direction. Secondly, assessments of Russia-Ukraine bilateral relations have changed. In 2002 Ukrainians’ view of relations with Russia was 23% good, 62% unstable and 10% bad. By 2021 the view had changed to 1% good and 49% hostile. Thirdly, there is an increasing feeling that contact with Russia should be curtailed altogether. In April 2014, 22% of Ukrainians supported the deepening of cooperation with Russia, while 35% called for its reduction. In 2021, 65% emphasised the need to cut or reduce cooperation with Russia and only 16% wanted it to deepen. Meanwhile, the level of public support for Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration has increased significantly. Moreover, the dynamics of recent years confirm that these are not situational fluctuations, but rather a stable trend.

The Russian Shadow Over Ukraine’s European Choice The hybrid war complicates Ukraine’s path towards the EU, diverting significant amounts of resources that could effectively be used in the European direction. On the one hand, Russian aggression has caused enormous human, financial and economic losses. The UN estimates that 13,300 people have been killed and 33,500 injured in the Donbas. About 1.5 million of the Donbas and Crimea residents have become internally displaced persons, with Russia occupying 43,744 km2, or 7.2% of Ukrainian territory. This is radically slowing down the country’s socio-economic development, including implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

The Russian Shadow Over Ukraine’s European Choice

171

On the other hand, Ukraine must allocate significant resources to counter the Kremlin’s aggression, keeping large military contingents in eastern Ukraine and along the administrative border with Crimea, thereby consistently increasing defence spending. As a result, Ukraine’s military expenditure in 2020 reached 4.1% of GDP, an 11% increase from 2019 and 198% from 2011. Moreover, the Ukraine government’s political and diplomatic efforts and public discourse are mainly focused on the Donbas war and the annexation of Crimea. Despite these difficulties, Ukraine continues to work its way towards Europe, realising that its successes simultaneously weaken the aggressor, discredit its political regime and undermine its efforts of Eurasian reintegration under the Russian scenario.

Looking to the Future with No Illusions Unfortunately, Russia-Ukraine relations in the near future are likely to follow two scenarios: continuation of the current low-intensity armed conflict or escalation by Russia. At the moment, there are no reasons for optimism. Ukraine and the EU alike will have to coexist with an authoritarian, militarised nuclear state that ignores international law and understands only the language of force. In the ‘post-Putin’ era, one cannot rule out some liberal changes in Russia, but two worst-case scenarios also seem very likely: the Kremlin’s drift to a North Korean model or the empire’s disintegration with unpredictable consequences. While suffering from a lengthy war, a pandemic and internal problems, Ukraine covers the EU’s eastern flank (about 3000 km long), but as yet has no European and Euro-Atlantic prospects, staying in the ‘reservation’ of the Eastern Partnership. At present, Ukraine effectively plays the de facto role of an ‘external partner’ outside the EU and NATO. Today, it is vital for Ukraine to preserve the West’s political solidarity and economic support, strengthen the sanctions front against Russia and expand the range of countries in solidarity with Ukraine. But the key in confronting Russia is to deepen Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration. This requires a clear roadmap for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO (membership) serving as a powerful incentive for internal reforms and European self-identification of Ukrainians. Top priorities include strengthening of internal resilience and unity in the face of the Russian threat and building the country’s defence capabilities as a whole. It is obvious that the EU needs to reconsider its east-facing positions. The European Neighbourhood Policy already looks like a ‘pre-war relic’ and requires a new quality of relations with partners in the security, political and economic spheres, primarily with the ‘Association Trio’—Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. At the same time, the recently adopted concept of the EU’s Russia strategy should be transformed into a clear action programme, prioritising ‘counteraction and deterrence’, while ‘interaction’ should no longer appear as one-sided concessions to the

172

Y. Yakymenko and M. Pashkov

Putin regime, in other words the already traditional and a priori losing quid pro quo game, which, unfortunately, continues today. Yuriy Yakymenko is the President of the Razumkov Centre, Kyiv, Ukraine. Before joining the Razumkov Centre, in 1995–2002, he worked at Administration of the President of Ukraine as the political analyst, Head of Division for liaison with political parties and public organisation, and Deputy Head of the Main Department of Political Analysis and Forecast. He studied political science at Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University, obtained MA degree in Political Theory at the University of Manchester (1994), and holds a PhD in Political Science. The Razumkov Centre is a non-governmental think tank founded in 1994, uniting experts in the fields of economy, energy, law, political sciences, international relations, military security, land relations, sociology, history, and philosophy. The Centre is also a member of TEPSA. Mykhailo Pashkov is the Co-Director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes at the Razumkov Centre since 2010. He graduated from the Smolensk Pedagogical Institute (1979); Moscow Youth Institute, Faculty of Journalism (1986); and Kyiv Institute of Political Science and Social Management (1991). He is a political scientist with vast experience and particular expertise on Russia–Ukraine politics, NATO, and European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Before joining the Razumkov Centre he worked at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and served as diplomat at the Embassy of Ukraine in the Russian Federation and as Chief Consultant at the Analytical Service of the National Security and Defence Council. The Razumkov Centre is a non-governmental think tank founded in 1994, uniting experts in the fields of economy, energy, law, political sciences, international relations, military security, land relations, sociology, history, and philosophy. The Centre is also a member of TEPSA.